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diff --git a/old/53346-0.txt b/old/53346-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 5f0b83c..0000000 --- a/old/53346-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,17525 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution -and Course of Nature, by Joseph Butler - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - -Title: The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature - To which are added two brief dissertations: I. On personal - identity. II. On the nature of virtue. - -Author: Joseph Butler - -Commentator: Howard Malcom - -Release Date: October 22, 2016 [EBook #53346] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION TO THE CONSTITUTION *** - - - - -Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -book was produced from scanned images of public domain -material from the Google Books project.) - - - - - - - - - - - THE - ANALOGY OF RELIGION, - TO THE - Constitution and Course of Nature. - - TO WHICH ARE ADDED - TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS: - I. ON PERSONAL IDENTITY.--II. ON THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. - - BY - JOSEPH BUTLER, D.C.L. - - Ejus [Analogiæ] hæc vis est, ut id quod dubium est ad - aliquid simile, de quo non quæritur referat ut incerta - certis probet.--QUINTIL. l. i. c. 6. - - WITH - AN INTRODUCTION, NOTES, CONSPECTUS, AND AMPLE INDEX, - BY - HOWARD MALCOM, D.D. - PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY, LEWISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA. - - SEVENTEENTH EDITION. - PHILADELPHIA: - J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO. - 1873. - - Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1857, by - J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO. - in the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of the United - States in and for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. - - - - -CONTENTS. - - - PAGE - - EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION 5 - - ” PREFACE 19 - - ” CONSPECTUS 21 - - AUTHOR’S ADVERTISEMENT 66 - - ” INTRODUCTION 67 - - PART I. - - OF NATURAL RELIGION. - - CHAP. I.--A Future Life 77 - - CHAP. II.--The Government of God by Rewards and Punishments 95 - - CHAP. III.--The Moral Government of God 105 - - CHAP. IV.--Probation, as implying Trial, Difficulties, and - Danger 128 - - CHAP. V.--Probation, as intended for Moral Discipline and - Improvement 136 - - CHAP. VI.--The Opinion of Necessity, considered as influencing - Practice 157 - - CHAP. VII.--The Government of God, considered as a Scheme or - Constitution, imperfectly comprehended 171 - - CONCLUSION 180 - - PART II. - - OF REVEALED RELIGION. - - CHAP. I.--The Importance of Christianity 186 - - CHAP. II.--The supposed Presumption against a Revelation, - considered as miraculous 202 - - CHAP. III.--Our Incapacity of judging, what were to be expected - in a Revelation; and the Credibility, from Analogy, - that it must contain things appearing liable to - Objections 209 - - CHAP. IV.--Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Constitution, - imperfectly comprehended 223 - - CHAP. V.--The Particular System of Christianity; the - Appointment of a Mediator, and the Redemption of - the World by him 230 - - CHAP. VI.--Want of Universality in Revelation; and of the - supposed Deficiency in the Proof of it 247 - - CHAP. VII.--The Particular Evidence for Christianity 263 - - CHAP. VIII.--Objections against arguing from the Analogy of - Nature to Religion 296 - - CONCLUSION 306 - - DISSERTATIONS. - - DISSERTATION I.--Personal Identity 317 - - DISSERTATION II.--The Nature of Virtue 324 - - INDEX TO PART I 333 - - INDEX TO PART II 343 - - - - -Editor’s Introduction - - -JOSEPH BUTLER was born at Wantage, England, May 18th, 1692, the -youngest of eight children. The biographies of that day were few -and meagre; and in few cases is this so much to be regretted as in -Butler’s. It would have been both interesting and profitable to trace -the development and occupations of one of the mightiest of human minds. -But no cotemporary gathered up the incidents of his life, and now all -efforts to elicit them have been without success. - -His father was a prosperous dry-goods merchant, who, at the time of his -son’s birth, had retired from business with a competency, and resided -in a suburban mansion called “The Priory,” still in existence. - -Being a non-conformist, he educated Joseph at a “dissenting” academy -at Gloucester, under SAMUEL JONES, a gentleman of great ability, and -a skilful instructor, who raised up some of the greatest men of their -day.[1] - -It was while a member of this academy, and about the age of twenty-one, -that Butler disclosed to the world his wonderful power of abstract -reasoning, in his famous correspondence with Samuel Clarke, in relation -to that eminent author’s “_Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of -God_.” This correspondence is now generally inserted at the end of that -work. - -Mr. Butler having deliberately adopted Episcopal views, and resolved -to unite himself with the Established Church, his father, with -praiseworthy liberality, sent him to Oxford, where he entered Oriel -College, March, 1714. Of his college life there is no account; nor of -the time and place of his ordination. He removed to London in 1718, -on receiving the appointment of “Preacher at the Rolls.” His famous -Fifteen Sermons were preached in that chapel, and published before -resigning the place, with a dedication to Sir Joseph Jekyl, “as a -parting mark of gratitude for the favors received during his connection -with that learned society.” - -One of Butler’s warmest college friends was Edward Talbot second son -of a clergyman who afterwards became Bishop of Durham. This admirable -young man died of smallpox; in his last hours recommending Butler to -his father’s patronage; and scarcely had that gentleman attained the -see of Durham, before he gave Mr. B. the living of Haughton, from -whence he transferred him, in 1725, to the richer benefice of Stanhope. - -On receiving this honorable and lucrative appointment, he resigned -the Lectureship at the Rolls, and in the autumn of 1726 retired to -his beautiful residence at Stanhope. Here, without a family to occupy -his time, he devoted himself to his great work, the Analogy: using -horseback exercise, seeing little company, living abstemiously and -caring for his flock. - -Seven years thus rolled away; when to draw him from what seemed to his -friends too great retirement and application, Lord-Chancellor Talbot -made him his chaplain, and afterwards, in 1736, gave him a prebend’s -stall in Rochester. In 1736, Butler being now forty-four, Caroline, -consort of George II., appointed him “Clerk of the Closet,” an office -which merely required his attendance at the Queen’s apartments every -evening, from seven to nine. - -Being now in London, convenient to the press, and enjoying both leisure -and competency, he published his immortal ANALOGY--the cherished work -of his life. The Queen was delighted with the book, and made herself -master of its glorious array of reasoning. But she died the same year, -and he lost not only a patroness, but a friend. He returned to his -benefice at Stanhope, the income of which had been held during his -residence in London. - -On her death-bed, the Queen had urged her husband to promote her -honored chaplain to a bishopric; and next year, the see of Norwich -becoming vacant, the Bishop of Bristol was translated to it, and the -see of Bristol given to Butler. Bristol was the poorest bishopric -in England, its emoluments being but $2,000 per annum; less than -those of the rectorship of Stanhope. Butler distinctly disclosed his -disappointment in his letter to the minister Walpole, accepting the -position; and declared that he did not think it “very suitable to the -condition of his fortune, nor answerable to the recommendation with -which he was honored.” The king was not displeased at this candor, -and in 1740 improved his income by giving him, in addition to his -bishopric, the profitable and influential office of Dean of St. -Paul’s. Butler, who had retained the living of Stanhope along with -his bishopric, now resigned that rectorship. “The rich revenues,” says -Professor Fitzgerald, “of the Deanery of St. Paul, enabled him to -gratify his taste at Bristol.” He expended about $25,000 in improving -and beautifying the episcopal residence and gardens. He fostered useful -charities, and employed his wealth for others rather than for himself. - -In 1750, upon the death of Dr. Edward Chandler, Bishop of Durham, -Butler was promoted to that see, the most honorable and lucrative -in England. He had before been offered the Primacy, on the death of -Archbishop Potter, but declined it, with the remark that “it was too -late for him to try to support a falling church.” On assuming his -diocese at Durham, Butler delivered and published his famous Charge -to the Clergy, upon “The Use and Importance of External Religion.” -He was at once assailed vigorously, in pamphlets and papers, by -Archdeacon Blackburn, the Rev. T. Lindsay, and others, on the charge -of Popery; an imputation which is still sometimes cast upon him, and -which finds some slender support in his setting up a marble cross over -the communion-table at Bristol. That he never was a Papist, is now so -evident, that we can account for the imputation only by the strong -jealousy of the Romish Church then prevalent. - -Butler now became still more munificent. His private charities were -exceedingly generous, and his public ones seemed sometimes to border on -extravagance. He gave $2,000 a year to the county hospital, and often -gave away thousands of dollars at a time. But though quite lavish in -buildings and ornaments, as well as in benevolence, he was remarkably -frugal in his personal expenses. It is said of him, by Rev. John -Newton, that on one occasion, when a distinguished visitor dined with -him by appointment, the provision consisted of a single joint of meat, -and a pudding. The bishop remarked to his guest on that occasion, that -he “had long been disgusted with the fashionable expense of time and -money in entertainments, and was determined that it should receive no -countenance from his example.” - -Of his amusements we know little except that he took much horseback -exercise, and often employed his secretary, Mr. Emms, to play for him -on the organ. - -Butler held the see of Durham less than two years. Symptoms of general -physical decay betrayed themselves about the time of his promotion, and -in spite of all that skill and affection could prompt, he sunk to rest -June 16th, 1752, aged sixty. He was never married. - -A considerable number of his sermons and charges have been printed, -but are too philosophical to be generally read. His great work is the -Analogy, published in 1736, and from that day read and admired by every -highly-cultivated mind. He was induced to write by a state of things -very remarkable in the history of religion. Debauchery and infidelity -were almost universal, not in any one class of society but in all. -England had reached the culminating point of irreligion, and the firm -re-establishment of Episcopacy had as yet done nothing to mend the -nation’s morals. Piety was deemed a mark of ignorance and vulgarity, -and multitudes of those who professed it were persecuted to dungeons -and death. - -Infidel writers, warmed into life by court corruption, became more -numerous and audacious than ever before. Their methods of attacking -Christianity were various; but the most successful then, as always, was -to impugn certain doctrines and declarations of the Sacred Scriptures, -as irrational, and hence reject the whole. They generally admitted the -Being and perfection of God, and extolled the sufficiency of natural -religion; but denied any revelation, or any necessity for one. The -verdict of the world was that the Bible is not authentic, that man is -not accountable, nor even probably immortal, that God neither rewards -nor punishes, and that present indulgence, as far as our nature admits, -is both wise and safe. - -Bishop Downam,[2] one of the most learned of the clergy, in the early -part of the seventeenth century writes thus: “In these times, if a -man do but labor to keep a good conscience, though he meddle not with -matters of state, if he make conscience of swearing, sanctify the -Sabbath, frequent sermons, or abstain from the common corruptions of -the times, he shall straightway be condemned for a puritan, and be less -favored than either a carnal gospeller, or a close Papist.” - -It was considered settled, especially in polite circles, that -Christianity, after so long a prevalence, had been found out to be an -imposture. The clergy, as a body, did nothing to dispel this moral -gloom, but rather increased it by their violent and scandalous conduct. -In the sad language of Bishop Warburton, “Religion had lost its hold on -the minds of the people.” He adds with great point, “Though a _rule of -right_ may direct the philosopher to a principle of action; and the -_point of honor_ may keep up the thing called manners, among gentlemen: -yet nothing but _religion_ can ever fix a sober standard of behavior -among the common people.” Even the universities were on the side of -irreligion; for professorships, as well as pulpits, were given to men, -not for positive worth and fitness, but for possessing qualities then -most in vogue with those who held the appointing power. Such were the -trying times which had driven our pilgrim fathers to seek a home amid -the wilds of an unexplored continent, and to face the dangers of sea -and savage. - -It must ever be regarded as among the highest instances of God’s -bringing good out of evil, that this outrageous rampancy of infidelity -brought out a host of champions for the truth of His word; who boldly -met the odium of discipleship, and waged battle in such style that the -Deistical controversy was settled forever. Never was a dispute more -determined on both sides, and never was victory more complete. Literary -infidelity not only recoiled, but was routed; and can never again -prevail. Henceforth, no _scholar_ will ever treat the evidences of -Christianity as a subject of ridicule or contempt. - -When we contrast the stupendous learning, and powerful logic, of the -Christian writers of that century, with the superficial and almost -contemptible productions of the writers against whom they contended, we -are tempted to wonder why such power should be requisite to overthrow -such weakness. But we must remember, that frail logic and shallow -considerations, will persuade men to indulge their vices; while -the soundest reasonings and the most impressive inducements, with -difficulty lead them to self-restraint and true holiness. - -The infidel writers of that day have sunk into such oblivion that -their works are now seldom found but in great libraries; and even -well-educated persons scarcely know more of them than their names. Yet -so perfectly did their principles accord with the temper of the times -and the universal depravity of the carnal heart, that they enjoyed the -highest popularity with all classes. Forever honored be the names of -that noble band, who, in face of such odds, established the authority -of the Bible, and left the advocates of atheism and immorality without -a lurking-place.[3] In this noble cohort Butler stands conspicuous: -and to him, I think, more than to all the others, is to be attributed -the sudden and total overthrow of infidelity, when it was in its glory. - -As a metaphysician, few have equalled him. What he added to the -science, has ever since remained a part of it, which can be said -of scarcely another. He advanced more that was new, fortified old -positions more ably, and applied speculation to religion more usefully -than any before him. Our language furnishes no profounder thinking. -Merely to understand him is an honorable distinction, and requires no -small previous training of the power of attention. As a polemic, he is -keen, sagacious, candid, patient, persevering, calm, inventive, and -profound: every page indicates that repose of mind, which belongs only -to true greatness, combined with a full knowledge of the subject. So -far as I am able to judge, he never presses a consideration beyond its -just limits, and seldom introduces an illustration which has not the -force of an argument. Fallacies he seems to abolish at a touch. - -The Analogy employed much of his life. It was begun in his twentieth -year, but was not published till he was forty-five. Such a mode of -writing never makes large books, for the matter, constantly revised, -becomes constantly condensed. The Analogy is so condensed, as that to -make a satisfactory synopsis is scarcely practicable. Hence, though my -Conspectus and notes have aided my pupils to understand and remember -the argument, they do not in any measure obviate the necessity of -studying the book itself. If they do not increase the number of those -who shall studiously peruse the book itself, my aim and expectations -will be disappointed. - -To this work no reply has ever been attempted! Extensive as is its -diffusion, and great as is its acknowledged influence, infidelity -has had the highest inducements to attempt to set it aside. Written -for a present purpose, and most signally accomplishing it, it is yet -so written as to endure, in full value, through all coming time. -It is undoubtedly “the most original and the most profound work -extant, in any language, on the philosophy of religion,”[4] “the most -argumentative and philosophical defence of Christianity ever submitted -to the world.”[5] - -Writers in defence of Christianity had, before Butler, amply discussed -the several departments of evidences; but still there remained -objections. The structure of the globe, the course of nature, the -organization of animals, &c. were affirmed to contradict revelation. -Its doctrines and duties, moreover, were pronounced inconsistent -with sound reason. Butler repeats none of the old arguments, but -confines himself to the showing that the declarations of revelation -are in perfect harmony with facts seen daily in the world, and which -all admit. That the world might not have been ordered and governed -otherwise, he does not choose to dispute. Taking things as they are, -and closely studying the connection between one thing and another, -we ought to inquire what course of action on our part, will conform -to the needs of such a nature and such circumstances. Our bodies are -constructed of parts, all adapted to each other, and also to one -general end. So too, our souls. And the two together have relations -and adaptations, which may, to some extent at least, indicate what is -designed to be the _general_ end of our existence. If Christianity -befits these several parts of our mixed nature and their obvious uses, -then there is nothing incongruous between the two; and no objections -against Christianity can be drawn from the course of nature. On the -contrary, all seems to be governed as the gospel declares it is, and -shows that the Author of man and the Author of the Bible is the same. -This is still more impressive when we consider that we have a _moral -faculty_; for it is the very object and business of this faculty to -deal with right and wrong, good and evil; the facts and magnitudes of -which are obvious in the course of nature. If Christianity does, in an -especial manner, _befit_ this faculty, if it is adapted to promote our -general rectitude and happiness, and if it contains no principle which -is not discernible in the government of the visible world, then there -is no discrepancy between Christianity and Providence. - -This is Butler’s position. He confines himself to proving such -an analogy between revelation and the daily course of things, as -that nothing known in the universe can be offered in disproof of -Christianity. The mode of warfare was new. Without professing to prove -Christianity to be true, he demonstrates that it cannot be proved to be -false; and that if it be even probable, the rejection of it is a gross -folly and a tremendous hazard. Every objection against it he proves to -be equally forcible against facts which constantly occur, and which all -admit, though none profess to understand. Thus leaving the ramparts of -the church to be guarded by the mighty men who had valiantly maintained -its defence, he quietly walked out into the camp of the enemy, and -spiked every gun! - -It has been said that the whole argument of the “Analogy” seems to be -built on Ecclesiasticus xlii. 24: “All things are double, one against -the other, and God hath made nothing imperfect.” If it be so, it -involves no disparagement to have received thus the seminal idea of -this immortal work. Who else has so gloriously discerned and expanded -the profound philosophy of the son of Sirac? Others have uttered -sentiments which seem to involve the whole exposition of Butler. Origen -affirms that “he who believes the Scripture to have proceeded from Him -who is the Author of nature, may well expect to find the same sort of -difficulties in it, as are found in nature.” Shall we assign to Origen -the whole credit of the “Analogy”? As well might we bestow all our -admiration for the delightful papers of Addison, in the Spectator, to -the classical authors from whom he selected appropriate mottoes! By -such a rule, the entire merit of this most Christian work of Butler -should be attributed to the pagan Quintilian, from whom he derives the -motto which so appropriately graces his title-page. - -A rapid sketch of the outline of the argument will aid the student -at his outset. He begins by taking for granted the existence of an -intelligent Author and Governor of the universe. Then, from the -conditions and changes observed in the visible world, he argues the -folly of objecting to revelation on account of doctrines which do but -declare the same general laws and the same principles of government. -That there is this harmony, he proves; and hence the probability that -the same sort of government will prevail hereafter, which prevails now. -He demonstrates that man is under exactly such a probation in this -world, and as to this world, as revelation affirms him to be under, -as to the next; and that embarrassments produced by the doctrine of -necessity, involve nature no less than religion. He then evinces the -need that man should be placed in a state of training and trial, if he -is ever to be qualified for better conditions; and that this world, -as now governed, is exactly adapted to give that training, and to -produce such a character as will insure happiness under any possible -contingencies. This is the argument of Part I. - -Proceeding to examine Christianity, he discusses its importance, its -proofs, the unavoidableness of its containing strange things, the -absurdity of expecting fully to comprehend its statements, and the -abundance of its evidence for candid minds, though they are not, and -ought not to be, irresistible. He answers not only the objections to -Christianity, but the objections against its proofs; which he shows -are very different things. Though he keeps rigidly to the refutation -of objections, and nowhere meddles with the direct evidence of -Christianity, yet, by removing every objection, he does in fact confirm -its claims. This clearing away of objections, _after_ the usual proofs -are presented, crowns and completes the evidence. Thus the ultimate -result of a study of his book is not only negative but positive; and -such has been its effect on every candid and competent student. - -We should remember that we have no right to require the removal of -objections, and that therefore the whole of Butler’s work is in fact -supererogatory; a concession and kindness to such as have doubts, -either honest or captious. Our only rightful demand of Christianity is -for _credentials_. It presents these in its nature, its miracles, its -prophecies, its propagation, its influence, and its success. If these -are competent, we should bow to its teachings. To suppose that we are -capable of judging of the _propriety_ of all God’s law, or even to -understand his reasons for it, if they were disclosed, is absurd. - -It is true we naturally presume that a revelation in words, and a -revelation by natural objects and the visible order of things, would -coincide; but to find out the fact or the extent of such coincidence, -is not our first business. We are to weigh the _testimony_ in favor of -religion, embrace it, if sufficient, and attribute the obscurity of any -part, to our present want of capacity. The solution of difficulties -serves to _confirm_ our faith in Christianity, but has no place in our -_ground of reception_: and we have no right to wait for such solution, -however painful and embarrassing may be the difficulties. - -Another, and perhaps even more important, use of the “Analogy,” is to -dissipate the prejudices and objections to Christianity which prevent -a candid study of its evidences. These prepossess and poison the mind, -and obstruct or abate the force of the best arguments. Few, if any, -after a careful examination of the positive evidences of Christianity, -conclude them to be inadequate. But many are they, who having heard -objections which their scanty learning does not enable them to answer, -and their no less scanty interest in the subject does not induce them -to examine, or which their inclinations lead them to cherish, cast -it all aside. In this way they relieve themselves from the labor of -investigation, as well as their compunctions of conscience; while they -indulge both their love of sin and pride of singularity. - -An instance of the use of this book to such a mind, we have in the -case of Chalmers. He had read, when a young man, several infidel -productions. Their semblance of logic and learning, and supercilious -confidence of style, disposed him to regard all religion as mere -superstition. His mind was poisoned. Accustomed as he had been to -the positive and precise reasonings of mathematics, he could not -find similar proofs for Christianity. But he was induced, by some -friends, to study Butler’s Analogy. This, as he expresses it, took -Christianity “out of the class of unlikelihoods.” It brought him to -the investigation, as if the evidence was neither plus nor minus. He -examined the evidences as he would have done a declaration that Cicero -weighed just one hundred and fifty pounds; open to the smallest proof -or presumption on the positive side of the question. Delivered from -prejudice, not only against Christianity but against its proofs, he -soon saw the madness of deism, and immovably accepted the word of God, -though he did not, at that time, feel its transforming power on his own -heart. Long afterwards he writes, “I cannot render sufficient homage to -the argument, which first, addressing itself to the _subject-matter_ of -Christianity, relieves it of all disproof, and pronounces it worthy of -a trial; and then, addressing itself to the evidence of Christianity, -relieves it of all objections, and makes good, to that evidence, all -the entireness and efficiency which natively belong to it.” Years -afterwards he said, “Butler made me a Christian.” That it did far more -for him than to effect his change of sentiment, that it continued to -be a light in his firmament, is touchingly told in the Preface of his -Bridgewater Treatise, where he says, “I have derived greater aid from -the views and reasonings of Butler, than I have been able to find, -besides, in the whole range of our extant authorship.” - -To the sincere believer in the word of God the study of Butler is of -great use. Doubts are among Satan’s tried weapons, and often haunt -the holiest, especially if of a contemplative turn. They see goodness -oppressed, and vice rampant; the world ruled by wicked men, and -truth making its way with difficulty. Their hearts are traitorous, -their surroundings full of temptation, and the direct evidence of -Christianity they may never have studied. To such the analogical -argument comes with full power, meets a candid examination, and -prevails. - -To no Christian is this book so useful as the minister. He is -constantly confronted by the difficulties which Butler so triumphantly -handles. Here he is furnished, not only with a shield to protect his -own mind from subtle darts, but a sword to demolish the cavil, and -defend the system of which he is a public teacher. - -To _all_ persons this book is of great value. We arrive at certainty -in but few of our decisions, and are often obliged, even in matters of -great moment, to act on probability. Thus we employ precautions when -an evil is not certain to occur. If the evil would be very serious, -we adopt the precaution, when there is but little probability, or -perhaps a bare possibility, of its occurrence. Now, Butler has shown -that if the proofs of revelation were weak, nay, if it had absolutely -no proof, nay further, if on fair examination there appeared not even -a probability of its truth, still there would remain a _possibility_, -and this alone, considering the tremendous issues at stake, should make -every man a Christian. This argument cannot be applied to Mahometanism -or any other religion, because against those much may be advanced as -_disproof_. Our author, having shown the utter absence of disproof, -shuts us up to the reception of Christianity, were its truth barely -possible. - -There have not been wanting persons to disparage the “Analogy,” because -it affords, as they say, no _direct_ proof of revelation. As well might -we demand a discussion of chemistry in a work on astronomy. Scores of -writers _prove_ Christianity, and here we have one to relieve us from -the difficulties which beset it, and objections which still remain. -There is an aspect in which the Analogy may be said to contribute -the best of proof. What can go further towards establishing a point, -than to demonstrate that there is no proof of the contrary? What can -show the fallacy of a set of objections, more than to prove that -they might be urged with no less force against the obvious course of -nature? This use of analogy is conformable to the severest logic, and -though offering no pretence of positive argument, goes far towards -establishing full conviction. “The probabilities,” says STEWART, -“resulting from a concurrence of different analogies, may rise so high -as to produce an effect on the belief scarcely distinguishable from -moral certainty.” - -When it is considered that Butler’s argument is wholly in addition -to the cumulative mass of direct and almost irresistible evidence, -and removes even the objections which attend the subject, we see the -rejection of Christianity to be inexpressibly rash and absurd. We see -the skeptic condemned at his own bar, for acting in the most momentous -of all possible concerns, in a manner the very opposite of that which -he calls sensible and prudent in his ordinary affairs. The “Analogy” -establishes, beyond cavil, strong _presumptions_ that Christianity is -true, aside from all inspection of its proofs. The man, therefore, who -really understands this book, and refuses to be a Christian, is led by -his lusts and not his reason. - -Some admirers of this book have lamented as a defect, its want of -evangelical tincture, and its exclusive reference to natural things. To -me, this is a prime recommendation. Were it otherwise, the reasoning -would be in a circle. The very structure of the argument demands that -it should avoid quotations from the Bible. - -It must be admitted, however, that some expressions, taken just as they -stand, without qualification by the current of the argument, tend to -lead astray. For instance, “There is nothing in the human mind contrary -to virtue.” “Men’s happiness and virtue are left to themselves.” -“Religion requires nothing which we are not well able to perform.” “Our -repentance is accepted, to eternal life.” “Our relations to God are -made known by reason.” Such expressions are not to be taken alone, but -as explained by the general drift of sentiment and doctrine. No one can -be familiar with his works, without finding the fullest evidence that -Christianity was to Butler infinitely more than a creed or a ritual. -Nor should we forget that such expressions are not to be interpreted by -the tenor of the “Analogy” only, but by that of his whole ‘Works.’ - -Even if it be judged that he everywhere fails to express himself in -such phrase as we usually call evangelical, it should be remembered -that he was a Church-of-England man, at a time when there was a -powerful reaction against the evangelism of the Puritans, and when a -real lack of emotional piety was general in his church. - -That he did not enjoy in his last illness, which extended over a long -period, that sustaining sense of the love of Christ which hearty -Christians generally feel, is certain. A friend, trying to relieve -his depression, reminded him of his excellent life, and especially -his wide liberalities. He immediately replied, “l am but a steward! -All is His, intrusted to me, to promote his glory and the good of -mankind; how can I know that I have not abused the trust? I reflect on -all these things, and they fill my soul with terror by the feeling of -responsibility they awaken.” - -On another occasion, his chaplain sought to soothe his troubled spirit -by referring to the extensive influence of his _Analogy_ in reclaiming -skeptics. His reply was, “I _began_ the Analogy with a view to the -glory of God; but as I proceeded, visions of the fame it might bring -me mingled themselves with my motives, and all was polluted and made -sinful! The book may be a blessing to others, but it weighs like lead -on my soul.” “Admit all this,” tenderly replied the chaplain; “yet has -not Jesus said, ‘Whosoever cometh unto me shall in no wise be cast -out’?” Instantly the Bishop raised himself in the bed, exclaiming, -“How wonderful that the force of this passage never struck me before! -‘Whosoever,’--_all_, ALL! ‘In no wise,’--no amount of sin can prevent -acceptance! Christ’s righteousness will hide the iniquities of _all_ -who accept his offer of mercy!” - -From that time, for weeks, Butler spoke to all who approached him, of -a _full_ and _free_ salvation. He died triumphantly repeating this -passage. - -If all that is said of the lack of evangelical sentiment in Butler or -his book be conceded, it certainly cannot impair either the value of -the analogical argument, or the force of our author’s use of it. - -Various circumstances conspire to make the study of “The Analogy” -difficult. The nature of the reasoning--the conciseness, and often -obscurity of the style--the dislocation of parts by frequent -digressions--the arrest of a close course of reasoning to answer -objections--and the abstruseness of the subject itself--combine to -make the full comprehension of its import difficult. Mackintosh says, -“No thinker so great, was ever so bad a writer.” But this, like some -other objections of Sir James, is stated too strongly. The language is -good, sinewy Saxon, and will endure when much that is now called fine -writing, will seem grotesque. Still it is possible to write philosophy -in better phrase, as has been shown by at least two great men, Berkeley -and Stewart. Had Butler but possessed the glowing style of Berkeley, -or the smooth, graceful, and transparent diction of Dugald Stewart, -his work, instead of serving only for close thinkers, or a college -text-book, would have been read by all classes, and banished that -vulgar infidelity which flippant writers still disseminate. That it is -thus restricted in its influence is a misfortune to the world. But he -wrote for a class, and did his work completely. Literary infidelity was -conquered. Vulgar, ignorant, licentious infidelity, will always exist, -and is even now deplorably prevalent. Both Europe and America contain -conceited and malignant ignoramuses, who by their sneers, their cavils, -and their audacity, make havoc of souls. Of these, Tom Paine is a type, -whose book, the contempt of cultivated minds, continues to be sold and -read. For this class of persons, “Baxter’s Call,” or “Alleine’s Alarm,” -are far more suitable than treatises on the evidences of Christianity, -or even Butler’s Analogy. - - - - -Editor’s Preface. - - -The text is the result of a careful collation of the various principal -editions. Occasionally solecisms are corrected, and a word transposed -or put in italics, when a sentence could thus be made perspicuous. The -author had a fashion of beginning a large proportion of his sentences -with “and,” “but,” “now,” “indeed,” “however,” &c., which often served -to perplex, and in such cases they have been omitted. Long paragraphs, -comprehending different topics, have been so divided as to correspond -with the true analysis; which will greatly assist the student in -detecting the successive stages of the argument. Special pains has been -taken to correct and improve the punctuation. Hundreds of sentences -have thus been rendered more perspicuous, and many which were obscure, -have been made lucid. In no respect was Butler’s style, as printed, so -defective. - -The Conspectus is made much ampler than any other, for this reason: -that students are apt to content themselves with such help instead of -mastering the full discussion by the author. In the present case they -cannot so do, for such is the fulness of the Conspectus, that if they -master this, they have mastered the subject itself in full. - -Notes by the present editor are distinguished from those of the author -by being enclosed in brackets. They are designed to open out further -views, to elucidate the text, to facilitate extended researches, and to -suggest topics for conversation in the class-room. - -The Index has cost far more labor than would be supposed, and may not -be of much benefit to the undergraduate. Its advantages will not be -small to him in after life when he desires to recur to particular -topics. The general scholar will find it enables him to make use of the -book for occasional reference. Without it the work is not complete for -the class-room, still less for the library. - -That students of the Analogy need help, is confessed; and all attempts -to furnish it have been kindly received. As is remarked by Bishop -Wilson, “His argument, clear and convincing as it is to a prepared -mind, is not obvious to the young reader, whose experience of life -being small, and his habits of reflection feeble, has not the furniture -necessary for comprehending, at first, the thoughts and conclusions of -such a mind. The style is too close, too negligent, too obscure, to be -suitable for the young.” - -If it be asked why, with several existing helps to the study of the -Analogy, I offer another, I frankly reply, because I have found none of -them satisfactory, either to the public or to myself. - - * * * * * - -Some teachers prefer their text-books to be accompanied by a set of -questions. Such will find in this edition all they desire. They have -only to enunciate each sentence of the Conspectus in the interrogative -form, and they will have every possible question prepared to their -hand. - - - - -Conspectus of the Author’s Introduction. - - -I. _What is probable evidence?_ - - =1.= It differs from demonstration in that it admits of degrees; of - _all_ degrees. - - 1.) One probability does not beget assurance. - - 2.) But the slightest presumption makes a probability. - - 3.) The repetition of it may make certainty. - - =2.= What constitutes probability is _likeness_; in regard to the - event itself, or its kind of evidences, or its circumstances. - - 1.) This daily affords presumptions, evidence, or conviction: - according as it is occasional, common, or constant. - - 2.) Measures our hopes and fears. - - 3.) Regulates our expectations as to men’s conduct. - - 4.) Enables us to judge of character from conduct. - - =3.= It is an imperfect mode of judging, and adapted to beings of - limited capacities. - - =4.= Where better evidence cannot be had, it constitutes moral - obligation, even though great doubts remain. - - 1.) We are as much bound to do what, on the whole, _appears_ to - be best, as if we _knew_ it to be so. - - 2.) In questions of great moment, it is reasonable to act when - the favorable chances are no greater than the unfavorable. - - 3.) There are numberless cases in which a man would be thought - distracted if he did not act, and that earnestly, where the - chances of success were _greatly against_ him. - - -II. _The use and application of probabilities_. - -Shall not go further into the _nature_ of probable evidence, nor -inquire _why_ likeness begets presumption and conviction; nor how far -analogical reasoning can be reduced to a _system_; but shall only show -how just and conclusive this mode of reasoning is. - - =1.= In determining our judgments and practice. - - 1.) There may be cases in which its value is doubtful. - - 2.) There may be seeming analogies, which are not really such. - - 3.) But as a mode of argument, it is perfectly just and - conclusive. - - =2.= In noting correspondencies between the different parts of God’s - government. - - 1.) We may expect to find the same sort of difficulties in the - Bible, as we do in Nature. - - 2.) To deny the Bible to be of God, because of these - difficulties, requires us to deny that the world was made by - him. - - 3.) If there be a likeness between revelation and the system of - nature, it affords a presumption that both have the same author. - - 4.) To reason on the construction and government of the world, - without settling foundation-principles, is mere hypothesis. - - 5.) To apply principles which are certain, to cases which are - not applicable, is no better. - - 6.) But to join abstract reasonings to the observation of - facts, and argue, from known present things, to what is likely - or credible, must be right. - - 7.) We cannot avoid acting thus, if we act at all. - - =3.= In its application to religion, revealed, as well as natural. - This is the use which will be made of analogy in the following - work. In so using it, - - 1.) It will be taken for proved that there is an intelligent - Creator and Ruler. - - --There are no presumptions _against_ this, prior to proof. - - --There are proofs:--from analogy, reason, tradition, &c. - - --The fact is not denied by the generality of skeptics. - - 2.) No regard will be paid to those who idly speculate as to how - the world _might_ have been made and governed. - - --Such prating would amount to this: - - · All creatures should have been made at first as happy as - they could be. - - · Nothing of hazard should be put upon them. - - · Should have been _secured_ in their happiness. - - · All punishments avoided. - - --It is a sufficient reply to such talk that mankind have not - faculties for such speculations. - - 3.) We are, to some extent, judges as to _ends_; and may - conclude that Nature and Providence are designed to produce - virtue and happiness; but of the _means_ of producing these in - the highest degree, we are not competent judges. - - --We know not the extent of the universe; - - --Nor even how one person can best be brought to perfection. - - --We are not often competent to judge of the conduct of each - other. - - --As to God, we may presume that order will prevail in his - universe; but are no judges of his modes for accomplishing - this end. - - 4.) Instead of vainly, and perhaps sinfully, imagining schemes - for God’s conduct, we must _study what is_. - - --Discovering general laws. - - --Comparing the known course of things with what revelation - teaches us to expect. - - -III. _The force of this use of Analogy._ - - =1.= Sometimes is practically equivalent to proof. - - =2.= Confirms what is otherwise proved. - - =3.= Shows that the system of revelation is no more open to - ridicule, than the system of nature. - - =4.= Answers almost all objections against religion. - - =5.= To a great extent answers objections against the _proofs_ of - religion. - - -IV. _General scope of the book._ - - =1.= The divine government is considered, as containing in it, - - Chap. 1. Man’s future existence. - - ” 2. In a state of reward or punishment. - - ” 3. This according to our behavior. - - ” 4. Our present life probationary. - - ” 5. And also disciplinary. - - ” 6. Notwithstanding the doctrine of necessity. - - ” 7. Or any apparent want of wisdom or goodness. - - =2.= Revealed religion is considered, - - Chap. 1. As important. - - ” 2. As proved by miracles. - - ” 3. As containing strange things. - - ” 4. As a scheme imperfectly comprehended. - - ” 5. As carried on by a mediator. - - ” 6. As having such an amount of evidence as God saw fit to give. - - ” 7. As having sufficient and full evidence. - - -Conspectus of the Analogy. - - -PART I. - - -CHAPTER I. - -A FUTURE LIFE. - -Will not discuss the subject of identity; but will consider what -analogy suggests from changes which do not destroy; and thus see -whether it is not _probable_ that we shall live hereafter. - - -I. _The probabilities that we shall survive death._ - - =1.= It is a law of nature that creatures should exist in different - stages, and in various degrees of perfection. - - --Worms turn into flies. - - --Eggs are hatched into birds. - - --Our own present state is as different from our state in the - womb, as two states of the same being can be. - - --That we shall hereafter exist in a state as different from - the present as the present is from our state in the womb, is - according to analogy. - - =2.= We now have capacities for happiness, action, misery, &c., and - there is always a probability that things will continue as they - are, except when experience gives us reason to think they will be - altered. This is a general law; and is our _only_ natural reason - for expecting the continuance of any thing. - - =3.= There is no reason to apprehend that death will destroy us. - If there was, it would arise from the nature of death; or from the - analogy of nature. - - 1.) Not from the nature of death. - - --We know not what death is. - - --But only _some_ of its _effects_. - - --These effects do not imply the destruction of the living - agent. - - --We know little of what the _exercise_ of our powers depends - upon; and nothing of what _the powers_ themselves depend on. - - --We may be unable to _exercise_ our powers, and yet not lose - them--_e.g._ sleep, swoon. - - 2.) Not from analogy. - - --Reason shows no connection between death and our - destruction. - - --We have no faculties by which to trace any being beyond it. - - --The possession of living powers, up to the very moment - when our faculties cease to be able to trace them, is a - probability of their continuing. - - --We have already survived wonderful changes. - - --To live after death is analogous to the course of nature. - - -II. _Presumptions against a future life._ - - =1.= That death _destroys_ us. - - _Ans._ 1. This is an assumption that we are compound and - material beings, and hence discerptible; which is not true. - - 1.) Consciousness is a single, indivisible power, and of - course the subject of it must be. - - 2.) The material body is not ourself. - - 3.) We can easily conceive of our having more limbs, or of - a different kind, or of having more or fewer senses, or of - having no bodies at all, or of hereafter animating these same - bodies, remodelled. - - 4.) The dissolution of a succession of new and strange - bodies, would have no tendency to destroy _us_. - - _Ans._ 2. Though the absolute simplicity of the living being - cannot be proved by _experiment_, yet facts lead us so to - conclude. We lose limbs, &c. Our bodies were once _very_ small, - but we might, then, have lost part of them. There is a constant - destruction and renewal going on. - - 1.) Thus we see that no certain _bulk_ is necessary to our - existence, and unless it were proved that there is, and that - it is larger than an indissoluble atom, there is no reason to - presume that death destroys us, even if we are discerptible. - - 2.) The living agent is not an _internal material organism_, - which dies with the body. Because - - --Our only ground for this presumption is our relation to - other systems of matter. But we see these are not necessary - to us. - - --It will not do to say that lost portions of the body were - not _essential_--who is to determine? - - --The relation between the living agent, and the most - essential parts of the body, is only one by which they - mutually affect each other. - - 3.) If we regard our body as made up of organs of sense, we - come to the same result. - - --We see with the eyes, just as we do with glasses. The eye - is not a _recipient_, any more than a telescope. - - --It is not pretended that vision, hearing, &c. can be - traced clear up to the percipient; but so far as we can - trace perceptions, the _organ_ does not perceive. - - --In dreams we perceive without organs. - - --When we lose a limb we do not lose the _directing power_; - we could move a new one, if it could be made, or a wooden - one. But the limb cut off has no power of moving. - - --Thus, our loss of the _organs_ of perception and motion, - not being the destruction of the power, there is no - ground to think that the destruction of other organs or - instruments would destroy _us_. - - _Objection._ These observations apply equally to brutes. - - _Ans._ 1. Be it so. Perhaps they are immortal:--may hereafter - improve: we know not what latent powers they may have. - - 1.) The human being at one period looks as little likely to - make great intellectual attainments; for a long time he has - capacities for virtue and religion, but cannot use them. - - 2.) Many persons go out of the world who never became able - to exercise these capacities; _e.g._ infants. - - _Ans._ 2. If brutes were immortal, it does not prove them to - be _moral agents_. - - 1.) It may be necessary, for aught we know, that there - should be living creatures not moral agents, nor rational. - - 2.) All difficulties as to what would become of them, are - founded in our ignorance. - - =2.= That our souls, though not material, so depend upon the - bodily structure, that we cannot survive its destruction. - - _Ans._ 1. Reason, memory, &c. _do not_ depend on the body, - as perceptions by the senses do. Death may destroy those - _instruments_, and yet not destroy the _powers_ of reflection. - - _Ans._ 2. Human beings exist, here, in two very different - states, each having its own laws: sensation and reflection. By - the first we feel; by the second we reason and will. - - 1.) Nothing which we know to be destroyed at death, is - necessary to reflecting on ideas formerly received. - - 2.) Though the senses act like scaffolds, or levers, to - _bring in_ ideas, yet when once in, we can reflect, &c. - without their aid. - - _Ans._ 3. There are diseases which prove fatal, &c., yet do - not, in any part of their course, _impair_ the intellect; and - this indicates that they do not _destroy_ it. - - 1.) In the diseases alluded to, persons have their reflective - power, in full, the very moment before death. - - 2.) Now, why should a disease, at a certain degree, utterly - destroy powers which were not even affected by it, up to that - point? - - =3.= That death at least _suspends_ our reflective powers, - or interrupts our continuing to exist in the like state of - reflection which we do now. - - _Ans._ There appears so little connection between our powers of - sensation and our powers of reflection that we cannot presume - that what might _destroy the former_, could even _suspend the - latter_. - - 1.) We daily see reason, memory, &c. exercised without any - assistance, that we know of, from our bodies. - - 2.) Seeing them in lively exercise to the last, we must infer - that death is not a discontinuance of their exercise, nor of - the enjoyments and sufferings of such exercise. - - 3.) Our posthumous life may be but a going on, with - additions. Like the change at our birth--which produced not - a suspension of the faculties we had before, nor a _total_ - change in our state of life; but a continuance of both, with - great alterations. - - 4.) Death may but at once put us into a _higher_ state of - life, as our birth did; our relation to bodily organs may be - the only hinderance to our entering a higher condition of the - reflective powers. - - 5.) Were we even sure that death would suspend our - intellectual powers, it would not furnish even the lowest - probability that it would destroy them. - - _Objec._ From the analogy of plants. - - _Ans._ This furnishes poets with apt illustrations of our - frailty, but affords no proper analogy. Plants are destitute - of perception and action, and this is the very matter in - question. - - -REMARKS. - - =1.= It has been shown, that confining ourselves to what we - know, we see no probability of ever ceasing to be:--it cannot be - concluded from the reason of the thing:--nor from the analogy of - nature. - - =2.= We are therefore to go upon the belief of a future existence. - - =3.= Our going into _new scenes_ and conditions, is just as - natural as our coming into the world. - - =4.= Our condition may naturally be a social one. - - =5.= The advantages of it may naturally be bestowed, according to - some fixed law, in proportion to one’s degrees in virtue. - - 1.) Perhaps not so much as now _by society_; but by God’s more - immediate action. - - 2.) Yet this will be no less _natural_, _i.e._ stated, fixed, - or settled. - - 3.) Our notions of what is natural, are enlarged by greater - knowledge of God and his works. - - 4.) There may be some beings in the world, to whom the whole - of Christianity is as natural as the visible course of nature - seems to us. - - =6.= These probabilities of a future life, though they do not - satisfy curiosity, answer all the purposes of religion, as well - as demonstration. - - 1.) Even a demonstration of a future state, would not - demonstrate religion, but would be reconcilable with atheism. - - 2.) But as religion implies a future state, any presumption - against such a state, would be a presumption against religion. - - 3.) The foregoing observations remove all presumptions of that - sort, and prove to a great probability, a fundamental doctrine - of religion. - - -CHAPTER II. - -THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. - -The question of a future life is rendered momentous by our capacity for -happiness and misery. - -Especially if that happiness or misery depends on our present conduct. - -We should feel the deepest solicitude on this subject. - -And that if there were no proof of a future life and interest, other -than the probabilities just discussed. - - -I. _In the present world our pleasures and pains are, to a great -extent, in our own power._ - - =1.= We see them to be consequences of our actions. - - =2.= And we can _foresee_ these consequences. - - =3.= Our desires are not gratified, without the right kind of - exertion. - - =4.= By prudence we may enjoy life; rashness, or even neglect may - make us miserable. - - =5.= Why this is so is another matter. - - 1.) It may be impossible to be otherwise. - - 2.) Or it may be best on the whole. - - 3.) Or God’s plan may be to make only the good happy. - - 4.) Or the whole plan may be incomprehensible to us. - - _Objec._ It may be said “this is only the course of nature.” - - _Ans._ It is granted: but - - 1. The course of nature is but the will of God. We admit - that God is the natural governor of the world: and must not - turn round and deny it because his government is _uniform_. - - 2. Our natural foresight of the consequences of actions, is - his appointment. - - 3. The consequences themselves, are his appointment. - - 4. Our ability to foresee these consequences, is God’s - _instruction_ how we are to act. - - _Objec._ By this reasoning we are instructed to gratify our - appetites, and such gratification is our reward for so doing. - - _Ans._ Certainly not. Foreseen pleasures and pains are proper - motives to action _in general_; but we may, in particular - cases, damage ourselves by indulgence. Our eyes are made to - see with, but not to look at every thing:--for instance the - sun. - -It follows, from what has been said, that - - -II. _We are, now, actually under God’s government, in the strictest -sense._ - - =1.= Admitting that there is a God, it is not so much a matter of - speculation, as of experience, that he governs us. - - =2.= The annexing of pleasures and pains to certain actions, and - giving notice them, is the very essence of government. - - =3.= Whether by direct acts upon us, or by contriving a general - plan, does not affect the argument. - - 1.) If magistrates could make laws which should _execute - themselves_, their government would be far more perfect than it - is. - - 2.) God’s making fire burn us, is as much an instance of - government, as if he _directly inflicted_ the burn, whenever we - touched fire. - - =4.= Hence the analogy of nature shows nothing to render - incredible the Bible doctrine of God’s rewarding or punishing - according to our actions. - - -_Additional remarks on Punishment._ - -As men object chiefly to future punishment, it is proper to show -further that the course of administration, as to _present_ punishment, -is analogous to what religion teaches as to _the future_. - -Indeed they add credibility to it. - -And ought to raise the most serious apprehension. - - -I. _Circumstances to be observed touching present punishments._ - - =1.= They often follow acts which produce present pleasure or - advantage. - - =2.= The sufferings often far exceed the pleasure or advantage. - - =3.= They often follow remotely. - - =4.= After long delay they often come suddenly. - - =5.= As those remote effects are not certainly foreseen, they - may not be thought of at the time; or if so, there is a hope of - escaping. - - =6.= There are opportunities of advantage, which if neglected do - not recur. - - =7.= Though, in some cases, men who have sinned up to a certain - point, may retrieve their affairs, yet in many cases, reformation - is of no avail. - - =8.= Inconsiderateness is often as disastrous as wilful - wrong-doing. - - =9.= As some punishments by civil government, are capital, so are - some natural punishments. - - 1.) Seem intended to remove the offender out of the way. - - 2.) Or as an example to others. - - -II. _These things are not accidental, but proceed from fixed laws._ - - =1.= They are matters of daily experience. - - =2.= Proceed from the general laws, by which the world is - governed. - - -III. _They so closely resemble what religion teaches, as to future -punishment, that both might be expressed in the same words._ - -_e.g._ Proverbs, ch. i. - - The analogy sufficiently answers all objections against the - Scripture doctrine of future punishment, such as - - 1.) That our frailty or temptations annihilate the guilt of - vice. - - 2.) Or the objection from necessity. - - 3.) Or that the Almighty cannot be contradicted. - - 4.) Or that he cannot be offended. - - -REMARKS. - - =1.= Such reflections are terrific, but ought to be stated and - considered. - - =2.= Disregard of a hereafter cannot be justified by any thing - short of a _demonstration_ of atheism. Even skeptical doctrines - afford no justification. - - =3.= There is no pretence of reason for presuming that the - licentious will not find it better for them that they had never - been born. - - -CHAPTER III. - -MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. - -As the structure of the world shows _intelligence_, so the mode of -distributing pleasure and pain, shows government. That is, God’s -_natural_ government, such as a king exercises over his subjects. - -But this does not, at first sight, determine what is the _moral -character_ of such government. - - -I. _What is a moral or righteous government?_ - - =1.= Not mere rewarding and punishing. - - =2.= But doing this according to character. - - =3.= The perfection of moral government is doing this _exactly_. - - _Objec._ God is simply and absolutely benevolent. - - _Ans._ Benevolence, infinite in degree, would dispose him - to produce the greatest possible happiness, regardless of - behaviour. This would rob God of other attributes; and should - not be asserted unless it can be proved. And whether it can - be proved is not the point now in hand. - - The question is not whether there may not be, in the - universe, beings to whom he manifests absolute benevolence, - which might not be incompatible with justice; but whether he - treats _us_ so. - - =4.= It must be owned to be vastly difficult, in such a - disordered world, to estimate with exactness the overplus of - happiness on the side of virtue: and there may be exceptions to - the rule. But it is far from being doubtful that _on the whole_, - virtue is happier than vice, in this world. - - -II. _The beginnings of a righteous administration, are seen in nature._ - - =1.= It has been proved (ch. ii.) that God _governs_: and it is - reasonable to suppose that he would govern _righteously_. - - 1.) Any other rule of government would be harder to account for. - - 2.) The Bible doctrine that hereafter the good shall be happy, - and the wicked miserable, is no more than an expectation that a - method of government, now begun, shall be carried on. - - =2.= The opposite consequences of prudence and rashness, show - a right constitution of nature; and our ability to foresee and - control these consequences, shows that we are under moral law. - - =3.= God has so constructed society that vice, to a great degree, - is actually punished by it. - - 1.) Without this, society could not exist. - - 2.) This is God’s government, through society; and is as - _natural_, as society. - - 3.) Since the course of things is God’s appointment, men are - unavoidably accountable for their behaviour. - - _Objec._ Society often punishes good actions, and rewards - wickedness. - - _Ans._ 1. This is not _necessary_, and consequently not - natural. - - 2. Good actions are never punished by society as _good_, but - because considered bad. - - =4.= By the course of nature, virtue is rewarded, and vice - punished, _as such_, which proves a moral government; as will - be seen if we rightly distinguish between actions and their - qualities. - - 1.) An action may produce present gratification though it be - wrong: in which case the gratification is in the act, not the - morality of it: in other cases the enjoyment consists wholly in - the quality of virtuousness. - - 2.) Vice is naturally attended with uneasiness, apprehension, - vexation, remorse, &c. - - --This is a very different feeling from that produced by mere - misfortune. - - --Men comfort themselves under misfortune, that it was not - their own fault. - - 3.) Honest and good men are befriended _as such_. - - 4.) Injuries are resented as implying fault; and good offices - are regarded with gratitude on account of the _intention_, even - when they fail to benefit us. - - --This is seen in family government, where children are - punished for falsehood, fretfulness, &c., though no one is - hurt. - - --And also in civil government, where the absence or presence - of ill intention goes far in determining the penalty of - wrong-doing. - - 5.) The whole course of the world, in all ages and relations, - turns much upon approbation and disapprobation. - - 6.) The very fact of our having a moral nature, is a proof of - our being under God’s moral government. - - --We are placed in a condition which unavoidably operates on - our moral nature. - - --Hence it arises that reward to virtue and reprobation of - vice, as such, is a _rule_, never inverted. If it be thought - that there are instances to the contrary, (which is not so,) - they are evidently monstrous. - - --The _degree_ in which virtue and vice receive proper - returns, is not the question now, but only the thing itself, - in some degree. - - 7.) It is admitted that virtue sometimes suffers, and vice - prospers; but this is _disorder_, and not the order of nature. - - 8.) It follows, that we have in the government of the world, - a declaration from God, for virtue and against vice. So far - as a man is true to virtue, is he on the side of the divine - administration. Such a man must have a _sense of security_, and - a hope of _something better_. - - =5.= This hope is confirmed by observing that virtue has - necessary tendencies beyond their present effects. - - 1.) These are very obvious with regard to individuals. - - 2.) Are as real, though not so patent, in regard to society. - - --The power of a society under the direction of virtue, tends - to prevail over power not so directed, just as power under - direction of reason, tends to prevail over brute force. - - --As this may not be conceded, we will notice how the case - stands, as to reason: - - · Length of time, and proper opportunity, are necessary for - reason to triumph over brutes. - - · Rational beings, disunited, envious, unjust, and - treacherous, may be overcome by brutes, uniting themselves - by instinct: but this would be an inverted order of things. - - --A like tendency has virtue to produce superiority. - - · By making the good of society, the object of every member - of it. - - · By making every one industrious in his own sphere. - - · By uniting all in one bond of veracity and justice. - - 3.) If the part of God’s government which we see, and the part - we do not see, make up one scheme, then we see a _tendency_ in - virtue to superiority. - - 4.) But to _produce_ that superiority there must be - - --A force proportioned to the obstacles. - - --Sufficient lapse of time. - - --A fair field of trial; such as extent of time, adequate - occasions, and opportunities for the virtuous to unite. - - 5.) These things are denied to virtue in this life, so that its - tendencies, though real, are _hindered_. - - 6.) But it may have all requisite advantages hereafter. - - --Eternity will be lasting enough. - - --Good men will unite; as they cannot do now, scattered over - the earth, and ignorant of one another. - - --Other orders of virtuous beings will join; for the very - nature of virtue is a bond of union. - - 7.) The tendency of such an order of things, so far as seen by - vicious beings in any part of the universe, would be to the - amendment of all who were capable of it, and their recovery to - virtue. - - 8.) All this goes to show that the hinderances to virtue are - contingent, and that its beneficial tendencies are God’s - declarations in its favor. - - 9.) If the preceding considerations are thought to be too - speculative, we may easily come to the same result by - reflecting on the supremacy which any earthly nation would - attain, by entire virtue for many ages. - - -REMARKS. - -Consider now the general system of religion. The government of -the world is one; it is moral; virtue shall in the end prevail -over wickedness; and to see the importance and fitness of such an -arrangement we have only to consider what would be the state of things, -if vice had these advantages, or virtue the contrary. - - _Objec._ Why may not things be now going on in other worlds, and - continue always to go on in this world, in the same mixed and - disordered state as at present? - - _Ans._ We are not proving that God’s moral government is - _perfect_, or the truth of religion, but only seeing what - there is in the course of nature, to confirm it, supposing it - to be known. Were there nothing to judge by, but the present - distribution of pleasure and pain, we should have no ground - to conclude that hereafter we should be rewarded or punished - exactly according to our deserts. But even then there would - be no indication that vice is better than virtue. Still the - preceding observations _confirm_ the doctrine of future - retribution; for, - - 1.) They show that the Author of nature is not indifferent to - virtue and vice. - - 2.) That future distributive justice would differ not in - _kind_, but in degree only, from God’s present government. It - would be the _effect_, towards which we see the _tendency_. - - 3.) That higher rewards and punishments _may be_ hereafter. - - 4.) That we should _expect_ it to be so; because the - tendencies of vice and virtue are immutable, while the - hinderances are only artificial. - - -SUMMARY. - -[This enumerates the steps of the argument, in the foregoing chapter, -in as condensed a form as possible.] - - -CHAPTER IV. - -OF A STATE OF PROBATION. - -The doctrine of probation comprehends several particulars. But the -most common notion is that our future interests are _depending_; and -depending on _ourselves_. And that we have _opportunities_ for both -good and bad conduct, and _temptations_ to each. - -This is not exactly the same as our being under moral government; for -it implies allurement to evil, and difficulties in being good. - -Hence needs to be considered by itself. - - -_Doctrine._ THE NATURAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD, IN THIS WORLD, PUTS US ON -TRIAL AS TO THE THINGS OF THIS WORLD; AND SO IMPLIES, WHAT RELIGION -TEACHES, THAT HIS MORAL GOVERNMENT PUTS US ON TRIAL AS TO A FUTURE -WORLD. - - -I. _So far as we are tempted to do what will damage our future temporal -interests, so far we are under probation as to those interests._ - - =1.= The annexing of pleasures and pains to actions, as good or - bad, and enabling us to foresee their effect, implies that our - interests, in part at least, depend on ourselves. - - =2.= We often _blame_ ourselves and others for evils, as - resulting from misconduct. - - =3.= It is very certain that we often miss possible good, and - incur evils, not for want of knowing better, but through our - _fault_. - - =4.= Every one speaks of the hazards of young persons, from other - causes than ignorance. - - -II. _These natural or temporal trials are analogous to our moral and -religious trial._ - - =1.= In both cases, what constitutes the trial, is either in our - circumstances or in our nature. - - 1.) Some would do right but for violent or extraordinary - temptations. - - 2.) Others will _seek_ evil, and go out of their way after - wicked indulgence, when there are no external temptations. - - 3.) But even those who err through temptation, must have that - within which makes them _susceptible_ of temptation. - - 4.) So that we are in a like state of probation with respect to - both present and future interests. - - =2.= If we proceed to observe how mankind behave in both - capacities, we see the same analogy. - - 1.) Some scarcely look beyond the present gratification. - - 2.) Some are driven by their passions against their better - judgment and feeble resolutions. - - 3.) Some shamelessly go on in open vice. - - 4.) Some persist in wrong-doing, even under strong - apprehensions of future misery. - - =3.= The analogy is no less plain in regard to the influence of - others upon us. - - 1.) Bad example. - - 2.) Wrong education. - - 3.) Corruptions of religion. - - 4.) General prevalence of mistakes as to true happiness. - - =4.= In both cases negligence and folly bring difficulty as well - as vice. - - -III. _The disadvantages we labor under from our fallen and disordered -state, are the same, in relation to both earthly and future interests._ - -This disadvantage affords no ground of complaint; for, - - =1.= We _may_ manage to pass our days in comfort and peace. - - =2.= And so may we obtain the security and comfort of religion. - - =3.= We might as well complain that we are not a higher order of - beings. - - -REMARKS. - - =1.= It is thus proved that the state of trial, which religion - says we are in, is credible; for it exactly corresponds to what - we see. - - 1.) If from birth till death we were in a constant security - of enjoyment, without care or correctness, it would be a - presumption against religion. - - 2.) It might, if we had no experience, be urged that an - infinitely good Being would not expose us to the hazard of - misery. This is indeed a difficulty, and must remain so; but - still the course of nature is as it is. - - 3.) The miseries which we bring on ourselves are no more - unavoidable than our deportment. - - =2.= It has been proved that we are in danger of miscarrying as - to our interests, both present and future. - - =3.= The sum of the whole is, that as we do not have present - enjoyments and honors forced upon us, in spite of misconduct, so - this _may_ be the case, as to that chief and final good which - religion proposes. - - -CHAPTER V. - -PROBATION INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. - -Why we should be placed in the condition spoken of in the last chapter, -is a question which cannot be answered. It may be that we could not -understand, if told. And if we could, it might injure us to know, just -now. It certainly is consistent with God’s righteous government. - -Religion tells us that we are so placed in order to become qualified -for a better state. - -This, though a very partial answer to the inquiry _why_ we are so -placed, answers an infinitely more important question,--viz.: _What is -our business here?_ - - -I. _We are placed in this state of trial, for our improvement in -virtue, as the requisite qualification for future security and -happiness._ - - =1.= Every creature is designed for a particular way of life. - - 1.) Happiness depends on the congruity between a creature’s - nature and its circumstances. - - 2.) Man’s character might be so changed as to make him - _incapable_ of happiness on earth. - - 3.) Or he might be placed, without changing his nature, in a - world where he must be wretched, for want of the proper objects - to answer to his desires. - - 4.) So that without determining what is the future condition of - good men, we know there must be necessary _qualifications_ to - make us capable of enjoying it. - - =2.= Human beings are so constituted as to become fit for new and - different conditions. - - 1.) We not only acquire ideas, but store them up. - - 2.) We can become more expert in any kind of action. - - 3.) And can make settled alterations in our tempers. - - 4.) We can form _habits_--both bodily and mental. - - As these operate in producing radical changes in human - character, we will look for a moment at the process. - - --Neither perceptions, nor knowledge, are habits; though - necessary to _forming_ them. - - --There are habits of perception, however, and habits of - action: the former are passive, the latter active. - - --Habits of body are produced by external acts, and habits of - mind by the exertion of principles; _i.e._ carrying them out. - - --Resolutions to do well are acts, and may _help_ towards - forming good habits. But _mere_ theorizing, and forming - pictures in the mind, not only do not help, but may harden - the mind to a contrary course. - - --Passive impressions, by repetition grow weaker. Thus - familiarity with danger lessens fear. - - --Hence active habits may be formed and strengthened, by - acting according to certain motives or excitements, which - grow less sensibly felt and less and less felt, as the habit - strengthens. - - · Thus the sight of distress excites the passive emotion - of pity, and the active principle of benevolence. But - inquiring out cases of distress in order to relieve them, - causes diminished sensitiveness at the sight of misery, and - stronger benevolence and aptitude in relieving it. - - · So admonition, experience, and example, if acted upon, - produce good; if not, harden. - - 5.) The formation of a habit may be imperceptible and even - inexplicable, but the thing itself is matter of certain - experience. - - 6.) A habit once formed, the action becomes easy and often - pleasurable: opposite inclinations grow weaker: difficulties - less: and occasions more frequent. - - 7.) Thus, a new character, in several respects, is formed. - - =3.= We should not have these capacities for improvement and for - the reconstruction of character, if it were not necessary. - - 1.) They are necessary, even as to this life. - - --We are not qualified, at first, for mature life: - understanding and strength come gradually. - - --If we had them in full, at birth, we should at first be - distracted and bewildered, and our faculties would be of no - use previous to experience. Ignorant of any employment, we - could not provide for ourselves. - - --So that man is an unformed, unfinished creature, even as - to this world, till he _acquire_ knowledge, experience, and - habits. - - 2.) Provision is made for our acquiring, in youth, the - requisite qualities for manhood. - - --Children _learn_, from their very birth, - - · The nature and use of objects. - - · The subordinations of domestic life. - - · The rules of life. - - --Some of this learning is acquired so insensibly, as to seem - like instinct, but some requires great care and labor, and - the doing of things we are averse to. - - --According as we act during this formative period, is our - character formed; and our capacity for various stations in - society determined. - - --Early opportunities lost, cannot be recovered. - - 3.) Our state of discipline throughout this life, for another, - is exactly of the same kind: and comprehended under one general - law. - - --If we could not see how the present discipline fitted us - for a higher life, it would be no objection. - - · We do not know how food, sleep, &c. enlarges the - child’s body; nor would we expect such a result, prior to - experience. - - · Nor do children understand the need of exercise, - temperance, restraint, &c. - - --We thus see a general analogy of Providence indicating that - the present life is preparatory. - - =4.= If virtue is a necessary qualification for future happiness, - then we see our need of the moral culture of our present state. - - 1.) Analogy indicates that our future state will be social. - - --Nature furnishes no shadow of unreasonableness in the - Scripture doctrine that this future community will be under - the more immediate government of God. - - --Nor the least proof that its members will not require the - exercise of veracity, justice, &c. towards each other; and - that character which _results_ from the practice of such - virtues. - - --Certainly the universe is under moral government; and a - virtuous character must, in some way, be a condition of - happiness in that state. - - 2.) We are deficient, and in danger of deviating from what is - right. - - --We have desires for outward objects. - - --The times, degrees, &c. of gratifying these desires, are, - of right, subject to the control of the moral principle. - - --But that principle neither excites them, nor prevents their - being excited. - - --They may exist, when they cannot be lawfully gratified, or - gratified at all. - - --When the desire exists, and the gratification is unlawful, - we are tempted. - - 3.) The only security is the principle within. - - --The strengthening of this lessens the danger. - - --It may be strengthened, by discipline and exercise. - - · Noting examples. - - · Attending to the right, and not to preference. - - · Considering our true interests. - - --When improved, it becomes, in proportion to its strength, - our security from the dangers of natural propensions. - - --Virtue, become habitual by discipline, is improved virtue; - and improved virtue must produce increased happiness, if the - government of the world is moral. - - 4.) Even creatures made upright may fall. - - --The fall of an upright being, is not accounted for by the - nature of liberty; for that would only be saying that an - event happened because it might happen. - - --But from the very nature of propensions. - - --A finitely perfect being would have propensions - corresponding to its surroundings; its understanding; and its - moral sense; and all these in due proportions. - - --Such a being would have propensions, though the object - might not be present, or the indulgence might be contrary to - its moral sense; and this would have some tendency, however - small, to induce gratification. - - --The tendency would be increased by the frequency of - occasions; and yet more by the least indulgence, even in - thought; till, under peculiar conjunctures, it would become - effect. - - --The first transgression might so utterly disorder the - constitution, and change the proportions of forces, as to - lead to a repetition of irregularities; and hence to the - construction of bad habits, and a depraved character. - - 5.) On the contrary, a finitely perfect being may attain higher - virtue, and more security, by obeying the moral principle. - - --For the danger would lessen, by the increased - submissiveness of propensions. - - --The moral principle would gain force by exercise. - - 6.) Thus vice is not only criminal, but degrading; and virtue - is not only right, but improving. - - --The degree of improvement may be such that the danger of - sinning may be almost infinitely lessened. - - --Yet the security may always be the habits formed in a - state of discipline; making such a state altogether fit and - necessary. - - 7.) This course of reasoning is vastly stronger when applied to - fallen and corrupt creatures. - - --The upright need improvement; the fallen must be renewed. - - --Discipline is expedient for the one; necessary for the - other; and of a severer sort. - - -II. _The present world is peculiarly fit for such discipline as we -need._ - - =1.= Surrounding evils tend to produce moderation, practical - knowledge, &c. very different from a mere speculative knowledge - of our liability to vice and misery. - - =2.= Our experience in this world, with right views and practice, - may leave eternal impressions for good. - - =3.= Every act of self-government in the exercise of virtue, - must, from the very make of our nature, form habits of virtue, - and a more intense virtuous principle. - - =4.= Resolute and persevering resistance to particular and - violent temptations, is a _continued_ act of virtue, and that in - a _higher degree_ than if the seduction were transient and weak. - - =5.= Self-denial is not essential to virtue, but is almost - essential to discipline and improvement. - - 1.) Because actions materially virtuous, which have no - difficulty, but agree with our inclinations, may be done merely - from inclination, and so not be _really_ virtuous. - - 2.) But when they are done in face of danger and difficulty, - virtuousness is increased, and confirmed into a habit. - - _Objec._ 1. As our intellectual or physical powers may be - overtasked, so may our moral. - - _Ans._ This may be so in exceptional cases, but it does not - confute the argument. In general, it holds good. All that is - intended to be proved is, that this world is _intended_ to be a - state of improvement, and is _fitted_ for it. - - 1.) Some sciences which of themselves are highly improving, - require a trying measure of attention, which some will not - submit to. - - 2.) It is admitted that this world disciplines many to vice: - but this viciousness of many is the very thing which makes - the world a virtuous discipline to good men. The _whole end_ - in placing mankind as they are we know not; but these things - are evident--the virtues of some are exercised:--and so - exercised as to be improved: and improved beyond what they - would be in a perfectly virtuous community. - - 3.) That all, or even the generality, do not improve, is no - proof that their improvement was not _intended_. Of seeds and - animals not one in a million comes to perfection; yet such - as do, evidently answer an end for which they were designed. - The _appearance of waste_ in regard to seeds, &c. is just as - unaccountable, as the ruin of moral agents. - - _Objec._ 2. Rectitude arising from hope and fear, is only the - discipline of self-love. - - _Ans._ Obedience _is_ obedience, though prompted by hope or - fear: and a _course_ of such obedience, forms a habit of - it: and distinct habits of various virtues, by repressing - inclination whenever justice, veracity, &c. require. - - Beside, veracity, justice, regard to God’s authority, and - self-interest, are coincident; and each, separately, a just - principle. To begin a good life from either of them, and - persist, produces that very character which corresponds to our - relations to God, and secures happiness. - - _Objec._ 3. The virtues requisite for a state of afflictions, - and produced by it, are not wanted to qualify us for a state of - happiness. - - _Ans._ Such is not the verdict of experience. Passive - submission is essential to right character. Prosperity itself - begets extravagant desires; and imagination may produce as much - discontent as actual condition. Hence, though we may not need - _patience_ in heaven, we shall need that _temper_ which is - formed by patience. - - Self-love would always coincide with God’s commands, when - our interest was rightly understood; but it is liable to - error. Therefore, HABITS of resignation are necessary, for - _all_ creatures; and the proper discipline for resignation is - affliction. - - _Objec._ 4. The trouble and danger of such discipline, might have - been avoided by making us at once, what we are intended to become. - - _Ans._ What we are to be, is the effect of what we are to - do. God’s natural government is arranged not to save us from - trouble or danger, but to enable and incline us to go through - them. It is as natural for us to seek means to obtain things, - as it is to seek the things; and in worldly things we are left - to our choice, whether to improve our powers and so better our - condition, or to neglect improvement and so go without the - advantage. - - Analogy, therefore, makes the same arrangement credible, as to - a future state. - - -III. _This state of discipline may be necessary for the display of -character._ - - =1.= Not to the all-knowing Being, but to his creation, or part - of it, and in many ways which we know not. - - =2.= It may be a _means_ in disposing of men according to - character. - - =3.= And of showing creation that they are so disposed of. - - =4.= Such display of character certainly contributes, largely, to - the general course of things considered in this chapter. - - -CHAPTER VI. - -OF NECESSITY AS INFLUENCING CONDUCT. - -Fatalists have no right to object to Christianity, for they of course -hold the doctrine to be compatible with what they see in nature. - -The question is, whether it be not equally compatible with what -Christianity teaches. - -To argue on the supposition of so great an absurdity as necessity, is -puzzling; and the obscurity and puzzle of the argument must therefore -be excused. - - -I. _Necessity does not destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and -Governor of the world._ - - =1.= It does not exclude design and deliberation. - - 1.) This is matter of actual experience and consciousness. - - --Necessity does not account for the _existence_ of any - thing, but is only a _circumstance_ relating to its origin. - Instance the case of a house: the fatalist admits that it had - a builder, and the only question would be, was he obliged to - build it as he did? - - 2.) It is the same as to the construction of the world. To say - it exists by necessity must mean it had a maker, who _acted_ by - necessity: for necessity is only an abstract notion, and can - _do_ nothing. - - 3.) We say God exists by necessity, because we intuitively - discern that there must be an infinite Being, prior to all - causes; but we cannot say that _every thing_ so exists. - The fact that many changes in nature are produced by man’s - contrivance is a proof of this. - - 4.) Thus though the fatalist does not choose to mean by - necessity _an agent acting necessarily_, he is obliged to mean - this. - - 5.) And it also follows that a thing’s being done by necessity - does not exclude _design_. - - =2.= It does not exclude a belief that we are in a state of - religion. - - 1.) Suppose a fatalist to educate a child on his own - principles,--viz.: that he cannot do otherwise than he does; - and is not subject to praise or blame. - - (It might be asked, _would_ he, if possessed of common sense, - so educate his child?) - - --The child would be delighted with his freedom; but would - soon prove a pest, and go to destruction. - - --He would meet with checks and rebuffs, which would teach - him that he _was_ accountable. - - --He would, in the end, be convinced either that his doctrine - was wrong, or that he had reasoned inconclusively upon it, - and misapplied it. - - 2.) To apply fatalism to practice, in any other way, would be - found equally fallacious: _e.g._ that he need not take care of - his life. - - 3.) No such absurdity follows the doctrine of freedom. - - --Reasoning on this ground is justified by all experience. - - --The constitution of things is _as if_ we were free. - - 4.) If the doctrine of necessity be true, and yet, when we - _apply it_ to life, always misleads us; how, then, can we be - sure it would not mislead us with respect to future interests? - - 5.) It follows that if there are proofs of religion on the - supposition of freedom, they are just as conclusive on the - supposition of necessity. - - =3.= It does not refute the notion that God has a will and a - character. - - 1.) It does not hinder _us_ from having a will and a character; - from being cruel, or benevolent, or just, &c. - - 2.) If necessity be plead as the excuse for crime, it equally - excuses the _punishment_ of crime; for if it destroys the sin - of the one, it destroys the sin of the other. - - 3.) The very assumption of injustice in punishing crime, shows - that we cannot rid ourselves of the notion of justice and - injustice. - - _Objec._ If necessity be _reconcilable_ with the character of - God, as portrayed in Christianity, does it not destroy _the - proof_ that he has that character; and so destroy the proofs of - religion? - - _Ans._ No. Happiness and misery are not our fate, but the - results of our conduct. God’s government is that of a father - and a magistrate; and his natural rule of government must be - veracity and justice. We shall proceed to show that, - - -II. _Necessity does not destroy the proofs of religion._ - - =1.= It is a plain fact that God rewards and punishes. - - 1.) He has given us a moral faculty, by which we discern - between actions, and approve or disapprove, &c. - - 2.) This implies a _rule_, a peculiar _kind_ of rule; _i.e._ - one from which we cannot depart without being self-condemned. - - 3.) The dictates of our moral faculty are God’s laws, with - sanctions. It not only raises a sense of _duty_, but a sense of - _security_ in obeying, and danger in disobeying; and this is an - explicit sanction. - - 4.) God’s government must conform to the nature he has given - us; and we must infer that in the upshot happiness will follow - virtue, and misery vice. - - 5.) Hence religious worship is a duty, if only as a means of - keeping up the sense of this government. - - 6.) No objection from necessity can lie against this course of - proof. - - --The conclusion is wholly and directly from facts; not - from what might appear to us to be _fit_, but from what his - actions tell us _he wills_. - - =2.= Natural religion has external evidence which necessity, if - true, does not affect. - - 1.) Suppose a person convinced of the truths of natural - religion, but ignorant of history, and of the present state of - mankind, he would inquire: - - --How this religion came? - - --How far the belief of it extended? - - --If he found that some one had totally propounded it, as a - deduction of reason, then, though its evidences from reason - would not be impaired, its history would furnish no further - proof. - - 2.) But such an one would find, on the contrary, - - --That essentially it had been professed in all countries. - - --And can be traced up through all ages. - - --And was not _reasoned out_, but revealed. - - 3.) These things are of great weight. - - --Showing natural religion to be conformed to the common - sense of mankind. - - --And either that it was revealed, or forces itself upon the - mind. - - --The rude state of the early ages leads to the belief of its - being revealed, and such is the opinion of the learned. - - =3.= Early pretences to revelation indicate some original real - one from which they were copied. - - --The history of revelation is as old as history itself. - - --Such a fact is a proof of religion, against which there is - no presumption. - - --And indicates a revelation prior to the examination - of the book said to contain it; and independent of all - considerations of its being corrupted, or darkened by fables. - - =4.= It is thus apparent that the _external_ evidence of religion - is considerable; and is not affected by the doctrine of necessity. - - -REMARKS. - - 1. The danger of taking custom, &c. for our moral rule. - - 1.) We are all liable to prejudice. - - 2.) Reason may be impaired, perverted, or disregarded. - - 3.) The matter in hand is of infinite moment. - - 2. The foregoing observations amount to practical proof. - - _Objec._ Probabilities which cannot be confuted, may - be overbalanced by greater probabilities: much more by - demonstration. Now, as the doctrine of necessity must be true, - it cannot be that God governs us as if we were free when he - knows we are not. - - _Ans._ This brings the matter to a point, and the answer is - not to be evaded,--viz.: that the whole constitution and - course of things shows this reasoning to be false, be the - fallacy where it may. - - The doctrine of freedom shows where,--viz.: in supposing - ourselves necessary agents when in fact we are free. - - Admitting the doctrine of necessity, the fallacy evidently - lies in denying that necessary agents are accountable; for - that they _are_ rewarded and punished is undeniable. - -CONCLUSION.--It follows that necessity, if true, neither proves that -God will not make his creatures happy or miserable according to -their conduct, nor destroys the proofs that he will do so. That is, -necessity, practically, is false. - - -CHAPTER VII. - -DIVINE GOVERNMENT A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. - -Moral government, _as a fact_, has now been considered; it remains for -us to remove objections against its _wisdom and goodness_. A thing -being true does not prove it to be good. - -In arguing as to its truth, analogy could only show it to be credible. -But, if a moral government be admitted as a fact, analogy makes it -credible that it is a scheme or system, and that man’s comprehension -of it is necessarily so limited, as to be inadequate to determine its -injustice. - -This we shall find to be the case. - - -_Doctrine._ ON THE SUPPOSITION THAT GOD EXERCISES MORAL GOVERNMENT, -THE ANALOGY OF NATURE TEACHES THAT IT MUST BE A SCHEME, AND ONE QUITE -BEYOND OUR COMPREHENSION. - - -I. _The ordering of nature is a scheme; and makes it credible by -analogy, that moral government is a scheme._ - - =1.= The parts curiously correspond to each other; individuals to - individuals, species to species, events to events; and all these - both immediate and remote. - - =2.= This correspondence embraces all the past, and all the - future; including all creatures, actions, and events. - - 1.) There is no event, which does not depend for its occurrence - on some further thing, unknown to us; we cannot give the whole - account of any one thing. - - 2.) Things apparently the most insignificant, seem to be - necessary to others, of the greatest importance. - - =3.= If such is God’s natural government, it is credible that - such is his moral government. - - 1.) In fact they are so blended as to make one scheme. - - --One is subservient to the other, just as the vegetable - kingdom subserves the animal, and our animal organization - subserves our mental. - - --Every act of God seems to look beyond the occasion, and to - have reference to a general plan. - - --There is evidently a previous adjustment. - - · The periods, &c. for trying men. - - · The instruments of justice. - - · The kinds of retribution. - - 2.) The whole comprises a system, a very small part of which is - known to us: therefore no objections against any part can be - insisted on. - - 3.) This ignorance is universally acknowledged, except in - arguing against religion. That it ought to be a valid answer to - objections against religion, we proceed to show. - - --Suppose it to be asserted that all evils might have been - prevented by repeated interpositions; or that more good might - have been so produced; which would be the utmost that could - be said: still, - - --Our ignorance would vindicate religion from any objections - arising from apparent disorders in the world. - - --The government of the world might be _good_, even on those - suppositions; for at most they could but suggest that it - might be _better_. - - --At any rate, they are mere assertions. - - --Instances may be alleged, in things much less out of reach, - of suppositions palpably impossible, which _all_ do not see - to be so: nor _any, at first sight_. - - 4.) It follows that our ignorance is a satisfactory answer to - all objections against the divine government. - - --An objection against an act of Providence, no way connected - with any other thing, as being unjust, could not be answered - by our ignorance. - - --But when the objection is made against an act related to - other and unknown acts, then our ignorance is a full answer. - - --Some unknown relation, or unknown impossibility, may render - the act not only good, but good in the highest degree. - - -II. _Consider some particular things, in the natural government of God, -the like of which we may infer, by analogy, to be contained in his -moral government._ - - =1.= No ends are accomplished without means. - - 1.) Often, means very disagreeable bring the most desirable - results. - - 2.) How means produce ends, is not learned by reason, but - experience. - - 3.) In many cases, before experience, we should have expected - contrary results. - - 4.) Hence we may infer that those things which are objected - against God’s moral government, produce good. - - 5.) It is evident that our not seeing _how_ the means work - good, or their seeming to have an opposite effect, offers no - presumption against their fitness to work good. - - 6.) They may not only be fit, but the _only_ means of ultimate - good. - - _Objec._ Though our capacity of vice and misery may promote - virtue, and _our_ suffering for sin be better than if we were - restrained by force, yet it would have been better if evil had - not entered the world. - - _Ans._ It is granted that though sinful acts may produce - benefits, to refrain from them would produce more. We have - curative pains, yet pain is not better than health. - - =2.= Natural government is carried on by general laws. - - 1.) Nature shows that this is best: all the good we enjoy is - because there are general laws. They enable us to _forecast_ - for the procurement of good. - - 2.) It may not be possible, by general laws, to prevent all - irregularities, or remedy them. - - 3.) Direct interpositions might perhaps remedy many disorders - arising under them, but this would have bad effects. - - --Encouraging improvidence. - - --Leaving us no rule of life. - - --Every interposition would have _distant_ effects: so that - we could not guess what would be the _whole_ result. - - · If it be replied that those distant effects might also be - corrected by direct interpositions--this is only talking at - random. - - _Objec._ If we are so ignorant as this whole argument supposes, - we are too ignorant to understand the proofs of religion. - - _Ans._ 1. Total ignorance of a subject precludes argument, but - partial ignorance does not. We may, in various degrees, know a - man’s character, and the way he is _likely_ to pursue certain - ends; and yet not know how he _ought_ to act to gain those - ends. In this case objections to his mode of pursuing ends may - be answered by our ignorance, though that he _does_ act in a - certain manner is capable of proof. So we may have evidence - of God’s character and aims, and yet not be competent judges - as to his measures. Our ignorance is a good answer to the - difficulties of religion, but no objection to religion itself. - - _Ans._ 2. If our ignorance did invalidate the proofs of - religion, as well as the objections, yet is it undeniable that - moral obligations remain unaffected by our ignorance of the - consequences of obedience or violation. The consequences of - vice and virtue may not be fully known, yet it is credible that - they may be such as religion declares: and this credibility is - an obligation, in point of prudence, to abstain from sin. - - _Ans._ 3. Our answers to the objections against religion, are - _not_ equally valid against the proofs of it. - - [Answers rehearsed.] - - _Ans._ 4. Our answers, though they may be said to be based - on our ignorance, are really not so, but on what analogy - teaches _concerning_ our ignorance,--viz.: that it renders - us incompetent judges. They are based on experience, and - what we _do know_; so that to credit religion is to trust to - experience, and to disregard it is the contrary. - - -CONCLUSION. - - =1.= The reasoning of the last chapter leads us to regard this - life as part of a larger plan of things. - - 1.) Whether we are connected with the distant _parts_ of the - universe, is uncertain; but it is very clear we are connected, - more or less, with present, past, and future. - - 2.) We are evidently in the midst of a scheme, not fixed but - progressive; and one equally incomprehensible, whether we - regard the present, past, or future. - - =2.= This scheme contains as much that is wonderful as religion - does: for it certainly would be as wonderful that all nature - came into existence without a Creator, as that there should be a - Creator: and as wonderful that the Creator should act without any - rule or scheme, as that he should act with one; or that he should - act by a bad rule, rather than a righteous one. - - =3.= Our very nature compels us to believe that the will and - character of the Author of nature, is just and good. - - =4.= Whatever be his character, he formed the world as it is, and - controls it as he does, and has assigned us our part and lot. - - =5.= Irrational creatures act their part, and receive their lot, - without reflection, but creatures endued with reason, can hardly - avoid reflecting whither we go, and what is the scheme, in the - midst of which we find ourselves. - -[Here follows a recapitulation of the book.] - - -PART II. - - -CHAPTER I. - -IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. - -Every one must admit that we _need_ a revelation. Few, if any, could -reason out a system, even of natural religion. If they could, there is -no probability that they would. Such as might, would still feel the -want of revelation. To say that Christianity is superfluous, is as wild -as to say all are happy. - -No exactness in attending to natural religion can make Christianity of -small importance. - -If Christianity be from God, we must obey, unless we know all his -reasons for giving it: and also that those reasons no longer exist; at -least in our case. This we cannot know. - -The importance of Christianity appears if we regard it - - -I. _As a republication of natural religion._ - - =1.= It gives the moral system of the universe. - - 1.) Free from corruptions; teaching that - - --Jehovah created all things. - - -- ” governs all things. - - --Virtue is his law. - - --Mankind will be judged according to character. - - 2.) It publishes its facts authoritatively. - - 3.) With vastly more clearness; e.g. the doctrines of a future - state: danger of sin: efficacy of repentance. - - 4.) With the advantage of a visible church, distinguished from - the world by peculiar institutions. - - _Objec._ The perversions of Christianity, and the little good - it has done. - - _Ans._ 1. Natural religion is no less perverted, and has - done less good. - - 2. The benefits of Christianity are _not_ small. - - 3. The evils ascribed to it, are not _its_ effects. Things - are to be judged by their genuine tendencies. - - 4. The light of reason, no more than revelation forces - acquiescence. - - 5.) With the additional advantage that every Christian, is - bound to instruct and persuade others. - - -II. _As containing truths not discoverable by natural reason._ - - =1.= A mode of salvation for the ruined. - - =2.= Duties unknown before. - - =3.= Our relations to the Son and Holy Ghost. - - 1.) Hence the form of baptism. - - 2.) Pious regards to Christ, and the Holy Ghost, based on our - relations to them. - - =4.= The manner of external worship. - - -III. _The fearful hazard of neglecting Christianity._ - - =1.= Those who think natural religion _sufficient_, must admit - that Christianity is highly _important_. - - =2.= Our relations to Christ being made known, our religious - regard to him is an evident obligation. - - =3.= These relations being real, there is no reason to think that - our neglect of behaving suitably to them, will not be attended - with the same kind of consequences as follow the neglect of - duties made known by reason. - - =4.= If we are corrupt and depraved, and so unfit for heaven, and - if we need God’s Holy Spirit to renew our nature, how can it be a - slight thing whether we make use of the means for obtaining such - assistance? - - =5.= Thus, if Christianity be either true, or merely credible, it - is most rash and presumptuous to treat it lightly. - - -REMARKS. - - =1.= The distinction between positive and moral obligations. - - 1.) For moral precepts we can see _the reason_: for positive we - cannot. - - 2.) Moral duties are such _prior_ to command; positive duties - are such _because_ commanded. - - 3.) The manner in which a duty is made known, does not make it - moral or positive. - - =2.= The ground of regarding moral duties as superior to positive. - - 1.) Both have the nature of moral commands. - - 2.) If the two conflict, we must obey the moral. - - --Positive institutions are _means_ to moral ends. - - --Ends are more excellent than means. - - --Obedience to positive institutions, has no value but as - proceeding from moral principle. - - 3.) Both moral and positive duties are _revealed_, and so are - on a level; but the moral law is _also_ interwoven with our - very nature, and so its precepts must prevail when the two - interfere. - - =3.= There is less necessity for determining their relative - authority, than some suppose. - - 1.) Though man is disposed to outward and ritual religion, - nothing can give us acceptance with God, without moral virtue. - - 2.) Scripture always lays stress on moral duties. - - 3.) It is a great weakness, though very common, to make light - of positive institutions, because less important than moral. - - --We are bound to obey _all_ God’s commands. - - --A precept, merely positive, admitted to be from God, - creates moral obligation, in the strictest sense. - - -CONCLUSION. - -This account of Christianity shows our great obligation to study the -Scriptures. - - -CHAPTER II. - -PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST A REVELATION, CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. - -Having shown the need of revelation, we now examine the presumptions -against it. - -The analogy of nature is generally supposed to afford presumptions -against miracles. - -They are deemed to require stronger evidence than other events. - - -I. _Analogy furnishes no presumptions against the general scheme of -Christianity._ - - =1.= It is no presumption against Christianity, that it is not - the discovery of reason, or of experience. - - =2.= Nor is it a presumption against Christianity, that it - contains things _unlike_ the apparent course of nature. - - 1.) We cannot suppose every thing, in the vast universe, to be - just like what is the course of nature in this little world. - - 2.) Even within the present compass of our knowledge, we see - many things greatly unlike. - - =3.= If we choose to call what is unlike our known course of - things, _miraculous_, still that does not make it _improbable_. - - -II. _There is no presumption against such a revelation, as we should -now call miraculous, being made, at the beginning of the world._ - - =1.= There was then _no_ course of nature, as to this world. - - =2.= Whether man _then_ received a revelation involves a question - not of miracles, but of _fact_. - - =3.= Creation was a very different exertion of power from that - which _rules_ the world, now it _is_ made. - - =4.= Whether the power of forming _stopped_ when man was made; or - went on, and formed a religion for him, is merely a question as - to the _degree_ or _extent_, to which a power was exerted. - - =5.= There is then no presumption from analogy against supposing - man had a revelation when created. - - =6.= All tradition and history teaches that he had, which amounts - to a real and material proof. - - -III. _There is no presumption against miracles, or a miraculous -revelation, after the course of nature was settled._ - - =1.= Such a presumption, requires the adduction of some - _parallel_ case. - - =2.= This would require us to know the history of some other - world. - - =3.= Even then, if drawn from only one other world, the - presumption would be very precarious. - - _To be more particular_, - - =1.= There is a strong presumption against any truth till it is - proved--which yet is overcome by almost any proof. - - --Hence the question of a presumption against miracles, - involves only the _degree_ of presumption, (not whether the - presumption is _peculiar_ to miracles,) and whether that - degree is such as to render them incredible. - - =2.= If we _leave out religion_, we are in total darkness as - to the cause or circumstances on which the course of nature - depends. - - --Five or six thousand years may have given occasion and - reasons for miraculous interpositions of Providence. - - =3.= _Taking in religion_, there are distinct reasons for - miracles; to afford additional instruction; to attest the truth - of instruction. - - =4.= Miracles must not be compared with common events, but with - uncommon; earthquakes, pestilence, &c. - - -CONCLUSION. - - 1. There are no analogies to render miracles incredible. - - 2. On the contrary, we see good reasons for them. - - 3. There are no presumptions against them, _peculiar_ to them, - as distinguished from other unusual phenomena. - - -CHAPTER III. - -OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT SHOULD BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION FROM -GOD. - -Beside the objectors to the _evidences_ of Christianity, there are many -who object to its _nature_. They say it is not full enough: has in it -foolish things: gives rise to superstition: subserves tyranny: is not -universally known: not well arranged: figurative language, &c. - -It is granted that if it contained _immoralities_ or _contradictions_ -they would show it to be false. But other objections against religion, -aside from objections against its evidences, are frivolous: as will now -be shown. - -Let the student look to the _force_ of the proofs, rather than any -_consequences_ which may be drawn from them. - - -I. _The Scripture informs us of a scheme of government, in addition to -the material laws of the world._ - - =1.= If both these schemes, the physical and the moral, coincide - and form one whole, then our inability to criticise the system of - nature, renders it credible that we are incompetent to criticise - the system of grace. - - =2.= Nature shows many things we should not have expected, prior - to experience. - - =3.= Hence it is altogether likely it would be so in religion. - - =4.= If a citizen is incompetent to judge of the propriety of - the _general_ laws of his government, he is equally incompetent - to judge when and how far those laws should be suspended, or - deviated from. - - -II. _We are no better judges of how revelation should be imparted._ - -Whether to every man, or to some for others; or what mode or degree -of proof should be given; or whether the knowledge should be given -gradually or suddenly. - - =1.= We are not able to judge how much new knowledge ought to be - given by revelation. - - =2.= Nor how far, nor in what way, God should qualify men to - transmit any revelation he might make. - - =3.= Nor whether the evidence should be certain, probable, or - doubtful. - - =4.= Nor whether all should have the same benefit from it. - - =5.= Nor whether it should be in writing, or verbal. If it be - said that if not in writing it would not have answered its - purpose: I ask, what purpose? Who knows what purposes would best - suit God’s _general_ government? - - =6.= All which shows it to be absurd to object to particular - things in revelation as unsuitable. - - -III. _Hence the only question, concerning the truth of revelation is, -whether it is a revelation._ - - =1.= No obscurities, &c. could overthrow the authority of a - revelation. - - =2.= It can only be overthrown by nullifying the proofs. - - =3.= Though the proofs could be shown to be less strong than is - affirmed, it still should control our conduct. - - -IV. _Modes of arguing, which are perfectly just, in relation to other -books, are not so as to the Bible._ - - =1.= We are competent judges of common books, but not of - Scripture. - - =2.= Our only inquiry should be to find out the sense. - - =3.= In other books, internal improbabilities weaken external - proof; but in regard to revelation, we scarcely know what are - improbabilities. - - 1.) Those who judge the Scripture by preconceived expectations, - will imagine they find improbabilities. - - 2.) And so they would by thus judging in natural things. - - --It would seem very improbable, prior to experience, that - man should be better able to determine the magnitudes and - motions of heavenly bodies, than he is to determine the - causes and cures of disease, which much more nearly concerns - him. - - --Or that we should sometimes hit upon a thing in an instant, - even when thinking of something else, which we had been - vainly trying to discover for years. - - --Or that language should be so liable to abuse, that every - man may be a deceiver. - - --Or that brute instinct should ever be superior to reason. - - -V. _Such observations apply to almost all objections to Christianity, -as distinguished from objections against its evidence._ - -For instance, the disorderly manner in which some, in the apostolic age -used their miraculous gifts. - - =1.= This does not prove the acts _not_ miraculous. - - =2.= The person having any such gift, would have the same power - over it which he would have over any other ability, and might - pervert it. - - =3.= To say why was he not also endued with prudence, to restrain - its use, is but saying why did not God give a _higher degree_ of - miraculous endowment? As to which we are not competent judges. - - =4.= God does not confer his _natural_ gifts, (memory, eloquence, - knowledge, &c.) only on those who are prudent and make the best - use of them. - - =5.= Nor is worldly instruction, by educators, commonly given in - the happiest manner. - - -VI. _There is a resemblance between religion and nature in several -other respects._ - - =1.= In both, common and necessary things, are plain; but to “go - on to perfection” in either, requires exact and laborious study. - - =2.= The hinderances to both religious and physical knowledge, - are the same in kind. A more perfect knowledge may be brought - about, - - 1.) By the progress of learning and liberty. - - 2.) By students attending to intimations overlooked by the - generality. - - =3.= It is not wonderful that our knowledge of Bible truth should - be small; for the natural world has laid open to inspection, for - thousands of years, and yet only lately are any great discoveries - made. - - =4.= Perhaps these scientific discoveries, are to be the means of - opening and ascertaining Bible truth. - - _Objec._ The cases are not parallel; for natural knowledge is - of no consequence, compared to spiritual. - - _Ans._ 1. The cases _are_ parallel; for natural knowledge - is as important to our natural well-being, as spiritual - knowledge is to our spiritual well-being. - - _Ans._ 2. If the cases were not parallel, there are plenty of - other analogies, which show that God does not dispense his - gifts according to _our_ notions of their value. - - _Objec._ 2. If Christianity be intended for the recovery of - men, why not sooner introduced, and more widely diffused? - - _Ans._ The objection is just as strong against the natural - sciences. Nay, if the light of nature and of revelation are - both from the same source, we might _expect_ that revelation - would have been introduced and diffused just as it is. - - 1.) Remedies for disease are known but to a few, or not - known at all, nor to any without care and study. - - 2.) When proposed by discoverers, they have been treated - with derision, and the use rejected by thousands whom they - might have cured. - - 3.) The best remedies have been used unskilfully, and so - made to produce more disease. - - 4.) Their benefit may come very slowly. - - 5.) In some cases they may be wholly ineffectual. - - 6.) They maybe so disagreeable that many will not submit to - use them, even with the prospect of a cure. - - 7.) Sometimes the remedy may be entirely out of reach if we - were ready to take it. - -All this reasoning may be applied to Christianity. - - -VII. _Having obviated all objections to Christianity, from its -containing things we should not have expected, we will now consider the -objections against its morality._ - - =1.= Reason may judge, as to whether revelation contains things - contrary to justice, and wisdom, &c. as those attributes are - taught by natural religion. But no such objections are advanced, - except such as would equally condemn the constitution of nature. - - =2.= There are indeed particular precepts, to particular persons, - which _would_ be immoral, but for the precept. The precept - changes the nature of the action. - - =3.= None are contrary to immutable morality. We are never - commanded to cultivate the principles of ingratitude, treachery, - &c. - - =4.= God may command the taking of life or property because these - are _his_. - - =5.= The only real difficulty is, that such commands are liable - to be perverted by the wicked to their own horrid purposes; and - to mislead the weak. But such objections do not lie against - revelation, as such, but against the very notion of _religion as - a trial_. - - =6.= The sum of the whole is, objections against the _scheme_ - of Christianity do not affect its truth; since there are no - objections against its morality. Hence objections against it, - aside from its evidences, are frivolous. Objections against the - _evidence_, will be considered in a subsequent chapter, [_i.e._ - ch. vii.] - - -CHAPTER IV. - -CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY UNDERSTOOD. - -In the last chapter it was shown that we might expect, beforehand, that -a revelation would contain strange things, and things liable to great -objections. - -This abates the force of such objections, or rather precludes them. - -But it may be said this does not show such objectionable things to be -good, or credible. - -It was a sufficient answer [ch. vii. part i.] to objections against the -course of nature, that it was a _scheme_, imperfectly comprehended. - -If Christianity be a scheme, the like objections admit of a like answer. - -[In studying this chapter, let chap. vii. part i. be kept in view.] - - -I. _Christianity is a scheme, beyond our comprehension._ - - =1.= God’s _general_ plan is to conduct things _gradually_, so - that, finally, every one shall receive what he deserves. - - =2.= Christianity is a _particular_ arrangement, under this - general plan: is a part of it, and conduces to its completion. - - =3.= It is itself a complicated and mysterious economy. - - 1.) Its arrangements began from the fall of man. - - 2.) Various dispensations, patriarchal, prophetic, &c. were - preparatory to it. - - 3.) At a certain juncture in the condition of the world Jesus - Christ came. - - 4.) The mission of the Holy Ghost was part of this economy. - - 5.) Christ now presides over it, and will establish the church, - judge the world, give up the kingdom, &c. &c. - - =4.= Of course, we can comprehend but little of such a scheme. - - =5.= We plainly see, from what is revealed, that there is very - much unrevealed. - - =6.= Thus it is evident that we are as little capable of judging - as to the whole system of religion, as we are as to the whole - system of nature. - - -II. _In both material and spiritual things, means are used to -accomplish ends._ - - =1.= Hence a thing may seem foolish to us, because we do not know - its object and end. - - =2.= Its seeming foolish to us, is no proof that it is so. - - -III. _Christianity is carried on by general laws, no less than nature._ - - =1.= Why do we say there are _laws of nature_? - - 1.) We indeed know some such. But nothing of the laws of many - things, _e.g._ - - · Pestilence. - · Storms. - · Earthquakes. - · Diversities of human powers. - · Association of ideas. - - 2.) Hence we call many things _accidental_, which we know are - not matters of chance, but are subject to general laws. - - 3.) It is a very little way that we can trace things to their - general laws. - - 4.) We attribute many things to such laws, only by analogy. - - =2.= Just for the same reasons, we say that miracles comport with - God’s _general laws of wisdom_. These laws may be unknown to us; - but no more so than those by which some die as soon as born, or - live to old age, or have superior understandings, &c. - - =3.= We see no more reason to regard the frame and course of - nature as a scheme, than we have to regard Christianity as such. - - 1.) If the first is a scheme, then Christianity, if true, would - be _likely_ to be a scheme. - - 2.) As Christianity is revealed but in part, and is an - arrangement to accomplish ends, there would of course seem to - us, in it, irregularities; just as we see in nature. - - 3.) Therefore objections against the one, are answered in the - same manner as objections against the other. - - * * * * * - -Having, in a previous chapter, [ch. iii.,] answered objections to -Christianity _as a matter of fact_, and in this, as a general question -of _wisdom and goodness_, the next thing is to discuss _objections in -particular_. - -As one of these is directed against _the scheme_, as just now -described, it will be considered here. - - _Objec._ Christianity is a roundabout, and perplexed contrivance; - just such as men, for want of understanding or power, are obliged - to adopt, in their designs. - - _Ans._ 1.) God uses just such complex arrangements in the - natural world. The mystery is quite as great in nature as in - grace. - - 2.) We do not know what are means, and what are ends. - - 3.) The natural world, and its government, are not fixed, but - progressive. - - 4.) Great length of time is required in some changes; _e.g._ - animals, vegetables, geological periods, &c. - - 5.) One state of life is a preparation and means for attaining - another. - - 6.) Man is impatient, but Jehovah deliberate. - - -CHAPTER V. - -OF A MEDIATOR, AND REDEMPTION BY HIM. - -Nothing in Christianity is so much objected to as the position assigned -to Christ; yet nothing is more unjust. The whole world exhibits -mediation. - - -I. _Our existence, and all its satisfactions, are by the medium of -others._ - - =1.= If so in the natural world, why not in the spiritual? - - =2.= The objection therefore is not only against _Christ’s_ - mediation, but _all_ mediation. - - -II. _We cannot know all the ends for which God punishes, nor by whom he -should punish._ - - =1.= Future punishment may be as natural a sequence of sin, as a - broken limb is of falling from a precipice. - - =2.= This is not taking punishment out of the hands of God, and - giving it to nature; it is only distinguishing ordinary events - from miraculous. - - -III. _In natural providence, God has made provision that the bad -consequences of actions do not always follow._ - - =1.= We may say God could have prevented all evil. But we see he - permits it, and has provided relief, and even sometimes perfect - remedies for it. - - 1.) Thus the bad consequences of trifling on a precipice may be - prevented by a friend, if we do not reject his assistance. - - 2.) We may ourselves do much towards preventing the bad - consequences of our misdeeds. - - 3.) Still more if assisted. - - =2.= It might have been perfectly just if it were not so; but - that it is so, shows compassion, as distinguished from goodness. - - =3.= The course of nature affords many instances of such - compassion. - - =4.= Thus analogy sanctions an arrangement, by which the ruinous - consequences of vice or folly may be averted, at least in some - cases. - - =5.= If the consequences of rash and inconsiderate acts, which - we scarcely call vicious, are often so serious, we may apprehend - that the bad consequences will be greater, in proportion as the - irregularity is greater. - - =6.= A dissolute disregard to all religion, if there be a - religion, is incomparably more reprehensible than the mere - neglects, imprudencies, &c. of this life. - - =7.= As the effects of worldly imprudence and vice are often - misery, ruin, and even death, no one can say what may be - the consequences of blasphemy, contempt of God, and final - impenitence. - - =8.= Nor can any one tell, how far the consequences of such great - wickedness can possibly be prevented, consistently with the - eternal rule of right. - - =9.= Still there would, from analogy, be some hope of room for - pardon. - - -IV. _There is no probability that any thing we could do alone, would -entirely prevent the effects of our irregularities._ - - =1.= We do not know all the reasons for punishment, nor why it - should be fit to remit punishment. - - =2.= Nor do we know all the consequences of vice, and so should - not know how to prevent them. - - =3.= Vice impairs men’s abilities for helping themselves. - - =4.= Misconduct makes assistance necessary, which otherwise would - not have been. Why should not the same things be so, as to our - future interests? - - =5.= In temporal things, behaving well in time to come, does not - repair old errors, why should it as to future things? - - =6.= Were it so in _all cases_ it would be contrary to all our - notions of government. - - =7.= It could not be determined in what degree, or in what cases, - it would be so, even if we knew it might in _some_ cases. - - =8.= The efficacy of repentance, as urged in opposition to - atonement, is contrary to the general sense of mankind; as shown - by the prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices. - - -V. _In this state of apprehension, awakened by the light of nature, -revelation comes in, and teaches positively, the possibility of pardon -and safety._ - - =1.= Confirms our fears as to the unprevented consequences of sin. - - =2.= Declares the world to be in a state of ruin. - - =3.= That repentance alone will not secure pardon. - - =4.= That there is a mode of pardon, by interposition. - - =5.= That God’s moral government is compassionate, as well as his - natural government. - - =6.= That he has provided, by the interposition of a mediator, to - save men. - - =7.= All this seems to put man in a strange state of helpless - degradation. But it is not Christianity which puts him so. All - philosophy and history show man to be degraded and corrupt. - - -VI. _Scripture, in addition to confirming the dim testimony of the -light of nature, reveals a Christ, as mediator and propitiatory -sacrifice._ - - =1.= He is “_that prophet_.” - - 1.) Declared the will of God. - - 2.) Published anew the law of nature. - - 3.) Taught with authority. - - 4.) Revealed the right manner of worship. - - 5.) Revealed the exact use of repentance. - - 6.) Revealed future rewards and punishments. - - 7.) Set us a perfect example. - - =2.= He has a _kingdom_ which is not of this world. - - 1.) Founded a church. - - 2.) Governs it. - - 3.) Of it, all who obey him are members. - - 4.) Each of these shall live and reign with him forever. - - =3.= He is a propitiatory _sacrifice_. - - 1.) How his sacrifice becomes efficacious, we are not exactly - told. - - 2.) Conjectures may be absurd; at least cannot be certain. - - 3.) If any complain for want of further instruction, let him - produce his claim to it. - - 4.) Some, because they cannot explain, leave it out of their - creed; and regard Christ only as a teacher. - - 5.) We had better accept the benefit, without disputing about - how it was procured. - - -VII. _We are not judges, antecedent to revelation, whether a mediator -was necessary, nor what should be the whole nature of his office._ - - =1.= We know not how future punishment would have been inflicted. - - =2.= Nor all the reasons why it would be necessary. - - =3.= The satisfaction by Christ, does not represent God as - indifferent whether he punishes the innocent or guilty. - - 1.) We see, in this world, the innocent _forced_ to suffer for - the faults of the guilty. - - 2.) But Christ suffered _voluntarily_. - - =4.= Though, finally, every one shall receive according to - his own deserts; yet, during the progress of God’s scheme, - _vicarious_ sufferings may be necessary. - - 1.) God commands us to assist others, though in many cases it - costs us suffering and toil. - - 2.) One person’s sufferings often tend to relieve another. - - =5.= Vicarious atonement for sinners, serves to vindicate the - authority of God’s laws, and to deter men from sin. - - =6.= Objections to vicarious suffering are obviously not - objections to Christianity, but to the whole course of nature. - - =7.= The objection, therefore, amounts to nothing more than - saying that a divine arrangement is not necessary, or fit, - because the objector does not see it to be so; though he must - own he is no judge, and _could_ not understand why it should be - necessary, if it were so! - - -VIII. _We have no reason to expect the same information touching God’s -conduct, as we have in relation to our own duty._ - - =1.= God instructs us by experience. - - =2.= This experience, though sufficient for our purposes, is an - infinitely small part of his providence. - - =3.= The things not understood involve God’s appointment, and - Christ’s execution; but what _is required of us_, we are clearly - informed. - - =4.= Even the reasons for Christian precepts are made obvious. - - -CHAPTER VI. - -SUPPOSED LACK OF PROOF OF REVELATION, AND ITS WANT OF UNIVERSALITY. - -It has been thought to be a positive argument against revelation, that -its evidences are not adequate, and that it is not universally known -and believed. - -But the argument amounts to just this, that God would not bestow on us -any favor, except in such a mode and degree as we thought best, and did -exactly the same for everybody else. - -Such a notion, all analogy contradicts. - - -I. _Men act in their most important concerns on doubtful evidence._ - - =1.= It is often absolutely _impossible_ to say which of two - modes of acting will give most pleasure or profit. - - =2.= If it were possible, we cannot know what changes temper, - satiety, ill health, &c. might produce, so as to destroy our - pleasure. - - =3.= We cannot foresee what accidents may cut it all off. - - =4.= Strong objections and difficulties may attach to the course - of action we adopt, which yet all would admit ought not to deter - us. - - =5.= We may, after all, be deceived by appearances, or by our - passions, &c. - - =6.= Men think it reasonable to engage in pursuit of advantage, - even when the probabilities of success are against them. - - -II. _As to the light of Christianity not being universal._ - - =1.= Temporal good is enjoyed in very different degrees even - among creatures of the same species. - - =2.= Yet it is certain that God governs. - - =3.= We may prudently or imprudently use our good things. - - =4.= The Jewish religion was not universal. - - =5.= If it be _intended_ that Christianity should be a small - light, shining in a great and wide-spread darkness, it would be - perfectly uniform with other parts of God’s providence. - - =6.= If some have Christianity so corrupted, and interpolated, as - to cause thoughtful persons to doubt it, as is the case in some - countries; and if, where it is the purest, some learn much less - from it than they might, there are manifest parallels in God’s - natural dispensations. - - =7.= No more is expected of any one, than is equitable under his - circumstances. - - =8.= Every one is bound to get rid of his ignorance, as far as he - can, and to instruct his neighbor. - - =9.= If revelation _were_ universal, in extent and degree, - different understandings, educations, tempers, length of lives, - and outward advantages, would soon make the knowledge of it as - different as it is at present. - - -III. _Practical reflections._ - - _First._ That the evidence of religion is not such as unavoidably - to convince all, may be part of our probation. - - =1.= It gives scope for a wise or vicious use of our - understanding. Just as is the case in common affairs. - - =2.= Intellectual inattention to so serious a matter, is as - immoral, as disobedience after conviction of the truth. - - _Secondly._ If the evidence is really doubtful, it puts us on - probation. - - =1.= If a man were in doubt whether a certain person had done - him the greatest favor, or whether his whole temporal interest - depended on him, he ought not to regard that person as he would - if there were _no_ reason to think so. - - =2.= So if there is only reason to apprehend that Christianity - _may_ be true, we are as much bound to _examine_, &c. as we - would be bound to _obey_, if we _knew_ it was true. - - =3.= Considering the infinite importance of religion, there is - not much difference as to what ought to be the mode of life of - those who are convinced and those who doubt its truth. Their - hopes and fears are the same in kind, though not in degree; and - so their obligations are much the same. - - =4.= Doubts presuppose _some_ evidence, belief _more_, and - certainty _more still_. Each state should influence our - conduct, and does so, in common things. - - =5.= It shows a mental defect not to see evidence unless it is - glaring; and a corrupt heart not to be influenced by it unless - overpowering. - - _Thirdly._ Difficulties as to believing religion, are no more a - ground of complaint, than difficulties in practising it. - - =1.= They constitute a wholesome discipline. - - 1.) In allowing an unfair mind to deceive itself. - - 2.) In requiring belief and the practice of virtue under some - uncertainties. - - =2.= In the case of some minds, speculative difficulties as - to the evidence of religion is the _principal_ trial. A full - conviction of its truth would _constrain_ some to obedience. - - _Fourthly._ The difficulties may be _in the objector_ rather than - in the religion. - - =1.= Not sufficiently in earnest to be informed. - - =2.= Secretly _wishes_ religion not to be true. - - =3.= Looks at objections rather than replies. - - =4.= Treats the subject ludicrously. - - _Fifthly._ The proof of Christianity is level to common men. - - =1.= They are capable of being convinced of the existence of - God, and of their moral accountability. - - =2.= And they can understand the evidence of miracles, and the - fulfilment of prophecy. - - =3.= If they are capable of seeing the difficulty, they are - capable of understanding the proof. - - =4.= If they pick up objections from hearsay, and will not or - cannot examine them thoroughly, they must remain ignorant, just - as they do as to the sciences. - - _Objec._ Our directions should be too plain to _admit_ of - doubt; like those of an earthly master. - - _Ans._ The earthly master only wants his work done, and is - careless as to the state of the heart; but as the whole of - morality consists in the state of the heart, the cases are - not parallel. - - _Finally._ The credibility of our being in a state of probation - is just as great as the credibility of there being any religion. - Our probation may be whether we choose to inform ourselves as to - our duty, and then whether we choose to do it. - - Such is exactly the case as to temporal matters. To discern what - is best often requires difficult consideration, and yet leaves - doubts: and not reflecting carefully, or not acting even when - there may be doubt, is often fatal. - - -CHAPTER VII. - -POSITIVE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY. - -Having considered the objections both to the general scheme of -Christianity, and to particular doctrines in it, it only remains to -consider the positive evidence of its truth; _i.e._ what analogy -teaches with regard to that evidence. - -There are many evidences of Christianity, beside those from miracles or -prophecy, which are the principal; embracing a great variety of proofs, -direct and collateral, and reaching through all past time. We shall now -consider the proofs from MIRACLES and PROPHECY. - - -I. _Miracles._ - - =1.= Bible history gives the same evidence for the miracles - described, as for common events. - - 1.) The miracles are evidently not put in for ornament, as - speeches are by historians and poets put into the mouths of - heroes. - - 2.) The accounts of them have been quoted as genuine, by - various writers, from that day to this. - - 3.) These accounts are confirmed by subsequent events; and the - miracles alone, can account for those events. - - 4.) The only fair way of accounting for these statements, - and their reception in the world, is that the things really - happened. - - 5.) The statements should be admitted till disproved, even if - doubtful. - - =2.= Paul’s Epistles have evidences of genuineness, beyond what - can attach to mere history. - - 1.) _Additional._ His evidence is quite detached. He received - the gospel not in common with the other apostles, but - separately, and direct from Christ, _after_ his ascension. - - 2.) _Peculiar._ He speaks of Christ’s miracles and those of - others _incidentally_, as familiar facts, fully believed by - those to whom he wrote. - - =3.= Christianity demands credence on the ground of its miracles, - and was so received by great numbers, at the time and on the - spot; which is the case with no other religion. - - 1.) Its first converts embraced it on this ground. - - 2.) It is not conceivable that they would have done so, at such - fearful sacrifice, unless fully satisfied of the truth of these - miracles. - - 3.) Such a profession and sacrifices furnish the same kind of - evidence as if they had testified to the truth of the miracles - in writing. - - 4.) It is real evidence, for they had full opportunity to - inform themselves. - - 5.) It is a sort of evidence _distinct_ from direct history, - though of the same nature. - - 6.) Men are suspicious as well as credulous, and slow to - believe _against their interests_, as these did. - - =4.= It lies upon unbelievers to show why all this array of proof - is to be rejected; but in such an important concern we shall - proceed to notice some possible objections. - - _Objec._ 1. Enthusiasts make similar sacrifices for idle - follies. - - _Ans._ 1. This objection ignores the distinction between - opinions and facts. Suffering for an opinion is no proof of - its truth; but in attestation of observed facts, it is proof. - - 2. Enthusiasm _weakens_ testimony, it is true, even as to - facts; and so does disease, _in particular instances_. But - when great numbers, not weak, nor negligent, affirm that - _they_ saw and heard certain things, it is the fullest - evidence. - - 3. To reject testimony on the ground of enthusiasm, requires - that the things testified be _incredible_; which has not been - shown, as to religion, but the contrary. - - 4. Religion is not the only thing in regard to which - witnesses are liable to enthusiasm. In common matters, we - _get at the truth_ through witnesses, though influenced by - party spirit, custom, humor, romance, &c. &c. - - _Objec._ 2. Enthusiasm and knavery may have been combined in the - apostles and first Christians. - - _Ans._ Such a mixture is often seen, and is often reproved in - Scripture; but not more in religious than in common affairs. - Men in all matters deceive themselves and others, in every - degree, yet human testimony is good ground of belief. - - _Objec._ 3. Men have been deluded by false miracles. - - _Ans._ Not oftener than by other pretences. - - _Objec._ 4. Fabulous miracles have historical evidence. - - _Ans._ 1. If this were equal to that for Scripture miracles, - the evidence for the latter would not be _impaired_. The - objection really amounts to this, that evidence proved not to - be good, destroys evidence which is good and unconfuted! Or - to this, that if two men, of equal reputation, testify, in - _cases not related_ to each other, and one is proved false, - the other must not be believed! - - 2. Nothing can rebut testimony, but proof that the witness is - incompetent, or misled. - - 3. Against all such objections must be set the fact that - Christianity was too serious a matter to allow the first - converts to be careless as to its evidence; and also that - their religion forbid them to deceive others. - - -II. _As to the evidence from prophecy._ - - =1.= Obscurity as to _part_ of a prophecy does not invalidate it, - but is, as to us, as if that part were not written, or were lost. - We may not see the whole prophecy fulfilled, and yet see enough - fulfilled to perceive in it more than human foresight. - - =2.= A _long series_ of prophecies, all applicable to certain - events, is proof that such events were intended. This answers the - objection that _particular_ prophecies were not intended to be - applied as Christians apply them. - - Mythological and satirical writings greatly resemble prophecy. - Now we apply a parable, or fable, or satire, merely from seeing - it _capable_ of such application. - - So if a long series of prophecies be _applicable_ to the present - state of the world, or to the coming of Christ, it is proof that - they were so _intended_. - - Besides, the ancient Jews, _before_ Christ, applied the - prophecies to him, just as Christians do now. - - =3.= If it could be shown that the prophets did not understand - their own predictions, or that their prophecies are capable of - being applied to other events than those to which Christians - apply them, it would not abate the force of the argument from - prophecy, even with regard to those instances. For, - - 1.) To know the whole meaning of an author we must know the - whole meaning of his book, but knowing the meaning of a book is - not knowing the whole mind of the author. - - 2.) If the book is a _compilation_, the authors may have - meanings deeper than the compiler saw. If the prophets spoke - by inspiration, they are not the authors, but the writers of - prophecy, and may not have known all that the Divine Spirit - intended. But the fulfilment of the prophecy shows a foresight - more than human. - - -REMARK. - -This whole argument is just and real; but it is not expected that those -will be satisfied who will not submit to the perplexity and labor -of understanding it; or who have not modesty and fairness enough to -allow an argument its due weight; or who wilfully discard the whole -investigation. - - -THE GENERAL ARGUMENT - -We _now_ proceed to THE GENERAL ARGUMENT embracing both direct and -circumstantial evidence. A full discussion would require a volume, and -cannot be expected here; but _something_ should be said, especially -as most questions of difficulty, in practical affairs, are settled by -evidence arising from circumstances which confirm each other. - -The thing asserted is that God has given us a revelation declaring -himself to be a moral governor; stating his system of government; and -disclosing a plan for the recovery of mankind out of sin, and raising -them to perfect and final happiness. - - -I. _Consider this revelation as a history._ - - =1.= It furnishes an account of the world, as God’s world. - - 1.) God’s providence, commands, promises, and threatenings. - - 2.) Distinguishes God from idols. - - 3.) Describes the condition of religion and of its professors, - in a world considered as apostate and wicked. - - 4.) Political events are related as affecting religion, and not - for their importance as mere political events. - - 5.) The history is continued by prophecy, to the end of the - world. - - =2.= It embraces a vast variety of other topics; natural and - moral. - - 1.) Thus furnishing the largest scope for criticism. - - 2.) So that _doubts_ of its truth confirm that truth, for in - this enlightened age the claims of a book of such a nature - could be easily and finally shown to be false, if they were so. - - 3.) None who believe in natural religion, hold that - Christianity has been thus confuted. - - =3.= It contains a minute account of God’s selecting one nation - for his peculiar people, and of his dealings with them. - - 1.) Interpositions in their behalf. - - 2.) Threats of dispersion, &c. if they rebelled. - - 3.) Promises of a Messiah as their prince; so clearly as to - raise a general expectation, &c. - - 4.) Foretelling his rejection by them, and that he should be - the Savior of the Gentiles. - - =4.= Describes minutely the arrival of the Messiah, and his - life and labors; and the result, in the establishment of a new - religion. - - -II. _As to the authenticity of this history._ - -Suppose a person ignorant of all history but the Bible, and not -knowing even that to be true, were to inquire into its evidence of -authenticity, he would find, - - =1.= That natural religion owes its establishment to _the - truths_ contained in this book. This no more _disproves_ natural - religion, than our learning a proposition from Euclid, shows that - the proposition was not true before Euclid. - - =2.= The great antiquity of revelation. - - =3.= That its chronology is not contradicted but confirmed by - known facts. - - =4.= That there is nothing in the history itself to awaken - suspicion of its fidelity. - - 1.) Every thing said to be done in any age or country, is - conformable to the manners of that age and country. - - 2.) The characters are all perfectly natural. - - 3.) All the domestic and political incidents are credible. Some - of these, taken alone, seem strange to _some_, in _this_ day; - but not more so than things now occurring. - - 4.) Transcribers may have made errors, but these are not more - numerous than in other ancient books; and none of them impair - the narrative. - - =5.= That profane authors confirm Scripture accounts. - - =6.= That the credibility of the _general_ history, confirms the - accounts of the miracles, for they are all interwoven, and make - but one statement. - - =7.= That there certainly was and is such a people as the Jews; - whose form of government was founded on these very books of - Moses; and whose acknowledgment of the God of the Bible, kept - them a distinct race. - - =8.= That one Jesus, of Jewish extraction, arose at the time - when the Jews expected a Messiah, was rejected by them, as was - prophesied, and was received by the Gentiles, as was prophesied. - - =9.= That the religion of this Jesus spread till it became the - religion of the world, notwithstanding every sort of resistance; - and has continued till now. - - =10.= That the Jewish government was destroyed, and the people - dispersed into all lands; and still for many centuries, continue - to be a distinct race, professing the law of Moses. If this - separateness be _accounted for_, in any way, it does not destroy - the fact that it was _predicted_. - - -CONCLUSION. - - =1.= Recapitulation of the preceding ten observations. - - =2.= Add the fact that there are obvious appearances in the - world, aside from the Jews, which correspond to prophetic history. - - =3.= These appearances, compared with Bible history, and with - each other, in _a joint view_, will appear to be of great weight, - and would impress one who regarded them for the first time, more - than they do us who have been familiar with them. - - =4.= The preceding discussion, though not thorough, amounts to - proof of something more than human in this matter. - - 1.) The sufficiency of these proofs may be denied, but the - _existence_ of them cannot be. - - 2.) The conformity of prophecies to events may be said to be - accidental, but the _conformity itself_ cannot be denied. - - 3.) These collateral proofs may be pronounced fanciful, but it - cannot be said they are _nothing_. Probabilities may not amount - to demonstration, but they remain probabilities. - - =5.= Those who will set down all seeming completions of prophecy, - and judge of them by the common rules of evidence, will find that - _together_ they amount to strong proof. Because probable proofs, - added together, not only increase evidence, but multiply it. - - =6.= It is very well to observe objections; but it should be - remembered that a mistake on one side is far more dangerous than - a mistake on the other; and the safest conclusion is the best. - - =7.= Religion, like other things, is to be judged by all the - evidence taken together. Unless _all_ its proofs be overthrown, - it remains proved. If no proof singly were sufficient, the whole - taken together might be. - - =8.= It is much easier to start an objection, than to comprehend - the united force of a whole argument. - - =9.= Thus it appears that the positive evidence of revelation - cannot be destroyed, though it should be lessened. - - -CHAPTER VIII. - -OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT. - -If all made up their minds with proper care and candor, there would be -no need of this chapter. But some do not try to understand what they -condemn; and our mode of argument is open to objections, especially in -the minds of those who judge without thinking. The chief objections -will therefore be considered. They are these:--it does not solve -difficulties in revelation to say that there are as great in natural -religion:--it will not make men religious to show them that it is -_as_ important as worldly prudence, for showing that, does not make -them prudent:--the justice of God in the system of religion, is not -proved by showing it is as apparent as in his natural providence:--no -reasoning from analogy can carry full conviction:--mankind will not -renounce present pleasures, for a religion which is not free from -doubt. To each of which a reply will now be given. - - -I. _As to requiring a solution of all difficulties._ - - =1.= This is but resolving to comprehend the nature of God, and - the whole plan of his government throughout eternity. - - =2.= It is always right to argue from what is known, to what is - disputed. We are constantly so doing. The most eminent physician - does not understand all diseases, yet we do not despise what he - does know. - - =3.= It is very important to find that objections against - revelation are just as strong, not only against natural religion, - but against the course of nature. - - -II. _As to men’s having as little reason for worldly pursuits, as they -have for being religious._ - - =1.= If men can be convinced that they have as much reason to be - religious as they have to practise worldly prudence, then _there - is_ a reason for being religious. - - =2.= If religion proposes greater than worldly interests, and has - the same reasons for belief, then it has proportionally a greater - claim. - - =3.= If religion being left doubtful, proves it to be false, then - doubts as to the success of any worldly pursuit show it to be - wrong. Yet we constantly act, even in the most important affairs, - without _certainty_ of being right. - - -III. _As to the justice and goodness of God in religion._ - - =1.= Our business is not to vindicate God, but to learn our duty, - governed as we are; which is a very different thing. It has been - shown that if we knew all things, present, past, and future, and - the relations of each thing to all other things, we might see to - be just and good what now do not seem so: and it is probable we - should. - - =2.= We do not say that objections against God’s justice and - goodness are removed by showing the like objections against - natural providence, but that they are not _conclusive_, because - they apply equally to what we know to be facts. - - =3.= The existence of objections does not destroy the evidence - of facts. The fact for instance that God rewards and punishes, - though men may think it unjust. Even necessity, plead for human - acts, does no more to abolish justice than it does injustice. - - =4.= Though the reasonableness of Christianity cannot be shown - from analogy, the truth of it may. The truth of a fact may be - proved without regard to its quality. The reasonableness of - obeying Christianity is proved, if we barely prove Christianity - itself to be possible. - - =5.= Though analogy may not show Christian precepts to be good, - it proves them to be credible. - - -IV. _The analogical argument does not remove doubt._ - - =1.= What opinion does any man hold, about which there can be no - doubt? Even the best way of preserving and enjoying this life, - is not agreed upon. Whether our measures will accomplish our - objects, is always uncertain; and still more whether the objects, - if accomplished, will give us happiness. Yet men do not on this - account refuse to make exertion. - - =2.= This objection overlooks the very nature of religion. - The embracing of it presupposes a certain degree of candor - and integrity, to try which, and exercise, and improve it, is - its intention. Just as warning a man of danger, presupposes a - disposition to avoid danger. - - =3.= Religion is a probation, and has evidence enough as such; - and would not be such, if it compelled assent. - - =4.= We never mean by sufficient evidence, such an amount as - necessarily determines a man to act, but only such as will show - an action to be prudent. - - -V. _As to the small influence of the analogical argument._ - - =1.= As just observed, religion is a _test_, and an _exercise_, - of character; and that some reject it is nothing to our purpose. - We are inquiring not what sort of creature man is, but what he - should be. This is each man’s own concern. - - =2.= Religion, as a probation, accomplishes its end, whether - individuals believe or not. - - =3.= Even this objection admits that religion has some weight, - and of course it should have some influence; and if so, there is - the same reason, though not so strong, for publishing it, that - there would be, if it were likely to have greater influence. - -FURTHER. It must be considered that the reasoning in this treatise is -on the principles of other men, and arguments of the utmost importance -are omitted, because not universally admitted. Thus as to Fatalism, and -the abstract fitness or unfitness of actions. The general argument is -just a question of fact, and is here so treated. Abstract truths are -usually advanced as proof; but in this work, only _facts_ are adduced. -That the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, is -an abstract truth: but that they so appear to us, is only a matter of -fact. That there is such a thing as abstract right and wrong, which -determines the will of God in rewarding and punishing, is an assertion -of an abstract truth, as well as a fact. Suppose God in this world -rewarded and punished every man exactly as he obeyed or disobeyed his -conscience, this would not be an abstract truth, but a fact. And if -all acknowledged this as a fact, all would not see it to be right. If, -instead of his doing it now, we say he will do it hereafter, this too -is not an abstract truth, but a question of fact. This fact could be -fully proved on the abstract principles of moral fitness; but without -them, there has now been given a _conclusive practical proof_; which -though it may be cavilled at, and shown not to amount to demonstration, -cannot be answered. - -Hence it may be said as to the force of this treatise, - - =1.= To such as are convinced of the truth of revelation, as - proved on the principles of liberty and moral fitness, it will - furnish a full confirmation. To such as do not admit those - principles it is an original proof. - - =2.= Those who believe will find objections removed, and - those who disbelieve will find they have no grounds for their - scepticism; and a good deal beside. - - =3.= Thus though some may think _too much_ is here made of - analogy, yet there can be no denying that the argument is _real_. - It confirms _all facts_ to which it can be applied; and of - many is the only proof. It is strong on the side of religion, - and ought to be regarded by such as prefer facts to abstract - reasonings. - - -CONCLUSION. - -Recapitulates the general structure and design of the argument, the -classes of persons for whose benefit it is particularly adopted, and -declares those who reject Christianity to be wholly without excuse. - - - - -Advertisement prefixed to the First Edition. - - -If the reader should here meet with any thing which he had not before -attended to, it will not be in the observations upon the constitution -and course of nature, these being all obvious, but in the application -of them; in which, though there is nothing but what appears to me -of some real weight, and therefore of great importance, yet he will -observe several things, which will appear to him of very little, if -he can think things to be of little importance, which are of any real -weight at all, upon such a subject of religion. However, the proper -force of the following treatise lies in the whole general analogy -considered together. - -It is come, I know not how to be taken for granted, by many persons, -that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry; but that -it is, now at length, discovered to be fictitious. Accordingly they -treat it, as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point among -all people of discernment; and nothing remained, but to set it up -as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of -reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the -world. On the contrary, thus much at least, will be here found, not -taken for granted but proved, that any reasonable man, who will -thoroughly consider the matter, may be as much assured, as he is of his -own being, that it is not so clear a case, that there is nothing in -it. There is, I think, strong evidence of its truth; but it is certain -no one can, upon principles of reason, be satisfied of the contrary. -The practical consequence to be drawn from this, is not attended to by -every one who is concerned in it. - -_May, 1736._ - - - - -INTRODUCTION. - - -Probable evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by -this, that it admits of degrees; and of all variety of them, from the -highest moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption. We cannot -indeed say a thing is probably true upon one very slight presumption -for it; because, as there may be probabilities on both sides of a -question, there may be some against it; and though there be not, yet -a slight presumption does not beget that degree of conviction, which -is implied in saying a thing is probably true. But that the slightest -possible presumption is of the nature of a probability, appears from -hence; that such low presumption, often repeated, will amount even -to moral certainty. Thus a man’s having observed the ebb and flow of -the tide to-day, affords some sort of presumption, though the lowest -imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow: but the observation of -this event for so many days, and months, and ages together, as it has -been observed by mankind, gives us a full assurance that it will. - -That which chiefly constitutes _probability_ is expressed in the word -_likely_, _i.e._ like some truth,[6] or true event; like it, in itself, -in its evidence, in some (more or fewer) of its circumstances.[7] For -when we determine a thing to be probably true, suppose that an event -has or will come to pass, it is from the mind’s remarking in it a -likeness to some other event, which we have observed has come to pass. -This observation forms, in numberless daily instances, a presumption, -opinion, or full conviction, that such event has or will come to pass; -according as the observation is, that the like event has sometimes, -most commonly, or always, so far as our observation reaches, come to -pass at like distances of time, or place, or upon like occasions. Hence -arises the belief, that a child, if it lives twenty years, will grow -up to the stature and strength of a man; that food will contribute to -the preservation of its life, and the want of it for such a number of -days, be its certain destruction. So likewise the rule and measure -of our hopes and fears concerning the success of our pursuits; our -expectations that others will act so and so in such circumstances; and -our judgment that such actions proceed from such principles; all these -rely upon our having observed the like to what we hope, fear, expect, -judge; I say, upon our having observed the like, either with respect to -others or ourselves. Thus, the prince[8] who had always lived in a warm -climate, naturally concluded in the way of analogy, that there was no -such thing as water’s becoming hard, because he had always observed it -to be fluid and yielding. We, on the contrary, from analogy conclude, -that there is no presumption at all against this: that it is supposable -there may be frost in England any given day in January next; probable -that there will on some day of the month; and that there is a moral -certainty, _i.e._ ground for an expectation without any doubt of it, in -some part or other of the winter. - -Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect kind -of information; and is to be considered as relative only to beings -of limited capacities. For nothing which is the possible object of -knowledge, whether past, present, or future, can be probable to an -infinite intelligence; since it cannot but be discerned absolutely -as it is in itself, certainly true, or certainly false. But to us, -probability is the very guide of life. - -From these things it follows, that in questions of difficulty, or such -as are thought so, where more satisfactory evidence cannot be had, or -is not seen; if the result of examination be, that there appears upon -the whole, any even the lowest presumption on one side, and none on -the other, or a greater presumption on one side, though in the lowest -degree greater; this determines the question, even in matters of -speculation. In matters of practice, it will lay us under an absolute -and formal obligation, in point of prudence and of interest, to act -upon that presumption or low probability, though it be so low as to -leave the mind in very great doubt which is the truth. For surely a -man is as really bound in prudence to do what upon the whole, according -to the best of his judgment, appears to be for his happiness,[9] as -what he certainly knows to be so. - -Further, in questions of great consequence, a reasonable man will think -it concerns him to remark lower probabilities and presumptions than -these; such as amount to no more than showing one side of a question -to be as supposable and credible as the other: nay, such even as but -amount to much less than this. For numberless instances might be -mentioned respecting the common pursuits of life, where a man would -be thought, in a literal sense, distracted, who would not act, and -with great application too, not only upon an even chance, but upon -much less, and where the probability or chance was greatly against his -succeeding.[10] - -It is not my design to inquire further into the nature, the foundation, -and measure of probability; or whence it proceeds that _likeness_ -should beget that presumption, opinion, and full conviction, which -the human mind is formed to receive from it, and which it does -necessarily produce in every one; or to guard against the errors, to -which reasoning from analogy is liable. This belongs to the subject of -Logic; and is a part of that subject which has not yet been thoroughly -considered. Indeed I shall not take upon me to say, how far the extent, -compass, and force, of analogical reasoning, can be reduced to general -heads and rules; and the whole be formed into a system. But though so -little in this way has been attempted by those who have treated of our -intellectual powers, and the exercise of them; this does not hinder but -that we may be, as we unquestionably are, assured, that analogy is of -weight, in various degrees, towards determining our judgment and our -practice. Nor does it in any wise cease to be of weight in those cases, -because persons, either given to dispute, or who require things to be -stated with greater exactness than our faculties appear to admit of -in practical matters, may find other cases in which it is not easy to -say, whether it be, or be not, of any weight; or instances of seeming -analogies, which are really of none. It is enough to the present -purpose to observe, that this general way of arguing is evidently -natural, just, and conclusive. For there is no man can make a question -but that the sun will rise to-morrow, and be seen, where it is seen at -all, in the figure of a circle, and not in that of a square. - -Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen[11] has with singular -sagacity observed, that “_he who believes the Scripture to have -proceeded from him who is the Author of nature, may well expect -to find the same sort of difficulties in it, as are found in the -constitution of nature_.” And in a like way of reflection it may be -added, that he who denies the Scripture to have been from God upon -account of these difficulties, may, for the very same reason, deny -the world to have been formed by him. On the other hand, if there be -an analogy or likeness between that system of things and dispensation -of Providence, which _revelation_ informs us of, and that system of -things and dispensation of Providence, which _experience_ together with -reason informs us of, _i.e._ the known course of nature; this is a -presumption, that they have both the same author and cause; at least so -far as to answer objections against the former’s being from God, drawn -from any thing which is analogical or similar to what is in the latter, -which is acknowledged to be from him; for an Author of nature is here -supposed. - -Forming our notions of the constitution and government of the world -upon reasoning, without foundation for the principles which we assume, -whether from the attributes of God, or any thing else, is building -a world upon hypothesis, like Des Cartes. Forming our notions upon -reasoning from principles which are certain, but applied to cases to -which we have no ground to apply them, (like those who explain the -structure of the human body, and the nature of diseases and medicines, -from mere mathematics,) is an error much akin to the former: since what -is assumed in order to make the reasoning applicable, is Hypothesis. -But it must be allowed just, to join abstract reasonings with the -observation of facts, and argue from such facts as are known, to -others that are like them; from that part of the divine government over -intelligent creatures which comes under our view, to that larger and -more general government over them which is beyond it; and from what is -present, to collect what is likely, credible, or not incredible, will -be hereafter. - -This method then of concluding and determining being practical, and -what, if we will act at all, we cannot but act upon in the common -pursuits of life; being evidently conclusive, in various degrees, -proportionable to the degree and exactness of the whole analogy or -likeness; and having so great authority for its introduction into the -subject of religion, even revealed religion; my design is to apply -it to that subject in general, both natural and revealed: taking for -proved, that there is an intelligent Author of nature, and natural -Governor of the world. For as there is no presumption against this -prior to the proof of it: so it has been often proved with accumulated -evidence; from this argument of analogy and final causes; from abstract -reasonings; from the most ancient tradition and testimony; and from -the general consent of mankind. Nor does it appear, so far as I can -find, to be denied by the generality of those who profess themselves -dissatisfied with the evidence of religion. - -As there are some, who, instead of thus attending to what is in fact -the constitution of nature, form their notions of God’s government -upon hypothesis: so there are others, who indulge themselves in vain -and idle speculations, how the world might possibly have been framed -otherwise than it is; and upon supposition that things might, in -imagining that they should, have been disposed and carried on after a -better model, than what appears in the present disposition and conduct -of them.[12] Suppose now a person of such a turn of mind, to go on with -his reveries, till he had at length fixed upon some particular plan -of nature, as appearing to him the best.--One shall scarce be thought -guilty of detraction against human understanding, if one should say, -even beforehand, that the plan which this speculative person would fix -upon, though he were the wisest of the sons of men, probably would not -be the very best, even according to his own notions of _best_; whether -he thought that to be so, which afforded occasions and motives for -the exercise of the greatest virtue, or which was productive of the -greatest happiness, or that these two were necessarily connected, and -run up into one and the same plan. - -It may not be amiss, once for all, to see what would be the amount -of these emendations and imaginary improvements upon the system of -nature, or how far they would mislead us. It seems there could be no -stopping, till we came to some such conclusions as these: that all -creatures should at first be made as perfect and as happy as they -were capable of ever being: that nothing, surely, of hazard or danger -should be put upon them to do; some indolent persons would perhaps -think nothing at all: or certainly, that effectual care should be -taken, that they should, whether necessarily or not, yet eventually -and in fact, always do what was right and most conducive to happiness; -which would be thought easy for infinite power to effect, either by -not giving them any principles which would endanger their going wrong, -or by laying the right motive of action in every instance before their -minds in so strong a manner, as would never fail of inducing them to -act conformably to it: and that the whole method of government by -punishments should be rejected as absurd; as an awkward roundabout -method of carrying things on; nay, as contrary to a principal purpose, -for which it would be supposed creatures were made, namely, happiness. - -Now, without considering what is to be said in particular to the -several parts of this train of folly and extravagance, what has been -above intimated, is a full direct general answer to it; namely, that -we may see beforehand that we have not faculties for this kind of -speculation. For though it be admitted that, from the first principles -of our nature, we unavoidably judge or determine some ends to be -absolutely in themselves preferable to others, and that the ends now -mentioned, or if they run up into one, that this one is absolutely -the best; and consequently that we must conclude the ultimate end -designed, in the constitution of nature and conduct of Providence, is -the most virtue and happiness possible; yet we are far from being able -to judge what particular disposition of things would be most friendly -and assistant to virtue; or what means might be absolutely necessary -to produce the most happiness in a system of such extent as our own -world may be, taking in all that is past and to come, though we should -suppose it detached from the whole things. Indeed we are so far from -being able to judge of this, that we are not judges what may be the -necessary means of raising and conducting one person to the highest -perfection and happiness of his nature. Nay, even in the little affairs -of the present life, we find men of different educations and ranks are -not competent judges of the conduct of each other. Our whole nature -leads us to ascribe all moral perfection to God, and to deny all -imperfection of him. And this will forever be a practical proof of his -moral character, to such as will consider what a practical proof is; -because it is the voice of God speaking in us. Hence we conclude, that -virtue must be the happiness, and vice the misery, of every creature; -and that regularity and order and right cannot but prevail finally in a -universe under his government. But we are in no sort judges, what are -the necessary means of accomplishing this end. - -Let us then, instead of that idle and not very innocent employment of -forming imaginary models of a world, and schemes of governing it, turn -our thoughts to what we experience to be the conduct of nature with -respect to intelligent creatures; which may be resolved into general -laws or rules of administration, in the same way as many of the laws of -nature respecting inanimate matter may be collected from experiments. -Let us compare the known constitution and course of things with what is -said to be the moral system of nature; the acknowledged dispensations -of Providence, or that government which we find ourselves under, with -what religion teaches us to believe and expect; and see whether they -are not analogous and of a piece. Upon such a comparison it will, I -think, be found that they are very much so: that both may be traced -up to the same general laws, and resolved into the same principles of -divine conduct. - -The analogy here proposed to be considered is of pretty large extent, -and consists of several parts; in some more, in others less exact. -In some few instances perhaps, it may amount to a real practical -proof; in others not so. Yet in these it is a confirmation of what is -proved otherwise. It will undeniably show, what too many need to have -shown them, that the system of religion, both natural and revealed, -considered only as a system, and prior to the proof of it, is not -a subject of ridicule, unless that of nature be so too. And it will -afford an answer to almost all objections against the system both of -natural and revealed religion; though not perhaps an answer in so great -a degree, yet in a very considerable degree an answer to the objections -against the evidence of it: for objections against a proof, and -objections against what is said to be proved, the reader will observe -are different things. - -The divine government of the world, implied in the notion of religion -in general and of Christianity, contains in it: that mankind is -appointed to live in a future state;[13] that there every one shall be -rewarded or punished;[14] rewarded or punished respectively for all -that behaviour here, which we comprehend under the words, virtuous -or vicious, morally good or evil:[15] that our present life is a -probation, a state of trial,[16] and of discipline,[17] for that future -one; notwithstanding the objections, which men may fancy they have, -from notions of necessity, against there being any such moral plan as -this at all;[18] and whatever objections may appear to lie against -the wisdom and goodness of it, as it stands so imperfectly made known -to us at present:[19] that this world being in a state of apostasy -and wickedness, and consequently of ruin, and the sense both of their -condition and duty being greatly corrupted amongst men, this gave -occasion for an additional dispensation of Providence; of the utmost -importance;[20] proved by miracles;[21] but containing in it many -things appearing to us strange, and not to have been expected;[22] a -dispensation of Providence, which is a scheme or system of things;[23] -carried on by the mediation of a divine person, the Messiah, in order -to the recovery of the world;[24] yet not revealed to all men, nor -proved with the strongest possible evidence to all those to whom it is -revealed; but only to such a part of mankind, and with such particular -evidence, as the wisdom of God thought fit.[25] - -The design then of the following treatise will be to show, that -the several parts principally objected against in this moral and -Christian dispensation, including its scheme, its publication, and the -proof which God has afforded us of its truth; that the particular -parts principally objected against in this whole dispensation, are -analogous to what is experienced in the constitution and course of -nature or Providence; that the chief objections themselves which are -alleged against the former, are no other than what may be alleged -with like justness against the latter, where they are found in fact -to be inconclusive; and that this argument from analogy is in general -unanswerable, and undoubtedly of weight on the side of religion,[26] -notwithstanding the objections which may seem to lie against it, and -the real ground which there may be for difference of opinion, as to -the particular degree of weight which is to be laid upon it. This is a -general account of what may be looked for in the following treatise. -I shall begin it with that which is the foundation of all our hopes -and of all our fears; all our hopes and fears, which are of any -consideration; I mean a future life. - - - - -THE - -ANALOGY OF RELIGION. - - - - -PART I. - -Natural Religion. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -A FUTURE LIFE.[27] - - -Strange difficulties have been raised by some concerning personal -identity, or the sameness of living agents, implied in the notion of -our existing now and hereafter, or in any two successive moments; -which, whoever thinks it worth while, may see considered in the first -dissertation at the end of this treatise. But without regard to any of -them here, let us consider what the analogy of nature, and the several -changes which we have undergone, and those which we know we may undergo -without being destroyed, suggest, as to the effect which death may, or -may not, have upon us; and whether it be not from thence probable, that -we may survive this change, and exist in a future state of life and -perception. - -I. From our being born into the present world in the helpless imperfect -state of infancy, and having arrived from thence to mature age, we find -it to be a general law of nature in our own species, that the same -creatures, the _same individuals_, should exist in degrees of life and -perception, with capacities of action, of enjoyment and suffering, in -one period of their being, greatly different from those appointed them -in another period of it. In other creatures the same law holds. For -the difference of their capacities and states of life at their birth -(to go no higher) and in maturity; the change of worms into flies, and -the vast enlargement of their locomotive powers by such change: and -birds and insects bursting the shell of their habitation, and by this -means entering into a new world, furnished with new accommodations -for them, and finding a new sphere of action assigned them; these are -instances of this general law of nature. Thus all the various and -wonderful transformations of animals are to be taken into consideration -here. The states of life in which we ourselves existed formerly, in -the womb and in our infancy, are almost as different from our present -in mature age, as it is possible to conceive any two states or degrees -of life can be. Therefore that we are to exist hereafter, in a state -as different (suppose) from our present, as this is from our former, -is but according to the analogy of nature; according to a natural -order or appointment of the very same kind, with what we have already -experienced. - -II. We know we are endued with capacities of action, of happiness -and misery: for we are conscious of acting, of enjoying pleasure and -suffering pain. Now that we have these powers and capacities before -death, is a presumption that we shall retain them through and after -death; indeed a probability of it abundantly sufficient to act upon, -unless there be some positive reason to think that death is the -destruction of those living powers; because there is in every case -a probability, that all things will continue as we experience they -are, in all respects, except those in which we have some reason to -think they will be altered. This is that _kind_[28] of presumption or -probability from analogy, expressed in the very word _continuance_, -which seems our only natural reason for believing the course of the -world will continue to-morrow, as it has done so far as our experience -or knowledge of history can carry us back. Nay, it seems our only -reason for believing, that any one substance now existing will continue -to exist a moment longer; the self-existent substance only excepted. -Thus if men were assured that the unknown event, death, was not the -destruction of our faculties of perception and of action, there would -be no apprehension that any other power or event, unconnected with this -of death, would destroy these faculties just at the instant of each -creature’s death; and therefore no doubt but that they would remain -after it; which shows the high probability that our living powers will -continue after death, unless there be some ground to think that death -is their destruction.[29] For, if it would be in a manner certain that -we should survive death,[30] provided it were certain that death would -not be our destruction, it must be highly probable we shall survive -it, if there be no ground to think death will be our destruction. - -Though I think it must be acknowledged, that prior to the natural and -moral proofs of a future life commonly insisted upon, there would arise -a general confused suspicion, that in the great shock and alteration -which we shall undergo by death, we, _i.e._ our living powers, might be -wholly destroyed; yet even prior to those proofs, there is really no -particular distinct ground or reason for this apprehension at all, so -far as I can find. If there be, it must arise either from _the reason -of the thing_, or from _the analogy of nature_. - -But we cannot argue from _the reason of the thing_, that death is the -destruction of living agents, because we know not at all what death is -in itself; but only some of its effects, such as the dissolution of -flesh, skin, and bones. These effects do in no wise appear to imply the -destruction of a living agent. Besides, as we are greatly in the dark, -upon what the exercise of our living powers depends, so we are wholly -ignorant what the powers themselves depend upon; the powers themselves -as distinguished, not only from their actual exercise, but also from -the present capacity of exercising them; and as opposed to their -destruction: for sleep, or certainly a swoon, shows us, not only that -these powers exist when they are not exercised, as the passive power of -motion does in inanimate matter; but shows also that they exist, when -there is no present capacity of exercising them: or that the capacities -of exercising them for the present, as well as the actual exercise -of them, may be suspended, and yet the powers themselves remain -undestroyed. Since then we know not at all upon what the existence of -our living powers depends, this shows further, there can no probability -be collected from the reason of the thing, that death will be their -destruction: because their existence may depend upon somewhat in no -degree affected by death; upon somewhat quite out of the reach of this -king of terrors. So that there is nothing more certain, than that _the -reason of the thing_ shows us no connection between death and the -destruction of living agents. - -Nor can we find any thing throughout the whole _analogy of nature_ to -afford us even the slightest presumption, that animals ever lose their -living powers; much less if it were possible, that they lose them -by death: for we have no faculties wherewith to trace any beyond or -through it, so as to see what becomes of them. This event removes them -from our view. It destroys the _sensible_ proof, which we had before -their death, of their being possessed of living powers, but does not -appear to afford the least reason to believe that they are, then, or by -that event, deprived of them. - -Our knowing that they were possessed of these powers, up to the very -period to which we have faculties capable of tracing them, is itself -a probability of their retaining them beyond it. This is confirmed, -and a sensible credibility is given to it, by observing the very great -and astonishing changes which we have experienced; so great, that our -existence in another state of life, of perception and of action, will -be but according to a method of providential conduct, the like to which -has been already exercised even with regard to ourselves; according to -a course of nature, the like to which we have already gone through. - -However, as one cannot but be greatly sensible, how difficult it is to -silence imagination enough to make the voice of reason even distinctly -heard in this case; as we are accustomed, from our youth up, to indulge -that forward, delusive faculty, ever obtruding beyond its sphere; -(of some assistance indeed to apprehension, but the author of all -error,) as we plainly lose ourselves in gross and crude conceptions -of things, taking for granted that we are acquainted with what indeed -we are wholly ignorant of: it may be proper to consider the imaginary -presumptions, that death will be our destruction, arising from these -kinds of early and lasting prejudices; and to show how little they -really amount to, even though we cannot wholly divest ourselves of -them. And, - -I. All presumption of death’s being the destruction of living beings, -must go upon supposition that they are compounded;[31] and so, -discerptible. But since consciousness is a single and indivisible -power, it should seem that the subject in which it resides must be so -too. For were the motion of any particle of matter absolutely one and -indivisible, so as that it should imply a contradiction to suppose -part of this motion to exist, and part not to exist, _i.e._ part of -this matter to move, and part to be at rest, then its power of motion -would be indivisible; and so also would the subject in which the power -inheres, namely, the particle of matter: for if this could be divided -into two, one part might be moved and the other at rest, which is -contrary to the supposition. - -In like manner it has been argued,[32] and, for any thing appearing -to the contrary, justly, that since the perception or consciousness, -which we have of our own existence, is indivisible, so as that it -is a contradiction to suppose one part of it should be here and the -other there; the perceptive power, or the power of consciousness, is -indivisible too: and consequently the subject in which it resides, -_i.e._ the conscious being. Now, upon supposition that the living -agent each man calls himself, is thus a single being, which there is -at least no more difficulty in conceiving than in conceiving it to be -a compound, and of which there is the proof now mentioned; it follows, -that our organized bodies are no more ourselves or part of ourselves, -than any other matter around us. And it is as easy to conceive, how -matter, which is no part of ourselves, may be appropriated to us in the -manner which our present bodies are; as how we can receive impressions -from, and have power over, any matter. It is as easy to conceive, that -we may exist out of bodies, as in them; and that we might have animated -bodies of any other organs and senses wholly different from these now -given us; and that we may hereafter animate these same or new bodies, -variously modified and organized; as to conceive how we can animate -such bodies as our present. And lastly, the dissolution of all these -several organized bodies, supposing ourselves to have successively -animated them, would have no more conceivable tendency to destroy -the living beings ourselves, or deprive us of living faculties, the -faculties of perception and of action, than the dissolution of any -foreign matter, which we are capable of receiving impressions from, and -making use of, for the common occasions of life. - -II. The simplicity and absolute oneness of a living agent cannot, -from the nature of the thing, be properly proved by experimental -observations. But as these _fall in_ with the supposition of its -unity, so they plainly lead us to _conclude_ certainly, that our gross -organized bodies, with which we perceive objects of sense, and with -which we act, are no part of ourselves; and therefore show us, that we -have no reason to believe their destruction to be ours: even without -determining whether our living substance be material or immaterial. For -we see by experience, that men may lose their limbs, their organs of -sense, and even the greatest part of these bodies, and yet remain the -same living agents. Persons can trace up the existence of themselves -to a time, when the bulk of their bodies was extremely small, in -comparison of what it is in mature age: and we cannot but think, that -they might _then_ have lost a considerable part of that small body, -and yet have remained the same living agents; as they may now lose -great part of their present body, and remain so. And it is certain, -that the bodies of all animals are in a constant flux;[33] from that -never-ceasing attrition, which there is in every part of them. Now, -things of this kind unavoidably teach us to distinguish, between these -living agents ourselves, and large quantities of matter, in which we -are very nearly interested; since these may be alienated, and actually -are in a daily course of succession, and changing their owners; whilst -we are assured, that each living agent remains one and the same -permanent being.[34] And this general observation leads us on to the -following ones. - -_First_, That we have no way of determining by experience, what is the -certain bulk of the living being each man calls himself: and yet, till -it be determined that it is larger in bulk than the solid elementary -particles of matter, which there is no ground to think any natural -power can dissolve, there is no sort of reason to think death to be the -dissolution of it, of the living being, even though it should not be -absolutely indiscerptible. - -_Secondly_, From our being so nearly related to and interested -in certain systems of matter, (suppose our flesh and bones,) and -afterwards ceasing to be at all related to them, the living agents, -ourselves, remaining all this while undestroyed notwithstanding -such alienation; and consequently these systems of matter not being -ourselves, it follows further that we have no ground to conclude any -other (suppose _internal_) _systems_ of matter, to be the living agents -ourselves; because we can have no ground to conclude this, but from -our relation to and interest in such other systems of matter: and -therefore we can have no reason to conclude what befalls those systems -of matter at death, to be the destruction of the living agents. We have -already several times over, lost a great part or perhaps the whole of -our body, according to certain common established laws of nature, yet -we remain the same living agents. When we shall lose as great a part, -or the whole, by another common established law of nature, death, why -may we not also remain the same? That the alienation has been gradual -in one case, and in the other will be more at once, does not prove -any thing to the contrary. We have passed undestroyed through those -many and great revolutions of matter, so peculiarly appropriated to us -ourselves; why should we imagine death will be so fatal to us? Nor can -it be objected, that what is thus alienated or lost, is no part of our -original solid body, but only adventitious matter. Because we may lose -entire limbs, which must have contained many solid parts and vessels of -the original body; or if this be not admitted, we have no proof, that -any of these solid parts are dissolved or alienated by death. Though -we are very nearly related to that extraneous or adventitious matter, -whilst it continues united to and distending the several parts of our -solid body, yet after all, the relation a person bears to those parts -of his body, to which he is most nearly related, amounts but to this, -that the living agent, and those parts of the body, mutually affect -each other.[35] The same thing, the same thing in kind though not in -degree, may be said of _all foreign_ matter, which gives us ideas, and -over which we have any power. From these observations the whole ground -of the imagination is removed, that the dissolution of any matter, is -the destruction of a living agent, from the interest he once had in -such matter. - -_Thirdly_, If we consider our body somewhat more distinctly, as made -up of organs and instruments of perception and of motion, it will -bring us to the same conclusion. Thus the common optical experiments -show, and even the observation how sight is assisted by glasses -shows, that we see with our eyes in the same sense as we see with -glasses. Nor is there any reason to believe, that we see with them in -any other sense; any other, I mean, which would lead us to think the -eye itself a percipient. The like is to be said of hearing; and our -feeling distant solid matter by means of something in our hand, seems -an instance of the like kind, as to the subject we are considering. -All these are instances of foreign matter, or such as is no part of -our body, being instrumental in preparing objects for, and conveying -them to, the perceiving power, in a manner similar to the manner in -which our organs of sense prepare and convey them. Both are in a like -way instruments of our receiving such ideas from external objects, -as the Author of nature appointed those external objects to be the -occasions of exciting in us. Glasses are evident instances of this; -namely of matter which is no part of our body, preparing objects for -and conveying them towards the perceiving power, in like manner as our -bodily organs do. And if we see with our eyes only in the same manner -as we do with glasses, the like may justly be concluded, from analogy, -of all our other senses. It is not intended, by any thing here said, -to affirm, that the whole apparatus of vision, or of perception by -any other sense, can be traced through all its steps, quite up to the -_living power_ of seeing, or perceiving: but that so far as it can be -traced by experimental observations, so far it appears, that our organs -of sense prepare and convey objects, in order to their being perceived, -in like manner as foreign matter does, without affording any shadow of -appearance, that they themselves perceive. And that we have no reason -to think our organs of sense percipients, is confirmed by instances of -persons losing some of them, the living beings themselves, their former -occupiers, remaining unimpaired. It is confirmed also by the experience -of dreams; by which we find we are at present possessed of a latent, -and what would be otherwise an unimagined unknown power of perceiving -sensible objects, in as strong and lively a manner without our external -organs of sense, as with them. - -So also with regard to our power of moving, or directing motion by will -and choice; upon the destruction of a limb, this active power evidently -remains, unlessened; so that the living being, who has suffered this -loss, would be capable of moving as before, if it had another limb to -move with. It can walk by the help of an artificial leg. It can make -use of a pole or a lever, to reach towards itself and to move things, -beyond the length and the power of its arm; and this it does in the -same manner as it reaches and moves, with its natural arm, things -nearer and of less weight. Nor is there so much as any appearance of -our limbs being endued with a power of moving or directing themselves; -though they are adapted, like the several parts of a machine, to be the -instruments of motion to each other; and some parts of the same limb, -to be instruments of motion to the other parts. - -Thus a man determines that he will look at an object through a -microscope; or being lame, that he will walk to such a place with a -staff, a week hence. His eyes and his feet no more determine in these -cases, than the microscope and the staff. Nor is there any ground to -think they any more put the determination in practice; or that his -eyes are the seers, or his feet the movers, in any other sense than -as the microscope and the staff are. Upon the whole, then, our organs -of sense, and our limbs, are certainly _instruments_,[36] which the -living persons ourselves make use of to perceive and move with: there -is not any probability, that they are any more; nor consequently, -that we have any other kind of relation to them, than what we have to -any other foreign matter formed into instruments of perception and -motion, suppose into a microscope or a staff; (I say any other kind of -relation, for I am not speaking of the degree of it) nor consequently -is there any probability, that the alienation or dissolution of these -instruments, is the destruction of the perceiving and moving agent. - -And thus our finding that the dissolution of matter, in which living -beings were most nearly interested, is not their dissolution; and -that the destruction of several of the organs and instruments of -perception and of motion belonging to them, is not their destruction; -shows demonstratively, that there is no ground to think that the -dissolution of any other matter, or destruction of any other organs and -instruments, will be the dissolution or destruction of living agents, -from the like kind of relation. And we have no reason to think we stand -in any other kind of relation to any thing which we find dissolved by -death. - -But it is said, these observations are equally applicable to -brutes:[37] and it is thought an insuperable difficulty, that they -should be immortal, and by consequence capable of everlasting -happiness. Now this manner of expression is both invidious and weak: -but the thing intended by it, is really no difficulty at all, either in -the way of natural or moral consideration. For 1, Suppose the invidious -thing, designed in such a manner of expression, were really implied, as -it is not in the least, in the natural immortality of brutes, namely, -that they must arrive at great attainments, and become rational and -moral agents; even this would be no difficulty, since we know not what -latent powers and capacities they may be endued with. There was once, -prior to experience, as great presumption against human creatures, -as there is against the brute creatures, arriving at that degree of -understanding, which we have in mature age. For we can trace up our own -existence to the same original with theirs. We find it to be a general -law of nature, that creatures endued with _capacities_ of virtue and -religion should be placed in a condition of being, in which they are -altogether without _the use_ of them, for a considerable length of -their duration; as in infancy and childhood. And great part of the -human species, go out of the present world, before they come to the -exercise of these capacities in _any_ degree. - -2. The natural immortality of brutes does not in the least imply, that -they are endued with any latent capacities of a rational or _moral_ -nature. The economy of the universe might require, that there should -be living creatures without any capacities of this kind. And all -difficulties as to the manner how they are to be disposed of, are so -apparently and wholly founded in our ignorance, that it is wonderful -they should be insisted upon by any, but such as are weak enough to -think they are acquainted with the whole system of things. There -is then absolutely nothing at all in this objection, which is so -rhetorically urged, against the greatest part of the natural proofs -or presumptions of the immortality of human minds; I say the greatest -part, for it is less applicable to the following observation, which is -more peculiar to mankind. - -III. As it is evident our _present_ powers and capacities of reason, -memory, and affection, do not depend upon our gross body in the manner -in which perception by our organs of sense does; so they do not appear -to depend upon it at all, in any such manner as to give ground to -think, that the dissolution of this body will be the destruction of -these our present powers of reflection, as it will of our powers of -sensation; or to give ground to conclude, even that it will be so much -as a suspension of the former. - -Human creatures exist at present in two states of life and perception, -greatly different from each other; each of which has its own peculiar -laws, and its own peculiar enjoyments and sufferings. When any of -our senses are affected, or appetites gratified with the objects of -them, we may be said to exist or live in a state of sensation. When -none of our senses are affected or appetites gratified, and yet we -perceive, and reason, and act, we may be said to exist or live in a -state of reflection. Now it is by no means certain, that any thing -which is dissolved by death, is in any way necessary to the living -being, in this its state of reflection, _after_ ideas are gained. -For, though, from our present constitution and condition of being, -our external organs of sense are necessary for conveying in ideas to -our reflecting powers, as carriages, and levers, and scaffolds are in -architecture:[38] yet when these ideas are brought in, we are capable -of reflecting in the most intense degree, and of enjoying the greatest -pleasure, and feeling the greatest pain, by means of that reflection, -without any assistance from our senses; and without any at all, which -we know of, from that body which will be dissolved by death. It does -not appear then, that the relation of this gross body to the reflecting -being is, in any degree, necessary to thinking; to intellectual -enjoyments or sufferings: nor, consequently, that the dissolution or -alienation of the former by death, will be the destruction of those -present powers, which render us capable of this state of reflection. - -Further, there are instances of mortal diseases, which do not at all -affect our present intellectual powers; and this affords a presumption, -that those diseases will not destroy these present powers. Indeed, -from the observations made above,[39] it appears, that there is no -presumption, from their mutually affecting each other, that the -dissolution of the body is the destruction of the living agent. By -the same reasoning, it must appear too, that there is no presumption, -from their mutually affecting each other, that the dissolution of -the body is the destruction of our present reflecting powers: indeed -instances of their not affecting each other, afford a presumption of -the contrary. Instances of mortal diseases not impairing our present -reflecting powers, evidently turn our thoughts even from imagining such -diseases to be the destruction of them. Several things indeed greatly -affect all our living powers, and at length suspend the exercise of -them; as for instance drowsiness, increasing till it ends in sound -sleep: and hence we might have imagined it would destroy them, till -we found by experience the weakness of this way of judging. But in -the diseases now mentioned, there is not so much as this shadow of -probability, to lead us to any such conclusion, as to the reflecting -powers which we have at present. For in those diseases, persons the -moment before death appear to be in the highest vigor of life. They -discover apprehension, memory, reason, all entire; the utmost force of -affection; a sense of character, of shame and honor; and the highest -mental enjoyments and sufferings, even to the last gasp. These surely -prove even greater vigor of life than bodily strength does. Now what -pretence is there for thinking, that a progressive disease when arrived -to such a degree, I mean that degree which is mortal, will destroy -those powers, which were not impaired, which were not affected by it, -during its whole progress quite up to that degree? And if death by -diseases of this kind, is not the destruction of our present reflecting -powers, it will scarce be thought that death by any other means is. - -It is obvious that this general observation may be carried further. -There appears to be so little connection between our bodily powers -of sensation, and our present powers of reflection, that there is -no reason to conclude, that death, which destroys the former, does -so much as _suspend the exercise_ of the latter, or interrupt our -_continuing_ to exist in the like state of reflection which we do -now.[40] For suspension of reason, memory, and the affections which -they excite, is no part of the idea of death, nor implied in our notion -of it. Our daily experiencing these powers to be exercised, without -any assistance, that we know of, from those bodies which will be -dissolved by death; and our finding often, that the exercise of them -is so lively to the last; afford a sensible apprehension, that death -may not perhaps be so much as a discontinuance of the exercise of these -powers, nor of the enjoyments and sufferings which it implies.[41] So -that our posthumous life, whatever there may be in it additional to our -present, may yet not be beginning entirely anew; but going on. Death -may, in some sort and in some respects, answer to our birth; which is -not a suspension of the faculties which we had before it, or a _total_ -change of the state of life in which we existed when in the womb; but a -continuation of both, with such and such great alterations. - -Nay, for aught we know of ourselves, of our present life and of death, -death may immediately, in the natural course of things, put us into a -higher and more enlarged state of life, as our birth does;[42] a state -in which our capacities; and sphere of perception and of action, may -be much greater than at present. For as our relation to our external -organs of sense, renders us capable of existing in our present state of -sensation; so it may be the only natural hinderance to our existing, -immediately, and of course; in a _higher_ state of reflection. The -truth is, reason does not at all show us, in what state death naturally -leaves us. But were we sure, that it would suspend all our perceptive -and active powers; yet the suspension of a power and the destruction -of it, are effects so totally different in kind, as we experience from -sleep and a swoon, that we cannot in any wise argue from one to the -other; or conclude even to the lowest degree of probability, that the -same kind of force which is sufficient to suspend our faculties, though -it be increased ever so much, will be sufficient to destroy them.[43] - -These observations together may be sufficient to show, how little -presumption there is, that death is the destruction of human creatures. -However, there is the shadow of an analogy, which may lead us to -imagine it,--viz.: the supposed likeness which is observed between the -decay of vegetables, and of living creatures. This likeness is indeed -sufficient to afford the poets very apt allusions to the flowers of -the field, in their pictures of the frailty of our present life. But -in reason, the analogy is so far from holding, that there appears no -ground for the comparison, as to the present question; because one -of the two subjects compared is wholly void of that, which is the -principal and chief thing in the other; the power of perception and of -action; which is the only thing we are inquiring about the continuance -of. So that the destruction of a vegetable, is an event not similar or -analogous to the destruction of a living agent. - -If, as was above intimated, leaving off the delusive custom of -substituting imagination in the room of experience, we would confine -ourselves to what we do know and understand; if we would argue only -from that, and from that form our expectations, it would appear at -first sight, that as no probability of living beings ever ceasing to -be so, can be concluded from the reason of the thing, so none can be -collected from the analogy of nature; because we cannot trace any -living beings beyond death. But as we are conscious that we are endued -with capacities of perception and of action, and are living persons; -what we are to go upon is, that we shall continue so, till we foresee -some accident or event, which will endanger those capacities, or be -likely to destroy us: which death does in no wise appear to be. - -Thus, when we go out of this world, we may pass into new scenes, and -a new state of life and action, just as naturally as we came into the -present. And this new state may naturally be a social one.[44] And the -advantages of it, advantages, of every kind, may naturally be bestowed, -according to some fixed general laws of wisdom, upon every one in -proportion to the degrees of his virtue. And though the advantages -of that future natural state should not be bestowed, as these of the -present in some measure are, by the will of the society; but entirely -by his more immediate action, upon whom the whole frame of nature -depends: yet this distribution may be just as natural, as their being -distributed here by the instrumentality of men. Indeed, though one -should allow any confused undetermined sense, which people please to -put upon the word _natural_, it would be a shortness of thought scarce -credible, to imagine, that no system or course of things can be so, but -only what we see at present:[45] especially whilst the probability -of a future life, or the natural immortality of the soul, is admitted -upon the evidence of reason; because this is really both admitting -and denying at once, a state of being different from the present to -be natural. But the only distinct meaning of that word is, _stated_, -_fixed_, or _settled_; since what is natural as much requires and -presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, _i.e._ to effect it -continually, or at stated times, as what is supernatural or miraculous -does to effect it for once. - -Hence it must follow, that persons’ notion of what is natural, will be -enlarged in proportion to their greater knowledge of the works of God, -and the dispensations of his providence. Nor is there any absurdity in -supposing, that there may be beings in the universe, whose capacities, -and knowledge, and views, may be so extensive, as that the whole -Christian dispensation may to them appear natural, _i.e._ analogous -or conformable to God’s dealings with other parts of his creation; as -natural as the visible known course of things appears to us. For there -seems scarce any other possible sense to be put upon the word, but that -only in which it is here used; similar, stated, or uniform. - -This credibility of a future life, which has been here insisted upon, -how little soever it may satisfy our curiosity, seems to answer all the -purposes of religion, in like manner as a demonstrative proof would. -Indeed a proof, even a demonstrative one, of a future life, would not -be a proof of religion. For, that we are to live hereafter, is just as -reconcilable with the scheme of atheism, and as well to be accounted -for by it, as that we are now alive is: and therefore nothing can -be more absurd than to argue from that scheme, that there can be no -future state. But as religion implies a future state, any presumption -against such a state, is a presumption against religion. The foregoing -observations remove all presumptions of that sort, and prove, to a -very considerable degree of probability, one fundamental doctrine of -religion; which, if believed, would greatly open and dispose the mind -seriously to attend to the general evidence! of the whole. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. - - -That which makes the question concerning a future life to be of so -great importance to us, is our capacity of happiness and misery. And -that which makes the consideration of it to be of so great importance -to us, is the supposition of our happiness and misery hereafter -depending upon our actions here. Indeed, without this, curiosity -could not but sometimes bring a subject, in which we may be so highly -interested, to our thoughts; especially upon the mortality of others, -or the near prospect of our own. But reasonable men would not take -any further thought about hereafter, than what should happen thus -occasionally to rise in their minds, if it were certain that our future -interest no way depended upon our present behavior; whereas, on the -contrary, if there be ground, either from analogy or any thing else, to -think it does, then there is reason also for the most active thought -and solicitude, to secure that interest; to behave so as that we may -escape that misery, and obtain that happiness, in another life, which -we not only suppose ourselves capable of, but which we apprehend also -is put in our own power. And whether there be ground for this last -apprehension, certainly would deserve to be most seriously considered, -were there no other proof of a future life and interest, than that -presumptive one, which the foregoing observations amount to. - -In the present state, all which we enjoy, and a great part of what -we suffer, _is put in our own power_. Pleasure and pain are the -consequences of our actions; and we are endued by the Author of our -nature with capacities of foreseeing these consequences. We find by -experience that he does not so much as preserve our lives, exclusive -of our own care and attention, to provide ourselves with, and to make -use of, that sustenance, by which he has appointed our lives shall -be preserved; and without which, he has appointed, they shall not be -preserved. In general we foresee, that the external things, which -are the objects of our various passions, can neither be obtained nor -enjoyed, without exerting ourselves in such and such manners: but by -thus exerting ourselves, we obtain and enjoy these objects, in which -our natural good consists; or by this means God gives us the possession -and enjoyment of them. I know not, that we have any one kind or degree -of enjoyment, but by the means of our own actions. By prudence and -care, we may, for the most part, pass our days in tolerable ease and -quiet: on the contrary, we may, by rashness, ungoverned passion, -wilfulness, or even by negligence, make ourselves as miserable as ever -we please. And many do please to make themselves extremely miserable, -_i.e._ to do what they know beforehand will render them so. They follow -those ways, the fruit of which they know, by instruction, example, and -experience, will be disgrace, and poverty, and sickness, and untimely -death. This every one observes to be the general course of things; -though it is to be allowed, we cannot find by experience, that _all_ -our sufferings are owing to our own follies. - -Why the Author of nature does not give his creatures promiscuously such -and such perceptions, without regard to their behavior; why he does -not make them happy without the instrumentality of their own actions, -and prevent their bringing any sufferings upon themselves, is another -matter.[46] Perhaps there may be some impossibilities in the nature -of things, which we are unacquainted with.[47] Or less happiness, it -may be, would upon the whole be produced by such a method of conduct, -than is by the present. Or perhaps divine goodness, with which, if I -mistake not, we make very free in our speculations, may not be a bare -single disposition to produce happiness; but a disposition to make the -good, the faithful, the honest, happy. Perhaps an infinitely perfect -mind may be pleased with seeing his creatures behave suitably to the -nature which he has given them; to the relations which he has placed -them in to each other; and to that which they stand in to himself: -that relation to himself, which, during their existence, is even -necessary,[48] and which is the most important one of all: perhaps, -I say, an infinitely perfect mind may be pleased with this moral -piety of moral agents, in and for itself; as well as upon account of -its being essentially conducive to the happiness of his creation. Or -the whole end, for which God made, and thus governs the world, may -be utterly beyond the reach of our faculties: there may be somewhat -in it as impossible for us to have any conception of, as for a blind -man to have a conception of colors. However this be, it is certain -matter of universal experience, that the general method of divine -administration is, forewarning us, or giving us capacities to foresee, -with more or less clearness, that if we act so and so, we shall have -such enjoyments, if so and so, such sufferings; and giving us those -enjoyments, and making us feel those sufferings, in consequence of our -actions. - -“But all this is to be ascribed to the general course of nature,” True. -This is the very thing which I am observing. It is to be ascribed to -the general course of nature: _i.e._ not surely to the words or ideas, -_course of nature_; but to Him who appointed it, and put things into -it; or to a course of operation, from its uniformity or constancy, -called natural;[49] and which necessarily implies an operating agent. -For when men find themselves necessitated to confess an Author of -nature, or that God is the natural governor of the world, they must -not deny this again, because his government is uniform. They must not -deny that he does things at all, because he does them constantly,[50] -because the effects of his acting are permanent, whether his acting -be so or not; though there is no reason to think it is not. In short, -every man, in every thing he does, naturally acts upon the forethought -and apprehension of avoiding evil or obtaining good: and if the natural -course of things be the appointment of God, and our natural faculties -of knowledge and experience are given us by him, then the good and bad -consequences which follow our actions, are his appointment, and our -foresight of those consequences, is a warning given us by him, how we -are to act. - -“Is the pleasure then, naturally accompanying every particular -gratification of passion, intended to put us upon gratifying ourselves -in every such particular instance, and as a reward to us for so doing?” -No, certainly. Nor is it to be said, that our eyes were naturally -intended to give us the sight of each particular object, to which they -do or can extend; objects which are destructive of them, or which, for -any other reason, it may become us to turn our eyes from. Yet there is -no doubt, but that our eyes were intended for us to see with.[51] So -neither is there any doubt, but that the foreseen pleasures and pains -belonging to the passions, were intended, in general, to induce mankind -to act in such and such manners. - -From this general observation, obvious to every one, (that God has -given us to understand, he has appointed satisfaction and delight to be -the consequence of our acting in one manner, and pain and uneasiness of -our acting in another, and of our not acting at all; and that we find -these consequences, which we were beforehand informed of, uniformly -to follow;) we may learn, that we are at present actually under his -government in the strictest and most proper sense; in such a sense, as -that he rewards and punishes us for our actions. - -An Author of nature being supposed, it is not so much a deduction -of reason, as a matter of experience, that we are thus under his -government; under his government, in the same sense, as we are under -the government of civil magistrates. Because the annexing of pleasure -to some actions, and pain to others, in our power to do or forbear, -and giving notice of this appointment beforehand to those whom it -concerns, is the proper formal notion of government. - -Whether the pleasure or pain which thus follows upon our behavior, be -owing to the Author of nature’s acting upon us every moment which we -feel it; or to his having at once contrived and executed his own part -in the plan of the world; makes no alteration as to the matter before -us. For if civil magistrates could make the sanctions of their laws -take place, without interposing at all, after they had passed them; -without a trial, and the formalities of an execution: if they were able -to make their laws _execute themselves_, or every offender to execute -them upon himself; we should be just in the same sense under their -government then, as we are now; but in a much higher degree, and more -perfect manner. - -Vain is the ridicule, with which one foresees some persons will divert -themselves, upon finding lesser pains considered as instances of divine -punishment. There is no possibility of answering or evading the general -thing here intended, without denying all final causes. For final causes -being admitted, the pleasures and pains now mentioned must be admitted -too as instances of them. And if they are; if God annexes delight to -some actions, and uneasiness to others, with an apparent design to -induce us to act so and so; then he not only dispenses happiness and -misery, but also rewards and punishes actions. If, for example, the -pain which we feel, upon doing what tends to the destruction of our -bodies, suppose upon too near approaches to fire, or upon wounding -ourselves, be appointed by the Author of nature to prevent our doing -what thus tends to our destruction; this is altogether as much an -instance of his punishing our actions, and consequently of our being -under his government,[52] as declaring by a voice from heaven, that if -we acted so, he would inflict such pain upon us; and inflicting it, -whether it be greater or less. - -Thus we find, that the true notion or conception of the Author of -nature, is that of a master or governor, prior to the consideration -of his moral attributes. The fact of our case, which we find by -experience, is, that he actually exercises dominion or government over -us at present, by rewarding and punishing us for our actions, in as -strict and proper a sense of these words, and even in the same sense, -as children, servants, subjects, are rewarded and punished by those who -govern them. - -Thus the whole analogy of nature, the whole present course of things, -most fully shows, that there is nothing incredible in the general -doctrine of religion, that God will reward and punish men for their -actions hereafter: nothing incredible, I mean, arising out of the -notion of rewarding and punishing. For the whole course of nature is -a present instance of his exercising that government over us, which -implies in it rewarding and punishing. - - * * * * * - -As divine _punishment_ is what men chiefly object against, and are most -unwilling to allow; it may be proper to mention some circumstances -in the natural course of punishments at present, which are analogous -to what religion teaches us concerning a future state of punishment; -indeed so analogous, that as they add a further credibility to it, so -they cannot but raise a most serious apprehension of it in those who -will attend to them. - -It has been now observed, that such and such miseries naturally follow -such and such actions of imprudence and wilfulness, as well as actions -more commonly and more distinctly considered as vicious; and that -these consequences, when they may be foreseen, are properly natural -punishments annexed to such actions. The general thing here insisted -upon, is, not that we see a great deal of misery in the world, but a -great deal which men bring upon themselves by their own behavior, which -they might have foreseen and avoided. Now the circumstances of these -natural punishments, particularly deserving our attention, are such -as these. Oftentimes they follow, or are inflicted in consequence of, -actions which procure many present advantages, and are accompanied with -much present pleasure; for instance, sickness and untimely death are -the consequence of intemperance, though accompanied with the highest -mirth, and jollity. These punishments are often much greater, than -the advantages or pleasures obtained by the actions, of which they are -the punishments or consequences. Though we may imagine a constitution -of nature, in which these natural punishments, which are in fact to -follow, would follow, immediately upon such actions being done, or -very soon after; we find on the contrary in our world, that they are -often delayed a great while, sometimes even till long after the actions -occasioning them are forgot; so that the constitution of nature is -such, that delay of punishment is no sort nor degree of presumption of -final impunity. After such delay, these natural punishments or miseries -often come, not by degrees, but suddenly, with violence, and at once; -however, the chief misery often does. As certainty of such distant -misery following such actions, is never afforded persons, so perhaps -during the actions, they have seldom a distinct, full expectation of -its following:[53] and many times the case is only thus, that they see -in general, or may see, the credibility, that intemperance, suppose, -will bring after it diseases; civil crimes, civil punishments; when -yet the real probability often is, that they shall escape; but things -notwithstanding take their destined course, and the misery inevitably -follows at its appointed time, in very many of these cases. Thus also -though youth may be alleged as an excuse for rashness and folly, -as being naturally thoughtless, and not clearly foreseeing all the -consequences of being untractable and profligate, this does not hinder, -but that these consequences follow; and are grievously felt, throughout -the whole course of mature life. Habits contracted even in that age, -are often utter ruin: and men’s success in the world, not only in the -common sense of worldly success, but their real happiness and misery, -depends, in a great degree, and in various ways, upon the manner in -which they pass their youth; which consequences they for the most -part neglect to consider, and perhaps seldom can properly be said to -believe, beforehand. In numberless cases, the natural course of things -affords us opportunities for procuring advantages to ourselves at -certain times, which we cannot procure when we will; nor ever recall -the opportunities, if we have neglected them. Indeed the general course -of nature is an example of this. If, during the opportunity of youth, -persons are indocile and self-willed, they inevitably suffer in their -future life, for want of those acquirements, which they neglected the -natural season of attaining. If the husbandman lets seedtime pass -without sowing, the whole year is lost to him beyond recovery. Though -after men have been guilty of folly and extravagance _up to a certain -degree_, it is often in their power, to retrieve their affairs, to -recover their health and character, at least in good measure; yet real -reformation is in many cases, of no avail at all towards preventing -the miseries, poverty, sickness, infamy, naturally annexed to folly -and extravagance _exceeding that degree_. There is a certain bound to -imprudence and misbehavior, which being transgressed, there remains no -place for repentance in the natural course of things. It is further -very much to be remarked, that neglects from inconsiderateness, want -of attention,[54] not looking about us to see what we have to do, are -often attended with consequences altogether as dreadful, as any active -misbehavior, from the most extravagant passion. And lastly, civil -government being natural, the punishments of it are so too: and some -of these punishments are capital; as the effects of a dissolute course -of pleasure are often mortal. So that many natural punishments are -final[55] to him who incurs them, if considered only in his temporal -capacity; and seem inflicted by natural appointment, either to remove -the offender out of the way of being further mischievous, or as an -example, though frequently a disregarded one, to those who are left -behind. - -These things are not what we call accidental, or to be met with only -now and then; but they are things of every day’s experience. They -proceed from general laws, very general ones, by which God governs the -world in the natural course of his providence.[56] - -And they are so analogous, to what religion teaches us concerning the -future punishment of the wicked, so much of a piece with it, that -both would naturally be expressed in the very same words, and manner -of description. In the book of _Proverbs_,[57] for instance, wisdom -is introduced, as frequenting the most public places of resort, and -as rejected when she offers herself as the natural appointed guide -of human life. _How long_, speaking to those who are passing through -it, _how long, ye simple ones, will ye love folly, and the scorners -delight in their scorning, and fools hate knowledge? Turn ye at my -reproof. Behold, I will pour out my spirit upon you, I will make known -my words unto you._ But upon being neglected, _Because I have called, -and ye refused, I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded; but -ye have set at nought all my counsel, and would none of my reproof: I -also will laugh at your calamity, I will mock when your fear cometh; -when your fear cometh as desolation, and your destruction cometh as a -whirlwind; when distress and anguish come upon you. Then shall they -call upon me, but I will not answer; they shall seek me early, but they -shall not find me._ This passage, every one sees, is poetical, and -some parts of it are highly figurative; but the meaning is obvious. -And the thing intended is expressed more literally in the following -words; _For that they hated knowledge, and did not choose the fear of -the Lord----therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way, -and be filled with their own devices. For the security of the simple -shall slay them, and the prosperity of fools shall destroy them._ The -whole passage is so equally applicable to what we experience in the -present world, concerning the consequences of men’s actions, and to -what religion teaches us is to be expected in another, that it may be -questioned which of the two was principally intended. - -Indeed when one has been recollecting the proper proofs of a future -state of rewards and punishments, nothing methinks can give one so -sensible an apprehension of the latter, or representation of it to -the mind, as observing, that after the many disregarded checks, -admonitions, and warnings, which people meet with in the ways of vice -and folly and extravagance, warnings from their very nature, from the -examples of others, from the lesser inconveniences which they bring -upon themselves, from the instructions of wise and virtuous men: -after these have been long despised, scorned, ridiculed: after the -chief bad consequences, temporal consequences, of their follies, have -been delayed for a great while, at length they break in irresistibly, -like an armed force: repentance is too late to relieve, and can serve -only to aggravate their distress, the case is become desperate: and -poverty and sickness, remorse and anguish, infamy and death, the -effects of their own doings, overwhelm them beyond possibility of -remedy or escape. This is an account of what is; in fact, the general -constitution of nature. - -It is not in any sort meant, that, according to what appears at present -of the natural course of things, men are always uniformly punished -in proportion to their misbehavior. But that there are very many -instances of misbehavior punished in the several ways now mentioned, -and very dreadful instances too; sufficient to show what the laws of -the universe may admit, and, if thoroughly considered, sufficient fully -to answer all objections against the credibility of a future state of -punishments, from any imaginations, that the frailty of our nature and -external temptations, almost annihilate the guilt of human vices: as -well as objections of another sort; from necessity, from suppositions, -that the will of an infinite Being cannot be contradicted, or that he -must be incapable of offence and provocation.[58] - -Reflections of this kind are not without their terrors to serious -persons, even the most free from enthusiasm, and of the greatest -strength of mind; but it is fit that things be stated and considered as -they really are. There is, in the present age, a certain fearlessness -with regard to what may be hereafter under the government of God, which -nothing but a universally acknowledged demonstration on the side of -atheism can justify; and which makes it quite necessary, that men be -reminded, and if possible made to feel, that there is no sort of ground -for being thus presumptuous, even upon the most sceptical principles. -For, may it not be said of any person upon his being born into the -world, he may behave so as to be of no service to it, but by being -made an example of the woeful effects of vice and folly? That he may, -as any one may, if he will, incur an infamous execution from the hands -of civil justice, or in some other course of extravagance shorten his -days; or bring upon himself infamy and diseases worse than death? So -that it had been better for him, even with regard to the present world, -that he had never been born. And is there any pretence of reason for -people to think themselves secure, and talk as if they had certain -proof, that, let them act as licentiously as they will, there can be -nothing analogous to this, with regard to a future and more general -interest, under the providence and government of the same God? - - - - -CHAPTER III.[59] - -THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. - - -As the manifold appearances of design, and of final causes, in the -constitution of the world, prove it to be the work of an intelligent -mind, so the particular final causes of pleasure and pain distributed -amongst his creatures, prove that they are under his government; what -may be called his natural government of creatures endued with sense -and reason. This implies somewhat more than seems usually attended to, -when we speak of God’s natural government of the world. It implies -government of the very same kind with that which a master exercises -over his servants, or a civil magistrate over his subjects. These -latter instances of final causes, as really prove an intelligent -_Governor_ of the world, in the sense now mentioned, and before[60] -distinctly treated of; as any other instances of final causes prove an -intelligent _Maker_ of it. - -But this alone does not appear at first sight to determine any thing -certainly, concerning the moral character of the Author of nature, -considered in this relation of governor; does not ascertain his -government to be moral, or prove that he is the righteous Judge of -the world. Moral government consists, not in barely rewarding and -punishing men for their actions, which the most tyrannical may do, but -in rewarding the righteous, and punishing the wicked: in rendering to -men according to their actions, considered as good or evil. And the -_perfection_ of moral government consists in doing this, with regard -to all intelligent creatures, in an exact proportion to their personal -merits or demerits. - -Some men seem to think the only character of the Author of nature to be -that of simple absolute benevolence. This, considered as a principle of -action and infinite in degree, is a disposition to produce the greatest -possible happiness, without regard to persons’ behavior, otherwise than -as such regard would produce higher degrees of it. And supposing this -to be the only character of God, veracity and justice in him would be -nothing but benevolence conducted by wisdom. Surely this ought not to -be asserted, unless it can be proved; for we should speak with cautious -reverence upon such a subject. Whether it can be proved or no, is not -the thing here to be inquired into; but whether in the constitution and -conduct of the world, a righteous government be not discernibly planned -out: which necessarily implies a righteous governor. There may possibly -be in the creation beings, to whom the Author of nature manifests -himself under this most amiable of all characters, this of infinite -absolute benevolence; for it is the most amiable, supposing it not, as -perhaps it is not, incompatible with justice; but he manifests himself -to us under the character of a righteous governor. He may, consistently -with this, be simply and absolutely benevolent, in the sense now -explained: but he is (for he has given us a proof in the constitution -and conduct of the world that he is) a governor over servants, as he -rewards and punishes us for our actions. And in the constitution and -conduct of it, he may also have given, besides the reason of the thing, -and the natural presages of conscience, clear and distinct intimations, -that his government is righteous or moral: clear to such as think the -nature of it deserving their attention, and yet not to every careless -person, who casts a transient reflection upon the subject.[61] - -It is particularly to be observed, that the divine government, which -we experience ourselves under in the present state, taken alone, is -allowed not to be the perfection of moral government. Yet this by no -means hinders, but that there may be _somewhat_, be it more or less, -truly moral in it. A righteous government may plainly appear to be -carried on to some degree, enough to give us the apprehension that it -shall be completed, or carried on to that degree of perfection which -religion teaches us it shall; but which cannot appear, till much more -of the divine administration be seen, than can be seen in the present -life. The design of this chapter is to inquire how far this is the -case: how far, over and above the moral nature[62] which God has given -us, and our natural notion of him as righteous governor of those his -creatures, to whom he has given this nature;[63] I say how far besides -this, the principles and beginnings of a moral government over the -world may be discerned, notwithstanding and amidst all the confusion -and disorder of it. - -One might mention here, what has been often urged with great force, -that, in general, less uneasiness and more satisfaction, are the -natural consequences[64] of a virtuous than of a vicious course of -life, in the present state, as an instance of a moral government -established in nature; an instance of it collected from experience and -present matter of fact.[65] But it must be owned a thing of difficulty -to weigh and balance pleasures and uneasinesses, each amongst -themselves, and also against each other, so as to make an estimate with -any exactness, of the overplus of happiness on the side of virtue. -And it is not impossible, that, amidst the infinite disorders of the -world, there may be exceptions to the happiness of virtue; even with -regard to persons, whose course of life from their youth up has been -blameless: and more with regard to those who have gone on for some -time in the ways of vice, and have afterwards reformed. For suppose an -instance of the latter case; a person with his passions inflamed, his -natural faculty of self-government impaired by habits of indulgence, -and with all his vices about him, like so many harpies, craving their -accustomed gratification; who can say how long it might be, before -such a person would find more satisfaction in the reasonableness and -present good consequences of virtue, than difficulties and self-denial -in the restraints of it? Experience also shows, that men can to a -great degree, get over their sense of shame, so as that by professing -themselves to be without principle, and avowing even direct villany, -they can support themselves against the infamy of it. But as the ill -actions of any one will probably be more talked of, and oftener thrown -in his way, upon his reformation; so the infamy of them will be much -more felt, after the natural sense of virtue and of honor is recovered. -Uneasiness of this kind ought indeed to be put to the account of -former vices: yet it will be said they are in part the consequences -of reformation. Still I am far from allowing it doubtful, whether -virtue, upon the whole, be happier than vice in the present world. If -it were, yet the beginnings of a righteous administration may, beyond -all question, be found in nature, if we will attentively inquire after -them.[66] - -I. In whatever manner the notion of God’s moral government over the -world might be treated, if it did not appear, whether he were in a -proper sense our governor at all; yet when it is certain matter of -experience, that he does manifest himself to us under the character -of a governor in the sense explained,[67] it must deserve to be -considered, whether there be not reason to apprehend, that he may be -a righteous or moral governor. Since it appears to be fact, that God -does govern mankind by the method of rewards and punishments, according -to some settled rules of distribution; it is surely a question to be -asked, what presumption is there against his _finally_ rewarding and -punishing them according to this particular rule, namely, as they act -reasonably, or unreasonably, virtuously or viciously? Rendering men -happy or miserable by this rule, certainly falls in, much more falls -in, with our natural apprehensions and sense of things, than doing -so by any other rule whatever; since rewarding and punishing actions -by any other rule, would appear much harder to be accounted for, by -minds formed as he has formed ours. Be the evidence of religion then -more or less clear, the expectation which it raises in us, that the -righteous shall, upon the whole, be happy, and the wicked miserable, -cannot possibly be considered as absurd or chimerical; because it is -no more than an expectation, that a method of government already begun, -shall be carried on, the method of rewarding and punishing actions; and -shall be carried on by a particular rule, which unavoidably appears to -us at first sight more natural than any other, the rule which we call -distributive justice. Nor, - -II. Ought it to be entirely passed over, that tranquillity, -satisfaction, and external advantages, being the natural consequences -of prudent management of ourselves, and our affairs; and rashness, -profligate negligence, and wilful folly, bringing after them many -inconveniences and sufferings; these afford instances of a right -constitution of nature, as the correction of children, for their -own sakes, and by way of example, when they run into danger or hurt -themselves, is a part of right education.[68] Thus, that God governs -the world by general fixed laws, that he has endued us with capacities -of reflecting upon this constitution of things, and foreseeing the good -and bad consequences of behavior, plainly implies _some sort_ of moral -government; since from such a constitution of things it cannot but -follow, that prudence and imprudence, which are of the nature of virtue -and vice,[69] must be, as they are, respectively rewarded and punished. - -III. From the natural course of things, vicious actions are, to a -great degree, actually punished as mischievous to society; and besides -punishment actually inflicted upon this account, there is also the -fear and apprehension of it in those persons, whose crimes have -rendered them obnoxious to it, in case of a discovery; this state of -fear being often itself a very considerable punishment. The natural -fear and apprehension of it too, which restrains from such crimes, -is a declaration of nature against them. It is necessary to the very -being of society, that vices, destructive of it, should be punished -_as being so_; the vices of falsehood, injustice, cruelty: which -punishment therefore is as natural as society, and so is an instance -of a kind of moral government, naturally established, and actually -taking place. And, since the certain natural course of things is the -conduct of providence or the government of God, though carried on by -the instrumentality of men, the observation here made amounts to this, -that mankind find themselves placed by him in such circumstances, as -that they are unavoidably accountable for their behavior; and are often -punished, and sometimes rewarded, under his government, in the view of -their being mischievous, or eminently beneficial to society. - -If it be objected that good actions and such as are beneficial to -society, are often punished, as in the case of persecution and in other -cases; and that ill and mischievous actions are often rewarded:[70] it -may be answered distinctly, first, that this is in no sort necessary, -and consequently not natural in the sense in which it is necessary, and -therefore natural, that ill or mischievous actions should be punished: -and in the next place, that good actions are never punished, considered -as beneficial to society, nor ill actions rewarded, under the view of -their being hurtful to it. So that it stands good, without any thing on -the side of vice to be set over against it, that the Author of nature -has as truly directed, that vicious actions, considered as mischievous -to society, should be punished, and put mankind under a _necessity_ of -thus punishing them, as he has directed and necessitated us to preserve -our lives by food. - -IV. In the natural course of things, virtue _as such_ is actually -rewarded, and vice _as such_ punished: which seems to afford an -instance or example, not only of government, but of moral government, -begun and established; moral in the strictest sense, though not in -that perfection of degree, which religion teaches us to expect. -In order to see this more clearly, we must distinguish between -_actions_ themselves, and that _quality_ ascribed to them, which we -call virtuous or vicious.[71] The gratification itself of every -natural passion, must be attended with delight; and acquisitions of -fortune, however made, are acquisitions of the means or materials of -enjoyment. An action then, by which any natural passion is gratified, -or fortune acquired, procures delight or advantage; abstracted from -all consideration of the morality of such action. Consequently, the -pleasure or advantage in this case, is gained by the action itself, not -by the morality, the virtuousness or viciousness of it; though it be -perhaps virtuous or vicious. - -To say that such an action or course of behavior, procured such -pleasure or advantage, or brought on such inconvenience and pain, is -quite a different thing from saying, that such good or bad effect -was owing to the virtue or vice of such action or behavior. In one -case, an action abstracted from all moral consideration, produced its -effect: in the other case, for it will appear that there are such -cases, the morality of the action under a moral consideration, _i.e._ -the virtuousness or viciousness of it, produced the effect. Now I say -virtue as such, naturally procures considerable advantages to the -virtuous, and vice as such, naturally occasions great inconvenience -and even misery to the vicious, in very many instances. The immediate -effects of virtue and vice upon the mind and temper, are to be -mentioned as instances of it. Vice as such is naturally attended with -some sort of uneasiness, and not uncommonly, with great disturbance and -apprehension. That inward feeling, which, respecting lesser matters and -in familiar speech we call being vexed with oneself, and in matters -of importance and in more serious language, remorse; is an uneasiness -naturally arising from an action of a man’s own, reflected upon by -himself as wrong, unreasonable, faulty, _i.e._ vicious in greater or -less degrees: and this manifestly is a different feeling from that -uneasiness, which arises from a sense of mere loss or harm. What is -more common, than to hear a man lamenting an accident or event, and -adding--but however he has the satisfaction that he cannot blame -himself for it; or on the contrary, that he has the uneasiness of -being sensible it was his own doing? Thus also the disturbance and -fear, which often follow upon a man’s having done an injury, arise -from a sense of his being blameworthy; otherwise there would, in many -cases, be no ground of disturbance, nor any reason to fear resentment -or shame. On the other hand, inward security and peace, and a mind -open to the several gratifications of life, are the natural attendants -of innocence and virtue. To which must be added the complacency, -satisfaction, and even joy of heart, which accompany the exercise, the -real exercise of gratitude, friendship, benevolence. - -And here, I think, ought to be mentioned the fears of future -punishment, and peaceful hopes of a better life, in those who fully -believe, or have any serious apprehension of religion: because these -hopes and fears are present uneasiness and satisfaction to the mind, -and cannot be got rid of by great part of the world, even by men who -have thought most thoroughly upon the subject of religion. And no one -can say, how considerable this uneasiness or satisfaction may be, or -what upon the whole it may amount to.[72] - -In the next place comes in the consideration, that all honest and -good men are disposed to befriend honest good men as such, and to -discountenance the vicious as such, and do so in some degree; indeed -in a considerable degree: from which favor and discouragement cannot -but arise considerable advantage and inconvenience. Though the -generality of the world have little regard to the morality of their -own actions, and may be supposed to have less to that of others, when -they themselves are not concerned; yet let any one be known to be a -man of virtue, somehow or other he will be favored and good offices -will be done him, from regard to his character, without remote views, -occasionally, and in some low degree, I think, by the generality of -the world, as it happens to come in their way. Public honors too -and advantages are the natural consequences, and sometimes at least, -the consequences in fact, of virtuous actions; of eminent justice, -fidelity, charity, love to our country, considered in the view of -being virtuous. And sometimes even death itself, often infamy and -external inconveniences, are the public consequences of vice as vice. -For instance, the sense which mankind have of tyranny, injustice, -oppression, additional to the mere feeling or fear of misery, has -doubtless been instrumental in bringing about revolutions, which make -a figure even in the history of the world. For it is plain, that men -resent injuries as implying faultiness, and retaliate, not merely -under the notion of having received harm, but of having received -wrong; and they have this resentment in behalf of others, as well as -of themselves. So likewise even the generality are, in some degree, -grateful and disposed to return good offices, not merely because such -a one has been the occasion of good to them, but under the view, that -such good offices implied kind intention and good desert in the doer. - -To all this may be added two or three particular things, which many -persons will think frivolous; but to me nothing appears so, which at -all comes in towards determining a question of such importance, as, -whether there be or be not, a moral institution of government, in the -strictest sense moral, _visibly_ established and begun in nature. The -particular things are these: That in domestic government, which is -doubtless natural, children and others also are very generally punished -for falsehood, injustice, and ill-behavior, as such, and rewarded for -the contrary: which are instances of veracity and justice and right -behavior, as such, naturally enforced by rewards and punishments, more -or less considerable. That, though civil government be supposed to take -cognizance of actions in no other view than as prejudicial to society, -without respect to the immorality of them, yet as such actions are -immoral, so the sense which men have of the immorality of them, very -greatly contributes, in different ways, to bring offenders to justice. -And that entire absence of all crime and guilt in the moral sense, when -plainly appearing, will almost of course procure, and circumstances of -aggravated guilt prevent, a remission of the penalties annexed to civil -crimes, in many cases, though by no means in all. - -Upon the whole then, besides the good and bad effects of virtue and -vice upon men’s own minds, the course of the world does, in some -measure, turn upon the approbation and disapprobation of them as such, -in others. The sense of well and ill doing, the presages of conscience, -the love of good characters and dislike of bad ones, honor, shame, -resentment, gratitude, all these, considered in themselves, and in -their effects, do afford manifest real instances, of virtue as such -naturally favored, and of vice as such discountenanced, more or less, -in the daily course of human life; in every age, in every relation, -in every general circumstance of it. That God has given us a moral -nature,[73] may most justly be urged as a proof of our being under his -moral government: but that he has placed us in a condition, which gives -this nature, as one may speak, scope to operate, and in which it does -unavoidably operate; _i.e._ influence mankind to act, so as thus to -favor and reward virtue, and discountenance and punish vice, this is -not the same, but a further additional proof of his moral government; -for it is an instance of it. The first is a proof, that he will finally -favor and support virtue effectually: the second is an example of his -favoring and supporting it at present, in some degree. - -If a more distinct inquiry be made, whence it arises, that virtue as -such is often rewarded, and vice as such is punished, and this rule -never inverted, it will be found to proceed, in part, immediately from -the moral nature itself, which God has given us;[74] and also in part, -from his having given us, together with this nature, so great a power -over each other’s happiness and misery. For, _first_, it is certain, -that peace and delight, in some degree and upon some occasions, is -the necessary and present effect of virtuous practice; an effect -arising immediately from that constitution of our nature. We are _so -made_, that well-doing as such, gives us satisfaction, at least in -some instances; ill-doing as such, in none. And, _secondly_, from our -moral nature, joined with God’s having put our happiness and misery -in many respects in each other’s power, it cannot but be, that vice -as such, some kinds and instances of it at least, will be infamous, -and men will be disposed to punish it as in itself detestable; and the -villain will by no means be able always to avoid feeling that infamy, -any more than he will be able to escape this further punishment, which -mankind will be disposed to inflict upon him, under the notion of his -deserving it. But there can be nothing on the side of vice, to answer -this; because there is nothing in the human mind contradictory, as -the logicians speak, to virtue. For virtue consists in a regard to -what is right and reasonable, as being so; in a regard to veracity, -justice, charity, in themselves: and there is surely no such thing, -as a like natural regard to falsehood, injustice, cruelty. If it be -thought, that there are instances of an approbation of vice, as such, -in itself, and for its own sake, (though it does not appear to me, that -there is any such thing at all;) it is evidently monstrous: as much -so, as the most acknowledged perversion of any passion whatever. Such -instances of perversion then being left out, as merely imaginary, or -at least unnatural; it must follow, from the frame of our nature, and -from our condition, in the respects now described, that vice cannot -at all be, and virtue cannot but be, favored as such by others, upon -some occasions, and happy in itself, in some degree. For what is here -insisted upon, is not the _degree_ in which virtue and vice are thus -distinguished, but only the thing itself, that they are so in some -degree; though the whole good and bad effect of virtue and vice as -such, is not inconsiderable in degree. But that they must be thus -distinguished in some degree, is in a manner necessary: it is matter -of fact of daily experience, even in the greatest confusion of human -affairs. - -It is not pretended but that, in the natural course of things, -happiness and misery appear to be distributed by other rules, than -only the personal merit and demerit of characters. They may sometimes -be distributed by way of mere discipline. There may be the wisest and -best reasons, why the world should be governed by general laws, from -whence such promiscuous distribution perhaps must follow; and also -why our happiness and misery should be put in each other’s power, in -the degree which they are. And these things, as, in general, they -contribute to the rewarding virtue and punishing vice, as such, so -they often contribute also, not to the inversion of this, which is -impossible, but to the rendering persons prosperous, though wicked; -afflicted, though righteous; and, which is worse, to the _rewarding -some actions_, though vicious, and _punishing other actions_, though -virtuous.[75] But all this cannot drown the voice of nature in the -conduct of Providence, plainly declaring itself for virtue, by way -of distinction from vice, and preference to it. For our being so -constituted as that virtue and vice are thus naturally favored and -discountenanced, rewarded and punished, respectively as such, is -an intuitive proof of the intent of nature, that it should be so; -otherwise the constitution of our mind, from which it thus immediately -and directly proceeds, would be absurd. But it cannot be said, because -virtuous actions are sometimes punished, and vicious actions rewarded, -that nature intended it. For, though this great disorder is brought -about, as all actions are, by means of some natural passion; yet _this -may be_, as it undoubtedly is, brought about by the perversion of such -passion, implanted in us for other, and those very good purposes. And -indeed these other and good purposes, even of every passion, may be -clearly seen. - -We have then a declaration, in some degree of present effect, from Him -who is supreme in nature, which side he is of, or what part he takes; -a declaration for virtue, and against vice. So far therefore as a man -is true to virtue, to veracity and justice, to equity and charity, and -the right of the case, in whatever he is concerned; so far he is on the -side of the divine administration, and co-operates with it: and from -hence, to such a man, arises naturally a secret satisfaction and sense -of security, and implicit hope of somewhat further. - -V. This hope is confirmed by the necessary tendencies of virtue, -which, though not of present effect, yet are at present discernible in -nature; and so afford an instance of somewhat moral in the essential -constitution of it. There is, in the nature of things, a tendency in -virtue and vice to produce the good and bad effects now mentioned, in -a greater degree than they do in fact produce them. For instance; good -and bad men would be much more rewarded and punished as such, were it -not, that justice is often artificially eluded,[76] that characters are -not known, and many, who would thus favor virtue and discourage vice, -are hindered from doing so, by accidental causes. These tendencies of -virtue and vice are obvious with regard to _individuals_. But it may -require more particularly to be considered, that power in a _society_, -by being under the direction of virtue, naturally increases, and has -a necessary tendency to prevail over opposite power, not under the -direction of it; in like manner, as power, by being under the direction -of reason, increases, and has a tendency to prevail over brute force. -There are several brute creatures of equal, and several of superior -strength, to that of men; and possibly the sum of the whole strength -of brutes may be greater than that of mankind; but reason gives us the -advantage and superiority over them; and thus man is the acknowledged -governing animal upon the earth. Nor is this superiority considered by -any as accidental; but as what reason has a tendency, in the nature of -the thing, to obtain. And yet perhaps difficulties may be raised about -the meaning, as well as the truth, of the assertion, that virtue has -the like tendency. - -To obviate these difficulties, let us see more distinctly, how the case -stands with regard to reason; which is so readily acknowledged to have -this advantageous tendency. Suppose then two or three men, of the best -and most improved understanding, in a desolate open plain, attacked -by ten times the number of beasts of prey: would their reason secure -them the victory in this unequal combat? Power then, though joined -with reason, and under its direction, cannot be expected to prevail -over opposite power, though merely brutal, unless the one bears some -proportion to the other. Again: put the imaginary case, that rational -and irrational creatures were of like external shape and manner: it is -certain, before there were opportunities for the first to distinguish -each other, to separate from their adversaries, and to form a union -among themselves, they might be upon a level, or in several respects -upon great disadvantage; though united they might be vastly superior: -since union is of such efficacy, that ten men united, might be able -to accomplish, what ten thousand of the same natural strength and -understanding wholly ununited, could not. In this case, brute force -might more than maintain its ground against reason, for want of union -among the rational creatures. Or suppose a number of men to land upon -an island inhabited only by wild beasts; men who, by the regulations -of civil government, the inventions of art, and the experience of some -years, could they be preserved so long, would be really sufficient to -subdue the wild beasts, and to preserve themselves in security from -them: yet a conjuncture of accidents might give such advantage to the -irrational animals as they might at once overpower, and even extirpate, -the rational ones. Length of time then, proper scope, and opportunities -for reason to exert itself, may be absolutely necessary to its -prevailing over brute force. - -Further: there are many instances of brutes succeeding in attempts, -which they could not have undertaken, had not their irrational nature -rendered them incapable of foreseeing the danger of such attempt, or -the fury of passion hindered their attending to it: and there are -instances of reason and real prudence preventing men’s undertaking -what, it has appeared afterwards, they might have succeeded in by a -lucky rashness. In certain conjunctures, ignorance and folly, weakness -and discord, may have their advantages. So that rational animals -have not _necessarily_ the superiority over irrational ones; but, -how improbable soever it may be, it is evidently possible, that in -some globes the latter may be superior. And were the former wholly at -variance and disunited, by false self-interest and envy, by treachery -and injustice, and consequent rage and malice against each other, -whilst the latter were firmly united among themselves by instinct, this -might greatly contribute to the introducing such an inverted order -of things. For every one would consider it as inverted: since reason -has, in the nature of it, a tendency to prevail over brute force; -notwithstanding the possibility it may not prevail, and the necessity, -which there is, of many concurring circumstances to render it prevalent. - -Now I say, virtue in a society has a like tendency to procure -superiority and additional power: whether this power be considered -as the means of security from opposite power, or of obtaining other -advantages. It has this tendency, by rendering public good, an object -and end, to every member of the society; by putting every one upon -consideration and diligence, recollection and self-government, both in -order to see what is the most effectual method, and also in order to -perform their proper part, for obtaining and preserving it; by uniting -a society within itself, and so increasing its strength; and, which -is particularly to be mentioned, uniting it by means of veracity and -justice. For as these last are principal bonds of union, so benevolence -or public spirit, undirected, unrestrained by them, is, nobody knows -what. - -And suppose the invisible world, and the invisible dispensations of -Providence, to be, in any sort, analogous to what appears: or that both -together make up one uniform scheme, the two parts of which, the part -which we see, and that which is beyond our observation, are analogous -to each other: then, there must be a like natural tendency in the -derived power, throughout the universe, under the direction of virtue, -to prevail in general over that which is not under its direction; as -there is in reason, derived reason in the universe, to prevail over -brute force. - -But then, in order to the prevalence of virtue, or that it may actually -produce, what it has a tendency to produce; the _like concurrences -are necessary_, as are, to the prevalence of reason. There must be -some proportion, between the natural power or force which is, and that -which is not, under the direction of virtue: there must be sufficient -length of time; for the complete success of virtue, as of reason, -cannot, from the nature of the thing, be otherwise than gradual: there -must be, as one may speak, a fair field of trial, a stage large and -extensive enough, proper occasions and opportunities, for the virtuous -to join together, to exert themselves against lawless force, and to -reap the fruit of their united labors. Now indeed it is to be hoped, -that the disproportion between the good and bad, even here on earth, -is not so great, but that the former have natural power sufficient -to their prevailing to a considerable degree, if circumstances would -permit this power to be united. For, much less, very much less, power -under the direction of virtue, would prevail over much greater not -under the direction of it.[77] However, good men over the face of -the earth cannot unite; because, (among other reasons,) they cannot -be sufficiently ascertained of each other’s characters. And the -known course of human things, the scene we are now passing through, -particularly the shortness of life, denies to virtue its full scope in -several other respects. - -The natural tendency which we have been considering, though real, is -_hindered_ from being carried into effect in the present state: but -these hinderances may be removed in a future one. Virtue, to borrow the -Christian allusion, is militant here; and various untoward accidents -contribute to its being often overborne: but it may combat with -greater advantage hereafter, and prevail completely, and enjoy its -consequent rewards, in some future states. Neglected as it is, perhaps -unknown, perhaps despised and oppressed here; there maybe scenes in -eternity, lasting enough, and in every other way adapted, to afford -it a sufficient sphere of action; and a sufficient sphere for the -natural consequences of it to follow in fact. If the soul be naturally -immortal, and this state be a progress towards a future one, as -childhood is towards mature age, good men may naturally unite, not only -among themselves, but also with other orders of virtuous creatures, -in that future state. For virtue, from the very nature of it, is a -principle and bond of union, in some degree, among all who are endued -with it, and known to each other; so as that by it, a good man cannot -but recommend himself to the favor and protection of all virtuous -beings, throughout the whole universe, who can be acquainted with his -character, and can any way interpose in his behalf in any part of his -duration. - -One might add, that suppose all this advantageous tendency of virtue -to become effect, among one or more orders of creatures, in any -distant scenes and periods, and to be seen by any orders of vicious -creatures, throughout the universal kingdom of God; this happy effect -of virtue would have a tendency, by way of example, and possibly in -other ways, to amend those of them who are capable of amendment, and of -being recovered to a just sense of virtue. If our notions of the plan -of Providence were enlarged in any sort proportionable to what late -discoveries have enlarged our views with respect to the material world, -representations of this kind would not appear absurd or extravagant. -They are not to be taken as intended for a literal delineation of -what is in fact the particular scheme of the universe, which cannot -be known without revelation: for suppositions are not to be looked -on as true, because not incredible: but they are mentioned to show, -that our finding virtue to be hindered from procuring to itself such -superiority and advantages, is no objection against its having, in the -essential nature of the thing, a tendency to procure them. And the -suppositions now mentioned do plainly show this: for they show, that -these hinderances are so far from being necessary, that we ourselves -can easily conceive, how they may be removed in future states, and full -scope be granted to virtue. And all these advantageous tendencies -of it are to be considered as declarations of God in its favor. This -however is taking a pretty large compass: though it is certain, that, -as the material world appears to be, in a manner, boundless and -immense, there must be _some_ scheme of Providence vast in proportion -to it. - -But let us return to the earth our habitation; and we shall see this -happy tendency of virtue, by imagining an instance not so vast and -remote: by supposing a kingdom or society of men upon it, perfectly -virtuous, for a succession of many ages; to which, if you please, may -be given a situation advantageous for universal monarchy. In such -a state, there would be no such thing as faction: but men of the -greatest capacity would of course, all along, have the chief direction -of affairs willingly yielded to them; and they would share it among -themselves without envy. Each of these would have the part assigned -him, to which his genius was peculiarly adapted; and others, who had -not any distinguished genius, would be safe, and think themselves very -happy, by being under the protection and guidance of those who had. -Public determinations would really be the result of the united wisdom -of the community: and they would faithfully be executed, by the united -strength of it. Some would contribute in a higher way, but all in some -way, to the public prosperity: and in it, each would enjoy the fruits -of his own virtue. And as injustice, whether by fraud or force, would -be unknown among themselves, so they would be sufficiently secured -from it in their neighbors. For cunning and false self-interest, -confederacies in injustice, ever slight, and accompanied with faction -and intestine treachery; these on one hand would be found mere childish -folly and weakness, when set in opposition against wisdom, public -spirit, union inviolable, and fidelity on the other: allowing both -a sufficient length of years to try their force. Add the general -influence, which such a kingdom would have over the face of the earth, -by way of example particularly, and the reverence which would be paid -it. It would plainly be superior to all others, and the world must -gradually come under its empire; not by means of lawless violence; -but partly by what must be allowed to be just conquest; and partly by -other kingdoms submitting themselves voluntarily to it, throughout a -course of ages, and claiming its protection, one after another, in -successive exigencies. The head of it would be a universal monarch, -in another sense than any mortal has yet been; and the Eastern style -would be literally applicable to him, _that all people, nations, and -languages should serve him_. And though indeed our knowledge of human -nature, and the whole history of mankind, show the impossibility, -without some miraculous interposition, that a number of men, here on -earth, should unite in one society or government, in the fear of God -and universal practice of virtue; and that such a government should -continue so united for a succession of ages: yet admitting or supposing -this, the effect would be as now drawn out. Thus for instance, the -wonderful power and prosperity promised to the Jewish nation in the -Scripture, would be, in a great measure, the consequence of what is -predicted of them; that the _people should be all righteous, and -inherit the land forever_;[78] were we to understand the latter phrase -of a long continuance only, sufficient to give things time to work. The -predictions of this kind, for there are many of them, cannot come to -pass, in the present known course of nature; but suppose them come to -pass, and then, the dominion and preëminence promised must naturally -follow, to a very considerable degree. - -Consider now the general system of religion; that the government of -the world is uniform, and one, and moral; that virtue and right shall -finally have the advantage, and prevail over fraud and lawless force, -over the deceits as well as the violence of wickedness, under the -conduct of one supreme governor: and from the observations above made, -it will appear that God has, by our reason, given us to see a peculiar -connection in the several parts of this scheme, and a tendency towards -the completion of it, arising out of the very nature of virtue: which -tendency is to be considered as something moral in the essential -constitution of things. If any one should think all this to be of -little importance, I desire him to consider, what he would think, if -vice had, essentially and in its nature, these advantageous tendencies; -or if virtue had essentially the contrary ones. - -It may be objected, that notwithstanding all these natural effects and -natural tendencies of virtue, yet things may be now going on throughout -the universe, and may go on hereafter, in the same mixed way as here at -present upon earth: virtue sometimes prosperous, sometimes depressed; -vice sometimes punished, sometimes successful. - -The answer to which is, that it is not the purpose of this chapter, -nor of this treatise, properly to prove God’s perfect moral government -over the world, or the truth of religion; but to observe what there -is in the constitution and course of nature, to confirm the proper -proof of it, supposed to be known: and that the weight of the -foregoing observations to this purpose may be thus distinctly proved. -Pleasure and pain are, to a certain degree, say to a very high degree, -distributed among us without any apparent regard to the merit or -demerit of characters. And were there nothing else concerning this -matter discernible in the constitution and course of nature, there -would be no ground from the constitution and course of nature, to hope -or to fear that men would be rewarded or punished hereafter according -to their deserts: which, however, it is to be remarked, implies, that -even then there would be no ground from appearances to think, that vice -upon the whole would have the advantage, rather than that virtue would. -Thus the proof of a future state of retribution would rest upon the -usual known arguments for it; which are I think plainly unanswerable; -and would be so, though there were no additional confirmation of them -from the things above insisted on. But these things are a very strong -confirmation of them. For, - -_First_, They show that the Author of nature is not indifferent to -virtue and vice. They amount to a declaration, from him, determinate -and not to be evaded, in favor of one, and against the other; such a -declaration, as there is nothing to be set over against or answer, on -the part of vice. So that were a man, laying aside the proper proof -of religion, to determine from the course of nature only, whether it -were most probable, that the righteous or the wicked would have the -advantage in a future life; there can be no doubt, but that he would -determine the probability to be, that the former would. The course of -nature then, in the view of it now given, furnishes us with a real -practical proof of the obligations of religion. - -_Secondly_, When, conformably to what religion teaches us, God shall -reward and punish virtue and vice as such, so as that every one shall, -upon the whole, have his deserts; this distributive justice will not -be a thing different in _kind_, but only in _degree_, from what we -experience in his present government. It will be that in _effect_, -towards which we now see a _tendency_. It will be no more than the -_completion_ of that moral government, the _principles and beginning_ -of which have been shown, beyond all dispute, discernible in the -present constitution and course of nature. - -_Thirdly_, As under the _natural_ government of God, our experience of -those kinds and degrees of happiness and misery, which we do experience -at present, gives just ground to hope for, and to fear, higher degrees -and other kinds of both in a future state, supposing a future state -admitted: so under his _moral_ government our experience, that virtue -and vice are, in the manners above mentioned, actually rewarded and -punished at present, in a certain degree, gives just ground to hope and -to fear, that they _may be_ rewarded and punished in a higher degree -hereafter. It is acknowledged indeed that this alone is not sufficient -ground to think, that they _actually will be_ rewarded and punished in -a higher degree, rather than in a lower: but then, - -_Lastly_, There is sufficient ground to think so, from the good and -bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For these tendencies are essential, -and founded in the nature of things: whereas the hinderances to -their becoming effect are, in numberless cases, not necessary, but -artificial only. Now it may be much more strongly argued, that these -tendencies, as well as the actual rewards and punishments, of virtue -and vice, which arise directly out of the nature of things, will -remain hereafter, than that the accidental hinderances of them will. -And if these hinderances do not remain; those rewards and punishments -cannot but be carried on much farther towards the perfection of moral -government: _i.e._ the tendencies of virtue and vice will become -effect; but when, or where, or in what particular way, cannot be known -at all, but by revelation. - -Upon the whole: there is a kind of moral government implied in God’s -natural government:[79] virtue and vice are naturally rewarded and -punished as beneficial and mischievous to society;[80] and rewarded -and punished directly as virtue and vice.[81] The notion of a moral -scheme of government is not fictitious, but natural; for it is -suggested to our thoughts by the constitution and course of nature: -and the execution of this scheme is actually begun, in the instances -here mentioned. And these things are to be considered as a declaration -of the Author of nature, for virtue, and against vice: they give a -credibility to the supposition of their being rewarded and punished -hereafter; and also ground to hope and to fear, that they may be -rewarded and punished in higher degrees than they are here. All this -is confirmed, and the argument for religion, from the constitution -and course of nature, is carried on farther, by observing, that there -are natural tendencies, and, in innumerable cases, only artificial -hinderances, to this moral scheme’s being carried on much farther -towards perfection, than it is at present.[82] - -The notion then of a moral scheme of government, much more perfect -than what is seen, is not a fictitious, but a natural notion; for it -is suggested to our thoughts, by the essential tendencies of virtue -and vice. These tendencies are to be considered as intimations, as -implicit promises and threatenings, from the Author of nature, of much -greater rewards and punishments to follow virtue and vice, than do at -present. Indeed, every _natural_ tendency, which is to continue, but -which is hindered from becoming effect by only _accidental_ causes, -affords a presumption, that such tendency will, some time or other, -become effect: a presumption proportionable in degree to the length of -the duration, through which such tendency will continue. From these -things together, arises a real presumption, that the moral scheme of -government established in nature, shall be carried on much farther -towards perfection hereafter; and, I think, a presumption that it will -be absolutely completed. From these things, joined with the moral -nature which God has given us, considered as given us by him, arises a -practical proof[83] that it _will_ be completed: a proof from fact; and -therefore a distinct one from that which is deduced from the eternal -and unalterable relations, the fitness and unfitness of actions. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - -PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER.[84] - - -The general doctrine of religion, that our present life is a state of -probation for a future one, comprehends under it several particular -things, distinct from each other. The first and most common meaning -of it seems to be, that our future interest is now depending, and -depending upon ourselves; that we have scope and opportunities here, -for that good and bad behavior, which God will reward and punish -hereafter; together with temptations to one, as well as inducements -of reason to the other. And this, in a great measure, is the same as -saying, that we are under the moral government of God, and to give -an account of our actions to him. For the notion of a future account -and general righteous judgment, implies some sort of temptations -to what is wrong: otherwise there would be no moral possibility of -doing wrong, nor ground for judgment, or discrimination. But there -is this difference, that the word _probation_ is more distinctly and -particularly expressive of allurements to wrong, or difficulties in -adhering uniformly to what is right, and of the danger of miscarrying -by such temptations, than the words _moral government_. A state -of probation then, as thus particularly implying in it trial, -difficulties, and danger, may require to be considered distinctly by -itself.[85] - -As the moral government of God, which religion teaches us, implies -that we are in a state of trial with regard to a future world, so -also his natural government over us implies that we are in a state of -trial, in the like sense, with regard to the present world. Natural -government by rewards and punishments, as much implies natural trial, -as moral government does moral trial. The natural government of God -here meant,[86] consists in his annexing pleasure to some actions, -and pain to others, which are in our power to do or forbear, and -giving us notice of such appointment, beforehand. This necessarily -implies, that he has made our happiness and misery, or our interest, to -depend in part upon ourselves. So far as men have temptations to any -course of action, which will probably occasion them greater temporal -inconvenience and uneasiness, than satisfaction, so far their temporal -interest is in danger from themselves; or they are in a state of trial -with respect to it. Now people often blame others, and even themselves, -for their misconduct in their temporal concerns. And we find many are -greatly wanting to themselves, and miss that natural happiness, which -they might have obtained in the present life: perhaps every one does -in some degree. But many run themselves into great inconvenience, and -into extreme distress and misery, not through incapacity of knowing -better, and doing better, for themselves, which would be nothing -to the present purpose, but through their own fault. These things -necessarily imply temptation, and danger of miscarrying, in a greater -or less degree, with respect to our worldly interest or happiness. -Every one too, without having religion in his thoughts, speaks of the -hazards which young people run, upon their setting out in the world: -hazards from other causes, than merely their ignorance, and unavoidable -accidents. And some courses of vice, at least, being contrary to men’s -worldly interest or good; temptations to these must at the same time be -temptations to forego our present and our future interest. - -Thus in our natural or temporal capacity, we are in a state of trial, -_i.e._ of difficulty and danger, analogous, or like to our moral and -religious trial. This will more distinctly appear to any one, who -thinks it worth while, more distinctly, to consider, what it is which -constitutes our trial in both capacities, and to observe, how mankind -behave under it. - -That which constitutes this trial, in both these capacities, must be -something either in our external circumstances, or in our nature. For, -on the one hand, persons may be betrayed into wrong behavior upon -surprise, or overcome upon any other very singular and extraordinary -external occasions, who would, otherwise, have preserved their -character of prudence and of virtue: in which cases, every one, in -speaking of the wrong behavior of these persons, would impute it to -such particular external circumstances. On the other hand, men who -have contracted habits of vice and folly of any kind, or have some -particular passions in excess, will seek opportunities, and, as it -were, go out of their way, to gratify themselves in these respects, -at the expense of their wisdom and their virtue; led to it, as every -one would say, not by external temptations, but by such habits and -passions. And the account of this last case is, that particular -passions are no more coincident with prudence, or that reasonable -self-love, the end of which is our worldly interest, than they are -with the principle of virtue and religion; but often draw contrary -ways to one, as well as to the other: and so such particular passions -are as much temptations, to act imprudently with regard to our worldly -interest, as to act viciously.[87] When we say, men are misled by -external circumstances of temptation; it cannot but be understood, that -there is somewhat within themselves, to render those circumstances -temptations, or to render them susceptible of impressions from them. -So when we say, they are misled by passions; it is always supposed, -that there are occasions, circumstances, and objects, exciting -these passions, and affording means for gratifying them. Therefore, -temptations from within, and from without, coincide, and mutually imply -each other. The several external objects of the appetites, passions, -and affections, being present to the senses, or offering themselves to -the mind, and so exciting emotions suitable to their nature; not only -in cases where they can be gratified consistently with innocence and -prudence, but also in cases where they cannot, and yet can be gratified -imprudently and viciously: this as really puts them in danger of -voluntarily foregoing their present interest or good, as their future; -and as really renders self-denial necessary to secure one, as the -other: _i.e._ we are in a like state of trial with respect to both, by -the very same passions, excited by the very same means. - -Thus mankind having a temporal interest depending upon themselves, and -a prudent course of behavior being necessary to secure it, passions -inordinately excited, whether by means of example, or by any other -external circumstance, towards such objects, at such times, or in -such degrees, as that they cannot be gratified consistently with -worldly prudence, are temptations; dangerous, and too often successful -temptations, to forego a greater temporal good for a less; _i.e._ to -forego what is, upon the whole, our temporal interest, for the sake -of a present gratification. This is a description of our state of -trial in our temporal capacity. Substitute now the word _future_ for -_temporal_, and _virtue_ for _prudence_; and it will be just as proper -a description of our state of trial in our religious capacity; so -analogous are they to each other.[88] - -If, from consideration of this our like state of trial in both -capacities, we go on to observe farther, how mankind behave under -it; we shall find there are some, who have so little sense of it, -that they scarce look beyond the passing day: they are so taken up -with present gratifications, as to have, in a manner, no feeling of -consequences, no regard to their future ease or fortune in this life: -any more than to their happiness in another. Some appear to be blinded -and deceived by inordinate passion, in their worldly concerns, as -much as in religion. Others are not deceived, but as it were forcibly -carried away by the like passions, against their better judgment, and -feeble resolutions too of acting better.[89] And there are men, and -truly not a few, who shamelessly avow, not their interest, but their -mere will and pleasure, to be their law of life: and who, in open -defiance of every thing reasonable, will go on in a course of vicious -extravagance, foreseeing, with no remorse and little fear, that it will -be their temporal ruin; and some of them, under the apprehension of -the consequences of wickedness in another state. To speak in the most -moderate way, human creatures are not only continually liable to go -wrong voluntarily, but we see likewise that they often actually do so, -with respect to their temporal interests, as well as with respect to -religion. - -Thus our difficulties and dangers, or our trials in our temporal and -our religious capacity, as they proceed from the same causes, and have -the same effect upon men’s behavior, are evidently analogous, and of -the same kind. - -It may be added, that the difficulties and dangers of miscarrying in -our religious state of trial, are greatly increased, and one is ready -to think, are in a manner wholly _made_, by the ill behavior of others; -by a wrong education, wrong in a moral sense, sometimes positively -vicious; by general bad example; by the dishonest artifices which are -got into business of all kinds; and, in very many parts of the world, -by religion’s being corrupted into superstitions, which indulge men in -their vices. In like manner, the difficulties of conducting ourselves -prudently in respect to our present interest, and our danger of being -led aside from pursuing it, are greatly increased, by a foolish -education; and, after we come to mature age, by the extravagance and -carelessness of others, with whom we have intercourse: and by mistaken -notions, very generally prevalent, and taken up from common opinion, -concerning temporal happiness, and wherein it consists. - -Persons, by their own _negligence_ and _folly_ in temporal affairs, no -less than by a course of vice, bring themselves into new difficulties, -and, by habits of indulgence, become less qualified to go through -them: and one irregularity after another, embarrasses things to such -a degree, that they know not whereabout they are; and often makes -the path of conduct so intricate and perplexed, that it is difficult -to trace it out; difficult even to determine what is the prudent or -the moral part. Thus, for instance, wrong behavior in one stage of -life, youth; wrong, I mean considering ourselves only in our temporal -capacity, without taking in religion; this, in several ways, increases -the difficulties of right behavior in mature age; _i.e._ puts us into -a more disadvantageous state of trial in our temporal capacity. - -We are an inferior part of the creation of God. There are natural -appearances of our being in a state of degradation.[90] We certainly -are in a condition, which _does not seem_, by any means, the most -advantageous we could imagine or desire, either in our natural or moral -capacity, for securing either our present or future interest. However, -this condition, low, and careful, and uncertain as it is, does not -afford any just ground of complaint. For, as men _may_ manage their -temporal affairs with prudence, and so pass their days here on earth -in tolerable ease and satisfaction, by a moderate degree of care: so -likewise with regard to religion, there is no more required than what -they are well able to do,[91] and what they must be greatly wanting -to themselves, if they neglect. And for persons to have that put upon -them, which they are well able to go through, and no more, we naturally -consider as an equitable thing; supposing it done by proper authority. -Nor have we any more reason to complain of it, with regard to the -Author of nature, than of his not having given us advantages belonging -to other orders of creatures. - -[REMARKS.] The thing here insisted upon is, that the state of trial, -which religion teaches us we are in, is rendered credible, by its -being throughout uniform and of a piece with the general conduct of -Providence towards us, in all other respects within the compass of our -knowledge. Indeed if mankind, considered in their natural capacity, as -inhabitants of this world only, found themselves, from their birth to -their death, in a settled state of security and happiness, without -any solicitude or thought of their own: or if they were in no danger -of being brought into inconveniences and distress, by carelessness, or -the folly of passion, through bad example, the treachery of others, or -the deceitful appearances of things: were this our natural condition, -then it might seem strange, and be some presumption against the truth -of religion, that it represents our future and more general interest, -as not secure _of course_, but as depending upon our behavior, and -requiring recollection and self-government to obtain it. It _then_ -might be alleged, “What you say is our condition, in one respect, is -not in any wise of a sort with what we find, by experience, is our -condition in another. Our whole present interest is secured to our -hands, without any solicitude of ours; and why should not our future -interest, if we have any such, be so too?” But since, on the contrary, -thought and consideration, the voluntary denying ourselves many things -which we desire, and a course of behavior, far from being always -agreeable to us, are absolutely necessary to our acting even a common -decent, and common prudent part, so as to pass with any satisfaction -through the _present_ world, and be received upon any tolerable -good terms in it: since this is the case, all presumption against -self-denial and attention being necessary to secure our _higher_ -interest,[92] is removed. - -Had we not experience, it might, perhaps speciously, be urged, that it -is improbable any thing of hazard and danger should be put upon us by -an infinite being; when every thing which has hazard and danger in our -manner of conception, and will end in error, confusion, and misery, -is already certain in his foreknowledge. Indeed, why any thing of -hazard and danger should be put upon such frail creatures as we are, -may well be thought a difficulty in speculation; and cannot but be so, -till we know the whole, or at least much more of the case. But still -the constitution of nature is as it is. Our happiness and misery are -trusted to our conduct, and made to depend upon it. Somewhat, and, in -many circumstances, a great deal too, is put upon us, either to do, -or to suffer, as we choose. All the various miseries of life, which -people bring upon themselves by negligence and folly, and might have -avoided by proper care, are instances of this: which miseries are, -beforehand, just as contingent and undetermined as conduct, and left to -be determined by it. - -These observations are an answer[93] to the objections against the -credibility of a state of trial, as implying temptations, and real -danger of miscarrying with regard to our general interest, under the -moral government of God. And they show, that, if we are at all to be -considered in such a capacity, and as having such an interest, the -general analogy of Providence must lead us to apprehend ourselves in -danger of miscarrying, in different degrees, as to this interest, by -our neglecting to act the proper part belonging to us in that capacity. -For we have a present interest under the government of God, which we -experience here upon earth. This interest, as it is not forced upon us, -so neither is it offered to our acceptance, but to our acquisition; and -in such manner, as that we are in danger of missing it, by means of -temptations to neglect, or act contrary to it; and without attention -and self-denial, we must and do miss it. It is then perfectly credible, -that this may be our case, with respect to that chief and final good, -which religion proposes to us. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - -PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. - - -From the consideration of our being in a probation-state, of so -much difficulty and hazard, naturally arises the question, how we -came to be placed in it? But such a general inquiry as this would -be found involved in insuperable difficulties. For, though some -of these difficulties would be lessened, by observing that all -wickedness is voluntary, as is implied in its very notion; and that -many of the miseries of life have apparent good effects: yet, when -we consider other circumstances belonging to both, and what must be -the consequence of the former in a life to come, it cannot but be -acknowledged plain folly and presumption, to pretend to give an account -of the _whole reasons_ of this matter; the whole reasons of our being -allotted a condition, out of which so much wickedness and misery, -so circumstanced, would in fact arise. Whether it be not beyond our -faculties, not only to find out, but even to understand; or, though we -should be supposed capable of understanding it, yet, whether it would -be of service or prejudice to us to be informed of it, is impossible -to say. But as our present condition can in no wise be shown to be -inconsistent with the perfect moral government of God: so religion -teaches us we were placed in it, that we might qualify ourselves, by -the practice of virtue, for another state which is to follow it. This, -though but a partial answer, a very partial one indeed, to the inquiry -now mentioned; is yet a more satisfactory answer to another, which is -of real, and of the utmost importance to us to have answered,--viz.: -What is our business here? The known end then, why we are placed -in a state of so much affliction, hazard, and difficulty, is, our -improvement in virtue and piety, as the requisite qualification for a -future state of security and happiness. - -The beginning of life, considered as an education for mature age in the -present world, appears plainly, at first sight, analogous to this our -trial for a future one: the former being in our temporal capacity, what -the latter is in our religious capacity. Some observations common to -both, and a more distinct consideration of each, will more distinctly -show the extent and force of the analogy between them; and the -credibility, which arises from hence, as well as from the nature of the -thing, that the present life was intended to be a state of discipline -for a future one. - -I. Every species of creatures is, we see, designed for a particular -way of life; to which, the nature, the capacities, temper, and -qualifications, of each species, are as necessary as their external -circumstances. Both come into the notion of such state, or particular -way of life, and are constituent parts of it. Change a man’s capacities -or character, to the degree in which it is conceivable they may be -changed, and he would be altogether incapable of a human course of -life, and human happiness; as incapable, as if, his nature continuing -unchanged, he were placed in a world, where he had no sphere of action, -nor any objects to answer his appetites, passions, and affections of -any sort. One thing is set over against another, as an ancient writer -expresses it.[94] Our nature corresponds to our external condition. -Without this correspondence, there would be no possibility of any -such thing as human life and happiness: which life and happiness are, -therefore, a _result_ from our nature and condition jointly: meaning -by human life, not living in the literal sense, but the whole complex -notion commonly understood by those words. So that without determining -what will be the employment and happiness, the particular life, of -good men hereafter; there must be some determinate capacities, some -necessary character and qualifications, without which persons cannot -but be utterly incapable of it: in like manner, as there must be some, -without which men would be incapable of their present state of life. - -II. The constitution of human creatures, and indeed of all creatures -which come under our notice, is such, as that they are capable -of naturally becoming qualified for states of life, for which -they were once wholly unqualified. In imagination we may indeed -conceive of creatures, incapable of having any of their faculties -naturally enlarged, or as being unable naturally to acquire any new -qualifications. But the faculties of every species known to us, are -made for enlargement; for acquirements of experience and habits. We -find ourselves, in particular, endued with capacities, not only of -perceiving ideas, and of knowledge or perceiving truth, but also of -storing up ideas and knowledge by memory. We are capable, not only of -acting, and of having different momentary impressions made upon us; -but of getting a new facility in any kind of action, and of settled -alterations in our temper or character. The power of the two last is -the power of habits. But neither the perception of ideas, nor knowledge -of any sort, are habits; though absolutely necessary to the forming of -them. However, apprehension, reason, memory, which are the capacities -of acquiring knowledge, are greatly improved by exercise. Whether the -word habit is applicable to all these improvements, and in particular -how far the powers of memory and of habits may be powers of the same -nature, I shall not inquire. But that perceptions come into our minds -readily and of course, by means of their having been there before, -seems a thing of the same sort, as readiness in any particular kind of -action, proceeding from being accustomed to it. Aptness to recollect -practical observations, of service in our conduct, is plainly habit in -many cases. There are habits of perception, and habits of action. An -instance of the former, is our constant and even involuntary readiness, -in correcting the impressions of our sight concerning magnitudes and -distances, so as to substitute judgment in the room of sensation, -imperceptibly to ourselves. It seems as if all other associations of -ideas not naturally connected, might be called passive habits; as -properly as our readiness in understanding languages upon sight, or -hearing of words. Our readiness in speaking and writing them, are -instances of active habits. - -For distinctness, we may consider habits, as belonging to the body, -or to the mind: and the latter will be explained by the former. -Under the former are comprehended all bodily activities or motions, -whether graceful or unbecoming, which are owing to use: under the -latter, general habits of life and conduct; such as those of obedience -and submission to authority, or to any particular person; those -of veracity, justice, and charity; those of attention, industry, -self-government, envy, revenge. Habits of this latter kind seem -produced by repeated acts, as well as the former. And as habits -belonging to the body are produced by external _acts_, so habits of the -mind are produced by the _exertion_ of inward practical principles; -_i.e._ by carrying them into act, or acting upon them; the principles -of obedience, of veracity, justice, and charity. Nor can those -habits be formed by any external course of action, otherwise than as -it proceeds from these principles: because it is only these inward -principles exerted, which are strictly acts of obedience, of veracity, -of justice, and of charity. - -So likewise habits of attention, industry, self-government, are in -the same manner acquired by exercise; and habits of envy and revenge -by indulgence, whether in outward act, or in thought and intention; -_i.e._ inward act: for such intention is an act. Resolutions to do -well, are also properly acts. And endeavoring to enforce upon our own -minds a practical sense of virtue, or to beget in others that practical -sense of it, which a man really has himself, is a virtuous act. All -these, therefore, may and will contribute towards forming good habits. -But going over the theory of virtue in one’s thoughts, talking well, -and drawing fine pictures, of it; this is so far from necessarily or -certainly conducing to form a habit of it, in him who thus employs -himself, that it may harden the mind in a contrary course, and render -it gradually more insensible; _i.e._ form a habit of insensibility -to all moral considerations. For, from our very faculty of habits, -passive impressions, by being repeated, grow weaker. Thoughts, by often -passing through the mind, are felt less sensibly: being accustomed to -danger, begets intrepidity, _i.e._ lessens fear; to distress, lessens -the passion of pity; to instances of others’ mortality, lessens the -sensible apprehension of our own. - -From these two observations together, that practical habits are formed -and strengthened by repeated acts, and that passive impressions grow -weaker by being repeated upon us, it must follow, that active habits -may be gradually forming and strengthening, by a course of acting -upon such and such motives and excitements, while these motives and -excitements themselves are, by proportionable degrees, growing less -sensible; _i.e._ are continually less and less sensibly felt, even as -the active habits strengthen. And experience confirms this: for active -principles, at the very time that they are less lively in perception -than they were, are found to be, somehow, wrought more thoroughly into -the temper and character, and become more effectual in influencing -our practice. The three things just mentioned may afford instances of -it. Perception of danger is a natural excitement of passive fear, and -active caution: and by being inured to danger, habits of the latter are -gradually wrought, at the same time that the former gradually lessens. -Perception of distress in others is a natural excitement, passively -to pity, and actively to relieve it: but let a man set himself to -attend to, inquire out, and relieve distressed persons, and he cannot -but grow less and less sensibly affected with the various miseries of -life, with which he must become acquainted; when yet, at the same time, -benevolence, considered not as a passion, but as a practical principle -of action, will strengthen: and while he passively compassionates the -distressed less, he will acquire a greater aptitude actively to assist -and befriend them. So also at the same time that the daily instances of -men’s dying around us give us daily a less sensible passive feeling or -apprehension of our own mortality, such instances greatly contribute to -the strengthening a practical regard to it in serious men; _i.e._ to -forming a habit of acting with a constant view to it. - -This seems further to show, that passive impressions made upon our -minds by admonition, experience, or example, though they may have a -remote efficacy, and a very great one, towards forming active habits, -yet can have this efficacy no otherwise than by inducing us to such a -course of action: and that it is not being _affected_ so and so, but -acting, which forms those habits: only it must be always remembered, -that real endeavors to enforce good impressions upon ourselves are a -species of virtuous action. Nor do we know how far it is possible, in -the nature of things, that effects should be wrought in us at once, -equivalent to habits; _i.e._ what is wrought by use and exercise. The -thing insisted on is, not what may be possible, but what is in fact the -appointment of nature: which is, that active habits are to be formed -by exercise. Their progress may be so gradual, as to be imperceptible -in its steps: it may be hard to explain the faculty, by which we are -capable of habits, throughout its several parts; and to trace it up -to its original, so as to distinguish it from all others in our mind: -and it seems as if contrary effects were to be ascribed to it. But -the thing in general, that our nature is formed to yield to use and -exercise, in some such manner as this, is matter of certain experience. - -Thus, by accustoming ourselves to any course of action, we get an -aptness to go on, a facility, readiness, and often pleasure, in it. -The inclinations which rendered us averse to it, grow weaker; the -difficulties in it, not only the imaginary but the real ones, lessen; -the reasons for it offer themselves of course to our thoughts upon all -occasions; and the least glimpse of them is sufficient to make us go -on, in a course of action, to which we have been accustomed. Practical -principles appear to grow stronger, absolutely in themselves, by -exercise; as well as relatively, with regard to contrary principles; -which, by being accustomed to submit, do so habitually, and of course. -Thus a new character, in several respects, may be formed; and many -habitudes of life, not given by nature, but which nature directs us to -acquire. - -III. Indeed we may be assured, that we should never have had these -capacities of improving by experience, acquired knowledge, and habits, -had they not been necessary, and intended to be made use of. And -accordingly we find them so necessary, and so much intended, that -without them we should be utterly incapable of that which was the end -for which we were made, considered in our temporal capacity only: the -employments and satisfactions of our mature state of life. - -Nature does in no wise qualify us wholly, much less at once, for this -mature state of life. Even maturity of understanding, and bodily -strength, not only are arrived at gradually, but are also very much -owing to the continued exercise of our powers of body and mind from -infancy. If we suppose a person brought into the world with both these -in maturity, as far as this is conceivable, he would plainly at first -be as unqualified for the human life of mature age, as an idiot. He -would be in a manner distracted, with astonishment, and apprehension, -and curiosity, and suspense: nor can one guess, how long it would be, -before he would be familiarized to himself and the objects about him, -enough even to set himself to any thing. It may be questioned too, -whether the natural information of his sight and hearing would be of -any manner of use to him in acting, before experience. And it seems, -that men would be strangely headstrong and self-willed, and disposed -to exert themselves with an impetuosity, which would render society -insupportable, and the living in it impracticable, were it not for some -acquired moderation and self-government, some aptitude and readiness -in restraining themselves, and concealing their sense of things. Want -of every thing of this kind which is learnt would render a man as -incapable of society, as want of language would; or as his natural -ignorance of any of the particular employments of life would render -him incapable of providing himself with the common conveniences, or -supplying the necessary wants of it. In these respects, and probably -in many more of which we have no particular notion, mankind is left -by nature, an unformed, unfinished creature; utterly deficient and -unqualified, before the acquirement of knowledge, experience, and -habits, for that mature state of life, which was the end of his -creation, considering him as related only to this world. - -But, as nature has endued us with a power of supplying those -deficiencies, by acquired knowledge, experience, and habits; so -likewise we are placed in a condition, in infancy, childhood, and -youth, fitted for it; fitted for our acquiring those qualifications of -all sorts, which we stand in need of in mature age. Hence children, -from their very birth, are daily growing acquainted with the objects -about them, with the scene in which they are placed, and to have -a future part; and learning something or other, necessary to the -performance of it. The subordinations, to which they are accustomed in -domestic life, teach them self-government in common behavior abroad, -and prepare them for subjection and obedience to civil authority.[95] -What passes before their eyes, and daily happens to them, gives them -experience, caution against treachery and deceit, together with -numberless little rules of action and conduct, which we could not -live without; and which are learnt so insensibly and so perfectly, as -to be mistaken perhaps for instinct, though they are the effect of -long experience and exercise; as much so as language, or knowledge in -particular business, or the qualifications and behavior belonging to -the several ranks and professions. Thus the beginning of our days is -adapted to be, and is, a state of education in the theory and practice -of mature life. We are much assisted in it by example, instruction, -and the care of others; but a great deal is left to ourselves to do. -And of this, as part is done easily and of course; so part requires -diligence and care, the voluntary foregoing many things which we -desire, and setting ourselves to what we should have no inclination to, -but for the necessity or expedience of it. For that labor and industry, -which the station of so many absolutely requires, they would be greatly -unqualified for, in maturity, as those in other stations would be for -any other sorts of application; if both were not accustomed to them -in their youth. And, according as persons behave themselves, in the -general education which all go through, and in the particular ones -adapted to particular employments, their character is formed,[96] and -made to appear; they recommend themselves more or less; and are capable -of, and placed in, different stations in society. - -The former part of life, then, is to be considered as an important -opportunity, which nature puts into our hands; and which, when lost -is not to be recovered. And our being placed in a state of discipline -throughout this life, for another world, is a providential disposition -of things, exactly of the same kind, as our being placed in a state -of discipline during childhood, for mature age. Our condition in both -respects is uniform and of a piece, and comprehended under one and the -same general law of nature. - -If we were not able at all to discern, how or in what way the present -life could be our preparation for another; this would be no objection -against the credibility of its being so. We do not discern, how food -and sleep contribute to the growth of the body; nor could have any -thought that they would, before we had experience. Nor do children at -all think, on the one hand, that the sports and exercises, to which -they are so much addicted, contribute to their health and growth; -nor, on the other, of the necessity which there is for their being -restrained in them. Nor are they capable of understanding the use of -many parts of discipline, which nevertheless they must be made to go -through, in order to qualify them for the business of mature age. Were -we not able then to discover, in what respects the present life could -form us for a future one; yet nothing would be more supposable than -that it might, in some respects or other, from the general analogy -of Providence. And this, for aught I see, might reasonably be said, -even though we should not take in the consideration of God’s moral -government over the world. But, - -IV. Take in this consideration, and consequently, that the character -of virtue and piety is a necessary qualification for the future state, -and then we may distinctly see, how, and in what respects, the present -life may be a preparation for it; since we _want, and are capable of, -improvement in that character, by moral and religious habits_; and _the -present life is fit to be a state of discipline for such improvement_: -in like manner as we have already observed, how, and in what respects, -infancy, childhood, and youth, are a necessary preparation, and a -natural state of discipline, for mature age. - -Nothing which we at present see, would lead us to the thought of a -solitary inactive state hereafter. If we judge at all from the analogy -of nature, we must suppose, according to the Scripture account of -it, that it will be a community. And there is no shadow of any thing -unreasonable in conceiving, though there be no analogy for it, that -this community will be, as the Scripture represents it, under the more -immediate, or, if such an expression may be used, the more sensible -government of God. Nor is our ignorance, what will be the employments -of this happy community, nor our consequent ignorance, what particular -scope or occasion there will be for the exercise of veracity, justice, -and charity, among the members of it with regard to each other, any -proof, that there will be no sphere of exercise for those virtues. -Much less, if that were possible, is our ignorance any proof, that -there will be no occasion for that frame of mind, or character, which -is formed by the daily practice of those particular virtues here, -and which is a result from it.[97] This at least must be owned in -general, that, as the government established in the universe is moral, -the character of virtue and piety must, in some way or other, be the -_condition_ of our happiness or the qualification for it. - -From what is above observed, concerning our natural power of habits, -it is easy to see, that we are _capable_ of moral improvement by -discipline. And how greatly we _want_ it, need not be proved to any -one who is acquainted with the great wickedness of mankind; or even -with those imperfections, which the best are conscious of. But it is -not perhaps distinctly attended to by every one, that the occasion -which human creatures have for discipline, to improve in them this -character of virtue and piety, is to be traced up higher than to excess -in the passions, by indulgence and habits of vice. Mankind, and perhaps -all finite creatures, from the very constitution of their nature, -before habits of virtue, are deficient, and in danger of deviating -from what is right; and therefore stand in need of virtuous habits, -for a security against this danger. For, together with the general -principle of moral understanding, we have in our inward frame various -affections towards particular external objects. These affections -are naturally, and of right, subject to the government of the moral -principle, as to the occasions upon which they may be gratified; as -to the times, degrees, and manner, in which the objects of them may -be pursued. But the principle of virtue can neither excite them, nor -prevent their being excited. On the contrary, they are naturally felt, -when the objects of them are present to the mind, not only before all -consideration whether they can be obtained by lawful means, but after -it is found they cannot. The natural objects of affection continue so; -the necessaries, conveniences, and pleasures of life, remain naturally -desirable, though they cannot be obtained innocently: nay, though -they cannot possibly be obtained at all. And when the objects of any -affection whatever cannot be obtained without unlawful means; but may -be obtained by them: such affection, though its being excited, and its -continuing some time in the mind, be as innocent as it is natural and -necessary, yet cannot but be conceived to have a _tendency_ to incline -persons to venture upon such unlawful means: and therefore must be -conceived as putting them in some danger of it. Now what is the general -security against this danger, against their actually deviating from -right? As the danger is, so also must the security be, from within: -from the practical principle of virtue.[98] The strengthening or -improving this principle, considered as practical, or as a principle -of action, will lessen the danger, or increase the security against -it. And this moral principle is capable of improvement, by proper -discipline and exercise: by recollecting the practical impressions -which example and experience have made upon us: and, instead of -following humor and mere inclination, by continually attending to the -equity and right of the case, in whatever we are engaged, be it in -greater or less matters; and accustoming ourselves always to act upon -it, as being itself the just and natural motive of action; and as this -moral course of behavior must necessarily, under the divine government, -be our final interest. _Thus the principle of virtue, improved into -a habit, of which improvement we are thus capable, will plainly be, -in proportion to the strength of it, a security against the danger -which finite creatures are in, from the very nature of propension, -or particular affections._ This way of putting the matter, supposes -particular affections to remain in a future state; which it is scarce -possible to avoid supposing. And if they do; we clearly see, that -acquired habits of virtue and self-government may be necessary for the -regulation of them. However, though we were not distinctly to take in -this supposition, but to speak only in general; the thing really comes -to the same. For habits of virtue, thus acquired by discipline, are -improvement in virtue: and improvement in virtue must be advancement in -happiness, if the government of the universe be moral. - -From these things we may observe, (and it will further show this -our natural and original need of being improved by discipline,) how -it comes to pass, that creatures made upright, fall; and how those -who preserve their uprightness, raise themselves by so doing, to a -more secure state of virtue. To say that the former is accounted for -by the nature of liberty, is to say no more, than that an event’s -actually happening is accounted for by a mere possibility of its -happening. But it seems distinctly conceivable from the very nature of -particular affections or propensions. For, suppose creatures intended -for such a particular state of life, for which such propensions were -necessary: suppose them endued with such propensions, together with -moral understanding, as well including a practical sense of virtue as -a speculative perception of it; and that all these several principles, -both natural and moral, forming an inward constitution of mind, were -in the most exact proportion possible; _i.e._ in a proportion the most -exactly adapted to their intended state of life; such creatures would -be made upright, or finitely perfect. Now particular propensions, from -their very nature, must be felt, the objects of them being present; -though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the allowance of -the moral principle. If they can be gratified without its allowance, -or by contradicting it, then they must be conceived to have some -tendency, in how low a degree soever, yet some tendency, to induce -persons to such forbidden gratification. This tendency, in some one -particular propension, may be increased, by the greater frequency of -occasions naturally exciting it, than of occasions exciting others. -The least voluntary indulgence in forbidden circumstances,[99] though -but in thought, will increase this wrong tendency; and may increase -it further, till, peculiar conjunctures perhaps conspiring, it -becomes effect; and danger of deviating from right, ends in actual -deviation from it; a danger necessarily arising from the very nature of -propension, and which therefore could not have been prevented, though -it might have been escaped, or got innocently through. The case would -be, as if we were to suppose a straight path marked out for a person, -in which a certain degree of attention would keep him steady: but if -he would not attend, in this degree, any one of a thousand objects, -catching his eye, might lead him out of it. - -Now it is impossible to say, how much even the first full overt act -of irregularity might disorder the inward constitution; unsettle the -adjustments, and alter the proportions, which formed it, and in which -the uprightness of its make consisted: but repetition of irregularities -would produce habits. Thus the constitution would be spoiled; -and creatures made upright, become corrupt and depraved in their -settled character, proportionably to their repeated irregularities -in occasional acts,[100] On the contrary, these creatures might -have improved and raised themselves, to a higher and more secure -state of virtue, by the contrary behavior: by steadily following the -moral principle, supposed to be one part of their nature: and thus -_withstanding_ that unavoidable danger of defection, which necessarily -arose from propension, the other part of it. For, by thus preserving -their integrity for some time, their danger would lessen; since -propensions, by being inured to submit, would do it more easily and -of course: and their security against this lessening danger would -increase; since the moral principle would gain additional strength -by exercise: both which things are implied in the notion of virtuous -habits. - -Thus vicious indulgence is not only criminal in itself, but also -depraves the inward constitution and character. And virtuous -self-government is not only right in itself, but also improves the -inward constitution or character: and may improve it to such a degree, -that though we should suppose it impossible for particular affections -to be absolutely coincident with the moral principle; and consequently -should allow, that such creatures as have been above supposed, would -forever remain defectible, yet their danger of actually deviating from -right may be almost infinitely lessened, and they fully fortified -against what remains of it; if that may be called danger, against which -there is an adequate, effectual security. Still, this their higher -perfection may continue to consist in habits of virtue formed in a -state of discipline, and this their more complete security remain to -proceed from them. - -Thus it is plainly conceivable, that creatures without blemish, as they -came out of the hands of God, may be in danger of going wrong; and so -may stand in need of the security of virtuous habits, additional to the -moral principle wrought into their natures by him. That which is the -ground of their danger, or their want of security, maybe considered as -a deficiency in themselves, to which virtuous habits are the natural -supply. And as they are naturally capable of being raised and improved -by discipline, it may be a thing fit and requisite, that they should be -placed in circumstances with an eye to it: in circumstances peculiarly -fitted to be to them a state of discipline for their improvement in -virtue. - -But how much more strongly must this hold with respect to those who -have corrupted their natures, are fallen from their original rectitude, -and whose passions are become excessive by repeated violations of -their inward constitution! Upright creatures may want to be improved: -depraved creatures want to be renewed. Education and discipline, which -may be in all degrees and sorts of gentleness and of severity, are -expedient for those: but must be absolutely necessary for these. For -these, discipline of the severer sort too, and in the higher degrees -of it, must be necessary, in order to wear out vicious habits; to -recover their primitive strength of self-government, which indulgence -must have weakened; to repair, as well as raise into a habit, the moral -principle, in order to their arriving at a secure state of virtuous -happiness. - -Whoever will consider the thing, may clearly see that the present world -is _peculiarly fit_ to be a state of discipline for this purpose, to -such as will set themselves to mend and improve. For, the various -temptations with which we are surrounded; our experience of the deceits -of wickedness; having been in many instances led wrong ourselves; the -great viciousness of the world; the infinite disorders consequent upon -it; our being made acquainted with pain and sorrow, either from our own -feeling of it, or from the sight of it in others; these things, though -some of them may indeed produce wrong effects upon our minds, yet when -duly reflected upon, have, all of them, a direct tendency to bring us -to a settled moderation and reasonableness of temper: the contrary both -to thoughtless levity, and also to that unrestrained self-will, and -violent bent to follow present inclination, which may be observed in -undisciplined minds. - -Such experience, as the present state affords, of the frailty of our -nature; of the boundless extravagance of ungoverned passion; of the -power which an infinite being has over us, by the various capacities -of misery which he has given us; in short, that kind and degree of -experience, which the present state affords us, that the constitution -of nature is such as to admit the possibility, the danger, and the -actual event, or creatures losing their innocence and happiness, and -becoming vicious and wretched; has a tendency to give us a practical -sense of things very different from a mere speculative knowledge, that -we are liable to vice, and capable of misery. And who knows, whether -the security of creatures in the highest and most settled state of -perfection, may not in part arise, from their having had such a sense -of things as this, formed, and habitually fixed within them, in some -state of probation. And passing through the present world with that -moral attention, which is necessary to the acting a right part in it, -may leave everlasting impressions of this sort upon our minds. - -To be a little more distinct: allurements to what is wrong, -difficulties in the discharge of our duty, our not being able to act a -uniform right part without some thought and care, and the opportunities -which we have, or imagine we have, of avoiding what we dislike or -obtaining what we desire, by unlawful means, when we either cannot do -it at all, or at least not so easily, by lawful ones, these things, -_i.e._ the snares and temptations of vice, are what render the present -world peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline, to those who will -preserve their integrity: because they render being upon our guard, -resolution, and the denial of our passions, necessary in order to that -end. The exercise of such particular recollection, intention of mind, -and self-government, in the practice of virtue, has, from the make of -our nature, a peculiar tendency to form habits of virtue; as implying, -not only a real, but also a more continued, and a more intense exercise -of the virtuous principle, or a more constant and a stronger effort of -virtue exerted into act. Thus suppose a person to know himself to be -in particular danger, for some time, of doing any thing wrong, which -yet he fully resolves not to do; continued recollection and keeping -upon his guard, in order to make good his resolution, is a _continued_ -exerting of that act of virtue in a _high degree_, which need have -been, and perhaps would have been, only _instantaneous_ and _weak_, had -the temptation been so. - -It is indeed ridiculous to assert, that self-denial is essential to -virtue and piety:[101] but it would have been nearer the truth, though -not strictly the truth itself, to have said, that it is essential to -discipline and improvement. For though actions materially virtuous, -which have no sort of difficulty, but are perfectly agreeable to -our particular inclinations, may possibly be done only from these -particular inclinations, and so may not be any exercise of the -principle of virtue, _i.e._ not be virtuous actions at all; yet, on -the contrary, they _may_ be an exercise of that principle: and when -they are, they have a tendency to form and fix the habit of virtue. -But when the exercise of the virtuous principle is more continued, -oftener repeated, and more intense; as it must be in circumstances of -danger, temptation, and difficulty, of any kind and in any degree; this -tendency is increased proportionably, and a more confirmed habit is the -consequence. - -This undoubtedly holds to a certain length: but how far it may hold, -I know not. Neither our intellectual powers, nor our bodily strength -can be improved beyond a certain degree: and both may be overwrought. -Possibly there may be something analogous to this, with respect to the -moral character; which is scarce worth considering. I mention it only, -lest it should come into some persons’ thoughts, not as an exception to -the foregoing observations, which perhaps it is; but as a confutation -of them, which it is not. And there may be several other exceptions. -Observations of this kind cannot be supposed to hold minutely, and in -every case. It is enough that they hold in general. And these plainly -hold so far, as that from them may be seen distinctly, (which is all -that is intended by them,) that _the present world is peculiarly fit -to be a state of discipline, for our improvement in virtue and piety_: -in the same sense as some sciences, by requiring and engaging the -attention, not to be sure of such persons as will not, but of such as -will, set themselves to them, are fit to form the mind to habits of -attention. - -Indeed the present state is so far from proving, in event, a discipline -of virtue to the generality of men, that on the contrary they seem to -make it a discipline of vice. And the viciousness of the world is, -in different ways, the great temptation which renders it a state of -virtuous discipline, in the degree it is, to good men. The whole end, -and the whole occasion, of mankind’s being placed in such a state as -the present, is not pretended to be accounted for. That which appears -amidst the general corruption, is, that there are some persons, who, -having within them the principle of amendment and recovery, attend to -and follow the notices of virtue and religion, be they more clear or -more obscure, which are afforded them; and that the present world is -not only an exercise of virtue in these persons, but an exercise of -it in ways and degrees, peculiarly apt to improve it: apt to improve -it, in some respects, even beyond what would be, by the exercise of -it, required in a perfectly virtuous society, or in a society of -equally imperfect virtue with themselves. But that the present world -does not actually become a state of moral discipline to many, even -to the generality, _i.e._ that they do not improve or grow better in -it, cannot be urged as a proof, that it was not intended for moral -discipline, by any who at all observe the analogy of nature. For, of -the numerous seeds of vegetables and bodies of animals, which are -adapted and put in the way to improve to such a point or state of -natural maturity and perfection, we do not see perhaps that one in -a million actually does. Far the greatest part of them decay before -they are improved to it; and appear to be absolutely destroyed. Yet no -one, who does not deny all final causes, will deny, that those seeds -and bodies, which do attain to that point of maturity and perfection, -answer the end for which they were really designed by nature; and -therefore that nature designed them for such perfection. I cannot -forbear adding, though it is not to the present purpose, that the -_appearance_ of such an amazing _waste_ in nature, with respect to -these seeds and bodies, by foreign causes, is to us as unaccountable, -as, what is much more terrible, the present and future ruin of so many -moral agents by themselves, _i.e._ by vice. - -Against this whole notion of moral discipline, it may be objected, in -another way; that so far as a course of behavior, materially virtuous, -proceeds from hope and fear, so far it is only a discipline and -strengthening of self-love. But doing what God commands, because he -commands it, is obedience, though it proceeds from hope or fear. A -course of such obedience will form habits of it. And a constant regard -to veracity, justice, and charity, may form distinct habits of these -particular virtues; and will certainly form habits of self-government, -and of denying our inclinations, whenever veracity, justice, or charity -requires it. Nor is there any foundation for this great nicety, with -which some affect to distinguish in this case, in order to depreciate -all religion proceeding from hope or fear. For, veracity, justice, and -charity, regard to God’s authority, and to our own chief interest, are -not only all three coincident; but each of them is, in itself, a just -and natural motive or principle of action. He who begins a good life -from any one of them, and perseveres in it, as he is already in some -degree, so he cannot fail of becoming more and more, of that character -which is correspondent to the constitution of nature as moral; and -to the relation which God stands in to us as moral governor of it: -nor consequently can he fail of obtaining that happiness, which this -constitution and relation necessarily suppose connected with that -character. - -These several observations, concerning the active principle of virtue -and obedience to God’s commands, are applicable to passive submission -or resignation to his will: which is another essential part of a right -character, connected with the former, and very much in our power to -form ourselves to. It may be imagined, that nothing but afflictions -can give occasion for or require this virtue; that it can have no -respect to, nor be any way necessary to qualify for, a state of perfect -happiness: but it is not experience which can make us think thus. -Prosperity itself, while any thing supposed desirable is not ours, -begets extravagant and unbounded thoughts. Imagination is altogether as -much a source of discontent, as any thing in our external condition. It -is indeed true, that there can be no scope for _patience_, when sorrow -shall be no more; but there may be need of a temper of mind, which -shall have been formed by patience. For, though self-love, considered -merely as an active principle leading us to pursue our chief interest, -cannot but be uniformly coincident with the principle of obedience to -God’s commands, our interest being rightly understood; because this -obedience, and the pursuit of our own chief interest, must be in every -ease one and the thing: yet it may be questioned, whether self-love, -considered merely as the desire of our own interest or happiness, can, -from its nature, be thus absolutely and uniformly coincident with the -will of God; any more than particular affections can:[102] coincident -in such sort, as not to be liable to be excited upon occasions and in -degrees, impossible to be gratified consistently with the constitution -of things, or the divine appointments. So that _habits_ of resignation -may, upon this account, be requisite for all creatures: habits, I -say; which signify what is formed by use. However, in general it is -obvious that both self-love and particular affection in human creatures -considered only as passive feelings, distort and rend the mind; and -therefore stand in need of discipline. Now denial of those particular -affections, in a course of active virtue and obedience to God’s will, -has a tendency to moderate them; and seems also to have a tendency -to habituate the mind, to be easy and satisfied with that degree of -happiness which is allotted us, _i.e._ to moderate self-love. But the -proper discipline for resignation is affliction. A right behavior -under that trial; recollecting ourselves so as to consider it in the -view, in which religion teaches us to consider it, as from the hand of -God, receiving it as what he appoints, or thinks proper to permit, in -his world and under his government; this will habituate the mind to a -dutiful submission. Such submission, together with the active principle -of obedience, make up the temper and character in us, which answers to -his sovereignty; and which absolutely belongs to the condition of our -being, as dependent creatures. Nor can it be said, that this is only -breaking the mind to a submission to mere power; for mere power may -be accidental, and precarious, and usurped: but it is forming within -ourselves the temper of resignation to His rightful authority, who is, -by nature, supreme over all. - -Upon the whole: such a character, and such qualifications, are -necessary for a mature state of life in the present world, as nature -alone does in no wise bestow; but has put it upon us, in great part, -to acquire, in our progress from one stage of life to another, from -childhood to mature age; put it upon us to acquire them, by giving -us capacities of doing it, and by placing us, in the beginning of -life, in a condition fit for it. And this is a general analogy to our -condition in the present world, as in a state of moral discipline for -another. - -It is in vain to object against the credibility of the present life’s -being intended for this purpose, that all the trouble and the danger -unavoidably accompanying such discipline, might have been saved us, by -our being made at once the creatures and the characters, _which we were -to be_. For we experience, that _what we were to be_, was to be the -effect of _what we would do_: and that the general conduct of nature -is, not to save us trouble or danger, but to make us capable of going -through them, and to put it upon us to do so. Acquirements of our own, -experience and habits, are the _natural_ supply to our deficiencies, -and security against our dangers: since it is as plainly natural to -set ourselves to acquire the qualifications, as the external things, -which we stand in need of. In particular, it is as plainly a general -law of nature, that we should with regard to our temporal interest, -form and cultivate practical principles within us, by attention, use, -and discipline, as any thing whatever is a natural law; chiefly in the -beginning of life, but also throughout the whole course of it. The -alternative is left to our choice: either to improve ourselves, and -better our condition; or, in default of such improvement, to remain -deficient and wretched. It is therefore perfectly credible, from the -analogy of nature, that the same may be our case, with respect to the -happiness of a future state, and the qualifications necessary for it. - -There is a third thing, which may seem implied in the present world’s -being a state of probation; that it is a _theatre of action_, for the -manifestation of persons’ characters, with respect to a future one: -not, to be sure, to an all-knowing Being, but to his creation or part -of it. This may, perhaps, be only a consequence of our being in a -state of probation in the other senses. However, it is not impossible, -that men’s showing and making manifest, what is in their heart, -what their real character is, may have respect to a future life, in -ways and manners with which we are not acquainted: particularly it -may be a means, (for the Author of nature does not appear to do any -thing without means,) of their being disposed of suitably to their -characters; and of its being known to the creation, by way of example, -that they are thus disposed of. But not to enter upon any conjectural -account of this; one may just mention, that the manifestation of -persons’ characters contributes very much, in various ways, to the -carrying on a great part of that general course of nature, respecting -mankind, which comes under our observation at present. I shall only -add, that probation, in both these senses, as well as in that treated -of in the foregoing chapter, is implied in moral government; since by -persons’ behavior under it, their characters cannot but be manifested, -and if they behave well, improved. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - -THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, CONSIDERED AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. - - -Throughout the foregoing treatise it appears, that the condition of -mankind, considered as inhabitants of this world only, and under the -government of God which we experience, is greatly analogous to our -condition, as designed for another world, or as under that farther -government, which religion teaches us. If therefore any assert, as a -fatalist must, that the opinion of universal necessity is reconcilable -with the former; there immediately arises a question in the way of -analogy, whether he must not also own it to be reconcilable with the -latter, _i.e._ with the system of religion itself, and the proof of -it. The reader then will observe, that the question now before us is -not absolute, _i.e._ whether the opinion of fate be reconcilable with -religion; but hypothetical, whether, upon supposition of its being -reconcilable with the constitution of nature, it be not reconcilable -with religion also. Or, what pretence a fatalist, not other persons, -but a fatalist, has to conclude from his opinion, that there can be no -such thing as religion. And as the puzzle and obscurity, which must -unavoidably arise from arguing upon so absurd a supposition as that of -universal necessity, will, I fear, easily be seen; it will, I hope, as -easily be excused.[103] - -Since it has been all along taken for granted, as a thing proved, that -there is an intelligent Author of nature, or natural Governor of the -world; and since an objection may be made against the proof of this, -from the opinion of universal necessity, as it may be supposed, that -such necessity will itself account for the origin and preservation -of all things; it is requisite, that this objection be distinctly -answered; or that it be shown, that a fatality supposed consistent -with what we certainly experience, does not destroy the proof of -an intelligent Author and Governor of nature; before we proceed to -consider, whether it destroys the proof of a moral Governor of it, or -of our being in a state of religion. - -When it is said by a fatalist, that the whole constitution of nature, -the actions of men, every thing, and every mode and circumstance -of every thing, is necessary, and could not possibly have been -otherwise; it is to be observed, that this necessity does not exclude -deliberation, choice, preference, and acting from certain principles, -and to certain ends: because all this is matter of undoubted -experience, acknowledged by all, and what every man may, every moment, -be conscious of. Hence it follows, that necessity, alone and of itself, -is in no sort an account of the constitution of nature, and how things -came _to be_ and _to continue_ as they are; but only an account of -this _circumstance_ relating to their origin and continuance, that -they could not have been otherwise, than they are and have been. The -assertion, that every thing is by necessity of nature, is not an -answer to the question; Whether the world came into being as it is, -by an intelligent Agent forming it thus, or not: but to quite another -question; Whether it came into being as it is, in that way and manner -which we call _necessarily_, or in that way and manner which we call -_freely_? For suppose farther, that one who was a fatalist, and one who -kept to his natural sense of things, and believed himself a free agent, -were disputing together, and vindicating their respective opinions; -and they should happen to instance a house; they would agree that it -was built by an architect. Their difference concerning necessity and -freedom would occasion no difference of judgment concerning this; -but only concerning another matter; whether the architect built it -necessarily or freely. - -Suppose they should proceed to inquire concerning the constitution -of nature. In a lax way of speaking, one of them might say, it was -by necessity; and the other, by freedom: but if they had any meaning -to their words, as the latter must mean a free agent, so the former -must at length be reduced to mean an agent, whether he would say one -or more, acting by necessity: for abstract notions can do nothing. We -indeed ascribe to God a necessary existence, uncaused by any agent. -For we find within ourselves the idea of infinity, _i.e._ immensity -and eternity, impossible, even in imagination, to be removed out of -being. We seem to discern intuitively, that there must, and cannot -but be, something, external to ourselves, answering this idea, or the -archetype of it. Hence, (for _this abstract_, as much as any other, -implies a _concrete_) we conclude, that there is, and cannot but be, -an infinite and immense eternal being, existing prior to all design -contributing to his existence, and exclusive of it. From the scantiness -of language, a manner of speaking has been introduced; that necessity -is the foundation, the reason, the account of the existence of God. But -it is not alleged, nor can it be at all intended, that _every thing_ -exists as it does, by this kind of necessity: a necessity antecedent in -nature to design: it cannot, I say, be meant that every thing exists -as it does, by this kind of necessity, upon several accounts; and -particularly because it is admitted, that design, in the actions of -men, contributes to many alterations in nature. If any deny this, I -shall not pretend to reason with them. - -From these things it follows; _First_, That when a fatalist asserts, -that every thing is _by necessity_, he must mean, _by an agent acting -necessarily_; he _must_, I say, mean this, for I am very sensible he -would not choose to mean it. _Secondly_, That the necessity, by which -such an agent is supposed to act, does not exclude intelligence and -design. So that, were the system of fatality admitted, it would just as -much account for the formation of the world, as for the structure of a -house, and no more. Necessity as much requires and supposes a necessary -agent, as freedom requires and supposes a free agent, to be the former -of the world. And the appearances of _design_ and of _final causes_ -in the constitution of nature as really prove this acting agent to be -an _intelligent designer_, or to act from choice; upon the scheme of -necessity, supposed possible, as upon that of freedom. - -It appearing thus, that the notion of necessity does not destroy -the proof that there is an intelligent Author of nature and natural -Governor of the world; the present question, which the analogy before -mentioned suggests,[104] and which, I think, it will answer, is this: -Whether the opinion of necessity, supposed consistent with possibility, -with the constitution of the world, and the natural government which -we experience exercised over it, destroys all reasonable ground of -belief, that we are in a state of religion: or whether that opinion be -reconcilable with religion; with the system, and the proof of it. - -Suppose then a fatalist to educate any one, from his youth up, in his -own principles; that the child should reason upon them, and conclude, -that since he cannot possibly behave otherwise than he does, he is not -a subject of blame or commendation, nor can deserve to be rewarded -or punished. Imagine him to eradicate the very perceptions of blame -and commendation out of his mind, by means of this system; to form -his temper, and character, and behavior to it; and from it to judge -of the treatment he was to expect, say, from reasonable men, upon his -coming abroad into the world: as the fatalist judges from this system, -what he is to expect from the Author of nature, and with regard to -a future state. I cannot forbear stopping here to ask, whether any -one of common sense would think fit, that a child should be put upon -these speculations, and be left to apply them to practice. And a -man has little pretence to reason, who is not sensible, that we are -all children in speculations of this kind. However, the child would -doubtless be highly delighted to find himself freed from the restraints -of fear and shame, with which his play-fellows were fettered and -embarrassed; and highly conceited in his superior knowledge, so far -beyond his years. But conceit and vanity would be the least bad part -of the influence, which these principles must have, when thus reasoned -and acted upon, during the course of his education. He must either be -allowed to go on and be the plague of all about him, and himself too, -even to his own destruction, or else correction must be continually -made use of, to supply the want of those natural perceptions of blame -and commendation, which we have supposed to be removed; and to give -him a practical impression, of what he had reasoned himself out of the -belief of, that he was in fact an accountable child, and to be punished -for doing what he was forbid. It is therefore in reality impossible, -but that the correction which he must meet with, in the course of his -education, must convince him, that if the scheme he was instructed -in were not false, yet that he reasoned inconclusively upon it, and -somehow or other misapplied it to practice and common life; as what the -fatalist experiences of the conduct of Providence at present, ought -in all reason to convince him, that this scheme is misapplied, when -applied to the subject of religion.[105] But supposing the child’s -temper could remain still formed to the system, and his expectation of -the treatment he was to have in the world, be regulated by it; so as -to expect that no reasonable man would blame or punish him, for any -thing which he should do, because he could not help doing it: upon this -supposition it is manifest he would, upon his coming abroad into the -world, be insupportable to society, and the treatment which he would -receive from it would render it so to him; and he could not fail of -doing something very soon, for which he would be delivered over into -the hands of civil justice. And thus, in the end, he would be convinced -of the obligations he was under to his wise instructor. - -Suppose this scheme of fatality, in any other way, applied to practice, -such practical application of it will be found equally absurd; equally -fallacious in a practical sense. For instance, that if a man be -destined to live such a time, he shall live to it, though he take no -care of his own preservation; or if he be destined to die before that -time, no care can prevent it, therefore all care about preserving one’s -life is to be neglected: which is the fallacy instanced in by the -ancients. On the contrary, none of these practical absurdities can be -drawn from reasoning, upon the supposition that we are free; but all -such reasoning with regard to the common affairs of life is justified -by experience. Therefore, though it were admitted that this opinion of -necessity were _speculatively_ true; yet, with regard to practice, it -is as if it were false, so far as our experience reaches: that is, to -the whole of our present life. For, the constitution of the present -world, and the condition in which we are actually placed, is, as if we -were free. And it may perhaps justly be concluded, that since the whole -process of action, through every step of it, suspense, deliberation, -inclining one way, determining, and at last doing as we determine, is -as if we were free, therefore we are so.[106] - -The thing here insisted upon is, that under the present natural -government of the world, we find we are treated and dealt with, as if -we were free, prior to all consideration whether we are so or not. -Were this opinion therefore of necessity admitted to be ever so true; -yet such is in fact our condition and the natural course of things, -that whenever we apply it to life and practice, this application of -it always misleads us, and cannot but mislead us, in a most dreadful -manner, with regard to our present interest. How then can people think -themselves so very secure, that the same application of the same -opinion may not mislead them also, in some analogous manner, with -respect to a future, a more general, and more important interest? For, -religion being a practical subject; and the analogy of nature showing -us, that we have not faculties to apply this opinion, were it a true -one, to practical subjects; whenever we do apply it to the subject of -religion, and thence conclude, that we are free from its obligations, -it is plain this conclusion cannot be depended upon. There will still -remain just reason to think, whatever appearances are, that we deceive -ourselves; in somewhat of a like manner, as when people fancy they can -draw contradictory conclusions from the idea of infinity. - -From these things together, the attentive reader will see it follows, -that if upon supposition of freedom the evidence of religion be -conclusive, it remains so, upon supposition of necessity, because the -notion of necessity is not applicable to practical subjects: _i.e._ -with respect to them, is as if it were not true. Nor does this contain -any reflection upon reason, but only upon what is unreasonable. For -to pretend to act upon reason, in opposition to practical principles, -which the Author of our nature gave us to act upon; and to pretend -to apply our reason to subjects, with regard to which, our own short -views, and even our experience, will show us, it cannot be depended -upon; and such, at best, the subject of necessity must be; this is -vanity, conceit, and unreasonableness. - -But this is not all. We find within ourselves a will, and are conscious -of a character. Now if this, in us, be reconcilable with fate, it -is reconcilable with it in the Author of nature. Besides, natural -government and final causes imply a character and a will in the -Governor and Designer;[107] a will concerning the creatures whom he -governs. The Author of nature then being certainly of some character or -other, notwithstanding necessity; it is evident this necessity is as -reconcilable with the particular character of benevolence, veracity, -and justice, in him, which attributes are the foundation of religion, -as with any other character: since we find this necessity no more -hinders _men_ from being benevolent, than cruel; true, than faithless; -just, than unjust; or, if the fatalist pleases, what we call unjust. It -is said indeed, that what, upon supposition of freedom, would be just -punishment, upon supposition of necessity, becomes manifestly unjust: -because it is punishment inflicted for doing that which persons could -not avoid doing. As if the necessity, which is supposed to destroy the -injustice of murder, for instance, would not also destroy the injustice -of punishing it! However, as little to the purpose as this objection -is in itself, it is very much to the purpose to observe from it, how -the notions of justice and injustice remain, even while we endeavor to -suppose them removed; how they force themselves upon the mind, even -while we are making suppositions destructive of them: for there is not, -perhaps, a man in the world, but would be ready to make this objection -at first thought. - -But though it is most evident, that universal necessity, if it be -reconcilable with any thing, is reconcilable with that character in -the Author of nature, which is the foundation of religion; “Yet, does -it not plainly destroy the _proof_ that he is of that character, and -consequently the proof of religion?” By no means. For we find, that -happiness and misery are not our _fate_, in any such sense as not to be -the consequences of our behavior; but that they are the consequences -of it.[108] We find God exercises the same kind of government over us, -which a father exercises over his children, and a civil magistrate over -his subjects. Now, whatever becomes of abstract questions concerning -liberty and necessity, it evidently appears to us, that veracity -and justice must be the natural rule and measure of exercising this -authority or government, to a Being who can have no competitions, or -interfering of interests, with his creatures and his subjects. - -But as the doctrine of liberty, though we experience its truth, may be -perplexed with difficulties, which run up into the most abstruse of -all speculations; and as the opinion of necessity seems to be the very -basis upon which infidelity grounds itself; it may be of some use to -offer a more particular proof of the obligations of religion, which may -distinctly be shown not to be destroyed by this opinion. - -The proof from final causes of an intelligent Author of nature is -not affected by the opinion of necessity; supposing necessity a -thing possible in itself, and reconcilable with the constitution of -things.[109] It is a matter of fact, independent on this or any other -speculation, that he governs the world by the method of rewards and -punishments:[110] and also that he hath given us a moral faculty, by -which we distinguish between actions, and approve some as virtuous -and of good desert, and disapprove others as vicious and of ill -desert.[111] This moral discernment implies, in the notion of it, a -rule of action, and a rule of a very peculiar kind: for it carries -in it authority and a right of direction; authority in such a sense, -as that we cannot depart from it without being self-condemned.[112] -And that the dictates of this moral faculty, which are by nature a -rule to us, are moreover the laws of God, laws in a sense including -sanctions; may be thus proved. Consciousness of a rule or guide of -action, in creatures who are capable of considering it as given them -by their Maker, not only raises immediately a sense of duty, but also -a sense of security in following it, and of danger in deviating from -it. A direction of the Author of nature, given to creatures capable of -looking upon it as such, is plainly a command from him: and a command -from him necessarily includes in it, at least, an implicit promise in -case of obedience, or threatening in case of disobedience. But then the -sense or perception of good and ill desert,[113] which is contained -in the moral discernment, renders the sanction explicit, and makes it -appear, as one may say, expressed. For since his method of government -is to reward and punish actions, his having annexed to some actions an -inseparable sense of good desert, and to others of ill, this surely -amounts to declaring, upon whom his punishments shall be inflicted, and -his rewards be bestowed. He must have given us this discernment and -sense of things, as a presentiment of what is to be hereafter: that is, -by way of information beforehand, what we are finally to expect in this -world. There is then most evident ground to think, that the government -of God, upon the whole, will be found to correspond to the nature which -he has given us: and that, in the upshot and issue of things, happiness -and misery shall, in fact and event, be made to follow virtue and vice -respectively; as he has already, in so peculiar a manner, associated -the ideas of them in our minds. And hence might easily be deduced the -obligations of religious worship, were it only to be considered as a -means of preserving upon our minds a sense of this moral government -of God, and securing our obedience to it: which yet is an extremely -imperfect view of that most important duty. - -No objection from necessity can lie against this general proof of -religion. None against the proposition reasoned upon, that we have -such a moral faculty and discernment; because this is a mere matter of -fact, a thing of experience, that human kind is thus constituted: none -against the conclusion; because it is immediate and wholly from this -fact. For the conclusion, that God will finally reward the righteous -and punish the wicked, is not here drawn, from its appearing to us -fit[114] that _he should_; but from its appearing, that he has told -us, _he will_. And this he hath certainly told us, in the promise -and threatening, which it hath been observed the notion of a command -implies, and the sense of good and ill desert which he has given us, -more distinctly expresses. This reasoning from fact is confirmed, and -in some degree even verified, by other facts; by the natural tendencies -of virtue and of vice;[115] and by this, that God, in the natural -course of his providence, punishes vicious actions as mischievous to -society; and also vicious actions as such in the strictest sense.[116] -So that the general proof of religion is unanswerably real, even upon -the wild supposition which we are arguing upon. - -It must be observed further, that natural religion has, besides this, -an external evidence; which the doctrine of necessity, if it could be -true, would not affect. For suppose a person, by the observations and -reasoning above, or by any other, convinced of the truth of religion; -that there is a God, who made the world, who is the moral governor -and judge of mankind, and will upon the whole deal with every one -according to his works: I say, suppose a person convinced of this by -reason, but to know nothing at all of antiquity, or the present state -of mankind: it would be natural for such a one to be inquisitive, what -was the history of this system of doctrine; at what time, and in what -manner, it came first into the world; and whether it were believed -by any considerable part of it. Were he upon inquiry to find, that -a particular person, in a late age, first of all proposed it, as a -deduction of reason, and that mankind were before wholly ignorant of -it; then, though its evidence from reason would remain, there would -be no additional probability of its truth, from the account of its -discovery. - -But instead of this being the fact, he would find, on the contrary, -what could not but afford him a very strong confirmation of its truth: -_First_, That somewhat of this system, with more or fewer additions and -alterations, hath been professed in all ages and countries, of which -we have any certain information relating to this matter. _Secondly_, -That it is certain historical fact, so far as we can trace things up, -that this whole system of belief, that there is one God, the creator -and moral governor of the world, and that mankind is in a state of -religion, was received in the first ages. And _Thirdly_, That as -there is no hint or intimation in history, that this system was first -reasoned out; so there is express historical or traditional evidence, -as ancient as history, that it was taught first by revelation. - -Now these things must be allowed to be of great weight. The first of -them, general consent, shows this system to be conformable to the -common sense of mankind. The second, namely, that religion was believed -in the first ages of the world, especially as it does not appear that -there were then any superstitious or false additions to it, cannot -but be a further confirmation of its truth. For it is a proof of -this alternative: either that it came into the world by revelation; -or that it is natural, obvious, and forces itself upon the mind. The -former of these is the conclusion of learned men. And whoever will -consider, how unapt for speculation rude and uncultivated minds are, -will, perhaps from hence alone, be strongly inclined to believe it the -truth. And as it is shown in the second part[117] of this treatise, -that there is nothing of such peculiar presumption against a revelation -in the beginning of the world, as there is supposed to be against -subsequent ones; a sceptic could not, I think, give any account, which -would appear more probable even to himself, of the early pretences to -revelation; than by supposing some real original one, from whence they -were copied. - -And the third thing above mentioned, that there is express historical -or traditional evidence, as ancient as history, of the system of -religion being taught mankind by revelation, this must be admitted as -some degree of real proof, that it was so taught. For why should not -the most ancient tradition be admitted as some additional proof of a -fact, against which there is no presumption? This proof is mentioned -here, because it has its weight to show, that religion came into -the world by revelation, prior to all consideration of the proper -authority of any book supposed to contain it; and even prior to all -consideration, whether the revelation itself be uncorruptly handed -down, or mixed and darkened with fables. Thus the historical account, -which we have of the origin of religion, taking in all circumstances, -is a real confirmation of its truth, no way affected by the opinion of -necessity. And the _external_ evidence, even of natural religion, is by -no means inconsiderable. - -It is carefully to be observed, and ought to be recollected after -all proofs of virtue and religion, which are only general, that as -speculative reason may be neglected, prejudiced, and deceived, so also -may our moral understanding be impaired and perverted, and the dictates -of it not impartially attended to. This indeed proves nothing against -the reality of our speculative or practical faculties of perception? -against their being intended by nature, to inform us in the theory -of things, and instruct us how we are to behave, and what we are to -expect in consequence of our behavior. Yet our liableness, in the -degree we are liable, to prejudice and perversion, is a most serious -admonition to us to be upon our guard, with respect to what is of such -consequence, as our determinations concerning virtue and religion; -and particularly not to take custom, and fashion, and slight notions -of honor, or imaginations of present ease, use, and convenience to -mankind, for the only moral rule.[118] - -The foregoing observations, drawn from the nature of the thing, and -the history of religion, amount, _when taken together_, to a real -practical proof of it, not to be confuted: such a proof as, considering -the infinite importance of the thing, I apprehend, would be admitted -fully sufficient, in reason, to influence the actions of men, who act -upon thought and reflection, if it were admitted that there is no proof -of the contrary. But it may be said; “There are many probabilities, -which cannot indeed be confuted; _i.e._ shown to be no probabilities, -and yet may be overbalanced by greater probabilities, on the other -side; much more by demonstration. And there is no occasion to object -against particular arguments alleged for an opinion, when the opinion -itself may be clearly shown to be false, without meddling with such -arguments at all, but leaving them just as they are.[119] Now the -method of government by rewards and punishments, and especially -rewarding and punishing good and ill desert as such respectively, must -go upon supposition, that we are free and not necessary agents. And -it is incredible, that the Author of nature should govern us upon a -supposition as true, which he knows to be false; and therefore absurd -to think, he will reward or punish us for our actions hereafter; -especially that he will do it under the notion, that they are of good -or ill desert.” - -Here then the matter is brought to a point. And the answer is full, -and not to be evaded,--viz.: that the whole constitution and course -of things, the whole analogy of Providence, shows beyond possibility -of doubt, that the conclusion from this reasoning is false; wherever -the fallacy lies. The doctrine of freedom indeed clearly shows where: -in supposing ourselves necessary, when in truth we are free agents. -But, upon the supposition of necessity, the fallacy lies in taking for -granted, that it is incredible necessary agents should be rewarded -and punished. That, somehow or other, the conclusion now mentioned -is false, is most certain. For it is fact, that God does govern even -brute creatures by the method of rewards and punishments, in the -natural course of things. Men are rewarded and punished for their -actions, punished for actions mischievous to society as being so, -punished for vicious actions as such; by the natural instrumentality -of each other, under the present conduct of Providence. Nay, even -the affection of gratitude, and the passion of resentment, and the -rewards and punishments following from them, which in general are to be -considered as natural, _i.e._ from the Author of nature; these rewards -and punishments, being _naturally_[120] annexed to actions considered -as implying good intention and good desert, ill intention and ill -desert; these natural rewards and punishments, I say, are as much a -contradiction to the conclusion above, and show its falsehood, as a -more exact and complete rewarding and punishing of good and ill desert -as such. So that if it be incredible, that necessary agents should be -thus rewarded and punished; then, men are not necessary but free; since -it is matter of fact, that they are thus rewarded and punished. If, -on the contrary, which is the supposition we have been arguing upon, -it be insisted that men are necessary agents; then, there is nothing -incredible in the further supposition of necessary agents being thus -rewarded and punished: since we ourselves are thus dealt with. - -From the whole therefore it must follow, that a necessity supposed -possible, and reconcilable with the constitution of things, does in no -sort prove that the Author of Nature will not, nor destroy the proof -that he will, finally and upon the whole, in his eternal government, -render his creatures happy or miserable, by some means or other, as -they behave well or ill. Or, to express this conclusion in words -conformable to the title of the chapter, the analogy of nature shows -us, that the opinion of necessity, considered as practical, is false. -And if necessity, upon the supposition above mentioned, doth not -destroy the proof of natural religion, it evidently makes no alteration -in the proof of revealed. - -From these things likewise we may learn, in what sense to understand -that general assertion, that the opinion of necessity is essentially -destructive of all religion. First, in a practical sense; that by this -notion, atheistical men pretend to satisfy and encourage themselves -in vice, and justify to others their disregard to all religion. And -secondly, in the strictest sense; that it is a contradiction to -the whole constitution of nature, and to what we may every moment -experience in ourselves, and so overturns every thing. But by no means -is this assertion to be understood, as if necessity, supposing it could -possibly be reconciled with the constitution of things, and with what -we experience, were not also reconcilable with religion: for upon this -supposition, it demonstrably is so.[121] - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - -THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR CONSTITUTION, -IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. - - -Though it be acknowledged, as it cannot but be, that the analogy of -nature gives a strong credibility to the general doctrine of religion, -and to the several particular things contained in it, considered as so -many matters of fact; and likewise that it shows this credibility not -to be destroyed by any notions of necessity: still, objections may be -insisted upon, against the wisdom, equity, and goodness of the divine -government implied in the notion of religion, and against the method -by which this government is conducted; to which objections analogy -can be no direct answer. For the credibility, or the certain truth, -of a matter of fact, does not immediately prove any thing concerning -the wisdom or goodness of it; and analogy can do no more, immediately -or directly, than show such and such things to be true or credible, -considered only as matters of fact. But if, upon supposition of a -moral constitution of nature and a moral government over it, analogy -suggests and makes it credible, that this government must be a scheme, -system, or constitution of government, as distinguished from a number -of single unconnected acts of distributive justice and goodness; and -likewise, that it must be a scheme, so imperfectly comprehended, and -of such a sort in other respects, as to afford a direct general answer -to all objections against the justice and goodness of it: then analogy -is, remotely, of great service in answering those objections; both by -suggesting the answer, and showing it to be a credible one. - -Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the case. For, _First_, -Upon supposition that God exercises a moral government over the -world, the analogy of his natural government suggests and makes it -credible, that his moral government _must_ be a scheme, quite beyond -our comprehension: and this affords a general answer to all objections -against the justice and goodness of it. _Secondly_, A more distinct -observation of some particular things contained in God’s scheme of -natural government, the like things being supposed, by analogy, to be -contained in his moral government, will further show, how little weight -is to be laid upon these objections. - -I. Upon supposition that God exercises a moral government over the -world, the analogy of his natural government suggests and makes -it credible, that his moral government must be a scheme, quite -beyond our comprehension; and this affords a general answer to -all objections against the justice and goodness of it. It is most -obvious, analogy renders it highly credible, that, upon supposition -of a moral government, it must be a scheme. For the world, and the -whole natural government of it, appears to be so: to be a scheme, -system, or constitution, whose parts correspond to each other, and -to a whole, as really as any work of art, or as any particular model -of a civil constitution and government. In this great scheme of the -natural world, individuals have various peculiar relations to other -individuals of their own species. Whole species are, we find, variously -related to other species, upon this earth. Nor do we know, how much -further these kinds of relations may extend. And, as there is not any -action or natural event, which we are acquainted with, so single and -unconnected, as not to have a respect to some other actions and events; -so possibly each of them, when it has not an immediate, may yet have -a remote, natural relation to other actions and events, much beyond -the compass of this present world. There seems indeed nothing, from -whence we can so much as make a conjecture, whether all creatures, -actions, and events, throughout the whole of nature, have relations to -each other But, as it is obvious, that all events have future unknown -consequences; so if we trace any event, as far as we can, into what is -connected with it, we shall find, that if it were not connected with -something further in nature, unknown to us, something both past and -present, such event could not possibly have been at all. Nor can we -give the whole account of any one thing whatever; of all its causes, -ends, and necessary adjuncts; those adjuncts, I mean, without which -it could not have been. By this most astonishing connection, these -reciprocal correspondences and mutual relations, every thing which we -see in the course of nature is actually brought about. Things seemingly -the most insignificant imaginable, are perpetually observed to be -necessary conditions to other things of the greatest importance; so -that any one thing whatever, may for aught we know to the contrary, be -a necessary condition to any other. - -The natural world then, and natural government of it, being such an -incomprehensible scheme; so incomprehensible, that a man must, really -in the literal sense, know nothing at all, who is not sensible of -his ignorance in it; this immediately suggests, and strongly shows -the credibility, that the moral world and government of it may be so -too.[122] Indeed the natural and moral constitution and government of -the world are so connected, as to make up together but one scheme: -and it is highly probable, that the first is formed and carried on -merely in subserviency to the latter; as the vegetable world is for the -animal, and organized bodies for minds. But the thing intended here is, -without inquiring how far the administration of the natural world is -subordinate to that of the moral, only to observe the credibility, that -one should be analogous or similar to the other: that therefore every -act of divine justice and goodness may be supposed to look much beyond -itself, and its immediate object; may have some reference to other -parts of God’s moral administration, and to a general moral plan; and -that every circumstance of this his moral government may be adjusted -beforehand with a view to the whole of it. For example: the determined -length of time, and the degrees and ways, in which virtue is to remain -in a state of warfare and discipline, and in which wickedness is -permitted to have its progress; the times appointed for the execution -of justice; the appointed instruments of it; the kinds of rewards and -punishments, and the manners of their distribution; all particular -instances of divine justice and goodness, and every circumstance of -them, may have such respects to each other, as to make up altogether -a whole, connected and related in all its parts; a scheme or system, -which is as properly such, as the natural world is, and of the like -kind. Supposing this to be the case, it is most evident, that we are -not competent judges of this scheme, from the small parts of it which -come within our view in the present life: therefore no objections -against any of these parts can be insisted upon by reasonable men.[123] - -This our ignorance, and the consequence here drawn from it, are -universally acknowledged upon _other_ occasions; and though scarce -denied, yet are universally forgot, when persons come to argue against -religion. And it is not perhaps easy, even for the most reasonable -men, always to bear in mind the degree of our ignorance, and make due -allowances for it. Upon these accounts, it may not be useless to go a -little further, in order to show more distinctly, how just an answer -our ignorance is, to objections against the scheme of Providence. -Suppose then a person boldly to assert,[124] that the things complained -of, the origin and continuance of evil, might easily have been -prevented by repeated interpositions;[125] interpositions so guarded -and circumstanced, as would preclude all mischief arising from them. -Or, if this were impracticable, that a _scheme_ of government is itself -an imperfection, since more good might have been produced, without any -scheme, system, or constitution at all, by continued single unrelated -acts of distributive justice and goodness; because these would have -occasioned no irregularities. Farther than this, it is presumed, the -objections will not be carried. Yet the answer is obvious: that were -these assertions true, still the observations above, concerning our -ignorance in the scheme of divine government and the consequence drawn -from it, would hold, in great measure; enough to vindicate religion, -against all objections from the disorders of the present state. Were -these assertions true, yet the government of the world might be just -and good notwithstanding; for, at the most, they would infer nothing -more than that it might have been better. But they are mere arbitrary -assertions; no man being sufficiently acquainted with the possibilities -of things, to bring any proof of them to the lowest degree of -probability. For however possible what is asserted may seem, yet many -instances may be alleged, in things much less out of our reach, of -suppositions absolutely impossible, and reducible to the most palpable -self contradictions, which, not every one would perceive to be such; -nor perhaps any one, at first sight suspect. - -From these things, it is easy to see distinctly, how our ignorance, -as it is the common, so it is really a satisfactory answer, to all -objections against the justice and goodness of Providence. If a man, -contemplating any one providential dispensation, which had no relation -to any others, should object, that he discerned in it a disregard to -justice, or a deficiency of goodness; nothing would be less an answer -to such objection, than our ignorance in other parts of providence, -or in the possibilities of things, no way related to what he was -contemplating. But when we know not but the part objected against may -be relative to other parts unknown to us; and when we are unacquainted -with what is, in the nature of the thing, practicable in the case -before us; then our ignorance is a satisfactory answer; because, some -unknown relation, or some unknown impossibility, may render what is -objected against, just and good; nay good in the highest practicable -degree. - -II. How little weight is to be laid upon such objections, will further -appear, by a more distinct observation of some particular things -contained in the natural government of God, the like to which may be -supposed, from analogy, to be contained in his moral government. - -_First_, As in the scheme of the natural world, no ends appear to be -accomplished without means: so we find that means very undesirable, -often conduce to bring about ends in such a measure desirable, as -greatly to overbalance the disagreeableness of the means. And in cases -where such means are conducive to such ends, it is not reason, but -_experience_, which shows us, that they are thus conducive. Experience -also shows many means to be conducive and necessary to accomplish ends, -which means, before experience, we should have thought, would have -had even a contrary tendency. From these observations relating to the -natural scheme of the world, the moral being supposed analogous to -it, arises a great credibility, that the putting our misery in each -other’s power to the degree it is, and making men liable to vice to the -degree we are; and in general, that those things which are objected -against the moral scheme of Providence, may be, upon the whole, -friendly and assistant to virtue, and productive of an overbalance of -happiness: _i.e._ the things objected against may be means, by which -an overbalance of good, will in the end, be found produced. And from -the same observations, it appears to be no presumption against this, -that we do not, if indeed we do not, see those means to have any -such tendency, or that they seem to us to have a contrary one. Thus -those things, which we call irregularities, may not be so at all; -because they may be means of accomplishing wise and good ends more -considerable. It may be added, as above, that they may also be the -only means, by which these wise and good ends are capable of being -accomplished. - -It may be proper to add, in order to obviate an absurd and wicked -conclusion from any of these observations, that though the constitution -of our nature, from whence we are capable of vice and misery, may, as -it undoubtedly does, contribute to the perfection and happiness of -the world; and though the actual permission of evil may be beneficial -to it: (_i.e._ it would have been more mischievous, not that a wicked -person had himself abstained from his own wickedness, but that any -one had forcibly prevented it, than that it was permitted:) yet -notwithstanding, it might have been much better for the world, if this -very evil had never been done. Nay it is most clearly conceivable, that -the very commission of wickedness may be beneficial to the world, and -yet, that it would be infinitely more beneficial for men to refrain -from it. For thus, in the wise and good constitution of the natural -world, there are disorders which bring their own cures; diseases, which -are themselves remedies. Many a man would have died, had it not been -for the gout or a fever; yet it would be thought madness to assert, -that sickness is a better or more perfect state than health; though the -like, with regard to the moral world, has been asserted. - -_Secondly_, The natural government of the world is carried on by -general laws. For this there may be wise and good reasons: the wisest -and best, for aught we know to the contrary. And that there are such -reasons, is suggested to our thoughts by the analogy of nature; by our -being made to experience good ends to be accomplished, as indeed all -the good which we enjoy is accomplished, by this means,--viz.: that the -laws, by which the world is governed, are general. We have scarce any -kind of enjoyments, but what we are, in some way or other, instrumental -in procuring ourselves, by acting in a manner which we _foresee_ likely -to procure them: now this foresight could not be at all, were not the -government of the world carried on by general laws. And though, for -aught we know to the contrary, every single case may be, at length, -found to have been provided for even by these: yet to prevent all -irregularities, or remedy them as they arise, by the wisest and best -general laws, may be impossible in the nature of things; as we see it -is absolutely impossible in civil government. - -But then we are ready to think, that, the constitution of nature -remaining as it is, and the course of things being permitted to go -on, in other respects, as it does, there might be interpositions to -prevent irregularities; though they could not have been prevented, or -remedied by any general laws. There would indeed be reason to wish, -which, by-the-way, is very different from a right to claim, that all -irregularities were prevented or remedied by present interpositions, -if these interpositions would have no other effect than this. But it -is plain they would have some visible and immediate _bad_ effects: -for instance, they would encourage idleness and negligence; and they -would render doubtful the natural rule of life, which is ascertained by -this very thing, that the course of the world is carried on by general -laws. And further, it is certain they would have _distant_ effects, -and very great ones too; by means of the wonderful connections before -mentioned.[126] So that we cannot so much as guess, what would be the -whole result of the interpositions desired. It may be said, any bad -result might be prevented by further interpositions, whenever there was -occasion for them: but this again is talking quite at random, and in -the dark.[127] - -Upon the whole then, we see wise reasons, why the course of the world -should be carried on by general laws, and good ends accomplished by -this means: and for aught we know, there may be the wisest reasons -for it, and the best ends accomplished by it. We have no ground to -believe, that all irregularities could be remedied as they arise, or -could have been precluded, by general laws. We find that interpositions -would produce evil, and prevent good: and, for aught we know, they -would produce greater evil than they would prevent; and prevent greater -good than they would produce. And if this be the case, then the not -interposing is so far from being a ground of complaint, that it is an -instance of goodness. This is intelligible and sufficient: and going -further, seems beyond the utmost reach of our faculties. - -It may be said, that “after all, these supposed impossibilities and -relations are what we are unacquainted with; and we must judge of -religion, as of other things, by what we do know, and look upon the -rest as nothing: or however, that the answers here given to what is -objected against religion, may equally be made use of to invalidate the -proof of it; since their stress lies so very much upon our ignorance.” -But, - -_First_, Though total ignorance in any matter does indeed equally -destroy, or rather preclude, all proof concerning it, and objections -against it; yet partial ignorance does not. For we may in any degree be -convinced, that a person is of such a character, and consequently will -pursue such ends; though we are greatly ignorant, what is the proper -way of acting, in order the most effectually to obtain those ends: and -in this case, objections against his manner of acting, as seemingly -not conducive to obtain them, might be answered by our ignorance; -though the proof that such ends were intended, might not at all be -invalidated by it. Thus, the proof of religion is a proof of the moral -character of God, and consequently that his government is moral, and -that every one upon the whole shall receive according to his deserts; a -proof that this is the designed end of his government. But we are not -competent judges, what is the proper way of acting, in order the most -effectually to accomplish this end.[128] Therefore our ignorance is an -answer to objections against the conduct of Providence, in permitting -irregularities, as seeming contradictory to this end. Now, since it -is so obvious, that our ignorance may be a satisfactory answer to -objections against a thing, and yet not affect the proof of it; till it -can be shown, it is frivolous to assert, that our ignorance invalidates -the proof of religion, as it does the objections against it. - -_Secondly_, Suppose unknown impossibilities, and unknown relations, -might justly be urged to invalidate the proof of religion, as well as -to answer objections against it; and that, in consequence of this, -the proof of it were doubtful. Still, let the assertion be despised, -or let it be ridiculed, it is undeniably true, that moral obligations -would remain certain, though it were not certain what would, upon the -whole, be the consequences of observing or violating them. For, these -obligations arise, immediately and necessarily, from the judgment of -our own mind, unless perverted, which we cannot violate without being -self-condemned. And they would be certain too, from considerations -of interest. For though it were doubtful, what will be the future -consequences of virtue and vice; yet it is, however, credible, that -they may have those consequences, which religion teaches us they will: -and this credibility is a certain[129] obligation in point of prudence, -to abstain from all wickedness, and to live in the conscientious -practice of all that is good. - -_Thirdly_, The answers above given to the objections against religion -cannot be made use of to invalidate the proof of it. For, upon -suspicion that God exercises a moral government over the world, analogy -does most strongly lead us to conclude, that this moral government must -be a scheme, or constitution, beyond our comprehension. A thousand -particular analogies show us, that parts of such a scheme, from their -relation to other parts, may conduce to accomplish ends, which we -should have thought they had no tendency to accomplish: nay ends, which -before experience, we should have thought such parts were contradictory -to, and had a tendency to prevent. Therefore all these analogies show, -that the way of arguing made use of in objecting against religion is -delusive: because they show it is not at all incredible, that, could we -comprehend the whole, we should find the permission of the disorders -objected against to be consistent with justice and goodness; and even -to be instances of them. Now this is not applicable to the proof of -religion, as it is to the objections against it;[130] and therefore -cannot invalidate that proof, as it does these objections. - -_Lastly_, From the observation now made, it is easy to see, that the -answers above given to the objections against Providence, though, -in a general way of speaking, they may be said to be taken from our -ignorance; yet are by no means taken merely from that, but from -something which analogy shows us concerning it. For analogy shows us -positively, that our ignorance in the possibilities of things, and the -various relations in nature, renders us incompetent judges, and leads -us to false conclusions, in cases similar to this, in which we pretend -to judge and to object. So that the things above insisted upon are not -mere suppositions of unknown impossibilities and relations: but they -are suggested to our thoughts, and even forced upon the observation -of serious men, and rendered credible too, by the analogy of nature. -Therefore to take these things into the account, is to judge by -experience and what we do know: and it is not judging so, to take no -notice of them. - - -CONCLUSION. - -The observations of the last chapter lead us to consider this little -scene of human life, in which we are so busily engaged, as having a -reference, of some sort or other, to a much larger plan of things. -Whether we are, any way, related to the more distant parts of the -boundless universe, into which we are brought, is altogether uncertain. -But it is evident, that the course of things, which comes within -our view, is connected with some things, past, present, and future, -beyond it.[131] So that we are placed, as one may speak, in the middle -of a scheme, not fixed but progressive, every way incomprehensible: -incomprehensible, in a manner equally, with respect to what has -been, what now is, and what shall be. This scheme cannot but contain -in it some things as wonderful, and as much beyond our thought and -conception,[132] as any thing in that of religion. For, will any man in -his senses say, that it is less difficult to conceive, how the world -came to be and to continue as it is, without, than with, an intelligent -Author and Governor of it? Or, admitting an intelligent Governor of -it, that there is some other rule of government more natural, and of -easier conception, than that which we call moral? Indeed, without an -intelligent Author and Governor of nature, no account at all can be -given, how this universe, or the part of it particularly in which we -are concerned, came to be, and the course of it to be carried on, as it -is: nor any, of its general end and design, without a moral governor of -it. That there is an intelligent Author of nature, and natural Governor -of the world, is a principle gone upon in the foregoing treatise; as -proved, and generally known, and confessed to be proved. And the very -notion of an intelligent Author of nature, proved by particular final -causes, implies a will and a character.[133] - -Now, as our whole nature, the nature which he has given us, leads us to -conclude his will and character to be moral, just, and good: so we can -scarce in imagination conceive, what it can be otherwise. However, in -consequence of this his will and character, whatever it be, he formed -the universe as it is, and carries on the course of it as he does, -rather than in any other manner; and has assigned to us, and to all -living creatures, a part and a lot in it. Irrational creatures act this -their part, and enjoy and undergo the pleasures and the pains allotted -them, without any reflection. But one would think it impossible, that -creatures endued with reason could avoid reflecting sometimes upon all -this; reflecting, if not from whence we came, yet, at least, whither -we are going; and what the mysterious scheme, in the midst of which -we find ourselves, will, at length, come out and produce: a scheme in -which it is certain we are highly interested, and in which we may be -interested even beyond conception.[134] - -For many things prove it palpably absurd to conclude, that we shall -cease to be, at death. Particular analogies do most sensibly show us, -that there is nothing to be thought strange, in our being to exist in -another state of life. And that we are now living beings, affords a -strong probability that we shall _continue_ so; unless there be some -positive ground, and there is none from reason or analogy, to think -death will destroy us. Were a persuasion of this kind ever so well -grounded, there would, surely, be little reason to take pleasure in it. -Indeed it can have no other ground, than some such imagination, as that -of our gross bodies being ourselves; which is contrary to experience. -Experience too most clearly shows us the folly of concluding, from -the body and the living agent affecting each other mutually, that the -dissolution of the former is the destruction of the latter. And there -are remarkable instances of their _not_ affecting each other, which -lead us to a contrary conclusion. The supposition, then, which in all -reason we are to go upon, is, that our living nature will _continue_ -after death. And it is infinitely unreasonable to form an institution -of life, or to act, upon any other supposition. - -All expectation of immortality, whether more or less certain, opens -an unbounded prospect to our hopes and our fears: since we see the -constitution of nature is such, as to admit of misery, as well as to be -productive of happiness, and experience ourselves to partake of both -in some degree; and since we cannot but know, what higher degrees of -both we are capable of. And there is no presumption against believing -further, that our future interest depends upon our present behavior: -for we see our present interest doth; and that the happiness and -misery, which are naturally annexed to our actions, very frequently do -not follow, till long after the actions are done, to which they are -respectively annexed. So that were speculation to leave us uncertain, -whether it were likely, that the Author of nature, in giving happiness -and misery to his creatures, hath regard to their actions or not, yet, -since we find by experience that he hath such regard, the whole sense -of things which he has given us, plainly leads us, at once and without -any elaborate inquiries, to think that it may, indeed must, be to good -actions chiefly that he hath annexed happiness, and to bad actions -misery; or that he will, upon the whole, reward those who do well, and -punish those who do evil. - -To confirm this from the constitution of the world, it has been -observed, that some sort of moral government is necessarily implied -in that natural government of God, which we experience ourselves -under; that good and bad actions, at present, are naturally rewarded -and punished, not only as beneficial and mischievous to society, but -also as virtuous and vicious: and that there is, in the very nature -of the thing, a tendency to their being rewarded and punished in a -much higher degree than they are at present. And though this higher -degree of distributive justice, which nature thus points out and leads -towards, is prevented for a time from taking place; it is by obstacles, -which the state of this world unhappily throws in its way, and which -therefore are in their nature temporary. Now, as these things in the -natural conduct of Providence are observable on the side of virtue; -so there is nothing to be set against them on the side of vice. A -moral scheme of government then is visibly established, and, in some -degree, carried into execution: and this, together with the essential -tendencies of virtue and vice duly considered, naturally raise in us an -apprehension, that it will be carried on further towards perfection in -a future state, and that every one shall there receive according to his -deserts. - -And if this be so, then our future and general interest, under the -moral government of God, is appointed to depend upon our behavior; -notwithstanding the difficulty, which this may occasion, of securing -it, and the danger of losing it: just in the same manner as our -temporal interest, under his natural government, is appointed to depend -upon our behavior; notwithstanding the like difficulty and danger. -For, from our original constitution, and that of the world which we -inhabit, we are naturally trusted with ourselves; with our own conduct -and our own interest. And from the same constitution of nature, -especially joined with that course of things which is owing to men, -we have temptations to be unfaithful in this trust; to forfeit this -interest, to neglect it, and run ourselves into misery and ruin. From -these temptations arise the difficulties of behaving so as to secure -our temporal interest, and the hazard of behaving so as to miscarry in -it. There is therefore nothing incredible in supposing there may be the -like difficulty and hazard with regard to that chief and final good, -which religion lays before us. - -The whole account, how it came to pass that we were placed in such a -condition as this, must indeed be beyond our comprehension. But it is -in part accounted for by what religion teaches us, that the character -of virtue and piety must be a necessary qualification for a future -state of security and happiness, under the moral government of God; in -like manner, as some certain qualifications or other are necessary for -every particular condition of life, under his natural government: and -that the present state was intended to be a school of discipline, for -improving in ourselves that character. Now this intention of nature -is rendered highly credible by observing; that we are plainly made -for improvement of all kinds; that it is a general appointment of -Providence, that we cultivate practical principles, and form within -ourselves habits of action, in order to become fit for what we were -wholly unfit for before; that in particular, childhood and youth is -naturally appointed to be a state of discipline for mature age; and -that the present world is peculiarly fitted for a state of moral -discipline. And, whereas objections are urged against the whole notion -of moral government and a probationary state, from the opinion of -necessity; it has been shown, that God has given us the evidence, as -it were, of experience, that all objections against religion, on this -head, are vain and delusive. He has also, in his natural government, -suggested an answer to all our short-sighted objections, against the -equity and goodness of his moral government; and in general he has -exemplified to us the latter by the former. - -These things, which it is to be remembered, are matters of fact, ought, -in all common sense, to awaken mankind; to induce them to consider -in earnest their condition, and what they have to do. It is absurd, -absurd to the degree of being ridiculous, if the subject were not of so -serious a kind, for men to think themselves secure in a vicious life; -or even in that immoral thoughtlessness, into which far the greatest -part of them are fallen. The credibility of religion, arising from -experience and facts here considered, is fully sufficient, in reason, -to engage them to live in the general practice of all virtue and piety; -under the serious apprehension, though it should be mixed with some -doubt,[135] of a righteous administration established in nature, and -a future judgment in consequence of it: especially when we consider, -how very questionable it is, whether any thing at all can be gained -by vice,[136] how unquestionably little as well as precarious, the -pleasures and profits of it are at the best, and how soon they must -be parted with at the longest. For, in the deliberations of reason, -concerning what we are to pursue and what to avoid, as temptations -to any thing from mere passion are supposed out of the case, so -inducements to vice, from cool expectations of pleasure and interest so -small and uncertain and short, are really so insignificant, as, in the -view of reason to be almost nothing in _themselves_; and in comparison -with the importance of religion they quite disappear and are lost. - -Mere passion may indeed be alleged, though not as a reason, yet as -an excuse, for a vicious course of life. And how sorry an excuse it -is, will be manifest by observing, that we are placed in a condition -in which we are unavoidably inured to govern our passions, by being -necessitated to govern them: and to lay ourselves under the same kind -of restraints, and as great ones too, from temporal regards, as virtue -and piety, in the ordinary course of things, require. The plea of -ungovernable passion then, on the side of vice, is the poorest of all -things; for it is no reason, and a poor excuse. The proper _motives_ to -religion are the proper _proofs_ of it, from our moral nature, from the -presages of conscience, and our natural apprehension of God under the -character of a righteous Governor and Judge: a nature, and conscience, -and apprehension, given us by him; and from the confirmation of the -dictates of reason, by _life and immortality brought to light by -the Gospel; and the wrath of God revealed from heaven against all -ungodliness and unrighteousness of men_. - - -END OF THE FIRST PART. - - - - -PART II. - -Revealed Religion. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.[137] - - -Some persons, upon pretence of the sufficiency of the light of nature, -avowedly reject all revelation, as in its very notion incredible, -and what must be fictitious. And indeed it is certain, no revelation -would have been given, had the light of nature been sufficient in -such a sense, as to render one not wanted and useless. But no man, -in seriousness and simplicity of mind, can possibly think it so, who -considers the state of religion in the heathen world before revelation, -and its present state in those places which have borrowed no light -from it: particularly the doubtfulness of some of the greatest men, -concerning things of the utmost importance, as well as the natural -inattention and ignorance of mankind in general. It is impossible to -say, who would have been able to have reasoned out that whole system, -which we call Natural Religion, in its genuine simplicity, clear of -superstition: but there is certainly no ground to affirm that the -generality could. If they could, there is no sort of probability that -they would. Admitting there were, they would highly want a standing -admonition to remind them of it, and inculcate it upon them. - -And further, were they as much disposed to attend to religion, as the -better sort of men are; yet even upon this supposition, there would -be various occasions for supernatural instruction and assistance, and -the greatest advantages might be afforded by them.[138] So that to say -revelation is a thing superfluous, what there was no need of, and what -can be of no service, is, I think, to talk quite wildly and at random. -Nor would it be more extravagant to affirm, that mankind is so entirely -at ease in the present state, and life so completely happy, that it -is a contradiction to suppose our condition capable of being, in any -respect, better. - -There are other persons, not to be ranked with these, who seem to -be getting into a way of neglecting, and as it were, overlooking -revelation, as of small importance provided natural religion be kept -to. With little regard either to the evidence of the former, or to -the objections against it, and even upon supposition of its truth; -“the only design of it,” say they, “must be, to establish a belief of -the moral system of nature, and to enforce the practice of natural -piety and virtue. The belief and practice of these were, perhaps, much -promoted by the first publication of Christianity: but whether they -are believed and practised, upon the evidence and motives of nature -or of revelation, is no great matter,”[139] This way of considering -revelation, though it is not the same with the former, yet borders -nearly upon it, and very much, at length runs up into it: and requires -to be particularly considered, with regard to the persons who seem -to be getting into this way. The consideration of it will likewise -further show the extravagance of the former opinion, and the truth of -the observations in answer to it, just mentioned. And an inquiry into -the importance of Christianity, cannot be an improper introduction to a -treatise concerning the credibility of it. - -Now, if God has given a revelation to mankind, and commanded those -things which are commanded in Christianity; it is evident, at first -sight, that it cannot in any wise be an indifferent matter, whether -we obey or disobey those commands: unless we are certainly assured, -that we know all the reasons for them, and that all those reasons are -now ceased, with regard to mankind in general, or to ourselves in -particular. It is absolutely impossible we can be assured of this.[140] -For our ignorance of these reasons proves nothing in the case: since -the whole analogy of nature shows, what is indeed in itself evident, -that there may be infinite reasons for things, with which we are not -acquainted. - -But the importance of Christianity will more distinctly appear, by -considering it more distinctly: _First_, as a republication, and -external institution, of natural or essential religion, adapted to the -present circumstances of mankind, and intended to promote natural piety -and virtue: _Secondly_, as containing an account of a dispensation of -things, not discoverable by reason, in consequence of which several -distinct precepts are enjoined us. For though natural religion is the -foundation and principal part of Christianity, it is not in any sense -the whole of it. - -I. Christianity is a republication of Natural religion. It instructs -mankind in the moral system of the world: that it is the work of an -infinitely perfect Being, and under his government, that virtue is -his law, and that he will finally judge mankind in righteousness, -and render to all according to their works, in a future state. And, -which is very material, it teaches natural religion in its genuine -simplicity; free from those superstitions, with which it was totally -corrupted, and under which it was in a manner lost. - -Revelation is, further, an _authoritative_ publication of natural -religion, and so affords the evidence of testimony for the truth of -it. Indeed the miracles and prophecies recorded in Scripture, were -intended to prove a particular dispensation of Providence, _i.e._ the -redemption of the world by the Messiah: but this does not hinder, but -that they may also prove God’s general providence over the world, as -our moral governor and judge. And they evidently do prove it; because -this character of the Author of nature, is necessarily connected with -and implied in that particular revealed dispensation of things: it is -likewise continually taught expressly, and insisted upon, by those -persons who wrought the miracles and delivered the prophecies. So -that indeed natural religion seems as much proved by the Scripture -revelation, as it would have been, had the design of revelation been -nothing else than to prove it. - -But it may possibly be disputed, how far miracles can prove natural -religion; and notable objections may be urged against this proof of it, -considered as a matter of speculation: but considered as a practical -thing, there can be none. For suppose a person to teach natural -religion to a nation, who bid lived in total ignorance or forgetfulness -of it; and to declare that he was commissioned by God so to do; suppose -him, in proof of his commission, to foretell things future, which no -human foresight could have guessed at; to divide the sea with a word; -feed great multitudes with bread from heaven; cure all manner of -diseases; and raise the dead, even himself, to life; would not this -give additional credibility to his teaching, a credibility beyond what -that of a common man would have; and be an authoritative publication of -the law of nature, _i.e._ a new proof of it? It would be a practical -one, of the strongest kind, perhaps, which human creatures are capable -of having given them. The Law of Moses then, and the Gospel of Christ, -are authoritative publications of the religion of nature; they afford -a proof of God’s general providence, as moral Governor of the world, -as well as of his particular dispensations of providence towards sinful -creatures, revealed in the Law and the Gospel. As they are the only -evidence of the latter, so they are an additional evidence of the -former. - -To show this further, let us suppose a man of the greatest and most -improved capacity, who had never heard of revelation, convinced upon -the whole, notwithstanding the disorders of the world, that it was -under the direction and moral government of an infinitely perfect -Being; but ready to question, whether he were not got beyond the reach -of his faculties: suppose him brought, by this suspicion, into great -danger of being carried away by the universal bad example of almost -every one around him, who appeared to have no sense, no practical -sense at least, of these things: and this, perhaps, would be as -advantageous a situation with regard to religion, as nature alone -ever placed any man in. What a confirmation now must it be to such a -person, all at once, to find, that this moral system of things was -revealed to mankind, in the name of that infinite Being, whom he had -from principles of reason believed in: and that the publishers of the -revelation proved their commission from him, by making it appear, that -he had intrusted them with a power of suspending and changing the -general laws of nature. - -Nor must it by any means be omitted, for it is a thing of the utmost -importance, that life and immortality are eminently brought to light -by the Gospel. The great doctrines of a future state, the danger of a -course of wickedness[141] and the efficacy of repentance, are not only -confirmed in the Gospel, but are taught, especially the last is, with a -degree of light, to which that of nature is but darkness. - -Further. As Christianity served these ends and purposes, when it was -first published, by the miraculous publication itself, so it was -intended to serve the same purposes in future ages, by means of the -settlement of a visible church:[142] of a society, distinguished from -common ones, and from the rest of the world, by peculiar religious -institutions; by an instituted method of instruction, and an instituted -form of external religion. Miraculous powers were given to the first -preachers of Christianity, in order to their introducing it into the -world: a visible church was established, in order to continue it, and -carry it on successively throughout all ages. Had only Moses and the -prophets, Christ and his apostles, taught, and by miracles proved, -religion to their contemporaries; the benefits of their instructions -would have reached but a small part of mankind. Christianity must -have been, in a great degree, sunk and forgot in a very few ages. To -prevent this, appears to have been one reason why a visible church was -instituted; to be like a city upon a hill, a standing memorial to the -world of the duty which we owe our Maker: to call men continually, -both by example and instruction, to attend to it, and, by the form -of religion, ever before their eyes, remind them of the reality; to -be the repository of the oracles of God; to hold up the light of -revelation in aid to that of nature, and to propagate it, throughout -all generations, to the end of the world--the light of revelation, -considered here in no other view, than as designed to enforce natural -religion. And in proportion as Christianity is professed and taught in -the world, religion, natural or essential religion, is thus distinctly -and advantageously laid before mankind, and brought again and again to -their thoughts, as a matter of infinite importance. - -A visible church has also a further tendency to promote natural -religion, as being an instituted method of education, originally -intended to be of peculiar advantage to those who conform to it. For -one end of the institution was, that, by admonition and reproof, as -well as instruction, by a general regular discipline, and public -exercises of religion, _the body of Christ_, as the Scripture speaks, -should be _edified_; _i.e._ trained up in piety and virtue for a higher -and better state. This settlement, then, appearing thus beneficial, -tending in the nature of the thing to answer, and, in some degree, -actually answering, those ends, it is to be remembered, that the very -notion of it implies positive institutions; for the visibility of the -church consists in them. Take away every thing of this kind, and you -lose the very notion itself. So that if the things now mentioned are -advantages, the reason and importance of positive institutions in -general is most obvious; since without them these advantages could not -be secured to the world. And it is mere idle wantonness, to insist upon -knowing the reasons, _why_ such particular ones were fixed upon rather -than others. - -The benefit arising from this supernatural assistance, which -Christianity affords to natural religion, is what some persons are very -slow in apprehending. And yet it is a thing distinct in itself, and a -very plain obvious one. For will any in good earnest really say, that -the bulk of mankind in the heathen world were in as advantageous a -situation, with regard to natural religion, as they are now among us: -that it was laid before them, and enforced upon them, in a manner as -distinct, and as much tending to influence their practice? - -The objections against all this, from the perversion of Christianity, -and from the supposition of its having had but little good influence, -however innocently they may be proposed, cannot be insisted upon as -conclusive, upon any principles, but such as lead to downright Atheism; -because the manifestation of the law of nature by reason, which, upon -all principles of Theism, must have been from God, has been perverted -and rendered ineffectual in the same manner. It may indeed, I think, -truly be said, that the good effects of Christianity have not been -small; nor its supposed ill effects, any effects at all of it, properly -speaking. Perhaps, too, the things done have been aggravated; and if -not, Christianity hath been often only a pretence, and the same evils -in the main would have been done upon some other pretence. However, -great and shocking as the corruptions and abuses of it have really -been, they cannot be insisted upon as arguments against it, upon -principles of Theism. For one cannot proceed one step in reasoning upon -natural religion, any more than upon Christianity, without laying it -down as a first principle, that the dispensations of Providence are not -to be judged of by their perversions, but by their genuine tendencies: -not by what they do actually seem to effect, but by what they would -effect if mankind did their part; that part which is justly put and -left upon them. It is altogether as much the language of one as of the -other: _He that is unjust, let him be unjust still: and he that is -holy, let him be holy still._[143] The light of reason does not, any -more than that of revelation, force men to submit to its authority; -both admonish them of what they ought to do and avoid, together with -the consequences of each; and after this, leave them at full liberty -to act just as they please, till the appointed time of judgment. -Every moment’s experience shows, that this is God’s general rule of -government.[144] - -To return then: Christianity being a promulgation of the law of nature; -being moreover an authoritative promulgation of it; with new light, -and other circumstances of peculiar advantage, adapted to the wants of -mankind; these things fully show its importance. - -It is to be observed further, that as the nature of the case requires, -so all Christians are commanded to contribute, by their profession -of Christianity, to preserve it in the world, and render it such -a promulgation and enforcement of religion. For it is the very -scheme of the Gospel, that each Christian should, in his degree, -contribute towards continuing and carrying it on: all by uniting in -the public profession and external practice of Christianity; some by -instructing, by having the oversight and taking care of this religious -community, the church of God. Now this further shows the importance of -Christianity; and, which is what I chiefly intend, its importance in a -practical sense: or the high obligations we are under, to take it into -our most serious consideration; and the danger there must necessarily -be, not only in treating it despitefully, which I am not now speaking -of, but in disregarding and neglecting it. For this is neglecting to -do what is expressly enjoined us, for continuing those benefits to the -world, and transmitting them down to future times. And all this holds, -even though the only thing to be considered in Christianity were its -subserviency to natural religion. - -II. Christianity is to be considered in a further view; as containing -an account of a dispensation of things, not at all discoverable by -reason, in consequence of which several distinct precepts are enjoined -us. Christianity is not only an external institution of natural -religion, and a new promulgation of God’s general providence, as -righteous governor and judge of the world; but it contains also a -revelation of a particular dispensation of Providence, carrying on by -his Son and Spirit, for the recovery and salvation of mankind, who are -represented in Scripture to be in a state of ruin. And in consequence -of this revelation being made, we are commanded _to be baptized_, not -only _in the name of the Father_, but also, _of the Son_, _and of the -Holy Ghost_: and other obligations of duty, unknown before, to the Son -and the Holy Ghost, are revealed. Now the importance of these duties -may be judged of, by observing that they arise, not from positive -command merely, but also from the offices which appear, from Scripture, -to belong to those divine persons in the Gospel dispensation; or from -the relations, which we are there informed, they stand in to us. By -_reason_ is revealed the relation, which God the Father stands in to -us. Hence arises the obligation of duty which we are under to him. In -_Scripture_ are revealed the relations, which the Son and Holy Spirit -stand in to us. Hence arise the obligations of duty;[145] which we are -under to them. The truth of the case, as one may speak, in each of -these three respects being admitted: that God is the governor of the -world, upon the evidence of reason; that Christ is the mediator between -God and man, and the Holy Ghost our guide and sanctifier, upon the -evidence of revelation: the truth of the case, I say, in each of these -respects being admitted, it is no more a question, why it should be -commanded, that we be baptized in the name of the Son and of the Holy -Ghost, than that we be baptized in the name of the Father. This matter -seems to require to be more fully stated.[146] - -Let it be remembered then, that religion comes under the twofold -consideration of internal and external: for the latter is as real a -part of religion, of true religion, as the former. Now, when religion -is considered under the first notion, as an inward principle, to be -exerted in such and such inward acts of the mind and heart, the essence -of natural religion may be said to consist in religious regards to -_God the Father Almighty_: and the essence of revealed religion, as -distinguished from natural, to consist in religious regards to _the -Son_, and to _the Holy Ghost_. The obligation we are under, of paying -these religious regards to each of these divine persons respectively, -arises from the respective relations which they each stand in to us. -How these relations are made known, whether by reason or revelation, -makes no alteration in the case: because the duties arise out of the -relations themselves, not out of the manner in which we are informed -of them. The Son and Spirit have each his proper office in that great -dispensation of Providence, the redemption of the world; the one our -Mediator, the other our Sanctifier. Does not then the duty of religious -regards to both these divine persons, as immediately arise to the view -of reason, out of the very nature of these offices and relations; as -the good-will and kind intention, which we owe to our fellow-creatures, -arise out of the common relations between us and them? But it will be -asked, “What are the inward religious regards, appearing thus obviously -due to the Son and Holy Spirit; as arising, not merely from command in -Scripture, but from the very nature of the revealed relations, which -they stand in to us?” I answer, the religious regards of reverence, -honor, love, trust, gratitude, fear, hope. - -In what external manner this inward worship is to be expressed, is a -matter of pure revealed command, as perhaps the external manner, in -which God the Father is to be worshipped, may be more so than we are -ready to think. But the worship, the internal worship itself, to the -Son and Holy Ghost, is no further matter of pure revealed command, than -as the relations they stand in to us are matter of pure revelation: for -the relations being known, the obligations to such internal worship -are obligations of reason, arising out of those relations themselves. -In short, the history of the gospel as immediately shows us the reason -of these obligations, as it shows us the meaning of the words, Son and -Holy Ghost. - -If this account of the Christian religion be just, those persons who -can speak lightly of it, as of little consequence, provided natural -religion be kept to, plainly forget, that Christianity, even what is -peculiarly so called, as distinguished from natural religion, has yet -somewhat very important, even of a moral nature. For the office of -our Lord being made known, and the relation he stands in to us, the -obligation of religious regards to him is plainly moral, as much as -charity to mankind is; since this obligation arises, before external -command, immediately out of that his office and relation itself. Those -persons appear to forget, that revelation is to be considered, as -informing us of somewhat new, in the state of mankind,[147] and in -the government of the world: as acquainting us with some relations we -stand in, which could not otherwise have been known. These relations -being real (though before revelation we could be under no obligations -from them, yet upon their being revealed), there is no reason to think, -but that neglect of behaving suitably to them will be attended with -the same kind of consequences under God’s government, as neglecting to -behave suitably to any other relations, made known to us by reason. -Ignorance, whether unavoidable or voluntary, so far as we can possibly -see, will just as much, and just as little, excuse in one case as in -the other: the ignorance being supposed equally unavoidable, or equally -voluntary, in both cases. - -If therefore Christ be indeed the mediator between God and man, _i.e._ -if Christianity be true; if he be indeed our Lord, our Savior, and our -God, no one can say, what may follow, not only the obstinate, but -the careless disregard to him, in those high relations. Nay, no one -can say, what may follow such disregard, even in the way of natural -consequence.[148] For, as the natural consequences of vice in this -life are doubtless to be considered as judicial punishments inflicted -by God, so for aught we know, the judicial punishments of the future -life may be, in a like way or a like sense, the natural consequence of -vice:[149] of men’s violating or disregarding the relations which God -has placed them in here, and made known to them. - -If mankind are corrupted and depraved in their moral character, and -so are unfit for that state, which Christ is gone to prepare for his -disciples; and if the assistance of God’s Spirit be necessary to renew -their nature, in the degree requisite to their being qualified for -that state; (all which is implied in the express, though figurative -declaration, _Except a man be born of the Spirit, he cannot enter -into the kingdom of God_:[150]) supposing this, is it possible any -serious person can think it a slight matter, whether or no he makes -use of the means, expressly commanded by God, for obtaining this -divine assistance? Especially since the whole analogy of nature shows, -that we are not to expect any benefits, without making use of the -appointed means for obtaining or enjoying them. Now reason shows us -nothing, of the particular immediate means of obtaining either temporal -or spiritual benefits. This therefore we must learn, either from -experience or revelation. And experience, the present case does not -admit of. - -The conclusion from all this evidently is, that Christianity being -supposed either true or credible, it is unspeakable irreverence, and -really the most presumptuous rashness, to treat it as a light matter. -It can never justly be esteemed of little consequence, till it be -positively supposed false. Nor do I know a higher and more important -obligation which we are under, than that of examining most seriously -into its evidence, supposing its credibility; and of embracing it, upon -supposition of its truth. - -The two following deductions may be proper to be added, in order to -illustrate the foregoing observations, and to prevent their being -mistaken. - -_First_, Hence we may clearly see, where lies the distinction between -what is positive and what is moral in religion. Moral _precepts_, are -precepts the reasons of which we see: positive _precepts_, are precepts -the reasons of which we do not see.[151] Moral _duties_ arise out of -the nature of the case itself, prior to external command. Positive -_duties_ do not arise out of the nature of the case, but from external -command; nor would they be duties at all, were it not for such command, -received from Him whose creatures and subjects we are. But the manner -in which the nature of the case or the fact of the relation, is made -known, this doth not denominate any duty either positive or moral. That -we be baptized in the name of the Father is as much a positive duty, as -that we be baptized in the name of the Son, because both arise equally -from revealed command: though the relation which we stand in to God -the Father is made known to us by reason, and the relation we stand -in to Christ, by revelation only. On the other hand, the dispensation -of the Gospel being admitted, gratitude as immediately becomes due to -Christ, from his being the voluntary minister of this dispensation, -as it is due to God the Father, from his being the fountain of all -good; though the first is made known to us by revelation only, the -second by reason. Hence also we may see, and, for distinctness’ sake, -it may be worth mentioning, that positive institutions come under a -twofold consideration. They are either institutions founded on natural -religion, as baptism in the name of the Father; (though this has also a -particular reference to the gospel dispensation, for it is in the name -of God, as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ:) or they are external -institutions founded on revealed religion; as baptism in the name of -the Son; and of the Holy Ghost. - -_Secondly_, From the distinction between what is moral and what is -positive in religion, appears the ground of that peculiar preference, -which the Scripture teaches us to be due to the former. - -The reason of positive institutions in general, is very obvious; -though we should not see the reason, why particular ones are pitched -upon rather than others. Whoever, therefore, instead of cavilling at -words, will attend to the thing itself, may clearly see, that positive -institutions in general, as distinguished from this or that particular -one, have the nature of moral commands; since the reasons of them -appear. Thus, for instance, the _external_ worship of God is a moral -duty, though no particular mode of it be so. Care then is to be taken, -when a comparison is made between positive and moral duties, that they -be compared no further than as they are different; no further than as -the former are positive, or arise out of mere external command, the -reasons of which we are not acquainted with; and as the latter are -moral, or arise out of the apparent reason of the case, without such -external command. Unless this caution be observed, we shall run into -endless confusion. - -Now this being premised, suppose two standing precepts enjoined by the -same authority; that, in certain conjunctures, it is impossible to -obey both; that the former is moral, _i.e._ a precept of which we see -the reasons, and that they hold in the particular case before us; but -that the latter is positive, _i.e._ a precept of which we do not see -the reasons: it is indisputable that our obligations are to obey the -former; because there is an apparent reason for this preference, and -none against it. Further, positive institutions, all those I suppose -which Christianity enjoins, are means to a moral end: and the end must -be acknowledged more excellent than the means.[152] Nor is observance -of these institutions any religious obedience at all, or of any value, -otherwise than as it proceeds from a moral principle. This seems to -be the strict logical way of stating and determining this matter; -but will, perhaps, be found less applicable to practice, than may be -thought at first sight. - -Therefore, in a more practical, though more lax way of consideration, -and taking the words, _moral law_ and _positive institutions_, in -the popular sense, I add, that the whole moral law is as much matter -of revealed command, as positive institutions are: for the Scripture -enjoins every moral virtue. In this respect then they are both upon -a level. But the moral law is, moreover, written upon our hearts; -interwoven into our very nature. And this is a plain intimation of the -Author of it, which is to be preferred, when they interfere. - -But there is not altogether so much necessity for the determination of -this question, as some persons seem to think. Nor are we left to reason -alone to determine it. For, _First_, Though mankind have, in all ages, -been greatly prone to place their religion in peculiar positive rites, -by way of equivalent for obedience to moral precepts; yet, without -making any comparison at all between them, and consequently without -determining which is to have the preference, the nature of the thing -abundantly shows all notions of that kind to be utterly subversive of -true religion, as they are, moreover, contrary to the whole general -tenor of Scripture; and likewise to the most express particular -declarations of it, that nothing can render us accepted of God, without -moral virtue. - -_Secondly_, Upon the occasion of mentioning together positive and moral -duties, the Scripture always puts the stress of religion upon the -latter, and never upon the former. This, though no sort of allowance -to neglect the former, when they do not interfere with the latter, -is yet a plain intimation, that when they do, the latter are to be -preferred. And as mankind are for placing the stress of their religion -anywhere, rather than upon virtue; lest both the reason of the thing, -and the general spirit of Christianity, appearing in the intimation -now mentioned, should be ineffectual against this prevalent folly, -our Lord himself, from whose command alone the obligation of positive -institutions arises, has taken occasion to make the comparison between -them and moral precepts; when the Pharisees censured him, for _eating -with publicans and sinners_; and also when they censured his disciples, -for _plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath day_. Upon this -comparison, he has determined expressly, and in form, which shall have -the preference when they interfere. And by delivering his authoritative -determination in a proverbial manner of expression, he has made it -general: _I will have mercy, and not sacrifice_.[153] The propriety of -the word _proverbial_, is not the thing insisted upon: though I think -the manner of speaking is to be called so. But that the manner of -speaking very remarkably renders the determination general, is surely -indisputable. For, had it been said only, that God preferred mercy to -the rigid observance of the Sabbath, even then, by parity of reason, -most justly might we have argued, that he preferred mercy likewise, -to the observance of other ritual institutions; and in general, moral -duties, to positive ones. And thus the determination would have been -general; though its being so were inferred and not expressed. But as -the passage really stands in the Gospel, it is much stronger. For -the sense and the very literal words of our Lord’s answer, are as -applicable to any other instance of a comparison, between positive and -moral duties, as to that upon which they were spoken. And if, in case -of competition, mercy is to be preferred to positive institutions, -it will scarce be thought, that justice is to give place to them. It -is remarkable too, that, as the words are a quotation from the Old -Testament, they are introduced, on both the forementioned occasions, -with a declaration, that the Pharisees did not understand the meaning -of them. This, I say, is very remarkable. For, since it is scarce -possible, for the most ignorant person, not to understand the literal -sense of the passage in the prophet;[154] and since understanding -the literal sense would not have prevented their _condemning the -guiltless_,[155] it can hardly be doubted, that the thing which our -Lord really intended in that declaration was, that the Pharisees had -not learned from it, as they might, wherein the _general_ spirit of -religion consists: that it consists in moral piety and virtue, as -distinguished from ritual observances. However, it is certain we may -learn this from his divine application of the passage, in the Gospel. - -But, as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of human nature, when, -upon a comparison of two things, one is found to be of greater -importance than the other, to consider this other as of scarce any -importance at all: it is highly necessary that we remind ourselves, how -great presumption it is, to make light of any institutions of divine -appointment; that our obligations to obey all God’s commands whatever -are absolute and indispensable; and that commands merely positive, -admitted to be from him, lay us under a moral obligation to obey them: -an obligation moral in the strictest and most proper sense. - -To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the account now given of -Christianity most strongly shows and enforces upon us the obligation -of searching the Scriptures, in order to see, what the scheme of -revelation really is; instead of determining beforehand, from reason, -what the scheme of it must be.[156] Indeed if in revelation there be -found any passages, the seeming meaning of which is contrary to natural -religion; we may most certainly conclude, such seeming meaning not to -be the real one.[157] But it is not any degree of a presumption against -an interpretation of Scripture, that such interpretation contains a -doctrine, which the light of nature cannot discover;[158] or a precept, -which the law of nature does not oblige to. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. - - -Having shown the importance of the Christian revelation, and the -obligations which we are under seriously to attend to it, upon -supposition of its truth, or its credibility, the next thing in -order, is to consider the supposed presumptions against revelation in -general; which shall be the subject of this chapter: and the objections -against the Christian in particular, which shall be the subject of -some following ones.[159] For it seems the most natural method, to -remove the prejudices against Christianity, before we proceed to the -consideration of the positive evidence for it, and the objections -against that evidence.[160] - -It is, I think, commonly supposed, that there is some peculiar -presumption, from the analogy of nature, against the Christian scheme -of things, at least against miracles; so as that stronger evidence -is necessary to prove the truth and reality of them, than would be -sufficient to convince us of other events, or matters of fact. Indeed -the consideration of this supposed presumption cannot but be thought -very insignificant, by many persons. Yet, as it belongs to the subject -of this treatise; so it may tend to open the mind, and remove some -prejudices, however needless the consideration of it be, upon its own -account. - -I. I find no appearance of a presumption, from the analogy of nature, -against the _general scheme_ of Christianity, that God created -and invisibly governs the world by Jesus Christ; and by him also -will hereafter judge it in righteousness, _i.e._ render to every -one according to his works; and that good men are under the secret -influence of his Spirit. Whether these things are, or are not, to -be called miraculous, is perhaps only a question about words; or -however, is of no moment in the case. If the analogy of nature raises -any presumption against this general scheme of Christianity, it must -be, either because it is not discoverable by reason or experience; or -else, because it is unlike that course of nature, which is. But analogy -raises no presumption against the truth of this scheme, upon either of -these accounts. - -_First_, There is no presumption, from analogy, against the truth -of it, upon account of its not being discoverable by reason or -experience. Suppose one who never heard of revelation, of the most -improved understanding, and acquainted with our whole system of natural -philosophy and natural religion; such a one could not but be sensible, -that it was but a very small part of the natural and moral system -of the universe, which he was acquainted with. He could not but be -sensible, that there must be innumerable things, in the dispensations -of Providence past, in the invisible government over the world at -present carrying on, and in what is to come; of which he was wholly -ignorant,[161] and which could not be discovered without revelation. -Whether the scheme of nature be, in the strictest sense, infinite or -not; it is evidently vast, even beyond all possible imagination. And -doubtless that part of it, which is open to our view, is but as a point -in comparison of the whole plan of Providence, reaching throughout -eternity past and future; in comparison of what is even now going on, -in the remote parts of the boundless universe, nay, in comparison of -the whole scheme of this world. And therefore, that things lie beyond -the natural reach of our faculties, is no sort of presumption against -the truth and reality of them; because it is certain, there are -innumerable things, in the constitution and government of the universe, -which are thus beyond the natural reach of our faculties. - -_Secondly_, Analogy raises no presumption against any of the things -contained in this general doctrine of Scripture now mentioned, upon -account of their being unlike the known course of nature. For there is -no presumption at all from analogy, that the _whole_ course of things, -or divine government naturally unknown to us, and _every thing_ in it, -is like to any thing in that which is known; and therefore no peculiar -presumption against any thing in the former, upon account of its being -unlike to any thing in the latter. And in the constitution and natural -government of the world, as well as in the moral government of it, we -see things, in a great degree, unlike one another: and therefore ought -not to wonder at such unlikeness between things visible and invisible. -However, the scheme of Christianity is by no means entirely unlike the -scheme of nature; as will appear in the following part of this treatise. - -The notion of a miracle, considered as a proof of a divine mission, -has been stated with great exactness by divines; and is, I think, -sufficiently understood by every one. There are also invisible -miracles,[162] the Incarnation of Christ, for instance, which, being -secret, cannot be alleged as a proof of such a mission; but require -themselves to be proved by visible miracles. Revelation itself too -is miraculous; and miracles are the proof of it; and the supposed -presumption against these shall presently be considered. All which I -have been observing here is, that, whether we choose to call every -thing in the dispensations of Providence, not discoverable without -revelation, nor like the known course of things, miraculous; and -whether the general Christian dispensation now mentioned is to be -called so, or not; the foregoing observations seem certainly to show, -that there is no presumption against it from the analogy of nature. - -II. There is no presumption, from analogy, against some operations, -which we should now call miraculous; particularly none against a -revelation at the beginning of the world: nothing of such presumption -against it, as is supposed to be implied or expressed in the word, -_miraculous_.[163] A miracle, in its very notion, is relative to a -course of nature; and implies something different from it, considered -as being so. Now, either there was no course of nature at the time -which we are speaking of; or if there were, we are not acquainted what -the course of nature is, upon the first peopling of worlds. Therefore -the question, whether mankind had a revelation made to them at _that_ -time, is to be considered, not as a question concerning a miracle, but -as a common question of fact. And we have the like reason, be it more -or less, to admit the report of tradition, concerning this question, -and concerning common matters of fact of the same antiquity; for -instance, what part of the earth was first peopled. - -Or thus: When mankind was first placed in this state, there was a power -exerted, totally different from the present course of nature. Now, -whether this power, thus wholly different from the present course of -nature, (for we cannot properly apply to it the word _miraculous_;) -whether this power _stopped_ immediately after it had made man, or -went on, and exerted itself further in giving him a revelation, is a -question of the same kind, as whether an ordinary power exerted itself -in such a particular _degree_ and manner, or not. - -Or suppose the power exerted in the formation of the world be -considered as miraculous, or rather, be called by that name; the -case will not be different: since it must be acknowledged, that such -a power was exerted. For supposing it acknowledged, that our Savior -spent some years in a course of working miracles:[164] there is no -more presumption, worth mentioning, against his having exerted this -miraculous power, in a certain degree greater, than in a certain degree -less; in one or two more instances, than in one or two fewer; in this, -than in another manner. - -It is evident then, that there can be no peculiar presumption, from the -analogy of nature, against supposing a revelation, when man was first -placed upon earth.[165] - -Add, that there does not appear the least intimation in history or -tradition, that religion was first reasoned out: but the whole of -history and tradition makes for the other side, that it came into the -world by revelation. Indeed the state of religion, in the first ages of -which we have any account, seems to suppose and imply, that this was -the original of it among mankind.[166] And these reflections together, -without taking in the peculiar authority of Scripture, amount to real -and a very material degree of evidence, that there was a revelation -at the beginning of the world. Now this, as it is a confirmation of -natural religion, and therefore mentioned in the former part of this -treatise;[167] so likewise it has a tendency to remove any prejudices -against a subsequent revelation. - -III. But still it may be objected, that there is some peculiar -presumption, from analogy, against miracles; particularly against -revelation, after the settlement and during the continuance of a course -of nature. - -Now with regard to this supposed presumption, it is to be observed in -general, that before we can have ground for raising what can, with -any propriety, be called an _argument_ from analogy, for or against -revelation considered as something miraculous, we must be acquainted -with a similar or parallel case. But the history of some other world, -seemingly in like circumstances with our own, is no more than a -parallel case: and therefore nothing short of this can be so. Yet, -could we come at a presumptive proof, for or against a revelation, from -being informed, whether such world had one, or not; such a proof, being -drawn from one single instance only, must be infinitely precarious. -More particularly: - -_First_, There is a very strong presumption against common speculative -truths, and against the most ordinary facts, before the proof[168] -of them; which yet is overcome by almost any proof. There is a -presumption of millions to one, against the story of Cæsar, or -of any other man. For suppose a number of common facts so and so -circumstanced, of which we had no kind of proof, should happen to come -into one’s thoughts; every one would, without any possible doubt, -conclude them to be false. And the like may be said of a single -common fact. Hence it appears, that the question of importance, as -to the matter before us, is, concerning the _degree_ of the peculiar -presumption supposed against miracles; not whether there be any -peculiar presumption at all against them. For, if there be the -presumption of millions to one, against the most common facts; what -can a small presumption, additional to this, amount to, though it be -peculiar? It cannot be estimated, and is as nothing. The only material -question is, whether there be any such presumptions against miracles, -as to render them in any sort incredible. - -_Secondly_, If we leave out the consideration of religion, we are -in such total darkness, upon what causes, occasions, reasons, or -circumstances, the present course of nature depends; that there does -not appear any improbability for or against supposing, that five or -six thousand years may have given scope[169] for causes, occasions, -reasons, or circumstances, from whence miraculous interpositions may -have arisen. And from this, joined with the foregoing observation, it -will follow, that there must be a presumption, beyond all comparison -greater, against the _particular_ common facts just now instanced in, -than against miracles _in general_; before any evidence of either. - -_Thirdly_, Take in the consideration of religion, or the moral -system of the world, and then we see distinct particular reasons for -miracles: to afford mankind instruction additional to that of nature, -and to attest the truth of it. This gives a real credibility to the -supposition, that it might be part of the original plan of things, that -there should be miraculous interpositions. - -_Lastly_, Miracles must not be compared to common natural events, or to -events which, though uncommon, are similar to what we daily experience: -but to the extraordinary phenomena of nature. And then the comparison -will be between the presumption against miracles, and the presumption -against such uncommon appearances, suppose, as comets, and against -there being any such powers in nature as magnetism and electricity, -so contrary to the properties of other bodies not endued with these -powers. And before any one can determine, whether there be any peculiar -presumption against miracles, more than against other extraordinary -things; he must consider, what, upon first hearing, would be the -presumption against the last mentioned appearances and powers, to a -person acquainted only with the daily, monthly, and annual course of -nature respecting this earth, and with those common powers of matter -which we every day see. - -Upon all this I conclude; that there certainly is no such presumption -against miracles, as to render them in any wise incredible: that, -on the contrary, our being able to discern reasons for them, gives -a positive credibility to the history of them, in cases where those -reasons hold: and that it is by no means certain, that there is any -_peculiar_ presumption at all, from analogy, even in the lowest degree, -against miracles, as distinguished from other extraordinary phenomena: -though it is not worth while to perplex the reader with inquiries into -the abstract nature of evidence, in order to determine a question, -which, without such inquiries, we see[170] is of no importance. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - -OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING, WHAT WERE TO BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION; -AND THE CREDIBILITY, FROM ANALOGY, THAT IT MUST CONTAIN THINGS LIABLE -TO OBJECTIONS. - - -Besides the objections against the _evidence_ for Christianity, many -are alleged against the _scheme_ of it; against the whole manner -in which it is put and left with the world; as well as against -several particular relations in Scripture: objections drawn from -the deficiencies of revelation: from things in it appearing to men -_foolishness_;[171] from its containing matters of offence, which have -led, and it must have been foreseen would lead, into strange enthusiasm -and superstition, and be made to serve the purposes of tyranny and -wickedness; from its not being universal; and, which is a thing of the -same kind, from its evidence not being so convincing and satisfactory -as it might have been: for this last is sometimes turned into a -positive argument against its truth.[172] - -It would be tedious, indeed impossible, to enumerate the several -particulars comprehended under the objections here referred to; they -being so various, according to the different fancies of men. There -are persons who think it a strong objection against the authority -of Scripture, that it is not composed by rules of art, agreed -upon by critics, for polite and correct writing. And the scorn is -inexpressible, with which some of the prophetic parts of Scripture are -treated: partly through the rashness of interpreters; but very much -also, on account of the hieroglyphical and figurative language, in -which they are left us. - -Some of the principal things of this sort shall be particularly -considered in the following chapters. But my design at present is to -observe in general, with respect to this whole way of arguing, that, -upon supposition of a revelation, it is highly credible beforehand, -that we should be incompetent judges of it to a great degree: and -that it would contain many things appearing to us liable to great -objections; in case we judge of it otherwise, than by the analogy -of nature. Therefore, though objections against the _evidence_ of -Christianity are most seriously to be considered, yet objections -against Christianity itself are, in a great measure, frivolous: almost -all objections against it, excepting those which are alleged against -the particular proofs of its coming from God. I express myself with -caution, lest I should be mistaken to vilify reason; which is indeed -the only faculty we have wherewith to judge concerning any thing, even -revelation itself: or be misunderstood to assert, that a supposed -revelation cannot be proved false, from internal characters. For, it -may contain clear immoralities or contradictions; and either of these -would prove it false. Nor will I take upon me to affirm, that nothing -else can possibly render any supposed revelation incredible. Yet still -the observation above, is, I think, true beyond doubt; that objections -against Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its -evidence, are frivolous. To make out this, is the general design of the -present chapter. - -With regard to the whole of it, I cannot but particularly wish, that -the _proofs_ might be attended to; rather than the assertions cavilled -at, upon account of any unacceptable _consequences_, real or supposed, -which may be drawn from them. For, after all, that which is true, must -be admitted, though it should show us the shortness of our faculties: -and that we are in no wise judges of many things, of which we are apt -to think ourselves very competent ones. Nor will this be any objection -with reasonable men; at least upon second thought it will not be any -objection with such, against the justness of the following observations. - -As God governs the world and instructs his creatures, according to -certain laws or rules, in the known course of nature; known by reason -together with experience: so the Scripture informs us of a scheme of -divine Providence, additional to this. It relates, that God has, by -revelation, instructed men in things concerning his government, which -they could not otherwise have known; and reminded them of things, which -they might otherwise know; and attested the truth of the whole by -miracles. Now if the natural and the revealed dispensation of things -are both from God, if they coincide with each other, and together -make up one scheme of Providence; our being incompetent judges of -one, must render it credible, that we may be incompetent judges also -of the other. Upon experience, the acknowledged constitution and -course of nature is found to be greatly different from what, before -experience, would have been expected; and such as, men fancy, there lie -great objections against. This renders it beforehand highly credible, -that they may find the revealed dispensation likewise, if they judge -of it as they do of the constitution of nature, very different from -expectations formed beforehand; and liable, in appearance, to great -objections: objections against the scheme itself, and against the -degrees and manners of the miraculous interpositions by which it was -attested and carried on. Thus, suppose a prince to govern his dominions -in the wisest manner possible, by common known laws; and that upon -some exigencies he should suspend these laws; and govern, in several -instances, in a different manner. If one of his subjects were not a -competent judge beforehand, by what common rules the government should -or would be carried on; it could not be expected, that the same person -would be a competent judge, in what exigencies, or in what manner, or -to what degree, those laws commonly observed would be suspended or -deviated from. If he were not a judge of the wisdom of the ordinary -administration, there is no reason to think he would be a judge of the -wisdom of the extraordinary. If he thought he had objections against -the former; doubtless, it is highly supposable, he might think also, -that he had objections against the latter. And thus, as we fall into -infinite follies and mistakes, whenever we pretend, otherwise than from -experience and analogy, to judge of the constitution and course of -nature; it is evidently supposable beforehand, that we should fall into -as great, in pretending to judge in like manner concerning revelation. -Nor is there any more ground to expect that this latter should appear -to us clear of objections, than that the former should. - -These observations, relating to the whole of Christianity, are -applicable to inspiration in particular. As we are in no sort judges -beforehand, by what laws or rules, in what degree, or by what means, -it were to have been expected, that God would naturally instruct -us; so upon supposition of his affording us light and instruction -by revelation, additional to what he has afforded us by reason and -experience, we are in no sort judges, by what methods, and in what -proportion, it were to be expected that this supernatural light and -instruction would be afforded us. We know not beforehand, what degree -or kind of natural information it were to be expected God would afford -men, each by his own reason and experience: nor how far he would enable -and effectually dispose them to communicate it, whatever it should -be, to each other; nor whether the evidence of it would be certain, -highly probable, or doubtful; nor whether it would be given with equal -clearness and conviction to all. Nor could we guess, upon any good -ground I mean, whether natural knowledge, or even the faculty itself, -by which we are capable of attaining it, reason, would be given us at -once, or gradually. - -In like manner, we are wholly ignorant, what degree of new knowledge, -it were to be expected, God would give mankind by revelation, upon -supposition of his affording one: or how far, or in what way, he would -interpose miraculously, to qualify them, to whom he should originally -make the revelation, for communicating the knowledge given by it; and -to secure their doing it to the age in which they should live; and to -secure its being transmitted to posterity. We are equally ignorant, -whether the evidence of it would be certain or highly probable, or -doubtful:[173] or whether all who should have any degree of instruction -from it, and any degree of evidence of its truth, would have the -same: or whether the scheme would be revealed at once, or unfolded -gradually.[174] Nay we are not in any sort able to judge, whether -it were to have been expected, that the revelation should have been -committed to writing; or left to be handed down, and consequently -corrupted, by verbal tradition, and at length sunk under it, if mankind -so pleased, and during such time as they are permitted, in the degree -they evidently are, to act as they will. - -But it may be said, “that a revelation in some of the above-mentioned -circumstances, one, for instance, which was not committed to writing, -and thus secured against danger of corruption, would not have answered -its purpose.” I ask, what purpose? It would not have answered all the -purposes, which it has now answered, and in the same degree: but it -would have answered others, or the same in different degrees. And which -of these were the purposes of God, and best fell in with his general -government, we could not at all have determined beforehand. - -Now since we have no principles of reason, upon which to judge -beforehand, how it were to be expected that revelation should have been -left, or what was most suitable to the divine plan of government, in -any of the forementioned respects; it must be quite frivolous to object -afterwards as to any of them, against its being left in one way, rather -than another: for this would be to object against things, upon account -of their being different from expectations, which has been shown to be -without reason. - -Thus we see, that the only question concerning the truth of -Christianity is, whether it be a real revelation; not whether it be -attended with every circumstance which we should have looked for: and -concerning the authority of Scripture, whether it be what it claims to -be; not whether it be a book of such sort, and so promulged, as weak -men are apt to fancy a book containing a divine revelation should be. -Therefore, neither obscurity, nor seeming inaccuracy of style, nor -various readings, nor early disputes about the authors of particular -parts, nor any other things of the like kind, though they had been -much more considerable in degree than they are, could overthrow the -authority of the Scripture: unless the prophets, apostles, or our Lord, -had promised, that the book containing the divine revelation should be -exempt from those things. Nor indeed can any objections overthrow such -a kind of revelation as the Christian claims to be, (since there are -no objections against the morality of it,[175]) but such as can show, -that there is no proof of miracles wrought originally in attestation -of it; no appearance of any thing miraculous in its obtaining in the -world; nor any of prophecy, that is, of events foretold, which human -sagacity could not foresee. If it can be shown, that the proof alleged -for all these is absolutely none at all, then is revelation overturned. -But were it allowed, that the proof of any one or all of them is lower -than is allowed; yet, whilst _any_ proof of them remains, revelation -will stand upon much the same foot it does at present, as to all the -purposes of life and practice, and ought to have the like influence -upon our behavior. - -From the foregoing observations too, it will follow, and those who -will thoroughly examine into revelation will find it worth remarking, -that there are several ways of arguing, which though just with regard -to other writings, are not applicable to Scripture: at least not to -its prophetic parts. We cannot argue, for instance, that such and such -cannot be the sense or intent of a passage of Scripture, for, if it -had, it would have been expressed more plainly, or represented under -a more apt figure or hieroglyphic. Yet we may justly argue thus, with -respect to common books. And the reason of this difference is very -evident. In Scripture we are not competent judges, as we are in common -books, how plainly it were to have been expected, that the sense should -have been expressed, or under how apt an image figured. The only -question is, what appearance there is, that this _is_ the sense; and -scarce at all, how much more determinately or accurately it might have -been expressed or figured.[176] - -“But is it not self-evident, that internal improbabilities of all kinds -weaken external probable proof?” Doubtless. But to what practical -purpose can this be alleged here, when it has been proved before,[177] -that real internal improbabilities, which rise even to moral certainty, -are overcome by the most ordinary testimony; and when it now has been -made to appear, that we scarce know what are improbabilities, as to the -matter we are here considering: as it will further appear from what -follows. - -From the observations made above it is manifest, that we are not in any -sort competent judges, what supernatural instruction were to have been -expected; and it is self-evident, that the objections of an incompetent -judgment must be frivolous. Yet it may be proper to go one step -further, and observe, that if men will be regardless of these things, -and pretend to judge of the Scripture by preconceived expectations; the -analogy of nature shows beforehand, not only that it is highly credible -they may, but also probable that they will, imagine they have strong -objections against it, however really unexceptionable. For so, prior -to experience, they would think they had, against the circumstances, -and degrees, and the whole manner of that instruction, which is -afforded by the ordinary course of nature. Were the instruction which -God affords to brute creatures by instincts and mere propensions, and -to mankind by these together with reason, matter of probable proof, -and not of certain observation: it would be rejected as incredible, -in many instances of it, only upon account of the means by which this -instruction is given, the seeming disproportions, the limitations, -necessary conditions, and circumstances of it. For instance: would it -not have been thought highly improbable, that men should have been so -much more capable of discovering, even to certainty, the general laws -of matter, and the magnitudes, paths, and revolutions, of heavenly -bodies; than the occasions and cures of distempers, and many other -things in which human life seems so much more nearly concerned, than in -astronomy? How capricious and irregular a way of information would it -be said; is that of _invention_, by means of which nature instructs us -in matters of science, and in many things, upon which the affairs of -the world greatly depend: that a man should, by this faculty, be made -acquainted with a thing in an instant, (when perhaps he is thinking of -something else,) which he has in vain been searching after, it may be, -for years. - -So likewise the imperfections attending the only method, by which -nature enables and directs us to communicate our thoughts to each -other, are innumerable. Language is, in its very nature, inadequate, -ambiguous, liable to infinite abuse, even from negligence; and so -liable to it from design, that every man can deceive and betray by -it. And, to mention but one instance more; that brutes, without -reason, should act, in many respects, with a sagacity and foresight -vastly greater than what men have in those respects, would be thought -impossible. Yet it is certain they do act with such superior foresight: -whether it be their own, indeed, is another question. From these -things, it is highly credible beforehand, that upon supposition that -God should afford men some additional instruction by revelation, -it would be with circumstances, in manners, degrees, and respects, -against the credibility of which we should be apt to fancy we had great -objections. Nor are the objections against the Scripture, nor against -Christianity in general, at all more or greater, than the analogy of -nature would beforehand--not perhaps give ground to _expect_; (for the -analogy may not be sufficient, in some cases, to ground an expectation -upon;) but no more nor greater, than analogy would show it, beforehand, -to be supposable and _credible_, that there might seem to lie against -revelation. - -By applying these general observations to a particular objection, it -will be more distinctly seen, how they are applicable to others of the -like kind; and indeed to almost all objections against Christianity, -as distinguished from objections against its evidence. It appears -from Scripture, that, as it was not unusual in the apostolic age, for -persons, upon their conversion to Christianity, to be endued with -miraculous gifts; so, some of those persons exercised these gifts in -a strangely irregular and disorderly manner;[178] and this is made an -objection against their being really miraculous. Now the foregoing -observations quite remove this objection, how considerable soever it -may appear at first sight. For, consider a person endued with any of -these gifts, for instance that of tongues: it is to be supposed, that -he had the same power over this miraculous gift, as he would have had -over it, had it been the effect of habit, of study and use, as it -ordinarily is; or the same power over it, as he had over any other -natural endowment. Consequently, he would use it in the same manner as -he did any other; either regularly, and upon proper occasions only, or -irregularly, and upon improper ones: according to his sense of decency, -and his character of prudence.[179] Where then is the objection? Why, -if this miraculous power was indeed given to the world to propagate -Christianity, and attest the truth of it, we might, it seems, have -expected, that other sort of persons should have been chosen to be -invested with it; or that these should, at the same time, have been -endued with prudence; or that they should have been continually -restrained and directed in the exercise of it: _i.e._ that God should -have miraculously interposed, if at all, in a different manner, or -higher degree. But, from the observations made above, it is undeniably -evident, that we are not judges in what degrees and manners it were to -have been expected he should miraculously interpose; upon supposition -of his doing it in some degree and manner. Nor, in the natural course -of Providence, are superior gifts of memory, eloquence, knowledge, and -other talents of great influence, conferred only on persons of prudence -and decency, or such as are disposed to make the properest use of -them. Nor is the instruction and admonition naturally afforded us for -the conduct of life, particularly in our education, commonly given in -a manner the most suited to recommend it; but often with circumstances -apt to prejudice us against such instruction. - -One might go on to add, there is a great resemblance between the light -of nature and of revelation, in several other respects. Practical -Christianity, or that faith and behavior which renders a man a -Christian, is a plain and obvious thing: like the common rules of -conduct, with respect to ordinary temporal affairs. The more distinct -and particular knowledge of those things, the study of which the -apostle calls _going on unto perfection_,[180] and of the prophetic -parts of revelation, like many parts of natural and even civil -knowledge, may require very exact thought, and careful consideration. -The hinderances too, of natural, and of supernatural light and -knowledge, have been of the same kind. And as it is owned the whole -scheme of Scripture is not yet understood; so, if it ever comes to be -understood, before the _restitution of all things_,[181] and without -miraculous interpositions, it must be in the same way as natural -knowledge is come at: by the continuance and progress of learning and -of liberty;[182] and by particular persons attending to, comparing, and -pursuing, intimations scattered up and down it, which are overlooked -and disregarded by the generality of the world. For this is the way in -which all improvements are made; by thoughtful men’s tracing on obscure -hints, dropped us by nature as it were, accidentally, or which seem to -come into our minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible, that a book -which has been so long in the possession of mankind, should contain -many truths as yet undiscovered. For, all the same phenomena, and the -same faculties of investigation, from which such great discoveries -in natural knowledge have been made in the present and last age, were -equally in the possession of mankind, several thousand years before. -And possibly it might be intended, that events, as they come to pass, -should open and ascertain the meaning of several parts of Scripture. - -It may be objected, that this analogy fails in a material respect: -for that natural knowledge is of little or no consequence. But I have -been speaking of the general instruction which nature does or does not -afford us. And besides, some parts of natural knowledge, in the more -common restrained sense of the words, are of the greatest consequence -to the ease and convenience of life. But suppose the analogy did, as it -does not, fail in this respect; yet it might be abundantly supplied, -from the whole constitution and course of nature: which shows, that God -does not dispense his gifts according to _our_ notions of the advantage -and consequence they would be of to us. And this in general, with his -method of dispensing knowledge in particular, would together make out -an analogy full to the point before us. - -But it may be objected still further and more generally; “The Scripture -represents the world as in a state of ruin, and Christianity as an -expedient to recover it, to help in these respects where nature fails: -in particular, to supply the deficiencies of natural light. Is it -credible then, that so many ages should have been let pass, before a -matter of such a sort, of so great and so general importance, was made -known to mankind; and then that it should be made known to so small a -part of them? Is it conceivable, that this supply should be so very -deficient, should have the like obscurity and doubtfulness, be liable -to the like perversions, in short, lie open to all the like objections, -as the light of nature itself?”[183] - -Without determining how far this, in fact, is so, I answer; it is -by no means incredible, that it might be so, if the light of nature -and of revelation be from the same hand. Men are naturally liable to -diseases: for which God, in his good providence, has provided natural -remedies.[184] But remedies existing in nature have been unknown -to mankind for many ages; are known but to few now; probably many -valuable ones are not known yet. Great has been and is the obscurity -and difficulty, in the nature and application of them. Circumstances -_seem_ often to make them very improper, where they are absolutely -necessary. It is after long labor and study, and many unsuccessful -endeavors, that they are brought to be as useful as they are; after -high contempt and absolute rejection of the most useful we have; and -after disputes and doubts, which have seemed to be endless. The best -remedies too, when unskilfully, much more when dishonestly applied, may -produce new diseases; and with the rightest application the success of -them is often doubtful. In many cases they are not effectual: where -they are, it is often very slowly: and the application of them, and the -necessary regimen accompanying it, is not uncommonly so disagreeable, -that some will not submit to them; and satisfy themselves with the -excuse, that if they would, it is not certain whether it would be -successful. And many persons, who labor under diseases, for which there -are known natural remedies, are not so happy as to be always, if ever, -in the way of them. In a word, the remedies which nature has provided -for diseases are neither certain, perfect, nor universal. And indeed -the same principles of arguing, which would lead us to conclude, that -they must be so, would lead us likewise to conclude, that there could -be no occasion for them; _i.e._ that there could be no diseases at all. -And therefore our experience that there are diseases, shows that it is -credible beforehand, upon supposition nature has provided remedies for -them, that these remedies may be, as by experience we find they are, -neither certain, nor perfect, nor universal; because it shows, that the -principles upon which we should expect the contrary are fallacious. - -And now, what is the just consequence from all these things? Not -that reason is no judge of what is offered to us as being of divine -revelation. For this would be to infer that we are unable to judge -of any thing, because we are unable to judge of all things. Reason -can, and it ought to judge, not only of the meaning, but also of the -morality and the evidence of revelation. - -_First_, It is the province of reason to judge of the morality of -the Scripture; _i.e._ not whether it contains things different from -what we should have expected from a wise, just, and good Being; (for -objections from hence have been now obviated:) but whether it contains -things plainly contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness; to what -the light of nature teaches us of God. And I know nothing of this sort -objected against Scripture, excepting such objections as are formed -upon suppositions, which would equally conclude, that the constitution -of nature is contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness; which -most certainly it is not. There are, indeed, some particular precepts -in Scripture, given to particular persons, requiring actions, which -would be immoral and vicious, were it not for such precepts. But it is -easy to see, that all these are of such a kind, as that the precept -changes the whole nature of the case and of the action; and both -constitutes and shows that not to be unjust or immoral, which, prior -to the precept, must have appeared and really been so: which may well -be, since none of these precepts are contrary to immutable morality. -If it were commanded, to cultivate the _principles_, and act from the -spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty; the command would not alter -the nature of the case or of the action, in any of these instances. -But it is quite otherwise in precepts, which require only the doing an -_external action_: for instance, taking away the property, or life of -any. For men have no right, either to life or property, but what arises -solely from the grant of God. When this grant is revoked, they cease -to have any right at all in either: and when this revocation is made -known, as surely it is possible it may be, it must cease to be unjust -to deprive them of either. And though a course of external acts, which -without command would be immoral, must make an immoral habit; yet a few -detached commands have no such natural tendency. I thought proper to -say thus much of the few Scripture precepts, which require, not vicious -actions, but actions which would have been vicious, but for such -precepts; because they are sometimes weakly urged as immoral, and great -weight is laid upon objections drawn from them. - -To me there seems no difficulty at all in these precepts, but what -arises from their being offences: _i.e._ from their being liable to be -perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked designing men, to serve the -most horrid purposes; and perhaps to mislead the weak and enthusiastic. -And objections from this head are not objections against revelation; -but against the whole notion of religion, as a trial: and against the -general constitution of nature. - -_Secondly_, Reason is able to judge, and must, of the evidence of -revelation, and of the objections urged against that evidence: which -shall be the subject of a following chapter.[185] - -The consequence of the foregoing observations is, that the question -upon which the truth of Christianity depends, is scarcely at all -what objections there are against its scheme, since there are none -against the morality of it, but _what objections there are against its -evidence_; or, _what proof there remains of it, after due allowances -are made for the objections against that proof_: because it has been -shown, that the _objections against Christianity, as distinguished -from objections against its evidence, are frivolous_. For surely very -little weight, if any at all, is to be laid upon a way of arguing and -objecting, which, when applied to the general constitution of nature, -experience shows not to be conclusive: and such, I think, is the whole -way of objecting treated of throughout this chapter. It is resolvable -into principles, and goes upon suppositions, which mislead us to think, -that the Author of nature would not act, as we experience he does; or -would act, in such and such cases, as we experience he does not in like -cases. But the unreasonableness of this way of objecting will appear -yet more evidently from hence, that the chief things thus objected -against are justified, as shall be further shown,[186] by distinct, -particular, and full analogies, in the constitution and course of -nature. - -It is to be remembered, that, as frivolous as objections of the -foregoing sort against revelation are, yet, when a supposed revelation -is more consistent with itself, and has a more general and uniform -tendency to promote virtue, than, all circumstances considered, could -have been expected from enthusiasm and political views, this is a -presumptive proof of its not proceeding from them, and so of its truth: -because we are competent judges, what might have been expected from -enthusiasm and political views.[187] - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - -CHRISTIANITY, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY -COMPREHENDED. - - -As hath been now shown,[188] the analogy of nature renders it highly -credible beforehand, that, supposing a revelation to be made, it must -contain many things very different from what we should have expected, -and such as appear open to great objections: and that this observation, -in good measure, takes off the force of those objections, or rather -precludes them. It may be alleged, that this is a very partial answer -to such objections, or a very unsatisfactory way of obviating them: -because it does not show at all, that the things objected against -can be wise, just, and good; much less, that it is credible they are -so. It will therefore be proper to show this distinctly; by applying -to these objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of -Christianity, the answer above[189] given to the like objections -against the constitution of nature: before we consider the particular -analogies in the latter, to the particular things objected against in -the former. Now that which affords a sufficient answer to objections -against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the constitution of -nature, is its being a constitution, a system, or scheme, imperfectly -comprehended;[190] a scheme in which means are made use of to -accomplish ends; and which is carried on by general laws. For from -these things it has been proved, not only to be possible, but also -to be credible, that those things which are objected against may be -consistent with wisdom, justice, and goodness; nay, may be instances -of them: and even that the constitution and government of nature may -be perfect in the highest possible degree. If Christianity then be -a scheme, and of the like kind; it is evident, the like objections -against it must admit of the like answer. And, - -I. Christianity is a scheme, quite beyond our comprehension. - -The moral government of God is exercised, by gradually conducting -things so in the course of his providence, that every one, at -length and upon the whole, shall receive according to his deserts; -and neither fraud nor violence, but truth and right, shall finally -prevail. Christianity is a particular scheme under this general plan of -Providence, and a part of it, conducive to its completion, with regard -to mankind: consisting itself also of various parts, and a mysterious -economy, which has been carrying on from the time the world came into -its present wretched state, and is still carrying on, for its recovery, -by a divine person, the Messiah; who is to _gather together in one the -children of God, that are scattered abroad_,[191] and establish _an -everlasting kingdom, wherein dwelleth righteousness_.[192] In order to -it; after various manifestations of things, relating to this great and -general scheme of Providence, through a succession of many ages: (For -_the Spirit of Christ which was in the prophets, testified beforehand -his sufferings, and the glory that should follow: unto whom it was -revealed, that not unto themselves, but unto us they did minister the -things which are now reported unto us by them that have preached the -Gospel; which things the angels desire to look into_:[193])--after -various dispensations looking forward and preparatory to, this final -salvation: _in the fulness of time_, when infinite wisdom thought fit; -He, _being in the form of God,--made himself of no reputation, and took -upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men: -and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became -obedient to death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore God also hath -highly exalted him, and given him a name, which is above every name: -that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, -and things in the earth, and things under the earth: and that every -tongue should confess, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God -the Father._[194] Parts likewise of this economy are the miraculous -mission of the Holy Ghost, and his ordinary assistances given to good -men:[195] the invisible government, which Christ at present exercises -over his church: that which he himself refers to in these words: _In -my Father’s house are many mansions--I go to prepare a place for -you_:[196] and his future return to _judge the world in righteousness_, -and completely re-establish the kingdom of God. _For the Father judgeth -no man; but hath committed all judgment unto the Son: that all men -should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father._[197] _All power -is given unto him in heaven and in earth._[198] _And he must reign, -till he hath put all enemies under his feet. Then cometh the end, when -he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when -he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power. And -when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also -himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God -may be all in all._[199] Surely little need be said to show, that this -system, or scheme of things, is but imperfectly comprehended by us. The -Scripture expressly asserts it to be so. And indeed one cannot read a -passage relating to this _great mystery of godliness_,[200] but what -immediately runs up into something which shows us our ignorance in it; -as every thing in nature shows us our ignorance in the constitution -of nature. And whoever will seriously consider that part of the -Christian scheme, which is revealed in Scripture, will find so much -more unrevealed, as will convince him, that, to all the purposes of -judging and objecting, we know as little of it, as of the constitution -of nature. Our ignorance, therefore, is as much an answer to our -objections against the perfection of one, as against the perfection of -the other.[201] - -II. It is obvious too, that in the Christian dispensation, as much as -in the natural scheme of things, means are made use of to accomplish -ends. - -The observation of this furnishes us with the same answer, to -objections against the perfection of Christianity, as to objections -of the like kind, against the constitution of nature. It shows the -credibility, that the things objected against, how _foolish_[202] -soever they appear to men, may be the very best means of accomplishing -the very best ends. And their appearing _foolishness_ is no presumption -against this, in a scheme so greatly beyond our comprehension.[203] - -III. The credibility, that the Christian dispensation may have been, -all along, carried on by general laws,[204] no less than the course of -nature, may require to be more distinctly made out. - -Consider then, upon _what ground_ it is we say, that the whole common -course of nature is carried on according to general fore-ordained laws. -We know indeed several of the general laws of matter; and a great -part of the natural behavior of living agents is reducible to general -laws. But we know in a manner nothing, by what laws, storms, tempests, -earthquakes, famine, pestilence, become the instruments of destruction -to mankind. And the laws by which persons born into the world at such -a time and place are of such capacities, geniuses, tempers; the laws -by which thoughts come into our mind, in a multitude of cases; and by -which innumerable things happen, of the greatest influence upon the -affairs and state of the world. These laws are so wholly unknown to us, -that we call the events which come to pass by them, accidental; though -all reasonable men know certainly, that there cannot, in reality, be -any such thing as chance; and conclude that the things which have this -appearance are the result of general laws, and may be reduced to them. -It is but an exceeding little way, and in but a very few respects, that -we can trace up the natural course of things before us, to general -laws. It is only from analogy, that we conclude the whole of it to be -capable of being reduced to them: only from our seeing that part is so. -It is from our finding, that the course of nature, in some respects and -so far, goes on by general laws, that we conclude this of the rest. - -If that be a just ground for such a conclusion, it is a just ground -also, if not to conclude, yet to apprehend, to render it supposable -and credible, which is sufficient for answering objections, that God’s -miraculous interpositions may have been, all along in like manner, -by _general_ laws of wisdom. Thus, that miraculous powers should be -exerted, at such times, upon such occasions, in such degrees and -manners, and with regard to such persons, rather than others; that -the affairs of the world, being permitted to go on in their natural -course so far, should, just at such a point, have a new direction given -them by miraculous interpositions; that these interpositions should -be exactly in such degrees and respects only; all this may have been -by general laws. These laws are indeed unknown to us: but no more -unknown than the laws from whence it is, that some die as soon as -they are born, and others live to extreme old age; that one man is so -superior to another in understanding; with innumerable more things, -which, as was before observed, we cannot reduce to any laws or rules, -though it is taken for granted, they are as much reducible to general -ones, as gravitation. If the revealed dispensations of Providence, -and miraculous interpositions, be by general laws, as well as God’s -ordinary government in the course of nature, made known by reason and -experience; there is no more reason to expect that every exigence, as -it arises, should be provided for by these general laws or miraculous -interpositions, than that every exigence in nature should be, by the -general laws of nature. Yet there might be wise and good reasons, why -miraculous interpositions should be by general laws; and why these laws -should not be broken in upon, or deviated from, by other miracles. - -Upon the whole then, the appearance of deficiencies and irregularities -in nature is owing to its being a scheme but in part made known, and -of such a certain particular kind in other respects. We see no more -reason why the frame and course of nature should be such a scheme, than -why Christianity should. And that the former is such a scheme, renders -it credible, that the latter, upon supposition of its truth, may be -so too. And as it is manifest, that Christianity is a scheme revealed -but in part, and a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish -ends, like to that of nature: so the credibility, that it may have -been all along carried on by general laws, no less than the course of -nature, has been distinctly proved. From all this it is beforehand -credible that there might, I think probable that there would, be the -like appearance of deficiencies and irregularities in Christianity, -as in nature: _i.e._ that Christianity would be liable to the like -objections, as the frame of nature. And these objections are answered -by these observations concerning Christianity; as the like objections -against the frame of nature are answered by the like observations -concerning the frame of nature. - - * * * * * - -The objections against Christianity, considered as a matter of -fact,[205] having, in general, been obviated in the preceding chapter; -and the same, considered as made against the wisdom and goodness of it, -having been obviated in this: the next thing, according to the method -proposed, is to show, that the principal objections, in particular, -against Christianity, may be answered, by particular and full analogies -in nature. And as one of them is made against the whole scheme of it -together, as just now described, I choose to consider it here, rather -than in a distinct chapter by itself. - -The thing objected against this scheme of the gospel is, “that -it seems to suppose God was reduced to the necessity of a long -series of intricate means, in order to accomplish his ends, the -recovery and salvation of the world: in like sort as men, for want -of understanding or power, not being able to come at their ends -directly, are forced to go roundabout ways, and make use of many -perplexed contrivances to arrive at them,” Now every thing which we -see shows the folly of this, considered as an objection against the -truth of Christianity. For, according to our manner of conception, -God makes use of variety of means, what we often think tedious ones, -in the natural course of providence, for the accomplishment of all -his ends. Indeed it is certain there is somewhat in this matter quite -beyond our comprehension: but the mystery is as great in nature as in -Christianity. We know what we ourselves aim at, as final ends: and -what courses we take, merely as means conducing to those ends. But we -are greatly ignorant how far things are considered by the Author of -nature, under the single notion of means and ends; so as that it may be -said, this is merely an end, and that merely a means, in his regard. -And whether there be not some peculiar absurdity in our very manner of -conception, concerning this matter, something contradictory arising -from our extremely imperfect views of things, it is impossible to say. - -However, this much is manifest, that the whole natural world and -government of it, is a scheme or system; not a fixed, but a progressive -one: a scheme in which the operation of various means takes up a -great length of time, before the ends they tend to can be attained. -The change of seasons, the ripening of fruits, the very history of a -flower, are instances of this: and so is human life. Thus vegetable -bodies, and those of animals, though possibly formed at once, yet -grow up by degrees to a mature state. And thus rational agents, who -animate these latter bodies, are naturally directed to form each his -own manners and character, by the gradual gaining of knowledge and -experience, and by a long course of action. Our existence is not only -successive, as it must be of necessity; but one state of our life and -being is appointed by God, to be a preparation for another; and that -to be the means of attaining to another succeeding one: infancy to -childhood; childhood to youth; youth to mature age. Men are impatient, -and for precipitating things: but the Author of nature appears -deliberate throughout his operations; accomplishing his natural ends by -slow successive steps.[206] And there is a plan of things beforehand -laid out, which, from the nature of it, requires various systems of -means, as well as length of time, in order to the carrying on its -several parts into execution. - -Thus, in the daily course of natural providence, God operates in the -very same manner, as in the dispensation of Christianity; making one -thing subservient to another; this, to something further; and so on, -through a progressive series of means, which extend, both backward and -forward, beyond our utmost view. Of this manner of operation, every -thing we see in the course of nature is as much an instance, as any -part of the Christian dispensation. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - -THE PARTICULAR SYSTEM OF CHRISTIANITY; THE APPOINTMENT OF A MEDIATOR, -AND THE REDEMPTION OF THE WORLD BY HIM. - - -There is not, I think, any thing relating to Christianity, which has -been more objected against, than the mediation of Christ, in some -or other of its parts. Yet upon thorough consideration, there seems -nothing less justly liable to it.[207] For, - -I. The whole analogy of nature removes all imagined presumption against -the general notion of _a Mediator between God and man_.[208] For we -find all living creatures are brought into the world, and their life -in infancy is preserved, by the instrumentality of others: and every -satisfaction of it, some way or other, is bestowed by the like means. -So that the visible government, which God exercises over the world, is -by the instrumentality and mediation of others. How far his invisible -government be or be not so, it is impossible to determine at all by -reason. The supposition, that part of it is so, appears, to say the -least, altogether as credible, as the contrary. There is then no sort -of objection, from the light of nature, against the general notion of a -mediator between God and man, considered as a doctrine of Christianity, -or as an appointment in this dispensation: since we find by experience, -that God does appoint mediators, to be the instruments of good and evil -to us: the instruments of his justice and his mercy. And the objection -here referred to is urged, not against mediation in that high, eminent, -and peculiar sense, in which Christ is our mediator; but absolutely -against the whole notion itself of a mediator at all. - -II. As we must suppose, that the world is under the proper moral -government of God, or in a state of religion, before we can enter into -consideration of the revealed doctrine, concerning the redemption of -it by Christ: so that supposition is here to be distinctly noticed. -Now the divine moral government which religion teaches us, implies -that the consequence of vice shall be misery, in some future state, by -the righteous judgment of God. That such consequent punishment shall -take effect by his appointment, is necessarily implied. But, as it -is not in any sort to be supposed, that we are made acquainted with -all the ends or reasons, for which it is fit that future punishments -should be inflicted, or why God has appointed such and such consequent -misery to follow vice; and as we are altogether in the dark, how or in -what manner it shall follow, by what immediate occasions, or by the -instrumentality of what means; so there is no absurdity in supposing -it may follow in a way analogous to that in which many miseries -follow such and such courses of action at present; poverty, sickness, -infamy, untimely death by diseases, death from the hands of civil -justice. There is no absurdity in supposing future punishment may -follow wickedness _of course_, as we speak, or in the way of natural -consequence from God’s original constitution of the world; from the -nature he has given us, and from the condition in which he places us; -or in a like manner, as a person rashly trifling upon a precipice, -in the way of natural consequence, falls down; in the way of natural -consequence of this, breaks his limbs, and in the way of natural -consequence, without help, perishes. - -Some good men may perhaps be offended with hearing it spoken of as a -supposable thing that future punishments of wickedness may be in the -way of natural consequence: as if this were taking the execution of -justice out of the hands of God, and giving it to nature. But they -should remember, that when things come to pass according to the course -of nature, this does not hinder them from being his doing, who is -the God of nature: and that the Scripture ascribes those punishments -to divine justice, which are known to be natural; and which must be -called so, when distinguished from such as are miraculous. After all, -this supposition, or rather this way of speaking, is here made use -of only by way of illustration of the subject before us. For since it -must be admitted, that the future punishment of wickedness is not a -matter of arbitrary appointment, but of reason, equity, and justice; it -comes for aught I see, to the same thing, whether it is supposed to be -inflicted in a way analogous to that in which the temporal punishments -of vice and folly are inflicted, or in any other way. And though there -were a difference, it is allowable, in the present case, to make this -supposition, plainly not an incredible one, that future punishment may -follow wickedness in the way of natural consequence, or according to -some general laws of government already established in the universe. - -III. Upon this supposition, or even without it, we may observe -somewhat, much to the present purpose, in the constitution of nature or -appointments of Providence: the provision which is made, that all the -bad natural consequences of men’s actions should not always actually -follow; or that such bad consequences, as, according to the settled -course of things, would inevitably have followed if not prevented, -should, in certain degrees, be prevented. We are apt presumptuously to -imagine, that the world might have been so constituted, as that there -would not have been any such thing as misery or evil. On the contrary -we find the Author of nature permits it: but then he has provided -reliefs, and in many cases perfect remedies for it, after some pains -and difficulties; reliefs and remedies even for that evil, which is the -fruit of our own misconduct; and which, in the course of nature, would -have continued, and ended in our destruction, but for such remedies. -And this is an instance both of severity and of indulgence, in the -constitution of nature. Thus all the bad consequences, now mentioned, -of a man’s trifling upon a precipice, might be prevented. And though -all were not, yet some of them might, by proper interposition, if not -rejected:[209] by another’s coming to the rash man’s relief, with his -own laying hold on that relief, in such sort as the case required. -Persons may do a great deal themselves towards preventing the bad -consequences of their follies: and more may be done by themselves, -together with the assistance of others their fellow-creatures; which -assistance nature requires and prompts us to. This is the general -constitution of the world. - -Now suppose it had been so constituted, that after such actions were -done, as were foreseen naturally to draw after them misery to the doer, -it should have been no more in human power to have prevented that -naturally consequent misery, in any instance, than it is in all: no -one can say, whether such a more severe constitution of things might -not yet have been really good. But, on the contrary, provision being -made by nature, that we may and do, to so great degree, prevent the bad -natural effects of our follies; this may be called mercy or compassion -in the original constitution of the world: compassion, as distinguished -from goodness in general. And, the whole known constitution and -course of things affording us instances of such compassion, it would -be according to the analogy of nature, to hope, that however ruinous -the natural consequences of vice might be, from the general laws of -God’s government over the universe; yet provision might be made, -possibly might have been originally made, for preventing those ruinous -consequences from inevitably following: at least from following -universally, and in all cases. - -Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this made a question, or -spoken of as in any degree doubtful. The generality of mankind are so -far from having that awful sense of things, which the present state of -vice and misery and darkness seems to make but reasonable, that they -have scarce any apprehension or thought at all about this matter, any -way: and some serious persons may have spoken unadvisedly concerning -it. But let us observe, what we experience to be, and what, from -the very constitution of nature cannot but be, the consequences of -irregular and disorderly behavior: even of such rashness, wilfulness, -neglects, as we scarce call vicious. Now it is natural to apprehend, -that the bad consequences of irregularity will be greater, in -proportion as the irregularity is so. And there is no comparison -between these irregularities, and the greater instances of vice, or -a dissolute profligate disregard to all religion; if there be any -thing at all in religion. For consider what it is for creatures, moral -agents, presumptuously to introduce that confusion and misery into the -kingdom of God, which mankind have in fact introduced: to blaspheme the -Sovereign Lord of all; to contemn his authority; to be injurious, to -the degree they are, to their fellow-creatures, the creatures of God. -Add that the effects of vice in the present world are often extreme -misery, irretrievable ruin, and even death: and upon putting all this -together, it will appear, that as no one can say, in what degree fatal -the unprevented consequences of vice may be, according to the general -rule of divine government; so it is by no means intuitively certain, -how far these consequences could possibly, in the nature of the thing, -be prevented, consistently with the eternal rule of right, or with what -is, in fact, the moral constitution of nature. However, there would be -large ground to hope, that the universal government was not so severely -strict, but that there was room for pardon, or for having those penal -consequences prevented. Yet, - -IV. There seems no probability, that any thing we could do would -alone and of itself prevent them: prevent their following, or being -inflicted. But one would think at least, it were impossible that -the contrary should be thought certain. For we are not acquainted -with the whole of the case. We are not informed of all the reasons, -which render it fit that future punishments should be inflicted: and -therefore cannot know, whether any thing we could do would make such -an alteration, as to render it fit that they should be remitted. We -do not know what the whole natural or appointed consequences of vice -are; nor in what way they would follow, if not prevented: and therefore -can in no sort say, whether we could do any thing which would be -sufficient to prevent them. Our ignorance being thus manifest, let -us recollect the analogy of nature or Providence. For, though this -may be but a slight ground to raise a positive opinion upon, in this -matter; yet it is sufficient to answer a mere arbitrary assertion, -without any kind of evidence, urged by way of objection against a -doctrine, the proof of which is not reason, but revelation. Consider -then: people ruin their fortunes by extravagance; they bring diseases -upon themselves by excess; they incur the penalties of civil laws; -and surely civil government is natural; will sorrow for these follies -past, and behaving well for the future, alone and of itself prevent -the natural consequences of them? On the contrary, men’s natural -abilities of helping themselves are often impaired; or if not, yet they -are forced to be beholden to the assistance of others, upon several -accounts, and in different ways; assistance which they would have had -no occasion for, had it not been for their misconduct; but which, in -the disadvantageous condition they have reduced themselves to, is -absolutely necessary to their recovery, and retrieving their affairs. -Since this is our case, considering ourselves merely as inhabitants of -this world, and as having a temporal interest here, under the natural -government of God, which however has a great deal moral in it; why is -it not supposable that this may be our case also, in our more important -capacity, as under his perfect moral government, and having a more -general and future interest depending?[210] If we have misbehaved in -this higher capacity, and rendered ourselves obnoxious to the future -punishment, which God has annexed to vice: it is plainly credible, that -behaving well for the time to come may be--not useless, God forbid--but -wholly insufficient, alone and of itself, to prevent that punishment: -or to put us in the condition which we should have been in, had we -preserved our innocence. - -Though we ought to reason with all reverence, whenever we reason -concerning the divine conduct: yet it may be added, that it is clearly -contrary to all our notions of government, as well as to what is, -in fact, the general constitution of nature, to suppose, that doing -well for the future should, in all cases, prevent all the judicial -bad consequences of having done evil, or all the punishment annexed -to disobedience. We have manifestly nothing from whence to determine, -in what degree, and in what cases, reformation would prevent this -punishment, even supposing that it would in some. And though the -efficacy of repentance itself alone, to prevent what mankind had -rendered themselves obnoxious to, and recover what they had forfeited, -is now insisted upon, in opposition to Christianity; yet, by the -general prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices over the heathen world, -this notion of repentance alone being sufficient to expiate guilt, -appears to be contrary to the general sense of mankind.[211] - -Upon the whole then; had the laws, the general laws of God’s government -been permitted to operate, without any interposition in our behalf, -the future punishment, for aught we know to the contrary, or have any -reason to think, must inevitably have followed, notwithstanding any -thing we could have done to prevent it. - -V. In this darkness, or this light of nature, call it which you -please, revelation comes in; and confirms every doubting fear, which -could enter into the heart of man, concerning the future unprevented -consequence of wickedness. It supposes the world to be in a state -of ruin (a supposition which seems the very ground of the Christian -dispensation; and which, if not provable by reason, yet is in no -wise contrary to it;) and teaches us too, that the rules of divine -government are such, as not to admit of pardon immediately and -directly upon repentance, or by the sole efficacy of it. But teaches -at the same time, what nature might justly have hoped, that the moral -government of the universe was not so rigid, but that there was room -for an interposition, to avert the fatal consequences of vice; which -therefore, by this means, does admit of pardon. Revelation teaches us, -that the unknown laws of God’s more general government, no less than -the particular laws by which we experience he governs us at present, -are compassionate,[212] as well as good in the more general notion of -goodness: and that he hath mercifully provided, that there should be -an interposition to prevent the destruction of human kind; whatever -that destruction unprevented would have been. _God so loved the world, -that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth_, not, to -be sure, in a speculative, but in a practical sense, _that whosoever -believeth in him, should not perish_:[213] gave his Son in the same -way of goodness to the world, as he affords particular persons the -friendly assistance of their fellow-creatures, when, without it, their -temporal ruin would be the certain consequence of their follies: in the -same way of goodness, I say, though in a transcendent and infinitely -higher degree. And the Son of God _loved us, and gave himself for us_, -with a love, which he himself compares to that of human friendship: -though, in this case, all comparisons must fall infinitely short of -the thing intended to be illustrated by them. He interposed in such -a manner as was necessary and effectual to prevent that execution of -justice upon sinners, which God had appointed should otherwise have -been executed upon them; or in such a manner, as to prevent that -punishment from actually following, which, according to the general -laws of divine government, must have followed the sins of the world, -had it not been for such interposition.[214] - -If any thing here said should appear, upon first thought, inconsistent -with divine goodness; a second, I am persuaded, will entirely remove -that appearance. For were we to suppose the constitution of things to -be such, as that the whole creation must have perished, had it not -been for something, which God had appointed should be, in order to -prevent that ruin: even this supposition would not be inconsistent, in -any degree, with the most absolutely perfect goodness. Still it may -be thought, that this whole manner of treating the subject before us -supposes mankind to be naturally in a very strange state. And truly so -it does. But it is not Christianity which has put us into this state. -Whoever will consider the manifold miseries, and the extreme wickedness -of the world; that the best have great wrongnesses within themselves, -which they complain of, and endeavor to amend; but that the generality -grow more profligate and corrupt with age; that even moralists thought -the present state to be a state of punishment: and, that the earth our -habitation has the appearances of being a ruin: whoever, I say, will -consider all these, and some other obvious things, will think he has -little reason to object against the Scripture account, that mankind is -in a state of degradation; against this being _the fact_: how difficult -soever he may think it to account for, or even to form a distinct -conception of the occasions and circumstances of it. But that the -crime of our first parents was the occasion of our being placed in a -more disadvantageous condition, is a thing throughout and particularly -analogous to what we see in the daily course of natural providence; as -the recovery of the world by the interposition of Christ has been shown -to be so in general. - -VI. The particular manner in which Christ interposed in the redemption -of the world, or his office as _Mediator_, in the largest sense, -_between God and man_, is thus represented to us in the Scripture. -_He is the light of the world_;[215] the revealer of the will of God -in the most eminent sense. He is a propitiatory sacrifice;[216] _the -Lamb of God_:[217] and, as he voluntarily offered himself up, he is -styled our High Priest.[218] And, which seems of peculiar weight, he is -described beforehand in the Old Testament, under the same characters -of a priest, and an expiatory victim.[219] And whereas it is objected, -that all this is merely by way of allusion to the sacrifices of -the Mosaic law, the Apostle on the contrary affirms, that the _law -was a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the -things_:[220] and that _the priests that offer gifts according to the -law--serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things, as Moses was -admonished of God, when he was about to make the tabernacle. For see, -saith he, that thou make all things according to the pattern showed to -thee in the mount_;[221] _i.e._ the Levitical priesthood was a shadow -of the priesthood of Christ; in like manner as the tabernacle made by -Moses was according to that showed him in the mount. The priesthood of -Christ, and the tabernacle in the mount, were the originals; of the -former of which the Levitical priesthood was a type; and of the latter -the tabernacle made by Moses was a copy. The doctrine of this epistle -then plainly is, that the legal sacrifices were allusions to the great -and final atonement to be made by the blood of Christ; and not that -this was an allusion to those. Nor can any thing be more express and -determinate than the following passage. _It is not possible that the -blood of bulls and of goats should take away sin. Wherefore when he -cometh into the world, he saith, Sacrifice and offering_, _i.e._ of -bulls and of goats, _thou wouldest not, but a body hast thou prepared -me. Lo! I come to do thy will, O God. By which will we are sanctified., -through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all._[222] -And to add one passage more of the like kind: _Christ was once offered -to bear the sins of many: and unto them that look for him shall he -appear the second time, without sin_; _i.e._ without bearing sin, -as he did at his first coming, by being an offering for it; without -having our _iniquities_ again _laid upon him_, without being any more -a sin-offering:--_unto them, that look for him shall he appear the -second time, without sin, unto salvation_.[223] Nor do the inspired -writers at all confine themselves to this manner of speaking concerning -the satisfaction of Christ; but declare an efficacy in what he did and -suffered for us, additional to and beyond mere instruction, example, -and government, in great variety of expression: _That Jesus should -die for that nation_, the Jews: _and not for that nation only, but -that also_, plainly by the efficacy of his death, _he should gather -together in one the children of God that were scattered abroad_:[224] -that _he suffered for sins, the just for the unjust_:[225] that _he -gave his life, himself, a ransom_:[226] that _we are bought, bought -with a price_:[227] that _he redeemed us with his blood: redeemed us -from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us_:[228] that he -is our _advocate_, _intercessor_, and _propitiation_:[229] that _he -was made perfect_, or consummate, _through sufferings; and being_ thus -_made perfect, he became the author of salvation_:[230] that _God was -in Christ reconciling the world to himself; by the death of his Son, by -the cross; not imputing their trespasses unto them_:[231] and lastly, -that _through death he destroyed him that had the power of death_.[232] -Christ having thus _humbled himself, and become obedient to death, even -the death of the cross; God also hath highly exalted him, and given -him a name, which is above every name: hath given all things into his -hands: hath committed all judgment unto him; that all men should honor -the Son, even as they honor the Father_.[233] For, _worthy is the Lamb -that was slain, to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, -and honor, and glory, and blessing. And every creature which is in -heaven, and on the earth, heard I, saying, Blessing, and honor, and -glory, and power, be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto -the Lamb forever and ever._[234] - -These passages of Scripture seem to comprehend and express the chief -parts of Christ’s office, as Mediator between God and man, so far, I -mean, as the nature of this his office is revealed; and it is usually -treated of by divines under three heads. - -_First_, He was, by way of eminence, the Prophet: _that Prophet that -should come into the world_,[235] to declare the divine will. He -published anew the law of nature, which men had corrupted; and the very -knowledge of which, to some degree, was lost among them. He taught -mankind, taught us authoritatively, to _live soberly, righteously, and -godly in this present world_, in expectation of the future judgment -of God. He confirmed the truth of this moral system of nature, and -gave us additional evidence of it; the evidence of testimony.[236] He -distinctly revealed the manner, in which God would be worshipped, the -efficacy of repentance, and the rewards and punishments of a future -life. Thus he was a prophet in a sense in which no other ever was. To -which is to be added, that he set us a perfect _example, that we should -follow his steps_. - -_Secondly_, He has a _kingdom which is not of this world_. He founded -a Church, to be to mankind a standing memorial of religion, and -invitation to it; which he promised to be with always even to the -end. He exercises an invisible government over it, himself, and by -his Spirit: over that part of it which is militant here on earth, a -government of discipline, _for the perfecting of the saints, for the -edifying his body: till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of -the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure -of the stature of the fulness of Christ_.[237] Of this Church, all -persons scattered over the world, who live in obedience to his laws, -are members. For these he is _gone to prepare a place, and will come -again to receive them unto himself, that where he is, there they may be -also; and reign with him forever and ever_:[238] and likewise _to take -vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not his Gospel_.[239] - -Against these parts of Christ’s office I find no objections, but what -are fully obviated in the beginning of this chapter. - -_Lastly_, Christ offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice, and made -atonement for the sins of the world; which is mentioned last, in regard -to what is objected against it. Sacrifices of expiation were commanded -the Jews, and obtained among most other nations, from tradition, whose -original probably was revelation. And they were continually repeated, -both occasionally, and at the returns of stated times: and made up -great part of the external religion of mankind. _But now once in the -end of the world Christ appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of -himself._[240] This sacrifice was, in the highest degree and with the -most extensive influence, of that efficacy for obtaining pardon of sin, -which the heathens may be supposed to have thought their sacrifices to -have been, and which the Jewish sacrifices really were in some degree, -and with regard to some persons.[241] - -How and in what particular _way_ it had this efficacy, there are not -wanting persons who have endeavored to explain: but I do not find that -the Scripture has explained it. We seem to be very much in the dark -concerning the manner in which the ancients understood atonement to be -made, _i.e._ pardon to be obtained by sacrifices. And if the Scripture -has, as surely it has, left this matter of the satisfaction of Christ -mysterious, left somewhat in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it -must be, if not evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain. Nor has any -one reason to complain for want of further information, unless he can -show his claim to it. - -Some have endeavored to explain the efficacy of what Christ has -done and suffered for us, beyond what the Scripture has authorized: -others, probably because they could not explain it, have been for -taking it away, and confining his office as Redeemer of the world, -to his instruction, example, and government of the church. Whereas -the doctrine of the Gospel appears to be, not only that he taught the -efficacy of repentance, but rendered it of the efficacy of which it -is, by what he did and suffered for us: that he obtained for us the -benefit of having our repentance accepted unto eternal life: not only -that he revealed to sinners, that they were in a capacity of salvation, -and how they might obtain it; but moreover that he put them into this -capacity of salvation, by what he did and suffered for them; put us -into a capacity of escaping future punishment, and obtaining future -happiness. And it is our wisdom thankfully to accept the benefit, by -performing the conditions, upon which it is offered, on our part, -without disputing how it was procured on his. For, - -VII. Since we neither know by what means punishment in a future state -would have followed wickedness in this: nor in what manner it would -have been inflicted, had it not been prevented; nor all the reasons -why its infliction would have been needful, nor the particular nature -of that state of happiness, which Christ is gone to prepare for his -disciples: and since we are ignorant how far any thing which we could -do, would, alone and of itself, have been effectual to prevent that -punishment to which we were obnoxious, and recover that happiness which -we had forfeited; it is most evident we are not judges, antecedently -to revelation, whether a mediator was or was not necessary, to obtain -those ends: to prevent that future punishment, and bring mankind to -the final happiness of their nature. For the very same reasons, upon -supposition of the necessity of a mediator, we are no more judges, -antecedently to revelation, of the whole nature of his office, or -of the several parts of which it consists; or of what was fit and -requisite to be assigned him, in order to accomplish the ends of divine -Providence in the appointment. Hence it follows, that to object against -the expediency or usefulness of particular things, revealed to have -been done or suffered by him, because we do not see how they were -conducive to those ends, is highly absurd. Yet nothing is more common -to be met with, than this absurdity. If it be acknowledged beforehand, -that we are not judges in the case, it is evident that no objection -can, with any shadow of reason, be urged against any particular part of -Christ’s mediatorial office revealed in Scripture, till it can be shown -positively not to be requisite or conducive to the ends proposed to be -accomplished; or that it is in itself unreasonable. - -There is one objection made against the satisfaction of Christ, which -looks to be of this positive kind: that the doctrine of his being -appointed to suffer for the sins of the world, represents God as being -indifferent whether he punished the innocent or the guilty. Now from -the foregoing observations we may see the extreme slightness of all -such objections; and (though it is most certain all who make them _do -not see_ the consequence) that they conclude altogether as much against -God’s whole original constitution of nature, and the whole daily -course of divine Providence in the government of the world, (_i.e._ -against the whole scheme of Theism and the whole notion of religion,) -as against Christianity. For the world is a constitution or system, -whose parts have a mutual reference to each other: and there is a -scheme of things gradually carrying on, called the course of nature, -to the carrying on of which God has appointed us, in various ways, -to contribute. And when, in the daily course of natural providence, -it is appointed that innocent people should suffer for the faults -of the guilty, this is liable to the very same objection, as the -instance we are now considering. The infinitely greater importance of -that appointment of Christianity, which is objected against, does not -hinder but it may be, as it plainly is, an appointment of the very same -_kind_, with what the world affords us daily examples of. Nay, if there -were any force at all in the objection, it would be stronger, in one -respect, against natural providence, than against Christianity: because -under the former we are in many cases commanded, and even necessitated -whether we will or no, to suffer for the faults of others; whereas the -sufferings of Christ were voluntary. - -The world’s being under the righteous government of God does indeed -imply, that finally, and upon the whole, every one shall receive -according to his personal deserts: and the general doctrine of the -whole Scripture is, that this shall be the completion of the divine -government. But during the progress, and, for aught we know, even in -order to the completion of this moral scheme, vicarious punishments may -be fit, and absolutely necessary. Men by their follies run themselves -into extreme distress; into difficulties which would be absolutely -fatal to them, were it not for the interposition and assistance of -others. God commands by the law of nature, that we afford them this -assistance, in many cases where we cannot do it without very great -pains, and labor, and sufferings to ourselves. We see in what variety -of ways one person’s sufferings contribute to the relief of another: -and how, or by what particular means, this comes to pass, or follows, -from the constitution and laws of nature, which came under our notice: -and, being familiarized to it, men are not shocked with it. So that the -reason of their insisting upon objections of the foregoing kind against -the satisfaction of Christ is, either that they do not consider God’s -settled and uniform appointments as his appointments at all; or else -they forget that vicarious punishment is a providential appointment -of every day’s experience. And then, from their being unacquainted -with the more general laws of nature or divine government over the -world, and not seeing how the sufferings of Christ could contribute -to the redemption of it, unless by arbitrary and tyrannical will, -they conclude his sufferings could not contribute to it any other -way. And yet, what has been often alleged in justification of this -doctrine, even from the apparent natural tendency of this method of -our redemption; its tendency to vindicate the authority of God’s laws, -and deter his creatures from sin; this has never yet been answered, -and is I think plainly unanswerable: though I am far from thinking it -an account of the whole of the case. But, without taking this into -consideration, it abundantly appears, from the observations above made, -that this objection is not an objection against Christianity, but -against the whole general constitution of nature. And if it were to be -considered as an objection against Christianity, or considering it as -it is, an objection against the constitution of nature; it amounts to -no more in conclusion than this, that a divine appointment cannot be -necessary or expedient, because the objector does not discern it to be -so: though he must own that the nature of the case is such, as renders -him incapable of judging, whether it be so or not; or of seeing it to -be necessary, though it were so! - -It is indeed a matter of great patience to reasonable men, to find -people arguing in this manner: objecting against the credibility of -such particular things revealed in Scripture, that they do not see -the necessity or expediency of them. For though it is highly right, -and the most pious exercise of our understanding, to inquire with due -reverence into the ends and reasons of God’s dispensations: yet when -those reasons are concealed, to argue from our ignorance, that such -dispensations cannot be from God, is infinitely absurd. The presumption -of this kind of objections seems almost lost in the folly of them. And -the folly of them is yet greater, when they are urged, as usually they -are, against things in Christianity analogous or like to those natural -dispensations of Providence, which are matter of experience. Let reason -be kept to: and if any part of the Scripture account of the redemption -of the world by Christ can be shown to be really contrary to it, let -the Scripture, in the name of God, be given up. But let not such poor -creatures as we are, go on objecting against an infinite scheme, that -we do not see the necessity or usefulness of all its parts, and call -this reasoning; and, which still further heightens the absurdity in the -present case, parts which we are not actively concerned in. For it may -be worth mentioning, - -_Lastly_, That not only the reason of the thing, but the whole -analogy of nature, should teach us, not to expect to have the like -information concerning the divine conduct, as concerning our own duty. -God instructs us by experience, (for it is not reason, but experience -which instructs us,) what good or bad consequences will follow from -our acting in such and such manners: and by this he directs us how we -are to behave ourselves. But, though we are sufficiently instructed -for the common purposes of life: yet it is but an almost infinitely -small part of natural providence, which we are at all let into. -The case is the same with regard to revelation. The doctrine of a -mediator between God and man, against which it is objected, that the -expediency of some things in it is not understood, relates only to -what was done on God’s part in the appointment, and on the Mediator’s -in the execution of it. For what is _required of us_, in consequence -of this gracious dispensation, is another subject, in which none can -complain for want of information. The constitution of the world, and -God’s natural government over it, is all mystery, as much as the -Christian dispensation. Yet under the first he has given men all -things pertaining to life; and under the other all things pertaining -unto godliness. And it may be added, that there is nothing hard to be -accounted for in any of the common precepts of Christianity: though -if there were, surely a divine command is abundantly sufficient to -lay us under the strongest obligations to obedience. But the fact is, -that the reasons of all the Christian precepts are evident. Positive -institutions are manifestly necessary to keep up and propagate religion -among mankind. And our duty to Christ, the internal and external -worship of him; this part of the religion of the Gospel manifestly -arises out of what he has done and suffered, his authority and -dominion, and the relation which he is revealed to stand in to us.[242] - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - -THE WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION; AND THE SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN -THE PROOF OF IT. - - -It has been thought by some persons, that if the evidence of revelation -appears doubtful, this itself turns into a positive argument against -it: because it cannot be supposed, that, if it were true, it would -be left to subsist upon doubtful evidence. And the objection against -revelation from its not being universal is often insisted upon as of -great weight. - -The weakness of these opinions may be shown, by observing the -suppositions on which they are founded: which are really such as these; -that it cannot be thought God would have bestowed any favor at all -upon us, unless in the degree which we think he might, and which, we -imagine, would be most to our particular advantage; and also that it -cannot be thought he would bestow a favor upon any, unless he bestowed -the same upon all; suppositions, which we find contradicted, not by -a few instances in God’s natural government of the world, but by the -general analogy of nature together. - -Persons who speak of the evidence of religion as doubtful, and of this -supposed doubtfulness as a positive argument against it, should be -put upon considering, what that evidence is, which they act upon with -regard to their temporal interests. It is not only extremely difficult, -but in many cases absolutely impossible, to balance pleasure and pain, -satisfaction and uneasiness, so as to be able to say on which side -is the overplus. There are the like difficulties and impossibilities -in making the due allowances for a change of temper and taste, for -satiety, disgusts, ill health: any of which render men incapable of -enjoying, after they have obtained what they most eagerly desired. -Numberless too are the accidents, besides that one of untimely death, -which may even probably disappoint the best-concerted schemes: and -strong objections are often seen to lie against them, not to be removed -or answered, but which seem overbalanced by reasons on the other side; -so as that the certain difficulties and dangers of the pursuit are, by -every one; thought justly disregarded, upon account of the appearing -greater advantages in case of success, though there be but little -probability of it. Lastly, every one observes our liableness, if we be -not upon our guard, to be deceived by the falsehood of men, and the -false appearances of things: and this danger must be greatly increased, -if there be a strong bias within, suppose from indulged passion, to -favor the deceit. Hence arises that great uncertainty and doubtfulness -of proof, _wherein_ our temporal interest really consists; what are the -most probable _means_ of attaining it; and whether those means will -eventually be _successful_. And numberless instances there are, in the -daily course of life, in which all men think it reasonable to engage in -pursuits, though the probability is greatly against succeeding; and to -make such provision for themselves, as it is supposable they may have -occasion for, though the plain acknowledged probability is, that they -never shall. - -Those who think the objection against revelation, from its light not -being universal, to be of weight,[243] should observe, that the Author -of nature, in numberless instances, bestows that upon some, which he -does not upon others, who seem equally to stand in need of it. Indeed -he appears to bestow all his gifts with the most promiscuous variety -among creatures of the same species: health and strength, capacities -of prudence and of knowledge, means of improvement, riches, and all -external advantages. As there are not any two men found, of exactly -like shape and features; so it is probable there are not any two, of -an exactly like constitution, temper, and situation, with regard to -the goods and evils of life. Yet, notwithstanding these uncertainties -and varieties, God does exercise a natural government over the world; -and there is such a thing as a prudent and imprudent institution of -life, with regard to our health and our affairs, under that his natural -government. - -As neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation have been universal; and -as they have been afforded to a greater or less part of the world, -at different times; so likewise at different times, both revelations -have had different degrees of evidence. The Jews who lived during the -succession of prophets, that is, from Moses till after the Captivity, -had higher evidence of the truth of their religion, than those had, -who lived in the interval between the last-mentioned period, and the -coming of Christ. And the first Christians had higher evidence of the -miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity, than what we have now. -They had also a strong presumptive proof of the truth of it, perhaps of -much greater force, in way of argument, than many think, of which we -have very little remaining; I mean the presumptive proof of its truth, -from the influence which it had upon the lives of the generality of its -professors. And we, or future ages, may possibly have a proof of it, -which they could not have, from the conformity between the prophetic -history, and the state of the world[244] and of Christianity. - -And further: if we were to suppose the evidence, which some have of -religion, to amount to little more than seeing that it _may_ be true; -but that they remain in great doubts and uncertainties about both its -evidence and its nature, and great perplexities concerning the rule -of life: others to have a _full conviction_ of the truth of religion, -with a distinct knowledge of their duty; and others severally to have -all the intermediate degrees of religious light and evidence, which -lie between these two--if we put the case, that for the present, it -was intended that revelation should be no more than a small light, -in the midst of a world greatly overspread, notwithstanding it, with -ignorance and darkness: that certain glimmerings of this light should -extend, and be directed, to remote distances, in such a manner as -that those who really partook of it should not discern whence it -originally came: that some in a nearer situation to it should have -its light obscured, and, in different ways and degrees, intercepted: -and that others should be placed within its clearer influence, and -be much more enlivened, cheered, and directed by it; but yet that -even to these it should be no more than a _light shining in a dark -place_: all this would be perfectly uniform, and of a piece with the -conduct of Providence, in the distribution of its other blessings. If -the fact of the case really were, that some have received no light -at all from the Scripture; as many ages and countries in the heathen -world: that others, though they have, by means of it, had essential or -natural religion enforced upon their consciences, yet have never had -the genuine Scripture revelation, with its real evidence, proposed to -their consideration; and the ancient Persians and modern Mahometans -may possibly be instances of people in a situation somewhat like to -this; that others, though they have had the Scripture laid before them -as of divine revelation, yet have had it with the system and evidence -of Christianity so interpolated, the system so corrupted, the evidence -so blended with false miracles, as to leave the mind in the utmost -doubtfulness and uncertainty about the whole; which may be the state -of some thoughtful men, in most of those nations who call themselves -Christian: and lastly, that others have had Christianity offered to -them in its genuine simplicity, and with its proper evidence, as -persons in countries and churches of civil and of Christian liberty; -but that even these persons are left in great ignorance in many -respects, and have by no means light afforded them enough to satisfy -their curiosity, but only to regulate their life, to teach them their -duty, and encourage them in the careful discharge of it. I say, if we -were to suppose this somewhat of a general true account of the degrees -of moral and religious light and evidence, which were intended to be -afforded mankind, and of what has actually been and is their situation, -in their moral and religious capacity; there would be nothing in all -this ignorance, doubtfulness, and uncertainty, in all these varieties, -and supposed disadvantages of some in comparison of others, respecting -religion, but may be paralleled by manifest analogies in the natural -dispensations of Providence at present, considering ourselves merely in -our temporal capacity. - -Nor is there any thing shocking in all this, or which would seem to -bear hard upon the moral administration in nature, if we would really -keep in mind, that every one shall be dealt equitably with: instead of -forgetting this, or explaining it away, after it is acknowledged in -words. All shadow of injustice, and indeed all harsh appearances, in -this various economy of Providence, would be lost, if we would keep -in mind, that every merciful allowance shall be made, and no more be -required of any one, than what might have been equitably expected of -him, from the circumstances in which he was placed; and not what might -have been expected, had he been placed in other circumstances: _i.e._ -in Scripture language, that every man shall be _accepted according to -what he had, not according to what he had not_.[245] This however does -not by any means imply, that all persons’ condition here is equally -advantageous with respect to futurity. And Providence’s designing to -place some in greater darkness with respect to religious knowledge, -is no more a reason why they should not endeavor to get out of that -darkness, and others to bring them out of it, than why ignorant and -slow people in matters of other knowledge should not endeavor to learn, -or should not be instructed. - -It is not unreasonable to suppose, that the same wise and good -principle, whatever it was, which disposed the Author of nature to -make different kinds and orders of creatures, disposed him also to -place creatures of like kinds in different situations. And that the -same principle which disposed him to make creatures of different -moral capacities, disposed him also to place creatures of like moral -capacities in different religious situations; and even the same -creatures, in different periods of their being. The account or reason -of this is also most probably the account why the constitution of -things is such, as that creatures of moral natures or capacities, for a -considerable part of that duration in which they are living agents, are -not at all subjects of morality and religion; but grow up to be so, and -grow up to be so more and more, gradually from childhood to mature age. - -What, in particular, is the account or reason of these things, we must -be greatly in the dark, were it only that we know so very little even -of our own case. Our present state may possibly be the consequence -of something past, of which we are wholly ignorant: as it has a -reference to somewhat to come, of which we know scarce any more than -is necessary for practice. A system or constitution, in its notion, -implies variety; and so complicated a one as this world, very great -variety. So that were revelation universal, yet, from men’s different -capacities of understanding, from the different lengths of their lives, -their different educations and other external circumstances, and from -their difference of temper and bodily constitution, their religious -situations would be widely different, and the disadvantage of some in -comparison of others, perhaps, altogether as much as at present. The -true account, whatever it be, why mankind, or such a part of mankind, -are placed in this condition of ignorance, must be supposed also the -true account of our further ignorance, in not knowing the reasons why, -or whence it is, that they are placed in this condition. - -The following practical reflections may deserve the serious -consideration of those persons, who think the circumstances of mankind -or their own, in the forementioned respects, a ground of complaint. - -_First_, The evidence of religion not appearing obvious, may constitute -one particular part of some men’s trial in the religious sense: as -it gives scope, for a virtuous exercise, or vicious neglect of their -understanding, in examining or not examining into that evidence. There -seems no possible reason to be given, why we may not be in a state -of moral probation, with regard to the exercise of our understanding -upon the subject of religion, as we are with regard to our behavior -in common affairs. The former is as much a thing within our power and -choice as the latter. And I suppose it is to be laid down for certain, -that the same character, the same inward principle, which, after a man -is convinced of the truth of religion, renders him obedient to the -precepts of it, would, were he not thus convinced, set him about an -examination of it, upon its system and evidence being offered to his -thoughts: and that in the latter state his examination would be with an -impartiality, seriousness, and solicitude, proportionable to what his -obedience is in the former. And as inattention, negligence, want of all -serious concern, about a matter of such a nature and such importance, -when offered to men’s consideration, is, before a distinct conviction -of its truth, as real depravity and dissoluteness, as neglect of -religious practice after such conviction: so active solicitude about -it, and fair impartial consideration of its evidence before such -conviction, is as really an exercise of a morally right temper; as -is religious practice after. Thus, that religion is not intuitively -true, but a matter of deduction and inference; that a conviction of its -truth is not forced upon every one, but left to be, by some, collected -with heedful attention to premises; this as much constitutes religious -probation, as much affords sphere, scope, opportunity, for right -and wrong behavior, as any thing whatever does. And their manner of -treating this subject, when laid before them, shows what is in their -heart, and is an exertion of it. - -_Secondly_, It appears to be a thing as evident, though it is not so -much attended to, that if, upon consideration of religion, the evidence -of it should seem to any persons doubtful, in the highest supposable -degree; even this doubtful evidence will, however, put them into a -_general state of probation_ in the moral and religious sense. For, -suppose a man to be really in doubt, whether such a person had not done -him the greatest favor; or, whether his whole temporal interest did not -depend upon that person; no one, who had any sense of gratitude and of -prudence, could possibly consider himself in the same situation, with -regard to such person, as if he had no such doubt. In truth, it is -as just to say, that certainty and doubt are the same, as to say the -situations now mentioned would leave a man as entirely at liberty in -point of gratitude or prudence, as he would be, were he certain he had -received no favor from such person; or that he no way depended upon -him. Thus, though the evidence of religion which is afforded to some -men should be little more than they are given to see, the system of -Christianity, or religion in general, to be supposable and credible; -this ought in all reason to beget a serious practical apprehension, -that it _may_ be true. And even this will afford matter of exercise -for religious suspense and deliberation, for moral resolution and -self-government; because the apprehension that religion may be true -does as really lay men under obligations, as a full conviction that -it is true. It gives occasion and motives to consider further the -important subject; to preserve attentively upon their minds a general -implicit sense that they may be under divine moral government, an -awful solicitude about religion, whether natural or revealed. Such -apprehension ought to turn men’s eyes to every degree of new light -which may be had, from whatever side it comes; and induce them to -refrain, in the mean time, from all immoralities, and live in the -conscientious practice of every common virtue. Especially are they -bound to keep at the greatest distance from all dissolute profaneness, -for this the very nature of the case forbids; and to treat with highest -reverence a matter, upon which their own whole interest and being, -and the fate of nature, depend. This behavior, and an active endeavor -to maintain within themselves this temper, is the business, the duty, -and the wisdom of those persons, who complain of the doubtfulness of -religion: is what they are under the most proper obligations to. And -such behavior is an exertion of, and has a tendency to improve in -them, that character, which the practice of all the several duties of -religion, from a full conviction of its truth, is an exertion of, and -has a tendency to improve in others: others, I say, to whom God has -afforded such conviction. Nay, considering the infinite importance -of religion, revealed as well as natural, I think it may be said in -general, that whoever will weigh the matter thoroughly may see, there -is not near so much difference, as is commonly imagined, between what -ought in reason to be the rule of life, to those persons who are -fully convinced of its truth, and to those who have only a serious -doubting apprehension, that it may be true. Their hopes, and fears, and -obligations, will be in various degrees: but, as the subject-matter -of their hopes and fears is the same, so the subject-matter of their -obligations, what they are bound to do and to refrain from, is not so -very unlike. - -It is to be observed further, that, from a character of understanding, -or a situation of influence in the world, some persons have it in their -power to do infinitely more harm or good, by setting an example of -profaneness and avowed disregard to all religion, or, on the contrary, -of a serious, though perhaps doubting, apprehension of its truth, and -of a reverent regard to it under this doubtfulness; than they can do, -by acting well or ill in all the _common intercourses_ among mankind. -Consequently they are most highly accountable for a behavior, which, -they may easily foresee, is of such importance, and in which there -is most plainly a right and a wrong; even admitting the evidence of -religion to be as doubtful as is pretended. - -The ground of these observations, and that which renders them just -and true, is, that doubting necessarily implies _some_ degree of -evidence for that, of which we doubt. For no person would be in doubt -concerning the truth of a number of facts so and so circumstanced, -which should accidentally come into his thoughts, and of which he had -no evidence at all. And though in the case of an even chance, and -where consequently we were in doubt, we should in common language say, -that we had no evidence at all for either side; yet that situation -of things, which renders it an even chance and no more, that such an -event will happen, renders this case equivalent to all others, where -there is such evidence on both sides of a question,[246] as leaves -the mind in doubt concerning the truth. Indeed in all these cases, -there is no more evidence on one side than on the other; but there is -(what is equivalent to) much more for either, than for the truth of a -number of facts, which come into one’s thoughts at random. Thus, in -all these cases, doubt as much presupposes evidence, in lower degrees, -as belief presupposes higher, and certainty higher still. Any one, -who will a little attend to the nature of evidence, will easily carry -this observation on, and see, that between no evidence at all, and -that degree of it which affords ground of doubt, there are as many -intermediate degrees, as there are, between that degree which is the -ground of doubt, and demonstration. And though we have not faculties -to distinguish these degrees of evidence with any sort of exactness; -yet, in proportion as they are discerned, they ought to influence -our practice. It is as real an imperfection in the moral character, -not to be influenced in practice by a lower degree of evidence when -discerned, as it is in the understanding, not to discern it. And as, -in all subjects which men consider, they discern the lower as well -as higher degrees of evidence, proportionably to their capacity of -understanding; so, in practical subjects, they are influenced in -practice, by the lower as well as higher degrees of it, proportionably -to their fairness and honesty. And as, in proportion to defects in the -understanding, men are unapt to see lower degrees of evidence, are in -danger of overlooking evidence when it is not glaring, and are easily -imposed upon in such cases; so, in proportion to the corruption of -the heart, they seem capable of satisfying themselves with having no -regard in practice to evidence acknowledged to be real, if it be not -overbearing. From these things it must follow, that doubting concerning -religion implies such a degree of evidence for it, as, joined with -the consideration of its importance, unquestionably lays men under the -obligations before mentioned, to have a dutiful regard to it in all -their behavior. - -_Thirdly_, The difficulties in which the evidence of religion is -involved, which some complain of, is no more a just ground of -complaint, than the external circumstances of temptation, which others -are placed in; or than difficulties in the practice of it, after a full -conviction of its truth. Temptations render our state a more improving -state of discipline,[247] than it would be otherwise: as they give -occasion for a more attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, which -confirms and strengthens it more, than an easier or less attentive -exercise of it could. Speculative difficulties are, in this respect, of -the very same nature with these external temptations. For the evidence -of religion not appearing obvious, is to some persons a temptation to -reject it, without any consideration at all; and therefore requires -such an attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, seriously to -consider that evidence, as there would be no occasion for, but for such -temptation. And the supposed doubtfulness of its evidence, after it has -been in some sort considered, affords opportunity to an unfair mind -of explaining away, and deceitfully hiding from itself, that evidence -which it might see; and also for men’s encouraging themselves in vice, -from hopes of impunity, though they do clearly see thus much at least, -that these hopes are uncertain. In like manner the common temptation -to many instances of folly, which end in temporal infamy and ruin, -is the ground for hope of not being detected, and of escaping with -impunity; _i.e._ the doubtfulness of the proof beforehand, that such -foolish behavior will thus end in infamy and ruin. On the contrary, -supposed doubtfulness in the evidence of religion calls for a more -careful and attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, in fairly -yielding themselves up to the proper influence of any real evidence, -though doubtful; and in practising conscientiously all virtue, though -under some uncertainty, whether the government in the universe may -not possibly be such, as that vice may escape with impunity. And in -general, temptation, meaning by this word the lesser allurements to -wrong and difficulties in the discharge of our duty, as well as the -greater ones; temptation, I say, as such and of every kind and degree, -as it calls forth some virtuous efforts, additional to what would -otherwise have been wanting, cannot but be an additional discipline -and improvement of virtue, as well as probation of it in the other -senses of that word.[248] So that the very same account is to be given, -why the evidence of religion should be left in such a manner, as to -require, in some, an attentive, solicitous, perhaps painful exercise of -their understanding about it; as why others should be placed in such -circumstances, as that the practice of its common duties, after a full -conviction of the truth of it, should require attention, solicitude, -and pains: or, why appearing doubtfulness should be permitted to -afford matter of temptation to some; as why external difficulties -and allurements should be permitted to afford matter of temptation -to others. The same account also is to be given, why some should be -exercised with temptations of both these kinds; as why others should be -exercised with the latter in such very high degrees, as some have been, -particularly as the primitive Christians were. - -Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing, that the speculative -difficulties, in which the evidence of religion is involved, may make -even the principal part of some persons’ trial. For as the chief -temptations of the generality of the world are the ordinary motives -to injustice, or unrestrained pleasure, or to live in the neglect of -religion, from that frame of mind which renders many persons almost -without feeling as to any thing distant, or which is not the object of -their senses; so there are other persons without this shallowness of -temper, persons of a deeper sense as to what is invisible and future; -who not only see, but have a general practical feeling, that what is to -come will be present, and that things are not less real for their not -being the objects of sense; and who, from their natural constitution of -body and of temper, and from their external condition, may have small -temptations to behave ill, small difficulty in behaving well, in the -common course of life. Now when these latter persons have a distinct -full conviction of me truth of religion, without any possible doubts -or difficulties, the practice of it is to them unavoidable, unless -they do a constant violence to their own minds; and religion is scarce -any more a discipline to them, than it is to creatures in a state -of perfection. Yet these persons may possibly stand in need of moral -discipline and exercise, in a higher degree than they would have by -such an easy practice of religion. Or it may be requisite, for reasons -unknown to us, that they should give some further manifestation[249] -what is their moral character, to the creation of God, than such -a practice of it would be. Thus in the great variety of religious -situations in which men are placed, what constitutes, what chiefly and -peculiarly constitutes, the probation, in all senses, of some persons, -may be the difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved: -and their principal and distinguished trial may be, how they will -behave under and with respect to these difficulties. Circumstances in -men’s situation in their temporal capacity, analogous in good measure -to this respecting religion, are to be observed. We find some persons -are placed in such a situation in the world, as that their chief -difficulty with regard to conduct, is not the doing what is prudent -when it is known; for this, in numberless cases, is as easy as the -contrary: but to some the principal exercise is, recollection and being -upon their guard against deceits, the deceits suppose of those about -them; against false appearances of reason and prudence. To persons in -some situations, the principal exercise with respect to conduct is, -attention in order to inform themselves what is proper, what is really -the reasonable and prudent part to act. - -[_Fourthly._] As I have hitherto gone upon supposition, that men’s -dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion is not owing to their -neglects or prejudices; it must be added, on the other hand, in all -common reason, and as what the truth of the case plainly requires -should be added, that such dissatisfaction possibly may be owing to -those, possibly may be men’s own fault. For, - -If there are any persons, who never set themselves heartily and in -earnest to be informed in religion: if there are any, who secretly -wish it may not prove true; and are less attentive to evidence than to -difficulties, and more to objections than to what is said in answer to -them: these persons will scarce be thought in a likely way of seeing -the evidence of religion, though it were most certainly true, and -capable of being ever so fully proved. If any accustom themselves to -consider this subject in the way of mirth and sport: if they attend -to forms and representations, and inadequate manners of expression, -instead of the real things intended by them: (for signs often can be -no more than inadequately expressive of the things signified:) or if -they substitute human errors in the room of divine truth; why may -not all, or any of these things, hinder some men from seeing that -evidence, which really is seen by others; as a like turn of mind, with -respect to matters of common speculation and practice, does, we find -by experience, hinder them from attaining that knowledge and right -understanding, in matters of common speculation and practice, which -more fair and attentive minds attain to? And the effect will be the -same, whether their neglect of seriously considering the evidence of -religion, and their indirect behavior with regard to it, proceed from -mere carelessness, or from the grosser vices; or whether it be owing -to this, that forms and figurative manners of expression, as well as -errors, administer occasions of ridicule, when the things intended, and -the truth itself, would not. Men may indulge a ludicrous turn so far -as to lose all sense of conduct and prudence in worldly affairs, and -even, as it seems, to impair their faculty of reason. And in general, -levity, carelessness, passion, and prejudice _do_ hinder us from being -rightly informed, with respect to common things: and they _may_, in -like manner, and perhaps, in some further providential manner, with -respect to moral and religious subjects: may hinder evidence from being -laid before us, and from being seen when it is. The Scripture[250] -does declare, that every one _shall not understand_. And it makes no -difference, by what providential conduct this comes to pass: whether -the evidence of Christianity was, originally and with design, put and -left so, as that those who are desirous of evading moral obligations -should not see it; and that honest-minded persons should: or, whether -it comes to pass by any other means. - -Further: [_Fifthly._] The general proof of natural religion and of -Christianity does, I think, lie level to common men: even those, the -greatest part of whose time, from childhood to old age, is taken -up with providing for themselves and their families the common -conveniences, perhaps necessaries, of life: those I mean, of this -rank, who ever think at all of asking after proof, or attending to it. -Common men, were they as much in earnest about religion, as about their -temporal affairs, are capable of being convinced upon real evidence, -that there is a God who governs the world: and they feel themselves to -be of a moral nature, and accountable creatures. And as Christianity -entirely falls in with this their natural sense of things, so they are -capable, not only of being persuaded, but of being made to see, that -there is evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of it, and many -appearing completions of prophecy. - -This proof, though real and conclusive, is liable to objections, -and may be run up into difficulties; which however persons who are -capable not only of talking of, but of really seeing, are capable -also of seeing through: _i.e._ not of clearing up and answering them, -so as to satisfy their curiosity, for of such knowledge we are not -capable with respect to any one thing in nature; but capable of seeing -that the proof is not lost in these difficulties, or destroyed by -these objections. But then a thorough examination into religion with -regard to these objections, which cannot be the business of every -man, is a matter of pretty large compass, and, from the nature of it, -requires some knowledge, as well as time and attention; to see, how -the evidence comes out, upon balancing one thing with another, and -what, upon the whole, is the amount of it. If persons who pick up -these objections from others, and take for granted they are of weight, -upon the word of those from whom they received them, or, by often -retailing of them, come to see or fancy they see them to be of weight; -will not prepare themselves for such an examination, with a competent -degree of knowledge; or will not give that time and attention to the -subject, which, from the nature of it, is necessary for attaining such -information: in this case, they must remain in doubtfulness, ignorance, -or error: in the same way as they must, with regard to common -sciences, and matters of common life, if they neglect the necessary -means of being informed in them. - -Perhaps it will still be objected, that if a prince or common master -were to send directions to a servant, he would take care, that they -should always bear the certain marks, who they came from, and that -their sense should be always plain: so as that there should be no -possible doubt if he could help it, concerning the authority or meaning -of them. The proper answer to all this kind of objections is, that, -wherever the fallacy lies, it is even certain we cannot argue thus with -respect to Him who is the Governor of the world: and that he does not -afford us such information, with respect to our temporal affairs and -interests, experience abundantly shows. - -However, there is a full answer to this objection, from the very nature -of religion. The reason why a prince would give his directions in this -plain manner is, that he absolutely desires an external action done, -without concerning himself with the motive or principle upon which it -is done: _i.e._ he regards only the external event, or the thing’s -being done; and not at all, properly speaking, the doing of it, or the -action. Whereas the whole of morality and religion consisting merely in -action itself, there is no sort of parallel between the cases. But if -the prince be supposed to regard only the action; _i.e._ only to desire -to exercise, or in any sense prove, the understanding or loyalty of a -servant; he would not always give his orders in such a plain manner. -It may be proper to add, that the will of God, respecting morality and -religion, may be considered either as absolute, or as only conditional. -If it be absolute, it can only be thus, that we should act virtuously -in such given circumstances; not that we should be brought to act -so, by this changing of our circumstances. And if God’s will be thus -absolute, then it is in our power, in the highest and strictest sense, -to do or to contradict his will; which is a most weighty consideration. -Or his will may be considered only as conditional, that if we act -so and so, we shall be rewarded: if otherwise, punished: of which -conditional will of the Author of nature, the whole constitution of it -affords most certain instances. - -Upon the whole: that we are in a state of religion necessarily -implies, that we are in a state of probation: and the credibility -of our being at all in such a state being admitted, there seems no -peculiar difficulty in supposing our probation to be, just as it -is, in those respects which are above objected against. There seems -no pretence, from _the reason of the thing_, to say, that the trial -cannot equitably be any thing, but whether persons will act suitably -to certain information, or such as admits no room for doubt; so as -that there can be no danger of miscarriage, but either from their not -attending to what they certainly know, or from overbearing passion -hurrying them on to act contrary to it. For, since ignorance and doubt, -afford scope for probation in all senses, as really as intuitive -conviction or certainty; and since the two former are to be put to -the same account as difficulties in practice; men’s moral probation -may also be, whether they will take due care to inform themselves by -impartial consideration, and afterwards whether they will act as the -case requires, upon the evidence which they have, however doubtful. -And this, we find by _experience_, is frequently our probation,[251] -in our temporal capacity. For, the information which we want with -regard to our worldly interests is by no means always given us of -course, without any care of our own. And we are greatly liable to -self-deceit from inward secret prejudices, and also to the deceits of -others. So that to be able to judge what is the prudent part, often -requires much and difficult consideration. Then after we have judged -the very best we can, the evidence upon which we must act, if we will -live and act at all, is perpetually doubtful to a very high degree. -And the constitution and course of the world in fact is such, as that -want of impartial consideration what we have to do, and venturing -upon extravagant courses because it is doubtful what will be the -consequence, are often naturally, _i.e._ providentially, altogether -as fatal, as misconduct occasioned by heedless inattention to what we -certainly know, or disregarding it from overbearing passion. - -Several of the observations here made may well seem strange, perhaps -unintelligible, to many good men. But if the persons for whose sake -they are made think so, (persons who object as above, and throw off all -regard to religion under pretence of want of evidence;) I desire them -to consider again, whether their thinking so be owing to any thing -unintelligible in these observations, or to their own not having such -a sense of religion and serious solicitude about it, as even their -state of scepticism does in all reason require? It ought to be forced -upon the reflection of these persons, that our nature and condition -necessarily require us, in the daily course of life, to act upon -evidence much lower than what is commonly called probable: to guard, -not only against what we fully believe will, but also against what we -think it supposable may, happen; and to engage in pursuits when the -probability is greatly against success, if it even be credible, that -possibly we may succeed in them. - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - -THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY. - - -The presumptions against revelation, and objections against the general -scheme of Christianity, and particular things relating to it, being -removed, there remains to be considered, what positive evidence we -have for the truth of it; chiefly in order to see, what the analogy -of nature suggests with regard to that evidence, and the objections -against it: or to see what is, and is allowed to be, the plain -natural rule of judgment and of action, in our temporal concerns, in -cases where we have the same kind of evidence, and the same kind of -objections against it, that we have in the case before us. - -In the evidence of Christianity there seem to be several things of -great weight, not reducible to the head, either of miracles, or the -completion of prophecy, in the common acceptation of the words. But -these two are its direct and fundamental proofs: and those other -things, however considerable they are, yet ought never to be urged -apart from its direct proofs, but always to be joined with them. Thus -the evidence of Christianity will be a long series of things, reaching, -as it seems, from the beginning of the world to the present time, of -great variety and compass, taking in both the direct and also the -collateral, proofs, and making up, all of them together, one argument. -The conviction arising from this kind of proof may be compared to -what they call _the effect_, in architecture or other works of art; -a result from a great number of things, so and so disposed, and taken -into one view. I shall therefore, _first_, make some observations -relating to miracles, and the appearing completions of prophecy; and -consider what analogy suggests, in answer to the objections brought -against this evidence. And, _secondly_, I shall endeavor to give some -account of the general argument now mentioned, consisting both of the -direct and collateral evidence, considered as making up one argument: -this being the kind of proof, upon which we determine most questions -of difficulty, concerning common facts, alleged to have happened, or -seeming likely to happen; especially questions relating to conduct. - -_First_, I shall make some observations upon the direct proof of -Christianity from miracles and prophecy, and upon the objections -alleged against it.[252] - -I. Now the following observations relating to the _historical evidence -of miracles_ wrought in attestation of Christianity appear to be of -great weight. - -1. The Old Testament affords us the same historical evidence of the -miracles of Moses and of the prophets, as of the common civil history -of Moses and the kings of Israel; or, as of the affairs of the Jewish -nation. And the _Gospels_ and _the Acts_ afford us the same historical -evidence of the miracles of Christ and the apostles, as of the common -matters related in them. This indeed could not have been affirmed by -any reasonable man, if the authors of these books, like many other -historians, had appeared to aim at an entertaining manner of writing, -and hence interspersed miracles in their works, at proper distances -and upon proper occasions. These might have animated a dull relation, -amused the reader, and engaged his attention. And the same account -would naturally have been given of them, as of the speeches and -descriptions given by such authors: the same account, in a manner, as -is to be given, why the poets make use of wonders and prodigies. But -the facts, both miraculous and natural, in Scripture, are related in -plain unadorned narratives, and both of them appear, in all respects, -to stand upon the same foot of historical evidence.[253] - -Further: some parts of Scripture, containing an account of miracles -fully sufficient to prove the truth of Christianity, are quoted as -genuine, from the age in which they are said to be written, down to -the present: and no other parts of them, material in the present -question, are omitted to be quoted in such manner, as to afford any -sort of proof of their not being genuine. And, as common history, when -called in question in any instance, may often be greatly confirmed by -contemporary or subsequent events more known and acknowledged; and as -the common Scripture history, like many others, is thus confirmed; -so likewise is the miraculous history of it, not only in particular -instances, but in general. For, the establishment of the Jewish and -Christian religions, which were events contemporary with the miracles -related to be wrought in attestation of both, or subsequent to them, -these events are just what we should have _expected_, upon supposition -such miracles were really wrought to attest the truth of those -religions. These miracles are a satisfactory account of those events: -of which no other satisfactory account can be given; nor any account at -all, but what is merely imaginary and invented. - -It is to be added, that the most obvious, the most easy and direct -account of this history, how it came to be written, and to be received -in the world as a true history, is that it really is so; nor can -any other account of it be easy and direct. Now, though an account, -not at all obvious, but very far-fetched and indirect, may be and -often is, the true account of a matter, yet it cannot be admitted on -the authority of its being asserted. Mere guess, supposition, and -possibility, when opposed to historical evidence, prove nothing, but -that historical evidence is not demonstrative. - -The just consequence from all this, I think is, that the Scripture -history in general is to be admitted as an authentic genuine history, -till something positive be alleged sufficient to invalidate it. No -man will deny the consequence to be, that it cannot be rejected, or -thrown by as of no authority, till it can be proved to be of none; even -though the evidence now mentioned for its authority were doubtful. This -evidence may be confronted by historical evidence on the other side, -if there be any: or general incredibility in the things related, or -inconsistence in the general turn of the history, would prove it to be -of no authority. But since, upon the face of the matter, upon a first -and general view, the _appearance_ is, that it is an authentic history, -it cannot be determined to be fictitious, without some proof that it is -so. The following observations in support of these, and coincident with -them, will greatly confirm the historical evidence for the truth of -Christianity. - -2. The Epistles of Paul, from the nature of epistolary writing, and -moreover from several of them being written, not to particular persons -but to churches, carry in them evidences of their being genuine, beyond -what can be in a mere historical narrative, left to the world at -large. This evidence,[254] joined with that which they have in common -with the rest of the New Testament, seems not to leave so much as any -particular pretence for denying their genuineness, considered as an -ordinary matter of fact, or of criticism: I say _particular_ pretence, -for _denying_ it; because any single fact, of such a kind and such -antiquity, may have _general doubts_ raised concerning it, from the -very nature of human affairs and human testimony. There is also to be -mentioned a distinct and particular evidence of the genuineness of the -epistle chiefly referred to here, the first to the Corinthians; from -the manner in which it is quoted by Clemens Romanus, in an epistle of -his own to that church.[255] Now these epistles afford a proof of -Christianity, detached from all others, which is, I think, a thing of -weight; and also a proof of a nature and kind peculiar to itself. For, - -In them the author declares, that he received the Gospel in general, -and the institution of the Communion in particular, not from the rest -of the apostles, or jointly together with them, but alone, from Christ -himself; whom he declares likewise, conformably to the history in the -Acts, that he saw after his ascension.[256] So that the testimony of -Paul is to be considered, as detached from that of the rest of the -apostles. - -He declares further, that he was endued with a power of working -miracles, as what was publicly known to those very people, speaks of -frequent and great variety of miraculous gifts as then subsisting in -those very churches, to which he was writing; which he was reproving -for several irregularities, and where he had personal opposers. He -mentions these gifts incidentally, in the most easy manner, and without -effort; by way of reproof to those who had them, for their indecent -use of them; and by way of depreciating them, in comparison of moral -virtues. In short he speaks to these churches, of these miraculous -powers, in the manner any one would speak to another of a thing, which -was as familiar, and as much known in common to them both, as any thing -in the world.[257] And this, as hath been observed by several persons, -is surely a very considerable thing. - -3. It is an acknowledged historical fact, that Christianity offered -itself to the world, and demanded to be received, upon the allegation, -(_i.e._ as unbelievers would speak, upon the pretence,) of miracles, -publicly wrought to attest the truth of it, in such an age; and -that it was actually received by great numbers in that very age, -and upon the professed belief of the reality of these miracles. And -Christianity, including the dispensation of the Old Testament, seems -distinguished by this from all other religions. I mean, that this -does not _appear_ to be the case with regard to any other; for surely -it will not be supposed to lie upon any person, to prove by positive -historical evidence, that it was not. It does in no sort appear that -Mahometanism was first received in the world upon the foot of supposed -miracles,[258] _i.e._ public ones:[259] for, as revelation is itself -miraculous, all pretence to it must necessarily imply some pretence -of miracles. And it is a known fact, that it was immediately, at the -very first, propagated by other means. And as particular institutions, -whether in Paganism or Popery, said to be confirmed by miracles _after_ -those institutions had obtained, are not to the purpose: so, were there -what might be called historical proof, that any of them were introduced -by a supposed divine command, believed to be attested by miracles; -these would not be in any wise parallel. For single things of this sort -are easy to be accounted for, after parties are formed, and have power -in their hands; and the leaders of them are in veneration with the -multitude; and political interests are blended with religious claims, -and religious distinctions. But _before_ any thing of this kind, for a -few persons, and those of the lowest rank, all at once, to bring over -such great numbers to a new religion, and get it to be received upon -the particular evidence of miracles; this is quite another thing. - -I think it will be allowed by any fair adversary, that the fact -now mentioned, taking in all the circumstances, is peculiar to -the Christian religion. However, the fact itself is allowed, that -Christianity obtained, _i.e._ was professed to be received in the -world, upon the belief of miracles, immediately in the age in which -it is said those miracles were wrought: or that this is what its -first converts would have alleged, as the reason for their embracing -it. It is not to be supposed that such numbers of men, in the most -distant parts of the world, should forsake the religion of their -country, in which they had been educated; separate themselves from -their friends, particularly in their festival shows and solemnities, -to which the common people are so greatly addicted, and which were of -a nature to engage them much more, than any thing of that sort among -us: and embrace a religion, which could not but expose them to many -inconveniences, and indeed must have been a giving up the world in a -great degree, even from the very first, and before the empire engaged -in form against them: it cannot be supposed, that such numbers should -make so great, and to say the least, so inconvenient a change in their -whole institution of life, unless they were really convinced of the -truth of those miracles, upon the knowledge or belief of which they -professed to make it. And it will, I suppose, readily be acknowledged, -that the generality of the first converts to Christianity must have -believed them: that as by becoming Christians they declared to the -world, they were satisfied of the truth of those miracles; so this -declaration was to be credited. And this their testimony is the same -kind of evidence for those miracles, as if they had put it in writing, -and these writings had come down to us. And it is real evidence, -because it is of facts, which they had capacity and full opportunity to -inform themselves of. - -It is also distinct from the direct or express historical evidence, -though it is of the same kind: and would be allowed to be distinct in -all cases. For were a fact expressly related by one or more ancient -historians, and disputed in after ages; that this fact is acknowledged -to have been _believed_ by great numbers of the age in which the -historian says it was done, would be allowed an additional proof of -such fact, quite distinct from the express testimony of the historian. -The credulity of mankind is acknowledged: and the suspicions of mankind -ought to be acknowledged too; and their backwardness even to believe, -and greater still to practise, what makes against their interest. And -it must particularly be remembered, that education, and prejudice, and -authority, were against Christianity, in the age I am speaking of. So -that the immediate conversion of such numbers is a real presumption -of somewhat more than human in this matter.[260] I say presumption, -for it is not alleged as a proof alone and by itself. Nor need any one -of the things mentioned in this chapter be considered as a proof by -itself: and yet all of them together may be one of the strongest.[261] - -Upon the whole: as there is large historical evidence, both direct and -circumstantial, of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity, -collected by those who have writ upon the subject; it lies upon -unbelievers to show why this evidence is not to be credited. This way -of speaking is, I think, just; and what persons who write in defence -of religion naturally fall into. Yet, in a matter of such unspeakable -importance, the proper question is, not whom it lies upon, according to -the rules of argument, to maintain or confute objections: but whether -there really are any, against this evidence, sufficient, in reason, to -destroy the credit of it. However, unbelievers seem to take upon them -the part of showing that there are. - -They allege, that numberless enthusiastic people, in different ages -and countries, expose themselves to the same difficulties which the -primitive Christians did; and are ready to give up their lives for the -most idle follies imaginable. It is not very clear, to what purpose -this objection is brought. For surely, every one, in every case, must -distinguish between opinions and facts. And though testimony is no -proof of enthusiastic opinions, or of any _opinion_ at all; yet it -is allowed, in all other cases, to be a proof of _facts_. A person’s -laying down his life in attestation of facts or of opinions, is the -strongest proof of his believing them. And if the apostles and their -contemporaries did believe the facts, in attestation of which they -exposed themselves to sufferings and death; this their belief, or -rather knowledge, must be a proof of those facts: for they were such -as came under the observation of their senses. And though it is not of -equal weight, yet it is of weight, that the martyrs of the next age, -notwithstanding they were not eye-witnesses of those facts, as were -the apostles and their contemporaries, had, however, full opportunity -to inform themselves whether they were true or not, and gave equal -proof of their believing them to be true. - -But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the evidence of testimony -even for facts, in matters relating to religion: some seem to think it -totally and absolutely destroys the evidence of testimony upon this -subject. The powers of enthusiasm, and of diseases too, which operate -in a like manner, are indeed very wonderful, in particular instances. -But if great numbers of men, not appearing in any peculiar degree weak, -nor under any peculiar suspicion of negligence, affirm that they saw -and heard such things plainly, with their eyes and their ears, and are -admitted to be in earnest; such testimony is evidence of the strongest -kind we can have, for any matter of fact. Possibly it may be overcome, -strong as it is, by incredibility in the things thus attested, or by -contrary testimony. And in an instance where one thought it was so -overcome, it might be just to consider, how far such evidence could be -accounted for by enthusiasm; for it seems as if no other imaginable -account were to be given of it. But till such incredibility be shown, -or contrary testimony produced, it cannot surely be expected, that so -far-fetched, so indirect and wonderful an account of such testimony, as -that of enthusiasm must be; an account so strange, that the generality -of mankind can scarce be made to understand what is meant by it; it -cannot, I say, be expected that such an account will be admitted of -such evidence; when there is this direct, easy, and obvious account of -it, that people really saw and heard a thing not incredible, which they -affirm, sincerely and with full assurance, they did see and hear. - -Granting then that enthusiasm is not (strictly speaking) an absurd, -but a possible account of such testimony, it is manifest, that the -very mention of it goes upon the previous supposition, that the things -so attested are incredible: and therefore need not be considered, -till they are shown to be so. Much less need it be considered, after -the contrary has been proved. And I think it has been proved, to full -satisfaction, that there is no incredibility in a revelation, in -general; or in such a one as the Christian, in particular. However, as -religion is supposed peculiarly liable to enthusiasm, it may just be -observed, that prejudices almost without number, and without name, -such as romance, affection, humor, a desire to engage attention, or -to surprise, party spirit, custom, little competitions, unaccountable -likings and dislikings; these influence men strongly in common matters. -And as these prejudices are often scarce know a or reflected upon -by the persons themselves who are influenced by them, they are to -be considered as influences of a like kind to enthusiasm. Yet human -testimony, in common matters, is naturally and justly believed, -notwithstanding. - -It is intimated further, in a more refined way of observation, that -though it should be proved, that the apostles and first Christians -could not, in some respects, be deceived themselves, and in other -respects, cannot be thought to have intended to impose upon the world, -yet it will not follow that their general testimony is to be believed, -though truly handed down to us: because they might still in part, -_i.e._ in other respects, be deceived themselves, and in part also -designedly impose upon others; which, it is added, is a thing very -credible, from that mixture of real enthusiasm, and real knavery, to be -met with in the same characters.[262] - -I must confess, I think the matter of fact contained in this -observation upon mankind is not to be denied; and that something -very much akin to it is often supposed in Scripture as a very common -case, and most severely reproved. But it were to have been expected, -that persons capable of applying this observation as applied in -the objection, might also frequently have met with the like mixed -character, in instances where religion was quite out of the case. -The thing plainly is, that mankind are naturally endued with reason, -or a capacity of distinguishing between truth and falsehood; and as -naturally they are endued with veracity, or a regard to truth in what -they say: but from many occasions they are liable to be prejudiced and -biassed and deceived themselves, and capable of intending to deceive -others, in every degree: insomuch that, as we are all liable to be -deceived by prejudice, so likewise it seems to be not an uncommon -thing, for persons who, from their regard to truth, would not invent -a lie entirely without any foundation at all, to propagate it with -heightening circumstances, after it is once invented and set a-going. -And others, though they would not _propagate_ a lie, yet, which is a -lower degree of falsehood, will let it pass without contradiction. But -notwithstanding all this, _human testimony_ remains still a natural -ground of assent; and this assent a natural principle of action. - -It is objected further, that however it has happened, the _fact_ -is, that mankind have, in different ages, been strangely deluded -with pretences to miracles and wonders. But it is by no means to be -admitted, that they have been oftener, or are at all more liable to be -deceived by these than by other pretences. - -It is added, that there is a very considerable degree of historical -evidence for miracles, which are, on all hands, acknowledged to be -fabulous. But suppose there were even _the like_ historical evidence -for these, to what there is for those alleged in proof of Christianity, -which yet is in no wise allowed, but suppose this; the consequence -would not be, that the evidence of the latter is not to be admitted. -Nor is there a man in the world, who in common cases, would conclude -thus. For what would such a conclusion really amount to but this, that -evidence, confuted by contrary evidence, or any way overbalanced, -destroys the credibility of other evidence, neither confuted nor -overbalanced? To argue that because there is, if there were, like -evidence from testimony, for miracles acknowledged false, as for those -in attestation of Christianity, therefore the evidence in the latter -case is not to be credited; this is the same as to argue, that if two -men of equally good reputation had given evidence in different cases -no way connected, and one of them had been convicted of perjury, this -confuted the testimony of the other! - -Upon the whole then, the general observation, that human creatures -are so liable to be deceived, from enthusiasm in religion, and -principles equivalent to enthusiasm in common matters, and in both from -negligence; and that they are so capable of dishonestly endeavoring -to deceive others; this does indeed weaken the evidence of testimony -in all cases, but does not destroy it in any. And these things will -appear, to different men, to weaken the evidence of testimony, in -different degrees: in degrees proportionable to the observations they -have made, or the notions they have any way taken up, concerning the -weakness and negligence and dishonesty of mankind; or concerning the -powers of enthusiasm, and prejudices equivalent to it. But it seems -to me, that people do not know what they say, who affirm these things -to destroy the evidence from testimony which we have, of the truth of -Christianity. Nothing can destroy the evidence of testimony in any -case, but a proof or probability, that persons are not competent judges -of the facts to which they give testimony; or that they are actually -under some indirect influence in giving it, in such particular case. -Till this be made out, the _natural_ laws of human actions require, -that testimony be admitted. It can never be sufficient to overthrow -direct historical evidence, indolently to say, that there are so many -principles, from whence men are liable to be deceived themselves, -and disposed to deceive others, especially in matters of religion, -that one knows not what to believe. And it is surprising persons can -help reflecting, that this very manner of speaking supposes they are -not satisfied that there is nothing in the evidence, of which they -speak thus; or that they can avoid observing, if they do make this -reflection, that it is on such a subject, a very material one.[263] - -Over against all these objections is to be set the _importance_ of -Christianity, as what must have engaged the attention of its first -converts, so as to have rendered them less liable to be deceived from -carelessness, than they would in common matters; and likewise the -strong _obligations to veracity_, which their religion laid them under: -so that the first and most obvious presumption is, that they could not -be deceived themselves nor deceive others. And this presumption, in -this degree, is peculiar to the testimony we have been considering. - -In argument, assertions are nothing in themselves, and have an air of -positiveness which sometimes is not very easy: yet they are necessary, -and necessary to be repeated; in order to connect a discourse, and -distinctly to lay before the view of the reader, what is proposed -to be proved, and what is left as proved. Now the conclusion from -the foregoing observations is, I think, beyond all doubt, this: -that unbelievers must be forced to admit the external evidence for -Christianity, _i.e._ the proof of miracles wrought to attest it, to be -of real weight and very considerable; though they cannot allow it to -be sufficient, to convince them of the reality of those miracles. And -as they must, in all reason, admit this; so it seems to me, that upon -consideration they would, in fact, admit it; those of them, I mean, who -know any thing at all of the matter; in like manner as persons, in many -cases, own they see strong evidence from testimony, for the truth of -things, which yet they cannot be convinced are true: cases, suppose, -where there is contrary testimony; or things which they think, whether -with or without reason, to be incredible. But there is no testimony -contrary to that which we have been considering: and it has been fully -proved, that there is no incredibility in Christianity in general, or -in any part of it. - -II. As to the evidence for Christianity from prophecy, I shall only -make some few general observations, which are suggested by the analogy -of nature; _i.e._ by the acknowledged natural rules of judging in -common matters, concerning evidence of a like kind to this from -prophecy. - -1. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of a prophecy does -not, in any degree, invalidate the proof of foresight, arising from -the appearing completion of those other parts, which are understood. -For the case is evidently the same, as if those parts which are not -understood were lost, or not written at all, or written in an unknown -tongue. Whether this observation be commonly attended to or not, it is -so evident, that one can scarce bring oneself to set down an instance -in common matters, to exemplify it. However, suppose a writing, partly -in cipher, and partly in plain words at length; and that in the part -one understood, there appeared mention of several known facts; it would -never come into any man’s thoughts to imagine, that if he understood -the whole, perhaps he might find, that those facts were not in reality -known by the writer. Indeed, both in this example and in the thing -intended to be exemplified by it, our not understanding the whole (the -whole, suppose, of a sentence or a paragraph) might sometimes occasion -a doubt, whether one understood the literal meaning of such a part: but -this comes under another consideration. - -For the same reason, though a man should be incapable, for want of -learning, or opportunities of inquiry, or from not having turned -his studies this way, even so much as to judge whether particular -prophecies have been throughout completely fulfilled; yet he may see, -in general, that they have been fulfilled to such a degree, as, upon -very good ground, to be convinced of foresight more than human in such -prophecies, and of such events being intended by them. For the same -reason also, though, by means of the deficiencies in civil history, -and the different accounts of historians, the most learned should not -be able to make out to satisfaction, that such parts of the prophetic -history have been minutely and throughout fulfilled; yet a very strong -_proof of foresight_ may arise, from that general completion of them, -which is made out. As much perhaps, as the giver of prophecy intended -should ever be afforded by such parts of prophecy. - -2. A long series of prophecy being applicable to such and such events, -is itself a proof that it was intended of them: as the rules by which -we naturally judge and determine, in common cases parallel to this, -will show.[264] This observation I make in answer to the common -objection against the application of the prophecies, that, considering -each of them distinctly by itself, it does not at all appear, that they -were intended of those particular events to which they are applied by -Christians; and therefore it is to be supposed, that if they meant any -thing, they were intended of other events unknown to us, and not of -these at all. - -Now there are two kinds of writing, which bear a great resemblance to -prophecy, with respect to the matter before us: the mythological, and -the satirical, where the satire is to a certain degree concealed. And -a man might be assured, that he understood what an author intended by -a fable or parable related without any application or moral, merely -from seeing it to be easily capable of such application, and that such -a moral might naturally be deduced from it. And he might be fully -assured, that such persons and events were intended in a satirical -writing, merely from its being applicable to them. And, agreeable to -the last observation, he might be in a good measure satisfied of it, -though he were not enough informed in affairs, or in the story of such -persons to understand half the satire. For, his satisfaction that -he understood the meaning, the intended meaning, of these writings, -would be greater or less in proportion as he saw the general turn -of them to be capable of such application; and in proportion to the -number of particular things capable of it. And thus, if a long series -of prophecy is applicable to the present state of the church, and to -the political situations of the kingdoms of the world, some thousand -years after these prophecies were delivered; and a long series of -prophecy delivered before the coming of Christ is applicable to him; -these things are in themselves a proof, that the prophetic history was -intended of him, and of those events: in proportion as the general turn -of it is capable of such application, and to the number and variety of -particular prophecies capable of it. And though, in all just way of -consideration, the obvious completion of prophecies is to be allowed to -be thus explanatory of, and to determine, their meaning; yet it is to -be remembered further, that the ancient Jews applied the prophecies to -a Messiah before his coming,[265] in much the same manner as Christians -do now: and that the primitive Christians interpreted the prophecies -respecting the state of the church and of the world in the last ages, -in the sense which the event seems to confirm and verify. From these -things it may be made appear: - -3. That the showing even to a high probability, if that could be, -that the prophets thought of some other events, in such and such -predictions, and not those which Christians allege to be completions -of those predictions; or that such and such prophecies are capable of -being applied to other events than those, to which Christians apply -them--that this would not confute or destroy the force of the argument -from prophecy, even with regard to those very instances. For, observe -how this matter really is. If one knew such a person to be the sole -author of such a book, and was certainly assured, or satisfied to any -degree, that one knew the whole of what he intended in it; one should -be assured or satisfied to such degree, that one knew the whole -meaning of that book: for the meaning of a book is nothing but the -meaning of the author. But if one knew a person to have _compiled_ a -book out of memoirs, which he received from another, of vastly superior -knowledge in the subject of it, especially if it were a book full -of great intricacies and difficulties; it would in no wise follow, -that one knew the whole meaning of the book, from knowing the whole -meaning of the compiler: for the original author of them, might have, -and there would be no presumption, in many cases, against supposing -him to have, some further meaning than the compiler saw. To say then -that the Scriptures, and the things contained in them, can have no -other or further meaning than those persons had, who first recited or -wrote them, is evidently saying, that those persons were the original, -proper, and sole authors of those books, _i.e._ that they are not -inspired: which is absurd, while the authority of these books is under -examination; _i.e._ till you have determined they are of no divine -authority at all. Till this be determined, it must in all reason be -supposed, not indeed that they have, (for this is taking for granted -that they are inspired;) but that they may have, some further meaning -than what the compilers saw or understood. And, upon this supposition, -it is supposable also, that this further meaning may be fulfilled. - -Events corresponding to prophecies, interpreted in a different meaning -from that, in which the prophets are supposed to have understood them; -affords in a manner, the same proof, that this different sense was -originally intended, as it would have afforded, if the prophets had -not understood their predictions in the sense it is supposed they did: -because there is no presumption of _their_ sense of them being the -whole sense of them. And it has been already shown, that the apparent -completions of prophecy must be allowed to be explanatory of its -meaning. So that the question is, whether a series of prophecy has -been fulfilled, in a natural or proper, _i.e._ in any real sense of -the words of it. For such completion is equally a proof of foresight -more than human, whether the prophets are, or are not, supposed to have -understood it in a different sense. I say, supposed: for, though I -think it clear, that the prophets did not understand the full meaning -of their predictions, it is another question, how far they thought they -did; and in what sense they understood them. - -Hence may be seen, to how little purpose those persons busy themselves, -who endeavor to prove, that the prophetic history is applicable to -events of the age in which it was written, or of ages before it. -To have proved this, before there was any appearance of a further -completion of it, might have answered some purpose; for it might have -prevented the expectation of any such further completion. Thus could -Porphyry have shown, that some principal parts of the book of Daniel, -for instance the seventh verse of the seventh chapter, which the -Christians interpreted of the latter ages, was applicable to events, -which happened before or about the age of Antiochus Epiphanes; this -might have prevented them from expecting any further completion of -it. And, unless there was then, as I think there must have been, -external evidence concerning that book, more than is come down to -us; such a discovery might have been a stumbling-block in the way -of Christianity itself: considering the authority which our Savior -has given to the book of Daniel, and how much the general scheme of -Christianity presupposes the truth of it. But even this discovery, -had there been any such,[266] would be of very little weight with -reasonable men now; if this passage, thus applicable to events before -the age of Porphyry, appears to be applicable also to events, which -succeeded the dissolution of the Roman empire. I mention this, not at -all as intending to insinuate, that the division of this empire into -ten parts, for it plainly was divided into about that number, were, -alone and by itself, of any moment in verifying the prophetic history: -but only as an example of the thing I am speaking of. Thus upon the -whole, the matter of inquiry evidently must be, as above put, Whether -the prophecies are applicable to Christ, and to the present state of -the world, and of the church; applicable in such a degree, as to imply -foresight: not whether they are _capable_ of any other application. -Though I know no pretence for saying the general turn of them is -capable of any other. - -These observations are, I think, just, and the evidence referred to -in them real: though there may be people who will not accept of such -imperfect information from Scripture. Some too have not integrity and -regard enough to truth, to attend to evidence, which keeps the mind -in doubt, perhaps perplexity, and which is much of a different sort -from what they expected. It plainly requires a degree of modesty and -fairness, beyond what every one has, for a man to say, not to the world -but to himself, that there is a real appearance of great weight in this -matter, though he is not able thoroughly to satisfy himself about it; -but that it shall have its influence upon him, in proportion to its -apparent reality and weight. It is much more easy, and more falls in -with the negligence, presumption, and wilfulness of the generality, to -determine at once, with a decisive air, There is nothing in it. The -prejudices arising from that absolute contempt and scorn, with which -this evidence is treated in the world, I do not mention. For what can -be said to persons, who are weak enough in their understandings to -think this any presumption against it; or, if they do not, are yet weak -enough in their temper to be influenced by such prejudices, upon such a -subject? - -_Secondly_, I shall endeavor to give some account of the general -argument for the truth of Christianity, consisting both of the direct -and circumstantial evidence considered as making up one argument. To -state and examine this argument fully, would be a work much beyond the -compass of this whole treatise; nor is so much as a proper abridgment -of it to be expected here. Yet the present subject requires to have -some brief account of it given. For it is the kind of evidence, upon -which most questions of difficulty, in common practice, are determined: -evidence arising from various coincidences, which support and confirm -each other, and in this manner prove, with more or less certainty, the -point under consideration. I choose to do it also: First, because it -seems to be of the greatest importance, and not duly attended to by -every one, that the proof of revelation is not some direct and express -things only, but a great variety of circumstantial things also; and -that though each of these direct and circumstantial things is indeed -to be considered separately, yet they are afterwards to be joined -together; for that the proper force of the evidence consists in the -result of those several things, considered in their respects to each -other, and united into one view. In the next place, because it seems -to me, that the matters of fact here set down, which are acknowledged -by unbelievers, must be acknowledged by them also to contain together -a degree of evidence of great weight, if they could be brought to -lay these several things before themselves distinctly, and then with -attention consider them together; instead of that cursory thought of -them, to which we are familiarized. For being familiarized to the -cursory thought of things as really hinders the weight of them from -being seen, as from having its due influence upon practice. - -The thing asserted, and the truth of which is to be inquired into, -is this: That over and above our reason and affections, which God -has given us for the information of our judgment and the conduct -of our lives, he has also, by external revelation, given us an -account of himself and his moral government over the world, implying -a future state of rewards and punishments; _i.e._ hath revealed -the system of natural religion: (for natural religion may be -externally[267] revealed by God, as the ignorant may be taught it by -their fellow-creatures)--that God, I say, has given us the evidence -of revelation, as well as the evidence of reason, to ascertain this -moral system; together with an account of a particular dispensation of -Providence, which reason could no way have discovered, and a particular -institution of religion founded on it, for the recovery of mankind out -of their present wretched condition, and raising them to the perfection -and final happiness of their nature. - -This revelation, whether real or supposed, may be considered as wholly -historical. For prophecy is nothing but the history of events before -they come to pass; doctrines also are matters of fact; and precepts -come under the same notion. The general design of Scripture, which -contains in it this revelation, thus considered as historical, may be -said to be, to give us an account of the world in this one single view, -as God’s world: by which it appears essentially distinguished from all -other books, so far as I have found, except such as are copied from -it. It begins with an account of God’s creation of the world, in order -to ascertain, and distinguish from all others, who is the object of -our worship, by what he has done: in order to ascertain, who he is, -concerning whose providence, commands, promises, and threatenings, -this sacred book, all along, treats; [viz.] the Maker and Proprietor -of the world, he whose creatures we are, the God of nature: in order -likewise to distinguish him from the idols of the nations, which are -either imaginary beings, _i.e._ no beings at all; or else part of that -creation, the historical relation of which is here given. And John, not -improbably with an eye to this Mosaic account of the creation, begins -his Gospel with an account of our Savior’s pre-existence, and that _all -things were made by him; and without him, was not any thing made that -was made_:[268] agreeably to the doctrine of Paul, that _God created -all things by Jesus Christ_.[269] This being premised, the Scripture, -taken together, seems to profess to contain a kind of an abridgment of -the history of the world, in the view just now mentioned: that is, a -general account of the condition of religion and its professors, during -the continuance of that apostasy from God, and state of wickedness, -which it everywhere supposes the world to lie in. And this account -of the state of religion carries with it some brief account of the -political state of things, as religion is affected by it. Revelation -indeed considers the common affairs of this world, and what is going -on in it, as a mere scene of distraction; and cannot be supposed to -concern itself with foretelling at what time Rome, or Babylon, or -Greece, or any particular place, should be the most conspicuous seat -of that tyranny and dissoluteness, which all places equally aspire -to be; cannot, I say, be supposed to give any account of this wild -scene for its own sake. But it seems to contain some very general -account of the chief governments of the world, as the general state of -religion has been, is, or shall be, affected by them, from the first -transgression, and during the whole interval of the world’s continuing -in its present state, to a certain future period, spoken of both in -the Old and New Testament, very distinctly, and in great variety of -expression: _The times of the restitution of all things_:[270] when -_the mystery of God shall be finished, as he hath declared to his -servants the prophets_:[271] when _the God of heaven shall set up a -kingdom, which shall never be destroyed: and the kingdom shall not be -left to other people_,[272] as it is represented to be during this -apostasy, but _judgment shall be given to the saints_,[273] and _they -shall reign_:[274] _and the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of -the kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the -saints of the Most High_.[275] - -Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would remark, how great a -length of time the whole relation takes up, near six thousand years -of which are past; and how great a variety of things it treats of; -the natural and moral system or history of the world, including the -time when it was formed, all contained in the very first book, and -evidently written in a rude and unlearned age; and in subsequent -books, the various common and prophetic history, and the particular -dispensation of Christianity. Now all this together gives the largest -scope for criticism; and for the confutation of what is capable of -being confuted, either from reason, or from common history, or from -any inconsistence in its several parts. And it deserves, I think, to -be mentioned, that whereas some imagine the supposed doubtfulness of -the evidence for revelation implies a positive argument that it is not -true; it appears, on the contrary, to imply a positive argument that -it is true. For, could any common relation of such antiquity, extent, -and variety (for in these things the stress of what I am now observing -lies) be proposed to the examination of the world: that it could not, -in an age of knowledge and liberty, be confuted, or shown to have -nothing in it, to the satisfaction of reasonable men; would be thought -a strong presumptive proof of its truth. Indeed it must be a _proof_ -of it, just in proportion to the probability, that if it were false, -it might be shown to be so: which, I think, is scarce pretended to be -shown, but upon principles and in ways of arguing, which have been -clearly obviated.[276] Nor does it at all appear, that any set of men, -who believe natural religion, are of the opinion, that Christianity has -been thus confuted. But to proceed: - -Together with the moral system of the world, the Old Testament contains -a chronological account of the beginning of it, and from thence, an -unbroken genealogy of mankind for many ages before common history -begins; and carried on as much farther as to make up a continued -thread of history, of the length of between three and four thousand -years. It contains an account of God’s making a covenant with a -particular nation, that they should be his people, and he would be -their God, in a peculiar sense; of his often interposing miraculously -in their affairs; giving them the promise, and long after, the -possession, of a particular country; assuring them of the greatest -national prosperity in it, if they would worship him, in opposition -to the idols which the rest of the world worshipped, and obey his -commands; and threatening them with unexampled punishments if they -disobeyed him, and fell into the general idolatry: insomuch that -this one nation should continue to be the observation and the wonder -of all the world. It declares particularly, that _God would scatter -them among all people, from one end of the earth unto the other_; but -that _when they should return unto the Lord their God, he would have -compassion upon them, and gather them from all the nations, whither he -had scattered them_: that _Israel should be saved in the Lord, with an -everlasting salvation; and not be ashamed or confounded world without -end_.[277] And as some of these promises are conditional, others are as -absolute as any thing can be expressed: that the time should come, when -_the people should be all righteous, and inherit the land forever_: -that _though God would make a full end of all nations whither he had -scattered them, yet would he not make a full end of them_: that _he -would bring again the captivity of his people Israel, and plant them -upon their land, and they should be no more pulled up out of their -land_: that _the seed of Israel should not cease from being a nation -forever_.[278] It foretells, that God would raise them up a particular -person, in whom all his promises should finally be fulfilled; the -Messiah, who should be, in a high and eminent sense, their anointed -Prince and Savior. This was foretold in such a manner, as raised a -general expectation of such a person in the nation, as appears from -the New Testament, and is an acknowledged fact; an expectation of his -coming at such a particular time, before any one appeared claiming to -be that person, and when there was no ground for such an expectation, -but from the prophecies: which expectation, therefore, must in all -reason be presumed to be explanatory of those prophecies, if there were -any doubt about their meaning. It seems moreover to foretell, that this -person should be rejected by the nation to whom he had been so long -promised, though he was so much desired by them.[279] And it expressly -foretells, that he should be the Savior of the Gentiles; and that the -completion of the scheme contained in this book, and then begun, and in -its progress, should be something so great, that in comparison with it, -the restoration of the Jews alone would be but of small account. _It is -a light thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes -of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel: I will also give thee -for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be for salvation unto the -end of the earth._ And, _In the last days, the mountain of the Lord’s -house shall be established in the top of the mountains, and shall be -exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow into it--for out of -Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. -And he shall judge among the nations--and the Lord alone shall be -exalted in that day, and the idols he shall utterly abolish._[280] - -The Scripture further contains an account, that at the time the Messiah -was expected, a person rose up in this nation, claiming to be that -Messiah, to be the person to whom all the prophecies referred, and in -whom they should center: that he spent some years in a continued course -of miraculous works; and endued his immediate disciples and followers -with a power of doing the same, as a proof of the truth of that -religion, which he commissioned them to publish: that invested with -this authority and power, they made numerous converts in the remotest -countries, and settled and established his religion in the world; to -the end of which the Scripture professes to give a prophetic account of -the state of this religion among mankind.[281] - -Let us now suppose a person utterly ignorant of history, to have all -this related to him out of the Scripture. Or suppose such an one, -having the Scripture put into his hands, to remark these things in -it, not knowing but that the whole, even its civil history, as well -as the other parts of it, might be, from beginning to end, an entire -invention; and to ask, What truth was in it, and whether the revelation -here related was real, or a fiction? And, instead of a direct answer, -suppose him, all at once, to be told the following confessed facts; and -then to unite them into one view. - -Let him first be told, in how great a degree the profession and -establishment of natural religion, the belief that there is one God -to be worshipped, that virtue is his law, and that mankind shall be -rewarded and punished hereafter, as they obey and disobey it here; in -how very great a degree, I say, the profession and establishment of -this moral system in the world is owing to the revelation, whether -real or supposed, contained in this book: the establishment of this -moral system, even in those countries which do not acknowledge the -proper authority of the Scripture.[282] Let him be told also, what -number of nations do acknowledge its proper authority. Let him then -take in the consideration, of what importance religion is to mankind. -And upon these things he might, I think, truly observe, that this -supposed revelation’s obtaining and being received in the world, with -all the circumstances and effects of it, considered together as one -event, is the most conspicuous and important event in the history of -mankind: that a book of this nature, and thus promulged and recommended -to our consideration, demands, as if by a voice from heaven, to have -its claims most seriously examined; and that, before such examination, -to treat it with any kind of scoffing and ridicule, is an offence -against natural piety. It is to be remembered, that how much soever -the establishment of natural religion in the world is owing to the -Scripture revelation, this does not destroy the proof of religion from -reason, any more than the proof of Euclid’s Elements is destroyed, by -a man’s knowing or thinking, that he should never have seen the truth -of the several propositions contained in it, nor had those propositions -come into his thoughts, but for that mathematician. - -Let such a person as we are speaking of be, in the next place, -informed of the acknowledged antiquity of the first parts of this book; -and that its chronology, its account of the time when the earth, and -the several parts of it, were first peopled with human creatures, is -no way contradicted, but is really confirmed, by the natural and civil -history of the world, collected from common historians, from the state -of the earth, and from the late invention of arts and sciences. - -And as the Scripture contains an unbroken thread of common and civil -history, from the creation to the captivity, for between three and -four thousand years; let the person we are speaking of be told, in the -next place, that this general history, as it is not contradicted, but -confirmed by profane history[283] as much as there would be reason -to expect, upon supposition of its truth; so there is nothing in the -whole history _itself_, to give any reasonable ground of suspicion -of its not being, in the general, a faithful and literally true -genealogy of men, and series of things. I speak here only of the common -Scripture history, or of the course of ordinary events related in it, -as distinguished from miracles, and from the prophetic history. In -all the Scripture narrations of this kind, following events arise out -of foregoing ones, as in all other histories. There appears nothing -related as done in any age, not conformable to the manners of that -age: nothing in the account of a succeeding age, which one would say -could not be true, or was improbable, from the account of things in the -preceding one. There is nothing in the characters, which would raise a -thought of their being feigned; but all the internal marks imaginable -of their being real. It is to be added also, that mere genealogies, -bare narratives of the number of years, which persons called by such -and such names lived, do not carry the face of fiction; perhaps do -carry some presumption of veracity: and all unadorned narratives, which -have nothing to surprise, may be thought to carry somewhat of the like -presumption too. And the domestic and the political history is plainly -credible. There may be incidents in Scripture, which, taken alone in -the naked way they are told, may appear strange; especially to persons -of other manners, temper, education: but there are also incidents of -undoubted truth, in many or most persons’ lives, which, in the same -circumstances, would appear to the full as strange.[284] There may be -mistakes of transcribers, there may be other real or seeming mistakes, -not easy to be particularly accounted for: but there are certainly -no more things of this kind in the Scripture, than what were to have -been expected in books of such antiquity; and nothing, in any wise, -sufficient to discredit the general narrative. - -Now, that a history, claiming to commence from the creation, and -extending in one continued series, through so great a length of time, -and variety of events, should have such appearances of reality and -truth in its whole contexture, is surely a very remarkable circumstance -in its favor. And as all this is applicable to the common history -of the New Testament, so there is a further credibility, and a very -high one, given to it by profane authors: many of these writing of -the same times, and confirming the truth of customs and events, which -are incidentally as well as more purposely mentioned in it. And this -credibility of the common Scripture-history, gives some credibility -to its miraculous history: especially as this is interwoven with the -common, so as that they imply each other, and both together make up one -relation. - -Let it then be more particularly observed to this person, that it is an -acknowledged matter of fact, which is indeed implied in the foregoing -observation, that there was such a nation as the Jews, of the greatest -antiquity, whose government and general polity was founded on the law, -here related to be given them by Moses as from heaven: that natural -religion, with rites additional yet no way contrary to it, was their -established religion, which cannot be said of the Gentile world: and -that their very being as a nation, depended upon their acknowledgment -of one God, the God of the universe. For, suppose in their captivity in -Babylon, they had gone over to the religion of their conquerors, there -would have remained no bond of union, to keep them a distinct people. -And while they were under their own kings, in their own country, a -total apostasy from God would have been the dissolution of their whole -government. They in such a sense nationally acknowledged and worshipped -the Maker of heaven and earth, when the rest of the world were sunk in -idolatry, as rendered them, in fact, the peculiar people of God. This -remarkable establishment and preservation of natural religion among -them, seems to add peculiar credibility to the historical evidence for -the miracles of Moses and the prophets. Because these miracles are a -full satisfactory account of this event, which plainly needs to be -accounted for, and cannot be otherwise. - -Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of history, be acquainted -further, that one claiming to be the Messiah, of Jewish extraction, -rose up at the time when this nation, from the prophecies above -mentioned, expected the Messiah: that he was rejected, as it seemed -to have been foretold he should, by the body of the people, under the -direction of their rulers: that in the course of a very few years, he -was believed on and acknowledged as the promised Messiah, by great -numbers among the Gentiles, agreeably to the prophecies of Scripture, -yet not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles,[285] of which -miracles we have also strong historical evidence; (by which I mean here -no more than must be acknowledged by unbelievers; for let pious frauds -and follies be admitted to weaken, it is absurd to say they destroy -our evidence of miracles wrought in proof of Christianity:)[286] that -this religion approving itself to the reason of mankind, and carrying -its own evidence with it, so far as reason is a judge of its system, -and being no way contrary to reason in those parts of it which require -to be believed upon the mere authority of its Author; that this -religion, I say, gradually spread and supported itself for some hundred -years, not only without any assistance from temporal power, but under -constant discouragements, and often the bitterest persecutions from -it; and then became the religion of the world: that in the mean time -the Jewish nation and government were destroyed in a very remarkable -manner, and the people carried away captive and dispersed through the -most distant countries; in which state of dispersion they have remained -fifteen hundred years: and that they remain a numerous people, united -among themselves, and distinguished from the rest of the world, as they -were in the days of Moses, by the profession of his law; and everywhere -looked upon in a manner, which one scarce knows how distinctly to -express, but in the words of the prophetic account of it, given so -many ages before it came to pass: _Thou shalt become an astonishment, -a proverb, and a byword, among all nations whither the Lord shall lead -thee_.[287] - -The appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews remaining a distinct -people in their dispersion, and the confirmation which this event -appears to give to the truth of revelation, may be thought to be -answered, by their religion’s forbidding them intermarriages with those -of other nations, and prescribing them many peculiarities in their -food, by which they are debarred from incorporating with the people in -whose countries they live. This is not, I think, a satisfactory account -of that which it pretends to account for. But what does it pretend to -account for? The correspondence between this event and the prophecies; -or the coincidence of both, with a long dispensation of Providence, -of a peculiar nature, towards that people? No. It is only the event -itself, which is offered to be thus accounted for: which single event, -taken alone, abstracted from all such correspondence and coincidence, -perhaps would not have appeared miraculous: but that correspondence -and coincidence may be so, though the event itself be supposed not. -Thus the concurrence of our Saviour’s being born at Bethlehem, with a -long foregoing series of prophecy and other coincidences, is doubtless -miraculous; the series of prophecy, and other coincidences, and the -event, being admitted: though the event itself appears to have been -brought about in a natural way; of which, however, no one can be -certain. - -As several of these events seem, in some degree expressly, to have -verified the prophetic history already, so likewise they may be -considered further, as having a peculiar aspect towards the full -completion of it; as affording some presumption that the whole of it -shall, one time or other, be fulfilled. Thus, that the Jews have been -so wonderfully preserved in their long and wide dispersion; which is -indeed the direct fulfilling of some prophecies, but is now mentioned -only as looking forward to somewhat yet to come: that natural religion -came forth from Judea, and spread, in the degree it has done over -the world, before lost in idolatry; which, together with some other -things, have distinguished that very place, in like manner as the -people of it are distinguished: that this great change of religion over -the earth was brought about under the profession and acknowledgment, -that Jesus was the promised Messiah: things of this kind naturally -turn the thoughts of serious men towards the full completion of the -prophetic history, concerning the final restoration of that people; -concerning the establishment of the everlasting kingdom among them, the -kingdom of the Messiah; and the future state of the world, under this -sacred government. Such circumstances and events, compared with these -prophecies, though no completions of them, yet would not, I think, -be spoken of as nothing in the argument, by a person upon his first -being informed of them. They fall in with the prophetic history of -things still future, give it some additional credibility, and have the -appearance of being somewhat in order to the full completion of it. - -Indeed it requires a good degree of knowledge, and great calmness and -consideration, to be able to judge thoroughly of the evidence for the -truth of Christianity, from that part of the prophetic history which -relates to the situation of the kingdoms of the world, and to the state -of the church, from the establishment of Christianity to the present -time. But it appears from a general view of it, to be very material. -And those persons who have thoroughly examined it, and some of them -were men of the coolest tempers, greatest capacities, and least liable -to imputations of prejudice, insist upon it as determinately conclusive. - -[CONCLUSION.] Suppose now a person quite ignorant of history, first -to recollect the passages above mentioned out of Scripture, without -knowing but that the whole was a late fiction, then to be informed -of the correspondent facts now mentioned, and to unite them all into -one view: that the profession and establishment of natural religion -in the world is greatly owing, in different ways, to this book, and -the supposed revelation which it contains; that it is acknowledged to -be of the earliest antiquity; that its chronology and common history -are entirely credible; that this ancient nation, the Jews, of whom it -chiefly treats, appear to have been, in fact, the people of God, in a -distinguished sense; that, as there was a national expectation among -them, raised from the prophecies, of a Messiah to appear at such a -time, so one at this time appeared claiming to be that Messiah; that -he was rejected by this nation, but received by the Gentiles, not upon -the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles; that the religion he taught -supported itself under the greatest difficulties, gained ground, and -at length became the religion of the world; that in the mean time the -Jewish polity was utterly destroyed, and the nation dispersed over the -face of the earth; that notwithstanding this, they have remained a -distinct numerous people for so many centuries, even to this day; which -not only appears to be the express completion of several prophecies -concerning them, but also renders it, as one may speak, a visible and -easy possibility that the promises made to them as a nation, may yet be -fulfilled. - -To these acknowledged truths, let the person we have been supposing -add, as I think he ought, whether every one will allow it or no, the -obvious appearances which there are, of the state of the world, in -other respects besides what relates to the Jews, and of the Christian -church, having so long answered, and still answering to the prophetic -history. Suppose, I say, these facts set over against the things before -mentioned out of the Scripture, and seriously compared with them; -the joint view of both together must, I think, appear of very great -weight to a considerate reasonable person: of much greater indeed, upon -having them first laid before him, than is easy for us, who are so -familiarized to them, to conceive, without some particular attention -for that purpose. - -All these things, and the several particulars contained under them, -require to be distinctly and most thoroughly examined into; that the -weight of each may be judged of, upon such examination, and such -conclusion drawn, as results from their _united force_. But this has -not been attempted here. I have gone no further than to show, that the -general imperfect view of them now given, the confessed historical -evidence for miracles, and the many obvious appearing completions of -prophecy, together with the collateral things[288] here mentioned, and -there are several others of the like sort; that all this together, -which, being fact, must be acknowledged by unbelievers, amounts to -real evidence of somewhat more than human in this matter: evidence -much more important, than careless men, who have been accustomed -only to transient and partial views of it, can imagine; and indeed -abundantly sufficient to act upon. And these things, I apprehend, must -be acknowledged by unbelievers. For though they may say, that the -historical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity, -is not sufficient to convince them, that such miracles were really -wrought: they cannot deny, that there is such historical evidence, -it being a known matter of fact that there is. They may say, the -conformity between the prophecies and events is by accident: but there -are many instances in which such conformity itself cannot be denied. -They may say, with regard to such kind of collateral things as those -above mentioned, that any odd accidental events, without meaning, will -have a meaning found in them by fanciful people: and that such as are -fanciful in any one certain way, will make out a thousand coincidences, -which seem to favor their peculiar follies. Men, I say, may talk -thus: but no one who is serious, can possibly think these things to -be nothing, if he considers the importance of collateral things, and -even of lesser circumstances, in the evidence of probability, as -distinguished in nature, from the evidence of demonstration. In many -cases indeed it seems to require the truest judgment, to determine with -exactness the weight of circumstantial evidence: but it is very often -altogether as convincing, as that which is the most express and direct. - -This general view of the evidence for Christianity, considered as -making one argument, may also serve to recommend to serious persons, -to set down every thing which they think may be of any real weight at -all in proof of it, and particularly the many seeming completions of -prophecy: and they will find, that, judging by the natural rules, by -which we judge of probable evidence in common matters, they amount to -a much higher degree of proof, upon such a _joint review_, than could -be supposed upon considering them separately, at different times; -how strong soever the proof might before appear to them, upon such -separate views of it. For probable proofs, by being added, not only -_increase_ the evidence, but _multiply_ it.[289] Nor should I dissuade -any one from setting down, what he thought made for the contrary -side. But then it is to be remembered, not in order to influence his -judgment, but his practice, that a mistake on one side may be, in its -consequences, much more dangerous, than a mistake on the other. And -what course is most safe, and what most dangerous, will be thought a -very material consideration, when we deliberate, not concerning events, -but concerning conduct in our temporal affairs. To be influenced by -this consideration in our judgment, to believe or disbelieve upon it, -is indeed as much prejudice, as any thing whatever. And, like other -prejudices, it operates contrary ways, in different men; for some are -inclined to believe what they hope, and others what they fear. And -it is manifest unreasonableness to apply to men’s passions in order -to gain their assent. But in deliberations concerning conduct, there -is nothing which reason more requires to be taken into the account, -than the importance of it. For, suppose it doubtful, what would be the -consequence of acting in this, or in the contrary manner: still, that -taking one side could be attended with little or no bad consequence, -and taking the other might be attended with the greatest, must appear, -to unprejudiced reason, of the highest moment towards determining how -we are to act. The truth of our religion, like the truth of common -matters, is to be judged of by all the evidence taken together. -And unless the whole series of things which may be alleged in this -argument, and every particular thing in it, can reasonably be supposed -to have been by accident (for here the stress of the argument for -Christianity lies); then is the truth of it proved: in like manner, as -if in any common case, numerous events acknowledged, were to be alleged -in proof of any other event disputed; the truth of the disputed event -would be proved, not only if any one of the acknowledged ones did of -itself clearly imply it, but, though no one of them singly did so, if -the whole of the acknowledged events taken together could not in reason -be supposed to have happened, unless the disputed one were true. - -It is obvious, how much advantage the nature of this evidence gives -to those persons who attack Christianity, especially in conversation. -For it is easy to show, in a short and lively manner, that such and -such things are liable to objection, that this and another thing is of -little weight in itself; but impossible to show, in like manner, the -united force of the whole argument in one view. - -Lastly, as it has been made appear, that there is no presumption -against a revelation as miraculous; that the general scheme of -Christianity, and the principal parts of it, are conformable to the -experienced constitution of things, and the whole perfectly credible: -so the account now given of the positive evidence for it, shows, that -this evidence is such, as, from the nature of it, cannot be destroyed, -though it should be lessened. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - -OBJECTIONS AGAINST ARGUING FROM THE ANALOGY OF NATURE, TO RELIGION. - - -If every one would consider, with such attention as they are bound, -even in point of morality, to consider, what they judge and give -characters of; the occasion of this chapter would be, in some good -measure at least, superseded. But since this is not to be expected; -for some we find do not concern themselves to understand even what -they write against: since this treatise, in common with most others, -lies open to objections, which may appear very material to thoughtful -men at first sight; and, besides that, seems peculiarly liable to the -objections of such as can judge without thinking, and of such as can -censure without judging; it may not be amiss to set down the chief of -these objections which occur to me, and consider them to their hands. -They are such as these: - -“That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revelation, by -saying, that there are the same in natural religion; when what is -wanting is to clear both of them of these their common, as well as -other their respective, difficulties; that it is a strange way indeed -of convincing men of the obligations of religion, to show them, -that they have as little reason for their worldly pursuits: and a -strange way of vindicating the justice and goodness of the Author of -nature, and of removing the objections against both, to which the -system of religion lies open, to show, that the like objections lie -against natural providence; a way of answering objections against -religion, without so much as pretending to make out, that the -system of it, or the particular things in it objected against, are -reasonable--especially, perhaps some may be inattentive enough to add, -must this be thought strange, when it is confessed that analogy is no -answer to such objections: that when this sort of reasoning is carried -to the utmost length it can be imagined capable of, it will yet leave -the mind in a very unsatisfied state; and that it must be unaccountable -ignorance of mankind, to imagine they will be prevailed with to forego -their present interests and pleasures, from regard to religion, upon -doubtful evidence.” - -Now, as plausible as this way of talking may appear, that appearance -will be found in a great measure owing to half views, which show but -part of an object, yet show that indistinctly, and to undeterminate -language. By these means weak men are often deceived by others, and -ludicrous men, by themselves. And even those, who are serious and -considerate, cannot always readily disentangle, and at once clearly see -through the perplexities, in which subjects themselves are involved; -and which are heightened by the deficiencies and the abuse of words. To -this latter sort of persons, the following reply to each part of this -objection severally, may be of some assistance; as it may also tend a -little to stop and silence others. - -_First_, The thing wanted, _i.e._ what men require, is to have _all_ -difficulties cleared. And this is, or at least for any thing we know -to the contrary, it may be, the same as requiring to comprehend the -divine nature, and the whole plan of Providence from everlasting to -everlasting! But it hath always been allowed to argue from what is -acknowledged, to what is disputed. And it is in no other sense a poor -thing, to argue from natural religion to revealed, in the manner -found fault with, than it is to argue in numberless other ways of -probable deduction and inference, in matters of conduct, which we are -continually reduced to the necessity of doing. Indeed the epithet -_poor_ may be applied, I fear as properly, to great part or the whole -of human life, as it is to the things mentioned in the objection. Is it -not a poor thing, for a physician to have so little knowledge in the -cure of diseases, as even the most eminent have? To act upon conjecture -and guess, where the life of man is concerned? Undoubtedly it is: but -not in comparison of having no skill at all in that useful art, and -being obliged to act wholly in the dark. - -Further: since it is as unreasonable, as it is common, to urge -objections against revelation, which are of equal weight against -natural religion; and those who do this, if they are not confused -themselves, deal unfairly with others, in making it seem that they are -arguing only against revelation, or particular doctrines of it, when -in reality they are arguing against moral providence; it is a thing -of consequence to show, that such objections are as much levelled -against natural religion, as against revealed. Objections, which are -equally applicable to both, are properly speaking answered, by its -being shown that they are so, provided the former be admitted to be -true. And without taking in the consideration how distinctly this is -admitted, it is plainly very material to observe, that as the things -objected against in natural religion are of the same kind with what is -certain matter of experience in the course of providence, and in the -information which God affords us concerning our temporal interest under -his government; so the objections against the system of Christianity, -and the evidence of it, are of the very same kind with those which are -made against the system and evidence of natural religion. However, the -reader upon review may see, that most of the analogies insisted upon, -even in the latter part of this treatise, do not necessarily require to -have more taken for granted than is in the former; [viz.] that there is -an Author of nature, or natural Governor of the world: and Christianity -is vindicated, not from its analogy to natural religion, but chiefly -from its analogy to the experienced constitution of nature. - -_Secondly_, Religion is a practical thing, and consists in such a -determinate course of life, as what, there is reason to think, is -commanded by the Author of nature, and will, upon the whole, be our -happiness under his government. If men can be convinced, that they -have the like reason to believe this, as to believe that taking care -of their temporal affairs will be to their advantage; such conviction -cannot but be an argument to them for the practice of religion. -And if there be really any reason for believing one of these, and -endeavoring to preserve life, and secure ourselves the necessaries -and conveniences of it; then there is reason also for believing the -other, and endeavoring to secure the interest it proposes to us. And -if the interest, which religion proposes to us, be infinitely greater -than our whole temporal interest; then there must be proportionably -greater reason for endeavoring to secure one, than the other; since, by -the supposition, the probability of our securing one is equal to the -probability of our securing the other. This seems plainly unanswerable, -and has a tendency to influence fair minds, who consider what our -condition really is, or upon what evidence we are naturally appointed -to act; and who are disposed to acquiesce in the terms upon which we -live, and attend to and follow that practical instruction, whatever it -be, which is afforded us. - -But the chief and proper force of the argument referred to in the -objection, lies in another place. The proof of religion, it is said, is -involved in such inextricable difficulties, as to render it doubtful; -and that it cannot be supposed that if it were true, it would be left -upon doubtful evidence. Here then, over and above the force of each -particular difficulty or objection, these difficulties and objections -taken together are turned into a positive argument against the truth -of religion; which argument would stand thus. If religion were true, -it would not be left doubtful, and open to objections to the degree -in which it is: therefore that it is thus left, not only renders the -evidence of it weak, and lessens its force, in proportion to the weight -of such objections, but also shows it to be false, or is a general -presumption of its being so. Now the observation, that from the natural -constitution and course of things, we must in our temporal concerns, -almost continually, and even in matters of great consequence, act upon -evidence of a like kind and degree to the evidence of religion, is an -answer to this argument. Because it shows, that it is according to the -conduct and character of the Author of nature to appoint we should act -upon evidence like to that, which this argument presumes he cannot be -supposed to appoint we should act upon: it is an instance, a general -one, made up of numerous particular ones, of somewhat in his dealing -with us, similar to what is said to be incredible. As the force of this -answer lies merely in the parallel, which there is between the evidence -for religion and for our temporal conduct; the answer is equally just -and conclusive, whether the parallel be made out, by showing the -evidence of the former to be higher, or the evidence of the latter to -be lower. - -_Thirdly_, The design of this treatise is not to vindicate the -character of God, but to show the obligations of men: it is not to -justify his providence, but to show what belongs to us to do. These are -two subjects, and ought not to be confounded. Though they may at length -run up into each other, yet observations may immediately tend to make -out the latter, which do not appear, by any immediate connection, to -the purpose of the former; which is less our concern, than many seem to -think. For, first, - -It is not necessary we should justify the dispensations of Providence -against objections, any farther than to show, that the things objected -against may, for aught we know, be consistent with justice and -goodness. Suppose then, that there are things in the system of this -world, and plan of Providence relating to it, which taken alone would -be unjust: yet it has been shown unanswerably, that if we could take -in the reference, which these things may have to other things, present -past and to come; to the whole scheme, which the things objected -against are parts of; these very things might, for aught we know, be -found to be, not only consistent with justice, but instances of it. -Indeed it has been shown, by the analogy of what we see, not only -possible that this may be the case, but credible that it is. And thus -objections, drawn from such things, are answered, and Providence is -vindicated, as far as religion makes its vindication necessary. - -Hence it appears, Secondly, that objections against the Divine justice -and goodness are not endeavored to be _removed_, by showing that the -like objections, allowed to be really conclusive, lie against natural -providence: but those objections being supposed and shown not to be -_conclusive_, the things objected against, considered as matters of -fact, are farther shown to be credible, from their conformity to the -constitution of nature; for instance, that God will reward and punish -men for their actions hereafter, from the observation, that he does -reward and punish them for their actions here. And this, I apprehend, -is of weight. - -Thirdly, it would be of weight, even though those objections were -not answered. For, there being the proof of religion above set down; -and religion implying several facts; for instance again, the fact -last mentioned, that God will reward and punish men for their actions -hereafter; the observation, that his present method of government is by -rewards and punishments, shows that future fact not to be incredible: -whatever objections men may think they have against it, as unjust or -unmerciful, according to their notions of justice and mercy; or as -improbable from their belief of necessity. I say, _as improbable_: for -it is evident no objection against it, _as unjust_, can be urged from -necessity; since this notion as much destroys injustice, as it does -justice. - -Fourthly, Though objections against the reasonableness of the system of -religion cannot indeed be answered without entering into consideration -of its reasonableness; yet objections against the credibility or -truth of it may. Because the system of it is reducible into what is -properly matter of fact: and the truth, the probable truth of facts, -may be shown without consideration of their reasonableness. Nor is it -necessary, though, in some cases and respects, it is highly useful and -proper, yet it is not necessary, to give a proof of the reasonableness -of every precept enjoined us, and of every particular dispensation -of Providence, which comes into the system of religion. Indeed the -more thoroughly a person of a right disposition is convinced of the -perfection of the Divine nature and conduct, the farther he will -advance towards that perfection of religion, which John[290] speaks -of.[291] But the general obligations of religion are fully made out, by -proving the reasonableness of the practice of it. And that the practice -of religion _is_ reasonable, may be shown, though no more could be -proved, than that the system of it _may be_ so, for aught we know to -the contrary: and even without entering into the distinct consideration -of this. - -Fifthly, It is easy to see, that though the analogy of nature is not -an immediate answer to objections against the wisdom, the justice, or -goodness, of any doctrine or precept of religion; yet it may be, as it -is, an immediate and direct answer to what is really intended by such -objections; which is, to show that the things objected against are -incredible. - -_Fourthly_, It is most readily acknowledged, that the foregoing -treatise is by no means satisfactory; very far indeed from it: but so -would any natural institution of life appear, if reduced into a system, -together with its evidence. Leaving religion out of the case, men are -divided in their opinions, whether our pleasures overbalance our pains: -and whether it be, or be not, eligible to live in this world.[292] And -were all such controversies settled, which perhaps, in speculation, -would be found involved in great difficulties; and were it determined -upon the evidence of reason, as nature has determined it to our hands, -that life is to be preserved: still, the rules which God has been -pleased to afford us, for escaping the miseries of it, and obtaining -its satisfactions, the rules, for instance, of preserving health, and -recovering it when lost, are not only fallible and precarious, but -very far from being exact. Nor are we informed by nature, as to future -contingencies and accidents, so as to render it at all certain, what -is the best method of managing our affairs. What will be the success -of our temporal pursuits, in the common sense of the word success, is -highly doubtful. And what will be the success of them in the proper -sense of the word; _i.e._ what happiness or enjoyment we shall obtain -by them, is doubtful in a much higher degree. Indeed the unsatisfactory -nature of the evidence, with which we are obliged to take up, in the -daily course of life, is scarce to be expressed. Yet men do not throw -away life, or disregard the interests of it, upon account of this -doubtfulness. The evidence of religion then being admitted real, those -who object against it, as not satisfactory, _i.e._ as not being what -they wish it, plainly forget the very condition of our being: for -satisfaction, in this sense, does not belong to such a creature as man. - -And, what is more material, they forget also the very nature of -religion. For, religion presupposes, in all those who will embrace it, -a certain degree of integrity and honesty; which it was intended to try -whether men have or not, and to exercise in such as have it, in order -to its improvement. Religion presupposes this as much, and in the same -sense, as speaking to a man presupposes he understands the language in -which you speak; or as warning a man of any danger presupposes that he -hath such a regard to himself, as that he will endeavor to avoid it. -Therefore the question is not at all, Whether the evidence of religion -be satisfactory; but Whether it be, in reason, sufficient to prove and -discipline that virtue, which it presupposes. Now the evidence of it is -fully sufficient for all those purposes of _probation_; how far soever -it is from being satisfactory, as to the purposes of _curiosity_, or -any other: and indeed it answers the purposes of the former in several -respects, which it would not do, if it were as overpowering as is -required. Besides, whether the motives or the evidence for any course -of action be satisfactory, meaning here, by that word, what satisfies -a man that such a course of action will in event be for his good; this -need never be, and I think, strictly speaking, never is, the practical -question in common matters. The practical question in all cases is, -Whether the evidence for a course of action be such as, taking in all -circumstances, makes the faculty within us, which is the guide and -judge of conduct,[293] determine that course of action to be prudent. -Indeed, satisfaction that it will be for our interest or happiness, -abundantly determines an action to be prudent: but evidence almost -infinitely lower than this, determines actions to be so too; even in -the conduct of every day. - -_Fifthly_, As to the objection concerning the influence which this -argument, or any part of it, may, or may not be expected to have upon -men; I observe, as above, that religion being intended for a trial[294] -and exercise of the morality of every person’s character, who is a -subject of it; and there being, as I have shown, such evidence for -it, as is sufficient, in reason, to influence men to embrace it: to -object, that it is not to be imagined mankind will be influenced by -such evidence, is nothing to the purpose of the foregoing treatise. For -the purpose of it is not to inquire, what sort of creatures mankind -are; but what the light and knowledge, which is afforded them, requires -they should be: to show how, in reason, they ought to behave; not how, -in fact, they will behave. This depends upon themselves, and is their -own concern; the personal concern of each man in particular. How little -regard the generality have to it, experience indeed does too fully -show. But religion, considered as a probation, has had its end upon -all persons, to whom it has been proposed with evidence sufficient in -reason to influence their practice: for by this means they have been -put into a state of probation; let them behave as they will in it. -Thus, not only revelation, but reason also, teaches us, that by the -evidence of religion being laid before men, the designs of Providence -are carrying on, not only with regard to those who will be influenced -by it, but likewise with regard to those who will not. Lastly, the -objection here referred to, allows the thing insisted upon in this -treatise to be of _some_ weight; and if so, it may be hoped it will -have some influence. And if there be a probability that it will have -any at all, there is the same reason in kind, though not in degree, -to lay it before men, as there would be, if it were likely to have a -greater influence. - -Further, I desire it may be considered, with respect to the whole of -the foregoing objections, that in this treatise I have argued upon -the principles of others,[295] not my own: and have omitted what I -think true, and of the utmost importance, because by others thought -unintelligible, or not true. Thus I have argued upon the principles of -the fatalists, which I do not believe: and have omitted a thing of the -utmost importance which I do believe,--[viz.] the moral fitness and -unfitness of actions, prior to all will whatever; which as certainly -determine the divine _conduct_, as speculative truth and falsehood -necessarily determine the divine _judgment_. Indeed the principle of -liberty, and that of moral fitness, so force themselves upon the mind, -that moralists, ancient as well as modern, have formed their language -upon it. And probably it may appear in mine, though I have endeavored -to avoid it; and, in order to avoid it, have sometimes been obliged to -express myself in a manner, which will appear strange to such as do not -observe the reason for it. But the general argument here pursued, does -not at all suppose, or proceed upon these principles. - -Now, these two abstract principles of liberty and moral fitness being -omitted, religion can be considered in no other view, than merely as -a question of fact: and in this view it is here considered. It is -obvious, that Christianity, and the proof of it, are both historical. -Even natural religion is, properly, a matter of fact. For, that there -is a righteous Governor of the world, is so: and this proposition -contains the general system of natural religion. But then, several -abstract truths, and in particular those two principles, are usually -taken into consideration in the proof of it: whereas it is here treated -of only as a matter of fact. To explain this; That the three angles of -a triangle are equal to two right ones, is an abstract truth; but that -they appear so to our mind, is only a matter of fact. This last must -have been admitted, if any thing was, by those ancient sceptics, who -would not admit the former: but pretended to doubt, whether there were -any such thing as truth, or whether we could certainly depend upon our -faculties of understanding for the knowledge of it in any case. - -The assertion that there is, in the nature of things, an original -standard of right and wrong in actions, independent upon all will, but -which unalterably determines the will of God, to exercise that moral -government over the world, which religion teaches, (_i.e._ finally -and upon the whole to reward and punish men respectively as they act -right or wrong;) contains an abstract truth, as well as matter of fact. -But suppose that in the present state, every man without exception, -was rewarded and punished, in exact proportion as he followed or -transgressed that sense of right and wrong, which God has implanted -in his nature: this would not be at all an abstract truth, but only a -matter of fact. And though this fact were acknowledged by every one, -yet the same difficulties might be raised as now are, concerning the -abstract questions of liberty and moral fitness. And we should have a -proof, even the certain one of experience, that the government of the -world was perfectly moral, without taking in the consideration of those -questions: and this proof would remain, in what way soever they were -determined. - -Thus, God having given mankind a moral faculty, the object of which -is actions, and which naturally approves some actions as right, and -of good desert, and condemns others as wrong, and of ill desert; that -he will, finally and upon the whole, reward the former and punish the -latter, is not an assertion of an abstract truth, but of what is as -mere a fact, as his doing so at present would be. This future fact I -have not, indeed, proved with the force with which it might be proved, -from the principles of liberty and moral fitness; but without them -have given a really conclusive practical proof of it, which is greatly -strengthened by the general analogy of nature; a proof easily cavilled -at, easily shown not to be demonstrative, (and it is not offered as -such;) but impossible, I think, to be evaded, or answered. Thus the -obligations of religion are made out, exclusive of the questions -concerning liberty and moral fitness; which have been perplexed with -difficulties and abstruse reasonings, as every thing may. - -Hence therefore may be observed distinctly, what is the force of this -treatise. It will be, to such as are convinced of religion upon the -proof arising out of the two last mentioned principles, an _additional_ -proof and confirmation of it: to such as do not admit those principles, -an _original_ proof of it,[296] and a confirmation of that proof. Those -who believe, will here find the scheme of Christianity cleared of -objections, and the evidence of it in a peculiar manner strengthened. -Those who do not believe will at least be shown the absurdity of all -attempts to prove Christianity false, the plain undoubted credibility -of it; and, I hope, a good deal more. - -Thus, though some perhaps may seriously think, that analogy, as here -urged, has too great stress laid upon it; and ridicule, unanswerable -ridicule, may be applied, to show the argument from it in a -disadvantageous light; yet there can be no question, but that it is -a real one. For religion, both natural and revealed, implying in it -numerous facts; analogy, being a _confirmation_ of all facts to which -it can be applied, and the _only proof_ of most, cannot but be admitted -by every one to be a material thing, and truly of weight on the side of -religion, both natural and revealed. And it ought to be particularly -regarded by such as profess to follow nature, and to be less satisfied -with abstract reasonings. - - - - -CONCLUSION. - - -Whatever account may be given of the strange inattention and disregard, -in some ages and countries, to a matter of such importance as religion; -it would, before experience, be incredible, that there should be the -like disregard in those, who have had the moral system of the world -laid before them, as it is by Christianity, and often inculcated upon -them: because this moral system carries in it a good degree of evidence -for its truth, upon its being barely proposed to our thoughts. There -is no need of abstruse reasonings and distinctions, to convince an -unprejudiced understanding, that there is a God who made and governs -the world, and will judge it in righteousness; though they may be -necessary to answer abstruse difficulties, when once such are raised: -when the very meaning of those words, which express most intelligibly -the general doctrine of religion, is pretended to be uncertain; and -the clear truth of the thing itself is obscured by the intricacies of -speculation. To an unprejudiced mind, ten thousand thousand instances -of design cannot but prove a designer. And it is intuitively manifest, -that _creatures_ ought to live under a dutiful sense of their Maker; -and that justice and charity must be his laws, to creatures whom he has -made social, and placed in society. - -The truth of revealed religion, peculiarly so called, is not indeed -self-evident, but requires external proof, in order to its being -received. Yet inattention, among us, to revealed religion, will -be found to imply the same dissolute immoral temper of mind, as -inattention to natural religion: because, when both are laid before -us, in the manner they are in Christian countries of liberty, our -obligations to inquire into both, and to embrace both upon supposition -of their truth, are obligations of the same nature. Revelation claims -to be the voice of God: and our obligation to attend to his voice is -surely moral, in all cases. And as it is insisted, that its evidence -is conclusive, upon thorough consideration of it; so it offers itself -with obvious appearances of having something more than human in it, -and therefore in all reason requires to have its claims most seriously -examined into. - -It is to be added, that though light and knowledge, in what manner -soever afforded, is equally from God; yet a miraculous revelation -has a peculiar tendency, from the first principles of our nature, to -awaken mankind, and inspire them with reverence and awe. And this -is a peculiar obligation, to attend to what claims to be so, with -such appearances of truth. It is therefore most certain, that our -obligations to inquire seriously into the evidence of Christianity, -and, upon supposition of its truth, to embrace it, are of the utmost -importance, and moral in the highest and most proper sense. Let us then -suppose, that the evidence of religion in general, and of Christianity, -has been seriously inquired into, by all reasonable men among us. Yet -we find many professedly to reject both, upon speculative principles of -infidelity. All of them do not content themselves with a bare neglect -of religion, and enjoying their imaginary freedom from its restraints. -Some go much beyond this. They deride God’s moral government over -the world. They renounce his protection, and defy his justice. They -ridicule and vilify Christianity, and blaspheme the author of it; and -take all occasions to manifest scorn and contempt of revelation. This -amounts to an active setting themselves against religion; to what -may be considered as a positive principle of irreligion, which they -cultivate within themselves; and, whether they intend this effect -or not, render habitual, as a good man does the contrary principle. -Others, who are not chargeable with all this profligateness, yet are in -avowed opposition to religion, as if discovered to be groundless. - -Now admitting, which is the supposition we go upon, that these persons -act upon what they think principles of reason, (and otherwise they are -not to be argued with,) it is really inconceivable, that they should -imagine they clearly see the whole evidence of it, considered in -itself, to be nothing at all: nor do they pretend this. They are far -indeed from having a just notion of its evidence: but they would not -say its evidence was nothing, if they thought the system of it, with -all its circumstances, were credible, like other matters of science or -history. Their manner of treating it must proceed, either from such -kind of objections against all religion, as have been answered or -obviated in the former part of this treatise; or else from objections, -and difficulties, supposed more peculiar to Christianity. Thus, they -entertain prejudices against the whole notion of a revelation, and -miraculous interpositions. They find things in Scripture, whether in -incidental passages, or in the general scheme of it, which appear to -them unreasonable. They take for granted, that if Christianity were -true, the light of it must have been more general, and the evidence -of it more satisfactory, or rather overpowering: that it must and -would have been, in some way, otherwise put and left, than it is. Now -this is not imagining they see the evidence itself to be nothing, -or inconsiderable; but quite another thing. It is being fortified -_against_ the evidence, in some degree acknowledged, by thinking they -see the system of Christianity, or something which appears to them -necessarily connected with it, to be incredible or false; fortified -against that evidence, which might otherwise make great impression -upon them. Or, lastly, if any of these persons are, upon the whole, in -doubt concerning the truth of Christianity; their behavior seems owing -to their taking for granted, through strange inattention, that such -doubting is, in a manner, the same thing as being certain against it. - -To these persons, and to this state of opinion concerning religion, -the foregoing treatise is adapted. For, all the general objections -against the moral system of nature having been obviated, it is -shown, that there is not any peculiar presumption at all against -Christianity, considered either as not discoverable by reason, or as -unlike to what is so discovered; nor any, worth mentioning, against -it as miraculous, if any at all; none, certainly, which can render -it in the least incredible. It is shown, that, upon supposition of -a divine revelation, the analogy of nature renders it beforehand -highly credible, I think probable, that many things in it must appear -liable to great objections; and that we must be incompetent judges of -it, to a great degree. This observation is, I think, unquestionably -true, and of the very utmost importance. But it is urged, as I hope -it will be understood, with great caution not to vilify the faculty -of reason, which is _the candle of the Lord within us_;[297] though -it can afford no light, where it does not shine; nor judge, where -it has no principles to judge upon. The objections here spoken of, -being first answered in the view of objections against Christianity -as a matter of fact, are in the next place considered as urged more -immediately against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the Christian -dispensation. And it is fully made out, that they admit of exactly the -like answer, in every respect, to what the like objections against -the constitution of nature admit of: that, as partial views give the -appearance of wrong to things, which, upon further consideration -and knowledge of their relations to other things, are found just -and good; so it is perfectly credible, that the things objected -against the wisdom and goodness of the Christian dispensation, may -be rendered instances of wisdom and goodness, by their reference to -other things beyond our view. Because Christianity is a scheme as much -above our comprehension, as that of nature; and like that, a scheme -in which means are made use of to accomplish ends, and which, as is -most credible, may be carried on by general laws. And it ought to be -attended to, that this is not an answer taken merely or chiefly from -our ignorance: but from something positive, which our observation shows -us. For, to like objections, the like answer is experienced to be just, -in numberless parallel cases. - -The objections against the Christian dispensation, and the method -by which it is carried on, having been thus obviated, in general, -and together; the chief of them are considered distinctly, and the -particular things objected to are shown credible, by their perfect -analogy, each apart, to the constitution of nature. Thus, if man be -fallen from his primitive state, and to be restored, and infinite -wisdom and power engages in accomplishing our recovery: it were to have -been expected, it is said, that this should have been effected at once; -and not by such a long series of means, and such a various economy of -persons and things; one dispensation preparatory to another, this to -a further one, and so on through an indefinite number of ages, before -the end of the scheme proposed can be completely accomplished; a scheme -conducted by infinite wisdom, and executed by almighty power. But now, -on the contrary, our finding that every thing in the constitution and -course of nature is thus carried on, shows such expectations concerning -revelation to be highly unreasonable; and is a satisfactory answer to -them, when urged as objections against the credibility, that the great -scheme of Providence in the redemption of the world may be of this -kind, and to be accomplished in this manner. - -As to the particular method of our redemption, the appointment of a -Mediator between God and man: this has been shown to be most obviously -analogous to the general conduct of nature, _i.e._ the God of nature, -in appointing others to be the instruments of his mercy, as we -experience in the daily course of Providence. The condition of this -world, which the doctrine of our redemption by Christ presupposes, so -much falls in with natural appearances, that heathen moralists inferred -it from those appearances: inferred that human nature was fallen from -its original rectitude, and in consequence of this, degraded from its -primitive happiness. However this opinion came into the world, these -appearances kept up the tradition, and confirmed the belief of it. -And as it was the general opinion under the light of nature, that -repentance and reformation, alone and by itself, was not sufficient to -do away sin, and procure a full remission of the penalties annexed to -it; and as the reason of the thing does not at all lead to any such -conclusion; so every day’s experience shows us, that reformation is -not, in any sort, sufficient to prevent the present disadvantages and -miseries, which, in the natural course of things, God has annexed to -folly and extravagance. - -Yet there may be ground to think, that the punishments, which, by -the general laws of divine government, are annexed to vice, may be -prevented: that provision may have been, even originally, made, that -they should be prevented by some means or other, though they could not -by reformation alone. For we have daily instances of _such mercy_, in -the general conduct of nature: compassion provided for misery,[298] -medicines for diseases, friends against enemies. There is provision -made, in the original constitution of the world, that much of the -natural bad consequences of our follies, which persons themselves -alone cannot prevent, may be prevented by the assistance of others; -assistance which nature enables, and disposes, and appoints them to -afford. By a method of goodness analogous to this, when the world lay -in wickedness, and consequently in ruin, _God so loved the world, that -he gave his only-begotten Son_ to save it: and _he being made perfect -by suffering, became the author of eternal salvation to all them that -obey him_.[299] Indeed neither reason nor analogy would lead us to -think, in particular, that the interposition of Christ, in the manner -in which he did interpose, would be of that efficacy for recovery -of the world, which the Scripture teaches us it was. But neither -would reason nor analogy lead us to think, that other particular -means would be of the efficacy, which experience shows they are, in -numberless instances. Therefore, as the case before us does not admit -of experience; so, that neither reason nor analogy can show how, or -in what particular way, the interposition of Christ, as revealed in -Scripture, is of that efficacy, which it is there represented to be; -this is no kind nor degree of presumption against its being really of -that efficacy. - -Further: the objections against Christianity, from the light of it not -being universal, nor its evidence so strong as might possibly be given, -have been answered by the general analogy of nature. That God has made -such variety of creatures, is indeed an answer to the former: but that -he dispenses his gifts in such variety, both of degrees and kinds, -among creatures of the same species, and even to the same individuals -at different times; is a more obvious and full answer to it. And it is -so far from being the method of Providence in other cases, to afford us -such overbearing evidence, as some require in proof of Christianity; -that on the contrary, the evidence upon which we are naturally -appointed to act in common matters, throughout a very great part of -life, is doubtful in a high degree. And admitting the fact, that God -has afforded to some no more than doubtful evidence of religion; the -same account may be given of it, as of difficulties and temptations -with regard to practice. But as it is not impossible,[300] surely, -that this alleged doubtfulness may be men’s own fault; it deserves -their most serious consideration, whether it be not so. However, it is -certain, that doubting implies a _degree_ of evidence for that of which -we doubt: and that this degree of evidence as really lays us under -obligations as demonstrative evidence. - -The whole of religion then is throughout credible: nor is there, I -think, any thing, relating to the revealed dispensation of things, more -different from the experienced constitution and course of nature, than -some parts of the constitution of nature are from other parts of it. -If so, the only question which remains is, What positive evidence can -be alleged for the truth of Christianity? This too in general has been -considered, and the objections against it estimated. Deduct, therefore, -what is to be deducted from that evidence, upon account of any weight -which may be thought to remain in these objections, after what the -analogy of nature has suggested in answer to them: and then consider, -what are the practical consequences from all this upon the most -sceptical principles one can argue upon (for I am writing to persons -who entertain these principles): and upon such consideration it will be -obvious, that immorality, as little excuse as it admits of in itself, -is greatly aggravated, in persons who have been made acquainted with -Christianity, whether they believe it or not: because the moral system -of nature, or natural religion, which Christianity lays before us, -approves itself, almost intuitively, to a reasonable mind, upon seeing -it proposed. - -In the next place, with regard to Christianity, it will be observed -that there is a middle between a full satisfaction of the truth of it, -and a satisfaction of the contrary. The middle state of mind between -these two consists in a serious apprehension, that it may be true, -joined with doubt whether it is so. And this, upon the best judgment -I am able to make, is as far towards speculative infidelity, as any -sceptic can at all be supposed to go, who has had true Christianity, -with the proper evidences of it, laid before him, and has in any -tolerable measure considered them. For I would not be mistaken to -comprehend all who have ever heard of it; because it seems evident, -that in many countries called Christian, neither Christianity nor -its evidence, is fairly laid before men. And in places where both -are, there appear to be some who have very little attended to either, -and who reject Christianity with a scorn proportionate to their -inattention; and yet are by no means without understanding in other -matters. Now it has been shown, that a serious apprehension that -Christianity may be true, lays persons under the strictest obligations -of a serious regard to it, throughout the whole of their life; a regard -not the same exactly, but in many respects nearly the same with what a -full conviction of its truth would lay them under. - -_Lastly_, it will appear, that blasphemy and profaneness, with -regard to Christianity, are absolutely without excuse. There is no -temptation to it, but from the wantonness of vanity or mirth; and -those, considering the infinite importance of the subject, are no such -temptations as to afford any excuse for it. If this be a just account -of things, and yet men can go on to vilify or disregard Christianity, -which is to talk and act as if they had a demonstration of its -falsehood, there is no reason to think they would alter their behavior -to any purpose, though there were a demonstration of its truth. - - - - -DISSERTATIONS. - -OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. - -OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. - - -Advertisement. - -In the first copy of these papers, I had inserted the two following -dissertations into the chapters, on _a Future Life_, and on the _Moral -Government of God_; with which they are closely connected. But as these -do not directly fall under the _title_ of the foregoing treatise, and -would have kept the subject of it too long out of sight, it seems more -proper to place them by themselves. - - - - -DISSERTATION I. - -Personal Identity. - - -Whether we are to live in a future state, as it is the most important -question which can possibly be asked, so it is the most intelligible -one which can be expressed in language. Yet strange perplexities have -been raised about the meaning of that identity or sameness of person, -which is implied in the notion of our living now and hereafter, or in -any two successive moments. And the solution of these difficulties hath -been stranger than the difficulties themselves. For, personal identity -has been explained so by some, as to render the inquiry concerning a -future life of no consequence at all to us the persons who are making -it. And though few men can be misled by such subtleties; yet it may be -proper to consider them a little. - -When it is asked _wherein_ personal identity consists, the answer -should be the same, as if it were asked wherein consists similitude, -or equality; that all attempts to define would but perplex it. Yet -there is no difficulty at all in ascertaining _the idea_. For as, -upon two triangles being compared or viewed together, there arises to -the mind the idea of similitude; or upon twice two and four, the idea -of equality: so likewise, upon comparing the consciousness of one’s -self, or one’s own existence, in any two moments, there as immediately -arises to the mind the idea of personal identity. And as the two former -comparisons not only give us the ideas of similitude and equality; -but also show us that two triangles are alike, and twice two and four -are equal: so the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of -personal identity, but also shows us the identity of ourselves in those -two moments; the present, suppose, and that immediately past; or the -present, and that a month, a year, or twenty years past. In other -words, by reflecting upon that which is myself now, and that which was -myself twenty years ago, I discern they are not two, but one and the -same self. - -But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain our -personal identity to ourselves, yet to say, that it _makes_ personal -identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons, is to say, -that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action, but -what he can remember; indeed none but what he reflects upon. And one -should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal -identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal -identity; any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute -truth, which it presupposes. - -This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from hence; that to be -endued with consciousness is inseparable from the idea of a person, or -intelligent being. For, this might be expressed inaccurately thus, that -consciousness makes personality: and from hence it might be concluded -to make personal identity. But though present consciousness of what we -at present do and feel is necessary to our being the persons we _now -are_; yet present consciousness of past actions or feelings is not -necessary to our being the same persons who performed those actions, or -_once had_ those feelings. - -The inquiry, what makes vegetables the same, in the common acceptation -of the word, does not appear to have any relation to this of personal -identity: because, the word _same_, when applied to them and to a -person, is not only applied to different subjects, but it is also -used in different senses. For when a man swears to the same tree, -as having stood fifty years in the same place, he means only the -same as to all the purposes of property, and uses of common life; -and not that the tree has been all that time the same, in the strict -philosophical sense of the word. For he does not know, whether any one -particle of the present tree be the same with any one particle of the -tree which stood in the same place fifty years ago. And if they have -not one common particle of matter, they cannot be the same tree in -the proper philosophic sense of the word _same_: it being evidently -a contradiction in terms, to say they are, when no part of their -substance, and no one of their properties is the same: no part of their -substance, by the supposition; no one of their properties, because it -is allowed, that the same property cannot be transferred from one -substance to another. Therefore when we say the identity of sameness of -a plant consists in a continuation of the same life, communicated under -the same organization, to a number of particles of matter, whether the -same or not; the word _same_, when applied to life and to organization, -cannot possibly be understood to signify, what it signifies in this -very sentence, when applied to matter. In a loose and popular sense -then, the life and the organization and the plant are justly said to -be the same, notwithstanding the perpetual change of the parts. But in -strict and philosophical language, no man, no being, no mode of being, -no any thing, can be the same with that, with which it has indeed -nothing the same. Now sameness is used in this latter sense, when -applied to persons. The identity of these, therefore, cannot subsist -with diversity of substance. - -The thing here considered, and as I think, demonstratively determined, -is proposed by Mr. Locke in these words, _Whether it_; _i.e._ the same -self or person, _be the same identical substance_? And he has suggested -what is a much better answer to the question, than that which he gives -it in form. For he defines person, _a thinking intelligent being_, -&c., and personal identity, _the sameness of a rational being_.[301] -The question then is, whether the same rational being is the same -substance: which needs no answer, because being and substance, in -this place, stand for the same idea. The ground of the doubt, whether -the same person be the same substance, is said to be this; that the -consciousness of our own existence, in youth and in old age, or in any -two joint successive moments, is not the _same individual action_,[302] -_i.e._ not the same consciousness, but different successive -consciousnesses. Now it is strange that this should have occasioned -such perplexities. For it is surely conceivable, that a person may have -a capacity of knowing some object or other to be the same now, which -it was when he contemplated it formerly: yet in this case, where, by -the supposition, the object is perceived to be the same, the perception -of it in any two moments cannot be one and the same perception. And -thus, though the successive consciousnesses, which we have of our own -existence, are not the same, yet are they consciousnesses of one and -the same thing or object; of the same person, self, or living agent. -The person, of whose existence the consciousness is felt now, and was -felt an hour or a year ago, is discerned to be; not two persons, but -one and the same person; and therefore is one and the same. - -Mr. Locke’s observations upon this subject appear hasty: and he seems -to profess himself dissatisfied with suppositions, which he has made -relating to it.[303] But some of those hasty observations have been -carried to a strange length by others; whose notion, when traced -and examined to the bottom, amounts, I think, to this:[304] “That -personality is not a permanent, but a transient thing: that it lives -and dies, begins and ends continually: that no one can any more remain -one and the same person two moments together, than two successive -moments can be one and the same moment: that our substance is indeed -continually changing; but whether this be so or not, is, it seems, -nothing to the purpose; since it is not substance, but consciousness -alone, which constitutes personality: which consciousness, being -successive, cannot be the same in any two moments, nor consequently -the personality constituted by it.” Hence it must follow, that it is -a fallacy upon ourselves, to charge our present selves with any thing -we did, or to imagine our present selves interested in any thing which -befell us yesterday; or that our present self will be interested in -what will befall us to-morrow: since our present self is not, in -reality, the same with the self of yesterday, but another like self or -person coming in its room, and mistaken for it; to which another self -will succeed to-morrow. This, I say, must follow. For if the self or -person of to-day, and that of to-morrow, are not the same, but only -like persons; the person of to-day is really no more interested in what -will befall the person of to-morrow, than in what will befall any other -person. - -It may be thought, perhaps, that this is not a just representation of -the opinion we are speaking of: because those who maintain it allow, -that a person is the same as far back as his remembrance reaches. -Indeed they use the words, _identity_, and _same person_. Nor will -language permit these words to be laid aside; since if they were, there -must be I know not what ridiculous periphrasis substituted in the -room of them. But they cannot, _consistently with themselves_, mean, -that the person is really the same. For it is self-evident, that the -personality cannot be really the same, if, as they expressly assert, -that in which it consists is not the same. And as, consistently with -themselves, they cannot, so, I think it appears, they do not _mean_, -that the person is _really_ the same, but only that he is so in a -fictitious sense: in such a sense only as they assert, for this they do -assert, that any number of persons whatever may be the same person. The -bare unfolding this notion, and laying it thus naked and open, seems -the best confutation of it. However, since great stress is said to be -put upon it, I add the following things. - -_First_, This notion is absolutely contradictory to that certain -conviction, which necessarily and every moment rises within us, when we -turn our thoughts upon ourselves, when we reflect upon what is past, -and look forward upon what is to come. All imagination of a daily -change of that living agent which each man calls himself, for another, -or of any such change throughout our whole present life, is entirely -borne down by our natural sense of things. Nor is it possible for a -person in his wits to alter his conduct, with regard to his health or -affairs, from a suspicion, that, though he should live to-morrow, he -should not, however, be the same person he is to-day. Yet, if it be -reasonable to act, with respect to a future life, upon the notion that -personality is transient, it is reasonable to act upon it, with respect -to the present. Here then is a notion equally applicable to religion -and to temporal concerns. Every one sees and feels the inexpressible -absurdity of it in the latter case; therefore, if any can take up with -it in the former, this cannot proceed from the reason of the thing, but -must be owing to inward unfairness, and secret corruption of heart. - -_Secondly_, It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or quality, but a -_being_ only, which is capable of life and action, of happiness and -misery. Now all beings confessedly continue the same, during the whole -time of their existence. Consider then a living being now existing, and -which has existed for any time alive. This living being must have done -and suffered and enjoyed, what it has done and suffered and enjoyed -formerly, (this living being, I say, and not another) as really as it -does and suffers and enjoys, what it does and suffers and enjoys this -instant. All these successive actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, are -actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, of the same living being. And they -are so, prior to all consideration of its remembering or forgetting: -since remembering or forgetting can make no alteration in the truth of -past matter of fact. And suppose this being endued with limited powers -of knowledge and memory, there is no more difficulty in conceiving it -to have a power of knowing itself to be the same living being which it -was some time ago, of remembering some of its actions, sufferings, and -enjoyments, and forgetting others, than in conceiving it to know or -remember or forget any thing else. - -_Thirdly_, Every person is _conscious_, that he is now the same person -or self he was as far back as his remembrance reaches: since when any -one reflects upon a past action of his own, he is just as certain -of the person who did that action, namely, himself who now reflects -upon it, as he is certain that the action was done at all. Nay, very -often a person’s assurance of an action having been done, of which he -is absolutely assured, arises wholly from the consciousness that he -himself did it. This he, person, or self, must either be a substance, -or the property of some substance. If he, a person, be a substance; -then consciousness that he is the same person is consciousness that -he is the same substance. If the person, or he, be the property of -a substance, still consciousness that he is the same property is as -certain a proof that his substance remains the same, as consciousness -that he remains the same substance would be; since the same property -cannot be transferred from one substance to another. - -But though we are thus certain, that we are the same agents, living -beings, or substances, now, which we were as far back as our -remembrance reaches; yet it is asked, whether we may not possibly -be deceived in it? And this question may be asked at the end of any -demonstration whatever: because it is a question concerning the truth -of perception by memory. He who can doubt, whether perception by memory -can in this case be depended upon, may doubt also, whether perception -by deduction and reasoning, which also include memory, or indeed -whether intuitive perception can. Here then we can go no further. For -it is ridiculous to attempt to prove the truth of those perceptions, -whose truth we can no otherwise prove, than by other perceptions of -exactly the same kind with them, and which there is just the same -ground to suspect; or to attempt to prove the truth of our faculties, -which can no otherwise be proved, than by the use or means of those -very suspected faculties themselves.[305] - - - - -DISSERTATION II. - -The Nature of Virtue. - - -That which renders beings capable of moral government, is their having -a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception and of action. -Brute creatures are impressed and actuated by various instincts and -propensions: so also are we. But additional to this, we have a capacity -of reflecting upon actions and characters, and making them an object to -our thought: and on doing this, we naturally and unavoidably approve -some actions, under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of -good desert; and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill desert. -That we have this moral approving and disapproving[306] faculty, is -certain from our experiencing it in ourselves, and recognising it in -each other. It appears from our exercising it unavoidably, in the -approbation and disapprobation even of feigned characters; from the -words right and wrong, odious and amiable, base and worthy, with many -others of like signification in all languages applied to actions and -characters: from the many written systems of morals which suppose it, -since it cannot be imagined, that all these authors, throughout all -these treatises, had absolutely no meaning at all to their words, or a -meaning merely chimerical: from our natural sense of gratitude, which, -implies a distinction between merely being the instrument of good, and -intending it: from the distinction every one makes between injury and -mere harm, which, Hobbes says, is peculiar to mankind; and between -injury and just punishment, a distinction plainly natural, prior to the -consideration of human laws. - -It is manifest that great part of common language, and of common -behavior over the world, is formed upon supposition of such a moral -faculty; whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or -divine reason; whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding, -or as a perception of the heart; or, which seems the truth, as -including both. Nor is it at all doubtful in the general, what course -of action this faculty, or practical discerning power within us, -approves and what it disapproves. For, as much as it has been disputed -wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt there may be -about particulars; yet, in general, there is in reality a universally -acknowledged standard of it. It is that, which all ages and all -countries have made profession of in public: it is that, which every -man you meet puts on the show of: it is that, which the primary and -fundamental laws of all civil constitutions over the face of the earth -make it their business and endeavor to enforce the practice of upon -mankind: namely, justice, veracity, and regard to common good. It being -manifest then, in general, that we have such a faculty or discernment -as this, it may be of use to remark some things more distinctly -concerning it. - -_First_, It ought to be observed, that the object of this faculty -is actions,[307] comprehending under that name active or practical -principles: those principles from which men would act, if occasions -and circumstances gave them power; and which, when fixed and habitual -in any person, we call his character. It does not appear, that brutes -have the least reflex sense of actions, as distinguished from events: -or that will and design, which constitute the very nature of actions -as such, are at all an object to their perception. But to ours they -are: and they are the object, and the only one, of the approving and -disapproving faculty. Acting, conduct, behavior, abstracted from all -regard to what is in fact and event the consequence of it, is itself -the natural object of the moral discernment; as speculative truth -and falsehood is of speculative reason. Intention of such and such -consequences, is indeed, always included; for it is part of the action -itself: but though the intended good or bad consequences do not follow, -we have exactly the same sense of the _action_, as if they did. In -like manner we think well or ill of characters, abstracted from all -consideration of the good or the evil, which persons of such characters -have it actually in their power to do. We never, in the moral way, -applaud or blame either ourselves or others, for what we enjoy or what -we suffer, or for having impressions made upon us, which we consider -as altogether out of our power: but only for what we do or would have -done, had it been in our power: or for what we leave undone, which we -might have done, or would have left undone, though we could have done. - -_Secondly_, Our sense or discernment of actions as morally good or -evil, implies in it a sense or discernment of them as of good or ill -desert. It may be difficult to explain this perception, so as to -answer all the questions which may be asked concerning it: but every -one speaks of such and such actions as deserving punishment; and it is -not, I suppose, pretended, that they have absolutely no meaning at all -to the expression. Now the meaning plainly is not, that we conceive -it for the good of society, that the doer of such actions should be -made to suffer. For if, unhappily, it were resolved, that a man, who -by some innocent action, was infected with the plague, should be left -to perish, lest, by other people’s coming near him, the infection -should spread; no one would say he _deserved_ this treatment. Innocence -and ill desert are inconsistent ideas. Ill desert always supposes -guilt: and if one be no part of the other, yet they are evidently and -naturally connected in our mind. The sight of a man in misery raises -our compassion towards him; and if this misery be inflicted on him by -another, our indignation against the author of it. But when we are -informed, that the sufferer is a villain, and is punished only for -his treachery or cruelty; our compassion exceedingly lessens, and in -many instances our indignation wholly subsides. Now what produces -this effect is the conception of that in the sufferer, which we call -ill desert. Upon considering then, or viewing together, our notion of -vice and that of misery, there results a third, that of ill desert. -And thus there is in human creatures an association of the two ideas, -natural and moral evil, wickedness and punishment. If this association -were merely artificial or accidental, it were nothing: but being most -unquestionably natural, it greatly concerns us to attend to it, instead -of endeavoring to explain it away. - -It may be observed further, concerning our perception of good and -of ill desert, that the former is very weak with respect to common -instances of virtue. One reason of which may be, that it does not -appear to a spectator, how far such instances of virtue proceed from -a virtuous principle, or in what degree this principle is prevalent: -since a very weak regard to virtue may be sufficient to make men act -well in many common instances. On the other hand, our perception of ill -desert in vicious actions lessens, in proportion to the temptations men -are thought to have had to such vices. For, vice in human creatures -consisting chiefly in the absence or want of the virtuous principle; -though a man be overcome, suppose by tortures, it does not from thence -appear to what degree the virtuous principle was wanting. All that -appears is, that he had it not in such a degree, as to prevail over -the temptation; but possibly he had it in a degree, which would have -rendered him proof against common temptations. - -_Thirdly_, Our perception of vice and ill desert arises from, and is -the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and capacities -of the agent. For the mere neglect of doing what we ought to do, would, -in many cases, be determined by all men to be in the highest degree -vicious. This determination must arise from such comparison, and be the -result of it; because such neglect would not be vicious in creatures -of other natures and capacities, as brutes. It is the same also with -respect to positive vices, or such as consist in doing what we ought -not. For every one has a different sense of harm done by an idiot, -madman, or child, and by one of mature and common understanding; though -the action of both, including the intention, which is part of the -action, be the same: as it may be, since idiots and madmen, as well as -children, are capable not only of doing mischief but also of intending -it. Now this difference must arise from somewhat discerned in the -nature or capacities of one, which renders the action vicious; and the -want of which, in the other, renders the same action innocent or less -vicious: and this plainly supposes a comparison, whether reflected upon -or not, between the action and capacities of the agent, previous to our -determining an action to be vicious. Hence arises a proper application -of the epithets, incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit, to -actions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious. - -_Fourthly_, It deserves to be considered, whether men are more at -liberty, in point of morals, to make themselves miserable without -reason, than to make other people so: or dissolutely to neglect their -own greater good, for the sake of a present lesser gratification, than -they are to neglect the good of others, whom nature has committed to -their care. It would seem, that a due concern about our own interest -or happiness, and a reasonable endeavor to secure and promote it, -(which is, I think, very much the meaning of the word prudence, -in our language;) it would seem, that this is virtue, and the -contrary behavior faulty and blamable; since, in the calmest way of -reflection, we approve of the first, and condemn the other conduct, -both in ourselves and others. This approbation and disapprobation -are altogether different from mere desire of our own, or of their -happiness, and from sorrow upon missing it. For the object or occasion -of this last kind of perception is satisfaction or uneasiness: whereas -the object of the first is active behavior. In one case, what our -thoughts fix upon is our condition: in the other, our conduct. - -It is true indeed, that nature has not given us so sensible a -disapprobation of imprudence and folly, either in _ourselves_ or -_others_, as of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty: I suppose, because -that constant habitual sense of private interest and good, which we -always carry about with us, renders such sensible disapprobation less -necessary, less wanting, to keep us from imprudently neglecting our own -happiness, and foolishly injuring ourselves, than it is necessary and -wanting to keep us from injuring others; to whose good we cannot have -so strong and constant a regard: and also because imprudence and folly, -appearing to bring its own punishment more immediately and constantly -than injurious behavior, it less needs the additional punishment, -which would be inflicted upon it by others, had they the same sensible -indignation against it, as against injustice, and fraud, and cruelty. -Besides, unhappiness being in itself the natural object of compassion, -the unhappiness which people bring upon themselves, though it be -wilfully, excites in us some pity for them; and this of course lessens -our displeasure against them. Still it is matter of experience, that we -are formed so as to reflect very severely upon the greater instances of -imprudent neglect and foolish rashness, both in ourselves and others. -In instances of this kind, men often say of themselves with remorse, -and of others with some indignation, that they deserved to suffer such -calamities, because they brought them upon themselves, and would not -take warning. Particularly when persons come to poverty and distress by -a long course of extravagance, and after frequent admonitions, though -without falsehood or injustice; we plainly, do not regard such people -as alike objects of compassion with those, who are brought into the -same condition by unavoidable accidents. From these things it appears, -that prudence is a species of virtue, and folly of vice: meaning by -_folly_, something quite different from mere incapacity; a thoughtless -want of that regard and attention to our own happiness, which we had -capacity for. And this the word properly includes; and, as it seems, in -its usual acceptation: for we scarcely apply it to brute creatures. - -However, if any person be disposed to dispute the matter, I shall very -willingly give him up the words virtue and vice, as not applicable to -prudence and folly: but must insist, that the faculty within us, which -is the judge of actions, approves of prudent actions, and disapproves -imprudent ones: I say prudent and imprudent _actions_ as such, and -considered distinctly from the happiness or misery which they occasion. -And by the way, this observation may help to determine what justness -there is in the objection against religion, that it teaches us to be -interested and selfish. - -_Fifthly_, Without inquiring how far, and in what sense, virtue is -resolvable into benevolence, and vice into the want of it; it may -be proper to observe, that benevolence, and the want of it, singly -considered, are in no sort the _whole_, of virtue and vice. For if -this were the case, in the review of one’s own character, or that of -others, our moral understanding and moral sense would be indifferent -to every thing, but the degrees in which benevolence prevailed, and -the degrees in which it was wanting. That is, we should neither approve -of benevolence to some persons rather than to others, nor disapprove -injustice and falsehood upon any other account, than merely as an -overbalance of happiness was foreseen likely to be produced by the -first, and of misery by the second. On the contrary, suppose two men -competitors for any thing whatever, which would be of equal advantage -to each of them; though nothing indeed would be more impertinent, -than for a stranger to busy himself to get one of them preferred -to the other; yet such endeavor would be virtue, in behalf of a -friend or benefactor, abstracted from all consideration of distant -consequences: as that examples of gratitude, and the cultivation of -friendship, would be of general good to the world. Again, suppose one -man should, by fraud or violence, take from another the fruit of his -labor, with intent to give it to a third, who he thought would have as -much pleasure from it as would balance the pleasure which the first -possessor would have had in the enjoyment, and his vexation in the -loss of it; suppose also that no bad consequences would follow: yet -such an action would surely be vicious. Nay further, were treachery, -violence, and injustice, no otherwise vicious, than as foreseen likely -to produce an overbalance of misery to society; then, if in any case a -man could procure to himself as great advantage by an act of injustice, -as the whole foreseen inconvenience, likely to be brought upon others -by it, would amount to; such a piece of injustice would not be faulty -or vicious at all: because it would be no more than, in any other case, -for a man to prefer his own satisfaction to another’s, in equal degrees. - -The fact, then, appears to be, that we are _constituted_ so as to -condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve -of benevolence to some preferably to others, abstracted from all -consideration, which conduct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of -happiness or misery. Therefore, were the Author of nature to propose -nothing to himself as an end but the production of happiness, were -his moral character merely that of benevolence; yet ours is not so. -Upon that supposition indeed, the only reason of his giving us the -above mentioned approbation of benevolence to some persons rather -than others, and disapprobation of falsehood, unprovoked violence, -and injustice, must be, that he foresaw this constitution of our -nature would produce more happiness, than forming us with a temper of -mere general benevolence. But still, since this is our constitution, -falsehood, violence, injustice, must be vice in us; and benevolence to -some, preferably to others, virtue; abstracted from all consideration -of the overbalance of evil or good, which they may appear likely to -produce. - -Now if human creatures are endued with such a moral nature as we have -been explaining, or with a moral faculty, the natural object of which -is actions: moral government must consist in rendering them happy and -unhappy, in rewarding and punishing them, as they follow, neglect, or -depart from, the moral rule of action interwoven in their nature, or -suggested and enforced by this moral faculty;[308] in rewarding and -punishing them upon account of their so doing. - -I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth observation, contradicted -what any author designed to assert. But some of great and distinguished -merit, have, I think, expressed themselves in a manner, which may -occasion some danger, to careless readers, of imagining the whole of -virtue to consist in singly aiming, according to the best of their -judgment, at promoting the happiness of mankind in the present state; -and the whole of vice, in doing what they foresee, or might foresee, -is likely to produce an overbalance of unhappiness in it: than which -mistakes, none can be conceived more terrible. For it is certain, that -some of the most shocking instances of injustice, adultery, murder, -perjury, and even of persecution, may, in many supposable cases, not -have the appearance of being likely to produce an overbalance of -misery in the present state; perhaps sometimes may have the contrary -appearance. - -This reflection might easily be carried on, but I forbear. The -happiness of the world is the concern of Him who is the lord and the -proprietor of it: nor do we know what we are about, when we endeavor -to promote the good of mankind in any ways, but those which he has -directed; that is indeed in all ways not contrary to veracity and -justice. I speak thus upon supposition of persons really endeavoring, -in some sort, to do good without regard to these. But the truth seems -to be; that such supposed endeavors proceed, almost always, from -ambition, the spirit of party, or some indirect principle, concealed -perhaps in great measure from persons themselves. And though it is our -business and our duty to endeavor, within the bounds of veracity and -justice, to contribute to the ease, convenience, and even cheerfulness -and diversion of our fellow-creatures: yet, from our short views, it is -greatly uncertain, whether this endeavor will, in particular instances, -produce an overbalance of happiness upon the whole; since so many and -distant things must come into the account. And that which makes it our -duty is, that there is some appearance that it will, and no positive -appearance sufficient to balance this, on the contrary side; and also, -that such benevolent endeavor is a cultivation of that most excellent -of all virtuous principles, the active principle of benevolence. - -However, though veracity, as well as justice, is to be our rule of -life; it must be added, otherwise a snare will be laid in the way of -some plain men, that the use of common forms of speech, generally -understood, cannot be falsehood; and in general, that there can be no -designed falsehood, without designing to deceive. It must likewise be -observed, that in numberless cases, a man may be under the strictest -obligations to what he foresees will deceive, without his intending it. -For it is impossible not to foresee, that the words and actions of men, -in different ranks and employments, and of different educations, will -perpetually be mistaken by each other. And it cannot but be so, while -they will judge with the utmost carelessness, as they daily do, of what -they are not, perhaps, enough informed to be competent judges of, even -though they considered it with great attention. - - - - -FOOTNOTES - - -[1] Among these were _Jones_, author of the admirable Treatise on the -Canon of the New Testament: _Lardner_, _Maddox_, _Chandler_, Archbishop -_Secker_, &c. - -[2] Sermon at Spittle, on Abraham’s trial. - -[3] Among them were CUDWORTH, born 1617; “Intel. Syst. of the -Universe:” BOYLE, 1626; “Things above Reason:” STILLINGFLEET, 1635; -“Letters to a Deist:” Sir I. NEWTON, 1642; “Observations on Prophecy:” -LESLIE, 1650; “Short Method with Deists:” LOWTH, 1661, Vindic. of -the Divine Author of the Bible: KING, 1669; “Origin of Evil:” SAM. -CLARK, 1675; “Evidences of Nat. and Rev. Religion:” WATERLAND, 1683; -“Scripture Vindicated:” LARDNER, 1684; “Credibility of Gospel History:” -LELAND, 1691; “View of Deistical Writers,” and “Advantage and Necessity -of Rev.:” CHANDLER, 1693; “Definition of Christianity,” on “Prophecy,” -&c.: WARBURTON, 1698; “Divine Leg. of Moses;” Bishop NEWTON, 1704; “On -the Prophecies:” WATSON, 1737; “Apology for Christianity,” (against -Gibbon,) and also “Apology for the Bible,” (against Paine.) - -[4] MCINTOSH: “Progress of Ethical Philosophy.” - -[5] BROUGHAM: “Disc. on Nat. Theology.” - -[6] Verisimile. - -[7] [These three ways of being “like,” are very distinct from each -other. The first is equivalent to a logical induction. The second -produces belief, because the same evidence made us believe in a similar -case. The third is just an analogy, in the popular sense of the term.] - -[8] The story is told by Mr. Locke in the Chapter of Probability. - -[9] [This is good common sense, and men always act thus if prudent. -But it is not enough thus to act in the matter of salvation. “He that -_believeth_ not shall be damned:” Mark xvi. 16. “He that _believeth_ -hath everlasting life:” John iii. 36. “With the heart man _believeth_ -unto righteousness:” Rom. x. 10. Belief is part of the sinner’s _duty_ -in submitting himself to God; and not merely a question of prudence.] - -[10] See Part II. chap. vi. - -[11] Philocal. p. 23, Ed. Cant. - -[12] [Some of these speculations, carried to the full measure of -absurdity and impiety, may be found in Bayle’s great “Historical and -Critical Dictionary.” See as instances, the articles ORIGEN, MANICHÆUS, -PAULICIANS.] - -[13] Ch. i. - -[14] Ch. ii. - -[15] Ch. iii. - -[16] Ch. iv. - -[17] Ch. v. - -[18] Ch. vi. - -[19] Ch. vii. - -[20] Part II. Ch. i. - -[21] Ch. ii. - -[22] Ch. iii. - -[23] Ch. iv. - -[24] Ch. v. - -[25] Ch. vi. vii. - -[26] Ch. viii. - -[27] [This chapter Dr. Chalmers regards as the least satisfactory in -the book: not because lacking in just analogies, but because infected -with the obscure metaphysics of that age. His reasoning, however, only -serves to show that B. has perhaps made too much of the argument from -the indivisibility of consciousness; and by no means that he does not -fairly use it. - -We certainly cannot object that the subject of identity is not -made plain. Who has explained identity, or motion, or cohesion, or -crystallization, or any thing? Locke goes squarely at the subject of -personal identity, (see Essay, ch. 27,) but has rendered us small aid. -His definition is, “Existence itself, which determines a being of any -sort, to a particular time and place, incommunicable to two beings of -the same kind.” I had rather define it “the uninterrupted continuance -of being.” What ceases to exist, cannot again exist: for then it would -exist after it had ceased to exist, and would have existed before it -existed. Locke makes _consciousness_ to constitute identity, and argues -that a man and a person are not the same; and that hence if I kill a -man, but was not conscious of what I did, or have utterly forgotten, -I am not the same person. Watts shows up this notion of Locke very -ludicrously. - -Butler, in his “Dissertation,” urges that consciousness _presupposes_ -identity, as knowledge presupposes truth. On Locke’s theory, no person -would have existed any earlier than the period to which his memory -extends. We cannot suppose the soul made up of many consciousnesses, -nor could memory, if material, spread itself over successive years of -life.] - -[28] I say _kind_ of presumption or probability; for I do not mean to -affirm that there is the same _degree_ of conviction, that our living -powers will continue after death, as there is, that our substances will. - -[29] _Destruction of living powers_, is a manner of expression -unavoidably ambiguous; and may signify either _the destruction of a -living being, so as that the same living being shall be incapable of -ever perceiving or acting again at all_; or _the destruction of those -means and instruments by which it is capable of its present life, of -its present state of perception and of action_. It is here used in the -former sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithet _present_ is -added. The loss of a man’s eye is a destruction of living powers in the -latter sense. But we have no reason to think the destruction of living -powers, in the former sense, to be possible. We have no more reason to -think a being endued with living powers, ever loses them during its -whole existence, than to believe that a stone ever acquires them. - -[30] [The next paragraph indicates that Butler does not, as Chalmers -thinks, consider this argument as “handing us over to an absolute -demonstration.” It just places all arguments for and against the soul’s -future life, in that balanced condition, which leaves us to learn the -fact from revelation, free from presumptions _against_ its truth. This -view of the case entirely relieves the objection as to the future life -of brutes; and shows how entirely we must rely on revelation, as to the -future, both of man and beast.] - -[31] [Dodwell had published a book, in which he argues that human -souls are not _naturally_ immortal, but become so, by the power of the -Holy Ghost, in regeneration. Dr. Clarke replied. The controversy was -continued by Collins. Dr. C. wrote four tracts on the subject. - -These “presumptions” form the base of materialism, and hence the denial -of a future state. Surely, thoughts and feelings, if material, have -extension. But can any one conceive of love a foot long, or anger -an inch thick? How superior to the gloomy mists of modern infidels -have even pagans been! Cicero makes Cato say, “The soul is a simple, -uncompounded substance, without parts or mixture: it cannot be divided, -and so cannot perish.” And in another place, “I never could believe -that the soul lost its senses by escaping from senseless matter; or -that such a release will not enlarge and improve its powers;” and -again, “I am persuaded that I shall only begin truly to live, when I -cease to live in this world,” Xenophon reports Cyrus as saying, in his -last moments, “O my sons! do not imagine that when death has taken me -from you, I shall cease to exist.”] - -[32] See Dr. Clarke’s Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the defences of it. - -[33] [As every particle of our bodies is changed within seven years, -an average life would take us through many such changes. If the mind -changes with the body, it would be unjust for an old man to be made to -suffer for the sins of his youth. To escape this, the materialist is -driven to affirm that _the whole_ is not altered, though every particle -be changed. - -This argument from the constant flux is irresistible. It proves our -identity, and that matter and mind are not the same. Does it not -also destroy all presumption that the Ego cannot exist without this -particular body?] - -[34] See Dissertation I. - -[35] [The mind affects the body, as much as the body does the mind. -Love, anger, &c. quicken the circulation; fear checks it; terror may -stop it altogether. Mania is as often produced by moral, as by physical -causes, and hence of late moral means are resorted to for cure. The -brain of a maniac, seldom shows, on dissection, any derangement. But -this does not prove that there was no _functional_ derangement.] - -[36] [“S. What shall we say, then, of the shoemaker? That he cuts with -his instrument only, or with his hands also? A. With his hands also. -S. Does he use his eyes also, in making shoes? A. Yes. S. But are we -agreed that he who uses, and what he uses, are different? A. Yes. S. -The shoemaker, then, and harper, are different from the hands and eyes -they use? A. It appears so. S. Does a man then _use_ his whole body? A. -Certainly. S. But he who uses, and that which he uses are different. -A. Yes. S. A man then is something different from his own body.” PLAT. -ALCIBI. PRIM. p. 129, D. Stallb. Ed. - -“It may easily be perceived that the _mind_ both sees and hears, and -not those parts which are, so to speak, windows of the mind.” “Neither -are we bodies; nor do I, while speaking this to thee, speak to thy -body.” “Whatever is done by thy mind, is done by thee.” CICERO, Tusc. -Disput. I. 20, 46 and 22, 52. - -“The mind of each man is the man; not that figure which may be pointed -out with the finger.” CIC., de Rep. b. 6, s. 24.] - -[37] [Butler’s argument, if advanced for _proof_ would prove too much, -not only as to brutes but as to man; for it would prove pre-existence. -And this is really the tenet, (_i.e._ transmigration,) of those who -arrive at the doctrine of immortality only by philosophy. Philosophy -cannot establish the doctrine of a future state, nor can it afford any -presumptions _against_ either a future or a pre-existent state. - -Nothing is gained by insisting that reason teaches the true doctrine -of the soul; any more than there would be by insisting that by it -we learned the doctrine of a trinity, or atonement. Philosophy does -teach that He who can _create_, under infinite diversity of forms, can -_sustain_ existence, in any mode he pleases. - -The reader who chooses to look further into the discussion as to -the immortality of brutes, will find it spread out in POLIGNAC’S -Anti-Lucretius, and still more in BAYLE’S Dictionary, under the -articles PEREIRA, and RORARIUS. The topic is also discussed in DES -CARTES on the Passions: BAXTER on The Nature of the Soul: HUME’S -Essays, Essay 9: SEARCH’S Light of Nature: CHEYNE’S Philosophical -Principles: WAGSTAFF on the Immortality of Brutes: EDWARDS’ Critical -and Philosophical Exercitations: WATT’S Essays, Essay 9: COLLIBER’S -Enquiry: LOCKE on the Understanding, b. 2, ch. ix.: DITTON on the -Resurrection: WILLIS De Anima Brutæ.] - -[38] [It is as absurd to suppose that a brain thinks, as that an eye -sees, or a finger feels. The eye no more sees, than the telescope or -spectacles. If the _nerve_ be paralyzed, there is no vision, though -the eye be perfect. A few words spoken or read, may at once deprive of -sight, or knock a person down. - -The mind sometimes survives the body. Swift, utterly helpless from -palsy, retained his faculties. In some, the body survives the mind. -MORGAGNI, HALLER, BONNET, and others, have proved that there is no -part of the brain, not even the pineal gland, which has not been found -destroyed by disease, where there had been no hallucination of mind, -nor any suspicion of such disease, during life.] - -[39] Pp. 84, 85. - -[40] [We are told by sceptics that “mind is the result of a curious and -complicated organization.” A mere jumble of words! But were the mind -material, there is no evidence that death would destroy it: for we do -not see that death has any power over matter. The body remains the very -same as it does in a swoon, till _chemical_ changes begin.] - -[41] There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life, -here considered: Whether death be the destruction of living agents; -if not, Whether it be the destruction of their _present_ powers of -reflection, as it certainly is the destruction of their present -powers of sensation; and if not, Whether it be the suspension, or -discontinuance of the exercise of these present reflecting powers. Now, -if there be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were -possible, less for the next, and less still for the first. - -[42] This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans, -νομίζειν μὲν γὰρ δὴ τὸν μὲν ἐνθάδε βίον, ὡς ἂν ἀκμὴν κυομένων εἶναι· -τὸν δὲ θάνατον, γένεσιν εἰς τὸν ὄντως βίον, καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα τοῖς -φιλοσοφήσασι· Lib. xv. p. 1039, Ed. Amst. 1707. [“For they think that -the present life is like that of those who are just ready to be born; -and that death is a birth into the real life, and a happy one to those -who have practised philosophy.”] To which opinion perhaps Antoninus may -allude in these words, ὡς νῦν περιμένεις, πότε ἔμβρυον ἐκ τῆς γαστρὸς -τῆς γυναικός σου ἐξέλθῃ, οὕτως ἐκδέχεσθαι, τὴν ὥραν ὲν ᾗ τὸ ψυχάριόν -σου τοῦ ἐλύτρου τούτου ἐκπεσεῖται. Lib. ix. c. 3. [As this last passage -may, by some, be thought indelicate, it is left untranslated.] - -[43] [The _increase_ of a force in any direction, cannot of itself -_change_ that direction. An arrow shot from a bow, towards an object, -does not aim at some other object, by being shot with more force.] - -[44] [Our nature will _always_ be ours, or we should cease to be -ourselves, and become something else. And this nature is _social_. -Every one feels, at least sometimes, that he is not complete in himself -for the production of happiness; and so looks round for that which -may fit his wants, and supply what he cannot produce from within. -Hence amusements, of a thousand kinds, are resorted to, and still -more, society. Society is a want of the mind; as food is of the body. -Society, such as perfectly suits our real nature, and calls out, in a -right manner, its every attribute, would secure our perfect happiness. -But Such society must include God.] - -[45] See Part II. chap. ii. and Part II. chap. iv. - -[46] [Objections and difficulties belong to all subjects, in _some_ -of their bearings. Ingenious and uncandid men may start others, which -care and candor may remove. It is therefore no proof of weakness in a -doctrine, that it is attacked with objections, both real and merely -plausible. Error has been spread by two opposite means:--a dogmatic -insisting on doubtful points, and an unteachable cavilling at certain -truth.] - -[47] Part I. chap. vii. - -[48] [Our relation to God is “even necessary,” because we are his -creatures: so that the relation must endure so long as we endure. But -our relations to other creatures are contingent, and may be changed or -abrogated.] - -[49] Pp. 93, 94. - -[50] [“The terms nature, and power of nature, and course of nature, -are but empty words, and merely mean that a thing occurs usually or -frequently. The raising of a human body out of the earth we call a -miracle, the generation of one in the ordinary way we call natural, for -no other reason than because one is usual the other unusual. Did men -usually rise out of the earth like corn we should call that natural.” -Dr. CLARKE, Controv. with Leibnitz.] - -[51] [That man consists of parts, is evident; and the use of each part, -and of the whole man, is open to investigation. In examining any part -we learn what it _is_, and what it is _to do_: _e.g._ the eye, the -hand, the heart. So of mental faculties; memory is to preserve ideas, -shame to deter us from things shameful, compassion to induce us to -relieve distress. In observing our whole make, we may see an ultimate -design,--viz.: not particular animal gratifications, but intellectual -and moral improvement, and happiness by that means. If this be our end, -it is our duty. To disregard it, must bring punishment; for shame, -anguish, remorse, are by the laws of mind, the sequences of sin. - -See LAW’S Notes on King’s Origin of Evil.] - -[52] [It is almost amazing that philosophy, because it discovers the -laws of matter, should be placed in antagonism with the Bible which -reveals a superintending Providence. The Bible itself teaches this very -result of philosophy,--viz.: that the world is governed by _general -laws_. See Prov. viii. 29: Job. xxxviii. 12, 24, 31, 33: Ps. cxix. 90, -91: Jer. xxxi. 35, and xxxiii. 25.] - -[53] See Part II. chap. vi. - -[54] Part II. chap. vi. - -[55] The general consideration of a future state of punishment, most -evidently belongs to the subject of natural religion. But if any of -these reflections should be thought to relate more peculiarly to this -doctrine, as taught in Scripture, the reader is desired to observe, -that Gentile writers, both moralists and poets, speak of the future -punishment of the wicked, both as to the duration and degree of it, -in a like manner of expression and of description, as the Scripture -does. So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of mere -revelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that the great -distinction between the righteous and the wicked, shall be made at the -end of this world; that each shall _then_ receive according to his -deserts. Reason did, as it well might, conclude that it should, finally -and upon the whole, be well with the righteous, and ill with the -wicked: but it could not be determined upon any principles of reason, -whether human creatures might not have been appointed to pass through -other states of life and being, before that distributive justice should -finally and effectually take place. Revelation teaches us, that the -next state of things after the present is appointed for the execution -of this justice; that it shall be no longer delayed; but _the mystery -of God_, the great mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to -prevail, _shall then be finished_; and he will _take to him his great -power and will reign_, by rendering to every one according to his works. - -[56] [Our language furnishes no finer specimens of the argument -analogical. Butler here seizes the very points, which are most -plausible and most insisted on, as showing the harshness and -unreasonableness of Christianity; and overthrows them at a stroke by -simply directing attention to the same things, in the universally -observed course of nature.] - -[57] Chap. i. - -[58] See chaps. iv. and vi. - -[59] [This chapter, more than any other, carries the force of -positive argument. If in this world, we have _proofs_ that God is -a moral governor, then in order to evince that we shall be under -moral government _hereafter_, we have only to supply an intermediate -consideration,--viz.: that God, as such, must be unchangeable. The -argument, as just remarked, assumes a substantive form, because -admitted facts, as to this world, exhibiting the very _principles_ on -which God’s government goes at present, compel us not only to _suppose_ -that the principles of God will remain, but to _believe_ so.] - -[60] Chap. ii. - -[61] The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not -being universal, nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be -urged against natural religion, as well as against revealed. And -therefore the consideration of them belongs to the first part of this -treatise, as well as the second. But as these objections are chiefly -urged against revealed religion, I choose to consider them in the -second part. And the answer to them there, ch. vi., as urged against -Christianity, being almost equally applicable to them as urged against -the religion of nature; to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to -that chapter. - -[62] Dissertation II. - -[63] Chap. vi. - -[64] See Lord Shaftesbury’s Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part II. - -[65] [At the foundation of moral improvement, lies the conviction -that what is right, is our happiness, no less than our duty. This -again is based upon a conviction that God governs justly; and has all -power over us for good or evil. As creation is full of the evidences -of _design_, so is Providence. And as the human mind shows, in its -structure, the most exquisite marks of design, so the government of -mind shows a final object for all our faculties. Among the attributes -of mind we observe, conspicuous, a disposition to seek ends, lay plans, -and sacrifice present indulgence to future and greater good: and a -facility in learning how to subordinate one thing to another, so as -to secure success in our plans. This, with conscience to approve or -disapprove our modes, constitutes an evident _adaptedness_ to a moral -government on the part of God; and would be worse than superfluous, if -there be no such government. Every rule of action, deduced by reason -from the light of nature, may fairly be regarded as God’s law; and the -inconveniences resulting from wrong actions, are God’s retributions. -These retributions, felt or observed, are divine teachings, saying, -emphatically, if you act thus you shall receive thus. We do actually -so judge, in relation to physics. Every rule of motion, distance, -gravitation, heat, electricity, &c. &c., is received as God’s law; and -we would deem it insane to act in opposition.] - -[66] [Consult CAPP on the Gov. of God: TWISSE Vindiciæ Prov. Dei: -WITTICHII Excre. Theol.: DWIGHT’S Theol.: MARTINIUS de Gubernatione -Mundi: LIEFCHILD on Providence: MORTON on do.: SHERLOCK on do.: -RUTHERFORD on do.: and the Sermons of Thos. Leland, Porteus, Topping, -Hunt, Davies, Horseley, South, Wisheart, Seed, Collings, and Doddridge.] - -[67] Chap. ii. - -[68] [In the structure of man, physical and mental, we find no -contrivances for disease or pain, so that in general those who conform -to the laws of their being, enjoy happiness; and suffering is chiefly -the result of our own conduct. But, as without revelation we could only -learn the evil of vice, by its effects, and would often learn it too -late to retrieve our affairs, or our souls’ peace, God has in mercy -given forth his teachings, by which, _beforehand_, we may know the -effects of actions.] - -[69] See Dissertation II. - -[70] [It was contended by MANDEVILLE in his “_Fable of the Bees_,” -that private vices, as luxury for instance, are often conducive to the -well-being of society. This idea is fully refuted by WARBURTON, Divine -Legation of Moses, b. 1: BERKELEY, Minute Philosopher, Dial. 2: and by -BROWN, Characteristics, Ess. 2.] - -[71] [A strong illustration of this distinction is seen in the -“delivering up” of our Savior to be crucified. As to the mere act of -delivering up, we find it referred, =1.= To God the Father, John iii. -16: Acts ii. 23: Rom. viii. 32. =2.= To Christ himself, Eph. v. 2, and -v. 25, &c. In this last passage it is literally _delivered himself_. -=3.= To the Jewish rulers, Luke xx. 20: Mark xii. 12. =4.= To Pontius -Pilate, Matt. xxvii. 26: Mark xv. 15: John xix. 6. =5.= To Judas, Matt. -xxvi. 15: Zec. xi. 12. - -As to the _mere act_, Judas and Pilate did just what God the Father, -and our Lord Jesus did. But how infinitely unlike the _qualities_ of -the act!] - -[72] [“When one supposes he is about to die, there comes over him a -fear and anxiety about things in regard to which he felt none before. -For the stories which are told about _Hades_, that such, as have -practised wrong, must there suffer punishment, although made light of -for a while, these torment the soul lest they should be true. But he -who is conscious of innocence, has a pleasant and good hope, which will -support old age.” PLATO, Respub. i. s. 5.] - -[73] See Dissertation II. - -[74] [Aside from revelation, our ideas of the divine attributes must -be derived from a knowledge of our own. Among these is our moral -sense, which constrains us to consider right and wrong as an immutable -distinction, and moral worth as our highest excellence. Hence we -ascribe perfect virtue to God. It does not follow from such reasoning, -that we form a Deity after our own conceptions, for it is but the -argument _a fortiori_, “He that formed the eye, shall he not see? He -that teacheth man knowledge, shall he not know?” Ps. xciv. 9. We do not -conceive of a Deity who sees just as we do; but that _he sees_, for he -makes sight. So we infer that he has moral attributes, because we have -them, from him. - -This point is not sufficiently pressed upon infidels. They readily -acknowledge God’s physical attributes, because the argument is -addressed to their _understanding_, but deny his moral ones, because -their _hearts_ are hardened through the deceitfulness of sin.] - -[75] [It is easy to see that the occasional disadvantages of virtue, -are no less conducive to moral excellence, than its being generally -advantageous. In view of its general advantages, we are virtuous with a -proper and commanded view to our instinctive desire for happiness. In -face of its disadvantages, we cultivate virtue for its own sake.] - -[76] [The common remark, “virtue brings its own reward,” is true -only with qualifications. The apostles, as to _this_ life, were the -most miserable of men: (1 Cor. xv. 9.) Virtue does not _always_ -bring earthly rewards. The grand support of the good is drawn from -considerations of that future state which the infidel denies. Observe, -1. We cannot suppose that God would so construct man, as that his -principal comfort and reward for virtue, is a delusion. 2. Very good -persons are often beset with painful doubts and fears, as to their -future safety. Would God allow such doubts, if the expectation of -future happiness were the _only_ reward of virtue? 3. This reward, at -best, is private; but for the encouragement of virtue, it must have -_obvious_ triumphs. - -On the other hand, bad men grow callous to the rebukes of conscience, -so that great sinners suffer less from remorse than small ones, and -what is worse, owe their tranquillity to their guilt. Again, he who -kills a good man, wholly _deprives_ him of his only reward, if this -life alone gives it. And the villain who kills himself, escapes his -only punishment. - -Virtuous persons, in the strong language of ROBERT HALL,[A] would be -“the _only_ persons who are wholly disappointed of their object; the -only persons who (by a fatal and irreparable mistake), expecting an -imaginary happiness in an imaginary world, lose their only opportunity -of enjoying those present pleasures, of which others avail themselves; -dooming themselves to grasp at shadows, while they neglect the -substance, and harassed with a perpetual struggle against their natural -propensities and passions, and all in vain!” - -[A] Sermon on the Vanity of Man.] - -[77] [Because, so soon as any community, or collection of persons, -conclude a man to be wholly vicious in his course, and without any -restraint of conscience, he is at once shorn of his influence, and will -soon be stripped of all power of mischief. On the other hand, we see -the might of virtue unarmed with power, in Luther, in Roger Williams, -in Wm. Penn, and innumerable other instances.] - -[78] Isa. lx. 21. - -[79] P. 109. - -[80] P. 110, &c. - -[81] P. 111, &c. - -[82] P. 118, &c. - -[83] See this proof drawn out briefly, ch. vi. - -[84] [This chapter is one of many attempts to account for the -mixture of suffering and enjoyment in this world; and demands close -examination both of its theory and its arguments. The student may -consult, as he has opportunity, MUSÆI Disput.: HOLTZSFUSII Disp. de -Lapsu Prim. Hominum: SELDEN de Laps. Angelorum: STAPFERI Inst.: WITSII -Econom. Fœd.: BATE’S Harmony of the Divine Attrib.: CALCOTT on the -Fall: SHUCKFORD on the Creation of Man: MANTON’S Sermons: SOUTH’S -do.: TOPLADY’S do.: PEARSON on the Creed: LE CLERC’S Diss.: HENLY’S -Dissert.: KENNICOTT on the Tree of Life: and FABRICIUS de Primo Peccato -Angelorum Lapsorum.] - -[85] [The _evils_ of life, are not to be regarded as entering, -necessarily, into God’s plan of probation; and they are not here so -presented. The Scriptures show that _all_ suffering is either punitive, -or castigatory. Man at first was to be tried by temptations, not by -sufferings.] - -[86] Chap. ii. - -[87] See Sermons preached at the _Rolle_, 1726, 2d ed. p. 205, &c. -Pref. p. 25, &c. Serm. p. 21, &c. - -[88] [“If we persist in our objection, notwithstanding these analogies, -then should we conclude, either that we are under the regimen of an -unrighteous Deity, or that there is no Deity at all.”--Dr. CHALMERS.] - -[89] [Shall _we_ be of such? Shall we forget or disregard the great -fact that when death has transferred us to other conditions, we, our -proper selves, will remain? No longer, indeed, united with flesh and -blood, surrounded with houses, lands, business, or enjoyments, such as -the present, _but still ourselves_. Still with wants to be supplied, -desires to be gratified, and capacities to be employed and developed!] - -[90] Part II. chap. v. - -[91] [This is one of those passages, remarked on in our introduction, -as a statement not properly explained or guarded. We cannot suppose the -author, to have overlooked the great fact of man’s fall and corruption. -That the argument properly considered, stands good, is the verdict of -such a man as CHALMERS. After speaking of human helplessness in matters -of religion, he says, “There is nothing in this [helplessness] to break -the analogies on which to found the negative vindication that forms -the great and undoubted achievement of this volume. The analogy lies -here:--that if a man wills to obtain prosperity in this life, he may, -if observant of the rules which experience and wisdom prescribe, in -general, make it good. And if he wills to attain blessedness in the -next life, he shall, if observant of what religion prescribes, most -certainly make it good; in conformity with the declaration, ‘he that -seeketh findeth.’”] - -[92] [It comes to this:--good things, in this life, are not forced -upon us; for we may refuse them, or turn any of them into evils. Nor -are they offered for our mere acceptance: but only as the _results_ of -self-control and pains-taking. So is it, as to heaven.] - -[93] [They _are_ an answer, but a cavil remains,--viz.: “the difference -between temporal and eternal things, is so vast that the cases are not -analogous.” Fairly considered, the cases are analogous, differing only -in _degree_, and not at all in principle. What would be wrong on a -great scale, is wrong on a small one. - -Perhaps the analogy may be pressed further. As the happiness and life -of some animals, may be sacrificed for the benefit of man, why may -not the happiness and life of some men, be sacrificed for the good of -innumerable beings of a higher order, who witness the affairs of this -earth? It would but be securing “the greatest good of the greatest -number.” No analogies could _teach_ this, for analogies of course teach -nothing. But if the Scriptures contained this doctrine, immensely more -repugnant than that which our author is here defending, would analogy -offer repellant presumptions?] - -[94] [That is, the son of Sirac, who says, “All things are double, -one against another; and He hath made nothing imperfect: one thing -established the good of another:” Ecclesiasticus xlii. 24.] - -[95] [Consult MILLMAN’S Hist. of Christ, vol. i.: PRIESTLEY’S -Institutes of Nat. and Rev. Rel., vol. i. ch. i.: and WHATELY’S Pol. -Econ., sec. 5.] - -[96] [We are too apt to overlook the effect of actions on the actor; -(which is often the chief effect) in improving or impairing his -own powers. A razor used to cut wood or stone, is not only put to -an improper use, but spoiled for the use which is proper. But this -is a faint illustration. The razor may be sharpened again; but how -shall we restore a blunted sensibility, an enfeebled judgment, or a -vitiated appetite? Our wrong-doing inflicts worse results on ourselves -than on our victims; and the evil may spread disaster over our whole -future. Hence the young make a fatal blunder when they suppose that an -occasional indulgence in impropriety may be compatible with general -welfare, and improvement. Instead of balancing the pros and cons of a -particular act, in the scale of utility or pleasure, they should mark -well its effects on themselves. See the description of how an upright -being may fall; in a subsequent part of this chapter.] - -[97] [“It might seem, at first sight, that if our state hereafter -presented no temptations to falsehood, injustice, &c., our habit of -indulging these vices here would be no disqualification for such -a state; and our forming the contrary habits no qualification. -But _habits_ of veracity, justice, &c. are not merely securities -against temptations to the contrary, but needful for conserving the -_principles_ of love of truth, justice, &c. As our happiness depends -upon _the ratio_ between our circumstances and our dispositions, our -happiness, in a state where things are ordered so as to give no scope -for the practice of falsehood, injustice, &c., _must depend on our -having formed a love for their opposites_. Besides, the circumstances -of the future life may be such as only to remove temptations from -characters formed by such moral discipline as we undergo in this life, -and not all things that could be temptations to any one.”--PROF. -FITZGERALD.] - -[98] It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually -restrain creatures from doing wrong. But if by a _sense of interest_ -is meant a speculative conviction or belief, that such and such -indulgence would occasion them greater uneasiness, upon the whole, than -satisfaction; it is contrary to present experience to say, that this -sense of interest is sufficient to restrain them from thus indulging -themselves. And if by a _sense of interest_ is meant a practical regard -to what is upon the whole our happiness; this is not only coincident -with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the -idea itself. And it is evident this reasonable self-love wants to -be improved, as really as any principle in our nature. For we daily -see it overmatched, not only by the more boisterous passions, but by -curiosity, shame, love of imitation, by any thing, even indolence: -especially if the interest, the temporal interest, suppose, which -is the end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are -profligate men mistaken, when they affirm they are wholly governed -by interestedness and self-love; and so little cause is there for -moralists to disclaim this principle.--See p. 131. - -[99] [Discipline is mainly promoted by a careful regard to acts of -small individual moment. The subjecting of trivial acts to moral -considerations, is the sure, and the only mode of self-culture. -These acts are embryo habits, and we may often see clearly the moral -character of a habit, when the single act seems indifferent. Thus -viewed, the importance of single acts will seldom seem small. A single -cigar, one glass of wine for convivial purposes, one story told with -exaggerations, may change the complexion of our character, and of our -whole destiny! - -It is doing or refusing to do, from a law-abiding regard to -consequences, that constitutes self-discipline. Papists wholly err -in teaching the repression of bodily desires as in itself virtuous. -Indulgence may be either an obstacle or an aid to moral progress, -according to our reason for indulgence. When we can repress an appetite -or passion whenever indulgence would be wrong, its mastery over us is -broken; and when the passions and appetites act rightly, from force -of virtuous habit, without direct volition, discipline is complete. -Ascetic acts are only useful as _means_, and so long as they are -_ascetic_ (askesis) are proofs of imperfect obedience. Discipline is -good only _as_ discipline; and when complete, changes from a struggle -between principle and inclination, to a spontaneous habit, and -permanent mental peace.] - -[100] [Chalmers objects to this hypothetical fall of man, that it wants -harmony with the Scripture account. But I do not see the force of the -objection. Butler _of course_ does not copy the Scripture account, for -he would then depart from the aim and nature of his book. The Bible -says man fell _suddenly_, no less in his state than in his character. -Butler says that we could not reason out _how much_ disorder and -damage would ensue from the first sin: and in saying this, avoids any -incongruity with the Mosaic account, which tells us how much. What B. -says of the formation of habit, by repeated transgressions, certainly -cannot be gainsayed. - -Adam “died,” the very day he ate the forbidden fruit. The sinner -“lives” the very day he believes on the only-begotten Son of God. -Increase of guilt, or growth in grace are predicable in both instances. -In both also there is an instant transition into a new relationship -with God.] - -[101] [A forced or reluctant obedience is wholly incompatible with -earthly happiness; but may, in the highest degree promote our _future_ -happiness. It will not _long_ mar our happiness, even here; because -being based on principle, and established by habit, it will, in process -of time, be superseded by prompt and pleasurable submission. Thus a -person _habitually_ virtuous, is hardly conscious of self-denial; a -fact noticed by Aristotle. “He who abstains from bodily pleasures and -delights, is virtuous in this very abstinence; but he who is troubled -by it is undisciplined.” Ethic. Nic. ii. 3.] - -[102] P. 145. - -[103] [The student should learn to distinguish between the _kinds_ -of necessity. There is--1. “Logical necessity,” which requires the -admission of a consequent to a premise 2. “Moral necessity,” which -requires means in order to ends. “Physical necessity,” which is the -compulsory connection of sequences to antecedents, in the material -world. 4. “Metaphysical necessity,” which belongs to God only, as -existing eternally and immutably. All these exist and operate, and by -them we govern ourselves. - -But there are various other kinds of necessity, erroneous and -pernicious, which may be grouped under two heads:--1. “Atheistic,” -sometimes called the Democritic, which ascribes all things to the -mechanical laws of matter. 2. “Theistic,” which admits the existence of -God, but denies to him moral character, and makes him the arbitrary and -only agent in the universe, and creatures not responsible. See COLLINGS -on Providence, PRICE’S Dissertations, RUTHERFORD on Providence, -CHARNOCK’S Sermons, and WHATELY’S Logic.] - -[104] P. 157. - -[105] P. 158. - -[106] [HUME says, “though man, in truth, is a necessary agent, having -all his actions determined by fixed and immutable laws, yet, this being -concealed from him, he acts with the conviction of being a free agent.” - -Which is the same as to say that God intended to conceal from men an -important fact, involving the whole subject of right and wrong, but Mr. -Hume found him out!] - -[107] By _will_ and _character_ is meant that which, in speaking of -men, we should express, not only by these words, but also by the words -_temper_, _taste_, _dispositions_, _practical principles_: _that whole -frame of mind, from whence we act in one manner rather than another_. - -[108] Chap. ii. - -[109] P. 157, &c. - -[110] Chap. ii. - -[111] Dissert. II. - -[112] Serm. 2, at the _Rolls_. - -[113] Dissert. II. - -[114] However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of God -is determined, by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case; -though one chooses to decline matters of such abstract speculation, -and to speak with caution when one does speak of them. But if it be -intelligible to say, that _it is fit and reasonable for every one to -consult his own happiness_, then _fitness of action, or the right and -reason of the case_, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And it -seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve one course of action, -or one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from -design implies that he does, without supposing somewhat prior in that -end, to be the ground of the preference; as to suppose him to discern -an abstract proposition to be true, without supposing somewhat prior in -it, to be the ground of the discernment. It doth not therefore appear, -that moral right is any more relative to perception, than abstract -truth is; or that it is any more improper to speak of the fitness and -lightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of things, than -to speak of abstract truth, as thus founded. - -[115] P. 118. - -[116] P. 110, &c. - -[117] Chap. ii. - -[118] Dissertation II. - -[119] Pp. 68, 71. - -[120] Serm. 8th, at the _Rolls_. - -[121] [Consult, in favor of the doctrine of necessity, atheistical -writers generally; such as Fichte, Hegel, D’Holback, Comte, Crousse, -Martineau, Leroux, and Holyoake--also, BELSHAM’S Essays, COLLINS on -Liberty, CROMBIE on Phil. Necessity, HOBBES’ Liberty and Necessity, and -Leviathan, PRIESTLEY on Liberty, HARTLEY on Man, and EDWARDS on the -Will. - -Against the doctrine, see BEATTIE’S Works, Part 2; Replies to Hobbes -by BRAMHALL and LAWSON; Replies to Priestley by PALMER and BRYANT; -GROVE on Liberty; CLARKE’S Sermons at the Boyle Lectures; GIBB’S -Contemplations; KING’S Origin of Evil; REID on the Mind; WATTS on -Liberty; HARRIS’ Boyle Lectures; JACKSON’S Defence; BUTTERWORTH on -Moral Government.] - -[122] [MAIMONIDES makes use of the following similitude. “Suppose one -of good understanding, whose mother had died soon after he was born to -be brought up on an island, where he saw no human being but his father -nor the female of any beast. This person when grown up inquires how men -are produced. He is told that they are bred in the womb of one of the -same species and that while in the womb we are very small and there -move and are nourished. The young man inquires whether when thus in -the womb we did not eat, and drink, and breathe, as we do now, and is -answered, No. Then he denies it, and offers demonstration that it could -not be so. For says he, if either of us cease to breathe our life is -gone; and how could we have lived close shut up in a womb for months? -So if we cease to eat and drink, we die, and how could the child live -so for months? and thus he satisfies himself that it is _impossible_ -man should come into existence in such a manner.”] - -[123] [Let us imagine a person to be taken to view some great -historical painting, before which hangs a thick curtain. The attendant -raises the curtain a few inches. Can the spectator, from the unmeaning -strip of foreground, derive any conception of the figures yet -concealed? Much less is he able to criticize their proportions, or -beauty, or perspective, or even the design of the artist? The small -fragment of a tree, or flower, or animal, or building, may seem quite -unmeaning and even ugly, though the whole would present beauty, -fitness, or grandeur. Now the portion of God’s dominions within our -survey, is as utterly insignificant, compared to the universe, and its -interminable duration, as, an atom compared to a planet or a man’s age -to eternity. - -The concluding observations of this chapter, abundantly remove every -difficulty as to such ignorance being as valid against the _proofs_ of -religion, as it is against _objections_ to it.] - -[124] [No truly philosophical mind can be arrogant; because the -wider the range of thought, the greater are the discoveries of our -ignorance. The young student may well hesitate to decide points, on -which the profoundest thinkers take opposite sides, and when conscious -of inability intrust himself to the guidance of those whose lives are -best.] - -[125] Pp. 177, 178. - -[126] P. 173, &c. - -[127] P. 175. - -[128] Pp. 72, 73. - -[129] P. 68, and Part II. chap. vi. - -[130] Serm. at the _Rolls_, p. 312, 2d ed. - -[131] P. 172, &c. - -[132] See Part II. ch. ii. - -[133] P. 173. - -[134] [The remainder of this chapter is a recapitulation of the whole -argument from the beginning; and should be carefully conned.] - -[135] Part II. ch. vi. - -[136] P. 108. - -[137] [There is a slight indication in this chapter that Butler falls -into the old plan of settling the necessity of Christianity, before -determining its truth. Paley discards this order of arrangement, -in his very first sentence; and with good reason. The necessity of -revelation is an abstraction; the proofs of it are patent facts. To -hold in abeyance the credentials presented by Christianity, till -we first satisfy ourselves that God could or would make any such -announcements, is unphilosophical and irreverent. This chapter -discusses the _importance_ rather than the necessity of revelation; and -so is a fitting commencement of the discussion. Every truth disclosed -in revelation, over and above the truths which natural religion -furnishes, proves the _necessity_ of revelation, if we would know any -thing of _such_ truths. And it is such truths which constitute the very -peculiarities of revelation, and teach the _way of salvation_, for the -sinful and helpless.] - -[138] [No one can read the writings of the great sages of antiquity -without a full and sad conviction that in relation to the character -of God, the sinfulness of man, the future state, and the rules of -living, those prime points on which we need knowledge, they were -almost profoundly ignorant. See on this point, LELAND’S Adv. and -Necess.: CHALMERS’ Nat. Theol.: MCCOSH’S Div. Gov.: PASCAL’S Thoughts: -WARBURTON’S Div. Legation.] - -[139] Invenis multos----propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia quasi -sufficiunt sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid -mihi præcepturus est Christus? Ut bene vivam? Jam bene vivo. Quid -mihi necessarius est Christus; nullum homicidium, nullum furtum, -nullam rapinam facio, res alienas non concupisco, nullo adulterio -contaminor? Nam inveniatur in vita mea aliquid quod reprehendatur, et -qui reprehenderit faciat Christianum. _Aug. in Psal._ xxxi. [You find -many who refuse to become Christians, because they feel sufficient of -themselves to lead a good life. “We ought to live well.” says one. -“What will Christ teach me? To live well? I do live well, what need -then have I of Christ? I commit no murder, no theft, no robbery. I -covet no man’s goods, and am polluted by no adultery. Let some one -find in me any thing to censure, and he who can do so, may make me a -Christian.”] - -[140] [The true mode of distinguishing a temporary, local, or -individual command from such as are of universal and perpetual -obligation, is well laid down by WAYLAND, _Mor. Sci._ ch. ix. sec. 2.] - -[141] [Natural religion shows us the danger of sin; but not the -infinite danger of eternal retribution, and the hopelessness of -restoration after death. And as to the efficacy of repentance, it -rather opposes that doctrine than teaches it. At least it does not -teach that repentance may be accepted, so as not only to cancel guilt, -but restore to the favor of God.] - -[142] [“Christianity was left with Christians, to be transmitted, in -like manner as the religion of nature had been left, with mankind in -general. There was however this difference that by an institution -of external religion with a standing ministry for instruction and -discipline, it pleased God to unite Christiana into _visible churches_, -and all along to preserve them over a great part of the world, and thus -perpetuate a general publication of the Gospel.” BUTLER’S sermon before -the Soc. for Prop. the Gospel. He goes on to show, in that discourse, -that these churches, however corrupt any may become, are repositories -for the written oracles of God, and so carry the antidote to their -heresies.] - -[143] Rev. xxii. 11. - -[144] [“It is no real objection to this, though it may seem so at first -sight, to say that since Christianity is a _remedial_ system, designed -to obviate those very evils which have been produced by the neglect -and abuse of the light of nature, it ought not to be _liable_ to the -same perversions. Because--1. Christianity is not designed primarily -to remedy the defects of _nature_, but of an unnatural state of ruin -into which men were brought by _the Fall_. And 2. It is remedial of -the defects of nature in a _great degree_, by its giving additional -advantages. 3. It might be impossible that it should be remedial in a -greater degree than it is, without destroying man’s free agency; which -would be to destroy its own end, the practice of virtue.”--FITZGERALD’S -Notes.] - -[145] [CHALMERS (Nat. Theol., b. v. ch. iv.) makes this very plain. -He shows the _ethics_ of natural religion to be one thing and -its _objects_ another. Natural religion discloses no Redeemer or -Sanctifier; but it teaches how we should regard such a person, if -there be one. It teaches love and conformity to such a being by the -_relation_ in which we of course stand to him. How we are to _express_ -that love and obedience it cannot teach.] - -[146] See The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy, of the Christian -Sacraments, &c., [by WATERLAND,] and COLLIBER of Revealed Religion, as -there quoted. - -[147] [If Christianity were but “a republication of natural religion,” -or as Tindall says, “as old as creation,” why do deists oppose it? It -does indeed republish natural religion, but it adds stupendous truths -beside. If it gave us no new light, no new motives, it would be but a -tremendous curse, making us all the more responsible, and none the more -instructed or secure.] - -[148] P. 94. - -[149] Ch. v. - -[150] John iii. 5. - -[151] This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts -considered respectively as such. But yet, since the latter have -somewhat of a moral nature, we may see the reason of them, considered -in this view. Moral and positive precepts are in some respects alike, -in other respects different. So far as they are alike, we discern the -reasons of both; so far as they are different, we discern the reasons -of the former, but not of the latter. See p. 189, &c. - -[152] [Without offering the least objection to what is here said of -the comparative value of moral and positive institutions, it should -not be overlooked that sometimes, obedience to a positive rite is more -indicative of an obedient spirit, than obedience to a moral rule. The -latter is urged by its intrinsic propriety, over and above the command, -and appeals to several of our finer impulses. The former rests singly -on our reverence for the will of God. There are many who would repel a -temptation to steal, or to lie, who yet are insensible to the duty of -baptism or the Lord’s supper.] - -[153] Matt. ix. 13, and xii. 7. - -[154] Hosea vi. 6. - -[155] See Matt. xii. 7. - -[156] See ch. iii. - -[157] [Dr. ANGUS judiciously remarks on this sentence, “This sentiment, -as understood by Butler, is just, but very liable to abuse. Clearly, -the Bible must be so interpreted as to agree with _all_ known truth, -whether of natural religion or natural science. At the same time, to -correct the theology of the Bible by the theology of nature, as finite -and guilty men understand it, may involve the rejection of Bible -theology entirely; and of the very light and teaching it was intended -to supply. The converse of Butler’s statement is equally true, and even -more important. If in natural theology there be found any facts, the -seeming lesson of which is contrary to revealed religion, such seeming -lesson is not the real one.” Practically, it will be found that seeming -meanings of Scripture, really erroneous, are corrected by other parts -of Scripture itself. I understand Butler as only affirming that we -must interpret Scripture according to immutable principles, and _known -truth_. The infidel rejects it for not conforming to his _assumed -hypothesis_.] - -[158] P. 203. - -[159] Chaps. iii., iv., v., vi. - -[160] Chap. vii. - -[161] P. 172. - -[162] [Papists urge that the actual conversion of the bread and wine -in the Eucharist is an invisible miracle. But an invisible miracle is -such because wrought under circumstances which _exclude_ examination: -while transubstantiation _invites_ and _facilitates_ examination. It is -wrought publicly, and constantly, and yet cannot be discovered to be a -miracle. Indeed it supposes the working of a second miracle, to make -the first invisible.] - -[163] [Paley shows conclusively that a denial of miracles leads not -only to a denial of revelation, but a denial of the existence of God, -all of whose extraordinary acts are necessarily miraculous.] - -[164] [WHATELY, in his _Logic_, b. iii., has shown the folly of the -Deistical attempts to explain our Savior’s miracles as mere natural -events. Having labored to show this of some _one_ of the miracles, they -then do so as to _another_, and thence infer that _all_ were accidental -conjunctures of natural circumstances. He says, they might as well -argue “that because it is not improbable one may throw sixes once in a -hundred throws, therefore it is no more improbable that one may throw -sixes a hundred times running.” - -FITZGERALD says, “the improbability of a whole series of strange -natural events, taking place unaccountably, one after another, amounts -to a far greater improbability than is involved in the admission of -miracles.”] - -[165] [That man, at first, must have had supernatural _instructions_, -or in other words some revelations, is shown by Archbishop WHATELY in -his “Origin of Civilization.” Rev. SAMUEL STANHOPE SMITH expresses -his conviction, both from reason and history, that man in his savage -state could not even have preserved life without instruction from his -Creator.] - -[166] [The maintenance by the Jews, of a system of pure Theism, through -so many and so rude ages, without being superior, or even equal to -their neighbors, in science and civilization, can only be accounted for -on the presumption of a revelation.] - -[167] P. 166, &c. - -[168] [MILLS (Logic, chap. 24, § 5,) points out what he deems a mistake -of “some of the writers against Hume on Miracles,” in confounding -the improbability of an event, before its occurrence, with the -improbability afterwards; that is, considering them equal in degree. -He fully proves that the great Laplace fell into this error, and the -student should consult the passage. - -Prof. FITZGERALD holds Butler to have fallen into the mistake adverted -to by Mills; and quotes the latter author in a way which seems to make -him say that such is his opinion also. I do not so understand Mills, -nor do I see that Butler has confounded these meanings; but the very -contrary. He expressly affirms, and most truly, that the strongest -presumption may lie against “the most ordinary facts _before the proof_ -which yet is overcome by almost any proof.” Butler’s position here, may -be thus illustrated. Suppose a hundred numbers to be put in a box, and -it is proposed to draw out the number 42. Now there are 99 chances to 1 -against drawing that, or any other _given_ number. But suppose a child -tells you he put the hundred numbers into a box, and drew out one, and -it proved to be 42; you at once believe, for that was as likely to come -as any other. - -The proof of Christianity from prophecy becomes amazingly strong, thus -viewed. There are many predictions, for instance that Christ should be -born at a certain time, and place, and under certain very particular -circumstances. The probabilities against such a _conjuncture_ of events -are almost infinite; yet they happened exactly as foretold.] - -[169] [For instance, a mass of ice or snow, may imperceptibly -accumulate for an age, and then suddenly fall and overwhelm a village. -Or a planet, or comet, may have been gradually nearing our earth for a -million of years, without producing, _as yet_, any effect on our orbit; -but in process of time, its proximity may work great changes in our -condition.] - -[170] P. 208. - -[171] 1 Cor. i. 28. - -[172] See Chap. vi. - -[173] See Chap. vi. - -[174] [See note, page 218.] - -[175] P. 220. - -[176] [It is not to be understood that Butler would not have the -ordinary rules of interpretation applied to the Holy Scriptures. -Because the interpretation, “if not gathered _out_ of the words, -must be brought _into_ them.” We cannot interpret them as if we knew -beforehand, what the Holy Ghost meant to say; as SPINOZA proposes to -do, in his Philosophia Scripturæ Interpretes. The student will do well -to consult BENSON’S Hulsean Lectures on Scripture Difficulties: KING’S -Morsels of Criticism: STORR, Exertationes Exeget.: MICHAELIS, Introd. -ad. Nov. Test.: and FEATLEY’S Key.] - -[177] Pp. 207, 208. - -[178] [See 1 Cor. xii. 1-10: xiii. 1: and xiv. 1-19.] - -[179] [“The power of healing, or working miracles, is, during the -whole course of its operation, one continued arrest or diversion of -the general laws of matter and motion. It was therefore fit that this -power should be given occasionally. But the _speaking with tongues_, -when once the gift was conferred, became thenceforth a natural -power; just as the free use of members of the body, after being -restored, by miracle, to the exercise of their natural functions. -In healing, the apostles are to be considered as the workers of a -miracle; in speaking strange tongues, as persons on whom a miracle is -performed.”--WARBURTON, Doct. of Grace, b. i. ch. iii.] - -[180] Heb. vi. 1. - -[181] Acts iii. 21. - -[182] [The doctrine of “development” has of late been popular in -some quarters. Butler here shows the only _safe_ notion we may -entertain on that subject. “Exact thought, and careful consideration” -may show us how to confute specious heresies, expound embarrassing -passages, dissipate painful doubts, and remove many prejudices or -misapprehensions. But revelation is complete as it stands. - -We may hope for progress in theology as in other sciences; not in -the development of new facts or faith, as Papists and Socinians -pretend, but in the increase of sound wisdom, aided by a more perfect -interpretation of God’s word.] - -[183] Chap. vi. - -[184] Chap. v. - -[185] Chap. vii. - -[186] Chap. iv. latter part, and v. vi. - -[187] [This pregnant paragraph should receive very full attention. -We know much of men, little of God. What men are likely to do, or -say, in certain circumstances, is often very clear; and generally may -be guessed at. But what God would do or say in new contingencies, -who shall attempt to prescribe or predict? We are poorly qualified -to assert that such and such declarations could not have come from -infinite wisdom; but we are quite competent to affirm that such and -such things could not have come from human contrivance or enthusiasm.] - -[188] In the foregoing chapter. - -[189] Part I, ch. vii., to which this all along refers. - -[190] [“It is the last step of reason to know there is an infinity of -things which surpass it.”--PASCAL. “The wall of adamant which bounds -human inquiry, has scarcely ever been discovered by any adventurer, -till he was aroused by the shock that drove him back.”--Sir JAS. -MACKINTOSH. “Of the dark parts of revelation there are two sorts: -one which may be cleared up by the studious; the other which will -always reside within the shadow of God’s throne where it would be -impiety to intrude.”--WARBURTON. “A Christianity without mystery is as -unphilosophical as it is unscriptural.”--ANGUS.] - -[191] John xi. 52. - -[192] 2 Peter iii. 13. - -[193] 1 Peter i. 11, 12. - -[194] Phil. ii. [6-11.] - -[195] [The influences of the Holy Spirit are not only “given to good -men,” but are sent upon many who live unmindful of eternity, quickening -their consciences, enlightening their understandings and arresting -their passions, and thus it is they are converted unto the truth in -Christ.] - -[196] John xiv. 2. - -[197] John v. 22, 23. - -[198] Matt. xxviii. 18. - -[199] 1 Cor. xv. 28. - -[200] 1 Tim. iii. 16. - -[201] P. 174, &c. - -[202] 1 Cor. i. [18-25.] - -[203] Pp. 178, 179. - -[204] Pp. 180, 181. - -[205] P. 172, &c. - -[206] [“Providence hurries not himself to display to-day the -consequence of the principle he yesterday announced. He will draw it -out in the lapse of ages Even according to our reasoning logic is none -the less sure, because it is slow.”--GUIZOT on Civilization, Lect. I. - -How impressively is this sentiment sustained by modern geology, and -astronomy!] - -[207] [“Philosophers make shameful and dangerous mistakes, when they -judge of the Divine economy. He cannot, they tell us, act thus, -it would be contrary to his wisdom, or his justice, &c. But while -they make these peremptory assertions they show themselves to be -unacquainted with the fundamental rules of their own science, and -with the origin of all late improvements. True philosophy would begin -the other way, with observing the constitution of the world, how God -has made us, and in what circumstances he has placed us, and _then_ -from what he has done, form a sure judgment what he would do. Thus -might they learn ‘the invisible things of God from those which are -clearly seen’ the things which are not accomplished from those which -are.”--POWELL’S _Use and Abuse of Philosophy_.] - -[208] 1 Tim. ii. 5. - -[209] [The interposition of a man of known probity and worth often -saves the thoughtless or the guilty from punishment. Mediation is seen -in a thousand forms in the arrangements of social life; and the common -sense of all mankind approves of it. The release of the offending, by -the intercession of the good, and all the benefits of advice, caution, -example, instruction, persuasion, and authority, are instances of -mediation.] - -[210] [MR. NEWMAN notices a distinction between the facts of -revelation, and its principles; and considers the argument from analogy -more concerned with its principles than with its facts. “The revealed -facts are special and singular, from the nature of the case, but the -revealed principles are common to all the works of God; and if the -Author of nature be the author of grace, it may be expected that the -principles displayed in them will be the same, and form a connecting -link between them. In this identity of _principle_, lies the analogy -of natural and revealed religion, in Butler’s sense of the word. The -Incarnation is a fact, and cannot be paralleled by any thing in nature: -the doctrine of mediation is a principle, and is abundantly exemplified -in nature.”--_Essay on Developments._] - -[211] [The student will find the inadequacy of repentance to cancel -guilt, beautifully exhibited by WAYLAND, Mor. Science: MAGEE, -Atonement: HOWE, Living Temple.] - -[212] P. 232, &c. - -[213] John iii. 16. - -[214] It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cursory -reader, that it is, in any sort, affirmed or implied in any thing -said in this chapter, that none can have the benefit of the general -redemption, but such as have the advantage of being made acquainted -with it in the present life. But it may be needful to mention, that -several questions, which have been brought into the subject before -us, and determined, are not in the least entered into here, questions -which have been, I fear, rashly determined, and perhaps with equal -rashness contrary ways. For instance, whether God could have saved -the world by other means than the death of Christ, consistently with -the general laws of his government. And had not Christ come into the -world, what would have been the future condition of the better sort of -men; those just persons over the face of the earth, for whom Manasses -in his prayer[A] asserts, repentance was not appointed. The meaning of -the first of these questions is greatly ambiguous: and neither of them -can properly be answered, without going upon that infinitely absurd -supposition, that we know the whole of the case. And perhaps the very -inquiry, _What would have followed, if God had not done as he has_, may -have in it some very great impropriety: and ought not to be carried -on any further than is necessary to help our partial and inadequate -conceptions of things. - -[A] [The “prayer of Manasses” is one of the apocryphal books of the Old -Testament, which next precedes “Maccabees.”] - -[215] John i., and viii. 12. - -[216] Rom. iii. 25, v. 11: 1 Cor. v. 7: Eph. v. 2: 1 John ii. 2: Matt -xxvi. 28. - -[217] John i. 29, 36, and throughout the book of Revelation. - -[218] Throughout the epistle to the Hebrews. - -[219] Isa. liii.: Dan. ix. 24: Ps. cx. 4. - -[220] Heb. x. 1. - -[221] Heb. viii. 4, 5. - -[222] Heb. x. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10. - -[223] Heb. ix. 28. - -[224] John xi. 51, 52. - -[225] 1 Pet. iii. 18. - -[226] Matt. xx. 28: Mark x. 45: 1 Tim. ii. 6. - -[227] 2 Pet. ii. 1: Rev. xiv. 4: 1 Cor. vi. 20. - -[228] 1 Pet. i. 19: Rev. v. 9: Gal. iii. 13. - -[229] Heb. vii. 25: 1 John ii. 1, 2. - -[230] Heb. ii. 10.: v. 9. - -[231] 2 Cor. v. 19: Rom. v. 10: Eph. ii. 16. - -[232] Heb. ii. 14. See also a remarkable passage in the book of Job, -xxxiii. 24. - -[233] Phil. ii. 8, 9: John iii. 35, and v. 22, 23. - -[234] Rev. v. 12, 13. - -[235] John vi. 14. - -[236] P. 188, &c. - -[237] Eph. iv. 12, 13. - -[238] John xiv. 2, 3: Rev. iii. 21, and xi. 15. - -[239] 2 Thess. i. 8. - -[240] Heb. ix. 26. - -[241] [Consult MAGEE, on Atonement: STAPFERI Institutiones: TURRETIN, -De Satisfactione: CHALMERS, Discourses: OWEN, Satis. of Christ.] - -[242] P. 194, &c. - -[243] [This objection is ably urged by TINDALL. The answer of our -author is complete. We should remember, that twice in the history of -mankind, revelation _has been_ universal. The first pair, and the -occupants of the ark, comprised the whole population. But how soon was -light rejected! Christianity is universal, in nature and intention; is -to become so in fact; and according to a very probable construction of -prophecy, will continue to be universal, for three hundred and sixty -thousand years.] - -[244] [May not this be a principal object of the Apocalypse? As the -book of Daniel furnished a constant and powerful support to the faith -of the Jew, by the constant development of prophecy, so the Apocalypse, -rightly studied must powerfully, and through all time, support the -faith of the Christian by the continual unfolding and verification of -its predictions.] - -[245] 2 Cor. viii. 12. - -[246] Introduction. - -[247] Part I. chap. v. - -[248] Part I. chap. iv. and pp. 156, 157. - -[249] Pp. 156, 157. - -[250] Dan. xii. 10. See also Isa. xxix. 13, 14: Matt. vi. 23, and -xi. 25, and xiii. 11, 12: John iii. 19, and v. 44: 1 Cor. ii. 14, -and 2 Cor. iv. 4: 2 Tim. iii. 13; and that affectionate as well as -authoritative admonition, so very many times inculcated, _He that -hath ears to hear, let him hear_. Grotius saw so strongly the thing -intended in these and other passages of Scripture of the like sense, -as to say, that the proof given us of Christianity was less than it -might have been, for this very purpose: _Ut ita sermo Evangelii tanquam -lapis esset Lydius ad quem ingenia sanabilia explorarentur_. De Ver. -R. C. lib. ii. [So that the Gospel should be a touchstone, to test the -honesty of men’s dispositions.] - -[251] Pp. 100, 257, &c. - -[252] [See WITSII Meletemeta, Diss. IV.: PFAFII Disput.: CAMPBELL on -Miracles: DOUGLASS’ Criterion: FARMER’S Dissertations: PALEY’S Evid.: -TAYLOR’S Apol. of Ben Mordecai: TUCKER’S Light of Nat.: WATSON’S -Tracts, vol. iv.: JORTIN’S Sermons: Bp. FLEETWOOD’S Essays: BOYLE -Lectures: LARDNER’S Credibility.] - -[253] [“The miracles of the Jewish historian, are intimately connected -with all the civil affairs, and make a necessary and inseparable -part. The whole history is founded in them; it consists of little -else; and if it were not a history of them, it would be a history of -nothing.”--BOLINGBROKE, Posthumous Works, vol. iii. p. 279.] - -[254] [An admirable work on this recondite mode of proving the truth -of the New Testament narrative, is PALEY’S Horæ Paulinæ. The same -department of evidence is ably handled by BIRK, in his Horæ Evangelicæ, -and Horæ Apostolicæ: GRAVES on the Pentateuch: and BLUNT in his -“Undesigned Coincidences both of the Old and New Testament.” GROTIUS, -De Veritate, has some excellent passages on the same subject.] - -[255] [Clem. Rom. Ep. 1. c. 47.] CLEMENT, who is here quoted, lived in -the first century, and is mentioned Phil. iv. 3. His epistle to the -Corinthians, written in Greek, contains the passage here referred to, -which may be thus translated: “Take the letter of the blessed Paul -the Apostle. What did he write to you, in the first beginning of the -Gospel? Truly he sent you a divinely inspired letter about himself, and -Cephas, and Apollos.” - -[256] Gal. i.: 1 Cor. xi. 23, &c.: 1 Cor. xv. 8. - -[257] Rom. xv. 19: 1 Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10-28, &c., and xiii. 1, 2, 8, and -the whole 14th chapter: 2 Cor. xii. 12, 13: Gal. iii. 2, 5. - -[258] See the Koran, chap. xiii. and chap. xvii. - -[259] [MAHOMET expressly declares that he worked no _public_ miracles -in confirmation of his mission, “because the former nations have -charged them with imposture.” He claims, however, to have had private -miraculous assurances of his mission, and most preposterous they were. - -WHATELY, in his Christian Evidences, has handled this aspect of -miracles with great ability. See also PALEY’S Evidences, sec. 3: and -GIBBON’S Decline and Fall, chap. 1.] - -[260] [ALEXANDER, in his Evidences, and several other writers have -placed this argument in a very convincing light. ARNOBIUS, one of the -earliest Christian writers, asks, “Shall we say that the men of those -times were inconsiderate, deceitful, stupid, and brutish enough to -feign having seen what they never saw? and that when they might have -lived in peace and comfort, they chose gratuitous hatred and obloquy?” - -The _rejection_ of Christianity by so many in the first age was the -result of the continued action of personal and hereditary prejudice -and depravity, capable of resisting any supposable evidence. The -_reception_ of Christianity by multitudes, under the same evidences, -and to their immediate personal damage, shows strongly that there was -enough evidence to produce those effects. Thus the rejection by some -does not countervail the acceptance by others.] - -[261] P. 294, &c. - -[262] [Compare BUTLER’S Sermons; on Balaam, and on Self-deceit.] - -[263] See the foregoing chapter. - -[264] [“Whenever a general scheme is known to be pursued by a writer, -that scheme becomes the true key in the hands of his reader, for -unlocking the meaning of particular parts, which would otherwise not -be seen clearly to refer to such scheme. The inspired writers had one -common and predominant scheme in view, which was to _bear testimony to -Jesus_. Whatever passages occur in their writings, which bear an apt -and easy resemblance to the history of Jesus, may, or rather must in -all reasonable construction, be applied to him.”--HURD on the Proph., -p. 117.] - -[265] [Consult on this point, GULICK, Theologia Prophetica: VITRINGA, -Observationes: HENGSTENBURG, Christologia: HORSLEY’S Tracts and -Sermons: KING’S Morsels of Criticism: WAUGH’S Dissertations: LYALL’S -Propœdia Prophetica.] - -[266] It appears that Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in this -way. For Jerome on the place says: _Duas posteriores bestias--in uno -Macedonum regno ponit_. And as to the ten kings; _Decem reges enumerat, -qui fuerunt sævissimi: ipsosque reges non unius ponit regni, verbi -gratia, Macedoniæ, Syriæ, Asiæ, et Ægypti; sed de diversis regnis unum -efficit regum ordinem_. [“The two latter beasts he places in one of the -Macedonian kingdoms.” “He reckons up ten kings who had been excessively -cruel and these not kings of one country, as Macedonia, for instance, -or Syria, or Asia, or Egypt; but makes up his set of kings out of -different kingdoms.”] In this way of interpretation, any thing may be -made of any thing. - -[267] P. 189, &c. - -[268] John i. 3. - -[269] Eph. iii. 9. - -[270] Acts iii. 21. - -[271] Rev. x. 7. - -[272] Dan. ii. 44. - -[273] Dan. vii. 22. - -[274] Rev. xi. 17, 18; xx. 6. - -[275] Dan. vii. 27. - -[276] Chap. ii. iii. &c. - -[277] Deut. xxviii. 64; xxx. 2, 3: Isa. xlv. 17. - -[278] Isa. lx. 21: Jer. xxx. 11; xlvi. 28: Amos ix. 14, 15: Jer. xxxi. -36. - -[279] Isa. viii. 14, 15; xlix. 5; chap. liii.: Mal. i. 10, 11, and -chap. iii. - -[280] Isa. xlix. 6, chap. ii., chap, xi., chap. lvi. 7: Mal. i. 11. To -which must be added, the other prophecies of the like kind, several in -the New Testament, and very many in the Old; which describe what shall -be the completion of the revealed plan of Providence. - -[281] [See DAVIDSON’S Disc. on Proph.: BLANEY on Daniel’s LXX. Weeks: -HURD’S Introd. to the Study of Proph.: JORTIN’S Ser. at Boyle Lect.: -FULLER’S Gosp. its own Witness, part ii.: WAUGH’S Diss.: APTHORPE’S -Discourses.] - -[282] P. 250. - -[283] [Hundreds of instances might be adduced, in which profane -historians corroborate the statements of the Scriptures. The following -are merely specimens: DIODORUS SICULUS, STRABO, TACITUS, PLINY, and -SOLINUS, speak of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. The lives of -David and Solomon are given in the remains of the PHŒNICIAN ANNALS, -in DAMASCENUS, and EUPOLEMUS. MENANDER describes the carrying away of -the Ten Tribes by Salmanasor. SUETONIUS, TACITUS, PLINY the younger, -and NUMENIUS, speak of Jesus Christ. His miracles are owned by -CELSUS, PORPHYRY, JULIAN, and Jewish writers opposed to Christianity. -SUETONIUS, TACITUS, PLINY, JULIAN, and others describe his being put -to death; and TACITUS says that many were put to death for adhering -to his religion. PHLEGON mentions the miracles of Peter; and Paul is -enumerated among eminent authors, in a fragment of LONGINUS.] - -[284] [This thought is elaborated with skill by WHATELY in his -“_Historic Doubts_.” He takes up all the popular infidel objections -as to the life of Christ, and applies them with undiminished or even -increased force against the evidences that such a man as Buonaparte -ever existed. - -JOHNSON in a lively sally once said--“‘It is easy to be on the negative -side. I deny that Canada is taken. The French are a much more numerous -people than we; and it is not likely they would allow us to take it.’ -‘But the Government have announced the fact.’ ‘Very true. But the -ministry have put us to an enormous expense by the war in America, and -it is their interest to persuade us that we have got something for -our money.’ ‘But the fact is confirmed by thousands who were at the -taking of it.’ ‘Aye, but these men have an interest in deceiving us: -they don’t want you should think the French have beat them. Now suppose -you go over and find it so, that would only satisfy yourself; for -when you come back we will not believe you. We will say you have been -bribed.’”--BOSWELL.] - -[285] P. 267, &c. - -[286] P. 270, &c. - -[287] Deut. xxviii. 37. - -[288] All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not -reducible to the head of certain miracles, or determinate completions -of prophecy. See p. 263. - -[289] [Butler states this argument with more than his usual brevity, -and its force is not seen without reflection. “If contrivance or -accident could have given to Christianity _any_ of its apparent -testimonies, its miracles, its prophecies, its morals, its propagation, -or [the character of] its founder, there could be no room to believe, -or even imagine, that _all_ these appearances of great credibility, -could be _united together_, by any such means. If successful craft -could have contrived its public miracles, or the pretence of them, -it requires another reach of craft, to adopt its prophecies to the -same object. Further, it required not only a different, but a totally -opposite art to conceive and promulgate its admirable morals. Again, -its propagation, in defiance of the powers and terrors of the world, -implied still other qualities of action. Lastly, the model of the life -of its founder, is a work of such originality and wisdom, as could be -the offspring only of consummate powers of invention, or rather never -could have been _devised_, but must have come from real life. The -hypothesis sinks under its incredibility. Each of these suppositions of -contrivance, being arbitrary and unsupported, the climax of them is an -extravagance.”--DAVISON, on Prophecy.] - -[290] 1 John iv. 18.--[“There is no fear in love,” &c.] - -[291] [Obedience from dread, if it continue to be the only motive, -precludes advance toward perfection; for “He that feareth is not -made perfect in love.” But obedience from a discernment of the -reasonableness and beneficence of religion, and of the perfections of -its Author, increases love till it “casteth out fear.”] - -[292] [See a discussion of this subject, in BAYLE’S Historical and -Biographical Dictionary: art. XENOPHANES: notes D, E, F, G.] - -[293] See Dissertation II. - -[294] [It is remarked by DEAN FITZGERALD, that “It is not inconceivable -that the Almighty should apply such a test of men’s candor and -fidelity, as should require them first to act upon a thing as true, -before they were so fully satisfied of its truth as to leave no doubt -remaining. Such a course of action might be the appointed, and for all -we know, the only possible way of overcoming habits of thought and -feeling, repugnant to the belief demanded, so that a fixed religious -faith might be the reward, as it were, of a sincere course of prudent -behavior.”] - -[295] By _arguing upon the principles of others_, the reader will -observe is meant, not proving any thing _from_ those principles, but -_notwithstanding_ them. Thus religion is proved, not _from_ the opinion -of necessity; which is absurd: but, _notwithstanding_ or _even though_ -that opinion were admitted to be true. - -[296] P. 141, &c. - -[297] Prov. xx. 27. - -[298] Serm. at the _Rolls_, p. 106. - -[299] John iii. 16: Heb. v. 9. - -[300] P. 258, &c. - -[301] Locke’s Works, vol. i. p. 146. - -[302] Locke, pp. 146, 147. - -[303] Locke, p. 152. - -[304] See an answer to Dr. Clarke’s Third Defence of his Letter to Mr. -Podwell, 2d edit. p. 44, 56, &c. - -[305] [“One is continually reminded throughout this dissertation, of -what is called _The common-sense school_ of Scotch metaphysicians. Nor -can there be any doubt that REID, in particular, was largely indebted -to Butler, of whose writings he was a diligent student, for forming -that sober and manly character of understanding which is, I think, his -great merit.”--FITZGERALD.] - -[306] This way of speaking is taken from Epictetus,[A] and is made -use of as seeming the most full, and least liable to cavil. And -the moral faculty may be understood to have these two epithets, -δοκιμαστικὴ and ἀποδοκιμαστικὴ [applauding and condemning] upon a -double account; because, upon a survey of actions, whether before or -after they are done, it determines them to be good or evil; and also -because it determines itself to be the guide of action and of life, -in contradistinction from all other faculties, or natural principles -of action; in the very same manner as speculative reason _directly_ -and naturally judges of speculative truth and falsehood: and at the -same time is attended with a consciousness upon _reflection_, that the -natural right to judge of them belongs to it. - -[A] Arr. Epict. lib. i. cap. i. - -[307] Οὐδὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία--ἐν πείσει ἀλλὰ ἐνεργείᾳ, [Virtue and vice -are not in feeling, but in action,] M. Anton, lib. ix. 16. Virtutis -laus omnis in actione consistit. [The whole praise of virtue, depends -on action.] Cic. Off. lib. i. cap. 6. - -[308] P. 145. - - - - -INDEX TO PART I. - -REFERENCES TO THE EDITOR’S NOTES ARE IN BRACKETS. - - - Abstract reasonings may mislead, 162 - fitness of things, _note_ 166 - - Actions - distinguished from their qualities, 111 - manifest character, 156 - rewarded and punished, 98 - this world a theater of, 156 - what sort exercise virtue, 152 - - Active and passive impressions, 140 - - Advantages of virtue, 113 - may never recur, 101 - - Affections, excited by objects, 145 - need control, 166 - part of our constitution, 147 - - Affliction, a discipline, 150 - chiefly of our own making, 100 - - Agent, the living, not compounded, 81 - - Alienation of parts of our body, 84 - - All things made double, 137 - - Allurements, use of, 151 - - Analogy - answers objections as to a present state of trial, 135 - as to modes of existence, 78 - carrying the force of positive argument, [105 - deals only with facts, 171 - indicates future punishment, 101 - may amount to proof, 168 - objections which it cannot answer, 171 - the only proof of some things, 79 - - Antiquity of religion, 167 - - Atheists not argued with, in this treatise, 181 - - - Beginnings of a righteous government seen on earth, 107 - - Bible, teaches the existence of general laws, [99 - - Bodies - not necessary to us, 82 - not ourselves, 83 - only instruments, 85, 86 - their solid elements, 88 - - Bodily and mental habits, 134 - - Brain, does not think, [89 - - Brahminical notion of death, 92 - - Brutes, - are they immortal?, [88 - may have greater strength than man, 119 - under man’s control, 119 - - - Capacities, - state of in infancy, 88 - not destroyed by death, 89 - not dependent on the body, 79 - - Causes and ends incomprehensible, 172 - - Changes compatible with identity, 78, 83 - - Character - manifested by probation, 156 - not given but acquired, 155 - what it means, _note_ 163 - - Conscience, - how it acts, 164 - implies government, 115 - a rule, 164 - authority, 164 - future retribution, 165 - may be impaired, 168 - perverted, 168 - - Consciousness an indiscerptible entity, 82 - presupposes identity, [77 - - Consequences - may sometimes be avoided, 102 - may be foreseen, 98 - show a moral government, 98 - - Course of nature constant, 97 - - Creatures finitely perfect, 147 - may fall, 148 - have each a way of life, 137 - - - Danger of wrong doing, how increased, 132 - - Death - and birth similar, 91 - enlarges our sphere, 92 - has no power over matter, [91 - is not a suspension of our powers, 91 - is not our destruction, 80 - what it is, 80 - - Decay of vegetables, inference from, 92 - - Definitions of identity, 77 - - Delivering up of the Lord Jesus Christ, [111 - - Destruction of seeds, 153 - - Different states of human existence, 89 - - Difficulties belong to all subjects, [96 - exercise the virtuous principle, 152 - - Disadvantages of virtue temporary, 126 - - Discipline, its true nature and use, [148 - - Disease not destructive to the soul, 90 - sometimes remedial, 177 - - Disorder produced by sin, 148 - - Distress excites passive pity and active relief, 140 - - Distributive justice a natural rule, 110 - - Divine government a scheme, CHAP. VII. - - Domestic government, 114 - - Dreams, what they prove, 86 - - - Earthly satisfactions attainable, 183 - - Effects of actions on the actor, [143 - - Ends often produced by unlikely means, 180 - - Enjoyments in our own power to a great degree, 95 - - Error, how spread, [96 - - Evidence of natural religion, 166 - - Evil, may possibly be useful, 177 - its possible origin, 147 - not a necessary part of probation, [128 - - Exceptions to the happiness of virtue, 108 - - Experience indispensable, 141 - - - Faculties, human, not perfect at first, 141 - - Fall of man, 133, [148 - - Fallacy in fatalism, 169 - - Fallen creatures require discipline, 150 - - Fatalism,--see _Necessity_. - - Fear a proper motive to obedience, 154 - - Folly, destructive, as well as crime, 132 - - Formal notion of government, 99 - - Foundation of moral improvement, [108 - - Future advantages, how proportioned, 93 - - Future existence probable, CHAP. I. - of brutes, [79 - - Future interest dependent on conduct, 95 - - Future life, - a solemn subject, 95 - not an inactive condition, 144 - reconcilable with atheism, 94 - this life preparatory to it, CHAP. V. - - Future punishment credible, 103 - - Future retribution, how proved, 125 - - Future state - different from the present, 78 - brings us into new scenes, 93 - may have temptations, [145 - social, 144 - will not require such virtues as does the present life, 154 - - - General laws - govern the world, 177, [99 - produce punishment, 103 - wisdom of them, 178 - - General method of God’s government, 97 - - General system of religion, 124 - - Gradual improvement, a wise arrangement, 141, 142 - - GOD - an intelligent governor, 106 - determined by what is fit, [166 - governs by human instruments, 111 - governs justly, [108 - has a will and a character, 163 - his aims incomprehensible, 97 - his attributes inferred from our own, [115 - his general government, 97 - his government just and good, 176 - his indirect commands, 165 - moral government of, CHAP. III. - natural ” , ” II. - necessarily existent, 159 - not indifferent to human actions, 125 - not simply benevolent, 106 - rewards and punishes, 169 - the only necessary being, 159 - - Good actions, how punished, 111 - - Good habits necessary even to the virtuous, 149 - - Good men befriended as such, 112 - cannot now all unite, 121 - - Good not forced upon us, [134 - - Government, - civil, an ordinance of God, 111 - considered as a scheme, CHAP. VII. - of God, CHAP. II. - not perfected in this world, 107 - the formal notion of it, 98 - the perfection of, 106 - - - Habits, - how formed, &c., 139 - necessary to us hereafter, [145 - of resignation, 155 - often ruinous, 101 - of virtue an improvement in virtue, 147 - passive, 138 - shape the character, 141 - - Happiness - not always the _immediate_ reward of virtue, 108 - not given promiscuously, 138 - requisites for, 137 - the result of virtue, 118 - - Helplessness of man, [138 - - Higher degrees of retribution probable, 127 - - Hinderances to virtue, 121 - - History of religion, 169 - - Honest men befriend the honest, 112 - - Hope and fear appeal to self-love, 153 - are just principles of action, 154 - - Human life preparatory, 144 - - Hume’s wonderful discovery, [162 - - Human powers may be overtasked, 152 - - - Identity - does not depend on the sameness of the body, 83 - of living agents, 77, 78 - not explicable, [77 - - Ignorance - acknowledged on all subjects but religion, 174 - answers objections, 175 - the argument from, 180 - total, destroys proof, 178 - - Illustration of the modification of an action by its intention, [111 - - Imagination a source of discontent, 154 - produces much error, 81 - - Immortality of brutes, 88 - - Improvement - by discipline, 144 - by habit, 147 - of our faculties gradual, 141 - wisdom of this, 142 - - Incomprehensibility of God’s plans, 97 - - Inconsiderateness destructive, 102 - - Inferiority of brute force, 119 - - Infidelity unjustifiable, 105 - - Insignificance of our knowledge, [174 - - Interest coincident with virtue, 154 - not a sufficient restraint, _note_ 146 - - Interpositions to prevent irregularities, 177 - would produce evil, 178 - - Intentional good rewarded, 114 - - Irregularities perhaps unavoidable, 177 - seeming may not be such, 176 - - Inward peace attends virtue, 112 - - - Kingdom, idea of a perfect, 123 - - Knowledge of man insignificant, [174 - - - Liberty does not account for the fall, 147 - implied in our present condition, 162 - - Life a probation, 128 - one part of it preparatory to another, [142 - what is it intended for, 137 - - Living agent not subject to death, 79 - - Living powers, see _Death_. - - Locke on human identity, [77 - - - Maimonides, his similitude, [173 - - Man - an inferior part of creation, 133 - a system of parts, [98 - by nature social, [93 - capable of improvement, 145 - connected with present, past, and future, 181 - dealt with as if free, 162 - has a moral nature, 115 - his fall not accounted for by his free agency, 147 - his helplessness, [138 - knows nothing fully, 173 - may become qualified for new states, 137 - not a competent judge of God’s schemes, 174 - requires moral culture, 145 - - Mania often produced by moral causes, [85 - - Materialism, its philosophical absurdity, [81 - - Matter and mind not the same, [83 - affect each other, 85 - - Means - learned by experience, 176 - man not a competent judge of the fitness of them, 178 - not always agreeable, 176 - - Men often miss possible temporal good, 129 - - Men’s temporal interests greatly depend on themselves, 131 - - Might of unarmed virtue, [121 - - Mind - influenced by the passions, 131 - is the man, [87 - its effects on the body, [85 - may survive the body, [89 - the only real percipient, 85 - uses the body as an instrument, [87 - - Miracles, properly speaking, not unnatural, 94 - - Miseries as contingent as conduct, 135 - generally are avoidable, 100 - - Mixture of suffering and enjoyment in this world, [128 - - Moral and natural government of God similar to each other, 184 - - Moral attributes of God may be inferred from our own, [115 - - Moral discipline, CHAP. V. - - Moral government of God, CHAP. III. - - Moral improvement, basis of, [108 - - Moral world, its apparent irregularities, 176 - - Mystery of God, finished, _note_ 102 - - - Natural, the true meaning of the word, 94 - - Natural government of God, CHAP. II. - - Natural religion, - its evidences not affected by the doctrine of necessity, 166 - proof of, 166 - teaches the doctrine of punishment, 102 - - Necessary agents may be punished, 169 - - Necessary bulk of one’s self, 84 - - Necessary existence of God, 159 - - Necessary tendencies of virtue, 118 - - Negligence and folly disastrous, 132 - - Necessity - consigns us to a fallacy, 169 - contradicts the constitution of nature, 170 - destroys no proof of religion, 170 - different kinds of, [157 - does not exclude design, 160 - doctrine of, CHAP. VI. - not an agent, 159 - not applicable to practice, 163 - not in conflict with religion, 160 - our condition indicates freedom, 162 - reconcilable with religion, 168 - the doctrine absurd, 157 - what it means, 158 - writers for and against, [170 - - New scenes in the next world, 93 - - - Obedience, reluctant, useful, [152 - - Objections, - against a proof and against a thing to be proved, 179 - against the scheme of Providence, 174 - analogy of plants, 92 - Christianity not universal, 169 - course of nature, 97 - destruction of seeds, 153 - difference between temporal and eternal things, [135 - discipline might have been avoided, 156 - God simply benevolent, 106 - good and evil may be mixed in the next world, 124 - gratification of appetites natural and proper, 98 - ignorance, the argument from invalidates the proof of religion, 178 - immortality of brutes, 87 - incredible that necessary agents should be punished, 169 - irregularities of the moral world, 176 - necessity destroys the proof of religion, 165 - our powers may be overtasked, 152 - probabilities may be overbalanced by probabilities, 169 - punishments are only natural events, 99 - rectitude arising from hope and fear, sordid, 153 - rewards and punishments, 95 - sin need not have entered the world, 177 - society punishes good actions, 111 - special interpositions might prevent evil, 177, 178 - to the doctrine of necessity, CHAP. VI. - to the doctrine of future punishments, 100-103 - virtue sometimes punished, 111 - virtues of the present life not wanted hereafter, 154 - world disciplines some to vice, 153 - - Obligation certain, when proofs are not, 179 - - Occasional disadvantages of virtue, 117 - - Occasional indulgences in wrong-doing awfully dangerous, [143 - - One period of life preparatory to another, [142 - - Opportunities once lost irrecoverable, 143 - - Organs of sense mere instruments, 89 - - Our moral nature proves a moral government, 115 - - - Pain, no contrivance for it in man, [110 - - Partial ignorance does not destroy proof, 178 - - Passions - carry away the judgment, 131 - make our condition one of trial, 130 - may account for the fall of man, 147 - may be excited where gratification is impossible or unlawful, 146 - may remain in a future state, 147 - should be subject to the moral principle, 145 - the bare excitement of, not criminal, 145 - but dangerous, 146 - - Passive habits, 138 - - Passive impressions weakened by repetition, 139 - - Passive submission essential, 155 - - Peace of the virtuous, 112 - - Perception, instruments of, 85 - possible without instruments, 86 - - Perfection of moral government, 106, 107 - of an earthly kingdom, 123 - - Persecution unnatural, 111 - - Philosophy never arrogant, [174 - what it cannot teach, [87 - - Pleasure - not a sufficient reason for action, 98 - and pain mostly depend on ourselves, 95 - the distribution indicates moral government, 105 - - Powers - may be improved by exercise, 138 - may be overtasked, 152 - may exist and not be exercised, 80 - no reason for supposing that death will destroy them, 81 - - Practical proof, what, 168 - - Present existence unaccounted for by atheism, 94 - - Presumptions that death will destroy us, 81 - that it will suspend our existence, 91 - - Presumptuousness unjustifiable, 105 - - Private vices not public benefits, [111 - - Probabilities in favor of religion may be overbalanced by - probabilities against it, 169 - - Probation, CHAP. IV. - applies to the present life as well as the future, 130 - does not necessarily imply suffering, [128 - implies allurements, 129 - is more than moral government, 128 - requires severe discipline, 150 - - Proofs of natural religion, 166 - of religion not affected by the doctrine of necessity, 160 - - Propensions necessarily create temptations, 146 - are excited by their appropriate objects, 147 - - Proper gratification of the appetites, 98 - - Prosperity of a virtuous community, 123 - may beget discontent, 154 - - Providence, objections to God’s, 140, 174 - - Public spirit a fruit of virtue, 120 - - Punishment - an alarming subject, 105 - especially considered, 100 - greater hereafter than now, 127 - in a future state credible, 103, 125 - is God’s voice of instruction, [108 - is sometimes capital, 102 - not unjust, 163 - often long delayed, 101 - often overtakes suddenly, 101 - of virtuous actions, 111 - religious and natural similar, 100 - results from folly as well as crime, 132 - the result of general laws, 103 - - - Quotations. - Aristotle, [152 - Chalmers, [131, 138, 148 - Cicero, [82, 86 - Clarke, [97 - Fitzgerald, [145 - Robert Hall, [118 - Hume, [162 - Maimonides, [173 - Mandeville, [111 - Plato, [87, 113 - Son of Sirac, [137 - Strabo, [92 - - - Rashness, consequences of, 96 - - Reason - an incompetent judge of means, 178 - gives power over brute force, 119 - needs experience, 141 - not dependent on bodily powers, 89 - requires a fair opportunity, 119-121 - - Recapitulation of the whole argument, 180 - - Rectitude, is self-interest a proper motive to it?, 153 - - References to other authors. - Bates, [128 - Baxter, [88 - Bayle, [88 - Beattie, [170 - Belsham, [170 - Berkeley, [111 - Bonnett, [89 - Bramhall, [171 - Brown, [111 - Bryant, [171 - Butterworth, [107 - Calcott, [128 - Capp, [109 - Chalmers, [77, 79, 148 - Charnock, [158 - Cheyne, [88 - Clarke, 82, [81, 97, 171 - Colliber, [88 - Collings, [158, 170 - Compte, [170 - Crombie, [170 - Crouse, [170 - Davies, [109 - D’Holbach, [170 - Descartes, [88 - Ditton, [88 - Doddridge, [109 - Dodwell, [81 - Dwight, [109 - Edwards, [88, 170 - Fabricius, [128 - Fichte, [170 - Gibbs, [171 - Grove, [171 - Haller, [89 - Harris, [171 - Hartley, [170 - Hegel, [170 - Henly, [128 - Hobbes, [170 - Holtzfusius, [128 - Holyoake, [170 - Horseley, [109 - Hume, [88 - Hunt, [109 - Jackson, [171 - Konnicott, [128 - King, [98, 171 - Law, [98 - Lawson, [171 - Le Clerc, [128 - Leland, [109 - Leroux, [170 - Liefchild, [109 - Locke, [88 - Manton, [128 - Martineau, [170 - Martinius, [119 - Milman, [142 - Morgagni, [89 - Morton, [109 - Musæus, [128 - Palmer, [171 - Pearson, [128 - Polignac, [88 - Porteus, [109 - Price, [158 - Priestley, [142, 170 - Reid, [170 - Rutherford, [109, 158 - Search, [88 - Seed, [109 - Selden, [128 - Shaftesbury, 108 - Sherlock, [109 - Shuckford, [128 - Son of Sirac, [137 - South, [109, 128 - Stapfer, [128 - Strabo, 92 - Toplady, [128 - Topping, [109 - Twisse, [109 - Wagstaff, [88 - Warburton, [111 - Watts, [77, 88, 171 - Whately, [142, 158 - Willis, [88 - Wisheart, [109 - Witsius, [128 - Wittichius, [109 - - Reflection not dependent on sensation, 91 - - Reformation is attended with discomfort, 108 - may not prevent penalties, 102 - - Relation between us and our bodies, 85 - - Relations of things, limitless, 173 - - Religion - a question of fact, 165 - historical evidence of, 168 - professed in all ages, 167 - its proofs not affected by the doctrine of necessity, 170 - nor by our ignorance, 178 - - Reluctant obedience profitable, [152 - - Remedies often very disagreeable, 176 - - Repentance may be too late, 104 - - Requisites to the superiority of reason, 119 - of virtue, 120, 121 - - Resentment of injuries, 114 - - Resignation - a temper consonant with God’s sovereignty, 155 - essential to virtue, 154 - the fruit of affliction, 155 - the habit necessary hereafter, 155 - - Retributions are divine teachings, [108 - - Revelation, - antiquity of, 167 - not improbable, 167 - not universal, _note_ 107 - - Rewards and punishments, how distributed, 126 - - - Satisfactions of virtue, 108 - - Scheme of God incomprehensible, 172 - - Self-denial, its relations to present happiness, 134 - not essential to piety, 152 - - Self-discipline, what, [148 - - Self-love - a just principle of action, 154 - appealed to, 153 - how moderated and disciplined, 155 - not a sufficient restraint, _note_ 146 - reasonable and safe, 130 - - Sensation not necessary to reflection, 91 - - Senses not percipients, 85 - - Severe discipline necessary, 150 - - Similitude of a historical painting, [174 - - Simplicity of the living agent, 83 - - Sin, why not kept out of the world, 177 - - Skepticism does not justify irreligion, 105 - - Social, our nature essentially such, [93 - - Society - must punish vice, 110 - natural and necessary, [93 - sometimes punishes the good, 111 - - Soul - a simple substance, 82 - not destroyed with the body, 79 - not naturally immortal, [81 - - Souls of brutes, 88 - - Special interpositions of Providence, 177, 178 - - Stages of existence, 78 - - State of probation, CHAP. IV. - - State of discipline and improvement, CHAP. V. - - Submissive temper necessary, 155 - - Subordinations exceedingly beneficial, 142 - - Subserviencies in nature, 173 - - Sufferings may be avoided, 95 - not necessary to the cultivation of virtue, [128 - - - Temporal and religious probation similar, 132 - - Temptations - increased by bad examples, 132 - and by former errors, 132 - intended for our improvement, 136 - involve probation, 129 - may improve or injure us, 153 - security against their evils, 146 - sources of, to upright beings, 147 - the necessary result of propensions, 146 - - Tendencies of virtue, 118 - hindered, 121 - essential, not accidental, 126 - - Terms “nature” and “course of nature”, [97 - - Theorizing no aid to virtue, 139 - - Thoughtlessness often fatal, 101 - - Transmigration of souls, [87 - - Trials - manifest character, 156 - may exist in a future state, 147 - produced by our propensions, 131 - qualify for a better state, 144 - unreasonable ones are not inflicted, 133 - why we are subjected to them, 136 - - - Ultimate design of man, [98 - - Understanding may be perverted, 168 - - Uneasiness produced by former sins, 109 - - Union of good beings, 122 - - Unjustifiableness of religious indifference, 105 - - Upright creatures may fall, 147 - need good habits, 149 - - Universe and its government immense, 123 - - - Vice - actually punished by society 110, 111 - must produce uneasiness, 112 - never rewarded as such, 116 - not only criminal but depraving, 149 - often increased by trials, 153 - punished as such, 114 - - Vicious men lose their influence, [121 - - Virtue - a bond of union, 122 - as such, rewarded on earth, 111 - “brings its own reward”, [118 - has occasional disadvantages, [117 - hinderances accidental, 121 - how and why rewarded, 111 - improved by trials, 151 - its benefits to a community, 123 - natural, not vice, 116 - not always rewarded in this life, 108 - on the whole happier than vice, 113 - secures peace, 112 - tendencies essential, 126 - tends to give power, 118, [121 - - Virtuous beings need virtuous habits, 149 - - Virtuous habits a security, 147 - how formed, 139 - improve virtue, 147 - necessary in a future state, [145 - - Voice of nature is for virtue, 117 - - - Waste of seeds, 153 - - Wickedness may produce some benefits, 177 - voluntary, 136 - - Will and character - of God, how determined, _note_ 166 - what they mean, _note_ 163 - - Wonderful discovery of Hume, [162 - - World - a system of subordinations, 173 - a theater for the manifestation of character, 156 - disciplines some to vice, 153 - fitted for man’s discipline, 150 - governed by fixed laws, 110 - - - Youth - a determining period, 101 - if lost, not to be recovered, 143 - its beneficial subordinations, 142 - - - - -INDEX TO PART II. - -REFERENCES TO THE EDITOR’S NOTES ARE IN BRACKETS - - - A common absurdity, 243 - - Abstract truth distinguished from facts, 305, [186 - - Absurdity of some objections to Christianity, 245 - - Abuse of our natural endowments, 217 - - Accidental, what events are so called, 226 - - Accountability gradually increases, 251 - - Actions, - definition of, in morals, 261 - distinguished from things done, 261 - their bad consequences sometimes escaped, 232 - virtue and vice consist in them, 261 - - Advantage, as proper a consideration in religion as in temporal - affairs, 298 - variously bestowed, 249, 312 - - Analogy - a confirmation of all facts to which it can be applied, 306 - affords no argument against the scheme of Christianity, 203 - nor against miracles, 203 - answers presumptions against miracles, 207 - does not prove the wisdom of God, 301 - does not teach that the _whole_ of God’s government is like that on - earth, 204 - easily cavilled at, but unanswerable, 306 - between natural information and that derived from inspiration, 212 - between the remedies of nature and those of grace, 219 - between the gospel and human discoveries, 219 - between the light of nature and of revelation, 218 - between the use of natural gifts, and miraculous, 217 - between the government of God and that of a human master, 261 - its small influence on men, 303 - how used in this treatise, 306 - may show our duty, but not the design of the requirement, 246 - objections to this mode of arguing, CHAP. VIII. - shows that there may be infinite reasons for things, with which we - are not acquainted, 188 - the only ground for some of our knowledge, 306 - - Antidote to heresies, [191 - - Apocalypse, its principal object, [249 - - Appearances of men and things deceptive, 248 - - Arguments proper as to human writings, are not so as to Scripture, 214 - - Atonement, - how held by the ancients, 241 - makes the innocent suffer for the guilty, 243 - - Author of nature taken for granted, 298 - - Authoritativeness of revelation, 189 - - - Baptism - a test of obedience, [199 - commanded and important, 194 - why the form of words, 194 - - Bible, how to be interpreted, [202, 215 - - Brutes, their great sagacity, 216 - - Boundary of human inquiry, [223 - - - Candor necessary in judging of Christianity, 302 - - Chance, really no such thing, 226 - - Characters drawn in Scripture evidently unfeigned, 287 - - Christ - a mediator, CHAP. V. - a prophet, 240 - a priest and king, 241 - his history, as given in Scripture, 285 - his pre-existence taught, 282 - his satisfaction, 239 - his sufferings voluntary, 243 - manner of his interposition, 238 - not merely a teacher and example, 242 - offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice, 241 - - Christianity - a fearful curse, if it give no more light than natural religion, [196 - a question of fact, 301 - a remedial system, [193 - an authoritative republication of the religion of nature, 188, 189 - a particular scheme under a general plan, 194, 224 - a scheme imperfectly comprehended, CHAP. IV. - a scheme revealed but in part, 226 - brings life and immortality to light, 190 - could not possibly be a contrivance, [222, 294 - demands attention, if barely probable, 253 - has evidences besides miracles and prophecy, 263 - in what degree remedial, [193 - is a real revelation, 213 - is conformable to the constitution of things, 295 - its benefits require the use of means, 197 - its establishment and prevalence, the most conspicuous and important - event in history, 286 - its evidences, CHAP. VII. - its good effects not small, 192 - its precepts plain and obvious, 218 - its proof historical, 304 - its proofs liable to objection, 260 - men bound to examine its evidence, 197 - miracles and prophecy its direct and fundamental proofs, 263 - must have mysteries, [223 - no objection to the morality of it, 214, 220, 222 - not merely a republication of natural religion, [196 - not primarily designed to remedy the defects of nature, [193 - not the discovery of reason, 188 - objections to its evidence, 210 - objections to its nature, 210 - offered to some in a corrupt state, 250 - prescribes new duties, 194 - preserves natural religion in the world, 191 - propagated against all obstructions, [294 - rashness of treating it lightly, 194, 196, 197 - requires means to accomplish ends, 225 - reveals a particular dispensation of Providence, 194 - reveals important facts, 196 - some of its dark parts may be cleared up, others cannot, [223 - teaches more than natural religion, 194 - the evils ascribed to it, are not its evils, 192 - the one great question concerning it, 213, 214 - the only religion professedly confirmed by miracles, 268 - to be transmitted by Christians, [190 - universal, in nature and intention, [248 - what alone could disprove it, 295 - why not remedial to a greater degree, 193 - why not sooner promulgated, 219 - - Christians - bound to spread Christianity, 190 - primitive, their testimony, 267 - - Church - men bound to support it, 193 - preserves a knowledge of religion, 191 - visible, its design, 190, 191 - - Circumstantial evidences of Christianity, 263, 281 - often as convincing as direct testimony, 294 - - Clemens Romanus, testimony of, 266 - his letter to the Corinthians, [266 - - Climax of infidel extravagance, [294 - - Coincidence of natural and revealed religion, 211, 218 - - Coincidences of Scripture, 266 - - Comparison, how it may mislead us, 201 - - Compassion distinct from goodness, 233 - visible in the constitution of the world, 233 - - Consequences of infidelity; more dangerous than those of faith, 294 - of sin, often averted, 233 - - Conversational objections to revelation, 295 - - Conversion, how produced, [225 - - Course of nature - different from what we might have supposed, previous to experience, 211 - none at the beginning, 205 - our total darkness as to its causes, 208 - - Creation - Mosaic account of, referred to by John, 282 - a different exertion of power from government, 205 - why Scripture describes it, 281 - - Creatures of like moral qualities placed in different religious - situations, 251 - - Credulity of mankind acknowledged, 269 - - Cumulative proof of Christianity, [207 - - - Daniel - his book had more evidence of authenticity than has come to us, 279 - his predictions a support of Jewish faith, [249 - quoted by Christ, 279 - - Dark parts of revelation, [223 - - Degrees of evidence have degrees of weight, 255 - require nice examination, 258 - - Deistical explanation of Christ’s miracles, [206 - - Deists, why do they oppose Christianity, [196 - - Depravity of man obvious, 238 - doctrine of, [218 - - Desert of good and ill, the notion of, 305 - - Development, of truth, 218 - modern, doctrine of, [218 - - Differences of religious advantages may have like reasons as those for - different temporal advantages, 251 - would remain if revelation were universal, 252 - - Difficulties - absurdity of requiring them to be all removed, 297 - as to the evidence of religion, analogous to those attending the - practice of it, 256 - cannot be solved by analogy, 296 - speculative, may be the chief trials of some, 257 - the discernment which can see them, might suffice to see through - them, 260 - - Direct and circumstantial evidence must be taken together, 280 - - Diseases of body and mind, analogous as to their remedies, 220 - - Disobedience, without possible excuse, 253 - - Dispensations, preparatory one to another, 310 - - Disregard of religion a great profligacy, 233 - - Distinction between moral and positive obligation, 198, [198 - between acts and principles, [235 - between temporary, individual, and universal commands, [188 - - Doubt - affords scope for probation, 262 - exercises our virtuous principles, 256 - implies some evidence, 252, 254, 283 - involves some obligation, 263 - puts us upon probation, 253 - - Doubtful evidence should have _some_ influence, 255 - - Duties arising from revealed relations, 195 - moral and positive, 194 - - - Earth, its appearances confirm Scripture, 238 - - Effect of Adam’s transgression, 238 - of combined probabilities, 294, [294 - - Efficacy of repentance, [190 - not taught by the light of nature, 190 - - End, God’s not known, 246 - - Enthusiasm - is not peculiar to religion, 272 - impairs no testimony for Christianity, 271 - may often weaken testimony, 271 - sometimes mixed with knavery, 272 - the absence of all sign of it in Christianity, a presumptive proof - in its favor, 222 - will not account for the spread of Christianity, 270 - - Enthusiasts make as great sacrifices as Christians, 270 - - Epistles of Paul, proof from, 266 - - Eternal retribution not taught by natural religion, [190 - - Ethics of natural religion distinguished from its objects, [194 - - Events expound Scripture, 219 - - Evidence - of Christianity impregnable, 295 - collateral and direct to be viewed together, 294 - from miracles and prophecy, 267 - imperfect, should yet influence practice in proportion to its - degree, 255 - of circumstances may be most direct, 294 - of religion, open to all, 260 - of religion, the same in kind as that which controls us in - temporal things, 258 - much lower than satisfactory often determines us, 303 - not only increased but multiplied by a combination of - probabilities, 294, [294 - reason the proper judge of, 221 - requires careful sifting, 256 - candor in judging, 302, [303 - safety always in admitting it, 294 - why liable to objection, 257 - - Evil, remedies provided for it, 219, 232 - - Exaggeration practised by many who will not lie, 272 - - External manner of heart worship, 195 - - Experience - affords no presumption against Christianity, 203 - corroborates Christian doctrines, 245 - teaches the effects of actions, 246 - - Extravagance of some objections, 187, 188 - - - Facts - analogy the only proof of some, 306 - distinguished from abstract truths, 305 - of revelation distinguished from its principles, [235 - - Fall of man, assumed as a fact, 236 - confirmed by appearances, 238 - - Falsehood, its degrees and inducements, 272 - - False miracles have deceived many, 273 - have some historic evidence, 273 - - Fatalists, their principles argued upon, 304 - - Fear cast out by love, [301 - - Fitness, moral, 304, 305 - - Flippant objections to Christianity, 295 - - Folly, a real vice, 280 - - Foresight of brutes, 216 - - Future punishments, - all the reasons for them not known, 234 - not arbitrarily appointed, 232 - natural sequences, 231, 232 - rendered credible by temporal punishments, 300 - - - Genealogy of mankind given in Scripture, 283 - - General laws - a wise arrangement, 227 - do not render miracles incredible, 227 - control the Christian dispensation, 226 - few events can be traced up to them, 226 - miracles may be their results, 226, 227 - the ground of believing there are such, 226 - things called accidental governed by them, 226 - - Geology, its impressive lessons, [229 - - GOD - a master giving laws, 261 - all his reasons for giving a command must be certainly known, and - known to have passed away, before we can safely disregard it, 188 - duties towards him as the Father, 194, 195 - governs by mediation, 230 - his government shows compassion, 233 - progressive, 229 - his means and ends we cannot distinguish, 228 - his providence, objections to it idle, 300, 301 - his reasons not assigned, 246 - his will, as absolute or conditional, 261 - how he would act in contingencies, unknown, [222 - how to be worshipped, a pure matter of revelation, 195 - instructs us by experience, 211, 246 - little known, [222 - not indifferent as to who suffer, 243 - reveals our duties, not his plans, 246 - the real author of the prophecies, 276 - - Good and evil unequally distributed, 248 - - Government of God sometimes, apparently, tardy in its results, 224, 225 - - Gradual growth of causes, [208 - - - Happiness not always secured by well-laid schemes, 247 - - Hazard of neglecting Christianity, 262 - - Heathen world, condition of, 186, 250 - - Hieroglyphic and figurative language of Scripture, 210 - - Hinderances to natural and spiritual knowledge similar, 218 - - History - of miracles, 264 - of the Jews confirmed by their condition, 289, 290 - of the origin of religion, 206 - furnishes no parallel to revelation, 207 - prophecy is history anticipated, 281 - Scripture, has not been invalidated, 283 - - Holy Spirit, its operations on the heart, [225 - - Human contrivance unequal to some things, [222 - - Human life, in what sense it may be called poor, 297 - - Human testimony, reliable notwithstanding the prevalence of - falsehood, 273 - - - Identity of principle between natural and revealed religion, [235 - - Ignorance - of heathen writers, [187 - of other worlds, forbids objections to Christianity on the ground - of miracles, 207 - of the laws of miracles, not greater than of natural laws, 256 - of the reason of our present condition, 251 - much of it our own fault, 259 - - Imagination may fancy unreal coincidences, 293 - - Immorality not authorized in Scripture, 221, 222 - - Impassable limit to human knowledge, [223 - - Imperceptible accumulation of forces, [208 - - Imperfect knowledge, better than acting in the dark, 297 - - Imperfection of language, 216 - - Importance of revelation, CHAP. I. - an abstraction, [186 - precludes the idea that the first witnesses were careless, 274 - - Improbability before and after an event, [207 - of the Deistical theory greater than that of miracles, [206 - - Inadequacy of repentance, [236 - - Inattention to religion, real depravity, 252, 307 - prevents convincement, 258 - - Incarnation an invisible miracle, 204 - cannot be paralleled, [235 - - Influence of the Holy Ghost, [225 - of the analogical argument, 303 - - Innocent sometimes suffer for the guilty, 243 - - Inspiration, the proper kind and extent of it not discoverable by - reason, 212 - not to be interpreted like other writings, 212 - - Inspired writers, key to their meaning, [276 - their one great scheme, [276 - show a foresight more than human, 278, 279 - - Instruction from God to savages, [206 - - Intercession by the good for the bad, [232 - - Interest, temporal, not always apparent, 302 - - Interpositions of men for each other, [232 - - Internal improbabilities weaken external proof, 215 - - Interpretation of Scripture, [215 - - Irregularity, really no such thing, 226 - whence the appearance of, 227 - - Irregularities of men, consequences proportioned to magnitude, 233 - - Irreligion an aggravated sin, 233 - especially in persons in high standing, 254 - not justifiable on any pretence, 256, 312 - - Invention an irregular way of information, 216 - - Invisible miracles, [204 - things of God, how learned, [230 - - - Jews - God’s dealing with them, 290 - their continuance, a standing miracle, 290 - their history confirmed by facts, 291 - their system of Theism, [206 - - Jewish miracles, a part of civil history, [265 - - John, his allusion to Christ, in the beginning of his gospel, 282 - his doctrine agrees with that of Paul, 282 - - - Kingdom of Christ on earth, 241 - - Knowledge - profound, not necessary to piety, 218 - scientific and religious, have the same difficulties, 218 - - Knowledge of Scripture, improved in the same way as knowledge of the - sciences, 218 - unequally distributed, 249 - - - Language necessarily ambiguous, 216 - of the prophecies, often figurative, 210 - - Laplace, error of, [207 - - Levity destructive to religious influence, 259 - - Liberty - belief of our, unavoidable, 304 - of the will, not discussed, _note_ 304 - necessary to the progress of knowledge, 218 - the principle so natural that language is formed on it, 304 - - Life - future, brought to light by the gospel, 190 - may be taken away by command, 221 - not thrown away because success is uncertain, 302 - whether desirable or not, 301 - - Light of nature - displayed in the Scriptures, 188 - does not teach our future condition, 190 - favors the doctrine of a Mediator, 230 - has left the greatest heathen in doubt, 186 - - Ludicrous turn, danger of, 259 - - - Mahometanism not received on the footing of miracles, [268 - - Mahometans and ancient Persians, how situated as to revelation, 250 - - Man - accepted according to what he hath, 251 - his circumstances no ground of complaint, 252 - his obligation to study the Scriptures, 202, 262 - must be renewed, 197 - - Manasses, prayer of, [237 - - Manner of worship a matter of pure revelation, 195 - - Martyrs - could not have been impostors, 272 - had full knowledge of facts, 269, 271 - the full force of their testimony, 269 - their obligations to veracity, 274 - were not enthusiasts, 271 - - Means as related to ends, 225 - - Mediation seen everywhere, 230 - exemplified in social life, [232 - - Mediator, - appointment of, CHAP. V. - the notion of, natural, 230 - the Scripture doctrine of, 238-240 - whether one was necessary, 243 - why most objected to, 243 - - Medium between full satisfaction of a truth and full satisfaction to - the contrary, 313 - - Memory, eloquence, &c. imprudently used, 217 - - Men apt to be deluded by pretences, 273 - their conduct may be guessed at, [222 - - Mercy seen in the constitution of the world, 233 - - Messiah came at the expected time, 285 - his mission, 224 - - Minuteness of predictions touching Christ, 207 - - Miracles - admitted evidence for such as are false does not impair the evidence - of Christian, 273 - contrary to the course of nature?, 206 - denying them leads to Atheism, [205 - disorderly use of, 217 - distinct reasons for them, 208 - large historical evidence for their truth, 270 - manner in which related, 264 - no argument of analogy against them, 205-207 - none parallel to those of Scripture, 207 - not mere embellishments, 264 - not to be compared to common events, 209 - nowise incredible, 209 - occasions for them likely to arise in the course of ages, 208 - of the Old Testament, inseparable from history, [265 - operate by general laws, 226 - Pagan and Popish, were wrought _after_ those systems had obtained, 268 - peculiar to the Jewish and Christian religions, 268 - received as genuine from the first, 268, 269 - regulated by general laws, 227 - satisfactorily account for the existence of Christianity, 265 - should be compared to uncommon events, 209 - the credentials of Christianity, 267 - the evidence of their truth at first, 249 - the question of their truth only one of _degree_ in point of - evidence, 208 - the only satisfactory account of some events, 265 - the real nature of presumptions against them, 208 - the term a relative one, 205 - their direct proof of Christianity, 264 - their evidence the same as that for common facts, 264 - their force as proofs, 189 - visible and invisible, 204, [204 - what evidence arises from their having been accepted as true by the - first Christians, 268 - writers upon, [264, 268 - - Miraculous power - creation not properly an act of, 205 - misused by some, 217, 267 - pretences of, have deluded some, 273 - why bestowed, 190 - - Misconduct creates need of assistance, 235 - - Mistake of some of Hume’s opponents, 207 - - Mistakes of philosophers dangerous, [230 - of transcribers, &c., 228 - - Modern geology, lesson from, [229 - - Moral action, the nature of, 261 - an action becomes such by command, [221 - - Moral duties. See _Positive_. - - Moral faculty, its object, 305 - - Moral government. See _Government_. - - Moral precepts. See _Positive_. - - Moral system revealed to mankind, 190 - - Morality of Scripture, reason a judge of, 220 - - Mysteries to be expected in revelation, 223, 224 - as many in nature as in Scripture, 246 - - Mystery of godliness, 225 - - Mythological writings resemble prophecy, 276 - - - Narratives of Scripture unadorned, 228 - - Natural consequences of vice are judicial punishments, 197 - and spiritual things analogous in importance, 219 - endowments often abused, 217 - - Natural light compared to revelation, 218 - - Natural religion - and revealed, coincide, 211 - as much perverted as Christianity, 192 - could not have been reasoned out, 192 - discloses no Redeemer, [194 - its ethics and objects distinguished, [194 - its light wholly insufficient, 187 - might be authenticated by miracles, 190 - moral system of, 187 - taught and confirmed by Christianity, 188, 286, 292 - what it does not teach, [190, 194 - - Nature carried on by uniform laws, 226 - implies the agency of God, 231 - its light insufficient, 186 - - Nature and obligation of sacraments, _note_ 195 - - Necessity of revelation, [186 - - Negligence prevents the recognition of truth, 258 - wholly inexcusable, 197 - - - Obedience from dread, [301 - or disobedience, an important matter, 188 - to a positive rite, especially indicative of piety, 199 - - Objections - to certain precepts of Scripture, as immoral, 221 - to prophecy, from its obscurity, 275 - to revelation, are of equal weight against natural religion, 97 - to the analogical argument, as such, CHAP. VIII. - to the distribution of good and evil, 248-250 - to the doctrine of mediation, CHAP. V. - to the evidence for miracles, CHAP. II. - to the unequal distribution of religious knowledge, 249 - - Objections to Christianity - as a matter of fact, 301 - as a remedial system, [193, 219 - as a roundabout, perplexed contrivance, 228 - as deficient in point of truth, 247 - as a scheme, 209 - as mysterious, [223 - as to its wisdom and goodness, CHAP. IV. - as unimportant, CHAP. I. - atonement makes the innocent suffer for the guilty, 227, 243 - contains things unlike the course of nature, 204 - does not remove difficulties, [223 - has been perverted, 192 - has been productive of evils, 192 - has internal improbabilities, 225-227 - disclosed to the world so recently, 219 - disorderly use of miraculous gifts, 227 - has small influence, 192, 303 - if true would not be left doubtful, 299 - is not satisfactory, 260, 261 - its doctrine of mediation, CHAP. V. - its external proof weakened by internal improbabilities, 215 - its lack of evidence, CHAP. VI. - its late introduction, 219 - may be advanced flippantly, but cannot be so answered, 295 - natural things too unimportant to furnish analogies in its favor, 219 - not just and good, CHAP. IV. - not necessary, 147 - not universal, CHAP. VI., 248 - slowly developed, 219 - some of its precepts immoral, 221 - sufficiency of natural religion, 187 - vicarious sufferings, 245 - - Obligation arises from the bare supposableness of Christianity, 253, 262 - - Obligations to God arising out of relationship, 196 - - Obscurity in part of a prophecy, does not impair the evidence of - foresight, 275 - - Offenders often shielded by friends, [232 - - Offices of Christ as a mediator, 238-240 - - Opinions must be distinguished from facts, 270 - - Ordinary rules of interpretation, [215 - - - Pagan and Popish miracles easily accounted for, 268 - - Parables show what the author intended, 276 - - Partial views give an appearance of wrong, 309 - - Passion hinders correct judgment, 259 - - Paul, his separate testimony, 266 - how he received the gospel, 267 - summary of his testimony, 267 - - Perfection of religion, what? CHAP. VIII. - - Persons for whom this treatise is written, 309 - - Philosophy, its true mode of proceeding, [230 - - Piety superior to ritual observances, 201 - - Pleasures and pains, which overbalance? 301 - - Political events, how mentioned in Scripture, 282 - - Popish doctrine of a miracle at the Eucharist, [204 - - Popular conversational objections, 295 - - Porphyry’s mode of interpretation frivolous, _note_ 279 - objections to the book of Daniel, 279 - - Positive evidence of Christianity, CHAP. VII. - - Positive institutions - belong to the notion of a church, 192 - lay us under the strictest obligation, 202 - means to moral ends, 199 - men disposed to depend on them, 200 - necessary to keep up and propagate religion, 246 - not to be made light of, 201 - not to supersede moral obedience, 200 - the reason of them often obvious, 198 - two modes of viewing them, 198 - - Positive precepts compared with moral, 198, 201 - create moral obligations, 221 - - Power of healing, [217 - - Practice should be influenced by probability, 254 - - Predictions of Christ very numerous and minute, 207, 208 - - Prejudice a hinderance to knowledge, 258 - a mark of weakness, 280 - as hostile to truth as enthusiasm, 272 - operates contrary ways, 294 - - Preservation of the Jews as a distinct race, 291 - - Presumptions - against miracles, 205 - against revelation as miraculous, CHAP. II. - none against the _general scheme_ of Christianity, 203 - none peculiar to miracles, 207 - strong, overcome by weak proof, 207, [207 - - Priesthood of Christ, 238 - Jewish, typical of Christ, 239 - - Principles argued upon in this treatise, 304 - - Progressions in our existence, 229 - - Progress in theology probable, [218 - - Probable proofs, by being added, not only increase evidence, but - multiply it, 294 - - Probability should influence practice, 254 - - Profane history corroborates Scripture statements, 287 - - Proofs of Christianity - a touchstone of honesty, [259 - level to common men, 260 - some important ones omitted in this treatise, and why, 304 - why not more plain, 261 - - Prophecy - a joint review of prophecies furnishes a far stronger proof than - examination in detail, 294 - a series of, being applicable to certain events, is proof that it - was intended of them, 276 - compared to compiled memoirs, 278 - created the expectation of a Messiah, 284 - confirmed by appearances, 292 - evidence from, 275 - expressed in figurative language, 275 - how understood by ancient Jews, 277 - in relation to the Jews, 284 - is history anticipated, 281 - its obscurity, 275 - its proofs amazingly strong, [207 - may not _always_ have been understood by the writer, 278 - proves foresight, 276, 279 - sometimes obscured by interpreters, 210 - summary of, concerning Christ, 284 - use of, to future ages, 249 - writers upon, 277, 285 - - Prophet, Christ a, 240 - - Prophets - not the _authors_ of what they wrote, 278 - their sense of their predictions not necessarily the whole - sense, 278 - whether they had in view the events which Christians consider - fulfilments, 277 - - Proverbial, use of the word, 201 - - Providence, never hasty, [229 - objections to it useless, 300, 301 - the course of, progressive, 229 - - Province of reason, 220 - - Prudence, its best plans often frustrated, 247 - often requires us to act with uncertain prospect of success, 247, 248 - - Punishment - follows wickedness, _of course_, 231 - instances of vicarious, 244 - not always avoided by reformation, 235 - not promiscuously inflicted, 243 - provision made for escaping it, 232, 311 - we cannot of ourselves escape it, 234 - we cannot know why such and such are inflicted, 231 - - - Quotations - Angus, [202, 223 - Augustine, _note_ 187 - Arnobius, [269 - Clemens Romanus, [266 - Davidson, [294 - Fitzgerald, [303 - Grotius, [259 - Guizot, [229 - Hurd, [276 - Dr. Johnson, [288 - Mahomet, [268 - Powell, [230 - Warburton, [217, 223 - Whately, [206 - - - Rashness of interpreters, 210 - of treating religion lightly, 197 - - Reason - could not have invented Christianity, 206 - could not ascertain the power of penitence, 194 - discovers our relation to God the Father, 194 - but not our relation to the Son and Holy Ghost, 194, 196 - its limits very narrow, [223 - its proper province, 220 - must have right principles, 220 - needs the aid of experience in judging of the consequences of - actions, 246 - not sufficient to construct a system of natural religion free - from superstition, 186 - our only faculty for judging even revelation, 210 - requires the importance of a question to be taken into account, 295 - teaches nothing of the certain means of either temporal or spiritual - good, 197 - very incompetent to judge what a revelation ought to be, 210-212 - - Reasoning by analogy to any extent, leaves the mind unsatisfied, 296 - - Redemption - agreeable to our natural notions, 235 - analogous to natural remedies, 232 - conjectures about it must be uncertain, 242 - mode of, not discoverable by reason, 243 - men not competent judges of its plan, 243 - on whom are its benefits, _note_ 237 - Scripture account of, 239, 240 - we should be thankful for it, without disputing how it was - procured, 242 - - References to other authors - Alexander, [269 - Apthorpe, [285 - Bayle, [301 - Benson, [215 - Birk, [266 - Blaney, [285 - Blunt, [266 - Bolingbroke, [265 - Boswell, [288 - Boyle, [264 - Butler, [190, 272 - Campbell, [264 - Celsus, [287 - Chalmers, [187, 194, 242 - Colliber, 195 - Damascenus, [287 - Davidson, [285 - Diodorus Siculus, [287 - Eupolemus, [287 - Featley, [215 - Fitzgerald, [193, 206, 207 - Fleetwood, [264 - Fuller, [285 - Gibbon, [268 - Graves, [266 - Grotius, [266 - Gulick, [277 - Hengstenburg, [277 - Horseley, [277 - Howe, [236 - Hurd, [285 - Jortin, [264, 285 - Julian, [257 - King, [215, 277 - Lardner, [264 - Leland, [187 - Longinus, [287 - Lyall, [277 - McCosh, [187 - Mackintosh, [223 - Magee, [236, 242 - Manasses, [237 - Menander, [287 - Michaelis, [215 - Mills, [207 - Newman, [235 - Numenius, [287 - Owen, [242 - Paley, [205, 266, 268 - Pascal, [187, 223 - Pfaffius, [264 - Phlegon, [287 - Phœnician Annals, [287 - Pliny, [287 - Porphyry, 279, [287 - Samuel Stanhope Smith, [206 - Solinus, [287 - Spinoza, [215 - Stapfer, [242 - Storr, [215 - Strabo, [287 - Suetonius, [287 - Tacitus, [287 - Taylor, [264 - Tindall, [196, 248 - Tucker, [264 - Turretin, [242 - Vitringa, [276 - Warburton, [187 - Waterland, [195 - Watson, [264 - Waugh, [277, 285 - Wayland, [188, 236 - Whately, [206, 268, 288 - Witsius, [264 - - Reformation does not always preclude punishment, 235 - - Regard due to the Son and Holy Spirit, 195 - - Regard to God as Creator, the essence of natural religion, 195 - - Rejection of Christ by many, at first, the argument from it, [269 - foretold, 285 - - Relations, being learned, duties are perceived, 194 - - Relations of man to Deity, 194 - to the Son and Holy Ghost, 195 - - Religion - a practical thing, 298 - a question of fact, 301, 304 - affords particular reasons for miracles, 208 - confirmed by the establishment of a church, 191 - considered as external and internal, 195 - doubt of its evidence does not release from moral obligation, 254 - has its end on all persons to whom proposed, 303, [303 - if true, why susceptible of any possible doubt? 299 - its acceptance safe, 295 - its general spirit intimated, 200, 201 - its great importance, 254 - its introduction into the world, 206 - its reasonableness fully shown, if it can only be proved that it _may_ - be reasonable, 301 - its very nature overlooked by those who insist that it should have - overwhelming evidence, 302 - may be true, though doubtful, 299 - must be judged by its evidences _taken together_, 294 - not a thing reasoned out, 206 - not equally taught to all men, 206 - objections to it removed by analogy, 300 - presupposes candor in those who examine it, 256, 302, [303 - reason may judge of its morality, 220 - reasonable, for aught which can be shown to the contrary, 301 - the perception of, 302 - the view of it taken in this treatise, 299 - the evidence for it may be lessened, but cannot be destroyed, 295 - why its evidences are allowed to admit of doubt, 249, 253, 299 - - Relief for evils provided, 232 - - Remedial nature of Christianity, [193 - - Remedies - provided in nature, 219, 232 - may be unskilfully used, 220 - show the compassion of God, 233 - and also his strictness, 234 - - Repentance - cannot cancel guilt, 236, [236 - general sense of mankind on the subject, 236 - its efficacy not taught by natural religion, [190 - its efficacy taught in the Scriptures, 190 - not sufficient to preclude disaster, 234, 235 - - Revelation - a particular part of a great plan, 224 - accounts for the Theism of the Jews, [206 - at the beginning of the world, would not be miraculous, 205 - cannot be neglected with impunity, 260-262 - considered as miraculous, CHAP. II. - considered historically, 281 - difference between its facts and its principles, [235 - discovers new relations, and so new duties, 194 - distinguished from natural religion, 195 - does not compel assent, 253 - has twice been universal, [248 - how it could be overturned, 214 - its disclosures, of course, could not have been anticipated, 211, 212 - its measure of evidence puts us on probation, 253 - its facts necessarily singular, [235 - no more different from the course of nature than some parts of the - course of nature are different from other parts, 312 - necessary, CHAP. I. - republishes and confirms natural religion, 188, 189 - nothing incredible in it, 271 - teaches that God’s laws are compassionate, 236 - the use of unwritten revelation, 213 - what is to be expected in revelation, 210, 212 - - Reverence for the will of God, [199 - - Ridicule of Scripture - an offence against natural piety, 286 - easier than examination, 259 - the great weakness of being influenced by it, 280 - - Roman Empire mentioned, 279 - - Rules for health very fallible and inexact, 302 - of Biblical interpretation, [215 - - - Sacrifices - commanded, 241 - expiatory, 239 - how the ancients regarded them, 242 - learned by the heathen from tradition, 241 - really efficacious, 242 - the prevalence of, 236 - - Sacrifice of Christ - an objection to it, 243 - _how_ efficacious, not taught, 242 - proper and real, 239-241 - puts us into a capacity for salvation, 242 - voluntary, 244 - - Safety an important consideration in judging, 294 - - Satirical writings, how understood, 276, 277 - - Scheme of nature, vast, 204 - progressive, 229 - - Scheme of providence, if understood, would justify facts which are - objected to, 300 - - Schemes, the best may be disconcerted, 247 - - Science confirms Scripture history, 287 - - Scorn of prophetic diction, 210 - - Scripture - announces a general restoration of things, 282 - antiquity of, 287 - characters evidently not feigned, 287 - confirmed by profane authors, 288 - confirmed by the state of the earth, 287 - considered historically, 281 - contains an abridged history of the world, 282 - exposed to criticism, 283 - expounded by itself, [202 - gives a history of this world as God’s world, 281 - gives an account of civil governments only as they affected - religion, 282 - has internal evidence of truth, 287 - history genuine, 265 - how distinguished from other books, 281-283 - how to be interpreted, [202 - if false could be shown to be so, 283 - includes a history of thousands of years, 283 - includes the chronology of nearly four thousand years, 284 - its authority the great question, not its contents, 214 - its chronicles confirmed by history, 287 - its evidences comprise a series of things of great variety and reaching - to the beginning of time, 263 - its evidences not intended to be overpowering, 253 - its great proofs are miracles and prophecy, 264 - its relation to miracles only to be accounted for on the supposition - of their truth, 265 - its strangeness not surprising, 288 - its style objected to, 210 - its truth must be judged of by the evidence _taken together_, 295 - may contain things not yet discovered, 218 - miracles, their first reception, 265 - naturalness of its statements, 287 - not composed by rules of art, 210 - nothing improbable related in any part, 287 - not to be judged by preconceived expectation, 215 - not to be judged exactly as other books, 214 - ordinary rules of interpretation, [215 - our duty to search it, 202, 262 - precepts, some give offence, 210 - reveals our relation to the Son and Holy Spirit, 194 - the possibility of its truth demands investigation, 258 - truths not discoverable by reason, 203 - variety of topics introduced, 283 - written in a rude age, 283 - why it describes creation, 282 - - Searching the Scriptures a great duty, 202 - - Self-deceit, our liability to it, 262 - - Serious apprehension may comport with doubt, 313 - - Shameful mistakes of philosophers, [230 - - Similarity of objections to religion and nature, 298 - - Sincerity of belief proved by dying for it, 270 - - Skepticism no justification of irreligion, 253 - - Sorrow cannot of itself restore abused benefits, 234 - - Speaking with tongues, [217 - - Speculative difficulties similar to external temptations, 256 - the chief trial of some, 257, 259 - - Spread of Christianity unaccountable if it were an imposture, 290 - - Standing ministry, what for, [191 - - Strangeness of some Scripture events, 288 - - Stupidity of the martyrs, if insincere, [269 - - Subserviences, the world a system of, 229 - - Success, temporal, always uncertain, 302 - - Suffering, ignorance does not prevent it either in temporal or spiritual - things, 196 - - Sufferings of Christ vindicate God’s law, 244 - of the early Christians, 269 - - Sufficiency of light of nature pretended, 186 - - Summary of Jewish history, 284 - of the historical evidence of Scripture, 292 - - Supernatural instructions necessary from the first, [206 - - - Temporal interests not always discerned, 247, 248 - managed by prudent persons on the very principles proposed by religion - as to spiritual interests, 298, 299 - - Temporal interests often decided by considerations which fall short of - demonstration, 299 - - Temporary commands, distinguished from perpetual, [188 - - Temptation - a wholesome discipline, 256 - earthly and spiritual similar, 256 - calls forth virtuous effort, 257 - - Testimony - can be destroyed only by counter-testimony, or by the incompetency of - the witness, 274 - for miracles not mentioned in Scripture, does not impair the testimony - for those there recorded, 273 - of Paul, separate and independent, 266 - of profane authors to the truth of Scripture history, [287 - of the first Christians, 269, 271 - must be judged candidly, [259 - none counter to Christianity, 275 - slight, overcomes strong presumptions, 208 - unconfuted, must be admitted, 273 - value of, lessened by enthusiasm, 271 - - Theism of the Jews accounted for, [206 - - Theology of the Bible, not to be corrected, [202 - - Things which it is unreasonable to dispute, 307 - - Thoughtlessness of men, 233 - - Tradition teaches that there was a revelation at the beginning, 205 - of the fall of man, 311 - - Transubstantiation, [205 - - Trial by speculative difficulties, analogous to other trials, 256 - - True philosophy inductive, [230 - - Truth of Christianity proved, unless the whole of its history and - influence can be accounted for by accident, 295 - - Truth, how developed, [218 - the, of an event may be fully proved, though no _one_ of sundry proofs - may be complete, 295 - whether there is any such thing, denied by skeptics, 305 - - Twofold effect of the analogical argument, 305 - - - Unbelievers, acknowledgment of, 289 - cannot deny a conformity between prophecy and events, 293 - - Understanding, its right use, 245 - - Undesigned coincidences in Bible history, [266 - - Undeterminate language deceives many, 297 - - Unequal distribution of religious knowledge, 249 - - Unfair dealing of objectors, 297 - - Unreasonableness of applying to passion for guidance, 295 - - Unsatisfactory evidence, men often obliged to act upon it, 302 - - - Variety in the distribution of God’s gifts, 249, 312 - - Vastness of the scheme of nature, 204 - - Veracity of the first Christians, 274 - - Vicarious punishments witnessed every day, 244 - deter from sin, 245 - - Vice - appointed to be punished, 231 - blinds men to just evidence, 255 - its effects in the present world, 234 - its natural consequences are God’s judicial inflictions, 197 - its real enormity, 234 - not palliated by any supposed lack of evidence for religion, 255 - - Vindication of religion by analogy impossible, 296 - of the character of God, not attempted in this treatise, 299, 300 - - - Way of salvation for the helpless, [186 - - Will of GOD, as absolute or conditional, 261 - - World, wickedness of, 238 - - Worship, mode of, a matter of pure revelation, 195 - - Writers - on the atonement, [242 - Christian sacraments, [195 - miracles, [264, 268 - necessity of revelation, [187 - prophecy, [277-285 - Scripture difficulties, [215 - undesigned coincidences, [266 - -THE END. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Analogy of Religion to the -Constitution and Course of Nat, by Joseph Butler - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION TO THE CONSTITUTION *** - -***** This file should be named 53346-0.txt or 53346-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/3/3/4/53346/ - -Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -book was produced from scanned images of public domain -material from the Google Books project.) - 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