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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4867e2c --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #52589 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/52589) diff --git a/old/52589-0.txt b/old/52589-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index d9a2a37..0000000 --- a/old/52589-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,16671 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Influence of Sea Power upon the French -Revolution and Empire 1793-1812, Vol II (o, by Alfred Thayer Mahan - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812, Vol II (of 2) - -Author: Alfred Thayer Mahan - -Release Date: July 23, 2016 [EBook #52589] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER *** - - - - -Produced by StevenGibbs, Christian Boissonnas and the -Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net - - - - - - - - - - THE - - INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER - - UPON THE - - FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE - - 1793-1812 - - - BY - - CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN, U.S.N. - - PRESIDENT UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE - - AUTHOR OF "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783" - OF "THE GULF AND INLAND WATERS," AND OF A - "LIFE OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT" - - - IN TWO VOLUMES - - VOL. II. - - - FOURTH EDITION. - - - LONDON: - SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, SEARLE, & RIVINGTON. - (LIMITED.) - - - - -UNIVERSITY PRESS: - -JOHN WILSON AND SON, CAMBRIDGE, U.S.A. - - - - -CONTENTS OF VOL. II. - - - CHAPTER XII. - - EVENTS ON THE CONTINENT, 1798-1800. - - DISORDERS OF FRANCE UNDER THE DIRECTORY.—DISASTROUS WAR OF THE SECOND - COALITION.—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSULATE.—BONAPARTE OVERTHROWS - AUSTRIA AND FRAMES AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN THE ARMED NEUTRALITY OF - 1800.—PEACE OF LUNÉVILLE WITH AUSTRIA. - - PAGE - - Hostilities of Naples against the French 1 - - Disastrous defeat of the Neapolitans 2 - - The French enter Naples 2 - - Piedmont annexed to France 2 - - Beginning of the war of the Second Coalition 3 - - Reverses of the French in Germany and Italy 3 - - Masséna falls back in Switzerland 4 - - Further French disasters in Italy 5 - - The French evacuate southern Italy 6 - - Battle of the Trebia won by Suwarrow 6 - - Loss of northern Italy by the French 7 - - The French defeated at the battle of Novi by Suwarrow 8 - - Change in the plans of the Coalition 8 - - Masséna defeats the allies at the battle of Zurich 9 - - Disastrous march of Suwarrow into Switzerland 9 - - Failure of the Anglo-Russian expedition against Holland 10 - - Loss of Bonaparte's conquests in Italy and of the Ionian Islands 10 - - Internal disorders of France 11 - - Bonaparte's return, and the revolution of Brumaire 18 15 - - Bonaparte's measures to restore order 15 - - His advances toward Great Britain and Austria to obtain peace 16 - - Reasons of the two governments for refusing 17 - - Prosperity of Great Britain 17 - - Russia abandons the coalition 19 - - Forces of France and Austria in 1800 19 - - Bonaparte's plan of campaign 20 - - Opening of the campaign in Italy 21 - - Masséna shut up in Genoa 21 - - Moreau's advance into Germany 21 - - Bonaparte crosses the Saint Bernard 22 - - Battle of Marengo, and armistice following it 23 - - Armistice in Germany 24 - - Diplomatic negotiations 25 - - Bonaparte's colonial and maritime anxieties 25 - - The Czar Paul I.'s hostility to Great Britain 26 - - Dispute between England and Denmark concerning neutral rights 26 - - Effect of this upon Bonaparte's plans 27 - - Policy of Russia and Prussia 28 - - Bonaparte undertakes to form a coalition against Great Britain 29 - - Factors in the question 29 - - Vacillations of Prussia 31 - - Bonaparte's advances to Russia 32 - - Hostile action of Paul I. toward Great Britain 33 - - His pretensions to Malta 33 - - Negotiations for a maritime truce 34 - - Their failure 35 - - Action of Prussia against Great Britain 35 - - Armed Neutrality of 1800 36 - - Its claims 37 - - Renewal of hostilities between Austria and France 38 - - Defeat of Austria at the battle of Hohenlinden 38 - - Peace of Lunéville 39 - - Terms of the treaty 40 - - - CHAPTER XIII. - - EVENTS OF 1801. - - BRITISH EXPEDITION TO THE BALTIC.—BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN.—BONAPARTE'S - FUTILE ATTEMPTS TO CONTEST CONTROL OF THE SEA.—HIS CONTINENTAL - POLICY.—PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE WITH GREAT BRITAIN, OCTOBER, - 1801.—INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER, SO FAR, ON THE COURSE OF THE - REVOLUTION. - - Isolation of Great Britain in Europe, in 1801 41 - - Expedition to the Baltic planned 41 - - Instructions to Sir Hyde Parker, commander-in-chief 42 - - Nelson second in command 42 - - The fleet sails 42 - - Nelson's plan of operations 43 - - The military situation, strategic and tactical 44 - - Characteristics of Nelson's military genius 45 - - Denmark's relation to the league of the northern States 46 - - Half measures of Sir Hyde Parker 47 - - Nelson advances against Copenhagen 47 - - Battle of Copenhagen 48 - - Results of the battle 51 - - Nelson's negotiations with the Danish government 51 - - Armistice concluded with Denmark 51 - - Assassination of the Czar Paul I. 51 - - Merits of Nelson's conduct in the Baltic 52 - - British embargo upon merchant ships of the Baltic powers 53 - - Resulting retaliatory action of Prussia 54 - - Inherent weakness of the Northern League 55 - - Conciliatory action of the new Czar 55 - - Sir Hyde Parker relieved from command 56 - - Nelson takes the British fleet to Revel 56 - - His action rebuked by the Czar 57 - - Convention between Great Britain and Russia 57 - - Dissolution of the Armed Neutrality 57 - - Nature of the claims maintained by it 58 - - Bonaparte's proceedings in the Italian and Spanish peninsulas 59 - - Failure of his maritime projects for the relief of Malta and Egypt 60 - - His attempt to collect a naval force in Cadiz 63 - - Naval battle of Algesiras, and its consequences 64 - - Strategic significance of these events 65 - - Cession of Louisiana by Spain to France 67 - - Bonaparte's intended occupation of Portugal frustrated 67 - - His diplomatic dilemma in the summer of 1801 68 - - Coolness towards him of Russia and Prussia 69 - - Triumphant influence of the British Sea Power 69 - - Preliminaries of Peace between Great Britain and France 70 - - Terms of the preliminaries signed at London, October, 1801 71 - - Cessation of hostilities 72 - - Criticism of the terms by the British Opposition 72 - - Influence of Sea Power upon the course of the Revolution 74 - - Pitt's opinions 75 - - - CHAPTER XIV. - - OUTLINE OF EVENTS FROM THE SIGNATURE OF THE PRELIMINARIES - TO THE RUPTURE OF THE PEACE OF AMIENS. - - Unstable character of the settlement of 1801 76 - - Treaties with Turkey and Portugal contracted secretly by France 77 - - Impression produced in Great Britain by these and by the cession - of Louisiana 78 - - Expedition sent to Haïti by Bonaparte 78 - - Delays in negotiating the definitive treaty 79 - - Bonaparte accepts the presidency of the Cisalpine Republic 80 - - Effect produced in Great Britain by this step 80 - - Signature of the Peace of Amiens, March 25, 1802 81 - - Provisions concerning Malta 81 - - Illusive effects caused by Bonaparte's system of secret treaties 82 - - Annihilation of the Sea Power of France 83 - - Bonaparte proclaimed First Consul for life 83 - - Action of Bonaparte in the German indemnities 84 - - Injury to Austria and annoyance of Great Britain 85 - - Bonaparte's reclamations against the British press 85 - - Piedmont and Elba formally incorporated with France 85 - - The Valais wrested from Switzerland for military reasons 86 - - Bonaparte's armed intervention in Switzerland, 1802 87 - - Emotion of Europe and remonstrance of Great Britain 88 - - The British ministry countermands restitution of captured - colonies 89 - - Bonaparte's wrath at the British remonstrance 89 - - Strained relations between the two States 90 - - Bonaparte demands the evacuation of Egypt and Malta 91 - - Attitude of the British ministry concerning Malta 91 - - Causes of the delay in evacuating it 92 - - Importance of Malta 92 - - Broad ground now taken by the ministry 93 - - Publication of Sébastiani's report, January, 1803 93 - - Its effect in Great Britain 94 - - Disasters of the French in Haïti 94 - - Bonaparte's preponderant interest in Malta and the East 95 - - High tone now assumed by the British ministry 96 - - Additional provocation given by Bonaparte 96 - - Ominous proceedings of the ministry 97 - - The British ultimatum 98 - - Great Britain declares war, May 16, 1803 98 - - Universal character of the strife thus renewed 98 - - Unanimity of feeling in Great Britain 99 - - Pitt's forecast of the nature of the struggle 100 - - - CHAPTER XV. - - THE TRAFALGAR CAMPAIGN TO THE SPANISH DECLARATION OF WAR. - MAY, 1803—DECEMBER, 1804. - - PREPARATIONS FOR THE INVASION OF ENGLAND.—THE GREAT - FLOTILLA.—NAPOLEON'S MILITARY AND NAVAL COMBINATIONS, - AND BRITISH NAVAL STRATEGY.—ESSENTIAL UNITY OF NAPOLEON'S - PURPOSE.—CAUSES OF SPANISH WAR. - - Preparations of the two States 101 - - Cession of Louisiana to the United States 104 - - Effect of the British Sea Power upon this measure 105 - - Resources of Great Britain and France as affected by their social - systems 105 - - Offensive and defensive gain to Great Britain by forcing the war 106 - - Inconvenience to Bonaparte from the premature outbreak 107 - - Exhaustion of France under the pressure of Sea Power 108 - - Bonaparte's resolution to invade Great Britain 109 - - Seizure by him of Hanover and of the Heel of Italy 109 - - Object of these measures 110 - - Offence and injury to Prussia by occupation of Hanover 110 - - French troops quartered on Holland, Hanover, and Naples 111 - - Bonaparte's plans for the invasion of England 111 - - His naval combinations to that end 112 - - Building of the great flotilla 113 - - Its points of concentration described 114 - - Difficulties of the undertaking 115 - - Certainty of Napoleon's purpose 116 - - Interesting character of this historical crisis 117 - - Strategic effect of the British blockading squadrons 118 - - Strategic dispositions in the British Channel 119 - - Security felt by British naval officers 120 - - St. Vincent's opposition to small gun-vessels 121 - - The Sea Fencibles 121 - - Deterioration of naval material under St. Vincent's - administration 122 - - Effects upon the Channel and Mediterranean ships 123 - - Embarrassment caused to Nelson 124 - - Bonaparte's naval combination hinges upon Nelson's perplexities 124 - - Details of his first plan 125 - - Merits of St. Vincent's general strategic dispositions 126 - - Nelson's uncertainties as to the French purposes 127 - - His certainty as to his own course 127 - - Embarrassment caused by the condition of his ships 128 - - Delays encountered by Napoleon 129 - - Death of the commander of the Toulon fleet 130 - - Villeneuve appointed to succeed him 130 - - Change of detail in Napoleon's naval combination 131 - - Significance of this new combination 132 - - War begins between Great Britain and Spain 133 - - Train of causes which led to this outbreak 133 - - Detention of the Spanish treasure-ships 137 - - - CHAPTER XVI. - - THE TRAFALGAR CAMPAIGN—CONCLUDED. - JANUARY—OCTOBER, 1805. - - SUCCESSIVE MODIFICATIONS OF NAPOLEON'S PLAN.—NARRATIVE OF NAVAL - MOVEMENTS.—FINAL FAILURE OF NAPOLEON'S NAVAL COMBINATIONS.—WAR - WITH AUSTRIA, AND BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ.—BATTLE OF - TRAFALGAR.—VITAL CHANGE IMPOSED UPON NAPOLEON'S POLICY BY THE - RESULT OF THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN. - - Napoleon has direction of both Spanish and French fleets 140 - - His lack of familiarity with maritime difficulties 141 - - Instructions to the Rochefort and Toulon admirals 142 - - The Rochefort squadron puts to sea 142 - - Delay, and final departure, of the Toulon fleet 143 - - Nelson's movements 143 - - He takes his fleet to Alexandria 144 - - The Toulon ships being crippled in a gale, Villeneuve returns to - Toulon 144 - - Napoleon's plans again modified by this delay 146 - - Stations of the British and Allied fleets in March, 1805 147 - - Napoleon's new instructions to his admirals 149 - - Return of Nelson to Toulon, and his subsequent movements 150 - - Second Sailing of Villeneuve 151 - - Joined by a Spanish division at Cadiz, and reaches Martinique 151 - - Nelson's uncertainties and head winds 152 - - He reaches Gibraltar, and follows Villeneuve to West Indies 152 - - Napoleon goes to Italy 153 - - His naval measures and surmises 154 - - Nelson's sound strategy and sagacity 156 - - Miscalculations of Napoleon 157 - - The measures of the British Admiralty 159 - - Nelson in the West Indies 161 - - Divergent directions taken by the hostile fleets 161 - - Villeneuve returns to Europe 162 - - Nelson penetrates his intention and sails in pursuit 163 - - Napoleon sends to Ferrol instructions for Villeneuve 164 - - Napoleon's efforts to distract the British navy 165 - - The British resist the diversions raised for them 166 - - Villeneuve sighted at sea by a dispatch ship from Nelson 167 - - The news brought to London 168 - - Energetic and skilful measures of the Admiralty 168 - - Villeneuve intercepted by Calder off Cape Finisterre 169 - - Nelson reaches Gibraltar 169 - - Napoleon misled by the rapidity of the British action 170 - - Napoleon goes to Boulogne to await Villeneuve 171 - - The engagement between Calder and Villeneuve 171 - - Subsequent mistakes of the British admiral 172 - - Villeneuve puts into Vigo, and reaches Coruña 173 - - Calder joins Cornwallis off Brest 174 - - Nelson also joins Cornwallis from Gibraltar 174 - - Strategic advantage now in the hands of the British 175 - - Cornwallis divides his fleet and destroys his advantage 176 - - Imminent hostilities on the Continent 176 - - The Third Coalition formed 177 - - Urgent orders from Napoleon to Villeneuve 178 - - Napoleon's decision as to his own movements 179 - - Villeneuve sails from Coruña for Brest 179 - - He abandons his purpose and enters Cadiz 180 - - The allied fleets blockaded in Cadiz by Collingwood 181 - - Napoleon's campaign of 1805 in Germany 181 - - Battle of Austerlitz and peace of Presburg 182 - - Fate of the great flotilla 182 - - Discussion of the chances of Napoleon's project of invasion 182 - - Necessity of making the attempt 184 - - Napoleon's orders to Villeneuve in Cadiz 185 - - Nelson takes command off Cadiz 186 - - The combined fleets put to sea 187 - - Nelson's tactics at Trafalgar discussed 188 - - Battle of Trafalgar 190 - - Death of Nelson 192 - - Nautical disasters succeeding the battle 194 - - Immediate results of the battle 195 - - Subsequent fate of the French ships in Cadiz 195 - - Momentous consequences flowing from the battle of Trafalgar 196 - - Commerce-destroying henceforth the sole resource of Napoleon 197 - - - CHAPTER XVII. - - THE WARFARE AGAINST COMMERCE DURING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION - AND EMPIRE, TO THE BERLIN DECREE. 1793-1806. - - Characteristics of the Warfare against Commerce 199 - - Measures of France and of Great Britain 200 - - Conduct of Napoleon and of the ministry contrasted 201 - - Identity of the methods of the Republic and of the Emperor 202 - - Primary measures of the belligerents 203 - - Twofold system of Great Britain for the protection of trade 204 - - Seamen a part of the military strength of a nation 205 - - The British Convoy Act 205 - - Results to France of her dependence upon commerce-destroying 206 - - Activity of French cruisers 207 - - Amount and distribution of British trade 207 - - Character of French Channel privateers 208 - - Indifferent efficiency of many British cruisers 210 - - French privateering in the Atlantic 210 - - French privateering in the West Indies 211 - - Its piratical character, arising from remoteness from Europe 213 - - Size and force of British East India ships 214 - - Consequent character of French privateering in Indian seas 215 - - Efficient protection of British trade in India 216 - - Advantages of the convoy system 217 - - Destruction of French commerce by British control of the sea 218 - - Numbers of British captures 219 - - The French flag swept from the sea 219 - - Annihilation of French commerce except the coasting trade 220 - - Discussion of the number and value of British vessels captured 221 - - Deductions as to the losses of Great Britain 226 - - Swelling prosperity of the country 227 - - Support to British trade contributed by neutral shipping 228 - - Conclusions thence drawn by the French government 230 - - Effect of the appearance of the United States as neutral carriers 231 - - Rapid increase of American merchant shipping 232 - - Other neutral carriers 233 - - Attitude taken by Russia in 1793 233 - - Severe restrictions on neutrals imposed by Great Britain 234 - - Rule of 1756 234 - - Seizures of American ships in West Indies, 1793 236 - - Jay's Mission to Great Britain, 1794 237 - - Terms of treaty concluded by him 238 - - Indignation of French government 239 - - Effect of Jay's treaty upon American relations with Great - Britain 240 - - Gradual shaping of British commercial war policy 242 - - Vacillating action of French government towards neutrals 242 - - France breaks off relations with the United States 244 - - French aggressions upon neutrals after 1796 244 - - Embargo upon American vessels in 1793 246 - - Growing exasperation between France and the United States 246 - - Effect of Bonaparte's successes upon French foreign policy 247 - - Early attempts to stifle British trade 248 - - Determination to arrest neutral trade with Great Britain 249 - - Law of January 18, 1798 250 - - Modification of channels of British trade caused by the war 250 - - Policy of Pitt in seeking to dominate the Caribbean Sea 252 - - Carriage of tropical produce by neutrals 253 - - Course of trade in Europe, 1793-1798 254 - - Effects of the law of January 18, 1798 254 - - Discussion in the Conseil des Anciens, January, 1799 255 - - Measures of the United States caused by the law of January 18 258 - - _Quasi_ war of 1798 with France 258 - - French reverses in 1799 259 - - French successes in 1800 260 - - Questions involved in the Armed Neutrality of 1800 260 - - Opinions of Pitt and of Fox on the disputed points 261 - - British conventions with the neutral Baltic States, 1801 261 - - Concession of the Rule of 1756 by Russia 262 - - Lessons as to belligerent interest in neutral trade, afforded by - the war between Great Britain and France, 1793-1801 262 - - Further lesson afforded by the short peace of Amiens, 1801-1803 265 - - Renewal of war, May, 1803 265 - - Bonaparte's measures against British trade, 1803-1805 265 - - Threatened injury to British commerce by neutral carriers 266 - - Extent of American trade with colonies of enemies to Great - Britain 267 - - Pitt's commercial measures upon resuming power in 1804 267 - - Methods of American trade between belligerent countries and - their colonies 268 - - Condemnation of American ships in British prize courts, 1804 269 - - Death of Pitt. Fox becomes Foreign Minister, 1806 269 - - Fox's desire to conciliate the United States 269 - - Order in Council of May 16, 1806, substituted for Rule of 1756 269 - - Character of the blockade of French coast thus imposed 270 - - Intention of the new measure, and its consequences 270 - - Death of Fox, September, 1806 270 - - War between France and Prussia 270 - - Napoleon enters Berlin and issues the Berlin Decree 271 - - Object of the decree 271 - - - CHAPTER XVIII. - - THE WARFARE AGAINST COMMERCE, 1806-1812. - - THE BERLIN AND MILAN DECREES OF NAPOLEON, 1806 AND 1807.—THE - BRITISH ORDERS IN COUNCIL, 1807-1809.—ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY - OF THESE MEASURES OF THE TWO BELLIGERENTS.—OUTLINE OF - CONTEMPORARY LEADING EVENTS. - - Object of, and pretext for, the Berlin Decree 272 - - Terms of the Decree 272 - - Napoleon's winter campaign against Russia, 1806-1807 273 - - The Decree remains inoperative 274 - - Battle of Friedland and conventions of Tilsit, June-July, 1807 274 - - British retaliatory Order in Council, January, 1807 275 - - Its terms and object 275 - - Effect upon American traders 276 - - Napoleon's designs upon Denmark and Portugal 276 - - Prompt action of the British ministry 277 - - Portuguese court withdraws to Brazil 277 - - General exclusion of British goods from the Continent 278 - - Attitude of Napoleon towards the United States 279 - - Nature of the questions confronting Napoleon 280 - - Jealousy of Great Britain towards neutral trade 281 - - Momentous decision of Napoleon as to the scope of the Berlin - Decree 281 - - Effect of this decision in Great Britain 282 - - Embargo Act of the United States, 1807 282 - - Succeeded by Non-Intercourse Act, 1809 283 - - British Orders in Council of November, 1807 283 - - Object of these orders 285 - - Summary of their requirements 286 - - Their effect upon neutrals 287 - - The effect upon the continental nations 288 - - Essential features of the opposing British and French policies 289 - - Napoleon's Milan Decree 290 - - Duration of the two policies 291 - - Napoleon's usurpation in Spain 291 - - The Bayonne and Rambouillet Decrees 292 - - The Spanish revolt and French disasters 292 - - Battle of Vimiero and French evacuation of Portugal 292 - - Conventions of Erfurt and war between Russia and Sweden 293 - - The British navy in the Baltic 294 - - Letter of Napoleon and the Czar to the King of Great Britain 294 - - Napoleon in the Spanish Peninsula 295 - - Diversion made by Sir John Moore 296 - - Opening of the year 1809 296 - - Austria's preparations for war 297 - - State of the commercial warfare in 1809 298 - - Evasion of Napoleon's decrees by the Dutch 299 - - Consequent measures of Napoleon 300 - - Passive resistance of the Continent to the decrees 301 - - British seizure of Heligoland 302 - - Conditions in the Baltic 303 - - General conditions of British trade, 1806-1809 304 - - The License System 307 - - Origin of "neutralization" 309 - - Its effect upon the action of British cruisers 310 - - Workings of the License System 311 - - British Order in Council of April, 1809 313 - - War between Austria and France 314 - - Wellesley's operations in the Peninsula 315 - - Battles of Essling and Wagram 316 - - Sweden forced to join in the Continental System 316 - - Napoleon's urgent attempts to enforce the System 317 - - Conditions in the Peninsula 318 - - Northern Germany occupied by French troops 319 - - Holland united to the Empire 321 - - Napoleon's demands upon Prussia and Sweden 322 - - Extensive seizure of ships with British goods 323 - - Napoleon's Customs Decree of August 5, 1810 324 - - Universal application of this decree 325 - - Napoleon's fiscal measures and license system 326 - - Decree of October 19, 1810, to burn British manufactured goods 327 - - Uneasiness of Russia 329 - - Napoleon's annexation of Oldenburg and the Hanse towns 330 - - Commercial distress in Great Britain 331 - - Embarrassment and suffering in France 333 - - Napoleon's financial expedients 337 - - Credit of France and of Great Britain 338 - - Internal condition of France and of England 340 - - The conscription in France 342 - - Exhaustion of the two nations 343 - - Difficulties between France and Russia 344 - - Admiral Saumarez in the Baltic 346 - - Understanding between Sweden, Russia, and Great Britain 347 - - Affairs in the Spanish Peninsula 348 - - Fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz 349 - - Discontent and misery in France 350 - - Russian treaties with Sweden and Turkey 350 - - Napoleon invades Russia 351 - - Revocation of the British Orders in Council 351 - - The United States declare war against Great Britain 351 - - Analysis of the British and French measures 351 - - - CHAPTER XIX. - - SUMMARY.—THE FUNCTION OF SEA POWER AND THE POLICY OF GREAT - BRITAIN IN THE REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS. - - Great Britain's unpreparedness for war in 1792 358 - - Spirit and aims of the French leaders 359 - - Decree of the National Convention, November 19, 1792 361 - - Significance of this step 362 - - Annexation of Belgium, and opening of the Scheldt 362 - - Interest of Great Britain in the Netherlands 363 - - British preparations for war 363 - - Consistency of Pitt's course 364 - - Convention's decree of December 15, 1792 367 - - Aggressive spirit of the French Revolution 368 - - Misconception of its strength by European statesmen 370 - - Conservative temper of the British nation 371 - - Irrepressible conflict between the two forces 372 - - Twofold aspect of Sea Power 372 - - Origin and character of the British Sea Power 373 - - Annihilation of French, Dutch, and Spanish navigation 375 - - Consequent opportunities for neutral carriers 376 - - Restrictions imposed upon these by Great Britain 377 - - Rise of prices on the continent of Europe 377 - - Great Britain becomes the depot for supplying the Continent 378 - - Direct and indirect effects upon British prosperity 380 - - Strength of Great Britain dependent upon Sea Power 381 - - Use of Sea Power made by the ministry 382 - - "Security" the avowed object of the war 383 - - The war, therefore, avowedly defensive 384 - - British treaty obligations to Holland 384 - - Relation of Great Britain to the general struggle 385 - - Two resources arising from Sea Power 386 - - Great land operations inexpedient for Great Britain 386 - - Characteristics of the Seven Years' War 387 - - Contrasts between the elder and the younger Pitt 387 - - Pitt's war policy not simply a military question 391 - - General direction given by him to the national effort 392 - - Justification of his colonial enterprises 393 - - Unprecedented naval development and commercial prosperity - secured by him 394 - - Importance of these results 394 - - Exhaustion of France caused by Pitt's measures 395 - - Bonaparte's opinion as to the influence of Sea Power 396 - - Ruinous results to France of the measures to destroy British - commerce 396 - - Napoleon forced to these steps by Pitt's policy 397 - - Identity of spirit in the Republic and in Napoleon 398 - - France forced into the battle-field of Great Britain's choosing 400 - - Strain of the Continental System upon Europe 401 - - Revolt from it of Spain and Russia 401 - - Effect of these movements 402 - - Napoleon submits to divide his forces 402 - - General correctness of Pitt's war policy 402 - - The criticisms on the campaign of 1793 considered 403 - - Peculiar character of the Revolutionary War 403 - - Dependence of statesmen upon military advice 404 - - Peculiar merit of Pitt 404 - - His death 405 - - His policy pursued by his successors 405 - - Exhaustion the only check upon a great national movement 406 - - France revived by Bonaparte in 1796 and 1799 407 - - He unites the nation in a renewed forward movement 407 - - Bonaparte the incarnation of the Revolution 408 - - Combination of powers in Napoleon's hands 408 - - His career dependent upon the staying power of France 408 - - Effect of Great Britain upon French endurance 409 - - Function of Great Britain in the Napoleonic wars 411 - - Accuracy of Pitt's forecast 411 - - Result postponed only by Bonaparte's genius 411 - - - INDEX 413 - -NOTE.—The references to the "Correspondance de Napoléon" are to the -quarto edition, in thirty-two volumes, published in Paris between 1858 -and 1869. - - - - -LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. - - - VOLUME II. - - MAP AND BATTLE PLANS. - - PAGE - - I. Battle of Copenhagen 44 - - II. Map of North Atlantic 117 - - III. The Attack at Trafalgar 190 - - - - -THE - -INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER - -UPON THE - -FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE. - - - - -CHAPTER XII. - -EVENTS ON THE CONTINENT, 1798-1800. - -DISORDERS OF FRANCE UNDER THE DIRECTORY.—DISASTROUS WAR OF THE SECOND -COALITION.—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSULATE.—BONAPARTE OVERTHROWS AUSTRIA -AND FRAMES AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN THE ARMED NEUTRALITY OF 1800.—PEACE OF -LUNÉVILLE WITH AUSTRIA. - - -While Bonaparte was crossing the Syrian desert and chafing over the -siege of Acre, the long gathering storm of war known as the Second -Coalition had broken upon France. It had been preceded by a premature -outburst of hostility on the part of the Two Sicilies, induced by the -excitement consequent upon the battle of the Nile and fostered by -Nelson;[1] who, however influenced, was largely responsible for the -action of the court. Despite the advice of Austria to wait, a summons -was sent to the French on the 22d of November, 1798, to evacuate -the Papal States and Malta. A Neapolitan army of fifty thousand men -marched upon Rome; and five thousand were carried by Nelson's ships to -Leghorn with the idea of harassing the confidently-expected retreat -of the enemy.[2] Leghorn was at once surrendered; but in the south -the campaign ended in utter disaster. The French general Championnet, -having but fifteen thousand men, evacuated Rome, which the Neapolitans -consequently entered without opposition; but their field operations met -with a series of humiliating reverses, due partly to bad generalship -and partly to inexperience and the lack of mutual confidence often -found among untried troops. The French re-entered Rome seventeen days -after the campaign opened; and the king of Naples, who had made a -triumphal entry into the city, hurried back to his capital, called upon -the people to rise in defence of their homes against the invaders, and -then fled with the royal family to Palermo, Nelson giving them and -the Hamiltons passage on board his flag-ship. The peasantry and the -populace flew to arms, in obedience to the king's proclamation and to -their own feelings of hatred to the republicans. Under the guidance -of the priests and monks, with hardy but undisciplined fury, they in -the field harassed the advance of the French, and in the capital rose -against the upper classes, who were suspected of secret intelligence -with the enemy. Championnet, however, continued to advance; and on -the 23d of January, 1799, Naples was stormed by his troops. After the -occupation, a series of judicious concessions to the prejudices of the -people induced their cheerful submission. The conquest was followed -by the birth to the Batavian, Helvetian, Ligurian, Cisalpine, and -Roman republics, of a little sister, named the Parthenopeian Republic, -destined to a troubled existence as short as its name was long. - -The Neapolitan declaration of war caused the ruin of the Piedmontese -monarchy. The Directory, seeing that war with Austria was probable, -decided to occupy all Piedmont. The king abdicated on the 9th of -December, 1798; retiring to the island of Sardinia, which was left in -his possession. Piedmont was soon after annexed to the French Republic. - -On the 20th of February, 1799, having failed to receive from the -emperor the explanations demanded concerning the entrance of the -Russian troops into his dominions, the Directory ordered its generals -to advance. Jourdan was to command in Germany, Masséna in Switzerland, -and Schérer in Italy. The armies of the republic, enfeebled by two -years of peace and by the economies of a government always embarrassed -for money and deficient in executive vigor, were everywhere inferior -to those of the enemy; and the plan of campaign, providing for several -operations out of reach of mutual support, has been regarded by -military critics as essentially vicious. - -Jourdan crossed the Rhine at Strasburg on the first of March, advancing -through the Black Forest upon the head waters of the Danube. On the 6th -Masséna crossed the river above Lake Constance, and moved through the -Alps toward the Tyrol, driving the Austrians before him on his right -and centre; but on the left he entirely failed to carry the important -position of Feldkirch, upon which would depend the communication -between his left and the right of Jourdan, if the latter succeeded in -pushing on as ordered. This, however, he was unable to do. After some -severe partial encounters there was fought on March 25th, at Stokach, -near the north-west extremity of Lake Constance, a pitched battle in -which the French were defeated. Jourdan then saw that he had to do -with largely superior forces and retreated upon the Rhine, which he -recrossed above Strasburg on the 6th of April. - -On the 26th of March, the day after the defeat of Jourdan at Stokach, -Schérer in Italy attacked the Austrians, who were occupying the line of -the Adige, rendered famous by Bonaparte in his great campaign of 1796. -The events of that day were upon the whole favorable to the French; -but Schérer showed irresolution and consequent delay in improving such -advantages as he had obtained. After a week of manœuvring the two -armies met in battle on the 5th of April near Magnano, and after a long -and bloody struggle the French were forced to give way. On the 6th, -the day that Jourdan retreated across the Rhine, Schérer also fell back -behind the Mincio. Not feeling secure there, although the Austrians did -not pursue, he threw garrisons into the posts on that line, and on the -12th retired behind the Adda; sending word to Macdonald, Championnet's -successor at Naples, to prepare to evacuate that kingdom and bring to -northern Italy the thirty thousand men now so sorely needed. - -Jourdan having offered his resignation after the battle of Stokach, -the armies in Germany and in Switzerland were united under the command -of Masséna; whose long front, extending from the Engadine, around the -sources of the Inn, along the Rhine as low as Dusseldorf, was held by -but one hundred thousand men, of whom two-thirds were in Switzerland. -In the position which Switzerland occupies, thrust out to the eastward -from the frontiers of France, having on the one flank the fields of -Germany, on the other those of Italy, and approachable from both sides -by many passes, the difficulties of defence are great;[3] and Masséna -found himself menaced from both quarters, as well as in front, by -enemies whose aggregate force was far superior to his own. Pressed -along the line of the Rhine both above and below Lake Constance, he was -compelled to retire upon works constructed by him around Zurich; being -unable to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces, which approached -from both directions. On the 4th of June the Austrians assaulted his -lines; and, though the attack was repulsed, Masséna thought necessary -to evacuate the place forty-eight hours later, falling back upon a -position on the Albis mountains a few miles in his rear. - -During the two months over which these contests between Masséna and his -enemies were spread, the affairs of the French in Italy were growing -daily more desperate. After the victory of Magnano the Austrians were -joined, on the 24th of April, by twenty thousand Russians under Marshal -Suwarrow, who became general-in-chief of the allied armies. On the 26th -Schérer turned over his command to Moreau; but, although the latter was -an officer of very great capacity, the change was too late to avoid -all the impending disasters. On the 27th the passage of the Adda was -forced by the allies, and on the 29th they entered Milan; the French -retiring upon the Ticino, breaking down the bridges over the Po, and -taking steps to secure their communications with Genoa. Pausing but a -moment, they again retreated in two columns upon Turin and Alessandria; -Moreau drawing together near the latter place the bulk of his force, -about twenty thousand men, and sending pressing invitations to -Macdonald to hasten the northward march of the army of Naples. The new -positions were taken the 7th of May, and it was not till the 5th that -the Austro-Russians, delayed by the destruction of the bridges, could -cross the Po. But the insurrection of the country in all directions was -showing how little the submission of the people and the establishment -of new republics were accompanied by any hearty fidelity to the French -cause; and on the 18th, leaving a garrison in Alessandria, Moreau -retreated upon the Apennines. On the 6th of June his troops were -distributed among the more important points on the crest of the range, -from Pontremoli, above Spezia, to Loano, and all his convoys had safely -crossed the mountains to the latter point. It was at this moment that -he had an interview with Admiral Bruix, whose fleet had anchored in -Vado Bay two days before.[4] - -While events were thus passing in Upper Italy, Macdonald, in obedience -to his orders, evacuated Naples on the 7th of May, at the moment -when Moreau was taking his position on the Apennines and Bonaparte -making his last fruitless assault upon Acre. Leaving garrisons at the -principal strong places of the kingdom, he hurried north, and on the -25th entered Florence, where, though his junction with Moreau was far -from being effected, he was for the first time in sure communication -with him by courier. There were two routes that Macdonald might -take,—either by the sea-shore, which was impracticable for artillery, -or else, crossing the Apennines, he would find a better road in the -plain south of the Po, through Modena and Parma, and by it might join -the army of Italy under the walls of Tortona. The latter course was -chosen, and after a delay too much prolonged the army of Naples set -out on the 9th of June. All went well with it until the 17th, when, -having passed Modena and Parma, routing the allied detachments which he -encountered, Macdonald reached the Trebia. Here, however, he was met -by Suwarrow, and after three days' desperate fighting was forced to -retreat by the road he came, to his old positions on the other side of -the mountains. On the same day the citadel of Turin capitulated to the -allies. After pursuing Macdonald some distance, Suwarrow turned back -to meet Moreau, and compelled him also to retire to his former posts. -This disastrous attempt at a junction within the enemies' lines cost -the French fifteen thousand men. It now became necessary for the army -of Naples to get to Genoa at all costs by the Corniche road, and this -it was able to do through the inactivity of the enemy,—due, so Jomini -says, not to Suwarrow, but to the orders from Vienna. By the middle of -July both armies were united under Moreau. As a result of the necessary -abandonment of Naples by the French troops, the country fell at once -into the power of the armed peasantry, except the garrisons left in a -few strong places; and these, by the help of the British navy, were -also reduced by the 1st of August. - -This striking practical illustration of the justness of Bonaparte's -views, concerning the danger incurred by the French in Upper Italy -through attempting to occupy Naples, was followed by further disasters. -On the 21st of July the citadel of Alessandria capitulated; and this -loss was followed on the 30th by that of Mantua, which had caused -Bonaparte so much delay and trouble in 1796. The latter success -was somewhat dearly bought, inasmuch as the emperor of Germany had -positively forbidden Suwarrow to make any further advance before -Mantua fell.[5] Opportunity was thus given for the junction of Moreau -and Macdonald, and for the reorganization of the latter's army, which -the affairs of the Trebia and the subsequent precipitate retreat had -left in a state of prostration and incoherence, from which it did not -recover for a month. The delay would have been still more favorable to -the French had Mantua resisted to the last moment; but it capitulated -at a time when it could still have held out for several days, and -Suwarrow was thus enabled to bring up the besieging corps to his -support, unknown to the enemy. - -Meanwhile Moreau had been relieved by Joubert, one of the most -brilliant of the young generals who had fought under Bonaparte in -Italy. The newcomer, reaching his headquarters on the 2d of August, -at once determined upon the offensive, moved thereto by the wish to -relieve Mantua, and also by the difficulty of feeding his army in the -sterile mountains now that ruin had befallen the coastwise traffic of -Genoa, by which supplies had before been maintained.[6] On the 10th -of August the French advanced. On the 14th they were in position at -Novi; and there Joubert saw, but too late, that Suwarrow's army was -far larger than he had expected, and that the rumor of Mantua's fall, -which he had refused to credit, must be true. He intended to retreat; -but the Russian marshal attacked the next morning, and after a fierce -struggle, which the strength of their position enabled the French to -prolong till night, they were driven from the field with heavy loss, -four general officers and thirty-seven guns being captured. Joubert -was killed early in the day; and Moreau, who had remained to aid him -until familiar with all the details of his command, again took the -temporary direction of the army by the agreement of the other generals. -Immediately after the battle Suwarrow sent into the late Papal States -a division which, co-operating with the Neapolitan royalists and the -British navy, forced the French to evacuate the new Roman republic on -the 27th of September, 1799. - -At this moment of success new dispositions were taken by the allied -governments, apparently through the initiative of Austria; which -wished, by removing Suwarrow, to keep entire control of Italy in her -own hands. This change of plan, made at so critical a moment, stopped -the hitherto triumphant progress; and, by allowing time for Bonaparte -to arrive and to act, turned victory into defeat. By it Suwarrow was to -march across the Alps into Switzerland, and there take charge of the -campaign against Masséna, having under him an army composed mainly of -Russians. The Archduke Charles, now commanding in Switzerland, was to -depart with the greater part of the Austrian contingent to the lower -Rhine, where he would by his operations support the invasion of Holland -then about to begin. - -On the 13th of August,—the same day that Bruix entered Brest, carrying -with him the Spanish fleet, and two days before the battle of Novi,—the -expedition against Holland, composed of seventeen thousand Russians -and thirty thousand British troops, sailed from England. Delayed first -by light winds and then by heavy weather, the landing was not made -till the 27th of the month. On the 31st the Archduke, taking with him -thirty-six thousand Austrians, started for the lower Rhine, leaving -General Hotze and the Russian Korsakoff to make head against Masséna -until the arrival of Suwarrow. The latter, on the 11th of September, -immediately after the surrender of Tortona, began his northward march. - -At the moment the Archduke assumed his new command, the French on the -lower Rhine, crossing at Mannheim, invested and bombarded Philipsburg; -and their operations seemed so far serious as to draw him and a large -part of his force in the same direction. This greatly diminished one -of the difficulties confronting Masséna in the offensive movement he -then had in contemplation. Hearing at the same time that Suwarrow had -started from Italy, he made his principal attack from his left upon -the Russians before Zurich on the 25th of September, the right wing of -his long line advancing in concert against the Austrian position east -of Lake Zurich upon its inlet, the Linth. Each effort was completely -successful, and decisive; the enemy being in both directions driven -back, and forced to recross the streams above and below the lake. -Suwarrow, after a very painful march and hard fighting, reached his -first appointed rendezvous at Mutten two days after the battle of -Zurich had been lost; and the corps that were to have met him there, -fearing their retreat would be cut off, had not awaited his arrival. -The old marshal with great difficulty fought his way through the -mountains to Ilanz, where at length he assembled his exhausted and -shattered forces on the 9th of October, the day on which Bonaparte -landed at Fréjus on his return from Egypt. By that time Switzerland -was entirely cleared of Russians and Austrians. The river Rhine, both -above and below Lake Constance, marked the dividing line between the -belligerents. - -The Anglo-Russian attack upon Holland had no better fate. Landing upon -the peninsula between the Zuyder Zee and the North Sea, the allies were -for awhile successful; but their movements were cautious and slow, -giving time for the local resistance to grow and for re-enforcements to -come up. The remnants of the Dutch navy were surrendered and taken back -to England; but the Duke of York, who had chief command of the allied -troops, was compelled on the 18th of October to sign a convention, by -which the invading force was permitted to retire unmolested by the -first of December. - -During the three remaining months of 1799 some further encounters took -place in Germany and Italy. In the latter the result was a succession -of disasters to the French, ending with the capitulation, on the 4th -of December, of Coni, their last remaining stronghold in Piedmont, -and the retreat of the army into the Riviera of Genoa. Corfu and the -Ionian Islands having been reduced by the combined Russian and Turkish -fleets in the previous March, and Ancona surrendered on the 10th of -November, all Bonaparte's conquests in Italy and the Adriatic had been -lost to France when the Directory fell. The brave soldiers of the army -of Italy, destitute and starving, without food, without pay, without -clothing or shoes, without even wood for camp-fires in the bitter -winter nights on the slopes of the Apennines, deserted in crowds and -made their way to the interior. In some regiments none but officers -and non-commissioned officers were left. An epidemic born of want and -exposure carried off men by hundreds. Championnet, overwhelmed by his -misfortunes and by the sight of the misery surrounding him, fell ill -and died. Bonaparte, now First Consul, sent Masséna to replace him. - -In Germany nothing decisive occurred in the field; but in consequence -of some disagreements of opinion between himself and the Archduke, -Suwarrow declined further co-operation, and, alleging the absolute -need of rest for his soldiers after their frightful exposure in -Switzerland, marched them at the end of October into winter quarters -in Bavaria. This closed the share of the Russians in the second -coalition. The Czar, who had embarked in the war with the idea of -restoring the rights of monarchs and the thrones that had been -overturned, was dissatisfied both with the policy of Austria, which -looked to her own predominance in Italy, and with Great Britain. -A twelvemonth more was to see him at the head of a league of the -northern states against the maritime claims of the great Sea Power, -and completely won over to the friendship of Bonaparte by the military -genius and wily flattery of the renowned captain. - -During this disastrous year, in which France lost all Italy except the -narrow strip of sea-coast about Genoa, and after months of desperate -struggle had barely held her own in Switzerland, Germany, and Holland, -the internal state of the country was deplorable. The Revolutionary -government by the Committee of Public Safety had contrived, by the -use of the extraordinary powers granted to it, to meet with greater -or less success the demands of the passing hour; although in so doing -it was continually accumulating embarrassments against a future day -of reckoning. The Directory, deprived of the extraordinary powers of -its predecessor, had succeeded to these embarrassments, and the day of -reckoning had arrived. It has been seen how the reactionary spirit, -which followed the rule of blood, had prevailed more and more until, -in 1797, the political composition of the two Councils was so affected -by it as to produce a strong conflict between them and the executive. -This dead-lock had been overcome and harmony restored by the violent -measures of September, 1797, by which two Directors and a number of -members of the legislature had been forcibly expelled from their -office. The parties, of two very different shades of opinion, to which -the ejected members belonged, had not, however, ceased to exist. In -1798, in the yearly elections to replace one-third of the legislature, -they again returned a body of representatives sufficient to put the -Councils in opposition to the Directory; but this year the choice of -the electors was baffled by a system of double returns. The sitting -Councils, of the same political party as the Directory, pronounced upon -these, taking care in so doing to insure that the majority in the new -bodies should be the same as in the old. In May, 1799, however, the -same circumstance again recurred. The fact is particularly interesting, -as showing the opposition which was felt toward the government -throughout the country. - -This opposition was due to a cause which rarely fails to make -governments unpopular. The Directory had been unsuccessful. It was -called upon to pay the bills due to the public expectation of better -things when once the war was over. This it was not able to do. Though -peace had been made with the continent, there remained so many matters -of doubt and contention that large armies had to be maintained. The -expenses of the state went on, but the impoverished nation cried -out against the heavy taxation laid to meet them; the revenues -continually fell short of the expenditures, and the measures proposed -by the ministers to remedy this evil excited vehement criticisms. -The unpopularity of the government, arising from inefficient action, -reacted upon and increased the weakness which was inherent in its -cumbrous, many-headed form. Hence there resulted, from the debility of -the head, an impotence which permeated all the links of the executive -administration down to the lowest members. - -In France itself the disorder and anarchy prevailing in the interior -touched the verge of social dissolution.[7] Throughout the country, -but especially in the south and west, prevailed brigandage on a large -scale—partly political, partly of the ordinary highway type. There -were constant reports of diligences and mail-wagons stopped,[8] of -public treasure plundered, of republican magistrates assassinated. -Disorganization and robbery spread throughout the army, a natural -result of small pay, irregularly received, and of the system of -contributions, administered with little responsibility by the -commanders of armies in the field. The attempt of the government to -check and control this abuse was violently resented by generals, both -of the better and the worse class; by the one as reflecting upon their -character and injuring their position, by the other as depriving them -of accustomed though unlawful gains. Two men of unblemished repute, -Joubert and Championnet, came to a direct issue with the Directory -upon this point. Joubert resigned the command of the army of Italy, in -which Bernadotte from the same motive refused to replace him; while -Championnet, in Naples, compelled the commissioner of the Directory to -leave the kingdom. For this act, however, he was deprived and brought -to a court-martial. - -From the weakness pervading the administration and from the inadequate -returns of the revenue, the government was driven to extraordinary -measures and to the anticipation of its income. Greater and more -onerous taxes were laid; and, as the product of these was not -immediate, purchases had to be made at long and uncertain credit, and -consequently were exorbitant in price while deficient in quantity and -quality. From this arose much suffering among all government employés, -but especially among the soldiers, who needed the first attention, and -whose distress led them easily to side with their officers against -the administration. Contracts so made only staved off the evil day, -at the price of increasing indebtedness for the state and of growing -corruption among the contractor class and the officials dealing with -them. Embarrassment and disorder consequently increased apace without -any proportionate vigor in the external action of the government, and -the effects were distributed among and keenly felt by all individuals, -except the small number whose ability or whose corruptness enables -them to grow rich when, and as, society becomes most distressed. The -creditors of the nation, and especially the holders of bonds, could -with difficulty obtain even partial payment. In the general distrust -and perplexity individuals and communities took to hoarding both money -and food, moved by the dangers of transit and by fear of the scarcity -which they saw to be impending. This stagnation of internal circulation -was accompanied by the entire destruction of maritime commerce, due to -the pressure of the British navy and to the insane decree of Nivôse 29 -(January 19, 1798).[9] Both concurred to paralyze the energies of the -people, to foster indolence and penury, and by sheer want to induce a -state of violence with which the executive was unable to cope. - -When to this internal distress were added the military disasters just -related, the outcry became loud and universal. All parties united -against the Directors, who did not dare in 1799 to repeat the methods -by which in the two previous years a majority had been obtained in the -legislature. On the 18th of June the new Councils were able to force -a change in the composition of the Directory, further enfeebling it -through the personal weakness of the new members. These hastened to -reverse many of the measures of their predecessors, but no change of -policy could restore the lost prestige. The effect of these steps was -only further to depress that branch of the government which, in so -critical a moment and in so disordered a society, should overbear all -others and save the state—not by discussion, but by action. - -Such was the condition of affairs found by Bonaparte when he returned -from Egypt. The revolution of Brumaire 18 (November 9, 1799) threw -into his hands uncontrolled power. This he proceeded at once to use -with the sagacity and vigor that rarely failed him in his early -prime. The administration of the country was reconstituted on lines -which sacrificed local independence, but invigorated the grasp of -the central executive, and made its will felt in every corner of the -land. Vexatious measures of the preceding government were repealed, -and for them was substituted a policy of liberal conciliation, -intended to rally all classes of Frenchmen to the support of the new -rule. In the West and North, in La Vendée, Brittany, and Normandy, -the insurrection once suppressed by Hoche had again raised its head -against the Directory. To the insurgents Bonaparte offered reasonable -inducements to submission, while asserting his firm determination -to restore authority at any cost; and the rapid gathering of sixty -thousand troops in the rebellious districts proved his resolution to -use for that purpose a force so overwhelming, that the completion of -its task would release it by the return of spring, to take the field -against external foes. Before the end of February the risings were -suppressed, and this time forever. Immediate steps were taken to put -the finances on a sounder basis, and to repair the military disasters -of the last twelvemonth. To the two principal armies, of the Rhine and -of Italy, were sent respectively Moreau and Masséna, the two greatest -generals of the republic after Bonaparte himself; and money advanced by -Parisian bankers was forwarded to relieve the more pressing wants of -the destitute soldiery. - -At the same time that these means were used to recover France herself -from the condition of debility into which she had fallen, the first -consul made a move calculated either to gain for her the time she yet -needed, or, in case it failed, to rally to his support all classes in -the state. Departing from the usual diplomatic routine, he addressed -a personal letter to the king of Great Britain and to the emperor -of Germany, deploring the existing war, and expressing a wish that -negotiations for peace might be opened. The reply from both sovereigns -came through the ordinary channels of their respective ministries. -Austria said civilly that she could not negotiate apart from her -allies; and furthermore, that the war being only to preserve Europe -from universal disorder, due to the unstable and aggressive character -of the French governments since the Revolution, no stable peace could -be made until there was some guarantee for a change of policy. This -she could not yet recognize in the new administration, which owed its -existence only to the violent overthrow of its predecessor. Great -Britain took substantially the same ground. Peace was worse than -worthless, if insecure; and experience had shown that no defence except -that of steady and open hostility was availing, while the system which -had prevailed in France remained the same. She could not recognize a -change of system in the mere violent substitution of one set of rulers -for another. Disavowing any claim to prescribe to France what should -be her form of government, the British ministry nevertheless said -distinctly that the best guarantee for a permanent change of policy -would be the restoration of the Bourbons. This seemingly impolitic -suggestion insured—what was very possibly its object—the continuance of -the war until were realized the advantages that seemed about to accrue. -Not only were the conditions at that time overwhelmingly in favor of -the allies, but there was also every probability of the reduction of -Egypt and Malta, and of further decisive successes in Italy. These, -if obtained, would be so many cards strengthening their hands in the -diplomatic game to be played in the negotiations for peace. Believing, -as the British ministry of that day assuredly did, that a secure peace -could only be based on the exhaustion, and not upon the moderation or -good faith, of their enemy, it would have been the height of folly to -concede time, or submit to that vacillation of purpose and relaxation -of tension which their own people would certainly feel, if negotiations -were opened. - -Nor were these military and moral considerations the only ones -affecting the decision of the government. Despite the immense burdens -imposed by the war to support her own military expenditures and -furnish the profuse subsidies paid to her allies, the power of the -country to bear them was greatly increased. Thanks to the watery -rampart which secured peace within her borders, Great Britain had now -become the manufactory and warehouse of Europe. The commercial and -maritime prostration of Holland and France, her two great rivals in -trade and manufactures, had thrown into her hands these sources of -their prosperity; and she, through the prodigious advances of the ten -years' peace, was fully ready to profit by them. By the capture of -their foreign possessions and the ruin of the splendid French colony -in Haïti, she now controlled the chief regions whence were drawn the -tropical products indispensable to Europeans. She monopolized their -markets as well as the distribution of their produce. Jealously -reserving to British merchant shipping the trade of her own and -conquered colonies, she yet met the immense drain made by the navy -upon her merchant seamen by relaxing the famous Navigation Laws; -permitting her ships to be manned by foreigners, and foreign ships to -engage in branches of her commerce closed to them in time of peace. -But while thus encouraging neutrals to carry the surplus trade, whose -rapid growth was outstripping the capacity of her own shipping, she -rigorously denied their right to do as much for her enemies. These -severe restrictions, which her uncontrolled sea-power enabled her -to maintain, were re-enforced by suicidal edicts of the French -government, retaliating upon the same unhappy neutrals the injury their -weakness compelled them to accept from the mistress of the seas,—thus -driving them from French shores, and losing a concurrence essential -to French export and import. In this time of open war no flag was so -safe from annoyance as the British, for none other was protected by a -powerful navy. Neutrals sought its convoy against French depredations, -and the navigation of the world was now swayed by this one great power, -whom its necessities had not yet provoked to lay a yoke heavier than -the oppressed could bear. - -To this control of the carrying trade, and of so much of the -agricultural production of the globe, was added a growing absorption -of the manufactures of Europe, due to the long war paralyzing the -peaceful energies of the continental peoples. In the great system of -circulation and exchange, everything thus tended more and more to Great -Britain; which was indicated as the natural centre for accumulation -and distribution by its security, its accessibility, and its nearness -to the continent on which were massed the largest body of consumers -open to maritime commerce. Becoming thus the chief medium through -which the business of the civilized world was carried on and its wants -supplied, her capital grew apace; and was steadily applied, by the able -hands in which it accumulated, to develop, by increased production and -increased facilities of carriage, the powers of the country to supply -demands that were continually increasing on both sides of the Atlantic. -The foreign trade, export and import, which in 1792, the last year of -peace, had amounted to £44,500,000, rose in 1797 to £50,000,000, and -in 1800 to £73,700,000. Encouraged by these evident proofs of growing -wealth, the ministry was able so to increase the revenue that its -receipts, independent of extraordinary war taxes, far exceeded anything -it had ever been before, "or," to use Pitt's words, "anything which -the most sanguine hopes could have anticipated. If," he continued, -"we compare this year of war with former years of peace, we shall in -the produce of our revenue and in the extent of our commerce behold a -spectacle at once paradoxical, inexplicable, and astonishing. We have -increased our external and internal commerce to a greater pitch than -ever it was before; and we may look to the present as the proudest year -that has ever occurred for this country."[10] - -With such resources to sustain the armies of their allies, and certain -of keeping a control of the sea unparalleled even in the history of -Great Britain, the ministry looked hopefully forward to a year which -should renew and complete the successes of 1799. They reckoned without -Bonaparte, as Bonaparte in his turn reckoned again and again without -Nelson. - -Russia took no more part in the coalition; but the forces of Germany, -under the control of Austria and subsidized by Great Britain, either -actually in the field or holding the fortified posts on which the -operations depended, amounted to something over two hundred and fifty -thousand men. Of these, one hundred and twenty-five thousand under -Mélas were in Italy. The remainder under General Kray were in Germany, -occupying the angle formed by the Rhine at Bâle, where, after flowing -west from Lake Constance, it turns abruptly north for the remainder -of its course. The plan of campaign was to stand on the defensive in -Germany, holding in check the enemies there opposed to them, and in -Italy to assume a vigorous offensive, so as to drive the French finally -out of the country. That achieved, the idea was entertained of entering -France at the extreme south, and possibly investing Toulon, supported -by the British navy. - -When Bonaparte first took charge, there remained to France only two -hundred and fifty thousand soldiers, of whom at the opening of the -campaign of 1800 there were in the field, opposed to the Austrians, but -one hundred and sixty-five thousand. One hundred thousand conscripts -were called for; but time would be needed to turn these into soldiers, -even with the advantage of the nucleus of veterans around whom they -would be gathered. The equipment and provisioning both of the old and -new levies also required time and effort. Bonaparte's project was to -assume the offensive in Germany, turning there the position of the -Austrians, and driving them northward from the Rhine towards the head -waters of the Danube. For this great operation the army under Moreau -was raised to an equality with the enemy opposed to him. Masséna in -Italy was directed to stand solely on the defensive, concentrating -around Genoa the bulk of the thirty-five or forty thousand men which -alone he had. While he held this position in such force, the Austrians -could scarcely advance into France along the narrow coast road, leaving -him in the rear. When the expected success in Germany was won, there -was to be detached from that army, which should then assume an attitude -of observation, a corps twenty thousand strong. This should cross -Switzerland, entering Italy by the St. Gothard Pass, and there joining -a force of forty thousand to be led by the First Consul in person -through the Pass of St. Bernard. This mass of sixty thousand men was to -throw itself in rear of the Austrians, forcing them to fight for their -communications through Lombardy, and hoping under the first general of -the age to win, over a less skilful opponent, such victories as had -illustrated the famous campaigns of 1796 and 1797. - -Bonaparte's plan thus hinged upon the French occupation of Switzerland, -which, intervening as a great rampart between the Austrians in Germany -and Italy, permitted him to cover the movements against the former by -the curtain of the Rhine between Lake Constance and Bâle, and to use -safely and secretly the passes leading into the plains of Lombardy -and Piedmont. To this advantage of position he conjoined, with -inconceivable wiliness, an absolute secrecy as to the very existence -of the forty thousand, known as the Army of Reserve, which he himself -was to lead. The orders constituting this force were given the utmost -publicity. Its headquarters were established at Dijon, and one of -Bonaparte's most trusted subordinates was sent to command it. An appeal -was made to discharged soldiers to join its ranks; some material of -war and some conscripts, with a corps of officers, were assembled. -There preparations stopped—or went on so feebly in comparison with the -glowing boasts of the French journals, that hostile spies were entirely -deceived. The Army of Reserve became the joke of Europe, while the -scattered detachments that were to compose it were assembling at points -separated, yet chosen with Bonaparte's consummate skill to permit -rapid concentration when the hour came. To insure perfect secrecy, -the correspondence of these different bodies was with him alone, not -through the Ministry of War. - -The campaign was opened by the Austrians in Italy. Mélas, with seventy -thousand men, attacked Masséna along the chain of the Apennines. -Difficulties of subsistence had forced the latter to disseminate his -troops between Genoa and Nice. Through this necessarily thin line -the Austrians broke on the 5th of April, and after several days of -strenuous resistance, furthered by the facilities for defence offered -by that mountainous region, Masséna was driven into Genoa. The left -wing of his army under Suchet was forced back toward Nice, where it -took position on the Var. On the 18th of April Masséna was definitively -shut up in Genoa with eighteen thousand men, and so short of provisions -that it became a matter of the utmost urgency to relieve him. - -On April 25 Moreau began his movements, of a somewhat complicated -character, but resulting in his whole army being safely across the -Rhine on the first of May. Eighty thousand French troops were then -drawn up between Bâle and Lake Constance in an east and west direction, -threatening the left flank of the enemy, whose front was north and -south, and in position to attack both their line of retreat and the -immense depots whose protection embarrassed all the movements of -the Austrians. On the 3d of May the latter were defeated at Engen, -and their depot at Stokach was captured. On the 5th they were again -beaten at Moesskirch, and on the 9th at Biberach, losing other -large deposits of stores. General Kray then retired upon Ulm on the -Danube, and the first act of Bonaparte's design was accomplished. -It had not corresponded with the lines laid down by him, which were -too adventurous to suit Moreau, nor was the result equal to his -expectations; but the general strategic outcome was to check for the -time any movements of the enemy in Germany, and enable Moreau to send -the force needed to co-operate with Bonaparte in Italy. This started -on the 13th of May, and was joined on the way by some detachments in -Switzerland; the whole amounting to between fifteen and twenty thousand -men.[11] - -On the 6th of May the first consul left Paris, having delayed to -the last moment in order to keep up the illusions of the Austrian -commander-in-chief in Italy. The crossing of the St. Bernard began -on the 15th, and on the 20th the whole army had passed. On the 26th -it issued in the plains of Piedmont; whence Bonaparte turned to the -eastward, to insure his great object of throwing his force across the -enemy's communications and taking from him all hope of regaining them -without a battle. On the first of June he entered Milan. - -Meanwhile Masséna's army, a prey to horrible famine, prolonged in Genoa -a resistance which greatly contributed to the false position of the -Austrians. Of these, twenty-five thousand were before Nice, thirty -thousand before Genoa. Twenty thousand more had been lost by casualties -since the campaign opened. Unwilling to relinquish his gains, Mélas -waited too long to concentrate his scattered troops; and when at -last he sent the necessary orders, Masséna was treating to evacuate -Genoa. The Austrian officer on the spot, unwilling to lose the prize, -postponed compliance until it was secured,—a delay fraught with serious -results. On the 5th Genoa was given up, and the besiegers, leaving a -garrison in the place, marched to join the commander-in-chief, who -was gathering his forces around Alessandria. Meanwhile Bonaparte had -crossed to the south side of the Po with half his army. On the 14th -of June was fought the battle of Marengo. Anxious lest the foe might -give him the slip, the first consul had spread his troops too widely; -and the first events of the day were so far in favor of the Austrians -that Mélas, who was seventy-six years old, left the field at two in -the afternoon, certain of victory, to seek repose. An hour later the -opportune arrival of General Desaix turned the scales, and Bonaparte -remained conqueror on the ground, standing across the enemy's line -of retreat. The following day Mélas signed a convention abandoning -all northern Italy, as far as the Mincio, behind which the Austrians -were to withdraw. All the fortified places were given up to France, -including the hardly won Genoa. While awaiting the Emperor's answer -to propositions of peace, sent by the First Consul, there was to be -in Italy a suspension of arms, during which neither army should send -detachments to Germany. On the 2d of July Bonaparte re-entered Paris in -triumph, after an absence of less than two months. - -Meantime Moreau, after learning the successful crossing of the St. -Bernard, had resumed the offensive. Moving to the eastward, he crossed -the Danube below Ulm with part of his force on the 19th of June, -threatening Kray's communications with Bohemia. A partial encounter on -that day left five thousand prisoners in the hands of the French, who -maintained the position they had gained. The same night Kray evacuated -Ulm, moving rapidly off by a road to the northward and so effecting -his escape. Moreau, unable to intercept, followed for some distance -and then stopped a pursuit which promised small results. He was still -ignorant of the battle of Marengo, of which the Austrians now had news; -and the latter, while concealing the victory, announced to him the -suspension of arms, and suggested a similar arrangement in Germany. -Convinced that events favorable to France lay behind this proposition, -Moreau would come to no agreement; but on the contrary decided at once -to secure for his victorious army the most advantageous conditions -with which to enter upon negotiations. Closely investing the important -fortresses of Ulm and Ingolstadt on the Danube, with part of his force, -he recrossed the river with the remainder and advanced into Bavaria. On -the 28th of June he entered Munich; and near there was signed on the -15th of July an armistice, closely corresponding with that concluded -by Bonaparte in Italy just one month before. The two belligerents -retired behind appointed lines, not again to engage in hostilities -without twelve days' notice. During this suspension of arms the -blockaded Austrian fortresses should receive every fortnight provisions -proportioned to their consumption, so that in case of renewed -operations they would be in the same condition as when the truce began. -The two great French armies were now encamped in the fertile plains of -Italy and Germany, living in quiet off districts external to France, -which was thus relieved of the larger part of their expense. - -The effect of this short and brilliant campaign of unbroken French -successes was to dispose to peace both members of the coalition. -Neither, however, was yet reduced to negotiate apart from its ally. On -the very day the news of Marengo was received at Vienna, but before -the last reverses in Germany, Austria had renewed her engagements with -Great Britain, both powers stipulating not to treat singly. The first -consul, on the other hand, was distinctly opposed to joint discussions, -his constant policy in the cabinet as in the field being to separate -his opponents. As Austria's great need was to gain time, she sent to -Paris an envoy empowered to exchange views with the French government -but to conclude nothing. The emperor also intimated his wish for a -general pacification, and on the 9th of August the British minister at -Vienna notified to that court the willingness of his own to enter into -negotiations for a general peace. - -With this began an encounter of wits, in which Bonaparte showed himself -as astute at a bargain as he was wily in the field. Austria, if not -given too much time, was at his mercy; but Great Britain held over him -a like advantage in her control of the sea, which was strangling the -colonial empire he passionately wished to restore. Haïti had escaped -from all but nominal control; Martinique, the gem of the Antilles, was -in British hands; Malta and Egypt, the trophies of his own enterprise, -were slowly but surely expiring. For these he too needed time; for -with it there was good prospect of soon playing a card which should -reverse, or at least seriously modify, the state of the game, by -bringing Russia and the Baltic navies into the combination against -Great Britain. In this support, and in the extremity to which he might -reduce Austria, lay his only chances to check the great opponent of -France; for, while almost supreme on the Continent, he could not from -the coast project his power beyond the range of a cannon's ball. His -correspondence throughout this period abounds with instructions and -exhortations to fit out the fleets, to take the sea, to relieve Malta -and Egypt, to seize Sardinia by an expedition from Corsica, and Mahon -by a squadron from Brest. All fell fruitless before the exhaustion of -French sea power, as did also his plan for an extensive cruise on a -grand scale against British commerce in many quarters of the world. -"I see with regret," wrote he to the minister of Marine, "that the -armament of the fleet has been sacrificed to that of a great number of -small vessels;" but in truth there was nothing else to do. His ablest -admirals failed to equip ships from which every resource was cut off by -the omnipresent cruisers of the enemy. "We can never take Mahon," he -writes to the court of Spain, in the full swing of his triumphs after -Marengo; "therefore make war on Portugal and take her provinces, so as -to enter negotiations for peace with your hands as full as possible of -equivalents." - -The Czar Paul had joined the second coalition full of ardor against the -French revolution and determined to restore the princes who had lost -their thrones. He had been bitterly mortified by the reverses to his -troops in 1799, and especially by the disaster to Suwarrow, for which -he not unjustly blamed Austria. He was also dissatisfied to find in his -allies less of zeal for unfortunate sovereigns than of desire to reduce -the power of France, to whose system they attributed the misfortunes of -Europe. Disappointment in his unbalanced mind turned soon to coolness -and was rapidly passing to hostility. The transition was assisted, and -a pretext for a breach with Great Britain afforded, by a fresh outbreak -of the old dispute between her and the Baltic powers concerning the -rights of neutrals. Denmark in 1799 adopted the policy of convoying her -merchant vessels by ships of war, and claimed that a statement from the -senior naval officer, that the cargoes contained nothing forbidden by -the law of nations, exempted the convoy from the belligerent right of -search. British statesmen denied that this conceded belligerent right -could be nullified by any rule adopted by a neutral; to which they were -the more impelled as the Danes and themselves differed radically in the -definition of contraband. Danish naval officers being instructed to -resist the search of their convoys, two hostile encounters took place; -one in December, 1799, and the other in July, 1800. In the latter -several were killed on both sides, and the Danish frigate was carried -into the Downs. Seeing the threatening character of affairs, the -British ministry took immediate steps to bring them to an issue. An -ambassador was sent to Copenhagen supported by nine ships-of-the-line -and several bomb-vessels; and on the 29th of August, barely a month -after the affray, a convention was signed by which the general subject -of searching ships under convoy was referred to future discussion, but -Denmark consented to suspend her convoys until a definitive treaty was -made. The Danish frigate was at once released. - -It will be observed that this collision occurred in the very midst of -the negotiations between Austria and France, to which Great Britain -claimed the right to be a party. The whole vexed question of neutral -and belligerent rights was thus violently raised, at a moment most -inauspicious to the allies and most favorable to Bonaparte. The latter, -crowned with victory upon the Continent, found every neutral commercial -state disposed to side with him in contesting positions considered by -Great Britain to be vital to her safety. It was for him to foster this -disposition and combine the separate powers into one great effort, -before which the Mistress of the Seas should be compelled to recede -and submit. The occasion here arose, as it were spontaneously, to -realize what became the great dream of his life and ultimately led him -to his ruin,—to unite the Continent against the British Islands and, -as he phrased it, "to conquer the sea by the land." Circumstances, -partly anterior to his rise to power, and partly contrived by his -sagacious policy during the previous few months, particularly favored -at this moment such a league, for which the affair of the Danish -convoy supplied an impulse, and the prostration of Great Britain's -ally, Austria, an opportunity. Bonaparte underestimated the vitality -and influence of a state upon which centred a far-reaching commercial -system, and in valuing naval power he did not appreciate that a mere -mass of ships had not the weight he himself was able to impart to a -mass of men. He never fully understood the maritime problems with -which from time to time he had to deal; but he showed wonderful skill -at this critical period in combining against his principal enemy an -opposition, for which Prussia afforded the body and the hot temper of -the Czar the animating soul. - -Since 1795 Prussia had shut herself up to a rigorous neutrality, in -which were embraced the North German states. Under this system, during -the maritime war, the commerce of the larger part of the Continent -poured in through these states—by the great German rivers, the Ems, the -Weser, and the Elbe—and through the cities of Hamburg and Bremen. The -tonnage clearing from Great Britain alone to North Germany increased -from 120,000 in 1792 to 389,000 in 1800; a traffic of which Prussia -took the lion's share. To these advantages of neutral territory it -was desirable to join the utmost freedom for neutral navigation. Upon -this Great Britain bore heavily; but so large a proportion of the -trade was done through her, and the sea was so entirely under the -power of her navy, that prudence had so far dictated acquiescence in -her claims, even when not admitted. This was particularly the case -while Russia, under Catherine II., and in the first years of her son, -tacitly or openly supported Great Britain; and while Austria, though -badly beaten in the field, remained unshaken in power. The weaker -maritime countries, Sweden, Denmark, and the United States of America, -were determined by similar motives. They groaned under the British -exactions; but the expansion of their commerce outweighed the injuries -received, and submission was less hurtful than resistance in arms. -Russia herself, though not strictly a maritime state, was a large -producer of articles which were mainly carried by British ships and -for which England was the chief customer. The material interests of -Russia, and especially of the powerful nobles, were therefore bound up -with peace with Great Britain; but an absolute monarch could disregard -this fact, at least for a time. The furious, impulsive temper of -Paul I., if aroused, was quite capable of overleaping all prudential -considerations, of using the colossal power of his empire to support -the other states, and even of compelling them to act in concert with -him. - -Such were the discordant elements which Bonaparte had to reconcile -into a common effort: on the one hand, the strong though short-sighted -mercantile interests, which to retain great present advantages would -favor submission rather than resistance to the exactions of Great -Britain. These were represented by the development of carrying trade -in the neutral Baltic states, by the enlarged commerce of Prussia and -North Germany,—which through their neutrality in a maritime war had -become the highway of intercourse between the Continent and the outer -world,—and by the productions of Russia, which formed the revenue of -her great proprietors, and found their way to market wholly by sea. -Bound together by the close relations which commerce breeds between -states, and by the dependence of each upon the capital and mercantile -system of Great Britain, these interests constituted the prosperity -of nations, and could by no rulers be lightly disregarded. On the -other hand stood the dignity of neutral flags and their permanent -interests,—always contrary to those of belligerents,—the ambition -of Prussia and her jealousy of Austria, and finally the chivalrous, -reckless, half insane Paul I., seeking now with all the bitterness of -personal feeling to gratify his resentment against his late allies. - -Bonaparte had already begun to work upon the Czar as well as upon the -neutral powers. Closely observing the political horizon from his first -accession to office, he had noted every condition capable of raising -embarrassments to Great Britain, whom his unerring military insight -had long before recognized[12] as the key to a military situation, in -which his own object was the predominance of France, not only on the -Continent but throughout the world. Sagacious a statesman as he was, -and clearly as he recognized the power of moral and political motives, -his ideal of control was essentially forcible, based upon superior -armies and superior fleets; and consequently every political problem -was by him viewed much as a campaign, in which forces were to be moved, -combined, and finally massed upon the vital points of an enemy's -position. The power of Great Britain was sea power in its widest sense, -commercial and naval; against it, therefore, he aimed to effect such a -combination as would both destroy her commerce and cripple her navy. -The impotence of France and Spain, united, to injure the one or the -other had been clearly shown by repeated defeats, and by the failure -of the commerce-destroying so industriously carried on during seven -years of war. Far from decaying or languishing, the commerce of Great -Britain throve everywhere with redoubled vigor, and her fleets rode -triumphant in all seas. There was, however, one quarter in which she -had not hitherto been disturbed, except by the quickly extinguished -efforts of the Dutch navy; and just there, in the Baltic and North Sea, -was the point where, next to the British islands and seas themselves, -she was most vulnerable. There was concentrated a great part of her -shipping; there was the market for the colonial produce stored in her -overflowing warehouses; there also were gathered three navies, whose -united masses—manned by hardy seamen trained in a boisterous navigation -and sheltered in an enclosed sea of perilous access—might overweight a -force already strained to control the Mediterranean, to blockade the -hostile arsenals, and to protect the merchant shipping which thronged -over every ocean highway. - -To close the north of Europe to British trade, and to combine the -Baltic navies against that of Great Britain, became thenceforth the -fixed ideas of Bonaparte's life. To conciliate Denmark he released a -number of Danish ships, which had been arrested by the Directory for -submitting to search by British cruisers. The extent of the czar's -alienation from his former allies not being at first apparent, he next -courted Prussia, the head of the North German neutrality, in whose -power it was to arrest British trade both through her own territory -and through Hamburg. Prussia was ambitious to play a leading part in -Europe. The five years spent by Austria, France, and Great Britain in -exhausting warfare, she had used to consolidate her power and husband -her resources. She wished now to pose as a mediator, and looked for -the time when the prostration of the combatants and her own restored -strength would cause them to bend to her influence, and yield her -points, through the simple exhibition of her force. The advances and -flatteries of the first consul were graciously received, but the path -Prussia had traced for herself was to involve no risks—only gains; -she wished much, but would venture naught. It was a dangerous part to -play, this waiting on opportunity, against such a man as swayed the -destinies of the Continent during the next twelve years. From it arose -a hesitating, selfish, and timid policy, fluctuating with every breath -of danger or hope of advantage, dishonoring the national name, until it -ended in Jena and the agonies of humiliation through which the country -passed between that disaster and the overthrow of Napoleon. Such a -spirit is prone to side with a strong combination and to yield to a -masterful external impulse. - -Under this Bonaparte next sought to bring her. "We shall make nothing -out of Prussia," he writes to Talleyrand on the first of June, 1800, on -his way to Marengo; and he adds, "If the news from Egypt [apparently -the defeat of the Turks by Kleber] is confirmed, it will become -important to have some one in Russia. The Ottoman Empire cannot exist -much longer, and if Paul I. turns his looks in that direction our -interests become common."[13] Bonaparte was at no pains to reconcile -this view with an assurance made a month later to Turkey that "no -anxiety need be felt about Egypt, which will be restored as soon as the -Porte shall resume its former relations with France."[14] On the 4th -of June he recommends general and flattering overtures to the czar, -accompanied by special marks of consideration. The latter was fully -prepared to be won by compliments from the man for whose military -glory he had come to feel a profound enthusiasm. On the 4th of July -Bonaparte's general advances took form in a definite proposal to -surrender to Russian troops Malta, whose speedy loss by himself he saw -to be inevitable; an offer calculated not only to charm the Czar, who -delighted to fancy himself the head and protector of an ancient order -of knights, but also to sow discord between him and Great Britain, if, -as was probable, the latter declined to yield her prey to a friend -who at a critical moment had forsaken her. The letter sketched by the -first consul was carefully worded to quicken the ready vanity of its -recipient. "Desiring to give a proof of personal consideration to the -emperor of Russia and to distinguish him from the other enemies of -the republic, who fight from a vile love of gain, the first consul -wishes, if the garrison of Malta is constrained by famine to evacuate -the place, to restore it to the hands of the czar as grand master of -the order; and although the first consul is certain that Malta has -provisions for several months,[15] he wishes his Majesty to inform him -what conventions he would wish to make, and what measures to take, so -that, if the case arise, his troops may enter that place."[16] This was -shortly followed by the release of the Russian prisoners in France, -in number between seven and eight thousand, whom Bonaparte clad and -dismissed with their colors and their officers to return into Russia; -suggesting that, if the czar thought proper, he "might demand of the -English to release an equal number of French prisoners; but if not, the -first consul hoped he would accept his troops as an especial mark of -the esteem felt for the brave Russian armies."[17] - -Immediately after these transactions occurred the collision between -British and Danish cruisers in the Channel, and the entrance of -the Baltic by the British fleet, to support its ambassador in his -negotiation with Denmark. Paul I. made of the latter a pretext for -sequestrating all British property in Russia, to be held as a guarantee -against the future action of Great Britain. This order, dated August -29, 1800, was followed by another of September 10, announcing that -"several political circumstances induced the emperor to think that -a rupture of friendship with England may ensue," and directing a -concentration of Russian troops. The cloud blew over for a moment, -the sequestration being removed on the 22d of September; but the fall -of Malta, which had surrendered on the 5th of the same month, brought -matters to an issue. The czar had gladly accepted Bonaparte's adroit -advances and designated a general to go to Paris, take command of the -released prisoners and with them repair to Malta. The capitulation -became known to him early in November; before which he had formally -published his intention to revive the Armed Neutrality of 1780 against -the maritime claims of Great Britain. It being very doubtful whether -the latter would deliver the island after his unfriendly measures, -a sequestration of British property was again decreed. Some three -hundred ships were seized, their crews marched into the interior, -and seals placed on all warehouses containing British property; the -czar declaring that the embargo should not be removed until the -acknowledgment of his rights to Malta, as grand master of the Order. -The sequestrated property was to be held by an imperial commission and -applied to pay debts due to Russian subjects by private Englishmen. - -Affairs had now reached a stage where Prussia felt encouraged to move. -The breach between Great Britain and Russia had opened wide, while the -relations of the czar and first consul had become so friendly as to -assure their concert. The armistice between Austria and France still -continued, pending the decision whether the latter would negotiate with -the emperor and Great Britain conjointly; but Bonaparte was a close as -well as a hard bargainer. He would not admit the joint negotiation, -nor postpone the renewal of hostilities beyond the 11th of September, -except on condition of a maritime truce as favorable to France as he -considered the land armistice to be to Austria. He proposed entire -freedom of navigation to merchant vessels, the raising of the blockades -of Brest, Cadiz, Toulon, and Flushing, and that Malta and Alexandria -should be freely open to receive provisions by French or neutral -vessels. The effect would be to allow the French dockyards to obtain -naval stores, of which they were utterly destitute, and Malta and -Egypt to receive undefined quantities of supplies and so prolong their -resistance indefinitely. Great Britain was only willing to adopt for -Egypt and Malta the literal terms of the armistice applied to the three -Austrian fortresses blockaded by French troops. These were to receive -every fortnight provisions proportioned to their consumption, and the -British ministry offered to allow the same to Malta and Egypt. They -also conceded free navigation, except in the articles of military and -naval stores. Bonaparte refused. Austria's advantage in the armistice, -he said, was not the mere retention of the fortresses, but the use -she was making of her respite. Between these two extreme views no -middle term could be found. In fact, great as were the results of -Marengo, and of Moreau's more methodical advance into Germany, the -material advantage of Great Britain over France still far exceeded -that of France over Austria. The French had gained great successes, -but they were now forcing the enemy back upon the centre of his power -and they had not possession of his communications; whereas Great -Britain had shut off, not merely Egypt and Malta, but France herself -from all fruitful intercourse with the outer world. The negotiation -for a maritime truce was broken off on the 9th of October. Meanwhile -Bonaparte, declining to await its issue, had given notice that -hostilities would be resumed between the 5th and 10th of September; -and Austria, not yet ready, was fain to purchase a further delay by -surrendering the blockaded places, Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsburg. -A convention to this effect was concluded, and the renewal of the war -postponed for forty-five days dating from September 21st. - -In such conditions Prussia saw one of those opportunities which, under -Bonaparte's manipulation, so often misled her. The prostration of her -German rival would be hastened, and the support of the first consul in -the approaching apportionment of indemnities to German states secured, -by joining the concert of the Baltic powers against Great Britain. -Without this accession to the northern league the quarrel would be -mainly naval, and its issue, before the disciplined valor of British -seamen, scarcely doubtful. Prussia alone was so situated as to deal the -direct and heavy blow at British commerce of closing its accustomed -access to the Continent; and the injury thus inflicted so far exceeded -any she herself could incidentally receive, as to make this course less -hazardous than that of offending the czar and the French government. -The political connection of Hanover with Great Britain was a further -motive, giving Prussia the hope, so often dangled before her eyes by -Bonaparte, of permanently annexing the German dominions of the British -king. An occasion soon arose for showing her bias. In the latter part -of October a British cruiser seized a Prussian merchantman trying to -enter the Texel with a cargo of naval stores. The captor, through -stress of weather, took his prize into Cuxhaven, a port at the mouth -of the Elbe belonging to Hamburg, through which passed much of the -British commerce with the Continent. Prussia demanded its release of -the Hamburg senate, and upon refusal ordered two thousand troops to -take possession of the port. The senate then bought the prize and -delivered it to Prussia, and the British government also directed its -restoration; a step of pure policy with which Fox taunted the ministry. -It was, as he truly remarked, a concession of principle, dictated -by the fact that Prussia, while capable of doing much harm to Great -Britain, could not be reached by the British navy. - -Whether it was wise to waive a point, in order to withhold an important -member from the formidable combination of the North, may be argued; but -the attempt met the usual fate of concessions attributed to weakness. -The remonstrances of the British ambassador received the reply that -the occupation, having been ordered, must be carried out; that the -neutrality of Cuxhaven "being thus placed under the guarantee of the -king will be more effectually out of the reach of all violation." Such -reasoning indicated beyond doubt the stand Prussia was about to take; -and her influence fixed the course of Denmark, which is said to have -been averse from a step that threatened to stop her trade and would -probably make her the first victim of Great Britain's resentment. On -the 16th of December a treaty renewing the Armed Neutrality of 1780 -was signed at St. Petersburg by Russia and Sweden, and received the -prompt adherence of Denmark and Prussia. Its leading affirmations were -that neutral ships were free to carry on the coasting and colonial -trade of states at war, that enemy's goods under the neutral flag -were not subject to seizure, and that blockades, to be respected, must -be supported by such a force of ships before the port as to make the -attempt to enter hazardous. A definition of contraband was adopted -excluding naval stores from that title; and the claim was affirmed -that vessels under convoy of a ship of war were not liable to the -belligerent right of search. Each of these assertions contested one -of the maritime claims upon which Great Britain conceived her naval -power, and consequently her place among the nations, to depend; but -the consenting states bound themselves to maintain their positions by -force, if necessary. - -Thus was successfully formed the combination of the Northern powers -against Great Britain, the first and most willing of those effected by -Bonaparte. By a singular coincidence, which recalls the opportuneness -of his departure from England in 1798 to check the yet undivined -expedition against Egypt,[18] Nelson, the man destined also to -strike this coalition to the ground, was during its formation slowly -journeying from the Mediterranean, with which his name and his glory -both before and after are most closely associated, to the North Sea; -as though again drawn by some mysterious influence, to be at hand for -unknown services which he alone could render. On the 11th of July, -a week after Bonaparte made his first offer of Malta to the czar, -Nelson left Leghorn for Trieste and Vienna. He passed through Hamburg -at the very time that the affair of the Prussian prize was under -discussion, and landed in England on the 6th of November. Finding his -health entirely restored by the land journey, he applied for immediate -service, and was assigned to command a division of the Channel fleet -under Lord St. Vincent; but he did not go afloat until the 17th of -January, 1801, when his flag was hoisted on board the "San Josef," -the three-decker he had captured at the battle of Cape St. Vincent. -Meanwhile, however, it had been settled between the Admiralty and -himself that if a fleet were sent into the Baltic, he should go as -second in command to Sir Hyde Parker; and when in the very act of -reporting to St. Vincent, the day before he joined the San Josef, a -letter arrived from Parker announcing his appointment. - -By this time Austria had received a final blow, which forced her to -treat alone, and postponed for nearly five years her reappearance in -the field. The emperor had sent an envoy to Lunéville, who was met -by Joseph Bonaparte as the representative of France; but refusing -to make peace apart from Great Britain, hostilities were resumed on -the 28th of November. On the 3d of December Moreau won the great -battle of Hohenlinden, and then advanced upon Vienna. On the 25th an -armistice was signed at Steyer, within a hundred miles of the Austrian -capital. Successes, less brilliant but decided, were obtained in Italy, -resulting on the 16th of January, 1801, in an armistice between the -armies there. At nearly the same moment with this last news the first -consul received a letter from the czar, manifesting extremely friendly -feelings towards France, while full of hatred towards England, and -signifying his intention to send an ambassador to Paris. This filled -Bonaparte with sanguine hopes, the expression of which shows how -heavily sea power weighed in his estimation. "Peace with the emperor," -he wrote to his brother at Lunéville, "is _nothing_ in comparison with -the alliance of the czar, which will _dominate England_ and preserve -Egypt for us;"[19] and he ordered him to prolong the negotiations until -the arrival of the expected ambassador, that the engagements contracted -with Germany might be made in concert with Russia. Upon a similar -combined action he based extravagant expectations of naval results, -dependent upon the impression, with which he so hardly parted, that one -set of ships was equal to another.[20] A courier was at once dispatched -to Spain to arrange expeditions against Ireland, against Brazil and the -East Indies, to the Caribbean Sea for the recovery of the French and -Spanish islands, and to the Mediterranean to regain Minorca. "In the -embarrassment about to come upon England, threatened in the Archipelago -by the Russians and in the northern seas by the combined Powers, it -will be impossible for her long to keep a strong squadron in the -Mediterranean."[21] - -The Russian envoy not arriving, however, Joseph Bonaparte was -instructed to bring matters to a conclusion; and on the 9th of February -the Austrian minister at Lunéville, after a stubborn fight over the -terms, signed a treaty of peace. The principal conditions were: 1. -The definitive surrender of all German possessions west of the Rhine, -so that the river became the frontier of France from Switzerland to -Holland. 2. The cession of Belgium made at Campo Formio was confirmed. -3. In Italy, Austria herself was confined to the east bank of the -Adige, and the princes of that house having principalities west of -the river were dispossessed; their territories going to the Cisalpine -Republic and to an infante of Spain, who was established in Tuscany -with the title of King of Etruria. The Cisalpine and Etruria being -dependent for their political existence upon France, the latter, -through its control of their territory, interposed between Austria and -Naples and shut off the British from access to Leghorn. 4. The eleventh -article of the treaty guaranteed the independence of the Dutch, Swiss, -Cisalpine and Ligurian republics. In its influence upon the future -course of events this was the most important of all the stipulations. -It gave to the political status of the Continent a definition, upon -which Great Britain reckoned in her own treaty with France a few months -later; and its virtual violation by Bonaparte became ultimately both -the reason and the excuse for her refusal to fulfil the engagements -about Malta, which led to the renewal of the war and so finally to -the downfall of Napoleon. 5. The German Empire was pledged to give to -the princes dispossessed on the west of the Rhine, and in Italy, an -indemnity within the empire itself. By this Prussia, which was among -the losers, reaped through Bonaparte's influence an abundant recompense -for the support already given to his policy in the North. This success -induced her to continue the same time-serving opportunism, until, when -no longer necessary to France, she was thrown over with a rudeness that -roused her to an isolated, and therefore speedily crushed resistance. - - - - -CHAPTER XIII. - -EVENTS OF 1801. - -BRITISH EXPEDITION TO THE BALTIC—BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN—BONAPARTE'S -FUTILE ATTEMPTS TO CONTEST CONTROL OF THE SEA—HIS CONTINENTAL -POLICY—PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE WITH GREAT BRITAIN, OCTOBER, -1801—INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER SO FAR UPON THE COURSE OF THE REVOLUTION. - - -By the peace of Lunéville Great Britain was left alone, and for the -moment against all Europe. The ministry met the emergency with vigor -and firmness, though possibly with too much reliance upon diplomacy -and too little upon the military genius of the great seaman whose -services were at their disposal. Upon the Continent nothing could be -effected, all resistance to France had been crushed by the genius of -Bonaparte; but time had to be gained for the expedition then under way -against Egypt and destined to compel its evacuation by the French. The -combination in the North also must be quickly dissolved, if the country -were to treat on anything like equal terms. - -An armed negotiation with the Baltic powers, similar to that employed -with Denmark the preceding August, was therefore determined; and a -fleet of eighteen sail-of-the-line with thirty-five smaller vessels -was assembled at Yarmouth, on the east coast of England. Rapidity of -movement was essential to secure the advantage from the ice, which, -breaking up in the harbors less rapidly than in the open water, would -delay the concentration of the hostile navies; and also to allow the -Baltic powers the least possible time to prepare for hostilities -which they had scarcely anticipated. Everything pointed to Nelson, -the most energetic and daring of British admirals, for the chief -command of an expedition in which so much depended upon the squadron, -numerically inferior to the aggregate of forces arrayed against it, -attacking separately each of the component parts before their junction; -but Nelson was still among the junior flag-officers, and the rather -erratic manner in which, while in the central Mediterranean and under -the influence of Lady Hamilton, he had allowed his views of the -political situation to affect his actions even in questions of military -subordination, had probably excited in Earl Spencer, the First Lord, -by whom the officers were selected, a distrust of his fitness for a -charge requiring a certain delicacy of discretion as well as vigor -of action. Whatever the reason, withholding the chief command from -him was unquestionably a mistake,—which would not have been made by -St. Vincent, who succeeded Spencer a few weeks later upon the fall of -the Pitt ministry. The conditions did not promise a pacific solution -when the expedition was planned, and the prospect was even worse when -it sailed. The instructions given to Sir Hyde Parker allowed Denmark -forty-eight hours to accept Great Britain's terms and withdraw from her -engagements with the other Powers. Whether she complied peaceably or -not, after she was reduced to submission the division of the Russian -fleet at Revel was to be attacked, before the melting ice allowed it to -join the main body in Cronstadt; and Sweden was to be similarly dealt -with. Under such orders diplomacy had a minor part to play, while in -their directness and simplicity they were admirably suited to the fiery -temper and prompt military action which distinguished Nelson; and, but -for the opportune death of Paul I., Great Britain might have had reason -to regret that the opportunity to give Russia a severe reminder of -her sea power was allowed to slip through the lax grasp of a sluggish -admiral. - -The fleet sailed from Yarmouth on the 12th of March, 1801; and on the -19th, although there had been some scattering in a heavy gale, nearly -all were collected off the Skaw, the northern point of Jutland at the -entrance of the Kattegat. The wind being north-west was fair for going -to Copenhagen, and Nelson, if in command, would have advanced at once -with the ambassador on board. "While the negotiation is going on," -he said, "the Dane should see our flag waving every moment he lifted -his head." As it was, the envoy went forward with a frigate alone and -the fleet waited. On the 12th it was off Elsineur, where the envoy -rejoined, Denmark having rejected the British terms. - -This amounted to an acceptance of hostilities, and it only remained -to the commander-in-chief to act at once; for the wind was favorable, -an advantage which at any moment might be lost. On this day Nelson -addressed Parker a letter, summing up in a luminous manner the features -of the situation and the different methods of action. "Not a moment -should be lost in attacking," he said; "we shall never be so good a -match for them as at this moment." He next hinted, what he had probably -already said, that the fleet ought to have been off Copenhagen, and not -at Elsineur, when the negotiation failed. "Then you might instantly -attack and there would be scarcely a doubt but the Danish fleet would -be destroyed, and the capital made so hot that Denmark would listen to -reason and its true interest." Since, however, the mistake of losing so -much time had been made, he seeks to stir his superior to lose no more. -"Almost the safety, certainly the honor, of England is more entrusted -to you than ever yet fell to the lot of any British officer; ... never -did our country depend so much on the success of any fleet as of this." - -Having thus shown the necessity for celerity, Nelson next discussed the -plan of operations. Copenhagen is on the east side of the island of -Zealand, fronting the coast of Sweden, from which it is separated by -the passage called the Sound. On the west the island is divided from -the other parts of Denmark by the Great Belt. The navigation of the -latter being much the more difficult, the preparations of the Danes -had been made on the side of the Sound, and chiefly about Copenhagen -itself. For half a mile from the shore in front of the city, flats -extend, and in the Sound itself at a distance of little over a mile, -is a long shoal called the Middle Ground. Between these two bodies of -shallow water is a channel, called the King's, through which a fleet -of heavy ships could sail, and from whose northern end a deep pocket -stretches toward Copenhagen, forming the harbor proper. The natural -point of attack therefore appears to be at the north; and there the -Danes had erected powerful works, rising on piles out of the shoal -water off the harbor's mouth and known as the Three-Crown Batteries. -Nelson, however, pointed out that not only was this head of the line -exceedingly strong, but that the wind that was fair to attack would -be foul to return; therefore a disabled ship would have no escape but -by passing through the King's Channel. Doing so she would have to run -the gantlet of a line of armed hulks, which the Danes had established -as floating batteries along the inner edge of the channel—covering the -front of Copenhagen—and would also be separated from her fleet. Nor -was this difficulty, which may be called tactical, the only objection -to a plan that he disparaged as "taking the bull by the horns." He -remarked that so long as the British fleet remained in the Sound, -without entering the Baltic, the way was left open for both the Swedes -and the Russians, if released by the ice, to make a junction with the -Danes. Consequently, he advised that a sufficiently strong force of -the lighter ships-of-the-line should pass outside the Middle Ground, -despite the difficulties of navigation, which were not insuperable, and -come up in rear of the city. There they would interpose between the -Danes and their allies, and be in position to assail the weaker part of -the hostile order. He offered himself to lead this detachment. - -[Illustration: Battle of Copenhagen.] - -This whole letter of March 24, 1801,[22] possesses peculiar interest; -for it shows with a rare particularity, elicited by the need he felt -of arousing and convincing his superior, Nelson's clear discernment of -the decisive features of a military situation. The fame of this great -admiral has depended less upon his conduct of campaigns than upon the -renowned victories he won in the actual collision of fleet with fleet; -and even then has been mutilated by the obstinacy with which, despite -the perfectly evident facts, men have persisted in seeing in them -nothing but dash,—heart, not head.[23] Throughout his correspondence, -it is true, there are frequent traces of the activity of his mental -faculties and of the general accuracy of his military conclusions; but -ordinarily it is from his actions that his reasonings and principles -must be deduced. In the present case we have the views he held and the -course he evidently would have pursued clearly formulated by himself; -and it cannot but be a subject of regret that the naval world should -have lost so fine an illustration as he would there have given of the -principles and conduct of naval warfare. He concluded his letter with -a suggestion worthy of Napoleon himself, and which, if adopted, would -have brought down the Baltic Confederacy with a crash that would have -resounded throughout Europe. "Supposing us through the Belt with the -wind first westerly, would it not be possible to go with the fleet, -or detach ten ships of three and two decks, with one bomb and two -fire-ships, to Revel, to destroy the Russian squadron at that place? I -do not see the great risk of such a detachment, and with the remainder -to attempt the business at Copenhagen. The measure may be thought bold, -but I am of opinion the boldest are the safest; and our country demands -a most vigorous exertion of her force, directed with judgment." - -Committed as the Danes were to a stationary defence, this -recommendation to strike at the soul of the confederacy evinced the -clearest perception of the key to the situation, which Nelson himself -summed up in the following words: "I look upon the Northern League to -be like a tree, of which Paul was the trunk and Sweden and Denmark -the branches. If I can get at the trunk and hew it down, the branches -fall of course; but I may lop the branches and yet not be able to -fell the tree, and my power must be weaker when its greatest strength -is required"[24]—that is, the Russians should have been attacked -before the fleet was weakened, as it inevitably must be, by the -battle with the Danes. "If we could have cut up the Russian fleet," -he said again, "that was my object." Whatever Denmark's wishes about -fighting, she was by her continental possessions tied to the policy -of Russia and Prussia, either of whom could overwhelm her by land. -She dared not disregard them. The course of both depended upon the -czar; for the temporizing policy of Prussia would at once embrace -his withdrawal from the league as an excuse for doing the same. At -Revel were twelve Russian ships-of-the-line, fully half their Baltic -fleet, whose destruction would have paralyzed the remainder and the -naval power of the empire. To persuade Parker to such a step was, -however, hopeless. "Our fleet would never have acted against Russia -and Sweden," wrote Nelson afterwards, "although Copenhagen would have -been burned; for Sir Hyde Parker was determined not to leave Denmark -hostile in his rear;"[25] a reason whose technical accuracy under all -the circumstances was nothing short of pedantic, and illustrates the -immense distance between a good and accomplished officer, which Parker -was, and a genius whose comprehension of rules serves only to guide, -not to fetter, his judgment. - -Although unable to rise equal to the great opportunity indicated by -Nelson, Sir Hyde Parker adopted his suggestion as to the method and -direction of the principal attack upon the defences of Copenhagen. -For this, Nelson asked ten ships-of-the-line and a number of smaller -vessels, with which he undertook to destroy the floating batteries -covering the front of the city. These being reduced, the bomb vessels -could be placed so as to play with effect upon the dockyard, arsenals, -and the town, in case further resistance was made. - -The nights of the 30th and 31st of March were employed sounding the -channel. On the first of April the fleet moved up to the north end of -the Middle Ground, about four miles from the city; and that afternoon -Nelson's division, to which Parker had assigned two ships-of-the-line -more than had been asked—or twelve altogether—got under way, passed -through the outer channel and anchored towards sundown off the -south-east end of the shoal, two miles from the head[26] of the -Danish line. Nelson announced his purpose to attack as soon as the -wind served; and the night was passed by him in arranging the order -of battle. The enterprise was perilous, not on account of the force -to be engaged, but because of the great difficulties of navigation. -The pilots were mostly mates of merchantmen trading with the Baltic; -and their experience in vessels of three or four hundred tons did -not fit them for the charge of heavy battle-ships. They betrayed -throughout great indecision, and their imperfect knowledge contributed -to the principal mishaps of the day, as well as to a comparative -incompleteness in the results of victory. - -The next morning the wind came fair at south-south-east, and at eight -A. M. the British captains were summoned to the flag-ship for their -final instructions. The Danish line to be attacked extended in a -north-west and south-east direction for somewhat over a mile. It was -composed of hulks and floating batteries, eighteen to twenty in number -and mounting 628 guns, of which about 375 would—fighting thus at -anchor—be on the engaged side. The southern flank now to be assailed -was partly supported by works on shore; but from the intervening shoal -water these were too distant for thoroughly efficient fire. Being thus -distinctly weaker than the northern extremity, which was covered by the -Three-Crown Battery and a second line of heavy ships, this southern end -was most properly chosen by the British as the point of their chief -assault for tactical reasons, independently of the strategic advantage -urged by Nelson in thus interposing between the enemy and his allies. -At half-past nine signal was made to weigh. The ships were soon under -sail; but the difficulties of pilotage, despite careful soundings made -during the night by an experienced naval captain, were soon apparent. -The "Agamemnon," of sixty-four guns, was unable to weather the point -of the Middle Ground, and had to anchor out of range. She had no share -in the battle. The "Bellona" and "Russell," seventy-fours, the fourth -and fifth in the order, entered the Channel; but keeping too far to -the eastward they ran ashore on its farther side—upon the Middle -Ground. They were not out of action, but beyond the range of the -most efficient gunnery under the conditions of that period. Nelson's -flag-ship following them passed clear, as did the rest of the heavy -ships; but the loss of these three out of the line prevented by so -much its extension to the northward. The result was to expose that -part of the British order to a weight of fire quite disproportioned to -its strength. A body of frigates very gallantly undertook to fill the -gap, which they could do but inadequately, and suffered heavy loss in -attempting. - -The battle was at its height at half-past eleven. There was then no -more manœuvring, but the simple question of efficient gunnery and -endurance. At about two P. M. a great part of the Danish line had -ceased to fire, and the flag-ship "Dannebrog" was in flames. During the -action the Danish crews were frequently re-enforced from the shore; -and the new-comers in several cases, reaching the ships after they had -struck, renewed the fight, either through ignorance or indifference -to the fact. The land batteries also fired on boats trying to take -possession. Nelson seized on this circumstance to bring the affair to a -conclusion. He wrote a letter addressed "To the brothers of Englishmen, -the Danes," and sent it under flag of truce to the Crown Prince, who -was in the city. "Lord Nelson has directions to spare Denmark when -no longer resisting; but if the firing is continued on the part of -Denmark, Lord Nelson will be obliged to set on fire all the floating -batteries he has taken, without having the power of saving the brave -Danes who have defended them." The letter was sent on shore by a -British officer who had served in the Russian navy and spoke Danish. -The engagement continued until about three P. M., when the whole line -of floating defences south-east of the Crown Batteries had either -struck or been destroyed. - -The fortifications were still unharmed, as were the ships west of them -covering the harbor proper; but their fire was stopped by the bearer -of a flag of truce who was bringing to Nelson the reply of the Crown -Prince. The latter demanded the precise purport of the first message. -Nelson took a high hand. He had destroyed the part of the enemy's -line which he had attacked; but it was important now to withdraw his -crippled ships, and with the existing wind that could only be done by -passing the Crown Batteries. Had the three that ran aground been in the -line, it is permissible to believe that that work would have been so -far injured as to be practically harmless; but this was far from the -case. The admiral in his second letter politicly ignored this feature -of the situation. He wrote, "Lord Nelson's object in sending on shore a -flag of truce is humanity;[27] he therefore _consents_ that hostilities -shall cease till Lord Nelson can take his prisoners out of the prizes, -and he consents to land all the wounded Danes and to burn or remove -his prizes. Lord Nelson, with humble duty to His Royal Highness, begs -leave to say that he will ever esteem it the greatest victory he ever -gained, if this flag of truce may be the happy forerunner of a lasting -and happy union between my most gracious Sovereign and His Majesty the -King of Denmark." Having written the letter, he referred the bearer -for definite action to Sir Hyde Parker, who lay some four miles off -in the "London;" foreseeing that the long pull there and back would -give time for the leading ships, which were much crippled, to clear -the shoals, though their course for so doing lay close under the Crown -Batteries. Thus the exposed part of the British fleet was successfully -removed from a dangerous position and rejoined Parker north of the -Middle Ground. The advantage obtained by Nelson's presence of mind -and promptness in gaining this respite was shown by the difficulties -attending the withdrawal. Three out of five ships-of-the-line grounded, -two of which remained fast for several hours a mile from the batteries, -but protected by the truce. - -The result of the battle of Copenhagen was to uncover the front of the -city and lay it, with its dockyards and arsenals, open to bombardment. -It was now safe to place the bomb vessels in the King's Channel. It -became a question for Denmark to decide, whether fear of her powerful -allies and zeal for the claims of neutrals should lead her to undergo -further punishment, or whether the suffering already endured and the -danger still threatening were excuse sufficient for abandoning the -coalition. On the other hand, Nelson, who was the brains as well as the -backbone of the British power in the North, cared little, either now or -before the battle, about the attitude of Denmark, except as it deterred -Parker from advancing. Now, as before, his one idea was to get at the -Russian division still locked in Revel by the ice. The negotiations -were carried on by him and resulted in an armistice for fourteen weeks, -after which hostilities could be resumed upon fourteen days' notice. -Thus was assured to Parker for four months the entire immunity he -desired for his communications. Fear of Russia long deterred the Danes -from this concession, which Nelson frankly told them he must have, so -as to be at liberty to act against the Russian fleet and return to -them; and he made it the indispensable requisite to sparing the city. -During the discussions, however, the Crown Prince received news of the -czar's death. Paul I. had been murdered by a body of conspirators on -the night of March 24. The Danish government concealed the tidings; -but the departure of the soul of the confederacy relieved their worst -fears and encouraged them to yield to Nelson's demands. - -Denmark's part in the Armed Neutrality was suspended during the -continuance of the armistice; but the British ministers showed -as little appreciation of the military situation as did their -commander-in-chief in the Baltic. "Upon a consideration of all the -circumstances," they wrote to Nelson,[28] "His Majesty has thought fit -to approve the armistice." Nelson was naturally and justly indignant at -this absurdly inadequate understanding of the true nature of services, -concerning whose military character a French naval critic has truly -said that "they will always be in the eyes of seamen his fairest -title to glory. He alone was capable of displaying such boldness and -perseverance; he alone could confront the immense difficulties of that -enterprise and overcome them."[29] But his conduct at Copenhagen, -brilliant as was the display of energy, of daring and of endurance, -was far from exhausting the merits of his Baltic campaign. He had -lifted and carried on his shoulders the dead weight of his superior, -he had clearly read the political as well as the military situation, -and he never for one moment lost sight of the key to both. To bombard -Copenhagen was to his mind a useless piece of vandalism, which would -embitter a nation that ought to be conciliated, and destroy the -only hold Great Britain still had over Denmark.[30] Except for the -necessity of managing his lethargic and cautious commander-in-chief, -we may believe he would never have contemplated it; but under the -circumstances he used the threat as the one means by which he could -extort truce from Denmark and induce Parker to move. With the latter -to handle, the armistice slipped the knot of the military difficulty; -it was the one important point, alongside which every other fell into -insignificance. "My object," he said, "was to get at Revel before the -frost broke up at Cronstadt, that the twelve sail-of-the-line might -be destroyed." Well might St. Vincent write, "Your Lordship's whole -conduct, from your first appointment to this hour, is the subject of -our constant admiration. It does not become me to make comparisons; all -agree there is but one Nelson." - -Meantime, while the British fleet had been dallying in the approaches -to the Baltic, important events had occurred, furthering the projects -of Bonaparte in the North and seriously complicating the position of -Great Britain. No formal declaration of war was at any time issued by -the latter country; but its government had not unjustly regarded as -an act of direct hostility the combination of Denmark, Sweden, and -Prussia, to support the czar in a course first undertaken to assure -his claim upon Malta, and in furtherance of which he had seized as -pledges three hundred British merchant vessels with their crews.[31] -As an offset to the British interests thus foreclosed upon by Russia, -and to negotiate upon somewhat equal terms, the government, on the 14th -of January, 1801, ordered an embargo laid upon Russian, Danish, and -Swedish vessels in British ports, and the seizure of merchant ships of -these powers at sea. Of four hundred and fifty Swedish vessels then -abroad, two hundred were detained or brought into British harbors. -They were not, however, condemned as prizes, but held inviolable to -await the issue of the existing difficulties. To the remonstrances of -Sweden and Denmark, supported by Prussia, the British ministry replied -definitely, on the 7th of March, that the embargo would not be revoked -so long as the Powers affected "continued to form part of a confederacy -which had for its object to impose by force on his Majesty a new system -of maritime law, inconsistent with the dignity and independence of his -crown, and the rights and interests of his people."[32] In consequence -of this and of the entrance of the Sound by Parker's fleet, Prussia, on -the 30th of March, and as a measure of retaliation, closed the mouths -of the Elbe, the Weser, and the Ems—in other words, the ports of North -Germany—against British commerce, and took possession of the German -states belonging to the king of Great Britain. On the same day a corps -of Danish troops occupied Hamburg, more certainly to stop British trade -therewith. - -Thus Bonaparte's conception was completely realized. There was not -only a naval combination against Great Britain, but also an exclusion -of her trade from one of its chief markets. The danger, however, was -much less than it seemed. On the one hand, while the annoyances to -neutral navigation were indisputable, the advantages it drew from the -war were far greater; its interests really demanded peace, even at -the price set by Great Britain. On the other hand, the more important -claims of the great Sea Power, however judged by standards of natural -right, had prescription on their side; and in the case of contraband, -whatever may be thought of classifying naval stores as such, there -was for it a colorable pretext in the fact that France then had no -merchant shipping, except coasters; that naval stores entering her -ports were almost certainly for ships of war; and that it was in -part to the exclusion of such articles that Great Britain owed the -maritime supremacy, which alone among armed forces had successfully -defied Bonaparte. In short, the interest of the Northern states was -to yield the points in dispute, while that of Great Britain was not -to yield; a truth not only asserted by the ministry but conceded in -the main by the opposition. There needed therefore only to throw a -little weight into one scale, or to take a little from the other, to -turn the balance; while the coalition would dissolve entirely either -upon decisive naval operations by Great Britain, or upon the death -of Paul I. The czar was the only person embarked heart and soul in -the Northern quarrel, because the only one deaf to the call of clear -interest. Herein is apparent the crying mistake of intrusting the -conduct of the naval campaign to another than Nelson. The time placidly -consumed by Parker in deliberations and talking would have sufficed his -lieutenant to scour the Baltic, to destroy the Russians at Revel as he -did the Danish line at Copenhagen, and to convince the neutral states -of the hopelessness of the struggle. Fortunately for Great Britain, -the interests of Russian proprietors, which were bound up with British -commerce, and hardly yielded eight years later to restrictions imposed -by the popular Alexander I., rebelled against the measures of a ruler -whose insanity was no longer doubtful. The murder of Paul opened the -way for peace. - -Among the first measures of the new czar was the release of the British -seamen imprisoned by his father. This order was dated April 7. On the -12th the British ships entered the Baltic,—much to the surprise of -the Northern Powers, who thought their heavy draught would prevent. -The three-deckers had to remove their guns to pass some shoal ground -ten miles above Copenhagen. After an excursion to intercept a Swedish -fleet said to be at sea, Parker anchored his ships in Kioge Bay,—off -the coast of Zealand just within the entrance to the Baltic,—and -there awaited further instructions from home; the Russian minister -at Copenhagen having informed him that the new czar would not go to -war.[33] Nelson entirely disapproved of this inactive attitude. Russia -might yield the conditions of Great Britain, but she would be more -likely to do so if the British fleet lay off the harbor of Revel. This -seems also to have been the view of the ministry. It received news -of the battle of Copenhagen on April 15, and at about the same date -learned the death of Paul I. Advantage was very properly taken of the -latter to adopt a policy of conciliation. On the 17th orders were -issued to Parker modifying his first instructions. If Alexander removed -the embargo and released the seamen, all hostile movements were to be -suspended. If not, a cessation of hostilities was to be offered, if -Russia were willing to treat; _but upon condition that, until these -ships and men were released, the Revel division should not join that in -Cronstadt, nor vice versâ_.[34] This presumed a position of the British -fleet very different from Kioge Bay, over four hundred miles from Revel. - -Four days later, orders were issued relieving Parker and leaving Nelson -in command. Taken as this step was, only a week after the news of a -victory, it can scarcely be construed otherwise than as an implied -censure. To this view an expression of Nelson's lends color. "They -are not Sir Hyde Parker's real friends who wish for an inquiry," he -wrote to a confidential correspondent. "His friends in the fleet wish -everything of this fleet to be forgot, for we all respect and love Sir -Hyde; but the dearer his friends, the more uneasy they have been at -his _idleness,_ for that is the truth—no criminality."[35] The orders -were received on May 5. Nelson's first signal was to hoist the boats -aboard and prepare to weigh. "If Sir Hyde were gone," he wrote the -same afternoon, "I would now be under sail." On the 7th the fleet left -Kioge Bay and on the 12th appeared off Revel. The Russian division had -sailed three days before and was now safe under the guns of Cronstadt. -From Revel Nelson dispatched very complimentary letters to the Russian -minister of foreign affairs, but received in reply the message that -"the only proof of the loyalty of his intentions that the czar could -accept was the prompt withdrawal of his fleet; and that until then no -negotiation could proceed." "I do not believe he would have written -such a letter," said Nelson, "if the Russian fleet had been in -Revel;"[36] but the bird was flown, and with a civil explanation he -withdrew from the port. He still remained in the Baltic, awaiting the -issue of the negotiations; but Russia meant peace, and on the 17th of -May the czar ordered the release of the embargoed British ships. On the -4th of June Great Britain also released the Danes and Swedes detained -in her ports. Russia and Prussia had already agreed, on the 27th of -April, that hostile measures against England should cease, Hamburg and -Hanover be evacuated, and the free navigation of the rivers restored. - -On the 17th of June was signed at St. Petersburg a convention between -Russia and Great Britain, settling the points that had been in dispute. -The question of Malta was tacitly dropped. As regards neutral claims -Russia conceded that the neutral flag should not cover enemy's goods; -and while she obtained the formal admission that articles of hostile -origin which had become _bonâ fide_ neutral property were exempt from -seizure, she yielded the very important exception of colonial produce. -This, no matter who the owner, could not by a neutral be carried -direct from the colony to the mother country of a nation at war.[37] -Great Britain, on the other hand, conceded the right of neutrals to -carry on the coasting trade of a belligerent; and that naval stores -should not be classed as contraband of war. The latter was an important -concession, the former probably not, coasting trade being ordinarily -done by small craft especially adapted to the local conditions. As -regards searching merchant vessels under convoy of a ship of war, -Russia yielded the principle and Great Britain accepted methods which -would make the process less offensive. Privateers in such case could -not search. The question was unimportant; for neutral merchant ships -will not lightly submit to the restraint and delays of convoy, and -so lose the chief advantage, that of speed, which they have over -belligerents. When a neutral sees necessary to convoy her merchantmen, -the very fact shows relations already strained. - -Sweden and Denmark necessarily followed the course of Russia and -acceded to all the terms of the convention between that court and Great -Britain; Sweden on the 23d of October, 1801, and Denmark on the 30th -of the following March. The claim to carry colonial produce to Europe, -thus abandoned, was of importance to them, though not to Russia. At the -same time the Baltic states renewed among themselves the engagements, -which they had relinquished in their convention with Great Britain, -that the neutral flag should cover enemy's property on board and -that the convoy of a ship of war should exempt merchant vessels from -search. These principles were in point of fact modifications sought to -be introduced into international law, and not prescriptive rights, as -commonly implied by French historians[38] dealing with this question. -For this reason both the United States and the Baltic powers, while -favoring the new rule, were little disposed to attempt by arms to -compel the surrender by Great Britain of a claim sanctioned by long -custom. - -Thus had fallen resultless, as far as the objects of the first consul -were concerned, the vast combination against Great Britain which he -had fostered in the North. During its short existence he had actively -pursued in the south of Europe, against Naples and Portugal, other -measures intended further to embarrass, isolate, and cripple the -great Sea Power, and to facilitate throwing much needed supplies and -re-enforcements into Egypt. "The ambassador of the republic," he wrote -in February, 1801, "will make the Spanish ministry understand that we -must at whatsoever cost become masters of the Mediterranean.... France -will have fifteen ships-of-the-line in the Mediterranean before the -equinox; and, if Spain will join to them fifteen others, the English, -who are about to have the ports of Lisbon, Sicily, and Naples closed to -them, will not be able to keep thirty ships in the Mediterranean. That -being so, I doubt not they will evacuate Mahon, being unable to remain -in that sea."[39] - -For the closure of the ports Bonaparte relied with good reason upon -his armies; but in the concurrent expectation of uniting thirty French -and Spanish ships he reckoned without his host, as he did also upon -the Russian Black Sea fleet, and the numbers the British must keep -in the Baltic and off Brest. After the armistice with Austria in -Italy, a corps under Murat was pushed toward Naples; and on the same -day that the treaty of Lunéville was concluded, February 9, a truce -for thirty days was signed with the Two Sicilies. This was followed -on the 28th of March by a definitive treaty of peace. Naples engaged -to exclude from all her ports, including those of Sicily, the ships -both of war and commerce belonging to Great Britain and Turkey; while -those of France and her allies, as well as of the Northern powers, -should have free access. She also suffered some slight territorial -loss; but the most significant article was kept secret. The boot of -Italy was to be occupied by a division of twelve or fifteen thousand -French, whom Naples was to pay and support, and to whom were to be -delivered all the maritime fortresses south of the river Ofanto and -east of the Bradano, including the ports of Taranto and Brindisi. "This -occupation," wrote Bonaparte to his war-minister, "is only in order to -facilitate the communications of the army of Egypt with France."[40] -The Neapolitan ports became a refuge for French squadrons; while the -army of occupation stood ready to embark, if any body of ships found -their way to those shores. Unfortunately, the combined British and -Turkish armies had already landed in Egypt, and had won the battle of -Alexandria a week before the treaty with Naples was signed. As a speedy -result the French in Egypt were divided; part being forced back upon -Cairo and part shut up in Alexandria,—while the fleet of Admiral Keith -cruised off the coast. - -No French squadron succeeded in carrying to Egypt the desired -re-enforcements, notwithstanding the numerous efforts made by the -first consul. The failure arose from two causes: the penury of the -French arsenals, and the difficulty of a large body of ships escaping -together, or of several small bodies effecting a combination, in face -of the watchfulness of the British. Both troubles were due mainly to -the rigid and methodical system introduced by Earl St. Vincent; who, -fortunately for Great Britain, assumed command of the Channel fleet -at the same time that Bonaparte sought to impress upon the French -navy a more sagacious direction and greater energy of action. His -instructions to Admiral Bruix in February, 1800,[41] were to sail -from Brest with over thirty French and Spanish sail-of-the-line, to -drive the British blockaders from before the port, to relieve Malta, -send a light squadron to Egypt, and then bring his fleet to Toulon, -where it would be favorably placed to control the Mediterranean. -Delay ensuing, owing to lack of supplies and the unwillingness of the -Spaniards, he wrote again at the end of March, "If the equinox passes -without the British fleet dispersing, then, great as is our interest in -raising the blockade of Malta and carrying help to Egypt, they must be -abandoned;"[42] and throughout the summer months he confined his action -to the unremitting efforts, already noticed, to keep a stream of small -vessels constantly moving towards Egypt. - -After the autumn equinox Bonaparte again prepared for a grand naval -operation. Admiral Ganteaume was detailed to sail from Brest with -seven ships-of-the-line, carrying besides their crews four thousand -troops and an immense amount of material. "Admiral Ganteaume," wrote -he to Menou, commander-in-chief in Egypt, "brings to your army the -succor we have not before been able to send. He will hand you this -letter." The letter was dated October 29, 1800, but it never reached -its destination. Ganteaume could not get out from Brest till nearly -three months later, when, on January 23d, 1801, a terrible north-east -gale drove off the British squadron and enabled him to put to sea. "A -great imprudence," says Thiers, "but what could be done in presence of -an enemy's fleet which incessantly blockaded Brest in all weathers, and -only retired when cruising became impossible. It was necessary either -never to go out, or to do so in a tempest which should remove the -British squadron." The incident of the sortie, as well as Ganteaume's -subsequent experiences, illustrates precisely the deterrent effect -exercised by St. Vincent's blockades.[43] They could not prevent -occasional escapes, but they did throw obstacles nearly insuperable in -the way of combining and executing any of the major operations of war. -Owing to the weather which had to be chosen for starting, the squadron -was at once dispersed and underwent considerable damage.[44] It was -not all reunited till a week later. On the 9th of February it passed -Gibraltar; but news of its escape had already reached the British -admiral Warren cruising off Cadiz, who followed quickly, entering -Gibraltar only twenty-hours after the French went by. On the 13th of -January Ganteaume captured a British frigate, from which he learned -that the Mediterranean fleet under Lord Keith was then convoying an -army of fifteen thousand British troops against Egypt. He expected -that Warren also would soon be after him, and the injuries received in -the gale weighed upon his mind. Considering all the circumstances, he -decided to abandon Egypt and go to Toulon. Warren remained cruising -in the Mediterranean watching for the French admiral, who twice again -started for his destination. The first time he was obliged to return -by a collision between two ships. The second, an outbreak of disease -compelled him to send back three of the squadron. The other four -reached the African coast some distance west of Alexandria, where -they undertook to land the troops; but Keith's fleet appeared on the -horizon, and, cutting their cables, they made a hasty retreat, without -having effected their object. - -Similar misfortune attended Bonaparte's attempt to collect an efficient -force in Cadiz, where Spain had been induced or compelled to yield to -him six ships-of-the-line, and where she herself had some vessels. -To these he intended to send a large detachment from Rochefort under -Admiral Bruix, who was to command the whole, when combined. To -concentrations at any point, however, British squadrons before the -ports whence the divisions were to sail imposed obstacles, which, even -if occasionally evaded, were fatal to the final great design. The -advantage of the central position was consistently realized. On the -other hand, where a great number of ships happened to be together, -as at Brest in 1801, the want of supplies, caused by the same close -watch and by the seizure of naval stores as contraband, paralyzed -their equipment. Finding himself baffled at Brest for these reasons, -the first consul appointed Rochefort for the first concentration. When -the second was effected at Cadiz, Bruix was to hold himself ready for -further operations. If Egypt could not be directly assisted, it might -be indirectly by harassing the British communications. "Every day," -wrote Bonaparte, "a hundred sails pass the straits under weak convoy, -to supply Malta and the English fleet." If this route were flanked at -Cadiz, by a squadron like that of Bruix, much exertion would be needed -to protect it. But the concentration at Rochefort failed, the ships -from Brest could not get there, and the Rochefort ships themselves -never sailed. - -Coincidently with this attempt, another effort was made to strengthen -the force at Cadiz.[45] The three vessels sent back by Ganteaume, after -his second sailing from Toulon, were also ordered to proceed there, -under command of Rear Admiral Linois. Linois successfully reached -the Straits of Gibraltar, but there learned from a prize that seven -British ships were cruising off his destination. These had been sent -with Admiral Saumarez from the Channel fleet, to replace Warren, when -the admiralty learned the active preparations making in Cadiz and the -French ports. Not venturing to proceed against so superior an enemy, -Linois put into Gibraltar Bay, anchoring on the Spanish side under -the guns of Algesiras. Word was speedily sent to Saumarez; and on -July 6, two days after Linois anchored, six British ships were seen -rounding the west point of the bay. They attacked at once; but the -wind was baffling, they could not get their positions, and both flanks -of the French line were supported by shore batteries, which were -efficiently worked by soldiers landed from the squadron. The attack was -repulsed, and one British seventy-four that grounded under a battery -was forced to strike. Saumarez withdrew under Gibraltar and proceeded -to refit; the crews working all day and by watches at night to gain -the opportunity to revenge their defeat. Linois sent to Cadiz for the -help he needed, and on the 10th five Spanish ships-of-the-line and one -French[46] from there anchored off Algesiras. On the 12th they got -under way with Linois's three, and at the same time Saumarez with his -six hauled out from Gibraltar. The allies retreated upon Cadiz, the -British following. During the night the van of the pursuers brought -the hostile rear to action, and a terrible scene ensued. A Spanish -three-decker caught fire, and in the confusion was taken for an enemy -by one of her own fleet of the same class. The two ships, of one -hundred and twelve guns each and among the largest in the world, ran -foul of each other and perished miserably in a common conflagration. -The French "St. Antoine" was captured. - -The incident of Saumarez's meeting with Linois has a particular value, -because of the repulse and disaster to the British vessels on the first -occasion. Unvarying success accounts, or seems to account, for itself; -but in this case the advantage of the squadron's position before Cadiz -transpires through a failure on the battle-field. To that position -was due, first, that Linois's detachment could not make its junction; -second, that it was attacked separately and very severely handled; -third, that in the retreat to Cadiz the three French ships were not -in proper condition to engage, although one of them when brought to -action made a very dogged resistance to, and escaped from, an inferior -ship. Consequently, the six British that pursued had only six enemies -instead of nine to encounter. After making allowance for the very -superior quality of the British officers and crews over the Spanish, it -is evident the distinguishing feature in these operations was that the -British squadron brought the enemies' divisions to action separately. -It was able to do so because it had been kept before the hostile port, -interposing between them. - -Saumarez had wrung success out of considerable difficulty. The failure -of the wind greatly increased the disadvantage to his vessels, coming -under sail into action with others already drawn up at anchor, -and to whom the loss of spars for the moment meant little. These -circumstances, added to the support of the French by land batteries and -some gunboats, went far to neutralize tactically the superior numbers -of the British. With all deductions, however, the fight at Algesiras -was extremely creditable to Linois. He was a man not only distinguished -for courage, but also of a cautious temper peculiarly fitted to secure -every advantage offered by a defensive position. Despite his success -there, the broad result was decisively in favor of his opponents. "Sir -James Saumarez's action," wrote Lord St. Vincent, "has put us upon -velvet." Seven British had worsted nine enemy's ships, as distinctly -superior, for the most part, in individual force as they were in -numbers. Not only had the Spaniards three of ninety guns and over, and -one of eighty, but two of Linois's were of the latter class, of which -Saumarez had but one. The difference between such and the seventy-fours -was not only in number of pieces, but in weight also. The substantial -issue, however, can be distinguished from the simple victory, and it -was secured not only by superior efficiency but also by strategic -disposition. - -Brilliant as was Saumarez's achievement, which Nelson, then in -England, warmly extolled in the House of Lords, the claim made by his -biographer, that to these operations alone was wholly due the defeat -of Bonaparte's plan, is exaggerated. It was arranged, he says, that -when the junction was made, the Cadiz ships should proceed off Lisbon, -sack that place, and destroy British merchantmen lying there; "then, -being re-enforced by the Brest fleet, they were to pass the Straits of -Gibraltar, steer direct for Alexandria, and there land such a body of -troops as would raise the siege and drive the English out of Egypt. -_This would certainly have succeeded_ had the squadron under Linois not -encountered that of Sir James, which led to the total defeat of their -combined fleets and to the abandonment of the grand plan."[47] This -might be allowed to stand as a harmless exhibition of a biographer's -zeal, did it not tend to obscure the true lesson to be derived from -this whole naval period, by attributing to a single encounter, however -brilliant, results due to an extensive, well-conceived general -system. Sir James Saumarez's operations were but an epitome of an -action going on everywhere from the Baltic to Egypt. By this command -of the sea the British fleets, after they had adopted the plan of -close-watching the enemy's ports, held everywhere interior positions, -which, by interposing between the hostile detachments, facilitated -beating them in detail. For the most part this advantage of position -resulted in quietly detaining the enemy in port, and so frustrating his -combinations. It was Saumarez's good fortune to illustrate how it could -also enable a compact body of highly disciplined ships to meet in rapid -succession two parts of a force numerically very superior, and by the -injuries inflicted on each neutralize the whole for a definite time. -But, had he never seen Linois, Bonaparte's plan still required the -junctions from Rochefort and Brest which were never effected. - -By naval combinations and by holding the Neapolitan ports Bonaparte -sought to preserve Egypt and force Great Britain to peace. "The -question of maritime peace," he wrote to Ganteaume,[48] "hangs now upon -the English expedition to Egypt." Portugal, the ancient ally of Great -Britain, was designed to serve other purposes of his policy,—to furnish -equivalents, with which to wrest from his chief enemy the conquests -that the sea power of France and her allies could not touch. "Notify -our minister at Madrid," wrote he to Talleyrand, September 30, 1800, -"that the Spanish troops must be masters of Portugal before October 15. -This is the only means by which we can have an equivalent for Malta, -Mahon, and Trinidad. Besides, the danger of Portugal will be keenly -felt in England, and will by so much quicken her disposition to peace." - -A secret treaty ceding Louisiana to France, in return for Tuscany -to the Spanish infante, had been signed the month before; and Spain -at the same time undertook to bring Portugal to break with Great -Britain. Solicitation proving ineffectual, Bonaparte in the spring -again demanded the stronger measure of an armed occupation of the -little kingdom; growing more urgent as it became evident that Egypt -was slipping from his grasp. Spain finally agreed to invade Portugal, -and accepted the co-operation of a French corps. The first consul -purposed to occupy at least three of the Portuguese provinces; -but he was outwitted by the adroitness of the Spanish government, -unwillingly submissive to his pressure, and by the compliance of his -brother Lucien, French minister to Madrid. Portugal made no efficient -resistance; and the two peninsular courts quickly reached an agreement, -by which the weaker closed her ports to Great Britain, paid twenty -million francs to France, and ceded a small strip of territory to Spain. - -Bonaparte was enraged at this treaty, which was ratified without -giving him a chance to interfere;[49] but in the summer of 1801 his -diplomatic game reached a stage where further delay was impossible. -He saw that the loss of Egypt was only a question of time; but so -long as any French troops held out there it was a card in his hand, -too valuable to risk for the trifling gain of a foothold in Portugal. -"The English are not masters of Egypt," he writes boldly on the 23d -of July to the French agent in London. "We have certain news that -Alexandria can hold out a year, and Lord Hawkesbury knows that Egypt is -in Alexandria;"[50] but four days later he sends the hopeless message -to Murat, "There is no longer any question of embarking"[51] the troops -about Taranto, sent there for the sole purpose of being nearer to -Egypt.[52] He continues, in sharp contrast with his former expectation, -"The station of the troops upon the Adriatic is intended to impose upon -the Turks and the English, and to serve as material for compensation -to the latter by evacuating those provinces." Both Naples and Portugal -were too distant, too ex-centric, and thrust too far into contact with -the British dominion of the sea to be profitably, or even safely, -held by France in her condition of naval debility; a truth abundantly -witnessed by the later events of Napoleon's reign, by the disastrous -occupation of Portugal in 1807, by the reverses of Soult and Masséna -in 1809 and 1811, and by the failure even to attempt the conquest of -Sicily. - -Russia and Prussia had grown less friendly since the death of Paul. -Even their agreement that Hanover should be evacuated, disposed as they -now were to please Great Britain, was to be postponed until "it was -ascertained that a certain power would not occupy that country;"[53] -a stipulation which betrayed the distrust felt by both. Since then -each had experienced evasions and rebuffs showing the unwillingness of -the first consul to meet their wishes in his treatment of the smaller -states; and they suspected, although they did not yet certainly know, -the steps already taken to incorporate with France regions to whose -independence they held.[54] Both were responding to the call of their -interests, beneficially and vitally connected with the sea power of -Great Britain, and threatened on the Continent by the encroaching -course of the French ruler. Bonaparte felt that the attempt to make -further gains in Europe, with which to traffic against those of Great -Britain abroad, might arouse resistance in these great powers, not yet -exhausted like Austria, and so indefinitely postpone the maritime peace -essential to the revival of the French navy and the re-establishment -of the colonial system; both at this time objects of prime importance -in his eyes. Thus it was that, beginning the year 1801 without a -single ally, in face of the triumphant march of the French armies and -of a formidable maritime combination, the Sea Power of Great Britain -had dispersed the Northern coalition, commanded the friendship of the -great states, retained control of the Mediterranean, reduced Egypt to -submission, and forced even the invincible Bonaparte to wish a speedy -cessation of hostilities. - -The great aim of the first consul now was to bring Great Britain -to terms before news of the evacuation of Alexandria could come to -hand. Negotiations had been slowly progressing for nearly six months; -the first advances having been made on the 21st of March by the new -ministry which came into power upon Pitt's resignation. Both parties -being inclined to peace, the advantage necessarily belonged to the man -who, untrammelled by associates in administration, held in absolute -control the direction of his country. The Addington ministry, hampered -by its own intrinsic weakness and by the eagerness of the nation, -necessarily yielded before the iron will of one who was never more firm -in outward bearing than in the most critical moments. He threatened -them with the occupation of Hanover; he intimated great designs for -which troops were embarked at Rochefort, Brest, Toulon, Cadiz, and -ready to embark in Holland; he boasted that Alexandria could hold out -yet a year. Nevertheless, although the terms were incontestably more -advantageous to France than to Great Britain, the government of the -latter insisted upon and obtained one concession, that of Trinidad, -which Bonaparte at first withheld.[55] His eagerness to conclude was in -truth as great as their own, though better concealed. Finally, he sent -on the 17th of September an ultimatum, and added, "If preliminaries are -not signed by the 10th of Vendémiaire (October 2), the negotiations -will be broken." "You will appreciate the importance of this clause," -he wrote confidentially to the French envoy, "when you reflect that -Menou may possibly not be able to hold in Alexandria beyond the first -of Vendémiaire, that at this season the winds are fair to come from -Egypt, and ships reach Italy and Trieste in very few days. Thus it -is essential to push them to a finish before Vendémiaire 10;" that -is, before they learn the fall of Alexandria. The question of terms, -as he had said before, hinged on Egypt. The envoy, however, was -furnished with a different but plausible reason. "Otto can give them -to understand that from our inferiority at sea and our superiority on -land the campaign begins for us in winter, and therefore I do not wish -to remain longer in this stagnation."[56] Whatever motives influenced -the British ministry, it is evident that Bonaparte was himself in a -hurry for peace. The preliminaries were signed in London on the first -of October, 1801. - -The conditions are easily stated. Of all her conquests, Great Britain -retained only the islands of Ceylon in the East Indies and Trinidad in -the West. How great this concession, will be realized by enumerating -the chief territories thus restored to their former owners. These were, -in the Mediterranean, Elba, Malta, Minorca; in the West Indies, Tobago, -Santa Lucia, Martinique, and the extensive Dutch possessions in Guiana; -in Africa, the Cape of Good Hope; and in India, the French and Dutch -stations in the peninsula. France consented to leave to Portugal her -possessions entire, to withdraw her troops from the kingdom of Naples -and the Roman territory, and to acknowledge the independence of the -Republic of the Seven Islands. Under this name the former Venetian -islands, Corfu and others—given to France by the treaty of Campo -Formio—had, after their conquest in 1799 by the fleets of Russia and -Turkey, been constituted into an independent state under the guarantee -of those two powers. Their deliverance from France was considered an -important security to the Turkish Empire. The capitulation of the -French troops in Alexandria was not yet known in England; and the -preliminaries merely stipulated the return of Egypt to the Porte, -whose dominions were to be preserved as they existed before the war. -Malta, restored to the Knights of St. John, was to be freed from -all French or British influence and placed under the guarantee of a -third Power. Owing to the decay of the Order, the disposition of this -important naval station, secretly coveted by both parties, was the most -difficult matter to arrange satisfactorily. In the definitive treaty -its status was sought to be secured by a cumbrous set of provisions, -occupying one third of the entire text; and the final refusal of Great -Britain to evacuate, until satisfaction was obtained for what she -claimed to be violations of the spirit of the engagements between the -two countries, became the test question upon which hinged the rupture -of this short-lived peace. - -As the first article of the preliminaries stipulated that upon their -ratification hostilities in all parts of the world, by sea and land, -should cease, they were regarded in both Great Britain and France as -equivalent to a definitive treaty; the postponement of the latter -being only to allow the negotiators time to settle the details of the -intricate agreements, thus broadly outlined, without prolonging the -sufferings of war. To France they could not but be acceptable. She -regained much, and gave up nothing that she could have held without -undue and often useless exertion. In Great Britain the general joy was -marred by the severe, yet accurate, condemnation passed upon the terms -by a body of exceptionally able men, drawn mainly from the ranks of the -Pitt cabinet, although their leader gave his own approval. They pointed -out, clearly and indisputably, that the disparity between the material -gains of Great Britain and France was enormous, disproportionate to -their relative advantages at the time of signature, and not to be -reconciled with that security which had been the professed object -of the struggle. They asserted with little exaggeration that the -conditions were for France to hold what she had, and for Great Britain -to recede to her possessions before the war. They predicted with fatal -accuracy the speedy renewal of hostilities, under the disadvantage of -having lost by the peace important positions not easy to be regained. -The ministry had little to reply. To this or that item of criticism -exception might be taken; but in the main their defence was that by -the failure of their allies no hope remained of contesting the power -of France on the Continent, and that Trinidad and Ceylon were very -valuable acquisitions. Being insular, they were controlled by the -nation ruling the sea, while, from their nearness to the mainlands of -South America and of India, they were important as depots of trade, -as well as for strategic reasons. The most assuring argument was put -forward by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had negotiated the -preliminaries. At the beginning of the war Great Britain had 135 -ships-of-the-line and 133 frigates; at its close she had 202 of the -former and 277 of the latter. France had begun with 80 of the line and -66 frigates, and ended with 39 and 35 respectively. However the first -consul might exert himself, Lord Hawkesbury justly urged that the -British might allow him many years labor and then be willing to chance -a maritime war.[57] - -Material advantages such as had thus been given up undoubtedly -contribute to security. In surrendering as much as she did abroad, -while France retained such extensive gains upon the Continent and -acquired there such a preponderating influence, Great Britain, which -had so large a stake in the European commonwealth, undoubtedly incurred -a serious risk. The shortness of the peace, and the disquieting -disputes which arose throughout it, sufficiently prove this. -Nevertheless, could contemporaries accurately read the signs of their -times, Englishmen of that day need not have been dissatisfied with -the general results of the war. A long stage had been successfully -traversed towards the final solution of a great difficulty. In 1792 the -spirit of propagating revolution by violence had taken possession of -the French nation as a whole. As Napoleon has strikingly remarked, "It -was part of the political religion of the France of that day to make -war in the name of principles."[58] "The Montagnards and the Jacobins," -says the republican historian Henri Martin, the bitter censurer of -Bonaparte, "were resolved, like the Girondists, to propagate afar, by -arms, the principles of the Revolution; and they hoped, by hurling a -defiance at all kings, to put France in the impossibility of recoiling -or stopping herself."[59] Such a design could be checked only by -raising up against it a barrier of physical armed opposition. This -had been effected and maintained chiefly by the Sea Power of Great -Britain, the prime agent and moving spirit, directly through her navy, -indirectly through the subsidies drawn from her commerce; and the -latter had nearly doubled while carrying on this arduous and extensive -war. In 1801 the aggressive tendencies of the French nation, as a -whole, were exhausted. So far as they still survived, they were now -embodied in and dependent upon a single man, in which shape they were -at once more distinctly to be recognized and more odious. They were -also less dangerous; because the power of one man, however eminent for -genius, is far less for good or evil than the impulse of a great people. - -The British statesmen of that day did not clearly distinguish this -real nature of their gains, though they did intuitively discern the -true character of the struggle in which they were engaged. As is -not infrequent with intuitions, the reasoning by which they were -supported was often faulty; but Pitt's formulation of the objects of -Great Britain in the one word "security" was substantially correct. -Security was her just and necessary aim, forced upon her by the -circumstances of the Revolution,—security not for herself alone, but -for the community of states of which she was an important member. This -was threatened with anarchy through the lawless spirit with which -the French leaders proposed to force the spread of principles and -methods, many of them good as well as many bad, but for whose healthful -development were demanded both time and freedom of choice, which they -in their impatience were unwilling to give. "Security," said Pitt in -his speech upon the preliminaries, "was our great object; there were -different means of accomplishing it, with better or worse prospects -of success; and according to the different variations of policy -occasioned by a change of circumstances, we still pursued our great -object, Security. In order to obtain it we certainly did look for the -subversion of that government founded upon revolutionary principles.... -We have the satisfaction of knowing that we have survived the violence -of the revolutionary fever, and we have seen the extent of its -principles abated. We have seen Jacobinism deprived of its fascination; -we have seen it stripped of the name and pretext of liberty; it has -shown itself to be capable only of destroying, not of building, and -that it must necessarily end in a military despotism."[60] Such, in -truth, was the gain of the first war of Great Britain with the French -Revolution. It was, however, but a stage in the progress; there -remained still another, of warfare longer, more bitter, more furious,—a -struggle for the mastery, whose end was not to be seen by the chief -leaders of the one preceding it. - - - - -CHAPTER XIV. - -OUTLINE OF EVENTS FROM THE SIGNATURE OF THE PRELIMINARIES TO THE -RUPTURE OF THE PEACE OF AMIENS. - -OCTOBER, 1801.-MAY, 1803. - - -The preliminaries of peace between Great Britain and France, signed -on the first of October, 1801, were regarded by both parties, at -least ostensibly, as settling their relative status and acquisitions. -In their broad outlines no change would be worked by the definitive -treaty, destined merely to regulate details whose adjustment would -demand time and so prolong the distress of war. This expectation, -that the basis of a durable peace had been reached, proved delusive. -A series of unpleasant surprises awaited first one party and then -the other, producing in Great Britain a feeling of insecurity, which -gave point and added vigor to the declamations of those who from the -first had scoffed at the idea of any peace proving permanent, if it -rested upon the good faith of the French government and surrendered -those material guarantees which alone, they asserted, could curb the -ambition and enforce the respect of a man like Bonaparte. Bitter -indeed must have been the unspoken thoughts of the ministry, as the -revolving months brought with them an unceasing succession of events -which justified their opponents' prophecies while proving themselves -to be outwitted; and which, by the increase given to French influence -and power in Europe, necessitated the maintenance of large military -establishments, and converted the peace from first to last into a -condition of armed truce. - -The day after the signature of the preliminaries news reached -London[61] of the surrender of Alexandria, which completed the loss of -Egypt by the French. It was believed that Bonaparte had, at the time -of signing, possessed this information, which would have materially -affected the footing upon which he was treating. However that was, he -was undoubtedly assured of the issue,[62] and therefore precipitated a -conclusion by which to France, and not to Great Britain, was attributed -the gracious act of restoring its dominion to the Porte. Concealing -the fact from the Turkish plenipotentiary in Paris, the French -government on the 9th of October signed with him a treaty, by which -it undertook to evacuate the province it no longer held. In return, -Turkey conceded to France, her recent enemy, commercial privileges -equal to those allowed Great Britain, to whose sea power alone she -owed the recovery of Syria and Egypt. This bargain, concluded without -the knowledge of the British ministry, was not made public until after -the ratification of the preliminaries. At the same time became known a -treaty with Portugal, signed at Madrid on the 29th of September. By the -preliminaries with Great Britain, Portuguese territory was to remain -intact; but by the treaty of Madrid so much of Brazil was added to -French Guiana as to give the latter control of the northern outlet of -the Amazon. - -These events were surprises, and disagreeable surprises, to the -British ministers. On the other hand, the existence of the secret -treaty of March 21, 1801, by which Spain ceded to France the colony -of Louisiana, was known to them,[63] though unavowed at the time of -signing. While impressed with the importance of this transaction, -following as it did the cession of the Spanish half of San Domingo, the -ministry allowed the veil of mystery, with which Bonaparte had been -pleased to shroud it, to remain unlifted. The United States minister -to London had procured and forwarded to his government on the 20th -of November a copy of this treaty,[64] which so closely affected his -fellow countrymen; but it was not until January, 1802, that the fact -became generally known in England. Gloomy prophecies of French colonial -aggrandizement were uttered by the partisans of the Opposition, who -pictured the hereditary enemy of Great Britain planted by the Spanish -treaty at the mouth of the great river of North America, and by the -Portuguese at that of the artery of the southern continent; while the -vast and rich colonies of Spain, lying between these two extremes, -would be controlled by the supremacy of France in the councils of the -Peninsular courts. In a generation which still retained the convictions -of the eighteenth century on the subject of colonial expansion, these -predictions of evil struck heavily home,—enforced as they were by the -knowledge that full one fourth of the trade which made the strength -of Great Britain rested then upon that Caribbean America, into which -France was now making a colossal intrusion. Faithful to the sagacious -principle by which he ever proportioned the extent of his military -preparation to the vastness of the end in view, the expedition sent -by Bonaparte to reassert in Haïti the long dormant authority of -the mother-country was calculated on a scale which aroused intense -alarm in London. On the 4th of December, 1801, only ten weeks after -the preliminaries were signed, and long before the conclusion of -the definitive treaty, fifteen ships-of-the-line and six frigates -sailed from Brest for Haïti; and these were rapidly followed by other -divisions, so that the whole force dispatched much exceeded twenty -ships-of-the-line, and carried over twenty thousand troops. The number -was none too great for the arduous task,—indeed experience proved it to -be far from adequate to meet the waste due to climatic causes; but to -Great Britain it was portentous. Distrusting Bonaparte's purposes, a -large division of British ships was ordered to re-enforce the squadron -at Jamaica. Weary of a nine-years war and expecting their discharge, -the crews of some of the vessels mutinied; and the execution of several -of these poor seamen was one of the first results of Bonaparte's -ill-fated attempt to restore the colonial system of France. - -The apprehensions shown concerning these distant undertakings partook -more of panic than of reasonable fear. They overlooked the long period -that must pass between possession and development, as well as the -hopeless inferiority of France in that sea power upon which the tenure -of colonies must depend. They ignored the evident enormous difficulties -to be overcome, and were blind to the tottering condition of the -Spanish colonial system, then rapidly approaching its fall. But if -there was exaggeration in an anticipation of danger, which the whole -history of her maritime past entitled Great Britain to reject with -scorn, there was no question that each month was revealing unexpected -and serious changes in the relative positions of the two powers, which, -if not wilfully concealed by France, had certainly not been realized by -the British ministers when the preliminaries were signed. Whether they -had been cheated or merely out-manœuvred, it became daily more plain -that the balance of power in Europe, of which Great Britain was so -important a factor, was no longer what it had been when she made such -heavy sacrifices of her maritime conquests to secure the status of the -Continent. - -At the same time was unaccountably delayed the work of the -plenipotentiaries, who were to settle at Amiens the terms of the -definitive treaty. The British ambassador left London on the first of -November, and after some stop in Paris reached Amiens on the first of -December. The French and Dutch envoys arrived shortly after; but the -Spanish failed to appear, and on different pretexts negotiations were -spun out. That this was contrary to the wishes of the British ministers -scarcely admits of doubt. They had already made every sacrifice they -could afford; and the position of a popular government, under the free -criticism of a people impatient for a settled condition of affairs, and -forced to temporizing expedients for carrying on the state business -during a period of uncertainty, was too unpleasant to suggest bad -faith on their part. While this suspense still lasted, a startling -event occurred, greatly affecting the balance of power. The Cisalpine -Republic, whose independence was guaranteed by the treaty of Lunéville, -adopted toward the end of 1801 a new constitution, drawn up under the -inspection of Bonaparte himself. Delegates of the republic, to the -number of several hundred, were summoned to Lyon to confer with the -first consul on the permanent organization of their state; and there, -under his influence, as was alleged, offered to him the presidency, -with functions even more extensive than those he enjoyed as ruler of -France. The offer was accepted by him on the 26th of January, 1802; and -thus the power of the Cisalpine, with its four million inhabitants, was -wielded by the same man who already held that of the French republic. A -few days later for the name Cisalpine was substituted Italian,—a change -thought to indicate an aggressive attitude towards the remaining states -of Italy. - -These proceedings at Lyon caused great alarm in England, and many -persons before pacifically disposed now wished to renew the war. -The ministers nevertheless ignored what had passed so publicly, and -continued the effort for peace, despite the delays and tergiversations -of which their envoy, Lord Cornwallis, bitterly complained; but by -the beginning of March, when negotiations had lasted three months, -their patience began to give way. A number of ships were ordered into -commission, and extensive naval preparations begun. At the same time -an ultimatum was sent forward, and Cornwallis instructed to leave -Amiens in eight days if it were not accepted. The first consul had too -much at stake on the seas to risk a rupture,[65] when he had already -gained so much by the protraction of negotiations and by his astute -diplomacy. The definitive treaty was signed on the 25th of March, 1802. -The terms did not materially differ from those of the preliminaries, -except in the article of Malta. The boundary of French Guiana obtained -from Portugal was indeed pushed back off the Amazon, but no mention was -made of the now notorious cession of Louisiana. - -The provisions touching the little island of Malta and its -dependencies, Gozo and Comino, were long and elaborate. The object of -each country was to secure the exclusion of the other from a position -so important for controlling the Mediterranean and the approaches -thereby to Egypt and India. The Order of Knights was to be restored, -with the provision that no citizen either of Great Britain or France -was thereafter to be a member. The independence and neutrality of the -Order and of the island were proclaimed. The British forces were to -evacuate within three months after the exchange of ratifications; but -this stipulation was qualified by the proviso that there should then -be on the spot a Grand Master to receive possession, and also two -thousand Neapolitan troops which the king of Naples was to be invited -to send as a garrison. These were to remain for one year after its -restitution to the Grand Master; or longer, if the Order had not then -provided the necessary force. Naples was thus selected as guardian of -the coveted position, because its weakness could arouse no jealousy. -The independence of the islands was placed under the guarantee of Great -Britain, France, Austria, Spain, Russia, and Prussia; the last four -being also invited to accede to the long list of stipulations. The -presence of a grand master and the guarantee of the four powers—whose -acquiescence was not first obtained—were thus integral parts of the -agreement; and upon their failure Great Britain afterwards justified -the delays which left Malta still a pledge in her hands, when she -demanded from France explanations and indemnities for subsequent -actions, injurious, as she claimed, to her security and to her dignity. - -By another clause of the treaty Great Britain consented to evacuate -Porto Ferrajo, the principal port in Elba, which she had up to that -time held by force of arms. It was then known that this was in effect -to abandon the island to France, who had obtained its cession from -Naples and Tuscany, formerly joint owners, by conventions first made -known some time after the signature of the preliminaries. Elba was by -its position fitted seriously to embarrass the trade of Great Britain -with Northern Italy, under the restrictions laid wherever Bonaparte's -power extended; but the most important feature of the transaction -was the impression produced by the long concealment of treaties thus -unexpectedly divulged. These sudden, unforeseen changes imparted an air -of illusion to all existing conditions, and undermined the feeling of -security essential to the permanent relations of states. - -Despite the shocks caused by these various revelations, the treaty of -Amiens was received in Great Britain with satisfaction, though not -with the unmeasured demonstrations that followed the announcement of -the preliminaries. In France the general joy was no less profound. "It -was believed," writes M. Thiers, "that the true peace, the peace of -the seas, was secured,—that peace which was the certain and necessary -condition of peace on the Continent." The enthusiasm of the nation -was poured out at the feet of the first consul, to whose genius for -war and for diplomacy were not unjustly attributed the brilliant, as -well as apparently solid, results. Statesmen might murmur that France -had lost her colonial empire and failed to hold Egypt and Malta, -while Great Britain had extended and consolidated her Indian empire -by overthrowing the Sultan of Mysore, the ancient ally of France and -her own most formidable foe in the peninsula; but the mass even of -intelligent Frenchmen stopped not to regard the wreck of their sea -power, of which those disastrous events were but the sign. Facts so -remote, and whose significance was not immediately apparent, were lost -to sight in the glare of dazzling deeds wrought close at hand. All -eyes were held by the splendid succession of victories in Italy and -Germany, by the extension of the republic to her natural limits at the -Rhine and the Alps, by the restoration of internal order, and by the -proudly dominant position accorded their ruler in the councils of the -Continent. To these was now added free access to the sea, wrung by the -same mighty hand—as was fondly believed—from the weakening of the great -Sea Power. At an extraordinary session of the Legislature, convoked to -give legal sanction to the treaties and measures of the government, -the Treaty of Amiens was presented last, as the crowning work of the -first consul; and it was used as the occasion for conferring upon him -a striking mark of public acknowledgment. After some hesitations, the -question was submitted to the nation whether his tenure of office -should be for life. The majority of votes cast were affirmative; and -on the 3d of August, 1802, the senate formally presented to him a -_senatus-consultum_, setting forth that "the French people names, and -the senate proclaims. Napoleon Bonaparte consul for life." - -Bonaparte had not waited for this exaltation to continue his restless -political activity, destined soon to make waste paper of the Treaty of -Amiens. Great Britain having steadfastly refused to recognize the new -states set up by him in Italy, he argued she had forfeited all right to -interfere thenceforth in their concerns. From this he seems to have -advanced to the position that she had no further claim to mingle in the -affairs of the Continent at large. The consequent indifference shown -by him to British sentiment and interests, in continental matters, -was increased by his conviction that "in the existing state of Europe -England cannot reasonably make war, alone, against us;"[66] an opinion -whose open avowal in more offensive terms afterwards became the spark -to kindle the final great conflagration. - -The treaty of Lunéville had provided that the German princes, who by -it lost territory on the west bank of the Rhine and in Italy, should -receive compensation elsewhere in the German empire; and it was agreed -that these indemnities should be made mainly at the expense of the -ecclesiastical principalities, where, the tenure being for life only, -least hardship would be involved. The difficulties attending these -distributions, and the fixed animosity between Prussia and Austria, -gave Bonaparte a fair pretext to intervene as mediator, and to guide -the final settlement upon lines which should diminish the relative -power and prestige of France's traditional enemy, Austria, and exalt -her rivals. In doing this he adroitly obtained the imposing support -of Russia, whose young sovereign readily accepted the nattering offer -of joint intervention; the more so that the princes allied to his -family might thus receive a disproportionate share of the spoils. Under -Bonaparte's skilful handling, the acquisitions of Prussia were so far -greater than those of Austria as to fulfil his prediction, that "the -empire of Germany should be really divided into two empires, since -its affairs will be arranged at two different centres."[67] After the -settlement he boasted that "the affairs of Germany had been arranged -entirely to the advantage of France and of her allies."[68] Great -Britain was not consulted; and her people, though silent, saw with -displeasure the weakening of their ally and the aggrandizement of a -state they held to be faithless as well as hostile. At the same time -bad feeling was further excited by the peremptory demands of Bonaparte -for the expulsion from England of certain French royalists, and for -the repression of the freedom of the British press in its attacks upon -himself. To these demands the British government declined to yield. - -The reclamations of Bonaparte against the press, and his intervention -in German affairs, preceded the proclamation of the consulate for -life. It was followed at a short interval by the formal incorporation -with France of Piedmont and Elba, by decree dated September 11, 1802. -Piedmont had been organized as a French military department in April, -1801;[69] and Bonaparte had then secretly avowed the measure to be a -first step to annexation. The significance of the present action was -that it changed a condition which was _de facto_ only, and presumably -temporary, to one that was claimed to be _de jure_ and permanent. As -such, it was a distinct encroachment by France, much affecting the -states of the Continent, and especially Austria, against whose Italian -possessions Piedmont was meant to serve as a base of operations. The -adjacent Republic of Liguria, as the Genoese territory was then styled, -was also organized as a French military division,[70] and no security -existed against similar action there,—most injurious to British -commerce, and adding another to the transformation scenes passing -before the eyes of Europe. Nor was the material gain to France alone -considered; for, no compensation being given to the King of Sardinia -for the loss of his most important state, this consummated injury was -felt as a slight by both Great Britain and Russia, which had earnestly -sought some reparation for him. For the time, however, no remonstrance -was made by the ministry. - -New offence was soon given, which, if not greater in degree, produced -all the effect of cumulative grievance. The little canton of Valais, -in south-western Switzerland, had in the spring of 1802 been forcibly -detached from the confederation and proclaimed independent, in order -to secure to the French the Simplon route passing through it to Italy; -a measure which, wrote Bonaparte, "joined to the exclusive right -of France to send her armies by that road, has changed the system -of war to be adopted in Italy."[71] No further open step was then -taken to control the affairs of Switzerland; but the French minister -was instructed to support secretly the party in sympathy with the -Revolution,[72] and an ominous sentence appeared in the message of the -first consul to the Legislature, May 6, 1802, that "the counsels of -the French government to the factions in Switzerland had so far been -ineffective. It is still hoped that the voice of wisdom and moderation -will command attention, and that the powers adjoining Helvetia will -not be forced to intervene to stifle troubles whose continuance would -threaten their own tranquillity."[73] - -In Switzerland, perhaps more than in any other part of Europe, had -been realized the purpose, announced by the National Convention in -the celebrated decrees of November 19 and December 15, 1792, to -propagate by force changes in the government of countries where the -French armies could penetrate. Vast changes had indeed been made in -Belgium, Holland, and Italy; but these when first invaded were in -open war with France. The interference in Switzerland in 1798 had no -characteristic of serious war, for no means of opposition existed in -the invaded cantons. It was an armed intervention, undertaken by -the Directory under the impulsion of Bonaparte, avowedly to support -citizens of a foreign state "wishing to recover their liberty."[74] "As -soon as the signal was given by the entrance of the French armies in -1798 the rising was prompt and general;"[75] and was followed by the -adoption of a highly centralized constitution, for which the country -was unprepared. From that time forward agitation was incessant. Two -parties strove for the mastery; the one favoring the new order, known -as the Unitarians, whose sympathies were with the French Revolution, -the other the Aristocratic, which sought to return towards the former -Constitution, and looked for countenance and support to the older -governments of Europe. Between the two there was a central party of -more moderate opinions. - -Having secured the Valais for France, Bonaparte in August, 1802, -withdrew the French troops till then maintained in Switzerland; -a politic measure tending to show Europe that he respected the -independence of the country guaranteed at Lunéville. The opposing -parties soon came to blows; and the nominal government of moderates, -which had obtained its authority by extra-constitutional action,[76] -found that it had on its side "neither the ardent patriots, who wished -absolute unity, nor the peaceable masses sufficiently well disposed -to the revolution, but who knew it only by the horrors of war and the -presence of foreign troops."[77] The aristocratic party got the upper -hand and established itself in the capital, whence the government was -driven. The latter appealed to Bonaparte to intervene; and after a -moment's refusal he decided to do so. "I will not," he said, "deliver -the formidable bastions of the Alps to fifteen hundred mercenaries -paid by England." A French colonel was sent as special envoy bearing -a proclamation, dated September 30, 1802, to command the oligarchic -government to dissolve and all armed assemblies to disperse. To support -this order, thirty thousand French soldiers, under General Ney, were -massed on the frontiers and soon entered the country. Before this show -of force all opposition in Switzerland at once ceased. - -The emotion of Europe was profound; but of the great powers none -save Great Britain spoke. What to Bonaparte was a step necessary -to the supremacy of France, even though a violation of the treaty -of Lunéville, was, in the eyes of Englishmen, not only among the -ministry but among the most strenuous of the opposition, an oppressive -interference with "the lawful efforts of a brave and generous people -to recover their ancient laws and government, and to procure the -re-establishment of a system which experience has demonstrated not only -to be favorable to the maintenance of their domestic happiness, but to -be perfectly consistent with the tranquillity and security of other -powers." The British cabinet expressed an unwillingness to believe that -there "would be any further attempt to control that independent nation -in the exercise of its undoubted rights."[78] - -Despite this avowed confidence, the ministry on the same day, October -10, that this vigorous remonstrance was penned, dispatched a special -envoy with orders to station himself on the frontiers of Switzerland, -ascertain the disposition of the people, and assure them that, if -they were disposed to resist the French advance, Great Britain would -furnish them pecuniary succors. The envoy was carefully to refrain -from promoting resistance, if the Swiss did not spontaneously offer -it; but if they did, he was to give them every facility to obtain arms -and supplies. Being thus committed to a course which could scarcely -fail to lead to hostilities, the British ministry next bethought itself -to secure some conquests of the late war, for whose restitution, in -compliance with the treaty, orders had already gone forward. On the -17th of October dispatches were sent to the West Indies, to Dutch -Guiana, and to the Cape of Good Hope, directing that the French and -Dutch colonies ordered to be restored should be retained until further -instructions. - -Upon receiving the British remonstrance, Bonaparte broke into furious -words mingled with threats. On the 23d of October he dictated -instructions to M. Otto, the French minister in London, which are -characterized even by M. Thiers as truly extraordinary. "He would not -deliver the Alps to fifteen hundred mercenaries paid by England. If -the British ministry, to support its parliamentary influence, should -intimate that there was anything the first consul had not done, -because he was prevented from doing it, that instant he would do it." -He scouted the danger to France from maritime war, and said plainly -that, if it arose, the coasts of Europe from Hanover to Taranto would -be occupied by French troops and closed to British commerce. "Liguria, -Lombardy, Switzerland and Holland would be converted into French -provinces, realizing the Empire of the Gauls." Great Britain herself -was threatened with invasion by a hundred thousand soldiers; and if, -to avert the danger, she succeeded in arousing another continental -war, "it would be England that forced us to conquer Europe. The first -consul was but thirty-three. He had as yet destroyed only states of -the second order. Who knows how long it would take him, if forced -thereto, to change again the face of Europe and revive the Empire of -the West?" The minister was directed to state to the British government -that the policy of France towards England was "the whole treaty of -Amiens; nothing but the treaty of Amiens." A week later the same phrase -was repeated in the Moniteur, the official journal, in an article -which expressly denied Great Britain's right to appeal to the treaty -of Lunéville, because she had refused to recognize the new states -constituted by it. M. Otto wisely withheld the provoking language of -the dispatch, but necessarily communicated the demand for the whole -treaty of Amiens and the refusal of aught not therein found. To this -the British minister of foreign affairs replied with the pregnant -words, "The state of the Continent when the treaty of Amiens was -signed, and nothing but that state." The two declarations created a -dead-lock, unless one party would recede. - -Despite these explicit formulas both governments were somewhat in -the dark as to the extent of the dangers. The British ministry had -not heard all that Bonaparte said, and he was ignorant of the orders -sent to retain the captured colonies. Meanwhile, Swiss opposition -having failed, the British envoy to them was recalled; and on the -15th of November new instructions were sent to the Cape of Good Hope -and the West Indies, revoking those of the previous month to stop the -restitutions. It remained, however, a question whether the second -vessel would overtake the first. If she did not, the action of the -British ministry would transpire in an offensive way. Accordingly, when -Parliament met on the 23d of November, the king's speech took the color -of this perplexity, alluding somewhat enigmatically to the necessity -of watching the European situation and providing for security as well -as for peace. The debates which followed were tinged with the same -hue of uncertainty. The ministry could only say that its policy was -to preserve peace, if possible; but that, in view of recent events, -it must call upon the House and the country to entertain a spirit of -watchfulness.[79] - -The Swiss affair was the turning-point in the relations of the two -countries. The first consul's vigilance had been lulled by the seeming -easy acquiescence of the British ministry in previous encroachments, -and the readiness with which, notwithstanding these, they had -surrendered their conquests and continued to fulfil the terms of the -treaty. Their present action not only exasperated, but aroused him. -The remonstrance ended in words; but, like the little trickle which -betrays the fissure in a dam, it betokened danger and gave warning -that the waters of strife were ready to burst through the untempered -barrier put together to restrain them, and again pour their desolating -flood over Europe. Bonaparte began to look carefully at the existing -situation, and found that the British troops had not yet quitted Egypt -nor surrendered Malta to the Order of St. John. Representations were -made on both these subjects, and the British government was pressed to -evacuate Malta.[80] - -The ministry, however, were also alive to the gravity of the situation, -increased as it was by the orders, not yet known, to stop the -restitutions. To abandon Egypt to Turkey they had no objection; and -to the French ambassador's demand replied, on November 30, that the -failure to do so had resulted from a misunderstanding on the part of -the British commander-in-chief, to whom explicit instructions were -now sent. Regarding Malta, their feeling was very different. Honestly -intending to carry out the treaty, they had admitted the Neapolitan -garrison to the island, though not yet to the fortifications; and their -ambassadors to the Great Powers had been early directed to ask their -guarantee for the independence of the Order. The French government -did not instruct its representatives to do the same. Whether this was -due, as Thiers says, to the negligence of Talleyrand, or whether the -first consul preferred not to be troubled by the resistance of other -powers in case he again seized the island, the failure of France -to join in the application caused Russia and Prussia to defer their -answer to the British ambassadors. The joint request was not made to -Prussia until September, nor to the czar until November 3. By this time -the Swiss incident had come and gone, leaving behind it the state of -tension already described. Not till the 25th of the month did the czar -reply; and then, before giving his acquiescence, he required in the -organization of the island changes seriously affecting the object of -the treaty, which aimed to base its independence upon its own people -as well as upon guarantees. At Amiens it had been agreed that the -Order should be open to native Maltese, by whom also at least half the -government offices should be filled. Half the garrison likewise was -to be composed of natives. To these provisions the czar excepted. All -such points of interior organization were to be left to the decision of -the legal government of the Order;[81] i. e., of the Order as before -constituted. - -The record of the ministry in the matter of Malta was so clear that -it could well afford to protract discussion on the points raised by -Russia. No cession made by the treaty had been more generally lamented -by Englishmen, keenly sensitive to all that affected their position -in the Mediterranean or threatened the approaches to India. In case -the peace which was its sole achievement failed, the ministry could -save from the wreck of its hopes no more welcome prize with which to -meet a disappointed people. Other valid objections to restoration were -not wanting. No Grand Master had yet accepted. Spain, notoriously -under Bonaparte's influence, had suppressed the revenues of the Order -within her limits. Similar action had followed elsewhere, and it was -argued that the income of the Order would not suffice to maintain the -defence of the island, nor consequently its independence. But, while -thus keeping its hold on Malta by diplomatic pleas, the ministry took -broader ground in its discussions with France. Its envoy there was -replaced by an ambassador of the highest rank, Lord Whitworth; who was -instructed to affirm explicitly Great Britain's right to interfere -in continental affairs, whenever in her judgment required by her own -interests, or those of Europe in general. He was also to point out the -various encroachments which had added to the influence and power of -France, and to intimate that these changes in the conditions since the -treaty had been concluded entitled Great Britain to compensations. The -annexation of Piedmont, the renunciation of the Grand Duke of Parma in -favor of France, the invasion of Switzerland, were specifically named -as making a most material alteration in the state of engagements since -the conclusion of the definitive treaty. Attention was also called to -the fact that although, by a convention signed in August, 1801, French -troops were to remain in Holland only until the conclusion of peace -between Great Britain and France, they had not yet been withdrawn, -thus violating the independence of the Batavian republic guaranteed -at Lunéville. The ambassador was warned, however, not to commit the -government to any specific determinations, and especially on the -subject of Malta.[82] - -The ministers, therefore, were still undecided. They had climbed upon -the fence, but were prepared to get down again on the side whence -they had started, if a fair opportunity were given. Unfortunately for -the interests of peace, Bonaparte, in the madness of his strength, -either exaggerating the weakness of the ministry or underestimating -the impulsion it could receive from popular feeling, proceeded -deliberately to arouse the spirit which he was never again able to -lay. On the 30th of January, 1803, was published in the "Moniteur" -Colonel Sébastiani's famous report of his mission to the Levant. -Sébastiani had been dispatched in a frigate the previous September, to -visit Tripoli, Egypt, Syria, and the Ionian islands, and ascertain the -political and military conditions. His report was in the main a fulsome -narrative of the reverence in which the first consul was said to be -held by the Eastern peoples; but, upon the very detailed account of the -indifference to military preparations, followed the startling statement -that "six thousand French troops would now suffice to conquer Egypt." -The Ionian islands were also pronounced ready to declare themselves -French at the first opportunity. Finally, General Stuart, commanding -the British troops in Alexandria, was accused of seeking to compass -Sébastiani's murder by sending to the Pasha a copy of a general order -issued by Bonaparte when in Egypt. - -The exasperation such a paper would excite in Great Britain was so -obvious, that its publication has been attributed to the deliberate -design to provoke a maritime war; under cover of which the first -consul could, without open humiliation, abandon the enterprise against -Haïti.[83] The first and general success of the French troops in that -colony had been followed by a frightful pestilence of yellow fever; -after which the negroes in every quarter again rose and defied the -weakened bands of their enemies. On the 8th of January the "Moniteur" -published the death of Leclerc, the commander-in-chief, with an account -of the ravages of the disease. It was indeed painfully apparent that -the colony could not be regained, and utilized, without an expenditure -of life impossible to afford;[84] but the fever itself was an excuse -even more potent than the British navy for abandoning the attempt -without military dishonor. To penetrate the real motives of a spirit -so subtle and unscrupulous as Bonaparte's is hopeless; nor can -dependence be placed upon the statements of his brothers Lucien and -Joseph, who are the sole authorities for the purpose thus alleged for -the publication. There seems little cause to seek another reason than -the same truculent arrogance manifested in his instructions to Otto of -October 23, and the success which his past experience had taught him to -expect from bluster. The secret mission to Prussia of his confidential -aid, Duroc, six weeks later, clearly indicates that the result had -disappointed him and that he did not want war,—at least as yet.[85] -Duroc was instructed to see the king personally and say that, if war -broke out, French troops would occupy Hanover, a step known to be -particularly obnoxious to Prussia, who wished herself to absorb it. Her -repugnance was to be used as a lever, to induce intervention with Great -Britain to evacuate Malta.[86] - -Bonaparte in truth was less interested in the West than in the East, -whose vast populations, vivid history, and fabled riches struck his -imagination far more forcibly than the unpeopled wildernesses of -America. Access to the East, as to the West, was perforce by water, -and so controlled by the power that ruled the sea; but the way by the -Levant was shorter, evasion therefore easier. Malta, Taranto, the -Ionian islands, the Morea were gateways to the East. The last three, -as practically continental,[87] he considered to be within his own -grasp; the first alone could be readily and securely held by the Power -of the Seas. From it therefore he sought to hasten her. On the 27th of -January Talleyrand, "with great solemnity and by express order of the -first consul," required of Lord Whitworth to inform him what were his -Majesty's intentions regarding the evacuation of Malta. No reply was -given, except a promise to report the conversation.[88] On the 30th -was issued Sébastiani's report, whose scarcely veiled threats against -British interests in the East might perhaps induce a weak government to -propitiate the first consul by compliance. - -If so meant, the attempt was miscalculated. The British ministry -replied that, despite his just claim for compensation, the king would -have withdrawn his force from Malta, when the clauses of the treaty -affecting it were fulfilled; but that, in view of Sébastiani's report, -he would not do so until substantial security was provided against -the purposes therein revealed. From that time forward letters and -interviews followed in rapid succession, the British ministry gradually -stiffening in its attitude concerning the island. On the 20th of -February Bonaparte gave a fresh provocation which deeply stirred the -British people, although no notice was taken of it by the ministry. In -a message sent that day to the legislature, he declared the certainty -of continental peace; but concerning Great Britain he continued: "Two -parties there strive for power. One has made peace and wishes to keep -it; the other has sworn implacable hatred to France.... Whatever the -success of intrigue in London, it will not drag other nations into new -leagues, and this government says with just pride: 'England, alone, -cannot to-day contend against France.'" - -On March 8 the British government sent a message to Parliament, that, -in consequence of military preparations going on in the ports of France -and Holland, the king judged expedient to adopt additional measures -of precaution for the security of his dominions. It is fair to say -that these preparations were not on a scale by themselves to warrant -the proposed action; which was asserted by critics of the ministry to -be due to information of transactions at the Cape of Good Hope. This -had already been delivered to the Dutch authorities when the orders -countermanding the restitution arrived; but the British commander -had adroitly repossessed himself of the works. This news reached -London early in March; and the proposed armaments were thought to be -precautions rather against Bonaparte's action, when he too heard it, -than against the existing movements in French or Dutch ports. - -From this time forward Great Britain rather than France was aggressive. -Receiving no explanation upon the grievances advanced, Lord Whitworth -was on the 4th of April instructed to say that, if the French -government continued to evade discussion about compensations due for -its aggressions on the Continent and satisfaction for Sébastiani's -report, and yet demanded the evacuation of Malta, he should declare -that relations of amity could not continue to exist, and that he must -leave Paris within a certain time. If they were willing to discuss, he -was instructed to propose the cession of Malta in perpetuity to Great -Britain and the evacuation of Holland and Switzerland by French troops; -in return for which Great Britain would confirm Elba to France and -acknowledge the kingdom of Etruria. If a satisfactory arrangement were -made in Italy for the king of Sardinia, she would further acknowledge -the Italian and Ligurian republics. The first consul replied that -he would sooner see the British on the heights of Montmartre than -in the possession of Malta. Some futile efforts were made to find a -middle term; but the ministry having insisted, as its ultimatum, -upon occupying the island for at least ten years, the ambassador -demanded his passports and left Paris on the 12th of May. On the 16th -Great Britain declared war against France. The following day Admiral -Cornwallis sailed from Plymouth with ten ships-of-the-line, and two -days later appeared off Brest, resuming the watch of that port. On the -afternoon of the 18th Nelson hoisted his flag on board the "Victory" at -Portsmouth, and on the 20th sailed for the Mediterranean, there to take -the chief command. - -Thus again, after a brief intermission, began the strife between -Great Britain and France, destined during its twelve years' course -to involve successively all the powers of Europe, from Portugal to -Russia, from Turkey to Sweden. On the land, state after state went -down before the great soldier who wielded the armies of France and the -auxiliary legions of subject countries, added to her standards by his -policy. Victory after victory graced his eagles, city after city and -province after province were embodied in his empire, peace after peace -was wrested from the conquered; but one enemy remained ever erect, -unsubdued, defiant; and on the ocean there was neither peace nor truce, -until the day when he himself fell under the hosts of foes, aroused by -his vain attempt to overthrow, through their sufferings, the power that -rested upon the seas. - -The debates in the House of Commons revealed an agreement of sentiment -unparalleled in the former war. Differences of opinion there were. A -very few thought that hostilities might even yet be averted, while -others argued bitterly that, had Bonaparte's first encroachments been -resisted, the nation might have been spared, if not war, at least -humiliation. But, while both groups condemned the administration, the -one for precipitation, the other for pusillanimous and protracted -submission, both agreed that just occasion for war had been given. As -usual, opposition took the form of an amendment to the address, which, -while carefully excluding any approval of the ministry, still "assured -his Majesty of our firm determination to co-operate with his Majesty -in calling forth the resources of the United Kingdom for the vigorous -prosecution of the war in which we are involved." The proposer, Mr. -Grey—one of the most strenuous opponents of the former war—was careful -to say that, though he objected to some points of the late negotiation, -he acknowledged the necessity of resisting the spirit of encroachment -shown by France. Even for this very qualified disapproval of a ministry -in whose capacity none had confidence, there could in this grave crisis -be found only 67 votes, against 398 who preferred not to weaken, by an -apparent discord, the unanimous voice. Having regard to the reasons -for their dissent urged by the various speakers, the result disposes -forever of the vain assertion that Great Britain feared to meet France -alone. The solemn decision was not taken blindfold nor in haste. The -exorbitant power of Bonaparte, the impossibility of allies, the burden -that must be borne, were all quoted and faced; and Mr. Pitt, who -then spoke for the first time in many months, while fully supporting -the war, warned the members in his stately periods of the arduous -struggle before them. "In giving their assurances he trusted that -other gentlemen felt impressed with the same sense which he did of -the awful importance of the engagement into which they were preparing -to enter; and that they considered those assurances, not as formal -words of ceremony or custom, but as a solemn and deliberate pledge, on -behalf of themselves and of the nation whom they represented,—knowing -and feeling to their full extent the real difficulties and dangers of -their situation, and being prepared to meet those difficulties and -dangers with every exertion and every sacrifice which the unexampled -circumstances of the times rendered indispensable for the public -safety.... The scale of our exertions could not be measured by those -of former times, or confined within the limits even of the great, and -till then unexampled, efforts of the last war."[89] - -In the same speech Pitt correctly and explicitly indicated the two -methods by which France might seek to subdue Great Britain. "If they -indulge themselves in any expectation of success in the present -contest, it is built chiefly on the supposition (1) that they can -either break the spirit and shake the determination of the country by -harassing us with perpetual apprehension of descent upon our coasts, or -(2) that they can impair our resources and undermine our credit, by the -effects of an expensive and protracted contest." Not to one only, but -to both of these means did Bonaparte resort, on a scale proportioned to -his comprehensive genius and his mighty resources. For the invasion of -England preparations were at once begun, so extensive and so thorough -as to indicate not a mere threat, but a fixed purpose; and at the -same time measures were taken to close to Great Britain the markets -of the Continent, as well as to harass her commerce by the ordinary -operations of maritime war. Trafalgar marked the term when all thought -of invasion disappeared, and was succeeded by the vast combinations of -the Continental System, itself but an expansion of the former measures -of exclusion. Framed to impair the resources and sap the credit of -Great Britain, this stupendous fabric, upheld, not by the cohesion of -its parts, but by the dextrous balancing of an ever watchful policy, -overtaxed the skill and strength of its designer, and crushed him in -its fall. - - - - -CHAPTER XV. - -THE TRAFALGAR CAMPAIGN TO THE SPANISH DECLARATION OF WAR. MAY, -1803—DECEMBER, 1804. - -PREPARATIONS FOR THE INVASION OF ENGLAND.—THE GREAT -FLOTILLA.—NAPOLEON'S MILITARY AND NAVAL COMBINATIONS AND BRITISH NAVAL -STRATEGY.—ESSENTIAL UNITY OF NAPOLEON'S PURPOSE.—CAUSES OF SPANISH WAR. - - -Although Great Britain and France had each, up to the last moment, -hoped to retain peace upon its own terms, preparations for war had gone -on rapidly ever since the king's message of March 8. Immediately upon -issuing this, couriers were dispatched to the various sea-ports, with -orders to impress seamen for the numerous ships hastily ordered into -commission. Some details have come down giving a vivid presentment of -that lawless proceeding known as a "hot press," at this period when it -was on the point of disappearing. "About 7 P. M. yesterday," says the -Plymouth report of March 10, "the town was alarmed with the marching -of several bodies of Royal Marines in parties of twelve or fourteen -each, with their officers and a naval officer, armed. So secret were -the orders kept that they did not know the nature of the service on -which they were going, until they boarded the tier of colliers at the -new quay, and other gangs the ships at Catwater, the Pool and the -gin-shops. A great number of prime seamen were taken out and sent -on board the admiral's ship. In other parts of the town, and in all -the receiving and gin-shops at Dock, several hundreds of seamen and -landsmen were picked up. By returns this morning it appears that -upwards of four hundred useful hands were pressed last night. One gang -entered the Dock theatre and cleared the whole gallery except the -women." Parties of seamen and marines were placed across all roads -leading out of the towns, to intercept fugitives. In Portsmouth the -colliers were stripped so clean of men that they could not put to -sea; while frigates and smaller vessels swept the Channel and other -sea-approaches to the kingdom, stopping all merchant ships, and taking -from them a part of their crews. The whole flotilla of trawl-boats -fishing off the Eddystone, forty in number, were searched, and two -hands taken from each. Six East India ships, wind-bound off Plymouth -on their outward voyage, were boarded by armed boats and robbed of -three hundred seamen, till then unaware that a rupture with France was -near.[90] - -Bonaparte on his side had been no less active, although he sought by -the secrecy of his movements to avert alarm and postpone, if possible, -the war which for his aims was premature. Orders were given that -re-enforcements for the colonies should go forward rapidly, ere peace -was broken. No ships-of-the-line or frigates should henceforth go with -them; and those already abroad were for the most part at once recalled. -Troops were concentrated on the coasts of Holland and Flanders; and -the flat-boats built in the last war with a view to invading England -were assembled quietly in the Scheldt and the Channel ports. Plans were -studied for the harassment of British commerce. On the 9th of April was -commanded the armament of the shores, from the Scheldt westward to the -Somme, a distance of one hundred and twenty miles, which afterwards -became, to use Marmont's vivid expression, "a coast of iron and -bronze." A few days later Elba and all the coasts and islands of France -were ordered fortified; and the first consul's aides-de-camp sped north -and east and west, to see and report the state of preparation in all -quarters. - -One affair of great importance still remained to arrange. The -smaller French islands in the East and West Indies could be held in -subjection by a moderate number of troops, who could also resist for a -considerable time any attempt of the British, unless on a very large -scale. This was not the case with Haïti or Louisiana. In the former -the French, reduced by the fever, were now shut up in a few sea-ports; -communication between which, being only by water, must cease when the -maritime war broke out. Between the blacks within and the British -without, the loss of the island was therefore certain. Louisiana -had not yet been occupied. Whatever its unknown possibilities, the -immediate value to France of this possession, so lately regained, was -as a source of supplies to Haïti, dependent for many essentials upon -the American continent. With the fall of the island the colony on the -mainland became useless. Its cession by Spain to France had at once -aroused the jealousy, with which, from colonial days, the people of -the United States have viewed any political interference by European -nations on the American continent, even when involving only a transfer -from one power to another. In the dire straits of the Revolution, when -the need of help from abroad was so great, they had been careful to -insert in the Treaty of Alliance with France an express stipulation, -that she would not acquire for herself any of the possessions of Great -Britain on the mainland; having then in view Canada and the Floridas. -This feeling was intensified when, as now, the change of ownership was -from a weak and inert state like Spain to one so powerful as France, -with the reputation for aggressiveness that was fast gathering around -the name of Bonaparte. - -The fear and anger of the American people increased with the reserve -shown by the French government, in replying to the questions of their -minister in Paris, who asked repeatedly, but in vain, for assurances -as to the navigation of the Mississippi; and the excitement reached -a climax when in November, 1802, news was received that the Spanish -authorities in New Orleans had refused to American citizens the right -of deposit, conceded by the treaty of 1795 with Spain. This was -naturally attributed to Bonaparte's influence, and the inhabitants of -the upper Mississippi valley were ready to resort to arms to enforce -their rights. - -Such was the threatening state of affairs in America, while war with -Great Britain was fast drawing on. Bonaparte was not the man to -recede before a mere menace of hostilities in the distant wilderness -of Louisiana; but it was plain that, in case of rupture with Great -Britain, any possessions of France on the Gulf of Mexico were sure to -fall either to her or to the Americans, if he incurred the enmity of -the latter. It was then believed in Washington that France had also -acquired from Spain the Floridas, which contained naval ports essential -to the defence of Louisiana. On the 12th of April, 1803, arrived in -Paris Mr. Monroe, sent by Jefferson as envoy extraordinary, to treat, -in conjunction with the regular minister to France, for the cession of -the Floridas and of the island of New Orleans to the United States; the -object of the latter being to secure the Mississippi down to its mouth -as their western boundary. Monroe's arrival was most opportune. Lord -Whitworth had five days before communicated the message of the British -cabinet that, unless the French government was prepared to enter into -the required explanations, relations of amity could not exist, and at -the same time the London papers were discussing a proposition to raise -fifty thousand men to take New Orleans.[91] Three days later, April -10, the first consul decided to sell Louisiana;[92] and Monroe upon -his arrival had only to settle the terms of the bargain, which did -not indeed realize the precise object of his mission, but which gave -to his country control of the west bank of the Mississippi throughout -its course, and of both banks from its mouth nearly to Baton Rouge, -a distance of over two hundred miles. The treaty, signed April 30, -1803, gave to the United States "the whole of Louisiana as Spain had -possessed it," for the sum of eighty million francs. Thus the fear of -Great Britain's sea power was the determining factor[93] to sweep the -vast region known as Louisiana, stretching from the Gulf toward Canada, -and from the Mississippi toward Mexico, with ill-defined boundaries in -either direction, into the hands of the United States, and started the -latter on that course of expansion to the westward which has brought -her to the shores of the Pacific. - -Having thus relinquished a position he could not defend, and, as far as -in him lay, secured the French possessions beyond the sea, Bonaparte -could now give his whole attention to the plans for subjugating the -British Islands which had long been ripening in his fertile brain. - -It was from the first evident that Great Britain, having in the -three kingdoms but fifteen million inhabitants, could not invade the -territory of France with its population of over twenty-five millions. -This was the more true because the demands of her navy, of her great -mercantile shipping, and of a manufacturing and industrial system not -only vast but complex, so that interference with parts would seriously -derange the whole, left for recruiting the British armies a fraction, -insignificant when compared with the resources in men of France; where -capital and manufactures, commerce and shipping, had disappeared, -leaving only an agricultural peasantry, upon which the conscription -could freely draw without materially increasing the poverty of the -country, or deranging a social system essentially simple. - -This seeming inability to injure France gave rise to the sarcastic -remark, that it was hardly worth while for a country to go to war -in order to show that it could put itself in a good posture for -defence. This, however, was a very superficial view of the matter. -Great Britain's avowed reason for war was the necessity—forced upon a -reluctant ministry and conceded by a bitter opposition—of resisting -encroachments by a neighboring state. Of these, on the Continent, part -had already occurred and were, for the time at least, irremediable; but -there had also been clearly revealed the purpose of continuing similar -encroachments, in regions whose tenure by an enemy would seriously -compromise her colonial empire. To prevent this, Great Britain, by -declaring war, regained her belligerent rights, and so resumed at -once that control of the sea which needed only them to complete. She -pushed her sway up to every point of her enemy's long coast-line; and -following the strategy of the previous war, under the administration -of the veteran seaman who had imparted to it such vigor, she prevented -her enemy from combining any great operation, by which her world-wide -dominion could be shaken or vital injury be inflicted at any point. -The British squadrons, hugging the French coasts and blocking the -French arsenals, were the first line of the defence, covering British -interests from the Baltic to Egypt, the British colonies in the four -quarters of the globe, and the British merchantmen which whitened every -sea. - -This was the defensive gain in a war whose motive was essentially -defensive. Offensively Great Britain, by the suddenness with which she -forced the issue, dealt a blow whose weight none understood better -than Bonaparte. That he meant war eventually is most probable. His -instructions to Decaen, Captain-General of the French East Indies, -dated January 15, 1803, speak of the possibility of war by September, -1804; but how little the bravado of Sébastiani's report indicated a -wish for an immediate rupture, is shown by the secret message sent to -Andréossy in London, on the very day Whitworth left Paris. Despite -the bluster about his willingness to see Great Britain on Montmartre -rather than in Malta, he then wrote: "Direct General Andréossy that -when he is assured the accompanying note has been communicated to -the English government, he cause it to be understood through Citizen -Schimmelpenninck _or by any other indirect means_, that if England -absolutely rejects the proposition of giving Malta to one of the -guaranteeing powers, we would not here be averse from accepting that -England should retain Malta for ten years, and France should occupy -the peninsula of Otranto. _It is important, if this proposition has no -chance of success, that no communication be made leaving any trace_; -and that we here may always be able to _deny that this government could -have adhered to this proposition_."[94] Bonaparte understood perfectly -that Great Britain, by forcing his hand, had struck down the French -navy before it had begun to rise. "Peace," he said, "is necessary to -restore a navy,—peace to fill our arsenals empty of material, and -peace because then only the one drill-ground for fleets, the sea, -is open." "Ships, colonies, commerce," the wants he avowed later at -Ulm, were swept away by the same blow. How distressed the finances -of France, how devoid of credit, none knew better than he, who then, -as throughout his rule, was engaged in keeping up the quotations by -government manipulation; and the chief of all sources of wealth, -maritime commerce, was crushed by the sea power of Great Britain, which -thenceforth coiled closely and with ever tightening compression round -the coasts of France. - -Bonaparte could not indeed realize the full extent of the injury that -would be done. Impatient of obstacles, he refused to see that the -construction of the flotilla to invade England would devour the scanty -material for ship-building, occupy all the workmen, and so stop the -growth of the real navy. Even when built, the ever-recurring demand -for repairs drained the dockyards of mechanics.[95] Nor could he -foresee how completely Great Britain, by reviving the Rule of 1756 in -all its rigor, and by replying to each blow from the land by one yet -heavier from the sea, would cut off the resources of France and destroy -her as a fortress falls by blockade. Unsparing ridicule has been heaped -upon Pitt for predicting the break-down of the French Revolution, in -its aggressive military character, by financial distress; but in fact -Pitt, though he underestimated the time necessary and did not look -for the vast system of spoliation which supplied the lack of regular -income, was a true prophet. The republic had already devoured an -immense capital;[96] and when the conquering spirit it ever displayed -reached its natural culmination in Bonaparte, the constantly recurring -need of money drove him on from violence to violence till it ended in -his ruin. This penury was caused directly by the maritime war, which -shut France off from commerce beyond the seas; and indirectly by the -general prostration of business in Europe and consequent poverty of -consumers, due to their isolation from the sea, enforced by Bonaparte -as the only means of wearing out Great Britain. - -In 1798, when the Peace of Campo Formio had left France face to face -with Great Britain alone, the question of invading the latter had -naturally arisen; but Bonaparte easily convinced himself and the -Directory that the attempt was impossible with any naval force that -could at that time be raised. He then pointed out that there were two -other principal ways of injuring the enemy: one by occupying Hanover -and Hamburg, through which British trade entered the Continent; the -other by seizing Egypt as a base of operations against India. These two -were somewhat of the nature of a flank attack; and the former being -in the then state of the Continent inexpedient,—for both Hamburg -and Hanover were included in the North German neutrality under the -guarantee of Prussia, while Austria was by no means so reduced as in -1803,—the expedition against Egypt was determined. Whatever personal -motives may then have influenced Bonaparte, that undertaking, from the -military point of view and in the then condition of the Mediterranean, -was well conceived; and, while allowing for a large amount of good -luck, the measure of success achieved must be ascribed to the -completeness and secrecy of his preparations, as the final failure must -to the sea power of Great Britain. - -In 1803 Bonaparte found himself no longer a simple general, under -a weak and jealous government upon whose co-operation he could not -certainly depend, but an absolute ruler wielding all the resources of -France. He resolved therefore to strike straight at the vital centre -of the British power, by a direct invasion of the British Islands. The -very greatness of the peril in crossing the Channel, and in leaving -it between him and his base, was not without a certain charm for his -adventurous temper; but, while willing to take many a risk for so great -an end, he left to chance nothing for which he himself could provide. -The plan for the invasion was marked by the comprehensiveness of view -and the minute attention to detail which distinguished his campaigns; -and the preparations were on a scale of entire adequacy, which he never -failed to observe when the power to do so was in his hands. - -For these in their grandeur, however, time was needed; but the first -consul was ready to move at once, as far as was possible to land -forces, upon the two flanks of the British position. On the 26th of May -a corps under General Mortier entered Hanover; while a few days later -another corps, under General St. Cyr, passed through the Papal States -into the kingdom of Naples, and resumed possession of the peninsula -of Otranto with the ports of Brindisi and Taranto. From the latter -the Ionian islands, the Morea, and Egypt, were all threatened; and the -position kept alive, as in the deep strategy of Napoleon it was meant -to do, the anxiety of Nelson concerning those points and the Levant -generally. Upon this distraction of the greatest British admiral, -justified as it was by the enemy's undoubted purposes in the eastern -Mediterranean, depended a decisive part of Bonaparte's combination -against Great Britain. - -In Hanover British trade was struck. This German electorate of George -III. bordered on both the Elbe and the Weser, in the lower part of -their course; by occupying it France controlled the two great rivers -and excluded from them all British goods. The act was censured as -infringing the neutrality of Germany. Bonaparte justified it by the -hostile character of the elector as king of Great Britain; but no -such plea could be advanced for the occupation of Cuxhaven, the port -of Hamburg, which lay on the Elbe outside Hanover. Triple offence was -given to Prussia. Her ambition to figure as the guardian of North -German neutrality was affronted, her particular wish to control Hanover -slighted, and her trade most injuriously affected. To the exclusion of -British goods Great Britain replied by blockading the mouths of the -rivers, suffering no ships to pass where her own were not allowed, and -holding Germany responsible for permitting a breach of its neutrality -injurious to herself. The commerce of Hamburg and Bremen was thus -stopped; and as they were the brokers who received and distributed the -manufactures of Prussia, the blow was felt throughout the kingdom. The -distress among the workmen was so wide-spread that the king had to -come to their relief, and many wealthy men lost half their incomes. In -addition to the advantages of position obtained in Hanover and Naples, -Napoleon threw on these two neutral states the charge of supporting -the corps quartered on them, amounting to some thirty thousand men in -Hanover and half that number in Naples. Holland, against which as the -ally of France[97] Great Britain also declared war, had to maintain -a somewhat larger force. By such expedients Bonaparte eased his own -finances at the expense of neutral or dependent countries; but he was -not therefore more beloved. - -To invade Great Britain there had first to be concentrated round a -chosen point the great armies required to insure success, and the -very large number of vessels needed to transport them. Other corps, -more or less numerous, destined to further the principal movement by -diversions in different directions, distracting the enemy's attention, -might embark at distant ports and sail independently of the main -body; but for the latter it was necessary to start together and land -simultaneously, in mass, at a given point of the English coast. To this -principal effort Bonaparte destined one hundred and thirty thousand -men; of whom one hundred thousand should form the first line and -embark at the same hour from four different ports, which lay within a -length of twenty miles on the Channel coast. The other thirty thousand -constituted the reserve, and were to sail shortly after the first. - -To carry any such force at once, in ordinary sea-going vessels of that -day, was impracticable. The requisite number could not be had, and -there was no French Channel port where they could safely lie. Even were -these difficulties overcome, and the troops embarked together, the mere -process of getting under way would entail endless delays, the vessels -dependent upon sail could not keep together, and the only conditions -of wind under which they could move at all would expose them to be -scattered and destroyed by the British navy, which would have the same -power of motion, and to which Bonaparte could oppose no equal force. -The very gathering of so many helpless sailing transports would betray -the place where the French navy must concentrate, and where therefore -the hostile ships would assemble at the first indication of a combined -movement. Finally, such transports must anchor at some distance from -the British coast and the troops land from them in boats, an additional -operation both troublesome and dangerous. - -For these reasons the crossing must be made in vessels not dependent -upon sail alone, but capable of being moved by oars. They must -therefore be small and of very light draught, which would allow them -to shelter in the shallow French harbors and be beached upon reaching -the English coast, so that the troops could land directly from them. It -was possible that a number of such vessels once started, and favored -by fog or calm, might pass unseen, or even in defiance of the enemy's -ships-of-war, lying helpless to attack through want of wind. It was -upon this possibility that Bonaparte sought to fix the attention of the -British government. As the occupation of Taranto and the movements in -Italy were designed to divert Nelson's attention to the Levant, so the -ostentatious preparation of the great flotilla to pass unsupported was -meant to conceal the real purpose of supporting it. To concentrate the -apprehensions of the British authorities upon the flotilla, to draw -their eyes away from the naval ports in which lay the French squadrons, -and then to unite the latter in the Channel, controlling it for a -measurable time by a great fleet, was the grand combination by which -Bonaparte hoped to insure the triumphant crossing of the army and the -conquest of England. He kept it, however, in his own breast; a profound -secret only gradually revealed to the very few men intrusted with its -execution. - -To create and organize the flotilla and the army of invasion was -the first task. Preparations so extensive and rapid demanded all the -resources of France. To build at the same time the thousand and more -of boats, each of which should carry from sixty to a hundred soldiers, -besides from two to four heavy cannon for its own defence, overpassed -the powers of any single port. Far in the interior of France, on the -banks of the numerous streams running toward the Channel and the Bay of -Biscay, as well as in all the little coast harbors themselves, hosts of -men were busily working. The North Sea and Holland were also required -to furnish their quota. At the same time measures were taken to -facilitate their passage in safety to the point of concentration, which -was fixed at Boulogne, and to harbor them commodiously upon arrival. -They could from their light draught run close along shore, and from -their construction be beached without harm. Within easy gunshot of the -coast, therefore, lay the road they followed in their passages, which -were commonly made in bodies of thirty to sixty, and from port to port, -till the journey's end. To support the movements, sea-coast batteries -were established at short intervals; under which, if hard pressed, they -could take refuge. In addition there were organized in each maritime -district batteries of field artillery, which stood ready to drive at -once to the scene of action in case the enemy attacked. "One field-gun -to every league of coast is the least allowance," wrote Bonaparte. -In the early months of the war great importance was attached by the -British to harassing these voyages and impeding the concentration, but -the attempt was soon abandoned. The boats, if endangered, anchored -under the nearest guns, infantry and horse-artillery summoned by the -coast-telegraph hurried to the scene, and the enemy's vessels soon -found the combined resistance too strong. Ordinarily, indeed, the -coastwise movement of a division of the flotilla was a concerted -operation, in which all the arms, afloat and ashore, assisted. In -extreme cases the vessels were beached, and British seamen fought hand -to hand with French soldiers for possession; rarely, however, with -success. "The cause of our flotilla not having succeeded in destroying -the gun-vessels of the enemy," wrote Lord St. Vincent, "did not arise -from their draught of water, but from the powerful batteries on the -coast." The concentration, though accomplished less swiftly than -Bonaparte's eagerness demanded, was little impeded by the British. - -The port of Boulogne, near the eastern end of the English Channel, lies -on a strip of coast which runs due south from the Straits of Dover to -the mouth of the Somme, a distance of about fifty miles. It is a tidal -harbor, the mouth of a little river called the Liane, on the north side -of which the town is built. In it even boats of small draught then -lay aground at low water; and its capacity at high water was limited. -Extensive excavations were therefore ordered to be made by the soldiers -encamped in the neighborhood, who received extra wages for the work. -When finished, the port presented a double basin; the outer, oblong, -bordering the river bed on either side of the channel, which was left -clear; the inner of semi-circular form, dug out of the flats opposite -the town and connected with the former by a narrow passage. Both were -lined with quays, alongside which the vessels of the flotilla lay -in tiers, sometimes nine deep; and in July, 1805, when the hour for -the last and greatest of Napoleon's naval combinations was at hand, -and Trafalgar itself in the near distance, Boulogne sheltered over a -thousand gunboats and transports ready to carry forty thousand men to -the shores of England. North and south, not only the neighborhood of -the harbor but the whole coast bristled with cannon; and opposite the -entrance rose a powerful work, built upon piles, to protect the vessels -when going out and also when anchored outside. For here was one of the -great difficulties of the undertaking. So many boats could not pass -out through the narrow channel during one high water. Two tides at -the least, that is, twenty-four hours, were needed, granting the most -perfect organization and most accurate movement. Half of the flotilla -therefore must lie outside for some hours; and it was not to be -expected that the British cruisers would allow so critical a moment to -pass unimproved, unless deterred by the protection which the foresight -of Bonaparte had provided. - -North of Boulogne and within five miles of it were two other much -smaller harbors, likewise tidal, called Vimereux and Ambleteuse; and -to the south, twelve miles distant, a third, named Étaples. Though -insignificant, the impossibility of enlarging Boulogne to hold the -whole flotilla compelled Bonaparte to develop these, and they together -held some seven hundred more gun-vessels and transports. From the -three, sixty-two thousand soldiers were to embark; and from each of -the four ports a due proportion of field artillery, ammunition and -other supplies were to go forward. Some six thousand horses were also -to be transported; but the greater part of the cavalry took only their -saddles and bridles, looking to find mounts in the enemy's country. In -the North Sea ports, Calais, Dunkirk, and Ostend, the flotilla numbered -four hundred, the troops twenty-seven thousand, the horses twenty-five -hundred. These formed the reserve, to follow the main body closely, but -apart from it. In the end they also were moved to the Boulogne coast; -and their boats, after some sharp fighting with British cruisers, -joined the main flotilla in the four Channel ports. - -To handle such a mass of men upon the battle-field is a faculty to -which few generals, after years of experience, attain. To effect the -passage of a broad river with an army of that size, before a watchful -enemy of equal force, is a delicate operation. To cross an arm of -the sea nearly forty miles wide—for such was the distance separating -Boulogne and its sister ports from the intended place of landing, -between Dover and Hastings—in the face of a foe whose control of the -sea was for the most part undisputed, was an undertaking so bold that -men still doubt whether Napoleon meant it; but he assuredly did. For -success he looked to the perfect organization and drill of the army -and the flotilla, which by practice in embarking and moving should -be able to seize, without an hour's delay, the favorable moment he -hoped to provide by the great naval combination concealed in his -brain. This combination, modified and expanded as the months rolled -by, but remaining essentially the same, was the germ whence sprang -the intricate and stirring events recorded in this and the following -chapters,—events obscured to most men by the dazzling lustre of -Trafalgar. - - [Between the penning and the publishing of this very positive - assertion of the author's convictions, he has met renewed - expressions of doubts as to Napoleon's purpose, based upon his - words to Metternich in 1810,[98] as well as upon the opinions - of persons more or less closely connected with the emperor. As - regards the incident recorded by Metternich—it is not merely - an easy way of overcoming a difficulty, but the statement of - a simple fact, to say that no reliance can be placed upon any - avowal of Napoleon's as to his intentions, unless corroborated - by circumstances. That the position at Boulogne was well chosen - for turning his arms against Austria at a moment's notice, is - very true; but it is likewise true that, barring the power of the - British navy, it was equally favorable to an invasion of England. - What then does this amount to, but that the great captain, as - always in his career, met a strategic exigency arising from the - existence of two dangers in divergent directions, by taking a - central position, whence he could readily turn his arms against - either before the other came up? - - The considerations that to the author possess irresistible force - are: (1) that Napoleon actually did undertake the almost equally - hazardous expedition to Egypt; (2) that he saw, with his clear - intuition, that, if he did not accept the risk of being destroyed - with his army in crossing the Channel, Great Britain would in the - end overwhelm him by her sea power, and that therefore, extreme - as was the danger of destruction in one case, it was less than in - the other alternative,—an argument further developed in the later - portions of this work. (3) Inscrutable as are the real purposes - of so subtle a spirit, the author holds with Thiers and Lanfrey, - that it is impossible to rise from the perusal of Napoleon's - correspondence during these thirty months, without the conviction - that so sustained a deception as it would contain—on the - supposition that the invasion was not intended—would be impossible - even to him. It may also be remarked that the Memoirs of Marmont - and Ney, who commanded corps in the Army of Invasion, betray no - doubt of a purpose which the first explicitly asserts; nor does - the life of Marshal Davout, another corps commander, record any - such impression on his part.[99]] - -[Illustration: North Atlantic Ocean.] - -Meanwhile that period of waiting from May, 1803, to August, 1805, when -the tangled net of naval and military movements began to unravel, was -a striking and wonderful pause in the world's history. On the heights -above Boulogne, and along the narrow strip of beach from Étaples to -Vimereux, were encamped one hundred and thirty thousand of the most -brilliant soldiery of all time, the soldiers who had fought in Germany, -Italy, and Egypt, soldiers who were yet to win, from Austria, Ulm and -Austerlitz, and from Prussia, Auerstadt and Jena, to hold their own, -though barely, at Eylau against the army of Russia, and to overthrow -it also, a few months later, on the bloody field of Friedland. -Growing daily more vigorous in the bracing sea air and the hardy life -laid out for them, they could on fine days, as they practised the -varied manœuvres which were to perfect the vast host in embarking and -disembarking with order and rapidity, see the white cliffs fringing the -only country that to the last defied their arms. Far away, Cornwallis -off Brest, Collingwood off Rochefort, Pellew off Ferrol, were battling -the wild gales of the Bay of Biscay, in that tremendous and sustained -vigilance which reached its utmost tension in the years preceding -Trafalgar, concerning which Collingwood wrote that admirals need to -be made of iron, but which was forced upon them by the unquestionable -and imminent danger of the country. Farther distant still, severed -apparently from all connection with the busy scene at Boulogne, Nelson -before Toulon was wearing away the last two years of his glorious -but suffering life, fighting the fierce north-westers of the Gulf of -Lyon and questioning, questioning continually with feverish anxiety, -whether Napoleon's object was Egypt again or Great Britain really. -They were dull, weary, eventless months, those months of watching and -waiting of the big ships before the French arsenals. Purposeless they -surely seemed to many, but they saved England. The world has never -seen a more impressive demonstration of the influence of sea power -upon its history. Those far distant, storm-beaten ships, upon which -the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the -world. Holding the interior positions they did, before—and therefore -between—the chief dockyards and detachments of the French navy, the -latter could unite only by a concurrence of successful evasions, of -which the failure of any one nullified the result. Linked together as -the various British fleets were by chains of smaller vessels, chance -alone could secure Bonaparte's great combination, which depended -upon the covert concentration of several detachments upon a point -practically within the enemy's lines. Thus, while bodily present before -Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon, strategically the British squadrons lay -in the Straits of Dover barring the way against the Army of Invasion. - -The Straits themselves, of course, were not without their own special -protection. Both they and their approaches, in the broadest sense of -the term, from the Texel to the Channel Islands, were patrolled by -numerous frigates and smaller vessels, from one hundred to a hundred -and fifty in all. These not only watched diligently all that happened -in the hostile harbors and sought to impede the movements of the -flat-boats, but also kept touch with and maintained communication -between the detachments of ships-of-the-line. Of the latter, five -off the Texel watched the Dutch navy, while others were anchored off -points of the English coast with reference to probable movements of the -enemy. Lord St. Vincent, whose ideas on naval strategy were clear and -sound, though he did not use the technical terms of the art, discerned -and provided against the very purpose entertained by Bonaparte, of a -concentration before Boulogne by ships drawn from the Atlantic and -Mediterranean. The best security, the most advantageous strategic -positions, were doubtless those before the enemy's ports; and never in -the history of blockades has there been excelled, if ever equalled, -the close locking of Brest by Admiral Cornwallis, both winter and -summer, between the outbreak of war and the battle of Trafalgar. It -excited not only the admiration but the wonder of contemporaries.[100] -In case, however, the French at Brest got out, so the prime minister -of the day informed the speaker of the House, Cornwallis's rendezvous -was off the Lizard (due north of Brest), so as to go for _Ireland, or -follow the French up Channel_, if they took either direction. _Should -the French run for the Downs_, the five sail-of-the-line at Spithead -would also follow them; and Lord Keith (in the Downs) would in addition -to his six, and six block ships, have also the North Sea fleet at his -command.[101] Thus provision was made, in case of danger, for the -outlying detachments to fall back on the strategic centre, gradually -accumulating strength, till they formed a body of from twenty-five to -thirty heavy and disciplined ships-of-the-line, sufficient to meet all -probable contingencies. - -Hence, neither the Admiralty nor British naval officers in general -shared the fears of the country concerning the peril from the flotilla. -"Our first defence," wrote Nelson in 1801, "is close to the enemy's -ports; and the Admiralty have taken such precautions, by having such -a respectable force under my orders, that I venture to express a -well-grounded hope that the enemy would be annihilated before they get -ten miles from their own shores."[102] "As to the possibility of the -enemy being able in a narrow sea to pass through our blockading and -protecting squadron," said Pellew, "with all the secrecy and dexterity -and by those hidden means that some worthy people expect, I really, -from anything I have seen in the course of my professional experience, -am not much disposed to concur in it."[103] Napoleon also understood -that his gunboats could not at sea contend against heavy ships with -any founded hope of success. "A discussion was started in the camp," -says Marmont, "as to the possibility of fighting ships of war with -flat boats, armed with 24- and 36-pounders, and as to whether, with -a flotilla of several thousands, a squadron might be attacked. It -was sought to establish the belief in a possible success; ... but, -notwithstanding the confidence with which Bonaparte supported this -view, he never shared it for a moment."[104] He could not, without -belying every military conviction he ever held. Lord St. Vincent -therefore steadily refused to countenance the creation of a large force -of similar vessels on the plea of meeting them upon their own terms. -"Our great reliance," he wrote, "is on the vigilance and activity of -our cruisers at sea, any reduction in the number of which, by applying -them to guard our ports, inlets, and beaches, would in my judgment -tend to our destruction." He knew also that gunboats, if built, could -only be manned, as the French flotilla was, by crippling the crews of -the cruising ships; for, extensive as were Great Britain's maritime -resources, they were taxed beyond their power by the exhausting demands -of her navy and merchant shipping. - -It is true there existed an enrolled organization called the Sea -Fencibles, composed of men whose pursuits were about the water on -the coasts and rivers of the United Kingdom; men who in the last war -had been exempted from impressment, because of the obligation they -took to turn out for the protection of the country when threatened -with invasion. When, however, invasion did threaten in 1801, not -even the stirring appeals of Nelson, to whom was then entrusted the -defence system, could bring them forward; although he assured them -their services were absolutely required, at the moment, and on board -the coast-defence vessels. Out of a total of 2600 in four districts -immediately menaced, only 385 were willing to enter into training or -go afloat. The others could not leave their occupations without loss, -and prayed that they might be held excused.[105] When the French were -actually on the sea, coming, they professed their readiness to fly on -board; so, wrote Nelson, we must "trust to our ships being manned at -the last moment by this (almost) scrambling manner." In the present -war, therefore, St. Vincent resisted the re-establishment of the corps -until the impress had manned the ships first commissioned, and even -then yielded only to the pressure in the cabinet. "It was an item in -the estimates," he said with rough humor, "of no other use than to -calm the fears of the old ladies, both in and out." It was upon his -former system of close watching the enemy's ports that he relied for -the mastery of the Channel, without which Bonaparte's flotilla dared -not leave the French coast. "This boat business," as Nelson had said, -"may be a part of a great plan of invasion; it can never be the only -one."[106] The event did not deceive them. - -In one very important particular, however, St. Vincent had seriously -imperilled the success of his general policy. Feeling deeply the -corruption prevailing in the dockyard and contract systems of that -day, as soon as he came to the head of the Admiralty he entered upon a -struggle with them, in which he showed both the singleness of purpose -and the harshness of his character. Peace, by reducing the dependence -of the country upon its naval establishments, favored his designs of -reform; and he was consequently unwilling to recognize the signs of -renewing strife, or to postpone changes which, however desirable, -must inevitably introduce friction and delay under the press of war. -Hence, in the second year of this war, Great Britain had in commission -ten fewer line-of-battle-ships than at the same period of the former. -"Many old and useful officers and a vast number of artificers had been -discharged from the king's dockyards; the customary supplies of timber -and other important articles of naval stores had been omitted to be -kept up; and some articles, including a large portion of hemp, had -actually been sold out of the service. A deficiency of workmen and of -materials produced, of course, a suspension in the routine of dockyard -business. New ships could not be built; nor could old ones be repaired. -Many of the ships in commission, too, having been merely patched up, -were scarcely in a state to keep the sea."[107] On this point St. -Vincent was vulnerable to the attack made upon his administration by -Pitt in March, 1804; but as regarded Pitt's main criticism, the refusal -to expend money and seamen upon gunboats, he was entirely right, and -his view of the question was that of a statesman and of a man of -correct military instincts.[108] Nor, after his experience with the -Sea Fencibles, can he be blamed for not sharing Pitt's emotion over "a -number of gallant and good old men, coming forward with the zeal and -spirit of lads swearing allegiance to the king," &c.[109] - -These ill-timed changes affected most injuriously that very station—the -Mediterranean—upon which hinged Bonaparte's projected combination. Out -of the insufficient numbers, the heaviest squadrons and most seaworthy -ships were naturally and properly massed upon the Channel and Biscay -coasts. "I know," said Sir Edward Pellew, speaking of his personal -experience in command of a squadron of six of the line off Ferrol, "I -know and can assert with confidence that our navy was never better -found, that it was never better supplied and that our men were never -better fed or better clothed;"[110] and the condition of the ships -was proved not only by the tenacity with which Pellew and his chief, -Cornwallis, kept their stations, but by the fact that in the furious -winter gales little damage was received. But at the same time Nelson -was complaining bitterly that his ships were not seaworthy, that they -were shamefully equipped, and destitute of the most necessary stores; -while St. Vincent was writing to him, "We can send you neither ships -nor men, and with the resources of your mind, you will do without them -very well."[111] "Bravo, my lord!" said Nelson, ironically; "but," he -wrote a month later, "I do not believe Lord St. Vincent would have kept -the sea with such ships;"[112] and again, naming seven out of the ten -under his command, "These are certainly among the very finest ships in -our service, the best commanded and the very best manned, yet I wish -them safe in England and that I had ships not half so well manned in -their room; for it is not a store-ship a week that would keep them in -repair."[113] - -Such weakness interfered seriously with the close watch of Toulon, in -face of the furious weather for which the Gulf of Lyon is noted; yet, -from the strategic conditions of the Mediterranean, in no station was -it more important to get the earliest news of an enemy's sailing and -to keep constant touch with him. With the Straits of Gibraltar at one -end, involving in case of escape several different possibilities, and -with Egypt fifteen hundred miles away at the other, the most sagacious -admiral might be misled as to the destination of a French squadron, -if once lost to sight. Upon this difficulty Bonaparte framed his -combination. In his first purpose the Toulon fleet was to be raised -to ten sail-of-the-line, and at the fitting moment was to sail with -a north-west wind, steering a course which, if seen by any British -lookout, would indicate an intention of going eastward. To strengthen -this presumption, General St. Cyr at Taranto was ordered to raise -batteries to shelter a fleet of ten sail, and to prepare half a million -rations; while the Minister of War was instructed that an extraordinary -operation in that direction was contemplated about the 20th of -November.[114] Simultaneously, twenty ships-of-the-line carrying twenty -thousand troops were to be ready in Brest for a descent upon Ireland, -and to be maintained in a state of readiness for instant sailing. -This would conduce to keep Cornwallis close to Brest and away from the -approaches to the Channel. The Toulon fleet, after losing sight of the -British, was to haul up for the Straits, be joined off Cadiz or Lisbon -by a squadron from Rochefort, raising its force to fifteen or sixteen -sail-of-the-line, and thence, passing midway between Ushant and the -Scilly islands, come about the middle of February off Boulogne; were -the first consul expected then to be ready for crossing with his one -hundred and thirty thousand men. - -For the Toulon fleet, as the pivot on which all turned, Bonaparte -selected his boldest admiral, Latouche Tréville, and fixed the middle -of January, 1804, as the time of sailing. All the French authorities -were scrupulously deceived, except the admiral himself, the Minister -of Marine, and the maritime prefect at Toulon, Ganteaume, who had -divined the secret.[115] The orders to the latter, ostentatiously -confidential to deceive the office clerks, announced Martinique as -the real destination, but enjoined him to tell the general commanding -the troops that the squadron was going to the Morea, touching at -Taranto. At the same time staff-officers were sent to notify St. Cyr -that re-enforcements, which would raise his force to thirty thousand -men, were coming not only from Toulon but from other ports; and troops -throughout northern Italy began to move toward the sea-board. - -It is not wonderful that Nelson was misled by such an elaborate scheme -of deception. To this day men doubt whether Bonaparte seriously -meant to invade England, and naval men then realized too keenly the -dangers of the undertaking not to suspect a feint in it. Under all -the conditions of the problem, Egypt and the Straits were equally -probable solutions, and Egypt was not the only possible objective -east of Toulon. Sicily and Sardinia, the Ionian Islands and the -Morea, were coveted by Bonaparte; both as forwarding his control of -the Mediterranean and as measurable advances towards Egypt and the -Levant, traditional objects of French ambition. Nelson also suspected -a secret understanding between France and Russia to divide the Turkish -Empire;[116] a suspicion justified in the past by Bonaparte's actions -and to be vindicated in the future by the agreements of Tilsit. -The perplexities of the British admiral were therefore simply the -inevitable uncertainties of the defence, the part assumed perforce by -the British Empire at large in this war. He had to provide against -widely divergent contingencies; and the question is not how far he -guessed[117] the inscrutable purposes of Bonaparte, but how well he -took measures for meeting either fortune. - -Let it, however, be remarked in passing, that the great merit of St. -Vincent's strategy was that it minimized the evil resulting from a -single admiral's mis-step. To the success of the French scheme it was -necessary that, not only one but, all their detached efforts should -succeed. The strength of the British strategy lay not in hermetically -sealing any one port, but in effectually preventing a great combination -from all the ports. It was essential to Bonaparte not merely that his -scattered squadrons should, one at one time and another at another, -escape to sea, but that they should do so at periods so ordered, and -by routes so determined, as to insure a rapid concentration at a -particular point. Against this the British provided by the old and -sound usage of interior positions and lines. This advantage Bonaparte -recognized, and sought to overthrow by inducing them to diverging -operations—toward the Levant on one flank, toward Ireland on the other. -Both diverted from Boulogne. - -To return to Nelson. During the first six months of his command he -believed that the Toulon fleet was bound out of the Mediterranean;[118] -and indeed, despite Bonaparte's wiles and the opinions of most of his -own friends, he continually reverted to that conviction up to the final -escape of Villeneuve. He could not, however, on the ground of his own -intuitions resist the facts reported to him. On December 12, 1803, he -writes: "Who shall say where they are bound? My opinion is, certainly, -out of the Mediterranean."[119] Again, January 16, 1804: "It is -difficult to say what may be the destination of the Toulon fleet, Egypt -or Ireland. I rather lean to the latter."[120] A week later, January -23, the effect of Bonaparte's feints begins to show: "Information just -received leads me to believe the French fleet is about to put to sea -bound to the eastward toward Naples and Sicily."[121] February 10: -"The French have thirty thousand men ready to embark from Marseilles -and Nice, and I am led to believe the Ferrol ships will push for the -Mediterranean. Egypt is Bonaparte's object."[122] - -Against either contingency his course is perfectly clear,—never -to lose touch of the Toulon fleet. "My eyes are constantly fixed -on Toulon,"[123] he says. "I will not lose sight of the Toulon -fleet."[124] "It is of the utmost importance," he writes to his lookout -frigates, "that the enemy's squadron in Toulon should be most strictly -watched, and that I should be made acquainted with their sailing and -route with all dispatch."[125] But here the inadequacy of St. Vincent's -navy told heavily; and to that, not to Nelson, must be attributed the -mis-steps of the later campaign. "My crazy fleet," he writes. "If I -am to watch the French I must be at sea, and if at sea must have bad -weather; and if the ships are not fit to stand bad weather they are -useless."[126] "I know no way of watching the enemy but to be at sea," -he tells St. Vincent himself, "and therefore good ships are necessary." -Under such conditions, with "terrible weather," in winter, not four -fine days in six weeks, and even in summer having a hard gale every -week,[127] it was impossible to keep his rickety ships close up against -Toulon, as Cornwallis kept against Brest. "I make it a rule not to -contend with the north-westers," he said. "Going off large or furling -all sail we escape damage by the constant care of the captains;" and he -not unjustly claimed equal credit with Cornwallis, in that with such -a fleet, to which nothing was sent, he kept the sea ten consecutive -months, "not a ship refitted in any way, except what was done at -sea."[128] - -Though desirable for the battle-ships themselves to be near Toulon, it -would have been possible, in so narrow a sea, to dispense with that by -taking a central position, and keeping touch with the enemy by numerous -frigates; but here also the deficiencies of the navy interfered. -Among the Maddalena Islands, at the north end of Sardinia, was found -an admirable central anchorage, well sheltered, and having eastern -and western exits by which it could be left at a moment's notice in -all winds. Here the fleet could safely lie, ready for instant action, -within striking distance of any route taken by the enemy, and sure to -be found by lookout ships bringing tidings. Thither, therefore, as the -direction most favorable for intercepting the French,[129] Nelson went -in January, 1804, when informed they were about to sail; but he wrote: -"I am kept in great distress for frigates and smaller vessels at this -critical moment. I want ten more than I have, in order to watch that -the French should not escape me."[130] This but summed up the constant -worry of those anxious two years,[131] as it does also the results of -recent experience in the annual manœuvres of European navies. Under -such circumstances all depends upon the position taken by the main body -and the number of scouts it can throw out. Properly, these should move -in couples; one of which can carry information, while its consort keeps -touch of the enemy till it meets another of the lookouts scattered on -their different radii of action. - -The situation of Nelson in the Mediterranean, the character of his -anxieties, and the condition of his ships have been given in some -detail, because upon the opposing Mediterranean fleets turns the chief -strategic interest of the intended invasion of England and of the -campaign which issued in Trafalgar. Lord St. Vincent left office with -the Addington Ministry in May, 1804, and under the energetic rule of -his successor, who threw his administrative system to the winds, the -condition of Nelson's fleet was somewhat bettered; but the change came -too late to remedy it altogether. - -Various events meanwhile concurred to postpone the execution of -Bonaparte's project and so to prolong the watch of the British admiral. -The Boulogne flotilla itself was not as forward as had been expected; -but the drain made by it upon the French arsenals, for workmen and -materials, was a greater cause of delay, by retarding the equipment -of the ships meant to cover the crossing. In December only seven of -the line were ready in Toulon.[132] In the spring of 1804, the first -consul's attention was absorbed by the royalist plot, which led to the -arrest of Pichegru and Moreau, to the seizure of the Duc d'Enghien -on German soil and to his execution at Vincennes in March. This last -event had diplomatic consequences, in the attitude taken by Russia and -Prussia, which still farther engrossed him; and the invasion of Great -Britain was thus by successive delays put off to the summer of 1804. -On May 25, Napoleon, who had assumed the imperial title on the 18th -of that month, writes to Latouche[133] that on the ocean side all was -prepared, that the project was only postponed, not abandoned, and asks -if he will be ready by July. July 2 he writes again,[134] anticipating -his sailing from Toulon by the first of August, instructs him to pick -up at Cadiz one French ship-of-the-line which had taken refuge there, -thence to go to Rochefort, and finally to reach Boulogne, according to -the first plan, by passing through the Channel; or, if necessary, by -going north of the British islands. In all passages from port to port -he was to keep far out to sea to avoid detection. "Let us," he adds, -"be masters of the Strait for six hours and we shall be masters of the -world." On the 2d of August, however, Napoleon postpones the invasion -for some weeks, because some divisions of the flotilla had not yet -joined; and on the 20th of that month Latouche Tréville died. - -This loss was serious, as there was not among the surviving French -admirals any who had shown himself fit for so important a task, except -perhaps Bruix. He, being already definitely associated with the -flotilla, could not well be displaced; and his health, moreover, was -very bad, so that he also died the following March. Of two others who -might possibly prove equal to high command, Rosily and Villeneuve, -Napoleon, after some hesitation and with much mistrust, chose the -latter. "All naval expeditions undertaken since I have been at the head -of the government," said he, "have always failed, because the admirals -see double, and have learned—where, I do not know—_that war can be -made without running risks_."[135] From this simple and undeniable -standpoint no choice more unfortunate than Villeneuve could have been -made. Accomplished, brave, and skilful, he saw the defects of the -French navy with a clearness which absolutely sapped his power to take -risks. Although capable of the utmost self-devotion, he was unable to -devote his command as the forlorn hope upon which might follow a great -achievement. - -Doubting Villeneuve's resolution, Napoleon now changed the details of -his combination; giving to the Toulon fleet the inferior rôle of a -diversion, instead of the great part of covering the flotilla at the -chief centre of strategic action. The Brest fleet, during the life of -Latouche Tréville, had been destined to tie Cornwallis to the French -coast by the passive service of a mere demonstration. It was now given -the principal part. Its admiral, Ganteaume, had in 1801 been blamed for -not relieving Egypt; but Napoleon still felt for him the partiality -of close personal association, and knew him to be an able officer. In -the new plan, therefore, the Irish expedition passed definitively from -a demonstration to a resolve. To it were assigned eighteen thousand -troops under Marshal Augereau. Embarking them, Ganteaume should sail -with a fleet of twenty ships-of-the-line, pass far out into the -Atlantic to baffle pursuit, and then head for the north of Ireland -as though coming from Newfoundland. Having landed the soldiers, for -which only thirty-six hours were allowed, the fleet should sail for -the straits of Dover, either by the English Channel or by the north of -Scotland, according to the winds. Arriving near its destination two -courses were open, the choice between which would again depend on the -wind. Either the Grand Army at Boulogne would cross at once to England, -or a corps of twenty-five thousand assembled in Holland under General -Marmont, would sail under Ganteaume's convoy for Ireland. "With only -eighteen thousand men in Ireland," wrote Napoleon, "we would run great -risks; but whether they be increased to forty thousand, or I myself be -in England and eighteen thousand in Ireland, the gain of the war will -be ours."[136] - -The Toulon and Rochefort squadrons were to favor these operations -by a powerful diversion. They were to sail separately for the West -Indies, the former numbering twelve of the line and the latter five. -Upon reaching the Atlantic two of the Toulon ships were to be directed -against St. Helena, which they were to seize and then cruise in its -neighborhood for three months against British commerce. The rest of -the division, carrying four thousand troops, was to retake Dutch -Guiana and re-enforce San Domingo,[137] if possible. The Rochefort -division, lately commanded by Villeneuve, but now by Missiessy, was -to seize the islands Santa Lucia and Dominica, re-enforce Martinique -and Guadaloupe and then join Villeneuve. Thus combined, all would -return to Europe, appear before Ferrol, releasing five French ships -which were there blockaded, and finally anchor at Rochefort. "Thus -attacked simultaneously in Asia, Africa, and America," wrote Napoleon, -"the English, long accustomed not to suffer from the war, will by -these successive shocks to their commerce feel the evidence of their -weakness. I think that the sailing of these twenty ships-of-the-line -will oblige them to dispatch over thirty in pursuit."[138] Villeneuve -was to sail by October 12, and Missiessy before November 1. The Irish -expedition should await the departure of the others, but it was hoped -might get away before November 23. - -This second combination was more vast, more complicated and therefore -much more difficult than the first. It is interesting chiefly as -indicating the transition in the emperor's mind, from the comparatively -simple scheme laid down for Latouche Tréville to the grandiose -conception which ended in Trafalgar and claimed Villeneuve as its -victim. The course of events, mightier than the wills of sovereigns, -now intervened to change again Napoleon's purpose and restore to the -Toulon fleet the central part in the great drama. In December, 1804, -formal war broke out between Great Britain and Spain. - -Spain since 1796 had been in defensive and offensive alliance with -France. By the treaty of San Ildefonso, then signed, she had bound -herself to furnish, upon the simple demand of the French government, -fifteen ships-of-the-line to re-enforce the French navy, as well -as a specified body of troops. Holland also had entered into a -similar covenant "forever" against Great Britain. At the outbreak of -hostilities, therefore, Bonaparte found on either flank a maritime -state formally obliged to aid him, whatever its present wish. Holland, -a small flat country near at hand, was easily dominated by his army. -It was rich, had a valid government and energetic people; and its -position admirably seconded his schemes against Great Britain. It -therefore suited him to have the Batavian republic join in the war. -Spain, on the contrary, being extensive and rugged, was with difficulty -controlled by an armed force, as Napoleon afterwards learned to his -cost. It was remote from the centre of his power and from the intended -operations; while effective military support could not be had from its -government, feeble to disorganization, nor from its people, indolent -and jealous of foreigners. One thing only was left to Spain of her -former greatness,—the silver poured into her treasury from her colonies. - -Bonaparte therefore decided to allow the neutrality of Spain, and to -relinquish the stipulated aid in kind, upon condition of receiving an -equivalent in money. This he fixed at six million francs per month, -or about fourteen million dollars annually. Spain protested earnestly -against the amount, but the first consul was inexorable. He required -also that all levies of troops should cease, any land forces sent -into the provinces adjoining France, since September, 1801, should -be withdrawn, and the Spanish navy reorganized. Further, he demanded -that five French ships-of-the-line then in Ferrol, where they had -taken refuge from the British navy in July, 1803, when returning from -Haïti, should be by Spain repaired and got ready for sea. "Spain," said -Bonaparte, "has three alternatives: 1, she may declare war against -England; 2, she may pay the specified subsidy; 3, war will be declared -by France against Spain."[139] - -When war began, the British minister at Madrid was instructed to ask -if Spain intended to furnish France the ships promised by the treaty. -If the answer was yes, he was to express no opinion, but say that any -excess over the stipulations would be regarded as a declaration of war. -Later, when it became known that Spain had signed a convention[140] -stipulating the payment of subsidies to France, the ministry took -the ground that this was a just cause of war, whenever Great Britain -chose so to consider it; though for the time she might pass it over. -"You will explain distinctly," ran the ambassador's instructions, -dated November 24, 1803, "that his Majesty can only be induced to -abstain from immediate hostilities in consequence of such a measure, -upon the consideration that it is a temporary expedient, ... and that -his Majesty must be at liberty to consider a perseverance in the -system of furnishing succors to France as, at any future period, when -circumstances may render it necessary, a just cause of war."[141] "I am -expressly enjoined to declare," wrote the British ambassador, in making -this communication, "that such payments are a war subsidy, a succor -the most efficacious, the best adapted to the wants and situation -of the enemy, the most prejudicial to the interests of his Britannic -Majesty's subjects, and the most dangerous to his dominions; in fine, -more than equivalent to every other species of aggression."[142] -Repeated inquiries failed to draw from the Spanish government any -official statement of the terms of its bargain, either as to the -amount of the subsidy, the period during which it should continue, or -other conditions of the agreement.[143] Such communication the French -ambassador positively over-ruled.[144] - -Warning was therefore early given[145] that a condition essential to -postponement of action by Great Britain was the suspension of all -further arming in Spanish ports. This was repeated in the most formal -terms, and as an ultimatum, a few weeks later, on the 18th of February, -1804. "I am ordered to declare to you that the system of forbearance -on the part of England absolutely depends on the cessation of every -naval armament, and I am expressly forbidden to prolong my residence -here, if unfortunately this condition should be rejected."[146] It -was alleged and was incontrovertibly true, that, while Spain was so -evidently under Bonaparte's influence, armaments in her ports as -effectively necessitated watching, and so as greatly added to Great -Britain's burdens, as if war actually existed.[147] Another complaint -was that prizes made by French privateers were, by process of law, -condemned and sold in Spanish ports.[148] The same was doubtless -allowed to Great Britain; but in the strict blockade of the ports of -France the latter here derived a great benefit, while upon her enemy -was simply imposed an additional burden in scouring all the Spanish -coast, as though actually at war, in order to recapture inward-bound -prizes. Once condemned, the prize goods found their way to the French -ports by Spanish coasters. Independent of the difficulty of identifying -the property, the small size of these neutral carriers made seizure -inexpedient; for the costs of condemnation were greater than the value -of the prize.[149] The Spanish government claimed that the condemnation -and sale of prize goods in their ports was simply an act of authorized -commerce, free from all hostility.[150] Americans who recall the -cruises of the Alabama and her fellows will be disposed to think that, -whatever the technical accuracy of the plea, neutrality benevolent to -an enemy's cruisers constitutes a just cause of war, whenever policy so -advises. - -The relations between the two countries continued in this strained and -critical condition during the greater part of 1804. Bonaparte insisted -that the Spanish dockyards should repair the French ships in Ferrol -and Cadiz,—which was indeed one of the conditions of the convention -of October 19, 1803, concealed from Great Britain,—and should permit -seamen to pass by land from one port of Spain to another, and from -France through Spain, to complete their crews. He consented indeed that -they should go in small bodies of thirty or forty, but the vigilance -of the British officials could not be deceived. The relations between -France and Spain at this time were not inaptly described in the letter -of Napoleon to the king, announcing his assumption of the imperial -dignity. He styled him therein "ally and confederate." In June, 1804, -an aide-de-camp of the emperor visited Ferrol and Madrid, charged to -ascertain the condition of the ships and demand their completion.[151] -The British minister could obtain no explanation of this mission, which -naturally aroused his attention.[152] Spain in truth was no longer -a free agent. On the 3d of July, Napoleon ordered his Minister of -Marine to send to Ferrol the men still needed to man the ships there; -and on the 19th of the month[153] the British admiral Cochrane, then -blockading the port, remonstrated with the governor of Galicia upon -this procedure as hostile to Great Britain. On the 3d of September, and -again on the 11th, Cochrane wrote to his government that Spanish ships -in Ferrol were fitting for sea, that three first-rates were expected -from Cadiz, and that no doubt remained that the French, Spanish, and -Dutch ships in the port were to act together. He had consequently found -necessary to concentrate his force.[154] Immediately upon receiving -this information, the British ministry notified the Spanish government -that orders had been sent to their admiral off Ferrol to prevent -any Spanish ships of war from entering or leaving that port. The -ambassador at Madrid was directed to require that the armaments should -be discontinued, and placed upon the same footing as before the war. -He was also to demand a clear explanation of the relations existing -between France and Spain. Unless satisfactory replies were given, he -was ordered to quit Madrid. - -At the same time the ministry took a more questionable step. -Orders were sent to Cornwallis, to Cochrane, to Nelson, and to the -naval officer off Cadiz to detain and send to England all Spanish -treasure-ships; the intention being to keep them as a pledge until -satisfactory arrangements with Spain were made. In consequence of this, -on the 5th of October, four British frigates stopped, near Cadiz, -four Spanish vessels, of the same class but of inferior armament. -The disparity of force was not great enough to justify the Spanish -commodore in yielding; and an action followed in which one of his -frigates blew up. The other three surrendered and were taken to -England. Curiously enough, the news of this transaction had not reached -Madrid when the British representative, on the 10th of November, left -the city. The final discussions between him and the Spanish government -went on in complete ignorance of so decisive an event; but as he could -get no explanation of the agreements between France and Spain, he -persisted in demanding his passports. On the 12th of December, 1804, -Spain declared war. - -That Great Britain had just cause for war can scarcely be denied. She -now for the first time came into contact with Napoleon's claim that it -was, not merely the interest, but the bounden duty of every maritime -state to join his attempt to crush her.[155] Upon this principle -he justified his policy of coercing all into such hostilities, and -formulated at a later day the maxim, "There are no neutrals." The -subsidy paid by Spain, calculated on British rates of expenditure, was -annually worth to France fifteen ships-of-the-line and two hundred -thousand troops;[156] but against Napoleon's further extension of his -principle, by suddenly calling into activity the Spanish navy, Great -Britain's only safeguard was to insist upon the latter's remaining -unarmed. The Spanish government, having promised not to arm, suddenly -and without explanation began to equip vessels in Ferrol,—an act -which, coinciding with the passage of French seamen through Spain to -that place, fairly excited alarm and justified the orders not to allow -Spanish ships to enter or leave the port. - -The seizure of the treasure-ships is less easily excused, though -the obloquy attending it has been unduly heightened by the tragical -explosion. Its best palliation lies in Great Britain's previous -experience that, in the commercial decadence and poverty of Spain, the -treasures of the colonies were a determining factor in negotiations. -While they were on the sea, Spain temporized; when they arrived, she -stiffened. The purpose was to retain them as a pledge, to be restored -in case of a peaceable issue; as Swedish merchantmen were embargoed in -1801, and released when the Armed Neutrality dissolved. A Spanish naval -historian, while censuring other acts of Great Britain, says: "The mere -detention of the division from America, carrying specie which might be -used in behalf of French preparations, could have been overlooked as -an able and not very illegal means of bettering the prospects of the -English reclamations, in consequence of the scanty satisfaction they -obtained from our Court;" and again: "If all the circumstances are -impartially weighed, ... we shall see that all the charges made against -England for the seizure of the frigates may be reduced simply to want -of proper foresight in the strength of the force detailed to effect -it."[157] The action, nevertheless, was precipitate, and extenuated by -no urgent political necessity. Nelson, who certainly was not averse to -strong measures, directed his captains to disobey the order, which he -at first thought came only from Cornwallis; for, he said, "I am clearly -of the opinion that Spain has no wish to go to war with England."[158] - - - - -CHAPTER XVI. - -THE TRAFALGAR CAMPAIGN—CONCLUDED. - -JANUARY—OCTOBER, 1805. - -SUCCESSIVE MODIFICATIONS OF NAPOLEON'S PLAN.—NARRATIVE OF NAVAL -MOVEMENTS.—FINAL FAILURE OF NAPOLEON'S NAVAL COMBINATIONS.—WAR WITH -AUSTRIA, AND BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ.—BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR.—VITAL CHANGE -IMPOSED UPON NAPOLEON'S POLICY BY THE RESULT OF THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN. - - -The Spanish declaration of war was followed by a new treaty of alliance -with France, signed in Paris on the 5th of January, 1805, and confirmed -on the 18th of the month at Madrid. Spain undertook to furnish, by -March 21, to the common cause, at least twenty-five ships-of-the-line -and eleven frigates; but the military direction of the whole allied -effort was entrusted to Napoleon. - -This accession of Spain could not become immediately operative, owing -to the backward state of her armaments caused by the previous demands -of Great Britain. The emperor therefore adhered for the time to his -existing plans, formulated on the 27th and 29th of September. These -proving abortive, he next framed, upon lines equal both in boldness and -scope to those of the Marengo and Austerlitz campaigns, the immense -combination which resulted in Trafalgar. - -The events of the ten following months, therefore, have an interest -wholly unique, as the development of the only great naval campaign ever -planned by this foremost captain of modern times. From his opponents, -also, upon whom was thrown the harder task of the defensive, -was elicited an exhibition of insight, combination, promptitude, -and decision, which showed them to be, on their own element, not -unworthy to match with the great emperor. For Napoleon was at this -disadvantage,—he could not fully realize the conditions of the sea. -Accustomed by forethought and sheer will to trample obstacles under -foot, remembering the midwinter passage of the Splugen made by -Macdonald at his command, and the extraordinary impediments overcome -by himself in crossing the Saint Bernard, he could not believe that -the difficulties of the sea could not be vanquished by unskilled men -handling the ponderous machines entrusted to them, when confronted -by a skilful enemy. To quote an able French writer: "But one thing -was wanting to the victor of Austerlitz,—_le sentiment exact des -difficultés de la marine_."[159] - -With steam, possibly, this inequality of skill might have been so -reduced as to enable the generalship of Napoleon, having also the -advantage of the initiative, to turn the scale. With sailing ships -it was not so; and in following the story of Trafalgar it must be -remembered that the naval superiority of Great Britain lay not in -the number of her ships, but in the wisdom, energy, and tenacity -of her admirals and seamen. At best her numbers were but equal to -those arrayed against her. The real contest was between the naval -combinations of Napoleon and the insight of British officers, avoiding -or remedying the ex-centric movements he untiringly sought to impress -upon their forces. - -In December detailed instructions for executing the plan of September -29 were issued to Admirals Villeneuve and Missiessy.[160] The latter, -after leaving Rochefort, was to steer between the Azores and Canaries, -so as to avoid the British squadrons off the Biscay coast of Spain, -go direct to Martinique, take the British islands Santa Lucia and -Dominica, and upon Villeneuve's arrival place himself under his -command. In pursuance of these orders Missiessy escaped from Rochefort -on January 11. He was seen next day by a lookout vessel belonging to -the blockading squadron; but the latter, for whatever reason, was -off its post, and Missiessy reached Martinique safely on the 20th of -February. On the 24th of that month six British ships-of-the-line, -under Rear-Admiral Cochrane, sailed in pursuit from before Ferrol; -where their place was taken by a detachment of equal force drawn from -before Brest. - -Villeneuve's orders were to go from Toulon direct to Cayenne, recapture -the former Dutch colonies of Guiana, form a junction with Missiessy, -re-enforce San Domingo, and start on his return for Europe not later -than sixty days after reaching South America. With the combined -squadrons he was to appear off Ferrol, release the French ships there -blockaded, and bring the whole force, amounting to twenty of the line, -to Rochefort. "The result of your cruise," wrote Napoleon to him, "will -be to secure our colonies against any attack, and to retake the four -Dutch colonies on the Continent, as well as such other British islands -as may appear open to the force under your command." Six thousand -troops were embarked on board his squadron for the operations on shore. -Both he and Missiessy were expressly forbidden to land their crews for -that purpose; a decision of the great emperor worthy to be remembered -in these days. - -Villeneuve was ready to sail early in January, but his first need was -to elude the watchfulness of Nelson. The British admiral was known to -move from point to point in his command, between the Maddalena Islands -and Cape San Sebastian on the Spanish coast, while he kept before -Toulon lookout ships always informed of his whereabouts. Villeneuve -therefore thought indispensable to start with a breeze strong enough -to carry him a hundred miles the first night. For a fortnight the wind -hung at north-east and south-east—fair but very light; but on the 17th -of January it shifted to north-west, with signs of an approaching gale. -The next morning Villeneuve sent a division to drive off the enemy's -lookouts; and when these disappeared the squadron sailed, numbering ten -of the line and seven frigates. Nelson with eleven ships-of-the-line -was at the moment at anchor in Maddalena Bay. - -Following Napoleon's plan for deceiving the British admiral, the -French squadron steered for the south end of Sardinia, as though bound -eastward. During the night it was dogged by the enemy's frigates, which -had retired no further than was necessary to avoid capture. At ten -o'clock they were close by; and at two in the morning, satisfied as -to the French course, they parted company and hastened to Nelson,—the -wind then blowing a whole gale from the north-west. Twelve hours later -they were seen from the flag-ship with the signal flying that the -enemy was at sea, and in two hours more the British fleet was under -way. Unable to beat out by the western entrance in the teeth of the -storm, it ran in single column through the narrow eastern pass as night -fell,—Nelson's ship leading, the others steering by the poop lanterns -of the vessel next ahead. When clear of the port the fleet hauled up to -the southward, and during the night, which was unsettled and squally, -kept along the east coast of Sardinia. The frigate "Seahorse" was sent -ahead to pass round the south end of the island and get touch again of -the enemy. - -During the night the wind changed to south-south-west, and blew heavily -throughout the 21st. On the forenoon of the 22d the fleet, still -struggling against a heavy southwesterly gale, was fifty miles east of -the south end of Sardinia. There it was rejoined by the "Seahorse," -which the day before had caught sight of a French frigate standing -in toward Cagliari, but had not seen the main body. Not till the 26th -did Nelson reach Cagliari, where to his relief he found the French had -not been. Nothing even was known of their movements; but the same day -the frigate "Phœbe" joined from the westward with news that a French -eighty-gun ship, partially dismasted, had put in to Ajaccio. The -British fleet then stretched across to Palermo, where it arrived on the -28th. Having now fairly covered the approaches from the westward to -Sardinia, Sicily, and Naples, Nelson reasoned that one of two things -must have happened: either the French, despite the southerly gale, had -succeeded in going east between Sicily and Africa, or they had put back -disabled. In the latter case he could not now overtake them; in the -former, he must follow.[161] Accordingly, after sending scouts to scour -the seas, and three frigates to resume the watch off Toulon, he shaped -his course along the north side of Sicily, and on the 30th of January -passed through the straits of Messina on his way to Egypt. - -Villeneuve had in fact returned to Toulon. On the first night an -eighty-four-gun ship and three frigates separated, and the former put -in dismasted to Ajaccio, as Nelson had learned. The following day -and in the night, when the wind shifted to south-west, three more -ships-of-the-line were crippled. Forced to the eastward by the gale, -and aware that two enemy's frigates had marked his course, the admiral -feared that he should meet the British at a disadvantage and determined -to retreat. - -Thus prematurely ended the first movement in Napoleon's naval -combination for the invasion of England. The Rochefort squadron had -escaped only to become a big detachment, wholly out of reach of support -or recall. The Toulon fleet, forced to await a heavy wind in order to -effect the evasion by which alone the combination could be formed, was -through the inexperience of its seamen crippled by the very advantage -it had secured. In truth, however, had it gone on, it would almost -infallibly have been driven by the south-west gale into the very spot, -between Sardinia and Sicily, where Nelson went to seek it, and which -was ransacked by his lookouts.[162] Neither Villeneuve nor Nelson -doubted the result of such meeting.[163] - -The other factor in this combination, the Brest fleet and army corps -of twenty thousand men, had been held in readiness to act, dependent -upon the successful evasion of the two others. "I calculate," Napoleon -had said, "that the sailing of twenty ships from Rochefort and Toulon -will force the enemy to send thirty in pursuit;"[164] a diversion that -would very materially increase the chances for the Brest armament. For -a moment he spoke of sending to India this powerful body, strongly -re-enforced from the French and Spanish ships in Ferrol.[165] This was, -however, but a passing thought, rejected by his sound military instinct -as an ex-centric movement, disseminating his force and weakening the -purposed attack upon the heart of the British power. Three months -later, when he began to fear failure for the latter attempt, he -recurred to the East India project in terms which show why he at first -laid it aside. "In case, through any event whatsoever, our expedition -have not full success, and I cannot compass _the greatest of all ends, -which will cause all the rest to fall_,[166] I think we must calculate -the operation in India for September."[167] India in truth was to the -imagination of Napoleon what Egypt was to Nelson,—an object which -colored all his ideas and constantly misled him. As was shrewdly said -by an American citizen to the British government, in this very month -of January, 1805, "The French in general believe that the fountains of -British wealth are in India and China. They never appeared to me to -understand that the most abundant source is in her agriculture, her -manufactures, and the foreign demand."[168] This impression Napoleon -fully shared, and it greatly affected his judgment during the coming -campaign. - -The return of Villeneuve and the delay necessary to repair his ships, -concurring with the expected re-enforcements from Spain, wholly changed -the details of Napoleon's plan. In essence it remained the same from -first to last; but the large number of ships now soon to be at his -command appealed powerfully to his love for great masses and wide -combinations. Now, also, Villeneuve could not reach the West Indies -before the sickly season. - -The contemplated conquests in America, which had formed so important -a part of the first plan, were therefore laid aside, and so was also -the Irish expedition by Ganteaume's fleet. The concentration of naval -forces in the West Indies or at some point exterior to France became -now the great aim; and the sally of the various detachments, before -intended to favor the crossing of the flotilla by a diversion, was now -to be the direct means of covering it, by bringing them to the English -Channel and before Boulogne. The operations were to begin in March; and -urgent orders were sent to Spain to have the contingents in her several -ports ready to move at a moment's notice. - -The situations of the squadrons in March, when the great Trafalgar -campaign opened, need to be stated. On the extreme right, in the Texel, -were nine ships-of-the-line with a due proportion of lighter vessels; -and some eighty transports lay ready to embark Marmont's army corps of -twenty-five thousand men.[169] The Boulogne flotilla was assembled; -the few detachments still absent being so near at hand that their -junction could be confidently expected before the appearance of the -covering fleet. The army, one hundred and thirty thousand strong, was -by frequent practice able to embark in two hours.[170] Two tides were -needed for all the boats to clear the ports; but as word of the fleet's -approach would precede its arrival, they could haul out betimes and -lie in the open sea, under the batteries, ready to start. In Brest, -Ganteaume had twenty-one ships-of-the-line. The Rochefort squadron was -now in the West Indies with Missiessy; but two more ships were ready -in that port and one in Lorient. In Ferrol were five French and ten -Spanish; of the latter it was expected that six or eight could sail in -March. In Cadiz the treaty called for twelve or fifteen to be ready at -the same time, but only six were then actually able to move. There was -also in Cadiz one French ship. In Cartagena were six Spaniards, which, -however, took no part in the campaign. At Toulon Villeneuve would have -eleven ships. All these were ships-of-the-line. The total available -at the opening of the campaign was therefore sixty-seven; but it will -be observed that they were disseminated in detachments, and that the -strategic problem was, first, to unite them in the face of an enemy -that controlled the communications, and, next, to bring them to the -strategic centre. - -As in 1796, the declaration of Spain in 1805 added immensely to the -anxieties of Great Britain. Lord Melville, who succeeded St. Vincent -as First Lord in May, 1804, had at once contracted for several -ships-of-the-line to be built in private yards;[171] but these were not -yet ready. A somewhat singular expedient was then adopted to utilize -worn-out vessels, twelve of which were in February, 1805, cased with -two-inch oak plank, and with some additional bracing sent to sea. It is -said some of these bore a part in the battle of Trafalgar.[172] - -The disposition and strength of the British detachments varied with the -movements of the enemy and with the increasing strength of their own -navy. Lord Keith, in the Downs with eleven small ships-of-the-line, -watched the Texel and the Straits of Dover. The Channel fleet under -Cornwallis held Brest under lock and key, with a force varying from -eleven, when the year began, to twenty or twenty-four in the following -April. This was the centre of the great British naval line. Off -Rochefort no squadron was kept after Missiessy's escape. In March -that event had simply transferred to the West Indies five French and -six British ships. Off Ferrol eight ships were watching the combined -fifteen in the port. In October, when the Spanish war was threatening, -a division of six was sent to blockade Cadiz. Nelson's command, which -had before extended to Cape Finisterre, was now confined to Gibraltar -as its western limit, and the Cadiz portion assigned to Sir John -Orde,—a step particularly invidious to Nelson, depriving him of the -most lucrative part of his station, in favor of one who was not only -his senior, with power to annoy him, but reputed to be his personal -enemy. Nelson had within the Straits twelve of the line, several of -which, however, were in bad condition; and one, kept permanently -at Naples for political reasons, was useless to him. Two others -were on their way to join, but did not arrive before the campaign -opened. It may be added that there were in India from eight to ten -ships-of-the-line, and in the West Indies four, which Cochrane's -arrival would raise to ten.[173] - -On the 2d of March Napoleon issued specific orders for the campaign -to Villeneuve and Ganteaume. The latter, who was to command-in-chief -after the junction, was directed to sail at the first moment possible -with his twenty-one ships, carrying besides their crews thirty-six -hundred troops. He was to go first to Ferrol, destroy or drive off the -blockading squadron, and be joined by the French and Spanish ships -there ready; thence by the shortest route to Martinique, where he -was to be met by Villeneuve and, it was hoped, by Missiessy also. If -Villeneuve did not at once appear, he was to be awaited at least thirty -days. When united, the whole force, amounting to over forty of the -line, would, to avoid detection, steer for the Channel by an unusual -route and proceed direct to Boulogne, where the emperor expected it -between June 10 and July 10. If by Villeneuve's not coming, or other -cause, Ganteaume found himself with less than twenty-five ships, he -was to go to Ferrol; where it would be the emperor's care to assemble -a re-enforcement. He might, however, even with so small a number, move -straight on Boulogne if he thought advisable.[174] - -Villeneuve's orders were to sail at the earliest date for Cadiz, where -he was not to enter but be joined outside by the ships then ready. -From Cadiz he was to go to Martinique, and there wait forty days for -Ganteaume. If the latter did not then appear he was to call at San -Domingo, land some troops and thence go to the Bay of Santiago in the -Canary Islands,[175] where he would cruise twenty days. This provided a -second rendezvous where Ganteaume could join, if unexpectedly delayed -in Brest. The emperor, like all French rulers, did not wish to risk -his fleet in battle with nearly equal forces. Whatever the result, -his combinations would suffer. "I prefer," said he, "the rendezvous -at Martinique to any other; but I also prefer Santiago to a junction -before Brest, by raising the blockade, in order to avoid fighting of -any kind."[176] When Ganteaume, at a most critical instant, only six -days before Villeneuve got away, reported that he was ready,—that -there were but fifteen British ships in the offing and success was -sure,—Napoleon replied: "A naval victory now would lead to nothing. -Have but one aim,—to fulfil your mission. Sail without fighting."[177] -So to the old delusion of ulterior objects was sacrificed the one -chance for compassing the junction essential to success. By April 1 the -British fleet off Brest was increased to twenty-one sail. - -Meanwhile Nelson had returned from his fruitless search at Alexandria, -and on the 13th of March again appeared off Toulon. Thence he went -to Cape San Sebastian, showing his ships off Barcelona to convince -the enemy he was fixed on the coast of Spain; reasoning that if they -thought him to the westward they would more readily start for Egypt, -which he still believed to be their aim. He had by his communications -with Alexandria learned the distracted state of that country since the -destruction of the Mameluke power and its restoration to the Turks, and -reported that the French could easily hold it, if they once effected a -lodgment.[178] From Cape San Sebastian the fleet next went to the Gulf -of Palmas, a convenient roadstead in the south of Sardinia, to fill -with provisions from transports lately arrived. It anchored there on -the 26th of March, but was again at sea when, at 8 A. M. of April 4, -being then twenty miles west of the Gulf, a frigate brought word of -the second sailing of the Toulon fleet. When last seen, in the evening -of March 31, it was sixty miles south of Toulon, steering south with a -north-west wind. One of the pair of lookouts was then sent to Nelson; -and the other, losing sight of the enemy during the night, joined him -a few hours after the first. The only clue she could give was that, -having herself steered south-west with a wind from west-north-west, the -enemy had probably kept on south or borne away to the eastward. Nelson, -therefore, took the fleet midway between Sardinia and the African -coast, scattering lookout ships along the line between these two -points.[179] He was thus centrally placed to cover everything east of -Sardinia, and with means of speedy information if the French attempted -to pass, at any point, the line occupied by him. - -Villeneuve had indeed headed as reported by the British frigates, -swayed by Nelson's ruse in appearing off Barcelona.[180] Believing -the enemy off Cape San Sebastian, he meant to go east of the Balearic -Islands. The next day, April 1; a neutral ship informed him that it -had seen the British fleet south of Sardinia. The wind fortunately -hauling to the eastward, Villeneuve changed his course to pass north -of the Balearics; and on the 6th of April, when Nelson was watching -for him between Sardinia and Africa, he appeared off Cartagena. The -Spanish division there declined to join him, having no instructions -from its government; and the French fleet, continuing at once with a -fresh easterly wind, passed Gibraltar on the 8th. On the 9th it reached -Cadiz, driving away Orde's squadron. Following his orders strictly, -Villeneuve anchored outside the port; and was there at once joined by -the French seventy-four "l'Aigle," and six Spanish ships. During the -night the combined force of eighteen of the line sailed for Martinique, -where it anchored May 14, after a passage of thirty-four days. Some -Spanish ships separated the day after sailing; but, having sealed -instructions giving the rendezvous, they arrived only two days later -than the main body. - -This sortie of Villeneuve had so far been exceptionally happy. By a -mere accident he had learned Nelson's position, while that admiral was -misled by what seems to have been bad management on the part of his -carefully placed lookouts. Nelson was not prone to blame subordinates, -but he apparently felt he had not been well served in this case. Not -till April 16, when Villeneuve was already six days on his way from -Cadiz, did he learn from a passing ship that nine days before the -French were seen off Cape de Gata, on the coast of Spain, steering -westward with an east wind, evidently bound to the Atlantic. To this -piece of great good luck Villeneuve's fortune added another. While -he carried an east wind with him till clear of the Straits, Nelson, -from the 4th of April to the 19th, had a succession of strong westerly -gales. "We have been nine days coming two hundred miles," he wrote. -"For a whole month we have had nothing like a Levanter except for -the French fleet."[181] Not till May 6, after a resolute struggle of -over three weeks against contrary fortune, did he anchor his fleet in -Gibraltar Bay. Five days later he was on his way to the West Indies. -But while the escape from Toulon showed the impossibility of securing -every naval detachment of the enemy, the events elsewhere happening -proved the extreme difficulty of so timing the evasions as to effect a -great combination. While Villeneuve with eighteen ships was hastening -to the West Indies, Missiessy,[182] with five others, having very -imperfectly fulfilled his mission to annoy the enemy's islands, was -speeding back to Rochefort, where orders at once to retrace his steps -were waiting. At the same time Ganteaume with his twenty-one was -hopelessly locked in Brest. Amid all the difficulties of their task, -the British fleets, sticking close to the French arsenals, not only -tempered their efficiency for war to the utmost toughness, but reaped -also the advantages inseparable from interior positions. - -The better to divert attention from his real designs, Napoleon took -the time appointed for his squadrons' sailing to visit Italy. Leaving -Paris April 1, and journeying leisurely, he was in Alessandria on the -first of May and in Milan on the 10th. There he remained a month, and -was on the 26th crowned king of the late Italian Republic. His stay in -Italy was prolonged to July. It is probably to this carefully timed -absence that we owe the full and invaluable record of his hopes and -fears, of the naval combinations which chased each other through his -tireless mind, of the calculations and surmises—true or false, but -always ingenious—which are contained in his almost daily letters to the -Minister of Marine. - -Prominent among his preoccupations were the detention of -Ganteaume,—who, "hermetically blockaded and thwarted by constant -calms,"[183] could not get away,—and the whereabouts of Nelson, who -disappeared from his sight as entirely, and from his knowledge far more -completely, than Villeneuve did from the British ken. "In God's name! -hurry my Brest squadron away, that it may have time to join Villeneuve. -Nelson has been again deceived and gone to Egypt. Villeneuve was out of -sight on the 10th of April. Send him word that Nelson is seeking him in -Egypt; I have sent the same news to Ganteaume by a courier. God grant, -however, that he may not find him in Brest."[184] On the 15th of April -Ganteaume did make an attempt. The British fleet had been driven off -by a gale on the 11th, but reappeared on the 13th. On the afternoon -of the 14th word was brought to Admiral Gardner, who had temporarily -relieved Cornwallis, that the French were getting under way. The next -day they came out; but the enemy now numbered twenty-four sail to their -twenty-one, and after a demonstration they retired within the port. - -As the advancing season gave less and less hope of the blockade -relaxing, Napoleon formed a new combination. Two ships-of-the-line, -now nearly ready at Rochefort, should sail under Rear-Admiral Magon, -carrying modified instructions to Villeneuve. The latter was now -commanded to wait thirty-five days after Magon's arrival, and then, if -Ganteaume had not appeared, return direct to Ferrol, discarding the -alternative rendezvous of Santiago. At Ferrol he would find fifteen -French and Spanish ships, making with his own and Magon's a total of -thirty-five. With these he was to appear before Brest, where Ganteaume -would join him, and with the combined force of fifty-six of the line at -once enter the Channel. Magon sailed with these orders early in May, -and on June 4 reached Villeneuve just in time to insure the direction -given by the latter to his fleet upon its return. To facilitate the -junction at Brest very heavy batteries were thrown up, covering the -anchorage outside the Goulet; and there, in May, Ganteaume took up his -position, covered by one hundred and fifty guns on shore. - -It will be recognized that the emperor's plan, while retaining its -essential features, had now undergone a most important modification, -due to the closeness of the British blockade of Brest. A combination -of his squadrons still remained the key-stone of the fabric; but the -tenacity with which the largest of his detachments was held in check -had forced him to accept—what he had rejected as least advantageous—a -concentration in the Bay of Biscay, the great hive where swarmed the -British navy. - -It became therefore more than ever desirable to divert as many as -possible of the enemy's cruisers from those waters; an object which -now continuously occupied Napoleon's mind and curiously tinged his -calculations with the color of his hopes. In defiance of statistics, -he thought the East Indies, as has before been said, the first of -British interests. He sought therefore to raise alarms about India, -and persisted in believing that every division sailing from England -was bound there. "Cochrane," he writes on April 13, "was before Lisbon -on March 4. He must first have gone to the Cape de Verde, thence to -Madeira, and if he gets no information he will go to India. That is -what any admiral of sense would do in his case."[185] On the 10th -of May, when Cochrane had been over a month in the West Indies, -he reiterates this opinion, and at the same time conjectures that -five thousand troops which sailed from England on the 15th of April -with most secret orders were gone to the Cape of Good Hope. "Fears -of Villeneuve's meeting this expedition will force them to send -more ships to India."[186] On the 31st of May he guesses that eight -ships-of-the-line, which sailed ten days before under Collingwood, were -bound to India,[187] and a week later repeats the surmise emphatically: -"The responsibility of the ministers is so great they cannot but send -him to the East Indies."[188] On the 9th of June he writes: "Everything -leads me to believe the English sent fifteen ships to the East Indies, -when they learned that Cochrane reached Barbadoes a fortnight after -Missiessy sailed; and in that case it is quite possible Nelson has -been sent to America."[189] This opinion is repeated on the 13th and -14th; and on the 28th, as the veil was about to fall from his eyes, -he sums up the acute reasoning which, starting from a false premise, -had so misled him: "It is difficult to believe that without any news -the English have sent seventeen ships-of-the-line (i. e. Nelson and -Collingwood combined) to the West Indies, when Nelson, joining his ten -to Cochrane's six, and three at Jamaica, would have nineteen—superior -to our squadron; while Collingwood going to the East Indies with eight -and finding there nine, in all seventeen, also superior to us—it is -difficult, I say, to believe that the enemy, with the chance of being -everywhere superior, should blindly abandon the East Indies."[190] - -Some French writers,[191] as well as some English, have disparaged the -insight of Nelson, comparing him unfavorably with Napoleon, and basing -their estimate largely upon his error in esteeming Egypt the aim of the -French. In view of the foregoing extracts, and of other miscalculations -made by the emperor during this remarkable campaign—which will appear -farther on—it must be admitted that when in the dark, without good -information, both were forced to inferences, more or less acute, -but which, resting on no solid data, rose, as Nelson said, little -above guesses. So also Collingwood has been credited with completely -unravelling Napoleon's plan, and his penetration has been exalted above -Nelson's because, _after_ the latter's return from chasing Villeneuve -to the West Indies, he wrote that the flight there was to take off the -British naval force; overlooking his conjecture, two lines before, that -(not England, but) "Ireland is the real mark and butt of all these -operations." Rather might each adopt for himself Napoleon's own words, -"I have so often in my life been mistaken that I no longer blush for -it."[192] When his frigates lost sight of Villeneuve, on the night -of March 31, Nelson went neither east nor west; he concentrated his -force to cover what he thought the most likely objects of the enemy, -and awaited information as to his movements. "I shall neither go to -the eastward of Sicily nor to the westward of Sardinia until I know -something positive."[193] It can be confidently said that under like -conditions Napoleon would have done the same. - -The fault of Napoleon's calculations was in over-estimating both the -importance and the danger of India, and also in not allowing for -the insight and information of the British government. He himself -laid down, with his peculiarly sound judgment, the lines it ought to -follow: "If I had been in the British Admiralty, I would have sent -a light squadron to the East and West Indies, and formed a strong -fleet of twenty of the line which I would not have dispatched until I -knew Villeneuve's destination."[194] This was just what the Admiralty -did. A light squadron was on its way to India, and eight ships were -ordered to the West Indies under Collingwood; but that able officer, -finding Nelson had started, contented himself with sending two to -re-enforce him, and took up his own position with six before Cadiz, -thus blocking the junction of the Cartagena ships. The strong body -of twenty was kept before Brest, much to Napoleon's annoyance. "If -England realizes the serious game she is playing, she ought to raise -the blockade of Brest."[195] But here, as with regard to the Indian -expeditions, Napoleon's thought was fathered by his wish. To weaken the -Brest blockade, as he confessed a little later, was the great point for -France.[196] - -Nothing in fact is more noteworthy, nor more creditable, than the -intelligence and steadiness with which the British naval authorities -resisted Napoleon's efforts to lead them into ex-centric movements. -This was partly due to an accurate judgment of the worth of the -enemy's detached squadrons, partly to an intuitive sense of the supreme -importance of the Biscay positions, and partly to information much -more accurate than Napoleon imagined, or than he himself received in -naval transactions. "Those boasted English," jeered he, when he thought -them ignorant of Villeneuve's second sailing, "who claim to know of -everything, who have agents everywhere, couriers booted and spurred -everywhere, knew nothing of it."[197] Yet, by a singular coincidence, -on the very day, April 25, that they were supposed thus deceived, the -Admiralty were hurrying letters to Nelson and to the West Indies with -the important tidings. "You reason," wrote he to Decrès, "as if the -enemy were in the secret."[198] This is just what they were,—not as -to all details, but as to the main features of his plans. While the -emperor was wildly reckoning on imaginary squadrons hastening to India, -and guessing where Nelson was, both the latter and his government knew -where Villeneuve had gone, and the British admiral was already in the -West Indies. About the beginning of May it was known in England not -only that the Toulon fleet had sailed, but whither it was bound;[199] -and about the first of June, despite the cautions about secrecy -imposed by Bonaparte, the British were informed by a prisoner that -"the combined fleet, of sixty sail-of-the-line, will fight our fleet -(_balayer la Manche_), while the large frigates will come up channel -to convoy the flotilla over. The troops are impatiently awaiting the -appearance of the ships to set them free."[200] - -The Admiralty therefore understood as well as did Napoleon that the -crucial necessity in their dispositions was to prevent the combination -of the enemy's squadrons, and that the chief scene of operations -would be the Bay of Biscay and the approaches to the Channel. They -contented themselves, consequently, with strengthening the force -there, and keeping before Cadiz alone a detachment under Collingwood, -lest a concentration in that port should compel them to weaken the -Biscay squadrons. At the time Villeneuve sailed, an expedition of five -thousand troops, whose destination was kept profoundly secret, was -ready to start for the Mediterranean. This re-enforcement secured the -naval bases of Gibraltar and Malta, and the Mediterranean otherwise was -abandoned to frigates, supported by two or three ships-of-the-line. -Herein also the practice of the Admiralty agreed with the precept of -Napoleon. "The Mediterranean," wrote he on June 7 to his Minister of -Marine, "is now nothing. I would rather see there two of Villeneuve's -ships than forty;" and he added the pregnant counsel, which was -exemplified by the British action, "It seems to me your purpose is _not -exclusive enough_ for a great operation. You must correct this fault, -for that is the art of great successes and of great operations." - -The secret expedition was met by Nelson just as he started for the -West Indies. During his heavy beat down the Mediterranean he too, as -carefully as Napoleon, had been studying the field on which he was to -act; but while the one planned with all the freedom and certainty of an -offensive, which, disposing of large means, moves upon a known object, -the other, though in a restricted sphere, underwent the embarrassments -of the defensive, ignorant where the blow was to fall. One clear light, -however, shone step by step on his path,—wherever the French fleet was -gone there should he go also. - -The west wind which delayed his progress brought swiftly to him, on -April 19, a vessel[201] from Gibraltar, with word that, two hours -after Villeneuve passed the Straits, a frigate had started for England -with the news, and that the French and Spaniards had sailed together -from Cadiz. From this circumstance he reasoned, accurately, that the -destination was the British Islands;[202] but he did not penetrate the -deep design of a concentration in the West Indies. He therefore sent -the frigate "Amazon" ahead of the fleet to Lisbon, to gather news and -rejoin him off Cape St. Vincent; and by her he wrote the Admiralty, -and also to the admirals off Brest and in Ireland, that he should take -position fifty leagues west of the Scilly Islands, and thence steer -slowly toward them. To any person who will plot this position on a map -it will be apparent that, with winds prevailing from the westward, he -would there be, as he said, equally well situated to reach Brest or -Ireland; in short, in an excellent strategic position known to the -authorities at home. - -Stopping but four hours at Gibraltar on May 6, on the 9th he was off -Cape St. Vincent, and there received news that the combined squadrons, -to the number of eighteen of the line, had gone to the West Indies. His -concern was great, for he fully understood the value of those islands. -He had served there, knew them intimately, and had married there. Not a -year before he had written, "If our islands should fall, England would -be so clamorous for peace that we should humble ourselves."[203] Still, -with all his anxiety, he kept his head. The convoy of troops was close -at hand, he must provide for its safety. On the 11th of May it arrived, -Nelson's fleet being then under way. To the two ships-of-the-line -guarding it he added a third, the "Royal Sovereign," whose bad sailing -delayed him; and to this circumstance it was owing that that ship, -newly coppered, bore Collingwood's flag far in advance of either -British column into the fire at Trafalgar. Three hours after the -convoy's junction, at 7 P. M.of May 11, Nelson with ten ships was on -his way to the West Indies, to seek eighteen which had thirty-one days' -start. - -On the 4th of June the British fleet, having gained eight days on -the allies, anchored at Barbadoes, where it found Cochrane with two -sail-of-the-line. The same day Magon with his two joined Villeneuve. -In the three weeks the latter had now been in Martinique he had -accomplished nothing but the capture of Diamond Rock, a small islet -detached from the main island, which the British held and from which -they annoyed the coasters. A frigate outstripping Magon had brought -pressing orders to make conquests in the British possessions, during -the thirty-five days of waiting for Ganteaume. In consequence, when -Magon joined, the fleet was under way, standing north to clear the -islands before making the stretch to the southward, and to windward, to -reach Barbadoes; which Villeneuve had selected as his first point of -attack. - -On the 4th of June, therefore, the two hostile fleets were but a -hundred miles apart, the distance separating Barbadoes from Martinique. -Most singularly, at the very moment Villeneuve started north to return -upon Barbadoes, false news, too plausible to be slighted, induced -Nelson to go south. Positive information was sent by the officer -commanding at Santa Lucia that the allies had been seen from there, -May 29, steering south. Nelson anchored at Barbadoes at 5 P. M. June -4, embarked two thousand troops during the night, and at 10 A. M. next -day made sail for the southward. On the 6th he passed Tobago, which -was reported safe, and on the 7th anchored off Trinidad; where to the -astonishment of every one nothing had been heard of the enemy. Cursing -the news which had forced him to disregard his own judgment, when only -a hundred miles of fair wind severed him from his prey, Nelson turned -upon his tracks and steered for Martinique, tortured with fears for -Jamaica and every exposed British possession. - -On the 8th of June, when Nelson left Trinidad, the combined fleets were -nearly four hundred miles from him, off the west side of Antigua. Here -they captured fourteen merchant ships which had imprudently left port, -and by them were informed that Nelson with fourteen ships (instead -of ten) had reached Barbadoes. To these fourteen, Villeneuve, whose -information was poor, added five as the force of Cochrane, making -nineteen to his eighteen. Supposing therefore the enemy to be superior, -not only in quality, which he conceded, but in numbers also, he -decided, in view of so unexpected an event as the arrival on the scene -of the greatest British admiral, to return at once to Europe. In this -he doubtless met the wishes of Napoleon. "I think," said the latter, -ere he knew the fact, "that the arrival of Nelson may lead Villeneuve -to return to Europe;"[204] and he argued, still seeing things as he -wished,—certainly not as a seaman would,—"When Nelson learns Villeneuve -has left the Windward Islands, he will go to Jamaica,"[205] a thousand -miles to leeward. "So far from being infallible like the Pope," wrote -Nelson at the same moment, "I believe my opinions to be very fallible, -and therefore I may be mistaken that the enemy's fleet is gone to -Europe; but I cannot bring myself to think otherwise."[206] Then, -having given his reasons, he seems to dive into Napoleon's mind and -read his thoughts. "The enemy will not give me credit for quitting the -West Indies for this month to come."[207] - -Villeneuve also doubtless hoped to shake off his pursuer by his sudden -change of purpose. Transferring troops necessary to garrison the French -islands to four frigates, he directed the latter to land them at -Guadaloupe and rejoin him off the Azores,—a mistaken rendezvous, which -materially lengthened his backward voyage. The combined fleet then made -sail on the 9th of June to the northward, to reach the westerly winds -that favor the passage to Europe. - -Three days later Nelson also was off Antigua, and convinced himself -that the allies were bound back to Europe. With the tireless energy -that brooked no rest when once resolve was formed, the night was passed -transferring the troops which but one week before he had embarked at -Barbadoes. But not even a night's delay was allowed in sending news to -Europe. At 8 P. M. he hurried off the brig "Curieux" with dispatches -to the Admiralty, which the captain, Bettesworth, was to deliver in -person; a momentous action, and one fraught with decisive consequences -to the campaign, although somewhat marred by an overcautious admiral. -On the 13th, at noon, the fleet itself, accompanied by one of -Cochrane's two ships, the "Spartiate," sailed for the Straits of -Gibraltar; but Nelson, uncertain as to the enemy's destination, also -sent word to the officer commanding off Ferrol,[208] lest he might be -taken unawares. - -Although Villeneuve's decision to return was fortunate and -characterized by the extraordinary good luck which upon the whole had -so far attended him, it is evident that he ran the chance of crossing -Ganteaume on the Atlantic, as he himself had been crossed by Missiessy. -Napoleon had taken precautions to insure both his waiting long enough, -and also his return in case Ganteaume could not get away by a certain -time; but not having foreseen, nor until June 28[209] even known, -Nelson's pursuit of Villeneuve, he could not anticipate the course of -the latter in such a contingency, nor combine with it the action of the -Brest fleet. - -Ganteaume, however, was not able to elude Lord Gardner, and on the -8th of May the emperor, having received in Italy the news of Magon's -sailing, gave his final decision. If before midnight of May 20 an -opportunity offered, the Brest fleet should start; but from daybreak -of the 21st, had it every chance in the world, it should stand fast. A -frigate was to be kept ready to sail the instant the latter condition -took effect, carrying to Villeneuve orders for his action upon reaching -Ferrol. This frigate did sail May 21, but of course did not find the -admiral in the West Indies. Duplicate instructions were sent to Ferrol. - -Villeneuve was by them informed that he would in Ferrol find ready for -sea five French and nine Spanish ships, which, with those already under -his orders, would make a force of thirty-four sail-of-the-line. In the -roads off Rochefort would be five more. At Brest twenty-one ships were -lying outside the Goulet, under the protection of one hundred and fifty -cannon, ready to get under way at a moment's notice. The great point -was to concentrate these three masses, or as much of them as possible, -off Boulogne. Three courses were open to him. If the squadron at Ferrol -could not leave the port when he appeared, on account of head winds, he -should order it to join him at Rochefort and go there at once himself. -Thence with forty ships he should proceed off Brest, join Ganteaume, -and at once enter the Channel. If, however, the wind was fair for -leaving Ferrol, that is, southerly, he would see in that a reason for -hastening to Brest, without stopping for the Rochefort squadron; the -more so as every delay would increase the British force before Brest. -Thirdly, he might possibly, as he drew toward Ushant, find the winds so -fair as to give the hope of getting to Boulogne with his thirty-five -ships three or four days before the enemy's fleet at Brest could -follow. If so, it was left to his discretion to embrace so favorable -an opportunity. To these three courses Napoleon added a fourth as a -possible alternative. After rallying the Ferrol ships he might pass -north of the British Islands, join the Dutch squadron of the Texel with -Marmont's corps there embarked, and with these appear off Boulogne. -The emperor, however, looked upon this rather as a last resort. A great -concentration in the Bay of Biscay was the one aim he now favored. - -To facilitate this he busied himself much with the question of -diverting the enemy from that great centre of his operations. This it -was that made him so ready to believe that each squadron that sailed -was gone to the East Indies. If so, it was well removed from the Bay -of Biscay. For this he sought to get the Cartagena ships to Toulon -or to Cadiz. "If we can draw six English ships before each port," he -writes, "that will be a fine diversion for us; and if I can get the -Cartagena ships in Toulon I will threaten Egypt in so many ways that -they will be obliged to keep there an imposing force. They will believe -Villeneuve gone to the East Indies in concerted operation with the -Toulon squadron."[210] For this he purposes to send Missiessy to Cadiz. -In Rochefort that admiral will occupy a British detachment, but on the -spot where the emperor does not wish it; at Cadiz it will be remote -from the scene. But later on he says, "Perhaps the enemy, who are now -thoroughly frightened, will not be led away; in that case I shall have -dispersed my force uselessly."[211] Therefore he concludes to keep him -at Rochefort, where, if blockaded, he reduces the force either off -Ferrol or off Brest. If not blockaded, he is to go to sea, take a wide -sweep in the Atlantic, and appear off Ireland. The English will then -doubtless detach ships to seek him; but he will again disappear and -take position near Cape Finisterre, where he will be likely to meet -Villeneuve returning.[212] Finally, for the same reason, toward the end -of June he tries to create alarm about the Texel. Marmont is directed -to make demonstrations and even to embark his troops, while part of -the emperor's guard is moved to Utrecht. "This will lead the enemy to -weaken his fleet before Brest, which is the great point."[213] - -All these movements were sound and wise; but the emperor made the -mistake of underestimating his enemy. "We have not to do," he said, -"with a far-sighted, but with a very proud government. What we are -doing is so simple that a government the least foresighted would not -have made war. For an instant they have feared for London; soon they -will be sending squadrons to the two Indies."[214] - -The British government and the British Admiralty doubtless made -blunders; but barring the one great mistake, for which the previous -administration of St. Vincent was responsible, of allowing the material -of the navy to fall below the necessities of the moment, the Trafalgar -campaign was in its leading outlines well and adequately conceived, and -in its execution, as event succeeded event, ably and even brilliantly -directed. Adequate detachments were placed before each of the enemy's -minor arsenals, while the fleet before Brest constituted the great -central body upon which the several divisions might, and when necessity -arose, actually did fall back. Sudden disaster, or being beaten in -detail, thus became almost impossible. In the home ports was maintained -a well-proportioned reserve, large enough to replace ships disabled or -repairing, but not so large as seriously to weaken the force at sea. -As a rule the Admiralty successfully shunned the ex-centric movements -to which Napoleon would divert them, and clung steadfastly to that -close watch which St. Vincent had perfected, and which unquestionably -embodied the soundest strategic principles. Missiessy returned to -Rochefort on the 26th of May and was promptly blocked by a body of five -or six ships. As the force in Ferrol increased, by the preparation -of ships for sea, the opposing squadron of six or seven was raised -to ten, under Rear-Admiral Calder. Before Brest were from twenty to -twenty-five, to whose command Admiral Cornwallis returned early in -July, after a three months' sick leave. Collingwood with half a dozen -was before Cadiz, where he effectually prevented a concentration, -which, by its distance from the scene of action, would have seriously -embarrassed the British navy. Such was the situation when Villeneuve -and Nelson, in June and July, were re-crossing the Atlantic, heading, -the one for Ferrol, the other for the Straits; and when the crisis, to -which all the previous movements had been leading, was approaching its -culmination. - -When Nelson started back for Europe, although convinced the French -were thither bound, he had no absolute certainty of the fact.[215] -For his decision he relied upon his own judgment. In dispatching the -"Curieux" the night before he himself sailed, he directed her captain -to steer a certain course, by following which he believed he would fall -in with the allied fleet.[216] Accordingly the "Curieux" did, on the -19th of June, sight the enemy in latitude 33° 12' north and longitude -58° west, nine hundred miles north-north-east from Antigua, standing -north-north-west. The same day Nelson himself learned from an American -schooner that a fleet of about twenty-two large ships of war had been -seen by it on the 15th, three hundred and fifty miles south of the -position in which Bettesworth saw it four days later. - -Bettesworth fully understood the importance of the knowledge thus -gained. The precise destination of the enemy did not certainly appear, -but there could be no doubt that he was returning to Europe. With that -intelligence, and the information concerning Nelson's purposes, it -was urgent to reach England speedily. Carrying a press of sail, the -"Curieux" anchored at Plymouth on the 7th of July. The captain posted -at once to London, arriving the evening of the 8th, at eleven. The head -of the Admiralty at that time was Lord Barham, an aged naval officer, -who had been unexpectedly called to the office two months before, in -consequence of the impeachment of Lord Melville, the successor to St. -Vincent. It was fortunate for Great Britain that the direction of naval -operations at so critical a moment was in the hands of a man, who, -though over eighty and long a stranger to active service, understood -intuitively, and without need of explanation, the various conditions -of weather and service likely to affect the movements of the scattered -detachments, British and hostile, upon whose rapid combinations so much -now depended. - -Barham having gone to bed, Bettesworth's dispatches were not given him -till early next morning. As soon as he got them he exclaimed angrily -at the loss of so many precious hours; and, without waiting to dress, -at once dictated orders with which, by 9 A. M. of the 9th, Admiralty -messengers were hurrying to Plymouth and Portsmouth. Cornwallis was -directed to raise the blockade at Rochefort, sending the five ships -composing it to Sir Robert Calder, then watching off Ferrol with ten; -and the latter was ordered, with the fifteen ships thus united under -his command, to cruise one hundred miles west of Cape Finisterre, -to intercept Villeneuve and forestall his junction with the Ferrol -squadron. With Nelson returning toward Cadiz, where he would find -Collingwood, and with Cornwallis off Brest, this disposition completed -the arrangements necessary to thwart the primary combinations of -the emperor, unknown to, but shrewdly surmised by, his opponents. -It realized for Ferrol that which Napoleon had indicated as the -proper course for the British fleet off Brest, in case it received -intelligence of Villeneuve's approach there,—to meet the enemy so far -at sea as to prevent the squadron in port from joining in the intended -battle.[217] - -Fair winds favoring the quick, Cornwallis received his orders on the -11th; and on the 15th, eight days after the "Curieux" anchored in -Plymouth, the Rochefort ships joined Calder. The latter proceeded at -once to the post assigned him, where on the 19th he received through -Lisbon the tidings of Villeneuve's return sent by Nelson from the West -Indies. The same day Nelson himself, having outstripped the combined -fleets, anchored in Gibraltar. On the 22d the sudden lifting of a -dense fog revealed to each other the hostile squadrons of Calder and -Villeneuve; the British fifteen sail-of-the-line, the allies twenty. -The numbers of the latter were an unpleasant surprise to Calder, the -"Curieux" having reported them as only seventeen.[218] - -It is difficult to praise too highly the prompt and decisive step taken -by Lord Barham, when so suddenly confronted with the dilemma of either -raising the blockade of Rochefort and Ferrol, or permitting Villeneuve -to proceed unmolested to his destination, whatever that might be. To -act instantly and rightly in so distressing a perplexity—to be able -to make so unhesitating a sacrifice of advantages long and rightly -cherished, in order to strike at once one of the two converging -detachments of an enemy—shows generalship of a high order. It may be -compared to Bonaparte's famous abandonment of the siege of Mantua in -1796, to throw himself upon the Austrian armies descending from the -Tyrol. In the hands of a more resolute or more capable admiral than -Calder, the campaign would probably have been settled off Finisterre. -Notice has been taken of Barham's good luck, in that the brilliant -period of Trafalgar fell within his nine months' tenure of office;[219] -but Great Britain might better be congratulated that so clear-headed a -man held the reins at so critical a moment. - -The length of Villeneuve's passage, which so happily concurred to -assure the success of Barham's masterly move, was due not only to the -inferior seamanship of the allies, but also to the mistaken rendezvous -off the Azores,[220]—assigned by the French admiral when leaving the -West Indies. The westerly gales, which prevail in the North Atlantic, -blow during the summer from the south of west, west of the Azores, and -from the north of west when east of them. A fleet bound for a European -port north of the islands—as Ferrol is—should therefore so use the -south-west winds as to cross their meridian well to the northward. -Nelson himself sighted one of the group, though his destination was in -a lower latitude. In consequence of his mistake, Villeneuve was by the -north-west winds forced down on the coast of Portugal, where he met the -north-easters prevalent at that season, against which he was struggling -when encountered by Calder. This delay was therefore caused, not by bad -luck, but by bad management. - -Napoleon himself was entirely misled by Barham's measures, whose -rapidity he himself could not have surpassed. He had left Turin on the -8th of July, and, travelling incessantly, reached Fontainebleau on the -evening of the 11th. About the 20th he appears to have received the -news brought ten days before by the "Curieux," and at the same time -that of the Rochefort blockade being raised.[221] Not till the 27th did -he learn that the British squadron off Ferrol had also disappeared, -after being joined by the Rochefort ships. "The 'Curieux' only reached -England on the 9th," he wrote to Decrès; "_the Admiralty could not -decide the movements of its squadrons in twenty-four hours_, yet the -Rochefort division disappeared on the 12th. On the 15th it joined that -off Ferrol, and the same day, or at latest the next, these fourteen -ships departed by orders given _prior to_ the arrival of the 'Curieux.' -What news had the English before the arrival of that brig? That the -French were at Martinique; that Nelson had then but nine ships. What -should they have done? I should not be surprised if they have sent -another squadron to strengthen Nelson, ... and that it is these -fourteen ships from before Ferrol they have sent to America."[222] - -On the 2d of August the emperor set out for Boulogne, and there on -the 8th received news of Villeneuve's action with Calder and of his -subsequent entry into Ferrol. The fleets had fought on the afternoon of -July 22, and two Spanish ships-of-the-line had been taken. Night-fall -and fog parted the combatants; the obscurity being so great that the -allies did not know their loss till next day. One of the British ships -lost a foretopmast, and others suffered somewhat in their spars; but -these mishaps, though pleaded in Calder's defence, do not seem to have -been the chief reasons that deterred him from dogging the enemy till -he had brought him again to action. He was preoccupied with the care -of the prizes, a secondary matter, and with the thought of what would -happen in case the Ferrol and Rochefort squadrons sailed. "I could -not hope to succeed without receiving great damage; I had no friendly -port to go to, and had the Ferrol and Rochefort squadrons come out, I -must have fallen an easy prey. They might have gone to Ireland. Had I -been defeated it is impossible to say what the consequences might have -been."[223] In short, the British admiral had fallen into the error -against which Napoleon used to caution his generals. He had "made to -himself a picture," and allowed the impression produced by it to blind -him to the fact (if indeed he ever saw it) that he had before him the -largest and most important of the several detachments of the enemy, -that it was imperatively necessary not to permit it to escape unharmed, -and that at no future day could he be sure of bringing his own squadron -into play with such decisive effect. The wisdom of engaging at any -particular moment was a tactical question, to be determined by the -circumstances at the time; but the duty of keeping touch with the -enemy, so as to use promptly any opportunity offered, was a strategic -question, the answer to which admits of no doubt whatever. On the -evening of the 24th the wind was fair to carry him to the enemy, but he -parted from them. During the night it blew fresh; and on the morning -of the 25th, says a French authority, the fleet was without order, -several vessels had lost sails, and others sustained injuries to their -spars.[224] Calder, however, was not on hand. - -It is related of Nelson that, on his return voyage from the West -Indies, he used to say to his captains, speaking of the fleet which -Calder allowed to escape, "If we meet them we shall find them not less -than eighteen, I rather think twenty, sail-of-the-line, and therefore -do not be surprised if I should not fall on them immediately; _we -won't part without a battle_. I will let them alone till we approach -the shores of Europe, _or they give me an advantage too tempting to be -resisted_."[225] And again, after reaching England, he found on the -23d of August great anxiety prevailing about Calder, who with eighteen -ships was then again cruising for Villeneuve, supposed to have been -re-enforced to twenty-eight by the Ferrol squadron. "I am no conjuror," -he wrote, "but this I ventured without any fear, that if Calder got -fairly alongside their twenty-eight sail, by the time the enemy had -beat our fleet soundly, they would do us no harm this year."[226] These -two utterances of this consummate warrior sufficiently show how Calder -should have viewed his opportunity in July. - -Villeneuve had no more wish to renew the action than had Calder. -Less even than that admiral could he rise to the height of risking a -detachment in order to secure the success of a great design. In the -eighteen ships left to him were over twelve hundred men so ill that -it was necessary to put them ashore. Constrained by the winds, he put -into Vigo on the 28th of July. Calder, on the other hand, having seen -his prizes so far north as to insure their safety, returned off Cape -Finisterre where he hoped to meet Nelson. Not finding him, he on the -29th resumed the blockade of Ferrol. On the 31st Villeneuve, leaving -three of his worst vessels in Vigo, sailed for Ferrol with fifteen -ships, of which two only were Spaniards. The fleet, having a strong -south-west gale, kept close along shore to avoid meeting Calder; but -the latter, having been blown off by the storm, was not in sight -when Villeneuve reached the harbor's mouth. The allied ships were -entering with a fair wind, when the French admiral received dispatches -forbidding him to anchor in Ferrol. If, from injuries received in -battle, or losses from any causes whatever, he was unable to carry out -the plan of entering the Channel, the emperor preferred that, after -rallying the Ferrol and Rochefort squadrons, he should go to Cadiz; -but, the Brest fleet being ready and the other preparations complete, -he hoped everything from the skill, zeal, and courage of Villeneuve. -"Make us masters of the Straits of Dover," he implored, "be it but for -four or five days."[227] Napoleon leaned on a broken reed. Forbidden -to enter Ferrol, Villeneuve took his ships into the adjacent harbor of -Coruña,[228] where he anchored August 1. - -Thus was effected the junction which Calder had been expected to -prevent. His absence on the particular day may have been unavoidable; -but, if so, it does but emphasize his fault in losing sight of the -allies on the 24th of July, when he had a fair wind. Twenty-nine French -and Spanish ships were now concentrated at Ferrol. The popular outcry -was so great that he felt compelled to ask an enquiry. The Admiralty -having, by a movement both judiciously and promptly ordered, secured -a meeting with the enemy's force so far from Ferrol as to deprive it -of the support of the ships there, was justly incensed at the failure -to reap the full advantage. It therefore ordered a court-martial. The -trial was held the following December; and the admiral, while expressly -cleared of either cowardice or disaffection, was adjudged not to have -done his utmost to renew the engagement and to take or destroy every -ship of the enemy. His conduct was pronounced highly censurable, and he -was sentenced to be severely reprimanded. - -This was after Trafalgar. The immediate result of the junction in -Ferrol was the abandonment of the blockade there. On the 2d of August -Calder sent five ships to resume the watch off Rochefort, whence the -French squadron had meantime escaped. Not till August 9 did he know of -Villeneuve's entrance into Ferrol. Having with him then but nine ships, -he fell back upon the main body before Brest, which he joined on the -14th,—Cornwallis then having under him seventeen ships, which Calder's -junction raised to twenty-six. - -The next day, August 15, Nelson also joined the fleet. On the 25th of -July, a week after reaching Gibraltar, he had received the "Curieux's" -news. Obeying his constant rule to seek the French, he at once started -north with the eleven ships which had accompanied him from the West -Indies,—intending to go either to Ferrol, Brest, or Ireland, according -to the tidings which might reach him on the way. After communicating -with Cornwallis, he continued on to England with his own ship, the -"Victory," and one other whose condition required immediate repairs. On -the 18th he landed in Portsmouth, after an absence of over two years. - -Cornwallis had now under his command a concentrated force of -thirty-four or thirty-five sail-of-the-line, all admirably seasoned -and disciplined. The allies had in Brest twenty-one, in Ferrol -twenty-nine; two great bodies, neither of which, however, was equal in -number, nor still less in quality, to his. Adrift somewhere on the sea -were the five French ships from Rochefort. For more than five months -these vessels, which sailed on the 17th of July, five days after the -blockading ships had left to join Calder, ranged the seas without -meeting an equal British division,—a circumstance which earned for them -from the French the name of "the Invisible Squadron." But, while thus -fortunately unseen by the enemy, Napoleon found it equally impossible -to bring them within the scope of his combinations;[229] and it may be -doubted whether commerce-destroying to the sum of two million dollars -compensated for the loss of so important a military factor. - -The ships in Cadiz being blocked by Collingwood, and those in Cartagena -remaining always inert, the naval situation was now comparatively -simple. Cornwallis was superior to either of the enemy's detachments, -and he held an interior position. In case Villeneuve approached, it -was scarcely possible that the two hostile squadrons, dependent upon -the wind, which if fair for one would be foul to the other, could -unite before he had effectually crushed one of them. It ought to be -equally improbable, with proper lookouts, that Villeneuve could -elude the British fleet and gain so far the start of it as to cover -the Straits of Dover during the time required by Napoleon. In his -concentrated force and his interior position Cornwallis controlled the -issue,—barring of course those accidents which cannot be foreseen, and -which at times derange the best-laid plans. - -Such was the situation when, on August 17, Cornwallis was informed -that Villeneuve had put to sea with, it was said, twenty-seven or -twenty-eight ships-of-the-line. He at once detached toward Ferrol Sir -Robert Calder with eighteen sail, keeping with himself sixteen. This -division of his fleet, which is condemned by the simplest and most -generally admitted principles of warfare, transferred to Villeneuve -all the advantage of central position and superior force, and was -stigmatized by Napoleon as a "glaring blunder." "What a chance," he -wrote, upon hearing it when all was over, "has Villeneuve missed. He -might, by coming upon Brest from a wide sweep to sea, have played -hide and seek with Calder and fallen upon Cornwallis; or else, with -his thirty ships have beaten Calder's twenty and gained a decided -preponderance."[230] This censure of both admirals was just. - -While the British squadrons were concentrating in the Bay of Biscay, -and the happy insight and diligence of Nelson were bringing the -Mediterranean ships to the critical centre of action, Napoleon, from -the heights overlooking Boulogne, was eagerly awaiting news from -Villeneuve, and at the same time anxiously watching the signs of the -times on the Continent, where the sky was already dark with a gathering -storm. The encroachments which led to the second war with Great -Britain, in 1803, had excited no less distrust among the continental -powers, who were indeed more immediately and disastrously affected -by them; but none had then dared to move. The violation of German -neutrality in 1804, by the seizure of the Duc d'Enghien on the soil of -Baden, had caused a general indignation; which, on the part of Russia -and Austria, was quickened into a desire to act by his execution, -regarded by most as a judicial murder. Prussia shared the anger and -fears of the other powers, but not enough to decide her vacillating -government. - -In this state of things the fall of the Addington ministry, and the -consequent vigor imparted to the foreign policy of Great Britain by -Pitt's second accession to power, led naturally to another coalition; -the centre of which, as ever, was found in London. The czar having -remonstrated vigorously, both with Napoleon and the German Diet, upon -the seizure of the Duc d'Enghien, a bitter correspondence had followed, -causing the rupture of diplomatic relations between France and Russia -in August, 1804. For similar reasons, and at the same time, the French -embassy to Sweden was recalled. Austria still temporized, though her -actions excited Napoleon's suspicions. - -Early in 1805 the czar sent special envoys to London, to treat -concerning certain vast schemes for the reorganization of Europe in -the interests of general peace. The particular object was not reached; -but on the 11th of April a treaty between Great Britain and Russia was -signed, the two agreeing to promote a league among the powers to stop -further encroachments by Napoleon. Six weeks later the emperor was -crowned King of Italy, and in June Genoa was annexed to France. This -last act, contemplated by Napoleon for many years,[231] determined -Austria's accession to the treaty. By her signature, given August -9,[232] the third coalition was formed. Sweden became a party to it at -the same time, and Great Britain undertook to pay subsidies to all the -members. - -The preparations of Austria, ever deliberate, could not escape -Napoleon's watchful eye. "All my news from Italy is warlike," he -writes, "and indeed Austria no longer observes any concealment."[233] -Yet, trusting to his enemy's slowness and his own readiness, he did -not lose hope. The position was precisely analogous to those military -situations in which he had so often snatched success from overwhelming -numbers, by rapidly throwing himself on one enemy before the other -could join. He might even yet deal his long cherished blow to Great -Britain, under which, if successful, Austria also would at once -succumb. On August 13, two days after learning of Villeneuve's entry -into Coruña, he instructs Talleyrand to notify the emperor that the -troops assembled in the Tyrol _must_ be withdrawn to Bohemia, leaving -him free to carry on his war with England undisturbed, or by November -he will be in Vienna.[234] Urgent messages are the same day sent to -Villeneuve to hasten and fulfil his mission, for time was pressing; -threatened by Austria and Great Britain, a blow must speedily be -struck. He is no longer ordered to refrain from fighting. On the -contrary, if superior to the British, counting two Spanish ships equal -to one French, he is to attack at all hazards.[235] "If with thirty -ships my admirals fear to attack twenty-four British, we may as well -give up all hope of a navy."[236] - -On the 23d of August the emperor announces to Talleyrand his final -and momentous decision: "My squadron sailed August 14 from Ferrol -with thirty-four ships;[237] it had no enemy in sight. If it follows -my instructions, joins the Brest squadron and enters the Channel, -there is still time; I am master of England. If, on the contrary, my -admirals hesitate, manœuvre badly, and do not fulfil their purpose, -I have no other resource than to wait for winter to cross with the -flotilla. That operation is risky; it would be more so if, pressed by -time, political events should oblige me to postpone it to the month of -April. Such being the case, I hasten to meet the most pressing danger: -I raise my camp here, and by September 23 I shall have in Germany two -hundred thousand men, and twenty-five thousand in Naples. I march upon -Vienna, and do not lay down my arms until I have Naples and Venice, -and have no more to fear from Austria. Austria will certainly thus -be quieted during the winter." These words were a prophecy. The same -day numerous orders, strictly preparatory as yet, were issued to the -troops in Hanover, Holland, and Italy, and other provision made for -the contemplated change of purpose. At the same time, still clinging -to every hope of arresting Austria, and so being left free for the -invasion of England, he sent Duroc to Berlin to offer Hanover to -Prussia, upon condition that the latter should move troops toward -Bohemia or at least make a clear declaration to Austria. - -The issue was already decided. On the 13th of August, after three -fruitless attempts, Villeneuve got to sea with his twenty-nine -ships-of-the-line. The frigate "Didon" was sent to seek the Rochefort -squadron and direct it also upon Brest. Yet the unfortunate admiral was -even then hesitating whether he should go there with his vastly greater -force, and the orders were likely seriously to endanger the smaller -division. As he sailed, he penned these significant words to the -Minister of Marine: "The enemy's forces, more concentrated than ever, -leave me little other resource than to go to Cadiz."[238] - -Shortly after he cleared the harbor the wind shifted to north-east, -foul for his purpose. The fleet stood to the north-west; but the -ships were badly handled and several received damage. On the morning -of the 15th they were two hundred and fifty miles west-north-west -from Cape Finisterre; the wind blowing a moderate gale, still from -the north-east. Three ships of war were in sight,—two British, the -third the frigate that had been sent to seek the Rochefort squadron, -but which had been captured. A Danish merchantman reported that they -were lookouts from a hostile body of twenty-five ships. The story -had no foundation, for Cornwallis had not yet divided his fleet; but -Villeneuve pictured to himself his inefficient command meeting a force -with which it was wholly unable to cope. Losing sight of the great -whole of which his own enterprise was but a part, though one of vital -importance, his resolution finally broke down. That evening he ordered -the fleet to bear up for Cadiz. On the 20th[239] it was sighted from -the three ships commanded by Collingwood, who with a small division -of varying strength had watched the port since the previous May. With -steady judgment, that admiral in retiring kept just out of gunshot, -determined, as he said, not to be driven into the Mediterranean without -dragging the enemy too through the Straits. Villeneuve had little -heart to pursue. That afternoon he anchored in Cadiz, where were then -assembled thirty-five French and Spanish ships-of-the-line. Collingwood -at once resumed his station outside. That night one ship-of-the-line -joined him, and on the 22d Sir Richard Bickerton arrived with four from -the Mediterranean. On the 30th Calder appeared, bringing with him the -eighteen detached by Cornwallis. In compliance with his orders he had -been before Ferrol, found the port empty, and, learning that Villeneuve -had sailed for Cadiz, had hastened to re-enforce the blockade. With -twenty-six ships-of-the-line Collingwood held the enemy securely -checked, and remained in chief command until the 28th of September, -when Nelson arrived from England. - -Thus ended, and forever, Napoleon's profoundly conceived and -laboriously prepared scheme for the invasion of England. If it be -sought to fix a definite moment which marked the final failure of so -vast a plan, that one may well be chosen when Villeneuve made signal -to bear up for Cadiz. When, precisely, Napoleon learned the truth, -does not appear. Decrès, the Minister of Marine, had however prepared -him in some measure for Villeneuve's action; and, after a momentary -outburst of rage against the unfortunate admiral, he at once issued -in rapid succession the directions, by which, to use his own graphic -expression, his legions were made to "pirouette," and the march toward -the Rhine and Upper Danube was begun. "My decision is taken," he writes -to Talleyrand, August 25; "my movement is begun. Three weeks hence I -shall be in Germany with two hundred thousand men." During that and -the two following days order after order issued from his headquarters; -and on the 28th he wrote to Duroc that the army was in full movement. -To conceal his change of purpose and to gain all-important time, by -lulling the suspicions of Austria, he himself remained at Boulogne, -with his eyes seemingly fixed seaward, until the 3d of September, when -he went to Paris. On the 24th he left the capital for the army, on -the 26th he was at Strasbourg, and on the 7th of October the French -army, numbering near two hundred thousand, struck the Danube below -Ulm; cutting off some eighty thousand Austrians there assembled under -General Mack. On the 20th, the day before Trafalgar, Ulm capitulated; -thirty thousand men laying down their arms. Thirty thousand more had -been taken in the actions preceding this event.[240] On the 13th of -November French troops entered Vienna, and on the 2d of December the -battle of Austerlitz was won over the combined Russians and Austrians. -On the 26th the emperor of Germany signed the Peace of Presburg. By it -he relinquished Venice with all other possessions in Italy, and ceded -the Tyrol to Bavaria, the ally of France. - -Austria was thus quieted for three years, but the expedition against -Great Britain was never resumed. In the course of the following year -difficulties arose between Prussia and France, which led to war and -the overthrow of the North German kingdom at Auerstadt and Jena. Yet -another campaign was needed to bring Russia to peace in 1807. Meanwhile -the Boulogne flotilla was rotting on the beach. In October, 1807, -Decrès, by Napoleon's orders, made an inspection of the boats and the -four ports. Of the twelve hundred of the former, specially built for -the invasion, not over three hundred were fit to put to sea; of the -nine hundred transports nearly all were past service. The circular port -at Boulogne was covered two feet deep with sand; those of Vimereux and -Ambleteuse, three feet. A very few years more would suffice to bury -them.[241] In 1814 an English lady, visiting Boulogne after Napoleon's -first abdication, noted in her journal that the mud walls of the -encampment were still to be seen on the heights behind the town,—the -crumbling record of a great failure. - -The question will naturally here arise, What at any time were the -chances of success? To a purely speculative question, involving so many -elements and into which the conditions of sea war then introduced so -many varying quantities, it would be folly to reply with a positive -assertion. Certain determining factors may, however, be profitably -noted. It is, for instance, evident that, if Villeneuve on leaving the -West Indies had had with him the Ferrol squadron, and still more if he -had been joined by Ganteaume, he could have steered at once for the -Channel; and, by attending to well-known weather conditions, could -have entered it with a favoring wind sure to last him to Boulogne. The -difficulty of effecting such a combination in the West Indies, which -was Napoleon's favorite project, was owing to the presence of British -divisions before the hostile ports; and step by step this circumstance -drove the emperor back on what he pronounced the worst alternative,—a -concentration in front of Brest. As has been noticed, at the critical -moment when this final concentration was to be attempted, the British, -by a series of movements which resulted naturally from their strategic -policy, were before that port in force superior to either of the French -detachments seeking there to make their junction. Cornwallis's blunder -in dividing that force cannot obscure the military lesson involved. - -Nor can Calder's error, in suffering Villeneuve to escape him in July, -detract from the equally significant and precisely similar lesson -then illustrated. There also the British fleet was on hand to check -an important junction—at a point so far from Ferrol as to be out -of supporting distance by the division in the port—by virtue of an -intelligent use of interior positions and interior lines. - -To the strategic advantage conferred by these interior positions, -for clinging to which credit is due above all to St. Vincent, -is to be added the very superior character of the British -personnel,—particularly of the officers; for the immense demand for -seamen made it hard to maintain the quality of the crews. Continually -cruising, not singly but in squadrons more or less numerous, the ships -were ever on the drill ground,—nay, on the battle-field,—experiencing -all the varying phases impressed upon it by the changes of the ocean. -Thus practised and hardened into perfect machines, though inferior in -numbers, they were continually superior in force and in mobility to -their opponents. - -Possessing, therefore, strategic advantage and superior force, the -probabilities favored Great Britain. Nevertheless, there remained to -Napoleon enough chances of success to forbid saying that his enterprise -was hopeless. A seaman can scarcely deny that, despite the genius of -Nelson and the tenacity of the British officers, it was possible that -some favorable concurrence of circumstances might have brought forty -or more French ships into the Channel, and given Napoleon the mastery -of the Straits for the few days he asked. The very removal of the -squadrons of observation from before Rochefort and Ferrol, in order -to constitute the fleet with which Calder fought Villeneuve, though -admirable as a display of generalship, shows that the British navy, so -far as numbers were concerned, was not adequate to perfect security, -and might, by some conceivable combination of circumstances, have been -outwitted and overwhelmed at the decisive point. - -The importance attached by the emperor to his project was not -exaggerated. He might, or he might not, succeed; but, if he failed -against Great Britain, he failed everywhere. This he, with the -intuition of genius, felt; and to this the record of his after history -now bears witness. To the strife of arms with the great Sea Power -succeeded the strife of endurance. Amid all the pomp and circumstance -of the war which for ten years to come desolated the Continent, amid -all the tramping to and fro over Europe of the French armies and their -auxiliary legions, there went on unceasingly that noiseless pressure -upon the vitals of France, that compulsion, whose silence, when once -noted, becomes to the observer the most striking and awful mark of the -working of Sea Power. Under it the resources of the Continent wasted -more and more with each succeeding year; and Napoleon, amid all the -splendor of his imperial position, was ever needy. To this, and to -the immense expenditures required to enforce the Continental System, -are to be attributed most of those arbitrary acts which made him the -hated of the peoples, for whose enfranchisement he did so much. Lack -of revenue and lack of credit, such was the price paid by Napoleon -for the Continental System, through which alone, after Trafalgar, he -hoped to crush the Power of the Sea. It may be doubted whether, amid -all his glory, he ever felt secure after the failure of the invasion -of England. To borrow his own vigorous words, in the address to the -nation issued before he joined the army, "To live without commerce, -without shipping, without colonies, subjected to the unjust will of our -enemies, is to live as Frenchmen should not." Yet so had France to live -throughout his reign, by the will of the one enemy never conquered. - -On the 14th of September, before quitting Paris, Napoleon sent -Villeneuve orders to take the first favorable opportunity to leave -Cadiz, to enter the Mediterranean, join the ships at Cartagena, and -with this combined force move upon southern Italy. There, at any -suitable point, he was to land the troops embarked in the fleet to -re-enforce General St. Cyr, who already had instructions to be ready -to attack Naples at a moment's notice.[242] The next day these orders -were reiterated to Decrès, enforcing the importance to the general -campaign of so powerful a diversion as the presence of this great fleet -in the Mediterranean; but, as "Villeneuve's excessive pusillanimity -will prevent him from undertaking this, you will send to replace him -Admiral Rosily, who will bear letters directing Villeneuve to return -to France and give an account of his conduct."[243] The emperor had -already formulated his complaints against the admiral under seven -distinct heads.[244] On the 15th of September, the same day the orders -to relieve Villeneuve were issued, Nelson, having spent at home only -twenty-five days, left England for the last time. On the 28th, when he -joined the fleet off Cadiz, he found under his command twenty-nine -ships-of-the-line, which successive arrivals raised to thirty-three by -the day of the battle; but, water running short, it became necessary to -send the ships, by divisions of six, to fill up at Gibraltar. To this -cause was due that only twenty-seven British vessels were present in -the action,—an unfortunate circumstance; for, as Nelson said, what the -country wanted was not merely a splendid victory, but annihilation; -"numbers only can annihilate."[245] The force under his command was -thus disposed: the main body about fifty miles west-south-west of -Cadiz, seven lookout frigates close in with the port, and between these -extremes, two small detachments of ships-of-the-line,—the one twenty -miles from the harbor, the other about thirty-five. "By this chain," he -wrote, "I hope to have constant communication with the frigates." - -Napoleon's commands to enter the Mediterranean reached Villeneuve on -September 27. The following day, when Nelson was joining his fleet, -the admiral acknowledged their receipt, and submissively reported his -intention to obey as soon as the wind served. Before he could do so, -accurate intelligence was received of the strength of Nelson's force, -which the emperor had not known. Villeneuve assembled a council of -war to consider the situation, and the general opinion was adverse to -sailing; but the commander-in-chief, alleging the orders of Napoleon, -announced his determination to follow them. To this all submitted. An -event, then unforeseen by Villeneuve, precipitated his action. - -Admiral Rosily's approach was known in Cadiz some time before he could -arrive. It at first made little impression upon Villeneuve, who was -not expecting to be superseded. On the 11th of October, however, along -with the news that his successor had reached Madrid, there came to him -a rumor of the truth. His honor took alarm. If not allowed to remain -afloat, how remove the undeserved imputation of cowardice which he knew -had by some been attached to his name. He at once wrote to Decrès that -he would have been well content if permitted to continue with the fleet -in a subordinate capacity; and closed with the words, "I will sail -to-morrow, if circumstances favor." - -The wind next day was fair, and the combined fleets began to weigh. -On the 19th eight ships got clear of the harbor, and by ten A. M. -Nelson, far at sea, knew by signal that the long-expected movement had -begun. He at once made sail toward the Straits of Gibraltar to bar -the entrance of the Mediterranean to the allies. On the 20th, all the -latter, thirty-three ships-of-the-line accompanied by five frigates -and two brigs, were at sea, steering with a south-west wind to the -northward and westward to gain the offing needed before heading direct -for the Straits. That morning Nelson, for whom the wind had been fair, -was lying to off Cape Spartel to intercept the enemy; and learning from -his frigates that they were north of him, he stood in that direction to -meet them. - -During the day the wind shifted to west, still fair for the British and -allowing the allies, by going about, to head south. It was still very -weak, so that the progress of the fleets was slow. During the night -both manœuvred; the allies to gain, the British to retain, the position -they wished. At daybreak of the 21st they were in presence, the French -and Spaniards steering south in five columns; of which the two to -windward, containing together twelve ships, constituted a detached -squadron of observation under Admiral Gravina. The remaining twenty-one -formed the main body, commanded by Villeneuve. Cape Trafalgar, from -which the battle took its name, was on the south-eastern horizon, ten -or twelve miles from the allies; and the British fleet was at the same -distance from them to the westward. - -Soon after daylight Villeneuve signalled to form line of battle on -the starboard tack, on which they were then sailing, heading south. -In performing this evolution Gravina with his twelve ships took post -in the van of the allied fleet, his own flag-ship heading the column. -It is disputed between the French and Spaniards whether this step was -taken by Villeneuve's order, or of Gravina's own motion. In either -case, these twelve, by abandoning their central and windward position, -sacrificed to a great extent their power to re-enforce any threatened -part of the order, and also unduly extended a line already too long. -In the end, instead of being a reserve well in hand, they became the -helpless victims of the British concentration. - -At 8 A. M. Villeneuve saw that battle could not be shunned. Wishing to -have Cadiz under his lee in case of disaster, he ordered the combined -fleet to wear together. The signal was clumsily executed; but by ten -all had gone round and were heading north in inverse order, Gravina's -squadron in the rear. At eleven Villeneuve directed this squadron to -keep well to windward, so as to be in position to succor the centre, -upon which the enemy seemed about to make his chief attack; a judicious -order, but rendered fruitless by the purpose of the British to -concentrate on the rear itself. When this signal was made, Cadiz was -twenty miles distant in the north-north-east, and the course of the -allies was carrying them toward it. - -Owing to the lightness of the wind Nelson would lose no time in -manœuvring. He formed his fleet rapidly in two divisions, each in -single column, the simplest and most flexible order of attack, and -the one whose regularity is most easily preserved. The simple column, -however, unflanked, sacrifices during the critical period of closing -the support given by the rear ships to the leader, and draws upon the -latter the concentrated fire of the enemy's line. Its use by Nelson -on this occasion has been much criticised. It is therefore to be -remarked that, although his orders, issued several days previous to the -battle, are somewhat ambiguous on this point, their natural meaning -seems to indicate the intention, if attacking from to windward, to draw -up with his fleet in two columns parallel to the enemy and abreast -his rear. Then the column nearest the enemy, the lee, keeping away -together, would advance in line against the twelve rear ships; while -the weather column, moving forward, would hold in check the remainder -of the hostile fleet. In either event, whether attacking in column or -in line, the essential feature of his plan was to overpower twelve of -the enemy by sixteen British, while the remainder of his force covered -this operation. The destruction of the rear was entrusted to the second -in command; he himself with a smaller body took charge of the more -uncertain duties of the containing force. "The second in command," -wrote he in his memorable order, "will, after my instructions are made -known to him, have the entire direction of his line." - -The justification of Nelson's dispositions for battle at Trafalgar -rests therefore primarily upon the sluggish breeze, which would so have -delayed formations as to risk the loss of the opportunity. It must -also be observed that, although a column of ships does not possess the -sustained momentum of a column of men, whose depth and mass combine to -drive it through the relatively thin resistance of a line, and so cut -the latter in twain, the results nevertheless are closely analogous. -The leaders in either case are sacrificed,—success is won over their -prostrate forms; but the continued impact upon one part of the enemy's -order is essentially a concentration, the issue of which, if long -enough maintained, cannot be doubtful. Penetration, severance, and -the enveloping of one of the parted fragments, must be the result. -So, exactly, it was at Trafalgar. It must also be noted that the rear -ships of either column, until they reached the hostile line, swept -with their broadsides the sea over which enemy's ships from either -flank might try to come to the support of the attacked centre. No such -attempt was in fact made from either extremity of the combined fleet. - -[Illustration: The Attack at Trafalgar.] - -The two British columns were nearly a mile apart and advanced on -parallel courses,—heading nearly east, but a little to the northward -to allow for the gradual advance in that direction of the hostile -fleet. The northern or left-hand column, commonly called the "weather -line" because the wind came rather from that side, contained twelve -ships, and was led by Nelson himself in the "Victory," a ship of one -hundred guns. The "Royal Sovereign," of the same size and carrying -Collingwood's flag, headed the right column, of fifteen ships. - -To the British advance the allies opposed the traditional order of -battle, a long single line, closehauled,—in this case heading north, -with the wind from west-north-west. The distance from one flank to -the other was nearly five miles. Owing partly to the lightness of -the breeze, partly to the great number of ships, and partly to the -inefficiency of many of the units of the fleet, the line was very -imperfectly formed. Ships were not in their places, intervals were of -irregular width, here vessels were not closed up, there two overlapped, -one masking the other's fire. The general result was that, instead -of a line, the allied order showed a curve of gradual sweep, convex -toward the east. To the British approach from the west, therefore, it -presented a disposition resembling a re-entrant angle; and Collingwood, -noting with observant eye the advantage of this arrangement for a -cross-fire, commented favorably upon it in his report of the battle. It -was, however, the result of chance, not of intention,—due, not to the -talent of the chief, but to the want of skill in his subordinates. - -The commander-in-chief of the allies, Villeneuve, was in the -"Bucentaure," an eighty-gun ship, the twelfth in order from the van of -the line. Immediately ahead of him was the huge Spanish four-decker, -the "Santisima Trinidad," a Goliath among ships, which had now come -forth to her last battle. Sixth behind the "Bucentaure," and therefore -eighteenth in the order, came a Spanish three-decker, the "Santa Ana," -flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Alava. These two admirals marked the -right and left of the allied centre, and upon them, therefore, the -British leaders respectively directed their course,—Nelson upon the -"Bucentaure," Collingwood upon the "Santa Ana." - -The "Royal Sovereign" had recently been refitted, and with clean new -copper easily outsailed her more worn followers. Thus it happened that, -as Collingwood came within range, his ship, outstripping the others -by three quarters of a mile, entered alone, and for twenty minutes -endured, unsupported, the fire of all the hostile ships that could -reach her. A proud deed, surely, but surely also not a deed to be -commended as a pattern. The first shot of the battle was fired at her -by the "Fougueux," the next astern of the "Santa Ana." This was just at -noon, and with the opening guns the ships of both fleets hoisted their -ensigns; the Spaniards also hanging large wooden crosses from their -spanker booms. - -The "Royal Sovereign" advanced in silence until, ten minutes later, -she passed close under the stern of the "Santa Ana." Then she fired a -double-shotted broadside which struck down four hundred of the enemy's -crew, and, luffing rapidly, took her position close alongside, the -muzzles of the hostile guns nearly touching. Here the "Royal Sovereign" -underwent the fire not only of her chief antagonist, but of four other -ships; three of which belonged to the division of five that ought -closely to have knit the "Santa Ana" to the "Bucentaure," and so fixed -an impassable barrier to the enemy seeking to pierce the centre. The -fact shows strikingly the looseness of the allied order, these three -being all in rear and to leeward of their proper stations. - -For fifteen minutes the "Royal Sovereign" was the only British ship -in close action. Then her next astern entered the battle, followed -successively by the rest of the column. In rear of the "Santa Ana" were -fifteen ships. Among these, Collingwood's vessels penetrated in various -directions; chiefly, however, at first near the spot where his flag had -led the way, enveloping and destroying in detail the enemy's centre -and leading rear ships, and then passing on to subdue the rest. Much -doubtless was determined by chance in such confusion and obscurity; -but the original tactical plan insured an overwhelming concentration -upon a limited portion of the enemy's order. This being subdued with -the less loss, because so outnumbered, the intelligence and skill of -the various British captains readily compassed the destruction of the -dwindling remnant. Of the sixteen ships, including the "Santa Ana," -which composed the allied rear, twelve were taken or destroyed. - -Not till one o'clock, or nearly half an hour after the vessels next -following Collingwood came into action, did the "Victory" reach the -"Bucentaure." The latter was raked with the same dire results that -befell the "Santa Ana;" but a ship close to leeward blocked the way, -and Nelson was not able to grapple with the enemy's commander-in-chief. -The "Victory," prevented from going through the line, fell on board -the "Redoutable," a French seventy-four, between which and herself a -furious action followed,—the two lying in close contact. At half-past -one Nelson fell mortally wounded, the battle still raging fiercely. - -The ship immediately following Nelson's came also into collision -with the "Redoutable," which thus found herself in combat with two -antagonists. The next three of the British weather column each in -succession raked the "Bucentaure," complying thus with Nelson's -order that every effort must be made to capture the enemy's -commander-in-chief. Passing on, these three concentrated their efforts, -first, upon the "Bucentaure," and next upon the "Santisima Trinidad." -Thus it happened that upon the allied commander-in-chief, upon his -next ahead, and upon the ship which, though not his natural supporter -astern, had sought and filled that honorable post,—upon the key, in -short, of the allied order,—were combined under the most advantageous -conditions the fires of five hostile vessels, three of them -first-rates. Consequently, not only were the three added to the prizes, -but also a great breach was made between the van and rear of the -combined fleets. This breach became yet wider by the singular conduct -of Villeneuve's proper next astern. Soon after the "Victory" came -into action, that ship bore up out of the line, wore round, and stood -toward the rear, followed by three others. This movement is attributed -to a wish to succor the rear. If so, it was at best an indiscreet and -ill-timed act, which finds little palliation in the fact that not one -of these ships was taken. - -Thus, two hours after the battle began, the allied fleet was cut in -two, the rear enveloped and in process of being destroyed in detail, -the "Bucentaure," "Santisima Trinidad," and "Redoutable" practically -reduced, though not yet surrendered. Ahead of the "Santisima Trinidad" -were ten ships, which as yet had not been engaged. The inaction of -the van, though partly accounted for by the slackness of the wind, -has given just cause for censure. To it, at ten minutes before two, -Villeneuve made signal to get into action and to wear together. This -was accomplished with difficulty, owing to the heavy swell and want -of wind. At three, however, all the ships were about, but by an -extraordinary fatality they did not keep together. Five with Admiral -Dumanoir stood along to windward of the battle, three passed to leeward -of it, and two, keeping away, left the field entirely. Of the whole -number, three were intercepted, raising the loss of the allies to -eighteen ships-of-the-line taken, one of which caught fire and was -burned. The approach of Admiral Dumanoir, if made an hour earlier, -might have conduced to save Villeneuve; it was now too late. Exchanging -a few distant broadsides with enemy's ships, he stood off to the -south-west with four vessels; one of those at first with him having -been cut off. - -At quarter before five Admiral Gravina, whose ship had been the rear -of the order during the battle and had lost heavily, retreated toward -Cadiz, making signal to the vessels which had not struck to form around -his flag. Five other Spanish ships and five French followed him. As -he was withdrawing, the last two to resist of the allied fleet struck -their colors. - -During the night of the 21st these eleven ships anchored at the mouth -of Cadiz harbor, which they could not then enter, on account of a land -wind from south-east. At the same time the British and their prizes -were being carried shoreward by the heavy swell which had prevailed -during the battle; the light air blowing from the sea not enabling them -to haul off. The situation was one of imminent peril. At midnight the -wind freshened much, but fortunately hauled to the southward, whence -it blew a gale all the 22d. The ships got their heads to the westward -and drew off shore, with thirteen of the prizes; the other four having -had to anchor off Cape Trafalgar. That morning the "Bucentaure," -Villeneuve's late flag-ship, was wrecked on some rocks off the entrance -to Cadiz; and toward evening the "Redoutable," that had so nobly -supported her, was found to be sinking astern of the British ship that -had her in tow. During the night of the 22d she went down, with a -hundred and fifty of her people still on board. On the 24th the same -fate befell the great "Santisima Trinidad," which had been the French -admiral's next ahead. Thus his own ship and his two supports vanished -from the seas. - -For several days the wind continued violent from north-west and -south-west. On the 23d five of the ships that had escaped with Gravina -put out, to cut off some of the prizes that were near the coast. They -succeeded in taking two; but as these were battered to pieces, while -three of the five rescuers were carried on the beach and wrecked with -great loss of life, little advantage resulted from this well-meant -and gallant sortie. Two other prizes were given up to their own crews -by the British prize-masters, because the latter were not able with -their scanty force to save them. These got into Cadiz. Of the remaining -British prizes, all but four either went ashore or were destroyed by -the orders of Collingwood, who despaired of saving them. No British -ship was lost. - -Of thirty-three combined French and Spanish ships which sailed out of -Cadiz on the 20th of October, eleven, five French and six Spanish, -mostly now disabled hulks, lay there at anchor on the last day of -the month. The four that escaped to sea under Dumanoir fell in with -a British squadron of the same size near Cape Ortegal, on the 4th -of November, and were all taken. This raised the allied loss to -twenty-two,—two more than the twenty for which Nelson, in his dying -hour, declared that he had bargained. - -No attempt to move from Cadiz was again made by the shattered relics -of the fight. On the 25th of October Rosily arrived and took up his -now blasted command. Nearly three years later, when the Spanish -monarchy, so long the submissive tool of the Directory and of Napoleon, -had been overthrown by the latter, and the Spanish people had risen -against the usurper, the five French ships were still in the port. -Surprised between the British blockade and the now hostile batteries -of the coast, Rosily, after an engagement of two days with the latter, -surrendered his squadron, with the four thousand seamen then on board. -This event occurred on the 14th of June, 1808. It was the last echo of -Trafalgar. - -Such, in its leading outlines and direct consequences, was the famous -battle of Trafalgar. Its lasting significance and far-reaching results -have been well stated by a recent historian, more keenly alive than -most of his fellows to the paramount, though silent, influence of Sea -Power upon the course of events: "Trafalgar was not only the greatest -naval victory, it was the greatest and most momentous victory won -either by land or by sea during the whole of the Revolutionary War. -No victory, and no series of victories, of Napoleon produced the same -effect upon Europe.... A generation passed after Trafalgar before -France again seriously threatened England at sea. The prospect of -crushing the British navy, so long as England had the means to equip -a navy, vanished. Napoleon henceforth set his hopes on exhausting -England's resources, by compelling every state on the Continent to -exclude her commerce. Trafalgar forced him to impose his yoke upon -_all_ Europe, or to abandon the hope of conquering Great Britain.... -Nelson's last triumph left England in such a position that no means -remained to injure her but those which _must result in the ultimate -deliverance of the Continent_."[246] - -These words may be accepted with very slight modification. Napoleon's -scheme for the invasion of Great Britain, thwarted once and again by -the strategic difficulties attendant upon its execution, was finally -frustrated when Villeneuve gave up the attempt to reach Brest and -headed for Cadiz. On the part of the allies Trafalgar was, in itself, -a useless holocaust, precipitated in the end by the despair of the -unfortunate admiral, upon whose irresolution Napoleon not unjustly -visited the anger caused by the wreck of his plans. Villeneuve -was perfectly clear-sighted and right in his appreciation of the -deficiencies of his command,—of the many chances against success. -Where he wretchedly failed was in not recognizing the simple duty of -obedience,—the obligation to persist at all hazards in the part of a -great scheme assigned to him, even though it led to the destruction of -his whole force. Had he, upon leaving Ferrol, been visited by a little -of the desperation which brought him to Trafalgar, the invasion of -England might possibly—not probably—have been effected. - -An event so striking as the battle of Trafalgar becomes, however, to -mankind the symbol of all the circumstances—more important, perhaps, -but less obvious—which culminate in it. In this sense it may be said -that Trafalgar was the cause—as it certainly marked the period—of -Napoleon's resolution to crush Great Britain by excluding her commerce -from the Continent. Here, therefore, the story of the influence of -Sea Power upon this great conflict ceases to follow the strictly -naval events, and becomes concerned simply with commerce-destroying, -ordinarily a secondary operation of maritime war, but exalted in the -later years of Napoleon's reign to be the principal, if not the sole, -means of action. - -To this the two next chapters are devoted. Of these, the first deals -with commerce-destroying in the ordinary sense of the words, directed -against enemies' property on the high seas; beginning with the outbreak -of war in 1793, and narrating the series of measures by which the -republic sought to break down British commerce and foreshadowed the -policy of Napoleon's Berlin and Milan decrees. The second begins -with the Berlin decree, in 1806; and, tracing one by one the steps -which carried the emperor from violence to violence, seeks to show -how these found their necessary outcome in the Russian expedition and -the fall of the Empire. Detached thus, as far as may be, from the -maze of contemporary history in which they are commonly lost, these -successive acts of the French government are seen to form a logical -sequence, connected by one motive and dominated by one necessity. The -motive is the destruction of Great Britain, the necessity that of -self-preservation. Each nation, unassailable on its own element, stood -like an impregnable fortress that can be brought to surrender only by -the exhaustion of its resources. In this struggle of endurance Napoleon -fell. - - - - -CHAPTER XVII. - -THE WARFARE AGAINST COMMERCE DURING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE, -TO THE BERLIN DECREE. 1793-1806. - - -The Warfare against Commerce during the French Revolution, alike under -the Republic and under Napoleon, was marked by the same passionate -vehemence, the same extreme and far-reaching conceptions, the same -obstinate resolve utterly to overthrow and extirpate every opposing -force, that characterized the political and military enterprises of -the period. In the effort to bring under the yoke of their own policy -the commerce of the whole world, the two chief contestants, France and -Great Britain, swayed back and forth in deadly grapple over the vast -arena, trampling under foot the rights and interests of the weaker -parties; who, whether as neutrals, or as subjects of friendly or allied -powers, looked helplessly on, and found that in this great struggle -for self-preservation, neither outcries, nor threats, nor despairing -submission, availed to lessen the pressure that was gradually crushing -out both hope and life. The question between Napoleon and the British -people became simply one of endurance, as was tersely and powerfully -shown by the emperor himself. Both were expending their capital, and -drawing freely drafts upon the future, the one in money, the other in -men, to sustain their present strength. Like two infuriated dogs, they -had locked jaws over Commerce, as the decisive element in the contest. -Neither would let go his grip until failing vitality should loose it, -or until some bystander should deal one a wound through which the -powers of life should drain away. All now know that in the latter way -the end came. The commercial policy of the great monarch, who, from the -confines of Europe, had watched the tussle with all the eagerness of -self-interest, angered Napoleon. To enforce his will, he made new and -offensive annexations of territory. The czar replied by a commercial -edict, sharp and decisive, and war was determined. "It is all a scene -in the Opera," wrote Napoleon,[247] "and the English are the scene -shifters." Words failed the men of that day to represent the grandeur -and apparent solidity of the Empire in 1811, when Napoleon's heir was -born. In December, 1812, it was shattered from turret to foundation -stone; wrecked in the attempt "to conquer the sea by the land." The -scene was shifted indeed. - -Great Britain remained victorious on the field, but she had touched -the verge of ruin. Confronted with the fixed resolution of her enemy -to break down her commerce by an absolute exclusion from the continent -of Europe, and as far as possible from the rest of the world, she met -the challenge by a measure equally extreme, forbidding all neutral -vessels to enter ports hostile to her, unless they had first touched -at one of her own. Shut out herself from the Continent, she announced -that while this exclusion lasted she would shut the Continent off from -all external intercourse. "No trade except _through_ England," was the -formula under which her leaders expressed their purpose. The entrance -of Russia into this strife, under the provocations of Napoleon, -prevented the problem, which of these two policies would overthrow the -other, from reaching a natural solution; and the final result of the -measures which it is one object of this and the following chapter to -narrate must remain for ever uncertain. It is, however, evident that -a commercial and manufacturing country like Great Britain must, in a -strife the essence of which was the restriction of trade, suffer more -than one depending, as France did, mainly upon her internal resources. -The question, as before stated, was whether she could endure the -greater drain by her greater wealth. Upon the whole, the indications -were, and to the end continued to be, that she could do so; that -Napoleon, in entering upon this particular struggle, miscalculated his -enemy's strength. - -But besides this, here, as in every contest where the opponents are -closely matched, where power and discipline and leadership are nearly -equal, there was a further question: which of the two would make the -first and greatest mistakes, and how ready the other party was to -profit by his errors. In so even a balance, the wisest prophet cannot -foresee how the scale will turn. The result will depend not merely upon -the skill of the swordsman in handling his weapons, but also upon the -wariness of his fence and the quickness of his returns; much, too, upon -his temper. Here also Napoleon was worsted. Scarcely was the battle -over commerce joined, when the uprising of Spain was precipitated by -over-confidence; Great Britain hastened at once to place herself by the -side of the insurgents. Four years later, when the British people were -groaning in a protracted financial crisis,—when, if ever, there was -a hope that the expected convulsion and ruin were at hand,—Napoleon, -instead of waiting for his already rigorous blockade to finish the work -he attributed to it, strove to draw it yet closer, by demands which -were unnecessary and to which the czar could not yield. Again Great -Britain seized her opportunity, received her late enemy's fleet, and -filled his treasury. Admit the difficulties of Napoleon; allow as we -may for the intricacy of the problem before him; the fact remains that -he wholly misunderstood the temper of the Spanish people, the dangers -of the Spanish enterprise, the resolution of Alexander. On the other -hand, looking upon the principal charge against the policy of the -British government, that it alienated the United States, it is still -true that there was no miscalculation as to the long-suffering of the -latter under the guidance of Jefferson, with his passion for peace. The -submission of the United States lasted until Napoleon was committed to -his final blunder, thus justifying the risk taken by Great Britain and -awarding to her the strategic triumph. - -The Continental System of Napoleon, here briefly alluded to, and to be -described more fully further on, was, however, only the continuation, -in its spirit and aims, of a policy outlined and initiated by the -Republic under the Directory; which in turn but carried into its -efforts against commerce the savage thoroughness which the Convention -had sought to impress upon the general war. The principal measures of -the emperor found antitypes in the decrees of the Directory; the only -important difference being, that the execution of the latter reflected -the feeble planning and intermittent energy of the government which -issued them; whereas Napoleon, as always, impressed upon his system -a vigor, and employed for its fulfilment means, proportioned to the -arduousness of the task and the greatness of the expected results. -The one series being therefore but the successor and fulfilment of -the other, it has been thought best to present them in the same close -connection in which they stand in the order of events, so as to -show more clearly the unity of design running throughout the whole -history,—a unity due to the inexorable logic of facts, to the existence -of an external compulsion, which could in no other way be removed or -resisted. Both in common owed their origin to the inability of France -seriously to embarrass, by the ordinary operations of war, the great -commerce of her rival, though she launched her national cruisers and -privateers by dozens on every sea. The Sea Power of England held its -way so steadily, preserved its trade in the main so successfully, and -was withal so evidently the principal enemy, the key of the hostile -effort against France, that it drove not only the weak Directors, but -the great soldier and statesman who followed them, into the course -which led straight to destruction. - -The declarations of war were followed by the customary instructions to -commanders of ships-of-war and privateers to seize and bring into port -the merchant vessels of the enemy, as well as neutrals found violating -the generally acknowledged principles of international law. So far -there was nothing in the course of either belligerent that differed -from the usual and expected acts of States at war. At once the sea -swarmed with hastily equipped cruisers; and, as always happens on an -unexpected, or even sudden, outbreak of hostilities, many valuable -prizes were made by ships of either nation. The victims were taken -unawares, and the offence on each side was more active and efficient -than the defence. This first surprise, however, soon passed, and was -succeeded by the more regular course of maritime war. The great British -fleets gradually established a distinct preponderance over the masses -of the enemy, and the latter was quickly reduced to the ordinary -operations of commerce-destroying, in the sense usually given to that -word,—a policy, moreover, to which the national tradition and the -opinion of many eminent naval officers particularly inclined. - -To these raids upon their shipping, by numerous scattered cruisers, the -British opposed a twofold system. By the one, their merchant vessels -bound to different quarters of the globe were gathered in specified -ports, and when assembled sailed together under the care of a body of -ships of war, charged to conduct them to their voyage's end. This was -the convoy system, the essence of which was to concentrate the exposed -wealth of the country, under the protection of a force adequate to meet -and drive away any probable enemy. Immense numbers of ships thus sailed -together; from two to three hundred was not an unusual gathering; and -five hundred, or even a thousand,[248] were at times seen together -in localities like the Chops of the Channel or the entrance to the -Baltic, where the especial danger necessitated a stronger guard and a -more careful acceptance of protection by the trader,—thus emphasizing -and enlarging the peculiar features of the practice. It is scarcely -necessary to remark that much time was lost in collecting such huge -bodies, and that the common rate of sailing was far below the powers -of many of their members; while the simultaneous arrival of great -quantities of the same goods tended to lower prices. Consequently, many -owners, relying upon the speed of their vessels and upon good luck, -sailed without convoy upon completing their cargoes,—willing, after the -manner of merchants, to take great risks for the sake of great returns, -by being first in the market. To protect these, and others, which, by -misfortune or bad management parted from their convoy, as well as to -maintain their general command of the sea, the British resorted to -another system, which may be called that of patrol. Fast frigates and -sloops-of-war, with a host of smaller vessels, were disseminated over -the ocean, upon the tracks which commerce follows and to which the -hostile cruisers were therefore constrained. To each was assigned his -cruising ground, the distribution being regulated by the comparative -dangers, and by the necessary accumulation of merchant shipping in -particular localities, as the North Sea, the approach to the English -Channel, and, generally, the centres to which the routes of commerce -converge. The forces thus especially assigned to patrol duty, the ships -"on a cruise," to use the technical expression, were casually increased -by the large number of vessels going backward and forward between -England and their respective stations, dispatch-boats, ships going in -for repairs or returning from them, so that the seas about Europe -were alive with British cruisers; each one of which was wide-awake for -prizes. To these again were added the many privateers, whose cruising -ground was not indeed assigned by the government, but which were -constrained in their choice by the same conditions that dictated at -once the course of the trader and the lair of the commerce-destroyer. - -Through this cloud of friends and foes the unprotected merchantman had -to run the gantlet, trusting to his heels. If he were taken, all indeed -was not lost, for there remained the chance of recapture by a friendly -cruiser; but in that case the salvage made a large deduction from the -profits of the voyage. The dangers thus run were not, however, solely -at the risk of the owner; for, not to speak of the embarrassment caused -to others by the failure of one merchant, the crews of the ships, -the sailors, constituted a great potential element of the combatant -force of the nation. A good seaman, especially in those days of simple -weapons, was more than half ready to become at once a fighting man. In -this he differed from an untrained landsman, and the customs of war -therefore kept him, whenever taken afloat, a prisoner till exchanged. -Every merchant ship captured thus diminished the fighting power of -Great Britain, and the losses were so numerous that an act, known as -the Convoy Act, was passed in 1798, compelling the taking of convoy and -the payment of a certain sum for the protection. In the first year of -its imposition this tax brought in £1,292,000 to the Treasury, while -resulting in a yet greater saving of insurance to owners; and the -diminished number of prizes taken by the French was thought to be a -serious inconvenience to them, at a time when, by the admission of the -Directory, foreign commerce under their own flag was annihilated. This -remarkable confession, and the experience which dictated the Convoy -Act, may together be taken as an indication that, in the defence and -attack of commerce, as in other operations of war, concentration of -effort will as a rule be found a sounder policy than dissemination. -In 1795 the French formally abandoned the policy of keeping great -fleets together, as they had before done in their history, and took -to the _guerre de course_. Within three years, ending in December, -1798, "privateers alone put more than twenty thousand individuals in -the balance of exchanges favorable to England," and "not a single -merchant vessel sailed under the French flag."[249] "The fate of almost -all mere cruisers (_bâtimens armés en course_) is to fall, a little -sooner or later, into the hands of the enemy," and in consequence, -"out of a maritime conscription of eighty thousand seamen, to-day -but half remain" with which to man the fleet. British contemporary -authority gives 743 as the number of privateers taken from France -alone, between the outbreak of war in 1793 and the 31st of December, -1800,—not to speak of 273 ships of war of the cruiser classes.[250] The -absolute loss inflicted by the efforts of these vessels and their more -fortunate comrades cannot be given with precision; but as the result -of an inquiry, the details of which will be presented further on, the -author is convinced that it did not exceed two and a half per cent, -and probably fell below two per cent of the total volume of British -trade. This loss may be looked upon as a war tax, onerous indeed, but -by no means insupportable; and which it would be folly to think could, -by itself alone, exercise any decisive influence upon the policy of a -wealthy and resolute nation. Yet no country is so favorably situated as -France then was for operations against British commerce, whether in the -home waters or in the West Indies, at that time the source of at least -a fourth part of the trade of the Empire. - -The indecisiveness of the results obtained by the French in their war -against British shipping was not due to want of effort on their part. -On the contrary, the activity displayed by their corsairs, though -somewhat intermittent, was at times phenomenal; and this fact, as well -as the extraordinarily favorable position of France, must be kept in -view in estimating the probable advantages to be obtained from this -mode of warfare. At the period in question London carried on more than -half the commerce of Great Britain; in addition to its foreign trade -it was the great distributing centre of a domestic traffic, carried -on principally by the coasters which clustered by hundreds in the -Thames. The annual trade of export and import to the metropolis was -over £60,000,000, and the entries and departures of vessels averaged -between thirteen and fourteen thousand. Of this great going and coming -of ships and wealth, nearly two thirds had to pass through the English -Channel, nowhere more than eighty miles wide and narrowing to twenty at -the Straits of Dover; while the remaining third, comprising the trade -from Holland, Germany, and the Baltic, as well as the coasting trade -to North Britain, was easily accessible from the ports of Boulogne, -Dunkirk, and Calais, and was still further exposed after the French, -in 1794 and 1795, obtained complete control of Belgium and Holland. -From St. Malo to the Texel, a distance of over three hundred miles, the -whole coast became a nest of privateers of all kinds and sizes,—from -row-boats armed only with musketry and manned by a dozen men, or even -less, up to vessels carrying from ten to twenty guns and having crews -of one hundred and fifty. In the principal Channel ports of France -alone, independent of Belgium and Holland, there were at one time in -the winter of 1800 eighty-seven privateers, mounting from fourteen to -twenty-eight guns, besides numerous row-boats. These were actually -employed in commerce-destroying, and the fishing-boats of the coast -were capable upon short notice of being fitted for that service, in -which they often engaged. - -The nearness of the prey, the character of the seas, and the ease of -making shelter either on the French or English shore in case of bad -weather, modified very greatly the necessity for size and perfect -sea-worthiness in the vessels thus used; and also, from the shortness -of the run necessary to reach the cruising ground, each one placed on -this line of coast was easily equal to ten starting for the same object -from a more remote base of operations. Privateers sailing at sundown -with a fair wind from St. Malo, or Dieppe, or Dunkirk to cruise in the -Channel, would reach their cruising ground before morning of the long -winter nights of that latitude. The length of stay would be determined -by their good fortune in making prizes, if unmolested by a British -cruiser. They ventured over close to the English side; they were seen -at times from the shore seizing their prizes.[251] At Dover, in the -latter part of 1810, "signals were out almost every day, on account -of enemy's privateers appearing in sight."[252] Innocent-looking -fishing-boats, showing only their half-dozen men busy at their work, -lay at anchor upon, or within, the lines joining headland to headland -of the enemy's coast, watching the character and appearance of passing -vessels. When night or other favorable opportunity offered, they pulled -quickly alongside the unsuspecting merchantman, which, under-manned -and unwatchful, from the scarcity of seamen, was often first awakened -to the danger by a volley of musketry, followed by the clambering of -the enemy to the decks. The crews, few in number, poor in quality, -and not paid for fighting, offered usually but slight resistance to -the overpowering assault. Boarding was the corsair's game, because he -carried many men. - -It seems extraordinary that even the comparative impunity enjoyed by -the privateers—for that it was only comparative is shown by the fact -that an average of fifty were yearly captured—should have been attained -in the face of the immense navy of Great Britain, and the large number -of cruisers assigned to the protection of the coasts and the Channel. -There were, however, many reasons for it. The privateering spirit is -essentially that of the gambler and the lottery, and at no time was -that spirit more widely diffused in France than in the period before -us. The odds are not only great, but they are not easy to calculate. -The element of chance enters very unduly, and when, as in the present -case, the gain may be very great, while the immediate risk to the -owner, who does not accompany his ship, is comparatively small, the -disposition to push venture after venture becomes irresistible. The -seaman, who risks his liberty, is readily tempted by high wages and -the same hope of sudden profits that moves the owner; and this was -more especially true at a time when the laying up of the fleets, -and the disappearance of the merchant shipping, threw seafaring men -wholly upon the coasting trade or privateering. The number of ships -and men so engaged is thus accounted for; but among them and among -the owners there was a certain proportion who pursued the occupation -with a thoughtfulness and method which would distinguish a more -regular business, and which, while diminishing the risk of this, very -much increased the returns. Vessels were selected, or built, with -special reference to speed and handiness; captains were chosen in whom -seamanlike qualities were joined to particular knowledge of the British -coast and the routes of British trade; the conditions of wind and -weather were studied; the long winter nights were preferred because -of the cover they afforded; they knew and reckoned upon the habits of -the enemy's ships-of-war; account was kept of the times of sailing and -arrival of the large convoys.[253] On the British side, a considerable -deduction must be made from the efficiency indicated by the mere number -of the coast cruisers. Many of them were poor sailers, quite unable -to overtake the better and more dangerous class of privateers. The -inducements to exertion were not great; for the privateer meant little -money at best, and the abuses that gathered round the proceedings of -the Admiralty Courts often swallowed up that little in costs. The -command of the small vessels thus employed fell largely into the hands -of men who had dropped hopelessly out of the race of life, while their -more fortunate competitors were scattered on distant seas, and in -better ships. To such, the slight chance of a bootless prize was but a -poor inducement to exposure and activity, on the blustering nights and -in the dangerous spots where the nimble privateer, looking for rich -plunder, was wont to be found. It was worth more money to recapture a -British merchantman than to take a French cruiser. - -Privateering from the Atlantic, or Biscay, coast of France was -necessarily carried on in vessels of a very different class from those -which frequented the Channel. There was no inducement for the merchant -ships of Great Britain to pass within the line from Ushant to Cape -Finisterre; while, on the other hand, her ships-of-war abounded there, -for the double purpose of watching the French fleets in the ports, -and intercepting both the enemy's cruisers and their prizes, as they -attempted to enter. For these reasons, privateers leaving Bordeaux, -Bayonne, or Nantes, needed to be large and seaworthy, provisioned and -equipped for distant voyages and for a long stay at sea. Their greatest -danger was met near their home ports, either going or returning; -and their hopes were set, not upon the small and often unprofitable -coaster, but upon the richly laden trader from the East or West Indies -or the Mediterranean. Out, therefore, beyond the line of the enemy's -blockade, upon the deep sea and on one of the great commercial highways -converging toward the Channel, was their post; there to remain as long -as possible, and not lightly to encounter again the perils of the Bay -of Biscay. Moreover, being larger and more valuable, the owner had -to think upon their defence; they could not, like the cheap Channel -gropers, be thrown away in case of any hostile meeting. While they -could not cope with the big frigates of the enemy, there were still -his smaller cruisers, and the hosts of his privateers, that might be -met; and many a stout battle was fought by those French corsairs. One -of these, the "Bordelais," taken in 1799, was said then to be the -largest of her kind sailing out of France. She had the keel of a 38-gun -frigate, carried twenty-four 12-pounder guns, and a crew of two hundred -and twenty men. In four years this ship had captured one hundred and -sixty prizes, and was said to have cleared to her owners in Bordeaux a -million sterling.[254] - -A third most important and lucrative field for the enterprise of French -privateers was found in the West Indies. The islands of Guadaloupe and -Martinique served as excellent bases of operations. The latter indeed -was for many years in British possession, but the former remained, -practically without interruption, in the hands of France until its -capture in 1810. During the many years of close alliance, from 1796 to -1808, between France and Spain, the West Indian ports of the latter -served not only to maintain her own privateers, but to give a wide -extension to the efforts of her more active partner. The geographical -and climatic conditions of this region tended also to modify the -character both of the cruisers and of their methods. Along with a -very large European trade, carried on by ships of an average burden -of two hundred and fifty tons, there was also a considerable traffic -from island to island by much smaller vessels. This local trade was -not only between the possessions of the same nation or of friendly -States, but existed also, by means of neutrals or contraband, between -those of powers at war; and through these and her system of free ports, -together with liberal modifications of her commercial code wherever an -advantage could thereby be gained, Great Britain succeeded in drawing -into her own currents, in war as well as in peace, the course of much -of the export and import of the whole Caribbean Sea and Spanish Main. -From these two kinds of trade—combined with the general good weather -prevailing, with the contiguity of the islands to each other, and with -the numerous ports and inlets scattered throughout their extent—there -arose two kinds of privateering enterprise. The one, carried on mainly -by large and fast-sailing schooners or brigs, was found generally -suitable for undertakings directed against ships bound to or from -Europe; while for the other the various islands abounded with small -row-boats or other petty craft, each with its group of plunderers, -which lay in wait and usually in profound concealment to issue out -upon the passing trader.[255] The uncertain character of the wind in -some parts of the day particularly favored an attack, by two or three -heavily manned rowing boats, upon a vessel large enough to take them -all on board bodily, but fettered by calm and with a small crew. On one -occasion a United States sloop-of-war, lying thus motionless with her -ports closed, was taken for a merchantman and assailed by several of -these marauders, who then paid dearly for the mistake into which they -had been led by her seemingly unarmed and helpless condition. - -The remoteness of this region from Europe covered very great -irregularities, both by the privateers and in the courts. This evil -became greater in the French and Spanish islands, when, by the -progress of the war, the Sea Power of Great Britain more and more -broke off correspondence between them and the mother countries; and -when Napoleon's aggression drove the Spaniards into revolution and -anarchy, the control of Spain, always inert, became merely nominal. -These circumstances, coinciding with the presence of a very large -neutral shipping, mainly belonging to the United States, whose -geographical nearness made her one of the chief sources of supplies to -these colonies, caused the privateering of the Latin and mixed races -to degenerate rapidly into piracy, towards which that mode of warfare -naturally tends. As early as 1805, an American insurance company -complained to the Secretary of State that "property plundered by real -or pretended French privateers was uniformly taken into the ports of -Cuba, and there, with the connivance of the Spanish government, was -sold and distributed, _without any form of trial_, or pretence for -legal condemnation."[1] And the United States consul at Santiago de -Cuba reported officially that more than a thousand American seamen had -been landed in that port, most of them without clothes or any means of -support; and that "the scene of robbery, destruction, evasion, perjury, -cruelty, and insult, to which the Americans captured by French pirates, -and brought into this and adjacent ports, have been subjected, has -perhaps not been equalled in a century past."[256] This lawlessness -ended, as is generally known, in an actual prevalence of piracy on an -extensive scale, about the south side of Cuba and other unfrequented -parts of the archipelago, for some years after the war. From the -character of the ground and the slow communications of the day, these -desperadoes were finally put down only by the systematic and long -continued efforts of the various governments concerned. - -The Eastern trade of Great Britain was in the hands of the East India -Company; and its ships, which carried on the intercourse between India -and Europe, were of a size altogether exceptional in those days. At a -time when a small ship-of-the-line measured from fourteen to sixteen -hundred tons, and the traders between America and Europe averaged -under three hundred, a large proportion of the East Indiamen were of -twelve hundred tons burden, exceeding considerably the dimensions -of a first-class frigate.[257] Being pierced for numerous guns and -carrying many men, both crew and passengers, among whom often figured -considerable detachments of troops, they presented a very formidable -appearance, and were more than once mistaken for ships of war by French -cruisers; so much so that in the year 1804 a body of them in the China -seas, by their firm bearing and compact order, imposed upon a hostile -squadron of respectable size, commanded by an admiral of cautious -temper though of proved courage, making him for a brief period the -laughing stock of both hemispheres, and bringing down on his head a -scathing letter from the emperor. Their armament, however, was actually -feeble, especially in the earlier part of the French Revolution. About -the year 1801, it was determined to increase it so that the larger -ships should carry thirty-eight 18-pounders;[258] but the change seems -to have been but imperfectly effected, and upon the occasion in -question the ships which thus "bluffed" Admiral Linois were none of -them a match for a medium frigate. It is, indeed, manifestly impossible -to combine within the same space the stowage of a rich and bulky cargo -and the fighting efficiency of a ship of war of the same tonnage. -Still, the batteries, though proportionately weak, were too powerful -for ordinary privateers to encounter, unless by a fortunate surprise; -and, as the French entertained great, if not exaggerated, ideas of the -dependence of Great Britain upon her Indian possessions, considerable -efforts were made to carry on commerce-destroying in the Eastern -seas by squadrons of heavy frigates, re-enforced occasionally by -ships-of-the-line. These were the backbone of the _guerre de course_, -but their efforts were supplemented by those of numerous privateers of -less size, that preyed upon the coasting trade and the smaller ships, -which, from China to the Red Sea, and throughout the Indian Ocean, -whether under British or neutral flags, were carrying goods of British -origin. - -At the outbreak of the war Great Britain was taken unawares in India, -as everywhere; and, as the operations in Europe and in the West Indies -called for the first care of the government, the Indian seas were -practically abandoned to the enemy for over a year. After the fall -of Pondicherry, in September, 1793, Admiral Cornwallis returned to -Europe with all his small squadron, leaving but a single sloop-of-war -to protect the vast expanse of ocean covered by the commerce of the -East India Company.[259] Not till the month of October, 1794, did his -successor reach the station. Under these circumstances the losses were -inevitably severe, and would have been yet more heavy had not the -company itself fitted out several ships to cruise for the protection -of trade.[260] An animated warfare, directed solely toward the -destruction and protection of commerce, now ensued for several years, -and was marked by some exceedingly desperate and well-contested frigate -actions; as well as by many brilliant exploits of French privateersmen, -among whom the name of Robert Surcouf has attained a lasting celebrity. -Depending at first upon the islands of France and Bourbon as their -base of operations, the distance of these from the peninsula of -Hindoostan, combined with the size of the East India ships, compelled -the employment of relatively large vessels, able to keep the sea for -long periods and to carry crews which would admit of many detachments -to man prizes without unduly weakening the fighting capacity. When, -in 1795, the conquest of Holland and flight of the Orange government -turned the Dutch from enemies into allies of France, their colonies and -ports became accessories of great importance to the cruisers, owing to -their nearness to the scene of action and especially to the great trade -route between China and Europe. On the other hand the British, long -debarred from rewards for their efforts, other than recaptures of their -own merchant ships, now found the whole of the Dutch trade thrown open -to them, and the returns bear witness both to its numbers and to their -activity. - -Notwithstanding, however, the unprotected state of British commerce -in the early years of the war, and the distinguished activity of -the French cruisers, the insurance premiums at no time rose to the -sums demanded in 1782, when a concentrated effort to control the -sea by a fleet, under Admiral Suffren, was made by France.[261] At -that time the premiums were fifteen per cent; between 1798 and 1805 -they fluctuated between eight and twelve per cent. In 1805 the chief -command in the Indian seas was given to Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Pellew, -afterwards Lord Exmouth, and by his skilful arrangements such security -was afforded to the trade from Bombay to China, one of the most exposed -parts of the Eastern commercial routes, that the premium fell to eight -per cent, with a return of three per cent, if sailing with convoy. -Under this systematic care the losses by capture amounted to but one -per cent on the property insured, being less than those by the dangers -of the sea.[262] But during the very period that these happy results -were obtained by wisely applying the principle of concentration of -effort to the protection of commerce, disaster was overtaking the trade -of Calcutta; which lost nineteen vessels in two months through the -neglect of its merchants to accept the convoys of the admiral.[263] In -fact, as the small proportionate loss inflicted by scattered cruisers -appears to indicate the inconclusiveness of that mode of warfare, so -the result of the convoy system, in this and other instances, warrants -the inference that, when properly systematized and applied, it will -have more success as a defensive measure than hunting for individual -marauders,—a process which, even when most thoroughly planned, still -resembles looking for a needle in a haystack. - -Soon after this time the British government reverted most properly -to the policy of Pitt, by directing expeditions against the enemies' -colonies, the foreign bases of their Sea Power, and, in the absence of -great fleets, the only possible support upon which commerce-destroying -can depend; with whose fall it must also fall. The islands of Bourbon -and of France capitulated in 1810, the same year that saw the surrender -of Guadaloupe, the last survivor of the French West India Islands. -This was followed in 1811 by the reduction of the Dutch colony of -Java. Thus "an end was put to the predatory warfare which had been -successfully carried on against the British trade in India for a number -of years."[264] - -While the scattered cruisers of France were thus worrying, by a petty -and inconclusive warfare, the commerce of Great Britain and its neutral -carriers, the great British fleets, being left in quiet possession of -the seas by the avowed purpose of the Directory to limit its efforts -to the _guerre de course_, swept from the ocean every merchant ship -wearing a hostile flag, and imposed upon the neutral trade with France -the extreme limitations of maritime international law, as held by the -British courts. Toward the end of the war, indeed, those principles -were given an extension, which the government itself admitted was -beyond anything before claimed as reconcilable with recognized law. -The precise amount of the injury done, the exact number of the vessels -detained, sent in, and finally condemned, in all parts of the world -will perhaps never be known; it is certainly not within the power -of the present writer to determine them. The frequent, though not -complete, returns of British admirals give some idea of the prevailing -activity, which will also appear from the occasional details that must -be cited in the latter part of this chapter. Into the single port of -Plymouth, in the eight years and a half ending September 29, 1801, -there were sent 948 vessels of all nations;[265] of which 447 were -enemy's property, 156 recaptured British, and the remainder neutrals, -belonging mostly to America, Denmark, and Sweden, the three chief -neutral maritime states. From Jamaica, the British commander-in-chief -reports that, between March 1 and August 3, 1800,—that is, in five -months,—203 vessels have been captured, detained, or destroyed.[1] -This was in but one part of the West Indian Seas. The admiral at the -Leeward Islands reports that in two months of the same year 62 vessels -had been sent in.[1] In five months, ending September 3, 1800, Lord -Keith reports from the Mediterranean 180 captures.[266] How far these -instances may be accepted as a fair example of the usual results of -British cruising, it is impossible to say; but it may be remarked that -they all occur at a period when the war had been raging for seven -years, and that captures are more numerous at the beginning than at -the latter end of long hostilities. In war, as in all states of life, -people learn to accommodate themselves to their conditions, to minimize -risks; and even prize lists become subject to the uniformity of results -observed in other statistics. - -Whatever the particulars of French losses, however, they are all summed -up in the unprecedented admission of the Directory, in 1799, that "not -a single merchant ship is on the sea carrying the French flag." This -was by no means a figure of speech, to express forcibly an extreme -depression. It was the statement of a literal fact. "The former sources -of our prosperity," wrote M. Arnould, Chef du Bureau du Commerce, -as early as 1797, "are either lost or dried up. Our agricultural, -manufacturing, and industrial power is almost extinct." And again -he says, "The total number of registers issued to French ships from -September, 1793, to September, 1796, amounts only to 6028." Of these, -3351 were undecked and of less than thirty tons burden. "The maritime -war paralyzes our distant navigation and even diminishes considerably -that on our coasts; so that a great number of French ships remain -inactive, and perhaps decaying, in our ports. This remark applies -principally to ships of over two hundred tons, the number of which, -according to the subjoined table,[267] amounts only to 248. Before -the revolution the navigation of the seas of Europe and to the French -colonies employed more than 2,000 ships." - -In the year ending September 20, 1800, according to a report submitted -to the consuls,[268] France received directly from Asia, Africa, and -America, all together, less than $300,000 worth of goods; while her -exports to those three quarters of the world amounted to only $56,000. -Whether these small amounts were carried in French or neutral bottoms -is immaterial; the annihilation of French shipping is proved by them. -The same report shows that the average size of the vessels, which, by -hugging closely the coast, avoided British cruisers and maintained the -water traffic between France and her neighbors, Holland, Spain, and -Italy, was but thirty-six tons. Intercourse by water is always easier -and, for a great bulk, quicker than by land; but in those days of -wagon carriage and often poor roads it was especially so. In certain -districts of France great distress for food was frequently felt in -those wars, although grain abounded in other parts; because the surplus -could not be distributed rapidly by land, nor freely by water. For the -latter conveyance it was necessary to depend upon very small vessels, -unfit for distant voyages, but which could take refuge from pursuers in -the smallest port, or be readily beached; and which, if captured, would -not singly be a serious loss. - -Towards the end of 1795, a contemporary British authority states -that over three thousand British ships had been captured, and about -eight hundred French.[269] This was, however, confessedly only an -estimate, and probably, so far as concerns the British losses, a -large exaggeration. Ten years later a member of the House of Commons, -speaking with a view rather to disparage the earlier administration, -gave the British losses for the same years as 1,395.[270] Lloyd's lists -give the whole number of British captured, for the years 1793-1800, -both inclusive, as 4,344, of which 705 were recaptured; leaving a total -loss of 3,639.[271] Assuming, what is only for this purpose admissible, -that the average loss each year was nearly the same, these figures -would give for the three years, 1793-1795, 1,365 as the number of -captures made by hostile cruisers. In the tables appended to Norman's -"Corsairs of France" the losses for the same period are given as -1,636.[272] - -Finally, the number of prizes brought into French ports up to September -16, 1798, was stated by M. Arnould, in the Conseil des Anciens, as -being 2,658. The table from which his figures were taken he called "an -authentic list, just printed, drawn up in the office of the French -Ministry of Marine, of all prizes made since the outbreak of the -war."[273] It included vessels of all nationalities, during a period -when France had not only been at war with several states, but had made -large seizures of neutral vessels upon various pretexts. Of the entire -number M. Arnould considered that not more than 2,000 were British. If -we accept his estimate, only 900 British ships would have been taken in -three years. It is to be observed, however, as tending to reconcile the -discrepancy between this and the English accounts, that the tables used -by him probably did not give, or at most gave very imperfectly, the -French captures made in the East and West Indies; and, furthermore, the -aggregate British losses, as given by Lloyd's lists, and by Norman's -tables, include captures made by the Dutch and Spaniards as well as by -the French.[274] - -The British reports of their own losses are thus seen largely to exceed -those made by the French. According equal confidence to the statements -of Sir William Curtis, of Norman, and of Lloyd's list, we should reach -an annual loss by capture of 488 British ships; which would give a -total, in the twenty-one years of war, from 1793-1814,[275] of 10,248. -Norman's grand total of 10,871 considerably exceeds this amount; but -it will be safer, in considering a subject of so great importance as -the absolute injury done, and effect produced, by war upon commerce, -to accept the larger figure, or to say, in round numbers, that -eleven thousand British vessels were captured by the enemy during -the protracted and desperate wars caused by the French Revolution. It -is the great and conspicuous instance of commerce-destroying, carried -on over a long series of years, with a vigor and thoroughness never -surpassed, and supported, moreover, by an unparalleled closure of the -continental markets of Great Britain. The Directory first, and Napoleon -afterwards, abandoned all attempts to contest the control of the sea, -and threw themselves, as Louis XIV. had done before them, wholly upon -a cruising war against commerce. It will be well in this day, when the -same tendency so extensively prevails, to examine somewhat carefully -what this accepted loss really meant, how it was felt by the British -people at the time, and what expectation can reasonably be deduced -from it that, by abandoning military control of the sea, and depending -exclusively upon scattered cruisers, a country dependent as Great -Britain is upon external commerce can be brought to terms. - -Evidently, a mere statement of numbers, such as the above, without -any particulars as to size, or the value of cargoes, affords but a -poor indication of the absolute or relative loss sustained by British -commerce. It may, however, be used as a basis, both for comparison -with the actual number of vessels entering and clearing annually from -British ports, and also for an estimate as to the probable tonnage -captured. The annual average of capture, deduced from 11,000 ships in -twenty-one years is 524. In the three years 1793-1795, the average -annual number of British vessels entering and clearing from ports of -Great Britain was 21,560.[276] Dividing by 524, it is found that one -fortieth, or two and a half per cent of British shipping, reckoning -by numbers, was taken by the enemy. In the three years 1798-1800, -1801 being the year of broken hostilities, the average annual entries -and departures were 21,369,[1] which again gives two and a half as -the percentage of the captures. It must be noted, also, that only the -commerce of England and Scotland with foreign countries, with the -colonies, with Ireland and the Channel Islands, and with British India -enters into these lists of arrivals and departures. The returns of that -day did not take account of British coasters, nor of the local trade -of the colonies, nor again of the direct intercourse between Ireland -and ports other than those of Great Britain. Yet all these contributed -victims to swell the list of prizes,[277] and so to increase very -materially the apparent proportion of the latter to a commerce of which -the returns cited present only a fraction. Unfortunately, the amount of -the coasting trade cannot now be ascertained,[278] and the consequent -deduction from the calculated two and a half per cent of loss can only -be conjectured. - -To obtain the tonnage loss there appears to the writer no fairer means -than to determine the average tonnage of the vessels entering and -departing as above, at different periods of the war. In the three years -1793-1795, the average size of each ship entering or sailing from the -ports of Great Britain, including the Irish trade, was 121 tons. In -the year 1800 the average is 126 tons. In 1809 it has fallen again to -121, and in 1812 to 115 tons. We cannot then go far wrong in allowing -125 tons as the average size of British vessels employed in carrying on -the foreign and the coasting trade of Great Britain itself during the -war.[279] On this allowance the aggregate tonnage lost in the 11,000 -British prizes, would be 1,375,000 in twenty-one years. In these years -the aggregate British tonnage entering and leaving the ports of Great -Britain, exclusive of the great neutral tonnage employed in carrying -for the same trade, amounted to over 55,000,000;[280] so that the loss -is again somewhat less than one fortieth, or 2½ per cent. - -Another slight indication of the amount of loss, curious from its -coincidence with the above deductions, is derived from the report of -prize goods received into France in the year ending September, 1800, -which amounted to 29,201,676 francs. At the then current value of the -franc this was equivalent to £1,216,000. The real value of British -exports for 1800 was £56,000,000, the prize goods again being rather -less than one fortieth of the amount. The imports, however, being -also nearly £56,000,000, the loss on the entire amount falls to one -eightieth. It is true that many of these prize goods were probably -taken in neutrals, but on the other hand the report does not take into -account French capture in the colonies and East Indies; nor those made -by Holland and Spain, the allies of France. - -If the total number of vessels _belonging_ to Great Britain and all -her dependencies be taken, as the standard by which to judge her loss -by captures, it will be found that in 1795 they amounted to 16,728;[1] -in 1800, 17,885;[281] in 1805, 22,051;[2] in 1810, 23,703.[282] Using -again 524 as the annual number of captures, the annual proportion of -loss is seen gradually to fall from a very little over 3 per cent, in -the first year, to somewhat less than 2½ per cent, in the last. - -Finally, it may be added that the Lloyd's list before quoted gives -the total number of losses by sea risks, 1793-1800, as 2,967; which, -being contrasted with the losses by capture, 3,639, shows that the -danger from enemy's cruisers very little exceeded those of the ocean. -To offset, though only partially, her own losses, Great Britain -received prize goods, during the same years, to the amount of over -£5,000,000.[283] There were also engaged in carrying on her commerce, -in 1801, under the British flag, 2,779 vessels, measuring 369,563 tons, -that had been brought into her ports as prizes; which numbers had -increased in 1811 to 4,023 ships and 536,240 tons.[284] - -Taking everything together, it seems reasonable to conclude that the -direct loss to the nation, by the operation of hostile cruisers, did -not exceed 2½ per cent of the commerce of the Empire; and that this -loss was partially made good by the prize ships and merchandise taken -by its own naval vessels and privateers. A partial, if not a complete, -compensation for her remaining loss is also to be found in the great -expansion of her mercantile operations carried on under neutral flags; -for, although this too was undoubtedly harassed by the enemy, yet to -it almost entirely was due the increasing volume of trade that poured -through Great Britain to and from the continent of Europe, every ton of -which left a part of its value to swell the bulk of British wealth. The -writings of the period show that the injuries due to captured shipping -passed unremarked amid the common incidents and misfortunes of life; -neither their size nor their effects were great enough to attract -public notice, amid the steady increase of national wealth and the -activities concerned in amassing it. "During all the operations of war -and finance," says one writer, "the gains of our enterprising people -were beyond all calculation, however the unproductive classes may -have suffered from the depreciation of money and the inequalities of -taxation. Our commerce has become more than double its greatest extent -during the happiest years of peace."[285] There were, indeed, darker -shades to the picture, for war means suffering as well as effort; but -with regard to the subject-matter of this chapter, Commerce, and its -fate in this war, there was for many years but one voice, for but one -was possible. The minister, essentially a master of trade and finance, -delighted year by year to enlarge upon the swelling volume of business -and the growing returns of the revenue. Not only did the new taxes -bring in liberally, but the older ones were increasingly productive. -These signs of prosperity were not seen all at once. The first plunge -into the war was followed, as it always is, by a shrinking of the -system and a contraction of the muscles; but as the enemy more and more -surrendered the control of the sea, as the naval victories of the years -1797 and 1798 emphasized more and more the absolute dominion of Great -Britain over it, and as the new channels of enterprise became familiar, -the energies of the people expanded to meet the new opportunities. - -The share borne by neutral shipping in the extension and maintenance -of this extraordinary fabric of prosperity, thus existing in the -midst of all the sorrow, suffering, and waste of war, must next be -considered; for it was the cause of the remarkable measures taken by -both belligerents against neutral trade, which imparted so singular -and desolating a character to the closing years of the struggle and -affected deeply the commerce of the whole world. At the very beginning -of the war Great Britain proceeded to avail herself of the services -of neutrals, by a remission of that part of the Navigation Act which -required three fourths of the crews of British merchantmen to be -British subjects. On the 30th of April, 1793, this was so modified -as to permit three fourths to be foreigners, to replace the large -body taken for the fleets. This was followed, from time to time, as -the number of enemies multiplied through the extending conquests -and alliances of France, by a series of orders and proclamations, -infringing more and more upon the spirit of the Act, with the direct -and obvious purpose of employing neutral vessels to carry on operations -hitherto limited to the British flag. The demands of the navy for -seamen, the risks of capture, the delays of convoy, entirely arrested, -and even slightly set back, the development of the British carrying -trade; while at the same time the important position of Great Britain -as the great manufacturing nation, coinciding with a diminution in the -productions of the Continent, consequent upon the war, and a steadily -growing demand for manufactured goods on the part of the United -States, called imperiously for more carriers. The material of British -traffic was increasing with quickened steps, at the very time that -her own shipping was becoming less able to bear it. Thus in 1797, -when the British navy was forced to leave the Mediterranean, all the -Levant trade, previously confined to British ships, was thrown open -to every neutral. In 1798, being then at war with Spain, the great -raw material, Spanish wool, essential to the cloth manufactures, was -allowed to enter in vessels of any neutral country. The produce even -of hostile colonies could be imported by British subjects in neutral -bottoms, though not for consumption in England, but for re-exportation; -a process by which it paid a toll to Great Britain, without directly -affecting the reserved market of the British colonist. The effect -of these various conditions and measures can best be shown by a few -figures, which indicate at once the expansion of British commerce, the -arrest of British carrying trade, and the consequent growth of the -neutral shipping. In 1792, the last year of peace, the total British -exports and imports amounted to £44,565,000; in 1796 to £53,706,000; -in 1800, the last unbroken year of war, to £73,723,000.[286] For the -same years the carrying of this trade was done, in 1792, by 3,151,389 -tons of British, and 479,630 tons of foreign shipping; in 1796, by -2,629,575 British, and 998,427 foreign; in 1800, by 2,825,078 British -and 1,448,287 foreign. Thus, while there was so great an increase in -the commerce of the kingdom, and it employed nearly 650,000 more tons -of shipping in 1800 than in 1792, the amount carried in British ships -had fallen off; and the proportion of neutral bottoms had risen from -thirteen to nearly thirty-four per cent. - -The significance of these facts could not escape the French government, -nor yet the jealousies of certain classes connected with the carrying -trade in Great Britain herself; but in the first war the latter were -not joined by the other powerful and suffering interests, which -gradually impelled the ministry into a series of acts deeply injurious -to all neutrals, but chiefly to the United States. In France, the early -effusiveness of the revolutionists toward England, based upon the hope -that she too would be swept into the torrent of their movement, had -been quickly chilled and turned to bitterness, greater even than that -which had so long divided the two nations. Victorious everywhere upon -the Continent, the government saw before it only one unconquerable -enemy, the Power of the Sea; it knew that she, by her subsidies and -her exhortations, maintained the continental states in their recurring -hostilities, and it saw her alone, amid the general confusion and -impoverishment, preserve quiet and increase a wealth which was not only -brilliant, but solid. The Directory therefore reached the conclusion, -which Napoleon made the basis of his policy and which he never wearied -of proclaiming, that Great Britain maintained the war and promoted -the discord of nations for the simple purpose of founding her own -prosperity upon the ruin of all other commerce, her power upon the -ruin of all other navies.[287] At the same time the French government -held tenaciously to that profound delusion, the bequest to it from -past generations of naval officers and statesmen, that a war directed -against the commerce of Great Britain was a sure means of destroying -her. It knew that hosts of privateers were employed, and that very -many British prizes were brought in; yet, withal, the great Sea Power -moved steadily on, evidently greater and stronger as the years went -by. It knew also that her manufactures were increasing, that their -products filled the Continent; that the produce of the East and of the -West, of the Baltic and of the Mediterranean, centred in Great Britain; -and that through her, not the Continent only, but France herself, -drew most of her tropical articles of consumption. There was but one -solution for this persistent escape from apparently sure destruction; -and that was to be found in the support of the neutral carrier and the -pockets of the neutral consumer. From this premise the fatal logic of -the French Revolution was irresistibly drawn to the conclusion that, -as every neutral ship engaged in the British carrying trade was a -help to England, it was consequently an enemy to France and liable to -capture.[288] Napoleon but amplified this precedent when he declared -that there were no more neutrals, and placed before Sweden, longing -only for quiet, the option "war with France or cannon-balls for English -vessels approaching your ports." - -The exceptionally intense spirit which animated the parties to this -war trenched with unusual severity upon the interests of neutral -powers, always more or less in conflict with the aims of belligerents. -These questions also received new importance, because now appeared -for the first time a neutral maritime state, of great extent and -rapidly growing, whose interests and ambitions at that time pointed to -shipping and carrying trade as forms of enterprise for which it had -received from nature peculiar facilities. In all previous wars the -Americans had acted as the colonists of Great Britain, either loyal or -in revolt. In 1793 they had for four years been a nation in the real -sense of the word, and Washington's first term closed. In the very -first Congress measures were taken for developing American shipping, -by differential duties upon native and foreign ships.[289] From the -impulse thus given, combined with the opening offered by the increase -of British trade and the diminished employment of British shipping, -the ship-builders and merchants extended their operations rapidly. By -the report of a committee of the House, January 10, 1803, it appears -that the merchant tonnage of the United States was then inferior to -that of no other country, except Great Britain.[290] In 1790 there had -entered her ports from abroad, 355,000 tons of her own shipping and -251,000 foreign, of which 217,000 were British.[291] In the year 1801 -there entered 799,304 tons of native shipping,[292] and of foreign but -138,000.[293] The amount of British among the latter is not stated; -but in the year 1800 there cleared from Great Britain under her own -flag, for the United States, but 14,381 tons.[294] Figures like these -give but a comparative and partial view of the activity of American -shipping, leaving out of account all the carrying done by it outside -the ken of the home authorities; but it is safe to say that the United -States contributed annually at least six hundred thousand tons to -maintain the traffic of the world, which, during those eventful years, -centred in Great Britain and ministered to her power. Among the forms -of gain thus opened to American traders there was one to which allusion -only will here be made, because at a later period it became the source -of very great trouble, leading step by step to the war of 1812. This -was the carriage of the productions of French and other colonies, -enemies of Great Britain, to the United States, and thence re-exporting -them to Europe. - -Besides the new state in the Western Hemisphere, there were three -others whose isolated position had hitherto given them the character -of neutrals in the maritime wars of the eighteenth century. These were -the Baltic countries, Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, which had combined -in 1780 to defend their neutral rights, if need were, by force of arms. -The power of this confederacy to assume the same attitude in 1793 -was broken by the policy of Russia. By whatever motives swayed, the -Empress Catharine took decided ground against the French Revolution. -On the 25th of March, 1793, a convention between her and the British -government was signed, by which both parties agreed, not only to close -their own ports against France and not to permit the exportation -of food to that country, but also "to unite all their efforts _to -prevent other powers_, not implicated in the war, from giving, on this -occasion of common concern to every civilized state, any protection -whatever, directly or indirectly in consequence of their neutrality, -to the commerce or property of the French on the sea."[295] How the -empress understood this engagement was shown by her notification, -during the same summer, to the courts of Sweden and Denmark, that -she would station a fleet in the North Sea to prevent neutrals bound -to France from proceeding.[296] Great Britain had already—June 8, -1793—directed the commanders of cruisers to detain all vessels loaded -with flour or grain, bound to French ports, and to send them to -England, where the cargo would be purchased and freight paid by the -British government.[297] These instructions were duly communicated to -the government of the neutral states, which protested with more or -less vigor and tenacity, but found themselves helpless to resist force -with force. Singularly enough, the French government had preceded the -British on this occasion, having issued orders to the same effect on -the 9th of the previous May; but the fact appears to have escaped the -ministry, for, in justifying their action to the United States, they do -not allude to it. Their course is defended on the broad ground that, -from the character of the war and the situation of France, there was -a fair prospect of starving her into submission,[298] and that under -such circumstances provisions, always a questionable article, became -contraband of war. The answer was not satisfactory to the neutral, -deprived of part of his expected gains, but the argument was one of -those that admit of no appeal except to arms. A further justification -of the order was found by the British ministry in the undoubted fact -that "the French government itself was the sole legal importer of -grain in France" at that time; and therefore "the trade was no longer -to be regarded as a mercantile speculation of individuals, but as an -immediate operation of the very persons who have declared war, and are -now carrying it on, against Great Britain." The American minister to -France, Monroe, confirms this, in his letter of October 16, 1794: "The -whole commerce of France, to the absolute exclusion of individuals, is -carried on by the government itself."[299] - -Soon after, on the 6th of November, 1793, another order was issued -by the British ministry, directing the seizure of "all ships laden -with goods the produce of any colony belonging to France, or carrying -provisions or other supplies for the use of any such colony." This -order was based upon the Rule of 1756, so called from the war in which -it first came conspicuously into notice, and the principle of which, as -stated by British authorities, was that a trade forbidden to neutrals -by the laws of a country, during peace, could not be lawfully carried -on by them in time of war, for the convenience of the belligerent; -because, by such employment, their ships "were in effect incorporated -in the enemy's navigation, having adopted his commerce and character -and identified themselves with his interests and purposes."[300] At -that time the colonial trade was generally reserved to the mother -country; and against it particularly, together with the coasting -trade, similarly restricted, was this ruling of the British courts and -government directed. Neutrals replied, "Because the parent country -monopolizes in peace the whole commerce of its colonies, does it follow -that in war it should have no right to regulate it at all?"[301] "We -deny that municipal regulations, established in peace, can in any wise -limit the public rights of neutrals in time of war."[302] It is evident -that these two lines of argument do not fairly meet each other; they -resemble rather opposite and equal weights in a balance, which will -quickly be overturned when passion or interest, combined with power, is -thrown in upon either side. Starting from such fundamentally different -premises, interested parties might argue on indefinitely in parallel -lines, without ever approaching a point of contact. - -The chief present interest in this question, referring as it does -to an obsolete colonial policy, is as illustrative of one of those -dead-locks, which, occurring at a critical moment, when passion or -interest is aroused, offer no solution but by war. It was useless to -point out that Great Britain relaxed in every direction her own peace -regulations, for the advantage of British commerce in the present -contest. The reply was perfectly apt, that she did not dispute the -right of her enemy to avail himself of any help the neutral could give; -she only asserted the determination not to permit the neutral to extend -it with impunity. There was no doubt, in the mind of any considerable -body of Englishmen, as to the perfect soundness of the English -doctrine. Lord Howick, who, as Mr. Grey, had embarrassed his party in -1792 by the exuberance of his liberalism,[303] as foreign minister -in 1807 wrote: "Neutrality, properly considered, does not consist in -taking advantage of every situation between belligerent states by which -emolument may accrue to the neutral, whatever may be the consequences -to either belligerent party; but in observing a strict and honest -impartiality, so as not to afford advantage in the war to either; and, -particularly, in so far restraining its trade to the accustomed course -which it held in time of peace, as not to render assistance to one -belligerent in escaping the effects of the other's hostilities."[304] -An agreement among any number of the subjects of the interested nation -proves nothing as to the right of the question, but the irreconcilable -divergence of views at this time shows most clearly the necessity, -under which every country lies, to be ready to support its own sense of -its rights and honor by force, if necessary. - -Under the order of November 6, some hundreds of American ships were -seized and brought into West Indian ports by British cruisers.[305] The -application of the order to them was, however, liable to two serious -objections, even admitting the principle. In the first place, it was -made without warning, under a rule that was at least not generally -accepted; and in the second place, the trade between the French West -India Islands and the United States had been permitted, before the -war, in vessels of sixty tons and upwards.[306] In the year ending -September 30, 1790, fifty-seven thousand tons of American shipping -entered home ports from the French colonies. The trade, therefore, was -one that existed prior to the war, and so did not come under the rule -of 1756.[307] The order of November 6 was not made public until nearly -the end of the year; the United States minister in London not receiving -a copy until Christmas Day. He hastened at once to protest, but before -he could obtain an audience a second was issued, January 8, 1794, -revoking the former and limiting the operations of the rule to vessels -bound from the colonies direct to Europe. Although the principle was -maintained by the new order, and not admitted by the United States, -still, as their own trade was excepted, much dissatisfaction was -removed. - -The serious nature of the difficulties that had already arisen -determined the government to send an extraordinary envoy to England. -John Jay was nominated to this office, and reached London in June, -1794. The British government, having already receded from its first -position, as well as revoked the order of June 8, 1793, for the -seizure of provisions, found no difficulty in assuming a conciliatory -attitude. The result of Jay's mission was a treaty of Commerce and -Navigation, concluded November 19, 1794, the first contracted between -the two countries since the separation. The injuries done to American -commerce, under the orders of November 6, were to be submitted to a -joint commission. The report of the latter was not made until 1804, -but by it compensation was made for most of the seizures; and it was -claimed in the following year by Mr. Monroe, then envoy in London, that -the decision of the commission definitely disposed of the principle of -the Rule of 1756. It does not appear, however, that its power extended -further than the settlement of the cases. There, its decision was to be -final; but it had no power to commit either government to any general -principle of international law not otherwise established.[308] The -Rule of 1756 was not mentioned in the treaty, and the failure to do so -may be construed as a tacit acquiescence, or at least submission, on -the part of the United States.[309] On the other hand, considerable -commercial advantages were obtained. Great Britain conceded to American -ships the privilege of direct trade between their own country and the -British East and West Indies, but they were precluded from carrying -the produce of those colonies to other foreign ports. Indeed, so great -was the anxiety of the British ministers to prevent coffee and sugar -from being taken to Europe, indirectly, by neutral ships, that they -insisted upon, and Jay admitted, a stipulation that while the trade -with the British West Indies was permitted, the United States would not -allow the carrying of any molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa, or cotton -in American vessels to any other part of the world than to the United -States. This would have stopped a profitable trade already open to -American merchants, who first imported, and then re-exported to France, -the produce of the French islands; the broken voyage being considered -to purge the origin of the commodities. This article (the twelfth) was -accordingly rejected by the Senate, and only as thus modified was the -treaty ratified by both powers. - -The French government had viewed with distrust the negotiation between -Great Britain and the United States. Although assured by Mr. Jay, -through the American minister at Paris, that the treaty contained an -express stipulation guarding the existing conventions between France -and his own country, the Directory had the insolence to demand a copy -of the instrument, to which it considered itself entitled, although -it had not yet been communicated to the United States government. -When the terms finally became known, its indignation passed bounds. -The principal points to which it took exception were two, wherein -the United States admitted conditions favoring the interests of -belligerents relatively to neutrals, and against which the chief -efforts of the weaker maritime states had been addressed. The first -of these was the well-settled principle that a neutral ship did not -protect property belonging to an enemy, laden on board it. The United -States had always admitted this as valid, while trying to introduce, as -an innovation, the contrary rule. In the treaty of 1778 with France, -the two countries had stipulated that in any future war in which one -of them should be engaged the belligerent should respect his enemy's -property, if under the flag of the other party to the compact; but -the United States did not think that this agreement between two -nations overturned for all others a settled usage. The interests of -Great Britain indisposed her to accept the proposed change, and the -old principle was explicitly accepted in the seventeenth article of -Jay's treaty. The other point objected to by France referred to the -definitions of contraband of war. This has always been, and still -is, one of the most difficult problems of international law; for an -article may be of the first importance in the wars of one age or one -country, and of slight consequence in another century or a different -scene. By Jay's treaty the United States allowed that naval stores -were, and under some circumstances provisions might be, contraband of -war, and therefore liable to seizure. A free trade in these articles -was of great importance to the Americans; but they were weak then, as -in a military sense they, with far less excuse, are now; and then, as -now, they must submit in questions of doubtful right. The material -interests of United States citizens, as distinguished from the national -self-respect, were in part saved by Great Britain undertaking to pay -for provisions when seized as contraband. All these conditions bore -against the wishes of the French, who regarded the Americans as owing -an undischarged debt of gratitude to them for the scanty, though -certainly most important, aid extended in the Revolutionary struggle -by the monarch whom his people had since beheaded; and from this time -the arrogance with which the French government had treated that of -the United States became tinged with acrimony. It refused to see the -difficulties and weakness of the new and still scarcely cemented body -of states; or that, indirectly, the bargain struck by the latter was -upon the whole as advantageous to France herself as could be expected, -when Great Britain had an absolute control over the sea and all that -floated upon it. To imperious rebukes and reproaches succeeded a series -of measures, outraging neutral and treaty rights, which finally led to -hostilities between the two countries. - -From the time of Jay's treaty to the peace of Amiens, and until the -year 1804 in the following war, the relations between Great Britain -and the United States remained on a fairly settled basis. Innumerable -vexations, indeed, attended neutral commerce at the hands of cruisers -who were willing on slight grounds to seize a prize, taking the -chance of the courts deciding in their favor, and the delays of prize -courts added greatly to the annoyance; but upon the whole American -trade throve greatly. In June, 1797, the Secretary of State reported, -in reply to a resolution of the House, that "captures and losses by -British cruisers, it is presumed, have not been numerous; for the -citizens of the United States having, these three years past, been -accustomed to look to the government for aid in prosecuting these -claims, it is not to be doubted that, generally, these cases have -been reported to the Department." In 1801 there was an outbreak of -lawless seizure in the West Indies.[310] The American vessels engaged -in that trade were small, and, as legal expenses were the same for -a large as for a small prize, the cost of a contest amounted to a -sum very disproportionate to the value of the ship; so the captors -hoped, by the well-known delays of procedure, to extort a compromise. -An abuse of this kind, however outrageous, is different in principle -from the direct action of a government; nor are such cases the only -ones in which men have been willing to take dishonest advantage of the -imperfections, ambiguities, or delays of the law.[311] The Secretary -of State, in transmitting a report on the subject to the House of -Representatives, said, "Neither the communications from our minister -at London, nor my conversations with the Chargé d'Affaires of his -Britannic Majesty in the United States, would lead to an opinion that -any additional orders have lately been given by the British government, -authorizing the system of depredation alluded to."[312] - -In fact, at this time Pitt's government seems to have considered all -trade, which did not go direct to hostile countries, an advantage to -Great Britain, and especially if it could be drawn to pass through -her own ports. Accordingly, in January, 1798, a further relaxation of -the Rule of 1756 was promulgated, extending to European neutrals the -concession made in 1794 to the United States. British cruisers were now -directed not to capture neutral ships, bound from the hostile colonies -to Europe and laden with colonial produce, provided the latter had -become neutral property and its destination was to their own country, -or to a port of Great Britain. The final clause foreshadowed the policy -of the Orders in Council of ten years later, towards which Great -Britain, under the stress of war, was steadily gravitating. The law -of self-preservation, divined by the instinct of the state, demanded -that the United Kingdom should become, for that war, the storehouse of -the world's commerce. The more thriving that commerce, the better for -her, if it could be concentrated in her own borders. Thus France and -the whole world should become tributary to a wealth and to a power by -which, not Great Britain only, but the world should be saved. It was -a great conception, of slow growth and gradual realization; it was -disfigured in its progress by imperfections, blunders, and crimes; -but it was radically sound and in the end victorious, for upon Great -Britain and upon commerce hung the destinies of the world. - -The action of France towards neutral, and especially towards American, -vessels reflected the instability and excitement of the successive -French governments, the violent passions of the time, and the -uncertainty necessarily attendant upon the course of a nation which, -having cut adrift from fixed principles and precedents, is guided -only by changing impressions of right and wrong. The decree of the -9th of May, 1793, arresting vessels laden with provisions or carrying -enemy's goods, was revoked as regards the United States on the 23d -of the same month, because contrary to the treaty of 1778. On the -28th, five days later, the revocation was revoked, and the original -order established.[313] On the first of July the decision was again -reversed and the treaty ordered to be observed; notwithstanding which -the United States minister found it impossible to obtain the release -of vessels seized contrary to its terms, and on the 27th of the month -the last decision was again repealed.[314] On the 22d of September the -American minister writes: "I understand it is still in contemplation -to repeal the decree I complained of, and that in the mean time it has -not been transmitted to the tribunals. In effect, it can do very little -harm; because the fleets of this country are confined by the enemy, -and the privateers by a decree of the Convention."[315] Here matters -rested during the Reign of Terror and until November 15, 1794, after -the fall of Robespierre, when the Directory issued its first edict on -the subject; reiterating that enemy's goods under the neutral flag -would be considered liable to seizure, until the powers, enemies of -France, should declare French property free on board neutral ships. -This made the treatment of cargoes on American vessels depend, not upon -the formal engagements of France with the United States, but upon the -conduct of Great Britain; and it was succeeded, on the 3d of January, -1795, by a decree of revocation. Enemy's goods under neutral flags -now remained exempt from capture until the 2d of July, 1796; when -proclamation was issued, notifying neutral powers that the ships of -the French Republic would be used against their merchant vessels, were -it for the purpose of confiscation, search or detention, in the same -manner that they suffered the English to act in regard to them. Great -Britain was thus made supreme arbiter of the conduct of France towards -neutrals. - -This last step of the French government was directly traceable to its -dissatisfaction with Jay's treaty, the ratifications of which had -been exchanged at London on the 28th of October, 1795. On the 16th of -February, 1796, the Minister of Foreign Affairs told Mr. Monroe, the -American minister, that his government considered the alliance between -the two countries, formed by the treaty of 1778, to be terminated, -_ipso facto_, by Jay's treaty; and on the 7th of October he was further -informed that the minister to the United States had been recalled -and would not be replaced. Meanwhile President Washington, being -dissatisfied with Monroe's conduct, had summoned him home and sent out -Mr. Pinckney as his relief; but the Directory, on the 11th of December, -refused to receive any minister plenipotentiary from the United States -until the grievances it had alleged were redressed,[316] and on the -25th of January, 1797, Pinckney was ordered to leave the country as an -unauthorized foreigner. - -France was now fully embarked on a course of violence toward the United -States, which arose, not from any reasonable cause of discontent given, -but from the disposition, identical with that shown toward the weaker -European nations, to compel all countries to follow the dictates of -the French policy. The utterly loose terms of the decree of July 2, -1796, authorized the seizure of any neutral vessel by a French captain, -if, in his judgment, the conduct of Great Britain toward the neutral -justified it; and left the ultimate fate of the prize to a tribunal -governed only by its own opinion upon the same subject. "You are -mistaken," said a French deputy, "if you think that a privateer sails -furnished with instructions from the Minister of Marine, who ought -to direct their action. The instructions are drawn up by his owners; -they indicate to the captain what he may seize and what release. They -compile for him his duties under all the rules, under all the laws, -contradictory or otherwise, from the year 1400 up to the law of Nivôse -29, An 6" (Jan. 18, 1798).[317] - -In the West Indies the French agents, practically removed from all -control of the home government by the British command of the sea, -issued on the 27th of November, 1796, a decree for the capture of -Americans bound to, or coming from, British ports. They had already, on -the first of August, directed that all vessels having contraband goods -on board should be seized and condemned, whatever their destination, -and although the accepted law condemned only the contraband articles -themselves, not the ship nor the rest of the cargo. On the first of the -following February the same commissioners ordered the capture of all -neutrals sailing for the French islands which had surrendered to the -enemy, and declared them good prize. That these acts fairly represented -the purpose of the Directory may be inferred from the capture of -American ships in European waters under the decree of July 2, and -from the fact that the French consuls at Malaga and Cadiz interpreted -the decree to authorize seizure and condemnation for the single -circumstance of being destined for a British port.[318] Over three -hundred American vessels were thus seized, and most of them condemned. -Envoys sent from the United States to treat concerning these matters -said, in October, 1797, that France had violently taken from America -over fifteen million dollars.[319] "At no period of the war," wrote -they again, February 7, 1798, "has Britain undertaken to exercise such -a power. At no period has she asserted such a right."[320] "Was there -ever anything," said the deputy before quoted, "like the injustice of -the condemnations in the Antilles?" - -These irregular and arbitrary proceedings are chiefly significant as -showing the lack of any fixed principles of action on the part of the -French government and its agents; and they were closely connected -with similar courses towards neutral vessels in French ports. At the -outbreak of hostilities in 1793, one hundred and three American ships -were embargoed at Bordeaux and detained more than a year, without -any reason given; nor had the owners been indemnified in 1796.[321] -Cargoes were forcibly taken from vessels and payment either refused -or offered in kind, and so delayed that in the West Indies alone the -American losses were calculated at two million dollars. Besides these -acts, which had the character of spoliations, the contracts and other -financial obligations of the French government and its agents with -citizens of the United States remained undischarged. The irritation -between the two governments, and on the part of American merchants, -continued to increase rapidly. The decree of July 2, the essence of -which was the formal repudiation of a clause of the treaty of 1778, at -the time when alone it became applicable, remained in force; and was -rendered more obnoxious by a further order, of March 2, 1797, making -more stringent the proofs of neutrality to be adduced before French -tribunals and requiring papers which had long been disused. - -At this time the astonishing successes of Bonaparte's Italian campaigns -were approaching their triumphant conclusion. The battle of Rivoli -had been fought on the 14th of January, 1797,[322] Mantua capitulated -on the 2d of February, and the Pope had been compelled to sue for -peace. To Austria there remained only the hope of contesting the -approach to her German dominions. The confidence of the Directors -knew no bounds, and they now began to formulate the policy toward -British commerce which Napoleon inherited from them. The design was -formed of forcing the United States to recede from the obnoxious -conventions of Jay's treaty; and the government of Holland, then -entirely dependent upon that of France, was pressed to demand that -Dutch property on board American vessels should be protected against -British seizure, and to suggest the concurrence of the three republics -against Great Britain.[323] The Dutch accordingly represented "that, -when circumstances oblige our commerce to confide its interests to the -neutral flag of American vessels, it has a just right to insist that -that flag be protected with energy;"[324] in other words, that, when -the British control of the sea forced the Dutch ships from it, Dutch -trade should be carried on under the American flag, and that the United -States should fight to prevent the seizure of the Dutch property, -although it admitted that the traditional law of nations would not -justify it in so doing. On the 6th of May, 1797, Spain also, doubtless -under the dictation of France, made the same demand.[324] Similar -representations were made to the other neutral country, Denmark. Here -is seen the forerunner of Napoleon's contention that, as against Great -Britain's control of the sea, no state had a right to be neutral. Soon -afterward the idea was carried farther. Denmark was requested to close -the mouth of the Elbe to British commerce. "The French," wrote our -minister to London on the 12th of March, 1797, "assign our treaty with -England as the cause of their maritime conduct toward us, but they have -recently demanded of Hamburg and Bremen to suspend all commerce with -England. These have not complied, and the French minister has been -recalled from Hamburg. The same demand has been made at Copenhagen, and -the refusal has produced a sharp diplomatic controversy. These powers -have made no late treaty with England."[325] - -Hostilities with Austria had ceased by the preliminaries of Leoben, -April 18, followed, after long negotiations, by the treaty of Campo -Formio, October 17, 1797. Of the coalition against France, Great -Britain alone remained upright and defiant. She had in 1797, after -Austria had yielded, offered to negotiate; but the terms demanded -were such that she refused to accept them, and her envoy was ordered -out of France as peremptorily as Mr. Pinckney had been a few months -before. The Directory thought that the time was now come when she could -be brought to unconditional surrender, and the weapon by which her -commerce should be annihilated was already forged to its hand. On the -31st of October, 1796 (Brumaire 10, An 5),[326] a law had been passed -by the Legislature forbidding entirely the admission of any British -manufactured goods, directing that all persons who already had such in -possession should declare them within three days, and that they should -be at once packed and stored for re-exportation. In order to insure the -execution of the statute, domiciliary visits were authorized everywhere -within three leagues of the frontiers or sea-board, and throughout -France the dwellings of all tradesmen were also open to search. Laws of -similar purpose had been passed early in the war;[327] but they either -had been found insufficient or were no longer applicable to the changed -conditions of affairs. "Now that," to use the words of a deputy, "the -flags of the Republic or those of its allies float over the sea from -Embden to Trieste, and almost all the ports of the European seas are -closed to England, we must stop the voluntary subsidies which are -paid her by the consumers of English merchandise."[328] With Belgium -annexed, with Spain and Holland vassals rather than allies, with the -greater part of Italy in military occupation, it seemed possible to -repel the entrance points of British goods to the Continent far from -the French frontier, and by strict watchfulness to close the latter -against such as worked their way to it. - -The expectation, however, was deceived; the superior quality and -abundance of British manufactures created a demand which evaded all -watchfulness and enlisted all classes against the officials. The -Directory therefore determined, toward the end of 1797, to put the -law into force with all severity and to introduce another and final -rigor into its maritime prize code. On the 4th of January, 1798, a -message was sent to the council of Five Hundred, announcing that "on -that very day the municipal administrators, the justices of the peace, -the commissaries of the Directory, and the superintendents of customs, -are proceeding in all the chief places of the departments, in all -the ports, and in all the principal communes, to seize all English -merchandise now in France in contravention of the law of Brumaire 10, -An 5. Such is the _first act_ by which, now that peace is given to the -Continent, the war declared long since against England is about to -assume the real character that belongs to it." But more was needed. -Neutral vessels were in the habit of entering British ports, shipping -British goods, and carrying on British trade; they were even known, -when opportunity offered, to introduce articles of British manufacture, -directly or indirectly, into France. By so doing they aided Great -Britain and actually took part in the war. "The Directory, therefore, -thinks it urgent and necessary to pass a law declaring that the -character of vessels, relative to their quality of neutral or enemy, -shall be determined by their cargo; ... in consequence, that every -vessel found at sea, having on board English merchandise as her cargo, -in whole or in part, shall be declared lawful prize, whosoever shall be -the proprietor of this merchandise, _which shall be reputed contraband -for this cause alone_, that it comes from England or her possessions." -This decree was adopted without discussion, in the very terms of the -Directory's message, on the 18th of January, 1798. From that time -forward, to use the expression of a French deputy, speaking a year -later on the proposed repeal of the law, "if a handkerchief of English -origin is found on board a neutral ship, both the rest of the cargo -and the ship itself are subject to condemnation." It is, perhaps, well -to point out that this differed from the Rule of 1756, by forbidding -a trade which at all times had been open to neutrals, in peace as in -war. It differed from the old rule condemning enemy's property found in -neutral bottoms, by condemning also neutral property of hostile origin, -together with the whole cargo and the ship, as contaminated by the -presence of any British goods. - -Nevertheless, British commerce continued to thrive, and was rather -benefited than injured by the new law. What the indomitable purpose, -unlimited power, and extraordinary mental and physical activity of -Napoleon could only partially accomplish, proved to be wholly beyond -the weak arm of the Directory. When war first shut the ports of France -to Great Britain, her trade thither passed through the Netherlands -and Holland. When the Netherlands were overrun, Amsterdam monopolized -the traffic. With the fall of Holland, it passed away to Bremen and -Hamburg. The latter port, being farther east and more remote from the -French armies, naturally drew the greater part and became the real heir -of Amsterdam.[329] It was the emporium of Northern Germany, through -which poured the colonial produce of the world and the manufactures -of the British Islands, and from which they were distributed over -the Continent. The enormous subsidies paid by the United Kingdom to -Germany found their way back, in part at least, by the increased -purchasing power of the belligerent countries,[330] which consumed -the manufactures of Great Britain and the coffee and sugar which had -passed through her ports and paid toll to her revenues.[331] The -shipping clearing for Hamburg from British ports, which was naught in -1793, rose to fifty-three thousand tons in 1795; and in 1798, the year -during which the new French law operated, increased to seventy-four -thousand. But, while Hamburg was the great centre, all the northern -German ports shared the same prosperity. After Prussia retired from the -war against France, in April, 1795, a neutral North German territory -was established, behind a line agreed upon between the two countries. -The total tonnage entering the ports of this region increased from one -hundred and twenty thousand in 1792 to two hundred and six thousand in -1795; and in 1798 reached three hundred and three thousand. The value -of merchandise imported rose from £2,200,000 in 1792, to £8,300,000 in -1795, £11,000,000 in 1798, and £13,500,000 in 1800.[332] - -A similar elasticity was shown by British trade throughout the world. -Only in the Mediterranean was there a marked decrease both of exports -and imports,—a loss partly filled by the enterprise of American -merchants;[333] but only partly, for the Barbary pirates seconded -the sweeping French decrees in excluding neutrals from that sea. But -it was in the West Indies, together with the German ports, that the -commercial activity of Great Britain found its greatest resources; -and in the steady support contributed by that region to her financial -stability is to be found the justification of the much derided policy -of Pitt in capturing sugar islands. Alike as valuable pieces of -property, as possessions to be exchanged when framing a treaty, and -as bases for cruisers, which not merely seized upon British shipping -but disturbed the commercial development of the whole region, each -hostile island should at once have been seized by Great Britain. In -a contest between equal navies for the control of the sea, to waste -military effort upon the capture of small islands, as the French -did in 1778, is a preposterous misdirection of effort; but when one -navy is overwhelmingly preponderant, as the British was after 1794, -when the enemy confines himself to commerce-destroying by crowds of -small privateers, then the true military policy is to stamp out the -nests where they swarm. If, by so doing, control is also gained of -a rich commercial region, as the Caribbean Sea then was, the action -is doubly justified. The produce of the West Indies, as of the East, -figured doubly in the returns of British commerce,—as imports, and as -re-exported to the Continent.[334] Each captured island contributed -to swell the revenues by which the war was maintained.[335] The -disappearance of the merchant fleets of France, Spain, and Holland, the -ruin of San Domingo, and the general disorganization of such French -islands as were not taken, threw the greater part of the production -of tropical articles into British hands; and the practice of the day, -which confined its transport to British ships, helped to support the -shipping interest also in the strain brought upon it by the war. The -Americans alone could compete in the continental market as carriers -of such produce. Debarred from going with it direct to Europe by the -Rule of 1756, the rise in price, due to the diminished production -and decrease of transport just mentioned, allowed them to take the -sugar and coffee of the colonies at war with England to American -ports, reship it to the Continent, and yet make a good profit on the -transaction. As the British colonists were in full possession of the -home market, and their produce commanded high prices, the outcry which -caused so much trouble ten years later was not now raised. On the -contrary, their prosperous condition facilitated the British orders of -January, 1798, exempting from capture Danes, Swedes, and other neutral -ships, when carrying coffee and sugar of hostile origin to their own -country, or to England. - -It was against this great system of trade that the law of Nivôse 29 -was launched. British manufactured goods, rather than British gold -and silver, bought and paid for the produce of the East and West -Indies, for that of the United States and of the Levant. The Continent -consumed the manufactures of Great Britain, the sugar and coffee of her -colonies, and obtained through British merchants the spices and wares -of the East; for all which it for the most part paid back specie. The -United States took specie from France herself for the colonial produce -carried there in its vessels, and with it paid Great Britain for her -manufactures. France herself received British goods through continental -channels, and paid hard cash for them. The money thus coming to London -had flowed back as subsidies to the armies of the coalitions. Now, -thanks to Bonaparte, Great Britain stood alone. The French navy was -powerless to contend with her fleets; but, by actual possession or by -treaty, the Directory had excluded her ships from a great part of the -Continent. Nevertheless, British goods abounded in all parts through -the complicity of neutral carriers. If these could be stopped, the -market for British manufactures would be closed; therefore against them -were launched the cruisers of France, with the authority of the decree -to capture any one of them found with a bale or box of British origin -on board. The result was curious. - -After the lapse of a year, on the 13th of January, 1799, the Directory -addressed a message to the lower house of the Legislature[336] on the -subject of maritime prizes, in which occurred the celebrated avowal, -already quoted, that not a single merchant ship under French colors -sailed the deep seas. But this was not all. The irregularities and -outrages of privateers had so terrified neutrals that there had been an -immense diminution in the entries of neutral tonnage, although Great -Britain had rather relaxed than increased the severe rules she had -adopted early in the war. In consequence of the smaller importations -from abroad, there were necessarily smaller sales of French goods, and -the decrease of neutral carriers impeded the export of agricultural -produce and manufactures, as well as the importation of raw materials -essential to the latter. The Directory attributed the evil to an -existing ordinance, which left the final determination of prize -cases in the hands of the courts, instead of attributing it to the -executive. It argued that if there were a right of final appeal to the -latter, it could check the arbitrary proceedings of the cruisers and -the erroneous decisions of the judges. If, as was represented by the -American consulate at Paris, the courts of first instance were chiefly -composed of merchants in the sea-ports, most of whom were, directly -or indirectly, interested in fitting out privateers,[337] there was -certainly need of some change in the existing legislation. In the -Conseil des Anciens, however, a different view prevailed. On the 17th -of January, 1799, a debate began in that body, on a resolution fixing -the date when the law of January 18, 1798, became operative.[338] The -consequent discussion took a wide range over the policy and results -of the enactment, as shown by the year it had been in force. The -disastrous commercial condition of France was freely admitted on all -sides; but in several powerful speeches it was attributed directly and -convincingly to the working of the law itself. "Neutrals repelled from -our ports; our agricultural products without any outlet abroad; our -industry and commerce annihilated; our colonies helpless; our shipping -ways deserted; a balance of twenty thousand sailors in English prisons; -our ships of war without seamen,—such are the political effects of the -law which is ruining, crushing us."[339] - -In less impassioned words, other deputies showed the unfairness of -the law. If, on the land frontier, a wagon was stopped carrying a -bale of British goods, the bale was confiscated, but the rest of the -load escaped. If in a ship a like bale was found, not only it, but -all the rest of the cargo and the ship itself were condemned. Even -in the fiercest heat of the Revolution and the utmost danger to the -country, it had never been attempted, as now, to forbid neutrals -carrying British goods to their own country.[340] The step could not -be justified under the plea of reprisals; for "if the English have -seized French goods on these same neutrals, they have not confiscated -the rest of the cargo. These are, therefore, not reprisals, but new -proceedings on our part, which neutrals could neither expect nor guard -against."[341] A neutral ship came within reach of the French coast -only at her extreme peril. A small package of British goods would -justify her capture by a French privateer, whatever her destination; -nay, even if she were bringing to France articles urgently needed, and -intended to take away French produce in exchange for them. Neutrals, -allies, even French vessels themselves, carrying on the little trade -with neighboring states, were preyed on by French corsairs. This -condition reacted on the enterprise of the cruisers themselves. It was -much safer, and quite as profitable, to keep close to the home coast -and board passing vessels. The merest trifle, smuggled on board by one -of the crew, or shipped unknown to the master and owner, made them good -prize. Owing to this caution, the captures brought into French home -ports had dropped, from six hundred and sixty-two in the previous year, -to four hundred and fifty-two, notwithstanding the vast extension of -the field for seizures.[342] - -The loss of prizes, however, was far from being the worst effect of -the law. Neutrals being repelled, friendly and French shipping scared -away, commerce had been seriously crippled for want of carriage. In -the year before the enactment the coasting trade employed 895,000 -tons; of which 120,000 were neutrals, by whom goods were transported -from one sea frontier of France to another, as from the Bay of Biscay -to the French Mediterranean coast. In the year following, the total -fell to 746,000; but the neutrals dropped to 38,000. In the foreign -trade 860,000 tons were employed in the year before the law, of which -623,000 were neutral. In the year following, the total fell to 688,000, -of which 468,000 were neutrals. There thus resulted a total loss of -322,000 tons in a commerce of only 1,750,000. To this the speaker added -a striking comparison: "In the same year in which we lost 322,000 -tons by the operation of the law, we took four hundred and fifty-two -prizes. Assuming—what is not the case—that these were all English, and -that they averaged two hundred tons burden—an excessive allowance—we -have taken from our enemy 90,400 tons against 322,000 we have lost." -"All the sufferings of ourselves and allies might be borne, if good -resulted to ourselves or harm to England; but it has not." "English -ships are insured at a premium of five per cent, while neutrals bound -to France have to pay twenty to thirty per cent. Neutrals themselves -seek English convoy.[343] French merchants would gladly charter neutral -ships to carry to San Domingo the produce that is overflowing our -storehouses, and to bring back the coffee and sugar for which we are -paying such extravagant rates; but they will not come near us. So, -instead of paying a moderate price with French goods, we are paying -exorbitant rates in specie, which goes straight to England, our most -cruel foe."[344] The policy of the law was condemned by the results. -In support of its justice, it was alleged that there were at sea only -French and British ships, whence it followed that all which were not -French could be seized,—a contention which derives its sole present -interest from being the same as that put forth by Napoleon ten years -later. It shows again—what can scarcely be too often asserted in the -interests of truth—that the emperor was but the full and perfect -incarnation of the spirit that animated the Convention and the -Directory. - -The Government of the United States had not yet, in 1798, passed -into the hands of men with an undue "passion for peace." Upon the -unceremonious dismissal of Mr. Pinckney, not for personal objections -but as rejecting any minister from America, the President had called a -special meeting of Congress in May, 1797, and recommended an increase -of the naval establishment. When the news of the law of January 18, -1798, reached the United States, Congress was in session. On the 28th -of May an act was approved, authorizing the capture of any French armed -vessel which shall, upon the coast of the United States, have committed -any depredation upon her commerce.[345] On the 7th of July another act -abrogated all existing treaties between the two countries;[346] and on -the 9th was decreed the seizure of French armed vessels anywhere on the -high seas, not only by public armed ships, but by privateers, which -the President was authorized to commission.[347] Thereupon followed a -period of maritime hostilities, though without a formal declaration of -war, which lasted three years; the first prize being taken from the -French in June, 1798, and peace being restored by a treaty, signed in -Paris September 30, 1800, and ratified the following February. The -small force of the United States was principally occupied in the West -Indies, protecting their trade,—both by the patrol system directed -against the enemy's cruisers, and by convoying bodies of merchantmen -to and from the islands. As the condition of the French navy did not -allow keeping large fleets afloat, the ships of the United States, -though generally small, were able to hold their ground, capture many -of the enemy, and preserve their own commerce from molestation. The -mercantile shipping of France, however, had already been so entirely -destroyed by Great Britain, that she suffered far more from the -cessation of the carrying trade, which Americans had maintained for -her, than from the attacks of the American navy. - -The year 1798, which opened with the unlucky law of January 18, was in -all respects unfortunate for France. In May Bonaparte sailed for Egypt, -the country thus parting with its ablest general, with thirty-two -thousand of its best troops, and its only available fleet, of thirteen -sail-of-the-line, which the government with the utmost difficulty had -been able to equip. On the first of August Nelson destroyed the fleet -in the Battle of the Nile; and the British navy, forced to leave the -Mediterranean in 1796, again asserted its preponderance throughout the -whole of that sea, opposing an effectual barrier to the return of the -army in Egypt. The entire face of affairs changed, not only in the -East but in Europe. The Porte, at first hesitating, declared openly -against France. A second coalition was formed between Great Britain, -Austria, and Russia, to which Naples acceded; and the armies of the -latter entered upon their campaign in November. They were, indeed, -quickly overthrown; but the very march of the French troops against -them left the armies in northern Italy hopelessly inferior to their -opponents. The year 1799 was full of reverses. In Germany and in Italy -the French were steadily driven back; in Switzerland only did they, -under Masséna, hold their ground. The British indeed were repelled in -their attack upon Holland, but they carried away with them the Dutch -navy. A Russo-Turkish fleet, entering the Mediterranean, retook the -Ionian Islands from the French; and Admiral Bruix escaped from Brest -only to find it impossible to achieve any substantial results in the -face of the British superiority on the sea. In the midst of this -confusion and disaster, and amid the commercial and internal distress -caused by the maritime legislation, Bonaparte returned. Landing on the -9th of October, he on the 9th of November overthrew the Directory. -Preparations for war were at once begun, and the successes of the -first consul in Italy and of Moreau in Germany, in 1800, combined with -the defection of the czar from the coalition, restored peace to the -Continent and internal quiet to France. - -Upon this followed the renewal of the Armed Neutrality of the Baltic -powers. Great Britain found herself again without an ally, face to face -with France, now supported by the naval combination of the northern -states. Still she stood resolute, abating not a jot of her asserted -maritime rights. As before, the allies demanded that the neutral flag -should cover the enemy's property that floated under it, and that the -term "contraband of war" should apply only to articles strictly and -solely applicable to warlike purposes, which, they claimed, naval -stores and provisions were not. They proposed also to deprive Great -Britain of the belligerent right of search, by sending ships of war -with the merchant ships, and requiring that the assertion of the naval -captain should be received as establishing the lawful character of -the two or three hundred cargoes under his convoy. "The question," -said Pitt, "is whether we are to permit the navy of our enemy to be -recruited and supplied,—whether we are to suffer blockaded ports to be -furnished with warlike stores and provisions,—whether we are to suffer -neutral nations, by hoisting a flag upon a sloop or a fishing boat, -to convey the treasures of South America to the harbors of Spain, or -the naval stores of the Baltic to Brest and Toulon. I would ask, too, -has there ever been a period, since we have been a naval country, in -which we have acted upon this principle?"[348] and he alleged not only -the unbroken practice of Great Britain, but her old treaties with the -allied states, and especially the convention with Russia in 1793. So -far as precedent and tradition went, England's case was unimpeachable. -She was called upon to surrender, not a new pretension, but an old -right important to her military position. "I have no hesitation," said -Fox, Pitt's great opponent, "in saying that, as a general proposition, -'free bottoms do not make free goods;' and that, as an axiom, it is -supported neither by the law of nations nor by common-sense."[349] - -At this time the British navy was superior to the combined forces of -all Europe. A fleet, of which Nelson was the animating spirit though -not the nominal head, entered the Baltic. Denmark was struck down on -the 2d of April, 1801; and this blow, coinciding with the murder of -the Czar Paul, dissolved a coalition more menacing in appearance than -in reality. The young man who succeeded to the Russian throne met with -dignity the imposing attitude of Nelson, now left in chief command; -but he had not inherited his father's fantastic ambitions, and the -material interests of Russia in that day pointed to peace with Great -Britain. The treaty, signed June 5, 1801,[350] permitted the neutral to -trade from port to port on the coast of a nation at war; but renounced, -on the part of Russia, the claim that the neutral flag covered the -enemy's goods. On the other hand Great Britain admitted that property -of a belligerent, sold _bonâ fide_ to a neutral, became neutral in -character and as such not liable to seizure; but from the operation -of this admission obtained the special exception of produce from the -hostile colonies.[351] This, Russia conceded, could not be carried -directly from the colony to the mother country, even though it had -become neutral property by a real sale; and similarly the direct trade -from the mother country to the colony was renounced. Great Britain thus -obtained an explicit acknowledgment of the Rule of 1756 from the most -formidable of the maritime powers, and strengthened her hands for the -approaching dispute with the United States. In return, she abandoned -the claim, far more injurious to Russia, to seize naval stores as -contraband of war. Four months later, hostilities between Great Britain -and France also ceased. - -The maritime commercial interests, both of belligerents and neutrals, -received convincing and conspicuous illustration from this, the first -of the two sea wars growing out of the French Revolution. It was the -interest of the neutrals to step in and take up the trade necessarily -abandoned, to a greater or less degree, by the belligerents; and -it was also useful to both parties to the war that they should do -so. But it was very much less to the advantage of the more purely -maritime state than it was to its antagonist; for not only did she -need help less, but such temporary changes in the course of trade -tend to become permanent. The immediate gain may become a final and -irretrievable loss. Hence Great Britain is seen to yield readily the -restrictions of the Navigation Act, wherever it is clearly advisable -to avail herself of neutral seamen or neutral carriers; but the -concession goes no further than immediately necessary, and is always -expressly guarded as temporary. The relaxation is a purely warlike -measure, and she is perfectly consistent in refusing to allow it to -her enemies. Every slackening of the Navigation Act was a violation -in principle of the Rule of 1756,[352] which she was quite content to -have her enemy imitate; as the big boy at school offers the small one -the opportunity of returning an injury in kind. France might employ -neutrals contrary to what Great Britain claimed as the law of nations, -as the latter herself did; but there was the difference that Great -Britain could put a stop to the operations favorable to her opponent, -while France could only partially impede those that advantaged hers. -It was, therefore, clearly the policy of the British to yield nothing -to neutrals except when they could not avoid it, and then explicitly -to assert the principle, while conceding a relaxation; they thus kept -control over the neutral trade, and impeded operations that both helped -their enemy and might also supplant their own commerce. In the latter -part of the war, as the purpose of France to cripple their trade took -shape, and the exclusion of British goods from the Continent became an -evident and avowed intention, the ministry strengthened itself with -the reflection that the measure was impracticable so long as neutral -bottoms abounded; but a few months later the denial of intercourse -between hostile nations and their colonies by neutral intermediaries -was inserted in the Russian treaty. The intention to use neutrals -to the utmost extent desirable for British interests thus coincided -with the determination to stop a traffic esteemed contrary to them. -The permission to neutrals, by the orders of January, 1798, to carry -the produce of French and Dutch colonies to Great Britain, when they -were threatened with seizure if they sailed with the same for France -or Holland, illustrates both motives of action; while it betrays the -gradual shaping of the policy—which grew up over against Bonaparte's -Continental System—of forcing neutrals to make England the storehouse -and toll-gate of the world's commerce. Superficially, Great Britain -seems rather to relax toward neutrals between 1793 and 1801; but the -appearance is only superficial. The tendencies that issued in the ever -famous Orders in Council of 1807 were alive and working in 1798. - -The question for British statesmen to determine, therefore, was how -far to acquiesce in the expansion of neutral trade, and where to draw -their line,—always a difficult task, dependent upon many considerations -and liable to result in inconsistencies, real or apparent. For France -the problem was less intricate. Her commerce even before the war -was chiefly in foreign hands;[353] she had therefore little cause -to fear ultimate injury by concessions. Immediate loss by neutral -competition was impossible, for the British navy left her no ships to -lose. Hence it was her interest to avail herself of neutral carriers -to the fullest extent, to recognize that the freer their operations -the better for her, and that, even could restrictions upon their -carrying for her enemy be enforced, the result would be to compel the -British people to develop further their own merchant shipping. Every -blow at a neutral was really, even though not seemingly, a blow for -Great Britain. In a general way this was seen clearly enough, and a -policy favoring neutrals was traditional in France, but the blind -passions of the Revolution overthrew it. To use the vigorous words of -a deputy: "The French people is the victim of an ill-devised scheme, -of a too blind trust in commerce-destroying, _an auxiliary measure_, -which, to be really useful, should strike only the enemy, and not -reach the navigation of neutrals and allies, and still less paralyze -the circulation and export of our agriculture and of the national -industries."[354] Such were the results of the direct action of -successive French governments, and of the indirect embarrassment caused -by the delays and inconsistencies of the executive and the tribunals. -It was thought that neutrals could be coerced by French severities -into resisting British restrictions, whether countenanced or not by -international law. But Great Britain, though a hard taskmaster, did not -so lay her burdens as to lose services which were essential to her, nor -compel a resistance that under the military conditions was hopeless; -and the series of wild measures, which culminated in the law of January -18, 1798, only frightened neutrals from French coasts, while leaving -Great Britain in full control of the sea. The year 1797 saw the lowest -depression of British trade; coincidently with the law of January 18 -began a development, which, at first gradual, soon became rapid, and in -which the neutrals driven from France bore an increasing proportion. - -The short peace of Amiens lasted long enough to indicate how thoroughly -Great Britain, while using neutrals, had preserved her own maritime -advantages intact. The preliminaries were signed October 1, 1801, and -war was again declared May 16, 1803; but, notwithstanding the delays -in paying off the ships of war, and the maintenance of an unusually -large number of seamen in the peace establishment, the neutral shipping -employed fell from twenty-eight per cent, in 1801, to eighteen and a -half per cent in 1802. - -On the outbreak of the second war Napoleon reverted at once to the -commercial policy of the Convention and the Directory. On the 20th -of June, 1803, a decree was issued by him directing the confiscation -of any produce of the British colonies, and of any manufactures of -Great Britain, introduced into France. Neutral vessels arriving were -required to present a certificate from the French consul at the port -of embarkation, certifying that the cargo was in no part of British -origin. The same measure was forcibly carried out in Holland, though -nominally an independent state;[355] and the occupation of Hanover, -while dictated also by the general principle of injuring Great Britain -as much as possible, had mainly in view the closure of the Elbe and -the Weser to British commerce. Beyond this, however, Bonaparte being -then engrossed with the purpose of a direct attack by armed force upon -the British islands, the indirect hostilities upon their commercial -prosperity were, for the moment, neglected. - -At the same period Great Britain began to feel that neutral rivalry was -being carried too far for her own welfare, and determined to tighten -the reins previously slackened. She obtained from Sweden in July, 1803, -a special concession, allowing her to arrest Swedish vessels laden with -naval stores for France, and to purchase the cargoes at a fair price,—a -stipulation identical with that about provisions in Jay's treaty; and -when the French occupation of Hanover excluded her ships from the Elbe -and Weser, she by a blockade of the rivers shut out neutrals also. -But it was in the West Indies, so long a fruitful source of wealth, -that the pressure of neutral competition was most heavily felt. The -utter ruin of San Domingo, and the embarrassments of the other islands -hostile to Great Britain, had in the former war combined with the -dangers of the seas to raise the price of colonial produce on the -Continent,[356] and, consequently, to give a great development to the -British growth of sugar and coffee, the transport of which was confined -by law to British vessels. The planters, the shipping business, and -the British merchants dealing with the West Indies, together with the -various commercial interests and industries connected with them, all -participated in the benefits of this traffic, which supplied over one -fourth of the imports of the kingdom, and took off besides a large -amount of manufactures. As production increased, however, and prices -lowered, the West India business began to feel keenly the competition -by the produce of the hostile islands, exported by American merchants. - -Of the extent of this commerce, and of its dependence upon the -interruption, by Great Britain, of the ordinary channels for French -and Dutch trade, a few figures will give an idea. In 1792, before the -war, the United States exported to Europe 1,122,000 pounds of sugar, -and 2,136,742 of coffee; in 1796, 35,000,000 of sugar and 62,000,000 -of coffee; in 1800, 82,000,000 of sugar and 47,000,000 coffee. In -1803, during the short peace, the exports fell to 20,000,000 of sugar -and 10,000,000 coffee; in 1804, a year of war, they again rose to -74,000,000 sugar, and 48,000,000 coffee. The precise destination cannot -be given; but the trade between France and her West India Islands, -carried on by American ships, amounted in 1805 to over $20,000,000, of -which only $6,000,000 were United States produce. In like manner the -trade with Holland was over $17,000,000, of which $2,000,000 were of -American origin. - -Upon the return of Mr. Pitt to power, in 1804, the attempt was made -to strengthen the fabric of British commercial prosperity in the -Caribbean, by an extension of the system of free ports in the different -colonies; by means of which, and of their large merchant shipping, the -British collected in their own hands, by both authorized and contraband -traffic, so much of the carrying trade of this region, extending their -operations to the mainland as well as throughout the islands. More, -however, was needed to restrain the operations of the Americans, who, -by reducing the price of coffee on the Continent, diminished the -re-exportation from Great Britain, thus affecting the revenue of the -kingdom and the profits of the planters; and who also, by acting as -carriers, interfered with the accumulations at the free ports and the -consequent employment of British ships. All the classes interested -joined in urging the government to find some relief; and the clamor was -increased by a sense of indignation at the tricks by which belligerent -rights were believed to be evaded by the Americans. The Rule of 1756 -did not allow the latter to carry their cargoes direct to Europe; but, -as the trade winds compelled vessels to run to the northward until -they reached the westerly winds prevailing in the higher latitudes, -no great delay was involved in making an American port, or even in -trans-shipping the cargo to a vessel bound for Europe.[357] Great -Britain admitted that articles of hostile origin, but become neutral -property, could be carried freely to the neutral country; and, when so -imported, became part of the neutral stock and could then be freely -re-exported to a hostile state. - -The question of a _bonâ fide_ importation, like all others involving -a question of intention, could be determined only by the character of -the transactions attending it; but it was held generally that actual -landing and storage, with payment of the duties, was sufficient proof, -unless rebutted by other circumstances. Early in the war following the -peace of Amiens, the British courts awoke to the fact that the duties -paid on goods so imported were simply secured by a bond, and that on -re-exportation a drawback was given, so that a very small percentage -of the nominal duties was actually paid.[358] Upon this ground a ship -was condemned in May, 1805, and great numbers of American vessels -carrying colonial produce to Europe were seized and brought into port, -as well as others proceeding from the United States to the West Indies, -with cargoes originating in the mother countries; and when, in the -opinion of the court, the duties had been only nominally paid, they -were condemned. It is hard to see the soundness of an objection to -these decisions, based on the validity of the payments; but the action -of the British government is open to severe censure in that no warning -was given of its purpose no longer to accept, as proof of importation, -the payment of duties by bond, on which drawback was given. Whether -it had known the law of the United States or not, that law had been -open to it, and ignorance of its provisions was due not to any want of -publicity, but to the carelessness of British authorities. Under the -circumstances, the first seizures were little short of robbery. - -The reclamations of the United States met with little attention -during Pitt's brief second administration; but after his death, in -January, 1806, and the accession to office of Grenville and Fox, -a more conciliatory attitude was shown,—especially by the latter, -who became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Favorably inclined to the -Americans since his opposition to the policy of the Revolutionary -War, he seemed desirous of conceding their wishes; but the pressure -from without, joined to opposition within the ministry, prevented a -frank reversal of the course pursued. Instead of the Rule of 1756, Fox -obtained an Order in Council, dated May 16, 1806, placing the coast -of the Continent, from Brest to the Elbe, in a state of blockade. -The blockade, however, was only to be enforced strictly between the -mouth of the Seine and Ostend. Into ports between those two points no -neutral would be admitted on any pretext, and, if attempting to enter, -would be condemned; but on either side, neutral ships could go in and -out freely, provided they "had not been laden at any port belonging -to his Majesty's enemies, or, if departing, were not destined to any -port belonging to his Majesty's enemies." The wording of the order was -evidently framed to avoid all question as to the origin of cargoes, -upon which the Rule of 1756 hinged. Not the origin of the cargo, but -the port of lading, determined the admission of the neutral ship to the -harbors partially blockaded; and if to them, then, _a fortiori_, to all -open ports of the enemy. On the other hand, the strict blockade already -established of the Elbe and Weser was by this order partially relieved, -in the expectation that neutrals would carry British manufactures to -those northern markets. In short, the Order was a compromise, granting -something both to the mercantile interest and to the Americans, though -not conceding the full demands of either. It is at best doubtful -whether the British were able to establish an effective blockade over -the extent of coast from Brest to the Elbe, but the United States -and Napoleon had no doubts whatever about it; and it thus fell, by a -singular irony of fate, to the most liberal of the British statesmen, -the friend of the Americans and of Napoleon, as almost the last act of -his life, to fire the train which led to the Berlin and Milan decrees, -to the Orders in Council of 1807, and to the war with the United States -six years later. - -Fox died on the 13th of September, 1806, and was succeeded as Minister -of Foreign Affairs by Lord Howick. On the 25th of the same month the -partial restrictions still imposed on the Elbe and the Weser were -removed; so that neutral ships, even though from the ports of an enemy -of Great Britain, were able to enter. In the mean time, war had broken -out between France and Prussia; the battle of Jena was fought October -14, and on the 26th Napoleon entered Berlin. The battle of Trafalgar, -a twelvemonth before, had shattered all his confidence in the French -navy and destroyed his hopes of directly invading Great Britain. On -the other hand the short campaign of 1805 had overthrown the Austrian -power, and that of 1806 had just laid Prussia at his feet. The dream of -reducing Great Britain by the destruction of her commercial prosperity, -long floating in his mind, now became tangible, and was formulated -into the phrase that he "would conquer the sea by the land." Two of -the great military monarchies were already prostrate. Spain, Holland, -Italy, and the smaller German states were vassals, more or less -unwilling, but completely under his control; there seemed no reason to -doubt that he could impose his will on the Continent and force it to -close every port to British trade. On the 21st of November, 1806, the -emperor issued the famous Berlin Decree; and then, having taken the -first in the series of fated steps which led to his ruin, he turned -to the eastward and plunged with his army into the rigors of a Polish -winter to fulfil his destiny. - - - - -CHAPTER XVIII. - -THE WARFARE AGAINST COMMERCE, 1806-1812. - -THE BERLIN AND MILAN DECREES OF NAPOLEON, 1806 AND 1807.—THE BRITISH -ORDERS IN COUNCIL, 1807-1809.—ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY OF THESE MEASURES -OF THE TWO BELLIGERENTS.—OUTLINE OF CONTEMPORARY LEADING EVENTS. - - -Napoleon's Berlin decree alleged many reasons and contained many -provisions; but the essential underlying idea was to crush the commerce -of Great Britain by closing the Continent to her products of every -kind.[359] The pretext was found in the Order in Council of May 16, -1806, issued by the ministry of Grenville and Fox, putting the coast -of the Continent from Brest to the Elbe under blockade. Napoleon -asserted that the right to blockade applied only to fortified, not -to commercial, ports, which was not true; and further, that the -united forces of Great Britain were unable to maintain so extensive -an operation, which, if not certainly true, was at least plausible. -Retaliating an abuse, if it were one, with a yet greater excess, the -Berlin decree began by declaring the British islands blockaded, at -a time when the emperor could not keep a ship at sea, except as a -fugitive from the omnipresent fleets of his enemy. From this condition -of phantom blockade it resulted that all commerce with the British -Islands was forbidden; and consequently all merchandise exported from -them, having been unlawfully carried, became good prize. Vessels from -Great Britain could not be admitted into French ports. Further, as -the British refused to surrender the old rule, by which the goods of -individual enemies at sea were liable to capture, Napoleon decreed that -not only the property of individual Englishmen on the Continent was to -be seized, but also that of individual neutrals, if of British origin. -The preamble ended with a clause defining the duration of the edict, by -which the emperor burned his ships, laying down conditions which Great -Britain would never accept until at her last gasp. "The present decree -shall be considered as a fundamental principle of the Empire, until -England has acknowledged that the law of war is one and the same on the -land as on the sea; that it cannot be extended to private property of -whatever kind, nor to the person of individuals not in the profession -of arms, and that the right of blockade must be restricted to fortified -places, actually invested by sufficient forces." - -Having launched his missile, Napoleon became at once engaged in the -campaign against Russia. The bloody and doubtful battle of Eylau was -fought on the 8th of February, 1807, and for the next few months -the emperor was too busily engaged, holding on by his teeth on the -banks of the Vistula, to superintend the working of his decree.[360] -Immediately upon its promulgation in Paris, the American minister -demanded an explanation on several points from the Minister of Marine, -who replied that he did not understand it to make any alterations in -the laws respecting maritime captures, and that an American vessel -could not be taken at sea merely on the ground that she was bound to, -or coming from, a British port; this he inferred from the fact that -such vessels were, by the seventh article, denied admission to French -ports.[361] The inference, natural though it was, only showed how -elastic and slippery the terms of Napoleon's orders could be. The whole -edict, in fact, remained a dead letter until the struggle with Russia -was decided. At first, British merchants desisted from sending to the -Continent; but, as advices showed that the decree was inoperative, -shipments by neutral vessels became as brisk as at any time before, -and so continued until August or September, 1807.[362] The battle of -Friedland, resulting in the total defeat of the Russian army, was -fought on the 14th of June; on the 22d an armistice was signed; and on -the 25th Alexander and Napoleon had their first interview upon the raft -in the Niemen. On the 8th of July was concluded the remarkable and, to -Europe, threatening Treaty of Tilsit. The czar recognized all the new -states created by the emperor, and ceded to him the maritime positions -of the Ionian Islands, and the mouths of the Cattaro in the Adriatic; -in return for which Napoleon acquiesced in Russia's taking Finland from -Sweden, and also, under certain conditions, the European provinces of -the Turkish Empire as far as the Balkans. A further clause, buried in -the most profound secrecy, bound Russia and France to make common cause -in all circumstances; to unite their forces by land and sea in any war -they should have to maintain; to take arms against Great Britain, if -she would not subscribe to this treaty; and to summon, jointly, Sweden, -Denmark, Portugal, and Austria to concur in the projects of Russia and -France,—that is to say, to shut their ports to England and to declare -war against her.[363] - -At the time the Berlin decree was issued, negotiations were proceeding -in London, between the United States envoys and the British ministry, -concerning the several matters in dispute between the two countries; -and on the 31st of December, 1806, a commercial treaty was signed by -the respective commissioners. The vexed question of the trade between -the hostile countries and their colonies was arranged, by a stipulation -that goods imported from the colonies to the United States might be -re-exported, provided, after deducting the drawback, they had paid -full two per cent duties, _ad valorem_, to the Treasury; and that -articles coming from the mother countries might likewise be re-shipped -to the colonies, provided they remained subject to one per cent duty, -after recovering the drawback. These, as well as other features of -the treaty, were not acceptable to the United States, and it was not -ratified by that government. - -Meantime the British ministry had been considering the terms of the -Berlin decree, and, instead of waiting to see how far it would become -operative, determined to retort by a measure of retaliation. On the -7th of January, 1807, an Order in Council was issued by the Whig -ministers, which often returned to plague them in the succeeding years, -when they, in opposition, were severely criticising the better known -measures of the following November. The January Order, after quoting -Napoleon's decree, avowed his Majesty's unwillingness to carry to -extremes his undoubted right of retaliation; and therefore, for the -present, went no further than to forbid all trade by neutral vessels -"from one port to another, both of which ports shall belong to, or be -in possession of, France or her allies, or shall be so far under their -control as that British vessels may not freely trade thereat."[364] -The direct object of this step was to stop the coastwise trade in -Europe; its principle was the right of retaliation; in its effect, -it was an extension of the prohibition laid by the Rule of 1756. The -latter forbade the direct trade between hostile colonies and the mother -countries; the order of January, 1807, extended the restriction to -trade between any two hostile ports. It bore particularly hard upon -American ships, which were in the habit of going from place to place -in Europe, either seeking the best markets or gathering a cargo. Under -it, "American trade in the Mediterranean was swept away by seizures -and condemnations, and that in other seas threatened with the same -fate."[365] - -Matters were in this state when Napoleon returned to Paris at the -end of July, full of his projects against Great Britain, and against -neutrals as the abettors of her prosperity. His aims were not limited -to crushing her by commercial oppression; in the not distant future -he intended to seize the navies of Europe and combine them in a -direct assault upon her maritime power. On the 19th of July, while -he was still at Dresden, Portugal was notified that she must choose -between war with France or with Great Britain; and on the 31st, from -Paris, a similar intimation was given to Denmark.[366] To constrain -the latter, a corps under Bernadotte was collecting on her frontiers; -while another, under Junot, was assembling in the south of France to -invade Portugal. But in both countries Napoleon was anticipated by -Great Britain. The ministry had received certain information[367] of -the secret articles agreed to at Tilsit, and foresaw the danger of -allowing the two navies of Denmark and Portugal to fall into the hands -of the emperor. Early in August twenty-five sail-of-the-line entered -the Baltic, convoying transports with twenty-seven thousand troops; the -island on which Copenhagen stands was invested by the ships, and the -town itself by the army. The Danish government was then summoned to -surrender its fleet into the safe keeping of Great Britain, a pledge -being offered that it, and all other maritime equipment delivered, -should be held only as a deposit and restored at a general peace. The -offer being refused, the city was bombarded from the 2d to the 5th of -September, at the expiration of which time the terms demanded were -yielded, the British took possession of eighteen sail-of-the-line -besides a number of frigates, stripped the dockyards of their stores, -and returned to England. The transaction has been visited with the most -severe, yet uncalled-for, condemnation. The British ministry knew the -intention of Napoleon to invade Denmark, to force her into war, and -that the fleet would soon pass into his hands, if not snatched away. -They avoided the mistake made by Pitt, in seizing the Spanish frigates -in 1804; for the force sent to Copenhagen was sufficient to make -opposition hopeless and to justify submission. To have receded before -the obstinacy of the Danish government would have been utter weakness. - -In Portugal Great Britain had to deal with a friendly nation, instead -of the hostile prepossessions of Denmark. The French corps of invasion, -under Junot, entered Spain on its way to Portugal on the 17th of -October. Under the urgent and unsparing orders of Napoleon it made a -march of extreme suffering with great rapidity, losing most of its -numbers by the way from privation, exposure, or straggling; but when -the handful that kept together entered Lisbon on the 30th of November, -it found the Portuguese fleet gone, and that the court and its treasure -had departed with it. The British government had for some time past -expected such an attempt by Napoleon, and at the critical moment a -squadron on the spot determined the vacillating regent to withdraw to -Brazil. - -Though foiled in his endeavors to seize the fleets, Napoleon had -succeeded in formally closing the ports of the two countries to the -introduction of British goods; while the bombardment at Copenhagen had -served as a colorable pretext for the declaration of hostility against -Great Britain made by Russia on the 20th of October. The mediation -proposed by the czar had already been refused by the British ministry, -unless the articles of the Treaty of Tilsit were first communicated -to it;[368] but those articles were not of a character to bear such -an exposure. Prussia, under the compulsion of the two empires, closed -her ports against Great Britain by a proclamation dated September -2d; no navigation nor trade with England or her colonies was to be -permitted, either in British or in neutral vessels.[369] Austria also -acceded to the Continental System, and excluded British goods from -her borders.[370] In Italy, the new kingdom of Etruria showed little -zeal in enforcing Napoleon's commands to co-operate in his measures; -the British carried on commerce at Leghorn, as freely as at any port -in their own country. By the emperor's orders the viceroy of Italy -therefore took possession of the city; and at the same time French -detachments entered also the Papal States, occupied their coasts, and -drove the British from them. Joseph Bonaparte being already king of -Naples, the control of Napoleon and the exclusion of his enemies were -thus extended over both coasts of Italy. Turkey being at this time -involved in hostilities with Great Britain, the emperor was able to -assert that "England sees her merchandise repelled by all Europe; and -her ships, loaded with useless wealth, seek in vain, from the Sound to -the Hellespont, a port open to receive them."[371] Decrees applying -extreme rigor to the examination of vessels entering the Elbe and the -Weser were issued on the 6th of August and 13th of November.[372] -Napoleon had a special grudge against the two Hanseatic cities, -Bremen and Hamburg, which had long mocked his efforts to prevent the -introduction of British merchandise to the Continent; for which the -commercial aptitudes of their merchants, their extensive intelligence -abroad, and their noble rivers, afforded peculiar facilities. Despite -all these efforts and the external appearances of universal submission, -there still occurred wide-spread evasions of the emperor's orders, to -which allusion must be made later. It is necessary, before doing so, -to give the contemporary measures of other nations, in order that the -whole situation, at once of public regulation and private disobedience, -together with the final results, may come distinctly before the reader. - -Great as was the power of Napoleon, it ceased, like that of certain -wizards, when it reached the water. Enemies and neutrals alike bowed to -his invincible armies and his superb genius when he could reach them -by land; but beyond the water there was one enemy, Great Britain, and -one neutral, America, whom he could not directly touch. The spirit of -his course toward England and his initiatory steps have been given; it -remained now to define his action toward the United States. Weak as -the latter was, feeble to humiliation as had been the course of its -government hitherto, and although the prepossessions of the party in -power were undoubtedly strongly against Great Britain, the question -was one of immense importance; but the emperor, who respected nothing -but force, failed so to realize it. He stood just where the Directory -stood at the end of 1797, every enemy but Great Britain overthrown, but -seeing her defiant still and prosperous. Napoleon, however, had, what -the Directory had not, experimental evidence of the results of such -restrictions upon neutrals as were imposed by the law of January 18, -1798. It was possible to ascribe the disastrous effects to France of -that measure, and its total failure to achieve the object intended, -to one of two totally distinct causes. Either the law had been -inadequately enforced, owing to the feeble executive efforts of the -Directors and the comparatively limited extent of their influence, or -else it was in its nature and essence so contrary to the true interest -and policy of France that the very limitations imposed by defective -power had saved her, and the ability to carry it further would have -ended in utter ruin. Pursued somewhat further, the question became: -Will it be possible, not for France only but for all Europe,—for the -concurrence of all Europe is necessary to the effectual working of the -scheme,—to dispense with the neutral carrier (whom it is the tendency -of the Berlin decree to repel) for a length of time sufficient to ruin -Great Britain? Can Europe forego external commerce for a longer time -than Great Britain can spare the European market? Can the intercourse -between the continental nations be so facilitated, the accustomed -routes of import and export so modified, such changes introduced into -the habits of manufacture and consumption, as will render bearable the -demands made upon the patience of nations? If, as the Order in Council -of January seems to indicate, Great Britain resent the attempt to keep -neutrals from her ports, by retaliatory measures impeding their traffic -with the Continent, upon whom will these combined French and English -restrictions fall most heavily?—upon the state having a large body of -merchant ships, to which neutrals are the natural rivals; or upon the -nations whose shipping is small, and to whom therefore neutrals are -useful, if not necessary, auxiliaries? - -In a commercial war, as in any other, the question must be faced -whether with ten thousand it is possible to meet him who is coming -with twenty thousand. As a matter of fact, while Napoleon was -contemplating a measure which would most injuriously affect neutrals, -already largely employed in transporting British goods, the jealousy -of British merchants and statesmen was keenly excited by the growth -of this neutral carrying trade,[373] and they were casting about for -a pretext and a means to cripple it. The Berlin decree revived the -clamor of these men, who, being then in opposition, had condemned the -Order of January, 1807, for not carrying retaliation far enough, and -for directing it upon the coasting trade, which could only partially -be reached, instead of upon the neutral carriage of colonial goods, -which lay open everywhere to the British navy. A change of ministry in -the latter part of March, 1807, brought this party again into power, -after an absence from it of fourteen months since the death of Pitt. In -the mean time, however, the decree had remained inoperative, through -the absence of Napoleon in Poland, the decisions of the Minister of -Marine as to its scope, and the connivance of the local authorities -everywhere in its neglect. No further steps therefore had been taken -by the new British ministry up to the time of the emperor's return to -Paris. The latter at first only issued some additional regulations of a -municipal character, to ensure a stricter observance, but he was soon -called upon to give a momentous decision. The opinion of the Minister -of Marine, as to the meaning of certain clauses of the decree,[374] was -submitted to him by the Minister of Justice; and he stated that the -true original intention was that French armed vessels should seize and -bring into port neutrals having on board any goods of British origin, -even though at the time neutral property. As to whether they should -also arrest neutrals for the simple reason that they were going to, or -coming from, the British Islands, his Majesty reserved his decision. -This dictum of the emperor, which threw to the winds the ruling of -the Minister of Marine, was given to the prize courts on the 18th of -September, 1807, and shortly afterward the latter acted upon it in the -case of an American ship wrecked upon the French coast; that part of -her cargo which was of British origin was ordered to be sold for the -benefit of the state.[375] The effect of Napoleon's pronouncements was -at once seen in Great Britain. The insurance of neutral ships bound to -continental ports, especially to those of Holland and Hamburg, rose -from four guineas in August to eight and twelve in October, and some -insurers refused to take risks even at twenty-five and thirty. In the -two months of September and October sixty-five permits were issued by -the Custom House to re-land and store cargoes that had actually been -shipped for the Continent.[376] The Tory ministry now had the pretext -it wanted for a far-reaching and exhaustive measure of retaliation. - -Napoleon's decisions of September 18 were communicated to the Congress -of the United States on December 18 by the President; who at the -same time transmitted a proclamation from the king of Great Britain, -dated October 16, directing the impressment of British seamen found -serving on board any foreign merchant ship.[377] In view of the -dangers to which American vessels were exposed by the action of the -two belligerents, an embargo was recommended, to insure their safety -by keeping them in their own ports; the real purpose, however, being -to retaliate upon Great Britain, in pursuance of the policy of a -Non-Importation Act directed against that country, which had gone into -effect the previous July. An Act of Embargo was accordingly at once -passed, and was approved on the 22d of December.[378] All registered -vessels belonging to the United States were forbidden to depart from -the ports in which they were then lying, except upon giving bond that -their cargoes would be landed in another port of the country. This -continued in force throughout the year 1808 and until March 1, 1809, -when it was repealed; and for it was substituted a Non-Intercourse -Act,[379] which allowed the merchant ships of the United States to -go abroad in search of employment and to traffic between their own -and other countries, except Great Britain and France and the colonies -occupied by them, which were wholly forbidden to American vessels. They -not only could not clear from home for those countries, but they were -required to give bond that they would not, during the voyage, enter any -of their ports, nor be directly or indirectly engaged in any trade with -them. French or British ships entering a port of the United States were -to be seized and condemned. This act was to continue in force until the -end of the next session of Congress; and it accordingly remained the -law governing the intercourse of the United States with Great Britain -and France until May, 1810. - -On the 11th of November, 1807, were published the great retaliatory -measures of Great Britain, which for the moment filled the cup of -neutrals. Setting forth the Berlin Decree as the justifying ground -for their action, the Orders in Council of that date[380] proclaimed -a paper blockade, of the barest form and most extensive scope, of all -enemies' ports. "All ports and places of France and her allies, or -of any other country at war with his Majesty, and all other ports or -places in Europe from which, although not at war with his Majesty, -the British flag is excluded, and all ports in the colonies of his -Majesty's enemies, _shall from henceforth be subject to the same -restrictions_, in point of trade and navigation, _as if the same were -actually blockaded in the most strict and rigorous manner_." All trade -in hostile colonial produce was likewise declared unlawful for neutrals. - -An actual blockade, such as is here mentioned, requires the presence -off the blockaded port of a force sufficient to make entrance or -departure manifestly dangerous; in which case a vessel attempting to -pass in either direction is, by that common consent of nations called -International Law, justly liable to capture. To place such a force -before each of the many and widely scattered harbors embraced by these -Orders, was evidently beyond the power of even the vast numbers of -the British navy. The object which could not be attained by the use -of means acknowledged to be lawful, the British ministry determined -to compass by sheer force, by that maritime supremacy which they -unquestionably wielded, and which they could make effectual to the -ends they had in view, namely: to maintain the commerce and shipping -of Great Britain, upon which her naval strength depended, to force the -enemy's trade to pass through her ports, and thus to raise her revenues -to the point necessary to her salvation in the life and death struggle -in which she was embarked.[381] - -The entire suppression of trade with the restricted coasts, whether -by neutral carriers or in the articles of import or export the world -needed, was in no sense whatever the object of the British ministers. -To retaliate on their enemy was the first aim, to make him suffer -as he had meant to make them; but, withal, to turn his own measures -against him, so that while he was straitened, Great Britain should -reap some amelioration for her own troubles. Throughout this stormy -and woeful period, the instinct of the British nation recognized that -the hearts of the continental peoples were with them rather than with -Napoleon,—and for much the same reason that the United States, contrary -alike to the general interests of mankind and to her own, sided upon -the whole, though by no means unanimously, against Great Britain. -In either case the immediate oppressor was the object of hatred. -Throughout the five years or more that the Continental blockade was -in force, the Continental nations saw the British trying everywhere, -with more or less success, to come to their relief,—to break through -the iron barrier which Napoleon had established. During great part -of that time a considerable intercourse did prevail; and the mutual -intelligence thus maintained made clear to all parties the community -of interests that bound them together, notwithstanding the political -hostilities. Nothing appears more clearly, between the lines of the -British diplomatic correspondence, than the conviction that the people -were ready to further their efforts to circumvent the measures of -Napoleon. - -Keeping in view the purpose of making the United Kingdom the centre -and warehouse of the world's commerce, it was evident that, provided -this end—the chief object of the Orders in Council—were attained, -the greater the commerce of the outside world was, the greater would -be the advantage, or toll, resulting to Great Britain. The Orders -therefore contained, besides the general principle of blockade, certain -exceptions, narrow in wording but wide in application. By the first, -neutrals were permitted to trade directly between their own country and -the hostile colonies. They were also allowed to trade direct between -the latter and the free ports of the British colonies, which were thus -enabled, in their degree, to become the centres of local commerce, as -Britain herself was to be the entrepôt of European and general commerce. - -The second exception, which was particularly odious to neutrals, -permitted the latter to go direct from a port of the United Kingdom to -a restricted hostile port, although they might not start from their own -country for the same, nor for any other place in Europe from which the -British flag was excluded. Conversely, neutrals were at liberty to sail -from any port of his Majesty's enemies forbidden to them by the Orders, -provided they went direct to some port in Europe belonging to Great -Britain;[382] but they might not return to their own land without first -stopping at a British port. - -Such, stripped of their verbiage, appears to be the gist of the Orders -in Council of November 11, 1807. Neutrals might not trade directly -with any ports in Europe not open to British ships; but they might -trade with them by going first to a British port, there landing their -cargo, reshipping it subject to certain duties,[383] and thence -proceeding to a hostile port. The same process was to be observed on -the return voyage; it might not be direct home, but must first be to -Great Britain. The commerce of the Continent thus paid toll, going and -coming; or, to repeat the words of the ministry, there was for the -enemy "no trade except through Great Britain." British cruisers were -"instructed to warn any vessel which shall have commenced her voyage -prior to any notice of this Order, to discontinue it; and to proceed -instead to some port in this kingdom, or to Gibraltar or Malta; and any -vessel which, after being so warned, shall be found in the prosecution -of a forbidden voyage, shall be captured." Vessels which in obedience -to the warning came into a British port were to be permitted, after -landing their cargo, to "report it for exportation, and allowed to -proceed to their original port of destination, or to any other port -at amity with his Majesty, upon receiving a certificate from the -collector of the port" setting forth these facts; but from this general -permission to "report," were specially excepted "sugar, coffee, wine, -brandy, snuff, and tobacco," which could be exported to a restricted -port only "under such conditions as his Majesty, by any license to -be granted for that purpose, may direct." Licenses were generally -necessary for export of any foreign produce or manufacture; while goods -of British origin could be taken to a hostile country without such -license. In the end, the export of cotton to the Continent was wholly -forbidden, the object being to cripple the foreign manufactures. Upon -the license requirements was soon built up the extraordinary licensed -traffic, which played so important a subordinate part in the workings -both of the Orders and of the Continental System. - -Anything more humiliating and vexatious to neutrals than these Orders -can scarcely be conceived. They trampled upon all previously received -law, upon men's inbred ideas of their rights; and that by sheer -uncontrolled force, the law of the strongest. There was also not only -denial of right, but positive injury and loss, direct and indirect. Yet -it must not be forgotten that they were a very real and severe measure -of retaliation upon Napoleon's government; of which a contemporary -German writer had truly said it was already wound up so tight the -springs could almost be heard to crack. It must be remembered, too, -that Great Britain was fighting for her life. The additional expense -entailed upon every cargo which reached the Continent after passing -through her ports, the expenses of delay, of unloading and reloading, -wharfage, licenses, maintenance, fell chiefly upon the continental -consumer; upon the subjects of Napoleon, or upon those whom he was -holding in military bondage. Nor was this all. Although Great Britain -was not able to blockade all the individual French or continental -ports,—an inability due more to the dangers of the sea than to the -number of the harbors,—she was able to make the approach to the French -coast exceedingly dangerous, so much so that it was more to the -interest of the ordinary trader to submit to the Orders than to attempt -to evade them; especially as, upon arriving at a port under Napoleon's -control, he found the emperor possessed with every disposition to -confiscate his cargo, if a plausible pretext could be made. In the -English Channel Great Britain controlled the approaches from the -Atlantic to all the northern continental ports; and at Gibraltar those -to the Mediterranean. The Orders were therefore by no means an empty -threat. They could not but exercise a very serious influence upon the -imports to the Continent, and especially upon those exotic objects -of consumption, sugar, coffee, and other tropical growths, which had -become so essential to the comfort of people; and upon certain raw -materials, such as cotton, dye-woods and indigo. Naval stores from the -Baltic for England passed so near the French coast that they might -be slipped in by a lucky chance; but the neutral from the Atlantic, -who was found near the coast of France or Spain, had to account for -the appearances which were against him. These obstacles to direct -import tended therefore to increase prices by diminishing supplies, -and combined with the duties laid by Great Britain, upon the cargoes -forced into her ports, to raise the cost of living throughout the -Continent. The embarrassments of its unfortunate inhabitants were -further augmented by the difficulty of exporting their own products; -and nowhere was this more keenly felt than in Russia, where the -revenues of the nobility depended largely on the British demand for -naval stores, and where the French alliance and the Continental System -were proportionately detested. - -The object of the Orders in Council was therefore twofold: to embarrass -France and Napoleon by the prohibition of direct import and export -trade, of all external commerce, which for them could only be carried -on by neutrals; and at the same time to force into the Continent all -the British products or manufactures that it could take. A preference -was secured for the latter over foreign products by the license -practice, which left the course of traffic to the constant manipulation -of the Board of Trade. The whole system was then, and has since been, -roundly abused as being in no sense a military measure, but merely -a gigantic exhibition of commercial greed; but this simply begs the -question. To win her fight Great Britain was obliged not only to -weaken Napoleon, but to increase her own strength. The battle between -the sea and the land was to be fought out on Commerce. England had no -army wherewith to meet Napoleon; Napoleon had no navy to cope with -that of his enemy. As in the case of an impregnable fortress, the only -alternative for either of these contestants was to reduce the other -by starvation. On the common frontier, the coast line, they met in -a deadly strife in which no weapon was drawn. The imperial soldiers -were turned into coast-guards-men to shut out Great Britain from her -markets; the British ships became revenue cutters to prohibit the -trade of France. The neutral carrier, pocketing his pride, offered -his service to either for pay, and the other then regarded him as -taking part in hostilities. The ministry, in the exigencies of -debate, betrayed some lack of definite conviction as to their precise -aim. Sometimes the Orders were justified as a military measure of -retaliation; sometimes the need of supporting British commerce as -essential to her life and to her naval strength was alleged; and -their opponents in either case taunted them with inconsistency.[384] -Napoleon, with despotic simplicity, announced clearly his purpose of -ruining England through her trade, and the ministry really needed no -other arguments than his avowals. _Salus civitatis suprema lex._ To -call the measures of either not military, is as inaccurate as it would -be to call the ancient practice of circumvallation unmilitary, because -the only weapon used for it was the spade. - -Napoleon was not the man to accept silently the Orders in Council. -On the 27th of October he had signed the treaty of Fontainebleau -with Spain, arranging the partition of Portugal and taking thus the -first step in the invasion of the Peninsula. On November 16 he left -Fontainebleau to visit his kingdom of Italy. From the capital, Milan, -he issued the decree which bears its name, on the 17th of December, -1807. Alleging the Orders as its motive, the Milan Decree declared -that any ship which submitted to search by a British cruiser was -thereby "denationalized;" a word for which, at sea, "outlaw" is the -only equivalent. It lost the character of its own country, so far as -French cruisers were concerned, and was liable to arrest as a vagrant. -The decree further declared that all vessels going to, or sailing from, -Great Britain, were for that fact alone good prize,—a point which, -under the Berlin decree, had as yet been left open. French privateers -were still sufficiently numerous to make these regulations a great -additional danger to ships at sea; and the decree went on to say that, -when coming under the previous provisions, they should be seized -whenever they entered a French port. - -The two belligerents had now laid down the general lines of policy on -which they intended to act. The Orders in Council received various -modifications, due largely to the importance to Great Britain of the -American market, which absorbed a great part of her manufactures; -but these modifications, though sensibly lightening the burden upon -neutrals and introducing some changes of form, in no sense departed -from the spirit of the originals. The entire series was finally -withdrawn in June, 1812, but too late to avert the war with the United -States, which was declared in the same month. Napoleon never revoked -his Berlin and Milan decrees, although by a trick he induced an -over-eager President of the United States to believe that he had done -so. - -In the year 1808 the emperor's purpose to overthrow the Spanish -monarchy, and place one of his own family upon the throne, finally -matured. He left Paris on the 2d of April, and, after a long delay at -Bordeaux, on the 14th reached Bayonne. There took place his meetings -with the king and infante of Spain which resulted in the former -resigning his crown, to be disposed of as to Napoleon might seem best. -While at Bayonne, on April 17, the emperor issued an order, directing -the sequestration of all American ships which should enter the -ports of France, Italy, Holland, and the Hanse towns, as being under -suspicion of having come from Great Britain. The justification for this -step was found in the Embargo Act of December, 1807, in consequence -of which, Napoleon argued, as such ships could not lawfully have left -their own country, they came really from England, and their papers -were fabricated.[385] Under this ruling sequestrations continued to be -made until March 23, 1810; when the Decree of Rambouillet confiscated -finally the vessels and cargoes thus seized.[386] After May, 1810, the -Non-Intercourse Act, which had replaced the Embargo, was temporarily -suspended as regarded both Great Britain and France, and never renewed -as to the latter; so the plea upon which these confiscations had -proceeded was no longer valid. - -Meanwhile the emperor's plans for the Peninsula met with unexpected -reverses. An insurrection on the 2d of May in Madrid was followed by -spontaneous popular risings in all parts of the country. On the 21st of -July an army corps under General Dupont was cut off by the insurgents -in Andalusia and surrendered, to the number of eighteen thousand, at -Baylen; and on the 29th the new king of Spain, Joseph Bonaparte, fled -from Madrid, which he had only entered on the 20th. On the 1st of -August a British fleet appeared off the coast of Portugal, bearing the -first division of troops destined to act in the Peninsula, under the -command of Sir Arthur Wellesley. On the 21st the battle of Vimiero was -fought, resulting in the defeat of Junot; who, by the Convention of -Cintra, signed on the 30th, was permitted to evacuate Portugal and was -conveyed to France with his army in British transports. At the same -time a division of the Russian fleet which had taken refuge in Lisbon, -on its return from the Mediterranean, was, by a separate convention, -left in the hands of Great Britain until the conclusion of the war. -The admiral had steadily refused to co-operate with Junot; in which -course he probably reflected the strong feeling of the Russian upper -classes against the French alliance. In consequence of these successive -disasters Portugal was wholly lost, and the French army in Spain fell -back to the line of the Ebro. - -Napoleon realized the necessity of vigorous measures to suppress the -general uprising, before it had attained organization and consistency, -and determined to take the field in person; but, before removing to -this distant scene of action, he thought advisable to confirm and -establish his understanding with the czar, upon whose support depended -so much of his position in Central Europe. The two sovereigns met for -the second time, September 27, 1808, at Erfurt. The alliance formed -at Tilsit was renewed; France undertook not to consent to peace until -Russia obtained Finland from Sweden, Moldavia and Wallachia from -Turkey; Russia guaranteed the crown of Spain to Joseph; and it was -agreed that a formal proposition for peace should at once be made -to England, as publicly and conspicuously as possible. The czar had -already in the preceding February begun hostilities against Sweden, -giving as a pretext her leaning toward Great Britain and her refusal to -join with Russia and Denmark in shutting the Baltic to British fleets. -Denmark also had declared war against Sweden, for carrying on which the -possession of Norway then gave her facilities which she no longer has; -and Prussia, on the 6th of March, had closed her ports against Swedish -commerce "at the solicitation of the imperial courts of Paris and St. -Petersburg." - -The vital importance of the Baltic to Great Britain, both as the -source whence her naval stores were drawn and as a channel whereby her -commerce might find a way into the Continent remote from the active -vigilance of Napoleon, imposed upon her the necessity of strenuously -supporting Sweden. A fleet of sixty-two sail, of which sixteen were -of the line, was accordingly sent through the Sound in April, under -Sir James Saumarez, one of the most distinguished of British admirals; -who, to an unusually brilliant reputation for seamanship, activity, -and hard fighting, joined a calm and well-balanced temper, peculiarly -fitted to deal with the delicate political situation that obtained in -the North during the four years of his Baltic command. The fleet was -shortly followed by a body of ten thousand troops under the celebrated -Sir John Moore; but the rapid progress of the Russian arms rendered -this assistance abortive, and Moore was soon transported to that scene -of action in the Peninsula in connection with which his name has been -immortalized. - -A joint letter, addressed to the king of Great Britain by the allied -emperors, was forwarded through the usual channels by the foreign -ministers of both powers on the 12th of October. The British reply, -dated October 28, expressed a willingness to enter into the proposed -negotiations, provided the king of Sweden and the government acting -in the name of the king of Spain, then a prisoner in the hands of -Napoleon, were understood to be parties to any negotiation in which -Great Britain was engaged. "To Spain," said the British note, "his -Majesty is not bound by any formal instrument; but his Majesty has, -in the face of the world, contracted with that nation engagements not -less sacred, and not less binding upon his Majesty's mind, than the -most solemn treaties." This reply was, in one point at least, open -to severe criticism for uncalled-for insolence. To that part of the -letter of the two sovereigns which attributed the sufferings of the -Continent to the cessation of maritime commerce, it was retorted: -"His Majesty cannot be expected to hear with unqualified regret that -the system devised for the destruction of the commerce of his subjects -has recoiled upon its authors, or its instruments." Nevertheless, it -is impossible to withhold admiration for the undaunted attitude of -the solitary Power that ruled the sea, in the face of the two mighty -sovereigns who between them controlled the forces of the Continent, or -to refuse recognition of the fidelity with which, against overwhelming -odds, she now, as always in the time of Pitt, refused to separate her -cause from that of her allies. The decision of the British court was -made known to Europe by a public declaration, dated December 15, which, -while expressing the same firm resolve, allowed to appear plainly the -sense entertained by the ministry of the restiveness of the Continent -under the yoke it was bearing. - -The proposal to include the Spanish people in the negotiations was -rejected by both France and Russia. Napoleon, having in the mean time -returned to Paris, left there on the 29th of October to take command -of the armies, which, to the number of over three hundred thousand -men of all arms, had either entered Spain or were rapidly converging -upon it. On the 8th of November he crossed the frontier, and on the -4th of December Madrid surrendered. Northern Spain being overrun and -subdued, the capital having fallen without any real resistance, and -the political prestige of the insurrection being thus seriously, if -not hopelessly, injured, the emperor now proposed to divide the mass -of soldiers that had so far acted under his own supreme direction. In -the disorganized and helpless condition of the Spanish people, with -the proved weakness and imbecility of the provisional governments, -a dispersion that might otherwise be unwise became admissible. Army -corps under his marshals were to overrun the southern provinces -of the Peninsula, while an overwhelming force under his personal -leadership was to cross the frontier, and carry the eagles to Lisbon, -in accordance with his boast made before leaving Paris. From this -determination he was turned aside by the sudden intelligence that -the small body of British troops, commanded by Sir John Moore, which -he supposed to be retreating toward Lisbon, and which he expected to -drive on board the ships there, had cut loose from their connection -with it, and, by a daring move to the north, were threatening his own -lines of communication with France. Upon the receipt of this news, on -the 21st of December, he at once postponed his previous purposes to -the necessity of dislodging and driving out of Spain the little force, -of less than twenty-five thousand men, that had dared thus to traverse -his plans. Thus was Napoleon headed from his course by an imperious -military necessity, and Spain saved at a most critical moment, by the -petty army which had come from the sea, and which had only dared to -make this move—well nigh desperate at the best—because it knew that, in -the inevitable retreat, it would find in the sea no impassable barrier, -but a hospitable host,—in truth, its own country. The Peninsula gained -the time to breathe, which, unless under stern compulsion, Napoleon -never granted to an enemy; and the opportunity thus lost to him never -again returned. - -Thus opened the year 1809. Napoleon at the head of eighty thousand -men was driving before him, through the snows of northwestern Spain, -some twenty thousand British troops, with the relentless energy that -distinguished all his movements of pursuit. In the north, Russia, -having completed the conquest of Finland, was now preparing to invade -Sweden on the west of the Baltic, the king of that country was on the -point of being dethroned on account of insanity, and the policy of the -nation was tending to a peace with its gigantic enemy; which the latter -refused to grant except upon the condition of joining the alliance -against Great Britain. To this Sweden was most unwilling to accede. -Her people depended wholly upon their produce of naval stores and grain -and upon maritime commerce. Hence, to lose the freedom of their trade -was almost tantamount to destruction, and the British ministry from -the first saw that, whatever steps Sweden might be forced to take, its -real wishes must be to keep open intercourse with Great Britain. From -the anxious and delicate position of this small country, between these -opposing claims, arose the necessity of great prudence and caution on -the part of the British government, of its diplomatic representative, -and of the admiral commanding the fleet. The task ultimately devolved -upon the latter, when Sweden was at last forced into formal war; and to -his sound judgment and self-restraint was largely due that no actual -collision took place, and that, in the decisive moments of 1812, she, -despite her serious causes of complaint against the czar, sided with -Russia, instead of against her. - -In Central Europe, Austria, since the peace of Presburg,[387] three -years before, had been quietly engaged in restoring her military -strength. The various changes which had taken place in Germany during -that time, the establishment and growth of the Confederation of the -Rhine, the destruction of the power of Prussia, the foundation of the -Duchy of Warsaw, combined with the great losses of territory which she -had herself undergone, had left Austria in a position that she could -not possibly accept as final; while the alliance between Russia and -France placed her in a state of isolation, which Napoleon had been -careful to emphasize during the meeting at Erfurt. The renewal of the -war between herself and France was therefore in the nature of things. -The only question to be decided was when to declare it;[388] but -this was a matter which Napoleon, who fully understood the political -situation, was not in the habit of allowing an enemy to determine. -He undertook his Spanish enterprise with the full knowledge that his -absence, and that of his Grand Army, in the Peninsula must be short; he -understood that a prolonged stay there, caused by lack of immediate and -decisive success, would give Austria the opportunity she needed; but -he had reasonable expectation of accomplishing his task, and returning -with his army to his eastern frontiers, within a safe period of time. -This hope was frustrated by the action of Sir John Moore. The year -1809 therefore opened with the prospect of war impending over the two -empires. "From the frontiers of Austria to the centre of Paris," wrote -Metternich, "I have found but one opinion accepted by the public,—that -is, that in the spring at latest, Austria will take the field against -France. This conclusion is drawn from the relative position of the two -powers."[389] - -Underlying the other contentions, affecting them all with the unheeded, -quiet, but persistent action which ordinarily characterizes the -exertions of sea power, fermenting continually in the hearts of the -people, was the commercial warfare, the absence of that maritime peace -for which the nations sighed. The Berlin and Milan decrees on the one -side, the Orders in Council on the other, were still, at the opening of -1809, in full force. France, which especially needed the concurrence -of neutral carriers, had taken away even the slight chances of -reaching her ports which British cruisers might leave, by pronouncing -confiscation on any ship which had submitted to a search, though it was -powerless to resist. Great Britain, on the other hand, having shut out -all competition with her own trade to the Continent by the blockade, -which forbade direct access to neutral ships, was prepared to avail -herself of every chance to force upon Europe, at any point, and by -any means, neutral or other, any and all merchandise, manufactured -or colonial, which came from her own warehouses. For this the license -system offered a means of which neutrals were only too ready to avail -themselves. A British license could admit them to any port from which -a British blockade excluded them; and, as it was only to be obtained -legitimately in a British port, the neutral carriers, when there, -naturally filled up with the most paying cargo, whatever its origin. - -In the years from 1806 to 1810, as at earlier periods of the -revolutionary wars, Holland and the Hanse towns competed for the -profits of this indirect and often contraband trade. In June, 1806, -Napoleon, in pursuance of his policy of placing members of his own -family upon the thrones of the Continent, had obtained the conversion -of Holland from a republic to a monarchy and bestowed its crown upon -his brother Louis. The latter sought from the first to identify -himself with his new subjects, and constantly withstood the commands -of Napoleon in favor of their interests. Foremost among these was -maritime commerce, for which geographical position and generations -of habit especially fitted the Dutch. With such dispositions on the -part of the king, notwithstanding the jealous watchfulness and sharp -remonstrances of the emperor, evasions were frequent, and the decrees -even openly disregarded on different pretences. The whole community -naturally engaged in undertakings at once so consonant to its habits -and so remunerative when successful. From the time the Berlin decree -was issued until after the war with Austria in 1809, Napoleon's -attention, though often angrily attracted by Holland and the neglect -of his orders, was still too much diverted to admit of the decisive -measures needed to enforce them. First, the Russian war in 1807, then -the affairs of the Peninsula extending through 1808, finally the -Austrian war in 1809 with his hazardous position between the battles of -Essling and Wagram, accompanied as the whole period was with financial -difficulties and expedients due to the straits of the empire under the -cessation of maritime commerce, occupied his mind almost wholly, and -allowed but partial attention to the Continental System. - -Neutral ships therefore continued to be openly admitted into Holland, -and the emperor's demands for their confiscation to be eluded; and -there was besides much smuggling, for which the character of the coast -and its nearness to England offered ample facilities. From Holland -the goods usually found their way without great difficulty into -France, though on two occasions Napoleon, to punish Holland for her -waywardness, closed the frontier against her. "Your Majesty," wrote he -to Louis, "took advantage of the moment in which I had embarrassments -upon the Continent, to allow the relations between Holland and England -to be resumed; to violate the laws of the blockade, the only measure by -which that power can be seriously injured. I showed my dissatisfaction -by forbidding France to you, and made you feel that, without having -recourse to my armies, I could, by closing the Rhine, the Weser, -the Scheldt, and the Meuse to Holland, place her in a position more -critical than by declaring war against her. I was so isolating her -as to annihilate her. The blow resounded in Holland. Your Majesty -appealed to my generosity.... I removed the line of custom-houses; but -your Majesty returned to your former system. It is true I was then at -Vienna, and had a grievous war upon my hands. All the American ships -which entered the ports of Holland, while they were repelled from those -of France, your Majesty received. I have been obliged a second time -to close my custom-houses to Dutch commerce.... I will not conceal my -intention to re-unite Holland to France, to round off her territory, as -the most disastrous blow I can deal to England." He consented, however, -to suspend his action, upon condition that the existing stores of -colonial merchandise were confiscated, as well as the cargoes of the -American ships.[390] - -The important part played in the former war by Hamburg and Bremen, as -commercial centres and warehouses for continental trade, has already -been mentioned. To a certain extent they still fulfilled the same -function, but under greatly altered conditions. The political changes -following the war of 1806 and 1807, and the presence of French troops -in Prussian fortresses and throughout Northern Germany, combined to -make them subservient, as Prussia was, to the emperor's wishes. In -point of form the continental blockade extended throughout all this -region, as in Holland; everywhere vessels and merchandise coming from -Great Britain were proscribed and should be confiscated, whenever -found.[391] All the shores of the North Sea, those of Denmark, and, -by the co-operation of the czar, the coasts of the Baltic, shared the -general prohibition. The minister of France at Hamburg found his chief -occupations in either demanding subsidies—contributions in money or -kind—for the French troops, or in insisting, much against his will, -upon increased severity against the introduction of British goods. The -distress occasioned by these stringent requirements was very great, -even while Napoleon's other preoccupations lasted; but the general -consent of all the people in passive resistance, the activity of -smugglers, and the corruption that ever hangs about custom-houses and -increases with the duties, conspired to mitigate the privations. The -coasts of the North Sea, between the mouths of the Ems, the Weser, and -the Elbe, and those of Danish Holstein, low, of difficult approach for -large vessels, and hence favorable to the multiplication of small boats -and the operations of those having local knowledge, fostered smuggling; -to which also conduced the numbers of fishermen, and the fringe of -off-lying islands, out of the reach of the ordinary custom-house -officer. - -To support this contraband trade, the British, on the 5th of September, -1807, seized Heligoland and converted it into a depot for goods waiting -to be introduced into Germany or Holstein. "A garrison of six hundred -men defended the island, and ships of war cruised continually in its -neighborhood. From there contraband traders obtained merchandise, with -which they supplied the Continent. Farmers along the coast received -these smuggled goods, which were taken from them during the night and -spread far and wide. The populations of the various countries aided -the smugglers, joined them in opposing the revenue officers and in -seducing the latter from their duty."[392] Between Holstein and Hamburg -was drawn up a close line of custom-house officials; but the forbidden -goods leaked through all barriers. "More than six thousand persons -of the lower and middle classes passed their day in going more than -twenty times from Altona, in Holstein, to Hamburg. Punishments and -confiscations fell upon the guilty; but this did not put an end to the -incessant strife, sometimes by cunning, sometimes by force, against -this fiscal tyranny."[393] Between five and six hundred women were -employed by the merchants of Hamburg daily to convey into the city, -each of them, fourteen pounds of coffee and other produce, concealed -beneath their garments.[394] - -In the Baltic conditions were somewhat different. Much there depended -upon the heartiness of the czar in the cause; upon whether he would -content himself with a bare perfunctory compliance with the letter of -his engagements at Tilsit and Erfurt, or would decisively enforce an -entire cessation of traffic with Great Britain. The latter course, -however, was impossible to Alexander. Impulsive and ambitious, he -yet lacked the hardness of character needed to disregard the cold -disapproval of the nobles and the distress of his subjects. Under -the influence of Napoleon's presence, of his fascination and his -promises, it had seemed possible to do that which in the isolation of -his court, and deprived of sympathy, became drearily monotonous; nor -did Napoleon, by fidelity to his word, make the task easier. Decrees -of great severity were issued,[395] and the British flag was honestly -excluded; but the quick mercantile intelligence soon detected that -no ill-timed curiosity as to ships' papers would be exercised,[396] -nor vexatious impediments thrown in the way of exporting the national -products, which, if essential to Great Britain's naval supremacy, were -no less the source of Russia's wealth. In truth, British consumption of -naval stores, and British capital invested in Russia, had been leading -elements in the prosperity of the country; and it had been no light -sacrifice to concede such advantages as the czar had already yielded. - -Such was the working condition of the Continental System between -1806 and 1810. Despite the general disquietude in Great Britain and -the undoubted impediments raised to that free export upon which her -prosperity was based, the general confidence was unabated.[397] -Much was hoped from the resistance of the continental peoples, more -from their steadfast evasion of the edicts. In 1806, just before the -Berlin decree was issued, but when the system was already in force, -a commercial magazine wrote: "The regulations adopted only show the -ignorance of the French government of commercial principles. When -the blockade of the Elbe was removed, instead of finding markets -exhausted and prices enhanced, they were found overstocked."[398] -"In spite of every prohibition British goods continue (Dec. 1, 1806) -to find their way in vast quantities into France. They are exported -hence on French orders. It is easy to insure them for the whole -transit to the town in France where they are to be delivered to -the purchaser. They are introduced at almost all parts of the land -confines of the French Empire. No sooner are they received into the -French merchant's warehouse, than evidence is procured that they are -of French manufacture; the proper marks are stamped, and the goods are -in a state to be exhibited, in proof that the manufactures of France -quite outrival those of England. The writer had this information from -gentlemen who have a concern in the trade to which it relates."[399] -"Though the port of Venice is now totally shut against British -commerce, as also the peninsula of Istria from whence Italian silk -has always been obtained, yet through neutral vessels we now obtain -Piedmont silk, which is the best and finest, direct from Leghorn, -Lucca, and Genoa."[400] "From Malta a brisk trade, yielding quick -returns, is kept up with the ports of Italy. Malta is the emporium, the -storehouse. From Malta we supply Leghorn and other places in the power -of France. But the British goods are sold, even before they are landed, -for ready money; and scarcely a pound's worth of British property is at -any moment hazarded where the French might seize it."[401] - -Indications of embarrassment now begin to accumulate, but still, -in January, 1808, we read: "Several ships from Holland have lately -entered our harbors, and brought over large quantities of goods -usually imported from Hamburg. This is a proof of the futility of -Bonaparte's commercial speculations."[402] Russia had by this declared -against Great Britain, causing a rise in all Russian produce; and -the Embargo Act of the United States had just gone into operation. -There is a vast falling off in the Baltic and American trade. In 1805 -over eleven thousand ships had passed through the Sound, going and -coming; in 1807 barely six thousand, and British ships are excluded -from all but Swedish harbors. In August, 1808, the ports of Holland -are opened for the export of Dutch butter, and two hundred bales of -silk are allowed to be smuggled out, for which a bribe of six thousand -guineas was extorted by some person in authority.[403] In 1809 a notice -again occurs of the ports of Holland being opened by the king; and -concurrently, West India produce, which has been for some months dull, -is found more in demand and commanding good prices.[404] Malta is doing -a famous business at the same time, and has become one of the greatest -depots in the Mediterranean.[405] - -The year 1809 was marked by a great, though temporary, revival of -trade, due to several causes. Napoleon himself was detained during -great part of the year in the heart of Austria, absorbed in one of his -most doubtful contests with the empire; and in his absence trade with -the North Sea ports went on almost as in time of peace. In the United -States an eager British minister, of politics opposed to the party -in power, had committed himself without due authority to an official -statement to the government that the Orders in Council would be -rescinded by June 10. The President, without waiting to hear further, -removed the restrictions of the Non-Intercourse Act on that date; and -accordingly, for some months there was free traffic and a very great -interchange of goods between the United States and Great Britain. In -South America, the withdrawal of the Portuguese court to Brazil and the -uprising of Spain against Napoleon had resulted in throwing open the -colonial ports to Great Britain; and an immense wave of speculative -shipments, heavily employing the manufactories, was setting in that -direction. In the Baltic, the czar was wearying of his engagements with -France, and of the emperor's tergiversations; wearying too, of the -opposition of his court and subjects. He adhered faithfully, indeed, -to the letter of his bargain and refused admission to British ships: -but he would not open his eyes to the fact that British commerce was -being carried on in his ports by neutrals with British licenses. He had -never promised to exclude neutrals, or forbid all export and import; -and it was none of his business to pry behind the papers that covered -transactions essential to his people. The imports to Great Britain -of naval stores, mainly from the Baltic, more than doubled from 1808 -to 1809, and were even greater the following year.[406] Wool from -Spain and silk from Italy experienced a similar rise. Even West India -produce, so vigorously excluded from the Continent, shared the general -advance; and there was a great, though feverish and unsound, hope of -returning prosperity. It was evident that Napoleon's measures were -meeting only partial success, and men were willing to believe that -their failure lay in the nature of things,—in the impossibility of his -attempt. They had yet to learn that persecution fails only when it is -not, or cannot be, thorough and unrelenting. - -Among the multiplied impediments to intercourse between nations, due -first of all to the narrow ideas of commercial policy prevalent at that -epoch, increased by the state of open maritime war or hostile exclusion -existing between Great Britain and most of the continental countries, -and further complicated by the continental blockade of Napoleon and the -retaliatory orders of the British government, there arose an obscure -but extensive usage of "licenses;" which served, though but partially, -and in a wholly arbitrary manner, to remove some of the difficulties -that prevented the exchange of commodities. A license, from its name, -implies a prohibition which is intended to be removed in the particular -case; and the license practice of the Napoleonic wars was for the most -part not so much a system, as an aggregation of individual permissions -to carry on a traffic forbidden by the existing laws of the authority -granting them. The licenses were issued both by the British government -and by Napoleon; and they were addressed, according to the character -of the sway borne by one party or the other, either to the police of -the seas, the armed cruisers, or to the customs authorities of the -continental ports. It was generally admitted in Great Britain that the -Board of Trade was actuated only by upright motives in its action, -though the practice was vigorously attacked on many grounds,—chiefly in -order to impugn the Orders in Council to which alone their origin was -attributed; but in France the taint of court corruption, or favoritism, -in the issue of licenses was clearly asserted.[407] - -The "License System," in the peculiar and extensive form to which the -phrase was commonly applied, was adopted by the British government in -1808,[408] immediately after the Orders in Council and the alliance -of Russia with Napoleon. Licenses did not then first begin to be -issued, nor were they then for the first time necessary;[409] but -then began the development which carried their numbers from two -thousand six hundred and six in 1807, to over fifteen thousand in -1809 and over eighteen thousand in 1810. After the last year there -was a rapid falling off, due, not to a change of system, but to the -bitter experience that the license, which protected against a British -cruiser, did not save the ship and cargo upon arrival in a port under -Napoleon's control, when he had at last devoted his indomitable energy -to the thorough enforcement of his decrees. During the years in which -the practice flourished, it was principally to the Baltic ports that -the licensed vessels went, though they also made their way to those of -Holland, France, Spain, and other countries on the Continent. The trade -to the British East and West Indies was confined to British vessels, as -in time of profound peace. - -The true origin of the later license trade is to be found in that -supremacy and omnipresence of the British navy, which made it -impossible for vessels under an enemy's flag to keep the sea. In order -to employ their vessels, hostile owners transferred them to a neutral -ownership, ordinarily by a fraudulent process which received the name -of "neutralization." A neutralized ship remained the property of the -hostile merchant; but, for a stipulated price, a neutral firm, who made -this their regular business, gave their name as the owners and obtained -from the authorities of the neutral country all the requisite papers -and attestations by which the British cruisers, on searching, might be -deceived. As a regular systematic business, fraudulent from beginning -to end, the practice first arose during the war of the American -Revolution, in 1780, when Holland became a party to the war, having a -large mercantile tonnage with very inadequate means of protecting it. -At that time a firm established itself in Embden, on the Prussian side -of the Ems, which divides Prussia from Holland, and within the two -years that remained of the war "neutralized," under Prussian flags, -a hundred thousand tons of foreign shipping, besides cargoes to an -immense value for those days. In the wars of Napoleon it was the fate -of Holland to be again dragged in the wake of France, and the same -practice of neutralization, supported by false oaths and false papers, -again sprang up and flourished extensively in the Prussian province of -East Friesland,—Prussia carefully maintaining her neutrality from 1795 -to the unfortunate Jena campaign of 1806. - -In the year 1806 it was asserted that there were upwards of three -thousand sail belonging to merchants of Holland, France, and Spain -navigating under the Prussian flag; and the practice doubtless was -not confined to Prussia. "It is notorious," wrote Lord Howick, the -British foreign minister, "that the coasting trade of the enemy is -carried on not only by neutral ships but by the shameful misconduct of -neutral merchants, who lend their names for a small percentage, not -only to cover the goods, but in numberless instances to mask the ships -of the enemy."[410] The fact becoming known, British cruisers, when -meeting a valuable ship with Prussian papers, were apt to take the -chance of her being condemned and send her in; but even in British -ports and admiralty courts the neutralizing agent was prepared to -cover his transaction. The captain and crew of the detained vessel -were all carefully instructed and prepared to swear to the falsehoods, -which were attested by equally false papers sworn to before Prussian -judges. To this trade, it was alleged, France owed the power to obtain -naval stores despite the British blockade of her arsenals. The frauds -recoiled in a curious way on the head of Prussia; for, in the later -stage of the Jena campaign, the neutralized ships supplied French -magazines in the Baltic ports, the French hospitals at Lubeck, and -the army that besieged Dantzic. The capture of vessels, the character -of whose papers was suspected, served to swell the cry against Great -Britain for violating neutral rights, induced greater severity in the -British naval measures, and so directly contributed to the Berlin -Decree and the Orders in Council.[411] - -Thus had stood the neutralizing trade toward the end of 1805. After -Napoleon had finally abandoned all thought of invading England, the -victorious campaign of Austerlitz and the peace of Presburg, extending -by conquest the boundaries of the empire, extended also the sweep of -those municipal regulations, already in force, which excluded British -goods from French territory. Early in 1806, beguiling Prussia into -hostilities with Great Britain through the occupation of Hanover, the -emperor compassed also the closure of the great German rivers. Peace -was indeed soon restored; but the Jena campaign, quickly following, -delivered Prussia, bound hand and foot, to Napoleon's dictates. In the -summer of 1807 the Peace of Tilsit united the empires of the East -and West in a common exclusion of British trade, to which Prussia -could not but accede. Great Britain thus found herself face to face -with no mere municipal regulations of one or two countries, but with -a great political combination aiming at her destruction through the -commerce which was her life. Nor was this combination merely one of -those unfriendly acts which seeks its end by peaceful means, like the -Non-Intercourse Acts of America. The British cabinet was perfectly -informed that the minor states were to be coerced, by direct military -force, into concurrence with the commercial policy of France and -Russia,—a concurrence essential to its success. - -It was necessary for Great Britain to meet this threatening -conjunction, with such measures as should reduce the proposed injury -to an amount possible for her to bear, until the inevitable revulsion -came. She found ready to her hand the immense unprincipled system of -neutralized vessels, and by means of them and of veritable neutrals she -proposed to maintain her trade with the Continent. To do so, without -reversing the general lines of her policy, as laid down in the Orders -in Council, it was necessary to supply each neutral employed with a -clear and unmistakable paper, which would insure beyond peradventure -the respect of British cruisers for a class of vessels they had been -accustomed to regard with suspicion. It would not do that a ship -engaged in maintaining a British trade that was in great danger of -extinction should be stopped by their own cruisers. The wording of -the licenses was therefore emphatically sweeping and forcible. They -protected against detention the vessel carrying one, whatever the -flag she flew (the French flag alone being excepted), and directed -that "the vessel shall be allowed to proceed, notwithstanding all the -documents which accompany the ship and cargo may represent the same -to be destined to any neutral or hostile port, or to whomsoever such -property may belong."[412] These broad provisions were necessary, -for the flags flown, except that of the United States, were those of -nations which had, willingly or under duress, entered the Continental -System; and the papers, having to undergo the scrutiny of hostile -agents at the ports of arrival, had to be falsified, or, as it was -euphoniously called, "simulated," to deceive the customs officer, -if zealous, or to give him, if lukewarm, fair ground for admitting -the goods. The license protected against the British cruiser, which -otherwise would have detained the vessel on the ground of her papers, -intended to deceive the port officers. "The system of licenses," said -an adverse petition, "renders it necessary for the ships employed to -be provided with sets of forged, or, as they are termed, simulated -papers."[413] Of these, two sets were commonly carried, the paper, the -wax for the seals, and other accompaniments being carefully imitated, -and signatures of foreign rulers, as of Napoleon and of the President -and Secretary of State of the United States, skilfully forged.[414] The -firms conducting this business made themselves known to the mercantile -community by circular letters.[415] - -In this way large fleets of licensed vessels under the flags of -Prussia, Denmark, Mecklenburg, Oldenburg, Kniphausen, and other almost -unknown German principalities, as well as many American merchant ships, -went yearly to the Baltic laden with British and colonial produce, -and returned with the timber, hemp, tallow, and grain of the North. -They entered St. Petersburg and every port in the Baltic, discharged, -loaded with the return cargo, and then repaired to a common rendezvous; -whence, when collected to the number of about five hundred, they -sailed for Great Britain under convoy of ships of war, to protect them -against the privateers that swarmed in the Sound and North Sea.[416] -Crushed between England and France, the Danish seamen, who would not -come into the licensed service of the former, had lost their livelihood -and had turned in a body to privateering, in the practice of which they -fell little short of piracy;[417] and French privateers also found the -ground profitable for cruising. - -It was to this disposition of the north countries, as well as to -conciliate the United States, that was probably due the Order in -Council of April 26, 1809; which, while preserving the spirit, -and probably securing the advantages of those of November, 1807, -nevertheless formally and in terms revoked the latter, except so far -as expressly stated in the new edict. The constructive, or paper, -blockade, which under the former orders extended to every port whence -the British flag was excluded, was now narrowed down to the coasts of -Holland, France, and so much of Italy as was under Napoleon's immediate -dominion. The reasons assigned for this new measure were "the divers -events which had taken place since the date of the former orders, -affecting the relations between Great Britain and the territories of -other powers." The Spanish peninsula, being now in open and general -revolt against Napoleon, was of course exempted; and southern Italy, -by its nearness to Malta and Sicily, one a possession and the other -an ally of England, might more readily be supplied from them than -by neutrals coming from a greater distance. The maintenance of the -blockade of Holland was particularly favorable to British trade. By -that means the great articles of continental consumption could reach -Holland and France, direct, only by British license, which meant that -they came from England; while, if carried from a neutral country to -the German rivers, to the Hanse towns, or to the Baltic, as the new -Order allowed them to be, they had to be brought thence to the regions -more immediately under Napoleon's government by land carriage, which -would so raise their price as not to conflict with the British licensed -trade. Thus the condition of the suffering neutral populations was -relieved, without loosening the pressure upon France; and some of the -offence given to the neutral carriers was removed. Another advantage -accrued to Great Britain from thus throwing open the trade to the -Baltic to all neutrals; for the great demand and high prices of naval -equipment would induce them to bring these to the British market and -arsenals, in preference to other countries. - -This Order was issued at the moment when the British minister at -Washington was assuring the American government that the Orders in -Council would be wholly withdrawn on the 10th of June following.[418] -At the same time the French and Austrians were drawing near to each -other on the fields of Germany. On the 6th of April the Archduke -Charles issued his address to the Austrian army, and on the 10th -crossed the Inn, moving toward Bavaria. On the 12th Napoleon quitted -Paris to place himself at the head of his troops, which had already -preceded him, but were then scattered in different positions, in sore -need of his directing hand. On the 17th he was in their midst. On the -same day the first collision occurred with Davout's corps under the -walls of Ratisbon. Five days of active manœuvring and hard fighting -succeeded, ending with the battle of Eckmuhl; after which the Archduke, -outgeneralled and defeated, fell back into Bohemia. On the 12th of -May Vienna surrendered, and on the 13th Napoleon entered the Austrian -capital for the second time in his career. - -In the same eventful week, and on the very day of the battle of -Eckmuhl, Sir Arthur Wellesley again landed at Lisbon to begin his -memorable four years of command in the Peninsula. Napoleon had -relinquished to Soult the pursuit of Sir John Moore, while still in -mid-career; and after the embarkation of the British army from Coruña -and the surrender of that city, January 16-26, 1809, the marshal was -ordered to invade Portugal. After a difficult series of operations, -Oporto was reached and stormed on the 29th of March; but Soult lacked -the means to push further south. Wellesley, on his arrival, at once -decided to march against him, in preference to attacking the French -forces in Spain on the line of the Tagus. On the 12th of May, the -same day that Vienna surrendered, the British troops crossed the -Douro, Soult was forced to evacuate Oporto in haste, retreated to the -northward, and re-entered Spain. The British general then returned with -his army to the Tagus, and on the 27th of June advanced along that line -into Spain. On the 28th of July he fought the battle of Talavera; but, -though victorious, the failure of the Spanish troops to support him, -their unreliable character as soldiers, and the want of provisions, -compelled him to return at the end of August into Portugal, where he -took up a position close to the frontier. - -The French movements in Spain were rendered indecisive by lack of -unity in the direction of the armies, due to the military incapacity -of the king and the jealousies of the different marshals. The same -early summer months were passed by Napoleon in a desperate struggle on -the banks of the Danube, below Vienna. Though the capital had fallen, -the Austrian army still remained, chastened but not subdued, and now -confronted him on the north side of the stream under a general of a -high order of merit, if inferior to the great emperor. To cross from -the south to the north bank of the broad river, in the face of such -a foe, was no light undertaking even for Napoleon. The first attempt -began on the 20th of May; and during the two succeeding days the -French army passed slowly across the insufficient bridges which alone -could be thrown, for lack of proper material. During the 21st and 22d -continued the strife, known in history as the battle of Essling; and -on the latter day some sixty thousand French troops were in action -with the Austrians, when the great bridge, joining the south shore to -the island of Lobau in mid-stream, gave way before a freshet, which -had already raised the waters of the Danube by fourteen feet. The -supply of ammunition to the engaged troops ceased, and it therefore -became impossible to retain the positions already gained. During the -night of the 22d the corps on the north side were withdrawn into the -island; and for the next six weeks Napoleon was untiringly occupied in -providing materials for bridges which would be sure not to fail him. -At last, when all was prepared, the army again crossed, and on the 6th -of July was fought the memorable battle of Wagram. Terminating in the -defeat of the Austrians, it was followed on the 12th by an armistice; -and a definitive treaty of peace was ratified at Vienna on the 15th -of October. Austria surrendered all her remaining sea-board on the -Adriatic, besides portions of her interior territory, and again acceded -to the prohibition of British goods of all kinds within her dominions. - -A month before, September 17, 1809, peace had been concluded between -Russia and Sweden; the latter ceding Finland and engaging to close her -ports to all British ships, "with the exception of the importation -of salt and colonial productions, which habit had rendered necessary -to the people of Sweden."[419] On the 6th of January Napoleon, less -merciful than the czar, exacted a convention which allowed only the -entry of salt, excluding explicitly the colonial produce permitted -by the Russian treaty; in return for which he restored Pomerania -to Sweden.[420] Thus were formally closed to Great Britain all the -northern ports through which, by the license trade, she had continued -to pour her merchandise into the Continent, though in much diminished -volume. - -It now became Napoleon's great object to enforce the restrictions, -which had thus been wrested from vanquished opponents in support -of his continental policy, by increased personal vigilance and by -urgently reiterated demands, for which he had an undeniable ground in -the express terms of his treaties with the sea-board powers. Upon the -Continent, except in the Spanish peninsula, the treaty of Vienna was -followed by a peace of exhaustion, which lasted nearly three years. -The emperor returned to Fontainebleau on the 26th of October, and at -once began the dispositions from which he hoped the reduction of Great -Britain, but which irresistibly led, step by step, to his own final -overthrow. The French army was withdrawn from southern Germany, but -gradually; remaining long enough in the various conquered or allied -countries to ease the imperial treasury from the expense of their -support, according to Napoleon's invariable policy. The evacuation was -not completed until the first of June, 1810. A hundred thousand men, -chiefly new levies, were directed on Spain, together with the Imperial -Guard, the supposed precursor of the emperor himself; but the best of -the troops, the hardened corps of Davout and Masséna, were reserved for -northern Germany and the Dutch frontiers, to enforce the submission -of the people to the continental blockade. Napoleon himself did not -go to Spain, and that tedious war dragged wearily on, with greater or -less vigor here or there, according to the qualities of the different -leaders; but lacking the unity of aim, the concert of action, which -nothing but the presence of a master spirit could insure among so -many generals of equal rank, imbued with mutual jealousy, and each -taxed with a burden that demanded his utmost strength. Around Lisbon, -Wellington was preparing the lines of Torres Vedras, and thus striking -deep into the soil of the Peninsula a grip from which all the armies of -France could not shake him, so long as the navy of Great Britain stood -at his back, securing his communications and his line of retreat; but -of this Napoleon knew nothing. - -It was above all things necessary to bring the Spanish war to an end, -and the emperor was heartily weary of it; but still the Continental -System constrained him. "Duroc assured me," writes Bourrienne,[421] -"that the emperor had more than once shown regret at being engaged -in the Spanish war; but since he had the English to fight there, no -consideration could have induced him to abandon it, the more so as -all that he was then doing was to defend the honor of the Continental -System.... He said to Duroc one day, 'I no longer hold to Joseph being -king of Spain, and he himself cares little about it. I would place -there the first comer, if he could close his ports to the English.'" -The military situation in Spain imperatively demanded his own presence; -without it the war was interminable. The Spanish ulcer, as he himself -aptly termed it, was draining away both men and money; and the seat -of the trouble was at Lisbon, where the British sea power had at last -found the place to set its fangs in his side and gnaw unceasingly. -But Napoleon could not resolve either to withdraw from the contest -or to superintend it in person. The Spaniards and Portuguese, in the -prevailing anarchy, could contribute little, as consumers, to British -commerce; whereas the north of Europe, from Holland to St. Petersburg, -while yielding a nominal acquiescence, everywhere evaded the blockades -with the connivance of their governments. Here, then, in his opinion, -was the quarter to strike Great Britain; the Peninsula was to her but -a drain of men and money, which the custom of northern and central -Europe alone enabled her to endure. The emperor therefore decided to -sustain both efforts, the peninsular war and the northern continental -blockade; to divide his strength between the two, instead of combining -it upon either; and to give his immediate attention to the North. -Thus it was that the Sea Power of Great Britain, defying his efforts -otherwise, forced him into the field of its own choosing, lured him, -the great exemplar of concentrated effort, to scatter his forces, and -led him along a path which at last gave no choice except retreat in -discomfiture or advance to certain ruin. - -Napoleon advanced. Since the Jena campaign he had occupied with French -and Polish troops the fortresses of Glogau, Custrin, Stettin, and -Dantzic. By these he controlled the Oder and the Vistula, and kept -a constant rein upon Prussia, so as to exact the war indemnities -she still owed, to check any movement upon her part, and to enforce -the demands of his policy. Davout, the most severe and thorough of -the French marshals, took command of these fortresses, as also of -Hanover and of the Hanse towns, on which likewise imperial troops were -quartered. At the mouth of the Ems his corps was in touch with that of -Marshal Oudinot, which stretched thence along the frontiers of Holland -to Belgium and Boulogne. Thus the whole sea-board from Boulogne to -the Baltic was gripped by French divisions, which in any dispute or -doubt powerfully supported the emperor's arguments and sustained the -Continental System, both by actual interference and by the constant -threat contained in their presence. These measures "were necessary," -says M. Thiers[422] "in order to compel the Hanse towns to renounce -commercial intercourse with Great Britain, and to coerce Holland, which -paid no more attention to the commercial blockade than if it had been -governed by an English or a German prince. Even when the governments -attempted to keep good faith the communities were little affected, and -pursued a contraband trade which the most vigorous measures failed to -prevent. Napoleon determined to conduct in person this kind of warfare." - -Holland was the first victim. As has before been said, Louis Bonaparte -strove continually to thwart the operation of the system. Napoleon -now demanded a strict execution of the blockade, and for that purpose -that the guard of the Dutch coasts and of the mouths of the rivers -should be entrusted to French custom-house officers.[423] He also -required that the American vessels which had entered Dutch ports under -the king's permission should be confiscated. Louis, though willing -to concede the former conditions and to exclude Americans and other -neutrals thenceforward, could not bring himself to give up those -that had entered under his own authority; but, having been induced -to visit his brother in Paris in November, 1809, he was by threats -and persuasion brought to yield every point demanded. It was during -these interviews that Napoleon, giving way to one of those transports -of passion which increased with him as years went by, again betrayed -the fatal compulsion under which England held him, and the purposes -already forming in his mind. "It is the English," he cried, "who have -forced me to aggrandize myself unceasingly.[424] But for them I would -not have united Naples, Spain, Portugal to my empire. I have willed to -struggle and to extend my coasts, in order to increase my resources. If -they keep on, they will oblige me to join Holland to my shore lines, -then the Hanse towns, finally Pomerania, and perhaps even Dantzic." -Then he suggested that Louis should, by indirect means, convey to the -British cabinet the impending danger of Napoleon's proceeding to these -extremities, in the hopes that apprehension might induce it to offer -terms of peace, in order to avert the union of Holland to the empire. - -A Dutch banker, M. Labouchère, who had extensive relations with -prominent houses, was accordingly dispatched, though without formal -credentials, and opened the matter to the ministers; but the latter -showed little interest. Whatever the nominal state of Holland, they -said, it is really only a French dependency; and as for the extension -of the Continental System, they expected no less than an increase -of tyranny with the increase of the emperor's sway. Louis was then -sent back to Holland, having further agreed to cede to France all his -provinces west of the Rhine, and to line the coasts of the remainder -with an army partly Dutch, partly French, but commanded by a French -general. Overwhelmed with mortification, he cherished at times impotent -thoughts of resistance, which issued only in insults to the French -Chargé and in impediments thrown in the way of the French army of -occupation and the customs officers. Finally, in June, 1810, a body of -French troops having presented themselves before Harlem were denied -entrance; and at about the same time a servant of the French embassy -was mobbed at the Hague. Napoleon at once ordered Oudinot to enter, -not only Harlem, but Amsterdam, with drums beating and colors flying, -while the French corps to the north and south of Holland crossed the -frontiers to support the army of occupation. On the first of July Louis -signed his abdication, which was published on the 3d; by which time he -had secretly left the kingdom for an unknown destination. On the 9th -Holland was united to the empire by an imperial decree. The coveted -American ships with their cargoes were sequestrated, and the large -accumulations of colonial produce formed under Louis's lax blockade -were made to contribute to the imperial treasury, by being admitted -into France upon payment of a duty of fifty per cent. But, for this -immediate benefit, the thrifty Hollanders were to pay by an unrelenting -exclusion of trade, by the quartering of foreign troops, and by the -conscription, both land and naval. - -The empire now extended to the Ems; but still, with persevering -cunning, smugglers and neutrals contrived to introduce tropical produce -and British manufactures to some extent. Owing to the restrictions, -indeed, the goods rose from fifty to a hundred per cent over the London -prices, but still they came; and, in consequence at once of the British -blockade of the French coast and of the emperor's jealous support of -that blockade by his own decrees, the people of France had to pay far -dearer than the other continental nations.[425] Thus were Napoleon's -objects doubly thwarted; for, while he aimed at breaking down Great -Britain by exclusion from the rest of Europe, he also meant to make -France, as the corner stone of his power, the most prosperous nation, -and to secure for her the continental market which her rival was to -lose.[426] All foreign articles decreased in price in proportion as -the distance from Paris increased. Before the union, coffee and sugar -cost in his capital three and four times what they did in Holland. He -now became unremitting and threatening in his representations to the -Northern states. Exacting the last farthing of Prussia at one breath, -with the next he offered to deduct from the debt the value of all -licensed cargoes seized by her. He menaced Sweden with the reoccupation -of Pomerania, if the great fleets under British license were admitted -to Stralsund. It was indeed to the Northern and Baltic ports that four -fifths of the licensed vessels went; only a small proportion sailed -to the blockaded ports of France and Holland.[427] By dint of urgent -representations and the presence of the French troops, he contrived to -have seized the greater part of a convoy of six hundred sail, which -entered the Baltic in the summer of 1810; but which, being delayed by -head winds, had not reached their ports in time to escape the movements -of his troops. The Northern trade had taken on immense dimensions in -1809, when Napoleon was battling about Vienna and the governments -were not under his eye; but this year he could make himself felt, -and some forty million dollars' worth of British property was seized -in the northern ports.[428] The blow seriously affected the already -overstrained commercial system of Great Britain, and its results were -shown by the fall in the number of licenses issued, from eighteen -thousand in 1810 to seventy-five hundred in 1811. - -The emperor went further. Deciding, after long consideration, that -fifty per cent on the London prices represented the profits of -smugglers of colonial goods, he determined to allow the introduction -of the latter upon payment of duty to that extent. Characteristically -unwilling to appear to take a step backward, he extended this -permission only to produce not coming from British colonies; but it -was understood, and officially intimated to the customs authorities, -that the inquiry should not be rigorous. In this subterfuge, says M. -Thiers, consisted the whole combination.[429] Having thus constituted -a lawful variety of colonial products in the empire and in the subject -countries, the emperor felt at liberty to execute one of those vast -confiscations, which contributed so materially to his military chest. -All collections of these goods existing within his reach were to be -seized at the same time, and, if they had not been declared, should -be condemned; if they had, should pay half their value, in money or -in kind. "Thus it was hoped to seize everywhere at the same time, and -to take for the treasury of Napoleon, or for that of his allies, the -half in case of declaration, the whole in case of dissimulation. It can -be conceived what terror would be caused to the numerous accomplices -of British commerce."[430] This measure was established by a decree -of August 5, 1810, and accepted by all the continental states, except -Russia. The latter refused to go beyond her obligations by the treaty -of Tilsit, and took the occasion to express her uneasiness at seeing -the French troops gradually extending along the northern seas, and even -as close to her own borders as Dantzic. The impossibility of cordial -co-operation in the immense sacrifices demanded by the Continental -System was clearly shown by this refusal; but by no less vigorous -means could Great Britain be reached, and Napoleon could not recede. -The decree was extended outside the boundaries of the empire, to any -depot of colonial goods within four days' march of the frontiers, in -Switzerland, in Germany, in Prussia, in the Hanse towns. Large sums of -money were realized, and the government became a dealer in groceries -when the payments were made in kind. The pressure of the French troops -extended everywhere, and French flotillas cruised along the coasts of -the North Sea, whether within the limits of the empire or not, in the -mouths and along the course of the great rivers, to seal them more -completely. - -The decree of August 5 was carried out by the armed hand. "_Wherever -my troops are_," wrote Napoleon to Prussia, "I suffer no English -smuggling." On this ground French authorities executed the mandate in -the Prussian port of Stettin, which was in the military occupation -only of his troops. "All the ports of this once potent kingdom," -says a contemporary magazine, "are filled with French soldiers, who -seize and burn every article which can possibly have passed through -British hands. Prussia is described as in a deplorable state, almost -disorganized and no employment for industry."[431] Similar action was -taken in the Hanse towns with no other justification. The king of -Westphalia was ordered to withdraw his army from the northern part of -the kingdom, that French soldiers might enter for the same purpose. In -Switzerland the native authorities were permitted to act, but a French -customs officer supervised. On the 18th of August the emperor directed -the military occupation of the territory of Lubeck, Lauenburg, Hamburg, -and all the west bank of the Elbe, for a length of fifty miles from its -mouth; thence the line extended, at about the same distance from the -sea, to Bremen, and thence to the frontiers of Holland, taking in the -little states of Arenberg and Oldenburg. This military occupation was -but the precursor of the annexation of these countries a few months -later, which led to the first overt act of displeasure on the part of -the czar. In justification of the step, one of a series which alienated -Alexander and led up to the Russian war, was alleged the purpose of -sustaining the continental blockade as the only means of destroying -Great Britain. "General Morand," so read the orders, "is charged to -take all necessary measures for the prevention of smuggling. For this -purpose he will establish a first line of troops from Holstein to -East-Frisia, and a second line in rear of the first."[432] - -On the 6th of October the viceroy of Italy was directed to occupy -with Italian troops all the Italian cantons of Switzerland, and to -sequestrate at once all colonial or other contraband merchandise. The -order was accompanied with Napoleon's usual formula: "This ought to -bring in several millions." Eugene was to explain that this was only -a step similar to the occupation of northern Germany, that it did not -invade the neutrality of Switzerland; and he was to be particularly -careful that the emperor's hand did not appear. "That there should be -a quarrel between _you_ and Switzerland will do no harm."[433] On the -19th of October Prussia was notified that, if she did not efficiently -preclude the passage of British and colonial merchandise through her -states, the French army would enter them; and the French minister was -directed to leave Berlin if satisfaction was not given.[434] - -Coincidently with these principal measures, the correspondence of -Napoleon teems with orders, complaints, remonstrances, reprimands, -queries, all showing how bent his mind was on the one purpose. Having -turned over the command of the army in Portugal, directed against the -British, to his ablest marshal, Masséna, he was concentrating his own -energies on the blockade. At the same time, he occupied himself with -stringent measures for protecting the industries of France in the -European market. No man ever held more thoroughly than the emperor that -element of the theory of protection, that the government can manage the -business of the people better than themselves. His kingdom of Italy -should not use Swiss nor German cottons; such goods must come only from -France.[435] Italian raw silks shall go nowhere but to France,[436] -and then only to Lyon. The whole export trade is in his hands by a -system of licenses,[437] apparently borrowed from Great Britain, and -which at this time he greatly extended. On the 25th of July an order -was given that no ship could clear from a port of the empire for abroad -without a license, signed by the emperor himself. On September 15 -another decree was issued,[438] allowing licensed vessels to sail from -Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck for French ports. The license was to cost -twelve dollars per ton, and was good only for the return voyage; but -the vessel upon arriving in France was exempt from all question as -to search by British cruisers, and might even land all her cargo in -a British port,—in other words, she was excepted from the Berlin and -Milan decrees. She could not, however, enter France with any British -goods. Returning, she was to load with wines or other French produce, -except grain or flour. Under the rival license systems new and curious -methods of evasion grew up. Compelled to take French articles which -were not wanted in Great Britain, as well as those that were, the -former were put on board of so inferior a quality that they could be -thrown into the sea without loss. At either end smuggling boats met -the licensed vessel before entering port, and took from her forbidden -articles. Ships of either nation, with foreign flag, and simulated -papers, were to be seen in each other's ports.[439] The British, as a -commercial people, were naturally willing to give a larger extension to -this evasive trade; but the emperor would not grant anything that he -thought could help his enemy, even though it benefited his own people. -He believed, and rightly, that Great Britain was receiving more harm -than France; he did not realize that, from her immense wealth and -commercial aptitudes, she could endure the process longer. - -The decree of August 5 admitted colonial goods, but excluded British -manufactures. On the 19th of October was issued another edict, -directing that all such manufactured goods, wherever found in the -emperor's dominions, or even in countries in the mere military -occupation of his troops, should be publicly burned. This was -remorselessly done. "Persons who at this epoch were living in the -interior of France can form no idea of the desolation which so savage a -measure spread through countries accustomed to live by commerce. What -a spectacle offered to peoples impoverished and lacking everything, -to see the burning of articles the distribution of which would have -been an alleviation to their sufferings!... What a means of attacking -conquered peoples, to irritate their privations by the destruction -of a number of articles of the first necessity!"[440] "The tampering -with the mails," says Savary, the Minister of Police, "caused me to -make some very sad reflections, and forced me to admit that we were -not advancing toward tranquillity; and that, if the party against us -were not yet formed, at least all sentiments were agreed, and that a -single reverse would be enough to ruin us.... The more we disturbed the -relations of Europe with England, the more, on all sides, men sought -to draw together; and we remained with the odious epithets given to -us by all those whom our measures thwarted."[441] "There was already -an understanding from one end of Europe to the other; every cabinet -earnestly wished the overthrow of Napoleon, as the people also wished, -with at least equal ardor, a state of things less stifling for their -industry and trade. Despite the terror inspired by Napoleon's name, -there was, side by side with that terror, that damnable Continental -System which settled the question; it was necessary either to fight or -to succumb. The people of the North were under an imperious necessity -to break that yoke of lead, which made the custom house the prime agent -of the governments of Europe."[442] - -Russia had refused to accede to any steps beyond her engagements of -Tilsit; but nowhere was discontent more profound, nowhere opposition -more to be dreaded. While Napoleon was indisputably leading Great -Britain into greater and greater embarrassment, by the depreciation -of her manufactures and by the accumulations of unsalable sugars and -coffees in her warehouses, he was also ruining the agriculture of -Russia and the revenues of her nobles. Despite the relief afforded by -the great licensed fleets, the Tilsit agreements so embarrassed trade, -that hemp, which in 1802 was worth £32 the ton in London, had reached, -in 1809, £118;[443] and other products of the North rose in the same -proportion. At the same time sixty thousand tons of coffee lay in the -London warehouses, unsalable at sixpence the pound, while the price -on the Continent was from four to five shillings, and in places even -seven shillings.[444] No better proof of the efficacious co-working -of Napoleon's system and of the British Orders can be offered; but -the question was one of endurance. Which could stand such a strain -longer? In Russia matters were fast approaching a climax. The czar -felt the ground trembling under his feet;[445] and, while he renewed -his protestations of fidelity to Tilsit and Erfurt, he had to see -Napoleon, by his licenses, evading the restrictions which he at the -same time was pressing his ally to enforce more rigorously. In vain was -the explanation offered that these licenses were but in furtherance of -the restrictive system; that France was unloading her surplus products -upon England, while refusing to receive aught but specie in return; and -that in consequence the exchange was going more and more against Great -Britain. The czar knew better; and the repeated and urgent letters of -the emperor, becoming, as was the wont of Napoleon's requests, rather -peremptory than entreating, to seize and confiscate all neutral ships -entering Russian ports, fell on deaf ears. Alexander feared war; but he -remembered his father's fate, and feared assassination more. - -On the 10th of December, 1810, the emperor sent a message to the Senate -announcing that he had annexed to the empire the Hanse towns, together -with the region on the North Sea intervening between them and Holland, -which had been as yet only in military occupation. In the same paper -he expressed his intention of making a canal from the Elbe to Lubeck, -by which the empire should be brought into direct water communication -with the Baltic. This assurance was not calculated to ease the anxiety -of the czar as to the eastward progress of France; but the measure -was accompanied by a circumstance of personal affront, peculiarly -dangerous to an alliance which depended chiefly upon the personal -relations of two absolute sovereigns. The Grand Duke of Oldenburg, one -of the countries thus unceremoniously annexed, was uncle to the czar; -and though Napoleon proposed to indemnify him for the material loss, -by territory taken in the interior of Germany, Alexander would not -accept such satisfaction nor name any compensation that he would think -adequate. He did not threaten war, but he refused to surrender his -grievance, and reserved his right to retaliate an injury. - -Meantime very serious results were developing, both in Great Britain -and France, from the strained and abnormal conditions of commerce and -the shocks caused by Napoleon's sudden and tremendous blows at credit, -by his wide-spread confiscations, and by the Baltic seizures. The -triple array of French troops that lined the shores of the Continent, -re-enforced by the belt of British cruisers girding the coasts from the -Ems to Bayonne, and from the Pyrenees to Orbitello, created a barrier -which neither mercantile ingenuity nor popular want could longer evade -to a degree that afforded any real measure of relief. The stolid, -though as yet peaceable, measures of resistance taken by the United -States had added seriously to the embarrassments of Great Britain, -while rather furthering the policy of Napoleon, however contrary this -was to the interests of France. During the years 1808 and 1809, the -continuance of the embargo and of the non-intercourse acts, closing -the North American market, coincided with the opening of the South -American; and a great rush was made by the British mercantile community -for the latter, although it was not, by the number of the inhabitants, -nor by their wealth, nor by their habits of life, at all able to take -the place of the consumers lost in Europe and North America. The goods -sent out in great quantities were injudiciously chosen, as well as -far in excess of the possible requirements; so they remained unsold, -and for the most part uncared for and unhoused, on the beach in South -American ports. The judgment of men seemed to become unhinged amid the -gloom and perplexity of the time, and the frantic desire of each to -save himself increased the confusion. Mere movement, however aimless or -dangerous, is less intolerable than passive waiting. - -The years 1809 and 1810 were consequently marked by an extensive -movement in trade, which carried with it an appearance of prosperity -in great part delusive. Immense imports were made from the Baltic, and -from Italy, at the moment that Napoleon's coils were tightening around -them; large shipments also to the North, to South America, and to the -West Indies. In the United States only was there a transient period of -solid transactions; for in May, 1810, the Non-Intercourse Act expired -by its own limitations. A proviso, however, was immediately enacted -that if, before the 3d of March, 1811, either Great Britain or France -should recall their decrees so far as they affected the United States, -the Act should, within three months of the revocation, revive against -the power that maintained its edicts. Napoleon contrived to satisfy -President Madison that his Berlin and Milan decrees were so recalled on -the first of November; but Great Britain refused to consider the terms -of the withdrawal satisfactory, as in truth they were not. The Order -in Council of April 26, 1809, remained in force; and non-intercourse -between the United States and Great Britain again obtained in February, -1811, and continued to the outbreak of the war in 1812. - -Toward the end of 1810 the results of the various causes of trouble -began to be heavily felt. Very scant returns coming from South America, -the shippers were unable to discharge their debts to the manufacturers; -and the embarrassments of the latter were felt by their workmen. From -the West Indies the returns came in tropical produce, which could be -realized only on the Continent, long since partly and now effectually -closed. A succession of bad seasons had necessitated the importation -of large quantities of grain from Holland and France, especially in -1809, when an abundant harvest there, coinciding with a very bad crop -in England, induced Napoleon to enter upon his license system, and to -authorize an export which in three years drained £10,000,000 in specie -from the enemy. The freights to the licensed carriers, mostly neutrals -or hostile, at least in name, were also paid in specie, which was thus -taken out of the country; and there was a further drain of gold for -the maintenance of the fleets in distant parts of the world and for -the war in Spain, which now took the place of the former subsidies -to allies as a consumer of British treasure. Thus arose a scarcity -of specie. In November, 1810, the bankruptcies were two hundred and -seventy-three, against one hundred and thirty of the same month a -year before. Stoppages and compositions equalled in number half the -traders of the kingdom. "The general failures have wonderfully affected -manufactures, and want of confidence prevails between manufacturer -and merchant." A month later "bankruptcies continue to increase, and -confidence is nearly at an end. Neither gold nor silver is often to -be seen. The trade of the manufacturing towns is at stand; and houses -fail, not every day, but every hour. In the great sea-ports, the king's -stores are full of all kinds of colonial produce which find no sale. -Despondency is increased by the accounts from the Continent, which -represent all the sea-ports and internal depots of trade to be full of -French soldiers, who seize and burn every article which can possibly -have passed through British hands." As the shadows darkened, murmurs -grew louder and louder against the once popular[446] Orders in Council, -to which all the evil was now attributed. The press changed its tone -upon them, and a gradual agitation for their repeal grew up around the -Opposition leaders; who, from the moment they lost power, had never -ceased to inveigh against the retaliatory system framed by the ministry. - -But while disaster was thus thickening about Great Britain, the case -of France was worse. It was quite true, as the emperor said, that the -people could live without sugar and coffee, and that necessity would -in time find ways to produce many articles the import of which was -denied her; but such warped applications of her industry and ingenuity, -even when finally realized, could neither replace the loss of her -natural channels of effort nor for any length of time cope with a -nation, which, however momentarily shaken by unprecedented conditions, -yet kept power continually to renew her strength by contact, through -the sea, with new sources. That Great Britain would do this, her -traditions and the habits of her people were the pledge; and the -credit of the government bore witness to it through all. In the early -part of 1811 a serious commercial crisis occurred in France, causing -great anxiety to Napoleon. It was his particular wish to keep this -corner-stone of the empire prosperous and contented under the immense -demands made upon it for men, and the bitter sufferings entailed by -the conscription. But prosperity was hard to secure with all the -sea outlets of her manufactures and agriculture closed, with only a -continental market, and that impoverished by the universal cessation -of trade and further enfeebled by the exhausting demands made upon the -peoples to support the armies quartered upon them. The British blockade -of the French, Dutch, and Italian coasts forbade absolutely, except -to the limited license trade, the water carriage of raw materials -essential to manufactures, and prevented the export of French luxuries. -"The state of France as it fell under my observation in 1807," wrote -an American traveller, "exhibited a very different perspective" from -that of Great Britain. "The effects of the loss of external trade -were everywhere visible,—in the commercial cities half-deserted, and -reduced to a state of inaction and gloom truly deplorable; in the -inland towns, in which the populace is eminently wretched, and where -I saw not one indication of improvement, but on the contrary numbers -of edifices falling to ruin; on the high roads, where the infrequency -of vehicles and travellers denoted but too strongly the decrease of -internal consumption, and the languor of internal trade; and among the -inhabitants of the country, particularly of the South, whose misery is -extreme, in consequence of the exorbitant taxes, and of the want of -outlet for their surplus produce. In 1807 the number of mendicants in -the inland towns was almost incredible.... The fields were principally -cultivated by women."[447] - -All the genius of Napoleon could not create demands when there was not -means to gratify them, and the exquisite products of French taste and -skill labored under the same disadvantage as coffee and sugar, than -which they were even less necessary; men could dispense with them. -Production, stimulated by an exaggerated protection, became for a time -excessive and then ceased; even the exclusion of British manufactures -and the frequent burnings could not secure the continental market to -articles, the raw materials for which were made so dear by the sea -blockade, or by the long land carriage. Levant cotton made its weary -way on horse and mule back, from Turkey, through Illyria, to Trieste, -and thence was duly forwarded to France;[448] but even so, when made -into stuffs, found itself in competition with British cottons which -were landed in Salonica, conveyed on horses and mules through Servia -and Hungary into Vienna, and thence distributed over Germany.[449] In -the same manner was British colonial produce introduced. Despite all -Napoleon's efforts, smuggling continued to compete with and undersell -the fair trader, and his own licenses were used to evade his own -decrees.[450] Many firms in Holland went out of business altogether, -the factories of Lyon closed their doors, and several Paris houses were -in distress; although, like the British warehouses, their stores were -crowded with goods for which they could find no purchasers. Banks could -not recover their advances, internal commerce fell into confusion, and -general disaster followed. - -At the same time there was in France, as in Great Britain, much -suffering from bad harvests, and this was aggravated for the former by -the interruption of the coasting trade by the British cruisers, and -by the indifferent character of the inland roads, which, except when -they served the military plans of the emperor, were neglected from the -straitened state of the finances. The government came to the rescue -with various measures of relief, necessarily partial and arbitrary; -designed rather to stave off immediate trouble than to afford a radical -cure for existing difficulties. Yet serious remedies were needed; for -the growing distress of the Continent must continue to react upon -France, which found therein its only customers. In Holland almost all -the former sources of wealth had one by one been cut off; and even -money-lending, which survived the others, became a losing business -from the wide-spread ruin in Europe.[451] In Russia the ruble had -fallen to one third of the value it had before the institution of the -Continental System; although the czar had refused to impose upon his -people and their commerce the decrees of August 5 and October 19, which -Napoleon had forced upon other states. With growing poverty in Europe, -the empire must grow poorer, and in proportion to its loss of wealth -must be the diminution of the revenue. Yet already the revenue was -insufficient to the wants of the state, despite all the extraordinary -resources which had been called up during the past year, and which -could not again be expected. It was not to be hoped that many American -ships would again place themselves within reach of the emperor's -confiscations. The enormous seizures of colonial produce, made by -surprise in the previous August, could not, to any similar extent, be -repeated. The duty of fifty per cent, levied throughout the states -occupied by his troops, on the coffee and sugar which was declared by -the owners, had fallen upon accumulations made during the years of lax -blockade and had brought in large sums; but it now served only as an -inducement to smuggling. Great ingenuity had been shown in devising -extraordinary means for extracting money from the subject peoples, -but every year saw these supplies diminishing. Like slavery, like bad -farming, Napoleon's administration, and especially his army, required -continually new soil[452] and did little to renew or develop the powers -which it taxed; beneficent plans were formed, multitudinous orders -issued, but they received rare fulfilment except when they conduced to -the military efficiency of the state. - -There remained two resources. One was economy; and the correspondence -of Napoleon at this period teems with exhortations to his lieutenants, -with denials of money, and with precepts to get all they can out of -the annexed territories, and ask as little as possible from him.[453] -The emperor held in reserve, subject only to his own orders, a great -military treasure which had begun with war contributions, and into -which poured the results of the extraordinary transactions just -mentioned. Five wars had brought into this chest 805,000,000 francs; -but in 1810 there remained but 354,000,000, and he was unwilling to -trench further upon it, unless some grave emergency arose. He hoped -to spare, if not to add to it, by the confiscation of the property of -Spanish nobles who had resisted his change of dynasty, as well as by -the seizure of "false neutrals." Evidently, however, such resources are -precarious, and cannot be compared to those of a commercial state. -Contrasted with Great Britain, the financial expedients of Napoleon -resembled those of a mediæval prince or an Oriental potentate; and in -a strain of endurance, in a question of time, the very artificial, not -to say unnatural, framework of power which he had built could not hope -to outlast the highly organized, essentially modern, and above all -consistently developed society which confronted him. A state of long -standing and fixed traditions may endure the evils of a bad system, -disadvantaged by it, but not ruined; but when the system is new and -rests upon a single man, it asks in vain for the confidence inspired -by a closely knit, yet wide-spreading, body politic whose established -character guarantees the future. - -This was clearly shown in the ability of either government to use -the other resource—borrowing—as a means to supplement its deficient -income. Napoleon steadfastly refused to resort to this, alleging that -it was an unjustifiable draft upon the future, and could have but one -result—bankruptcy. He proved easily that Great Britain could not go on -borrowing indefinitely at her present rate. A better reason for his own -abstinence was to be found in the condition of his credit. The public -debt of France under his rule was small, and, as he did not add to it, -it stood at a good figure in the market.[454] His military genius, the -wide flight of his arms, the war contributions, the iniquitous plan by -which he quartered his troops on foreign countries, not merely in war -but in peace, and made them responsible for their maintenance,—measures -such as these, facilitated by frequently recurrent wars and combined -with exactions like those narrated in this chapter, enabled him to meet -his expenditures, accumulate the large reserve fund mentioned, and at -the same time distribute in France an amount of coin which greatly -aided the circulation. But his success imposed upon no one. Everybody -understood that such expedients were essentially transient, that to -renew them meant renewed wars, invasions growing ever wider and wider, -and results dependent always upon military prestige, which a single -lost battle might overthrow. Compared with insecurity such as this, the -fast growing debt of Great Britain possessed a relative solidity; which -even exceeded the absolute confidence felt that the interest would be -regularly paid. Behind her stood the history and the prestige of a -Sea Power which men knew had met many a heavy reverse, yet had never -failed; and which stood before Napoleon more mighty than ever. Far and -wide, through many a sea and in many a land, stretched the roots of her -strength; never more glorious, because never more sorely tried than by -the great emperor. She had credit, he had none. - -Savary, one of the most devoted of Napoleon's followers, quotes with -conviction the following words to him of a Parisian banker, in the -early part of 1811: "A humiliating fact, and one which gives the key -to many others, is the state of credit in France and in England. -The English debt amounts to about $3,500,000,000, ours only to -$250,000,000; and yet the English could borrow at need sums much more -considerable than we ourselves could, and above all at an infinitely -more favorable rate. Why this difference? Why is the credit of the -State, in France, lower than the credit of the leading merchants and -bankers; while the reverse is the permanent condition in England? A -word suffices to explain it: To restore one's credit in England, you -have only to work with the government; while to lose one's credit -in France it is only necessary _not_ to keep out of government -transactions. All England is, so to say, a single commercial house, -of which ministers are the directors, the laws the contract, which -power itself cannot infringe. Here the Council of State usurps the -powers of the tribunals, and I could almost say that nothing useful -is done, because _nothing is really guaranteed_."[455] A competent -American witness, before quoted, who had spent two years in France, -wrote, in 1809: "The French rulers, whatever may be their power, are -unable to obtain supplies at home except by _sacrifices equivalent to -the risk which is incurred by contracting with them_. Their credit -abroad may be estimated by the fact, which is so well known to us all, -that no intelligent merchant in this country can be induced, by any -consideration, to make advances in their favor, or to accept a bill on -their treasury, from their highest accredited agent."[456] - -While the public credit, that touchstone of prosperity, stood thus -in the two states, the same eye-witness thus describes the relative -condition of the two peoples: "In France the extinction of all public -spirit and of the influence of public opinion, the depopulation and -decay of the great towns, the stern dominion of a military police, -incessantly checked the exultation, natural to the mind, on viewing the -profusion of the bounties bestowed by nature. The pressure of the taxes -was aggravated by the most oppressive rigor in the collection. The -condition of the peasantry as to their food, clothing, and habitations -bore no comparison with the state of the same class in England.... -In England, whatever may be the representations of those who, with -little knowledge of the facts, affect to deplore her condition, it is -nevertheless true that there does not exist, and never has existed -elsewhere, so beautiful and perfect a model of public and private -prosperity.... I pay this just tribute of admiration with the more -pleasure, as it is to me in the light of an atonement for the errors -and prejudices under which I labored on this subject, before I enjoyed -the advantage of a personal experience. A residence of nearly two -years in that country—during which period I visited and studied nearly -every part of it, with no other view or purpose than that of obtaining -correct information, and I may add, with previous studies well fitted -to promote my object—convinced me I had been egregiously deceived."[457] - -The writer saw England before her sorest trial came. Since 1807, and -especially after 1809, the condition of both nations had grown sensibly -worse. The commercial embarrassments of Great Britain under the -dislocation of her trade and the loss of her markets, occasioned partly -by the Continental System and partly by the American Non-Intercourse -Act, and aggravated by the wild speculations that followed the year -1808, resulted in 1811 in wide-spread disaster,—merchants failing, -manufactories closing, workmen out of employment and starving. In -France the commercial crisis of the same year, extending over the -Continent, soon became a chaos of firms crashing one upon the other and -dragging down, each the other, in its fall.[458] Soon great numbers -of workmen in all the provinces found themselves, like their English -brethren, deprived of occupation. Council upon council was held by the -emperor to ascertain how, by government interference, to remedy the -ills for which governmental interference was immediately responsible. -But, underneath the apparently similar conditions of distress in the -two countries, lay the real difference between a nation shut in, and -thrown back upon itself, and one that kept open its communications with -the world at large. In 1811 Great Britain had already begun to react -through her natural channels; the energies of her people under the load -upon them had been like a strong spring, whose tension remains, though -compressed. The South American trade revived; the Spanish Main took off -the accumulations in the West India Islands, and the latter in turn -began to call for supplies from home; Russia was visibly relenting; in -the Peninsula, Masséna, whose progress had been stopped at the lines of -Torres Vedras, was forced to retreat into Spain in the month of March, -and through a liberated Portugal were found new openings for British -commerce. For France there could be no return of prosperity until the -sea was again free to her, either through her own or through neutral -ships; but the latter could not safely repair to her ports until her -rival revoked the still existing Order in Council, blockading the -whole French and Dutch coast, and this she would not do before the -emperor recalled the decrees upon which rested his Continental System. -And while Great Britain was making appalling drafts upon the future -in her ever-mounting debt, France was exhausting a capital which no -forcing power could replace, by her anticipated conscriptions, which -led to a revolt far more menacing than the riots of English workmen. -Sixty thousand "refractory" conscripts were scattered through the -departments, and among the forests of western, central, and southern -France, refusing to join their regiments and defying the authorities. -They were pursued by flying columns of old soldiers; who, often long -strangers to their own countrymen, took with their property the same -liberties they had practised in foreign parts. In January, 1811, the -whole conscription for the year was called out, and in midsummer that -for 1812; but no legal measures could make men of the boys sent to die -before the virile age,[459] more often of exposure than by the hands of -the enemy, in the gloomy mountains and parched plains of Spain. - -The great struggle of endurance, "of the highest individual genius -against the resources and institutions of a great nation"[460] who -stayed its power on the sea, was now drawing near its close; the battle -between the sea and the land was about to terminate in one of the most -impressive and gigantic military catastrophes recorded by history. -But the inevitable end was already clearly indicated before Napoleon -started for Russia, although the dim vision of weary eyes in England, -strained by long watching, saw not that which the apprehensions of -Frenchmen, troubled with the anguish of France, tremblingly felt. The -credit of France was gone; nor could her people bear any added burdens, -until the sea, over which Great Britain still moved unresisted, was -open to them. The people of the Continent had become bitterly hostile -through the sufferings caused by the blockade, and the imperial -power could only be maintained by an army which was itself filled by -borrowing upon the future; its capital, its reserve, was fast being -exhausted.[461] The question of physical endurance was settled; the -only point really left in doubt was that of moral endurance. Would -Great Britain and the British government have the nerve to hold out -till the emperor was exhausted?[462] Already the agitation for the -repeal of the Orders in Council, with which the existing ministry -was identified, was becoming ominous. The leaders of the Opposition -were opposed to the Peninsular war; and Napier has vividly shown the -doubts and hesitations of the ministry as to sustaining that great -enterprise which compelled Napoleon to such waste of life, to such a -fatal division of his force. Time was not allowed to test to the utmost -British tenacity; the darkest hour was fast passing away, the clouds -began to break and the day to dawn. - -Three weeks after Napoleon's annexation of the Hanse towns and of -the Duchy of Oldenburg, on the last day of the year 1810, Alexander -put forth a commercial ukase which under all the circumstances had -the appearance of retaliatory action; and at the least drew a sharp -line between his commercial policy and the Continental System as -inculcated by Napoleon. The decree expressly permitted the entrance -of colonial produce under neutral flags; and many articles of French -manufacture were virtually denied admission, by not being included in -a list of goods which could be introduced on payment of duty. In vain -did the czar assert that his object was to develop, by protection, -Russian manufactures of the excluded articles. Napoleon rejected -the explanation. "The last ukase," he wrote in a personal letter to -Alexander, "is at bottom, but yet more in form, specially directed -against France."[463] But while the exclusion of French products was -the most open, the admission of neutral ships with colonial produce was -the most significant, feature of the edict. This was the point upon -which the emperor had been most importunate; here was the leak which, -in his judgment, was sinking the ship. "Six hundred English merchant -ships," he had written in a previous letter, October 23, 1810,[464] -"wandering in the Baltic, have been refused admission to Prussian -ports and those of Mecklenburg, and have steered for your Majesty's -states. If you admit them the war still lasts.... Your Majesty knows -that if you confiscate them we shall have peace. Whatever their papers, -under whatever names they are masked, French, German, Spanish, Danish, -Russian, your Majesty may be sure they are English." - -Later, on the 4th of November,[465] Napoleon wrote through the -ordinary ministerial channels: "There are no neutrals. Whatever the -papers produced, they are false. Not a single ship enters Russia with -so-called American papers but comes really from England.[466] Peace or -war is in the hands of Russia. Let her confiscate all ships brought -in by the English, and join France in demanding of Sweden the seizure -of the immense quantity of merchandise the English have landed at -Gottenburg under various flags. If Russia wishes peace with England, -she has here the means. But Russia has followed opposite principles, -and of this but one proof need be given: that is, that the colonial -merchandise which appeared at the last Leipzig fair was brought there -by seven hundred wagons coming from Russia; that to-day all the traffic -in that merchandise is done through Russia; finally, that the twelve -hundred ships which the English have convoyed by twenty ships of war, -disguised under Swedish, Portuguese, Spanish, American flags, have in -part landed their cargoes in Russia." To these complaints Alexander -had replied that he had adhered, and would adhere, to his engagements -and exclude British ships; but that he would not, and could not, go -beyond them and forbid neutrals. The ukase of December 31 took the -matter out of diplomatic discussion, and, coming so immediately upon -the annexation of Oldenburg, had the appearance of defiance. As such -Napoleon accepted it. "This seems," he wrote in the personal letter of -February 28 above quoted, "a change of system. All Europe so regards -it; and already our alliance no longer exists, in the opinion of -England and of Europe.... If your Majesty abandons the alliance and -burns the conventions of Tilsit, it would be evident that war would -follow a few months sooner or later. The result must be, on either -side, to strain the resources of our empires in preparations.... If -your Majesty has not the purpose of reconciliation with England, you -will see the necessity, for yourself and for me, of dissipating all -these clouds." From that time both sovereigns prepared for war. - -The turn of affairs in the North at this time, and during the -succeeding critical twelvemonth, was powerfully influenced by the -presence of a great British fleet in the Baltic and by the extreme -discretion of its admiral. Napoleon had compelled Sweden to follow -up her exclusion of British ships by a formal declaration of war, -which was issued November 17, 1810. The British minister had to -leave Stockholm; and, after his departure, the political as well as -military direction of affairs on the spot was under the conduct of -Sir James Saumarez. That most distinguished and admirable officer had -thoroughly appreciated, during his three summers in the Baltic, the -feelings of the Swedish rulers and people; and it was chiefly owing -to his representations to his own government, and to his steadily -conciliatory action, that the formal war never became actual. He -resisted with dignity and firmness every attempt on the part of the -Swedish authorities to carry out Napoleon's orders to confiscate; but -he did not allow himself to be moved, by such occasional yielding on -their part, to any act of retaliation. Good feeling between the two -nations centred around his attractive personality, and facilitated the -essential, but difficult, conciliation between Sweden and Russia. The -entire license trade was under the protection of his fleet, which -had charge also of the suppression of privateering, of the police -of the hostile coasts, and of the interruption of communications -between Denmark and Norway.[467] Its presence virtually insured the -independence of Sweden against France and Russia, except during the -winter months, when compelled to leave the Baltic; and its numbers -and character gave the Swedish government a sufficient excuse for not -proceeding to the extremities demanded by Napoleon. During the summer -of 1811 the flag-ship was the centre of the secret consultations which -went on between the two states, to which Russia also, having finally -rejected Napoleon's terms, soon became a party; and towards the end of -the season the negotiation, practically completed by the admiral, was -formally concluded with a British plenipotentiary. It was determined to -keep up the appearance of war, but with the understanding that Sweden -would join the alliance of Great Britain and Russia. The czar had -then no cause to fear that, in the approaching contest with the great -conqueror, he should find a hostile Sweden on his flank and rear.[468] - -The preparations of Napoleon for the great Russian campaign occupied -the year 1811. It was his intention to carry on a vigorous warfare in -the Spanish peninsula, while collecting the immense forces of every -kind needed in the north of Germany. But the unsatisfactory character -of many of the soldiers gathering on the Elbe, among them being tens -of thousands of refractory conscripts and foreign nationalities, -compelled him to withdraw from Spain in the latter part of 1811 some -forty thousand veterans, whose place was to be filled by levies of -an inferior character, which, moreover, did not at once appear. The -fortune of war in the Peninsula during the year had varied in different -quarters. On the east coast General Suchet had brought Tortosa to -capitulate on the 1st of January. Thence advancing to the south he -reduced Tarragona by siege and assault on the 28th of June,—an exploit -which obtained for him his grade of Marshal of France. Still moving -forward, according to Napoleon's general plan and instructions to -him, the end of the year found him before the city of Valencia, which -surrendered on the 9th of January, 1812. But to obtain these later -successes, at the time that so many hardened warriors were removed from -the Peninsula, it had been necessary to support Suchet with divisions -taken from the centre and west, to abandon the hope entertained of -combining another great attempt against Lisbon, and also to withdraw -Marmont's corps from the valley of the Tagus to a more northern -position, around Salamanca and Valladolid. At this time Wellington -occupied a line on the frontiers of Portugal, north of the Tagus, -resting on the city of Almeida and facing Ciudad Rodrigo. The latter, -with Badajoz, on the Guadiana, constituted the two supports to the -strong barrier by which the emperor proposed to check any offensive -movements of the enemy upon Spain. - -The year had been passed by the British general in patient contention -with the innumerable difficulties, political and military, of his -situation. Masséna had indeed been forced to withdraw from Portugal -in April, but since that time Wellington had been balked, in every -attempt, by superior numbers and by the strength of the positions -opposed to him. His reward was now near at hand. On the 8th of January, -1812, he suddenly appeared before Ciudad Rodrigo, favored in his -movements by the pre-occupation of Marmont, who was engaged in the -reorganization and arrangements necessitated by the withdrawal of so -many troops for the Russian war, and also deceived by the apparent -inactivity in the British lines. The siege was pushed with a vigor that -disregarded the ordinary rules of war, and the place was successfully -stormed on the 19th of January. As rapidly as the nature of the -country, the season, and other difficulties would permit, Wellington -moved to the south, intending to attack Badajoz. On the 16th of March -the place was invested, and though most ably defended by a governor of -unusual ability, it was snatched out of the hands of Marshal Soult by -the same audacity and disregard of ordinary methods that had bereft -Marmont of the sister fortress. Badajoz was stormed on the night of the -6th of April; and the Spanish frontier then lay open to the British, -to be crossed as soon as their numbers, or the mistakes of the enemy, -should justify the attempt. - -Thus opened the fatal year 1812. The clouds breaking away, though -scarce yet perceptibly, for Great Britain, were gathering in -threatening masses on the horizon of Napoleon. A painful picture is -drawn by his eulogist, M. Thiers, of the internal state of the empire -at this time. An excessively dry season had caused very short crops -throughout Europe, and want had produced bread riots in England, as -well as in France and elsewhere. But such demonstrations of popular -fury were far more dangerous and significant, in a country where all -expression of opinion had been so rigorously controlled as in the -empire, and in a capital which concentrates and leads, as only Paris -does, the feelings of a nation. The discontent was heightened and -deepened by the miseries of the conscription, which ate ever deeper -and deeper, wringing the heart of every family, and becoming more and -more extreme as each succeeding enterprise became vaster than those -before it, and as the excessive demands, by reducing the quality of -the individual victims, required ever growing numbers. Six hundred -thousand men had been poured into Spain, three hundred thousand of whom -had died there.[469] Besides the immense masses carried forward to the -confines of Poland, and those destined for the Peninsula, there was to -be a powerful reserve between the Elbe and the Rhine, another behind -the Rhine in France itself, and to these Napoleon now proposed to add -yet a third, of one hundred and twenty thousand so-called national -guards, taken from the conscription of the four last years and legally -not liable to the call. Throughout the great cities there was growing -irritation, rising frequently to mutiny, with loud popular outcries, -and again the number of refractory conscripts, of whom forty thousand -had been arrested the year before, rose to fifty thousand; again flying -columns pursued them through all the departments. Caught, shut up in -the islands off the coasts, whence they could not escape, and, when -drilled, marched under strong guard to the ends of Europe, they none -the less contrived often to desert; and everywhere the people, hating -the emperor, received them with open arms and passed them back, from -hand to hand, to their homes. Thus amid starvation, misery, weeping, -and violence, the time drew near for Napoleon to complete his great -military undertaking of conquering the sea by the land. - -In the North the situation had finally developed according to the -wishes of Great Britain. The secret understanding of 1811 had resulted -in January, 1812, in another commercial ukase, allowing many British -manufactures to be introduced into Russia. On the 5th of April a -secret treaty was concluded with Sweden, ceding Finland to Russia, -but assuring to the former power Norway, of which Denmark was to be -deprived. Relieved now on her northern flank, Russia soon after made -peace with Turkey under the mediation of Great Britain. Thus with both -hands freed she awaited the oncoming of Napoleon. - -On the 9th of May, 1812, the emperor left Paris to take command of his -forces in Poland; and on the 24th of June the imperial army, to the -number of four hundred thousand men, crossed the Niemen and entered -Russia. Two hundred thousand more followed close behind. The preceding -day, June 23, the British Orders in Council of 1807 and 1809 were -revoked, as to the United States of America. It was too late. War -had been declared by Congress, and the declaration approved by the -President, five days before, on the 18th of June, 1812. - - * * * * * - -In narrating the extraordinary, and indeed unparalleled, series of -events which reach their climax in the Berlin and Milan Decrees -and the Orders in Council, the aim has been to compress the story -within the closest limits consistent with clearness, and at the same -time to indicate the mutual connection of the links in the chain; -how one step led to another; and how throughout the whole, amid -apparent inconsistencies, there is an identity of characteristics, -not impossible to trace, from the outbreak of the Revolution to the -downfall of Napoleon. To do this it has been thought expedient to -suppress a mass of details, much of a very interesting character, -bearing upon the working of the two opposing systems. The influence of -the military element of Sea Power, the function of the British navy, -after Trafalgar, has also been passed over in silence. When that great -disaster wrecked Napoleon's naval hopes, and convinced him that not -for many years could he possibly gather the ships and train the seamen -necessary to meet his enemy in battle upon the ocean, he seized with -his usual sagacity the one only remaining means of ruining her, and -upon that concentrated his great energies. The history of Europe and -of the civilized world, after 1805, turned upon this determination -to destroy Great Britain through her commerce; and the decision was -forced upon the mighty emperor by the power of the British navy, and -the wise resolve of the government not to expose her land forces to -his blows, until peculiarly favorable circumstances should justify so -doing. The opportunity came with the Spanish uprising; and, by one of -those coincidences not uncommon in history, with the hour came the man. -The situation was indeed of the most favorable for Great Britain. The -theatre of war, surrounded on three sides by water, was for the French -a salient thrust far out into the enemy's domain on the sea, while its -interior features and the political character of the people, incapable -of cohesion and organized effort, made the struggle one eminently alien -to the emperor's genius; for it gave no opportunity for those brilliant -combinations and lightning-like blows in which he delighted. To the -British the Peninsula offered the advantage that the whole coast line -was a base of operations; while every friendly port was a bridge-head -by which to penetrate, or upon which, in case of reverse, to retire, -with a sure retreat in the sea beyond. - -The course pursued by each of the two governments, in this great -enterprise of commerce-destroying, may be looked at from the two points -of view, of policy and of rightfulness. - -In the matter of policy, both Napoleon's decrees and the Orders in -Council have been fiercely assailed and extensively argued. In so broad -and complicated a subject, a probable conclusion can only be reached -by disregarding the mass of details, of statistics, with which the -disputants have rather obscured than elucidated the subject, and by -seeking the underlying principle which guided, or should have guided, -either government. It is possible to form a very strong argument, for -or against either, by fastening upon the inevitable inconveniences -entailed upon each nation by the measures of its adversary and by its -own course. It is by impressions received from these incidents—or -accidents—the accompaniments rather than the essentials of the -two systems, that the debates of Parliament and the conclusions of -historians have been colored. - -As the combined tendency of the two policies, fully carried out, was -to destroy neutral trade in Europe, the preponderance of injury must -fall upon the nation which most needed the concurrence of the neutral -carrier. That nation unquestionably was France.[470] Even in peace, -as before stated, much more than half her trade was done in neutral -bottoms; the war left her wholly dependent upon them. Alike to export -and to import she must have free admission of neutral ships to her -ports. Prior to the Berlin decree the British made no pretence to -stop this; but they did, by reviving in 1804 the Rule of 1756, and -by Fox's decree of May, 1806, blockading the coast from Brest to the -Elbe, betray an apprehension of the result to themselves of the neutral -trade with France. This should have put the emperor upon his guard. The -very anxieties shown by a people of such mercantile aptitudes should -have been most seriously regarded, as betraying where their immediate -danger lay. The American market was a most important benefit to them, -but American merchant ships threatened to be a yet more important -injury. These having, under the circumstances of the war, a practical -monopoly of carrying West India produce which exceeded in quality and -quantity that of the British Islands, were underselling the latter on -the Continent. The ill effect of this was partially obviated by the -Rule of 1756; but there remained the fear that they would absorb, and -be absorbed by, the commerce of the Continent; that to it, and to it -alone, they would carry both articles of consumption and raw materials -for manufacture; and that from it, and from it alone, they would take -away manufactured articles with which Great Britain up to the present -time had supplied them,—and, through them, large tracts of Spanish -America. - -Up to 1804 the course of trade had been for American ships to load for -continental ports, receive there the greater part of the payment for -their cargoes in bills of exchange on the Continent, and with these -to go to British ports and pay for British manufactures, with which -they completed their lading. If, on the other hand, they went from -home direct to Great Britain, the cargoes they carried were in excess -of British consumption, and so far were profitable to Great Britain -chiefly as to a middleman, who re-exported them to the Continent. But, -when Pitt returned to power, this course of trade was being sensibly -modified. American ships were going more and more direct to the -Continent, there completing their cargoes and sailing direct for home. -Continental manufactures were supplanting British, though not in all -kinds, because the American carrier found it more profitable to take -them as his return freight; just as the produce of continental colonies -was, through the same medium, cutting under British coffees, sugars, -and other tropical products. British merchants were alarmed because, -not only their merchant shipping, but the trade it carried was being -taken away; and British statesmen saw, in the decay of their commerce, -the fall of the British navy which depended upon it. - -It was plainly the policy of Napoleon to further a change which of -itself was naturally growing, and which yet depended wholly upon the -neutral carrier. The latter was the key of the position; he was, while -war lasted, essentially the enemy of Great Britain, who needed him -little, and the friend of France, who needed him much. Truth would -have justified England in saying, as she felt, that every neutral was -more or less serving France. But in so doing the neutral was protected -by the conventions of international law and precedent, which the -British mind instinctively reveres, and for violating which it must -have an excuse. This the emperor, whose genius inclined essentially -to aggressive and violent action, promptly afforded. Overlooking the -evident tendency of events, unmindful of the experience of 1798, he -chose to regard the order of blockade of May, 1806, as a challenge, and -issued the Berlin decree, which he was powerless to carry out unless -the neutral ship came into a port under his control. He thus drove the -latter away, lost its services, and gave Great Britain the excuse she -was seeking for still further limiting its sphere of action, under the -plea of retaliation upon France and her associates. And a most real -retaliation it was. Opposition orators might harp on the definition -of the word, and carp at the method as striking neutrals and not the -enemy. Like Napoleon, they blinked at the fundamental fact that, while -Great Britain ruled the sea, the neutral was the ally of her enemy. - -The same simple principle vindicates the policy of the British -ministry. Folios of argument and oratory have been produced to show -the harm suffered by Great Britain in this battle over Commerce. -Undoubtedly she suffered,—perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to -say she nearly died; but when two combatants enter the lists, not for -a chivalric parade but for life and death, it is not the incidental -injuries, but the preponderance of harm done and the relative -endurance, which determine the issue. To the same test of principle -must be referred the mistakes in details charged against British -ministries. Military writers say that, when the right strategic line of -effort is chosen, mistakes of detail are comparatively harmless, and -even a lost battle is not fatal. When France decided, practically, to -suppress the concurrence of the neutral carrier, she made a strategic -blunder; and when Great Britain took advantage of the mistake, she -achieved a strategic success, which became a triumph. - -As regards the rightfulness of the action of the two parties, viewed -separately from their policy, opinions will probably always differ, -according to the authority attributed by individuals to the _dicta_ of -International Law. It may be admitted at once that neither Napoleon's -decrees nor the British orders can be justified at that bar, except -by the simple plea of self-preservation,—the first law of states even -more than of men; for no government is empowered to assent to that last -sacrifice, which the individual may make for the noblest motives. The -beneficent influence of the mass of conventions known as International -Law is indisputable, nor should its authority be lightly undermined; -but it cannot prevent the interests of belligerents and neutrals from -clashing, nor speak with perfect clearness in all cases where they do. -Of this the Rule of 1756 offered, in its day, a conspicuous instance. -The belligerent claimed that the neutral, by covering with his flag a -trade previously the monopoly of the enemy, not only inflicted a grave -injury by snatching from him a lawful prey, but was guilty likewise -of a breach of neutrality; the neutral contended that the enemy had -a right to change his commercial regulations, in war as well as in -peace. To the author, though an American, the belligerent argument -seems the stronger; nor was the laudable desire of the neutral for gain -a nobler motive than the solicitude, about their national resources, -of men who rightly believed themselves engaged in a struggle for -national existence. The measure meted to Austria and Prussia was an -ominous indication of the fate Great Britain might expect, if her -strength failed her. But, whatever the decision of our older and milder -civilization on the merits of the particular question, there can be -no doubt of the passionate earnestness of the two disputants in their -day, nor of the conviction of right held by either. In such a dilemma, -the last answer of International Law has to be that every state is the -final judge as to whether it should or should not make war; to its own -self alone is it responsible for the rightfulness of this action. If, -however, the condition of injury entailed by the neutral's course is -such as to justify war, it justifies all lesser means of control. The -question of the rightfulness of these disappears, and that of policy -alone remains. - -It is the business of the neutral, by his prepared condition, to make -impolitic that which he claims is also wrong. The neutral which fails -to do so, which leaves its ports defenceless and its navy stunted until -the emergency comes, will then find, as the United States found in the -early years of this century, an admirable opportunity to write State -Papers. - - - - -CHAPTER XIX. - -SUMMARY—THE FUNCTION OF SEA POWER AND THE POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN IN -THE REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS. - - -The outbreak of the French Revolutionary War found Great Britain -unprepared. For nearly ten years her course had been directed by the -second Pitt, who, though inheriting the lofty spirit and indomitable -constancy of his father, yet loved peace rather than war, and sought -the greatness and prosperity of his country through the development -of her commerce and manufactures and the skilful management of her -finances. He strove also consistently for the reduction of expenditure, -including that for the military, and even for the naval establishment. -As late as February 17, 1792, when the Revolution had already been -nearly three years in progress and France was on the eve of declaring -war against Prussia and Austria, he avowed his expectation of many -years of peace for the British empire; and the estimates provided -for only sixteen thousand seamen and marines. "Unquestionably," said -he, "there never was a time in the history of this country, when, -from the situation of Europe, we might more reasonably expect fifteen -years of peace than at the present moment." When the war with Germany -began, Great Britain proclaimed and steadily maintained an attitude of -neutrality; and the Minister asserted over and over again, to France -and to her enemies, the intention not to interfere with the internal -affairs of that country. This purpose continued unshaken through -the tremendous events of the succeeding summer and autumn; through -the assaults on the Tuileries on June 20 and August 10, through the -suspension of the king which immediately followed the latter date, -through the revolting massacres of September, finally through the -deposition of the King and the proclamation of the Republic. Doubtless -these events gave a series of shocks to public opinion in Great -Britain, alienating the friends and embittering the enemies of the -Revolution; doubtless whatever sympathy with the French advance towards -freedom the ministers felt was chilled and repelled by the excesses and -anarchy which marked its steps; but, whatever their personal feelings, -no indication appears, either in their public actions or in their -private correspondence as since revealed, of any intention to depart -from a strict, even though cold, neutrality, until near the end of the -year 1792. - -The leaders of the party in France, which at this time was exerting -the greatest influence upon the course of the Revolution, had long -favored war with foreign nations, as the surest means to destroy the -monarchy and unite public feeling in favor of the Republic and of the -Revolution. The course of events had justified their forecast. Prussia -and Austria had given provocation; and, although the latter at least -would not have proceeded to extremes, war had been proclaimed and the -fall of the monarchy had followed. There was, however, one nation with -which the revolutionists imagined themselves to be in sympathy, and -which they thought also as a whole sympathized with them. That nation -was the English; between England and France there was to be friendship, -and concurrence of effort to a common end. Herein the French leaders -fatally misconceived the character of English freedom, and the nature -of its successive advances to the conditions in which it then stood, -and through which Englishmen hoped for yet further enlargement. -Reverence for the past, and, in the main, for the existing order of -things; profound regard for law and for an orderly method of making -needful changes; a constant reference to the old rights and customs -of the English people; respect for vested rights, for agreements, for -treaties,—such were the checks which had modified and controlled the -actions of the English, even when most profoundly moved. The spirit -which dominated the French Revolution was that of destruction. The -standard, by which all things human were to be tried, was a declaration -of human rights put forth by its leaders, which contained indeed many -noble, true, and most essential principles; but, if aught existing did -not at once square with those principles, the forces of the Revolution -were to advance against it and sweep it from the face of the earth. -No respect for the past, no existent prescriptive rights, no treaties -that seemed contrary to natural rights, were to control the actions -of the revolutionists. They were to destroy, and to rebuild from the -foundation, according to their own interpretation of what justice -demanded. - -The courses and aims, therefore, of the two nations were wholly -divergent, and, as these were but the expression in either case of the -national temper, the hope of sympathy and concurrence was delusive; -but it was a natural delusion, fostered in the hearts of the sanguine -Frenchmen by the utterances of many warm-hearted friends of freedom in -the rival nation, and by the more violent words of a limited number of -revolutionary societies. The former of these were, however, quickly -alienated by the atrocities which began to stain the progress of the -Revolution; while the latter, being supposed by the French leaders to -represent the feeling of the British nation, as distinguished from its -Government, contributed to draw them further in that path of reckless -enmity to existing institutions which led to the war with Great -Britain. - -Still, so long as the exponents of French public feeling confined -themselves to violent and irregular action within their own borders, -and to declamations, which did not go beyond words, against the -governments and institutions of other nations, the British ministry -remained quiet, though watchful. There are extant private letters, -written in the early part of November, 1792, by the Prime Minister, and -by his relative, Lord Grenville, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which -indicate that they rejoiced in having maintained the neutrality of -Great Britain, and that they looked forward to its continuance, though -with anxiety. But on the 19th of that month the National Convention, -which then comprised within itself both the executive and legislative -functions of the French Government, adopted a declaration that it would -grant fraternity and succor to _all_ people who should wish to recover -their liberty;[471] and it charged administrative officers to give -republican generals the necessary orders to carry help to those people -and to defend their citizens who had been molested, or who might be -subject to molestation, on account of their devotion to the cause of -liberty. As if further to emphasize the scope of this decree, for such -in effect it was, it was ordered to be translated and printed in all -languages. - -By this official action the French Government had taken a great and -important step, radically modifying its relations to all other states. -The decree did not mention the governments with which France was then -at war, limiting to their people the application of its terms. On the -contrary, when a member of the Convention, a month later, proposed -to insert words which should restrict its operation to those peoples -"against whose tyrants France was, or should hereafter be, at war," -and gave, as his reason, to remove the uneasiness of Great Britain, -the motion found no support. The previous question was moved, and the -Convention passed on to other business.[472] - -The men who then wielded the power of France had thus gone beyond a -simple inveighing against other governments, and the mere use of words -calculated to excite discontent among the people of other states, and -had announced an intention to interfere forcibly in their internal -affairs whenever called upon to do so by citizens who, in the opinion -of the French Government, were deprived of their just liberty or -molested in their efforts to recover it. The anarchist of our own -day, who contents himself with verbally attacking existing laws and -institutions, however vehemently, may remain untouched so long as he -confines himself to the expression and advocacy of his opinions; but -when he incites others to action in order to carry out his ideas, he -is held responsible for the effect of his words; and when he takes -measures leading to violence, he is open to arrest and punishment. Such -as this, among governments, was the step taken by France in November, -1792. She not only incited the citizens of other states to rebellion, -but announced her intention of supporting them, and gave to her -generals the necessary orders for carrying that purpose into effect. - -Meanwhile the Austrian Netherlands was rapidly overrun and annexed -to the French Republic, which thus abandoned the lofty posture of -disinterestedness, and the disclaimers of all desire for conquest -which the leaders of the Revolution had made from the tribune of the -Convention. Soon after followed a decree declaring the navigation of -the Scheldt, the great artery of Belgium, open to the sea. This set -aside, without negotiation, the compacts of the previous owners of the -Netherlands, by which the navigation of the river from the sea was -reserved to Holland, within whose territory the mouth lay,—an agreement -consecrated by renewed treaties, and which, by long standing, had -become part of the public law of Europe. The act strikingly showed -the determination of the French leaders to disregard treaties which -conflicted with their construction of the natural rights of man; for -they were at peace with Holland, yet made no attempt to obtain their -end by negotiation. - -The interests and the peace of Great Britain were now seriously -threatened. For over a century her statesmen had held, and held -rightly, that the possession of Belgium by France was incompatible -with her security. They had supported the legal, though iniquitous, -claim of the Dutch to the exclusive navigation of the Scheldt; and, -above all, the country was bound by a treaty of alliance to defend -Holland, whose rights as defined by treaty had been rudely set aside by -France. Moreover, on the 28th of November deputations from the British -revolutionary societies were received at the bar of the Convention, and -the President of the latter, in reply to their address, made a speech -strongly hostile to the British Government, affecting to distinguish -between it and the people over whom it ruled; a pretence which was -equally maintained in the United States of America, where the French -minister the following year dared to appeal openly to the people -against the policy of their government. - -On the 1st of December the British Government issued a proclamation, -calling out the militia on account of seditions and insurrectionary -movements dangerous to the state, and at the same time, as required -by law, summoned Parliament to meet on the 15th. The hopes and the -patience of Pitt were alike exhausted; and although he still continued -to listen to any overtures that contained a promise of peace, he had -determined to exact guarantees, amounting to more than words, which -should assure the safety of Great Britain and her ally, Holland. -Meantime the British forces should be organized and got ready to act. -The French Government had proclaimed its intention of interfering in -the affairs and overthrowing the institutions of all states, when, -in its judgment, their citizens were molested in their efforts for -freedom. To await supinely the moment when it should please France to -act would be the decision of folly; nor was it possible, for one imbued -with English traditions, to view without distrust a government which -appeared to look for justice by disregarding law, and avowedly disowned -existing compacts and treaties in favor of a speculative somewhat -called the Rights of Man, concerning which, its own passions being the -judge, revelations as numerous might be expected as were vouchsafed to -Mahomet. - -There are some who can only account for the different lines of -action followed by Pitt, before and after 1792, in both cases with -the indomitable tenacity of his race and lineage, by conceiving -two entirely different personalities in the same man,—a sudden and -portentous change, unprecedented save by miracle as in the case of -St. Paul. More truly may be seen in him the same man acting under -circumstances wholly different, and in the later instance unforeseen. -It was not given to Pitt to read the future of the French Revolution -with the prophetic eye of Burke. He had the genius, not of the seer, -but of the man of affairs; but that he had the latter in an eminent -degree is evident from the very rapidity of the change, when he was -at last forced to the conviction that external conditions were wholly -changed. He was at heart the minister of peace, the financier, the -promoter of commerce and of gradual and healthy reforms; but in a great -speech, delivered before he had begun to fear that peace would end in -his time, he impressed upon his hearers his own profound conviction -that all the blessings which England then enjoyed rested upon the union -of liberty with law. Having enumerated the material circumstances to -which the existing prosperity of the nation was to be ascribed, he -continued:— - - "But these are connected with others more important. They are - obviously and necessarily connected with the duration of peace, - the continuance of which, on a secure and durable footing, - must ever be the first object of the foreign policy of this - country. They are connected _still more_ with its internal - tranquillity, and with the natural effects of a free but - well-regulated government.... This is the great and governing - cause, the operation of which has given scope to all the other - circumstances which I have enumerated. It is the union of liberty - with law, which, by raising a barrier equally firm against the - encroachments of power and the violence of popular commotion, - affords to property its just security, produces the exertion - of genius and labor, the extent and solidity of credit, the - circulation and increase of capital; which forms and upholds - the national character and sets in motion all the springs which - actuate the great mass of the community through all its various - descriptions.... On this point, therefore, let us principally - fix our attention; let us preserve this first and most essential - object, and every other is in our power."[473] - -It was perfectly consistent with this position that, when Pitt saw -a neighboring state in convulsions from the struggle of a turbulent -minority for liberty without law; when that state had not only -proclaimed its purpose, but taken steps to promote a similar condition -in other nations; when societies representing a small, but active and -radical, minority in England were openly fraternizing with France; -when the great leader of the English Opposition had, from his seat in -Parliament, praised the French soldiery for joining the mobs,—it was -perfectly consistent with his past that Pitt should oppose with all his -powers a course of action which not only endangered the internal peace -upon which the prosperity of England rested, but also carried into the -realm of international relations the same disorganizing principles, the -same disregard for law, covenant, and vested right that had reduced -France to her then pitiful condition. Not only Great Britain, but -the European world was threatened with subversion. That Pitt did not -bewail aloud the wreck of his hopes, the frustration of his career, -the diversion of his energies from the path that was dearest to him, -shows the strength, not the instability, of the man. That he laid aside -the reforms he had projected, and discouraged all movements towards -internal change, which, by dividing the wills of the people, might -weaken their power for external action, proves but that concentration -of purpose which, sacrificing present gratification to future good, -achieves great ends. Never does the trained seaman appear greater, -has well said the naval novelist Cooper, than when, confronted with -unexpected peril, he turns all his energies from the path in which they -were before directed, to meet the new danger. "Never," writes Lanfrey -of the critical period between Essling and Wagram, "had the maxim -of sacrificing the accessory to the principal, of which Napoleon's -military conceptions afford so many admirable examples, _and which is -true in every art_, been applied with more activity and fitness.... -The complications which he most feared were to him, for the moment, as -though they did not exist. No secondary event had power to draw him -off from the great task he had primarily assigned to himself."[474] -All instinctively recognize the courage as well as the wisdom of this -conduct in the dangers which the seaman and the soldier are called to -meet; why deny its application to the no less urgent, and at times -more momentous, issues presented to the statesman? If, as may fairly -be claimed, it is to the maritime power of Great Britain that Europe -owes the arrest of a subversive revolution, if to that maritime power -is due that a great, irresistible, and beneficent movement toward the -liberty and welfare of the masses survived a convulsion that threatened -its destruction, then to Pitt, as the master spirit who directed the -movements of the British nation, the gratitude of Europe is also due. - -When Parliament met on the 15th of December, the king's speech -mentioned the disturbances that had taken place in the country and the -threatening state of affairs in Europe, and recommended an increase in -the land and sea forces of the kingdom. This measure was alleged, among -other grievances by France, as indicating an unfriendly feeling toward -her on the part of the British Government; but it has been reasonably -urged that she had already manned a fleet superior to that which Great -Britain had in commission, besides keeping ready for instant service a -large number of other ships, which could have no possible enemy except -the British navy. Viewed simply as measures of precaution, of the -necessity for which every state is its own judge, it is difficult to -criticise severely either government; but the fact remains that France -had been the first to arm her fleet, and that Great Britain did not do -the same until substantial grounds of offence had been given. - -By a singular coincidence, on the same day that Parliament met, the -National Convention issued a second celebrated decree, yet more -decisive in its character than that of November 19, which it was -evidently meant to emphasize and supplement. The generals of the -Republic were now directed "in every country which the armies of the -French Republic shall occupy, to announce the abolition of all existing -authorities, of nobility, of serfage, of every feudal right and every -monopoly; to proclaim the sovereignty of the people and convoke the -inhabitants in assemblies to form a provisional government, to which -no officer of a former government, no noble, nor any member of the -former privileged corporations, shall be eligible." To this was -added the singular and most significant declaration that "the French -nation will treat as enemies any people which, refusing liberty and -equality, desires to preserve its prince and privileged castes, or to -make any accommodation with them." It was impossible to announce more -clearly that this was no mere war of opinions, but, on the contrary, -one of principles and methods fraught with serious and practical -consequences; nor could any despot have worded a more contemptuous -denial of the rights of a people concerning their form of government. -The revolutionary spirit, which underlay the frequent changes of men -in the French Government, showed how fixed was its purpose to alter -forcibly the institutions of other states, regardless of the habits -and affections of their citizens, by the systems imposed upon the -smaller neighboring nations, hammered all upon the anvil of French -centralization, in defiance of the wishes and the struggles of the -people concerned. Europe thus found itself face to face with a movement -as enthusiastic in its temper and as radical in its demands as the -invasions of the Mahometans. - -To this fanatical, yet lofty, and in the masses of the French people -generous and devoted spirit, continental Europe had no equal force -to oppose. It is a common remark that the eighteenth century saw the -appearance of several ruling princes who were possessed with the -liberal views of the rising school of philosophers, and who sincerely -desired to effect the improvement and elevation of their people,—to -remove grievances, to lighten burdens, to advance the general welfare. -The wisdom or strength of these men had not been equal to the task -they had assumed. There still remained unjustifiable inequalities of -conditions, grievous abuses, a depression of the lower orders, and -a stagnation among the upper, which seemed to place insurmountable -obstacles in the way of advance, and made it impossible for the -masses to feel a living, national interest in governments which -contributed so little to their happiness. This good-will among the -sovereigns of the day was indeed a most encouraging symptom. It made -it possible to effect the needed changes and to advance without a -violent break with the past,—to have reform and progress without -revolution; but to achieve these ends was beyond the power of the ruler -alone: there was needed the voice and co-operation of all classes in -the state. This Louis XVI. had sought to obtain; but unfortunately, -not only for France but for Europe, the most numerous and important -of the orders of the States-General had met the difficulties of the -situation, the outcome of centuries, not with firmness, but with -impatience. From the beginning was shown the determination to break -with the past,—to proceed at a bound to the desired goal. No regard -was had to the fitness of the people for such sudden change, to the -immense conservative force of established custom, nor to the value of -continuity in the life of a nation. Nor was this all. Law, as well -as custom, was lightly set at nought. The first Assembly threw off -the fetters imposed by its instructions, and assumed powers which -had not been confided to it. By means of these usurped faculties the -Constituent Assembly radically changed the constitution of France. - -The instantaneous effect upon the French people and upon the internal -condition of the state is well known. As the far-reaching character -of the movement, and its lack of efficient elements for self-control, -became evident, the anxieties of conservative men in other nations, -however desirous of steady progress in human liberty, could not fail to -be aroused. It was notorious, long before 1792, that ill-balanced as -was the new constitutional frame of government in France, and radical -as was the temper of the leading members of the Legislative Assembly, -the deliberations of the latter were overawed by the clubs and the -populace of Paris, and that government had practically passed into -the hands of the mob which was worked by the clubs and the radical -municipality of the city. The grotesque yet terrible scenes of June 20 -and August 10, the hideous massacres of September, not merely showed -the frantic excesses of which a French mob is capable, but also and -more solemnly evinced how completely governmental control was swallowed -up in anarchy. Still, all these things were internal to France, and it -might be hoped would so remain until the French people had worked their -own solution of their troubles. The decrees of November 19 and December -15 blasted this hope, and formally announced that French beliefs and -methods were to be forcibly spread throughout Europe. How was the -assault to be met? - -Few statesmen of that day expected that this mighty and furious spirit -of misrule would so soon bend its neck to an uncontrolled and energetic -despotism. The coming of the one man, Napoleon, was dimly seen in the -distance by the thoughtful, who knew that anarchy clears the way for -absolute power; but the speedy appearance and tyrannous efficiency of -the Committee of Public Safety, with its handmaid the Revolutionary -Tribunal, were not foreseen. The statesmen of 1793 saw the strength, -but were more impressed by the superficial exhibition of disorder in -the popular outburst. They expected to repress it, to drive it back -within the limits of France, and impose the guarantees necessary for -the security of Europe, by meeting it with numerous, well-organized -armies of veteran troops, and by a solid, orderly financial system, -wielding plentiful resources. In short, they thought to cope with a -mighty spirit by means of elaborate and powerful machinery. The means -were insufficient. The living spirit developed the rude but efficient -organism which was needed to direct its energies and which was in -sympathy with its aims; the elaborate machinery of armies and finances -failed, because not quickened by the life of the nations by whose -rulers it was wielded. - -Fortunately for Europe and for freedom, another spirit, less -demonstrative but equally powerful, was already living and animating -another great nation, peculiarly fitted by position and by the -character of its power to grapple with and exhaust that which was -vicious and destructive in the temper of the French Revolution. As -already said, the great feature of English freedom was its respect for -law, for established authority, for existing rights; its conservative -while progressive character, in which it was directly opposed to the -subversive principles of the French. But the English temper, when once -aroused, was marked also by a tenacity of purpose, a constancy of -endurance, which strongly supported the conservative tendencies of the -race and were equally foreign to the French character. Once embarked in -the strife, and definitely committed for the time to the preservation, -rather than to the progress, of society, under leaders who strongly -embodied the national traits, hatred of the enemy's principles became -more conspicuous, superficially, than the love of freedom, which yet -retained its hold deep in the hearts of both rulers and people. War -does not live on the benevolent emotions, though it may be excited -by them. The position and the maritime power of England were great -factors, great determining factors in the final issue of the French -Revolutionary wars; but these were but the machinery of the British -power. The great gain to the cause of stability in human history was -made when the spirit of order and law, embodied in the great nation -which it had created, rose against the spirit of lawlessness and -anarchy, which had now possessed a people who for long years and by -nature had been submissively subject to external authority. Two living -forces had met in a desperate struggle, which was not indeed for life -and death, for both would survive; but from which should result the -predominance of the one that was compatible with reasonable freedom, -and the subjection of the other, which knew no mean between anarchy -and servile submission. Less ebullient, but more steadfast and deeply -rooted, the former wore out the latter; it forced it back through the -stage of prostration under absolute power until it had returned to the -point whence it started, there to renew its journey under conditions -that made it no longer a danger to the whole world. - -Such being the profound nature of the strife, its course may be -regarded under two aspects, not necessarily opposed, but rather -complementary. First, and obviously, there is the policy of the leaders -on either side, the objects which they proposed to themselves, the -steps by which they sought to compass those objects, and the results of -their various movements. Secondly, there is the more obscure and wider -question as to the relative influence of the great elements of power -which entered as unconscious factors in the strife,—mighty forces, -wielded or directed by statesmen, and yet after all their masters. Of -these factors Sea Power was one, and among the most important. - -The circumstances of the times had placed this force wholly in the -hands of Great Britain. She wielded it as absolute mistress. Its -action, like that of all the other forces in the strife, depended -in part upon the direction given it by the British leaders for the -purposes of war. From this point of view, its structure appears to -be simple and rudimentary; the related movements of a few principal -parts are open to inspection and susceptible of criticism. But from -another point of view, in its course and influence, this wonderful and -mysterious Power is seen to be a complex organism, endued with a life -of its own, receiving and imparting countless impulses, moving in a -thousand currents which twine in and around one another in infinite -flexibility, not quite defying the investigation which they provoke, -but rendering it exceedingly laborious. This Power feels and is moved -by many interests; it has a great history in the past, it is making a -great and yet more wonderful history in the present. Grown to the size -of a colossus, which overshadows the earth without a second,—unless it -be the new rival rising in the Western hemisphere,—it is now assailed -with a fury and virulence never before displayed. Attacked in every -quarter and by every means, sought to be cut off alike from the -sources and from the issues of its enterprise, it adapts itself with -the readiness of instinct to every change. It yields here, it pushes -there; it gives ground in one quarter, it advances in another; it bears -heavy burdens, it receives heavy blows; but throughout all it lives -and it grows. It does not grow because of the war, but it does grow in -spite of the war. The war impedes and checks, but does not stop, its -progress. Drained of its seamen for the war-fleets, it modifies the -restrictions of generations, throws open its ports to neutral ships, -its decks to neutral seamen, and by means of those allies maintains -its fair proportions, until the enemy proclaims that the neutral who -carries but a bale of British goods, even to his own country, ceases -thereby to be a neutral and becomes the enemy of France; a proclamation -which but precipitated the ruin of French commerce, without markedly -injuring that of its rival. - -The maritime power and commercial prosperity of Great Britain sprang -essentially from the genius and aptitudes of her people, and were -exceptionally favored and developed by the peculiar situation of -the British Islands. To these natural advantages the policy of the -government added somewhat, as at times it also ignorantly imposed -obstacles; but the actions of statesmen only modified, for good or -ill, they did not create the impulses which originated and maintained -the maritime activity of the British people. The most celebrated -measure designed to foster that activity, Cromwell's Navigation Act, -had now been in operation for a century and a quarter; but, while its -superficial effects had secured the adherence of the British people and -the envy of foreign states, shrewder economists, even a century ago, -had come to regard it as an injury to the commercial prosperity of the -country. They justified it only as a means of forcing the development -of the merchant marine, the nursery of the naval force upon which the -safety of Great Britain must depend. Whatever the fluctuations of its -fortunes or the mistakes of governments in the past, the sea power of -Great Britain had at the opening of the French Revolution attained -proportions, and shown a tenacity of life, which carried the promise -of the vast expansion of our own day. Painfully harassed during the -American Revolution, and suffering from the combined attacks of France, -Spain, and Holland, seeing then large portions of its carrying trade -pass into the hands of neutrals, and bereft by the event of the war of -its most powerful colonies, it had not only survived these strains, but -by the immediate and sustained reaction of the peace had, in 1793, more -than regained its pre-eminence. Once more it stood ready, not only to -protect its own country, but to sustain, with its well-proved vitality, -the demands of the continental war; where the armies of her allies, -long untouched by the fires which breathed in France and England, were -but a part of the machinery through which the maritime power of the -latter energized. - -How far the ministers of the day understood, and how wisely they used, -the sea power of Great Britain, is a question that will demand a -separate consideration. That is the question of military policy,—of the -strategy of the war. We have first to consider the influence of the -maritime power in itself, and the functions discharged by Great Britain -simply in consequence of possessing this great and unique resource. -The existence, powers, and unconscious working of a faculty obviously -offer a subject for consideration distinct from the intelligent use of -the faculty; though a correct appreciation of the former conduces to an -accurate criticism of the latter. - -Because of the decay of the French navy during the early years of -the war, the Republic, after 1795, virtually abandoned all attempt -to contest control of the sea. A necessary consequence was the -disappearance of its merchant shipping, a result accelerated by the -capture of most of its colonies, and the ruin of its colonial system -by the outbreaks of the blacks. So great was this loss, due rather to -the natural operation of Great Britain's naval supremacy than to any -particular direction by the ministry, that the Executive Directory, in -a message to the Council of Five Hundred, January 13, 1799, could use -the expression, scarcely exaggerated, "It is unhappily too true that -there is not a single merchant vessel sailing under the French flag." -Two years later the Minister of the Interior reported to the Consular -Government that the commerce with Asia, Africa, and America was almost -naught, the importations direct from all those quarters of the globe -amounting to only 1,500,000 francs, while the exports to them were -but 300,000 francs. As the advancing tide of French conquest extended -the territory and alliances of the Republic, the commerce of its new -friends was involved in the same disaster that had befallen its own. -The shipping of Spain and Holland thus also disappeared from the sea, -and a large part of their colonies likewise passed into the hands of -Great Britain, to swell the commerce and to employ the shipping of the -latter. The navy of neither of these Powers exerted any effect upon the -control of the sea, except so far as they occupied the attention of -detachments of the British navy, so marked had the numerical and moral -superiority of the latter become. - -The disappearance of so large a body of merchant shipping as that of -France, Holland, and Spain, could not, of course, imply the total -loss to commerce and to the world of the traffic previously done by -it. Much less could these three countries wholly dispense with the -supplies for which, during peace, they had chiefly depended upon the -sea. On the contrary, the necessity for importing many articles by sea -was increased by the general continental war, which not only created -a long hostile frontier, prohibitory of intercourse on the land side, -but also, by drawing great numbers of workers from their ordinary -occupations to the armies of all parties, caused a material diminution -in the products of Europe at large. In France, shut in both by land -and sea, with a million of men under arms, and confronted with the -stern determination of England to reduce her by starvation, the danger -and the suffering were particularly great; and had there not been a -singularly abundant and early harvest in 1794, the aim of her enemy -might then have been in great measure reached. - -Such a condition of things offered of course a great opening to neutral -maritime states. They hastened to embrace it,—among others the United -States, whose carrying trade grew very rapidly at this time; but the -naval power of Great Britain during this period was so overwhelming, -and her purpose so strong, that she succeeded in imposing severe -restraints upon neutrals as well as enemies, in matters which she -considered of prime importance. Sweden and Denmark strenuously resisted -her claim to prevent the importation into France of provisions and -naval stores; but failing, through the hostile attitude of the Czarina -towards France, to receive the powerful support of Russia, as in -1780 they had done, they were forced to succumb to the Power of the -Sea. The United States likewise were constrained by their impotence -to yield, under protest, before the same overwhelming Power. While -reserving the principle, they in practice conceded naval stores to be -contraband, and on the subject of provisions accepted a compromise -which protected their own citizens without materially injuring -France. No serious attempt was made to change the existing rule of -international law, by which enemies' property on board neutral ships -was good prize. As seizure involved sending the ship into a port of -the captor, and a possible detention there during the adjudication -of suspected goods, the inconvenience of the process was a powerful -deterrent. The English courts also held that the produce of hostile -colonies was lawful prize if found in neutral bottoms; because, the -trade of those colonies being by the mother countries interdicted to -foreigners in peace, the concession of it in war was merely a ruse to -defraud the other belligerent of his just rights of capture,—a plea -uselessly contested by American writers. All these causes operated -to the injury of both hostile and neutral commerce, and to the same -extent, in appearance at least, to the benefit of the British; and they -are cited simply as illustrative of the natural working of so great a -force as the Sea Power of Great Britain then was. The results were due, -not to the skill with which the force was used or distributed, but to -sheer preponderance of existing brute strength. - -By the destruction of the enemies' own shipping and by denying neutrals -the right to carry to them many articles of the first importance, -Great Britain placed the hostile countries in a state of comparative -isolation, and created within their borders a demand for the prohibited -merchandise which raised its price and made the supplying of it -extremely profitable. When commercial intercourse is thus refused its -usual direct roads, it seeks a new path, by the nearest circuitous -course, with all the persistency of a natural force. The supply will -work its way to the demand, though in diminished volume, through all -the obstacles interposed by man. Even the contracted lines about a -beleaguered city will thus be pierced by the ingenuity of the trader -seeking gain; but when the blockade is extended over a long frontier, -total exclusion becomes hopeless. In such cases the tendency of -commerce is to seek a centre near the line which it intends to cross, -and there to accumulate the goods which are to pass the hostile -frontier and reach the belligerent. That centre will usually be in a -neutral seaport, to which trade is free, and a clearance for which will -afford no pretext for seizure or detention by the opposite belligerent. -Thus, in the American Revolution, the neutral Dutch island of St. -Eustatius became the rendezvous and depot of traders who purposed to -introduce their goods, even contraband of war, into the West India -islands of either party to that contest; and it was asserted that upon -its capture by the British, in 1781, when war began with Holland, large -amounts of property belonging to English merchants, but intended for -French customers, were found there. So, in the American Civil War, from -1861 to 1865, the town of Nassau in the British Bahamas became a centre -at which were accumulated stores of all kinds intended to break through -the blockade of the Southern coast. - -So again, in the wars of the French Revolution, as long as Holland -remained in alliance with Great Britain, that country was the centre -from which foreign goods poured into France and the continent of -Europe; but when the United Provinces had been overrun by French -troops, and a revolution in their government had attached them to -the French policy, commerce, driven from their now blockaded coast, -sought another depot farther to the eastward, and found it in Bremen, -Hamburg, and some other German ports,—of which, however, Hamburg was -by far the most favored and prosperous. Through Hamburg the coffee -and sugar of the West Indies, the manufactured goods of Great Britain, -the food products of America, the luxuries of the East, poured into -Germany; and also into France, despite the prohibitive measures of -French governments. An indication of this change in the course of -commerce is found in the fact that the imports from Great Britain alone -into Germany, which amounted to £2,000,000 in 1792, had in 1796, the -year after Holland became allied to France, increased to £8,000,000, -although the purchasing power of Germany had meanwhile diminished. -In the same time the tonnage annually clearing from Great Britain to -Germany increased from 120,000 to 266,000. Similar results, on a much -smaller scale, were seen at Gibraltar when Spain attempted to prevent -British goods entering her own ports; and again at Malta, when the -possession of that island offered British commerce a foothold far -advanced in the Central Mediterranean. Somewhat similar, likewise, were -the advantages of the islands of Ceylon and Trinidad with reference -to the mainlands of India and South America, which gave to them a -particular commercial as well as strategic value, and led England to -accept them as her compensations at the Peace of Amiens. - -In such cases the temporary commercial centre not only reaps the -profits of the broker, but all classes of its community benefit by -the increase of employments, of floating capital, and of floating -population. Precisely analogous to these was the office which her -geographical position and unrivalled control of the sea enabled Great -Britain to discharge toward the European world during the French -Revolution. Her maritime power and commercial spirit, the gradual -though rapid growth of past generations, enabled her at once to become -the warehouse where accumulated the products of all nations and of all -seas then open to commerce, and whence they were transshipped to the -tempest-tossed and war-torn Continent. So also her watery bulwarks, -traversed in every direction by her powerful navy, secured her peaceful -working as the great manufactory of Europe, and thus fostered an -immense development of her industries, which had become more than ever -necessary to the welfare of the world, since those of Holland and -France were either crippled for want of raw material or isolated by -their impotence at sea. Great Britain impeded the direct admission of -tropical products to the Continent; but their re-exportation from her -own ports and the export of British manufactures became the two chief -sources of her singular prosperity. The favorable reaction produced -by this concentration within her borders of so much of the commercial -machinery of the civilized world, is evident. Activities of every -kind sprang up on all sides, increasing the employment of labor and -the circulation of capital; and, while it is vain to contend that war -increases the prosperity of nations, it must be conceded that such a -state of things as we have depicted affords much compensation to the -nation concerned, and may even increase its proportionate prosperity, -when compared with that of its less fortunate enemies. To quote the -words of Lanfrey: "The English nation had never at any time shown more -reliance upon its own resources than when Pitt, in 1801, retired after -eight years of war. The people bore without difficulty the heavy taxes -which the war imposed upon them, and what was more astonishing still, -Pitt had found no opposition in Parliament to his last Budget. The -immense increase in the industrial prosperity of England triumphantly -refuted the predictions of her enemies, as well as the complaints of -alarmists. As the effect of every fresh declaration of war upon the -Continent had been to diminish competition in the great market of -the world and to throw into her hands the navies and colonies of her -adversaries, the English had begun to look upon the loan of millions -and the subsidies as so much premium paid for the development of their -own resources."[475] - -It is not, therefore, merely as a weapon of war in the hands of the -ministry that the sea power of Great Britain is to be regarded; nor -yet only as the fruitful mother of subsidies, upon whose bountiful -breasts hung the impoverished and struggling nations of the Continent. -Great as were its value and importance in these respects, it had yet -a nobler and more vital function. Upon it depended the vigorous life -of the great nation which supplied the only power of motive capable -of coping with the demoniac energy that then possessed the spirit of -the French. Great Britain, though herself unconscious of the future, -was in the case of a man called upon to undergo a prolonged period -of trial, exposure, and anxiety, severely testing all his powers, -physical and mental. However sound the constitution, it is essential -that, when thus assailed by adverse external influences, all its vital -processes should be protected, nourished, and even stimulated, or else -the bodily energies will flag, fail, and collapse. This protection, -this nourishment, the maritime power ministered to the body politic of -the state. Despite the undeniable sufferings of large classes among -the people, the ministry could boast from year to year the general -prosperity of the realm, the flourishing condition of commerce, the -progressive preponderance and control of the sea exerted by the navy, -and a series of naval victories of unprecedented brilliancy, which -stimulated to the highest degree the enthusiasm of the nation. Such a -combination of encouraging circumstances maintained in full tension the -springs of self-confidence and moral energy, in the absence of which no -merely material powers or resources are capable of effective action. - -By the natural and almost unaided working of its intrinsic faculties, -the sea power of Great Britain sustained the material forces of -the state and the spirit of the people. From these we turn to the -consideration of the more striking, though not more profound, effects -produced by the use made of this maritime power by the British -ministry—to the policy and naval strategy of the war—in curtailing the -resources and sapping the strength of the enemy, and in compelling -him to efforts at once inevitable, exhausting, and fruitless. In -undertaking this examination, it will be first necessary to ascertain -what were the objects the ministers proposed to achieve by the -struggle in which they had embarked the nation. If these are found to -agree, in the main, with the aim they should have kept before them, -through realizing the character of the general contest, and Great -Britain's proper part in it, the policy of the war will be justified. -It will then only remain to consider how well the general direction -given to the naval and military operations furthered the objects -proposed,—whether the strategy of the war was well adapted to bring its -policy to a successful issue. - -The sudden revulsion of feeling in the British ministry, consequent -upon the decrees of November 19 and December 15, has been mentioned. -It was then realized that not only the internal quiet of Great Britain -was endangered, but that the political stability of Europe was -threatened by a Power whose volcanic energy could not be ignored. There -was not merely the fear that extreme democratic principles would be -transmitted from the masses of one country to those of another still -unprepared to receive them. To say that the British Government went to -war merely to divert the interest of the lower orders from internal -to foreign relations is not a fair statement of the case. The danger -that threatened England and Europe was the violent intervention of the -French in the internal affairs of every country to which their armies -could penetrate. This purpose was avowed by the Convention, and how -sincerely was proved by the history of many an adjoining state within -the next few years. Although the worst excesses of the Revolution had -not yet occurred, enough had been done to indicate its tendencies, -and to show that, where it prevailed, security of life, property, and -social order disappeared. - -Security, therefore, was from the first alleged as the great object of -the war by the Prime Minister, who undoubtedly was the exponent of the -government, as truly as he was the foremost man then in England. In his -speech of February 12, 1793, upon the French declaration of war, he -returns again and again to this word, as the key-note to the British -policy. - - "Not only had his Majesty entered into no treaty, but no step - even had been taken, and no engagement formed on the part of our - Government, to interfere in the internal affairs of France, or - attempt to dictate to them any form of constitution. I declare - that the whole of the interference of Great Britain has been with - the general view of seeing if it was possible, either by our own - exertions or in concert with any other Power, to _repress this - French system of aggrandizement and aggression_, with the view of - seeing whether we could not re-establish the blessings of peace; - whether we could not, either separately or jointly with other - Powers, provide for the _security_ of our own country and _the - general security of Europe_." - -It is only fair to Pitt to compare the thought underlying this speech -of February 12, 1793, with that of February 17, 1792, already quoted, -in order that there may be realized the identity of principle and -conviction which moved him under circumstances so diverse. This -position he continually maintained from year to year; nor did he, when -taunted by the leader of the Opposition with lack of definiteness in -the objects of the war, suffer himself to be goaded into any other -statement of policy. It was in vain that the repeated jeer was uttered, -that the ministry did not know what they were driving at; and when the -constant recurrence of allied disasters and French successes on the -Continent, preceding as they did the most brilliant successes of the -British navy, made yet more poignant the exultation of the Opposition, -Pitt still refused, with all his father's proud tenacity, to give any -other account of his course than that he sought security—peace, yes, -but only a secure peace. To define precisely what success on the part -of Great Britain, or what reverses suffered by France, would constitute -the required security, was to prophesy the uncertain fortunes of war, -and the endurance of that strange madness which was impelling the -French nation. When a man finds his interests or his life threatened -by the persistent malice of a powerful enemy, he can make no reply to -the question, how long or how far he will carry his resistance, except -this: that when the enemy's power of injury is effectually curtailed, -or when his own power of resistance ends, then, and then only, will he -cease to fight. It fell to Pitt's lot, at one period of the war, to be -brought face to face with the latter alternative; but the course of the -French Government—of the Directory as well as of Napoleon—justified -fully the presentiment of the British Government in 1793, that not -until the aggressive power of France was brought within bounds, could -Europe know lasting peace. Peace could not be hoped from the temper of -the French rulers. - -Whatever shape, therefore, the military operations might assume, -the object of the war in the apprehension of the British minister -was strictly defensive; just as the French invasion of the Austrian -Netherlands, though an offensive military operation, was, in its -inception, part of a strictly defensive war. To the larger and more -general motive of her own security and that of Europe, there was also -added, for Great Britain, the special treaty obligation to assist -Holland in a defensive struggle,—an obligation which was brought into -play by the French declaration of war against the United Provinces. -It is necessary to note the two causes of war, because the relation -of Great Britain to the wider conflict was different from that which -she bore to the defence of Holland, and entailed a different line -of action. The treaty called upon her to contribute a certain quota -of land forces, and the character of her particular interest, in -both the Netherlands and Holland, made it expedient and proper that -British troops should enter the field for their protection; but after -the disastrous campaign of 1794 had subdued Holland to France, and -a revolution in its government had changed its relations to Great -Britain, the troops were withdrawn, and did not again appear on the -Continent until 1799, when favorable circumstances induced a second, -but futile attempt to rescue the Provinces from French domination. - -The part borne by the troops of England in the earlier continental -campaigns was therefore but an episode, depending upon her special -relations to Holland, and terminated by the subjection of that country -to France. What was the relation of Great Britain to the wider -struggle, in which, at the beginning, almost all the nations of the -Continent were engaged? What functions could she discharge towards -curtailing the power of France, and so restoring to Europe that -security without which peace is but a vain word? Upon the answers to -these questions should depend the criticism of the use made by the -British ministry of the nation's power. To condemn details without -having first considered what should be the leading outlines of a -great design, is as unsafe as it is unfair; for steps indefensible in -themselves may be justified by the exigencies of the general policy. -It is not to be expected that, in a war of such vast proportions and -involving such unprecedented conditions, serious mistakes of detail -should not be made; but, if the great measures adopted bear a due -proportion both to the powers possessed and to the end aimed at, then -the government will have fulfilled all that can be demanded of it. - -The sea power which constituted the chief strength of Great Britain -furnished her with two principal weapons: naval superiority, which -the course of the war soon developed into supremacy, and money. The -traditional policy of a strong party in the state, largely represented -in the governing classes, was bitterly adverse to a standing army; and -the force actually maintained was to a great extent neutralized by -the character of the empire, which, involving possessions scattered -over all quarters of the globe, necessitated dispersion instead of -concentrated action. The embarrassment thus caused was increased -by the dangerously discontented condition of Ireland, involving -the maintenance of a considerable permanent force there, with the -possibility of having to augment it. Furthermore, the thriving -condition of the manufactures and commerce of England, protected from -the storm of war ravaging the Continent and of such vital importance -to the general welfare of Europe, made it inexpedient to withdraw her -people from the ranks of labor, at a time when the working classes of -other nations were being drained for the armies. - -For these reasons great operations on land, or a conspicuous share in -the continental campaigns became, if not absolutely impossible to Great -Britain, at least clearly unadvisable. It was economically wiser, for -the purposes of the coalitions, that she should be controlling the -sea, supporting the commerce of the world, making money and managing -the finances, while other states, whose industries were exposed to -the blast of war and who had not the same commercial aptitudes, did -the fighting on land. This defines substantially the course followed -by the ministry of the day, for which the younger Pitt has been most -severely criticised. It is perhaps impossible to find any historian of -repute who will defend the general military conduct of the Cabinet at -whose head he stood; while the brilliant successes of the Seven Years' -War have offered a ready text for disparagers, from his contemporary, -Fox, to those of our own day, to draw a mortifying contrast between -his father and himself. Yet what were the military enterprises -and achievements of the justly famed Seven Years' War? They were -enterprises of exactly the same character as those undertaken in the -French Revolutionary War, and as those which, it may be added, are so -constant a feature of English history, whether during times of European -peace or of European war, that it may reasonably be suspected there is, -in the conditions of the British empire, some constant cause for their -recurrence. Like the petty wars which occur every few years in our -generation, they were mixed military and naval expeditions, based upon -the fleet and upon the control of the sea, scattered in all quarters -of the world, employing bodies of troops small when compared to the -size of continental armies, and therefore for the most part bearing, -individually, the character of secondary operations, however much they -may have conduced to a great common end. - -It is an ungracious task to institute comparisons; but, if just -conclusions are to be reached, the real facts of a case must be set -forth. The elder Pitt had not to contend with such a navy as confronted -his son at the outbreak of the French Revolution. The French navy, as -is avowed by its historians, had received great and judicious care -throughout the reign of Louis XVI.; it had a large and splendid body -of ships in 1793; it enjoyed the proud confidence of the nation, -consequent upon its actions in the war of 1778; and, although its -efficiency was fatally affected by the legislation of the National -Assembly and by the emigrations, it was still an imposing force. Not -until years of neglect had passed over it, and the fatal Battle of -the Nile had been fought, did its character and weight sink to the -same relative insignificance that the elder Pitt encountered in the -Seven Years' War. The elder, like the younger, shaped his system of -war upon the control of the sea, upon the acquisition of colonies, -upon subsidizing allies upon the Continent, and, as main outlines of -policy, these were undoubtedly correct; but the former had in his favor -heavy odds in the weak condition of the French navy, and in having -on his side the great military genius of the age. On the side of the -elder Pitt fought Frederick the Great, against a coalition, numerically -overwhelming indeed, but half-hearted, ill-knit, and led by generals -far inferior to their great opponent, often mere creatures of the most -corrupt Court favor. Against the younger Pitt arose a greater than -Frederick, at the very moment of triumph, when the combined effects -of the sea power of England, of the armies of Austria, and of the -incompetency of the Directory had brought the Revolution "to bay,"—to -use the words of a distinguished French naval officer and student.[476] -In 1796 and in 1799 Bonaparte, and Bonaparte alone, rescued from -impending destruction—not France, for France was not the object of -Pitt's efforts—but that "system of aggrandizement and aggression" to -which France was then committed. - -The elder Pitt saw his work completed, though by weaker hands; the -younger struggled on through disappointment after disappointment, and -died under the shadow of Austerlitz, worn out in heart and mind by the -dangers of his country. Contemporaries and men of later generations, -British and foreigners, have agreed in attributing to him the leading -part in the coalitions against Revolutionary France; but they have -failed to admit the specific difficulties under which he labored, and -how nearly he achieved success. It is easy to indulge in criticism -of details, and to set one undertaking against another; to show the -failures of expeditions landed on the French coast in the Seven Years' -War; to point out that Wolfe's conquest of Canada in 1759, by freeing -the American colonies from their fear of France, promoted their revolt -against Great Britain, while Nelson in 1798, and Abercromby in 1801, -saved Egypt, and probably India also, to England; to say that the -elder Pitt did not regain Minorca by arms, while the younger secured -both it and Malta. Martinique fell to the arms of both; the Cape of -Good Hope, Ceylon, Trinidad, prizes of the later war, may fairly be -set against Havana and Manila of the earlier. In India, Clive, the -first and greatest of British Indian heroes, served the elder Pitt; -yet before the arms of the younger fell Mysore, the realm of Hyder Ali -and Tippoo Saib, the most formidable enemies that Britain had yet met -in the Peninsula. Such comparisons and arguments are endless; partly -because there is much to be said on both sides, but chiefly because -they concern details only, and do not touch the root of the matter. - -The objects of the two Pitts were different, for the circumstances of -their generations were essentially diverse. The task of the one was -to extend and establish the great colonial system, whose foundations -had been laid by previous generations, and to sustain in Europe the -balance of power between rival, but orderly, governments; that of the -other was to steady the social order and political framework of Great -Britain herself, and of Europe, against a hurricane which threatened to -tear up both by the roots. Each in his day, to strengthen his country -and to weaken the enemy, pursued the same great line of policy, which -in the one age and in the other fitted the situation of Great Britain. -To extend and consolidate her sea power; to lay the world under -contribution to her commerce; to control the sea by an all-powerful -navy; to extend her colonial empire by conquest, thereby increasing her -resources, multiplying her naval bases, and depriving her enemy alike -of revenues and of points whence he could trouble English shipping; -to embarrass the great enemy, France, by subsidizing continental -allies,—such was the policy of both the Pitts; such, alike in the -Revolution and in the Seven Years' War, was the policy imposed by a due -recognition, not only of the special strength of Great Britain, but of -her position in relation to the general struggle. Frederick in the one -case, Austria in the other, needed the money, which only the sustained -commercial prosperity of England could supply. The difference in the -actual careers run by the two statesmen is that the son had to meet -far greater obstacles than the father, and that, so far as the part of -Great Britain herself was concerned, he achieved equal, if not greater, -successes. The father had to contend, not against the mighty fury of -the French Revolution, but against the courtier generals and the merely -professional soldiery of Louis XV. and his mistresses; he had an allied -America; he met no mutiny of the British fleet; he was threatened by -no coalition of the Baltic Powers; he encountered no Bonaparte. It was -the boast of British merchants that under his rule "Commerce was united -to and made to grow by war;" but British commerce increased during the -French Revolution even more than it did in the earlier war, and the -growth of the British navy, in material strength and in military glory, -under the son, exceeded that under the father. - -In history the personality of the elder statesman is far more imposing -than that of the younger. The salient characteristic of the one was -an imperious and fiery impetuosity; that of the other, reserve. The -one succeeded in power a minister inefficient as an administrator, -weak in nerve, and grotesque in personal appearance; the striking -contrast presented by the first William Pitt to the Duke of Newcastle, -his aggressive temper, the firm self-reliance of his character, his -dazzling personality, around which a dramatic halo clung even in the -hour of his death, made a vivid impression upon the imagination of -contemporaries, and have descended as a tradition to our own days. -Save to a few intimate friends, the second Pitt was known to his -fellow-countrymen only on the benches of the House of Commons. A temper -as indomitable as his father's bore in silence the vastly greater and -more prolonged strain of a most chequered struggle; only a few knew -that the strain was endured with a cheerfulness, a calmness, and a -presence of mind, which of themselves betoken a born leader of men. In -the darkest hour, when the last ally, Austria, had forsaken England -and consented to treat with France, when the seamen of the fleet -had mutinied, and British ships of war, taken violently from their -officers, were blockading the approaches to London, Pitt was awakened -during the night by a member of the Cabinet with some disastrous news. -He listened quietly, gave his directions calmly and clearly, and -dismissed the messenger. The latter, after leaving the house, thought -it necessary to return for some further instruction, and found the -minister again sleeping quietly. The incident is a drama in itself. - -In considering the use made of Great Britain's powers for war by -the administration of the second Pitt, the broad outlines should be -regarded, not as a simply military question,—such as the combinations -of a general officer in a campaign,—but as efforts of statesmanship, -directing arms in an attempt to compass by force the requirements -considered to be most decisive in a political situation. The office -of the statesman is to determine, and to indicate to the military -authorities, the national interests most vital to be defended, as -well as the objects of conquest or destruction most injurious to the -enemy, in view of the political exigencies which the military power -only subserves. The methods by which the military force will proceed -to the ends thus indicated to it—the numbers, character, equipment -of the forces to be employed, and their management in campaign—are -technical matters, to be referred to the military or naval expert by -the statesman. If the latter undertakes to dictate in these, he goes -beyond his last and commonly incurs misfortune. - -It is not likely that such a division of labor, between the statesman, -the soldier, and the seaman, is ever formally made. It is enough if it -be practically recognized by the due influence of the military element -in deciding details, and by its cheerful obedience in carrying out the -views of the government whose servant it is. In criticising results it -is fair to assume, where not otherwise proved, that for the general -direction of the war the government is responsible, and that in the -particular management of military movements the advice of professional -men has had just weight. A somewhat striking illustration of this is -to be found in the change of naval strategy, within the limits of the -Channel fleet, when, without any change in the government, the positive -convictions and stringent methods of Lord St. Vincent set aside, in -1800, the traditions of Lord Howe and Lord Bridport. - -What then was the general direction imparted to military movements -by a government which had announced its object in the war to be -the attainment of security, by "repressing the French system of -aggrandizement and aggression"? - -Owing to the distracted condition of France, many confusing -cross-lights were at first cast upon that central theatre of European -disturbance, by movements whose force it was impossible rightly to -estimate. Such were the risings in La Vendée and Brittany, the revolt -at Lyon, the delivery of Toulon to the allied fleets. Experience -justifies the opinion that such insurgent movements, involving but a -part of a nation, are best left to themselves, supported only by money -and supplies. If, thus aided, they have not the vitality to make good -their cause, the presence of foreign troops, viewed ever with jealousy -by the natives, will not insure success. It is, however, the French -Revolution itself that furnishes the surest illustrations of this -truth, shedding upon it a light which Pitt did not have to guide him. -Such embarrassments of the French Government were naturally thought to -give opportunity for powerful diversions; the more so as the amount of -disaffection was much exaggerated, and the practice of partial descents -upon the French coasts had come down unquestioned from previous wars. - -To this mistake, as natural as any ever made in war, and to the -treaty obligation to support Holland, is to be attributed much of -the misdirection given to the British army in the first two years -of the war. When the illusion was over, and Holland conquered, the -military effort of Great Britain was at once concentrated on its proper -objects of ruling the sea and securing positions that contributed to -naval control and commercial development. Even in 1793 a respectable -force had been sent to the West Indies, which in 1794 reduced all the -Windward Islands. Stretching its efforts too far, reverses followed; -but in 1795 a powerful fleet was sent with sixteen thousand troops -commanded by Sir Ralph Abercromby, the best general officer revealed by -the early part of the war. From the first, Pitt had seen the necessity -of controlling the West Indies. That necessity was twofold: first, by -far the greatest fraction of British trade, over one fourth of the -whole, depended upon them; and, second, the enemy's islands were not -only valuable as producing, they were above all the homes of cruisers -that endangered all commerce, neutral as well as British. To control -the whole Caribbean region was, among those objects that lay within the -scope of the British Government, the one most essential to the success -of the general war. To sneer at the attempt as showing merely a wish -for sugar islands is to ignore the importance of the West Indies to the -financial stability of Great Britain; upon whose solvency depended, -not only the maritime war, but the coalitions whose aid was needed to -repress "the system of French aggression." - -Abercromby restored England's control over the lesser Antilles, except -Guadeloupe, and added to her possessions Trinidad and the Dutch -colonies on the mainland. Although unable to retain Haïti, whose -ports were for some time occupied, the British navy ensured its loss -to France and the final success of the negro revolt; and commercial -relations were established with the new government. During the same -period the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, and other Dutch and French -possessions in India were reduced by similar expeditions. These not -only extended the sphere of British commerce; they contributed yet -more to its enlargement by the security resulting from the conversion -of hostile to friendly ports, and the consequent diminution of enemy's -cruisers. - -It is a singular fact that neither the extraordinary commercial -prosperity secured by these successes, nor the immense development of -the navy during Pitt's administration, is mentioned in the celebrated -denunciation of his "drivelling" war policy by Macaulay. Of naval -administration the latter speaks, in order to assign the credit to -another; on commercial and naval expansion he is silent. Yet no -factors in the war were so important. The one sustained Great Britain, -on whose shoulders was upborne the whole resistance of Europe; the -other crushed France by a process of constriction which, but for -Bonaparte, would have reduced her at an early period, and to free her -from which Napoleon himself was driven to measures that ruined him. -These important results were obtained by lengthening the cords and -strengthening the stakes of British commerce, by colonial expansion -and safe-guarding the seas, and by the growth of the navy,—none of -which objects could have been accomplished without the hearty support -of the Prime Minister. From the co-operation of these causes, and the -restrictions placed on neutral trade, the commerce of Great Britain -increased by 65[477] per cent between 1792 and 1800, while the loss by -capture was less than 2½ per cent on the annual volume of trade. - -The directly offensive use of Great Britain's maritime power made by -the ministry, in order to repress the French system of aggression, -consisted in throwing back France upon herself, while at the same time -cutting off her resources. The continental armies which begirt her on -the land side were supported by subsidies; and also when practicable, -as in the Mediterranean, by the co-operation of the British fleets, to -whose influence upon his Italian campaign in 1796 Bonaparte continually -alludes. To seaward the colonial system of France was ruined, raw -material cut off from her manufactures, her merchant shipping swept -from the sea. In 1797 the chief of the Bureau of Commerce in France -wrote: "The former sources of our prosperity are either lost or -dried up. Our agricultural, manufacturing, and industrial power is -almost extinct."[478] At the same time, while not denying the right -of neutrals to trade with ports not blockaded, every restriction -that could be placed upon such trade by stringent, and even forced, -interpretations of international law was rigorously imposed by a navy -whose power was irresistible. Even provisions (and it will be well for -Great Britain of the present day to recall the fact) were claimed to be -contraband of war, on the ground that, in the then condition of France, -when there was a reasonable hope of starving her into peace, to supply -them contributed to prolong hostilities. - -So severe was the suffering and poverty caused by this isolation, that -in the moment of his greatest triumph, immediately after signing the -peace of Campo Formio, which left Great Britain without an ally, in -October, 1797, Bonaparte wrote: "Either our government must destroy -the English monarchy, or must expect to be itself destroyed by the -corruption and intrigue of those active islanders. Let us concentrate -all our activity upon the navy and destroy England." The Directory, -conscious that its navy was paralyzed and that its _guerre de course_, -pursued since 1795 against British commerce, had not seriously affected -the latter, although 1797 was the year of its lowest depression, could -see no further means of injuring England except by attacking the -neutral carriers of her wares. Affecting to regard them as accomplices -in Great Britain's crimes against humanity, it procured from the -Convention, in January, 1798, a decree that "every vessel found at -sea, having on board English merchandise as her cargo, in whole or in -part, shall be declared lawful prize, whosoever shall be the proprietor -of the merchandise, which shall be reputed contraband for this cause -alone, that it comes from England or her possessions." At the same time -orders were issued to confiscate property of British origin wherever -found on shore, and domiciliary visits were authorized to insure its -discovery. Napoleon was therefore perfectly justified in declaring in -later years that the Directory outlined the policy of his Continental -System, embodied in his Berlin and Milan decrees of 1806 and 1807. - -To the Directory the attempt thus to destroy British prosperity worked -disaster. To Napoleon it brought ruin, owing to the greater vigor, -wider scope, and longer duration which he was able to impart to the -process. The aim of his Berlin and Milan decrees, like that of the -Directory, was to undermine British trade by depriving it of the -necessary concurrence of neutral carriers. As this alone would not be -enough, he determined to support the decrees by excluding Great Britain -from her principal market, to close the entire Continent to all goods -coming from her or her colonies, or even passing through her ports. For -this purpose—to carry out this gigantic project—edict after edict was -issued to France and her allied countries; for this purpose annexation -after annexation to the empire was made; for this purpose a double -cordon of French troops lined the shores of the Continent from France -to the Baltic; for this purpose British goods were not only seized but -publicly burned throughout his dominions; for this purpose demands -were made upon all neutral states to exclude British manufactures and -colonial produce; for this purpose the calamitous Spanish war was -incurred;[479] and finally, for this purpose reiterated and imperious -complaints were addressed to the czar on his failure to enforce the -exclusion, and, upon his persistence, the fatal invasion of Russia -followed. - -The justice or wisdom of this course is not here in question. It -is enough to say that it nearly ruined Great Britain, but entirely -ruined Napoleon. The noticeable point, bearing upon the wisdom of -Pitt's military policy, is that Napoleon was forced into it by that -policy, because England was destroying him and he had no other means -of injuring her. Great Britain's success not only followed, but was -consequent upon steady adherence to the main features of Pitt's policy. -Military writers say that success on a battle-field is of slight -avail if the strategic line of operations is ill-chosen, and that -even a great defeat may be redeemed if the position has been taken in -accordance with the strategic conditions of the campaign. This amounts -to saying, in non-military language, that hard blows are useless if not -struck on the right spot. Numerous reverses attended the coalitions -against France, although few fell upon Great Britain herself; but none -was fatal because the general policy, begun by Pitt and continued by -his successors, was strategically sound with reference to the object in -view,—namely, "the repression of that system of aggression" which was -the very spirit of the French Revolution, formulated by the Convention, -adopted by the Directory, inherited and given its full logical -development by Napoleon. - -It is the fashion with the political heirs of Fox, Pitt's greatest -opponent, to draw a marked contrast between the war which preceded -and that which followed the Peace of Amiens. In the former it is -Great Britain which, in a frenzy of hatred or panic fear toward the -French Revolution, becomes the wanton aggressor, and turns a movement -that, despite some excesses, was on the whole beneficent, into the -stormy torrent of blood that poured over Europe. In the second war, -Napoleon is the great culprit, the incarnate spirit of aggression, -violence, faithlessness, and insolence; with whom peace was impossible. -It is, however, notorious, and conceded by French writers, that the -French leaders in 1791 and 1792 wanted war on the Continent;[480] the -impartial conduct of the British Cabinet was admitted by the French -Government when acknowledging the recall of the British ambassador -six months before war broke out;[481] the decrees of November 19 and -December 15 are before the reader, as is the refusal of the Convention -to give the former a construction conciliatory to Great Britain; the -treaty rights of Holland had been set aside by the high hand without an -attempt at negotiation, and there can be little doubt that the purpose -was already formed to invade her territory shortly. Despite all this, -not Great Britain, but the Republic, declared war. The treatment, -by the Convention and the Directory, of the lesser states that fell -under their power,[482] their dealings with Great Britain, their -aggressiveness, insolence, and bad faith were identical in spirit with -the worst that can be said of Napoleon; the sole difference being that -for a weak, incompetent, and many-headed government was substituted -the iron rule of a single man of incomparable genius. Scruples were -known to neither. The Berlin and Milan decrees, in which was embodied -the Continental System that led Napoleon to his ruin, were, as he -himself said, but the logical development of the Directory's decree of -January, 1798,[483] against which even the long-suffering United States -of America rebelled. Both measures struck at Great Britain through the -hearts of allies and of neutrals, for whose rights and welfare, when -conflicting with the course France wished to take, they showed equal -disregard; both were framed in the very spirit of the first National -(Constituent) Assembly, which set aside institutions and conventions -that did not square with its own ideas of right; which sought justice, -as it saw it, by overleaping law. - -It is, however, far more important to note, and clearly to apprehend, -that both measures were forced upon the rulers of France by the -strategic lines of policy laid down by the ministry of Pitt. The -decree of January, 1798, followed close upon the rupture of the peace -conferences of Lille, initiated by Pitt in 1797; a rupture brought on -by a display of arrogance and insolence on the part of the Directory, -similar to that shown by it towards the United States at the same -period, that can only be realized by reading the correspondence,[484] -and which is now known to have been due, in part at least, to the hope -of a bribe from the British ministry.[485] The Berlin decree, which -formally began the Continental System, was issued in November, 1806, -when Pitt had not been a year in his grave. Both were forced upon the -French leaders by the evident hopelessness of reaching Great Britain -in any other way, and because her policy of war was hurting France -terribly, while sustaining her own strength. In other words, Great -Britain, by the strategic direction she gave to her efforts in this -war, forced the French spirit of aggression into a line of action which -could not but result fatally.[486] But for Bonaparte, the result, -nearly attained in 1795 and again in 1799, would have followed then; -not even his genius could avert it finally. - -It is related that a leader of antiquity once cried to his opponent, -"If you are the great general you claim to be, why do you not come -down and fight me?" and received the pertinent reply, "If you are the -great general you say, why do you not _make_ me come down and fight -you?" This was precisely what Great Britain effected. By the mastery -of the sea, by the destruction of the French colonial system and -commerce, by her persistent enmity to the spirit of aggression which -was incarnate in the French Revolution and personified in Napoleon, -by her own sustained and unshaken strength, she drove the enemy into -the battle-field of the Continental System, where his final ruin was -certain. Under the feeble rule of the Directory that ruin came on -apace; within a year it was evident that the only gainer by the system -was the foe whom it sought to overthrow, that France herself and her -allies, as well as neutral Powers, were but being broken down to -the profit of Great Britain. Despite the first failure, there was a -plausible attraction about the measure which led Napoleon, confident -in his strength and genius, to apply it again with the relentless -thoroughness characteristic of his reign. For a time it succeeded, -owing not only to the vigor with which it was used, but also to Great -Britain being exasperated into retaliatory steps which, by forbidding -the trade of neutrals to and between all the ports thus closed to -British commerce, stopped at its source the contraband trade, which -eluded Napoleon's blockade and kept open the way for British exports to -the Continent. - -The strain, however, was too great to be endured by the great -composite political system which the emperor had founded, and through -which he hoped to exclude his enemy from every continental market. -The privations of all classes, the sufferings of the poorer, turned -men's hearts from the foreign ruler, who, in the pursuit of aims -which they neither sympathized with nor understood, was causing them -daily ills which they understood but too well. All were ready to fall -away and rise in rebellion when once the colossus was shaken. The -people of Spain, at one extremity of Europe, revolted in 1808; the -Czar of Russia, at the other, threw down the gauntlet in 1810, by a -proclamation which opened his harbors to all neutral ships bringing -colonial produce, the object of Napoleon's bitterest reclamations. In -the one case the people refused the ruler put over them to insure a -more vigorous enforcement of the continental blockade; in the other the -absolute monarch declined longer to burden his subjects with exactions -which were ruining them for the same object. The Spanish outbreak gave -England a foothold upon the Continent at a point most favorable for -support by her maritime strength and most injurious to the emperor, -not only from the character of the country and the people, but also -because it compelled him to divide his forces between his most remote -frontiers. The defection of the czar made a fatal breach in the line of -the continental blockade, opening a certain though circuitous access -for British goods to all parts of Europe. Incapable of anticipating -defeat and of receding from a purpose once formed, Napoleon determined -upon war with Russia. He, the great teacher of concentration, proceeded -to divide his forces between the two extremes of Europe. The results -are well known to all. - -It was not by attempting great military operations on land, but by -controlling the sea, and through the sea the world outside Europe, -that both the first and the second Pitt ensured the triumph of their -country in the two contests where either stood as the representative of -the nation. Mistakes were made by both; it was the elder who offered -to Spain to give Gibraltar for Minorca, which the younger recovered -by force of arms. Mistakes many may be charged against the conduct -of the war under the younger; but, with one possible exception, they -are mistakes of detail in purely military direction, which cannot -invalidate the fact that the general line of action chosen and followed -was correct. To recur to the simile already borrowed from military art, -the mistakes were tactical, not strategic; nor, it may be added, to any -great degree administrative. - -The possible exception occurred at the beginning of the war, in the -spring and summer of 1793. It may be, as has been claimed by many, that -a march direct upon Paris at that time by the forces of the Coalition -would have crushed all opposition, and, by reducing the mob of the -capital, have insured the submission of the country. It may be so; but -in criticising the action of the British ministers, so far as it was -theirs, it must be remembered that not only did men of the highest -military reputation in Europe advise against the movement, but that the -Duke of Brunswick, then second to none in distinction as a soldier, -had tried it and failed a few months before. For unprofessional men -to insist, against the best professional opinions at their command, -is a course whose propriety or prudence can only be shown by the -event,—a test to which the advance upon Paris, now so freely prescribed -by the wisdom of after-sight, was not brought. One consideration, -generally overlooked, may here be presented. To attempt so momentous -and hazardous an enterprise, when the leaders to whom its conduct must -be intrusted regard it as unwise, is to incur a great probability of -disaster. Even Bonaparte would not force his plans upon Moreau, when -the latter, in 1800, persisted in preferring his own. Yet this must -statesmen have done, had they in 1793 ordered their generals to advance -on Paris. - -Once lost, the opportunity, if such it were, did not recur. It depended -purely upon destroying the resistance of France before it had time to -organize. Thenceforward there remained to encounter, not the policy of -a court, playing its game upon the chess-board of war, with knights -and pawns, castles and armies, but a nation in arms, breathing a fury -and inspired by passions which only physical exhaustion could repress. -Towards that exhaustion Great Britain could on the land side contribute -effectually only by means of allies, and this she did. On the side of -the sea, her own sphere of action, there were two things she needed to -do. The first was to sustain her own strength, by fostering, widening, -and guarding the workings of her commercial system; the second was to -cut France off from the same sources of strength and life. Both were -most effectually accomplished,—not, as Macaulay asserts, by the able -administration of Earl Spencer (whose merit is not disputed), but by -the general policy of the ministry in the extension of the colonial -system, in the wise attention paid to the support of British commerce -in all its details, and in the extraordinary augmentation of the -navy. Between 1754 and 1760, the period embracing the most brilliant -triumphs of the elder Pitt, the British navy increased by 33 per cent. -Between 1792 and 1800, under his son, the increase was 82 per cent. -How entirely the military management and direction of this mighty -force depended upon the sea-officers, and not upon the statesman, when -a civilian was at the head of the Admiralty, will be evident to any -one studying closely the slackness of the Channel fleet immediately -under the eye of Earl Spencer, or the paltry dispositions made in -particular emergencies like the Irish invasion of 1796, and contrasting -these with the vigor manifested at that very moment under Jervis in -the Mediterranean, or later, in the admirable operations of the same -officer in command of the Channel fleet. - -Few indeed are the statesmen who are not thus dependent upon -professional subordinates. Pitt was no exception. He was not a general -or an admiral, nor does he appear so to have considered himself; but he -realized perfectly where Great Britain's strength lay, and where the -sphere of her efforts. By that understanding he guided her movements; -and in the final triumph wrought by the spirit of the British nation -over the spirit of the French Revolution, the greatest share cannot -justly be denied to the chief who, in the long struggle against wind -and tide, forced often to swerve from the direct course he would have -followed by unforeseen dangers that rose around the ship in her passage -through unknown seas, never forgot the goal "Security," upon which -from the first his will was set. Fit indeed it was that he should drop -at his post just when Trafalgar had been won and Austerlitz lost. That -striking contrast of substantial and, in fact, decisive success with -bewildering but evanescent disaster, symbolized well his troubled -career, as it superficially appears. As the helm escaped his dying -hands, all seemed lost, but in truth the worst was passed. "The pilot -had weathered the storm." - -The death of Pitt was followed by the formation of a ministry of -somewhat composite character, centring round his relative and former -colleague, Lord Grenville, and his life-long rival, Fox. This held -office but for fourteen months; a period long enough for it to afford -Napoleon the pretext for his Berlin decree, but not sufficient to -impress any radical change upon the main lines of policy laid down by -Pitt. Upon its fall in March, 1807, his devoted personal friends and -political followers succeeded to power. Confronted almost immediately -by the threatening union between the empires of the East and West, of -which the known, if concealed, purpose was to divide between France -and Russia the control of the Continent, and to subdue Great Britain -also by commercial exhaustion, the ministry, both necessarily and by -tradition, opposed to this combination the policy transmitted to them -by their great leader. Colonial enterprises were multiplied, until -it could be said of colonies, as the French Directory had before -sorrowfully confessed concerning shipping, that not one was left under -a flag hostile to Great Britain. The navy, expanding to its greatest -numerical force in 1808, was maintained in equal strength, if in -somewhat diminished numbers, up to the termination of the struggle. -While unable to prevent the material growth of the French navy by -ship-building carried on in its ports, Great Britain continued to -impede its progress and cut off its supplies by the close watch -maintained over the French coast, by confining its fleets to their -harbors,—and so shutting them off from the one drill ground, the -sea,—and finally by frustrating Napoleon's project of increasing his -own power by violently seizing the vessels of smaller continental -states. - -The secure tenure of the great common and highway of commerce—the -sea—was thus provided for. The enemy's navy was neutralized, his bases -abroad cut off, his possessions became the markets as well as the -sources of British trade. It was not enough, however, for commerce, -that its transit should be comparatively safe. Its operations of -exchange needed both materials and markets, both producers and -consumers. From these, as is known, Napoleon sought to exclude it by -the Continental System, which through the co-operation of Russia he -thought could be rendered effective. To this again the ministry of -Perceval and Canning opposed the Orders in Council, tempered by the -license system, with the double object of prolonging the resistance -of Great Britain and sapping that of her enemy; measures which but -reproduced, on a vaster scale, the Rule of 1756, with the modifications -introduced by Pitt, in 1798, for the same ends. - -The question thus resolved itself, as has before been perhaps too -often said, into a conflict of endurance,—which nation could live the -longest in this deadly grapple. This brings us back again face to face -with the great consideration: Was the struggle which began in 1793 one -to be solved by a brilliant display of generalship, shattering the -organized forces of an ordinary enemy, and with it crushing the powers -of resistance in the state? Or had it not rather its origin in the -fury of a nation, against which all coercion except that of exhaustion -is fruitless? The aims, the tendencies, the excitement of the French -people had risen to a pitch, and had made demands, which defied -repression by any mere machinery or organization, however skilfully -framed or directed. When the movement of a nation depends upon—nay, is -the simple evidence of—a profound emotion permeating each individual of -the mass, the mighty impulse, from its very diffusion, has not those -vital centres of power, the destruction of which paralyzes the whole. -Not till the period of passion—necessarily brief, but for the time -resistless—has given place to the organization to which all social -movement tends, is a people found to have, as the tyrant of antiquity -wished, a single neck to be severed by a blow. - -The frenzy of the French nation had spent itself, the period of -organization had set in, when Bonaparte appeared upon the scene; -but, as the tension of popular emotion slackened, there had not been -found, in the imperfect organization which sought to replace it, the -power to bear the burden of the state. No longer able to depend upon -a homogeneous movement of the millions, but only upon the efficient -working of the ordinary machinery of civil government and armies, in -her case most imperfectly developed, France now offered to the attacks -of her enemies those vital points, with which, when crushed, resistance -ceases. Military reverses and exhaustion by bad government brought her -in 1795, and again in 1799, to her last gasp. At both epochs Bonaparte -saved her. - -The great captain and organizer not only brought victory with him -and restored the machinery of government; he supplied also a centre -around which popular enthusiasm and confidence might once more rally. -He became not only the exponent of national unity, but in a very real -sense the embodiment of those aspirations and aggressive tendencies, -which in the first days of the Revolution had bound Frenchmen together -as one man, but had afterwards evaporated and frittered away for want -of that definiteness of aim and sagacious direction which only a great -leader can impart. Under his skilful manipulation the lofty sentiments -of the early revolutionists became catchwords, which assured his hold -upon the imaginations and enthusiasm of the people, again swayed as one -man to follow him in his career of aggression. Metternich well said -that Bonaparte was to him simply the incarnation of the Revolution.[487] - -It was with these two phases of one and the same condition that Europe -had to deal between 1793 and 1814. In the one instance a people -unified by a common passion and common aims, in the other the same -people concentrated into a common action by submission to the will of -a sovereign, apparently resistless in the council as in the field. -It is true that the affections of his subjects soon ceased to follow -him, except in the armies by whose power he ruled, but the result is -the same. All the energies of the nation are summed up in a single -overpowering impulse,—at first spontaneous, afterwards artificial,—to -which during the first half of Napoleon's career was given a guidance -of matchless energy and wisdom. - -Such a combination is for the time irresistible, as the continent of -Europe proved during long and weary years. Absolute power, concentrated -force, central position, extraordinary sagacity and energy, all united -to assure to Napoleon the dazzling successes which are matters of -history. The duration and the permanent results of this startling -career depended, however, upon the staying power of the French nation -and upon the steadfastness of the resistance. Upon the Continent, the -latter in its actuality ceased. Potentially it remained,—men's hearts -swelled to bursting under the tyranny they endured; but before the -power and the genius of the great conqueror outward rebellion shrank -away. States dared not trust each other,—they could not act together; -and so men went silently in the bitterness of their spirits. - -There remained one small group of islands, close on the flank of the -would-be ruler of the world, with a population numbering little -more than half that of his immediate dominions, whose inhabitants -deeply sympathized with sufferings and oppression they were powerless -directly to relieve. The resistance they had offered to the aggressive -fury of the Revolution they continued to oppose to its successor and -representative; but it was not by direct action in the field, but -only by operations aimed to abridge the resources and endurance of -France, that they could look forward to a possibility of success. For -seven years went on this final silent strife, whose outlines have been -traced in the preceding chapter of this work. During its continuance -Great Britain herself, while escaping the political oppression and -national humiliation undergone by the continental peoples, drank deep -of the cup of suffering. Her strength wasted visibly; but the mere -fact of her endurance and persistence compelled her enemy to efforts -more exhausting, to measures more fatal, than those forced upon -herself. And, while thus subjected to a greater strain, Napoleon was -by Great Britain cut off from that greatest of all sources of renewing -vitality—the Sea. - -The true function of Great Britain in this long struggle can scarcely -be recognized unless there be a clear appreciation of the fact that -a really great national movement, like the French Revolution, or a -really great military power under an incomparable general, like the -French empire under Napoleon, is not to be brought to terms by ordinary -military successes, which simply destroy the organized force opposed. - -Of the latter, the protracted and not wholly hopeless resistance, which -in 1813 and 1814 succeeded even the great Russian catastrophe, is a -signal instance; while to subvert such a power, wielded by such a man, -by any reverse less tremendous than it then underwent, is hopeless. Two -Napoleons do not co-exist. In the former case, on the other hand, the -tangible something, the decisive point against which military effort -can be directed, is wanting. Of this the struggle between the North -and South in the American Civil War affords a conspicuous example. -Few, probably, would now maintain that the capture of Richmond in the -first year of the war, when the enthusiasm of the Southern people was -at its height, their fighting force undiminished, their hopes undimmed -by the bitter disappointments of a four years' struggle, would have had -any decisive effect upon the high-spirited race. Positions far more -important fell without a sign of such result. No man could then have -put his finger here, or there, and said, "This is the key-stone of -resistance;" for in the high and stern feeling of the moment resistance -was not here nor there, but everywhere. - -So was it in the early flush of the French Revolution. The "On to -Paris" of 1793 would probably have had no more decisive results -than the "On to Richmond" of 1861, had it been successful. Not -till enthusiasm has waned before sorrow, and strength failed under -exhaustion, does popular impulse, when deep and universal, acquiesce -in the logic of war. To such exhaustion France was brought when -Bonaparte took the helm. By his organizing genius he restored her -military strength, the material of which still remained, economized -such resources as the wastefulness of preceding governments had left, -and above all secured for her a further power of endurance by drawing -upon the life-blood of surrounding nations. So exhaustion was for the -time postponed; but, if the course of aggression which Bonaparte had -inherited from the Revolution was to continue, there were needed, not -the resources of the Continent only, but of the world. There was needed -also a diminution of ultimate resistance below the stored-up aggressive -strength of France; otherwise, however procrastinated, the time must -come when the latter should fail. - -On both these points Great Britain withstood Napoleon. She shut him -off from the world, and by the same act prolonged her own powers of -endurance beyond his power of aggression. This in the retrospect of -history was the function of Great Britain in the Revolutionary and -Napoleonic period; and that the successive ministries of Pitt and his -followers pursued the course best fitted, upon the whole, to discharge -that function, is their justification to posterity. It is the glory of -Pitt's genius that as he discovered the object, "Security," so likewise -he foresaw the means, Exhaustion, by which alone the French propaganda -of aggression would be brought to pause. The eloquent derision poured -upon his predictions of failure from financial exhaustion, from -expenditure of resources, from slackening of enthusiasm, recoils -from the apprehension of the truth. He saw clearly the line of Great -Britain's action, he foresaw the direction of events, he foretold the -issue. How long the line would be, how the course of events would be -retarded, how protracted the issue, he could not foretell, because no -man could foresee the supreme genius of Napoleon Bonaparte. - - - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] See, for instance, his letter to Lady Hamilton, Oct. 3, 1798 -(Disp., vol. iii. p. 140), which is but one of many similar expressions -in his correspondence. - -[2] Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 177. - -[3] In an entirely open country, without natural obstacles, there are -few or none of those strategic points, by occupying which in a central -position an inferior force is able to multiply its action against -the divided masses of the enemy. On the other hand, in a very broken -country, such as Switzerland, the number of important strategic points, -passes, heads of valleys, bridges, etc., are so multiplied, that either -some must be left unoccupied, or the defenders lose, by dissemination, -the advantage which concentration upon one or two controlling centres -usually confers. - -[4] See ante, vol. i. p. 313. - -[5] It is said that the old marshal on receiving these orders cried: -"This is the way armies are ruined." - -[6] Jomini, Guerres de la Rév. Fran., livre xv. p. 124. Martin, Hist. -de France depuis 1789, vol. iii. p. 50. It was just at this moment -that Nelson sent a division to the Gulf of Genoa to co-operate with -Suwarrow. (Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 431.) - -[7] The phrase is that of Thiers. Hist. de la Rév., vol. x. p. 353. - -[8] A curious evidence of the insecurity of the highways is afforded -by an ordinance issued by Bonaparte a year after he became First -Consul (Jan. 7, 1801), that no regular diligence should travel without -carrying a corporal and four privates, with muskets and twenty rounds, -and in addition, at night, two mounted gendarmes. If specie to the -value of over 50,000 francs were carried, there must be four gendarmes -by day and night. (Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 697.) - -[9] See _post_, Chapter XVII. - -[10] Speech of February 18, 1801. - -[11] Thiers, Cons. et Empire, vol. i., p. 332. - -[12] See ante, p, 251. - -[13] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 410. - -[14] Ibid., vol. vi. p. 497. - -[15] "Voyant bien," says M. Thiers, Bonaparte's panegyrist, "que Malta -ne pouvait pas tenir longtemps." (Cons. et Emp., vol. ii. p. 92.) - -[16] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 498. - -[17] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 520. - -[18] See vol. i. pp. 249, 256. - -[19] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 738, Jan. 21, 1801. - -[20] Contrast Bonaparte's reliance upon the aggregate numbers of Baltic -navies with Nelson's professional opinion when about to fight them. -"During the Council of War (March 31, 1801) certain difficulties were -started by some of the members relative to each of the three Powers -we should have to engage, either in succession or united, in those -seas. The number of the Russians was in particular represented as -formidable. Lord Nelson kept pacing the cabin, mortified at everything -which savored either of alarm or irresolution. When the above remark -was applied to the Swedes, he sharply observed, 'The more numerous the -better;' and when to the Russians, he repeatedly said, 'So much the -better; I wish they were twice as many,—the easier the victory, depend -on it.' He alluded, as he afterwards explained in private, to the total -want of tactique among the Northern fleets." (Col. Stewart's Narrative; -Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 301.) - -James, who was a careful investigator, estimates the allied Russian, -Swedish, and Danish navies in the Baltic at fifty-two sail, of -which not over forty-one were in condition for service, instead of -eighty-eight as represented by some writers. "It must have been a -very happy combination of circumstances," he adds, "that could have -assembled in one spot twenty-five of those forty-one; and against that -twenty-five of three different nations, all mere novices in naval -tactics, eighteen, or, with Nelson to command, fifteen British sail -were more than a match." (Nav. Hist., vol. iii. p. 43; ed. 1878.) - -[21] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 747. To Talleyrand, Jan. 27, 1801. - -[22] Nelson's Letters and Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 295. - -[23] While this work was going through the press, the author was -gratified to find in the life of the late distinguished admiral -Sir William Parker an anecdote of Nelson, which, as showing the -military ideas of that great sea-officer, is worth a dozen of the -"go straight at them" stories which pass current as embodying his -precepts. "Throughout the month of October, 1804, Toulon was frequently -reconnoitred, and the frigates 'Phoebe' and 'Amazon' were ordered to -cruise together. Previous to their going away Lord Nelson gave to -Captains Capel and Parker several injunctions, in case they should -get an opportunity of attacking two of the French frigates, which now -got under weigh more frequently. _The principal one was_ that they -should not each single out and attack an opponent, but 'that both -should endeavor together to take _one frigate_; if successful, chase -the other; but, if you do not take the second, still you have won a -victory and your country will gain a frigate.' Then half laughing, and -half snappishly, he said kindly to them as he wished them good-by, 'I -daresay you consider yourselves a couple of fine fellows, and when you -get away from me will do nothing of the sort, but think yourselves -wiser than I am!'" ("The Last of Nelson's Captains," by Admiral Sir -Augustus Phillimore, K. C. B., London, 1891, p. 122.) - -[24] Nels. Disp., vol. iv. p. 355. See also a very emphatic statement -of his views on the campaign, in a letter to Mr. Vansittart, p. 367. - -[25] Nelson's Disp., April 9, 1801, vol. iv. pp. 339 and 341. - -[26] The Danes were moored with their heads to the southward. - -[27] If Nelson had an _arrière pensée_ in sending the flag, he -never admitted it, before or after, to friend or foe. "Many of my -friends," he wrote a month after the battle, "thought it a _ruse de -guerre_ and not quite justifiable. Very few attribute it to the cause -that I felt, and which I trust in God I shall retain to the last -moment,—_humanity_." He then enlarges upon the situation, and says that -the wounded Danes in the prizes were receiving half the shot fired by -the shore batteries. (Nels. Disp., vol. iv., p. 360.) - -[28] April 20, 1801. Nels. Disp., vol. iv. p. 355, note. - -[29] Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. ii. p. 43, 1st -edition. - -[30] Having destroyed Copenhagen, we had done our worst, and not much -nearer being friends.—_Nels. Disp._, vol. iv. p. 361. - -[31] The second embargo was laid on Nov. 7, 1800, for the sole purpose -of enforcing the surrender of Malta to Russia. (Annual Register, 1800; -State Papers, p. 253.) It antedated by six weeks the declaration of -Armed Neutrality, by which the other powers, on the plea of neutral -rights, agreed to arm. (Ibid., p. 260.) In fact, the other powers -urged upon Great Britain that the Russian sequestration being on -account of Malta, they had no share in it, and so were not subjects -for retaliation; ignoring that they had chosen that moment to come to -Russia's support. - -[32] Annual Register, 1801; State Papers, p. 246. - -[33] Nels. Disp., vol. iv., pp. 349, 352. - -[34] Ibid., p. 349; also see p. 379. - -[35] Ibid., vol. iv. p. 416. - -[36] Nels. Disp., vol. iv. p. 373. - -[37] For the important bearings of this stipulation, which was made -as an additional and explanatory declaration to the main convention -(Annual Register, 1801; State Papers, p. 217), see _post_, Chapter XVI. -It was a matter in which Russia, not being a carrier, had no interest. - -[38] For instance, Thiers, H. Martin, and Lanfrey. - -[39] Corr. de Nap. vol. vii. p. 25. - -[40] Corr. de Nap. vol. vii. p. 47. - -[41] For full particulars of Bonaparte's views for the ships in Brest, -which then contained the large body of Spaniards brought back by Bruix -the previous August, see Corr. de Nap. vol. vi. pp. 181, 186. It must -be remembered that there was then practically no French line-of-battle -force in the Mediterranean. - -[42] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. pp. 262, 263. - -[43] The advantage of the close watch is also shown by the perplexity -arising when an enemy's squadron did escape. In this case, seven -ships-of-the-line were detached from the Channel fleet in chase of -Ganteaume, but "owing to lack of information" they were sent to the -West Indies instead of the Mediterranean. (James, vol. iii. p. 73.) The -latter was sufficiently controlled by Keith with seven sail-of-the-line -in the Levant, and Warren with five before Cadiz, to which he joined -two more at Minorca. - -[44] See _ante_, vol. i. p. 68, for particulars. - -[45] In the above the attempt has been merely to summarize the rapid -succession of events, and the orders issuing from Bonaparte's intensely -active mind to meet the varying situations. Reference may be made by -the student to his correspondence, vol. vi. pp. 719, 729, 745; vol. -vii. pp. 4, 24-26, 69-73, 125, 144, 164, 197, 198. - -[46] This ship, the "St. Antoine," was one of those ceded to France by -Spain. - -[47] Ross's Life of Saumarez, vol. ii. p. 21. - -[48] March 2, 1801. Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 72. - -[49] The treaty was signed June 6, and ratified June 16. (Ann. Reg. -1801; State Papers, p. 351.) Bonaparte received his copy June 15. -(Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 215.) - -[50] Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 256. - -[51] Ibid., p. 266. - -[52] See ante, p. 60. - -[53] Ann. Reg. 1801; State Papers, p. 257. - -[54] Paul I. had particularly held to the preservation of Naples -and the restitution of Piedmont to the king of Sardinia. On April -12 the first consul heard of Paul's death, and the same day issued -an order making Piedmont a military division of France. This was -purposely antedated to April 2. (Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 147.) -Talleyrand was notified that this was a first, though tentative, step -to incorporation. If the Prussian minister remonstrated, he was to -reply that France had not discussed the affairs of Italy with the king -of Prussia. (Ibid., p. 153.) Alexander was civilly told that Paul's -interest in the Italian princes was considered to be personal, not -political. (Ibid., p. 169.) The Russian ambassador, however, a month -later haughtily reminded Talleyrand that his mission depended upon the -"kings of Sardinia and the Two Sicilies being again put in possession -of the states which they possessed before the irruption of the French -troops into Italy." (Ann. Reg., 1801; State Papers, pp. 340-342) -Liguria (Genoa) was also made a military division of France by order -dated April 18. (Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 162.) - -[55] While refusing this in his instructions to the French negotiator, -the latter was informed he might yield it, if necessary. (Corr. de -Nap., vol. vii., pp. 255-258.) - -[56] Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 323. - -[57] Parliamentary History, vol. xxxvi. p. 47. - -[58] Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. iii. p. 377. - -[59] Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. i. p. 396. - -[60] Speech of Nov. 3, 1801. - -[61] Annual Register 1801, p. 280. - -[62] See ante, p. 70. - -[63] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. pp. 509, 511. - -[64] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 511. - -[65] The slightest delay under these circumstances is very prejudicial, -and may be of great consequence to our squadrons and naval -expeditions.—_Corr. de Nap._, March 11, 1802. - -[66] Corr. de Nap., March 12, 1802, vol. vii. p. 522. - -[67] Ibid., April 3, 1802, vol. vii. p. 543. - -[68] Corr. de Nap., July 1, 1802, vol. vii. p. 641. - -[69] Ibid., April 13, 1801, vol. vii. p. 153. - -[70] Ibid., April 18, 1801, vol. vii. p. 162. - -[71] Corr. de Nap., August 2, 1802, vol. vii. p. 696. - -[72] Ibid., vol. vii. pp. 528, 544. - -[73] Ibid., vol. vii. p. 578. - -[74] Decree of Nov. 19, 1792. - -[75] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., livre xv. p. 38. - -[76] Ibid., livre xv. pp. 50, 51. - -[77] Ibid., xvi. p. 234. - -[78] Note Verbale. Remonstrance addressed to the French government. -(Ann. Reg. 1802; State Papers, p. 675.) - -[79] Lord Hawkesbury's speech; Parl. Hist., vol. xxxvi. p. 971. - -[80] Parl. Hist., vol. xxxvi. p. 1380. - -[81] Annual Register, 1803, p. 681. - -[82] Secret Instructions to Lord Whitworth; Yonge's Life of Lord -Liverpool, vol. i. p. 93. - -[83] Adams, Hist. of the United States, 1801-1817, vol. ii. pp. 13-21. - -[84] The San Domingo expedition cost the lives of over twenty-five -thousand French soldiers. - -[85] The British ambassador in Paris reached the same conclusion from -the instructions sent by Talleyrand to the French envoy in London. "It -appears from this note that this government is not desirous to proceed -to extremities; that is to say, it is not prepared to do so." (March -18; Parl. Hist., vol. xxxvi. p. 1315.) The United States minister in -Paris also wrote, March 24, "Here there is an earnest and sincere -desire to avoid war, as well in the government as the people." (Am. -State Papers, ii. 549.) - -[86] Instructions to Duroc, March 12, 1803, Corr. de Nap., vol. viii. -pp. 307-311. It is noteworthy that these instructions were issued the -same day that was received in Paris information of the king's message -to Parliament of March 8, that "in consequence of military preparations -in the ports of France and Holland he had adopted additional measures -of precaution." Two days later the militia was called out. - -[87] Corr. de Nap., vol. viii. p. 308. - -[88] Parl. Hist., vol. xxxvi. p. 1293. - -[89] Speech of May 23, 1803. - -[90] Naval Chronicle, vol. ix. pp. 243, 247, 329, 330, 332, 491. - -[91] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 553. - -[92] Ibid. - -[93] In case of war, it was the purpose of the British government to -send an expedition to occupy New Orleans, as it did afterwards in 1814. -(Am. State papers, vol. ii. pp. 551, 557.) - -[94] Napoleon to Talleyrand; Corr. de Nap., May 13, 1803. - -[95] Thiers, Consulat et Empire, livre xx. p. 182. - -[96] The French republic had devoured under the form of assignats an -immense amount of national property.—THIERS: _Cons. et Emp._, livre -xvii. p. 377. - -[97] "Holland," says Thiers, "would have wished to remain neutral; -but the first consul had taken a resolution, _whose justice cannot be -denied_, to make every maritime nation aid in our strife against Great -Britain." (Cons. et Emp., livre xvii. p. 383.) - -[98] Metternich's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 48, note. - -[99] Chénier's Vie du Maréchal Davout, Paris, 1866. - -[100] See Naval Chronicle, vol. x. pp. 508, 510; vol. xi. p. 81. -Nelson's Dispatches, vol. v. p. 438. - -[101] Pellew's Life of Lord Sidmouth, vol. ii. p. 237. - -[102] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 452. - -[103] Parl. Debates, March 15, 1804. - -[104] Mémoires du Duc de Raguse, vol. ii. p. 212. - -[105] Nelson's Disp. and Letters, vol. iv pp. 444-447. - -[106] Nelson's Disp., vol. iv. p 500. - -[107] James, Nav. Hist., vol. iii. p. 212 (ed. 1878). - -[108] See Cobbett's Reg., vol. v. pp. 442, 443, for some very sensible -remarks on Pitt's attack, written by Cobbett himself. - -[109] Stanhope's Pitt, vol. iv. p. 94. - -[110] Parl. Debates, 1804, p. 892. - -[111] Nels. Disp., vol. v. p. 283. - -[112] Ibid., p. 306. - -[113] Ibid., p. 174. The following references also show conditions of -Nelson's ships: vol. v. pp. 179, 211, 306, 307, 319, 334; vol. vi. pp. -38, 84, 99, 100, 103, 134, 158. - -[114] Corr. de Nap., vol. viii. p. 657. - -[115] Corr. de Nap., vol. ix. p. 168. - -[116] Nels. Disp., vol. v. pp. 115, 136. - -[117] "It is at best but a guess," to use his own words, "and the world -attaches wisdom to him that guesses right." (Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. -193.) - -[118] See Nels. Disp., vol. v. pp. 179, 185, 247, 309, 374. - -[119] Nels. Disp., vol. v. p. 309. - -[120] Ibid., p. 374. - -[121] Ibid., p. 388. - -[122] Ibid., pp. 405, 411. - -[123] Ibid., p. 498. - -[124] Ibid., p. 411. - -[125] Ibid., p. 300. - -[126] Nels. Disp., vol. v. p. 306. - -[127] Ibid., pp. 253, 254. - -[128] Ibid., p. 438. - -[129] Ibid., p. 388. - -[130] Ibid., p. 395. - -[131] See Nels. Disp., vol. v. pp. 145, 162, 413; vol. vi. pp. 84, 328, -329. - -[132] Corr. de. Nap., vol. ix. p. 226. - -[133] Corr. de Nap., vol. ix. p. 475. - -[134] Ibid., p 513. - -[135] Ibid., Sept. 12, 1804. - -[136] Corr. de Nap., vol. ix. p. 700, Sept. 29, 1804. - -[137] The former Spanish part of the island was still in the hands of -France. - -[138] Corr. de Nap., Sept. 27 and 29, 1804. - -[139] For Bonaparte's attitude toward Spain, see two letters to -Talleyrand, Aug. 14 and 16, 1803; Corr. de Nap. vol. viii. pp. 580-585. - -[140] Signed Oct. 19, 1803. (Combate Naval de Trafalgar, by D. José? de -Couto, p. 79.) - -[141] Parl. Debates, 1805, vol. iii. p. 70. - -[142] Parl. Debates, 1805, vol. iii. p. 72. - -[143] Ibid., p. 372. - -[144] Ibid., p. 81. - -[145] Jan. 24, 1804. Ibid., p. 85. - -[146] Ibid., p. 89. - -[147] Ibid. - -[148] Ibid., pp. 85, 89. - -[149] For some account of the advantages to French privateers arising -from this use of Spanish ports, with interesting particulars, see Naval -Chronicle, vol. xiii. p. 76. In March, 1804, Spain prohibited the sale -of prizes in her ports. - -[150] Parl. Debates, 1805, vol. iii. p. 86. - -[151] Corr. de Nap. vol. ix. p. 482. - -[152] Parl. Debates, 1805, vol. iii. p. 93. - -[153] Ibid., p. 122. - -[154] Ibid., pp. 95, 122. - -[155] Thiers, Cons. et Emp. livre xvii. pp. 383, 384. - -[156] Pitt's Speech of February 11, 1805. - -[157] D. José de Couto, Combate Naval de Trafalgar (Madrid, 1851), pp. -83, 89. - -[158] Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 240. This letter was not sent, Nelson -soon after receiving the Admiralty's order. - -[159] Jurien de la Gravière, Revue des Deux Mondes, Oct. 1887, p. 611. - -[160] Correspondance de Napoléon, vol. x. pp. 79-97. - -[161] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. vi. p. 333. - -[162] After writing these words the author noted Nelson's opinion -to the same effect: "Had they not been crippled, nothing could -have hindered our meeting them on January 21, off the south end of -Sardinia." (Dispatches, vol. vi. p. 354.) - -[163] For Villeneuve's opinion see Chevalier's Hist. de la Mar. Fran. -sous l'Empire, p. 134; for Nelson's, Disp. vol. vi. pp. 334, 339. - -[164] Corr. de Nap., vol. ix. p. 701. - -[165] Ibid., Jan. 16, 1805. - -[166] Compare with Nelson's views on attacking Russian fleet, _ante_, -p. 46. - -[167] Corr. de Nap., April 29, 1805, vol. x. p. 443. - -[168] Letter to Pitt by Robert Francis; Castlereagh's Memoirs, vol. v. -p. 444. The whole letter is most suggestive, not to say prophetic. From -internal indications it is extremely probable that the writer of these -letters, signed Robert Francis, was Robert Fulton, though the fact is -not mentioned in any of his biographies. - -[169] Mémoires du Duc de Raguse, vol. ii. p. 261. - -[170] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., vol. v. p. 413. - -[171] Barrow's Autobiography, p. 263. - -[172] Ibid. Nav. Chron., vol. xiii. p. 328. - -[173] The above account depends mainly upon the "Naval Chronicle" for -April 15, 1805; vol. xiii. pp. 365-367,—checked by James and other -sources. - -[174] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 227. - -[175] So in the orders, Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 232. At a later date -this rendezvous is spoken of by Napoleon as in the Cape de Verde. -(Corr. de Nap., vol. xi. p. 50.) A singular confusion in such important -orders. - -[176] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 447. - -[177] Ibid., 324. - -[178] Nels. Disp., vol. vi. pp. 338-341. - -[179] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. vi. p. 397. - -[180] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous l'Empire, p. 142. - -[181] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. vi. pp. 410, 411, 415. - -[182] See _ante_, p. 142. Missiessy sailed from the West Indies in the -same week that Villeneuve sailed for them. - -[183] Corr. de Nap., April 13, 1805, vol. x. p. 390. - -[184] Ibid., April 20 and 23. - -[185] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 394. - -[186] Ibid., p. 490. - -[187] Ibid., p. 571. - -[188] Ibid., p. 616. - -[189] Ibid., p. 624. - -[190] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 708. - -[191] For example, Thiers, Cons. et Emp., liv. xx. p. 178; Jurien de la -Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. ii. p. 224 (first edition). - -[192] Corr. de Nap., vol. xi. p. 162. - -[193] Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 401. In a former work ("The Influence -of Sea Power upon History," p. 23), the author casually spoke of this -as a false step, into which Nelson had been misled. A closer study has -convinced him that the British admiral did quite right. - -[194] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 624. Compare this with Nelson's remark, -just quoted. - -[195] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 624. - -[196] Ibid., June 22, 1805, p. 686. - -[197] Nap. to Decrès, May 10, 1805. - -[198] Corr. de Nap., June 9, p. 624. - -[199] Annual Register, 1805, p. 225; Naval Chronicle, vol. xiii. p. 399. - -[200] Naval Chronicle, vol. xiii. p. 484. The expression "_balayer -la Manche_"—sweep the Channel—is far stronger than the Chronicle's -translation, which is preserved in the quotation. - -[201] Apparently a prize. (Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 410.) - -[202] Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 411. - -[203] Ibid., Sept. 6, 1804. - -[204] Corr. de Nap., June 28, 1805, vol. x. p. 708. - -[205] Ibid., p. 705. - -[206] Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 457. - -[207] Ibid., p. 45. - -[208] Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 459. - -[209] On this date is the first intimation of Nelson's sailing as known -to Napoleon. June 27, he writes, "I do not clearly see where Nelson has -been." (Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 701.) - -[210] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. April 23 and May 4, 1805, pp. 420, 465. - -[211] Ibid., May 24, p. 544. - -[212] Ibid., May 29, pp. 563, 624. - -[213] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. June 22, p. 686. - -[214] Ibid., p. 545. - -[215] See, for his reasoning, letter of June 16, three days after -leaving Antigua; and also, for his uncertainty after reaching Europe, -July 18. (Nels. Disp., vol. vi. pp. 457, 473.) - -[216] Naval Chronicle, vol. xiv. p. 64. - -[217] Napoleon to Decrès, July 18, 1805. - -[218] Naval Chronicle, vol. xiv. p. 64. - -[219] Barrow's Autobiography, pp. 276-290. - -[220] See _ante_, p. 162. - -[221] Napoleon to Berthier, Decrès, and Ganteaume, July 20, 1805. - -[222] Napoleon to Decrès, July 27, 1805. - -[223] Calder's Defence, Naval Chronicle, vol. xv. p. 167. The words -quoted, frequently repeated in different terms, embody the spirit of -the whole paper. - -[224] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous l'Emp., p. 171. Couto (Combate de -Trafalgar, p. 107) gives a very serious account of the injuries -suffered by the four remaining Spanish ships. - -[225] Nelson's Disp., vol. vi. p. 457. - -[226] Nelson's Disp., vol. vii. p. 16. - -[227] Corr. de Napoléon, July 16, 1805. - -[228] The harbors of Ferrol, Coruña, and a third called Betanzos, are -inlets having a common entrance from the sea. - -[229] See Napoleon's letters to Decrès, Allemand, and others, July 26, -1805. - -[230] Napoleon to Decrès, August 29. - -[231] Napoleon to Talleyrand, Dec. 18, 1799. "Frame your reply to Genoa -in such terms as to leave us free to incorporate the Ligurian Republic -with France, within a few months." - -[232] Stanhope's Pitt, vol. iv. p. 318. - -[233] Napoleon to Talleyrand, July 31, 1805. - -[234] Ibid., August 13. - -[235] Napoleon to Villeneuve, August 13. - -[236] Napoleon to Decrès, August 14. - -[237] Twenty-nine only of the line. - -[238] Chevalier, Marine Française sous l'Empire, p. 180. - -[239] Collingwood's Correspondence, August 21, 1805. - -[240] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., livre xxii. pp. 125, 128. - -[241] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., livre xxviii. p. 233. - -[242] Napoleon to St. Cyr, Sept. 2, 1805. - -[243] Napoleon to Decrès, Sept. 15. - -[244] Ibid., Sept. 4. - -[245] Nels. Disp., vol. vii. p. 80. - -[246] Fyffe's History of Modern Europe, vol. i. p. 281. - -[247] To the King of Wurtemburg, April 2, 1811; Corr., vol. xxii. p. 19. - -[248] Life of Sir Wm. Parker, vol. i. p. 39. Ross's Life of Lord de -Saumarez, vol. ii. p. 214. Naval Chronicle, Plymouth Report, Dec. 10, -1800. - -[249] Message of Directory to Council of Five Hundred, Jan., 1799; -Moniteur, An 7, p. 482. - -[250] McArthur, Financial and Political Facts of the Eighteenth -Century, London, 1801, p. 308. Norman (Corsairs of France, London, -1887, App.) gives the number of French privateers taken in the same -period as 556. - -[251] Sir J. Barrow, then a Secretary to the Admiralty, mentions in -a letter to J. W. Croker, July 18, 1810, that two colliers had been -captured in sight of Ramsgate, close under the North Foreland; and on -July 27 an ordnance hoy taken close under Galloper Light, in the face -of the whole squadron in the Downs, not one of which moved. (Croker's -Diary, vol. i. p. 33) - -[252] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxiv. p. 327. For further curious -particulars concerning French privateering in the narrow seas, see Nav. -Chron., vol. xxii. p. 279; vol. xxiv. pp. 327, 448, 460-462, 490; vol. -xxv. pp. 32-34, 44, 203, 293; vol. xxvii. pp. 102, 237. - -[253] See, for example, the account of the privateer captain, Jean -Blackeman Nav. Chron., vol. xii. p. 454. - -[254] Naval Chronicle, vol. ii. p. 535; vol. iii. p. 151. - -[255] In 1806, on the Jamaica station alone, were captured by the -British forty-eight public or private armed vessels, two of which were -frigates, the rest small. (Nav. Chron., vol. xvii. pp. 255, 337.) - -[256] American State Papers, vol. ii. pp. 670, 771. - -[257] James (Naval Hist., ed. 1878, vol. iii. p. 249) says that though -denominated 1,200-ton ships, the registered tonnage of most exceeds -1,300, and in some cases amounts to 1,500 tons. - -[258] Nav. Chronicle, vol. vi. p. 251. - -[259] Brenton's Naval Hist. (first ed.) vol. i. p. 346. Low's Indian -Navy, vol. i. 204. - -[260] Low's Indian Navy, vol. i. 205. Milburn's Oriental Commerce, vol. -i. 405. - -[261] The premium of insurance, which had in 1782 been fifteen guineas -per cent on ships engaged in the trade with China and India, did not -exceed half that rate at any period between the spring of 1793 and the -end of the struggle. (Lindsay's Merchant Shipping, vol. ii. 265. See -also Chalmer's Historical View, pp. 308-310.) - -[262] Letter of Bombay merchants to Sir Edward Pellew; Nav. Chron., -vol. xxiii. 107. - -[263] Robert Surcouf, by J. K. Laughton; Colburn's United Service -Magazine, 1883, part i. pp. 331, 332. - -[264] Milburn's Oriental Commerce, vol. i. p. xci. - -[265] Naval Chronicle, vol. vii. 276. - -[266] Naval Chronicle, vol. iv. pp. 150, 151, 326. - -[267] Registration of vessels made in all ports of France (except the -newly acquired departments) from September 1793, to September 1796:— - - Under 30 tons 3,351 (undecked) - Between 30 and 100 tons 1,897 - " 100 and 200 tons 532 - " 200 and 400 tons 193 - Above 400 tons 55 - ‒‒‒‒‒ - 6,028 - -It should be explained that as all ships, old as well as new, had to -register, this gives the total of French shipping without deduction for -losses. - -[268] Moniteur, 26 Floréal, An 9 (May 16, 1801). - -[269] Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. 359. - -[270] Cobbett's Parl. Debates, March 15, 1804, p. 921. - -[271] Naval Chronicle, vol. xvii. p. 369. - -[272] Norman gives the total number of captures, 1793-1800, as 5,158 -against Lloyd's 3,639. Through the kindness of Captain H. M. Hozier, -Secretary of Lloyd's, the author has received a list of British ships -taken, annually, 1793-1814. This list makes the numbers considerably -less than the earlier one used in the text. By it, between 1793 and -1800, both inclusive, only 3,466 British ships were captured. - -[273] Moniteur, 16 Pluviôse, An 7 (Feb. 5, 1799), pp. 582, 583. - -[274] Guérin gives the total number of captures by France from Great -Britain, from 1793 to the Peace of Amiens, March 25, 1802, including -both ships of war and merchant vessels, as 2,172; while the French -lost in all, from ships-of-the-line to fishing-boats, between 1,520 -and 1,550. Of this total, 27 were ships-of-the-line and 70 frigates,—a -number considerably below that given by James, the painstaking -English naval historian. Allowing 150 as the number of smaller naval -vessels taken, there would remain, by Guérin's estimate, about 1,300 -French trading vessels which fell into British hands. Of these a -large proportion must have been the chasse-marées that carried on the -coasting trade (as their expressive name implies); attacks on which -formed so frequent and lucrative a diversion from the monotony of -blockade service. (Hist. Mar de la France, vol. iii. p. 674.) - -Guérin claims great carefulness, but the author owns to much distrust -of his accuracy. It is evident, however, from all the quotations, that -Fox's statement, May 24, 1795, that in the second year of the war -France had taken 860 ships, was much exaggerated. (Speeches, vol. v. p. -419. Longman's, 1815.) - -[275] In this period of twenty-two years there were eighteen months of -maritime peace. - -[276] Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. - -[277] Thus it is told of one of the most active of French -privateersmen, sailing out of Dunkirk, that "the trade from London to -Berwick, in the smacks, was his favorite object; not only from the -value of the cargoes, but because they required few hands to man them, -and from their good sailing were almost sure to escape British cruisers -and get safely into ports of France or Holland." Between 1793 and 1801 -this one man had taken thirty-four prizes. (Nav. Chron., vol. xii. p. -454.) - -[278] Returns of the coasting trade were not made until 1824. Porter's -Progress of the Nation, section iii. p. 77. - -[279] The merchant vessels of that day were generally small. From -Macpherson's tables it appears that those trading between Great Britain -and the United States, between 1792 and 1800, averaged from 200 to 230 -tons; those to the West Indies and the Baltic about 250; to Germany, -to Italy, and the Western Mediterranean, 150; to the Levant, 250 to -300, with some of 500 tons. The East India Company's ships, as has been -said, were larger, averaging nearly 800 tons. The general average is -reduced to that above given (125) by the large number of vessels in -the Irish trade. In 1796 there were 13,558 entries and clearances from -English and Scotch ports for Ireland, being more than half the entire -number (not tonnage) of British ships employed in so-called foreign -trade. The average size of these was only 80 tons. (Macpherson.) In -1806 there were 13,939 for Ireland to 5,211 for all other parts of the -world, the average tonnage again being 80. (Porter's Progress of the -Nation, part ii. pp. 85, 174.) - -Sir William Parker, an active frigate captain, who commanded the same -ship from 1801 to 1811, was in that period interested in 52 prizes. The -average tonnage of these, excluding a ship-of-the-line and a frigate, -was 126 tons. (Life, vol. i. p. 412.) - -In 1798, 6,844 coasters entered or left London, their average size -being 73 tons. The colliers were larger. Of the latter 3,289 entered -or sailed, having a mean tonnage of 228. (Colquhoun's Commerce of the -Thames, p. 13.) - -[280] The returns for 1813 were destroyed by fire, and so an exact -aggregate cannot be given. Two million tons are allowed for that year, -which is probably too little. - -[281] Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. 368, 535. - -[282] Porter's Progress of the Nation, part ii. p. 171. - -[283] Chalmer's Historical View, p. 307. - -[284] Porter, part ii. p. 173. The Naval Chronicle, vol. xxix. p. -453, gives an official tabular statement of prize-vessels admitted -to registry between 1793 and 1812. In 1792 there were but 609, total -tonnage 93,994. - -[285] Chalmer's Historical View, p. 351. - -[286] The amounts given are those known as the "official values," -assigned arbitrarily to the specific articles a century before. The -advantage attaching to this system is, that, no fluctuation of price -entering as a factor, the values continue to represent from year to -year the proportion of trade done. Official values are used throughout -this chapter when not otherwise stated. The "real values," deduced from -current prices, were generally much greater than the official. Thus, in -1800, the whole volume of trade, by official value £73,723,000, was by -real value £111,231,000. The figures are taken from Macpherson's Annals -of Commerce. - -[287] The French will not suffer a Power which seeks to found its -prosperity upon the misfortunes of other states, to raise its commerce -upon the ruin of that of other states, and which, aspiring to the -dominion of the seas, wishes to introduce everywhere the articles of -its own manufacture and to receive nothing from foreign industry, any -longer to enjoy the fruit of its guilty speculations.—_Message of -Directory to the Council of Five Hundred_, Jan. 4, 1798. - -[288] Message of Directory to Council of Five Hundred, Jan. 4, 1798. - -[289] The act imposing these duties went into effect Aug. 15, 1789. -Vessels built in the United States, and owned by her citizens, paid -an entrance duty of six cents per ton; all other vessels fifty cents. -A discount of ten per cent on the established duties was also allowed -upon articles imported in vessels built and owned in the country. -(Annals of Congress. First Congress, pp. 2131, 2132.) - -[290] Am. State Papers, vol. x. 502. - -[291] Ibid., p. 389. - -[292] Ibid., p. 528. - -[293] Ibid., p. 584. - -[294] Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. 535. - -[295] Am. State Papers, vol. i. 243. - -[296] Annual Register, 1793, p. 346*. - -[297] Am. State Papers, i. 240. A complete series of the orders -injuriously affecting United States commerce, issued by Great Britain -and France, from 1791 to 1808, can be found in the Am. State Papers, -vol. iii. p. 262. - -[298] Am. State Papers, i. 240, 241. How probable this result was may -be seen from the letters of Gouverneur Morris, Oct. 19, 1793, and March -6, 1794. State Papers, vol. i. pp. 375, 404. - -[299] Am. State Papers, vol. i. p. 679. - -[300] Wheaton's International Law, p. 753. - -[301] Monroe to the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. Am. State -Papers, vol. ii. p. 735. - -[302] Reply to "War in Disguise, or Frauds of the Neutral Flag," by -Gouverneur Morris, New York, 1806, p. 22. - -[303] Russell's Life of Fox, vol. ii. p. 281. - -[304] Letter to Danish Minister, March 17, 1807. Cobbett's Parl. -Debates, vol. x. p. 406. - -[305] A letter from an American consul in the West Indies, dated March -7, 1794, gives 220 as the number. This was, however, only a partial -account, the orders having been recently received. (Am. State Papers, -i. p. 429.) - -[306] By the ordinance of Aug. 30, 1784. See Annals of Congress, Jan. -13, 1794, p. 192. - -[307] The National Convention, immediately after the outbreak of war, -on the 17th of February, 1793, gave a great extension to the existing -permission of trade between the United States and the French colonies; -but this could not affect the essential fact that the trade, under some -conditions, had been allowed in peace. - -[308] In fact Monroe, in another part of the same letter, avows: -"The doctrine of Great Britain in every decision is the same.... -Every departure from it is claimed as a relaxation of the principle, -gratuitously conceded by Great Britain." - -[309] Mr. Jay seems to have been under some misapprehension in this -matter, for upon his return he wrote to the Secretary of State: "The -treaty does prohibit re-exportation from the United States of West -India commodities in neutral vessels; ... but we may carry them direct -from French and other West India islands to Europe." (Am. State Papers, -i. 520.) This the treaty certainly did not admit. - -[310] See letter of Thos. Fitzsimmons, Am. State Papers, vol. ii. 347. - -[311] The pretexts for these seizures seem usually to have been the -alleged contraband character of the cargoes. - -[312] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. 345. - -[313] It will be remembered that the closing days of May witnessed the -culmination of the death struggle between the Jacobins and Girondists, -and that the latter finally fell on the second of June. - -[314] Am. State Papers, vol. i. pp. 284, 286, 748. - -[315] Ibid., p. 372. - -[316] One of these complaints was that the United States now prohibited -the sale, in her ports, of prizes taken from the British by French -cruisers. This practice, not accorded by the treaty with France, and -which had made an unfriendly distinction against Great Britain, was -forbidden by Jay's treaty. - -[317] Speech of M. Dentzel in the Conseil des Anciens. Moniteur, An 7, -p. 555. - -[318] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 28. - -[319] Ibid., vol. ii. p. 163. - -[320] Letter to Talleyrand, Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 178. - -[321] Ibid., vol. i. pp. 740, 748. - -[322] The day after the news of Rivoli was received, Mr. Pinckney, who -had remained in Paris, though unrecognized, was curtly directed to -leave France. - -[323] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 13. - -[324] Ibid., p. 14. - -[325] American State Papers, vol. ii. p. 14. - -[326] Moniteur, An v. pp. 164, 167. - -[327] March 1, and October 8, 1793. Ibid. - -[328] Speech of Lecouteulx; Moniteur, An v. p. 176. - -[329] Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. 463. - -[330] Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. 413, note. - -[331] Of the imports into Germany, three fifths were foreign -merchandise re-exported from Great Britain. - -[332] These figures are all taken from Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, -vol. iv. - -[333] See Am. State Papers, vol. x. p. 487. - -[334] The importance of the West India region to the commercial system -of Great Britain in the last decade of the 18th century will be seen -from the following table, showing the distribution per cent of British -trade in 1792 and 1800:— - - Imports from, Exports to, - 1792. 1800. 1792. 1800. - - British West Indies 20 28 11 10 - United States 5 7 17 15 - Russia 9 8 3 2 - Germany and Prussia 5 12 9 31 - France, Belgium, and Holland 8 4 15 12 - Mediterranean 7 2 6 2 - Spain and Portugal 9 5 6 3 - Ireland 13 7 9 9 - Asia (not Levant) 14 16 10 7 - Miscellaneous 10 11 14 9 - ‒‒‒ ‒‒‒ ‒‒‒ ‒‒‒ - 100 100 100 100 - -The significance of these figures lies not only in the amounts set -down directly to the West Indies, but also in the great increase of -exports to Germany, and the high rate maintained to France, Belgium, -and Holland, with which war existed. Of these exports 25 per cent in -1792, and 43 per cent in 1800, were foreign merchandise, chiefly West -Indian—_re-exported_. - -[335] In 1800 the captured islands sent 9 per cent of the British -imports. - -[336] Moniteur, An vii. pp 478, 482. - -[337] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 8. - -[338] Moniteur, An vii. p. 502. - -[339] Ibid., p. 716; Couzard's speech. - -[340] Moniteur, An vii. p. 555; Dentzel's speech. - -[341] Ibid.; Lenglet's speech. - -[342] Ibid., pp. 582, 583. The figures are chiefly taken from the -speech of M. Arnould. A person of the same name, who was Chef du Bureau -du Commerce, published in 1797 a book called "Système Maritime et -Politique des Européens," containing much detailed information about -French maritime affairs, and displaying bitter hatred of England. If -the deputy himself was not the author, he doubtless had access to the -best official intelligence. - -[343] In consequence of the law of Jan. 18, 1798, the British -government appointed a ship-of-the-line and two frigates to convoy a -fleet of American vessels to their own coast.—_Macpherson's Annals of -Commerce_, vol. iv. p. 440. - -[344] Moniteur, An vii. p. 564; Cornet's speech. - -[345] Annals of Congress, 1798, p. 3733. - -[346] Ibid., p. 3754. - -[347] Ibid. - -[348] Speech of February 2, 1801. - -[349] Speech of March 25, 1801. - -[350] Annual Register, 1801; State Papers, p. 212. - -[351] Ibid., p. 217. - -[352] The _principle_ of the Rule of 1756, it will be remembered, was -that the neutral had no right to carry on, for a belligerent, a trade -from which the latter excluded him in peace. - -[353] By a report submitted to the National Convention, July 3, 1793, -it appears that in the years 1787-1789 two tenths only of French -commerce was done in French bottoms. In 1792, the last of maritime -peace, three tenths was carried by French ships. (Moniteur, 1793, p. -804.) - -[354] Moniteur, An vii. p. 582; Arnould's speech. - -[355] Annual Register, 1804. State Papers, p. 286. - -[356] The exports of the French West India islands in 1788 amounted to -$52,000,000, of which $40,000,000 were from San Domingo alone. (Traité -d'Économie Politique et de Commerce des Colonies, par P. F. Page. -Paris, An 9 (1800) p. 15.) This being for the time almost wholly lost, -the effect upon prices can be imagined. - -[357] An American vessel arrived in Marblehead May 29, landed her -cargo on the 30th and 31st, reloaded, and cleared June 3. (Robinson's -Admiralty Reports, vol. v. p. 396.) - -[358] In the case of the brig "Aurora," Mr. Madison, the Secretary of -State, wrote: "The duties were paid or secured, according to law, in -like manner as they are required to be secured on a like cargo meant -for home consumption; when re-shipped, the duties were drawn back with -a deduction of three and a half per cent (on them), as is permitted to -imported articles in all cases." (Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 732.) - -In the case of the American ship "William," captured and sent in, on -duties to the amount of $1,239 the drawback was $1,211. (Robinson's -Admiralty Reports, vol. v. p. 396.) In the celebrated case of the -"Essex," with which began the seizures in 1804, on duties amounting to -$5,278, the drawback was $5,080. (Ibid., 405.) - -[359] The text of the Berlin decree can be found among the series -beginning in American State Papers, vol. iii. p. 262. - -[360] A curious indication of the dependence of the Continent upon -British manufactures is afforded by the fact that the French army, -during this awful winter, was clad and shod with British goods, -imported by the French minister at Hamburg, in face of the Berlin -decree. (Bourrienne's Memoirs, vol. vii. p. 292.) - -[361] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 805. - -[362] Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. xiii. Appendix, pp. xxxiv-xlv. - -[363] Thiers, Consulat et Empire, vol. vii. pp. 666-669. - -[364] Letter of Lord Howick to Mr. Monroe, Jan. 10, 1807; Am. State -Papers, vol. iii. p. 5. - -[365] President's Message to Congress, Oct. 27, 1807; Am. State Papers, -vol. iii. p. 5. - -[366] Correspondance de Napoléon. - -[367] British Declaration of September 25, 1807,—a paper which ably and -completely vindicates the action of Great Britain; Annual Register, -1807, p. 735. - -[368] Annual Register, 1807. State Papers, p. 771. - -[369] Ibid., p. 739. - -[370] Lanfrey's Napoleon (French ed.), vol. iv. p. 153. - -[371] Corr. de Nap., vol. xv. p. 659. - -[372] Annual Register, 1807, p. 777. - -[373] See, for example, Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. viii. pp. 636 -and 641-644; vol. ix. p. 87, petition of West India planters; p. 100, -speech of Mr. Hibbert, and p. 684, speech of Mr. George Rose. - -[374] See _ante_, p. 273. - -[375] Am. State Papers, vol. iii. pp. 245-247. - -[376] Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. xiii. Appendix, pp. xxxiv-xlv. - -[377] Am. State Papers, vol. iii. pp. 23, 24. - -[378] Annals of Congress, 1807, p. 2814. - -[379] Annals of Congress, 1808-1809, p. 1824. - -[380] There were three Orders in Council published on the 11th of -November, all relating to the same general subject. They were followed -by three others, issued November 25, further explaining or modifying -the former three. The author, in his analysis, has omitted reference to -particular ones; and has tried to present simply the essential features -of the whole, suppressing details. - -[381] The attention paid to sustaining the commerce of Great Britain -was shown most clearly in the second Order of November 11, which -overrode the Navigation Act by permitting _any_ friendly vessel to -import articles the produce of hostile countries; a permission extended -later (by Act of Parliament, April 14, 1808) to _any_ ship, "belonging -to _any_ country, _whether in amity with his Majesty or not_." Enemy's -merchant ships were thus accepted as carriers for British trade with -restricted ports. See Am. State Papers, vol. iii. pp. 270, 282. - -[382] Gibraltar and Malta are especially named, they being natural -depots for the Mediterranean, whence a large contraband trade was -busied in evading Napoleon's measures. The governors of those places -were authorized to license even enemy's vessels, if unarmed and not -over one hundred tons burthen, to carry on British trade, contrary to -the emperor's decrees. - -[383] On March 28, 1808, an Act of Parliament was passed, fixing -the duties on exportations from Great Britain in furtherance of the -provisions of the Orders. This Act contained a clause excepting -American ships, ordered into British ports, from the tonnage duties -laid on those which entered voluntarily. - -[384] In a debate on the Orders, March 3, 1812, the words of Spencer -Perceval, one among the ministers chiefly responsible for them, are -thus reported: "With respect to the principle upon which the Orders in -Council were founded, he begged to state that he had always considered -them as _strictly retaliatory_; and as far as he could understand -the matter they were most completely justified upon the principle -of retaliation.... _The object of the government was to protect and -force the trade of this country_, which had been assailed in such an -unprecedented manner by the French decrees. If the Orders in Council -had not been issued, France would have had free colonial trade by means -of neutrals, and we should have been shut out from the Continent.... -_The object of the Orders in Council was, not to destroy the trade -of the Continent, but to force the Continent to trade with us._" -(Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. xxi. p. 1152.) - -As regards the retaliatory effect upon France, Perceval stated that the -revenue from customs in France fell from sixty million francs, in 1807, -to eighteen and a half million in 1808, and eleven and a half in 1809. -(Ibid. p. 1157.) - -[385] Correspondance de Napoléon, vol. xvii. p. 19. - -[386] Mr. Henry Adams (History of the United States, 1801-1817) gives -134 as the number of American ships seized between April, 1809, and -April, 1810, and estimates the value of the vessels and cargoes at -$10,000,000 (Vol. v. p. 242.) The author takes this opportunity of -acknowledging his great indebtedness to Mr. Adams's able and exhaustive -work, in threading the diplomatic intricacies of this time. - -[387] December 26, 1805. - -[388] Metternich's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 82. - -[389] Metternich to Stadion, Jan. 11, 1809; Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 312. - -[390] Letter of Napoleon to Louis, dated Trianon, Dec. 20, 1808; -Mémoires de Bourrienne, vol. viii. p. 134. Garnier's Louis Bonaparte, -p. 351. The date should be 1809. On Dec. 20, 1808, Napoleon was at -Madrid, in 1809 at Trianon; not to speak of the allusion to the -Austrian war of 1809. - -[391] Napoleon issued orders to this effect in August, 1807. Cargoes -of goods such as England might furnish were sequestrated; those that -could not possibly be of British origin, as naval stores and French -wines, were admitted. All vessels were to be prevented from leaving the -Weser. No notification of this action was given to foreign agents. See -Cobbett's Political Register, 1807, pp. 857-859. - -[392] Thiers, Consulate and Empire (Forbes's translation), vol. xii. p. -21. - -[393] Mémoires de Bourrienne, French Minister at Hamburg, vol. viii. -pp. 193-198. - -[394] Annual Register, 1809; State Papers, 747. - -[395] April 1, 1808; Naval Chronicle, vol. xxi. p. 48. May 7, 1809; -Annual Register, 1809, p. 698. - -[396] Napoleon saw, in 1809, that his work at Tilsit was all to be done -over, since the only war Russia could make against the English was -by commerce, which was protected nearly as before. There was sold in -Mayence sugar and coffee which came from Riga.—_Mémoires de Savary, duc -de Rovigo_ (Imperial Chief of Police), vol. iii. p. 135. - -[397] D'Ivernois, Effects of the Continental blockade, London, Jan., -1810. Lord Grenville, one of the leaders of the Opposition, expressed a -similar confidence when speaking in the House of Lords, Feb. 8, 1810. -(Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. xv. p. 347.) So also the King's speech -at the opening of Parliament, Jan. 19, 1809: "The public revenues, -notwithstanding we are shut out from almost all the continent of -Europe and entirely from the United States, has increased to a degree -never expected, even by those persons who were most sanguine." (Naval -Chronicle, vol. xxi. p. 48.) - -[398] Monthly Magazine, vol. xxi. p. 195. - -[399] Ibid., vol. xxii. p. 514. - -[400] Ibid., vol. xxi. p. 539. - -[401] Monthly Magazine, vol. xxii. p. 618. - -[402] Ibid., vol. xxiv. p. 611. - -[403] Ibid., vol. xxvi. p. 11. - -[404] Ibid., vol. xxvii. pp. 417, 641. - -[405] Ibid., p. 135. - -[406] Tooke's History of Prices, vol. i. pp. 300, 301. - -[407] Salgues, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la France, vol. -viii. pp. 350-355. Mémoires de Marmont, due de Raguse, vol. iii. p. -365. Mémoires de Savary, due de Rovigo, vol. v. p. 115. - -[408] Quarterly Review, May, 1811, p. 465. - -[409] For instance, a license was necessary for a British subject to -ship any articles to an enemy's port, though in a neutral vessel. In -principle, licenses are essential to trade with an enemy. In 1805 and -1807 Orders in Council dispensed with the necessity of a license in -particular instances; but even then merchants preferred to take out a -license, because it cut short any questions raised by British cruisers, -and especially by privateers. See Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. x. p. -924. - -[410] Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. x. p. 406. - -[411] For an interesting account of the neutralizing trade, see Naval -Chronicle, vol. xxxi. pp. 288-295, and vol. xxxii. p. 119. On the -License System, the Parliamentary Debates (table of contents), and the -Quarterly Review of May, 1811, may be consulted. - -[412] Quarterly Review, May, 1811, p. 461. Lindsay's History of -Merchant Shipping, vol. ii. p 316. - -[413] Petition of Hull merchants, 1812; Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. -xxi. p. 979. - -[414] Am. State Papers, vol. iii. p. 341. - -[415] Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxi. p. 1113. - -[416] Ross's Life of Admiral Saumarez, vol. ii. pp. 196, 241. - -[417] In the years 1809 and 1810 one hundred and sixty American vessels -alone were seized by Danish privateers. Only a part, however, were -condemned. (Am. State Papers, vol. iii. p. 521.) - -[418] Erskine's note to that effect was dated April 19, 1809. - -[419] Annual Register, 1809, p. 726. - -[420] Moniteur, Feb. 24, 1810. - -[421] Mémoires, vol. ix. pp. 21-24. - -[422] Cons. et Empire (Forbes's Trans.), xii. 15. - -[423] Corr. de Nap., vol. xx. p. 235. - -[424] Compare Metternich's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 188. - -[425] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xxxviii. p. 182. - -[426] Corr. de Nap., vol. xxi. p. 70: "Mon principe est, La France -avant tout." (Letter to viceroy of Italy.) - -[427] Parl. Debates, vol. xxi. p. 1050; xxiii. p. 540. - -[428] Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. xxi. pp. 1056, 1117. - -[429] The decree was also shrouded in secrecy, and its existence denied -in the Moniteur (Cobbett's Pol. Register, xviii. p. 701). Napoleon -wrote to the viceroy of Italy, Aug. 6, 1810: "You will receive a decree -which I have just issued to regulate duties on colonial produce.... It -is to be executed in Italy; it is secret and to be kept in your hands. -You will therefore give orders in pursuance of this decree only by -ministerial letters." (Corr., vol. xxi. p. 28.) - -[430] Thiers, Cons. et Empire, Book xxxviii. pp. 181-189. - -[431] Monthly Magazine, Feb. 1811, vol. xxxi. p. 67. - -[432] Corr. de Nap., vol. xxi. p. 58. - -[433] Corr. de Nap., vol. xxi. p. 224. - -[434] Ibid., p. 268. - -[435] Ibid., p. 77. - -[436] Ibid., pp. 70, 71. - -[437] Ibid., pp. 61, 62. - -[438] Cobbett's Pol. Register, vol. xviii. pp. 704, 722. - -[439] At Bordeaux licensed vessels were known to take on board wines -and brandies for the British army in Portugal. (Mémoires du duc de -Rovigo, vol. v. p. 60.) - -[440] Bourrienne, Mémoires, vol. viii. p. 261. - -[441] Mémoires du duc de Rovigo, vol. v. p. 66. - -[442] Mémoires de Bourrienne, vol. ix. p. 60. - -[443] Porter's Progress of the Nation, sect. iii. p. 205. In 1815, -after Napoleon's overthrow, the price fell to £34. - -[444] Tooke's Hist. of Prices, vol. i. p. 354. - -[445] Souvenirs du duc de Vicence, vol. i. p. 88. - -[446] Both Monroe and Pinkney, while ministers in London, informed the -United States government that the extreme measures taken were popular. -(Am. State Papers, vol. iii. pp. 188, 206.) - -[447] Letter on the Genius and Disposition of the French Government; by -an American lately returned from Europe, pp. 189-192. Baltimore, 1810. -See also Metternich's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 476, for the unhappiness of -France. - -[448] Mémoires du due de Raguse, vol. iii. p. 423. Marmont adds: "This -was a powerful help to French industry _during that time of suffering -and misery_." - -[449] Tooke's History of Prices, vol. i. p. 311. - -[450] In like manner, vessels with British licenses frequently slipped -into French ports, especially with naval stores from the Baltic. - -[451] "There was not a Dutchman," says M. Thiers, "who had not lost -fifty per cent by foreign loans." (Cons. et Empire (Forbes's trans.), -xii. 47.) - -[452] "The emperor does desire war, because he needs more or less -virgin soil to explore, because he has need to occupy his armies and to -entertain them at the expense of others.... M. Romanzow has repeated to -me a long conversation he had had with the emperor. 'He wants money,' -said he,—'he does not hide it; he wishes war against Austria to procure -it.'" (Metternich to Stadion, Feb. 17, 1809; Memoirs, ii. 329.) The -Austrian war of 1809 brought $34,000,000 into Napoleon's military -chest. (Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xxxviii. p. 34.) - -[453] Thus to Davout, commanding the Army of Germany: "I shall need -much money, which should make you feel the importance of obtaining for -me as much as you can, and asking of me as little as possible." (Corr., -March 24, 1811.) - -[454] This condition of the debt was partly factitious, Napoleon -maintaining the public funds at eighty, by the secret intervention of -the military chest. (Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xli. p. 18.) - -[455] Mémoires du duc de Rovigo, vol. v. p. 116. - -[456] Genius and Disposition of French Govt., p. 166. Baltimore, 1810. - -[457] Genius and Disposition of French Govt., pp. 181-192. - -[458] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xli. p. 22. - -[459] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xli. p. 11. - -[460] Arnold's History of Rome, opening of chap. xliii. - -[461] It is interesting to observe in Metternich's letters, while -ambassador at Paris, how he counts upon this exhausting of the capital -of French soldiers as the ultimate solution of the subjection of -Austria. "For some time Napoleon has lived on anticipations. The -reserves are destroyed." (April 11, 1809.) Compare also his exclamation -to the emperor in 1813: "Is not your present army anticipated by -a generation? I have seen your soldiers; they are mere children." -(Memoirs, vol. i. p. 189). - -[462] See Metternich's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 477. - -[463] Corr. de Nap., vol. xxi. p. 497 (Feb. 28, 1811). - -[464] Ibid., p. 275. - -[465] Ibid., p. 296. - -[466] These contentions of Napoleon were for the most part perfectly -correct. Some interesting facts, bearing upon the true character of the -so-called neutral trade in the Baltic, may be gathered from Ross's Life -of Saumarez, vol. ii. chaps. ix.-xiii. See also representations made -by a number of American ship-captains, Am. State Papers, vol. iii. pp. -329-333. On the other hand, the scrupulously upright John Quincy Adams, -U. S. minister to Russia, affirmed that he positively knew some of the -American ships to be direct from the United States. The facts, however, -only show the dependence of the world at that time upon the Sea Power -of Great Britain, which made Napoleon's Continental System impossible; -yet, on the other hand, it was his only means of reaching his enemy. If -he advanced, he was ruined; if he receded, he failed. - -[467] During one year, 1809, this fleet captured 430 vessels, averaging -sixty tons each, of which 340 were Danes. Among these were between -thirty and forty armed cutters and schooners, of which Denmark had to -employ a great many to supply Norway with grain. The remaining ninety -vessels were Russian. (Naval Chronicle, vol. xxii. p. 517.) - -[468] "Once more I must tell you," wrote a Swedish statesman to -Saumarez, "that you were the first cause that Russia dared to make war -against France. Had you fired one shot when we declared war against -England, all had been ended and Europe would have been enslaved." -(Ross's Saumarez, vol. ii. p. 294.) - -[469] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xlii. p. 383. - -[470] Compare Metternich's argument with the French Minister of Foreign -Affairs, October, 1807. (Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 161.) - -[471] Annual Register, 1792; State Papers, p. 355. - -[472] Moniteur, Dec. 25, 1792; Proposition of M. Barailon. - -[473] Pitt's Speeches, vol. ii. pp. 46, 47. - -[474] Lanfrey's Napoleon, vol. iv. p. 112 (Eng. trans., ed. 1886). - -[475] Lanfrey's Napoleon, vol. ii. chap. iii. p. 122 (Eng. trans., 2d -ed.). - -[476] Jurien de la Gravière, Vie de l'Amiral Baudin, p. 9. - -[477] That is, about 8 per cent annually. The increase during the four -years of the elder Pitt in the Seven Years' War, 1757-1761, was 29 per -cent, about 7 per cent annually. - -[478] Système Maritime et Politique des Européens dans le 18me -siècle, par Arnould. Paris, 1797. - -[479] For Napoleon's own assertion of this fact, see "Note pour le -Ministre des Relations Extérieures," Corr. de Nap., Oct. 7, 1810. See -also _ante_, p. 320. - -[480] Martin, Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. i. p. 396. - -[481] Annual Register, 1793, p. 163. For the correspondence on that -occasion see A. R. 1792; State Papers, pp. 326, 327. See also letter of -Le Brun, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the Moniteur of Aug. -26, 1792. - -[482] The Directory tended to impose upon the smaller states, -neighboring to or allies of France, republican constitutions, -"unitaires" (centralized) in form, analogous to our own, as Bonaparte -had done for the Cisalpine Republic and for Genoa. It had just done so -in Holland, where it had raised against the government of the United -Provinces a kind of 18th of Fructidor (coup d'état). It now (1798) -aimed at revolutionizing Switzerland. Bonaparte urged it on. He had -already provoked a revolution in a republic near to and allied with the -Swiss, that of the Grisons.—MARTIN: _Hist. de France depuis_ 1789, vol. -iii. p. 7. - -[483] Napoleon's remark referred to the edicts of the Directory, -confiscating British goods wherever found on land; but it applies -equally to the decree of January, 1798, which extended the edict to -the sea: "Le Directoire ébaucha le système du blocus continental; il -ordonna la saisie de toutes les marchandises Anglaises qui pouvaient -se trouver à Mayence et dans les autres pays cédés à la France." -(Commentaires de Napoléon I., Paris, 1867, vol. iii. p. 413.) - -[484] This correspondence, so far as published, is to be found in the -Annual Register for 1797; State Papers, pp. 181-223. - -[485] See Stanhope's Life of Pitt, vol. ii. p. 224 (ed. 1879). - -[486] For a graphic description of the effects of the Berlin decree on -the Continent, see Fyffe's History of Modern Europe, vol. i. p. 328. - -[487] Metternich's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 65. - - - - -INDEX. - - - _Acre_, Siege of, by Bonaparte, - i. 294-302. - - _Alexander_, Czar of Russia - ii. succeeds to the throne, 55; - Convention with Great Britain, June, 1801, 57; - coolness toward Bonaparte, 69, and note; - joint action with Bonaparte in German indemnities, 84; - conditions required before guaranteeing status of Malta, 92; - attitude upon the execution of the Duc d'Enghien, 129, 177; - joins Third Coalition, 177; - defeated at Austerlitz, 182; - commercial policy, 200; - campaign of Eylau and Friedland, 273; - Treaty of Tilsit, 274, 310; - meeting at Erfurt, 293; - war with Sweden, 293; - joint letter with Napoleon to king of Great Britain, 294; - attitude toward the Continental System, 303, 324, 329; - peace with Sweden, 316; - uneasiness at extension of French empire, 324; - dissatisfaction at the annexation of Oldenburg, 330; - disagreement with Napoleon concerning the Continental System, - 344,401; - understanding reached with Great Britain and Sweden, 347; - peace with Turkey, 350; - attacked by Napoleon, 351. - - _Antwerp_, commercial isolation of, - i. in 1780, 9; - naval importance of, 15; - development under Napoleon as a naval arsenal, 377. - - _Armed Neutrality_, of 1800, - ii. signature and affirmations of, 36; - dissolution of, 57. - - _Austria_, - i. natural ally of Great Britain, 12; - quarrel with Holland about the Scheldt, 17; - war with Turkey, 1788, 19; - successes, 24; - peace with Turkey, 25; - joins in Declaration of Pilnitz, 28; - war with France, 29; - driven from Netherlands, 1792, 31; - jealousy of Prussia, 80; - holds Italian duchies, 84; - successes in 1793, 93; - mistakes, 94; - reverses, 103, 168; - forced to retire across the Rhine in 1794, 169, 171; - strengthens alliance with Great Britain, 172; - successes of 1795, 181-183; - campaign in Italy, 1795, 195-198; - reverses in Italy, 1796, 209-212, 216, 217, 233; - signs preliminaries of Leoben, 234; - Treaty of Campo Formio, Austrian gains and losses, 250; - dissatisfaction at French occupation of Rome, 279; - tumult in Vienna, 280; - alliance with Naples and Russia, 1798, 282; - ii. renewal of war with France, 3; - successes in Switzerland and Italy, 4-8; - defeat at battle of Zurich, 1799, 9; - refusal to treat with Bonaparte, 16; - disastrous campaigns of 1800 in Germany and Italy, 19-24; - negotiations with Great Britain and France, 25; - armistice with France, 25, 35; - renewal of hostilities and defeat of Hohenlinden, 38; - Peace of Lunéville, 39; - loss of power by German indemnities, 84; - joins Third Coalition, 177-179; - disastrous campaign of Austerlitz, 181; - Peace of Presburg, 182; - accedes to the Continental System, 1807, 278; - preparations to renew the war, 297; - war with France in 1809, 314-316; - Peace of Vienna and renewed exclusion of British goods, 316. - - - _Barham_, Lord, First Lord of Admiralty, - ii, 168; - masterly action of, before Trafalgar, 169, 174. - - _Battles_, land, - Aboukir, i. 322; - Arcola, i. 233; - Austerlitz, ii. 182; - Badajos,ii. 349; - Castiglione, i. 233; - Ciudad Rodrigo, ii. 348; - Eckmuhl, ii. 315; - Essling, ii. 316; - Eylau, ii. 273; - Fleurus, i. 168; - Friedland, ii. 274; - Jena, ii. 270; - Jemappes, i. 31; - Lodi, i. 210; - Loano, i. 198; - Marengo, ii. 23; - Pyramids, i. 277; - Rivoli, i. 233, 243; - Talavera, ii. 315; - Valmy, i. 30; - Wagram, ii. 316; - Wattignies, i. 103. - - _Battles_, sea, - Algesiras, ii. 63-66; - Camperdown, i. 378; - Copenhagen, ii. 47-51; - First of June, i. 126-155; - Hotham and Martin, i. 190-194; - Île Groix, i. 177; - Nile, i. 261-277; - St. Vincent, i. 221-229; - Trafalgar, ii. 185-195. - - _Bettesworth_, captain, British navy, - ii. fortunate meeting with combined fleets in June, 1805, - 163, 167. - - _Bonaparte_, Napoleon, - i. interest in the East, 14; - influence upon course of events, 183; - appointed to command Army of Italy, 203; - successful campaign of 1796, 207-211; - designs upon Corsica, 213; - opinion of the effect of British Mediterranean fleet upon his - operations, 217; - critical position in Italy, May, 1796-Feb. 1797, 233; - fall of Mantua, 233; - advances into Carinthia, 234; - signs preliminaries of Leoben, 234; - offence at action of the Council of Five Hundred, 244; - sends Augereau to support _coup d'état_, 244; - deep projects for maritime and Oriental expansion, 246-249; - signs Treaty of Campo Formio, 250; - opinion of danger to France from British Sea Power, 251; - return to Paris and command of Army of England, 252; - Egyptian expedition organized, 253; - sails from Toulon, 256; - captures Malta, and sails thence for Egypt, 257; - lands at Alexandria, 260; - orders concerning the disposition of the fleet, 261-263; - criticism of Nelson's conduct, 275; - conquest of Lower Egypt, 277; - objects in Egyptian undertaking, 288; - Syrian expedition, 290; - siege of Acre, 299; - retreat into Egypt, 302; - criticisms upon Sir Sidney Smith, 303; - defeats Turks at Aboukir, 322; - return to France, 324; - criticism upon his Oriental projects, 324-328; - attempts to send relief to Egypt and Malta, 329-331; - views as to condition of French in Egypt, 332; - views as to relative importance of Brest and Antwerp, 377; - ii. policy as first consul, 15, 20; - campaign of Marengo, 22; - negotiations with Austria and Great Britain, 1800, 25, 34, - 35, 38-40; - overtures to the Czar, 29, 32, 37; - to Prussia, 28, 31; - efforts to form a coalition against Great Britain, 25-37; - Mediterranean projects, 1800-1801, 59-68; - anxiety for maritime peace, 70; - sends expedition to Haïti, 78; - president of Cisalpine republic, 80; - first consul for life, 83; - aggressions in 1802, 84-90; - insults to Great Britain, 93-96; - projects against Great Britain, 1803, 100; - preparations to invade England, 102, 105, 111-117; - invasion of Hanover and Naples, 109-111; - first combinations to invade England, 124; - becomes emperor, May, 1804, 130. See also Napoleon. - - _Boulogne_, - ii. point of concentration for Bonaparte's flotilla for invasion - of England, 113; - preparations at, 114; - strategic value of, 116; - appearance in 1814, 182. - - _Brest_, - i. character and surroundings of the port, 304, 305, 342-344; - methods of watching observed by Howe and Bridport, 345, 346, - 364-367; - St. Vincent's methods, 368-376; - paralysis as a port of equipment, 376; - Napoleon's preference for Antwerp, 377. - - _Bridport_, Lord, British admiral, - i. succeeds Howe in command of Channel fleet, 165; - action of Île Groix, 177; - escape of the French fleet from Brest, 1799, 305; - method of watching Brest, 345, 346; - French expedition against Ireland, 360-367; - anecdote of, 368; - relieved in command by St. Vincent, 368. - - _Brueys_, French admiral, - i. commands French division in Adriatic, 252, 255; - designs upon Malta in 1798, 255; - appointed to command fleet in Egyptian expedition, 253; - negligent conduct of, 262, 263; - inadequate preparations for defence, 264-266; - Battle of the Nile, 266-272; - killed, 271. - - _Bruix_, French admiral, - i. escape from Brest with twenty-five ships-of-the-line, in 1799, - 305; - enters Mediterranean, 307; - action in Mediterranean, 312-315; - re-enters Atlantic accompanied by sixteen Spanish ships, 315; - reaches Brest, 316; - comments on this cruise, 318; - ii. instructions of Bonaparte to, in 1800, 60-63; - connection with invasion flotilla, and death, 130. - - - _Calder_, British admiral, - ii. ordered to command a detached squadron, 168; - action with combined fleets, 171; - court-martial upon, 174. - - _Catharine_, Empress of Russia, - i. influence upon Joseph II., Emperor of Germany, 11; - relations with Austria and France, 1784, 16, 17; - naval undertakings, 1788, 20; - attitude toward French Revolution, 82, 243; ii. 233; - ii. death, 243. - - _Chauvelin_, French ambassador to Great Britain, - i. disputes with British ministry, 32-34; - dismissed from Great Britain, 34. - - _Collingwood_, British admiral, - i. remarks of, 70, 71, 75, 309 (note); - attention to health of crew, 71; - distinguished share in battle of Cape St. Vincent, 227; - ii. blockade off Rochefort, 118; - ordered to West Indies with eight ships in 1805, 155, 157; - blockade of Cadiz, 157, 159, 167, 175, 180; - surmise as to Napoleon's intentions, 156; - brilliant conduct at Trafalgar, 191; - succeeds to command after Nelson's death, 195. - - _Commerce_, warfare against, - ii. chaps. xvii. and xviii. - - _Commerce_-destroying, - i. by scattered cruisers, 179, 326-328, 335-338; ii. 199-218, - 221-228. - - _Cornwallis_, British admiral, - i. action with superior French fleet, 177; - tenacity in maintaining Brest blockade, 373, 376; ii. 98, 118, - 119, 123, 128, 148, 153; - orders to detach squadron under Calder to meet Villeneuve, - 168; - joined by Calder and Nelson, 174; - mistake in dividing his force, 176. - - _Corsica_, - i. acquired by France in 1769, 88; - relations to France and to Great Britain, 88; - revolt against the Convention, 88; - French expelled by British, 187; - union with Great Britain proclaimed, 188; - difficulties of government by Great Britain, 188, 189; - value of the island, 179, 186; - Bonaparte's measures to recover, 213, 216; - evacuated by the British, 216; - contributes a detachment to Egyptian Expedition, 254, 257. - - - _Davout_, French marshal, - ii. battle of Eckmuhl, 314; - charged with maintenance of Continental System, 317; - command in Prussia and Hanse towns, 319; - injunctions of Napoleon to, 337, note. - - _Decrees_, French, - of Fraternity, Nov. 19, 1792, i. 31, ii. 361; - extending French system, Dec. 15, 1792, i. 32, ii. 367; - ii. affecting neutral carriers, 231, 234, 242-246; - confiscating ships carrying goods of British origin, January, - 1798, 249, 250, 254-259; - Napoleon's Berlin, 271-273, 281; - Milan, 290; - Bayonne and Rambouillet, 291, 292; - general seizure of goods of British origin, August, 1810, 324; - public burning of British manufactures, Oct. 19, 1810, 327. - - _De Galles_, Morard, French admiral, - i. commands Brest fleet in 1793, 61-63; - conduct in the mutiny of that year, 62; - opinions as to the efficiency of the seamen, 61; - commands naval part of Irish Expedition, 1796, 350-360. - - _Denmark_, - i. hostility to Sweden, 21; - invades Sweden, 1788, 21; - stopped by Great Britain and Prussia, 22, 25; - seeks the commercial advantages of neutrality in French - Revolution, 83; - loss of West India colonies, 121; - ii. quarrel with Great Britain about rights of convoy, 26; - Bonaparte tries to conciliate, 30; - joins Armed Neutrality of 1800, 36; - British expedition against, 41-47; - battle of Copenhagen, 47-51; - armistice with Great Britain, 51, and convention, 58; - Napoleon's designs against, 276; - second British expedition and bombardment of Copenhagen, 277; - shares in Continental System, 301; - privateering by Danish seamen, 313; - deprived of Norway, 350. - - _De Rions_, D'Albert, French commodore, - i. mobbed by the populace of Toulon, 41-44; - commands Brest fleet in mutiny of 1790, 45; - leaves the navy and emigrates, 46; - Suffren's high opinion of, 46. - - _Devins_, Austrian general, - i. inefficiency of, in 1795 in Italy,195-198. - - _Directory_, - i. established as French executive government, 175, 176; - arrogance toward foreign states, 240, 242; - ii. disasters and incompetency of, 1-14; - overthrown by Bonaparte, 15; - identity of spirit with Napoleon, 258, 354, 396, 398. - - _Dumouriez_, French general, - i. wins battles of Valmy and Jemappes, 30, 31, 89; - defeated at Neerwinden and driven from Holland and - Netherlands, 89; - treason of, 89. - - - _Egypt_, - i. nominal dependence upon Turkey under the Mamelukes, 85; - genesis of Bonaparte's expedition to, 246-249; - conquest of, by the French, 260, 277, 288-290; - Bonaparte's purpose in the enterprise, 288; - loss of, by the French, 330-334; - Kleber's opinion of the value of, 331; - tenure dependent upon control of the sea, 331, 332, ii. 60-63; - ii. restored to Turkey, 72; - condition under Turkish rule, 94, 150; - Nelson's apprehensions for, 124-127; - his search for the French fleet in Alexandria, 1805, 144. - - _Elba_, island of, - i. seized by British, though a possession of Tuscany, 213; - evacuated, 220; - ii. transferred to France at Peace of Amiens, 82. - - _Elliott_, Sir Gilbert, - i. British Viceroy of Corsica, 187, 188, 213; - quoted, 188, 217, 218; - returns to England, 230. - - - _Flotilla_, - ii. for invasion of England, numbers and character of, 111-116; - estimate of, as a fighting force by British naval officers and - Napoleon, 120-122; - ultimate fate of, 182. - - _Fox_, British statesman, - ii. opinion as to "free ships, free goods," 261; - minister of foreign affairs, 1806, 269; - modification of Rule of 1756 by Order in Council of - May, 1806, 270; - death, 270; - praise of French soldiery, 365; - disparagement of Pitt, 387. - - _France_, - i. results of war of 1778 to, 3, 4; - condition of, in 1789, 6; - policy of, as to Sweden, Poland, and Turkey, 13; - interest in the Levant and the Baltic, 14, 22; - interest in Netherlands, 15, and Holland, 16-18; - alliance with Holland, 1785, 18; - increasing internal disorder, 18, 24; - meeting of States General, 25; - outline of events in the Revolution to Feb. 1, 1793, 28-33; - declares war against Austria, 29, - and against Great Britain and Holland, 34; - condition of the navy in 1793, and causes thereof, 35-68; - comparative strength of British and French fleets, 75, 110; - acquisition and status of Corsica, 88; - internal conflicts in 1793, 89-92; - disasters on eastern frontiers, 93; - energy shown by the government, 93-96; - disasters retrieved in 1793, 103; - internal rebellions quelled, 104, 105; - condition and importance of West India Islands, 111, 114, 115; - contest over West India Islands, 115-119; - scarcity of provisions, 1793, 122; - convoy of provisions ordered from America, 122; - internal events, 1794, 166-168; - military successes in 1794, 168-171; - conquest of Belgium and Holland, 170; - peace with Prussia, Holland, and Spain, 172; - reaction of 1795, 173, 174; - internal disorders, 175, 176; - great fleets withdrawn from the sea, and policy of - commerce-destroying adopted, 179, 201; - military weakness in 1795, 180-183; - loses Corsica, 1794, 187; - successes in Italy, 1795-1796, 198, 209-211, 233, 234; - regains Corsica, 216; - brings Austria to peace, 234, 250; - arrogance toward foreign governments, 240-243; - reactionary disorders, 243; - coup d'état of Sept. 3, 1797, 244; - danger from Great Britain, 251; - sends expedition to Egypt, 253; - capture of Malta by, 257; - naval defeat at the Nile, 263-277; - subjugation of Egypt by, 277, 289; - aggressions upon Holland and Switzerland, 278; - offence given to Naples, Austria, and Russia, 280-282; - reverses in the Mediterranean, 1798, 287; - expectations from conquest of Egypt, 288; - reverses in Europe, 1799, 323, - loss of Malta and Egypt, 328-334; - maritime impotence of, 335-338, - expeditions against Ireland, 346-380; - ii. conquest of Naples, 2; - reverses in Europe, 1799, 3-11, 407; - internal disorders, 1799, 11-15; Bonaparte first consul, 15; - successful campaign of 1800, 19-24; - maritime and colonial exhaustion, 1800, 25, 35; - peace of Lunéville with Austria, 39; - fruitless attempts to control Mediterranean, 59-68; - preliminaries of peace with Great Britain, 71-73; - exhaustion of national spirit of aggression, 74; - aggressions of Bonaparte, 1801-1803, 76-97; - cession of Louisiana by Spain, 77; - Peace of Amiens with Great Britain, 81; - renewal of war, 98; - Louisiana ceded to United States, 104; - maritime and financial weakness, 106-108; - occupation of Hanover and heel of Italy, 109-111; - preparations for invasion of England, 111-117; - exactions from Spain, 133; - Trafalgar campaign, 140-181; - its chances of success discussed, 182-184; - necessity of invading England, 184; - campaign of 1805 and battle of Austerlitz, 181; - naval defeat of Trafalgar, 187-195; - far-reaching consequences of this battle, 196; - succeeded by the Continental System, 197-200; - maritime impotence of, 202; - activity of privateers, 207-210; - characteristics of privateering, in Europe, 208, - in Atlantic, 210, - in West Indies, 212, - in East Indies, 215-218; - destruction of French commerce, 218-220, 375; - bitterness against Great Britain and maritime neutrals, 230; - anger against United States, 239; - measures directed against neutral carriers, 242-248, 250-254; - results of these measures, 254-258; - _quasi_ war with the United States, 258; - true commercial policy of, 262-265, 280, 354; - commercial measures of Napoleon, 265; - Berlin Decree, 271; - campaign against Russia, 273; - Peace of Tilsit, 274; - invasion of Portugal, 277; - Milan Decree, 290; - war in Spain, 292; - war with Austria, 1809, 314; - excessive prices in, 322; - internal distress of, 333-337, 340-342, 349; - want of credit, 339, 343; - disputes with Russia, 344; - invasion of Russia, 351; - analysis of commercial measures of Napoleon, 351-357; - temper and aims of leaders in French Revolution, 359-363, 367, - 384, also 74; - decrees of November 19, 361, - and December 15, 367; - effect of the maritime war upon French industry, 395; - identity of spirit in the Republic, the Directory, and in - Napoleon, 396-399; - the struggle with Great Britain one of endurance, 406; - similarity of characteristics in the external action of France - from 1793-1812, 407-411; - continued vitality of the movement due to Bonaparte, 407, 408. - - - _Ganteaume_, French admiral, - i. report of condition of French naval officers and seamen, 1801, 65; - injuries received by squadron under his command, 67; - commerce-destroying cruise in 1795, 202; - brings Bonaparte back from Egypt to France, 323; - escape from Brest in 1801, 376, ii. 61; - failure to relieve Egypt, 62; - maritime prefect at Toulon, 1803, 125; - command of Brest fleet, 1804, and instructions from Napoleon, - 131, 147; - modified instructions, 149; - unable to escape from Brest, 153; - awaits Villeneuve outside the Goulet, 154. - - _Genoa_, coasting trade with Southern France, i. 195, 200, ii. 7; - i. French intrigues in, 201, 213; - preparations in, for Egyptian Expedition, 254, 257; - organized as Republic of Liguria by Bonaparte, 278, 279; - ii. Admiral Bruix reinforces, 313, 5, 6; - Masséna besieged in, 20-23; - made a military division of France, 69, note, 85; - annexed to France, 177; - effect of this measure upon Austria, 177. - - _Gravina_, Spanish admiral, - ii. commands the allied rear at the battle of Trafalgar, 187, - 188, 194. - - _Great Britain_, - i. importance of her action against France, 1; - results to, of War of 1778, 3, 8; - recovery of prosperity under second Pitt, 5; - importance to, of public confidence in Pitt, 6; - attitude toward Russia, 1770-1790, and interest in the Levant - and Baltic, 10-17, 20-23, 25, 27; - relations to Holland and the Netherlands, 15-17, 19, 21, 32; - relations to Turkey, 12, 22-24; - alliance with Prussia and Holland, 19, 21, 22, 25; - refuses to interfere in French Revolution, 1791, 29; - change of feeling in, 30; - recalls her ambassador from Paris, 32; - dismisses French ambassador, 34; - war declared against, by France, 34; - influence of, 1793-1815, 68; - condition of navy in 1793, 69-75; - policy of, in war of French Revolution, 81; - takes possession of Toulon, 92; - unpreparedness of, in 1793, 96; - military and naval policy, 97-103; - evacuates Toulon, 105; - effect produced by, in Peninsular War, 106 (note); - importance of West Indies to, 109-111; - mistaken action in Haïti, 111-113, 116; - reduces the Lesser Antilles, 115; - reverses and loss of Guadaloupe, 116-119; - sufferings of West India trade, 120; - takes Trinidad, 120; - and other West India colonies, 121; - takes part in Continental War as ally of Holland, 93; - withdraws from Holland, 169, 170; - injury to, from French conquest of Holland, 170; - war with Holland and capture of Dutch colonies, 170; - new treaties with Austria and Russia, 172; - interests and policy in Mediterranean, 185, 186; - political union of Corsica with, 188; - abandons Corsica, 215; - impolicy of evacuating Mediterranean, 217, 218; - depression of, in 1797, 229; - effect of battle of Cape St. Vincent, 231; - security due to sea power, 236; - negotiations for peace, 1796, 240; - in 1797, 245; - naval successes of 1797, 255; - resolve again to dispute control of Mediterranean, 256; - joins Second Coalition, 282; - frustrates Bonaparte's Oriental projects, 324; - dependence upon sea power, 327; - policy of, for protection of commerce, 337, ii. 203-205; - ii. expedition against Holland, 1799, 8-10; - prosperity of, in 1800, 17-19, 227-231; - collision with northern states about neutral rights, 26-37, - 260-262; - Baltic Expedition of 1801, 41-57; - conventions with Baltic powers, 57, 58, 261; - influence of sea power, 69, 74; - peace with France, 71-75, 81; - remonstrance with Bonaparte upon his intervention in - Switzerland, 88-90; - strained relations with France, 90-97; - renewal of war, 98; - unanimity of British people, 99; - policy of renewing the war, 105-108; - measures for resisting invasion, 117-122; - quarrel with Spain, 1804, 133-139; - naval dispositions, 1805, 148; - insight of naval authorities, 157-159, 166; - effect upon the fortunes of Napoleon, 184, 196-201; - control of sea by, 218; - losses by capture, 221-227; - dependence upon neutral carrier, 229-231; - restrictions upon neutral trade, 233-239, 240-242; - Jay's treaty with, 237; - prosperity of trade, 249-254; - general policy as to neutral trade, 262, 266-268; - seizures of American ships, 1805, 269; - blockade of coast of Europe, 269; - Order in Council of January, 1807, 275; - expedition against Denmark, 1807, 276; - Orders in Council of November, 1807, 283-290; - landing in Portugal, 292; - supports Spanish revolt, 294; - operations in Peninsula, 296, 315, 318, 343, 348, - also i. 106-108; - seizure of Heligoland, 302; - conditions of trade, 1806-1812, 304-306, 329-333, 340-342, 354, - 373, 377-382; - License System, 308-313; - Order in Council of April, 1809, 313; - credit of, 339; - internal condition, 340; - influence in Baltic, 346; - policy and rightfulness of the Orders in Council, 351-357; - influence upon the French Revolution and Empire, chap. xix. - - - _Haïti_, French colony, - i. early revolutionary disorders in, 47-49, 111; - British operations in, 111-113, 116; - rule of Toussaint L'Ouverture, 113; - base of privateering, 120; - ii. Bonaparte's expedition against, 78; - its reverses, 94; - dependence upon American continent, 103; - loss of, to France, 103. - - _Hamburg_, - i. commercial importance of, during French Revolutionary wars, - 253, ii. 28, 108-110, 250, 251, 299, 301, 378; - ii. Cuxhaven occupied by Prussian troops, 36; - occupied by Danish troops, 54; - Napoleon's grudge against, 279; - imperial troops quartered on, 319; - confiscations of colonial produce, 324, 325; - annexed to French empire, 330. - - _Hanover_, - i. commercial importance to Great Britain, 253, ii. 110, 266; - ii. Prussian designs upon, 35, 110; - occupied by Prussian troops, 54; - evacuated, 68; - occupied by Bonaparte, 109; - offered by Bonaparte to Prussia, 179. - - _Hoche_, French general, - i. commanding army of Sambre and Meuse, 240, 377; - anxiety about reactionary movements in France, 244; - pacification of La Vendée, 347; - commands expedition against Ireland, 347-360; - interest in a second expedition, and death, 378. - - _Holland_, - i. weakness of, in 1781, 7; - fall of barrier towns and quarrel about the Scheldt, 7, 9, - 16-18; - relations to Great Britain and France, 1783-1793, 17-19; - relations to Russia, 16, 20; - occupied by Prussian troops, 1787, 19; - defensive alliance with Great Britain and Prussia, 1788, 21, - ii. 363, 384, 393; - the Scheldt opened, i. 31, ii. 362; - France declares war against, 1793, i. 34; - condition of navy, 78; - course of, in French Revolution, 83; - colonies of, 83; - invasion of, by Dumouriez, 1793, 89; - invasion and conquest by Pichegru, 1795, 169; - fall of stadtholder, and republic proclaimed, 170; - war with Great Britain and loss of colonies, 170, ii. 375, 394 - (see also West Indies, pp. 109-121); - treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with France, i. 172; - centralized constitution imposed by France, 278; - contemplated invasion of Ireland from, 378; - naval defeat at Camperdown, 378; - ii. compelled to war against Great Britain by Bonaparte in 1803, - 111; - share in Bonaparte's projected invasion of England, 119, 131, - 133, 147, 164, 165; - base of commerce-destroying, 207, 216; - demands upon the United States to resist seizure of belligerent - property, 247; - confiscation of goods of British origin ordered by Bonaparte, - 1803, 265; - confiscations of American ships by Bonaparte, 292, 320, 321; - Louis Bonaparte crowned king, 299; - withstands Napoleon's Continental System, 300, 305, 318, 320; - continuous blockade by British navy, 313; - Louis abdicates and Holland is annexed to French Empire, 321; - commercial ruin of, 1811, 336. - - _Hood_, Lord, British admiral, - i. commands Mediterranean fleet, 96; - receives surrender of Toulon, 92; - forced to evacuate the port, 105; - retires to Hyères Bay, 106; - conquest of Corsica, 187; - merit of, 207; - returns to England, 189; - succeeded by Jervis, 194, 203; - tactical dispositions at St. Kitt's, in 1782, compared to those - of Brueys in Aboukir Bay, 265. - - _Hotham_, British admiral, - i. commands in Mediterranean, 1795, 190-194; - sluggishness of, 192, 199-202, 207. - - _Howe_, Earl, British admiral, - i. commands Channel fleet, 96; - military character and naval policy of, 101; - naval campaign of 1794 and battle of June 1, 125-160; - admirable tactics of, 135, 149, 160; - strategic error of, 156-159; - retires from active service, 164; - opinion concerning Battle of the Nile, 273; - conduct of Brest blockade and Channel service, 162, 338-346. - - - _Ionian_ islands (Corfu and others), - i. possessions of Venice in 1793, and subsequent transfers, 86, - 235; - Bonaparte's desire for, 247-249 (and note); - transferred to France by treaty of Campo Formio, 250, 251; - indicated by Bonaparte as station for French fleet, 262; - taken from France by Russo-Turkish fleet, 286, ii. 10; - ii. constituted Republic of Seven Islands by peace of 1801, 71; - transferred to France by Treaty of Tilsit, 274. - - _Ireland_, - i. French expedition against, 1796, 346-361; in 1798, 378-380; - ii. Bonaparte's designs against, 124, 131; - British anxiety about, 156, 160, 171, 386; also, i. 306. - - _Italy_, - i. lack of political unity in, 81, 84, 185; - interest of Great Britain in, 185, 186; - campaign of 1795 in, 195-198; - part of the British fleet in the campaign, 199-201; - Bonaparte's campaign of 1796 in, 208-211, 233-236; - ii. French reverses in 1799, 3-10; - campaign of Marengo, 20-23; - Bonaparte's designs in, in 1800, 59, 80, 85, 86; - occupation of Naples, 1803, 109, 112, 124; - Napoleon crowned king of, 153; - commercial orders of Napoleon, 325, 326. - - - _Jay_, John, - ii. United States envoy to Great Britain, 237; - Treaty of Commerce and Navigation negotiated by, 237-239; - anger of French government, 239, 240, 244. - - _Jervis_, British admiral. See St. Vincent. - - _Joseph II._, Emperor of Germany, - i. succeeds Maria Theresa, 1780, 7; - raises the question of the Scheldt, 9, 17, 18; - attempts to exchange the Netherlands for Bavaria, 18; - declares war against Turkey, 19; - dies, 1790, 25. - - _Jourdan_, French general, - i. commands army of Sambre and Meuse, 1794, 168; - wins battle of Fleurus, 168; - pursuit of Austrians, 169; - operations of, 1795, 180-182; - disasters in 1796, 213, 216; - ii. command in Germany in 1799, 3; - defeated at Stokach, 3; - resigns command, 4. - - - _Keith_, British admiral, - i. commands naval division watching Cadiz, 286; - unexpected appearance of French fleet under Bruix, 1799, 307; - recalled to Gibraltar, 310; - sails in pursuit of Bruix, 312; - left in command of fleet by St. Vincent, 312; - further pursuit of French fleet, 312-316; - returns to Torbay, 316; - returns to Mediterranean as commander-in-chief, 316, 329; - conduct of pursuit examined, 320, 321; - letter to Kleber, 333; - ii. operations against French in Egypt, 1801, 60, 62; - commands squadron in the Downs, 1803-1805, 120, 148; - report of captures in Mediterranean, 219. - - _Kleber_, French general, - i. left by Bonaparte in command in Egypt, 331; - opinion as to dependence of Egypt upon the navy, 331; - Convention of El Arish, 332; - letter from Admiral Keith, 333; - assassinated, 334. - - - _Leopold_, Emperor of Germany, - i. succeeds Joseph II., 25; - makes peace with Turkey, 26; - joins Prussia in Declaration of Pilnitz, 28. - - _Levant_, the, - i. advance of Russia in, 10-12; - commercial and political importance of, 11; - interest of France in, 12, 14; - interest of Great Britain in, 23; - interest of Bonaparte in, 247-253, ii. 95. - - _License System_, - ii. of Great Britain, 307-313; - of Napoleon, 307, 326, 327, 329. - - _Linois_, French admiral, - ii. repels British fleet at battle of Algesiras, 63-66; - deceived by a body of East India ships, 214, 215. - - _Louis XVI._, King of France, - i. interferes between Austria and Holland, 17, 18; - brought from Versailles to Paris by the mob, 25; - flight from Paris and capture of, 1791, 28; - scenes of June 20 and August 10, 1792, 30; - suspended, 30; - and deposed, 31; - tried and executed, 32; - interest in the navy, 50, 67. - - _Louisiana_, - ii. cession by Spain to France, 67, 77; - apprehensions of Great Britain, 77; - anger of the United States people, 103; - sold to the United States by Bonaparte, 104. - - - _Malta_, Island of, - i. belongs to Knights of St. John in 1793, 87; - its dependence upon the fleet, 87; - importance of, 87, 247; - Bonaparte's designs upon, 255; - seized by Bonaparte, 257; - Nelson's opinion of, 258; - interest of the Czar, Paul I., in, 281, 282, ii. 32-34, 53; - blockaded by British and Portuguese squadron, and summoned to - surrender by Sir James Saumarez, i. 285; - isolation of, 285, 329; - surrendered to British, 330; - ii. stipulations of the preliminaries of peace in 1801, 72; - provisions of the Treaty of Amiens, 81; - disputes between England and France concerning, 91-98; - Orders in Council of 1807, 286, 287; - commercial importance, 1807-1812, 305. - - _Mann_, British admiral, - i. joins Mediterranean fleet, 194; - detached to blockade Richery in Cadiz, 202; - ordered to rejoin by Jervis, 213; - mistaken action of, 214, 215. - - _Marmont_, French marshal, - i. opinion concerning Sir Sidney Smith, 295 (note); - ii. commands corps in Holland for invasion of England, 117, 120, - 131, 165; quoted, i. 259 (note), ii. 102, 335. - - _Martin_, French admiral, - i. commands Toulon fleet in actions with British in 1795, 189-194. - - _Masséna_, French marshal, - ii. commander-in-chief in Switzerland and Germany, 1799, 3-5; - wins battle of Zurich, 9; - sent by Bonaparte to Italy, 15; - operations in Italy, 1800, 21; - besieged in Genoa, 22; - reverses in Portugal, 342, 348. - - _Missiessy_, French admiral, - ii. commands Rochefort division, 132; - escapes to the West Indies, 142, 144; - returns thence to Rochefort, 152, 166; - Napoleon's further purposes for, 165. - - _Montagu_, British admiral, - i. commands division under Lord Howe, May and June, 1794, 125, - 126, 156-161. - - _Moreau_, French general, - i. commands in Holland, 1795, 180; - advance into Germany, 1796, 216; - command in Italy, 1799, 313, - ii. and retreat before Suwarrow, 5-8; - appointed by Bonaparte to command in Germany, 15; - successful campaign of 1800, 21-24; - wins battle of Hohenlinden, 38; - arrest upon charge of royalist conspiracy, 129. - - - _Naples_, see Two Sicilies. - - _Napoleon_ (see also Bonaparte), - ii. Emperor of the French, 130; - plans for invading England modified by the death of Admiral - Latouche Tréville, 130; - second combination, 131; - his dealings with Spain, 1803-1804, 133-139; - failure to realize maritime conditions, 141; - instructions to Admirals Villeneuve and Missiessy, 142; - final combination, 146-150; - surmises as to British movements, 153-158, 162, 166, 170; - crowned King of Italy, 153; - suspicious of Austria, 1805, 176-179; - campaign of Austerlitz, 181; - constant embarrassment from the closure of the sea by the - British navy, 184; - anger against Admiral Villeneuve, 185; - effect of Trafalgar upon policy, 197, 223, 351; - miscalculation in his attempt to crush British commerce, 201; - vigor displayed in the attempt, 202; - measures at outbreak of war, 1803, 265; - Jena campaign, 270; - Berlin Decree, 271-273; - campaign against Russia, 1807, 274; - Treaty of Tilsit, 274; - projects against Portugal and Denmark, 276; - enforcement of his Continental System, 277-279, 310, 396; - additional vigor in Berlin Decree, 281; - character of the commercial warfare, 289; - Milan Decree, 290; - usurpation in Spain, 291; - meeting with the Czar at Erfurt, 293; - joint letter to George III., 294; - campaign in Spain, 1808, 295; - anger with Holland, 299; - war with Austria, 1809, 314-316; - exactions from Sweden, 316, 322; - increased severity of warfare on commerce, 317-328; - Holland annexed to the Empire, 321; - annexation of Oldenburg and the Hanse towns, 330; - license system, 332; - failing resources, 336; - military treasure, 337; - condition of credit, 338-340; - sufferings in France, 1811, 340-343, 349; - altercations with Russia, 344-346; - preparations for war, 347; - invades Russia, 351; - essential error of his Continental System, 351-355, 401, 402; - concentration of purpose, 366; - his services to the Revolution, 388, 400, 407; - Continental System inherited from Directory, 396, 399; - greatness of his power, 408; - effect upon it of the British sea-power, 409; - prolongation of the Revolution due to his genius, 411. - - _Navy, British_, - i. condition in 1793, 69-72; - mutinies in, 72, 73, 232, 236-239; - condition of material, 73-75; - force compared with French navy, 1793, 75; - in 1801, ii. 73; - tardy mobilization in 1793, i. 96, 97; - preponderance of, 110, 287, 290, 291, 324, 325, 328-338; - inefficient action in the Atlantic, i. 162, 338, 339; - ii. deficient strength in 1803, 122-124, 128, 148, 184; - effect on the French Revolution, 395, 405, 406; - increase under Pitt, 404, - and under his successors, 405. - - _Navy, Dutch_, - i. numbers and importance, i. 78; - inaction of, 171; - defeat at Camperdown, 255, 378. - - _Navy, French_, - i. deterioration after 1789, 35-41; - disorders in, 41-50, 60-63; - legislation by National Assemblies, 51-59; - effects of legislation, 59, 60, 122; - condition of officers and seamen, 64-66, 189, 193, 201; - condition of material, 66-68, 163, 179, 253, 338 (note); - force compared with British, 1793, 75; - in 1801, ii. 73; - inferiority in Mediterranean, 1798-1801, i. 287, 290, 291, 324, - 325, 328-334; ii. 25, 59-63; - inferiority and operations in Atlantic, i. 335-338; - ii. peace essential to restore, 69, 81, 107, 184. - - _Navy, Spanish_, - i. numbers of, 75; - inefficiency of, 76-78, 81, 213, 222, 231; - defeat at Cape St. Vincent, 221-228. - - _Nelson_, British Admiral, - i. significance of his services in the Baltic and the Levant, - 14, 22; - services in Corsica, 187; - early actions in the Mediterranean, 191-194; - services on Italian coast, 194-201, 208-212; - professional characteristics, 196, 205, 274, ii. 43-45, 52, 55, - 139, 156, 162, 163, 172; - takes possession of Elba, i. 213; - brilliant conduct at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 226-228; - wounded in expedition against Teneriffe, and returns to - England, 1797, 249; - rejoins fleet off Cadiz, April, 1798, 256; - sent to watch armaments in Toulon, May, 1798, 256; - pursuit of French fleet to Egypt, 258-261; - battle of the Nile, 266-272; - wounded, 272; - merits of, in this battle, 273-277; - sends word to India, 283; - goes to Naples, 284; - blockades Malta, 285; - distrust of Russia, 286, ii. 126; - relations with Sir Sidney Smith, i. 297; - incident of Bruix's incursion into the Mediterranean, 308-321; - return to England, 1800, 330, ii. 37; - views as to the French in Egypt, i. 331; - reasons for refusing chief command in Baltic to, 373, ii. 42; - ii. responsibility for action of Naples in 1798, 1; - detailed as second in command of the Baltic expedition, 37; - his letter to Parker on the political and military situation, - 43-47; - battle of Copenhagen, 48-51; - negotiates an armistice with Denmark, 51; - merit of his conduct, 52; - left in chief command and takes fleet to Revel, 56; - rebuked by the Czar, 57; - appointed to Mediterranean command on renewal of war in - 1803, 98; - difficulties and perplexities, 123-129; - opinion as to the dispositions of Spain in 1804, 139; - goes to Egypt in search of French at Villeneuve's first - sailing, 144; - return off Toulon, 150; - Villeneuve's second sailing, 151; - pursues to West Indies, 152, 159-161; - insight of, 156, 162; - return to Europe, 163, 167, 169, 174; - joins Brest fleet, 174, and returns to England, 175; - joins fleet off Cadiz, 181, 186; - battle of Trafalgar, 187; - death, 192. - - _Nielly_, French rear-admiral, - i. mentioned, 123, 126, 135, 155, 157. - - _Notables_, Assembly of, - i. in France, 1787, 7, 19; - meeting of, in 1788, 24. - - - _Orders_ in Council, British, June 8, 1793, - ii. arresting vessels carrying provisions to France, 233; - Nov. 6, 1793, seizing vessels laden with produce from enemy's - colonies, 234; - partial revocation of this, Jan. 8, 1794, 237; - further relaxation, January, 1798, 242; - Fox's, of May 16, 1806, establishing constructive blockade of - hostile coasts, 269; - Jan. 7, 1807, forbidding neutral trade between hostile - ports, 275; - Nov. 7, 1807, establishing constructive blockade of all ports - whence British flag was excluded, 283-290; - April 26, 1809, modifying those of Nov., 1807, 313; - final revocation of Orders of 1807 and 1809, 351; - analysis of their policy, 351-355. - - - _Paoli_, Corsican leader, - i. relations with Great Britain and France, 88; - promotes union of island to Great Britain, 187; - subsequent discontent, 188. - - _Parker_, Sir Hyde, British admiral, - i. command of Brest Blockade, 373; - ii. of expedition to Baltic, 42-56; - relieved of command, 56; - Nelson's censure of, 56. - - _Paul I._, Czar of Russia, - i. succeeds to the throne, 243; - becomes hostile to French Republic, 281; - interest in Malta, 281, ii. 32; - alliance with Austria, i. 282; - sends squadron to Mediterranean, 286; - ii. Russian army enters Italy, 5; - successes in Italy and reverses in Switzerland, 5-9; - dissatisfaction with his allies, 11, 26; - Bonaparte's advances to, 29-33; - hostile measures toward Great Britain, 33; - formation of Armed Neutrality, 36; - sends ambassador to Bonaparte, 38; - importance to the northern league, 46; - murdered, 51. - - _Peace_, Treaties of, - Amiens, 1802, ii. 81 - (see also preliminaries, 71), - Basle, 1795, i. 172; - Campo Formio, 1797, i. 250; - Lunéville, 1801, ii. 39, 40; - Presburg, 1805, ii. 182; - Vienna, 1809, ii. 316. - Preliminaries of Leoben, 1797, i. 234; - of London, 1801, ii. 71. - - _Pellew_, British admiral, - i. commanding frigate off Brest, 351-354; - action with the "Droits de l'Homme," 357; - commands blockading force off Ferrol, ii. 118; - ii. opinion of the invasion flotilla, 120, - and of the condition of British navy, 123; - able measures for protection of trade in India, 217. - - _Perceval_, British statesman, - ii. statement as to the object of the Orders in Council of - November, 1807, 290, note. - - _Pilnitz_, declaration of, - i. by Austria and Prussia, 28; - effect upon the French people, 29. - - _Pitt_, British statesman, - i. prime minister of Great Britain, 5; - power in the nation, 6; - opposition to Russian advance in the East, 20-24; - attitude toward the French Revolution, 29, 32-34, - ii. 358-367, 382; - treats with France, 1796 and 1797, i. 240, 245; - ii. resigns office, 1801, 70; - supports preliminaries of peace negotiated by Addington - ministry, 72; - statement of object of British government in the war, 74, 75, - 383-385; - speech upon renewal of war in 1803, 99; - attack upon St. Vincent's administration of the navy, 123; - returns to office, and forms Third Coalition, 177, 267; - policy in seizing enemy's colonies defended, 217, 252, 386, - 393-395; - modifies Rule of 1756 and originates commercial war policy of - Great Britain, 242, 263; - speech on the Armed Neutrality of 1800, 260; - measures to restrain American trade with hostile colonies, - 267, 354; - death, 269; - prosperity of Great Britain under his war administration, - 380-382, 394, also 17-19; - comparison between himself and his father, 387-391; - general war policy of, 391-405; - growth of navy under, 404; - success practically attained at his death, 405; - his policy adopted by his successors, 405; - accurate forecast of course of French Revolution, 411. - - _Portugal_, Navy of, - i. in 1793, 78; - traditional alliance with Great Britain, 84; - co-operation with British navy, 162, 285; - French designs against, 219 (and note); - Bonaparte's designs upon, ii. 59, 67, 276, 296; - treaty with France, 77, 81; - Lisbon occupied by Junot's corps, 277; - flight of the Court to Brazil, 277; - ports closed to British trade, 277; - British land and expel Junot, 292; - Wellesley lands in 1809, 315; - British operations in, 318, 348; - Masséna invades, 326; - but forced to retreat, 342, 348. - - _Privateering_, - II. French, number of privateers captured, 1793-1800, 206; - their activity, 207; - privateering in the Channel and North Sea, 207-210; - in the Atlantic, 210-211; - in the West Indies, 211-214; - in the East Indies, 214-218. - - _Prussia_, - i. death of Frederic the Great, 1786, 19; - interference in Holland, 1787, 19; - defensive alliance with Great Britain and Holland, 1788, 21, 22, - King joins in Declaration of Pilnitz, 28; - takes arms against France, 30; - jealousy of Austria, 80, 94; - advance into France, 93; - retreat from France, 103; - inaction in 1794, 103, 171; - makes peace with France, 1795, 172; - guarantee of North German Neutrality, 172; - refusal to join Second Coalition, 282; - ii. rigorous neutrality after 1795, 28; - ambitions of, 31; - hostile attitude toward Great Britain in 1800, 34; - joins Armed Neutrality, 36; - opportunism of, 40; - closes the German rivers against British trade, 54; - subsequent coolness toward Bonaparte, 68; - rebuff from Bonaparte, 69, note; - favored by Bonaparte in apportioning German indemnities, 84; - Bonaparte's pressure upon, 95; - annoyance at Bonaparte's occupation of Hanover, 110; - indignation at murder of the Duc d'Enghien, 177; - Hanover offered to, by Bonaparte, upon conditions, 179; - commercial advantages through neutrality, 251; - war with France, and defeat of Jena, 270; - tyranny of Napoleon over, 301, 311, 319, 322, 324, 325; - share in "neutralizing" traffic, 309. - - - _Richery_, French admiral, - i. commerce-destroying expedition, 202, 214; - shares in expedition against Ireland, 214, 348-353. - - _Rule_ of 1756, - ii. conceded by Russia and the Baltic States, 57, 58, 261, 262; - statement of, 234-236; - seizure of American vessels under, 236-239; - modifications of, by British government, 237, 242, 262, 263, - 269; - evasion of, by American vessels, 253, 266-269; - extension of, by Orders in Council of January, 1807, 275; - tendency and importance of, 353-355, - arguments for and against, 356, also 235, 236. - - _Russia_, - i. relations with Austria, 1780-1790, 9, 11, 16, 17, 19, 24, 25; - advance of, since 1713, 10; - relations to Great Britain in 1770, 11, 12, - and in 1785, 13, 22, 23; - relations with France in 1785, 17; - war with Turkey, 1787, 19; - attempt to send fleet from Baltic to Mediterranean, 20; - war with Sweden, 1788, 21; - successes on Black Sea, 24-27; - peace with Turkey and Sweden, 27; - unfriendly attitude toward French Revolution, 34, 82, ii. 233; - partition of Poland, i. 82; - defensive alliance with Great Britain, 1795, 172; - death of Catharine and accession of Paul I., 243; - difficulties with France, 1798, 281; - joins Second Coalition, 282; - conjointly with Turkey sends fleet against the Ionian - Islands, 286; - ii. Russian army enters Italy, 5; - battles of the Trebia, 6, - and of Novi, 8, - won from the French, 1799; - Russian army marches into Switzerland, 9, - and retires into Bavaria, 11; - reduction of the Ionian Islands, 10; - abandons the Coalition, 11, 19; - dissatisfaction of the Czar, 26; - interest in peace with England, 28, 29, 289, 293, 306, 329; - measures of Paul I. against Great Britain, 32-34; - Armed Neutrality renewed, 36, 260; - admiration of Paul for Bonaparte, 32, 38; - assassination of Paul and accession of Alexander, 51, 56; - convention with Great Britain, 1801, 57, 261; - attitude concerning Malta, 92; - breach with France caused by murder of Duc d'Enghien, 177; - mission to Great Britain and formation of Third Coalition, 177; - effect of Russia upon the struggle between Great Britain and - Napoleon, 200, 401, 409; - war with France, 1807, 273; - conventions of Tilsit between Russia and France, 274, 276, 278, - 310, 329, 405; - war declared against Great Britain, 278, 305; - conventions of Erfurt with Napoleon, 293; - war with Sweden, 1808, 293; - joint letter of Czar and Napoleon to George III., 294; - enforcement of the Continental System, 301, 303, 306, 329, 336, - 406; - peace with Sweden, 1809, 316; - causes leading to war with France in 1812, 325, 330, 336, - 344-346, 397, 401; - alliance with Great Britain and Sweden, 347, 350; - peace with Turkey, 350; - Napoleon's invasion, 351. - - - _Sardinia_, Island of, - i. gives name to Italian Kingdom, 87; - ii. strategic importance of, 87, 128. - - _Sardinia_, Kingdom of, - i. at war with France in 1793, 34; - extent of, 84, 87; - operations of, in 1793, and 1794, 93, 171; - in 1795, 195-198; - defeats by Bonaparte, 1796, 209; - concludes separate peace with France, 209; - cedes islands of Sardinia and San Pietro to France, 246, 248; - ii. Piedmont annexed to France and the Court retires to island of - Sardinia, 2; - interest of the Czars in, 69, note; - British intercession for, 97. - - _Saumarez_, British admiral, - i. commands a ship at Battle of Cape St. Vincent, 233; - commands "Orion" at the Battle of the Nile, 265; - criticism of Nelson's plan, 273; - sails for Gibraltar with the prizes, 284; - summons French garrison at Malta, 285; - commands inshore squadron off Brest, 375; - ii. commands fleet at Battle of Algesiras, 63-66; - commendations of by St. Vincent and Nelson, 65, 66; - commands Baltic fleet, 1808-1812, 294, 297, 313; - eminent services of, 346, 347 (note). - - _Scheldt_, River, - i. question of the, 9, 16, 18; - importance of, 10, 20; - opened to commerce by the French, 31. - - _Schérer_, French general, - i. wins battle of Loano, 198; - relieved by Bonaparte, 203; - ii. inefficiency in 1799, in Italy, 3-5. - - _Sébastiani_, French colonel, - ii. mission to the Levant and report, 93; - Bonaparte's object in publishing, 94, 106; - exasperation in Great Britain, 94; - effect upon British policy, 96, 97. - - _Smith_, Sir Sidney, British naval captain, - i. reputation and character of, 294, 295; - mission to the Mediterranean, 1799, 296; - annoyance of St. Vincent and Nelson, 297; - supports the besieged garrison at Acre, 298-302; - conduct on this occasion considered, 302-304; - accompanies Turkish Expedition against Egypt, 321; - countenances Convention of El Arish in disregard of his orders, - 331-334. - - _Spain_, - i. results of war of 1778 to, 3, 4; - defensive alliance with Russia and Austria, 1789, 25; - Nootka Sound trouble with Great Britain, 44, 45; - condition of navy, 1793, 75-78, 82, 229, 231; - France declares war against, 79; - strategic position and inefficient administration of, 80; - fleet enters Toulon with Hood, 92; - war in Pyrenees, 1793, 104; - evacuation of Toulon, 105; - loss of Trinidad, 120; - disasters on French frontier, 1794, 171; - peace of Basle with France, 1795, 172; - changed relations with Great Britain, 213; - defensive and offensive alliance with France, 214; - naval co-operation with France, 214-216, 348; - naval defeat off Cape St. Vincent, 219-229; - share in Admiral Bruix's Expedition, 307-316; - internal weakness of, in 1799, 311; - ii. Bonaparte's use of, to further his continental policy, 59, - 62, 67; - naval defeat near Cadiz, 1801, 64; - cession of Louisiana to France, 77; - Peace of Amiens with Great Britain, 81; - renewal of war with Great Britain, 1804, 133; - subserviency to Bonaparte's control, 134-136; - subsidies paid to France, 133, 138; - renewed alliance with France, 140; - share in Trafalgar campaign, 151, 154, 162-180; - naval defeat off Cape Finisterre, 169-171; - naval defeat at Trafalgar, 187-195; - revolt against Napoleon, 195, 292, 401; - weakness of colonial administration, 79, 213; - Napoleon's usurpation, 291; - Great Britain assumes Spanish cause, 294; - Napoleon's campaign in, 1808, 295, 298, 315; - Wellesley in, 315, 348, 349; - drain of Spanish war upon Napoleon, 317, 318, 319, 342, 343, - 348, 397, 401, 402. - - _St. André_, Jean Bon, French representative and commissioner, - i. opinions on naval efficiency, 37, 58, 66. - - _States General_, - i. meeting of the, in France, May, 1789, 24, 25. - - _Strategy_, naval, - i. strategic position of Spain, i. 80-82; - of Portugal, 84; - particular importance of Mediterranean islands, 85, 247, 248; - importance of Malta, 87, 258, 319, ii. 92; - Maddalena Bay in Sardinia, 88, ii. 128, 143; - Corsica, i. 88, 186; - general dispositions of British fleet, 1793, 96; - its tardy mobilization, 97, 100; - necessity to Great Britain of forcing French fleets to sea, - 97-100; - Lord Howe's strategic dispositions, 101-103, 125, 162-166, 338, - 339; - strategic value of Toulon, 105; - analogy between British operations in Peninsula and Napoleon's - intended invasion of England, 106-108; - strategic conditions in West Indies, 109-115; - mistakes of the British in West Indies, 116-120; - criticism of naval campaign of May, 1794, 155-160; - faulty dispositions of the Channel fleet, 1793-1800, 165, - 361-366; - policy of an inferior navy deduced from Napoleon's practice, - 179, 180, 304, 305; - strategic influence of the British Mediterranean fleet, 185, - 195-197, 207, 216-218, 233, 254, 255, 277, 280, 282, 287, - 290-292, 324, 325, 328-334, ii. 25, 59-68, 123-125, 129, 159; - Hotham's campaign of 1795 criticised, 198-201; - French commerce-destroying policy, 201-203, 335-337, - ii. 203-210, 221-227; - effects of the Battle of the Nile, 277, 282-284, 287, 291, 325; - strategic importance of Acre, 293, 298, 299, 324; - strategic significance of Bruix's incursion into the - Mediterranean, 304, 318; - St. Vincent's strategic action at this time, 309-312, 314, - 318-321; - contrast between his point of view and that of Lord Keith, 313, - 320, 321; - coincidence of his views with Nelson's, 319, 321; - Nelson's action, 310; - discussion of Bruix's conduct, 316-318; - of the British admirals', 318-321; - policy of evasion entailed by French naval weakness, 335; - strategic problem before Great Britain in the Revolutionary - wars, 338; - its true solution, 339-342; - strategic interest of Ushant, 344; - the winds as strategic factors, 344; - faulty dispositions of the Channel fleet, 1793-1800, 345; - analysis of the effects upon Irish expedition, 1796, 360-366; - changes made by St. Vincent in 1800, 368-371, 374, 375; - their efficacy, 375, 376, ii. 60-66, 106, 118-121, 126, 153, - 166, 183; - Napoleon's estimate of Antwerp, i. 377; - Nelson in the Baltic, ii. 43-47, 51-53; - Napoleon's object in concentrating at Cadiz, 63; - strategic significance of battle of Algesiras, 64-66; - defensive and offensive gain to Great Britain in forcing war, - 1803, 106-108; - Napoleon's combinations for invasion of England, 111-117, 124, - 131-133, 140-142, 145-150; - British measures for thwarting them, 118-122, 126, 148; - Nelson's strategy, 127, 142-144, 150-152, 156, 159-163, 167, - 172, 174, 186, 187; - various surmises and measures of Napoleon during the Trafalgar - campaign, 153-159, 162, 165, 170, 173, 178, 181; - generally accurate strategy of the British authorities, - 157-159, 166, 176, 183; - masterly combination of Lord Barham, 168-170, 184; - mistake of Admiral Calder, 171, 174; - mistake of Cornwallis, 176; - analysis of the strategic chances in the Trafalgar campaign, - 182-185; - character of Villeneuve's error, 196; - strategic effect of the campaign upon the remainder of the - war, 197; - general naval strategy of the British, 1793-1812, 392-411. - - _St. Vincent_, Earl, British admiral (Jervis), - i. expedition to West Indies, 115; - assumes command of Mediterranean fleet, 203; - perfection of fleet under, 206; - professional character, 203-206; - blockade of Toulon, 212; - seizes Elba with a squadron, 213; - ordered to evacuate Corsica, 215; - retires to Gibraltar, 216; firmness of, 217; - ordered to rendezvous at Lisbon, 219; - disasters to fleet, 219; - meeting with Spanish fleet, 221; - battle of Cape St. Vincent, 222-228; - merit of, 228; - created Earl St. Vincent, 229; - establishes blockade of Cadiz, 232; - incident of mutiny, 236 (note); - sends Nelson to Teneriffe, 249; - sends Nelson into the Mediterranean, May, 1798, 256-258; - residence at Gibraltar, 285; - seizes Minorca, 287; - relations with Sir Sidney Smith, 294-297; - conduct during Bruix's incursion into the Mediterranean, 306-321; - health fails, 312; - returns to England, 321; - commands Channel fleet, 368; - methods of watching Brest, 368-375; - becomes First Lord of the Admiralty, 375, ii. 42; - merit of his strategic dispositions, i. 375, 376, ii. 126, 183. - ii. encomium upon Nelson, 53; - upon Saumarez, 65; - his naval dispositions in second war, 119-122, 126; - his inopportune economy, 122, 124, 127, 128, 166; - leaves office, 129; - - _Suwarrow_, Russian marshal, - i. storming of Ismail, 26; - commands corps sent to support Austrians in Italy, 282, 284, ii. 5; - ii. commander-in-chief of allied forces, 5; - victorious campaign in Italy, 5-8; - disastrous march into Switzerland, 9; - declines further co-operation with Austrians, 10. - - _Sweden_, - i. loss of Baltic provinces to Russia, 10; - hostility to Russia, 17; - troops enter Russia, 1788, 21; - supported by Great Britain and Prussia, 21, 25; - interest of western powers in, 22; - subsidized by Turkey, 24; - peace with Russia, 1790, 27; - even balance of naval strength in Baltic, 27; - unfriendly to French Revolution in 1793, 34; - seeks the commercial advantages of neutrality, 83, ii. 233; - loss of West India islands, 1801, i. 121; - ii. joins Armed Neutrality of 1800, 36; - embargo of merchant ships by Great Britain, 53; - convention with Great Britain, 58, 266; - quarrel with France and joins Third Coalition, 177; - Napoleon's exactions from, 231, 317, 322, 345; - summoned by France and Russia to close ports against Great - Britain, 274; - hostilities with Russia, 1808, 293; - British relations with, 1808-1812, 294, 296, 297, 305, 317; - cedes Finland and makes peace with Russia, 316; - formal war with Great Britain, 346. - - _Switzerland_, - i. disturbances in, 1797, 278; - France intervenes by force and changes constitution, 279; - French operations in, 1799, ii. 3-9; - strategic importance in Bonaparte's campaign of 1800, 20, 22; - independence guaranteed at Lunéville, 40; - Bonaparte's intervention in, 1802, 86-88; - action of British ministry thereupon, 88-90; - effect upon course of events, 90-93; - enforcement by Napoleon of his commercial war measures, - 324-326. - - - _Tactics_, Naval, - i. French and British on May 28, 1794, 127-129; - on May 29, 129-134; - June 1, 136-147; - merits of Howe's, 135, 150, 160; - analysis of the results of the battle of June 1, with - deductions, 149-155; - Sir John Jervis at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 224, 225; - Nelson's tactical move on that occasion, 226-228; - dispositions of the French admiral in Aboukir Bay, 263, 264; - contrasted with Hood's at St. Kitts in 1782, 265; - Nelson's tactics at the Nile, concentration on enemy's - van, 266; - arrival of the British reserve, and concentration on - centre, 270; - analysis of Nelson's claim to credit, 273-277; - tactical dispositions before Brest of Bridport, 351, 366, - and of St. Vincent, 371; - ii. tactical anecdotes of Nelson, 39, 45; - tactical surroundings at Copenhagen, 1801, 44; - Nelson's dispositions in consequence, 47, 48; - his tactics at Trafalgar, 188; - analysis of them, 189; - the result, 192-194. - - _Trafalgar_, battle of, - ii. decisive effect upon the course of the war, 196-198. - - _Treaty_, Holland and France, 1795, - offensive and defensive alliance, i. 172, ii. 133; - Jay's, of commerce and navigation, between Great Britain and - United States, 1794, ii. 237-239; - San Ildefouso, offensive and defensive between France and Spain, - 1796, i. 213, ii. 133, - and renewed in 1805, ii. 140; - Tilsit, between France and Russia, 1807, ii. 274; - conventions, of El Arish between Turkey and French - commander-in-chief in Egypt, 1799, i. 332-334; - of Great Britain and Russia concerning neutral navigation, 1801, - ii. 57, 261. - - See also "Peace" and "Armed Neutrality." - - _Troubridge_, British captain, - i. Nelson's praise of, 75; - leads the fleet at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent, 224, 227; - misfortune at the Battle of the Nile, 269; - bombardment of Alexandria, 297; - services at Naples, 308. - - _Turkey_, Empire of, - i. encroachments of Russia upon, 10; - natural ally of France, 12, 22; - treaty of Kainardji, 1774, 13; - declares war against Russia, 1787, 19; - war with Austria, 19; - relations to Great Britain in 1790, 23; - military reverses, 24, 26; - peace with Austria and Russia, 25, 27; - disorganized condition in 1793, 85; - territorial limits, 85; - Bonaparte's estimate of strength of, 248; - effect of battle of the Nile upon, 277; - war declared against France, 278; - Russo-Turkish fleet enters Mediterranean, 286; - troops sent to Acre, 301; - unfortunate landing in Aboukir Bay, 322; - convention for the evacuation of Egypt, 332; - ii. capture of the Ionian Islands, 10; - peace with France, 77; - misrule in Egypt, 150; - hostilities with Great Britain, 278. - - _Two Sicilies_, The, - i. navy of, in 1793, 78; - attitude toward French Revolution, 84; - effect of Bonaparte's victories upon, 1796, 211; - abandons the Coalition, 211; - strategic importance of, 218; - dissatisfaction at French advance in Italy, 279; - defensive alliance with Austria, 282; - Nelson's arrival in Naples, 285; - ii. premature hostilities with France, 1; - the Court flies to Palermo, 2; - Naples occupied by French troops, 2; - French forced to evacuate the Kingdom, 6; - French division occupies the heel of Italy after Marengo, 59; - evacuates after Peace of Amiens 71; - reoccupation after renewal of war in 1803, 109; - part played in Napoleon's combinations, 110, 124, 185; - Joseph Bonaparte, King of, 278. - - - _United States_, - difficulties with France, 1793-1797, i. 241, ii 242-248; - ii. cession of Louisiana by Spain to France, 78; - jealousy of political interference on the American continent by - European nations, 103; - uneasiness at cession of Louisiana, 104; - buys Louisiana of France, 105; - sufferings from privateers in the West Indies, 1805, 213; - importance of American carrying trade, 231; - growth of merchant shipping, 232; - injuries under Rule of 1756, 233-237; - Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Great Britain, 1794, - 237-239; - difficulties with France arising thence, 239; - relations with Great Britain, 1794-1804, 241; - French aggressions upon American shipping, 242-246; - demands of Spain and Holland, 247; - course of trade with Europe, 1793-1804, 253, 254, 354; - hostilities with France, 1798-1800, 258; - trade with belligerent colonies, 266-268, 353; - British seizures of American ships, 1804, 269; - commercial treaty of 1806 with Great Britain rejected by - Senate, 275; - effect upon American trade of British Order of January, - 1807, 276; - Embargo Act of December, 1807, 282, - succeeded by Non-Intercourse Act, 1809, 283; - importance of American market to Great Britain, 291; - losses by Napoleon's decrees of Bayonne and Rambouillet, 292; - American ships in Dutch ports confiscated by Napoleon, 320, - 321; - expiration of Non-Intercourse Act, and proviso succeeding it, - 331; - American trade in Baltic, 1809-1812, 345, and note; - declaration of war against Great Britain, 351. - - - _Van Stabel_, French rear-admiral, - i. escape of, from Lord Howe, 66; - protects large convoy from America, 123; - brings it safely to Brest, 161. - - "_Vengeur_," French ship-of-the-line, - i. desperate action with the British ship "Brunswick," 140-143; - sinks, 144. - - _Venice_, Republic of, - i. deprived of possessions on Italian mainland, also Istria and - Dalmatia, 235; - insurrection against French, 246; - conduct of Bonaparte toward, 247-249; - annihilation of, 250. - - _Villaret-Joyeuse_, French admiral, - i. letters of, 56; - position before Revolution, 57; - sails in command of Brest fleet, 124; - meeting with British fleet, 126; - manœuvres of, May 28 and 29, 1794, 126-134; - conduct in battle of June 1, 136-139, 144-147; - strategy of, 159, 160; - anecdote, 160 (note); - winter cruise of, January, 1795, 163, 164; - action with Lord Bridport, 177-178; - appointed to command fleet in Irish Expedition, 1796, 349; - views as to the expedition, 349; - detached from it at Hoche's request, 350. - - _Villeneuve_, French admiral, - i. sent with a division from Toulon to Brest, 220; - commands the rear division at battle of the Nile, 271; - conduct of, 272; - ii. appointed to command the Toulon squadron in 1804, 130; - Napoleon's instructions to, 142, 149, 164; - first sortie from Toulon, 143; - return to port, 144; - second sailing and arrival in West Indies, 151; - inaction there, 161, - and return to Europe, 162; - meeting with Calder's fleet, 169, 171; - anchors in Vigo Bay and thence goes to Ferrol, 173; - sails from Ferrol for Brest, 179, - but bears up for Cadiz, 180; - Napoleon's charges against, 185; - battle of Trafalgar, 187-195; - criticism of, 196. - - - _Wellesley_, British general, - ii. landing in Portugal, 1808, and victory of Vimiero, 292; - landing in Lisbon, 1809, beginning of Peninsular command, and - operations in Portugal, 315; - lines of Torres Vedras, 318; - capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, 348, 349. - - _West Indies_, commercial importance of, - in the French Revolution, i. 109, 110; - character of military control required, 110-112, ii. 252; - military importance of Lesser Antilles, i. 114, 117, 119; - military and naval operations in, 115-121; - ii. French Expedition to, 1801, ii. 78, 94, 103; - Nelson's estimate of, 160; - American trade with, 232, 236-238, 245, 253, 266-269; - importance to British commercial system, 252, and note, 393. - - - - - +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ - | | - | Transcriber's Note: | - | | - | Minor typographical errors have been corrected without note. | - | | - | Italicized words are surrounded by underline characters, _like | - | this_. | - | | - | Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant | - | form was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed. | - | | - | Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. | - | | - | Word combinations that appeared with and without hyphens were | - | changed to the predominant form if it could be determined. | - | | - | Footnotes were moved to the end of the book and numbered in one | - | continuous sequence. | - | | - | In the index the numbers i. and ii. refer to volumes i. and ii. | - +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Influence of Sea Power upon the -French Revolution and Empire 1793-1, by Alfred Thayer Mahan - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER *** - -***** This file should be named 52589-0.txt or 52589-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/2/5/8/52589/ - -Produced by StevenGibbs, Christian Boissonnas and the -Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812, Vol II (of 2) - -Author: Alfred Thayer Mahan - -Release Date: July 23, 2016 [EBook #52589] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER *** - - - - -Produced by StevenGibbs, Christian Boissonnas and the -Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<div class="transnote"> -<p class="ac">Transcriber's Note:</p> -<p>This book was published in two volumes, of which this is the second. The first - volume was released as Project Gutenberg ebook #52588, available at - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/52588">http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/52588</a></p> -</div> - -<div class="chapter p4"> -<h1 class="no-break"><span class="x-smaller">THE</span><br /><br /> -INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER<br /><br /> -<span class="xx-smaller">UPON THE</span><br /><br /> -<span class="smaller">FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE<br /><br /> -1793-1812</span></h1> -</div> - -<p class="ac p2">BY</p> - -<p class="ac">CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN, U.S.N.</p> - -<p class="ac xx-smaller">PRESIDENT UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE</p> - -<p class="ac x-smaller">AUTHOR OF "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, - 1660-1783"<br /> -OF "THE GULF AND INLAND WATERS," AND OF A<br /> -"LIFE OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT"</p> - -<p class="ac p2">IN TWO VOLUMES</p> - -<p class="ac"><span class="sc">Vol. II.</span></p> - -<p class="ac p4">FOURTH EDITION.</p> - -<p class="ac p4">LONDON</p> - -<p class="ac smaller">SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, SEARLE, & RIVINGTON<br /> -<span class="x-smaller">(LIMITED)</span> -</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p class="ac p4">University Press:<br /> -John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, U.S.A.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii">[Pg iii]</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter p4"> -<h2>CONTENTS OF VOL. II.</h2> -</div> - -<table id="TOC" summary="CONTENTS"> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="chap-head"><a name="Chapter_12" id="Chapter_12"></a> - <a href="#CHAPTER_XII">CHAPTER XII</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="chap-head"><span class="sc">Events on the Continent, - 1798-1800.</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="chapsum"><span class="sc">Disorders of France under - the Directory.—Disastrous War of the Second Coalition.—Establishment of the - Consulate.—Bonaparte Overthrows Austria and Frames - against Great Britain the Armed Neutrality of 1800.—Peace - of Lunéville with Austria.</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="c2 smaller">Page</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_1">Hostilities of Naples against the French</a></td> - <td class="c2">1</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_2">Disastrous defeat of the Neapolitans</a></td> - <td class="c2">2</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_2">The French enter Naples</a></td> - <td class="c2">2</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_2">Piedmont annexed to France</a></td> - <td class="c2">2</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_3">Beginning of the war of the Second Coalition</a></td> - <td class="c2">3</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_3">Reverses of the French in Germany and Italy</a></td> - <td class="c2">3</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_4">Masséna falls back in Switzerland</a></td> - <td class="c2">4</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_5">Further French disasters in Italy</a></td> - <td class="c2">5</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_6">The French evacuate southern Italy</a></td> - <td class="c2">6</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_6">Battle of the Trebia won by Suwarrow</a></td> - <td class="c2">6</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_7">Loss of northern Italy by the French</a></td> - <td class="c2">7</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_8">The French defeated at the battle of Novi by - Suwarrow</a></td> - <td class="c2">8</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_8">Change in the plans of the Coalition</a></td> - <td class="c2">8</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_9">Masséna defeats the allies at the battle - of Zurich</a></td> - <td class="c2">9</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_9">Disastrous march of Suwarrow into Switzerland</a></td> - <td class="c2">9</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_10">Failure of the Anglo-Russian expedition - against Holland</a></td> - <td class="c2">10</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_10">Loss of Bonaparte's conquests in Italy and of the - Ionian Islands</a></td> - <td class="c2">10</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_11">Internal disorders of France</a></td> - <td class="c2">11</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_15">Bonaparte's return, and the revolution of - Brumaire 18</a></td> - <td class="c2">15</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_15">Bonaparte's measures to restore order</a></td> - <td class="c2">15</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_16">His advances toward Great Britain and Austria - to obtain peace</a></td> - <td class="c2">16</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_17">Reasons of the two governments for refusing</a> - <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iv" id="Page_iv">[Pg iv]</a></span></td> - <td class="c2">17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_17">Prosperity of Great Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_19">Russia abandons the coalition</a></td> - <td class="c2">19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_19">Forces of France and Austria in 1800</a></td> - <td class="c2">19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_20">Bonaparte's plan of campaign</a></td> - <td class="c2">20</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_21">Opening of the campaign in Italy</a></td> - <td class="c2">21</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_21">Masséna shut up in Genoa</a></td> - <td class="c2">21</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_21">Moreau's advance into Germany</a></td> - <td class="c2">21</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_22">Bonaparte crosses the Saint Bernard</a></td> - <td class="c2">22</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_23">Battle of Marengo, and armistice following it</a></td> - <td class="c2">23</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_24">Armistice in Germany</a></td> - <td class="c2">24</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_25">Diplomatic negotiations</a></td> - <td class="c2">25</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_25">Bonaparte's colonial and maritime anxieties</a></td> - <td class="c2">25</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_26">The Czar Paul I.'s hostility to Great Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">26</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_26">Dispute between England and Denmark concerning - neutral rights</a></td> - <td class="c2">26</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_27">Effect of this upon Bonaparte's plans</a></td> - <td class="c2">27</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_28">Policy of Russia and Prussia</a></td> - <td class="c2">28</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_29">Bonaparte undertakes to form a coalition against - Great Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">29</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_29">Factors in the question</a></td> - <td class="c2">29</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_31">Vacillations of Prussia</a></td> - <td class="c2">31</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_32">Bonaparte's advances to Russia</a></td> - <td class="c2">32</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_33">Hostile action of Paul I. toward Great Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">33</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_33">His pretensions to Malta</a></td> - <td class="c2">33</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_34">Negotiations for a maritime truce</a></td> - <td class="c2">34</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_35">Their failure</a></td> - <td class="c2">35</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_35">Action of Prussia against Great Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">35</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_36">Armed Neutrality of 1800</a></td> - <td class="c2">36</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_37">Its claims</a></td> - <td class="c2">37</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_38">Renewal of hostilities between Austria - and France</a></td> - <td class="c2">38</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_38">Defeat of Austria at the battle of - Hohenlinden</a></td> - <td class="c2">38</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_39">Peace of Lunéville</a></td> - <td class="c2">39</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_40">Terms of the treaty</a></td> - <td class="c2">40</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="chap-head"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">CHAPTER XIII</a> - <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[Pg v]</a></span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="chap-head"><span class="sc">Events of 1801.</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="chapsum"><span class="sc">British Expedition to the - Baltic.—Battle of Copenhagen.—Bonaparte's futile Attempts to contest Control - of the Sea.—His Continental Policy.—Preliminaries of Peace with Great Britain, - October, 1801.—Influence of Sea Power, so far, on the Course of the - Revolution.</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_41">Isolation of Great Britain in Europe, in 1801</a></td> - <td class="c2">41</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_41">Expedition to the Baltic planned</a></td> - <td class="c2">41</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_42">Instructions to Sir Hyde Parker, - commander-in-chief</a></td> - <td class="c2">42</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_42">Nelson second in command</a></td> - <td class="c2">42</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_42">The fleet sails</a></td> - <td class="c2">42</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_43">Nelson's plan of operations</a></td> - <td class="c2">43</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_44">The military situation, strategic and tactical</a></td> - <td class="c2">44</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_45">Characteristics of Nelson's military genius</a></td> - <td class="c2">45</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_46">Denmark's relation to the league of the - northern States</a></td> - <td class="c2">46</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_47">Half measures of Sir Hyde Parker</a></td> - <td class="c2">47</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_47">Nelson advances against Copenhagen</a></td> - <td class="c2">47</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_48">Battle of Copenhagen</a></td> - <td class="c2">48</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_51">Results of the battle</a></td> - <td class="c2">51</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_51">Nelson's negotiations with the Danish - government</a></td> - <td class="c2">51</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_51">Armistice concluded with Denmark</a></td> - <td class="c2">51</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_51">Assassination of the Czar Paul I.</a></td> - <td class="c2">51</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_52">Merits of Nelson's conduct in the Baltic</a></td> - <td class="c2">52</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_53">British embargo upon merchant ships of the - Baltic powers</a></td> - <td class="c2">53</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_54">Resulting retaliatory action of Prussia</a></td> - <td class="c2">54</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_55">Inherent weakness of the Northern League</a></td> - <td class="c2">55</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_55">Conciliatory action of the new Czar</a></td> - <td class="c2">55</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_56">Sir Hyde Parker relieved from command</a></td> - <td class="c2">56</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_56">Nelson takes the British fleet to Revel</a></td> - <td class="c2">56</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_57">His action rebuked by the Czar</a></td> - <td class="c2">57</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_57">Convention between Great Britain and Russia</a></td> - <td class="c2">57</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_57">Dissolution of the Armed Neutrality</a></td> - <td class="c2">57</td> - </tr> <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_58">Nature of the claims maintained by it</a></td> - <td class="c2">58</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_59">Bonaparte's proceedings in the Italian and - Spanish peninsulas</a></td> - <td class="c2">59</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_60">Failure of his maritime projects for the relief of - Malta and Egypt</a></td> - <td class="c2">60</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_63">His attempt to collect a naval force in Cadiz</a></td> - <td class="c2">63</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_64">Naval battle of Algesiras, and its - consequences</a></td> - <td class="c2">64</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_65">Strategic significance of these events</a> - <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[Pg vi]</a></span></td> - <td class="c2">65</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_67">Cession of Louisiana by Spain to France</a></td> - <td class="c2">67</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_67">Bonaparte's intended occupation of Portugal - frustrated</a></td> - <td class="c2">67</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_68">His diplomatic dilemma in the summer of 1801</a></td> - <td class="c2">68</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_69">Coolness towards him of Russia and Prussia</a></td> - <td class="c2">69</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_69">Triumphant influence of the British Sea Power</a></td> - <td class="c2">69</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_70">Preliminaries of Peace between Great Britain - and France</a></td> - <td class="c2">70</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_71">Terms of the preliminaries signed at London, - October, 1801</a></td> - <td class="c2">71</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_72">Cessation of hostilities</a></td> - <td class="c2">72</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_72">Criticism of the terms by the British - Opposition</a></td> - <td class="c2">72</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_74">Influence of Sea Power upon the course of - the Revolution</a></td> - <td class="c2">74</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_75">Pitt's opinions</a></td> - <td class="c2">75</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="chap-head"><a name="Chapter_14" id="Chapter_14"></a> - <a href="#CHAPTER_XIV">CHAPTER XIV</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="chap-head"><span class="sc">Outline of Events from the - Signature of the Preliminaries to the Rupture of the Peace of Amiens.</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_76">Unstable character of the settlement of 1801</a></td> - <td class="c2">76</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_77">Treaties with Turkey and Portugal contracted - secretly by France</a></td> - <td class="c2">77</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_78">Impression produced in Great Britain by these and by - the cession of Louisiana</a></td> - <td class="c2">78</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_78">Expedition sent to Haïti by Bonaparte</a></td> - <td class="c2">78</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_79">Delays in negotiating the definitive treaty</a></td> - <td class="c2">79</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_80">Bonaparte accepts the presidency of the - Cisalpine Republic</a></td> - <td class="c2">80</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_80">Effect produced in Great Britain by this step</a></td> - <td class="c2">80</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_81">Signature of the Peace of Amiens, - March 25, 1802</a></td> - <td class="c2">81</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_81">Provisions concerning Malta</a></td> - <td class="c2">81</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_82">Illusive effects caused by Bonaparte's system of - secret treaties</a></td> - <td class="c2">82</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_83">Annihilation of the Sea Power of France</a></td> - <td class="c2">83</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_83">Bonaparte proclaimed First Consul for life</a></td> - <td class="c2">83</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_84">Action of Bonaparte in the German indemnities</a></td> - <td class="c2">84</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_85">Injury to Austria and annoyance of - Great Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">85</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_85">Bonaparte's reclamations against the - British press</a></td> - <td class="c2">85</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_85">Piedmont and Elba formally incorporated - with France</a></td> - <td class="c2">85</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_86">The Valais wrested from Switzerland for - military reasons</a></td> - <td class="c2">86</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_87">Bonaparte's armed intervention in - Switzerland, 1802</a></td> - <td class="c2">87</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_88">Emotion of Europe and remonstrance of - Great Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">88</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_89">The British ministry countermands restitution - of captured colonies</a></td> - <td class="c2">89</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_89">Bonaparte's wrath at the British remonstrance</a></td> - <td class="c2">89</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_90">Strained relations between the two States</a></td> - <td class="c2">90</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_91">Bonaparte demands the evacuation of Egypt and Malta</a> - <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span></td> - <td class="c2">91</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_91">Attitude of the British ministry - concerning Malta</a></td> - <td class="c2">91</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_92">Causes of the delay in evacuating it</a></td> - <td class="c2">92</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_92">Importance of Malta</a></td> - <td class="c2">92</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_93">Broad ground now taken by the ministry</a></td> - <td class="c2">93</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_93">Publication of Sébastiani's report, - January, 1803</a></td> - <td class="c2">93</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_94">Its effect in Great Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">94</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_94">Disasters of the French in Haïti</a></td> - <td class="c2">94</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_95">Bonaparte's preponderant interest in Malta - and the East</a></td> - <td class="c2">95</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_96">High tone now assumed by the British ministry</a></td> - <td class="c2">96</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_96">Additional provocation given by Bonaparte</a></td> - <td class="c2">96</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_97">Ominous proceedings of the ministry</a></td> - <td class="c2">97</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_98">The British ultimatum</a></td> - <td class="c2">98</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_98">Great Britain declares war, May 16, 1803</a></td> - <td class="c2">98</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_98">Universal character of the strife thus renewed</a></td> - <td class="c2">98</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_99">Unanimity of feeling in Great Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">99</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_100">Pitt's forecast of the nature of the struggle</a></td> - <td class="c2">100</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="chap-head"><a name="Chapter_15" id="Chapter_15"></a> - <a href="#CHAPTER_XV">CHAPTER XV</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="chap-head"><span class="sc">The Trafalgar Campaign to the - Spanish Declaration of War. May, 1803—December, 1804.</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="chapsum"><span class="sc">Preparations for the Invasion - of England.—The Great Flotilla.—Napoleon's Military and Naval Combinations, - and British Naval Strategy.—Essential Unity of Napoleon's Purpose.—Causes of - Spanish War.</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_101">Preparations of the two States</a></td> - <td class="c2">101</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_104">Cession of Louisiana to the United States</a></td> - <td class="c2">104</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_105">Effect of the British Sea Power upon - this measure</a></td> - <td class="c2">105</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_105">Resources of Great Britain and France as - affected by their social systems</a></td> - <td class="c2">105</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_106">Offensive and defensive gain to Great Britain by - forcing the war</a></td> - <td class="c2">106</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_107">Inconvenience to Bonaparte from the - premature outbreak</a></td> - <td class="c2">107</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_108">Exhaustion of France under the pressure - of Sea Power</a></td> - <td class="c2">108</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_109">Bonaparte's resolution to invade - Great Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">109</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_109">Seizure by him of Hanover and of the - Heel of Italy</a></td> - <td class="c2">109</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_110">Object of these measures</a></td> - <td class="c2">110</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_110">Offence and injury to Prussia by - occupation of Hanover</a></td> - <td class="c2">110</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_111">French troops quartered on Holland, - Hanover, and Naples</a></td> - <td class="c2">111</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_111">Bonaparte's plans for the invasion of England</a> - <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[Pg viii]</a></span></td> - <td class="c2">111</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_112">His naval combinations to that end</a></td> - <td class="c2">112</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_113">Building of the great flotilla</a></td> - <td class="c2">113</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_114">Its points of concentration described</a></td> - <td class="c2">114</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_115">Difficulties of the undertaking</a></td> - <td class="c2">115</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_116">Certainty of Napoleon's purpose</a></td> - <td class="c2">116</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_117">Interesting character of this - historical crisis</a></td> - <td class="c2">117</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_118">Strategic effect of the British - blockading squadrons</a></td> - <td class="c2">118</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_119">Strategic dispositions in the British Channel</a></td> - <td class="c2">119</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_120">Security felt by British naval officers</a></td> - <td class="c2">120</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_121">St. Vincent's opposition to small gun-vessels</a></td> - <td class="c2">121</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_121">The Sea Fencibles</a></td> - <td class="c2">121</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_122">Deterioration of naval material under St. Vincent's - administration</a></td> - <td class="c2">122</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_123">Effects upon the Channel and - Mediterranean ships</a></td> - <td class="c2">123</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_124">Embarrassment caused to Nelson</a></td> - <td class="c2">124</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_124">Bonaparte's naval combination hinges upon Nelson's - perplexities</a></td> - <td class="c2">124</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_125">Details of his first plan</a></td> - <td class="c2">125</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_126">Merits of St. Vincent's general - strategic dispositions</a></td> - <td class="c2">126</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_127">Nelson's uncertainties as to the - French purposes</a></td> - <td class="c2">127</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_127">His certainty as to his own course</a></td> - <td class="c2">127</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_128">Embarrassment caused by the - condition of his ships</a></td> - <td class="c2">128</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_129">Delays encountered by Napoleon</a></td> - <td class="c2">129</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_130">Death of the commander of the Toulon fleet</a></td> - <td class="c2">130</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_130">Villeneuve appointed to succeed him</a></td> - <td class="c2">130</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_131">Change of detail in Napoleon's naval - combination</a></td> - <td class="c2">131</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_132">Significance of this new combination</a></td> - <td class="c2">132</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_133">War begins between Great Britain and Spain</a></td> - <td class="c2">133</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_133">Train of causes which led to this outbreak</a></td> - <td class="c2">133</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_137">Detention of the Spanish treasure-ships</a></td> - <td class="c2">137</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="chap-head"><a name="Chapter_16" id="Chapter_16"></a> - <a href="#CHAPTER_XVI">CHAPTER XVI</a> - <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</a></span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="chap-head"><span class="sc">The Trafalgar - Campaign—Concluded. January—October, 1805.</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="chapsum"><span class="sc">Successive Modifications of - Napoleon's Plan.—Narrative of Naval Movements.—Final Failure of Napoleon's - Naval Combinations.—War with Austria, and Battle of Austerlitz.—Battle of - Trafalgar.—Vital Change imposed upon Napoleon's Policy by the Result of the - Naval Campaign.</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_140">Napoleon has direction of both Spanish - and French fleets</a></td> - <td class="c2">140</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_141">His lack of familiarity with maritime - difficulties</a></td> - <td class="c2">141</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_142">Instructions to the Rochefort - and Toulon admirals</a></td> - <td class="c2">142</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_142">The Rochefort squadron puts to sea</a></td> - <td class="c2">142</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_143">Delay, and final departure, of the - Toulon fleet</a></td> - <td class="c2">143</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_143">Nelson's movements</a></td> - <td class="c2">143</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_144">He takes his fleet to Alexandria</a></td> - <td class="c2">144</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_144">The Toulon ships being crippled in a gale, Villeneuve - returns to Toulon</a></td> - <td class="c2">144</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_146">Napoleon's plans again modified by this delay</a></td> - <td class="c2">146</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_147">Stations of the British and Allied fleets - in March, 1805</a></td> - <td class="c2">147</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_149">Napoleon's new instructions to his admirals</a></td> - <td class="c2">149</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a href="#Page_150">Return of Nelson to Toulon, and his - subsequent movements</a></td> - <td class="c2">150</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_151">Second Sailing of Villeneuve</a></td> - <td class="c2">151</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_151">Joined by a Spanish division at Cadiz, and reaches - Martinique</a></td> - <td class="c2">151</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_152">Nelson's uncertainties and head winds</a></td> - <td class="c2">152</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_152">He reaches Gibraltar, and follows Villeneuve to West - Indies</a></td> - <td class="c2">152</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_153">Napoleon goes to Italy</a></td> - <td class="c2">153</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_154">His naval measures and surmises</a></td> - <td class="c2">154</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_156">Nelson's sound strategy and sagacity</a></td> - <td class="c2">156</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_157">Miscalculations of Napoleon</a></td> - <td class="c2">157</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_159">The measures of the British Admiralty</a></td> - <td class="c2">159</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_161">Nelson in the West Indies</a></td> - <td class="c2">161</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_161">Divergent directions taken by the hostile fleets</a></td> - <td class="c2">161</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_162">Villeneuve returns to Europe</a></td> - <td class="c2">162</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_163">Nelson penetrates his intention and sails in pursuit</a></td> - <td class="c2">163</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_164">Napoleon sends to Ferrol instructions for Villeneuve</a></td> - <td class="c2">164</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_165">Napoleon's efforts to distract the British navy</a></td> - <td class="c2">165</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_166">The British resist the diversions raised for them</a></td> - <td class="c2">166</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_167">Villeneuve sighted at sea by a dispatch ship from Nelson</a></td> - <td class="c2">167</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_168">The news brought to London</a> - <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a></span></td> - <td class="c2">168</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_168">Energetic and skilful measures of the Admiralty</a></td> - <td class="c2">168</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_169">Villeneuve intercepted by Calder off Cape Finisterre</a></td> - <td class="c2">169</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_169">Nelson reaches Gibraltar</a></td> - <td class="c2">169</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_170">Napoleon misled by the rapidity of the British action</a></td> - <td class="c2">170</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_171">Napoleon goes to Boulogne to await Villeneuve</a></td> - <td class="c2">171</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_171">The engagement between Calder and Villeneuve</a></td> - <td class="c2">171</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_172">Subsequent mistakes of the British admiral</a></td> - <td class="c2">172</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_173">Villeneuve puts into Vigo, and reaches Coruña</a></td> - <td class="c2">173</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_174">Calder joins Cornwallis off Brest</a></td> - <td class="c2">174</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_174">Nelson also joins Cornwallis from Gibraltar</a></td> - <td class="c2">174</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_175">Strategic advantage now in the hands of the British</a></td> - <td class="c2">175</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_176">Cornwallis divides his fleet and destroys his advantage</a></td> - <td class="c2">176</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_176">Imminent hostilities on the Continent</a></td> - <td class="c2">176</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_177">The Third Coalition formed</a></td> - <td class="c2">177</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_178">Urgent orders from Napoleon to Villeneuve</a></td> - <td class="c2">178</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_179">Napoleon's decision as to his own movements</a></td> - <td class="c2">179</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_179">Villeneuve sails from Coruña for Brest</a></td> - <td class="c2">179</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_180">He abandons his purpose and enters Cadiz</a></td> - <td class="c2">180</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_181">The allied fleets blockaded in Cadiz by Collingwood</a></td> - <td class="c2">181</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_181">Napoleon's campaign of 1805 in Germany</a></td> - <td class="c2">181</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_182">Battle of Austerlitz and peace of Presburg</a></td> - <td class="c2">182</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_182">Fate of the great flotilla</a></td> - <td class="c2">182</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_182">Discussion of the chances of Napoleon's project of - invasion</a></td> - <td class="c2">182</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_184">Necessity of making the attempt</a></td> - <td class="c2">184</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_185">Napoleon's orders to Villeneuve in Cadiz</a></td> - <td class="c2">185</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_186">Nelson takes command off Cadiz</a></td> - <td class="c2">186</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_187">The combined fleets put to sea</a></td> - <td class="c2">187</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_188">Nelson's tactics at Trafalgar discussed</a></td> - <td class="c2">188</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_190">Battle of Trafalgar</a></td> - <td class="c2">190</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_192">Death of Nelson</a></td> - <td class="c2">192</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_194">Nautical disasters succeeding the battle</a></td> - <td class="c2">194</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_195">Immediate results of the battle</a></td> - <td class="c2">195</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_195">Subsequent fate of the French ships in Cadiz</a></td> - <td class="c2">195</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_196">Momentous consequences flowing from the battle of - Trafalgar</a></td> - <td class="c2">196</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_197">Commerce-destroying henceforth the sole resource - of Napoleon</a></td> - <td class="c2">197</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="chap-head"><a name="Chapter_17" id="Chapter_17"></a> - <a href="#CHAPTER_XVII">CHAPTER XVII</a> - <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="chap-head"><span class="sc">The Warfare against Commerce - during the French Revolution and Empire, to the Berlin Decree. 1793-1806.</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_199">Characteristics of the Warfare against Commerce</a></td> - <td class="c2">199</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_200">Measures of France and of Great Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">200</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_201">Conduct of Napoleon and of the ministry contrasted</a></td> - <td class="c2">201</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_202">Identity of the methods of the Republic and of - the Emperor</a></td> - <td class="c2">202</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_203">Primary measures of the belligerents</a></td> - <td class="c2">203</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_204">Twofold system of Great Britain for the protection of trade</a></td> - <td class="c2">204</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_205">Seamen a part of the military strength of a nation</a></td> - <td class="c2">205</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_205">The British Convoy Act</a></td> - <td class="c2">205</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_206">Results to France of her dependence upon - commerce-destroying</a></td> - <td class="c2">206</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_207">Activity of French cruisers</a></td> - <td class="c2">207</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_207">Amount and distribution of British trade</a></td> - <td class="c2">207</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_208">Character of French Channel privateers</a></td> - <td class="c2">208</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_210">Indifferent efficiency of many British cruisers</a></td> - <td class="c2">210</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_210">French privateering in the Atlantic</a></td> - <td class="c2">210</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_211">French privateering in the West Indies</a></td> - <td class="c2">211</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_213">Its piratical character, arising from remoteness - from Europe</a></td> - <td class="c2">213</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_214">Size and force of British East India ships</a></td> - <td class="c2">214</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_215">Consequent character of French privateering in - Indian seas</a></td> - <td class="c2">215</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_216">Efficient protection of British trade in India</a></td> - <td class="c2">216</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_217">Advantages of the convoy system</a></td> - <td class="c2">217</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_218">Destruction of French commerce by British control - of the sea</a></td> - <td class="c2">218</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_219">Numbers of British captures</a></td> - <td class="c2">219</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_219">The French flag swept from the sea</a></td> - <td class="c2">219</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_220">Annihilation of French commerce except the coasting trade</a></td> - <td class="c2">220</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_221">Discussion of the number and value of British - vessels captured</a></td> - <td class="c2">221</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_226">Deductions as to the losses of Great Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">226</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_227">Swelling prosperity of the country</a></td> - <td class="c2">227</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_228">Support to British trade contributed by neutral shipping</a></td> - <td class="c2">228</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_230">Conclusions thence drawn by the French government</a></td> - <td class="c2">230</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_231">Effect of the appearance of the United States as - neutral carriers</a></td> - <td class="c2">231</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_232">Rapid increase of American merchant shipping</a></td> - <td class="c2">232</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_233">Other neutral carriers</a></td> - <td class="c2">233</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_233">Attitude taken by Russia in 1793</a></td> - <td class="c2">233</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_234">Severe restrictions on neutrals imposed by Great Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">234</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_234">Rule of 1756</a></td> - <td class="c2">234</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_236">Seizures of American ships in West Indies, 1793</a></td> - <td class="c2">236</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_237">Jay's Mission to Great Britain, 1794</a></td> - <td class="c2">237</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_238">Terms of treaty concluded by him</a> - <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[Pg xii]</a></span></td> - <td class="c2">238</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_239">Indignation of French government</a></td> - <td class="c2">239</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_240">Effect of Jay's treaty upon American relations with Great - Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">240</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_242">Gradual shaping of British commercial war policy</a></td> - <td class="c2">242</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_242">Vacillating action of French government towards neutrals</a></td> - <td class="c2">242</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_244">France breaks off relations with the United States</a></td> - <td class="c2">244</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_244">French aggressions upon neutrals after 1796</a></td> - <td class="c2">244</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_246">Embargo upon American vessels in 1793</a></td> - <td class="c2">246</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_246">Growing exasperation between France and the United States</a></td> - <td class="c2">246</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_247">Effect of Bonaparte's successes upon French foreign policy</a></td> - <td class="c2">247</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_248">Early attempts to stifle British trade</a></td> - <td class="c2">248</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_249">Determination to arrest neutral trade with Great Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">249</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_250">Law of January 18, 1798</a></td> - <td class="c2">250</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_250">Modification of channels of British trade caused by - the war</a></td> - <td class="c2">250</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_252">Policy of Pitt in seeking to dominate the Caribbean Sea</a></td> - <td class="c2">252</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_253">Carriage of tropical produce by neutrals</a></td> - <td class="c2">253</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_254">Course of trade in Europe, 1793-1798</a></td> - <td class="c2">254</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_254">Effects of the law of January 18, 1798</a></td> - <td class="c2">254</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_255">Discussion in the Conseil des Anciens, January, 1799</a></td> - <td class="c2">255</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_258">Measures of the United States caused by the law of - January 18</a></td> - <td class="c2">258</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_258"><i>Quasi</i> war of 1798 with France</a></td> - <td class="c2">258</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_259">French reverses in 1799</a></td> - <td class="c2">259</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_260">French successes in 1800</a></td> - <td class="c2">260</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_260">Questions involved in the Armed Neutrality of 1800</a></td> - <td class="c2">260</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_261">Opinions of Pitt and of Fox on the disputed points</a></td> - <td class="c2">261</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_261">British conventions with the neutral Baltic States, 1801</a></td> - <td class="c2">261</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_262">Concession of the Rule of 1756 by Russia</a></td> - <td class="c2">262</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_262">Lessons as to belligerent interest in neutral trade, - afforded by the war between Great Britain and France, 1793-1801</a></td> - <td class="c2">262</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_265">Further lesson afforded by the short peace of - Amiens, 1801-1803</a></td> - <td class="c2">265</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_265">Renewal of war, May, 1803</a></td> - <td class="c2">265</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_265">Bonaparte's measures against British trade, 1803-1805</a></td> - <td class="c2">265</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_266">Threatened injury to British commerce by neutral carriers</a></td> - <td class="c2">266</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_267">Extent of American trade with colonies of enemies to Great - Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">267</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_267">Pitt's commercial measures upon resuming power in 1804</a></td> - <td class="c2">267</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_268">Methods of American trade between belligerent countries and - their colonies</a></td> - <td class="c2">268</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_269">Condemnation of American ships in British prize - courts, 1804</a></td> - <td class="c2">269</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_269">Death of Pitt. Fox becomes Foreign Minister, 1806</a></td> - <td class="c2">269</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_269">Fox's desire to conciliate the United States</a></td> - <td class="c2">269</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_269">Order in Council of May 16, 1806, substituted for Rule - of 1756</a></td> - <td class="c2">269</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_270">Character of the blockade of French coast thus imposed</a> - <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">[Pg xiii]</a></span></td> - <td class="c2">270</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_270">Intention of the new measure, and its consequences</a></td> - <td class="c2">270</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_270">Death of Fox, September, 1806</a></td> - <td class="c2">270</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_270">War between France and Prussia</a></td> - <td class="c2">270</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_271">Napoleon enters Berlin and issues the Berlin Decree</a></td> - <td class="c2">271</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_271">Object of the decree</a></td> - <td class="c2">271</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="chap-head"><a name="Chapter_18" id="Chapter_18"></a> - <a href="#CHAPTER_XVIII">CHAPTER XVIII.</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="chap-head"><span class="sc">The Warfare against Commerce, - 1806-1812.</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="chapsum"><span class="sc">The Berlin and Milan Decrees - of Napoleon, 1806 and 1807.—The British Orders in Council, 1807-1809.—Analysis - of the Policy of these Measures of the two Belligerents.—Outline of - Contemporary Leading Events.</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_272">Object of, and pretext for, the Berlin Decree</a></td> - <td class="c2">272</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_272">Terms of the Decree</a></td> - <td class="c2">272</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_273">Napoleon's winter campaign against Russia, 1806-1807</a></td> - <td class="c2">273</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_274">The Decree remains inoperative</a></td> - <td class="c2">274</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_274">Battle of Friedland and conventions of Tilsit, - June-July, 1807</a></td> - <td class="c2">274</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_275">British retaliatory Order in Council, January, 1807</a></td> - <td class="c2">275</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_275">Its terms and object</a></td> - <td class="c2">275</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_276">Effect upon American traders</a></td> - <td class="c2">276</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_276">Napoleon's designs upon Denmark and Portugal</a></td> - <td class="c2">276</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_277">Prompt action of the British ministry</a></td> - <td class="c2">277</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_277">Portuguese court withdraws to Brazil</a></td> - <td class="c2">277</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_278">General exclusion of British goods from the Continent</a></td> - <td class="c2">278</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_279">Attitude of Napoleon towards the United States</a></td> - <td class="c2">279</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_280">Nature of the questions confronting Napoleon</a></td> - <td class="c2">280</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_281">Jealousy of Great Britain towards neutral trade</a></td> - <td class="c2">281</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_281">Momentous decision of Napoleon as to the scope of the - Berlin Decree</a></td> - <td class="c2">281</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_282">Effect of this decision in Great Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">282</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_282">Embargo Act of the United States, 1807</a></td> - <td class="c2">282</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_283">Succeeded by Non-Intercourse Act, 1809</a></td> - <td class="c2">283</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_283">British Orders in Council of November, 1807</a></td> - <td class="c2">283</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_285">Object of these orders</a></td> - <td class="c2">285</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_286">Summary of their requirements</a></td> - <td class="c2">286</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_287">Their effect upon neutrals</a></td> - <td class="c2">287</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_288">The effect upon the continental nations</a></td> - <td class="c2">288</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_289">Essential features of the opposing British and French - policies</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiv" id="Page_xiv">[Pg xiv]</a></span> - </td> - <td class="c2">289</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_290">Napoleon's Milan Decree</a></td> - <td class="c2">290</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_291">Duration of the two policies</a></td> - <td class="c2">291</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_291">Napoleon's usurpation in Spain</a></td> - <td class="c2">291</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_292">The Bayonne and Rambouillet Decrees</a></td> - <td class="c2">292</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_292">The Spanish revolt and French disasters</a></td> - <td class="c2">292</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_292">Battle of Vimiero and French evacuation of Portugal</a></td> - <td class="c2">292</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_293">Conventions of Erfurt and war between Russia and Sweden</a></td> - <td class="c2">293</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_294">The British navy in the Baltic</a></td> - <td class="c2">294</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_294">Letter of Napoleon and the Czar to the King of - Great Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">294</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_295">Napoleon in the Spanish Peninsula</a></td> - <td class="c2">295</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_296">Diversion made by Sir John Moore</a></td> - <td class="c2">296</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_296">Opening of the year 1809</a></td> - <td class="c2">296</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_297">Austria's preparations for war</a></td> - <td class="c2">297</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_298">State of the commercial warfare in 1809</a></td> - <td class="c2">298</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_299">Evasion of Napoleon's decrees by the Dutch</a></td> - <td class="c2">299</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_300">Consequent measures of Napoleon</a></td> - <td class="c2">300</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_301">Passive resistance of the Continent to the decrees</a></td> - <td class="c2">301</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_302">British seizure of Heligoland</a></td> - <td class="c2">302</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_303">Conditions in the Baltic</a></td> - <td class="c2">303</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_304">General conditions of British trade, 1806-1809</a></td> - <td class="c2">304</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_307">The License System</a></td> - <td class="c2">307</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_309">Origin of "neutralization"</a></td> - <td class="c2">309</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_310">Its effect upon the action of British cruisers</a></td> - <td class="c2">310</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_311">Workings of the License System</a></td> - <td class="c2">311</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_313">British Order in Council of April, 1809</a></td> - <td class="c2">313</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_314">War between Austria and France</a></td> - <td class="c2">314</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_315">Wellesley's operations in the Peninsula</a></td> - <td class="c2">315</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_316">Battles of Essling and Wagram</a></td> - <td class="c2">316</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_316">Sweden forced to join in the Continental System</a></td> - <td class="c2">316</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_317">Napoleon's urgent attempts to enforce the System</a></td> - <td class="c2">317</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_318">Conditions in the Peninsula</a></td> - <td class="c2">318</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_319">Northern Germany occupied by French troops</a></td> - <td class="c2">319</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_321">Holland united to the Empire</a></td> - <td class="c2">321</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_322">Napoleon's demands upon Prussia and Sweden</a></td> - <td class="c2">322</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_323">Extensive seizure of ships with British goods</a></td> - <td class="c2">323</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_324">Napoleon's Customs Decree of August 5, 1810</a></td> - <td class="c2">324</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_325">Universal application of this decree</a></td> - <td class="c2">325</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_326">Napoleon's fiscal measures and license system</a></td> - <td class="c2">326</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_327">Decree of October 19, 1810, to burn British manufactured - goods</a></td> - <td class="c2">327</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_329">Uneasiness of Russia</a></td> - <td class="c2">329</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_330">Napoleon's annexation of Oldenburg and the Hanse towns</a></td> - <td class="c2">330</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_331">Commercial distress in Great Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">331</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_333">Embarrassment and suffering in France</a> - <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv">[Pg xv]</a></span></td> - <td class="c2">333</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_337">Napoleon's financial expedients</a></td> - <td class="c2">337</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_338">Credit of France and of Great Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">338</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_340">Internal condition of France and of England</a></td> - <td class="c2">340</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_342">The conscription in France</a></td> - <td class="c2">342</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_343">Exhaustion of the two nations</a></td> - <td class="c2">343</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_344">Difficulties between France and Russia</a></td> - <td class="c2">344</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_346">Admiral Saumarez in the Baltic</a></td> - <td class="c2">346</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_347">Understanding between Sweden, Russia, and Great Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">347</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_348">Affairs in the Spanish Peninsula</a></td> - <td class="c2">348</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_349">Fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz</a></td> - <td class="c2">349</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_350">Discontent and misery in France</a></td> - <td class="c2">350</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_350">Russian treaties with Sweden and Turkey</a></td> - <td class="c2">350</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_351">Napoleon invades Russia</a></td> - <td class="c2">351</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_351">Revocation of the British Orders in Council</a></td> - <td class="c2">351</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_351">The United States declare war against Great Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">351</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_351">Analysis of the British and French measures</a></td> - <td class="c2">351</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="chap-head"><a name="Chapter_19" id="Chapter_19"></a> - <a href="#CHAPTER_XIX">CHAPTER XIX.</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="chapsum"><span class="sc">Summary.—The Function of Sea - Power and the Policy of Great Britain in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic - Wars.</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_358">Great Britain's unpreparedness for war in 1792</a></td> - <td class="c2">358</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_359">Spirit and aims of the French leaders</a></td> - <td class="c2">359</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_361">Decree of the National Convention, November 19, 1792</a></td> - <td class="c2">361</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_362">Significance of this step</a></td> - <td class="c2">362</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_362">Annexation of Belgium, and opening of the Scheldt</a></td> - <td class="c2">362</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_363">Interest of Great Britain in the Netherlands</a></td> - <td class="c2">363</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_363">British preparations for war</a></td> - <td class="c2">363</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_364">Consistency of Pitt's course</a></td> - <td class="c2">364</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_367">Convention's decree of December 15, 1792</a></td> - <td class="c2">367</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_368">Aggressive spirit of the French Revolution</a></td> - <td class="c2">368</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_370">Misconception of its strength by European statesmen</a></td> - <td class="c2">370</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_371">Conservative temper of the British nation</a></td> - <td class="c2">371</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_372">Irrepressible conflict between the two forces</a></td> - <td class="c2">372</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_372">Twofold aspect of Sea Power</a></td> - <td class="c2">372</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_373">Origin and character of the British Sea Power</a></td> - <td class="c2">373</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_375">Annihilation of French, Dutch, and Spanish navigation</a></td> - <td class="c2">375</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_376">Consequent opportunities for neutral carriers</a></td> - <td class="c2">376</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_377">Restrictions imposed upon these by Great Britain</a> - <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvi" id="Page_xvi">[Pg xvi]</a></span></td> - <td class="c2">377</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_377">Rise of prices on the continent of Europe</a></td> - <td class="c2">377</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_378">Great Britain becomes the depot for supplying - the Continent</a></td> - <td class="c2">378</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_380">Direct and indirect effects upon British prosperity</a></td> - <td class="c2">380</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_381">Strength of Great Britain dependent upon Sea Power</a></td> - <td class="c2">381</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_382">Use of Sea Power made by the ministry</a></td> - <td class="c2">382</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_383">"Security" the avowed object of the war</a></td> - <td class="c2">383</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_384">The war, therefore, avowedly defensive</a></td> - <td class="c2">384</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_384">British treaty obligations to Holland</a></td> - <td class="c2">384</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_385">Relation of Great Britain to the general struggle</a></td> - <td class="c2">385</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_386">Two resources arising from Sea Power</a></td> - <td class="c2">386</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_386">Great land operations inexpedient for Great Britain</a></td> - <td class="c2">386</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_387">Characteristics of the Seven Years' War</a></td> - <td class="c2">387</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_387">Contrasts between the elder and the younger Pitt</a></td> - <td class="c2">387</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_391">Pitt's war policy not simply a military question</a></td> - <td class="c2">391</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_392">General direction given by him to the national effort</a></td> - <td class="c2">392</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_393">Justification of his colonial enterprises</a></td> - <td class="c2">393</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_394">Unprecedented naval development and commercial prosperity - secured by him</a></td> - <td class="c2">394</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_394">Importance of these results</a></td> - <td class="c2">394</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_395">Exhaustion of France caused by Pitt's measures</a></td> - <td class="c2">395</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_396">Bonaparte's opinion as to the influence of Sea Power</a></td> - <td class="c2">396</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_396">Ruinous results to France of the measures to destroy British - commerce</a></td> - <td class="c2">396</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_397">Napoleon forced to these steps by Pitt's policy</a></td> - <td class="c2">397</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_398">Identity of spirit in the Republic and in Napoleon</a></td> - <td class="c2">398</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_400">France forced into the battle-field of Great - Britain's choosing</a></td> - <td class="c2">400</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_401">Strain of the Continental System upon Europe</a></td> - <td class="c2">401</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_401">Revolt from it of Spain and Russia</a></td> - <td class="c2">401</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_402">Effect of these movements</a></td> - <td class="c2">402</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_402">Napoleon submits to divide his forces</a></td> - <td class="c2">402</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_402">General correctness of Pitt's war policy</a></td> - <td class="c2">402</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_403">The criticisms on the campaign of 1793 considered</a></td> - <td class="c2">403</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_403">Peculiar character of the Revolutionary War</a></td> - <td class="c2">403</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_404">Dependence of statesmen upon military advice</a></td> - <td class="c2">404</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_404">Peculiar merit of Pitt</a></td> - <td class="c2">404</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_405">His death</a></td> - <td class="c2">405</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_405">His policy pursued by his successors</a></td> - <td class="c2">405</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_406">Exhaustion the only check upon a great national movement</a></td> - <td class="c2">406</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_407">France revived by Bonaparte in 1796 and 1799</a></td> - <td class="c2">407</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_407">He unites the nation in a renewed forward movement</a></td> - <td class="c2">407</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_408">Bonaparte the incarnation of the Revolution</a></td> - <td class="c2">408</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_408">Combination of powers in Napoleon's hands</a></td> - <td class="c2">408</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_408">His career dependent upon the staying power of France</a> - <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvii" id="Page_xvii">[Pg xvii]</a></span></td> - <td class="c2">408</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_409">Effect of Great Britain upon French endurance</a></td> - <td class="c2">409</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_411">Function of Great Britain in the Napoleonic wars</a></td> - <td class="c2">411</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_411">Accuracy of Pitt's forecast</a></td> - <td class="c2">411</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> - <a href="#Page_411">Result postponed only by Bonaparte's genius</a></td> - <td class="c2">411</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2"><hr class="sect3" /></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"><a name="index" id="index"></a> - <a href="#INDEX2">INDEX</a></td> - <td class="c2">413</td> - </tr> -</table> - -<div class="blockquot"> -<p><span class="sc">Note.</span>—The references to the "Correspondance de Napoléon" are to -the quarto edition, in thirty-two volumes, published in Paris between 1858 -and 1869.</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<div class="chapter p4"> -<h2>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.</h2> -</div> - -<hr class="small" /> - -<p class="ac">VOLUME II.<br /> -<br /> -MAP AND BATTLE PLANS.</p> - -<table id="MAPS" summary="MAPS AND BATTLE PLANS"> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="chap-head">VOLUME II.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="chap-head">MAPS AND BATTLE PLANS.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td></td> - <td class="c2 smaller">Page</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c2">I.</td> - <td class="c1"><a href="#i-044.jpg">Battle of Copenhagen</a></td> - <td class="c2">44</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c2">II.</td> - <td class="c1"><a href="#i-117.jpg">Map of North Atlantic</a></td> - <td class="c2">117</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c2">III.</td> - <td class="c1"><a href="#i-190.jpg">The Attack at Trafalgar</a></td> - <td class="c2">190</td> - </tr> -</table> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter p4"> -<p class="ac smaller">THE</p> - -<p class="ac larger">INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER</p> - -<p class="ac xx-smaller">UPON THE</p> - -<p class="ac">FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE.</p> -</div> - -<hr class="small p4" /> - -<div class="chapter p4"> -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XII" id="CHAPTER_XII"></a>CHAPTER XII.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="ac"><span class="sc">Events on the Continent, 1798-1800.</span></p> - -<p class="chapsum"><span class="sc">Disorders of France under the Directory.—Disastrous -War of the Second Coalition.—Establishment of the -Consulate.—Bonaparte overthrows Austria and frames -against Great Britain the Armed Neutrality of 1800.—Peace -of Lunéville with Austria.</span></p> - -<p class="drop-cap">WHILE Bonaparte was crossing the Syrian desert and -chafing over the siege of Acre, the long gathering -storm of war known as the Second Coalition had broken -upon France. It had been preceded by a premature outburst -of hostility on the part of the Two Sicilies, induced -by the excitement consequent upon the battle of the Nile -and fostered by Nelson; -<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> who, however influenced, was -largely responsible for the action of the court. Despite the -advice of Austria to wait, a summons was sent to the -French on the 22d of November, 1798, to evacuate the -Papal States and Malta. A Neapolitan army of fifty thousand -men marched upon Rome; and five thousand were -carried by Nelson's ships to Leghorn with the idea of harassing -the confidently-expected retreat of the enemy. -<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> -Leghorn was at once surrendered; but in the south the -campaign ended in utter disaster. The French general -Championnet, having but fifteen thousand men, evacuated -Rome, which the Neapolitans consequently entered without -opposition; but their field operations met with a series of -humiliating reverses, due partly to bad generalship and -partly to inexperience and the lack of mutual confidence -often found among untried troops. The French re-entered -Rome seventeen days after the campaign opened; and the -king of Naples, who had made a triumphal entry into the -city, hurried back to his capital, called upon the people to -rise in defence of their homes against the invaders, and -then fled with the royal family to Palermo, Nelson giving -them and the Hamiltons passage on board his flag-ship. -The peasantry and the populace flew to arms, in -obedience to the king's proclamation and to their own feelings -of hatred to the republicans. Under the guidance of -the priests and monks, with hardy but undisciplined fury, -they in the field harassed the advance of the French, and -in the capital rose against the upper classes, who were suspected -of secret intelligence with the enemy. Championnet, -however, continued to advance; and on the 23d of -January, 1799, Naples was stormed by his troops. After -the occupation, a series of judicious concessions to the prejudices -of the people induced their cheerful submission. -The conquest was followed by the birth to the Batavian, -Helvetian, Ligurian, Cisalpine, and Roman republics, of a -little sister, named the Parthenopeian Republic, destined to -a troubled existence as short as its name was long.</p> - -<p>The Neapolitan declaration of war caused the ruin of the -Piedmontese monarchy. The Directory, seeing that war -with Austria was probable, decided to occupy all Piedmont. -The king abdicated on the 9th of December, 1798; retiring -to the island of Sardinia, which was left in his possession. -Piedmont was soon after annexed to the French Republic.</p> - -<p>On the 20th of February, 1799, having failed to receive -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span> -from the emperor the explanations demanded concerning -the entrance of the Russian troops into his dominions, the -Directory ordered its generals to advance. Jourdan was to -command in Germany, Masséna in Switzerland, and Schérer -in Italy. The armies of the republic, enfeebled by two -years of peace and by the economies of a government -always embarrassed for money and deficient in executive -vigor, were everywhere inferior to those of the enemy; and -the plan of campaign, providing for several operations out -of reach of mutual support, has been regarded by military -critics as essentially vicious.</p> - -<p>Jourdan crossed the Rhine at Strasburg on the first of -March, advancing through the Black Forest upon the head -waters of the Danube. On the 6th Masséna crossed the -river above Lake Constance, and moved through the Alps -toward the Tyrol, driving the Austrians before him on his -right and centre; but on the left he entirely failed to carry -the important position of Feldkirch, upon which would -depend the communication between his left and the right -of Jourdan, if the latter succeeded in pushing on as ordered. -This, however, he was unable to do. After some severe -partial encounters there was fought on March 25th, at -Stokach, near the north-west extremity of Lake Constance, -a pitched battle in which the French were defeated. Jourdan -then saw that he had to do with largely superior forces -and retreated upon the Rhine, which he recrossed above -Strasburg on the 6th of April.</p> - -<p>On the 26th of March, the day after the defeat of Jourdan -at Stokach, Schérer in Italy attacked the Austrians, -who were occupying the line of the Adige, rendered famous -by Bonaparte in his great campaign of 1796. The events of -that day were upon the whole favorable to the French; but -Schérer showed irresolution and consequent delay in improving -such advantages as he had obtained. After a week -of manœuvring the two armies met in battle on the 5th of -April near Magnano, and after a long and bloody struggle -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> -the French were forced to give way. On the 6th, the day -that Jourdan retreated across the Rhine, Schérer also fell -back behind the Mincio. Not feeling secure there, although -the Austrians did not pursue, he threw garrisons into the -posts on that line, and on the 12th retired behind the Adda; -sending word to Macdonald, Championnet's successor at -Naples, to prepare to evacuate that kingdom and bring to -northern Italy the thirty thousand men now so sorely -needed.</p> - -<p>Jourdan having offered his resignation after the battle -of Stokach, the armies in Germany and in Switzerland -were united under the command of Masséna; whose long -front, extending from the Engadine, around the sources of -the Inn, along the Rhine as low as Dusseldorf, was held by -but one hundred thousand men, of whom two-thirds were -in Switzerland. In the position which Switzerland occupies, -thrust out to the eastward from the frontiers of France, -having on the one flank the fields of Germany, on the other -those of Italy, and approachable from both sides by many -passes, the difficulties of defence are great; -<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> and Masséna -found himself menaced from both quarters, as well as in -front, by enemies whose aggregate force was far superior -to his own. Pressed along the line of the Rhine both -above and below Lake Constance, he was compelled to retire -upon works constructed by him around Zurich; being -unable to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces, -which approached from both directions. On the 4th of -June the Austrians assaulted his lines; and, though the -attack was repulsed, Masséna thought necessary to evacuate -the place forty-eight hours later, falling back upon a -position on the Albis mountains a few miles in his rear.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span></p> - -<p>During the two months over which these contests between -Masséna and his enemies were spread, the affairs of the -French in Italy were growing daily more desperate. After -the victory of Magnano the Austrians were joined, on the -24th of April, by twenty thousand Russians under Marshal -Suwarrow, who became general-in-chief of the allied armies. -On the 26th Schérer turned over his command to Moreau; -but, although the latter was an officer of very great capacity, -the change was too late to avoid all the impending disasters. -On the 27th the passage of the Adda was forced -by the allies, and on the 29th they entered Milan; the -French retiring upon the Ticino, breaking down the bridges -over the Po, and taking steps to secure their communications -with Genoa. Pausing but a moment, they again retreated -in two columns upon Turin and Alessandria; -Moreau drawing together near the latter place the bulk of -his force, about twenty thousand men, and sending pressing -invitations to Macdonald to hasten the northward -march of the army of Naples. The new positions were -taken the 7th of May, and it was not till the 5th that the -Austro-Russians, delayed by the destruction of the bridges, -could cross the Po. But the insurrection of the country -in all directions was showing how little the submission of -the people and the establishment of new republics were accompanied -by any hearty fidelity to the French cause; and -on the 18th, leaving a garrison in Alessandria, Moreau retreated -upon the Apennines. On the 6th of June his -troops were distributed among the more important points -on the crest of the range, from Pontremoli, above Spezia, to -Loano, and all his convoys had safely crossed the mountains -to the latter point. It was at this moment that he -had an interview with Admiral Bruix, whose fleet had -anchored in Vado Bay two days before. -<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span></p> - -<p>While events were thus passing in Upper Italy, Macdonald, -in obedience to his orders, evacuated Naples on the 7th -of May, at the moment when Moreau was taking his position -on the Apennines and Bonaparte making his last fruitless -assault upon Acre. Leaving garrisons at the principal -strong places of the kingdom, he hurried north, and on the -25th entered Florence, where, though his junction with -Moreau was far from being effected, he was for the first -time in sure communication with him by courier. There -were two routes that Macdonald might take,—either by the -sea-shore, which was impracticable for artillery, or else, -crossing the Apennines, he would find a better road in the -plain south of the Po, through Modena and Parma, and by -it might join the army of Italy under the walls of Tortona. -The latter course was chosen, and after a delay too much prolonged -the army of Naples set out on the 9th of June. All -went well with it until the 17th, when, having passed Modena -and Parma, routing the allied detachments which he encountered, -Macdonald reached the Trebia. Here, however, he -was met by Suwarrow, and after three days' desperate fighting -was forced to retreat by the road he came, to his old -positions on the other side of the mountains. On the same -day the citadel of Turin capitulated to the allies. After -pursuing Macdonald some distance, Suwarrow turned back -to meet Moreau, and compelled him also to retire to his -former posts. This disastrous attempt at a junction within -the enemies' lines cost the French fifteen thousand men. -It now became necessary for the army of Naples to get to -Genoa at all costs by the Corniche road, and this it was -able to do through the inactivity of the enemy,—due, so -Jomini says, not to Suwarrow, but to the orders from Vienna. -By the middle of July both armies were united under Moreau. -As a result of the necessary abandonment of Naples -by the French troops, the country fell at once into the -power of the armed peasantry, except the garrisons left in -a few strong places; and these, by the help of the British -navy, were also reduced by the 1st of August.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span></p> - -<p>This striking practical illustration of the justness of -Bonaparte's views, concerning the danger incurred by the -French in Upper Italy through attempting to occupy Naples, -was followed by further disasters. On the 21st of July -the citadel of Alessandria capitulated; and this loss was -followed on the 30th by that of Mantua, which had caused -Bonaparte so much delay and trouble in 1796. The latter -success was somewhat dearly bought, inasmuch as the emperor -of Germany had positively forbidden Suwarrow to -make any further advance before Mantua fell. -<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> Opportunity -was thus given for the junction of Moreau and Macdonald, -and for the reorganization of the latter's army, -which the affairs of the Trebia and the subsequent precipitate -retreat had left in a state of prostration and incoherence, -from which it did not recover for a month. The -delay would have been still more favorable to the French -had Mantua resisted to the last moment; but it capitulated -at a time when it could still have held out for several days, -and Suwarrow was thus enabled to bring up the besieging -corps to his support, unknown to the enemy.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Moreau had been relieved by Joubert, one of -the most brilliant of the young generals who had fought -under Bonaparte in Italy. The newcomer, reaching his -headquarters on the 2d of August, at once determined upon -the offensive, moved thereto by the wish to relieve Mantua, -and also by the difficulty of feeding his army in the sterile -mountains now that ruin had befallen the coastwise traffic -of Genoa, by which supplies had before been maintained. -<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> -On the 10th of August the French advanced. On the 14th -they were in position at Novi; and there Joubert saw, but -too late, that Suwarrow's army was far larger than he had -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> -expected, and that the rumor of Mantua's fall, which he -had refused to credit, must be true. He intended to retreat; -but the Russian marshal attacked the next morning, -and after a fierce struggle, which the strength of their position -enabled the French to prolong till night, they were -driven from the field with heavy loss, four general officers -and thirty-seven guns being captured. Joubert was killed -early in the day; and Moreau, who had remained to aid him -until familiar with all the details of his command, again -took the temporary direction of the army by the agreement -of the other generals. Immediately after the battle Suwarrow -sent into the late Papal States a division which, co-operating -with the Neapolitan royalists and the British -navy, forced the French to evacuate the new Roman republic -on the 27th of September, 1799.</p> - -<p>At this moment of success new dispositions were taken -by the allied governments, apparently through the initiative -of Austria; which wished, by removing Suwarrow, to -keep entire control of Italy in her own hands. This -change of plan, made at so critical a moment, stopped the -hitherto triumphant progress; and, by allowing time for -Bonaparte to arrive and to act, turned victory into defeat. -By it Suwarrow was to march across the Alps into Switzerland, -and there take charge of the campaign against Masséna, -having under him an army composed mainly of -Russians. The Archduke Charles, now commanding in -Switzerland, was to depart with the greater part of the -Austrian contingent to the lower Rhine, where he would -by his operations support the invasion of Holland then -about to begin.</p> - -<p>On the 13th of August,—the same day that Bruix entered -Brest, carrying with him the Spanish fleet, and two days -before the battle of Novi,—the expedition against Holland, -composed of seventeen thousand Russians and thirty -thousand British troops, sailed from England. Delayed -first by light winds and then by heavy weather, the landing -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> -was not made till the 27th of the month. On the 31st the -Archduke, taking with him thirty-six thousand Austrians, -started for the lower Rhine, leaving General Hotze and the -Russian Korsakoff to make head against Masséna until the -arrival of Suwarrow. The latter, on the 11th of September, -immediately after the surrender of Tortona, began his -northward march.</p> - -<p>At the moment the Archduke assumed his new command, -the French on the lower Rhine, crossing at Mannheim, -invested and bombarded Philipsburg; and their -operations seemed so far serious as to draw him and a large -part of his force in the same direction. This greatly diminished -one of the difficulties confronting Masséna in the -offensive movement he then had in contemplation. Hearing -at the same time that Suwarrow had started from Italy, -he made his principal attack from his left upon the Russians -before Zurich on the 25th of September, the right -wing of his long line advancing in concert against the -Austrian position east of Lake Zurich upon its inlet, the -Linth. Each effort was completely successful, and decisive; -the enemy being in both directions driven back, and -forced to recross the streams above and below the lake. -Suwarrow, after a very painful march and hard fighting, -reached his first appointed rendezvous at Mutten two days -after the battle of Zurich had been lost; and the corps that -were to have met him there, fearing their retreat would be -cut off, had not awaited his arrival. The old marshal with -great difficulty fought his way through the mountains to -Ilanz, where at length he assembled his exhausted and -shattered forces on the 9th of October, the day on which -Bonaparte landed at Fréjus on his return from Egypt. By -that time Switzerland was entirely cleared of Russians -and Austrians. The river Rhine, both above and below -Lake Constance, marked the dividing line between the -belligerents.</p> - -<p>The Anglo-Russian attack upon Holland had no better -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> -fate. Landing upon the peninsula between the Zuyder Zee -and the North Sea, the allies were for awhile successful; -but their movements were cautious and slow, giving time -for the local resistance to grow and for re-enforcements to -come up. The remnants of the Dutch navy were surrendered -and taken back to England; but the Duke of -York, who had chief command of the allied troops, was -compelled on the 18th of October to sign a convention, by -which the invading force was permitted to retire unmolested -by the first of December.</p> - -<p>During the three remaining months of 1799 some further -encounters took place in Germany and Italy. In the latter -the result was a succession of disasters to the French, -ending with the capitulation, on the 4th of December, of -Coni, their last remaining stronghold in Piedmont, and the -retreat of the army into the Riviera of Genoa. Corfu and -the Ionian Islands having been reduced by the combined -Russian and Turkish fleets in the previous March, and -Ancona surrendered on the 10th of November, all Bonaparte's -conquests in Italy and the Adriatic had been lost to -France when the Directory fell. The brave soldiers of the -army of Italy, destitute and starving, without food, without -pay, without clothing or shoes, without even wood for -camp-fires in the bitter winter nights on the slopes of the -Apennines, deserted in crowds and made their way to -the interior. In some regiments none but officers and non-commissioned -officers were left. An epidemic born of want -and exposure carried off men by hundreds. Championnet, -overwhelmed by his misfortunes and by the sight of the -misery surrounding him, fell ill and died. Bonaparte, now -First Consul, sent Masséna to replace him.</p> - -<p>In Germany nothing decisive occurred in the field; but -in consequence of some disagreements of opinion between -himself and the Archduke, Suwarrow declined further co-operation, -and, alleging the absolute need of rest for his -soldiers after their frightful exposure in Switzerland, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> -marched them at the end of October into winter quarters -in Bavaria. This closed the share of the Russians in the -second coalition. The Czar, who had embarked in the war -with the idea of restoring the rights of monarchs and the -thrones that had been overturned, was dissatisfied both -with the policy of Austria, which looked to her own predominance -in Italy, and with Great Britain. A twelvemonth -more was to see him at the head of a league of the -northern states against the maritime claims of the great -Sea Power, and completely won over to the friendship of -Bonaparte by the military genius and wily flattery of the -renowned captain.</p> - -<p>During this disastrous year, in which France lost all -Italy except the narrow strip of sea-coast about Genoa, and -after months of desperate struggle had barely held her own -in Switzerland, Germany, and Holland, the internal state -of the country was deplorable. The Revolutionary government -by the Committee of Public Safety had contrived, by -the use of the extraordinary powers granted to it, to meet -with greater or less success the demands of the passing -hour; although in so doing it was continually accumulating -embarrassments against a future day of reckoning. -The Directory, deprived of the extraordinary powers of its -predecessor, had succeeded to these embarrassments, and -the day of reckoning had arrived. It has been seen how -the reactionary spirit, which followed the rule of blood, -had prevailed more and more until, in 1797, the political -composition of the two Councils was so affected by it -as to produce a strong conflict between them and the -executive. This dead-lock had been overcome and harmony -restored by the violent measures of September, 1797, by -which two Directors and a number of members of the -legislature had been forcibly expelled from their office. -The parties, of two very different shades of opinion, to -which the ejected members belonged, had not, however, -ceased to exist. In 1798, in the yearly elections to -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> -replace one-third of the legislature, they again returned a -body of representatives sufficient to put the Councils in -opposition to the Directory; but this year the choice of -the electors was baffled by a system of double returns. -The sitting Councils, of the same political party as the -Directory, pronounced upon these, taking care in so -doing to insure that the majority in the new bodies -should be the same as in the old. In May, 1799, -however, the same circumstance again recurred. The -fact is particularly interesting, as showing the opposition -which was felt toward the government throughout the -country.</p> - -<p>This opposition was due to a cause which rarely fails -to make governments unpopular. The Directory had been -unsuccessful. It was called upon to pay the bills due to -the public expectation of better things when once the war -was over. This it was not able to do. Though peace had -been made with the continent, there remained so many -matters of doubt and contention that large armies had to -be maintained. The expenses of the state went on, but the -impoverished nation cried out against the heavy taxation -laid to meet them; the revenues continually fell short of -the expenditures, and the measures proposed by the ministers -to remedy this evil excited vehement criticisms. The -unpopularity of the government, arising from inefficient -action, reacted upon and increased the weakness which -was inherent in its cumbrous, many-headed form. Hence -there resulted, from the debility of the head, an impotence -which permeated all the links of the executive administration -down to the lowest members.</p> - -<p>In France itself the disorder and anarchy prevailing in -the interior touched the verge of social dissolution. -<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> -Throughout the country, but especially in the south and -west, prevailed brigandage on a large scale—partly political, -partly of the ordinary highway type. There were -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> -constant reports of diligences and mail-wagons stopped, -<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> of -public treasure plundered, of republican magistrates assassinated. -Disorganization and robbery spread throughout -the army, a natural result of small pay, irregularly received, -and of the system of contributions, administered with -little responsibility by the commanders of armies in the -field. The attempt of the government to check and control -this abuse was violently resented by generals, both of -the better and the worse class; by the one as reflecting -upon their character and injuring their position, by the -other as depriving them of accustomed though unlawful -gains. Two men of unblemished repute, Joubert and -Championnet, came to a direct issue with the Directory -upon this point. Joubert resigned the command of the -army of Italy, in which Bernadotte from the same motive -refused to replace him; while Championnet, in Naples, -compelled the commissioner of the Directory to leave the -kingdom. For this act, however, he was deprived and -brought to a court-martial.</p> - -<p>From the weakness pervading the administration and -from the inadequate returns of the revenue, the government -was driven to extraordinary measures and to the -anticipation of its income. Greater and more onerous -taxes were laid; and, as the product of these was not -immediate, purchases had to be made at long and uncertain -credit, and consequently were exorbitant in price while -deficient in quantity and quality. From this arose much -suffering among all government employés, but especially -among the soldiers, who needed the first attention, and -whose distress led them easily to side with their officers -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> -against the administration. Contracts so made only staved -off the evil day, at the price of increasing indebtedness for -the state and of growing corruption among the contractor -class and the officials dealing with them. Embarrassment -and disorder consequently increased apace without any -proportionate vigor in the external action of the government, -and the effects were distributed among and keenly -felt by all individuals, except the small number whose -ability or whose corruptness enables them to grow rich -when, and as, society becomes most distressed. The creditors -of the nation, and especially the holders of bonds, could -with difficulty obtain even partial payment. In the general -distrust and perplexity individuals and communities took -to hoarding both money and food, moved by the dangers of -transit and by fear of the scarcity which they saw to be -impending. This stagnation of internal circulation was -accompanied by the entire destruction of maritime commerce, -due to the pressure of the British navy and to the -insane decree of Nivôse 29 (January 19, 1798). -<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> Both -concurred to paralyze the energies of the people, to foster -indolence and penury, and by sheer want to induce a state -of violence with which the executive was unable to cope.</p> - -<p>When to this internal distress were added the military -disasters just related, the outcry became loud and universal. -All parties united against the Directors, who did not dare -in 1799 to repeat the methods by which in the two previous -years a majority had been obtained in the legislature. On -the 18th of June the new Councils were able to force a -change in the composition of the Directory, further enfeebling -it through the personal weakness of the new members. -These hastened to reverse many of the measures of their -predecessors, but no change of policy could restore the lost -prestige. The effect of these steps was only further to -depress that branch of the government which, in so critical -a moment and in so disordered a society, should overbear -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> -all others and save the state—not by discussion, but by -action.</p> - -<p>Such was the condition of affairs found by Bonaparte -when he returned from Egypt. The revolution of Brumaire -18 (November 9, 1799) threw into his hands uncontrolled -power. This he proceeded at once to use with the sagacity -and vigor that rarely failed him in his early prime. The -administration of the country was reconstituted on lines -which sacrificed local independence, but invigorated the -grasp of the central executive, and made its will felt in -every corner of the land. Vexatious measures of the preceding -government were repealed, and for them was substituted -a policy of liberal conciliation, intended to rally all -classes of Frenchmen to the support of the new rule. In -the West and North, in La Vendée, Brittany, and Normandy, -the insurrection once suppressed by Hoche had -again raised its head against the Directory. To the insurgents -Bonaparte offered reasonable inducements to submission, -while asserting his firm determination to restore -authority at any cost; and the rapid gathering of sixty thousand -troops in the rebellious districts proved his resolution -to use for that purpose a force so overwhelming, that the -completion of its task would release it by the return of -spring, to take the field against external foes. Before the -end of February the risings were suppressed, and this time -forever. Immediate steps were taken to put the finances -on a sounder basis, and to repair the military disasters of -the last twelvemonth. To the two principal armies, of -the Rhine and of Italy, were sent respectively Moreau and -Masséna, the two greatest generals of the republic after -Bonaparte himself; and money advanced by Parisian -bankers was forwarded to relieve the more pressing -wants of the destitute soldiery.</p> - -<p>At the same time that these means were used to recover -France herself from the condition of debility into which -she had fallen, the first consul made a move calculated -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> -either to gain for her the time she yet needed, or, in case -it failed, to rally to his support all classes in the state. -Departing from the usual diplomatic routine, he addressed -a personal letter to the king of Great Britain and to the -emperor of Germany, deploring the existing war, and expressing -a wish that negotiations for peace might be -opened. The reply from both sovereigns came through -the ordinary channels of their respective ministries. Austria -said civilly that she could not negotiate apart from her -allies; and furthermore, that the war being only to preserve -Europe from universal disorder, due to the unstable -and aggressive character of the French governments since -the Revolution, no stable peace could be made until there -was some guarantee for a change of policy. This she could -not yet recognize in the new administration, which owed its -existence only to the violent overthrow of its predecessor. -Great Britain took substantially the same ground. Peace -was worse than worthless, if insecure; and experience had -shown that no defence except that of steady and open hostility -was availing, while the system which had prevailed -in France remained the same. She could not recognize a -change of system in the mere violent substitution of one -set of rulers for another. Disavowing any claim to prescribe -to France what should be her form of government, -the British ministry nevertheless said distinctly that the -best guarantee for a permanent change of policy would be -the restoration of the Bourbons. This seemingly impolitic -suggestion insured—what was very possibly its object—the -continuance of the war until were realized the advantages -that seemed about to accrue. Not only were the -conditions at that time overwhelmingly in favor of the -allies, but there was also every probability of the reduction -of Egypt and Malta, and of further decisive successes in -Italy. These, if obtained, would be so many cards strengthening -their hands in the diplomatic game to be played in -the negotiations for peace. Believing, as the British ministry -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> -of that day assuredly did, that a secure peace could -only be based on the exhaustion, and not upon the moderation -or good faith, of their enemy, it would have been -the height of folly to concede time, or submit to that -vacillation of purpose and relaxation of tension which -their own people would certainly feel, if negotiations were -opened.</p> - -<p>Nor were these military and moral considerations the -only ones affecting the decision of the government. Despite -the immense burdens imposed by the war to support her -own military expenditures and furnish the profuse subsidies -paid to her allies, the power of the country to bear them -was greatly increased. Thanks to the watery rampart -which secured peace within her borders, Great Britain had -now become the manufactory and warehouse of Europe. -The commercial and maritime prostration of Holland and -France, her two great rivals in trade and manufactures, -had thrown into her hands these sources of their prosperity; -and she, through the prodigious advances of the ten years' -peace, was fully ready to profit by them. By the capture -of their foreign possessions and the ruin of the splendid -French colony in Haïti, she now controlled the chief regions -whence were drawn the tropical products indispensable to -Europeans. She monopolized their markets as well as the -distribution of their produce. Jealously reserving to British -merchant shipping the trade of her own and conquered -colonies, she yet met the immense drain made by the navy -upon her merchant seamen by relaxing the famous Navigation -Laws; permitting her ships to be manned by foreigners, -and foreign ships to engage in branches of her commerce -closed to them in time of peace. But while thus -encouraging neutrals to carry the surplus trade, whose rapid -growth was outstripping the capacity of her own shipping, -she rigorously denied their right to do as much for her enemies. -These severe restrictions, which her uncontrolled -sea-power enabled her to maintain, were re-enforced by -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> -suicidal edicts of the French government, retaliating upon -the same unhappy neutrals the injury their weakness compelled -them to accept from the mistress of the seas,—thus -driving them from French shores, and losing a concurrence -essential to French export and import. In this time of -open war no flag was so safe from annoyance as the British, -for none other was protected by a powerful navy. Neutrals -sought its convoy against French depredations, and the navigation -of the world was now swayed by this one great -power, whom its necessities had not yet provoked to lay a -yoke heavier than the oppressed could bear.</p> - -<p>To this control of the carrying trade, and of so much of -the agricultural production of the globe, was added a growing -absorption of the manufactures of Europe, due to the -long war paralyzing the peaceful energies of the continental -peoples. In the great system of circulation and exchange, -everything thus tended more and more to Great -Britain; which was indicated as the natural centre for accumulation -and distribution by its security, its accessibility, -and its nearness to the continent on which were massed the -largest body of consumers open to maritime commerce. Becoming -thus the chief medium through which the business -of the civilized world was carried on and its wants supplied, -her capital grew apace; and was steadily applied, by the -able hands in which it accumulated, to develop, by increased -production and increased facilities of carriage, the powers -of the country to supply demands that were continually -increasing on both sides of the Atlantic. The foreign trade, -export and import, which in 1792, the last year of peace, -had amounted to £44,500,000, rose in 1797 to £50,000,000, -and in 1800 to £73,700,000. Encouraged by these evident -proofs of growing wealth, the ministry was able so to increase -the revenue that its receipts, independent of extraordinary -war taxes, far exceeded anything it had ever been -before, "or," to use Pitt's words, "anything which the -most sanguine hopes could have anticipated. If," he continued, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> -"we compare this year of war with former years of -peace, we shall in the produce of our revenue and in the -extent of our commerce behold a spectacle at once paradoxical, -inexplicable, and astonishing. We have increased our -external and internal commerce to a greater pitch than ever -it was before; and we may look to the present as the -proudest year that has ever occurred for this country." -<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> - -<p>With such resources to sustain the armies of their allies, -and certain of keeping a control of the sea unparalleled even -in the history of Great Britain, the ministry looked hopefully -forward to a year which should renew and complete -the successes of 1799. They reckoned without Bonaparte, -as Bonaparte in his turn reckoned again and again without -Nelson.</p> - -<p>Russia took no more part in the coalition; but the -forces of Germany, under the control of Austria and subsidized -by Great Britain, either actually in the field or holding -the fortified posts on which the operations depended, -amounted to something over two hundred and fifty thousand -men. Of these, one hundred and twenty-five thousand -under Mélas were in Italy. The remainder under General -Kray were in Germany, occupying the angle formed by the -Rhine at Bâle, where, after flowing west from Lake Constance, -it turns abruptly north for the remainder of its -course. The plan of campaign was to stand on the defensive -in Germany, holding in check the enemies there opposed -to them, and in Italy to assume a vigorous offensive, -so as to drive the French finally out of the country. That -achieved, the idea was entertained of entering France at the -extreme south, and possibly investing Toulon, supported by -the British navy.</p> - -<p>When Bonaparte first took charge, there remained to -France only two hundred and fifty thousand soldiers, of -whom at the opening of the campaign of 1800 there were -in the field, opposed to the Austrians, but one hundred and -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> -sixty-five thousand. One hundred thousand conscripts -were called for; but time would be needed to turn these -into soldiers, even with the advantage of the nucleus of -veterans around whom they would be gathered. The equipment -and provisioning both of the old and new levies also -required time and effort. Bonaparte's project was to assume -the offensive in Germany, turning there the position -of the Austrians, and driving them northward from the -Rhine towards the head waters of the Danube. For this -great operation the army under Moreau was raised to an -equality with the enemy opposed to him. Masséna in Italy -was directed to stand solely on the defensive, concentrating -around Genoa the bulk of the thirty-five or forty thousand -men which alone he had. While he held this position in -such force, the Austrians could scarcely advance into -France along the narrow coast road, leaving him in the -rear. When the expected success in Germany was won, -there was to be detached from that army, which should -then assume an attitude of observation, a corps twenty -thousand strong. This should cross Switzerland, entering -Italy by the St. Gothard Pass, and there joining a force of -forty thousand to be led by the First Consul in person -through the Pass of St. Bernard. This mass of sixty thousand -men was to throw itself in rear of the Austrians, -forcing them to fight for their communications through -Lombardy, and hoping under the first general of the age to -win, over a less skilful opponent, such victories as had -illustrated the famous campaigns of 1796 and 1797.</p> - -<p>Bonaparte's plan thus hinged upon the French occupation -of Switzerland, which, intervening as a great rampart between -the Austrians in Germany and Italy, permitted him -to cover the movements against the former by the curtain -of the Rhine between Lake Constance and Bâle, and to use -safely and secretly the passes leading into the plains of -Lombardy and Piedmont. To this advantage of position -he conjoined, with inconceivable wiliness, an absolute -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> -secrecy as to the very existence of the forty thousand, -known as the Army of Reserve, which he himself was to -lead. The orders constituting this force were given the -utmost publicity. Its headquarters were established at -Dijon, and one of Bonaparte's most trusted subordinates -was sent to command it. An appeal was made to discharged -soldiers to join its ranks; some material of war and -some conscripts, with a corps of officers, were assembled. -There preparations stopped—or went on so feebly in comparison -with the glowing boasts of the French journals, that -hostile spies were entirely deceived. The Army of Reserve -became the joke of Europe, while the scattered detachments -that were to compose it were assembling at points separated, -yet chosen with Bonaparte's consummate skill to permit -rapid concentration when the hour came. To insure perfect -secrecy, the correspondence of these different bodies -was with him alone, not through the Ministry of War.</p> - -<p>The campaign was opened by the Austrians in Italy. -Mélas, with seventy thousand men, attacked Masséna along -the chain of the Apennines. Difficulties of subsistence -had forced the latter to disseminate his troops between -Genoa and Nice. Through this necessarily thin line the -Austrians broke on the 5th of April, and after several days -of strenuous resistance, furthered by the facilities for defence -offered by that mountainous region, Masséna was -driven into Genoa. The left wing of his army under Suchet -was forced back toward Nice, where it took position -on the Var. On the 18th of April Masséna was definitively -shut up in Genoa with eighteen thousand men, and so -short of provisions that it became a matter of the utmost -urgency to relieve him.</p> - -<p>On April 25 Moreau began his movements, of a somewhat -complicated character, but resulting in his whole army -being safely across the Rhine on the first of May. Eighty -thousand French troops were then drawn up between Bâle -and Lake Constance in an east and west direction, threatening -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> -the left flank of the enemy, whose front was north -and south, and in position to attack both their line of retreat -and the immense depots whose protection embarrassed -all the movements of the Austrians. On the 3d of -May the latter were defeated at Engen, and their depot at -Stokach was captured. On the 5th they were again beaten -at Moesskirch, and on the 9th at Biberach, losing other -large deposits of stores. General Kray then retired upon -Ulm on the Danube, and the first act of Bonaparte's design -was accomplished. It had not corresponded with the lines -laid down by him, which were too adventurous to suit -Moreau, nor was the result equal to his expectations; but -the general strategic outcome was to check for the time -any movements of the enemy in Germany, and enable Moreau -to send the force needed to co-operate with Bonaparte -in Italy. This started on the 13th of May, and was joined -on the way by some detachments in Switzerland; the -whole amounting to between fifteen and twenty thousand -men. -<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p> - -<p>On the 6th of May the first consul left Paris, having delayed -to the last moment in order to keep up the illusions -of the Austrian commander-in-chief in Italy. The crossing -of the St. Bernard began on the 15th, and on the 20th the -whole army had passed. On the 26th it issued in the plains -of Piedmont; whence Bonaparte turned to the eastward, to -insure his great object of throwing his force across the -enemy's communications and taking from him all hope of -regaining them without a battle. On the first of June he -entered Milan.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Masséna's army, a prey to horrible famine, -prolonged in Genoa a resistance which greatly contributed -to the false position of the Austrians. Of these, twenty-five -thousand were before Nice, thirty thousand before -Genoa. Twenty thousand more had been lost by casualties -since the campaign opened. Unwilling to relinquish his -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> -gains, Mélas waited too long to concentrate his scattered -troops; and when at last he sent the necessary orders, -Masséna was treating to evacuate Genoa. The Austrian -officer on the spot, unwilling to lose the prize, postponed -compliance until it was secured,—a delay fraught with -serious results. On the 5th Genoa was given up, and the -besiegers, leaving a garrison in the place, marched to join -the commander-in-chief, who was gathering his forces -around Alessandria. Meanwhile Bonaparte had crossed to -the south side of the Po with half his army. On the 14th -of June was fought the battle of Marengo. Anxious lest -the foe might give him the slip, the first consul had spread -his troops too widely; and the first events of the day were -so far in favor of the Austrians that Mélas, who was seventy-six -years old, left the field at two in the afternoon, -certain of victory, to seek repose. An hour later the opportune -arrival of General Desaix turned the scales, and -Bonaparte remained conqueror on the ground, standing -across the enemy's line of retreat. The following day -Mélas signed a convention abandoning all northern Italy, -as far as the Mincio, behind which the Austrians were to -withdraw. All the fortified places were given up to France, -including the hardly won Genoa. While awaiting the Emperor's -answer to propositions of peace, sent by the First -Consul, there was to be in Italy a suspension of arms, during -which neither army should send detachments to Germany. -On the 2d of July Bonaparte re-entered Paris in -triumph, after an absence of less than two months.</p> - -<p>Meantime Moreau, after learning the successful crossing -of the St. Bernard, had resumed the offensive. Moving to the -eastward, he crossed the Danube below Ulm with part of his -force on the 19th of June, threatening Kray's communications -with Bohemia. A partial encounter on that day left -five thousand prisoners in the hands of the French, who -maintained the position they had gained. The same night -Kray evacuated Ulm, moving rapidly off by a road to the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> -northward and so effecting his escape. Moreau, unable to -intercept, followed for some distance and then stopped a -pursuit which promised small results. He was still ignorant -of the battle of Marengo, of which the Austrians now -had news; and the latter, while concealing the victory, announced -to him the suspension of arms, and suggested a -similar arrangement in Germany. Convinced that events -favorable to France lay behind this proposition, Moreau -would come to no agreement; but on the contrary decided -at once to secure for his victorious army the most advantageous -conditions with which to enter upon negotiations. -Closely investing the important fortresses of Ulm and -Ingolstadt on the Danube, with part of his force, he recrossed -the river with the remainder and advanced into -Bavaria. On the 28th of June he entered Munich; and -near there was signed on the 15th of July an armistice, -closely corresponding with that concluded by Bonaparte in -Italy just one month before. The two belligerents retired -behind appointed lines, not again to engage in hostilities -without twelve days' notice. During this suspension of -arms the blockaded Austrian fortresses should receive every -fortnight provisions proportioned to their consumption, so -that in case of renewed operations they would be in the same -condition as when the truce began. The two great French -armies were now encamped in the fertile plains of Italy and -Germany, living in quiet off districts external to France, -which was thus relieved of the larger part of their expense.</p> - -<p>The effect of this short and brilliant campaign of unbroken -French successes was to dispose to peace both members -of the coalition. Neither, however, was yet reduced to -negotiate apart from its ally. On the very day the news of -Marengo was received at Vienna, but before the last reverses -in Germany, Austria had renewed her engagements -with Great Britain, both powers stipulating not to treat -singly. The first consul, on the other hand, was distinctly -opposed to joint discussions, his constant policy in the cabinet -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> -as in the field being to separate his opponents. As -Austria's great need was to gain time, she sent to Paris an -envoy empowered to exchange views with the French government -but to conclude nothing. The emperor also intimated -his wish for a general pacification, and on the 9th -of August the British minister at Vienna notified to that -court the willingness of his own to enter into negotiations -for a general peace.</p> - -<p>With this began an encounter of wits, in which Bonaparte -showed himself as astute at a bargain as he was wily in the -field. Austria, if not given too much time, was at his -mercy; but Great Britain held over him a like advantage in -her control of the sea, which was strangling the colonial -empire he passionately wished to restore. Haïti had escaped -from all but nominal control; Martinique, the gem of -the Antilles, was in British hands; Malta and Egypt, the -trophies of his own enterprise, were slowly but surely expiring. -For these he too needed time; for with it there was -good prospect of soon playing a card which should reverse, -or at least seriously modify, the state of the game, by bringing -Russia and the Baltic navies into the combination -against Great Britain. In this support, and in the extremity -to which he might reduce Austria, lay his only chances -to check the great opponent of France; for, while almost -supreme on the Continent, he could not from the coast project -his power beyond the range of a cannon's ball. His -correspondence throughout this period abounds with instructions -and exhortations to fit out the fleets, to take the sea, -to relieve Malta and Egypt, to seize Sardinia by an expedition -from Corsica, and Mahon by a squadron from Brest. -All fell fruitless before the exhaustion of French sea -power, as did also his plan for an extensive cruise on a -grand scale against British commerce in many quarters of -the world. "I see with regret," wrote he to the minister -of Marine, "that the armament of the fleet has been sacrificed -to that of a great number of small vessels;" but in -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> -truth there was nothing else to do. His ablest admirals -failed to equip ships from which every resource was cut off -by the omnipresent cruisers of the enemy. "We can never -take Mahon," he writes to the court of Spain, in the full -swing of his triumphs after Marengo; "therefore make war -on Portugal and take her provinces, so as to enter negotiations -for peace with your hands as full as possible of -equivalents."</p> - -<p>The Czar Paul had joined the second coalition full of -ardor against the French revolution and determined to -restore the princes who had lost their thrones. He had -been bitterly mortified by the reverses to his troops in 1799, -and especially by the disaster to Suwarrow, for which he -not unjustly blamed Austria. He was also dissatisfied to -find in his allies less of zeal for unfortunate sovereigns than -of desire to reduce the power of France, to whose system -they attributed the misfortunes of Europe. Disappointment -in his unbalanced mind turned soon to coolness and -was rapidly passing to hostility. The transition was assisted, -and a pretext for a breach with Great Britain afforded, -by a fresh outbreak of the old dispute between her and the -Baltic powers concerning the rights of neutrals. Denmark -in 1799 adopted the policy of convoying her merchant vessels -by ships of war, and claimed that a statement from the -senior naval officer, that the cargoes contained nothing forbidden -by the law of nations, exempted the convoy from the -belligerent right of search. British statesmen denied that -this conceded belligerent right could be nullified by any rule -adopted by a neutral; to which they were the more impelled -as the Danes and themselves differed radically in the definition -of contraband. Danish naval officers being instructed -to resist the search of their convoys, two hostile encounters -took place; one in December, 1799, and the other in July, -1800. In the latter several were killed on both sides, and -the Danish frigate was carried into the Downs. Seeing the -threatening character of affairs, the British ministry took -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> -immediate steps to bring them to an issue. An ambassador -was sent to Copenhagen supported by nine ships-of-the-line -and several bomb-vessels; and on the 29th of August, -barely a month after the affray, a convention was signed -by which the general subject of searching ships under convoy -was referred to future discussion, but Denmark consented -to suspend her convoys until a definitive treaty was -made. The Danish frigate was at once released.</p> - -<p>It will be observed that this collision occurred in the very -midst of the negotiations between Austria and France, to -which Great Britain claimed the right to be a party. The -whole vexed question of neutral and belligerent rights was -thus violently raised, at a moment most inauspicious to -the allies and most favorable to Bonaparte. The latter, -crowned with victory upon the Continent, found every neutral -commercial state disposed to side with him in contesting -positions considered by Great Britain to be vital to her -safety. It was for him to foster this disposition and combine -the separate powers into one great effort, before which -the Mistress of the Seas should be compelled to recede and -submit. The occasion here arose, as it were spontaneously, -to realize what became the great dream of his life and ultimately -led him to his ruin,—to unite the Continent against -the British Islands and, as he phrased it, "to conquer the -sea by the land." Circumstances, partly anterior to his -rise to power, and partly contrived by his sagacious policy -during the previous few months, particularly favored at -this moment such a league, for which the affair of the -Danish convoy supplied an impulse, and the prostration of -Great Britain's ally, Austria, an opportunity. Bonaparte -underestimated the vitality and influence of a state upon -which centred a far-reaching commercial system, and in -valuing naval power he did not appreciate that a mere mass -of ships had not the weight he himself was able to impart -to a mass of men. He never fully understood the maritime -problems with which from time to time he had to deal; but -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> -he showed wonderful skill at this critical period in combining -against his principal enemy an opposition, for which -Prussia afforded the body and the hot temper of the Czar -the animating soul.</p> - -<p>Since 1795 Prussia had shut herself up to a rigorous -neutrality, in which were embraced the North German -states. Under this system, during the maritime war, the -commerce of the larger part of the Continent poured in -through these states—by the great German rivers, the -Ems, the Weser, and the Elbe—and through the cities of -Hamburg and Bremen. The tonnage clearing from Great -Britain alone to North Germany increased from 120,000 -in 1792 to 389,000 in 1800; a traffic of which Prussia -took the lion's share. To these advantages of neutral -territory it was desirable to join the utmost freedom -for neutral navigation. Upon this Great Britain bore -heavily; but so large a proportion of the trade was -done through her, and the sea was so entirely under the -power of her navy, that prudence had so far dictated acquiescence -in her claims, even when not admitted. This -was particularly the case while Russia, under Catherine -II., and in the first years of her son, tacitly or openly -supported Great Britain; and while Austria, though -badly beaten in the field, remained unshaken in power. -The weaker maritime countries, Sweden, Denmark, and -the United States of America, were determined by similar -motives. They groaned under the British exactions; but -the expansion of their commerce outweighed the injuries -received, and submission was less hurtful than resistance -in arms. Russia herself, though not strictly a maritime -state, was a large producer of articles which were mainly -carried by British ships and for which England was the -chief customer. The material interests of Russia, and -especially of the powerful nobles, were therefore bound up -with peace with Great Britain; but an absolute monarch -could disregard this fact, at least for a time. The furious, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> -impulsive temper of Paul I., if aroused, was quite capable -of overleaping all prudential considerations, of using the -colossal power of his empire to support the other states, -and even of compelling them to act in concert with him.</p> - -<p>Such were the discordant elements which Bonaparte had -to reconcile into a common effort: on the one hand, the -strong though short-sighted mercantile interests, which -to retain great present advantages would favor submission -rather than resistance to the exactions of Great Britain. -These were represented by the development of carrying -trade in the neutral Baltic states, by the enlarged commerce -of Prussia and North Germany,—which through -their neutrality in a maritime war had become the highway -of intercourse between the Continent and the outer -world,—and by the productions of Russia, which formed -the revenue of her great proprietors, and found their way -to market wholly by sea. Bound together by the close -relations which commerce breeds between states, and by -the dependence of each upon the capital and mercantile system -of Great Britain, these interests constituted the prosperity -of nations, and could by no rulers be lightly disregarded. -On the other hand stood the dignity of neutral -flags and their permanent interests,—always contrary to -those of belligerents,—the ambition of Prussia and her -jealousy of Austria, and finally the chivalrous, reckless, -half insane Paul I., seeking now with all the bitterness -of personal feeling to gratify his resentment against his -late allies.</p> - -<p>Bonaparte had already begun to work upon the Czar as -well as upon the neutral powers. Closely observing the -political horizon from his first accession to office, he had -noted every condition capable of raising embarrassments -to Great Britain, whom his unerring military insight had -long before recognized -<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> -as the key to a military situation, -in which his own object was the predominance of France, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> -not only on the Continent but throughout the world. -Sagacious a statesman as he was, and clearly as he recognized -the power of moral and political motives, his ideal -of control was essentially forcible, based upon superior -armies and superior fleets; and consequently every political -problem was by him viewed much as a campaign, in -which forces were to be moved, combined, and finally -massed upon the vital points of an enemy's position. The -power of Great Britain was sea power in its widest sense, -commercial and naval; against it, therefore, he aimed to -effect such a combination as would both destroy her commerce -and cripple her navy. The impotence of France -and Spain, united, to injure the one or the other had been -clearly shown by repeated defeats, and by the failure of -the commerce-destroying so industriously carried on during -seven years of war. Far from decaying or languishing, -the commerce of Great Britain throve everywhere -with redoubled vigor, and her fleets rode triumphant in all -seas. There was, however, one quarter in which she had -not hitherto been disturbed, except by the quickly extinguished -efforts of the Dutch navy; and just there, in the -Baltic and North Sea, was the point where, next to the -British islands and seas themselves, she was most vulnerable. -There was concentrated a great part of her shipping; -there was the market for the colonial produce stored -in her overflowing warehouses; there also were gathered -three navies, whose united masses—manned by hardy -seamen trained in a boisterous navigation and sheltered -in an enclosed sea of perilous access—might overweight -a force already strained to control the Mediterranean, to -blockade the hostile arsenals, and to protect the merchant -shipping which thronged over every ocean highway.</p> - -<p>To close the north of Europe to British trade, and to -combine the Baltic navies against that of Great Britain, -became thenceforth the fixed ideas of Bonaparte's life. -To conciliate Denmark he released a number of Danish -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> -ships, which had been arrested by the Directory for submitting -to search by British cruisers. The extent of the -czar's alienation from his former allies not being at first -apparent, he next courted Prussia, the head of the North -German neutrality, in whose power it was to arrest British -trade both through her own territory and through Hamburg. -Prussia was ambitious to play a leading part in -Europe. The five years spent by Austria, France, and -Great Britain in exhausting warfare, she had used to -consolidate her power and husband her resources. She -wished now to pose as a mediator, and looked for the -time when the prostration of the combatants and her own -restored strength would cause them to bend to her influence, -and yield her points, through the simple exhibition of -her force. The advances and flatteries of the first consul -were graciously received, but the path Prussia had traced -for herself was to involve no risks—only gains; she -wished much, but would venture naught. It was a dangerous -part to play, this waiting on opportunity, against -such a man as swayed the destinies of the Continent during -the next twelve years. From it arose a hesitating, -selfish, and timid policy, fluctuating with every breath of -danger or hope of advantage, dishonoring the national -name, until it ended in Jena and the agonies of humiliation -through which the country passed between that disaster -and the overthrow of Napoleon. Such a spirit is prone -to side with a strong combination and to yield to a masterful -external impulse.</p> - -<p>Under this Bonaparte next sought to bring her. "We -shall make nothing out of Prussia," he writes to Talleyrand -on the first of June, 1800, on his way to Marengo; -and he adds, "If the news from Egypt [apparently the -defeat of the Turks by Kleber] is confirmed, it will become -important to have some one in Russia. The Ottoman -Empire cannot exist much longer, and if Paul I. -turns his looks in that direction our interests become -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> -common." -<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> -Bonaparte was at no pains to reconcile this -view with an assurance made a month later to Turkey -that "no anxiety need be felt about Egypt, which will be -restored as soon as the Porte shall resume its former relations -with France." -<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> On the 4th of June he recommends -general and flattering overtures to the czar, accompanied -by special marks of consideration. The latter was fully -prepared to be won by compliments from the man for -whose military glory he had come to feel a profound enthusiasm. -On the 4th of July Bonaparte's general advances -took form in a definite proposal to surrender to -Russian troops Malta, whose speedy loss by himself he -saw to be inevitable; an offer calculated not only to -charm the Czar, who delighted to fancy himself the head -and protector of an ancient order of knights, but also to -sow discord between him and Great Britain, if, as was -probable, the latter declined to yield her prey to a friend -who at a critical moment had forsaken her. The letter -sketched by the first consul was carefully worded to -quicken the ready vanity of its recipient. "Desiring to -give a proof of personal consideration to the emperor of -Russia and to distinguish him from the other enemies of -the republic, who fight from a vile love of gain, the first -consul wishes, if the garrison of Malta is constrained by -famine to evacuate the place, to restore it to the hands -of the czar as grand master of the order; and although -the first consul is certain that Malta has provisions for -several months, -<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> -he wishes his Majesty to inform him -what conventions he would wish to make, and what measures -to take, so that, if the case arise, his troops may enter -that place." -<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> -This was shortly followed by the release of -the Russian prisoners in France, in number between seven -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> -and eight thousand, whom Bonaparte clad and dismissed -with their colors and their officers to return into Russia; -suggesting that, if the czar thought proper, he "might -demand of the English to release an equal number of -French prisoners; but if not, the first consul hoped he -would accept his troops as an especial mark of the esteem -felt for the brave Russian armies." -<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a></p> - -<p>Immediately after these transactions occurred the collision -between British and Danish cruisers in the Channel, -and the entrance of the Baltic by the British fleet, to support -its ambassador in his negotiation with Denmark. -Paul I. made of the latter a pretext for sequestrating all -British property in Russia, to be held as a guarantee -against the future action of Great Britain. This order, -dated August 29, 1800, was followed by another of September -10, announcing that "several political circumstances -induced the emperor to think that a rupture of -friendship with England may ensue," and directing a concentration -of Russian troops. The cloud blew over for a -moment, the sequestration being removed on the 22d of -September; but the fall of Malta, which had surrendered -on the 5th of the same month, brought matters to an issue. -The czar had gladly accepted Bonaparte's adroit advances -and designated a general to go to Paris, take command of -the released prisoners and with them repair to Malta. -The capitulation became known to him early in November; -before which he had formally published his intention -to revive the Armed Neutrality of 1780 against the maritime -claims of Great Britain. It being very doubtful -whether the latter would deliver the island after his unfriendly -measures, a sequestration of British property was -again decreed. Some three hundred ships were seized, -their crews marched into the interior, and seals placed on -all warehouses containing British property; the czar declaring -that the embargo should not be removed until the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> -acknowledgment of his rights to Malta, as grand master -of the Order. The sequestrated property was to be held by -an imperial commission and applied to pay debts due to -Russian subjects by private Englishmen.</p> - -<p>Affairs had now reached a stage where Prussia felt -encouraged to move. The breach between Great Britain -and Russia had opened wide, while the relations of the -czar and first consul had become so friendly as to assure -their concert. The armistice between Austria and France -still continued, pending the decision whether the latter -would negotiate with the emperor and Great Britain conjointly; -but Bonaparte was a close as well as a hard bargainer. -He would not admit the joint negotiation, nor -postpone the renewal of hostilities beyond the 11th of -September, except on condition of a maritime truce as -favorable to France as he considered the land armistice to -be to Austria. He proposed entire freedom of navigation -to merchant vessels, the raising of the blockades of Brest, -Cadiz, Toulon, and Flushing, and that Malta and Alexandria -should be freely open to receive provisions by French -or neutral vessels. The effect would be to allow the -French dockyards to obtain naval stores, of which they -were utterly destitute, and Malta and Egypt to receive -undefined quantities of supplies and so prolong their resistance -indefinitely. Great Britain was only willing to -adopt for Egypt and Malta the literal terms of the armistice -applied to the three Austrian fortresses blockaded by -French troops. These were to receive every fortnight -provisions proportioned to their consumption, and the -British ministry offered to allow the same to Malta and -Egypt. They also conceded free navigation, except in the -articles of military and naval stores. Bonaparte refused. -Austria's advantage in the armistice, he said, was not the -mere retention of the fortresses, but the use she was making -of her respite. Between these two extreme views no -middle term could be found. In fact, great as were the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> -results of Marengo, and of Moreau's more methodical advance -into Germany, the material advantage of Great -Britain over France still far exceeded that of France over -Austria. The French had gained great successes, but -they were now forcing the enemy back upon the centre of -his power and they had not possession of his communications; -whereas Great Britain had shut off, not merely -Egypt and Malta, but France herself from all fruitful -intercourse with the outer world. The negotiation for a -maritime truce was broken off on the 9th of October. -Meanwhile Bonaparte, declining to await its issue, had -given notice that hostilities would be resumed between -the 5th and 10th of September; and Austria, not yet -ready, was fain to purchase a further delay by surrendering -the blockaded places, Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsburg. -A convention to this effect was concluded, and the -renewal of the war postponed for forty-five days dating -from September 21st.</p> - -<p>In such conditions Prussia saw one of those opportunities -which, under Bonaparte's manipulation, so often -misled her. The prostration of her German rival would -be hastened, and the support of the first consul in the -approaching apportionment of indemnities to German -states secured, by joining the concert of the Baltic powers -against Great Britain. Without this accession to the -northern league the quarrel would be mainly naval, and -its issue, before the disciplined valor of British seamen, -scarcely doubtful. Prussia alone was so situated as to -deal the direct and heavy blow at British commerce of -closing its accustomed access to the Continent; and the -injury thus inflicted so far exceeded any she herself could -incidentally receive, as to make this course less hazardous -than that of offending the czar and the French government. -The political connection of Hanover with Great -Britain was a further motive, giving Prussia the hope, so -often dangled before her eyes by Bonaparte, of permanently -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> -annexing the German dominions of the British -king. An occasion soon arose for showing her bias. In -the latter part of October a British cruiser seized a Prussian -merchantman trying to enter the Texel with a cargo -of naval stores. The captor, through stress of weather, -took his prize into Cuxhaven, a port at the mouth of the -Elbe belonging to Hamburg, through which passed much -of the British commerce with the Continent. Prussia demanded -its release of the Hamburg senate, and upon refusal -ordered two thousand troops to take possession of the -port. The senate then bought the prize and delivered it -to Prussia, and the British government also directed its -restoration; a step of pure policy with which Fox taunted -the ministry. It was, as he truly remarked, a concession -of principle, dictated by the fact that Prussia, while capable -of doing much harm to Great Britain, could not be -reached by the British navy.</p> - -<p>Whether it was wise to waive a point, in order to withhold -an important member from the formidable combination -of the North, may be argued; but the attempt met -the usual fate of concessions attributed to weakness. The -remonstrances of the British ambassador received the -reply that the occupation, having been ordered, must be -carried out; that the neutrality of Cuxhaven "being thus -placed under the guarantee of the king will be more effectually -out of the reach of all violation." Such reasoning -indicated beyond doubt the stand Prussia was about to -take; and her influence fixed the course of Denmark, -which is said to have been averse from a step that threatened -to stop her trade and would probably make her the -first victim of Great Britain's resentment. On the 16th -of December a treaty renewing the Armed Neutrality of -1780 was signed at St. Petersburg by Russia and Sweden, -and received the prompt adherence of Denmark and Prussia. -Its leading affirmations were that neutral ships were -free to carry on the coasting and colonial trade of states -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> -at war, that enemy's goods under the neutral flag were not -subject to seizure, and that blockades, to be respected, -must be supported by such a force of ships before the -port as to make the attempt to enter hazardous. A definition -of contraband was adopted excluding naval stores -from that title; and the claim was affirmed that vessels -under convoy of a ship of war were not liable to the belligerent -right of search. Each of these assertions contested -one of the maritime claims upon which Great -Britain conceived her naval power, and consequently her -place among the nations, to depend; but the consenting -states bound themselves to maintain their positions by -force, if necessary.</p> - -<p>Thus was successfully formed the combination of the -Northern powers against Great Britain, the first and most -willing of those effected by Bonaparte. By a singular -coincidence, which recalls the opportuneness of his departure -from England in 1798 to check the yet undivined -expedition against Egypt, -<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> Nelson, the man destined also -to strike this coalition to the ground, was during its formation -slowly journeying from the Mediterranean, with -which his name and his glory both before and after are -most closely associated, to the North Sea; as though -again drawn by some mysterious influence, to be at hand -for unknown services which he alone could render. On -the 11th of July, a week after Bonaparte made his first -offer of Malta to the czar, Nelson left Leghorn for Trieste -and Vienna. He passed through Hamburg at the very -time that the affair of the Prussian prize was under discussion, -and landed in England on the 6th of November. -Finding his health entirely restored by the land journey, -he applied for immediate service, and was assigned to -command a division of the Channel fleet under Lord St. -Vincent; but he did not go afloat until the 17th of January, -1801, when his flag was hoisted on board the "San -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> -Josef," the three-decker he had captured at the battle of -Cape St. Vincent. Meanwhile, however, it had been -settled between the Admiralty and himself that if a fleet -were sent into the Baltic, he should go as second in command -to Sir Hyde Parker; and when in the very act of -reporting to St. Vincent, the day before he joined the -San Josef, a letter arrived from Parker announcing his -appointment.</p> - -<p>By this time Austria had received a final blow, which -forced her to treat alone, and postponed for nearly five -years her reappearance in the field. The emperor had -sent an envoy to Lunéville, who was met by Joseph Bonaparte -as the representative of France; but refusing to -make peace apart from Great Britain, hostilities were resumed -on the 28th of November. On the 3d of December -Moreau won the great battle of Hohenlinden, and then -advanced upon Vienna. On the 25th an armistice was -signed at Steyer, within a hundred miles of the Austrian -capital. Successes, less brilliant but decided, were obtained -in Italy, resulting on the 16th of January, 1801, in an -armistice between the armies there. At nearly the same -moment with this last news the first consul received a -letter from the czar, manifesting extremely friendly feelings -towards France, while full of hatred towards England, -and signifying his intention to send an ambassador -to Paris. This filled Bonaparte with sanguine hopes, the -expression of which shows how heavily sea power weighed -in his estimation. "Peace with the emperor," he wrote -to his brother at Lunéville, "is <i>nothing</i> in comparison -with the alliance of the czar, which will <i>dominate England</i> -and preserve Egypt for us;" -<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> and he ordered him to -prolong the negotiations until the arrival of the expected -ambassador, that the engagements contracted with Germany -might be made in concert with Russia. Upon a -similar combined action he based extravagant expectations -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> -of naval results, dependent upon the impression, -with which he so hardly parted, that one set of ships was -equal to another. -<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> -A courier was at once dispatched to -Spain to arrange expeditions against Ireland, against -Brazil and the East Indies, to the Caribbean Sea for the -recovery of the French and Spanish islands, and to the -Mediterranean to regain Minorca. "In the embarrassment -about to come upon England, threatened in the -Archipelago by the Russians and in the northern seas by -the combined Powers, it will be impossible for her long -to keep a strong squadron in the Mediterranean." -<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a></p> - -<p>The Russian envoy not arriving, however, Joseph Bonaparte -was instructed to bring matters to a conclusion; -and on the 9th of February the Austrian minister at Lunéville, -after a stubborn fight over the terms, signed a treaty -of peace. The principal conditions were: 1. The definitive -surrender of all German possessions west of the -Rhine, so that the river became the frontier of France -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> -from Switzerland to Holland. 2. The cession of Belgium -made at Campo Formio was confirmed. 3. In Italy, -Austria herself was confined to the east bank of the -Adige, and the princes of that house having principalities -west of the river were dispossessed; their territories -going to the Cisalpine Republic and to an infante of -Spain, who was established in Tuscany with the title of -King of Etruria. The Cisalpine and Etruria being dependent -for their political existence upon France, the -latter, through its control of their territory, interposed between -Austria and Naples and shut off the British from -access to Leghorn. 4. The eleventh article of the treaty -guaranteed the independence of the Dutch, Swiss, Cisalpine -and Ligurian republics. In its influence upon the -future course of events this was the most important of all -the stipulations. It gave to the political status of the -Continent a definition, upon which Great Britain reckoned -in her own treaty with France a few months later; and -its virtual violation by Bonaparte became ultimately both -the reason and the excuse for her refusal to fulfil the engagements -about Malta, which led to the renewal of the -war and so finally to the downfall of Napoleon. 5. The -German Empire was pledged to give to the princes dispossessed -on the west of the Rhine, and in Italy, an indemnity -within the empire itself. By this Prussia, which was -among the losers, reaped through Bonaparte's influence -an abundant recompense for the support already given to -his policy in the North. This success induced her to continue -the same time-serving opportunism, until, when no -longer necessary to France, she was thrown over with a -rudeness that roused her to an isolated, and therefore -speedily crushed resistance.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter p4"> -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIII" id="CHAPTER_XIII"></a>CHAPTER XIII.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="ac"><span class="sc">Events of 1801.</span></p> - -<p class="chapsum"><span class="sc">British Expedition to the Baltic—Battle of - Copenhagen—Bonaparte's futile attempts to contest control of the Sea—His - Continental Policy—Preliminaries of Peace with Great Britain, October, - 1801—Influence of Sea Power so far upon the Course of the Revolution.</span></p> - -<p class="drop-cap">BY the peace of Lunéville Great Britain was left alone, -and for the moment against all Europe. The ministry -met the emergency with vigor and firmness, though possibly -with too much reliance upon diplomacy and too little upon -the military genius of the great seaman whose services -were at their disposal. Upon the Continent nothing could -be effected, all resistance to France had been crushed by -the genius of Bonaparte; but time had to be gained for the -expedition then under way against Egypt and destined to -compel its evacuation by the French. The combination in -the North also must be quickly dissolved, if the country -were to treat on anything like equal terms.</p> - -<p>An armed negotiation with the Baltic powers, similar to -that employed with Denmark the preceding August, was -therefore determined; and a fleet of eighteen sail-of-the-line -with thirty-five smaller vessels was assembled at Yarmouth, -on the east coast of England. Rapidity of movement was -essential to secure the advantage from the ice, which, -breaking up in the harbors less rapidly than in the open -water, would delay the concentration of the hostile navies; -and also to allow the Baltic powers the least possible time -to prepare for hostilities which they had scarcely anticipated. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> -Everything pointed to Nelson, the most energetic -and daring of British admirals, for the chief command of an -expedition in which so much depended upon the squadron, -numerically inferior to the aggregate of forces arrayed -against it, attacking separately each of the component parts -before their junction; but Nelson was still among the -junior flag-officers, and the rather erratic manner in which, -while in the central Mediterranean and under the influence -of Lady Hamilton, he had allowed his views of the political -situation to affect his actions even in questions of military -subordination, had probably excited in Earl Spencer, the -First Lord, by whom the officers were selected, a distrust of -his fitness for a charge requiring a certain delicacy of discretion -as well as vigor of action. Whatever the reason, -withholding the chief command from him was unquestionably -a mistake,—which would not have been made by St. -Vincent, who succeeded Spencer a few weeks later upon the -fall of the Pitt ministry. The conditions did not promise -a pacific solution when the expedition was planned, and the -prospect was even worse when it sailed. The instructions -given to Sir Hyde Parker allowed Denmark forty-eight -hours to accept Great Britain's terms and withdraw from -her engagements with the other Powers. Whether she -complied peaceably or not, after she was reduced to submission -the division of the Russian fleet at Revel was to be -attacked, before the melting ice allowed it to join the main -body in Cronstadt; and Sweden was to be similarly dealt -with. Under such orders diplomacy had a minor part to play, -while in their directness and simplicity they were admirably -suited to the fiery temper and prompt military action -which distinguished Nelson; and, but for the opportune -death of Paul I., Great Britain might have had reason to -regret that the opportunity to give Russia a severe reminder -of her sea power was allowed to slip through the lax grasp -of a sluggish admiral.</p> - -<p>The fleet sailed from Yarmouth on the 12th of March, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> -1801; and on the 19th, although there had been some -scattering in a heavy gale, nearly all were collected off the -Skaw, the northern point of Jutland at the entrance of the -Kattegat. The wind being north-west was fair for going -to Copenhagen, and Nelson, if in command, would have -advanced at once with the ambassador on board. "While -the negotiation is going on," he said, "the Dane should see -our flag waving every moment he lifted his head." As it -was, the envoy went forward with a frigate alone and the -fleet waited. On the 12th it was off Elsineur, where the -envoy rejoined, Denmark having rejected the British terms.</p> - -<p>This amounted to an acceptance of hostilities, and it only -remained to the commander-in-chief to act at once; for the -wind was favorable, an advantage which at any moment -might be lost. On this day Nelson addressed Parker a -letter, summing up in a luminous manner the features of -the situation and the different methods of action. "Not a -moment should be lost in attacking," he said; "we shall -never be so good a match for them as at this moment." -He next hinted, what he had probably already said, that -the fleet ought to have been off Copenhagen, and not at -Elsineur, when the negotiation failed. "Then you might -instantly attack and there would be scarcely a doubt but -the Danish fleet would be destroyed, and the capital made -so hot that Denmark would listen to reason and its true -interest." Since, however, the mistake of losing so much -time had been made, he seeks to stir his superior to lose no -more. "Almost the safety, certainly the honor, of England -is more entrusted to you than ever yet fell to the lot of any -British officer; ... never did our country depend so much -on the success of any fleet as of this."</p> - -<p>Having thus shown the necessity for celerity, Nelson -next discussed the plan of operations. Copenhagen is on -the east side of the island of Zealand, fronting the coast -of Sweden, from which it is separated by the passage -called the Sound. On the west the island is divided from -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> -the other parts of Denmark by the Great Belt. The navigation -of the latter being much the more difficult, the -preparations of the Danes had been made on the side of -the Sound, and chiefly about Copenhagen itself. For half -a mile from the shore in front of the city, flats extend, and -in the Sound itself at a distance of little over a mile, is a -long shoal called the Middle Ground. Between these two -bodies of shallow water is a channel, called the King's, -through which a fleet of heavy ships could sail, and from -whose northern end a deep pocket stretches toward Copenhagen, -forming the harbor proper. The natural point of -attack therefore appears to be at the north; and there the -Danes had erected powerful works, rising on piles out of -the shoal water off the harbor's mouth and known as the -Three-Crown Batteries. Nelson, however, pointed out -that not only was this head of the line exceedingly strong, -but that the wind that was fair to attack would be foul to -return; therefore a disabled ship would have no escape -but by passing through the King's Channel. Doing so -she would have to run the gantlet of a line of armed -hulks, which the Danes had established as floating batteries -along the inner edge of the channel—covering the -front of Copenhagen—and would also be separated from -her fleet. Nor was this difficulty, which may be called -tactical, the only objection to a plan that he disparaged as -"taking the bull by the horns." He remarked that so -long as the British fleet remained in the Sound, without -entering the Baltic, the way was left open for both the -Swedes and the Russians, if released by the ice, to make -a junction with the Danes. Consequently, he advised -that a sufficiently strong force of the lighter ships-of-the-line -should pass outside the Middle Ground, despite the -difficulties of navigation, which were not insuperable, and -come up in rear of the city. There they would interpose -between the Danes and their allies, and be in position to -assail the weaker part of the hostile order. He offered -himself to lead this detachment.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span></p> - -<div class="figcenter"><a name="i-044.jpg" id="i-044.jpg"></a> - <img src="images/i-044.jpg" - alt="" /> - <div class="caption">Battle of Copenhagen.<br /> - <a href="images/i-044hr.jpg"><span class="disp">Click here for larger - map</span></a></div> -</div> - -<p>This whole letter of March 24, 1801, -<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> possesses peculiar -interest; for it shows with a rare particularity, elicited -by the need he felt of arousing and convincing his superior, -Nelson's clear discernment of the decisive features -of a military situation. The fame of this great admiral has -depended less upon his conduct of campaigns than upon -the renowned victories he won in the actual collision of -fleet with fleet; and even then has been mutilated by the -obstinacy with which, despite the perfectly evident facts, -men have persisted in seeing in them nothing but dash,—heart, -not head. -<a name="FNanchor_23_23" id="FNanchor_23_23"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> Throughout his correspondence, it is -true, there are frequent traces of the activity of his mental -faculties and of the general accuracy of his military -conclusions; but ordinarily it is from his actions that his -reasonings and principles must be deduced. In the present -case we have the views he held and the course he evidently -would have pursued clearly formulated by himself; -and it cannot but be a subject of regret that the naval world -should have lost so fine an illustration as he would there -have given of the principles and conduct of naval warfare. -He concluded his letter with a suggestion worthy of Napoleon -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> -himself, and which, if adopted, would have brought -down the Baltic Confederacy with a crash that would have -resounded throughout Europe. "Supposing us through -the Belt with the wind first westerly, would it not be possible -to go with the fleet, or detach ten ships of three and -two decks, with one bomb and two fire-ships, to Revel, to -destroy the Russian squadron at that place? I do not see -the great risk of such a detachment, and with the remainder -to attempt the business at Copenhagen. The measure -may be thought bold, but I am of opinion the boldest are -the safest; and our country demands a most vigorous -exertion of her force, directed with judgment."</p> - -<p>Committed as the Danes were to a stationary defence, -this recommendation to strike at the soul of the confederacy -evinced the clearest perception of the key to the situation, -which Nelson himself summed up in the following -words: "I look upon the Northern League to be like a -tree, of which Paul was the trunk and Sweden and Denmark -the branches. If I can get at the trunk and hew it -down, the branches fall of course; but I may lop the -branches and yet not be able to fell the tree, and my -power must be weaker when its greatest strength is required" -<a name="FNanchor_24_24" id="FNanchor_24_24"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a>—that -is, the Russians should have been attacked -before the fleet was weakened, as it inevitably must be, -by the battle with the Danes. "If we could have cut up -the Russian fleet," he said again, "that was my object." -Whatever Denmark's wishes about fighting, she was by -her continental possessions tied to the policy of Russia -and Prussia, either of whom could overwhelm her by land. -She dared not disregard them. The course of both depended -upon the czar; for the temporizing policy of Prussia -would at once embrace his withdrawal from the league -as an excuse for doing the same. At Revel were twelve -Russian ships-of-the-line, fully half their Baltic fleet, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> -whose destruction would have paralyzed the remainder -and the naval power of the empire. To persuade Parker -to such a step was, however, hopeless. "Our fleet would -never have acted against Russia and Sweden," wrote Nelson -afterwards, "although Copenhagen would have been -burned; for Sir Hyde Parker was determined not to leave -Denmark hostile in his rear;" -<a name="FNanchor_25_25" id="FNanchor_25_25"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> a reason whose technical -accuracy under all the circumstances was nothing short -of pedantic, and illustrates the immense distance between -a good and accomplished officer, which Parker was, and a -genius whose comprehension of rules serves only to guide, -not to fetter, his judgment.</p> - -<p>Although unable to rise equal to the great opportunity -indicated by Nelson, Sir Hyde Parker adopted his suggestion -as to the method and direction of the principal attack -upon the defences of Copenhagen. For this, Nelson asked -ten ships-of-the-line and a number of smaller vessels, with -which he undertook to destroy the floating batteries covering -the front of the city. These being reduced, the bomb -vessels could be placed so as to play with effect upon the -dockyard, arsenals, and the town, in case further resistance -was made.</p> - -<p>The nights of the 30th and 31st of March were employed -sounding the channel. On the first of April the fleet -moved up to the north end of the Middle Ground, about -four miles from the city; and that afternoon Nelson's -division, to which Parker had assigned two ships-of-the-line -more than had been asked—or twelve altogether—got -under way, passed through the outer channel and anchored -towards sundown off the south-east end of the -shoal, two miles from the head -<a name="FNanchor_26_26" id="FNanchor_26_26"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> of the Danish line. -Nelson announced his purpose to attack as soon as the -wind served; and the night was passed by him in arranging -the order of battle. The enterprise was perilous, not -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> -on account of the force to be engaged, but because of the -great difficulties of navigation. The pilots were mostly -mates of merchantmen trading with the Baltic; and their -experience in vessels of three or four hundred tons did -not fit them for the charge of heavy battle-ships. They -betrayed throughout great indecision, and their imperfect -knowledge contributed to the principal mishaps of the -day, as well as to a comparative incompleteness in the -results of victory.</p> - -<p>The next morning the wind came fair at south-south-east, -and at eight <span class="sc">A. M.</span> the British captains were summoned -to the flag-ship for their final instructions. The -Danish line to be attacked extended in a north-west and -south-east direction for somewhat over a mile. It was -composed of hulks and floating batteries, eighteen to -twenty in number and mounting 628 guns, of which about -375 would—fighting thus at anchor—be on the engaged -side. The southern flank now to be assailed was partly -supported by works on shore; but from the intervening -shoal water these were too distant for thoroughly efficient -fire. Being thus distinctly weaker than the northern extremity, -which was covered by the Three-Crown Battery -and a second line of heavy ships, this southern end was -most properly chosen by the British as the point of their -chief assault for tactical reasons, independently of the -strategic advantage urged by Nelson in thus interposing -between the enemy and his allies. At half-past nine signal -was made to weigh. The ships were soon under sail; -but the difficulties of pilotage, despite careful soundings -made during the night by an experienced naval captain, -were soon apparent. The "Agamemnon," of sixty-four -guns, was unable to weather the point of the Middle -Ground, and had to anchor out of range. She had no -share in the battle. The "Bellona" and "Russell," seventy-fours, -the fourth and fifth in the order, entered the -Channel; but keeping too far to the eastward they ran ashore -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> -on its farther side—upon the Middle Ground. They were -not out of action, but beyond the range of the most efficient -gunnery under the conditions of that period. Nelson's flag-ship -following them passed clear, as did the rest of the -heavy ships; but the loss of these three out of the line -prevented by so much its extension to the northward. -The result was to expose that part of the British order to -a weight of fire quite disproportioned to its strength. A -body of frigates very gallantly undertook to fill the gap, -which they could do but inadequately, and suffered heavy -loss in attempting.</p> - -<p>The battle was at its height at half-past eleven. There -was then no more manœuvring, but the simple question -of efficient gunnery and endurance. At about two <span class="sc">P. M.</span> a -great part of the Danish line had ceased to fire, and the -flag-ship "Dannebrog" was in flames. During the action -the Danish crews were frequently re-enforced from the -shore; and the new-comers in several cases, reaching the -ships after they had struck, renewed the fight, either -through ignorance or indifference to the fact. The land -batteries also fired on boats trying to take possession. -Nelson seized on this circumstance to bring the affair to -a conclusion. He wrote a letter addressed "To the -brothers of Englishmen, the Danes," and sent it under -flag of truce to the Crown Prince, who was in the city. -"Lord Nelson has directions to spare Denmark when no -longer resisting; but if the firing is continued on the part -of Denmark, Lord Nelson will be obliged to set on fire all -the floating batteries he has taken, without having the -power of saving the brave Danes who have defended -them." The letter was sent on shore by a British officer -who had served in the Russian navy and spoke Danish. -The engagement continued until about three <span class="sc">P. M.</span>, when -the whole line of floating defences south-east of the Crown -Batteries had either struck or been destroyed.</p> - -<p>The fortifications were still unharmed, as were the ships -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> -west of them covering the harbor proper; but their fire -was stopped by the bearer of a flag of truce who was -bringing to Nelson the reply of the Crown Prince. The -latter demanded the precise purport of the first message. -Nelson took a high hand. He had destroyed the part of -the enemy's line which he had attacked; but it was important -now to withdraw his crippled ships, and with the -existing wind that could only be done by passing the -Crown Batteries. Had the three that ran aground been -in the line, it is permissible to believe that that work -would have been so far injured as to be practically harmless; -but this was far from the case. The admiral in his -second letter politicly ignored this feature of the situation. -He wrote, "Lord Nelson's object in sending on -shore a flag of truce is humanity; -<a name="FNanchor_27_27" id="FNanchor_27_27"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> he therefore <i>consents</i> -that hostilities shall cease till Lord Nelson can take his -prisoners out of the prizes, and he consents to land all the -wounded Danes and to burn or remove his prizes. Lord -Nelson, with humble duty to His Royal Highness, begs -leave to say that he will ever esteem it the greatest victory -he ever gained, if this flag of truce may be the happy -forerunner of a lasting and happy union between my most -gracious Sovereign and His Majesty the King of Denmark." -Having written the letter, he referred the bearer -for definite action to Sir Hyde Parker, who lay some four -miles off in the "London;" foreseeing that the long pull -there and back would give time for the leading ships, -which were much crippled, to clear the shoals, though -their course for so doing lay close under the Crown Batteries. -Thus the exposed part of the British fleet was -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> -successfully removed from a dangerous position and rejoined -Parker north of the Middle Ground. The advantage -obtained by Nelson's presence of mind and promptness -in gaining this respite was shown by the difficulties attending -the withdrawal. Three out of five ships-of-the-line -grounded, two of which remained fast for several -hours a mile from the batteries, but protected by the -truce.</p> - -<p>The result of the battle of Copenhagen was to uncover -the front of the city and lay it, with its dockyards and -arsenals, open to bombardment. It was now safe to place -the bomb vessels in the King's Channel. It became a -question for Denmark to decide, whether fear of her powerful -allies and zeal for the claims of neutrals should lead -her to undergo further punishment, or whether the suffering -already endured and the danger still threatening were -excuse sufficient for abandoning the coalition. On the -other hand, Nelson, who was the brains as well as the -backbone of the British power in the North, cared little, -either now or before the battle, about the attitude of Denmark, -except as it deterred Parker from advancing. Now, -as before, his one idea was to get at the Russian division -still locked in Revel by the ice. The negotiations were -carried on by him and resulted in an armistice for fourteen -weeks, after which hostilities could be resumed upon -fourteen days' notice. Thus was assured to Parker for -four months the entire immunity he desired for his communications. -Fear of Russia long deterred the Danes -from this concession, which Nelson frankly told them he -must have, so as to be at liberty to act against the Russian -fleet and return to them; and he made it the indispensable -requisite to sparing the city. During the discussions, -however, the Crown Prince received news of the czar's -death. Paul I. had been murdered by a body of conspirators -on the night of March 24. The Danish government -concealed the tidings; but the departure of the soul of the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> -confederacy relieved their worst fears and encouraged -them to yield to Nelson's demands.</p> - -<p>Denmark's part in the Armed Neutrality was suspended -during the continuance of the armistice; but the British -ministers showed as little appreciation of the military -situation as did their commander-in-chief in the Baltic. -"Upon a consideration of all the circumstances," they -wrote to Nelson, -<a name="FNanchor_28_28" id="FNanchor_28_28"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> "His Majesty has thought fit to approve -the armistice." Nelson was naturally and justly indignant -at this absurdly inadequate understanding of the -true nature of services, concerning whose military character -a French naval critic has truly said that "they will -always be in the eyes of seamen his fairest title to glory. -He alone was capable of displaying such boldness and -perseverance; he alone could confront the immense difficulties -of that enterprise and overcome them." -<a name="FNanchor_29_29" id="FNanchor_29_29"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> But his -conduct at Copenhagen, brilliant as was the display of -energy, of daring and of endurance, was far from exhausting -the merits of his Baltic campaign. He had lifted and -carried on his shoulders the dead weight of his superior, -he had clearly read the political as well as the military -situation, and he never for one moment lost sight of the -key to both. To bombard Copenhagen was to his mind -a useless piece of vandalism, which would embitter a nation -that ought to be conciliated, and destroy the only hold -Great Britain still had over Denmark. -<a name="FNanchor_30_30" id="FNanchor_30_30"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> Except for the -necessity of managing his lethargic and cautious commander-in-chief, -we may believe he would never have -contemplated it; but under the circumstances he used the -threat as the one means by which he could extort truce -from Denmark and induce Parker to move. With the -latter to handle, the armistice slipped the knot of the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> -military difficulty; it was the one important point, alongside -which every other fell into insignificance. "My object," -he said, "was to get at Revel before the frost broke -up at Cronstadt, that the twelve sail-of-the-line might be -destroyed." Well might St. Vincent write, "Your Lordship's -whole conduct, from your first appointment to this -hour, is the subject of our constant admiration. It does -not become me to make comparisons; all agree there is -but one Nelson."</p> - -<p>Meantime, while the British fleet had been dallying in -the approaches to the Baltic, important events had occurred, -furthering the projects of Bonaparte in the North -and seriously complicating the position of Great Britain. -No formal declaration of war was at any time issued by -the latter country; but its government had not unjustly -regarded as an act of direct hostility the combination of -Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia, to support the czar in a -course first undertaken to assure his claim upon Malta, -and in furtherance of which he had seized as pledges three -hundred British merchant vessels with their crews. -<a name="FNanchor_31_31" id="FNanchor_31_31"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> As -an offset to the British interests thus foreclosed upon by -Russia, and to negotiate upon somewhat equal terms, the -government, on the 14th of January, 1801, ordered an embargo -laid upon Russian, Danish, and Swedish vessels in -British ports, and the seizure of merchant ships of these -powers at sea. Of four hundred and fifty Swedish vessels -then abroad, two hundred were detained or brought into -British harbors. They were not, however, condemned as -prizes, but held inviolable to await the issue of the existing -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> -difficulties. To the remonstrances of Sweden and -Denmark, supported by Prussia, the British ministry replied -definitely, on the 7th of March, that the embargo -would not be revoked so long as the Powers affected "continued -to form part of a confederacy which had for its -object to impose by force on his Majesty a new system of -maritime law, inconsistent with the dignity and independence -of his crown, and the rights and interests of his -people." -<a name="FNanchor_32_32" id="FNanchor_32_32"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> In consequence -of this and of the entrance of -the Sound by Parker's fleet, Prussia, on the 30th of March, -and as a measure of retaliation, closed the mouths of the -Elbe, the Weser, and the Ems—in other words, the ports -of North Germany—against British commerce, and took -possession of the German states belonging to the king of -Great Britain. On the same day a corps of Danish troops -occupied Hamburg, more certainly to stop British trade -therewith.</p> - -<p>Thus Bonaparte's conception was completely realized. -There was not only a naval combination against Great -Britain, but also an exclusion of her trade from one of -its chief markets. The danger, however, was much less -than it seemed. On the one hand, while the annoyances -to neutral navigation were indisputable, the advantages it -drew from the war were far greater; its interests really -demanded peace, even at the price set by Great Britain. -On the other hand, the more important claims of the great -Sea Power, however judged by standards of natural right, -had prescription on their side; and in the case of contraband, -whatever may be thought of classifying naval stores -as such, there was for it a colorable pretext in the fact -that France then had no merchant shipping, except -coasters; that naval stores entering her ports were almost -certainly for ships of war; and that it was in part to the -exclusion of such articles that Great Britain owed the -maritime supremacy, which alone among armed forces had -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> -successfully defied Bonaparte. In short, the interest of -the Northern states was to yield the points in dispute, -while that of Great Britain was not to yield; a truth not -only asserted by the ministry but conceded in the main -by the opposition. There needed therefore only to throw -a little weight into one scale, or to take a little from the -other, to turn the balance; while the coalition would dissolve -entirely either upon decisive naval operations by -Great Britain, or upon the death of Paul I. The czar -was the only person embarked heart and soul in the Northern -quarrel, because the only one deaf to the call of -clear interest. Herein is apparent the crying mistake of -intrusting the conduct of the naval campaign to another -than Nelson. The time placidly consumed by Parker in -deliberations and talking would have sufficed his lieutenant -to scour the Baltic, to destroy the Russians at Revel -as he did the Danish line at Copenhagen, and to convince -the neutral states of the hopelessness of the struggle. -Fortunately for Great Britain, the interests of Russian -proprietors, which were bound up with British commerce, -and hardly yielded eight years later to restrictions imposed -by the popular Alexander I., rebelled against the -measures of a ruler whose insanity was no longer doubtful. -The murder of Paul opened the way for peace.</p> - -<p>Among the first measures of the new czar was the release -of the British seamen imprisoned by his father. -This order was dated April 7. On the 12th the British -ships entered the Baltic,—much to the surprise of the -Northern Powers, who thought their heavy draught would -prevent. The three-deckers had to remove their guns to -pass some shoal ground ten miles above Copenhagen. -After an excursion to intercept a Swedish fleet said to be -at sea, Parker anchored his ships in Kioge Bay,—off the -coast of Zealand just within the entrance to the Baltic,—and -there awaited further instructions from home; the -Russian minister at Copenhagen having informed him -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> -that the new czar would not go to war. -<a name="FNanchor_33_33" id="FNanchor_33_33"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> Nelson entirely -disapproved of this inactive attitude. Russia might yield -the conditions of Great Britain, but she would be more -likely to do so if the British fleet lay off the harbor of -Revel. This seems also to have been the view of the -ministry. It received news of the battle of Copenhagen -on April 15, and at about the same date learned the death -of Paul I. Advantage was very properly taken of the -latter to adopt a policy of conciliation. On the 17th -orders were issued to Parker modifying his first instructions. -If Alexander removed the embargo and released -the seamen, all hostile movements were to be suspended. -If not, a cessation of hostilities was to be offered, if Russia -were willing to treat; <i>but upon condition that, until -these ships and men were released, the Revel division should -not join that in Cronstadt, nor vice versâ</i>. -<a name="FNanchor_34_34" id="FNanchor_34_34"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> This presumed -a position of the British fleet very different from Kioge -Bay, over four hundred miles from Revel.</p> - -<p>Four days later, orders were issued relieving Parker and -leaving Nelson in command. Taken as this step was, only -a week after the news of a victory, it can scarcely be construed -otherwise than as an implied censure. To this -view an expression of Nelson's lends color. "They are -not Sir Hyde Parker's real friends who wish for an inquiry," -he wrote to a confidential correspondent. "His -friends in the fleet wish everything of this fleet to be forgot, -for we all respect and love Sir Hyde; but the dearer -his friends, the more uneasy they have been at his <i>idleness,</i> -for that is the truth—no criminality." -<a name="FNanchor_35_35" id="FNanchor_35_35"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> The orders were -received on May 5. Nelson's first signal was to hoist the -boats aboard and prepare to weigh. "If Sir Hyde were -gone," he wrote the same afternoon, "I would now be -under sail." On the 7th the fleet left Kioge Bay and on -the 12th appeared off Revel. The Russian division had -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> -sailed three days before and was now safe under the guns -of Cronstadt. From Revel Nelson dispatched very complimentary -letters to the Russian minister of foreign -affairs, but received in reply the message that "the only -proof of the loyalty of his intentions that the czar could -accept was the prompt withdrawal of his fleet; and that -until then no negotiation could proceed." "I do not believe -he would have written such a letter," said Nelson, -"if the Russian fleet had been in Revel;" -<a name="FNanchor_36_36" id="FNanchor_36_36"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> but the bird -was flown, and with a civil explanation he withdrew from -the port. He still remained in the Baltic, awaiting the -issue of the negotiations; but Russia meant peace, and on -the 17th of May the czar ordered the release of the embargoed -British ships. On the 4th of June Great Britain -also released the Danes and Swedes detained in her ports. -Russia and Prussia had already agreed, on the 27th of -April, that hostile measures against England should -cease, Hamburg and Hanover be evacuated, and the free -navigation of the rivers restored.</p> - -<p>On the 17th of June was signed at St. Petersburg a convention -between Russia and Great Britain, settling the -points that had been in dispute. The question of Malta -was tacitly dropped. As regards neutral claims Russia -conceded that the neutral flag should not cover enemy's -goods; and while she obtained the formal admission that -articles of hostile origin which had become <i>bonâ fide</i> neutral -property were exempt from seizure, she yielded the very -important exception of colonial produce. This, no matter -who the owner, could not by a neutral be carried direct -from the colony to the mother country of a nation at war. -<a name="FNanchor_37_37" id="FNanchor_37_37"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> -Great Britain, on the other hand, conceded the right of -neutrals to carry on the coasting trade of a belligerent; -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> -and that naval stores should not be classed as contraband -of war. The latter was an important concession, the -former probably not, coasting trade being ordinarily done -by small craft especially adapted to the local conditions. -As regards searching merchant vessels under convoy of a -ship of war, Russia yielded the principle and Great Britain -accepted methods which would make the process less -offensive. Privateers in such case could not search. The -question was unimportant; for neutral merchant ships will -not lightly submit to the restraint and delays of convoy, -and so lose the chief advantage, that of speed, which they -have over belligerents. When a neutral sees necessary to -convoy her merchantmen, the very fact shows relations -already strained.</p> - -<p>Sweden and Denmark necessarily followed the course -of Russia and acceded to all the terms of the convention -between that court and Great Britain; Sweden on the 23d -of October, 1801, and Denmark on the 30th of the following -March. The claim to carry colonial produce to -Europe, thus abandoned, was of importance to them, though -not to Russia. At the same time the Baltic states renewed -among themselves the engagements, which they had relinquished -in their convention with Great Britain, that the -neutral flag should cover enemy's property on board and -that the convoy of a ship of war should exempt merchant -vessels from search. These principles were in point of fact -modifications sought to be introduced into international -law, and not prescriptive rights, as commonly implied by -French historians -<a name="FNanchor_38_38" id="FNanchor_38_38"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> dealing with this question. For this -reason both the United States and the Baltic powers, while -favoring the new rule, were little disposed to attempt by -arms to compel the surrender by Great Britain of a claim -sanctioned by long custom.</p> - -<p>Thus had fallen resultless, as far as the objects of the -first consul were concerned, the vast combination against -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> -Great Britain which he had fostered in the North. During -its short existence he had actively pursued in the south -of Europe, against Naples and Portugal, other measures -intended further to embarrass, isolate, and cripple the great -Sea Power, and to facilitate throwing much needed supplies -and re-enforcements into Egypt. "The ambassador of the -republic," he wrote in February, 1801, "will make the -Spanish ministry understand that we must at whatsoever -cost become masters of the Mediterranean.... France -will have fifteen ships-of-the-line in the Mediterranean -before the equinox; and, if Spain will join to them fifteen -others, the English, who are about to have the ports of -Lisbon, Sicily, and Naples closed to them, will not be able -to keep thirty ships in the Mediterranean. That being so, -I doubt not they will evacuate Mahon, being unable to -remain in that sea." -<a name="FNanchor_39_39" id="FNanchor_39_39"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a></p> - -<p>For the closure of the ports Bonaparte relied with good -reason upon his armies; but in the concurrent expectation -of uniting thirty French and Spanish ships he reckoned -without his host, as he did also upon the Russian Black -Sea fleet, and the numbers the British must keep in the -Baltic and off Brest. After the armistice with Austria in -Italy, a corps under Murat was pushed toward Naples; -and on the same day that the treaty of Lunéville was concluded, -February 9, a truce for thirty days was signed -with the Two Sicilies. This was followed on the 28th of -March by a definitive treaty of peace. Naples engaged to -exclude from all her ports, including those of Sicily, the -ships both of war and commerce belonging to Great Britain -and Turkey; while those of France and her allies, as well -as of the Northern powers, should have free access. She -also suffered some slight territorial loss; but the most -significant article was kept secret. The boot of Italy was -to be occupied by a division of twelve or fifteen thousand -French, whom Naples was to pay and support, and to whom -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> -were to be delivered all the maritime fortresses south of -the river Ofanto and east of the Bradano, including the -ports of Taranto and Brindisi. "This occupation," wrote -Bonaparte to his war-minister, "is only in order to facilitate -the communications of the army of Egypt with -France." -<a name="FNanchor_40_40" id="FNanchor_40_40"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> The Neapolitan ports became a refuge for -French squadrons; while the army of occupation stood ready -to embark, if any body of ships found their way to those -shores. Unfortunately, the combined British and Turkish -armies had already landed in Egypt, and had won the -battle of Alexandria a week before the treaty with Naples -was signed. As a speedy result the French in Egypt were -divided; part being forced back upon Cairo and part shut -up in Alexandria,—while the fleet of Admiral Keith -cruised off the coast.</p> - -<p>No French squadron succeeded in carrying to Egypt the -desired re-enforcements, notwithstanding the numerous -efforts made by the first consul. The failure arose from -two causes: the penury of the French arsenals, and the -difficulty of a large body of ships escaping together, or of -several small bodies effecting a combination, in face of the -watchfulness of the British. Both troubles were due -mainly to the rigid and methodical system introduced -by Earl St. Vincent; who, fortunately for Great Britain, -assumed command of the Channel fleet at the same time -that Bonaparte sought to impress upon the French navy a -more sagacious direction and greater energy of action. -His instructions to Admiral Bruix in February, 1800, -<a name="FNanchor_41_41" id="FNanchor_41_41"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> were -to sail from Brest with over thirty French and Spanish -sail-of-the-line, to drive the British blockaders from before -the port, to relieve Malta, send a light squadron to Egypt, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> -and then bring his fleet to Toulon, where it would be -favorably placed to control the Mediterranean. Delay -ensuing, owing to lack of supplies and the unwillingness of -the Spaniards, he wrote again at the end of March, "If the -equinox passes without the British fleet dispersing, then, -great as is our interest in raising the blockade of Malta -and carrying help to Egypt, they must be abandoned;" -<a name="FNanchor_42_42" id="FNanchor_42_42"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_42_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> and -throughout the summer months he confined his action to -the unremitting efforts, already noticed, to keep a stream of -small vessels constantly moving towards Egypt.</p> - -<p>After the autumn equinox Bonaparte again prepared for -a grand naval operation. Admiral Ganteaume was detailed -to sail from Brest with seven ships-of-the-line, carrying -besides their crews four thousand troops and an immense -amount of material. "Admiral Ganteaume," wrote he to -Menou, commander-in-chief in Egypt, "brings to your army -the succor we have not before been able to send. He will -hand you this letter." The letter was dated October 29, -1800, but it never reached its destination. Ganteaume -could not get out from Brest till nearly three months later, -when, on January 23d, 1801, a terrible north-east gale drove -off the British squadron and enabled him to put to sea. -"A great imprudence," says Thiers, "but what could be -done in presence of an enemy's fleet which incessantly -blockaded Brest in all weathers, and only retired when -cruising became impossible. It was necessary either never -to go out, or to do so in a tempest which should remove -the British squadron." The incident of the sortie, as well -as Ganteaume's subsequent experiences, illustrates precisely -the deterrent effect exercised by St. Vincent's -blockades. -<a name="FNanchor_43_43" id="FNanchor_43_43"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_43_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> -They could not prevent occasional escapes, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> -but they did throw obstacles nearly insuperable in the way -of combining and executing any of the major operations of -war. Owing to the weather which had to be chosen for -starting, the squadron was at once dispersed and underwent -considerable damage. -<a name="FNanchor_44_44" id="FNanchor_44_44"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_44_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> It was not all reunited till a week -later. On the 9th of February it passed Gibraltar; but -news of its escape had already reached the British admiral -Warren cruising off Cadiz, who followed quickly, entering -Gibraltar only twenty-hours after the French went by. -On the 13th of January Ganteaume captured a British -frigate, from which he learned that the Mediterranean fleet -under Lord Keith was then convoying an army of fifteen -thousand British troops against Egypt. He expected that -Warren also would soon be after him, and the injuries received -in the gale weighed upon his mind. Considering all -the circumstances, he decided to abandon Egypt and go to -Toulon. Warren remained cruising in the Mediterranean -watching for the French admiral, who twice again started -for his destination. The first time he was obliged to -return by a collision between two ships. The second, an -outbreak of disease compelled him to send back three of -the squadron. The other four reached the African coast -some distance west of Alexandria, where they undertook -to land the troops; but Keith's fleet appeared on the -horizon, and, cutting their cables, they made a hasty retreat, -without having effected their object.</p> - -<p>Similar misfortune attended Bonaparte's attempt to collect -an efficient force in Cadiz, where Spain had been induced -or compelled to yield to him six ships-of-the-line, and -where she herself had some vessels. To these he intended -to send a large detachment from Rochefort under Admiral -Bruix, who was to command the whole, when combined. -To concentrations at any point, however, British squadrons -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> -before the ports whence the divisions were to sail imposed -obstacles, which, even if occasionally evaded, were fatal to -the final great design. The advantage of the central position -was consistently realized. On the other hand, where -a great number of ships happened to be together, as at -Brest in 1801, the want of supplies, caused by the same -close watch and by the seizure of naval stores as contraband, -paralyzed their equipment. Finding himself baffled -at Brest for these reasons, the first consul appointed -Rochefort for the first concentration. When the second -was effected at Cadiz, Bruix was to hold himself ready for -further operations. If Egypt could not be directly assisted, -it might be indirectly by harassing the British communications. -"Every day," wrote Bonaparte, "a hundred sails -pass the straits under weak convoy, to supply Malta and the -English fleet." If this route were flanked at Cadiz, by a -squadron like that of Bruix, much exertion would be needed -to protect it. But the concentration at Rochefort failed, -the ships from Brest could not get there, and the Rochefort -ships themselves never sailed.</p> - -<p>Coincidently with this attempt, another effort was made -to strengthen the force at Cadiz. -<a name="FNanchor_45_45" id="FNanchor_45_45"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_45_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> The three vessels sent -back by Ganteaume, after his second sailing from Toulon, -were also ordered to proceed there, under command of Rear -Admiral Linois. Linois successfully reached the Straits of -Gibraltar, but there learned from a prize that seven British -ships were cruising off his destination. These had been -sent with Admiral Saumarez from the Channel fleet, to -replace Warren, when the admiralty learned the active -preparations making in Cadiz and the French ports. Not -venturing to proceed against so superior an enemy, Linois -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> -put into Gibraltar Bay, anchoring on the Spanish side -under the guns of Algesiras. Word was speedily sent to -Saumarez; and on July 6, two days after Linois anchored, -six British ships were seen rounding the west point of the -bay. They attacked at once; but the wind was baffling, -they could not get their positions, and both flanks of the -French line were supported by shore batteries, which were -efficiently worked by soldiers landed from the squadron. -The attack was repulsed, and one British seventy-four that -grounded under a battery was forced to strike. Saumarez -withdrew under Gibraltar and proceeded to refit; the crews -working all day and by watches at night to gain the opportunity -to revenge their defeat. Linois sent to Cadiz for the -help he needed, and on the 10th five Spanish ships-of-the-line -and one French -<a name="FNanchor_46_46" id="FNanchor_46_46"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_46_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> from there anchored off Algesiras. -On the 12th they got under way with Linois's three, and at -the same time Saumarez with his six hauled out from Gibraltar. -The allies retreated upon Cadiz, the British following. -During the night the van of the pursuers brought the -hostile rear to action, and a terrible scene ensued. A -Spanish three-decker caught fire, and in the confusion was -taken for an enemy by one of her own fleet of the same -class. The two ships, of one hundred and twelve guns each -and among the largest in the world, ran foul of each other -and perished miserably in a common conflagration. The -French "St. Antoine" was captured.</p> - -<p>The incident of Saumarez's meeting with Linois has a -particular value, because of the repulse and disaster to the -British vessels on the first occasion. Unvarying success -accounts, or seems to account, for itself; but in this case -the advantage of the squadron's position before Cadiz transpires -through a failure on the battle-field. To that position -was due, first, that Linois's detachment could not make -its junction; second, that it was attacked separately and -very severely handled; third, that in the retreat to Cadiz the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> -three French ships were not in proper condition to engage, -although one of them when brought to action made a very -dogged resistance to, and escaped from, an inferior ship. -Consequently, the six British that pursued had only six -enemies instead of nine to encounter. After making allowance -for the very superior quality of the British officers and -crews over the Spanish, it is evident the distinguishing feature -in these operations was that the British squadron -brought the enemies' divisions to action separately. It was -able to do so because it had been kept before the hostile port, -interposing between them.</p> - -<p>Saumarez had wrung success out of considerable difficulty. -The failure of the wind greatly increased the disadvantage -to his vessels, coming under sail into action with -others already drawn up at anchor, and to whom the loss -of spars for the moment meant little. These circumstances, -added to the support of the French by land batteries and -some gunboats, went far to neutralize tactically the superior -numbers of the British. With all deductions, however, the -fight at Algesiras was extremely creditable to Linois. He -was a man not only distinguished for courage, but also of -a cautious temper peculiarly fitted to secure every advantage -offered by a defensive position. Despite his success -there, the broad result was decisively in favor of his opponents. -"Sir James Saumarez's action," wrote Lord St. -Vincent, "has put us upon velvet." Seven British had -worsted nine enemy's ships, as distinctly superior, for the -most part, in individual force as they were in numbers. -Not only had the Spaniards three of ninety guns and over, -and one of eighty, but two of Linois's were of the latter -class, of which Saumarez had but one. The difference -between such and the seventy-fours was not only in number -of pieces, but in weight also. The substantial issue, however, -can be distinguished from the simple victory, and it -was secured not only by superior efficiency but also by -strategic disposition.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span></p> - -<p>Brilliant as was Saumarez's achievement, which Nelson, -then in England, warmly extolled in the House of Lords, -the claim made by his biographer, that to these operations -alone was wholly due the defeat of Bonaparte's plan, is -exaggerated. It was arranged, he says, that when the -junction was made, the Cadiz ships should proceed off -Lisbon, sack that place, and destroy British merchantmen -lying there; "then, being re-enforced by the Brest fleet, -they were to pass the Straits of Gibraltar, steer direct for -Alexandria, and there land such a body of troops as would -raise the siege and drive the English out of Egypt. <i>This -would certainly have succeeded</i> had the squadron under -Linois not encountered that of Sir James, which led to -the total defeat of their combined fleets and to the abandonment -of the grand plan." -<a name="FNanchor_47_47" id="FNanchor_47_47"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_47_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> This might be allowed to -stand as a harmless exhibition of a biographer's zeal, did -it not tend to obscure the true lesson to be derived from -this whole naval period, by attributing to a single encounter, -however brilliant, results due to an extensive, -well-conceived general system. Sir James Saumarez's -operations were but an epitome of an action going on everywhere -from the Baltic to Egypt. By this command of the -sea the British fleets, after they had adopted the plan of -close-watching the enemy's ports, held everywhere interior -positions, which, by interposing between the hostile detachments, -facilitated beating them in detail. For the most -part this advantage of position resulted in quietly detaining -the enemy in port, and so frustrating his combinations. -It was Saumarez's good fortune to illustrate how it could -also enable a compact body of highly disciplined ships -to meet in rapid succession two parts of a force numerically -very superior, and by the injuries inflicted on each -neutralize the whole for a definite time. But, had he never -seen Linois, Bonaparte's plan still required the junctions -from Rochefort and Brest which were never effected.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span></p> - -<p>By naval combinations and by holding the Neapolitan -ports Bonaparte sought to preserve Egypt and force Great -Britain to peace. "The question of maritime peace," he -wrote to Ganteaume, -<a name="FNanchor_48_48" id="FNanchor_48_48"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_48_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> "hangs now upon the English expedition -to Egypt." Portugal, the ancient ally of Great -Britain, was designed to serve other purposes of his policy,—to -furnish equivalents, with which to wrest from his chief -enemy the conquests that the sea power of France and her -allies could not touch. "Notify our minister at Madrid," -wrote he to Talleyrand, September 30, 1800, "that the -Spanish troops must be masters of Portugal before October -15. This is the only means by which we can have an -equivalent for Malta, Mahon, and Trinidad. Besides, -the danger of Portugal will be keenly felt in England, -and will by so much quicken her disposition to peace."</p> - -<p>A secret treaty ceding Louisiana to France, in return -for Tuscany to the Spanish infante, had been signed the -month before; and Spain at the same time undertook to -bring Portugal to break with Great Britain. Solicitation -proving ineffectual, Bonaparte in the spring again demanded -the stronger measure of an armed occupation of -the little kingdom; growing more urgent as it became -evident that Egypt was slipping from his grasp. Spain -finally agreed to invade Portugal, and accepted the co-operation -of a French corps. The first consul purposed -to occupy at least three of the Portuguese provinces; but -he was outwitted by the adroitness of the Spanish government, -unwillingly submissive to his pressure, and by the -compliance of his brother Lucien, French minister to -Madrid. Portugal made no efficient resistance; and the -two peninsular courts quickly reached an agreement, by -which the weaker closed her ports to Great Britain, paid -twenty million francs to France, and ceded a small strip -of territory to Spain.</p> - -<p>Bonaparte was enraged at this treaty, which was ratified -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> -without giving him a chance to interfere; -<a name="FNanchor_49_49" id="FNanchor_49_49"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_49_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> but in the -summer of 1801 his diplomatic game reached a stage -where further delay was impossible. He saw that the -loss of Egypt was only a question of time; but so long as -any French troops held out there it was a card in his -hand, too valuable to risk for the trifling gain of a foothold -in Portugal. "The English are not masters of -Egypt," he writes boldly on the 23d of July to the French -agent in London. "We have certain news that Alexandria -can hold out a year, and Lord Hawkesbury knows -that Egypt is in Alexandria;" -<a name="FNanchor_50_50" id="FNanchor_50_50"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_50_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> but four days later he -sends the hopeless message to Murat, "There is no longer -any question of embarking" -<a name="FNanchor_51_51" id="FNanchor_51_51"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_51_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> the troops about Taranto, -sent there for the sole purpose of being nearer to Egypt. -<a name="FNanchor_52_52" id="FNanchor_52_52"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_52_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> -He continues, in sharp contrast with his former expectation, -"The station of the troops upon the Adriatic is intended -to impose upon the Turks and the English, and to -serve as material for compensation to the latter by evacuating -those provinces." Both Naples and Portugal were -too distant, too ex-centric, and thrust too far into contact -with the British dominion of the sea to be profitably, or -even safely, held by France in her condition of naval -debility; a truth abundantly witnessed by the later events -of Napoleon's reign, by the disastrous occupation of Portugal -in 1807, by the reverses of Soult and Masséna in 1809 -and 1811, and by the failure even to attempt the conquest -of Sicily.</p> - -<p>Russia and Prussia had grown less friendly since the -death of Paul. Even their agreement that Hanover should -be evacuated, disposed as they now were to please Great -Britain, was to be postponed until "it was ascertained -that a certain power would not occupy that country;" -<a name="FNanchor_53_53" id="FNanchor_53_53"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_53_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> -a stipulation which betrayed the distrust felt by both. -Since then each had experienced evasions and rebuffs -showing the unwillingness of the first consul to meet their -wishes in his treatment of the smaller states; and they -suspected, although they did not yet certainly know, the -steps already taken to incorporate with France regions to -whose independence they held. -<a name="FNanchor_54_54" id="FNanchor_54_54"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_54_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> Both were responding to -the call of their interests, beneficially and vitally connected -with the sea power of Great Britain, and threatened -on the Continent by the encroaching course of the -French ruler. Bonaparte felt that the attempt to make -further gains in Europe, with which to traffic against those -of Great Britain abroad, might arouse resistance in these -great powers, not yet exhausted like Austria, and so indefinitely -postpone the maritime peace essential to the -revival of the French navy and the re-establishment of the -colonial system; both at this time objects of prime importance -in his eyes. Thus it was that, beginning the year -1801 without a single ally, in face of the triumphant -march of the French armies and of a formidable maritime -combination, the Sea Power of Great Britain had dispersed -the Northern coalition, commanded the friendship -of the great states, retained control of the Mediterranean, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> -reduced Egypt to submission, and forced even the invincible -Bonaparte to wish a speedy cessation of hostilities.</p> - -<p>The great aim of the first consul now was to bring -Great Britain to terms before news of the evacuation of -Alexandria could come to hand. Negotiations had been -slowly progressing for nearly six months; the first advances -having been made on the 21st of March by the new -ministry which came into power upon Pitt's resignation. -Both parties being inclined to peace, the advantage necessarily -belonged to the man who, untrammelled by associates -in administration, held in absolute control the -direction of his country. The Addington ministry, hampered -by its own intrinsic weakness and by the eagerness -of the nation, necessarily yielded before the iron will of -one who was never more firm in outward bearing than in -the most critical moments. He threatened them with the -occupation of Hanover; he intimated great designs for -which troops were embarked at Rochefort, Brest, Toulon, -Cadiz, and ready to embark in Holland; he boasted that -Alexandria could hold out yet a year. Nevertheless, although -the terms were incontestably more advantageous -to France than to Great Britain, the government of the -latter insisted upon and obtained one concession, that of -Trinidad, which Bonaparte at first withheld. -<a name="FNanchor_55_55" id="FNanchor_55_55"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_55_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> His eagerness -to conclude was in truth as great as their own, -though better concealed. Finally, he sent on the 17th of -September an ultimatum, and added, "If preliminaries -are not signed by the 10th of Vendémiaire (October 2), -the negotiations will be broken." "You will appreciate -the importance of this clause," he wrote confidentially to -the French envoy, "when you reflect that Menou may possibly -not be able to hold in Alexandria beyond the first of -Vendémiaire, that at this season the winds are fair to -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> -come from Egypt, and ships reach Italy and Trieste in -very few days. Thus it is essential to push them to a -finish before Vendémiaire 10;" that is, before they learn -the fall of Alexandria. The question of terms, as he had -said before, hinged on Egypt. The envoy, however, was -furnished with a different but plausible reason. "Otto -can give them to understand that from our inferiority at -sea and our superiority on land the campaign begins for -us in winter, and therefore I do not wish to remain longer -in this stagnation." -<a name="FNanchor_56_56" id="FNanchor_56_56"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_56_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a> Whatever motives influenced the -British ministry, it is evident that Bonaparte was himself -in a hurry for peace. The preliminaries were signed in -London on the first of October, 1801.</p> - -<p>The conditions are easily stated. Of all her conquests, -Great Britain retained only the islands of Ceylon in the -East Indies and Trinidad in the West. How great this -concession, will be realized by enumerating the chief -territories thus restored to their former owners. These -were, in the Mediterranean, Elba, Malta, Minorca; in -the West Indies, Tobago, Santa Lucia, Martinique, and -the extensive Dutch possessions in Guiana; in Africa, the -Cape of Good Hope; and in India, the French and Dutch -stations in the peninsula. France consented to leave to -Portugal her possessions entire, to withdraw her troops -from the kingdom of Naples and the Roman territory, and -to acknowledge the independence of the Republic of the -Seven Islands. Under this name the former Venetian -islands, Corfu and others—given to France by the treaty -of Campo Formio—had, after their conquest in 1799 by -the fleets of Russia and Turkey, been constituted into -an independent state under the guarantee of those two -powers. Their deliverance from France was considered -an important security to the Turkish Empire. The capitulation -of the French troops in Alexandria was not yet -known in England; and the preliminaries merely stipulated -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> -the return of Egypt to the Porte, whose dominions -were to be preserved as they existed before the war. -Malta, restored to the Knights of St. John, was to be -freed from all French or British influence and placed -under the guarantee of a third Power. Owing to the decay -of the Order, the disposition of this important naval -station, secretly coveted by both parties, was the most -difficult matter to arrange satisfactorily. In the definitive -treaty its status was sought to be secured by a cumbrous -set of provisions, occupying one third of the entire -text; and the final refusal of Great Britain to evacuate, -until satisfaction was obtained for what she claimed to -be violations of the spirit of the engagements between the -two countries, became the test question upon which hinged -the rupture of this short-lived peace.</p> - -<p>As the first article of the preliminaries stipulated that -upon their ratification hostilities in all parts of the world, -by sea and land, should cease, they were regarded in both -Great Britain and France as equivalent to a definitive -treaty; the postponement of the latter being only to allow -the negotiators time to settle the details of the intricate -agreements, thus broadly outlined, without prolonging the -sufferings of war. To France they could not but be acceptable. -She regained much, and gave up nothing that -she could have held without undue and often useless exertion. -In Great Britain the general joy was marred by -the severe, yet accurate, condemnation passed upon the -terms by a body of exceptionally able men, drawn mainly -from the ranks of the Pitt cabinet, although their leader -gave his own approval. They pointed out, clearly and -indisputably, that the disparity between the material -gains of Great Britain and France was enormous, disproportionate -to their relative advantages at the time of signature, -and not to be reconciled with that security which -had been the professed object of the struggle. They asserted -with little exaggeration that the conditions were -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> -for France to hold what she had, and for Great Britain to -recede to her possessions before the war. They predicted -with fatal accuracy the speedy renewal of hostilities, -under the disadvantage of having lost by the peace important -positions not easy to be regained. The ministry had -little to reply. To this or that item of criticism exception -might be taken; but in the main their defence was that -by the failure of their allies no hope remained of contesting -the power of France on the Continent, and that Trinidad -and Ceylon were very valuable acquisitions. Being -insular, they were controlled by the nation ruling the sea, -while, from their nearness to the mainlands of South America -and of India, they were important as depots of trade, as -well as for strategic reasons. The most assuring argument -was put forward by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who -had negotiated the preliminaries. At the beginning of -the war Great Britain had 135 ships-of-the-line and 133 -frigates; at its close she had 202 of the former and 277 of -the latter. France had begun with 80 of the line and 66 -frigates, and ended with 39 and 35 respectively. However -the first consul might exert himself, Lord Hawkesbury -justly urged that the British might allow him many -years labor and then be willing to chance a maritime war. -<a name="FNanchor_57_57" id="FNanchor_57_57"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_57_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a></p> - -<p>Material advantages such as had thus been given up -undoubtedly contribute to security. In surrendering as -much as she did abroad, while France retained such extensive -gains upon the Continent and acquired there such -a preponderating influence, Great Britain, which had so -large a stake in the European commonwealth, undoubtedly -incurred a serious risk. The shortness of the peace, -and the disquieting disputes which arose throughout it, -sufficiently prove this. Nevertheless, could contemporaries -accurately read the signs of their times, Englishmen -of that day need not have been dissatisfied with the general -results of the war. A long stage had been successfully -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> -traversed towards the final solution of a great difficulty. -In 1792 the spirit of propagating revolution by violence -had taken possession of the French nation as a whole. -As Napoleon has strikingly remarked, "It was part of the -political religion of the France of that day to make war -in the name of principles." -<a name="FNanchor_58_58" id="FNanchor_58_58"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_58_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> "The Montagnards and the -Jacobins," says the republican historian Henri Martin, -the bitter censurer of Bonaparte, "were resolved, like the -Girondists, to propagate afar, by arms, the principles of -the Revolution; and they hoped, by hurling a defiance at -all kings, to put France in the impossibility of recoiling -or stopping herself." -<a name="FNanchor_59_59" id="FNanchor_59_59"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_59_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a> Such a design could be checked -only by raising up against it a barrier of physical armed -opposition. This had been effected and maintained chiefly -by the Sea Power of Great Britain, the prime agent and -moving spirit, directly through her navy, indirectly through -the subsidies drawn from her commerce; and the latter -had nearly doubled while carrying on this arduous and -extensive war. In 1801 the aggressive tendencies of the -French nation, as a whole, were exhausted. So far as they -still survived, they were now embodied in and dependent -upon a single man, in which shape they were at once -more distinctly to be recognized and more odious. They -were also less dangerous; because the power of one man, -however eminent for genius, is far less for good or evil -than the impulse of a great people.</p> - -<p>The British statesmen of that day did not clearly distinguish -this real nature of their gains, though they did -intuitively discern the true character of the struggle in -which they were engaged. As is not infrequent with intuitions, -the reasoning by which they were supported was -often faulty; but Pitt's formulation of the objects of Great -Britain in the one word "security" was substantially correct. -Security was her just and necessary aim, forced -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> -upon her by the circumstances of the Revolution,—security -not for herself alone, but for the community of states -of which she was an important member. This was threatened -with anarchy through the lawless spirit with which -the French leaders proposed to force the spread of principles -and methods, many of them good as well as many -bad, but for whose healthful development were demanded -both time and freedom of choice, which they in their impatience -were unwilling to give. "Security," said Pitt -in his speech upon the preliminaries, "was our great object; -there were different means of accomplishing it, with better -or worse prospects of success; and according to the different -variations of policy occasioned by a change of circumstances, -we still pursued our great object, Security. In -order to obtain it we certainly did look for the subversion -of that government founded upon revolutionary principles.... -We have the satisfaction of knowing that we have -survived the violence of the revolutionary fever, and we -have seen the extent of its principles abated. We have -seen Jacobinism deprived of its fascination; we have seen -it stripped of the name and pretext of liberty; it has shown -itself to be capable only of destroying, not of building, and -that it must necessarily end in a military despotism." -<a name="FNanchor_60_60" id="FNanchor_60_60"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_60_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> -Such, in truth, was the gain of the first war of Great Britain -with the French Revolution. It was, however, but a stage -in the progress; there remained still another, of warfare -longer, more bitter, more furious,—a struggle for the -mastery, whose end was not to be seen by the chief leaders -of the one preceding it.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span></p> - - - - -<div class="chapter p4"> -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIV" id="CHAPTER_XIV"></a>CHAPTER XIV.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="chapsum"><span class="sc">Outline of Events from the Signature of the Preliminaries -to the Rupture of the Peace of Amiens.</span></p> - -<p class="ac"><span class="sc smaller">October, 1801.-May, 1803.</span></p> - -<p class="drop-cap">THE preliminaries of peace between Great Britain and -France, signed on the first of October, 1801, were regarded -by both parties, at least ostensibly, as settling their -relative status and acquisitions. In their broad outlines -no change would be worked by the definitive treaty, destined -merely to regulate details whose adjustment would -demand time and so prolong the distress of war. This -expectation, that the basis of a durable peace had been -reached, proved delusive. A series of unpleasant surprises -awaited first one party and then the other, producing in -Great Britain a feeling of insecurity, which gave point and -added vigor to the declamations of those who from the first -had scoffed at the idea of any peace proving permanent, if -it rested upon the good faith of the French government and -surrendered those material guarantees which alone, they -asserted, could curb the ambition and enforce the respect -of a man like Bonaparte. Bitter indeed must have been -the unspoken thoughts of the ministry, as the revolving -months brought with them an unceasing succession of -events which justified their opponents' prophecies while -proving themselves to be outwitted; and which, by the increase -given to French influence and power in Europe, necessitated -the maintenance of large military establishments, -and converted the peace from first to last into a condition -of armed truce.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span></p> - -<p>The day after the signature of the preliminaries news -reached London -<a name="FNanchor_61_61" id="FNanchor_61_61"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_61_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> of the surrender of Alexandria, which -completed the loss of Egypt by the French. It was believed -that Bonaparte had, at the time of signing, possessed this -information, which would have materially affected the -footing upon which he was treating. However that was, -he was undoubtedly assured of the issue, -<a name="FNanchor_62_62" id="FNanchor_62_62"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_62_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> and therefore -precipitated a conclusion by which to France, and not to -Great Britain, was attributed the gracious act of restoring -its dominion to the Porte. Concealing the fact from the -Turkish plenipotentiary in Paris, the French government -on the 9th of October signed with him a treaty, by which -it undertook to evacuate the province it no longer held. In -return, Turkey conceded to France, her recent enemy, commercial -privileges equal to those allowed Great Britain, to -whose sea power alone she owed the recovery of Syria and -Egypt. This bargain, concluded without the knowledge of -the British ministry, was not made public until after the -ratification of the preliminaries. At the same time became -known a treaty with Portugal, signed at Madrid on the 29th -of September. By the preliminaries with Great Britain, -Portuguese territory was to remain intact; but by the treaty -of Madrid so much of Brazil was added to French Guiana -as to give the latter control of the northern outlet of the -Amazon.</p> - -<p>These events were surprises, and disagreeable surprises, -to the British ministers. On the other hand, the existence -of the secret treaty of March 21, 1801, by which Spain -ceded to France the colony of Louisiana, was known to -them, -<a name="FNanchor_63_63" id="FNanchor_63_63"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_63_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> -though unavowed at the time of signing. While -impressed with the importance of this transaction, following -as it did the cession of the Spanish half of San Domingo, -the ministry allowed the veil of mystery, with which -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> -Bonaparte had been pleased to shroud it, to remain unlifted. -The United States minister to London had procured -and forwarded to his government on the 20th of November -a copy of this treaty, -<a name="FNanchor_64_64" id="FNanchor_64_64"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_64_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a> which so closely affected his fellow -countrymen; but it was not until January, 1802, that the -fact became generally known in England. Gloomy prophecies -of French colonial aggrandizement were uttered by the -partisans of the Opposition, who pictured the hereditary -enemy of Great Britain planted by the Spanish treaty at -the mouth of the great river of North America, and by the -Portuguese at that of the artery of the southern continent; -while the vast and rich colonies of Spain, lying between -these two extremes, would be controlled by the supremacy -of France in the councils of the Peninsular courts. In a -generation which still retained the convictions of the eighteenth -century on the subject of colonial expansion, these -predictions of evil struck heavily home,—enforced as they -were by the knowledge that full one fourth of the trade -which made the strength of Great Britain rested then upon -that Caribbean America, into which France was now -making a colossal intrusion. Faithful to the sagacious -principle by which he ever proportioned the extent of his -military preparation to the vastness of the end in view, the -expedition sent by Bonaparte to reassert in Haïti the long -dormant authority of the mother-country was calculated on -a scale which aroused intense alarm in London. On the -4th of December, 1801, only ten weeks after the preliminaries -were signed, and long before the conclusion of the -definitive treaty, fifteen ships-of-the-line and six frigates -sailed from Brest for Haïti; and these were rapidly followed -by other divisions, so that the whole force dispatched -much exceeded twenty ships-of-the-line, and carried over -twenty thousand troops. The number was none too great -for the arduous task,—indeed experience proved it to be -far from adequate to meet the waste due to climatic causes; -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> -but to Great Britain it was portentous. Distrusting Bonaparte's -purposes, a large division of British ships was -ordered to re-enforce the squadron at Jamaica. Weary of -a nine-years war and expecting their discharge, the crews -of some of the vessels mutinied; and the execution of -several of these poor seamen was one of the first results of -Bonaparte's ill-fated attempt to restore the colonial system -of France.</p> - -<p>The apprehensions shown concerning these distant undertakings -partook more of panic than of reasonable fear. -They overlooked the long period that must pass between -possession and development, as well as the hopeless inferiority -of France in that sea power upon which the tenure of -colonies must depend. They ignored the evident enormous -difficulties to be overcome, and were blind to the tottering condition -of the Spanish colonial system, then rapidly approaching -its fall. But if there was exaggeration in an anticipation -of danger, which the whole history of her maritime past -entitled Great Britain to reject with scorn, there was no -question that each month was revealing unexpected and -serious changes in the relative positions of the two powers, -which, if not wilfully concealed by France, had certainly -not been realized by the British ministers when the preliminaries -were signed. Whether they had been cheated -or merely out-manœuvred, it became daily more plain that -the balance of power in Europe, of which Great Britain was -so important a factor, was no longer what it had been when -she made such heavy sacrifices of her maritime conquests -to secure the status of the Continent.</p> - -<p>At the same time was unaccountably delayed the work -of the plenipotentiaries, who were to settle at Amiens the -terms of the definitive treaty. The British ambassador -left London on the first of November, and after some stop -in Paris reached Amiens on the first of December. The -French and Dutch envoys arrived shortly after; but the -Spanish failed to appear, and on different pretexts negotiations -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> -were spun out. That this was contrary to the -wishes of the British ministers scarcely admits of doubt. -They had already made every sacrifice they could afford; -and the position of a popular government, under the free -criticism of a people impatient for a settled condition of -affairs, and forced to temporizing expedients for carrying -on the state business during a period of uncertainty, was -too unpleasant to suggest bad faith on their part. While -this suspense still lasted, a startling event occurred, -greatly affecting the balance of power. The Cisalpine -Republic, whose independence was guaranteed by the treaty -of Lunéville, adopted toward the end of 1801 a new constitution, -drawn up under the inspection of Bonaparte -himself. Delegates of the republic, to the number of -several hundred, were summoned to Lyon to confer with -the first consul on the permanent organization of their -state; and there, under his influence, as was alleged, -offered to him the presidency, with functions even more -extensive than those he enjoyed as ruler of France. The -offer was accepted by him on the 26th of January, 1802; -and thus the power of the Cisalpine, with its four million -inhabitants, was wielded by the same man who already -held that of the French republic. A few days later for -the name Cisalpine was substituted Italian,—a change -thought to indicate an aggressive attitude towards the -remaining states of Italy.</p> - -<p>These proceedings at Lyon caused great alarm in England, -and many persons before pacifically disposed now -wished to renew the war. The ministers nevertheless -ignored what had passed so publicly, and continued the -effort for peace, despite the delays and tergiversations of -which their envoy, Lord Cornwallis, bitterly complained; -but by the beginning of March, when negotiations had -lasted three months, their patience began to give way. -A number of ships were ordered into commission, and extensive -naval preparations begun. At the same time an -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> -ultimatum was sent forward, and Cornwallis instructed -to leave Amiens in eight days if it were not accepted. -The first consul had too much at stake on the seas to risk -a rupture, -<a name="FNanchor_65_65" id="FNanchor_65_65"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_65_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> -when he had already gained so much by the -protraction of negotiations and by his astute diplomacy. -The definitive treaty was signed on the 25th of March, -1802. The terms did not materially differ from those of -the preliminaries, except in the article of Malta. The -boundary of French Guiana obtained from Portugal was -indeed pushed back off the Amazon, but no mention was -made of the now notorious cession of Louisiana.</p> - -<p>The provisions touching the little island of Malta and -its dependencies, Gozo and Comino, were long and elaborate. -The object of each country was to secure the exclusion -of the other from a position so important for -controlling the Mediterranean and the approaches thereby -to Egypt and India. The Order of Knights was to be -restored, with the provision that no citizen either of Great -Britain or France was thereafter to be a member. The -independence and neutrality of the Order and of the island -were proclaimed. The British forces were to evacuate -within three months after the exchange of ratifications; -but this stipulation was qualified by the proviso that there -should then be on the spot a Grand Master to receive possession, -and also two thousand Neapolitan troops which -the king of Naples was to be invited to send as a garrison. -These were to remain for one year after its restitution -to the Grand Master; or longer, if the Order had not -then provided the necessary force. Naples was thus -selected as guardian of the coveted position, because its -weakness could arouse no jealousy. The independence of -the islands was placed under the guarantee of Great -Britain, France, Austria, Spain, Russia, and Prussia; -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> -the last four being also invited to accede to the long list -of stipulations. The presence of a grand master and the -guarantee of the four powers—whose acquiescence was not -first obtained—were thus integral parts of the agreement; -and upon their failure Great Britain afterwards justified -the delays which left Malta still a pledge in her hands, -when she demanded from France explanations and indemnities -for subsequent actions, injurious, as she claimed, -to her security and to her dignity.</p> - -<p>By another clause of the treaty Great Britain consented -to evacuate Porto Ferrajo, the principal port in Elba, -which she had up to that time held by force of arms. It -was then known that this was in effect to abandon the island -to France, who had obtained its cession from Naples and -Tuscany, formerly joint owners, by conventions first made -known some time after the signature of the preliminaries. -Elba was by its position fitted seriously to embarrass the -trade of Great Britain with Northern Italy, under the -restrictions laid wherever Bonaparte's power extended; -but the most important feature of the transaction was the -impression produced by the long concealment of treaties -thus unexpectedly divulged. These sudden, unforeseen -changes imparted an air of illusion to all existing conditions, -and undermined the feeling of security essential to -the permanent relations of states.</p> - -<p>Despite the shocks caused by these various revelations, -the treaty of Amiens was received in Great Britain with -satisfaction, though not with the unmeasured demonstrations -that followed the announcement of the preliminaries. -In France the general joy was no less profound. "It was -believed," writes M. Thiers, "that the true peace, the -peace of the seas, was secured,—that peace which was the -certain and necessary condition of peace on the Continent." -The enthusiasm of the nation was poured out at the feet -of the first consul, to whose genius for war and for diplomacy -were not unjustly attributed the brilliant, as well -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> -as apparently solid, results. Statesmen might murmur -that France had lost her colonial empire and failed to -hold Egypt and Malta, while Great Britain had extended -and consolidated her Indian empire by overthrowing the -Sultan of Mysore, the ancient ally of France and her own -most formidable foe in the peninsula; but the mass even -of intelligent Frenchmen stopped not to regard the wreck -of their sea power, of which those disastrous events were -but the sign. Facts so remote, and whose significance -was not immediately apparent, were lost to sight in the -glare of dazzling deeds wrought close at hand. All eyes -were held by the splendid succession of victories in Italy -and Germany, by the extension of the republic to her -natural limits at the Rhine and the Alps, by the restoration -of internal order, and by the proudly dominant position -accorded their ruler in the councils of the Continent. -To these was now added free access to the sea, wrung -by the same mighty hand—as was fondly believed—from -the weakening of the great Sea Power. At an extraordinary -session of the Legislature, convoked to give legal -sanction to the treaties and measures of the government, -the Treaty of Amiens was presented last, as the crowning -work of the first consul; and it was used as the occasion -for conferring upon him a striking mark of public -acknowledgment. After some hesitations, the question -was submitted to the nation whether his tenure of office -should be for life. The majority of votes cast were affirmative; -and on the 3d of August, 1802, the senate formally -presented to him a <i>senatus-consultum</i>, setting forth that -"the French people names, and the senate proclaims. -Napoleon Bonaparte consul for life."</p> - -<p>Bonaparte had not waited for this exaltation to continue -his restless political activity, destined soon to make waste -paper of the Treaty of Amiens. Great Britain having -steadfastly refused to recognize the new states set up by -him in Italy, he argued she had forfeited all right to interfere -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> -thenceforth in their concerns. From this he -seems to have advanced to the position that she had no -further claim to mingle in the affairs of the Continent at -large. The consequent indifference shown by him to -British sentiment and interests, in continental matters, -was increased by his conviction that "in the existing state -of Europe England cannot reasonably make war, alone, -against us;" -<a name="FNanchor_66_66" id="FNanchor_66_66"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_66_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a> an opinion whose open avowal in more -offensive terms afterwards became the spark to kindle the -final great conflagration.</p> - -<p>The treaty of Lunéville had provided that the German -princes, who by it lost territory on the west bank of the -Rhine and in Italy, should receive compensation elsewhere -in the German empire; and it was agreed that these -indemnities should be made mainly at the expense of the -ecclesiastical principalities, where, the tenure being for -life only, least hardship would be involved. The difficulties -attending these distributions, and the fixed animosity -between Prussia and Austria, gave Bonaparte a -fair pretext to intervene as mediator, and to guide the -final settlement upon lines which should diminish the -relative power and prestige of France's traditional enemy, -Austria, and exalt her rivals. In doing this he adroitly -obtained the imposing support of Russia, whose young -sovereign readily accepted the nattering offer of joint intervention; -the more so that the princes allied to his -family might thus receive a disproportionate share of the -spoils. Under Bonaparte's skilful handling, the acquisitions -of Prussia were so far greater than those of Austria -as to fulfil his prediction, that "the empire of Germany -should be really divided into two empires, since its affairs -will be arranged at two different centres." -<a name="FNanchor_67_67" id="FNanchor_67_67"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_67_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a> After the -settlement he boasted that "the affairs of Germany had -been arranged entirely to the advantage of France and of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> -her allies." -<a name="FNanchor_68_68" id="FNanchor_68_68"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_68_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> -Great Britain was not consulted; and her -people, though silent, saw with displeasure the weakening -of their ally and the aggrandizement of a state they held -to be faithless as well as hostile. At the same time bad -feeling was further excited by the peremptory demands of -Bonaparte for the expulsion from England of certain -French royalists, and for the repression of the freedom of -the British press in its attacks upon himself. To these -demands the British government declined to yield.</p> - -<p>The reclamations of Bonaparte against the press, and -his intervention in German affairs, preceded the proclamation -of the consulate for life. It was followed at a short -interval by the formal incorporation with France of -Piedmont and Elba, by decree dated September 11, 1802. -Piedmont had been organized as a French military department -in April, 1801; -<a name="FNanchor_69_69" id="FNanchor_69_69"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_69_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> and Bonaparte had then secretly -avowed the measure to be a first step to annexation. The -significance of the present action was that it changed a -condition which was <i>de facto</i> only, and presumably temporary, -to one that was claimed to be <i>de jure</i> and permanent. -As such, it was a distinct encroachment by France, -much affecting the states of the Continent, and especially -Austria, against whose Italian possessions Piedmont was -meant to serve as a base of operations. The adjacent Republic -of Liguria, as the Genoese territory was then -styled, was also organized as a French military division, -<a name="FNanchor_70_70" id="FNanchor_70_70"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_70_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a> -and no security existed against similar action there,—most -injurious to British commerce, and adding another to -the transformation scenes passing before the eyes of -Europe. Nor was the material gain to France alone considered; -for, no compensation being given to the King of -Sardinia for the loss of his most important state, this consummated -injury was felt as a slight by both Great Britain -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> -and Russia, which had earnestly sought some reparation -for him. For the time, however, no remonstrance was -made by the ministry.</p> - -<p>New offence was soon given, which, if not greater in -degree, produced all the effect of cumulative grievance. -The little canton of Valais, in south-western Switzerland, -had in the spring of 1802 been forcibly detached from the -confederation and proclaimed independent, in order to -secure to the French the Simplon route passing through it -to Italy; a measure which, wrote Bonaparte, "joined to -the exclusive right of France to send her armies by that -road, has changed the system of war to be adopted in -Italy." -<a name="FNanchor_71_71" id="FNanchor_71_71"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_71_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a> -No further open step was then taken to control -the affairs of Switzerland; but the French minister was -instructed to support secretly the party in sympathy with -the Revolution, -<a name="FNanchor_72_72" id="FNanchor_72_72"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_72_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a> -and an ominous sentence appeared in the -message of the first consul to the Legislature, May 6, -1802, that "the counsels of the French government to the -factions in Switzerland had so far been ineffective. It is -still hoped that the voice of wisdom and moderation will -command attention, and that the powers adjoining Helvetia -will not be forced to intervene to stifle troubles whose -continuance would threaten their own tranquillity." -<a name="FNanchor_73_73" id="FNanchor_73_73"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_73_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a></p> - -<p>In Switzerland, perhaps more than in any other part of -Europe, had been realized the purpose, announced by the -National Convention in the celebrated decrees of November -19 and December 15, 1792, to propagate by force -changes in the government of countries where the French -armies could penetrate. Vast changes had indeed been -made in Belgium, Holland, and Italy; but these when -first invaded were in open war with France. The interference -in Switzerland in 1798 had no characteristic of -serious war, for no means of opposition existed in the invaded -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> -cantons. It was an armed intervention, undertaken -by the Directory under the impulsion of Bonaparte, avowedly -to support citizens of a foreign state "wishing to recover -their liberty." -<a name="FNanchor_74_74" id="FNanchor_74_74"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_74_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a> As soon as the signal was given -by the entrance of the French armies in 1798 the rising -was prompt and general;" -<a name="FNanchor_75_75" id="FNanchor_75_75"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_75_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> and was followed by the -adoption of a highly centralized constitution, for which the -country was unprepared. From that time forward agitation -was incessant. Two parties strove for the mastery; -the one favoring the new order, known as the Unitarians, -whose sympathies were with the French Revolution, the -other the Aristocratic, which sought to return towards the -former Constitution, and looked for countenance and support -to the older governments of Europe. Between the -two there was a central party of more moderate opinions.</p> - -<p>Having secured the Valais for France, Bonaparte in -August, 1802, withdrew the French troops till then maintained -in Switzerland; a politic measure tending to show -Europe that he respected the independence of the country -guaranteed at Lunéville. The opposing parties soon came -to blows; and the nominal government of moderates, -which had obtained its authority by extra-constitutional -action, -<a name="FNanchor_76_76" id="FNanchor_76_76"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_76_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a> -found that it had on its side "neither the ardent -patriots, who wished absolute unity, nor the peaceable -masses sufficiently well disposed to the revolution, but -who knew it only by the horrors of war and the presence -of foreign troops." -<a name="FNanchor_77_77" id="FNanchor_77_77"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_77_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a> The aristocratic party got the upper -hand and established itself in the capital, whence the government -was driven. The latter appealed to Bonaparte -to intervene; and after a moment's refusal he decided to -do so. "I will not," he said, "deliver the formidable -bastions of the Alps to fifteen hundred mercenaries paid -by England." A French colonel was sent as special envoy -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> -bearing a proclamation, dated September 30, 1802, to -command the oligarchic government to dissolve and all -armed assemblies to disperse. To support this order, -thirty thousand French soldiers, under General Ney, were -massed on the frontiers and soon entered the country. -Before this show of force all opposition in Switzerland at -once ceased.</p> - -<p>The emotion of Europe was profound; but of the great -powers none save Great Britain spoke. What to Bonaparte -was a step necessary to the supremacy of France, -even though a violation of the treaty of Lunéville, was, in -the eyes of Englishmen, not only among the ministry but -among the most strenuous of the opposition, an oppressive -interference with "the lawful efforts of a brave and generous -people to recover their ancient laws and government, -and to procure the re-establishment of a system which experience -has demonstrated not only to be favorable to the -maintenance of their domestic happiness, but to be perfectly -consistent with the tranquillity and security of -other powers." The British cabinet expressed an unwillingness -to believe that there "would be any further -attempt to control that independent nation in the exercise -of its undoubted rights." -<a name="FNanchor_78_78" id="FNanchor_78_78"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_78_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a></p> - -<p>Despite this avowed confidence, the ministry on the -same day, October 10, that this vigorous remonstrance -was penned, dispatched a special envoy with orders to -station himself on the frontiers of Switzerland, ascertain -the disposition of the people, and assure them that, if they -were disposed to resist the French advance, Great Britain -would furnish them pecuniary succors. The envoy was -carefully to refrain from promoting resistance, if the -Swiss did not spontaneously offer it; but if they did, he -was to give them every facility to obtain arms and supplies. -Being thus committed to a course which could -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> -scarcely fail to lead to hostilities, the British ministry -next bethought itself to secure some conquests of the late -war, for whose restitution, in compliance with the treaty, -orders had already gone forward. On the 17th of October -dispatches were sent to the West Indies, to Dutch Guiana, -and to the Cape of Good Hope, directing that the French -and Dutch colonies ordered to be restored should be retained -until further instructions.</p> - -<p>Upon receiving the British remonstrance, Bonaparte -broke into furious words mingled with threats. On the -23d of October he dictated instructions to M. Otto, the -French minister in London, which are characterized even -by M. Thiers as truly extraordinary. "He would not deliver -the Alps to fifteen hundred mercenaries paid by -England. If the British ministry, to support its parliamentary -influence, should intimate that there was anything -the first consul had not done, because he was -prevented from doing it, that instant he would do it." -He scouted the danger to France from maritime war, and -said plainly that, if it arose, the coasts of Europe from -Hanover to Taranto would be occupied by French troops -and closed to British commerce. "Liguria, Lombardy, -Switzerland and Holland would be converted into French -provinces, realizing the Empire of the Gauls." Great -Britain herself was threatened with invasion by a hundred -thousand soldiers; and if, to avert the danger, she succeeded -in arousing another continental war, "it would be -England that forced us to conquer Europe. The first -consul was but thirty-three. He had as yet destroyed -only states of the second order. Who knows how long it -would take him, if forced thereto, to change again the -face of Europe and revive the Empire of the West?" The -minister was directed to state to the British government -that the policy of France towards England was "the whole -treaty of Amiens; nothing but the treaty of Amiens." A -week later the same phrase was repeated in the Moniteur, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> -the official journal, in an article which expressly denied -Great Britain's right to appeal to the treaty of Lunéville, -because she had refused to recognize the new states constituted -by it. M. Otto wisely withheld the provoking -language of the dispatch, but necessarily communicated -the demand for the whole treaty of Amiens and the refusal -of aught not therein found. To this the British -minister of foreign affairs replied with the pregnant -words, "The state of the Continent when the treaty of -Amiens was signed, and nothing but that state." The -two declarations created a dead-lock, unless one party -would recede.</p> - -<p>Despite these explicit formulas both governments were -somewhat in the dark as to the extent of the dangers. -The British ministry had not heard all that Bonaparte -said, and he was ignorant of the orders sent to retain the -captured colonies. Meanwhile, Swiss opposition having -failed, the British envoy to them was recalled; and on -the 15th of November new instructions were sent to the -Cape of Good Hope and the West Indies, revoking those -of the previous month to stop the restitutions. It remained, -however, a question whether the second vessel -would overtake the first. If she did not, the action of the -British ministry would transpire in an offensive way. -Accordingly, when Parliament met on the 23d of November, -the king's speech took the color of this perplexity, -alluding somewhat enigmatically to the necessity of watching -the European situation and providing for security as -well as for peace. The debates which followed were -tinged with the same hue of uncertainty. The ministry -could only say that its policy was to preserve peace, if -possible; but that, in view of recent events, it must call -upon the House and the country to entertain a spirit of -watchfulness. -<a name="FNanchor_79_79" id="FNanchor_79_79"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_79_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a></p> - -<p>The Swiss affair was the turning-point in the relations -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> -of the two countries. The first consul's vigilance had -been lulled by the seeming easy acquiescence of the British -ministry in previous encroachments, and the readiness -with which, notwithstanding these, they had surrendered -their conquests and continued to fulfil the terms of the -treaty. Their present action not only exasperated, but -aroused him. The remonstrance ended in words; but, -like the little trickle which betrays the fissure in a dam, -it betokened danger and gave warning that the waters of -strife were ready to burst through the untempered barrier -put together to restrain them, and again pour their desolating -flood over Europe. Bonaparte began to look carefully -at the existing situation, and found that the British troops -had not yet quitted Egypt nor surrendered Malta to the -Order of St. John. Representations were made on both -these subjects, and the British government was pressed to -evacuate Malta. -<a name="FNanchor_80_80" id="FNanchor_80_80"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_80_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a></p> - -<p>The ministry, however, were also alive to the gravity of -the situation, increased as it was by the orders, not yet -known, to stop the restitutions. To abandon Egypt to -Turkey they had no objection; and to the French ambassador's -demand replied, on November 30, that the failure -to do so had resulted from a misunderstanding on the part -of the British commander-in-chief, to whom explicit instructions -were now sent. Regarding Malta, their feeling -was very different. Honestly intending to carry out the -treaty, they had admitted the Neapolitan garrison to the -island, though not yet to the fortifications; and their ambassadors -to the Great Powers had been early directed to -ask their guarantee for the independence of the Order. -The French government did not instruct its representatives -to do the same. Whether this was due, as Thiers -says, to the negligence of Talleyrand, or whether the first -consul preferred not to be troubled by the resistance of -other powers in case he again seized the island, the failure -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> -of France to join in the application caused Russia and -Prussia to defer their answer to the British ambassadors. -The joint request was not made to Prussia until September, -nor to the czar until November 3. By this time the -Swiss incident had come and gone, leaving behind it the -state of tension already described. Not till the 25th of -the month did the czar reply; and then, before giving his -acquiescence, he required in the organization of the island -changes seriously affecting the object of the treaty, which -aimed to base its independence upon its own people as -well as upon guarantees. At Amiens it had been agreed -that the Order should be open to native Maltese, by whom -also at least half the government offices should be filled. -Half the garrison likewise was to be composed of natives. -To these provisions the czar excepted. All such points of -interior organization were to be left to the decision of the -legal government of the Order; -<a name="FNanchor_81_81" id="FNanchor_81_81"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_81_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> i. e., of the Order as before -constituted.</p> - -<p>The record of the ministry in the matter of Malta was -so clear that it could well afford to protract discussion on -the points raised by Russia. No cession made by the -treaty had been more generally lamented by Englishmen, -keenly sensitive to all that affected their position in the -Mediterranean or threatened the approaches to India. In -case the peace which was its sole achievement failed, the -ministry could save from the wreck of its hopes no more -welcome prize with which to meet a disappointed people. -Other valid objections to restoration were not wanting. -No Grand Master had yet accepted. Spain, notoriously -under Bonaparte's influence, had suppressed the revenues -of the Order within her limits. Similar action had followed -elsewhere, and it was argued that the income of -the Order would not suffice to maintain the defence of the -island, nor consequently its independence. But, while -thus keeping its hold on Malta by diplomatic pleas, the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> -ministry took broader ground in its discussions with -France. Its envoy there was replaced by an ambassador -of the highest rank, Lord Whitworth; who was instructed -to affirm explicitly Great Britain's right to interfere in -continental affairs, whenever in her judgment required by -her own interests, or those of Europe in general. He was -also to point out the various encroachments which had -added to the influence and power of France, and to intimate -that these changes in the conditions since the treaty -had been concluded entitled Great Britain to compensations. -The annexation of Piedmont, the renunciation of -the Grand Duke of Parma in favor of France, the invasion -of Switzerland, were specifically named as making a most -material alteration in the state of engagements since the -conclusion of the definitive treaty. Attention was also -called to the fact that although, by a convention signed in -August, 1801, French troops were to remain in Holland -only until the conclusion of peace between Great Britain -and France, they had not yet been withdrawn, thus violating -the independence of the Batavian republic guaranteed -at Lunéville. The ambassador was warned, however, not -to commit the government to any specific determinations, -and especially on the subject of Malta. -<a name="FNanchor_82_82" id="FNanchor_82_82"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_82_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a></p> - -<p>The ministers, therefore, were still undecided. They -had climbed upon the fence, but were prepared to get -down again on the side whence they had started, if a fair -opportunity were given. Unfortunately for the interests -of peace, Bonaparte, in the madness of his strength, either -exaggerating the weakness of the ministry or underestimating -the impulsion it could receive from popular feeling, -proceeded deliberately to arouse the spirit which he -was never again able to lay. On the 30th of January, -1803, was published in the "Moniteur" Colonel Sébastiani's -famous report of his mission to the Levant. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> -Sébastiani had been dispatched in a frigate the previous -September, to visit Tripoli, Egypt, Syria, and the Ionian -islands, and ascertain the political and military conditions. -His report was in the main a fulsome narrative of the -reverence in which the first consul was said to be held by -the Eastern peoples; but, upon the very detailed account -of the indifference to military preparations, followed the -startling statement that "six thousand French troops -would now suffice to conquer Egypt." The Ionian islands -were also pronounced ready to declare themselves French -at the first opportunity. Finally, General Stuart, commanding -the British troops in Alexandria, was accused of -seeking to compass Sébastiani's murder by sending to the -Pasha a copy of a general order issued by Bonaparte when -in Egypt.</p> - -<p>The exasperation such a paper would excite in Great -Britain was so obvious, that its publication has been attributed -to the deliberate design to provoke a maritime -war; under cover of which the first consul could, without -open humiliation, abandon the enterprise against Haïti. -<a name="FNanchor_83_83" id="FNanchor_83_83"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_83_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a> -The first and general success of the French troops in that -colony had been followed by a frightful pestilence of yellow -fever; after which the negroes in every quarter again -rose and defied the weakened bands of their enemies. On -the 8th of January the "Moniteur" published the death -of Leclerc, the commander-in-chief, with an account of the -ravages of the disease. It was indeed painfully apparent -that the colony could not be regained, and utilized, without -an expenditure of life impossible to afford; -<a name="FNanchor_84_84" id="FNanchor_84_84"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_84_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a> but the -fever itself was an excuse even more potent than the British -navy for abandoning the attempt without military dishonor. -To penetrate the real motives of a spirit so subtle -and unscrupulous as Bonaparte's is hopeless; nor can dependence -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> -be placed upon the statements of his brothers -Lucien and Joseph, who are the sole authorities for the -purpose thus alleged for the publication. There seems -little cause to seek another reason than the same truculent -arrogance manifested in his instructions to Otto of October -23, and the success which his past experience had -taught him to expect from bluster. The secret mission to -Prussia of his confidential aid, Duroc, six weeks later, -clearly indicates that the result had disappointed him and -that he did not want war,—at least as yet. -<a name="FNanchor_85_85" id="FNanchor_85_85"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_85_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a> Duroc was -instructed to see the king personally and say that, if war -broke out, French troops would occupy Hanover, a step -known to be particularly obnoxious to Prussia, who wished -herself to absorb it. Her repugnance was to be used as a -lever, to induce intervention with Great Britain to evacuate -Malta. -<a name="FNanchor_86_86" id="FNanchor_86_86"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_86_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a></p> - -<p>Bonaparte in truth was less interested in the West than -in the East, whose vast populations, vivid history, and -fabled riches struck his imagination far more forcibly -than the unpeopled wildernesses of America. Access to -the East, as to the West, was perforce by water, and so -controlled by the power that ruled the sea; but the way -by the Levant was shorter, evasion therefore easier. -Malta, Taranto, the Ionian islands, the Morea were gateways -to the East. The last three, as practically continental, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> -<a name="FNanchor_87_87" id="FNanchor_87_87"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_87_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a> -he considered to be within his own grasp; the -first alone could be readily and securely held by the -Power of the Seas. From it therefore he sought to hasten -her. On the 27th of January Talleyrand, "with great -solemnity and by express order of the first consul," required -of Lord Whitworth to inform him what were his -Majesty's intentions regarding the evacuation of Malta. -No reply was given, except a promise to report the conversation. -<a name="FNanchor_88_88" id="FNanchor_88_88"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_88_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a> -On the 30th was issued Sébastiani's report, -whose scarcely veiled threats against British interests in -the East might perhaps induce a weak government to -propitiate the first consul by compliance.</p> - -<p>If so meant, the attempt was miscalculated. The -British ministry replied that, despite his just claim for -compensation, the king would have withdrawn his force -from Malta, when the clauses of the treaty affecting it -were fulfilled; but that, in view of Sébastiani's report, -he would not do so until substantial security was provided -against the purposes therein revealed. From that time -forward letters and interviews followed in rapid succession, -the British ministry gradually stiffening in its attitude -concerning the island. On the 20th of February -Bonaparte gave a fresh provocation which deeply stirred -the British people, although no notice was taken of it by -the ministry. In a message sent that day to the legislature, -he declared the certainty of continental peace; but -concerning Great Britain he continued: "Two parties -there strive for power. One has made peace and wishes -to keep it; the other has sworn implacable hatred to -France.... Whatever the success of intrigue in London, -it will not drag other nations into new leagues, and this -government says with just pride: 'England, alone, cannot -to-day contend against France.'"</p> - -<p>On March 8 the British government sent a message to -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> -Parliament, that, in consequence of military preparations -going on in the ports of France and Holland, the king -judged expedient to adopt additional measures of precaution -for the security of his dominions. It is fair to say -that these preparations were not on a scale by themselves -to warrant the proposed action; which was asserted by -critics of the ministry to be due to information of transactions -at the Cape of Good Hope. This had already been -delivered to the Dutch authorities when the orders countermanding -the restitution arrived; but the British commander -had adroitly repossessed himself of the works. -This news reached London early in March; and the proposed -armaments were thought to be precautions rather -against Bonaparte's action, when he too heard it, than -against the existing movements in French or Dutch -ports.</p> - -<p>From this time forward Great Britain rather than -France was aggressive. Receiving no explanation upon -the grievances advanced, Lord Whitworth was on the 4th -of April instructed to say that, if the French government -continued to evade discussion about compensations due -for its aggressions on the Continent and satisfaction for -Sébastiani's report, and yet demanded the evacuation of -Malta, he should declare that relations of amity could not -continue to exist, and that he must leave Paris within a -certain time. If they were willing to discuss, he was instructed -to propose the cession of Malta in perpetuity to -Great Britain and the evacuation of Holland and Switzerland -by French troops; in return for which Great Britain -would confirm Elba to France and acknowledge the kingdom -of Etruria. If a satisfactory arrangement were made -in Italy for the king of Sardinia, she would further acknowledge -the Italian and Ligurian republics. The first -consul replied that he would sooner see the British on the -heights of Montmartre than in the possession of Malta. -Some futile efforts were made to find a middle term; but -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> -the ministry having insisted, as its ultimatum, upon occupying -the island for at least ten years, the ambassador -demanded his passports and left Paris on the 12th of May. -On the 16th Great Britain declared war against France. -The following day Admiral Cornwallis sailed from Plymouth -with ten ships-of-the-line, and two days later appeared -off Brest, resuming the watch of that port. On -the afternoon of the 18th Nelson hoisted his flag on board -the "Victory" at Portsmouth, and on the 20th sailed for -the Mediterranean, there to take the chief command.</p> - -<p>Thus again, after a brief intermission, began the strife -between Great Britain and France, destined during its -twelve years' course to involve successively all the powers -of Europe, from Portugal to Russia, from Turkey to Sweden. -On the land, state after state went down before the -great soldier who wielded the armies of France and the -auxiliary legions of subject countries, added to her standards -by his policy. Victory after victory graced his eagles, -city after city and province after province were embodied -in his empire, peace after peace was wrested from the conquered; -but one enemy remained ever erect, unsubdued, -defiant; and on the ocean there was neither peace nor -truce, until the day when he himself fell under the hosts of -foes, aroused by his vain attempt to overthrow, through -their sufferings, the power that rested upon the seas.</p> - -<p>The debates in the House of Commons revealed an agreement -of sentiment unparalleled in the former war. Differences -of opinion there were. A very few thought that -hostilities might even yet be averted, while others argued -bitterly that, had Bonaparte's first encroachments been resisted, -the nation might have been spared, if not war, at -least humiliation. But, while both groups condemned the -administration, the one for precipitation, the other for -pusillanimous and protracted submission, both agreed that -just occasion for war had been given. As usual, opposition -took the form of an amendment to the address, which, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> -while carefully excluding any approval of the ministry, -still "assured his Majesty of our firm determination to co-operate -with his Majesty in calling forth the resources of -the United Kingdom for the vigorous prosecution of the -war in which we are involved." The proposer, Mr. Grey—one -of the most strenuous opponents of the former war—was -careful to say that, though he objected to some -points of the late negotiation, he acknowledged the necessity -of resisting the spirit of encroachment shown by -France. Even for this very qualified disapproval of a ministry -in whose capacity none had confidence, there could -in this grave crisis be found only 67 votes, against 398 who -preferred not to weaken, by an apparent discord, the unanimous -voice. Having regard to the reasons for their dissent -urged by the various speakers, the result disposes forever -of the vain assertion that Great Britain feared to meet -France alone. The solemn decision was not taken blindfold -nor in haste. The exorbitant power of Bonaparte, -the impossibility of allies, the burden that must be borne, -were all quoted and faced; and Mr. Pitt, who then spoke -for the first time in many months, while fully supporting -the war, warned the members in his stately periods of the -arduous struggle before them. "In giving their assurances -he trusted that other gentlemen felt impressed with the -same sense which he did of the awful importance of the -engagement into which they were preparing to enter; and -that they considered those assurances, not as formal words -of ceremony or custom, but as a solemn and deliberate -pledge, on behalf of themselves and of the nation whom -they represented,—knowing and feeling to their full extent -the real difficulties and dangers of their situation, and -being prepared to meet those difficulties and dangers with -every exertion and every sacrifice which the unexampled -circumstances of the times rendered indispensable for the -public safety.... The scale of our exertions could not be -measured by those of former times, or confined within the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> -limits even of the great, and till then unexampled, efforts -of the last war." -<a name="FNanchor_89_89" id="FNanchor_89_89"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_89_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a></p> - -<p>In the same speech Pitt correctly and explicitly indicated -the two methods by which France might seek to subdue -Great Britain. "If they indulge themselves in any expectation -of success in the present contest, it is built chiefly on -the supposition (1) that they can either break the spirit -and shake the determination of the country by harassing -us with perpetual apprehension of descent upon our coasts, -or (2) that they can impair our resources and undermine -our credit, by the effects of an expensive and protracted -contest." Not to one only, but to both of these means did -Bonaparte resort, on a scale proportioned to his comprehensive -genius and his mighty resources. For the invasion -of England preparations were at once begun, so extensive -and so thorough as to indicate not a mere threat, -but a fixed purpose; and at the same time measures were -taken to close to Great Britain the markets of the Continent, -as well as to harass her commerce by the ordinary -operations of maritime war. Trafalgar marked the term -when all thought of invasion disappeared, and was succeeded -by the vast combinations of the Continental System, -itself but an expansion of the former measures of exclusion. -Framed to impair the resources and sap the credit -of Great Britain, this stupendous fabric, upheld, not by the -cohesion of its parts, but by the dextrous balancing of an -ever watchful policy, overtaxed the skill and strength of -its designer, and crushed him in its fall.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter p4"> -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XV" id="CHAPTER_XV"></a>CHAPTER XV.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="ac"><span class="sc">The Trafalgar Campaign to the Spanish Declaration -of War. May, 1803—December, 1804.</span></p> - -<p class="chapsum"><span class="sc">Preparations for the Invasion of England.—The Great -Flotilla.—Napoleon's Military and Naval Combinations -and British Naval Strategy.—Essential Unity of Napoleon's -Purpose.—Causes of Spanish War.</span></p> - -<p class="drop-cap">ALTHOUGH Great Britain and France had each, up to -the last moment, hoped to retain peace upon its own -terms, preparations for war had gone on rapidly ever since -the king's message of March 8. Immediately upon issuing -this, couriers were dispatched to the various sea-ports, with -orders to impress seamen for the numerous ships hastily -ordered into commission. Some details have come down -giving a vivid presentment of that lawless proceeding -known as a "hot press," at this period when it was on the -point of disappearing. "About 7 <span class="sc">P. M.</span> yesterday," says -the Plymouth report of March 10, "the town was alarmed -with the marching of several bodies of Royal Marines in -parties of twelve or fourteen each, with their officers and a -naval officer, armed. So secret were the orders kept that -they did not know the nature of the service on which they -were going, until they boarded the tier of colliers at the -new quay, and other gangs the ships at Catwater, the Pool -and the gin-shops. A great number of prime seamen were -taken out and sent on board the admiral's ship. In other -parts of the town, and in all the receiving and gin-shops at -Dock, several hundreds of seamen and landsmen were -picked up. By returns this morning it appears that -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> -upwards of four hundred useful hands were pressed last -night. One gang entered the Dock theatre and cleared the -whole gallery except the women." Parties of seamen and -marines were placed across all roads leading out of the -towns, to intercept fugitives. In Portsmouth the colliers -were stripped so clean of men that they could not put to sea; -while frigates and smaller vessels swept the Channel and -other sea-approaches to the kingdom, stopping all merchant -ships, and taking from them a part of their crews. The -whole flotilla of trawl-boats fishing off the Eddystone, forty -in number, were searched, and two hands taken from each. -Six East India ships, wind-bound off Plymouth on their -outward voyage, were boarded by armed boats and robbed -of three hundred seamen, till then unaware that a rupture -with France was near. -<a name="FNanchor_90_90" id="FNanchor_90_90"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_90_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a></p> - -<p>Bonaparte on his side had been no less active, although -he sought by the secrecy of his movements to avert alarm -and postpone, if possible, the war which for his aims was -premature. Orders were given that re-enforcements for -the colonies should go forward rapidly, ere peace was -broken. No ships-of-the-line or frigates should henceforth -go with them; and those already abroad were for the most -part at once recalled. Troops were concentrated on the -coasts of Holland and Flanders; and the flat-boats built in -the last war with a view to invading England were assembled -quietly in the Scheldt and the Channel ports. -Plans were studied for the harassment of British commerce. -On the 9th of April was commanded the armament of the -shores, from the Scheldt westward to the Somme, a distance -of one hundred and twenty miles, which afterwards became, -to use Marmont's vivid expression, "a coast of iron and -bronze." A few days later Elba and all the coasts and -islands of France were ordered fortified; and the first -consul's aides-de-camp sped north and east and west, to -see and report the state of preparation in all quarters.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span></p> - -<p>One affair of great importance still remained to arrange. -The smaller French islands in the East and West Indies -could be held in subjection by a moderate number of troops, -who could also resist for a considerable time any attempt -of the British, unless on a very large scale. This was not -the case with Haïti or Louisiana. In the former the French, -reduced by the fever, were now shut up in a few sea-ports; -communication between which, being only by water, must -cease when the maritime war broke out. Between the -blacks within and the British without, the loss of the -island was therefore certain. Louisiana had not yet been -occupied. Whatever its unknown possibilities, the immediate -value to France of this possession, so lately regained, -was as a source of supplies to Haïti, dependent for many -essentials upon the American continent. With the fall of -the island the colony on the mainland became useless. Its -cession by Spain to France had at once aroused the jealousy, -with which, from colonial days, the people of the United States -have viewed any political interference by European nations -on the American continent, even when involving only a -transfer from one power to another. In the dire straits of -the Revolution, when the need of help from abroad was so -great, they had been careful to insert in the Treaty of -Alliance with France an express stipulation, that she would -not acquire for herself any of the possessions of Great -Britain on the mainland; having then in view Canada and -the Floridas. This feeling was intensified when, as now, -the change of ownership was from a weak and inert state -like Spain to one so powerful as France, with the reputation -for aggressiveness that was fast gathering around the -name of Bonaparte.</p> - -<p>The fear and anger of the American people increased -with the reserve shown by the French government, in replying -to the questions of their minister in Paris, who asked -repeatedly, but in vain, for assurances as to the navigation -of the Mississippi; and the excitement reached a climax -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> -when in November, 1802, news was received that the Spanish -authorities in New Orleans had refused to American -citizens the right of deposit, conceded by the treaty of 1795 -with Spain. This was naturally attributed to Bonaparte's -influence, and the inhabitants of the upper Mississippi valley -were ready to resort to arms to enforce their rights.</p> - -<p>Such was the threatening state of affairs in America, -while war with Great Britain was fast drawing on. Bonaparte -was not the man to recede before a mere menace of -hostilities in the distant wilderness of Louisiana; but it -was plain that, in case of rupture with Great Britain, any -possessions of France on the Gulf of Mexico were sure to -fall either to her or to the Americans, if he incurred the -enmity of the latter. It was then believed in Washington -that France had also acquired from Spain the Floridas, -which contained naval ports essential to the defence of -Louisiana. On the 12th of April, 1803, arrived in Paris -Mr. Monroe, sent by Jefferson as envoy extraordinary, to -treat, in conjunction with the regular minister to France, -for the cession of the Floridas and of the island of New -Orleans to the United States; the object of the latter being -to secure the Mississippi down to its mouth as their -western boundary. Monroe's arrival was most opportune. -Lord Whitworth had five days before communicated the -message of the British cabinet that, unless the French government -was prepared to enter into the required explanations, -relations of amity could not exist, and at the same -time the London papers were discussing a proposition to -raise fifty thousand men to take New Orleans. -<a name="FNanchor_91_91" id="FNanchor_91_91"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_91_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a> Three days -later, April 10, the first consul decided to sell Louisiana; -<a name="FNanchor_92_92" id="FNanchor_92_92"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_92_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a> -and Monroe upon his arrival had only to settle the terms of -the bargain, which did not indeed realize the precise object of -his mission, but which gave to his country control of the west -bank of the Mississippi throughout its course, and of both -banks from its mouth nearly to Baton Rouge, a distance of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> -over two hundred miles. The treaty, signed April 30, -1803, gave to the United States "the whole of Louisiana -as Spain had possessed it," for the sum of eighty million -francs. Thus the fear of Great Britain's sea power was -the determining factor -<a name="FNanchor_93_93" id="FNanchor_93_93"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_93_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a> to sweep the vast region known as -Louisiana, stretching from the Gulf toward Canada, and -from the Mississippi toward Mexico, with ill-defined boundaries -in either direction, into the hands of the United -States, and started the latter on that course of expansion -to the westward which has brought her to the shores of -the Pacific.</p> - -<p>Having thus relinquished a position he could not defend, -and, as far as in him lay, secured the French possessions -beyond the sea, Bonaparte could now give his whole attention -to the plans for subjugating the British Islands which -had long been ripening in his fertile brain.</p> - -<p>It was from the first evident that Great Britain, having -in the three kingdoms but fifteen million inhabitants, could -not invade the territory of France with its population of -over twenty-five millions. This was the more true because -the demands of her navy, of her great mercantile -shipping, and of a manufacturing and industrial system -not only vast but complex, so that interference with parts -would seriously derange the whole, left for recruiting the -British armies a fraction, insignificant when compared with -the resources in men of France; where capital and manufactures, -commerce and shipping, had disappeared, leaving -only an agricultural peasantry, upon which the conscription -could freely draw without materially increasing the poverty -of the country, or deranging a social system essentially -simple.</p> - -<p>This seeming inability to injure France gave rise to the -sarcastic remark, that it was hardly worth while for a -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> -country to go to war in order to show that it could put -itself in a good posture for defence. This, however, was a -very superficial view of the matter. Great Britain's avowed -reason for war was the necessity—forced upon a reluctant -ministry and conceded by a bitter opposition—of resisting -encroachments by a neighboring state. Of these, on -the Continent, part had already occurred and were, for the -time at least, irremediable; but there had also been clearly -revealed the purpose of continuing similar encroachments, -in regions whose tenure by an enemy would seriously compromise -her colonial empire. To prevent this, Great Britain, -by declaring war, regained her belligerent rights, and -so resumed at once that control of the sea which needed -only them to complete. She pushed her sway up to every -point of her enemy's long coast-line; and following the -strategy of the previous war, under the administration of -the veteran seaman who had imparted to it such vigor, she -prevented her enemy from combining any great operation, -by which her world-wide dominion could be shaken or vital -injury be inflicted at any point. The British squadrons, -hugging the French coasts and blocking the French arsenals, -were the first line of the defence, covering British interests -from the Baltic to Egypt, the British colonies in the four -quarters of the globe, and the British merchantmen which -whitened every sea.</p> - -<p>This was the defensive gain in a war whose motive was -essentially defensive. Offensively Great Britain, by the -suddenness with which she forced the issue, dealt a blow -whose weight none understood better than Bonaparte. -That he meant war eventually is most probable. His instructions -to Decaen, Captain-General of the French East -Indies, dated January 15, 1803, speak of the possibility of -war by September, 1804; but how little the bravado of Sébastiani's -report indicated a wish for an immediate rupture, -is shown by the secret message sent to Andréossy in London, -on the very day Whitworth left Paris. Despite the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> -bluster about his willingness to see Great Britain on Montmartre -rather than in Malta, he then wrote: "Direct General -Andréossy that when he is assured the accompanying -note has been communicated to the English government, he -cause it to be understood through Citizen Schimmelpenninck -<i>or by any other indirect means</i>, that if England absolutely -rejects the proposition of giving Malta to one of the guaranteeing -powers, we would not here be averse from accepting -that England should retain Malta for ten years, and France -should occupy the peninsula of Otranto. <i>It is important, if -this proposition has no chance of success, that no communication -be made leaving any trace</i>; and that we here may always -be able to <i>deny that this government could have adhered to -this proposition</i>." -<a name="FNanchor_94_94" id="FNanchor_94_94"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_94_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a> Bonaparte understood perfectly that -Great Britain, by forcing his hand, had struck down the -French navy before it had begun to rise. "Peace," he said, -"is necessary to restore a navy,—peace to fill our arsenals -empty of material, and peace because then only the one -drill-ground for fleets, the sea, is open." "Ships, colonies, -commerce," the wants he avowed later at Ulm, were swept -away by the same blow. How distressed the finances of -France, how devoid of credit, none knew better than he, -who then, as throughout his rule, was engaged in keeping -up the quotations by government manipulation; and the -chief of all sources of wealth, maritime commerce, was -crushed by the sea power of Great Britain, which thenceforth -coiled closely and with ever tightening compression -round the coasts of France.</p> - -<p>Bonaparte could not indeed realize the full extent of the -injury that would be done. Impatient of obstacles, he -refused to see that the construction of the flotilla to invade -England would devour the scanty material for ship-building, -occupy all the workmen, and so stop the growth -of the real navy. Even when built, the ever-recurring -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> -demand for repairs drained the dockyards of mechanics. -<a name="FNanchor_95_95" id="FNanchor_95_95"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_95_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a> -Nor could he foresee how completely Great Britain, by -reviving the Rule of 1756 in all its rigor, and by replying -to each blow from the land by one yet heavier from the -sea, would cut off the resources of France and destroy her -as a fortress falls by blockade. Unsparing ridicule has -been heaped upon Pitt for predicting the break-down of the -French Revolution, in its aggressive military character, by -financial distress; but in fact Pitt, though he underestimated -the time necessary and did not look for the vast -system of spoliation which supplied the lack of regular -income, was a true prophet. The republic had already -devoured an immense capital; -<a name="FNanchor_96_96" id="FNanchor_96_96"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_96_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a> and when the conquering -spirit it ever displayed reached its natural culmination in -Bonaparte, the constantly recurring need of money drove -him on from violence to violence till it ended in his ruin. -This penury was caused directly by the maritime war, -which shut France off from commerce beyond the seas; -and indirectly by the general prostration of business in -Europe and consequent poverty of consumers, due to -their isolation from the sea, enforced by Bonaparte as the -only means of wearing out Great Britain.</p> - -<p>In 1798, when the Peace of Campo Formio had left -France face to face with Great Britain alone, the question -of invading the latter had naturally arisen; but Bonaparte -easily convinced himself and the Directory that the attempt -was impossible with any naval force that could at that time -be raised. He then pointed out that there were two other -principal ways of injuring the enemy: one by occupying -Hanover and Hamburg, through which British trade -entered the Continent; the other by seizing Egypt as a base -of operations against India. These two were somewhat of -the nature of a flank attack; and the former being in the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> -then state of the Continent inexpedient,—for both Hamburg -and Hanover were included in the North German neutrality -under the guarantee of Prussia, while Austria was by no -means so reduced as in 1803,—the expedition against Egypt -was determined. Whatever personal motives may then -have influenced Bonaparte, that undertaking, from the -military point of view and in the then condition of the -Mediterranean, was well conceived; and, while allowing -for a large amount of good luck, the measure of success -achieved must be ascribed to the completeness and secrecy -of his preparations, as the final failure must to the sea -power of Great Britain.</p> - -<p>In 1803 Bonaparte found himself no longer a simple -general, under a weak and jealous government upon whose -co-operation he could not certainly depend, but an absolute -ruler wielding all the resources of France. He resolved -therefore to strike straight at the vital centre of the British -power, by a direct invasion of the British Islands. The -very greatness of the peril in crossing the Channel, and in -leaving it between him and his base, was not without a -certain charm for his adventurous temper; but, while -willing to take many a risk for so great an end, he left to -chance nothing for which he himself could provide. The -plan for the invasion was marked by the comprehensiveness -of view and the minute attention to detail which distinguished -his campaigns; and the preparations were on a -scale of entire adequacy, which he never failed to observe -when the power to do so was in his hands.</p> - -<p>For these in their grandeur, however, time was needed; -but the first consul was ready to move at once, as far as -was possible to land forces, upon the two flanks of the -British position. On the 26th of May a corps under -General Mortier entered Hanover; while a few days later -another corps, under General St. Cyr, passed through the -Papal States into the kingdom of Naples, and resumed -possession of the peninsula of Otranto with the ports of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> -Brindisi and Taranto. From the latter the Ionian islands, -the Morea, and Egypt, were all threatened; and the position -kept alive, as in the deep strategy of Napoleon it was -meant to do, the anxiety of Nelson concerning those points -and the Levant generally. Upon this distraction of the -greatest British admiral, justified as it was by the enemy's -undoubted purposes in the eastern Mediterranean, depended -a decisive part of Bonaparte's combination against -Great Britain.</p> - -<p>In Hanover British trade was struck. This German -electorate of George III. bordered on both the Elbe and the -Weser, in the lower part of their course; by occupying it -France controlled the two great rivers and excluded from -them all British goods. The act was censured as infringing -the neutrality of Germany. Bonaparte justified it by the -hostile character of the elector as king of Great Britain; -but no such plea could be advanced for the occupation of -Cuxhaven, the port of Hamburg, which lay on the Elbe -outside Hanover. Triple offence was given to Prussia. -Her ambition to figure as the guardian of North German -neutrality was affronted, her particular wish to control -Hanover slighted, and her trade most injuriously affected. -To the exclusion of British goods Great Britain replied by -blockading the mouths of the rivers, suffering no ships to -pass where her own were not allowed, and holding Germany -responsible for permitting a breach of its neutrality -injurious to herself. The commerce of Hamburg and -Bremen was thus stopped; and as they were the brokers -who received and distributed the manufactures of Prussia, -the blow was felt throughout the kingdom. The distress -among the workmen was so wide-spread that the king had -to come to their relief, and many wealthy men lost half -their incomes. In addition to the advantages of position -obtained in Hanover and Naples, Napoleon threw on these -two neutral states the charge of supporting the corps -quartered on them, amounting to some thirty thousand -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> -men in Hanover and half that number in Naples. Holland, -against which as the ally of France -<a name="FNanchor_97_97" id="FNanchor_97_97"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_97_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> Great Britain also -declared war, had to maintain a somewhat larger force. -By such expedients Bonaparte eased his own finances at the -expense of neutral or dependent countries; but he was not -therefore more beloved.</p> - -<p>To invade Great Britain there had first to be concentrated -round a chosen point the great armies required to -insure success, and the very large number of vessels -needed to transport them. Other corps, more or less -numerous, destined to further the principal movement by -diversions in different directions, distracting the enemy's -attention, might embark at distant ports and sail independently -of the main body; but for the latter it was -necessary to start together and land simultaneously, in -mass, at a given point of the English coast. To this -principal effort Bonaparte destined one hundred and -thirty thousand men; of whom one hundred thousand -should form the first line and embark at the same hour -from four different ports, which lay within a length of -twenty miles on the Channel coast. The other thirty -thousand constituted the reserve, and were to sail shortly -after the first.</p> - -<p>To carry any such force at once, in ordinary sea-going -vessels of that day, was impracticable. The requisite -number could not be had, and there was no French Channel -port where they could safely lie. Even were these -difficulties overcome, and the troops embarked together, -the mere process of getting under way would entail endless -delays, the vessels dependent upon sail could not keep together, -and the only conditions of wind under which they -could move at all would expose them to be scattered and -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> -destroyed by the British navy, which would have the same -power of motion, and to which Bonaparte could oppose no -equal force. The very gathering of so many helpless -sailing transports would betray the place where the -French navy must concentrate, and where therefore the -hostile ships would assemble at the first indication of a -combined movement. Finally, such transports must anchor -at some distance from the British coast and the -troops land from them in boats, an additional operation -both troublesome and dangerous.</p> - -<p>For these reasons the crossing must be made in vessels -not dependent upon sail alone, but capable of being moved -by oars. They must therefore be small and of very light -draught, which would allow them to shelter in the shallow -French harbors and be beached upon reaching the -English coast, so that the troops could land directly from -them. It was possible that a number of such vessels once -started, and favored by fog or calm, might pass unseen, -or even in defiance of the enemy's ships-of-war, lying -helpless to attack through want of wind. It was upon -this possibility that Bonaparte sought to fix the attention -of the British government. As the occupation of Taranto -and the movements in Italy were designed to divert Nelson's -attention to the Levant, so the ostentatious preparation -of the great flotilla to pass unsupported was meant -to conceal the real purpose of supporting it. To concentrate -the apprehensions of the British authorities upon -the flotilla, to draw their eyes away from the naval ports -in which lay the French squadrons, and then to unite the -latter in the Channel, controlling it for a measurable time -by a great fleet, was the grand combination by which -Bonaparte hoped to insure the triumphant crossing of the -army and the conquest of England. He kept it, however, -in his own breast; a profound secret only gradually revealed -to the very few men intrusted with its execution.</p> - -<p>To create and organize the flotilla and the army of invasion -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> -was the first task. Preparations so extensive and -rapid demanded all the resources of France. To build at -the same time the thousand and more of boats, each of -which should carry from sixty to a hundred soldiers, besides -from two to four heavy cannon for its own defence, -overpassed the powers of any single port. Far in the interior -of France, on the banks of the numerous streams -running toward the Channel and the Bay of Biscay, as -well as in all the little coast harbors themselves, hosts of -men were busily working. The North Sea and Holland -were also required to furnish their quota. At the same -time measures were taken to facilitate their passage in -safety to the point of concentration, which was fixed at -Boulogne, and to harbor them commodiously upon arrival. -They could from their light draught run close -along shore, and from their construction be beached without -harm. Within easy gunshot of the coast, therefore, -lay the road they followed in their passages, which were -commonly made in bodies of thirty to sixty, and from -port to port, till the journey's end. To support the movements, -sea-coast batteries were established at short intervals; -under which, if hard pressed, they could take -refuge. In addition there were organized in each maritime -district batteries of field artillery, which stood ready -to drive at once to the scene of action in case the enemy -attacked. "One field-gun to every league of coast is the -least allowance," wrote Bonaparte. In the early months -of the war great importance was attached by the British -to harassing these voyages and impeding the concentration, -but the attempt was soon abandoned. The boats, if -endangered, anchored under the nearest guns, infantry -and horse-artillery summoned by the coast-telegraph hurried -to the scene, and the enemy's vessels soon found the -combined resistance too strong. Ordinarily, indeed, the -coastwise movement of a division of the flotilla was a concerted -operation, in which all the arms, afloat and ashore, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> -assisted. In extreme cases the vessels were beached, and -British seamen fought hand to hand with French soldiers -for possession; rarely, however, with success. "The cause -of our flotilla not having succeeded in destroying the gun-vessels -of the enemy," wrote Lord St. Vincent, "did not -arise from their draught of water, but from the powerful -batteries on the coast." The concentration, though accomplished -less swiftly than Bonaparte's eagerness demanded, -was little impeded by the British.</p> - -<p>The port of Boulogne, near the eastern end of the English -Channel, lies on a strip of coast which runs due south -from the Straits of Dover to the mouth of the Somme, a -distance of about fifty miles. It is a tidal harbor, the -mouth of a little river called the Liane, on the north side -of which the town is built. In it even boats of small -draught then lay aground at low water; and its capacity -at high water was limited. Extensive excavations were -therefore ordered to be made by the soldiers encamped in -the neighborhood, who received extra wages for the work. -When finished, the port presented a double basin; the -outer, oblong, bordering the river bed on either side of the -channel, which was left clear; the inner of semi-circular -form, dug out of the flats opposite the town and connected -with the former by a narrow passage. Both were lined -with quays, alongside which the vessels of the flotilla lay -in tiers, sometimes nine deep; and in July, 1805, when -the hour for the last and greatest of Napoleon's naval -combinations was at hand, and Trafalgar itself in the -near distance, Boulogne sheltered over a thousand gunboats -and transports ready to carry forty thousand men to -the shores of England. North and south, not only the -neighborhood of the harbor but the whole coast bristled -with cannon; and opposite the entrance rose a powerful -work, built upon piles, to protect the vessels when going -out and also when anchored outside. For here was one of -the great difficulties of the undertaking. So many boats -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> -could not pass out through the narrow channel during one -high water. Two tides at the least, that is, twenty-four -hours, were needed, granting the most perfect organization -and most accurate movement. Half of the flotilla therefore -must lie outside for some hours; and it was not to be expected -that the British cruisers would allow so critical a -moment to pass unimproved, unless deterred by the protection -which the foresight of Bonaparte had provided.</p> - -<p>North of Boulogne and within five miles of it were two -other much smaller harbors, likewise tidal, called Vimereux -and Ambleteuse; and to the south, twelve miles distant, -a third, named Étaples. Though insignificant, the -impossibility of enlarging Boulogne to hold the whole -flotilla compelled Bonaparte to develop these, and they -together held some seven hundred more gun-vessels and -transports. From the three, sixty-two thousand soldiers -were to embark; and from each of the four ports a due -proportion of field artillery, ammunition and other supplies -were to go forward. Some six thousand horses were -also to be transported; but the greater part of the cavalry -took only their saddles and bridles, looking to find mounts -in the enemy's country. In the North Sea ports, Calais, -Dunkirk, and Ostend, the flotilla numbered four hundred, -the troops twenty-seven thousand, the horses twenty-five -hundred. These formed the reserve, to follow the main -body closely, but apart from it. In the end they also -were moved to the Boulogne coast; and their boats, after -some sharp fighting with British cruisers, joined the main -flotilla in the four Channel ports.</p> - -<p>To handle such a mass of men upon the battle-field is a -faculty to which few generals, after years of experience, -attain. To effect the passage of a broad river with an -army of that size, before a watchful enemy of equal force, -is a delicate operation. To cross an arm of the sea nearly -forty miles wide—for such was the distance separating -Boulogne and its sister ports from the intended place of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> -landing, between Dover and Hastings—in the face of a foe -whose control of the sea was for the most part undisputed, -was an undertaking so bold that men still doubt whether -Napoleon meant it; but he assuredly did. For success he -looked to the perfect organization and drill of the army -and the flotilla, which by practice in embarking and moving -should be able to seize, without an hour's delay, the -favorable moment he hoped to provide by the great naval -combination concealed in his brain. This combination, -modified and expanded as the months rolled by, but remaining -essentially the same, was the germ whence sprang -the intricate and stirring events recorded in this and the -following chapters,—events obscured to most men by the -dazzling lustre of Trafalgar.</p> - -<p>[Between the penning and the publishing of this very -positive assertion of the author's convictions, he has met -renewed expressions of doubts as to Napoleon's purpose, -based upon his words to Metternich in 1810, -<a name="FNanchor_98_98" id="FNanchor_98_98"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_98_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a> as well as upon -the opinions of persons more or less closely connected with -the emperor. As regards the incident recorded by Metternich—it -is not merely an easy way of overcoming a difficulty, -but the statement of a simple fact, to say that no -reliance can be placed upon any avowal of Napoleon's as to -his intentions, unless corroborated by circumstances. That -the position at Boulogne was well chosen for turning his -arms against Austria at a moment's notice, is very true; -but it is likewise true that, barring the power of the British -navy, it was equally favorable to an invasion of England. -What then does this amount to, but that the great -captain, as always in his career, met a strategic exigency -arising from the existence of two dangers in divergent -directions, by taking a central position, whence he could -readily turn his arms against either before the other -came up?</p> - -<p>The considerations that to the author possess irresistible -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> -force are: (1) that Napoleon actually did undertake -the almost equally hazardous expedition to Egypt; (2) -that he saw, with his clear intuition, that, if he did not -accept the risk of being destroyed with his army in crossing -the Channel, Great Britain would in the end overwhelm -him by her sea power, and that therefore, extreme -as was the danger of destruction in one case, it was less -than in the other alternative,—an argument further developed -in the later portions of this work. (3) Inscrutable as -are the real purposes of so subtle a spirit, the author holds -with Thiers and Lanfrey, that it is impossible to rise -from the perusal of Napoleon's correspondence during -these thirty months, without the conviction that so sustained -a deception as it would contain—on the supposition -that the invasion was not intended—would be -impossible even to him. It may also be remarked that -the Memoirs of Marmont and Ney, who commanded corps -in the Army of Invasion, betray no doubt of a purpose which -the first explicitly asserts; nor does the life of Marshal -Davout, another corps commander, record any such impression -on his part. -<a name="FNanchor_99_99" id="FNanchor_99_99"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_99_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a>]</p> - -<div class="figcenter"><a name="i-117.jpg" id="i-117.jpg"></a> - <img src="images/i-117.jpg" - alt="" /> - <div class="caption">North Atlantic Ocean.<br /> - <a href="images/i-117hr.jpg"><span class="disp">Click here for - larger map</span></a></div> -</div> - -<p>Meanwhile that period of waiting from May, 1803, to -August, 1805, when the tangled net of naval and military -movements began to unravel, was a striking and wonderful -pause in the world's history. On the heights above -Boulogne, and along the narrow strip of beach from Étaples -to Vimereux, were encamped one hundred and thirty -thousand of the most brilliant soldiery of all time, the -soldiers who had fought in Germany, Italy, and Egypt, -soldiers who were yet to win, from Austria, Ulm and -Austerlitz, and from Prussia, Auerstadt and Jena, to -hold their own, though barely, at Eylau against the army -of Russia, and to overthrow it also, a few months later, -on the bloody field of Friedland. Growing daily more -vigorous in the bracing sea air and the hardy life laid out -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> -for them, they could on fine days, as they practised the -varied manœuvres which were to perfect the vast host in -embarking and disembarking with order and rapidity, see -the white cliffs fringing the only country that to the last -defied their arms. Far away, Cornwallis off Brest, Collingwood -off Rochefort, Pellew off Ferrol, were battling -the wild gales of the Bay of Biscay, in that tremendous -and sustained vigilance which reached its utmost tension -in the years preceding Trafalgar, concerning which Collingwood -wrote that admirals need to be made of iron, -but which was forced upon them by the unquestionable -and imminent danger of the country. Farther distant -still, severed apparently from all connection with the -busy scene at Boulogne, Nelson before Toulon was wearing -away the last two years of his glorious but suffering -life, fighting the fierce north-westers of the Gulf of Lyon -and questioning, questioning continually with feverish -anxiety, whether Napoleon's object was Egypt again or -Great Britain really. They were dull, weary, eventless -months, those months of watching and waiting of the -big ships before the French arsenals. Purposeless they -surely seemed to many, but they saved England. The -world has never seen a more impressive demonstration of -the influence of sea power upon its history. Those far -distant, storm-beaten ships, upon which the Grand Army -never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the -world. Holding the interior positions they did, before—and -therefore between—the chief dockyards and detachments -of the French navy, the latter could unite only by -a concurrence of successful evasions, of which the failure -of any one nullified the result. Linked together as the -various British fleets were by chains of smaller vessels, -chance alone could secure Bonaparte's great combination, -which depended upon the covert concentration of several -detachments upon a point practically within the enemy's -lines. Thus, while bodily present before Brest, Rochefort, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> -and Toulon, strategically the British squadrons lay -in the Straits of Dover barring the way against the Army -of Invasion.</p> - -<p>The Straits themselves, of course, were not without -their own special protection. Both they and their approaches, -in the broadest sense of the term, from the -Texel to the Channel Islands, were patrolled by numerous -frigates and smaller vessels, from one hundred to a hundred -and fifty in all. These not only watched diligently -all that happened in the hostile harbors and sought to -impede the movements of the flat-boats, but also kept -touch with and maintained communication between the -detachments of ships-of-the-line. Of the latter, five off -the Texel watched the Dutch navy, while others were anchored -off points of the English coast with reference to -probable movements of the enemy. Lord St. Vincent, -whose ideas on naval strategy were clear and sound, -though he did not use the technical terms of the art, discerned -and provided against the very purpose entertained -by Bonaparte, of a concentration before Boulogne by ships -drawn from the Atlantic and Mediterranean. The best -security, the most advantageous strategic positions, were -doubtless those before the enemy's ports; and never in the -history of blockades has there been excelled, if ever -equalled, the close locking of Brest by Admiral Cornwallis, -both winter and summer, between the outbreak of -war and the battle of Trafalgar. It excited not only -the admiration but the wonder of contemporaries. -<a name="FNanchor_100_100" id="FNanchor_100_100"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_100_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a> In -case, however, the French at Brest got out, so the prime -minister of the day informed the speaker of the House, -Cornwallis's rendezvous was off the Lizard (due north -of Brest), so as to go for <i>Ireland, or follow the French up -Channel</i>, if they took either direction. <i>Should the French -run for the Downs</i>, the five sail-of-the-line at Spithead -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> -would also follow them; and Lord Keith (in the Downs) -would in addition to his six, and six block ships, have -also the North Sea fleet at his command. -<a name="FNanchor_101_101" id="FNanchor_101_101"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_101_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a> Thus provision -was made, in case of danger, for the outlying -detachments to fall back on the strategic centre, gradually -accumulating strength, till they formed a body of -from twenty-five to thirty heavy and disciplined ships-of-the-line, -sufficient to meet all probable contingencies.</p> - -<p>Hence, neither the Admiralty nor British naval officers -in general shared the fears of the country concerning the -peril from the flotilla. "Our first defence," wrote Nelson -in 1801, "is close to the enemy's ports; and the Admiralty -have taken such precautions, by having such a respectable -force under my orders, that I venture to express -a well-grounded hope that the enemy would be annihilated -before they get ten miles from their own shores." -<a name="FNanchor_102_102" id="FNanchor_102_102"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_102_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a> "As -to the possibility of the enemy being able in a narrow sea -to pass through our blockading and protecting squadron," -said Pellew, "with all the secrecy and dexterity and by -those hidden means that some worthy people expect, I -really, from anything I have seen in the course of my -professional experience, am not much disposed to concur -in it." -<a name="FNanchor_103_103" id="FNanchor_103_103"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_103_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a> -Napoleon also understood that his gunboats -could not at sea contend against heavy ships with any -founded hope of success. "A discussion was started in -the camp," says Marmont, "as to the possibility of fighting -ships of war with flat boats, armed with 24- and 36-pounders, -and as to whether, with a flotilla of several -thousands, a squadron might be attacked. It was sought -to establish the belief in a possible success; ... but, notwithstanding -the confidence with which Bonaparte supported -this view, he never shared it for a moment." -<a name="FNanchor_104_104" id="FNanchor_104_104"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_104_104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a> He -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> -could not, without belying every military conviction he -ever held. Lord St. Vincent therefore steadily refused to -countenance the creation of a large force of similar vessels -on the plea of meeting them upon their own terms. "Our -great reliance," he wrote, "is on the vigilance and activity -of our cruisers at sea, any reduction in the number of -which, by applying them to guard our ports, inlets, and -beaches, would in my judgment tend to our destruction." -He knew also that gunboats, if built, could only be -manned, as the French flotilla was, by crippling the -crews of the cruising ships; for, extensive as were Great -Britain's maritime resources, they were taxed beyond -their power by the exhausting demands of her navy and -merchant shipping.</p> - -<p>It is true there existed an enrolled organization called -the Sea Fencibles, composed of men whose pursuits were -about the water on the coasts and rivers of the United -Kingdom; men who in the last war had been exempted -from impressment, because of the obligation they took to -turn out for the protection of the country when threatened -with invasion. When, however, invasion did threaten in -1801, not even the stirring appeals of Nelson, to whom -was then entrusted the defence system, could bring them -forward; although he assured them their services were -absolutely required, at the moment, and on board the -coast-defence vessels. Out of a total of 2600 in four districts -immediately menaced, only 385 were willing to -enter into training or go afloat. The others could not -leave their occupations without loss, and prayed that they -might be held excused. -<a name="FNanchor_105_105" id="FNanchor_105_105"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_105_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a> When the French were actually -on the sea, coming, they professed their readiness to fly on -board; so, wrote Nelson, we must "trust to our ships being -manned at the last moment by this (almost) scrambling -manner." In the present war, therefore, St. Vincent resisted -the re-establishment of the corps until the impress -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> -had manned the ships first commissioned, and even then -yielded only to the pressure in the cabinet. "It was an -item in the estimates," he said with rough humor, "of no -other use than to calm the fears of the old ladies, both in -and out." It was upon his former system of close watching -the enemy's ports that he relied for the mastery of -the Channel, without which Bonaparte's flotilla dared not -leave the French coast. "This boat business," as Nelson -had said, "may be a part of a great plan of invasion; it -can never be the only one." -<a name="FNanchor_106_106" id="FNanchor_106_106"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_106_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a> The event did not deceive -them.</p> - -<p>In one very important particular, however, St. Vincent -had seriously imperilled the success of his general policy. -Feeling deeply the corruption prevailing in the dockyard -and contract systems of that day, as soon as he came to -the head of the Admiralty he entered upon a struggle -with them, in which he showed both the singleness of -purpose and the harshness of his character. Peace, by -reducing the dependence of the country upon its naval -establishments, favored his designs of reform; and he -was consequently unwilling to recognize the signs of renewing -strife, or to postpone changes which, however -desirable, must inevitably introduce friction and delay -under the press of war. Hence, in the second year of this -war, Great Britain had in commission ten fewer line-of-battle-ships -than at the same period of the former. "Many -old and useful officers and a vast number of artificers had -been discharged from the king's dockyards; the customary -supplies of timber and other important articles of -naval stores had been omitted to be kept up; and some -articles, including a large portion of hemp, had actually -been sold out of the service. A deficiency of workmen -and of materials produced, of course, a suspension in the -routine of dockyard business. New ships could not be -built; nor could old ones be repaired. Many of the ships -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> -in commission, too, having been merely patched up, were -scarcely in a state to keep the sea." -<a name="FNanchor_107_107" id="FNanchor_107_107"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_107_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a> On this point St. -Vincent was vulnerable to the attack made upon his administration -by Pitt in March, 1804; but as regarded -Pitt's main criticism, the refusal to expend money and -seamen upon gunboats, he was entirely right, and his -view of the question was that of a statesman and of a man -of correct military instincts. -<a name="FNanchor_108_108" id="FNanchor_108_108"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_108_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a> Nor, after his experience -with the Sea Fencibles, can he be blamed for not sharing -Pitt's emotion over "a number of gallant and good old -men, coming forward with the zeal and spirit of lads -swearing allegiance to the king," &c. -<a name="FNanchor_109_109" id="FNanchor_109_109"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_109_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a></p> - -<p>These ill-timed changes affected most injuriously that -very station—the Mediterranean—upon which hinged -Bonaparte's projected combination. Out of the insufficient -numbers, the heaviest squadrons and most seaworthy -ships were naturally and properly massed upon the Channel -and Biscay coasts. "I know," said Sir Edward -Pellew, speaking of his personal experience in command -of a squadron of six of the line off Ferrol, "I know and -can assert with confidence that our navy was never better -found, that it was never better supplied and that our men -were never better fed or better clothed;" -<a name="FNanchor_110_110" id="FNanchor_110_110"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_110_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a> and the condition -of the ships was proved not only by the tenacity -with which Pellew and his chief, Cornwallis, kept their -stations, but by the fact that in the furious winter gales -little damage was received. But at the same time Nelson -was complaining bitterly that his ships were not seaworthy, -that they were shamefully equipped, and destitute -of the most necessary stores; while St. Vincent was -writing to him, "We can send you neither ships nor men, -and with the resources of your mind, you will do without -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> -them very well." -<a name="FNanchor_111_111" id="FNanchor_111_111"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_111_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a> "Bravo, my lord!" said Nelson, -ironically; "but," he wrote a month later, "I do not believe -Lord St. Vincent would have kept the sea with such -ships;" -<a name="FNanchor_112_112" id="FNanchor_112_112"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_112_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a> -and again, naming seven out of the ten under -his command, "These are certainly among the very finest -ships in our service, the best commanded and the very -best manned, yet I wish them safe in England and that I -had ships not half so well manned in their room; for it is -not a store-ship a week that would keep them in repair." -<a name="FNanchor_113_113" id="FNanchor_113_113"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_113_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a></p> - -<p>Such weakness interfered seriously with the close watch -of Toulon, in face of the furious weather for which the -Gulf of Lyon is noted; yet, from the strategic conditions -of the Mediterranean, in no station was it more important -to get the earliest news of an enemy's sailing and to keep -constant touch with him. With the Straits of Gibraltar -at one end, involving in case of escape several different -possibilities, and with Egypt fifteen hundred miles away -at the other, the most sagacious admiral might be misled -as to the destination of a French squadron, if once lost to -sight. Upon this difficulty Bonaparte framed his combination. -In his first purpose the Toulon fleet was to be -raised to ten sail-of-the-line, and at the fitting moment -was to sail with a north-west wind, steering a course -which, if seen by any British lookout, would indicate an -intention of going eastward. To strengthen this presumption, -General St. Cyr at Taranto was ordered to raise batteries -to shelter a fleet of ten sail, and to prepare half a -million rations; while the Minister of War was instructed -that an extraordinary operation in that direction was contemplated -about the 20th of November. -<a name="FNanchor_114_114" id="FNanchor_114_114"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_114_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a> Simultaneously, -twenty ships-of-the-line carrying twenty thousand troops -were to be ready in Brest for a descent upon Ireland, and -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> -to be maintained in a state of readiness for instant sailing. -This would conduce to keep Cornwallis close to -Brest and away from the approaches to the Channel. The -Toulon fleet, after losing sight of the British, was to haul -up for the Straits, be joined off Cadiz or Lisbon by a -squadron from Rochefort, raising its force to fifteen or -sixteen sail-of-the-line, and thence, passing midway between -Ushant and the Scilly islands, come about the middle -of February off Boulogne; were the first consul expected -then to be ready for crossing with his one hundred and -thirty thousand men.</p> - -<p>For the Toulon fleet, as the pivot on which all turned, -Bonaparte selected his boldest admiral, Latouche Tréville, -and fixed the middle of January, 1804, as the time of -sailing. All the French authorities were scrupulously deceived, -except the admiral himself, the Minister of Marine, -and the maritime prefect at Toulon, Ganteaume, who had -divined the secret. -<a name="FNanchor_115_115" id="FNanchor_115_115"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_115_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a> -The orders to the latter, ostentatiously -confidential to deceive the office clerks, announced -Martinique as the real destination, but enjoined him to -tell the general commanding the troops that the squadron -was going to the Morea, touching at Taranto. At the -same time staff-officers were sent to notify St. Cyr that -re-enforcements, which would raise his force to thirty -thousand men, were coming not only from Toulon but -from other ports; and troops throughout northern Italy -began to move toward the sea-board.</p> - -<p>It is not wonderful that Nelson was misled by such an -elaborate scheme of deception. To this day men doubt -whether Bonaparte seriously meant to invade England, and -naval men then realized too keenly the dangers of the undertaking -not to suspect a feint in it. Under all the conditions -of the problem, Egypt and the Straits were equally -probable solutions, and Egypt was not the only possible -objective east of Toulon. Sicily and Sardinia, the Ionian -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span> -Islands and the Morea, were coveted by Bonaparte; both -as forwarding his control of the Mediterranean and as -measurable advances towards Egypt and the Levant, traditional -objects of French ambition. Nelson also suspected -a secret understanding between France and Russia to -divide the Turkish Empire; -<a name="FNanchor_116_116" id="FNanchor_116_116"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_116_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a> a suspicion justified in the -past by Bonaparte's actions and to be vindicated in the -future by the agreements of Tilsit. The perplexities of -the British admiral were therefore simply the inevitable -uncertainties of the defence, the part assumed perforce by -the British Empire at large in this war. He had to provide -against widely divergent contingencies; and the -question is not how far he guessed -<a name="FNanchor_117_117" id="FNanchor_117_117"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_117_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a> the inscrutable purposes -of Bonaparte, but how well he took measures for -meeting either fortune.</p> - -<p>Let it, however, be remarked in passing, that the great -merit of St. Vincent's strategy was that it minimized the -evil resulting from a single admiral's mis-step. To the -success of the French scheme it was necessary that, not -only one but, all their detached efforts should succeed. -The strength of the British strategy lay not in hermetically -sealing any one port, but in effectually preventing a -great combination from all the ports. It was essential to -Bonaparte not merely that his scattered squadrons should, -one at one time and another at another, escape to sea, but -that they should do so at periods so ordered, and by routes -so determined, as to insure a rapid concentration at a -particular point. Against this the British provided by -the old and sound usage of interior positions and lines. -This advantage Bonaparte recognized, and sought to -overthrow by inducing them to diverging operations—toward -the Levant on one flank, toward Ireland on the -other. Both diverted from Boulogne.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span></p> - -<p>To return to Nelson. During the first six months of -his command he believed that the Toulon fleet was bound -out of the Mediterranean; -<a name="FNanchor_118_118" id="FNanchor_118_118"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_118_118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a> and indeed, despite Bonaparte's -wiles and the opinions of most of his own friends, -he continually reverted to that conviction up to the final -escape of Villeneuve. He could not, however, on the -ground of his own intuitions resist the facts reported to -him. On December 12, 1803, he writes: "Who shall -say where they are bound? My opinion is, certainly, out -of the Mediterranean." -<a name="FNanchor_119_119" id="FNanchor_119_119"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_119_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a> Again, January 16, 1804: "It -is difficult to say what may be the destination of the -Toulon fleet, Egypt or Ireland. I rather lean to the -latter." -<a name="FNanchor_120_120" id="FNanchor_120_120"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_120_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a> -A week later, January 23, the effect of Bonaparte's -feints begins to show: "Information just received -leads me to believe the French fleet is about to put to -sea bound to the eastward toward Naples and Sicily." -<a name="FNanchor_121_121" id="FNanchor_121_121"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_121_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a> -February 10: "The French have thirty thousand men ready -to embark from Marseilles and Nice, and I am led to believe -the Ferrol ships will push for the Mediterranean. -Egypt is Bonaparte's object." -<a name="FNanchor_122_122" id="FNanchor_122_122"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_122_122" class="fnanchor">[122]</a></p> - -<p>Against either contingency his course is perfectly clear,—never -to lose touch of the Toulon fleet. "My eyes are -constantly fixed on Toulon," -<a name="FNanchor_123_123" id="FNanchor_123_123"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_123_123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a> he says. "I will not lose -sight of the Toulon fleet." -<a name="FNanchor_124_124" id="FNanchor_124_124"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_124_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a> "It is of the utmost importance," -he writes to his lookout frigates, "that the -enemy's squadron in Toulon should be most strictly -watched, and that I should be made acquainted with -their sailing and route with all dispatch." -<a name="FNanchor_125_125" id="FNanchor_125_125"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_125_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a> But here -the inadequacy of St. Vincent's navy told heavily; -and to that, not to Nelson, must be attributed the mis-steps -of the later campaign. "My crazy fleet," he -writes. "If I am to watch the French I must be at sea, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> -and if at sea must have bad weather; and if the ships -are not fit to stand bad weather they are useless." -<a name="FNanchor_126_126" id="FNanchor_126_126"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_126_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a> "I -know no way of watching the enemy but to be at sea," he -tells St. Vincent himself, "and therefore good ships are necessary." -Under such conditions, with "terrible weather," -in winter, not four fine days in six weeks, and even in -summer having a hard gale every week, -<a name="FNanchor_127_127" id="FNanchor_127_127"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_127_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a> it was impossible -to keep his rickety ships close up against Toulon, as -Cornwallis kept against Brest. "I make it a rule not to -contend with the north-westers," he said. "Going off -large or furling all sail we escape damage by the constant -care of the captains;" and he not unjustly claimed equal -credit with Cornwallis, in that with such a fleet, to which -nothing was sent, he kept the sea ten consecutive months, -"not a ship refitted in any way, except what was done at -sea." -<a name="FNanchor_128_128" id="FNanchor_128_128"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_128_128" class="fnanchor">[128]</a></p> - -<p>Though desirable for the battle-ships themselves to be -near Toulon, it would have been possible, in so narrow a -sea, to dispense with that by taking a central position, and -keeping touch with the enemy by numerous frigates; but -here also the deficiencies of the navy interfered. Among -the Maddalena Islands, at the north end of Sardinia, was -found an admirable central anchorage, well sheltered, -and having eastern and western exits by which it could -be left at a moment's notice in all winds. Here the fleet -could safely lie, ready for instant action, within striking -distance of any route taken by the enemy, and sure to be -found by lookout ships bringing tidings. Thither, therefore, -as the direction most favorable for intercepting the -French, -<a name="FNanchor_129_129" id="FNanchor_129_129"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_129_129" class="fnanchor">[129]</a> -Nelson went in January, 1804, when informed -they were about to sail; but he wrote: "I am kept in great -distress for frigates and smaller vessels at this critical -moment. I want ten more than I have, in order to watch -that the French should not escape me." -<a name="FNanchor_130_130" id="FNanchor_130_130"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_130_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a> This but -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> -summed up the constant worry of those anxious two -years, -<a name="FNanchor_131_131" id="FNanchor_131_131"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_131_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a> -as it does also the results of recent experience in -the annual manœuvres of European navies. Under such -circumstances all depends upon the position taken by the -main body and the number of scouts it can throw out. -Properly, these should move in couples; one of which can -carry information, while its consort keeps touch of the -enemy till it meets another of the lookouts scattered on -their different radii of action.</p> - -<p>The situation of Nelson in the Mediterranean, the character -of his anxieties, and the condition of his ships have -been given in some detail, because upon the opposing -Mediterranean fleets turns the chief strategic interest of -the intended invasion of England and of the campaign -which issued in Trafalgar. Lord St. Vincent left office -with the Addington Ministry in May, 1804, and under -the energetic rule of his successor, who threw his administrative -system to the winds, the condition of Nelson's -fleet was somewhat bettered; but the change came too -late to remedy it altogether.</p> - -<p>Various events meanwhile concurred to postpone the -execution of Bonaparte's project and so to prolong the -watch of the British admiral. The Boulogne flotilla itself -was not as forward as had been expected; but the -drain made by it upon the French arsenals, for workmen -and materials, was a greater cause of delay, by retarding -the equipment of the ships meant to cover the crossing. -In December only seven of the line were ready in Toulon. -<a name="FNanchor_132_132" id="FNanchor_132_132"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_132_132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a> -In the spring of 1804, the first consul's attention -was absorbed by the royalist plot, which led to the arrest -of Pichegru and Moreau, to the seizure of the Duc d'Enghien -on German soil and to his execution at Vincennes in -March. This last event had diplomatic consequences, in -the attitude taken by Russia and Prussia, which still farther -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> -engrossed him; and the invasion of Great Britain was -thus by successive delays put off to the summer of 1804. -On May 25, Napoleon, who had assumed the imperial title -on the 18th of that month, writes to Latouche -<a name="FNanchor_133_133" id="FNanchor_133_133"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_133_133" class="fnanchor">[133]</a> that on -the ocean side all was prepared, that the project was only -postponed, not abandoned, and asks if he will be ready by -July. July 2 he writes again, -<a name="FNanchor_134_134" id="FNanchor_134_134"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_134_134" class="fnanchor">[134]</a> anticipating his sailing -from Toulon by the first of August, instructs him to pick -up at Cadiz one French ship-of-the-line which had taken -refuge there, thence to go to Rochefort, and finally to -reach Boulogne, according to the first plan, by passing -through the Channel; or, if necessary, by going north of -the British islands. In all passages from port to port he -was to keep far out to sea to avoid detection. "Let us," -he adds, "be masters of the Strait for six hours and we -shall be masters of the world." On the 2d of August, -however, Napoleon postpones the invasion for some weeks, -because some divisions of the flotilla had not yet joined; -and on the 20th of that month Latouche Tréville died.</p> - -<p>This loss was serious, as there was not among the surviving -French admirals any who had shown himself fit for -so important a task, except perhaps Bruix. He, being -already definitely associated with the flotilla, could not -well be displaced; and his health, moreover, was very -bad, so that he also died the following March. Of two -others who might possibly prove equal to high command, -Rosily and Villeneuve, Napoleon, after some hesitation -and with much mistrust, chose the latter. "All naval -expeditions undertaken since I have been at the head of -the government," said he, "have always failed, because -the admirals see double, and have learned—where, I do -not know—<i>that war can be made without running risks</i>." -<a name="FNanchor_135_135" id="FNanchor_135_135"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_135_135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a> -From this simple and undeniable standpoint no choice -more unfortunate than Villeneuve could have been made. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> -Accomplished, brave, and skilful, he saw the defects of -the French navy with a clearness which absolutely sapped -his power to take risks. Although capable of the utmost -self-devotion, he was unable to devote his command -as the forlorn hope upon which might follow a great -achievement.</p> - -<p>Doubting Villeneuve's resolution, Napoleon now changed -the details of his combination; giving to the Toulon fleet -the inferior rôle of a diversion, instead of the great part of -covering the flotilla at the chief centre of strategic action. -The Brest fleet, during the life of Latouche Tréville, -had been destined to tie Cornwallis to the French -coast by the passive service of a mere demonstration. It -was now given the principal part. Its admiral, Ganteaume, -had in 1801 been blamed for not relieving Egypt; -but Napoleon still felt for him the partiality of close personal -association, and knew him to be an able officer. In -the new plan, therefore, the Irish expedition passed definitively -from a demonstration to a resolve. To it were -assigned eighteen thousand troops under Marshal Augereau. -Embarking them, Ganteaume should sail with a -fleet of twenty ships-of-the-line, pass far out into the Atlantic -to baffle pursuit, and then head for the north of -Ireland as though coming from Newfoundland. Having -landed the soldiers, for which only thirty-six hours were -allowed, the fleet should sail for the straits of Dover, -either by the English Channel or by the north of Scotland, -according to the winds. Arriving near its destination -two courses were open, the choice between which would -again depend on the wind. Either the Grand Army at -Boulogne would cross at once to England, or a corps of -twenty-five thousand assembled in Holland under General -Marmont, would sail under Ganteaume's convoy for Ireland. -"With only eighteen thousand men in Ireland," -wrote Napoleon, "we would run great risks; but whether -they be increased to forty thousand, or I myself be in -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> -England and eighteen thousand in Ireland, the gain of -the war will be ours." -<a name="FNanchor_136_136" id="FNanchor_136_136"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_136_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a></p> - -<p>The Toulon and Rochefort squadrons were to favor -these operations by a powerful diversion. They were to -sail separately for the West Indies, the former numbering -twelve of the line and the latter five. Upon reaching the -Atlantic two of the Toulon ships were to be directed -against St. Helena, which they were to seize and then -cruise in its neighborhood for three months against British -commerce. The rest of the division, carrying four -thousand troops, was to retake Dutch Guiana and re-enforce -San Domingo, -<a name="FNanchor_137_137" id="FNanchor_137_137"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_137_137" class="fnanchor">[137]</a> if possible. The Rochefort division, -lately commanded by Villeneuve, but now by Missiessy, -was to seize the islands Santa Lucia and Dominica, re-enforce -Martinique and Guadaloupe and then join Villeneuve. -Thus combined, all would return to Europe, -appear before Ferrol, releasing five French ships which -were there blockaded, and finally anchor at Rochefort. -"Thus attacked simultaneously in Asia, Africa, and -America," wrote Napoleon, "the English, long accustomed -not to suffer from the war, will by these successive -shocks to their commerce feel the evidence of their weakness. -I think that the sailing of these twenty ships-of-the-line -will oblige them to dispatch over thirty in -pursuit." -<a name="FNanchor_138_138" id="FNanchor_138_138"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_138_138" class="fnanchor">[138]</a> -Villeneuve was to sail by October 12, and -Missiessy before November 1. The Irish expedition should -await the departure of the others, but it was hoped might -get away before November 23.</p> - -<p>This second combination was more vast, more complicated -and therefore much more difficult than the first. It -is interesting chiefly as indicating the transition in the -emperor's mind, from the comparatively simple scheme -laid down for Latouche Tréville to the grandiose conception -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span> -which ended in Trafalgar and claimed Villeneuve as -its victim. The course of events, mightier than the wills -of sovereigns, now intervened to change again Napoleon's -purpose and restore to the Toulon fleet the central part in -the great drama. In December, 1804, formal war broke -out between Great Britain and Spain.</p> - -<p>Spain since 1796 had been in defensive and offensive -alliance with France. By the treaty of San Ildefonso, -then signed, she had bound herself to furnish, upon the -simple demand of the French government, fifteen ships-of-the-line -to re-enforce the French navy, as well as a -specified body of troops. Holland also had entered into a -similar covenant "forever" against Great Britain. At -the outbreak of hostilities, therefore, Bonaparte found on -either flank a maritime state formally obliged to aid him, -whatever its present wish. Holland, a small flat country -near at hand, was easily dominated by his army. It was -rich, had a valid government and energetic people; and -its position admirably seconded his schemes against Great -Britain. It therefore suited him to have the Batavian -republic join in the war. Spain, on the contrary, being -extensive and rugged, was with difficulty controlled by an -armed force, as Napoleon afterwards learned to his cost. -It was remote from the centre of his power and from the -intended operations; while effective military support could -not be had from its government, feeble to disorganization, -nor from its people, indolent and jealous of foreigners. -One thing only was left to Spain of her former greatness,—the -silver poured into her treasury from her -colonies.</p> - -<p>Bonaparte therefore decided to allow the neutrality of -Spain, and to relinquish the stipulated aid in kind, upon -condition of receiving an equivalent in money. This he -fixed at six million francs per month, or about fourteen -million dollars annually. Spain protested earnestly -against the amount, but the first consul was inexorable. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> -He required also that all levies of troops should cease, -any land forces sent into the provinces adjoining France, -since September, 1801, should be withdrawn, and the -Spanish navy reorganized. Further, he demanded that -five French ships-of-the-line then in Ferrol, where they -had taken refuge from the British navy in July, 1803, -when returning from Haïti, should be by Spain repaired -and got ready for sea. "Spain," said Bonaparte, "has -three alternatives: 1, she may declare war against England; -2, she may pay the specified subsidy; 3, war will -be declared by France against Spain." -<a name="FNanchor_139_139" id="FNanchor_139_139"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_139_139" class="fnanchor">[139]</a></p> - -<p>When war began, the British minister at Madrid was instructed -to ask if Spain intended to furnish France the -ships promised by the treaty. If the answer was yes, he -was to express no opinion, but say that any excess over the -stipulations would be regarded as a declaration of war. -Later, when it became known that Spain had signed a convention -<a name="FNanchor_140_140" id="FNanchor_140_140"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_140_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a> -stipulating the payment of subsidies to France, -the ministry took the ground that this was a just cause of -war, whenever Great Britain chose so to consider it; though -for the time she might pass it over. "You will explain -distinctly," ran the ambassador's instructions, dated November -24, 1803, "that his Majesty can only be induced to -abstain from immediate hostilities in consequence of such -a measure, upon the consideration that it is a temporary -expedient, ... and that his Majesty must be at liberty to -consider a perseverance in the system of furnishing succors -to France as, at any future period, when circumstances -may render it necessary, a just cause of war." -<a name="FNanchor_141_141" id="FNanchor_141_141"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_141_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a> "I am -expressly enjoined to declare," wrote the British ambassador, -in making this communication, "that such payments -are a war subsidy, a succor the most efficacious, the best -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> -adapted to the wants and situation of the enemy, the most -prejudicial to the interests of his Britannic Majesty's subjects, -and the most dangerous to his dominions; in fine, -more than equivalent to every other species of aggression." -<a name="FNanchor_142_142" id="FNanchor_142_142"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_142_142" class="fnanchor">[142]</a> -Repeated inquiries failed to draw from the Spanish government -any official statement of the terms of its bargain, -either as to the amount of the subsidy, the period during -which it should continue, or other conditions of the agreement. -<a name="FNanchor_143_143" id="FNanchor_143_143"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_143_143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a> -Such communication the French ambassador positively -over-ruled. -<a name="FNanchor_144_144" id="FNanchor_144_144"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_144_144" class="fnanchor">[144]</a></p> - -<p>Warning was therefore early given -<a name="FNanchor_145_145" id="FNanchor_145_145"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_145_145" class="fnanchor">[145]</a> that a condition -essential to postponement of action by Great Britain was -the suspension of all further arming in Spanish ports. -This was repeated in the most formal terms, and as an -ultimatum, a few weeks later, on the 18th of February, -1804. "I am ordered to declare to you that the system of -forbearance on the part of England absolutely depends on -the cessation of every naval armament, and I am expressly -forbidden to prolong my residence here, if unfortunately -this condition should be rejected." -<a name="FNanchor_146_146" id="FNanchor_146_146"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_146_146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a> It was alleged and -was incontrovertibly true, that, while Spain was so evidently -under Bonaparte's influence, armaments in her ports -as effectively necessitated watching, and so as greatly added -to Great Britain's burdens, as if war actually existed. -<a name="FNanchor_147_147" id="FNanchor_147_147"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_147_147" class="fnanchor">[147]</a> -Another complaint was that prizes made by French privateers -were, by process of law, condemned and sold in -Spanish ports. -<a name="FNanchor_148_148" id="FNanchor_148_148"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_148_148" class="fnanchor">[148]</a> -The same was doubtless allowed to Great -Britain; but in the strict blockade of the ports of France -the latter here derived a great benefit, while upon her -enemy was simply imposed an additional burden in scouring -all the Spanish coast, as though actually at war, in -order to recapture inward-bound prizes. Once condemned, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span> -the prize goods found their way to the French ports by -Spanish coasters. Independent of the difficulty of identifying -the property, the small size of these neutral carriers -made seizure inexpedient; for the costs of condemnation -were greater than the value of the prize. -<a name="FNanchor_149_149" id="FNanchor_149_149"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_149_149" class="fnanchor">[149]</a> The Spanish -government claimed that the condemnation and sale of -prize goods in their ports was simply an act of authorized -commerce, free from all hostility. -<a name="FNanchor_150_150" id="FNanchor_150_150"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_150_150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a> Americans who recall -the cruises of the Alabama and her fellows will be disposed -to think that, whatever the technical accuracy of the plea, -neutrality benevolent to an enemy's cruisers constitutes a -just cause of war, whenever policy so advises.</p> - -<p>The relations between the two countries continued in -this strained and critical condition during the greater part -of 1804. Bonaparte insisted that the Spanish dockyards -should repair the French ships in Ferrol and Cadiz,—which -was indeed one of the conditions of the convention -of October 19, 1803, concealed from Great Britain,—and -should permit seamen to pass by land from one port of -Spain to another, and from France through Spain, to complete -their crews. He consented indeed that they should -go in small bodies of thirty or forty, but the vigilance of -the British officials could not be deceived. The relations -between France and Spain at this time were not inaptly -described in the letter of Napoleon to the king, announcing -his assumption of the imperial dignity. He styled him -therein "ally and confederate." In June, 1804, an aide-de-camp -of the emperor visited Ferrol and Madrid, charged -to ascertain the condition of the ships and demand their -completion. -<a name="FNanchor_151_151" id="FNanchor_151_151"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_151_151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a> -The British minister could obtain no explanation -of this mission, which naturally aroused his attention. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> -<a name="FNanchor_152_152" id="FNanchor_152_152"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_152_152" class="fnanchor">[152]</a> -Spain in truth was no longer a free agent. On the -3d of July, Napoleon ordered his Minister of Marine to -send to Ferrol the men still needed to man the ships there; -and on the 19th of the month -<a name="FNanchor_153_153" id="FNanchor_153_153"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_153_153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a> the British admiral Cochrane, -then blockading the port, remonstrated with the -governor of Galicia upon this procedure as hostile to -Great Britain. On the 3d of September, and again on the -11th, Cochrane wrote to his government that Spanish ships -in Ferrol were fitting for sea, that three first-rates were -expected from Cadiz, and that no doubt remained that the -French, Spanish, and Dutch ships in the port were to act -together. He had consequently found necessary to concentrate -his force. -<a name="FNanchor_154_154" id="FNanchor_154_154"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_154_154" class="fnanchor">[154]</a> -Immediately upon receiving this information, -the British ministry notified the Spanish government -that orders had been sent to their admiral off Ferrol to -prevent any Spanish ships of war from entering or leaving -that port. The ambassador at Madrid was directed to -require that the armaments should be discontinued, and -placed upon the same footing as before the war. He was -also to demand a clear explanation of the relations existing -between France and Spain. Unless satisfactory replies -were given, he was ordered to quit Madrid.</p> - -<p>At the same time the ministry took a more questionable -step. Orders were sent to Cornwallis, to Cochrane, to -Nelson, and to the naval officer off Cadiz to detain and -send to England all Spanish treasure-ships; the intention -being to keep them as a pledge until satisfactory -arrangements with Spain were made. In consequence of -this, on the 5th of October, four British frigates stopped, -near Cadiz, four Spanish vessels, of the same class but -of inferior armament. The disparity of force was not -great enough to justify the Spanish commodore in yielding; -and an action followed in which one of his frigates -blew up. The other three surrendered and were taken to -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> -England. Curiously enough, the news of this transaction -had not reached Madrid when the British representative, -on the 10th of November, left the city. The final discussions -between him and the Spanish government went -on in complete ignorance of so decisive an event; but as -he could get no explanation of the agreements between -France and Spain, he persisted in demanding his passports. -On the 12th of December, 1804, Spain declared -war.</p> - -<p>That Great Britain had just cause for war can scarcely -be denied. She now for the first time came into contact -with Napoleon's claim that it was, not merely the interest, -but the bounden duty of every maritime state to join -his attempt to crush her. -<a name="FNanchor_155_155" id="FNanchor_155_155"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_155_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a> Upon this principle he justified -his policy of coercing all into such hostilities, and -formulated at a later day the maxim, "There are no neutrals." -The subsidy paid by Spain, calculated on British -rates of expenditure, was annually worth to France fifteen -ships-of-the-line and two hundred thousand troops; -<a name="FNanchor_156_156" id="FNanchor_156_156"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_156_156" class="fnanchor">[156]</a> but -against Napoleon's further extension of his principle, by -suddenly calling into activity the Spanish navy, Great -Britain's only safeguard was to insist upon the latter's -remaining unarmed. The Spanish government, having -promised not to arm, suddenly and without explanation -began to equip vessels in Ferrol,—an act which, coinciding -with the passage of French seamen through Spain -to that place, fairly excited alarm and justified the orders -not to allow Spanish ships to enter or leave the port.</p> - -<p>The seizure of the treasure-ships is less easily excused, -though the obloquy attending it has been unduly heightened -by the tragical explosion. Its best palliation lies -in Great Britain's previous experience that, in the commercial -decadence and poverty of Spain, the treasures of -the colonies were a determining factor in negotiations. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> -While they were on the sea, Spain temporized; when they -arrived, she stiffened. The purpose was to retain them -as a pledge, to be restored in case of a peaceable issue; as -Swedish merchantmen were embargoed in 1801, and released -when the Armed Neutrality dissolved. A Spanish -naval historian, while censuring other acts of Great -Britain, says: "The mere detention of the division from -America, carrying specie which might be used in behalf -of French preparations, could have been overlooked as an -able and not very illegal means of bettering the prospects -of the English reclamations, in consequence of the scanty -satisfaction they obtained from our Court;" and again: "If -all the circumstances are impartially weighed, ... we -shall see that all the charges made against England for -the seizure of the frigates may be reduced simply to want -of proper foresight in the strength of the force detailed to -effect it." -<a name="FNanchor_157_157" id="FNanchor_157_157"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_157_157" class="fnanchor">[157]</a> -The action, nevertheless, was precipitate, -and extenuated by no urgent political necessity. Nelson, -who certainly was not averse to strong measures, directed -his captains to disobey the order, which he at first thought -came only from Cornwallis; for, he said, "I am clearly -of the opinion that Spain has no wish to go to war with -England." -<a name="FNanchor_158_158" id="FNanchor_158_158"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_158_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span></p> - - - - -<div class="chapter p4"> -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XVI" id="CHAPTER_XVI"></a>CHAPTER XVI.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="ac"><span class="sc">The Trafalgar Campaign—Concluded.</span></p> - -<p class="chapsum"><span class="sc">Successive Modifications of Napoleon's Plan.—Narrative -of Naval Movements.—Final Failure of Napoleon's -Naval Combinations.—War with Austria, and Battle -of Austerlitz.—Battle of Trafalgar.—Vital Change -Imposed Upon Napoleon's Policy by the Result of the -Naval Campaign.</span></p> - -<p class="drop-cap">THE Spanish declaration of war was followed by a -new treaty of alliance with France, signed in Paris -on the 5th of January, 1805, and confirmed on the 18th of -the month at Madrid. Spain undertook to furnish, by -March 21, to the common cause, at least twenty-five ships-of-the-line -and eleven frigates; but the military direction -of the whole allied effort was entrusted to Napoleon.</p> - -<p>This accession of Spain could not become immediately -operative, owing to the backward state of her armaments -caused by the previous demands of Great Britain. The -emperor therefore adhered for the time to his existing -plans, formulated on the 27th and 29th of September. -These proving abortive, he next framed, upon lines equal -both in boldness and scope to those of the Marengo and -Austerlitz campaigns, the immense combination which -resulted in Trafalgar.</p> - -<p>The events of the ten following months, therefore, have -an interest wholly unique, as the development of the only -great naval campaign ever planned by this foremost captain -of modern times. From his opponents, also, upon -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> -whom was thrown the harder task of the defensive, was -elicited an exhibition of insight, combination, promptitude, -and decision, which showed them to be, on their -own element, not unworthy to match with the great emperor. -For Napoleon was at this disadvantage,—he could -not fully realize the conditions of the sea. Accustomed -by forethought and sheer will to trample obstacles under -foot, remembering the midwinter passage of the Splugen -made by Macdonald at his command, and the extraordinary -impediments overcome by himself in crossing the -Saint Bernard, he could not believe that the difficulties of -the sea could not be vanquished by unskilled men handling -the ponderous machines entrusted to them, when confronted -by a skilful enemy. To quote an able French -writer: "But one thing was wanting to the victor of Austerlitz,—<i>le -sentiment exact des difficultés de la marine</i>." -<a name="FNanchor_159_159" id="FNanchor_159_159"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_159_159" class="fnanchor">[159]</a></p> - -<p>With steam, possibly, this inequality of skill might have -been so reduced as to enable the generalship of Napoleon, -having also the advantage of the initiative, to turn the -scale. With sailing ships it was not so; and in following -the story of Trafalgar it must be remembered that -the naval superiority of Great Britain lay not in the number -of her ships, but in the wisdom, energy, and tenacity -of her admirals and seamen. At best her numbers were -but equal to those arrayed against her. The real contest -was between the naval combinations of Napoleon and the -insight of British officers, avoiding or remedying the -ex-centric movements he untiringly sought to impress -upon their forces.</p> - -<p>In December detailed instructions for executing the -plan of September 29 were issued to Admirals Villeneuve -and Missiessy. -<a name="FNanchor_160_160" id="FNanchor_160_160"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_160_160" class="fnanchor">[160]</a> The latter, after leaving Rochefort, was -to steer between the Azores and Canaries, so as to avoid the -British squadrons off the Biscay coast of Spain, go direct -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> -to Martinique, take the British islands Santa Lucia and -Dominica, and upon Villeneuve's arrival place himself -under his command. In pursuance of these orders Missiessy -escaped from Rochefort on January 11. He was seen -next day by a lookout vessel belonging to the blockading -squadron; but the latter, for whatever reason, was off its -post, and Missiessy reached Martinique safely on the 20th -of February. On the 24th of that month six British -ships-of-the-line, under Rear-Admiral Cochrane, sailed -in pursuit from before Ferrol; where their place was -taken by a detachment of equal force drawn from before -Brest.</p> - -<p>Villeneuve's orders were to go from Toulon direct to -Cayenne, recapture the former Dutch colonies of Guiana, -form a junction with Missiessy, re-enforce San Domingo, -and start on his return for Europe not later than sixty days -after reaching South America. With the combined squadrons -he was to appear off Ferrol, release the French ships -there blockaded, and bring the whole force, amounting to -twenty of the line, to Rochefort. "The result of your -cruise," wrote Napoleon to him, "will be to secure our -colonies against any attack, and to retake the four Dutch -colonies on the Continent, as well as such other British -islands as may appear open to the force under your command." -Six thousand troops were embarked on board -his squadron for the operations on shore. Both he and -Missiessy were expressly forbidden to land their crews -for that purpose; a decision of the great emperor worthy -to be remembered in these days.</p> - -<p>Villeneuve was ready to sail early in January, but his -first need was to elude the watchfulness of Nelson. The -British admiral was known to move from point to point in -his command, between the Maddalena Islands and Cape San -Sebastian on the Spanish coast, while he kept before Toulon -lookout ships always informed of his whereabouts. -Villeneuve therefore thought indispensable to start with -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> -a breeze strong enough to carry him a hundred miles the -first night. For a fortnight the wind hung at north-east -and south-east—fair but very light; but on the 17th of -January it shifted to north-west, with signs of an approaching -gale. The next morning Villeneuve sent a -division to drive off the enemy's lookouts; and when -these disappeared the squadron sailed, numbering ten of -the line and seven frigates. Nelson with eleven ships-of-the-line -was at the moment at anchor in Maddalena Bay.</p> - -<p>Following Napoleon's plan for deceiving the British -admiral, the French squadron steered for the south end of -Sardinia, as though bound eastward. During the night -it was dogged by the enemy's frigates, which had retired -no further than was necessary to avoid capture. At ten -o'clock they were close by; and at two in the morning, -satisfied as to the French course, they parted company -and hastened to Nelson,—the wind then blowing a whole -gale from the north-west. Twelve hours later they were -seen from the flag-ship with the signal flying that the -enemy was at sea, and in two hours more the British fleet -was under way. Unable to beat out by the western entrance -in the teeth of the storm, it ran in single column -through the narrow eastern pass as night fell,—Nelson's -ship leading, the others steering by the poop lanterns of -the vessel next ahead. When clear of the port the fleet -hauled up to the southward, and during the night, which -was unsettled and squally, kept along the east coast of -Sardinia. The frigate "Seahorse" was sent ahead to pass -round the south end of the island and get touch again of -the enemy.</p> - -<p>During the night the wind changed to south-south-west, -and blew heavily throughout the 21st. On the forenoon -of the 22d the fleet, still struggling against a heavy -southwesterly gale, was fifty miles east of the south end -of Sardinia. There it was rejoined by the "Seahorse," -which the day before had caught sight of a French frigate -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> -standing in toward Cagliari, but had not seen the main -body. Not till the 26th did Nelson reach Cagliari, where -to his relief he found the French had not been. Nothing -even was known of their movements; but the same day the -frigate "Phœbe" joined from the westward with news that -a French eighty-gun ship, partially dismasted, had put in -to Ajaccio. The British fleet then stretched across to -Palermo, where it arrived on the 28th. Having now -fairly covered the approaches from the westward to Sardinia, -Sicily, and Naples, Nelson reasoned that one of two -things must have happened: either the French, despite -the southerly gale, had succeeded in going east between -Sicily and Africa, or they had put back disabled. In the -latter case he could not now overtake them; in the former, -he must follow. -<a name="FNanchor_161_161" id="FNanchor_161_161"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_161_161" class="fnanchor">[161]</a> Accordingly, after sending scouts to -scour the seas, and three frigates to resume the watch off -Toulon, he shaped his course along the north side of -Sicily, and on the 30th of January passed through the -straits of Messina on his way to Egypt.</p> - -<p>Villeneuve had in fact returned to Toulon. On the -first night an eighty-four-gun ship and three frigates separated, -and the former put in dismasted to Ajaccio, as -Nelson had learned. The following day and in the night, -when the wind shifted to south-west, three more ships-of-the-line -were crippled. Forced to the eastward by the -gale, and aware that two enemy's frigates had marked his -course, the admiral feared that he should meet the British -at a disadvantage and determined to retreat.</p> - -<p>Thus prematurely ended the first movement in Napoleon's -naval combination for the invasion of England. -The Rochefort squadron had escaped only to become a big -detachment, wholly out of reach of support or recall. The -Toulon fleet, forced to await a heavy wind in order to -effect the evasion by which alone the combination could -be formed, was through the inexperience of its seamen -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> -crippled by the very advantage it had secured. In truth, -however, had it gone on, it would almost infallibly have -been driven by the south-west gale into the very spot, -between Sardinia and Sicily, where Nelson went to seek -it, and which was ransacked by his lookouts. -<a name="FNanchor_162_162" id="FNanchor_162_162"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_162_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a> Neither -Villeneuve nor Nelson doubted the result of such meeting. -<a name="FNanchor_163_163" id="FNanchor_163_163"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_163_163" class="fnanchor">[163]</a></p> - -<p>The other factor in this combination, the Brest fleet -and army corps of twenty thousand men, had been held in -readiness to act, dependent upon the successful evasion of -the two others. "I calculate," Napoleon had said, "that -the sailing of twenty ships from Rochefort and Toulon -will force the enemy to send thirty in pursuit;" -<a name="FNanchor_164_164" id="FNanchor_164_164"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_164_164" class="fnanchor">[164]</a> a diversion -that would very materially increase the chances for -the Brest armament. For a moment he spoke of sending -to India this powerful body, strongly re-enforced from the -French and Spanish ships in Ferrol. -<a name="FNanchor_165_165" id="FNanchor_165_165"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_165_165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a> This was, however, -but a passing thought, rejected by his sound military -instinct as an ex-centric movement, disseminating his -force and weakening the purposed attack upon the heart -of the British power. Three months later, when he began -to fear failure for the latter attempt, he recurred to the -East India project in terms which show why he at first -laid it aside. "In case, through any event whatsoever, -our expedition have not full success, and I cannot compass -<i>the greatest of all ends, which will cause all the rest to -fall</i>, -<a name="FNanchor_166_166" id="FNanchor_166_166"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_166_166" class="fnanchor">[166]</a> I think we must calculate the operation in India for -September." -<a name="FNanchor_167_167" id="FNanchor_167_167"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_167_167" class="fnanchor">[167]</a> India in truth was to the imagination of -Napoleon what Egypt was to Nelson,—an object which -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> -colored all his ideas and constantly misled him. As -was shrewdly said by an American citizen to the British -government, in this very month of January, 1805, -"The French in general believe that the fountains of -British wealth are in India and China. They never appeared -to me to understand that the most abundant source -is in her agriculture, her manufactures, and the foreign -demand." -<a name="FNanchor_168_168" id="FNanchor_168_168"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_168_168" class="fnanchor">[168]</a> This impression Napoleon fully shared, and -it greatly affected his judgment during the coming -campaign.</p> - -<p>The return of Villeneuve and the delay necessary to -repair his ships, concurring with the expected re-enforcements -from Spain, wholly changed the details of Napoleon's -plan. In essence it remained the same from first -to last; but the large number of ships now soon to be -at his command appealed powerfully to his love for great -masses and wide combinations. Now, also, Villeneuve -could not reach the West Indies before the sickly season.</p> - -<p>The contemplated conquests in America, which had -formed so important a part of the first plan, were therefore -laid aside, and so was also the Irish expedition by -Ganteaume's fleet. The concentration of naval forces in -the West Indies or at some point exterior to France became -now the great aim; and the sally of the various -detachments, before intended to favor the crossing of the -flotilla by a diversion, was now to be the direct means of -covering it, by bringing them to the English Channel and -before Boulogne. The operations were to begin in March; -and urgent orders were sent to Spain to have the contingents -in her several ports ready to move at a moment's -notice.</p> - -<p>The situations of the squadrons in March, when the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> -great Trafalgar campaign opened, need to be stated. -On the extreme right, in the Texel, were nine ships-of-the-line -with a due proportion of lighter vessels; and -some eighty transports lay ready to embark Marmont's -army corps of twenty-five thousand men. -<a name="FNanchor_169_169" id="FNanchor_169_169"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_169_169" class="fnanchor">[169]</a> The Boulogne -flotilla was assembled; the few detachments still absent -being so near at hand that their junction could be confidently -expected before the appearance of the covering -fleet. The army, one hundred and thirty thousand strong, -was by frequent practice able to embark in two hours. -<a name="FNanchor_170_170" id="FNanchor_170_170"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_170_170" class="fnanchor">[170]</a> -Two tides were needed for all the boats to clear the ports; -but as word of the fleet's approach would precede its arrival, -they could haul out betimes and lie in the open sea, -under the batteries, ready to start. In Brest, Ganteaume -had twenty-one ships-of-the-line. The Rochefort squadron -was now in the West Indies with Missiessy; but two -more ships were ready in that port and one in Lorient. -In Ferrol were five French and ten Spanish; of the latter -it was expected that six or eight could sail in March. In -Cadiz the treaty called for twelve or fifteen to be ready at -the same time, but only six were then actually able to -move. There was also in Cadiz one French ship. In -Cartagena were six Spaniards, which, however, took no -part in the campaign. At Toulon Villeneuve would have -eleven ships. All these were ships-of-the-line. The -total available at the opening of the campaign was therefore -sixty-seven; but it will be observed that they were -disseminated in detachments, and that the strategic problem -was, first, to unite them in the face of an enemy that -controlled the communications, and, next, to bring them -to the strategic centre.</p> - -<p>As in 1796, the declaration of Spain in 1805 added immensely -to the anxieties of Great Britain. Lord Melville, -who succeeded St. Vincent as First Lord in May, 1804, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> -had at once contracted for several ships-of-the-line to be -built in private yards; -<a name="FNanchor_171_171" id="FNanchor_171_171"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_171_171" class="fnanchor">[171]</a> but these were not yet ready. A -somewhat singular expedient was then adopted to utilize -worn-out vessels, twelve of which were in February, 1805, -cased with two-inch oak plank, and with some additional -bracing sent to sea. It is said some of these bore a part -in the battle of Trafalgar. -<a name="FNanchor_172_172" id="FNanchor_172_172"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_172_172" class="fnanchor">[172]</a></p> - -<p>The disposition and strength of the British detachments -varied with the movements of the enemy and with the increasing -strength of their own navy. Lord Keith, in the -Downs with eleven small ships-of-the-line, watched the -Texel and the Straits of Dover. The Channel fleet under -Cornwallis held Brest under lock and key, with a force -varying from eleven, when the year began, to twenty or -twenty-four in the following April. This was the centre -of the great British naval line. Off Rochefort no squadron -was kept after Missiessy's escape. In March that event -had simply transferred to the West Indies five French and -six British ships. Off Ferrol eight ships were watching -the combined fifteen in the port. In October, when the -Spanish war was threatening, a division of six was sent to -blockade Cadiz. Nelson's command, which had before -extended to Cape Finisterre, was now confined to Gibraltar -as its western limit, and the Cadiz portion assigned to Sir -John Orde,—a step particularly invidious to Nelson, depriving -him of the most lucrative part of his station, in -favor of one who was not only his senior, with power to -annoy him, but reputed to be his personal enemy. Nelson -had within the Straits twelve of the line, several of which, -however, were in bad condition; and one, kept permanently -at Naples for political reasons, was useless to him. -Two others were on their way to join, but did not arrive -before the campaign opened. It may be added that there -were in India from eight to ten ships-of-the-line, and in -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> -the West Indies four, which Cochrane's arrival would -raise to ten. -<a name="FNanchor_173_173" id="FNanchor_173_173"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_173_173" class="fnanchor">[173]</a></p> - -<p>On the 2d of March Napoleon issued specific orders for -the campaign to Villeneuve and Ganteaume. The latter, -who was to command-in-chief after the junction, was directed -to sail at the first moment possible with his twenty-one -ships, carrying besides their crews thirty-six hundred -troops. He was to go first to Ferrol, destroy or drive off -the blockading squadron, and be joined by the French and -Spanish ships there ready; thence by the shortest route -to Martinique, where he was to be met by Villeneuve and, -it was hoped, by Missiessy also. If Villeneuve did not -at once appear, he was to be awaited at least thirty days. -When united, the whole force, amounting to over forty -of the line, would, to avoid detection, steer for the Channel -by an unusual route and proceed direct to Boulogne, where -the emperor expected it between June 10 and July 10. -If by Villeneuve's not coming, or other cause, Ganteaume -found himself with less than twenty-five ships, he was to -go to Ferrol; where it would be the emperor's care to -assemble a re-enforcement. He might, however, even -with so small a number, move straight on Boulogne if he -thought advisable. -<a name="FNanchor_174_174" id="FNanchor_174_174"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_174_174" class="fnanchor">[174]</a></p> - -<p>Villeneuve's orders were to sail at the earliest date for -Cadiz, where he was not to enter but be joined outside by -the ships then ready. From Cadiz he was to go to Martinique, -and there wait forty days for Ganteaume. If the -latter did not then appear he was to call at San Domingo, -land some troops and thence go to the Bay of Santiago in -the Canary Islands, -<a name="FNanchor_175_175" id="FNanchor_175_175"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_175_175" class="fnanchor">[175]</a> where he would cruise twenty days. -This provided a second rendezvous where Ganteaume could -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> -join, if unexpectedly delayed in Brest. The emperor, -like all French rulers, did not wish to risk his fleet in -battle with nearly equal forces. Whatever the result, his -combinations would suffer. "I prefer," said he, "the -rendezvous at Martinique to any other; but I also prefer -Santiago to a junction before Brest, by raising the blockade, -in order to avoid fighting of any kind." -<a name="FNanchor_176_176" id="FNanchor_176_176"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_176_176" class="fnanchor">[176]</a> When -Ganteaume, at a most critical instant, only six days before -Villeneuve got away, reported that he was ready,—that -there were but fifteen British ships in the offing and -success was sure,—Napoleon replied: "A naval victory -now would lead to nothing. Have but one aim,—to fulfil -your mission. Sail without fighting." -<a name="FNanchor_177_177" id="FNanchor_177_177"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_177_177" class="fnanchor">[177]</a> So to the old -delusion of ulterior objects was sacrificed the one chance -for compassing the junction essential to success. By -April 1 the British fleet off Brest was increased to twenty-one -sail.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Nelson had returned from his fruitless search -at Alexandria, and on the 13th of March again appeared -off Toulon. Thence he went to Cape San Sebastian, -showing his ships off Barcelona to convince the enemy he -was fixed on the coast of Spain; reasoning that if they -thought him to the westward they would more readily -start for Egypt, which he still believed to be their aim. -He had by his communications with Alexandria learned -the distracted state of that country since the destruction -of the Mameluke power and its restoration to the Turks, -and reported that the French could easily hold it, if they -once effected a lodgment. -<a name="FNanchor_178_178" id="FNanchor_178_178"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_178_178" class="fnanchor">[178]</a> From Cape San Sebastian the -fleet next went to the Gulf of Palmas, a convenient roadstead -in the south of Sardinia, to fill with provisions from -transports lately arrived. It anchored there on the 26th -of March, but was again at sea when, at 8 A. M. of April -4, being then twenty miles west of the Gulf, a frigate -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> -brought word of the second sailing of the Toulon fleet. -When last seen, in the evening of March 31, it was sixty -miles south of Toulon, steering south with a north-west -wind. One of the pair of lookouts was then sent to -Nelson; and the other, losing sight of the enemy during -the night, joined him a few hours after the first. The -only clue she could give was that, having herself steered -south-west with a wind from west-north-west, the enemy -had probably kept on south or borne away to the eastward. -Nelson, therefore, took the fleet midway between Sardinia -and the African coast, scattering lookout ships along the -line between these two points. -<a name="FNanchor_179_179" id="FNanchor_179_179"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_179_179" class="fnanchor">[179]</a> He was thus centrally -placed to cover everything east of Sardinia, and with means -of speedy information if the French attempted to pass, -at any point, the line occupied by him.</p> - -<p>Villeneuve had indeed headed as reported by the British -frigates, swayed by Nelson's ruse in appearing off Barcelona. -<a name="FNanchor_180_180" id="FNanchor_180_180"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_180_180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a> -Believing the enemy off Cape San Sebastian, he -meant to go east of the Balearic Islands. The next day, -April 1; a neutral ship informed him that it had seen the -British fleet south of Sardinia. The wind fortunately -hauling to the eastward, Villeneuve changed his course to -pass north of the Balearics; and on the 6th of April, when -Nelson was watching for him between Sardinia and Africa, -he appeared off Cartagena. The Spanish division there -declined to join him, having no instructions from its government; -and the French fleet, continuing at once with a -fresh easterly wind, passed Gibraltar on the 8th. On the -9th it reached Cadiz, driving away Orde's squadron. -Following his orders strictly, Villeneuve anchored outside -the port; and was there at once joined by the French -seventy-four "l'Aigle," and six Spanish ships. During -the night the combined force of eighteen of the line sailed -for Martinique, where it anchored May 14, after a passage -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> -of thirty-four days. Some Spanish ships separated the day -after sailing; but, having sealed instructions giving the -rendezvous, they arrived only two days later than the -main body.</p> - -<p>This sortie of Villeneuve had so far been exceptionally -happy. By a mere accident he had learned Nelson's position, -while that admiral was misled by what seems to -have been bad management on the part of his carefully -placed lookouts. Nelson was not prone to blame subordinates, -but he apparently felt he had not been well served -in this case. Not till April 16, when Villeneuve was already -six days on his way from Cadiz, did he learn from -a passing ship that nine days before the French were seen -off Cape de Gata, on the coast of Spain, steering westward -with an east wind, evidently bound to the Atlantic. -To this piece of great good luck Villeneuve's fortune -added another. While he carried an east wind with him -till clear of the Straits, Nelson, from the 4th of April to -the 19th, had a succession of strong westerly gales. "We -have been nine days coming two hundred miles," he -wrote. "For a whole month we have had nothing like a -Levanter except for the French fleet." -<a name="FNanchor_181_181" id="FNanchor_181_181"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_181_181" class="fnanchor">[181]</a> Not till May 6, -after a resolute struggle of over three weeks against contrary -fortune, did he anchor his fleet in Gibraltar Bay. -Five days later he was on his way to the West Indies. -But while the escape from Toulon showed the impossibility -of securing every naval detachment of the enemy, the -events elsewhere happening proved the extreme difficulty -of so timing the evasions as to effect a great combination. -While Villeneuve with eighteen ships was hastening to -the West Indies, Missiessy, -<a name="FNanchor_182_182" id="FNanchor_182_182"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_182_182" class="fnanchor">[182]</a> with five others, having very -imperfectly fulfilled his mission to annoy the enemy's -islands, was speeding back to Rochefort, where orders at -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> -once to retrace his steps were waiting. At the same time -Ganteaume with his twenty-one was hopelessly locked in -Brest. Amid all the difficulties of their task, the British -fleets, sticking close to the French arsenals, not only tempered -their efficiency for war to the utmost toughness, but -reaped also the advantages inseparable from interior -positions.</p> - -<p>The better to divert attention from his real designs, -Napoleon took the time appointed for his squadrons' sailing -to visit Italy. Leaving Paris April 1, and journeying -leisurely, he was in Alessandria on the first of May and -in Milan on the 10th. There he remained a month, and -was on the 26th crowned king of the late Italian Republic. -His stay in Italy was prolonged to July. It is probably -to this carefully timed absence that we owe the full -and invaluable record of his hopes and fears, of the naval -combinations which chased each other through his tireless -mind, of the calculations and surmises—true or false, -but always ingenious—which are contained in his almost -daily letters to the Minister of Marine.</p> - -<p>Prominent among his preoccupations were the detention -of Ganteaume,—who, "hermetically blockaded and -thwarted by constant calms," -<a name="FNanchor_183_183" id="FNanchor_183_183"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_183_183" class="fnanchor">[183]</a> could not get away,—and -the whereabouts of Nelson, who disappeared from his sight -as entirely, and from his knowledge far more completely, -than Villeneuve did from the British ken. "In God's -name! hurry my Brest squadron away, that it may have -time to join Villeneuve. Nelson has been again deceived -and gone to Egypt. Villeneuve was out of sight on the -10th of April. Send him word that Nelson is seeking -him in Egypt; I have sent the same news to Ganteaume -by a courier. God grant, however, that he may not find -him in Brest." -<a name="FNanchor_184_184" id="FNanchor_184_184"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_184_184" class="fnanchor">[184]</a> On the 15th of April Ganteaume did -make an attempt. The British fleet had been driven off -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span> -by a gale on the 11th, but reappeared on the 13th. On -the afternoon of the 14th word was brought to Admiral -Gardner, who had temporarily relieved Cornwallis, that -the French were getting under way. The next day they -came out; but the enemy now numbered twenty-four sail -to their twenty-one, and after a demonstration they retired -within the port.</p> - -<p>As the advancing season gave less and less hope of the -blockade relaxing, Napoleon formed a new combination. -Two ships-of-the-line, now nearly ready at Rochefort, -should sail under Rear-Admiral Magon, carrying modified -instructions to Villeneuve. The latter was now commanded -to wait thirty-five days after Magon's arrival, and -then, if Ganteaume had not appeared, return direct to -Ferrol, discarding the alternative rendezvous of Santiago. -At Ferrol he would find fifteen French and Spanish ships, -making with his own and Magon's a total of thirty-five. -With these he was to appear before Brest, where Ganteaume -would join him, and with the combined force of -fifty-six of the line at once enter the Channel. Magon -sailed with these orders early in May, and on June 4 -reached Villeneuve just in time to insure the direction -given by the latter to his fleet upon its return. To facilitate -the junction at Brest very heavy batteries were -thrown up, covering the anchorage outside the Goulet; -and there, in May, Ganteaume took up his position, covered -by one hundred and fifty guns on shore.</p> - -<p>It will be recognized that the emperor's plan, while -retaining its essential features, had now undergone a -most important modification, due to the closeness of the -British blockade of Brest. A combination of his squadrons -still remained the key-stone of the fabric; but the -tenacity with which the largest of his detachments was -held in check had forced him to accept—what he had rejected -as least advantageous—a concentration in the Bay -of Biscay, the great hive where swarmed the British navy.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span></p> - -<p>It became therefore more than ever desirable to divert -as many as possible of the enemy's cruisers from those -waters; an object which now continuously occupied Napoleon's -mind and curiously tinged his calculations with the -color of his hopes. In defiance of statistics, he thought -the East Indies, as has before been said, the first of British -interests. He sought therefore to raise alarms about -India, and persisted in believing that every division sailing -from England was bound there. "Cochrane," he -writes on April 13, "was before Lisbon on March 4. He -must first have gone to the Cape de Verde, thence to Madeira, -and if he gets no information he will go to India. -That is what any admiral of sense would do in his case." -<a name="FNanchor_185_185" id="FNanchor_185_185"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_185_185" class="fnanchor">[185]</a> -On the 10th of May, when Cochrane had been over a -month in the West Indies, he reiterates this opinion, and -at the same time conjectures that five thousand troops -which sailed from England on the 15th of April with -most secret orders were gone to the Cape of Good Hope. -"Fears of Villeneuve's meeting this expedition will force -them to send more ships to India." -<a name="FNanchor_186_186" id="FNanchor_186_186"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_186_186" class="fnanchor">[186]</a> On the 31st of May -he guesses that eight ships-of-the-line, which sailed ten -days before under Collingwood, were bound to India, -<a name="FNanchor_187_187" id="FNanchor_187_187"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_187_187" class="fnanchor">[187]</a> and -a week later repeats the surmise emphatically: "The -responsibility of the ministers is so great they cannot but -send him to the East Indies." -<a name="FNanchor_188_188" id="FNanchor_188_188"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_188_188" class="fnanchor">[188]</a> On the 9th of June he -writes: "Everything leads me to believe the English sent -fifteen ships to the East Indies, when they learned that -Cochrane reached Barbadoes a fortnight after Missiessy -sailed; and in that case it is quite possible Nelson has -been sent to America." -<a name="FNanchor_189_189" id="FNanchor_189_189"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_189_189" class="fnanchor">[189]</a> This opinion is repeated on the -13th and 14th; and on the 28th, as the veil was about to -fall from his eyes, he sums up the acute reasoning which, -starting from a false premise, had so misled him: "It is -difficult to believe that without any news the English have -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> -sent seventeen ships-of-the-line (i. e. Nelson and Collingwood -combined) to the West Indies, when Nelson, joining -his ten to Cochrane's six, and three at Jamaica, would -have nineteen—superior to our squadron; while Collingwood -going to the East Indies with eight and finding -there nine, in all seventeen, also superior to us—it is -difficult, I say, to believe that the enemy, with the chance -of being everywhere superior, should blindly abandon the -East Indies." -<a name="FNanchor_190_190" id="FNanchor_190_190"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_190_190" class="fnanchor">[190]</a></p> - -<p>Some French writers, -<a name="FNanchor_191_191" id="FNanchor_191_191"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_191_191" class="fnanchor">[191]</a> as well as some English, have -disparaged the insight of Nelson, comparing him unfavorably -with Napoleon, and basing their estimate largely upon -his error in esteeming Egypt the aim of the French. In -view of the foregoing extracts, and of other miscalculations -made by the emperor during this remarkable campaign—which -will appear farther on—it must be admitted -that when in the dark, without good information, both were -forced to inferences, more or less acute, but which, resting -on no solid data, rose, as Nelson said, little above -guesses. So also Collingwood has been credited with -completely unravelling Napoleon's plan, and his penetration -has been exalted above Nelson's because, <i>after</i> the -latter's return from chasing Villeneuve to the West Indies, -he wrote that the flight there was to take off the British -naval force; overlooking his conjecture, two lines before, -that (not England, but) "Ireland is the real mark and butt -of all these operations." Rather might each adopt for -himself Napoleon's own words, "I have so often in my life -been mistaken that I no longer blush for it." -<a name="FNanchor_192_192" id="FNanchor_192_192"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_192_192" class="fnanchor">[192]</a> When his -frigates lost sight of Villeneuve, on the night of March 31, -Nelson went neither east nor west; he concentrated his force -to cover what he thought the most likely objects of the -enemy, and awaited information as to his movements. "I -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> -shall neither go to the eastward of Sicily nor to the westward -of Sardinia until I know something positive." -<a name="FNanchor_193_193" id="FNanchor_193_193"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_193_193" class="fnanchor">[193]</a> It -can be confidently said that under like conditions Napoleon -would have done the same.</p> - -<p>The fault of Napoleon's calculations was in over-estimating -both the importance and the danger of India, and -also in not allowing for the insight and information of the -British government. He himself laid down, with his peculiarly -sound judgment, the lines it ought to follow: "If -I had been in the British Admiralty, I would have sent a -light squadron to the East and West Indies, and formed -a strong fleet of twenty of the line which I would not have -dispatched until I knew Villeneuve's destination." -<a name="FNanchor_194_194" id="FNanchor_194_194"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_194_194" class="fnanchor">[194]</a> This -was just what the Admiralty did. A light squadron was -on its way to India, and eight ships were ordered to the -West Indies under Collingwood; but that able officer, -finding Nelson had started, contented himself with sending -two to re-enforce him, and took up his own position -with six before Cadiz, thus blocking the junction of the -Cartagena ships. The strong body of twenty was kept -before Brest, much to Napoleon's annoyance. "If England -realizes the serious game she is playing, she ought -to raise the blockade of Brest." -<a name="FNanchor_195_195" id="FNanchor_195_195"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_195_195" class="fnanchor">[195]</a> But here, as with regard -to the Indian expeditions, Napoleon's thought was fathered -by his wish. To weaken the Brest blockade, as he confessed -a little later, was the great point for France. -<a name="FNanchor_196_196" id="FNanchor_196_196"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_196_196" class="fnanchor">[196]</a></p> - -<p>Nothing in fact is more noteworthy, nor more creditable, -than the intelligence and steadiness with which the British -naval authorities resisted Napoleon's efforts to lead -them into ex-centric movements. This was partly due to -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> -an accurate judgment of the worth of the enemy's detached -squadrons, partly to an intuitive sense of the -supreme importance of the Biscay positions, and partly to -information much more accurate than Napoleon imagined, -or than he himself received in naval transactions. "Those -boasted English," jeered he, when he thought them ignorant -of Villeneuve's second sailing, "who claim to know -of everything, who have agents everywhere, couriers booted -and spurred everywhere, knew nothing of it." -<a name="FNanchor_197_197" id="FNanchor_197_197"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_197_197" class="fnanchor">[197]</a> Yet, -by a singular coincidence, on the very day, April 25, that -they were supposed thus deceived, the Admiralty were -hurrying letters to Nelson and to the West Indies with -the important tidings. "You reason," wrote he to Decrès, -"as if the enemy were in the secret." -<a name="FNanchor_198_198" id="FNanchor_198_198"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_198_198" class="fnanchor">[198]</a> This is just -what they were,—not as to all details, but as to the main -features of his plans. While the emperor was wildly -reckoning on imaginary squadrons hastening to India, and -guessing where Nelson was, both the latter and his government -knew where Villeneuve had gone, and the British -admiral was already in the West Indies. About the beginning -of May it was known in England not only that -the Toulon fleet had sailed, but whither it was bound; -<a name="FNanchor_199_199" id="FNanchor_199_199"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_199_199" class="fnanchor">[199]</a> -and about the first of June, despite the cautions about -secrecy imposed by Bonaparte, the British were informed -by a prisoner that "the combined fleet, of sixty sail-of-the-line, -will fight our fleet (<i>balayer la Manche</i>), while the -large frigates will come up channel to convoy the flotilla -over. The troops are impatiently awaiting the appearance -of the ships to set them free." -<a name="FNanchor_200_200" id="FNanchor_200_200"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_200_200" class="fnanchor">[200]</a></p> - -<p>The Admiralty therefore understood as well as did -Napoleon that the crucial necessity in their dispositions -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> -was to prevent the combination of the enemy's squadrons, -and that the chief scene of operations would be the Bay of -Biscay and the approaches to the Channel. They contented -themselves, consequently, with strengthening the -force there, and keeping before Cadiz alone a detachment -under Collingwood, lest a concentration in that port should -compel them to weaken the Biscay squadrons. At the -time Villeneuve sailed, an expedition of five thousand -troops, whose destination was kept profoundly secret, was -ready to start for the Mediterranean. This re-enforcement -secured the naval bases of Gibraltar and Malta, and the -Mediterranean otherwise was abandoned to frigates, supported -by two or three ships-of-the-line. Herein also the -practice of the Admiralty agreed with the precept of Napoleon. -"The Mediterranean," wrote he on June 7 to his -Minister of Marine, "is now nothing. I would rather see -there two of Villeneuve's ships than forty;" and he added -the pregnant counsel, which was exemplified by the British -action, "It seems to me your purpose is <i>not exclusive -enough</i> for a great operation. You must correct this -fault, for that is the art of great successes and of great -operations."</p> - -<p>The secret expedition was met by Nelson just as he -started for the West Indies. During his heavy beat down -the Mediterranean he too, as carefully as Napoleon, had -been studying the field on which he was to act; but while -the one planned with all the freedom and certainty of an -offensive, which, disposing of large means, moves upon -a known object, the other, though in a restricted sphere, -underwent the embarrassments of the defensive, ignorant -where the blow was to fall. One clear light, however, -shone step by step on his path,—wherever the French fleet -was gone there should he go also.</p> - -<p>The west wind which delayed his progress brought -swiftly to him, on April 19, a vessel -<a name="FNanchor_201_201" id="FNanchor_201_201"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_201_201" class="fnanchor">[201]</a> from Gibraltar, with -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> -word that, two hours after Villeneuve passed the Straits, -a frigate had started for England with the news, and that -the French and Spaniards had sailed together from Cadiz. -From this circumstance he reasoned, accurately, that the -destination was the British Islands; -<a name="FNanchor_202_202" id="FNanchor_202_202"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_202_202" class="fnanchor">[202]</a> but he did not penetrate -the deep design of a concentration in the West -Indies. He therefore sent the frigate "Amazon" ahead -of the fleet to Lisbon, to gather news and rejoin him off -Cape St. Vincent; and by her he wrote the Admiralty, -and also to the admirals off Brest and in Ireland, that -he should take position fifty leagues west of the Scilly -Islands, and thence steer slowly toward them. To any -person who will plot this position on a map it will be apparent -that, with winds prevailing from the westward, he -would there be, as he said, equally well situated to reach -Brest or Ireland; in short, in an excellent strategic -position known to the authorities at home.</p> - -<p>Stopping but four hours at Gibraltar on May 6, on -the 9th he was off Cape St. Vincent, and there received -news that the combined squadrons, to the number of eighteen -of the line, had gone to the West Indies. His concern -was great, for he fully understood the value of those islands. -He had served there, knew them intimately, and -had married there. Not a year before he had written, "If -our islands should fall, England would be so clamorous -for peace that we should humble ourselves." -<a name="FNanchor_203_203" id="FNanchor_203_203"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_203_203" class="fnanchor">[203]</a> Still, -with all his anxiety, he kept his head. The convoy of -troops was close at hand, he must provide for its safety. -On the 11th of May it arrived, Nelson's fleet being then -under way. To the two ships-of-the-line guarding it he -added a third, the "Royal Sovereign," whose bad sailing -delayed him; and to this circumstance it was owing that -that ship, newly coppered, bore Collingwood's flag far in -advance of either British column into the fire at Trafalgar. -Three hours after the convoy's junction, at 7 <span class="sc">P. M.</span>of May -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span> -11, Nelson with ten ships was on his way to the West -Indies, to seek eighteen which had thirty-one days' start.</p> - -<p>On the 4th of June the British fleet, having gained -eight days on the allies, anchored at Barbadoes, where it -found Cochrane with two sail-of-the-line. The same day -Magon with his two joined Villeneuve. In the three -weeks the latter had now been in Martinique he had -accomplished nothing but the capture of Diamond Rock, -a small islet detached from the main island, which the -British held and from which they annoyed the coasters. -A frigate outstripping Magon had brought pressing orders -to make conquests in the British possessions, during the -thirty-five days of waiting for Ganteaume. In consequence, -when Magon joined, the fleet was under way, standing -north to clear the islands before making the stretch to the -southward, and to windward, to reach Barbadoes; which -Villeneuve had selected as his first point of attack.</p> - -<p>On the 4th of June, therefore, the two hostile fleets -were but a hundred miles apart, the distance separating -Barbadoes from Martinique. Most singularly, at the very -moment Villeneuve started north to return upon Barbadoes, -false news, too plausible to be slighted, induced Nelson -to go south. Positive information was sent by the -officer commanding at Santa Lucia that the allies had -been seen from there, May 29, steering south. Nelson -anchored at Barbadoes at 5 <span class="sc">P. M.</span> June 4, embarked two -thousand troops during the night, and at 10 <span class="sc">A. M.</span> next -day made sail for the southward. On the 6th he passed -Tobago, which was reported safe, and on the 7th anchored -off Trinidad; where to the astonishment of every one -nothing had been heard of the enemy. Cursing the news -which had forced him to disregard his own judgment, -when only a hundred miles of fair wind severed him from -his prey, Nelson turned upon his tracks and steered for -Martinique, tortured with fears for Jamaica and every -exposed British possession.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span></p> - -<p>On the 8th of June, when Nelson left Trinidad, the -combined fleets were nearly four hundred miles from him, -off the west side of Antigua. Here they captured fourteen -merchant ships which had imprudently left port, and by -them were informed that Nelson with fourteen ships (instead -of ten) had reached Barbadoes. To these fourteen, -Villeneuve, whose information was poor, added five as the -force of Cochrane, making nineteen to his eighteen. Supposing -therefore the enemy to be superior, not only in -quality, which he conceded, but in numbers also, he decided, -in view of so unexpected an event as the arrival on -the scene of the greatest British admiral, to return at once -to Europe. In this he doubtless met the wishes of Napoleon. -"I think," said the latter, ere he knew the fact, -"that the arrival of Nelson may lead Villeneuve to return -to Europe;" -<a name="FNanchor_204_204" id="FNanchor_204_204"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_204_204" class="fnanchor">[204]</a> and he argued, still seeing things as he -wished,—certainly not as a seaman would,—"When Nelson -learns Villeneuve has left the Windward Islands, he -will go to Jamaica," -<a name="FNanchor_205_205" id="FNanchor_205_205"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_205_205" class="fnanchor">[205]</a> a thousand miles to leeward. "So -far from being infallible like the Pope," wrote Nelson at -the same moment, "I believe my opinions to be very fallible, -and therefore I may be mistaken that the enemy's -fleet is gone to Europe; but I cannot bring myself to -think otherwise." -<a name="FNanchor_206_206" id="FNanchor_206_206"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_206_206" class="fnanchor">[206]</a> Then, having given his reasons, he -seems to dive into Napoleon's mind and read his thoughts. -"The enemy will not give me credit for quitting the West -Indies for this month to come." -<a name="FNanchor_207_207" id="FNanchor_207_207"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_207_207" class="fnanchor">[207]</a></p> - -<p>Villeneuve also doubtless hoped to shake off his pursuer -by his sudden change of purpose. Transferring troops -necessary to garrison the French islands to four frigates, -he directed the latter to land them at Guadaloupe and rejoin -him off the Azores,—a mistaken rendezvous, which -materially lengthened his backward voyage. The combined -fleet then made sail on the 9th of June to the northward, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> -to reach the westerly winds that favor the passage to -Europe.</p> - -<p>Three days later Nelson also was off Antigua, and convinced -himself that the allies were bound back to Europe. -With the tireless energy that brooked no rest when once -resolve was formed, the night was passed transferring the -troops which but one week before he had embarked at -Barbadoes. But not even a night's delay was allowed in -sending news to Europe. At 8 <span class="sc">P. M.</span> he hurried off the -brig "Curieux" with dispatches to the Admiralty, which -the captain, Bettesworth, was to deliver in person; a momentous -action, and one fraught with decisive consequences -to the campaign, although somewhat marred by an overcautious -admiral. On the 13th, at noon, the fleet itself, accompanied -by one of Cochrane's two ships, the "Spartiate," -sailed for the Straits of Gibraltar; but Nelson, uncertain -as to the enemy's destination, also sent word to the officer -commanding off Ferrol, -<a name="FNanchor_208_208" id="FNanchor_208_208"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_208_208" class="fnanchor">[208]</a> lest he might be taken unawares.</p> - -<p>Although Villeneuve's decision to return was fortunate -and characterized by the extraordinary good luck which -upon the whole had so far attended him, it is evident that -he ran the chance of crossing Ganteaume on the Atlantic, -as he himself had been crossed by Missiessy. Napoleon -had taken precautions to insure both his waiting long -enough, and also his return in case Ganteaume could not -get away by a certain time; but not having foreseen, nor -until June 28 -<a name="FNanchor_209_209" id="FNanchor_209_209"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_209_209" class="fnanchor">[209]</a> even known, Nelson's pursuit of Villeneuve, -he could not anticipate the course of the latter in such a -contingency, nor combine with it the action of the Brest -fleet.</p> - -<p>Ganteaume, however, was not able to elude Lord Gardner, -and on the 8th of May the emperor, having received -in Italy the news of Magon's sailing, gave his final decision. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> -If before midnight of May 20 an opportunity offered, -the Brest fleet should start; but from daybreak of the 21st, -had it every chance in the world, it should stand fast. A -frigate was to be kept ready to sail the instant the latter -condition took effect, carrying to Villeneuve orders for his -action upon reaching Ferrol. This frigate did sail May -21, but of course did not find the admiral in the West -Indies. Duplicate instructions were sent to Ferrol.</p> - -<p>Villeneuve was by them informed that he would in -Ferrol find ready for sea five French and nine Spanish -ships, which, with those already under his orders, would -make a force of thirty-four sail-of-the-line. In the roads -off Rochefort would be five more. At Brest twenty-one -ships were lying outside the Goulet, under the protection -of one hundred and fifty cannon, ready to get under way -at a moment's notice. The great point was to concentrate -these three masses, or as much of them as possible, -off Boulogne. Three courses were open to him. If the -squadron at Ferrol could not leave the port when he appeared, -on account of head winds, he should order it to -join him at Rochefort and go there at once himself. Thence -with forty ships he should proceed off Brest, join Ganteaume, -and at once enter the Channel. If, however, the -wind was fair for leaving Ferrol, that is, southerly, he -would see in that a reason for hastening to Brest, without -stopping for the Rochefort squadron; the more so as every -delay would increase the British force before Brest. -Thirdly, he might possibly, as he drew toward Ushant, -find the winds so fair as to give the hope of getting to -Boulogne with his thirty-five ships three or four days -before the enemy's fleet at Brest could follow. If so, it -was left to his discretion to embrace so favorable an opportunity. -To these three courses Napoleon added a -fourth as a possible alternative. After rallying the -Ferrol ships he might pass north of the British Islands, -join the Dutch squadron of the Texel with Marmont's -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span> -corps there embarked, and with these appear off Boulogne. -The emperor, however, looked upon this rather as a last -resort. A great concentration in the Bay of Biscay was -the one aim he now favored.</p> - -<p>To facilitate this he busied himself much with the -question of diverting the enemy from that great centre of -his operations. This it was that made him so ready to -believe that each squadron that sailed was gone to the -East Indies. If so, it was well removed from the Bay of -Biscay. For this he sought to get the Cartagena ships to -Toulon or to Cadiz. "If we can draw six English ships -before each port," he writes, "that will be a fine diversion -for us; and if I can get the Cartagena ships in Toulon I -will threaten Egypt in so many ways that they will be -obliged to keep there an imposing force. They will believe -Villeneuve gone to the East Indies in concerted operation -with the Toulon squadron." -<a name="FNanchor_210_210" id="FNanchor_210_210"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_210_210" class="fnanchor">[210]</a> For this he purposes to send -Missiessy to Cadiz. In Rochefort that admiral will occupy -a British detachment, but on the spot where the emperor -does not wish it; at Cadiz it will be remote from the scene. -But later on he says, "Perhaps the enemy, who are now -thoroughly frightened, will not be led away; in that case -I shall have dispersed my force uselessly." -<a name="FNanchor_211_211" id="FNanchor_211_211"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_211_211" class="fnanchor">[211]</a> Therefore he -concludes to keep him at Rochefort, where, if blockaded, -he reduces the force either off Ferrol or off Brest. If not -blockaded, he is to go to sea, take a wide sweep in the -Atlantic, and appear off Ireland. The English will then -doubtless detach ships to seek him; but he will again disappear -and take position near Cape Finisterre, where he -will be likely to meet Villeneuve returning. -<a name="FNanchor_212_212" id="FNanchor_212_212"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_212_212" class="fnanchor">[212]</a> Finally, for -the same reason, toward the end of June he tries to create -alarm about the Texel. Marmont is directed to make -demonstrations and even to embark his troops, while part -of the emperor's guard is moved to Utrecht. "This will -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> -lead the enemy to weaken his fleet before Brest, which is -the great point." -<a name="FNanchor_213_213" id="FNanchor_213_213"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_213_213" class="fnanchor">[213]</a></p> - -<p>All these movements were sound and wise; but the -emperor made the mistake of underestimating his enemy. -"We have not to do," he said, "with a far-sighted, but with -a very proud government. What we are doing is so simple -that a government the least foresighted would not -have made war. For an instant they have feared for -London; soon they will be sending squadrons to the two -Indies." -<a name="FNanchor_214_214" id="FNanchor_214_214"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_214_214" class="fnanchor">[214]</a></p> - -<p>The British government and the British Admiralty -doubtless made blunders; but barring the one great mistake, -for which the previous administration of St. Vincent -was responsible, of allowing the material of the navy to -fall below the necessities of the moment, the Trafalgar -campaign was in its leading outlines well and adequately -conceived, and in its execution, as event succeeded event, -ably and even brilliantly directed. Adequate detachments -were placed before each of the enemy's minor arsenals, -while the fleet before Brest constituted the great central -body upon which the several divisions might, and when -necessity arose, actually did fall back. Sudden disaster, -or being beaten in detail, thus became almost impossible. -In the home ports was maintained a well-proportioned -reserve, large enough to replace ships disabled or repairing, -but not so large as seriously to weaken the force at -sea. As a rule the Admiralty successfully shunned the -ex-centric movements to which Napoleon would divert -them, and clung steadfastly to that close watch which St. -Vincent had perfected, and which unquestionably embodied -the soundest strategic principles. Missiessy returned to -Rochefort on the 26th of May and was promptly blocked -by a body of five or six ships. As the force in Ferrol -increased, by the preparation of ships for sea, the opposing -squadron of six or seven was raised to ten, under Rear-Admiral -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> -Calder. Before Brest were from twenty to -twenty-five, to whose command Admiral Cornwallis returned -early in July, after a three months' sick leave. -Collingwood with half a dozen was before Cadiz, where he -effectually prevented a concentration, which, by its distance -from the scene of action, would have seriously embarrassed -the British navy. Such was the situation when -Villeneuve and Nelson, in June and July, were re-crossing -the Atlantic, heading, the one for Ferrol, the other for -the Straits; and when the crisis, to which all the previous -movements had been leading, was approaching its -culmination.</p> - -<p>When Nelson started back for Europe, although convinced -the French were thither bound, he had no absolute -certainty of the fact. -<a name="FNanchor_215_215" id="FNanchor_215_215"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_215_215" class="fnanchor">[215]</a> For his decision he relied upon his -own judgment. In dispatching the "Curieux" the night -before he himself sailed, he directed her captain to steer -a certain course, by following which he believed he would -fall in with the allied fleet. -<a name="FNanchor_216_216" id="FNanchor_216_216"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_216_216" class="fnanchor">[216]</a> Accordingly the "Curieux" -did, on the 19th of June, sight the enemy in latitude 33° -12' north and longitude 58° west, nine hundred miles -north-north-east from Antigua, standing north-north-west. -The same day Nelson himself learned from an American -schooner that a fleet of about twenty-two large ships of -war had been seen by it on the 15th, three hundred and -fifty miles south of the position in which Bettesworth -saw it four days later.</p> - -<p>Bettesworth fully understood the importance of the -knowledge thus gained. The precise destination of the -enemy did not certainly appear, but there could be no -doubt that he was returning to Europe. With that intelligence, -and the information concerning Nelson's purposes, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> -it was urgent to reach England speedily. Carrying a -press of sail, the "Curieux" anchored at Plymouth on the -7th of July. The captain posted at once to London, arriving -the evening of the 8th, at eleven. The head of the -Admiralty at that time was Lord Barham, an aged naval -officer, who had been unexpectedly called to the office two -months before, in consequence of the impeachment of -Lord Melville, the successor to St. Vincent. It was fortunate -for Great Britain that the direction of naval operations -at so critical a moment was in the hands of a man, who, -though over eighty and long a stranger to active service, -understood intuitively, and without need of explanation, -the various conditions of weather and service likely to -affect the movements of the scattered detachments, British -and hostile, upon whose rapid combinations so much now -depended.</p> - -<p>Barham having gone to bed, Bettesworth's dispatches -were not given him till early next morning. As soon as -he got them he exclaimed angrily at the loss of so many -precious hours; and, without waiting to dress, at once dictated -orders with which, by 9 <span class="sc">A. M.</span> of the 9th, Admiralty -messengers were hurrying to Plymouth and Portsmouth. -Cornwallis was directed to raise the blockade at Rochefort, -sending the five ships composing it to Sir Robert -Calder, then watching off Ferrol with ten; and the latter -was ordered, with the fifteen ships thus united under his -command, to cruise one hundred miles west of Cape Finisterre, -to intercept Villeneuve and forestall his junction -with the Ferrol squadron. With Nelson returning toward -Cadiz, where he would find Collingwood, and with Cornwallis -off Brest, this disposition completed the arrangements -necessary to thwart the primary combinations of -the emperor, unknown to, but shrewdly surmised by, his -opponents. It realized for Ferrol that which Napoleon -had indicated as the proper course for the British fleet off -Brest, in case it received intelligence of Villeneuve's -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> -approach there,—to meet the enemy so far at sea as to prevent -the squadron in port from joining in the intended -battle. -<a name="FNanchor_217_217" id="FNanchor_217_217"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_217_217" class="fnanchor">[217]</a></p> - -<p>Fair winds favoring the quick, Cornwallis received -his orders on the 11th; and on the 15th, eight days after -the "Curieux" anchored in Plymouth, the Rochefort ships -joined Calder. The latter proceeded at once to the post -assigned him, where on the 19th he received through Lisbon -the tidings of Villeneuve's return sent by Nelson from -the West Indies. The same day Nelson himself, having -outstripped the combined fleets, anchored in Gibraltar. -On the 22d the sudden lifting of a dense fog revealed to -each other the hostile squadrons of Calder and Villeneuve; -the British fifteen sail-of-the-line, the allies twenty. The -numbers of the latter were an unpleasant surprise to Calder, -the "Curieux" having reported them as only seventeen. -<a name="FNanchor_218_218" id="FNanchor_218_218"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_218_218" class="fnanchor">[218]</a></p> - -<p>It is difficult to praise too highly the prompt and decisive -step taken by Lord Barham, when so suddenly confronted -with the dilemma of either raising the blockade -of Rochefort and Ferrol, or permitting Villeneuve to proceed -unmolested to his destination, whatever that might -be. To act instantly and rightly in so distressing a perplexity—to -be able to make so unhesitating a sacrifice of -advantages long and rightly cherished, in order to strike -at once one of the two converging detachments of an -enemy—shows generalship of a high order. It may be -compared to Bonaparte's famous abandonment of the siege -of Mantua in 1796, to throw himself upon the Austrian -armies descending from the Tyrol. In the hands of a -more resolute or more capable admiral than Calder, the -campaign would probably have been settled off Finisterre. -Notice has been taken of Barham's good luck, in that the -brilliant period of Trafalgar fell within his nine months' -tenure of office; -<a name="FNanchor_219_219" id="FNanchor_219_219"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_219_219" class="fnanchor">[219]</a> -but Great Britain might better be congratulated -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> -that so clear-headed a man held the reins at -so critical a moment.</p> - -<p>The length of Villeneuve's passage, which so happily -concurred to assure the success of Barham's masterly move, -was due not only to the inferior seamanship of the allies, -but also to the mistaken rendezvous off the Azores, -<a name="FNanchor_220_220" id="FNanchor_220_220"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_220_220" class="fnanchor">[220]</a>—assigned -by the French admiral when leaving the West -Indies. The westerly gales, which prevail in the North -Atlantic, blow during the summer from the south of west, -west of the Azores, and from the north of west when east -of them. A fleet bound for a European port north of the -islands—as Ferrol is—should therefore so use the south-west -winds as to cross their meridian well to the northward. -Nelson himself sighted one of the group, though -his destination was in a lower latitude. In consequence -of his mistake, Villeneuve was by the north-west winds -forced down on the coast of Portugal, where he met the -north-easters prevalent at that season, against which he -was struggling when encountered by Calder. This delay -was therefore caused, not by bad luck, but by bad management.</p> - -<p>Napoleon himself was entirely misled by Barham's -measures, whose rapidity he himself could not have surpassed. -He had left Turin on the 8th of July, and, travelling -incessantly, reached Fontainebleau on the evening -of the 11th. About the 20th he appears to have received -the news brought ten days before by the "Curieux," and at -the same time that of the Rochefort blockade being -raised. -<a name="FNanchor_221_221" id="FNanchor_221_221"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_221_221" class="fnanchor">[221]</a> Not till the 27th did he learn that the British -squadron off Ferrol had also disappeared, after being -joined by the Rochefort ships. "The 'Curieux' only -reached England on the 9th," he wrote to Decrès; "<i>the -Admiralty could not decide the movements of its squadrons -in twenty-four hours</i>, yet the Rochefort division disappeared -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span> -on the 12th. On the 15th it joined that off Ferrol, -and the same day, or at latest the next, these fourteen -ships departed by orders given <i>prior to</i> the arrival of the -'Curieux.' What news had the English before the arrival -of that brig? That the French were at Martinique; that -Nelson had then but nine ships. What should they have -done? I should not be surprised if they have sent another -squadron to strengthen Nelson, ... and that it is these -fourteen ships from before Ferrol they have sent to -America." -<a name="FNanchor_222_222" id="FNanchor_222_222"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_222_222" class="fnanchor">[222]</a></p> - -<p>On the 2d of August the emperor set out for Boulogne, -and there on the 8th received news of Villeneuve's action -with Calder and of his subsequent entry into Ferrol. The -fleets had fought on the afternoon of July 22, and two -Spanish ships-of-the-line had been taken. Night-fall and -fog parted the combatants; the obscurity being so great -that the allies did not know their loss till next day. One -of the British ships lost a foretopmast, and others suffered -somewhat in their spars; but these mishaps, though -pleaded in Calder's defence, do not seem to have been -the chief reasons that deterred him from dogging the -enemy till he had brought him again to action. He was -preoccupied with the care of the prizes, a secondary -matter, and with the thought of what would happen in -case the Ferrol and Rochefort squadrons sailed. "I -could not hope to succeed without receiving great damage; -I had no friendly port to go to, and had the Ferrol and -Rochefort squadrons come out, I must have fallen an easy -prey. They might have gone to Ireland. Had I been -defeated it is impossible to say what the consequences -might have been." -<a name="FNanchor_223_223" id="FNanchor_223_223"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_223_223" class="fnanchor">[223]</a> In short, the British admiral had -fallen into the error against which Napoleon used to -caution his generals. He had "made to himself a picture," -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span> -and allowed the impression produced by it to blind -him to the fact (if indeed he ever saw it) that he had -before him the largest and most important of the several -detachments of the enemy, that it was imperatively necessary -not to permit it to escape unharmed, and that at no -future day could he be sure of bringing his own squadron -into play with such decisive effect. The wisdom of engaging -at any particular moment was a tactical question, to be -determined by the circumstances at the time; but the duty -of keeping touch with the enemy, so as to use promptly any -opportunity offered, was a strategic question, the answer -to which admits of no doubt whatever. On the evening -of the 24th the wind was fair to carry him to the enemy, -but he parted from them. During the night it blew fresh; -and on the morning of the 25th, says a French authority, -the fleet was without order, several vessels had lost sails, -and others sustained injuries to their spars. -<a name="FNanchor_224_224" id="FNanchor_224_224"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_224_224" class="fnanchor">[224]</a> Calder, -however, was not on hand.</p> - -<p>It is related of Nelson that, on his return voyage from -the West Indies, he used to say to his captains, speaking -of the fleet which Calder allowed to escape, "If we meet -them we shall find them not less than eighteen, I rather -think twenty, sail-of-the-line, and therefore do not be -surprised if I should not fall on them immediately; <i>we -won't part without a battle</i>. I will let them alone till we -approach the shores of Europe, <i>or they give me an advantage -too tempting to be resisted</i>." -<a name="FNanchor_225_225" id="FNanchor_225_225"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_225_225" class="fnanchor">[225]</a> And again, after reaching -England, he found on the 23d of August great anxiety -prevailing about Calder, who with eighteen ships was then -again cruising for Villeneuve, supposed to have been re-enforced -to twenty-eight by the Ferrol squadron. "I am -no conjuror," he wrote, "but this I ventured without any -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> -fear, that if Calder got fairly alongside their twenty-eight -sail, by the time the enemy had beat our fleet soundly, -they would do us no harm this year." -<a name="FNanchor_226_226" id="FNanchor_226_226"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_226_226" class="fnanchor">[226]</a> These two -utterances of this consummate warrior sufficiently show -how Calder should have viewed his opportunity in -July.</p> - -<p>Villeneuve had no more wish to renew the action than -had Calder. Less even than that admiral could he rise to -the height of risking a detachment in order to secure the -success of a great design. In the eighteen ships left to -him were over twelve hundred men so ill that it was necessary -to put them ashore. Constrained by the winds, he -put into Vigo on the 28th of July. Calder, on the other -hand, having seen his prizes so far north as to insure -their safety, returned off Cape Finisterre where he hoped -to meet Nelson. Not finding him, he on the 29th resumed -the blockade of Ferrol. On the 31st Villeneuve, leaving -three of his worst vessels in Vigo, sailed for Ferrol with -fifteen ships, of which two only were Spaniards. The -fleet, having a strong south-west gale, kept close along -shore to avoid meeting Calder; but the latter, having been -blown off by the storm, was not in sight when Villeneuve -reached the harbor's mouth. The allied ships were entering -with a fair wind, when the French admiral received -dispatches forbidding him to anchor in Ferrol. If, from -injuries received in battle, or losses from any causes -whatever, he was unable to carry out the plan of entering -the Channel, the emperor preferred that, after rallying -the Ferrol and Rochefort squadrons, he should go to -Cadiz; but, the Brest fleet being ready and the other -preparations complete, he hoped everything from the skill, -zeal, and courage of Villeneuve. "Make us masters of the -Straits of Dover," he implored, "be it but for four or five -days." -<a name="FNanchor_227_227" id="FNanchor_227_227"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_227_227" class="fnanchor">[227]</a> Napoleon leaned on a broken reed. Forbidden -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> -to enter Ferrol, Villeneuve took his ships into the adjacent -harbor of Coruña, -<a name="FNanchor_228_228" id="FNanchor_228_228"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_228_228" class="fnanchor">[228]</a> where he anchored August 1.</p> - -<p>Thus was effected the junction which Calder had been -expected to prevent. His absence on the particular day -may have been unavoidable; but, if so, it does but emphasize -his fault in losing sight of the allies on the 24th of -July, when he had a fair wind. Twenty-nine French and -Spanish ships were now concentrated at Ferrol. The -popular outcry was so great that he felt compelled to ask -an enquiry. The Admiralty having, by a movement both -judiciously and promptly ordered, secured a meeting with -the enemy's force so far from Ferrol as to deprive it of the -support of the ships there, was justly incensed at the -failure to reap the full advantage. It therefore ordered a -court-martial. The trial was held the following December; -and the admiral, while expressly cleared of either -cowardice or disaffection, was adjudged not to have done -his utmost to renew the engagement and to take or destroy -every ship of the enemy. His conduct was pronounced -highly censurable, and he was sentenced to be severely -reprimanded.</p> - -<p>This was after Trafalgar. The immediate result of the -junction in Ferrol was the abandonment of the blockade -there. On the 2d of August Calder sent five ships to -resume the watch off Rochefort, whence the French squadron -had meantime escaped. Not till August 9 did he know -of Villeneuve's entrance into Ferrol. Having with him then -but nine ships, he fell back upon the main body before -Brest, which he joined on the 14th,—Cornwallis then having -under him seventeen ships, which Calder's junction -raised to twenty-six.</p> - -<p>The next day, August 15, Nelson also joined the fleet. -On the 25th of July, a week after reaching Gibraltar, he -had received the "Curieux's" news. Obeying his constant -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span> -rule to seek the French, he at once started north with the -eleven ships which had accompanied him from the West -Indies,—intending to go either to Ferrol, Brest, or Ireland, -according to the tidings which might reach him on the -way. After communicating with Cornwallis, he continued -on to England with his own ship, the "Victory," and one -other whose condition required immediate repairs. On -the 18th he landed in Portsmouth, after an absence of -over two years.</p> - -<p>Cornwallis had now under his command a concentrated -force of thirty-four or thirty-five sail-of-the-line, all admirably -seasoned and disciplined. The allies had in Brest -twenty-one, in Ferrol twenty-nine; two great bodies, neither -of which, however, was equal in number, nor still less in -quality, to his. Adrift somewhere on the sea were the five -French ships from Rochefort. For more than five months -these vessels, which sailed on the 17th of July, five days -after the blockading ships had left to join Calder, ranged -the seas without meeting an equal British division,—a circumstance -which earned for them from the French the -name of "the Invisible Squadron." But, while thus fortunately -unseen by the enemy, Napoleon found it equally -impossible to bring them within the scope of his combinations; -<a name="FNanchor_229_229" id="FNanchor_229_229"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_229_229" class="fnanchor">[229]</a> -and it may be doubted whether commerce-destroying -to the sum of two million dollars compensated -for the loss of so important a military factor.</p> - -<p>The ships in Cadiz being blocked by Collingwood, and -those in Cartagena remaining always inert, the naval -situation was now comparatively simple. Cornwallis was -superior to either of the enemy's detachments, and he held -an interior position. In case Villeneuve approached, it -was scarcely possible that the two hostile squadrons, dependent -upon the wind, which if fair for one would be -foul to the other, could unite before he had effectually -crushed one of them. It ought to be equally improbable, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span> -with proper lookouts, that Villeneuve could elude the -British fleet and gain so far the start of it as to cover the -Straits of Dover during the time required by Napoleon. -In his concentrated force and his interior position Cornwallis -controlled the issue,—barring of course those -accidents which cannot be foreseen, and which at times -derange the best-laid plans.</p> - -<p>Such was the situation when, on August 17, Cornwallis -was informed that Villeneuve had put to sea with, it -was said, twenty-seven or twenty-eight ships-of-the-line. -He at once detached toward Ferrol Sir Robert Calder -with eighteen sail, keeping with himself sixteen. This -division of his fleet, which is condemned by the simplest -and most generally admitted principles of warfare, transferred -to Villeneuve all the advantage of central position -and superior force, and was stigmatized by Napoleon as a -"glaring blunder." "What a chance," he wrote, upon -hearing it when all was over, "has Villeneuve missed. -He might, by coming upon Brest from a wide sweep to -sea, have played hide and seek with Calder and fallen -upon Cornwallis; or else, with his thirty ships have -beaten Calder's twenty and gained a decided preponderance." -<a name="FNanchor_230_230" id="FNanchor_230_230"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_230_230" class="fnanchor">[230]</a> -This censure of both admirals was just.</p> - -<p>While the British squadrons were concentrating in the -Bay of Biscay, and the happy insight and diligence of Nelson -were bringing the Mediterranean ships to the critical -centre of action, Napoleon, from the heights overlooking -Boulogne, was eagerly awaiting news from Villeneuve, -and at the same time anxiously watching the signs of the -times on the Continent, where the sky was already dark -with a gathering storm. The encroachments which led to -the second war with Great Britain, in 1803, had excited -no less distrust among the continental powers, who were -indeed more immediately and disastrously affected by -them; but none had then dared to move. The violation -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> -of German neutrality in 1804, by the seizure of the Duc -d'Enghien on the soil of Baden, had caused a general -indignation; which, on the part of Russia and Austria, -was quickened into a desire to act by his execution, regarded -by most as a judicial murder. Prussia shared the -anger and fears of the other powers, but not enough to -decide her vacillating government.</p> - -<p>In this state of things the fall of the Addington ministry, -and the consequent vigor imparted to the foreign -policy of Great Britain by Pitt's second accession to -power, led naturally to another coalition; the centre of -which, as ever, was found in London. The czar having -remonstrated vigorously, both with Napoleon and the -German Diet, upon the seizure of the Duc d'Enghien, a -bitter correspondence had followed, causing the rupture -of diplomatic relations between France and Russia in -August, 1804. For similar reasons, and at the same time, -the French embassy to Sweden was recalled. Austria -still temporized, though her actions excited Napoleon's -suspicions.</p> - -<p>Early in 1805 the czar sent special envoys to London, -to treat concerning certain vast schemes for the reorganization -of Europe in the interests of general peace. The -particular object was not reached; but on the 11th of -April a treaty between Great Britain and Russia was -signed, the two agreeing to promote a league among the -powers to stop further encroachments by Napoleon. Six -weeks later the emperor was crowned King of Italy, and -in June Genoa was annexed to France. This last act, -contemplated by Napoleon for many years, -<a name="FNanchor_231_231" id="FNanchor_231_231"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_231_231" class="fnanchor">[231]</a> determined -Austria's accession to the treaty. By her signature, given -August 9, -<a name="FNanchor_232_232" id="FNanchor_232_232"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_232_232" class="fnanchor">[232]</a> -the third coalition was formed. Sweden became -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> -a party to it at the same time, and Great Britain -undertook to pay subsidies to all the members.</p> - -<p>The preparations of Austria, ever deliberate, could not -escape Napoleon's watchful eye. "All my news from -Italy is warlike," he writes, "and indeed Austria no -longer observes any concealment." -<a name="FNanchor_233_233" id="FNanchor_233_233"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_233_233" class="fnanchor">[233]</a> Yet, trusting to his -enemy's slowness and his own readiness, he did not lose -hope. The position was precisely analogous to those -military situations in which he had so often snatched -success from overwhelming numbers, by rapidly throwing -himself on one enemy before the other could join. He -might even yet deal his long cherished blow to Great -Britain, under which, if successful, Austria also would -at once succumb. On August 13, two days after learning -of Villeneuve's entry into Coruña, he instructs Talleyrand -to notify the emperor that the troops assembled in -the Tyrol <i>must</i> be withdrawn to Bohemia, leaving him -free to carry on his war with England undisturbed, or by -November he will be in Vienna. -<a name="FNanchor_234_234" id="FNanchor_234_234"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_234_234" class="fnanchor">[234]</a> Urgent messages are -the same day sent to Villeneuve to hasten and fulfil his -mission, for time was pressing; threatened by Austria -and Great Britain, a blow must speedily be struck. He -is no longer ordered to refrain from fighting. On the -contrary, if superior to the British, counting two Spanish -ships equal to one French, he is to attack at all hazards. -<a name="FNanchor_235_235" id="FNanchor_235_235"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_235_235" class="fnanchor">[235]</a> -"If with thirty ships my admirals fear to attack twenty-four -British, we may as well give up all hope of a -navy." -<a name="FNanchor_236_236" id="FNanchor_236_236"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_236_236" class="fnanchor">[236]</a></p> - -<p>On the 23d of August the emperor announces to Talleyrand -his final and momentous decision: "My squadron -sailed August 14 from Ferrol with thirty-four ships; -<a name="FNanchor_237_237" id="FNanchor_237_237"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_237_237" class="fnanchor">[237]</a> it -had no enemy in sight. If it follows my instructions, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span> -joins the Brest squadron and enters the Channel, there is -still time; I am master of England. If, on the contrary, -my admirals hesitate, manœuvre badly, and do not fulfil -their purpose, I have no other resource than to wait for -winter to cross with the flotilla. That operation is risky; -it would be more so if, pressed by time, political events -should oblige me to postpone it to the month of April. -Such being the case, I hasten to meet the most pressing -danger: I raise my camp here, and by September 23 I -shall have in Germany two hundred thousand men, and -twenty-five thousand in Naples. I march upon Vienna, -and do not lay down my arms until I have Naples and -Venice, and have no more to fear from Austria. Austria -will certainly thus be quieted during the winter." These -words were a prophecy. The same day numerous orders, -strictly preparatory as yet, were issued to the troops in -Hanover, Holland, and Italy, and other provision made for -the contemplated change of purpose. At the same time, -still clinging to every hope of arresting Austria, and so -being left free for the invasion of England, he sent Duroc -to Berlin to offer Hanover to Prussia, upon condition -that the latter should move troops toward Bohemia or at -least make a clear declaration to Austria.</p> - -<p>The issue was already decided. On the 13th of August, -after three fruitless attempts, Villeneuve got to sea with -his twenty-nine ships-of-the-line. The frigate "Didon" -was sent to seek the Rochefort squadron and direct it also -upon Brest. Yet the unfortunate admiral was even then -hesitating whether he should go there with his vastly -greater force, and the orders were likely seriously to endanger -the smaller division. As he sailed, he penned -these significant words to the Minister of Marine: "The -enemy's forces, more concentrated than ever, leave me -little other resource than to go to Cadiz." -<a name="FNanchor_238_238" id="FNanchor_238_238"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_238_238" class="fnanchor">[238]</a></p> - -<p>Shortly after he cleared the harbor the wind shifted to -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> -north-east, foul for his purpose. The fleet stood to the -north-west; but the ships were badly handled and several -received damage. On the morning of the 15th they were -two hundred and fifty miles west-north-west from Cape -Finisterre; the wind blowing a moderate gale, still from -the north-east. Three ships of war were in sight,—two -British, the third the frigate that had been sent to seek -the Rochefort squadron, but which had been captured. -A Danish merchantman reported that they were lookouts -from a hostile body of twenty-five ships. The story had -no foundation, for Cornwallis had not yet divided his -fleet; but Villeneuve pictured to himself his inefficient -command meeting a force with which it was wholly unable -to cope. Losing sight of the great whole of which -his own enterprise was but a part, though one of vital -importance, his resolution finally broke down. That -evening he ordered the fleet to bear up for Cadiz. On -the 20th -<a name="FNanchor_239_239" id="FNanchor_239_239"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_239_239" class="fnanchor">[239]</a> it was sighted from the three ships commanded -by Collingwood, who with a small division of varying -strength had watched the port since the previous May. -With steady judgment, that admiral in retiring kept just -out of gunshot, determined, as he said, not to be driven -into the Mediterranean without dragging the enemy too -through the Straits. Villeneuve had little heart to pursue. -That afternoon he anchored in Cadiz, where were -then assembled thirty-five French and Spanish ships-of-the-line. -Collingwood at once resumed his station outside. -That night one ship-of-the-line joined him, and on -the 22d Sir Richard Bickerton arrived with four from the -Mediterranean. On the 30th Calder appeared, bringing -with him the eighteen detached by Cornwallis. In compliance -with his orders he had been before Ferrol, found -the port empty, and, learning that Villeneuve had sailed -for Cadiz, had hastened to re-enforce the blockade. With -twenty-six ships-of-the-line Collingwood held the enemy -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span> -securely checked, and remained in chief command until -the 28th of September, when Nelson arrived from -England.</p> - -<p>Thus ended, and forever, Napoleon's profoundly conceived -and laboriously prepared scheme for the invasion -of England. If it be sought to fix a definite moment -which marked the final failure of so vast a plan, that one -may well be chosen when Villeneuve made signal to bear -up for Cadiz. When, precisely, Napoleon learned the -truth, does not appear. Decrès, the Minister of Marine, -had however prepared him in some measure for Villeneuve's -action; and, after a momentary outburst of rage -against the unfortunate admiral, he at once issued in -rapid succession the directions, by which, to use his own -graphic expression, his legions were made to "pirouette," -and the march toward the Rhine and Upper Danube was -begun. "My decision is taken," he writes to Talleyrand, -August 25; "my movement is begun. Three weeks hence -I shall be in Germany with two hundred thousand men." -During that and the two following days order after order -issued from his headquarters; and on the 28th he wrote to -Duroc that the army was in full movement. To conceal -his change of purpose and to gain all-important time, by -lulling the suspicions of Austria, he himself remained at -Boulogne, with his eyes seemingly fixed seaward, until -the 3d of September, when he went to Paris. On the -24th he left the capital for the army, on the 26th he was -at Strasbourg, and on the 7th of October the French army, -numbering near two hundred thousand, struck the Danube -below Ulm; cutting off some eighty thousand Austrians -there assembled under General Mack. On the 20th, the -day before Trafalgar, Ulm capitulated; thirty thousand -men laying down their arms. Thirty thousand more had -been taken in the actions preceding this event. -<a name="FNanchor_240_240" id="FNanchor_240_240"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_240_240" class="fnanchor">[240]</a> On the -13th of November French troops entered Vienna, and on -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> -the 2d of December the battle of Austerlitz was won over -the combined Russians and Austrians. On the 26th the -emperor of Germany signed the Peace of Presburg. By it -he relinquished Venice with all other possessions in Italy, -and ceded the Tyrol to Bavaria, the ally of France.</p> - -<p>Austria was thus quieted for three years, but the expedition -against Great Britain was never resumed. In the -course of the following year difficulties arose between -Prussia and France, which led to war and the overthrow -of the North German kingdom at Auerstadt and Jena. -Yet another campaign was needed to bring Russia to -peace in 1807. Meanwhile the Boulogne flotilla was rotting -on the beach. In October, 1807, Decrès, by Napoleon's -orders, made an inspection of the boats and the -four ports. Of the twelve hundred of the former, specially -built for the invasion, not over three hundred were fit to -put to sea; of the nine hundred transports nearly all were -past service. The circular port at Boulogne was covered -two feet deep with sand; those of Vimereux and -Ambleteuse, three feet. A very few years more would -suffice to bury them. -<a name="FNanchor_241_241" id="FNanchor_241_241"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_241_241" class="fnanchor">[241]</a> In 1814 an English lady, visiting -Boulogne after Napoleon's first abdication, noted in her -journal that the mud walls of the encampment were still -to be seen on the heights behind the town,—the crumbling -record of a great failure.</p> - -<p>The question will naturally here arise, What at any -time were the chances of success? To a purely speculative -question, involving so many elements and into which -the conditions of sea war then introduced so many varying -quantities, it would be folly to reply with a positive -assertion. Certain determining factors may, however, be -profitably noted. It is, for instance, evident that, if -Villeneuve on leaving the West Indies had had with him -the Ferrol squadron, and still more if he had been joined -by Ganteaume, he could have steered at once for the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span> -Channel; and, by attending to well-known weather conditions, -could have entered it with a favoring wind sure to -last him to Boulogne. The difficulty of effecting such a -combination in the West Indies, which was Napoleon's -favorite project, was owing to the presence of British -divisions before the hostile ports; and step by step this -circumstance drove the emperor back on what he pronounced -the worst alternative,—a concentration in front -of Brest. As has been noticed, at the critical moment -when this final concentration was to be attempted, the -British, by a series of movements which resulted naturally -from their strategic policy, were before that port in -force superior to either of the French detachments seeking -there to make their junction. Cornwallis's blunder -in dividing that force cannot obscure the military lesson -involved.</p> - -<p>Nor can Calder's error, in suffering Villeneuve to escape -him in July, detract from the equally significant and precisely -similar lesson then illustrated. There also the -British fleet was on hand to check an important junction—at -a point so far from Ferrol as to be out of supporting -distance by the division in the port—by virtue of -an intelligent use of interior positions and interior lines.</p> - -<p>To the strategic advantage conferred by these interior -positions, for clinging to which credit is due above all to -St. Vincent, is to be added the very superior character of -the British personnel,—particularly of the officers; for the -immense demand for seamen made it hard to maintain -the quality of the crews. Continually cruising, not singly -but in squadrons more or less numerous, the ships were -ever on the drill ground,—nay, on the battle-field,—experiencing -all the varying phases impressed upon it by -the changes of the ocean. Thus practised and hardened -into perfect machines, though inferior in numbers, they -were continually superior in force and in mobility to their -opponents.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span></p> - -<p>Possessing, therefore, strategic advantage and superior -force, the probabilities favored Great Britain. Nevertheless, -there remained to Napoleon enough chances of success -to forbid saying that his enterprise was hopeless. A -seaman can scarcely deny that, despite the genius of Nelson -and the tenacity of the British officers, it was possible -that some favorable concurrence of circumstances might -have brought forty or more French ships into the Channel, -and given Napoleon the mastery of the Straits for the few -days he asked. The very removal of the squadrons of -observation from before Rochefort and Ferrol, in order to -constitute the fleet with which Calder fought Villeneuve, -though admirable as a display of generalship, shows that -the British navy, so far as numbers were concerned, was -not adequate to perfect security, and might, by some conceivable -combination of circumstances, have been outwitted -and overwhelmed at the decisive point.</p> - -<p>The importance attached by the emperor to his project -was not exaggerated. He might, or he might not, succeed; -but, if he failed against Great Britain, he failed everywhere. -This he, with the intuition of genius, felt; and to this the -record of his after history now bears witness. To the strife -of arms with the great Sea Power succeeded the strife of -endurance. Amid all the pomp and circumstance of the -war which for ten years to come desolated the Continent, -amid all the tramping to and fro over Europe of the French -armies and their auxiliary legions, there went on unceasingly -that noiseless pressure upon the vitals of France, -that compulsion, whose silence, when once noted, becomes -to the observer the most striking and awful mark of the -working of Sea Power. Under it the resources of the -Continent wasted more and more with each succeeding -year; and Napoleon, amid all the splendor of his imperial -position, was ever needy. To this, and to the immense -expenditures required to enforce the Continental System, -are to be attributed most of those arbitrary acts which -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> -made him the hated of the peoples, for whose enfranchisement -he did so much. Lack of revenue and lack -of credit, such was the price paid by Napoleon for the -Continental System, through which alone, after Trafalgar, -he hoped to crush the Power of the Sea. It may be -doubted whether, amid all his glory, he ever felt secure -after the failure of the invasion of England. To borrow -his own vigorous words, in the address to the nation -issued before he joined the army, "To live without commerce, -without shipping, without colonies, subjected to -the unjust will of our enemies, is to live as Frenchmen -should not." Yet so had France to live throughout his -reign, by the will of the one enemy never conquered.</p> - -<p>On the 14th of September, before quitting Paris, Napoleon -sent Villeneuve orders to take the first favorable -opportunity to leave Cadiz, to enter the Mediterranean, -join the ships at Cartagena, and with this combined force -move upon southern Italy. There, at any suitable point, -he was to land the troops embarked in the fleet to re-enforce -General St. Cyr, who already had instructions to -be ready to attack Naples at a moment's notice. -<a name="FNanchor_242_242" id="FNanchor_242_242"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_242_242" class="fnanchor">[242]</a> The -next day these orders were reiterated to Decrès, enforcing -the importance to the general campaign of so powerful a -diversion as the presence of this great fleet in the Mediterranean; -but, as "Villeneuve's excessive pusillanimity -will prevent him from undertaking this, you will send to -replace him Admiral Rosily, who will bear letters directing -Villeneuve to return to France and give an account of -his conduct." -<a name="FNanchor_243_243" id="FNanchor_243_243"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_243_243" class="fnanchor">[243]</a> The emperor had already formulated his -complaints against the admiral under seven distinct -heads. -<a name="FNanchor_244_244" id="FNanchor_244_244"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_244_244" class="fnanchor">[244]</a> On the 15th of September, the same day the -orders to relieve Villeneuve were issued, Nelson, having -spent at home only twenty-five days, left England for the -last time. On the 28th, when he joined the fleet off -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> -Cadiz, he found under his command twenty-nine ships-of-the-line, -which successive arrivals raised to thirty-three by -the day of the battle; but, water running short, it became -necessary to send the ships, by divisions of six, to fill up -at Gibraltar. To this cause was due that only twenty-seven -British vessels were present in the action,—an unfortunate -circumstance; for, as Nelson said, what the -country wanted was not merely a splendid victory, but -annihilation; "numbers only can annihilate." -<a name="FNanchor_245_245" id="FNanchor_245_245"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_245_245" class="fnanchor">[245]</a> The force -under his command was thus disposed: the main body -about fifty miles west-south-west of Cadiz, seven lookout -frigates close in with the port, and between these extremes, -two small detachments of ships-of-the-line,—the -one twenty miles from the harbor, the other about thirty-five. -"By this chain," he wrote, "I hope to have constant -communication with the frigates."</p> - -<p>Napoleon's commands to enter the Mediterranean reached -Villeneuve on September 27. The following day, when -Nelson was joining his fleet, the admiral acknowledged -their receipt, and submissively reported his intention to -obey as soon as the wind served. Before he could do so, -accurate intelligence was received of the strength of -Nelson's force, which the emperor had not known. Villeneuve -assembled a council of war to consider the situation, -and the general opinion was adverse to sailing; but -the commander-in-chief, alleging the orders of Napoleon, -announced his determination to follow them. To this all -submitted. An event, then unforeseen by Villeneuve, -precipitated his action.</p> - -<p>Admiral Rosily's approach was known in Cadiz some -time before he could arrive. It at first made little impression -upon Villeneuve, who was not expecting to be -superseded. On the 11th of October, however, along with -the news that his successor had reached Madrid, there -came to him a rumor of the truth. His honor took alarm. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span> -If not allowed to remain afloat, how remove the undeserved -imputation of cowardice which he knew had by some been -attached to his name. He at once wrote to Decrès that he -would have been well content if permitted to continue -with the fleet in a subordinate capacity; and closed with -the words, "I will sail to-morrow, if circumstances -favor."</p> - -<p>The wind next day was fair, and the combined fleets -began to weigh. On the 19th eight ships got clear of the -harbor, and by ten <span class="sc">A. M.</span> Nelson, far at sea, knew by signal -that the long-expected movement had begun. He at -once made sail toward the Straits of Gibraltar to bar the -entrance of the Mediterranean to the allies. On the 20th, -all the latter, thirty-three ships-of-the-line accompanied -by five frigates and two brigs, were at sea, steering with -a south-west wind to the northward and westward to gain -the offing needed before heading direct for the Straits. -That morning Nelson, for whom the wind had been fair, -was lying to off Cape Spartel to intercept the enemy; and -learning from his frigates that they were north of him, he -stood in that direction to meet them.</p> - -<p>During the day the wind shifted to west, still fair for -the British and allowing the allies, by going about, to -head south. It was still very weak, so that the progress -of the fleets was slow. During the night both manœuvred; -the allies to gain, the British to retain, the position they -wished. At daybreak of the 21st they were in presence, -the French and Spaniards steering south in five columns; -of which the two to windward, containing together twelve -ships, constituted a detached squadron of observation -under Admiral Gravina. The remaining twenty-one -formed the main body, commanded by Villeneuve. Cape -Trafalgar, from which the battle took its name, was on -the south-eastern horizon, ten or twelve miles from the -allies; and the British fleet was at the same distance from -them to the westward.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span></p> - -<p>Soon after daylight Villeneuve signalled to form line -of battle on the starboard tack, on which they were then -sailing, heading south. In performing this evolution -Gravina with his twelve ships took post in the van of the -allied fleet, his own flag-ship heading the column. It is -disputed between the French and Spaniards whether this -step was taken by Villeneuve's order, or of Gravina's own -motion. In either case, these twelve, by abandoning their -central and windward position, sacrificed to a great extent -their power to re-enforce any threatened part of the order, -and also unduly extended a line already too long. In the -end, instead of being a reserve well in hand, they became -the helpless victims of the British concentration.</p> - -<p>At 8 <span class="sc">A. M.</span> Villeneuve saw that battle could not be -shunned. Wishing to have Cadiz under his lee in case of -disaster, he ordered the combined fleet to wear together. -The signal was clumsily executed; but by ten all had -gone round and were heading north in inverse order, -Gravina's squadron in the rear. At eleven Villeneuve -directed this squadron to keep well to windward, so as to -be in position to succor the centre, upon which the enemy -seemed about to make his chief attack; a judicious order, -but rendered fruitless by the purpose of the British to -concentrate on the rear itself. When this signal was -made, Cadiz was twenty miles distant in the north-north-east, -and the course of the allies was carrying them -toward it.</p> - -<p>Owing to the lightness of the wind Nelson would lose -no time in manœuvring. He formed his fleet rapidly in -two divisions, each in single column, the simplest and -most flexible order of attack, and the one whose regularity -is most easily preserved. The simple column, however, -unflanked, sacrifices during the critical period of closing -the support given by the rear ships to the leader, and -draws upon the latter the concentrated fire of the enemy's -line. Its use by Nelson on this occasion has been much -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span> -criticised. It is therefore to be remarked that, although -his orders, issued several days previous to the battle, are -somewhat ambiguous on this point, their natural meaning -seems to indicate the intention, if attacking from to windward, -to draw up with his fleet in two columns parallel to -the enemy and abreast his rear. Then the column nearest -the enemy, the lee, keeping away together, would advance -in line against the twelve rear ships; while the weather -column, moving forward, would hold in check the remainder -of the hostile fleet. In either event, whether attacking -in column or in line, the essential feature of his plan -was to overpower twelve of the enemy by sixteen British, -while the remainder of his force covered this operation. -The destruction of the rear was entrusted to the second in -command; he himself with a smaller body took charge of -the more uncertain duties of the containing force. "The -second in command," wrote he in his memorable order, -"will, after my instructions are made known to him, have -the entire direction of his line."</p> - -<p>The justification of Nelson's dispositions for battle at -Trafalgar rests therefore primarily upon the sluggish -breeze, which would so have delayed formations as to risk -the loss of the opportunity. It must also be observed that, -although a column of ships does not possess the sustained -momentum of a column of men, whose depth and mass -combine to drive it through the relatively thin resistance -of a line, and so cut the latter in twain, the results nevertheless -are closely analogous. The leaders in either case -are sacrificed,—success is won over their prostrate forms; -but the continued impact upon one part of the enemy's -order is essentially a concentration, the issue of which, if -long enough maintained, cannot be doubtful. Penetration, -severance, and the enveloping of one of the parted fragments, -must be the result. So, exactly, it was at Trafalgar. -It must also be noted that the rear ships of either -column, until they reached the hostile line, swept with -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> -their broadsides the sea over which enemy's ships from -either flank might try to come to the support of the attacked -centre. No such attempt was in fact made from -either extremity of the combined fleet.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"><a name="i-190.jpg" id="i-190.jpg"></a> - <img src="images/i-190.jpg" - alt="" /> - <div class="caption">The Attack at Trafalgar.<br /> - <a href="images/i-190hr.jpg"><span class="disp">Click here for - larger map</span></a></div> -</div> - -<p>The two British columns were nearly a mile apart and -advanced on parallel courses,—heading nearly east, but a -little to the northward to allow for the gradual advance -in that direction of the hostile fleet. The northern or -left-hand column, commonly called the "weather line" -because the wind came rather from that side, contained -twelve ships, and was led by Nelson himself in the "Victory," -a ship of one hundred guns. The "Royal Sovereign," -of the same size and carrying Collingwood's flag, -headed the right column, of fifteen ships.</p> - -<p>To the British advance the allies opposed the traditional -order of battle, a long single line, closehauled,—in this -case heading north, with the wind from west-north-west. -The distance from one flank to the other was nearly five -miles. Owing partly to the lightness of the breeze, partly -to the great number of ships, and partly to the inefficiency -of many of the units of the fleet, the line was very imperfectly -formed. Ships were not in their places, intervals -were of irregular width, here vessels were not closed up, -there two overlapped, one masking the other's fire. The -general result was that, instead of a line, the allied order -showed a curve of gradual sweep, convex toward the east. -To the British approach from the west, therefore, it presented -a disposition resembling a re-entrant angle; and -Collingwood, noting with observant eye the advantage of -this arrangement for a cross-fire, commented favorably -upon it in his report of the battle. It was, however, the -result of chance, not of intention,—due, not to the talent -of the chief, but to the want of skill in his subordinates.</p> - -<p>The commander-in-chief of the allies, Villeneuve, was -in the "Bucentaure," an eighty-gun ship, the twelfth in -order from the van of the line. Immediately ahead of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> -him was the huge Spanish four-decker, the "Santisima -Trinidad," a Goliath among ships, which had now come -forth to her last battle. Sixth behind the "Bucentaure," -and therefore eighteenth in the order, came a Spanish three-decker, -the "Santa Ana," flying the flag of Vice-Admiral -Alava. These two admirals marked the right and left of -the allied centre, and upon them, therefore, the British -leaders respectively directed their course,—Nelson upon -the "Bucentaure," Collingwood upon the "Santa Ana."</p> - -<p>The "Royal Sovereign" had recently been refitted, and -with clean new copper easily outsailed her more worn -followers. Thus it happened that, as Collingwood came -within range, his ship, outstripping the others by three -quarters of a mile, entered alone, and for twenty minutes -endured, unsupported, the fire of all the hostile ships that -could reach her. A proud deed, surely, but surely also -not a deed to be commended as a pattern. The first shot -of the battle was fired at her by the "Fougueux," the next -astern of the "Santa Ana." This was just at noon, and -with the opening guns the ships of both fleets hoisted their -ensigns; the Spaniards also hanging large wooden crosses -from their spanker booms.</p> - -<p>The "Royal Sovereign" advanced in silence until, ten -minutes later, she passed close under the stern of the -"Santa Ana." Then she fired a double-shotted broadside -which struck down four hundred of the enemy's crew, -and, luffing rapidly, took her position close alongside, -the muzzles of the hostile guns nearly touching. Here -the "Royal Sovereign" underwent the fire not only of her -chief antagonist, but of four other ships; three of which -belonged to the division of five that ought closely to have -knit the "Santa Ana" to the "Bucentaure," and so fixed -an impassable barrier to the enemy seeking to pierce the -centre. The fact shows strikingly the looseness of the -allied order, these three being all in rear and to leeward -of their proper stations.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span></p> - -<p>For fifteen minutes the "Royal Sovereign" was the only -British ship in close action. Then her next astern entered -the battle, followed successively by the rest of the column. -In rear of the "Santa Ana" were fifteen ships. Among -these, Collingwood's vessels penetrated in various directions; -chiefly, however, at first near the spot where his flag -had led the way, enveloping and destroying in detail the -enemy's centre and leading rear ships, and then passing -on to subdue the rest. Much doubtless was determined by -chance in such confusion and obscurity; but the original -tactical plan insured an overwhelming concentration upon -a limited portion of the enemy's order. This being subdued -with the less loss, because so outnumbered, the intelligence -and skill of the various British captains readily -compassed the destruction of the dwindling remnant. -Of the sixteen ships, including the "Santa Ana," which -composed the allied rear, twelve were taken or destroyed.</p> - -<p>Not till one o'clock, or nearly half an hour after the -vessels next following Collingwood came into action, did -the "Victory" reach the "Bucentaure." The latter was -raked with the same dire results that befell the "Santa -Ana;" but a ship close to leeward blocked the way, and -Nelson was not able to grapple with the enemy's commander-in-chief. -The "Victory," prevented from going through -the line, fell on board the "Redoutable," a French seventy-four, -between which and herself a furious action followed,—the -two lying in close contact. At half-past one Nelson -fell mortally wounded, the battle still raging fiercely.</p> - -<p>The ship immediately following Nelson's came also -into collision with the "Redoutable," which thus found -herself in combat with two antagonists. The next three -of the British weather column each in succession raked -the "Bucentaure," complying thus with Nelson's order that -every effort must be made to capture the enemy's commander-in-chief. -Passing on, these three concentrated -their efforts, first, upon the "Bucentaure," and next upon the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span> -"Santisima Trinidad." Thus it happened that upon the -allied commander-in-chief, upon his next ahead, and upon -the ship which, though not his natural supporter astern, -had sought and filled that honorable post,—upon the key, -in short, of the allied order,—were combined under the -most advantageous conditions the fires of five hostile -vessels, three of them first-rates. Consequently, not only -were the three added to the prizes, but also a great breach -was made between the van and rear of the combined fleets. -This breach became yet wider by the singular conduct of -Villeneuve's proper next astern. Soon after the "Victory" -came into action, that ship bore up out of the line, wore -round, and stood toward the rear, followed by three -others. This movement is attributed to a wish to succor -the rear. If so, it was at best an indiscreet and ill-timed -act, which finds little palliation in the fact that not one -of these ships was taken.</p> - -<p>Thus, two hours after the battle began, the allied fleet was -cut in two, the rear enveloped and in process of being destroyed -in detail, the "Bucentaure," "Santisima Trinidad," -and "Redoutable" practically reduced, though not yet surrendered. -Ahead of the "Santisima Trinidad" were ten -ships, which as yet had not been engaged. The inaction -of the van, though partly accounted for by the slackness -of the wind, has given just cause for censure. To it, at -ten minutes before two, Villeneuve made signal to get -into action and to wear together. This was accomplished -with difficulty, owing to the heavy swell and want of wind. -At three, however, all the ships were about, but by an -extraordinary fatality they did not keep together. Five -with Admiral Dumanoir stood along to windward of the -battle, three passed to leeward of it, and two, keeping -away, left the field entirely. Of the whole number, three -were intercepted, raising the loss of the allies to eighteen -ships-of-the-line taken, one of which caught fire and was -burned. The approach of Admiral Dumanoir, if made an -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span> -hour earlier, might have conduced to save Villeneuve; it -was now too late. Exchanging a few distant broadsides -with enemy's ships, he stood off to the south-west with -four vessels; one of those at first with him having been -cut off.</p> - -<p>At quarter before five Admiral Gravina, whose ship -had been the rear of the order during the battle and had -lost heavily, retreated toward Cadiz, making signal to the -vessels which had not struck to form around his flag. Five -other Spanish ships and five French followed him. As he -was withdrawing, the last two to resist of the allied fleet -struck their colors.</p> - -<p>During the night of the 21st these eleven ships anchored -at the mouth of Cadiz harbor, which they could not then -enter, on account of a land wind from south-east. At the -same time the British and their prizes were being carried -shoreward by the heavy swell which had prevailed during -the battle; the light air blowing from the sea not enabling -them to haul off. The situation was one of imminent -peril. At midnight the wind freshened much, but fortunately -hauled to the southward, whence it blew a gale all -the 22d. The ships got their heads to the westward and -drew off shore, with thirteen of the prizes; the other four -having had to anchor off Cape Trafalgar. That morning -the "Bucentaure," Villeneuve's late flag-ship, was wrecked -on some rocks off the entrance to Cadiz; and toward -evening the "Redoutable," that had so nobly supported her, -was found to be sinking astern of the British ship that had -her in tow. During the night of the 22d she went down, -with a hundred and fifty of her people still on board. On -the 24th the same fate befell the great "Santisima Trinidad," -which had been the French admiral's next ahead. -Thus his own ship and his two supports vanished from -the seas.</p> - -<p>For several days the wind continued violent from north-west -and south-west. On the 23d five of the ships that had -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span> -escaped with Gravina put out, to cut off some of the prizes -that were near the coast. They succeeded in taking two; -but as these were battered to pieces, while three of the five -rescuers were carried on the beach and wrecked with great -loss of life, little advantage resulted from this well-meant -and gallant sortie. Two other prizes were given up to -their own crews by the British prize-masters, because the -latter were not able with their scanty force to save them. -These got into Cadiz. Of the remaining British prizes, -all but four either went ashore or were destroyed by the -orders of Collingwood, who despaired of saving them. No -British ship was lost.</p> - -<p>Of thirty-three combined French and Spanish ships -which sailed out of Cadiz on the 20th of October, eleven, -five French and six Spanish, mostly now disabled hulks, -lay there at anchor on the last day of the month. The -four that escaped to sea under Dumanoir fell in with a -British squadron of the same size near Cape Ortegal, on -the 4th of November, and were all taken. This raised the -allied loss to twenty-two,—two more than the twenty for -which Nelson, in his dying hour, declared that he had -bargained.</p> - -<p>No attempt to move from Cadiz was again made by the -shattered relics of the fight. On the 25th of October -Rosily arrived and took up his now blasted command. -Nearly three years later, when the Spanish monarchy, so -long the submissive tool of the Directory and of Napoleon, -had been overthrown by the latter, and the Spanish people -had risen against the usurper, the five French ships were -still in the port. Surprised between the British blockade -and the now hostile batteries of the coast, Rosily, after -an engagement of two days with the latter, surrendered -his squadron, with the four thousand seamen then on -board. This event occurred on the 14th of June, 1808. -It was the last echo of Trafalgar.</p> - -<p>Such, in its leading outlines and direct consequences, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span> -was the famous battle of Trafalgar. Its lasting significance -and far-reaching results have been well stated by a -recent historian, more keenly alive than most of his -fellows to the paramount, though silent, influence of Sea -Power upon the course of events: "Trafalgar was not -only the greatest naval victory, it was the greatest and -most momentous victory won either by land or by sea -during the whole of the Revolutionary War. No victory, -and no series of victories, of Napoleon produced the same -effect upon Europe.... A generation passed after Trafalgar -before France again seriously threatened England at -sea. The prospect of crushing the British navy, so long -as England had the means to equip a navy, vanished. -Napoleon henceforth set his hopes on exhausting England's -resources, by compelling every state on the Continent to -exclude her commerce. Trafalgar forced him to impose -his yoke upon <i>all</i> Europe, or to abandon the hope of conquering -Great Britain.... Nelson's last triumph left -England in such a position that no means remained to -injure her but those which <i>must result in the ultimate deliverance -of the Continent</i>." -<a name="FNanchor_246_246" id="FNanchor_246_246"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_246_246" class="fnanchor">[246]</a></p> - -<p>These words may be accepted with very slight modification. -Napoleon's scheme for the invasion of Great -Britain, thwarted once and again by the strategic difficulties -attendant upon its execution, was finally frustrated -when Villeneuve gave up the attempt to reach Brest and -headed for Cadiz. On the part of the allies Trafalgar -was, in itself, a useless holocaust, precipitated in the end -by the despair of the unfortunate admiral, upon whose -irresolution Napoleon not unjustly visited the anger -caused by the wreck of his plans. Villeneuve was perfectly -clear-sighted and right in his appreciation of the -deficiencies of his command,—of the many chances against -success. Where he wretchedly failed was in not recognizing -the simple duty of obedience,—the obligation to -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span> -persist at all hazards in the part of a great scheme assigned -to him, even though it led to the destruction of -his whole force. Had he, upon leaving Ferrol, been visited -by a little of the desperation which brought him to -Trafalgar, the invasion of England might possibly—not -probably—have been effected.</p> - -<p>An event so striking as the battle of Trafalgar becomes, -however, to mankind the symbol of all the circumstances—more -important, perhaps, but less obvious—which culminate -in it. In this sense it may be said that Trafalgar -was the cause—as it certainly marked the period—of -Napoleon's resolution to crush Great Britain by excluding -her commerce from the Continent. Here, therefore, the -story of the influence of Sea Power upon this great conflict -ceases to follow the strictly naval events, and becomes -concerned simply with commerce-destroying, ordinarily a -secondary operation of maritime war, but exalted in the -later years of Napoleon's reign to be the principal, if not -the sole, means of action.</p> - -<p>To this the two next chapters are devoted. Of these, the -first deals with commerce-destroying in the ordinary sense -of the words, directed against enemies' property on the -high seas; beginning with the outbreak of war in 1793, -and narrating the series of measures by which the republic -sought to break down British commerce and foreshadowed -the policy of Napoleon's Berlin and Milan -decrees. The second begins with the Berlin decree, in -1806; and, tracing one by one the steps which carried the -emperor from violence to violence, seeks to show how -these found their necessary outcome in the Russian expedition -and the fall of the Empire. Detached thus, as far -as may be, from the maze of contemporary history in -which they are commonly lost, these successive acts of -the French government are seen to form a logical -sequence, connected by one motive and dominated by -one necessity. The motive is the destruction of Great -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span> -Britain, the necessity that of self-preservation. Each -nation, unassailable on its own element, stood like an -impregnable fortress that can be brought to surrender -only by the exhaustion of its resources. In this struggle -of endurance Napoleon fell.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span></p> - - - - -<div class="chapter p4"> -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XVII" id="CHAPTER_XVII"></a>CHAPTER XVII.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="ac"><span class="sc">The Warfare against Commerce during the French Revolution -and Empire, to the Berlin Decree. 1793-1806.</span></p> - -<p class="drop-cap">THE Warfare against Commerce during the French -Revolution, alike under the Republic and under -Napoleon, was marked by the same passionate vehemence, -the same extreme and far-reaching conceptions, the same -obstinate resolve utterly to overthrow and extirpate every -opposing force, that characterized the political and military -enterprises of the period. In the effort to bring under the -yoke of their own policy the commerce of the whole world, -the two chief contestants, France and Great Britain, -swayed back and forth in deadly grapple over the vast -arena, trampling under foot the rights and interests of -the weaker parties; who, whether as neutrals, or as subjects -of friendly or allied powers, looked helplessly on, -and found that in this great struggle for self-preservation, -neither outcries, nor threats, nor despairing submission, -availed to lessen the pressure that was gradually crushing -out both hope and life. The question between Napoleon -and the British people became simply one of endurance, as -was tersely and powerfully shown by the emperor himself. -Both were expending their capital, and drawing freely -drafts upon the future, the one in money, the other in men, -to sustain their present strength. Like two infuriated dogs, -they had locked jaws over Commerce, as the decisive element -in the contest. Neither would let go his grip until failing -vitality should loose it, or until some bystander should -deal one a wound through which the powers of life should -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span> -drain away. All now know that in the latter way the -end came. The commercial policy of the great monarch, -who, from the confines of Europe, had watched the tussle -with all the eagerness of self-interest, angered Napoleon. -To enforce his will, he made new and offensive annexations -of territory. The czar replied by a commercial -edict, sharp and decisive, and war was determined. "It -is all a scene in the Opera," wrote Napoleon, -<a name="FNanchor_247_247" id="FNanchor_247_247"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_247_247" class="fnanchor">[247]</a> "and the -English are the scene shifters." Words failed the men of -that day to represent the grandeur and apparent solidity -of the Empire in 1811, when Napoleon's heir was born. -In December, 1812, it was shattered from turret to foundation -stone; wrecked in the attempt "to conquer the sea -by the land." The scene was shifted indeed.</p> - -<p>Great Britain remained victorious on the field, but she -had touched the verge of ruin. Confronted with the fixed -resolution of her enemy to break down her commerce by -an absolute exclusion from the continent of Europe, and -as far as possible from the rest of the world, she met the -challenge by a measure equally extreme, forbidding all -neutral vessels to enter ports hostile to her, unless they -had first touched at one of her own. Shut out herself from -the Continent, she announced that while this exclusion -lasted she would shut the Continent off from all external -intercourse. "No trade except <i>through</i> England," was the -formula under which her leaders expressed their purpose. -The entrance of Russia into this strife, under the provocations -of Napoleon, prevented the problem, which of these -two policies would overthrow the other, from reaching a -natural solution; and the final result of the measures which -it is one object of this and the following chapter to narrate -must remain for ever uncertain. It is, however, evident -that a commercial and manufacturing country like Great -Britain must, in a strife the essence of which was the -restriction of trade, suffer more than one depending, as -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span> -France did, mainly upon her internal resources. The -question, as before stated, was whether she could endure -the greater drain by her greater wealth. Upon the -whole, the indications were, and to the end continued -to be, that she could do so; that Napoleon, in entering -upon this particular struggle, miscalculated his enemy's -strength.</p> - -<p>But besides this, here, as in every contest where the -opponents are closely matched, where power and discipline -and leadership are nearly equal, there was a further -question: which of the two would make the first and -greatest mistakes, and how ready the other party was to -profit by his errors. In so even a balance, the wisest -prophet cannot foresee how the scale will turn. The -result will depend not merely upon the skill of the -swordsman in handling his weapons, but also upon the -wariness of his fence and the quickness of his returns; -much, too, upon his temper. Here also Napoleon was -worsted. Scarcely was the battle over commerce joined, -when the uprising of Spain was precipitated by over-confidence; -Great Britain hastened at once to place herself -by the side of the insurgents. Four years later, when -the British people were groaning in a protracted financial -crisis,—when, if ever, there was a hope that the expected -convulsion and ruin were at hand,—Napoleon, instead of -waiting for his already rigorous blockade to finish the -work he attributed to it, strove to draw it yet closer, by -demands which were unnecessary and to which the czar -could not yield. Again Great Britain seized her opportunity, -received her late enemy's fleet, and filled his treasury. -Admit the difficulties of Napoleon; allow as we -may for the intricacy of the problem before him; the fact -remains that he wholly misunderstood the temper of the -Spanish people, the dangers of the Spanish enterprise, the -resolution of Alexander. On the other hand, looking -upon the principal charge against the policy of the British -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span> -government, that it alienated the United States, it is -still true that there was no miscalculation as to the long-suffering -of the latter under the guidance of Jefferson, -with his passion for peace. The submission of the -United States lasted until Napoleon was committed to -his final blunder, thus justifying the risk taken by Great -Britain and awarding to her the strategic triumph.</p> - -<p>The Continental System of Napoleon, here briefly -alluded to, and to be described more fully further on, was, -however, only the continuation, in its spirit and aims, of -a policy outlined and initiated by the Republic under the -Directory; which in turn but carried into its efforts -against commerce the savage thoroughness which the -Convention had sought to impress upon the general war. -The principal measures of the emperor found antitypes in -the decrees of the Directory; the only important difference -being, that the execution of the latter reflected the feeble -planning and intermittent energy of the government which -issued them; whereas Napoleon, as always, impressed upon -his system a vigor, and employed for its fulfilment means, -proportioned to the arduousness of the task and the greatness -of the expected results. The one series being therefore -but the successor and fulfilment of the other, it has -been thought best to present them in the same close connection -in which they stand in the order of events, so as -to show more clearly the unity of design running throughout -the whole history,—a unity due to the inexorable logic -of facts, to the existence of an external compulsion, which -could in no other way be removed or resisted. Both in -common owed their origin to the inability of France -seriously to embarrass, by the ordinary operations of war, -the great commerce of her rival, though she launched her -national cruisers and privateers by dozens on every sea. -The Sea Power of England held its way so steadily, preserved -its trade in the main so successfully, and was -withal so evidently the principal enemy, the key of the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> -hostile effort against France, that it drove not only the -weak Directors, but the great soldier and statesman who -followed them, into the course which led straight to -destruction.</p> - -<p>The declarations of war were followed by the customary -instructions to commanders of ships-of-war and privateers -to seize and bring into port the merchant vessels of the -enemy, as well as neutrals found violating the generally -acknowledged principles of international law. So far -there was nothing in the course of either belligerent that -differed from the usual and expected acts of States at war. -At once the sea swarmed with hastily equipped cruisers; -and, as always happens on an unexpected, or even sudden, -outbreak of hostilities, many valuable prizes were made -by ships of either nation. The victims were taken unawares, -and the offence on each side was more active and -efficient than the defence. This first surprise, however, -soon passed, and was succeeded by the more regular -course of maritime war. The great British fleets gradually -established a distinct preponderance over the masses -of the enemy, and the latter was quickly reduced to the -ordinary operations of commerce-destroying, in the sense -usually given to that word,—a policy, moreover, to which -the national tradition and the opinion of many eminent -naval officers particularly inclined.</p> - -<p>To these raids upon their shipping, by numerous scattered -cruisers, the British opposed a twofold system. By -the one, their merchant vessels bound to different quarters -of the globe were gathered in specified ports, and when -assembled sailed together under the care of a body of -ships of war, charged to conduct them to their voyage's -end. This was the convoy system, the essence of which -was to concentrate the exposed wealth of the country, under -the protection of a force adequate to meet and drive away -any probable enemy. Immense numbers of ships thus -sailed together; from two to three hundred was not an -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span> -unusual gathering; and five hundred, or even a thousand, -<a name="FNanchor_248_248" id="FNanchor_248_248"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_248_248" class="fnanchor">[248]</a> -were at times seen together in localities like the Chops -of the Channel or the entrance to the Baltic, where the -especial danger necessitated a stronger guard and a more -careful acceptance of protection by the trader,—thus -emphasizing and enlarging the peculiar features of the -practice. It is scarcely necessary to remark that much -time was lost in collecting such huge bodies, and that the -common rate of sailing was far below the powers of many -of their members; while the simultaneous arrival of great -quantities of the same goods tended to lower prices. Consequently, -many owners, relying upon the speed of their -vessels and upon good luck, sailed without convoy upon -completing their cargoes,—willing, after the manner of -merchants, to take great risks for the sake of great returns, -by being first in the market. To protect these, and -others, which, by misfortune or bad management parted -from their convoy, as well as to maintain their general -command of the sea, the British resorted to another system, -which may be called that of patrol. Fast frigates -and sloops-of-war, with a host of smaller vessels, were disseminated -over the ocean, upon the tracks which commerce -follows and to which the hostile cruisers were therefore -constrained. To each was assigned his cruising ground, -the distribution being regulated by the comparative dangers, -and by the necessary accumulation of merchant shipping -in particular localities, as the North Sea, the approach -to the English Channel, and, generally, the centres to -which the routes of commerce converge. The forces thus -especially assigned to patrol duty, the ships "on a cruise," -to use the technical expression, were casually increased by -the large number of vessels going backward and forward -between England and their respective stations, dispatch-boats, -ships going in for repairs or returning from them, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span> -so that the seas about Europe were alive with British -cruisers; each one of which was wide-awake for prizes. -To these again were added the many privateers, whose -cruising ground was not indeed assigned by the government, -but which were constrained in their choice by the -same conditions that dictated at once the course of the -trader and the lair of the commerce-destroyer.</p> - -<p>Through this cloud of friends and foes the unprotected -merchantman had to run the gantlet, trusting to his heels. -If he were taken, all indeed was not lost, for there remained -the chance of recapture by a friendly cruiser; but -in that case the salvage made a large deduction from the -profits of the voyage. The dangers thus run were not, -however, solely at the risk of the owner; for, not to speak -of the embarrassment caused to others by the failure of -one merchant, the crews of the ships, the sailors, constituted -a great potential element of the combatant force of -the nation. A good seaman, especially in those days of -simple weapons, was more than half ready to become at -once a fighting man. In this he differed from an untrained -landsman, and the customs of war therefore kept him, -whenever taken afloat, a prisoner till exchanged. Every -merchant ship captured thus diminished the fighting -power of Great Britain, and the losses were so numerous -that an act, known as the Convoy Act, was passed in -1798, compelling the taking of convoy and the payment of -a certain sum for the protection. In the first year of its -imposition this tax brought in £1,292,000 to the Treasury, -while resulting in a yet greater saving of insurance -to owners; and the diminished number of prizes taken by -the French was thought to be a serious inconvenience to -them, at a time when, by the admission of the Directory, -foreign commerce under their own flag was annihilated. -This remarkable confession, and the experience which -dictated the Convoy Act, may together be taken as an -indication that, in the defence and attack of commerce, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span> -as in other operations of war, concentration of effort will -as a rule be found a sounder policy than dissemination. -In 1795 the French formally abandoned the policy of -keeping great fleets together, as they had before done in -their history, and took to the <i>guerre de course</i>. Within -three years, ending in December, 1798, "privateers alone -put more than twenty thousand individuals in the balance -of exchanges favorable to England," and "not a single merchant -vessel sailed under the French flag." -<a name="FNanchor_249_249" id="FNanchor_249_249"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_249_249" class="fnanchor">[249]</a> "The fate of -almost all mere cruisers (<i>bâtimens armés en course</i>) is to -fall, a little sooner or later, into the hands of the enemy," -and in consequence, "out of a maritime conscription of -eighty thousand seamen, to-day but half remain" with -which to man the fleet. British contemporary authority -gives 743 as the number of privateers taken from France -alone, between the outbreak of war in 1793 and the 31st of -December, 1800,—not to speak of 273 ships of war of the -cruiser classes. -<a name="FNanchor_250_250" id="FNanchor_250_250"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_250_250" class="fnanchor">[250]</a> -The absolute loss inflicted by the efforts -of these vessels and their more fortunate comrades cannot -be given with precision; but as the result of an inquiry, the -details of which will be presented further on, the author is -convinced that it did not exceed two and a half per cent, -and probably fell below two per cent of the total volume -of British trade. This loss may be looked upon as a war -tax, onerous indeed, but by no means insupportable; and -which it would be folly to think could, by itself alone, -exercise any decisive influence upon the policy of a -wealthy and resolute nation. Yet no country is so favorably -situated as France then was for operations against -British commerce, whether in the home waters or in the -West Indies, at that time the source of at least a fourth -part of the trade of the Empire.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span></p> - -<p>The indecisiveness of the results obtained by the French -in their war against British shipping was not due to want -of effort on their part. On the contrary, the activity displayed -by their corsairs, though somewhat intermittent, was -at times phenomenal; and this fact, as well as the extraordinarily -favorable position of France, must be kept in view -in estimating the probable advantages to be obtained from -this mode of warfare. At the period in question London -carried on more than half the commerce of Great Britain; -in addition to its foreign trade it was the great distributing -centre of a domestic traffic, carried on principally by -the coasters which clustered by hundreds in the Thames. -The annual trade of export and import to the metropolis -was over £60,000,000, and the entries and departures of -vessels averaged between thirteen and fourteen thousand. -Of this great going and coming of ships and wealth, nearly -two thirds had to pass through the English Channel, nowhere -more than eighty miles wide and narrowing to -twenty at the Straits of Dover; while the remaining third, -comprising the trade from Holland, Germany, and the -Baltic, as well as the coasting trade to North Britain, -was easily accessible from the ports of Boulogne, Dunkirk, -and Calais, and was still further exposed after the French, -in 1794 and 1795, obtained complete control of Belgium -and Holland. From St. Malo to the Texel, a distance of -over three hundred miles, the whole coast became a nest -of privateers of all kinds and sizes,—from row-boats -armed only with musketry and manned by a dozen men, or -even less, up to vessels carrying from ten to twenty guns -and having crews of one hundred and fifty. In the principal -Channel ports of France alone, independent of Belgium -and Holland, there were at one time in the winter -of 1800 eighty-seven privateers, mounting from fourteen -to twenty-eight guns, besides numerous row-boats. These -were actually employed in commerce-destroying, and the -fishing-boats of the coast were capable upon short notice -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span> -of being fitted for that service, in which they often -engaged.</p> - -<p>The nearness of the prey, the character of the seas, and -the ease of making shelter either on the French or English -shore in case of bad weather, modified very greatly the -necessity for size and perfect sea-worthiness in the vessels -thus used; and also, from the shortness of the run necessary -to reach the cruising ground, each one placed on this -line of coast was easily equal to ten starting for the same -object from a more remote base of operations. Privateers -sailing at sundown with a fair wind from St. Malo, or -Dieppe, or Dunkirk to cruise in the Channel, would reach -their cruising ground before morning of the long winter -nights of that latitude. The length of stay would be determined -by their good fortune in making prizes, if unmolested -by a British cruiser. They ventured over close -to the English side; they were seen at times from the -shore seizing their prizes. -<a name="FNanchor_251_251" id="FNanchor_251_251"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_251_251" class="fnanchor">[251]</a> At Dover, in the latter part -of 1810, "signals were out almost every day, on account -of enemy's privateers appearing in sight." -<a name="FNanchor_252_252" id="FNanchor_252_252"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_252_252" class="fnanchor">[252]</a> Innocent-looking -fishing-boats, showing only their half-dozen men busy -at their work, lay at anchor upon, or within, the lines -joining headland to headland of the enemy's coast, watching -the character and appearance of passing vessels. -When night or other favorable opportunity offered, they -pulled quickly alongside the unsuspecting merchantman, -which, under-manned and unwatchful, from the scarcity of -seamen, was often first awakened to the danger by a -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span> -volley of musketry, followed by the clambering of the -enemy to the decks. The crews, few in number, poor in -quality, and not paid for fighting, offered usually but -slight resistance to the overpowering assault. Boarding -was the corsair's game, because he carried many men.</p> - -<p>It seems extraordinary that even the comparative impunity -enjoyed by the privateers—for that it was only comparative -is shown by the fact that an average of fifty were -yearly captured—should have been attained in the face -of the immense navy of Great Britain, and the large number -of cruisers assigned to the protection of the coasts and -the Channel. There were, however, many reasons for it. -The privateering spirit is essentially that of the gambler -and the lottery, and at no time was that spirit more -widely diffused in France than in the period before us. -The odds are not only great, but they are not easy to -calculate. The element of chance enters very unduly, -and when, as in the present case, the gain may be very -great, while the immediate risk to the owner, who does not -accompany his ship, is comparatively small, the disposition -to push venture after venture becomes irresistible. The -seaman, who risks his liberty, is readily tempted by high -wages and the same hope of sudden profits that moves the -owner; and this was more especially true at a time when -the laying up of the fleets, and the disappearance of the -merchant shipping, threw seafaring men wholly upon the -coasting trade or privateering. The number of ships and -men so engaged is thus accounted for; but among them -and among the owners there was a certain proportion who -pursued the occupation with a thoughtfulness and method -which would distinguish a more regular business, and -which, while diminishing the risk of this, very much increased -the returns. Vessels were selected, or built, with -special reference to speed and handiness; captains were -chosen in whom seamanlike qualities were joined to particular -knowledge of the British coast and the routes of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span> -British trade; the conditions of wind and weather were -studied; the long winter nights were preferred because of -the cover they afforded; they knew and reckoned upon the -habits of the enemy's ships-of-war; account was kept of -the times of sailing and arrival of the large convoys. -<a name="FNanchor_253_253" id="FNanchor_253_253"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_253_253" class="fnanchor">[253]</a> On -the British side, a considerable deduction must be made -from the efficiency indicated by the mere number of the -coast cruisers. Many of them were poor sailers, quite -unable to overtake the better and more dangerous class of -privateers. The inducements to exertion were not great; -for the privateer meant little money at best, and the -abuses that gathered round the proceedings of the Admiralty -Courts often swallowed up that little in costs. The -command of the small vessels thus employed fell largely -into the hands of men who had dropped hopelessly out of the -race of life, while their more fortunate competitors were -scattered on distant seas, and in better ships. To such, -the slight chance of a bootless prize was but a poor inducement -to exposure and activity, on the blustering nights -and in the dangerous spots where the nimble privateer, -looking for rich plunder, was wont to be found. It was -worth more money to recapture a British merchantman -than to take a French cruiser.</p> - -<p>Privateering from the Atlantic, or Biscay, coast of -France was necessarily carried on in vessels of a very -different class from those which frequented the Channel. -There was no inducement for the merchant ships of -Great Britain to pass within the line from Ushant to -Cape Finisterre; while, on the other hand, her ships-of-war -abounded there, for the double purpose of watching -the French fleets in the ports, and intercepting both the -enemy's cruisers and their prizes, as they attempted to -enter. For these reasons, privateers leaving Bordeaux, -Bayonne, or Nantes, needed to be large and seaworthy, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span> -provisioned and equipped for distant voyages and for a -long stay at sea. Their greatest danger was met near -their home ports, either going or returning; and their -hopes were set, not upon the small and often unprofitable -coaster, but upon the richly laden trader from the East or -West Indies or the Mediterranean. Out, therefore, beyond -the line of the enemy's blockade, upon the deep sea and on -one of the great commercial highways converging toward -the Channel, was their post; there to remain as long as -possible, and not lightly to encounter again the perils of -the Bay of Biscay. Moreover, being larger and more -valuable, the owner had to think upon their defence; they -could not, like the cheap Channel gropers, be thrown -away in case of any hostile meeting. While they could -not cope with the big frigates of the enemy, there were -still his smaller cruisers, and the hosts of his privateers, -that might be met; and many a stout battle was fought by -those French corsairs. One of these, the "Bordelais," -taken in 1799, was said then to be the largest of her kind -sailing out of France. She had the keel of a 38-gun frigate, -carried twenty-four 12-pounder guns, and a crew of -two hundred and twenty men. In four years this ship -had captured one hundred and sixty prizes, and was said -to have cleared to her owners in Bordeaux a million -sterling. -<a name="FNanchor_254_254" id="FNanchor_254_254"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_254_254" class="fnanchor">[254]</a></p> - -<p>A third most important and lucrative field for the enterprise -of French privateers was found in the West Indies. -The islands of Guadaloupe and Martinique served as excellent -bases of operations. The latter indeed was for -many years in British possession, but the former remained, -practically without interruption, in the hands of France -until its capture in 1810. During the many years of -close alliance, from 1796 to 1808, between France and -Spain, the West Indian ports of the latter served not only -to maintain her own privateers, but to give a wide extension -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span> -to the efforts of her more active partner. The geographical -and climatic conditions of this region tended also -to modify the character both of the cruisers and of their -methods. Along with a very large European trade, carried -on by ships of an average burden of two hundred and -fifty tons, there was also a considerable traffic from island -to island by much smaller vessels. This local trade was -not only between the possessions of the same nation or of -friendly States, but existed also, by means of neutrals or -contraband, between those of powers at war; and through -these and her system of free ports, together with liberal -modifications of her commercial code wherever an advantage -could thereby be gained, Great Britain succeeded -in drawing into her own currents, in war as well as -in peace, the course of much of the export and import of -the whole Caribbean Sea and Spanish Main. From these -two kinds of trade—combined with the general good -weather prevailing, with the contiguity of the islands to -each other, and with the numerous ports and inlets scattered -throughout their extent—there arose two kinds of -privateering enterprise. The one, carried on mainly by -large and fast-sailing schooners or brigs, was found generally -suitable for undertakings directed against ships -bound to or from Europe; while for the other the various -islands abounded with small row-boats or other petty craft, -each with its group of plunderers, which lay in wait and -usually in profound concealment to issue out upon the -passing trader. -<a name="FNanchor_255_255" id="FNanchor_255_255"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_255_255" class="fnanchor">[255]</a> -The uncertain character of the wind in -some parts of the day particularly favored an attack, by -two or three heavily manned rowing boats, upon a vessel -large enough to take them all on board bodily, but fettered -by calm and with a small crew. On one occasion a United -States sloop-of-war, lying thus motionless with her ports -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span> -closed, was taken for a merchantman and assailed by -several of these marauders, who then paid dearly for the -mistake into which they had been led by her seemingly -unarmed and helpless condition.</p> - -<p>The remoteness of this region from Europe covered very -great irregularities, both by the privateers and in the -courts. This evil became greater in the French and -Spanish islands, when, by the progress of the war, the -Sea Power of Great Britain more and more broke off correspondence -between them and the mother countries; and -when Napoleon's aggression drove the Spaniards into revolution -and anarchy, the control of Spain, always inert, -became merely nominal. These circumstances, coinciding -with the presence of a very large neutral shipping, mainly -belonging to the United States, whose geographical nearness -made her one of the chief sources of supplies to these -colonies, caused the privateering of the Latin and mixed -races to degenerate rapidly into piracy, towards which -that mode of warfare naturally tends. As early as 1805, -an American insurance company complained to the Secretary -of State that "property plundered by real or pretended -French privateers was uniformly taken into the -ports of Cuba, and there, with the connivance of the -Spanish government, was sold and distributed, <i>without -any form of trial</i>, or pretence for legal condemnation."[1] -And the United States consul at Santiago de Cuba reported -officially that more than a thousand American seamen -had been landed in that port, most of them without -clothes or any means of support; and that "the scene of -robbery, destruction, evasion, perjury, cruelty, and insult, -to which the Americans captured by French pirates, and -brought into this and adjacent ports, have been subjected, -has perhaps not been equalled in a century past." -<a name="FNanchor_256_256" id="FNanchor_256_256"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_256_256" class="fnanchor">[256]</a> This -lawlessness ended, as is generally known, in an actual -prevalence of piracy on an extensive scale, about the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span> -south side of Cuba and other unfrequented parts of the -archipelago, for some years after the war. From the character -of the ground and the slow communications of the -day, these desperadoes were finally put down only by the -systematic and long continued efforts of the various -governments concerned.</p> - -<p>The Eastern trade of Great Britain was in the hands of -the East India Company; and its ships, which carried on -the intercourse between India and Europe, were of a -size altogether exceptional in those days. At a time -when a small ship-of-the-line measured from fourteen to -sixteen hundred tons, and the traders between America -and Europe averaged under three hundred, a large proportion -of the East Indiamen were of twelve hundred tons -burden, exceeding considerably the dimensions of a first-class -frigate. -<a name="FNanchor_257_257" id="FNanchor_257_257"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_257_257" class="fnanchor">[257]</a> -Being pierced for numerous guns and carrying -many men, both crew and passengers, among whom -often figured considerable detachments of troops, they -presented a very formidable appearance, and were more -than once mistaken for ships of war by French cruisers; -so much so that in the year 1804 a body of them in the -China seas, by their firm bearing and compact order, imposed -upon a hostile squadron of respectable size, commanded -by an admiral of cautious temper though of -proved courage, making him for a brief period the laughing -stock of both hemispheres, and bringing down on his -head a scathing letter from the emperor. Their armament, -however, was actually feeble, especially in the -earlier part of the French Revolution. About the year -1801, it was determined to increase it so that the larger -ships should carry thirty-eight 18-pounders; -<a name="FNanchor_258_258" id="FNanchor_258_258"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_258_258" class="fnanchor">[258]</a> but the -change seems to have been but imperfectly effected, and -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span> -upon the occasion in question the ships which thus -"bluffed" Admiral Linois were none of them a match for -a medium frigate. It is, indeed, manifestly impossible to -combine within the same space the stowage of a rich and -bulky cargo and the fighting efficiency of a ship of war of -the same tonnage. Still, the batteries, though proportionately -weak, were too powerful for ordinary privateers -to encounter, unless by a fortunate surprise; and, as the -French entertained great, if not exaggerated, ideas of the -dependence of Great Britain upon her Indian possessions, -considerable efforts were made to carry on commerce-destroying -in the Eastern seas by squadrons of heavy -frigates, re-enforced occasionally by ships-of-the-line. -These were the backbone of the <i>guerre de course</i>, but -their efforts were supplemented by those of numerous -privateers of less size, that preyed upon the coasting -trade and the smaller ships, which, from China to the -Red Sea, and throughout the Indian Ocean, whether -under British or neutral flags, were carrying goods of -British origin.</p> - -<p>At the outbreak of the war Great Britain was taken -unawares in India, as everywhere; and, as the operations -in Europe and in the West Indies called for the first care -of the government, the Indian seas were practically abandoned -to the enemy for over a year. After the fall of -Pondicherry, in September, 1793, Admiral Cornwallis -returned to Europe with all his small squadron, leaving -but a single sloop-of-war to protect the vast expanse of -ocean covered by the commerce of the East India Company. -<a name="FNanchor_259_259" id="FNanchor_259_259"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_259_259" class="fnanchor">[259]</a> -Not till the month of October, 1794, did his -successor reach the station. Under these circumstances -the losses were inevitably severe, and would have been yet -more heavy had not the company itself fitted out several -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span> -ships to cruise for the protection of trade. -<a name="FNanchor_260_260" id="FNanchor_260_260"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_260_260" class="fnanchor">[260]</a> An animated -warfare, directed solely toward the destruction and protection -of commerce, now ensued for several years, and -was marked by some exceedingly desperate and well-contested -frigate actions; as well as by many brilliant -exploits of French privateersmen, among whom the name -of Robert Surcouf has attained a lasting celebrity. Depending -at first upon the islands of France and Bourbon -as their base of operations, the distance of these from the -peninsula of Hindoostan, combined with the size of the -East India ships, compelled the employment of relatively -large vessels, able to keep the sea for long periods and to -carry crews which would admit of many detachments to -man prizes without unduly weakening the fighting capacity. -When, in 1795, the conquest of Holland and flight -of the Orange government turned the Dutch from enemies -into allies of France, their colonies and ports became accessories -of great importance to the cruisers, owing to -their nearness to the scene of action and especially to -the great trade route between China and Europe. On the -other hand the British, long debarred from rewards for -their efforts, other than recaptures of their own merchant -ships, now found the whole of the Dutch trade thrown -open to them, and the returns bear witness both to its -numbers and to their activity.</p> - -<p>Notwithstanding, however, the unprotected state of -British commerce in the early years of the war, and the -distinguished activity of the French cruisers, the insurance -premiums at no time rose to the sums demanded in -1782, when a concentrated effort to control the sea by a -fleet, under Admiral Suffren, was made by France. -<a name="FNanchor_261_261" id="FNanchor_261_261"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_261_261" class="fnanchor">[261]</a> At -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span> -that time the premiums were fifteen per cent; between -1798 and 1805 they fluctuated between eight and twelve -per cent. In 1805 the chief command in the Indian seas -was given to Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Pellew, afterwards -Lord Exmouth, and by his skilful arrangements -such security was afforded to the trade from Bombay to -China, one of the most exposed parts of the Eastern commercial -routes, that the premium fell to eight per cent, -with a return of three per cent, if sailing with convoy. -Under this systematic care the losses by capture amounted -to but one per cent on the property insured, being less -than those by the dangers of the sea. -<a name="FNanchor_262_262" id="FNanchor_262_262"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_262_262" class="fnanchor">[262]</a> But during the -very period that these happy results were obtained by -wisely applying the principle of concentration of effort -to the protection of commerce, disaster was overtaking -the trade of Calcutta; which lost nineteen vessels in two -months through the neglect of its merchants to accept the -convoys of the admiral. -<a name="FNanchor_263_263" id="FNanchor_263_263"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_263_263" class="fnanchor">[263]</a> In fact, as the small proportionate -loss inflicted by scattered cruisers appears to indicate -the inconclusiveness of that mode of warfare, so the -result of the convoy system, in this and other instances, -warrants the inference that, when properly systematized -and applied, it will have more success as a defensive -measure than hunting for individual marauders,—a process -which, even when most thoroughly planned, still -resembles looking for a needle in a haystack.</p> - -<p>Soon after this time the British government reverted -most properly to the policy of Pitt, by directing expeditions -against the enemies' colonies, the foreign bases of -their Sea Power, and, in the absence of great fleets, the -only possible support upon which commerce-destroying -can depend; with whose fall it must also fall. The -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span> -islands of Bourbon and of France capitulated in 1810, the -same year that saw the surrender of Guadaloupe, the last -survivor of the French West India Islands. This was -followed in 1811 by the reduction of the Dutch colony of -Java. Thus "an end was put to the predatory warfare -which had been successfully carried on against the British -trade in India for a number of years." -<a name="FNanchor_264_264" id="FNanchor_264_264"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_264_264" class="fnanchor">[264]</a></p> - -<p>While the scattered cruisers of France were thus worrying, -by a petty and inconclusive warfare, the commerce of -Great Britain and its neutral carriers, the great British -fleets, being left in quiet possession of the seas by the -avowed purpose of the Directory to limit its efforts to the -<i>guerre de course</i>, swept from the ocean every merchant -ship wearing a hostile flag, and imposed upon the neutral -trade with France the extreme limitations of maritime -international law, as held by the British courts. Toward -the end of the war, indeed, those principles were given an -extension, which the government itself admitted was beyond -anything before claimed as reconcilable with recognized -law. The precise amount of the injury done, the exact -number of the vessels detained, sent in, and finally condemned, -in all parts of the world will perhaps never be -known; it is certainly not within the power of the present -writer to determine them. The frequent, though not complete, -returns of British admirals give some idea of the -prevailing activity, which will also appear from the occasional -details that must be cited in the latter part of this -chapter. Into the single port of Plymouth, in the eight -years and a half ending September 29, 1801, there were -sent 948 vessels of all nations; -<a name="FNanchor_265_265" id="FNanchor_265_265"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_265_265" class="fnanchor">[265]</a> of which 447 were -enemy's property, 156 recaptured British, and the remainder -neutrals, belonging mostly to America, Denmark, and -Sweden, the three chief neutral maritime states. From -Jamaica, the British commander-in-chief reports that, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span> -between March 1 and August 3, 1800,—that is, in five -months,—203 vessels have been captured, detained, or -destroyed.[1] This was in but one part of the West Indian -Seas. The admiral at the Leeward Islands reports that -in two months of the same year 62 vessels had been sent -in.[1] In five months, ending September 3, 1800, Lord -Keith reports from the Mediterranean 180 captures. -<a name="FNanchor_266_266" id="FNanchor_266_266"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_266_266" class="fnanchor">[266]</a> -How far these instances may be accepted as a fair example -of the usual results of British cruising, it is impossible to -say; but it may be remarked that they all occur at a -period when the war had been raging for seven years, -and that captures are more numerous at the beginning -than at the latter end of long hostilities. In war, as in -all states of life, people learn to accommodate themselves -to their conditions, to minimize risks; and even prize lists -become subject to the uniformity of results observed in -other statistics.</p> - -<p>Whatever the particulars of French losses, however, -they are all summed up in the unprecedented admission -of the Directory, in 1799, that "not a single merchant -ship is on the sea carrying the French flag." This was -by no means a figure of speech, to express forcibly an -extreme depression. It was the statement of a literal -fact. "The former sources of our prosperity," wrote M. -Arnould, Chef du Bureau du Commerce, as early as 1797, -"are either lost or dried up. Our agricultural, manufacturing, -and industrial power is almost extinct." And -again he says, "The total number of registers issued to -French ships from September, 1793, to September, 1796, -amounts only to 6028." Of these, 3351 were undecked -and of less than thirty tons burden. "The maritime war -paralyzes our distant navigation and even diminishes -considerably that on our coasts; so that a great number -of French ships remain inactive, and perhaps decaying, in -our ports. This remark applies principally to ships of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span> -over two hundred tons, the number of which, according -to the subjoined table, -<a name="FNanchor_267_267" id="FNanchor_267_267"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_267_267" class="fnanchor">[267]</a> amounts only to 248. Before the -revolution the navigation of the seas of Europe and to the -French colonies employed more than 2,000 ships."</p> - -<p>In the year ending September 20, 1800, according to a -report submitted to the consuls, -<a name="FNanchor_268_268" id="FNanchor_268_268"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_268_268" class="fnanchor">[268]</a> France received directly -from Asia, Africa, and America, all together, less than -$300,000 worth of goods; while her exports to those three -quarters of the world amounted to only $56,000. Whether -these small amounts were carried in French or neutral -bottoms is immaterial; the annihilation of French shipping -is proved by them. The same report shows that the -average size of the vessels, which, by hugging closely the -coast, avoided British cruisers and maintained the water -traffic between France and her neighbors, Holland, Spain, -and Italy, was but thirty-six tons. Intercourse by water -is always easier and, for a great bulk, quicker than by -land; but in those days of wagon carriage and often poor -roads it was especially so. In certain districts of France -great distress for food was frequently felt in those wars, -although grain abounded in other parts; because the surplus -could not be distributed rapidly by land, nor freely -by water. For the latter conveyance it was necessary to -depend upon very small vessels, unfit for distant voyages, -but which could take refuge from pursuers in the smallest -port, or be readily beached; and which, if captured, would -not singly be a serious loss.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span></p> - -<p>Towards the end of 1795, a contemporary British authority -states that over three thousand British ships had -been captured, and about eight hundred French. -<a name="FNanchor_269_269" id="FNanchor_269_269"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_269_269" class="fnanchor">[269]</a> This -was, however, confessedly only an estimate, and probably, -so far as concerns the British losses, a large exaggeration. -Ten years later a member of the House of Commons, -speaking with a view rather to disparage the earlier -administration, gave the British losses for the same years -as 1,395. -<a name="FNanchor_270_270" id="FNanchor_270_270"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_270_270" class="fnanchor">[270]</a> -Lloyd's lists give the whole number of British -captured, for the years 1793-1800, both inclusive, as -4,344, of which 705 were recaptured; leaving a total loss -of 3,639. -<a name="FNanchor_271_271" id="FNanchor_271_271"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_271_271" class="fnanchor">[271]</a> -Assuming, what is only for this purpose admissible, -that the average loss each year was nearly the -same, these figures would give for the three years, 1793-1795, -1,365 as the number of captures made by hostile -cruisers. In the tables appended to Norman's "Corsairs -of France" the losses for the same period are given as -1,636. -<a name="FNanchor_272_272" id="FNanchor_272_272"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_272_272" class="fnanchor">[272]</a></p> - -<p>Finally, the number of prizes brought into French ports -up to September 16, 1798, was stated by M. Arnould, in -the Conseil des Anciens, as being 2,658. The table -from which his figures were taken he called "an authentic -list, just printed, drawn up in the office of the French Ministry -of Marine, of all prizes made since the outbreak of the -war." -<a name="FNanchor_273_273" id="FNanchor_273_273"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_273_273" class="fnanchor">[273]</a> -It included vessels of all nationalities, during a -period when France had not only been at war with several -states, but had made large seizures of neutral vessels -upon various pretexts. Of the entire number M. Arnould -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span> -considered that not more than 2,000 were British. If we -accept his estimate, only 900 British ships would have -been taken in three years. It is to be observed, however, -as tending to reconcile the discrepancy between this and -the English accounts, that the tables used by him probably -did not give, or at most gave very imperfectly, the French -captures made in the East and West Indies; and, furthermore, -the aggregate British losses, as given by Lloyd's -lists, and by Norman's tables, include captures made by -the Dutch and Spaniards as well as by the French. -<a name="FNanchor_274_274" id="FNanchor_274_274"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_274_274" class="fnanchor">[274]</a></p> - -<p>The British reports of their own losses are thus seen -largely to exceed those made by the French. According -equal confidence to the statements of Sir William Curtis, -of Norman, and of Lloyd's list, we should reach an annual -loss by capture of 488 British ships; which would give -a total, in the twenty-one years of war, from 1793-1814, -<a name="FNanchor_275_275" id="FNanchor_275_275"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_275_275" class="fnanchor">[275]</a> -of 10,248. Norman's grand total of 10,871 considerably -exceeds this amount; but it will be safer, in considering a -subject of so great importance as the absolute injury done, -and effect produced, by war upon commerce, to accept the -larger figure, or to say, in round numbers, that eleven -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span> -thousand British vessels were captured by the enemy -during the protracted and desperate wars caused by the -French Revolution. It is the great and conspicuous instance -of commerce-destroying, carried on over a long -series of years, with a vigor and thoroughness never surpassed, -and supported, moreover, by an unparalleled -closure of the continental markets of Great Britain. The -Directory first, and Napoleon afterwards, abandoned all -attempts to contest the control of the sea, and threw -themselves, as Louis XIV. had done before them, wholly -upon a cruising war against commerce. It will be well -in this day, when the same tendency so extensively prevails, -to examine somewhat carefully what this accepted -loss really meant, how it was felt by the British people at -the time, and what expectation can reasonably be deduced -from it that, by abandoning military control of the sea, -and depending exclusively upon scattered cruisers, a -country dependent as Great Britain is upon external commerce -can be brought to terms.</p> - -<p>Evidently, a mere statement of numbers, such as the -above, without any particulars as to size, or the value of -cargoes, affords but a poor indication of the absolute or -relative loss sustained by British commerce. It may, -however, be used as a basis, both for comparison with -the actual number of vessels entering and clearing annually -from British ports, and also for an estimate as to the -probable tonnage captured. The annual average of capture, -deduced from 11,000 ships in twenty-one years is 524. In -the three years 1793-1795, the average annual number of -British vessels entering and clearing from ports of Great -Britain was 21,560. -<a name="FNanchor_276_276" id="FNanchor_276_276"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_276_276" class="fnanchor">[276]</a> Dividing by 524, it is found that -one fortieth, or two and a half per cent of British shipping, -reckoning by numbers, was taken by the enemy. -In the three years 1798-1800, 1801 being the year of -broken hostilities, the average annual entries and departures -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span> -were 21,369,[1] which again gives two and a half as -the percentage of the captures. It must be noted, also, -that only the commerce of England and Scotland with -foreign countries, with the colonies, with Ireland and the -Channel Islands, and with British India enters into these -lists of arrivals and departures. The returns of that day -did not take account of British coasters, nor of the local -trade of the colonies, nor again of the direct intercourse -between Ireland and ports other than those of Great -Britain. Yet all these contributed victims to swell the -list of prizes, -<a name="FNanchor_277_277" id="FNanchor_277_277"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_277_277" class="fnanchor">[277]</a> and so to increase very materially the -apparent proportion of the latter to a commerce of which -the returns cited present only a fraction. Unfortunately, -the amount of the coasting trade cannot now be ascertained, -<a name="FNanchor_278_278" id="FNanchor_278_278"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_278_278" class="fnanchor">[278]</a> -and the consequent deduction from the calculated -two and a half per cent of loss can only be -conjectured.</p> - -<p>To obtain the tonnage loss there appears to the writer -no fairer means than to determine the average tonnage of -the vessels entering and departing as above, at different -periods of the war. In the three years 1793-1795, the -average size of each ship entering or sailing from the -ports of Great Britain, including the Irish trade, was 121 -tons. In the year 1800 the average is 126 tons. In 1809 -it has fallen again to 121, and in 1812 to 115 tons. We -cannot then go far wrong in allowing 125 tons as the -average size of British vessels employed in carrying on -the foreign and the coasting trade of Great Britain itself -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span> -during the war. -<a name="FNanchor_279_279" id="FNanchor_279_279"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_279_279" class="fnanchor">[279]</a> On this allowance the aggregate tonnage -lost in the 11,000 British prizes, would be 1,375,000 -in twenty-one years. In these years the aggregate British -tonnage entering and leaving the ports of Great Britain, -exclusive of the great neutral tonnage employed in carrying -for the same trade, amounted to over 55,000,000; -<a name="FNanchor_280_280" id="FNanchor_280_280"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_280_280" class="fnanchor">[280]</a> so -that the loss is again somewhat less than one fortieth, or -2½ per cent.</p> - -<p>Another slight indication of the amount of loss, curious -from its coincidence with the above deductions, is derived -from the report of prize goods received into France in the -year ending September, 1800, which amounted to 29,201,676 -francs. At the then current value of the franc this -was equivalent to £1,216,000. The real value of British -exports for 1800 was £56,000,000, the prize goods again -being rather less than one fortieth of the amount. The -imports, however, being also nearly £56,000,000, the loss -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span> -on the entire amount falls to one eightieth. It is true that -many of these prize goods were probably taken in neutrals, -but on the other hand the report does not take into account -French capture in the colonies and East Indies; nor -those made by Holland and Spain, the allies of France.</p> - -<p>If the total number of vessels <i>belonging</i> to Great -Britain and all her dependencies be taken, as the standard -by which to judge her loss by captures, it will be found -that in 1795 they amounted to 16,728; -<a href="#Footnote_281_281" class="fnanchor">[281]</a> in 1800, 17,885; -<a name="FNanchor_281_281" id="FNanchor_281_281"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_281_281" class="fnanchor">[281]</a> -in 1805, 22,051; -<a href="#Footnote_282_282" class="fnanchor">[282]</a> in 1810, 23,703. -<a name="FNanchor_282_282" id="FNanchor_282_282"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_282_282" class="fnanchor">[282]</a> Using again 524 as -the annual number of captures, the annual proportion of -loss is seen gradually to fall from a very little over 3 per -cent, in the first year, to somewhat less than 2½ per cent, -in the last.</p> - -<p>Finally, it may be added that the Lloyd's list before -quoted gives the total number of losses by sea risks, -1793-1800, as 2,967; which, being contrasted with the -losses by capture, 3,639, shows that the danger from -enemy's cruisers very little exceeded those of the ocean. -To offset, though only partially, her own losses, Great -Britain received prize goods, during the same years, to -the amount of over £5,000,000. -<a name="FNanchor_283_283" id="FNanchor_283_283"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_283_283" class="fnanchor">[283]</a> There were also engaged -in carrying on her commerce, in 1801, under the -British flag, 2,779 vessels, measuring 369,563 tons, that -had been brought into her ports as prizes; which numbers -had increased in 1811 to 4,023 ships and 536,240 tons. -<a name="FNanchor_284_284" id="FNanchor_284_284"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_284_284" class="fnanchor">[284]</a></p> - -<p>Taking everything together, it seems reasonable to conclude -that the direct loss to the nation, by the operation -of hostile cruisers, did not exceed 2½ per cent of the commerce -of the Empire; and that this loss was partially -made good by the prize ships and merchandise taken by -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span> -its own naval vessels and privateers. A partial, if not a -complete, compensation for her remaining loss is also to -be found in the great expansion of her mercantile operations -carried on under neutral flags; for, although this too -was undoubtedly harassed by the enemy, yet to it almost -entirely was due the increasing volume of trade that -poured through Great Britain to and from the continent -of Europe, every ton of which left a part of its value to -swell the bulk of British wealth. The writings of the -period show that the injuries due to captured shipping -passed unremarked amid the common incidents and misfortunes -of life; neither their size nor their effects were -great enough to attract public notice, amid the steady -increase of national wealth and the activities concerned -in amassing it. "During all the operations of war and -finance," says one writer, "the gains of our enterprising -people were beyond all calculation, however the unproductive -classes may have suffered from the depreciation of -money and the inequalities of taxation. Our commerce -has become more than double its greatest extent during -the happiest years of peace." -<a name="FNanchor_285_285" id="FNanchor_285_285"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_285_285" class="fnanchor">[285]</a> There were, indeed, darker -shades to the picture, for war means suffering as well as -effort; but with regard to the subject-matter of this chapter, -Commerce, and its fate in this war, there was for -many years but one voice, for but one was possible. The -minister, essentially a master of trade and finance, delighted -year by year to enlarge upon the swelling volume -of business and the growing returns of the revenue. Not -only did the new taxes bring in liberally, but the older -ones were increasingly productive. These signs of prosperity -were not seen all at once. The first plunge into -the war was followed, as it always is, by a shrinking of -the system and a contraction of the muscles; but as the -enemy more and more surrendered the control of the sea, -as the naval victories of the years 1797 and 1798 emphasized -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span> -more and more the absolute dominion of Great -Britain over it, and as the new channels of enterprise became -familiar, the energies of the people expanded to -meet the new opportunities.</p> - -<p>The share borne by neutral shipping in the extension -and maintenance of this extraordinary fabric of prosperity, -thus existing in the midst of all the sorrow, suffering, -and waste of war, must next be considered; for it was the -cause of the remarkable measures taken by both belligerents -against neutral trade, which imparted so singular -and desolating a character to the closing years of the -struggle and affected deeply the commerce of the whole -world. At the very beginning of the war Great Britain -proceeded to avail herself of the services of neutrals, by a -remission of that part of the Navigation Act which required -three fourths of the crews of British merchantmen -to be British subjects. On the 30th of April, 1793, this -was so modified as to permit three fourths to be foreigners, -to replace the large body taken for the fleets. This was -followed, from time to time, as the number of enemies -multiplied through the extending conquests and alliances -of France, by a series of orders and proclamations, infringing -more and more upon the spirit of the Act, with the -direct and obvious purpose of employing neutral vessels -to carry on operations hitherto limited to the British -flag. The demands of the navy for seamen, the risks of -capture, the delays of convoy, entirely arrested, and even -slightly set back, the development of the British carrying -trade; while at the same time the important position of -Great Britain as the great manufacturing nation, coinciding -with a diminution in the productions of the Continent, -consequent upon the war, and a steadily growing demand -for manufactured goods on the part of the United States, -called imperiously for more carriers. The material of -British traffic was increasing with quickened steps, at the -very time that her own shipping was becoming less able -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span> -to bear it. Thus in 1797, when the British navy was -forced to leave the Mediterranean, all the Levant trade, -previously confined to British ships, was thrown open to -every neutral. In 1798, being then at war with Spain, -the great raw material, Spanish wool, essential to the -cloth manufactures, was allowed to enter in vessels of any -neutral country. The produce even of hostile colonies -could be imported by British subjects in neutral bottoms, -though not for consumption in England, but for re-exportation; -a process by which it paid a toll to Great Britain, -without directly affecting the reserved market of the British -colonist. The effect of these various conditions and -measures can best be shown by a few figures, which indicate -at once the expansion of British commerce, the arrest -of British carrying trade, and the consequent growth of -the neutral shipping. In 1792, the last year of peace, the -total British exports and imports amounted to £44,565,000; -in 1796 to £53,706,000; in 1800, the last unbroken year of -war, to £73,723,000. -<a name="FNanchor_286_286" id="FNanchor_286_286"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_286_286" class="fnanchor">[286]</a> For the same years the carrying of -this trade was done, in 1792, by 3,151,389 tons of British, -and 479,630 tons of foreign shipping; in 1796, by 2,629,575 -British, and 998,427 foreign; in 1800, by 2,825,078 British -and 1,448,287 foreign. Thus, while there was so great an -increase in the commerce of the kingdom, and it employed -nearly 650,000 more tons of shipping in 1800 than in 1792, -the amount carried in British ships had fallen off; and the -proportion of neutral bottoms had risen from thirteen to -nearly thirty-four per cent.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span></p> - -<p>The significance of these facts could not escape the -French government, nor yet the jealousies of certain -classes connected with the carrying trade in Great Britain -herself; but in the first war the latter were not joined by -the other powerful and suffering interests, which gradually -impelled the ministry into a series of acts deeply injurious -to all neutrals, but chiefly to the United States. In -France, the early effusiveness of the revolutionists toward -England, based upon the hope that she too would be swept -into the torrent of their movement, had been quickly chilled -and turned to bitterness, greater even than that which had -so long divided the two nations. Victorious everywhere -upon the Continent, the government saw before it only -one unconquerable enemy, the Power of the Sea; it knew -that she, by her subsidies and her exhortations, maintained -the continental states in their recurring hostilities, and it -saw her alone, amid the general confusion and impoverishment, -preserve quiet and increase a wealth which was not -only brilliant, but solid. The Directory therefore reached -the conclusion, which Napoleon made the basis of his policy -and which he never wearied of proclaiming, that Great Britain -maintained the war and promoted the discord of nations -for the simple purpose of founding her own prosperity upon -the ruin of all other commerce, her power upon the ruin of -all other navies. -<a name="FNanchor_287_287" id="FNanchor_287_287"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_287_287" class="fnanchor">[287]</a> At the same time the French government -held tenaciously to that profound delusion, the bequest to it -from past generations of naval officers and statesmen, that -a war directed against the commerce of Great Britain was -a sure means of destroying her. It knew that hosts of -privateers were employed, and that very many British -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> -prizes were brought in; yet, withal, the great Sea Power -moved steadily on, evidently greater and stronger as the -years went by. It knew also that her manufactures were -increasing, that their products filled the Continent; that -the produce of the East and of the West, of the Baltic -and of the Mediterranean, centred in Great Britain; and -that through her, not the Continent only, but France -herself, drew most of her tropical articles of consumption. -There was but one solution for this persistent escape from -apparently sure destruction; and that was to be found in -the support of the neutral carrier and the pockets of the -neutral consumer. From this premise the fatal logic of -the French Revolution was irresistibly drawn to the conclusion -that, as every neutral ship engaged in the British -carrying trade was a help to England, it was consequently -an enemy to France and liable to capture. -<a name="FNanchor_288_288" id="FNanchor_288_288"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_288_288" class="fnanchor">[288]</a> Napoleon but -amplified this precedent when he declared that there were -no more neutrals, and placed before Sweden, longing only -for quiet, the option "war with France or cannon-balls -for English vessels approaching your ports."</p> - -<p>The exceptionally intense spirit which animated the parties -to this war trenched with unusual severity upon the interests -of neutral powers, always more or less in conflict -with the aims of belligerents. These questions also received -new importance, because now appeared for the first -time a neutral maritime state, of great extent and rapidly -growing, whose interests and ambitions at that time pointed -to shipping and carrying trade as forms of enterprise for -which it had received from nature peculiar facilities. In -all previous wars the Americans had acted as the colonists -of Great Britain, either loyal or in revolt. In 1793 they -had for four years been a nation in the real sense of the -word, and Washington's first term closed. In the very -first Congress measures were taken for developing American -shipping, by differential duties upon native and -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span> -foreign ships. -<a name="FNanchor_289_289" id="FNanchor_289_289"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_289_289" class="fnanchor">[289]</a> From the impulse thus given, combined -with the opening offered by the increase of British trade -and the diminished employment of British shipping, the -ship-builders and merchants extended their operations -rapidly. By the report of a committee of the House, -January 10, 1803, it appears that the merchant tonnage of -the United States was then inferior to that of no other -country, except Great Britain. -<a name="FNanchor_290_290" id="FNanchor_290_290"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_290_290" class="fnanchor">[290]</a> In 1790 there had entered -her ports from abroad, 355,000 tons of her own -shipping and 251,000 foreign, of which 217,000 were -British. -<a name="FNanchor_291_291" id="FNanchor_291_291"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_291_291" class="fnanchor">[291]</a> In the year 1801 there entered 799,304 tons of -native shipping, -<a name="FNanchor_292_292" id="FNanchor_292_292"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_292_292" class="fnanchor">[292]</a> and of foreign but 138,000. -<a name="FNanchor_293_293" id="FNanchor_293_293"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_293_293" class="fnanchor">[293]</a> The amount -of British among the latter is not stated; but in the year -1800 there cleared from Great Britain under her own flag, -for the United States, but 14,381 tons. -<a name="FNanchor_294_294" id="FNanchor_294_294"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_294_294" class="fnanchor">[294]</a> Figures like these -give but a comparative and partial view of the activity of -American shipping, leaving out of account all the carrying -done by it outside the ken of the home authorities; but it is -safe to say that the United States contributed annually at -least six hundred thousand tons to maintain the traffic of -the world, which, during those eventful years, centred in -Great Britain and ministered to her power. Among the -forms of gain thus opened to American traders there was -one to which allusion only will here be made, because at -a later period it became the source of very great trouble, -leading step by step to the war of 1812. This was the -carriage of the productions of French and other colonies, -enemies of Great Britain, to the United States, and thence -re-exporting them to Europe.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span></p> - -<p>Besides the new state in the Western Hemisphere, -there were three others whose isolated position had -hitherto given them the character of neutrals in the maritime -wars of the eighteenth century. These were the Baltic -countries, Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, which had combined -in 1780 to defend their neutral rights, if need were, -by force of arms. The power of this confederacy to assume -the same attitude in 1793 was broken by the policy -of Russia. By whatever motives swayed, the Empress -Catharine took decided ground against the French Revolution. -On the 25th of March, 1793, a convention between -her and the British government was signed, by which both -parties agreed, not only to close their own ports against -France and not to permit the exportation of food to that -country, but also "to unite all their efforts <i>to prevent -other powers</i>, not implicated in the war, from giving, on -this occasion of common concern to every civilized state, -any protection whatever, directly or indirectly in consequence -of their neutrality, to the commerce or property of -the French on the sea." -<a name="FNanchor_295_295" id="FNanchor_295_295"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_295_295" class="fnanchor">[295]</a> How the empress understood -this engagement was shown by her notification, during the -same summer, to the courts of Sweden and Denmark, that -she would station a fleet in the North Sea to prevent -neutrals bound to France from proceeding. -<a name="FNanchor_296_296" id="FNanchor_296_296"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_296_296" class="fnanchor">[296]</a> Great Britain -had already—June 8, 1793—directed the commanders of -cruisers to detain all vessels loaded with flour or grain, -bound to French ports, and to send them to England, -where the cargo would be purchased and freight paid by -the British government. -<a name="FNanchor_297_297" id="FNanchor_297_297"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_297_297" class="fnanchor">[297]</a> These instructions were duly -communicated to the government of the neutral states, -which protested with more or less vigor and tenacity, but -found themselves helpless to resist force with force. Singularly -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span> -enough, the French government had preceded the -British on this occasion, having issued orders to the same -effect on the 9th of the previous May; but the fact appears -to have escaped the ministry, for, in justifying their action -to the United States, they do not allude to it. Their -course is defended on the broad ground that, from the -character of the war and the situation of France, there -was a fair prospect of starving her into submission, -<a name="FNanchor_298_298" id="FNanchor_298_298"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_298_298" class="fnanchor">[298]</a> and -that under such circumstances provisions, always a questionable -article, became contraband of war. The answer -was not satisfactory to the neutral, deprived of part of his -expected gains, but the argument was one of those that -admit of no appeal except to arms. A further justification -of the order was found by the British ministry in the -undoubted fact that "the French government itself was the -sole legal importer of grain in France" at that time; and -therefore "the trade was no longer to be regarded as a -mercantile speculation of individuals, but as an immediate -operation of the very persons who have declared war, and -are now carrying it on, against Great Britain." The -American minister to France, Monroe, confirms this, in -his letter of October 16, 1794: "The whole commerce of -France, to the absolute exclusion of individuals, is -carried on by the government itself." -<a name="FNanchor_299_299" id="FNanchor_299_299"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_299_299" class="fnanchor">[299]</a></p> - -<p>Soon after, on the 6th of November, 1793, another order -was issued by the British ministry, directing the seizure -of "all ships laden with goods the produce of any colony -belonging to France, or carrying provisions or other supplies -for the use of any such colony." This order was -based upon the Rule of 1756, so called from the war in -which it first came conspicuously into notice, and the principle -of which, as stated by British authorities, was that -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span> -a trade forbidden to neutrals by the laws of a country, during -peace, could not be lawfully carried on by them in -time of war, for the convenience of the belligerent; because, -by such employment, their ships "were in effect -incorporated in the enemy's navigation, having adopted -his commerce and character and identified themselves with -his interests and purposes." -<a name="FNanchor_300_300" id="FNanchor_300_300"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_300_300" class="fnanchor">[300]</a> At that time the colonial -trade was generally reserved to the mother country; and -against it particularly, together with the coasting trade, -similarly restricted, was this ruling of the British courts -and government directed. Neutrals replied, "Because the -parent country monopolizes in peace the whole commerce -of its colonies, does it follow that in war it should have no -right to regulate it at all?" -<a name="FNanchor_301_301" id="FNanchor_301_301"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_301_301" class="fnanchor">[301]</a> "We deny that municipal -regulations, established in peace, can in any wise limit -the public rights of neutrals in time of war." -<a name="FNanchor_302_302" id="FNanchor_302_302"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_302_302" class="fnanchor">[302]</a> It is evident -that these two lines of argument do not fairly meet -each other; they resemble rather opposite and equal weights -in a balance, which will quickly be overturned when passion -or interest, combined with power, is thrown in upon -either side. Starting from such fundamentally different -premises, interested parties might argue on indefinitely -in parallel lines, without ever approaching a point of -contact.</p> - -<p>The chief present interest in this question, referring as -it does to an obsolete colonial policy, is as illustrative of -one of those dead-locks, which, occurring at a critical -moment, when passion or interest is aroused, offer no -solution but by war. It was useless to point out that -Great Britain relaxed in every direction her own peace -regulations, for the advantage of British commerce in the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span> -present contest. The reply was perfectly apt, that she -did not dispute the right of her enemy to avail himself of -any help the neutral could give; she only asserted the -determination not to permit the neutral to extend it with -impunity. There was no doubt, in the mind of any considerable -body of Englishmen, as to the perfect soundness -of the English doctrine. Lord Howick, who, as Mr. Grey, -had embarrassed his party in 1792 by the exuberance of -his liberalism, -<a name="FNanchor_303_303" id="FNanchor_303_303"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_303_303" class="fnanchor">[303]</a> as foreign minister in 1807 wrote: -"Neutrality, properly considered, does not consist in -taking advantage of every situation between belligerent -states by which emolument may accrue to the neutral, -whatever may be the consequences to either belligerent -party; but in observing a strict and honest impartiality, -so as not to afford advantage in the war to either; and, -particularly, in so far restraining its trade to the accustomed -course which it held in time of peace, as not to -render assistance to one belligerent in escaping the -effects of the other's hostilities." -<a name="FNanchor_304_304" id="FNanchor_304_304"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_304_304" class="fnanchor">[304]</a> An agreement among -any number of the subjects of the interested nation proves -nothing as to the right of the question, but the irreconcilable -divergence of views at this time shows most -clearly the necessity, under which every country lies, to be -ready to support its own sense of its rights and honor by -force, if necessary.</p> - -<p>Under the order of November 6, some hundreds of -American ships were seized and brought into West Indian -ports by British cruisers. -<a name="FNanchor_305_305" id="FNanchor_305_305"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_305_305" class="fnanchor">[305]</a> The application of the order -to them was, however, liable to two serious objections, -even admitting the principle. In the first place, it was -made without warning, under a rule that was at least not -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span> -generally accepted; and in the second place, the trade -between the French West India Islands and the United -States had been permitted, before the war, in vessels of -sixty tons and upwards. -<a name="FNanchor_306_306" id="FNanchor_306_306"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_306_306" class="fnanchor">[306]</a> In the year ending September -30, 1790, fifty-seven thousand tons of American shipping -entered home ports from the French colonies. The trade, -therefore, was one that existed prior to the war, and so -did not come under the rule of 1756. -<a name="FNanchor_307_307" id="FNanchor_307_307"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_307_307" class="fnanchor">[307]</a> The order of November -6 was not made public until nearly the end of the -year; the United States minister in London not receiving -a copy until Christmas Day. He hastened at once to protest, -but before he could obtain an audience a second was -issued, January 8, 1794, revoking the former and limiting -the operations of the rule to vessels bound from the colonies -direct to Europe. Although the principle was maintained -by the new order, and not admitted by the United -States, still, as their own trade was excepted, much dissatisfaction -was removed.</p> - -<p>The serious nature of the difficulties that had already -arisen determined the government to send an extraordinary -envoy to England. John Jay was nominated to this office, -and reached London in June, 1794. The British government, -having already receded from its first position, as -well as revoked the order of June 8, 1793, for the seizure -of provisions, found no difficulty in assuming a conciliatory -attitude. The result of Jay's mission was a treaty of -Commerce and Navigation, concluded November 19, 1794, -the first contracted between the two countries since the -separation. The injuries done to American commerce, -under the orders of November 6, were to be submitted to -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span> -a joint commission. The report of the latter was not -made until 1804, but by it compensation was made for -most of the seizures; and it was claimed in the following -year by Mr. Monroe, then envoy in London, that the -decision of the commission definitely disposed of the -principle of the Rule of 1756. It does not appear, however, -that its power extended further than the settlement -of the cases. There, its decision was to be final; but it -had no power to commit either government to any general -principle of international law not otherwise established. -<a name="FNanchor_308_308" id="FNanchor_308_308"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_308_308" class="fnanchor">[308]</a> -The Rule of 1756 was not mentioned in the treaty, and -the failure to do so may be construed as a tacit acquiescence, -or at least submission, on the part of the United -States. -<a name="FNanchor_309_309" id="FNanchor_309_309"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_309_309" class="fnanchor">[309]</a> -On the other hand, considerable commercial advantages -were obtained. Great Britain conceded to -American ships the privilege of direct trade between -their own country and the British East and West Indies, -but they were precluded from carrying the produce of -those colonies to other foreign ports. Indeed, so great -was the anxiety of the British ministers to prevent coffee -and sugar from being taken to Europe, indirectly, by -neutral ships, that they insisted upon, and Jay admitted, -a stipulation that while the trade with the British West -Indies was permitted, the United States would not allow -the carrying of any molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa, or cotton -in American vessels to any other part of the world than to -the United States. This would have stopped a profitable -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span> -trade already open to American merchants, who first imported, -and then re-exported to France, the produce of -the French islands; the broken voyage being considered to -purge the origin of the commodities. This article (the -twelfth) was accordingly rejected by the Senate, and only -as thus modified was the treaty ratified by both powers.</p> - -<p>The French government had viewed with distrust the -negotiation between Great Britain and the United States. -Although assured by Mr. Jay, through the American -minister at Paris, that the treaty contained an express -stipulation guarding the existing conventions between -France and his own country, the Directory had the insolence -to demand a copy of the instrument, to which it -considered itself entitled, although it had not yet been -communicated to the United States government. When -the terms finally became known, its indignation passed -bounds. The principal points to which it took exception -were two, wherein the United States admitted conditions -favoring the interests of belligerents relatively to neutrals, -and against which the chief efforts of the weaker maritime -states had been addressed. The first of these was -the well-settled principle that a neutral ship did not protect -property belonging to an enemy, laden on board it. -The United States had always admitted this as valid, -while trying to introduce, as an innovation, the contrary -rule. In the treaty of 1778 with France, the two countries -had stipulated that in any future war in which one -of them should be engaged the belligerent should respect -his enemy's property, if under the flag of the other party -to the compact; but the United States did not think that -this agreement between two nations overturned for all -others a settled usage. The interests of Great Britain -indisposed her to accept the proposed change, and the old -principle was explicitly accepted in the seventeenth article -of Jay's treaty. The other point objected to by France -referred to the definitions of contraband of war. This has -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span> -always been, and still is, one of the most difficult problems -of international law; for an article may be of the -first importance in the wars of one age or one country, -and of slight consequence in another century or a different -scene. By Jay's treaty the United States allowed that -naval stores were, and under some circumstances provisions -might be, contraband of war, and therefore liable -to seizure. A free trade in these articles was of great -importance to the Americans; but they were weak then, as -in a military sense they, with far less excuse, are now; -and then, as now, they must submit in questions of doubtful -right. The material interests of United States citizens, -as distinguished from the national self-respect, were -in part saved by Great Britain undertaking to pay for provisions -when seized as contraband. All these conditions -bore against the wishes of the French, who regarded the -Americans as owing an undischarged debt of gratitude to -them for the scanty, though certainly most important, aid -extended in the Revolutionary struggle by the monarch -whom his people had since beheaded; and from this time -the arrogance with which the French government had -treated that of the United States became tinged with -acrimony. It refused to see the difficulties and weakness -of the new and still scarcely cemented body of states; or -that, indirectly, the bargain struck by the latter was upon -the whole as advantageous to France herself as could be -expected, when Great Britain had an absolute control -over the sea and all that floated upon it. To imperious -rebukes and reproaches succeeded a series of measures, -outraging neutral and treaty rights, which finally led to -hostilities between the two countries.</p> - -<p>From the time of Jay's treaty to the peace of Amiens, -and until the year 1804 in the following war, the relations -between Great Britain and the United States remained -on a fairly settled basis. Innumerable vexations, indeed, -attended neutral commerce at the hands of cruisers who -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span> -were willing on slight grounds to seize a prize, taking -the chance of the courts deciding in their favor, and the -delays of prize courts added greatly to the annoyance; but -upon the whole American trade throve greatly. In June, -1797, the Secretary of State reported, in reply to a resolution -of the House, that "captures and losses by British -cruisers, it is presumed, have not been numerous; for the -citizens of the United States having, these three years -past, been accustomed to look to the government for aid -in prosecuting these claims, it is not to be doubted that, -generally, these cases have been reported to the Department." -In 1801 there was an outbreak of lawless seizure -in the West Indies. -<a name="FNanchor_310_310" id="FNanchor_310_310"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_310_310" class="fnanchor">[310]</a> The American vessels engaged in -that trade were small, and, as legal expenses were the -same for a large as for a small prize, the cost of a contest -amounted to a sum very disproportionate to the value of -the ship; so the captors hoped, by the well-known delays -of procedure, to extort a compromise. An abuse of this -kind, however outrageous, is different in principle from -the direct action of a government; nor are such cases the -only ones in which men have been willing to take dishonest -advantage of the imperfections, ambiguities, or delays -of the law. -<a name="FNanchor_311_311" id="FNanchor_311_311"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_311_311" class="fnanchor">[311]</a> The Secretary of State, in transmitting -a report on the subject to the House of Representatives, -said, "Neither the communications from our minister at -London, nor my conversations with the Chargé d'Affaires -of his Britannic Majesty in the United States, would lead -to an opinion that any additional orders have lately been -given by the British government, authorizing the system of -depredation alluded to." -<a name="FNanchor_312_312" id="FNanchor_312_312"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_312_312" class="fnanchor">[312]</a></p> - -<p>In fact, at this time Pitt's government seems to have -considered all trade, which did not go direct to hostile -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span> -countries, an advantage to Great Britain, and especially if -it could be drawn to pass through her own ports. Accordingly, -in January, 1798, a further relaxation of the -Rule of 1756 was promulgated, extending to European -neutrals the concession made in 1794 to the United States. -British cruisers were now directed not to capture neutral -ships, bound from the hostile colonies to Europe and -laden with colonial produce, provided the latter had -become neutral property and its destination was to their -own country, or to a port of Great Britain. The final -clause foreshadowed the policy of the Orders in Council -of ten years later, towards which Great Britain, under the -stress of war, was steadily gravitating. The law of self-preservation, -divined by the instinct of the state, demanded -that the United Kingdom should become, for that -war, the storehouse of the world's commerce. The more -thriving that commerce, the better for her, if it could be -concentrated in her own borders. Thus France and the -whole world should become tributary to a wealth and to a -power by which, not Great Britain only, but the world -should be saved. It was a great conception, of slow -growth and gradual realization; it was disfigured in its -progress by imperfections, blunders, and crimes; but it -was radically sound and in the end victorious, for upon -Great Britain and upon commerce hung the destinies of -the world.</p> - -<p>The action of France towards neutral, and especially -towards American, vessels reflected the instability and excitement -of the successive French governments, the violent -passions of the time, and the uncertainty necessarily attendant -upon the course of a nation which, having cut adrift -from fixed principles and precedents, is guided only by -changing impressions of right and wrong. The decree of -the 9th of May, 1793, arresting vessels laden with provisions -or carrying enemy's goods, was revoked as regards -the United States on the 23d of the same month, because -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span> -contrary to the treaty of 1778. On the 28th, five days -later, the revocation was revoked, and the original order -established. -<a name="FNanchor_313_313" id="FNanchor_313_313"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_313_313" class="fnanchor">[313]</a> On the first of July the decision was -again reversed and the treaty ordered to be observed; notwithstanding -which the United States minister found it -impossible to obtain the release of vessels seized contrary -to its terms, and on the 27th of the month the last decision -was again repealed. -<a name="FNanchor_314_314" id="FNanchor_314_314"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_314_314" class="fnanchor">[314]</a> On the 22d of September the -American minister writes: "I understand it is still in -contemplation to repeal the decree I complained of, and -that in the mean time it has not been transmitted to the -tribunals. In effect, it can do very little harm; because -the fleets of this country are confined by the enemy, and -the privateers by a decree of the Convention." -<a name="FNanchor_315_315" id="FNanchor_315_315"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_315_315" class="fnanchor">[315]</a> Here -matters rested during the Reign of Terror and until -November 15, 1794, after the fall of Robespierre, when -the Directory issued its first edict on the subject; reiterating -that enemy's goods under the neutral flag would be -considered liable to seizure, until the powers, enemies of -France, should declare French property free on board neutral -ships. This made the treatment of cargoes on American -vessels depend, not upon the formal engagements of -France with the United States, but upon the conduct of -Great Britain; and it was succeeded, on the 3d of January, -1795, by a decree of revocation. Enemy's goods -under neutral flags now remained exempt from capture -until the 2d of July, 1796; when proclamation was issued, -notifying neutral powers that the ships of the French Republic -would be used against their merchant vessels, were it -for the purpose of confiscation, search or detention, in the -same manner that they suffered the English to act in regard -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span> -to them. Great Britain was thus made supreme arbiter -of the conduct of France towards neutrals.</p> - -<p>This last step of the French government was directly -traceable to its dissatisfaction with Jay's treaty, the ratifications -of which had been exchanged at London on the -28th of October, 1795. On the 16th of February, 1796, -the Minister of Foreign Affairs told Mr. Monroe, the -American minister, that his government considered the -alliance between the two countries, formed by the treaty -of 1778, to be terminated, <i>ipso facto</i>, by Jay's treaty; and -on the 7th of October he was further informed that the -minister to the United States had been recalled and would -not be replaced. Meanwhile President Washington, being -dissatisfied with Monroe's conduct, had summoned him -home and sent out Mr. Pinckney as his relief; but the -Directory, on the 11th of December, refused to receive -any minister plenipotentiary from the United States until -the grievances it had alleged were redressed, -<a name="FNanchor_316_316" id="FNanchor_316_316"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_316_316" class="fnanchor">[316]</a> and on the -25th of January, 1797, Pinckney was ordered to leave the -country as an unauthorized foreigner.</p> - -<p>France was now fully embarked on a course of violence -toward the United States, which arose, not from any -reasonable cause of discontent given, but from the disposition, -identical with that shown toward the weaker -European nations, to compel all countries to follow the -dictates of the French policy. The utterly loose terms of -the decree of July 2, 1796, authorized the seizure of any -neutral vessel by a French captain, if, in his judgment, the -conduct of Great Britain toward the neutral justified it; -and left the ultimate fate of the prize to a tribunal governed -only by its own opinion upon the same subject. -"You are mistaken," said a French deputy, "if you think -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span> -that a privateer sails furnished with instructions from the -Minister of Marine, who ought to direct their action. The -instructions are drawn up by his owners; they indicate to -the captain what he may seize and what release. They compile -for him his duties under all the rules, under all the -laws, contradictory or otherwise, from the year 1400 up to -the law of Nivôse 29, An 6" (Jan. 18, 1798). -<a name="FNanchor_317_317" id="FNanchor_317_317"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_317_317" class="fnanchor">[317]</a></p> - -<p>In the West Indies the French agents, practically removed -from all control of the home government by the -British command of the sea, issued on the 27th of November, -1796, a decree for the capture of Americans bound to, -or coming from, British ports. They had already, on the -first of August, directed that all vessels having contraband -goods on board should be seized and condemned, whatever -their destination, and although the accepted law condemned -only the contraband articles themselves, not the -ship nor the rest of the cargo. On the first of the following -February the same commissioners ordered the capture -of all neutrals sailing for the French islands which had -surrendered to the enemy, and declared them good prize. -That these acts fairly represented the purpose of the -Directory may be inferred from the capture of American -ships in European waters under the decree of July 2, and -from the fact that the French consuls at Malaga and Cadiz -interpreted the decree to authorize seizure and condemnation -for the single circumstance of being destined for a -British port. -<a name="FNanchor_318_318" id="FNanchor_318_318"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_318_318" class="fnanchor">[318]</a> -Over three hundred American vessels were -thus seized, and most of them condemned. Envoys sent -from the United States to treat concerning these matters -said, in October, 1797, that France had violently taken -from America over fifteen million dollars. -<a name="FNanchor_319_319" id="FNanchor_319_319"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_319_319" class="fnanchor">[319]</a> "At no -period of the war," wrote they again, February 7, 1798, -"has Britain undertaken to exercise such a power. At -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span> -no period has she asserted such a right." -<a name="FNanchor_320_320" id="FNanchor_320_320"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_320_320" class="fnanchor">[320]</a> "Was there -ever anything," said the deputy before quoted, "like the -injustice of the condemnations in the Antilles?"</p> - -<p>These irregular and arbitrary proceedings are chiefly -significant as showing the lack of any fixed principles of -action on the part of the French government and its -agents; and they were closely connected with similar -courses towards neutral vessels in French ports. At the -outbreak of hostilities in 1793, one hundred and three -American ships were embargoed at Bordeaux and detained -more than a year, without any reason given; nor had the -owners been indemnified in 1796. -<a name="FNanchor_321_321" id="FNanchor_321_321"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_321_321" class="fnanchor">[321]</a> Cargoes were forcibly -taken from vessels and payment either refused or offered -in kind, and so delayed that in the West Indies alone the -American losses were calculated at two million dollars. -Besides these acts, which had the character of spoliations, -the contracts and other financial obligations of the French -government and its agents with citizens of the United -States remained undischarged. The irritation between -the two governments, and on the part of American merchants, -continued to increase rapidly. The decree of -July 2, the essence of which was the formal repudiation -of a clause of the treaty of 1778, at the time when alone -it became applicable, remained in force; and was rendered -more obnoxious by a further order, of March 2, 1797, -making more stringent the proofs of neutrality to be adduced -before French tribunals and requiring papers which -had long been disused.</p> - -<p>At this time the astonishing successes of Bonaparte's -Italian campaigns were approaching their triumphant -conclusion. The battle of Rivoli had been fought on the -14th of January, 1797, -<a name="FNanchor_322_322" id="FNanchor_322_322"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_322_322" class="fnanchor">[322]</a> Mantua capitulated on the 2d of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span> -February, and the Pope had been compelled to sue for -peace. To Austria there remained only the hope of contesting -the approach to her German dominions. The -confidence of the Directors knew no bounds, and they now -began to formulate the policy toward British commerce -which Napoleon inherited from them. The design was -formed of forcing the United States to recede from the -obnoxious conventions of Jay's treaty; and the government -of Holland, then entirely dependent upon that of -France, was pressed to demand that Dutch property on -board American vessels should be protected against British -seizure, and to suggest the concurrence of the three -republics against Great Britain. -<a name="FNanchor_323_323" id="FNanchor_323_323"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_323_323" class="fnanchor">[323]</a> The Dutch accordingly -represented "that, when circumstances oblige our commerce -to confide its interests to the neutral flag of American -vessels, it has a just right to insist that that flag be -protected with energy;" -<a href="#Footnote_324_324" class="fnanchor">[324]</a> in other words, that, when the -British control of the sea forced the Dutch ships from it, -Dutch trade should be carried on under the American flag, -and that the United States should fight to prevent the -seizure of the Dutch property, although it admitted that -the traditional law of nations would not justify it in so -doing. On the 6th of May, 1797, Spain also, doubtless -under the dictation of France, made the same demand. -<a name="FNanchor_324_324" id="FNanchor_324_324"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_324_324" class="fnanchor">[324]</a> -Similar representations were made to the other neutral -country, Denmark. Here is seen the forerunner of Napoleon's -contention that, as against Great Britain's control -of the sea, no state had a right to be neutral. Soon -afterward the idea was carried farther. Denmark was requested -to close the mouth of the Elbe to British commerce. -"The French," wrote our minister to London on -the 12th of March, 1797, "assign our treaty with England -as the cause of their maritime conduct toward us, but -they have recently demanded of Hamburg and Bremen to -suspend all commerce with England. These have not -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span> -complied, and the French minister has been recalled from -Hamburg. The same demand has been made at Copenhagen, -and the refusal has produced a sharp diplomatic -controversy. These powers have made no late treaty with -England." -<a name="FNanchor_325_325" id="FNanchor_325_325"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_325_325" class="fnanchor">[325]</a></p> - -<p>Hostilities with Austria had ceased by the preliminaries -of Leoben, April 18, followed, after long negotiations, by -the treaty of Campo Formio, October 17, 1797. Of the -coalition against France, Great Britain alone remained -upright and defiant. She had in 1797, after Austria had -yielded, offered to negotiate; but the terms demanded -were such that she refused to accept them, and her envoy -was ordered out of France as peremptorily as Mr. Pinckney -had been a few months before. The Directory thought -that the time was now come when she could be brought to -unconditional surrender, and the weapon by which her -commerce should be annihilated was already forged to its -hand. On the 31st of October, 1796 (Brumaire 10, An -5), -<a name="FNanchor_326_326" id="FNanchor_326_326"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_326_326" class="fnanchor">[326]</a> -a law had been passed by the Legislature forbidding -entirely the admission of any British manufactured goods, -directing that all persons who already had such in possession -should declare them within three days, and that they -should be at once packed and stored for re-exportation. -In order to insure the execution of the statute, domiciliary -visits were authorized everywhere within three leagues of -the frontiers or sea-board, and throughout France the -dwellings of all tradesmen were also open to search. -Laws of similar purpose had been passed early in the -war; -<a name="FNanchor_327_327" id="FNanchor_327_327"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_327_327" class="fnanchor">[327]</a> -but they either had been found insufficient or were -no longer applicable to the changed conditions of affairs. -"Now that," to use the words of a deputy, "the flags of -the Republic or those of its allies float over the sea from -Embden to Trieste, and almost all the ports of the European -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span> -seas are closed to England, we must stop the voluntary -subsidies which are paid her by the consumers of -English merchandise." -<a name="FNanchor_328_328" id="FNanchor_328_328"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_328_328" class="fnanchor">[328]</a> With Belgium annexed, with -Spain and Holland vassals rather than allies, with the -greater part of Italy in military occupation, it seemed -possible to repel the entrance points of British goods to -the Continent far from the French frontier, and by strict -watchfulness to close the latter against such as worked -their way to it.</p> - -<p>The expectation, however, was deceived; the superior -quality and abundance of British manufactures created a -demand which evaded all watchfulness and enlisted all -classes against the officials. The Directory therefore determined, -toward the end of 1797, to put the law into -force with all severity and to introduce another and final -rigor into its maritime prize code. On the 4th of January, -1798, a message was sent to the council of Five Hundred, -announcing that "on that very day the municipal administrators, -the justices of the peace, the commissaries of the -Directory, and the superintendents of customs, are proceeding -in all the chief places of the departments, in all -the ports, and in all the principal communes, to seize all -English merchandise now in France in contravention of -the law of Brumaire 10, An 5. Such is the <i>first act</i> by -which, now that peace is given to the Continent, the war -declared long since against England is about to assume -the real character that belongs to it." But more was -needed. Neutral vessels were in the habit of entering -British ports, shipping British goods, and carrying on -British trade; they were even known, when opportunity -offered, to introduce articles of British manufacture, -directly or indirectly, into France. By so doing they -aided Great Britain and actually took part in the war. -"The Directory, therefore, thinks it urgent and necessary -to pass a law declaring that the character of vessels, rela -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span>tive -to their quality of neutral or enemy, shall be determined -by their cargo; ... in consequence, that every -vessel found at sea, having on board English merchandise -as her cargo, in whole or in part, shall be declared lawful -prize, whosoever shall be the proprietor of this merchandise, -<i>which shall be reputed contraband for this cause alone</i>, -that it comes from England or her possessions." This -decree was adopted without discussion, in the very terms of -the Directory's message, on the 18th of January, 1798. -From that time forward, to use the expression of a French -deputy, speaking a year later on the proposed repeal of -the law, "if a handkerchief of English origin is found on -board a neutral ship, both the rest of the cargo and the -ship itself are subject to condemnation." It is, perhaps, -well to point out that this differed from the Rule of 1756, -by forbidding a trade which at all times had been open to -neutrals, in peace as in war. It differed from the old rule -condemning enemy's property found in neutral bottoms, -by condemning also neutral property of hostile origin, -together with the whole cargo and the ship, as contaminated -by the presence of any British goods.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless, British commerce continued to thrive, -and was rather benefited than injured by the new law. -What the indomitable purpose, unlimited power, and -extraordinary mental and physical activity of Napoleon -could only partially accomplish, proved to be wholly -beyond the weak arm of the Directory. When war first -shut the ports of France to Great Britain, her trade -thither passed through the Netherlands and Holland. -When the Netherlands were overrun, Amsterdam monopolized -the traffic. With the fall of Holland, it passed -away to Bremen and Hamburg. The latter port, being -farther east and more remote from the French armies, -naturally drew the greater part and became the real heir -of Amsterdam. -<a name="FNanchor_329_329" id="FNanchor_329_329"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_329_329" class="fnanchor">[329]</a> -It was the emporium of Northern Germany, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span> -through which poured the colonial produce of the -world and the manufactures of the British Islands, and -from which they were distributed over the Continent. The -enormous subsidies paid by the United Kingdom to Germany -found their way back, in part at least, by the increased -purchasing power of the belligerent countries, -<a name="FNanchor_330_330" id="FNanchor_330_330"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_330_330" class="fnanchor">[330]</a> -which consumed the manufactures of Great Britain and -the coffee and sugar which had passed through her ports -and paid toll to her revenues. -<a name="FNanchor_331_331" id="FNanchor_331_331"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_331_331" class="fnanchor">[331]</a> The shipping clearing for -Hamburg from British ports, which was naught in 1793, -rose to fifty-three thousand tons in 1795; and in 1798, the -year during which the new French law operated, increased -to seventy-four thousand. But, while Hamburg was the -great centre, all the northern German ports shared the -same prosperity. After Prussia retired from the war -against France, in April, 1795, a neutral North German -territory was established, behind a line agreed upon -between the two countries. The total tonnage entering -the ports of this region increased from one hundred and -twenty thousand in 1792 to two hundred and six thousand -in 1795; and in 1798 reached three hundred and three -thousand. The value of merchandise imported rose from -£2,200,000 in 1792, to £8,300,000 in 1795, £11,000,000 -in 1798, and £13,500,000 in 1800. -<a name="FNanchor_332_332" id="FNanchor_332_332"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_332_332" class="fnanchor">[332]</a></p> - -<p>A similar elasticity was shown by British trade throughout -the world. Only in the Mediterranean was there a -marked decrease both of exports and imports,—a loss -partly filled by the enterprise of American merchants; -<a name="FNanchor_333_333" id="FNanchor_333_333"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_333_333" class="fnanchor">[333]</a> -but only partly, for the Barbary pirates seconded the -sweeping French decrees in excluding neutrals from that -sea. But it was in the West Indies, together with the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span> -German ports, that the commercial activity of Great -Britain found its greatest resources; and in the steady -support contributed by that region to her financial stability -is to be found the justification of the much derided -policy of Pitt in capturing sugar islands. Alike as valuable -pieces of property, as possessions to be exchanged -when framing a treaty, and as bases for cruisers, which not -merely seized upon British shipping but disturbed the -commercial development of the whole region, each hostile -island should at once have been seized by Great -Britain. In a contest between equal navies for the control -of the sea, to waste military effort upon the capture -of small islands, as the French did in 1778, is a preposterous -misdirection of effort; but when one navy is overwhelmingly -preponderant, as the British was after 1794, when the -enemy confines himself to commerce-destroying by crowds -of small privateers, then the true military policy is to -stamp out the nests where they swarm. If, by so doing, -control is also gained of a rich commercial region, as the -Caribbean Sea then was, the action is doubly justified. -The produce of the West Indies, as of the East, figured -doubly in the returns of British commerce,—as imports, -and as re-exported to the Continent. -<a name="FNanchor_334_334" id="FNanchor_334_334"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_334_334" class="fnanchor">[334]</a> Each captured -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span> -island contributed to swell the revenues by which the war -was maintained. -<a name="FNanchor_335_335" id="FNanchor_335_335"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_335_335" class="fnanchor">[335]</a> The disappearance of the merchant -fleets of France, Spain, and Holland, the ruin of San -Domingo, and the general disorganization of such French -islands as were not taken, threw the greater part of the -production of tropical articles into British hands; and the -practice of the day, which confined its transport to British -ships, helped to support the shipping interest also in the -strain brought upon it by the war. The Americans alone -could compete in the continental market as carriers of -such produce. Debarred from going with it direct to -Europe by the Rule of 1756, the rise in price, due to the -diminished production and decrease of transport just mentioned, -allowed them to take the sugar and coffee of the -colonies at war with England to American ports, reship it -to the Continent, and yet make a good profit on the transaction. -As the British colonists were in full possession -of the home market, and their produce commanded high -prices, the outcry which caused so much trouble ten years -later was not now raised. On the contrary, their prosperous -condition facilitated the British orders of January, -1798, exempting from capture Danes, Swedes, and other -neutral ships, when carrying coffee and sugar of hostile -origin to their own country, or to England.</p> - -<p>It was against this great system of trade that the law of -Nivôse 29 was launched. British manufactured goods, -rather than British gold and silver, bought and paid for -the produce of the East and West Indies, for that of the -United States and of the Levant. The Continent consumed -the manufactures of Great Britain, the sugar and coffee of -her colonies, and obtained through British merchants the -spices and wares of the East; for all which it for the most -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span> -part paid back specie. The United States took specie -from France herself for the colonial produce carried there -in its vessels, and with it paid Great Britain for her -manufactures. France herself received British goods -through continental channels, and paid hard cash for -them. The money thus coming to London had flowed -back as subsidies to the armies of the coalitions. Now, -thanks to Bonaparte, Great Britain stood alone. The -French navy was powerless to contend with her fleets; -but, by actual possession or by treaty, the Directory had -excluded her ships from a great part of the Continent. -Nevertheless, British goods abounded in all parts through -the complicity of neutral carriers. If these could be -stopped, the market for British manufactures would be -closed; therefore against them were launched the cruisers -of France, with the authority of the decree to capture any -one of them found with a bale or box of British origin on -board. The result was curious.</p> - -<p>After the lapse of a year, on the 13th of January, 1799, -the Directory addressed a message to the lower house of -the Legislature -<a name="FNanchor_336_336" id="FNanchor_336_336"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_336_336" class="fnanchor">[336]</a> on the subject of maritime prizes, in which -occurred the celebrated avowal, already quoted, that not a -single merchant ship under French colors sailed the deep -seas. But this was not all. The irregularities and outrages -of privateers had so terrified neutrals that there -had been an immense diminution in the entries of neutral -tonnage, although Great Britain had rather relaxed than -increased the severe rules she had adopted early in the -war. In consequence of the smaller importations from -abroad, there were necessarily smaller sales of French -goods, and the decrease of neutral carriers impeded the -export of agricultural produce and manufactures, as well -as the importation of raw materials essential to the latter. -The Directory attributed the evil to an existing ordinance, -which left the final determination of prize cases in the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span> -hands of the courts, instead of attributing it to the executive. -It argued that if there were a right of final appeal -to the latter, it could check the arbitrary proceedings of -the cruisers and the erroneous decisions of the judges. -If, as was represented by the American consulate at -Paris, the courts of first instance were chiefly composed -of merchants in the sea-ports, most of whom were, -directly or indirectly, interested in fitting out privateers, -<a name="FNanchor_337_337" id="FNanchor_337_337"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_337_337" class="fnanchor">[337]</a> -there was certainly need of some change in the existing -legislation. In the Conseil des Anciens, however, a -different view prevailed. On the 17th of January, 1799, -a debate began in that body, on a resolution fixing the -date when the law of January 18, 1798, became operative. -<a name="FNanchor_338_338" id="FNanchor_338_338"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_338_338" class="fnanchor">[338]</a> -The consequent discussion took a wide range over the -policy and results of the enactment, as shown by the year -it had been in force. The disastrous commercial condition -of France was freely admitted on all sides; but in several -powerful speeches it was attributed directly and convincingly -to the working of the law itself. "Neutrals repelled -from our ports; our agricultural products without -any outlet abroad; our industry and commerce annihilated; -our colonies helpless; our shipping ways deserted; a balance -of twenty thousand sailors in English prisons; our -ships of war without seamen,—such are the political effects -of the law which is ruining, crushing us." -<a name="FNanchor_339_339" id="FNanchor_339_339"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_339_339" class="fnanchor">[339]</a></p> - -<p>In less impassioned words, other deputies showed the -unfairness of the law. If, on the land frontier, a wagon -was stopped carrying a bale of British goods, the bale was -confiscated, but the rest of the load escaped. If in a -ship a like bale was found, not only it, but all the rest -of the cargo and the ship itself were condemned. Even -in the fiercest heat of the Revolution and the utmost danger -to the country, it had never been attempted, as now, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span> -to forbid neutrals carrying British goods to their own -country. -<a name="FNanchor_340_340" id="FNanchor_340_340"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_340_340" class="fnanchor">[340]</a> The step could not be justified under the plea -of reprisals; for "if the English have seized French -goods on these same neutrals, they have not confiscated -the rest of the cargo. These are, therefore, not reprisals, -but new proceedings on our part, which neutrals could -neither expect nor guard against." -<a name="FNanchor_341_341" id="FNanchor_341_341"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_341_341" class="fnanchor">[341]</a> A neutral ship came -within reach of the French coast only at her extreme -peril. A small package of British goods would justify -her capture by a French privateer, whatever her destination; -nay, even if she were bringing to France articles -urgently needed, and intended to take away French produce -in exchange for them. Neutrals, allies, even French -vessels themselves, carrying on the little trade with -neighboring states, were preyed on by French corsairs. -This condition reacted on the enterprise of the cruisers -themselves. It was much safer, and quite as profitable, -to keep close to the home coast and board passing vessels. -The merest trifle, smuggled on board by one of the crew, -or shipped unknown to the master and owner, made them -good prize. Owing to this caution, the captures brought -into French home ports had dropped, from six hundred -and sixty-two in the previous year, to four hundred and -fifty-two, notwithstanding the vast extension of the field -for seizures. -<a name="FNanchor_342_342" id="FNanchor_342_342"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_342_342" class="fnanchor">[342]</a></p> - -<p>The loss of prizes, however, was far from being the -worst effect of the law. Neutrals being repelled, friendly -and French shipping scared away, commerce had been -seriously crippled for want of carriage. In the year -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span> -before the enactment the coasting trade employed 895,000 -tons; of which 120,000 were neutrals, by whom goods were -transported from one sea frontier of France to another, as -from the Bay of Biscay to the French Mediterranean coast. -In the year following, the total fell to 746,000; but the -neutrals dropped to 38,000. In the foreign trade 860,000 -tons were employed in the year before the law, of which -623,000 were neutral. In the year following, the total -fell to 688,000, of which 468,000 were neutrals. There -thus resulted a total loss of 322,000 tons in a commerce -of only 1,750,000. To this the speaker added a striking -comparison: "In the same year in which we lost 322,000 -tons by the operation of the law, we took four hundred -and fifty-two prizes. Assuming—what is not the case—that -these were all English, and that they averaged two -hundred tons burden—an excessive allowance—we have -taken from our enemy 90,400 tons against 322,000 we -have lost." "All the sufferings of ourselves and allies -might be borne, if good resulted to ourselves or harm to -England; but it has not." "English ships are insured -at a premium of five per cent, while neutrals bound to -France have to pay twenty to thirty per cent. Neutrals -themselves seek English convoy. -<a name="FNanchor_343_343" id="FNanchor_343_343"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_343_343" class="fnanchor">[343]</a> French merchants -would gladly charter neutral ships to carry to San -Domingo the produce that is overflowing our storehouses, -and to bring back the coffee and sugar for which we are -paying such extravagant rates; but they will not come -near us. So, instead of paying a moderate price with -French goods, we are paying exorbitant rates in specie, -which goes straight to England, our most cruel foe." -<a name="FNanchor_344_344" id="FNanchor_344_344"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_344_344" class="fnanchor">[344]</a> -The policy of the law was condemned by the results. In -support of its justice, it was alleged that there were at -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span> -sea only French and British ships, whence it followed that -all which were not French could be seized,—a contention -which derives its sole present interest from being the -same as that put forth by Napoleon ten years later. It -shows again—what can scarcely be too often asserted in -the interests of truth—that the emperor was but the full -and perfect incarnation of the spirit that animated the -Convention and the Directory.</p> - -<p>The Government of the United States had not yet, in -1798, passed into the hands of men with an undue -"passion for peace." Upon the unceremonious dismissal -of Mr. Pinckney, not for personal objections but as rejecting -any minister from America, the President had called -a special meeting of Congress in May, 1797, and recommended -an increase of the naval establishment. When -the news of the law of January 18, 1798, reached the -United States, Congress was in session. On the 28th of -May an act was approved, authorizing the capture of any -French armed vessel which shall, upon the coast of the -United States, have committed any depredation upon her -commerce. -<a name="FNanchor_345_345" id="FNanchor_345_345"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_345_345" class="fnanchor">[345]</a> On the 7th of July another act abrogated all -existing treaties between the two countries; -<a name="FNanchor_346_346" id="FNanchor_346_346"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_346_346" class="fnanchor">[346]</a> and on the -9th was decreed the seizure of French armed vessels anywhere -on the high seas, not only by public armed ships, -but by privateers, which the President was authorized to -commission. -<a name="FNanchor_347_347" id="FNanchor_347_347"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_347_347" class="fnanchor">[347]</a> Thereupon followed a period of maritime -hostilities, though without a formal declaration of war, -which lasted three years; the first prize being taken from -the French in June, 1798, and peace being restored by a -treaty, signed in Paris September 30, 1800, and ratified -the following February. The small force of the United -States was principally occupied in the West Indies, protecting -their trade,—both by the patrol system directed -against the enemy's cruisers, and by convoying bodies of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span> -merchantmen to and from the islands. As the condition -of the French navy did not allow keeping large fleets afloat, -the ships of the United States, though generally small, -were able to hold their ground, capture many of the -enemy, and preserve their own commerce from molestation. -The mercantile shipping of France, however, had already -been so entirely destroyed by Great Britain, that she -suffered far more from the cessation of the carrying trade, -which Americans had maintained for her, than from the -attacks of the American navy.</p> - -<p>The year 1798, which opened with the unlucky law of -January 18, was in all respects unfortunate for France. -In May Bonaparte sailed for Egypt, the country thus -parting with its ablest general, with thirty-two thousand -of its best troops, and its only available fleet, of thirteen -sail-of-the-line, which the government with the utmost -difficulty had been able to equip. On the first of August -Nelson destroyed the fleet in the Battle of the Nile; and -the British navy, forced to leave the Mediterranean in -1796, again asserted its preponderance throughout the -whole of that sea, opposing an effectual barrier to the -return of the army in Egypt. The entire face of affairs -changed, not only in the East but in Europe. The Porte, -at first hesitating, declared openly against France. A -second coalition was formed between Great Britain, Austria, -and Russia, to which Naples acceded; and the armies -of the latter entered upon their campaign in November. -They were, indeed, quickly overthrown; but the very -march of the French troops against them left the armies -in northern Italy hopelessly inferior to their opponents. -The year 1799 was full of reverses. In Germany and in -Italy the French were steadily driven back; in Switzerland -only did they, under Masséna, hold their ground. -The British indeed were repelled in their attack upon -Holland, but they carried away with them the Dutch navy. -A Russo-Turkish fleet, entering the Mediterranean, retook -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span> -the Ionian Islands from the French; and Admiral Bruix -escaped from Brest only to find it impossible to achieve -any substantial results in the face of the British superiority -on the sea. In the midst of this confusion and disaster, -and amid the commercial and internal distress caused by -the maritime legislation, Bonaparte returned. Landing -on the 9th of October, he on the 9th of November overthrew -the Directory. Preparations for war were at once -begun, and the successes of the first consul in Italy and -of Moreau in Germany, in 1800, combined with the defection -of the czar from the coalition, restored peace to the -Continent and internal quiet to France.</p> - -<p>Upon this followed the renewal of the Armed Neutrality -of the Baltic powers. Great Britain found herself again -without an ally, face to face with France, now supported -by the naval combination of the northern states. Still -she stood resolute, abating not a jot of her asserted maritime -rights. As before, the allies demanded that the -neutral flag should cover the enemy's property that floated -under it, and that the term "contraband of war" should -apply only to articles strictly and solely applicable to -warlike purposes, which, they claimed, naval stores and -provisions were not. They proposed also to deprive -Great Britain of the belligerent right of search, by sending -ships of war with the merchant ships, and requiring -that the assertion of the naval captain should be received -as establishing the lawful character of the two or three -hundred cargoes under his convoy. "The question," said -Pitt, "is whether we are to permit the navy of our enemy -to be recruited and supplied,—whether we are to suffer -blockaded ports to be furnished with warlike stores and -provisions,—whether we are to suffer neutral nations, by -hoisting a flag upon a sloop or a fishing boat, to convey -the treasures of South America to the harbors of Spain, -or the naval stores of the Baltic to Brest and Toulon. I -would ask, too, has there ever been a period, since we -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span> -have been a naval country, in which we have acted upon -this principle?" -<a name="FNanchor_348_348" id="FNanchor_348_348"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_348_348" class="fnanchor">[348]</a> and he alleged not only the unbroken -practice of Great Britain, but her old treaties with the -allied states, and especially the convention with Russia -in 1793. So far as precedent and tradition went, England's -case was unimpeachable. She was called upon to -surrender, not a new pretension, but an old right important -to her military position. "I have no hesitation," -said Fox, Pitt's great opponent, "in saying that, as a -general proposition, 'free bottoms do not make free -goods;' and that, as an axiom, it is supported neither by -the law of nations nor by common-sense." -<a name="FNanchor_349_349" id="FNanchor_349_349"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_349_349" class="fnanchor">[349]</a></p> - -<p>At this time the British navy was superior to the combined -forces of all Europe. A fleet, of which Nelson was -the animating spirit though not the nominal head, entered -the Baltic. Denmark was struck down on the 2d of April, -1801; and this blow, coinciding with the murder of the -Czar Paul, dissolved a coalition more menacing in appearance -than in reality. The young man who succeeded to -the Russian throne met with dignity the imposing attitude -of Nelson, now left in chief command; but he had not inherited -his father's fantastic ambitions, and the material -interests of Russia in that day pointed to peace with -Great Britain. The treaty, signed June 5, 1801, -<a name="FNanchor_350_350" id="FNanchor_350_350"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_350_350" class="fnanchor">[350]</a> permitted -the neutral to trade from port to port on the coast -of a nation at war; but renounced, on the part of Russia, -the claim that the neutral flag covered the enemy's goods. -On the other hand Great Britain admitted that property -of a belligerent, sold <i>bonâ fide</i> to a neutral, became -neutral in character and as such not liable to seizure; but -from the operation of this admission obtained the special -exception of produce from the hostile colonies. -<a name="FNanchor_351_351" id="FNanchor_351_351"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_351_351" class="fnanchor">[351]</a> This, -Russia conceded, could not be carried directly from the -colony to the mother country, even though it had become -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span> -neutral property by a real sale; and similarly the direct -trade from the mother country to the colony was renounced. -Great Britain thus obtained an explicit acknowledgment -of the Rule of 1756 from the most -formidable of the maritime powers, and strengthened her -hands for the approaching dispute with the United States. -In return, she abandoned the claim, far more injurious to -Russia, to seize naval stores as contraband of war. Four -months later, hostilities between Great Britain and France -also ceased.</p> - -<p>The maritime commercial interests, both of belligerents -and neutrals, received convincing and conspicuous illustration -from this, the first of the two sea wars growing -out of the French Revolution. It was the interest of the -neutrals to step in and take up the trade necessarily abandoned, -to a greater or less degree, by the belligerents; and -it was also useful to both parties to the war that they -should do so. But it was very much less to the advantage -of the more purely maritime state than it was to its -antagonist; for not only did she need help less, but such -temporary changes in the course of trade tend to become -permanent. The immediate gain may become a final and -irretrievable loss. Hence Great Britain is seen to yield -readily the restrictions of the Navigation Act, wherever it -is clearly advisable to avail herself of neutral seamen or -neutral carriers; but the concession goes no further than -immediately necessary, and is always expressly guarded as -temporary. The relaxation is a purely warlike measure, -and she is perfectly consistent in refusing to allow it to -her enemies. Every slackening of the Navigation Act was -a violation in principle of the Rule of 1756, -<a name="FNanchor_352_352" id="FNanchor_352_352"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_352_352" class="fnanchor">[352]</a> which she -was quite content to have her enemy imitate; as the big -boy at school offers the small one the opportunity of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span> -returning an injury in kind. France might employ -neutrals contrary to what Great Britain claimed as the -law of nations, as the latter herself did; but there was the -difference that Great Britain could put a stop to the -operations favorable to her opponent, while France could -only partially impede those that advantaged hers. It was, -therefore, clearly the policy of the British to yield nothing -to neutrals except when they could not avoid it, and then -explicitly to assert the principle, while conceding a relaxation; -they thus kept control over the neutral trade, -and impeded operations that both helped their enemy -and might also supplant their own commerce. In the -latter part of the war, as the purpose of France to cripple -their trade took shape, and the exclusion of British goods -from the Continent became an evident and avowed intention, -the ministry strengthened itself with the reflection -that the measure was impracticable so long as neutral -bottoms abounded; but a few months later the denial of -intercourse between hostile nations and their colonies by -neutral intermediaries was inserted in the Russian treaty. -The intention to use neutrals to the utmost extent desirable -for British interests thus coincided with the determination -to stop a traffic esteemed contrary to them. -The permission to neutrals, by the orders of January, -1798, to carry the produce of French and Dutch colonies -to Great Britain, when they were threatened with seizure -if they sailed with the same for France or Holland, illustrates -both motives of action; while it betrays the gradual -shaping of the policy—which grew up over against -Bonaparte's Continental System—of forcing neutrals -to make England the storehouse and toll-gate of the -world's commerce. Superficially, Great Britain seems -rather to relax toward neutrals between 1793 and 1801; -but the appearance is only superficial. The tendencies -that issued in the ever famous Orders in Council of 1807 -were alive and working in 1798.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span></p> - -<p>The question for British statesmen to determine, therefore, -was how far to acquiesce in the expansion of -neutral trade, and where to draw their line,—always a -difficult task, dependent upon many considerations and -liable to result in inconsistencies, real or apparent. For -France the problem was less intricate. Her commerce -even before the war was chiefly in foreign hands; -<a name="FNanchor_353_353" id="FNanchor_353_353"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_353_353" class="fnanchor">[353]</a> she -had therefore little cause to fear ultimate injury by concessions. -Immediate loss by neutral competition was -impossible, for the British navy left her no ships to lose. -Hence it was her interest to avail herself of neutral carriers -to the fullest extent, to recognize that the freer their -operations the better for her, and that, even could restrictions -upon their carrying for her enemy be enforced, the -result would be to compel the British people to develop -further their own merchant shipping. Every blow at a -neutral was really, even though not seemingly, a blow for -Great Britain. In a general way this was seen clearly -enough, and a policy favoring neutrals was traditional in -France, but the blind passions of the Revolution overthrew -it. To use the vigorous words of a deputy: "The French -people is the victim of an ill-devised scheme, of a too -blind trust in commerce-destroying, <i>an auxiliary measure</i>, -which, to be really useful, should strike only the enemy, -and not reach the navigation of neutrals and allies, and -still less paralyze the circulation and export of our -agriculture and of the national industries." -<a name="FNanchor_354_354" id="FNanchor_354_354"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_354_354" class="fnanchor">[354]</a> Such were -the results of the direct action of successive French governments, -and of the indirect embarrassment caused by -the delays and inconsistencies of the executive and the -tribunals. It was thought that neutrals could be coerced -by French severities into resisting British restrictions, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span> -whether countenanced or not by international law. But -Great Britain, though a hard taskmaster, did not so lay -her burdens as to lose services which were essential to -her, nor compel a resistance that under the military conditions -was hopeless; and the series of wild measures, -which culminated in the law of January 18, 1798, only -frightened neutrals from French coasts, while leaving -Great Britain in full control of the sea. The year 1797 -saw the lowest depression of British trade; coincidently -with the law of January 18 began a development, which, -at first gradual, soon became rapid, and in which -the neutrals driven from France bore an increasing -proportion.</p> - -<p>The short peace of Amiens lasted long enough to indicate -how thoroughly Great Britain, while using neutrals, -had preserved her own maritime advantages intact. The -preliminaries were signed October 1, 1801, and war was -again declared May 16, 1803; but, notwithstanding the -delays in paying off the ships of war, and the maintenance -of an unusually large number of seamen in the peace establishment, -the neutral shipping employed fell from -twenty-eight per cent, in 1801, to eighteen and a half -per cent in 1802.</p> - -<p>On the outbreak of the second war Napoleon reverted at -once to the commercial policy of the Convention and the -Directory. On the 20th of June, 1803, a decree was -issued by him directing the confiscation of any produce -of the British colonies, and of any manufactures of Great -Britain, introduced into France. Neutral vessels arriving -were required to present a certificate from the French -consul at the port of embarkation, certifying that the -cargo was in no part of British origin. The same measure -was forcibly carried out in Holland, though nominally an -independent state; -<a name="FNanchor_355_355" id="FNanchor_355_355"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_355_355" class="fnanchor">[355]</a> and the occupation of Hanover, while -dictated also by the general principle of injuring Great -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span> -Britain as much as possible, had mainly in view the -closure of the Elbe and the Weser to British commerce. -Beyond this, however, Bonaparte being then engrossed -with the purpose of a direct attack by armed force upon -the British islands, the indirect hostilities upon their -commercial prosperity were, for the moment, neglected.</p> - -<p>At the same period Great Britain began to feel that -neutral rivalry was being carried too far for her own -welfare, and determined to tighten the reins previously -slackened. She obtained from Sweden in July, 1803, a -special concession, allowing her to arrest Swedish vessels -laden with naval stores for France, and to purchase the -cargoes at a fair price,—a stipulation identical with that -about provisions in Jay's treaty; and when the French -occupation of Hanover excluded her ships from the Elbe -and Weser, she by a blockade of the rivers shut out -neutrals also. But it was in the West Indies, so long a -fruitful source of wealth, that the pressure of neutral -competition was most heavily felt. The utter ruin of -San Domingo, and the embarrassments of the other -islands hostile to Great Britain, had in the former war -combined with the dangers of the seas to raise the price -of colonial produce on the Continent, -<a name="FNanchor_356_356" id="FNanchor_356_356"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_356_356" class="fnanchor">[356]</a> and, consequently, -to give a great development to the British growth of sugar -and coffee, the transport of which was confined by law to -British vessels. The planters, the shipping business, and -the British merchants dealing with the West Indies, -together with the various commercial interests and industries -connected with them, all participated in the benefits -of this traffic, which supplied over one fourth of the imports -of the kingdom, and took off besides a large amount -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span> -of manufactures. As production increased, however, and -prices lowered, the West India business began to feel -keenly the competition by the produce of the hostile -islands, exported by American merchants.</p> - -<p>Of the extent of this commerce, and of its dependence -upon the interruption, by Great Britain, of the ordinary -channels for French and Dutch trade, a few figures will -give an idea. In 1792, before the war, the United States -exported to Europe 1,122,000 pounds of sugar, and -2,136,742 of coffee; in 1796, 35,000,000 of sugar and -62,000,000 of coffee; in 1800, 82,000,000 of sugar and -47,000,000 coffee. In 1803, during the short peace, the -exports fell to 20,000,000 of sugar and 10,000,000 coffee; -in 1804, a year of war, they again rose to 74,000,000 -sugar, and 48,000,000 coffee. The precise destination cannot -be given; but the trade between France and her West -India Islands, carried on by American ships, amounted -in 1805 to over $20,000,000, of which only $6,000,000 -were United States produce. In like manner the trade -with Holland was over $17,000,000, of which $2,000,000 -were of American origin.</p> - -<p>Upon the return of Mr. Pitt to power, in 1804, the -attempt was made to strengthen the fabric of British commercial -prosperity in the Caribbean, by an extension of the -system of free ports in the different colonies; by means of -which, and of their large merchant shipping, the British -collected in their own hands, by both authorized and -contraband traffic, so much of the carrying trade of this -region, extending their operations to the mainland as -well as throughout the islands. More, however, was -needed to restrain the operations of the Americans, who, -by reducing the price of coffee on the Continent, diminished -the re-exportation from Great Britain, thus affecting -the revenue of the kingdom and the profits of the planters; -and who also, by acting as carriers, interfered with the -accumulations at the free ports and the consequent employment -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span> -of British ships. All the classes interested -joined in urging the government to find some relief; and -the clamor was increased by a sense of indignation at the -tricks by which belligerent rights were believed to be -evaded by the Americans. The Rule of 1756 did not -allow the latter to carry their cargoes direct to Europe; -but, as the trade winds compelled vessels to run to the -northward until they reached the westerly winds prevailing -in the higher latitudes, no great delay was involved -in making an American port, or even in trans-shipping -the cargo to a vessel bound for Europe. -<a name="FNanchor_357_357" id="FNanchor_357_357"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_357_357" class="fnanchor">[357]</a> Great Britain -admitted that articles of hostile origin, but become neutral -property, could be carried freely to the neutral country; -and, when so imported, became part of the neutral stock -and could then be freely re-exported to a hostile state.</p> - -<p>The question of a <i>bonâ fide</i> importation, like all others -involving a question of intention, could be determined -only by the character of the transactions attending it; but -it was held generally that actual landing and storage, -with payment of the duties, was sufficient proof, unless -rebutted by other circumstances. Early in the war following -the peace of Amiens, the British courts awoke to -the fact that the duties paid on goods so imported were -simply secured by a bond, and that on re-exportation a -drawback was given, so that a very small percentage of -the nominal duties was actually paid. -<a name="FNanchor_358_358" id="FNanchor_358_358"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_358_358" class="fnanchor">[358]</a> Upon this ground -a ship was condemned in May, 1805, and great numbers -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span> -of American vessels carrying colonial produce to Europe -were seized and brought into port, as well as others proceeding -from the United States to the West Indies, with -cargoes originating in the mother countries; and when, -in the opinion of the court, the duties had been only nominally -paid, they were condemned. It is hard to see the -soundness of an objection to these decisions, based on the -validity of the payments; but the action of the British -government is open to severe censure in that no warning -was given of its purpose no longer to accept, as proof of -importation, the payment of duties by bond, on which -drawback was given. Whether it had known the law -of the United States or not, that law had been open -to it, and ignorance of its provisions was due not to any -want of publicity, but to the carelessness of British authorities. -Under the circumstances, the first seizures were -little short of robbery.</p> - -<p>The reclamations of the United States met with little -attention during Pitt's brief second administration; but -after his death, in January, 1806, and the accession to -office of Grenville and Fox, a more conciliatory attitude -was shown,—especially by the latter, who became Minister -of Foreign Affairs. Favorably inclined to the Americans -since his opposition to the policy of the Revolutionary -War, he seemed desirous of conceding their wishes; but -the pressure from without, joined to opposition within the -ministry, prevented a frank reversal of the course pursued. -Instead of the Rule of 1756, Fox obtained an Order in -Council, dated May 16, 1806, placing the coast of the -Continent, from Brest to the Elbe, in a state of blockade. -The blockade, however, was only to be enforced strictly -between the mouth of the Seine and Ostend. Into ports -between those two points no neutral would be admitted -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span> -on any pretext, and, if attempting to enter, would be condemned; -but on either side, neutral ships could go in and -out freely, provided they "had not been laden at any -port belonging to his Majesty's enemies, or, if departing, -were not destined to any port belonging to his Majesty's -enemies." The wording of the order was evidently framed -to avoid all question as to the origin of cargoes, upon -which the Rule of 1756 hinged. Not the origin of the -cargo, but the port of lading, determined the admission -of the neutral ship to the harbors partially blockaded; -and if to them, then, <i>a fortiori</i>, to all open ports of the -enemy. On the other hand, the strict blockade already -established of the Elbe and Weser was by this order partially -relieved, in the expectation that neutrals would -carry British manufactures to those northern markets. -In short, the Order was a compromise, granting something -both to the mercantile interest and to the Americans, -though not conceding the full demands of either. It is at -best doubtful whether the British were able to establish an -effective blockade over the extent of coast from Brest to -the Elbe, but the United States and Napoleon had no -doubts whatever about it; and it thus fell, by a singular -irony of fate, to the most liberal of the British statesmen, -the friend of the Americans and of Napoleon, as almost -the last act of his life, to fire the train which led to the -Berlin and Milan decrees, to the Orders in Council of 1807, -and to the war with the United States six years later.</p> - -<p>Fox died on the 13th of September, 1806, and was succeeded -as Minister of Foreign Affairs by Lord Howick. -On the 25th of the same month the partial restrictions -still imposed on the Elbe and the Weser were removed; -so that neutral ships, even though from the ports of an -enemy of Great Britain, were able to enter. In the mean -time, war had broken out between France and Prussia; the -battle of Jena was fought October 14, and on the 26th -Napoleon entered Berlin. The battle of Trafalgar, a -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span> -twelvemonth before, had shattered all his confidence in -the French navy and destroyed his hopes of directly invading -Great Britain. On the other hand the short campaign -of 1805 had overthrown the Austrian power, and -that of 1806 had just laid Prussia at his feet. The dream -of reducing Great Britain by the destruction of her commercial -prosperity, long floating in his mind, now became -tangible, and was formulated into the phrase that he -"would conquer the sea by the land." Two of the great military -monarchies were already prostrate. Spain, Holland, -Italy, and the smaller German states were vassals, more -or less unwilling, but completely under his control; -there seemed no reason to doubt that he could impose his -will on the Continent and force it to close every port to -British trade. On the 21st of November, 1806, the emperor -issued the famous Berlin Decree; and then, having -taken the first in the series of fated steps which led to -his ruin, he turned to the eastward and plunged with -his army into the rigors of a Polish winter to fulfil his -destiny.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter p4"> -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XVIII" id="CHAPTER_XVIII"></a>CHAPTER XVIII.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="ac"><span class="sc">The Warfare against Commerce, 1806-1812.</span></p> - -<p class="chapsum"><span class="sc">The Berlin and Milan Decrees of Napoleon, -1806 and 1807.—The British Orders in Council, 1807-1809.—Analysis of -the Policy of these Measures of the two Belligerents.—Outline -of Contemporary Leading Events.</span></p> - -<p class="drop-cap">NAPOLEON'S Berlin decree alleged many reasons -and contained many provisions; but the essential -underlying idea was to crush the commerce of Great -Britain by closing the Continent to her products of every -kind. -<a name="FNanchor_359_359" id="FNanchor_359_359"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_359_359" class="fnanchor">[359]</a> -The pretext was found in the Order in Council of -May 16, 1806, issued by the ministry of Grenville and -Fox, putting the coast of the Continent from Brest to the -Elbe under blockade. Napoleon asserted that the right to -blockade applied only to fortified, not to commercial, ports, -which was not true; and further, that the united forces of -Great Britain were unable to maintain so extensive an -operation, which, if not certainly true, was at least -plausible. Retaliating an abuse, if it were one, with a -yet greater excess, the Berlin decree began by declaring -the British islands blockaded, at a time when the emperor -could not keep a ship at sea, except as a fugitive from the -omnipresent fleets of his enemy. From this condition of -phantom blockade it resulted that all commerce with the -British Islands was forbidden; and consequently all merchandise -exported from them, having been unlawfully -carried, became good prize. Vessels from Great Britain -could not be admitted into French ports. Further, as the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span> -British refused to surrender the old rule, by which the -goods of individual enemies at sea were liable to capture, -Napoleon decreed that not only the property of individual -Englishmen on the Continent was to be seized, but also -that of individual neutrals, if of British origin. The preamble -ended with a clause defining the duration of the -edict, by which the emperor burned his ships, laying down -conditions which Great Britain would never accept until -at her last gasp. "The present decree shall be considered -as a fundamental principle of the Empire, until -England has acknowledged that the law of war is one and -the same on the land as on the sea; that it cannot be extended -to private property of whatever kind, nor to the -person of individuals not in the profession of arms, and -that the right of blockade must be restricted to fortified -places, actually invested by sufficient forces."</p> - -<p>Having launched his missile, Napoleon became at once -engaged in the campaign against Russia. The bloody -and doubtful battle of Eylau was fought on the 8th of -February, 1807, and for the next few months the emperor -was too busily engaged, holding on by his teeth on the -banks of the Vistula, to superintend the working of his -decree. -<a name="FNanchor_360_360" id="FNanchor_360_360"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_360_360" class="fnanchor">[360]</a> -Immediately upon its promulgation in Paris, -the American minister demanded an explanation on -several points from the Minister of Marine, who replied -that he did not understand it to make any alterations in -the laws respecting maritime captures, and that an -American vessel could not be taken at sea merely on the -ground that she was bound to, or coming from, a British -port; this he inferred from the fact that such vessels were, -by the seventh article, denied admission to French ports. -<a name="FNanchor_361_361" id="FNanchor_361_361"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_361_361" class="fnanchor">[361]</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span> -The inference, natural though it was, only showed how -elastic and slippery the terms of Napoleon's orders could -be. The whole edict, in fact, remained a dead letter -until the struggle with Russia was decided. At first, -British merchants desisted from sending to the Continent; -but, as advices showed that the decree was inoperative, -shipments by neutral vessels became as brisk as at any -time before, and so continued until August or September, -1807. -<a name="FNanchor_362_362" id="FNanchor_362_362"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_362_362" class="fnanchor">[362]</a> -The battle of Friedland, resulting in the total -defeat of the Russian army, was fought on the 14th of -June; on the 22d an armistice was signed; and on -the 25th Alexander and Napoleon had their first interview -upon the raft in the Niemen. On the 8th of July -was concluded the remarkable and, to Europe, threatening -Treaty of Tilsit. The czar recognized all the new states -created by the emperor, and ceded to him the maritime -positions of the Ionian Islands, and the mouths of the -Cattaro in the Adriatic; in return for which Napoleon -acquiesced in Russia's taking Finland from Sweden, and -also, under certain conditions, the European provinces of -the Turkish Empire as far as the Balkans. A further -clause, buried in the most profound secrecy, bound Russia -and France to make common cause in all circumstances; -to unite their forces by land and sea in any war they -should have to maintain; to take arms against Great -Britain, if she would not subscribe to this treaty; and to -summon, jointly, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, and Austria -to concur in the projects of Russia and France,—that is -to say, to shut their ports to England and to declare war -against her. -<a name="FNanchor_363_363" id="FNanchor_363_363"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_363_363" class="fnanchor">[363]</a></p> - -<p>At the time the Berlin decree was issued, negotiations -were proceeding in London, between the United States -envoys and the British ministry, concerning the several -matters in dispute between the two countries; and on the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span> -31st of December, 1806, a commercial treaty was signed -by the respective commissioners. The vexed question of -the trade between the hostile countries and their colonies -was arranged, by a stipulation that goods imported from -the colonies to the United States might be re-exported, -provided, after deducting the drawback, they had paid full -two per cent duties, <i>ad valorem</i>, to the Treasury; and that -articles coming from the mother countries might likewise -be re-shipped to the colonies, provided they remained subject -to one per cent duty, after recovering the drawback. -These, as well as other features of the treaty, were not -acceptable to the United States, and it was not ratified by -that government.</p> - -<p>Meantime the British ministry had been considering -the terms of the Berlin decree, and, instead of waiting to -see how far it would become operative, determined to retort -by a measure of retaliation. On the 7th of January, -1807, an Order in Council was issued by the Whig ministers, -which often returned to plague them in the succeeding -years, when they, in opposition, were severely -criticising the better known measures of the following -November. The January Order, after quoting Napoleon's -decree, avowed his Majesty's unwillingness to carry to -extremes his undoubted right of retaliation; and therefore, -for the present, went no further than to forbid all -trade by neutral vessels "from one port to another, both -of which ports shall belong to, or be in possession of, -France or her allies, or shall be so far under their control -as that British vessels may not freely trade thereat." -<a name="FNanchor_364_364" id="FNanchor_364_364"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_364_364" class="fnanchor">[364]</a> -The direct object of this step was to stop the coastwise -trade in Europe; its principle was the right of retaliation; -in its effect, it was an extension of the prohibition -laid by the Rule of 1756. The latter forbade the direct -trade between hostile colonies and the mother countries; -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span> -the order of January, 1807, extended the restriction to trade -between any two hostile ports. It bore particularly hard -upon American ships, which were in the habit of going -from place to place in Europe, either seeking the best -markets or gathering a cargo. Under it, "American trade -in the Mediterranean was swept away by seizures and condemnations, -and that in other seas threatened with the -same fate." -<a name="FNanchor_365_365" id="FNanchor_365_365"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_365_365" class="fnanchor">[365]</a></p> - -<p>Matters were in this state when Napoleon returned to -Paris at the end of July, full of his projects against Great -Britain, and against neutrals as the abettors of her prosperity. -His aims were not limited to crushing her by -commercial oppression; in the not distant future he intended -to seize the navies of Europe and combine them in -a direct assault upon her maritime power. On the 19th -of July, while he was still at Dresden, Portugal was -notified that she must choose between war with France -or with Great Britain; and on the 31st, from Paris, a -similar intimation was given to Denmark. -<a name="FNanchor_366_366" id="FNanchor_366_366"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_366_366" class="fnanchor">[366]</a> To constrain -the latter, a corps under Bernadotte was collecting on her -frontiers; while another, under Junot, was assembling in -the south of France to invade Portugal. But in both -countries Napoleon was anticipated by Great Britain. -The ministry had received certain information -<a name="FNanchor_367_367" id="FNanchor_367_367"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_367_367" class="fnanchor">[367]</a> of the -secret articles agreed to at Tilsit, and foresaw the danger -of allowing the two navies of Denmark and Portugal to -fall into the hands of the emperor. Early in August -twenty-five sail-of-the-line entered the Baltic, convoying -transports with twenty-seven thousand troops; the island -on which Copenhagen stands was invested by the ships, -and the town itself by the army. The Danish government -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span> -was then summoned to surrender its fleet into the safe -keeping of Great Britain, a pledge being offered that it, -and all other maritime equipment delivered, should be -held only as a deposit and restored at a general peace. -The offer being refused, the city was bombarded from the -2d to the 5th of September, at the expiration of which time -the terms demanded were yielded, the British took possession -of eighteen sail-of-the-line besides a number of frigates, -stripped the dockyards of their stores, and returned -to England. The transaction has been visited with the most -severe, yet uncalled-for, condemnation. The British ministry -knew the intention of Napoleon to invade Denmark, -to force her into war, and that the fleet would soon pass -into his hands, if not snatched away. They avoided the -mistake made by Pitt, in seizing the Spanish frigates in -1804; for the force sent to Copenhagen was sufficient to -make opposition hopeless and to justify submission. To -have receded before the obstinacy of the Danish government -would have been utter weakness.</p> - -<p>In Portugal Great Britain had to deal with a friendly -nation, instead of the hostile prepossessions of Denmark. -The French corps of invasion, under Junot, entered Spain -on its way to Portugal on the 17th of October. Under the -urgent and unsparing orders of Napoleon it made a march -of extreme suffering with great rapidity, losing most of -its numbers by the way from privation, exposure, or -straggling; but when the handful that kept together entered -Lisbon on the 30th of November, it found the Portuguese -fleet gone, and that the court and its treasure -had departed with it. The British government had for -some time past expected such an attempt by Napoleon, and -at the critical moment a squadron on the spot determined -the vacillating regent to withdraw to Brazil.</p> - -<p>Though foiled in his endeavors to seize the fleets, Napoleon -had succeeded in formally closing the ports of the -two countries to the introduction of British goods; while -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span> -the bombardment at Copenhagen had served as a colorable -pretext for the declaration of hostility against Great -Britain made by Russia on the 20th of October. The -mediation proposed by the czar had already been refused -by the British ministry, unless the articles of the Treaty -of Tilsit were first communicated to it; -<a name="FNanchor_368_368" id="FNanchor_368_368"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_368_368" class="fnanchor">[368]</a> but those articles -were not of a character to bear such an exposure. Prussia, -under the compulsion of the two empires, closed her -ports against Great Britain by a proclamation dated September -2d; no navigation nor trade with England or her -colonies was to be permitted, either in British or in neutral -vessels. -<a name="FNanchor_369_369" id="FNanchor_369_369"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_369_369" class="fnanchor">[369]</a> -Austria also acceded to the Continental System, -and excluded British goods from her borders. -<a name="FNanchor_370_370" id="FNanchor_370_370"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_370_370" class="fnanchor">[370]</a> In -Italy, the new kingdom of Etruria showed little zeal in -enforcing Napoleon's commands to co-operate in his measures; -the British carried on commerce at Leghorn, as -freely as at any port in their own country. By the emperor's -orders the viceroy of Italy therefore took possession -of the city; and at the same time French detachments -entered also the Papal States, occupied their coasts, and -drove the British from them. Joseph Bonaparte being -already king of Naples, the control of Napoleon and the -exclusion of his enemies were thus extended over both -coasts of Italy. Turkey being at this time involved in -hostilities with Great Britain, the emperor was able to -assert that "England sees her merchandise repelled by all -Europe; and her ships, loaded with useless wealth, seek -in vain, from the Sound to the Hellespont, a port open to -receive them." -<a name="FNanchor_371_371" id="FNanchor_371_371"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_371_371" class="fnanchor">[371]</a> -Decrees applying extreme rigor to the -examination of vessels entering the Elbe and the Weser -were issued on the 6th of August and 13th of November. -<a name="FNanchor_372_372" id="FNanchor_372_372"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_372_372" class="fnanchor">[372]</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span> -Napoleon had a special grudge against the two Hanseatic -cities, Bremen and Hamburg, which had long mocked his -efforts to prevent the introduction of British merchandise -to the Continent; for which the commercial aptitudes of -their merchants, their extensive intelligence abroad, and -their noble rivers, afforded peculiar facilities. Despite all -these efforts and the external appearances of universal -submission, there still occurred wide-spread evasions of -the emperor's orders, to which allusion must be made -later. It is necessary, before doing so, to give the contemporary -measures of other nations, in order that the -whole situation, at once of public regulation and private -disobedience, together with the final results, may come -distinctly before the reader.</p> - -<p>Great as was the power of Napoleon, it ceased, like that -of certain wizards, when it reached the water. Enemies -and neutrals alike bowed to his invincible armies and his -superb genius when he could reach them by land; but beyond -the water there was one enemy, Great Britain, and -one neutral, America, whom he could not directly touch. -The spirit of his course toward England and his initiatory -steps have been given; it remained now to define his -action toward the United States. Weak as the latter -was, feeble to humiliation as had been the course of its -government hitherto, and although the prepossessions of -the party in power were undoubtedly strongly against -Great Britain, the question was one of immense importance; -but the emperor, who respected nothing but force, -failed so to realize it. He stood just where the Directory -stood at the end of 1797, every enemy but Great Britain -overthrown, but seeing her defiant still and prosperous. -Napoleon, however, had, what the Directory had not, experimental -evidence of the results of such restrictions upon -neutrals as were imposed by the law of January 18, 1798. -It was possible to ascribe the disastrous effects to France -of that measure, and its total failure to achieve the object -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span> -intended, to one of two totally distinct causes. Either the -law had been inadequately enforced, owing to the feeble -executive efforts of the Directors and the comparatively -limited extent of their influence, or else it was in its -nature and essence so contrary to the true interest and -policy of France that the very limitations imposed by -defective power had saved her, and the ability to carry it -further would have ended in utter ruin. Pursued somewhat -further, the question became: Will it be possible, -not for France only but for all Europe,—for the concurrence -of all Europe is necessary to the effectual working -of the scheme,—to dispense with the neutral carrier -(whom it is the tendency of the Berlin decree to repel) -for a length of time sufficient to ruin Great Britain? Can -Europe forego external commerce for a longer time than -Great Britain can spare the European market? Can the -intercourse between the continental nations be so facilitated, -the accustomed routes of import and export so -modified, such changes introduced into the habits of -manufacture and consumption, as will render bearable the -demands made upon the patience of nations? If, as the -Order in Council of January seems to indicate, Great -Britain resent the attempt to keep neutrals from her ports, -by retaliatory measures impeding their traffic with the -Continent, upon whom will these combined French and -English restrictions fall most heavily?—upon the state -having a large body of merchant ships, to which neutrals -are the natural rivals; or upon the nations whose shipping -is small, and to whom therefore neutrals are useful, -if not necessary, auxiliaries?</p> - -<p>In a commercial war, as in any other, the question must -be faced whether with ten thousand it is possible to meet -him who is coming with twenty thousand. As a matter of -fact, while Napoleon was contemplating a measure which -would most injuriously affect neutrals, already largely -employed in transporting British goods, the jealousy of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span> -British merchants and statesmen was keenly excited by -the growth of this neutral carrying trade, -<a name="FNanchor_373_373" id="FNanchor_373_373"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_373_373" class="fnanchor">[373]</a> and they were -casting about for a pretext and a means to cripple it. -The Berlin decree revived the clamor of these men, who, -being then in opposition, had condemned the Order of -January, 1807, for not carrying retaliation far enough, -and for directing it upon the coasting trade, which could -only partially be reached, instead of upon the neutral -carriage of colonial goods, which lay open everywhere to -the British navy. A change of ministry in the latter part -of March, 1807, brought this party again into power, after -an absence from it of fourteen months since the death of -Pitt. In the mean time, however, the decree had remained -inoperative, through the absence of Napoleon in Poland, -the decisions of the Minister of Marine as to its scope, and -the connivance of the local authorities everywhere in its -neglect. No further steps therefore had been taken by -the new British ministry up to the time of the emperor's -return to Paris. The latter at first only issued some -additional regulations of a municipal character, to ensure -a stricter observance, but he was soon called upon -to give a momentous decision. The opinion of the Minister -of Marine, as to the meaning of certain clauses of the -decree, -<a name="FNanchor_374_374" id="FNanchor_374_374"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_374_374" class="fnanchor">[374]</a> -was submitted to him by the Minister of Justice; -and he stated that the true original intention was that -French armed vessels should seize and bring into port -neutrals having on board any goods of British origin, -even though at the time neutral property. As to whether -they should also arrest neutrals for the simple reason that -they were going to, or coming from, the British Islands, -his Majesty reserved his decision. This dictum of the -emperor, which threw to the winds the ruling of the Minister -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span> -of Marine, was given to the prize courts on the 18th -of September, 1807, and shortly afterward the latter -acted upon it in the case of an American ship wrecked -upon the French coast; that part of her cargo which was -of British origin was ordered to be sold for the benefit of -the state. -<a name="FNanchor_375_375" id="FNanchor_375_375"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_375_375" class="fnanchor">[375]</a> -The effect of Napoleon's pronouncements was -at once seen in Great Britain. The insurance of neutral -ships bound to continental ports, especially to those of -Holland and Hamburg, rose from four guineas in August -to eight and twelve in October, and some insurers refused -to take risks even at twenty-five and thirty. In the two -months of September and October sixty-five permits were -issued by the Custom House to re-land and store cargoes -that had actually been shipped for the Continent. -<a name="FNanchor_376_376" id="FNanchor_376_376"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_376_376" class="fnanchor">[376]</a> The Tory -ministry now had the pretext it wanted for a far-reaching -and exhaustive measure of retaliation.</p> - -<p>Napoleon's decisions of September 18 were communicated -to the Congress of the United States on December -18 by the President; who at the same time transmitted a -proclamation from the king of Great Britain, dated October -16, directing the impressment of British seamen found -serving on board any foreign merchant ship. -<a name="FNanchor_377_377" id="FNanchor_377_377"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_377_377" class="fnanchor">[377]</a> In view of -the dangers to which American vessels were exposed by -the action of the two belligerents, an embargo was recommended, -to insure their safety by keeping them in their -own ports; the real purpose, however, being to retaliate -upon Great Britain, in pursuance of the policy of a Non-Importation -Act directed against that country, which had -gone into effect the previous July. An Act of Embargo -was accordingly at once passed, and was approved on the -22d of December. -<a name="FNanchor_378_378" id="FNanchor_378_378"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_378_378" class="fnanchor">[378]</a> All registered vessels belonging to -the United States were forbidden to depart from the ports -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span> -in which they were then lying, except upon giving bond -that their cargoes would be landed in another port of the -country. This continued in force throughout the year -1808 and until March 1, 1809, when it was repealed; and -for it was substituted a Non-Intercourse Act, -<a name="FNanchor_379_379" id="FNanchor_379_379"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_379_379" class="fnanchor">[379]</a> which allowed -the merchant ships of the United States to go -abroad in search of employment and to traffic between -their own and other countries, except Great Britain and -France and the colonies occupied by them, which were -wholly forbidden to American vessels. They not only -could not clear from home for those countries, but they -were required to give bond that they would not, during -the voyage, enter any of their ports, nor be directly or -indirectly engaged in any trade with them. French or -British ships entering a port of the United States were to -be seized and condemned. This act was to continue in -force until the end of the next session of Congress; and it -accordingly remained the law governing the intercourse -of the United States with Great Britain and France until -May, 1810.</p> - -<p>On the 11th of November, 1807, were published the -great retaliatory measures of Great Britain, which for the -moment filled the cup of neutrals. Setting forth the Berlin -Decree as the justifying ground for their action, the -Orders in Council of that date -<a name="FNanchor_380_380" id="FNanchor_380_380"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_380_380" class="fnanchor">[380]</a> proclaimed a paper blockade, -of the barest form and most extensive scope, of all -enemies' ports. "All ports and places of France and her -allies, or of any other country at war with his Majesty, -and all other ports or places in Europe from which, although -not at war with his Majesty, the British flag is -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span> -excluded, and all ports in the colonies of his Majesty's -enemies, <i>shall from henceforth be subject to the same restrictions</i>, -in point of trade and navigation, <i>as if the same -were actually blockaded in the most strict and rigorous manner</i>." -All trade in hostile colonial produce was likewise -declared unlawful for neutrals.</p> - -<p>An actual blockade, such as is here mentioned, requires -the presence off the blockaded port of a force sufficient -to make entrance or departure manifestly dangerous; in -which case a vessel attempting to pass in either direction -is, by that common consent of nations called International -Law, justly liable to capture. To place such a force before -each of the many and widely scattered harbors embraced -by these Orders, was evidently beyond the power -of even the vast numbers of the British navy. The object -which could not be attained by the use of means acknowledged -to be lawful, the British ministry determined to compass -by sheer force, by that maritime supremacy which -they unquestionably wielded, and which they could make -effectual to the ends they had in view, namely: to maintain -the commerce and shipping of Great Britain, upon which -her naval strength depended, to force the enemy's trade to -pass through her ports, and thus to raise her revenues to -the point necessary to her salvation in the life and death -struggle in which she was embarked. -<a name="FNanchor_381_381" id="FNanchor_381_381"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_381_381" class="fnanchor">[381]</a></p> - -<p>The entire suppression of trade with the restricted -coasts, whether by neutral carriers or in the articles of -import or export the world needed, was in no sense whatever -the object of the British ministers. To retaliate on -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span> -their enemy was the first aim, to make him suffer as he -had meant to make them; but, withal, to turn his own -measures against him, so that while he was straitened, -Great Britain should reap some amelioration for her own -troubles. Throughout this stormy and woeful period, the -instinct of the British nation recognized that the hearts -of the continental peoples were with them rather than -with Napoleon,—and for much the same reason that the -United States, contrary alike to the general interests of -mankind and to her own, sided upon the whole, though -by no means unanimously, against Great Britain. In -either case the immediate oppressor was the object of -hatred. Throughout the five years or more that the Continental -blockade was in force, the Continental nations -saw the British trying everywhere, with more or less success, -to come to their relief,—to break through the iron -barrier which Napoleon had established. During great -part of that time a considerable intercourse did prevail; -and the mutual intelligence thus maintained made clear -to all parties the community of interests that bound them -together, notwithstanding the political hostilities. Nothing -appears more clearly, between the lines of the British -diplomatic correspondence, than the conviction that the -people were ready to further their efforts to circumvent -the measures of Napoleon.</p> - -<p>Keeping in view the purpose of making the United -Kingdom the centre and warehouse of the world's commerce, -it was evident that, provided this end—the chief -object of the Orders in Council—were attained, the -greater the commerce of the outside world was, the -greater would be the advantage, or toll, resulting to -Great Britain. The Orders therefore contained, besides -the general principle of blockade, certain exceptions, narrow -in wording but wide in application. By the first, -neutrals were permitted to trade directly between their -own country and the hostile colonies. They were also -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span> -allowed to trade direct between the latter and the free -ports of the British colonies, which were thus enabled, -in their degree, to become the centres of local commerce, -as Britain herself was to be the entrepôt of European and -general commerce.</p> - -<p>The second exception, which was particularly odious to -neutrals, permitted the latter to go direct from a port of -the United Kingdom to a restricted hostile port, although -they might not start from their own country for the same, -nor for any other place in Europe from which the British -flag was excluded. Conversely, neutrals were at liberty -to sail from any port of his Majesty's enemies forbidden -to them by the Orders, provided they went direct to some -port in Europe belonging to Great Britain; -<a name="FNanchor_382_382" id="FNanchor_382_382"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_382_382" class="fnanchor">[382]</a> but they -might not return to their own land without first stopping -at a British port.</p> - -<p>Such, stripped of their verbiage, appears to be the gist -of the Orders in Council of November 11, 1807. Neutrals -might not trade directly with any ports in Europe not open -to British ships; but they might trade with them by going -first to a British port, there landing their cargo, reshipping -it subject to certain duties, -<a name="FNanchor_383_383" id="FNanchor_383_383"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_383_383" class="fnanchor">[383]</a> and thence proceeding -to a hostile port. The same process was to be observed -on the return voyage; it might not be direct home, but -must first be to Great Britain. The commerce of the Continent -thus paid toll, going and coming; or, to repeat the -words of the ministry, there was for the enemy "no trade -except through Great Britain." British cruisers were -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span> -"instructed to warn any vessel which shall have commenced -her voyage prior to any notice of this Order, to -discontinue it; and to proceed instead to some port in -this kingdom, or to Gibraltar or Malta; and any vessel -which, after being so warned, shall be found in the prosecution -of a forbidden voyage, shall be captured." Vessels -which in obedience to the warning came into a British -port were to be permitted, after landing their cargo, to -"report it for exportation, and allowed to proceed to their -original port of destination, or to any other port at amity -with his Majesty, upon receiving a certificate from the -collector of the port" setting forth these facts; but from -this general permission to "report," were specially excepted -"sugar, coffee, wine, brandy, snuff, and tobacco," -which could be exported to a restricted port only "under -such conditions as his Majesty, by any license to be -granted for that purpose, may direct." Licenses were -generally necessary for export of any foreign produce or -manufacture; while goods of British origin could be -taken to a hostile country without such license. In the -end, the export of cotton to the Continent was wholly forbidden, -the object being to cripple the foreign manufactures. -Upon the license requirements was soon built up -the extraordinary licensed traffic, which played so important -a subordinate part in the workings both of the Orders -and of the Continental System.</p> - -<p>Anything more humiliating and vexatious to neutrals -than these Orders can scarcely be conceived. -They trampled upon all previously received law, upon -men's inbred ideas of their rights; and that by sheer -uncontrolled force, the law of the strongest. There -was also not only denial of right, but positive injury -and loss, direct and indirect. Yet it must not be forgotten -that they were a very real and severe measure -of retaliation upon Napoleon's government; of which -a contemporary German writer had truly said it was -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span> -already wound up so tight the springs could almost -be heard to crack. It must be remembered, too, that -Great Britain was fighting for her life. The additional -expense entailed upon every cargo which reached the -Continent after passing through her ports, the expenses -of delay, of unloading and reloading, wharfage, licenses, -maintenance, fell chiefly upon the continental consumer; -upon the subjects of Napoleon, or upon those whom he -was holding in military bondage. Nor was this all. Although -Great Britain was not able to blockade all the individual -French or continental ports,—an inability due -more to the dangers of the sea than to the number of the -harbors,—she was able to make the approach to the French -coast exceedingly dangerous, so much so that it was more -to the interest of the ordinary trader to submit to the Orders -than to attempt to evade them; especially as, upon arriving -at a port under Napoleon's control, he found the emperor -possessed with every disposition to confiscate his cargo, if -a plausible pretext could be made. In the English Channel -Great Britain controlled the approaches from the Atlantic -to all the northern continental ports; and at Gibraltar -those to the Mediterranean. The Orders were therefore -by no means an empty threat. They could not but exercise -a very serious influence upon the imports to the Continent, -and especially upon those exotic objects of -consumption, sugar, coffee, and other tropical growths, -which had become so essential to the comfort of people; -and upon certain raw materials, such as cotton, dye-woods -and indigo. Naval stores from the Baltic for England -passed so near the French coast that they might be slipped -in by a lucky chance; but the neutral from the Atlantic, -who was found near the coast of France or Spain, had to -account for the appearances which were against him. -These obstacles to direct import tended therefore to increase -prices by diminishing supplies, and combined with -the duties laid by Great Britain, upon the cargoes forced -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span> -into her ports, to raise the cost of living throughout the -Continent. The embarrassments of its unfortunate inhabitants -were further augmented by the difficulty of exporting -their own products; and nowhere was this more keenly -felt than in Russia, where the revenues of the nobility depended -largely on the British demand for naval stores, -and where the French alliance and the Continental System -were proportionately detested.</p> - -<p>The object of the Orders in Council was therefore twofold: -to embarrass France and Napoleon by the prohibition -of direct import and export trade, of all external -commerce, which for them could only be carried on by -neutrals; and at the same time to force into the Continent -all the British products or manufactures that it could take. -A preference was secured for the latter over foreign products -by the license practice, which left the course of -traffic to the constant manipulation of the Board of Trade. -The whole system was then, and has since been, roundly -abused as being in no sense a military measure, but -merely a gigantic exhibition of commercial greed; but -this simply begs the question. To win her fight Great -Britain was obliged not only to weaken Napoleon, but to -increase her own strength. The battle between the sea and -the land was to be fought out on Commerce. England had -no army wherewith to meet Napoleon; Napoleon had no -navy to cope with that of his enemy. As in the case of -an impregnable fortress, the only alternative for either of -these contestants was to reduce the other by starvation. -On the common frontier, the coast line, they met in a -deadly strife in which no weapon was drawn. The imperial -soldiers were turned into coast-guards-men to shut -out Great Britain from her markets; the British ships -became revenue cutters to prohibit the trade of France. -The neutral carrier, pocketing his pride, offered his service -to either for pay, and the other then regarded him -as taking part in hostilities. The ministry, in the exigencies -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span> -of debate, betrayed some lack of definite conviction -as to their precise aim. Sometimes the Orders were -justified as a military measure of retaliation; sometimes -the need of supporting British commerce as essential to -her life and to her naval strength was alleged; and their -opponents in either case taunted them with inconsistency. -<a name="FNanchor_384_384" id="FNanchor_384_384"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_384_384" class="fnanchor">[384]</a> -Napoleon, with despotic simplicity, announced clearly his -purpose of ruining England through her trade, and the -ministry really needed no other arguments than his -avowals. <i>Salus civitatis suprema lex.</i> To call the measures -of either not military, is as inaccurate as it would be -to call the ancient practice of circumvallation unmilitary, -because the only weapon used for it was the spade.</p> - -<p>Napoleon was not the man to accept silently the Orders -in Council. On the 27th of October he had signed the -treaty of Fontainebleau with Spain, arranging the partition -of Portugal and taking thus the first step in the -invasion of the Peninsula. On November 16 he left Fontainebleau -to visit his kingdom of Italy. From the -capital, Milan, he issued the decree which bears its name, -on the 17th of December, 1807. Alleging the Orders as -its motive, the Milan Decree declared that any ship which -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span> -submitted to search by a British cruiser was thereby -"denationalized;" a word for which, at sea, "outlaw" is -the only equivalent. It lost the character of its own country, -so far as French cruisers were concerned, and was liable -to arrest as a vagrant. The decree further declared that -all vessels going to, or sailing from, Great Britain, were -for that fact alone good prize,—a point which, under the -Berlin decree, had as yet been left open. French privateers -were still sufficiently numerous to make these regulations -a great additional danger to ships at sea; and the -decree went on to say that, when coming under the previous -provisions, they should be seized whenever they -entered a French port.</p> - -<p>The two belligerents had now laid down the general -lines of policy on which they intended to act. The Orders -in Council received various modifications, due largely to -the importance to Great Britain of the American market, -which absorbed a great part of her manufactures; but -these modifications, though sensibly lightening the burden -upon neutrals and introducing some changes of form, in -no sense departed from the spirit of the originals. The -entire series was finally withdrawn in June, 1812, but too -late to avert the war with the United States, which was -declared in the same month. Napoleon never revoked his -Berlin and Milan decrees, although by a trick he induced -an over-eager President of the United States to believe -that he had done so.</p> - -<p>In the year 1808 the emperor's purpose to overthrow -the Spanish monarchy, and place one of his own family -upon the throne, finally matured. He left Paris on the -2d of April, and, after a long delay at Bordeaux, on the -14th reached Bayonne. There took place his meetings -with the king and infante of Spain which resulted in the -former resigning his crown, to be disposed of as to Napoleon -might seem best. While at Bayonne, on April 17, -the emperor issued an order, directing the sequestration -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span> -of all American ships which should enter the ports of -France, Italy, Holland, and the Hanse towns, as being -under suspicion of having come from Great Britain. The -justification for this step was found in the Embargo Act -of December, 1807, in consequence of which, Napoleon -argued, as such ships could not lawfully have left their -own country, they came really from England, and their -papers were fabricated. -<a name="FNanchor_385_385" id="FNanchor_385_385"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_385_385" class="fnanchor">[385]</a> Under this ruling sequestrations -continued to be made until March 23, 1810; when the Decree -of Rambouillet confiscated finally the vessels and cargoes -thus seized. -<a name="FNanchor_386_386" id="FNanchor_386_386"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_386_386" class="fnanchor">[386]</a> -After May, 1810, the Non-Intercourse Act, -which had replaced the Embargo, was temporarily suspended -as regarded both Great Britain and France, and -never renewed as to the latter; so the plea upon which -these confiscations had proceeded was no longer valid.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the emperor's plans for the Peninsula met -with unexpected reverses. An insurrection on the 2d of -May in Madrid was followed by spontaneous popular risings -in all parts of the country. On the 21st of July an -army corps under General Dupont was cut off by the insurgents -in Andalusia and surrendered, to the number of -eighteen thousand, at Baylen; and on the 29th the new -king of Spain, Joseph Bonaparte, fled from Madrid, which -he had only entered on the 20th. On the 1st of August a -British fleet appeared off the coast of Portugal, bearing -the first division of troops destined to act in the Peninsula, -under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley. On the 21st -the battle of Vimiero was fought, resulting in the defeat -of Junot; who, by the Convention of Cintra, signed on the -30th, was permitted to evacuate Portugal and was conveyed -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span> -to France with his army in British transports. At the -same time a division of the Russian fleet which had taken -refuge in Lisbon, on its return from the Mediterranean, -was, by a separate convention, left in the hands of Great -Britain until the conclusion of the war. The admiral had -steadily refused to co-operate with Junot; in which course -he probably reflected the strong feeling of the Russian -upper classes against the French alliance. In consequence -of these successive disasters Portugal was wholly -lost, and the French army in Spain fell back to the line -of the Ebro.</p> - -<p>Napoleon realized the necessity of vigorous measures to -suppress the general uprising, before it had attained -organization and consistency, and determined to take the -field in person; but, before removing to this distant scene -of action, he thought advisable to confirm and establish -his understanding with the czar, upon whose support depended -so much of his position in Central Europe. The -two sovereigns met for the second time, September 27, -1808, at Erfurt. The alliance formed at Tilsit was renewed; -France undertook not to consent to peace until -Russia obtained Finland from Sweden, Moldavia and Wallachia -from Turkey; Russia guaranteed the crown of Spain -to Joseph; and it was agreed that a formal proposition for -peace should at once be made to England, as publicly and -conspicuously as possible. The czar had already in the preceding -February begun hostilities against Sweden, giving as -a pretext her leaning toward Great Britain and her refusal -to join with Russia and Denmark in shutting the Baltic to -British fleets. Denmark also had declared war against -Sweden, for carrying on which the possession of Norway -then gave her facilities which she no longer has; and -Prussia, on the 6th of March, had closed her ports -against Swedish commerce "at the solicitation of the -imperial courts of Paris and St. Petersburg."</p> - -<p>The vital importance of the Baltic to Great Britain, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span> -both as the source whence her naval stores were drawn -and as a channel whereby her commerce might find a -way into the Continent remote from the active vigilance of -Napoleon, imposed upon her the necessity of strenuously -supporting Sweden. A fleet of sixty-two sail, of which -sixteen were of the line, was accordingly sent through the -Sound in April, under Sir James Saumarez, one of the -most distinguished of British admirals; who, to an unusually -brilliant reputation for seamanship, activity, and -hard fighting, joined a calm and well-balanced temper, -peculiarly fitted to deal with the delicate political situation -that obtained in the North during the four years of -his Baltic command. The fleet was shortly followed by -a body of ten thousand troops under the celebrated Sir -John Moore; but the rapid progress of the Russian arms -rendered this assistance abortive, and Moore was soon -transported to that scene of action in the Peninsula in -connection with which his name has been immortalized.</p> - -<p>A joint letter, addressed to the king of Great Britain by -the allied emperors, was forwarded through the usual -channels by the foreign ministers of both powers on the -12th of October. The British reply, dated October 28, -expressed a willingness to enter into the proposed negotiations, -provided the king of Sweden and the government -acting in the name of the king of Spain, then a prisoner -in the hands of Napoleon, were understood to be parties -to any negotiation in which Great Britain was engaged. -"To Spain," said the British note, "his Majesty is not -bound by any formal instrument; but his Majesty has, in -the face of the world, contracted with that nation engagements -not less sacred, and not less binding upon his Majesty's -mind, than the most solemn treaties." This reply -was, in one point at least, open to severe criticism for -uncalled-for insolence. To that part of the letter of the -two sovereigns which attributed the sufferings of the Continent -to the cessation of maritime commerce, it was retorted: -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span> -"His Majesty cannot be expected to hear with -unqualified regret that the system devised for the destruction -of the commerce of his subjects has recoiled upon -its authors, or its instruments." Nevertheless, it is impossible -to withhold admiration for the undaunted attitude -of the solitary Power that ruled the sea, in the face -of the two mighty sovereigns who between them controlled -the forces of the Continent, or to refuse recognition of the -fidelity with which, against overwhelming odds, she now, -as always in the time of Pitt, refused to separate her cause -from that of her allies. The decision of the British court -was made known to Europe by a public declaration, dated -December 15, which, while expressing the same firm resolve, -allowed to appear plainly the sense entertained by -the ministry of the restiveness of the Continent under the -yoke it was bearing.</p> - -<p>The proposal to include the Spanish people in the -negotiations was rejected by both France and Russia. -Napoleon, having in the mean time returned to Paris, left -there on the 29th of October to take command of the -armies, which, to the number of over three hundred thousand -men of all arms, had either entered Spain or were -rapidly converging upon it. On the 8th of November he -crossed the frontier, and on the 4th of December Madrid -surrendered. Northern Spain being overrun and subdued, -the capital having fallen without any real resistance, and -the political prestige of the insurrection being thus -seriously, if not hopelessly, injured, the emperor now proposed -to divide the mass of soldiers that had so far acted -under his own supreme direction. In the disorganized -and helpless condition of the Spanish people, with the -proved weakness and imbecility of the provisional governments, -a dispersion that might otherwise be unwise became -admissible. Army corps under his marshals were to -overrun the southern provinces of the Peninsula, while an -overwhelming force under his personal leadership was to -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span> -cross the frontier, and carry the eagles to Lisbon, in accordance -with his boast made before leaving Paris. From -this determination he was turned aside by the sudden intelligence -that the small body of British troops, commanded -by Sir John Moore, which he supposed to be -retreating toward Lisbon, and which he expected to drive -on board the ships there, had cut loose from their connection -with it, and, by a daring move to the north, were -threatening his own lines of communication with France. -Upon the receipt of this news, on the 21st of December, he -at once postponed his previous purposes to the necessity of -dislodging and driving out of Spain the little force, of -less than twenty-five thousand men, that had dared thus -to traverse his plans. Thus was Napoleon headed from -his course by an imperious military necessity, and Spain -saved at a most critical moment, by the petty army which -had come from the sea, and which had only dared to make -this move—well nigh desperate at the best—because it -knew that, in the inevitable retreat, it would find in the -sea no impassable barrier, but a hospitable host,—in truth, -its own country. The Peninsula gained the time to breathe, -which, unless under stern compulsion, Napoleon never -granted to an enemy; and the opportunity thus lost to -him never again returned.</p> - -<p>Thus opened the year 1809. Napoleon at the head of -eighty thousand men was driving before him, through the -snows of northwestern Spain, some twenty thousand British -troops, with the relentless energy that distinguished -all his movements of pursuit. In the north, Russia, having -completed the conquest of Finland, was now preparing -to invade Sweden on the west of the Baltic, the king of -that country was on the point of being dethroned on account -of insanity, and the policy of the nation was tending -to a peace with its gigantic enemy; which the latter -refused to grant except upon the condition of joining the -alliance against Great Britain. To this Sweden was most -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span> -unwilling to accede. Her people depended wholly upon -their produce of naval stores and grain and upon maritime -commerce. Hence, to lose the freedom of their trade -was almost tantamount to destruction, and the British -ministry from the first saw that, whatever steps Sweden -might be forced to take, its real wishes must be to keep -open intercourse with Great Britain. From the anxious -and delicate position of this small country, between these -opposing claims, arose the necessity of great prudence -and caution on the part of the British government, of its -diplomatic representative, and of the admiral commanding -the fleet. The task ultimately devolved upon the latter, -when Sweden was at last forced into formal war; and to -his sound judgment and self-restraint was largely due that -no actual collision took place, and that, in the decisive -moments of 1812, she, despite her serious causes of complaint -against the czar, sided with Russia, instead of -against her.</p> - -<p>In Central Europe, Austria, since the peace of Presburg, -<a name="FNanchor_387_387" id="FNanchor_387_387"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_387_387" class="fnanchor">[387]</a> -three years before, had been quietly engaged in restoring -her military strength. The various changes which had -taken place in Germany during that time, the establishment -and growth of the Confederation of the Rhine, the -destruction of the power of Prussia, the foundation of the -Duchy of Warsaw, combined with the great losses of territory -which she had herself undergone, had left Austria in -a position that she could not possibly accept as final; while -the alliance between Russia and France placed her in a -state of isolation, which Napoleon had been careful to -emphasize during the meeting at Erfurt. The renewal of -the war between herself and France was therefore in the -nature of things. The only question to be decided was -when to declare it; -<a name="FNanchor_388_388" id="FNanchor_388_388"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_388_388" class="fnanchor">[388]</a> -but this was a matter which Napoleon, -who fully understood the political situation, was not -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span> -in the habit of allowing an enemy to determine. He undertook -his Spanish enterprise with the full knowledge -that his absence, and that of his Grand Army, in the Peninsula -must be short; he understood that a prolonged stay -there, caused by lack of immediate and decisive success, -would give Austria the opportunity she needed; but he had -reasonable expectation of accomplishing his task, and returning -with his army to his eastern frontiers, within a -safe period of time. This hope was frustrated by the -action of Sir John Moore. The year 1809 therefore opened -with the prospect of war impending over the two empires. -"From the frontiers of Austria to the centre of -Paris," wrote Metternich, "I have found but one opinion -accepted by the public,—that is, that in the spring at -latest, Austria will take the field against France. This -conclusion is drawn from the relative position of the two -powers." -<a name="FNanchor_389_389" id="FNanchor_389_389"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_389_389" class="fnanchor">[389]</a></p> - -<p>Underlying the other contentions, affecting them all -with the unheeded, quiet, but persistent action which -ordinarily characterizes the exertions of sea power, fermenting -continually in the hearts of the people, was the -commercial warfare, the absence of that maritime peace -for which the nations sighed. The Berlin and Milan decrees -on the one side, the Orders in Council on the other, -were still, at the opening of 1809, in full force. France, -which especially needed the concurrence of neutral carriers, -had taken away even the slight chances of reaching -her ports which British cruisers might leave, by pronouncing -confiscation on any ship which had submitted to a -search, though it was powerless to resist. Great Britain, -on the other hand, having shut out all competition with -her own trade to the Continent by the blockade, which -forbade direct access to neutral ships, was prepared to -avail herself of every chance to force upon Europe, at any -point, and by any means, neutral or other, any and all -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span> -merchandise, manufactured or colonial, which came from -her own warehouses. For this the license system offered -a means of which neutrals were only too ready to avail -themselves. A British license could admit them to any -port from which a British blockade excluded them; and, -as it was only to be obtained legitimately in a British -port, the neutral carriers, when there, naturally filled up -with the most paying cargo, whatever its origin.</p> - -<p>In the years from 1806 to 1810, as at earlier periods of -the revolutionary wars, Holland and the Hanse towns competed -for the profits of this indirect and often contraband -trade. In June, 1806, Napoleon, in pursuance of his -policy of placing members of his own family upon the -thrones of the Continent, had obtained the conversion of -Holland from a republic to a monarchy and bestowed its -crown upon his brother Louis. The latter sought from -the first to identify himself with his new subjects, and -constantly withstood the commands of Napoleon in favor -of their interests. Foremost among these was maritime -commerce, for which geographical position and generations -of habit especially fitted the Dutch. With such -dispositions on the part of the king, notwithstanding the -jealous watchfulness and sharp remonstrances of the emperor, -evasions were frequent, and the decrees even openly -disregarded on different pretences. The whole community -naturally engaged in undertakings at once so consonant to -its habits and so remunerative when successful. From -the time the Berlin decree was issued until after the war -with Austria in 1809, Napoleon's attention, though often -angrily attracted by Holland and the neglect of his -orders, was still too much diverted to admit of the decisive -measures needed to enforce them. First, the Russian -war in 1807, then the affairs of the Peninsula extending -through 1808, finally the Austrian war in 1809 -with his hazardous position between the battles of Essling -and Wagram, accompanied as the whole period was with -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span> -financial difficulties and expedients due to the straits of -the empire under the cessation of maritime commerce, -occupied his mind almost wholly, and allowed but partial -attention to the Continental System.</p> - -<p>Neutral ships therefore continued to be openly admitted -into Holland, and the emperor's demands for their confiscation -to be eluded; and there was besides much smuggling, -for which the character of the coast and its -nearness to England offered ample facilities. From -Holland the goods usually found their way without great -difficulty into France, though on two occasions Napoleon, -to punish Holland for her waywardness, closed the frontier -against her. "Your Majesty," wrote he to Louis, -"took advantage of the moment in which I had embarrassments -upon the Continent, to allow the relations between -Holland and England to be resumed; to violate the -laws of the blockade, the only measure by which that -power can be seriously injured. I showed my dissatisfaction -by forbidding France to you, and made you feel that, -without having recourse to my armies, I could, by closing -the Rhine, the Weser, the Scheldt, and the Meuse to -Holland, place her in a position more critical than by -declaring war against her. I was so isolating her as to -annihilate her. The blow resounded in Holland. Your -Majesty appealed to my generosity.... I removed the -line of custom-houses; but your Majesty returned to your -former system. It is true I was then at Vienna, and had -a grievous war upon my hands. All the American ships -which entered the ports of Holland, while they were repelled -from those of France, your Majesty received. I -have been obliged a second time to close my custom-houses -to Dutch commerce.... I will not conceal my -intention to re-unite Holland to France, to round off her -territory, as the most disastrous blow I can deal to England." -He consented, however, to suspend his action, -upon condition that the existing stores of colonial merchandise -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span> -were confiscated, as well as the cargoes of the -American ships. -<a name="FNanchor_390_390" id="FNanchor_390_390"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_390_390" class="fnanchor">[390]</a></p> - -<p>The important part played in the former war by Hamburg -and Bremen, as commercial centres and warehouses -for continental trade, has already been mentioned. -To a certain extent they still fulfilled the same function, -but under greatly altered conditions. The political -changes following the war of 1806 and 1807, and the -presence of French troops in Prussian fortresses and -throughout Northern Germany, combined to make them -subservient, as Prussia was, to the emperor's wishes. In -point of form the continental blockade extended throughout -all this region, as in Holland; everywhere vessels and merchandise -coming from Great Britain were proscribed and -should be confiscated, whenever found. -<a name="FNanchor_391_391" id="FNanchor_391_391"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_391_391" class="fnanchor">[391]</a> All the shores of -the North Sea, those of Denmark, and, by the co-operation -of the czar, the coasts of the Baltic, shared the general -prohibition. The minister of France at Hamburg found -his chief occupations in either demanding subsidies—contributions -in money or kind—for the French troops, or in -insisting, much against his will, upon increased severity -against the introduction of British goods. The distress -occasioned by these stringent requirements was very great, -even while Napoleon's other preoccupations lasted; but -the general consent of all the people in passive resistance, -the activity of smugglers, and the corruption that ever -hangs about custom-houses and increases with the duties, -conspired to mitigate the privations. The coasts of the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span> -North Sea, between the mouths of the Ems, the Weser, -and the Elbe, and those of Danish Holstein, low, of difficult -approach for large vessels, and hence favorable to the -multiplication of small boats and the operations of those -having local knowledge, fostered smuggling; to which also -conduced the numbers of fishermen, and the fringe of off-lying -islands, out of the reach of the ordinary custom-house -officer.</p> - -<p>To support this contraband trade, the British, on the -5th of September, 1807, seized Heligoland and converted -it into a depot for goods waiting to be introduced into -Germany or Holstein. "A garrison of six hundred men -defended the island, and ships of war cruised continually -in its neighborhood. From there contraband traders -obtained merchandise, with which they supplied the Continent. -Farmers along the coast received these smuggled -goods, which were taken from them during the night -and spread far and wide. The populations of the various -countries aided the smugglers, joined them in opposing -the revenue officers and in seducing the latter from their -duty." -<a name="FNanchor_392_392" id="FNanchor_392_392"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_392_392" class="fnanchor">[392]</a> -Between Holstein and Hamburg was drawn up a -close line of custom-house officials; but the forbidden -goods leaked through all barriers. "More than six thousand -persons of the lower and middle classes passed their -day in going more than twenty times from Altona, in -Holstein, to Hamburg. Punishments and confiscations -fell upon the guilty; but this did not put an end to the -incessant strife, sometimes by cunning, sometimes by -force, against this fiscal tyranny." -<a name="FNanchor_393_393" id="FNanchor_393_393"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_393_393" class="fnanchor">[393]</a> Between five and six -hundred women were employed by the merchants of Hamburg -daily to convey into the city, each of them, fourteen -pounds of coffee and other produce, concealed beneath -their garments. -<a name="FNanchor_394_394" id="FNanchor_394_394"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_394_394" class="fnanchor">[394]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span></p> - -<p>In the Baltic conditions were somewhat different. Much -there depended upon the heartiness of the czar in the -cause; upon whether he would content himself with a -bare perfunctory compliance with the letter of his engagements -at Tilsit and Erfurt, or would decisively enforce an -entire cessation of traffic with Great Britain. The latter -course, however, was impossible to Alexander. Impulsive -and ambitious, he yet lacked the hardness of character -needed to disregard the cold disapproval of the nobles -and the distress of his subjects. Under the influence of -Napoleon's presence, of his fascination and his promises, -it had seemed possible to do that which in the isolation -of his court, and deprived of sympathy, became drearily -monotonous; nor did Napoleon, by fidelity to his word, -make the task easier. Decrees of great severity were -issued, -<a name="FNanchor_395_395" id="FNanchor_395_395"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_395_395" class="fnanchor">[395]</a> -and the British flag was honestly excluded; but -the quick mercantile intelligence soon detected that no -ill-timed curiosity as to ships' papers would be exercised, -<a name="FNanchor_396_396" id="FNanchor_396_396"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_396_396" class="fnanchor">[396]</a> -nor vexatious impediments thrown in the way of exporting -the national products, which, if essential to Great Britain's -naval supremacy, were no less the source of Russia's -wealth. In truth, British consumption of naval stores, -and British capital invested in Russia, had been leading -elements in the prosperity of the country; and it had been -no light sacrifice to concede such advantages as the czar -had already yielded.</p> - -<p>Such was the working condition of the Continental -System between 1806 and 1810. Despite the general disquietude -in Great Britain and the undoubted impediments -raised to that free export upon which her prosperity was -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span> -based, the general confidence was unabated. -<a name="FNanchor_397_397" id="FNanchor_397_397"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_397_397" class="fnanchor">[397]</a> Much was -hoped from the resistance of the continental peoples, more -from their steadfast evasion of the edicts. In 1806, just -before the Berlin decree was issued, but when the system -was already in force, a commercial magazine wrote: "The -regulations adopted only show the ignorance of the French -government of commercial principles. When the blockade -of the Elbe was removed, instead of finding markets -exhausted and prices enhanced, they were found overstocked." -<a name="FNanchor_398_398" id="FNanchor_398_398"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_398_398" class="fnanchor">[398]</a> -"In spite of every prohibition British goods -continue (Dec. 1, 1806) to find their way in vast quantities -into France. They are exported hence on French -orders. It is easy to insure them for the whole transit to -the town in France where they are to be delivered to the -purchaser. They are introduced at almost all parts of the -land confines of the French Empire. No sooner are they -received into the French merchant's warehouse, than evidence -is procured that they are of French manufacture; -the proper marks are stamped, and the goods are in a -state to be exhibited, in proof that the manufactures of -France quite outrival those of England. The writer had -this information from gentlemen who have a concern in -the trade to which it relates." -<a name="FNanchor_399_399" id="FNanchor_399_399"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_399_399" class="fnanchor">[399]</a> "Though the port of -Venice is now totally shut against British commerce, as -also the peninsula of Istria from whence Italian silk has -always been obtained, yet through neutral vessels we now -obtain Piedmont silk, which is the best and finest, direct -from Leghorn, Lucca, and Genoa." -<a name="FNanchor_400_400" id="FNanchor_400_400"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_400_400" class="fnanchor">[400]</a> "From Malta a brisk -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span> -trade, yielding quick returns, is kept up with the ports of -Italy. Malta is the emporium, the storehouse. From -Malta we supply Leghorn and other places in the power -of France. But the British goods are sold, even before -they are landed, for ready money; and scarcely a pound's -worth of British property is at any moment hazarded -where the French might seize it." -<a name="FNanchor_401_401" id="FNanchor_401_401"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_401_401" class="fnanchor">[401]</a></p> - -<p>Indications of embarrassment now begin to accumulate, -but still, in January, 1808, we read: "Several ships from -Holland have lately entered our harbors, and brought over -large quantities of goods usually imported from Hamburg. -This is a proof of the futility of Bonaparte's commercial -speculations." -<a name="FNanchor_402_402" id="FNanchor_402_402"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_402_402" class="fnanchor">[402]</a> -Russia had by this declared against Great -Britain, causing a rise in all Russian produce; and the -Embargo Act of the United States had just gone into -operation. There is a vast falling off in the Baltic and -American trade. In 1805 over eleven thousand ships -had passed through the Sound, going and coming; in -1807 barely six thousand, and British ships are excluded -from all but Swedish harbors. In August, 1808, the ports -of Holland are opened for the export of Dutch butter, and -two hundred bales of silk are allowed to be smuggled out, -for which a bribe of six thousand guineas was extorted by -some person in authority. -<a name="FNanchor_403_403" id="FNanchor_403_403"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_403_403" class="fnanchor">[403]</a> In 1809 a notice again occurs -of the ports of Holland being opened by the king; -and concurrently, West India produce, which has been for -some months dull, is found more in demand and commanding -good prices. -<a name="FNanchor_404_404" id="FNanchor_404_404"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_404_404" class="fnanchor">[404]</a> Malta is doing a famous business -at the same time, and has become one of the greatest depots -in the Mediterranean. -<a name="FNanchor_405_405" id="FNanchor_405_405"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_405_405" class="fnanchor">[405]</a></p> - -<p>The year 1809 was marked by a great, though temporary, -revival of trade, due to several causes. Napoleon -himself was detained during great part of the year in the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</a></span> -heart of Austria, absorbed in one of his most doubtful -contests with the empire; and in his absence trade with -the North Sea ports went on almost as in time of peace. -In the United States an eager British minister, of politics -opposed to the party in power, had committed himself -without due authority to an official statement to the government -that the Orders in Council would be rescinded by -June 10. The President, without waiting to hear further, -removed the restrictions of the Non-Intercourse Act on -that date; and accordingly, for some months there was -free traffic and a very great interchange of goods between -the United States and Great Britain. In South America, -the withdrawal of the Portuguese court to Brazil and the -uprising of Spain against Napoleon had resulted in throwing -open the colonial ports to Great Britain; and an immense -wave of speculative shipments, heavily employing -the manufactories, was setting in that direction. In the -Baltic, the czar was wearying of his engagements with -France, and of the emperor's tergiversations; wearying -too, of the opposition of his court and subjects. He adhered -faithfully, indeed, to the letter of his bargain and -refused admission to British ships: but he would not open -his eyes to the fact that British commerce was being carried -on in his ports by neutrals with British licenses. He -had never promised to exclude neutrals, or forbid all export -and import; and it was none of his business to pry behind -the papers that covered transactions essential to his people. -The imports to Great Britain of naval stores, mainly from -the Baltic, more than doubled from 1808 to 1809, and -were even greater the following year. -<a name="FNanchor_406_406" id="FNanchor_406_406"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_406_406" class="fnanchor">[406]</a> Wool from Spain -and silk from Italy experienced a similar rise. Even -West India produce, so vigorously excluded from the Continent, -shared the general advance; and there was a great, -though feverish and unsound, hope of returning prosperity. -It was evident that Napoleon's measures were meeting -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span> -only partial success, and men were willing to believe that -their failure lay in the nature of things,—in the impossibility -of his attempt. They had yet to learn that persecution -fails only when it is not, or cannot be, thorough -and unrelenting.</p> - -<p>Among the multiplied impediments to intercourse between -nations, due first of all to the narrow ideas of commercial -policy prevalent at that epoch, increased by the -state of open maritime war or hostile exclusion existing -between Great Britain and most of the continental countries, -and further complicated by the continental blockade -of Napoleon and the retaliatory orders of the British government, -there arose an obscure but extensive usage of -"licenses;" which served, though but partially, and in a -wholly arbitrary manner, to remove some of the difficulties -that prevented the exchange of commodities. A license, -from its name, implies a prohibition which is intended to -be removed in the particular case; and the license practice -of the Napoleonic wars was for the most part not so -much a system, as an aggregation of individual permissions -to carry on a traffic forbidden by the existing laws -of the authority granting them. The licenses were issued -both by the British government and by Napoleon; and -they were addressed, according to the character of the -sway borne by one party or the other, either to the police -of the seas, the armed cruisers, or to the customs authorities -of the continental ports. It was generally admitted -in Great Britain that the Board of Trade was actuated -only by upright motives in its action, though the practice -was vigorously attacked on many grounds,—chiefly in -order to impugn the Orders in Council to which alone -their origin was attributed; but in France the taint of -court corruption, or favoritism, in the issue of licenses -was clearly asserted. -<a name="FNanchor_407_407" id="FNanchor_407_407"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_407_407" class="fnanchor">[407]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span></p> - -<p>The "License System," in the peculiar and extensive -form to which the phrase was commonly applied, was -adopted by the British government in 1808, -<a name="FNanchor_408_408" id="FNanchor_408_408"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_408_408" class="fnanchor">[408]</a> immediately -after the Orders in Council and the alliance of Russia -with Napoleon. Licenses did not then first begin to be -issued, nor were they then for the first time necessary; -<a name="FNanchor_409_409" id="FNanchor_409_409"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_409_409" class="fnanchor">[409]</a> -but then began the development which carried their numbers -from two thousand six hundred and six in 1807, to -over fifteen thousand in 1809 and over eighteen thousand -in 1810. After the last year there was a rapid falling -off, due, not to a change of system, but to the bitter -experience that the license, which protected against a -British cruiser, did not save the ship and cargo upon -arrival in a port under Napoleon's control, when he had -at last devoted his indomitable energy to the thorough enforcement -of his decrees. During the years in which the -practice flourished, it was principally to the Baltic ports -that the licensed vessels went, though they also made their -way to those of Holland, France, Spain, and other countries -on the Continent. The trade to the British East and -West Indies was confined to British vessels, as in time of -profound peace.</p> - -<p>The true origin of the later license trade is to be found -in that supremacy and omnipresence of the British navy, -which made it impossible for vessels under an enemy's -flag to keep the sea. In order to employ their vessels, -hostile owners transferred them to a neutral ownership, -ordinarily by a fraudulent process which received the -name of "neutralization." A neutralized ship remained -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span> -the property of the hostile merchant; but, for a stipulated -price, a neutral firm, who made this their regular business, -gave their name as the owners and obtained from the -authorities of the neutral country all the requisite papers -and attestations by which the British cruisers, on searching, -might be deceived. As a regular systematic business, -fraudulent from beginning to end, the practice first arose -during the war of the American Revolution, in 1780, when -Holland became a party to the war, having a large mercantile -tonnage with very inadequate means of protecting -it. At that time a firm established itself in Embden, on -the Prussian side of the Ems, which divides Prussia from -Holland, and within the two years that remained of the -war "neutralized," under Prussian flags, a hundred thousand -tons of foreign shipping, besides cargoes to an immense -value for those days. In the wars of Napoleon it -was the fate of Holland to be again dragged in the wake -of France, and the same practice of neutralization, supported -by false oaths and false papers, again sprang up -and flourished extensively in the Prussian province of -East Friesland,—Prussia carefully maintaining her -neutrality from 1795 to the unfortunate Jena campaign -of 1806.</p> - -<p>In the year 1806 it was asserted that there were upwards -of three thousand sail belonging to merchants of -Holland, France, and Spain navigating under the Prussian -flag; and the practice doubtless was not confined to Prussia. -"It is notorious," wrote Lord Howick, the British foreign -minister, "that the coasting trade of the enemy is carried -on not only by neutral ships but by the shameful misconduct -of neutral merchants, who lend their names for a -small percentage, not only to cover the goods, but in numberless -instances to mask the ships of the enemy." -<a name="FNanchor_410_410" id="FNanchor_410_410"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_410_410" class="fnanchor">[410]</a> The -fact becoming known, British cruisers, when meeting a -valuable ship with Prussian papers, were apt to take the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span> -chance of her being condemned and send her in; but -even in British ports and admiralty courts the neutralizing -agent was prepared to cover his transaction. -The captain and crew of the detained vessel were all -carefully instructed and prepared to swear to the falsehoods, -which were attested by equally false papers -sworn to before Prussian judges. To this trade, it -was alleged, France owed the power to obtain naval -stores despite the British blockade of her arsenals. The -frauds recoiled in a curious way on the head of Prussia; -for, in the later stage of the Jena campaign, the neutralized -ships supplied French magazines in the Baltic -ports, the French hospitals at Lubeck, and the army -that besieged Dantzic. The capture of vessels, the character -of whose papers was suspected, served to swell -the cry against Great Britain for violating neutral rights, -induced greater severity in the British naval measures, -and so directly contributed to the Berlin Decree and the -Orders in Council. -<a name="FNanchor_411_411" id="FNanchor_411_411"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_411_411" class="fnanchor">[411]</a></p> - -<p>Thus had stood the neutralizing trade toward the end of -1805. After Napoleon had finally abandoned all thought of -invading England, the victorious campaign of Austerlitz and -the peace of Presburg, extending by conquest the boundaries -of the empire, extended also the sweep of those municipal -regulations, already in force, which excluded British goods -from French territory. Early in 1806, beguiling Prussia -into hostilities with Great Britain through the occupation -of Hanover, the emperor compassed also the closure of the -great German rivers. Peace was indeed soon restored; -but the Jena campaign, quickly following, delivered Prussia, -bound hand and foot, to Napoleon's dictates. In the -summer of 1807 the Peace of Tilsit united the empires of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span> -the East and West in a common exclusion of British -trade, to which Prussia could not but accede. Great -Britain thus found herself face to face with no mere -municipal regulations of one or two countries, but with a -great political combination aiming at her destruction -through the commerce which was her life. Nor was this -combination merely one of those unfriendly acts which -seeks its end by peaceful means, like the Non-Intercourse -Acts of America. The British cabinet was perfectly informed -that the minor states were to be coerced, by direct -military force, into concurrence with the commercial -policy of France and Russia,—a concurrence essential -to its success.</p> - -<p>It was necessary for Great Britain to meet this threatening -conjunction, with such measures as should reduce the -proposed injury to an amount possible for her to bear, until -the inevitable revulsion came. She found ready to her -hand the immense unprincipled system of neutralized vessels, -and by means of them and of veritable neutrals she -proposed to maintain her trade with the Continent. To do -so, without reversing the general lines of her policy, as laid -down in the Orders in Council, it was necessary to supply -each neutral employed with a clear and unmistakable -paper, which would insure beyond peradventure the respect -of British cruisers for a class of vessels they had -been accustomed to regard with suspicion. It would not -do that a ship engaged in maintaining a British trade that -was in great danger of extinction should be stopped by -their own cruisers. The wording of the licenses was -therefore emphatically sweeping and forcible. They protected -against detention the vessel carrying one, whatever -the flag she flew (the French flag alone being excepted), -and directed that "the vessel shall be allowed to proceed, -notwithstanding all the documents which accompany the -ship and cargo may represent the same to be destined to -any neutral or hostile port, or to whomsoever such property -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span> -may belong." -<a name="FNanchor_412_412" id="FNanchor_412_412"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_412_412" class="fnanchor">[412]</a> -These broad provisions were necessary, -for the flags flown, except that of the United States, were -those of nations which had, willingly or under duress, -entered the Continental System; and the papers, having -to undergo the scrutiny of hostile agents at the ports of -arrival, had to be falsified, or, as it was euphoniously -called, "simulated," to deceive the customs officer, if -zealous, or to give him, if lukewarm, fair ground for admitting -the goods. The license protected against the -British cruiser, which otherwise would have detained the -vessel on the ground of her papers, intended to deceive -the port officers. "The system of licenses," said an adverse -petition, "renders it necessary for the ships employed -to be provided with sets of forged, or, as they are -termed, simulated papers." -<a name="FNanchor_413_413" id="FNanchor_413_413"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_413_413" class="fnanchor">[413]</a> Of these, two sets were -commonly carried, the paper, the wax for the seals, and -other accompaniments being carefully imitated, and signatures -of foreign rulers, as of Napoleon and of the President -and Secretary of State of the United States, skilfully -forged. -<a name="FNanchor_414_414" id="FNanchor_414_414"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_414_414" class="fnanchor">[414]</a> -The firms conducting this business made themselves -known to the mercantile community by circular -letters. -<a name="FNanchor_415_415" id="FNanchor_415_415"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_415_415" class="fnanchor">[415]</a></p> - -<p>In this way large fleets of licensed vessels under the -flags of Prussia, Denmark, Mecklenburg, Oldenburg, Kniphausen, -and other almost unknown German principalities, -as well as many American merchant ships, went yearly -to the Baltic laden with British and colonial produce, and -returned with the timber, hemp, tallow, and grain of the -North. They entered St. Petersburg and every port in -the Baltic, discharged, loaded with the return cargo, and -then repaired to a common rendezvous; whence, when collected -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span> -to the number of about five hundred, they sailed for -Great Britain under convoy of ships of war, to protect them -against the privateers that swarmed in the Sound and North -Sea. -<a name="FNanchor_416_416" id="FNanchor_416_416"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_416_416" class="fnanchor">[416]</a> -Crushed between England and France, the Danish -seamen, who would not come into the licensed service of -the former, had lost their livelihood and had turned in a -body to privateering, in the practice of which they fell -little short of piracy; -<a name="FNanchor_417_417" id="FNanchor_417_417"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_417_417" class="fnanchor">[417]</a> and French privateers also found -the ground profitable for cruising.</p> - -<p>It was to this disposition of the north countries, as well -as to conciliate the United States, that was probably due -the Order in Council of April 26, 1809; which, while -preserving the spirit, and probably securing the advantages -of those of November, 1807, nevertheless formally -and in terms revoked the latter, except so far as expressly -stated in the new edict. The constructive, or paper, -blockade, which under the former orders extended to -every port whence the British flag was excluded, was -now narrowed down to the coasts of Holland, France, and -so much of Italy as was under Napoleon's immediate -dominion. The reasons assigned for this new measure -were "the divers events which had taken place since -the date of the former orders, affecting the relations -between Great Britain and the territories of other powers." -The Spanish peninsula, being now in open and -general revolt against Napoleon, was of course exempted; -and southern Italy, by its nearness to Malta and Sicily, -one a possession and the other an ally of England, might -more readily be supplied from them than by neutrals -coming from a greater distance. The maintenance of the -blockade of Holland was particularly favorable to British -trade. By that means the great articles of continental -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span> -consumption could reach Holland and France, direct, only -by British license, which meant that they came from England; -while, if carried from a neutral country to the German -rivers, to the Hanse towns, or to the Baltic, as the -new Order allowed them to be, they had to be brought -thence to the regions more immediately under Napoleon's -government by land carriage, which would so raise their -price as not to conflict with the British licensed trade. -Thus the condition of the suffering neutral populations -was relieved, without loosening the pressure upon -France; and some of the offence given to the neutral -carriers was removed. Another advantage accrued to -Great Britain from thus throwing open the trade to the -Baltic to all neutrals; for the great demand and high -prices of naval equipment would induce them to bring -these to the British market and arsenals, in preference to -other countries.</p> - -<p>This Order was issued at the moment when the British -minister at Washington was assuring the American -government that the Orders in Council would be -wholly withdrawn on the 10th of June following. -<a name="FNanchor_418_418" id="FNanchor_418_418"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_418_418" class="fnanchor">[418]</a> At -the same time the French and Austrians were drawing -near to each other on the fields of Germany. On -the 6th of April the Archduke Charles issued his address -to the Austrian army, and on the 10th crossed the Inn, -moving toward Bavaria. On the 12th Napoleon quitted -Paris to place himself at the head of his troops, which -had already preceded him, but were then scattered in -different positions, in sore need of his directing hand. -On the 17th he was in their midst. On the same day the -first collision occurred with Davout's corps under the -walls of Ratisbon. Five days of active manœuvring and -hard fighting succeeded, ending with the battle of -Eckmuhl; after which the Archduke, outgeneralled and -defeated, fell back into Bohemia. On the 12th of May -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span> -Vienna surrendered, and on the 13th Napoleon entered -the Austrian capital for the second time in his career.</p> - -<p>In the same eventful week, and on the very day of the -battle of Eckmuhl, Sir Arthur Wellesley again landed at -Lisbon to begin his memorable four years of command in -the Peninsula. Napoleon had relinquished to Soult the -pursuit of Sir John Moore, while still in mid-career; and -after the embarkation of the British army from Coruña -and the surrender of that city, January 16-26, 1809, the -marshal was ordered to invade Portugal. After a difficult -series of operations, Oporto was reached and stormed on -the 29th of March; but Soult lacked the means to push further -south. Wellesley, on his arrival, at once decided to -march against him, in preference to attacking the French -forces in Spain on the line of the Tagus. On the 12th of -May, the same day that Vienna surrendered, the British -troops crossed the Douro, Soult was forced to evacuate -Oporto in haste, retreated to the northward, and re-entered -Spain. The British general then returned with his army -to the Tagus, and on the 27th of June advanced along that -line into Spain. On the 28th of July he fought the battle -of Talavera; but, though victorious, the failure of the -Spanish troops to support him, their unreliable character -as soldiers, and the want of provisions, compelled him to -return at the end of August into Portugal, where he took -up a position close to the frontier.</p> - -<p>The French movements in Spain were rendered indecisive -by lack of unity in the direction of the armies, due to the -military incapacity of the king and the jealousies of the -different marshals. The same early summer months were -passed by Napoleon in a desperate struggle on the banks of -the Danube, below Vienna. Though the capital had fallen, -the Austrian army still remained, chastened but not subdued, -and now confronted him on the north side of the -stream under a general of a high order of merit, if inferior -to the great emperor. To cross from the south to -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</a></span> -the north bank of the broad river, in the face of such a -foe, was no light undertaking even for Napoleon. The -first attempt began on the 20th of May; and during the -two succeeding days the French army passed slowly across -the insufficient bridges which alone could be thrown, for -lack of proper material. During the 21st and 22d continued -the strife, known in history as the battle of Essling; -and on the latter day some sixty thousand French -troops were in action with the Austrians, when the great -bridge, joining the south shore to the island of Lobau in -mid-stream, gave way before a freshet, which had already -raised the waters of the Danube by fourteen feet. The -supply of ammunition to the engaged troops ceased, and it -therefore became impossible to retain the positions already -gained. During the night of the 22d the corps on the -north side were withdrawn into the island; and for the -next six weeks Napoleon was untiringly occupied in providing -materials for bridges which would be sure not to -fail him. At last, when all was prepared, the army -again crossed, and on the 6th of July was fought the -memorable battle of Wagram. Terminating in the defeat -of the Austrians, it was followed on the 12th by an armistice; -and a definitive treaty of peace was ratified at Vienna -on the 15th of October. Austria surrendered all her remaining -sea-board on the Adriatic, besides portions of her -interior territory, and again acceded to the prohibition of -British goods of all kinds within her dominions.</p> - -<p>A month before, September 17, 1809, peace had been -concluded between Russia and Sweden; the latter ceding -Finland and engaging to close her ports to all British -ships, "with the exception of the importation of salt and -colonial productions, which habit had rendered necessary -to the people of Sweden." -<a name="FNanchor_419_419" id="FNanchor_419_419"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_419_419" class="fnanchor">[419]</a> On the 6th of January Napoleon, -less merciful than the czar, exacted a convention -which allowed only the entry of salt, excluding explicitly -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</a></span> -the colonial produce permitted by the Russian treaty; in -return for which he restored Pomerania to Sweden. -<a name="FNanchor_420_420" id="FNanchor_420_420"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_420_420" class="fnanchor">[420]</a> -Thus were formally closed to Great Britain all the northern -ports through which, by the license trade, she had -continued to pour her merchandise into the Continent, -though in much diminished volume.</p> - -<p>It now became Napoleon's great object to enforce the -restrictions, which had thus been wrested from vanquished -opponents in support of his continental policy, by increased -personal vigilance and by urgently reiterated demands, -for which he had an undeniable ground in the -express terms of his treaties with the sea-board powers. -Upon the Continent, except in the Spanish peninsula, the -treaty of Vienna was followed by a peace of exhaustion, -which lasted nearly three years. The emperor returned to -Fontainebleau on the 26th of October, and at once began -the dispositions from which he hoped the reduction of -Great Britain, but which irresistibly led, step by step, to -his own final overthrow. The French army was withdrawn -from southern Germany, but gradually; remaining -long enough in the various conquered or allied countries -to ease the imperial treasury from the expense of their -support, according to Napoleon's invariable policy. The -evacuation was not completed until the first of June, 1810. -A hundred thousand men, chiefly new levies, were directed -on Spain, together with the Imperial Guard, the -supposed precursor of the emperor himself; but the best -of the troops, the hardened corps of Davout and Masséna, -were reserved for northern Germany and the Dutch frontiers, -to enforce the submission of the people to the -continental blockade. Napoleon himself did not go to -Spain, and that tedious war dragged wearily on, with -greater or less vigor here or there, according to the -qualities of the different leaders; but lacking the unity of -aim, the concert of action, which nothing but the presence -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[Pg 318]</a></span> -of a master spirit could insure among so many generals of -equal rank, imbued with mutual jealousy, and each taxed -with a burden that demanded his utmost strength. Around -Lisbon, Wellington was preparing the lines of Torres -Vedras, and thus striking deep into the soil of the Peninsula -a grip from which all the armies of France could not -shake him, so long as the navy of Great Britain stood at -his back, securing his communications and his line of -retreat; but of this Napoleon knew nothing.</p> - -<p>It was above all things necessary to bring the Spanish -war to an end, and the emperor was heartily weary of it; -but still the Continental System constrained him. "Duroc -assured me," writes Bourrienne, -<a name="FNanchor_421_421" id="FNanchor_421_421"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_421_421" class="fnanchor">[421]</a> "that the emperor had -more than once shown regret at being engaged in the Spanish -war; but since he had the English to fight there, no -consideration could have induced him to abandon it, the -more so as all that he was then doing was to defend the -honor of the Continental System.... He said to Duroc -one day, 'I no longer hold to Joseph being king of Spain, -and he himself cares little about it. I would place there -the first comer, if he could close his ports to the English.'" -The military situation in Spain imperatively demanded his -own presence; without it the war was interminable. The -Spanish ulcer, as he himself aptly termed it, was draining -away both men and money; and the seat of the trouble -was at Lisbon, where the British sea power had at last -found the place to set its fangs in his side and gnaw unceasingly. -But Napoleon could not resolve either to withdraw -from the contest or to superintend it in person. The -Spaniards and Portuguese, in the prevailing anarchy, -could contribute little, as consumers, to British commerce; -whereas the north of Europe, from Holland to St. Petersburg, -while yielding a nominal acquiescence, everywhere -evaded the blockades with the connivance of their governments. -Here, then, in his opinion, was the quarter to strike -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[Pg 319]</a></span> -Great Britain; the Peninsula was to her but a drain of -men and money, which the custom of northern and central -Europe alone enabled her to endure. The emperor therefore -decided to sustain both efforts, the peninsular war -and the northern continental blockade; to divide his -strength between the two, instead of combining it upon -either; and to give his immediate attention to the North. -Thus it was that the Sea Power of Great Britain, defying -his efforts otherwise, forced him into the field of its own -choosing, lured him, the great exemplar of concentrated -effort, to scatter his forces, and led him along a path -which at last gave no choice except retreat in discomfiture -or advance to certain ruin.</p> - -<p>Napoleon advanced. Since the Jena campaign he had -occupied with French and Polish troops the fortresses of -Glogau, Custrin, Stettin, and Dantzic. By these he controlled -the Oder and the Vistula, and kept a constant rein -upon Prussia, so as to exact the war indemnities she -still owed, to check any movement upon her part, and to -enforce the demands of his policy. Davout, the most -severe and thorough of the French marshals, took command -of these fortresses, as also of Hanover and of the Hanse -towns, on which likewise imperial troops were quartered. -At the mouth of the Ems his corps was in touch with that -of Marshal Oudinot, which stretched thence along the -frontiers of Holland to Belgium and Boulogne. Thus the -whole sea-board from Boulogne to the Baltic was gripped -by French divisions, which in any dispute or doubt powerfully -supported the emperor's arguments and sustained -the Continental System, both by actual interference and -by the constant threat contained in their presence. These -measures "were necessary," says M. Thiers -<a name="FNanchor_422_422" id="FNanchor_422_422"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_422_422" class="fnanchor">[422]</a> "in order to -compel the Hanse towns to renounce commercial intercourse -with Great Britain, and to coerce Holland, which -paid no more attention to the commercial blockade than -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[Pg 320]</a></span> -if it had been governed by an English or a German prince. -Even when the governments attempted to keep good faith -the communities were little affected, and pursued a contraband -trade which the most vigorous measures failed to -prevent. Napoleon determined to conduct in person this -kind of warfare."</p> - -<p>Holland was the first victim. As has before been said, -Louis Bonaparte strove continually to thwart the operation -of the system. Napoleon now demanded a strict -execution of the blockade, and for that purpose that the -guard of the Dutch coasts and of the mouths of the rivers -should be entrusted to French custom-house officers. -<a name="FNanchor_423_423" id="FNanchor_423_423"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_423_423" class="fnanchor">[423]</a> -He also required that the American vessels which had -entered Dutch ports under the king's permission should -be confiscated. Louis, though willing to concede the -former conditions and to exclude Americans and other -neutrals thenceforward, could not bring himself to give -up those that had entered under his own authority; but, -having been induced to visit his brother in Paris in November, -1809, he was by threats and persuasion brought -to yield every point demanded. It was during these interviews -that Napoleon, giving way to one of those transports -of passion which increased with him as years went by, -again betrayed the fatal compulsion under which England -held him, and the purposes already forming in his mind. -"It is the English," he cried, "who have forced me to -aggrandize myself unceasingly. -<a name="FNanchor_424_424" id="FNanchor_424_424"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_424_424" class="fnanchor">[424]</a> But for them I would -not have united Naples, Spain, Portugal to my empire. -I have willed to struggle and to extend my coasts, in -order to increase my resources. If they keep on, they -will oblige me to join Holland to my shore lines, then the -Hanse towns, finally Pomerania, and perhaps even Dantzic." -Then he suggested that Louis should, by indirect -means, convey to the British cabinet the impending danger -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[Pg 321]</a></span> -of Napoleon's proceeding to these extremities, in the -hopes that apprehension might induce it to offer terms of -peace, in order to avert the union of Holland to the -empire.</p> - -<p>A Dutch banker, M. Labouchère, who had extensive -relations with prominent houses, was accordingly dispatched, -though without formal credentials, and opened -the matter to the ministers; but the latter showed little -interest. Whatever the nominal state of Holland, they -said, it is really only a French dependency; and as for -the extension of the Continental System, they expected -no less than an increase of tyranny with the increase of -the emperor's sway. Louis was then sent back to Holland, -having further agreed to cede to France all his provinces -west of the Rhine, and to line the coasts of the remainder -with an army partly Dutch, partly French, but commanded -by a French general. Overwhelmed with mortification, he -cherished at times impotent thoughts of resistance, which -issued only in insults to the French Chargé and in impediments -thrown in the way of the French army of occupation -and the customs officers. Finally, in June, 1810, a -body of French troops having presented themselves before -Harlem were denied entrance; and at about the same time -a servant of the French embassy was mobbed at the -Hague. Napoleon at once ordered Oudinot to enter, not -only Harlem, but Amsterdam, with drums beating and -colors flying, while the French corps to the north and -south of Holland crossed the frontiers to support the -army of occupation. On the first of July Louis signed -his abdication, which was published on the 3d; by which -time he had secretly left the kingdom for an unknown destination. -On the 9th Holland was united to the empire -by an imperial decree. The coveted American ships with -their cargoes were sequestrated, and the large accumulations -of colonial produce formed under Louis's lax blockade -were made to contribute to the imperial treasury, by -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[Pg 322]</a></span> -being admitted into France upon payment of a duty of -fifty per cent. But, for this immediate benefit, the thrifty -Hollanders were to pay by an unrelenting exclusion of -trade, by the quartering of foreign troops, and by the -conscription, both land and naval.</p> - -<p>The empire now extended to the Ems; but still, with persevering -cunning, smugglers and neutrals contrived to introduce -tropical produce and British manufactures to some -extent. Owing to the restrictions, indeed, the goods rose -from fifty to a hundred per cent over the London prices, -but still they came; and, in consequence at once of the -British blockade of the French coast and of the emperor's -jealous support of that blockade by his own decrees, the -people of France had to pay far dearer than the other continental -nations. -<a name="FNanchor_425_425" id="FNanchor_425_425"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_425_425" class="fnanchor">[425]</a> Thus were Napoleon's objects doubly -thwarted; for, while he aimed at breaking down Great -Britain by exclusion from the rest of Europe, he also -meant to make France, as the corner stone of his power, -the most prosperous nation, and to secure for her the continental -market which her rival was to lose. -<a name="FNanchor_426_426" id="FNanchor_426_426"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_426_426" class="fnanchor">[426]</a> All foreign -articles decreased in price in proportion as the distance -from Paris increased. Before the union, coffee and sugar -cost in his capital three and four times what they did in -Holland. He now became unremitting and threatening -in his representations to the Northern states. Exacting -the last farthing of Prussia at one breath, with the next -he offered to deduct from the debt the value of all licensed -cargoes seized by her. He menaced Sweden with the -reoccupation of Pomerania, if the great fleets under British -license were admitted to Stralsund. It was indeed to -the Northern and Baltic ports that four fifths of the licensed -vessels went; only a small proportion sailed to the blockaded -ports of France and Holland. -<a name="FNanchor_427_427" id="FNanchor_427_427"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_427_427" class="fnanchor">[427]</a> By dint of urgent -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[Pg 323]</a></span> -representations and the presence of the French troops, he -contrived to have seized the greater part of a convoy of -six hundred sail, which entered the Baltic in the summer -of 1810; but which, being delayed by head winds, had not -reached their ports in time to escape the movements of his -troops. The Northern trade had taken on immense dimensions -in 1809, when Napoleon was battling about -Vienna and the governments were not under his eye; but -this year he could make himself felt, and some forty -million dollars' worth of British property was seized in -the northern ports. -<a name="FNanchor_428_428" id="FNanchor_428_428"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_428_428" class="fnanchor">[428]</a> The blow seriously affected the -already overstrained commercial system of Great Britain, -and its results were shown by the fall in the number of -licenses issued, from eighteen thousand in 1810 to seventy-five -hundred in 1811.</p> - -<p>The emperor went further. Deciding, after long consideration, -that fifty per cent on the London prices represented -the profits of smugglers of colonial goods, he -determined to allow the introduction of the latter upon -payment of duty to that extent. Characteristically unwilling -to appear to take a step backward, he extended -this permission only to produce not coming from British -colonies; but it was understood, and officially intimated -to the customs authorities, that the inquiry should not be -rigorous. In this subterfuge, says M. Thiers, consisted -the whole combination. -<a name="FNanchor_429_429" id="FNanchor_429_429"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_429_429" class="fnanchor">[429]</a> Having thus constituted a lawful -variety of colonial products in the empire and in the -subject countries, the emperor felt at liberty to execute -one of those vast confiscations, which contributed so -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[Pg 324]</a></span> -materially to his military chest. All collections of these -goods existing within his reach were to be seized at the -same time, and, if they had not been declared, should be -condemned; if they had, should pay half their value, in -money or in kind. "Thus it was hoped to seize everywhere -at the same time, and to take for the treasury of -Napoleon, or for that of his allies, the half in case of -declaration, the whole in case of dissimulation. It can -be conceived what terror would be caused to the numerous -accomplices of British commerce." -<a name="FNanchor_430_430" id="FNanchor_430_430"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_430_430" class="fnanchor">[430]</a> This measure was -established by a decree of August 5, 1810, and accepted -by all the continental states, except Russia. The latter -refused to go beyond her obligations by the treaty of -Tilsit, and took the occasion to express her uneasiness -at seeing the French troops gradually extending along the -northern seas, and even as close to her own borders as -Dantzic. The impossibility of cordial co-operation in the -immense sacrifices demanded by the Continental System -was clearly shown by this refusal; but by no less vigorous -means could Great Britain be reached, and Napoleon -could not recede. The decree was extended outside the -boundaries of the empire, to any depot of colonial goods -within four days' march of the frontiers, in Switzerland, -in Germany, in Prussia, in the Hanse towns. Large -sums of money were realized, and the government became -a dealer in groceries when the payments were made in -kind. The pressure of the French troops extended everywhere, -and French flotillas cruised along the coasts of the -North Sea, whether within the limits of the empire or not, -in the mouths and along the course of the great rivers, -to seal them more completely.</p> - -<p>The decree of August 5 was carried out by the armed -hand. "<i>Wherever my troops are</i>," wrote Napoleon to -Prussia, "I suffer no English smuggling." On this -ground French authorities executed the mandate in the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[Pg 325]</a></span> -Prussian port of Stettin, which was in the military occupation -only of his troops. "All the ports of this once -potent kingdom," says a contemporary magazine, "are -filled with French soldiers, who seize and burn every -article which can possibly have passed through British -hands. Prussia is described as in a deplorable state, -almost disorganized and no employment for industry." -<a name="FNanchor_431_431" id="FNanchor_431_431"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_431_431" class="fnanchor">[431]</a> -Similar action was taken in the Hanse towns with no -other justification. The king of Westphalia was ordered -to withdraw his army from the northern part of the kingdom, -that French soldiers might enter for the same purpose. -In Switzerland the native authorities were -permitted to act, but a French customs officer supervised. -On the 18th of August the emperor directed the military -occupation of the territory of Lubeck, Lauenburg, Hamburg, -and all the west bank of the Elbe, for a length of -fifty miles from its mouth; thence the line extended, at -about the same distance from the sea, to Bremen, and -thence to the frontiers of Holland, taking in the little -states of Arenberg and Oldenburg. This military occupation -was but the precursor of the annexation of these -countries a few months later, which led to the first overt -act of displeasure on the part of the czar. In justification -of the step, one of a series which alienated Alexander -and led up to the Russian war, was alleged the purpose of -sustaining the continental blockade as the only means of -destroying Great Britain. "General Morand," so read the -orders, "is charged to take all necessary measures for -the prevention of smuggling. For this purpose he will -establish a first line of troops from Holstein to East-Frisia, -and a second line in rear of the first." -<a name="FNanchor_432_432" id="FNanchor_432_432"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_432_432" class="fnanchor">[432]</a></p> - -<p>On the 6th of October the viceroy of Italy was directed -to occupy with Italian troops all the Italian cantons of -Switzerland, and to sequestrate at once all colonial or -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[Pg 326]</a></span> -other contraband merchandise. The order was accompanied -with Napoleon's usual formula: "This ought to -bring in several millions." Eugene was to explain that -this was only a step similar to the occupation of northern -Germany, that it did not invade the neutrality of Switzerland; -and he was to be particularly careful that the -emperor's hand did not appear. "That there should be -a quarrel between <i>you</i> and Switzerland will do no harm." -<a name="FNanchor_433_433" id="FNanchor_433_433"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_433_433" class="fnanchor">[433]</a> -On the 19th of October Prussia was notified that, if she -did not efficiently preclude the passage of British and -colonial merchandise through her states, the French army -would enter them; and the French minister was directed -to leave Berlin if satisfaction was not given. -<a name="FNanchor_434_434" id="FNanchor_434_434"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_434_434" class="fnanchor">[434]</a></p> - -<p>Coincidently with these principal measures, the correspondence -of Napoleon teems with orders, complaints, -remonstrances, reprimands, queries, all showing how bent -his mind was on the one purpose. Having turned over the -command of the army in Portugal, directed against the -British, to his ablest marshal, Masséna, he was concentrating -his own energies on the blockade. At the same -time, he occupied himself with stringent measures for -protecting the industries of France in the European market. -No man ever held more thoroughly than the emperor -that element of the theory of protection, that the government -can manage the business of the people better than -themselves. His kingdom of Italy should not use Swiss -nor German cottons; such goods must come only from -France. -<a name="FNanchor_435_435" id="FNanchor_435_435"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_435_435" class="fnanchor">[435]</a> -Italian raw silks shall go nowhere but to France, -<a name="FNanchor_436_436" id="FNanchor_436_436"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_436_436" class="fnanchor">[436]</a> -and then only to Lyon. The whole export trade -is in his hands by a system of licenses, -<a name="FNanchor_437_437" id="FNanchor_437_437"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_437_437" class="fnanchor">[437]</a> apparently borrowed -from Great Britain, and which at this time he -greatly extended. On the 25th of July an order was -given that no ship could clear from a port of the empire -for abroad without a license, signed by the emperor himself. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[Pg 327]</a></span> -On September 15 another decree was issued, -<a name="FNanchor_438_438" id="FNanchor_438_438"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_438_438" class="fnanchor">[438]</a> allowing -licensed vessels to sail from Hamburg, Bremen, and -Lubeck for French ports. The license was to cost twelve -dollars per ton, and was good only for the return voyage; -but the vessel upon arriving in France was exempt from -all question as to search by British cruisers, and might -even land all her cargo in a British port,—in other words, -she was excepted from the Berlin and Milan decrees. She -could not, however, enter France with any British goods. -Returning, she was to load with wines or other French -produce, except grain or flour. Under the rival license -systems new and curious methods of evasion grew up. -Compelled to take French articles which were not wanted -in Great Britain, as well as those that were, the former -were put on board of so inferior a quality that they could -be thrown into the sea without loss. At either end smuggling -boats met the licensed vessel before entering port, -and took from her forbidden articles. Ships of either -nation, with foreign flag, and simulated papers, were to -be seen in each other's ports. -<a name="FNanchor_439_439" id="FNanchor_439_439"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_439_439" class="fnanchor">[439]</a> The British, as a commercial -people, were naturally willing to give a larger extension -to this evasive trade; but the emperor would not -grant anything that he thought could help his enemy, -even though it benefited his own people. He believed, and -rightly, that Great Britain was receiving more harm than -France; he did not realize that, from her immense wealth -and commercial aptitudes, she could endure the process -longer.</p> - -<p>The decree of August 5 admitted colonial goods, but -excluded British manufactures. On the 19th of October -was issued another edict, directing that all such manufactured -goods, wherever found in the emperor's dominions, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[Pg 328]</a></span> -or even in countries in the mere military occupation of -his troops, should be publicly burned. This was remorselessly -done. "Persons who at this epoch were living -in the interior of France can form no idea of the desolation -which so savage a measure spread through countries -accustomed to live by commerce. What a spectacle offered -to peoples impoverished and lacking everything, -to see the burning of articles the distribution of which -would have been an alleviation to their sufferings!... -What a means of attacking conquered peoples, to irritate -their privations by the destruction of a number of articles -of the first necessity!" -<a name="FNanchor_440_440" id="FNanchor_440_440"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_440_440" class="fnanchor">[440]</a> "The tampering with the mails," -says Savary, the Minister of Police, "caused me to make -some very sad reflections, and forced me to admit that we -were not advancing toward tranquillity; and that, if the -party against us were not yet formed, at least all sentiments -were agreed, and that a single reverse would be -enough to ruin us.... The more we disturbed the relations -of Europe with England, the more, on all sides, -men sought to draw together; and we remained with the -odious epithets given to us by all those whom our measures -thwarted." -<a name="FNanchor_441_441" id="FNanchor_441_441"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_441_441" class="fnanchor">[441]</a> -"There was already an understanding from -one end of Europe to the other; every cabinet earnestly -wished the overthrow of Napoleon, as the people also -wished, with at least equal ardor, a state of things less -stifling for their industry and trade. Despite the terror -inspired by Napoleon's name, there was, side by side with -that terror, that damnable Continental System which settled -the question; it was necessary either to fight or to -succumb. The people of the North were under an imperious -necessity to break that yoke of lead, which made -the custom house the prime agent of the governments of -Europe." -<a name="FNanchor_442_442" id="FNanchor_442_442"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_442_442" class="fnanchor">[442]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[Pg 329]</a></span></p> - -<p>Russia had refused to accede to any steps beyond her -engagements of Tilsit; but nowhere was discontent more -profound, nowhere opposition more to be dreaded. While -Napoleon was indisputably leading Great Britain into -greater and greater embarrassment, by the depreciation of -her manufactures and by the accumulations of unsalable -sugars and coffees in her warehouses, he was also ruining -the agriculture of Russia and the revenues of her nobles. -Despite the relief afforded by the great licensed fleets, the -Tilsit agreements so embarrassed trade, that hemp, which -in 1802 was worth £32 the ton in London, had reached, -in 1809, £118; -<a name="FNanchor_443_443" id="FNanchor_443_443"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_443_443" class="fnanchor">[443]</a> -and other products of the North rose in -the same proportion. At the same time sixty thousand -tons of coffee lay in the London warehouses, unsalable -at sixpence the pound, while the price on the Continent -was from four to five shillings, and in places even seven -shillings. -<a name="FNanchor_444_444" id="FNanchor_444_444"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_444_444" class="fnanchor">[444]</a> -No better proof of the efficacious co-working -of Napoleon's system and of the British Orders can be -offered; but the question was one of endurance. Which -could stand such a strain longer? In Russia matters -were fast approaching a climax. The czar felt the ground -trembling under his feet; -<a name="FNanchor_445_445" id="FNanchor_445_445"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_445_445" class="fnanchor">[445]</a> -and, while he renewed his protestations -of fidelity to Tilsit and Erfurt, he had to see -Napoleon, by his licenses, evading the restrictions which -he at the same time was pressing his ally to enforce more -rigorously. In vain was the explanation offered that these -licenses were but in furtherance of the restrictive system; -that France was unloading her surplus products upon -England, while refusing to receive aught but specie in -return; and that in consequence the exchange was going -more and more against Great Britain. The czar knew -better; and the repeated and urgent letters of the emperor, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[Pg 330]</a></span> -becoming, as was the wont of Napoleon's requests, rather -peremptory than entreating, to seize and confiscate all -neutral ships entering Russian ports, fell on deaf ears. -Alexander feared war; but he remembered his father's -fate, and feared assassination more.</p> - -<p>On the 10th of December, 1810, the emperor sent a -message to the Senate announcing that he had annexed to -the empire the Hanse towns, together with the region on -the North Sea intervening between them and Holland, -which had been as yet only in military occupation. In -the same paper he expressed his intention of making a -canal from the Elbe to Lubeck, by which the empire -should be brought into direct water communication with -the Baltic. This assurance was not calculated to ease the -anxiety of the czar as to the eastward progress of France; -but the measure was accompanied by a circumstance of -personal affront, peculiarly dangerous to an alliance -which depended chiefly upon the personal relations of two -absolute sovereigns. The Grand Duke of Oldenburg, one -of the countries thus unceremoniously annexed, was uncle -to the czar; and though Napoleon proposed to indemnify -him for the material loss, by territory taken in the -interior of Germany, Alexander would not accept such -satisfaction nor name any compensation that he would -think adequate. He did not threaten war, but he refused -to surrender his grievance, and reserved his right to retaliate -an injury.</p> - -<p>Meantime very serious results were developing, both in -Great Britain and France, from the strained and abnormal -conditions of commerce and the shocks caused by -Napoleon's sudden and tremendous blows at credit, by -his wide-spread confiscations, and by the Baltic seizures. -The triple array of French troops that lined the shores -of the Continent, re-enforced by the belt of British cruisers -girding the coasts from the Ems to Bayonne, and from -the Pyrenees to Orbitello, created a barrier which neither -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[Pg 331]</a></span> -mercantile ingenuity nor popular want could longer evade -to a degree that afforded any real measure of relief. The -stolid, though as yet peaceable, measures of resistance -taken by the United States had added seriously to the -embarrassments of Great Britain, while rather furthering -the policy of Napoleon, however contrary this was to the -interests of France. During the years 1808 and 1809, -the continuance of the embargo and of the non-intercourse -acts, closing the North American market, coincided with -the opening of the South American; and a great rush was -made by the British mercantile community for the latter, -although it was not, by the number of the inhabitants, nor -by their wealth, nor by their habits of life, at all able to -take the place of the consumers lost in Europe and North -America. The goods sent out in great quantities were -injudiciously chosen, as well as far in excess of the possible -requirements; so they remained unsold, and for the -most part uncared for and unhoused, on the beach in -South American ports. The judgment of men seemed to -become unhinged amid the gloom and perplexity of the -time, and the frantic desire of each to save himself increased -the confusion. Mere movement, however aimless -or dangerous, is less intolerable than passive waiting.</p> - -<p>The years 1809 and 1810 were consequently marked by -an extensive movement in trade, which carried with it an -appearance of prosperity in great part delusive. Immense -imports were made from the Baltic, and from Italy, at the -moment that Napoleon's coils were tightening around them; -large shipments also to the North, to South America, and -to the West Indies. In the United States only was there -a transient period of solid transactions; for in May, 1810, -the Non-Intercourse Act expired by its own limitations. -A proviso, however, was immediately enacted that if, -before the 3d of March, 1811, either Great Britain or -France should recall their decrees so far as they affected -the United States, the Act should, within three months -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[Pg 332]</a></span> -of the revocation, revive against the power that maintained -its edicts. Napoleon contrived to satisfy President -Madison that his Berlin and Milan decrees were so recalled -on the first of November; but Great Britain refused -to consider the terms of the withdrawal satisfactory, as in -truth they were not. The Order in Council of April 26, -1809, remained in force; and non-intercourse between the -United States and Great Britain again obtained in February, -1811, and continued to the outbreak of the war in 1812.</p> - -<p>Toward the end of 1810 the results of the various -causes of trouble began to be heavily felt. Very scant -returns coming from South America, the shippers were -unable to discharge their debts to the manufacturers; and -the embarrassments of the latter were felt by their workmen. -From the West Indies the returns came in tropical -produce, which could be realized only on the Continent, -long since partly and now effectually closed. A succession -of bad seasons had necessitated the importation of -large quantities of grain from Holland and France, especially -in 1809, when an abundant harvest there, coinciding -with a very bad crop in England, induced Napoleon to -enter upon his license system, and to authorize an export -which in three years drained £10,000,000 in specie from -the enemy. The freights to the licensed carriers, mostly -neutrals or hostile, at least in name, were also paid in -specie, which was thus taken out of the country; and -there was a further drain of gold for the maintenance of -the fleets in distant parts of the world and for the war in -Spain, which now took the place of the former subsidies -to allies as a consumer of British treasure. Thus arose a -scarcity of specie. In November, 1810, the bankruptcies -were two hundred and seventy-three, against one hundred -and thirty of the same month a year before. Stoppages -and compositions equalled in number half the traders -of the kingdom. "The general failures have wonderfully -affected manufactures, and want of confidence prevails between -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[Pg 333]</a></span> -manufacturer and merchant." A month later -"bankruptcies continue to increase, and confidence is -nearly at an end. Neither gold nor silver is often to be -seen. The trade of the manufacturing towns is at stand; -and houses fail, not every day, but every hour. In the -great sea-ports, the king's stores are full of all kinds of -colonial produce which find no sale. Despondency is increased -by the accounts from the Continent, which represent -all the sea-ports and internal depots of trade to be -full of French soldiers, who seize and burn every article -which can possibly have passed through British hands." -As the shadows darkened, murmurs grew louder and louder -against the once popular -<a name="FNanchor_446_446" id="FNanchor_446_446"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_446_446" class="fnanchor">[446]</a> Orders in Council, to which all -the evil was now attributed. The press changed its tone -upon them, and a gradual agitation for their repeal grew -up around the Opposition leaders; who, from the moment -they lost power, had never ceased to inveigh against the -retaliatory system framed by the ministry.</p> - -<p>But while disaster was thus thickening about Great -Britain, the case of France was worse. It was quite true, -as the emperor said, that the people could live without -sugar and coffee, and that necessity would in time find -ways to produce many articles the import of which was -denied her; but such warped applications of her industry -and ingenuity, even when finally realized, could neither -replace the loss of her natural channels of effort nor for -any length of time cope with a nation, which, however -momentarily shaken by unprecedented conditions, yet -kept power continually to renew her strength by contact, -through the sea, with new sources. That Great Britain -would do this, her traditions and the habits of her people -were the pledge; and the credit of the government bore -witness to it through all. In the early part of 1811 a -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[Pg 334]</a></span> -serious commercial crisis occurred in France, causing -great anxiety to Napoleon. It was his particular wish to -keep this corner-stone of the empire prosperous and contented -under the immense demands made upon it for men, -and the bitter sufferings entailed by the conscription. But -prosperity was hard to secure with all the sea outlets of -her manufactures and agriculture closed, with only a continental -market, and that impoverished by the universal -cessation of trade and further enfeebled by the exhausting -demands made upon the peoples to support the armies -quartered upon them. The British blockade of the -French, Dutch, and Italian coasts forbade absolutely, -except to the limited license trade, the water carriage of -raw materials essential to manufactures, and prevented the -export of French luxuries. "The state of France as it fell -under my observation in 1807," wrote an American traveller, -"exhibited a very different perspective" from that -of Great Britain. "The effects of the loss of external -trade were everywhere visible,—in the commercial cities -half-deserted, and reduced to a state of inaction and gloom -truly deplorable; in the inland towns, in which the populace -is eminently wretched, and where I saw not one indication -of improvement, but on the contrary numbers of -edifices falling to ruin; on the high roads, where the -infrequency of vehicles and travellers denoted but too -strongly the decrease of internal consumption, and the -languor of internal trade; and among the inhabitants -of the country, particularly of the South, whose misery is -extreme, in consequence of the exorbitant taxes, and of -the want of outlet for their surplus produce. In 1807 the -number of mendicants in the inland towns was almost incredible.... -The fields were principally cultivated by -women." -<a name="FNanchor_447_447" id="FNanchor_447_447"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_447_447" class="fnanchor">[447]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[Pg 335]</a></span></p> - -<p>All the genius of Napoleon could not create demands -when there was not means to gratify them, and the exquisite -products of French taste and skill labored under the -same disadvantage as coffee and sugar, than which they -were even less necessary; men could dispense with them. -Production, stimulated by an exaggerated protection, became -for a time excessive and then ceased; even the exclusion -of British manufactures and the frequent burnings -could not secure the continental market to articles, the -raw materials for which were made so dear by the sea -blockade, or by the long land carriage. Levant cotton -made its weary way on horse and mule back, from Turkey, -through Illyria, to Trieste, and thence was duly forwarded -to France; -<a name="FNanchor_448_448" id="FNanchor_448_448"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_448_448" class="fnanchor">[448]</a> -but even so, when made into stuffs, found itself -in competition with British cottons which were landed -in Salonica, conveyed on horses and mules through Servia -and Hungary into Vienna, and thence distributed over -Germany. -<a name="FNanchor_449_449" id="FNanchor_449_449"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_449_449" class="fnanchor">[449]</a> -In the same manner was British colonial produce -introduced. Despite all Napoleon's efforts, smuggling -continued to compete with and undersell the fair -trader, and his own licenses were used to evade his own -decrees. -<a name="FNanchor_450_450" id="FNanchor_450_450"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_450_450" class="fnanchor">[450]</a> -Many firms in Holland went out of business -altogether, the factories of Lyon closed their doors, and -several Paris houses were in distress; although, like the -British warehouses, their stores were crowded with goods -for which they could find no purchasers. Banks could -not recover their advances, internal commerce fell into -confusion, and general disaster followed.</p> - -<p>At the same time there was in France, as in Great -Britain, much suffering from bad harvests, and this was -aggravated for the former by the interruption of the coasting -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[Pg 336]</a></span> -trade by the British cruisers, and by the indifferent -character of the inland roads, which, except when they -served the military plans of the emperor, were neglected -from the straitened state of the finances. The government -came to the rescue with various measures of relief, -necessarily partial and arbitrary; designed rather to stave -off immediate trouble than to afford a radical cure for -existing difficulties. Yet serious remedies were needed; -for the growing distress of the Continent must continue to -react upon France, which found therein its only customers. -In Holland almost all the former sources of wealth had -one by one been cut off; and even money-lending, which -survived the others, became a losing business from the -wide-spread ruin in Europe. -<a name="FNanchor_451_451" id="FNanchor_451_451"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_451_451" class="fnanchor">[451]</a> In Russia the ruble had -fallen to one third of the value it had before the institution -of the Continental System; although the czar had refused -to impose upon his people and their commerce the -decrees of August 5 and October 19, which Napoleon had -forced upon other states. With growing poverty in Europe, -the empire must grow poorer, and in proportion to its loss -of wealth must be the diminution of the revenue. Yet already -the revenue was insufficient to the wants of the state, -despite all the extraordinary resources which had been -called up during the past year, and which could not again -be expected. It was not to be hoped that many American -ships would again place themselves within reach of the -emperor's confiscations. The enormous seizures of colonial -produce, made by surprise in the previous August, -could not, to any similar extent, be repeated. The duty -of fifty per cent, levied throughout the states occupied by -his troops, on the coffee and sugar which was declared by -the owners, had fallen upon accumulations made during -the years of lax blockade and had brought in large sums; -but it now served only as an inducement to smuggling. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[Pg 337]</a></span> -Great ingenuity had been shown in devising extraordinary -means for extracting money from the subject peoples, but -every year saw these supplies diminishing. Like slavery, -like bad farming, Napoleon's administration, and especially -his army, required continually new soil -<a name="FNanchor_452_452" id="FNanchor_452_452"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_452_452" class="fnanchor">[452]</a> and did -little to renew or develop the powers which it taxed; -beneficent plans were formed, multitudinous orders issued, -but they received rare fulfilment except when they conduced -to the military efficiency of the state.</p> - -<p>There remained two resources. One was economy; -and the correspondence of Napoleon at this period teems -with exhortations to his lieutenants, with denials of -money, and with precepts to get all they can out of the -annexed territories, and ask as little as possible from -him. -<a name="FNanchor_453_453" id="FNanchor_453_453"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_453_453" class="fnanchor">[453]</a> -The emperor held in reserve, subject only to his -own orders, a great military treasure which had begun -with war contributions, and into which poured the results -of the extraordinary transactions just mentioned. Five -wars had brought into this chest 805,000,000 francs; -but in 1810 there remained but 354,000,000, and he -was unwilling to trench further upon it, unless some -grave emergency arose. He hoped to spare, if not to add -to it, by the confiscation of the property of Spanish nobles -who had resisted his change of dynasty, as well as by the -seizure of "false neutrals." Evidently, however, such -resources are precarious, and cannot be compared to those -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[Pg 338]</a></span> -of a commercial state. Contrasted with Great Britain, -the financial expedients of Napoleon resembled those of -a mediæval prince or an Oriental potentate; and in a -strain of endurance, in a question of time, the very artificial, -not to say unnatural, framework of power which he -had built could not hope to outlast the highly organized, -essentially modern, and above all consistently developed -society which confronted him. A state of long standing -and fixed traditions may endure the evils of a bad system, -disadvantaged by it, but not ruined; but when the system -is new and rests upon a single man, it asks in vain for -the confidence inspired by a closely knit, yet wide-spreading, -body politic whose established character guarantees -the future.</p> - -<p>This was clearly shown in the ability of either government -to use the other resource—borrowing—as a means -to supplement its deficient income. Napoleon steadfastly -refused to resort to this, alleging that it was an unjustifiable -draft upon the future, and could have but one result—bankruptcy. -He proved easily that Great Britain could -not go on borrowing indefinitely at her present rate. A -better reason for his own abstinence was to be found in -the condition of his credit. The public debt of France -under his rule was small, and, as he did not add to it, it -stood at a good figure in the market. -<a name="FNanchor_454_454" id="FNanchor_454_454"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_454_454" class="fnanchor">[454]</a> His military -genius, the wide flight of his arms, the war contributions, -the iniquitous plan by which he quartered his troops on -foreign countries, not merely in war but in peace, and -made them responsible for their maintenance,—measures -such as these, facilitated by frequently recurrent wars -and combined with exactions like those narrated in this -chapter, enabled him to meet his expenditures, accumulate -the large reserve fund mentioned, and at the same time -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[Pg 339]</a></span> -distribute in France an amount of coin which greatly -aided the circulation. But his success imposed upon no -one. Everybody understood that such expedients were -essentially transient, that to renew them meant renewed -wars, invasions growing ever wider and wider, and results -dependent always upon military prestige, which a single -lost battle might overthrow. Compared with insecurity -such as this, the fast growing debt of Great Britain possessed -a relative solidity; which even exceeded the absolute -confidence felt that the interest would be regularly -paid. Behind her stood the history and the prestige of a -Sea Power which men knew had met many a heavy -reverse, yet had never failed; and which stood before -Napoleon more mighty than ever. Far and wide, through -many a sea and in many a land, stretched the roots of her -strength; never more glorious, because never more sorely -tried than by the great emperor. She had credit, he -had none.</p> - -<p>Savary, one of the most devoted of Napoleon's followers, -quotes with conviction the following words to him of -a Parisian banker, in the early part of 1811: "A humiliating -fact, and one which gives the key to many others, is -the state of credit in France and in England. The English -debt amounts to about $3,500,000,000, ours only to -$250,000,000; and yet the English could borrow at need -sums much more considerable than we ourselves could, and -above all at an infinitely more favorable rate. Why this -difference? Why is the credit of the State, in France, -lower than the credit of the leading merchants and bankers; -while the reverse is the permanent condition in England? -A word suffices to explain it: To restore one's -credit in England, you have only to work with the government; -while to lose one's credit in France it is only -necessary <i>not</i> to keep out of government transactions. -All England is, so to say, a single commercial house, of -which ministers are the directors, the laws the contract, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[Pg 340]</a></span> -which power itself cannot infringe. Here the Council of -State usurps the powers of the tribunals, and I could almost -say that nothing useful is done, because <i>nothing is -really guaranteed</i>." -<a name="FNanchor_455_455" id="FNanchor_455_455"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_455_455" class="fnanchor">[455]</a> -A competent American witness, before -quoted, who had spent two years in France, wrote, in -1809: "The French rulers, whatever may be their power, -are unable to obtain supplies at home except by <i>sacrifices -equivalent to the risk which is incurred by contracting -with them</i>. Their credit abroad may be estimated by the -fact, which is so well known to us all, that no intelligent -merchant in this country can be induced, by any -consideration, to make advances in their favor, or to -accept a bill on their treasury, from their highest accredited -agent." -<a name="FNanchor_456_456" id="FNanchor_456_456"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_456_456" class="fnanchor">[456]</a></p> - -<p>While the public credit, that touchstone of prosperity, -stood thus in the two states, the same eye-witness thus -describes the relative condition of the two peoples: "In -France the extinction of all public spirit and of the influence -of public opinion, the depopulation and decay of the -great towns, the stern dominion of a military police, incessantly -checked the exultation, natural to the mind, on -viewing the profusion of the bounties bestowed by nature. -The pressure of the taxes was aggravated by the most -oppressive rigor in the collection. The condition of the -peasantry as to their food, clothing, and habitations bore -no comparison with the state of the same class in England.... -In England, whatever may be the representations -of those who, with little knowledge of the facts, -affect to deplore her condition, it is nevertheless true -that there does not exist, and never has existed elsewhere, -so beautiful and perfect a model of public and -private prosperity.... I pay this just tribute of admiration -with the more pleasure, as it is to me in the light of -an atonement for the errors and prejudices under which -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[Pg 341]</a></span> -I labored on this subject, before I enjoyed the advantage -of a personal experience. A residence of nearly two years -in that country—during which period I visited and -studied nearly every part of it, with no other view or -purpose than that of obtaining correct information, and -I may add, with previous studies well fitted to promote -my object—convinced me I had been egregiously -deceived." -<a name="FNanchor_457_457" id="FNanchor_457_457"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_457_457" class="fnanchor">[457]</a></p> - -<p>The writer saw England before her sorest trial came. -Since 1807, and especially after 1809, the condition of -both nations had grown sensibly worse. The commercial -embarrassments of Great Britain under the dislocation of -her trade and the loss of her markets, occasioned partly -by the Continental System and partly by the American -Non-Intercourse Act, and aggravated by the wild speculations -that followed the year 1808, resulted in 1811 in -wide-spread disaster,—merchants failing, manufactories -closing, workmen out of employment and starving. In -France the commercial crisis of the same year, extending -over the Continent, soon became a chaos of firms crashing -one upon the other and dragging down, each the other, in -its fall. -<a name="FNanchor_458_458" id="FNanchor_458_458"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_458_458" class="fnanchor">[458]</a> -Soon great numbers of workmen in all the provinces -found themselves, like their English brethren, deprived -of occupation. Council upon council was held by -the emperor to ascertain how, by government interference, -to remedy the ills for which governmental interference -was immediately responsible. But, underneath the apparently -similar conditions of distress in the two countries, -lay the real difference between a nation shut in, -and thrown back upon itself, and one that kept open its -communications with the world at large. In 1811 Great -Britain had already begun to react through her natural -channels; the energies of her people under the load upon -them had been like a strong spring, whose tension remains, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[Pg 342]</a></span> -though compressed. The South American trade revived; -the Spanish Main took off the accumulations in the West -India Islands, and the latter in turn began to call for supplies -from home; Russia was visibly relenting; in the -Peninsula, Masséna, whose progress had been stopped at -the lines of Torres Vedras, was forced to retreat into -Spain in the month of March, and through a liberated -Portugal were found new openings for British commerce. -For France there could be no return of prosperity until -the sea was again free to her, either through her own or -through neutral ships; but the latter could not safely repair -to her ports until her rival revoked the still existing -Order in Council, blockading the whole French and Dutch -coast, and this she would not do before the emperor recalled -the decrees upon which rested his Continental System. -And while Great Britain was making appalling -drafts upon the future in her ever-mounting debt, France -was exhausting a capital which no forcing power could -replace, by her anticipated conscriptions, which led to a -revolt far more menacing than the riots of English workmen. -Sixty thousand "refractory" conscripts were scattered -through the departments, and among the forests of -western, central, and southern France, refusing to join -their regiments and defying the authorities. They were -pursued by flying columns of old soldiers; who, often long -strangers to their own countrymen, took with their property -the same liberties they had practised in foreign parts. -In January, 1811, the whole conscription for the year was -called out, and in midsummer that for 1812; but no legal -measures could make men of the boys sent to die before -the virile age, -<a name="FNanchor_459_459" id="FNanchor_459_459"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_459_459" class="fnanchor">[459]</a> -more often of exposure than by the hands -of the enemy, in the gloomy mountains and parched -plains of Spain.</p> - -<p>The great struggle of endurance, "of the highest individual -genius against the resources and institutions of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[Pg 343]</a></span> -a great nation" -<a name="FNanchor_460_460" id="FNanchor_460_460"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_460_460" class="fnanchor">[460]</a> -who stayed its power on the sea, was -now drawing near its close; the battle between the sea -and the land was about to terminate in one of the most -impressive and gigantic military catastrophes recorded by -history. But the inevitable end was already clearly indicated -before Napoleon started for Russia, although the -dim vision of weary eyes in England, strained by long -watching, saw not that which the apprehensions of -Frenchmen, troubled with the anguish of France, tremblingly -felt. The credit of France was gone; nor could -her people bear any added burdens, until the sea, over -which Great Britain still moved unresisted, was open to -them. The people of the Continent had become bitterly -hostile through the sufferings caused by the blockade, -and the imperial power could only be maintained by an -army which was itself filled by borrowing upon the future; -its capital, its reserve, was fast being exhausted. -<a name="FNanchor_461_461" id="FNanchor_461_461"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_461_461" class="fnanchor">[461]</a> The -question of physical endurance was settled; the only -point really left in doubt was that of moral endurance. -Would Great Britain and the British government have -the nerve to hold out till the emperor was exhausted?" -<a name="FNanchor_462_462" id="FNanchor_462_462"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_462_462" class="fnanchor">[462]</a> -Already the agitation for the repeal of the Orders in -Council, with which the existing ministry was identified, -was becoming ominous. The leaders of the Opposition were -opposed to the Peninsular war; and Napier has vividly -shown the doubts and hesitations of the ministry as to -sustaining that great enterprise which compelled Napoleon -to such waste of life, to such a fatal division of his force. -Time was not allowed to test to the utmost British -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[Pg 344]</a></span> -tenacity; the darkest hour was fast passing away, the -clouds began to break and the day to dawn.</p> - -<p>Three weeks after Napoleon's annexation of the Hanse -towns and of the Duchy of Oldenburg, on the last day of -the year 1810, Alexander put forth a commercial ukase -which under all the circumstances had the appearance of -retaliatory action; and at the least drew a sharp line between -his commercial policy and the Continental System -as inculcated by Napoleon. The decree expressly permitted -the entrance of colonial produce under neutral flags; and -many articles of French manufacture were virtually denied -admission, by not being included in a list of goods which -could be introduced on payment of duty. In vain did the -czar assert that his object was to develop, by protection, -Russian manufactures of the excluded articles. Napoleon -rejected the explanation. "The last ukase," he wrote in -a personal letter to Alexander, "is at bottom, but yet more -in form, specially directed against France." -<a name="FNanchor_463_463" id="FNanchor_463_463"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_463_463" class="fnanchor">[463]</a> But while -the exclusion of French products was the most open, the -admission of neutral ships with colonial produce was the -most significant, feature of the edict. This was the point -upon which the emperor had been most importunate; here -was the leak which, in his judgment, was sinking the -ship. "Six hundred English merchant ships," he had -written in a previous letter, October 23, 1810, -<a name="FNanchor_464_464" id="FNanchor_464_464"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_464_464" class="fnanchor">[464]</a> "wandering -in the Baltic, have been refused admission to Prussian -ports and those of Mecklenburg, and have steered for your -Majesty's states. If you admit them the war still lasts.... -Your Majesty knows that if you confiscate them -we shall have peace. Whatever their papers, under whatever -names they are masked, French, German, Spanish, -Danish, Russian, your Majesty may be sure they are -English."</p> - -<p>Later, on the 4th of November, -<a name="FNanchor_465_465" id="FNanchor_465_465"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_465_465" class="fnanchor">[465]</a> Napoleon wrote through -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[Pg 345]</a></span> -the ordinary ministerial channels: "There are no neutrals. -Whatever the papers produced, they are false. Not a -single ship enters Russia with so-called American papers -but comes really from England. -<a name="FNanchor_466_466" id="FNanchor_466_466"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_466_466" class="fnanchor">[466]</a> Peace or war is in the -hands of Russia. Let her confiscate all ships brought in -by the English, and join France in demanding of Sweden -the seizure of the immense quantity of merchandise the -English have landed at Gottenburg under various flags. -If Russia wishes peace with England, she has here the -means. But Russia has followed opposite principles, and -of this but one proof need be given: that is, that the -colonial merchandise which appeared at the last Leipzig -fair was brought there by seven hundred wagons coming -from Russia; that to-day all the traffic in that merchandise -is done through Russia; finally, that the twelve hundred -ships which the English have convoyed by twenty -ships of war, disguised under Swedish, Portuguese, -Spanish, American flags, have in part landed their cargoes -in Russia." To these complaints Alexander had -replied that he had adhered, and would adhere, to his engagements -and exclude British ships; but that he would -not, and could not, go beyond them and forbid neutrals. -The ukase of December 31 took the matter out of diplomatic -discussion, and, coming so immediately upon the -annexation of Oldenburg, had the appearance of defiance. -As such Napoleon accepted it. "This seems," he wrote -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[Pg 346]</a></span> -in the personal letter of February 28 above quoted, "a -change of system. All Europe so regards it; and already -our alliance no longer exists, in the opinion of England -and of Europe.... If your Majesty abandons the alliance -and burns the conventions of Tilsit, it would be evident -that war would follow a few months sooner or later. -The result must be, on either side, to strain the resources -of our empires in preparations.... If your Majesty has -not the purpose of reconciliation with England, you will -see the necessity, for yourself and for me, of dissipating -all these clouds." From that time both sovereigns prepared -for war.</p> - -<p>The turn of affairs in the North at this time, and during -the succeeding critical twelvemonth, was powerfully influenced -by the presence of a great British fleet in the -Baltic and by the extreme discretion of its admiral. -Napoleon had compelled Sweden to follow up her exclusion -of British ships by a formal declaration of war, -which was issued November 17, 1810. The British minister -had to leave Stockholm; and, after his departure, -the political as well as military direction of affairs on the -spot was under the conduct of Sir James Saumarez. That -most distinguished and admirable officer had thoroughly -appreciated, during his three summers in the Baltic, the -feelings of the Swedish rulers and people; and it was -chiefly owing to his representations to his own government, -and to his steadily conciliatory action, that the -formal war never became actual. He resisted with dignity -and firmness every attempt on the part of the Swedish -authorities to carry out Napoleon's orders to confiscate; -but he did not allow himself to be moved, by such -occasional yielding on their part, to any act of retaliation. -Good feeling between the two nations centred -around his attractive personality, and facilitated the -essential, but difficult, conciliation between Sweden and -Russia. The entire license trade was under the protection -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[Pg 347]</a></span> -of his fleet, which had charge also of the suppression of -privateering, of the police of the hostile coasts, and of the -interruption of communications between Denmark and -Norway. -<a name="FNanchor_467_467" id="FNanchor_467_467"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_467_467" class="fnanchor">[467]</a> -Its presence virtually insured the independence -of Sweden against France and Russia, except during the -winter months, when compelled to leave the Baltic; and -its numbers and character gave the Swedish government -a sufficient excuse for not proceeding to the extremities -demanded by Napoleon. During the summer of 1811 the -flag-ship was the centre of the secret consultations which -went on between the two states, to which Russia also, -having finally rejected Napoleon's terms, soon became a -party; and towards the end of the season the negotiation, -practically completed by the admiral, was formally concluded -with a British plenipotentiary. It was determined -to keep up the appearance of war, but with the understanding -that Sweden would join the alliance of Great -Britain and Russia. The czar had then no cause to fear -that, in the approaching contest with the great conqueror, -he should find a hostile Sweden on his flank and rear. -<a name="FNanchor_468_468" id="FNanchor_468_468"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_468_468" class="fnanchor">[468]</a></p> - -<p>The preparations of Napoleon for the great Russian -campaign occupied the year 1811. It was his intention -to carry on a vigorous warfare in the Spanish peninsula, -while collecting the immense forces of every kind needed -in the north of Germany. But the unsatisfactory character -of many of the soldiers gathering on the Elbe, among -them being tens of thousands of refractory conscripts and -foreign nationalities, compelled him to withdraw from -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[Pg 348]</a></span> -Spain in the latter part of 1811 some forty thousand -veterans, whose place was to be filled by levies of an inferior -character, which, moreover, did not at once appear. -The fortune of war in the Peninsula during the year had -varied in different quarters. On the east coast General -Suchet had brought Tortosa to capitulate on the 1st of -January. Thence advancing to the south he reduced -Tarragona by siege and assault on the 28th of June,—an -exploit which obtained for him his grade of Marshal of -France. Still moving forward, according to Napoleon's -general plan and instructions to him, the end of the year -found him before the city of Valencia, which surrendered -on the 9th of January, 1812. But to obtain these later -successes, at the time that so many hardened warriors -were removed from the Peninsula, it had been necessary -to support Suchet with divisions taken from the centre -and west, to abandon the hope entertained of combining -another great attempt against Lisbon, and also to withdraw -Marmont's corps from the valley of the Tagus to a -more northern position, around Salamanca and Valladolid. -At this time Wellington occupied a line on the -frontiers of Portugal, north of the Tagus, resting on the -city of Almeida and facing Ciudad Rodrigo. The latter, -with Badajoz, on the Guadiana, constituted the two supports -to the strong barrier by which the emperor proposed -to check any offensive movements of the enemy upon -Spain.</p> - -<p>The year had been passed by the British general in -patient contention with the innumerable difficulties, -political and military, of his situation. Masséna had -indeed been forced to withdraw from Portugal in April, -but since that time Wellington had been balked, in every -attempt, by superior numbers and by the strength of the -positions opposed to him. His reward was now near at -hand. On the 8th of January, 1812, he suddenly appeared -before Ciudad Rodrigo, favored in his movements -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[Pg 349]</a></span> -by the pre-occupation of Marmont, who was engaged in -the reorganization and arrangements necessitated by the -withdrawal of so many troops for the Russian war, and -also deceived by the apparent inactivity in the British -lines. The siege was pushed with a vigor that disregarded -the ordinary rules of war, and the place was successfully -stormed on the 19th of January. As rapidly as -the nature of the country, the season, and other difficulties -would permit, Wellington moved to the south, intending -to attack Badajoz. On the 16th of March the place was -invested, and though most ably defended by a governor of -unusual ability, it was snatched out of the hands of Marshal -Soult by the same audacity and disregard of ordinary -methods that had bereft Marmont of the sister fortress. -Badajoz was stormed on the night of the 6th of April; -and the Spanish frontier then lay open to the British, to -be crossed as soon as their numbers, or the mistakes of -the enemy, should justify the attempt.</p> - -<p>Thus opened the fatal year 1812. The clouds breaking -away, though scarce yet perceptibly, for Great Britain, -were gathering in threatening masses on the horizon of -Napoleon. A painful picture is drawn by his eulogist, -M. Thiers, of the internal state of the empire at this time. -An excessively dry season had caused very short crops -throughout Europe, and want had produced bread riots in -England, as well as in France and elsewhere. But such -demonstrations of popular fury were far more dangerous -and significant, in a country where all expression of -opinion had been so rigorously controlled as in the empire, -and in a capital which concentrates and leads, as -only Paris does, the feelings of a nation. The discontent -was heightened and deepened by the miseries of the conscription, -which ate ever deeper and deeper, wringing the -heart of every family, and becoming more and more extreme -as each succeeding enterprise became vaster than -those before it, and as the excessive demands, by reducing -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[Pg 350]</a></span> -the quality of the individual victims, required ever -growing numbers. Six hundred thousand men had been -poured into Spain, three hundred thousand of whom had -died there. -<a name="FNanchor_469_469" id="FNanchor_469_469"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_469_469" class="fnanchor">[469]</a> -Besides the immense masses carried forward -to the confines of Poland, and those destined for the Peninsula, -there was to be a powerful reserve between the Elbe -and the Rhine, another behind the Rhine in France itself, -and to these Napoleon now proposed to add yet a third, of -one hundred and twenty thousand so-called national -guards, taken from the conscription of the four last years -and legally not liable to the call. Throughout the great -cities there was growing irritation, rising frequently to -mutiny, with loud popular outcries, and again the number -of refractory conscripts, of whom forty thousand had been -arrested the year before, rose to fifty thousand; again -flying columns pursued them through all the departments. -Caught, shut up in the islands off the coasts, whence they -could not escape, and, when drilled, marched under strong -guard to the ends of Europe, they none the less contrived -often to desert; and everywhere the people, hating the -emperor, received them with open arms and passed them -back, from hand to hand, to their homes. Thus amid -starvation, misery, weeping, and violence, the time drew -near for Napoleon to complete his great military undertaking -of conquering the sea by the land.</p> - -<p>In the North the situation had finally developed -according to the wishes of Great Britain. The secret -understanding of 1811 had resulted in January, 1812, in -another commercial ukase, allowing many British manufactures -to be introduced into Russia. On the 5th of April -a secret treaty was concluded with Sweden, ceding Finland -to Russia, but assuring to the former power Norway, -of which Denmark was to be deprived. Relieved now on -her northern flank, Russia soon after made peace with -Turkey under the mediation of Great Britain. Thus with -both hands freed she awaited the oncoming of Napoleon.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[Pg 351]</a></span></p> - -<p>On the 9th of May, 1812, the emperor left Paris to take -command of his forces in Poland; and on the 24th of June -the imperial army, to the number of four hundred thousand -men, crossed the Niemen and entered Russia. Two -hundred thousand more followed close behind. The preceding -day, June 23, the British Orders in Council of -1807 and 1809 were revoked, as to the United States of -America. It was too late. War had been declared by -Congress, and the declaration approved by the President, -five days before, on the 18th of June, 1812.</p> - -<hr class="sect" /> - -<p>In narrating the extraordinary, and indeed unparalleled, -series of events which reach their climax in the -Berlin and Milan Decrees and the Orders in Council, the -aim has been to compress the story within the closest limits -consistent with clearness, and at the same time to indicate -the mutual connection of the links in the chain; how -one step led to another; and how throughout the whole, -amid apparent inconsistencies, there is an identity of -characteristics, not impossible to trace, from the outbreak -of the Revolution to the downfall of Napoleon. To do this -it has been thought expedient to suppress a mass of details, -much of a very interesting character, bearing upon the -working of the two opposing systems. The influence of -the military element of Sea Power, the function of the -British navy, after Trafalgar, has also been passed over in -silence. When that great disaster wrecked Napoleon's -naval hopes, and convinced him that not for many years -could he possibly gather the ships and train the seamen -necessary to meet his enemy in battle upon the ocean, he -seized with his usual sagacity the one only remaining -means of ruining her, and upon that concentrated his -great energies. The history of Europe and of the civilized -world, after 1805, turned upon this determination to destroy -Great Britain through her commerce; and the decision -was forced upon the mighty emperor by the power -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[Pg 352]</a></span> -of the British navy, and the wise resolve of the government -not to expose her land forces to his blows, until peculiarly -favorable circumstances should justify so doing. The opportunity -came with the Spanish uprising; and, by one of -those coincidences not uncommon in history, with the -hour came the man. The situation was indeed of the most -favorable for Great Britain. The theatre of war, surrounded -on three sides by water, was for the French a -salient thrust far out into the enemy's domain on the sea, -while its interior features and the political character of -the people, incapable of cohesion and organized effort, -made the struggle one eminently alien to the emperor's -genius; for it gave no opportunity for those brilliant combinations -and lightning-like blows in which he delighted. -To the British the Peninsula offered the advantage that -the whole coast line was a base of operations; while every -friendly port was a bridge-head by which to penetrate, or -upon which, in case of reverse, to retire, with a sure retreat -in the sea beyond.</p> - -<p>The course pursued by each of the two governments, in -this great enterprise of commerce-destroying, may be -looked at from the two points of view, of policy and of -rightfulness.</p> - -<p>In the matter of policy, both Napoleon's decrees and the -Orders in Council have been fiercely assailed and extensively -argued. In so broad and complicated a subject, a -probable conclusion can only be reached by disregarding -the mass of details, of statistics, with which the disputants -have rather obscured than elucidated the subject, -and by seeking the underlying principle which guided, or -should have guided, either government. It is possible to -form a very strong argument, for or against either, by -fastening upon the inevitable inconveniences entailed -upon each nation by the measures of its adversary and by -its own course. It is by impressions received from these -incidents—or accidents—the accompaniments rather -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">[Pg 353]</a></span> -than the essentials of the two systems, that the debates -of Parliament and the conclusions of historians have been -colored.</p> - -<p>As the combined tendency of the two policies, fully -carried out, was to destroy neutral trade in Europe, the -preponderance of injury must fall upon the nation which -most needed the concurrence of the neutral carrier. -That nation unquestionably was France. -<a name="FNanchor_470_470" id="FNanchor_470_470"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_470_470" class="fnanchor">[470]</a> Even in peace, -as before stated, much more than half her trade was done -in neutral bottoms; the war left her wholly dependent -upon them. Alike to export and to import she must have -free admission of neutral ships to her ports. Prior to the -Berlin decree the British made no pretence to stop this; -but they did, by reviving in 1804 the Rule of 1756, and -by Fox's decree of May, 1806, blockading the coast from -Brest to the Elbe, betray an apprehension of the result to -themselves of the neutral trade with France. This should -have put the emperor upon his guard. The very anxieties -shown by a people of such mercantile aptitudes should -have been most seriously regarded, as betraying where -their immediate danger lay. The American market was -a most important benefit to them, but American merchant -ships threatened to be a yet more important injury. These -having, under the circumstances of the war, a practical -monopoly of carrying West India produce which exceeded -in quality and quantity that of the British Islands, were -underselling the latter on the Continent. The ill effect -of this was partially obviated by the Rule of 1756; but -there remained the fear that they would absorb, and be -absorbed by, the commerce of the Continent; that to it, -and to it alone, they would carry both articles of consumption -and raw materials for manufacture; and that from it, -and from it alone, they would take away manufactured -articles with which Great Britain up to the present time -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">[Pg 354]</a></span> -had supplied them,—and, through them, large tracts of -Spanish America.</p> - -<p>Up to 1804 the course of trade had been for American -ships to load for continental ports, receive there the -greater part of the payment for their cargoes in bills of -exchange on the Continent, and with these to go to British -ports and pay for British manufactures, with which they -completed their lading. If, on the other hand, they went -from home direct to Great Britain, the cargoes they carried -were in excess of British consumption, and so far -were profitable to Great Britain chiefly as to a middleman, -who re-exported them to the Continent. But, when Pitt -returned to power, this course of trade was being sensibly -modified. American ships were going more and more -direct to the Continent, there completing their cargoes and -sailing direct for home. Continental manufactures were -supplanting British, though not in all kinds, because the -American carrier found it more profitable to take them as -his return freight; just as the produce of continental -colonies was, through the same medium, cutting under -British coffees, sugars, and other tropical products. -British merchants were alarmed because, not only their -merchant shipping, but the trade it carried was being -taken away; and British statesmen saw, in the decay of -their commerce, the fall of the British navy which -depended upon it.</p> - -<p>It was plainly the policy of Napoleon to further a -change which of itself was naturally growing, and which -yet depended wholly upon the neutral carrier. The latter -was the key of the position; he was, while war lasted, essentially -the enemy of Great Britain, who needed him little, -and the friend of France, who needed him much. Truth -would have justified England in saying, as she felt, that -every neutral was more or less serving France. But in -so doing the neutral was protected by the conventions of -international law and precedent, which the British mind -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">[Pg 355]</a></span> -instinctively reveres, and for violating which it must -have an excuse. This the emperor, whose genius inclined -essentially to aggressive and violent action, promptly -afforded. Overlooking the evident tendency of events, -unmindful of the experience of 1798, he chose to regard -the order of blockade of May, 1806, as a challenge, and -issued the Berlin decree, which he was powerless to carry -out unless the neutral ship came into a port under his -control. He thus drove the latter away, lost its services, -and gave Great Britain the excuse she was seeking for -still further limiting its sphere of action, under the plea -of retaliation upon France and her associates. And a -most real retaliation it was. Opposition orators might -harp on the definition of the word, and carp at the method -as striking neutrals and not the enemy. Like Napoleon, -they blinked at the fundamental fact that, while Great -Britain ruled the sea, the neutral was the ally of her -enemy.</p> - -<p>The same simple principle vindicates the policy of the -British ministry. Folios of argument and oratory have -been produced to show the harm suffered by Great Britain -in this battle over Commerce. Undoubtedly she suffered,—perhaps -it would not be an exaggeration to say she -nearly died; but when two combatants enter the lists, not -for a chivalric parade but for life and death, it is not the -incidental injuries, but the preponderance of harm done -and the relative endurance, which determine the issue. -To the same test of principle must be referred the mistakes -in details charged against British ministries. -Military writers say that, when the right strategic line -of effort is chosen, mistakes of detail are comparatively -harmless, and even a lost battle is not fatal. When -France decided, practically, to suppress the concurrence -of the neutral carrier, she made a strategic blunder; and -when Great Britain took advantage of the mistake, she -achieved a strategic success, which became a triumph.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">[Pg 356]</a></span></p> - -<p>As regards the rightfulness of the action of the two -parties, viewed separately from their policy, opinions -will probably always differ, according to the authority -attributed by individuals to the <i>dicta</i> of International -Law. It may be admitted at once that neither Napoleon's -decrees nor the British orders can be justified at that bar, -except by the simple plea of self-preservation,—the first -law of states even more than of men; for no government -is empowered to assent to that last sacrifice, which the -individual may make for the noblest motives. The beneficent -influence of the mass of conventions known as -International Law is indisputable, nor should its authority -be lightly undermined; but it cannot prevent the interests -of belligerents and neutrals from clashing, nor -speak with perfect clearness in all cases where they do. -Of this the Rule of 1756 offered, in its day, a conspicuous -instance. The belligerent claimed that the neutral, by -covering with his flag a trade previously the monopoly of -the enemy, not only inflicted a grave injury by snatching -from him a lawful prey, but was guilty likewise of a -breach of neutrality; the neutral contended that the -enemy had a right to change his commercial regulations, -in war as well as in peace. To the author, though an -American, the belligerent argument seems the stronger; -nor was the laudable desire of the neutral for gain a -nobler motive than the solicitude, about their national -resources, of men who rightly believed themselves engaged -in a struggle for national existence. The measure meted -to Austria and Prussia was an ominous indication of the -fate Great Britain might expect, if her strength failed -her. But, whatever the decision of our older and milder -civilization on the merits of the particular question, there -can be no doubt of the passionate earnestness of the two -disputants in their day, nor of the conviction of right -held by either. In such a dilemma, the last answer of -International Law has to be that every state is the final -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">[Pg 357]</a></span> -judge as to whether it should or should not make war; -to its own self alone is it responsible for the rightfulness -of this action. If, however, the condition of injury -entailed by the neutral's course is such as to justify war, -it justifies all lesser means of control. The question of -the rightfulness of these disappears, and that of policy -alone remains.</p> - -<p>It is the business of the neutral, by his prepared condition, -to make impolitic that which he claims is also -wrong. The neutral which fails to do so, which leaves -its ports defenceless and its navy stunted until the emergency -comes, will then find, as the United States found -in the early years of this century, an admirable opportunity -to write State Papers.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">[Pg 358]</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter p4"> -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIX" id="CHAPTER_XIX"></a>CHAPTER XIX.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="chapsum"><span class="sc">Summary—The Function of Sea Power and the Policy of -Great Britain in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic -Wars.</span></p> - - -<p class="drop-cap">THE outbreak of the French Revolutionary War found -Great Britain unprepared. For nearly ten years -her course had been directed by the second Pitt, who, -though inheriting the lofty spirit and indomitable constancy -of his father, yet loved peace rather than war, and -sought the greatness and prosperity of his country through -the development of her commerce and manufactures and -the skilful management of her finances. He strove also -consistently for the reduction of expenditure, including -that for the military, and even for the naval establishment. -As late as February 17, 1792, when the Revolution had -already been nearly three years in progress and France -was on the eve of declaring war against Prussia and Austria, -he avowed his expectation of many years of peace -for the British empire; and the estimates provided for -only sixteen thousand seamen and marines. "Unquestionably," -said he, "there never was a time in the history -of this country, when, from the situation of Europe, we -might more reasonably expect fifteen years of peace than -at the present moment." When the war with Germany -began, Great Britain proclaimed and steadily maintained -an attitude of neutrality; and the Minister asserted over -and over again, to France and to her enemies, the intention -not to interfere with the internal affairs of that -country. This purpose continued unshaken through the -tremendous events of the succeeding summer and autumn; -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">[Pg 359]</a></span> -through the assaults on the Tuileries on June 20 and -August 10, through the suspension of the king which -immediately followed the latter date, through the revolting -massacres of September, finally through the deposition -of the King and the proclamation of the Republic. -Doubtless these events gave a series of shocks to public -opinion in Great Britain, alienating the friends and embittering -the enemies of the Revolution; doubtless whatever -sympathy with the French advance towards freedom -the ministers felt was chilled and repelled by the excesses -and anarchy which marked its steps; but, whatever their -personal feelings, no indication appears, either in their -public actions or in their private correspondence as since -revealed, of any intention to depart from a strict, even -though cold, neutrality, until near the end of the year -1792.</p> - -<p>The leaders of the party in France, which at this time -was exerting the greatest influence upon the course of -the Revolution, had long favored war with foreign -nations, as the surest means to destroy the monarchy and -unite public feeling in favor of the Republic and of the -Revolution. The course of events had justified their -forecast. Prussia and Austria had given provocation; -and, although the latter at least would not have proceeded -to extremes, war had been proclaimed and the -fall of the monarchy had followed. There was, however, -one nation with which the revolutionists imagined themselves -to be in sympathy, and which they thought also as -a whole sympathized with them. That nation was the -English; between England and France there was to be -friendship, and concurrence of effort to a common end. -Herein the French leaders fatally misconceived the character -of English freedom, and the nature of its successive -advances to the conditions in which it then stood, and -through which Englishmen hoped for yet further enlargement. -Reverence for the past, and, in the main, for the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">[Pg 360]</a></span> -existing order of things; profound regard for law and for -an orderly method of making needful changes; a constant -reference to the old rights and customs of the English -people; respect for vested rights, for agreements, for -treaties,—such were the checks which had modified and -controlled the actions of the English, even when most -profoundly moved. The spirit which dominated the -French Revolution was that of destruction. The standard, -by which all things human were to be tried, was a -declaration of human rights put forth by its leaders, -which contained indeed many noble, true, and most -essential principles; but, if aught existing did not at -once square with those principles, the forces of the -Revolution were to advance against it and sweep it from -the face of the earth. No respect for the past, no existent -prescriptive rights, no treaties that seemed contrary -to natural rights, were to control the actions of the -revolutionists. They were to destroy, and to rebuild -from the foundation, according to their own interpretation -of what justice demanded.</p> - -<p>The courses and aims, therefore, of the two nations -were wholly divergent, and, as these were but the expression -in either case of the national temper, the hope of -sympathy and concurrence was delusive; but it was a -natural delusion, fostered in the hearts of the sanguine -Frenchmen by the utterances of many warm-hearted -friends of freedom in the rival nation, and by the more -violent words of a limited number of revolutionary -societies. The former of these were, however, quickly -alienated by the atrocities which began to stain the -progress of the Revolution; while the latter, being supposed -by the French leaders to represent the feeling of -the British nation, as distinguished from its Government, -contributed to draw them further in that path of reckless -enmity to existing institutions which led to the war with -Great Britain.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361">[Pg 361]</a></span></p> - -<p>Still, so long as the exponents of French public feeling -confined themselves to violent and irregular action within -their own borders, and to declamations, which did not go -beyond words, against the governments and institutions -of other nations, the British ministry remained quiet, -though watchful. There are extant private letters, written -in the early part of November, 1792, by the Prime -Minister, and by his relative, Lord Grenville, the Minister -of Foreign Affairs, which indicate that they rejoiced -in having maintained the neutrality of Great Britain, and -that they looked forward to its continuance, though with -anxiety. But on the 19th of that month the National -Convention, which then comprised within itself both the -executive and legislative functions of the French Government, -adopted a declaration that it would grant fraternity -and succor to <i>all</i> people who should wish to recover their -liberty; -<a name="FNanchor_471_471" id="FNanchor_471_471"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_471_471" class="fnanchor">[471]</a> -and it charged administrative officers to give -republican generals the necessary orders to carry help -to those people and to defend their citizens who had been -molested, or who might be subject to molestation, on -account of their devotion to the cause of liberty. As -if further to emphasize the scope of this decree, for such -in effect it was, it was ordered to be translated and -printed in all languages.</p> - -<p>By this official action the French Government had -taken a great and important step, radically modifying its -relations to all other states. The decree did not mention -the governments with which France was then at war, -limiting to their people the application of its terms. On -the contrary, when a member of the Convention, a month -later, proposed to insert words which should restrict its -operation to those peoples "against whose tyrants France -was, or should hereafter be, at war," and gave, as his -reason, to remove the uneasiness of Great Britain, the -motion found no support. The previous question was -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362">[Pg 362]</a></span> -moved, and the Convention passed on to other business. -<a name="FNanchor_472_472" id="FNanchor_472_472"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_472_472" class="fnanchor">[472]</a></p> - -<p>The men who then wielded the power of France had -thus gone beyond a simple inveighing against other governments, -and the mere use of words calculated to excite -discontent among the people of other states, and had -announced an intention to interfere forcibly in their internal -affairs whenever called upon to do so by citizens -who, in the opinion of the French Government, were deprived -of their just liberty or molested in their efforts to -recover it. The anarchist of our own day, who contents -himself with verbally attacking existing laws and institutions, -however vehemently, may remain untouched so long -as he confines himself to the expression and advocacy of his -opinions; but when he incites others to action in order to -carry out his ideas, he is held responsible for the effect of -his words; and when he takes measures leading to violence, -he is open to arrest and punishment. Such as this, -among governments, was the step taken by France in -November, 1792. She not only incited the citizens of -other states to rebellion, but announced her intention of -supporting them, and gave to her generals the necessary -orders for carrying that purpose into effect.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the Austrian Netherlands was rapidly overrun -and annexed to the French Republic, which thus -abandoned the lofty posture of disinterestedness, and the -disclaimers of all desire for conquest which the leaders of -the Revolution had made from the tribune of the Convention. -Soon after followed a decree declaring the navigation -of the Scheldt, the great artery of Belgium, open to -the sea. This set aside, without negotiation, the compacts -of the previous owners of the Netherlands, by which -the navigation of the river from the sea was reserved to -Holland, within whose territory the mouth lay,—an -agreement consecrated by renewed treaties, and which, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363">[Pg 363]</a></span> -by long standing, had become part of the public law of -Europe. The act strikingly showed the determination of -the French leaders to disregard treaties which conflicted -with their construction of the natural rights of man; for -they were at peace with Holland, yet made no attempt to -obtain their end by negotiation.</p> - -<p>The interests and the peace of Great Britain were now -seriously threatened. For over a century her statesmen -had held, and held rightly, that the possession of Belgium -by France was incompatible with her security. They had -supported the legal, though iniquitous, claim of the -Dutch to the exclusive navigation of the Scheldt; and, -above all, the country was bound by a treaty of alliance -to defend Holland, whose rights as defined by treaty had -been rudely set aside by France. Moreover, on the 28th -of November deputations from the British revolutionary -societies were received at the bar of the Convention, and -the President of the latter, in reply to their address, -made a speech strongly hostile to the British Government, -affecting to distinguish between it and the people over -whom it ruled; a pretence which was equally maintained -in the United States of America, where the French minister -the following year dared to appeal openly to the -people against the policy of their government.</p> - -<p>On the 1st of December the British Government issued -a proclamation, calling out the militia on account of -seditions and insurrectionary movements dangerous to -the state, and at the same time, as required by law, summoned -Parliament to meet on the 15th. The hopes -and the patience of Pitt were alike exhausted; and -although he still continued to listen to any overtures -that contained a promise of peace, he had determined to -exact guarantees, amounting to more than words, which -should assure the safety of Great Britain and her ally, -Holland. Meantime the British forces should be organized -and got ready to act. The French Government had -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364">[Pg 364]</a></span> -proclaimed its intention of interfering in the affairs and -overthrowing the institutions of all states, when, in its -judgment, their citizens were molested in their efforts -for freedom. To await supinely the moment when it -should please France to act would be the decision of -folly; nor was it possible, for one imbued with English -traditions, to view without distrust a government which -appeared to look for justice by disregarding law, and -avowedly disowned existing compacts and treaties in -favor of a speculative somewhat called the Rights of Man, -concerning which, its own passions being the judge, -revelations as numerous might be expected as were -vouchsafed to Mahomet.</p> - -<p>There are some who can only account for the different -lines of action followed by Pitt, before and after 1792, in -both cases with the indomitable tenacity of his race and -lineage, by conceiving two entirely different personalities -in the same man,—a sudden and portentous change, unprecedented -save by miracle as in the case of St. Paul. -More truly may be seen in him the same man acting -under circumstances wholly different, and in the later -instance unforeseen. It was not given to Pitt to read -the future of the French Revolution with the prophetic -eye of Burke. He had the genius, not of the seer, but of -the man of affairs; but that he had the latter in an eminent -degree is evident from the very rapidity of the -change, when he was at last forced to the conviction that -external conditions were wholly changed. He was at -heart the minister of peace, the financier, the promoter -of commerce and of gradual and healthy reforms; but in -a great speech, delivered before he had begun to fear that -peace would end in his time, he impressed upon his hearers -his own profound conviction that all the blessings -which England then enjoyed rested upon the union of -liberty with law. Having enumerated the material circumstances -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365">[Pg 365]</a></span> -to which the existing prosperity of the nation -was to be ascribed, he continued:—</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> -<p>"But these are connected with others more important. -They are obviously and necessarily connected with the duration -of peace, the continuance of which, on a secure and -durable footing, must ever be the first object of the foreign -policy of this country. They are connected <i>still more</i> with -its internal tranquillity, and with the natural effects of a free -but well-regulated government.... This is the great and -governing cause, the operation of which has given scope to -all the other circumstances which I have enumerated. It is -the union of liberty with law, which, by raising a barrier -equally firm against the encroachments of power and the -violence of popular commotion, affords to property its just -security, produces the exertion of genius and labor, the extent -and solidity of credit, the circulation and increase of capital; -which forms and upholds the national character and sets in -motion all the springs which actuate the great mass of the -community through all its various descriptions.... On this -point, therefore, let us principally fix our attention; let us -preserve this first and most essential object, and every other -is in our power." -<a name="FNanchor_473_473" id="FNanchor_473_473"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_473_473" class="fnanchor">[473]</a></p> -</div> - -<p>It was perfectly consistent with this position that, -when Pitt saw a neighboring state in convulsions from -the struggle of a turbulent minority for liberty without -law; when that state had not only proclaimed its purpose, -but taken steps to promote a similar condition in -other nations; when societies representing a small, but -active and radical, minority in England were openly -fraternizing with France; when the great leader of the -English Opposition had, from his seat in Parliament, -praised the French soldiery for joining the mobs,—it was -perfectly consistent with his past that Pitt should oppose -with all his powers a course of action which not only -endangered the internal peace upon which the prosperity -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366">[Pg 366]</a></span> -of England rested, but also carried into the realm of -international relations the same disorganizing principles, -the same disregard for law, covenant, and vested right -that had reduced France to her then pitiful condition. -Not only Great Britain, but the European world was -threatened with subversion. That Pitt did not bewail -aloud the wreck of his hopes, the frustration of his -career, the diversion of his energies from the path that -was dearest to him, shows the strength, not the instability, -of the man. That he laid aside the reforms he had projected, -and discouraged all movements towards internal -change, which, by dividing the wills of the people, -might weaken their power for external action, proves but -that concentration of purpose which, sacrificing present -gratification to future good, achieves great ends. Never -does the trained seaman appear greater, has well said the -naval novelist Cooper, than when, confronted with unexpected -peril, he turns all his energies from the path in -which they were before directed, to meet the new danger. -"Never," writes Lanfrey of the critical period between -Essling and Wagram, "had the maxim of sacrificing the -accessory to the principal, of which Napoleon's military -conceptions afford so many admirable examples, <i>and which -is true in every art</i>, been applied with more activity and -fitness.... The complications which he most feared -were to him, for the moment, as though they did not -exist. No secondary event had power to draw him off -from the great task he had primarily assigned to himself." -<a name="FNanchor_474_474" id="FNanchor_474_474"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_474_474" class="fnanchor">[474]</a> -All instinctively recognize the courage as well as -the wisdom of this conduct in the dangers which the seaman -and the soldier are called to meet; why deny its -application to the no less urgent, and at times more -momentous, issues presented to the statesman? If, as -may fairly be claimed, it is to the maritime power of -Great Britain that Europe owes the arrest of a subversive -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367">[Pg 367]</a></span> -revolution, if to that maritime power is due that a -great, irresistible, and beneficent movement toward the -liberty and welfare of the masses survived a convulsion -that threatened its destruction, then to Pitt, as the -master spirit who directed the movements of the British -nation, the gratitude of Europe is also due.</p> - -<p>When Parliament met on the 15th of December, the -king's speech mentioned the disturbances that had taken -place in the country and the threatening state of affairs -in Europe, and recommended an increase in the land -and sea forces of the kingdom. This measure was alleged, -among other grievances by France, as indicating an unfriendly -feeling toward her on the part of the British -Government; but it has been reasonably urged that she -had already manned a fleet superior to that which Great -Britain had in commission, besides keeping ready for -instant service a large number of other ships, which -could have no possible enemy except the British navy. -Viewed simply as measures of precaution, of the necessity -for which every state is its own judge, it is difficult -to criticise severely either government; but the fact remains -that France had been the first to arm her fleet, -and that Great Britain did not do the same until substantial -grounds of offence had been given.</p> - -<p>By a singular coincidence, on the same day that Parliament -met, the National Convention issued a second -celebrated decree, yet more decisive in its character than -that of November 19, which it was evidently meant to emphasize -and supplement. The generals of the Republic -were now directed "in every country which the armies of -the French Republic shall occupy, to announce the abolition -of all existing authorities, of nobility, of serfage, of -every feudal right and every monopoly; to proclaim the -sovereignty of the people and convoke the inhabitants in -assemblies to form a provisional government, to which no -officer of a former government, no noble, nor any member -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368">[Pg 368]</a></span> -of the former privileged corporations, shall be eligible." -To this was added the singular and most significant declaration -that "the French nation will treat as enemies -any people which, refusing liberty and equality, desires -to preserve its prince and privileged castes, or to make -any accommodation with them." It was impossible to -announce more clearly that this was no mere war of -opinions, but, on the contrary, one of principles and -methods fraught with serious and practical consequences; -nor could any despot have worded a more contemptuous -denial of the rights of a people concerning their form of -government. The revolutionary spirit, which underlay -the frequent changes of men in the French Government, -showed how fixed was its purpose to alter forcibly the -institutions of other states, regardless of the habits and -affections of their citizens, by the systems imposed upon -the smaller neighboring nations, hammered all upon the -anvil of French centralization, in defiance of the wishes -and the struggles of the people concerned. Europe thus -found itself face to face with a movement as enthusiastic -in its temper and as radical in its demands as the -invasions of the Mahometans.</p> - -<p>To this fanatical, yet lofty, and in the masses of the -French people generous and devoted spirit, continental Europe -had no equal force to oppose. It is a common remark -that the eighteenth century saw the appearance of several -ruling princes who were possessed with the liberal views of -the rising school of philosophers, and who sincerely desired -to effect the improvement and elevation of their -people,—to remove grievances, to lighten burdens, to -advance the general welfare. The wisdom or strength -of these men had not been equal to the task they had -assumed. There still remained unjustifiable inequalities -of conditions, grievous abuses, a depression of the lower -orders, and a stagnation among the upper, which seemed -to place insurmountable obstacles in the way of advance, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369">[Pg 369]</a></span> -and made it impossible for the masses to feel a living, -national interest in governments which contributed so -little to their happiness. This good-will among the sovereigns -of the day was indeed a most encouraging symptom. -It made it possible to effect the needed changes -and to advance without a violent break with the past,—to -have reform and progress without revolution; but -to achieve these ends was beyond the power of the ruler -alone: there was needed the voice and co-operation of -all classes in the state. This Louis XVI. had sought to -obtain; but unfortunately, not only for France but for -Europe, the most numerous and important of the orders -of the States-General had met the difficulties of the -situation, the outcome of centuries, not with firmness, -but with impatience. From the beginning was shown -the determination to break with the past,—to proceed at -a bound to the desired goal. No regard was had to the -fitness of the people for such sudden change, to the immense -conservative force of established custom, nor to -the value of continuity in the life of a nation. Nor was -this all. Law, as well as custom, was lightly set at -nought. The first Assembly threw off the fetters imposed -by its instructions, and assumed powers which had -not been confided to it. By means of these usurped faculties -the Constituent Assembly radically changed the -constitution of France.</p> - -<p>The instantaneous effect upon the French people and -upon the internal condition of the state is well known. -As the far-reaching character of the movement, and its -lack of efficient elements for self-control, became evident, -the anxieties of conservative men in other nations, however -desirous of steady progress in human liberty, could not -fail to be aroused. It was notorious, long before 1792, -that ill-balanced as was the new constitutional frame of -government in France, and radical as was the temper of the -leading members of the Legislative Assembly, the deliberations -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370">[Pg 370]</a></span> -of the latter were overawed by the clubs and the -populace of Paris, and that government had practically -passed into the hands of the mob which was worked by -the clubs and the radical municipality of the city. The -grotesque yet terrible scenes of June 20 and August 10, -the hideous massacres of September, not merely showed -the frantic excesses of which a French mob is capable, but -also and more solemnly evinced how completely governmental -control was swallowed up in anarchy. Still, all -these things were internal to France, and it might be hoped -would so remain until the French people had worked their -own solution of their troubles. The decrees of November -19 and December 15 blasted this hope, and formally -announced that French beliefs and methods were to be -forcibly spread throughout Europe. How was the assault -to be met?</p> - -<p>Few statesmen of that day expected that this mighty -and furious spirit of misrule would so soon bend its neck -to an uncontrolled and energetic despotism. The coming -of the one man, Napoleon, was dimly seen in the distance -by the thoughtful, who knew that anarchy clears -the way for absolute power; but the speedy appearance -and tyrannous efficiency of the Committee of Public -Safety, with its handmaid the Revolutionary Tribunal, -were not foreseen. The statesmen of 1793 saw the -strength, but were more impressed by the superficial exhibition -of disorder in the popular outburst. They expected -to repress it, to drive it back within the limits of -France, and impose the guarantees necessary for the -security of Europe, by meeting it with numerous, well-organized -armies of veteran troops, and by a solid, orderly -financial system, wielding plentiful resources. In short, -they thought to cope with a mighty spirit by means of -elaborate and powerful machinery. The means were insufficient. -The living spirit developed the rude but efficient -organism which was needed to direct its energies -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371">[Pg 371]</a></span> -and which was in sympathy with its aims; the elaborate -machinery of armies and finances failed, because not -quickened by the life of the nations by whose rulers it -was wielded.</p> - -<p>Fortunately for Europe and for freedom, another spirit, -less demonstrative but equally powerful, was already -living and animating another great nation, peculiarly -fitted by position and by the character of its power to -grapple with and exhaust that which was vicious and -destructive in the temper of the French Revolution. As -already said, the great feature of English freedom was its -respect for law, for established authority, for existing -rights; its conservative while progressive character, in -which it was directly opposed to the subversive principles -of the French. But the English temper, when once -aroused, was marked also by a tenacity of purpose, a constancy -of endurance, which strongly supported the conservative -tendencies of the race and were equally foreign to -the French character. Once embarked in the strife, and -definitely committed for the time to the preservation, -rather than to the progress, of society, under leaders -who strongly embodied the national traits, hatred of -the enemy's principles became more conspicuous, superficially, -than the love of freedom, which yet retained its -hold deep in the hearts of both rulers and people. War -does not live on the benevolent emotions, though it may -be excited by them. The position and the maritime -power of England were great factors, great determining -factors in the final issue of the French Revolutionary -wars; but these were but the machinery of the British -power. The great gain to the cause of stability in human -history was made when the spirit of order and law, embodied -in the great nation which it had created, rose -against the spirit of lawlessness and anarchy, which had -now possessed a people who for long years and by nature -had been submissively subject to external authority. Two -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_372" id="Page_372">[Pg 372]</a></span> -living forces had met in a desperate struggle, which was -not indeed for life and death, for both would survive; but -from which should result the predominance of the one -that was compatible with reasonable freedom, and the -subjection of the other, which knew no mean between -anarchy and servile submission. Less ebullient, but -more steadfast and deeply rooted, the former wore out -the latter; it forced it back through the stage of prostration -under absolute power until it had returned to the -point whence it started, there to renew its journey under -conditions that made it no longer a danger to the whole -world.</p> - -<p>Such being the profound nature of the strife, its course -may be regarded under two aspects, not necessarily opposed, -but rather complementary. First, and obviously, -there is the policy of the leaders on either side, the objects -which they proposed to themselves, the steps by -which they sought to compass those objects, and the -results of their various movements. Secondly, there is -the more obscure and wider question as to the relative -influence of the great elements of power which entered as -unconscious factors in the strife,—mighty forces, wielded -or directed by statesmen, and yet after all their masters. -Of these factors Sea Power was one, and among the most -important.</p> - -<p>The circumstances of the times had placed this force -wholly in the hands of Great Britain. She wielded it as -absolute mistress. Its action, like that of all the other -forces in the strife, depended in part upon the direction -given it by the British leaders for the purposes of war. -From this point of view, its structure appears to be -simple and rudimentary; the related movements of a few -principal parts are open to inspection and susceptible of -criticism. But from another point of view, in its course -and influence, this wonderful and mysterious Power is -seen to be a complex organism, endued with a life of its -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_373" id="Page_373">[Pg 373]</a></span> -own, receiving and imparting countless impulses, moving -in a thousand currents which twine in and around one another -in infinite flexibility, not quite defying the investigation -which they provoke, but rendering it exceedingly -laborious. This Power feels and is moved by many interests; -it has a great history in the past, it is making -a great and yet more wonderful history in the present. -Grown to the size of a colossus, which overshadows the -earth without a second,—unless it be the new rival rising -in the Western hemisphere,—it is now assailed with a -fury and virulence never before displayed. Attacked in -every quarter and by every means, sought to be cut off -alike from the sources and from the issues of its enterprise, -it adapts itself with the readiness of instinct to -every change. It yields here, it pushes there; it gives -ground in one quarter, it advances in another; it bears -heavy burdens, it receives heavy blows; but throughout -all it lives and it grows. It does not grow because of the -war, but it does grow in spite of the war. The war impedes -and checks, but does not stop, its progress. Drained -of its seamen for the war-fleets, it modifies the restrictions -of generations, throws open its ports to neutral ships, -its decks to neutral seamen, and by means of those allies -maintains its fair proportions, until the enemy proclaims -that the neutral who carries but a bale of British goods, -even to his own country, ceases thereby to be a neutral -and becomes the enemy of France; a proclamation which -but precipitated the ruin of French commerce, without -markedly injuring that of its rival.</p> - -<p>The maritime power and commercial prosperity of -Great Britain sprang essentially from the genius and -aptitudes of her people, and were exceptionally favored -and developed by the peculiar situation of the British -Islands. To these natural advantages the policy of the -government added somewhat, as at times it also ignorantly -imposed obstacles; but the actions of statesmen -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_374" id="Page_374">[Pg 374]</a></span> -only modified, for good or ill, they did not create the -impulses which originated and maintained the maritime -activity of the British people. The most celebrated -measure designed to foster that activity, Cromwell's -Navigation Act, had now been in operation for a century -and a quarter; but, while its superficial effects had secured -the adherence of the British people and the envy -of foreign states, shrewder economists, even a century -ago, had come to regard it as an injury to the commercial -prosperity of the country. They justified it only as -a means of forcing the development of the merchant -marine, the nursery of the naval force upon which the -safety of Great Britain must depend. Whatever the -fluctuations of its fortunes or the mistakes of governments -in the past, the sea power of Great Britain had at -the opening of the French Revolution attained proportions, -and shown a tenacity of life, which carried the -promise of the vast expansion of our own day. Painfully -harassed during the American Revolution, and suffering -from the combined attacks of France, Spain, and Holland, -seeing then large portions of its carrying trade pass into -the hands of neutrals, and bereft by the event of the war -of its most powerful colonies, it had not only survived -these strains, but by the immediate and sustained reaction -of the peace had, in 1793, more than regained its -pre-eminence. Once more it stood ready, not only to -protect its own country, but to sustain, with its well-proved -vitality, the demands of the continental war; -where the armies of her allies, long untouched by the -fires which breathed in France and England, were but a -part of the machinery through which the maritime power -of the latter energized.</p> - -<p>How far the ministers of the day understood, and how -wisely they used, the sea power of Great Britain, is -a question that will demand a separate consideration. -That is the question of military policy,—of the strategy of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_375" id="Page_375">[Pg 375]</a></span> -the war. We have first to consider the influence of the -maritime power in itself, and the functions discharged by -Great Britain simply in consequence of possessing this -great and unique resource. The existence, powers, and -unconscious working of a faculty obviously offer a subject -for consideration distinct from the intelligent use of the -faculty; though a correct appreciation of the former -conduces to an accurate criticism of the latter.</p> - -<p>Because of the decay of the French navy during the -early years of the war, the Republic, after 1795, virtually -abandoned all attempt to contest control of the sea. -A necessary consequence was the disappearance of its -merchant shipping, a result accelerated by the capture -of most of its colonies, and the ruin of its colonial -system by the outbreaks of the blacks. So great was this -loss, due rather to the natural operation of Great Britain's -naval supremacy than to any particular direction by the -ministry, that the Executive Directory, in a message to -the Council of Five Hundred, January 13, 1799, could -use the expression, scarcely exaggerated, "It is unhappily -too true that there is not a single merchant vessel sailing -under the French flag." Two years later the Minister -of the Interior reported to the Consular Government that -the commerce with Asia, Africa, and America was almost -naught, the importations direct from all those -quarters of the globe amounting to only 1,500,000 -francs, while the exports to them were but 300,000 -francs. As the advancing tide of French conquest extended -the territory and alliances of the Republic, the -commerce of its new friends was involved in the same -disaster that had befallen its own. The shipping of -Spain and Holland thus also disappeared from the sea, -and a large part of their colonies likewise passed into the -hands of Great Britain, to swell the commerce and to -employ the shipping of the latter. The navy of neither -of these Powers exerted any effect upon the control of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_376" id="Page_376">[Pg 376]</a></span> -the sea, except so far as they occupied the attention of -detachments of the British navy, so marked had the -numerical and moral superiority of the latter become.</p> - -<p>The disappearance of so large a body of merchant shipping -as that of France, Holland, and Spain, could not, of -course, imply the total loss to commerce and to the world -of the traffic previously done by it. Much less could these -three countries wholly dispense with the supplies for -which, during peace, they had chiefly depended upon the -sea. On the contrary, the necessity for importing many -articles by sea was increased by the general continental -war, which not only created a long hostile frontier, prohibitory -of intercourse on the land side, but also, by -drawing great numbers of workers from their ordinary -occupations to the armies of all parties, caused a material -diminution in the products of Europe at large. In France, -shut in both by land and sea, with a million of men under -arms, and confronted with the stern determination of -England to reduce her by starvation, the danger and the -suffering were particularly great; and had there not been -a singularly abundant and early harvest in 1794, the aim -of her enemy might then have been in great measure -reached.</p> - -<p>Such a condition of things offered of course a great -opening to neutral maritime states. They hastened to -embrace it,—among others the United States, whose -carrying trade grew very rapidly at this time; but the -naval power of Great Britain during this period was so -overwhelming, and her purpose so strong, that she succeeded -in imposing severe restraints upon neutrals as -well as enemies, in matters which she considered of -prime importance. Sweden and Denmark strenuously resisted -her claim to prevent the importation into France -of provisions and naval stores; but failing, through the -hostile attitude of the Czarina towards France, to receive -the powerful support of Russia, as in 1780 they had done, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_377" id="Page_377">[Pg 377]</a></span> -they were forced to succumb to the Power of the Sea. -The United States likewise were constrained by their -impotence to yield, under protest, before the same overwhelming -Power. While reserving the principle, they -in practice conceded naval stores to be contraband, and -on the subject of provisions accepted a compromise which -protected their own citizens without materially injuring -France. No serious attempt was made to change the -existing rule of international law, by which enemies' -property on board neutral ships was good prize. As -seizure involved sending the ship into a port of the -captor, and a possible detention there during the adjudication -of suspected goods, the inconvenience of the process -was a powerful deterrent. The English courts also -held that the produce of hostile colonies was lawful prize -if found in neutral bottoms; because, the trade of those -colonies being by the mother countries interdicted to foreigners -in peace, the concession of it in war was merely a -ruse to defraud the other belligerent of his just rights of -capture,—a plea uselessly contested by American writers. -All these causes operated to the injury of both hostile -and neutral commerce, and to the same extent, in appearance -at least, to the benefit of the British; and they are -cited simply as illustrative of the natural working of -so great a force as the Sea Power of Great Britain then -was. The results were due, not to the skill with which -the force was used or distributed, but to sheer preponderance -of existing brute strength.</p> - -<p>By the destruction of the enemies' own shipping and by -denying neutrals the right to carry to them many articles -of the first importance, Great Britain placed the hostile -countries in a state of comparative isolation, and created -within their borders a demand for the prohibited merchandise -which raised its price and made the supplying -of it extremely profitable. When commercial intercourse -is thus refused its usual direct roads, it seeks a new path, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_378" id="Page_378">[Pg 378]</a></span> -by the nearest circuitous course, with all the persistency -of a natural force. The supply will work its way to the -demand, though in diminished volume, through all the -obstacles interposed by man. Even the contracted lines -about a beleaguered city will thus be pierced by the -ingenuity of the trader seeking gain; but when the blockade -is extended over a long frontier, total exclusion becomes -hopeless. In such cases the tendency of commerce -is to seek a centre near the line which it intends to cross, -and there to accumulate the goods which are to pass the -hostile frontier and reach the belligerent. That centre -will usually be in a neutral seaport, to which trade is -free, and a clearance for which will afford no pretext for -seizure or detention by the opposite belligerent. Thus, -in the American Revolution, the neutral Dutch island of -St. Eustatius became the rendezvous and depot of traders -who purposed to introduce their goods, even contraband -of war, into the West India islands of either party to that -contest; and it was asserted that upon its capture by the -British, in 1781, when war began with Holland, large -amounts of property belonging to English merchants, but -intended for French customers, were found there. So, in -the American Civil War, from 1861 to 1865, the town of -Nassau in the British Bahamas became a centre at which -were accumulated stores of all kinds intended to break -through the blockade of the Southern coast.</p> - -<p>So again, in the wars of the French Revolution, as long -as Holland remained in alliance with Great Britain, that -country was the centre from which foreign goods poured -into France and the continent of Europe; but when the -United Provinces had been overrun by French troops, and -a revolution in their government had attached them to the -French policy, commerce, driven from their now blockaded -coast, sought another depot farther to the eastward, and -found it in Bremen, Hamburg, and some other German -ports,—of which, however, Hamburg was by far the most -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_379" id="Page_379">[Pg 379]</a></span> -favored and prosperous. Through Hamburg the coffee -and sugar of the West Indies, the manufactured goods of -Great Britain, the food products of America, the luxuries -of the East, poured into Germany; and also into France, -despite the prohibitive measures of French governments. -An indication of this change in the course of commerce is -found in the fact that the imports from Great Britain -alone into Germany, which amounted to £2,000,000 in -1792, had in 1796, the year after Holland became allied -to France, increased to £8,000,000, although the purchasing -power of Germany had meanwhile diminished. In -the same time the tonnage annually clearing from Great -Britain to Germany increased from 120,000 to 266,000. -Similar results, on a much smaller scale, were seen at -Gibraltar when Spain attempted to prevent British goods -entering her own ports; and again at Malta, when the -possession of that island offered British commerce a foothold -far advanced in the Central Mediterranean. Somewhat -similar, likewise, were the advantages of the islands -of Ceylon and Trinidad with reference to the mainlands -of India and South America, which gave to them a particular -commercial as well as strategic value, and led -England to accept them as her compensations at the -Peace of Amiens.</p> - -<p>In such cases the temporary commercial centre not only -reaps the profits of the broker, but all classes of its community -benefit by the increase of employments, of floating -capital, and of floating population. Precisely analogous -to these was the office which her geographical position -and unrivalled control of the sea enabled Great Britain -to discharge toward the European world during the -French Revolution. Her maritime power and commercial -spirit, the gradual though rapid growth of past generations, -enabled her at once to become the warehouse where -accumulated the products of all nations and of all seas -then open to commerce, and whence they were transhipped -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_380" id="Page_380">[Pg 380]</a></span> -to the tempest-tossed and war-torn Continent. -So also her watery bulwarks, traversed in every direction -by her powerful navy, secured her peaceful working as the -great manufactory of Europe, and thus fostered an immense -development of her industries, which had become more -than ever necessary to the welfare of the world, since those -of Holland and France were either crippled for want of -raw material or isolated by their impotence at sea. Great -Britain impeded the direct admission of tropical products -to the Continent; but their re-exportation from her own -ports and the export of British manufactures became the -two chief sources of her singular prosperity. The favorable -reaction produced by this concentration within her -borders of so much of the commercial machinery of the -civilized world, is evident. Activities of every kind -sprang up on all sides, increasing the employment of -labor and the circulation of capital; and, while it is vain -to contend that war increases the prosperity of nations, it -must be conceded that such a state of things as we have -depicted affords much compensation to the nation concerned, -and may even increase its proportionate prosperity, -when compared with that of its less fortunate enemies. -To quote the words of Lanfrey: "The English nation had -never at any time shown more reliance upon its own resources -than when Pitt, in 1801, retired after eight years -of war. The people bore without difficulty the heavy taxes -which the war imposed upon them, and what was more -astonishing still, Pitt had found no opposition in Parliament -to his last Budget. The immense increase in the -industrial prosperity of England triumphantly refuted the -predictions of her enemies, as well as the complaints of -alarmists. As the effect of every fresh declaration of -war upon the Continent had been to diminish competition -in the great market of the world and to throw into her -hands the navies and colonies of her adversaries, the English -had begun to look upon the loan of millions and the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_381" id="Page_381">[Pg 381]</a></span> -subsidies as so much premium paid for the development of -their own resources." -<a name="FNanchor_475_475" id="FNanchor_475_475"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_475_475" class="fnanchor">[475]</a></p> - -<p>It is not, therefore, merely as a weapon of war in -the hands of the ministry that the sea power of Great -Britain is to be regarded; nor yet only as the fruitful -mother of subsidies, upon whose bountiful breasts hung -the impoverished and struggling nations of the Continent. -Great as were its value and importance in these respects, -it had yet a nobler and more vital function. Upon it -depended the vigorous life of the great nation which -supplied the only power of motive capable of coping with -the demoniac energy that then possessed the spirit of the -French. Great Britain, though herself unconscious of the -future, was in the case of a man called upon to undergo -a prolonged period of trial, exposure, and anxiety, severely -testing all his powers, physical and mental. However -sound the constitution, it is essential that, when thus -assailed by adverse external influences, all its vital processes -should be protected, nourished, and even stimulated, -or else the bodily energies will flag, fail, and collapse. -This protection, this nourishment, the maritime power -ministered to the body politic of the state. Despite the -undeniable sufferings of large classes among the people, -the ministry could boast from year to year the general -prosperity of the realm, the flourishing condition of commerce, -the progressive preponderance and control of the -sea exerted by the navy, and a series of naval victories of -unprecedented brilliancy, which stimulated to the highest -degree the enthusiasm of the nation. Such a combination -of encouraging circumstances maintained in full tension -the springs of self-confidence and moral energy, in the -absence of which no merely material powers or resources -are capable of effective action.</p> - -<p>By the natural and almost unaided working of its intrinsic -faculties, the sea power of Great Britain sustained -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_382" id="Page_382">[Pg 382]</a></span> -the material forces of the state and the spirit of -the people. From these we turn to the consideration of -the more striking, though not more profound, effects produced -by the use made of this maritime power by the -British ministry—to the policy and naval strategy of the -war—in curtailing the resources and sapping the strength -of the enemy, and in compelling him to efforts at once -inevitable, exhausting, and fruitless. In undertaking -this examination, it will be first necessary to ascertain -what were the objects the ministers proposed to achieve -by the struggle in which they had embarked the nation. -If these are found to agree, in the main, with the aim -they should have kept before them, through realizing the -character of the general contest, and Great Britain's proper -part in it, the policy of the war will be justified. It will -then only remain to consider how well the general direction -given to the naval and military operations furthered -the objects proposed,—whether the strategy of the war -was well adapted to bring its policy to a successful -issue.</p> - -<p>The sudden revulsion of feeling in the British ministry, -consequent upon the decrees of November 19 and December -15, has been mentioned. It was then realized that not -only the internal quiet of Great Britain was endangered, -but that the political stability of Europe was threatened -by a Power whose volcanic energy could not be ignored. -There was not merely the fear that extreme democratic -principles would be transmitted from the masses of one -country to those of another still unprepared to receive -them. To say that the British Government went to war -merely to divert the interest of the lower orders from internal -to foreign relations is not a fair statement of the -case. The danger that threatened England and Europe -was the violent intervention of the French in the internal -affairs of every country to which their armies could penetrate. -This purpose was avowed by the Convention, and -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_383" id="Page_383">[Pg 383]</a></span> -how sincerely was proved by the history of many an adjoining -state within the next few years. Although the -worst excesses of the Revolution had not yet occurred, -enough had been done to indicate its tendencies, and to -show that, where it prevailed, security of life, property, -and social order disappeared.</p> - -<p>Security, therefore, was from the first alleged as the -great object of the war by the Prime Minister, who undoubtedly -was the exponent of the government, as truly -as he was the foremost man then in England. In his -speech of February 12, 1793, upon the French declaration -of war, he returns again and again to this word, as the -key-note to the British policy.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>"Not only had his Majesty entered into no treaty, but no -step even had been taken, and no engagement formed on the -part of our Government, to interfere in the internal affairs of -France, or attempt to dictate to them any form of constitution. -I declare that the whole of the interference of Great -Britain has been with the general view of seeing if it was -possible, either by our own exertions or in concert with any -other Power, to <i>repress this French system of aggrandizement -and aggression</i>, with the view of seeing whether we could not -re-establish the blessings of peace; whether we could not, -either separately or jointly with other Powers, provide for -the <i>security</i> of our own country and <i>the general security of -Europe</i>."</p></div> - -<p>It is only fair to Pitt to compare the thought underlying -this speech of February 12, 1793, with that of February -17, 1792, already quoted, in order that there may be -realized the identity of principle and conviction which -moved him under circumstances so diverse. This position -he continually maintained from year to year; nor -did he, when taunted by the leader of the Opposition with -lack of definiteness in the objects of the war, suffer himself -to be goaded into any other statement of policy. It -was in vain that the repeated jeer was uttered, that the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_384" id="Page_384">[Pg 384]</a></span> -ministry did not know what they were driving at; and -when the constant recurrence of allied disasters and -French successes on the Continent, preceding as they did -the most brilliant successes of the British navy, made yet -more poignant the exultation of the Opposition, Pitt still -refused, with all his father's proud tenacity, to give any -other account of his course than that he sought security—peace, -yes, but only a secure peace. To define precisely -what success on the part of Great Britain, or what reverses -suffered by France, would constitute the required -security, was to prophesy the uncertain fortunes of war, -and the endurance of that strange madness which was -impelling the French nation. When a man finds his interests -or his life threatened by the persistent malice of -a powerful enemy, he can make no reply to the question, -how long or how far he will carry his resistance, except -this: that when the enemy's power of injury is effectually -curtailed, or when his own power of resistance ends, -then, and then only, will he cease to fight. It fell to -Pitt's lot, at one period of the war, to be brought face to -face with the latter alternative; but the course of the -French Government—of the Directory as well as of -Napoleon—justified fully the presentiment of the British -Government in 1793, that not until the aggressive power -of France was brought within bounds, could Europe know -lasting peace. Peace could not be hoped from the temper -of the French rulers.</p> - -<p>Whatever shape, therefore, the military operations -might assume, the object of the war in the apprehension -of the British minister was strictly defensive; just as the -French invasion of the Austrian Netherlands, though an -offensive military operation, was, in its inception, part of -a strictly defensive war. To the larger and more general -motive of her own security and that of Europe, there was -also added, for Great Britain, the special treaty obligation -to assist Holland in a defensive struggle,—an obligation -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_385" id="Page_385">[Pg 385]</a></span> -which was brought into play by the French declaration -of war against the United Provinces. It is necessary to -note the two causes of war, because the relation of Great -Britain to the wider conflict was different from that which -she bore to the defence of Holland, and entailed a different -line of action. The treaty called upon her to contribute -a certain quota of land forces, and the character of her -particular interest, in both the Netherlands and Holland, -made it expedient and proper that British troops should -enter the field for their protection; but after the disastrous -campaign of 1794 had subdued Holland to France, -and a revolution in its government had changed its relations -to Great Britain, the troops were withdrawn, and -did not again appear on the Continent until 1799, when -favorable circumstances induced a second, but futile attempt -to rescue the Provinces from French domination.</p> - -<p>The part borne by the troops of England in the earlier -continental campaigns was therefore but an episode, depending -upon her special relations to Holland, and terminated -by the subjection of that country to France. What -was the relation of Great Britain to the wider struggle, -in which, at the beginning, almost all the nations of the -Continent were engaged? What functions could she discharge -towards curtailing the power of France, and so -restoring to Europe that security without which peace is -but a vain word? Upon the answers to these questions -should depend the criticism of the use made by the British -ministry of the nation's power. To condemn details -without having first considered what should be the leading -outlines of a great design, is as unsafe as it is unfair; for -steps indefensible in themselves may be justified by the -exigencies of the general policy. It is not to be expected -that, in a war of such vast proportions and involving such -unprecedented conditions, serious mistakes of detail should -not be made; but, if the great measures adopted bear a -due proportion both to the powers possessed and to the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_386" id="Page_386">[Pg 386]</a></span> -end aimed at, then the government will have fulfilled all -that can be demanded of it.</p> - -<p>The sea power which constituted the chief strength of -Great Britain furnished her with two principal weapons: -naval superiority, which the course of the war soon developed -into supremacy, and money. The traditional policy -of a strong party in the state, largely represented in the -governing classes, was bitterly adverse to a standing -army; and the force actually maintained was to a great -extent neutralized by the character of the empire, which, -involving possessions scattered over all quarters of the -globe, necessitated dispersion instead of concentrated -action. The embarrassment thus caused was increased -by the dangerously discontented condition of Ireland, -involving the maintenance of a considerable permanent -force there, with the possibility of having to augment it. -Furthermore, the thriving condition of the manufactures -and commerce of England, protected from the storm of -war ravaging the Continent and of such vital importance -to the general welfare of Europe, made it inexpedient to -withdraw her people from the ranks of labor, at a time -when the working classes of other nations were being -drained for the armies.</p> - -<p>For these reasons great operations on land, or a conspicuous -share in the continental campaigns became, if -not absolutely impossible to Great Britain, at least clearly -unadvisable. It was economically wiser, for the purposes -of the coalitions, that she should be controlling the sea, -supporting the commerce of the world, making money and -managing the finances, while other states, whose industries -were exposed to the blast of war and who had not -the same commercial aptitudes, did the fighting on land. -This defines substantially the course followed by the -ministry of the day, for which the younger Pitt has been -most severely criticised. It is perhaps impossible to -find any historian of repute who will defend the general -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_387" id="Page_387">[Pg 387]</a></span> -military conduct of the Cabinet at whose head he stood; -while the brilliant successes of the Seven Years' War have -offered a ready text for disparagers, from his contemporary, -Fox, to those of our own day, to draw a mortifying contrast -between his father and himself. Yet what were the -military enterprises and achievements of the justly famed -Seven Years' War? They were enterprises of exactly the -same character as those undertaken in the French Revolutionary -War, and as those which, it may be added, are so -constant a feature of English history, whether during -times of European peace or of European war, that it may -reasonably be suspected there is, in the conditions of the -British empire, some constant cause for their recurrence. -Like the petty wars which occur every few years in our -generation, they were mixed military and naval expeditions, -based upon the fleet and upon the control of the -sea, scattered in all quarters of the world, employing -bodies of troops small when compared to the size of -continental armies, and therefore for the most part bearing, -individually, the character of secondary operations, -however much they may have conduced to a great common -end.</p> - -<p>It is an ungracious task to institute comparisons; but, -if just conclusions are to be reached, the real facts of a -case must be set forth. The elder Pitt had not to contend -with such a navy as confronted his son at the outbreak of -the French Revolution. The French navy, as is avowed -by its historians, had received great and judicious care -throughout the reign of Louis XVI.; it had a large and -splendid body of ships in 1793; it enjoyed the proud confidence -of the nation, consequent upon its actions in the -war of 1778; and, although its efficiency was fatally -affected by the legislation of the National Assembly and -by the emigrations, it was still an imposing force. Not -until years of neglect had passed over it, and the fatal -Battle of the Nile had been fought, did its character and -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_388" id="Page_388">[Pg 388]</a></span> -weight sink to the same relative insignificance that the -elder Pitt encountered in the Seven Years' War. The -elder, like the younger, shaped his system of war upon the -control of the sea, upon the acquisition of colonies, upon -subsidizing allies upon the Continent, and, as main outlines -of policy, these were undoubtedly correct; but the -former had in his favor heavy odds in the weak condition -of the French navy, and in having on his side the great -military genius of the age. On the side of the elder Pitt -fought Frederick the Great, against a coalition, numerically -overwhelming indeed, but half-hearted, ill-knit, -and led by generals far inferior to their great opponent, -often mere creatures of the most corrupt Court favor. -Against the younger Pitt arose a greater than Frederick, -at the very moment of triumph, when the combined effects -of the sea power of England, of the armies of Austria, and -of the incompetency of the Directory had brought the -Revolution "to bay,"—to use the words of a distinguished -French naval officer and student. -<a name="FNanchor_476_476" id="FNanchor_476_476"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_476_476" class="fnanchor">[476]</a> In 1796 and -in 1799 Bonaparte, and Bonaparte alone, rescued from -impending destruction—not France, for France was not -the object of Pitt's efforts—but that "system of aggrandizement -and aggression" to which France was then -committed.</p> - -<p>The elder Pitt saw his work completed, though by -weaker hands; the younger struggled on through disappointment -after disappointment, and died under the -shadow of Austerlitz, worn out in heart and mind by the -dangers of his country. Contemporaries and men of later -generations, British and foreigners, have agreed in attributing -to him the leading part in the coalitions against -Revolutionary France; but they have failed to admit the -specific difficulties under which he labored, and how -nearly he achieved success. It is easy to indulge in -criticism of details, and to set one undertaking against -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_389" id="Page_389">[Pg 389]</a></span> -another; to show the failures of expeditions landed on -the French coast in the Seven Years' War; to point out -that Wolfe's conquest of Canada in 1759, by freeing the -American colonies from their fear of France, promoted -their revolt against Great Britain, while Nelson in 1798, -and Abercromby in 1801, saved Egypt, and probably India -also, to England; to say that the elder Pitt did not regain -Minorca by arms, while the younger secured both it and -Malta. Martinique fell to the arms of both; the Cape of -Good Hope, Ceylon, Trinidad, prizes of the later war, -may fairly be set against Havana and Manila of the -earlier. In India, Clive, the first and greatest of British -Indian heroes, served the elder Pitt; yet before the arms -of the younger fell Mysore, the realm of Hyder Ali and -Tippoo Saib, the most formidable enemies that Britain -had yet met in the Peninsula. Such comparisons and -arguments are endless; partly because there is much to -be said on both sides, but chiefly because they concern -details only, and do not touch the root of the matter.</p> - -<p>The objects of the two Pitts were different, for the circumstances -of their generations were essentially diverse. -The task of the one was to extend and establish the great -colonial system, whose foundations had been laid by -previous generations, and to sustain in Europe the -balance of power between rival, but orderly, governments; -that of the other was to steady the social order -and political framework of Great Britain herself, and of -Europe, against a hurricane which threatened to tear up -both by the roots. Each in his day, to strengthen his -country and to weaken the enemy, pursued the same great -line of policy, which in the one age and in the other fitted -the situation of Great Britain. To extend and consolidate -her sea power; to lay the world under contribution to her -commerce; to control the sea by an all-powerful navy; to -extend her colonial empire by conquest, thereby increasing -her resources, multiplying her naval bases, and depriving -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_390" id="Page_390">[Pg 390]</a></span> -her enemy alike of revenues and of points whence he -could trouble English shipping; to embarrass the great -enemy, France, by subsidizing continental allies,—such -was the policy of both the Pitts; such, alike in the -Revolution and in the Seven Years' War, was the policy -imposed by a due recognition, not only of the special -strength of Great Britain, but of her position in relation -to the general struggle. Frederick in the one case, Austria -in the other, needed the money, which only the sustained -commercial prosperity of England could supply. -The difference in the actual careers run by the two statesmen -is that the son had to meet far greater obstacles -than the father, and that, so far as the part of Great -Britain herself was concerned, he achieved equal, if not -greater, successes. The father had to contend, not against -the mighty fury of the French Revolution, but against the -courtier generals and the merely professional soldiery of -Louis XV. and his mistresses; he had an allied America; -he met no mutiny of the British fleet; he was threatened -by no coalition of the Baltic Powers; he encountered no -Bonaparte. It was the boast of British merchants that -under his rule "Commerce was united to and made to -grow by war;" but British commerce increased during the -French Revolution even more than it did in the earlier -war, and the growth of the British navy, in material -strength and in military glory, under the son, exceeded -that under the father.</p> - -<p>In history the personality of the elder statesman is far -more imposing than that of the younger. The salient -characteristic of the one was an imperious and fiery impetuosity; -that of the other, reserve. The one succeeded -in power a minister inefficient as an administrator, weak -in nerve, and grotesque in personal appearance; the striking -contrast presented by the first William Pitt to the -Duke of Newcastle, his aggressive temper, the firm self-reliance -of his character, his dazzling personality, around -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_391" id="Page_391">[Pg 391]</a></span> -which a dramatic halo clung even in the hour of his death, -made a vivid impression upon the imagination of contemporaries, -and have descended as a tradition to our own -days. Save to a few intimate friends, the second Pitt -was known to his fellow-countrymen only on the benches -of the House of Commons. A temper as indomitable as -his father's bore in silence the vastly greater and more -prolonged strain of a most chequered struggle; only a few -knew that the strain was endured with a cheerfulness, a -calmness, and a presence of mind, which of themselves -betoken a born leader of men. In the darkest hour, when -the last ally, Austria, had forsaken England and consented -to treat with France, when the seamen of the fleet had -mutinied, and British ships of war, taken violently from -their officers, were blockading the approaches to London, -Pitt was awakened during the night by a member of the -Cabinet with some disastrous news. He listened quietly, -gave his directions calmly and clearly, and dismissed the -messenger. The latter, after leaving the house, thought -it necessary to return for some further instruction, and -found the minister again sleeping quietly. The incident -is a drama in itself.</p> - -<p>In considering the use made of Great Britain's powers -for war by the administration of the second Pitt, the broad -outlines should be regarded, not as a simply military question,—such -as the combinations of a general officer in a -campaign,—but as efforts of statesmanship, directing -arms in an attempt to compass by force the requirements -considered to be most decisive in a political situation. -The office of the statesman is to determine, and to indicate -to the military authorities, the national interests -most vital to be defended, as well as the objects of conquest -or destruction most injurious to the enemy, in view -of the political exigencies which the military power only -subserves. The methods by which the military force will -proceed to the ends thus indicated to it—the numbers, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_392" id="Page_392">[Pg 392]</a></span> -character, equipment of the forces to be employed, and -their management in campaign—are technical matters, to -be referred to the military or naval expert by the statesman. -If the latter undertakes to dictate in these, he goes -beyond his last and commonly incurs misfortune.</p> - -<p>It is not likely that such a division of labor, between -the statesman, the soldier, and the seaman, is ever formally -made. It is enough if it be practically recognized -by the due influence of the military element in deciding -details, and by its cheerful obedience in carrying out the -views of the government whose servant it is. In criticising -results it is fair to assume, where not otherwise -proved, that for the general direction of the war the government -is responsible, and that in the particular management -of military movements the advice of professional men -has had just weight. A somewhat striking illustration -of this is to be found in the change of naval strategy, -within the limits of the Channel fleet, when, without any -change in the government, the positive convictions and -stringent methods of Lord St. Vincent set aside, in 1800, -the traditions of Lord Howe and Lord Bridport.</p> - -<p>What then was the general direction imparted to -military movements by a government which had announced -its object in the war to be the attainment of -security, by "repressing the French system of aggrandizement -and aggression"?</p> - -<p>Owing to the distracted condition of France, many -confusing cross-lights were at first cast upon that central -theatre of European disturbance, by movements whose -force it was impossible rightly to estimate. Such were -the risings in La Vendée and Brittany, the revolt at -Lyon, the delivery of Toulon to the allied fleets. Experience -justifies the opinion that such insurgent movements, -involving but a part of a nation, are best left to -themselves, supported only by money and supplies. If, -thus aided, they have not the vitality to make good their -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_393" id="Page_393">[Pg 393]</a></span> -cause, the presence of foreign troops, viewed ever with -jealousy by the natives, will not insure success. It is, -however, the French Revolution itself that furnishes the -surest illustrations of this truth, shedding upon it a light -which Pitt did not have to guide him. Such embarrassments -of the French Government were naturally thought -to give opportunity for powerful diversions; the more so -as the amount of disaffection was much exaggerated, and -the practice of partial descents upon the French coasts -had come down unquestioned from previous wars.</p> - -<p>To this mistake, as natural as any ever made in war, -and to the treaty obligation to support Holland, is to be -attributed much of the misdirection given to the British -army in the first two years of the war. When the illusion -was over, and Holland conquered, the military effort -of Great Britain was at once concentrated on its proper -objects of ruling the sea and securing positions that contributed -to naval control and commercial development. -Even in 1793 a respectable force had been sent to the -West Indies, which in 1794 reduced all the Windward -Islands. Stretching its efforts too far, reverses followed; -but in 1795 a powerful fleet was sent with sixteen thousand -troops commanded by Sir Ralph Abercromby, the -best general officer revealed by the early part of the war. -From the first, Pitt had seen the necessity of controlling -the West Indies. That necessity was twofold: first, by -far the greatest fraction of British trade, over one fourth -of the whole, depended upon them; and, second, the -enemy's islands were not only valuable as producing, -they were above all the homes of cruisers that endangered -all commerce, neutral as well as British. To control the -whole Caribbean region was, among those objects that lay -within the scope of the British Government, the one most -essential to the success of the general war. To sneer at -the attempt as showing merely a wish for sugar islands is -to ignore the importance of the West Indies to the financial -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_394" id="Page_394">[Pg 394]</a></span> -stability of Great Britain; upon whose solvency depended, -not only the maritime war, but the coalitions -whose aid was needed to repress "the system of French -aggression."</p> - -<p>Abercromby restored England's control over the lesser -Antilles, except Guadeloupe, and added to her possessions -Trinidad and the Dutch colonies on the mainland. Although -unable to retain Haïti, whose ports were for some -time occupied, the British navy ensured its loss to France -and the final success of the negro revolt; and commercial -relations were established with the new government. -During the same period the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, -and other Dutch and French possessions in India were -reduced by similar expeditions. These not only extended -the sphere of British commerce; they contributed yet -more to its enlargement by the security resulting from -the conversion of hostile to friendly ports, and the consequent -diminution of enemy's cruisers.</p> - -<p>It is a singular fact that neither the extraordinary -commercial prosperity secured by these successes, nor the -immense development of the navy during Pitt's administration, -is mentioned in the celebrated denunciation of -his "drivelling" war policy by Macaulay. Of naval administration -the latter speaks, in order to assign the -credit to another; on commercial and naval expansion he -is silent. Yet no factors in the war were so important. -The one sustained Great Britain, on whose shoulders was -upborne the whole resistance of Europe; the other crushed -France by a process of constriction which, but for Bonaparte, -would have reduced her at an early period, and to -free her from which Napoleon himself was driven to measures -that ruined him. These important results were obtained -by lengthening the cords and strengthening the -stakes of British commerce, by colonial expansion and -safe-guarding the seas, and by the growth of the navy,—none -of which objects could have been accomplished without -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_395" id="Page_395">[Pg 395]</a></span> -the hearty support of the Prime Minister. From the -co-operation of these causes, and the restrictions placed -on neutral trade, the commerce of Great Britain increased -by 65 -<a name="FNanchor_477_477" id="FNanchor_477_477"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_477_477" class="fnanchor">[477]</a> -per cent between 1792 and 1800, while the loss by -capture was less than 2½ per cent on the annual volume of -trade.</p> - -<p>The directly offensive use of Great Britain's maritime -power made by the ministry, in order to repress the -French system of aggression, consisted in throwing back -France upon herself, while at the same time cutting off -her resources. The continental armies which begirt her -on the land side were supported by subsidies; and also -when practicable, as in the Mediterranean, by the co-operation -of the British fleets, to whose influence upon -his Italian campaign in 1796 Bonaparte continually alludes. -To seaward the colonial system of France was -ruined, raw material cut off from her manufactures, her -merchant shipping swept from the sea. In 1797 the chief -of the Bureau of Commerce in France wrote: "The former -sources of our prosperity are either lost or dried up. Our -agricultural, manufacturing, and industrial power is almost -extinct." -<a name="FNanchor_478_478" id="FNanchor_478_478"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_478_478" class="fnanchor">[478]</a> -At the same time, while not denying the -right of neutrals to trade with ports not blockaded, every -restriction that could be placed upon such trade by stringent, -and even forced, interpretations of international law -was rigorously imposed by a navy whose power was irresistible. -Even provisions (and it will be well for Great -Britain of the present day to recall the fact) were claimed -to be contraband of war, on the ground that, in the then -condition of France, when there was a reasonable hope of -starving her into peace, to supply them contributed to -prolong hostilities.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_396" id="Page_396">[Pg 396]</a></span></p> - -<p>So severe was the suffering and poverty caused by this -isolation, that in the moment of his greatest triumph, -immediately after signing the peace of Campo Formio, -which left Great Britain without an ally, in October, -1797, Bonaparte wrote: "Either our government must -destroy the English monarchy, or must expect to be itself -destroyed by the corruption and intrigue of those active -islanders. Let us concentrate all our activity upon the -navy and destroy England." The Directory, conscious -that its navy was paralyzed and that its <i>guerre de course</i>, -pursued since 1795 against British commerce, had not -seriously affected the latter, although 1797 was the year -of its lowest depression, could see no further means of -injuring England except by attacking the neutral carriers -of her wares. Affecting to regard them as accomplices -in Great Britain's crimes against humanity, it procured -from the Convention, in January, 1798, a decree that -"every vessel found at sea, having on board English -merchandise as her cargo, in whole or in part, shall be -declared lawful prize, whosoever shall be the proprietor -of the merchandise, which shall be reputed contraband -for this cause alone, that it comes from England or her -possessions." At the same time orders were issued to confiscate -property of British origin wherever found on shore, -and domiciliary visits were authorized to insure its discovery. -Napoleon was therefore perfectly justified in -declaring in later years that the Directory outlined the -policy of his Continental System, embodied in his Berlin -and Milan decrees of 1806 and 1807.</p> - -<p>To the Directory the attempt thus to destroy British -prosperity worked disaster. To Napoleon it brought -ruin, owing to the greater vigor, wider scope, and longer -duration which he was able to impart to the process. -The aim of his Berlin and Milan decrees, like that of the -Directory, was to undermine British trade by depriving -it of the necessary concurrence of neutral carriers. As -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_397" id="Page_397">[Pg 397]</a></span> -this alone would not be enough, he determined to support -the decrees by excluding Great Britain from her principal -market, to close the entire Continent to all goods -coming from her or her colonies, or even passing through -her ports. For this purpose—to carry out this gigantic -project—edict after edict was issued to France and her -allied countries; for this purpose annexation after annexation -to the empire was made; for this purpose a double -cordon of French troops lined the shores of the Continent -from France to the Baltic; for this purpose British goods -were not only seized but publicly burned throughout his -dominions; for this purpose demands were made upon all -neutral states to exclude British manufactures and colonial -produce; for this purpose the calamitous Spanish war -was incurred; -<a name="FNanchor_479_479" id="FNanchor_479_479"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_479_479" class="fnanchor">[479]</a> -and finally, for this purpose reiterated and -imperious complaints were addressed to the czar on his -failure to enforce the exclusion, and, upon his persistence, -the fatal invasion of Russia followed.</p> - -<p>The justice or wisdom of this course is not here in question. -It is enough to say that it nearly ruined Great -Britain, but entirely ruined Napoleon. The noticeable -point, bearing upon the wisdom of Pitt's military policy, -is that Napoleon was forced into it by that policy, because -England was destroying him and he had no other means -of injuring her. Great Britain's success not only followed, -but was consequent upon steady adherence to the -main features of Pitt's policy. Military writers say that -success on a battle-field is of slight avail if the strategic -line of operations is ill-chosen, and that even a great -defeat may be redeemed if the position has been taken in -accordance with the strategic conditions of the campaign. -This amounts to saying, in non-military language, that -hard blows are useless if not struck on the right spot. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_398" id="Page_398">[Pg 398]</a></span> -Numerous reverses attended the coalitions against France, -although few fell upon Great Britain herself; but none -was fatal because the general policy, begun by Pitt and -continued by his successors, was strategically sound with -reference to the object in view,—namely, "the repression -of that system of aggression" which was the very spirit of -the French Revolution, formulated by the Convention, -adopted by the Directory, inherited and given its full -logical development by Napoleon.</p> - -<p>It is the fashion with the political heirs of Fox, Pitt's -greatest opponent, to draw a marked contrast between the -war which preceded and that which followed the Peace of -Amiens. In the former it is Great Britain which, in a -frenzy of hatred or panic fear toward the French Revolution, -becomes the wanton aggressor, and turns a movement -that, despite some excesses, was on the whole beneficent, -into the stormy torrent of blood that poured over Europe. -In the second war, Napoleon is the great culprit, the incarnate -spirit of aggression, violence, faithlessness, and -insolence; with whom peace was impossible. It is, however, -notorious, and conceded by French writers, that the -French leaders in 1791 and 1792 wanted war on the Continent; -<a name="FNanchor_480_480" id="FNanchor_480_480"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_480_480" class="fnanchor">[480]</a> -the impartial conduct of the British Cabinet was -admitted by the French Government when acknowledging -the recall of the British ambassador six months before -war broke out; -<a name="FNanchor_481_481" id="FNanchor_481_481"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_481_481" class="fnanchor">[481]</a> -the decrees of November 19 and December -15 are before the reader, as is the refusal of the Convention -to give the former a construction conciliatory to -Great Britain; the treaty rights of Holland had been set -aside by the high hand without an attempt at negotiation, -and there can be little doubt that the purpose was already -formed to invade her territory shortly. Despite all this, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_399" id="Page_399">[Pg 399]</a></span> -not Great Britain, but the Republic, declared war. The -treatment, by the Convention and the Directory, of the -lesser states that fell under their power, -<a name="FNanchor_482_482" id="FNanchor_482_482"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_482_482" class="fnanchor">[482]</a> their dealings -with Great Britain, their aggressiveness, insolence, and -bad faith were identical in spirit with the worst that can -be said of Napoleon; the sole difference being that for a -weak, incompetent, and many-headed government was substituted -the iron rule of a single man of incomparable -genius. Scruples were known to neither. The Berlin -and Milan decrees, in which was embodied the Continental -System that led Napoleon to his ruin, were, as he himself -said, but the logical development of the Directory's -decree of January, 1798, -<a name="FNanchor_483_483" id="FNanchor_483_483"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_483_483" class="fnanchor">[483]</a> -against which even the long-suffering -United States of America rebelled. Both measures -struck at Great Britain through the hearts of allies -and of neutrals, for whose rights and welfare, when conflicting -with the course France wished to take, they -showed equal disregard; both were framed in the very -spirit of the first National (Constituent) Assembly, which -set aside institutions and conventions that did not square -with its own ideas of right; which sought justice, as it -saw it, by overleaping law.</p> - -<p>It is, however, far more important to note, and clearly -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_400" id="Page_400">[Pg 400]</a></span> -to apprehend, that both measures were forced upon the -rulers of France by the strategic lines of policy laid down -by the ministry of Pitt. The decree of January, 1798, -followed close upon the rupture of the peace conferences -of Lille, initiated by Pitt in 1797; a rupture brought on -by a display of arrogance and insolence on the part of the -Directory, similar to that shown by it towards the United -States at the same period, that can only be realized by -reading the correspondence, -<a name="FNanchor_484_484" id="FNanchor_484_484"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_484_484" class="fnanchor">[484]</a> and which is now known to -have been due, in part at least, to the hope of a bribe -from the British ministry. -<a name="FNanchor_485_485" id="FNanchor_485_485"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_485_485" class="fnanchor">[485]</a> The Berlin decree, which -formally began the Continental System, was issued in -November, 1806, when Pitt had not been a year in his -grave. Both were forced upon the French leaders by the -evident hopelessness of reaching Great Britain in any -other way, and because her policy of war was hurting -France terribly, while sustaining her own strength. In -other words, Great Britain, by the strategic direction she -gave to her efforts in this war, forced the French spirit of -aggression into a line of action which could not but result -fatally. -<a name="FNanchor_486_486" id="FNanchor_486_486"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_486_486" class="fnanchor">[486]</a> -But for Bonaparte, the result, nearly attained in -1795 and again in 1799, would have followed then; not -even his genius could avert it finally.</p> - -<p>It is related that a leader of antiquity once cried to his -opponent, "If you are the great general you claim to be, -why do you not come down and fight me?" and received -the pertinent reply, "If you are the great general you -say, why do you not <i>make</i> me come down and fight you?" -This was precisely what Great Britain effected. By the -mastery of the sea, by the destruction of the French colonial -system and commerce, by her persistent enmity to -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_401" id="Page_401">[Pg 401]</a></span> -the spirit of aggression which was incarnate in the -French Revolution and personified in Napoleon, by her -own sustained and unshaken strength, she drove the -enemy into the battle-field of the Continental System, -where his final ruin was certain. Under the feeble rule -of the Directory that ruin came on apace; within a year -it was evident that the only gainer by the system was the -foe whom it sought to overthrow, that France herself and -her allies, as well as neutral Powers, were but being -broken down to the profit of Great Britain. Despite the -first failure, there was a plausible attraction about the -measure which led Napoleon, confident in his strength -and genius, to apply it again with the relentless thoroughness -characteristic of his reign. For a time it succeeded, -owing not only to the vigor with which it was used, but -also to Great Britain being exasperated into retaliatory -steps which, by forbidding the trade of neutrals to and -between all the ports thus closed to British commerce, -stopped at its source the contraband trade, which eluded -Napoleon's blockade and kept open the way for British -exports to the Continent.</p> - -<p>The strain, however, was too great to be endured by the -great composite political system which the emperor had -founded, and through which he hoped to exclude his -enemy from every continental market. The privations of -all classes, the sufferings of the poorer, turned men's -hearts from the foreign ruler, who, in the pursuit of aims -which they neither sympathized with nor understood, was -causing them daily ills which they understood but too -well. All were ready to fall away and rise in rebellion -when once the colossus was shaken. The people of Spain, -at one extremity of Europe, revolted in 1808; the Czar of -Russia, at the other, threw down the gauntlet in 1810, by -a proclamation which opened his harbors to all neutral -ships bringing colonial produce, the object of Napoleon's -bitterest reclamations. In the one case the people refused -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_402" id="Page_402">[Pg 402]</a></span> -the ruler put over them to insure a more vigorous enforcement -of the continental blockade; in the other the absolute -monarch declined longer to burden his subjects with -exactions which were ruining them for the same object. -The Spanish outbreak gave England a foothold upon the -Continent at a point most favorable for support by her -maritime strength and most injurious to the emperor, -not only from the character of the country and the people, -but also because it compelled him to divide his forces -between his most remote frontiers. The defection of the -czar made a fatal breach in the line of the continental -blockade, opening a certain though circuitous access for -British goods to all parts of Europe. Incapable of anticipating -defeat and of receding from a purpose once formed, -Napoleon determined upon war with Russia. He, the -great teacher of concentration, proceeded to divide his -forces between the two extremes of Europe. The results -are well known to all.</p> - -<p>It was not by attempting great military operations on -land, but by controlling the sea, and through the sea the -world outside Europe, that both the first and the second -Pitt ensured the triumph of their country in the two contests -where either stood as the representative of the nation. -Mistakes were made by both; it was the elder who offered -to Spain to give Gibraltar for Minorca, which the younger -recovered by force of arms. Mistakes many may be charged -against the conduct of the war under the younger; but, -with one possible exception, they are mistakes of detail -in purely military direction, which cannot invalidate the -fact that the general line of action chosen and followed -was correct. To recur to the simile already borrowed from -military art, the mistakes were tactical, not strategic; nor, -it may be added, to any great degree administrative.</p> - -<p>The possible exception occurred at the beginning of the -war, in the spring and summer of 1793. It may be, as -has been claimed by many, that a march direct upon -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_403" id="Page_403">[Pg 403]</a></span> -Paris at that time by the forces of the Coalition would -have crushed all opposition, and, by reducing the mob of -the capital, have insured the submission of the country. -It may be so; but in criticising the action of the British -ministers, so far as it was theirs, it must be remembered -that not only did men of the highest military reputation -in Europe advise against the movement, but that the -Duke of Brunswick, then second to none in distinction -as a soldier, had tried it and failed a few months before. -For unprofessional men to insist, against the best professional -opinions at their command, is a course whose propriety -or prudence can only be shown by the event,—a -test to which the advance upon Paris, now so freely prescribed -by the wisdom of after-sight, was not brought. -One consideration, generally overlooked, may here be presented. -To attempt so momentous and hazardous an -enterprise, when the leaders to whom its conduct must be -intrusted regard it as unwise, is to incur a great probability -of disaster. Even Bonaparte would not force his plans -upon Moreau, when the latter, in 1800, persisted in -preferring his own. Yet this must statesmen have done, -had they in 1793 ordered their generals to advance on -Paris.</p> - -<p>Once lost, the opportunity, if such it were, did not -recur. It depended purely upon destroying the resistance -of France before it had time to organize. Thenceforward -there remained to encounter, not the policy of a court, -playing its game upon the chess-board of war, with -knights and pawns, castles and armies, but a nation in -arms, breathing a fury and inspired by passions which -only physical exhaustion could repress. Towards that -exhaustion Great Britain could on the land side contribute -effectually only by means of allies, and this she did. On -the side of the sea, her own sphere of action, there were -two things she needed to do. The first was to sustain her -own strength, by fostering, widening, and guarding the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_404" id="Page_404">[Pg 404]</a></span> -workings of her commercial system; the second was to -cut France off from the same sources of strength and life. -Both were most effectually accomplished,—not, as Macaulay -asserts, by the able administration of Earl Spencer -(whose merit is not disputed), but by the general policy -of the ministry in the extension of the colonial system, in -the wise attention paid to the support of British commerce -in all its details, and in the extraordinary augmentation -of the navy. Between 1754 and 1760, the period embracing -the most brilliant triumphs of the elder Pitt, the -British navy increased by 33 per cent. Between 1792 -and 1800, under his son, the increase was 82 per cent. -How entirely the military management and direction of -this mighty force depended upon the sea-officers, and not -upon the statesman, when a civilian was at the head of the -Admiralty, will be evident to any one studying closely the -slackness of the Channel fleet immediately under the eye -of Earl Spencer, or the paltry dispositions made in particular -emergencies like the Irish invasion of 1796, and -contrasting these with the vigor manifested at that very -moment under Jervis in the Mediterranean, or later, in -the admirable operations of the same officer in command of -the Channel fleet.</p> - -<p>Few indeed are the statesmen who are not thus dependent -upon professional subordinates. Pitt was no exception. -He was not a general or an admiral, nor does he -appear so to have considered himself; but he realized perfectly -where Great Britain's strength lay, and where the -sphere of her efforts. By that understanding he guided -her movements; and in the final triumph wrought by the -spirit of the British nation over the spirit of the French -Revolution, the greatest share cannot justly be denied to -the chief who, in the long struggle against wind and tide, -forced often to swerve from the direct course he would -have followed by unforeseen dangers that rose around the -ship in her passage through unknown seas, never forgot -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_405" id="Page_405">[Pg 405]</a></span> -the goal "Security," upon which from the first his will -was set. Fit indeed it was that he should drop at his -post just when Trafalgar had been won and Austerlitz -lost. That striking contrast of substantial and, in fact, -decisive success with bewildering but evanescent disaster, -symbolized well his troubled career, as it superficially -appears. As the helm escaped his dying hands, all -seemed lost, but in truth the worst was passed. "The -pilot had weathered the storm."</p> - -<p>The death of Pitt was followed by the formation of a -ministry of somewhat composite character, centring round -his relative and former colleague, Lord Grenville, and his -life-long rival, Fox. This held office but for fourteen -months; a period long enough for it to afford Napoleon -the pretext for his Berlin decree, but not sufficient to -impress any radical change upon the main lines of policy -laid down by Pitt. Upon its fall in March, 1807, his -devoted personal friends and political followers succeeded -to power. Confronted almost immediately by the threatening -union between the empires of the East and West, -of which the known, if concealed, purpose was to divide -between France and Russia the control of the Continent, -and to subdue Great Britain also by commercial exhaustion, -the ministry, both necessarily and by tradition, opposed -to this combination the policy transmitted to them -by their great leader. Colonial enterprises were multiplied, -until it could be said of colonies, as the French -Directory had before sorrowfully confessed concerning -shipping, that not one was left under a flag hostile to -Great Britain. The navy, expanding to its greatest -numerical force in 1808, was maintained in equal -strength, if in somewhat diminished numbers, up to the -termination of the struggle. While unable to prevent the -material growth of the French navy by ship-building -carried on in its ports, Great Britain continued to impede -its progress and cut off its supplies by the close watch -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_406" id="Page_406">[Pg 406]</a></span> -maintained over the French coast, by confining its fleets -to their harbors,—and so shutting them off from the one -drill ground, the sea,—and finally by frustrating Napoleon's -project of increasing his own power by violently -seizing the vessels of smaller continental states.</p> - -<p>The secure tenure of the great common and highway -of commerce—the sea—was thus provided for. The -enemy's navy was neutralized, his bases abroad cut off, -his possessions became the markets as well as the sources -of British trade. It was not enough, however, for commerce, -that its transit should be comparatively safe. Its -operations of exchange needed both materials and markets, -both producers and consumers. From these, as is -known, Napoleon sought to exclude it by the Continental -System, which through the co-operation of Russia he -thought could be rendered effective. To this again the -ministry of Perceval and Canning opposed the Orders in -Council, tempered by the license system, with the double -object of prolonging the resistance of Great Britain and -sapping that of her enemy; measures which but reproduced, -on a vaster scale, the Rule of 1756, with the modifications -introduced by Pitt, in 1798, for the same ends.</p> - -<p>The question thus resolved itself, as has before been -perhaps too often said, into a conflict of endurance,—which -nation could live the longest in this deadly -grapple. This brings us back again face to face with the -great consideration: Was the struggle which began in -1793 one to be solved by a brilliant display of generalship, -shattering the organized forces of an ordinary -enemy, and with it crushing the powers of resistance in -the state? Or had it not rather its origin in the fury of -a nation, against which all coercion except that of exhaustion -is fruitless? The aims, the tendencies, the -excitement of the French people had risen to a pitch, and -had made demands, which defied repression by any mere -machinery or organization, however skilfully framed or -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_407" id="Page_407">[Pg 407]</a></span> -directed. When the movement of a nation depends -upon—nay, is the simple evidence of—a profound emotion -permeating each individual of the mass, the mighty -impulse, from its very diffusion, has not those vital -centres of power, the destruction of which paralyzes the -whole. Not till the period of passion—necessarily brief, -but for the time resistless—has given place to the organization -to which all social movement tends, is a people -found to have, as the tyrant of antiquity wished, a single -neck to be severed by a blow.</p> - -<p>The frenzy of the French nation had spent itself, the -period of organization had set in, when Bonaparte appeared -upon the scene; but, as the tension of popular -emotion slackened, there had not been found, in the imperfect -organization which sought to replace it, the power -to bear the burden of the state. No longer able to depend -upon a homogeneous movement of the millions, but only -upon the efficient working of the ordinary machinery of -civil government and armies, in her case most imperfectly -developed, France now offered to the attacks of her enemies -those vital points, with which, when crushed, resistance -ceases. Military reverses and exhaustion by bad -government brought her in 1795, and again in 1799, to -her last gasp. At both epochs Bonaparte saved her.</p> - -<p>The great captain and organizer not only brought victory -with him and restored the machinery of government; -he supplied also a centre around which popular enthusiasm -and confidence might once more rally. He became -not only the exponent of national unity, but in a very real -sense the embodiment of those aspirations and aggressive -tendencies, which in the first days of the Revolution had -bound Frenchmen together as one man, but had afterwards -evaporated and frittered away for want of that definiteness -of aim and sagacious direction which only a great -leader can impart. Under his skilful manipulation the -lofty sentiments of the early revolutionists became catchwords, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_408" id="Page_408">[Pg 408]</a></span> -which assured his hold upon the imaginations and -enthusiasm of the people, again swayed as one man to -follow him in his career of aggression. Metternich well -said that Bonaparte was to him simply the incarnation -of the Revolution. -<a name="FNanchor_487_487" id="FNanchor_487_487"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_487_487" class="fnanchor">[487]</a></p> - -<p>It was with these two phases of one and the same condition -that Europe had to deal between 1793 and 1814. -In the one instance a people unified by a common passion -and common aims, in the other the same people concentrated -into a common action by submission to the will of a -sovereign, apparently resistless in the council as in the -field. It is true that the affections of his subjects soon -ceased to follow him, except in the armies by whose power -he ruled, but the result is the same. All the energies of -the nation are summed up in a single overpowering impulse,—at -first spontaneous, afterwards artificial,—to -which during the first half of Napoleon's career was -given a guidance of matchless energy and wisdom.</p> - -<p>Such a combination is for the time irresistible, as the -continent of Europe proved during long and weary years. -Absolute power, concentrated force, central position, extraordinary -sagacity and energy, all united to assure to -Napoleon the dazzling successes which are matters of history. -The duration and the permanent results of this -startling career depended, however, upon the staying -power of the French nation and upon the steadfastness of -the resistance. Upon the Continent, the latter in its -actuality ceased. Potentially it remained,—men's hearts -swelled to bursting under the tyranny they endured; but -before the power and the genius of the great conqueror -outward rebellion shrank away. States dared not trust -each other,—they could not act together; and so men went -silently in the bitterness of their spirits.</p> - -<p>There remained one small group of islands, close on the -flank of the would-be ruler of the world, with a population -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_409" id="Page_409">[Pg 409]</a></span> -numbering little more than half that of his immediate -dominions, whose inhabitants deeply sympathized -with sufferings and oppression they were powerless -directly to relieve. The resistance they had offered to -the aggressive fury of the Revolution they continued to -oppose to its successor and representative; but it was not -by direct action in the field, but only by operations -aimed to abridge the resources and endurance of France, -that they could look forward to a possibility of success. -For seven years went on this final silent strife, whose -outlines have been traced in the preceding chapter of this -work. During its continuance Great Britain herself, while -escaping the political oppression and national humiliation -undergone by the continental peoples, drank deep -of the cup of suffering. Her strength wasted visibly; but -the mere fact of her endurance and persistence compelled -her enemy to efforts more exhausting, to measures more -fatal, than those forced upon herself. And, while thus -subjected to a greater strain, Napoleon was by Great -Britain cut off from that greatest of all sources of -renewing vitality—the Sea.</p> - -<p>The true function of Great Britain in this long struggle -can scarcely be recognized unless there be a clear appreciation -of the fact that a really great national movement, -like the French Revolution, or a really great military -power under an incomparable general, like the French -empire under Napoleon, is not to be brought to terms -by ordinary military successes, which simply destroy the -organized force opposed.</p> - -<p>Of the latter, the protracted and not wholly hopeless -resistance, which in 1813 and 1814 succeeded even the -great Russian catastrophe, is a signal instance; while to -subvert such a power, wielded by such a man, by any -reverse less tremendous than it then underwent, is hopeless. -Two Napoleons do not co-exist. In the former case, -on the other hand, the tangible something, the decisive -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_410" id="Page_410">[Pg 410]</a></span> -point against which military effort can be directed, is -wanting. Of this the struggle between the North and -South in the American Civil War affords a conspicuous -example. Few, probably, would now maintain that the -capture of Richmond in the first year of the war, when -the enthusiasm of the Southern people was at its height, -their fighting force undiminished, their hopes undimmed -by the bitter disappointments of a four years' struggle, -would have had any decisive effect upon the high-spirited -race. Positions far more important fell without a sign of -such result. No man could then have put his finger here, -or there, and said, "This is the key-stone of resistance;" -for in the high and stern feeling of the moment resistance -was not here nor there, but everywhere.</p> - -<p>So was it in the early flush of the French Revolution. -The "On to Paris" of 1793 would probably have had no -more decisive results than the "On to Richmond" of 1861, -had it been successful. Not till enthusiasm has waned -before sorrow, and strength failed under exhaustion, does -popular impulse, when deep and universal, acquiesce in -the logic of war. To such exhaustion France was brought -when Bonaparte took the helm. By his organizing genius -he restored her military strength, the material of which -still remained, economized such resources as the wastefulness -of preceding governments had left, and above all -secured for her a further power of endurance by drawing -upon the life-blood of surrounding nations. So exhaustion -was for the time postponed; but, if the course of aggression -which Bonaparte had inherited from the Revolution -was to continue, there were needed, not the resources of -the Continent only, but of the world. There was needed -also a diminution of ultimate resistance below the stored-up -aggressive strength of France; otherwise, however -procrastinated, the time must come when the latter -should fail.</p> - -<p>On both these points Great Britain withstood Napoleon. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_411" id="Page_411">[Pg 411]</a></span> -She shut him off from the world, and by the same act prolonged -her own powers of endurance beyond his power of -aggression. This in the retrospect of history was the -function of Great Britain in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic -period; and that the successive ministries of Pitt -and his followers pursued the course best fitted, upon -the whole, to discharge that function, is their justification -to posterity. It is the glory of Pitt's genius that as -he discovered the object, "Security," so likewise he -foresaw the means, Exhaustion, by which alone the -French propaganda of aggression would be brought to -pause. The eloquent derision poured upon his predictions -of failure from financial exhaustion, from expenditure of -resources, from slackening of enthusiasm, recoils from the -apprehension of the truth. He saw clearly the line of -Great Britain's action, he foresaw the direction of events, -he foretold the issue. How long the line would be, how -the course of events would be retarded, how protracted the -issue, he could not foretell, because no man could foresee -the supreme genius of Napoleon Bonaparte.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> - -See, for instance, his letter to Lady Hamilton, Oct. 3, 1798 (Disp., vol. -iii. p. 140), which is but one of many similar expressions in his correspondence.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> - -Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 177.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> - -In an entirely open country, without natural obstacles, there are few or -none of those strategic points, by occupying which in a central position an inferior -force is able to multiply its action against the divided masses of the -enemy. On the other hand, in a very broken country, such as Switzerland, the -number of important strategic points, passes, heads of valleys, bridges, etc., -are so multiplied, that either some must be left unoccupied, or the defenders -lose, by dissemination, the advantage which concentration upon one or two -controlling centres usually confers.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> -See ante, vol. i. p. <a href="#Page_313">313</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> - -It is said that the old marshal on receiving these orders cried: "This is -the way armies are ruined."</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> - -Jomini, Guerres de la Rév. Fran., livre xv. p. 124. Martin, Hist. de -France depuis 1789, vol. iii. p. 50. It was just at this moment that Nelson -sent a division to the Gulf of Genoa to co-operate with Suwarrow. (Nels. -Disp., vol. iii. p. 431.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> - -The phrase is that of Thiers. Hist. de la Rév., vol. x. p. 353.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> - -A curious evidence of the insecurity of the highways is afforded by an -ordinance issued by Bonaparte a year after he became First Consul (Jan. 7, -1801), that no regular diligence should travel without carrying a corporal -and four privates, with muskets and twenty rounds, and in addition, at night, -two mounted gendarmes. If specie to the value of over 50,000 francs were -carried, there must be four gendarmes by day and night. (Corr. de Nap., -vol. vi. p. 697.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> -See <i>post</i>, Chapter XVII.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> -Speech of February 18, 1801.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> -Thiers, Cons. et Empire, vol. i., p. 332.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> -See ante, p, 251.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 410.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> -Ibid., vol. vi. p. 497.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> -"Voyant bien," says M. Thiers, Bonaparte's panegyrist, "que Malta ne -pouvait pas tenir longtemps." (Cons. et Emp., vol. ii. p. 92.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 498.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 520.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> -See vol. i. pp. 249, 256.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 738, Jan. 21, 1801.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> -Contrast Bonaparte's reliance upon the aggregate numbers of Baltic -navies with Nelson's professional opinion when about to fight them. "During -the Council of War (March 31, 1801) certain difficulties were started by -some of the members relative to each of the three Powers we should have to -engage, either in succession or united, in those seas. The number of the Russians -was in particular represented as formidable. Lord Nelson kept pacing -the cabin, mortified at everything which savored either of alarm or irresolution. -When the above remark was applied to the Swedes, he sharply observed, -'The more numerous the better;' and when to the Russians, he -repeatedly said, 'So much the better; I wish they were twice as many,—the -easier the victory, depend on it.' He alluded, as he afterwards explained in -private, to the total want of tactique among the Northern fleets." (Col. -Stewart's Narrative; Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 301.) -</p> -<p> -James, who was a careful investigator, estimates the allied Russian, Swedish, -and Danish navies in the Baltic at fifty-two sail, of which not over forty-one -were in condition for service, instead of eighty-eight as represented by some -writers. "It must have been a very happy combination of circumstances," he -adds, "that could have assembled in one spot twenty-five of those forty-one; -and against that twenty-five of three different nations, all mere novices in -naval tactics, eighteen, or, with Nelson to command, fifteen British sail were -more than a match." (Nav. Hist., vol. iii. p. 43; ed. 1878.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 747. To Talleyrand, Jan. 27, 1801.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> -Nelson's Letters and Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 295.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_23_23" id="Footnote_23_23"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> -While this work was going through the press, the author was gratified -to find in the life of the late distinguished admiral Sir William Parker an -anecdote of Nelson, which, as showing the military ideas of that great sea-officer, -is worth a dozen of the "go straight at them" stories which pass current -as embodying his precepts. "Throughout the month of October, 1804, -Toulon was frequently reconnoitred, and the frigates 'Phoebe' and 'Amazon' -were ordered to cruise together. Previous to their going away Lord -Nelson gave to Captains Capel and Parker several injunctions, in case they -should get an opportunity of attacking two of the French frigates, which now -got under weigh more frequently. <i>The principal one was</i> that they should -not each single out and attack an opponent, but 'that both should endeavor -together to take <i>one frigate</i>; if successful, chase the other; but, if you do not -take the second, still you have won a victory and your country will gain a -frigate.' Then half laughing, and half snappishly, he said kindly to them as -he wished them good-by, 'I daresay you consider yourselves a couple of fine -fellows, and when you get away from me will do nothing of the sort, but -think yourselves wiser than I am!'" ("The Last of Nelson's Captains," by -Admiral Sir Augustus Phillimore, K. C. B., London, 1891, p. 122.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_24_24" id="Footnote_24_24"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> -Nels. Disp., vol. iv. p. 355. See also a very emphatic statement of his -views on the campaign, in a letter to Mr. Vansittart, p. 367.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_25_25" id="Footnote_25_25"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> -Nelson's Disp., April 9, 1801, vol. iv. pp. 339 and 341.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_26_26" id="Footnote_26_26"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> -The Danes were moored with their heads to the southward.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_27_27" id="Footnote_27_27"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_27_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> -If Nelson had an <i>arrière pensée</i> in sending the flag, he never admitted -it, before or after, to friend or foe. "Many of my friends," he wrote a month -after the battle, "thought it a <i>ruse de guerre</i> and not quite justifiable. Very -few attribute it to the cause that I felt, and which I trust in God I shall retain -to the last moment,—<i>humanity</i>." He then enlarges upon the situation, and -says that the wounded Danes in the prizes were receiving half the shot fired -by the shore batteries. (Nels. Disp., vol. iv., p. 360.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_28_28" id="Footnote_28_28"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_28_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> -April 20, 1801. Nels. Disp., vol. iv. p. 355, note.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_29_29" id="Footnote_29_29"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_29_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> -Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. ii. p. 43, 1st edition.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_30_30" id="Footnote_30_30"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_30_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> -Having destroyed Copenhagen, we had done our worst, and not much -nearer being friends.—<i>Nels. Disp.</i>, vol. iv. p. 361.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_31_31" id="Footnote_31_31"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_31_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> -The second embargo was laid on Nov. 7, 1800, for the sole purpose of -enforcing the surrender of Malta to Russia. (Annual Register, 1800; State -Papers, p. 253.) It antedated by six weeks the declaration of Armed Neutrality, -by which the other powers, on the plea of neutral rights, agreed to -arm. (Ibid., p. 260.) In fact, the other powers urged upon Great Britain that -the Russian sequestration being on account of Malta, they had no share in it, -and so were not subjects for retaliation; ignoring that they had chosen that -moment to come to Russia's support.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_32_32" id="Footnote_32_32"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_32_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> -Annual Register, 1801; State Papers, p. 246.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_33_33" id="Footnote_33_33"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_33_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> -Nels. Disp., vol. iv., pp. 349, 352.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_34_34" id="Footnote_34_34"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_34_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 349; also see p. 379.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_35_35" id="Footnote_35_35"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_35_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> -Ibid., vol. iv. p. 416.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_36_36" id="Footnote_36_36"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_36_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> -Nels. Disp., vol. iv. p. 373.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_37_37" id="Footnote_37_37"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_37_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> -For the important bearings of this stipulation, which was made as an -additional and explanatory declaration to the main convention (Annual -Register, 1801; State Papers, p. 217), see <i>post</i>, Chapter XVI. It was a matter -in which Russia, not being a carrier, had no interest.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_38_38" id="Footnote_38_38"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_38_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> -For instance, Thiers, H. Martin, and Lanfrey.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_39_39" id="Footnote_39_39"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_39_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap. vol. vii. p. 25.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_40_40" id="Footnote_40_40"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_40_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap. vol. vii. p. 47.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_41_41" id="Footnote_41_41"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_41_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> -For full particulars of Bonaparte's views for the ships in Brest, which -then contained the large body of Spaniards brought back by Bruix the -previous August, see Corr. de Nap. vol. vi. pp. 181, 186. It must be -remembered that there was then practically no French line-of-battle force in -the Mediterranean.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_42_42" id="Footnote_42_42"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_42_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. pp. 262, 263.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_43_43" id="Footnote_43_43"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_43_43"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> -The advantage of the close watch is also shown by the perplexity arising -when an enemy's squadron did escape. In this case, seven ships-of-the-line -were detached from the Channel fleet in chase of Ganteaume, but "owing to -lack of information" they were sent to the West Indies instead of the -Mediterranean. (James, vol. iii. p. 73.) The latter was sufficiently controlled -by Keith with seven sail-of-the-line in the Levant, and Warren with -five before Cadiz, to which he joined two more at Minorca.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_44_44" id="Footnote_44_44"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_44_44"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> -See <i>ante</i>, vol. i. p. 68, for particulars.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_45_45" id="Footnote_45_45"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_45_45"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> -In the above the attempt has been merely to summarize the rapid succession -of events, and the orders issuing from Bonaparte's intensely active -mind to meet the varying situations. Reference may be made by the student -to his correspondence, vol. vi. pp. 719, 729, 745; vol. vii. pp. 4, 24-26, 69-73, -125, 144, 164, 197, 198.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_46_46" id="Footnote_46_46"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_46_46"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> -This ship, the "St. Antoine," was one of those ceded to France by Spain.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_47_47" id="Footnote_47_47"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_47_47"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> -Ross's Life of Saumarez, vol. ii. p. 21.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_48_48" id="Footnote_48_48"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_48_48"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> -March 2, 1801. Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 72.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_49_49" id="Footnote_49_49"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_49_49"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> -The treaty was signed June 6, and ratified June 16. (Ann. Reg. 1801; -State Papers, p. 351.) Bonaparte received his copy June 15. (Corr. de Nap., -vol. vii. p. 215.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_50_50" id="Footnote_50_50"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_50_50"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 256.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_51_51" id="Footnote_51_51"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_51_51"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 266.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_52_52" id="Footnote_52_52"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_52_52"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> -See ante, p. <a href="#Page_60">60</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_53_53" id="Footnote_53_53"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_53_53"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> -Ann. Reg. 1801; State Papers, p. 257.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_54_54" id="Footnote_54_54"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_54_54"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> -Paul I. had particularly held to the preservation of Naples and the restitution -of Piedmont to the king of Sardinia. On April 12 the first consul heard -of Paul's death, and the same day issued an order making Piedmont a military -division of France. This was purposely antedated to April 2. (Corr. de Nap., -vol. vii. p. 147.) Talleyrand was notified that this was a first, though tentative, -step to incorporation. If the Prussian minister remonstrated, he was to -reply that France had not discussed the affairs of Italy with the king of -Prussia. (Ibid., p. 153.) Alexander was civilly told that Paul's interest in the -Italian princes was considered to be personal, not political. (Ibid., p. 169.) -The Russian ambassador, however, a month later haughtily reminded Talleyrand -that his mission depended upon the "kings of Sardinia and the Two -Sicilies being again put in possession of the states which they possessed before -the irruption of the French troops into Italy." (Ann. Reg., 1801; State -Papers, pp. 340-342) Liguria (Genoa) was also made a military division of -France by order dated April 18. (Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 162.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_55_55" id="Footnote_55_55"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_55_55"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> -While refusing this in his instructions to the French negotiator, the latter -was informed he might yield it, if necessary. (Corr. de Nap., vol. vii., -pp. 255-258.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_56_56" id="Footnote_56_56"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_56_56"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 323.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_57_57" id="Footnote_57_57"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_57_57"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> -Parliamentary History, vol. xxxvi. p. 47.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_58_58" id="Footnote_58_58"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_58_58"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> -Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. iii. p. 377.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_59_59" id="Footnote_59_59"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_59_59"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> -Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. i. p. 396.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_60_60" id="Footnote_60_60"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_60_60"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> -Speech of Nov. 3, 1801.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_61_61" id="Footnote_61_61"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_61_61"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> -Annual Register 1801, p. 280.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_62_62" id="Footnote_62_62"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_62_62"><span class="label">[62]</span></a> -See ante, p. <a href="#Page_70">70</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_63_63" id="Footnote_63_63"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_63_63"><span class="label">[63]</span></a> -Am. State Papers, vol. ii. pp. 509, 511.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_64_64" id="Footnote_64_64"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_64_64"><span class="label">[64]</span></a> -Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 511.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_65_65" id="Footnote_65_65"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_65_65"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> -The slightest delay under these circumstances is very prejudicial, and -may be of great consequence to our squadrons and naval expeditions.—<i>Corr. -de Nap.</i>, March 11, 1802.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_66_66" id="Footnote_66_66"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_66_66"><span class="label">[66]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., March 12, 1802, vol. vii. p. 522.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_67_67" id="Footnote_67_67"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_67_67"><span class="label">[67]</span></a> -Ibid., April 3, 1802, vol. vii. p. 543.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_68_68" id="Footnote_68_68"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_68_68"><span class="label">[68]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., July 1, 1802, vol. vii. p. 641.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_69_69" id="Footnote_69_69"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_69_69"><span class="label">[69]</span></a> -Ibid., April 13, 1801, vol. vii. p. 153.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_70_70" id="Footnote_70_70"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_70_70"><span class="label">[70]</span></a> -Ibid., April 18, 1801, vol. vii. p. 162.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_71_71" id="Footnote_71_71"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_71_71"><span class="label">[71]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., August 2, 1802, vol. vii. p. 696.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_72_72" id="Footnote_72_72"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_72_72"><span class="label">[72]</span></a> -Ibid., vol. vii. pp. 528, 544.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_73_73" id="Footnote_73_73"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_73_73"><span class="label">[73]</span></a> -Ibid., vol. vii. p. 578.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_74_74" id="Footnote_74_74"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_74_74"><span class="label">[74]</span></a> -Decree of Nov. 19, 1792.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_75_75" id="Footnote_75_75"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_75_75"><span class="label">[75]</span></a> -Thiers, Cons. et Emp., livre xv. p. 38.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_76_76" id="Footnote_76_76"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_76_76"><span class="label">[76]</span></a> -Ibid., livre xv. pp. 50, 51.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_77_77" id="Footnote_77_77"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_77_77"><span class="label">[77]</span></a> -Ibid., xvi. p. 234.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_78_78" id="Footnote_78_78"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_78_78"><span class="label">[78]</span></a> -Note Verbale. Remonstrance addressed to the French government. -(Ann. Reg. 1802; State Papers, p. 675.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_79_79" id="Footnote_79_79"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_79_79"><span class="label">[79]</span></a> -Lord Hawkesbury's speech; Parl. Hist., vol. xxxvi. p. 971.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_80_80" id="Footnote_80_80"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_80_80"><span class="label">[80]</span></a> -Parl. Hist., vol. xxxvi. p. 1380.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_81_81" id="Footnote_81_81"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_81_81"><span class="label">[81]</span></a> -Annual Register, 1803, p. 681.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_82_82" id="Footnote_82_82"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_82_82"><span class="label">[82]</span></a> -Secret Instructions to Lord Whitworth; Yonge's Life of Lord Liverpool, -vol. i. p. 93.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_83_83" id="Footnote_83_83"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_83_83"><span class="label">[83]</span></a> -Adams, Hist. of the United States, 1801-1817, vol. ii. pp. 13-21.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_84_84" id="Footnote_84_84"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_84_84"><span class="label">[84]</span></a> -The San Domingo expedition cost the lives of over twenty-five thousand -French soldiers.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_85_85" id="Footnote_85_85"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_85_85"><span class="label">[85]</span></a> -The British ambassador in Paris reached the same conclusion from the -instructions sent by Talleyrand to the French envoy in London. "It appears -from this note that this government is not desirous to proceed to extremities; -that is to say, it is not prepared to do so." (March 18; Parl. Hist., vol. xxxvi. -p. 1315.) The United States minister in Paris also wrote, March 24, "Here -there is an earnest and sincere desire to avoid war, as well in the government -as the people." (Am. State Papers, ii. 549.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_86_86" id="Footnote_86_86"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_86_86"><span class="label">[86]</span></a> -Instructions to Duroc, March 12, 1803, Corr. de Nap., vol. viii. pp. 307-311. -It is noteworthy that these instructions were issued the same day that -was received in Paris information of the king's message to Parliament of -March 8, that "in consequence of military preparations in the ports of France -and Holland he had adopted additional measures of precaution." Two days -later the militia was called out.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_87_87" id="Footnote_87_87"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_87_87"><span class="label">[87]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. viii. p. 308.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_88_88" id="Footnote_88_88"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_88_88"><span class="label">[88]</span></a> -Parl. Hist., vol. xxxvi. p. 1293.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_89_89" id="Footnote_89_89"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_89_89"><span class="label">[89]</span></a> -Speech of May 23, 1803.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_90_90" id="Footnote_90_90"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_90_90"><span class="label">[90]</span></a> -Naval Chronicle, vol. ix. pp. 243, 247, 329, 330, 332, 491.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_91_91" id="Footnote_91_91"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_91_91"><span class="label">[91]</span></a> -Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 553.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_92_92" id="Footnote_92_92"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_92_92"><span class="label">[92]</span></a> -Ibid.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_93_93" id="Footnote_93_93"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_93_93"><span class="label">[93]</span></a> -In case of war, it was the purpose of the British government to send an -expedition to occupy New Orleans, as it did afterwards in 1814. (Am. State -papers, vol. ii. pp. 551, 557.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_94_94" id="Footnote_94_94"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_94_94"><span class="label">[94]</span></a> -Napoleon to Talleyrand; Corr. de Nap., May 13, 1803.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_95_95" id="Footnote_95_95"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_95_95"><span class="label">[95]</span></a> -Thiers, Consulat et Empire, livre xx. p. 182.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_96_96" id="Footnote_96_96"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_96_96"><span class="label">[96]</span></a> -The French republic had devoured under the form of assignats an -immense amount of national property.—<span class="sc">Thiers</span>: <i>Cons. et Emp.</i>, livre xvii. -p. 377.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_97_97" id="Footnote_97_97"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_97_97"><span class="label">[97]</span></a> -"Holland," says Thiers, "would have wished to remain neutral; but the -first consul had taken a resolution, <i>whose justice cannot be denied</i>, to make -every maritime nation aid in our strife against Great Britain." (Cons. et -Emp., livre xvii. p. 383.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_98_98" id="Footnote_98_98"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_98_98"><span class="label">[98]</span></a> -Metternich's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 48, note.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_99_99" id="Footnote_99_99"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_99_99"><span class="label">[99]</span></a> -Chénier's Vie du Maréchal Davout, Paris, 1866.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_100_100" id="Footnote_100_100"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_100_100"><span class="label">[100]</span></a> -See Naval Chronicle, vol. x. pp. 508, 510; vol. xi. p. 81. Nelson's Dispatches, -vol. v. p. 438.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_101_101" id="Footnote_101_101"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_101_101"><span class="label">[101]</span></a> -Pellew's Life of Lord Sidmouth, vol. ii. p. 237.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_102_102" id="Footnote_102_102"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_102_102"><span class="label">[102]</span></a> -Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 452.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_103_103" id="Footnote_103_103"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_103_103"><span class="label">[103]</span></a> -Parl. Debates, March 15, 1804.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_104_104" id="Footnote_104_104"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_104_104"><span class="label">[104]</span></a> -Mémoires du Duc de Raguse, vol. ii. p. 212.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_105_105" id="Footnote_105_105"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_105_105"><span class="label">[105]</span></a> -Nelson's Disp. and Letters, vol. iv pp. 444-447.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_106_106" id="Footnote_106_106"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_106_106"><span class="label">[106]</span></a> -Nelson's Disp., vol. iv. p 500.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_107_107" id="Footnote_107_107"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_107_107"><span class="label">[107]</span></a> -James, Nav. Hist., vol. iii. p. 212 (ed. 1878).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_108_108" id="Footnote_108_108"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_108_108"><span class="label">[108]</span></a> -See Cobbett's Reg., vol. v. pp. 442, 443, for some very sensible remarks -on Pitt's attack, written by Cobbett himself.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_109_109" id="Footnote_109_109"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_109_109"><span class="label">[109]</span></a> -Stanhope's Pitt, vol. iv. p. 94.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_110_110" id="Footnote_110_110"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_110_110"><span class="label">[110]</span></a> -Parl. Debates, 1804, p. 892.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_111_111" id="Footnote_111_111"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_111_111"><span class="label">[111]</span></a> -Nels. Disp., vol. v. p. 283.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_112_112" id="Footnote_112_112"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_112_112"><span class="label">[112]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 306.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_113_113" id="Footnote_113_113"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_113_113"><span class="label">[113]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 174. The following references also show conditions of Nelson's -ships: vol. v. pp. 179, 211, 306, 307, 319, 334; vol. vi. pp. 38, 84, 99, -100, 103, 134, 158.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_114_114" id="Footnote_114_114"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_114_114"><span class="label">[114]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. viii. p. 657.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_115_115" id="Footnote_115_115"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_115_115"><span class="label">[115]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. ix. p. 168.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_116_116" id="Footnote_116_116"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_116_116"><span class="label">[116]</span></a> -Nels. Disp., vol. v. pp. 115, 136.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_117_117" id="Footnote_117_117"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_117_117"><span class="label">[117]</span></a> -"It is at best but a guess," to use his own words, "and the world attaches -wisdom to him that guesses right." (Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 193.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_118_118" id="Footnote_118_118"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_118_118"><span class="label">[118]</span></a> -See Nels. Disp., vol. v. pp. 179, 185, 247, 309, 374.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_119_119" id="Footnote_119_119"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_119_119"><span class="label">[119]</span></a> -Nels. Disp., vol. v. p. 309.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_120_120" id="Footnote_120_120"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_120_120"><span class="label">[120]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 374.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_121_121" id="Footnote_121_121"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_121_121"><span class="label">[121]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 388.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_122_122" id="Footnote_122_122"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_122_122"><span class="label">[122]</span></a> -Ibid., pp. 405, 411.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_123_123" id="Footnote_123_123"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_123_123"><span class="label">[123]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 498.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_124_124" id="Footnote_124_124"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_124_124"><span class="label">[124]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 411.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_125_125" id="Footnote_125_125"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_125_125"><span class="label">[125]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 300.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_126_126" id="Footnote_126_126"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_126_126"><span class="label">[126]</span></a> -Nels. Disp., vol. v. p. 306.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_127_127" id="Footnote_127_127"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_127_127"><span class="label">[127]</span></a> -Ibid., pp. 253, 254.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_128_128" id="Footnote_128_128"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_128_128"><span class="label">[128]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 438.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_129_129" id="Footnote_129_129"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_129_129"><span class="label">[129]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 388.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_130_130" id="Footnote_130_130"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_130_130"><span class="label">[130]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 395.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_131_131" id="Footnote_131_131"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_131_131"><span class="label">[131]</span></a> -See Nels. Disp., vol. v. pp. 145, 162, 413; vol. vi. pp. 84, 328, 329.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_132_132" id="Footnote_132_132"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_132_132"><span class="label">[132]</span></a> -Corr. de. Nap., vol. ix. p. 226.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_133_133" id="Footnote_133_133"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_133_133"><span class="label">[133]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. ix. p. 475.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_134_134" id="Footnote_134_134"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_134_134"><span class="label">[134]</span></a> -Ibid., p 513.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_135_135" id="Footnote_135_135"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_135_135"><span class="label">[135]</span></a> -Ibid., Sept. 12, 1804.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_136_136" id="Footnote_136_136"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_136_136"><span class="label">[136]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. ix. p. 700, Sept. 29, 1804.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_137_137" id="Footnote_137_137"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_137_137"><span class="label">[137]</span></a> -The former Spanish part of the island was still in the hands of France.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_138_138" id="Footnote_138_138"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_138_138"><span class="label">[138]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., Sept. 27 and 29, 1804.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_139_139" id="Footnote_139_139"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_139_139"><span class="label">[139]</span></a> -For Bonaparte's attitude toward Spain, see two letters to Talleyrand, -Aug. 14 and 16, 1803; Corr. de Nap. vol. viii. pp. 580-585.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_140_140" id="Footnote_140_140"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_140_140"><span class="label">[140]</span></a> -Signed Oct. 19, 1803. (Combate Naval de Trafalgar, by D. José? de -Couto, p. 79.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_141_141" id="Footnote_141_141"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_141_141"><span class="label">[141]</span></a> -Parl. Debates, 1805, vol. iii. p. 70.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_142_142" id="Footnote_142_142"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_142_142"><span class="label">[142]</span></a> -Parl. Debates, 1805, vol. iii. p. 72.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_143_143" id="Footnote_143_143"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_143_143"><span class="label">[143]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 372.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_144_144" id="Footnote_144_144"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_144_144"><span class="label">[144]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 81.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_145_145" id="Footnote_145_145"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_145_145"><span class="label">[145]</span></a> -Jan. 24, 1804. Ibid., p. 85.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_146_146" id="Footnote_146_146"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_146_146"><span class="label">[146]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 89.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_147_147" id="Footnote_147_147"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_147_147"><span class="label">[147]</span></a> -Ibid.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_148_148" id="Footnote_148_148"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_148_148"><span class="label">[148]</span></a> -Ibid., pp. 85, 89.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_149_149" id="Footnote_149_149"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_149_149"><span class="label">[149]</span></a> -For some account of the advantages to French privateers arising from -this use of Spanish ports, with interesting particulars, see Naval Chronicle, -vol. xiii. p. 76. In March, 1804, Spain prohibited the sale of prizes in her -ports.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_150_150" id="Footnote_150_150"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_150_150"><span class="label">[150]</span></a> -Parl. Debates, 1805, vol. iii. p. 86.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_151_151" id="Footnote_151_151"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_151_151"><span class="label">[151]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap. vol. ix. p. 482.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_152_152" id="Footnote_152_152"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_152_152"><span class="label">[152]</span></a> -Parl. Debates, 1805, vol. iii. p. 93.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_153_153" id="Footnote_153_153"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_153_153"><span class="label">[153]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 122.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_154_154" id="Footnote_154_154"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_154_154"><span class="label">[154]</span></a> -Ibid., pp. 95, 122.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_155_155" id="Footnote_155_155"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_155_155"><span class="label">[155]</span></a> -Thiers, Cons. et Emp. livre xvii. pp. 383, 384.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_156_156" id="Footnote_156_156"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_156_156"><span class="label">[156]</span></a> -Pitt's Speech of February 11, 1805.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_157_157" id="Footnote_157_157"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_157_157"><span class="label">[157]</span></a> -D. José de Couto, Combate Naval de Trafalgar (Madrid, 1851), pp. -83, 89.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_158_158" id="Footnote_158_158"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_158_158"><span class="label">[158]</span></a> -Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 240. This letter was not sent, Nelson soon after -receiving the Admiralty's order.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_159_159" id="Footnote_159_159"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_159_159"><span class="label">[159]</span></a> -Jurien de la Gravière, Revue des Deux Mondes, Oct. 1887, p. 611.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_160_160" id="Footnote_160_160"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_160_160"><span class="label">[160]</span></a> -Correspondance de Napoléon, vol. x. pp. 79-97.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_161_161" id="Footnote_161_161"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_161_161"><span class="label">[161]</span></a> -Nelson's Dispatches, vol. vi. p. 333.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_162_162" id="Footnote_162_162"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_162_162"><span class="label">[162]</span></a> -After writing these words the author noted Nelson's opinion to the same -effect: "Had they not been crippled, nothing could have hindered our meeting -them on January 21, off the south end of Sardinia." (Dispatches, vol. vi. -p. 354.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_163_163" id="Footnote_163_163"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_163_163"><span class="label">[163]</span></a> -For Villeneuve's opinion see Chevalier's Hist. de la Mar. Fran. sous -l'Empire, p. 134; for Nelson's, Disp. vol. vi. pp. 334, 339.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_164_164" id="Footnote_164_164"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_164_164"><span class="label">[164]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. ix. p. 701.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_165_165" id="Footnote_165_165"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_165_165"><span class="label">[165]</span></a> -Ibid., Jan. 16, 1805.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_166_166" id="Footnote_166_166"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_166_166"><span class="label">[166]</span></a> -Compare with Nelson's views on attacking Russian fleet, <i>ante</i>, p. 46.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_167_167" id="Footnote_167_167"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_167_167"><span class="label">[167]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., April 29, 1805, vol. x. p. 443.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_168_168" id="Footnote_168_168"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_168_168"><span class="label">[168]</span></a> -Letter to Pitt by Robert Francis; Castlereagh's Memoirs, vol. v. p. 444. -The whole letter is most suggestive, not to say prophetic. From internal -indications it is extremely probable that the writer of these letters, signed -Robert Francis, was Robert Fulton, though the fact is not mentioned in any -of his biographies.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_169_169" id="Footnote_169_169"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_169_169"><span class="label">[169]</span></a> -Mémoires du Duc de Raguse, vol. ii. p. 261.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_170_170" id="Footnote_170_170"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_170_170"><span class="label">[170]</span></a> -Thiers, Cons. et Emp., vol. v. p. 413.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_171_171" id="Footnote_171_171"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_171_171"><span class="label">[171]</span></a> -Barrow's Autobiography, p. 263.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_172_172" id="Footnote_172_172"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_172_172"><span class="label">[172]</span></a> -Ibid. Nav. Chron., vol. xiii. p. 328.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_173_173" id="Footnote_173_173"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_173_173"><span class="label">[173]</span></a> -The above account depends mainly upon the "Naval Chronicle" for April -15, 1805; vol. xiii. pp. 365-367,—checked by James and other sources.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_174_174" id="Footnote_174_174"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_174_174"><span class="label">[174]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 227.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_175_175" id="Footnote_175_175"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_175_175"><span class="label">[175]</span></a> -So in the orders, Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 232. At a later date this rendezvous -is spoken of by Napoleon as in the Cape de Verde. (Corr. de Nap., -vol. xi. p. 50.) A singular confusion in such important orders.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_176_176" id="Footnote_176_176"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_176_176"><span class="label">[176]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 447.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_177_177" id="Footnote_177_177"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_177_177"><span class="label">[177]</span></a> -Ibid., 324.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_178_178" id="Footnote_178_178"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_178_178"><span class="label">[178]</span></a> -Nels. Disp., vol. vi. pp. 338-341.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_179_179" id="Footnote_179_179"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_179_179"><span class="label">[179]</span></a> -Nelson's Dispatches, vol. vi. p. 397.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_180_180" id="Footnote_180_180"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_180_180"><span class="label">[180]</span></a> -Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous l'Empire, p. 142.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_181_181" id="Footnote_181_181"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_181_181"><span class="label">[181]</span></a> -Nelson's Dispatches, vol. vi. pp. 410, 411, 415.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_182_182" id="Footnote_182_182"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_182_182"><span class="label">[182]</span></a> -See <i>ante</i>, p. <a href="#Page_142">142</a>. -Missiessy sailed from the West Indies in the same -week that Villeneuve sailed for them.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_183_183" id="Footnote_183_183"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_183_183"><span class="label">[183]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., April 13, 1805, vol. x. p. 390.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_184_184" id="Footnote_184_184"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_184_184"><span class="label">[184]</span></a> -Ibid., April 20 and 23.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_185_185" id="Footnote_185_185"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_185_185"><span class="label">[185]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 394.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_186_186" id="Footnote_186_186"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_186_186"><span class="label">[186]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 490.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_187_187" id="Footnote_187_187"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_187_187"><span class="label">[187]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 571.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_188_188" id="Footnote_188_188"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_188_188"><span class="label">[188]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 616.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_189_189" id="Footnote_189_189"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_189_189"><span class="label">[189]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 624.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_190_190" id="Footnote_190_190"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_190_190"><span class="label">[190]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 708.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_191_191" id="Footnote_191_191"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_191_191"><span class="label">[191]</span></a> -For example, Thiers, Cons. et Emp., liv. xx. p. 178; Jurien de la Gravière, -Guerres Maritimes, vol. ii. p. 224 (first edition).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_192_192" id="Footnote_192_192"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_192_192"><span class="label">[192]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. xi. p. 162.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_193_193" id="Footnote_193_193"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_193_193"><span class="label">[193]</span></a> -Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 401. In a former work ("The Influence of Sea -Power upon History," p. 23), the author casually spoke of this as a false step, -into which Nelson had been misled. A closer study has convinced him that -the British admiral did quite right.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_194_194" id="Footnote_194_194"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_194_194"><span class="label">[194]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 624. Compare this with Nelson's remark, just -quoted.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_195_195" id="Footnote_195_195"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_195_195"><span class="label">[195]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 624.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_196_196" id="Footnote_196_196"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_196_196"><span class="label">[196]</span></a> -Ibid., June 22, 1805, p. 686.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_197_197" id="Footnote_197_197"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_197_197"><span class="label">[197]</span></a> -Nap. to Decrès, May 10, 1805.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_198_198" id="Footnote_198_198"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_198_198"><span class="label">[198]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., June 9, p. 624.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_199_199" id="Footnote_199_199"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_199_199"><span class="label">[199]</span></a> -Annual Register, 1805, p. 225; Naval Chronicle, vol. xiii. p. 399.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_200_200" id="Footnote_200_200"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_200_200"><span class="label">[200]</span></a> -Naval Chronicle, vol. xiii. p. 484. The expression "<i>balayer la Manche</i>"—sweep -the Channel—is far stronger than the Chronicle's translation, which -is preserved in the quotation.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_201_201" id="Footnote_201_201"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_201_201"><span class="label">[201]</span></a> -Apparently a prize. (Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 410.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_202_202" id="Footnote_202_202"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_202_202"><span class="label">[202]</span></a> -Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 411.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_203_203" id="Footnote_203_203"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_203_203"><span class="label">[203]</span></a> -Ibid., Sept. 6, 1804.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_204_204" id="Footnote_204_204"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_204_204"><span class="label">[204]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., June 28, 1805, vol. x. p. 708.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_205_205" id="Footnote_205_205"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_205_205"><span class="label">[205]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 705.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_206_206" id="Footnote_206_206"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_206_206"><span class="label">[206]</span></a> -Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 457.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_207_207" id="Footnote_207_207"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_207_207"><span class="label">[207]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 45.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_208_208" id="Footnote_208_208"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_208_208"><span class="label">[208]</span></a> -Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 459.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_209_209" id="Footnote_209_209"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_209_209"><span class="label">[209]</span></a> -On this date is the first intimation of Nelson's sailing as known to Napoleon. -June 27, he writes, "I do not clearly see where Nelson has been." -(Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 701.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_210_210" id="Footnote_210_210"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_210_210"><span class="label">[210]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. x. April 23 and May 4, 1805, pp. 420, 465.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_211_211" id="Footnote_211_211"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_211_211"><span class="label">[211]</span></a> -Ibid., May 24, p. 544.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_212_212" id="Footnote_212_212"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_212_212"><span class="label">[212]</span></a> -Ibid., May 29, pp. 563, 624.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_213_213" id="Footnote_213_213"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_213_213"><span class="label">[213]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. x. June 22, p. 686.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_214_214" id="Footnote_214_214"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_214_214"><span class="label">[214]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 545.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_215_215" id="Footnote_215_215"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_215_215"><span class="label">[215]</span></a> -See, for his reasoning, letter of June 16, three days after leaving -Antigua; and also, for his uncertainty after reaching Europe, July 18. -(Nels. Disp., vol. vi. pp. 457, 473.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_216_216" id="Footnote_216_216"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_216_216"><span class="label">[216]</span></a> -Naval Chronicle, vol. xiv. p. 64.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_217_217" id="Footnote_217_217"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_217_217"><span class="label">[217]</span></a> -Napoleon to Decrès, July 18, 1805.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_218_218" id="Footnote_218_218"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_218_218"><span class="label">[218]</span></a> -Naval Chronicle, vol. xiv. p. 64.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_219_219" id="Footnote_219_219"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_219_219"><span class="label">[219]</span></a> -Barrow's Autobiography, pp. 276-290.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_220_220" id="Footnote_220_220"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_220_220"><span class="label">[220]</span></a> -See <i>ante</i>, p. <a href="#Page_162">162</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_221_221" id="Footnote_221_221"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_221_221"><span class="label">[221]</span></a> -Napoleon to Berthier, Decrès, and Ganteaume, July 20, 1805.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_222_222" id="Footnote_222_222"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_222_222"><span class="label">[222]</span></a> -Napoleon to Decrès, July 27, 1805.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_223_223" id="Footnote_223_223"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_223_223"><span class="label">[223]</span></a> -Calder's Defence, Naval Chronicle, vol. xv. p. 167. The words quoted, -frequently repeated in different terms, embody the spirit of the whole paper.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_224_224" id="Footnote_224_224"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_224_224"><span class="label">[224]</span></a> -Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous l'Emp., p. 171. Couto (Combate de Trafalgar, -p. 107) gives a very serious account of the injuries suffered by the -four remaining Spanish ships.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_225_225" id="Footnote_225_225"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_225_225"><span class="label">[225]</span></a> -Nelson's Disp., vol. vi. p. 457.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_226_226" id="Footnote_226_226"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_226_226"><span class="label">[226]</span></a> -Nelson's Disp., vol. vii. p. 16.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_227_227" id="Footnote_227_227"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_227_227"><span class="label">[227]</span></a> -Corr. de Napoléon, July 16, 1805.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_228_228" id="Footnote_228_228"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_228_228"><span class="label">[228]</span></a> -The harbors of Ferrol, Coruña, and a third called Betanzos, are inlets -having a common entrance from the sea.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_229_229" id="Footnote_229_229"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_229_229"><span class="label">[229]</span></a> -See Napoleon's letters to Decrès, Allemand, and others, July 26, 1805.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_230_230" id="Footnote_230_230"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_230_230"><span class="label">[230]</span></a> -Napoleon to Decrès, August 29.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_231_231" id="Footnote_231_231"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_231_231"><span class="label">[231]</span></a> -Napoleon to Talleyrand, Dec. 18, 1799. "Frame your reply to Genoa in -such terms as to leave us free to incorporate the Ligurian Republic with -France, within a few months."</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_232_232" id="Footnote_232_232"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_232_232"><span class="label">[232]</span></a> -Stanhope's Pitt, vol. iv. p. 318.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_233_233" id="Footnote_233_233"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_233_233"><span class="label">[233]</span></a> -Napoleon to Talleyrand, July 31, 1805.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_234_234" id="Footnote_234_234"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_234_234"><span class="label">[234]</span></a> -Ibid., August 13.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_235_235" id="Footnote_235_235"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_235_235"><span class="label">[235]</span></a> -Napoleon to Villeneuve, August 13.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_236_236" id="Footnote_236_236"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_236_236"><span class="label">[236]</span></a> -Napoleon to Decrès, August 14.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_237_237" id="Footnote_237_237"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_237_237"><span class="label">[237]</span></a> -Twenty-nine only of the line.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_238_238" id="Footnote_238_238"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_238_238"><span class="label">[238]</span></a> -Chevalier, Marine Française sous l'Empire, p. 180.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_239_239" id="Footnote_239_239"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_239_239"><span class="label">[239]</span></a> -Collingwood's Correspondence, August 21, 1805.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_240_240" id="Footnote_240_240"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_240_240"><span class="label">[240]</span></a> -Thiers, Cons. et Emp., livre xxii. pp. 125, 128.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_241_241" id="Footnote_241_241"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_241_241"><span class="label">[241]</span></a> -Thiers, Cons. et Emp., livre xxviii. p. 233.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_242_242" id="Footnote_242_242"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_242_242"><span class="label">[242]</span></a> -Napoleon to St. Cyr, Sept. 2, 1805.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_243_243" id="Footnote_243_243"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_243_243"><span class="label">[243]</span></a> -Napoleon to Decrès, Sept. 15.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_244_244" id="Footnote_244_244"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_244_244"><span class="label">[244]</span></a> -Ibid., Sept. 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_245_245" id="Footnote_245_245"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_245_245"><span class="label">[245]</span></a> -Nels. Disp., vol. vii. p. 80.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_246_246" id="Footnote_246_246"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_246_246"><span class="label">[246]</span></a> -Fyffe's History of Modern Europe, vol. i. p. 281.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_247_247" id="Footnote_247_247"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_247_247"><span class="label">[247]</span></a> -To the King of Wurtemburg, April 2, 1811; Corr., vol. xxii. p. 19.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_248_248" id="Footnote_248_248"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_248_248"><span class="label">[248]</span></a> -Life of Sir Wm. Parker, vol. i. p. 39. Ross's Life of Lord de Saumarez, -vol. ii. p. 214. Naval Chronicle, Plymouth Report, Dec. 10, 1800.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_249_249" id="Footnote_249_249"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_249_249"><span class="label">[249]</span></a> -Message of Directory to Council of Five Hundred, Jan., 1799; Moniteur, -An 7, p. 482.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_250_250" id="Footnote_250_250"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_250_250"><span class="label">[250]</span></a> -McArthur, Financial and Political Facts of the Eighteenth Century, -London, 1801, p. 308. Norman (Corsairs of France, London, 1887, App.) -gives the number of French privateers taken in the same period as 556.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_251_251" id="Footnote_251_251"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_251_251"><span class="label">[251]</span></a> -Sir J. Barrow, then a Secretary to the Admiralty, mentions in a letter to J. -W. Croker, July 18, 1810, that two colliers had been captured in sight of Ramsgate, -close under the North Foreland; and on July 27 an ordnance hoy taken -close under Galloper Light, in the face of the whole squadron in the Downs, -not one of which moved. (Croker's Diary, vol. i. p. 33)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_252_252" id="Footnote_252_252"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_252_252"><span class="label">[252]</span></a> -Naval Chronicle, vol. xxiv. p. 327. For further curious particulars concerning -French privateering in the narrow seas, see Nav. Chron., vol. xxii. -p. 279; vol. xxiv. pp. 327, 448, 460-462, 490; vol. xxv. pp. 32-34, 44, 203, -293; vol. xxvii. pp. 102, 237.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_253_253" id="Footnote_253_253"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_253_253"><span class="label">[253]</span></a> -See, for example, the account of the privateer captain, Jean Blackeman -Nav. Chron., vol. xii. p. 454.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_254_254" id="Footnote_254_254"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_254_254"><span class="label">[254]</span></a> -Naval Chronicle, vol. ii. p. 535; vol. iii. p. 151.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_255_255" id="Footnote_255_255"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_255_255"><span class="label">[255]</span></a> -In 1806, on the Jamaica station alone, were captured by the British -forty-eight public or private armed vessels, two of which were frigates, the -rest small. (Nav. Chron., vol. xvii. pp. 255, 337.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_256_256" id="Footnote_256_256"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_256_256"><span class="label">[256]</span></a> -American State Papers, vol. ii. pp. 670, 771.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_257_257" id="Footnote_257_257"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_257_257"><span class="label">[257]</span></a> -James (Naval Hist., ed. 1878, vol. iii. p. 249) says that though denominated -1,200-ton ships, the registered tonnage of most exceeds 1,300, and in -some cases amounts to 1,500 tons.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_258_258" id="Footnote_258_258"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_258_258"><span class="label">[258]</span></a> -Nav. Chronicle, vol. vi. p. 251.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_259_259" id="Footnote_259_259"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_259_259"><span class="label">[259]</span></a> -Brenton's Naval Hist. (first ed.) vol. i. p. 346. Low's Indian Navy, -vol. i. 204.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_260_260" id="Footnote_260_260"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_260_260"><span class="label">[260]</span></a> -Low's Indian Navy, vol. i. 205. Milburn's Oriental Commerce, vol. i. 405.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_261_261" id="Footnote_261_261"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_261_261"><span class="label">[261]</span></a> -The premium of insurance, which had in 1782 been fifteen guineas per -cent on ships engaged in the trade with China and India, did not exceed half -that rate at any period between the spring of 1793 and the end of the -struggle. (Lindsay's Merchant Shipping, vol. ii. 265. See also Chalmer's -Historical View, pp. 308-310.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_262_262" id="Footnote_262_262"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_262_262"><span class="label">[262]</span></a> -Letter of Bombay merchants to Sir Edward Pellew; Nav. Chron., vol. -xxiii. 107.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_263_263" id="Footnote_263_263"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_263_263"><span class="label">[263]</span></a> -Robert Surcouf, by J. K. Laughton; Colburn's United Service Magazine, -1883, part i. pp. 331, 332.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_264_264" id="Footnote_264_264"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_264_264"><span class="label">[264]</span></a> -Milburn's Oriental Commerce, vol. i. p. xci.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_265_265" id="Footnote_265_265"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_265_265"><span class="label">[265]</span></a> -Naval Chronicle, vol. vii. 276.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_266_266" id="Footnote_266_266"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_266_266"><span class="label">[266]</span></a> -Naval Chronicle, vol. iv. pp. 150, 151, 326.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<div><a name="Footnote_267_267" id="Footnote_267_267"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_267_267"><span class="label">[267]</span></a> -Registration of vessels made in all ports of France (except the newly -acquired departments) from September 1793, to September 1796:— -</div> - -<table id="FOOTNOTE_267" summary="Registration of Vessels"> - <tr> - <td class="c1">Under 30 tons</td> - <td class="c2">3,351</td> - <td class="c1">(undecked)</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1">Between 30 and 100 tons</td> - <td class="c2">1,897</td> - <td class="c1"></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> " - 100 and 200 tons</td> - <td class="c2">532</td> - <td class="c1"></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"> " - 200 and 400 tons</td> - <td class="c2">193</td> - <td class="c1"></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1">Above 400 tons</td> - <td class="c2">55</td> - <td class="c1"></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"></td> - <td class="c2">――</td> - <td class="c1"></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"></td> - <td class="c2">6,028</td> - <td class="c1"></td> - </tr> -</table> - -<p> -It should be explained that as all ships, old as well as new, had to register, -this gives the total of French shipping without deduction for losses.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_268_268" id="Footnote_268_268"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_268_268"><span class="label">[268]</span></a> -Moniteur, 26 Floréal, An 9 (May 16, 1801).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_269_269" id="Footnote_269_269"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_269_269"><span class="label">[269]</span></a> -Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. 359.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_270_270" id="Footnote_270_270"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_270_270"><span class="label">[270]</span></a> -Cobbett's Parl. Debates, March 15, 1804, p. 921.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_271_271" id="Footnote_271_271"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_271_271"><span class="label">[271]</span></a> -Naval Chronicle, vol. xvii. p. 369.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_272_272" id="Footnote_272_272"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_272_272"><span class="label">[272]</span></a> -Norman gives the total number of captures, 1793-1800, as 5,158 against -Lloyd's 3,639. Through the kindness of Captain H. M. Hozier, Secretary of -Lloyd's, the author has received a list of British ships taken, annually, 1793-1814. -This list makes the numbers considerably less than the earlier one -used in the text. By it, between 1793 and 1800, both inclusive, only 3,466 -British ships were captured.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_273_273" id="Footnote_273_273"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_273_273"><span class="label">[273]</span></a> -Moniteur, 16 Pluviôse, An 7 (Feb. 5, 1799), pp. 582, 583.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_274_274" id="Footnote_274_274"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_274_274"><span class="label">[274]</span></a> -Guérin gives the total number of captures by France from Great Britain, -from 1793 to the Peace of Amiens, March 25, 1802, including both ships of -war and merchant vessels, as 2,172; while the French lost in all, from ships-of-the-line -to fishing-boats, between 1,520 and 1,550. Of this total, 27 were -ships-of-the-line and 70 frigates,—a number considerably below that given -by James, the painstaking English naval historian. Allowing 150 as the -number of smaller naval vessels taken, there would remain, by Guérin's -estimate, about 1,300 French trading vessels which fell into British hands. -Of these a large proportion must have been the chasse-marées that carried -on the coasting trade (as their expressive name implies); attacks on -which formed so frequent and lucrative a diversion from the monotony of -blockade service. (Hist. Mar de la France, vol. iii. p. 674.) -</p> -<p> -Guérin claims great carefulness, but the author owns to much distrust of -his accuracy. It is evident, however, from all the quotations, that Fox's statement, -May 24, 1795, that in the second year of the war France had taken 860 -ships, was much exaggerated. (Speeches, vol. v. p. 419. Longman's, 1815.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_275_275" id="Footnote_275_275"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_275_275"><span class="label">[275]</span></a> -In this period of twenty-two years there were eighteen months of maritime -peace.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_276_276" id="Footnote_276_276"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_276_276"><span class="label">[276]</span></a> -Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_277_277" id="Footnote_277_277"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_277_277"><span class="label">[277]</span></a> -Thus it is told of one of the most active of French privateersmen, sailing -out of Dunkirk, that "the trade from London to Berwick, in the smacks, -was his favorite object; not only from the value of the cargoes, but because -they required few hands to man them, and from their good sailing were -almost sure to escape British cruisers and get safely into ports of France or -Holland." Between 1793 and 1801 this one man had taken thirty-four prizes. -(Nav. Chron., vol. xii. p. 454.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_278_278" id="Footnote_278_278"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_278_278"><span class="label">[278]</span></a> -Returns of the coasting trade were not made until 1824. Porter's -Progress of the Nation, section iii. p. 77.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_279_279" id="Footnote_279_279"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_279_279"><span class="label">[279]</span></a> -The merchant vessels of that day were generally small. From Macpherson's -tables it appears that those trading between Great Britain and the -United States, between 1792 and 1800, averaged from 200 to 230 tons; those -to the West Indies and the Baltic about 250; to Germany, to Italy, and the -Western Mediterranean, 150; to the Levant, 250 to 300, with some of 500 -tons. The East India Company's ships, as has been said, were larger, averaging -nearly 800 tons. The general average is reduced to that above given -(125) by the large number of vessels in the Irish trade. In 1796 there were -13,558 entries and clearances from English and Scotch ports for Ireland, -being more than half the entire number (not tonnage) of British ships employed -in so-called foreign trade. The average size of these was only 80 tons. -(Macpherson.) In 1806 there were 13,939 for Ireland to 5,211 for all other -parts of the world, the average tonnage again being 80. (Porter's Progress -of the Nation, part ii. pp. 85, 174.) -</p> -<p> -Sir William Parker, an active frigate captain, who commanded the same -ship from 1801 to 1811, was in that period interested in 52 prizes. The average -tonnage of these, excluding a ship-of-the-line and a frigate, was 126 tons. -(Life, vol. i. p. 412.) -</p> -<p> -In 1798, 6,844 coasters entered or left London, their average size being 73 -tons. The colliers were larger. Of the latter 3,289 entered or sailed, having -a mean tonnage of 228. (Colquhoun's Commerce of the Thames, p. 13.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_280_280" id="Footnote_280_280"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_280_280"><span class="label">[280]</span></a> -The returns for 1813 were destroyed by fire, and so an exact aggregate -cannot be given. Two million tons are allowed for that year, which is probably -too little.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_281_281" id="Footnote_281_281"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_281_281"><span class="label">[281]</span></a> -Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. 368, 535.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_282_282" id="Footnote_282_282"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_282_282"><span class="label">[282]</span></a> -Porter's Progress of the Nation, part ii. p. 171.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_283_283" id="Footnote_283_283"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_283_283"><span class="label">[283]</span></a> -Chalmer's Historical View, p. 307.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_284_284" id="Footnote_284_284"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_284_284"><span class="label">[284]</span></a> -Porter, part ii. p. 173. The Naval Chronicle, vol. xxix. p. 453, gives an -official tabular statement of prize-vessels admitted to registry between 1793 -and 1812. In 1792 there were but 609, total tonnage 93,994.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_285_285" id="Footnote_285_285"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_285_285"><span class="label">[285]</span></a> -Chalmer's Historical View, p. 351.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_286_286" id="Footnote_286_286"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_286_286"><span class="label">[286]</span></a> -The amounts given are those known as the "official values," assigned -arbitrarily to the specific articles a century before. The advantage attaching -to this system is, that, no fluctuation of price entering as a factor, the values -continue to represent from year to year the proportion of trade done. Official -values are used throughout this chapter when not otherwise stated. The -"real values," deduced from current prices, were generally much greater -than the official. Thus, in 1800, the whole volume of trade, by official value -£73,723,000, was by real value £111,231,000. The figures are taken from -Macpherson's Annals of Commerce.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_287_287" id="Footnote_287_287"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_287_287"><span class="label">[287]</span></a> -The French will not suffer a Power which seeks to found its prosperity -upon the misfortunes of other states, to raise its commerce upon the ruin of -that of other states, and which, aspiring to the dominion of the seas, wishes -to introduce everywhere the articles of its own manufacture and to receive -nothing from foreign industry, any longer to enjoy the fruit of its guilty -speculations.—<i>Message of Directory to the Council of Five Hundred</i>, Jan. -4, 1798.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_288_288" id="Footnote_288_288"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_288_288"><span class="label">[288]</span></a> -Message of Directory to Council of Five Hundred, Jan. 4, 1798.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_289_289" id="Footnote_289_289"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_289_289"><span class="label">[289]</span></a> -The act imposing these duties went into effect Aug. 15, 1789. Vessels -built in the United States, and owned by her citizens, paid an entrance duty -of six cents per ton; all other vessels fifty cents. A discount of ten per -cent on the established duties was also allowed upon articles imported in -vessels built and owned in the country. (Annals of Congress. First Congress, -pp. 2131, 2132.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_290_290" id="Footnote_290_290"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_290_290"><span class="label">[290]</span></a> -Am. State Papers, vol. x. 502.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_291_291" id="Footnote_291_291"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_291_291"><span class="label">[291]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 389.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_292_292" id="Footnote_292_292"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_292_292"><span class="label">[292]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 528.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_293_293" id="Footnote_293_293"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_293_293"><span class="label">[293]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 584.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_294_294" id="Footnote_294_294"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_294_294"><span class="label">[294]</span></a> -Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. 535.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_295_295" id="Footnote_295_295"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_295_295"><span class="label">[295]</span></a> -Am. State Papers, vol. i. 243.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_296_296" id="Footnote_296_296"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_296_296"><span class="label">[296]</span></a> -Annual Register, 1793, p. 346*.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_297_297" id="Footnote_297_297"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_297_297"><span class="label">[297]</span></a> -Am. State Papers, i. 240. A complete series of the orders injuriously -affecting United States commerce, issued by Great Britain and France, from -1791 to 1808, can be found in the Am. State Papers, vol. iii. p. 262.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_298_298" id="Footnote_298_298"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_298_298"><span class="label">[298]</span></a> -Am. State Papers, i. 240, 241. How probable this result was may be -seen from the letters of Gouverneur Morris, Oct. 19, 1793, and March 6, -1794. State Papers, vol. i. pp. 375, 404.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_299_299" id="Footnote_299_299"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_299_299"><span class="label">[299]</span></a> -Am. State Papers, vol. i. p. 679.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_300_300" id="Footnote_300_300"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_300_300"><span class="label">[300]</span></a> -Wheaton's International Law, p. 753.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_301_301" id="Footnote_301_301"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_301_301"><span class="label">[301]</span></a> -Monroe to the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. Am. State Papers, -vol. ii. p. 735.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_302_302" id="Footnote_302_302"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_302_302"><span class="label">[302]</span></a> -Reply to "War in Disguise, or Frauds of the Neutral Flag," by Gouverneur -Morris, New York, 1806, p. 22.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_303_303" id="Footnote_303_303"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_303_303"><span class="label">[303]</span></a> -Russell's Life of Fox, vol. ii. p. 281.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_304_304" id="Footnote_304_304"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_304_304"><span class="label">[304]</span></a> -Letter to Danish Minister, March 17, 1807. Cobbett's Parl. Debates, -vol. x. p. 406.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_305_305" id="Footnote_305_305"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_305_305"><span class="label">[305]</span></a> -A letter from an American consul in the West Indies, dated March 7, -1794, gives 220 as the number. This was, however, only a partial account, -the orders having been recently received. (Am. State Papers, i. p. 429.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_306_306" id="Footnote_306_306"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_306_306"><span class="label">[306]</span></a> -By the ordinance of Aug. 30, 1784. See Annals of Congress, Jan. 13, -1794, p. 192.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_307_307" id="Footnote_307_307"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_307_307"><span class="label">[307]</span></a> -The National Convention, immediately after the outbreak of war, on the -17th of February, 1793, gave a great extension to the existing permission of -trade between the United States and the French colonies; but this could not -affect the essential fact that the trade, under some conditions, had been allowed -in peace.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_308_308" id="Footnote_308_308"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_308_308"><span class="label">[308]</span></a> -In fact Monroe, in another part of the same letter, avows: "The doctrine -of Great Britain in every decision is the same.... Every departure -from it is claimed as a relaxation of the principle, gratuitously conceded by -Great Britain."</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_309_309" id="Footnote_309_309"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_309_309"><span class="label">[309]</span></a> -Mr. Jay seems to have been under some misapprehension in this matter, -for upon his return he wrote to the Secretary of State: "The treaty does -prohibit re-exportation from the United States of West India commodities in -neutral vessels; ... but we may carry them direct from French and other -West India islands to Europe." (Am. State Papers, i. 520.) This the treaty -certainly did not admit.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_310_310" id="Footnote_310_310"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_310_310"><span class="label">[310]</span></a> -See letter of Thos. Fitzsimmons, Am. State Papers, vol. ii. 347.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_311_311" id="Footnote_311_311"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_311_311"><span class="label">[311]</span></a> -The pretexts for these seizures seem usually to have been the alleged -contraband character of the cargoes.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_312_312" id="Footnote_312_312"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_312_312"><span class="label">[312]</span></a> -Am. State Papers, vol. ii. 345.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_313_313" id="Footnote_313_313"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_313_313"><span class="label">[313]</span></a> -It will be remembered that the closing days of May witnessed the culmination -of the death struggle between the Jacobins and Girondists, and that -the latter finally fell on the second of June.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_314_314" id="Footnote_314_314"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_314_314"><span class="label">[314]</span></a> -Am. State Papers, vol. i. pp. 284, 286, 748.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_315_315" id="Footnote_315_315"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_315_315"><span class="label">[315]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 372.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_316_316" id="Footnote_316_316"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_316_316"><span class="label">[316]</span></a> -One of these complaints was that the United States now prohibited the -sale, in her ports, of prizes taken from the British by French cruisers. This -practice, not accorded by the treaty with France, and which had made an unfriendly -distinction against Great Britain, was forbidden by Jay's treaty.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_317_317" id="Footnote_317_317"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_317_317"><span class="label">[317]</span></a> -Speech of M. Dentzel in the Conseil des Anciens. Moniteur, An 7, -p. 555.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_318_318" id="Footnote_318_318"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_318_318"><span class="label">[318]</span></a> -Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 28.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_319_319" id="Footnote_319_319"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_319_319"><span class="label">[319]</span></a> -Ibid., vol. ii. p. 163.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_320_320" id="Footnote_320_320"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_320_320"><span class="label">[320]</span></a> -Letter to Talleyrand, Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 178.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_321_321" id="Footnote_321_321"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_321_321"><span class="label">[321]</span></a> -Ibid., vol. i. pp. 740, 748.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_322_322" id="Footnote_322_322"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_322_322"><span class="label">[322]</span></a> -The day after the news of Rivoli was received, Mr. Pinckney, who had -remained in Paris, though unrecognized, was curtly directed to leave France.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_323_323" id="Footnote_323_323"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_323_323"><span class="label">[323]</span></a> -Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 13.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_324_324" id="Footnote_324_324"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_324_324"><span class="label">[324]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 14.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_325_325" id="Footnote_325_325"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_325_325"><span class="label">[325]</span></a> -American State Papers, vol. ii. p. 14.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_326_326" id="Footnote_326_326"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_326_326"><span class="label">[326]</span></a> -Moniteur, An v. pp. 164, 167.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_327_327" id="Footnote_327_327"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_327_327"><span class="label">[327]</span></a> -March 1, and October 8, 1793. Ibid.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_328_328" id="Footnote_328_328"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_328_328"><span class="label">[328]</span></a> -Speech of Lecouteulx; Moniteur, An v. p. 176.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_329_329" id="Footnote_329_329"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_329_329"><span class="label">[329]</span></a> -Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. 463.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_330_330" id="Footnote_330_330"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_330_330"><span class="label">[330]</span></a> -Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. 413, note.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_331_331" id="Footnote_331_331"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_331_331"><span class="label">[331]</span></a> -Of the imports into Germany, three fifths were foreign merchandise re-exported -from Great Britain.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_332_332" id="Footnote_332_332"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_332_332"><span class="label">[332]</span></a> -These figures are all taken from Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, -vol. iv.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_333_333" id="Footnote_333_333"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_333_333"><span class="label">[333]</span></a> - -See Am. State Papers, vol. x. p. 487.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<div><a name="Footnote_334_334" id="Footnote_334_334"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_334_334"><span class="label">[334]</span></a> -The importance of the West India region to the commercial system of -Great Britain in the last decade of the 18th century will be seen from the -following table, showing the distribution per cent of British trade in 1792 -and 1800:— -</div> - -<table id="FOOTNOTE_334" summary="Importance of West India region"> - <tr> - <td class="c1"></td> - <td colspan="2" class="c3">Imports from,</td> - <td colspan="2" class="c3">Exports to,</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"></td> - <td class="c2">1792.</td> - <td class="c2">1800.</td> - <td class="c2">1792.</td> - <td class="c2">1800.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1">British West Indies</td> - <td class="c2">20</td> - <td class="c2">28</td> - <td class="c2">11</td> - <td class="c2">10</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1">United States</td> - <td class="c2">5</td> - <td class="c2">7</td> - <td class="c2">17</td> - <td class="c2">15</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1">Russia</td> - <td class="c2">9</td> - <td class="c2">8</td> - <td class="c2">3</td> - <td class="c2">2</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1">Germany and Prussia</td> - <td class="c2">5</td> - <td class="c2">12</td> - <td class="c2">9</td> - <td class="c2">31</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1">France, Belgium, and Holland</td> - <td class="c2">8</td> - <td class="c2">4</td> - <td class="c2">15</td> - <td class="c2">12</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1">Mediterranean</td> - <td class="c2">7</td> - <td class="c2">2</td> - <td class="c2">6</td> - <td class="c2">2</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1">Spain and Portugal</td> - <td class="c2">9</td> - <td class="c2">5</td> - <td class="c2">6</td> - <td class="c2">3</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1">Ireland</td> - <td class="c2">13</td> - <td class="c2">7</td> - <td class="c2">9</td> - <td class="c2">9</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1">Asia (not Levant)</td> - <td class="c2">14</td> - <td class="c2">16</td> - <td class="c2">10</td> - <td class="c2">7</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1">Miscellaneous</td> - <td class="c2">10</td> - <td class="c2">11</td> - <td class="c2">14</td> - <td class="c2">9</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"></td> - <td class="c2">――</td> - <td class="c2">――</td> - <td class="c2">――</td> - <td class="c2">――</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="c1"></td> - <td class="c2">100</td> - <td class="c2">100</td> - <td class="c2">100</td> - <td class="c2">100</td> - </tr> -</table> - -<p> -The significance of these figures lies not only in the amounts set down -directly to the West Indies, but also in the great increase of exports to Germany, -and the high rate maintained to France, Belgium, and Holland, with -which war existed. Of these exports 25 per cent in 1792, and 43 per cent -in 1800, were foreign merchandise, chiefly West Indian—<i>re-exported</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_335_335" id="Footnote_335_335"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_335_335"><span class="label">[335]</span></a> - -In 1800 the captured islands sent 9 per cent of the British imports.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_336_336" id="Footnote_336_336"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_336_336"><span class="label">[336]</span></a> - -Moniteur, An vii. pp 478, 482.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_337_337" id="Footnote_337_337"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_337_337"><span class="label">[337]</span></a> - -Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 8.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_338_338" id="Footnote_338_338"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_338_338"><span class="label">[338]</span></a> - -Moniteur, An vii. p. 502.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_339_339" id="Footnote_339_339"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_339_339"><span class="label">[339]</span></a> - -Ibid., p. 716; Couzard's speech.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_340_340" id="Footnote_340_340"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_340_340"><span class="label">[340]</span></a> - -Moniteur, An vii. p. 555; Dentzel's speech.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_341_341" id="Footnote_341_341"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_341_341"><span class="label">[341]</span></a> - -Ibid.; Lenglet's speech.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_342_342" id="Footnote_342_342"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_342_342"><span class="label">[342]</span></a> - -Ibid., pp. 582, 583. The figures are chiefly taken from the speech of -M. Arnould. A person of the same name, who was Chef du Bureau du -Commerce, published in 1797 a book called "Système Maritime et Politique -des Européens," containing much detailed information about French maritime -affairs, and displaying bitter hatred of England. If the deputy himself -was not the author, he doubtless had access to the best official intelligence.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_343_343" id="Footnote_343_343"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_343_343"><span class="label">[343]</span></a> - -In consequence of the law of Jan. 18, 1798, the British government -appointed a ship-of-the-line and two frigates to convoy a fleet of American -vessels to their own coast.—<i>Macpherson's Annals of Commerce</i>, vol. iv. -p. 440.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_344_344" id="Footnote_344_344"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_344_344"><span class="label">[344]</span></a> - -Moniteur, An vii. p. 564; Cornet's speech.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_345_345" id="Footnote_345_345"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_345_345"><span class="label">[345]</span></a> - -Annals of Congress, 1798, p. 3733.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_346_346" id="Footnote_346_346"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_346_346"><span class="label">[346]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 3754.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_347_347" id="Footnote_347_347"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_347_347"><span class="label">[347]</span></a> -Ibid.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_348_348" id="Footnote_348_348"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_348_348"><span class="label">[348]</span></a> -Speech of February 2, 1801.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_349_349" id="Footnote_349_349"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_349_349"><span class="label">[349]</span></a> -Speech of March 25, 1801.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_350_350" id="Footnote_350_350"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_350_350"><span class="label">[350]</span></a> -Annual Register, 1801; State Papers, p. 212.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_351_351" id="Footnote_351_351"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_351_351"><span class="label">[351]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 217.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_352_352" id="Footnote_352_352"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_352_352"><span class="label">[352]</span></a> -The <i>principle</i> of the Rule of 1756, it will be remembered, was that -the neutral had no right to carry on, for a belligerent, a trade from which the -latter excluded him in peace.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_353_353" id="Footnote_353_353"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_353_353"><span class="label">[353]</span></a> -By a report submitted to the National Convention, July 3, 1793, it appears -that in the years 1787-1789 two tenths only of French commerce was -done in French bottoms. In 1792, the last of maritime peace, three tenths -was carried by French ships. (Moniteur, 1793, p. 804.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_354_354" id="Footnote_354_354"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_354_354"><span class="label">[354]</span></a> -Moniteur, An vii. p. 582; Arnould's speech.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_355_355" id="Footnote_355_355"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_355_355"><span class="label">[355]</span></a> -Annual Register, 1804. State Papers, p. 286.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_356_356" id="Footnote_356_356"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_356_356"><span class="label">[356]</span></a> -The exports of the French West India islands in 1788 amounted to -$52,000,000, of which $40,000,000 were from San Domingo alone. (Traité -d'Économie Politique et de Commerce des Colonies, par P. F. Page. Paris, -An 9 (1800) p. 15.) This being for the time almost wholly lost, the effect -upon prices can be imagined.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_357_357" id="Footnote_357_357"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_357_357"><span class="label">[357]</span></a> -An American vessel arrived in Marblehead May 29, landed her cargo on -the 30th and 31st, reloaded, and cleared June 3. (Robinson's Admiralty Reports, -vol. v. p. 396.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_358_358" id="Footnote_358_358"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_358_358"><span class="label">[358]</span></a> -In the case of the brig "Aurora," Mr. Madison, the Secretary of State, -wrote: "The duties were paid or secured, according to law, in like manner -as they are required to be secured on a like cargo meant for home consumption; -when re-shipped, the duties were drawn back with a deduction of three -and a half per cent (on them), as is permitted to imported articles in all -cases." (Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 732.) -</p> -<p> -In the case of the American ship "William," captured and sent in, on -duties to the amount of $1,239 the drawback was $1,211. (Robinson's Admiralty -Reports, vol. v. p. 396.) In the celebrated case of the "Essex," with -which began the seizures in 1804, on duties amounting to $5,278, the drawback -was $5,080. (Ibid., 405.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_359_359" id="Footnote_359_359"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_359_359"><span class="label">[359]</span></a> -The text of the Berlin decree can be found among the series beginning -in American State Papers, vol. iii. p. 262.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_360_360" id="Footnote_360_360"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_360_360"><span class="label">[360]</span></a> -A curious indication of the dependence of the Continent upon British -manufactures is afforded by the fact that the French army, during this awful -winter, was clad and shod with British goods, imported by the French minister -at Hamburg, in face of the Berlin decree. (Bourrienne's Memoirs, -vol. vii. p. 292.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_361_361" id="Footnote_361_361"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_361_361"><span class="label">[361]</span></a> -Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 805.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_362_362" id="Footnote_362_362"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_362_362"><span class="label">[362]</span></a> -Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. xiii. Appendix, pp. xxxiv-xlv.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_363_363" id="Footnote_363_363"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_363_363"><span class="label">[363]</span></a> -Thiers, Consulat et Empire, vol. vii. pp. 666-669.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_364_364" id="Footnote_364_364"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_364_364"><span class="label">[364]</span></a> -Letter of Lord Howick to Mr. Monroe, Jan. 10, 1807; Am. State Papers, -vol. iii. p. 5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_365_365" id="Footnote_365_365"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_365_365"><span class="label">[365]</span></a> -President's Message to Congress, Oct. 27, 1807; Am. State Papers, vol. -iii. p. 5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_366_366" id="Footnote_366_366"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_366_366"><span class="label">[366]</span></a> -Correspondance de Napoléon.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_367_367" id="Footnote_367_367"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_367_367"><span class="label">[367]</span></a> -British Declaration of September 25, 1807,—a paper which ably and -completely vindicates the action of Great Britain; Annual Register, 1807, -p. 735.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_368_368" id="Footnote_368_368"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_368_368"><span class="label">[368]</span></a> -Annual Register, 1807. State Papers, p. 771.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_369_369" id="Footnote_369_369"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_369_369"><span class="label">[369]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 739.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_370_370" id="Footnote_370_370"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_370_370"><span class="label">[370]</span></a> -Lanfrey's Napoleon (French ed.), vol. iv. p. 153.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_371_371" id="Footnote_371_371"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_371_371"><span class="label">[371]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. xv. p. 659.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_372_372" id="Footnote_372_372"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_372_372"><span class="label">[372]</span></a> -Annual Register, 1807, p. 777.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_373_373" id="Footnote_373_373"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_373_373"><span class="label">[373]</span></a> -See, for example, Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. viii. pp. 636 and 641-644; -vol. ix. p. 87, petition of West India planters; p. 100, speech of Mr. -Hibbert, and p. 684, speech of Mr. George Rose.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_374_374" id="Footnote_374_374"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_374_374"><span class="label">[374]</span></a> -See <i>ante</i>, p. 273.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_375_375" id="Footnote_375_375"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_375_375"><span class="label">[375]</span></a> -Am. State Papers, vol. iii. pp. 245-247.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_376_376" id="Footnote_376_376"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_376_376"><span class="label">[376]</span></a> -Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. xiii. Appendix, pp. xxxiv-xlv.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_377_377" id="Footnote_377_377"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_377_377"><span class="label">[377]</span></a> -Am. State Papers, vol. iii. pp. 23, 24.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_378_378" id="Footnote_378_378"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_378_378"><span class="label">[378]</span></a> -Annals of Congress, 1807, p. 2814.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_379_379" id="Footnote_379_379"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_379_379"><span class="label">[379]</span></a> -Annals of Congress, 1808-1809, p. 1824.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_380_380" id="Footnote_380_380"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_380_380"><span class="label">[380]</span></a> -There were three Orders in Council published on the 11th of November, -all relating to the same general subject. They were followed by three others, -issued November 25, further explaining or modifying the former three. The -author, in his analysis, has omitted reference to particular ones; and has -tried to present simply the essential features of the whole, suppressing -details.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_381_381" id="Footnote_381_381"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_381_381"><span class="label">[381]</span></a> -The attention paid to sustaining the commerce of Great Britain was -shown most clearly in the second Order of November 11, which overrode the -Navigation Act by permitting <i>any</i> friendly vessel to import articles the -produce of hostile countries; a permission extended later (by Act of Parliament, -April 14, 1808) to <i>any</i> ship, "belonging to <i>any</i> country, <i>whether in -amity with his Majesty or not</i>." Enemy's merchant ships were thus accepted -as carriers for British trade with restricted ports. See Am. State Papers, vol. -iii. pp. 270, 282.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_382_382" id="Footnote_382_382"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_382_382"><span class="label">[382]</span></a> -Gibraltar and Malta are especially named, they being natural depots -for the Mediterranean, whence a large contraband trade was busied in -evading Napoleon's measures. The governors of those places were authorized -to license even enemy's vessels, if unarmed and not over one hundred -tons burthen, to carry on British trade, contrary to the emperor's decrees.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_383_383" id="Footnote_383_383"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_383_383"><span class="label">[383]</span></a> -On March 28, 1808, an Act of Parliament was passed, fixing the duties -on exportations from Great Britain in furtherance of the provisions of the -Orders. This Act contained a clause excepting American ships, ordered -into British ports, from the tonnage duties laid on those which entered -voluntarily.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_384_384" id="Footnote_384_384"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_384_384"><span class="label">[384]</span></a> -In a debate on the Orders, March 3, 1812, the words of Spencer Perceval, -one among the ministers chiefly responsible for them, are thus reported: -"With respect to the principle upon which the Orders in Council were -founded, he begged to state that he had always considered them as <i>strictly -retaliatory</i>; and as far as he could understand the matter they were most -completely justified upon the principle of retaliation.... <i>The object of the -government was to protect and force the trade of this country</i>, which had been -assailed in such an unprecedented manner by the French decrees. If the -Orders in Council had not been issued, France would have had free colonial -trade by means of neutrals, and we should have been shut out from the Continent.... -<i>The object of the Orders in Council was, not to destroy the trade of -the Continent, but to force the Continent to trade with us.</i>" (Cobbett's Parl. -Debates, vol. xxi. p. 1152.) -</p> -<p> -As regards the retaliatory effect upon France, Perceval stated that the -revenue from customs in France fell from sixty million francs, in 1807, to -eighteen and a half million in 1808, and eleven and a half in 1809. (Ibid. -p. 1157.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_385_385" id="Footnote_385_385"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_385_385"><span class="label">[385]</span></a> -Correspondance de Napoléon, vol. xvii. p. 19.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_386_386" id="Footnote_386_386"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_386_386"><span class="label">[386]</span></a> -Mr. Henry Adams (History of the United States, 1801-1817) gives -134 as the number of American ships seized between April, 1809, and April, -1810, and estimates the value of the vessels and cargoes at $10,000,000 -(Vol. v. p. 242.) The author takes this opportunity of acknowledging his -great indebtedness to Mr. Adams's able and exhaustive work, in threading the -diplomatic intricacies of this time.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_387_387" id="Footnote_387_387"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_387_387"><span class="label">[387]</span></a> -December 26, 1805.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_388_388" id="Footnote_388_388"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_388_388"><span class="label">[388]</span></a> -Metternich's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 82.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_389_389" id="Footnote_389_389"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_389_389"><span class="label">[389]</span></a> -Metternich to Stadion, Jan. 11, 1809; Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 312.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_390_390" id="Footnote_390_390"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_390_390"><span class="label">[390]</span></a> -Letter of Napoleon to Louis, dated Trianon, Dec. 20, 1808; Mémoires -de Bourrienne, vol. viii. p. 134. Garnier's Louis Bonaparte, p. 351. The -date should be 1809. On Dec. 20, 1808, Napoleon was at Madrid, in 1809 at -Trianon; not to speak of the allusion to the Austrian war of 1809.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_391_391" id="Footnote_391_391"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_391_391"><span class="label">[391]</span></a> -Napoleon issued orders to this effect in August, 1807. Cargoes of goods -such as England might furnish were sequestrated; those that could not possibly -be of British origin, as naval stores and French wines, were admitted. -All vessels were to be prevented from leaving the Weser. No notification of -this action was given to foreign agents. See Cobbett's Political Register, -1807, pp. 857-859.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_392_392" id="Footnote_392_392"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_392_392"><span class="label">[392]</span></a> -Thiers, Consulate and Empire (Forbes's translation), vol. xii. p. 21.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_393_393" id="Footnote_393_393"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_393_393"><span class="label">[393]</span></a> -Mémoires de Bourrienne, French Minister at Hamburg, vol. viii. pp. -193-198.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_394_394" id="Footnote_394_394"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_394_394"><span class="label">[394]</span></a> -Annual Register, 1809; State Papers, 747.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_395_395" id="Footnote_395_395"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_395_395"><span class="label">[395]</span></a> -April 1, 1808; Naval Chronicle, vol. xxi. p. 48. May 7, 1809; Annual -Register, 1809, p. 698.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_396_396" id="Footnote_396_396"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_396_396"><span class="label">[396]</span></a> -Napoleon saw, in 1809, that his work at Tilsit was all to be done over, -since the only war Russia could make against the English was by commerce, -which was protected nearly as before. There was sold in Mayence sugar and -coffee which came from Riga.—<i>Mémoires de Savary, duc de Rovigo</i> (Imperial -Chief of Police), vol. iii. p. 135.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_397_397" id="Footnote_397_397"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_397_397"><span class="label">[397]</span></a> -D'Ivernois, Effects of the Continental blockade, London, Jan., 1810. -Lord Grenville, one of the leaders of the Opposition, expressed a similar confidence -when speaking in the House of Lords, Feb. 8, 1810. (Cobbett's Parl. -Debates, vol. xv. p. 347.) So also the King's speech at the opening of Parliament, -Jan. 19, 1809: "The public revenues, notwithstanding we are shut -out from almost all the continent of Europe and entirely from the United -States, has increased to a degree never expected, even by those persons who -were most sanguine." (Naval Chronicle, vol. xxi. p. 48.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_398_398" id="Footnote_398_398"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_398_398"><span class="label">[398]</span></a> -Monthly Magazine, vol. xxi. p. 195.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_399_399" id="Footnote_399_399"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_399_399"><span class="label">[399]</span></a> -Ibid., vol. xxii. p. 514.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_400_400" id="Footnote_400_400"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_400_400"><span class="label">[400]</span></a> -Ibid., vol. xxi. p. 539.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_401_401" id="Footnote_401_401"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_401_401"><span class="label">[401]</span></a> -Monthly Magazine, vol. xxii. p. 618.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_402_402" id="Footnote_402_402"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_402_402"><span class="label">[402]</span></a> -Ibid., vol. xxiv. p. 611.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_403_403" id="Footnote_403_403"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_403_403"><span class="label">[403]</span></a> -Ibid., vol. xxvi. p. 11.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_404_404" id="Footnote_404_404"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_404_404"><span class="label">[404]</span></a> -Ibid., vol. xxvii. pp. 417, 641.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_405_405" id="Footnote_405_405"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_405_405"><span class="label">[405]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 135.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_406_406" id="Footnote_406_406"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_406_406"><span class="label">[406]</span></a> -Tooke's History of Prices, vol. i. pp. 300, 301.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_407_407" id="Footnote_407_407"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_407_407"><span class="label">[407]</span></a> -Salgues, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la France, vol. viii. pp. -350-355. Mémoires de Marmont, due de Raguse, vol. iii. p. 365. Mémoires -de Savary, due de Rovigo, vol. v. p. 115.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_408_408" id="Footnote_408_408"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_408_408"><span class="label">[408]</span></a> -Quarterly Review, May, 1811, p. 465.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_409_409" id="Footnote_409_409"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_409_409"><span class="label">[409]</span></a> -For instance, a license was necessary for a British subject to ship any -articles to an enemy's port, though in a neutral vessel. In principle, licenses -are essential to trade with an enemy. In 1805 and 1807 Orders in Council -dispensed with the necessity of a license in particular instances; but even -then merchants preferred to take out a license, because it cut short any questions -raised by British cruisers, and especially by privateers. See Cobbett's -Parl. Debates, vol. x. p. 924.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_410_410" id="Footnote_410_410"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_410_410"><span class="label">[410]</span></a> -Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. x. p. 406.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_411_411" id="Footnote_411_411"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_411_411"><span class="label">[411]</span></a> -For an interesting account of the neutralizing trade, see Naval Chronicle, -vol. xxxi. pp. 288-295, and vol. xxxii. p. 119. On the License System, the -Parliamentary Debates (table of contents), and the Quarterly Review of May, -1811, may be consulted.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_412_412" id="Footnote_412_412"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_412_412"><span class="label">[412]</span></a> -Quarterly Review, May, 1811, p. 461. Lindsay's History of Merchant -Shipping, vol. ii. p 316.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_413_413" id="Footnote_413_413"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_413_413"><span class="label">[413]</span></a> -Petition of Hull merchants, 1812; Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. xxi. -p. 979.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_414_414" id="Footnote_414_414"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_414_414"><span class="label">[414]</span></a> -Am. State Papers, vol. iii. p. 341.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_415_415" id="Footnote_415_415"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_415_415"><span class="label">[415]</span></a> -Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxi. p. 1113.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_416_416" id="Footnote_416_416"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_416_416"><span class="label">[416]</span></a> -Ross's Life of Admiral Saumarez, vol. ii. pp. 196, 241.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_417_417" id="Footnote_417_417"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_417_417"><span class="label">[417]</span></a> -In the years 1809 and 1810 one hundred and sixty American vessels -alone were seized by Danish privateers. Only a part, however, were condemned. -(Am. State Papers, vol. iii. p. 521.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_418_418" id="Footnote_418_418"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_418_418"><span class="label">[418]</span></a> -Erskine's note to that effect was dated April 19, 1809.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_419_419" id="Footnote_419_419"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_419_419"><span class="label">[419]</span></a> -Annual Register, 1809, p. 726.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_420_420" id="Footnote_420_420"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_420_420"><span class="label">[420]</span></a> -Moniteur, Feb. 24, 1810.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_421_421" id="Footnote_421_421"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_421_421"><span class="label">[421]</span></a> -Mémoires, vol. ix. pp. 21-24.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_422_422" id="Footnote_422_422"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_422_422"><span class="label">[422]</span></a> -Cons. et Empire (Forbes's Trans.), xii. 15.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_423_423" id="Footnote_423_423"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_423_423"><span class="label">[423]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. xx. p. 235.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_424_424" id="Footnote_424_424"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_424_424"><span class="label">[424]</span></a> -Compare Metternich's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 188.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_425_425" id="Footnote_425_425"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_425_425"><span class="label">[425]</span></a> -Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xxxviii. p. 182.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_426_426" id="Footnote_426_426"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_426_426"><span class="label">[426]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. xxi. p. 70: "Mon principe est, La France avant -tout." (Letter to viceroy of Italy.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_427_427" id="Footnote_427_427"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_427_427"><span class="label">[427]</span></a> -Parl. Debates, vol. xxi. p. 1050; xxiii. p. 540.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_428_428" id="Footnote_428_428"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_428_428"><span class="label">[428]</span></a> -Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. xxi. pp. 1056, 1117.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_429_429" id="Footnote_429_429"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_429_429"><span class="label">[429]</span></a> -The decree was also shrouded in secrecy, and its existence denied in the -Moniteur (Cobbett's Pol. Register, xviii. p. 701). Napoleon wrote to the -viceroy of Italy, Aug. 6, 1810: "You will receive a decree which I have just -issued to regulate duties on colonial produce.... It is to be executed in -Italy; it is secret and to be kept in your hands. You will therefore give -orders in pursuance of this decree only by ministerial letters." (Corr., vol. -xxi. p. 28.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_430_430" id="Footnote_430_430"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_430_430"><span class="label">[430]</span></a> -Thiers, Cons. et Empire, Book xxxviii. pp. 181-189.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_431_431" id="Footnote_431_431"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_431_431"><span class="label">[431]</span></a> -Monthly Magazine, Feb. 1811, vol. xxxi. p. 67.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_432_432" id="Footnote_432_432"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_432_432"><span class="label">[432]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. xxi. p. 58.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_433_433" id="Footnote_433_433"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_433_433"><span class="label">[433]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. xxi. p. 224.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_434_434" id="Footnote_434_434"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_434_434"><span class="label">[434]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 268.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_435_435" id="Footnote_435_435"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_435_435"><span class="label">[435]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 77.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_436_436" id="Footnote_436_436"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_436_436"><span class="label">[436]</span></a> -Ibid., pp. 70, 71.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_437_437" id="Footnote_437_437"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_437_437"><span class="label">[437]</span></a> -Ibid., pp. 61, 62.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_438_438" id="Footnote_438_438"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_438_438"><span class="label">[438]</span></a> -Cobbett's Pol. Register, vol. xviii. pp. 704, 722.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_439_439" id="Footnote_439_439"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_439_439"><span class="label">[439]</span></a> -At Bordeaux licensed vessels were known to take on board wines and -brandies for the British army in Portugal. (Mémoires du duc de Rovigo, -vol. v. p. 60.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_440_440" id="Footnote_440_440"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_440_440"><span class="label">[440]</span></a> -Bourrienne, Mémoires, vol. viii. p. 261.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_441_441" id="Footnote_441_441"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_441_441"><span class="label">[441]</span></a> -Mémoires du duc de Rovigo, vol. v. p. 66.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_442_442" id="Footnote_442_442"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_442_442"><span class="label">[442]</span></a> -Mémoires de Bourrienne, vol. ix. p. 60.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_443_443" id="Footnote_443_443"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_443_443"><span class="label">[443]</span></a> -Porter's Progress of the Nation, sect. iii. p. 205. In 1815, after Napoleon's -overthrow, the price fell to £34.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_444_444" id="Footnote_444_444"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_444_444"><span class="label">[444]</span></a> -Tooke's Hist. of Prices, vol. i. p. 354.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_445_445" id="Footnote_445_445"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_445_445"><span class="label">[445]</span></a> -Souvenirs du duc de Vicence, vol. i. p. 88.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_446_446" id="Footnote_446_446"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_446_446"><span class="label">[446]</span></a> -Both Monroe and Pinkney, while ministers in London, informed the -United States government that the extreme measures taken were popular. -(Am. State Papers, vol. iii. pp. 188, 206.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_447_447" id="Footnote_447_447"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_447_447"><span class="label">[447]</span></a> -Letter on the Genius and Disposition of the French Government; by an -American lately returned from Europe, pp. 189-192. Baltimore, 1810. See -also Metternich's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 476, for the unhappiness of France.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_448_448" id="Footnote_448_448"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_448_448"><span class="label">[448]</span></a> -Mémoires du due de Raguse, vol. iii. p. 423. Marmont adds: "This -was a powerful help to French industry <i>during that time of suffering and -misery</i>."</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_449_449" id="Footnote_449_449"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_449_449"><span class="label">[449]</span></a> -Tooke's History of Prices, vol. i. p. 311.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_450_450" id="Footnote_450_450"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_450_450"><span class="label">[450]</span></a> -In like manner, vessels with British licenses frequently slipped into -French ports, especially with naval stores from the Baltic.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_451_451" id="Footnote_451_451"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_451_451"><span class="label">[451]</span></a> -"There was not a Dutchman," says M. Thiers, "who had not lost fifty -per cent by foreign loans." (Cons. et Empire (Forbes's trans.), xii. 47.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_452_452" id="Footnote_452_452"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_452_452"><span class="label">[452]</span></a> -"The emperor does desire war, because he needs more or less virgin -soil to explore, because he has need to occupy his armies and to entertain -them at the expense of others.... M. Romanzow has repeated to me a long -conversation he had had with the emperor. 'He wants money,' said he,—'he -does not hide it; he wishes war against Austria to procure it.'" (Metternich -to Stadion, Feb. 17, 1809; Memoirs, ii. 329.) The Austrian war of -1809 brought $34,000,000 into Napoleon's military chest. (Thiers, Cons. et -Emp., Book xxxviii. p. 34.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_453_453" id="Footnote_453_453"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_453_453"><span class="label">[453]</span></a> -Thus to Davout, commanding the Army of Germany: "I shall need -much money, which should make you feel the importance of obtaining for -me as much as you can, and asking of me as little as possible." (Corr., March -24, 1811.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_454_454" id="Footnote_454_454"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_454_454"><span class="label">[454]</span></a> -This condition of the debt was partly factitious, Napoleon maintaining -the public funds at eighty, by the secret intervention of the military chest. -(Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xli. p. 18.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_455_455" id="Footnote_455_455"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_455_455"><span class="label">[455]</span></a> -Mémoires du duc de Rovigo, vol. v. p. 116.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_456_456" id="Footnote_456_456"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_456_456"><span class="label">[456]</span></a> -Genius and Disposition of French Govt., p. 166. Baltimore, 1810.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_457_457" id="Footnote_457_457"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_457_457"><span class="label">[457]</span></a> -Genius and Disposition of French Govt., pp. 181-192.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_458_458" id="Footnote_458_458"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_458_458"><span class="label">[458]</span></a> -Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xli. p. 22.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_459_459" id="Footnote_459_459"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_459_459"><span class="label">[459]</span></a> -Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xli. p. 11.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_460_460" id="Footnote_460_460"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_460_460"><span class="label">[460]</span></a> -Arnold's History of Rome, opening of chap. xliii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_461_461" id="Footnote_461_461"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_461_461"><span class="label">[461]</span></a> -It is interesting to observe in Metternich's letters, while ambassador -at Paris, how he counts upon this exhausting of the capital of French -soldiers as the ultimate solution of the subjection of Austria. "For some -time Napoleon has lived on anticipations. The reserves are destroyed." -(April 11, 1809.) Compare also his exclamation to the emperor in 1813: -"Is not your present army anticipated by a generation? I have seen your -soldiers; they are mere children." (Memoirs, vol. i. p. 189).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_462_462" id="Footnote_462_462"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_462_462"><span class="label">[462]</span></a> -See Metternich's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 477.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_463_463" id="Footnote_463_463"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_463_463"><span class="label">[463]</span></a> -Corr. de Nap., vol. xxi. p. 497 (Feb. 28, 1811).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_464_464" id="Footnote_464_464"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_464_464"><span class="label">[464]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 275.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_465_465" id="Footnote_465_465"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_465_465"><span class="label">[465]</span></a> -Ibid., p. 296.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_466_466" id="Footnote_466_466"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_466_466"><span class="label">[466]</span></a> -These contentions of Napoleon were for the most part perfectly correct. -Some interesting facts, bearing upon the true character of the so-called -neutral trade in the Baltic, may be gathered from Ross's Life of Saumarez, -vol. ii. chaps. ix.-xiii. See also representations made by a number of American -ship-captains, Am. State Papers, vol. iii. pp. 329-333. On the other hand, -the scrupulously upright John Quincy Adams, U. S. minister to Russia, -affirmed that he positively knew some of the American ships to be direct -from the United States. The facts, however, only show the dependence of -the world at that time upon the Sea Power of Great Britain, which made -Napoleon's Continental System impossible; yet, on the other hand, it was his -only means of reaching his enemy. If he advanced, he was ruined; if he -receded, he failed.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_467_467" id="Footnote_467_467"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_467_467"><span class="label">[467]</span></a> -During one year, 1809, this fleet captured 430 vessels, averaging sixty -tons each, of which 340 were Danes. Among these were between thirty and -forty armed cutters and schooners, of which Denmark had to employ a great -many to supply Norway with grain. The remaining ninety vessels were -Russian. (Naval Chronicle, vol. xxii. p. 517.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_468_468" id="Footnote_468_468"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_468_468"><span class="label">[468]</span></a> -"Once more I must tell you," wrote a Swedish statesman to Saumarez, -"that you were the first cause that Russia dared to make war against France. -Had you fired one shot when we declared war against England, all had been -ended and Europe would have been enslaved." (Ross's Saumarez, vol. ii. -p. 294.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_469_469" id="Footnote_469_469"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_469_469"><span class="label">[469]</span></a> -Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xlii. p. 383.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_470_470" id="Footnote_470_470"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_470_470"><span class="label">[470]</span></a> -Compare Metternich's argument with the French Minister of Foreign -Affairs, October, 1807. (Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 161.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_471_471" id="Footnote_471_471"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_471_471"><span class="label">[471]</span></a> -Annual Register, 1792; State Papers, p. 355.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_472_472" id="Footnote_472_472"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_472_472"><span class="label">[472]</span></a> -Moniteur, Dec. 25, 1792; Proposition of M. Barailon.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_473_473" id="Footnote_473_473"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_473_473"><span class="label">[473]</span></a> -Pitt's Speeches, vol. ii. pp. 46, 47.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_474_474" id="Footnote_474_474"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_474_474"><span class="label">[474]</span></a> -Lanfrey's Napoleon, vol. iv. p. 112 (Eng. trans., ed. 1886).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_475_475" id="Footnote_475_475"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_475_475"><span class="label">[475]</span></a> -Lanfrey's Napoleon, vol. ii. chap. iii. p. 122 (Eng. trans., 2d ed.).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_476_476" id="Footnote_476_476"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_476_476"><span class="label">[476]</span></a> -Jurien de la Gravière, Vie de l'Amiral Baudin, p. 9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_477_477" id="Footnote_477_477"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_477_477"><span class="label">[477]</span></a> -That is, about 8 per cent annually. The increase during the four years -of the elder Pitt in the Seven Years' War, 1757-1761, was 29 per cent, about -7 per cent annually.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_478_478" id="Footnote_478_478"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_478_478"><span class="label">[478]</span></a> -Système Maritime et Politique des Européens dans le 18<sup>me</sup> siècle, par -Arnould. Paris, 1797.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_479_479" id="Footnote_479_479"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_479_479"><span class="label">[479]</span></a> -For Napoleon's own assertion of this fact, see "Note pour le Ministre -des Relations Extérieures," Corr. de Nap., Oct. 7, 1810. See also <i>ante</i>, -p. 320.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_480_480" id="Footnote_480_480"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_480_480"><span class="label">[480]</span></a> -Martin, Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. i. p. 396.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_481_481" id="Footnote_481_481"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_481_481"><span class="label">[481]</span></a> -Annual Register, 1793, p. 163. For the correspondence on that occasion -see A. R. 1792; State Papers, pp. 326, 327. See also letter of Le Brun, -French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the Moniteur of Aug. 26, 1792.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_482_482" id="Footnote_482_482"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_482_482"><span class="label">[482]</span></a> -The Directory tended to impose upon the smaller states, neighboring to -or allies of France, republican constitutions, "unitaires" (centralized) in -form, analogous to our own, as Bonaparte had done for the Cisalpine Republic -and for Genoa. It had just done so in Holland, where it had raised -against the government of the United Provinces a kind of 18th of Fructidor -(coup d'état). It now (1798) aimed at revolutionizing Switzerland. Bonaparte -urged it on. He had already provoked a revolution in a republic near -to and allied with the Swiss, that of the Grisons.—<span class="sc">Martin</span>: -<i>Hist. de France depuis</i> 1789, vol. iii. p. 7.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_483_483" id="Footnote_483_483"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_483_483"><span class="label">[483]</span></a> -Napoleon's remark referred to the edicts of the Directory, confiscating -British goods wherever found on land; but it applies equally to the decree of -January, 1798, which extended the edict to the sea: "Le Directoire ébaucha -le système du blocus continental; il ordonna la saisie de toutes les marchandises -Anglaises qui pouvaient se trouver à Mayence et dans les autres pays -cédés à la France." (Commentaires de Napoléon I., Paris, 1867, vol. iii. -p. 413.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_484_484" id="Footnote_484_484"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_484_484"><span class="label">[484]</span></a> -This correspondence, so far as published, is to be found in the Annual -Register for 1797; State Papers, pp. 181-223.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_485_485" id="Footnote_485_485"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_485_485"><span class="label">[485]</span></a> -See Stanhope's Life of Pitt, vol. ii. p. 224 (ed. 1879).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_486_486" id="Footnote_486_486"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_486_486"><span class="label">[486]</span></a> -For a graphic description of the effects of the Berlin decree on the -Continent, see Fyffe's History of Modern Europe, vol. i. p. 328.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_487_487" id="Footnote_487_487"></a> -<a href="#FNanchor_487_487"><span class="label">[487]</span></a> -Metternich's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 65.</p></div> -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_413" id="Page_413">[Pg 413]</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter p4"> -<h2><a name="INDEX2" id="INDEX2"></a>INDEX.</h2> -</div> - -<ul class="index"> - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>Acre</i>, Siege of, by Bonaparte,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_294">294-302</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Alexander</i>, Czar of Russia</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> succeeds to the throne, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Convention with Great Britain, June, 1801, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">coolness toward Bonaparte, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, and -<a href="#Footnote_54_54">note</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">joint action with Bonaparte in German indemnities, - <a href="#Page_84">84</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">conditions required before guaranteeing status of Malta, - <a href="#Page_92">92</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">attitude upon the execution of the Duc d'Enghien, - <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">joins Third Coalition, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">defeated at Austerlitz, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">commercial policy, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">campaign of Eylau and Friedland, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Treaty of Tilsit, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, - <a href="#Page_310">310</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">meeting at Erfurt, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">war with Sweden, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">joint letter with Napoleon to king of Great Britain, - <a href="#Page_294">294</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">attitude toward the Continental System, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, - <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">peace with Sweden, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">uneasiness at extension of French empire, - <a href="#Page_324">324</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">dissatisfaction at the annexation of Oldenburg, - <a href="#Page_330">330</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">disagreement with Napoleon concerning the Continental System, - <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">understanding reached with Great Britain and Sweden, - <a href="#Page_347">347</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">peace with Turkey, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">attacked by Napoleon, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Antwerp</i>, commercial isolation of,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> - in 1780, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_9">9</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">naval importance of, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_15">15</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">development under Napoleon as a naval arsenal, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_377">377</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <a name="armed_neutrality" id="armed_neutrality"></a> -<i>Armed Neutrality</i>, of 1800,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - signature and affirmations of, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">dissolution of, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Austria</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> - natural ally of Great Britain, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_12">12</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">quarrel with Holland about the Scheldt, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_17">17</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">war with Turkey, 1788, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_19">19</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">successes, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_24">24</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">peace with Turkey, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_25">25</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">joins in Declaration of Pilnitz, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_28">28</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">war with France, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_29">29</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">driven from Netherlands, 1792, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">jealousy of Prussia, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_80">80</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">holds Italian duchies, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_84">84</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">successes in 1793, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_93">93</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">mistakes, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_94">94</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">reverses, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_103">103</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_168">168</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">forced to retire across the Rhine in 1794, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_169">169</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_171">171</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">strengthens alliance with Great Britain, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_172">172</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">successes of 1795, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_181">181-183</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">campaign in Italy, 1795, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_195">195-198</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">reverses in Italy, 1796, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_209">209-212</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_216">216</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_217">217</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_233">233</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">signs preliminaries of Leoben, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_234">234</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Treaty of Campo Formio, Austrian gains and losses, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_250">250</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">dissatisfaction at French occupation of Rome, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_279">279</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">tumult in Vienna, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_280">280</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">alliance with Naples and Russia, 1798, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_282">282</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - renewal of war with France, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">successes in Switzerland and Italy, <a href="#Page_4">4-8</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">defeat at battle of Zurich, 1799, -<a href="#Page_9">9</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">refusal to treat with Bonaparte, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">disastrous campaigns of 1800 in Germany and Italy, -<a href="#Page_19">19-24</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">negotiations with Great Britain and France, -<a href="#Page_25">25</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">armistice with France, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, -<a href="#Page_35">35</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">renewal of hostilities and defeat of Hohenlinden, -<a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Peace of Lunéville, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">loss of power by German indemnities, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">joins Third Coalition, <a href="#Page_177">177-179</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">disastrous campaign of Austerlitz, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Peace of Presburg, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">accedes to the Continental System, 1807, -<a href="#Page_278">278</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">preparations to renew the war, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">war with France in 1809, -<a href="#Page_314">314-316</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Peace of Vienna and renewed exclusion of British goods, -<a href="#Page_316">316</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>Barham</i>, Lord, First Lord of Admiralty,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii</b>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">masterly action of, before Trafalgar, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, -<a href="#Page_174">174</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Battles</i>, land,</li> -<li class="isub2">Aboukir, <b>i.</b> - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_322">322</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Arcola, <b>i.</b> - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_233">233</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Austerlitz, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_182">182</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Badajos,<b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_349">349</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Castiglione, <b>i.</b> - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_233">233</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Ciudad Rodrigo, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_348">348</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Eckmuhl, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_315">315</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Essling, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_316">316</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Eylau, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_273">273</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Fleurus, <b>i.</b> - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_168">168</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Friedland, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_274">274</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Jena, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_270">270</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Jemappes, <b>i.</b> - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_31">31</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Lodi, <b>i.</b> - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_210">210</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Loano, <b>i.</b> - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_198">198</a>; -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_414" id="Page_414">[Pg 414]</a></span></li> -<li class="isub2">Marengo, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_23">23</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Pyramids, <b>i.</b> - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_277">277</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Rivoli, <b>i.</b> - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_233">233</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_243">243</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Talavera, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_315">315</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Valmy, <b>i.</b> - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_30">30</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Wagram, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_316">316</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Wattignies, <b>i.</b> - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_103">103</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Battles</i>, sea,</li> -<li class="isub2">Algesiras, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_63">63-66</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Camperdown, <b>i.</b> - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_378">378</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Copenhagen, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_47">47-51</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">First of June, <b>i.</b> - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_126">126-155</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Hotham and Martin, <b>i.</b> - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_190">190-194</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Île Groix, <b>i.</b> - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_177">177</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Nile, <b>i.</b> - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_261">261-277</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">St. Vincent, <b>i.</b> - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_221">221-229</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Trafalgar, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_185">185-195</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Bettesworth</i>, captain, British navy,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - fortunate meeting with combined fleets in June, 1805, -<a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <a name="Bonaparte" id="Bonaparte">Bonaparte</a> (see also -<a href="#Napoleon">Napoleon</a>),</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> interest in the East, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_14">14</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">influence upon course of events, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_183">183</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">appointed to command Army of Italy, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_203">203</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">successful campaign of 1796, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_207">207-211</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">designs upon Corsica, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_213">213</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">opinion of the effect of British Mediterranean fleet upon his -operations, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_217">217</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">critical position in Italy, May, 1796-Feb. 1797, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_233">233</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">fall of Mantua, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_233">233</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">advances into Carinthia, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_234">234</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">signs preliminaries of Leoben, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_234">234</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">offence at action of the Council of Five Hundred, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_244">244</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">sends Augereau to support <i>coup d'état</i>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_244">244</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">deep projects for maritime and Oriental expansion, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_246">246-249</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">signs Treaty of Campo Formio, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_250">250</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">opinion of danger to France from British Sea Power, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_251">251</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">return to Paris and command of Army of England, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_252">252</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Egyptian expedition organized, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_253">253</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">sails from Toulon, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_256">256</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">captures Malta, and sails thence for Egypt, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_257">257</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">lands at Alexandria, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_260">260</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">orders concerning the disposition of the fleet, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_261">261-263</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">criticism of Nelson's conduct, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_275">275</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">conquest of Lower Egypt, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_277">277</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">objects in Egyptian undertaking, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_288">288</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Syrian expedition, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_290">290</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">siege of Acre, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_299">299</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">retreat into Egypt, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_302">302</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">criticisms upon Sir Sidney Smith, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_303">303</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">defeats Turks at Aboukir, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_322">322</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">return to France, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_324">324</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">criticism upon his Oriental projects, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_324">324-328</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">attempts to send relief to Egypt and Malta, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_329">329-331</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">views as to condition of French in Egypt, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_332">332</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">views as to relative importance of Brest and Antwerp, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_377">377</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> policy as first consul, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, -<a href="#Page_20">20</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">campaign of Marengo, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">negotiations with Austria and Great Britain, 1800, -<a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, -<a href="#Page_38">38-40</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">overtures to the Czar, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, -<a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">to Prussia, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">efforts to form a coalition against Great Britain, -<a href="#Page_25">25-37</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Mediterranean projects, 1800-1801, <a href="#Page_59">59-68</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">anxiety for maritime peace, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">sends expedition to Haïti, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">president of Cisalpine republic, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">first consul for life, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">aggressions in 1802, <a href="#Page_84">84-90</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">insults to Great Britain, <a href="#Page_93">93-96</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">projects against Great Britain, 1803, -<a href="#Page_100">100</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">preparations to invade England, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, -<a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111-117</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">invasion of Hanover and Naples, <a href="#Page_109">109-111</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">first combinations to invade England, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">becomes emperor, May, 1804, -<a href="#Page_130">130</a>. See also <a href="#Napoleon">Napoleon.</a></li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Boulogne</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - point of concentration for Bonaparte's flotilla for invasion of England, - <a href="#Page_113">113</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">preparations at, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">strategic value of, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">appearance in 1814, -<a href="#Page_182">182</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Brest</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> character and surroundings of the port, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_304">304</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_305">305</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_342">342-344</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">methods of watching observed by Howe and Bridport, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_345">345</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_346">346</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_364">364-367</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">St. Vincent's methods, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_368">368-376</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">paralysis as a port of equipment, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_376">376</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Napoleon's preference for Antwerp, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_377">377</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Bridport</i>, Lord, British admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> succeeds Howe in command of Channel fleet, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_165">165</a>;</li> - <li class="isub4">action of Île Groix, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_177">177</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">escape of the French fleet from Brest, 1799, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_305">305</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">method of watching Brest, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_345">345</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_346">346</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">French expedition against Ireland, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_360">360-367</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">anecdote of, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_368">368</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">relieved in command by St. Vincent, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_368">368</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Brueys</i>, French admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> commands French division in Adriatic, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_252">252</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_255">255</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">designs upon Malta in 1798, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_255">255</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">appointed to command fleet in Egyptian expedition, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_253">253</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">negligent conduct of, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_262">262</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_263">263</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">inadequate preparations for defence, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_264">264-266</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Battle of the Nile, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_266">266-272</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">killed, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_271">271</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Bruix</i>, French admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> escape from Brest with twenty-five ships-of-the-line, in 1799, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_305">305</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">enters Mediterranean, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_307">307</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">action in Mediterranean, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_312">312-315</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">re-enters Atlantic accompanied by sixteen Spanish ships, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_315">315</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">reaches Brest, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_316">316</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">comments on this cruise, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_318">318</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - instructions of Bonaparte to, in 1800, - <a href="#Page_60">60-63</a>; - <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_415" id="Page_415">[Pg 415]</a></span></li> -<li class="isub4">connection with invasion flotilla, and death, -<a href="#Page_130">130</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>Calder</i>, British admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - ordered to command a detached squadron, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">action with combined fleets, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">court-martial upon, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Catharine</i>, Empress of Russia,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> influence upon Joseph II., Emperor of Germany, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_11">11</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">relations with Austria and France, 1784, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_16">16</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_17">17</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">naval undertakings, 1788, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_20">20</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">attitude toward French Revolution, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_82">82</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_243">243</a>; -<b>ii.</b> <a href="#Page_233">233</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - death, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Chauvelin</i>, French ambassador to Great Britain,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> disputes with British ministry, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_32">32-34</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">dismissed from Great Britain, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_34">34</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Collingwood</i>, British admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> remarks of, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_70">70</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_71">71</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_75">75</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_309">309</a> (note);</li> -<li class="isub4">attention to health of crew, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_71">71</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">distinguished share in battle of Cape St. Vincent, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_227">227</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - blockade off Rochefort, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">ordered to West Indies with eight ships in 1805, -<a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">blockade of Cadiz, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, -<a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, -<a href="#Page_180">180</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">surmise as to Napoleon's intentions, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">brilliant conduct at Trafalgar, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">succeeds to command after Nelson's death, -<a href="#Page_195">195</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Commerce</i>, warfare against,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - chaps.<a href="#Page_199"> xvii</a>. and <a href="#Page_272"> xviii</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Commerce</i>-destroying,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> by scattered cruisers, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_179">179</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_326">326-328</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_335">335-338</a>; - <b>ii.</b> <a href="#Page_199">199-218</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221-228</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Cornwallis</i>, British admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> action with superior French fleet, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_177">177</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">tenacity in maintaining Brest blockade, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_373">373</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_376">376</a>; - <b>ii.</b> <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, - <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, -<a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">orders to detach squadron under Calder to meet Villeneuve, -<a href="#Page_168">168</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">joined by Calder and Nelson, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">mistake in dividing his force, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Corsica</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> acquired by France in 1769, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_88">88</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">relations to France and to Great Britain, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_88">88</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">revolt against the Convention, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_88">88</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">French expelled by British, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_187">187</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">union with Great Britain proclaimed, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_188">188</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">difficulties of government by Great Britain, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_188">188</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_189">189</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">value of the island, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_179">179</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_186">186</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Bonaparte's measures to recover, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_213">213</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_216">216</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">evacuated by the British, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_216">216</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">contributes a detachment to Egyptian Expedition, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_254">254</a>, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_257">257</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>Davout</i>, French marshal,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - battle of Eckmuhl, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">charged with maintenance of Continental System, -<a href="#Page_317">317</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">command in Prussia and Hanse towns, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">injunctions of Napoleon to, <a href="#Footnote_452_452">337, note.</a></li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Decrees</i>, French,</li> -<li class="isub4">of Fraternity, Nov. 19, 1792, -<b>i.</b> <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_31">31</a>, -<b>ii.</b> <a href="#Page_361">361</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">extending French system, Dec. 15, 1792, -<b>i.</b> <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_32">32</a>, -<b>ii.</b> <a href="#Page_367">367</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - affecting neutral carriers, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, - <a href="#Page_242">242-246</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">confiscating ships carrying goods of British origin, January, 1798, -<a href="#Page_249">249</a>, -<a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254-259</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Napoleon's Berlin, <a href="#Page_271">271-273</a>, -<a href="#Page_281">281</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Milan, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Bayonne and Rambouillet, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, -<a href="#Page_292">292</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">general seizure of goods of British origin, August, 1810, -<a href="#Page_324">324</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">public burning of British manufactures, Oct. 19, 1810, -<a href="#Page_327">327</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>De Galles</i>, Morard, French admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> commands Brest fleet in 1793, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_61">61-63</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">conduct in the mutiny of that year, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_62">62</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">opinions as to the efficiency of the seamen, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_61">61</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">commands naval part of Irish Expedition, 1796, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_350">350-360</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Denmark</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> hostility to Sweden, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_21">21</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">invades Sweden, 1788, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_21">21</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">stopped by Great Britain and Prussia, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_22">22</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_25">25</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">seeks the commercial advantages of neutrality in French Revolution, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_83">83</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">loss of West India colonies, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_121">121</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - quarrel with Great Britain about rights of convoy, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Bonaparte tries to conciliate, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">joins Armed Neutrality of 1800, -<a href="#Page_36">36</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">British expedition against, <a href="#Page_41">41-47</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">battle of Copenhagen, <a href="#Page_47">47-51</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">armistice with Great Britain, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, and -convention, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Napoleon's designs against, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">second British expedition and bombardment of Copenhagen, -<a href="#Page_277">277</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">shares in Continental System, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">privateering by Danish seamen, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">deprived of Norway, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>De Rions</i>, D'Albert, French commodore,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> mobbed by the populace of Toulon, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_41">41-44</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">commands Brest fleet in mutiny of 1790, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_45">45</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">leaves the navy and emigrates, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_46">46</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Suffren's high opinion of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_46">46</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Devins</i>, Austrian general,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> inefficiency of, in 1795 in Italy, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_195">195-198</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Directory</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> established as French executive government, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_175">175</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_176">176</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">arrogance toward foreign states, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_240">240</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_242">242</a>; -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_416" id="Page_416">[Pg 416]</a></span></li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - disasters and incompetency of, <a href="#Page_1">1-14</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">overthrown by Bonaparte, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">identity of spirit with Napoleon, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, -<a href="#Page_354">354</a>, <a href="#Page_396">396</a>, <a href="#Page_398">398</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Dumouriez</i>, French general,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> wins battles of Valmy and Jemappes, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_30">30</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_31">31</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_89">89</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">defeated at Neerwinden and driven from Holland and Netherlands, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_89">89</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">treason of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_89">89</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>Egypt</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> nominal dependence upon Turkey under the Mamelukes, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_85">85</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">genesis of Bonaparte's expedition to, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_246">246-249</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">conquest of, by the French, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_260">260</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_277">277</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_288">288-290</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Bonaparte's purpose in the enterprise, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_288">288</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">loss of, by the French, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_330">330-334</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Kleber's opinion of the value of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_331">331</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">tenure dependent upon control of the sea, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_331">331</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_332">332</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_60">60-63</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - restored to Turkey, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">condition under Turkish rule, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, -<a href="#Page_150">150</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Nelson's apprehensions for, <a href="#Page_124">124-127</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">his search for the French fleet in Alexandria, 1805, -<a href="#Page_144">144</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Elba</i>, island of,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> seized by British, though a possession of Tuscany, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_213">213</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">evacuated, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_220">220</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - transferred to France at Peace of Amiens, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Elliott</i>, Sir Gilbert,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> British Viceroy of Corsica, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_187">187</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_188">188</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_213">213</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">quoted, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_188">188</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_217">217</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_218">218</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">returns to England, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_230">230</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>Flotilla</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - for invasion of England, numbers and character of, <a href="#Page_111">111-116</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">estimate of, as a fighting force by British naval officers and -Napoleon, <a href="#Page_120">120-122</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">ultimate fate of, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Fox</i>, British statesman,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - opinion as to "free ships, free goods," <a href="#Page_261">261</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">minister of foreign affairs, 1806, -<a href="#Page_269">269</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">modification of Rule of 1756 by Order in Council of May, 1806, -<a href="#Page_270">270</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">death, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">praise of French soldiery, <a href="#Page_365">365</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">disparagement of Pitt, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>France</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> results of war of 1778 to, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_3">3</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_4">4</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">condition of, in 1789, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_6">6</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">policy of, as to Sweden, Poland, and Turkey, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_13">13</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">interest in the Levant and the Baltic, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_14">14</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_22">22</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">interest in Netherlands, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_15">15</a>, and Holland, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_16">16-18</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">alliance with Holland, 1785, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_18">18</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">increasing internal disorder, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_18">18</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_24">24</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">meeting of States General, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_25">25</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">outline of events in the Revolution to Feb. 1, 1793, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_28">28-33</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">declares war against Austria, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_29">29</a>, and against -Great Britain and Holland, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_34">34</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">condition of the navy in 1793, -and causes thereof, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_35">35-68</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">comparative strength of British and French fleets, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_75">75</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_110">110</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">acquisition and status of Corsica, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_88">88</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">internal conflicts in 1793, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_89">89-92</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">disasters on eastern frontiers, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_93">93</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">energy shown by the government, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_93">93-96</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">disasters retrieved in 1793, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_103">103</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">internal rebellions quelled, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_104">104</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_105">105</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">condition and importance of West India Islands, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_111">111</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_114">114</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_115">115</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">contest over West India Islands, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_115">115-119</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">scarcity of provisions, 1793, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_122">122</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">convoy of provisions ordered from America, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_122">122</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">internal events, 1794, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_166">166-168</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">military successes in 1794, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_168">168-171</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">conquest of Belgium and Holland, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_170">170</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">peace with Prussia, Holland, and Spain, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_172">172</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">reaction of 1795, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_173">173</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_174">174</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">internal disorders, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_175">175</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_176">176</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">great fleets withdrawn from the sea, and policy of -commerce-destroying adopted, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_179">179</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_201">201</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">military weakness in 1795, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_180">180-183</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">loses Corsica, 1794, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_187">187</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">successes in Italy, 1795-1796, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_198">198</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_209">209-211</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_233">233</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_234">234</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">regains Corsica, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_216">216</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">brings Austria to peace, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_234">234</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_250">250</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">arrogance toward foreign governments, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_240">240-243</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">reactionary disorders, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_243">243</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">coup d'état of Sept. 3, 1797, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_244">244</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">danger from Great Britain, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_251">251</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">sends expedition to Egypt, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_253">253</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">capture of Malta by, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_257">257</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">naval defeat at the Nile, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_263">263-277</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">subjugation of Egypt by, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_277">277</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_289">289</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">aggressions upon Holland and Switzerland, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_278">278</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">offence given to Naples, Austria, and Russia, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_280">280-282</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">reverses in the Mediterranean, 1798, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_287">287</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">expectations from conquest of Egypt, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_288">288</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">reverses in Europe, 1799, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_323">323</a>,</li> -<li class="isub4">loss of Malta and Egypt, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_328">328-334</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">maritime impotence of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_335">335-338</a>,</li> -<li class="isub4">expeditions against Ireland, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_346">346-380</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - conquest of Naples, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">reverses in Europe, 1799, -<a href="#Page_3">3-11</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">internal disorders, 1799, -<a href="#Page_11">11-15</a>; Bonaparte first consul, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">successful campaign of 1800, -<a href="#Page_19">19-24</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">maritime and colonial exhaustion, 1800, -<a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">peace of Lunéville with Austria, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">fruitless attempts to control Mediterranean, -<a href="#Page_59">59-68</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">preliminaries of peace with Great Britain, <a href="#Page_71">71-73</a>; -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_417" id="Page_417">[Pg 417]</a></span></li> -<li class="isub4">exhaustion of national spirit of aggression, -<a href="#Page_74">74</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">aggressions of Bonaparte, 1801-1803, <a href="#Page_76">76-97</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">cession of Louisiana by Spain, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Peace of Amiens with Great Britain, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">renewal of war, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Louisiana ceded to United States, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">maritime and financial weakness, <a href="#Page_106">106-108</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">occupation of Hanover and heel of Italy, -<a href="#Page_109">109-111</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">preparations for invasion of England, -<a href="#Page_111">111-117</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">exactions from Spain, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Trafalgar campaign, <a href="#Page_140">140-181</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">its chances of success discussed, <a href="#Page_182">182-184</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">necessity of invading England, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">campaign of 1805 and battle of Austerlitz, -<a href="#Page_181">181</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">naval defeat of Trafalgar, <a href="#Page_187">187-195</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">far-reaching consequences of this battle, -<a href="#Page_196">196</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">succeeded by the Continental System, <a href="#Page_197">197-200</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">maritime impotence of, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">activity of privateers, <a href="#Page_207">207-210</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">characteristics of privateering, in Europe, -<a href="#Page_208">208</a>, in Atlantic, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, in West Indies, -<a href="#Page_212">212</a>, in East Indies, <a href="#Page_215">215-218</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">destruction of French commerce, <a href="#Page_218">218-220</a>, -<a href="#Page_375">375</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">bitterness against Great Britain and maritime neutrals, -<a href="#Page_230">230</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">anger against United States, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">measures directed against neutral carriers, -<a href="#Page_242">242-248</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250-254</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">results of these measures, <a href="#Page_254">254-258</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4"><i>quasi</i> war with the United States, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">true commercial policy of, <a href="#Page_262">262-265</a>, -<a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">commercial measures of Napoleon, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Berlin Decree, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">campaign against Russia, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Peace of Tilsit, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">invasion of Portugal, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Milan Decree, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">war in Spain, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">war with Austria, 1809, -<a href="#Page_314">314</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">excessive prices in, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">internal distress of, <a href="#Page_333">333-337</a>, -<a href="#Page_340">340-342</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">want of credit, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, -<a href="#Page_343">343</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">disputes with Russia, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">invasion of Russia, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">analysis of commercial measures of Napoleon, -<a href="#Page_351">351-357</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">temper and aims of leaders in French Revolution, -<a href="#Page_359">359-363</a>, <a href="#Page_367">367</a>, -<a href="#Page_384">384</a>, also <a href="#Page_74">74</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">decrees of November 19, <a href="#Page_361">361</a>, -and December <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_367">367</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">effect of the maritime war upon French industry, -<a href="#Page_395">395</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">identity of spirit in the Republic, the Directory, and in Napoleon, -<a href="#Page_396">396-399</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">the struggle with Great Britain one of endurance, -<a href="#Page_406">406</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">similarity of characteristics in the external action of France -from 1793-1812, <a href="#Page_407">407-411</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">continued vitality of the movement due to Bonaparte, -<a href="#Page_407">407</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>Ganteaume</i>, French admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> report of condition of French naval officers and -seamen, 1801, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_65">65</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">injuries received by squadron under his command, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_67">67</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">commerce-destroying cruise in 1795, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_202">202</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">brings Bonaparte back from Egypt to France, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_323">323</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">escape from Brest in 1801, - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_376">376</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_61">61</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">failure to relieve Egypt, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">maritime prefect at Toulon, 1803, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">command of Brest fleet, 1804, and instructions from Napoleon, -<a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">modified instructions, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">unable to escape from Brest, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">awaits Villeneuve outside the Goulet, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Genoa</i>, coasting trade with Southern France, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_195">195</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_200">200</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_7">7</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> French intrigues in, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_201">201</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_213">213</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">preparations in, for Egyptian Expedition, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_254">254</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_257">257</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">organized as Republic of Liguria by Bonaparte, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_279">279</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - Admiral Bruix reinforces, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, - <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Masséna besieged in, <a href="#Page_20">20-23</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">made a military division of France, -<a href="#Footnote_54_54">69, note</a>, -<a href="#Page_85">85</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">annexed to France, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">effect of this measure upon Austria, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Gravina</i>, Spanish admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - commands the allied rear at the battle of Trafalgar, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, - <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Great Britain</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> importance of her action against France, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_1">1</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">results to, of War of 1778, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_3">3</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_8">8</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">recovery of prosperity under second Pitt, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_5">5</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">importance to, of public confidence in Pitt, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_6">6</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">attitude toward Russia, 1770-1790, and interest in the Levant -and Baltic, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_10">10-17</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_20">20-23</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_25">25</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_27">27</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">relations to Holland and the Netherlands, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_15">15-17</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_19">19</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_21">21</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_32">32</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">relations to Turkey, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_12">12</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_22">22-24</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">alliance with Prussia and Holland, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_19">19</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_21">21</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_22">22</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_25">25</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">refuses to interfere in French Revolution, 1791, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_29">29</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">change of feeling in, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_30">30</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">recalls her ambassador from Paris, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_32">32</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">dismisses French ambassador, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_34">34</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">war declared against, by France, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_34">34</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">influence of, 1793-1815, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_68">68</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">condition of navy in 1793, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_69">69-75</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">policy of, in war of French Revolution, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_81">81</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">takes possession of Toulon, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_92">92</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">unpreparedness of, in 1793, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_96">96</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">military and naval policy, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_97">97-103</a>; -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_418" id="Page_418">[Pg 418]</a></span></li> -<li class="isub4">evacuates Toulon, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_105">105</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">effect produced by, in Peninsular War, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_106">106</a> (note);</li> -<li class="isub4">importance of West Indies to, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_109">109-111</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">mistaken action in Haïti, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_111">111-113</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_116">116</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">reduces the Lesser Antilles, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_115">115</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">reverses and loss of Guadaloupe, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_116">116-119</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">sufferings of West India trade, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_120">120</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">takes Trinidad, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_120">120</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">and other West India colonies, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_121">121</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">takes part in Continental War as ally of Holland, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_93">93</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">withdraws from Holland, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_169">169</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_170">170</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">injury to, from French conquest of Holland, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_170">170</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">war with Holland and capture of Dutch colonies, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_170">170</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">new treaties with Austria and Russia, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_172">172</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">interests and policy in Mediterranean, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_185">185</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_186">186</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">political union of Corsica with, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_188">188</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">abandons Corsica, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_215">215</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">impolicy of evacuating Mediterranean, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_217">217</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_218">218</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">depression of, in 1797, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_229">229</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">effect of battle of Cape St. Vincent, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_231">231</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">security due to sea power, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_236">236</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">negotiations for peace, 1796, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_240">240</a>; in 1797, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_245">245</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">naval successes of 1797, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_255">255</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">resolve again to dispute control of Mediterranean, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_256">256</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">joins Second Coalition, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_282">282</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">frustrates Bonaparte's Oriental projects, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_324">324</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">dependence upon sea power, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_327">327</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">policy of, for protection of commerce, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_337">337</a>, -<b>ii.</b> <a href="#Page_203">203-205</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - expedition against Holland, 1799, <a href="#Page_8">8-10</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">prosperity of, in 1800, -<a href="#Page_17">17-19</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227-231</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">collision with northern states about neutral rights, -<a href="#Page_26">26-37</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260-262</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Baltic Expedition of 1801, -<a href="#Page_41">41-57</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">conventions with Baltic powers, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, -<a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">influence of sea power, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, -<a href="#Page_74">74</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">peace with France, <a href="#Page_71">71-75</a>, -<a href="#Page_81">81</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">remonstrance with Bonaparte upon his intervention in Switzerland, -<a href="#Page_88">88-90</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">strained relations with France, <a href="#Page_90">90-97</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">renewal of war, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">unanimity of British people, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">policy of renewing the war, <a href="#Page_105">105-108</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">measures for resisting invasion, <a href="#Page_117">117-122</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">quarrel with Spain, 1804, -<a href="#Page_133">133-139</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">naval dispositions, 1805, -<a href="#Page_148">148</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">insight of naval authorities, <a href="#Page_157">157-159</a>, -<a href="#Page_166">166</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">effect upon the fortunes of Napoleon, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, -<a href="#Page_196">196-201</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">control of sea by, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">losses by capture, <a href="#Page_221">221-227</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">dependence upon neutral carrier, <a href="#Page_229">229-231</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">restrictions upon neutral trade, <a href="#Page_233">233-239</a>, -<a href="#Page_240">240-242</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Jay's treaty with, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">prosperity of trade, <a href="#Page_249">249-254</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">general policy as to neutral trade, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, -<a href="#Page_266">266-268</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">seizures of American ships, 1805, -<a href="#Page_269">269</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">blockade of coast of Europe, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Order in Council of January, 1807, -<a href="#Page_275">275</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">expedition against Denmark, 1807, -<a href="#Page_276">276</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Orders in Council of November, 1807, -<a href="#Page_283">283-290</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">landing in Portugal, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">supports Spanish revolt, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">operations in Peninsula, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, -<a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>, -<a href="#Page_348">348</a>, also <b>i.</b> <a href="#Page_106">106-108</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">seizure of Heligoland, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">conditions of trade, 1806-1812, <a href="#Page_304">304-306</a>, -<a href="#Page_329">329-333</a>, -<a href="#Page_340">340-342</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>, <a href="#Page_373">373</a>, -<a href="#Page_377">377-382</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">License System, <a href="#Page_308">308-313</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Order in Council of April, 1809, -<a href="#Page_313">313</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">credit of, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">internal condition, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">influence in Baltic, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">policy and rightfulness of the Orders in Council, -<a href="#Page_351">351-357</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">influence upon the French Revolution and Empire, -<a href="#CHAPTER_XIX">chap. xix.</a></li> - - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>Haïti</i>, French colony,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> early revolutionary disorders in, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_47">47-49</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_111">111</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">British operations in, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_111">111-113</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_116">116</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">rule of Toussaint L'Ouverture, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_113">113</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">base of privateering, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_120">120</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - Bonaparte's expedition against, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">its reverses, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">dependence upon American continent, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">loss of, to France, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Hamburg</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> commercial importance of, during French -Revolutionary wars, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_253">253</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108-110</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, - <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>, - <a href="#Page_378">378</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - Cuxhaven occupied by Prussian troops, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">occupied by Danish troops, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Napoleon's grudge against, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">imperial troops quartered on, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">confiscations of colonial produce, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, -<a href="#Page_325">325</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">annexed to French empire, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Hanover</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> commercial importance to Great Britain, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_253">253</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - Prussian designs upon, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">occupied by Prussian troops, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">evacuated, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">occupied by Bonaparte, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">offered by Bonaparte to Prussia, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Hoche</i>, French general,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> commanding army of Sambre and Meuse, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_240">240</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_377">377</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">anxiety about reactionary movements in France, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_244">244</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">pacification of La Vendée, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_347">347</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">commands expedition against Ireland, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_347">347-360</a>; -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_419" id="Page_419">[Pg 419]</a></span></li> -<li class="isub4">interest in a second expedition, and death, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_378">378</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Holland</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> weakness of, in 1781, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_7">7</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">fall of barrier towns and quarrel about the Scheldt, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_7">7</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_16">16-18</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">relations to Great Britain and France, 1783-1793, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_17">17-19</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">relations to Russia, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_16">16</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_20">20</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">occupied by Prussian troops, 1787, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_19">19</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">defensive alliance with Great Britain and Prussia, 1788, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_21">21</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_363">363</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">the Scheldt opened, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_31">31</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_362">362</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">France declares war against, 1793, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_34">34</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">condition of navy, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_78">78</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">course of, in French Revolution, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_83">83</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">colonies of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_83">83</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">invasion of, by Dumouriez, 1793, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_89">89</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">invasion and conquest by Pichegru, 1795, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_169">169</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">fall of stadtholder, and republic proclaimed, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_170">170</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">war with Great Britain and loss of colonies, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_170">170</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_394">394</a> (see also West Indies, - pp. <a href="#Page_109">109-121</a>);</li> -<li class="isub4">treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with France, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_172">172</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">centralized constitution imposed by France, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_278">278</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">contemplated invasion of Ireland from, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_378">378</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">naval defeat at Camperdown, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_378">378</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - compelled to war against Great Britain by Bonaparte in 1803, - <a href="#Page_111">111</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">share in Bonaparte's projected invasion of England, -<a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, -<a href="#Page_147">147</a>, -<a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">base of commerce-destroying, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, -<a href="#Page_216">216</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">demands upon the United States to resist seizure of belligerent -property, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">confiscation of goods of British origin ordered by Bonaparte, -1803, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">confiscations of American ships by Bonaparte, -<a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Louis Bonaparte crowned king, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">withstands Napoleon's Continental System, -<a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">continuous blockade by British navy, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Louis abdicates and Holland is annexed to French Empire, -<a href="#Page_321">321</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">commercial ruin of, 1811, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Hood</i>, Lord, British admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> commands Mediterranean fleet, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_96">96</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">receives surrender of Toulon, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_92">92</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">forced to evacuate the port, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_105">105</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">retires to Hyères Bay, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_106">106</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">conquest of Corsica, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_187">187</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">merit of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_207">207</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">returns to England, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_189">189</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">succeeded by Jervis, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_194">194</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_203">203</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">tactical dispositions at St. Kitt's, in 1782, -compared to those of Brueys in Aboukir Bay, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_265">265</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Hotham</i>, British admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> commands in Mediterranean, 1795, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_190">190-194</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">sluggishness of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_192">192</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_199">199-202</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_207">207</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Howe</i>, Earl, British admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> commands Channel fleet, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_96">96</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">military character and naval policy of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_101">101</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">naval campaign of 1794 and battle of June 1, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_125">125-160</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">admirable tactics of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_135">135</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_149">149</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_160">160</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">strategic error of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_156">156-159</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">retires from active service, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_164">164</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">opinion concerning Battle of the Nile, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_273">273</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">conduct of Brest blockade and Channel service, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_162">162</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_338">338-346</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>Ionian</i> islands (Corfu and others),</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> possessions of Venice in 1793, and subsequent transfers, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_86">86</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_235">235</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Bonaparte's desire for, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_247">247-249</a> -(and note);</li> -<li class="isub4">transferred to France by treaty of Campo Formio, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_250">250</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_251">251</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">indicated by Bonaparte as station for French fleet, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_262">262</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">taken from France by Russo-Turkish fleet, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_286">286</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_10">10</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - constituted Republic of Seven Islands by peace of 1801, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">transferred to France by Treaty of Tilsit, -<a href="#Page_274">274</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Ireland</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> French expedition against, 1796, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_346">346-361</a>; -in 1798, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_378">378-380</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - Bonaparte's designs against, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, - <a href="#Page_131">131</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">British anxiety about, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, -<a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, -<a href="#Page_386">386</a>; also, <b>i.</b> <a href="#Page_306">306</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Italy</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> lack of political unity in, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_81">81</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_84">84</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_185">185</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">interest of Great Britain in, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_185">185</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_186">186</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">campaign of 1795 in, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_195">195-198</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">part of the British fleet in the campaign, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_199">199-201</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Bonaparte's campaign of 1796 in, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_208">208-211</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_233">233-236</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - French reverses in 1799, <a href="#Page_3">3-10</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">campaign of Marengo, <a href="#Page_20">20-23</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Bonaparte's designs in, in 1800, -<a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, -<a href="#Page_86">86</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">occupation of Naples, 1803, -<a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Napoleon crowned king of, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">commercial orders of Napoleon, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, -<a href="#Page_326">326</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>Jay</i>, John,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - United States envoy to Great Britain, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Treaty of Commerce and Navigation negotiated by, -<a href="#Page_237">237-239</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">anger of French government, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, -<a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Jervis</i>, British admiral. See -<a href="#st_vincent">St. Vincent</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Joseph II.</i>, Emperor of Germany,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> succeeds Maria Theresa, 1780, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_7">7</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">raises the question of the Scheldt, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_9">9</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_17">17</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_18">18</a>; -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_420" id="Page_420">[Pg 420]</a></span></li> -<li class="isub4">attempts to exchange the Netherlands for Bavaria, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_18">18</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">declares war against Turkey, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_19">19</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">dies, 1790, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_25">25</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Jourdan</i>, French general,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> commands army of Sambre and Meuse, 1794, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_168">168</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">wins battle of Fleurus, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_168">168</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">pursuit of Austrians, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_169">169</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">operations of, 1795, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_180">180-182</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">disasters in 1796, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_213">213</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_216">216</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - command in Germany in 1799, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">defeated at Stokach, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">resigns command, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>Keith</i>, British admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> commands naval division watching Cadiz, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_286">286</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">unexpected appearance of French fleet under Bruix, 1799, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_307">307</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">recalled to Gibraltar, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_310">310</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">sails in pursuit of Bruix, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_312">312</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">left in command of fleet by St. Vincent, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_312">312</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">further pursuit of French fleet, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_312">312-316</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">returns to Torbay, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_316">316</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">returns to Mediterranean as commander-in-chief, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_316">316</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_329">329</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">conduct of pursuit examined, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_320">320</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_321">321</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">letter to Kleber, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_333">333</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - operations against French in Egypt, 1801, - <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">commands squadron in the Downs, 1803-1805, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, -<a href="#Page_148">148</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">report of captures in Mediterranean, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Kleber</i>, French general,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> left by Bonaparte in command in Egypt, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_331">331</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">opinion as to dependence of Egypt upon the navy, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_331">331</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Convention of El Arish, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_332">332</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">letter from Admiral Keith, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_333">333</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">assassinated, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_334">334</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>Leopold</i>, Emperor of Germany,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> succeeds Joseph II., -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_25">25</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">makes peace with Turkey, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_26">26</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">joins Prussia in Declaration of Pilnitz, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_28">28</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Levant</i>, the,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> advance of Russia in, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_10">10-12</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">commercial and political importance of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_11">11</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">interest of France in, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_12">12</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_14">14</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">interest of Great Britain in, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_23">23</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">interest of Bonaparte in, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_247">247-253</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_95">95</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>License System</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - of Great Britain, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_307">307-313</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">of Napoleon, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_307">307</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_326">326</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_327">327</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_329">329</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Linois</i>, French admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - repels British fleet at battle of Algesiras, <a href="#Page_63">63-66</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">deceived by a body of East India ships, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, -<a href="#Page_215">215</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Louis XVI.</i>, King of France,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> interferes between Austria and Holland, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_17">17</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_18">18</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">brought from Versailles to Paris by the mob, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_25">25</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">flight from Paris and capture of, 1791, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_28">28</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">scenes of June 20 and August 10, 1792, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_30">30</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">suspended, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_30">30</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">and deposed, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_31">31</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">tried and executed, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_32">32</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">interest in the navy, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_50">50</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_67">67</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Louisiana</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - cession by Spain to France, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">apprehensions of Great Britain, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">anger of the United States people, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">sold to the United States by Bonaparte, -<a href="#Page_104">104</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>Malta</i>, Island of,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> belongs to Knights of St. John in 1793, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_87">87</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">its dependence upon the fleet, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_87">87</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">importance of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_87">87</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_247">247</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Bonaparte's designs upon, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_255">255</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">seized by Bonaparte, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_257">257</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Nelson's opinion of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_258">258</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">interest of the Czar, Paul I., in, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_281">281</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_282">282</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_32">32-34</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">blockaded by British and Portuguese squadron, and summoned to -surrender by Sir James Saumarez, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_285">285</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">isolation of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_285">285</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_329">329</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">surrendered to British, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_330">330</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - stipulations of the preliminaries of peace in 1801, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">provisions of the Treaty of Amiens, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">disputes between England and France concerning, -<a href="#Page_91">91-98</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Orders in Council of 1807, -<a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">commercial importance, 1807-1812, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Mann</i>, British admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> joins Mediterranean fleet, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_194">194</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">detached to blockade Richery in Cadiz, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_202">202</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">ordered to rejoin by Jervis, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_213">213</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">mistaken action of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_214">214</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_215">215</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Marmont</i>, French marshal,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> opinion concerning Sir Sidney Smith, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_295">295</a> (note);</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - commands corps in Holland for invasion of England, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, - <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>; -quoted, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_259">259</a> (note), -<b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Martin</i>, French admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> commands Toulon fleet in actions with British in 1795, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_189">189-194</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Masséna</i>, French marshal,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - commander-in-chief in Switzerland and Germany, 1799, <a href="#Page_3">3-5</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">wins battle of Zurich, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">sent by Bonaparte to Italy, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">operations in Italy, 1800, -<a href="#Page_21">21</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">besieged in Genoa, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">reverses in Portugal, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, -<a href="#Page_348">348</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Missiessy</i>, French admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - commands Rochefort division, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">escapes to the West Indies, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, -<a href="#Page_144">144</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">returns thence to Rochefort, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, -<a href="#Page_166">166</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Napoleon's further purposes for, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Montagu</i>, British admiral, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_421" id="Page_421">[Pg 421]</a></span></li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> commands division under Lord Howe, May and June, 1794, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_125">125</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_126">126</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_156">156-161</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Moreau</i>, French general,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> commands in Holland, 1795, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_180">180</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">advance into Germany, 1796, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_216">216</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">command in Italy, 1799, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_313">313</a>,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - and retreat before Suwarrow, <a href="#Page_5">5-8</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">appointed by Bonaparte to command in Germany, -<a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">successful campaign of 1800, <a href="#Page_21">21-24</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">wins battle of Hohenlinden, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">arrest upon charge of royalist conspiracy, -<a href="#Page_129">129</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>Naples</i>, see <a href="#two_sicilies">Two Sicilies</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Napoleon</i> (see also <a name="Napoleon" id="Napoleon"></a> -<a href="#Bonaparte">Bonaparte</a>),</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - Emperor of the French, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">plans for invading England modified by the death of Admiral -Latouche Tréville, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">second combination, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">his dealings with Spain, 1803-1804, <a href="#Page_133">133-139</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">failure to realize maritime conditions, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">instructions to Admirals Villeneuve and Missiessy, -<a href="#Page_142">142</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">final combination, <a href="#Page_146">146-150</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">surmises as to British movements, <a href="#Page_153">153-158</a>, -<a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">crowned King of Italy, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">suspicious of Austria, 1805, <a href="#Page_176">176-179</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">campaign of Austerlitz, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">constant embarrassment from the closure of the sea by the -British navy, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">anger against Admiral Villeneuve, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">effect of Trafalgar upon policy, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, -<a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">miscalculation in his attempt to crush British commerce, -<a href="#Page_201">201</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">vigor displayed in the attempt, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">measures at outbreak of war, 1803, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Jena campaign, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Berlin Decree, <a href="#Page_271">271-273</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">campaign against Russia, 1807, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Treaty of Tilsit, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">projects against Portugal and Denmark, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">enforcement of his Continental System, <a href="#Page_277">277-279</a>, -<a href="#Page_310">310</a>, <a href="#Page_396">396</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">additional vigor in Berlin Decree, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">character of the commercial warfare, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Milan Decree, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">usurpation in Spain, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">meeting with the Czar at Erfurt, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">joint letter to George III., <a href="#Page_294">294</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">campaign in Spain, 1808, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">anger with Holland, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">war with Austria, 1809, <a href="#Page_314">314-316</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">exactions from Sweden, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, -<a href="#Page_322">322</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">increased severity of warfare on commerce, -<a href="#Page_317">317-328</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Holland annexed to the Empire, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">annexation of Oldenburg and the Hanse towns, -<a href="#Page_330">330</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">license system, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">failing resources, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">military treasure, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">condition of credit, <a href="#Page_338">338-340</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">sufferings in France, 1811, <a href="#Page_340">340-343</a>, -<a href="#Page_349">349</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">altercations with Russia, <a href="#Page_344">344-346</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">preparations for war, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">invades Russia, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">essential error of his Continental System, -<a href="#Page_351">351-355</a>, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>, -<a href="#Page_402">402</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">concentration of purpose, <a href="#Page_366">366</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">his services to the Revolution, <a href="#Page_388">388</a>, -<a href="#Page_400">400</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Continental System inherited from Directory, -<a href="#Page_396">396</a>, <a href="#Page_399">399</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">greatness of his power, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">effect upon it of the British sea-power, -<a href="#Page_409">409</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">prolongation of the Revolution due to his genius, -<a href="#Page_411">411</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Navy, British</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> condition in 1793, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_69">69-72</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">mutinies in, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_72">72</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_73">73</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_232">232</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_236">236-239</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">condition of material, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_73">73-75</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">force compared with French navy, 1793, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_75">75</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">in 1801, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_73">73</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">tardy mobilization in 1793, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_96">96</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_97">97</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">preponderance of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_110">110</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_287">287</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_290">290</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_291">291</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_324">324</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_325">325</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_328">328-338</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">inefficient action in the Atlantic, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_162">162</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_338">338</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_339">339</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - deficient strength in 1803, <a href="#Page_122">122-124</a>, - <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">effect on the French Revolution, <a href="#Page_395">395</a>, -<a href="#Page_405">405</a>, <a href="#Page_406">406</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">increase under Pitt, <a href="#Page_404">404</a>,</li> -<li class="isub4">and under his successors, <a href="#Page_405">405</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Navy, Dutch</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> numbers and importance, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_78">78</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">inaction of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_171">171</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">defeat at Camperdown, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_255">255</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_378">378</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Navy, French</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> deterioration after 1789, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_35">35-41</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">disorders in, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_41">41-50</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_60">60-63</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">legislation by National Assemblies, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_51">51-59</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">effects of legislation, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_59">59</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_60">60</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_122">122</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">condition of officers and seamen, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_64">64-66</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_189">189</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_193">193</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_201">201</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">condition of material, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_66">66-68</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_163">163</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_179">179</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_253">253</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_338">338</a> (note);</li> -<li class="isub4">force compared with British, 1793, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_75">75</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">in 1801, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_73">73</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">inferiority in Mediterranean, 1798-1801, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_287">287</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_290">290</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_291">291</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_324">324</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_325">325</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_328">328-334</a>; -<b>ii.</b> <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59-63</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">inferiority and operations in Atlantic, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_335">335-338</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - peace essential to restore, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Navy, Spanish</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> numbers of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_75">75</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">inefficiency of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_76">76-78</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_81">81</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_222">222</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_231">231</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">defeat at Cape St. Vincent, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_221">221-228</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Nelson</i>, British Admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> significance of his services in the Baltic and the Levant, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_14">14</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_22">22</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">services in Corsica, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_187">187</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">early actions in the Mediterranean, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_191">191-194</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">services on Italian coast, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_194">194-201</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_208">208-212</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">professional characteristics, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_196">196</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_205">205</a>, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_422" id="Page_422">[Pg 422]</a></span> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_274">274</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_43">43-45</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, - <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, -<a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">takes possession of Elba, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_213">213</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">brilliant conduct at battle of Cape St. Vincent, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_226">226-228</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">wounded in expedition against Teneriffe, and returns to -England, 1797, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_249">249</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">rejoins fleet off Cadiz, April, 1798, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_256">256</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">sent to watch armaments in Toulon, May, 1798, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_256">256</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">pursuit of French fleet to Egypt, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_258">258-261</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">battle of the Nile, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_266">266-272</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">wounded, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_272">272</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">merits of, in this battle, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_273">273-277</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">sends word to India, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_283">283</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">goes to Naples, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_284">284</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">blockades Malta, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_285">285</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">distrust of Russia, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_286">286</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_126">126</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">relations with Sir Sidney Smith, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_297">297</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">incident of Bruix's incursion into the Mediterranean, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_308">308-321</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">return to England, 1800, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_330">330</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_37">37</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">views as to the French in Egypt, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_331">331</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">reasons for refusing chief command in Baltic to, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_373">373</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_42">42</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - responsibility for action of Naples in 1798, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">detailed as second in command of the Baltic expedition, -<a href="#Page_37">37</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">his letter to Parker on the political and military situation, -<a href="#Page_43">43-47</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">battle of Copenhagen, <a href="#Page_48">48-51</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">negotiates an armistice with Denmark, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">merit of his conduct, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">left in chief command and takes fleet to Revel, -<a href="#Page_56">56</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">rebuked by the Czar, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">appointed to Mediterranean command on renewal of war in -1803, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">difficulties and perplexities, <a href="#Page_123">123-129</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">opinion as to the dispositions of Spain in 1804, -<a href="#Page_139">139</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">goes to Egypt in search of French at Villeneuve's first -sailing, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">return off Toulon, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Villeneuve's second sailing, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">pursues to West Indies, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, -<a href="#Page_159">159-161</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">insight of, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, -<a href="#Page_162">162</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">return to Europe, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, -<a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">joins Brest fleet, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, and returns to England, -<a href="#Page_175">175</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">joins fleet off Cadiz, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, -<a href="#Page_186">186</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">battle of Trafalgar, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">death, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Nielly</i>, French rear-admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> mentioned, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_123">123</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_126">126</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_135">135</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_155">155</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_157">157</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Notables</i>, Assembly of,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> in France, 1787, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_7">7</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_19">19</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">meeting of, in 1788, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_24">24</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>Orders</i> in Council, British, June 8,1793,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - arresting vessels carrying provisions to France, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Nov. 6, 1793, seizing vessels laden with -produce from enemy's colonies, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">partial revocation of this, Jan. 8, -1794, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">further relaxation, January, 1798, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Fox's, of May 16, 1806, establishing -constructive blockade of hostile coasts, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Jan. 7, 1807, forbidding neutral trade -between hostile ports, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Nov. 7, 1807, establishing constructive -blockade of all ports whence British flag was excluded, -<a href="#Page_283">283-290</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">April 26, 1809, modifying those of Nov., 1807, -<a href="#Page_313">313</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">final revocation of Orders of 1807 and 1809, -<a href="#Page_351">351</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">analysis of their policy, <a href="#Page_351">351-355</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>Paoli</i>, Corsican leader,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> relations with Great Britain and France, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_88">88</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">promotes union of island to Great Britain, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_187">187</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">subsequent discontent, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_188">188</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Parker</i>, Sir Hyde, British admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> command of Brest Blockade, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_373">373</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - of expedition to Baltic, <a href="#Page_42">42-56</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">relieved of command, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Nelson's censure of, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Paul I.</i>, Czar of Russia,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> succeeds to the throne, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_243">243</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">becomes hostile to French Republic, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_281">281</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">interest in Malta, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_281">281</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_32">32</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">alliance with Austria, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_282">282</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">sends squadron to Mediterranean, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_286">286</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - Russian army enters Italy, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">successes in Italy and reverses in Switzerland, -<a href="#Page_5">5-9</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">dissatisfaction with his allies, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, -<a href="#Page_26">26</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Bonaparte's advances to, <a href="#Page_29">29-33</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">hostile measures toward Great Britain, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">formation of Armed Neutrality, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">sends ambassador to Bonaparte, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">importance to the northern league, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">murdered, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <a name="peace" id="peace"></a><i>Peace</i>, Treaties of,</li> -<li class="isub4">Amiens, 1802, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li> -<li class="isub4">(see also preliminaries, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>),</li> -<li class="isub4">Basle, 1795, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_172">172</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Campo Formio, 1797, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_250">250</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Lunéville, 1801, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Presburg, 1805, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_182">182</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Vienna, 1809, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_316">316</a>. Preliminaries of Leoben, 1797, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_234">234</a>; -of London, 1801, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_71">71</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Pellew</i>, British admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> commanding frigate off Brest, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_351">351-354</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">action with the "Droits de l'Homme," -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_357">357</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">commands blockading force off Ferrol, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_118">118</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - opinion of the invasion flotilla, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>,</li> -<li class="isub4">and of the condition of British navy, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">able measures for protection of trade in India, -<a href="#Page_217">217</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Perceval</i>, British statesman, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_423" id="Page_423">[Pg 423]</a></span></li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - statement as to the object of the Orders in Council of November, 1807, - <a href="#Footnote_384_384">290, note</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Pilnitz</i>, declaration of,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> by Austria and Prussia, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_28">28</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">effect upon the French people, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_29">29</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Pitt</i>, British statesman,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> prime minister of Great Britain, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_5">5</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">power in the nation, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_6">6</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">opposition to Russian advance in the East, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_20">20-24</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">attitude toward the French Revolution, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_29">29</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_32">32-34</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_358">358-367</a>, <a href="#Page_382">382</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">treats with France, 1796 and 1797, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_240">240</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_245">245</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - resigns office, 1801, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">supports preliminaries of peace negotiated by Addington -ministry, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">statement of object of British government in the war, -<a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_383">383-385</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">speech upon renewal of war in 1803, -<a href="#Page_99">99</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">attack upon St. Vincent's administration of the navy, -<a href="#Page_123">123</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">returns to office, and forms Third Coalition, -<a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">policy in seizing enemy's colonies defended, -<a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>, -<a href="#Page_393">393-395</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">modifies Rule of 1756 and originates commercial war policy of -Great Britain, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, -<a href="#Page_263">263</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">speech on the Armed Neutrality of 1800, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">measures to restrain American trade with hostile colonies, -<a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">death, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">prosperity of Great Britain under his war administration, -<a href="#Page_380">380-382</a>, <a href="#Page_394">394</a>, -also <a href="#Page_17">17-19</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">comparison between himself and his father, -<a href="#Page_387">387-391</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">general war policy of, <a href="#Page_391">391-405</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">growth of navy under, <a href="#Page_404">404</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">success practically attained at his death, -<a href="#Page_405">405</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">his policy adopted by his successors, <a href="#Page_405">405</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">accurate forecast of course of French Revolution, -<a href="#Page_411">411</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Portugal</i>, Navy of,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> in 1793, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_78">78</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">traditional alliance with Great Britain, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_84">84</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">co-operation with British navy, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_162">162</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_285">285</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">French designs against, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_219">219</a> -(and note);</li> -<li class="isub4">Bonaparte's designs upon, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, - <a href="#Page_296">296</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">treaty with France, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, -<a href="#Page_81">81</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Lisbon occupied by Junot's corps, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">flight of the Court to Brazil, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">ports closed to British trade, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">British land and expel Junot, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Wellesley lands in 1809, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">British operations in, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, -<a href="#Page_348">348</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Masséna invades, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">but forced to retreat, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, -<a href="#Page_348">348</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Privateering</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2">II. French, number of privateers captured, 1793-1800, -<a href="#Page_206">206</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">their activity, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">privateering in the Channel and North Sea, -<a href="#Page_207">207-210</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">in the Atlantic, <a href="#Page_210">210-211</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">in the West Indies, <a href="#Page_211">211-214</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">in the East Indies, <a href="#Page_214">214-218</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Prussia</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> death of Frederic the Great, 1786, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_19">19</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">interference in Holland, 1787, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_19">19</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">defensive alliance with Great Britain and Holland, 1788, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_21">21</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_22">22</a>, -King joins in Declaration of Pilnitz, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_28">28</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">takes arms against France, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_30">30</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">jealousy of Austria, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_80">80</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_94">94</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">advance into France, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_93">93</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">retreat from France, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_103">103</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">inaction in 1794, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_103">103</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_171">171</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">makes peace with France, 1795, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_172">172</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">guarantee of North German Neutrality, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_172">172</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">refusal to join Second Coalition, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_282">282</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - rigorous neutrality after 1795, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">ambitions of, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">hostile attitude toward Great Britain in 1800, -<a href="#Page_34">34</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">joins Armed Neutrality, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">opportunism of, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">closes the German rivers against British trade, -<a href="#Page_54">54</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">subsequent coolness toward Bonaparte, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">rebuff from Bonaparte, <a href="#Footnote_54_54">69, note</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">favored by Bonaparte in apportioning German indemnities, -<a href="#Page_84">84</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Bonaparte's pressure upon, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">annoyance at Bonaparte's occupation of Hanover, -<a href="#Page_110">110</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">indignation at murder of the Duc d'Enghien, -<a href="#Page_177">177</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Hanover offered to, by Bonaparte, upon conditions, -<a href="#Page_179">179</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">commercial advantages through neutrality, -<a href="#Page_251">251</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">war with France, and defeat of Jena, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">tyranny of Napoleon over, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>, -<a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, -<a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">share in "neutralizing" traffic, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>Richery</i>, French admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> commerce-destroying expedition, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_202">202</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_214">214</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">shares in expedition against Ireland, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_214">214</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_348">348-353</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Rule</i> of 1756,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - conceded by Russia and the Baltic States, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, - <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">statement of, <a href="#Page_234">234-236</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">seizure of American vessels under, <a href="#Page_236">236-239</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">modifications of, by British government, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, -<a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, -<a href="#Page_269">269</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">evasion of, by American vessels, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, -<a href="#Page_266">266-269</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">extension of, by Orders in Council of January, 1807, -<a href="#Page_275">275</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">tendency and importance of, <a href="#Page_353">353-355</a>,</li> -<li class="isub4">arguments for and against, <a href="#Page_356">356</a>, also -<a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Russia</i>, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_424" id="Page_424">[Pg 424]</a></span></li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> relations with Austria, 1780-1790, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_9">9</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_11">11</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_16">16</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_17">17</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_19">19</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_24">24</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_25">25</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">advance of, since 1713, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_10">10</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">relations to Great Britain in 1770, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_11">11</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_12">12</a>, and in 1785, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_13">13</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_22">22</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_23">23</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">relations with France in 1785, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_17">17</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">war with Turkey, 1787, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_19">19</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">attempt to send fleet from Baltic to Mediterranean, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_20">20</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">war with Sweden, 1788, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_21">21</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">successes on Black Sea, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_24">24-27</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">peace with Turkey and Sweden, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_27">27</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">unfriendly attitude toward French Revolution, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_34">34</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_82">82</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_233">233</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">partition of Poland, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_82">82</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">defensive alliance with Great Britain, 1795, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_172">172</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">death of Catharine and accession of Paul I., -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_243">243</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">difficulties with France, 1798, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_281">281</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">joins Second Coalition, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_282">282</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">conjointly with Turkey sends fleet against the Ionian -Islands, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_286">286</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - Russian army enters Italy, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">battles of the Trebia, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, and of Novi, -<a href="#Page_8">8</a>, won from the French, 1799;</li> -<li class="isub4">Russian army marches into Switzerland, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>,</li> -<li class="isub5">and retires into Bavaria, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">reduction of the Ionian Islands, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">abandons the Coalition, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, -<a href="#Page_19">19</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">dissatisfaction of the Czar, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">interest in peace with England, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, -<a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, -<a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">measures of Paul I. against Great Britain, -<a href="#Page_32">32-34</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Armed Neutrality renewed, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, -<a href="#Page_260">260</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">admiration of Paul for Bonaparte, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, -<a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">assassination of Paul and accession of Alexander, -<a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">convention with Great Britain, 1801, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, -<a href="#Page_261">261</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">attitude concerning Malta, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">breach with France caused by murder of Duc d'Enghien, -<a href="#Page_177">177</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">mission to Great Britain and formation of Third Coalition, -<a href="#Page_177">177</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">effect of Russia upon the struggle between Great Britain and -Napoleon, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>, -<a href="#Page_409">409</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">war with France, 1807, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">conventions of Tilsit between Russia and France, -<a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a> -<a href="#Page_310">310</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>, -<a href="#Page_405">405</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">war declared against Great Britain, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, -<a href="#Page_305">305</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">conventions of Erfurt with Napoleon, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">war with Sweden, 1808, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">joint letter of Czar and Napoleon to George III., -<a href="#Page_294">294</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">enforcement of the Continental System, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>, -<a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>, -<a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_406">406</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">peace with Sweden, 1809, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">causes leading to war with France in 1812, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, -<a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344-346</a>, -<a href="#Page_397">397</a>, -<a href="#Page_401">401</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">alliance with Great Britain and Sweden, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>, -<a href="#Page_350">350</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">peace with Turkey, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Napoleon's invasion, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>Sardinia</i>, Island of,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> gives name to Italian Kingdom, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_87">87</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - strategic importance of, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Sardinia</i>, Kingdom of,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> at war with France in 1793, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_34">34</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">extent of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_87">87</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">operations of, in 1793, and 1794, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_93">93</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_171">171</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">in 1795, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_195">195-198</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">defeats by Bonaparte, 1796, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_209">209</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">concludes separate peace with France, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_209">209</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">cedes islands of Sardinia and San Pietro to France, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_246">246</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_248">248</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - Piedmont annexed to France and the Court retires to island of Sardinia, - <a href="#Page_2">2</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">interest of the Czars in, <a href="#Footnote_54_54">69, note</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">British intercession for, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Saumarez</i>, British admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> commands a ship at Battle of Cape St. Vincent, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_233">233</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">commands "Orion" at the Battle of the Nile, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_265">265</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">criticism of Nelson's plan, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_273">273</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">sails for Gibraltar with the prizes, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_284">284</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">summons French garrison at Malta, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_285">285</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">commands inshore squadron off Brest, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_375">375</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - commands fleet at Battle of Algesiras, <a href="#Page_63">63-66</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">commendations of by St. Vincent and Nelson, -<a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">commands Baltic fleet, 1808-1812, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, -<a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">eminent services of, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, -<a href="#Footnote_468_468">347 (note)</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Scheldt</i>, River,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> question of the, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_9">9</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_16">16</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_18">18</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">importance of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_20">20</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">opened to commerce by the French, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_31">31</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Schérer</i>, French general,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> wins battle of Loano, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_198">198</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">relieved by Bonaparte, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_203">203</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - inefficiency in 1799, in Italy, <a href="#Page_3">3-5</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Sébastiani</i>, French colonel,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - mission to the Levant and report, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Bonaparte's object in publishing, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, -<a href="#Page_106">106</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">exasperation in Great Britain, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">effect upon British policy, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, -<a href="#Page_97">97</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Smith</i>, Sir Sidney, British naval captain,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> reputation and character of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_294">294</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_295">295</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">mission to the Mediterranean, 1799, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_296">296</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">annoyance of St. Vincent and Nelson, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_297">297</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">supports the besieged garrison at Acre, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_298">298-302</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">conduct on this occasion considered, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_302">302-304</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">accompanies Turkish Expedition against Egypt, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_321">321</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">countenances Convention of El Arish in disregard of his orders, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_331">331-334</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Spain</i>, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_425" id="Page_425">[Pg 425]</a></span></li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> results of war of 1778 to, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_3">3</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_4">4</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">defensive alliance with Russia and Austria, 1789, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_25">25</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Nootka Sound trouble with Great Britain, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_44">44</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_45">45</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">condition of navy, 1793, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_75">75-78</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_82">82</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_231">231</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">France declares war against, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_79">79</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">strategic position and inefficient administration of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_80">80</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">fleet enters Toulon with Hood, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_92">92</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">war in Pyrenees, 1793, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_104">104</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">evacuation of Toulon, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_105">105</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">loss of Trinidad, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_120">120</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">disasters on French frontier, 1794, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_171">171</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">peace of Basle with France, 1795, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_172">172</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">changed relations with Great Britain, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_213">213</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">defensive and offensive alliance with France, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_214">214</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">naval co-operation with France, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_214">214-216</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_348">348</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">naval defeat off Cape St. Vincent, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_219">219-229</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">share in Admiral Bruix's Expedition, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_307">307-316</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">internal weakness of, in 1799, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_311">311</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - Bonaparte's use of, to further his continental policy, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, - <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">naval defeat near Cadiz, 1801, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">cession of Louisiana to France, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Peace of Amiens with Great Britain, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">renewal of war with Great Britain, 1804, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">subserviency to Bonaparte's control, <a href="#Page_134">134-136</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">subsidies paid to France, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, -<a href="#Page_138">138</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">renewed alliance with France, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">share in Trafalgar campaign, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, -<a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162-180</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">naval defeat off Cape Finisterre, <a href="#Page_169">169-171</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">naval defeat at Trafalgar, <a href="#Page_187">187-195</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">revolt against Napoleon, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, -<a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">weakness of colonial administration, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, -<a href="#Page_213">213</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Napoleon's usurpation, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Great Britain assumes Spanish cause, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Napoleon's campaign in, 1808, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>, -<a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Wellesley in, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, -<a href="#Page_349">349</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">drain of Spanish war upon Napoleon, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, -<a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, - <a href="#Page_343">343</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_397">397</a>, -<a href="#Page_401">401</a>, <a href="#Page_402">402</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>St. André</i>, Jean Bon, French representative and commissioner,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> opinions on naval efficiency, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_37">37</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_58">58</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_66">66</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>States General</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> meeting of the, in France, May, 1789, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_24">24</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_25">25</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Strategy</i>, naval,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> strategic position of Spain, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_80">80-82</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">of Portugal, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_84">84</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">particular importance of Mediterranean islands, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_85">85</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_247">247</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_248">248</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">importance of Malta, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_87">87</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_258">258</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_319">319</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_92">92</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Maddalena Bay in Sardinia, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_88">88</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Corsica, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_88">88</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_186">186</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">general dispositions of British fleet, 1793, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_96">96</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">its tardy mobilization, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_97">97</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_100">100</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">necessity to Great Britain of forcing French fleets to sea, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_97">97-100</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Lord Howe's strategic dispositions, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_101">101-103</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_125">125</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_162">162-166</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_338">338</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_339">339</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">strategic value of Toulon, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_105">105</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">analogy between British operations in Peninsula and Napoleon's -intended invasion of England, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_106">106-108</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">strategic conditions in West Indies, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_109">109-115</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">mistakes of the British in West Indies, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_116">116-120</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">criticism of naval campaign of May, 1794, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_155">155-160</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">faulty dispositions of the Channel fleet, 1793-1800, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_165">165</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_361">361-366</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">policy of an inferior navy deduced from Napoleon's practice, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_179">179</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_180">180</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_304">304</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_305">305</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">strategic influence of the British Mediterranean fleet, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_185">185</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_195">195-197</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_207">207</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_216">216-218</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_233">233</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_254">254</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_255">255</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_277">277</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_280">280</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_282">282</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_287">287</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_290">290-292</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_324">324</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_325">325</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_328">328-334</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59-68</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123-125</a>, - <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Hotham's campaign of 1795 criticised, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_198">198-201</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">French commerce-destroying policy, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_201">201-203</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_335">335-337</a>, -<b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_203">203-210</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221-227</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">effects of the Battle of the Nile, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_277">277</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_282">282-284</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_291">291</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_325">325</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">strategic importance of Acre, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_293">293</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_298">298</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_324">324</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">strategic significance of Bruix's incursion into the -Mediterranean, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_304">304</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_318">318</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">St. Vincent's strategic action at this time, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_309">309-312</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_314">314</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_318">318-321</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">contrast between his point of view and that of Lord Keith, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_313">313</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_321">321</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">coincidence of his views with Nelson's, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_319">319</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_321">321</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Nelson's action, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_310">310</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">discussion of Bruix's conduct, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_316">316-318</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">of the British admirals', -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_318">318-321</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">policy of evasion entailed by French naval weakness, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_335">335</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">strategic problem before Great Britain in the Revolutionary -wars, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_338">338</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">its true solution, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_339">339-342</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">strategic interest of Ushant, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_344">344</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">the winds as strategic factors, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_344">344</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">faulty dispositions of the Channel fleet, 1793-1800, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_345">345</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">analysis of the effects upon Irish expedition, 1796, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_360">360-366</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">changes made by St. Vincent in 1800, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_368">368-371</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_374">374</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_375">375</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">their efficacy, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_375">375</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_376">376</a>, -<b>ii.</b> <a href="#Page_60">60-66</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, -<a href="#Page_118">118-121</a>, - <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, - <a href="#Page_183">183</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Napoleon's estimate of Antwerp, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_377">377</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Nelson in the Baltic, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_43">43-47</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51-53</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Napoleon's object in concentrating at Cadiz, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>; -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_426" id="Page_426">[Pg 426]</a></span></li> -<li class="isub4">strategic significance of battle of Algesiras, -<a href="#Page_64">64-66</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">defensive and offensive gain to Great Britain in forcing war, -1803, <a href="#Page_106">106-108</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Napoleon's combinations for invasion of England, -<a href="#Page_111">111-117</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, -<a href="#Page_131">131-133</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140-142</a>, -<a href="#Page_145">145-150</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">British measures for thwarting them, <a href="#Page_118">118-122</a>, -<a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Nelson's strategy, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, -<a href="#Page_142">142-144</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150-152</a>, -<a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159-163</a>, -<a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, -<a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">various surmises and measures of Napoleon during the Trafalgar -campaign, <a href="#Page_153">153-159</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, -<a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, -<a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">generally accurate strategy of the British authorities, -<a href="#Page_157">157-159</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, -<a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">masterly combination of Lord Barham, <a href="#Page_168">168-170</a>, - <a href="#Page_184">184</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">mistake of Admiral Calder, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, -<a href="#Page_174">174</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">mistake of Cornwallis, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">analysis of the strategic chances in the Trafalgar campaign, -<a href="#Page_182">182-185</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">character of Villeneuve's error, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">strategic effect of the campaign upon the remainder of the -war, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">general naval strategy of the British, 1793-1812, -<a href="#Page_392">392-411</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><a name="st_vincent" id="st_vincent"></a><i>St. Vincent</i>, Earl, -British admiral (Jervis),</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> expedition to West Indies, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_115">115</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">assumes command of Mediterranean fleet, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_203">203</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">perfection of fleet under, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_206">206</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">professional character, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_203">203-206</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">blockade of Toulon, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_212">212</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">seizes Elba with a squadron, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_213">213</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">ordered to evacuate Corsica, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_215">215</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">retires to Gibraltar, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_216">216</a>; firmness of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_217">217</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">ordered to rendezvous at Lisbon, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_219">219</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">disasters to fleet, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_219">219</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">meeting with Spanish fleet, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_221">221</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">battle of Cape St. Vincent, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_222">222-228</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">merit of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_228">228</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">created Earl St. Vincent, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_229">229</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">establishes blockade of Cadiz, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_232">232</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">incident of mutiny, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_236">236</a> (note);</li> -<li class="isub4">sends Nelson to Teneriffe, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_249">249</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">sends Nelson into the Mediterranean, May, 1798, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_256">256-258</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">residence at Gibraltar, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_285">285</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">seizes Minorca, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_287">287</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">relations with Sir Sidney Smith, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_294">294-297</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">conduct during Bruix's incursion into the Mediterranean, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_306">306-321</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">health fails, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_312">312</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">returns to England, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_321">321</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">commands Channel fleet, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_368">368</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">methods of watching Brest, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_368">368-375</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">becomes First Lord of the Admiralty, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_375">375</a>, -<b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_42">42</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">merit of his strategic dispositions, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_375">375</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_376">376</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>.</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - encomium upon Nelson, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">upon Saumarez, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">his naval dispositions in second war, <a href="#Page_119">119-122</a>, -<a href="#Page_126">126</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">his inopportune economy, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, -<a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, -<a href="#Page_166">166</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">leaves office, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>;</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Suwarrow</i>, Russian marshal,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> storming of Ismail, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_26">26</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">commands corps sent to support Austrians in Italy, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_282">282</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_284">284</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_5">5</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - commander-in-chief of allied forces, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">victorious campaign in Italy, <a href="#Page_5">5-8</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">disastrous march into Switzerland, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">declines further co-operation with Austrians, -<a href="#Page_10">10</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Sweden</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> loss of Baltic provinces to Russia, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_10">10</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">hostility to Russia, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_17">17</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">troops enter Russia, 1788, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_21">21</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">supported by Great Britain and Prussia, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_21">21</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_25">25</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">interest of western powers in, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_22">22</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">subsidized by Turkey, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_24">24</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">peace with Russia, 1790, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_27">27</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">even balance of naval strength in Baltic, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_27">27</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">unfriendly to French Revolution in 1793, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_34">34</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">seeks the commercial advantages of neutrality, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_83">83</a>, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_233">233</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">loss of West India islands, 1801, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_121">121</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - joins Armed Neutrality of 1800, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">embargo of merchant ships by Great Britain, -<a href="#Page_53">53</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">convention with Great Britain, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, -<a href="#Page_266">266</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">quarrel with France and joins Third Coalition, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Napoleon's exactions from, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, -<a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">summoned by France and Russia to close ports against Great -Britain, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">hostilities with Russia, 1800, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">British relations with, 1808-1812, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, -<a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, -<a href="#Page_317">317</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">cedes Finland and makes peace with Russia, -<a href="#Page_316">316</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">formal war with Great Britain, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Switzerland</i>, </li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> disturbances in, 1797, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_278">278</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">France intervenes by force and changes constitution, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_279">279</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">French operations in, 1799, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_3">3-9</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">strategic importance in Bonaparte's campaign of 1800, -<a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">independence guaranteed at Lunéville, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Bonaparte's intervention in, 1802, <a href="#Page_86">86-88</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">action of British ministry thereupon, <a href="#Page_88">88-90</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">effect upon course of events, <a href="#Page_90">90-93</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">enforcement by Napoleon of his commercial war measures, -<a href="#Page_324">324-326</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>Tactics</i>, Naval,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> French and British on May 28, -1794, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_127">127-129</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">on May 29, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_129">129-134</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">June 1, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_136">136-147</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">merits of Howe's, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_135">135</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_150">150</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_160">160</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">analysis of the results of the battle of June 1, -with deductions, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_149">149-155</a>; -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_427" id="Page_427">[Pg 427]</a></span></li> -<li class="isub4">Sir John Jervis at battle of Cape St. Vincent, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_224">224</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_225">225</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Nelson's tactical move on that occasion, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_226">226-228</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">dispositions of the French admiral in Aboukir Bay, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_263">263</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_264">264</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">contrasted with Hood's at St. Kitts in 1782, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_265">265</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Nelson's tactics at the Nile, concentration on enemy's -van, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_266">266</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">arrival of the British reserve, and concentration on -centre, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_270">270</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">analysis of Nelson's claim to credit, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_273">273-277</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">tactical dispositions before Brest of Bridport, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_351">351</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_366">366</a>, -and of St. Vincent, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_371">371</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - tactical anecdotes of Nelson, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">tactical surroundings at Copenhagen, 1801, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Nelson's dispositions in consequence, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, -<a href="#Page_48">48</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">his tactics at Trafalgar, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">analysis of them, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">the result, <a href="#Page_192">192-194</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Trafalgar</i>, battle of,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - decisive effect upon the course of the war, <a href="#Page_196">196-198</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Treaty</i>, Holland and France, 1795,</li> -<li class="isub4">offensive and defensive alliance, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_172">172</a>, -<b>ii.</b> <a href="#Page_133">133</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Jay's, of commerce and navigation, between Great Britain and</li> -<li class="isub4">United States, 1794, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_237">237-239</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">San Ildefouso, offensive and defensive between France and Spain,</li> -<li class="isub4">1796, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_213">213</a>, -<b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_133">133</a>,</li> -<li class="isub4">and renewed in 1805, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_140">140</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Tilsit, between France and Russia, 1807, <b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_274">274</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">conventions, of El Arish between Turkey and French -commander-in-chief in Egypt, 1799, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_332">332-334</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">of Great Britain and Russia concerning neutral navigation, 1801,</li> -<li class="isub4"><b>ii.</b> - <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> See also <a href="#peace">"Peace"</a> and -<a href="#armed_neutrality">"Armed Neutrality."</a></li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Troubridge</i>, British captain,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> Nelson's praise of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_75">75</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">leads the fleet at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_224">224</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_227">227</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">misfortune at the Battle of the Nile, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_269">269</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">bombardment of Alexandria, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_297">297</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">services at Naples, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_308">308</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Turkey</i>, Empire of,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> encroachments of Russia upon, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_10">10</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">natural ally of France, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_12">12</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_22">22</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">treaty of Kainardji, 1774, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_13">13</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">declares war against Russia, 1787, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_19">19</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">war with Austria, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_19">19</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">relations to Great Britain in 1790, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_23">23</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">military reverses, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_24">24</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_26">26</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">peace with Austria and Russia, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_25">25</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_27">27</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">disorganized condition in 1793, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_85">85</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">territorial limits, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_85">85</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Bonaparte's estimate of strength of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_248">248</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">effect of battle of the Nile upon, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_277">277</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">war declared against France, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_278">278</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Russo-Turkish fleet enters Mediterranean, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_286">286</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">troops sent to Acre, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_301">301</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">unfortunate landing in Aboukir Bay, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_322">322</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">convention for the evacuation of Egypt, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_332">332</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - capture of the Ionian Islands, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">peace with France, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">misrule in Egypt, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">hostilities with Great Britain, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <a name="two_sicilies" id="two_sicilies"><i>Two Sicilies</i></a>, -The,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> navy of, in 1793, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_78">78</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">attitude toward French Revolution, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_84">84</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">effect of Bonaparte's victories upon, 1796, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_211">211</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">abandons the Coalition, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_211">211</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">strategic importance of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_218">218</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">dissatisfaction at French advance in Italy, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_279">279</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">defensive alliance with Austria, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_282">282</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Nelson's arrival in Naples, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_285">285</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - premature hostilities with France, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">the Court flies to Palermo, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Naples occupied by French troops, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">French forced to evacuate the Kingdom, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">French division occupies the heel of Italy after Marengo, -<a href="#Page_59">59</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">evacuates after Peace of Amiens <a href="#Page_71">71</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">reoccupation after renewal of war in 1803, -<a href="#Page_109">109</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">part played in Napoleon's combinations, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, -<a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Joseph Bonaparte, King of, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>United States</i>, </li> -<li class="isub4">difficulties with France, 1793-1797, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_241">241</a>, -<b>ii</b> <a href="#Page_242">242-248</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - cession of Louisiana by Spain to France, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">jealousy of political interference on the American continent by -European nations, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">uneasiness at cession of Louisiana, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">buys Louisiana of France, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">sufferings from privateers in the West Indies, 1805, -<a href="#Page_213">213</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">importance of American carrying trade, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">growth of merchant shipping, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">injuries under Rule of 1756, <a href="#Page_233">233-237</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Great Britain, 1794, -<a href="#Page_237">237-239</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">difficulties with France arising thence, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">relations with Great Britain, 1794-1804, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">French aggressions upon American shipping, -<a href="#Page_242">242-246</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">demands of Spain and Holland, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">course of trade with Europe, 1793-1804, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, -<a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">hostilities with France, 1798-1800, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">trade with belligerent colonies, <a href="#Page_266">266-268</a>, -<a href="#Page_353">353</a>; -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_428" id="Page_428">[Pg 428]</a></span></li> -<li class="isub4">British seizures of American ships, 1804, -<a href="#Page_269">269</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">commercial treaty of 1806 with Great Britain rejected by -Senate, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">effect upon American trade of British Order of January, 1807, -<a href="#Page_276">276</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Embargo Act of December, 1807, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, -succeeded by Non-Intercourse Act, 1809, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">importance of American market to Great Britain, -<a href="#Page_291">291</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">losses by Napoleon's decrees of Bayonne and Rambouillet, -<a href="#Page_292">292</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">American ships in Dutch ports confiscated by Napoleon, -<a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">expiration of Non-Intercourse Act, and proviso succeeding it, -<a href="#Page_331">331</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">American trade in Baltic, 1809-1812, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, -and <a href="#Footnote_466_466">note</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">declaration of war against Great Britain, -<a href="#Page_351">351</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>Van Stabel</i>, French rear-admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> escape of, from Lord Howe, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_66">66</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">protects large convoy from America, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_123">123</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">brings it safely to Brest, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_161">161</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> "<i>Vengeur</i>, " French ship-of-the-line,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> desperate action with the British ship "Brunswick," -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_140">140-143</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">sinks, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_144">144</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Venice</i>, Republic of,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> deprived of possessions on Italian mainland, -also Istria and Dalmatia, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_235">235</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">insurrection against French, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_246">246</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">conduct of Bonaparte toward, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_247">247-249</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">annihilation of, <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_250">250</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Villaret-Joyeuse</i>, French admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> letters of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_56">56</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">position before Revolution, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_57">57</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">sails in command of Brest fleet, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_124">124</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">meeting with British fleet, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_126">126</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">manœuvres of, May 28 and 29, 1794, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_126">126-134</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">conduct in battle of June 1, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_136">136-139</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_144">144-147</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">strategy of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_159">159</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_160">160</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">anecdote, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_160">160</a> (note);</li> -<li class="isub4">winter cruise of, January, 1795, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_163">163</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_164">164</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">action with Lord Bridport, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_177">177-178</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">appointed to command fleet in Irish Expedition, 1796, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_349">349</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">views as to the expedition, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_349">349</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">detached from it at Hoche's request, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_350">350</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>Villeneuve</i>, French admiral,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>i.</b> sent with a division from Toulon to Brest, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_220">220</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">commands the rear division at battle of the Nile, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_271">271</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">conduct of, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_272">272</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - appointed to command the Toulon squadron in 1804, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Napoleon's instructions to, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, -<a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">first sortie from Toulon, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">return to port, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">second sailing and arrival in West Indies, -<a href="#Page_151">151</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">inaction there, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, -and return to Europe, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">meeting with Calder's fleet, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, -<a href="#Page_171">171</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">anchors in Vigo Bay and thence goes to Ferrol, -<a href="#Page_173">173</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">sails from Ferrol for Brest, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, -but bears up for Cadiz, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Napoleon's charges against, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">battle of Trafalgar, <a href="#Page_187">187-195</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">criticism of, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst"> <i>Wellesley</i>, British general,</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - landing in Portugal, 1808, and victory of Vimiero, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">landing in Lisbon, 1809, beginning of Peninsular command, and -operations in Portugal, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">lines of Torres Vedras, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, -<a href="#Page_349">349</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"> <i>West Indies</i>, commercial importance of,</li> -<li class="isub4">in the French Revolution, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_109">109</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_110">110</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">character of military control required, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_110">110-112</a>, <b>ii.</b> -<a href="#Page_252">252</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">military importance of Lesser Antilles, <b>i.</b> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_114">114</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_117">117</a>, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_119">119</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">military and naval operations in, -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52588/52588-h/52588-h.htm#Page_115">115-121</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><b>ii.</b> - French Expedition to, 1801, i<b>i.</b> <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, - <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">Nelson's estimate of, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">American trade with, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, -<a href="#Page_236">236-238</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, -<a href="#Page_266">266-269</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">importance to British commercial system, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, -and <a href="#Footnote_334_334">note</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>.</li></ul> - - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<div class="transnote p2"> -<h3>Transcriber's Note:</h3> -<ul> - <li>Minor typographical errors have been corrected without note. Other - corrections are noted below.</li> - <li>Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.</li> - <li>Word combinations that appeared with and without hyphens were - changed to the predominant form if it could be determined.</li> - <li>Footnotes were moved to the end of the book and numbered in one - continuous sequence.</li> - <li>In the index the numbers i. and ii. refer to volumes i. and ii.</li> -</ul> -</div> - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Influence of Sea Power upon the -French Revolution and Empire 1793-1, by Alfred Thayer Mahan - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER *** - -***** This file should be named 52589-h.htm or 52589-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/2/5/8/52589/ - -Produced by StevenGibbs, Christian Boissonnas and the -Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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