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diff --git a/old/52589-0.txt b/old/52589-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index d9a2a37..0000000 --- a/old/52589-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,16671 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Influence of Sea Power upon the French -Revolution and Empire 1793-1812, Vol II (o, by Alfred Thayer Mahan - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812, Vol II (of 2) - -Author: Alfred Thayer Mahan - -Release Date: July 23, 2016 [EBook #52589] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER *** - - - - -Produced by StevenGibbs, Christian Boissonnas and the -Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net - - - - - - - - - - THE - - INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER - - UPON THE - - FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE - - 1793-1812 - - - BY - - CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN, U.S.N. - - PRESIDENT UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE - - AUTHOR OF "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783" - OF "THE GULF AND INLAND WATERS," AND OF A - "LIFE OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT" - - - IN TWO VOLUMES - - VOL. II. - - - FOURTH EDITION. - - - LONDON: - SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, SEARLE, & RIVINGTON. - (LIMITED.) - - - - -UNIVERSITY PRESS: - -JOHN WILSON AND SON, CAMBRIDGE, U.S.A. - - - - -CONTENTS OF VOL. II. - - - CHAPTER XII. - - EVENTS ON THE CONTINENT, 1798-1800. - - DISORDERS OF FRANCE UNDER THE DIRECTORY.—DISASTROUS WAR OF THE SECOND - COALITION.—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSULATE.—BONAPARTE OVERTHROWS - AUSTRIA AND FRAMES AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN THE ARMED NEUTRALITY OF - 1800.—PEACE OF LUNÉVILLE WITH AUSTRIA. - - PAGE - - Hostilities of Naples against the French 1 - - Disastrous defeat of the Neapolitans 2 - - The French enter Naples 2 - - Piedmont annexed to France 2 - - Beginning of the war of the Second Coalition 3 - - Reverses of the French in Germany and Italy 3 - - Masséna falls back in Switzerland 4 - - Further French disasters in Italy 5 - - The French evacuate southern Italy 6 - - Battle of the Trebia won by Suwarrow 6 - - Loss of northern Italy by the French 7 - - The French defeated at the battle of Novi by Suwarrow 8 - - Change in the plans of the Coalition 8 - - Masséna defeats the allies at the battle of Zurich 9 - - Disastrous march of Suwarrow into Switzerland 9 - - Failure of the Anglo-Russian expedition against Holland 10 - - Loss of Bonaparte's conquests in Italy and of the Ionian Islands 10 - - Internal disorders of France 11 - - Bonaparte's return, and the revolution of Brumaire 18 15 - - Bonaparte's measures to restore order 15 - - His advances toward Great Britain and Austria to obtain peace 16 - - Reasons of the two governments for refusing 17 - - Prosperity of Great Britain 17 - - Russia abandons the coalition 19 - - Forces of France and Austria in 1800 19 - - Bonaparte's plan of campaign 20 - - Opening of the campaign in Italy 21 - - Masséna shut up in Genoa 21 - - Moreau's advance into Germany 21 - - Bonaparte crosses the Saint Bernard 22 - - Battle of Marengo, and armistice following it 23 - - Armistice in Germany 24 - - Diplomatic negotiations 25 - - Bonaparte's colonial and maritime anxieties 25 - - The Czar Paul I.'s hostility to Great Britain 26 - - Dispute between England and Denmark concerning neutral rights 26 - - Effect of this upon Bonaparte's plans 27 - - Policy of Russia and Prussia 28 - - Bonaparte undertakes to form a coalition against Great Britain 29 - - Factors in the question 29 - - Vacillations of Prussia 31 - - Bonaparte's advances to Russia 32 - - Hostile action of Paul I. toward Great Britain 33 - - His pretensions to Malta 33 - - Negotiations for a maritime truce 34 - - Their failure 35 - - Action of Prussia against Great Britain 35 - - Armed Neutrality of 1800 36 - - Its claims 37 - - Renewal of hostilities between Austria and France 38 - - Defeat of Austria at the battle of Hohenlinden 38 - - Peace of Lunéville 39 - - Terms of the treaty 40 - - - CHAPTER XIII. - - EVENTS OF 1801. - - BRITISH EXPEDITION TO THE BALTIC.—BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN.—BONAPARTE'S - FUTILE ATTEMPTS TO CONTEST CONTROL OF THE SEA.—HIS CONTINENTAL - POLICY.—PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE WITH GREAT BRITAIN, OCTOBER, - 1801.—INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER, SO FAR, ON THE COURSE OF THE - REVOLUTION. - - Isolation of Great Britain in Europe, in 1801 41 - - Expedition to the Baltic planned 41 - - Instructions to Sir Hyde Parker, commander-in-chief 42 - - Nelson second in command 42 - - The fleet sails 42 - - Nelson's plan of operations 43 - - The military situation, strategic and tactical 44 - - Characteristics of Nelson's military genius 45 - - Denmark's relation to the league of the northern States 46 - - Half measures of Sir Hyde Parker 47 - - Nelson advances against Copenhagen 47 - - Battle of Copenhagen 48 - - Results of the battle 51 - - Nelson's negotiations with the Danish government 51 - - Armistice concluded with Denmark 51 - - Assassination of the Czar Paul I. 51 - - Merits of Nelson's conduct in the Baltic 52 - - British embargo upon merchant ships of the Baltic powers 53 - - Resulting retaliatory action of Prussia 54 - - Inherent weakness of the Northern League 55 - - Conciliatory action of the new Czar 55 - - Sir Hyde Parker relieved from command 56 - - Nelson takes the British fleet to Revel 56 - - His action rebuked by the Czar 57 - - Convention between Great Britain and Russia 57 - - Dissolution of the Armed Neutrality 57 - - Nature of the claims maintained by it 58 - - Bonaparte's proceedings in the Italian and Spanish peninsulas 59 - - Failure of his maritime projects for the relief of Malta and Egypt 60 - - His attempt to collect a naval force in Cadiz 63 - - Naval battle of Algesiras, and its consequences 64 - - Strategic significance of these events 65 - - Cession of Louisiana by Spain to France 67 - - Bonaparte's intended occupation of Portugal frustrated 67 - - His diplomatic dilemma in the summer of 1801 68 - - Coolness towards him of Russia and Prussia 69 - - Triumphant influence of the British Sea Power 69 - - Preliminaries of Peace between Great Britain and France 70 - - Terms of the preliminaries signed at London, October, 1801 71 - - Cessation of hostilities 72 - - Criticism of the terms by the British Opposition 72 - - Influence of Sea Power upon the course of the Revolution 74 - - Pitt's opinions 75 - - - CHAPTER XIV. - - OUTLINE OF EVENTS FROM THE SIGNATURE OF THE PRELIMINARIES - TO THE RUPTURE OF THE PEACE OF AMIENS. - - Unstable character of the settlement of 1801 76 - - Treaties with Turkey and Portugal contracted secretly by France 77 - - Impression produced in Great Britain by these and by the cession - of Louisiana 78 - - Expedition sent to Haïti by Bonaparte 78 - - Delays in negotiating the definitive treaty 79 - - Bonaparte accepts the presidency of the Cisalpine Republic 80 - - Effect produced in Great Britain by this step 80 - - Signature of the Peace of Amiens, March 25, 1802 81 - - Provisions concerning Malta 81 - - Illusive effects caused by Bonaparte's system of secret treaties 82 - - Annihilation of the Sea Power of France 83 - - Bonaparte proclaimed First Consul for life 83 - - Action of Bonaparte in the German indemnities 84 - - Injury to Austria and annoyance of Great Britain 85 - - Bonaparte's reclamations against the British press 85 - - Piedmont and Elba formally incorporated with France 85 - - The Valais wrested from Switzerland for military reasons 86 - - Bonaparte's armed intervention in Switzerland, 1802 87 - - Emotion of Europe and remonstrance of Great Britain 88 - - The British ministry countermands restitution of captured - colonies 89 - - Bonaparte's wrath at the British remonstrance 89 - - Strained relations between the two States 90 - - Bonaparte demands the evacuation of Egypt and Malta 91 - - Attitude of the British ministry concerning Malta 91 - - Causes of the delay in evacuating it 92 - - Importance of Malta 92 - - Broad ground now taken by the ministry 93 - - Publication of Sébastiani's report, January, 1803 93 - - Its effect in Great Britain 94 - - Disasters of the French in Haïti 94 - - Bonaparte's preponderant interest in Malta and the East 95 - - High tone now assumed by the British ministry 96 - - Additional provocation given by Bonaparte 96 - - Ominous proceedings of the ministry 97 - - The British ultimatum 98 - - Great Britain declares war, May 16, 1803 98 - - Universal character of the strife thus renewed 98 - - Unanimity of feeling in Great Britain 99 - - Pitt's forecast of the nature of the struggle 100 - - - CHAPTER XV. - - THE TRAFALGAR CAMPAIGN TO THE SPANISH DECLARATION OF WAR. - MAY, 1803—DECEMBER, 1804. - - PREPARATIONS FOR THE INVASION OF ENGLAND.—THE GREAT - FLOTILLA.—NAPOLEON'S MILITARY AND NAVAL COMBINATIONS, - AND BRITISH NAVAL STRATEGY.—ESSENTIAL UNITY OF NAPOLEON'S - PURPOSE.—CAUSES OF SPANISH WAR. - - Preparations of the two States 101 - - Cession of Louisiana to the United States 104 - - Effect of the British Sea Power upon this measure 105 - - Resources of Great Britain and France as affected by their social - systems 105 - - Offensive and defensive gain to Great Britain by forcing the war 106 - - Inconvenience to Bonaparte from the premature outbreak 107 - - Exhaustion of France under the pressure of Sea Power 108 - - Bonaparte's resolution to invade Great Britain 109 - - Seizure by him of Hanover and of the Heel of Italy 109 - - Object of these measures 110 - - Offence and injury to Prussia by occupation of Hanover 110 - - French troops quartered on Holland, Hanover, and Naples 111 - - Bonaparte's plans for the invasion of England 111 - - His naval combinations to that end 112 - - Building of the great flotilla 113 - - Its points of concentration described 114 - - Difficulties of the undertaking 115 - - Certainty of Napoleon's purpose 116 - - Interesting character of this historical crisis 117 - - Strategic effect of the British blockading squadrons 118 - - Strategic dispositions in the British Channel 119 - - Security felt by British naval officers 120 - - St. Vincent's opposition to small gun-vessels 121 - - The Sea Fencibles 121 - - Deterioration of naval material under St. Vincent's - administration 122 - - Effects upon the Channel and Mediterranean ships 123 - - Embarrassment caused to Nelson 124 - - Bonaparte's naval combination hinges upon Nelson's perplexities 124 - - Details of his first plan 125 - - Merits of St. Vincent's general strategic dispositions 126 - - Nelson's uncertainties as to the French purposes 127 - - His certainty as to his own course 127 - - Embarrassment caused by the condition of his ships 128 - - Delays encountered by Napoleon 129 - - Death of the commander of the Toulon fleet 130 - - Villeneuve appointed to succeed him 130 - - Change of detail in Napoleon's naval combination 131 - - Significance of this new combination 132 - - War begins between Great Britain and Spain 133 - - Train of causes which led to this outbreak 133 - - Detention of the Spanish treasure-ships 137 - - - CHAPTER XVI. - - THE TRAFALGAR CAMPAIGN—CONCLUDED. - JANUARY—OCTOBER, 1805. - - SUCCESSIVE MODIFICATIONS OF NAPOLEON'S PLAN.—NARRATIVE OF NAVAL - MOVEMENTS.—FINAL FAILURE OF NAPOLEON'S NAVAL COMBINATIONS.—WAR - WITH AUSTRIA, AND BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ.—BATTLE OF - TRAFALGAR.—VITAL CHANGE IMPOSED UPON NAPOLEON'S POLICY BY THE - RESULT OF THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN. - - Napoleon has direction of both Spanish and French fleets 140 - - His lack of familiarity with maritime difficulties 141 - - Instructions to the Rochefort and Toulon admirals 142 - - The Rochefort squadron puts to sea 142 - - Delay, and final departure, of the Toulon fleet 143 - - Nelson's movements 143 - - He takes his fleet to Alexandria 144 - - The Toulon ships being crippled in a gale, Villeneuve returns to - Toulon 144 - - Napoleon's plans again modified by this delay 146 - - Stations of the British and Allied fleets in March, 1805 147 - - Napoleon's new instructions to his admirals 149 - - Return of Nelson to Toulon, and his subsequent movements 150 - - Second Sailing of Villeneuve 151 - - Joined by a Spanish division at Cadiz, and reaches Martinique 151 - - Nelson's uncertainties and head winds 152 - - He reaches Gibraltar, and follows Villeneuve to West Indies 152 - - Napoleon goes to Italy 153 - - His naval measures and surmises 154 - - Nelson's sound strategy and sagacity 156 - - Miscalculations of Napoleon 157 - - The measures of the British Admiralty 159 - - Nelson in the West Indies 161 - - Divergent directions taken by the hostile fleets 161 - - Villeneuve returns to Europe 162 - - Nelson penetrates his intention and sails in pursuit 163 - - Napoleon sends to Ferrol instructions for Villeneuve 164 - - Napoleon's efforts to distract the British navy 165 - - The British resist the diversions raised for them 166 - - Villeneuve sighted at sea by a dispatch ship from Nelson 167 - - The news brought to London 168 - - Energetic and skilful measures of the Admiralty 168 - - Villeneuve intercepted by Calder off Cape Finisterre 169 - - Nelson reaches Gibraltar 169 - - Napoleon misled by the rapidity of the British action 170 - - Napoleon goes to Boulogne to await Villeneuve 171 - - The engagement between Calder and Villeneuve 171 - - Subsequent mistakes of the British admiral 172 - - Villeneuve puts into Vigo, and reaches Coruña 173 - - Calder joins Cornwallis off Brest 174 - - Nelson also joins Cornwallis from Gibraltar 174 - - Strategic advantage now in the hands of the British 175 - - Cornwallis divides his fleet and destroys his advantage 176 - - Imminent hostilities on the Continent 176 - - The Third Coalition formed 177 - - Urgent orders from Napoleon to Villeneuve 178 - - Napoleon's decision as to his own movements 179 - - Villeneuve sails from Coruña for Brest 179 - - He abandons his purpose and enters Cadiz 180 - - The allied fleets blockaded in Cadiz by Collingwood 181 - - Napoleon's campaign of 1805 in Germany 181 - - Battle of Austerlitz and peace of Presburg 182 - - Fate of the great flotilla 182 - - Discussion of the chances of Napoleon's project of invasion 182 - - Necessity of making the attempt 184 - - Napoleon's orders to Villeneuve in Cadiz 185 - - Nelson takes command off Cadiz 186 - - The combined fleets put to sea 187 - - Nelson's tactics at Trafalgar discussed 188 - - Battle of Trafalgar 190 - - Death of Nelson 192 - - Nautical disasters succeeding the battle 194 - - Immediate results of the battle 195 - - Subsequent fate of the French ships in Cadiz 195 - - Momentous consequences flowing from the battle of Trafalgar 196 - - Commerce-destroying henceforth the sole resource of Napoleon 197 - - - CHAPTER XVII. - - THE WARFARE AGAINST COMMERCE DURING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION - AND EMPIRE, TO THE BERLIN DECREE. 1793-1806. - - Characteristics of the Warfare against Commerce 199 - - Measures of France and of Great Britain 200 - - Conduct of Napoleon and of the ministry contrasted 201 - - Identity of the methods of the Republic and of the Emperor 202 - - Primary measures of the belligerents 203 - - Twofold system of Great Britain for the protection of trade 204 - - Seamen a part of the military strength of a nation 205 - - The British Convoy Act 205 - - Results to France of her dependence upon commerce-destroying 206 - - Activity of French cruisers 207 - - Amount and distribution of British trade 207 - - Character of French Channel privateers 208 - - Indifferent efficiency of many British cruisers 210 - - French privateering in the Atlantic 210 - - French privateering in the West Indies 211 - - Its piratical character, arising from remoteness from Europe 213 - - Size and force of British East India ships 214 - - Consequent character of French privateering in Indian seas 215 - - Efficient protection of British trade in India 216 - - Advantages of the convoy system 217 - - Destruction of French commerce by British control of the sea 218 - - Numbers of British captures 219 - - The French flag swept from the sea 219 - - Annihilation of French commerce except the coasting trade 220 - - Discussion of the number and value of British vessels captured 221 - - Deductions as to the losses of Great Britain 226 - - Swelling prosperity of the country 227 - - Support to British trade contributed by neutral shipping 228 - - Conclusions thence drawn by the French government 230 - - Effect of the appearance of the United States as neutral carriers 231 - - Rapid increase of American merchant shipping 232 - - Other neutral carriers 233 - - Attitude taken by Russia in 1793 233 - - Severe restrictions on neutrals imposed by Great Britain 234 - - Rule of 1756 234 - - Seizures of American ships in West Indies, 1793 236 - - Jay's Mission to Great Britain, 1794 237 - - Terms of treaty concluded by him 238 - - Indignation of French government 239 - - Effect of Jay's treaty upon American relations with Great - Britain 240 - - Gradual shaping of British commercial war policy 242 - - Vacillating action of French government towards neutrals 242 - - France breaks off relations with the United States 244 - - French aggressions upon neutrals after 1796 244 - - Embargo upon American vessels in 1793 246 - - Growing exasperation between France and the United States 246 - - Effect of Bonaparte's successes upon French foreign policy 247 - - Early attempts to stifle British trade 248 - - Determination to arrest neutral trade with Great Britain 249 - - Law of January 18, 1798 250 - - Modification of channels of British trade caused by the war 250 - - Policy of Pitt in seeking to dominate the Caribbean Sea 252 - - Carriage of tropical produce by neutrals 253 - - Course of trade in Europe, 1793-1798 254 - - Effects of the law of January 18, 1798 254 - - Discussion in the Conseil des Anciens, January, 1799 255 - - Measures of the United States caused by the law of January 18 258 - - _Quasi_ war of 1798 with France 258 - - French reverses in 1799 259 - - French successes in 1800 260 - - Questions involved in the Armed Neutrality of 1800 260 - - Opinions of Pitt and of Fox on the disputed points 261 - - British conventions with the neutral Baltic States, 1801 261 - - Concession of the Rule of 1756 by Russia 262 - - Lessons as to belligerent interest in neutral trade, afforded by - the war between Great Britain and France, 1793-1801 262 - - Further lesson afforded by the short peace of Amiens, 1801-1803 265 - - Renewal of war, May, 1803 265 - - Bonaparte's measures against British trade, 1803-1805 265 - - Threatened injury to British commerce by neutral carriers 266 - - Extent of American trade with colonies of enemies to Great - Britain 267 - - Pitt's commercial measures upon resuming power in 1804 267 - - Methods of American trade between belligerent countries and - their colonies 268 - - Condemnation of American ships in British prize courts, 1804 269 - - Death of Pitt. Fox becomes Foreign Minister, 1806 269 - - Fox's desire to conciliate the United States 269 - - Order in Council of May 16, 1806, substituted for Rule of 1756 269 - - Character of the blockade of French coast thus imposed 270 - - Intention of the new measure, and its consequences 270 - - Death of Fox, September, 1806 270 - - War between France and Prussia 270 - - Napoleon enters Berlin and issues the Berlin Decree 271 - - Object of the decree 271 - - - CHAPTER XVIII. - - THE WARFARE AGAINST COMMERCE, 1806-1812. - - THE BERLIN AND MILAN DECREES OF NAPOLEON, 1806 AND 1807.—THE - BRITISH ORDERS IN COUNCIL, 1807-1809.—ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY - OF THESE MEASURES OF THE TWO BELLIGERENTS.—OUTLINE OF - CONTEMPORARY LEADING EVENTS. - - Object of, and pretext for, the Berlin Decree 272 - - Terms of the Decree 272 - - Napoleon's winter campaign against Russia, 1806-1807 273 - - The Decree remains inoperative 274 - - Battle of Friedland and conventions of Tilsit, June-July, 1807 274 - - British retaliatory Order in Council, January, 1807 275 - - Its terms and object 275 - - Effect upon American traders 276 - - Napoleon's designs upon Denmark and Portugal 276 - - Prompt action of the British ministry 277 - - Portuguese court withdraws to Brazil 277 - - General exclusion of British goods from the Continent 278 - - Attitude of Napoleon towards the United States 279 - - Nature of the questions confronting Napoleon 280 - - Jealousy of Great Britain towards neutral trade 281 - - Momentous decision of Napoleon as to the scope of the Berlin - Decree 281 - - Effect of this decision in Great Britain 282 - - Embargo Act of the United States, 1807 282 - - Succeeded by Non-Intercourse Act, 1809 283 - - British Orders in Council of November, 1807 283 - - Object of these orders 285 - - Summary of their requirements 286 - - Their effect upon neutrals 287 - - The effect upon the continental nations 288 - - Essential features of the opposing British and French policies 289 - - Napoleon's Milan Decree 290 - - Duration of the two policies 291 - - Napoleon's usurpation in Spain 291 - - The Bayonne and Rambouillet Decrees 292 - - The Spanish revolt and French disasters 292 - - Battle of Vimiero and French evacuation of Portugal 292 - - Conventions of Erfurt and war between Russia and Sweden 293 - - The British navy in the Baltic 294 - - Letter of Napoleon and the Czar to the King of Great Britain 294 - - Napoleon in the Spanish Peninsula 295 - - Diversion made by Sir John Moore 296 - - Opening of the year 1809 296 - - Austria's preparations for war 297 - - State of the commercial warfare in 1809 298 - - Evasion of Napoleon's decrees by the Dutch 299 - - Consequent measures of Napoleon 300 - - Passive resistance of the Continent to the decrees 301 - - British seizure of Heligoland 302 - - Conditions in the Baltic 303 - - General conditions of British trade, 1806-1809 304 - - The License System 307 - - Origin of "neutralization" 309 - - Its effect upon the action of British cruisers 310 - - Workings of the License System 311 - - British Order in Council of April, 1809 313 - - War between Austria and France 314 - - Wellesley's operations in the Peninsula 315 - - Battles of Essling and Wagram 316 - - Sweden forced to join in the Continental System 316 - - Napoleon's urgent attempts to enforce the System 317 - - Conditions in the Peninsula 318 - - Northern Germany occupied by French troops 319 - - Holland united to the Empire 321 - - Napoleon's demands upon Prussia and Sweden 322 - - Extensive seizure of ships with British goods 323 - - Napoleon's Customs Decree of August 5, 1810 324 - - Universal application of this decree 325 - - Napoleon's fiscal measures and license system 326 - - Decree of October 19, 1810, to burn British manufactured goods 327 - - Uneasiness of Russia 329 - - Napoleon's annexation of Oldenburg and the Hanse towns 330 - - Commercial distress in Great Britain 331 - - Embarrassment and suffering in France 333 - - Napoleon's financial expedients 337 - - Credit of France and of Great Britain 338 - - Internal condition of France and of England 340 - - The conscription in France 342 - - Exhaustion of the two nations 343 - - Difficulties between France and Russia 344 - - Admiral Saumarez in the Baltic 346 - - Understanding between Sweden, Russia, and Great Britain 347 - - Affairs in the Spanish Peninsula 348 - - Fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz 349 - - Discontent and misery in France 350 - - Russian treaties with Sweden and Turkey 350 - - Napoleon invades Russia 351 - - Revocation of the British Orders in Council 351 - - The United States declare war against Great Britain 351 - - Analysis of the British and French measures 351 - - - CHAPTER XIX. - - SUMMARY.—THE FUNCTION OF SEA POWER AND THE POLICY OF GREAT - BRITAIN IN THE REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS. - - Great Britain's unpreparedness for war in 1792 358 - - Spirit and aims of the French leaders 359 - - Decree of the National Convention, November 19, 1792 361 - - Significance of this step 362 - - Annexation of Belgium, and opening of the Scheldt 362 - - Interest of Great Britain in the Netherlands 363 - - British preparations for war 363 - - Consistency of Pitt's course 364 - - Convention's decree of December 15, 1792 367 - - Aggressive spirit of the French Revolution 368 - - Misconception of its strength by European statesmen 370 - - Conservative temper of the British nation 371 - - Irrepressible conflict between the two forces 372 - - Twofold aspect of Sea Power 372 - - Origin and character of the British Sea Power 373 - - Annihilation of French, Dutch, and Spanish navigation 375 - - Consequent opportunities for neutral carriers 376 - - Restrictions imposed upon these by Great Britain 377 - - Rise of prices on the continent of Europe 377 - - Great Britain becomes the depot for supplying the Continent 378 - - Direct and indirect effects upon British prosperity 380 - - Strength of Great Britain dependent upon Sea Power 381 - - Use of Sea Power made by the ministry 382 - - "Security" the avowed object of the war 383 - - The war, therefore, avowedly defensive 384 - - British treaty obligations to Holland 384 - - Relation of Great Britain to the general struggle 385 - - Two resources arising from Sea Power 386 - - Great land operations inexpedient for Great Britain 386 - - Characteristics of the Seven Years' War 387 - - Contrasts between the elder and the younger Pitt 387 - - Pitt's war policy not simply a military question 391 - - General direction given by him to the national effort 392 - - Justification of his colonial enterprises 393 - - Unprecedented naval development and commercial prosperity - secured by him 394 - - Importance of these results 394 - - Exhaustion of France caused by Pitt's measures 395 - - Bonaparte's opinion as to the influence of Sea Power 396 - - Ruinous results to France of the measures to destroy British - commerce 396 - - Napoleon forced to these steps by Pitt's policy 397 - - Identity of spirit in the Republic and in Napoleon 398 - - France forced into the battle-field of Great Britain's choosing 400 - - Strain of the Continental System upon Europe 401 - - Revolt from it of Spain and Russia 401 - - Effect of these movements 402 - - Napoleon submits to divide his forces 402 - - General correctness of Pitt's war policy 402 - - The criticisms on the campaign of 1793 considered 403 - - Peculiar character of the Revolutionary War 403 - - Dependence of statesmen upon military advice 404 - - Peculiar merit of Pitt 404 - - His death 405 - - His policy pursued by his successors 405 - - Exhaustion the only check upon a great national movement 406 - - France revived by Bonaparte in 1796 and 1799 407 - - He unites the nation in a renewed forward movement 407 - - Bonaparte the incarnation of the Revolution 408 - - Combination of powers in Napoleon's hands 408 - - His career dependent upon the staying power of France 408 - - Effect of Great Britain upon French endurance 409 - - Function of Great Britain in the Napoleonic wars 411 - - Accuracy of Pitt's forecast 411 - - Result postponed only by Bonaparte's genius 411 - - - INDEX 413 - -NOTE.—The references to the "Correspondance de Napoléon" are to the -quarto edition, in thirty-two volumes, published in Paris between 1858 -and 1869. - - - - -LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. - - - VOLUME II. - - MAP AND BATTLE PLANS. - - PAGE - - I. Battle of Copenhagen 44 - - II. Map of North Atlantic 117 - - III. The Attack at Trafalgar 190 - - - - -THE - -INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER - -UPON THE - -FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE. - - - - -CHAPTER XII. - -EVENTS ON THE CONTINENT, 1798-1800. - -DISORDERS OF FRANCE UNDER THE DIRECTORY.—DISASTROUS WAR OF THE SECOND -COALITION.—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSULATE.—BONAPARTE OVERTHROWS AUSTRIA -AND FRAMES AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN THE ARMED NEUTRALITY OF 1800.—PEACE OF -LUNÉVILLE WITH AUSTRIA. - - -While Bonaparte was crossing the Syrian desert and chafing over the -siege of Acre, the long gathering storm of war known as the Second -Coalition had broken upon France. It had been preceded by a premature -outburst of hostility on the part of the Two Sicilies, induced by the -excitement consequent upon the battle of the Nile and fostered by -Nelson;[1] who, however influenced, was largely responsible for the -action of the court. Despite the advice of Austria to wait, a summons -was sent to the French on the 22d of November, 1798, to evacuate -the Papal States and Malta. A Neapolitan army of fifty thousand men -marched upon Rome; and five thousand were carried by Nelson's ships to -Leghorn with the idea of harassing the confidently-expected retreat -of the enemy.[2] Leghorn was at once surrendered; but in the south -the campaign ended in utter disaster. The French general Championnet, -having but fifteen thousand men, evacuated Rome, which the Neapolitans -consequently entered without opposition; but their field operations met -with a series of humiliating reverses, due partly to bad generalship -and partly to inexperience and the lack of mutual confidence often -found among untried troops. The French re-entered Rome seventeen days -after the campaign opened; and the king of Naples, who had made a -triumphal entry into the city, hurried back to his capital, called upon -the people to rise in defence of their homes against the invaders, and -then fled with the royal family to Palermo, Nelson giving them and -the Hamiltons passage on board his flag-ship. The peasantry and the -populace flew to arms, in obedience to the king's proclamation and to -their own feelings of hatred to the republicans. Under the guidance -of the priests and monks, with hardy but undisciplined fury, they in -the field harassed the advance of the French, and in the capital rose -against the upper classes, who were suspected of secret intelligence -with the enemy. Championnet, however, continued to advance; and on -the 23d of January, 1799, Naples was stormed by his troops. After the -occupation, a series of judicious concessions to the prejudices of the -people induced their cheerful submission. The conquest was followed -by the birth to the Batavian, Helvetian, Ligurian, Cisalpine, and -Roman republics, of a little sister, named the Parthenopeian Republic, -destined to a troubled existence as short as its name was long. - -The Neapolitan declaration of war caused the ruin of the Piedmontese -monarchy. The Directory, seeing that war with Austria was probable, -decided to occupy all Piedmont. The king abdicated on the 9th of -December, 1798; retiring to the island of Sardinia, which was left in -his possession. Piedmont was soon after annexed to the French Republic. - -On the 20th of February, 1799, having failed to receive from the -emperor the explanations demanded concerning the entrance of the -Russian troops into his dominions, the Directory ordered its generals -to advance. Jourdan was to command in Germany, Masséna in Switzerland, -and Schérer in Italy. The armies of the republic, enfeebled by two -years of peace and by the economies of a government always embarrassed -for money and deficient in executive vigor, were everywhere inferior -to those of the enemy; and the plan of campaign, providing for several -operations out of reach of mutual support, has been regarded by -military critics as essentially vicious. - -Jourdan crossed the Rhine at Strasburg on the first of March, advancing -through the Black Forest upon the head waters of the Danube. On the 6th -Masséna crossed the river above Lake Constance, and moved through the -Alps toward the Tyrol, driving the Austrians before him on his right -and centre; but on the left he entirely failed to carry the important -position of Feldkirch, upon which would depend the communication -between his left and the right of Jourdan, if the latter succeeded in -pushing on as ordered. This, however, he was unable to do. After some -severe partial encounters there was fought on March 25th, at Stokach, -near the north-west extremity of Lake Constance, a pitched battle in -which the French were defeated. Jourdan then saw that he had to do -with largely superior forces and retreated upon the Rhine, which he -recrossed above Strasburg on the 6th of April. - -On the 26th of March, the day after the defeat of Jourdan at Stokach, -Schérer in Italy attacked the Austrians, who were occupying the line of -the Adige, rendered famous by Bonaparte in his great campaign of 1796. -The events of that day were upon the whole favorable to the French; -but Schérer showed irresolution and consequent delay in improving such -advantages as he had obtained. After a week of manœuvring the two -armies met in battle on the 5th of April near Magnano, and after a long -and bloody struggle the French were forced to give way. On the 6th, -the day that Jourdan retreated across the Rhine, Schérer also fell back -behind the Mincio. Not feeling secure there, although the Austrians did -not pursue, he threw garrisons into the posts on that line, and on the -12th retired behind the Adda; sending word to Macdonald, Championnet's -successor at Naples, to prepare to evacuate that kingdom and bring to -northern Italy the thirty thousand men now so sorely needed. - -Jourdan having offered his resignation after the battle of Stokach, -the armies in Germany and in Switzerland were united under the command -of Masséna; whose long front, extending from the Engadine, around the -sources of the Inn, along the Rhine as low as Dusseldorf, was held by -but one hundred thousand men, of whom two-thirds were in Switzerland. -In the position which Switzerland occupies, thrust out to the eastward -from the frontiers of France, having on the one flank the fields of -Germany, on the other those of Italy, and approachable from both sides -by many passes, the difficulties of defence are great;[3] and Masséna -found himself menaced from both quarters, as well as in front, by -enemies whose aggregate force was far superior to his own. Pressed -along the line of the Rhine both above and below Lake Constance, he was -compelled to retire upon works constructed by him around Zurich; being -unable to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces, which approached -from both directions. On the 4th of June the Austrians assaulted his -lines; and, though the attack was repulsed, Masséna thought necessary -to evacuate the place forty-eight hours later, falling back upon a -position on the Albis mountains a few miles in his rear. - -During the two months over which these contests between Masséna and his -enemies were spread, the affairs of the French in Italy were growing -daily more desperate. After the victory of Magnano the Austrians were -joined, on the 24th of April, by twenty thousand Russians under Marshal -Suwarrow, who became general-in-chief of the allied armies. On the 26th -Schérer turned over his command to Moreau; but, although the latter was -an officer of very great capacity, the change was too late to avoid -all the impending disasters. On the 27th the passage of the Adda was -forced by the allies, and on the 29th they entered Milan; the French -retiring upon the Ticino, breaking down the bridges over the Po, and -taking steps to secure their communications with Genoa. Pausing but a -moment, they again retreated in two columns upon Turin and Alessandria; -Moreau drawing together near the latter place the bulk of his force, -about twenty thousand men, and sending pressing invitations to -Macdonald to hasten the northward march of the army of Naples. The new -positions were taken the 7th of May, and it was not till the 5th that -the Austro-Russians, delayed by the destruction of the bridges, could -cross the Po. But the insurrection of the country in all directions was -showing how little the submission of the people and the establishment -of new republics were accompanied by any hearty fidelity to the French -cause; and on the 18th, leaving a garrison in Alessandria, Moreau -retreated upon the Apennines. On the 6th of June his troops were -distributed among the more important points on the crest of the range, -from Pontremoli, above Spezia, to Loano, and all his convoys had safely -crossed the mountains to the latter point. It was at this moment that -he had an interview with Admiral Bruix, whose fleet had anchored in -Vado Bay two days before.[4] - -While events were thus passing in Upper Italy, Macdonald, in obedience -to his orders, evacuated Naples on the 7th of May, at the moment -when Moreau was taking his position on the Apennines and Bonaparte -making his last fruitless assault upon Acre. Leaving garrisons at the -principal strong places of the kingdom, he hurried north, and on the -25th entered Florence, where, though his junction with Moreau was far -from being effected, he was for the first time in sure communication -with him by courier. There were two routes that Macdonald might -take,—either by the sea-shore, which was impracticable for artillery, -or else, crossing the Apennines, he would find a better road in the -plain south of the Po, through Modena and Parma, and by it might join -the army of Italy under the walls of Tortona. The latter course was -chosen, and after a delay too much prolonged the army of Naples set -out on the 9th of June. All went well with it until the 17th, when, -having passed Modena and Parma, routing the allied detachments which he -encountered, Macdonald reached the Trebia. Here, however, he was met -by Suwarrow, and after three days' desperate fighting was forced to -retreat by the road he came, to his old positions on the other side of -the mountains. On the same day the citadel of Turin capitulated to the -allies. After pursuing Macdonald some distance, Suwarrow turned back -to meet Moreau, and compelled him also to retire to his former posts. -This disastrous attempt at a junction within the enemies' lines cost -the French fifteen thousand men. It now became necessary for the army -of Naples to get to Genoa at all costs by the Corniche road, and this -it was able to do through the inactivity of the enemy,—due, so Jomini -says, not to Suwarrow, but to the orders from Vienna. By the middle of -July both armies were united under Moreau. As a result of the necessary -abandonment of Naples by the French troops, the country fell at once -into the power of the armed peasantry, except the garrisons left in a -few strong places; and these, by the help of the British navy, were -also reduced by the 1st of August. - -This striking practical illustration of the justness of Bonaparte's -views, concerning the danger incurred by the French in Upper Italy -through attempting to occupy Naples, was followed by further disasters. -On the 21st of July the citadel of Alessandria capitulated; and this -loss was followed on the 30th by that of Mantua, which had caused -Bonaparte so much delay and trouble in 1796. The latter success -was somewhat dearly bought, inasmuch as the emperor of Germany had -positively forbidden Suwarrow to make any further advance before -Mantua fell.[5] Opportunity was thus given for the junction of Moreau -and Macdonald, and for the reorganization of the latter's army, which -the affairs of the Trebia and the subsequent precipitate retreat had -left in a state of prostration and incoherence, from which it did not -recover for a month. The delay would have been still more favorable to -the French had Mantua resisted to the last moment; but it capitulated -at a time when it could still have held out for several days, and -Suwarrow was thus enabled to bring up the besieging corps to his -support, unknown to the enemy. - -Meanwhile Moreau had been relieved by Joubert, one of the most -brilliant of the young generals who had fought under Bonaparte in -Italy. The newcomer, reaching his headquarters on the 2d of August, -at once determined upon the offensive, moved thereto by the wish to -relieve Mantua, and also by the difficulty of feeding his army in the -sterile mountains now that ruin had befallen the coastwise traffic of -Genoa, by which supplies had before been maintained.[6] On the 10th -of August the French advanced. On the 14th they were in position at -Novi; and there Joubert saw, but too late, that Suwarrow's army was -far larger than he had expected, and that the rumor of Mantua's fall, -which he had refused to credit, must be true. He intended to retreat; -but the Russian marshal attacked the next morning, and after a fierce -struggle, which the strength of their position enabled the French to -prolong till night, they were driven from the field with heavy loss, -four general officers and thirty-seven guns being captured. Joubert -was killed early in the day; and Moreau, who had remained to aid him -until familiar with all the details of his command, again took the -temporary direction of the army by the agreement of the other generals. -Immediately after the battle Suwarrow sent into the late Papal States -a division which, co-operating with the Neapolitan royalists and the -British navy, forced the French to evacuate the new Roman republic on -the 27th of September, 1799. - -At this moment of success new dispositions were taken by the allied -governments, apparently through the initiative of Austria; which -wished, by removing Suwarrow, to keep entire control of Italy in her -own hands. This change of plan, made at so critical a moment, stopped -the hitherto triumphant progress; and, by allowing time for Bonaparte -to arrive and to act, turned victory into defeat. By it Suwarrow was to -march across the Alps into Switzerland, and there take charge of the -campaign against Masséna, having under him an army composed mainly of -Russians. The Archduke Charles, now commanding in Switzerland, was to -depart with the greater part of the Austrian contingent to the lower -Rhine, where he would by his operations support the invasion of Holland -then about to begin. - -On the 13th of August,—the same day that Bruix entered Brest, carrying -with him the Spanish fleet, and two days before the battle of Novi,—the -expedition against Holland, composed of seventeen thousand Russians -and thirty thousand British troops, sailed from England. Delayed first -by light winds and then by heavy weather, the landing was not made -till the 27th of the month. On the 31st the Archduke, taking with him -thirty-six thousand Austrians, started for the lower Rhine, leaving -General Hotze and the Russian Korsakoff to make head against Masséna -until the arrival of Suwarrow. The latter, on the 11th of September, -immediately after the surrender of Tortona, began his northward march. - -At the moment the Archduke assumed his new command, the French on the -lower Rhine, crossing at Mannheim, invested and bombarded Philipsburg; -and their operations seemed so far serious as to draw him and a large -part of his force in the same direction. This greatly diminished one -of the difficulties confronting Masséna in the offensive movement he -then had in contemplation. Hearing at the same time that Suwarrow had -started from Italy, he made his principal attack from his left upon -the Russians before Zurich on the 25th of September, the right wing of -his long line advancing in concert against the Austrian position east -of Lake Zurich upon its inlet, the Linth. Each effort was completely -successful, and decisive; the enemy being in both directions driven -back, and forced to recross the streams above and below the lake. -Suwarrow, after a very painful march and hard fighting, reached his -first appointed rendezvous at Mutten two days after the battle of -Zurich had been lost; and the corps that were to have met him there, -fearing their retreat would be cut off, had not awaited his arrival. -The old marshal with great difficulty fought his way through the -mountains to Ilanz, where at length he assembled his exhausted and -shattered forces on the 9th of October, the day on which Bonaparte -landed at Fréjus on his return from Egypt. By that time Switzerland -was entirely cleared of Russians and Austrians. The river Rhine, both -above and below Lake Constance, marked the dividing line between the -belligerents. - -The Anglo-Russian attack upon Holland had no better fate. Landing upon -the peninsula between the Zuyder Zee and the North Sea, the allies were -for awhile successful; but their movements were cautious and slow, -giving time for the local resistance to grow and for re-enforcements to -come up. The remnants of the Dutch navy were surrendered and taken back -to England; but the Duke of York, who had chief command of the allied -troops, was compelled on the 18th of October to sign a convention, by -which the invading force was permitted to retire unmolested by the -first of December. - -During the three remaining months of 1799 some further encounters took -place in Germany and Italy. In the latter the result was a succession -of disasters to the French, ending with the capitulation, on the 4th -of December, of Coni, their last remaining stronghold in Piedmont, -and the retreat of the army into the Riviera of Genoa. Corfu and the -Ionian Islands having been reduced by the combined Russian and Turkish -fleets in the previous March, and Ancona surrendered on the 10th of -November, all Bonaparte's conquests in Italy and the Adriatic had been -lost to France when the Directory fell. The brave soldiers of the army -of Italy, destitute and starving, without food, without pay, without -clothing or shoes, without even wood for camp-fires in the bitter -winter nights on the slopes of the Apennines, deserted in crowds and -made their way to the interior. In some regiments none but officers -and non-commissioned officers were left. An epidemic born of want and -exposure carried off men by hundreds. Championnet, overwhelmed by his -misfortunes and by the sight of the misery surrounding him, fell ill -and died. Bonaparte, now First Consul, sent Masséna to replace him. - -In Germany nothing decisive occurred in the field; but in consequence -of some disagreements of opinion between himself and the Archduke, -Suwarrow declined further co-operation, and, alleging the absolute -need of rest for his soldiers after their frightful exposure in -Switzerland, marched them at the end of October into winter quarters -in Bavaria. This closed the share of the Russians in the second -coalition. The Czar, who had embarked in the war with the idea of -restoring the rights of monarchs and the thrones that had been -overturned, was dissatisfied both with the policy of Austria, which -looked to her own predominance in Italy, and with Great Britain. -A twelvemonth more was to see him at the head of a league of the -northern states against the maritime claims of the great Sea Power, -and completely won over to the friendship of Bonaparte by the military -genius and wily flattery of the renowned captain. - -During this disastrous year, in which France lost all Italy except the -narrow strip of sea-coast about Genoa, and after months of desperate -struggle had barely held her own in Switzerland, Germany, and Holland, -the internal state of the country was deplorable. The Revolutionary -government by the Committee of Public Safety had contrived, by the -use of the extraordinary powers granted to it, to meet with greater -or less success the demands of the passing hour; although in so doing -it was continually accumulating embarrassments against a future day -of reckoning. The Directory, deprived of the extraordinary powers of -its predecessor, had succeeded to these embarrassments, and the day of -reckoning had arrived. It has been seen how the reactionary spirit, -which followed the rule of blood, had prevailed more and more until, -in 1797, the political composition of the two Councils was so affected -by it as to produce a strong conflict between them and the executive. -This dead-lock had been overcome and harmony restored by the violent -measures of September, 1797, by which two Directors and a number of -members of the legislature had been forcibly expelled from their -office. The parties, of two very different shades of opinion, to which -the ejected members belonged, had not, however, ceased to exist. In -1798, in the yearly elections to replace one-third of the legislature, -they again returned a body of representatives sufficient to put the -Councils in opposition to the Directory; but this year the choice of -the electors was baffled by a system of double returns. The sitting -Councils, of the same political party as the Directory, pronounced upon -these, taking care in so doing to insure that the majority in the new -bodies should be the same as in the old. In May, 1799, however, the -same circumstance again recurred. The fact is particularly interesting, -as showing the opposition which was felt toward the government -throughout the country. - -This opposition was due to a cause which rarely fails to make -governments unpopular. The Directory had been unsuccessful. It was -called upon to pay the bills due to the public expectation of better -things when once the war was over. This it was not able to do. Though -peace had been made with the continent, there remained so many matters -of doubt and contention that large armies had to be maintained. The -expenses of the state went on, but the impoverished nation cried -out against the heavy taxation laid to meet them; the revenues -continually fell short of the expenditures, and the measures proposed -by the ministers to remedy this evil excited vehement criticisms. -The unpopularity of the government, arising from inefficient action, -reacted upon and increased the weakness which was inherent in its -cumbrous, many-headed form. Hence there resulted, from the debility of -the head, an impotence which permeated all the links of the executive -administration down to the lowest members. - -In France itself the disorder and anarchy prevailing in the interior -touched the verge of social dissolution.[7] Throughout the country, -but especially in the south and west, prevailed brigandage on a large -scale—partly political, partly of the ordinary highway type. There -were constant reports of diligences and mail-wagons stopped,[8] of -public treasure plundered, of republican magistrates assassinated. -Disorganization and robbery spread throughout the army, a natural -result of small pay, irregularly received, and of the system of -contributions, administered with little responsibility by the -commanders of armies in the field. The attempt of the government to -check and control this abuse was violently resented by generals, both -of the better and the worse class; by the one as reflecting upon their -character and injuring their position, by the other as depriving them -of accustomed though unlawful gains. Two men of unblemished repute, -Joubert and Championnet, came to a direct issue with the Directory -upon this point. Joubert resigned the command of the army of Italy, in -which Bernadotte from the same motive refused to replace him; while -Championnet, in Naples, compelled the commissioner of the Directory to -leave the kingdom. For this act, however, he was deprived and brought -to a court-martial. - -From the weakness pervading the administration and from the inadequate -returns of the revenue, the government was driven to extraordinary -measures and to the anticipation of its income. Greater and more -onerous taxes were laid; and, as the product of these was not -immediate, purchases had to be made at long and uncertain credit, and -consequently were exorbitant in price while deficient in quantity and -quality. From this arose much suffering among all government employés, -but especially among the soldiers, who needed the first attention, and -whose distress led them easily to side with their officers against -the administration. Contracts so made only staved off the evil day, -at the price of increasing indebtedness for the state and of growing -corruption among the contractor class and the officials dealing with -them. Embarrassment and disorder consequently increased apace without -any proportionate vigor in the external action of the government, and -the effects were distributed among and keenly felt by all individuals, -except the small number whose ability or whose corruptness enables -them to grow rich when, and as, society becomes most distressed. The -creditors of the nation, and especially the holders of bonds, could -with difficulty obtain even partial payment. In the general distrust -and perplexity individuals and communities took to hoarding both money -and food, moved by the dangers of transit and by fear of the scarcity -which they saw to be impending. This stagnation of internal circulation -was accompanied by the entire destruction of maritime commerce, due to -the pressure of the British navy and to the insane decree of Nivôse 29 -(January 19, 1798).[9] Both concurred to paralyze the energies of the -people, to foster indolence and penury, and by sheer want to induce a -state of violence with which the executive was unable to cope. - -When to this internal distress were added the military disasters just -related, the outcry became loud and universal. All parties united -against the Directors, who did not dare in 1799 to repeat the methods -by which in the two previous years a majority had been obtained in the -legislature. On the 18th of June the new Councils were able to force -a change in the composition of the Directory, further enfeebling it -through the personal weakness of the new members. These hastened to -reverse many of the measures of their predecessors, but no change of -policy could restore the lost prestige. The effect of these steps was -only further to depress that branch of the government which, in so -critical a moment and in so disordered a society, should overbear all -others and save the state—not by discussion, but by action. - -Such was the condition of affairs found by Bonaparte when he returned -from Egypt. The revolution of Brumaire 18 (November 9, 1799) threw -into his hands uncontrolled power. This he proceeded at once to use -with the sagacity and vigor that rarely failed him in his early -prime. The administration of the country was reconstituted on lines -which sacrificed local independence, but invigorated the grasp of -the central executive, and made its will felt in every corner of the -land. Vexatious measures of the preceding government were repealed, -and for them was substituted a policy of liberal conciliation, -intended to rally all classes of Frenchmen to the support of the new -rule. In the West and North, in La Vendée, Brittany, and Normandy, -the insurrection once suppressed by Hoche had again raised its head -against the Directory. To the insurgents Bonaparte offered reasonable -inducements to submission, while asserting his firm determination -to restore authority at any cost; and the rapid gathering of sixty -thousand troops in the rebellious districts proved his resolution to -use for that purpose a force so overwhelming, that the completion of -its task would release it by the return of spring, to take the field -against external foes. Before the end of February the risings were -suppressed, and this time forever. Immediate steps were taken to put -the finances on a sounder basis, and to repair the military disasters -of the last twelvemonth. To the two principal armies, of the Rhine and -of Italy, were sent respectively Moreau and Masséna, the two greatest -generals of the republic after Bonaparte himself; and money advanced by -Parisian bankers was forwarded to relieve the more pressing wants of -the destitute soldiery. - -At the same time that these means were used to recover France herself -from the condition of debility into which she had fallen, the first -consul made a move calculated either to gain for her the time she yet -needed, or, in case it failed, to rally to his support all classes in -the state. Departing from the usual diplomatic routine, he addressed -a personal letter to the king of Great Britain and to the emperor -of Germany, deploring the existing war, and expressing a wish that -negotiations for peace might be opened. The reply from both sovereigns -came through the ordinary channels of their respective ministries. -Austria said civilly that she could not negotiate apart from her -allies; and furthermore, that the war being only to preserve Europe -from universal disorder, due to the unstable and aggressive character -of the French governments since the Revolution, no stable peace could -be made until there was some guarantee for a change of policy. This -she could not yet recognize in the new administration, which owed its -existence only to the violent overthrow of its predecessor. Great -Britain took substantially the same ground. Peace was worse than -worthless, if insecure; and experience had shown that no defence except -that of steady and open hostility was availing, while the system which -had prevailed in France remained the same. She could not recognize a -change of system in the mere violent substitution of one set of rulers -for another. Disavowing any claim to prescribe to France what should -be her form of government, the British ministry nevertheless said -distinctly that the best guarantee for a permanent change of policy -would be the restoration of the Bourbons. This seemingly impolitic -suggestion insured—what was very possibly its object—the continuance of -the war until were realized the advantages that seemed about to accrue. -Not only were the conditions at that time overwhelmingly in favor of -the allies, but there was also every probability of the reduction of -Egypt and Malta, and of further decisive successes in Italy. These, -if obtained, would be so many cards strengthening their hands in the -diplomatic game to be played in the negotiations for peace. Believing, -as the British ministry of that day assuredly did, that a secure peace -could only be based on the exhaustion, and not upon the moderation or -good faith, of their enemy, it would have been the height of folly to -concede time, or submit to that vacillation of purpose and relaxation -of tension which their own people would certainly feel, if negotiations -were opened. - -Nor were these military and moral considerations the only ones -affecting the decision of the government. Despite the immense burdens -imposed by the war to support her own military expenditures and -furnish the profuse subsidies paid to her allies, the power of the -country to bear them was greatly increased. Thanks to the watery -rampart which secured peace within her borders, Great Britain had now -become the manufactory and warehouse of Europe. The commercial and -maritime prostration of Holland and France, her two great rivals in -trade and manufactures, had thrown into her hands these sources of -their prosperity; and she, through the prodigious advances of the ten -years' peace, was fully ready to profit by them. By the capture of -their foreign possessions and the ruin of the splendid French colony -in Haïti, she now controlled the chief regions whence were drawn the -tropical products indispensable to Europeans. She monopolized their -markets as well as the distribution of their produce. Jealously -reserving to British merchant shipping the trade of her own and -conquered colonies, she yet met the immense drain made by the navy -upon her merchant seamen by relaxing the famous Navigation Laws; -permitting her ships to be manned by foreigners, and foreign ships to -engage in branches of her commerce closed to them in time of peace. -But while thus encouraging neutrals to carry the surplus trade, whose -rapid growth was outstripping the capacity of her own shipping, she -rigorously denied their right to do as much for her enemies. These -severe restrictions, which her uncontrolled sea-power enabled her -to maintain, were re-enforced by suicidal edicts of the French -government, retaliating upon the same unhappy neutrals the injury their -weakness compelled them to accept from the mistress of the seas,—thus -driving them from French shores, and losing a concurrence essential -to French export and import. In this time of open war no flag was so -safe from annoyance as the British, for none other was protected by a -powerful navy. Neutrals sought its convoy against French depredations, -and the navigation of the world was now swayed by this one great power, -whom its necessities had not yet provoked to lay a yoke heavier than -the oppressed could bear. - -To this control of the carrying trade, and of so much of the -agricultural production of the globe, was added a growing absorption -of the manufactures of Europe, due to the long war paralyzing the -peaceful energies of the continental peoples. In the great system of -circulation and exchange, everything thus tended more and more to Great -Britain; which was indicated as the natural centre for accumulation -and distribution by its security, its accessibility, and its nearness -to the continent on which were massed the largest body of consumers -open to maritime commerce. Becoming thus the chief medium through -which the business of the civilized world was carried on and its wants -supplied, her capital grew apace; and was steadily applied, by the able -hands in which it accumulated, to develop, by increased production and -increased facilities of carriage, the powers of the country to supply -demands that were continually increasing on both sides of the Atlantic. -The foreign trade, export and import, which in 1792, the last year of -peace, had amounted to £44,500,000, rose in 1797 to £50,000,000, and -in 1800 to £73,700,000. Encouraged by these evident proofs of growing -wealth, the ministry was able so to increase the revenue that its -receipts, independent of extraordinary war taxes, far exceeded anything -it had ever been before, "or," to use Pitt's words, "anything which -the most sanguine hopes could have anticipated. If," he continued, -"we compare this year of war with former years of peace, we shall in -the produce of our revenue and in the extent of our commerce behold a -spectacle at once paradoxical, inexplicable, and astonishing. We have -increased our external and internal commerce to a greater pitch than -ever it was before; and we may look to the present as the proudest year -that has ever occurred for this country."[10] - -With such resources to sustain the armies of their allies, and certain -of keeping a control of the sea unparalleled even in the history of -Great Britain, the ministry looked hopefully forward to a year which -should renew and complete the successes of 1799. They reckoned without -Bonaparte, as Bonaparte in his turn reckoned again and again without -Nelson. - -Russia took no more part in the coalition; but the forces of Germany, -under the control of Austria and subsidized by Great Britain, either -actually in the field or holding the fortified posts on which the -operations depended, amounted to something over two hundred and fifty -thousand men. Of these, one hundred and twenty-five thousand under -Mélas were in Italy. The remainder under General Kray were in Germany, -occupying the angle formed by the Rhine at Bâle, where, after flowing -west from Lake Constance, it turns abruptly north for the remainder -of its course. The plan of campaign was to stand on the defensive in -Germany, holding in check the enemies there opposed to them, and in -Italy to assume a vigorous offensive, so as to drive the French finally -out of the country. That achieved, the idea was entertained of entering -France at the extreme south, and possibly investing Toulon, supported -by the British navy. - -When Bonaparte first took charge, there remained to France only two -hundred and fifty thousand soldiers, of whom at the opening of the -campaign of 1800 there were in the field, opposed to the Austrians, but -one hundred and sixty-five thousand. One hundred thousand conscripts -were called for; but time would be needed to turn these into soldiers, -even with the advantage of the nucleus of veterans around whom they -would be gathered. The equipment and provisioning both of the old and -new levies also required time and effort. Bonaparte's project was to -assume the offensive in Germany, turning there the position of the -Austrians, and driving them northward from the Rhine towards the head -waters of the Danube. For this great operation the army under Moreau -was raised to an equality with the enemy opposed to him. Masséna in -Italy was directed to stand solely on the defensive, concentrating -around Genoa the bulk of the thirty-five or forty thousand men which -alone he had. While he held this position in such force, the Austrians -could scarcely advance into France along the narrow coast road, leaving -him in the rear. When the expected success in Germany was won, there -was to be detached from that army, which should then assume an attitude -of observation, a corps twenty thousand strong. This should cross -Switzerland, entering Italy by the St. Gothard Pass, and there joining -a force of forty thousand to be led by the First Consul in person -through the Pass of St. Bernard. This mass of sixty thousand men was to -throw itself in rear of the Austrians, forcing them to fight for their -communications through Lombardy, and hoping under the first general of -the age to win, over a less skilful opponent, such victories as had -illustrated the famous campaigns of 1796 and 1797. - -Bonaparte's plan thus hinged upon the French occupation of Switzerland, -which, intervening as a great rampart between the Austrians in Germany -and Italy, permitted him to cover the movements against the former by -the curtain of the Rhine between Lake Constance and Bâle, and to use -safely and secretly the passes leading into the plains of Lombardy -and Piedmont. To this advantage of position he conjoined, with -inconceivable wiliness, an absolute secrecy as to the very existence -of the forty thousand, known as the Army of Reserve, which he himself -was to lead. The orders constituting this force were given the utmost -publicity. Its headquarters were established at Dijon, and one of -Bonaparte's most trusted subordinates was sent to command it. An appeal -was made to discharged soldiers to join its ranks; some material of -war and some conscripts, with a corps of officers, were assembled. -There preparations stopped—or went on so feebly in comparison with the -glowing boasts of the French journals, that hostile spies were entirely -deceived. The Army of Reserve became the joke of Europe, while the -scattered detachments that were to compose it were assembling at points -separated, yet chosen with Bonaparte's consummate skill to permit -rapid concentration when the hour came. To insure perfect secrecy, -the correspondence of these different bodies was with him alone, not -through the Ministry of War. - -The campaign was opened by the Austrians in Italy. Mélas, with seventy -thousand men, attacked Masséna along the chain of the Apennines. -Difficulties of subsistence had forced the latter to disseminate his -troops between Genoa and Nice. Through this necessarily thin line -the Austrians broke on the 5th of April, and after several days of -strenuous resistance, furthered by the facilities for defence offered -by that mountainous region, Masséna was driven into Genoa. The left -wing of his army under Suchet was forced back toward Nice, where it -took position on the Var. On the 18th of April Masséna was definitively -shut up in Genoa with eighteen thousand men, and so short of provisions -that it became a matter of the utmost urgency to relieve him. - -On April 25 Moreau began his movements, of a somewhat complicated -character, but resulting in his whole army being safely across the -Rhine on the first of May. Eighty thousand French troops were then -drawn up between Bâle and Lake Constance in an east and west direction, -threatening the left flank of the enemy, whose front was north and -south, and in position to attack both their line of retreat and the -immense depots whose protection embarrassed all the movements of -the Austrians. On the 3d of May the latter were defeated at Engen, -and their depot at Stokach was captured. On the 5th they were again -beaten at Moesskirch, and on the 9th at Biberach, losing other -large deposits of stores. General Kray then retired upon Ulm on the -Danube, and the first act of Bonaparte's design was accomplished. -It had not corresponded with the lines laid down by him, which were -too adventurous to suit Moreau, nor was the result equal to his -expectations; but the general strategic outcome was to check for the -time any movements of the enemy in Germany, and enable Moreau to send -the force needed to co-operate with Bonaparte in Italy. This started -on the 13th of May, and was joined on the way by some detachments in -Switzerland; the whole amounting to between fifteen and twenty thousand -men.[11] - -On the 6th of May the first consul left Paris, having delayed to -the last moment in order to keep up the illusions of the Austrian -commander-in-chief in Italy. The crossing of the St. Bernard began -on the 15th, and on the 20th the whole army had passed. On the 26th -it issued in the plains of Piedmont; whence Bonaparte turned to the -eastward, to insure his great object of throwing his force across the -enemy's communications and taking from him all hope of regaining them -without a battle. On the first of June he entered Milan. - -Meanwhile Masséna's army, a prey to horrible famine, prolonged in Genoa -a resistance which greatly contributed to the false position of the -Austrians. Of these, twenty-five thousand were before Nice, thirty -thousand before Genoa. Twenty thousand more had been lost by casualties -since the campaign opened. Unwilling to relinquish his gains, Mélas -waited too long to concentrate his scattered troops; and when at -last he sent the necessary orders, Masséna was treating to evacuate -Genoa. The Austrian officer on the spot, unwilling to lose the prize, -postponed compliance until it was secured,—a delay fraught with serious -results. On the 5th Genoa was given up, and the besiegers, leaving a -garrison in the place, marched to join the commander-in-chief, who -was gathering his forces around Alessandria. Meanwhile Bonaparte had -crossed to the south side of the Po with half his army. On the 14th -of June was fought the battle of Marengo. Anxious lest the foe might -give him the slip, the first consul had spread his troops too widely; -and the first events of the day were so far in favor of the Austrians -that Mélas, who was seventy-six years old, left the field at two in -the afternoon, certain of victory, to seek repose. An hour later the -opportune arrival of General Desaix turned the scales, and Bonaparte -remained conqueror on the ground, standing across the enemy's line -of retreat. The following day Mélas signed a convention abandoning -all northern Italy, as far as the Mincio, behind which the Austrians -were to withdraw. All the fortified places were given up to France, -including the hardly won Genoa. While awaiting the Emperor's answer -to propositions of peace, sent by the First Consul, there was to be -in Italy a suspension of arms, during which neither army should send -detachments to Germany. On the 2d of July Bonaparte re-entered Paris in -triumph, after an absence of less than two months. - -Meantime Moreau, after learning the successful crossing of the St. -Bernard, had resumed the offensive. Moving to the eastward, he crossed -the Danube below Ulm with part of his force on the 19th of June, -threatening Kray's communications with Bohemia. A partial encounter on -that day left five thousand prisoners in the hands of the French, who -maintained the position they had gained. The same night Kray evacuated -Ulm, moving rapidly off by a road to the northward and so effecting -his escape. Moreau, unable to intercept, followed for some distance -and then stopped a pursuit which promised small results. He was still -ignorant of the battle of Marengo, of which the Austrians now had news; -and the latter, while concealing the victory, announced to him the -suspension of arms, and suggested a similar arrangement in Germany. -Convinced that events favorable to France lay behind this proposition, -Moreau would come to no agreement; but on the contrary decided at once -to secure for his victorious army the most advantageous conditions -with which to enter upon negotiations. Closely investing the important -fortresses of Ulm and Ingolstadt on the Danube, with part of his force, -he recrossed the river with the remainder and advanced into Bavaria. On -the 28th of June he entered Munich; and near there was signed on the -15th of July an armistice, closely corresponding with that concluded -by Bonaparte in Italy just one month before. The two belligerents -retired behind appointed lines, not again to engage in hostilities -without twelve days' notice. During this suspension of arms the -blockaded Austrian fortresses should receive every fortnight provisions -proportioned to their consumption, so that in case of renewed -operations they would be in the same condition as when the truce began. -The two great French armies were now encamped in the fertile plains of -Italy and Germany, living in quiet off districts external to France, -which was thus relieved of the larger part of their expense. - -The effect of this short and brilliant campaign of unbroken French -successes was to dispose to peace both members of the coalition. -Neither, however, was yet reduced to negotiate apart from its ally. On -the very day the news of Marengo was received at Vienna, but before -the last reverses in Germany, Austria had renewed her engagements with -Great Britain, both powers stipulating not to treat singly. The first -consul, on the other hand, was distinctly opposed to joint discussions, -his constant policy in the cabinet as in the field being to separate -his opponents. As Austria's great need was to gain time, she sent to -Paris an envoy empowered to exchange views with the French government -but to conclude nothing. The emperor also intimated his wish for a -general pacification, and on the 9th of August the British minister at -Vienna notified to that court the willingness of his own to enter into -negotiations for a general peace. - -With this began an encounter of wits, in which Bonaparte showed himself -as astute at a bargain as he was wily in the field. Austria, if not -given too much time, was at his mercy; but Great Britain held over him -a like advantage in her control of the sea, which was strangling the -colonial empire he passionately wished to restore. Haïti had escaped -from all but nominal control; Martinique, the gem of the Antilles, was -in British hands; Malta and Egypt, the trophies of his own enterprise, -were slowly but surely expiring. For these he too needed time; for -with it there was good prospect of soon playing a card which should -reverse, or at least seriously modify, the state of the game, by -bringing Russia and the Baltic navies into the combination against -Great Britain. In this support, and in the extremity to which he might -reduce Austria, lay his only chances to check the great opponent of -France; for, while almost supreme on the Continent, he could not from -the coast project his power beyond the range of a cannon's ball. His -correspondence throughout this period abounds with instructions and -exhortations to fit out the fleets, to take the sea, to relieve Malta -and Egypt, to seize Sardinia by an expedition from Corsica, and Mahon -by a squadron from Brest. All fell fruitless before the exhaustion of -French sea power, as did also his plan for an extensive cruise on a -grand scale against British commerce in many quarters of the world. -"I see with regret," wrote he to the minister of Marine, "that the -armament of the fleet has been sacrificed to that of a great number of -small vessels;" but in truth there was nothing else to do. His ablest -admirals failed to equip ships from which every resource was cut off by -the omnipresent cruisers of the enemy. "We can never take Mahon," he -writes to the court of Spain, in the full swing of his triumphs after -Marengo; "therefore make war on Portugal and take her provinces, so as -to enter negotiations for peace with your hands as full as possible of -equivalents." - -The Czar Paul had joined the second coalition full of ardor against the -French revolution and determined to restore the princes who had lost -their thrones. He had been bitterly mortified by the reverses to his -troops in 1799, and especially by the disaster to Suwarrow, for which -he not unjustly blamed Austria. He was also dissatisfied to find in his -allies less of zeal for unfortunate sovereigns than of desire to reduce -the power of France, to whose system they attributed the misfortunes of -Europe. Disappointment in his unbalanced mind turned soon to coolness -and was rapidly passing to hostility. The transition was assisted, and -a pretext for a breach with Great Britain afforded, by a fresh outbreak -of the old dispute between her and the Baltic powers concerning the -rights of neutrals. Denmark in 1799 adopted the policy of convoying her -merchant vessels by ships of war, and claimed that a statement from the -senior naval officer, that the cargoes contained nothing forbidden by -the law of nations, exempted the convoy from the belligerent right of -search. British statesmen denied that this conceded belligerent right -could be nullified by any rule adopted by a neutral; to which they were -the more impelled as the Danes and themselves differed radically in the -definition of contraband. Danish naval officers being instructed to -resist the search of their convoys, two hostile encounters took place; -one in December, 1799, and the other in July, 1800. In the latter -several were killed on both sides, and the Danish frigate was carried -into the Downs. Seeing the threatening character of affairs, the -British ministry took immediate steps to bring them to an issue. An -ambassador was sent to Copenhagen supported by nine ships-of-the-line -and several bomb-vessels; and on the 29th of August, barely a month -after the affray, a convention was signed by which the general subject -of searching ships under convoy was referred to future discussion, but -Denmark consented to suspend her convoys until a definitive treaty was -made. The Danish frigate was at once released. - -It will be observed that this collision occurred in the very midst of -the negotiations between Austria and France, to which Great Britain -claimed the right to be a party. The whole vexed question of neutral -and belligerent rights was thus violently raised, at a moment most -inauspicious to the allies and most favorable to Bonaparte. The latter, -crowned with victory upon the Continent, found every neutral commercial -state disposed to side with him in contesting positions considered by -Great Britain to be vital to her safety. It was for him to foster this -disposition and combine the separate powers into one great effort, -before which the Mistress of the Seas should be compelled to recede -and submit. The occasion here arose, as it were spontaneously, to -realize what became the great dream of his life and ultimately led him -to his ruin,—to unite the Continent against the British Islands and, -as he phrased it, "to conquer the sea by the land." Circumstances, -partly anterior to his rise to power, and partly contrived by his -sagacious policy during the previous few months, particularly favored -at this moment such a league, for which the affair of the Danish -convoy supplied an impulse, and the prostration of Great Britain's -ally, Austria, an opportunity. Bonaparte underestimated the vitality -and influence of a state upon which centred a far-reaching commercial -system, and in valuing naval power he did not appreciate that a mere -mass of ships had not the weight he himself was able to impart to a -mass of men. He never fully understood the maritime problems with -which from time to time he had to deal; but he showed wonderful skill -at this critical period in combining against his principal enemy an -opposition, for which Prussia afforded the body and the hot temper of -the Czar the animating soul. - -Since 1795 Prussia had shut herself up to a rigorous neutrality, in -which were embraced the North German states. Under this system, during -the maritime war, the commerce of the larger part of the Continent -poured in through these states—by the great German rivers, the Ems, the -Weser, and the Elbe—and through the cities of Hamburg and Bremen. The -tonnage clearing from Great Britain alone to North Germany increased -from 120,000 in 1792 to 389,000 in 1800; a traffic of which Prussia -took the lion's share. To these advantages of neutral territory it -was desirable to join the utmost freedom for neutral navigation. Upon -this Great Britain bore heavily; but so large a proportion of the -trade was done through her, and the sea was so entirely under the -power of her navy, that prudence had so far dictated acquiescence in -her claims, even when not admitted. This was particularly the case -while Russia, under Catherine II., and in the first years of her son, -tacitly or openly supported Great Britain; and while Austria, though -badly beaten in the field, remained unshaken in power. The weaker -maritime countries, Sweden, Denmark, and the United States of America, -were determined by similar motives. They groaned under the British -exactions; but the expansion of their commerce outweighed the injuries -received, and submission was less hurtful than resistance in arms. -Russia herself, though not strictly a maritime state, was a large -producer of articles which were mainly carried by British ships and -for which England was the chief customer. The material interests of -Russia, and especially of the powerful nobles, were therefore bound up -with peace with Great Britain; but an absolute monarch could disregard -this fact, at least for a time. The furious, impulsive temper of -Paul I., if aroused, was quite capable of overleaping all prudential -considerations, of using the colossal power of his empire to support -the other states, and even of compelling them to act in concert with -him. - -Such were the discordant elements which Bonaparte had to reconcile -into a common effort: on the one hand, the strong though short-sighted -mercantile interests, which to retain great present advantages would -favor submission rather than resistance to the exactions of Great -Britain. These were represented by the development of carrying trade -in the neutral Baltic states, by the enlarged commerce of Prussia and -North Germany,—which through their neutrality in a maritime war had -become the highway of intercourse between the Continent and the outer -world,—and by the productions of Russia, which formed the revenue of -her great proprietors, and found their way to market wholly by sea. -Bound together by the close relations which commerce breeds between -states, and by the dependence of each upon the capital and mercantile -system of Great Britain, these interests constituted the prosperity -of nations, and could by no rulers be lightly disregarded. On the -other hand stood the dignity of neutral flags and their permanent -interests,—always contrary to those of belligerents,—the ambition -of Prussia and her jealousy of Austria, and finally the chivalrous, -reckless, half insane Paul I., seeking now with all the bitterness of -personal feeling to gratify his resentment against his late allies. - -Bonaparte had already begun to work upon the Czar as well as upon the -neutral powers. Closely observing the political horizon from his first -accession to office, he had noted every condition capable of raising -embarrassments to Great Britain, whom his unerring military insight -had long before recognized[12] as the key to a military situation, in -which his own object was the predominance of France, not only on the -Continent but throughout the world. Sagacious a statesman as he was, -and clearly as he recognized the power of moral and political motives, -his ideal of control was essentially forcible, based upon superior -armies and superior fleets; and consequently every political problem -was by him viewed much as a campaign, in which forces were to be moved, -combined, and finally massed upon the vital points of an enemy's -position. The power of Great Britain was sea power in its widest sense, -commercial and naval; against it, therefore, he aimed to effect such a -combination as would both destroy her commerce and cripple her navy. -The impotence of France and Spain, united, to injure the one or the -other had been clearly shown by repeated defeats, and by the failure -of the commerce-destroying so industriously carried on during seven -years of war. Far from decaying or languishing, the commerce of Great -Britain throve everywhere with redoubled vigor, and her fleets rode -triumphant in all seas. There was, however, one quarter in which she -had not hitherto been disturbed, except by the quickly extinguished -efforts of the Dutch navy; and just there, in the Baltic and North Sea, -was the point where, next to the British islands and seas themselves, -she was most vulnerable. There was concentrated a great part of her -shipping; there was the market for the colonial produce stored in her -overflowing warehouses; there also were gathered three navies, whose -united masses—manned by hardy seamen trained in a boisterous navigation -and sheltered in an enclosed sea of perilous access—might overweight a -force already strained to control the Mediterranean, to blockade the -hostile arsenals, and to protect the merchant shipping which thronged -over every ocean highway. - -To close the north of Europe to British trade, and to combine the -Baltic navies against that of Great Britain, became thenceforth the -fixed ideas of Bonaparte's life. To conciliate Denmark he released a -number of Danish ships, which had been arrested by the Directory for -submitting to search by British cruisers. The extent of the czar's -alienation from his former allies not being at first apparent, he next -courted Prussia, the head of the North German neutrality, in whose -power it was to arrest British trade both through her own territory -and through Hamburg. Prussia was ambitious to play a leading part in -Europe. The five years spent by Austria, France, and Great Britain in -exhausting warfare, she had used to consolidate her power and husband -her resources. She wished now to pose as a mediator, and looked for -the time when the prostration of the combatants and her own restored -strength would cause them to bend to her influence, and yield her -points, through the simple exhibition of her force. The advances and -flatteries of the first consul were graciously received, but the path -Prussia had traced for herself was to involve no risks—only gains; -she wished much, but would venture naught. It was a dangerous part to -play, this waiting on opportunity, against such a man as swayed the -destinies of the Continent during the next twelve years. From it arose -a hesitating, selfish, and timid policy, fluctuating with every breath -of danger or hope of advantage, dishonoring the national name, until it -ended in Jena and the agonies of humiliation through which the country -passed between that disaster and the overthrow of Napoleon. Such a -spirit is prone to side with a strong combination and to yield to a -masterful external impulse. - -Under this Bonaparte next sought to bring her. "We shall make nothing -out of Prussia," he writes to Talleyrand on the first of June, 1800, on -his way to Marengo; and he adds, "If the news from Egypt [apparently -the defeat of the Turks by Kleber] is confirmed, it will become -important to have some one in Russia. The Ottoman Empire cannot exist -much longer, and if Paul I. turns his looks in that direction our -interests become common."[13] Bonaparte was at no pains to reconcile -this view with an assurance made a month later to Turkey that "no -anxiety need be felt about Egypt, which will be restored as soon as the -Porte shall resume its former relations with France."[14] On the 4th -of June he recommends general and flattering overtures to the czar, -accompanied by special marks of consideration. The latter was fully -prepared to be won by compliments from the man for whose military -glory he had come to feel a profound enthusiasm. On the 4th of July -Bonaparte's general advances took form in a definite proposal to -surrender to Russian troops Malta, whose speedy loss by himself he saw -to be inevitable; an offer calculated not only to charm the Czar, who -delighted to fancy himself the head and protector of an ancient order -of knights, but also to sow discord between him and Great Britain, if, -as was probable, the latter declined to yield her prey to a friend -who at a critical moment had forsaken her. The letter sketched by the -first consul was carefully worded to quicken the ready vanity of its -recipient. "Desiring to give a proof of personal consideration to the -emperor of Russia and to distinguish him from the other enemies of -the republic, who fight from a vile love of gain, the first consul -wishes, if the garrison of Malta is constrained by famine to evacuate -the place, to restore it to the hands of the czar as grand master of -the order; and although the first consul is certain that Malta has -provisions for several months,[15] he wishes his Majesty to inform him -what conventions he would wish to make, and what measures to take, so -that, if the case arise, his troops may enter that place."[16] This was -shortly followed by the release of the Russian prisoners in France, -in number between seven and eight thousand, whom Bonaparte clad and -dismissed with their colors and their officers to return into Russia; -suggesting that, if the czar thought proper, he "might demand of the -English to release an equal number of French prisoners; but if not, the -first consul hoped he would accept his troops as an especial mark of -the esteem felt for the brave Russian armies."[17] - -Immediately after these transactions occurred the collision between -British and Danish cruisers in the Channel, and the entrance of -the Baltic by the British fleet, to support its ambassador in his -negotiation with Denmark. Paul I. made of the latter a pretext for -sequestrating all British property in Russia, to be held as a guarantee -against the future action of Great Britain. This order, dated August -29, 1800, was followed by another of September 10, announcing that -"several political circumstances induced the emperor to think that -a rupture of friendship with England may ensue," and directing a -concentration of Russian troops. The cloud blew over for a moment, -the sequestration being removed on the 22d of September; but the fall -of Malta, which had surrendered on the 5th of the same month, brought -matters to an issue. The czar had gladly accepted Bonaparte's adroit -advances and designated a general to go to Paris, take command of the -released prisoners and with them repair to Malta. The capitulation -became known to him early in November; before which he had formally -published his intention to revive the Armed Neutrality of 1780 against -the maritime claims of Great Britain. It being very doubtful whether -the latter would deliver the island after his unfriendly measures, -a sequestration of British property was again decreed. Some three -hundred ships were seized, their crews marched into the interior, -and seals placed on all warehouses containing British property; the -czar declaring that the embargo should not be removed until the -acknowledgment of his rights to Malta, as grand master of the Order. -The sequestrated property was to be held by an imperial commission and -applied to pay debts due to Russian subjects by private Englishmen. - -Affairs had now reached a stage where Prussia felt encouraged to move. -The breach between Great Britain and Russia had opened wide, while the -relations of the czar and first consul had become so friendly as to -assure their concert. The armistice between Austria and France still -continued, pending the decision whether the latter would negotiate with -the emperor and Great Britain conjointly; but Bonaparte was a close as -well as a hard bargainer. He would not admit the joint negotiation, -nor postpone the renewal of hostilities beyond the 11th of September, -except on condition of a maritime truce as favorable to France as he -considered the land armistice to be to Austria. He proposed entire -freedom of navigation to merchant vessels, the raising of the blockades -of Brest, Cadiz, Toulon, and Flushing, and that Malta and Alexandria -should be freely open to receive provisions by French or neutral -vessels. The effect would be to allow the French dockyards to obtain -naval stores, of which they were utterly destitute, and Malta and -Egypt to receive undefined quantities of supplies and so prolong their -resistance indefinitely. Great Britain was only willing to adopt for -Egypt and Malta the literal terms of the armistice applied to the three -Austrian fortresses blockaded by French troops. These were to receive -every fortnight provisions proportioned to their consumption, and the -British ministry offered to allow the same to Malta and Egypt. They -also conceded free navigation, except in the articles of military and -naval stores. Bonaparte refused. Austria's advantage in the armistice, -he said, was not the mere retention of the fortresses, but the use -she was making of her respite. Between these two extreme views no -middle term could be found. In fact, great as were the results of -Marengo, and of Moreau's more methodical advance into Germany, the -material advantage of Great Britain over France still far exceeded -that of France over Austria. The French had gained great successes, -but they were now forcing the enemy back upon the centre of his power -and they had not possession of his communications; whereas Great -Britain had shut off, not merely Egypt and Malta, but France herself -from all fruitful intercourse with the outer world. The negotiation -for a maritime truce was broken off on the 9th of October. Meanwhile -Bonaparte, declining to await its issue, had given notice that -hostilities would be resumed between the 5th and 10th of September; -and Austria, not yet ready, was fain to purchase a further delay by -surrendering the blockaded places, Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsburg. -A convention to this effect was concluded, and the renewal of the war -postponed for forty-five days dating from September 21st. - -In such conditions Prussia saw one of those opportunities which, under -Bonaparte's manipulation, so often misled her. The prostration of her -German rival would be hastened, and the support of the first consul in -the approaching apportionment of indemnities to German states secured, -by joining the concert of the Baltic powers against Great Britain. -Without this accession to the northern league the quarrel would be -mainly naval, and its issue, before the disciplined valor of British -seamen, scarcely doubtful. Prussia alone was so situated as to deal the -direct and heavy blow at British commerce of closing its accustomed -access to the Continent; and the injury thus inflicted so far exceeded -any she herself could incidentally receive, as to make this course less -hazardous than that of offending the czar and the French government. -The political connection of Hanover with Great Britain was a further -motive, giving Prussia the hope, so often dangled before her eyes by -Bonaparte, of permanently annexing the German dominions of the British -king. An occasion soon arose for showing her bias. In the latter part -of October a British cruiser seized a Prussian merchantman trying to -enter the Texel with a cargo of naval stores. The captor, through -stress of weather, took his prize into Cuxhaven, a port at the mouth -of the Elbe belonging to Hamburg, through which passed much of the -British commerce with the Continent. Prussia demanded its release of -the Hamburg senate, and upon refusal ordered two thousand troops to -take possession of the port. The senate then bought the prize and -delivered it to Prussia, and the British government also directed its -restoration; a step of pure policy with which Fox taunted the ministry. -It was, as he truly remarked, a concession of principle, dictated -by the fact that Prussia, while capable of doing much harm to Great -Britain, could not be reached by the British navy. - -Whether it was wise to waive a point, in order to withhold an important -member from the formidable combination of the North, may be argued; but -the attempt met the usual fate of concessions attributed to weakness. -The remonstrances of the British ambassador received the reply that -the occupation, having been ordered, must be carried out; that the -neutrality of Cuxhaven "being thus placed under the guarantee of the -king will be more effectually out of the reach of all violation." Such -reasoning indicated beyond doubt the stand Prussia was about to take; -and her influence fixed the course of Denmark, which is said to have -been averse from a step that threatened to stop her trade and would -probably make her the first victim of Great Britain's resentment. On -the 16th of December a treaty renewing the Armed Neutrality of 1780 -was signed at St. Petersburg by Russia and Sweden, and received the -prompt adherence of Denmark and Prussia. Its leading affirmations were -that neutral ships were free to carry on the coasting and colonial -trade of states at war, that enemy's goods under the neutral flag -were not subject to seizure, and that blockades, to be respected, must -be supported by such a force of ships before the port as to make the -attempt to enter hazardous. A definition of contraband was adopted -excluding naval stores from that title; and the claim was affirmed -that vessels under convoy of a ship of war were not liable to the -belligerent right of search. Each of these assertions contested one -of the maritime claims upon which Great Britain conceived her naval -power, and consequently her place among the nations, to depend; but -the consenting states bound themselves to maintain their positions by -force, if necessary. - -Thus was successfully formed the combination of the Northern powers -against Great Britain, the first and most willing of those effected by -Bonaparte. By a singular coincidence, which recalls the opportuneness -of his departure from England in 1798 to check the yet undivined -expedition against Egypt,[18] Nelson, the man destined also to -strike this coalition to the ground, was during its formation slowly -journeying from the Mediterranean, with which his name and his glory -both before and after are most closely associated, to the North Sea; -as though again drawn by some mysterious influence, to be at hand for -unknown services which he alone could render. On the 11th of July, -a week after Bonaparte made his first offer of Malta to the czar, -Nelson left Leghorn for Trieste and Vienna. He passed through Hamburg -at the very time that the affair of the Prussian prize was under -discussion, and landed in England on the 6th of November. Finding his -health entirely restored by the land journey, he applied for immediate -service, and was assigned to command a division of the Channel fleet -under Lord St. Vincent; but he did not go afloat until the 17th of -January, 1801, when his flag was hoisted on board the "San Josef," -the three-decker he had captured at the battle of Cape St. Vincent. -Meanwhile, however, it had been settled between the Admiralty and -himself that if a fleet were sent into the Baltic, he should go as -second in command to Sir Hyde Parker; and when in the very act of -reporting to St. Vincent, the day before he joined the San Josef, a -letter arrived from Parker announcing his appointment. - -By this time Austria had received a final blow, which forced her to -treat alone, and postponed for nearly five years her reappearance in -the field. The emperor had sent an envoy to Lunéville, who was met -by Joseph Bonaparte as the representative of France; but refusing -to make peace apart from Great Britain, hostilities were resumed on -the 28th of November. On the 3d of December Moreau won the great -battle of Hohenlinden, and then advanced upon Vienna. On the 25th an -armistice was signed at Steyer, within a hundred miles of the Austrian -capital. Successes, less brilliant but decided, were obtained in Italy, -resulting on the 16th of January, 1801, in an armistice between the -armies there. At nearly the same moment with this last news the first -consul received a letter from the czar, manifesting extremely friendly -feelings towards France, while full of hatred towards England, and -signifying his intention to send an ambassador to Paris. This filled -Bonaparte with sanguine hopes, the expression of which shows how -heavily sea power weighed in his estimation. "Peace with the emperor," -he wrote to his brother at Lunéville, "is _nothing_ in comparison with -the alliance of the czar, which will _dominate England_ and preserve -Egypt for us;"[19] and he ordered him to prolong the negotiations until -the arrival of the expected ambassador, that the engagements contracted -with Germany might be made in concert with Russia. Upon a similar -combined action he based extravagant expectations of naval results, -dependent upon the impression, with which he so hardly parted, that one -set of ships was equal to another.[20] A courier was at once dispatched -to Spain to arrange expeditions against Ireland, against Brazil and the -East Indies, to the Caribbean Sea for the recovery of the French and -Spanish islands, and to the Mediterranean to regain Minorca. "In the -embarrassment about to come upon England, threatened in the Archipelago -by the Russians and in the northern seas by the combined Powers, it -will be impossible for her long to keep a strong squadron in the -Mediterranean."[21] - -The Russian envoy not arriving, however, Joseph Bonaparte was -instructed to bring matters to a conclusion; and on the 9th of February -the Austrian minister at Lunéville, after a stubborn fight over the -terms, signed a treaty of peace. The principal conditions were: 1. -The definitive surrender of all German possessions west of the Rhine, -so that the river became the frontier of France from Switzerland to -Holland. 2. The cession of Belgium made at Campo Formio was confirmed. -3. In Italy, Austria herself was confined to the east bank of the -Adige, and the princes of that house having principalities west of -the river were dispossessed; their territories going to the Cisalpine -Republic and to an infante of Spain, who was established in Tuscany -with the title of King of Etruria. The Cisalpine and Etruria being -dependent for their political existence upon France, the latter, -through its control of their territory, interposed between Austria and -Naples and shut off the British from access to Leghorn. 4. The eleventh -article of the treaty guaranteed the independence of the Dutch, Swiss, -Cisalpine and Ligurian republics. In its influence upon the future -course of events this was the most important of all the stipulations. -It gave to the political status of the Continent a definition, upon -which Great Britain reckoned in her own treaty with France a few months -later; and its virtual violation by Bonaparte became ultimately both -the reason and the excuse for her refusal to fulfil the engagements -about Malta, which led to the renewal of the war and so finally to -the downfall of Napoleon. 5. The German Empire was pledged to give to -the princes dispossessed on the west of the Rhine, and in Italy, an -indemnity within the empire itself. By this Prussia, which was among -the losers, reaped through Bonaparte's influence an abundant recompense -for the support already given to his policy in the North. This success -induced her to continue the same time-serving opportunism, until, when -no longer necessary to France, she was thrown over with a rudeness that -roused her to an isolated, and therefore speedily crushed resistance. - - - - -CHAPTER XIII. - -EVENTS OF 1801. - -BRITISH EXPEDITION TO THE BALTIC—BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN—BONAPARTE'S -FUTILE ATTEMPTS TO CONTEST CONTROL OF THE SEA—HIS CONTINENTAL -POLICY—PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE WITH GREAT BRITAIN, OCTOBER, -1801—INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER SO FAR UPON THE COURSE OF THE REVOLUTION. - - -By the peace of Lunéville Great Britain was left alone, and for the -moment against all Europe. The ministry met the emergency with vigor -and firmness, though possibly with too much reliance upon diplomacy -and too little upon the military genius of the great seaman whose -services were at their disposal. Upon the Continent nothing could be -effected, all resistance to France had been crushed by the genius of -Bonaparte; but time had to be gained for the expedition then under way -against Egypt and destined to compel its evacuation by the French. The -combination in the North also must be quickly dissolved, if the country -were to treat on anything like equal terms. - -An armed negotiation with the Baltic powers, similar to that employed -with Denmark the preceding August, was therefore determined; and a -fleet of eighteen sail-of-the-line with thirty-five smaller vessels -was assembled at Yarmouth, on the east coast of England. Rapidity of -movement was essential to secure the advantage from the ice, which, -breaking up in the harbors less rapidly than in the open water, would -delay the concentration of the hostile navies; and also to allow the -Baltic powers the least possible time to prepare for hostilities -which they had scarcely anticipated. Everything pointed to Nelson, -the most energetic and daring of British admirals, for the chief -command of an expedition in which so much depended upon the squadron, -numerically inferior to the aggregate of forces arrayed against it, -attacking separately each of the component parts before their junction; -but Nelson was still among the junior flag-officers, and the rather -erratic manner in which, while in the central Mediterranean and under -the influence of Lady Hamilton, he had allowed his views of the -political situation to affect his actions even in questions of military -subordination, had probably excited in Earl Spencer, the First Lord, -by whom the officers were selected, a distrust of his fitness for a -charge requiring a certain delicacy of discretion as well as vigor -of action. Whatever the reason, withholding the chief command from -him was unquestionably a mistake,—which would not have been made by -St. Vincent, who succeeded Spencer a few weeks later upon the fall of -the Pitt ministry. The conditions did not promise a pacific solution -when the expedition was planned, and the prospect was even worse when -it sailed. The instructions given to Sir Hyde Parker allowed Denmark -forty-eight hours to accept Great Britain's terms and withdraw from her -engagements with the other Powers. Whether she complied peaceably or -not, after she was reduced to submission the division of the Russian -fleet at Revel was to be attacked, before the melting ice allowed it to -join the main body in Cronstadt; and Sweden was to be similarly dealt -with. Under such orders diplomacy had a minor part to play, while in -their directness and simplicity they were admirably suited to the fiery -temper and prompt military action which distinguished Nelson; and, but -for the opportune death of Paul I., Great Britain might have had reason -to regret that the opportunity to give Russia a severe reminder of -her sea power was allowed to slip through the lax grasp of a sluggish -admiral. - -The fleet sailed from Yarmouth on the 12th of March, 1801; and on the -19th, although there had been some scattering in a heavy gale, nearly -all were collected off the Skaw, the northern point of Jutland at the -entrance of the Kattegat. The wind being north-west was fair for going -to Copenhagen, and Nelson, if in command, would have advanced at once -with the ambassador on board. "While the negotiation is going on," -he said, "the Dane should see our flag waving every moment he lifted -his head." As it was, the envoy went forward with a frigate alone and -the fleet waited. On the 12th it was off Elsineur, where the envoy -rejoined, Denmark having rejected the British terms. - -This amounted to an acceptance of hostilities, and it only remained -to the commander-in-chief to act at once; for the wind was favorable, -an advantage which at any moment might be lost. On this day Nelson -addressed Parker a letter, summing up in a luminous manner the features -of the situation and the different methods of action. "Not a moment -should be lost in attacking," he said; "we shall never be so good a -match for them as at this moment." He next hinted, what he had probably -already said, that the fleet ought to have been off Copenhagen, and not -at Elsineur, when the negotiation failed. "Then you might instantly -attack and there would be scarcely a doubt but the Danish fleet would -be destroyed, and the capital made so hot that Denmark would listen to -reason and its true interest." Since, however, the mistake of losing so -much time had been made, he seeks to stir his superior to lose no more. -"Almost the safety, certainly the honor, of England is more entrusted -to you than ever yet fell to the lot of any British officer; ... never -did our country depend so much on the success of any fleet as of this." - -Having thus shown the necessity for celerity, Nelson next discussed the -plan of operations. Copenhagen is on the east side of the island of -Zealand, fronting the coast of Sweden, from which it is separated by -the passage called the Sound. On the west the island is divided from -the other parts of Denmark by the Great Belt. The navigation of the -latter being much the more difficult, the preparations of the Danes -had been made on the side of the Sound, and chiefly about Copenhagen -itself. For half a mile from the shore in front of the city, flats -extend, and in the Sound itself at a distance of little over a mile, -is a long shoal called the Middle Ground. Between these two bodies of -shallow water is a channel, called the King's, through which a fleet -of heavy ships could sail, and from whose northern end a deep pocket -stretches toward Copenhagen, forming the harbor proper. The natural -point of attack therefore appears to be at the north; and there the -Danes had erected powerful works, rising on piles out of the shoal -water off the harbor's mouth and known as the Three-Crown Batteries. -Nelson, however, pointed out that not only was this head of the line -exceedingly strong, but that the wind that was fair to attack would -be foul to return; therefore a disabled ship would have no escape but -by passing through the King's Channel. Doing so she would have to run -the gantlet of a line of armed hulks, which the Danes had established -as floating batteries along the inner edge of the channel—covering the -front of Copenhagen—and would also be separated from her fleet. Nor -was this difficulty, which may be called tactical, the only objection -to a plan that he disparaged as "taking the bull by the horns." He -remarked that so long as the British fleet remained in the Sound, -without entering the Baltic, the way was left open for both the Swedes -and the Russians, if released by the ice, to make a junction with the -Danes. Consequently, he advised that a sufficiently strong force of -the lighter ships-of-the-line should pass outside the Middle Ground, -despite the difficulties of navigation, which were not insuperable, and -come up in rear of the city. There they would interpose between the -Danes and their allies, and be in position to assail the weaker part of -the hostile order. He offered himself to lead this detachment. - -[Illustration: Battle of Copenhagen.] - -This whole letter of March 24, 1801,[22] possesses peculiar interest; -for it shows with a rare particularity, elicited by the need he felt -of arousing and convincing his superior, Nelson's clear discernment of -the decisive features of a military situation. The fame of this great -admiral has depended less upon his conduct of campaigns than upon the -renowned victories he won in the actual collision of fleet with fleet; -and even then has been mutilated by the obstinacy with which, despite -the perfectly evident facts, men have persisted in seeing in them -nothing but dash,—heart, not head.[23] Throughout his correspondence, -it is true, there are frequent traces of the activity of his mental -faculties and of the general accuracy of his military conclusions; but -ordinarily it is from his actions that his reasonings and principles -must be deduced. In the present case we have the views he held and the -course he evidently would have pursued clearly formulated by himself; -and it cannot but be a subject of regret that the naval world should -have lost so fine an illustration as he would there have given of the -principles and conduct of naval warfare. He concluded his letter with -a suggestion worthy of Napoleon himself, and which, if adopted, would -have brought down the Baltic Confederacy with a crash that would have -resounded throughout Europe. "Supposing us through the Belt with the -wind first westerly, would it not be possible to go with the fleet, -or detach ten ships of three and two decks, with one bomb and two -fire-ships, to Revel, to destroy the Russian squadron at that place? I -do not see the great risk of such a detachment, and with the remainder -to attempt the business at Copenhagen. The measure may be thought bold, -but I am of opinion the boldest are the safest; and our country demands -a most vigorous exertion of her force, directed with judgment." - -Committed as the Danes were to a stationary defence, this -recommendation to strike at the soul of the confederacy evinced the -clearest perception of the key to the situation, which Nelson himself -summed up in the following words: "I look upon the Northern League to -be like a tree, of which Paul was the trunk and Sweden and Denmark -the branches. If I can get at the trunk and hew it down, the branches -fall of course; but I may lop the branches and yet not be able to -fell the tree, and my power must be weaker when its greatest strength -is required"[24]—that is, the Russians should have been attacked -before the fleet was weakened, as it inevitably must be, by the -battle with the Danes. "If we could have cut up the Russian fleet," -he said again, "that was my object." Whatever Denmark's wishes about -fighting, she was by her continental possessions tied to the policy -of Russia and Prussia, either of whom could overwhelm her by land. -She dared not disregard them. The course of both depended upon the -czar; for the temporizing policy of Prussia would at once embrace -his withdrawal from the league as an excuse for doing the same. At -Revel were twelve Russian ships-of-the-line, fully half their Baltic -fleet, whose destruction would have paralyzed the remainder and the -naval power of the empire. To persuade Parker to such a step was, -however, hopeless. "Our fleet would never have acted against Russia -and Sweden," wrote Nelson afterwards, "although Copenhagen would have -been burned; for Sir Hyde Parker was determined not to leave Denmark -hostile in his rear;"[25] a reason whose technical accuracy under all -the circumstances was nothing short of pedantic, and illustrates the -immense distance between a good and accomplished officer, which Parker -was, and a genius whose comprehension of rules serves only to guide, -not to fetter, his judgment. - -Although unable to rise equal to the great opportunity indicated by -Nelson, Sir Hyde Parker adopted his suggestion as to the method and -direction of the principal attack upon the defences of Copenhagen. -For this, Nelson asked ten ships-of-the-line and a number of smaller -vessels, with which he undertook to destroy the floating batteries -covering the front of the city. These being reduced, the bomb vessels -could be placed so as to play with effect upon the dockyard, arsenals, -and the town, in case further resistance was made. - -The nights of the 30th and 31st of March were employed sounding the -channel. On the first of April the fleet moved up to the north end of -the Middle Ground, about four miles from the city; and that afternoon -Nelson's division, to which Parker had assigned two ships-of-the-line -more than had been asked—or twelve altogether—got under way, passed -through the outer channel and anchored towards sundown off the -south-east end of the shoal, two miles from the head[26] of the -Danish line. Nelson announced his purpose to attack as soon as the -wind served; and the night was passed by him in arranging the order -of battle. The enterprise was perilous, not on account of the force -to be engaged, but because of the great difficulties of navigation. -The pilots were mostly mates of merchantmen trading with the Baltic; -and their experience in vessels of three or four hundred tons did -not fit them for the charge of heavy battle-ships. They betrayed -throughout great indecision, and their imperfect knowledge contributed -to the principal mishaps of the day, as well as to a comparative -incompleteness in the results of victory. - -The next morning the wind came fair at south-south-east, and at eight -A. M. the British captains were summoned to the flag-ship for their -final instructions. The Danish line to be attacked extended in a -north-west and south-east direction for somewhat over a mile. It was -composed of hulks and floating batteries, eighteen to twenty in number -and mounting 628 guns, of which about 375 would—fighting thus at -anchor—be on the engaged side. The southern flank now to be assailed -was partly supported by works on shore; but from the intervening shoal -water these were too distant for thoroughly efficient fire. Being thus -distinctly weaker than the northern extremity, which was covered by the -Three-Crown Battery and a second line of heavy ships, this southern end -was most properly chosen by the British as the point of their chief -assault for tactical reasons, independently of the strategic advantage -urged by Nelson in thus interposing between the enemy and his allies. -At half-past nine signal was made to weigh. The ships were soon under -sail; but the difficulties of pilotage, despite careful soundings made -during the night by an experienced naval captain, were soon apparent. -The "Agamemnon," of sixty-four guns, was unable to weather the point -of the Middle Ground, and had to anchor out of range. She had no share -in the battle. The "Bellona" and "Russell," seventy-fours, the fourth -and fifth in the order, entered the Channel; but keeping too far to -the eastward they ran ashore on its farther side—upon the Middle -Ground. They were not out of action, but beyond the range of the -most efficient gunnery under the conditions of that period. Nelson's -flag-ship following them passed clear, as did the rest of the heavy -ships; but the loss of these three out of the line prevented by so -much its extension to the northward. The result was to expose that -part of the British order to a weight of fire quite disproportioned to -its strength. A body of frigates very gallantly undertook to fill the -gap, which they could do but inadequately, and suffered heavy loss in -attempting. - -The battle was at its height at half-past eleven. There was then no -more manœuvring, but the simple question of efficient gunnery and -endurance. At about two P. M. a great part of the Danish line had -ceased to fire, and the flag-ship "Dannebrog" was in flames. During the -action the Danish crews were frequently re-enforced from the shore; -and the new-comers in several cases, reaching the ships after they had -struck, renewed the fight, either through ignorance or indifference -to the fact. The land batteries also fired on boats trying to take -possession. Nelson seized on this circumstance to bring the affair to a -conclusion. He wrote a letter addressed "To the brothers of Englishmen, -the Danes," and sent it under flag of truce to the Crown Prince, who -was in the city. "Lord Nelson has directions to spare Denmark when -no longer resisting; but if the firing is continued on the part of -Denmark, Lord Nelson will be obliged to set on fire all the floating -batteries he has taken, without having the power of saving the brave -Danes who have defended them." The letter was sent on shore by a -British officer who had served in the Russian navy and spoke Danish. -The engagement continued until about three P. M., when the whole line -of floating defences south-east of the Crown Batteries had either -struck or been destroyed. - -The fortifications were still unharmed, as were the ships west of them -covering the harbor proper; but their fire was stopped by the bearer -of a flag of truce who was bringing to Nelson the reply of the Crown -Prince. The latter demanded the precise purport of the first message. -Nelson took a high hand. He had destroyed the part of the enemy's -line which he had attacked; but it was important now to withdraw his -crippled ships, and with the existing wind that could only be done by -passing the Crown Batteries. Had the three that ran aground been in the -line, it is permissible to believe that that work would have been so -far injured as to be practically harmless; but this was far from the -case. The admiral in his second letter politicly ignored this feature -of the situation. He wrote, "Lord Nelson's object in sending on shore a -flag of truce is humanity;[27] he therefore _consents_ that hostilities -shall cease till Lord Nelson can take his prisoners out of the prizes, -and he consents to land all the wounded Danes and to burn or remove -his prizes. Lord Nelson, with humble duty to His Royal Highness, begs -leave to say that he will ever esteem it the greatest victory he ever -gained, if this flag of truce may be the happy forerunner of a lasting -and happy union between my most gracious Sovereign and His Majesty the -King of Denmark." Having written the letter, he referred the bearer -for definite action to Sir Hyde Parker, who lay some four miles off -in the "London;" foreseeing that the long pull there and back would -give time for the leading ships, which were much crippled, to clear -the shoals, though their course for so doing lay close under the Crown -Batteries. Thus the exposed part of the British fleet was successfully -removed from a dangerous position and rejoined Parker north of the -Middle Ground. The advantage obtained by Nelson's presence of mind -and promptness in gaining this respite was shown by the difficulties -attending the withdrawal. Three out of five ships-of-the-line grounded, -two of which remained fast for several hours a mile from the batteries, -but protected by the truce. - -The result of the battle of Copenhagen was to uncover the front of the -city and lay it, with its dockyards and arsenals, open to bombardment. -It was now safe to place the bomb vessels in the King's Channel. It -became a question for Denmark to decide, whether fear of her powerful -allies and zeal for the claims of neutrals should lead her to undergo -further punishment, or whether the suffering already endured and the -danger still threatening were excuse sufficient for abandoning the -coalition. On the other hand, Nelson, who was the brains as well as the -backbone of the British power in the North, cared little, either now or -before the battle, about the attitude of Denmark, except as it deterred -Parker from advancing. Now, as before, his one idea was to get at the -Russian division still locked in Revel by the ice. The negotiations -were carried on by him and resulted in an armistice for fourteen weeks, -after which hostilities could be resumed upon fourteen days' notice. -Thus was assured to Parker for four months the entire immunity he -desired for his communications. Fear of Russia long deterred the Danes -from this concession, which Nelson frankly told them he must have, so -as to be at liberty to act against the Russian fleet and return to -them; and he made it the indispensable requisite to sparing the city. -During the discussions, however, the Crown Prince received news of the -czar's death. Paul I. had been murdered by a body of conspirators on -the night of March 24. The Danish government concealed the tidings; -but the departure of the soul of the confederacy relieved their worst -fears and encouraged them to yield to Nelson's demands. - -Denmark's part in the Armed Neutrality was suspended during the -continuance of the armistice; but the British ministers showed -as little appreciation of the military situation as did their -commander-in-chief in the Baltic. "Upon a consideration of all the -circumstances," they wrote to Nelson,[28] "His Majesty has thought fit -to approve the armistice." Nelson was naturally and justly indignant at -this absurdly inadequate understanding of the true nature of services, -concerning whose military character a French naval critic has truly -said that "they will always be in the eyes of seamen his fairest -title to glory. He alone was capable of displaying such boldness and -perseverance; he alone could confront the immense difficulties of that -enterprise and overcome them."[29] But his conduct at Copenhagen, -brilliant as was the display of energy, of daring and of endurance, -was far from exhausting the merits of his Baltic campaign. He had -lifted and carried on his shoulders the dead weight of his superior, -he had clearly read the political as well as the military situation, -and he never for one moment lost sight of the key to both. To bombard -Copenhagen was to his mind a useless piece of vandalism, which would -embitter a nation that ought to be conciliated, and destroy the -only hold Great Britain still had over Denmark.[30] Except for the -necessity of managing his lethargic and cautious commander-in-chief, -we may believe he would never have contemplated it; but under the -circumstances he used the threat as the one means by which he could -extort truce from Denmark and induce Parker to move. With the latter -to handle, the armistice slipped the knot of the military difficulty; -it was the one important point, alongside which every other fell into -insignificance. "My object," he said, "was to get at Revel before the -frost broke up at Cronstadt, that the twelve sail-of-the-line might -be destroyed." Well might St. Vincent write, "Your Lordship's whole -conduct, from your first appointment to this hour, is the subject of -our constant admiration. It does not become me to make comparisons; all -agree there is but one Nelson." - -Meantime, while the British fleet had been dallying in the approaches -to the Baltic, important events had occurred, furthering the projects -of Bonaparte in the North and seriously complicating the position of -Great Britain. No formal declaration of war was at any time issued by -the latter country; but its government had not unjustly regarded as -an act of direct hostility the combination of Denmark, Sweden, and -Prussia, to support the czar in a course first undertaken to assure -his claim upon Malta, and in furtherance of which he had seized as -pledges three hundred British merchant vessels with their crews.[31] -As an offset to the British interests thus foreclosed upon by Russia, -and to negotiate upon somewhat equal terms, the government, on the 14th -of January, 1801, ordered an embargo laid upon Russian, Danish, and -Swedish vessels in British ports, and the seizure of merchant ships of -these powers at sea. Of four hundred and fifty Swedish vessels then -abroad, two hundred were detained or brought into British harbors. -They were not, however, condemned as prizes, but held inviolable to -await the issue of the existing difficulties. To the remonstrances of -Sweden and Denmark, supported by Prussia, the British ministry replied -definitely, on the 7th of March, that the embargo would not be revoked -so long as the Powers affected "continued to form part of a confederacy -which had for its object to impose by force on his Majesty a new system -of maritime law, inconsistent with the dignity and independence of his -crown, and the rights and interests of his people."[32] In consequence -of this and of the entrance of the Sound by Parker's fleet, Prussia, on -the 30th of March, and as a measure of retaliation, closed the mouths -of the Elbe, the Weser, and the Ems—in other words, the ports of North -Germany—against British commerce, and took possession of the German -states belonging to the king of Great Britain. On the same day a corps -of Danish troops occupied Hamburg, more certainly to stop British trade -therewith. - -Thus Bonaparte's conception was completely realized. There was not -only a naval combination against Great Britain, but also an exclusion -of her trade from one of its chief markets. The danger, however, was -much less than it seemed. On the one hand, while the annoyances to -neutral navigation were indisputable, the advantages it drew from the -war were far greater; its interests really demanded peace, even at -the price set by Great Britain. On the other hand, the more important -claims of the great Sea Power, however judged by standards of natural -right, had prescription on their side; and in the case of contraband, -whatever may be thought of classifying naval stores as such, there -was for it a colorable pretext in the fact that France then had no -merchant shipping, except coasters; that naval stores entering her -ports were almost certainly for ships of war; and that it was in -part to the exclusion of such articles that Great Britain owed the -maritime supremacy, which alone among armed forces had successfully -defied Bonaparte. In short, the interest of the Northern states was -to yield the points in dispute, while that of Great Britain was not -to yield; a truth not only asserted by the ministry but conceded in -the main by the opposition. There needed therefore only to throw a -little weight into one scale, or to take a little from the other, to -turn the balance; while the coalition would dissolve entirely either -upon decisive naval operations by Great Britain, or upon the death -of Paul I. The czar was the only person embarked heart and soul in -the Northern quarrel, because the only one deaf to the call of clear -interest. Herein is apparent the crying mistake of intrusting the -conduct of the naval campaign to another than Nelson. The time placidly -consumed by Parker in deliberations and talking would have sufficed his -lieutenant to scour the Baltic, to destroy the Russians at Revel as he -did the Danish line at Copenhagen, and to convince the neutral states -of the hopelessness of the struggle. Fortunately for Great Britain, -the interests of Russian proprietors, which were bound up with British -commerce, and hardly yielded eight years later to restrictions imposed -by the popular Alexander I., rebelled against the measures of a ruler -whose insanity was no longer doubtful. The murder of Paul opened the -way for peace. - -Among the first measures of the new czar was the release of the British -seamen imprisoned by his father. This order was dated April 7. On the -12th the British ships entered the Baltic,—much to the surprise of -the Northern Powers, who thought their heavy draught would prevent. -The three-deckers had to remove their guns to pass some shoal ground -ten miles above Copenhagen. After an excursion to intercept a Swedish -fleet said to be at sea, Parker anchored his ships in Kioge Bay,—off -the coast of Zealand just within the entrance to the Baltic,—and -there awaited further instructions from home; the Russian minister -at Copenhagen having informed him that the new czar would not go to -war.[33] Nelson entirely disapproved of this inactive attitude. Russia -might yield the conditions of Great Britain, but she would be more -likely to do so if the British fleet lay off the harbor of Revel. This -seems also to have been the view of the ministry. It received news -of the battle of Copenhagen on April 15, and at about the same date -learned the death of Paul I. Advantage was very properly taken of the -latter to adopt a policy of conciliation. On the 17th orders were -issued to Parker modifying his first instructions. If Alexander removed -the embargo and released the seamen, all hostile movements were to be -suspended. If not, a cessation of hostilities was to be offered, if -Russia were willing to treat; _but upon condition that, until these -ships and men were released, the Revel division should not join that in -Cronstadt, nor vice versâ_.[34] This presumed a position of the British -fleet very different from Kioge Bay, over four hundred miles from Revel. - -Four days later, orders were issued relieving Parker and leaving Nelson -in command. Taken as this step was, only a week after the news of a -victory, it can scarcely be construed otherwise than as an implied -censure. To this view an expression of Nelson's lends color. "They -are not Sir Hyde Parker's real friends who wish for an inquiry," he -wrote to a confidential correspondent. "His friends in the fleet wish -everything of this fleet to be forgot, for we all respect and love Sir -Hyde; but the dearer his friends, the more uneasy they have been at -his _idleness,_ for that is the truth—no criminality."[35] The orders -were received on May 5. Nelson's first signal was to hoist the boats -aboard and prepare to weigh. "If Sir Hyde were gone," he wrote the -same afternoon, "I would now be under sail." On the 7th the fleet left -Kioge Bay and on the 12th appeared off Revel. The Russian division had -sailed three days before and was now safe under the guns of Cronstadt. -From Revel Nelson dispatched very complimentary letters to the Russian -minister of foreign affairs, but received in reply the message that -"the only proof of the loyalty of his intentions that the czar could -accept was the prompt withdrawal of his fleet; and that until then no -negotiation could proceed." "I do not believe he would have written -such a letter," said Nelson, "if the Russian fleet had been in -Revel;"[36] but the bird was flown, and with a civil explanation he -withdrew from the port. He still remained in the Baltic, awaiting the -issue of the negotiations; but Russia meant peace, and on the 17th of -May the czar ordered the release of the embargoed British ships. On the -4th of June Great Britain also released the Danes and Swedes detained -in her ports. Russia and Prussia had already agreed, on the 27th of -April, that hostile measures against England should cease, Hamburg and -Hanover be evacuated, and the free navigation of the rivers restored. - -On the 17th of June was signed at St. Petersburg a convention between -Russia and Great Britain, settling the points that had been in dispute. -The question of Malta was tacitly dropped. As regards neutral claims -Russia conceded that the neutral flag should not cover enemy's goods; -and while she obtained the formal admission that articles of hostile -origin which had become _bonâ fide_ neutral property were exempt from -seizure, she yielded the very important exception of colonial produce. -This, no matter who the owner, could not by a neutral be carried -direct from the colony to the mother country of a nation at war.[37] -Great Britain, on the other hand, conceded the right of neutrals to -carry on the coasting trade of a belligerent; and that naval stores -should not be classed as contraband of war. The latter was an important -concession, the former probably not, coasting trade being ordinarily -done by small craft especially adapted to the local conditions. As -regards searching merchant vessels under convoy of a ship of war, -Russia yielded the principle and Great Britain accepted methods which -would make the process less offensive. Privateers in such case could -not search. The question was unimportant; for neutral merchant ships -will not lightly submit to the restraint and delays of convoy, and -so lose the chief advantage, that of speed, which they have over -belligerents. When a neutral sees necessary to convoy her merchantmen, -the very fact shows relations already strained. - -Sweden and Denmark necessarily followed the course of Russia and -acceded to all the terms of the convention between that court and Great -Britain; Sweden on the 23d of October, 1801, and Denmark on the 30th -of the following March. The claim to carry colonial produce to Europe, -thus abandoned, was of importance to them, though not to Russia. At the -same time the Baltic states renewed among themselves the engagements, -which they had relinquished in their convention with Great Britain, -that the neutral flag should cover enemy's property on board and -that the convoy of a ship of war should exempt merchant vessels from -search. These principles were in point of fact modifications sought to -be introduced into international law, and not prescriptive rights, as -commonly implied by French historians[38] dealing with this question. -For this reason both the United States and the Baltic powers, while -favoring the new rule, were little disposed to attempt by arms to -compel the surrender by Great Britain of a claim sanctioned by long -custom. - -Thus had fallen resultless, as far as the objects of the first consul -were concerned, the vast combination against Great Britain which he -had fostered in the North. During its short existence he had actively -pursued in the south of Europe, against Naples and Portugal, other -measures intended further to embarrass, isolate, and cripple the -great Sea Power, and to facilitate throwing much needed supplies and -re-enforcements into Egypt. "The ambassador of the republic," he wrote -in February, 1801, "will make the Spanish ministry understand that we -must at whatsoever cost become masters of the Mediterranean.... France -will have fifteen ships-of-the-line in the Mediterranean before the -equinox; and, if Spain will join to them fifteen others, the English, -who are about to have the ports of Lisbon, Sicily, and Naples closed to -them, will not be able to keep thirty ships in the Mediterranean. That -being so, I doubt not they will evacuate Mahon, being unable to remain -in that sea."[39] - -For the closure of the ports Bonaparte relied with good reason upon -his armies; but in the concurrent expectation of uniting thirty French -and Spanish ships he reckoned without his host, as he did also upon -the Russian Black Sea fleet, and the numbers the British must keep -in the Baltic and off Brest. After the armistice with Austria in -Italy, a corps under Murat was pushed toward Naples; and on the same -day that the treaty of Lunéville was concluded, February 9, a truce -for thirty days was signed with the Two Sicilies. This was followed -on the 28th of March by a definitive treaty of peace. Naples engaged -to exclude from all her ports, including those of Sicily, the ships -both of war and commerce belonging to Great Britain and Turkey; while -those of France and her allies, as well as of the Northern powers, -should have free access. She also suffered some slight territorial -loss; but the most significant article was kept secret. The boot of -Italy was to be occupied by a division of twelve or fifteen thousand -French, whom Naples was to pay and support, and to whom were to be -delivered all the maritime fortresses south of the river Ofanto and -east of the Bradano, including the ports of Taranto and Brindisi. "This -occupation," wrote Bonaparte to his war-minister, "is only in order to -facilitate the communications of the army of Egypt with France."[40] -The Neapolitan ports became a refuge for French squadrons; while the -army of occupation stood ready to embark, if any body of ships found -their way to those shores. Unfortunately, the combined British and -Turkish armies had already landed in Egypt, and had won the battle of -Alexandria a week before the treaty with Naples was signed. As a speedy -result the French in Egypt were divided; part being forced back upon -Cairo and part shut up in Alexandria,—while the fleet of Admiral Keith -cruised off the coast. - -No French squadron succeeded in carrying to Egypt the desired -re-enforcements, notwithstanding the numerous efforts made by the -first consul. The failure arose from two causes: the penury of the -French arsenals, and the difficulty of a large body of ships escaping -together, or of several small bodies effecting a combination, in face -of the watchfulness of the British. Both troubles were due mainly to -the rigid and methodical system introduced by Earl St. Vincent; who, -fortunately for Great Britain, assumed command of the Channel fleet -at the same time that Bonaparte sought to impress upon the French -navy a more sagacious direction and greater energy of action. His -instructions to Admiral Bruix in February, 1800,[41] were to sail -from Brest with over thirty French and Spanish sail-of-the-line, to -drive the British blockaders from before the port, to relieve Malta, -send a light squadron to Egypt, and then bring his fleet to Toulon, -where it would be favorably placed to control the Mediterranean. -Delay ensuing, owing to lack of supplies and the unwillingness of the -Spaniards, he wrote again at the end of March, "If the equinox passes -without the British fleet dispersing, then, great as is our interest in -raising the blockade of Malta and carrying help to Egypt, they must be -abandoned;"[42] and throughout the summer months he confined his action -to the unremitting efforts, already noticed, to keep a stream of small -vessels constantly moving towards Egypt. - -After the autumn equinox Bonaparte again prepared for a grand naval -operation. Admiral Ganteaume was detailed to sail from Brest with -seven ships-of-the-line, carrying besides their crews four thousand -troops and an immense amount of material. "Admiral Ganteaume," wrote -he to Menou, commander-in-chief in Egypt, "brings to your army the -succor we have not before been able to send. He will hand you this -letter." The letter was dated October 29, 1800, but it never reached -its destination. Ganteaume could not get out from Brest till nearly -three months later, when, on January 23d, 1801, a terrible north-east -gale drove off the British squadron and enabled him to put to sea. "A -great imprudence," says Thiers, "but what could be done in presence of -an enemy's fleet which incessantly blockaded Brest in all weathers, and -only retired when cruising became impossible. It was necessary either -never to go out, or to do so in a tempest which should remove the -British squadron." The incident of the sortie, as well as Ganteaume's -subsequent experiences, illustrates precisely the deterrent effect -exercised by St. Vincent's blockades.[43] They could not prevent -occasional escapes, but they did throw obstacles nearly insuperable in -the way of combining and executing any of the major operations of war. -Owing to the weather which had to be chosen for starting, the squadron -was at once dispersed and underwent considerable damage.[44] It was -not all reunited till a week later. On the 9th of February it passed -Gibraltar; but news of its escape had already reached the British -admiral Warren cruising off Cadiz, who followed quickly, entering -Gibraltar only twenty-hours after the French went by. On the 13th of -January Ganteaume captured a British frigate, from which he learned -that the Mediterranean fleet under Lord Keith was then convoying an -army of fifteen thousand British troops against Egypt. He expected -that Warren also would soon be after him, and the injuries received in -the gale weighed upon his mind. Considering all the circumstances, he -decided to abandon Egypt and go to Toulon. Warren remained cruising -in the Mediterranean watching for the French admiral, who twice again -started for his destination. The first time he was obliged to return -by a collision between two ships. The second, an outbreak of disease -compelled him to send back three of the squadron. The other four -reached the African coast some distance west of Alexandria, where -they undertook to land the troops; but Keith's fleet appeared on the -horizon, and, cutting their cables, they made a hasty retreat, without -having effected their object. - -Similar misfortune attended Bonaparte's attempt to collect an efficient -force in Cadiz, where Spain had been induced or compelled to yield to -him six ships-of-the-line, and where she herself had some vessels. -To these he intended to send a large detachment from Rochefort under -Admiral Bruix, who was to command the whole, when combined. To -concentrations at any point, however, British squadrons before the -ports whence the divisions were to sail imposed obstacles, which, even -if occasionally evaded, were fatal to the final great design. The -advantage of the central position was consistently realized. On the -other hand, where a great number of ships happened to be together, -as at Brest in 1801, the want of supplies, caused by the same close -watch and by the seizure of naval stores as contraband, paralyzed -their equipment. Finding himself baffled at Brest for these reasons, -the first consul appointed Rochefort for the first concentration. When -the second was effected at Cadiz, Bruix was to hold himself ready for -further operations. If Egypt could not be directly assisted, it might -be indirectly by harassing the British communications. "Every day," -wrote Bonaparte, "a hundred sails pass the straits under weak convoy, -to supply Malta and the English fleet." If this route were flanked at -Cadiz, by a squadron like that of Bruix, much exertion would be needed -to protect it. But the concentration at Rochefort failed, the ships -from Brest could not get there, and the Rochefort ships themselves -never sailed. - -Coincidently with this attempt, another effort was made to strengthen -the force at Cadiz.[45] The three vessels sent back by Ganteaume, after -his second sailing from Toulon, were also ordered to proceed there, -under command of Rear Admiral Linois. Linois successfully reached -the Straits of Gibraltar, but there learned from a prize that seven -British ships were cruising off his destination. These had been sent -with Admiral Saumarez from the Channel fleet, to replace Warren, when -the admiralty learned the active preparations making in Cadiz and the -French ports. Not venturing to proceed against so superior an enemy, -Linois put into Gibraltar Bay, anchoring on the Spanish side under -the guns of Algesiras. Word was speedily sent to Saumarez; and on -July 6, two days after Linois anchored, six British ships were seen -rounding the west point of the bay. They attacked at once; but the -wind was baffling, they could not get their positions, and both flanks -of the French line were supported by shore batteries, which were -efficiently worked by soldiers landed from the squadron. The attack was -repulsed, and one British seventy-four that grounded under a battery -was forced to strike. Saumarez withdrew under Gibraltar and proceeded -to refit; the crews working all day and by watches at night to gain -the opportunity to revenge their defeat. Linois sent to Cadiz for the -help he needed, and on the 10th five Spanish ships-of-the-line and one -French[46] from there anchored off Algesiras. On the 12th they got -under way with Linois's three, and at the same time Saumarez with his -six hauled out from Gibraltar. The allies retreated upon Cadiz, the -British following. During the night the van of the pursuers brought -the hostile rear to action, and a terrible scene ensued. A Spanish -three-decker caught fire, and in the confusion was taken for an enemy -by one of her own fleet of the same class. The two ships, of one -hundred and twelve guns each and among the largest in the world, ran -foul of each other and perished miserably in a common conflagration. -The French "St. Antoine" was captured. - -The incident of Saumarez's meeting with Linois has a particular value, -because of the repulse and disaster to the British vessels on the first -occasion. Unvarying success accounts, or seems to account, for itself; -but in this case the advantage of the squadron's position before Cadiz -transpires through a failure on the battle-field. To that position -was due, first, that Linois's detachment could not make its junction; -second, that it was attacked separately and very severely handled; -third, that in the retreat to Cadiz the three French ships were not -in proper condition to engage, although one of them when brought to -action made a very dogged resistance to, and escaped from, an inferior -ship. Consequently, the six British that pursued had only six enemies -instead of nine to encounter. After making allowance for the very -superior quality of the British officers and crews over the Spanish, it -is evident the distinguishing feature in these operations was that the -British squadron brought the enemies' divisions to action separately. -It was able to do so because it had been kept before the hostile port, -interposing between them. - -Saumarez had wrung success out of considerable difficulty. The failure -of the wind greatly increased the disadvantage to his vessels, coming -under sail into action with others already drawn up at anchor, -and to whom the loss of spars for the moment meant little. These -circumstances, added to the support of the French by land batteries and -some gunboats, went far to neutralize tactically the superior numbers -of the British. With all deductions, however, the fight at Algesiras -was extremely creditable to Linois. He was a man not only distinguished -for courage, but also of a cautious temper peculiarly fitted to secure -every advantage offered by a defensive position. Despite his success -there, the broad result was decisively in favor of his opponents. "Sir -James Saumarez's action," wrote Lord St. Vincent, "has put us upon -velvet." Seven British had worsted nine enemy's ships, as distinctly -superior, for the most part, in individual force as they were in -numbers. Not only had the Spaniards three of ninety guns and over, and -one of eighty, but two of Linois's were of the latter class, of which -Saumarez had but one. The difference between such and the seventy-fours -was not only in number of pieces, but in weight also. The substantial -issue, however, can be distinguished from the simple victory, and it -was secured not only by superior efficiency but also by strategic -disposition. - -Brilliant as was Saumarez's achievement, which Nelson, then in -England, warmly extolled in the House of Lords, the claim made by his -biographer, that to these operations alone was wholly due the defeat -of Bonaparte's plan, is exaggerated. It was arranged, he says, that -when the junction was made, the Cadiz ships should proceed off Lisbon, -sack that place, and destroy British merchantmen lying there; "then, -being re-enforced by the Brest fleet, they were to pass the Straits of -Gibraltar, steer direct for Alexandria, and there land such a body of -troops as would raise the siege and drive the English out of Egypt. -_This would certainly have succeeded_ had the squadron under Linois not -encountered that of Sir James, which led to the total defeat of their -combined fleets and to the abandonment of the grand plan."[47] This -might be allowed to stand as a harmless exhibition of a biographer's -zeal, did it not tend to obscure the true lesson to be derived from -this whole naval period, by attributing to a single encounter, however -brilliant, results due to an extensive, well-conceived general -system. Sir James Saumarez's operations were but an epitome of an -action going on everywhere from the Baltic to Egypt. By this command -of the sea the British fleets, after they had adopted the plan of -close-watching the enemy's ports, held everywhere interior positions, -which, by interposing between the hostile detachments, facilitated -beating them in detail. For the most part this advantage of position -resulted in quietly detaining the enemy in port, and so frustrating his -combinations. It was Saumarez's good fortune to illustrate how it could -also enable a compact body of highly disciplined ships to meet in rapid -succession two parts of a force numerically very superior, and by the -injuries inflicted on each neutralize the whole for a definite time. -But, had he never seen Linois, Bonaparte's plan still required the -junctions from Rochefort and Brest which were never effected. - -By naval combinations and by holding the Neapolitan ports Bonaparte -sought to preserve Egypt and force Great Britain to peace. "The -question of maritime peace," he wrote to Ganteaume,[48] "hangs now upon -the English expedition to Egypt." Portugal, the ancient ally of Great -Britain, was designed to serve other purposes of his policy,—to furnish -equivalents, with which to wrest from his chief enemy the conquests -that the sea power of France and her allies could not touch. "Notify -our minister at Madrid," wrote he to Talleyrand, September 30, 1800, -"that the Spanish troops must be masters of Portugal before October 15. -This is the only means by which we can have an equivalent for Malta, -Mahon, and Trinidad. Besides, the danger of Portugal will be keenly -felt in England, and will by so much quicken her disposition to peace." - -A secret treaty ceding Louisiana to France, in return for Tuscany -to the Spanish infante, had been signed the month before; and Spain -at the same time undertook to bring Portugal to break with Great -Britain. Solicitation proving ineffectual, Bonaparte in the spring -again demanded the stronger measure of an armed occupation of the -little kingdom; growing more urgent as it became evident that Egypt -was slipping from his grasp. Spain finally agreed to invade Portugal, -and accepted the co-operation of a French corps. The first consul -purposed to occupy at least three of the Portuguese provinces; -but he was outwitted by the adroitness of the Spanish government, -unwillingly submissive to his pressure, and by the compliance of his -brother Lucien, French minister to Madrid. Portugal made no efficient -resistance; and the two peninsular courts quickly reached an agreement, -by which the weaker closed her ports to Great Britain, paid twenty -million francs to France, and ceded a small strip of territory to Spain. - -Bonaparte was enraged at this treaty, which was ratified without -giving him a chance to interfere;[49] but in the summer of 1801 his -diplomatic game reached a stage where further delay was impossible. -He saw that the loss of Egypt was only a question of time; but so -long as any French troops held out there it was a card in his hand, -too valuable to risk for the trifling gain of a foothold in Portugal. -"The English are not masters of Egypt," he writes boldly on the 23d -of July to the French agent in London. "We have certain news that -Alexandria can hold out a year, and Lord Hawkesbury knows that Egypt is -in Alexandria;"[50] but four days later he sends the hopeless message -to Murat, "There is no longer any question of embarking"[51] the troops -about Taranto, sent there for the sole purpose of being nearer to -Egypt.[52] He continues, in sharp contrast with his former expectation, -"The station of the troops upon the Adriatic is intended to impose upon -the Turks and the English, and to serve as material for compensation -to the latter by evacuating those provinces." Both Naples and Portugal -were too distant, too ex-centric, and thrust too far into contact with -the British dominion of the sea to be profitably, or even safely, -held by France in her condition of naval debility; a truth abundantly -witnessed by the later events of Napoleon's reign, by the disastrous -occupation of Portugal in 1807, by the reverses of Soult and Masséna -in 1809 and 1811, and by the failure even to attempt the conquest of -Sicily. - -Russia and Prussia had grown less friendly since the death of Paul. -Even their agreement that Hanover should be evacuated, disposed as they -now were to please Great Britain, was to be postponed until "it was -ascertained that a certain power would not occupy that country;"[53] -a stipulation which betrayed the distrust felt by both. Since then -each had experienced evasions and rebuffs showing the unwillingness of -the first consul to meet their wishes in his treatment of the smaller -states; and they suspected, although they did not yet certainly know, -the steps already taken to incorporate with France regions to whose -independence they held.[54] Both were responding to the call of their -interests, beneficially and vitally connected with the sea power of -Great Britain, and threatened on the Continent by the encroaching -course of the French ruler. Bonaparte felt that the attempt to make -further gains in Europe, with which to traffic against those of Great -Britain abroad, might arouse resistance in these great powers, not yet -exhausted like Austria, and so indefinitely postpone the maritime peace -essential to the revival of the French navy and the re-establishment -of the colonial system; both at this time objects of prime importance -in his eyes. Thus it was that, beginning the year 1801 without a -single ally, in face of the triumphant march of the French armies and -of a formidable maritime combination, the Sea Power of Great Britain -had dispersed the Northern coalition, commanded the friendship of the -great states, retained control of the Mediterranean, reduced Egypt to -submission, and forced even the invincible Bonaparte to wish a speedy -cessation of hostilities. - -The great aim of the first consul now was to bring Great Britain -to terms before news of the evacuation of Alexandria could come to -hand. Negotiations had been slowly progressing for nearly six months; -the first advances having been made on the 21st of March by the new -ministry which came into power upon Pitt's resignation. Both parties -being inclined to peace, the advantage necessarily belonged to the man -who, untrammelled by associates in administration, held in absolute -control the direction of his country. The Addington ministry, hampered -by its own intrinsic weakness and by the eagerness of the nation, -necessarily yielded before the iron will of one who was never more firm -in outward bearing than in the most critical moments. He threatened -them with the occupation of Hanover; he intimated great designs for -which troops were embarked at Rochefort, Brest, Toulon, Cadiz, and -ready to embark in Holland; he boasted that Alexandria could hold out -yet a year. Nevertheless, although the terms were incontestably more -advantageous to France than to Great Britain, the government of the -latter insisted upon and obtained one concession, that of Trinidad, -which Bonaparte at first withheld.[55] His eagerness to conclude was in -truth as great as their own, though better concealed. Finally, he sent -on the 17th of September an ultimatum, and added, "If preliminaries are -not signed by the 10th of Vendémiaire (October 2), the negotiations -will be broken." "You will appreciate the importance of this clause," -he wrote confidentially to the French envoy, "when you reflect that -Menou may possibly not be able to hold in Alexandria beyond the first -of Vendémiaire, that at this season the winds are fair to come from -Egypt, and ships reach Italy and Trieste in very few days. Thus it -is essential to push them to a finish before Vendémiaire 10;" that -is, before they learn the fall of Alexandria. The question of terms, -as he had said before, hinged on Egypt. The envoy, however, was -furnished with a different but plausible reason. "Otto can give them -to understand that from our inferiority at sea and our superiority on -land the campaign begins for us in winter, and therefore I do not wish -to remain longer in this stagnation."[56] Whatever motives influenced -the British ministry, it is evident that Bonaparte was himself in a -hurry for peace. The preliminaries were signed in London on the first -of October, 1801. - -The conditions are easily stated. Of all her conquests, Great Britain -retained only the islands of Ceylon in the East Indies and Trinidad in -the West. How great this concession, will be realized by enumerating -the chief territories thus restored to their former owners. These were, -in the Mediterranean, Elba, Malta, Minorca; in the West Indies, Tobago, -Santa Lucia, Martinique, and the extensive Dutch possessions in Guiana; -in Africa, the Cape of Good Hope; and in India, the French and Dutch -stations in the peninsula. France consented to leave to Portugal her -possessions entire, to withdraw her troops from the kingdom of Naples -and the Roman territory, and to acknowledge the independence of the -Republic of the Seven Islands. Under this name the former Venetian -islands, Corfu and others—given to France by the treaty of Campo -Formio—had, after their conquest in 1799 by the fleets of Russia and -Turkey, been constituted into an independent state under the guarantee -of those two powers. Their deliverance from France was considered an -important security to the Turkish Empire. The capitulation of the -French troops in Alexandria was not yet known in England; and the -preliminaries merely stipulated the return of Egypt to the Porte, -whose dominions were to be preserved as they existed before the war. -Malta, restored to the Knights of St. John, was to be freed from -all French or British influence and placed under the guarantee of a -third Power. Owing to the decay of the Order, the disposition of this -important naval station, secretly coveted by both parties, was the most -difficult matter to arrange satisfactorily. In the definitive treaty -its status was sought to be secured by a cumbrous set of provisions, -occupying one third of the entire text; and the final refusal of Great -Britain to evacuate, until satisfaction was obtained for what she -claimed to be violations of the spirit of the engagements between the -two countries, became the test question upon which hinged the rupture -of this short-lived peace. - -As the first article of the preliminaries stipulated that upon their -ratification hostilities in all parts of the world, by sea and land, -should cease, they were regarded in both Great Britain and France as -equivalent to a definitive treaty; the postponement of the latter -being only to allow the negotiators time to settle the details of the -intricate agreements, thus broadly outlined, without prolonging the -sufferings of war. To France they could not but be acceptable. She -regained much, and gave up nothing that she could have held without -undue and often useless exertion. In Great Britain the general joy was -marred by the severe, yet accurate, condemnation passed upon the terms -by a body of exceptionally able men, drawn mainly from the ranks of the -Pitt cabinet, although their leader gave his own approval. They pointed -out, clearly and indisputably, that the disparity between the material -gains of Great Britain and France was enormous, disproportionate to -their relative advantages at the time of signature, and not to be -reconciled with that security which had been the professed object -of the struggle. They asserted with little exaggeration that the -conditions were for France to hold what she had, and for Great Britain -to recede to her possessions before the war. They predicted with fatal -accuracy the speedy renewal of hostilities, under the disadvantage of -having lost by the peace important positions not easy to be regained. -The ministry had little to reply. To this or that item of criticism -exception might be taken; but in the main their defence was that by -the failure of their allies no hope remained of contesting the power -of France on the Continent, and that Trinidad and Ceylon were very -valuable acquisitions. Being insular, they were controlled by the -nation ruling the sea, while, from their nearness to the mainlands of -South America and of India, they were important as depots of trade, -as well as for strategic reasons. The most assuring argument was put -forward by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had negotiated the -preliminaries. At the beginning of the war Great Britain had 135 -ships-of-the-line and 133 frigates; at its close she had 202 of the -former and 277 of the latter. France had begun with 80 of the line and -66 frigates, and ended with 39 and 35 respectively. However the first -consul might exert himself, Lord Hawkesbury justly urged that the -British might allow him many years labor and then be willing to chance -a maritime war.[57] - -Material advantages such as had thus been given up undoubtedly -contribute to security. In surrendering as much as she did abroad, -while France retained such extensive gains upon the Continent and -acquired there such a preponderating influence, Great Britain, which -had so large a stake in the European commonwealth, undoubtedly incurred -a serious risk. The shortness of the peace, and the disquieting -disputes which arose throughout it, sufficiently prove this. -Nevertheless, could contemporaries accurately read the signs of their -times, Englishmen of that day need not have been dissatisfied with -the general results of the war. A long stage had been successfully -traversed towards the final solution of a great difficulty. In 1792 the -spirit of propagating revolution by violence had taken possession of -the French nation as a whole. As Napoleon has strikingly remarked, "It -was part of the political religion of the France of that day to make -war in the name of principles."[58] "The Montagnards and the Jacobins," -says the republican historian Henri Martin, the bitter censurer of -Bonaparte, "were resolved, like the Girondists, to propagate afar, by -arms, the principles of the Revolution; and they hoped, by hurling a -defiance at all kings, to put France in the impossibility of recoiling -or stopping herself."[59] Such a design could be checked only by -raising up against it a barrier of physical armed opposition. This -had been effected and maintained chiefly by the Sea Power of Great -Britain, the prime agent and moving spirit, directly through her navy, -indirectly through the subsidies drawn from her commerce; and the -latter had nearly doubled while carrying on this arduous and extensive -war. In 1801 the aggressive tendencies of the French nation, as a -whole, were exhausted. So far as they still survived, they were now -embodied in and dependent upon a single man, in which shape they were -at once more distinctly to be recognized and more odious. They were -also less dangerous; because the power of one man, however eminent for -genius, is far less for good or evil than the impulse of a great people. - -The British statesmen of that day did not clearly distinguish this -real nature of their gains, though they did intuitively discern the -true character of the struggle in which they were engaged. As is -not infrequent with intuitions, the reasoning by which they were -supported was often faulty; but Pitt's formulation of the objects of -Great Britain in the one word "security" was substantially correct. -Security was her just and necessary aim, forced upon her by the -circumstances of the Revolution,—security not for herself alone, but -for the community of states of which she was an important member. This -was threatened with anarchy through the lawless spirit with which -the French leaders proposed to force the spread of principles and -methods, many of them good as well as many bad, but for whose healthful -development were demanded both time and freedom of choice, which they -in their impatience were unwilling to give. "Security," said Pitt in -his speech upon the preliminaries, "was our great object; there were -different means of accomplishing it, with better or worse prospects -of success; and according to the different variations of policy -occasioned by a change of circumstances, we still pursued our great -object, Security. In order to obtain it we certainly did look for the -subversion of that government founded upon revolutionary principles.... -We have the satisfaction of knowing that we have survived the violence -of the revolutionary fever, and we have seen the extent of its -principles abated. We have seen Jacobinism deprived of its fascination; -we have seen it stripped of the name and pretext of liberty; it has -shown itself to be capable only of destroying, not of building, and -that it must necessarily end in a military despotism."[60] Such, in -truth, was the gain of the first war of Great Britain with the French -Revolution. It was, however, but a stage in the progress; there -remained still another, of warfare longer, more bitter, more furious,—a -struggle for the mastery, whose end was not to be seen by the chief -leaders of the one preceding it. - - - - -CHAPTER XIV. - -OUTLINE OF EVENTS FROM THE SIGNATURE OF THE PRELIMINARIES TO THE -RUPTURE OF THE PEACE OF AMIENS. - -OCTOBER, 1801.-MAY, 1803. - - -The preliminaries of peace between Great Britain and France, signed -on the first of October, 1801, were regarded by both parties, at -least ostensibly, as settling their relative status and acquisitions. -In their broad outlines no change would be worked by the definitive -treaty, destined merely to regulate details whose adjustment would -demand time and so prolong the distress of war. This expectation, -that the basis of a durable peace had been reached, proved delusive. -A series of unpleasant surprises awaited first one party and then -the other, producing in Great Britain a feeling of insecurity, which -gave point and added vigor to the declamations of those who from the -first had scoffed at the idea of any peace proving permanent, if it -rested upon the good faith of the French government and surrendered -those material guarantees which alone, they asserted, could curb the -ambition and enforce the respect of a man like Bonaparte. Bitter -indeed must have been the unspoken thoughts of the ministry, as the -revolving months brought with them an unceasing succession of events -which justified their opponents' prophecies while proving themselves -to be outwitted; and which, by the increase given to French influence -and power in Europe, necessitated the maintenance of large military -establishments, and converted the peace from first to last into a -condition of armed truce. - -The day after the signature of the preliminaries news reached -London[61] of the surrender of Alexandria, which completed the loss of -Egypt by the French. It was believed that Bonaparte had, at the time -of signing, possessed this information, which would have materially -affected the footing upon which he was treating. However that was, he -was undoubtedly assured of the issue,[62] and therefore precipitated a -conclusion by which to France, and not to Great Britain, was attributed -the gracious act of restoring its dominion to the Porte. Concealing -the fact from the Turkish plenipotentiary in Paris, the French -government on the 9th of October signed with him a treaty, by which -it undertook to evacuate the province it no longer held. In return, -Turkey conceded to France, her recent enemy, commercial privileges -equal to those allowed Great Britain, to whose sea power alone she -owed the recovery of Syria and Egypt. This bargain, concluded without -the knowledge of the British ministry, was not made public until after -the ratification of the preliminaries. At the same time became known a -treaty with Portugal, signed at Madrid on the 29th of September. By the -preliminaries with Great Britain, Portuguese territory was to remain -intact; but by the treaty of Madrid so much of Brazil was added to -French Guiana as to give the latter control of the northern outlet of -the Amazon. - -These events were surprises, and disagreeable surprises, to the -British ministers. On the other hand, the existence of the secret -treaty of March 21, 1801, by which Spain ceded to France the colony -of Louisiana, was known to them,[63] though unavowed at the time of -signing. While impressed with the importance of this transaction, -following as it did the cession of the Spanish half of San Domingo, the -ministry allowed the veil of mystery, with which Bonaparte had been -pleased to shroud it, to remain unlifted. The United States minister -to London had procured and forwarded to his government on the 20th -of November a copy of this treaty,[64] which so closely affected his -fellow countrymen; but it was not until January, 1802, that the fact -became generally known in England. Gloomy prophecies of French colonial -aggrandizement were uttered by the partisans of the Opposition, who -pictured the hereditary enemy of Great Britain planted by the Spanish -treaty at the mouth of the great river of North America, and by the -Portuguese at that of the artery of the southern continent; while the -vast and rich colonies of Spain, lying between these two extremes, -would be controlled by the supremacy of France in the councils of the -Peninsular courts. In a generation which still retained the convictions -of the eighteenth century on the subject of colonial expansion, these -predictions of evil struck heavily home,—enforced as they were by the -knowledge that full one fourth of the trade which made the strength -of Great Britain rested then upon that Caribbean America, into which -France was now making a colossal intrusion. Faithful to the sagacious -principle by which he ever proportioned the extent of his military -preparation to the vastness of the end in view, the expedition sent -by Bonaparte to reassert in Haïti the long dormant authority of -the mother-country was calculated on a scale which aroused intense -alarm in London. On the 4th of December, 1801, only ten weeks after -the preliminaries were signed, and long before the conclusion of -the definitive treaty, fifteen ships-of-the-line and six frigates -sailed from Brest for Haïti; and these were rapidly followed by other -divisions, so that the whole force dispatched much exceeded twenty -ships-of-the-line, and carried over twenty thousand troops. The number -was none too great for the arduous task,—indeed experience proved it to -be far from adequate to meet the waste due to climatic causes; but to -Great Britain it was portentous. Distrusting Bonaparte's purposes, a -large division of British ships was ordered to re-enforce the squadron -at Jamaica. Weary of a nine-years war and expecting their discharge, -the crews of some of the vessels mutinied; and the execution of several -of these poor seamen was one of the first results of Bonaparte's -ill-fated attempt to restore the colonial system of France. - -The apprehensions shown concerning these distant undertakings partook -more of panic than of reasonable fear. They overlooked the long period -that must pass between possession and development, as well as the -hopeless inferiority of France in that sea power upon which the tenure -of colonies must depend. They ignored the evident enormous difficulties -to be overcome, and were blind to the tottering condition of the -Spanish colonial system, then rapidly approaching its fall. But if -there was exaggeration in an anticipation of danger, which the whole -history of her maritime past entitled Great Britain to reject with -scorn, there was no question that each month was revealing unexpected -and serious changes in the relative positions of the two powers, which, -if not wilfully concealed by France, had certainly not been realized by -the British ministers when the preliminaries were signed. Whether they -had been cheated or merely out-manœuvred, it became daily more plain -that the balance of power in Europe, of which Great Britain was so -important a factor, was no longer what it had been when she made such -heavy sacrifices of her maritime conquests to secure the status of the -Continent. - -At the same time was unaccountably delayed the work of the -plenipotentiaries, who were to settle at Amiens the terms of the -definitive treaty. The British ambassador left London on the first of -November, and after some stop in Paris reached Amiens on the first of -December. The French and Dutch envoys arrived shortly after; but the -Spanish failed to appear, and on different pretexts negotiations were -spun out. That this was contrary to the wishes of the British ministers -scarcely admits of doubt. They had already made every sacrifice they -could afford; and the position of a popular government, under the free -criticism of a people impatient for a settled condition of affairs, and -forced to temporizing expedients for carrying on the state business -during a period of uncertainty, was too unpleasant to suggest bad -faith on their part. While this suspense still lasted, a startling -event occurred, greatly affecting the balance of power. The Cisalpine -Republic, whose independence was guaranteed by the treaty of Lunéville, -adopted toward the end of 1801 a new constitution, drawn up under the -inspection of Bonaparte himself. Delegates of the republic, to the -number of several hundred, were summoned to Lyon to confer with the -first consul on the permanent organization of their state; and there, -under his influence, as was alleged, offered to him the presidency, -with functions even more extensive than those he enjoyed as ruler of -France. The offer was accepted by him on the 26th of January, 1802; and -thus the power of the Cisalpine, with its four million inhabitants, was -wielded by the same man who already held that of the French republic. A -few days later for the name Cisalpine was substituted Italian,—a change -thought to indicate an aggressive attitude towards the remaining states -of Italy. - -These proceedings at Lyon caused great alarm in England, and many -persons before pacifically disposed now wished to renew the war. -The ministers nevertheless ignored what had passed so publicly, and -continued the effort for peace, despite the delays and tergiversations -of which their envoy, Lord Cornwallis, bitterly complained; but by -the beginning of March, when negotiations had lasted three months, -their patience began to give way. A number of ships were ordered into -commission, and extensive naval preparations begun. At the same time -an ultimatum was sent forward, and Cornwallis instructed to leave -Amiens in eight days if it were not accepted. The first consul had too -much at stake on the seas to risk a rupture,[65] when he had already -gained so much by the protraction of negotiations and by his astute -diplomacy. The definitive treaty was signed on the 25th of March, 1802. -The terms did not materially differ from those of the preliminaries, -except in the article of Malta. The boundary of French Guiana obtained -from Portugal was indeed pushed back off the Amazon, but no mention was -made of the now notorious cession of Louisiana. - -The provisions touching the little island of Malta and its -dependencies, Gozo and Comino, were long and elaborate. The object of -each country was to secure the exclusion of the other from a position -so important for controlling the Mediterranean and the approaches -thereby to Egypt and India. The Order of Knights was to be restored, -with the provision that no citizen either of Great Britain or France -was thereafter to be a member. The independence and neutrality of the -Order and of the island were proclaimed. The British forces were to -evacuate within three months after the exchange of ratifications; but -this stipulation was qualified by the proviso that there should then -be on the spot a Grand Master to receive possession, and also two -thousand Neapolitan troops which the king of Naples was to be invited -to send as a garrison. These were to remain for one year after its -restitution to the Grand Master; or longer, if the Order had not then -provided the necessary force. Naples was thus selected as guardian of -the coveted position, because its weakness could arouse no jealousy. -The independence of the islands was placed under the guarantee of Great -Britain, France, Austria, Spain, Russia, and Prussia; the last four -being also invited to accede to the long list of stipulations. The -presence of a grand master and the guarantee of the four powers—whose -acquiescence was not first obtained—were thus integral parts of the -agreement; and upon their failure Great Britain afterwards justified -the delays which left Malta still a pledge in her hands, when she -demanded from France explanations and indemnities for subsequent -actions, injurious, as she claimed, to her security and to her dignity. - -By another clause of the treaty Great Britain consented to evacuate -Porto Ferrajo, the principal port in Elba, which she had up to that -time held by force of arms. It was then known that this was in effect -to abandon the island to France, who had obtained its cession from -Naples and Tuscany, formerly joint owners, by conventions first made -known some time after the signature of the preliminaries. Elba was by -its position fitted seriously to embarrass the trade of Great Britain -with Northern Italy, under the restrictions laid wherever Bonaparte's -power extended; but the most important feature of the transaction -was the impression produced by the long concealment of treaties thus -unexpectedly divulged. These sudden, unforeseen changes imparted an air -of illusion to all existing conditions, and undermined the feeling of -security essential to the permanent relations of states. - -Despite the shocks caused by these various revelations, the treaty of -Amiens was received in Great Britain with satisfaction, though not -with the unmeasured demonstrations that followed the announcement of -the preliminaries. In France the general joy was no less profound. "It -was believed," writes M. Thiers, "that the true peace, the peace of -the seas, was secured,—that peace which was the certain and necessary -condition of peace on the Continent." The enthusiasm of the nation -was poured out at the feet of the first consul, to whose genius for -war and for diplomacy were not unjustly attributed the brilliant, as -well as apparently solid, results. Statesmen might murmur that France -had lost her colonial empire and failed to hold Egypt and Malta, -while Great Britain had extended and consolidated her Indian empire -by overthrowing the Sultan of Mysore, the ancient ally of France and -her own most formidable foe in the peninsula; but the mass even of -intelligent Frenchmen stopped not to regard the wreck of their sea -power, of which those disastrous events were but the sign. Facts so -remote, and whose significance was not immediately apparent, were lost -to sight in the glare of dazzling deeds wrought close at hand. All -eyes were held by the splendid succession of victories in Italy and -Germany, by the extension of the republic to her natural limits at the -Rhine and the Alps, by the restoration of internal order, and by the -proudly dominant position accorded their ruler in the councils of the -Continent. To these was now added free access to the sea, wrung by the -same mighty hand—as was fondly believed—from the weakening of the great -Sea Power. At an extraordinary session of the Legislature, convoked to -give legal sanction to the treaties and measures of the government, -the Treaty of Amiens was presented last, as the crowning work of the -first consul; and it was used as the occasion for conferring upon him -a striking mark of public acknowledgment. After some hesitations, the -question was submitted to the nation whether his tenure of office -should be for life. The majority of votes cast were affirmative; and -on the 3d of August, 1802, the senate formally presented to him a -_senatus-consultum_, setting forth that "the French people names, and -the senate proclaims. Napoleon Bonaparte consul for life." - -Bonaparte had not waited for this exaltation to continue his restless -political activity, destined soon to make waste paper of the Treaty of -Amiens. Great Britain having steadfastly refused to recognize the new -states set up by him in Italy, he argued she had forfeited all right to -interfere thenceforth in their concerns. From this he seems to have -advanced to the position that she had no further claim to mingle in the -affairs of the Continent at large. The consequent indifference shown -by him to British sentiment and interests, in continental matters, -was increased by his conviction that "in the existing state of Europe -England cannot reasonably make war, alone, against us;"[66] an opinion -whose open avowal in more offensive terms afterwards became the spark -to kindle the final great conflagration. - -The treaty of Lunéville had provided that the German princes, who by -it lost territory on the west bank of the Rhine and in Italy, should -receive compensation elsewhere in the German empire; and it was agreed -that these indemnities should be made mainly at the expense of the -ecclesiastical principalities, where, the tenure being for life only, -least hardship would be involved. The difficulties attending these -distributions, and the fixed animosity between Prussia and Austria, -gave Bonaparte a fair pretext to intervene as mediator, and to guide -the final settlement upon lines which should diminish the relative -power and prestige of France's traditional enemy, Austria, and exalt -her rivals. In doing this he adroitly obtained the imposing support -of Russia, whose young sovereign readily accepted the nattering offer -of joint intervention; the more so that the princes allied to his -family might thus receive a disproportionate share of the spoils. Under -Bonaparte's skilful handling, the acquisitions of Prussia were so far -greater than those of Austria as to fulfil his prediction, that "the -empire of Germany should be really divided into two empires, since -its affairs will be arranged at two different centres."[67] After the -settlement he boasted that "the affairs of Germany had been arranged -entirely to the advantage of France and of her allies."[68] Great -Britain was not consulted; and her people, though silent, saw with -displeasure the weakening of their ally and the aggrandizement of a -state they held to be faithless as well as hostile. At the same time -bad feeling was further excited by the peremptory demands of Bonaparte -for the expulsion from England of certain French royalists, and for -the repression of the freedom of the British press in its attacks upon -himself. To these demands the British government declined to yield. - -The reclamations of Bonaparte against the press, and his intervention -in German affairs, preceded the proclamation of the consulate for -life. It was followed at a short interval by the formal incorporation -with France of Piedmont and Elba, by decree dated September 11, 1802. -Piedmont had been organized as a French military department in April, -1801;[69] and Bonaparte had then secretly avowed the measure to be a -first step to annexation. The significance of the present action was -that it changed a condition which was _de facto_ only, and presumably -temporary, to one that was claimed to be _de jure_ and permanent. As -such, it was a distinct encroachment by France, much affecting the -states of the Continent, and especially Austria, against whose Italian -possessions Piedmont was meant to serve as a base of operations. The -adjacent Republic of Liguria, as the Genoese territory was then styled, -was also organized as a French military division,[70] and no security -existed against similar action there,—most injurious to British -commerce, and adding another to the transformation scenes passing -before the eyes of Europe. Nor was the material gain to France alone -considered; for, no compensation being given to the King of Sardinia -for the loss of his most important state, this consummated injury was -felt as a slight by both Great Britain and Russia, which had earnestly -sought some reparation for him. For the time, however, no remonstrance -was made by the ministry. - -New offence was soon given, which, if not greater in degree, produced -all the effect of cumulative grievance. The little canton of Valais, -in south-western Switzerland, had in the spring of 1802 been forcibly -detached from the confederation and proclaimed independent, in order -to secure to the French the Simplon route passing through it to Italy; -a measure which, wrote Bonaparte, "joined to the exclusive right -of France to send her armies by that road, has changed the system -of war to be adopted in Italy."[71] No further open step was then -taken to control the affairs of Switzerland; but the French minister -was instructed to support secretly the party in sympathy with the -Revolution,[72] and an ominous sentence appeared in the message of the -first consul to the Legislature, May 6, 1802, that "the counsels of -the French government to the factions in Switzerland had so far been -ineffective. It is still hoped that the voice of wisdom and moderation -will command attention, and that the powers adjoining Helvetia will -not be forced to intervene to stifle troubles whose continuance would -threaten their own tranquillity."[73] - -In Switzerland, perhaps more than in any other part of Europe, had -been realized the purpose, announced by the National Convention in -the celebrated decrees of November 19 and December 15, 1792, to -propagate by force changes in the government of countries where the -French armies could penetrate. Vast changes had indeed been made in -Belgium, Holland, and Italy; but these when first invaded were in -open war with France. The interference in Switzerland in 1798 had no -characteristic of serious war, for no means of opposition existed in -the invaded cantons. It was an armed intervention, undertaken by -the Directory under the impulsion of Bonaparte, avowedly to support -citizens of a foreign state "wishing to recover their liberty."[74] "As -soon as the signal was given by the entrance of the French armies in -1798 the rising was prompt and general;"[75] and was followed by the -adoption of a highly centralized constitution, for which the country -was unprepared. From that time forward agitation was incessant. Two -parties strove for the mastery; the one favoring the new order, known -as the Unitarians, whose sympathies were with the French Revolution, -the other the Aristocratic, which sought to return towards the former -Constitution, and looked for countenance and support to the older -governments of Europe. Between the two there was a central party of -more moderate opinions. - -Having secured the Valais for France, Bonaparte in August, 1802, -withdrew the French troops till then maintained in Switzerland; -a politic measure tending to show Europe that he respected the -independence of the country guaranteed at Lunéville. The opposing -parties soon came to blows; and the nominal government of moderates, -which had obtained its authority by extra-constitutional action,[76] -found that it had on its side "neither the ardent patriots, who wished -absolute unity, nor the peaceable masses sufficiently well disposed -to the revolution, but who knew it only by the horrors of war and the -presence of foreign troops."[77] The aristocratic party got the upper -hand and established itself in the capital, whence the government was -driven. The latter appealed to Bonaparte to intervene; and after a -moment's refusal he decided to do so. "I will not," he said, "deliver -the formidable bastions of the Alps to fifteen hundred mercenaries -paid by England." A French colonel was sent as special envoy bearing -a proclamation, dated September 30, 1802, to command the oligarchic -government to dissolve and all armed assemblies to disperse. To support -this order, thirty thousand French soldiers, under General Ney, were -massed on the frontiers and soon entered the country. Before this show -of force all opposition in Switzerland at once ceased. - -The emotion of Europe was profound; but of the great powers none -save Great Britain spoke. What to Bonaparte was a step necessary -to the supremacy of France, even though a violation of the treaty -of Lunéville, was, in the eyes of Englishmen, not only among the -ministry but among the most strenuous of the opposition, an oppressive -interference with "the lawful efforts of a brave and generous people -to recover their ancient laws and government, and to procure the -re-establishment of a system which experience has demonstrated not only -to be favorable to the maintenance of their domestic happiness, but to -be perfectly consistent with the tranquillity and security of other -powers." The British cabinet expressed an unwillingness to believe that -there "would be any further attempt to control that independent nation -in the exercise of its undoubted rights."[78] - -Despite this avowed confidence, the ministry on the same day, October -10, that this vigorous remonstrance was penned, dispatched a special -envoy with orders to station himself on the frontiers of Switzerland, -ascertain the disposition of the people, and assure them that, if -they were disposed to resist the French advance, Great Britain would -furnish them pecuniary succors. The envoy was carefully to refrain -from promoting resistance, if the Swiss did not spontaneously offer -it; but if they did, he was to give them every facility to obtain arms -and supplies. Being thus committed to a course which could scarcely -fail to lead to hostilities, the British ministry next bethought itself -to secure some conquests of the late war, for whose restitution, in -compliance with the treaty, orders had already gone forward. On the -17th of October dispatches were sent to the West Indies, to Dutch -Guiana, and to the Cape of Good Hope, directing that the French and -Dutch colonies ordered to be restored should be retained until further -instructions. - -Upon receiving the British remonstrance, Bonaparte broke into furious -words mingled with threats. On the 23d of October he dictated -instructions to M. Otto, the French minister in London, which are -characterized even by M. Thiers as truly extraordinary. "He would not -deliver the Alps to fifteen hundred mercenaries paid by England. If -the British ministry, to support its parliamentary influence, should -intimate that there was anything the first consul had not done, -because he was prevented from doing it, that instant he would do it." -He scouted the danger to France from maritime war, and said plainly -that, if it arose, the coasts of Europe from Hanover to Taranto would -be occupied by French troops and closed to British commerce. "Liguria, -Lombardy, Switzerland and Holland would be converted into French -provinces, realizing the Empire of the Gauls." Great Britain herself -was threatened with invasion by a hundred thousand soldiers; and if, -to avert the danger, she succeeded in arousing another continental -war, "it would be England that forced us to conquer Europe. The first -consul was but thirty-three. He had as yet destroyed only states of -the second order. Who knows how long it would take him, if forced -thereto, to change again the face of Europe and revive the Empire of -the West?" The minister was directed to state to the British government -that the policy of France towards England was "the whole treaty of -Amiens; nothing but the treaty of Amiens." A week later the same phrase -was repeated in the Moniteur, the official journal, in an article -which expressly denied Great Britain's right to appeal to the treaty -of Lunéville, because she had refused to recognize the new states -constituted by it. M. Otto wisely withheld the provoking language of -the dispatch, but necessarily communicated the demand for the whole -treaty of Amiens and the refusal of aught not therein found. To this -the British minister of foreign affairs replied with the pregnant -words, "The state of the Continent when the treaty of Amiens was -signed, and nothing but that state." The two declarations created a -dead-lock, unless one party would recede. - -Despite these explicit formulas both governments were somewhat in -the dark as to the extent of the dangers. The British ministry had -not heard all that Bonaparte said, and he was ignorant of the orders -sent to retain the captured colonies. Meanwhile, Swiss opposition -having failed, the British envoy to them was recalled; and on the -15th of November new instructions were sent to the Cape of Good Hope -and the West Indies, revoking those of the previous month to stop the -restitutions. It remained, however, a question whether the second -vessel would overtake the first. If she did not, the action of the -British ministry would transpire in an offensive way. Accordingly, when -Parliament met on the 23d of November, the king's speech took the color -of this perplexity, alluding somewhat enigmatically to the necessity -of watching the European situation and providing for security as well -as for peace. The debates which followed were tinged with the same -hue of uncertainty. The ministry could only say that its policy was -to preserve peace, if possible; but that, in view of recent events, -it must call upon the House and the country to entertain a spirit of -watchfulness.[79] - -The Swiss affair was the turning-point in the relations of the two -countries. The first consul's vigilance had been lulled by the seeming -easy acquiescence of the British ministry in previous encroachments, -and the readiness with which, notwithstanding these, they had -surrendered their conquests and continued to fulfil the terms of the -treaty. Their present action not only exasperated, but aroused him. -The remonstrance ended in words; but, like the little trickle which -betrays the fissure in a dam, it betokened danger and gave warning -that the waters of strife were ready to burst through the untempered -barrier put together to restrain them, and again pour their desolating -flood over Europe. Bonaparte began to look carefully at the existing -situation, and found that the British troops had not yet quitted Egypt -nor surrendered Malta to the Order of St. John. Representations were -made on both these subjects, and the British government was pressed to -evacuate Malta.[80] - -The ministry, however, were also alive to the gravity of the situation, -increased as it was by the orders, not yet known, to stop the -restitutions. To abandon Egypt to Turkey they had no objection; and -to the French ambassador's demand replied, on November 30, that the -failure to do so had resulted from a misunderstanding on the part of -the British commander-in-chief, to whom explicit instructions were -now sent. Regarding Malta, their feeling was very different. Honestly -intending to carry out the treaty, they had admitted the Neapolitan -garrison to the island, though not yet to the fortifications; and their -ambassadors to the Great Powers had been early directed to ask their -guarantee for the independence of the Order. The French government -did not instruct its representatives to do the same. Whether this was -due, as Thiers says, to the negligence of Talleyrand, or whether the -first consul preferred not to be troubled by the resistance of other -powers in case he again seized the island, the failure of France -to join in the application caused Russia and Prussia to defer their -answer to the British ambassadors. The joint request was not made to -Prussia until September, nor to the czar until November 3. By this time -the Swiss incident had come and gone, leaving behind it the state of -tension already described. Not till the 25th of the month did the czar -reply; and then, before giving his acquiescence, he required in the -organization of the island changes seriously affecting the object of -the treaty, which aimed to base its independence upon its own people -as well as upon guarantees. At Amiens it had been agreed that the -Order should be open to native Maltese, by whom also at least half the -government offices should be filled. Half the garrison likewise was -to be composed of natives. To these provisions the czar excepted. All -such points of interior organization were to be left to the decision of -the legal government of the Order;[81] i. e., of the Order as before -constituted. - -The record of the ministry in the matter of Malta was so clear that -it could well afford to protract discussion on the points raised by -Russia. No cession made by the treaty had been more generally lamented -by Englishmen, keenly sensitive to all that affected their position -in the Mediterranean or threatened the approaches to India. In case -the peace which was its sole achievement failed, the ministry could -save from the wreck of its hopes no more welcome prize with which to -meet a disappointed people. Other valid objections to restoration were -not wanting. No Grand Master had yet accepted. Spain, notoriously -under Bonaparte's influence, had suppressed the revenues of the Order -within her limits. Similar action had followed elsewhere, and it was -argued that the income of the Order would not suffice to maintain the -defence of the island, nor consequently its independence. But, while -thus keeping its hold on Malta by diplomatic pleas, the ministry took -broader ground in its discussions with France. Its envoy there was -replaced by an ambassador of the highest rank, Lord Whitworth; who was -instructed to affirm explicitly Great Britain's right to interfere -in continental affairs, whenever in her judgment required by her own -interests, or those of Europe in general. He was also to point out the -various encroachments which had added to the influence and power of -France, and to intimate that these changes in the conditions since the -treaty had been concluded entitled Great Britain to compensations. The -annexation of Piedmont, the renunciation of the Grand Duke of Parma in -favor of France, the invasion of Switzerland, were specifically named -as making a most material alteration in the state of engagements since -the conclusion of the definitive treaty. Attention was also called to -the fact that although, by a convention signed in August, 1801, French -troops were to remain in Holland only until the conclusion of peace -between Great Britain and France, they had not yet been withdrawn, -thus violating the independence of the Batavian republic guaranteed -at Lunéville. The ambassador was warned, however, not to commit the -government to any specific determinations, and especially on the -subject of Malta.[82] - -The ministers, therefore, were still undecided. They had climbed upon -the fence, but were prepared to get down again on the side whence -they had started, if a fair opportunity were given. Unfortunately for -the interests of peace, Bonaparte, in the madness of his strength, -either exaggerating the weakness of the ministry or underestimating -the impulsion it could receive from popular feeling, proceeded -deliberately to arouse the spirit which he was never again able to -lay. On the 30th of January, 1803, was published in the "Moniteur" -Colonel Sébastiani's famous report of his mission to the Levant. -Sébastiani had been dispatched in a frigate the previous September, to -visit Tripoli, Egypt, Syria, and the Ionian islands, and ascertain the -political and military conditions. His report was in the main a fulsome -narrative of the reverence in which the first consul was said to be -held by the Eastern peoples; but, upon the very detailed account of the -indifference to military preparations, followed the startling statement -that "six thousand French troops would now suffice to conquer Egypt." -The Ionian islands were also pronounced ready to declare themselves -French at the first opportunity. Finally, General Stuart, commanding -the British troops in Alexandria, was accused of seeking to compass -Sébastiani's murder by sending to the Pasha a copy of a general order -issued by Bonaparte when in Egypt. - -The exasperation such a paper would excite in Great Britain was so -obvious, that its publication has been attributed to the deliberate -design to provoke a maritime war; under cover of which the first -consul could, without open humiliation, abandon the enterprise against -Haïti.[83] The first and general success of the French troops in that -colony had been followed by a frightful pestilence of yellow fever; -after which the negroes in every quarter again rose and defied the -weakened bands of their enemies. On the 8th of January the "Moniteur" -published the death of Leclerc, the commander-in-chief, with an account -of the ravages of the disease. It was indeed painfully apparent that -the colony could not be regained, and utilized, without an expenditure -of life impossible to afford;[84] but the fever itself was an excuse -even more potent than the British navy for abandoning the attempt -without military dishonor. To penetrate the real motives of a spirit -so subtle and unscrupulous as Bonaparte's is hopeless; nor can -dependence be placed upon the statements of his brothers Lucien and -Joseph, who are the sole authorities for the purpose thus alleged for -the publication. There seems little cause to seek another reason than -the same truculent arrogance manifested in his instructions to Otto of -October 23, and the success which his past experience had taught him to -expect from bluster. The secret mission to Prussia of his confidential -aid, Duroc, six weeks later, clearly indicates that the result had -disappointed him and that he did not want war,—at least as yet.[85] -Duroc was instructed to see the king personally and say that, if war -broke out, French troops would occupy Hanover, a step known to be -particularly obnoxious to Prussia, who wished herself to absorb it. Her -repugnance was to be used as a lever, to induce intervention with Great -Britain to evacuate Malta.[86] - -Bonaparte in truth was less interested in the West than in the East, -whose vast populations, vivid history, and fabled riches struck his -imagination far more forcibly than the unpeopled wildernesses of -America. Access to the East, as to the West, was perforce by water, -and so controlled by the power that ruled the sea; but the way by the -Levant was shorter, evasion therefore easier. Malta, Taranto, the -Ionian islands, the Morea were gateways to the East. The last three, -as practically continental,[87] he considered to be within his own -grasp; the first alone could be readily and securely held by the Power -of the Seas. From it therefore he sought to hasten her. On the 27th of -January Talleyrand, "with great solemnity and by express order of the -first consul," required of Lord Whitworth to inform him what were his -Majesty's intentions regarding the evacuation of Malta. No reply was -given, except a promise to report the conversation.[88] On the 30th -was issued Sébastiani's report, whose scarcely veiled threats against -British interests in the East might perhaps induce a weak government to -propitiate the first consul by compliance. - -If so meant, the attempt was miscalculated. The British ministry -replied that, despite his just claim for compensation, the king would -have withdrawn his force from Malta, when the clauses of the treaty -affecting it were fulfilled; but that, in view of Sébastiani's report, -he would not do so until substantial security was provided against -the purposes therein revealed. From that time forward letters and -interviews followed in rapid succession, the British ministry gradually -stiffening in its attitude concerning the island. On the 20th of -February Bonaparte gave a fresh provocation which deeply stirred the -British people, although no notice was taken of it by the ministry. In -a message sent that day to the legislature, he declared the certainty -of continental peace; but concerning Great Britain he continued: "Two -parties there strive for power. One has made peace and wishes to keep -it; the other has sworn implacable hatred to France.... Whatever the -success of intrigue in London, it will not drag other nations into new -leagues, and this government says with just pride: 'England, alone, -cannot to-day contend against France.'" - -On March 8 the British government sent a message to Parliament, that, -in consequence of military preparations going on in the ports of France -and Holland, the king judged expedient to adopt additional measures -of precaution for the security of his dominions. It is fair to say -that these preparations were not on a scale by themselves to warrant -the proposed action; which was asserted by critics of the ministry to -be due to information of transactions at the Cape of Good Hope. This -had already been delivered to the Dutch authorities when the orders -countermanding the restitution arrived; but the British commander -had adroitly repossessed himself of the works. This news reached -London early in March; and the proposed armaments were thought to be -precautions rather against Bonaparte's action, when he too heard it, -than against the existing movements in French or Dutch ports. - -From this time forward Great Britain rather than France was aggressive. -Receiving no explanation upon the grievances advanced, Lord Whitworth -was on the 4th of April instructed to say that, if the French -government continued to evade discussion about compensations due for -its aggressions on the Continent and satisfaction for Sébastiani's -report, and yet demanded the evacuation of Malta, he should declare -that relations of amity could not continue to exist, and that he must -leave Paris within a certain time. If they were willing to discuss, he -was instructed to propose the cession of Malta in perpetuity to Great -Britain and the evacuation of Holland and Switzerland by French troops; -in return for which Great Britain would confirm Elba to France and -acknowledge the kingdom of Etruria. If a satisfactory arrangement were -made in Italy for the king of Sardinia, she would further acknowledge -the Italian and Ligurian republics. The first consul replied that -he would sooner see the British on the heights of Montmartre than -in the possession of Malta. Some futile efforts were made to find a -middle term; but the ministry having insisted, as its ultimatum, -upon occupying the island for at least ten years, the ambassador -demanded his passports and left Paris on the 12th of May. On the 16th -Great Britain declared war against France. The following day Admiral -Cornwallis sailed from Plymouth with ten ships-of-the-line, and two -days later appeared off Brest, resuming the watch of that port. On the -afternoon of the 18th Nelson hoisted his flag on board the "Victory" at -Portsmouth, and on the 20th sailed for the Mediterranean, there to take -the chief command. - -Thus again, after a brief intermission, began the strife between -Great Britain and France, destined during its twelve years' course -to involve successively all the powers of Europe, from Portugal to -Russia, from Turkey to Sweden. On the land, state after state went -down before the great soldier who wielded the armies of France and the -auxiliary legions of subject countries, added to her standards by his -policy. Victory after victory graced his eagles, city after city and -province after province were embodied in his empire, peace after peace -was wrested from the conquered; but one enemy remained ever erect, -unsubdued, defiant; and on the ocean there was neither peace nor truce, -until the day when he himself fell under the hosts of foes, aroused by -his vain attempt to overthrow, through their sufferings, the power that -rested upon the seas. - -The debates in the House of Commons revealed an agreement of sentiment -unparalleled in the former war. Differences of opinion there were. A -very few thought that hostilities might even yet be averted, while -others argued bitterly that, had Bonaparte's first encroachments been -resisted, the nation might have been spared, if not war, at least -humiliation. But, while both groups condemned the administration, the -one for precipitation, the other for pusillanimous and protracted -submission, both agreed that just occasion for war had been given. As -usual, opposition took the form of an amendment to the address, which, -while carefully excluding any approval of the ministry, still "assured -his Majesty of our firm determination to co-operate with his Majesty -in calling forth the resources of the United Kingdom for the vigorous -prosecution of the war in which we are involved." The proposer, Mr. -Grey—one of the most strenuous opponents of the former war—was careful -to say that, though he objected to some points of the late negotiation, -he acknowledged the necessity of resisting the spirit of encroachment -shown by France. Even for this very qualified disapproval of a ministry -in whose capacity none had confidence, there could in this grave crisis -be found only 67 votes, against 398 who preferred not to weaken, by an -apparent discord, the unanimous voice. Having regard to the reasons -for their dissent urged by the various speakers, the result disposes -forever of the vain assertion that Great Britain feared to meet France -alone. The solemn decision was not taken blindfold nor in haste. The -exorbitant power of Bonaparte, the impossibility of allies, the burden -that must be borne, were all quoted and faced; and Mr. Pitt, who -then spoke for the first time in many months, while fully supporting -the war, warned the members in his stately periods of the arduous -struggle before them. "In giving their assurances he trusted that -other gentlemen felt impressed with the same sense which he did of -the awful importance of the engagement into which they were preparing -to enter; and that they considered those assurances, not as formal -words of ceremony or custom, but as a solemn and deliberate pledge, on -behalf of themselves and of the nation whom they represented,—knowing -and feeling to their full extent the real difficulties and dangers of -their situation, and being prepared to meet those difficulties and -dangers with every exertion and every sacrifice which the unexampled -circumstances of the times rendered indispensable for the public -safety.... The scale of our exertions could not be measured by those -of former times, or confined within the limits even of the great, and -till then unexampled, efforts of the last war."[89] - -In the same speech Pitt correctly and explicitly indicated the two -methods by which France might seek to subdue Great Britain. "If they -indulge themselves in any expectation of success in the present -contest, it is built chiefly on the supposition (1) that they can -either break the spirit and shake the determination of the country by -harassing us with perpetual apprehension of descent upon our coasts, or -(2) that they can impair our resources and undermine our credit, by the -effects of an expensive and protracted contest." Not to one only, but -to both of these means did Bonaparte resort, on a scale proportioned to -his comprehensive genius and his mighty resources. For the invasion of -England preparations were at once begun, so extensive and so thorough -as to indicate not a mere threat, but a fixed purpose; and at the -same time measures were taken to close to Great Britain the markets -of the Continent, as well as to harass her commerce by the ordinary -operations of maritime war. Trafalgar marked the term when all thought -of invasion disappeared, and was succeeded by the vast combinations of -the Continental System, itself but an expansion of the former measures -of exclusion. Framed to impair the resources and sap the credit of -Great Britain, this stupendous fabric, upheld, not by the cohesion of -its parts, but by the dextrous balancing of an ever watchful policy, -overtaxed the skill and strength of its designer, and crushed him in -its fall. - - - - -CHAPTER XV. - -THE TRAFALGAR CAMPAIGN TO THE SPANISH DECLARATION OF WAR. MAY, -1803—DECEMBER, 1804. - -PREPARATIONS FOR THE INVASION OF ENGLAND.—THE GREAT -FLOTILLA.—NAPOLEON'S MILITARY AND NAVAL COMBINATIONS AND BRITISH NAVAL -STRATEGY.—ESSENTIAL UNITY OF NAPOLEON'S PURPOSE.—CAUSES OF SPANISH WAR. - - -Although Great Britain and France had each, up to the last moment, -hoped to retain peace upon its own terms, preparations for war had gone -on rapidly ever since the king's message of March 8. Immediately upon -issuing this, couriers were dispatched to the various sea-ports, with -orders to impress seamen for the numerous ships hastily ordered into -commission. Some details have come down giving a vivid presentment of -that lawless proceeding known as a "hot press," at this period when it -was on the point of disappearing. "About 7 P. M. yesterday," says the -Plymouth report of March 10, "the town was alarmed with the marching -of several bodies of Royal Marines in parties of twelve or fourteen -each, with their officers and a naval officer, armed. So secret were -the orders kept that they did not know the nature of the service on -which they were going, until they boarded the tier of colliers at the -new quay, and other gangs the ships at Catwater, the Pool and the -gin-shops. A great number of prime seamen were taken out and sent -on board the admiral's ship. In other parts of the town, and in all -the receiving and gin-shops at Dock, several hundreds of seamen and -landsmen were picked up. By returns this morning it appears that -upwards of four hundred useful hands were pressed last night. One gang -entered the Dock theatre and cleared the whole gallery except the -women." Parties of seamen and marines were placed across all roads -leading out of the towns, to intercept fugitives. In Portsmouth the -colliers were stripped so clean of men that they could not put to -sea; while frigates and smaller vessels swept the Channel and other -sea-approaches to the kingdom, stopping all merchant ships, and taking -from them a part of their crews. The whole flotilla of trawl-boats -fishing off the Eddystone, forty in number, were searched, and two -hands taken from each. Six East India ships, wind-bound off Plymouth -on their outward voyage, were boarded by armed boats and robbed of -three hundred seamen, till then unaware that a rupture with France was -near.[90] - -Bonaparte on his side had been no less active, although he sought by -the secrecy of his movements to avert alarm and postpone, if possible, -the war which for his aims was premature. Orders were given that -re-enforcements for the colonies should go forward rapidly, ere peace -was broken. No ships-of-the-line or frigates should henceforth go with -them; and those already abroad were for the most part at once recalled. -Troops were concentrated on the coasts of Holland and Flanders; and -the flat-boats built in the last war with a view to invading England -were assembled quietly in the Scheldt and the Channel ports. Plans were -studied for the harassment of British commerce. On the 9th of April was -commanded the armament of the shores, from the Scheldt westward to the -Somme, a distance of one hundred and twenty miles, which afterwards -became, to use Marmont's vivid expression, "a coast of iron and -bronze." A few days later Elba and all the coasts and islands of France -were ordered fortified; and the first consul's aides-de-camp sped north -and east and west, to see and report the state of preparation in all -quarters. - -One affair of great importance still remained to arrange. The -smaller French islands in the East and West Indies could be held in -subjection by a moderate number of troops, who could also resist for a -considerable time any attempt of the British, unless on a very large -scale. This was not the case with Haïti or Louisiana. In the former -the French, reduced by the fever, were now shut up in a few sea-ports; -communication between which, being only by water, must cease when the -maritime war broke out. Between the blacks within and the British -without, the loss of the island was therefore certain. Louisiana -had not yet been occupied. Whatever its unknown possibilities, the -immediate value to France of this possession, so lately regained, was -as a source of supplies to Haïti, dependent for many essentials upon -the American continent. With the fall of the island the colony on the -mainland became useless. Its cession by Spain to France had at once -aroused the jealousy, with which, from colonial days, the people of -the United States have viewed any political interference by European -nations on the American continent, even when involving only a transfer -from one power to another. In the dire straits of the Revolution, when -the need of help from abroad was so great, they had been careful to -insert in the Treaty of Alliance with France an express stipulation, -that she would not acquire for herself any of the possessions of Great -Britain on the mainland; having then in view Canada and the Floridas. -This feeling was intensified when, as now, the change of ownership was -from a weak and inert state like Spain to one so powerful as France, -with the reputation for aggressiveness that was fast gathering around -the name of Bonaparte. - -The fear and anger of the American people increased with the reserve -shown by the French government, in replying to the questions of their -minister in Paris, who asked repeatedly, but in vain, for assurances -as to the navigation of the Mississippi; and the excitement reached -a climax when in November, 1802, news was received that the Spanish -authorities in New Orleans had refused to American citizens the right -of deposit, conceded by the treaty of 1795 with Spain. This was -naturally attributed to Bonaparte's influence, and the inhabitants of -the upper Mississippi valley were ready to resort to arms to enforce -their rights. - -Such was the threatening state of affairs in America, while war with -Great Britain was fast drawing on. Bonaparte was not the man to -recede before a mere menace of hostilities in the distant wilderness -of Louisiana; but it was plain that, in case of rupture with Great -Britain, any possessions of France on the Gulf of Mexico were sure to -fall either to her or to the Americans, if he incurred the enmity of -the latter. It was then believed in Washington that France had also -acquired from Spain the Floridas, which contained naval ports essential -to the defence of Louisiana. On the 12th of April, 1803, arrived in -Paris Mr. Monroe, sent by Jefferson as envoy extraordinary, to treat, -in conjunction with the regular minister to France, for the cession of -the Floridas and of the island of New Orleans to the United States; the -object of the latter being to secure the Mississippi down to its mouth -as their western boundary. Monroe's arrival was most opportune. Lord -Whitworth had five days before communicated the message of the British -cabinet that, unless the French government was prepared to enter into -the required explanations, relations of amity could not exist, and at -the same time the London papers were discussing a proposition to raise -fifty thousand men to take New Orleans.[91] Three days later, April -10, the first consul decided to sell Louisiana;[92] and Monroe upon -his arrival had only to settle the terms of the bargain, which did -not indeed realize the precise object of his mission, but which gave -to his country control of the west bank of the Mississippi throughout -its course, and of both banks from its mouth nearly to Baton Rouge, -a distance of over two hundred miles. The treaty, signed April 30, -1803, gave to the United States "the whole of Louisiana as Spain had -possessed it," for the sum of eighty million francs. Thus the fear of -Great Britain's sea power was the determining factor[93] to sweep the -vast region known as Louisiana, stretching from the Gulf toward Canada, -and from the Mississippi toward Mexico, with ill-defined boundaries in -either direction, into the hands of the United States, and started the -latter on that course of expansion to the westward which has brought -her to the shores of the Pacific. - -Having thus relinquished a position he could not defend, and, as far as -in him lay, secured the French possessions beyond the sea, Bonaparte -could now give his whole attention to the plans for subjugating the -British Islands which had long been ripening in his fertile brain. - -It was from the first evident that Great Britain, having in the -three kingdoms but fifteen million inhabitants, could not invade the -territory of France with its population of over twenty-five millions. -This was the more true because the demands of her navy, of her great -mercantile shipping, and of a manufacturing and industrial system not -only vast but complex, so that interference with parts would seriously -derange the whole, left for recruiting the British armies a fraction, -insignificant when compared with the resources in men of France; where -capital and manufactures, commerce and shipping, had disappeared, -leaving only an agricultural peasantry, upon which the conscription -could freely draw without materially increasing the poverty of the -country, or deranging a social system essentially simple. - -This seeming inability to injure France gave rise to the sarcastic -remark, that it was hardly worth while for a country to go to war -in order to show that it could put itself in a good posture for -defence. This, however, was a very superficial view of the matter. -Great Britain's avowed reason for war was the necessity—forced upon a -reluctant ministry and conceded by a bitter opposition—of resisting -encroachments by a neighboring state. Of these, on the Continent, part -had already occurred and were, for the time at least, irremediable; but -there had also been clearly revealed the purpose of continuing similar -encroachments, in regions whose tenure by an enemy would seriously -compromise her colonial empire. To prevent this, Great Britain, by -declaring war, regained her belligerent rights, and so resumed at -once that control of the sea which needed only them to complete. She -pushed her sway up to every point of her enemy's long coast-line; and -following the strategy of the previous war, under the administration -of the veteran seaman who had imparted to it such vigor, she prevented -her enemy from combining any great operation, by which her world-wide -dominion could be shaken or vital injury be inflicted at any point. -The British squadrons, hugging the French coasts and blocking the -French arsenals, were the first line of the defence, covering British -interests from the Baltic to Egypt, the British colonies in the four -quarters of the globe, and the British merchantmen which whitened every -sea. - -This was the defensive gain in a war whose motive was essentially -defensive. Offensively Great Britain, by the suddenness with which she -forced the issue, dealt a blow whose weight none understood better -than Bonaparte. That he meant war eventually is most probable. His -instructions to Decaen, Captain-General of the French East Indies, -dated January 15, 1803, speak of the possibility of war by September, -1804; but how little the bravado of Sébastiani's report indicated a -wish for an immediate rupture, is shown by the secret message sent to -Andréossy in London, on the very day Whitworth left Paris. Despite -the bluster about his willingness to see Great Britain on Montmartre -rather than in Malta, he then wrote: "Direct General Andréossy that -when he is assured the accompanying note has been communicated to -the English government, he cause it to be understood through Citizen -Schimmelpenninck _or by any other indirect means_, that if England -absolutely rejects the proposition of giving Malta to one of the -guaranteeing powers, we would not here be averse from accepting that -England should retain Malta for ten years, and France should occupy -the peninsula of Otranto. _It is important, if this proposition has no -chance of success, that no communication be made leaving any trace_; -and that we here may always be able to _deny that this government could -have adhered to this proposition_."[94] Bonaparte understood perfectly -that Great Britain, by forcing his hand, had struck down the French -navy before it had begun to rise. "Peace," he said, "is necessary to -restore a navy,—peace to fill our arsenals empty of material, and -peace because then only the one drill-ground for fleets, the sea, -is open." "Ships, colonies, commerce," the wants he avowed later at -Ulm, were swept away by the same blow. How distressed the finances -of France, how devoid of credit, none knew better than he, who then, -as throughout his rule, was engaged in keeping up the quotations by -government manipulation; and the chief of all sources of wealth, -maritime commerce, was crushed by the sea power of Great Britain, which -thenceforth coiled closely and with ever tightening compression round -the coasts of France. - -Bonaparte could not indeed realize the full extent of the injury that -would be done. Impatient of obstacles, he refused to see that the -construction of the flotilla to invade England would devour the scanty -material for ship-building, occupy all the workmen, and so stop the -growth of the real navy. Even when built, the ever-recurring demand -for repairs drained the dockyards of mechanics.[95] Nor could he -foresee how completely Great Britain, by reviving the Rule of 1756 in -all its rigor, and by replying to each blow from the land by one yet -heavier from the sea, would cut off the resources of France and destroy -her as a fortress falls by blockade. Unsparing ridicule has been heaped -upon Pitt for predicting the break-down of the French Revolution, in -its aggressive military character, by financial distress; but in fact -Pitt, though he underestimated the time necessary and did not look -for the vast system of spoliation which supplied the lack of regular -income, was a true prophet. The republic had already devoured an -immense capital;[96] and when the conquering spirit it ever displayed -reached its natural culmination in Bonaparte, the constantly recurring -need of money drove him on from violence to violence till it ended in -his ruin. This penury was caused directly by the maritime war, which -shut France off from commerce beyond the seas; and indirectly by the -general prostration of business in Europe and consequent poverty of -consumers, due to their isolation from the sea, enforced by Bonaparte -as the only means of wearing out Great Britain. - -In 1798, when the Peace of Campo Formio had left France face to face -with Great Britain alone, the question of invading the latter had -naturally arisen; but Bonaparte easily convinced himself and the -Directory that the attempt was impossible with any naval force that -could at that time be raised. He then pointed out that there were two -other principal ways of injuring the enemy: one by occupying Hanover -and Hamburg, through which British trade entered the Continent; the -other by seizing Egypt as a base of operations against India. These two -were somewhat of the nature of a flank attack; and the former being -in the then state of the Continent inexpedient,—for both Hamburg -and Hanover were included in the North German neutrality under the -guarantee of Prussia, while Austria was by no means so reduced as in -1803,—the expedition against Egypt was determined. Whatever personal -motives may then have influenced Bonaparte, that undertaking, from the -military point of view and in the then condition of the Mediterranean, -was well conceived; and, while allowing for a large amount of good -luck, the measure of success achieved must be ascribed to the -completeness and secrecy of his preparations, as the final failure must -to the sea power of Great Britain. - -In 1803 Bonaparte found himself no longer a simple general, under -a weak and jealous government upon whose co-operation he could not -certainly depend, but an absolute ruler wielding all the resources of -France. He resolved therefore to strike straight at the vital centre -of the British power, by a direct invasion of the British Islands. The -very greatness of the peril in crossing the Channel, and in leaving -it between him and his base, was not without a certain charm for his -adventurous temper; but, while willing to take many a risk for so great -an end, he left to chance nothing for which he himself could provide. -The plan for the invasion was marked by the comprehensiveness of view -and the minute attention to detail which distinguished his campaigns; -and the preparations were on a scale of entire adequacy, which he never -failed to observe when the power to do so was in his hands. - -For these in their grandeur, however, time was needed; but the first -consul was ready to move at once, as far as was possible to land -forces, upon the two flanks of the British position. On the 26th of May -a corps under General Mortier entered Hanover; while a few days later -another corps, under General St. Cyr, passed through the Papal States -into the kingdom of Naples, and resumed possession of the peninsula -of Otranto with the ports of Brindisi and Taranto. From the latter -the Ionian islands, the Morea, and Egypt, were all threatened; and the -position kept alive, as in the deep strategy of Napoleon it was meant -to do, the anxiety of Nelson concerning those points and the Levant -generally. Upon this distraction of the greatest British admiral, -justified as it was by the enemy's undoubted purposes in the eastern -Mediterranean, depended a decisive part of Bonaparte's combination -against Great Britain. - -In Hanover British trade was struck. This German electorate of George -III. bordered on both the Elbe and the Weser, in the lower part of -their course; by occupying it France controlled the two great rivers -and excluded from them all British goods. The act was censured as -infringing the neutrality of Germany. Bonaparte justified it by the -hostile character of the elector as king of Great Britain; but no -such plea could be advanced for the occupation of Cuxhaven, the port -of Hamburg, which lay on the Elbe outside Hanover. Triple offence was -given to Prussia. Her ambition to figure as the guardian of North -German neutrality was affronted, her particular wish to control Hanover -slighted, and her trade most injuriously affected. To the exclusion of -British goods Great Britain replied by blockading the mouths of the -rivers, suffering no ships to pass where her own were not allowed, and -holding Germany responsible for permitting a breach of its neutrality -injurious to herself. The commerce of Hamburg and Bremen was thus -stopped; and as they were the brokers who received and distributed the -manufactures of Prussia, the blow was felt throughout the kingdom. The -distress among the workmen was so wide-spread that the king had to -come to their relief, and many wealthy men lost half their incomes. In -addition to the advantages of position obtained in Hanover and Naples, -Napoleon threw on these two neutral states the charge of supporting -the corps quartered on them, amounting to some thirty thousand men in -Hanover and half that number in Naples. Holland, against which as the -ally of France[97] Great Britain also declared war, had to maintain -a somewhat larger force. By such expedients Bonaparte eased his own -finances at the expense of neutral or dependent countries; but he was -not therefore more beloved. - -To invade Great Britain there had first to be concentrated round a -chosen point the great armies required to insure success, and the -very large number of vessels needed to transport them. Other corps, -more or less numerous, destined to further the principal movement by -diversions in different directions, distracting the enemy's attention, -might embark at distant ports and sail independently of the main -body; but for the latter it was necessary to start together and land -simultaneously, in mass, at a given point of the English coast. To this -principal effort Bonaparte destined one hundred and thirty thousand -men; of whom one hundred thousand should form the first line and -embark at the same hour from four different ports, which lay within a -length of twenty miles on the Channel coast. The other thirty thousand -constituted the reserve, and were to sail shortly after the first. - -To carry any such force at once, in ordinary sea-going vessels of that -day, was impracticable. The requisite number could not be had, and -there was no French Channel port where they could safely lie. Even were -these difficulties overcome, and the troops embarked together, the mere -process of getting under way would entail endless delays, the vessels -dependent upon sail could not keep together, and the only conditions -of wind under which they could move at all would expose them to be -scattered and destroyed by the British navy, which would have the same -power of motion, and to which Bonaparte could oppose no equal force. -The very gathering of so many helpless sailing transports would betray -the place where the French navy must concentrate, and where therefore -the hostile ships would assemble at the first indication of a combined -movement. Finally, such transports must anchor at some distance from -the British coast and the troops land from them in boats, an additional -operation both troublesome and dangerous. - -For these reasons the crossing must be made in vessels not dependent -upon sail alone, but capable of being moved by oars. They must -therefore be small and of very light draught, which would allow them -to shelter in the shallow French harbors and be beached upon reaching -the English coast, so that the troops could land directly from them. It -was possible that a number of such vessels once started, and favored -by fog or calm, might pass unseen, or even in defiance of the enemy's -ships-of-war, lying helpless to attack through want of wind. It was -upon this possibility that Bonaparte sought to fix the attention of the -British government. As the occupation of Taranto and the movements in -Italy were designed to divert Nelson's attention to the Levant, so the -ostentatious preparation of the great flotilla to pass unsupported was -meant to conceal the real purpose of supporting it. To concentrate the -apprehensions of the British authorities upon the flotilla, to draw -their eyes away from the naval ports in which lay the French squadrons, -and then to unite the latter in the Channel, controlling it for a -measurable time by a great fleet, was the grand combination by which -Bonaparte hoped to insure the triumphant crossing of the army and the -conquest of England. He kept it, however, in his own breast; a profound -secret only gradually revealed to the very few men intrusted with its -execution. - -To create and organize the flotilla and the army of invasion was -the first task. Preparations so extensive and rapid demanded all the -resources of France. To build at the same time the thousand and more -of boats, each of which should carry from sixty to a hundred soldiers, -besides from two to four heavy cannon for its own defence, overpassed -the powers of any single port. Far in the interior of France, on the -banks of the numerous streams running toward the Channel and the Bay of -Biscay, as well as in all the little coast harbors themselves, hosts of -men were busily working. The North Sea and Holland were also required -to furnish their quota. At the same time measures were taken to -facilitate their passage in safety to the point of concentration, which -was fixed at Boulogne, and to harbor them commodiously upon arrival. -They could from their light draught run close along shore, and from -their construction be beached without harm. Within easy gunshot of the -coast, therefore, lay the road they followed in their passages, which -were commonly made in bodies of thirty to sixty, and from port to port, -till the journey's end. To support the movements, sea-coast batteries -were established at short intervals; under which, if hard pressed, they -could take refuge. In addition there were organized in each maritime -district batteries of field artillery, which stood ready to drive at -once to the scene of action in case the enemy attacked. "One field-gun -to every league of coast is the least allowance," wrote Bonaparte. -In the early months of the war great importance was attached by the -British to harassing these voyages and impeding the concentration, but -the attempt was soon abandoned. The boats, if endangered, anchored -under the nearest guns, infantry and horse-artillery summoned by the -coast-telegraph hurried to the scene, and the enemy's vessels soon -found the combined resistance too strong. Ordinarily, indeed, the -coastwise movement of a division of the flotilla was a concerted -operation, in which all the arms, afloat and ashore, assisted. In -extreme cases the vessels were beached, and British seamen fought hand -to hand with French soldiers for possession; rarely, however, with -success. "The cause of our flotilla not having succeeded in destroying -the gun-vessels of the enemy," wrote Lord St. Vincent, "did not arise -from their draught of water, but from the powerful batteries on the -coast." The concentration, though accomplished less swiftly than -Bonaparte's eagerness demanded, was little impeded by the British. - -The port of Boulogne, near the eastern end of the English Channel, lies -on a strip of coast which runs due south from the Straits of Dover to -the mouth of the Somme, a distance of about fifty miles. It is a tidal -harbor, the mouth of a little river called the Liane, on the north side -of which the town is built. In it even boats of small draught then -lay aground at low water; and its capacity at high water was limited. -Extensive excavations were therefore ordered to be made by the soldiers -encamped in the neighborhood, who received extra wages for the work. -When finished, the port presented a double basin; the outer, oblong, -bordering the river bed on either side of the channel, which was left -clear; the inner of semi-circular form, dug out of the flats opposite -the town and connected with the former by a narrow passage. Both were -lined with quays, alongside which the vessels of the flotilla lay -in tiers, sometimes nine deep; and in July, 1805, when the hour for -the last and greatest of Napoleon's naval combinations was at hand, -and Trafalgar itself in the near distance, Boulogne sheltered over a -thousand gunboats and transports ready to carry forty thousand men to -the shores of England. North and south, not only the neighborhood of -the harbor but the whole coast bristled with cannon; and opposite the -entrance rose a powerful work, built upon piles, to protect the vessels -when going out and also when anchored outside. For here was one of the -great difficulties of the undertaking. So many boats could not pass -out through the narrow channel during one high water. Two tides at -the least, that is, twenty-four hours, were needed, granting the most -perfect organization and most accurate movement. Half of the flotilla -therefore must lie outside for some hours; and it was not to be -expected that the British cruisers would allow so critical a moment to -pass unimproved, unless deterred by the protection which the foresight -of Bonaparte had provided. - -North of Boulogne and within five miles of it were two other much -smaller harbors, likewise tidal, called Vimereux and Ambleteuse; and -to the south, twelve miles distant, a third, named Étaples. Though -insignificant, the impossibility of enlarging Boulogne to hold the -whole flotilla compelled Bonaparte to develop these, and they together -held some seven hundred more gun-vessels and transports. From the -three, sixty-two thousand soldiers were to embark; and from each of -the four ports a due proportion of field artillery, ammunition and -other supplies were to go forward. Some six thousand horses were also -to be transported; but the greater part of the cavalry took only their -saddles and bridles, looking to find mounts in the enemy's country. In -the North Sea ports, Calais, Dunkirk, and Ostend, the flotilla numbered -four hundred, the troops twenty-seven thousand, the horses twenty-five -hundred. These formed the reserve, to follow the main body closely, but -apart from it. In the end they also were moved to the Boulogne coast; -and their boats, after some sharp fighting with British cruisers, -joined the main flotilla in the four Channel ports. - -To handle such a mass of men upon the battle-field is a faculty to -which few generals, after years of experience, attain. To effect the -passage of a broad river with an army of that size, before a watchful -enemy of equal force, is a delicate operation. To cross an arm of -the sea nearly forty miles wide—for such was the distance separating -Boulogne and its sister ports from the intended place of landing, -between Dover and Hastings—in the face of a foe whose control of the -sea was for the most part undisputed, was an undertaking so bold that -men still doubt whether Napoleon meant it; but he assuredly did. For -success he looked to the perfect organization and drill of the army -and the flotilla, which by practice in embarking and moving should -be able to seize, without an hour's delay, the favorable moment he -hoped to provide by the great naval combination concealed in his -brain. This combination, modified and expanded as the months rolled -by, but remaining essentially the same, was the germ whence sprang -the intricate and stirring events recorded in this and the following -chapters,—events obscured to most men by the dazzling lustre of -Trafalgar. - - [Between the penning and the publishing of this very positive - assertion of the author's convictions, he has met renewed - expressions of doubts as to Napoleon's purpose, based upon his - words to Metternich in 1810,[98] as well as upon the opinions - of persons more or less closely connected with the emperor. As - regards the incident recorded by Metternich—it is not merely - an easy way of overcoming a difficulty, but the statement of - a simple fact, to say that no reliance can be placed upon any - avowal of Napoleon's as to his intentions, unless corroborated - by circumstances. That the position at Boulogne was well chosen - for turning his arms against Austria at a moment's notice, is - very true; but it is likewise true that, barring the power of the - British navy, it was equally favorable to an invasion of England. - What then does this amount to, but that the great captain, as - always in his career, met a strategic exigency arising from the - existence of two dangers in divergent directions, by taking a - central position, whence he could readily turn his arms against - either before the other came up? - - The considerations that to the author possess irresistible force - are: (1) that Napoleon actually did undertake the almost equally - hazardous expedition to Egypt; (2) that he saw, with his clear - intuition, that, if he did not accept the risk of being destroyed - with his army in crossing the Channel, Great Britain would in the - end overwhelm him by her sea power, and that therefore, extreme - as was the danger of destruction in one case, it was less than in - the other alternative,—an argument further developed in the later - portions of this work. (3) Inscrutable as are the real purposes - of so subtle a spirit, the author holds with Thiers and Lanfrey, - that it is impossible to rise from the perusal of Napoleon's - correspondence during these thirty months, without the conviction - that so sustained a deception as it would contain—on the - supposition that the invasion was not intended—would be impossible - even to him. It may also be remarked that the Memoirs of Marmont - and Ney, who commanded corps in the Army of Invasion, betray no - doubt of a purpose which the first explicitly asserts; nor does - the life of Marshal Davout, another corps commander, record any - such impression on his part.[99]] - -[Illustration: North Atlantic Ocean.] - -Meanwhile that period of waiting from May, 1803, to August, 1805, when -the tangled net of naval and military movements began to unravel, was -a striking and wonderful pause in the world's history. On the heights -above Boulogne, and along the narrow strip of beach from Étaples to -Vimereux, were encamped one hundred and thirty thousand of the most -brilliant soldiery of all time, the soldiers who had fought in Germany, -Italy, and Egypt, soldiers who were yet to win, from Austria, Ulm and -Austerlitz, and from Prussia, Auerstadt and Jena, to hold their own, -though barely, at Eylau against the army of Russia, and to overthrow -it also, a few months later, on the bloody field of Friedland. -Growing daily more vigorous in the bracing sea air and the hardy life -laid out for them, they could on fine days, as they practised the -varied manœuvres which were to perfect the vast host in embarking and -disembarking with order and rapidity, see the white cliffs fringing the -only country that to the last defied their arms. Far away, Cornwallis -off Brest, Collingwood off Rochefort, Pellew off Ferrol, were battling -the wild gales of the Bay of Biscay, in that tremendous and sustained -vigilance which reached its utmost tension in the years preceding -Trafalgar, concerning which Collingwood wrote that admirals need to -be made of iron, but which was forced upon them by the unquestionable -and imminent danger of the country. Farther distant still, severed -apparently from all connection with the busy scene at Boulogne, Nelson -before Toulon was wearing away the last two years of his glorious -but suffering life, fighting the fierce north-westers of the Gulf of -Lyon and questioning, questioning continually with feverish anxiety, -whether Napoleon's object was Egypt again or Great Britain really. -They were dull, weary, eventless months, those months of watching and -waiting of the big ships before the French arsenals. Purposeless they -surely seemed to many, but they saved England. The world has never -seen a more impressive demonstration of the influence of sea power -upon its history. Those far distant, storm-beaten ships, upon which -the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the -world. Holding the interior positions they did, before—and therefore -between—the chief dockyards and detachments of the French navy, the -latter could unite only by a concurrence of successful evasions, of -which the failure of any one nullified the result. Linked together as -the various British fleets were by chains of smaller vessels, chance -alone could secure Bonaparte's great combination, which depended -upon the covert concentration of several detachments upon a point -practically within the enemy's lines. Thus, while bodily present before -Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon, strategically the British squadrons lay -in the Straits of Dover barring the way against the Army of Invasion. - -The Straits themselves, of course, were not without their own special -protection. Both they and their approaches, in the broadest sense of -the term, from the Texel to the Channel Islands, were patrolled by -numerous frigates and smaller vessels, from one hundred to a hundred -and fifty in all. These not only watched diligently all that happened -in the hostile harbors and sought to impede the movements of the -flat-boats, but also kept touch with and maintained communication -between the detachments of ships-of-the-line. Of the latter, five -off the Texel watched the Dutch navy, while others were anchored off -points of the English coast with reference to probable movements of the -enemy. Lord St. Vincent, whose ideas on naval strategy were clear and -sound, though he did not use the technical terms of the art, discerned -and provided against the very purpose entertained by Bonaparte, of a -concentration before Boulogne by ships drawn from the Atlantic and -Mediterranean. The best security, the most advantageous strategic -positions, were doubtless those before the enemy's ports; and never in -the history of blockades has there been excelled, if ever equalled, -the close locking of Brest by Admiral Cornwallis, both winter and -summer, between the outbreak of war and the battle of Trafalgar. It -excited not only the admiration but the wonder of contemporaries.[100] -In case, however, the French at Brest got out, so the prime minister -of the day informed the speaker of the House, Cornwallis's rendezvous -was off the Lizard (due north of Brest), so as to go for _Ireland, or -follow the French up Channel_, if they took either direction. _Should -the French run for the Downs_, the five sail-of-the-line at Spithead -would also follow them; and Lord Keith (in the Downs) would in addition -to his six, and six block ships, have also the North Sea fleet at his -command.[101] Thus provision was made, in case of danger, for the -outlying detachments to fall back on the strategic centre, gradually -accumulating strength, till they formed a body of from twenty-five to -thirty heavy and disciplined ships-of-the-line, sufficient to meet all -probable contingencies. - -Hence, neither the Admiralty nor British naval officers in general -shared the fears of the country concerning the peril from the flotilla. -"Our first defence," wrote Nelson in 1801, "is close to the enemy's -ports; and the Admiralty have taken such precautions, by having such -a respectable force under my orders, that I venture to express a -well-grounded hope that the enemy would be annihilated before they get -ten miles from their own shores."[102] "As to the possibility of the -enemy being able in a narrow sea to pass through our blockading and -protecting squadron," said Pellew, "with all the secrecy and dexterity -and by those hidden means that some worthy people expect, I really, -from anything I have seen in the course of my professional experience, -am not much disposed to concur in it."[103] Napoleon also understood -that his gunboats could not at sea contend against heavy ships with -any founded hope of success. "A discussion was started in the camp," -says Marmont, "as to the possibility of fighting ships of war with -flat boats, armed with 24- and 36-pounders, and as to whether, with -a flotilla of several thousands, a squadron might be attacked. It -was sought to establish the belief in a possible success; ... but, -notwithstanding the confidence with which Bonaparte supported this -view, he never shared it for a moment."[104] He could not, without -belying every military conviction he ever held. Lord St. Vincent -therefore steadily refused to countenance the creation of a large force -of similar vessels on the plea of meeting them upon their own terms. -"Our great reliance," he wrote, "is on the vigilance and activity of -our cruisers at sea, any reduction in the number of which, by applying -them to guard our ports, inlets, and beaches, would in my judgment -tend to our destruction." He knew also that gunboats, if built, could -only be manned, as the French flotilla was, by crippling the crews of -the cruising ships; for, extensive as were Great Britain's maritime -resources, they were taxed beyond their power by the exhausting demands -of her navy and merchant shipping. - -It is true there existed an enrolled organization called the Sea -Fencibles, composed of men whose pursuits were about the water on -the coasts and rivers of the United Kingdom; men who in the last war -had been exempted from impressment, because of the obligation they -took to turn out for the protection of the country when threatened -with invasion. When, however, invasion did threaten in 1801, not -even the stirring appeals of Nelson, to whom was then entrusted the -defence system, could bring them forward; although he assured them -their services were absolutely required, at the moment, and on board -the coast-defence vessels. Out of a total of 2600 in four districts -immediately menaced, only 385 were willing to enter into training or -go afloat. The others could not leave their occupations without loss, -and prayed that they might be held excused.[105] When the French were -actually on the sea, coming, they professed their readiness to fly on -board; so, wrote Nelson, we must "trust to our ships being manned at -the last moment by this (almost) scrambling manner." In the present -war, therefore, St. Vincent resisted the re-establishment of the corps -until the impress had manned the ships first commissioned, and even -then yielded only to the pressure in the cabinet. "It was an item in -the estimates," he said with rough humor, "of no other use than to -calm the fears of the old ladies, both in and out." It was upon his -former system of close watching the enemy's ports that he relied for -the mastery of the Channel, without which Bonaparte's flotilla dared -not leave the French coast. "This boat business," as Nelson had said, -"may be a part of a great plan of invasion; it can never be the only -one."[106] The event did not deceive them. - -In one very important particular, however, St. Vincent had seriously -imperilled the success of his general policy. Feeling deeply the -corruption prevailing in the dockyard and contract systems of that -day, as soon as he came to the head of the Admiralty he entered upon a -struggle with them, in which he showed both the singleness of purpose -and the harshness of his character. Peace, by reducing the dependence -of the country upon its naval establishments, favored his designs of -reform; and he was consequently unwilling to recognize the signs of -renewing strife, or to postpone changes which, however desirable, -must inevitably introduce friction and delay under the press of war. -Hence, in the second year of this war, Great Britain had in commission -ten fewer line-of-battle-ships than at the same period of the former. -"Many old and useful officers and a vast number of artificers had been -discharged from the king's dockyards; the customary supplies of timber -and other important articles of naval stores had been omitted to be -kept up; and some articles, including a large portion of hemp, had -actually been sold out of the service. A deficiency of workmen and of -materials produced, of course, a suspension in the routine of dockyard -business. New ships could not be built; nor could old ones be repaired. -Many of the ships in commission, too, having been merely patched up, -were scarcely in a state to keep the sea."[107] On this point St. -Vincent was vulnerable to the attack made upon his administration by -Pitt in March, 1804; but as regarded Pitt's main criticism, the refusal -to expend money and seamen upon gunboats, he was entirely right, and -his view of the question was that of a statesman and of a man of -correct military instincts.[108] Nor, after his experience with the -Sea Fencibles, can he be blamed for not sharing Pitt's emotion over "a -number of gallant and good old men, coming forward with the zeal and -spirit of lads swearing allegiance to the king," &c.[109] - -These ill-timed changes affected most injuriously that very station—the -Mediterranean—upon which hinged Bonaparte's projected combination. Out -of the insufficient numbers, the heaviest squadrons and most seaworthy -ships were naturally and properly massed upon the Channel and Biscay -coasts. "I know," said Sir Edward Pellew, speaking of his personal -experience in command of a squadron of six of the line off Ferrol, "I -know and can assert with confidence that our navy was never better -found, that it was never better supplied and that our men were never -better fed or better clothed;"[110] and the condition of the ships -was proved not only by the tenacity with which Pellew and his chief, -Cornwallis, kept their stations, but by the fact that in the furious -winter gales little damage was received. But at the same time Nelson -was complaining bitterly that his ships were not seaworthy, that they -were shamefully equipped, and destitute of the most necessary stores; -while St. Vincent was writing to him, "We can send you neither ships -nor men, and with the resources of your mind, you will do without them -very well."[111] "Bravo, my lord!" said Nelson, ironically; "but," he -wrote a month later, "I do not believe Lord St. Vincent would have kept -the sea with such ships;"[112] and again, naming seven out of the ten -under his command, "These are certainly among the very finest ships in -our service, the best commanded and the very best manned, yet I wish -them safe in England and that I had ships not half so well manned in -their room; for it is not a store-ship a week that would keep them in -repair."[113] - -Such weakness interfered seriously with the close watch of Toulon, in -face of the furious weather for which the Gulf of Lyon is noted; yet, -from the strategic conditions of the Mediterranean, in no station was -it more important to get the earliest news of an enemy's sailing and -to keep constant touch with him. With the Straits of Gibraltar at one -end, involving in case of escape several different possibilities, and -with Egypt fifteen hundred miles away at the other, the most sagacious -admiral might be misled as to the destination of a French squadron, -if once lost to sight. Upon this difficulty Bonaparte framed his -combination. In his first purpose the Toulon fleet was to be raised -to ten sail-of-the-line, and at the fitting moment was to sail with -a north-west wind, steering a course which, if seen by any British -lookout, would indicate an intention of going eastward. To strengthen -this presumption, General St. Cyr at Taranto was ordered to raise -batteries to shelter a fleet of ten sail, and to prepare half a million -rations; while the Minister of War was instructed that an extraordinary -operation in that direction was contemplated about the 20th of -November.[114] Simultaneously, twenty ships-of-the-line carrying twenty -thousand troops were to be ready in Brest for a descent upon Ireland, -and to be maintained in a state of readiness for instant sailing. -This would conduce to keep Cornwallis close to Brest and away from the -approaches to the Channel. The Toulon fleet, after losing sight of the -British, was to haul up for the Straits, be joined off Cadiz or Lisbon -by a squadron from Rochefort, raising its force to fifteen or sixteen -sail-of-the-line, and thence, passing midway between Ushant and the -Scilly islands, come about the middle of February off Boulogne; were -the first consul expected then to be ready for crossing with his one -hundred and thirty thousand men. - -For the Toulon fleet, as the pivot on which all turned, Bonaparte -selected his boldest admiral, Latouche Tréville, and fixed the middle -of January, 1804, as the time of sailing. All the French authorities -were scrupulously deceived, except the admiral himself, the Minister -of Marine, and the maritime prefect at Toulon, Ganteaume, who had -divined the secret.[115] The orders to the latter, ostentatiously -confidential to deceive the office clerks, announced Martinique as -the real destination, but enjoined him to tell the general commanding -the troops that the squadron was going to the Morea, touching at -Taranto. At the same time staff-officers were sent to notify St. Cyr -that re-enforcements, which would raise his force to thirty thousand -men, were coming not only from Toulon but from other ports; and troops -throughout northern Italy began to move toward the sea-board. - -It is not wonderful that Nelson was misled by such an elaborate scheme -of deception. To this day men doubt whether Bonaparte seriously -meant to invade England, and naval men then realized too keenly the -dangers of the undertaking not to suspect a feint in it. Under all -the conditions of the problem, Egypt and the Straits were equally -probable solutions, and Egypt was not the only possible objective -east of Toulon. Sicily and Sardinia, the Ionian Islands and the -Morea, were coveted by Bonaparte; both as forwarding his control of -the Mediterranean and as measurable advances towards Egypt and the -Levant, traditional objects of French ambition. Nelson also suspected -a secret understanding between France and Russia to divide the Turkish -Empire;[116] a suspicion justified in the past by Bonaparte's actions -and to be vindicated in the future by the agreements of Tilsit. -The perplexities of the British admiral were therefore simply the -inevitable uncertainties of the defence, the part assumed perforce by -the British Empire at large in this war. He had to provide against -widely divergent contingencies; and the question is not how far he -guessed[117] the inscrutable purposes of Bonaparte, but how well he -took measures for meeting either fortune. - -Let it, however, be remarked in passing, that the great merit of St. -Vincent's strategy was that it minimized the evil resulting from a -single admiral's mis-step. To the success of the French scheme it was -necessary that, not only one but, all their detached efforts should -succeed. The strength of the British strategy lay not in hermetically -sealing any one port, but in effectually preventing a great combination -from all the ports. It was essential to Bonaparte not merely that his -scattered squadrons should, one at one time and another at another, -escape to sea, but that they should do so at periods so ordered, and -by routes so determined, as to insure a rapid concentration at a -particular point. Against this the British provided by the old and -sound usage of interior positions and lines. This advantage Bonaparte -recognized, and sought to overthrow by inducing them to diverging -operations—toward the Levant on one flank, toward Ireland on the other. -Both diverted from Boulogne. - -To return to Nelson. During the first six months of his command he -believed that the Toulon fleet was bound out of the Mediterranean;[118] -and indeed, despite Bonaparte's wiles and the opinions of most of his -own friends, he continually reverted to that conviction up to the final -escape of Villeneuve. He could not, however, on the ground of his own -intuitions resist the facts reported to him. On December 12, 1803, he -writes: "Who shall say where they are bound? My opinion is, certainly, -out of the Mediterranean."[119] Again, January 16, 1804: "It is -difficult to say what may be the destination of the Toulon fleet, Egypt -or Ireland. I rather lean to the latter."[120] A week later, January -23, the effect of Bonaparte's feints begins to show: "Information just -received leads me to believe the French fleet is about to put to sea -bound to the eastward toward Naples and Sicily."[121] February 10: -"The French have thirty thousand men ready to embark from Marseilles -and Nice, and I am led to believe the Ferrol ships will push for the -Mediterranean. Egypt is Bonaparte's object."[122] - -Against either contingency his course is perfectly clear,—never -to lose touch of the Toulon fleet. "My eyes are constantly fixed -on Toulon,"[123] he says. "I will not lose sight of the Toulon -fleet."[124] "It is of the utmost importance," he writes to his lookout -frigates, "that the enemy's squadron in Toulon should be most strictly -watched, and that I should be made acquainted with their sailing and -route with all dispatch."[125] But here the inadequacy of St. Vincent's -navy told heavily; and to that, not to Nelson, must be attributed the -mis-steps of the later campaign. "My crazy fleet," he writes. "If I -am to watch the French I must be at sea, and if at sea must have bad -weather; and if the ships are not fit to stand bad weather they are -useless."[126] "I know no way of watching the enemy but to be at sea," -he tells St. Vincent himself, "and therefore good ships are necessary." -Under such conditions, with "terrible weather," in winter, not four -fine days in six weeks, and even in summer having a hard gale every -week,[127] it was impossible to keep his rickety ships close up against -Toulon, as Cornwallis kept against Brest. "I make it a rule not to -contend with the north-westers," he said. "Going off large or furling -all sail we escape damage by the constant care of the captains;" and he -not unjustly claimed equal credit with Cornwallis, in that with such -a fleet, to which nothing was sent, he kept the sea ten consecutive -months, "not a ship refitted in any way, except what was done at -sea."[128] - -Though desirable for the battle-ships themselves to be near Toulon, it -would have been possible, in so narrow a sea, to dispense with that by -taking a central position, and keeping touch with the enemy by numerous -frigates; but here also the deficiencies of the navy interfered. -Among the Maddalena Islands, at the north end of Sardinia, was found -an admirable central anchorage, well sheltered, and having eastern -and western exits by which it could be left at a moment's notice in -all winds. Here the fleet could safely lie, ready for instant action, -within striking distance of any route taken by the enemy, and sure to -be found by lookout ships bringing tidings. Thither, therefore, as the -direction most favorable for intercepting the French,[129] Nelson went -in January, 1804, when informed they were about to sail; but he wrote: -"I am kept in great distress for frigates and smaller vessels at this -critical moment. I want ten more than I have, in order to watch that -the French should not escape me."[130] This but summed up the constant -worry of those anxious two years,[131] as it does also the results of -recent experience in the annual manœuvres of European navies. Under -such circumstances all depends upon the position taken by the main body -and the number of scouts it can throw out. Properly, these should move -in couples; one of which can carry information, while its consort keeps -touch of the enemy till it meets another of the lookouts scattered on -their different radii of action. - -The situation of Nelson in the Mediterranean, the character of his -anxieties, and the condition of his ships have been given in some -detail, because upon the opposing Mediterranean fleets turns the chief -strategic interest of the intended invasion of England and of the -campaign which issued in Trafalgar. Lord St. Vincent left office with -the Addington Ministry in May, 1804, and under the energetic rule of -his successor, who threw his administrative system to the winds, the -condition of Nelson's fleet was somewhat bettered; but the change came -too late to remedy it altogether. - -Various events meanwhile concurred to postpone the execution of -Bonaparte's project and so to prolong the watch of the British admiral. -The Boulogne flotilla itself was not as forward as had been expected; -but the drain made by it upon the French arsenals, for workmen and -materials, was a greater cause of delay, by retarding the equipment -of the ships meant to cover the crossing. In December only seven of -the line were ready in Toulon.[132] In the spring of 1804, the first -consul's attention was absorbed by the royalist plot, which led to the -arrest of Pichegru and Moreau, to the seizure of the Duc d'Enghien -on German soil and to his execution at Vincennes in March. This last -event had diplomatic consequences, in the attitude taken by Russia and -Prussia, which still farther engrossed him; and the invasion of Great -Britain was thus by successive delays put off to the summer of 1804. -On May 25, Napoleon, who had assumed the imperial title on the 18th -of that month, writes to Latouche[133] that on the ocean side all was -prepared, that the project was only postponed, not abandoned, and asks -if he will be ready by July. July 2 he writes again,[134] anticipating -his sailing from Toulon by the first of August, instructs him to pick -up at Cadiz one French ship-of-the-line which had taken refuge there, -thence to go to Rochefort, and finally to reach Boulogne, according to -the first plan, by passing through the Channel; or, if necessary, by -going north of the British islands. In all passages from port to port -he was to keep far out to sea to avoid detection. "Let us," he adds, -"be masters of the Strait for six hours and we shall be masters of the -world." On the 2d of August, however, Napoleon postpones the invasion -for some weeks, because some divisions of the flotilla had not yet -joined; and on the 20th of that month Latouche Tréville died. - -This loss was serious, as there was not among the surviving French -admirals any who had shown himself fit for so important a task, except -perhaps Bruix. He, being already definitely associated with the -flotilla, could not well be displaced; and his health, moreover, was -very bad, so that he also died the following March. Of two others who -might possibly prove equal to high command, Rosily and Villeneuve, -Napoleon, after some hesitation and with much mistrust, chose the -latter. "All naval expeditions undertaken since I have been at the head -of the government," said he, "have always failed, because the admirals -see double, and have learned—where, I do not know—_that war can be -made without running risks_."[135] From this simple and undeniable -standpoint no choice more unfortunate than Villeneuve could have been -made. Accomplished, brave, and skilful, he saw the defects of the -French navy with a clearness which absolutely sapped his power to take -risks. Although capable of the utmost self-devotion, he was unable to -devote his command as the forlorn hope upon which might follow a great -achievement. - -Doubting Villeneuve's resolution, Napoleon now changed the details of -his combination; giving to the Toulon fleet the inferior rôle of a -diversion, instead of the great part of covering the flotilla at the -chief centre of strategic action. The Brest fleet, during the life of -Latouche Tréville, had been destined to tie Cornwallis to the French -coast by the passive service of a mere demonstration. It was now given -the principal part. Its admiral, Ganteaume, had in 1801 been blamed for -not relieving Egypt; but Napoleon still felt for him the partiality -of close personal association, and knew him to be an able officer. In -the new plan, therefore, the Irish expedition passed definitively from -a demonstration to a resolve. To it were assigned eighteen thousand -troops under Marshal Augereau. Embarking them, Ganteaume should sail -with a fleet of twenty ships-of-the-line, pass far out into the -Atlantic to baffle pursuit, and then head for the north of Ireland -as though coming from Newfoundland. Having landed the soldiers, for -which only thirty-six hours were allowed, the fleet should sail for -the straits of Dover, either by the English Channel or by the north of -Scotland, according to the winds. Arriving near its destination two -courses were open, the choice between which would again depend on the -wind. Either the Grand Army at Boulogne would cross at once to England, -or a corps of twenty-five thousand assembled in Holland under General -Marmont, would sail under Ganteaume's convoy for Ireland. "With only -eighteen thousand men in Ireland," wrote Napoleon, "we would run great -risks; but whether they be increased to forty thousand, or I myself be -in England and eighteen thousand in Ireland, the gain of the war will -be ours."[136] - -The Toulon and Rochefort squadrons were to favor these operations -by a powerful diversion. They were to sail separately for the West -Indies, the former numbering twelve of the line and the latter five. -Upon reaching the Atlantic two of the Toulon ships were to be directed -against St. Helena, which they were to seize and then cruise in its -neighborhood for three months against British commerce. The rest of -the division, carrying four thousand troops, was to retake Dutch -Guiana and re-enforce San Domingo,[137] if possible. The Rochefort -division, lately commanded by Villeneuve, but now by Missiessy, was -to seize the islands Santa Lucia and Dominica, re-enforce Martinique -and Guadaloupe and then join Villeneuve. Thus combined, all would -return to Europe, appear before Ferrol, releasing five French ships -which were there blockaded, and finally anchor at Rochefort. "Thus -attacked simultaneously in Asia, Africa, and America," wrote Napoleon, -"the English, long accustomed not to suffer from the war, will by -these successive shocks to their commerce feel the evidence of their -weakness. I think that the sailing of these twenty ships-of-the-line -will oblige them to dispatch over thirty in pursuit."[138] Villeneuve -was to sail by October 12, and Missiessy before November 1. The Irish -expedition should await the departure of the others, but it was hoped -might get away before November 23. - -This second combination was more vast, more complicated and therefore -much more difficult than the first. It is interesting chiefly as -indicating the transition in the emperor's mind, from the comparatively -simple scheme laid down for Latouche Tréville to the grandiose -conception which ended in Trafalgar and claimed Villeneuve as its -victim. The course of events, mightier than the wills of sovereigns, -now intervened to change again Napoleon's purpose and restore to the -Toulon fleet the central part in the great drama. In December, 1804, -formal war broke out between Great Britain and Spain. - -Spain since 1796 had been in defensive and offensive alliance with -France. By the treaty of San Ildefonso, then signed, she had bound -herself to furnish, upon the simple demand of the French government, -fifteen ships-of-the-line to re-enforce the French navy, as well -as a specified body of troops. Holland also had entered into a -similar covenant "forever" against Great Britain. At the outbreak of -hostilities, therefore, Bonaparte found on either flank a maritime -state formally obliged to aid him, whatever its present wish. Holland, -a small flat country near at hand, was easily dominated by his army. -It was rich, had a valid government and energetic people; and its -position admirably seconded his schemes against Great Britain. It -therefore suited him to have the Batavian republic join in the war. -Spain, on the contrary, being extensive and rugged, was with difficulty -controlled by an armed force, as Napoleon afterwards learned to his -cost. It was remote from the centre of his power and from the intended -operations; while effective military support could not be had from its -government, feeble to disorganization, nor from its people, indolent -and jealous of foreigners. One thing only was left to Spain of her -former greatness,—the silver poured into her treasury from her colonies. - -Bonaparte therefore decided to allow the neutrality of Spain, and to -relinquish the stipulated aid in kind, upon condition of receiving an -equivalent in money. This he fixed at six million francs per month, -or about fourteen million dollars annually. Spain protested earnestly -against the amount, but the first consul was inexorable. He required -also that all levies of troops should cease, any land forces sent -into the provinces adjoining France, since September, 1801, should -be withdrawn, and the Spanish navy reorganized. Further, he demanded -that five French ships-of-the-line then in Ferrol, where they had -taken refuge from the British navy in July, 1803, when returning from -Haïti, should be by Spain repaired and got ready for sea. "Spain," said -Bonaparte, "has three alternatives: 1, she may declare war against -England; 2, she may pay the specified subsidy; 3, war will be declared -by France against Spain."[139] - -When war began, the British minister at Madrid was instructed to ask -if Spain intended to furnish France the ships promised by the treaty. -If the answer was yes, he was to express no opinion, but say that any -excess over the stipulations would be regarded as a declaration of war. -Later, when it became known that Spain had signed a convention[140] -stipulating the payment of subsidies to France, the ministry took -the ground that this was a just cause of war, whenever Great Britain -chose so to consider it; though for the time she might pass it over. -"You will explain distinctly," ran the ambassador's instructions, -dated November 24, 1803, "that his Majesty can only be induced to -abstain from immediate hostilities in consequence of such a measure, -upon the consideration that it is a temporary expedient, ... and that -his Majesty must be at liberty to consider a perseverance in the -system of furnishing succors to France as, at any future period, when -circumstances may render it necessary, a just cause of war."[141] "I am -expressly enjoined to declare," wrote the British ambassador, in making -this communication, "that such payments are a war subsidy, a succor -the most efficacious, the best adapted to the wants and situation -of the enemy, the most prejudicial to the interests of his Britannic -Majesty's subjects, and the most dangerous to his dominions; in fine, -more than equivalent to every other species of aggression."[142] -Repeated inquiries failed to draw from the Spanish government any -official statement of the terms of its bargain, either as to the -amount of the subsidy, the period during which it should continue, or -other conditions of the agreement.[143] Such communication the French -ambassador positively over-ruled.[144] - -Warning was therefore early given[145] that a condition essential to -postponement of action by Great Britain was the suspension of all -further arming in Spanish ports. This was repeated in the most formal -terms, and as an ultimatum, a few weeks later, on the 18th of February, -1804. "I am ordered to declare to you that the system of forbearance -on the part of England absolutely depends on the cessation of every -naval armament, and I am expressly forbidden to prolong my residence -here, if unfortunately this condition should be rejected."[146] It -was alleged and was incontrovertibly true, that, while Spain was so -evidently under Bonaparte's influence, armaments in her ports as -effectively necessitated watching, and so as greatly added to Great -Britain's burdens, as if war actually existed.[147] Another complaint -was that prizes made by French privateers were, by process of law, -condemned and sold in Spanish ports.[148] The same was doubtless -allowed to Great Britain; but in the strict blockade of the ports of -France the latter here derived a great benefit, while upon her enemy -was simply imposed an additional burden in scouring all the Spanish -coast, as though actually at war, in order to recapture inward-bound -prizes. Once condemned, the prize goods found their way to the French -ports by Spanish coasters. Independent of the difficulty of identifying -the property, the small size of these neutral carriers made seizure -inexpedient; for the costs of condemnation were greater than the value -of the prize.[149] The Spanish government claimed that the condemnation -and sale of prize goods in their ports was simply an act of authorized -commerce, free from all hostility.[150] Americans who recall the -cruises of the Alabama and her fellows will be disposed to think that, -whatever the technical accuracy of the plea, neutrality benevolent to -an enemy's cruisers constitutes a just cause of war, whenever policy so -advises. - -The relations between the two countries continued in this strained and -critical condition during the greater part of 1804. Bonaparte insisted -that the Spanish dockyards should repair the French ships in Ferrol -and Cadiz,—which was indeed one of the conditions of the convention -of October 19, 1803, concealed from Great Britain,—and should permit -seamen to pass by land from one port of Spain to another, and from -France through Spain, to complete their crews. He consented indeed that -they should go in small bodies of thirty or forty, but the vigilance -of the British officials could not be deceived. The relations between -France and Spain at this time were not inaptly described in the letter -of Napoleon to the king, announcing his assumption of the imperial -dignity. He styled him therein "ally and confederate." In June, 1804, -an aide-de-camp of the emperor visited Ferrol and Madrid, charged to -ascertain the condition of the ships and demand their completion.[151] -The British minister could obtain no explanation of this mission, which -naturally aroused his attention.[152] Spain in truth was no longer -a free agent. On the 3d of July, Napoleon ordered his Minister of -Marine to send to Ferrol the men still needed to man the ships there; -and on the 19th of the month[153] the British admiral Cochrane, then -blockading the port, remonstrated with the governor of Galicia upon -this procedure as hostile to Great Britain. On the 3d of September, and -again on the 11th, Cochrane wrote to his government that Spanish ships -in Ferrol were fitting for sea, that three first-rates were expected -from Cadiz, and that no doubt remained that the French, Spanish, and -Dutch ships in the port were to act together. He had consequently found -necessary to concentrate his force.[154] Immediately upon receiving -this information, the British ministry notified the Spanish government -that orders had been sent to their admiral off Ferrol to prevent -any Spanish ships of war from entering or leaving that port. The -ambassador at Madrid was directed to require that the armaments should -be discontinued, and placed upon the same footing as before the war. -He was also to demand a clear explanation of the relations existing -between France and Spain. Unless satisfactory replies were given, he -was ordered to quit Madrid. - -At the same time the ministry took a more questionable step. -Orders were sent to Cornwallis, to Cochrane, to Nelson, and to the -naval officer off Cadiz to detain and send to England all Spanish -treasure-ships; the intention being to keep them as a pledge until -satisfactory arrangements with Spain were made. In consequence of this, -on the 5th of October, four British frigates stopped, near Cadiz, -four Spanish vessels, of the same class but of inferior armament. -The disparity of force was not great enough to justify the Spanish -commodore in yielding; and an action followed in which one of his -frigates blew up. The other three surrendered and were taken to -England. Curiously enough, the news of this transaction had not reached -Madrid when the British representative, on the 10th of November, left -the city. The final discussions between him and the Spanish government -went on in complete ignorance of so decisive an event; but as he could -get no explanation of the agreements between France and Spain, he -persisted in demanding his passports. On the 12th of December, 1804, -Spain declared war. - -That Great Britain had just cause for war can scarcely be denied. She -now for the first time came into contact with Napoleon's claim that it -was, not merely the interest, but the bounden duty of every maritime -state to join his attempt to crush her.[155] Upon this principle -he justified his policy of coercing all into such hostilities, and -formulated at a later day the maxim, "There are no neutrals." The -subsidy paid by Spain, calculated on British rates of expenditure, was -annually worth to France fifteen ships-of-the-line and two hundred -thousand troops;[156] but against Napoleon's further extension of his -principle, by suddenly calling into activity the Spanish navy, Great -Britain's only safeguard was to insist upon the latter's remaining -unarmed. The Spanish government, having promised not to arm, suddenly -and without explanation began to equip vessels in Ferrol,—an act -which, coinciding with the passage of French seamen through Spain to -that place, fairly excited alarm and justified the orders not to allow -Spanish ships to enter or leave the port. - -The seizure of the treasure-ships is less easily excused, though -the obloquy attending it has been unduly heightened by the tragical -explosion. Its best palliation lies in Great Britain's previous -experience that, in the commercial decadence and poverty of Spain, the -treasures of the colonies were a determining factor in negotiations. -While they were on the sea, Spain temporized; when they arrived, she -stiffened. The purpose was to retain them as a pledge, to be restored -in case of a peaceable issue; as Swedish merchantmen were embargoed in -1801, and released when the Armed Neutrality dissolved. A Spanish naval -historian, while censuring other acts of Great Britain, says: "The mere -detention of the division from America, carrying specie which might be -used in behalf of French preparations, could have been overlooked as -an able and not very illegal means of bettering the prospects of the -English reclamations, in consequence of the scanty satisfaction they -obtained from our Court;" and again: "If all the circumstances are -impartially weighed, ... we shall see that all the charges made against -England for the seizure of the frigates may be reduced simply to want -of proper foresight in the strength of the force detailed to effect -it."[157] The action, nevertheless, was precipitate, and extenuated by -no urgent political necessity. Nelson, who certainly was not averse to -strong measures, directed his captains to disobey the order, which he -at first thought came only from Cornwallis; for, he said, "I am clearly -of the opinion that Spain has no wish to go to war with England."[158] - - - - -CHAPTER XVI. - -THE TRAFALGAR CAMPAIGN—CONCLUDED. - -JANUARY—OCTOBER, 1805. - -SUCCESSIVE MODIFICATIONS OF NAPOLEON'S PLAN.—NARRATIVE OF NAVAL -MOVEMENTS.—FINAL FAILURE OF NAPOLEON'S NAVAL COMBINATIONS.—WAR WITH -AUSTRIA, AND BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ.—BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR.—VITAL CHANGE -IMPOSED UPON NAPOLEON'S POLICY BY THE RESULT OF THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN. - - -The Spanish declaration of war was followed by a new treaty of alliance -with France, signed in Paris on the 5th of January, 1805, and confirmed -on the 18th of the month at Madrid. Spain undertook to furnish, by -March 21, to the common cause, at least twenty-five ships-of-the-line -and eleven frigates; but the military direction of the whole allied -effort was entrusted to Napoleon. - -This accession of Spain could not become immediately operative, owing -to the backward state of her armaments caused by the previous demands -of Great Britain. The emperor therefore adhered for the time to his -existing plans, formulated on the 27th and 29th of September. These -proving abortive, he next framed, upon lines equal both in boldness and -scope to those of the Marengo and Austerlitz campaigns, the immense -combination which resulted in Trafalgar. - -The events of the ten following months, therefore, have an interest -wholly unique, as the development of the only great naval campaign ever -planned by this foremost captain of modern times. From his opponents, -also, upon whom was thrown the harder task of the defensive, -was elicited an exhibition of insight, combination, promptitude, -and decision, which showed them to be, on their own element, not -unworthy to match with the great emperor. For Napoleon was at this -disadvantage,—he could not fully realize the conditions of the sea. -Accustomed by forethought and sheer will to trample obstacles under -foot, remembering the midwinter passage of the Splugen made by -Macdonald at his command, and the extraordinary impediments overcome -by himself in crossing the Saint Bernard, he could not believe that -the difficulties of the sea could not be vanquished by unskilled men -handling the ponderous machines entrusted to them, when confronted -by a skilful enemy. To quote an able French writer: "But one thing -was wanting to the victor of Austerlitz,—_le sentiment exact des -difficultés de la marine_."[159] - -With steam, possibly, this inequality of skill might have been so -reduced as to enable the generalship of Napoleon, having also the -advantage of the initiative, to turn the scale. With sailing ships -it was not so; and in following the story of Trafalgar it must be -remembered that the naval superiority of Great Britain lay not in -the number of her ships, but in the wisdom, energy, and tenacity -of her admirals and seamen. At best her numbers were but equal to -those arrayed against her. The real contest was between the naval -combinations of Napoleon and the insight of British officers, avoiding -or remedying the ex-centric movements he untiringly sought to impress -upon their forces. - -In December detailed instructions for executing the plan of September -29 were issued to Admirals Villeneuve and Missiessy.[160] The latter, -after leaving Rochefort, was to steer between the Azores and Canaries, -so as to avoid the British squadrons off the Biscay coast of Spain, -go direct to Martinique, take the British islands Santa Lucia and -Dominica, and upon Villeneuve's arrival place himself under his -command. In pursuance of these orders Missiessy escaped from Rochefort -on January 11. He was seen next day by a lookout vessel belonging to -the blockading squadron; but the latter, for whatever reason, was -off its post, and Missiessy reached Martinique safely on the 20th of -February. On the 24th of that month six British ships-of-the-line, -under Rear-Admiral Cochrane, sailed in pursuit from before Ferrol; -where their place was taken by a detachment of equal force drawn from -before Brest. - -Villeneuve's orders were to go from Toulon direct to Cayenne, recapture -the former Dutch colonies of Guiana, form a junction with Missiessy, -re-enforce San Domingo, and start on his return for Europe not later -than sixty days after reaching South America. With the combined -squadrons he was to appear off Ferrol, release the French ships there -blockaded, and bring the whole force, amounting to twenty of the line, -to Rochefort. "The result of your cruise," wrote Napoleon to him, "will -be to secure our colonies against any attack, and to retake the four -Dutch colonies on the Continent, as well as such other British islands -as may appear open to the force under your command." Six thousand -troops were embarked on board his squadron for the operations on shore. -Both he and Missiessy were expressly forbidden to land their crews for -that purpose; a decision of the great emperor worthy to be remembered -in these days. - -Villeneuve was ready to sail early in January, but his first need was -to elude the watchfulness of Nelson. The British admiral was known to -move from point to point in his command, between the Maddalena Islands -and Cape San Sebastian on the Spanish coast, while he kept before -Toulon lookout ships always informed of his whereabouts. Villeneuve -therefore thought indispensable to start with a breeze strong enough -to carry him a hundred miles the first night. For a fortnight the wind -hung at north-east and south-east—fair but very light; but on the 17th -of January it shifted to north-west, with signs of an approaching gale. -The next morning Villeneuve sent a division to drive off the enemy's -lookouts; and when these disappeared the squadron sailed, numbering ten -of the line and seven frigates. Nelson with eleven ships-of-the-line -was at the moment at anchor in Maddalena Bay. - -Following Napoleon's plan for deceiving the British admiral, the -French squadron steered for the south end of Sardinia, as though bound -eastward. During the night it was dogged by the enemy's frigates, which -had retired no further than was necessary to avoid capture. At ten -o'clock they were close by; and at two in the morning, satisfied as -to the French course, they parted company and hastened to Nelson,—the -wind then blowing a whole gale from the north-west. Twelve hours later -they were seen from the flag-ship with the signal flying that the -enemy was at sea, and in two hours more the British fleet was under -way. Unable to beat out by the western entrance in the teeth of the -storm, it ran in single column through the narrow eastern pass as night -fell,—Nelson's ship leading, the others steering by the poop lanterns -of the vessel next ahead. When clear of the port the fleet hauled up to -the southward, and during the night, which was unsettled and squally, -kept along the east coast of Sardinia. The frigate "Seahorse" was sent -ahead to pass round the south end of the island and get touch again of -the enemy. - -During the night the wind changed to south-south-west, and blew heavily -throughout the 21st. On the forenoon of the 22d the fleet, still -struggling against a heavy southwesterly gale, was fifty miles east of -the south end of Sardinia. There it was rejoined by the "Seahorse," -which the day before had caught sight of a French frigate standing -in toward Cagliari, but had not seen the main body. Not till the 26th -did Nelson reach Cagliari, where to his relief he found the French had -not been. Nothing even was known of their movements; but the same day -the frigate "Phœbe" joined from the westward with news that a French -eighty-gun ship, partially dismasted, had put in to Ajaccio. The -British fleet then stretched across to Palermo, where it arrived on the -28th. Having now fairly covered the approaches from the westward to -Sardinia, Sicily, and Naples, Nelson reasoned that one of two things -must have happened: either the French, despite the southerly gale, had -succeeded in going east between Sicily and Africa, or they had put back -disabled. In the latter case he could not now overtake them; in the -former, he must follow.[161] Accordingly, after sending scouts to scour -the seas, and three frigates to resume the watch off Toulon, he shaped -his course along the north side of Sicily, and on the 30th of January -passed through the straits of Messina on his way to Egypt. - -Villeneuve had in fact returned to Toulon. On the first night an -eighty-four-gun ship and three frigates separated, and the former put -in dismasted to Ajaccio, as Nelson had learned. The following day -and in the night, when the wind shifted to south-west, three more -ships-of-the-line were crippled. Forced to the eastward by the gale, -and aware that two enemy's frigates had marked his course, the admiral -feared that he should meet the British at a disadvantage and determined -to retreat. - -Thus prematurely ended the first movement in Napoleon's naval -combination for the invasion of England. The Rochefort squadron had -escaped only to become a big detachment, wholly out of reach of support -or recall. The Toulon fleet, forced to await a heavy wind in order to -effect the evasion by which alone the combination could be formed, was -through the inexperience of its seamen crippled by the very advantage -it had secured. In truth, however, had it gone on, it would almost -infallibly have been driven by the south-west gale into the very spot, -between Sardinia and Sicily, where Nelson went to seek it, and which -was ransacked by his lookouts.[162] Neither Villeneuve nor Nelson -doubted the result of such meeting.[163] - -The other factor in this combination, the Brest fleet and army corps -of twenty thousand men, had been held in readiness to act, dependent -upon the successful evasion of the two others. "I calculate," Napoleon -had said, "that the sailing of twenty ships from Rochefort and Toulon -will force the enemy to send thirty in pursuit;"[164] a diversion that -would very materially increase the chances for the Brest armament. For -a moment he spoke of sending to India this powerful body, strongly -re-enforced from the French and Spanish ships in Ferrol.[165] This was, -however, but a passing thought, rejected by his sound military instinct -as an ex-centric movement, disseminating his force and weakening the -purposed attack upon the heart of the British power. Three months -later, when he began to fear failure for the latter attempt, he -recurred to the East India project in terms which show why he at first -laid it aside. "In case, through any event whatsoever, our expedition -have not full success, and I cannot compass _the greatest of all ends, -which will cause all the rest to fall_,[166] I think we must calculate -the operation in India for September."[167] India in truth was to the -imagination of Napoleon what Egypt was to Nelson,—an object which -colored all his ideas and constantly misled him. As was shrewdly said -by an American citizen to the British government, in this very month -of January, 1805, "The French in general believe that the fountains of -British wealth are in India and China. They never appeared to me to -understand that the most abundant source is in her agriculture, her -manufactures, and the foreign demand."[168] This impression Napoleon -fully shared, and it greatly affected his judgment during the coming -campaign. - -The return of Villeneuve and the delay necessary to repair his ships, -concurring with the expected re-enforcements from Spain, wholly changed -the details of Napoleon's plan. In essence it remained the same from -first to last; but the large number of ships now soon to be at his -command appealed powerfully to his love for great masses and wide -combinations. Now, also, Villeneuve could not reach the West Indies -before the sickly season. - -The contemplated conquests in America, which had formed so important -a part of the first plan, were therefore laid aside, and so was also -the Irish expedition by Ganteaume's fleet. The concentration of naval -forces in the West Indies or at some point exterior to France became -now the great aim; and the sally of the various detachments, before -intended to favor the crossing of the flotilla by a diversion, was now -to be the direct means of covering it, by bringing them to the English -Channel and before Boulogne. The operations were to begin in March; and -urgent orders were sent to Spain to have the contingents in her several -ports ready to move at a moment's notice. - -The situations of the squadrons in March, when the great Trafalgar -campaign opened, need to be stated. On the extreme right, in the Texel, -were nine ships-of-the-line with a due proportion of lighter vessels; -and some eighty transports lay ready to embark Marmont's army corps of -twenty-five thousand men.[169] The Boulogne flotilla was assembled; -the few detachments still absent being so near at hand that their -junction could be confidently expected before the appearance of the -covering fleet. The army, one hundred and thirty thousand strong, was -by frequent practice able to embark in two hours.[170] Two tides were -needed for all the boats to clear the ports; but as word of the fleet's -approach would precede its arrival, they could haul out betimes and -lie in the open sea, under the batteries, ready to start. In Brest, -Ganteaume had twenty-one ships-of-the-line. The Rochefort squadron was -now in the West Indies with Missiessy; but two more ships were ready -in that port and one in Lorient. In Ferrol were five French and ten -Spanish; of the latter it was expected that six or eight could sail in -March. In Cadiz the treaty called for twelve or fifteen to be ready at -the same time, but only six were then actually able to move. There was -also in Cadiz one French ship. In Cartagena were six Spaniards, which, -however, took no part in the campaign. At Toulon Villeneuve would have -eleven ships. All these were ships-of-the-line. The total available -at the opening of the campaign was therefore sixty-seven; but it will -be observed that they were disseminated in detachments, and that the -strategic problem was, first, to unite them in the face of an enemy -that controlled the communications, and, next, to bring them to the -strategic centre. - -As in 1796, the declaration of Spain in 1805 added immensely to the -anxieties of Great Britain. Lord Melville, who succeeded St. Vincent -as First Lord in May, 1804, had at once contracted for several -ships-of-the-line to be built in private yards;[171] but these were not -yet ready. A somewhat singular expedient was then adopted to utilize -worn-out vessels, twelve of which were in February, 1805, cased with -two-inch oak plank, and with some additional bracing sent to sea. It is -said some of these bore a part in the battle of Trafalgar.[172] - -The disposition and strength of the British detachments varied with the -movements of the enemy and with the increasing strength of their own -navy. Lord Keith, in the Downs with eleven small ships-of-the-line, -watched the Texel and the Straits of Dover. The Channel fleet under -Cornwallis held Brest under lock and key, with a force varying from -eleven, when the year began, to twenty or twenty-four in the following -April. This was the centre of the great British naval line. Off -Rochefort no squadron was kept after Missiessy's escape. In March -that event had simply transferred to the West Indies five French and -six British ships. Off Ferrol eight ships were watching the combined -fifteen in the port. In October, when the Spanish war was threatening, -a division of six was sent to blockade Cadiz. Nelson's command, which -had before extended to Cape Finisterre, was now confined to Gibraltar -as its western limit, and the Cadiz portion assigned to Sir John -Orde,—a step particularly invidious to Nelson, depriving him of the -most lucrative part of his station, in favor of one who was not only -his senior, with power to annoy him, but reputed to be his personal -enemy. Nelson had within the Straits twelve of the line, several of -which, however, were in bad condition; and one, kept permanently -at Naples for political reasons, was useless to him. Two others -were on their way to join, but did not arrive before the campaign -opened. It may be added that there were in India from eight to ten -ships-of-the-line, and in the West Indies four, which Cochrane's -arrival would raise to ten.[173] - -On the 2d of March Napoleon issued specific orders for the campaign -to Villeneuve and Ganteaume. The latter, who was to command-in-chief -after the junction, was directed to sail at the first moment possible -with his twenty-one ships, carrying besides their crews thirty-six -hundred troops. He was to go first to Ferrol, destroy or drive off the -blockading squadron, and be joined by the French and Spanish ships -there ready; thence by the shortest route to Martinique, where he -was to be met by Villeneuve and, it was hoped, by Missiessy also. If -Villeneuve did not at once appear, he was to be awaited at least thirty -days. When united, the whole force, amounting to over forty of the -line, would, to avoid detection, steer for the Channel by an unusual -route and proceed direct to Boulogne, where the emperor expected it -between June 10 and July 10. If by Villeneuve's not coming, or other -cause, Ganteaume found himself with less than twenty-five ships, he -was to go to Ferrol; where it would be the emperor's care to assemble -a re-enforcement. He might, however, even with so small a number, move -straight on Boulogne if he thought advisable.[174] - -Villeneuve's orders were to sail at the earliest date for Cadiz, where -he was not to enter but be joined outside by the ships then ready. -From Cadiz he was to go to Martinique, and there wait forty days for -Ganteaume. If the latter did not then appear he was to call at San -Domingo, land some troops and thence go to the Bay of Santiago in the -Canary Islands,[175] where he would cruise twenty days. This provided a -second rendezvous where Ganteaume could join, if unexpectedly delayed -in Brest. The emperor, like all French rulers, did not wish to risk -his fleet in battle with nearly equal forces. Whatever the result, -his combinations would suffer. "I prefer," said he, "the rendezvous -at Martinique to any other; but I also prefer Santiago to a junction -before Brest, by raising the blockade, in order to avoid fighting of -any kind."[176] When Ganteaume, at a most critical instant, only six -days before Villeneuve got away, reported that he was ready,—that -there were but fifteen British ships in the offing and success was -sure,—Napoleon replied: "A naval victory now would lead to nothing. -Have but one aim,—to fulfil your mission. Sail without fighting."[177] -So to the old delusion of ulterior objects was sacrificed the one -chance for compassing the junction essential to success. By April 1 the -British fleet off Brest was increased to twenty-one sail. - -Meanwhile Nelson had returned from his fruitless search at Alexandria, -and on the 13th of March again appeared off Toulon. Thence he went -to Cape San Sebastian, showing his ships off Barcelona to convince -the enemy he was fixed on the coast of Spain; reasoning that if they -thought him to the westward they would more readily start for Egypt, -which he still believed to be their aim. He had by his communications -with Alexandria learned the distracted state of that country since the -destruction of the Mameluke power and its restoration to the Turks, and -reported that the French could easily hold it, if they once effected a -lodgment.[178] From Cape San Sebastian the fleet next went to the Gulf -of Palmas, a convenient roadstead in the south of Sardinia, to fill -with provisions from transports lately arrived. It anchored there on -the 26th of March, but was again at sea when, at 8 A. M. of April 4, -being then twenty miles west of the Gulf, a frigate brought word of -the second sailing of the Toulon fleet. When last seen, in the evening -of March 31, it was sixty miles south of Toulon, steering south with a -north-west wind. One of the pair of lookouts was then sent to Nelson; -and the other, losing sight of the enemy during the night, joined him -a few hours after the first. The only clue she could give was that, -having herself steered south-west with a wind from west-north-west, the -enemy had probably kept on south or borne away to the eastward. Nelson, -therefore, took the fleet midway between Sardinia and the African -coast, scattering lookout ships along the line between these two -points.[179] He was thus centrally placed to cover everything east of -Sardinia, and with means of speedy information if the French attempted -to pass, at any point, the line occupied by him. - -Villeneuve had indeed headed as reported by the British frigates, -swayed by Nelson's ruse in appearing off Barcelona.[180] Believing -the enemy off Cape San Sebastian, he meant to go east of the Balearic -Islands. The next day, April 1; a neutral ship informed him that it -had seen the British fleet south of Sardinia. The wind fortunately -hauling to the eastward, Villeneuve changed his course to pass north -of the Balearics; and on the 6th of April, when Nelson was watching -for him between Sardinia and Africa, he appeared off Cartagena. The -Spanish division there declined to join him, having no instructions -from its government; and the French fleet, continuing at once with a -fresh easterly wind, passed Gibraltar on the 8th. On the 9th it reached -Cadiz, driving away Orde's squadron. Following his orders strictly, -Villeneuve anchored outside the port; and was there at once joined by -the French seventy-four "l'Aigle," and six Spanish ships. During the -night the combined force of eighteen of the line sailed for Martinique, -where it anchored May 14, after a passage of thirty-four days. Some -Spanish ships separated the day after sailing; but, having sealed -instructions giving the rendezvous, they arrived only two days later -than the main body. - -This sortie of Villeneuve had so far been exceptionally happy. By a -mere accident he had learned Nelson's position, while that admiral was -misled by what seems to have been bad management on the part of his -carefully placed lookouts. Nelson was not prone to blame subordinates, -but he apparently felt he had not been well served in this case. Not -till April 16, when Villeneuve was already six days on his way from -Cadiz, did he learn from a passing ship that nine days before the -French were seen off Cape de Gata, on the coast of Spain, steering -westward with an east wind, evidently bound to the Atlantic. To this -piece of great good luck Villeneuve's fortune added another. While -he carried an east wind with him till clear of the Straits, Nelson, -from the 4th of April to the 19th, had a succession of strong westerly -gales. "We have been nine days coming two hundred miles," he wrote. -"For a whole month we have had nothing like a Levanter except for -the French fleet."[181] Not till May 6, after a resolute struggle of -over three weeks against contrary fortune, did he anchor his fleet in -Gibraltar Bay. Five days later he was on his way to the West Indies. -But while the escape from Toulon showed the impossibility of securing -every naval detachment of the enemy, the events elsewhere happening -proved the extreme difficulty of so timing the evasions as to effect a -great combination. While Villeneuve with eighteen ships was hastening -to the West Indies, Missiessy,[182] with five others, having very -imperfectly fulfilled his mission to annoy the enemy's islands, was -speeding back to Rochefort, where orders at once to retrace his steps -were waiting. At the same time Ganteaume with his twenty-one was -hopelessly locked in Brest. Amid all the difficulties of their task, -the British fleets, sticking close to the French arsenals, not only -tempered their efficiency for war to the utmost toughness, but reaped -also the advantages inseparable from interior positions. - -The better to divert attention from his real designs, Napoleon took -the time appointed for his squadrons' sailing to visit Italy. Leaving -Paris April 1, and journeying leisurely, he was in Alessandria on the -first of May and in Milan on the 10th. There he remained a month, and -was on the 26th crowned king of the late Italian Republic. His stay in -Italy was prolonged to July. It is probably to this carefully timed -absence that we owe the full and invaluable record of his hopes and -fears, of the naval combinations which chased each other through his -tireless mind, of the calculations and surmises—true or false, but -always ingenious—which are contained in his almost daily letters to the -Minister of Marine. - -Prominent among his preoccupations were the detention of -Ganteaume,—who, "hermetically blockaded and thwarted by constant -calms,"[183] could not get away,—and the whereabouts of Nelson, who -disappeared from his sight as entirely, and from his knowledge far more -completely, than Villeneuve did from the British ken. "In God's name! -hurry my Brest squadron away, that it may have time to join Villeneuve. -Nelson has been again deceived and gone to Egypt. Villeneuve was out of -sight on the 10th of April. Send him word that Nelson is seeking him in -Egypt; I have sent the same news to Ganteaume by a courier. God grant, -however, that he may not find him in Brest."[184] On the 15th of April -Ganteaume did make an attempt. The British fleet had been driven off -by a gale on the 11th, but reappeared on the 13th. On the afternoon -of the 14th word was brought to Admiral Gardner, who had temporarily -relieved Cornwallis, that the French were getting under way. The next -day they came out; but the enemy now numbered twenty-four sail to their -twenty-one, and after a demonstration they retired within the port. - -As the advancing season gave less and less hope of the blockade -relaxing, Napoleon formed a new combination. Two ships-of-the-line, -now nearly ready at Rochefort, should sail under Rear-Admiral Magon, -carrying modified instructions to Villeneuve. The latter was now -commanded to wait thirty-five days after Magon's arrival, and then, if -Ganteaume had not appeared, return direct to Ferrol, discarding the -alternative rendezvous of Santiago. At Ferrol he would find fifteen -French and Spanish ships, making with his own and Magon's a total of -thirty-five. With these he was to appear before Brest, where Ganteaume -would join him, and with the combined force of fifty-six of the line at -once enter the Channel. Magon sailed with these orders early in May, -and on June 4 reached Villeneuve just in time to insure the direction -given by the latter to his fleet upon its return. To facilitate the -junction at Brest very heavy batteries were thrown up, covering the -anchorage outside the Goulet; and there, in May, Ganteaume took up his -position, covered by one hundred and fifty guns on shore. - -It will be recognized that the emperor's plan, while retaining its -essential features, had now undergone a most important modification, -due to the closeness of the British blockade of Brest. A combination -of his squadrons still remained the key-stone of the fabric; but the -tenacity with which the largest of his detachments was held in check -had forced him to accept—what he had rejected as least advantageous—a -concentration in the Bay of Biscay, the great hive where swarmed the -British navy. - -It became therefore more than ever desirable to divert as many as -possible of the enemy's cruisers from those waters; an object which -now continuously occupied Napoleon's mind and curiously tinged his -calculations with the color of his hopes. In defiance of statistics, -he thought the East Indies, as has before been said, the first of -British interests. He sought therefore to raise alarms about India, -and persisted in believing that every division sailing from England -was bound there. "Cochrane," he writes on April 13, "was before Lisbon -on March 4. He must first have gone to the Cape de Verde, thence to -Madeira, and if he gets no information he will go to India. That is -what any admiral of sense would do in his case."[185] On the 10th -of May, when Cochrane had been over a month in the West Indies, -he reiterates this opinion, and at the same time conjectures that -five thousand troops which sailed from England on the 15th of April -with most secret orders were gone to the Cape of Good Hope. "Fears -of Villeneuve's meeting this expedition will force them to send -more ships to India."[186] On the 31st of May he guesses that eight -ships-of-the-line, which sailed ten days before under Collingwood, were -bound to India,[187] and a week later repeats the surmise emphatically: -"The responsibility of the ministers is so great they cannot but send -him to the East Indies."[188] On the 9th of June he writes: "Everything -leads me to believe the English sent fifteen ships to the East Indies, -when they learned that Cochrane reached Barbadoes a fortnight after -Missiessy sailed; and in that case it is quite possible Nelson has -been sent to America."[189] This opinion is repeated on the 13th and -14th; and on the 28th, as the veil was about to fall from his eyes, -he sums up the acute reasoning which, starting from a false premise, -had so misled him: "It is difficult to believe that without any news -the English have sent seventeen ships-of-the-line (i. e. Nelson and -Collingwood combined) to the West Indies, when Nelson, joining his ten -to Cochrane's six, and three at Jamaica, would have nineteen—superior -to our squadron; while Collingwood going to the East Indies with eight -and finding there nine, in all seventeen, also superior to us—it is -difficult, I say, to believe that the enemy, with the chance of being -everywhere superior, should blindly abandon the East Indies."[190] - -Some French writers,[191] as well as some English, have disparaged the -insight of Nelson, comparing him unfavorably with Napoleon, and basing -their estimate largely upon his error in esteeming Egypt the aim of the -French. In view of the foregoing extracts, and of other miscalculations -made by the emperor during this remarkable campaign—which will appear -farther on—it must be admitted that when in the dark, without good -information, both were forced to inferences, more or less acute, -but which, resting on no solid data, rose, as Nelson said, little -above guesses. So also Collingwood has been credited with completely -unravelling Napoleon's plan, and his penetration has been exalted above -Nelson's because, _after_ the latter's return from chasing Villeneuve -to the West Indies, he wrote that the flight there was to take off the -British naval force; overlooking his conjecture, two lines before, that -(not England, but) "Ireland is the real mark and butt of all these -operations." Rather might each adopt for himself Napoleon's own words, -"I have so often in my life been mistaken that I no longer blush for -it."[192] When his frigates lost sight of Villeneuve, on the night -of March 31, Nelson went neither east nor west; he concentrated his -force to cover what he thought the most likely objects of the enemy, -and awaited information as to his movements. "I shall neither go to -the eastward of Sicily nor to the westward of Sardinia until I know -something positive."[193] It can be confidently said that under like -conditions Napoleon would have done the same. - -The fault of Napoleon's calculations was in over-estimating both the -importance and the danger of India, and also in not allowing for -the insight and information of the British government. He himself -laid down, with his peculiarly sound judgment, the lines it ought to -follow: "If I had been in the British Admiralty, I would have sent -a light squadron to the East and West Indies, and formed a strong -fleet of twenty of the line which I would not have dispatched until I -knew Villeneuve's destination."[194] This was just what the Admiralty -did. A light squadron was on its way to India, and eight ships were -ordered to the West Indies under Collingwood; but that able officer, -finding Nelson had started, contented himself with sending two to -re-enforce him, and took up his own position with six before Cadiz, -thus blocking the junction of the Cartagena ships. The strong body -of twenty was kept before Brest, much to Napoleon's annoyance. "If -England realizes the serious game she is playing, she ought to raise -the blockade of Brest."[195] But here, as with regard to the Indian -expeditions, Napoleon's thought was fathered by his wish. To weaken the -Brest blockade, as he confessed a little later, was the great point for -France.[196] - -Nothing in fact is more noteworthy, nor more creditable, than the -intelligence and steadiness with which the British naval authorities -resisted Napoleon's efforts to lead them into ex-centric movements. -This was partly due to an accurate judgment of the worth of the -enemy's detached squadrons, partly to an intuitive sense of the supreme -importance of the Biscay positions, and partly to information much -more accurate than Napoleon imagined, or than he himself received in -naval transactions. "Those boasted English," jeered he, when he thought -them ignorant of Villeneuve's second sailing, "who claim to know of -everything, who have agents everywhere, couriers booted and spurred -everywhere, knew nothing of it."[197] Yet, by a singular coincidence, -on the very day, April 25, that they were supposed thus deceived, the -Admiralty were hurrying letters to Nelson and to the West Indies with -the important tidings. "You reason," wrote he to Decrès, "as if the -enemy were in the secret."[198] This is just what they were,—not as -to all details, but as to the main features of his plans. While the -emperor was wildly reckoning on imaginary squadrons hastening to India, -and guessing where Nelson was, both the latter and his government knew -where Villeneuve had gone, and the British admiral was already in the -West Indies. About the beginning of May it was known in England not -only that the Toulon fleet had sailed, but whither it was bound;[199] -and about the first of June, despite the cautions about secrecy -imposed by Bonaparte, the British were informed by a prisoner that -"the combined fleet, of sixty sail-of-the-line, will fight our fleet -(_balayer la Manche_), while the large frigates will come up channel -to convoy the flotilla over. The troops are impatiently awaiting the -appearance of the ships to set them free."[200] - -The Admiralty therefore understood as well as did Napoleon that the -crucial necessity in their dispositions was to prevent the combination -of the enemy's squadrons, and that the chief scene of operations -would be the Bay of Biscay and the approaches to the Channel. They -contented themselves, consequently, with strengthening the force -there, and keeping before Cadiz alone a detachment under Collingwood, -lest a concentration in that port should compel them to weaken the -Biscay squadrons. At the time Villeneuve sailed, an expedition of five -thousand troops, whose destination was kept profoundly secret, was -ready to start for the Mediterranean. This re-enforcement secured the -naval bases of Gibraltar and Malta, and the Mediterranean otherwise was -abandoned to frigates, supported by two or three ships-of-the-line. -Herein also the practice of the Admiralty agreed with the precept of -Napoleon. "The Mediterranean," wrote he on June 7 to his Minister of -Marine, "is now nothing. I would rather see there two of Villeneuve's -ships than forty;" and he added the pregnant counsel, which was -exemplified by the British action, "It seems to me your purpose is _not -exclusive enough_ for a great operation. You must correct this fault, -for that is the art of great successes and of great operations." - -The secret expedition was met by Nelson just as he started for the -West Indies. During his heavy beat down the Mediterranean he too, as -carefully as Napoleon, had been studying the field on which he was to -act; but while the one planned with all the freedom and certainty of an -offensive, which, disposing of large means, moves upon a known object, -the other, though in a restricted sphere, underwent the embarrassments -of the defensive, ignorant where the blow was to fall. One clear light, -however, shone step by step on his path,—wherever the French fleet was -gone there should he go also. - -The west wind which delayed his progress brought swiftly to him, on -April 19, a vessel[201] from Gibraltar, with word that, two hours -after Villeneuve passed the Straits, a frigate had started for England -with the news, and that the French and Spaniards had sailed together -from Cadiz. From this circumstance he reasoned, accurately, that the -destination was the British Islands;[202] but he did not penetrate the -deep design of a concentration in the West Indies. He therefore sent -the frigate "Amazon" ahead of the fleet to Lisbon, to gather news and -rejoin him off Cape St. Vincent; and by her he wrote the Admiralty, -and also to the admirals off Brest and in Ireland, that he should take -position fifty leagues west of the Scilly Islands, and thence steer -slowly toward them. To any person who will plot this position on a map -it will be apparent that, with winds prevailing from the westward, he -would there be, as he said, equally well situated to reach Brest or -Ireland; in short, in an excellent strategic position known to the -authorities at home. - -Stopping but four hours at Gibraltar on May 6, on the 9th he was off -Cape St. Vincent, and there received news that the combined squadrons, -to the number of eighteen of the line, had gone to the West Indies. His -concern was great, for he fully understood the value of those islands. -He had served there, knew them intimately, and had married there. Not a -year before he had written, "If our islands should fall, England would -be so clamorous for peace that we should humble ourselves."[203] Still, -with all his anxiety, he kept his head. The convoy of troops was close -at hand, he must provide for its safety. On the 11th of May it arrived, -Nelson's fleet being then under way. To the two ships-of-the-line -guarding it he added a third, the "Royal Sovereign," whose bad sailing -delayed him; and to this circumstance it was owing that that ship, -newly coppered, bore Collingwood's flag far in advance of either -British column into the fire at Trafalgar. Three hours after the -convoy's junction, at 7 P. M.of May 11, Nelson with ten ships was on -his way to the West Indies, to seek eighteen which had thirty-one days' -start. - -On the 4th of June the British fleet, having gained eight days on -the allies, anchored at Barbadoes, where it found Cochrane with two -sail-of-the-line. The same day Magon with his two joined Villeneuve. -In the three weeks the latter had now been in Martinique he had -accomplished nothing but the capture of Diamond Rock, a small islet -detached from the main island, which the British held and from which -they annoyed the coasters. A frigate outstripping Magon had brought -pressing orders to make conquests in the British possessions, during -the thirty-five days of waiting for Ganteaume. In consequence, when -Magon joined, the fleet was under way, standing north to clear the -islands before making the stretch to the southward, and to windward, to -reach Barbadoes; which Villeneuve had selected as his first point of -attack. - -On the 4th of June, therefore, the two hostile fleets were but a -hundred miles apart, the distance separating Barbadoes from Martinique. -Most singularly, at the very moment Villeneuve started north to return -upon Barbadoes, false news, too plausible to be slighted, induced -Nelson to go south. Positive information was sent by the officer -commanding at Santa Lucia that the allies had been seen from there, -May 29, steering south. Nelson anchored at Barbadoes at 5 P. M. June -4, embarked two thousand troops during the night, and at 10 A. M. next -day made sail for the southward. On the 6th he passed Tobago, which -was reported safe, and on the 7th anchored off Trinidad; where to the -astonishment of every one nothing had been heard of the enemy. Cursing -the news which had forced him to disregard his own judgment, when only -a hundred miles of fair wind severed him from his prey, Nelson turned -upon his tracks and steered for Martinique, tortured with fears for -Jamaica and every exposed British possession. - -On the 8th of June, when Nelson left Trinidad, the combined fleets were -nearly four hundred miles from him, off the west side of Antigua. Here -they captured fourteen merchant ships which had imprudently left port, -and by them were informed that Nelson with fourteen ships (instead -of ten) had reached Barbadoes. To these fourteen, Villeneuve, whose -information was poor, added five as the force of Cochrane, making -nineteen to his eighteen. Supposing therefore the enemy to be superior, -not only in quality, which he conceded, but in numbers also, he -decided, in view of so unexpected an event as the arrival on the scene -of the greatest British admiral, to return at once to Europe. In this -he doubtless met the wishes of Napoleon. "I think," said the latter, -ere he knew the fact, "that the arrival of Nelson may lead Villeneuve -to return to Europe;"[204] and he argued, still seeing things as he -wished,—certainly not as a seaman would,—"When Nelson learns Villeneuve -has left the Windward Islands, he will go to Jamaica,"[205] a thousand -miles to leeward. "So far from being infallible like the Pope," wrote -Nelson at the same moment, "I believe my opinions to be very fallible, -and therefore I may be mistaken that the enemy's fleet is gone to -Europe; but I cannot bring myself to think otherwise."[206] Then, -having given his reasons, he seems to dive into Napoleon's mind and -read his thoughts. "The enemy will not give me credit for quitting the -West Indies for this month to come."[207] - -Villeneuve also doubtless hoped to shake off his pursuer by his sudden -change of purpose. Transferring troops necessary to garrison the French -islands to four frigates, he directed the latter to land them at -Guadaloupe and rejoin him off the Azores,—a mistaken rendezvous, which -materially lengthened his backward voyage. The combined fleet then made -sail on the 9th of June to the northward, to reach the westerly winds -that favor the passage to Europe. - -Three days later Nelson also was off Antigua, and convinced himself -that the allies were bound back to Europe. With the tireless energy -that brooked no rest when once resolve was formed, the night was passed -transferring the troops which but one week before he had embarked at -Barbadoes. But not even a night's delay was allowed in sending news to -Europe. At 8 P. M. he hurried off the brig "Curieux" with dispatches -to the Admiralty, which the captain, Bettesworth, was to deliver in -person; a momentous action, and one fraught with decisive consequences -to the campaign, although somewhat marred by an overcautious admiral. -On the 13th, at noon, the fleet itself, accompanied by one of -Cochrane's two ships, the "Spartiate," sailed for the Straits of -Gibraltar; but Nelson, uncertain as to the enemy's destination, also -sent word to the officer commanding off Ferrol,[208] lest he might be -taken unawares. - -Although Villeneuve's decision to return was fortunate and -characterized by the extraordinary good luck which upon the whole had -so far attended him, it is evident that he ran the chance of crossing -Ganteaume on the Atlantic, as he himself had been crossed by Missiessy. -Napoleon had taken precautions to insure both his waiting long enough, -and also his return in case Ganteaume could not get away by a certain -time; but not having foreseen, nor until June 28[209] even known, -Nelson's pursuit of Villeneuve, he could not anticipate the course of -the latter in such a contingency, nor combine with it the action of the -Brest fleet. - -Ganteaume, however, was not able to elude Lord Gardner, and on the -8th of May the emperor, having received in Italy the news of Magon's -sailing, gave his final decision. If before midnight of May 20 an -opportunity offered, the Brest fleet should start; but from daybreak -of the 21st, had it every chance in the world, it should stand fast. A -frigate was to be kept ready to sail the instant the latter condition -took effect, carrying to Villeneuve orders for his action upon reaching -Ferrol. This frigate did sail May 21, but of course did not find the -admiral in the West Indies. Duplicate instructions were sent to Ferrol. - -Villeneuve was by them informed that he would in Ferrol find ready for -sea five French and nine Spanish ships, which, with those already under -his orders, would make a force of thirty-four sail-of-the-line. In the -roads off Rochefort would be five more. At Brest twenty-one ships were -lying outside the Goulet, under the protection of one hundred and fifty -cannon, ready to get under way at a moment's notice. The great point -was to concentrate these three masses, or as much of them as possible, -off Boulogne. Three courses were open to him. If the squadron at Ferrol -could not leave the port when he appeared, on account of head winds, he -should order it to join him at Rochefort and go there at once himself. -Thence with forty ships he should proceed off Brest, join Ganteaume, -and at once enter the Channel. If, however, the wind was fair for -leaving Ferrol, that is, southerly, he would see in that a reason for -hastening to Brest, without stopping for the Rochefort squadron; the -more so as every delay would increase the British force before Brest. -Thirdly, he might possibly, as he drew toward Ushant, find the winds so -fair as to give the hope of getting to Boulogne with his thirty-five -ships three or four days before the enemy's fleet at Brest could -follow. If so, it was left to his discretion to embrace so favorable -an opportunity. To these three courses Napoleon added a fourth as a -possible alternative. After rallying the Ferrol ships he might pass -north of the British Islands, join the Dutch squadron of the Texel with -Marmont's corps there embarked, and with these appear off Boulogne. -The emperor, however, looked upon this rather as a last resort. A great -concentration in the Bay of Biscay was the one aim he now favored. - -To facilitate this he busied himself much with the question of -diverting the enemy from that great centre of his operations. This it -was that made him so ready to believe that each squadron that sailed -was gone to the East Indies. If so, it was well removed from the Bay -of Biscay. For this he sought to get the Cartagena ships to Toulon -or to Cadiz. "If we can draw six English ships before each port," he -writes, "that will be a fine diversion for us; and if I can get the -Cartagena ships in Toulon I will threaten Egypt in so many ways that -they will be obliged to keep there an imposing force. They will believe -Villeneuve gone to the East Indies in concerted operation with the -Toulon squadron."[210] For this he purposes to send Missiessy to Cadiz. -In Rochefort that admiral will occupy a British detachment, but on the -spot where the emperor does not wish it; at Cadiz it will be remote -from the scene. But later on he says, "Perhaps the enemy, who are now -thoroughly frightened, will not be led away; in that case I shall have -dispersed my force uselessly."[211] Therefore he concludes to keep him -at Rochefort, where, if blockaded, he reduces the force either off -Ferrol or off Brest. If not blockaded, he is to go to sea, take a wide -sweep in the Atlantic, and appear off Ireland. The English will then -doubtless detach ships to seek him; but he will again disappear and -take position near Cape Finisterre, where he will be likely to meet -Villeneuve returning.[212] Finally, for the same reason, toward the end -of June he tries to create alarm about the Texel. Marmont is directed -to make demonstrations and even to embark his troops, while part of -the emperor's guard is moved to Utrecht. "This will lead the enemy to -weaken his fleet before Brest, which is the great point."[213] - -All these movements were sound and wise; but the emperor made the -mistake of underestimating his enemy. "We have not to do," he said, -"with a far-sighted, but with a very proud government. What we are -doing is so simple that a government the least foresighted would not -have made war. For an instant they have feared for London; soon they -will be sending squadrons to the two Indies."[214] - -The British government and the British Admiralty doubtless made -blunders; but barring the one great mistake, for which the previous -administration of St. Vincent was responsible, of allowing the material -of the navy to fall below the necessities of the moment, the Trafalgar -campaign was in its leading outlines well and adequately conceived, and -in its execution, as event succeeded event, ably and even brilliantly -directed. Adequate detachments were placed before each of the enemy's -minor arsenals, while the fleet before Brest constituted the great -central body upon which the several divisions might, and when necessity -arose, actually did fall back. Sudden disaster, or being beaten in -detail, thus became almost impossible. In the home ports was maintained -a well-proportioned reserve, large enough to replace ships disabled or -repairing, but not so large as seriously to weaken the force at sea. -As a rule the Admiralty successfully shunned the ex-centric movements -to which Napoleon would divert them, and clung steadfastly to that -close watch which St. Vincent had perfected, and which unquestionably -embodied the soundest strategic principles. Missiessy returned to -Rochefort on the 26th of May and was promptly blocked by a body of five -or six ships. As the force in Ferrol increased, by the preparation -of ships for sea, the opposing squadron of six or seven was raised -to ten, under Rear-Admiral Calder. Before Brest were from twenty to -twenty-five, to whose command Admiral Cornwallis returned early in -July, after a three months' sick leave. Collingwood with half a dozen -was before Cadiz, where he effectually prevented a concentration, -which, by its distance from the scene of action, would have seriously -embarrassed the British navy. Such was the situation when Villeneuve -and Nelson, in June and July, were re-crossing the Atlantic, heading, -the one for Ferrol, the other for the Straits; and when the crisis, to -which all the previous movements had been leading, was approaching its -culmination. - -When Nelson started back for Europe, although convinced the French -were thither bound, he had no absolute certainty of the fact.[215] -For his decision he relied upon his own judgment. In dispatching the -"Curieux" the night before he himself sailed, he directed her captain -to steer a certain course, by following which he believed he would fall -in with the allied fleet.[216] Accordingly the "Curieux" did, on the -19th of June, sight the enemy in latitude 33° 12' north and longitude -58° west, nine hundred miles north-north-east from Antigua, standing -north-north-west. The same day Nelson himself learned from an American -schooner that a fleet of about twenty-two large ships of war had been -seen by it on the 15th, three hundred and fifty miles south of the -position in which Bettesworth saw it four days later. - -Bettesworth fully understood the importance of the knowledge thus -gained. The precise destination of the enemy did not certainly appear, -but there could be no doubt that he was returning to Europe. With that -intelligence, and the information concerning Nelson's purposes, it -was urgent to reach England speedily. Carrying a press of sail, the -"Curieux" anchored at Plymouth on the 7th of July. The captain posted -at once to London, arriving the evening of the 8th, at eleven. The head -of the Admiralty at that time was Lord Barham, an aged naval officer, -who had been unexpectedly called to the office two months before, in -consequence of the impeachment of Lord Melville, the successor to St. -Vincent. It was fortunate for Great Britain that the direction of naval -operations at so critical a moment was in the hands of a man, who, -though over eighty and long a stranger to active service, understood -intuitively, and without need of explanation, the various conditions -of weather and service likely to affect the movements of the scattered -detachments, British and hostile, upon whose rapid combinations so much -now depended. - -Barham having gone to bed, Bettesworth's dispatches were not given him -till early next morning. As soon as he got them he exclaimed angrily -at the loss of so many precious hours; and, without waiting to dress, -at once dictated orders with which, by 9 A. M. of the 9th, Admiralty -messengers were hurrying to Plymouth and Portsmouth. Cornwallis was -directed to raise the blockade at Rochefort, sending the five ships -composing it to Sir Robert Calder, then watching off Ferrol with ten; -and the latter was ordered, with the fifteen ships thus united under -his command, to cruise one hundred miles west of Cape Finisterre, -to intercept Villeneuve and forestall his junction with the Ferrol -squadron. With Nelson returning toward Cadiz, where he would find -Collingwood, and with Cornwallis off Brest, this disposition completed -the arrangements necessary to thwart the primary combinations of -the emperor, unknown to, but shrewdly surmised by, his opponents. -It realized for Ferrol that which Napoleon had indicated as the -proper course for the British fleet off Brest, in case it received -intelligence of Villeneuve's approach there,—to meet the enemy so far -at sea as to prevent the squadron in port from joining in the intended -battle.[217] - -Fair winds favoring the quick, Cornwallis received his orders on the -11th; and on the 15th, eight days after the "Curieux" anchored in -Plymouth, the Rochefort ships joined Calder. The latter proceeded at -once to the post assigned him, where on the 19th he received through -Lisbon the tidings of Villeneuve's return sent by Nelson from the West -Indies. The same day Nelson himself, having outstripped the combined -fleets, anchored in Gibraltar. On the 22d the sudden lifting of a -dense fog revealed to each other the hostile squadrons of Calder and -Villeneuve; the British fifteen sail-of-the-line, the allies twenty. -The numbers of the latter were an unpleasant surprise to Calder, the -"Curieux" having reported them as only seventeen.[218] - -It is difficult to praise too highly the prompt and decisive step taken -by Lord Barham, when so suddenly confronted with the dilemma of either -raising the blockade of Rochefort and Ferrol, or permitting Villeneuve -to proceed unmolested to his destination, whatever that might be. To -act instantly and rightly in so distressing a perplexity—to be able -to make so unhesitating a sacrifice of advantages long and rightly -cherished, in order to strike at once one of the two converging -detachments of an enemy—shows generalship of a high order. It may be -compared to Bonaparte's famous abandonment of the siege of Mantua in -1796, to throw himself upon the Austrian armies descending from the -Tyrol. In the hands of a more resolute or more capable admiral than -Calder, the campaign would probably have been settled off Finisterre. -Notice has been taken of Barham's good luck, in that the brilliant -period of Trafalgar fell within his nine months' tenure of office;[219] -but Great Britain might better be congratulated that so clear-headed a -man held the reins at so critical a moment. - -The length of Villeneuve's passage, which so happily concurred to -assure the success of Barham's masterly move, was due not only to the -inferior seamanship of the allies, but also to the mistaken rendezvous -off the Azores,[220]—assigned by the French admiral when leaving the -West Indies. The westerly gales, which prevail in the North Atlantic, -blow during the summer from the south of west, west of the Azores, and -from the north of west when east of them. A fleet bound for a European -port north of the islands—as Ferrol is—should therefore so use the -south-west winds as to cross their meridian well to the northward. -Nelson himself sighted one of the group, though his destination was in -a lower latitude. In consequence of his mistake, Villeneuve was by the -north-west winds forced down on the coast of Portugal, where he met the -north-easters prevalent at that season, against which he was struggling -when encountered by Calder. This delay was therefore caused, not by bad -luck, but by bad management. - -Napoleon himself was entirely misled by Barham's measures, whose -rapidity he himself could not have surpassed. He had left Turin on the -8th of July, and, travelling incessantly, reached Fontainebleau on the -evening of the 11th. About the 20th he appears to have received the -news brought ten days before by the "Curieux," and at the same time -that of the Rochefort blockade being raised.[221] Not till the 27th did -he learn that the British squadron off Ferrol had also disappeared, -after being joined by the Rochefort ships. "The 'Curieux' only reached -England on the 9th," he wrote to Decrès; "_the Admiralty could not -decide the movements of its squadrons in twenty-four hours_, yet the -Rochefort division disappeared on the 12th. On the 15th it joined that -off Ferrol, and the same day, or at latest the next, these fourteen -ships departed by orders given _prior to_ the arrival of the 'Curieux.' -What news had the English before the arrival of that brig? That the -French were at Martinique; that Nelson had then but nine ships. What -should they have done? I should not be surprised if they have sent -another squadron to strengthen Nelson, ... and that it is these -fourteen ships from before Ferrol they have sent to America."[222] - -On the 2d of August the emperor set out for Boulogne, and there on -the 8th received news of Villeneuve's action with Calder and of his -subsequent entry into Ferrol. The fleets had fought on the afternoon of -July 22, and two Spanish ships-of-the-line had been taken. Night-fall -and fog parted the combatants; the obscurity being so great that the -allies did not know their loss till next day. One of the British ships -lost a foretopmast, and others suffered somewhat in their spars; but -these mishaps, though pleaded in Calder's defence, do not seem to have -been the chief reasons that deterred him from dogging the enemy till -he had brought him again to action. He was preoccupied with the care -of the prizes, a secondary matter, and with the thought of what would -happen in case the Ferrol and Rochefort squadrons sailed. "I could -not hope to succeed without receiving great damage; I had no friendly -port to go to, and had the Ferrol and Rochefort squadrons come out, I -must have fallen an easy prey. They might have gone to Ireland. Had I -been defeated it is impossible to say what the consequences might have -been."[223] In short, the British admiral had fallen into the error -against which Napoleon used to caution his generals. He had "made to -himself a picture," and allowed the impression produced by it to blind -him to the fact (if indeed he ever saw it) that he had before him the -largest and most important of the several detachments of the enemy, -that it was imperatively necessary not to permit it to escape unharmed, -and that at no future day could he be sure of bringing his own squadron -into play with such decisive effect. The wisdom of engaging at any -particular moment was a tactical question, to be determined by the -circumstances at the time; but the duty of keeping touch with the -enemy, so as to use promptly any opportunity offered, was a strategic -question, the answer to which admits of no doubt whatever. On the -evening of the 24th the wind was fair to carry him to the enemy, but he -parted from them. During the night it blew fresh; and on the morning -of the 25th, says a French authority, the fleet was without order, -several vessels had lost sails, and others sustained injuries to their -spars.[224] Calder, however, was not on hand. - -It is related of Nelson that, on his return voyage from the West -Indies, he used to say to his captains, speaking of the fleet which -Calder allowed to escape, "If we meet them we shall find them not less -than eighteen, I rather think twenty, sail-of-the-line, and therefore -do not be surprised if I should not fall on them immediately; _we -won't part without a battle_. I will let them alone till we approach -the shores of Europe, _or they give me an advantage too tempting to be -resisted_."[225] And again, after reaching England, he found on the -23d of August great anxiety prevailing about Calder, who with eighteen -ships was then again cruising for Villeneuve, supposed to have been -re-enforced to twenty-eight by the Ferrol squadron. "I am no conjuror," -he wrote, "but this I ventured without any fear, that if Calder got -fairly alongside their twenty-eight sail, by the time the enemy had -beat our fleet soundly, they would do us no harm this year."[226] These -two utterances of this consummate warrior sufficiently show how Calder -should have viewed his opportunity in July. - -Villeneuve had no more wish to renew the action than had Calder. -Less even than that admiral could he rise to the height of risking a -detachment in order to secure the success of a great design. In the -eighteen ships left to him were over twelve hundred men so ill that -it was necessary to put them ashore. Constrained by the winds, he put -into Vigo on the 28th of July. Calder, on the other hand, having seen -his prizes so far north as to insure their safety, returned off Cape -Finisterre where he hoped to meet Nelson. Not finding him, he on the -29th resumed the blockade of Ferrol. On the 31st Villeneuve, leaving -three of his worst vessels in Vigo, sailed for Ferrol with fifteen -ships, of which two only were Spaniards. The fleet, having a strong -south-west gale, kept close along shore to avoid meeting Calder; but -the latter, having been blown off by the storm, was not in sight -when Villeneuve reached the harbor's mouth. The allied ships were -entering with a fair wind, when the French admiral received dispatches -forbidding him to anchor in Ferrol. If, from injuries received in -battle, or losses from any causes whatever, he was unable to carry out -the plan of entering the Channel, the emperor preferred that, after -rallying the Ferrol and Rochefort squadrons, he should go to Cadiz; -but, the Brest fleet being ready and the other preparations complete, -he hoped everything from the skill, zeal, and courage of Villeneuve. -"Make us masters of the Straits of Dover," he implored, "be it but for -four or five days."[227] Napoleon leaned on a broken reed. Forbidden -to enter Ferrol, Villeneuve took his ships into the adjacent harbor of -Coruña,[228] where he anchored August 1. - -Thus was effected the junction which Calder had been expected to -prevent. His absence on the particular day may have been unavoidable; -but, if so, it does but emphasize his fault in losing sight of the -allies on the 24th of July, when he had a fair wind. Twenty-nine French -and Spanish ships were now concentrated at Ferrol. The popular outcry -was so great that he felt compelled to ask an enquiry. The Admiralty -having, by a movement both judiciously and promptly ordered, secured -a meeting with the enemy's force so far from Ferrol as to deprive it -of the support of the ships there, was justly incensed at the failure -to reap the full advantage. It therefore ordered a court-martial. The -trial was held the following December; and the admiral, while expressly -cleared of either cowardice or disaffection, was adjudged not to have -done his utmost to renew the engagement and to take or destroy every -ship of the enemy. His conduct was pronounced highly censurable, and he -was sentenced to be severely reprimanded. - -This was after Trafalgar. The immediate result of the junction in -Ferrol was the abandonment of the blockade there. On the 2d of August -Calder sent five ships to resume the watch off Rochefort, whence the -French squadron had meantime escaped. Not till August 9 did he know of -Villeneuve's entrance into Ferrol. Having with him then but nine ships, -he fell back upon the main body before Brest, which he joined on the -14th,—Cornwallis then having under him seventeen ships, which Calder's -junction raised to twenty-six. - -The next day, August 15, Nelson also joined the fleet. On the 25th of -July, a week after reaching Gibraltar, he had received the "Curieux's" -news. Obeying his constant rule to seek the French, he at once started -north with the eleven ships which had accompanied him from the West -Indies,—intending to go either to Ferrol, Brest, or Ireland, according -to the tidings which might reach him on the way. After communicating -with Cornwallis, he continued on to England with his own ship, the -"Victory," and one other whose condition required immediate repairs. On -the 18th he landed in Portsmouth, after an absence of over two years. - -Cornwallis had now under his command a concentrated force of -thirty-four or thirty-five sail-of-the-line, all admirably seasoned -and disciplined. The allies had in Brest twenty-one, in Ferrol -twenty-nine; two great bodies, neither of which, however, was equal in -number, nor still less in quality, to his. Adrift somewhere on the sea -were the five French ships from Rochefort. For more than five months -these vessels, which sailed on the 17th of July, five days after the -blockading ships had left to join Calder, ranged the seas without -meeting an equal British division,—a circumstance which earned for them -from the French the name of "the Invisible Squadron." But, while thus -fortunately unseen by the enemy, Napoleon found it equally impossible -to bring them within the scope of his combinations;[229] and it may be -doubted whether commerce-destroying to the sum of two million dollars -compensated for the loss of so important a military factor. - -The ships in Cadiz being blocked by Collingwood, and those in Cartagena -remaining always inert, the naval situation was now comparatively -simple. Cornwallis was superior to either of the enemy's detachments, -and he held an interior position. In case Villeneuve approached, it -was scarcely possible that the two hostile squadrons, dependent upon -the wind, which if fair for one would be foul to the other, could -unite before he had effectually crushed one of them. It ought to be -equally improbable, with proper lookouts, that Villeneuve could -elude the British fleet and gain so far the start of it as to cover -the Straits of Dover during the time required by Napoleon. In his -concentrated force and his interior position Cornwallis controlled the -issue,—barring of course those accidents which cannot be foreseen, and -which at times derange the best-laid plans. - -Such was the situation when, on August 17, Cornwallis was informed -that Villeneuve had put to sea with, it was said, twenty-seven or -twenty-eight ships-of-the-line. He at once detached toward Ferrol Sir -Robert Calder with eighteen sail, keeping with himself sixteen. This -division of his fleet, which is condemned by the simplest and most -generally admitted principles of warfare, transferred to Villeneuve -all the advantage of central position and superior force, and was -stigmatized by Napoleon as a "glaring blunder." "What a chance," he -wrote, upon hearing it when all was over, "has Villeneuve missed. He -might, by coming upon Brest from a wide sweep to sea, have played -hide and seek with Calder and fallen upon Cornwallis; or else, with -his thirty ships have beaten Calder's twenty and gained a decided -preponderance."[230] This censure of both admirals was just. - -While the British squadrons were concentrating in the Bay of Biscay, -and the happy insight and diligence of Nelson were bringing the -Mediterranean ships to the critical centre of action, Napoleon, from -the heights overlooking Boulogne, was eagerly awaiting news from -Villeneuve, and at the same time anxiously watching the signs of the -times on the Continent, where the sky was already dark with a gathering -storm. The encroachments which led to the second war with Great -Britain, in 1803, had excited no less distrust among the continental -powers, who were indeed more immediately and disastrously affected -by them; but none had then dared to move. The violation of German -neutrality in 1804, by the seizure of the Duc d'Enghien on the soil of -Baden, had caused a general indignation; which, on the part of Russia -and Austria, was quickened into a desire to act by his execution, -regarded by most as a judicial murder. Prussia shared the anger and -fears of the other powers, but not enough to decide her vacillating -government. - -In this state of things the fall of the Addington ministry, and the -consequent vigor imparted to the foreign policy of Great Britain by -Pitt's second accession to power, led naturally to another coalition; -the centre of which, as ever, was found in London. The czar having -remonstrated vigorously, both with Napoleon and the German Diet, upon -the seizure of the Duc d'Enghien, a bitter correspondence had followed, -causing the rupture of diplomatic relations between France and Russia -in August, 1804. For similar reasons, and at the same time, the French -embassy to Sweden was recalled. Austria still temporized, though her -actions excited Napoleon's suspicions. - -Early in 1805 the czar sent special envoys to London, to treat -concerning certain vast schemes for the reorganization of Europe in -the interests of general peace. The particular object was not reached; -but on the 11th of April a treaty between Great Britain and Russia was -signed, the two agreeing to promote a league among the powers to stop -further encroachments by Napoleon. Six weeks later the emperor was -crowned King of Italy, and in June Genoa was annexed to France. This -last act, contemplated by Napoleon for many years,[231] determined -Austria's accession to the treaty. By her signature, given August -9,[232] the third coalition was formed. Sweden became a party to it at -the same time, and Great Britain undertook to pay subsidies to all the -members. - -The preparations of Austria, ever deliberate, could not escape -Napoleon's watchful eye. "All my news from Italy is warlike," he -writes, "and indeed Austria no longer observes any concealment."[233] -Yet, trusting to his enemy's slowness and his own readiness, he did -not lose hope. The position was precisely analogous to those military -situations in which he had so often snatched success from overwhelming -numbers, by rapidly throwing himself on one enemy before the other -could join. He might even yet deal his long cherished blow to Great -Britain, under which, if successful, Austria also would at once -succumb. On August 13, two days after learning of Villeneuve's entry -into Coruña, he instructs Talleyrand to notify the emperor that the -troops assembled in the Tyrol _must_ be withdrawn to Bohemia, leaving -him free to carry on his war with England undisturbed, or by November -he will be in Vienna.[234] Urgent messages are the same day sent to -Villeneuve to hasten and fulfil his mission, for time was pressing; -threatened by Austria and Great Britain, a blow must speedily be -struck. He is no longer ordered to refrain from fighting. On the -contrary, if superior to the British, counting two Spanish ships equal -to one French, he is to attack at all hazards.[235] "If with thirty -ships my admirals fear to attack twenty-four British, we may as well -give up all hope of a navy."[236] - -On the 23d of August the emperor announces to Talleyrand his final -and momentous decision: "My squadron sailed August 14 from Ferrol -with thirty-four ships;[237] it had no enemy in sight. If it follows -my instructions, joins the Brest squadron and enters the Channel, -there is still time; I am master of England. If, on the contrary, my -admirals hesitate, manœuvre badly, and do not fulfil their purpose, -I have no other resource than to wait for winter to cross with the -flotilla. That operation is risky; it would be more so if, pressed by -time, political events should oblige me to postpone it to the month of -April. Such being the case, I hasten to meet the most pressing danger: -I raise my camp here, and by September 23 I shall have in Germany two -hundred thousand men, and twenty-five thousand in Naples. I march upon -Vienna, and do not lay down my arms until I have Naples and Venice, -and have no more to fear from Austria. Austria will certainly thus -be quieted during the winter." These words were a prophecy. The same -day numerous orders, strictly preparatory as yet, were issued to the -troops in Hanover, Holland, and Italy, and other provision made for -the contemplated change of purpose. At the same time, still clinging -to every hope of arresting Austria, and so being left free for the -invasion of England, he sent Duroc to Berlin to offer Hanover to -Prussia, upon condition that the latter should move troops toward -Bohemia or at least make a clear declaration to Austria. - -The issue was already decided. On the 13th of August, after three -fruitless attempts, Villeneuve got to sea with his twenty-nine -ships-of-the-line. The frigate "Didon" was sent to seek the Rochefort -squadron and direct it also upon Brest. Yet the unfortunate admiral was -even then hesitating whether he should go there with his vastly greater -force, and the orders were likely seriously to endanger the smaller -division. As he sailed, he penned these significant words to the -Minister of Marine: "The enemy's forces, more concentrated than ever, -leave me little other resource than to go to Cadiz."[238] - -Shortly after he cleared the harbor the wind shifted to north-east, -foul for his purpose. The fleet stood to the north-west; but the -ships were badly handled and several received damage. On the morning -of the 15th they were two hundred and fifty miles west-north-west -from Cape Finisterre; the wind blowing a moderate gale, still from -the north-east. Three ships of war were in sight,—two British, the -third the frigate that had been sent to seek the Rochefort squadron, -but which had been captured. A Danish merchantman reported that they -were lookouts from a hostile body of twenty-five ships. The story -had no foundation, for Cornwallis had not yet divided his fleet; but -Villeneuve pictured to himself his inefficient command meeting a force -with which it was wholly unable to cope. Losing sight of the great -whole of which his own enterprise was but a part, though one of vital -importance, his resolution finally broke down. That evening he ordered -the fleet to bear up for Cadiz. On the 20th[239] it was sighted from -the three ships commanded by Collingwood, who with a small division -of varying strength had watched the port since the previous May. With -steady judgment, that admiral in retiring kept just out of gunshot, -determined, as he said, not to be driven into the Mediterranean without -dragging the enemy too through the Straits. Villeneuve had little -heart to pursue. That afternoon he anchored in Cadiz, where were then -assembled thirty-five French and Spanish ships-of-the-line. Collingwood -at once resumed his station outside. That night one ship-of-the-line -joined him, and on the 22d Sir Richard Bickerton arrived with four from -the Mediterranean. On the 30th Calder appeared, bringing with him the -eighteen detached by Cornwallis. In compliance with his orders he had -been before Ferrol, found the port empty, and, learning that Villeneuve -had sailed for Cadiz, had hastened to re-enforce the blockade. With -twenty-six ships-of-the-line Collingwood held the enemy securely -checked, and remained in chief command until the 28th of September, -when Nelson arrived from England. - -Thus ended, and forever, Napoleon's profoundly conceived and -laboriously prepared scheme for the invasion of England. If it be -sought to fix a definite moment which marked the final failure of so -vast a plan, that one may well be chosen when Villeneuve made signal -to bear up for Cadiz. When, precisely, Napoleon learned the truth, -does not appear. Decrès, the Minister of Marine, had however prepared -him in some measure for Villeneuve's action; and, after a momentary -outburst of rage against the unfortunate admiral, he at once issued -in rapid succession the directions, by which, to use his own graphic -expression, his legions were made to "pirouette," and the march toward -the Rhine and Upper Danube was begun. "My decision is taken," he writes -to Talleyrand, August 25; "my movement is begun. Three weeks hence I -shall be in Germany with two hundred thousand men." During that and -the two following days order after order issued from his headquarters; -and on the 28th he wrote to Duroc that the army was in full movement. -To conceal his change of purpose and to gain all-important time, by -lulling the suspicions of Austria, he himself remained at Boulogne, -with his eyes seemingly fixed seaward, until the 3d of September, when -he went to Paris. On the 24th he left the capital for the army, on -the 26th he was at Strasbourg, and on the 7th of October the French -army, numbering near two hundred thousand, struck the Danube below -Ulm; cutting off some eighty thousand Austrians there assembled under -General Mack. On the 20th, the day before Trafalgar, Ulm capitulated; -thirty thousand men laying down their arms. Thirty thousand more had -been taken in the actions preceding this event.[240] On the 13th of -November French troops entered Vienna, and on the 2d of December the -battle of Austerlitz was won over the combined Russians and Austrians. -On the 26th the emperor of Germany signed the Peace of Presburg. By it -he relinquished Venice with all other possessions in Italy, and ceded -the Tyrol to Bavaria, the ally of France. - -Austria was thus quieted for three years, but the expedition against -Great Britain was never resumed. In the course of the following year -difficulties arose between Prussia and France, which led to war and -the overthrow of the North German kingdom at Auerstadt and Jena. Yet -another campaign was needed to bring Russia to peace in 1807. Meanwhile -the Boulogne flotilla was rotting on the beach. In October, 1807, -Decrès, by Napoleon's orders, made an inspection of the boats and the -four ports. Of the twelve hundred of the former, specially built for -the invasion, not over three hundred were fit to put to sea; of the -nine hundred transports nearly all were past service. The circular port -at Boulogne was covered two feet deep with sand; those of Vimereux and -Ambleteuse, three feet. A very few years more would suffice to bury -them.[241] In 1814 an English lady, visiting Boulogne after Napoleon's -first abdication, noted in her journal that the mud walls of the -encampment were still to be seen on the heights behind the town,—the -crumbling record of a great failure. - -The question will naturally here arise, What at any time were the -chances of success? To a purely speculative question, involving so many -elements and into which the conditions of sea war then introduced so -many varying quantities, it would be folly to reply with a positive -assertion. Certain determining factors may, however, be profitably -noted. It is, for instance, evident that, if Villeneuve on leaving the -West Indies had had with him the Ferrol squadron, and still more if he -had been joined by Ganteaume, he could have steered at once for the -Channel; and, by attending to well-known weather conditions, could -have entered it with a favoring wind sure to last him to Boulogne. The -difficulty of effecting such a combination in the West Indies, which -was Napoleon's favorite project, was owing to the presence of British -divisions before the hostile ports; and step by step this circumstance -drove the emperor back on what he pronounced the worst alternative,—a -concentration in front of Brest. As has been noticed, at the critical -moment when this final concentration was to be attempted, the British, -by a series of movements which resulted naturally from their strategic -policy, were before that port in force superior to either of the French -detachments seeking there to make their junction. Cornwallis's blunder -in dividing that force cannot obscure the military lesson involved. - -Nor can Calder's error, in suffering Villeneuve to escape him in July, -detract from the equally significant and precisely similar lesson -then illustrated. There also the British fleet was on hand to check -an important junction—at a point so far from Ferrol as to be out -of supporting distance by the division in the port—by virtue of an -intelligent use of interior positions and interior lines. - -To the strategic advantage conferred by these interior positions, -for clinging to which credit is due above all to St. Vincent, -is to be added the very superior character of the British -personnel,—particularly of the officers; for the immense demand for -seamen made it hard to maintain the quality of the crews. Continually -cruising, not singly but in squadrons more or less numerous, the ships -were ever on the drill ground,—nay, on the battle-field,—experiencing -all the varying phases impressed upon it by the changes of the ocean. -Thus practised and hardened into perfect machines, though inferior in -numbers, they were continually superior in force and in mobility to -their opponents. - -Possessing, therefore, strategic advantage and superior force, the -probabilities favored Great Britain. Nevertheless, there remained to -Napoleon enough chances of success to forbid saying that his enterprise -was hopeless. A seaman can scarcely deny that, despite the genius of -Nelson and the tenacity of the British officers, it was possible that -some favorable concurrence of circumstances might have brought forty -or more French ships into the Channel, and given Napoleon the mastery -of the Straits for the few days he asked. The very removal of the -squadrons of observation from before Rochefort and Ferrol, in order -to constitute the fleet with which Calder fought Villeneuve, though -admirable as a display of generalship, shows that the British navy, so -far as numbers were concerned, was not adequate to perfect security, -and might, by some conceivable combination of circumstances, have been -outwitted and overwhelmed at the decisive point. - -The importance attached by the emperor to his project was not -exaggerated. He might, or he might not, succeed; but, if he failed -against Great Britain, he failed everywhere. This he, with the -intuition of genius, felt; and to this the record of his after history -now bears witness. To the strife of arms with the great Sea Power -succeeded the strife of endurance. Amid all the pomp and circumstance -of the war which for ten years to come desolated the Continent, amid -all the tramping to and fro over Europe of the French armies and their -auxiliary legions, there went on unceasingly that noiseless pressure -upon the vitals of France, that compulsion, whose silence, when once -noted, becomes to the observer the most striking and awful mark of the -working of Sea Power. Under it the resources of the Continent wasted -more and more with each succeeding year; and Napoleon, amid all the -splendor of his imperial position, was ever needy. To this, and to -the immense expenditures required to enforce the Continental System, -are to be attributed most of those arbitrary acts which made him the -hated of the peoples, for whose enfranchisement he did so much. Lack -of revenue and lack of credit, such was the price paid by Napoleon -for the Continental System, through which alone, after Trafalgar, he -hoped to crush the Power of the Sea. It may be doubted whether, amid -all his glory, he ever felt secure after the failure of the invasion -of England. To borrow his own vigorous words, in the address to the -nation issued before he joined the army, "To live without commerce, -without shipping, without colonies, subjected to the unjust will of our -enemies, is to live as Frenchmen should not." Yet so had France to live -throughout his reign, by the will of the one enemy never conquered. - -On the 14th of September, before quitting Paris, Napoleon sent -Villeneuve orders to take the first favorable opportunity to leave -Cadiz, to enter the Mediterranean, join the ships at Cartagena, and -with this combined force move upon southern Italy. There, at any -suitable point, he was to land the troops embarked in the fleet to -re-enforce General St. Cyr, who already had instructions to be ready -to attack Naples at a moment's notice.[242] The next day these orders -were reiterated to Decrès, enforcing the importance to the general -campaign of so powerful a diversion as the presence of this great fleet -in the Mediterranean; but, as "Villeneuve's excessive pusillanimity -will prevent him from undertaking this, you will send to replace him -Admiral Rosily, who will bear letters directing Villeneuve to return -to France and give an account of his conduct."[243] The emperor had -already formulated his complaints against the admiral under seven -distinct heads.[244] On the 15th of September, the same day the orders -to relieve Villeneuve were issued, Nelson, having spent at home only -twenty-five days, left England for the last time. On the 28th, when he -joined the fleet off Cadiz, he found under his command twenty-nine -ships-of-the-line, which successive arrivals raised to thirty-three by -the day of the battle; but, water running short, it became necessary to -send the ships, by divisions of six, to fill up at Gibraltar. To this -cause was due that only twenty-seven British vessels were present in -the action,—an unfortunate circumstance; for, as Nelson said, what the -country wanted was not merely a splendid victory, but annihilation; -"numbers only can annihilate."[245] The force under his command was -thus disposed: the main body about fifty miles west-south-west of -Cadiz, seven lookout frigates close in with the port, and between these -extremes, two small detachments of ships-of-the-line,—the one twenty -miles from the harbor, the other about thirty-five. "By this chain," he -wrote, "I hope to have constant communication with the frigates." - -Napoleon's commands to enter the Mediterranean reached Villeneuve on -September 27. The following day, when Nelson was joining his fleet, -the admiral acknowledged their receipt, and submissively reported his -intention to obey as soon as the wind served. Before he could do so, -accurate intelligence was received of the strength of Nelson's force, -which the emperor had not known. Villeneuve assembled a council of -war to consider the situation, and the general opinion was adverse to -sailing; but the commander-in-chief, alleging the orders of Napoleon, -announced his determination to follow them. To this all submitted. An -event, then unforeseen by Villeneuve, precipitated his action. - -Admiral Rosily's approach was known in Cadiz some time before he could -arrive. It at first made little impression upon Villeneuve, who was -not expecting to be superseded. On the 11th of October, however, along -with the news that his successor had reached Madrid, there came to him -a rumor of the truth. His honor took alarm. If not allowed to remain -afloat, how remove the undeserved imputation of cowardice which he knew -had by some been attached to his name. He at once wrote to Decrès that -he would have been well content if permitted to continue with the fleet -in a subordinate capacity; and closed with the words, "I will sail -to-morrow, if circumstances favor." - -The wind next day was fair, and the combined fleets began to weigh. -On the 19th eight ships got clear of the harbor, and by ten A. M. -Nelson, far at sea, knew by signal that the long-expected movement had -begun. He at once made sail toward the Straits of Gibraltar to bar -the entrance of the Mediterranean to the allies. On the 20th, all the -latter, thirty-three ships-of-the-line accompanied by five frigates -and two brigs, were at sea, steering with a south-west wind to the -northward and westward to gain the offing needed before heading direct -for the Straits. That morning Nelson, for whom the wind had been fair, -was lying to off Cape Spartel to intercept the enemy; and learning from -his frigates that they were north of him, he stood in that direction to -meet them. - -During the day the wind shifted to west, still fair for the British and -allowing the allies, by going about, to head south. It was still very -weak, so that the progress of the fleets was slow. During the night -both manœuvred; the allies to gain, the British to retain, the position -they wished. At daybreak of the 21st they were in presence, the French -and Spaniards steering south in five columns; of which the two to -windward, containing together twelve ships, constituted a detached -squadron of observation under Admiral Gravina. The remaining twenty-one -formed the main body, commanded by Villeneuve. Cape Trafalgar, from -which the battle took its name, was on the south-eastern horizon, ten -or twelve miles from the allies; and the British fleet was at the same -distance from them to the westward. - -Soon after daylight Villeneuve signalled to form line of battle on -the starboard tack, on which they were then sailing, heading south. -In performing this evolution Gravina with his twelve ships took post -in the van of the allied fleet, his own flag-ship heading the column. -It is disputed between the French and Spaniards whether this step was -taken by Villeneuve's order, or of Gravina's own motion. In either -case, these twelve, by abandoning their central and windward position, -sacrificed to a great extent their power to re-enforce any threatened -part of the order, and also unduly extended a line already too long. -In the end, instead of being a reserve well in hand, they became the -helpless victims of the British concentration. - -At 8 A. M. Villeneuve saw that battle could not be shunned. Wishing to -have Cadiz under his lee in case of disaster, he ordered the combined -fleet to wear together. The signal was clumsily executed; but by ten -all had gone round and were heading north in inverse order, Gravina's -squadron in the rear. At eleven Villeneuve directed this squadron to -keep well to windward, so as to be in position to succor the centre, -upon which the enemy seemed about to make his chief attack; a judicious -order, but rendered fruitless by the purpose of the British to -concentrate on the rear itself. When this signal was made, Cadiz was -twenty miles distant in the north-north-east, and the course of the -allies was carrying them toward it. - -Owing to the lightness of the wind Nelson would lose no time in -manœuvring. He formed his fleet rapidly in two divisions, each in -single column, the simplest and most flexible order of attack, and -the one whose regularity is most easily preserved. The simple column, -however, unflanked, sacrifices during the critical period of closing -the support given by the rear ships to the leader, and draws upon the -latter the concentrated fire of the enemy's line. Its use by Nelson -on this occasion has been much criticised. It is therefore to be -remarked that, although his orders, issued several days previous to the -battle, are somewhat ambiguous on this point, their natural meaning -seems to indicate the intention, if attacking from to windward, to draw -up with his fleet in two columns parallel to the enemy and abreast -his rear. Then the column nearest the enemy, the lee, keeping away -together, would advance in line against the twelve rear ships; while -the weather column, moving forward, would hold in check the remainder -of the hostile fleet. In either event, whether attacking in column or -in line, the essential feature of his plan was to overpower twelve of -the enemy by sixteen British, while the remainder of his force covered -this operation. The destruction of the rear was entrusted to the second -in command; he himself with a smaller body took charge of the more -uncertain duties of the containing force. "The second in command," -wrote he in his memorable order, "will, after my instructions are made -known to him, have the entire direction of his line." - -The justification of Nelson's dispositions for battle at Trafalgar -rests therefore primarily upon the sluggish breeze, which would so have -delayed formations as to risk the loss of the opportunity. It must -also be observed that, although a column of ships does not possess the -sustained momentum of a column of men, whose depth and mass combine to -drive it through the relatively thin resistance of a line, and so cut -the latter in twain, the results nevertheless are closely analogous. -The leaders in either case are sacrificed,—success is won over their -prostrate forms; but the continued impact upon one part of the enemy's -order is essentially a concentration, the issue of which, if long -enough maintained, cannot be doubtful. Penetration, severance, and -the enveloping of one of the parted fragments, must be the result. -So, exactly, it was at Trafalgar. It must also be noted that the rear -ships of either column, until they reached the hostile line, swept -with their broadsides the sea over which enemy's ships from either -flank might try to come to the support of the attacked centre. No such -attempt was in fact made from either extremity of the combined fleet. - -[Illustration: The Attack at Trafalgar.] - -The two British columns were nearly a mile apart and advanced on -parallel courses,—heading nearly east, but a little to the northward -to allow for the gradual advance in that direction of the hostile -fleet. The northern or left-hand column, commonly called the "weather -line" because the wind came rather from that side, contained twelve -ships, and was led by Nelson himself in the "Victory," a ship of one -hundred guns. The "Royal Sovereign," of the same size and carrying -Collingwood's flag, headed the right column, of fifteen ships. - -To the British advance the allies opposed the traditional order of -battle, a long single line, closehauled,—in this case heading north, -with the wind from west-north-west. The distance from one flank to -the other was nearly five miles. Owing partly to the lightness of -the breeze, partly to the great number of ships, and partly to the -inefficiency of many of the units of the fleet, the line was very -imperfectly formed. Ships were not in their places, intervals were of -irregular width, here vessels were not closed up, there two overlapped, -one masking the other's fire. The general result was that, instead -of a line, the allied order showed a curve of gradual sweep, convex -toward the east. To the British approach from the west, therefore, it -presented a disposition resembling a re-entrant angle; and Collingwood, -noting with observant eye the advantage of this arrangement for a -cross-fire, commented favorably upon it in his report of the battle. It -was, however, the result of chance, not of intention,—due, not to the -talent of the chief, but to the want of skill in his subordinates. - -The commander-in-chief of the allies, Villeneuve, was in the -"Bucentaure," an eighty-gun ship, the twelfth in order from the van of -the line. Immediately ahead of him was the huge Spanish four-decker, -the "Santisima Trinidad," a Goliath among ships, which had now come -forth to her last battle. Sixth behind the "Bucentaure," and therefore -eighteenth in the order, came a Spanish three-decker, the "Santa Ana," -flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Alava. These two admirals marked the -right and left of the allied centre, and upon them, therefore, the -British leaders respectively directed their course,—Nelson upon the -"Bucentaure," Collingwood upon the "Santa Ana." - -The "Royal Sovereign" had recently been refitted, and with clean new -copper easily outsailed her more worn followers. Thus it happened that, -as Collingwood came within range, his ship, outstripping the others -by three quarters of a mile, entered alone, and for twenty minutes -endured, unsupported, the fire of all the hostile ships that could -reach her. A proud deed, surely, but surely also not a deed to be -commended as a pattern. The first shot of the battle was fired at her -by the "Fougueux," the next astern of the "Santa Ana." This was just at -noon, and with the opening guns the ships of both fleets hoisted their -ensigns; the Spaniards also hanging large wooden crosses from their -spanker booms. - -The "Royal Sovereign" advanced in silence until, ten minutes later, -she passed close under the stern of the "Santa Ana." Then she fired a -double-shotted broadside which struck down four hundred of the enemy's -crew, and, luffing rapidly, took her position close alongside, the -muzzles of the hostile guns nearly touching. Here the "Royal Sovereign" -underwent the fire not only of her chief antagonist, but of four other -ships; three of which belonged to the division of five that ought -closely to have knit the "Santa Ana" to the "Bucentaure," and so fixed -an impassable barrier to the enemy seeking to pierce the centre. The -fact shows strikingly the looseness of the allied order, these three -being all in rear and to leeward of their proper stations. - -For fifteen minutes the "Royal Sovereign" was the only British ship -in close action. Then her next astern entered the battle, followed -successively by the rest of the column. In rear of the "Santa Ana" were -fifteen ships. Among these, Collingwood's vessels penetrated in various -directions; chiefly, however, at first near the spot where his flag had -led the way, enveloping and destroying in detail the enemy's centre -and leading rear ships, and then passing on to subdue the rest. Much -doubtless was determined by chance in such confusion and obscurity; -but the original tactical plan insured an overwhelming concentration -upon a limited portion of the enemy's order. This being subdued with -the less loss, because so outnumbered, the intelligence and skill of -the various British captains readily compassed the destruction of the -dwindling remnant. Of the sixteen ships, including the "Santa Ana," -which composed the allied rear, twelve were taken or destroyed. - -Not till one o'clock, or nearly half an hour after the vessels next -following Collingwood came into action, did the "Victory" reach the -"Bucentaure." The latter was raked with the same dire results that -befell the "Santa Ana;" but a ship close to leeward blocked the way, -and Nelson was not able to grapple with the enemy's commander-in-chief. -The "Victory," prevented from going through the line, fell on board -the "Redoutable," a French seventy-four, between which and herself a -furious action followed,—the two lying in close contact. At half-past -one Nelson fell mortally wounded, the battle still raging fiercely. - -The ship immediately following Nelson's came also into collision -with the "Redoutable," which thus found herself in combat with two -antagonists. The next three of the British weather column each in -succession raked the "Bucentaure," complying thus with Nelson's -order that every effort must be made to capture the enemy's -commander-in-chief. Passing on, these three concentrated their efforts, -first, upon the "Bucentaure," and next upon the "Santisima Trinidad." -Thus it happened that upon the allied commander-in-chief, upon his -next ahead, and upon the ship which, though not his natural supporter -astern, had sought and filled that honorable post,—upon the key, in -short, of the allied order,—were combined under the most advantageous -conditions the fires of five hostile vessels, three of them -first-rates. Consequently, not only were the three added to the prizes, -but also a great breach was made between the van and rear of the -combined fleets. This breach became yet wider by the singular conduct -of Villeneuve's proper next astern. Soon after the "Victory" came -into action, that ship bore up out of the line, wore round, and stood -toward the rear, followed by three others. This movement is attributed -to a wish to succor the rear. If so, it was at best an indiscreet and -ill-timed act, which finds little palliation in the fact that not one -of these ships was taken. - -Thus, two hours after the battle began, the allied fleet was cut in -two, the rear enveloped and in process of being destroyed in detail, -the "Bucentaure," "Santisima Trinidad," and "Redoutable" practically -reduced, though not yet surrendered. Ahead of the "Santisima Trinidad" -were ten ships, which as yet had not been engaged. The inaction of -the van, though partly accounted for by the slackness of the wind, -has given just cause for censure. To it, at ten minutes before two, -Villeneuve made signal to get into action and to wear together. This -was accomplished with difficulty, owing to the heavy swell and want -of wind. At three, however, all the ships were about, but by an -extraordinary fatality they did not keep together. Five with Admiral -Dumanoir stood along to windward of the battle, three passed to leeward -of it, and two, keeping away, left the field entirely. Of the whole -number, three were intercepted, raising the loss of the allies to -eighteen ships-of-the-line taken, one of which caught fire and was -burned. The approach of Admiral Dumanoir, if made an hour earlier, -might have conduced to save Villeneuve; it was now too late. Exchanging -a few distant broadsides with enemy's ships, he stood off to the -south-west with four vessels; one of those at first with him having -been cut off. - -At quarter before five Admiral Gravina, whose ship had been the rear -of the order during the battle and had lost heavily, retreated toward -Cadiz, making signal to the vessels which had not struck to form around -his flag. Five other Spanish ships and five French followed him. As -he was withdrawing, the last two to resist of the allied fleet struck -their colors. - -During the night of the 21st these eleven ships anchored at the mouth -of Cadiz harbor, which they could not then enter, on account of a land -wind from south-east. At the same time the British and their prizes -were being carried shoreward by the heavy swell which had prevailed -during the battle; the light air blowing from the sea not enabling them -to haul off. The situation was one of imminent peril. At midnight the -wind freshened much, but fortunately hauled to the southward, whence -it blew a gale all the 22d. The ships got their heads to the westward -and drew off shore, with thirteen of the prizes; the other four having -had to anchor off Cape Trafalgar. That morning the "Bucentaure," -Villeneuve's late flag-ship, was wrecked on some rocks off the entrance -to Cadiz; and toward evening the "Redoutable," that had so nobly -supported her, was found to be sinking astern of the British ship that -had her in tow. During the night of the 22d she went down, with a -hundred and fifty of her people still on board. On the 24th the same -fate befell the great "Santisima Trinidad," which had been the French -admiral's next ahead. Thus his own ship and his two supports vanished -from the seas. - -For several days the wind continued violent from north-west and -south-west. On the 23d five of the ships that had escaped with Gravina -put out, to cut off some of the prizes that were near the coast. They -succeeded in taking two; but as these were battered to pieces, while -three of the five rescuers were carried on the beach and wrecked with -great loss of life, little advantage resulted from this well-meant -and gallant sortie. Two other prizes were given up to their own crews -by the British prize-masters, because the latter were not able with -their scanty force to save them. These got into Cadiz. Of the remaining -British prizes, all but four either went ashore or were destroyed by -the orders of Collingwood, who despaired of saving them. No British -ship was lost. - -Of thirty-three combined French and Spanish ships which sailed out of -Cadiz on the 20th of October, eleven, five French and six Spanish, -mostly now disabled hulks, lay there at anchor on the last day of -the month. The four that escaped to sea under Dumanoir fell in with -a British squadron of the same size near Cape Ortegal, on the 4th -of November, and were all taken. This raised the allied loss to -twenty-two,—two more than the twenty for which Nelson, in his dying -hour, declared that he had bargained. - -No attempt to move from Cadiz was again made by the shattered relics -of the fight. On the 25th of October Rosily arrived and took up his -now blasted command. Nearly three years later, when the Spanish -monarchy, so long the submissive tool of the Directory and of Napoleon, -had been overthrown by the latter, and the Spanish people had risen -against the usurper, the five French ships were still in the port. -Surprised between the British blockade and the now hostile batteries -of the coast, Rosily, after an engagement of two days with the latter, -surrendered his squadron, with the four thousand seamen then on board. -This event occurred on the 14th of June, 1808. It was the last echo of -Trafalgar. - -Such, in its leading outlines and direct consequences, was the famous -battle of Trafalgar. Its lasting significance and far-reaching results -have been well stated by a recent historian, more keenly alive than -most of his fellows to the paramount, though silent, influence of Sea -Power upon the course of events: "Trafalgar was not only the greatest -naval victory, it was the greatest and most momentous victory won -either by land or by sea during the whole of the Revolutionary War. -No victory, and no series of victories, of Napoleon produced the same -effect upon Europe.... A generation passed after Trafalgar before -France again seriously threatened England at sea. The prospect of -crushing the British navy, so long as England had the means to equip -a navy, vanished. Napoleon henceforth set his hopes on exhausting -England's resources, by compelling every state on the Continent to -exclude her commerce. Trafalgar forced him to impose his yoke upon -_all_ Europe, or to abandon the hope of conquering Great Britain.... -Nelson's last triumph left England in such a position that no means -remained to injure her but those which _must result in the ultimate -deliverance of the Continent_."[246] - -These words may be accepted with very slight modification. Napoleon's -scheme for the invasion of Great Britain, thwarted once and again by -the strategic difficulties attendant upon its execution, was finally -frustrated when Villeneuve gave up the attempt to reach Brest and -headed for Cadiz. On the part of the allies Trafalgar was, in itself, -a useless holocaust, precipitated in the end by the despair of the -unfortunate admiral, upon whose irresolution Napoleon not unjustly -visited the anger caused by the wreck of his plans. Villeneuve -was perfectly clear-sighted and right in his appreciation of the -deficiencies of his command,—of the many chances against success. -Where he wretchedly failed was in not recognizing the simple duty of -obedience,—the obligation to persist at all hazards in the part of a -great scheme assigned to him, even though it led to the destruction of -his whole force. Had he, upon leaving Ferrol, been visited by a little -of the desperation which brought him to Trafalgar, the invasion of -England might possibly—not probably—have been effected. - -An event so striking as the battle of Trafalgar becomes, however, to -mankind the symbol of all the circumstances—more important, perhaps, -but less obvious—which culminate in it. In this sense it may be said -that Trafalgar was the cause—as it certainly marked the period—of -Napoleon's resolution to crush Great Britain by excluding her commerce -from the Continent. Here, therefore, the story of the influence of -Sea Power upon this great conflict ceases to follow the strictly -naval events, and becomes concerned simply with commerce-destroying, -ordinarily a secondary operation of maritime war, but exalted in the -later years of Napoleon's reign to be the principal, if not the sole, -means of action. - -To this the two next chapters are devoted. Of these, the first deals -with commerce-destroying in the ordinary sense of the words, directed -against enemies' property on the high seas; beginning with the outbreak -of war in 1793, and narrating the series of measures by which the -republic sought to break down British commerce and foreshadowed the -policy of Napoleon's Berlin and Milan decrees. The second begins -with the Berlin decree, in 1806; and, tracing one by one the steps -which carried the emperor from violence to violence, seeks to show -how these found their necessary outcome in the Russian expedition and -the fall of the Empire. Detached thus, as far as may be, from the -maze of contemporary history in which they are commonly lost, these -successive acts of the French government are seen to form a logical -sequence, connected by one motive and dominated by one necessity. The -motive is the destruction of Great Britain, the necessity that of -self-preservation. Each nation, unassailable on its own element, stood -like an impregnable fortress that can be brought to surrender only by -the exhaustion of its resources. In this struggle of endurance Napoleon -fell. - - - - -CHAPTER XVII. - -THE WARFARE AGAINST COMMERCE DURING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE, -TO THE BERLIN DECREE. 1793-1806. - - -The Warfare against Commerce during the French Revolution, alike under -the Republic and under Napoleon, was marked by the same passionate -vehemence, the same extreme and far-reaching conceptions, the same -obstinate resolve utterly to overthrow and extirpate every opposing -force, that characterized the political and military enterprises of -the period. In the effort to bring under the yoke of their own policy -the commerce of the whole world, the two chief contestants, France and -Great Britain, swayed back and forth in deadly grapple over the vast -arena, trampling under foot the rights and interests of the weaker -parties; who, whether as neutrals, or as subjects of friendly or allied -powers, looked helplessly on, and found that in this great struggle -for self-preservation, neither outcries, nor threats, nor despairing -submission, availed to lessen the pressure that was gradually crushing -out both hope and life. The question between Napoleon and the British -people became simply one of endurance, as was tersely and powerfully -shown by the emperor himself. Both were expending their capital, and -drawing freely drafts upon the future, the one in money, the other in -men, to sustain their present strength. Like two infuriated dogs, they -had locked jaws over Commerce, as the decisive element in the contest. -Neither would let go his grip until failing vitality should loose it, -or until some bystander should deal one a wound through which the -powers of life should drain away. All now know that in the latter way -the end came. The commercial policy of the great monarch, who, from the -confines of Europe, had watched the tussle with all the eagerness of -self-interest, angered Napoleon. To enforce his will, he made new and -offensive annexations of territory. The czar replied by a commercial -edict, sharp and decisive, and war was determined. "It is all a scene -in the Opera," wrote Napoleon,[247] "and the English are the scene -shifters." Words failed the men of that day to represent the grandeur -and apparent solidity of the Empire in 1811, when Napoleon's heir was -born. In December, 1812, it was shattered from turret to foundation -stone; wrecked in the attempt "to conquer the sea by the land." The -scene was shifted indeed. - -Great Britain remained victorious on the field, but she had touched -the verge of ruin. Confronted with the fixed resolution of her enemy -to break down her commerce by an absolute exclusion from the continent -of Europe, and as far as possible from the rest of the world, she met -the challenge by a measure equally extreme, forbidding all neutral -vessels to enter ports hostile to her, unless they had first touched -at one of her own. Shut out herself from the Continent, she announced -that while this exclusion lasted she would shut the Continent off from -all external intercourse. "No trade except _through_ England," was the -formula under which her leaders expressed their purpose. The entrance -of Russia into this strife, under the provocations of Napoleon, -prevented the problem, which of these two policies would overthrow the -other, from reaching a natural solution; and the final result of the -measures which it is one object of this and the following chapter to -narrate must remain for ever uncertain. It is, however, evident that -a commercial and manufacturing country like Great Britain must, in a -strife the essence of which was the restriction of trade, suffer more -than one depending, as France did, mainly upon her internal resources. -The question, as before stated, was whether she could endure the -greater drain by her greater wealth. Upon the whole, the indications -were, and to the end continued to be, that she could do so; that -Napoleon, in entering upon this particular struggle, miscalculated his -enemy's strength. - -But besides this, here, as in every contest where the opponents are -closely matched, where power and discipline and leadership are nearly -equal, there was a further question: which of the two would make the -first and greatest mistakes, and how ready the other party was to -profit by his errors. In so even a balance, the wisest prophet cannot -foresee how the scale will turn. The result will depend not merely upon -the skill of the swordsman in handling his weapons, but also upon the -wariness of his fence and the quickness of his returns; much, too, upon -his temper. Here also Napoleon was worsted. Scarcely was the battle -over commerce joined, when the uprising of Spain was precipitated by -over-confidence; Great Britain hastened at once to place herself by the -side of the insurgents. Four years later, when the British people were -groaning in a protracted financial crisis,—when, if ever, there was -a hope that the expected convulsion and ruin were at hand,—Napoleon, -instead of waiting for his already rigorous blockade to finish the work -he attributed to it, strove to draw it yet closer, by demands which -were unnecessary and to which the czar could not yield. Again Great -Britain seized her opportunity, received her late enemy's fleet, and -filled his treasury. Admit the difficulties of Napoleon; allow as we -may for the intricacy of the problem before him; the fact remains that -he wholly misunderstood the temper of the Spanish people, the dangers -of the Spanish enterprise, the resolution of Alexander. On the other -hand, looking upon the principal charge against the policy of the -British government, that it alienated the United States, it is still -true that there was no miscalculation as to the long-suffering of the -latter under the guidance of Jefferson, with his passion for peace. The -submission of the United States lasted until Napoleon was committed to -his final blunder, thus justifying the risk taken by Great Britain and -awarding to her the strategic triumph. - -The Continental System of Napoleon, here briefly alluded to, and to be -described more fully further on, was, however, only the continuation, -in its spirit and aims, of a policy outlined and initiated by the -Republic under the Directory; which in turn but carried into its -efforts against commerce the savage thoroughness which the Convention -had sought to impress upon the general war. The principal measures of -the emperor found antitypes in the decrees of the Directory; the only -important difference being, that the execution of the latter reflected -the feeble planning and intermittent energy of the government which -issued them; whereas Napoleon, as always, impressed upon his system -a vigor, and employed for its fulfilment means, proportioned to the -arduousness of the task and the greatness of the expected results. -The one series being therefore but the successor and fulfilment of -the other, it has been thought best to present them in the same close -connection in which they stand in the order of events, so as to -show more clearly the unity of design running throughout the whole -history,—a unity due to the inexorable logic of facts, to the existence -of an external compulsion, which could in no other way be removed or -resisted. Both in common owed their origin to the inability of France -seriously to embarrass, by the ordinary operations of war, the great -commerce of her rival, though she launched her national cruisers and -privateers by dozens on every sea. The Sea Power of England held its -way so steadily, preserved its trade in the main so successfully, and -was withal so evidently the principal enemy, the key of the hostile -effort against France, that it drove not only the weak Directors, but -the great soldier and statesman who followed them, into the course -which led straight to destruction. - -The declarations of war were followed by the customary instructions to -commanders of ships-of-war and privateers to seize and bring into port -the merchant vessels of the enemy, as well as neutrals found violating -the generally acknowledged principles of international law. So far -there was nothing in the course of either belligerent that differed -from the usual and expected acts of States at war. At once the sea -swarmed with hastily equipped cruisers; and, as always happens on an -unexpected, or even sudden, outbreak of hostilities, many valuable -prizes were made by ships of either nation. The victims were taken -unawares, and the offence on each side was more active and efficient -than the defence. This first surprise, however, soon passed, and was -succeeded by the more regular course of maritime war. The great British -fleets gradually established a distinct preponderance over the masses -of the enemy, and the latter was quickly reduced to the ordinary -operations of commerce-destroying, in the sense usually given to that -word,—a policy, moreover, to which the national tradition and the -opinion of many eminent naval officers particularly inclined. - -To these raids upon their shipping, by numerous scattered cruisers, the -British opposed a twofold system. By the one, their merchant vessels -bound to different quarters of the globe were gathered in specified -ports, and when assembled sailed together under the care of a body of -ships of war, charged to conduct them to their voyage's end. This was -the convoy system, the essence of which was to concentrate the exposed -wealth of the country, under the protection of a force adequate to meet -and drive away any probable enemy. Immense numbers of ships thus sailed -together; from two to three hundred was not an unusual gathering; and -five hundred, or even a thousand,[248] were at times seen together -in localities like the Chops of the Channel or the entrance to the -Baltic, where the especial danger necessitated a stronger guard and a -more careful acceptance of protection by the trader,—thus emphasizing -and enlarging the peculiar features of the practice. It is scarcely -necessary to remark that much time was lost in collecting such huge -bodies, and that the common rate of sailing was far below the powers -of many of their members; while the simultaneous arrival of great -quantities of the same goods tended to lower prices. Consequently, many -owners, relying upon the speed of their vessels and upon good luck, -sailed without convoy upon completing their cargoes,—willing, after the -manner of merchants, to take great risks for the sake of great returns, -by being first in the market. To protect these, and others, which, by -misfortune or bad management parted from their convoy, as well as to -maintain their general command of the sea, the British resorted to -another system, which may be called that of patrol. Fast frigates and -sloops-of-war, with a host of smaller vessels, were disseminated over -the ocean, upon the tracks which commerce follows and to which the -hostile cruisers were therefore constrained. To each was assigned his -cruising ground, the distribution being regulated by the comparative -dangers, and by the necessary accumulation of merchant shipping in -particular localities, as the North Sea, the approach to the English -Channel, and, generally, the centres to which the routes of commerce -converge. The forces thus especially assigned to patrol duty, the ships -"on a cruise," to use the technical expression, were casually increased -by the large number of vessels going backward and forward between -England and their respective stations, dispatch-boats, ships going in -for repairs or returning from them, so that the seas about Europe -were alive with British cruisers; each one of which was wide-awake for -prizes. To these again were added the many privateers, whose cruising -ground was not indeed assigned by the government, but which were -constrained in their choice by the same conditions that dictated at -once the course of the trader and the lair of the commerce-destroyer. - -Through this cloud of friends and foes the unprotected merchantman had -to run the gantlet, trusting to his heels. If he were taken, all indeed -was not lost, for there remained the chance of recapture by a friendly -cruiser; but in that case the salvage made a large deduction from the -profits of the voyage. The dangers thus run were not, however, solely -at the risk of the owner; for, not to speak of the embarrassment caused -to others by the failure of one merchant, the crews of the ships, -the sailors, constituted a great potential element of the combatant -force of the nation. A good seaman, especially in those days of simple -weapons, was more than half ready to become at once a fighting man. In -this he differed from an untrained landsman, and the customs of war -therefore kept him, whenever taken afloat, a prisoner till exchanged. -Every merchant ship captured thus diminished the fighting power of -Great Britain, and the losses were so numerous that an act, known as -the Convoy Act, was passed in 1798, compelling the taking of convoy and -the payment of a certain sum for the protection. In the first year of -its imposition this tax brought in £1,292,000 to the Treasury, while -resulting in a yet greater saving of insurance to owners; and the -diminished number of prizes taken by the French was thought to be a -serious inconvenience to them, at a time when, by the admission of the -Directory, foreign commerce under their own flag was annihilated. This -remarkable confession, and the experience which dictated the Convoy -Act, may together be taken as an indication that, in the defence and -attack of commerce, as in other operations of war, concentration of -effort will as a rule be found a sounder policy than dissemination. -In 1795 the French formally abandoned the policy of keeping great -fleets together, as they had before done in their history, and took -to the _guerre de course_. Within three years, ending in December, -1798, "privateers alone put more than twenty thousand individuals in -the balance of exchanges favorable to England," and "not a single -merchant vessel sailed under the French flag."[249] "The fate of almost -all mere cruisers (_bâtimens armés en course_) is to fall, a little -sooner or later, into the hands of the enemy," and in consequence, -"out of a maritime conscription of eighty thousand seamen, to-day -but half remain" with which to man the fleet. British contemporary -authority gives 743 as the number of privateers taken from France -alone, between the outbreak of war in 1793 and the 31st of December, -1800,—not to speak of 273 ships of war of the cruiser classes.[250] The -absolute loss inflicted by the efforts of these vessels and their more -fortunate comrades cannot be given with precision; but as the result -of an inquiry, the details of which will be presented further on, the -author is convinced that it did not exceed two and a half per cent, -and probably fell below two per cent of the total volume of British -trade. This loss may be looked upon as a war tax, onerous indeed, but -by no means insupportable; and which it would be folly to think could, -by itself alone, exercise any decisive influence upon the policy of a -wealthy and resolute nation. Yet no country is so favorably situated as -France then was for operations against British commerce, whether in the -home waters or in the West Indies, at that time the source of at least -a fourth part of the trade of the Empire. - -The indecisiveness of the results obtained by the French in their war -against British shipping was not due to want of effort on their part. -On the contrary, the activity displayed by their corsairs, though -somewhat intermittent, was at times phenomenal; and this fact, as well -as the extraordinarily favorable position of France, must be kept in -view in estimating the probable advantages to be obtained from this -mode of warfare. At the period in question London carried on more than -half the commerce of Great Britain; in addition to its foreign trade -it was the great distributing centre of a domestic traffic, carried -on principally by the coasters which clustered by hundreds in the -Thames. The annual trade of export and import to the metropolis was -over £60,000,000, and the entries and departures of vessels averaged -between thirteen and fourteen thousand. Of this great going and coming -of ships and wealth, nearly two thirds had to pass through the English -Channel, nowhere more than eighty miles wide and narrowing to twenty at -the Straits of Dover; while the remaining third, comprising the trade -from Holland, Germany, and the Baltic, as well as the coasting trade -to North Britain, was easily accessible from the ports of Boulogne, -Dunkirk, and Calais, and was still further exposed after the French, -in 1794 and 1795, obtained complete control of Belgium and Holland. -From St. Malo to the Texel, a distance of over three hundred miles, the -whole coast became a nest of privateers of all kinds and sizes,—from -row-boats armed only with musketry and manned by a dozen men, or even -less, up to vessels carrying from ten to twenty guns and having crews -of one hundred and fifty. In the principal Channel ports of France -alone, independent of Belgium and Holland, there were at one time in -the winter of 1800 eighty-seven privateers, mounting from fourteen to -twenty-eight guns, besides numerous row-boats. These were actually -employed in commerce-destroying, and the fishing-boats of the coast -were capable upon short notice of being fitted for that service, in -which they often engaged. - -The nearness of the prey, the character of the seas, and the ease of -making shelter either on the French or English shore in case of bad -weather, modified very greatly the necessity for size and perfect -sea-worthiness in the vessels thus used; and also, from the shortness -of the run necessary to reach the cruising ground, each one placed on -this line of coast was easily equal to ten starting for the same object -from a more remote base of operations. Privateers sailing at sundown -with a fair wind from St. Malo, or Dieppe, or Dunkirk to cruise in the -Channel, would reach their cruising ground before morning of the long -winter nights of that latitude. The length of stay would be determined -by their good fortune in making prizes, if unmolested by a British -cruiser. They ventured over close to the English side; they were seen -at times from the shore seizing their prizes.[251] At Dover, in the -latter part of 1810, "signals were out almost every day, on account -of enemy's privateers appearing in sight."[252] Innocent-looking -fishing-boats, showing only their half-dozen men busy at their work, -lay at anchor upon, or within, the lines joining headland to headland -of the enemy's coast, watching the character and appearance of passing -vessels. When night or other favorable opportunity offered, they pulled -quickly alongside the unsuspecting merchantman, which, under-manned -and unwatchful, from the scarcity of seamen, was often first awakened -to the danger by a volley of musketry, followed by the clambering of -the enemy to the decks. The crews, few in number, poor in quality, -and not paid for fighting, offered usually but slight resistance to -the overpowering assault. Boarding was the corsair's game, because he -carried many men. - -It seems extraordinary that even the comparative impunity enjoyed by -the privateers—for that it was only comparative is shown by the fact -that an average of fifty were yearly captured—should have been attained -in the face of the immense navy of Great Britain, and the large number -of cruisers assigned to the protection of the coasts and the Channel. -There were, however, many reasons for it. The privateering spirit is -essentially that of the gambler and the lottery, and at no time was -that spirit more widely diffused in France than in the period before -us. The odds are not only great, but they are not easy to calculate. -The element of chance enters very unduly, and when, as in the present -case, the gain may be very great, while the immediate risk to the -owner, who does not accompany his ship, is comparatively small, the -disposition to push venture after venture becomes irresistible. The -seaman, who risks his liberty, is readily tempted by high wages and -the same hope of sudden profits that moves the owner; and this was -more especially true at a time when the laying up of the fleets, -and the disappearance of the merchant shipping, threw seafaring men -wholly upon the coasting trade or privateering. The number of ships -and men so engaged is thus accounted for; but among them and among -the owners there was a certain proportion who pursued the occupation -with a thoughtfulness and method which would distinguish a more -regular business, and which, while diminishing the risk of this, very -much increased the returns. Vessels were selected, or built, with -special reference to speed and handiness; captains were chosen in whom -seamanlike qualities were joined to particular knowledge of the British -coast and the routes of British trade; the conditions of wind and -weather were studied; the long winter nights were preferred because -of the cover they afforded; they knew and reckoned upon the habits of -the enemy's ships-of-war; account was kept of the times of sailing and -arrival of the large convoys.[253] On the British side, a considerable -deduction must be made from the efficiency indicated by the mere number -of the coast cruisers. Many of them were poor sailers, quite unable -to overtake the better and more dangerous class of privateers. The -inducements to exertion were not great; for the privateer meant little -money at best, and the abuses that gathered round the proceedings of -the Admiralty Courts often swallowed up that little in costs. The -command of the small vessels thus employed fell largely into the hands -of men who had dropped hopelessly out of the race of life, while their -more fortunate competitors were scattered on distant seas, and in -better ships. To such, the slight chance of a bootless prize was but a -poor inducement to exposure and activity, on the blustering nights and -in the dangerous spots where the nimble privateer, looking for rich -plunder, was wont to be found. It was worth more money to recapture a -British merchantman than to take a French cruiser. - -Privateering from the Atlantic, or Biscay, coast of France was -necessarily carried on in vessels of a very different class from those -which frequented the Channel. There was no inducement for the merchant -ships of Great Britain to pass within the line from Ushant to Cape -Finisterre; while, on the other hand, her ships-of-war abounded there, -for the double purpose of watching the French fleets in the ports, -and intercepting both the enemy's cruisers and their prizes, as they -attempted to enter. For these reasons, privateers leaving Bordeaux, -Bayonne, or Nantes, needed to be large and seaworthy, provisioned and -equipped for distant voyages and for a long stay at sea. Their greatest -danger was met near their home ports, either going or returning; -and their hopes were set, not upon the small and often unprofitable -coaster, but upon the richly laden trader from the East or West Indies -or the Mediterranean. Out, therefore, beyond the line of the enemy's -blockade, upon the deep sea and on one of the great commercial highways -converging toward the Channel, was their post; there to remain as long -as possible, and not lightly to encounter again the perils of the Bay -of Biscay. Moreover, being larger and more valuable, the owner had -to think upon their defence; they could not, like the cheap Channel -gropers, be thrown away in case of any hostile meeting. While they -could not cope with the big frigates of the enemy, there were still -his smaller cruisers, and the hosts of his privateers, that might be -met; and many a stout battle was fought by those French corsairs. One -of these, the "Bordelais," taken in 1799, was said then to be the -largest of her kind sailing out of France. She had the keel of a 38-gun -frigate, carried twenty-four 12-pounder guns, and a crew of two hundred -and twenty men. In four years this ship had captured one hundred and -sixty prizes, and was said to have cleared to her owners in Bordeaux a -million sterling.[254] - -A third most important and lucrative field for the enterprise of French -privateers was found in the West Indies. The islands of Guadaloupe and -Martinique served as excellent bases of operations. The latter indeed -was for many years in British possession, but the former remained, -practically without interruption, in the hands of France until its -capture in 1810. During the many years of close alliance, from 1796 to -1808, between France and Spain, the West Indian ports of the latter -served not only to maintain her own privateers, but to give a wide -extension to the efforts of her more active partner. The geographical -and climatic conditions of this region tended also to modify the -character both of the cruisers and of their methods. Along with a -very large European trade, carried on by ships of an average burden -of two hundred and fifty tons, there was also a considerable traffic -from island to island by much smaller vessels. This local trade was -not only between the possessions of the same nation or of friendly -States, but existed also, by means of neutrals or contraband, between -those of powers at war; and through these and her system of free ports, -together with liberal modifications of her commercial code wherever an -advantage could thereby be gained, Great Britain succeeded in drawing -into her own currents, in war as well as in peace, the course of much -of the export and import of the whole Caribbean Sea and Spanish Main. -From these two kinds of trade—combined with the general good weather -prevailing, with the contiguity of the islands to each other, and with -the numerous ports and inlets scattered throughout their extent—there -arose two kinds of privateering enterprise. The one, carried on mainly -by large and fast-sailing schooners or brigs, was found generally -suitable for undertakings directed against ships bound to or from -Europe; while for the other the various islands abounded with small -row-boats or other petty craft, each with its group of plunderers, -which lay in wait and usually in profound concealment to issue out -upon the passing trader.[255] The uncertain character of the wind in -some parts of the day particularly favored an attack, by two or three -heavily manned rowing boats, upon a vessel large enough to take them -all on board bodily, but fettered by calm and with a small crew. On one -occasion a United States sloop-of-war, lying thus motionless with her -ports closed, was taken for a merchantman and assailed by several of -these marauders, who then paid dearly for the mistake into which they -had been led by her seemingly unarmed and helpless condition. - -The remoteness of this region from Europe covered very great -irregularities, both by the privateers and in the courts. This evil -became greater in the French and Spanish islands, when, by the -progress of the war, the Sea Power of Great Britain more and more -broke off correspondence between them and the mother countries; and -when Napoleon's aggression drove the Spaniards into revolution and -anarchy, the control of Spain, always inert, became merely nominal. -These circumstances, coinciding with the presence of a very large -neutral shipping, mainly belonging to the United States, whose -geographical nearness made her one of the chief sources of supplies to -these colonies, caused the privateering of the Latin and mixed races -to degenerate rapidly into piracy, towards which that mode of warfare -naturally tends. As early as 1805, an American insurance company -complained to the Secretary of State that "property plundered by real -or pretended French privateers was uniformly taken into the ports of -Cuba, and there, with the connivance of the Spanish government, was -sold and distributed, _without any form of trial_, or pretence for -legal condemnation."[1] And the United States consul at Santiago de -Cuba reported officially that more than a thousand American seamen had -been landed in that port, most of them without clothes or any means of -support; and that "the scene of robbery, destruction, evasion, perjury, -cruelty, and insult, to which the Americans captured by French pirates, -and brought into this and adjacent ports, have been subjected, has -perhaps not been equalled in a century past."[256] This lawlessness -ended, as is generally known, in an actual prevalence of piracy on an -extensive scale, about the south side of Cuba and other unfrequented -parts of the archipelago, for some years after the war. From the -character of the ground and the slow communications of the day, these -desperadoes were finally put down only by the systematic and long -continued efforts of the various governments concerned. - -The Eastern trade of Great Britain was in the hands of the East India -Company; and its ships, which carried on the intercourse between India -and Europe, were of a size altogether exceptional in those days. At a -time when a small ship-of-the-line measured from fourteen to sixteen -hundred tons, and the traders between America and Europe averaged -under three hundred, a large proportion of the East Indiamen were of -twelve hundred tons burden, exceeding considerably the dimensions -of a first-class frigate.[257] Being pierced for numerous guns and -carrying many men, both crew and passengers, among whom often figured -considerable detachments of troops, they presented a very formidable -appearance, and were more than once mistaken for ships of war by French -cruisers; so much so that in the year 1804 a body of them in the China -seas, by their firm bearing and compact order, imposed upon a hostile -squadron of respectable size, commanded by an admiral of cautious -temper though of proved courage, making him for a brief period the -laughing stock of both hemispheres, and bringing down on his head a -scathing letter from the emperor. Their armament, however, was actually -feeble, especially in the earlier part of the French Revolution. About -the year 1801, it was determined to increase it so that the larger -ships should carry thirty-eight 18-pounders;[258] but the change seems -to have been but imperfectly effected, and upon the occasion in -question the ships which thus "bluffed" Admiral Linois were none of -them a match for a medium frigate. It is, indeed, manifestly impossible -to combine within the same space the stowage of a rich and bulky cargo -and the fighting efficiency of a ship of war of the same tonnage. -Still, the batteries, though proportionately weak, were too powerful -for ordinary privateers to encounter, unless by a fortunate surprise; -and, as the French entertained great, if not exaggerated, ideas of the -dependence of Great Britain upon her Indian possessions, considerable -efforts were made to carry on commerce-destroying in the Eastern -seas by squadrons of heavy frigates, re-enforced occasionally by -ships-of-the-line. These were the backbone of the _guerre de course_, -but their efforts were supplemented by those of numerous privateers of -less size, that preyed upon the coasting trade and the smaller ships, -which, from China to the Red Sea, and throughout the Indian Ocean, -whether under British or neutral flags, were carrying goods of British -origin. - -At the outbreak of the war Great Britain was taken unawares in India, -as everywhere; and, as the operations in Europe and in the West Indies -called for the first care of the government, the Indian seas were -practically abandoned to the enemy for over a year. After the fall -of Pondicherry, in September, 1793, Admiral Cornwallis returned to -Europe with all his small squadron, leaving but a single sloop-of-war -to protect the vast expanse of ocean covered by the commerce of the -East India Company.[259] Not till the month of October, 1794, did his -successor reach the station. Under these circumstances the losses were -inevitably severe, and would have been yet more heavy had not the -company itself fitted out several ships to cruise for the protection -of trade.[260] An animated warfare, directed solely toward the -destruction and protection of commerce, now ensued for several years, -and was marked by some exceedingly desperate and well-contested frigate -actions; as well as by many brilliant exploits of French privateersmen, -among whom the name of Robert Surcouf has attained a lasting celebrity. -Depending at first upon the islands of France and Bourbon as their -base of operations, the distance of these from the peninsula of -Hindoostan, combined with the size of the East India ships, compelled -the employment of relatively large vessels, able to keep the sea for -long periods and to carry crews which would admit of many detachments -to man prizes without unduly weakening the fighting capacity. When, -in 1795, the conquest of Holland and flight of the Orange government -turned the Dutch from enemies into allies of France, their colonies and -ports became accessories of great importance to the cruisers, owing to -their nearness to the scene of action and especially to the great trade -route between China and Europe. On the other hand the British, long -debarred from rewards for their efforts, other than recaptures of their -own merchant ships, now found the whole of the Dutch trade thrown open -to them, and the returns bear witness both to its numbers and to their -activity. - -Notwithstanding, however, the unprotected state of British commerce -in the early years of the war, and the distinguished activity of -the French cruisers, the insurance premiums at no time rose to the -sums demanded in 1782, when a concentrated effort to control the -sea by a fleet, under Admiral Suffren, was made by France.[261] At -that time the premiums were fifteen per cent; between 1798 and 1805 -they fluctuated between eight and twelve per cent. In 1805 the chief -command in the Indian seas was given to Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Pellew, -afterwards Lord Exmouth, and by his skilful arrangements such security -was afforded to the trade from Bombay to China, one of the most exposed -parts of the Eastern commercial routes, that the premium fell to eight -per cent, with a return of three per cent, if sailing with convoy. -Under this systematic care the losses by capture amounted to but one -per cent on the property insured, being less than those by the dangers -of the sea.[262] But during the very period that these happy results -were obtained by wisely applying the principle of concentration of -effort to the protection of commerce, disaster was overtaking the trade -of Calcutta; which lost nineteen vessels in two months through the -neglect of its merchants to accept the convoys of the admiral.[263] In -fact, as the small proportionate loss inflicted by scattered cruisers -appears to indicate the inconclusiveness of that mode of warfare, so -the result of the convoy system, in this and other instances, warrants -the inference that, when properly systematized and applied, it will -have more success as a defensive measure than hunting for individual -marauders,—a process which, even when most thoroughly planned, still -resembles looking for a needle in a haystack. - -Soon after this time the British government reverted most properly -to the policy of Pitt, by directing expeditions against the enemies' -colonies, the foreign bases of their Sea Power, and, in the absence of -great fleets, the only possible support upon which commerce-destroying -can depend; with whose fall it must also fall. The islands of Bourbon -and of France capitulated in 1810, the same year that saw the surrender -of Guadaloupe, the last survivor of the French West India Islands. -This was followed in 1811 by the reduction of the Dutch colony of -Java. Thus "an end was put to the predatory warfare which had been -successfully carried on against the British trade in India for a number -of years."[264] - -While the scattered cruisers of France were thus worrying, by a petty -and inconclusive warfare, the commerce of Great Britain and its neutral -carriers, the great British fleets, being left in quiet possession of -the seas by the avowed purpose of the Directory to limit its efforts -to the _guerre de course_, swept from the ocean every merchant ship -wearing a hostile flag, and imposed upon the neutral trade with France -the extreme limitations of maritime international law, as held by the -British courts. Toward the end of the war, indeed, those principles -were given an extension, which the government itself admitted was -beyond anything before claimed as reconcilable with recognized law. -The precise amount of the injury done, the exact number of the vessels -detained, sent in, and finally condemned, in all parts of the world -will perhaps never be known; it is certainly not within the power -of the present writer to determine them. The frequent, though not -complete, returns of British admirals give some idea of the prevailing -activity, which will also appear from the occasional details that must -be cited in the latter part of this chapter. Into the single port of -Plymouth, in the eight years and a half ending September 29, 1801, -there were sent 948 vessels of all nations;[265] of which 447 were -enemy's property, 156 recaptured British, and the remainder neutrals, -belonging mostly to America, Denmark, and Sweden, the three chief -neutral maritime states. From Jamaica, the British commander-in-chief -reports that, between March 1 and August 3, 1800,—that is, in five -months,—203 vessels have been captured, detained, or destroyed.[1] -This was in but one part of the West Indian Seas. The admiral at the -Leeward Islands reports that in two months of the same year 62 vessels -had been sent in.[1] In five months, ending September 3, 1800, Lord -Keith reports from the Mediterranean 180 captures.[266] How far these -instances may be accepted as a fair example of the usual results of -British cruising, it is impossible to say; but it may be remarked that -they all occur at a period when the war had been raging for seven -years, and that captures are more numerous at the beginning than at -the latter end of long hostilities. In war, as in all states of life, -people learn to accommodate themselves to their conditions, to minimize -risks; and even prize lists become subject to the uniformity of results -observed in other statistics. - -Whatever the particulars of French losses, however, they are all summed -up in the unprecedented admission of the Directory, in 1799, that "not -a single merchant ship is on the sea carrying the French flag." This -was by no means a figure of speech, to express forcibly an extreme -depression. It was the statement of a literal fact. "The former sources -of our prosperity," wrote M. Arnould, Chef du Bureau du Commerce, -as early as 1797, "are either lost or dried up. Our agricultural, -manufacturing, and industrial power is almost extinct." And again -he says, "The total number of registers issued to French ships from -September, 1793, to September, 1796, amounts only to 6028." Of these, -3351 were undecked and of less than thirty tons burden. "The maritime -war paralyzes our distant navigation and even diminishes considerably -that on our coasts; so that a great number of French ships remain -inactive, and perhaps decaying, in our ports. This remark applies -principally to ships of over two hundred tons, the number of which, -according to the subjoined table,[267] amounts only to 248. Before -the revolution the navigation of the seas of Europe and to the French -colonies employed more than 2,000 ships." - -In the year ending September 20, 1800, according to a report submitted -to the consuls,[268] France received directly from Asia, Africa, and -America, all together, less than $300,000 worth of goods; while her -exports to those three quarters of the world amounted to only $56,000. -Whether these small amounts were carried in French or neutral bottoms -is immaterial; the annihilation of French shipping is proved by them. -The same report shows that the average size of the vessels, which, by -hugging closely the coast, avoided British cruisers and maintained the -water traffic between France and her neighbors, Holland, Spain, and -Italy, was but thirty-six tons. Intercourse by water is always easier -and, for a great bulk, quicker than by land; but in those days of -wagon carriage and often poor roads it was especially so. In certain -districts of France great distress for food was frequently felt in -those wars, although grain abounded in other parts; because the surplus -could not be distributed rapidly by land, nor freely by water. For the -latter conveyance it was necessary to depend upon very small vessels, -unfit for distant voyages, but which could take refuge from pursuers in -the smallest port, or be readily beached; and which, if captured, would -not singly be a serious loss. - -Towards the end of 1795, a contemporary British authority states -that over three thousand British ships had been captured, and about -eight hundred French.[269] This was, however, confessedly only an -estimate, and probably, so far as concerns the British losses, a -large exaggeration. Ten years later a member of the House of Commons, -speaking with a view rather to disparage the earlier administration, -gave the British losses for the same years as 1,395.[270] Lloyd's lists -give the whole number of British captured, for the years 1793-1800, -both inclusive, as 4,344, of which 705 were recaptured; leaving a total -loss of 3,639.[271] Assuming, what is only for this purpose admissible, -that the average loss each year was nearly the same, these figures -would give for the three years, 1793-1795, 1,365 as the number of -captures made by hostile cruisers. In the tables appended to Norman's -"Corsairs of France" the losses for the same period are given as -1,636.[272] - -Finally, the number of prizes brought into French ports up to September -16, 1798, was stated by M. Arnould, in the Conseil des Anciens, as -being 2,658. The table from which his figures were taken he called "an -authentic list, just printed, drawn up in the office of the French -Ministry of Marine, of all prizes made since the outbreak of the -war."[273] It included vessels of all nationalities, during a period -when France had not only been at war with several states, but had made -large seizures of neutral vessels upon various pretexts. Of the entire -number M. Arnould considered that not more than 2,000 were British. If -we accept his estimate, only 900 British ships would have been taken in -three years. It is to be observed, however, as tending to reconcile the -discrepancy between this and the English accounts, that the tables used -by him probably did not give, or at most gave very imperfectly, the -French captures made in the East and West Indies; and, furthermore, the -aggregate British losses, as given by Lloyd's lists, and by Norman's -tables, include captures made by the Dutch and Spaniards as well as by -the French.[274] - -The British reports of their own losses are thus seen largely to exceed -those made by the French. According equal confidence to the statements -of Sir William Curtis, of Norman, and of Lloyd's list, we should reach -an annual loss by capture of 488 British ships; which would give a -total, in the twenty-one years of war, from 1793-1814,[275] of 10,248. -Norman's grand total of 10,871 considerably exceeds this amount; but -it will be safer, in considering a subject of so great importance as -the absolute injury done, and effect produced, by war upon commerce, -to accept the larger figure, or to say, in round numbers, that -eleven thousand British vessels were captured by the enemy during -the protracted and desperate wars caused by the French Revolution. It -is the great and conspicuous instance of commerce-destroying, carried -on over a long series of years, with a vigor and thoroughness never -surpassed, and supported, moreover, by an unparalleled closure of the -continental markets of Great Britain. The Directory first, and Napoleon -afterwards, abandoned all attempts to contest the control of the sea, -and threw themselves, as Louis XIV. had done before them, wholly upon -a cruising war against commerce. It will be well in this day, when the -same tendency so extensively prevails, to examine somewhat carefully -what this accepted loss really meant, how it was felt by the British -people at the time, and what expectation can reasonably be deduced -from it that, by abandoning military control of the sea, and depending -exclusively upon scattered cruisers, a country dependent as Great -Britain is upon external commerce can be brought to terms. - -Evidently, a mere statement of numbers, such as the above, without -any particulars as to size, or the value of cargoes, affords but a -poor indication of the absolute or relative loss sustained by British -commerce. It may, however, be used as a basis, both for comparison -with the actual number of vessels entering and clearing annually from -British ports, and also for an estimate as to the probable tonnage -captured. The annual average of capture, deduced from 11,000 ships in -twenty-one years is 524. In the three years 1793-1795, the average -annual number of British vessels entering and clearing from ports of -Great Britain was 21,560.[276] Dividing by 524, it is found that one -fortieth, or two and a half per cent of British shipping, reckoning -by numbers, was taken by the enemy. In the three years 1798-1800, -1801 being the year of broken hostilities, the average annual entries -and departures were 21,369,[1] which again gives two and a half as -the percentage of the captures. It must be noted, also, that only the -commerce of England and Scotland with foreign countries, with the -colonies, with Ireland and the Channel Islands, and with British India -enters into these lists of arrivals and departures. The returns of that -day did not take account of British coasters, nor of the local trade -of the colonies, nor again of the direct intercourse between Ireland -and ports other than those of Great Britain. Yet all these contributed -victims to swell the list of prizes,[277] and so to increase very -materially the apparent proportion of the latter to a commerce of which -the returns cited present only a fraction. Unfortunately, the amount of -the coasting trade cannot now be ascertained,[278] and the consequent -deduction from the calculated two and a half per cent of loss can only -be conjectured. - -To obtain the tonnage loss there appears to the writer no fairer means -than to determine the average tonnage of the vessels entering and -departing as above, at different periods of the war. In the three years -1793-1795, the average size of each ship entering or sailing from the -ports of Great Britain, including the Irish trade, was 121 tons. In -the year 1800 the average is 126 tons. In 1809 it has fallen again to -121, and in 1812 to 115 tons. We cannot then go far wrong in allowing -125 tons as the average size of British vessels employed in carrying on -the foreign and the coasting trade of Great Britain itself during the -war.[279] On this allowance the aggregate tonnage lost in the 11,000 -British prizes, would be 1,375,000 in twenty-one years. In these years -the aggregate British tonnage entering and leaving the ports of Great -Britain, exclusive of the great neutral tonnage employed in carrying -for the same trade, amounted to over 55,000,000;[280] so that the loss -is again somewhat less than one fortieth, or 2½ per cent. - -Another slight indication of the amount of loss, curious from its -coincidence with the above deductions, is derived from the report of -prize goods received into France in the year ending September, 1800, -which amounted to 29,201,676 francs. At the then current value of the -franc this was equivalent to £1,216,000. The real value of British -exports for 1800 was £56,000,000, the prize goods again being rather -less than one fortieth of the amount. The imports, however, being -also nearly £56,000,000, the loss on the entire amount falls to one -eightieth. It is true that many of these prize goods were probably -taken in neutrals, but on the other hand the report does not take into -account French capture in the colonies and East Indies; nor those made -by Holland and Spain, the allies of France. - -If the total number of vessels _belonging_ to Great Britain and all -her dependencies be taken, as the standard by which to judge her loss -by captures, it will be found that in 1795 they amounted to 16,728;[1] -in 1800, 17,885;[281] in 1805, 22,051;[2] in 1810, 23,703.[282] Using -again 524 as the annual number of captures, the annual proportion of -loss is seen gradually to fall from a very little over 3 per cent, in -the first year, to somewhat less than 2½ per cent, in the last. - -Finally, it may be added that the Lloyd's list before quoted gives -the total number of losses by sea risks, 1793-1800, as 2,967; which, -being contrasted with the losses by capture, 3,639, shows that the -danger from enemy's cruisers very little exceeded those of the ocean. -To offset, though only partially, her own losses, Great Britain -received prize goods, during the same years, to the amount of over -£5,000,000.[283] There were also engaged in carrying on her commerce, -in 1801, under the British flag, 2,779 vessels, measuring 369,563 tons, -that had been brought into her ports as prizes; which numbers had -increased in 1811 to 4,023 ships and 536,240 tons.[284] - -Taking everything together, it seems reasonable to conclude that the -direct loss to the nation, by the operation of hostile cruisers, did -not exceed 2½ per cent of the commerce of the Empire; and that this -loss was partially made good by the prize ships and merchandise taken -by its own naval vessels and privateers. A partial, if not a complete, -compensation for her remaining loss is also to be found in the great -expansion of her mercantile operations carried on under neutral flags; -for, although this too was undoubtedly harassed by the enemy, yet to -it almost entirely was due the increasing volume of trade that poured -through Great Britain to and from the continent of Europe, every ton of -which left a part of its value to swell the bulk of British wealth. The -writings of the period show that the injuries due to captured shipping -passed unremarked amid the common incidents and misfortunes of life; -neither their size nor their effects were great enough to attract -public notice, amid the steady increase of national wealth and the -activities concerned in amassing it. "During all the operations of war -and finance," says one writer, "the gains of our enterprising people -were beyond all calculation, however the unproductive classes may -have suffered from the depreciation of money and the inequalities of -taxation. Our commerce has become more than double its greatest extent -during the happiest years of peace."[285] There were, indeed, darker -shades to the picture, for war means suffering as well as effort; but -with regard to the subject-matter of this chapter, Commerce, and its -fate in this war, there was for many years but one voice, for but one -was possible. The minister, essentially a master of trade and finance, -delighted year by year to enlarge upon the swelling volume of business -and the growing returns of the revenue. Not only did the new taxes -bring in liberally, but the older ones were increasingly productive. -These signs of prosperity were not seen all at once. The first plunge -into the war was followed, as it always is, by a shrinking of the -system and a contraction of the muscles; but as the enemy more and more -surrendered the control of the sea, as the naval victories of the years -1797 and 1798 emphasized more and more the absolute dominion of Great -Britain over it, and as the new channels of enterprise became familiar, -the energies of the people expanded to meet the new opportunities. - -The share borne by neutral shipping in the extension and maintenance -of this extraordinary fabric of prosperity, thus existing in the -midst of all the sorrow, suffering, and waste of war, must next be -considered; for it was the cause of the remarkable measures taken by -both belligerents against neutral trade, which imparted so singular -and desolating a character to the closing years of the struggle and -affected deeply the commerce of the whole world. At the very beginning -of the war Great Britain proceeded to avail herself of the services -of neutrals, by a remission of that part of the Navigation Act which -required three fourths of the crews of British merchantmen to be -British subjects. On the 30th of April, 1793, this was so modified -as to permit three fourths to be foreigners, to replace the large -body taken for the fleets. This was followed, from time to time, as -the number of enemies multiplied through the extending conquests -and alliances of France, by a series of orders and proclamations, -infringing more and more upon the spirit of the Act, with the direct -and obvious purpose of employing neutral vessels to carry on operations -hitherto limited to the British flag. The demands of the navy for -seamen, the risks of capture, the delays of convoy, entirely arrested, -and even slightly set back, the development of the British carrying -trade; while at the same time the important position of Great Britain -as the great manufacturing nation, coinciding with a diminution in the -productions of the Continent, consequent upon the war, and a steadily -growing demand for manufactured goods on the part of the United -States, called imperiously for more carriers. The material of British -traffic was increasing with quickened steps, at the very time that -her own shipping was becoming less able to bear it. Thus in 1797, -when the British navy was forced to leave the Mediterranean, all the -Levant trade, previously confined to British ships, was thrown open -to every neutral. In 1798, being then at war with Spain, the great -raw material, Spanish wool, essential to the cloth manufactures, was -allowed to enter in vessels of any neutral country. The produce even -of hostile colonies could be imported by British subjects in neutral -bottoms, though not for consumption in England, but for re-exportation; -a process by which it paid a toll to Great Britain, without directly -affecting the reserved market of the British colonist. The effect -of these various conditions and measures can best be shown by a few -figures, which indicate at once the expansion of British commerce, the -arrest of British carrying trade, and the consequent growth of the -neutral shipping. In 1792, the last year of peace, the total British -exports and imports amounted to £44,565,000; in 1796 to £53,706,000; -in 1800, the last unbroken year of war, to £73,723,000.[286] For the -same years the carrying of this trade was done, in 1792, by 3,151,389 -tons of British, and 479,630 tons of foreign shipping; in 1796, by -2,629,575 British, and 998,427 foreign; in 1800, by 2,825,078 British -and 1,448,287 foreign. Thus, while there was so great an increase in -the commerce of the kingdom, and it employed nearly 650,000 more tons -of shipping in 1800 than in 1792, the amount carried in British ships -had fallen off; and the proportion of neutral bottoms had risen from -thirteen to nearly thirty-four per cent. - -The significance of these facts could not escape the French government, -nor yet the jealousies of certain classes connected with the carrying -trade in Great Britain herself; but in the first war the latter were -not joined by the other powerful and suffering interests, which -gradually impelled the ministry into a series of acts deeply injurious -to all neutrals, but chiefly to the United States. In France, the early -effusiveness of the revolutionists toward England, based upon the hope -that she too would be swept into the torrent of their movement, had -been quickly chilled and turned to bitterness, greater even than that -which had so long divided the two nations. Victorious everywhere upon -the Continent, the government saw before it only one unconquerable -enemy, the Power of the Sea; it knew that she, by her subsidies and -her exhortations, maintained the continental states in their recurring -hostilities, and it saw her alone, amid the general confusion and -impoverishment, preserve quiet and increase a wealth which was not only -brilliant, but solid. The Directory therefore reached the conclusion, -which Napoleon made the basis of his policy and which he never wearied -of proclaiming, that Great Britain maintained the war and promoted -the discord of nations for the simple purpose of founding her own -prosperity upon the ruin of all other commerce, her power upon the -ruin of all other navies.[287] At the same time the French government -held tenaciously to that profound delusion, the bequest to it from -past generations of naval officers and statesmen, that a war directed -against the commerce of Great Britain was a sure means of destroying -her. It knew that hosts of privateers were employed, and that very -many British prizes were brought in; yet, withal, the great Sea Power -moved steadily on, evidently greater and stronger as the years went -by. It knew also that her manufactures were increasing, that their -products filled the Continent; that the produce of the East and of the -West, of the Baltic and of the Mediterranean, centred in Great Britain; -and that through her, not the Continent only, but France herself, -drew most of her tropical articles of consumption. There was but one -solution for this persistent escape from apparently sure destruction; -and that was to be found in the support of the neutral carrier and the -pockets of the neutral consumer. From this premise the fatal logic of -the French Revolution was irresistibly drawn to the conclusion that, -as every neutral ship engaged in the British carrying trade was a -help to England, it was consequently an enemy to France and liable to -capture.[288] Napoleon but amplified this precedent when he declared -that there were no more neutrals, and placed before Sweden, longing -only for quiet, the option "war with France or cannon-balls for English -vessels approaching your ports." - -The exceptionally intense spirit which animated the parties to this -war trenched with unusual severity upon the interests of neutral -powers, always more or less in conflict with the aims of belligerents. -These questions also received new importance, because now appeared -for the first time a neutral maritime state, of great extent and -rapidly growing, whose interests and ambitions at that time pointed to -shipping and carrying trade as forms of enterprise for which it had -received from nature peculiar facilities. In all previous wars the -Americans had acted as the colonists of Great Britain, either loyal or -in revolt. In 1793 they had for four years been a nation in the real -sense of the word, and Washington's first term closed. In the very -first Congress measures were taken for developing American shipping, -by differential duties upon native and foreign ships.[289] From the -impulse thus given, combined with the opening offered by the increase -of British trade and the diminished employment of British shipping, -the ship-builders and merchants extended their operations rapidly. By -the report of a committee of the House, January 10, 1803, it appears -that the merchant tonnage of the United States was then inferior to -that of no other country, except Great Britain.[290] In 1790 there had -entered her ports from abroad, 355,000 tons of her own shipping and -251,000 foreign, of which 217,000 were British.[291] In the year 1801 -there entered 799,304 tons of native shipping,[292] and of foreign but -138,000.[293] The amount of British among the latter is not stated; -but in the year 1800 there cleared from Great Britain under her own -flag, for the United States, but 14,381 tons.[294] Figures like these -give but a comparative and partial view of the activity of American -shipping, leaving out of account all the carrying done by it outside -the ken of the home authorities; but it is safe to say that the United -States contributed annually at least six hundred thousand tons to -maintain the traffic of the world, which, during those eventful years, -centred in Great Britain and ministered to her power. Among the forms -of gain thus opened to American traders there was one to which allusion -only will here be made, because at a later period it became the source -of very great trouble, leading step by step to the war of 1812. This -was the carriage of the productions of French and other colonies, -enemies of Great Britain, to the United States, and thence re-exporting -them to Europe. - -Besides the new state in the Western Hemisphere, there were three -others whose isolated position had hitherto given them the character -of neutrals in the maritime wars of the eighteenth century. These were -the Baltic countries, Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, which had combined -in 1780 to defend their neutral rights, if need were, by force of arms. -The power of this confederacy to assume the same attitude in 1793 -was broken by the policy of Russia. By whatever motives swayed, the -Empress Catharine took decided ground against the French Revolution. -On the 25th of March, 1793, a convention between her and the British -government was signed, by which both parties agreed, not only to close -their own ports against France and not to permit the exportation -of food to that country, but also "to unite all their efforts _to -prevent other powers_, not implicated in the war, from giving, on this -occasion of common concern to every civilized state, any protection -whatever, directly or indirectly in consequence of their neutrality, -to the commerce or property of the French on the sea."[295] How the -empress understood this engagement was shown by her notification, -during the same summer, to the courts of Sweden and Denmark, that -she would station a fleet in the North Sea to prevent neutrals bound -to France from proceeding.[296] Great Britain had already—June 8, -1793—directed the commanders of cruisers to detain all vessels loaded -with flour or grain, bound to French ports, and to send them to -England, where the cargo would be purchased and freight paid by the -British government.[297] These instructions were duly communicated to -the government of the neutral states, which protested with more or -less vigor and tenacity, but found themselves helpless to resist force -with force. Singularly enough, the French government had preceded the -British on this occasion, having issued orders to the same effect on -the 9th of the previous May; but the fact appears to have escaped the -ministry, for, in justifying their action to the United States, they do -not allude to it. Their course is defended on the broad ground that, -from the character of the war and the situation of France, there was -a fair prospect of starving her into submission,[298] and that under -such circumstances provisions, always a questionable article, became -contraband of war. The answer was not satisfactory to the neutral, -deprived of part of his expected gains, but the argument was one of -those that admit of no appeal except to arms. A further justification -of the order was found by the British ministry in the undoubted fact -that "the French government itself was the sole legal importer of -grain in France" at that time; and therefore "the trade was no longer -to be regarded as a mercantile speculation of individuals, but as an -immediate operation of the very persons who have declared war, and are -now carrying it on, against Great Britain." The American minister to -France, Monroe, confirms this, in his letter of October 16, 1794: "The -whole commerce of France, to the absolute exclusion of individuals, is -carried on by the government itself."[299] - -Soon after, on the 6th of November, 1793, another order was issued -by the British ministry, directing the seizure of "all ships laden -with goods the produce of any colony belonging to France, or carrying -provisions or other supplies for the use of any such colony." This -order was based upon the Rule of 1756, so called from the war in which -it first came conspicuously into notice, and the principle of which, as -stated by British authorities, was that a trade forbidden to neutrals -by the laws of a country, during peace, could not be lawfully carried -on by them in time of war, for the convenience of the belligerent; -because, by such employment, their ships "were in effect incorporated -in the enemy's navigation, having adopted his commerce and character -and identified themselves with his interests and purposes."[300] At -that time the colonial trade was generally reserved to the mother -country; and against it particularly, together with the coasting -trade, similarly restricted, was this ruling of the British courts and -government directed. Neutrals replied, "Because the parent country -monopolizes in peace the whole commerce of its colonies, does it follow -that in war it should have no right to regulate it at all?"[301] "We -deny that municipal regulations, established in peace, can in any wise -limit the public rights of neutrals in time of war."[302] It is evident -that these two lines of argument do not fairly meet each other; they -resemble rather opposite and equal weights in a balance, which will -quickly be overturned when passion or interest, combined with power, is -thrown in upon either side. Starting from such fundamentally different -premises, interested parties might argue on indefinitely in parallel -lines, without ever approaching a point of contact. - -The chief present interest in this question, referring as it does -to an obsolete colonial policy, is as illustrative of one of those -dead-locks, which, occurring at a critical moment, when passion or -interest is aroused, offer no solution but by war. It was useless to -point out that Great Britain relaxed in every direction her own peace -regulations, for the advantage of British commerce in the present -contest. The reply was perfectly apt, that she did not dispute the -right of her enemy to avail himself of any help the neutral could give; -she only asserted the determination not to permit the neutral to extend -it with impunity. There was no doubt, in the mind of any considerable -body of Englishmen, as to the perfect soundness of the English -doctrine. Lord Howick, who, as Mr. Grey, had embarrassed his party in -1792 by the exuberance of his liberalism,[303] as foreign minister -in 1807 wrote: "Neutrality, properly considered, does not consist in -taking advantage of every situation between belligerent states by which -emolument may accrue to the neutral, whatever may be the consequences -to either belligerent party; but in observing a strict and honest -impartiality, so as not to afford advantage in the war to either; and, -particularly, in so far restraining its trade to the accustomed course -which it held in time of peace, as not to render assistance to one -belligerent in escaping the effects of the other's hostilities."[304] -An agreement among any number of the subjects of the interested nation -proves nothing as to the right of the question, but the irreconcilable -divergence of views at this time shows most clearly the necessity, -under which every country lies, to be ready to support its own sense of -its rights and honor by force, if necessary. - -Under the order of November 6, some hundreds of American ships were -seized and brought into West Indian ports by British cruisers.[305] The -application of the order to them was, however, liable to two serious -objections, even admitting the principle. In the first place, it was -made without warning, under a rule that was at least not generally -accepted; and in the second place, the trade between the French West -India Islands and the United States had been permitted, before the -war, in vessels of sixty tons and upwards.[306] In the year ending -September 30, 1790, fifty-seven thousand tons of American shipping -entered home ports from the French colonies. The trade, therefore, was -one that existed prior to the war, and so did not come under the rule -of 1756.[307] The order of November 6 was not made public until nearly -the end of the year; the United States minister in London not receiving -a copy until Christmas Day. He hastened at once to protest, but before -he could obtain an audience a second was issued, January 8, 1794, -revoking the former and limiting the operations of the rule to vessels -bound from the colonies direct to Europe. Although the principle was -maintained by the new order, and not admitted by the United States, -still, as their own trade was excepted, much dissatisfaction was -removed. - -The serious nature of the difficulties that had already arisen -determined the government to send an extraordinary envoy to England. -John Jay was nominated to this office, and reached London in June, -1794. The British government, having already receded from its first -position, as well as revoked the order of June 8, 1793, for the -seizure of provisions, found no difficulty in assuming a conciliatory -attitude. The result of Jay's mission was a treaty of Commerce and -Navigation, concluded November 19, 1794, the first contracted between -the two countries since the separation. The injuries done to American -commerce, under the orders of November 6, were to be submitted to a -joint commission. The report of the latter was not made until 1804, -but by it compensation was made for most of the seizures; and it was -claimed in the following year by Mr. Monroe, then envoy in London, that -the decision of the commission definitely disposed of the principle of -the Rule of 1756. It does not appear, however, that its power extended -further than the settlement of the cases. There, its decision was to be -final; but it had no power to commit either government to any general -principle of international law not otherwise established.[308] The -Rule of 1756 was not mentioned in the treaty, and the failure to do so -may be construed as a tacit acquiescence, or at least submission, on -the part of the United States.[309] On the other hand, considerable -commercial advantages were obtained. Great Britain conceded to American -ships the privilege of direct trade between their own country and the -British East and West Indies, but they were precluded from carrying -the produce of those colonies to other foreign ports. Indeed, so great -was the anxiety of the British ministers to prevent coffee and sugar -from being taken to Europe, indirectly, by neutral ships, that they -insisted upon, and Jay admitted, a stipulation that while the trade -with the British West Indies was permitted, the United States would not -allow the carrying of any molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa, or cotton -in American vessels to any other part of the world than to the United -States. This would have stopped a profitable trade already open to -American merchants, who first imported, and then re-exported to France, -the produce of the French islands; the broken voyage being considered -to purge the origin of the commodities. This article (the twelfth) was -accordingly rejected by the Senate, and only as thus modified was the -treaty ratified by both powers. - -The French government had viewed with distrust the negotiation between -Great Britain and the United States. Although assured by Mr. Jay, -through the American minister at Paris, that the treaty contained an -express stipulation guarding the existing conventions between France -and his own country, the Directory had the insolence to demand a copy -of the instrument, to which it considered itself entitled, although -it had not yet been communicated to the United States government. -When the terms finally became known, its indignation passed bounds. -The principal points to which it took exception were two, wherein -the United States admitted conditions favoring the interests of -belligerents relatively to neutrals, and against which the chief -efforts of the weaker maritime states had been addressed. The first -of these was the well-settled principle that a neutral ship did not -protect property belonging to an enemy, laden on board it. The United -States had always admitted this as valid, while trying to introduce, as -an innovation, the contrary rule. In the treaty of 1778 with France, -the two countries had stipulated that in any future war in which one -of them should be engaged the belligerent should respect his enemy's -property, if under the flag of the other party to the compact; but -the United States did not think that this agreement between two -nations overturned for all others a settled usage. The interests of -Great Britain indisposed her to accept the proposed change, and the -old principle was explicitly accepted in the seventeenth article of -Jay's treaty. The other point objected to by France referred to the -definitions of contraband of war. This has always been, and still -is, one of the most difficult problems of international law; for an -article may be of the first importance in the wars of one age or one -country, and of slight consequence in another century or a different -scene. By Jay's treaty the United States allowed that naval stores -were, and under some circumstances provisions might be, contraband of -war, and therefore liable to seizure. A free trade in these articles -was of great importance to the Americans; but they were weak then, as -in a military sense they, with far less excuse, are now; and then, as -now, they must submit in questions of doubtful right. The material -interests of United States citizens, as distinguished from the national -self-respect, were in part saved by Great Britain undertaking to pay -for provisions when seized as contraband. All these conditions bore -against the wishes of the French, who regarded the Americans as owing -an undischarged debt of gratitude to them for the scanty, though -certainly most important, aid extended in the Revolutionary struggle -by the monarch whom his people had since beheaded; and from this time -the arrogance with which the French government had treated that of -the United States became tinged with acrimony. It refused to see the -difficulties and weakness of the new and still scarcely cemented body -of states; or that, indirectly, the bargain struck by the latter was -upon the whole as advantageous to France herself as could be expected, -when Great Britain had an absolute control over the sea and all that -floated upon it. To imperious rebukes and reproaches succeeded a series -of measures, outraging neutral and treaty rights, which finally led to -hostilities between the two countries. - -From the time of Jay's treaty to the peace of Amiens, and until the -year 1804 in the following war, the relations between Great Britain -and the United States remained on a fairly settled basis. Innumerable -vexations, indeed, attended neutral commerce at the hands of cruisers -who were willing on slight grounds to seize a prize, taking the -chance of the courts deciding in their favor, and the delays of prize -courts added greatly to the annoyance; but upon the whole American -trade throve greatly. In June, 1797, the Secretary of State reported, -in reply to a resolution of the House, that "captures and losses by -British cruisers, it is presumed, have not been numerous; for the -citizens of the United States having, these three years past, been -accustomed to look to the government for aid in prosecuting these -claims, it is not to be doubted that, generally, these cases have -been reported to the Department." In 1801 there was an outbreak of -lawless seizure in the West Indies.[310] The American vessels engaged -in that trade were small, and, as legal expenses were the same for -a large as for a small prize, the cost of a contest amounted to a -sum very disproportionate to the value of the ship; so the captors -hoped, by the well-known delays of procedure, to extort a compromise. -An abuse of this kind, however outrageous, is different in principle -from the direct action of a government; nor are such cases the only -ones in which men have been willing to take dishonest advantage of the -imperfections, ambiguities, or delays of the law.[311] The Secretary -of State, in transmitting a report on the subject to the House of -Representatives, said, "Neither the communications from our minister -at London, nor my conversations with the Chargé d'Affaires of his -Britannic Majesty in the United States, would lead to an opinion that -any additional orders have lately been given by the British government, -authorizing the system of depredation alluded to."[312] - -In fact, at this time Pitt's government seems to have considered all -trade, which did not go direct to hostile countries, an advantage to -Great Britain, and especially if it could be drawn to pass through -her own ports. Accordingly, in January, 1798, a further relaxation of -the Rule of 1756 was promulgated, extending to European neutrals the -concession made in 1794 to the United States. British cruisers were now -directed not to capture neutral ships, bound from the hostile colonies -to Europe and laden with colonial produce, provided the latter had -become neutral property and its destination was to their own country, -or to a port of Great Britain. The final clause foreshadowed the policy -of the Orders in Council of ten years later, towards which Great -Britain, under the stress of war, was steadily gravitating. The law -of self-preservation, divined by the instinct of the state, demanded -that the United Kingdom should become, for that war, the storehouse of -the world's commerce. The more thriving that commerce, the better for -her, if it could be concentrated in her own borders. Thus France and -the whole world should become tributary to a wealth and to a power by -which, not Great Britain only, but the world should be saved. It was -a great conception, of slow growth and gradual realization; it was -disfigured in its progress by imperfections, blunders, and crimes; -but it was radically sound and in the end victorious, for upon Great -Britain and upon commerce hung the destinies of the world. - -The action of France towards neutral, and especially towards American, -vessels reflected the instability and excitement of the successive -French governments, the violent passions of the time, and the -uncertainty necessarily attendant upon the course of a nation which, -having cut adrift from fixed principles and precedents, is guided -only by changing impressions of right and wrong. The decree of the -9th of May, 1793, arresting vessels laden with provisions or carrying -enemy's goods, was revoked as regards the United States on the 23d -of the same month, because contrary to the treaty of 1778. On the -28th, five days later, the revocation was revoked, and the original -order established.[313] On the first of July the decision was again -reversed and the treaty ordered to be observed; notwithstanding which -the United States minister found it impossible to obtain the release -of vessels seized contrary to its terms, and on the 27th of the month -the last decision was again repealed.[314] On the 22d of September the -American minister writes: "I understand it is still in contemplation -to repeal the decree I complained of, and that in the mean time it has -not been transmitted to the tribunals. In effect, it can do very little -harm; because the fleets of this country are confined by the enemy, -and the privateers by a decree of the Convention."[315] Here matters -rested during the Reign of Terror and until November 15, 1794, after -the fall of Robespierre, when the Directory issued its first edict on -the subject; reiterating that enemy's goods under the neutral flag -would be considered liable to seizure, until the powers, enemies of -France, should declare French property free on board neutral ships. -This made the treatment of cargoes on American vessels depend, not upon -the formal engagements of France with the United States, but upon the -conduct of Great Britain; and it was succeeded, on the 3d of January, -1795, by a decree of revocation. Enemy's goods under neutral flags -now remained exempt from capture until the 2d of July, 1796; when -proclamation was issued, notifying neutral powers that the ships of -the French Republic would be used against their merchant vessels, were -it for the purpose of confiscation, search or detention, in the same -manner that they suffered the English to act in regard to them. Great -Britain was thus made supreme arbiter of the conduct of France towards -neutrals. - -This last step of the French government was directly traceable to its -dissatisfaction with Jay's treaty, the ratifications of which had -been exchanged at London on the 28th of October, 1795. On the 16th of -February, 1796, the Minister of Foreign Affairs told Mr. Monroe, the -American minister, that his government considered the alliance between -the two countries, formed by the treaty of 1778, to be terminated, -_ipso facto_, by Jay's treaty; and on the 7th of October he was further -informed that the minister to the United States had been recalled -and would not be replaced. Meanwhile President Washington, being -dissatisfied with Monroe's conduct, had summoned him home and sent out -Mr. Pinckney as his relief; but the Directory, on the 11th of December, -refused to receive any minister plenipotentiary from the United States -until the grievances it had alleged were redressed,[316] and on the -25th of January, 1797, Pinckney was ordered to leave the country as an -unauthorized foreigner. - -France was now fully embarked on a course of violence toward the United -States, which arose, not from any reasonable cause of discontent given, -but from the disposition, identical with that shown toward the weaker -European nations, to compel all countries to follow the dictates of -the French policy. The utterly loose terms of the decree of July 2, -1796, authorized the seizure of any neutral vessel by a French captain, -if, in his judgment, the conduct of Great Britain toward the neutral -justified it; and left the ultimate fate of the prize to a tribunal -governed only by its own opinion upon the same subject. "You are -mistaken," said a French deputy, "if you think that a privateer sails -furnished with instructions from the Minister of Marine, who ought -to direct their action. The instructions are drawn up by his owners; -they indicate to the captain what he may seize and what release. They -compile for him his duties under all the rules, under all the laws, -contradictory or otherwise, from the year 1400 up to the law of Nivôse -29, An 6" (Jan. 18, 1798).[317] - -In the West Indies the French agents, practically removed from all -control of the home government by the British command of the sea, -issued on the 27th of November, 1796, a decree for the capture of -Americans bound to, or coming from, British ports. They had already, on -the first of August, directed that all vessels having contraband goods -on board should be seized and condemned, whatever their destination, -and although the accepted law condemned only the contraband articles -themselves, not the ship nor the rest of the cargo. On the first of the -following February the same commissioners ordered the capture of all -neutrals sailing for the French islands which had surrendered to the -enemy, and declared them good prize. That these acts fairly represented -the purpose of the Directory may be inferred from the capture of -American ships in European waters under the decree of July 2, and -from the fact that the French consuls at Malaga and Cadiz interpreted -the decree to authorize seizure and condemnation for the single -circumstance of being destined for a British port.[318] Over three -hundred American vessels were thus seized, and most of them condemned. -Envoys sent from the United States to treat concerning these matters -said, in October, 1797, that France had violently taken from America -over fifteen million dollars.[319] "At no period of the war," wrote -they again, February 7, 1798, "has Britain undertaken to exercise such -a power. At no period has she asserted such a right."[320] "Was there -ever anything," said the deputy before quoted, "like the injustice of -the condemnations in the Antilles?" - -These irregular and arbitrary proceedings are chiefly significant as -showing the lack of any fixed principles of action on the part of the -French government and its agents; and they were closely connected -with similar courses towards neutral vessels in French ports. At the -outbreak of hostilities in 1793, one hundred and three American ships -were embargoed at Bordeaux and detained more than a year, without -any reason given; nor had the owners been indemnified in 1796.[321] -Cargoes were forcibly taken from vessels and payment either refused -or offered in kind, and so delayed that in the West Indies alone the -American losses were calculated at two million dollars. Besides these -acts, which had the character of spoliations, the contracts and other -financial obligations of the French government and its agents with -citizens of the United States remained undischarged. The irritation -between the two governments, and on the part of American merchants, -continued to increase rapidly. The decree of July 2, the essence of -which was the formal repudiation of a clause of the treaty of 1778, at -the time when alone it became applicable, remained in force; and was -rendered more obnoxious by a further order, of March 2, 1797, making -more stringent the proofs of neutrality to be adduced before French -tribunals and requiring papers which had long been disused. - -At this time the astonishing successes of Bonaparte's Italian campaigns -were approaching their triumphant conclusion. The battle of Rivoli -had been fought on the 14th of January, 1797,[322] Mantua capitulated -on the 2d of February, and the Pope had been compelled to sue for -peace. To Austria there remained only the hope of contesting the -approach to her German dominions. The confidence of the Directors -knew no bounds, and they now began to formulate the policy toward -British commerce which Napoleon inherited from them. The design was -formed of forcing the United States to recede from the obnoxious -conventions of Jay's treaty; and the government of Holland, then -entirely dependent upon that of France, was pressed to demand that -Dutch property on board American vessels should be protected against -British seizure, and to suggest the concurrence of the three republics -against Great Britain.[323] The Dutch accordingly represented "that, -when circumstances oblige our commerce to confide its interests to the -neutral flag of American vessels, it has a just right to insist that -that flag be protected with energy;"[324] in other words, that, when -the British control of the sea forced the Dutch ships from it, Dutch -trade should be carried on under the American flag, and that the United -States should fight to prevent the seizure of the Dutch property, -although it admitted that the traditional law of nations would not -justify it in so doing. On the 6th of May, 1797, Spain also, doubtless -under the dictation of France, made the same demand.[324] Similar -representations were made to the other neutral country, Denmark. Here -is seen the forerunner of Napoleon's contention that, as against Great -Britain's control of the sea, no state had a right to be neutral. Soon -afterward the idea was carried farther. Denmark was requested to close -the mouth of the Elbe to British commerce. "The French," wrote our -minister to London on the 12th of March, 1797, "assign our treaty with -England as the cause of their maritime conduct toward us, but they have -recently demanded of Hamburg and Bremen to suspend all commerce with -England. These have not complied, and the French minister has been -recalled from Hamburg. The same demand has been made at Copenhagen, and -the refusal has produced a sharp diplomatic controversy. These powers -have made no late treaty with England."[325] - -Hostilities with Austria had ceased by the preliminaries of Leoben, -April 18, followed, after long negotiations, by the treaty of Campo -Formio, October 17, 1797. Of the coalition against France, Great -Britain alone remained upright and defiant. She had in 1797, after -Austria had yielded, offered to negotiate; but the terms demanded -were such that she refused to accept them, and her envoy was ordered -out of France as peremptorily as Mr. Pinckney had been a few months -before. The Directory thought that the time was now come when she could -be brought to unconditional surrender, and the weapon by which her -commerce should be annihilated was already forged to its hand. On the -31st of October, 1796 (Brumaire 10, An 5),[326] a law had been passed -by the Legislature forbidding entirely the admission of any British -manufactured goods, directing that all persons who already had such in -possession should declare them within three days, and that they should -be at once packed and stored for re-exportation. In order to insure the -execution of the statute, domiciliary visits were authorized everywhere -within three leagues of the frontiers or sea-board, and throughout -France the dwellings of all tradesmen were also open to search. Laws of -similar purpose had been passed early in the war;[327] but they either -had been found insufficient or were no longer applicable to the changed -conditions of affairs. "Now that," to use the words of a deputy, "the -flags of the Republic or those of its allies float over the sea from -Embden to Trieste, and almost all the ports of the European seas are -closed to England, we must stop the voluntary subsidies which are -paid her by the consumers of English merchandise."[328] With Belgium -annexed, with Spain and Holland vassals rather than allies, with the -greater part of Italy in military occupation, it seemed possible to -repel the entrance points of British goods to the Continent far from -the French frontier, and by strict watchfulness to close the latter -against such as worked their way to it. - -The expectation, however, was deceived; the superior quality and -abundance of British manufactures created a demand which evaded all -watchfulness and enlisted all classes against the officials. The -Directory therefore determined, toward the end of 1797, to put the -law into force with all severity and to introduce another and final -rigor into its maritime prize code. On the 4th of January, 1798, a -message was sent to the council of Five Hundred, announcing that "on -that very day the municipal administrators, the justices of the peace, -the commissaries of the Directory, and the superintendents of customs, -are proceeding in all the chief places of the departments, in all -the ports, and in all the principal communes, to seize all English -merchandise now in France in contravention of the law of Brumaire 10, -An 5. Such is the _first act_ by which, now that peace is given to the -Continent, the war declared long since against England is about to -assume the real character that belongs to it." But more was needed. -Neutral vessels were in the habit of entering British ports, shipping -British goods, and carrying on British trade; they were even known, -when opportunity offered, to introduce articles of British manufacture, -directly or indirectly, into France. By so doing they aided Great -Britain and actually took part in the war. "The Directory, therefore, -thinks it urgent and necessary to pass a law declaring that the -character of vessels, relative to their quality of neutral or enemy, -shall be determined by their cargo; ... in consequence, that every -vessel found at sea, having on board English merchandise as her cargo, -in whole or in part, shall be declared lawful prize, whosoever shall be -the proprietor of this merchandise, _which shall be reputed contraband -for this cause alone_, that it comes from England or her possessions." -This decree was adopted without discussion, in the very terms of the -Directory's message, on the 18th of January, 1798. From that time -forward, to use the expression of a French deputy, speaking a year -later on the proposed repeal of the law, "if a handkerchief of English -origin is found on board a neutral ship, both the rest of the cargo -and the ship itself are subject to condemnation." It is, perhaps, well -to point out that this differed from the Rule of 1756, by forbidding -a trade which at all times had been open to neutrals, in peace as in -war. It differed from the old rule condemning enemy's property found in -neutral bottoms, by condemning also neutral property of hostile origin, -together with the whole cargo and the ship, as contaminated by the -presence of any British goods. - -Nevertheless, British commerce continued to thrive, and was rather -benefited than injured by the new law. What the indomitable purpose, -unlimited power, and extraordinary mental and physical activity of -Napoleon could only partially accomplish, proved to be wholly beyond -the weak arm of the Directory. When war first shut the ports of France -to Great Britain, her trade thither passed through the Netherlands -and Holland. When the Netherlands were overrun, Amsterdam monopolized -the traffic. With the fall of Holland, it passed away to Bremen and -Hamburg. The latter port, being farther east and more remote from the -French armies, naturally drew the greater part and became the real heir -of Amsterdam.[329] It was the emporium of Northern Germany, through -which poured the colonial produce of the world and the manufactures -of the British Islands, and from which they were distributed over -the Continent. The enormous subsidies paid by the United Kingdom to -Germany found their way back, in part at least, by the increased -purchasing power of the belligerent countries,[330] which consumed -the manufactures of Great Britain and the coffee and sugar which had -passed through her ports and paid toll to her revenues.[331] The -shipping clearing for Hamburg from British ports, which was naught in -1793, rose to fifty-three thousand tons in 1795; and in 1798, the year -during which the new French law operated, increased to seventy-four -thousand. But, while Hamburg was the great centre, all the northern -German ports shared the same prosperity. After Prussia retired from the -war against France, in April, 1795, a neutral North German territory -was established, behind a line agreed upon between the two countries. -The total tonnage entering the ports of this region increased from one -hundred and twenty thousand in 1792 to two hundred and six thousand in -1795; and in 1798 reached three hundred and three thousand. The value -of merchandise imported rose from £2,200,000 in 1792, to £8,300,000 in -1795, £11,000,000 in 1798, and £13,500,000 in 1800.[332] - -A similar elasticity was shown by British trade throughout the world. -Only in the Mediterranean was there a marked decrease both of exports -and imports,—a loss partly filled by the enterprise of American -merchants;[333] but only partly, for the Barbary pirates seconded -the sweeping French decrees in excluding neutrals from that sea. But -it was in the West Indies, together with the German ports, that the -commercial activity of Great Britain found its greatest resources; -and in the steady support contributed by that region to her financial -stability is to be found the justification of the much derided policy -of Pitt in capturing sugar islands. Alike as valuable pieces of -property, as possessions to be exchanged when framing a treaty, and -as bases for cruisers, which not merely seized upon British shipping -but disturbed the commercial development of the whole region, each -hostile island should at once have been seized by Great Britain. In -a contest between equal navies for the control of the sea, to waste -military effort upon the capture of small islands, as the French -did in 1778, is a preposterous misdirection of effort; but when one -navy is overwhelmingly preponderant, as the British was after 1794, -when the enemy confines himself to commerce-destroying by crowds of -small privateers, then the true military policy is to stamp out the -nests where they swarm. If, by so doing, control is also gained of -a rich commercial region, as the Caribbean Sea then was, the action -is doubly justified. The produce of the West Indies, as of the East, -figured doubly in the returns of British commerce,—as imports, and as -re-exported to the Continent.[334] Each captured island contributed -to swell the revenues by which the war was maintained.[335] The -disappearance of the merchant fleets of France, Spain, and Holland, the -ruin of San Domingo, and the general disorganization of such French -islands as were not taken, threw the greater part of the production -of tropical articles into British hands; and the practice of the day, -which confined its transport to British ships, helped to support the -shipping interest also in the strain brought upon it by the war. The -Americans alone could compete in the continental market as carriers -of such produce. Debarred from going with it direct to Europe by the -Rule of 1756, the rise in price, due to the diminished production -and decrease of transport just mentioned, allowed them to take the -sugar and coffee of the colonies at war with England to American -ports, reship it to the Continent, and yet make a good profit on the -transaction. As the British colonists were in full possession of the -home market, and their produce commanded high prices, the outcry which -caused so much trouble ten years later was not now raised. On the -contrary, their prosperous condition facilitated the British orders of -January, 1798, exempting from capture Danes, Swedes, and other neutral -ships, when carrying coffee and sugar of hostile origin to their own -country, or to England. - -It was against this great system of trade that the law of Nivôse 29 -was launched. British manufactured goods, rather than British gold -and silver, bought and paid for the produce of the East and West -Indies, for that of the United States and of the Levant. The Continent -consumed the manufactures of Great Britain, the sugar and coffee of her -colonies, and obtained through British merchants the spices and wares -of the East; for all which it for the most part paid back specie. The -United States took specie from France herself for the colonial produce -carried there in its vessels, and with it paid Great Britain for her -manufactures. France herself received British goods through continental -channels, and paid hard cash for them. The money thus coming to London -had flowed back as subsidies to the armies of the coalitions. Now, -thanks to Bonaparte, Great Britain stood alone. The French navy was -powerless to contend with her fleets; but, by actual possession or by -treaty, the Directory had excluded her ships from a great part of the -Continent. Nevertheless, British goods abounded in all parts through -the complicity of neutral carriers. If these could be stopped, the -market for British manufactures would be closed; therefore against them -were launched the cruisers of France, with the authority of the decree -to capture any one of them found with a bale or box of British origin -on board. The result was curious. - -After the lapse of a year, on the 13th of January, 1799, the Directory -addressed a message to the lower house of the Legislature[336] on the -subject of maritime prizes, in which occurred the celebrated avowal, -already quoted, that not a single merchant ship under French colors -sailed the deep seas. But this was not all. The irregularities and -outrages of privateers had so terrified neutrals that there had been an -immense diminution in the entries of neutral tonnage, although Great -Britain had rather relaxed than increased the severe rules she had -adopted early in the war. In consequence of the smaller importations -from abroad, there were necessarily smaller sales of French goods, and -the decrease of neutral carriers impeded the export of agricultural -produce and manufactures, as well as the importation of raw materials -essential to the latter. The Directory attributed the evil to an -existing ordinance, which left the final determination of prize -cases in the hands of the courts, instead of attributing it to the -executive. It argued that if there were a right of final appeal to the -latter, it could check the arbitrary proceedings of the cruisers and -the erroneous decisions of the judges. If, as was represented by the -American consulate at Paris, the courts of first instance were chiefly -composed of merchants in the sea-ports, most of whom were, directly -or indirectly, interested in fitting out privateers,[337] there was -certainly need of some change in the existing legislation. In the -Conseil des Anciens, however, a different view prevailed. On the 17th -of January, 1799, a debate began in that body, on a resolution fixing -the date when the law of January 18, 1798, became operative.[338] The -consequent discussion took a wide range over the policy and results -of the enactment, as shown by the year it had been in force. The -disastrous commercial condition of France was freely admitted on all -sides; but in several powerful speeches it was attributed directly and -convincingly to the working of the law itself. "Neutrals repelled from -our ports; our agricultural products without any outlet abroad; our -industry and commerce annihilated; our colonies helpless; our shipping -ways deserted; a balance of twenty thousand sailors in English prisons; -our ships of war without seamen,—such are the political effects of the -law which is ruining, crushing us."[339] - -In less impassioned words, other deputies showed the unfairness of -the law. If, on the land frontier, a wagon was stopped carrying a -bale of British goods, the bale was confiscated, but the rest of the -load escaped. If in a ship a like bale was found, not only it, but -all the rest of the cargo and the ship itself were condemned. Even -in the fiercest heat of the Revolution and the utmost danger to the -country, it had never been attempted, as now, to forbid neutrals -carrying British goods to their own country.[340] The step could not -be justified under the plea of reprisals; for "if the English have -seized French goods on these same neutrals, they have not confiscated -the rest of the cargo. These are, therefore, not reprisals, but new -proceedings on our part, which neutrals could neither expect nor guard -against."[341] A neutral ship came within reach of the French coast -only at her extreme peril. A small package of British goods would -justify her capture by a French privateer, whatever her destination; -nay, even if she were bringing to France articles urgently needed, and -intended to take away French produce in exchange for them. Neutrals, -allies, even French vessels themselves, carrying on the little trade -with neighboring states, were preyed on by French corsairs. This -condition reacted on the enterprise of the cruisers themselves. It was -much safer, and quite as profitable, to keep close to the home coast -and board passing vessels. The merest trifle, smuggled on board by one -of the crew, or shipped unknown to the master and owner, made them good -prize. Owing to this caution, the captures brought into French home -ports had dropped, from six hundred and sixty-two in the previous year, -to four hundred and fifty-two, notwithstanding the vast extension of -the field for seizures.[342] - -The loss of prizes, however, was far from being the worst effect of -the law. Neutrals being repelled, friendly and French shipping scared -away, commerce had been seriously crippled for want of carriage. In -the year before the enactment the coasting trade employed 895,000 -tons; of which 120,000 were neutrals, by whom goods were transported -from one sea frontier of France to another, as from the Bay of Biscay -to the French Mediterranean coast. In the year following, the total -fell to 746,000; but the neutrals dropped to 38,000. In the foreign -trade 860,000 tons were employed in the year before the law, of which -623,000 were neutral. In the year following, the total fell to 688,000, -of which 468,000 were neutrals. There thus resulted a total loss of -322,000 tons in a commerce of only 1,750,000. To this the speaker added -a striking comparison: "In the same year in which we lost 322,000 -tons by the operation of the law, we took four hundred and fifty-two -prizes. Assuming—what is not the case—that these were all English, and -that they averaged two hundred tons burden—an excessive allowance—we -have taken from our enemy 90,400 tons against 322,000 we have lost." -"All the sufferings of ourselves and allies might be borne, if good -resulted to ourselves or harm to England; but it has not." "English -ships are insured at a premium of five per cent, while neutrals bound -to France have to pay twenty to thirty per cent. Neutrals themselves -seek English convoy.[343] French merchants would gladly charter neutral -ships to carry to San Domingo the produce that is overflowing our -storehouses, and to bring back the coffee and sugar for which we are -paying such extravagant rates; but they will not come near us. So, -instead of paying a moderate price with French goods, we are paying -exorbitant rates in specie, which goes straight to England, our most -cruel foe."[344] The policy of the law was condemned by the results. -In support of its justice, it was alleged that there were at sea only -French and British ships, whence it followed that all which were not -French could be seized,—a contention which derives its sole present -interest from being the same as that put forth by Napoleon ten years -later. It shows again—what can scarcely be too often asserted in the -interests of truth—that the emperor was but the full and perfect -incarnation of the spirit that animated the Convention and the -Directory. - -The Government of the United States had not yet, in 1798, passed -into the hands of men with an undue "passion for peace." Upon the -unceremonious dismissal of Mr. Pinckney, not for personal objections -but as rejecting any minister from America, the President had called a -special meeting of Congress in May, 1797, and recommended an increase -of the naval establishment. When the news of the law of January 18, -1798, reached the United States, Congress was in session. On the 28th -of May an act was approved, authorizing the capture of any French armed -vessel which shall, upon the coast of the United States, have committed -any depredation upon her commerce.[345] On the 7th of July another act -abrogated all existing treaties between the two countries;[346] and on -the 9th was decreed the seizure of French armed vessels anywhere on the -high seas, not only by public armed ships, but by privateers, which -the President was authorized to commission.[347] Thereupon followed a -period of maritime hostilities, though without a formal declaration of -war, which lasted three years; the first prize being taken from the -French in June, 1798, and peace being restored by a treaty, signed in -Paris September 30, 1800, and ratified the following February. The -small force of the United States was principally occupied in the West -Indies, protecting their trade,—both by the patrol system directed -against the enemy's cruisers, and by convoying bodies of merchantmen -to and from the islands. As the condition of the French navy did not -allow keeping large fleets afloat, the ships of the United States, -though generally small, were able to hold their ground, capture many -of the enemy, and preserve their own commerce from molestation. The -mercantile shipping of France, however, had already been so entirely -destroyed by Great Britain, that she suffered far more from the -cessation of the carrying trade, which Americans had maintained for -her, than from the attacks of the American navy. - -The year 1798, which opened with the unlucky law of January 18, was in -all respects unfortunate for France. In May Bonaparte sailed for Egypt, -the country thus parting with its ablest general, with thirty-two -thousand of its best troops, and its only available fleet, of thirteen -sail-of-the-line, which the government with the utmost difficulty had -been able to equip. On the first of August Nelson destroyed the fleet -in the Battle of the Nile; and the British navy, forced to leave the -Mediterranean in 1796, again asserted its preponderance throughout the -whole of that sea, opposing an effectual barrier to the return of the -army in Egypt. The entire face of affairs changed, not only in the -East but in Europe. The Porte, at first hesitating, declared openly -against France. A second coalition was formed between Great Britain, -Austria, and Russia, to which Naples acceded; and the armies of the -latter entered upon their campaign in November. They were, indeed, -quickly overthrown; but the very march of the French troops against -them left the armies in northern Italy hopelessly inferior to their -opponents. The year 1799 was full of reverses. In Germany and in Italy -the French were steadily driven back; in Switzerland only did they, -under Masséna, hold their ground. The British indeed were repelled in -their attack upon Holland, but they carried away with them the Dutch -navy. A Russo-Turkish fleet, entering the Mediterranean, retook the -Ionian Islands from the French; and Admiral Bruix escaped from Brest -only to find it impossible to achieve any substantial results in the -face of the British superiority on the sea. In the midst of this -confusion and disaster, and amid the commercial and internal distress -caused by the maritime legislation, Bonaparte returned. Landing on the -9th of October, he on the 9th of November overthrew the Directory. -Preparations for war were at once begun, and the successes of the -first consul in Italy and of Moreau in Germany, in 1800, combined with -the defection of the czar from the coalition, restored peace to the -Continent and internal quiet to France. - -Upon this followed the renewal of the Armed Neutrality of the Baltic -powers. Great Britain found herself again without an ally, face to face -with France, now supported by the naval combination of the northern -states. Still she stood resolute, abating not a jot of her asserted -maritime rights. As before, the allies demanded that the neutral flag -should cover the enemy's property that floated under it, and that the -term "contraband of war" should apply only to articles strictly and -solely applicable to warlike purposes, which, they claimed, naval -stores and provisions were not. They proposed also to deprive Great -Britain of the belligerent right of search, by sending ships of war -with the merchant ships, and requiring that the assertion of the naval -captain should be received as establishing the lawful character of -the two or three hundred cargoes under his convoy. "The question," -said Pitt, "is whether we are to permit the navy of our enemy to be -recruited and supplied,—whether we are to suffer blockaded ports to be -furnished with warlike stores and provisions,—whether we are to suffer -neutral nations, by hoisting a flag upon a sloop or a fishing boat, -to convey the treasures of South America to the harbors of Spain, or -the naval stores of the Baltic to Brest and Toulon. I would ask, too, -has there ever been a period, since we have been a naval country, in -which we have acted upon this principle?"[348] and he alleged not only -the unbroken practice of Great Britain, but her old treaties with the -allied states, and especially the convention with Russia in 1793. So -far as precedent and tradition went, England's case was unimpeachable. -She was called upon to surrender, not a new pretension, but an old -right important to her military position. "I have no hesitation," said -Fox, Pitt's great opponent, "in saying that, as a general proposition, -'free bottoms do not make free goods;' and that, as an axiom, it is -supported neither by the law of nations nor by common-sense."[349] - -At this time the British navy was superior to the combined forces of -all Europe. A fleet, of which Nelson was the animating spirit though -not the nominal head, entered the Baltic. Denmark was struck down on -the 2d of April, 1801; and this blow, coinciding with the murder of -the Czar Paul, dissolved a coalition more menacing in appearance than -in reality. The young man who succeeded to the Russian throne met with -dignity the imposing attitude of Nelson, now left in chief command; -but he had not inherited his father's fantastic ambitions, and the -material interests of Russia in that day pointed to peace with Great -Britain. The treaty, signed June 5, 1801,[350] permitted the neutral to -trade from port to port on the coast of a nation at war; but renounced, -on the part of Russia, the claim that the neutral flag covered the -enemy's goods. On the other hand Great Britain admitted that property -of a belligerent, sold _bonâ fide_ to a neutral, became neutral in -character and as such not liable to seizure; but from the operation -of this admission obtained the special exception of produce from the -hostile colonies.[351] This, Russia conceded, could not be carried -directly from the colony to the mother country, even though it had -become neutral property by a real sale; and similarly the direct trade -from the mother country to the colony was renounced. Great Britain thus -obtained an explicit acknowledgment of the Rule of 1756 from the most -formidable of the maritime powers, and strengthened her hands for the -approaching dispute with the United States. In return, she abandoned -the claim, far more injurious to Russia, to seize naval stores as -contraband of war. Four months later, hostilities between Great Britain -and France also ceased. - -The maritime commercial interests, both of belligerents and neutrals, -received convincing and conspicuous illustration from this, the first -of the two sea wars growing out of the French Revolution. It was the -interest of the neutrals to step in and take up the trade necessarily -abandoned, to a greater or less degree, by the belligerents; and -it was also useful to both parties to the war that they should do -so. But it was very much less to the advantage of the more purely -maritime state than it was to its antagonist; for not only did she -need help less, but such temporary changes in the course of trade -tend to become permanent. The immediate gain may become a final and -irretrievable loss. Hence Great Britain is seen to yield readily the -restrictions of the Navigation Act, wherever it is clearly advisable -to avail herself of neutral seamen or neutral carriers; but the -concession goes no further than immediately necessary, and is always -expressly guarded as temporary. The relaxation is a purely warlike -measure, and she is perfectly consistent in refusing to allow it to -her enemies. Every slackening of the Navigation Act was a violation -in principle of the Rule of 1756,[352] which she was quite content to -have her enemy imitate; as the big boy at school offers the small one -the opportunity of returning an injury in kind. France might employ -neutrals contrary to what Great Britain claimed as the law of nations, -as the latter herself did; but there was the difference that Great -Britain could put a stop to the operations favorable to her opponent, -while France could only partially impede those that advantaged hers. -It was, therefore, clearly the policy of the British to yield nothing -to neutrals except when they could not avoid it, and then explicitly -to assert the principle, while conceding a relaxation; they thus kept -control over the neutral trade, and impeded operations that both helped -their enemy and might also supplant their own commerce. In the latter -part of the war, as the purpose of France to cripple their trade took -shape, and the exclusion of British goods from the Continent became an -evident and avowed intention, the ministry strengthened itself with -the reflection that the measure was impracticable so long as neutral -bottoms abounded; but a few months later the denial of intercourse -between hostile nations and their colonies by neutral intermediaries -was inserted in the Russian treaty. The intention to use neutrals -to the utmost extent desirable for British interests thus coincided -with the determination to stop a traffic esteemed contrary to them. -The permission to neutrals, by the orders of January, 1798, to carry -the produce of French and Dutch colonies to Great Britain, when they -were threatened with seizure if they sailed with the same for France -or Holland, illustrates both motives of action; while it betrays the -gradual shaping of the policy—which grew up over against Bonaparte's -Continental System—of forcing neutrals to make England the storehouse -and toll-gate of the world's commerce. Superficially, Great Britain -seems rather to relax toward neutrals between 1793 and 1801; but the -appearance is only superficial. The tendencies that issued in the ever -famous Orders in Council of 1807 were alive and working in 1798. - -The question for British statesmen to determine, therefore, was how -far to acquiesce in the expansion of neutral trade, and where to draw -their line,—always a difficult task, dependent upon many considerations -and liable to result in inconsistencies, real or apparent. For France -the problem was less intricate. Her commerce even before the war -was chiefly in foreign hands;[353] she had therefore little cause -to fear ultimate injury by concessions. Immediate loss by neutral -competition was impossible, for the British navy left her no ships to -lose. Hence it was her interest to avail herself of neutral carriers -to the fullest extent, to recognize that the freer their operations -the better for her, and that, even could restrictions upon their -carrying for her enemy be enforced, the result would be to compel the -British people to develop further their own merchant shipping. Every -blow at a neutral was really, even though not seemingly, a blow for -Great Britain. In a general way this was seen clearly enough, and a -policy favoring neutrals was traditional in France, but the blind -passions of the Revolution overthrew it. To use the vigorous words of -a deputy: "The French people is the victim of an ill-devised scheme, -of a too blind trust in commerce-destroying, _an auxiliary measure_, -which, to be really useful, should strike only the enemy, and not -reach the navigation of neutrals and allies, and still less paralyze -the circulation and export of our agriculture and of the national -industries."[354] Such were the results of the direct action of -successive French governments, and of the indirect embarrassment caused -by the delays and inconsistencies of the executive and the tribunals. -It was thought that neutrals could be coerced by French severities -into resisting British restrictions, whether countenanced or not by -international law. But Great Britain, though a hard taskmaster, did not -so lay her burdens as to lose services which were essential to her, nor -compel a resistance that under the military conditions was hopeless; -and the series of wild measures, which culminated in the law of January -18, 1798, only frightened neutrals from French coasts, while leaving -Great Britain in full control of the sea. The year 1797 saw the lowest -depression of British trade; coincidently with the law of January 18 -began a development, which, at first gradual, soon became rapid, and in -which the neutrals driven from France bore an increasing proportion. - -The short peace of Amiens lasted long enough to indicate how thoroughly -Great Britain, while using neutrals, had preserved her own maritime -advantages intact. The preliminaries were signed October 1, 1801, and -war was again declared May 16, 1803; but, notwithstanding the delays -in paying off the ships of war, and the maintenance of an unusually -large number of seamen in the peace establishment, the neutral shipping -employed fell from twenty-eight per cent, in 1801, to eighteen and a -half per cent in 1802. - -On the outbreak of the second war Napoleon reverted at once to the -commercial policy of the Convention and the Directory. On the 20th -of June, 1803, a decree was issued by him directing the confiscation -of any produce of the British colonies, and of any manufactures of -Great Britain, introduced into France. Neutral vessels arriving were -required to present a certificate from the French consul at the port -of embarkation, certifying that the cargo was in no part of British -origin. The same measure was forcibly carried out in Holland, though -nominally an independent state;[355] and the occupation of Hanover, -while dictated also by the general principle of injuring Great Britain -as much as possible, had mainly in view the closure of the Elbe and -the Weser to British commerce. Beyond this, however, Bonaparte being -then engrossed with the purpose of a direct attack by armed force upon -the British islands, the indirect hostilities upon their commercial -prosperity were, for the moment, neglected. - -At the same period Great Britain began to feel that neutral rivalry was -being carried too far for her own welfare, and determined to tighten -the reins previously slackened. She obtained from Sweden in July, 1803, -a special concession, allowing her to arrest Swedish vessels laden with -naval stores for France, and to purchase the cargoes at a fair price,—a -stipulation identical with that about provisions in Jay's treaty; and -when the French occupation of Hanover excluded her ships from the Elbe -and Weser, she by a blockade of the rivers shut out neutrals also. -But it was in the West Indies, so long a fruitful source of wealth, -that the pressure of neutral competition was most heavily felt. The -utter ruin of San Domingo, and the embarrassments of the other islands -hostile to Great Britain, had in the former war combined with the -dangers of the seas to raise the price of colonial produce on the -Continent,[356] and, consequently, to give a great development to the -British growth of sugar and coffee, the transport of which was confined -by law to British vessels. The planters, the shipping business, and -the British merchants dealing with the West Indies, together with the -various commercial interests and industries connected with them, all -participated in the benefits of this traffic, which supplied over one -fourth of the imports of the kingdom, and took off besides a large -amount of manufactures. As production increased, however, and prices -lowered, the West India business began to feel keenly the competition -by the produce of the hostile islands, exported by American merchants. - -Of the extent of this commerce, and of its dependence upon the -interruption, by Great Britain, of the ordinary channels for French -and Dutch trade, a few figures will give an idea. In 1792, before the -war, the United States exported to Europe 1,122,000 pounds of sugar, -and 2,136,742 of coffee; in 1796, 35,000,000 of sugar and 62,000,000 -of coffee; in 1800, 82,000,000 of sugar and 47,000,000 coffee. In -1803, during the short peace, the exports fell to 20,000,000 of sugar -and 10,000,000 coffee; in 1804, a year of war, they again rose to -74,000,000 sugar, and 48,000,000 coffee. The precise destination cannot -be given; but the trade between France and her West India Islands, -carried on by American ships, amounted in 1805 to over $20,000,000, of -which only $6,000,000 were United States produce. In like manner the -trade with Holland was over $17,000,000, of which $2,000,000 were of -American origin. - -Upon the return of Mr. Pitt to power, in 1804, the attempt was made -to strengthen the fabric of British commercial prosperity in the -Caribbean, by an extension of the system of free ports in the different -colonies; by means of which, and of their large merchant shipping, the -British collected in their own hands, by both authorized and contraband -traffic, so much of the carrying trade of this region, extending their -operations to the mainland as well as throughout the islands. More, -however, was needed to restrain the operations of the Americans, who, -by reducing the price of coffee on the Continent, diminished the -re-exportation from Great Britain, thus affecting the revenue of the -kingdom and the profits of the planters; and who also, by acting as -carriers, interfered with the accumulations at the free ports and the -consequent employment of British ships. All the classes interested -joined in urging the government to find some relief; and the clamor was -increased by a sense of indignation at the tricks by which belligerent -rights were believed to be evaded by the Americans. The Rule of 1756 -did not allow the latter to carry their cargoes direct to Europe; but, -as the trade winds compelled vessels to run to the northward until -they reached the westerly winds prevailing in the higher latitudes, -no great delay was involved in making an American port, or even in -trans-shipping the cargo to a vessel bound for Europe.[357] Great -Britain admitted that articles of hostile origin, but become neutral -property, could be carried freely to the neutral country; and, when so -imported, became part of the neutral stock and could then be freely -re-exported to a hostile state. - -The question of a _bonâ fide_ importation, like all others involving -a question of intention, could be determined only by the character of -the transactions attending it; but it was held generally that actual -landing and storage, with payment of the duties, was sufficient proof, -unless rebutted by other circumstances. Early in the war following the -peace of Amiens, the British courts awoke to the fact that the duties -paid on goods so imported were simply secured by a bond, and that on -re-exportation a drawback was given, so that a very small percentage -of the nominal duties was actually paid.[358] Upon this ground a ship -was condemned in May, 1805, and great numbers of American vessels -carrying colonial produce to Europe were seized and brought into port, -as well as others proceeding from the United States to the West Indies, -with cargoes originating in the mother countries; and when, in the -opinion of the court, the duties had been only nominally paid, they -were condemned. It is hard to see the soundness of an objection to -these decisions, based on the validity of the payments; but the action -of the British government is open to severe censure in that no warning -was given of its purpose no longer to accept, as proof of importation, -the payment of duties by bond, on which drawback was given. Whether -it had known the law of the United States or not, that law had been -open to it, and ignorance of its provisions was due not to any want of -publicity, but to the carelessness of British authorities. Under the -circumstances, the first seizures were little short of robbery. - -The reclamations of the United States met with little attention -during Pitt's brief second administration; but after his death, in -January, 1806, and the accession to office of Grenville and Fox, -a more conciliatory attitude was shown,—especially by the latter, -who became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Favorably inclined to the -Americans since his opposition to the policy of the Revolutionary -War, he seemed desirous of conceding their wishes; but the pressure -from without, joined to opposition within the ministry, prevented a -frank reversal of the course pursued. Instead of the Rule of 1756, Fox -obtained an Order in Council, dated May 16, 1806, placing the coast -of the Continent, from Brest to the Elbe, in a state of blockade. -The blockade, however, was only to be enforced strictly between the -mouth of the Seine and Ostend. Into ports between those two points no -neutral would be admitted on any pretext, and, if attempting to enter, -would be condemned; but on either side, neutral ships could go in and -out freely, provided they "had not been laden at any port belonging -to his Majesty's enemies, or, if departing, were not destined to any -port belonging to his Majesty's enemies." The wording of the order was -evidently framed to avoid all question as to the origin of cargoes, -upon which the Rule of 1756 hinged. Not the origin of the cargo, but -the port of lading, determined the admission of the neutral ship to the -harbors partially blockaded; and if to them, then, _a fortiori_, to all -open ports of the enemy. On the other hand, the strict blockade already -established of the Elbe and Weser was by this order partially relieved, -in the expectation that neutrals would carry British manufactures to -those northern markets. In short, the Order was a compromise, granting -something both to the mercantile interest and to the Americans, though -not conceding the full demands of either. It is at best doubtful -whether the British were able to establish an effective blockade over -the extent of coast from Brest to the Elbe, but the United States -and Napoleon had no doubts whatever about it; and it thus fell, by a -singular irony of fate, to the most liberal of the British statesmen, -the friend of the Americans and of Napoleon, as almost the last act of -his life, to fire the train which led to the Berlin and Milan decrees, -to the Orders in Council of 1807, and to the war with the United States -six years later. - -Fox died on the 13th of September, 1806, and was succeeded as Minister -of Foreign Affairs by Lord Howick. On the 25th of the same month the -partial restrictions still imposed on the Elbe and the Weser were -removed; so that neutral ships, even though from the ports of an enemy -of Great Britain, were able to enter. In the mean time, war had broken -out between France and Prussia; the battle of Jena was fought October -14, and on the 26th Napoleon entered Berlin. The battle of Trafalgar, -a twelvemonth before, had shattered all his confidence in the French -navy and destroyed his hopes of directly invading Great Britain. On -the other hand the short campaign of 1805 had overthrown the Austrian -power, and that of 1806 had just laid Prussia at his feet. The dream of -reducing Great Britain by the destruction of her commercial prosperity, -long floating in his mind, now became tangible, and was formulated -into the phrase that he "would conquer the sea by the land." Two of -the great military monarchies were already prostrate. Spain, Holland, -Italy, and the smaller German states were vassals, more or less -unwilling, but completely under his control; there seemed no reason to -doubt that he could impose his will on the Continent and force it to -close every port to British trade. On the 21st of November, 1806, the -emperor issued the famous Berlin Decree; and then, having taken the -first in the series of fated steps which led to his ruin, he turned -to the eastward and plunged with his army into the rigors of a Polish -winter to fulfil his destiny. - - - - -CHAPTER XVIII. - -THE WARFARE AGAINST COMMERCE, 1806-1812. - -THE BERLIN AND MILAN DECREES OF NAPOLEON, 1806 AND 1807.—THE BRITISH -ORDERS IN COUNCIL, 1807-1809.—ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY OF THESE MEASURES -OF THE TWO BELLIGERENTS.—OUTLINE OF CONTEMPORARY LEADING EVENTS. - - -Napoleon's Berlin decree alleged many reasons and contained many -provisions; but the essential underlying idea was to crush the commerce -of Great Britain by closing the Continent to her products of every -kind.[359] The pretext was found in the Order in Council of May 16, -1806, issued by the ministry of Grenville and Fox, putting the coast -of the Continent from Brest to the Elbe under blockade. Napoleon -asserted that the right to blockade applied only to fortified, not -to commercial, ports, which was not true; and further, that the -united forces of Great Britain were unable to maintain so extensive -an operation, which, if not certainly true, was at least plausible. -Retaliating an abuse, if it were one, with a yet greater excess, the -Berlin decree began by declaring the British islands blockaded, at -a time when the emperor could not keep a ship at sea, except as a -fugitive from the omnipresent fleets of his enemy. From this condition -of phantom blockade it resulted that all commerce with the British -Islands was forbidden; and consequently all merchandise exported from -them, having been unlawfully carried, became good prize. Vessels from -Great Britain could not be admitted into French ports. Further, as -the British refused to surrender the old rule, by which the goods of -individual enemies at sea were liable to capture, Napoleon decreed that -not only the property of individual Englishmen on the Continent was to -be seized, but also that of individual neutrals, if of British origin. -The preamble ended with a clause defining the duration of the edict, by -which the emperor burned his ships, laying down conditions which Great -Britain would never accept until at her last gasp. "The present decree -shall be considered as a fundamental principle of the Empire, until -England has acknowledged that the law of war is one and the same on the -land as on the sea; that it cannot be extended to private property of -whatever kind, nor to the person of individuals not in the profession -of arms, and that the right of blockade must be restricted to fortified -places, actually invested by sufficient forces." - -Having launched his missile, Napoleon became at once engaged in the -campaign against Russia. The bloody and doubtful battle of Eylau was -fought on the 8th of February, 1807, and for the next few months -the emperor was too busily engaged, holding on by his teeth on the -banks of the Vistula, to superintend the working of his decree.[360] -Immediately upon its promulgation in Paris, the American minister -demanded an explanation on several points from the Minister of Marine, -who replied that he did not understand it to make any alterations in -the laws respecting maritime captures, and that an American vessel -could not be taken at sea merely on the ground that she was bound to, -or coming from, a British port; this he inferred from the fact that -such vessels were, by the seventh article, denied admission to French -ports.[361] The inference, natural though it was, only showed how -elastic and slippery the terms of Napoleon's orders could be. The whole -edict, in fact, remained a dead letter until the struggle with Russia -was decided. At first, British merchants desisted from sending to the -Continent; but, as advices showed that the decree was inoperative, -shipments by neutral vessels became as brisk as at any time before, -and so continued until August or September, 1807.[362] The battle of -Friedland, resulting in the total defeat of the Russian army, was -fought on the 14th of June; on the 22d an armistice was signed; and on -the 25th Alexander and Napoleon had their first interview upon the raft -in the Niemen. On the 8th of July was concluded the remarkable and, to -Europe, threatening Treaty of Tilsit. The czar recognized all the new -states created by the emperor, and ceded to him the maritime positions -of the Ionian Islands, and the mouths of the Cattaro in the Adriatic; -in return for which Napoleon acquiesced in Russia's taking Finland from -Sweden, and also, under certain conditions, the European provinces of -the Turkish Empire as far as the Balkans. A further clause, buried in -the most profound secrecy, bound Russia and France to make common cause -in all circumstances; to unite their forces by land and sea in any war -they should have to maintain; to take arms against Great Britain, if -she would not subscribe to this treaty; and to summon, jointly, Sweden, -Denmark, Portugal, and Austria to concur in the projects of Russia and -France,—that is to say, to shut their ports to England and to declare -war against her.[363] - -At the time the Berlin decree was issued, negotiations were proceeding -in London, between the United States envoys and the British ministry, -concerning the several matters in dispute between the two countries; -and on the 31st of December, 1806, a commercial treaty was signed by -the respective commissioners. The vexed question of the trade between -the hostile countries and their colonies was arranged, by a stipulation -that goods imported from the colonies to the United States might be -re-exported, provided, after deducting the drawback, they had paid -full two per cent duties, _ad valorem_, to the Treasury; and that -articles coming from the mother countries might likewise be re-shipped -to the colonies, provided they remained subject to one per cent duty, -after recovering the drawback. These, as well as other features of -the treaty, were not acceptable to the United States, and it was not -ratified by that government. - -Meantime the British ministry had been considering the terms of the -Berlin decree, and, instead of waiting to see how far it would become -operative, determined to retort by a measure of retaliation. On the -7th of January, 1807, an Order in Council was issued by the Whig -ministers, which often returned to plague them in the succeeding years, -when they, in opposition, were severely criticising the better known -measures of the following November. The January Order, after quoting -Napoleon's decree, avowed his Majesty's unwillingness to carry to -extremes his undoubted right of retaliation; and therefore, for the -present, went no further than to forbid all trade by neutral vessels -"from one port to another, both of which ports shall belong to, or be -in possession of, France or her allies, or shall be so far under their -control as that British vessels may not freely trade thereat."[364] -The direct object of this step was to stop the coastwise trade in -Europe; its principle was the right of retaliation; in its effect, -it was an extension of the prohibition laid by the Rule of 1756. The -latter forbade the direct trade between hostile colonies and the mother -countries; the order of January, 1807, extended the restriction to -trade between any two hostile ports. It bore particularly hard upon -American ships, which were in the habit of going from place to place -in Europe, either seeking the best markets or gathering a cargo. Under -it, "American trade in the Mediterranean was swept away by seizures -and condemnations, and that in other seas threatened with the same -fate."[365] - -Matters were in this state when Napoleon returned to Paris at the -end of July, full of his projects against Great Britain, and against -neutrals as the abettors of her prosperity. His aims were not limited -to crushing her by commercial oppression; in the not distant future -he intended to seize the navies of Europe and combine them in a -direct assault upon her maritime power. On the 19th of July, while -he was still at Dresden, Portugal was notified that she must choose -between war with France or with Great Britain; and on the 31st, from -Paris, a similar intimation was given to Denmark.[366] To constrain -the latter, a corps under Bernadotte was collecting on her frontiers; -while another, under Junot, was assembling in the south of France to -invade Portugal. But in both countries Napoleon was anticipated by -Great Britain. The ministry had received certain information[367] of -the secret articles agreed to at Tilsit, and foresaw the danger of -allowing the two navies of Denmark and Portugal to fall into the hands -of the emperor. Early in August twenty-five sail-of-the-line entered -the Baltic, convoying transports with twenty-seven thousand troops; the -island on which Copenhagen stands was invested by the ships, and the -town itself by the army. The Danish government was then summoned to -surrender its fleet into the safe keeping of Great Britain, a pledge -being offered that it, and all other maritime equipment delivered, -should be held only as a deposit and restored at a general peace. The -offer being refused, the city was bombarded from the 2d to the 5th of -September, at the expiration of which time the terms demanded were -yielded, the British took possession of eighteen sail-of-the-line -besides a number of frigates, stripped the dockyards of their stores, -and returned to England. The transaction has been visited with the most -severe, yet uncalled-for, condemnation. The British ministry knew the -intention of Napoleon to invade Denmark, to force her into war, and -that the fleet would soon pass into his hands, if not snatched away. -They avoided the mistake made by Pitt, in seizing the Spanish frigates -in 1804; for the force sent to Copenhagen was sufficient to make -opposition hopeless and to justify submission. To have receded before -the obstinacy of the Danish government would have been utter weakness. - -In Portugal Great Britain had to deal with a friendly nation, instead -of the hostile prepossessions of Denmark. The French corps of invasion, -under Junot, entered Spain on its way to Portugal on the 17th of -October. Under the urgent and unsparing orders of Napoleon it made a -march of extreme suffering with great rapidity, losing most of its -numbers by the way from privation, exposure, or straggling; but when -the handful that kept together entered Lisbon on the 30th of November, -it found the Portuguese fleet gone, and that the court and its treasure -had departed with it. The British government had for some time past -expected such an attempt by Napoleon, and at the critical moment a -squadron on the spot determined the vacillating regent to withdraw to -Brazil. - -Though foiled in his endeavors to seize the fleets, Napoleon had -succeeded in formally closing the ports of the two countries to the -introduction of British goods; while the bombardment at Copenhagen had -served as a colorable pretext for the declaration of hostility against -Great Britain made by Russia on the 20th of October. The mediation -proposed by the czar had already been refused by the British ministry, -unless the articles of the Treaty of Tilsit were first communicated -to it;[368] but those articles were not of a character to bear such -an exposure. Prussia, under the compulsion of the two empires, closed -her ports against Great Britain by a proclamation dated September -2d; no navigation nor trade with England or her colonies was to be -permitted, either in British or in neutral vessels.[369] Austria also -acceded to the Continental System, and excluded British goods from -her borders.[370] In Italy, the new kingdom of Etruria showed little -zeal in enforcing Napoleon's commands to co-operate in his measures; -the British carried on commerce at Leghorn, as freely as at any port -in their own country. By the emperor's orders the viceroy of Italy -therefore took possession of the city; and at the same time French -detachments entered also the Papal States, occupied their coasts, and -drove the British from them. Joseph Bonaparte being already king of -Naples, the control of Napoleon and the exclusion of his enemies were -thus extended over both coasts of Italy. Turkey being at this time -involved in hostilities with Great Britain, the emperor was able to -assert that "England sees her merchandise repelled by all Europe; and -her ships, loaded with useless wealth, seek in vain, from the Sound to -the Hellespont, a port open to receive them."[371] Decrees applying -extreme rigor to the examination of vessels entering the Elbe and the -Weser were issued on the 6th of August and 13th of November.[372] -Napoleon had a special grudge against the two Hanseatic cities, -Bremen and Hamburg, which had long mocked his efforts to prevent the -introduction of British merchandise to the Continent; for which the -commercial aptitudes of their merchants, their extensive intelligence -abroad, and their noble rivers, afforded peculiar facilities. Despite -all these efforts and the external appearances of universal submission, -there still occurred wide-spread evasions of the emperor's orders, to -which allusion must be made later. It is necessary, before doing so, -to give the contemporary measures of other nations, in order that the -whole situation, at once of public regulation and private disobedience, -together with the final results, may come distinctly before the reader. - -Great as was the power of Napoleon, it ceased, like that of certain -wizards, when it reached the water. Enemies and neutrals alike bowed to -his invincible armies and his superb genius when he could reach them -by land; but beyond the water there was one enemy, Great Britain, and -one neutral, America, whom he could not directly touch. The spirit of -his course toward England and his initiatory steps have been given; it -remained now to define his action toward the United States. Weak as -the latter was, feeble to humiliation as had been the course of its -government hitherto, and although the prepossessions of the party in -power were undoubtedly strongly against Great Britain, the question -was one of immense importance; but the emperor, who respected nothing -but force, failed so to realize it. He stood just where the Directory -stood at the end of 1797, every enemy but Great Britain overthrown, but -seeing her defiant still and prosperous. Napoleon, however, had, what -the Directory had not, experimental evidence of the results of such -restrictions upon neutrals as were imposed by the law of January 18, -1798. It was possible to ascribe the disastrous effects to France of -that measure, and its total failure to achieve the object intended, -to one of two totally distinct causes. Either the law had been -inadequately enforced, owing to the feeble executive efforts of the -Directors and the comparatively limited extent of their influence, or -else it was in its nature and essence so contrary to the true interest -and policy of France that the very limitations imposed by defective -power had saved her, and the ability to carry it further would have -ended in utter ruin. Pursued somewhat further, the question became: -Will it be possible, not for France only but for all Europe,—for the -concurrence of all Europe is necessary to the effectual working of the -scheme,—to dispense with the neutral carrier (whom it is the tendency -of the Berlin decree to repel) for a length of time sufficient to ruin -Great Britain? Can Europe forego external commerce for a longer time -than Great Britain can spare the European market? Can the intercourse -between the continental nations be so facilitated, the accustomed -routes of import and export so modified, such changes introduced into -the habits of manufacture and consumption, as will render bearable the -demands made upon the patience of nations? If, as the Order in Council -of January seems to indicate, Great Britain resent the attempt to keep -neutrals from her ports, by retaliatory measures impeding their traffic -with the Continent, upon whom will these combined French and English -restrictions fall most heavily?—upon the state having a large body of -merchant ships, to which neutrals are the natural rivals; or upon the -nations whose shipping is small, and to whom therefore neutrals are -useful, if not necessary, auxiliaries? - -In a commercial war, as in any other, the question must be faced -whether with ten thousand it is possible to meet him who is coming -with twenty thousand. As a matter of fact, while Napoleon was -contemplating a measure which would most injuriously affect neutrals, -already largely employed in transporting British goods, the jealousy -of British merchants and statesmen was keenly excited by the growth -of this neutral carrying trade,[373] and they were casting about for -a pretext and a means to cripple it. The Berlin decree revived the -clamor of these men, who, being then in opposition, had condemned the -Order of January, 1807, for not carrying retaliation far enough, and -for directing it upon the coasting trade, which could only partially -be reached, instead of upon the neutral carriage of colonial goods, -which lay open everywhere to the British navy. A change of ministry in -the latter part of March, 1807, brought this party again into power, -after an absence from it of fourteen months since the death of Pitt. In -the mean time, however, the decree had remained inoperative, through -the absence of Napoleon in Poland, the decisions of the Minister of -Marine as to its scope, and the connivance of the local authorities -everywhere in its neglect. No further steps therefore had been taken -by the new British ministry up to the time of the emperor's return to -Paris. The latter at first only issued some additional regulations of a -municipal character, to ensure a stricter observance, but he was soon -called upon to give a momentous decision. The opinion of the Minister -of Marine, as to the meaning of certain clauses of the decree,[374] was -submitted to him by the Minister of Justice; and he stated that the -true original intention was that French armed vessels should seize and -bring into port neutrals having on board any goods of British origin, -even though at the time neutral property. As to whether they should -also arrest neutrals for the simple reason that they were going to, or -coming from, the British Islands, his Majesty reserved his decision. -This dictum of the emperor, which threw to the winds the ruling of -the Minister of Marine, was given to the prize courts on the 18th of -September, 1807, and shortly afterward the latter acted upon it in the -case of an American ship wrecked upon the French coast; that part of -her cargo which was of British origin was ordered to be sold for the -benefit of the state.[375] The effect of Napoleon's pronouncements was -at once seen in Great Britain. The insurance of neutral ships bound to -continental ports, especially to those of Holland and Hamburg, rose -from four guineas in August to eight and twelve in October, and some -insurers refused to take risks even at twenty-five and thirty. In the -two months of September and October sixty-five permits were issued by -the Custom House to re-land and store cargoes that had actually been -shipped for the Continent.[376] The Tory ministry now had the pretext -it wanted for a far-reaching and exhaustive measure of retaliation. - -Napoleon's decisions of September 18 were communicated to the Congress -of the United States on December 18 by the President; who at the -same time transmitted a proclamation from the king of Great Britain, -dated October 16, directing the impressment of British seamen found -serving on board any foreign merchant ship.[377] In view of the -dangers to which American vessels were exposed by the action of the -two belligerents, an embargo was recommended, to insure their safety -by keeping them in their own ports; the real purpose, however, being -to retaliate upon Great Britain, in pursuance of the policy of a -Non-Importation Act directed against that country, which had gone into -effect the previous July. An Act of Embargo was accordingly at once -passed, and was approved on the 22d of December.[378] All registered -vessels belonging to the United States were forbidden to depart from -the ports in which they were then lying, except upon giving bond that -their cargoes would be landed in another port of the country. This -continued in force throughout the year 1808 and until March 1, 1809, -when it was repealed; and for it was substituted a Non-Intercourse -Act,[379] which allowed the merchant ships of the United States to -go abroad in search of employment and to traffic between their own -and other countries, except Great Britain and France and the colonies -occupied by them, which were wholly forbidden to American vessels. They -not only could not clear from home for those countries, but they were -required to give bond that they would not, during the voyage, enter any -of their ports, nor be directly or indirectly engaged in any trade with -them. French or British ships entering a port of the United States were -to be seized and condemned. This act was to continue in force until the -end of the next session of Congress; and it accordingly remained the -law governing the intercourse of the United States with Great Britain -and France until May, 1810. - -On the 11th of November, 1807, were published the great retaliatory -measures of Great Britain, which for the moment filled the cup of -neutrals. Setting forth the Berlin Decree as the justifying ground -for their action, the Orders in Council of that date[380] proclaimed -a paper blockade, of the barest form and most extensive scope, of all -enemies' ports. "All ports and places of France and her allies, or -of any other country at war with his Majesty, and all other ports or -places in Europe from which, although not at war with his Majesty, -the British flag is excluded, and all ports in the colonies of his -Majesty's enemies, _shall from henceforth be subject to the same -restrictions_, in point of trade and navigation, _as if the same were -actually blockaded in the most strict and rigorous manner_." All trade -in hostile colonial produce was likewise declared unlawful for neutrals. - -An actual blockade, such as is here mentioned, requires the presence -off the blockaded port of a force sufficient to make entrance or -departure manifestly dangerous; in which case a vessel attempting to -pass in either direction is, by that common consent of nations called -International Law, justly liable to capture. To place such a force -before each of the many and widely scattered harbors embraced by these -Orders, was evidently beyond the power of even the vast numbers of -the British navy. The object which could not be attained by the use -of means acknowledged to be lawful, the British ministry determined -to compass by sheer force, by that maritime supremacy which they -unquestionably wielded, and which they could make effectual to the -ends they had in view, namely: to maintain the commerce and shipping -of Great Britain, upon which her naval strength depended, to force the -enemy's trade to pass through her ports, and thus to raise her revenues -to the point necessary to her salvation in the life and death struggle -in which she was embarked.[381] - -The entire suppression of trade with the restricted coasts, whether -by neutral carriers or in the articles of import or export the world -needed, was in no sense whatever the object of the British ministers. -To retaliate on their enemy was the first aim, to make him suffer -as he had meant to make them; but, withal, to turn his own measures -against him, so that while he was straitened, Great Britain should -reap some amelioration for her own troubles. Throughout this stormy -and woeful period, the instinct of the British nation recognized that -the hearts of the continental peoples were with them rather than with -Napoleon,—and for much the same reason that the United States, contrary -alike to the general interests of mankind and to her own, sided upon -the whole, though by no means unanimously, against Great Britain. -In either case the immediate oppressor was the object of hatred. -Throughout the five years or more that the Continental blockade was -in force, the Continental nations saw the British trying everywhere, -with more or less success, to come to their relief,—to break through -the iron barrier which Napoleon had established. During great part -of that time a considerable intercourse did prevail; and the mutual -intelligence thus maintained made clear to all parties the community -of interests that bound them together, notwithstanding the political -hostilities. Nothing appears more clearly, between the lines of the -British diplomatic correspondence, than the conviction that the people -were ready to further their efforts to circumvent the measures of -Napoleon. - -Keeping in view the purpose of making the United Kingdom the centre -and warehouse of the world's commerce, it was evident that, provided -this end—the chief object of the Orders in Council—were attained, -the greater the commerce of the outside world was, the greater would -be the advantage, or toll, resulting to Great Britain. The Orders -therefore contained, besides the general principle of blockade, certain -exceptions, narrow in wording but wide in application. By the first, -neutrals were permitted to trade directly between their own country and -the hostile colonies. They were also allowed to trade direct between -the latter and the free ports of the British colonies, which were thus -enabled, in their degree, to become the centres of local commerce, as -Britain herself was to be the entrepôt of European and general commerce. - -The second exception, which was particularly odious to neutrals, -permitted the latter to go direct from a port of the United Kingdom to -a restricted hostile port, although they might not start from their own -country for the same, nor for any other place in Europe from which the -British flag was excluded. Conversely, neutrals were at liberty to sail -from any port of his Majesty's enemies forbidden to them by the Orders, -provided they went direct to some port in Europe belonging to Great -Britain;[382] but they might not return to their own land without first -stopping at a British port. - -Such, stripped of their verbiage, appears to be the gist of the Orders -in Council of November 11, 1807. Neutrals might not trade directly -with any ports in Europe not open to British ships; but they might -trade with them by going first to a British port, there landing their -cargo, reshipping it subject to certain duties,[383] and thence -proceeding to a hostile port. The same process was to be observed on -the return voyage; it might not be direct home, but must first be to -Great Britain. The commerce of the Continent thus paid toll, going and -coming; or, to repeat the words of the ministry, there was for the -enemy "no trade except through Great Britain." British cruisers were -"instructed to warn any vessel which shall have commenced her voyage -prior to any notice of this Order, to discontinue it; and to proceed -instead to some port in this kingdom, or to Gibraltar or Malta; and any -vessel which, after being so warned, shall be found in the prosecution -of a forbidden voyage, shall be captured." Vessels which in obedience -to the warning came into a British port were to be permitted, after -landing their cargo, to "report it for exportation, and allowed to -proceed to their original port of destination, or to any other port -at amity with his Majesty, upon receiving a certificate from the -collector of the port" setting forth these facts; but from this general -permission to "report," were specially excepted "sugar, coffee, wine, -brandy, snuff, and tobacco," which could be exported to a restricted -port only "under such conditions as his Majesty, by any license to -be granted for that purpose, may direct." Licenses were generally -necessary for export of any foreign produce or manufacture; while goods -of British origin could be taken to a hostile country without such -license. In the end, the export of cotton to the Continent was wholly -forbidden, the object being to cripple the foreign manufactures. Upon -the license requirements was soon built up the extraordinary licensed -traffic, which played so important a subordinate part in the workings -both of the Orders and of the Continental System. - -Anything more humiliating and vexatious to neutrals than these Orders -can scarcely be conceived. They trampled upon all previously received -law, upon men's inbred ideas of their rights; and that by sheer -uncontrolled force, the law of the strongest. There was also not only -denial of right, but positive injury and loss, direct and indirect. Yet -it must not be forgotten that they were a very real and severe measure -of retaliation upon Napoleon's government; of which a contemporary -German writer had truly said it was already wound up so tight the -springs could almost be heard to crack. It must be remembered, too, -that Great Britain was fighting for her life. The additional expense -entailed upon every cargo which reached the Continent after passing -through her ports, the expenses of delay, of unloading and reloading, -wharfage, licenses, maintenance, fell chiefly upon the continental -consumer; upon the subjects of Napoleon, or upon those whom he was -holding in military bondage. Nor was this all. Although Great Britain -was not able to blockade all the individual French or continental -ports,—an inability due more to the dangers of the sea than to the -number of the harbors,—she was able to make the approach to the French -coast exceedingly dangerous, so much so that it was more to the -interest of the ordinary trader to submit to the Orders than to attempt -to evade them; especially as, upon arriving at a port under Napoleon's -control, he found the emperor possessed with every disposition to -confiscate his cargo, if a plausible pretext could be made. In the -English Channel Great Britain controlled the approaches from the -Atlantic to all the northern continental ports; and at Gibraltar those -to the Mediterranean. The Orders were therefore by no means an empty -threat. They could not but exercise a very serious influence upon the -imports to the Continent, and especially upon those exotic objects -of consumption, sugar, coffee, and other tropical growths, which had -become so essential to the comfort of people; and upon certain raw -materials, such as cotton, dye-woods and indigo. Naval stores from the -Baltic for England passed so near the French coast that they might -be slipped in by a lucky chance; but the neutral from the Atlantic, -who was found near the coast of France or Spain, had to account for -the appearances which were against him. These obstacles to direct -import tended therefore to increase prices by diminishing supplies, -and combined with the duties laid by Great Britain, upon the cargoes -forced into her ports, to raise the cost of living throughout the -Continent. The embarrassments of its unfortunate inhabitants were -further augmented by the difficulty of exporting their own products; -and nowhere was this more keenly felt than in Russia, where the -revenues of the nobility depended largely on the British demand for -naval stores, and where the French alliance and the Continental System -were proportionately detested. - -The object of the Orders in Council was therefore twofold: to embarrass -France and Napoleon by the prohibition of direct import and export -trade, of all external commerce, which for them could only be carried -on by neutrals; and at the same time to force into the Continent all -the British products or manufactures that it could take. A preference -was secured for the latter over foreign products by the license -practice, which left the course of traffic to the constant manipulation -of the Board of Trade. The whole system was then, and has since been, -roundly abused as being in no sense a military measure, but merely -a gigantic exhibition of commercial greed; but this simply begs the -question. To win her fight Great Britain was obliged not only to -weaken Napoleon, but to increase her own strength. The battle between -the sea and the land was to be fought out on Commerce. England had no -army wherewith to meet Napoleon; Napoleon had no navy to cope with -that of his enemy. As in the case of an impregnable fortress, the only -alternative for either of these contestants was to reduce the other -by starvation. On the common frontier, the coast line, they met in -a deadly strife in which no weapon was drawn. The imperial soldiers -were turned into coast-guards-men to shut out Great Britain from her -markets; the British ships became revenue cutters to prohibit the -trade of France. The neutral carrier, pocketing his pride, offered -his service to either for pay, and the other then regarded him as -taking part in hostilities. The ministry, in the exigencies of -debate, betrayed some lack of definite conviction as to their precise -aim. Sometimes the Orders were justified as a military measure of -retaliation; sometimes the need of supporting British commerce as -essential to her life and to her naval strength was alleged; and -their opponents in either case taunted them with inconsistency.[384] -Napoleon, with despotic simplicity, announced clearly his purpose of -ruining England through her trade, and the ministry really needed no -other arguments than his avowals. _Salus civitatis suprema lex._ To -call the measures of either not military, is as inaccurate as it would -be to call the ancient practice of circumvallation unmilitary, because -the only weapon used for it was the spade. - -Napoleon was not the man to accept silently the Orders in Council. -On the 27th of October he had signed the treaty of Fontainebleau -with Spain, arranging the partition of Portugal and taking thus the -first step in the invasion of the Peninsula. On November 16 he left -Fontainebleau to visit his kingdom of Italy. From the capital, Milan, -he issued the decree which bears its name, on the 17th of December, -1807. Alleging the Orders as its motive, the Milan Decree declared -that any ship which submitted to search by a British cruiser was -thereby "denationalized;" a word for which, at sea, "outlaw" is the -only equivalent. It lost the character of its own country, so far as -French cruisers were concerned, and was liable to arrest as a vagrant. -The decree further declared that all vessels going to, or sailing from, -Great Britain, were for that fact alone good prize,—a point which, -under the Berlin decree, had as yet been left open. French privateers -were still sufficiently numerous to make these regulations a great -additional danger to ships at sea; and the decree went on to say that, -when coming under the previous provisions, they should be seized -whenever they entered a French port. - -The two belligerents had now laid down the general lines of policy on -which they intended to act. The Orders in Council received various -modifications, due largely to the importance to Great Britain of the -American market, which absorbed a great part of her manufactures; -but these modifications, though sensibly lightening the burden upon -neutrals and introducing some changes of form, in no sense departed -from the spirit of the originals. The entire series was finally -withdrawn in June, 1812, but too late to avert the war with the United -States, which was declared in the same month. Napoleon never revoked -his Berlin and Milan decrees, although by a trick he induced an -over-eager President of the United States to believe that he had done -so. - -In the year 1808 the emperor's purpose to overthrow the Spanish -monarchy, and place one of his own family upon the throne, finally -matured. He left Paris on the 2d of April, and, after a long delay at -Bordeaux, on the 14th reached Bayonne. There took place his meetings -with the king and infante of Spain which resulted in the former -resigning his crown, to be disposed of as to Napoleon might seem best. -While at Bayonne, on April 17, the emperor issued an order, directing -the sequestration of all American ships which should enter the -ports of France, Italy, Holland, and the Hanse towns, as being under -suspicion of having come from Great Britain. The justification for this -step was found in the Embargo Act of December, 1807, in consequence -of which, Napoleon argued, as such ships could not lawfully have left -their own country, they came really from England, and their papers -were fabricated.[385] Under this ruling sequestrations continued to be -made until March 23, 1810; when the Decree of Rambouillet confiscated -finally the vessels and cargoes thus seized.[386] After May, 1810, the -Non-Intercourse Act, which had replaced the Embargo, was temporarily -suspended as regarded both Great Britain and France, and never renewed -as to the latter; so the plea upon which these confiscations had -proceeded was no longer valid. - -Meanwhile the emperor's plans for the Peninsula met with unexpected -reverses. An insurrection on the 2d of May in Madrid was followed by -spontaneous popular risings in all parts of the country. On the 21st of -July an army corps under General Dupont was cut off by the insurgents -in Andalusia and surrendered, to the number of eighteen thousand, at -Baylen; and on the 29th the new king of Spain, Joseph Bonaparte, fled -from Madrid, which he had only entered on the 20th. On the 1st of -August a British fleet appeared off the coast of Portugal, bearing the -first division of troops destined to act in the Peninsula, under the -command of Sir Arthur Wellesley. On the 21st the battle of Vimiero was -fought, resulting in the defeat of Junot; who, by the Convention of -Cintra, signed on the 30th, was permitted to evacuate Portugal and was -conveyed to France with his army in British transports. At the same -time a division of the Russian fleet which had taken refuge in Lisbon, -on its return from the Mediterranean, was, by a separate convention, -left in the hands of Great Britain until the conclusion of the war. -The admiral had steadily refused to co-operate with Junot; in which -course he probably reflected the strong feeling of the Russian upper -classes against the French alliance. In consequence of these successive -disasters Portugal was wholly lost, and the French army in Spain fell -back to the line of the Ebro. - -Napoleon realized the necessity of vigorous measures to suppress the -general uprising, before it had attained organization and consistency, -and determined to take the field in person; but, before removing to -this distant scene of action, he thought advisable to confirm and -establish his understanding with the czar, upon whose support depended -so much of his position in Central Europe. The two sovereigns met for -the second time, September 27, 1808, at Erfurt. The alliance formed -at Tilsit was renewed; France undertook not to consent to peace until -Russia obtained Finland from Sweden, Moldavia and Wallachia from -Turkey; Russia guaranteed the crown of Spain to Joseph; and it was -agreed that a formal proposition for peace should at once be made -to England, as publicly and conspicuously as possible. The czar had -already in the preceding February begun hostilities against Sweden, -giving as a pretext her leaning toward Great Britain and her refusal to -join with Russia and Denmark in shutting the Baltic to British fleets. -Denmark also had declared war against Sweden, for carrying on which the -possession of Norway then gave her facilities which she no longer has; -and Prussia, on the 6th of March, had closed her ports against Swedish -commerce "at the solicitation of the imperial courts of Paris and St. -Petersburg." - -The vital importance of the Baltic to Great Britain, both as the -source whence her naval stores were drawn and as a channel whereby her -commerce might find a way into the Continent remote from the active -vigilance of Napoleon, imposed upon her the necessity of strenuously -supporting Sweden. A fleet of sixty-two sail, of which sixteen were -of the line, was accordingly sent through the Sound in April, under -Sir James Saumarez, one of the most distinguished of British admirals; -who, to an unusually brilliant reputation for seamanship, activity, -and hard fighting, joined a calm and well-balanced temper, peculiarly -fitted to deal with the delicate political situation that obtained in -the North during the four years of his Baltic command. The fleet was -shortly followed by a body of ten thousand troops under the celebrated -Sir John Moore; but the rapid progress of the Russian arms rendered -this assistance abortive, and Moore was soon transported to that scene -of action in the Peninsula in connection with which his name has been -immortalized. - -A joint letter, addressed to the king of Great Britain by the allied -emperors, was forwarded through the usual channels by the foreign -ministers of both powers on the 12th of October. The British reply, -dated October 28, expressed a willingness to enter into the proposed -negotiations, provided the king of Sweden and the government acting -in the name of the king of Spain, then a prisoner in the hands of -Napoleon, were understood to be parties to any negotiation in which -Great Britain was engaged. "To Spain," said the British note, "his -Majesty is not bound by any formal instrument; but his Majesty has, -in the face of the world, contracted with that nation engagements not -less sacred, and not less binding upon his Majesty's mind, than the -most solemn treaties." This reply was, in one point at least, open -to severe criticism for uncalled-for insolence. To that part of the -letter of the two sovereigns which attributed the sufferings of the -Continent to the cessation of maritime commerce, it was retorted: -"His Majesty cannot be expected to hear with unqualified regret that -the system devised for the destruction of the commerce of his subjects -has recoiled upon its authors, or its instruments." Nevertheless, it -is impossible to withhold admiration for the undaunted attitude of -the solitary Power that ruled the sea, in the face of the two mighty -sovereigns who between them controlled the forces of the Continent, or -to refuse recognition of the fidelity with which, against overwhelming -odds, she now, as always in the time of Pitt, refused to separate her -cause from that of her allies. The decision of the British court was -made known to Europe by a public declaration, dated December 15, which, -while expressing the same firm resolve, allowed to appear plainly the -sense entertained by the ministry of the restiveness of the Continent -under the yoke it was bearing. - -The proposal to include the Spanish people in the negotiations was -rejected by both France and Russia. Napoleon, having in the mean time -returned to Paris, left there on the 29th of October to take command -of the armies, which, to the number of over three hundred thousand -men of all arms, had either entered Spain or were rapidly converging -upon it. On the 8th of November he crossed the frontier, and on the -4th of December Madrid surrendered. Northern Spain being overrun and -subdued, the capital having fallen without any real resistance, and -the political prestige of the insurrection being thus seriously, if -not hopelessly, injured, the emperor now proposed to divide the mass -of soldiers that had so far acted under his own supreme direction. In -the disorganized and helpless condition of the Spanish people, with -the proved weakness and imbecility of the provisional governments, -a dispersion that might otherwise be unwise became admissible. Army -corps under his marshals were to overrun the southern provinces -of the Peninsula, while an overwhelming force under his personal -leadership was to cross the frontier, and carry the eagles to Lisbon, -in accordance with his boast made before leaving Paris. From this -determination he was turned aside by the sudden intelligence that -the small body of British troops, commanded by Sir John Moore, which -he supposed to be retreating toward Lisbon, and which he expected to -drive on board the ships there, had cut loose from their connection -with it, and, by a daring move to the north, were threatening his own -lines of communication with France. Upon the receipt of this news, on -the 21st of December, he at once postponed his previous purposes to -the necessity of dislodging and driving out of Spain the little force, -of less than twenty-five thousand men, that had dared thus to traverse -his plans. Thus was Napoleon headed from his course by an imperious -military necessity, and Spain saved at a most critical moment, by the -petty army which had come from the sea, and which had only dared to -make this move—well nigh desperate at the best—because it knew that, in -the inevitable retreat, it would find in the sea no impassable barrier, -but a hospitable host,—in truth, its own country. The Peninsula gained -the time to breathe, which, unless under stern compulsion, Napoleon -never granted to an enemy; and the opportunity thus lost to him never -again returned. - -Thus opened the year 1809. Napoleon at the head of eighty thousand -men was driving before him, through the snows of northwestern Spain, -some twenty thousand British troops, with the relentless energy that -distinguished all his movements of pursuit. In the north, Russia, -having completed the conquest of Finland, was now preparing to invade -Sweden on the west of the Baltic, the king of that country was on the -point of being dethroned on account of insanity, and the policy of the -nation was tending to a peace with its gigantic enemy; which the latter -refused to grant except upon the condition of joining the alliance -against Great Britain. To this Sweden was most unwilling to accede. -Her people depended wholly upon their produce of naval stores and grain -and upon maritime commerce. Hence, to lose the freedom of their trade -was almost tantamount to destruction, and the British ministry from -the first saw that, whatever steps Sweden might be forced to take, its -real wishes must be to keep open intercourse with Great Britain. From -the anxious and delicate position of this small country, between these -opposing claims, arose the necessity of great prudence and caution on -the part of the British government, of its diplomatic representative, -and of the admiral commanding the fleet. The task ultimately devolved -upon the latter, when Sweden was at last forced into formal war; and to -his sound judgment and self-restraint was largely due that no actual -collision took place, and that, in the decisive moments of 1812, she, -despite her serious causes of complaint against the czar, sided with -Russia, instead of against her. - -In Central Europe, Austria, since the peace of Presburg,[387] three -years before, had been quietly engaged in restoring her military -strength. The various changes which had taken place in Germany during -that time, the establishment and growth of the Confederation of the -Rhine, the destruction of the power of Prussia, the foundation of the -Duchy of Warsaw, combined with the great losses of territory which she -had herself undergone, had left Austria in a position that she could -not possibly accept as final; while the alliance between Russia and -France placed her in a state of isolation, which Napoleon had been -careful to emphasize during the meeting at Erfurt. The renewal of the -war between herself and France was therefore in the nature of things. -The only question to be decided was when to declare it;[388] but -this was a matter which Napoleon, who fully understood the political -situation, was not in the habit of allowing an enemy to determine. -He undertook his Spanish enterprise with the full knowledge that his -absence, and that of his Grand Army, in the Peninsula must be short; he -understood that a prolonged stay there, caused by lack of immediate and -decisive success, would give Austria the opportunity she needed; but -he had reasonable expectation of accomplishing his task, and returning -with his army to his eastern frontiers, within a safe period of time. -This hope was frustrated by the action of Sir John Moore. The year -1809 therefore opened with the prospect of war impending over the two -empires. "From the frontiers of Austria to the centre of Paris," wrote -Metternich, "I have found but one opinion accepted by the public,—that -is, that in the spring at latest, Austria will take the field against -France. This conclusion is drawn from the relative position of the two -powers."[389] - -Underlying the other contentions, affecting them all with the unheeded, -quiet, but persistent action which ordinarily characterizes the -exertions of sea power, fermenting continually in the hearts of the -people, was the commercial warfare, the absence of that maritime peace -for which the nations sighed. The Berlin and Milan decrees on the one -side, the Orders in Council on the other, were still, at the opening of -1809, in full force. France, which especially needed the concurrence -of neutral carriers, had taken away even the slight chances of -reaching her ports which British cruisers might leave, by pronouncing -confiscation on any ship which had submitted to a search, though it was -powerless to resist. Great Britain, on the other hand, having shut out -all competition with her own trade to the Continent by the blockade, -which forbade direct access to neutral ships, was prepared to avail -herself of every chance to force upon Europe, at any point, and by -any means, neutral or other, any and all merchandise, manufactured -or colonial, which came from her own warehouses. For this the license -system offered a means of which neutrals were only too ready to avail -themselves. A British license could admit them to any port from which -a British blockade excluded them; and, as it was only to be obtained -legitimately in a British port, the neutral carriers, when there, -naturally filled up with the most paying cargo, whatever its origin. - -In the years from 1806 to 1810, as at earlier periods of the -revolutionary wars, Holland and the Hanse towns competed for the -profits of this indirect and often contraband trade. In June, 1806, -Napoleon, in pursuance of his policy of placing members of his own -family upon the thrones of the Continent, had obtained the conversion -of Holland from a republic to a monarchy and bestowed its crown upon -his brother Louis. The latter sought from the first to identify -himself with his new subjects, and constantly withstood the commands -of Napoleon in favor of their interests. Foremost among these was -maritime commerce, for which geographical position and generations -of habit especially fitted the Dutch. With such dispositions on the -part of the king, notwithstanding the jealous watchfulness and sharp -remonstrances of the emperor, evasions were frequent, and the decrees -even openly disregarded on different pretences. The whole community -naturally engaged in undertakings at once so consonant to its habits -and so remunerative when successful. From the time the Berlin decree -was issued until after the war with Austria in 1809, Napoleon's -attention, though often angrily attracted by Holland and the neglect -of his orders, was still too much diverted to admit of the decisive -measures needed to enforce them. First, the Russian war in 1807, then -the affairs of the Peninsula extending through 1808, finally the -Austrian war in 1809 with his hazardous position between the battles of -Essling and Wagram, accompanied as the whole period was with financial -difficulties and expedients due to the straits of the empire under the -cessation of maritime commerce, occupied his mind almost wholly, and -allowed but partial attention to the Continental System. - -Neutral ships therefore continued to be openly admitted into Holland, -and the emperor's demands for their confiscation to be eluded; and -there was besides much smuggling, for which the character of the coast -and its nearness to England offered ample facilities. From Holland -the goods usually found their way without great difficulty into -France, though on two occasions Napoleon, to punish Holland for her -waywardness, closed the frontier against her. "Your Majesty," wrote he -to Louis, "took advantage of the moment in which I had embarrassments -upon the Continent, to allow the relations between Holland and England -to be resumed; to violate the laws of the blockade, the only measure by -which that power can be seriously injured. I showed my dissatisfaction -by forbidding France to you, and made you feel that, without having -recourse to my armies, I could, by closing the Rhine, the Weser, -the Scheldt, and the Meuse to Holland, place her in a position more -critical than by declaring war against her. I was so isolating her -as to annihilate her. The blow resounded in Holland. Your Majesty -appealed to my generosity.... I removed the line of custom-houses; but -your Majesty returned to your former system. It is true I was then at -Vienna, and had a grievous war upon my hands. All the American ships -which entered the ports of Holland, while they were repelled from those -of France, your Majesty received. I have been obliged a second time -to close my custom-houses to Dutch commerce.... I will not conceal my -intention to re-unite Holland to France, to round off her territory, as -the most disastrous blow I can deal to England." He consented, however, -to suspend his action, upon condition that the existing stores of -colonial merchandise were confiscated, as well as the cargoes of the -American ships.[390] - -The important part played in the former war by Hamburg and Bremen, as -commercial centres and warehouses for continental trade, has already -been mentioned. To a certain extent they still fulfilled the same -function, but under greatly altered conditions. The political changes -following the war of 1806 and 1807, and the presence of French troops -in Prussian fortresses and throughout Northern Germany, combined to -make them subservient, as Prussia was, to the emperor's wishes. In -point of form the continental blockade extended throughout all this -region, as in Holland; everywhere vessels and merchandise coming from -Great Britain were proscribed and should be confiscated, whenever -found.[391] All the shores of the North Sea, those of Denmark, and, -by the co-operation of the czar, the coasts of the Baltic, shared the -general prohibition. The minister of France at Hamburg found his chief -occupations in either demanding subsidies—contributions in money or -kind—for the French troops, or in insisting, much against his will, -upon increased severity against the introduction of British goods. The -distress occasioned by these stringent requirements was very great, -even while Napoleon's other preoccupations lasted; but the general -consent of all the people in passive resistance, the activity of -smugglers, and the corruption that ever hangs about custom-houses and -increases with the duties, conspired to mitigate the privations. The -coasts of the North Sea, between the mouths of the Ems, the Weser, and -the Elbe, and those of Danish Holstein, low, of difficult approach for -large vessels, and hence favorable to the multiplication of small boats -and the operations of those having local knowledge, fostered smuggling; -to which also conduced the numbers of fishermen, and the fringe of -off-lying islands, out of the reach of the ordinary custom-house -officer. - -To support this contraband trade, the British, on the 5th of September, -1807, seized Heligoland and converted it into a depot for goods waiting -to be introduced into Germany or Holstein. "A garrison of six hundred -men defended the island, and ships of war cruised continually in its -neighborhood. From there contraband traders obtained merchandise, with -which they supplied the Continent. Farmers along the coast received -these smuggled goods, which were taken from them during the night and -spread far and wide. The populations of the various countries aided -the smugglers, joined them in opposing the revenue officers and in -seducing the latter from their duty."[392] Between Holstein and Hamburg -was drawn up a close line of custom-house officials; but the forbidden -goods leaked through all barriers. "More than six thousand persons -of the lower and middle classes passed their day in going more than -twenty times from Altona, in Holstein, to Hamburg. Punishments and -confiscations fell upon the guilty; but this did not put an end to the -incessant strife, sometimes by cunning, sometimes by force, against -this fiscal tyranny."[393] Between five and six hundred women were -employed by the merchants of Hamburg daily to convey into the city, -each of them, fourteen pounds of coffee and other produce, concealed -beneath their garments.[394] - -In the Baltic conditions were somewhat different. Much there depended -upon the heartiness of the czar in the cause; upon whether he would -content himself with a bare perfunctory compliance with the letter of -his engagements at Tilsit and Erfurt, or would decisively enforce an -entire cessation of traffic with Great Britain. The latter course, -however, was impossible to Alexander. Impulsive and ambitious, he -yet lacked the hardness of character needed to disregard the cold -disapproval of the nobles and the distress of his subjects. Under -the influence of Napoleon's presence, of his fascination and his -promises, it had seemed possible to do that which in the isolation of -his court, and deprived of sympathy, became drearily monotonous; nor -did Napoleon, by fidelity to his word, make the task easier. Decrees -of great severity were issued,[395] and the British flag was honestly -excluded; but the quick mercantile intelligence soon detected that -no ill-timed curiosity as to ships' papers would be exercised,[396] -nor vexatious impediments thrown in the way of exporting the national -products, which, if essential to Great Britain's naval supremacy, were -no less the source of Russia's wealth. In truth, British consumption of -naval stores, and British capital invested in Russia, had been leading -elements in the prosperity of the country; and it had been no light -sacrifice to concede such advantages as the czar had already yielded. - -Such was the working condition of the Continental System between -1806 and 1810. Despite the general disquietude in Great Britain and -the undoubted impediments raised to that free export upon which her -prosperity was based, the general confidence was unabated.[397] -Much was hoped from the resistance of the continental peoples, more -from their steadfast evasion of the edicts. In 1806, just before the -Berlin decree was issued, but when the system was already in force, -a commercial magazine wrote: "The regulations adopted only show the -ignorance of the French government of commercial principles. When -the blockade of the Elbe was removed, instead of finding markets -exhausted and prices enhanced, they were found overstocked."[398] -"In spite of every prohibition British goods continue (Dec. 1, 1806) -to find their way in vast quantities into France. They are exported -hence on French orders. It is easy to insure them for the whole -transit to the town in France where they are to be delivered to -the purchaser. They are introduced at almost all parts of the land -confines of the French Empire. No sooner are they received into the -French merchant's warehouse, than evidence is procured that they are -of French manufacture; the proper marks are stamped, and the goods are -in a state to be exhibited, in proof that the manufactures of France -quite outrival those of England. The writer had this information from -gentlemen who have a concern in the trade to which it relates."[399] -"Though the port of Venice is now totally shut against British -commerce, as also the peninsula of Istria from whence Italian silk -has always been obtained, yet through neutral vessels we now obtain -Piedmont silk, which is the best and finest, direct from Leghorn, -Lucca, and Genoa."[400] "From Malta a brisk trade, yielding quick -returns, is kept up with the ports of Italy. Malta is the emporium, the -storehouse. From Malta we supply Leghorn and other places in the power -of France. But the British goods are sold, even before they are landed, -for ready money; and scarcely a pound's worth of British property is at -any moment hazarded where the French might seize it."[401] - -Indications of embarrassment now begin to accumulate, but still, -in January, 1808, we read: "Several ships from Holland have lately -entered our harbors, and brought over large quantities of goods -usually imported from Hamburg. This is a proof of the futility of -Bonaparte's commercial speculations."[402] Russia had by this declared -against Great Britain, causing a rise in all Russian produce; and -the Embargo Act of the United States had just gone into operation. -There is a vast falling off in the Baltic and American trade. In 1805 -over eleven thousand ships had passed through the Sound, going and -coming; in 1807 barely six thousand, and British ships are excluded -from all but Swedish harbors. In August, 1808, the ports of Holland -are opened for the export of Dutch butter, and two hundred bales of -silk are allowed to be smuggled out, for which a bribe of six thousand -guineas was extorted by some person in authority.[403] In 1809 a notice -again occurs of the ports of Holland being opened by the king; and -concurrently, West India produce, which has been for some months dull, -is found more in demand and commanding good prices.[404] Malta is doing -a famous business at the same time, and has become one of the greatest -depots in the Mediterranean.[405] - -The year 1809 was marked by a great, though temporary, revival of -trade, due to several causes. Napoleon himself was detained during -great part of the year in the heart of Austria, absorbed in one of his -most doubtful contests with the empire; and in his absence trade with -the North Sea ports went on almost as in time of peace. In the United -States an eager British minister, of politics opposed to the party -in power, had committed himself without due authority to an official -statement to the government that the Orders in Council would be -rescinded by June 10. The President, without waiting to hear further, -removed the restrictions of the Non-Intercourse Act on that date; and -accordingly, for some months there was free traffic and a very great -interchange of goods between the United States and Great Britain. In -South America, the withdrawal of the Portuguese court to Brazil and the -uprising of Spain against Napoleon had resulted in throwing open the -colonial ports to Great Britain; and an immense wave of speculative -shipments, heavily employing the manufactories, was setting in that -direction. In the Baltic, the czar was wearying of his engagements with -France, and of the emperor's tergiversations; wearying too, of the -opposition of his court and subjects. He adhered faithfully, indeed, -to the letter of his bargain and refused admission to British ships: -but he would not open his eyes to the fact that British commerce was -being carried on in his ports by neutrals with British licenses. He had -never promised to exclude neutrals, or forbid all export and import; -and it was none of his business to pry behind the papers that covered -transactions essential to his people. The imports to Great Britain -of naval stores, mainly from the Baltic, more than doubled from 1808 -to 1809, and were even greater the following year.[406] Wool from -Spain and silk from Italy experienced a similar rise. Even West India -produce, so vigorously excluded from the Continent, shared the general -advance; and there was a great, though feverish and unsound, hope of -returning prosperity. It was evident that Napoleon's measures were -meeting only partial success, and men were willing to believe that -their failure lay in the nature of things,—in the impossibility of his -attempt. They had yet to learn that persecution fails only when it is -not, or cannot be, thorough and unrelenting. - -Among the multiplied impediments to intercourse between nations, due -first of all to the narrow ideas of commercial policy prevalent at that -epoch, increased by the state of open maritime war or hostile exclusion -existing between Great Britain and most of the continental countries, -and further complicated by the continental blockade of Napoleon and the -retaliatory orders of the British government, there arose an obscure -but extensive usage of "licenses;" which served, though but partially, -and in a wholly arbitrary manner, to remove some of the difficulties -that prevented the exchange of commodities. A license, from its name, -implies a prohibition which is intended to be removed in the particular -case; and the license practice of the Napoleonic wars was for the most -part not so much a system, as an aggregation of individual permissions -to carry on a traffic forbidden by the existing laws of the authority -granting them. The licenses were issued both by the British government -and by Napoleon; and they were addressed, according to the character -of the sway borne by one party or the other, either to the police of -the seas, the armed cruisers, or to the customs authorities of the -continental ports. It was generally admitted in Great Britain that the -Board of Trade was actuated only by upright motives in its action, -though the practice was vigorously attacked on many grounds,—chiefly in -order to impugn the Orders in Council to which alone their origin was -attributed; but in France the taint of court corruption, or favoritism, -in the issue of licenses was clearly asserted.[407] - -The "License System," in the peculiar and extensive form to which the -phrase was commonly applied, was adopted by the British government in -1808,[408] immediately after the Orders in Council and the alliance -of Russia with Napoleon. Licenses did not then first begin to be -issued, nor were they then for the first time necessary;[409] but -then began the development which carried their numbers from two -thousand six hundred and six in 1807, to over fifteen thousand in -1809 and over eighteen thousand in 1810. After the last year there -was a rapid falling off, due, not to a change of system, but to the -bitter experience that the license, which protected against a British -cruiser, did not save the ship and cargo upon arrival in a port under -Napoleon's control, when he had at last devoted his indomitable energy -to the thorough enforcement of his decrees. During the years in which -the practice flourished, it was principally to the Baltic ports that -the licensed vessels went, though they also made their way to those of -Holland, France, Spain, and other countries on the Continent. The trade -to the British East and West Indies was confined to British vessels, as -in time of profound peace. - -The true origin of the later license trade is to be found in that -supremacy and omnipresence of the British navy, which made it -impossible for vessels under an enemy's flag to keep the sea. In order -to employ their vessels, hostile owners transferred them to a neutral -ownership, ordinarily by a fraudulent process which received the name -of "neutralization." A neutralized ship remained the property of the -hostile merchant; but, for a stipulated price, a neutral firm, who made -this their regular business, gave their name as the owners and obtained -from the authorities of the neutral country all the requisite papers -and attestations by which the British cruisers, on searching, might be -deceived. As a regular systematic business, fraudulent from beginning -to end, the practice first arose during the war of the American -Revolution, in 1780, when Holland became a party to the war, having a -large mercantile tonnage with very inadequate means of protecting it. -At that time a firm established itself in Embden, on the Prussian side -of the Ems, which divides Prussia from Holland, and within the two -years that remained of the war "neutralized," under Prussian flags, -a hundred thousand tons of foreign shipping, besides cargoes to an -immense value for those days. In the wars of Napoleon it was the fate -of Holland to be again dragged in the wake of France, and the same -practice of neutralization, supported by false oaths and false papers, -again sprang up and flourished extensively in the Prussian province of -East Friesland,—Prussia carefully maintaining her neutrality from 1795 -to the unfortunate Jena campaign of 1806. - -In the year 1806 it was asserted that there were upwards of three -thousand sail belonging to merchants of Holland, France, and Spain -navigating under the Prussian flag; and the practice doubtless was -not confined to Prussia. "It is notorious," wrote Lord Howick, the -British foreign minister, "that the coasting trade of the enemy is -carried on not only by neutral ships but by the shameful misconduct of -neutral merchants, who lend their names for a small percentage, not -only to cover the goods, but in numberless instances to mask the ships -of the enemy."[410] The fact becoming known, British cruisers, when -meeting a valuable ship with Prussian papers, were apt to take the -chance of her being condemned and send her in; but even in British -ports and admiralty courts the neutralizing agent was prepared to -cover his transaction. The captain and crew of the detained vessel -were all carefully instructed and prepared to swear to the falsehoods, -which were attested by equally false papers sworn to before Prussian -judges. To this trade, it was alleged, France owed the power to obtain -naval stores despite the British blockade of her arsenals. The frauds -recoiled in a curious way on the head of Prussia; for, in the later -stage of the Jena campaign, the neutralized ships supplied French -magazines in the Baltic ports, the French hospitals at Lubeck, and -the army that besieged Dantzic. The capture of vessels, the character -of whose papers was suspected, served to swell the cry against Great -Britain for violating neutral rights, induced greater severity in the -British naval measures, and so directly contributed to the Berlin -Decree and the Orders in Council.[411] - -Thus had stood the neutralizing trade toward the end of 1805. After -Napoleon had finally abandoned all thought of invading England, the -victorious campaign of Austerlitz and the peace of Presburg, extending -by conquest the boundaries of the empire, extended also the sweep of -those municipal regulations, already in force, which excluded British -goods from French territory. Early in 1806, beguiling Prussia into -hostilities with Great Britain through the occupation of Hanover, the -emperor compassed also the closure of the great German rivers. Peace -was indeed soon restored; but the Jena campaign, quickly following, -delivered Prussia, bound hand and foot, to Napoleon's dictates. In the -summer of 1807 the Peace of Tilsit united the empires of the East -and West in a common exclusion of British trade, to which Prussia -could not but accede. Great Britain thus found herself face to face -with no mere municipal regulations of one or two countries, but with -a great political combination aiming at her destruction through the -commerce which was her life. Nor was this combination merely one of -those unfriendly acts which seeks its end by peaceful means, like the -Non-Intercourse Acts of America. The British cabinet was perfectly -informed that the minor states were to be coerced, by direct military -force, into concurrence with the commercial policy of France and -Russia,—a concurrence essential to its success. - -It was necessary for Great Britain to meet this threatening -conjunction, with such measures as should reduce the proposed injury -to an amount possible for her to bear, until the inevitable revulsion -came. She found ready to her hand the immense unprincipled system of -neutralized vessels, and by means of them and of veritable neutrals she -proposed to maintain her trade with the Continent. To do so, without -reversing the general lines of her policy, as laid down in the Orders -in Council, it was necessary to supply each neutral employed with a -clear and unmistakable paper, which would insure beyond peradventure -the respect of British cruisers for a class of vessels they had been -accustomed to regard with suspicion. It would not do that a ship -engaged in maintaining a British trade that was in great danger of -extinction should be stopped by their own cruisers. The wording of -the licenses was therefore emphatically sweeping and forcible. They -protected against detention the vessel carrying one, whatever the -flag she flew (the French flag alone being excepted), and directed -that "the vessel shall be allowed to proceed, notwithstanding all the -documents which accompany the ship and cargo may represent the same -to be destined to any neutral or hostile port, or to whomsoever such -property may belong."[412] These broad provisions were necessary, -for the flags flown, except that of the United States, were those of -nations which had, willingly or under duress, entered the Continental -System; and the papers, having to undergo the scrutiny of hostile -agents at the ports of arrival, had to be falsified, or, as it was -euphoniously called, "simulated," to deceive the customs officer, -if zealous, or to give him, if lukewarm, fair ground for admitting -the goods. The license protected against the British cruiser, which -otherwise would have detained the vessel on the ground of her papers, -intended to deceive the port officers. "The system of licenses," said -an adverse petition, "renders it necessary for the ships employed to -be provided with sets of forged, or, as they are termed, simulated -papers."[413] Of these, two sets were commonly carried, the paper, the -wax for the seals, and other accompaniments being carefully imitated, -and signatures of foreign rulers, as of Napoleon and of the President -and Secretary of State of the United States, skilfully forged.[414] The -firms conducting this business made themselves known to the mercantile -community by circular letters.[415] - -In this way large fleets of licensed vessels under the flags of -Prussia, Denmark, Mecklenburg, Oldenburg, Kniphausen, and other almost -unknown German principalities, as well as many American merchant ships, -went yearly to the Baltic laden with British and colonial produce, -and returned with the timber, hemp, tallow, and grain of the North. -They entered St. Petersburg and every port in the Baltic, discharged, -loaded with the return cargo, and then repaired to a common rendezvous; -whence, when collected to the number of about five hundred, they -sailed for Great Britain under convoy of ships of war, to protect them -against the privateers that swarmed in the Sound and North Sea.[416] -Crushed between England and France, the Danish seamen, who would not -come into the licensed service of the former, had lost their livelihood -and had turned in a body to privateering, in the practice of which they -fell little short of piracy;[417] and French privateers also found the -ground profitable for cruising. - -It was to this disposition of the north countries, as well as to -conciliate the United States, that was probably due the Order in -Council of April 26, 1809; which, while preserving the spirit, -and probably securing the advantages of those of November, 1807, -nevertheless formally and in terms revoked the latter, except so far -as expressly stated in the new edict. The constructive, or paper, -blockade, which under the former orders extended to every port whence -the British flag was excluded, was now narrowed down to the coasts of -Holland, France, and so much of Italy as was under Napoleon's immediate -dominion. The reasons assigned for this new measure were "the divers -events which had taken place since the date of the former orders, -affecting the relations between Great Britain and the territories of -other powers." The Spanish peninsula, being now in open and general -revolt against Napoleon, was of course exempted; and southern Italy, -by its nearness to Malta and Sicily, one a possession and the other -an ally of England, might more readily be supplied from them than -by neutrals coming from a greater distance. The maintenance of the -blockade of Holland was particularly favorable to British trade. By -that means the great articles of continental consumption could reach -Holland and France, direct, only by British license, which meant that -they came from England; while, if carried from a neutral country to -the German rivers, to the Hanse towns, or to the Baltic, as the new -Order allowed them to be, they had to be brought thence to the regions -more immediately under Napoleon's government by land carriage, which -would so raise their price as not to conflict with the British licensed -trade. Thus the condition of the suffering neutral populations was -relieved, without loosening the pressure upon France; and some of the -offence given to the neutral carriers was removed. Another advantage -accrued to Great Britain from thus throwing open the trade to the -Baltic to all neutrals; for the great demand and high prices of naval -equipment would induce them to bring these to the British market and -arsenals, in preference to other countries. - -This Order was issued at the moment when the British minister at -Washington was assuring the American government that the Orders in -Council would be wholly withdrawn on the 10th of June following.[418] -At the same time the French and Austrians were drawing near to each -other on the fields of Germany. On the 6th of April the Archduke -Charles issued his address to the Austrian army, and on the 10th -crossed the Inn, moving toward Bavaria. On the 12th Napoleon quitted -Paris to place himself at the head of his troops, which had already -preceded him, but were then scattered in different positions, in sore -need of his directing hand. On the 17th he was in their midst. On the -same day the first collision occurred with Davout's corps under the -walls of Ratisbon. Five days of active manœuvring and hard fighting -succeeded, ending with the battle of Eckmuhl; after which the Archduke, -outgeneralled and defeated, fell back into Bohemia. On the 12th of -May Vienna surrendered, and on the 13th Napoleon entered the Austrian -capital for the second time in his career. - -In the same eventful week, and on the very day of the battle of -Eckmuhl, Sir Arthur Wellesley again landed at Lisbon to begin his -memorable four years of command in the Peninsula. Napoleon had -relinquished to Soult the pursuit of Sir John Moore, while still in -mid-career; and after the embarkation of the British army from Coruña -and the surrender of that city, January 16-26, 1809, the marshal was -ordered to invade Portugal. After a difficult series of operations, -Oporto was reached and stormed on the 29th of March; but Soult lacked -the means to push further south. Wellesley, on his arrival, at once -decided to march against him, in preference to attacking the French -forces in Spain on the line of the Tagus. On the 12th of May, the -same day that Vienna surrendered, the British troops crossed the -Douro, Soult was forced to evacuate Oporto in haste, retreated to the -northward, and re-entered Spain. The British general then returned with -his army to the Tagus, and on the 27th of June advanced along that line -into Spain. On the 28th of July he fought the battle of Talavera; but, -though victorious, the failure of the Spanish troops to support him, -their unreliable character as soldiers, and the want of provisions, -compelled him to return at the end of August into Portugal, where he -took up a position close to the frontier. - -The French movements in Spain were rendered indecisive by lack of -unity in the direction of the armies, due to the military incapacity -of the king and the jealousies of the different marshals. The same -early summer months were passed by Napoleon in a desperate struggle on -the banks of the Danube, below Vienna. Though the capital had fallen, -the Austrian army still remained, chastened but not subdued, and now -confronted him on the north side of the stream under a general of a -high order of merit, if inferior to the great emperor. To cross from -the south to the north bank of the broad river, in the face of such -a foe, was no light undertaking even for Napoleon. The first attempt -began on the 20th of May; and during the two succeeding days the -French army passed slowly across the insufficient bridges which alone -could be thrown, for lack of proper material. During the 21st and 22d -continued the strife, known in history as the battle of Essling; and -on the latter day some sixty thousand French troops were in action -with the Austrians, when the great bridge, joining the south shore to -the island of Lobau in mid-stream, gave way before a freshet, which -had already raised the waters of the Danube by fourteen feet. The -supply of ammunition to the engaged troops ceased, and it therefore -became impossible to retain the positions already gained. During the -night of the 22d the corps on the north side were withdrawn into the -island; and for the next six weeks Napoleon was untiringly occupied in -providing materials for bridges which would be sure not to fail him. -At last, when all was prepared, the army again crossed, and on the 6th -of July was fought the memorable battle of Wagram. Terminating in the -defeat of the Austrians, it was followed on the 12th by an armistice; -and a definitive treaty of peace was ratified at Vienna on the 15th -of October. Austria surrendered all her remaining sea-board on the -Adriatic, besides portions of her interior territory, and again acceded -to the prohibition of British goods of all kinds within her dominions. - -A month before, September 17, 1809, peace had been concluded between -Russia and Sweden; the latter ceding Finland and engaging to close her -ports to all British ships, "with the exception of the importation -of salt and colonial productions, which habit had rendered necessary -to the people of Sweden."[419] On the 6th of January Napoleon, less -merciful than the czar, exacted a convention which allowed only the -entry of salt, excluding explicitly the colonial produce permitted -by the Russian treaty; in return for which he restored Pomerania -to Sweden.[420] Thus were formally closed to Great Britain all the -northern ports through which, by the license trade, she had continued -to pour her merchandise into the Continent, though in much diminished -volume. - -It now became Napoleon's great object to enforce the restrictions, -which had thus been wrested from vanquished opponents in support -of his continental policy, by increased personal vigilance and by -urgently reiterated demands, for which he had an undeniable ground in -the express terms of his treaties with the sea-board powers. Upon the -Continent, except in the Spanish peninsula, the treaty of Vienna was -followed by a peace of exhaustion, which lasted nearly three years. -The emperor returned to Fontainebleau on the 26th of October, and at -once began the dispositions from which he hoped the reduction of Great -Britain, but which irresistibly led, step by step, to his own final -overthrow. The French army was withdrawn from southern Germany, but -gradually; remaining long enough in the various conquered or allied -countries to ease the imperial treasury from the expense of their -support, according to Napoleon's invariable policy. The evacuation was -not completed until the first of June, 1810. A hundred thousand men, -chiefly new levies, were directed on Spain, together with the Imperial -Guard, the supposed precursor of the emperor himself; but the best of -the troops, the hardened corps of Davout and Masséna, were reserved for -northern Germany and the Dutch frontiers, to enforce the submission -of the people to the continental blockade. Napoleon himself did not -go to Spain, and that tedious war dragged wearily on, with greater or -less vigor here or there, according to the qualities of the different -leaders; but lacking the unity of aim, the concert of action, which -nothing but the presence of a master spirit could insure among so -many generals of equal rank, imbued with mutual jealousy, and each -taxed with a burden that demanded his utmost strength. Around Lisbon, -Wellington was preparing the lines of Torres Vedras, and thus striking -deep into the soil of the Peninsula a grip from which all the armies of -France could not shake him, so long as the navy of Great Britain stood -at his back, securing his communications and his line of retreat; but -of this Napoleon knew nothing. - -It was above all things necessary to bring the Spanish war to an end, -and the emperor was heartily weary of it; but still the Continental -System constrained him. "Duroc assured me," writes Bourrienne,[421] -"that the emperor had more than once shown regret at being engaged -in the Spanish war; but since he had the English to fight there, no -consideration could have induced him to abandon it, the more so as -all that he was then doing was to defend the honor of the Continental -System.... He said to Duroc one day, 'I no longer hold to Joseph being -king of Spain, and he himself cares little about it. I would place -there the first comer, if he could close his ports to the English.'" -The military situation in Spain imperatively demanded his own presence; -without it the war was interminable. The Spanish ulcer, as he himself -aptly termed it, was draining away both men and money; and the seat -of the trouble was at Lisbon, where the British sea power had at last -found the place to set its fangs in his side and gnaw unceasingly. -But Napoleon could not resolve either to withdraw from the contest -or to superintend it in person. The Spaniards and Portuguese, in the -prevailing anarchy, could contribute little, as consumers, to British -commerce; whereas the north of Europe, from Holland to St. Petersburg, -while yielding a nominal acquiescence, everywhere evaded the blockades -with the connivance of their governments. Here, then, in his opinion, -was the quarter to strike Great Britain; the Peninsula was to her but -a drain of men and money, which the custom of northern and central -Europe alone enabled her to endure. The emperor therefore decided to -sustain both efforts, the peninsular war and the northern continental -blockade; to divide his strength between the two, instead of combining -it upon either; and to give his immediate attention to the North. -Thus it was that the Sea Power of Great Britain, defying his efforts -otherwise, forced him into the field of its own choosing, lured him, -the great exemplar of concentrated effort, to scatter his forces, and -led him along a path which at last gave no choice except retreat in -discomfiture or advance to certain ruin. - -Napoleon advanced. Since the Jena campaign he had occupied with French -and Polish troops the fortresses of Glogau, Custrin, Stettin, and -Dantzic. By these he controlled the Oder and the Vistula, and kept -a constant rein upon Prussia, so as to exact the war indemnities -she still owed, to check any movement upon her part, and to enforce -the demands of his policy. Davout, the most severe and thorough of -the French marshals, took command of these fortresses, as also of -Hanover and of the Hanse towns, on which likewise imperial troops were -quartered. At the mouth of the Ems his corps was in touch with that of -Marshal Oudinot, which stretched thence along the frontiers of Holland -to Belgium and Boulogne. Thus the whole sea-board from Boulogne to -the Baltic was gripped by French divisions, which in any dispute or -doubt powerfully supported the emperor's arguments and sustained the -Continental System, both by actual interference and by the constant -threat contained in their presence. These measures "were necessary," -says M. Thiers[422] "in order to compel the Hanse towns to renounce -commercial intercourse with Great Britain, and to coerce Holland, which -paid no more attention to the commercial blockade than if it had been -governed by an English or a German prince. Even when the governments -attempted to keep good faith the communities were little affected, and -pursued a contraband trade which the most vigorous measures failed to -prevent. Napoleon determined to conduct in person this kind of warfare." - -Holland was the first victim. As has before been said, Louis Bonaparte -strove continually to thwart the operation of the system. Napoleon -now demanded a strict execution of the blockade, and for that purpose -that the guard of the Dutch coasts and of the mouths of the rivers -should be entrusted to French custom-house officers.[423] He also -required that the American vessels which had entered Dutch ports under -the king's permission should be confiscated. Louis, though willing -to concede the former conditions and to exclude Americans and other -neutrals thenceforward, could not bring himself to give up those -that had entered under his own authority; but, having been induced -to visit his brother in Paris in November, 1809, he was by threats -and persuasion brought to yield every point demanded. It was during -these interviews that Napoleon, giving way to one of those transports -of passion which increased with him as years went by, again betrayed -the fatal compulsion under which England held him, and the purposes -already forming in his mind. "It is the English," he cried, "who have -forced me to aggrandize myself unceasingly.[424] But for them I would -not have united Naples, Spain, Portugal to my empire. I have willed to -struggle and to extend my coasts, in order to increase my resources. If -they keep on, they will oblige me to join Holland to my shore lines, -then the Hanse towns, finally Pomerania, and perhaps even Dantzic." -Then he suggested that Louis should, by indirect means, convey to the -British cabinet the impending danger of Napoleon's proceeding to these -extremities, in the hopes that apprehension might induce it to offer -terms of peace, in order to avert the union of Holland to the empire. - -A Dutch banker, M. Labouchère, who had extensive relations with -prominent houses, was accordingly dispatched, though without formal -credentials, and opened the matter to the ministers; but the latter -showed little interest. Whatever the nominal state of Holland, they -said, it is really only a French dependency; and as for the extension -of the Continental System, they expected no less than an increase -of tyranny with the increase of the emperor's sway. Louis was then -sent back to Holland, having further agreed to cede to France all his -provinces west of the Rhine, and to line the coasts of the remainder -with an army partly Dutch, partly French, but commanded by a French -general. Overwhelmed with mortification, he cherished at times impotent -thoughts of resistance, which issued only in insults to the French -Chargé and in impediments thrown in the way of the French army of -occupation and the customs officers. Finally, in June, 1810, a body of -French troops having presented themselves before Harlem were denied -entrance; and at about the same time a servant of the French embassy -was mobbed at the Hague. Napoleon at once ordered Oudinot to enter, -not only Harlem, but Amsterdam, with drums beating and colors flying, -while the French corps to the north and south of Holland crossed the -frontiers to support the army of occupation. On the first of July Louis -signed his abdication, which was published on the 3d; by which time he -had secretly left the kingdom for an unknown destination. On the 9th -Holland was united to the empire by an imperial decree. The coveted -American ships with their cargoes were sequestrated, and the large -accumulations of colonial produce formed under Louis's lax blockade -were made to contribute to the imperial treasury, by being admitted -into France upon payment of a duty of fifty per cent. But, for this -immediate benefit, the thrifty Hollanders were to pay by an unrelenting -exclusion of trade, by the quartering of foreign troops, and by the -conscription, both land and naval. - -The empire now extended to the Ems; but still, with persevering -cunning, smugglers and neutrals contrived to introduce tropical produce -and British manufactures to some extent. Owing to the restrictions, -indeed, the goods rose from fifty to a hundred per cent over the London -prices, but still they came; and, in consequence at once of the British -blockade of the French coast and of the emperor's jealous support of -that blockade by his own decrees, the people of France had to pay far -dearer than the other continental nations.[425] Thus were Napoleon's -objects doubly thwarted; for, while he aimed at breaking down Great -Britain by exclusion from the rest of Europe, he also meant to make -France, as the corner stone of his power, the most prosperous nation, -and to secure for her the continental market which her rival was to -lose.[426] All foreign articles decreased in price in proportion as -the distance from Paris increased. Before the union, coffee and sugar -cost in his capital three and four times what they did in Holland. He -now became unremitting and threatening in his representations to the -Northern states. Exacting the last farthing of Prussia at one breath, -with the next he offered to deduct from the debt the value of all -licensed cargoes seized by her. He menaced Sweden with the reoccupation -of Pomerania, if the great fleets under British license were admitted -to Stralsund. It was indeed to the Northern and Baltic ports that four -fifths of the licensed vessels went; only a small proportion sailed -to the blockaded ports of France and Holland.[427] By dint of urgent -representations and the presence of the French troops, he contrived to -have seized the greater part of a convoy of six hundred sail, which -entered the Baltic in the summer of 1810; but which, being delayed by -head winds, had not reached their ports in time to escape the movements -of his troops. The Northern trade had taken on immense dimensions in -1809, when Napoleon was battling about Vienna and the governments -were not under his eye; but this year he could make himself felt, -and some forty million dollars' worth of British property was seized -in the northern ports.[428] The blow seriously affected the already -overstrained commercial system of Great Britain, and its results were -shown by the fall in the number of licenses issued, from eighteen -thousand in 1810 to seventy-five hundred in 1811. - -The emperor went further. Deciding, after long consideration, that -fifty per cent on the London prices represented the profits of -smugglers of colonial goods, he determined to allow the introduction -of the latter upon payment of duty to that extent. Characteristically -unwilling to appear to take a step backward, he extended this -permission only to produce not coming from British colonies; but it -was understood, and officially intimated to the customs authorities, -that the inquiry should not be rigorous. In this subterfuge, says M. -Thiers, consisted the whole combination.[429] Having thus constituted -a lawful variety of colonial products in the empire and in the subject -countries, the emperor felt at liberty to execute one of those vast -confiscations, which contributed so materially to his military chest. -All collections of these goods existing within his reach were to be -seized at the same time, and, if they had not been declared, should -be condemned; if they had, should pay half their value, in money or -in kind. "Thus it was hoped to seize everywhere at the same time, and -to take for the treasury of Napoleon, or for that of his allies, the -half in case of declaration, the whole in case of dissimulation. It can -be conceived what terror would be caused to the numerous accomplices -of British commerce."[430] This measure was established by a decree -of August 5, 1810, and accepted by all the continental states, except -Russia. The latter refused to go beyond her obligations by the treaty -of Tilsit, and took the occasion to express her uneasiness at seeing -the French troops gradually extending along the northern seas, and even -as close to her own borders as Dantzic. The impossibility of cordial -co-operation in the immense sacrifices demanded by the Continental -System was clearly shown by this refusal; but by no less vigorous -means could Great Britain be reached, and Napoleon could not recede. -The decree was extended outside the boundaries of the empire, to any -depot of colonial goods within four days' march of the frontiers, in -Switzerland, in Germany, in Prussia, in the Hanse towns. Large sums of -money were realized, and the government became a dealer in groceries -when the payments were made in kind. The pressure of the French troops -extended everywhere, and French flotillas cruised along the coasts of -the North Sea, whether within the limits of the empire or not, in the -mouths and along the course of the great rivers, to seal them more -completely. - -The decree of August 5 was carried out by the armed hand. "_Wherever -my troops are_," wrote Napoleon to Prussia, "I suffer no English -smuggling." On this ground French authorities executed the mandate in -the Prussian port of Stettin, which was in the military occupation -only of his troops. "All the ports of this once potent kingdom," -says a contemporary magazine, "are filled with French soldiers, who -seize and burn every article which can possibly have passed through -British hands. Prussia is described as in a deplorable state, almost -disorganized and no employment for industry."[431] Similar action was -taken in the Hanse towns with no other justification. The king of -Westphalia was ordered to withdraw his army from the northern part of -the kingdom, that French soldiers might enter for the same purpose. In -Switzerland the native authorities were permitted to act, but a French -customs officer supervised. On the 18th of August the emperor directed -the military occupation of the territory of Lubeck, Lauenburg, Hamburg, -and all the west bank of the Elbe, for a length of fifty miles from its -mouth; thence the line extended, at about the same distance from the -sea, to Bremen, and thence to the frontiers of Holland, taking in the -little states of Arenberg and Oldenburg. This military occupation was -but the precursor of the annexation of these countries a few months -later, which led to the first overt act of displeasure on the part of -the czar. In justification of the step, one of a series which alienated -Alexander and led up to the Russian war, was alleged the purpose of -sustaining the continental blockade as the only means of destroying -Great Britain. "General Morand," so read the orders, "is charged to -take all necessary measures for the prevention of smuggling. For this -purpose he will establish a first line of troops from Holstein to -East-Frisia, and a second line in rear of the first."[432] - -On the 6th of October the viceroy of Italy was directed to occupy -with Italian troops all the Italian cantons of Switzerland, and to -sequestrate at once all colonial or other contraband merchandise. The -order was accompanied with Napoleon's usual formula: "This ought to -bring in several millions." Eugene was to explain that this was only -a step similar to the occupation of northern Germany, that it did not -invade the neutrality of Switzerland; and he was to be particularly -careful that the emperor's hand did not appear. "That there should be -a quarrel between _you_ and Switzerland will do no harm."[433] On the -19th of October Prussia was notified that, if she did not efficiently -preclude the passage of British and colonial merchandise through her -states, the French army would enter them; and the French minister was -directed to leave Berlin if satisfaction was not given.[434] - -Coincidently with these principal measures, the correspondence of -Napoleon teems with orders, complaints, remonstrances, reprimands, -queries, all showing how bent his mind was on the one purpose. Having -turned over the command of the army in Portugal, directed against the -British, to his ablest marshal, Masséna, he was concentrating his own -energies on the blockade. At the same time, he occupied himself with -stringent measures for protecting the industries of France in the -European market. No man ever held more thoroughly than the emperor that -element of the theory of protection, that the government can manage the -business of the people better than themselves. His kingdom of Italy -should not use Swiss nor German cottons; such goods must come only from -France.[435] Italian raw silks shall go nowhere but to France,[436] -and then only to Lyon. The whole export trade is in his hands by a -system of licenses,[437] apparently borrowed from Great Britain, and -which at this time he greatly extended. On the 25th of July an order -was given that no ship could clear from a port of the empire for abroad -without a license, signed by the emperor himself. On September 15 -another decree was issued,[438] allowing licensed vessels to sail from -Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck for French ports. The license was to cost -twelve dollars per ton, and was good only for the return voyage; but -the vessel upon arriving in France was exempt from all question as -to search by British cruisers, and might even land all her cargo in -a British port,—in other words, she was excepted from the Berlin and -Milan decrees. She could not, however, enter France with any British -goods. Returning, she was to load with wines or other French produce, -except grain or flour. Under the rival license systems new and curious -methods of evasion grew up. Compelled to take French articles which -were not wanted in Great Britain, as well as those that were, the -former were put on board of so inferior a quality that they could be -thrown into the sea without loss. At either end smuggling boats met -the licensed vessel before entering port, and took from her forbidden -articles. Ships of either nation, with foreign flag, and simulated -papers, were to be seen in each other's ports.[439] The British, as a -commercial people, were naturally willing to give a larger extension to -this evasive trade; but the emperor would not grant anything that he -thought could help his enemy, even though it benefited his own people. -He believed, and rightly, that Great Britain was receiving more harm -than France; he did not realize that, from her immense wealth and -commercial aptitudes, she could endure the process longer. - -The decree of August 5 admitted colonial goods, but excluded British -manufactures. On the 19th of October was issued another edict, -directing that all such manufactured goods, wherever found in the -emperor's dominions, or even in countries in the mere military -occupation of his troops, should be publicly burned. This was -remorselessly done. "Persons who at this epoch were living in the -interior of France can form no idea of the desolation which so savage a -measure spread through countries accustomed to live by commerce. What -a spectacle offered to peoples impoverished and lacking everything, -to see the burning of articles the distribution of which would have -been an alleviation to their sufferings!... What a means of attacking -conquered peoples, to irritate their privations by the destruction -of a number of articles of the first necessity!"[440] "The tampering -with the mails," says Savary, the Minister of Police, "caused me to -make some very sad reflections, and forced me to admit that we were -not advancing toward tranquillity; and that, if the party against us -were not yet formed, at least all sentiments were agreed, and that a -single reverse would be enough to ruin us.... The more we disturbed the -relations of Europe with England, the more, on all sides, men sought -to draw together; and we remained with the odious epithets given to -us by all those whom our measures thwarted."[441] "There was already -an understanding from one end of Europe to the other; every cabinet -earnestly wished the overthrow of Napoleon, as the people also wished, -with at least equal ardor, a state of things less stifling for their -industry and trade. Despite the terror inspired by Napoleon's name, -there was, side by side with that terror, that damnable Continental -System which settled the question; it was necessary either to fight or -to succumb. The people of the North were under an imperious necessity -to break that yoke of lead, which made the custom house the prime agent -of the governments of Europe."[442] - -Russia had refused to accede to any steps beyond her engagements of -Tilsit; but nowhere was discontent more profound, nowhere opposition -more to be dreaded. While Napoleon was indisputably leading Great -Britain into greater and greater embarrassment, by the depreciation -of her manufactures and by the accumulations of unsalable sugars and -coffees in her warehouses, he was also ruining the agriculture of -Russia and the revenues of her nobles. Despite the relief afforded by -the great licensed fleets, the Tilsit agreements so embarrassed trade, -that hemp, which in 1802 was worth £32 the ton in London, had reached, -in 1809, £118;[443] and other products of the North rose in the same -proportion. At the same time sixty thousand tons of coffee lay in the -London warehouses, unsalable at sixpence the pound, while the price -on the Continent was from four to five shillings, and in places even -seven shillings.[444] No better proof of the efficacious co-working -of Napoleon's system and of the British Orders can be offered; but -the question was one of endurance. Which could stand such a strain -longer? In Russia matters were fast approaching a climax. The czar -felt the ground trembling under his feet;[445] and, while he renewed -his protestations of fidelity to Tilsit and Erfurt, he had to see -Napoleon, by his licenses, evading the restrictions which he at the -same time was pressing his ally to enforce more rigorously. In vain was -the explanation offered that these licenses were but in furtherance of -the restrictive system; that France was unloading her surplus products -upon England, while refusing to receive aught but specie in return; and -that in consequence the exchange was going more and more against Great -Britain. The czar knew better; and the repeated and urgent letters of -the emperor, becoming, as was the wont of Napoleon's requests, rather -peremptory than entreating, to seize and confiscate all neutral ships -entering Russian ports, fell on deaf ears. Alexander feared war; but he -remembered his father's fate, and feared assassination more. - -On the 10th of December, 1810, the emperor sent a message to the Senate -announcing that he had annexed to the empire the Hanse towns, together -with the region on the North Sea intervening between them and Holland, -which had been as yet only in military occupation. In the same paper -he expressed his intention of making a canal from the Elbe to Lubeck, -by which the empire should be brought into direct water communication -with the Baltic. This assurance was not calculated to ease the anxiety -of the czar as to the eastward progress of France; but the measure -was accompanied by a circumstance of personal affront, peculiarly -dangerous to an alliance which depended chiefly upon the personal -relations of two absolute sovereigns. The Grand Duke of Oldenburg, one -of the countries thus unceremoniously annexed, was uncle to the czar; -and though Napoleon proposed to indemnify him for the material loss, -by territory taken in the interior of Germany, Alexander would not -accept such satisfaction nor name any compensation that he would think -adequate. He did not threaten war, but he refused to surrender his -grievance, and reserved his right to retaliate an injury. - -Meantime very serious results were developing, both in Great Britain -and France, from the strained and abnormal conditions of commerce and -the shocks caused by Napoleon's sudden and tremendous blows at credit, -by his wide-spread confiscations, and by the Baltic seizures. The -triple array of French troops that lined the shores of the Continent, -re-enforced by the belt of British cruisers girding the coasts from the -Ems to Bayonne, and from the Pyrenees to Orbitello, created a barrier -which neither mercantile ingenuity nor popular want could longer evade -to a degree that afforded any real measure of relief. The stolid, -though as yet peaceable, measures of resistance taken by the United -States had added seriously to the embarrassments of Great Britain, -while rather furthering the policy of Napoleon, however contrary this -was to the interests of France. During the years 1808 and 1809, the -continuance of the embargo and of the non-intercourse acts, closing -the North American market, coincided with the opening of the South -American; and a great rush was made by the British mercantile community -for the latter, although it was not, by the number of the inhabitants, -nor by their wealth, nor by their habits of life, at all able to take -the place of the consumers lost in Europe and North America. The goods -sent out in great quantities were injudiciously chosen, as well as -far in excess of the possible requirements; so they remained unsold, -and for the most part uncared for and unhoused, on the beach in South -American ports. The judgment of men seemed to become unhinged amid the -gloom and perplexity of the time, and the frantic desire of each to -save himself increased the confusion. Mere movement, however aimless or -dangerous, is less intolerable than passive waiting. - -The years 1809 and 1810 were consequently marked by an extensive -movement in trade, which carried with it an appearance of prosperity -in great part delusive. Immense imports were made from the Baltic, and -from Italy, at the moment that Napoleon's coils were tightening around -them; large shipments also to the North, to South America, and to the -West Indies. In the United States only was there a transient period of -solid transactions; for in May, 1810, the Non-Intercourse Act expired -by its own limitations. A proviso, however, was immediately enacted -that if, before the 3d of March, 1811, either Great Britain or France -should recall their decrees so far as they affected the United States, -the Act should, within three months of the revocation, revive against -the power that maintained its edicts. Napoleon contrived to satisfy -President Madison that his Berlin and Milan decrees were so recalled on -the first of November; but Great Britain refused to consider the terms -of the withdrawal satisfactory, as in truth they were not. The Order -in Council of April 26, 1809, remained in force; and non-intercourse -between the United States and Great Britain again obtained in February, -1811, and continued to the outbreak of the war in 1812. - -Toward the end of 1810 the results of the various causes of trouble -began to be heavily felt. Very scant returns coming from South America, -the shippers were unable to discharge their debts to the manufacturers; -and the embarrassments of the latter were felt by their workmen. From -the West Indies the returns came in tropical produce, which could be -realized only on the Continent, long since partly and now effectually -closed. A succession of bad seasons had necessitated the importation -of large quantities of grain from Holland and France, especially in -1809, when an abundant harvest there, coinciding with a very bad crop -in England, induced Napoleon to enter upon his license system, and to -authorize an export which in three years drained £10,000,000 in specie -from the enemy. The freights to the licensed carriers, mostly neutrals -or hostile, at least in name, were also paid in specie, which was thus -taken out of the country; and there was a further drain of gold for -the maintenance of the fleets in distant parts of the world and for -the war in Spain, which now took the place of the former subsidies -to allies as a consumer of British treasure. Thus arose a scarcity -of specie. In November, 1810, the bankruptcies were two hundred and -seventy-three, against one hundred and thirty of the same month a -year before. Stoppages and compositions equalled in number half the -traders of the kingdom. "The general failures have wonderfully affected -manufactures, and want of confidence prevails between manufacturer -and merchant." A month later "bankruptcies continue to increase, and -confidence is nearly at an end. Neither gold nor silver is often to -be seen. The trade of the manufacturing towns is at stand; and houses -fail, not every day, but every hour. In the great sea-ports, the king's -stores are full of all kinds of colonial produce which find no sale. -Despondency is increased by the accounts from the Continent, which -represent all the sea-ports and internal depots of trade to be full of -French soldiers, who seize and burn every article which can possibly -have passed through British hands." As the shadows darkened, murmurs -grew louder and louder against the once popular[446] Orders in Council, -to which all the evil was now attributed. The press changed its tone -upon them, and a gradual agitation for their repeal grew up around the -Opposition leaders; who, from the moment they lost power, had never -ceased to inveigh against the retaliatory system framed by the ministry. - -But while disaster was thus thickening about Great Britain, the case -of France was worse. It was quite true, as the emperor said, that the -people could live without sugar and coffee, and that necessity would -in time find ways to produce many articles the import of which was -denied her; but such warped applications of her industry and ingenuity, -even when finally realized, could neither replace the loss of her -natural channels of effort nor for any length of time cope with a -nation, which, however momentarily shaken by unprecedented conditions, -yet kept power continually to renew her strength by contact, through -the sea, with new sources. That Great Britain would do this, her -traditions and the habits of her people were the pledge; and the -credit of the government bore witness to it through all. In the early -part of 1811 a serious commercial crisis occurred in France, causing -great anxiety to Napoleon. It was his particular wish to keep this -corner-stone of the empire prosperous and contented under the immense -demands made upon it for men, and the bitter sufferings entailed by -the conscription. But prosperity was hard to secure with all the -sea outlets of her manufactures and agriculture closed, with only a -continental market, and that impoverished by the universal cessation -of trade and further enfeebled by the exhausting demands made upon the -peoples to support the armies quartered upon them. The British blockade -of the French, Dutch, and Italian coasts forbade absolutely, except -to the limited license trade, the water carriage of raw materials -essential to manufactures, and prevented the export of French luxuries. -"The state of France as it fell under my observation in 1807," wrote -an American traveller, "exhibited a very different perspective" from -that of Great Britain. "The effects of the loss of external trade -were everywhere visible,—in the commercial cities half-deserted, and -reduced to a state of inaction and gloom truly deplorable; in the -inland towns, in which the populace is eminently wretched, and where -I saw not one indication of improvement, but on the contrary numbers -of edifices falling to ruin; on the high roads, where the infrequency -of vehicles and travellers denoted but too strongly the decrease of -internal consumption, and the languor of internal trade; and among the -inhabitants of the country, particularly of the South, whose misery is -extreme, in consequence of the exorbitant taxes, and of the want of -outlet for their surplus produce. In 1807 the number of mendicants in -the inland towns was almost incredible.... The fields were principally -cultivated by women."[447] - -All the genius of Napoleon could not create demands when there was not -means to gratify them, and the exquisite products of French taste and -skill labored under the same disadvantage as coffee and sugar, than -which they were even less necessary; men could dispense with them. -Production, stimulated by an exaggerated protection, became for a time -excessive and then ceased; even the exclusion of British manufactures -and the frequent burnings could not secure the continental market to -articles, the raw materials for which were made so dear by the sea -blockade, or by the long land carriage. Levant cotton made its weary -way on horse and mule back, from Turkey, through Illyria, to Trieste, -and thence was duly forwarded to France;[448] but even so, when made -into stuffs, found itself in competition with British cottons which -were landed in Salonica, conveyed on horses and mules through Servia -and Hungary into Vienna, and thence distributed over Germany.[449] In -the same manner was British colonial produce introduced. Despite all -Napoleon's efforts, smuggling continued to compete with and undersell -the fair trader, and his own licenses were used to evade his own -decrees.[450] Many firms in Holland went out of business altogether, -the factories of Lyon closed their doors, and several Paris houses were -in distress; although, like the British warehouses, their stores were -crowded with goods for which they could find no purchasers. Banks could -not recover their advances, internal commerce fell into confusion, and -general disaster followed. - -At the same time there was in France, as in Great Britain, much -suffering from bad harvests, and this was aggravated for the former by -the interruption of the coasting trade by the British cruisers, and -by the indifferent character of the inland roads, which, except when -they served the military plans of the emperor, were neglected from the -straitened state of the finances. The government came to the rescue -with various measures of relief, necessarily partial and arbitrary; -designed rather to stave off immediate trouble than to afford a radical -cure for existing difficulties. Yet serious remedies were needed; for -the growing distress of the Continent must continue to react upon -France, which found therein its only customers. In Holland almost all -the former sources of wealth had one by one been cut off; and even -money-lending, which survived the others, became a losing business -from the wide-spread ruin in Europe.[451] In Russia the ruble had -fallen to one third of the value it had before the institution of the -Continental System; although the czar had refused to impose upon his -people and their commerce the decrees of August 5 and October 19, which -Napoleon had forced upon other states. With growing poverty in Europe, -the empire must grow poorer, and in proportion to its loss of wealth -must be the diminution of the revenue. Yet already the revenue was -insufficient to the wants of the state, despite all the extraordinary -resources which had been called up during the past year, and which -could not again be expected. It was not to be hoped that many American -ships would again place themselves within reach of the emperor's -confiscations. The enormous seizures of colonial produce, made by -surprise in the previous August, could not, to any similar extent, be -repeated. The duty of fifty per cent, levied throughout the states -occupied by his troops, on the coffee and sugar which was declared by -the owners, had fallen upon accumulations made during the years of lax -blockade and had brought in large sums; but it now served only as an -inducement to smuggling. Great ingenuity had been shown in devising -extraordinary means for extracting money from the subject peoples, -but every year saw these supplies diminishing. Like slavery, like bad -farming, Napoleon's administration, and especially his army, required -continually new soil[452] and did little to renew or develop the powers -which it taxed; beneficent plans were formed, multitudinous orders -issued, but they received rare fulfilment except when they conduced to -the military efficiency of the state. - -There remained two resources. One was economy; and the correspondence -of Napoleon at this period teems with exhortations to his lieutenants, -with denials of money, and with precepts to get all they can out of -the annexed territories, and ask as little as possible from him.[453] -The emperor held in reserve, subject only to his own orders, a great -military treasure which had begun with war contributions, and into -which poured the results of the extraordinary transactions just -mentioned. Five wars had brought into this chest 805,000,000 francs; -but in 1810 there remained but 354,000,000, and he was unwilling to -trench further upon it, unless some grave emergency arose. He hoped -to spare, if not to add to it, by the confiscation of the property of -Spanish nobles who had resisted his change of dynasty, as well as by -the seizure of "false neutrals." Evidently, however, such resources are -precarious, and cannot be compared to those of a commercial state. -Contrasted with Great Britain, the financial expedients of Napoleon -resembled those of a mediæval prince or an Oriental potentate; and in -a strain of endurance, in a question of time, the very artificial, not -to say unnatural, framework of power which he had built could not hope -to outlast the highly organized, essentially modern, and above all -consistently developed society which confronted him. A state of long -standing and fixed traditions may endure the evils of a bad system, -disadvantaged by it, but not ruined; but when the system is new and -rests upon a single man, it asks in vain for the confidence inspired -by a closely knit, yet wide-spreading, body politic whose established -character guarantees the future. - -This was clearly shown in the ability of either government to use -the other resource—borrowing—as a means to supplement its deficient -income. Napoleon steadfastly refused to resort to this, alleging that -it was an unjustifiable draft upon the future, and could have but one -result—bankruptcy. He proved easily that Great Britain could not go on -borrowing indefinitely at her present rate. A better reason for his own -abstinence was to be found in the condition of his credit. The public -debt of France under his rule was small, and, as he did not add to it, -it stood at a good figure in the market.[454] His military genius, the -wide flight of his arms, the war contributions, the iniquitous plan by -which he quartered his troops on foreign countries, not merely in war -but in peace, and made them responsible for their maintenance,—measures -such as these, facilitated by frequently recurrent wars and combined -with exactions like those narrated in this chapter, enabled him to meet -his expenditures, accumulate the large reserve fund mentioned, and at -the same time distribute in France an amount of coin which greatly -aided the circulation. But his success imposed upon no one. Everybody -understood that such expedients were essentially transient, that to -renew them meant renewed wars, invasions growing ever wider and wider, -and results dependent always upon military prestige, which a single -lost battle might overthrow. Compared with insecurity such as this, the -fast growing debt of Great Britain possessed a relative solidity; which -even exceeded the absolute confidence felt that the interest would be -regularly paid. Behind her stood the history and the prestige of a -Sea Power which men knew had met many a heavy reverse, yet had never -failed; and which stood before Napoleon more mighty than ever. Far and -wide, through many a sea and in many a land, stretched the roots of her -strength; never more glorious, because never more sorely tried than by -the great emperor. She had credit, he had none. - -Savary, one of the most devoted of Napoleon's followers, quotes with -conviction the following words to him of a Parisian banker, in the -early part of 1811: "A humiliating fact, and one which gives the key -to many others, is the state of credit in France and in England. -The English debt amounts to about $3,500,000,000, ours only to -$250,000,000; and yet the English could borrow at need sums much more -considerable than we ourselves could, and above all at an infinitely -more favorable rate. Why this difference? Why is the credit of the -State, in France, lower than the credit of the leading merchants and -bankers; while the reverse is the permanent condition in England? A -word suffices to explain it: To restore one's credit in England, you -have only to work with the government; while to lose one's credit -in France it is only necessary _not_ to keep out of government -transactions. All England is, so to say, a single commercial house, -of which ministers are the directors, the laws the contract, which -power itself cannot infringe. Here the Council of State usurps the -powers of the tribunals, and I could almost say that nothing useful -is done, because _nothing is really guaranteed_."[455] A competent -American witness, before quoted, who had spent two years in France, -wrote, in 1809: "The French rulers, whatever may be their power, are -unable to obtain supplies at home except by _sacrifices equivalent to -the risk which is incurred by contracting with them_. Their credit -abroad may be estimated by the fact, which is so well known to us all, -that no intelligent merchant in this country can be induced, by any -consideration, to make advances in their favor, or to accept a bill on -their treasury, from their highest accredited agent."[456] - -While the public credit, that touchstone of prosperity, stood thus -in the two states, the same eye-witness thus describes the relative -condition of the two peoples: "In France the extinction of all public -spirit and of the influence of public opinion, the depopulation and -decay of the great towns, the stern dominion of a military police, -incessantly checked the exultation, natural to the mind, on viewing the -profusion of the bounties bestowed by nature. The pressure of the taxes -was aggravated by the most oppressive rigor in the collection. The -condition of the peasantry as to their food, clothing, and habitations -bore no comparison with the state of the same class in England.... -In England, whatever may be the representations of those who, with -little knowledge of the facts, affect to deplore her condition, it is -nevertheless true that there does not exist, and never has existed -elsewhere, so beautiful and perfect a model of public and private -prosperity.... I pay this just tribute of admiration with the more -pleasure, as it is to me in the light of an atonement for the errors -and prejudices under which I labored on this subject, before I enjoyed -the advantage of a personal experience. A residence of nearly two -years in that country—during which period I visited and studied nearly -every part of it, with no other view or purpose than that of obtaining -correct information, and I may add, with previous studies well fitted -to promote my object—convinced me I had been egregiously deceived."[457] - -The writer saw England before her sorest trial came. Since 1807, and -especially after 1809, the condition of both nations had grown sensibly -worse. The commercial embarrassments of Great Britain under the -dislocation of her trade and the loss of her markets, occasioned partly -by the Continental System and partly by the American Non-Intercourse -Act, and aggravated by the wild speculations that followed the year -1808, resulted in 1811 in wide-spread disaster,—merchants failing, -manufactories closing, workmen out of employment and starving. In -France the commercial crisis of the same year, extending over the -Continent, soon became a chaos of firms crashing one upon the other and -dragging down, each the other, in its fall.[458] Soon great numbers -of workmen in all the provinces found themselves, like their English -brethren, deprived of occupation. Council upon council was held by the -emperor to ascertain how, by government interference, to remedy the -ills for which governmental interference was immediately responsible. -But, underneath the apparently similar conditions of distress in the -two countries, lay the real difference between a nation shut in, and -thrown back upon itself, and one that kept open its communications with -the world at large. In 1811 Great Britain had already begun to react -through her natural channels; the energies of her people under the load -upon them had been like a strong spring, whose tension remains, though -compressed. The South American trade revived; the Spanish Main took off -the accumulations in the West India Islands, and the latter in turn -began to call for supplies from home; Russia was visibly relenting; in -the Peninsula, Masséna, whose progress had been stopped at the lines of -Torres Vedras, was forced to retreat into Spain in the month of March, -and through a liberated Portugal were found new openings for British -commerce. For France there could be no return of prosperity until the -sea was again free to her, either through her own or through neutral -ships; but the latter could not safely repair to her ports until her -rival revoked the still existing Order in Council, blockading the -whole French and Dutch coast, and this she would not do before the -emperor recalled the decrees upon which rested his Continental System. -And while Great Britain was making appalling drafts upon the future -in her ever-mounting debt, France was exhausting a capital which no -forcing power could replace, by her anticipated conscriptions, which -led to a revolt far more menacing than the riots of English workmen. -Sixty thousand "refractory" conscripts were scattered through the -departments, and among the forests of western, central, and southern -France, refusing to join their regiments and defying the authorities. -They were pursued by flying columns of old soldiers; who, often long -strangers to their own countrymen, took with their property the same -liberties they had practised in foreign parts. In January, 1811, the -whole conscription for the year was called out, and in midsummer that -for 1812; but no legal measures could make men of the boys sent to die -before the virile age,[459] more often of exposure than by the hands of -the enemy, in the gloomy mountains and parched plains of Spain. - -The great struggle of endurance, "of the highest individual genius -against the resources and institutions of a great nation"[460] who -stayed its power on the sea, was now drawing near its close; the battle -between the sea and the land was about to terminate in one of the most -impressive and gigantic military catastrophes recorded by history. -But the inevitable end was already clearly indicated before Napoleon -started for Russia, although the dim vision of weary eyes in England, -strained by long watching, saw not that which the apprehensions of -Frenchmen, troubled with the anguish of France, tremblingly felt. The -credit of France was gone; nor could her people bear any added burdens, -until the sea, over which Great Britain still moved unresisted, was -open to them. The people of the Continent had become bitterly hostile -through the sufferings caused by the blockade, and the imperial -power could only be maintained by an army which was itself filled by -borrowing upon the future; its capital, its reserve, was fast being -exhausted.[461] The question of physical endurance was settled; the -only point really left in doubt was that of moral endurance. Would -Great Britain and the British government have the nerve to hold out -till the emperor was exhausted?[462] Already the agitation for the -repeal of the Orders in Council, with which the existing ministry -was identified, was becoming ominous. The leaders of the Opposition -were opposed to the Peninsular war; and Napier has vividly shown the -doubts and hesitations of the ministry as to sustaining that great -enterprise which compelled Napoleon to such waste of life, to such a -fatal division of his force. Time was not allowed to test to the utmost -British tenacity; the darkest hour was fast passing away, the clouds -began to break and the day to dawn. - -Three weeks after Napoleon's annexation of the Hanse towns and of -the Duchy of Oldenburg, on the last day of the year 1810, Alexander -put forth a commercial ukase which under all the circumstances had -the appearance of retaliatory action; and at the least drew a sharp -line between his commercial policy and the Continental System as -inculcated by Napoleon. The decree expressly permitted the entrance -of colonial produce under neutral flags; and many articles of French -manufacture were virtually denied admission, by not being included in -a list of goods which could be introduced on payment of duty. In vain -did the czar assert that his object was to develop, by protection, -Russian manufactures of the excluded articles. Napoleon rejected -the explanation. "The last ukase," he wrote in a personal letter to -Alexander, "is at bottom, but yet more in form, specially directed -against France."[463] But while the exclusion of French products was -the most open, the admission of neutral ships with colonial produce was -the most significant, feature of the edict. This was the point upon -which the emperor had been most importunate; here was the leak which, -in his judgment, was sinking the ship. "Six hundred English merchant -ships," he had written in a previous letter, October 23, 1810,[464] -"wandering in the Baltic, have been refused admission to Prussian -ports and those of Mecklenburg, and have steered for your Majesty's -states. If you admit them the war still lasts.... Your Majesty knows -that if you confiscate them we shall have peace. Whatever their papers, -under whatever names they are masked, French, German, Spanish, Danish, -Russian, your Majesty may be sure they are English." - -Later, on the 4th of November,[465] Napoleon wrote through the -ordinary ministerial channels: "There are no neutrals. Whatever the -papers produced, they are false. Not a single ship enters Russia with -so-called American papers but comes really from England.[466] Peace or -war is in the hands of Russia. Let her confiscate all ships brought -in by the English, and join France in demanding of Sweden the seizure -of the immense quantity of merchandise the English have landed at -Gottenburg under various flags. If Russia wishes peace with England, -she has here the means. But Russia has followed opposite principles, -and of this but one proof need be given: that is, that the colonial -merchandise which appeared at the last Leipzig fair was brought there -by seven hundred wagons coming from Russia; that to-day all the traffic -in that merchandise is done through Russia; finally, that the twelve -hundred ships which the English have convoyed by twenty ships of war, -disguised under Swedish, Portuguese, Spanish, American flags, have in -part landed their cargoes in Russia." To these complaints Alexander -had replied that he had adhered, and would adhere, to his engagements -and exclude British ships; but that he would not, and could not, go -beyond them and forbid neutrals. The ukase of December 31 took the -matter out of diplomatic discussion, and, coming so immediately upon -the annexation of Oldenburg, had the appearance of defiance. As such -Napoleon accepted it. "This seems," he wrote in the personal letter of -February 28 above quoted, "a change of system. All Europe so regards -it; and already our alliance no longer exists, in the opinion of -England and of Europe.... If your Majesty abandons the alliance and -burns the conventions of Tilsit, it would be evident that war would -follow a few months sooner or later. The result must be, on either -side, to strain the resources of our empires in preparations.... If -your Majesty has not the purpose of reconciliation with England, you -will see the necessity, for yourself and for me, of dissipating all -these clouds." From that time both sovereigns prepared for war. - -The turn of affairs in the North at this time, and during the -succeeding critical twelvemonth, was powerfully influenced by the -presence of a great British fleet in the Baltic and by the extreme -discretion of its admiral. Napoleon had compelled Sweden to follow -up her exclusion of British ships by a formal declaration of war, -which was issued November 17, 1810. The British minister had to -leave Stockholm; and, after his departure, the political as well as -military direction of affairs on the spot was under the conduct of -Sir James Saumarez. That most distinguished and admirable officer had -thoroughly appreciated, during his three summers in the Baltic, the -feelings of the Swedish rulers and people; and it was chiefly owing -to his representations to his own government, and to his steadily -conciliatory action, that the formal war never became actual. He -resisted with dignity and firmness every attempt on the part of the -Swedish authorities to carry out Napoleon's orders to confiscate; but -he did not allow himself to be moved, by such occasional yielding on -their part, to any act of retaliation. Good feeling between the two -nations centred around his attractive personality, and facilitated the -essential, but difficult, conciliation between Sweden and Russia. The -entire license trade was under the protection of his fleet, which -had charge also of the suppression of privateering, of the police -of the hostile coasts, and of the interruption of communications -between Denmark and Norway.[467] Its presence virtually insured the -independence of Sweden against France and Russia, except during the -winter months, when compelled to leave the Baltic; and its numbers -and character gave the Swedish government a sufficient excuse for not -proceeding to the extremities demanded by Napoleon. During the summer -of 1811 the flag-ship was the centre of the secret consultations which -went on between the two states, to which Russia also, having finally -rejected Napoleon's terms, soon became a party; and towards the end of -the season the negotiation, practically completed by the admiral, was -formally concluded with a British plenipotentiary. It was determined to -keep up the appearance of war, but with the understanding that Sweden -would join the alliance of Great Britain and Russia. The czar had -then no cause to fear that, in the approaching contest with the great -conqueror, he should find a hostile Sweden on his flank and rear.[468] - -The preparations of Napoleon for the great Russian campaign occupied -the year 1811. It was his intention to carry on a vigorous warfare in -the Spanish peninsula, while collecting the immense forces of every -kind needed in the north of Germany. But the unsatisfactory character -of many of the soldiers gathering on the Elbe, among them being tens -of thousands of refractory conscripts and foreign nationalities, -compelled him to withdraw from Spain in the latter part of 1811 some -forty thousand veterans, whose place was to be filled by levies of -an inferior character, which, moreover, did not at once appear. The -fortune of war in the Peninsula during the year had varied in different -quarters. On the east coast General Suchet had brought Tortosa to -capitulate on the 1st of January. Thence advancing to the south he -reduced Tarragona by siege and assault on the 28th of June,—an exploit -which obtained for him his grade of Marshal of France. Still moving -forward, according to Napoleon's general plan and instructions to -him, the end of the year found him before the city of Valencia, which -surrendered on the 9th of January, 1812. But to obtain these later -successes, at the time that so many hardened warriors were removed from -the Peninsula, it had been necessary to support Suchet with divisions -taken from the centre and west, to abandon the hope entertained of -combining another great attempt against Lisbon, and also to withdraw -Marmont's corps from the valley of the Tagus to a more northern -position, around Salamanca and Valladolid. At this time Wellington -occupied a line on the frontiers of Portugal, north of the Tagus, -resting on the city of Almeida and facing Ciudad Rodrigo. The latter, -with Badajoz, on the Guadiana, constituted the two supports to the -strong barrier by which the emperor proposed to check any offensive -movements of the enemy upon Spain. - -The year had been passed by the British general in patient contention -with the innumerable difficulties, political and military, of his -situation. Masséna had indeed been forced to withdraw from Portugal -in April, but since that time Wellington had been balked, in every -attempt, by superior numbers and by the strength of the positions -opposed to him. His reward was now near at hand. On the 8th of January, -1812, he suddenly appeared before Ciudad Rodrigo, favored in his -movements by the pre-occupation of Marmont, who was engaged in the -reorganization and arrangements necessitated by the withdrawal of so -many troops for the Russian war, and also deceived by the apparent -inactivity in the British lines. The siege was pushed with a vigor that -disregarded the ordinary rules of war, and the place was successfully -stormed on the 19th of January. As rapidly as the nature of the -country, the season, and other difficulties would permit, Wellington -moved to the south, intending to attack Badajoz. On the 16th of March -the place was invested, and though most ably defended by a governor of -unusual ability, it was snatched out of the hands of Marshal Soult by -the same audacity and disregard of ordinary methods that had bereft -Marmont of the sister fortress. Badajoz was stormed on the night of the -6th of April; and the Spanish frontier then lay open to the British, -to be crossed as soon as their numbers, or the mistakes of the enemy, -should justify the attempt. - -Thus opened the fatal year 1812. The clouds breaking away, though -scarce yet perceptibly, for Great Britain, were gathering in -threatening masses on the horizon of Napoleon. A painful picture is -drawn by his eulogist, M. Thiers, of the internal state of the empire -at this time. An excessively dry season had caused very short crops -throughout Europe, and want had produced bread riots in England, as -well as in France and elsewhere. But such demonstrations of popular -fury were far more dangerous and significant, in a country where all -expression of opinion had been so rigorously controlled as in the -empire, and in a capital which concentrates and leads, as only Paris -does, the feelings of a nation. The discontent was heightened and -deepened by the miseries of the conscription, which ate ever deeper -and deeper, wringing the heart of every family, and becoming more and -more extreme as each succeeding enterprise became vaster than those -before it, and as the excessive demands, by reducing the quality of -the individual victims, required ever growing numbers. Six hundred -thousand men had been poured into Spain, three hundred thousand of whom -had died there.[469] Besides the immense masses carried forward to the -confines of Poland, and those destined for the Peninsula, there was to -be a powerful reserve between the Elbe and the Rhine, another behind -the Rhine in France itself, and to these Napoleon now proposed to add -yet a third, of one hundred and twenty thousand so-called national -guards, taken from the conscription of the four last years and legally -not liable to the call. Throughout the great cities there was growing -irritation, rising frequently to mutiny, with loud popular outcries, -and again the number of refractory conscripts, of whom forty thousand -had been arrested the year before, rose to fifty thousand; again flying -columns pursued them through all the departments. Caught, shut up in -the islands off the coasts, whence they could not escape, and, when -drilled, marched under strong guard to the ends of Europe, they none -the less contrived often to desert; and everywhere the people, hating -the emperor, received them with open arms and passed them back, from -hand to hand, to their homes. Thus amid starvation, misery, weeping, -and violence, the time drew near for Napoleon to complete his great -military undertaking of conquering the sea by the land. - -In the North the situation had finally developed according to the -wishes of Great Britain. The secret understanding of 1811 had resulted -in January, 1812, in another commercial ukase, allowing many British -manufactures to be introduced into Russia. On the 5th of April a -secret treaty was concluded with Sweden, ceding Finland to Russia, -but assuring to the former power Norway, of which Denmark was to be -deprived. Relieved now on her northern flank, Russia soon after made -peace with Turkey under the mediation of Great Britain. Thus with both -hands freed she awaited the oncoming of Napoleon. - -On the 9th of May, 1812, the emperor left Paris to take command of his -forces in Poland; and on the 24th of June the imperial army, to the -number of four hundred thousand men, crossed the Niemen and entered -Russia. Two hundred thousand more followed close behind. The preceding -day, June 23, the British Orders in Council of 1807 and 1809 were -revoked, as to the United States of America. It was too late. War -had been declared by Congress, and the declaration approved by the -President, five days before, on the 18th of June, 1812. - - * * * * * - -In narrating the extraordinary, and indeed unparalleled, series of -events which reach their climax in the Berlin and Milan Decrees -and the Orders in Council, the aim has been to compress the story -within the closest limits consistent with clearness, and at the same -time to indicate the mutual connection of the links in the chain; -how one step led to another; and how throughout the whole, amid -apparent inconsistencies, there is an identity of characteristics, -not impossible to trace, from the outbreak of the Revolution to the -downfall of Napoleon. To do this it has been thought expedient to -suppress a mass of details, much of a very interesting character, -bearing upon the working of the two opposing systems. The influence of -the military element of Sea Power, the function of the British navy, -after Trafalgar, has also been passed over in silence. When that great -disaster wrecked Napoleon's naval hopes, and convinced him that not -for many years could he possibly gather the ships and train the seamen -necessary to meet his enemy in battle upon the ocean, he seized with -his usual sagacity the one only remaining means of ruining her, and -upon that concentrated his great energies. The history of Europe and -of the civilized world, after 1805, turned upon this determination -to destroy Great Britain through her commerce; and the decision was -forced upon the mighty emperor by the power of the British navy, and -the wise resolve of the government not to expose her land forces to -his blows, until peculiarly favorable circumstances should justify so -doing. The opportunity came with the Spanish uprising; and, by one of -those coincidences not uncommon in history, with the hour came the man. -The situation was indeed of the most favorable for Great Britain. The -theatre of war, surrounded on three sides by water, was for the French -a salient thrust far out into the enemy's domain on the sea, while its -interior features and the political character of the people, incapable -of cohesion and organized effort, made the struggle one eminently alien -to the emperor's genius; for it gave no opportunity for those brilliant -combinations and lightning-like blows in which he delighted. To the -British the Peninsula offered the advantage that the whole coast line -was a base of operations; while every friendly port was a bridge-head -by which to penetrate, or upon which, in case of reverse, to retire, -with a sure retreat in the sea beyond. - -The course pursued by each of the two governments, in this great -enterprise of commerce-destroying, may be looked at from the two points -of view, of policy and of rightfulness. - -In the matter of policy, both Napoleon's decrees and the Orders in -Council have been fiercely assailed and extensively argued. In so broad -and complicated a subject, a probable conclusion can only be reached -by disregarding the mass of details, of statistics, with which the -disputants have rather obscured than elucidated the subject, and by -seeking the underlying principle which guided, or should have guided, -either government. It is possible to form a very strong argument, for -or against either, by fastening upon the inevitable inconveniences -entailed upon each nation by the measures of its adversary and by its -own course. It is by impressions received from these incidents—or -accidents—the accompaniments rather than the essentials of the -two systems, that the debates of Parliament and the conclusions of -historians have been colored. - -As the combined tendency of the two policies, fully carried out, was -to destroy neutral trade in Europe, the preponderance of injury must -fall upon the nation which most needed the concurrence of the neutral -carrier. That nation unquestionably was France.[470] Even in peace, -as before stated, much more than half her trade was done in neutral -bottoms; the war left her wholly dependent upon them. Alike to export -and to import she must have free admission of neutral ships to her -ports. Prior to the Berlin decree the British made no pretence to -stop this; but they did, by reviving in 1804 the Rule of 1756, and -by Fox's decree of May, 1806, blockading the coast from Brest to the -Elbe, betray an apprehension of the result to themselves of the neutral -trade with France. This should have put the emperor upon his guard. The -very anxieties shown by a people of such mercantile aptitudes should -have been most seriously regarded, as betraying where their immediate -danger lay. The American market was a most important benefit to them, -but American merchant ships threatened to be a yet more important -injury. These having, under the circumstances of the war, a practical -monopoly of carrying West India produce which exceeded in quality and -quantity that of the British Islands, were underselling the latter on -the Continent. The ill effect of this was partially obviated by the -Rule of 1756; but there remained the fear that they would absorb, and -be absorbed by, the commerce of the Continent; that to it, and to it -alone, they would carry both articles of consumption and raw materials -for manufacture; and that from it, and from it alone, they would take -away manufactured articles with which Great Britain up to the present -time had supplied them,—and, through them, large tracts of Spanish -America. - -Up to 1804 the course of trade had been for American ships to load for -continental ports, receive there the greater part of the payment for -their cargoes in bills of exchange on the Continent, and with these -to go to British ports and pay for British manufactures, with which -they completed their lading. If, on the other hand, they went from -home direct to Great Britain, the cargoes they carried were in excess -of British consumption, and so far were profitable to Great Britain -chiefly as to a middleman, who re-exported them to the Continent. But, -when Pitt returned to power, this course of trade was being sensibly -modified. American ships were going more and more direct to the -Continent, there completing their cargoes and sailing direct for home. -Continental manufactures were supplanting British, though not in all -kinds, because the American carrier found it more profitable to take -them as his return freight; just as the produce of continental colonies -was, through the same medium, cutting under British coffees, sugars, -and other tropical products. British merchants were alarmed because, -not only their merchant shipping, but the trade it carried was being -taken away; and British statesmen saw, in the decay of their commerce, -the fall of the British navy which depended upon it. - -It was plainly the policy of Napoleon to further a change which of -itself was naturally growing, and which yet depended wholly upon the -neutral carrier. The latter was the key of the position; he was, while -war lasted, essentially the enemy of Great Britain, who needed him -little, and the friend of France, who needed him much. Truth would -have justified England in saying, as she felt, that every neutral was -more or less serving France. But in so doing the neutral was protected -by the conventions of international law and precedent, which the -British mind instinctively reveres, and for violating which it must -have an excuse. This the emperor, whose genius inclined essentially -to aggressive and violent action, promptly afforded. Overlooking the -evident tendency of events, unmindful of the experience of 1798, he -chose to regard the order of blockade of May, 1806, as a challenge, and -issued the Berlin decree, which he was powerless to carry out unless -the neutral ship came into a port under his control. He thus drove the -latter away, lost its services, and gave Great Britain the excuse she -was seeking for still further limiting its sphere of action, under the -plea of retaliation upon France and her associates. And a most real -retaliation it was. Opposition orators might harp on the definition -of the word, and carp at the method as striking neutrals and not the -enemy. Like Napoleon, they blinked at the fundamental fact that, while -Great Britain ruled the sea, the neutral was the ally of her enemy. - -The same simple principle vindicates the policy of the British -ministry. Folios of argument and oratory have been produced to show -the harm suffered by Great Britain in this battle over Commerce. -Undoubtedly she suffered,—perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to -say she nearly died; but when two combatants enter the lists, not for -a chivalric parade but for life and death, it is not the incidental -injuries, but the preponderance of harm done and the relative -endurance, which determine the issue. To the same test of principle -must be referred the mistakes in details charged against British -ministries. Military writers say that, when the right strategic line of -effort is chosen, mistakes of detail are comparatively harmless, and -even a lost battle is not fatal. When France decided, practically, to -suppress the concurrence of the neutral carrier, she made a strategic -blunder; and when Great Britain took advantage of the mistake, she -achieved a strategic success, which became a triumph. - -As regards the rightfulness of the action of the two parties, viewed -separately from their policy, opinions will probably always differ, -according to the authority attributed by individuals to the _dicta_ of -International Law. It may be admitted at once that neither Napoleon's -decrees nor the British orders can be justified at that bar, except -by the simple plea of self-preservation,—the first law of states even -more than of men; for no government is empowered to assent to that last -sacrifice, which the individual may make for the noblest motives. The -beneficent influence of the mass of conventions known as International -Law is indisputable, nor should its authority be lightly undermined; -but it cannot prevent the interests of belligerents and neutrals from -clashing, nor speak with perfect clearness in all cases where they do. -Of this the Rule of 1756 offered, in its day, a conspicuous instance. -The belligerent claimed that the neutral, by covering with his flag a -trade previously the monopoly of the enemy, not only inflicted a grave -injury by snatching from him a lawful prey, but was guilty likewise -of a breach of neutrality; the neutral contended that the enemy had -a right to change his commercial regulations, in war as well as in -peace. To the author, though an American, the belligerent argument -seems the stronger; nor was the laudable desire of the neutral for gain -a nobler motive than the solicitude, about their national resources, -of men who rightly believed themselves engaged in a struggle for -national existence. The measure meted to Austria and Prussia was an -ominous indication of the fate Great Britain might expect, if her -strength failed her. But, whatever the decision of our older and milder -civilization on the merits of the particular question, there can be -no doubt of the passionate earnestness of the two disputants in their -day, nor of the conviction of right held by either. In such a dilemma, -the last answer of International Law has to be that every state is the -final judge as to whether it should or should not make war; to its own -self alone is it responsible for the rightfulness of this action. If, -however, the condition of injury entailed by the neutral's course is -such as to justify war, it justifies all lesser means of control. The -question of the rightfulness of these disappears, and that of policy -alone remains. - -It is the business of the neutral, by his prepared condition, to make -impolitic that which he claims is also wrong. The neutral which fails -to do so, which leaves its ports defenceless and its navy stunted until -the emergency comes, will then find, as the United States found in the -early years of this century, an admirable opportunity to write State -Papers. - - - - -CHAPTER XIX. - -SUMMARY—THE FUNCTION OF SEA POWER AND THE POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN IN -THE REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS. - - -The outbreak of the French Revolutionary War found Great Britain -unprepared. For nearly ten years her course had been directed by the -second Pitt, who, though inheriting the lofty spirit and indomitable -constancy of his father, yet loved peace rather than war, and sought -the greatness and prosperity of his country through the development -of her commerce and manufactures and the skilful management of her -finances. He strove also consistently for the reduction of expenditure, -including that for the military, and even for the naval establishment. -As late as February 17, 1792, when the Revolution had already been -nearly three years in progress and France was on the eve of declaring -war against Prussia and Austria, he avowed his expectation of many -years of peace for the British empire; and the estimates provided -for only sixteen thousand seamen and marines. "Unquestionably," said -he, "there never was a time in the history of this country, when, -from the situation of Europe, we might more reasonably expect fifteen -years of peace than at the present moment." When the war with Germany -began, Great Britain proclaimed and steadily maintained an attitude of -neutrality; and the Minister asserted over and over again, to France -and to her enemies, the intention not to interfere with the internal -affairs of that country. This purpose continued unshaken through -the tremendous events of the succeeding summer and autumn; through -the assaults on the Tuileries on June 20 and August 10, through the -suspension of the king which immediately followed the latter date, -through the revolting massacres of September, finally through the -deposition of the King and the proclamation of the Republic. Doubtless -these events gave a series of shocks to public opinion in Great -Britain, alienating the friends and embittering the enemies of the -Revolution; doubtless whatever sympathy with the French advance towards -freedom the ministers felt was chilled and repelled by the excesses and -anarchy which marked its steps; but, whatever their personal feelings, -no indication appears, either in their public actions or in their -private correspondence as since revealed, of any intention to depart -from a strict, even though cold, neutrality, until near the end of the -year 1792. - -The leaders of the party in France, which at this time was exerting -the greatest influence upon the course of the Revolution, had long -favored war with foreign nations, as the surest means to destroy the -monarchy and unite public feeling in favor of the Republic and of the -Revolution. The course of events had justified their forecast. Prussia -and Austria had given provocation; and, although the latter at least -would not have proceeded to extremes, war had been proclaimed and the -fall of the monarchy had followed. There was, however, one nation with -which the revolutionists imagined themselves to be in sympathy, and -which they thought also as a whole sympathized with them. That nation -was the English; between England and France there was to be friendship, -and concurrence of effort to a common end. Herein the French leaders -fatally misconceived the character of English freedom, and the nature -of its successive advances to the conditions in which it then stood, -and through which Englishmen hoped for yet further enlargement. -Reverence for the past, and, in the main, for the existing order of -things; profound regard for law and for an orderly method of making -needful changes; a constant reference to the old rights and customs -of the English people; respect for vested rights, for agreements, for -treaties,—such were the checks which had modified and controlled the -actions of the English, even when most profoundly moved. The spirit -which dominated the French Revolution was that of destruction. The -standard, by which all things human were to be tried, was a declaration -of human rights put forth by its leaders, which contained indeed many -noble, true, and most essential principles; but, if aught existing did -not at once square with those principles, the forces of the Revolution -were to advance against it and sweep it from the face of the earth. -No respect for the past, no existent prescriptive rights, no treaties -that seemed contrary to natural rights, were to control the actions -of the revolutionists. They were to destroy, and to rebuild from the -foundation, according to their own interpretation of what justice -demanded. - -The courses and aims, therefore, of the two nations were wholly -divergent, and, as these were but the expression in either case of the -national temper, the hope of sympathy and concurrence was delusive; -but it was a natural delusion, fostered in the hearts of the sanguine -Frenchmen by the utterances of many warm-hearted friends of freedom in -the rival nation, and by the more violent words of a limited number of -revolutionary societies. The former of these were, however, quickly -alienated by the atrocities which began to stain the progress of the -Revolution; while the latter, being supposed by the French leaders to -represent the feeling of the British nation, as distinguished from its -Government, contributed to draw them further in that path of reckless -enmity to existing institutions which led to the war with Great -Britain. - -Still, so long as the exponents of French public feeling confined -themselves to violent and irregular action within their own borders, -and to declamations, which did not go beyond words, against the -governments and institutions of other nations, the British ministry -remained quiet, though watchful. There are extant private letters, -written in the early part of November, 1792, by the Prime Minister, and -by his relative, Lord Grenville, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which -indicate that they rejoiced in having maintained the neutrality of -Great Britain, and that they looked forward to its continuance, though -with anxiety. But on the 19th of that month the National Convention, -which then comprised within itself both the executive and legislative -functions of the French Government, adopted a declaration that it would -grant fraternity and succor to _all_ people who should wish to recover -their liberty;[471] and it charged administrative officers to give -republican generals the necessary orders to carry help to those people -and to defend their citizens who had been molested, or who might be -subject to molestation, on account of their devotion to the cause of -liberty. As if further to emphasize the scope of this decree, for such -in effect it was, it was ordered to be translated and printed in all -languages. - -By this official action the French Government had taken a great and -important step, radically modifying its relations to all other states. -The decree did not mention the governments with which France was then -at war, limiting to their people the application of its terms. On the -contrary, when a member of the Convention, a month later, proposed -to insert words which should restrict its operation to those peoples -"against whose tyrants France was, or should hereafter be, at war," -and gave, as his reason, to remove the uneasiness of Great Britain, -the motion found no support. The previous question was moved, and the -Convention passed on to other business.[472] - -The men who then wielded the power of France had thus gone beyond a -simple inveighing against other governments, and the mere use of words -calculated to excite discontent among the people of other states, and -had announced an intention to interfere forcibly in their internal -affairs whenever called upon to do so by citizens who, in the opinion -of the French Government, were deprived of their just liberty or -molested in their efforts to recover it. The anarchist of our own -day, who contents himself with verbally attacking existing laws and -institutions, however vehemently, may remain untouched so long as he -confines himself to the expression and advocacy of his opinions; but -when he incites others to action in order to carry out his ideas, he -is held responsible for the effect of his words; and when he takes -measures leading to violence, he is open to arrest and punishment. Such -as this, among governments, was the step taken by France in November, -1792. She not only incited the citizens of other states to rebellion, -but announced her intention of supporting them, and gave to her -generals the necessary orders for carrying that purpose into effect. - -Meanwhile the Austrian Netherlands was rapidly overrun and annexed -to the French Republic, which thus abandoned the lofty posture of -disinterestedness, and the disclaimers of all desire for conquest -which the leaders of the Revolution had made from the tribune of the -Convention. Soon after followed a decree declaring the navigation of -the Scheldt, the great artery of Belgium, open to the sea. This set -aside, without negotiation, the compacts of the previous owners of the -Netherlands, by which the navigation of the river from the sea was -reserved to Holland, within whose territory the mouth lay,—an agreement -consecrated by renewed treaties, and which, by long standing, had -become part of the public law of Europe. The act strikingly showed -the determination of the French leaders to disregard treaties which -conflicted with their construction of the natural rights of man; for -they were at peace with Holland, yet made no attempt to obtain their -end by negotiation. - -The interests and the peace of Great Britain were now seriously -threatened. For over a century her statesmen had held, and held -rightly, that the possession of Belgium by France was incompatible -with her security. They had supported the legal, though iniquitous, -claim of the Dutch to the exclusive navigation of the Scheldt; and, -above all, the country was bound by a treaty of alliance to defend -Holland, whose rights as defined by treaty had been rudely set aside by -France. Moreover, on the 28th of November deputations from the British -revolutionary societies were received at the bar of the Convention, and -the President of the latter, in reply to their address, made a speech -strongly hostile to the British Government, affecting to distinguish -between it and the people over whom it ruled; a pretence which was -equally maintained in the United States of America, where the French -minister the following year dared to appeal openly to the people -against the policy of their government. - -On the 1st of December the British Government issued a proclamation, -calling out the militia on account of seditions and insurrectionary -movements dangerous to the state, and at the same time, as required -by law, summoned Parliament to meet on the 15th. The hopes and the -patience of Pitt were alike exhausted; and although he still continued -to listen to any overtures that contained a promise of peace, he had -determined to exact guarantees, amounting to more than words, which -should assure the safety of Great Britain and her ally, Holland. -Meantime the British forces should be organized and got ready to act. -The French Government had proclaimed its intention of interfering in -the affairs and overthrowing the institutions of all states, when, -in its judgment, their citizens were molested in their efforts for -freedom. To await supinely the moment when it should please France to -act would be the decision of folly; nor was it possible, for one imbued -with English traditions, to view without distrust a government which -appeared to look for justice by disregarding law, and avowedly disowned -existing compacts and treaties in favor of a speculative somewhat -called the Rights of Man, concerning which, its own passions being the -judge, revelations as numerous might be expected as were vouchsafed to -Mahomet. - -There are some who can only account for the different lines of -action followed by Pitt, before and after 1792, in both cases with -the indomitable tenacity of his race and lineage, by conceiving -two entirely different personalities in the same man,—a sudden and -portentous change, unprecedented save by miracle as in the case of -St. Paul. More truly may be seen in him the same man acting under -circumstances wholly different, and in the later instance unforeseen. -It was not given to Pitt to read the future of the French Revolution -with the prophetic eye of Burke. He had the genius, not of the seer, -but of the man of affairs; but that he had the latter in an eminent -degree is evident from the very rapidity of the change, when he was -at last forced to the conviction that external conditions were wholly -changed. He was at heart the minister of peace, the financier, the -promoter of commerce and of gradual and healthy reforms; but in a great -speech, delivered before he had begun to fear that peace would end in -his time, he impressed upon his hearers his own profound conviction -that all the blessings which England then enjoyed rested upon the union -of liberty with law. Having enumerated the material circumstances to -which the existing prosperity of the nation was to be ascribed, he -continued:— - - "But these are connected with others more important. They are - obviously and necessarily connected with the duration of peace, - the continuance of which, on a secure and durable footing, - must ever be the first object of the foreign policy of this - country. They are connected _still more_ with its internal - tranquillity, and with the natural effects of a free but - well-regulated government.... This is the great and governing - cause, the operation of which has given scope to all the other - circumstances which I have enumerated. It is the union of liberty - with law, which, by raising a barrier equally firm against the - encroachments of power and the violence of popular commotion, - affords to property its just security, produces the exertion - of genius and labor, the extent and solidity of credit, the - circulation and increase of capital; which forms and upholds - the national character and sets in motion all the springs which - actuate the great mass of the community through all its various - descriptions.... On this point, therefore, let us principally - fix our attention; let us preserve this first and most essential - object, and every other is in our power."[473] - -It was perfectly consistent with this position that, when Pitt saw -a neighboring state in convulsions from the struggle of a turbulent -minority for liberty without law; when that state had not only -proclaimed its purpose, but taken steps to promote a similar condition -in other nations; when societies representing a small, but active and -radical, minority in England were openly fraternizing with France; -when the great leader of the English Opposition had, from his seat in -Parliament, praised the French soldiery for joining the mobs,—it was -perfectly consistent with his past that Pitt should oppose with all his -powers a course of action which not only endangered the internal peace -upon which the prosperity of England rested, but also carried into the -realm of international relations the same disorganizing principles, the -same disregard for law, covenant, and vested right that had reduced -France to her then pitiful condition. Not only Great Britain, but -the European world was threatened with subversion. That Pitt did not -bewail aloud the wreck of his hopes, the frustration of his career, -the diversion of his energies from the path that was dearest to him, -shows the strength, not the instability, of the man. That he laid aside -the reforms he had projected, and discouraged all movements towards -internal change, which, by dividing the wills of the people, might -weaken their power for external action, proves but that concentration -of purpose which, sacrificing present gratification to future good, -achieves great ends. Never does the trained seaman appear greater, -has well said the naval novelist Cooper, than when, confronted with -unexpected peril, he turns all his energies from the path in which they -were before directed, to meet the new danger. "Never," writes Lanfrey -of the critical period between Essling and Wagram, "had the maxim -of sacrificing the accessory to the principal, of which Napoleon's -military conceptions afford so many admirable examples, _and which is -true in every art_, been applied with more activity and fitness.... -The complications which he most feared were to him, for the moment, as -though they did not exist. No secondary event had power to draw him -off from the great task he had primarily assigned to himself."[474] -All instinctively recognize the courage as well as the wisdom of this -conduct in the dangers which the seaman and the soldier are called to -meet; why deny its application to the no less urgent, and at times -more momentous, issues presented to the statesman? If, as may fairly -be claimed, it is to the maritime power of Great Britain that Europe -owes the arrest of a subversive revolution, if to that maritime power -is due that a great, irresistible, and beneficent movement toward the -liberty and welfare of the masses survived a convulsion that threatened -its destruction, then to Pitt, as the master spirit who directed the -movements of the British nation, the gratitude of Europe is also due. - -When Parliament met on the 15th of December, the king's speech -mentioned the disturbances that had taken place in the country and the -threatening state of affairs in Europe, and recommended an increase in -the land and sea forces of the kingdom. This measure was alleged, among -other grievances by France, as indicating an unfriendly feeling toward -her on the part of the British Government; but it has been reasonably -urged that she had already manned a fleet superior to that which Great -Britain had in commission, besides keeping ready for instant service a -large number of other ships, which could have no possible enemy except -the British navy. Viewed simply as measures of precaution, of the -necessity for which every state is its own judge, it is difficult to -criticise severely either government; but the fact remains that France -had been the first to arm her fleet, and that Great Britain did not do -the same until substantial grounds of offence had been given. - -By a singular coincidence, on the same day that Parliament met, the -National Convention issued a second celebrated decree, yet more -decisive in its character than that of November 19, which it was -evidently meant to emphasize and supplement. The generals of the -Republic were now directed "in every country which the armies of the -French Republic shall occupy, to announce the abolition of all existing -authorities, of nobility, of serfage, of every feudal right and every -monopoly; to proclaim the sovereignty of the people and convoke the -inhabitants in assemblies to form a provisional government, to which -no officer of a former government, no noble, nor any member of the -former privileged corporations, shall be eligible." To this was -added the singular and most significant declaration that "the French -nation will treat as enemies any people which, refusing liberty and -equality, desires to preserve its prince and privileged castes, or to -make any accommodation with them." It was impossible to announce more -clearly that this was no mere war of opinions, but, on the contrary, -one of principles and methods fraught with serious and practical -consequences; nor could any despot have worded a more contemptuous -denial of the rights of a people concerning their form of government. -The revolutionary spirit, which underlay the frequent changes of men -in the French Government, showed how fixed was its purpose to alter -forcibly the institutions of other states, regardless of the habits -and affections of their citizens, by the systems imposed upon the -smaller neighboring nations, hammered all upon the anvil of French -centralization, in defiance of the wishes and the struggles of the -people concerned. Europe thus found itself face to face with a movement -as enthusiastic in its temper and as radical in its demands as the -invasions of the Mahometans. - -To this fanatical, yet lofty, and in the masses of the French people -generous and devoted spirit, continental Europe had no equal force -to oppose. It is a common remark that the eighteenth century saw the -appearance of several ruling princes who were possessed with the -liberal views of the rising school of philosophers, and who sincerely -desired to effect the improvement and elevation of their people,—to -remove grievances, to lighten burdens, to advance the general welfare. -The wisdom or strength of these men had not been equal to the task -they had assumed. There still remained unjustifiable inequalities of -conditions, grievous abuses, a depression of the lower orders, and -a stagnation among the upper, which seemed to place insurmountable -obstacles in the way of advance, and made it impossible for the -masses to feel a living, national interest in governments which -contributed so little to their happiness. This good-will among the -sovereigns of the day was indeed a most encouraging symptom. It made -it possible to effect the needed changes and to advance without a -violent break with the past,—to have reform and progress without -revolution; but to achieve these ends was beyond the power of the ruler -alone: there was needed the voice and co-operation of all classes in -the state. This Louis XVI. had sought to obtain; but unfortunately, -not only for France but for Europe, the most numerous and important -of the orders of the States-General had met the difficulties of the -situation, the outcome of centuries, not with firmness, but with -impatience. From the beginning was shown the determination to break -with the past,—to proceed at a bound to the desired goal. No regard -was had to the fitness of the people for such sudden change, to the -immense conservative force of established custom, nor to the value of -continuity in the life of a nation. Nor was this all. Law, as well -as custom, was lightly set at nought. The first Assembly threw off -the fetters imposed by its instructions, and assumed powers which -had not been confided to it. By means of these usurped faculties the -Constituent Assembly radically changed the constitution of France. - -The instantaneous effect upon the French people and upon the internal -condition of the state is well known. As the far-reaching character -of the movement, and its lack of efficient elements for self-control, -became evident, the anxieties of conservative men in other nations, -however desirous of steady progress in human liberty, could not fail to -be aroused. It was notorious, long before 1792, that ill-balanced as -was the new constitutional frame of government in France, and radical -as was the temper of the leading members of the Legislative Assembly, -the deliberations of the latter were overawed by the clubs and the -populace of Paris, and that government had practically passed into -the hands of the mob which was worked by the clubs and the radical -municipality of the city. The grotesque yet terrible scenes of June 20 -and August 10, the hideous massacres of September, not merely showed -the frantic excesses of which a French mob is capable, but also and -more solemnly evinced how completely governmental control was swallowed -up in anarchy. Still, all these things were internal to France, and it -might be hoped would so remain until the French people had worked their -own solution of their troubles. The decrees of November 19 and December -15 blasted this hope, and formally announced that French beliefs and -methods were to be forcibly spread throughout Europe. How was the -assault to be met? - -Few statesmen of that day expected that this mighty and furious spirit -of misrule would so soon bend its neck to an uncontrolled and energetic -despotism. The coming of the one man, Napoleon, was dimly seen in the -distance by the thoughtful, who knew that anarchy clears the way for -absolute power; but the speedy appearance and tyrannous efficiency of -the Committee of Public Safety, with its handmaid the Revolutionary -Tribunal, were not foreseen. The statesmen of 1793 saw the strength, -but were more impressed by the superficial exhibition of disorder in -the popular outburst. They expected to repress it, to drive it back -within the limits of France, and impose the guarantees necessary for -the security of Europe, by meeting it with numerous, well-organized -armies of veteran troops, and by a solid, orderly financial system, -wielding plentiful resources. In short, they thought to cope with a -mighty spirit by means of elaborate and powerful machinery. The means -were insufficient. The living spirit developed the rude but efficient -organism which was needed to direct its energies and which was in -sympathy with its aims; the elaborate machinery of armies and finances -failed, because not quickened by the life of the nations by whose -rulers it was wielded. - -Fortunately for Europe and for freedom, another spirit, less -demonstrative but equally powerful, was already living and animating -another great nation, peculiarly fitted by position and by the -character of its power to grapple with and exhaust that which was -vicious and destructive in the temper of the French Revolution. As -already said, the great feature of English freedom was its respect for -law, for established authority, for existing rights; its conservative -while progressive character, in which it was directly opposed to the -subversive principles of the French. But the English temper, when once -aroused, was marked also by a tenacity of purpose, a constancy of -endurance, which strongly supported the conservative tendencies of the -race and were equally foreign to the French character. Once embarked in -the strife, and definitely committed for the time to the preservation, -rather than to the progress, of society, under leaders who strongly -embodied the national traits, hatred of the enemy's principles became -more conspicuous, superficially, than the love of freedom, which yet -retained its hold deep in the hearts of both rulers and people. War -does not live on the benevolent emotions, though it may be excited -by them. The position and the maritime power of England were great -factors, great determining factors in the final issue of the French -Revolutionary wars; but these were but the machinery of the British -power. The great gain to the cause of stability in human history was -made when the spirit of order and law, embodied in the great nation -which it had created, rose against the spirit of lawlessness and -anarchy, which had now possessed a people who for long years and by -nature had been submissively subject to external authority. Two living -forces had met in a desperate struggle, which was not indeed for life -and death, for both would survive; but from which should result the -predominance of the one that was compatible with reasonable freedom, -and the subjection of the other, which knew no mean between anarchy -and servile submission. Less ebullient, but more steadfast and deeply -rooted, the former wore out the latter; it forced it back through the -stage of prostration under absolute power until it had returned to the -point whence it started, there to renew its journey under conditions -that made it no longer a danger to the whole world. - -Such being the profound nature of the strife, its course may be -regarded under two aspects, not necessarily opposed, but rather -complementary. First, and obviously, there is the policy of the leaders -on either side, the objects which they proposed to themselves, the -steps by which they sought to compass those objects, and the results of -their various movements. Secondly, there is the more obscure and wider -question as to the relative influence of the great elements of power -which entered as unconscious factors in the strife,—mighty forces, -wielded or directed by statesmen, and yet after all their masters. Of -these factors Sea Power was one, and among the most important. - -The circumstances of the times had placed this force wholly in the -hands of Great Britain. She wielded it as absolute mistress. Its -action, like that of all the other forces in the strife, depended -in part upon the direction given it by the British leaders for the -purposes of war. From this point of view, its structure appears to -be simple and rudimentary; the related movements of a few principal -parts are open to inspection and susceptible of criticism. But from -another point of view, in its course and influence, this wonderful and -mysterious Power is seen to be a complex organism, endued with a life -of its own, receiving and imparting countless impulses, moving in a -thousand currents which twine in and around one another in infinite -flexibility, not quite defying the investigation which they provoke, -but rendering it exceedingly laborious. This Power feels and is moved -by many interests; it has a great history in the past, it is making a -great and yet more wonderful history in the present. Grown to the size -of a colossus, which overshadows the earth without a second,—unless it -be the new rival rising in the Western hemisphere,—it is now assailed -with a fury and virulence never before displayed. Attacked in every -quarter and by every means, sought to be cut off alike from the -sources and from the issues of its enterprise, it adapts itself with -the readiness of instinct to every change. It yields here, it pushes -there; it gives ground in one quarter, it advances in another; it bears -heavy burdens, it receives heavy blows; but throughout all it lives -and it grows. It does not grow because of the war, but it does grow in -spite of the war. The war impedes and checks, but does not stop, its -progress. Drained of its seamen for the war-fleets, it modifies the -restrictions of generations, throws open its ports to neutral ships, -its decks to neutral seamen, and by means of those allies maintains -its fair proportions, until the enemy proclaims that the neutral who -carries but a bale of British goods, even to his own country, ceases -thereby to be a neutral and becomes the enemy of France; a proclamation -which but precipitated the ruin of French commerce, without markedly -injuring that of its rival. - -The maritime power and commercial prosperity of Great Britain sprang -essentially from the genius and aptitudes of her people, and were -exceptionally favored and developed by the peculiar situation of -the British Islands. To these natural advantages the policy of the -government added somewhat, as at times it also ignorantly imposed -obstacles; but the actions of statesmen only modified, for good or -ill, they did not create the impulses which originated and maintained -the maritime activity of the British people. The most celebrated -measure designed to foster that activity, Cromwell's Navigation Act, -had now been in operation for a century and a quarter; but, while its -superficial effects had secured the adherence of the British people and -the envy of foreign states, shrewder economists, even a century ago, -had come to regard it as an injury to the commercial prosperity of the -country. They justified it only as a means of forcing the development -of the merchant marine, the nursery of the naval force upon which the -safety of Great Britain must depend. Whatever the fluctuations of its -fortunes or the mistakes of governments in the past, the sea power of -Great Britain had at the opening of the French Revolution attained -proportions, and shown a tenacity of life, which carried the promise -of the vast expansion of our own day. Painfully harassed during the -American Revolution, and suffering from the combined attacks of France, -Spain, and Holland, seeing then large portions of its carrying trade -pass into the hands of neutrals, and bereft by the event of the war of -its most powerful colonies, it had not only survived these strains, but -by the immediate and sustained reaction of the peace had, in 1793, more -than regained its pre-eminence. Once more it stood ready, not only to -protect its own country, but to sustain, with its well-proved vitality, -the demands of the continental war; where the armies of her allies, -long untouched by the fires which breathed in France and England, were -but a part of the machinery through which the maritime power of the -latter energized. - -How far the ministers of the day understood, and how wisely they used, -the sea power of Great Britain, is a question that will demand a -separate consideration. That is the question of military policy,—of the -strategy of the war. We have first to consider the influence of the -maritime power in itself, and the functions discharged by Great Britain -simply in consequence of possessing this great and unique resource. -The existence, powers, and unconscious working of a faculty obviously -offer a subject for consideration distinct from the intelligent use of -the faculty; though a correct appreciation of the former conduces to an -accurate criticism of the latter. - -Because of the decay of the French navy during the early years of -the war, the Republic, after 1795, virtually abandoned all attempt -to contest control of the sea. A necessary consequence was the -disappearance of its merchant shipping, a result accelerated by the -capture of most of its colonies, and the ruin of its colonial system -by the outbreaks of the blacks. So great was this loss, due rather to -the natural operation of Great Britain's naval supremacy than to any -particular direction by the ministry, that the Executive Directory, in -a message to the Council of Five Hundred, January 13, 1799, could use -the expression, scarcely exaggerated, "It is unhappily too true that -there is not a single merchant vessel sailing under the French flag." -Two years later the Minister of the Interior reported to the Consular -Government that the commerce with Asia, Africa, and America was almost -naught, the importations direct from all those quarters of the globe -amounting to only 1,500,000 francs, while the exports to them were -but 300,000 francs. As the advancing tide of French conquest extended -the territory and alliances of the Republic, the commerce of its new -friends was involved in the same disaster that had befallen its own. -The shipping of Spain and Holland thus also disappeared from the sea, -and a large part of their colonies likewise passed into the hands of -Great Britain, to swell the commerce and to employ the shipping of the -latter. The navy of neither of these Powers exerted any effect upon the -control of the sea, except so far as they occupied the attention of -detachments of the British navy, so marked had the numerical and moral -superiority of the latter become. - -The disappearance of so large a body of merchant shipping as that of -France, Holland, and Spain, could not, of course, imply the total -loss to commerce and to the world of the traffic previously done by -it. Much less could these three countries wholly dispense with the -supplies for which, during peace, they had chiefly depended upon the -sea. On the contrary, the necessity for importing many articles by sea -was increased by the general continental war, which not only created -a long hostile frontier, prohibitory of intercourse on the land side, -but also, by drawing great numbers of workers from their ordinary -occupations to the armies of all parties, caused a material diminution -in the products of Europe at large. In France, shut in both by land -and sea, with a million of men under arms, and confronted with the -stern determination of England to reduce her by starvation, the danger -and the suffering were particularly great; and had there not been a -singularly abundant and early harvest in 1794, the aim of her enemy -might then have been in great measure reached. - -Such a condition of things offered of course a great opening to neutral -maritime states. They hastened to embrace it,—among others the United -States, whose carrying trade grew very rapidly at this time; but the -naval power of Great Britain during this period was so overwhelming, -and her purpose so strong, that she succeeded in imposing severe -restraints upon neutrals as well as enemies, in matters which she -considered of prime importance. Sweden and Denmark strenuously resisted -her claim to prevent the importation into France of provisions and -naval stores; but failing, through the hostile attitude of the Czarina -towards France, to receive the powerful support of Russia, as in -1780 they had done, they were forced to succumb to the Power of the -Sea. The United States likewise were constrained by their impotence -to yield, under protest, before the same overwhelming Power. While -reserving the principle, they in practice conceded naval stores to be -contraband, and on the subject of provisions accepted a compromise -which protected their own citizens without materially injuring -France. No serious attempt was made to change the existing rule of -international law, by which enemies' property on board neutral ships -was good prize. As seizure involved sending the ship into a port of -the captor, and a possible detention there during the adjudication -of suspected goods, the inconvenience of the process was a powerful -deterrent. The English courts also held that the produce of hostile -colonies was lawful prize if found in neutral bottoms; because, the -trade of those colonies being by the mother countries interdicted to -foreigners in peace, the concession of it in war was merely a ruse to -defraud the other belligerent of his just rights of capture,—a plea -uselessly contested by American writers. All these causes operated -to the injury of both hostile and neutral commerce, and to the same -extent, in appearance at least, to the benefit of the British; and they -are cited simply as illustrative of the natural working of so great a -force as the Sea Power of Great Britain then was. The results were due, -not to the skill with which the force was used or distributed, but to -sheer preponderance of existing brute strength. - -By the destruction of the enemies' own shipping and by denying neutrals -the right to carry to them many articles of the first importance, -Great Britain placed the hostile countries in a state of comparative -isolation, and created within their borders a demand for the prohibited -merchandise which raised its price and made the supplying of it -extremely profitable. When commercial intercourse is thus refused its -usual direct roads, it seeks a new path, by the nearest circuitous -course, with all the persistency of a natural force. The supply will -work its way to the demand, though in diminished volume, through all -the obstacles interposed by man. Even the contracted lines about a -beleaguered city will thus be pierced by the ingenuity of the trader -seeking gain; but when the blockade is extended over a long frontier, -total exclusion becomes hopeless. In such cases the tendency of -commerce is to seek a centre near the line which it intends to cross, -and there to accumulate the goods which are to pass the hostile -frontier and reach the belligerent. That centre will usually be in a -neutral seaport, to which trade is free, and a clearance for which will -afford no pretext for seizure or detention by the opposite belligerent. -Thus, in the American Revolution, the neutral Dutch island of St. -Eustatius became the rendezvous and depot of traders who purposed to -introduce their goods, even contraband of war, into the West India -islands of either party to that contest; and it was asserted that upon -its capture by the British, in 1781, when war began with Holland, large -amounts of property belonging to English merchants, but intended for -French customers, were found there. So, in the American Civil War, from -1861 to 1865, the town of Nassau in the British Bahamas became a centre -at which were accumulated stores of all kinds intended to break through -the blockade of the Southern coast. - -So again, in the wars of the French Revolution, as long as Holland -remained in alliance with Great Britain, that country was the centre -from which foreign goods poured into France and the continent of -Europe; but when the United Provinces had been overrun by French -troops, and a revolution in their government had attached them to -the French policy, commerce, driven from their now blockaded coast, -sought another depot farther to the eastward, and found it in Bremen, -Hamburg, and some other German ports,—of which, however, Hamburg was -by far the most favored and prosperous. Through Hamburg the coffee -and sugar of the West Indies, the manufactured goods of Great Britain, -the food products of America, the luxuries of the East, poured into -Germany; and also into France, despite the prohibitive measures of -French governments. An indication of this change in the course of -commerce is found in the fact that the imports from Great Britain alone -into Germany, which amounted to £2,000,000 in 1792, had in 1796, the -year after Holland became allied to France, increased to £8,000,000, -although the purchasing power of Germany had meanwhile diminished. -In the same time the tonnage annually clearing from Great Britain to -Germany increased from 120,000 to 266,000. Similar results, on a much -smaller scale, were seen at Gibraltar when Spain attempted to prevent -British goods entering her own ports; and again at Malta, when the -possession of that island offered British commerce a foothold far -advanced in the Central Mediterranean. Somewhat similar, likewise, were -the advantages of the islands of Ceylon and Trinidad with reference -to the mainlands of India and South America, which gave to them a -particular commercial as well as strategic value, and led England to -accept them as her compensations at the Peace of Amiens. - -In such cases the temporary commercial centre not only reaps the -profits of the broker, but all classes of its community benefit by -the increase of employments, of floating capital, and of floating -population. Precisely analogous to these was the office which her -geographical position and unrivalled control of the sea enabled Great -Britain to discharge toward the European world during the French -Revolution. Her maritime power and commercial spirit, the gradual -though rapid growth of past generations, enabled her at once to become -the warehouse where accumulated the products of all nations and of all -seas then open to commerce, and whence they were transshipped to the -tempest-tossed and war-torn Continent. So also her watery bulwarks, -traversed in every direction by her powerful navy, secured her peaceful -working as the great manufactory of Europe, and thus fostered an -immense development of her industries, which had become more than ever -necessary to the welfare of the world, since those of Holland and -France were either crippled for want of raw material or isolated by -their impotence at sea. Great Britain impeded the direct admission of -tropical products to the Continent; but their re-exportation from her -own ports and the export of British manufactures became the two chief -sources of her singular prosperity. The favorable reaction produced -by this concentration within her borders of so much of the commercial -machinery of the civilized world, is evident. Activities of every -kind sprang up on all sides, increasing the employment of labor and -the circulation of capital; and, while it is vain to contend that war -increases the prosperity of nations, it must be conceded that such a -state of things as we have depicted affords much compensation to the -nation concerned, and may even increase its proportionate prosperity, -when compared with that of its less fortunate enemies. To quote the -words of Lanfrey: "The English nation had never at any time shown more -reliance upon its own resources than when Pitt, in 1801, retired after -eight years of war. The people bore without difficulty the heavy taxes -which the war imposed upon them, and what was more astonishing still, -Pitt had found no opposition in Parliament to his last Budget. The -immense increase in the industrial prosperity of England triumphantly -refuted the predictions of her enemies, as well as the complaints of -alarmists. As the effect of every fresh declaration of war upon the -Continent had been to diminish competition in the great market of -the world and to throw into her hands the navies and colonies of her -adversaries, the English had begun to look upon the loan of millions -and the subsidies as so much premium paid for the development of their -own resources."[475] - -It is not, therefore, merely as a weapon of war in the hands of the -ministry that the sea power of Great Britain is to be regarded; nor -yet only as the fruitful mother of subsidies, upon whose bountiful -breasts hung the impoverished and struggling nations of the Continent. -Great as were its value and importance in these respects, it had yet -a nobler and more vital function. Upon it depended the vigorous life -of the great nation which supplied the only power of motive capable -of coping with the demoniac energy that then possessed the spirit of -the French. Great Britain, though herself unconscious of the future, -was in the case of a man called upon to undergo a prolonged period -of trial, exposure, and anxiety, severely testing all his powers, -physical and mental. However sound the constitution, it is essential -that, when thus assailed by adverse external influences, all its vital -processes should be protected, nourished, and even stimulated, or else -the bodily energies will flag, fail, and collapse. This protection, -this nourishment, the maritime power ministered to the body politic of -the state. Despite the undeniable sufferings of large classes among -the people, the ministry could boast from year to year the general -prosperity of the realm, the flourishing condition of commerce, the -progressive preponderance and control of the sea exerted by the navy, -and a series of naval victories of unprecedented brilliancy, which -stimulated to the highest degree the enthusiasm of the nation. Such a -combination of encouraging circumstances maintained in full tension the -springs of self-confidence and moral energy, in the absence of which no -merely material powers or resources are capable of effective action. - -By the natural and almost unaided working of its intrinsic faculties, -the sea power of Great Britain sustained the material forces of -the state and the spirit of the people. From these we turn to the -consideration of the more striking, though not more profound, effects -produced by the use made of this maritime power by the British -ministry—to the policy and naval strategy of the war—in curtailing the -resources and sapping the strength of the enemy, and in compelling -him to efforts at once inevitable, exhausting, and fruitless. In -undertaking this examination, it will be first necessary to ascertain -what were the objects the ministers proposed to achieve by the -struggle in which they had embarked the nation. If these are found to -agree, in the main, with the aim they should have kept before them, -through realizing the character of the general contest, and Great -Britain's proper part in it, the policy of the war will be justified. -It will then only remain to consider how well the general direction -given to the naval and military operations furthered the objects -proposed,—whether the strategy of the war was well adapted to bring its -policy to a successful issue. - -The sudden revulsion of feeling in the British ministry, consequent -upon the decrees of November 19 and December 15, has been mentioned. -It was then realized that not only the internal quiet of Great Britain -was endangered, but that the political stability of Europe was -threatened by a Power whose volcanic energy could not be ignored. There -was not merely the fear that extreme democratic principles would be -transmitted from the masses of one country to those of another still -unprepared to receive them. To say that the British Government went to -war merely to divert the interest of the lower orders from internal -to foreign relations is not a fair statement of the case. The danger -that threatened England and Europe was the violent intervention of the -French in the internal affairs of every country to which their armies -could penetrate. This purpose was avowed by the Convention, and how -sincerely was proved by the history of many an adjoining state within -the next few years. Although the worst excesses of the Revolution had -not yet occurred, enough had been done to indicate its tendencies, -and to show that, where it prevailed, security of life, property, and -social order disappeared. - -Security, therefore, was from the first alleged as the great object of -the war by the Prime Minister, who undoubtedly was the exponent of the -government, as truly as he was the foremost man then in England. In his -speech of February 12, 1793, upon the French declaration of war, he -returns again and again to this word, as the key-note to the British -policy. - - "Not only had his Majesty entered into no treaty, but no step - even had been taken, and no engagement formed on the part of our - Government, to interfere in the internal affairs of France, or - attempt to dictate to them any form of constitution. I declare - that the whole of the interference of Great Britain has been with - the general view of seeing if it was possible, either by our own - exertions or in concert with any other Power, to _repress this - French system of aggrandizement and aggression_, with the view of - seeing whether we could not re-establish the blessings of peace; - whether we could not, either separately or jointly with other - Powers, provide for the _security_ of our own country and _the - general security of Europe_." - -It is only fair to Pitt to compare the thought underlying this speech -of February 12, 1793, with that of February 17, 1792, already quoted, -in order that there may be realized the identity of principle and -conviction which moved him under circumstances so diverse. This -position he continually maintained from year to year; nor did he, when -taunted by the leader of the Opposition with lack of definiteness in -the objects of the war, suffer himself to be goaded into any other -statement of policy. It was in vain that the repeated jeer was uttered, -that the ministry did not know what they were driving at; and when the -constant recurrence of allied disasters and French successes on the -Continent, preceding as they did the most brilliant successes of the -British navy, made yet more poignant the exultation of the Opposition, -Pitt still refused, with all his father's proud tenacity, to give any -other account of his course than that he sought security—peace, yes, -but only a secure peace. To define precisely what success on the part -of Great Britain, or what reverses suffered by France, would constitute -the required security, was to prophesy the uncertain fortunes of war, -and the endurance of that strange madness which was impelling the -French nation. When a man finds his interests or his life threatened -by the persistent malice of a powerful enemy, he can make no reply to -the question, how long or how far he will carry his resistance, except -this: that when the enemy's power of injury is effectually curtailed, -or when his own power of resistance ends, then, and then only, will he -cease to fight. It fell to Pitt's lot, at one period of the war, to be -brought face to face with the latter alternative; but the course of the -French Government—of the Directory as well as of Napoleon—justified -fully the presentiment of the British Government in 1793, that not -until the aggressive power of France was brought within bounds, could -Europe know lasting peace. Peace could not be hoped from the temper of -the French rulers. - -Whatever shape, therefore, the military operations might assume, -the object of the war in the apprehension of the British minister -was strictly defensive; just as the French invasion of the Austrian -Netherlands, though an offensive military operation, was, in its -inception, part of a strictly defensive war. To the larger and more -general motive of her own security and that of Europe, there was also -added, for Great Britain, the special treaty obligation to assist -Holland in a defensive struggle,—an obligation which was brought into -play by the French declaration of war against the United Provinces. -It is necessary to note the two causes of war, because the relation -of Great Britain to the wider conflict was different from that which -she bore to the defence of Holland, and entailed a different line -of action. The treaty called upon her to contribute a certain quota -of land forces, and the character of her particular interest, in -both the Netherlands and Holland, made it expedient and proper that -British troops should enter the field for their protection; but after -the disastrous campaign of 1794 had subdued Holland to France, and -a revolution in its government had changed its relations to Great -Britain, the troops were withdrawn, and did not again appear on the -Continent until 1799, when favorable circumstances induced a second, -but futile attempt to rescue the Provinces from French domination. - -The part borne by the troops of England in the earlier continental -campaigns was therefore but an episode, depending upon her special -relations to Holland, and terminated by the subjection of that country -to France. What was the relation of Great Britain to the wider -struggle, in which, at the beginning, almost all the nations of the -Continent were engaged? What functions could she discharge towards -curtailing the power of France, and so restoring to Europe that -security without which peace is but a vain word? Upon the answers to -these questions should depend the criticism of the use made by the -British ministry of the nation's power. To condemn details without -having first considered what should be the leading outlines of a -great design, is as unsafe as it is unfair; for steps indefensible in -themselves may be justified by the exigencies of the general policy. -It is not to be expected that, in a war of such vast proportions and -involving such unprecedented conditions, serious mistakes of detail -should not be made; but, if the great measures adopted bear a due -proportion both to the powers possessed and to the end aimed at, then -the government will have fulfilled all that can be demanded of it. - -The sea power which constituted the chief strength of Great Britain -furnished her with two principal weapons: naval superiority, which -the course of the war soon developed into supremacy, and money. The -traditional policy of a strong party in the state, largely represented -in the governing classes, was bitterly adverse to a standing army; and -the force actually maintained was to a great extent neutralized by -the character of the empire, which, involving possessions scattered -over all quarters of the globe, necessitated dispersion instead of -concentrated action. The embarrassment thus caused was increased -by the dangerously discontented condition of Ireland, involving -the maintenance of a considerable permanent force there, with the -possibility of having to augment it. Furthermore, the thriving -condition of the manufactures and commerce of England, protected from -the storm of war ravaging the Continent and of such vital importance -to the general welfare of Europe, made it inexpedient to withdraw her -people from the ranks of labor, at a time when the working classes of -other nations were being drained for the armies. - -For these reasons great operations on land, or a conspicuous share in -the continental campaigns became, if not absolutely impossible to Great -Britain, at least clearly unadvisable. It was economically wiser, for -the purposes of the coalitions, that she should be controlling the -sea, supporting the commerce of the world, making money and managing -the finances, while other states, whose industries were exposed to -the blast of war and who had not the same commercial aptitudes, did -the fighting on land. This defines substantially the course followed -by the ministry of the day, for which the younger Pitt has been most -severely criticised. It is perhaps impossible to find any historian of -repute who will defend the general military conduct of the Cabinet at -whose head he stood; while the brilliant successes of the Seven Years' -War have offered a ready text for disparagers, from his contemporary, -Fox, to those of our own day, to draw a mortifying contrast between -his father and himself. Yet what were the military enterprises -and achievements of the justly famed Seven Years' War? They were -enterprises of exactly the same character as those undertaken in the -French Revolutionary War, and as those which, it may be added, are so -constant a feature of English history, whether during times of European -peace or of European war, that it may reasonably be suspected there is, -in the conditions of the British empire, some constant cause for their -recurrence. Like the petty wars which occur every few years in our -generation, they were mixed military and naval expeditions, based upon -the fleet and upon the control of the sea, scattered in all quarters -of the world, employing bodies of troops small when compared to the -size of continental armies, and therefore for the most part bearing, -individually, the character of secondary operations, however much they -may have conduced to a great common end. - -It is an ungracious task to institute comparisons; but, if just -conclusions are to be reached, the real facts of a case must be set -forth. The elder Pitt had not to contend with such a navy as confronted -his son at the outbreak of the French Revolution. The French navy, as -is avowed by its historians, had received great and judicious care -throughout the reign of Louis XVI.; it had a large and splendid body -of ships in 1793; it enjoyed the proud confidence of the nation, -consequent upon its actions in the war of 1778; and, although its -efficiency was fatally affected by the legislation of the National -Assembly and by the emigrations, it was still an imposing force. Not -until years of neglect had passed over it, and the fatal Battle of -the Nile had been fought, did its character and weight sink to the -same relative insignificance that the elder Pitt encountered in the -Seven Years' War. The elder, like the younger, shaped his system of -war upon the control of the sea, upon the acquisition of colonies, -upon subsidizing allies upon the Continent, and, as main outlines of -policy, these were undoubtedly correct; but the former had in his favor -heavy odds in the weak condition of the French navy, and in having -on his side the great military genius of the age. On the side of the -elder Pitt fought Frederick the Great, against a coalition, numerically -overwhelming indeed, but half-hearted, ill-knit, and led by generals -far inferior to their great opponent, often mere creatures of the most -corrupt Court favor. Against the younger Pitt arose a greater than -Frederick, at the very moment of triumph, when the combined effects -of the sea power of England, of the armies of Austria, and of the -incompetency of the Directory had brought the Revolution "to bay,"—to -use the words of a distinguished French naval officer and student.[476] -In 1796 and in 1799 Bonaparte, and Bonaparte alone, rescued from -impending destruction—not France, for France was not the object of -Pitt's efforts—but that "system of aggrandizement and aggression" to -which France was then committed. - -The elder Pitt saw his work completed, though by weaker hands; the -younger struggled on through disappointment after disappointment, and -died under the shadow of Austerlitz, worn out in heart and mind by the -dangers of his country. Contemporaries and men of later generations, -British and foreigners, have agreed in attributing to him the leading -part in the coalitions against Revolutionary France; but they have -failed to admit the specific difficulties under which he labored, and -how nearly he achieved success. It is easy to indulge in criticism -of details, and to set one undertaking against another; to show the -failures of expeditions landed on the French coast in the Seven Years' -War; to point out that Wolfe's conquest of Canada in 1759, by freeing -the American colonies from their fear of France, promoted their revolt -against Great Britain, while Nelson in 1798, and Abercromby in 1801, -saved Egypt, and probably India also, to England; to say that the -elder Pitt did not regain Minorca by arms, while the younger secured -both it and Malta. Martinique fell to the arms of both; the Cape of -Good Hope, Ceylon, Trinidad, prizes of the later war, may fairly be -set against Havana and Manila of the earlier. In India, Clive, the -first and greatest of British Indian heroes, served the elder Pitt; -yet before the arms of the younger fell Mysore, the realm of Hyder Ali -and Tippoo Saib, the most formidable enemies that Britain had yet met -in the Peninsula. Such comparisons and arguments are endless; partly -because there is much to be said on both sides, but chiefly because -they concern details only, and do not touch the root of the matter. - -The objects of the two Pitts were different, for the circumstances of -their generations were essentially diverse. The task of the one was -to extend and establish the great colonial system, whose foundations -had been laid by previous generations, and to sustain in Europe the -balance of power between rival, but orderly, governments; that of the -other was to steady the social order and political framework of Great -Britain herself, and of Europe, against a hurricane which threatened to -tear up both by the roots. Each in his day, to strengthen his country -and to weaken the enemy, pursued the same great line of policy, which -in the one age and in the other fitted the situation of Great Britain. -To extend and consolidate her sea power; to lay the world under -contribution to her commerce; to control the sea by an all-powerful -navy; to extend her colonial empire by conquest, thereby increasing her -resources, multiplying her naval bases, and depriving her enemy alike -of revenues and of points whence he could trouble English shipping; -to embarrass the great enemy, France, by subsidizing continental -allies,—such was the policy of both the Pitts; such, alike in the -Revolution and in the Seven Years' War, was the policy imposed by a due -recognition, not only of the special strength of Great Britain, but of -her position in relation to the general struggle. Frederick in the one -case, Austria in the other, needed the money, which only the sustained -commercial prosperity of England could supply. The difference in the -actual careers run by the two statesmen is that the son had to meet -far greater obstacles than the father, and that, so far as the part of -Great Britain herself was concerned, he achieved equal, if not greater, -successes. The father had to contend, not against the mighty fury of -the French Revolution, but against the courtier generals and the merely -professional soldiery of Louis XV. and his mistresses; he had an allied -America; he met no mutiny of the British fleet; he was threatened by -no coalition of the Baltic Powers; he encountered no Bonaparte. It was -the boast of British merchants that under his rule "Commerce was united -to and made to grow by war;" but British commerce increased during the -French Revolution even more than it did in the earlier war, and the -growth of the British navy, in material strength and in military glory, -under the son, exceeded that under the father. - -In history the personality of the elder statesman is far more imposing -than that of the younger. The salient characteristic of the one was -an imperious and fiery impetuosity; that of the other, reserve. The -one succeeded in power a minister inefficient as an administrator, -weak in nerve, and grotesque in personal appearance; the striking -contrast presented by the first William Pitt to the Duke of Newcastle, -his aggressive temper, the firm self-reliance of his character, his -dazzling personality, around which a dramatic halo clung even in the -hour of his death, made a vivid impression upon the imagination of -contemporaries, and have descended as a tradition to our own days. -Save to a few intimate friends, the second Pitt was known to his -fellow-countrymen only on the benches of the House of Commons. A temper -as indomitable as his father's bore in silence the vastly greater and -more prolonged strain of a most chequered struggle; only a few knew -that the strain was endured with a cheerfulness, a calmness, and a -presence of mind, which of themselves betoken a born leader of men. In -the darkest hour, when the last ally, Austria, had forsaken England -and consented to treat with France, when the seamen of the fleet -had mutinied, and British ships of war, taken violently from their -officers, were blockading the approaches to London, Pitt was awakened -during the night by a member of the Cabinet with some disastrous news. -He listened quietly, gave his directions calmly and clearly, and -dismissed the messenger. The latter, after leaving the house, thought -it necessary to return for some further instruction, and found the -minister again sleeping quietly. The incident is a drama in itself. - -In considering the use made of Great Britain's powers for war by -the administration of the second Pitt, the broad outlines should be -regarded, not as a simply military question,—such as the combinations -of a general officer in a campaign,—but as efforts of statesmanship, -directing arms in an attempt to compass by force the requirements -considered to be most decisive in a political situation. The office -of the statesman is to determine, and to indicate to the military -authorities, the national interests most vital to be defended, as -well as the objects of conquest or destruction most injurious to the -enemy, in view of the political exigencies which the military power -only subserves. The methods by which the military force will proceed -to the ends thus indicated to it—the numbers, character, equipment -of the forces to be employed, and their management in campaign—are -technical matters, to be referred to the military or naval expert by -the statesman. If the latter undertakes to dictate in these, he goes -beyond his last and commonly incurs misfortune. - -It is not likely that such a division of labor, between the statesman, -the soldier, and the seaman, is ever formally made. It is enough if it -be practically recognized by the due influence of the military element -in deciding details, and by its cheerful obedience in carrying out the -views of the government whose servant it is. In criticising results it -is fair to assume, where not otherwise proved, that for the general -direction of the war the government is responsible, and that in the -particular management of military movements the advice of professional -men has had just weight. A somewhat striking illustration of this is -to be found in the change of naval strategy, within the limits of the -Channel fleet, when, without any change in the government, the positive -convictions and stringent methods of Lord St. Vincent set aside, in -1800, the traditions of Lord Howe and Lord Bridport. - -What then was the general direction imparted to military movements -by a government which had announced its object in the war to be -the attainment of security, by "repressing the French system of -aggrandizement and aggression"? - -Owing to the distracted condition of France, many confusing -cross-lights were at first cast upon that central theatre of European -disturbance, by movements whose force it was impossible rightly to -estimate. Such were the risings in La Vendée and Brittany, the revolt -at Lyon, the delivery of Toulon to the allied fleets. Experience -justifies the opinion that such insurgent movements, involving but a -part of a nation, are best left to themselves, supported only by money -and supplies. If, thus aided, they have not the vitality to make good -their cause, the presence of foreign troops, viewed ever with jealousy -by the natives, will not insure success. It is, however, the French -Revolution itself that furnishes the surest illustrations of this -truth, shedding upon it a light which Pitt did not have to guide him. -Such embarrassments of the French Government were naturally thought to -give opportunity for powerful diversions; the more so as the amount of -disaffection was much exaggerated, and the practice of partial descents -upon the French coasts had come down unquestioned from previous wars. - -To this mistake, as natural as any ever made in war, and to the -treaty obligation to support Holland, is to be attributed much of -the misdirection given to the British army in the first two years -of the war. When the illusion was over, and Holland conquered, the -military effort of Great Britain was at once concentrated on its proper -objects of ruling the sea and securing positions that contributed to -naval control and commercial development. Even in 1793 a respectable -force had been sent to the West Indies, which in 1794 reduced all the -Windward Islands. Stretching its efforts too far, reverses followed; -but in 1795 a powerful fleet was sent with sixteen thousand troops -commanded by Sir Ralph Abercromby, the best general officer revealed by -the early part of the war. From the first, Pitt had seen the necessity -of controlling the West Indies. That necessity was twofold: first, by -far the greatest fraction of British trade, over one fourth of the -whole, depended upon them; and, second, the enemy's islands were not -only valuable as producing, they were above all the homes of cruisers -that endangered all commerce, neutral as well as British. To control -the whole Caribbean region was, among those objects that lay within the -scope of the British Government, the one most essential to the success -of the general war. To sneer at the attempt as showing merely a wish -for sugar islands is to ignore the importance of the West Indies to the -financial stability of Great Britain; upon whose solvency depended, -not only the maritime war, but the coalitions whose aid was needed to -repress "the system of French aggression." - -Abercromby restored England's control over the lesser Antilles, except -Guadeloupe, and added to her possessions Trinidad and the Dutch -colonies on the mainland. Although unable to retain Haïti, whose -ports were for some time occupied, the British navy ensured its loss -to France and the final success of the negro revolt; and commercial -relations were established with the new government. During the same -period the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, and other Dutch and French -possessions in India were reduced by similar expeditions. These not -only extended the sphere of British commerce; they contributed yet -more to its enlargement by the security resulting from the conversion -of hostile to friendly ports, and the consequent diminution of enemy's -cruisers. - -It is a singular fact that neither the extraordinary commercial -prosperity secured by these successes, nor the immense development of -the navy during Pitt's administration, is mentioned in the celebrated -denunciation of his "drivelling" war policy by Macaulay. Of naval -administration the latter speaks, in order to assign the credit to -another; on commercial and naval expansion he is silent. Yet no -factors in the war were so important. The one sustained Great Britain, -on whose shoulders was upborne the whole resistance of Europe; the -other crushed France by a process of constriction which, but for -Bonaparte, would have reduced her at an early period, and to free her -from which Napoleon himself was driven to measures that ruined him. -These important results were obtained by lengthening the cords and -strengthening the stakes of British commerce, by colonial expansion -and safe-guarding the seas, and by the growth of the navy,—none of -which objects could have been accomplished without the hearty support -of the Prime Minister. From the co-operation of these causes, and the -restrictions placed on neutral trade, the commerce of Great Britain -increased by 65[477] per cent between 1792 and 1800, while the loss by -capture was less than 2½ per cent on the annual volume of trade. - -The directly offensive use of Great Britain's maritime power made by -the ministry, in order to repress the French system of aggression, -consisted in throwing back France upon herself, while at the same time -cutting off her resources. The continental armies which begirt her on -the land side were supported by subsidies; and also when practicable, -as in the Mediterranean, by the co-operation of the British fleets, to -whose influence upon his Italian campaign in 1796 Bonaparte continually -alludes. To seaward the colonial system of France was ruined, raw -material cut off from her manufactures, her merchant shipping swept -from the sea. In 1797 the chief of the Bureau of Commerce in France -wrote: "The former sources of our prosperity are either lost or -dried up. Our agricultural, manufacturing, and industrial power is -almost extinct."[478] At the same time, while not denying the right -of neutrals to trade with ports not blockaded, every restriction -that could be placed upon such trade by stringent, and even forced, -interpretations of international law was rigorously imposed by a navy -whose power was irresistible. Even provisions (and it will be well for -Great Britain of the present day to recall the fact) were claimed to be -contraband of war, on the ground that, in the then condition of France, -when there was a reasonable hope of starving her into peace, to supply -them contributed to prolong hostilities. - -So severe was the suffering and poverty caused by this isolation, that -in the moment of his greatest triumph, immediately after signing the -peace of Campo Formio, which left Great Britain without an ally, in -October, 1797, Bonaparte wrote: "Either our government must destroy -the English monarchy, or must expect to be itself destroyed by the -corruption and intrigue of those active islanders. Let us concentrate -all our activity upon the navy and destroy England." The Directory, -conscious that its navy was paralyzed and that its _guerre de course_, -pursued since 1795 against British commerce, had not seriously affected -the latter, although 1797 was the year of its lowest depression, could -see no further means of injuring England except by attacking the -neutral carriers of her wares. Affecting to regard them as accomplices -in Great Britain's crimes against humanity, it procured from the -Convention, in January, 1798, a decree that "every vessel found at -sea, having on board English merchandise as her cargo, in whole or in -part, shall be declared lawful prize, whosoever shall be the proprietor -of the merchandise, which shall be reputed contraband for this cause -alone, that it comes from England or her possessions." At the same time -orders were issued to confiscate property of British origin wherever -found on shore, and domiciliary visits were authorized to insure its -discovery. Napoleon was therefore perfectly justified in declaring in -later years that the Directory outlined the policy of his Continental -System, embodied in his Berlin and Milan decrees of 1806 and 1807. - -To the Directory the attempt thus to destroy British prosperity worked -disaster. To Napoleon it brought ruin, owing to the greater vigor, -wider scope, and longer duration which he was able to impart to the -process. The aim of his Berlin and Milan decrees, like that of the -Directory, was to undermine British trade by depriving it of the -necessary concurrence of neutral carriers. As this alone would not be -enough, he determined to support the decrees by excluding Great Britain -from her principal market, to close the entire Continent to all goods -coming from her or her colonies, or even passing through her ports. For -this purpose—to carry out this gigantic project—edict after edict was -issued to France and her allied countries; for this purpose annexation -after annexation to the empire was made; for this purpose a double -cordon of French troops lined the shores of the Continent from France -to the Baltic; for this purpose British goods were not only seized but -publicly burned throughout his dominions; for this purpose demands -were made upon all neutral states to exclude British manufactures and -colonial produce; for this purpose the calamitous Spanish war was -incurred;[479] and finally, for this purpose reiterated and imperious -complaints were addressed to the czar on his failure to enforce the -exclusion, and, upon his persistence, the fatal invasion of Russia -followed. - -The justice or wisdom of this course is not here in question. It -is enough to say that it nearly ruined Great Britain, but entirely -ruined Napoleon. The noticeable point, bearing upon the wisdom of -Pitt's military policy, is that Napoleon was forced into it by that -policy, because England was destroying him and he had no other means -of injuring her. Great Britain's success not only followed, but was -consequent upon steady adherence to the main features of Pitt's policy. -Military writers say that success on a battle-field is of slight -avail if the strategic line of operations is ill-chosen, and that -even a great defeat may be redeemed if the position has been taken in -accordance with the strategic conditions of the campaign. This amounts -to saying, in non-military language, that hard blows are useless if not -struck on the right spot. Numerous reverses attended the coalitions -against France, although few fell upon Great Britain herself; but none -was fatal because the general policy, begun by Pitt and continued by -his successors, was strategically sound with reference to the object in -view,—namely, "the repression of that system of aggression" which was -the very spirit of the French Revolution, formulated by the Convention, -adopted by the Directory, inherited and given its full logical -development by Napoleon. - -It is the fashion with the political heirs of Fox, Pitt's greatest -opponent, to draw a marked contrast between the war which preceded -and that which followed the Peace of Amiens. In the former it is -Great Britain which, in a frenzy of hatred or panic fear toward the -French Revolution, becomes the wanton aggressor, and turns a movement -that, despite some excesses, was on the whole beneficent, into the -stormy torrent of blood that poured over Europe. In the second war, -Napoleon is the great culprit, the incarnate spirit of aggression, -violence, faithlessness, and insolence; with whom peace was impossible. -It is, however, notorious, and conceded by French writers, that the -French leaders in 1791 and 1792 wanted war on the Continent;[480] the -impartial conduct of the British Cabinet was admitted by the French -Government when acknowledging the recall of the British ambassador -six months before war broke out;[481] the decrees of November 19 and -December 15 are before the reader, as is the refusal of the Convention -to give the former a construction conciliatory to Great Britain; the -treaty rights of Holland had been set aside by the high hand without an -attempt at negotiation, and there can be little doubt that the purpose -was already formed to invade her territory shortly. Despite all this, -not Great Britain, but the Republic, declared war. The treatment, -by the Convention and the Directory, of the lesser states that fell -under their power,[482] their dealings with Great Britain, their -aggressiveness, insolence, and bad faith were identical in spirit with -the worst that can be said of Napoleon; the sole difference being that -for a weak, incompetent, and many-headed government was substituted -the iron rule of a single man of incomparable genius. Scruples were -known to neither. The Berlin and Milan decrees, in which was embodied -the Continental System that led Napoleon to his ruin, were, as he -himself said, but the logical development of the Directory's decree of -January, 1798,[483] against which even the long-suffering United States -of America rebelled. Both measures struck at Great Britain through the -hearts of allies and of neutrals, for whose rights and welfare, when -conflicting with the course France wished to take, they showed equal -disregard; both were framed in the very spirit of the first National -(Constituent) Assembly, which set aside institutions and conventions -that did not square with its own ideas of right; which sought justice, -as it saw it, by overleaping law. - -It is, however, far more important to note, and clearly to apprehend, -that both measures were forced upon the rulers of France by the -strategic lines of policy laid down by the ministry of Pitt. The -decree of January, 1798, followed close upon the rupture of the peace -conferences of Lille, initiated by Pitt in 1797; a rupture brought on -by a display of arrogance and insolence on the part of the Directory, -similar to that shown by it towards the United States at the same -period, that can only be realized by reading the correspondence,[484] -and which is now known to have been due, in part at least, to the hope -of a bribe from the British ministry.[485] The Berlin decree, which -formally began the Continental System, was issued in November, 1806, -when Pitt had not been a year in his grave. Both were forced upon the -French leaders by the evident hopelessness of reaching Great Britain -in any other way, and because her policy of war was hurting France -terribly, while sustaining her own strength. In other words, Great -Britain, by the strategic direction she gave to her efforts in this -war, forced the French spirit of aggression into a line of action which -could not but result fatally.[486] But for Bonaparte, the result, -nearly attained in 1795 and again in 1799, would have followed then; -not even his genius could avert it finally. - -It is related that a leader of antiquity once cried to his opponent, -"If you are the great general you claim to be, why do you not come -down and fight me?" and received the pertinent reply, "If you are the -great general you say, why do you not _make_ me come down and fight -you?" This was precisely what Great Britain effected. By the mastery -of the sea, by the destruction of the French colonial system and -commerce, by her persistent enmity to the spirit of aggression which -was incarnate in the French Revolution and personified in Napoleon, -by her own sustained and unshaken strength, she drove the enemy into -the battle-field of the Continental System, where his final ruin was -certain. Under the feeble rule of the Directory that ruin came on -apace; within a year it was evident that the only gainer by the system -was the foe whom it sought to overthrow, that France herself and her -allies, as well as neutral Powers, were but being broken down to -the profit of Great Britain. Despite the first failure, there was a -plausible attraction about the measure which led Napoleon, confident -in his strength and genius, to apply it again with the relentless -thoroughness characteristic of his reign. For a time it succeeded, -owing not only to the vigor with which it was used, but also to Great -Britain being exasperated into retaliatory steps which, by forbidding -the trade of neutrals to and between all the ports thus closed to -British commerce, stopped at its source the contraband trade, which -eluded Napoleon's blockade and kept open the way for British exports to -the Continent. - -The strain, however, was too great to be endured by the great -composite political system which the emperor had founded, and through -which he hoped to exclude his enemy from every continental market. -The privations of all classes, the sufferings of the poorer, turned -men's hearts from the foreign ruler, who, in the pursuit of aims -which they neither sympathized with nor understood, was causing them -daily ills which they understood but too well. All were ready to fall -away and rise in rebellion when once the colossus was shaken. The -people of Spain, at one extremity of Europe, revolted in 1808; the -Czar of Russia, at the other, threw down the gauntlet in 1810, by a -proclamation which opened his harbors to all neutral ships bringing -colonial produce, the object of Napoleon's bitterest reclamations. In -the one case the people refused the ruler put over them to insure a -more vigorous enforcement of the continental blockade; in the other the -absolute monarch declined longer to burden his subjects with exactions -which were ruining them for the same object. The Spanish outbreak gave -England a foothold upon the Continent at a point most favorable for -support by her maritime strength and most injurious to the emperor, -not only from the character of the country and the people, but also -because it compelled him to divide his forces between his most remote -frontiers. The defection of the czar made a fatal breach in the line of -the continental blockade, opening a certain though circuitous access -for British goods to all parts of Europe. Incapable of anticipating -defeat and of receding from a purpose once formed, Napoleon determined -upon war with Russia. He, the great teacher of concentration, proceeded -to divide his forces between the two extremes of Europe. The results -are well known to all. - -It was not by attempting great military operations on land, but by -controlling the sea, and through the sea the world outside Europe, -that both the first and the second Pitt ensured the triumph of their -country in the two contests where either stood as the representative of -the nation. Mistakes were made by both; it was the elder who offered -to Spain to give Gibraltar for Minorca, which the younger recovered -by force of arms. Mistakes many may be charged against the conduct -of the war under the younger; but, with one possible exception, they -are mistakes of detail in purely military direction, which cannot -invalidate the fact that the general line of action chosen and followed -was correct. To recur to the simile already borrowed from military art, -the mistakes were tactical, not strategic; nor, it may be added, to any -great degree administrative. - -The possible exception occurred at the beginning of the war, in the -spring and summer of 1793. It may be, as has been claimed by many, that -a march direct upon Paris at that time by the forces of the Coalition -would have crushed all opposition, and, by reducing the mob of the -capital, have insured the submission of the country. It may be so; but -in criticising the action of the British ministers, so far as it was -theirs, it must be remembered that not only did men of the highest -military reputation in Europe advise against the movement, but that the -Duke of Brunswick, then second to none in distinction as a soldier, -had tried it and failed a few months before. For unprofessional men -to insist, against the best professional opinions at their command, -is a course whose propriety or prudence can only be shown by the -event,—a test to which the advance upon Paris, now so freely prescribed -by the wisdom of after-sight, was not brought. One consideration, -generally overlooked, may here be presented. To attempt so momentous -and hazardous an enterprise, when the leaders to whom its conduct must -be intrusted regard it as unwise, is to incur a great probability of -disaster. Even Bonaparte would not force his plans upon Moreau, when -the latter, in 1800, persisted in preferring his own. Yet this must -statesmen have done, had they in 1793 ordered their generals to advance -on Paris. - -Once lost, the opportunity, if such it were, did not recur. It depended -purely upon destroying the resistance of France before it had time to -organize. Thenceforward there remained to encounter, not the policy of -a court, playing its game upon the chess-board of war, with knights -and pawns, castles and armies, but a nation in arms, breathing a fury -and inspired by passions which only physical exhaustion could repress. -Towards that exhaustion Great Britain could on the land side contribute -effectually only by means of allies, and this she did. On the side of -the sea, her own sphere of action, there were two things she needed to -do. The first was to sustain her own strength, by fostering, widening, -and guarding the workings of her commercial system; the second was to -cut France off from the same sources of strength and life. Both were -most effectually accomplished,—not, as Macaulay asserts, by the able -administration of Earl Spencer (whose merit is not disputed), but by -the general policy of the ministry in the extension of the colonial -system, in the wise attention paid to the support of British commerce -in all its details, and in the extraordinary augmentation of the -navy. Between 1754 and 1760, the period embracing the most brilliant -triumphs of the elder Pitt, the British navy increased by 33 per cent. -Between 1792 and 1800, under his son, the increase was 82 per cent. -How entirely the military management and direction of this mighty -force depended upon the sea-officers, and not upon the statesman, when -a civilian was at the head of the Admiralty, will be evident to any -one studying closely the slackness of the Channel fleet immediately -under the eye of Earl Spencer, or the paltry dispositions made in -particular emergencies like the Irish invasion of 1796, and contrasting -these with the vigor manifested at that very moment under Jervis in -the Mediterranean, or later, in the admirable operations of the same -officer in command of the Channel fleet. - -Few indeed are the statesmen who are not thus dependent upon -professional subordinates. Pitt was no exception. He was not a general -or an admiral, nor does he appear so to have considered himself; but he -realized perfectly where Great Britain's strength lay, and where the -sphere of her efforts. By that understanding he guided her movements; -and in the final triumph wrought by the spirit of the British nation -over the spirit of the French Revolution, the greatest share cannot -justly be denied to the chief who, in the long struggle against wind -and tide, forced often to swerve from the direct course he would have -followed by unforeseen dangers that rose around the ship in her passage -through unknown seas, never forgot the goal "Security," upon which -from the first his will was set. Fit indeed it was that he should drop -at his post just when Trafalgar had been won and Austerlitz lost. That -striking contrast of substantial and, in fact, decisive success with -bewildering but evanescent disaster, symbolized well his troubled -career, as it superficially appears. As the helm escaped his dying -hands, all seemed lost, but in truth the worst was passed. "The pilot -had weathered the storm." - -The death of Pitt was followed by the formation of a ministry of -somewhat composite character, centring round his relative and former -colleague, Lord Grenville, and his life-long rival, Fox. This held -office but for fourteen months; a period long enough for it to afford -Napoleon the pretext for his Berlin decree, but not sufficient to -impress any radical change upon the main lines of policy laid down by -Pitt. Upon its fall in March, 1807, his devoted personal friends and -political followers succeeded to power. Confronted almost immediately -by the threatening union between the empires of the East and West, of -which the known, if concealed, purpose was to divide between France -and Russia the control of the Continent, and to subdue Great Britain -also by commercial exhaustion, the ministry, both necessarily and by -tradition, opposed to this combination the policy transmitted to them -by their great leader. Colonial enterprises were multiplied, until -it could be said of colonies, as the French Directory had before -sorrowfully confessed concerning shipping, that not one was left under -a flag hostile to Great Britain. The navy, expanding to its greatest -numerical force in 1808, was maintained in equal strength, if in -somewhat diminished numbers, up to the termination of the struggle. -While unable to prevent the material growth of the French navy by -ship-building carried on in its ports, Great Britain continued to -impede its progress and cut off its supplies by the close watch -maintained over the French coast, by confining its fleets to their -harbors,—and so shutting them off from the one drill ground, the -sea,—and finally by frustrating Napoleon's project of increasing his -own power by violently seizing the vessels of smaller continental -states. - -The secure tenure of the great common and highway of commerce—the -sea—was thus provided for. The enemy's navy was neutralized, his bases -abroad cut off, his possessions became the markets as well as the -sources of British trade. It was not enough, however, for commerce, -that its transit should be comparatively safe. Its operations of -exchange needed both materials and markets, both producers and -consumers. From these, as is known, Napoleon sought to exclude it by -the Continental System, which through the co-operation of Russia he -thought could be rendered effective. To this again the ministry of -Perceval and Canning opposed the Orders in Council, tempered by the -license system, with the double object of prolonging the resistance -of Great Britain and sapping that of her enemy; measures which but -reproduced, on a vaster scale, the Rule of 1756, with the modifications -introduced by Pitt, in 1798, for the same ends. - -The question thus resolved itself, as has before been perhaps too -often said, into a conflict of endurance,—which nation could live the -longest in this deadly grapple. This brings us back again face to face -with the great consideration: Was the struggle which began in 1793 one -to be solved by a brilliant display of generalship, shattering the -organized forces of an ordinary enemy, and with it crushing the powers -of resistance in the state? Or had it not rather its origin in the -fury of a nation, against which all coercion except that of exhaustion -is fruitless? The aims, the tendencies, the excitement of the French -people had risen to a pitch, and had made demands, which defied -repression by any mere machinery or organization, however skilfully -framed or directed. When the movement of a nation depends upon—nay, is -the simple evidence of—a profound emotion permeating each individual of -the mass, the mighty impulse, from its very diffusion, has not those -vital centres of power, the destruction of which paralyzes the whole. -Not till the period of passion—necessarily brief, but for the time -resistless—has given place to the organization to which all social -movement tends, is a people found to have, as the tyrant of antiquity -wished, a single neck to be severed by a blow. - -The frenzy of the French nation had spent itself, the period of -organization had set in, when Bonaparte appeared upon the scene; -but, as the tension of popular emotion slackened, there had not been -found, in the imperfect organization which sought to replace it, the -power to bear the burden of the state. No longer able to depend upon -a homogeneous movement of the millions, but only upon the efficient -working of the ordinary machinery of civil government and armies, in -her case most imperfectly developed, France now offered to the attacks -of her enemies those vital points, with which, when crushed, resistance -ceases. Military reverses and exhaustion by bad government brought her -in 1795, and again in 1799, to her last gasp. At both epochs Bonaparte -saved her. - -The great captain and organizer not only brought victory with him -and restored the machinery of government; he supplied also a centre -around which popular enthusiasm and confidence might once more rally. -He became not only the exponent of national unity, but in a very real -sense the embodiment of those aspirations and aggressive tendencies, -which in the first days of the Revolution had bound Frenchmen together -as one man, but had afterwards evaporated and frittered away for want -of that definiteness of aim and sagacious direction which only a great -leader can impart. Under his skilful manipulation the lofty sentiments -of the early revolutionists became catchwords, which assured his hold -upon the imaginations and enthusiasm of the people, again swayed as one -man to follow him in his career of aggression. Metternich well said -that Bonaparte was to him simply the incarnation of the Revolution.[487] - -It was with these two phases of one and the same condition that Europe -had to deal between 1793 and 1814. In the one instance a people -unified by a common passion and common aims, in the other the same -people concentrated into a common action by submission to the will of -a sovereign, apparently resistless in the council as in the field. -It is true that the affections of his subjects soon ceased to follow -him, except in the armies by whose power he ruled, but the result is -the same. All the energies of the nation are summed up in a single -overpowering impulse,—at first spontaneous, afterwards artificial,—to -which during the first half of Napoleon's career was given a guidance -of matchless energy and wisdom. - -Such a combination is for the time irresistible, as the continent of -Europe proved during long and weary years. Absolute power, concentrated -force, central position, extraordinary sagacity and energy, all united -to assure to Napoleon the dazzling successes which are matters of -history. The duration and the permanent results of this startling -career depended, however, upon the staying power of the French nation -and upon the steadfastness of the resistance. Upon the Continent, the -latter in its actuality ceased. Potentially it remained,—men's hearts -swelled to bursting under the tyranny they endured; but before the -power and the genius of the great conqueror outward rebellion shrank -away. States dared not trust each other,—they could not act together; -and so men went silently in the bitterness of their spirits. - -There remained one small group of islands, close on the flank of the -would-be ruler of the world, with a population numbering little -more than half that of his immediate dominions, whose inhabitants -deeply sympathized with sufferings and oppression they were powerless -directly to relieve. The resistance they had offered to the aggressive -fury of the Revolution they continued to oppose to its successor and -representative; but it was not by direct action in the field, but -only by operations aimed to abridge the resources and endurance of -France, that they could look forward to a possibility of success. For -seven years went on this final silent strife, whose outlines have been -traced in the preceding chapter of this work. During its continuance -Great Britain herself, while escaping the political oppression and -national humiliation undergone by the continental peoples, drank deep -of the cup of suffering. Her strength wasted visibly; but the mere -fact of her endurance and persistence compelled her enemy to efforts -more exhausting, to measures more fatal, than those forced upon -herself. And, while thus subjected to a greater strain, Napoleon was -by Great Britain cut off from that greatest of all sources of renewing -vitality—the Sea. - -The true function of Great Britain in this long struggle can scarcely -be recognized unless there be a clear appreciation of the fact that -a really great national movement, like the French Revolution, or a -really great military power under an incomparable general, like the -French empire under Napoleon, is not to be brought to terms by ordinary -military successes, which simply destroy the organized force opposed. - -Of the latter, the protracted and not wholly hopeless resistance, which -in 1813 and 1814 succeeded even the great Russian catastrophe, is a -signal instance; while to subvert such a power, wielded by such a man, -by any reverse less tremendous than it then underwent, is hopeless. Two -Napoleons do not co-exist. In the former case, on the other hand, the -tangible something, the decisive point against which military effort -can be directed, is wanting. Of this the struggle between the North -and South in the American Civil War affords a conspicuous example. -Few, probably, would now maintain that the capture of Richmond in the -first year of the war, when the enthusiasm of the Southern people was -at its height, their fighting force undiminished, their hopes undimmed -by the bitter disappointments of a four years' struggle, would have had -any decisive effect upon the high-spirited race. Positions far more -important fell without a sign of such result. No man could then have -put his finger here, or there, and said, "This is the key-stone of -resistance;" for in the high and stern feeling of the moment resistance -was not here nor there, but everywhere. - -So was it in the early flush of the French Revolution. The "On to -Paris" of 1793 would probably have had no more decisive results -than the "On to Richmond" of 1861, had it been successful. Not -till enthusiasm has waned before sorrow, and strength failed under -exhaustion, does popular impulse, when deep and universal, acquiesce -in the logic of war. To such exhaustion France was brought when -Bonaparte took the helm. By his organizing genius he restored her -military strength, the material of which still remained, economized -such resources as the wastefulness of preceding governments had left, -and above all secured for her a further power of endurance by drawing -upon the life-blood of surrounding nations. So exhaustion was for the -time postponed; but, if the course of aggression which Bonaparte had -inherited from the Revolution was to continue, there were needed, not -the resources of the Continent only, but of the world. There was needed -also a diminution of ultimate resistance below the stored-up aggressive -strength of France; otherwise, however procrastinated, the time must -come when the latter should fail. - -On both these points Great Britain withstood Napoleon. She shut him -off from the world, and by the same act prolonged her own powers of -endurance beyond his power of aggression. This in the retrospect of -history was the function of Great Britain in the Revolutionary and -Napoleonic period; and that the successive ministries of Pitt and his -followers pursued the course best fitted, upon the whole, to discharge -that function, is their justification to posterity. It is the glory of -Pitt's genius that as he discovered the object, "Security," so likewise -he foresaw the means, Exhaustion, by which alone the French propaganda -of aggression would be brought to pause. The eloquent derision poured -upon his predictions of failure from financial exhaustion, from -expenditure of resources, from slackening of enthusiasm, recoils -from the apprehension of the truth. He saw clearly the line of Great -Britain's action, he foresaw the direction of events, he foretold the -issue. How long the line would be, how the course of events would be -retarded, how protracted the issue, he could not foretell, because no -man could foresee the supreme genius of Napoleon Bonaparte. - - - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] See, for instance, his letter to Lady Hamilton, Oct. 3, 1798 -(Disp., vol. iii. p. 140), which is but one of many similar expressions -in his correspondence. - -[2] Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 177. - -[3] In an entirely open country, without natural obstacles, there are -few or none of those strategic points, by occupying which in a central -position an inferior force is able to multiply its action against -the divided masses of the enemy. On the other hand, in a very broken -country, such as Switzerland, the number of important strategic points, -passes, heads of valleys, bridges, etc., are so multiplied, that either -some must be left unoccupied, or the defenders lose, by dissemination, -the advantage which concentration upon one or two controlling centres -usually confers. - -[4] See ante, vol. i. p. 313. - -[5] It is said that the old marshal on receiving these orders cried: -"This is the way armies are ruined." - -[6] Jomini, Guerres de la Rév. Fran., livre xv. p. 124. Martin, Hist. -de France depuis 1789, vol. iii. p. 50. It was just at this moment -that Nelson sent a division to the Gulf of Genoa to co-operate with -Suwarrow. (Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 431.) - -[7] The phrase is that of Thiers. Hist. de la Rév., vol. x. p. 353. - -[8] A curious evidence of the insecurity of the highways is afforded -by an ordinance issued by Bonaparte a year after he became First -Consul (Jan. 7, 1801), that no regular diligence should travel without -carrying a corporal and four privates, with muskets and twenty rounds, -and in addition, at night, two mounted gendarmes. If specie to the -value of over 50,000 francs were carried, there must be four gendarmes -by day and night. (Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 697.) - -[9] See _post_, Chapter XVII. - -[10] Speech of February 18, 1801. - -[11] Thiers, Cons. et Empire, vol. i., p. 332. - -[12] See ante, p, 251. - -[13] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 410. - -[14] Ibid., vol. vi. p. 497. - -[15] "Voyant bien," says M. Thiers, Bonaparte's panegyrist, "que Malta -ne pouvait pas tenir longtemps." (Cons. et Emp., vol. ii. p. 92.) - -[16] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 498. - -[17] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 520. - -[18] See vol. i. pp. 249, 256. - -[19] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 738, Jan. 21, 1801. - -[20] Contrast Bonaparte's reliance upon the aggregate numbers of Baltic -navies with Nelson's professional opinion when about to fight them. -"During the Council of War (March 31, 1801) certain difficulties were -started by some of the members relative to each of the three Powers -we should have to engage, either in succession or united, in those -seas. The number of the Russians was in particular represented as -formidable. Lord Nelson kept pacing the cabin, mortified at everything -which savored either of alarm or irresolution. When the above remark -was applied to the Swedes, he sharply observed, 'The more numerous the -better;' and when to the Russians, he repeatedly said, 'So much the -better; I wish they were twice as many,—the easier the victory, depend -on it.' He alluded, as he afterwards explained in private, to the total -want of tactique among the Northern fleets." (Col. Stewart's Narrative; -Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 301.) - -James, who was a careful investigator, estimates the allied Russian, -Swedish, and Danish navies in the Baltic at fifty-two sail, of -which not over forty-one were in condition for service, instead of -eighty-eight as represented by some writers. "It must have been a -very happy combination of circumstances," he adds, "that could have -assembled in one spot twenty-five of those forty-one; and against that -twenty-five of three different nations, all mere novices in naval -tactics, eighteen, or, with Nelson to command, fifteen British sail -were more than a match." (Nav. Hist., vol. iii. p. 43; ed. 1878.) - -[21] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 747. To Talleyrand, Jan. 27, 1801. - -[22] Nelson's Letters and Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 295. - -[23] While this work was going through the press, the author was -gratified to find in the life of the late distinguished admiral -Sir William Parker an anecdote of Nelson, which, as showing the -military ideas of that great sea-officer, is worth a dozen of the -"go straight at them" stories which pass current as embodying his -precepts. "Throughout the month of October, 1804, Toulon was frequently -reconnoitred, and the frigates 'Phoebe' and 'Amazon' were ordered to -cruise together. Previous to their going away Lord Nelson gave to -Captains Capel and Parker several injunctions, in case they should -get an opportunity of attacking two of the French frigates, which now -got under weigh more frequently. _The principal one was_ that they -should not each single out and attack an opponent, but 'that both -should endeavor together to take _one frigate_; if successful, chase -the other; but, if you do not take the second, still you have won a -victory and your country will gain a frigate.' Then half laughing, and -half snappishly, he said kindly to them as he wished them good-by, 'I -daresay you consider yourselves a couple of fine fellows, and when you -get away from me will do nothing of the sort, but think yourselves -wiser than I am!'" ("The Last of Nelson's Captains," by Admiral Sir -Augustus Phillimore, K. C. B., London, 1891, p. 122.) - -[24] Nels. Disp., vol. iv. p. 355. See also a very emphatic statement -of his views on the campaign, in a letter to Mr. Vansittart, p. 367. - -[25] Nelson's Disp., April 9, 1801, vol. iv. pp. 339 and 341. - -[26] The Danes were moored with their heads to the southward. - -[27] If Nelson had an _arrière pensée_ in sending the flag, he -never admitted it, before or after, to friend or foe. "Many of my -friends," he wrote a month after the battle, "thought it a _ruse de -guerre_ and not quite justifiable. Very few attribute it to the cause -that I felt, and which I trust in God I shall retain to the last -moment,—_humanity_." He then enlarges upon the situation, and says that -the wounded Danes in the prizes were receiving half the shot fired by -the shore batteries. (Nels. Disp., vol. iv., p. 360.) - -[28] April 20, 1801. Nels. Disp., vol. iv. p. 355, note. - -[29] Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. ii. p. 43, 1st -edition. - -[30] Having destroyed Copenhagen, we had done our worst, and not much -nearer being friends.—_Nels. Disp._, vol. iv. p. 361. - -[31] The second embargo was laid on Nov. 7, 1800, for the sole purpose -of enforcing the surrender of Malta to Russia. (Annual Register, 1800; -State Papers, p. 253.) It antedated by six weeks the declaration of -Armed Neutrality, by which the other powers, on the plea of neutral -rights, agreed to arm. (Ibid., p. 260.) In fact, the other powers -urged upon Great Britain that the Russian sequestration being on -account of Malta, they had no share in it, and so were not subjects -for retaliation; ignoring that they had chosen that moment to come to -Russia's support. - -[32] Annual Register, 1801; State Papers, p. 246. - -[33] Nels. Disp., vol. iv., pp. 349, 352. - -[34] Ibid., p. 349; also see p. 379. - -[35] Ibid., vol. iv. p. 416. - -[36] Nels. Disp., vol. iv. p. 373. - -[37] For the important bearings of this stipulation, which was made -as an additional and explanatory declaration to the main convention -(Annual Register, 1801; State Papers, p. 217), see _post_, Chapter XVI. -It was a matter in which Russia, not being a carrier, had no interest. - -[38] For instance, Thiers, H. Martin, and Lanfrey. - -[39] Corr. de Nap. vol. vii. p. 25. - -[40] Corr. de Nap. vol. vii. p. 47. - -[41] For full particulars of Bonaparte's views for the ships in Brest, -which then contained the large body of Spaniards brought back by Bruix -the previous August, see Corr. de Nap. vol. vi. pp. 181, 186. It must -be remembered that there was then practically no French line-of-battle -force in the Mediterranean. - -[42] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. pp. 262, 263. - -[43] The advantage of the close watch is also shown by the perplexity -arising when an enemy's squadron did escape. In this case, seven -ships-of-the-line were detached from the Channel fleet in chase of -Ganteaume, but "owing to lack of information" they were sent to the -West Indies instead of the Mediterranean. (James, vol. iii. p. 73.) The -latter was sufficiently controlled by Keith with seven sail-of-the-line -in the Levant, and Warren with five before Cadiz, to which he joined -two more at Minorca. - -[44] See _ante_, vol. i. p. 68, for particulars. - -[45] In the above the attempt has been merely to summarize the rapid -succession of events, and the orders issuing from Bonaparte's intensely -active mind to meet the varying situations. Reference may be made by -the student to his correspondence, vol. vi. pp. 719, 729, 745; vol. -vii. pp. 4, 24-26, 69-73, 125, 144, 164, 197, 198. - -[46] This ship, the "St. Antoine," was one of those ceded to France by -Spain. - -[47] Ross's Life of Saumarez, vol. ii. p. 21. - -[48] March 2, 1801. Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 72. - -[49] The treaty was signed June 6, and ratified June 16. (Ann. Reg. -1801; State Papers, p. 351.) Bonaparte received his copy June 15. -(Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 215.) - -[50] Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 256. - -[51] Ibid., p. 266. - -[52] See ante, p. 60. - -[53] Ann. Reg. 1801; State Papers, p. 257. - -[54] Paul I. had particularly held to the preservation of Naples -and the restitution of Piedmont to the king of Sardinia. On April -12 the first consul heard of Paul's death, and the same day issued -an order making Piedmont a military division of France. This was -purposely antedated to April 2. (Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 147.) -Talleyrand was notified that this was a first, though tentative, step -to incorporation. If the Prussian minister remonstrated, he was to -reply that France had not discussed the affairs of Italy with the king -of Prussia. (Ibid., p. 153.) Alexander was civilly told that Paul's -interest in the Italian princes was considered to be personal, not -political. (Ibid., p. 169.) The Russian ambassador, however, a month -later haughtily reminded Talleyrand that his mission depended upon the -"kings of Sardinia and the Two Sicilies being again put in possession -of the states which they possessed before the irruption of the French -troops into Italy." (Ann. Reg., 1801; State Papers, pp. 340-342) -Liguria (Genoa) was also made a military division of France by order -dated April 18. (Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 162.) - -[55] While refusing this in his instructions to the French negotiator, -the latter was informed he might yield it, if necessary. (Corr. de -Nap., vol. vii., pp. 255-258.) - -[56] Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 323. - -[57] Parliamentary History, vol. xxxvi. p. 47. - -[58] Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. iii. p. 377. - -[59] Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. i. p. 396. - -[60] Speech of Nov. 3, 1801. - -[61] Annual Register 1801, p. 280. - -[62] See ante, p. 70. - -[63] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. pp. 509, 511. - -[64] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 511. - -[65] The slightest delay under these circumstances is very prejudicial, -and may be of great consequence to our squadrons and naval -expeditions.—_Corr. de Nap._, March 11, 1802. - -[66] Corr. de Nap., March 12, 1802, vol. vii. p. 522. - -[67] Ibid., April 3, 1802, vol. vii. p. 543. - -[68] Corr. de Nap., July 1, 1802, vol. vii. p. 641. - -[69] Ibid., April 13, 1801, vol. vii. p. 153. - -[70] Ibid., April 18, 1801, vol. vii. p. 162. - -[71] Corr. de Nap., August 2, 1802, vol. vii. p. 696. - -[72] Ibid., vol. vii. pp. 528, 544. - -[73] Ibid., vol. vii. p. 578. - -[74] Decree of Nov. 19, 1792. - -[75] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., livre xv. p. 38. - -[76] Ibid., livre xv. pp. 50, 51. - -[77] Ibid., xvi. p. 234. - -[78] Note Verbale. Remonstrance addressed to the French government. -(Ann. Reg. 1802; State Papers, p. 675.) - -[79] Lord Hawkesbury's speech; Parl. Hist., vol. xxxvi. p. 971. - -[80] Parl. Hist., vol. xxxvi. p. 1380. - -[81] Annual Register, 1803, p. 681. - -[82] Secret Instructions to Lord Whitworth; Yonge's Life of Lord -Liverpool, vol. i. p. 93. - -[83] Adams, Hist. of the United States, 1801-1817, vol. ii. pp. 13-21. - -[84] The San Domingo expedition cost the lives of over twenty-five -thousand French soldiers. - -[85] The British ambassador in Paris reached the same conclusion from -the instructions sent by Talleyrand to the French envoy in London. "It -appears from this note that this government is not desirous to proceed -to extremities; that is to say, it is not prepared to do so." (March -18; Parl. Hist., vol. xxxvi. p. 1315.) The United States minister in -Paris also wrote, March 24, "Here there is an earnest and sincere -desire to avoid war, as well in the government as the people." (Am. -State Papers, ii. 549.) - -[86] Instructions to Duroc, March 12, 1803, Corr. de Nap., vol. viii. -pp. 307-311. It is noteworthy that these instructions were issued the -same day that was received in Paris information of the king's message -to Parliament of March 8, that "in consequence of military preparations -in the ports of France and Holland he had adopted additional measures -of precaution." Two days later the militia was called out. - -[87] Corr. de Nap., vol. viii. p. 308. - -[88] Parl. Hist., vol. xxxvi. p. 1293. - -[89] Speech of May 23, 1803. - -[90] Naval Chronicle, vol. ix. pp. 243, 247, 329, 330, 332, 491. - -[91] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 553. - -[92] Ibid. - -[93] In case of war, it was the purpose of the British government to -send an expedition to occupy New Orleans, as it did afterwards in 1814. -(Am. State papers, vol. ii. pp. 551, 557.) - -[94] Napoleon to Talleyrand; Corr. de Nap., May 13, 1803. - -[95] Thiers, Consulat et Empire, livre xx. p. 182. - -[96] The French republic had devoured under the form of assignats an -immense amount of national property.—THIERS: _Cons. et Emp._, livre -xvii. p. 377. - -[97] "Holland," says Thiers, "would have wished to remain neutral; -but the first consul had taken a resolution, _whose justice cannot be -denied_, to make every maritime nation aid in our strife against Great -Britain." (Cons. et Emp., livre xvii. p. 383.) - -[98] Metternich's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 48, note. - -[99] Chénier's Vie du Maréchal Davout, Paris, 1866. - -[100] See Naval Chronicle, vol. x. pp. 508, 510; vol. xi. p. 81. -Nelson's Dispatches, vol. v. p. 438. - -[101] Pellew's Life of Lord Sidmouth, vol. ii. p. 237. - -[102] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 452. - -[103] Parl. Debates, March 15, 1804. - -[104] Mémoires du Duc de Raguse, vol. ii. p. 212. - -[105] Nelson's Disp. and Letters, vol. iv pp. 444-447. - -[106] Nelson's Disp., vol. iv. p 500. - -[107] James, Nav. Hist., vol. iii. p. 212 (ed. 1878). - -[108] See Cobbett's Reg., vol. v. pp. 442, 443, for some very sensible -remarks on Pitt's attack, written by Cobbett himself. - -[109] Stanhope's Pitt, vol. iv. p. 94. - -[110] Parl. Debates, 1804, p. 892. - -[111] Nels. Disp., vol. v. p. 283. - -[112] Ibid., p. 306. - -[113] Ibid., p. 174. The following references also show conditions of -Nelson's ships: vol. v. pp. 179, 211, 306, 307, 319, 334; vol. vi. pp. -38, 84, 99, 100, 103, 134, 158. - -[114] Corr. de Nap., vol. viii. p. 657. - -[115] Corr. de Nap., vol. ix. p. 168. - -[116] Nels. Disp., vol. v. pp. 115, 136. - -[117] "It is at best but a guess," to use his own words, "and the world -attaches wisdom to him that guesses right." (Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. -193.) - -[118] See Nels. Disp., vol. v. pp. 179, 185, 247, 309, 374. - -[119] Nels. Disp., vol. v. p. 309. - -[120] Ibid., p. 374. - -[121] Ibid., p. 388. - -[122] Ibid., pp. 405, 411. - -[123] Ibid., p. 498. - -[124] Ibid., p. 411. - -[125] Ibid., p. 300. - -[126] Nels. Disp., vol. v. p. 306. - -[127] Ibid., pp. 253, 254. - -[128] Ibid., p. 438. - -[129] Ibid., p. 388. - -[130] Ibid., p. 395. - -[131] See Nels. Disp., vol. v. pp. 145, 162, 413; vol. vi. pp. 84, 328, -329. - -[132] Corr. de. Nap., vol. ix. p. 226. - -[133] Corr. de Nap., vol. ix. p. 475. - -[134] Ibid., p 513. - -[135] Ibid., Sept. 12, 1804. - -[136] Corr. de Nap., vol. ix. p. 700, Sept. 29, 1804. - -[137] The former Spanish part of the island was still in the hands of -France. - -[138] Corr. de Nap., Sept. 27 and 29, 1804. - -[139] For Bonaparte's attitude toward Spain, see two letters to -Talleyrand, Aug. 14 and 16, 1803; Corr. de Nap. vol. viii. pp. 580-585. - -[140] Signed Oct. 19, 1803. (Combate Naval de Trafalgar, by D. José? de -Couto, p. 79.) - -[141] Parl. Debates, 1805, vol. iii. p. 70. - -[142] Parl. Debates, 1805, vol. iii. p. 72. - -[143] Ibid., p. 372. - -[144] Ibid., p. 81. - -[145] Jan. 24, 1804. Ibid., p. 85. - -[146] Ibid., p. 89. - -[147] Ibid. - -[148] Ibid., pp. 85, 89. - -[149] For some account of the advantages to French privateers arising -from this use of Spanish ports, with interesting particulars, see Naval -Chronicle, vol. xiii. p. 76. In March, 1804, Spain prohibited the sale -of prizes in her ports. - -[150] Parl. Debates, 1805, vol. iii. p. 86. - -[151] Corr. de Nap. vol. ix. p. 482. - -[152] Parl. Debates, 1805, vol. iii. p. 93. - -[153] Ibid., p. 122. - -[154] Ibid., pp. 95, 122. - -[155] Thiers, Cons. et Emp. livre xvii. pp. 383, 384. - -[156] Pitt's Speech of February 11, 1805. - -[157] D. José de Couto, Combate Naval de Trafalgar (Madrid, 1851), pp. -83, 89. - -[158] Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 240. This letter was not sent, Nelson -soon after receiving the Admiralty's order. - -[159] Jurien de la Gravière, Revue des Deux Mondes, Oct. 1887, p. 611. - -[160] Correspondance de Napoléon, vol. x. pp. 79-97. - -[161] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. vi. p. 333. - -[162] After writing these words the author noted Nelson's opinion -to the same effect: "Had they not been crippled, nothing could -have hindered our meeting them on January 21, off the south end of -Sardinia." (Dispatches, vol. vi. p. 354.) - -[163] For Villeneuve's opinion see Chevalier's Hist. de la Mar. Fran. -sous l'Empire, p. 134; for Nelson's, Disp. vol. vi. pp. 334, 339. - -[164] Corr. de Nap., vol. ix. p. 701. - -[165] Ibid., Jan. 16, 1805. - -[166] Compare with Nelson's views on attacking Russian fleet, _ante_, -p. 46. - -[167] Corr. de Nap., April 29, 1805, vol. x. p. 443. - -[168] Letter to Pitt by Robert Francis; Castlereagh's Memoirs, vol. v. -p. 444. The whole letter is most suggestive, not to say prophetic. From -internal indications it is extremely probable that the writer of these -letters, signed Robert Francis, was Robert Fulton, though the fact is -not mentioned in any of his biographies. - -[169] Mémoires du Duc de Raguse, vol. ii. p. 261. - -[170] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., vol. v. p. 413. - -[171] Barrow's Autobiography, p. 263. - -[172] Ibid. Nav. Chron., vol. xiii. p. 328. - -[173] The above account depends mainly upon the "Naval Chronicle" for -April 15, 1805; vol. xiii. pp. 365-367,—checked by James and other -sources. - -[174] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 227. - -[175] So in the orders, Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 232. At a later date -this rendezvous is spoken of by Napoleon as in the Cape de Verde. -(Corr. de Nap., vol. xi. p. 50.) A singular confusion in such important -orders. - -[176] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 447. - -[177] Ibid., 324. - -[178] Nels. Disp., vol. vi. pp. 338-341. - -[179] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. vi. p. 397. - -[180] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous l'Empire, p. 142. - -[181] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. vi. pp. 410, 411, 415. - -[182] See _ante_, p. 142. Missiessy sailed from the West Indies in the -same week that Villeneuve sailed for them. - -[183] Corr. de Nap., April 13, 1805, vol. x. p. 390. - -[184] Ibid., April 20 and 23. - -[185] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 394. - -[186] Ibid., p. 490. - -[187] Ibid., p. 571. - -[188] Ibid., p. 616. - -[189] Ibid., p. 624. - -[190] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 708. - -[191] For example, Thiers, Cons. et Emp., liv. xx. p. 178; Jurien de la -Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. ii. p. 224 (first edition). - -[192] Corr. de Nap., vol. xi. p. 162. - -[193] Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 401. In a former work ("The Influence -of Sea Power upon History," p. 23), the author casually spoke of this -as a false step, into which Nelson had been misled. A closer study has -convinced him that the British admiral did quite right. - -[194] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 624. Compare this with Nelson's remark, -just quoted. - -[195] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 624. - -[196] Ibid., June 22, 1805, p. 686. - -[197] Nap. to Decrès, May 10, 1805. - -[198] Corr. de Nap., June 9, p. 624. - -[199] Annual Register, 1805, p. 225; Naval Chronicle, vol. xiii. p. 399. - -[200] Naval Chronicle, vol. xiii. p. 484. The expression "_balayer -la Manche_"—sweep the Channel—is far stronger than the Chronicle's -translation, which is preserved in the quotation. - -[201] Apparently a prize. (Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 410.) - -[202] Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 411. - -[203] Ibid., Sept. 6, 1804. - -[204] Corr. de Nap., June 28, 1805, vol. x. p. 708. - -[205] Ibid., p. 705. - -[206] Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 457. - -[207] Ibid., p. 45. - -[208] Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 459. - -[209] On this date is the first intimation of Nelson's sailing as known -to Napoleon. June 27, he writes, "I do not clearly see where Nelson has -been." (Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 701.) - -[210] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. April 23 and May 4, 1805, pp. 420, 465. - -[211] Ibid., May 24, p. 544. - -[212] Ibid., May 29, pp. 563, 624. - -[213] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. June 22, p. 686. - -[214] Ibid., p. 545. - -[215] See, for his reasoning, letter of June 16, three days after -leaving Antigua; and also, for his uncertainty after reaching Europe, -July 18. (Nels. Disp., vol. vi. pp. 457, 473.) - -[216] Naval Chronicle, vol. xiv. p. 64. - -[217] Napoleon to Decrès, July 18, 1805. - -[218] Naval Chronicle, vol. xiv. p. 64. - -[219] Barrow's Autobiography, pp. 276-290. - -[220] See _ante_, p. 162. - -[221] Napoleon to Berthier, Decrès, and Ganteaume, July 20, 1805. - -[222] Napoleon to Decrès, July 27, 1805. - -[223] Calder's Defence, Naval Chronicle, vol. xv. p. 167. The words -quoted, frequently repeated in different terms, embody the spirit of -the whole paper. - -[224] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous l'Emp., p. 171. Couto (Combate de -Trafalgar, p. 107) gives a very serious account of the injuries -suffered by the four remaining Spanish ships. - -[225] Nelson's Disp., vol. vi. p. 457. - -[226] Nelson's Disp., vol. vii. p. 16. - -[227] Corr. de Napoléon, July 16, 1805. - -[228] The harbors of Ferrol, Coruña, and a third called Betanzos, are -inlets having a common entrance from the sea. - -[229] See Napoleon's letters to Decrès, Allemand, and others, July 26, -1805. - -[230] Napoleon to Decrès, August 29. - -[231] Napoleon to Talleyrand, Dec. 18, 1799. "Frame your reply to Genoa -in such terms as to leave us free to incorporate the Ligurian Republic -with France, within a few months." - -[232] Stanhope's Pitt, vol. iv. p. 318. - -[233] Napoleon to Talleyrand, July 31, 1805. - -[234] Ibid., August 13. - -[235] Napoleon to Villeneuve, August 13. - -[236] Napoleon to Decrès, August 14. - -[237] Twenty-nine only of the line. - -[238] Chevalier, Marine Française sous l'Empire, p. 180. - -[239] Collingwood's Correspondence, August 21, 1805. - -[240] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., livre xxii. pp. 125, 128. - -[241] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., livre xxviii. p. 233. - -[242] Napoleon to St. Cyr, Sept. 2, 1805. - -[243] Napoleon to Decrès, Sept. 15. - -[244] Ibid., Sept. 4. - -[245] Nels. Disp., vol. vii. p. 80. - -[246] Fyffe's History of Modern Europe, vol. i. p. 281. - -[247] To the King of Wurtemburg, April 2, 1811; Corr., vol. xxii. p. 19. - -[248] Life of Sir Wm. Parker, vol. i. p. 39. Ross's Life of Lord de -Saumarez, vol. ii. p. 214. Naval Chronicle, Plymouth Report, Dec. 10, -1800. - -[249] Message of Directory to Council of Five Hundred, Jan., 1799; -Moniteur, An 7, p. 482. - -[250] McArthur, Financial and Political Facts of the Eighteenth -Century, London, 1801, p. 308. Norman (Corsairs of France, London, -1887, App.) gives the number of French privateers taken in the same -period as 556. - -[251] Sir J. Barrow, then a Secretary to the Admiralty, mentions in -a letter to J. W. Croker, July 18, 1810, that two colliers had been -captured in sight of Ramsgate, close under the North Foreland; and on -July 27 an ordnance hoy taken close under Galloper Light, in the face -of the whole squadron in the Downs, not one of which moved. (Croker's -Diary, vol. i. p. 33) - -[252] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxiv. p. 327. For further curious -particulars concerning French privateering in the narrow seas, see Nav. -Chron., vol. xxii. p. 279; vol. xxiv. pp. 327, 448, 460-462, 490; vol. -xxv. pp. 32-34, 44, 203, 293; vol. xxvii. pp. 102, 237. - -[253] See, for example, the account of the privateer captain, Jean -Blackeman Nav. Chron., vol. xii. p. 454. - -[254] Naval Chronicle, vol. ii. p. 535; vol. iii. p. 151. - -[255] In 1806, on the Jamaica station alone, were captured by the -British forty-eight public or private armed vessels, two of which were -frigates, the rest small. (Nav. Chron., vol. xvii. pp. 255, 337.) - -[256] American State Papers, vol. ii. pp. 670, 771. - -[257] James (Naval Hist., ed. 1878, vol. iii. p. 249) says that though -denominated 1,200-ton ships, the registered tonnage of most exceeds -1,300, and in some cases amounts to 1,500 tons. - -[258] Nav. Chronicle, vol. vi. p. 251. - -[259] Brenton's Naval Hist. (first ed.) vol. i. p. 346. Low's Indian -Navy, vol. i. 204. - -[260] Low's Indian Navy, vol. i. 205. Milburn's Oriental Commerce, vol. -i. 405. - -[261] The premium of insurance, which had in 1782 been fifteen guineas -per cent on ships engaged in the trade with China and India, did not -exceed half that rate at any period between the spring of 1793 and the -end of the struggle. (Lindsay's Merchant Shipping, vol. ii. 265. See -also Chalmer's Historical View, pp. 308-310.) - -[262] Letter of Bombay merchants to Sir Edward Pellew; Nav. Chron., -vol. xxiii. 107. - -[263] Robert Surcouf, by J. K. Laughton; Colburn's United Service -Magazine, 1883, part i. pp. 331, 332. - -[264] Milburn's Oriental Commerce, vol. i. p. xci. - -[265] Naval Chronicle, vol. vii. 276. - -[266] Naval Chronicle, vol. iv. pp. 150, 151, 326. - -[267] Registration of vessels made in all ports of France (except the -newly acquired departments) from September 1793, to September 1796:— - - Under 30 tons 3,351 (undecked) - Between 30 and 100 tons 1,897 - " 100 and 200 tons 532 - " 200 and 400 tons 193 - Above 400 tons 55 - ‒‒‒‒‒ - 6,028 - -It should be explained that as all ships, old as well as new, had to -register, this gives the total of French shipping without deduction for -losses. - -[268] Moniteur, 26 Floréal, An 9 (May 16, 1801). - -[269] Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. 359. - -[270] Cobbett's Parl. Debates, March 15, 1804, p. 921. - -[271] Naval Chronicle, vol. xvii. p. 369. - -[272] Norman gives the total number of captures, 1793-1800, as 5,158 -against Lloyd's 3,639. Through the kindness of Captain H. M. Hozier, -Secretary of Lloyd's, the author has received a list of British ships -taken, annually, 1793-1814. This list makes the numbers considerably -less than the earlier one used in the text. By it, between 1793 and -1800, both inclusive, only 3,466 British ships were captured. - -[273] Moniteur, 16 Pluviôse, An 7 (Feb. 5, 1799), pp. 582, 583. - -[274] Guérin gives the total number of captures by France from Great -Britain, from 1793 to the Peace of Amiens, March 25, 1802, including -both ships of war and merchant vessels, as 2,172; while the French -lost in all, from ships-of-the-line to fishing-boats, between 1,520 -and 1,550. Of this total, 27 were ships-of-the-line and 70 frigates,—a -number considerably below that given by James, the painstaking -English naval historian. Allowing 150 as the number of smaller naval -vessels taken, there would remain, by Guérin's estimate, about 1,300 -French trading vessels which fell into British hands. Of these a -large proportion must have been the chasse-marées that carried on the -coasting trade (as their expressive name implies); attacks on which -formed so frequent and lucrative a diversion from the monotony of -blockade service. (Hist. Mar de la France, vol. iii. p. 674.) - -Guérin claims great carefulness, but the author owns to much distrust -of his accuracy. It is evident, however, from all the quotations, that -Fox's statement, May 24, 1795, that in the second year of the war -France had taken 860 ships, was much exaggerated. (Speeches, vol. v. p. -419. Longman's, 1815.) - -[275] In this period of twenty-two years there were eighteen months of -maritime peace. - -[276] Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. - -[277] Thus it is told of one of the most active of French -privateersmen, sailing out of Dunkirk, that "the trade from London to -Berwick, in the smacks, was his favorite object; not only from the -value of the cargoes, but because they required few hands to man them, -and from their good sailing were almost sure to escape British cruisers -and get safely into ports of France or Holland." Between 1793 and 1801 -this one man had taken thirty-four prizes. (Nav. Chron., vol. xii. p. -454.) - -[278] Returns of the coasting trade were not made until 1824. Porter's -Progress of the Nation, section iii. p. 77. - -[279] The merchant vessels of that day were generally small. From -Macpherson's tables it appears that those trading between Great Britain -and the United States, between 1792 and 1800, averaged from 200 to 230 -tons; those to the West Indies and the Baltic about 250; to Germany, -to Italy, and the Western Mediterranean, 150; to the Levant, 250 to -300, with some of 500 tons. The East India Company's ships, as has been -said, were larger, averaging nearly 800 tons. The general average is -reduced to that above given (125) by the large number of vessels in -the Irish trade. In 1796 there were 13,558 entries and clearances from -English and Scotch ports for Ireland, being more than half the entire -number (not tonnage) of British ships employed in so-called foreign -trade. The average size of these was only 80 tons. (Macpherson.) In -1806 there were 13,939 for Ireland to 5,211 for all other parts of the -world, the average tonnage again being 80. (Porter's Progress of the -Nation, part ii. pp. 85, 174.) - -Sir William Parker, an active frigate captain, who commanded the same -ship from 1801 to 1811, was in that period interested in 52 prizes. The -average tonnage of these, excluding a ship-of-the-line and a frigate, -was 126 tons. (Life, vol. i. p. 412.) - -In 1798, 6,844 coasters entered or left London, their average size -being 73 tons. The colliers were larger. Of the latter 3,289 entered -or sailed, having a mean tonnage of 228. (Colquhoun's Commerce of the -Thames, p. 13.) - -[280] The returns for 1813 were destroyed by fire, and so an exact -aggregate cannot be given. Two million tons are allowed for that year, -which is probably too little. - -[281] Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. 368, 535. - -[282] Porter's Progress of the Nation, part ii. p. 171. - -[283] Chalmer's Historical View, p. 307. - -[284] Porter, part ii. p. 173. The Naval Chronicle, vol. xxix. p. -453, gives an official tabular statement of prize-vessels admitted -to registry between 1793 and 1812. In 1792 there were but 609, total -tonnage 93,994. - -[285] Chalmer's Historical View, p. 351. - -[286] The amounts given are those known as the "official values," -assigned arbitrarily to the specific articles a century before. The -advantage attaching to this system is, that, no fluctuation of price -entering as a factor, the values continue to represent from year to -year the proportion of trade done. Official values are used throughout -this chapter when not otherwise stated. The "real values," deduced from -current prices, were generally much greater than the official. Thus, in -1800, the whole volume of trade, by official value £73,723,000, was by -real value £111,231,000. The figures are taken from Macpherson's Annals -of Commerce. - -[287] The French will not suffer a Power which seeks to found its -prosperity upon the misfortunes of other states, to raise its commerce -upon the ruin of that of other states, and which, aspiring to the -dominion of the seas, wishes to introduce everywhere the articles of -its own manufacture and to receive nothing from foreign industry, any -longer to enjoy the fruit of its guilty speculations.—_Message of -Directory to the Council of Five Hundred_, Jan. 4, 1798. - -[288] Message of Directory to Council of Five Hundred, Jan. 4, 1798. - -[289] The act imposing these duties went into effect Aug. 15, 1789. -Vessels built in the United States, and owned by her citizens, paid -an entrance duty of six cents per ton; all other vessels fifty cents. -A discount of ten per cent on the established duties was also allowed -upon articles imported in vessels built and owned in the country. -(Annals of Congress. First Congress, pp. 2131, 2132.) - -[290] Am. State Papers, vol. x. 502. - -[291] Ibid., p. 389. - -[292] Ibid., p. 528. - -[293] Ibid., p. 584. - -[294] Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. 535. - -[295] Am. State Papers, vol. i. 243. - -[296] Annual Register, 1793, p. 346*. - -[297] Am. State Papers, i. 240. A complete series of the orders -injuriously affecting United States commerce, issued by Great Britain -and France, from 1791 to 1808, can be found in the Am. State Papers, -vol. iii. p. 262. - -[298] Am. State Papers, i. 240, 241. How probable this result was may -be seen from the letters of Gouverneur Morris, Oct. 19, 1793, and March -6, 1794. State Papers, vol. i. pp. 375, 404. - -[299] Am. State Papers, vol. i. p. 679. - -[300] Wheaton's International Law, p. 753. - -[301] Monroe to the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. Am. State -Papers, vol. ii. p. 735. - -[302] Reply to "War in Disguise, or Frauds of the Neutral Flag," by -Gouverneur Morris, New York, 1806, p. 22. - -[303] Russell's Life of Fox, vol. ii. p. 281. - -[304] Letter to Danish Minister, March 17, 1807. Cobbett's Parl. -Debates, vol. x. p. 406. - -[305] A letter from an American consul in the West Indies, dated March -7, 1794, gives 220 as the number. This was, however, only a partial -account, the orders having been recently received. (Am. State Papers, -i. p. 429.) - -[306] By the ordinance of Aug. 30, 1784. See Annals of Congress, Jan. -13, 1794, p. 192. - -[307] The National Convention, immediately after the outbreak of war, -on the 17th of February, 1793, gave a great extension to the existing -permission of trade between the United States and the French colonies; -but this could not affect the essential fact that the trade, under some -conditions, had been allowed in peace. - -[308] In fact Monroe, in another part of the same letter, avows: -"The doctrine of Great Britain in every decision is the same.... -Every departure from it is claimed as a relaxation of the principle, -gratuitously conceded by Great Britain." - -[309] Mr. Jay seems to have been under some misapprehension in this -matter, for upon his return he wrote to the Secretary of State: "The -treaty does prohibit re-exportation from the United States of West -India commodities in neutral vessels; ... but we may carry them direct -from French and other West India islands to Europe." (Am. State Papers, -i. 520.) This the treaty certainly did not admit. - -[310] See letter of Thos. Fitzsimmons, Am. State Papers, vol. ii. 347. - -[311] The pretexts for these seizures seem usually to have been the -alleged contraband character of the cargoes. - -[312] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. 345. - -[313] It will be remembered that the closing days of May witnessed the -culmination of the death struggle between the Jacobins and Girondists, -and that the latter finally fell on the second of June. - -[314] Am. State Papers, vol. i. pp. 284, 286, 748. - -[315] Ibid., p. 372. - -[316] One of these complaints was that the United States now prohibited -the sale, in her ports, of prizes taken from the British by French -cruisers. This practice, not accorded by the treaty with France, and -which had made an unfriendly distinction against Great Britain, was -forbidden by Jay's treaty. - -[317] Speech of M. Dentzel in the Conseil des Anciens. Moniteur, An 7, -p. 555. - -[318] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 28. - -[319] Ibid., vol. ii. p. 163. - -[320] Letter to Talleyrand, Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 178. - -[321] Ibid., vol. i. pp. 740, 748. - -[322] The day after the news of Rivoli was received, Mr. Pinckney, who -had remained in Paris, though unrecognized, was curtly directed to -leave France. - -[323] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 13. - -[324] Ibid., p. 14. - -[325] American State Papers, vol. ii. p. 14. - -[326] Moniteur, An v. pp. 164, 167. - -[327] March 1, and October 8, 1793. Ibid. - -[328] Speech of Lecouteulx; Moniteur, An v. p. 176. - -[329] Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. 463. - -[330] Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. 413, note. - -[331] Of the imports into Germany, three fifths were foreign -merchandise re-exported from Great Britain. - -[332] These figures are all taken from Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, -vol. iv. - -[333] See Am. State Papers, vol. x. p. 487. - -[334] The importance of the West India region to the commercial system -of Great Britain in the last decade of the 18th century will be seen -from the following table, showing the distribution per cent of British -trade in 1792 and 1800:— - - Imports from, Exports to, - 1792. 1800. 1792. 1800. - - British West Indies 20 28 11 10 - United States 5 7 17 15 - Russia 9 8 3 2 - Germany and Prussia 5 12 9 31 - France, Belgium, and Holland 8 4 15 12 - Mediterranean 7 2 6 2 - Spain and Portugal 9 5 6 3 - Ireland 13 7 9 9 - Asia (not Levant) 14 16 10 7 - Miscellaneous 10 11 14 9 - ‒‒‒ ‒‒‒ ‒‒‒ ‒‒‒ - 100 100 100 100 - -The significance of these figures lies not only in the amounts set -down directly to the West Indies, but also in the great increase of -exports to Germany, and the high rate maintained to France, Belgium, -and Holland, with which war existed. Of these exports 25 per cent in -1792, and 43 per cent in 1800, were foreign merchandise, chiefly West -Indian—_re-exported_. - -[335] In 1800 the captured islands sent 9 per cent of the British -imports. - -[336] Moniteur, An vii. pp 478, 482. - -[337] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 8. - -[338] Moniteur, An vii. p. 502. - -[339] Ibid., p. 716; Couzard's speech. - -[340] Moniteur, An vii. p. 555; Dentzel's speech. - -[341] Ibid.; Lenglet's speech. - -[342] Ibid., pp. 582, 583. The figures are chiefly taken from the -speech of M. Arnould. A person of the same name, who was Chef du Bureau -du Commerce, published in 1797 a book called "Système Maritime et -Politique des Européens," containing much detailed information about -French maritime affairs, and displaying bitter hatred of England. If -the deputy himself was not the author, he doubtless had access to the -best official intelligence. - -[343] In consequence of the law of Jan. 18, 1798, the British -government appointed a ship-of-the-line and two frigates to convoy a -fleet of American vessels to their own coast.—_Macpherson's Annals of -Commerce_, vol. iv. p. 440. - -[344] Moniteur, An vii. p. 564; Cornet's speech. - -[345] Annals of Congress, 1798, p. 3733. - -[346] Ibid., p. 3754. - -[347] Ibid. - -[348] Speech of February 2, 1801. - -[349] Speech of March 25, 1801. - -[350] Annual Register, 1801; State Papers, p. 212. - -[351] Ibid., p. 217. - -[352] The _principle_ of the Rule of 1756, it will be remembered, was -that the neutral had no right to carry on, for a belligerent, a trade -from which the latter excluded him in peace. - -[353] By a report submitted to the National Convention, July 3, 1793, -it appears that in the years 1787-1789 two tenths only of French -commerce was done in French bottoms. In 1792, the last of maritime -peace, three tenths was carried by French ships. (Moniteur, 1793, p. -804.) - -[354] Moniteur, An vii. p. 582; Arnould's speech. - -[355] Annual Register, 1804. State Papers, p. 286. - -[356] The exports of the French West India islands in 1788 amounted to -$52,000,000, of which $40,000,000 were from San Domingo alone. (Traité -d'Économie Politique et de Commerce des Colonies, par P. F. Page. -Paris, An 9 (1800) p. 15.) This being for the time almost wholly lost, -the effect upon prices can be imagined. - -[357] An American vessel arrived in Marblehead May 29, landed her -cargo on the 30th and 31st, reloaded, and cleared June 3. (Robinson's -Admiralty Reports, vol. v. p. 396.) - -[358] In the case of the brig "Aurora," Mr. Madison, the Secretary of -State, wrote: "The duties were paid or secured, according to law, in -like manner as they are required to be secured on a like cargo meant -for home consumption; when re-shipped, the duties were drawn back with -a deduction of three and a half per cent (on them), as is permitted to -imported articles in all cases." (Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 732.) - -In the case of the American ship "William," captured and sent in, on -duties to the amount of $1,239 the drawback was $1,211. (Robinson's -Admiralty Reports, vol. v. p. 396.) In the celebrated case of the -"Essex," with which began the seizures in 1804, on duties amounting to -$5,278, the drawback was $5,080. (Ibid., 405.) - -[359] The text of the Berlin decree can be found among the series -beginning in American State Papers, vol. iii. p. 262. - -[360] A curious indication of the dependence of the Continent upon -British manufactures is afforded by the fact that the French army, -during this awful winter, was clad and shod with British goods, -imported by the French minister at Hamburg, in face of the Berlin -decree. (Bourrienne's Memoirs, vol. vii. p. 292.) - -[361] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 805. - -[362] Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. xiii. Appendix, pp. xxxiv-xlv. - -[363] Thiers, Consulat et Empire, vol. vii. pp. 666-669. - -[364] Letter of Lord Howick to Mr. Monroe, Jan. 10, 1807; Am. State -Papers, vol. iii. p. 5. - -[365] President's Message to Congress, Oct. 27, 1807; Am. State Papers, -vol. iii. p. 5. - -[366] Correspondance de Napoléon. - -[367] British Declaration of September 25, 1807,—a paper which ably and -completely vindicates the action of Great Britain; Annual Register, -1807, p. 735. - -[368] Annual Register, 1807. State Papers, p. 771. - -[369] Ibid., p. 739. - -[370] Lanfrey's Napoleon (French ed.), vol. iv. p. 153. - -[371] Corr. de Nap., vol. xv. p. 659. - -[372] Annual Register, 1807, p. 777. - -[373] See, for example, Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. viii. pp. 636 -and 641-644; vol. ix. p. 87, petition of West India planters; p. 100, -speech of Mr. Hibbert, and p. 684, speech of Mr. George Rose. - -[374] See _ante_, p. 273. - -[375] Am. State Papers, vol. iii. pp. 245-247. - -[376] Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. xiii. Appendix, pp. xxxiv-xlv. - -[377] Am. State Papers, vol. iii. pp. 23, 24. - -[378] Annals of Congress, 1807, p. 2814. - -[379] Annals of Congress, 1808-1809, p. 1824. - -[380] There were three Orders in Council published on the 11th of -November, all relating to the same general subject. They were followed -by three others, issued November 25, further explaining or modifying -the former three. The author, in his analysis, has omitted reference to -particular ones; and has tried to present simply the essential features -of the whole, suppressing details. - -[381] The attention paid to sustaining the commerce of Great Britain -was shown most clearly in the second Order of November 11, which -overrode the Navigation Act by permitting _any_ friendly vessel to -import articles the produce of hostile countries; a permission extended -later (by Act of Parliament, April 14, 1808) to _any_ ship, "belonging -to _any_ country, _whether in amity with his Majesty or not_." Enemy's -merchant ships were thus accepted as carriers for British trade with -restricted ports. See Am. State Papers, vol. iii. pp. 270, 282. - -[382] Gibraltar and Malta are especially named, they being natural -depots for the Mediterranean, whence a large contraband trade was -busied in evading Napoleon's measures. The governors of those places -were authorized to license even enemy's vessels, if unarmed and not -over one hundred tons burthen, to carry on British trade, contrary to -the emperor's decrees. - -[383] On March 28, 1808, an Act of Parliament was passed, fixing -the duties on exportations from Great Britain in furtherance of the -provisions of the Orders. This Act contained a clause excepting -American ships, ordered into British ports, from the tonnage duties -laid on those which entered voluntarily. - -[384] In a debate on the Orders, March 3, 1812, the words of Spencer -Perceval, one among the ministers chiefly responsible for them, are -thus reported: "With respect to the principle upon which the Orders in -Council were founded, he begged to state that he had always considered -them as _strictly retaliatory_; and as far as he could understand -the matter they were most completely justified upon the principle -of retaliation.... _The object of the government was to protect and -force the trade of this country_, which had been assailed in such an -unprecedented manner by the French decrees. If the Orders in Council -had not been issued, France would have had free colonial trade by means -of neutrals, and we should have been shut out from the Continent.... -_The object of the Orders in Council was, not to destroy the trade -of the Continent, but to force the Continent to trade with us._" -(Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. xxi. p. 1152.) - -As regards the retaliatory effect upon France, Perceval stated that the -revenue from customs in France fell from sixty million francs, in 1807, -to eighteen and a half million in 1808, and eleven and a half in 1809. -(Ibid. p. 1157.) - -[385] Correspondance de Napoléon, vol. xvii. p. 19. - -[386] Mr. Henry Adams (History of the United States, 1801-1817) gives -134 as the number of American ships seized between April, 1809, and -April, 1810, and estimates the value of the vessels and cargoes at -$10,000,000 (Vol. v. p. 242.) The author takes this opportunity of -acknowledging his great indebtedness to Mr. Adams's able and exhaustive -work, in threading the diplomatic intricacies of this time. - -[387] December 26, 1805. - -[388] Metternich's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 82. - -[389] Metternich to Stadion, Jan. 11, 1809; Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 312. - -[390] Letter of Napoleon to Louis, dated Trianon, Dec. 20, 1808; -Mémoires de Bourrienne, vol. viii. p. 134. Garnier's Louis Bonaparte, -p. 351. The date should be 1809. On Dec. 20, 1808, Napoleon was at -Madrid, in 1809 at Trianon; not to speak of the allusion to the -Austrian war of 1809. - -[391] Napoleon issued orders to this effect in August, 1807. Cargoes -of goods such as England might furnish were sequestrated; those that -could not possibly be of British origin, as naval stores and French -wines, were admitted. All vessels were to be prevented from leaving the -Weser. No notification of this action was given to foreign agents. See -Cobbett's Political Register, 1807, pp. 857-859. - -[392] Thiers, Consulate and Empire (Forbes's translation), vol. xii. p. -21. - -[393] Mémoires de Bourrienne, French Minister at Hamburg, vol. viii. -pp. 193-198. - -[394] Annual Register, 1809; State Papers, 747. - -[395] April 1, 1808; Naval Chronicle, vol. xxi. p. 48. May 7, 1809; -Annual Register, 1809, p. 698. - -[396] Napoleon saw, in 1809, that his work at Tilsit was all to be done -over, since the only war Russia could make against the English was -by commerce, which was protected nearly as before. There was sold in -Mayence sugar and coffee which came from Riga.—_Mémoires de Savary, duc -de Rovigo_ (Imperial Chief of Police), vol. iii. p. 135. - -[397] D'Ivernois, Effects of the Continental blockade, London, Jan., -1810. Lord Grenville, one of the leaders of the Opposition, expressed a -similar confidence when speaking in the House of Lords, Feb. 8, 1810. -(Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. xv. p. 347.) So also the King's speech -at the opening of Parliament, Jan. 19, 1809: "The public revenues, -notwithstanding we are shut out from almost all the continent of -Europe and entirely from the United States, has increased to a degree -never expected, even by those persons who were most sanguine." (Naval -Chronicle, vol. xxi. p. 48.) - -[398] Monthly Magazine, vol. xxi. p. 195. - -[399] Ibid., vol. xxii. p. 514. - -[400] Ibid., vol. xxi. p. 539. - -[401] Monthly Magazine, vol. xxii. p. 618. - -[402] Ibid., vol. xxiv. p. 611. - -[403] Ibid., vol. xxvi. p. 11. - -[404] Ibid., vol. xxvii. pp. 417, 641. - -[405] Ibid., p. 135. - -[406] Tooke's History of Prices, vol. i. pp. 300, 301. - -[407] Salgues, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la France, vol. -viii. pp. 350-355. Mémoires de Marmont, due de Raguse, vol. iii. p. -365. Mémoires de Savary, due de Rovigo, vol. v. p. 115. - -[408] Quarterly Review, May, 1811, p. 465. - -[409] For instance, a license was necessary for a British subject to -ship any articles to an enemy's port, though in a neutral vessel. In -principle, licenses are essential to trade with an enemy. In 1805 and -1807 Orders in Council dispensed with the necessity of a license in -particular instances; but even then merchants preferred to take out a -license, because it cut short any questions raised by British cruisers, -and especially by privateers. See Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. x. p. -924. - -[410] Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. x. p. 406. - -[411] For an interesting account of the neutralizing trade, see Naval -Chronicle, vol. xxxi. pp. 288-295, and vol. xxxii. p. 119. On the -License System, the Parliamentary Debates (table of contents), and the -Quarterly Review of May, 1811, may be consulted. - -[412] Quarterly Review, May, 1811, p. 461. Lindsay's History of -Merchant Shipping, vol. ii. p 316. - -[413] Petition of Hull merchants, 1812; Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. -xxi. p. 979. - -[414] Am. State Papers, vol. iii. p. 341. - -[415] Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxi. p. 1113. - -[416] Ross's Life of Admiral Saumarez, vol. ii. pp. 196, 241. - -[417] In the years 1809 and 1810 one hundred and sixty American vessels -alone were seized by Danish privateers. Only a part, however, were -condemned. (Am. State Papers, vol. iii. p. 521.) - -[418] Erskine's note to that effect was dated April 19, 1809. - -[419] Annual Register, 1809, p. 726. - -[420] Moniteur, Feb. 24, 1810. - -[421] Mémoires, vol. ix. pp. 21-24. - -[422] Cons. et Empire (Forbes's Trans.), xii. 15. - -[423] Corr. de Nap., vol. xx. p. 235. - -[424] Compare Metternich's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 188. - -[425] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xxxviii. p. 182. - -[426] Corr. de Nap., vol. xxi. p. 70: "Mon principe est, La France -avant tout." (Letter to viceroy of Italy.) - -[427] Parl. Debates, vol. xxi. p. 1050; xxiii. p. 540. - -[428] Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. xxi. pp. 1056, 1117. - -[429] The decree was also shrouded in secrecy, and its existence denied -in the Moniteur (Cobbett's Pol. Register, xviii. p. 701). Napoleon -wrote to the viceroy of Italy, Aug. 6, 1810: "You will receive a decree -which I have just issued to regulate duties on colonial produce.... It -is to be executed in Italy; it is secret and to be kept in your hands. -You will therefore give orders in pursuance of this decree only by -ministerial letters." (Corr., vol. xxi. p. 28.) - -[430] Thiers, Cons. et Empire, Book xxxviii. pp. 181-189. - -[431] Monthly Magazine, Feb. 1811, vol. xxxi. p. 67. - -[432] Corr. de Nap., vol. xxi. p. 58. - -[433] Corr. de Nap., vol. xxi. p. 224. - -[434] Ibid., p. 268. - -[435] Ibid., p. 77. - -[436] Ibid., pp. 70, 71. - -[437] Ibid., pp. 61, 62. - -[438] Cobbett's Pol. Register, vol. xviii. pp. 704, 722. - -[439] At Bordeaux licensed vessels were known to take on board wines -and brandies for the British army in Portugal. (Mémoires du duc de -Rovigo, vol. v. p. 60.) - -[440] Bourrienne, Mémoires, vol. viii. p. 261. - -[441] Mémoires du duc de Rovigo, vol. v. p. 66. - -[442] Mémoires de Bourrienne, vol. ix. p. 60. - -[443] Porter's Progress of the Nation, sect. iii. p. 205. In 1815, -after Napoleon's overthrow, the price fell to £34. - -[444] Tooke's Hist. of Prices, vol. i. p. 354. - -[445] Souvenirs du duc de Vicence, vol. i. p. 88. - -[446] Both Monroe and Pinkney, while ministers in London, informed the -United States government that the extreme measures taken were popular. -(Am. State Papers, vol. iii. pp. 188, 206.) - -[447] Letter on the Genius and Disposition of the French Government; by -an American lately returned from Europe, pp. 189-192. Baltimore, 1810. -See also Metternich's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 476, for the unhappiness of -France. - -[448] Mémoires du due de Raguse, vol. iii. p. 423. Marmont adds: "This -was a powerful help to French industry _during that time of suffering -and misery_." - -[449] Tooke's History of Prices, vol. i. p. 311. - -[450] In like manner, vessels with British licenses frequently slipped -into French ports, especially with naval stores from the Baltic. - -[451] "There was not a Dutchman," says M. Thiers, "who had not lost -fifty per cent by foreign loans." (Cons. et Empire (Forbes's trans.), -xii. 47.) - -[452] "The emperor does desire war, because he needs more or less -virgin soil to explore, because he has need to occupy his armies and to -entertain them at the expense of others.... M. Romanzow has repeated to -me a long conversation he had had with the emperor. 'He wants money,' -said he,—'he does not hide it; he wishes war against Austria to procure -it.'" (Metternich to Stadion, Feb. 17, 1809; Memoirs, ii. 329.) The -Austrian war of 1809 brought $34,000,000 into Napoleon's military -chest. (Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xxxviii. p. 34.) - -[453] Thus to Davout, commanding the Army of Germany: "I shall need -much money, which should make you feel the importance of obtaining for -me as much as you can, and asking of me as little as possible." (Corr., -March 24, 1811.) - -[454] This condition of the debt was partly factitious, Napoleon -maintaining the public funds at eighty, by the secret intervention of -the military chest. (Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xli. p. 18.) - -[455] Mémoires du duc de Rovigo, vol. v. p. 116. - -[456] Genius and Disposition of French Govt., p. 166. Baltimore, 1810. - -[457] Genius and Disposition of French Govt., pp. 181-192. - -[458] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xli. p. 22. - -[459] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xli. p. 11. - -[460] Arnold's History of Rome, opening of chap. xliii. - -[461] It is interesting to observe in Metternich's letters, while -ambassador at Paris, how he counts upon this exhausting of the capital -of French soldiers as the ultimate solution of the subjection of -Austria. "For some time Napoleon has lived on anticipations. The -reserves are destroyed." (April 11, 1809.) Compare also his exclamation -to the emperor in 1813: "Is not your present army anticipated by -a generation? I have seen your soldiers; they are mere children." -(Memoirs, vol. i. p. 189). - -[462] See Metternich's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 477. - -[463] Corr. de Nap., vol. xxi. p. 497 (Feb. 28, 1811). - -[464] Ibid., p. 275. - -[465] Ibid., p. 296. - -[466] These contentions of Napoleon were for the most part perfectly -correct. Some interesting facts, bearing upon the true character of the -so-called neutral trade in the Baltic, may be gathered from Ross's Life -of Saumarez, vol. ii. chaps. ix.-xiii. See also representations made -by a number of American ship-captains, Am. State Papers, vol. iii. pp. -329-333. On the other hand, the scrupulously upright John Quincy Adams, -U. S. minister to Russia, affirmed that he positively knew some of the -American ships to be direct from the United States. The facts, however, -only show the dependence of the world at that time upon the Sea Power -of Great Britain, which made Napoleon's Continental System impossible; -yet, on the other hand, it was his only means of reaching his enemy. If -he advanced, he was ruined; if he receded, he failed. - -[467] During one year, 1809, this fleet captured 430 vessels, averaging -sixty tons each, of which 340 were Danes. Among these were between -thirty and forty armed cutters and schooners, of which Denmark had to -employ a great many to supply Norway with grain. The remaining ninety -vessels were Russian. (Naval Chronicle, vol. xxii. p. 517.) - -[468] "Once more I must tell you," wrote a Swedish statesman to -Saumarez, "that you were the first cause that Russia dared to make war -against France. Had you fired one shot when we declared war against -England, all had been ended and Europe would have been enslaved." -(Ross's Saumarez, vol. ii. p. 294.) - -[469] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xlii. p. 383. - -[470] Compare Metternich's argument with the French Minister of Foreign -Affairs, October, 1807. (Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 161.) - -[471] Annual Register, 1792; State Papers, p. 355. - -[472] Moniteur, Dec. 25, 1792; Proposition of M. Barailon. - -[473] Pitt's Speeches, vol. ii. pp. 46, 47. - -[474] Lanfrey's Napoleon, vol. iv. p. 112 (Eng. trans., ed. 1886). - -[475] Lanfrey's Napoleon, vol. ii. chap. iii. p. 122 (Eng. trans., 2d -ed.). - -[476] Jurien de la Gravière, Vie de l'Amiral Baudin, p. 9. - -[477] That is, about 8 per cent annually. The increase during the four -years of the elder Pitt in the Seven Years' War, 1757-1761, was 29 per -cent, about 7 per cent annually. - -[478] Système Maritime et Politique des Européens dans le 18me -siècle, par Arnould. Paris, 1797. - -[479] For Napoleon's own assertion of this fact, see "Note pour le -Ministre des Relations Extérieures," Corr. de Nap., Oct. 7, 1810. See -also _ante_, p. 320. - -[480] Martin, Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. i. p. 396. - -[481] Annual Register, 1793, p. 163. For the correspondence on that -occasion see A. R. 1792; State Papers, pp. 326, 327. See also letter of -Le Brun, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the Moniteur of Aug. -26, 1792. - -[482] The Directory tended to impose upon the smaller states, -neighboring to or allies of France, republican constitutions, -"unitaires" (centralized) in form, analogous to our own, as Bonaparte -had done for the Cisalpine Republic and for Genoa. It had just done so -in Holland, where it had raised against the government of the United -Provinces a kind of 18th of Fructidor (coup d'état). It now (1798) -aimed at revolutionizing Switzerland. Bonaparte urged it on. He had -already provoked a revolution in a republic near to and allied with the -Swiss, that of the Grisons.—MARTIN: _Hist. de France depuis_ 1789, vol. -iii. p. 7. - -[483] Napoleon's remark referred to the edicts of the Directory, -confiscating British goods wherever found on land; but it applies -equally to the decree of January, 1798, which extended the edict to -the sea: "Le Directoire ébaucha le système du blocus continental; il -ordonna la saisie de toutes les marchandises Anglaises qui pouvaient -se trouver à Mayence et dans les autres pays cédés à la France." -(Commentaires de Napoléon I., Paris, 1867, vol. iii. p. 413.) - -[484] This correspondence, so far as published, is to be found in the -Annual Register for 1797; State Papers, pp. 181-223. - -[485] See Stanhope's Life of Pitt, vol. ii. p. 224 (ed. 1879). - -[486] For a graphic description of the effects of the Berlin decree on -the Continent, see Fyffe's History of Modern Europe, vol. i. p. 328. - -[487] Metternich's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 65. - - - - -INDEX. - - - _Acre_, Siege of, by Bonaparte, - i. 294-302. - - _Alexander_, Czar of Russia - ii. succeeds to the throne, 55; - Convention with Great Britain, June, 1801, 57; - coolness toward Bonaparte, 69, and note; - joint action with Bonaparte in German indemnities, 84; - conditions required before guaranteeing status of Malta, 92; - attitude upon the execution of the Duc d'Enghien, 129, 177; - joins Third Coalition, 177; - defeated at Austerlitz, 182; - commercial policy, 200; - campaign of Eylau and Friedland, 273; - Treaty of Tilsit, 274, 310; - meeting at Erfurt, 293; - war with Sweden, 293; - joint letter with Napoleon to king of Great Britain, 294; - attitude toward the Continental System, 303, 324, 329; - peace with Sweden, 316; - uneasiness at extension of French empire, 324; - dissatisfaction at the annexation of Oldenburg, 330; - disagreement with Napoleon concerning the Continental System, - 344,401; - understanding reached with Great Britain and Sweden, 347; - peace with Turkey, 350; - attacked by Napoleon, 351. - - _Antwerp_, commercial isolation of, - i. in 1780, 9; - naval importance of, 15; - development under Napoleon as a naval arsenal, 377. - - _Armed Neutrality_, of 1800, - ii. signature and affirmations of, 36; - dissolution of, 57. - - _Austria_, - i. natural ally of Great Britain, 12; - quarrel with Holland about the Scheldt, 17; - war with Turkey, 1788, 19; - successes, 24; - peace with Turkey, 25; - joins in Declaration of Pilnitz, 28; - war with France, 29; - driven from Netherlands, 1792, 31; - jealousy of Prussia, 80; - holds Italian duchies, 84; - successes in 1793, 93; - mistakes, 94; - reverses, 103, 168; - forced to retire across the Rhine in 1794, 169, 171; - strengthens alliance with Great Britain, 172; - successes of 1795, 181-183; - campaign in Italy, 1795, 195-198; - reverses in Italy, 1796, 209-212, 216, 217, 233; - signs preliminaries of Leoben, 234; - Treaty of Campo Formio, Austrian gains and losses, 250; - dissatisfaction at French occupation of Rome, 279; - tumult in Vienna, 280; - alliance with Naples and Russia, 1798, 282; - ii. renewal of war with France, 3; - successes in Switzerland and Italy, 4-8; - defeat at battle of Zurich, 1799, 9; - refusal to treat with Bonaparte, 16; - disastrous campaigns of 1800 in Germany and Italy, 19-24; - negotiations with Great Britain and France, 25; - armistice with France, 25, 35; - renewal of hostilities and defeat of Hohenlinden, 38; - Peace of Lunéville, 39; - loss of power by German indemnities, 84; - joins Third Coalition, 177-179; - disastrous campaign of Austerlitz, 181; - Peace of Presburg, 182; - accedes to the Continental System, 1807, 278; - preparations to renew the war, 297; - war with France in 1809, 314-316; - Peace of Vienna and renewed exclusion of British goods, 316. - - - _Barham_, Lord, First Lord of Admiralty, - ii, 168; - masterly action of, before Trafalgar, 169, 174. - - _Battles_, land, - Aboukir, i. 322; - Arcola, i. 233; - Austerlitz, ii. 182; - Badajos,ii. 349; - Castiglione, i. 233; - Ciudad Rodrigo, ii. 348; - Eckmuhl, ii. 315; - Essling, ii. 316; - Eylau, ii. 273; - Fleurus, i. 168; - Friedland, ii. 274; - Jena, ii. 270; - Jemappes, i. 31; - Lodi, i. 210; - Loano, i. 198; - Marengo, ii. 23; - Pyramids, i. 277; - Rivoli, i. 233, 243; - Talavera, ii. 315; - Valmy, i. 30; - Wagram, ii. 316; - Wattignies, i. 103. - - _Battles_, sea, - Algesiras, ii. 63-66; - Camperdown, i. 378; - Copenhagen, ii. 47-51; - First of June, i. 126-155; - Hotham and Martin, i. 190-194; - Île Groix, i. 177; - Nile, i. 261-277; - St. Vincent, i. 221-229; - Trafalgar, ii. 185-195. - - _Bettesworth_, captain, British navy, - ii. fortunate meeting with combined fleets in June, 1805, - 163, 167. - - _Bonaparte_, Napoleon, - i. interest in the East, 14; - influence upon course of events, 183; - appointed to command Army of Italy, 203; - successful campaign of 1796, 207-211; - designs upon Corsica, 213; - opinion of the effect of British Mediterranean fleet upon his - operations, 217; - critical position in Italy, May, 1796-Feb. 1797, 233; - fall of Mantua, 233; - advances into Carinthia, 234; - signs preliminaries of Leoben, 234; - offence at action of the Council of Five Hundred, 244; - sends Augereau to support _coup d'état_, 244; - deep projects for maritime and Oriental expansion, 246-249; - signs Treaty of Campo Formio, 250; - opinion of danger to France from British Sea Power, 251; - return to Paris and command of Army of England, 252; - Egyptian expedition organized, 253; - sails from Toulon, 256; - captures Malta, and sails thence for Egypt, 257; - lands at Alexandria, 260; - orders concerning the disposition of the fleet, 261-263; - criticism of Nelson's conduct, 275; - conquest of Lower Egypt, 277; - objects in Egyptian undertaking, 288; - Syrian expedition, 290; - siege of Acre, 299; - retreat into Egypt, 302; - criticisms upon Sir Sidney Smith, 303; - defeats Turks at Aboukir, 322; - return to France, 324; - criticism upon his Oriental projects, 324-328; - attempts to send relief to Egypt and Malta, 329-331; - views as to condition of French in Egypt, 332; - views as to relative importance of Brest and Antwerp, 377; - ii. policy as first consul, 15, 20; - campaign of Marengo, 22; - negotiations with Austria and Great Britain, 1800, 25, 34, - 35, 38-40; - overtures to the Czar, 29, 32, 37; - to Prussia, 28, 31; - efforts to form a coalition against Great Britain, 25-37; - Mediterranean projects, 1800-1801, 59-68; - anxiety for maritime peace, 70; - sends expedition to Haïti, 78; - president of Cisalpine republic, 80; - first consul for life, 83; - aggressions in 1802, 84-90; - insults to Great Britain, 93-96; - projects against Great Britain, 1803, 100; - preparations to invade England, 102, 105, 111-117; - invasion of Hanover and Naples, 109-111; - first combinations to invade England, 124; - becomes emperor, May, 1804, 130. See also Napoleon. - - _Boulogne_, - ii. point of concentration for Bonaparte's flotilla for invasion - of England, 113; - preparations at, 114; - strategic value of, 116; - appearance in 1814, 182. - - _Brest_, - i. character and surroundings of the port, 304, 305, 342-344; - methods of watching observed by Howe and Bridport, 345, 346, - 364-367; - St. Vincent's methods, 368-376; - paralysis as a port of equipment, 376; - Napoleon's preference for Antwerp, 377. - - _Bridport_, Lord, British admiral, - i. succeeds Howe in command of Channel fleet, 165; - action of Île Groix, 177; - escape of the French fleet from Brest, 1799, 305; - method of watching Brest, 345, 346; - French expedition against Ireland, 360-367; - anecdote of, 368; - relieved in command by St. Vincent, 368. - - _Brueys_, French admiral, - i. commands French division in Adriatic, 252, 255; - designs upon Malta in 1798, 255; - appointed to command fleet in Egyptian expedition, 253; - negligent conduct of, 262, 263; - inadequate preparations for defence, 264-266; - Battle of the Nile, 266-272; - killed, 271. - - _Bruix_, French admiral, - i. escape from Brest with twenty-five ships-of-the-line, in 1799, - 305; - enters Mediterranean, 307; - action in Mediterranean, 312-315; - re-enters Atlantic accompanied by sixteen Spanish ships, 315; - reaches Brest, 316; - comments on this cruise, 318; - ii. instructions of Bonaparte to, in 1800, 60-63; - connection with invasion flotilla, and death, 130. - - - _Calder_, British admiral, - ii. ordered to command a detached squadron, 168; - action with combined fleets, 171; - court-martial upon, 174. - - _Catharine_, Empress of Russia, - i. influence upon Joseph II., Emperor of Germany, 11; - relations with Austria and France, 1784, 16, 17; - naval undertakings, 1788, 20; - attitude toward French Revolution, 82, 243; ii. 233; - ii. death, 243. - - _Chauvelin_, French ambassador to Great Britain, - i. disputes with British ministry, 32-34; - dismissed from Great Britain, 34. - - _Collingwood_, British admiral, - i. remarks of, 70, 71, 75, 309 (note); - attention to health of crew, 71; - distinguished share in battle of Cape St. Vincent, 227; - ii. blockade off Rochefort, 118; - ordered to West Indies with eight ships in 1805, 155, 157; - blockade of Cadiz, 157, 159, 167, 175, 180; - surmise as to Napoleon's intentions, 156; - brilliant conduct at Trafalgar, 191; - succeeds to command after Nelson's death, 195. - - _Commerce_, warfare against, - ii. chaps. xvii. and xviii. - - _Commerce_-destroying, - i. by scattered cruisers, 179, 326-328, 335-338; ii. 199-218, - 221-228. - - _Cornwallis_, British admiral, - i. action with superior French fleet, 177; - tenacity in maintaining Brest blockade, 373, 376; ii. 98, 118, - 119, 123, 128, 148, 153; - orders to detach squadron under Calder to meet Villeneuve, - 168; - joined by Calder and Nelson, 174; - mistake in dividing his force, 176. - - _Corsica_, - i. acquired by France in 1769, 88; - relations to France and to Great Britain, 88; - revolt against the Convention, 88; - French expelled by British, 187; - union with Great Britain proclaimed, 188; - difficulties of government by Great Britain, 188, 189; - value of the island, 179, 186; - Bonaparte's measures to recover, 213, 216; - evacuated by the British, 216; - contributes a detachment to Egyptian Expedition, 254, 257. - - - _Davout_, French marshal, - ii. battle of Eckmuhl, 314; - charged with maintenance of Continental System, 317; - command in Prussia and Hanse towns, 319; - injunctions of Napoleon to, 337, note. - - _Decrees_, French, - of Fraternity, Nov. 19, 1792, i. 31, ii. 361; - extending French system, Dec. 15, 1792, i. 32, ii. 367; - ii. affecting neutral carriers, 231, 234, 242-246; - confiscating ships carrying goods of British origin, January, - 1798, 249, 250, 254-259; - Napoleon's Berlin, 271-273, 281; - Milan, 290; - Bayonne and Rambouillet, 291, 292; - general seizure of goods of British origin, August, 1810, 324; - public burning of British manufactures, Oct. 19, 1810, 327. - - _De Galles_, Morard, French admiral, - i. commands Brest fleet in 1793, 61-63; - conduct in the mutiny of that year, 62; - opinions as to the efficiency of the seamen, 61; - commands naval part of Irish Expedition, 1796, 350-360. - - _Denmark_, - i. hostility to Sweden, 21; - invades Sweden, 1788, 21; - stopped by Great Britain and Prussia, 22, 25; - seeks the commercial advantages of neutrality in French - Revolution, 83; - loss of West India colonies, 121; - ii. quarrel with Great Britain about rights of convoy, 26; - Bonaparte tries to conciliate, 30; - joins Armed Neutrality of 1800, 36; - British expedition against, 41-47; - battle of Copenhagen, 47-51; - armistice with Great Britain, 51, and convention, 58; - Napoleon's designs against, 276; - second British expedition and bombardment of Copenhagen, 277; - shares in Continental System, 301; - privateering by Danish seamen, 313; - deprived of Norway, 350. - - _De Rions_, D'Albert, French commodore, - i. mobbed by the populace of Toulon, 41-44; - commands Brest fleet in mutiny of 1790, 45; - leaves the navy and emigrates, 46; - Suffren's high opinion of, 46. - - _Devins_, Austrian general, - i. inefficiency of, in 1795 in Italy,195-198. - - _Directory_, - i. established as French executive government, 175, 176; - arrogance toward foreign states, 240, 242; - ii. disasters and incompetency of, 1-14; - overthrown by Bonaparte, 15; - identity of spirit with Napoleon, 258, 354, 396, 398. - - _Dumouriez_, French general, - i. wins battles of Valmy and Jemappes, 30, 31, 89; - defeated at Neerwinden and driven from Holland and - Netherlands, 89; - treason of, 89. - - - _Egypt_, - i. nominal dependence upon Turkey under the Mamelukes, 85; - genesis of Bonaparte's expedition to, 246-249; - conquest of, by the French, 260, 277, 288-290; - Bonaparte's purpose in the enterprise, 288; - loss of, by the French, 330-334; - Kleber's opinion of the value of, 331; - tenure dependent upon control of the sea, 331, 332, ii. 60-63; - ii. restored to Turkey, 72; - condition under Turkish rule, 94, 150; - Nelson's apprehensions for, 124-127; - his search for the French fleet in Alexandria, 1805, 144. - - _Elba_, island of, - i. seized by British, though a possession of Tuscany, 213; - evacuated, 220; - ii. transferred to France at Peace of Amiens, 82. - - _Elliott_, Sir Gilbert, - i. British Viceroy of Corsica, 187, 188, 213; - quoted, 188, 217, 218; - returns to England, 230. - - - _Flotilla_, - ii. for invasion of England, numbers and character of, 111-116; - estimate of, as a fighting force by British naval officers and - Napoleon, 120-122; - ultimate fate of, 182. - - _Fox_, British statesman, - ii. opinion as to "free ships, free goods," 261; - minister of foreign affairs, 1806, 269; - modification of Rule of 1756 by Order in Council of - May, 1806, 270; - death, 270; - praise of French soldiery, 365; - disparagement of Pitt, 387. - - _France_, - i. results of war of 1778 to, 3, 4; - condition of, in 1789, 6; - policy of, as to Sweden, Poland, and Turkey, 13; - interest in the Levant and the Baltic, 14, 22; - interest in Netherlands, 15, and Holland, 16-18; - alliance with Holland, 1785, 18; - increasing internal disorder, 18, 24; - meeting of States General, 25; - outline of events in the Revolution to Feb. 1, 1793, 28-33; - declares war against Austria, 29, - and against Great Britain and Holland, 34; - condition of the navy in 1793, and causes thereof, 35-68; - comparative strength of British and French fleets, 75, 110; - acquisition and status of Corsica, 88; - internal conflicts in 1793, 89-92; - disasters on eastern frontiers, 93; - energy shown by the government, 93-96; - disasters retrieved in 1793, 103; - internal rebellions quelled, 104, 105; - condition and importance of West India Islands, 111, 114, 115; - contest over West India Islands, 115-119; - scarcity of provisions, 1793, 122; - convoy of provisions ordered from America, 122; - internal events, 1794, 166-168; - military successes in 1794, 168-171; - conquest of Belgium and Holland, 170; - peace with Prussia, Holland, and Spain, 172; - reaction of 1795, 173, 174; - internal disorders, 175, 176; - great fleets withdrawn from the sea, and policy of - commerce-destroying adopted, 179, 201; - military weakness in 1795, 180-183; - loses Corsica, 1794, 187; - successes in Italy, 1795-1796, 198, 209-211, 233, 234; - regains Corsica, 216; - brings Austria to peace, 234, 250; - arrogance toward foreign governments, 240-243; - reactionary disorders, 243; - coup d'état of Sept. 3, 1797, 244; - danger from Great Britain, 251; - sends expedition to Egypt, 253; - capture of Malta by, 257; - naval defeat at the Nile, 263-277; - subjugation of Egypt by, 277, 289; - aggressions upon Holland and Switzerland, 278; - offence given to Naples, Austria, and Russia, 280-282; - reverses in the Mediterranean, 1798, 287; - expectations from conquest of Egypt, 288; - reverses in Europe, 1799, 323, - loss of Malta and Egypt, 328-334; - maritime impotence of, 335-338, - expeditions against Ireland, 346-380; - ii. conquest of Naples, 2; - reverses in Europe, 1799, 3-11, 407; - internal disorders, 1799, 11-15; Bonaparte first consul, 15; - successful campaign of 1800, 19-24; - maritime and colonial exhaustion, 1800, 25, 35; - peace of Lunéville with Austria, 39; - fruitless attempts to control Mediterranean, 59-68; - preliminaries of peace with Great Britain, 71-73; - exhaustion of national spirit of aggression, 74; - aggressions of Bonaparte, 1801-1803, 76-97; - cession of Louisiana by Spain, 77; - Peace of Amiens with Great Britain, 81; - renewal of war, 98; - Louisiana ceded to United States, 104; - maritime and financial weakness, 106-108; - occupation of Hanover and heel of Italy, 109-111; - preparations for invasion of England, 111-117; - exactions from Spain, 133; - Trafalgar campaign, 140-181; - its chances of success discussed, 182-184; - necessity of invading England, 184; - campaign of 1805 and battle of Austerlitz, 181; - naval defeat of Trafalgar, 187-195; - far-reaching consequences of this battle, 196; - succeeded by the Continental System, 197-200; - maritime impotence of, 202; - activity of privateers, 207-210; - characteristics of privateering, in Europe, 208, - in Atlantic, 210, - in West Indies, 212, - in East Indies, 215-218; - destruction of French commerce, 218-220, 375; - bitterness against Great Britain and maritime neutrals, 230; - anger against United States, 239; - measures directed against neutral carriers, 242-248, 250-254; - results of these measures, 254-258; - _quasi_ war with the United States, 258; - true commercial policy of, 262-265, 280, 354; - commercial measures of Napoleon, 265; - Berlin Decree, 271; - campaign against Russia, 273; - Peace of Tilsit, 274; - invasion of Portugal, 277; - Milan Decree, 290; - war in Spain, 292; - war with Austria, 1809, 314; - excessive prices in, 322; - internal distress of, 333-337, 340-342, 349; - want of credit, 339, 343; - disputes with Russia, 344; - invasion of Russia, 351; - analysis of commercial measures of Napoleon, 351-357; - temper and aims of leaders in French Revolution, 359-363, 367, - 384, also 74; - decrees of November 19, 361, - and December 15, 367; - effect of the maritime war upon French industry, 395; - identity of spirit in the Republic, the Directory, and in - Napoleon, 396-399; - the struggle with Great Britain one of endurance, 406; - similarity of characteristics in the external action of France - from 1793-1812, 407-411; - continued vitality of the movement due to Bonaparte, 407, 408. - - - _Ganteaume_, French admiral, - i. report of condition of French naval officers and seamen, 1801, 65; - injuries received by squadron under his command, 67; - commerce-destroying cruise in 1795, 202; - brings Bonaparte back from Egypt to France, 323; - escape from Brest in 1801, 376, ii. 61; - failure to relieve Egypt, 62; - maritime prefect at Toulon, 1803, 125; - command of Brest fleet, 1804, and instructions from Napoleon, - 131, 147; - modified instructions, 149; - unable to escape from Brest, 153; - awaits Villeneuve outside the Goulet, 154. - - _Genoa_, coasting trade with Southern France, i. 195, 200, ii. 7; - i. French intrigues in, 201, 213; - preparations in, for Egyptian Expedition, 254, 257; - organized as Republic of Liguria by Bonaparte, 278, 279; - ii. Admiral Bruix reinforces, 313, 5, 6; - Masséna besieged in, 20-23; - made a military division of France, 69, note, 85; - annexed to France, 177; - effect of this measure upon Austria, 177. - - _Gravina_, Spanish admiral, - ii. commands the allied rear at the battle of Trafalgar, 187, - 188, 194. - - _Great Britain_, - i. importance of her action against France, 1; - results to, of War of 1778, 3, 8; - recovery of prosperity under second Pitt, 5; - importance to, of public confidence in Pitt, 6; - attitude toward Russia, 1770-1790, and interest in the Levant - and Baltic, 10-17, 20-23, 25, 27; - relations to Holland and the Netherlands, 15-17, 19, 21, 32; - relations to Turkey, 12, 22-24; - alliance with Prussia and Holland, 19, 21, 22, 25; - refuses to interfere in French Revolution, 1791, 29; - change of feeling in, 30; - recalls her ambassador from Paris, 32; - dismisses French ambassador, 34; - war declared against, by France, 34; - influence of, 1793-1815, 68; - condition of navy in 1793, 69-75; - policy of, in war of French Revolution, 81; - takes possession of Toulon, 92; - unpreparedness of, in 1793, 96; - military and naval policy, 97-103; - evacuates Toulon, 105; - effect produced by, in Peninsular War, 106 (note); - importance of West Indies to, 109-111; - mistaken action in Haïti, 111-113, 116; - reduces the Lesser Antilles, 115; - reverses and loss of Guadaloupe, 116-119; - sufferings of West India trade, 120; - takes Trinidad, 120; - and other West India colonies, 121; - takes part in Continental War as ally of Holland, 93; - withdraws from Holland, 169, 170; - injury to, from French conquest of Holland, 170; - war with Holland and capture of Dutch colonies, 170; - new treaties with Austria and Russia, 172; - interests and policy in Mediterranean, 185, 186; - political union of Corsica with, 188; - abandons Corsica, 215; - impolicy of evacuating Mediterranean, 217, 218; - depression of, in 1797, 229; - effect of battle of Cape St. Vincent, 231; - security due to sea power, 236; - negotiations for peace, 1796, 240; - in 1797, 245; - naval successes of 1797, 255; - resolve again to dispute control of Mediterranean, 256; - joins Second Coalition, 282; - frustrates Bonaparte's Oriental projects, 324; - dependence upon sea power, 327; - policy of, for protection of commerce, 337, ii. 203-205; - ii. expedition against Holland, 1799, 8-10; - prosperity of, in 1800, 17-19, 227-231; - collision with northern states about neutral rights, 26-37, - 260-262; - Baltic Expedition of 1801, 41-57; - conventions with Baltic powers, 57, 58, 261; - influence of sea power, 69, 74; - peace with France, 71-75, 81; - remonstrance with Bonaparte upon his intervention in - Switzerland, 88-90; - strained relations with France, 90-97; - renewal of war, 98; - unanimity of British people, 99; - policy of renewing the war, 105-108; - measures for resisting invasion, 117-122; - quarrel with Spain, 1804, 133-139; - naval dispositions, 1805, 148; - insight of naval authorities, 157-159, 166; - effect upon the fortunes of Napoleon, 184, 196-201; - control of sea by, 218; - losses by capture, 221-227; - dependence upon neutral carrier, 229-231; - restrictions upon neutral trade, 233-239, 240-242; - Jay's treaty with, 237; - prosperity of trade, 249-254; - general policy as to neutral trade, 262, 266-268; - seizures of American ships, 1805, 269; - blockade of coast of Europe, 269; - Order in Council of January, 1807, 275; - expedition against Denmark, 1807, 276; - Orders in Council of November, 1807, 283-290; - landing in Portugal, 292; - supports Spanish revolt, 294; - operations in Peninsula, 296, 315, 318, 343, 348, - also i. 106-108; - seizure of Heligoland, 302; - conditions of trade, 1806-1812, 304-306, 329-333, 340-342, 354, - 373, 377-382; - License System, 308-313; - Order in Council of April, 1809, 313; - credit of, 339; - internal condition, 340; - influence in Baltic, 346; - policy and rightfulness of the Orders in Council, 351-357; - influence upon the French Revolution and Empire, chap. xix. - - - _Haïti_, French colony, - i. early revolutionary disorders in, 47-49, 111; - British operations in, 111-113, 116; - rule of Toussaint L'Ouverture, 113; - base of privateering, 120; - ii. Bonaparte's expedition against, 78; - its reverses, 94; - dependence upon American continent, 103; - loss of, to France, 103. - - _Hamburg_, - i. commercial importance of, during French Revolutionary wars, - 253, ii. 28, 108-110, 250, 251, 299, 301, 378; - ii. Cuxhaven occupied by Prussian troops, 36; - occupied by Danish troops, 54; - Napoleon's grudge against, 279; - imperial troops quartered on, 319; - confiscations of colonial produce, 324, 325; - annexed to French empire, 330. - - _Hanover_, - i. commercial importance to Great Britain, 253, ii. 110, 266; - ii. Prussian designs upon, 35, 110; - occupied by Prussian troops, 54; - evacuated, 68; - occupied by Bonaparte, 109; - offered by Bonaparte to Prussia, 179. - - _Hoche_, French general, - i. commanding army of Sambre and Meuse, 240, 377; - anxiety about reactionary movements in France, 244; - pacification of La Vendée, 347; - commands expedition against Ireland, 347-360; - interest in a second expedition, and death, 378. - - _Holland_, - i. weakness of, in 1781, 7; - fall of barrier towns and quarrel about the Scheldt, 7, 9, - 16-18; - relations to Great Britain and France, 1783-1793, 17-19; - relations to Russia, 16, 20; - occupied by Prussian troops, 1787, 19; - defensive alliance with Great Britain and Prussia, 1788, 21, - ii. 363, 384, 393; - the Scheldt opened, i. 31, ii. 362; - France declares war against, 1793, i. 34; - condition of navy, 78; - course of, in French Revolution, 83; - colonies of, 83; - invasion of, by Dumouriez, 1793, 89; - invasion and conquest by Pichegru, 1795, 169; - fall of stadtholder, and republic proclaimed, 170; - war with Great Britain and loss of colonies, 170, ii. 375, 394 - (see also West Indies, pp. 109-121); - treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with France, i. 172; - centralized constitution imposed by France, 278; - contemplated invasion of Ireland from, 378; - naval defeat at Camperdown, 378; - ii. compelled to war against Great Britain by Bonaparte in 1803, - 111; - share in Bonaparte's projected invasion of England, 119, 131, - 133, 147, 164, 165; - base of commerce-destroying, 207, 216; - demands upon the United States to resist seizure of belligerent - property, 247; - confiscation of goods of British origin ordered by Bonaparte, - 1803, 265; - confiscations of American ships by Bonaparte, 292, 320, 321; - Louis Bonaparte crowned king, 299; - withstands Napoleon's Continental System, 300, 305, 318, 320; - continuous blockade by British navy, 313; - Louis abdicates and Holland is annexed to French Empire, 321; - commercial ruin of, 1811, 336. - - _Hood_, Lord, British admiral, - i. commands Mediterranean fleet, 96; - receives surrender of Toulon, 92; - forced to evacuate the port, 105; - retires to Hyères Bay, 106; - conquest of Corsica, 187; - merit of, 207; - returns to England, 189; - succeeded by Jervis, 194, 203; - tactical dispositions at St. Kitt's, in 1782, compared to those - of Brueys in Aboukir Bay, 265. - - _Hotham_, British admiral, - i. commands in Mediterranean, 1795, 190-194; - sluggishness of, 192, 199-202, 207. - - _Howe_, Earl, British admiral, - i. commands Channel fleet, 96; - military character and naval policy of, 101; - naval campaign of 1794 and battle of June 1, 125-160; - admirable tactics of, 135, 149, 160; - strategic error of, 156-159; - retires from active service, 164; - opinion concerning Battle of the Nile, 273; - conduct of Brest blockade and Channel service, 162, 338-346. - - - _Ionian_ islands (Corfu and others), - i. possessions of Venice in 1793, and subsequent transfers, 86, - 235; - Bonaparte's desire for, 247-249 (and note); - transferred to France by treaty of Campo Formio, 250, 251; - indicated by Bonaparte as station for French fleet, 262; - taken from France by Russo-Turkish fleet, 286, ii. 10; - ii. constituted Republic of Seven Islands by peace of 1801, 71; - transferred to France by Treaty of Tilsit, 274. - - _Ireland_, - i. French expedition against, 1796, 346-361; in 1798, 378-380; - ii. Bonaparte's designs against, 124, 131; - British anxiety about, 156, 160, 171, 386; also, i. 306. - - _Italy_, - i. lack of political unity in, 81, 84, 185; - interest of Great Britain in, 185, 186; - campaign of 1795 in, 195-198; - part of the British fleet in the campaign, 199-201; - Bonaparte's campaign of 1796 in, 208-211, 233-236; - ii. French reverses in 1799, 3-10; - campaign of Marengo, 20-23; - Bonaparte's designs in, in 1800, 59, 80, 85, 86; - occupation of Naples, 1803, 109, 112, 124; - Napoleon crowned king of, 153; - commercial orders of Napoleon, 325, 326. - - - _Jay_, John, - ii. United States envoy to Great Britain, 237; - Treaty of Commerce and Navigation negotiated by, 237-239; - anger of French government, 239, 240, 244. - - _Jervis_, British admiral. See St. Vincent. - - _Joseph II._, Emperor of Germany, - i. succeeds Maria Theresa, 1780, 7; - raises the question of the Scheldt, 9, 17, 18; - attempts to exchange the Netherlands for Bavaria, 18; - declares war against Turkey, 19; - dies, 1790, 25. - - _Jourdan_, French general, - i. commands army of Sambre and Meuse, 1794, 168; - wins battle of Fleurus, 168; - pursuit of Austrians, 169; - operations of, 1795, 180-182; - disasters in 1796, 213, 216; - ii. command in Germany in 1799, 3; - defeated at Stokach, 3; - resigns command, 4. - - - _Keith_, British admiral, - i. commands naval division watching Cadiz, 286; - unexpected appearance of French fleet under Bruix, 1799, 307; - recalled to Gibraltar, 310; - sails in pursuit of Bruix, 312; - left in command of fleet by St. Vincent, 312; - further pursuit of French fleet, 312-316; - returns to Torbay, 316; - returns to Mediterranean as commander-in-chief, 316, 329; - conduct of pursuit examined, 320, 321; - letter to Kleber, 333; - ii. operations against French in Egypt, 1801, 60, 62; - commands squadron in the Downs, 1803-1805, 120, 148; - report of captures in Mediterranean, 219. - - _Kleber_, French general, - i. left by Bonaparte in command in Egypt, 331; - opinion as to dependence of Egypt upon the navy, 331; - Convention of El Arish, 332; - letter from Admiral Keith, 333; - assassinated, 334. - - - _Leopold_, Emperor of Germany, - i. succeeds Joseph II., 25; - makes peace with Turkey, 26; - joins Prussia in Declaration of Pilnitz, 28. - - _Levant_, the, - i. advance of Russia in, 10-12; - commercial and political importance of, 11; - interest of France in, 12, 14; - interest of Great Britain in, 23; - interest of Bonaparte in, 247-253, ii. 95. - - _License System_, - ii. of Great Britain, 307-313; - of Napoleon, 307, 326, 327, 329. - - _Linois_, French admiral, - ii. repels British fleet at battle of Algesiras, 63-66; - deceived by a body of East India ships, 214, 215. - - _Louis XVI._, King of France, - i. interferes between Austria and Holland, 17, 18; - brought from Versailles to Paris by the mob, 25; - flight from Paris and capture of, 1791, 28; - scenes of June 20 and August 10, 1792, 30; - suspended, 30; - and deposed, 31; - tried and executed, 32; - interest in the navy, 50, 67. - - _Louisiana_, - ii. cession by Spain to France, 67, 77; - apprehensions of Great Britain, 77; - anger of the United States people, 103; - sold to the United States by Bonaparte, 104. - - - _Malta_, Island of, - i. belongs to Knights of St. John in 1793, 87; - its dependence upon the fleet, 87; - importance of, 87, 247; - Bonaparte's designs upon, 255; - seized by Bonaparte, 257; - Nelson's opinion of, 258; - interest of the Czar, Paul I., in, 281, 282, ii. 32-34, 53; - blockaded by British and Portuguese squadron, and summoned to - surrender by Sir James Saumarez, i. 285; - isolation of, 285, 329; - surrendered to British, 330; - ii. stipulations of the preliminaries of peace in 1801, 72; - provisions of the Treaty of Amiens, 81; - disputes between England and France concerning, 91-98; - Orders in Council of 1807, 286, 287; - commercial importance, 1807-1812, 305. - - _Mann_, British admiral, - i. joins Mediterranean fleet, 194; - detached to blockade Richery in Cadiz, 202; - ordered to rejoin by Jervis, 213; - mistaken action of, 214, 215. - - _Marmont_, French marshal, - i. opinion concerning Sir Sidney Smith, 295 (note); - ii. commands corps in Holland for invasion of England, 117, 120, - 131, 165; quoted, i. 259 (note), ii. 102, 335. - - _Martin_, French admiral, - i. commands Toulon fleet in actions with British in 1795, 189-194. - - _Masséna_, French marshal, - ii. commander-in-chief in Switzerland and Germany, 1799, 3-5; - wins battle of Zurich, 9; - sent by Bonaparte to Italy, 15; - operations in Italy, 1800, 21; - besieged in Genoa, 22; - reverses in Portugal, 342, 348. - - _Missiessy_, French admiral, - ii. commands Rochefort division, 132; - escapes to the West Indies, 142, 144; - returns thence to Rochefort, 152, 166; - Napoleon's further purposes for, 165. - - _Montagu_, British admiral, - i. commands division under Lord Howe, May and June, 1794, 125, - 126, 156-161. - - _Moreau_, French general, - i. commands in Holland, 1795, 180; - advance into Germany, 1796, 216; - command in Italy, 1799, 313, - ii. and retreat before Suwarrow, 5-8; - appointed by Bonaparte to command in Germany, 15; - successful campaign of 1800, 21-24; - wins battle of Hohenlinden, 38; - arrest upon charge of royalist conspiracy, 129. - - - _Naples_, see Two Sicilies. - - _Napoleon_ (see also Bonaparte), - ii. Emperor of the French, 130; - plans for invading England modified by the death of Admiral - Latouche Tréville, 130; - second combination, 131; - his dealings with Spain, 1803-1804, 133-139; - failure to realize maritime conditions, 141; - instructions to Admirals Villeneuve and Missiessy, 142; - final combination, 146-150; - surmises as to British movements, 153-158, 162, 166, 170; - crowned King of Italy, 153; - suspicious of Austria, 1805, 176-179; - campaign of Austerlitz, 181; - constant embarrassment from the closure of the sea by the - British navy, 184; - anger against Admiral Villeneuve, 185; - effect of Trafalgar upon policy, 197, 223, 351; - miscalculation in his attempt to crush British commerce, 201; - vigor displayed in the attempt, 202; - measures at outbreak of war, 1803, 265; - Jena campaign, 270; - Berlin Decree, 271-273; - campaign against Russia, 1807, 274; - Treaty of Tilsit, 274; - projects against Portugal and Denmark, 276; - enforcement of his Continental System, 277-279, 310, 396; - additional vigor in Berlin Decree, 281; - character of the commercial warfare, 289; - Milan Decree, 290; - usurpation in Spain, 291; - meeting with the Czar at Erfurt, 293; - joint letter to George III., 294; - campaign in Spain, 1808, 295; - anger with Holland, 299; - war with Austria, 1809, 314-316; - exactions from Sweden, 316, 322; - increased severity of warfare on commerce, 317-328; - Holland annexed to the Empire, 321; - annexation of Oldenburg and the Hanse towns, 330; - license system, 332; - failing resources, 336; - military treasure, 337; - condition of credit, 338-340; - sufferings in France, 1811, 340-343, 349; - altercations with Russia, 344-346; - preparations for war, 347; - invades Russia, 351; - essential error of his Continental System, 351-355, 401, 402; - concentration of purpose, 366; - his services to the Revolution, 388, 400, 407; - Continental System inherited from Directory, 396, 399; - greatness of his power, 408; - effect upon it of the British sea-power, 409; - prolongation of the Revolution due to his genius, 411. - - _Navy, British_, - i. condition in 1793, 69-72; - mutinies in, 72, 73, 232, 236-239; - condition of material, 73-75; - force compared with French navy, 1793, 75; - in 1801, ii. 73; - tardy mobilization in 1793, i. 96, 97; - preponderance of, 110, 287, 290, 291, 324, 325, 328-338; - inefficient action in the Atlantic, i. 162, 338, 339; - ii. deficient strength in 1803, 122-124, 128, 148, 184; - effect on the French Revolution, 395, 405, 406; - increase under Pitt, 404, - and under his successors, 405. - - _Navy, Dutch_, - i. numbers and importance, i. 78; - inaction of, 171; - defeat at Camperdown, 255, 378. - - _Navy, French_, - i. deterioration after 1789, 35-41; - disorders in, 41-50, 60-63; - legislation by National Assemblies, 51-59; - effects of legislation, 59, 60, 122; - condition of officers and seamen, 64-66, 189, 193, 201; - condition of material, 66-68, 163, 179, 253, 338 (note); - force compared with British, 1793, 75; - in 1801, ii. 73; - inferiority in Mediterranean, 1798-1801, i. 287, 290, 291, 324, - 325, 328-334; ii. 25, 59-63; - inferiority and operations in Atlantic, i. 335-338; - ii. peace essential to restore, 69, 81, 107, 184. - - _Navy, Spanish_, - i. numbers of, 75; - inefficiency of, 76-78, 81, 213, 222, 231; - defeat at Cape St. Vincent, 221-228. - - _Nelson_, British Admiral, - i. significance of his services in the Baltic and the Levant, - 14, 22; - services in Corsica, 187; - early actions in the Mediterranean, 191-194; - services on Italian coast, 194-201, 208-212; - professional characteristics, 196, 205, 274, ii. 43-45, 52, 55, - 139, 156, 162, 163, 172; - takes possession of Elba, i. 213; - brilliant conduct at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 226-228; - wounded in expedition against Teneriffe, and returns to - England, 1797, 249; - rejoins fleet off Cadiz, April, 1798, 256; - sent to watch armaments in Toulon, May, 1798, 256; - pursuit of French fleet to Egypt, 258-261; - battle of the Nile, 266-272; - wounded, 272; - merits of, in this battle, 273-277; - sends word to India, 283; - goes to Naples, 284; - blockades Malta, 285; - distrust of Russia, 286, ii. 126; - relations with Sir Sidney Smith, i. 297; - incident of Bruix's incursion into the Mediterranean, 308-321; - return to England, 1800, 330, ii. 37; - views as to the French in Egypt, i. 331; - reasons for refusing chief command in Baltic to, 373, ii. 42; - ii. responsibility for action of Naples in 1798, 1; - detailed as second in command of the Baltic expedition, 37; - his letter to Parker on the political and military situation, - 43-47; - battle of Copenhagen, 48-51; - negotiates an armistice with Denmark, 51; - merit of his conduct, 52; - left in chief command and takes fleet to Revel, 56; - rebuked by the Czar, 57; - appointed to Mediterranean command on renewal of war in - 1803, 98; - difficulties and perplexities, 123-129; - opinion as to the dispositions of Spain in 1804, 139; - goes to Egypt in search of French at Villeneuve's first - sailing, 144; - return off Toulon, 150; - Villeneuve's second sailing, 151; - pursues to West Indies, 152, 159-161; - insight of, 156, 162; - return to Europe, 163, 167, 169, 174; - joins Brest fleet, 174, and returns to England, 175; - joins fleet off Cadiz, 181, 186; - battle of Trafalgar, 187; - death, 192. - - _Nielly_, French rear-admiral, - i. mentioned, 123, 126, 135, 155, 157. - - _Notables_, Assembly of, - i. in France, 1787, 7, 19; - meeting of, in 1788, 24. - - - _Orders_ in Council, British, June 8, 1793, - ii. arresting vessels carrying provisions to France, 233; - Nov. 6, 1793, seizing vessels laden with produce from enemy's - colonies, 234; - partial revocation of this, Jan. 8, 1794, 237; - further relaxation, January, 1798, 242; - Fox's, of May 16, 1806, establishing constructive blockade of - hostile coasts, 269; - Jan. 7, 1807, forbidding neutral trade between hostile - ports, 275; - Nov. 7, 1807, establishing constructive blockade of all ports - whence British flag was excluded, 283-290; - April 26, 1809, modifying those of Nov., 1807, 313; - final revocation of Orders of 1807 and 1809, 351; - analysis of their policy, 351-355. - - - _Paoli_, Corsican leader, - i. relations with Great Britain and France, 88; - promotes union of island to Great Britain, 187; - subsequent discontent, 188. - - _Parker_, Sir Hyde, British admiral, - i. command of Brest Blockade, 373; - ii. of expedition to Baltic, 42-56; - relieved of command, 56; - Nelson's censure of, 56. - - _Paul I._, Czar of Russia, - i. succeeds to the throne, 243; - becomes hostile to French Republic, 281; - interest in Malta, 281, ii. 32; - alliance with Austria, i. 282; - sends squadron to Mediterranean, 286; - ii. Russian army enters Italy, 5; - successes in Italy and reverses in Switzerland, 5-9; - dissatisfaction with his allies, 11, 26; - Bonaparte's advances to, 29-33; - hostile measures toward Great Britain, 33; - formation of Armed Neutrality, 36; - sends ambassador to Bonaparte, 38; - importance to the northern league, 46; - murdered, 51. - - _Peace_, Treaties of, - Amiens, 1802, ii. 81 - (see also preliminaries, 71), - Basle, 1795, i. 172; - Campo Formio, 1797, i. 250; - Lunéville, 1801, ii. 39, 40; - Presburg, 1805, ii. 182; - Vienna, 1809, ii. 316. - Preliminaries of Leoben, 1797, i. 234; - of London, 1801, ii. 71. - - _Pellew_, British admiral, - i. commanding frigate off Brest, 351-354; - action with the "Droits de l'Homme," 357; - commands blockading force off Ferrol, ii. 118; - ii. opinion of the invasion flotilla, 120, - and of the condition of British navy, 123; - able measures for protection of trade in India, 217. - - _Perceval_, British statesman, - ii. statement as to the object of the Orders in Council of - November, 1807, 290, note. - - _Pilnitz_, declaration of, - i. by Austria and Prussia, 28; - effect upon the French people, 29. - - _Pitt_, British statesman, - i. prime minister of Great Britain, 5; - power in the nation, 6; - opposition to Russian advance in the East, 20-24; - attitude toward the French Revolution, 29, 32-34, - ii. 358-367, 382; - treats with France, 1796 and 1797, i. 240, 245; - ii. resigns office, 1801, 70; - supports preliminaries of peace negotiated by Addington - ministry, 72; - statement of object of British government in the war, 74, 75, - 383-385; - speech upon renewal of war in 1803, 99; - attack upon St. Vincent's administration of the navy, 123; - returns to office, and forms Third Coalition, 177, 267; - policy in seizing enemy's colonies defended, 217, 252, 386, - 393-395; - modifies Rule of 1756 and originates commercial war policy of - Great Britain, 242, 263; - speech on the Armed Neutrality of 1800, 260; - measures to restrain American trade with hostile colonies, - 267, 354; - death, 269; - prosperity of Great Britain under his war administration, - 380-382, 394, also 17-19; - comparison between himself and his father, 387-391; - general war policy of, 391-405; - growth of navy under, 404; - success practically attained at his death, 405; - his policy adopted by his successors, 405; - accurate forecast of course of French Revolution, 411. - - _Portugal_, Navy of, - i. in 1793, 78; - traditional alliance with Great Britain, 84; - co-operation with British navy, 162, 285; - French designs against, 219 (and note); - Bonaparte's designs upon, ii. 59, 67, 276, 296; - treaty with France, 77, 81; - Lisbon occupied by Junot's corps, 277; - flight of the Court to Brazil, 277; - ports closed to British trade, 277; - British land and expel Junot, 292; - Wellesley lands in 1809, 315; - British operations in, 318, 348; - Masséna invades, 326; - but forced to retreat, 342, 348. - - _Privateering_, - II. French, number of privateers captured, 1793-1800, 206; - their activity, 207; - privateering in the Channel and North Sea, 207-210; - in the Atlantic, 210-211; - in the West Indies, 211-214; - in the East Indies, 214-218. - - _Prussia_, - i. death of Frederic the Great, 1786, 19; - interference in Holland, 1787, 19; - defensive alliance with Great Britain and Holland, 1788, 21, 22, - King joins in Declaration of Pilnitz, 28; - takes arms against France, 30; - jealousy of Austria, 80, 94; - advance into France, 93; - retreat from France, 103; - inaction in 1794, 103, 171; - makes peace with France, 1795, 172; - guarantee of North German Neutrality, 172; - refusal to join Second Coalition, 282; - ii. rigorous neutrality after 1795, 28; - ambitions of, 31; - hostile attitude toward Great Britain in 1800, 34; - joins Armed Neutrality, 36; - opportunism of, 40; - closes the German rivers against British trade, 54; - subsequent coolness toward Bonaparte, 68; - rebuff from Bonaparte, 69, note; - favored by Bonaparte in apportioning German indemnities, 84; - Bonaparte's pressure upon, 95; - annoyance at Bonaparte's occupation of Hanover, 110; - indignation at murder of the Duc d'Enghien, 177; - Hanover offered to, by Bonaparte, upon conditions, 179; - commercial advantages through neutrality, 251; - war with France, and defeat of Jena, 270; - tyranny of Napoleon over, 301, 311, 319, 322, 324, 325; - share in "neutralizing" traffic, 309. - - - _Richery_, French admiral, - i. commerce-destroying expedition, 202, 214; - shares in expedition against Ireland, 214, 348-353. - - _Rule_ of 1756, - ii. conceded by Russia and the Baltic States, 57, 58, 261, 262; - statement of, 234-236; - seizure of American vessels under, 236-239; - modifications of, by British government, 237, 242, 262, 263, - 269; - evasion of, by American vessels, 253, 266-269; - extension of, by Orders in Council of January, 1807, 275; - tendency and importance of, 353-355, - arguments for and against, 356, also 235, 236. - - _Russia_, - i. relations with Austria, 1780-1790, 9, 11, 16, 17, 19, 24, 25; - advance of, since 1713, 10; - relations to Great Britain in 1770, 11, 12, - and in 1785, 13, 22, 23; - relations with France in 1785, 17; - war with Turkey, 1787, 19; - attempt to send fleet from Baltic to Mediterranean, 20; - war with Sweden, 1788, 21; - successes on Black Sea, 24-27; - peace with Turkey and Sweden, 27; - unfriendly attitude toward French Revolution, 34, 82, ii. 233; - partition of Poland, i. 82; - defensive alliance with Great Britain, 1795, 172; - death of Catharine and accession of Paul I., 243; - difficulties with France, 1798, 281; - joins Second Coalition, 282; - conjointly with Turkey sends fleet against the Ionian - Islands, 286; - ii. Russian army enters Italy, 5; - battles of the Trebia, 6, - and of Novi, 8, - won from the French, 1799; - Russian army marches into Switzerland, 9, - and retires into Bavaria, 11; - reduction of the Ionian Islands, 10; - abandons the Coalition, 11, 19; - dissatisfaction of the Czar, 26; - interest in peace with England, 28, 29, 289, 293, 306, 329; - measures of Paul I. against Great Britain, 32-34; - Armed Neutrality renewed, 36, 260; - admiration of Paul for Bonaparte, 32, 38; - assassination of Paul and accession of Alexander, 51, 56; - convention with Great Britain, 1801, 57, 261; - attitude concerning Malta, 92; - breach with France caused by murder of Duc d'Enghien, 177; - mission to Great Britain and formation of Third Coalition, 177; - effect of Russia upon the struggle between Great Britain and - Napoleon, 200, 401, 409; - war with France, 1807, 273; - conventions of Tilsit between Russia and France, 274, 276, 278, - 310, 329, 405; - war declared against Great Britain, 278, 305; - conventions of Erfurt with Napoleon, 293; - war with Sweden, 1808, 293; - joint letter of Czar and Napoleon to George III., 294; - enforcement of the Continental System, 301, 303, 306, 329, 336, - 406; - peace with Sweden, 1809, 316; - causes leading to war with France in 1812, 325, 330, 336, - 344-346, 397, 401; - alliance with Great Britain and Sweden, 347, 350; - peace with Turkey, 350; - Napoleon's invasion, 351. - - - _Sardinia_, Island of, - i. gives name to Italian Kingdom, 87; - ii. strategic importance of, 87, 128. - - _Sardinia_, Kingdom of, - i. at war with France in 1793, 34; - extent of, 84, 87; - operations of, in 1793, and 1794, 93, 171; - in 1795, 195-198; - defeats by Bonaparte, 1796, 209; - concludes separate peace with France, 209; - cedes islands of Sardinia and San Pietro to France, 246, 248; - ii. Piedmont annexed to France and the Court retires to island of - Sardinia, 2; - interest of the Czars in, 69, note; - British intercession for, 97. - - _Saumarez_, British admiral, - i. commands a ship at Battle of Cape St. Vincent, 233; - commands "Orion" at the Battle of the Nile, 265; - criticism of Nelson's plan, 273; - sails for Gibraltar with the prizes, 284; - summons French garrison at Malta, 285; - commands inshore squadron off Brest, 375; - ii. commands fleet at Battle of Algesiras, 63-66; - commendations of by St. Vincent and Nelson, 65, 66; - commands Baltic fleet, 1808-1812, 294, 297, 313; - eminent services of, 346, 347 (note). - - _Scheldt_, River, - i. question of the, 9, 16, 18; - importance of, 10, 20; - opened to commerce by the French, 31. - - _Schérer_, French general, - i. wins battle of Loano, 198; - relieved by Bonaparte, 203; - ii. inefficiency in 1799, in Italy, 3-5. - - _Sébastiani_, French colonel, - ii. mission to the Levant and report, 93; - Bonaparte's object in publishing, 94, 106; - exasperation in Great Britain, 94; - effect upon British policy, 96, 97. - - _Smith_, Sir Sidney, British naval captain, - i. reputation and character of, 294, 295; - mission to the Mediterranean, 1799, 296; - annoyance of St. Vincent and Nelson, 297; - supports the besieged garrison at Acre, 298-302; - conduct on this occasion considered, 302-304; - accompanies Turkish Expedition against Egypt, 321; - countenances Convention of El Arish in disregard of his orders, - 331-334. - - _Spain_, - i. results of war of 1778 to, 3, 4; - defensive alliance with Russia and Austria, 1789, 25; - Nootka Sound trouble with Great Britain, 44, 45; - condition of navy, 1793, 75-78, 82, 229, 231; - France declares war against, 79; - strategic position and inefficient administration of, 80; - fleet enters Toulon with Hood, 92; - war in Pyrenees, 1793, 104; - evacuation of Toulon, 105; - loss of Trinidad, 120; - disasters on French frontier, 1794, 171; - peace of Basle with France, 1795, 172; - changed relations with Great Britain, 213; - defensive and offensive alliance with France, 214; - naval co-operation with France, 214-216, 348; - naval defeat off Cape St. Vincent, 219-229; - share in Admiral Bruix's Expedition, 307-316; - internal weakness of, in 1799, 311; - ii. Bonaparte's use of, to further his continental policy, 59, - 62, 67; - naval defeat near Cadiz, 1801, 64; - cession of Louisiana to France, 77; - Peace of Amiens with Great Britain, 81; - renewal of war with Great Britain, 1804, 133; - subserviency to Bonaparte's control, 134-136; - subsidies paid to France, 133, 138; - renewed alliance with France, 140; - share in Trafalgar campaign, 151, 154, 162-180; - naval defeat off Cape Finisterre, 169-171; - naval defeat at Trafalgar, 187-195; - revolt against Napoleon, 195, 292, 401; - weakness of colonial administration, 79, 213; - Napoleon's usurpation, 291; - Great Britain assumes Spanish cause, 294; - Napoleon's campaign in, 1808, 295, 298, 315; - Wellesley in, 315, 348, 349; - drain of Spanish war upon Napoleon, 317, 318, 319, 342, 343, - 348, 397, 401, 402. - - _St. André_, Jean Bon, French representative and commissioner, - i. opinions on naval efficiency, 37, 58, 66. - - _States General_, - i. meeting of the, in France, May, 1789, 24, 25. - - _Strategy_, naval, - i. strategic position of Spain, i. 80-82; - of Portugal, 84; - particular importance of Mediterranean islands, 85, 247, 248; - importance of Malta, 87, 258, 319, ii. 92; - Maddalena Bay in Sardinia, 88, ii. 128, 143; - Corsica, i. 88, 186; - general dispositions of British fleet, 1793, 96; - its tardy mobilization, 97, 100; - necessity to Great Britain of forcing French fleets to sea, - 97-100; - Lord Howe's strategic dispositions, 101-103, 125, 162-166, 338, - 339; - strategic value of Toulon, 105; - analogy between British operations in Peninsula and Napoleon's - intended invasion of England, 106-108; - strategic conditions in West Indies, 109-115; - mistakes of the British in West Indies, 116-120; - criticism of naval campaign of May, 1794, 155-160; - faulty dispositions of the Channel fleet, 1793-1800, 165, - 361-366; - policy of an inferior navy deduced from Napoleon's practice, - 179, 180, 304, 305; - strategic influence of the British Mediterranean fleet, 185, - 195-197, 207, 216-218, 233, 254, 255, 277, 280, 282, 287, - 290-292, 324, 325, 328-334, ii. 25, 59-68, 123-125, 129, 159; - Hotham's campaign of 1795 criticised, 198-201; - French commerce-destroying policy, 201-203, 335-337, - ii. 203-210, 221-227; - effects of the Battle of the Nile, 277, 282-284, 287, 291, 325; - strategic importance of Acre, 293, 298, 299, 324; - strategic significance of Bruix's incursion into the - Mediterranean, 304, 318; - St. Vincent's strategic action at this time, 309-312, 314, - 318-321; - contrast between his point of view and that of Lord Keith, 313, - 320, 321; - coincidence of his views with Nelson's, 319, 321; - Nelson's action, 310; - discussion of Bruix's conduct, 316-318; - of the British admirals', 318-321; - policy of evasion entailed by French naval weakness, 335; - strategic problem before Great Britain in the Revolutionary - wars, 338; - its true solution, 339-342; - strategic interest of Ushant, 344; - the winds as strategic factors, 344; - faulty dispositions of the Channel fleet, 1793-1800, 345; - analysis of the effects upon Irish expedition, 1796, 360-366; - changes made by St. Vincent in 1800, 368-371, 374, 375; - their efficacy, 375, 376, ii. 60-66, 106, 118-121, 126, 153, - 166, 183; - Napoleon's estimate of Antwerp, i. 377; - Nelson in the Baltic, ii. 43-47, 51-53; - Napoleon's object in concentrating at Cadiz, 63; - strategic significance of battle of Algesiras, 64-66; - defensive and offensive gain to Great Britain in forcing war, - 1803, 106-108; - Napoleon's combinations for invasion of England, 111-117, 124, - 131-133, 140-142, 145-150; - British measures for thwarting them, 118-122, 126, 148; - Nelson's strategy, 127, 142-144, 150-152, 156, 159-163, 167, - 172, 174, 186, 187; - various surmises and measures of Napoleon during the Trafalgar - campaign, 153-159, 162, 165, 170, 173, 178, 181; - generally accurate strategy of the British authorities, - 157-159, 166, 176, 183; - masterly combination of Lord Barham, 168-170, 184; - mistake of Admiral Calder, 171, 174; - mistake of Cornwallis, 176; - analysis of the strategic chances in the Trafalgar campaign, - 182-185; - character of Villeneuve's error, 196; - strategic effect of the campaign upon the remainder of the - war, 197; - general naval strategy of the British, 1793-1812, 392-411. - - _St. Vincent_, Earl, British admiral (Jervis), - i. expedition to West Indies, 115; - assumes command of Mediterranean fleet, 203; - perfection of fleet under, 206; - professional character, 203-206; - blockade of Toulon, 212; - seizes Elba with a squadron, 213; - ordered to evacuate Corsica, 215; - retires to Gibraltar, 216; firmness of, 217; - ordered to rendezvous at Lisbon, 219; - disasters to fleet, 219; - meeting with Spanish fleet, 221; - battle of Cape St. Vincent, 222-228; - merit of, 228; - created Earl St. Vincent, 229; - establishes blockade of Cadiz, 232; - incident of mutiny, 236 (note); - sends Nelson to Teneriffe, 249; - sends Nelson into the Mediterranean, May, 1798, 256-258; - residence at Gibraltar, 285; - seizes Minorca, 287; - relations with Sir Sidney Smith, 294-297; - conduct during Bruix's incursion into the Mediterranean, 306-321; - health fails, 312; - returns to England, 321; - commands Channel fleet, 368; - methods of watching Brest, 368-375; - becomes First Lord of the Admiralty, 375, ii. 42; - merit of his strategic dispositions, i. 375, 376, ii. 126, 183. - ii. encomium upon Nelson, 53; - upon Saumarez, 65; - his naval dispositions in second war, 119-122, 126; - his inopportune economy, 122, 124, 127, 128, 166; - leaves office, 129; - - _Suwarrow_, Russian marshal, - i. storming of Ismail, 26; - commands corps sent to support Austrians in Italy, 282, 284, ii. 5; - ii. commander-in-chief of allied forces, 5; - victorious campaign in Italy, 5-8; - disastrous march into Switzerland, 9; - declines further co-operation with Austrians, 10. - - _Sweden_, - i. loss of Baltic provinces to Russia, 10; - hostility to Russia, 17; - troops enter Russia, 1788, 21; - supported by Great Britain and Prussia, 21, 25; - interest of western powers in, 22; - subsidized by Turkey, 24; - peace with Russia, 1790, 27; - even balance of naval strength in Baltic, 27; - unfriendly to French Revolution in 1793, 34; - seeks the commercial advantages of neutrality, 83, ii. 233; - loss of West India islands, 1801, i. 121; - ii. joins Armed Neutrality of 1800, 36; - embargo of merchant ships by Great Britain, 53; - convention with Great Britain, 58, 266; - quarrel with France and joins Third Coalition, 177; - Napoleon's exactions from, 231, 317, 322, 345; - summoned by France and Russia to close ports against Great - Britain, 274; - hostilities with Russia, 1808, 293; - British relations with, 1808-1812, 294, 296, 297, 305, 317; - cedes Finland and makes peace with Russia, 316; - formal war with Great Britain, 346. - - _Switzerland_, - i. disturbances in, 1797, 278; - France intervenes by force and changes constitution, 279; - French operations in, 1799, ii. 3-9; - strategic importance in Bonaparte's campaign of 1800, 20, 22; - independence guaranteed at Lunéville, 40; - Bonaparte's intervention in, 1802, 86-88; - action of British ministry thereupon, 88-90; - effect upon course of events, 90-93; - enforcement by Napoleon of his commercial war measures, - 324-326. - - - _Tactics_, Naval, - i. French and British on May 28, 1794, 127-129; - on May 29, 129-134; - June 1, 136-147; - merits of Howe's, 135, 150, 160; - analysis of the results of the battle of June 1, with - deductions, 149-155; - Sir John Jervis at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 224, 225; - Nelson's tactical move on that occasion, 226-228; - dispositions of the French admiral in Aboukir Bay, 263, 264; - contrasted with Hood's at St. Kitts in 1782, 265; - Nelson's tactics at the Nile, concentration on enemy's - van, 266; - arrival of the British reserve, and concentration on - centre, 270; - analysis of Nelson's claim to credit, 273-277; - tactical dispositions before Brest of Bridport, 351, 366, - and of St. Vincent, 371; - ii. tactical anecdotes of Nelson, 39, 45; - tactical surroundings at Copenhagen, 1801, 44; - Nelson's dispositions in consequence, 47, 48; - his tactics at Trafalgar, 188; - analysis of them, 189; - the result, 192-194. - - _Trafalgar_, battle of, - ii. decisive effect upon the course of the war, 196-198. - - _Treaty_, Holland and France, 1795, - offensive and defensive alliance, i. 172, ii. 133; - Jay's, of commerce and navigation, between Great Britain and - United States, 1794, ii. 237-239; - San Ildefouso, offensive and defensive between France and Spain, - 1796, i. 213, ii. 133, - and renewed in 1805, ii. 140; - Tilsit, between France and Russia, 1807, ii. 274; - conventions, of El Arish between Turkey and French - commander-in-chief in Egypt, 1799, i. 332-334; - of Great Britain and Russia concerning neutral navigation, 1801, - ii. 57, 261. - - See also "Peace" and "Armed Neutrality." - - _Troubridge_, British captain, - i. Nelson's praise of, 75; - leads the fleet at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent, 224, 227; - misfortune at the Battle of the Nile, 269; - bombardment of Alexandria, 297; - services at Naples, 308. - - _Turkey_, Empire of, - i. encroachments of Russia upon, 10; - natural ally of France, 12, 22; - treaty of Kainardji, 1774, 13; - declares war against Russia, 1787, 19; - war with Austria, 19; - relations to Great Britain in 1790, 23; - military reverses, 24, 26; - peace with Austria and Russia, 25, 27; - disorganized condition in 1793, 85; - territorial limits, 85; - Bonaparte's estimate of strength of, 248; - effect of battle of the Nile upon, 277; - war declared against France, 278; - Russo-Turkish fleet enters Mediterranean, 286; - troops sent to Acre, 301; - unfortunate landing in Aboukir Bay, 322; - convention for the evacuation of Egypt, 332; - ii. capture of the Ionian Islands, 10; - peace with France, 77; - misrule in Egypt, 150; - hostilities with Great Britain, 278. - - _Two Sicilies_, The, - i. navy of, in 1793, 78; - attitude toward French Revolution, 84; - effect of Bonaparte's victories upon, 1796, 211; - abandons the Coalition, 211; - strategic importance of, 218; - dissatisfaction at French advance in Italy, 279; - defensive alliance with Austria, 282; - Nelson's arrival in Naples, 285; - ii. premature hostilities with France, 1; - the Court flies to Palermo, 2; - Naples occupied by French troops, 2; - French forced to evacuate the Kingdom, 6; - French division occupies the heel of Italy after Marengo, 59; - evacuates after Peace of Amiens 71; - reoccupation after renewal of war in 1803, 109; - part played in Napoleon's combinations, 110, 124, 185; - Joseph Bonaparte, King of, 278. - - - _United States_, - difficulties with France, 1793-1797, i. 241, ii 242-248; - ii. cession of Louisiana by Spain to France, 78; - jealousy of political interference on the American continent by - European nations, 103; - uneasiness at cession of Louisiana, 104; - buys Louisiana of France, 105; - sufferings from privateers in the West Indies, 1805, 213; - importance of American carrying trade, 231; - growth of merchant shipping, 232; - injuries under Rule of 1756, 233-237; - Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Great Britain, 1794, - 237-239; - difficulties with France arising thence, 239; - relations with Great Britain, 1794-1804, 241; - French aggressions upon American shipping, 242-246; - demands of Spain and Holland, 247; - course of trade with Europe, 1793-1804, 253, 254, 354; - hostilities with France, 1798-1800, 258; - trade with belligerent colonies, 266-268, 353; - British seizures of American ships, 1804, 269; - commercial treaty of 1806 with Great Britain rejected by - Senate, 275; - effect upon American trade of British Order of January, - 1807, 276; - Embargo Act of December, 1807, 282, - succeeded by Non-Intercourse Act, 1809, 283; - importance of American market to Great Britain, 291; - losses by Napoleon's decrees of Bayonne and Rambouillet, 292; - American ships in Dutch ports confiscated by Napoleon, 320, - 321; - expiration of Non-Intercourse Act, and proviso succeeding it, - 331; - American trade in Baltic, 1809-1812, 345, and note; - declaration of war against Great Britain, 351. - - - _Van Stabel_, French rear-admiral, - i. escape of, from Lord Howe, 66; - protects large convoy from America, 123; - brings it safely to Brest, 161. - - "_Vengeur_," French ship-of-the-line, - i. desperate action with the British ship "Brunswick," 140-143; - sinks, 144. - - _Venice_, Republic of, - i. deprived of possessions on Italian mainland, also Istria and - Dalmatia, 235; - insurrection against French, 246; - conduct of Bonaparte toward, 247-249; - annihilation of, 250. - - _Villaret-Joyeuse_, French admiral, - i. letters of, 56; - position before Revolution, 57; - sails in command of Brest fleet, 124; - meeting with British fleet, 126; - manœuvres of, May 28 and 29, 1794, 126-134; - conduct in battle of June 1, 136-139, 144-147; - strategy of, 159, 160; - anecdote, 160 (note); - winter cruise of, January, 1795, 163, 164; - action with Lord Bridport, 177-178; - appointed to command fleet in Irish Expedition, 1796, 349; - views as to the expedition, 349; - detached from it at Hoche's request, 350. - - _Villeneuve_, French admiral, - i. sent with a division from Toulon to Brest, 220; - commands the rear division at battle of the Nile, 271; - conduct of, 272; - ii. appointed to command the Toulon squadron in 1804, 130; - Napoleon's instructions to, 142, 149, 164; - first sortie from Toulon, 143; - return to port, 144; - second sailing and arrival in West Indies, 151; - inaction there, 161, - and return to Europe, 162; - meeting with Calder's fleet, 169, 171; - anchors in Vigo Bay and thence goes to Ferrol, 173; - sails from Ferrol for Brest, 179, - but bears up for Cadiz, 180; - Napoleon's charges against, 185; - battle of Trafalgar, 187-195; - criticism of, 196. - - - _Wellesley_, British general, - ii. landing in Portugal, 1808, and victory of Vimiero, 292; - landing in Lisbon, 1809, beginning of Peninsular command, and - operations in Portugal, 315; - lines of Torres Vedras, 318; - capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, 348, 349. - - _West Indies_, commercial importance of, - in the French Revolution, i. 109, 110; - character of military control required, 110-112, ii. 252; - military importance of Lesser Antilles, i. 114, 117, 119; - military and naval operations in, 115-121; - ii. French Expedition to, 1801, ii. 78, 94, 103; - Nelson's estimate of, 160; - American trade with, 232, 236-238, 245, 253, 266-269; - importance to British commercial system, 252, and note, 393. - - - - - +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ - | | - | Transcriber's Note: | - | | - | Minor typographical errors have been corrected without note. | - | | - | Italicized words are surrounded by underline characters, _like | - | this_. | - | | - | Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant | - | form was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed. | - | | - | Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. | - | | - | Word combinations that appeared with and without hyphens were | - | changed to the predominant form if it could be determined. | - | | - | Footnotes were moved to the end of the book and numbered in one | - | continuous sequence. | - | | - | In the index the numbers i. and ii. refer to volumes i. and ii. | - +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Influence of Sea Power upon the -French Revolution and Empire 1793-1, by Alfred Thayer Mahan - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER *** - -***** This file should be named 52589-0.txt or 52589-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/2/5/8/52589/ - -Produced by StevenGibbs, Christian Boissonnas and the -Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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