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diff --git a/old/51544-0.txt b/old/51544-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index db33eeb..0000000 --- a/old/51544-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6408 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The State, by Franz Oppenheimer - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: The State - Its History and Development Viewed Sociologically - -Author: Franz Oppenheimer - -Translator: John Gitterman - -Release Date: March 24, 2016 [EBook #51544] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE STATE *** - - - - -Produced by Julie Barkley, Charlie Howard,, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - - - - - - - - - THE STATE - - _ITS HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT VIEWED - SOCIOLOGICALLY_ - - _By_ FRANZ OPPENHEIMER, M.D., PH.D. - Professor of Political Science in the University of Frankfort-on-Main - - _Authorized Translation_ - _By_ JOHN M. GITTERMAN, PH.D., LL.B. - (Of the New York County Bar) - - [Illustration] - - NEW YORK - VANGUARD PRESS - - - - - _Copyright_, 1914 - THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY - - _Copyright_, 1922 - B. W. HUEBSCH, INC. - - - VANGUARD PRINTINGS - - _First--August, 1926_ - _Second--February, 1928_ - - - PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - - - - -THE MAN (1864--): - - _Franz Oppenheimer_, one of a fairly large number of British, - French and German physicians who abandoned their medical pursuits - and rose to fame as political economists, was born in Berlin. - He studied and practiced medicine, became private Lecturer of - Economics at the Berlin University in 1909, and Professor of - Sociology at the Frankfort University in 1919. His libertarian - views made him, for many years, the target of academic - persecutions, until the growing fame of his masterpiece, _The - State_, effectively silenced his detractors. - - -THE BOOK (1908): - - The organic history of the State is a long and exciting - adventure, usually rendered dull in learned accounts. Not so - in Oppenheimer’s _The State_ which extracts that history, in - a highly stimulating manner, from the sharp necessities and - homicidal conflicts of all sorts and conditions of men, from the - Stone Age to the Age of Henry Ford. The easy flow of important - information derivable from this German volume has rendered it - highly acceptable to American readers. - - - - -OTHER BOOKS BY DOCTOR FRANZ OPPENHEIMER - - - Die Siedlungsgenossenschaft 1896 - - Grossgrundeigentum und Soziale Frage 1898 - - Das Grundgesetz der Marxschen Gesellschaftslehre 1903 - - Robertus’ Angriff auf Ricardos Renten-theorie - und der Lexis-Diehl’sche Rettungsversuch 1908 - - David Ricardos Grundrententheorie 1909 - - Theorie der Reinen und Politischen Ökonomie 1910 - - - - -AUTHOR’S PREFACE - -TO THE SECOND AMERICAN EDITION - - -This little book has made its way. In addition to the present -translation into English, there are authorized editions in French, -Hungarian and Serbian. I am also informed that there are translations -published in Japanese, Russian, Hebrew and Yiddish; but these, of -course, are pirated. The book has stood the test of criticism, and has -been judged both favorably and unfavorably. It has, unquestionably, -revived the discussion on the origin and essence of the State. - -Several prominent ethnologists, particularly Holsti, the present -Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Finnish Free State, have attacked -the basic principle formulated and demonstrated in this Work, but they -have failed, because their definition of the State assumed the very -matter that required to be proven. They have brought together a large -array of facts in proof of the existence of some forms of _Government_ -and _Leadership_, even where no classes obtained, and to the substance -of these forms they have given the name of “The State.” It is not -my intention to controvert these facts. It is self-evident, that in -any group of human beings, be it ever so small, there must exist an -authority which determines conflicts and, in extraordinary situations, -assumes the leadership. But this authority is not “The State,” in -the sense in which I use the word. The State may be defined as an -organization of _one class_ dominating over the other classes. Such -a class organization can come about in one way only, namely, through -conquest and the subjection of ethnic groups by the dominating group. -This can be demonstrated with almost mathematical certainty. Not one of -my critics has brought proofs to invalidate this thesis. Most modern -sociologists, among whom may be named Albion Small, Alfred Vierkandt -and Wilhelm Wundt, accept this thesis. Wilhelm Wundt, in particular, -asserts in unmistakable language, that “the political society (a -term identical with the State in the sense employed in this book) -first came about and could originate only in the period of migration -and conquest,” whereby the subjugation of one people by another was -effected. - -But even some of my opponents are favorably inclined to my arguments, -as in the case of the venerable Adolf Wagner, whose words I am proud -to quote. In his article on “The State” in the _Handwörterbuch der -Staatswissenschaften_, he writes: “The sociologic concept of the State, -to which I have referred, particularly in the broad scope and treatment -of it given by Oppenheimer, deserves careful consideration, especially -from political economists and political historians. The vista opened -out, from this point of view, of the economic development of peoples -and that of the State during historic times, should be attractive even -to the opponents of the concept itself.” - -The “sociologic concept of the State,” as Ludwig Gumplowicz termed it, -is assured of ultimate general acceptance. Its opponents are strenuous -and persevering, and I once called them “the sociologic root of all -evil;” but the concept, none the less, is the basic principle of -“bourgeoisie” sociology, and will be found of value in the study, not -only of economics and history, but in that of Law and Constitutional -History. I permit myself to make a few remarks on this point. - -The earliest evidence of the recognition of the idea underlying the -_law of previous accumulation_, may be traced back, at the latest, to -the period of the decay of classical civilization, at the time when -the capitalistic slave economy brought the city states to ruin as -though their peoples had suffered from a galloping consumption. As -in our modern capitalistic age, which resembles that period in many -respects, there occurred a breach in all those naturally developed -relations in which the individual has found protection. What Ferdinand -Toennies calls the “community bonds” were loosened. The individual -found himself unprotected, compelled to rely on his own efforts and -on his own reason in the seething sea of competition which followed. -The collective reason, the product of the wisdom of thousands of years -of experience, could no longer guide or safeguard him. It had become -scattered. Out of this need for an individual reason, there arose the -idea of _nationalism_. This idea had its justification at first, as a -line of development and a method in the newly born science of social -government; but when later it became what Rubenstein (in his work -_Romantic Socialism_) calls a “tendency,” it was not justified. The -community, to use Toennies’ term, changed into a “society.” “Contract” -seemed to be the only bond that held men together--the contract based -on the purely rationalistic relation of service for service, the _do -ut des_, the “Contrat Social” of Rousseau. A “society” would thus -appear to be a union of self-seeking individuals who hoped through -combination to obtain their personal satisfactions. Aristotle had -taught that the State had developed, by gradual growth, from the family -group. The Stoics and Epicureans held that individuals formed the -State--with this difference, that the former viewed the individual as -being socially inclined by nature, and the latter that he was naturally -anti-social. To the Stoics, therefore, the “State of Nature” was a -peaceful union; to the Epicureans it was a war of each against the -other, with Society as a compelling means for a decent modus vivendi. -With the one a Society was conditioned “physei” (by nature); with the -other it was “nomo” (by decree). - -In spite, however, of this fundamental difference between these -schools, both assumed the premise that, at the beginning, individuals -were _free_, _equal_ politically and economically, and that it was from -such an original social order there had developed, through gradual -differentiation, the fully developed State with its class hierarchy. -This is the _law of previous accumulation_. - -But we should err if we believed that this thesis was originally -intended as a historical account. Rationalism is essentially -unhistoric, even anti-historic. On the contrary, the thesis was -originally put forward as a “fiction,” a theory, a conscious -unhistorical assumption. In this form it acquired the name of _natural -law_. It was under this name that it came into modern thought, -tinctured stoically in Grotius and Puffendorf, and epicureanally in -Hobbes. It became the operative weapon of thought among the rising -third estate of the capitalists. - -The capitalists used the weapon, first against the feudal state with -its privileged class, and, later against the fourth estate, with its -class theory of Socialism. Against the feudal domination it argued -that a “Law of Nature” knows and permits no privileges. After its -victories in the English Revolution of 1648, and the great French -Revolution of 1789, it justified, by the same reasoning, its own _de -facto_ pre-eminence, its own social and economic class superiority, -against the claims of the working classes. According to Adam Smith, the -classes in a society are the results of “natural” development. From an -original state of equality, these arose from no other cause than the -exercise of the economic virtues of industry, frugality and providence. -Since these virtues are pre-eminently those of a bourgeoisie society, -the capitalist rule, thus sanctioned by natural law, is just and -unassailable. As a corollary to this theorem the claims of Socialism -cannot be admitted. - -Thus, what originally was put forward as a “fiction,” became first, a -hypothesis and finally the _axiom_ of all bourgeoisie sociology. Those -who support it accept the axiom as self-evident, as not requiring -proof. For them, class domination, on this theory, is the result of a -gradual differentiation from an original state of general equality and -freedom, with no implication in it of any extra-economic power. Robert -Malthus applied this alleged law to the future, in his attempt to -demonstrate any kind of Socialism to be purely Utopian. His celebrated -_Law of Population_ is nothing but the _law of original accumulation_ -projected into the future. He claims that if any attempt were made to -restore the state of economic equality, the workings of the law would -have the effect--because of the difference in economic efficiency--of -restoring modern class conditions. All orthodox sociology begins -with the struggle against this supposed law of class formations. Yet -every step of progress made in the various fields of the science of -sociology, has been made by tearing up, one by one, the innumerable and -far-spreading roots which have proceeded from this supposed axiom. A -sound sociology has to recall the fact that class formation in historic -times, did not take place through gradual differentiation in pacific -economic competition, but was the result of violent conquest and -subjugation. - -As both Capitalism and Socialism had their origins in England, -these new ideas were certain to find their first expression in that -country. So that we find Gerrard Winstanley, the leader of the “true -levellers” of Cromwell’s time, arraying the facts of history against -this anti-historical theoretical assumption. He showed that the -English ruling class (the Squirearchy) was composed essentially of the -victorious conquerors, the Normans, and that the subject class were the -conquered English Saxons. But his demonstration had little influence. -It was only when the great French Revolution brought the contrast out -sharply that the thought sunk in. No less a person than Count St. -Simon, acknowledged as the founder of the science of modern sociology, -and the no less scientific Socialism, discovered in the dominant class -of his country the Frankish and Burgundian conquerors, and in its -subject population, the descendants of the Romanized Celts. It was -the publication of this discovery that gave birth to Western European -sociology. The conclusions drawn from it were carried further by St. -Simon’s disciple, August Comte, in his _Philosophy of History_, and -by the Saint Simonists, Enfantin and Bazard. These thinkers had great -influence on the economic development of the next century; but their -chief contribution was the elaboration of the sociologic idea of the -State. - -Among the peoples of Western Europe, the new sociology found a readier -acceptance than it did among those of Eastern Europe. The reason for -this can easily be seen when it is remembered that in the East the -contrast between the “State” and “Society,” had not been so definitely -realized, as it had been in the West. Even in the West, this contrast -was only fully appreciated, as a social fact, in England, France, the -Netherlands and Italy, because in these countries only the class of -mobile wealth which had worked its way up as the third estate, had -succeeded in ousting the feudal “State.” In France, the league of the -capitalists with the Crown against the then armed and active nobility -had succeeded in subjecting the Frondeurs under the absolute power of -the King. From this time on, this new estate represented itself as -the Nation, and the term “National Economy” takes the place of the -older term “Political Economy.” The members of this third estate felt -themselves to be those subjects of the State whose rights and liberties -had been curtailed by the privileges of the two dominant estates of -the nobility and the clergy. Henceforth, the Third Estate proclaims -the rights of “Society” and against the “State,” opposes the eternal -Law of Nature--that of original equality and freedom--against the -theoretic-historical rights of the Estates. The concept of Society as a -contrast to the concept of the State, first appears in Locke, and from -his time on this contrast was more and more defined, especially in the -writings of the physiocrat school of economists. - -In this struggle between classes and ideas, neither Middle nor Eastern -Europe played any important part. In Germany there had once developed -a Capitalist class (in the period of the Fuggers of Augsburg) which -attained to almost American magnitude. But it was crushed by the -Religious Wars and the various French invasions of the sixteenth and -seventeenth centuries, which left Germany a devastated, depopulated -desert. At the end of the period there remained a few cities and small -states under the absolute domination of princes. Within the cities -the artisans were bound together in their craft-leagues, and the rest -consisted of those of educational pursuits and academic officials. In -a large degree all these were dependent on the State--the members of -the craft-guilds because they accepted a privileged condition, the -officials because they were servants of the State, and the professional -men, because they belonged to the upper estate of the society. For this -reason there was no economic or social movement of the third estate in -Germany; there was only a literary movement influenced by the flow of -ideas from the West. This explains why the contrast between the two -ideas of the State and of Society was not present in the minds of the -German people. On the contrary, the two terms were used as synonyms, -both connotating an essentially necessary conformity to nature. - -But there is still another cause for this difference in the mental -attitude between Western and Eastern Europe. In England and France, -from the time of Descartes, the problems and inquiries of science -were set by men trained in mathematics and the natural sciences. -Especially in the new study of the philosophy of history, the beginning -of our modern sociology, did these men act as guides. In Germany, on -the contrary, it was the theologians and especially the Protestant -theologians who were the leaders of thought. In their hands the State -came to be looked upon as an instrument of Divine fashioning, and, -indeed, of immanent divinity. This thought resulted in a worship of -the State, which reached its height in the well-known Hegelian system. -It thus happened that two rivers of thought flowed for a time side by -side--the Sociology of Western Europe, and the philosophy of History of -Germany--with occasional intercommunicating streams, such as Althusios -and Puffendorf into the French, English and Dutch teaching of natural -law, and that of Rousseau into Hegel. In 1840, however, a direct -junction was effected through Lorenz Stein, one of Hegel’s most gifted -pupils who, later, became the leading German teacher of administrative -law, and influenced generations of thinkers. He came to Paris, as a -young man, for the purpose of studying Socialism at the fountain head. -He became acquainted with the celebrated men of that heroic time--with -Enfintin and Bazard, with Louis Blanc, Reybaud, and Proudhon. - -Lorenz Stein absorbed the new thought with enthusiasm, and in his -fertile mind there was precipitated the creative synthesis between the -Western Europe scientific sociological thought and the metaphysical -German philosophy of history. The product was called by him the Science -of Society (_Gesellschaftswissenschaft_). It is from the writings of -Stein that almost all the important developments of German sociologic -thought received their first impulses. Karl Marx, especially (as Struve -has shown), as well as Schaeffle, Othmar Spann and Gumplowicz are -largely indebted to him. - -It is not my purpose to develop this historical theme. I am concerned -only in tracing the development of the sociologic idea of the State. -The first effect of this meeting of the two streams of thought was a -mischievous confusion of terminology. The writers in Western Europe had -long ago lost control of the unification of expressions in thinking. -As stated above, the Third Estate began by thinking itself to be -“Society,” as opposed to the State. But when the Fourth Estate grew to -class consciousness and became aware of its own theoretic existence, -it arrogated to itself the term “Society” (as may be seen from the -selection of the word Socialism), and it treated the Bourgeoisie as a -form of the “State,” of the class state. There were thus two widely -differing concepts of “Society.” Yet here was an underlying idea common -to both Bourgeoisie and Socialist, since they conceived the State as -a collection of privileges arising and maintained _in violation_ of -natural law, while Society was thought of as the prescribed form of -human union in _conformity_ with natural law. They differed in one -essential only, namely, that while the Third Estate declared its -capitalistic Society to be the result of the processes of natural law, -the Socialists regarded their aims as not yet attained, and proclaimed -that the ideal society of the future which would really be the product -of the processes of natural law, could only be realized by the -elimination of all “surplus value.” Though both were in conflict with -regard to fundamentals, both agreed in viewing the “State” as _civitas -diaboli_ and “Society” as _civitas dei_. - -Stein, however, reversed the objectives of the two concepts. As an -Hegelian, and pre-eminently a worshipper of the State, he conceived the -State as _civitas coelestis_. Society, which he understood to mean only -the dominant bourgeoisie Society, he viewed through the eyes of his -Socialist friends and teachers, and conceived it as _civitas terrena_. - -What in Plato’s sense is the “pure idea,” the “ordre naturel” of the -early physiocrats and termed by Frenchmen and Englishmen “Society,” -was to Stein, the “State.” What had been contaminated and made impure -by the admixture of coarse matter, they termed the “State,” while -the German called it “Society.” In reality, however, there is little -difference between the two. Stein realized with pain, that Hegel’s pure -concept of a State based on right and freedom, was bound to remain -an “idea” only. Eternally fettered, as he assumed it must be, by the -forces of property and the culture proceeding from them, it could never -be a fact. This is his conclusion regarding “Society,” so that its -effective development is obstructed by the beneficent association of -human beings, as Stein conceived that association. - -Thus was attained the very pinnacle of confused thinking. All German -sociologists, with the single exception of Carl Dietzel, soon realized -that the Hegelian concept of the State was impotent, existing only in -the “Idea.” In no point did it touch the reality of historical growth, -and in no sense could it be made to stand for what had always been -considered as the State. Long ago both Marx and Bakunin--respectively -the founders of scientific collectivism and practical anarchism--and -especially Ludwig Gumplowicz, abandoned the Hegelian terminology and -accepted that of Western Europe and this has been generally accepted -everywhere. - -In this little book I have followed the Western European terminology. -By the “State,” I do not mean the human aggregation which may perchance -_come about to be_, or, as it properly _should be_. I mean by it -that summation of privileges and dominating positions which are -brought into being by extra-economic power. And in contrast to this, -I mean by Society, the totality of concepts of all purely natural -relations and institutions between man and man, which will not be -fully realized until the last remnant of the creations of the barbaric -“ages of conquest and migration,” has been eliminated from community -life. Others may call any form of leadership and government or some -other ideal, the “State.” That is a matter of personal choice. It is -useless to quarrel about definitions. But it might be well if those -other thinkers were to understand that they have not controverted the -sociologic idea of the “State,” if a concept of the “State” grounded on -a different basis, does not correspond to that which they have evolved. -And they must guard themselves particularly against the danger of -applying any definition other than that used in this book to those -actual historical products which have hitherto been called “States,” -the essence, development, course and future of which must be explained -by any true teaching or philosophy of the State. - - FRANZ OPPENHEIMER. - - Frankfort-on-Main, April 1922. - - - - -CONTENTS - - - CHAPTER PAGE - - AUTHOR’S PREFACE iii - - I THEORIES OF THE STATE 1 - - The Sociological Idea of the State 15 - - - II THE GENESIS OF THE STATE 22 - - (a) Political and Economic Means 24 - - (b) Peoples Without a State: Huntsmen and Grubbers 27 - - (c) Peoples Preceding the State: Herdsmen and Vikings 33 - - (d) The Genesis of the State 51 - - - III THE PRIMITIVE FEUDAL STATE 82 - - (a) The Form of Dominion 82 - - (b) The Integration 89 - - (c) The Differentiation: Group Theories and Group - Psychology 92 - - (d) The Primitive Feudal State of Higher Grade 105 - - - IV THE MARITIME STATE 121 - - (a) Traffic in Prehistoric Times 122 - - (b) Trade and the Primitive State 135 - - (c) The Genesis of the Maritime State 140 - - (d) Essence and Issue of the Maritime States 155 - - - V THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEUDAL STATE 174 - - (a) The Genesis of Landed Property 174 - - (b) The Central Power in the Primitive Feudal State 182 - - (c) The Political and Social Disintegration of the - Primitive Feudal State 191 - - (d) The Ethnic Amalgamation 213 - - (e) The Developed Feudal State 221 - - - VI THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 229 - - (a) The Emancipation of the Peasantry 231 - - (b) The Genesis of the Industrial State 236 - - (c) The Influences of Money Economy 243 - - (d) The Modern Constitutional State 257 - - - VII THE TENDENCY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE 274 - - - NOTES 293 - - - - -THE STATE - - - - -CHAPTER I - -THEORIES OF THE STATE - - -This treatise regards the State from the sociological standpoint only, -not from the juristic--sociology, as I understand the word, being both -a philosophy of history and a theory of economics. Our object is to -trace the development of the State from its socio-psychological genesis -up to its modern constitutional form; after that, we shall endeavor to -present a well-founded prognosis concerning its future development. -Since we shall trace only the State’s inner, essential being, we need -not concern ourselves with the external forms of law under which its -international and intra-national life is assumed. This treatise, in -short, is a contribution to the philosophy of State development; but -only in so far as the law of development here traced from its generic -form affects also the social problems common to all forms of the modern -State. - -With this limitation of treatment in mind, we may at the outset dismiss -all received doctrines of public law. Even a cursory examination of -conventional theories of the State is sufficient to show that they -furnish no explanation of its genesis, essence and purpose. These -theories represent all possible shadings between all imaginable -extremes. Rousseau derives the State from a social contract, while -Carey ascribes its origin to a band of robbers. Plato and the followers -of Karl Marx endow the State with omnipotence, making it the absolute -lord over the citizen in all political and economic matters; while -Plato even goes so far as to wish the State to regulate sexual -relations. The Manchester school, on the other hand, going to the -opposite extreme of liberalism, would have the State exercise only -needful police functions, and would thus logically have as a result -a scientific anarchism which must utterly exterminate the State. -From these various and conflicting views, it is impossible either to -establish a fixed principle, or to formulate a satisfactory concept of -the real essence of the State. - -This irreconcilable conflict of theories is easily explained by the -fact that none of the conventional theories treats the State from the -sociological view-point. Nevertheless, the State is a phenomenon common -to all history, and its essential nature can only be made plain by a -broad and comprehensive study of universal history. Except in the field -of sociology, the king’s highway of science, no treatment of the State -has heretofore taken this path. All previous theories of the State -have been class theories. To anticipate somewhat the outcome of our -researches, every State has been and is a class State, and every theory -of the State has been and is a class theory. - -A class theory is, however, of necessity, not the result of -investigation and reason, but a by-product of desires and will. Its -arguments are used, not to establish truth, but as weapons in the -contest for material interests. The result, therefore, is not science, -but nescience. By understanding the State, we may indeed recognize the -essence of theories concerning the State. But the converse is not true. -An understanding of theories about the State will give us no clue to -its essence. - -The following may be stated as a ruling concept, especially prevalent -in university teaching, of the origin and essence of the State. It -represents a view which, in spite of manifold attacks, is still -affirmed. - -It is maintained that the State is an organization of human community -life, which originates by reason of a social instinct implanted in men -by nature (Stoic Doctrine); or else is brought about by an irresistible -impulse to end the “war of all against all,” and to coerce the savage, -who opposes organized effort, to a peaceable community life in place -of the anti-social struggle in which all budding shoots of advancement -are destroyed (Epicurean Doctrine). These two apparently irreconcilable -concepts were fused by the intermediation of mediæval philosophy. -This, founded on theologic reasoning and belief in the Bible, developed -the opinion that man, originally and by nature a social creature, is, -through original sin, the fratricide of Cain and the transgression at -the tower of Babel, divided into innumerable tribes, which fight to the -hilt, until they unite peaceably as a State. - -This view is utterly untenable. It confuses the logical concept of a -class with some subordinate species thereof. Granted that the State is -_one_ form of organized political cohesion, it is also to be remembered -that it is a form having _specific_ characteristics. Every state in -history was or is a _state of classes_, a polity of superior and -inferior social groups, based upon distinctions either of rank or of -property. This phenomenon must, then, be called the “State.” With it -alone history occupies itself. - -We should, therefore, be justified in designating every other -form of political organization by the same term, without further -differentiation, had there never existed any other than a class-state, -or were it the only conceivable form. At least, proof might properly -be called for, to show that each conceivable political organization, -even though originally it did not represent a polity of superior and -inferior social and economic classes, since it is of necessity subject -to inherent laws of development, must in the end be resolved into the -specific class form of history. Were such proof forthcoming, it would -offer in fact only one form of political amalgamation, calling in -turn for differentiation at various stages of development, viz., the -preparatory stage, when class distinction does not exist, and the stage -of maturity, when it is fully developed. - -Former students of the philosophy of the State were dimly aware of this -problem. And they tried to adduce the required proof, that because of -inherent tendencies of development, every human political organization -must gradually become a class-state. Philosophers of the canon law -handed this theory down to philosophers of the law of nature. From -these, through the mediation of Rousseau, it became a part of the -teachings of the economists; and even to this day it rules their views -and diverts them from the facts. - -This assumed proof is based upon the concept of a “primitive -accumulation,” or an original store of wealth, in lands and in movable -property, brought about by means of purely economic forces; a doctrine -justly derided by Karl Marx as a “fairy tale.” Its scheme of reasoning -approximates this: - -Somewhere, in some far-stretching, fertile country, a number of free -men, of equal status, form a union for mutual protection. Gradually -they differentiate into property classes. Those best endowed with -strength, wisdom, capacity for saving, industry and caution, slowly -acquire a basic amount of real or movable property; while the stupid -and less efficient, and those given to carelessness and waste, remain -without possessions. The well-to-do lend their productive property to -the less well-off in return for tribute, either ground rent or profit, -and become thereby continually richer, while the others always remain -poor. These differences in possession gradually develop social class -distinctions; since everywhere the rich have preference, while they -alone have the time and the means to devote to public affairs and -to turn the laws administered by them to their own advantage. Thus, -in time, there develops a ruling and property-owning estate, and a -proletariate, a class without property. The primitive state of free and -equal fellows becomes a class-state, by an inherent law of development, -because in every conceivable mass of men there are, as may readily be -seen, strong and weak, clever and foolish, cautious and wasteful ones. - -This seems quite plausible, and it coincides with the experience of our -daily life. It is not at all unusual to see an especially gifted member -of the lower class rise from his former surroundings, and even attain -a leading position in the upper class; or conversely, to see some -spendthrift or weaker member of the higher group “lose his class” and -drop into the proletariate. - -And yet this entire theory is utterly mistaken; it is a “fairy tale,” -or it is a class theory used to justify the privileges of the upper -classes. The class-state never originated in this fashion, and never -could have so originated. History shows that it did not; and economics -shows deductively, with a testimony absolute, mathematical and binding, -that it could not. A simple problem in elementary arithmetic shows that -the assumption of an original accumulation is totally erroneous, and -has nothing to do with the development of the class-state. - -The proof is as follows: All teachers of natural law, etc., have -unanimously declared that the differentiation into income-receiving -classes and propertyless classes can only take place when all fertile -lands have been occupied. For so long as man has ample opportunity -to take up unoccupied land, “no one,” says Turgot, “would think of -entering the service of another;” we may add, “at least for wages, -which are not apt to be higher than the earnings of an independent -peasant working an unmortgaged and sufficiently large property;” while -mortgaging is not possible as long as land is yet free for the working -or taking, as free as air and water. Matter that is obtainable for the -taking has no value that enables it to be pledged, since no one loans -on things that can be had for nothing. - -The philosophers of natural law, then, assumed that complete occupancy -of the ground must have occurred quite early, because of the natural -increase of an originally small population. They were under the -impression that at their time, in the eighteenth century, it had taken -place many centuries previous, and they naïvely deduced the existing -class aggroupment from the assumed conditions of that long-past point -of time. It never entered their heads to work out their problem; and -with few exceptions their error has been copied by sociologists, -historians and economists. It is only quite recently that my figures -were worked out, and they are truly astounding.[A] - -[A] Franz Oppenheimer, _Theorie der Reinen und Politischen Œkonomie_. -Berlin, 1912.--_Translator._ - -We can determine with approximate accuracy the amount of land of -average fertility in the temperate zone, and also what amount is -sufficient to enable a family of peasants to exist comfortably, or -how much such a family can work with its own forces, without engaging -outside help or permanent farm servants. At the time of the migration -of the barbarians (350 to 750 A. D.), the lot of each able-bodied man -was about thirty morgen (equal to twenty acres) on average lands, on -very good ground only ten to fifteen morgen (equal to seven or ten -acres), four morgen being equal to one hectare. Of this land, at least -a third, and sometimes a half, was left uncultivated each year. The -remainder of the fifteen to twenty morgen sufficed to feed and fatten -into giants the immense families of these child-producing Germans, and -this in spite of the primitive technique, whereby at least half the -productive capacity of a day was lost. Let us assume that, in these -modern times, thirty morgen (equal to twenty acres) for the average -peasant suffices to support a family. We have then assumed a block -of land sufficiently large to meet any objection. Modern Germany, -populated as it is, contains an agricultural area of thirty-four -million hectares (equal to eighty-four million, fifteen thousand, four -hundred and eighty acres). The agricultural population, including -farm laborers and their families, amounts to seventeen million; so -that, assuming five persons to a family and an equal division of the -farm lands, each family would have ten hectares (equal to twenty-five -acres). In other words, not even in the Germany of our own day would -the point have been reached where, according to the theories of the -adherents of natural law, differentiation into classes would begin. - -Apply the same process to countries less densely settled, such, for -example, as the Danube States, Turkey, Hungary and Russia, and still -more astounding results will appear. As a matter of fact, there are -still on the earth’s surface, seventy-three billion, two hundred -million hectares (equal to one hundred eighty billion, eight hundred -eighty million and four hundred sixteen thousand acres); dividing -into the first amount the number of human beings of all professions -whatever, viz., one billion, eight hundred million, every family of -five persons could possess about thirty morgen (equal to eighteen -and a half acres), _and still leave about two-thirds of the planet -unoccupied_. - -If, therefore, purely economic causes are ever to bring about a -differentiation into classes by the growth of a propertyless laboring -class, the time has not yet arrived; and the critical point at which -ownership of land will cause a natural scarcity is thrust into the dim -future--if indeed it ever can arrive. - -As a matter of fact, however, for centuries past, in all parts of the -world, we have had a class-state, with possessing classes on top and -a propertyless laboring class at the bottom, even when population was -much less dense than it is to-day. Now it is true that the class-state -can arise only where all fertile acreage has been _occupied_ -completely; and since I have shown that even at the present time, all -the ground is not occupied economically, this must mean that it has -been preëmpted politically. Since land could not have acquired “natural -scarcity,” the scarcity must have been “legal.” This means that the -land has been preëmpted by a ruling class against its subject class, -and settlement prevented. Therefore the State, as a class-state, can -have originated in no other way than through conquest and subjugation. - -This view, the so-called “sociologic idea of the state,” as the -following will show, is supported in ample manner by well-known -historical facts. And yet most modern historians have rejected it, -holding that both groups, amalgamated by war into one State, before -that time had, each for itself formed a “State.” As there is no method -of obtaining historical proof to the contrary, since the beginnings -of human history are unknown, we should arrive at a verdict of “not -proven,” were it not that, deductively, there is the absolute certainty -that the State, as history shows it, the class-state, could not have -come about except through warlike subjugation. The mass of evidence -shows that our simple calculation excludes any other result. - - -THE SOCIOLOGICAL IDEA OF THE STATE - -To the originally, purely sociological, idea of the State, I have added -the economic phase and formulated it as follows: - -What, then, is the State as a sociological concept? The State, -completely in its genesis, essentially and almost completely during the -first stages of its existence, is a social institution, forced by a -victorious group of men on a defeated group, with the sole purpose of -regulating the dominion of the victorious group over the vanquished, -and securing itself against revolt from within and attacks from abroad. -Teleologically, this dominion had no other purpose than the economic -exploitation of the vanquished by the victors. - -No primitive state known to history originated in any other manner.[1] -Wherever a reliable tradition reports otherwise, either it concerns -the amalgamation of two fully developed primitive states into one body -of more complete organization; or else it is an adaptation to men of -the fable of the sheep which made a bear their king in order to be -protected against the wolf. But even in this latter case, the form and -content of the State became precisely the same as in those states where -nothing intervened, and which became immediately “wolf states.” - -The little history learned in our school-days suffices to prove this -generic doctrine. Everywhere we find some warlike tribe of wild men -breaking through the boundaries of some less warlike people, settling -down as nobility and founding its State. In Mesopotamia, wave follows -wave, state follows state--Babylonians, Amoritans, Assyrians, Arabs, -Medes, Persians, Macedonians, Parthians, Mongols, Seldshuks, Tartars, -Turks; on the Nile, Hyksos, Nubians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, -Turks; in Greece, the Doric States are typical examples; in Italy, -Romans, Ostrogoths, Lombards, Franks, Germans; in Spain, Carthaginians, -Visigoths, Arabs; in Gaul, Romans, Franks, Burgundians, Normans; in -Britain, Saxons, Normans. In India wave upon wave of wild warlike -clans has flooded over the country even to the islands of the Indian -Ocean. So also is it with China. In the European colonies, we find -the selfsame type, wherever a settled element of the population has -been found, as for example, in South America and Mexico. Where that -element is lacking, where only roving huntsmen are found, who may be -exterminated but not subjugated, the conquerors resort to the device -of importing from afar masses of men to be exploited, to be subject -perpetually to forced labor, and thus the slave trade arises. - -An apparent exception is found only in those European colonies in -which it is forbidden to replace the lack of a domiciled indigenous -population by the importation of slaves. One of these colonies, the -United States of America, is among the most powerful state-formations -in all history. The exception there found is to be explained by this, -that the mass of men to be exploited and worked without cessation -_imports itself_, by emigration in great hordes from primitive states -or from those in higher stages of development in which exploitation has -become unbearable, while liberty of movement has been attained. In this -case, one may speak of an infection from afar with “statehood” brought -in by the infected of foreign lands. Where, however, in such colonies, -immigration is very limited, either because of excessive distances -and the consequent high charges for moving from home, or because of -regulations limiting the immigration, we perceive an approximation -to the final end of the development of the State, which we nowadays -recognize as the necessary outcome and finale, but for which we have -not yet found a scientific terminology. Here again, in the dialectic -development, a change in the quantity is bound up with a change of -the quality. The old form is filled with new contents. We still find -a “State” in so far as it represents the tense regulation, secured by -external force, whereby is secured the social living together of large -bodies of men; but it is no longer the “State” in its older sense. -It is no longer the instrument of political domination and economic -exploitation of one social group by another; it is no longer a “State -of Classes.” It rather resembles a condition which appears to have -come about through a “social contract.” This stage is approached by -the Australian Colonies, excepting Queensland, which after the feudal -manner still exploits the half enslaved Kanakas. It is almost attained -in New Zealand. - -So long as there is no general assent as to the origin and essence of -states historically known or as to the sociological meaning of the word -“State,” it would be futile to attempt to force into use a new name -for these most advanced commonwealths. They will continue to be called -“states” in spite of all protests, especially because of the pleasure -of using confusing concepts. For the purpose of this study, however, we -propose to employ a new concept, a different verbal lever, and shall -speak of the result of the new process as a “Freemen’s Citizenship.” - -This summary survey of the states of the past and present should, if -space permitted, be supplemented by an examination of the facts offered -by the study of races, and of those states which are not treated in our -falsely called “Universal History.” On this point, the assurance may be -accepted that here again our general rule is valid without exception. -Everywhere, whether in the Malay Archipelago, or in the “great -sociological laboratory of Africa,” at all places on this planet where -the development of tribes has at all attained a higher form, the State -grew from the subjugation of one group of men by another. Its basic -justification, its raison d’être, was and is the economic exploitation -of those subjugated. - -The summary review thus far made may serve as proof of the basic -premise of this sketch. The pathfinder, to whom, before all others, -we are indebted for this line of investigation is Professor Ludwig -Gumplowicz of Graz, jurist and sociologist, who crowned a brave life -by a brave self-chosen death. We can, then, in sharp outlines, follow -in the sufferings of humanity the path which the State has pursued in -its progress through the ages. This we propose now to trace from the -primitive state founded on conquest to the “freemen’s citizenship.” - - - - -CHAPTER II - -THE GENESIS OF THE STATE - - -One single force impels all life; one force developed it, from the -single cell, the particle of albumen floating about in the warm ocean -of prehistoric time, up to the vertebrates, and then to man. This one -force, according to Lippert, is the tendency to provide for life, -bifurcated into “hunger and love.” With man, however, philosophy also -enters into the play of these forces, in order hereafter, together with -“hunger and love, to hold together the structure of the world of men.” -To be sure, this philosophy, this “idea” of Schopenhauer’s, is at its -source nothing else than a creature of the provision for life called -by him “will.” It is an organ of orientation in the world, an arm in -the struggle for existence. Yet in spite of this, we shall come to -know the desire for causation as a self-acting force, and of social -facts as coöperators in the sociological process of development. In the -beginning of human society, and as it gradually develops, this tendency -pushes itself forward in various bizarre ideas called “superstition.” -These are based on purely logical conclusions from incomplete -observations concerning air and water, earth and fire, animals and -plants, which seem endowed with a throng of spirits both kindly and -malevolent. One may say that in the most recent modern times, at a -stage attained only by very few races, there arises also the younger -daughter of the desire for causation, namely science, as a logical -result of complete observation of facts; science, now required to -exterminate widely branched-out superstition, which, with innumerable -threads, has rooted itself in the very soul of mankind. - -But, however powerfully, especially in the moment of “ecstasy,”[2] -superstition may have influenced history, however powerfully, even in -ordinary times, it may have coöperated in the development of human -communal life, the principal force of development is still to be found -in the necessities of life, which force man to acquire for himself -and for his family nourishment, clothing and housing. This remains, -therefore, the “economic” impulse. A sociological--and that means a -socio-psychological--investigation of the development of history can, -therefore, not progress otherwise than by following out the methods by -which economic needs have been satisfied in their gradual unfolding, -and by taking heed of the influences of the causation impulse at its -proper place. - - -(a) POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEANS - -There are two fundamentally opposed means whereby man, requiring -sustenance, is impelled to obtain the necessary means for satisfying -his desires. These are work and robbery, one’s own labor and the -forcible appropriation of the labor of others. Robbery! Forcible -appropriation! These words convey to us ideas of crime and the -penitentiary, since we are the contemporaries of a developed -civilization, specifically based on the inviolability of property. And -this tang is not lost when we are convinced that land and sea robbery -is the primitive relation of life, just as the warriors’ trade--which -also for a long time is only organized mass robbery--constitutes the -most respected of occupations. Both because of this, and also on -account of the need of having, in the further development of this -study, terse, clear, sharply opposing terms for these very important -contrasts, I propose in the following discussion to call one’s own -labor and the equivalent exchange of one’s own labor for the labor of -others, the “economic means” for the satisfaction of needs, while the -unrequited appropriation of the labor of others will be called the -“political means.” - -The idea is not altogether new; philosophers of history have at all -times found this contradiction and have tried to formulate it. But no -one of these formulæ has carried the premise to its complete logical -end. At no place is it clearly shown that the contradiction consists -only in the _means_ by which the _identical purpose_, the acquisition -of economic objects of consumption, is to be obtained. Yet this is the -critical point of the reasoning. In the case of a thinker of the rank -of Karl Marx, one may observe what confusion is brought about when -economic purpose and economic means are not strictly differentiated. -All those errors, which in the end led Marx’s splendid theory so far -away from truth, were grounded in the lack of clear differentiation -between the means of economic satisfaction of needs and its end. This -led him to designate slavery as an “economic category,” and force as -an “economic force”--half truths which are far more dangerous than -total untruths, since their discovery is more difficult, and false -conclusions from them are inevitable. - -On the other hand, our own sharp differentiation between the two -means toward the same end, will help us to avoid any such confusion. -This will be our key to an understanding of the development, the -essence, and the purpose of the State; and since all universal history -heretofore has been only the history of states, to an understanding -of universal history as well. All world history, from primitive times -up to our own civilization, presents a single phase, a contest namely -between the economic and the political means; and it can present only -this phase until we have achieved free citizenship. - - -(b) PEOPLES WITHOUT A STATE: HUNTSMEN AND GRUBBERS - -The state is an organization of the political means. No state, -therefore, can come into being until the economic means has created a -definite number of objects for the satisfaction of needs, which objects -may be taken away or appropriated by warlike robbery. For that reason, -primitive huntsmen are without a state; and even the more highly -developed huntsmen become parts of a state structure only when they -find in their neighborhood an evolved economic organization which they -can subjugate. But primitive huntsmen live in practical anarchy. - -Grosse says concerning primitive huntsmen in general: - -“There are no essential differences of fortune among them, and thus a -principal source for the origin of differences in station is lacking. -Generally, all grown men within the tribe enjoy equal rights. The older -men, thanks to their greater experience, have a certain authority; -but no one feels himself bound to render them obedience. Where in -some cases chiefs are recognized--as with the Botokude, the Central -Californians, the Wedda and the Mincopie--their power is extremely -limited. The chieftain has no means of enforcing his wishes against -the will of the rest. Most tribes of hunters, however, have no -chieftain. The entire society of the males still forms a homogeneous -undifferentiated mass, in which only those individuals achieve -prominence who are believed to possess magical powers.”[3] - -Here, then, there scarcely exists a spark of “statehood,” even in the -sense of ordinary theories of the state, still less in the sense of -the correct “sociologic idea of the state.” - -The social structure of primitive peasants has hardly more resemblance -to a state than has the horde of huntsmen. Where the peasant, working -the ground with a grub, is living in liberty, there is as yet no -“state.” The plow is always the mark of a higher economic condition -which occurs only in a state; that is to say, in a system of plantation -work carried on by subjugated servants.[4] The grubbers live isolated -from one another, scattered over the country in separated curtilages, -perhaps in villages, split up because of quarrels about district or -farm boundaries. In the best cases, they live in feebly organized -associations, bound together by oath, attached only loosely by the -tie which the consciousness of the same descent and speech and the -same belief imposes upon them. They unite perhaps once a year in the -common celebration of renowned ancestors or of the tribal god. There is -no ruling authority over the whole mass; the various chieftains of a -village, or possibly of a district, may have more or less influence in -their circumscribed spheres, this depending usually upon their personal -qualities, and especially upon the magical powers attributed to them. -Cunow describes the Peruvian peasants before the incursion of the Incas -as follows: “An unregulated living side by side of many independent, -mutually warring tribes, who again were split up into more or less -autonomous territorial unions, held together by ties of kinship.”[5] -One may say that all the primitive peasants of the old and new world -were of this type. - -In such a state of society, it is hardly conceivable that a warlike -organization could come about for purposes of attack. It is -sufficiently difficult to mobilize the clan, or still more the tribe, -for common defense. The peasant is always lacking in mobility. He is -as attached to the ground as the plants he cultivates. As a matter of -fact, the working of his field makes him “bound to the soil” (_glebæ -adscriptus_), even though, in the absence of law, he has freedom of -movement. What purpose, moreover, would a looting expedition effect in -a country, which throughout its extent is occupied only by grubbing -peasants? The peasant can carry off from the peasant nothing which he -does not already own. In a condition of society marked by superfluity -of agricultural land, each individual contributes only a little work -to its extensive cultivation. Each occupies as much territory as he -needs. More would be superfluous. Its acquisition would be lost labor, -even were its owner able to conserve for any length of time the grain -products thus secured. Under primitive conditions, however, this spoils -rapidly by reason of change of atmosphere, ants, or other agencies. -According to Ratzel, the Central African peasant must convert the -superfluous portion of his crops into beer as quickly as possible in -order not to lose it entirely! - -For all these reasons, primitive peasants are totally lacking in that -warlike desire to take the offensive which is the distinguishing mark -of hunters and herdsmen: war can not better their condition. And this -peaceable attitude is strengthened by the fact that the occupation of -the peasant does not make him an efficient warrior. It is true his -muscles are strong and he has powers of endurance, but he is sluggish -of movement and slow to come to a determination, while huntsmen and -nomads by their methods of living develop speed of motion and swiftness -of action. For this reason, the primitive peasant is usually of a more -gentle disposition than they.[B] - -[B] This psychological contradiction, though often expressly stated, is -not the absolute rule, Grosse, _Forms of the Family_, says (page 137): -“Some historians of civilization place the peasant in opposition to the -warlike nomads, claiming that the peasants are peace-loving peoples. In -fact one can not state that their economic life leads them to wars, or -educates them for it, as can be said of stock raisers. Nevertheless, -one finds within the scope of this form of cultivation a mass of the -most warlike and cruel peoples to be found anywhere. The wild cannibals -of the Bismarck archipelago, the blood-lusting Vitians, the butchers of -men of Dahome and Ashanti--they all cultivate the ‘peaceable’ acres; -and if other peasants are not quite as bad, it seems that the kindly -disposition of the vast mass appears to be, at least, questionable.” - -To sum up: within the economic and social conditions of the peasant -districts, one finds no differentiation working for the higher forms -of integration. There exists neither the impulse nor the possibility -for the warlike subjection of neighbors. No “State” can therefore -arise; and, as a matter of fact, none ever has arisen from such social -conditions. Had there been no impulse from without, from groups of men -nourished in a different manner, the primitive grubber would never have -discovered the State. - - -(c) PEOPLES PRECEDING THE STATE: HERDSMEN AND VIKINGS - -Herdsmen, on the contrary, even though isolated, have developed a whole -series of the elements of statehood; and in the tribes which have -progressed further, they have developed this in its totality, with the -single exception of the last point of identification which completes -the state in its modern sense, that is to say, with exception only of -the definitive occupation of a circumscribed territory. - -One of these elements is an economic one. Even without the intervention -of extra-economic force, there may still develop among herdsmen a -sufficiently marked differentiation of property and income. Assuming -that, at the start, there was complete equality in the number of -cattle, yet within a short time, the one man may be richer and the -other poorer. An especially clever breeder will see his herd increase -rapidly, while an especially careful watchman and bold hunter will -preserve his from decimation by beasts of prey. The element of luck -also affects the result. One of these herders finds an especially good -grazing ground and healthful watering places; the other one loses his -entire stock through pestilence, or through a snowfall or a sandstorm. - -Distinctions in fortune quickly bring about class distinctions. The -herdsman who has lost all must hire himself to the rich man; and -sinking thus under the other, become dependent on him. Wherever -herdsmen live, from all three parts of the ancient world, we find the -same story. Meitzen reports of the Lapps, nomadic in Norway: “Three -hundred reindeer sufficed for one family; who owned only a hundred -must enter the service of the richer, whose herds ran up to a thousand -head.”[6] The same writer, speaking of the Central Asiatic Nomads, -says: “A family required three hundred head of cattle for comfort; one -hundred head is poverty, followed by a life of debt. The servant must -cultivate the lands of the lord.”[7] Ratzel reports concerning the -Hottentots of Africa a form of “commendatio”: “The poor man endeavors -to hire himself to the rich man, his only object being to obtain -cattle.”[8] Laveleye, who reports the same circumstances from Ireland, -traces the origin and the name of the feudal system (_système féodal_) -to the loaning of cattle by the rich to the poor members of the tribe; -accordingly, a “fee-od” (owning of cattle) was the first feud whereby -so long as the debt existed the magnate bound the small owner to -himself as “his man.” - -We can only hint at the methods whereby, even in peaceable associations -of herdsmen, this economic and consequent social differentiation may -have been furthered by the connection of the patriarchate with the -offices of supreme and sacrificial priesthood if the wise old men -used cleverly the superstition of their clan associates. But this -differentiation, so long as it is unaffected by the political means, -operates within very modest bounds. Cleverness and efficiency are not -hereditary with any degree of certainty. The largest herd will be split -up if many heirs grow up in one tent, and fortune is tricky. In our -own day, the richest man among the Lapps of Sweden, in the shortest -possible time, has been reduced to such complete poverty that the -government has had to support him. All these causes bring it about -that the original condition of economic and social equality is always -approximately restored. “The more peaceable, aboriginal, and genuine -the nomad is, the smaller are the tangible differences of possession. -It is touching to note the pleasure with which an old prince of the -Tsaidam Mongols accepts his tribute or gift, consisting of a handful of -tobacco, a piece of sugar, and twenty-five kopeks.”[9] - -This equality is destroyed permanently and in greater degree by the -political means. “Where war is carried on and booty acquired, greater -differences arise, which find their expression in the ownership of -slaves, women, arms and spirited mounts.”[10] - -The ownership of _slaves_! The nomad is the inventor of slavery, and -thereby has created the seedling of the state, the first economic -exploitation of man by man. - -The huntsman carries on wars and takes captives. But he does not make -them slaves; either he kills them, or else he adopts them into the -tribe. Slaves would be of no use to him. The booty of the chase can -be stowed away even less than grain can be “capitalized.” The idea -of using a human being as a labor motor could only come about on -an economic plane on which a body of wealth has developed, call it -capital, which can be increased only with the assistance of dependent -labor forces. - -This stage is first reached by the herdsmen. The forces of one family, -lacking outside assistance, suffice to hold together a herd of very -limited size, and to protect it from attacks of beasts of prey or human -enemies. Until the political means is brought into play, auxiliary -forces are found very sparingly; such as the poorer members of the -clan already mentioned, together with runaways from foreign tribes, -who are found all over the world as protected dependents in the suite -of the greater owners of herds.[11] In some cases, an entire poor -clan of herdsmen enters, half freely, into the service of some rich -tribe. “Entire peoples take positions corresponding to their relative -wealth. Thus the Tungusen, who are very poor, try to live near the -settlements of the Tschuktsches, because they find occupation as -herdsmen of the reindeer belonging to the wealthy Tschuktsches; they -are paid in reindeer. And the subjection of the Ural-Samojedes by the -Sirjaenes came about through the gradual occupation of their pasturing -grounds.”[12] - -Excepting, however, the last named case, which is already very -state-like, the few existing labor forces, without capital, are not -sufficient to permit the clan to keep very large herds. Furthermore, -methods of herding themselves compel division. For a pasture may -not, as they say in the Swiss Alps, be “overpushed,” that is to say, -have too many cattle on it. The danger of losing the entire stock -is reduced by the measure in which it is distributed over various -pastures. For cattle plagues, storms, etc., can affect only a part; -while even the enemy from abroad can not drive off all at once. For -that reason, the Hereros, for example, “find every well-to-do owner -forced to keep, besides the main herd, several other subsidiary herds. -Younger brothers or other near relatives, or in want of these, tried -old servants, watch them.”[13] - -For that reason, the developed nomad spares his captured enemy; he can -use him as a slave on his pasture. We may note this transition from -killing to enslaving in a customary rite of the Scythians: they offered -up at their places of sacrifice one out of every hundred captured -enemies. Lippert, who reports this, sees in it “the beginning of a -limitation, and the reason thereof is evidently to be found in the -value which a captured enemy has acquired by becoming the servant of a -tribal herdsman.”[14] - -With the introduction of slaves into the tribal economy of the -herdsmen, the state, in its essential elements, is completed, except -that it has not as yet acquired a definitely circumscribed territorial -limit. The state has thus the _form_ of dominion, and its economic -basis is the exploitation of human labor. Henceforth, economic -differentiation and the formation of social classes progress rapidly. -The herds of the great, wisely divided and better guarded by numerous -armed servants than those of the simple freemen, as a rule, maintain -themselves at their original number: they also increase faster than -those of the freemen, since they are augmented by the greater share -in the booty which the rich receive, corresponding to the number of -warriors (slaves) which these place in the field. - -Likewise, the office of supreme priest creates an ever-widening -cleft which divides the numbers of the clan, all formerly equals; -until finally a genuine nobility, the rich descendants of the rich -patriarchs, is placed in juxtaposition to the ordinary freemen. “The -redskins have also in their progressive organization developed -no nobility and no slavery,[C] and in this their organization -distinguishes itself most essentially from those of the old world. -Both arise from the development of the patriarchate of stock-raising -people.”[15] - -[C] This statement of Lippert is not quite correct. The higher -developed domiciled huntsmen and fishermen of Northwest America have -both nobles and slaves. - -Thus we find, with all developed tribes of herdsmen, a social -separation into three distinct classes: nobility (“head of the house -of his fathers” in the biblical phrase), common freemen and slaves. -According to Mommsen, “all Indo-Germanic people have slavery as a -jural institution.”[16] This applies to the Arians and the Semites -of Asia and Africa as well as to the Hamites. Among all the Fulbe of -the Sahara, “society is divided into princes, chieftains, commons and -slaves.”[17] And we find the same facts everywhere, as a matter of -course, wherever slavery is legally established, as among the Hova[18] -and their Polynesian kinsmen, the “Sea Nomads.” Human psychology under -similar circumstances brings about like conditions, independent of -color or race. - -Thus the herdsman gradually becomes accustomed to earning his -livelihood through warfare, and to the exploitation of men as servile -labor motors. And one must admit that his entire mode of life impels -him to make more and more use of the “political means.” - -He is physically stronger and just as adroit and determined as the -primitive huntsman, whose food supply is too irregular to permit him -to attain his greatest natural physical development. The herdsman can, -in all cases, grow to his full stature, since he has uninterrupted -nourishment in the milk of his herds and an unfailing supply of meat. -This is shown in the Arian horse nomad, no less than in the herdsman of -Asia and Africa, e. g., the Zulu. Secondly, tribes of herdsmen increase -faster than hordes of hunters. This is so, not only because the adults -can obtain much more nourishment from a given territory, but still -more because possession of the milk of animals shortens the period of -nursing for the mothers, and consequently permits a greater number -of children to be born and to grow to maturity. As a consequence, the -pastures and steppes of the old world became inexhaustible fountains, -which periodically burst their confines letting loose inundations of -humanity, so that they came to be called the “_vaginæ gentium_.” - -Moreover we find a much larger number of armed warriors among -herdsmen than among hunters. Each one of these herdsmen is stronger -individually, and yet all of them together are at least as mobile -as is a horde of huntsmen; while the camel and horse riders among -them are incomparably more mobile. This greater mass of the best -individual elements is held together by an organization only possible -under the ægis of a slave-holding patriarchate accustomed to rule, an -organization prepared and developed by its occupation, and therefore -superior to that of the young warriors of the huntsmen sworn to the -service of one chief. - -Hunters, it may be observed, work best alone or in small groups. -Herdsmen, on the other hand, move to the best advantage in a great -train, in which each individual is best protected; and which is in -every sense an armed expedition, where every stopping place becomes an -armed camp. Thus there is developed a science of tactical maneuvers, -strict subordination, and firm discipline. “One does not make a -mistake,” as Ratzel says, “if one accounts as the disciplinary forces -in the life of the nomads the order of the tents which, in the same -form, exists since most ancient times. Every one and everything here -has a definite, traditional place; hence the speed and order in setting -up and in breaking camp, in establishment and in rearrangement. It is -unheard of that any one without orders, or without the most pressing -reason, should change his place. Thanks to this strict discipline, the -tents can be packed up and loaded away within the space of an hour.”[19] - -The same tried order, handed down from untold ages, regulates -the warlike march of the tribe of herdsmen while on the hunt, in -war and in peaceable wandering. Thus they become professional -fighters, irresistible until the state develops higher and mightier -organizations. Herdsman and warrior become identical concepts. Ratzel’s -statement concerning the Central Asiatic Nomads applies to them all: -“The nomad is, as herdsman, an economic, as warrior, a political -concept. It is easy for him to turn from any activity to that of the -warrior and robber. Everything in life has for him a pacific and -war-like, an honest and robber-like, side; according to circumstances, -the one or the other of these phases appears uppermost. Even fishing -and navigation, at the hands of the East Caspian Turkomans, developed -into piracy.... The activities of the apparently pacific existence as -a herdsman determine those of the warrior; the pastoral crook becomes -a fighting implement. In the fall, when the horses return strengthened -from the pasture and the second cropping of the sheep is completed, -the nomads’ minds turn to some feud or robbing expedition (_Baranta_, -literally, to make cattle, to lift cattle), adjourned to that time. -This is an expression of the right of self help, which in contentions -over points of law, or in quarrels affecting dignity, or in blood -feuds, seeks both requital and surety in the most valuable things that -the enemy possesses, namely, the animals of his herd. Young men who -have not been on a _baranta_ must first acquire the name _batir_, hero, -and thus earn the claim to honor and respect. The pleasure of ownership -joined to the desire for adventure develops the triple descending -gradation of avenger, hero and robber.”[20] - -An identical development takes place with the sea nomads, the -“Vikings,” as with the land nomads. This is quite natural, since in the -most important cases noted in the history of mankind, sea nomads are -simply land nomads taking to the sea. - -We have noted above one of the innumerable examples which indicate that -the herdsman does not long hesitate to use for marauding expeditions, -instead of the horse or the “ship of the desert,” the “horses of the -sea.” This case is exemplified by the East Caspian Turkomans.[21] -Another example is furnished by the Scythians: “From the moment when -they learn from their neighbors the art of navigating the seas, these -wandering herdsmen, whom Homer (_Iliad_, XIII, 3) calls ‘respected -horsemen, milk-eaters and poor, the most just of men,’ change into -daring navigators like their Baltic and Scandinavian brethren. Strabo -(_Cas._, 301) complains: ‘Since they have ventured on the sea, -carrying on piracy and murdering foreigners, they have become worse; -and associating with many peoples, they adopt their petty trading and -spendthrift habits.’”[22] - -If the Phœnicians really were “Semites,” they furnish an additional -example of incomparable importance of the transformation of land into -“sea Bedouins,” i. e., warlike robbers; and the same is probably -true for the majority of the numerous peoples who looted the rich -countries around the Mediterranean, whether from the coast of Asia -Minor, Dalmatia, or from the North African shore. These begin from the -earliest times, as we see from the Egyptian monuments (the Greeks -were not admitted into Egypt),[23] and continue to the present day: e. -g., the Riff pirates. The North African “Moors,” an amalgamation of -Arabs and of Berbers, both originally land nomads, are perhaps the most -celebrated example of this change. - -There are cases in which sea nomads--that is to say, sea robbers--arise -immediately from fishermen, with no intermediate herdsman stage. -We have already examined the causes which give the herdsmen their -superiority over the peasantry: the relatively numerous population of -the horde, combined with an activity which develops courage and quick -resolution in the individual, and educates the mass as a whole to tense -discipline. All this applies also to fishermen dwelling on the sea. -Rich fishing grounds permit a considerable density of population, as -is shown in the case of the Northwest Indians (Tlinkit, etc.); these -permit also the keeping of slaves, since the slave earns more by -fishing than his keep amounts to. Thus we find, here alone among the -redskins, slavery developed as an institution; and we find, therefore, -along with it, permanent economic differences among the freemen, which -result in a sort of plutocracy similar to that noted among herdsmen. -Here, as there, the habit of command over slaves produces the habit -of rule and a taste for the “political means.” This is favored by the -tense discipline developed in navigation. “Not the least advantage -of fishing in common is found in the discipline of the crews. They -must render implicit obedience to a leader chosen in each of the -larger fishing boats, since every success depends upon obedience. The -command of a ship afterward facilitates the command of the state. We -are accustomed to reckon the Solomon Islanders as complete savages, -and yet their life is subject to one solitary element, which combines -their forces, namely, navigation.”[24] If the Northwest Indians did not -become such celebrated sea robbers as their likes in the old world, -this is due to the fact that the neighborhoods within their reach had -developed no rich civilization; but all more developed fishermen carry -on piracy. - -For this reason, the Vikings have the same capacity to choose the -political means as the basis of their economic existence as have the -cattle raiders; and similarly they have been founders of states on a -large scale. Hereafter, we shall distinguish the states founded by -them as “sea states,” while the states founded by herdsmen--and in the -new world by hunters--will be called “land states.” Sea states will be -treated extensively when we discuss the consequences of the _developed -feudal state_. As long, however, as we are discussing the development -of the state, and the _primitive_ feudal state, we must limit ourselves -to the consideration of the land state and leave the sea state out of -account. This treatment is convenient, since in all essential things -the sea state has the same characteristics, but its development can not -be followed through the various typical stages as can the development -of the land state. - - -(d) THE GENESIS OF THE STATE - -The hordes of huntsmen are incomparably weaker, both in numbers and in -the strength of the single fighters, than are the herdsmen with whom -they occasionally brush. Naturally they can not withstand the impact. -They flee to the highlands and mountains, where the herdsmen have no -inclination to follow them, not only because of the physical hardships -involved, but also because their cattle do not find pasturage there; -or else they enter into a form of cliental relation, as happened often -in Africa, especially in very ancient times. When the Hyksos invaded -Egypt, such dependent huntsmen followed them. The huntsmen usually pay -for protection an inconsiderable tribute in the form of spoils of the -chase, and are used for reconnoitering and watching. But the huntsman, -being a “practical anarchist,” often invites his own destruction rather -than submit to regular labor. For these reasons, no “state” ever arose -from such contact. - -The peasants fight as undisciplined levies, and with their single -combatants undisciplined; so that, in the long run, even though they -are strong in numbers, they are no more able than are the hunters to -withstand the charge of the heavily armed herdsmen. But the peasantry -do not flee. The peasant is attached to his ground, and has been used -to regular work. He remains, yields to subjection, and pays tribute -to his conqueror; _that is the genesis of the land states in the old -world_. - -In the new world, where the larger herding animals, cattle, horses, -camels, were not indigenous, we find that instead of the herdsman the -hunter is the conqueror of the peasant, because of his infinitely -superior adroitness in the use of arms and in military discipline. -“In the old world we found that the contrast of herdsmen and peasants -developed civilization; in the new world the contrast is between the -sedentary and the roving tribes. The Toltecks, devoted to agriculture, -fought wild tribes (with a highly developed military organization) -breaking in from the north, as endlessly as did Iran with Turan.”[25] - -This applies not only to Peru and Mexico, but to all America, a strong -ground for the opinion that the fundamental basis of civilization is -the same all over the world, its development being consistent and -regular under the most varied economic and geographical conditions. -Wherever opportunity offers, and man possesses the power, he prefers -political to economic means for the preservation of his life. And -perhaps this is true not alone of man, for, according to Maeterlinck’s -_Life of the Bees_, a swarm which has once made the experiment of -obtaining honey from a foreign hive, by robbery instead of by tedious -building, is thenceforth spoiled for the “economic means.” From working -bees, robber bees have developed. - -Leaving out of account the state formations of the new world, which -have no great significance in universal history, the cause of the -genesis of all states is the contrast between peasants and herdsmen, -between laborers and robbers, between bottom lands and prairies. -Ratzel, regarding sociology from the geographical view-point, -expresses this cleverly: “It must be remembered that nomads do not -always destroy the opposing civilization of the settled folk. This -applies not only to tribes, but also to states, even to those of some -might. The war-like character of the nomads is a great factor in the -creation of states. It finds expression in the immense nations of -Asia controlled by nomad dynasties and nomad armies, such as Persia, -ruled by the Turks; China, conquered and governed by the Mongols and -Manchus; and in the Mongol and Radjaputa states of India, as well as -in the states on the border of the Soudan, where the amalgamation of -the formerly hostile elements has not yet developed so far, although -they are joined together by mutual benefit. In no place is it shown -so clearly as here on the border of the nomad and peasant peoples, -that the great workings of the impulse making for civilization on -the part of the nomads are not the result of civilizing activity, -but of war-like exploits at first detrimental to pacific work. Their -importance lies in the capacity of the nomads to hold together the -sedentary races who otherwise would easily fall apart. This, however, -does not exclude their learning much from their subjects.... Yet all -these industrious and clever folk did not have and could not have the -will and the power to rule, the military spirit, and the sense for -the order and subordination that befits a state. For this reason, the -desert-born lords of the Soudan rule over their negro folk just as -the Manchus rule their Chinese subjects. This takes place pursuant -to a law, valid from Timbuctoo to Pekin, whereby advantageous state -formations arise in rich peasant lands adjoining a wide prairie; where -a high material culture of sedentary peoples is violently subjugated to -the service of prairie dwellers having energy, war-like capacity, and -desire to rule.”[26] - -In the genesis of the state, from the subjection of a peasant folk by -a tribe of herdsmen or by sea nomads, six stages may be distinguished. -In the following discussion it should not be assumed that the actual -historical development must, in each particular case, climb the -entire scale step by step. Although, even here, the argument does not -depend upon bare theoretical construction, since every particular -stage is found in numerous examples, both in the world’s history and -in ethnology, and there are states which have apparently progressed -through them all. But there are many more which have skipped one or -more of these stages. - -The first stage comprises robbery and killing in border fights, endless -combats broken neither by peace nor by armistice. It is marked by -killing of men, carrying away of children and women, looting of herds, -and burning of dwellings. Even if the offenders are defeated at first, -they return in stronger and stronger bodies, impelled by the duty of -blood feud. Sometimes the peasant group may assemble, may organize -its militia, and perhaps temporarily defeat the nimble enemy; but -mobilization is too slow and supplies to be brought into the desert -too costly for the peasants. The peasants’ militia does not, as does -the enemy, carry its stock of food--its herds--with it into the field. -In Southwest Africa the Germans recently experienced the difficulties -which a well-disciplined and superior force, equipped with a supply -train, with a railway reaching back to its base of supply, and with -the millions of the German Empire behind it, may have with a handful -of herdsmen warriors, who were able to give the Germans a decided -setback. In the case of primitive levies, this difficulty is increased -by the narrow spirit of the peasant, who considers only his own -neighborhood, and by the fact that while the war is going on the lands -are uncultivated. Therefore, in such cases, in the long run, the small -but compact and easily mobilized body constantly defeats the greater -disjointed mass, as the panther triumphs over the buffalo. - -This is the first stage in the formation of states. The state may -remain stationary at this point for centuries, for a thousand years. -The following is a thoroughly characteristic example: - -“Every range of a Turkoman tribe formerly bordered upon a wide belt -which might be designated as its ‘looting district.’ Everything north -and east of Chorassan, though nominally under Persian dominion, has for -decades belonged more to the Turkomans, Jomudes, Goklenes, and other -tribes of the bordering plains, than to the Persians. The Tekinzes, -in a similar manner, looted all the stretches from Kiwa to Bokhara, -until other Turkoman tribes were successfully rounded up either by -force or by corruption to act as a buffer. Numberless further instances -can be found in the history of the chain of oases which extends -between Eastern and Western Asia directly through the steppes of its -central part, where since ancient times the Chinese have exercised -a predominant influence through their possession of all important -strategic centers, such as the Oasis of Chami. The nomads, breaking -through from north and south, constantly tried to land on these islands -of fertile ground, which to them must have appeared like Islands of -the Blessed. And every horde, whether laden down with booty or fleeing -after defeat, was protected by the plains. Although the most immediate -threats were averted by the continued weakening of the Mongols, and the -actual dominion of Thibet, yet the last insurrection of the Dunganes -showed how easily the waves of a mobile tribe break over these islands -of civilization. Only after the destruction of the nomads, impossible -as long as there are open plains in Central Asia, can their existence -be definitely secured.”[27] - -The entire history of the old world is replete with well-known -instances of mass expeditions, which must be assigned to the first -stage of state development, inasmuch as they were intent, not upon -conquest, but directly on looting. Western Europe suffered through -these expeditions at the hands of the Celts, Germans, Huns, Avars, -Arabs, Magyars, Tartars, Mongolians and Turks by land; while the -Vikings and the Saracens harassed it on the waterways. These hordes -inundated entire continents far beyond the limits of their accustomed -looting ground. They disappeared, returned, were absorbed, and left -behind them only wasted lands. In many cases, however, they advanced -in some part of the inundated district directly to the sixth and last -stage of state formation, in cases namely, where they established a -permanent dominion over the peasant population. Ratzel describes these -mass migrations excellently in the following: - -“The expeditions of the great hordes of nomads contrast with this -movement, drop by drop and step by step, since they overflow with -tremendous power, especially Central Asia and all neighboring -countries. The nomads of this district, as of Arabia and Northern -Africa, unite mobility in their way of life with an organization -holding together their entire mass for one single object. It seems to -be a characteristic of the nomads that they easily develop despotic -power and far-reaching might from the patriarchal cohesion of the -tribe. Mass governments thereby come into being, which compare with -other movements among men in the same way that swollen streams compare -with the steady but diffused flow of a tributary. The history of China, -India, and Persia, no less than that of Europe, shows their historical -importance. Just as they moved about on their ranges with their wives -and children, slaves and carts, herds and all their paraphernalia, so -they inundated the borderlands. While this ballast may have deprived -them of speed it increased their momentum. The frightened inhabitants -were driven before them, and like a wave they rolled over the conquered -countries, absorbing their wealth. Since they carried everything with -them, their new abodes were equipped with all their possessions, and -thus their final settlements were of an ethnographic importance. After -this manner, the Magyars flooded Hungary, the Manchus invaded China, -the Turks, the countries from Persia to the Adriatic.”[28] - -What has been said here of Hamites, Semites and Mongolians, may be said -also, at least in part, of the Arian tribes of herdsmen. It applies -also to the true negroes, at least to those who live entirely from -their herds: “The mobile, warlike tribes of the Kafirs possess a power -of expansion which needs only an enticing object in order to attain -violent effects and to overturn the ethnologic relations of vast -districts. Eastern Africa offers such an object. Here the climate did -not forbid stock raising, as in the countries of the interior, and did -not paralyze from the start, the power of impact of the nomads, while -nevertheless numerous peaceable agricultural peoples found room for -their development. Wandering tribes of Kafirs poured like devastating -streams into the fruitful lands of the Zambesi, and up to the highlands -between the Tanganyika and the coast. Here they met the advance guard -of the Watusi, a wave of Hamite eruption, coming from the north. The -former inhabitants of these districts were either exterminated, or as -serfs cultivated the lands which they formerly owned; or they still -continued to fight; or again, they remained undisturbed in settlements -left on one side by the stream of conquest.”[29] - -All this has taken place before our eyes. Some of it is still going -on. During many thousands of years it has “jarred all Eastern Africa -from the Zambesi to the Mediterranean.” The incursion of the Hyksos, -whereby for over five hundred years Egypt was subject to the shepherd -tribes of the eastern and northern deserts--“kinsmen of the peoples -who up to the present day herd their stock between the Nile and the -Red Sea”[30]--is the first authenticated foundation of a state. These -states were followed by many others both in the country of the Nile -itself, and farther southward, as far as the Empire of Muata Jamvo -on the southern rim of the central Congo district, which Portuguese -traders in Angola reported as early as the end of the sixteenth -century, and down to the Empire of Uganda, which only in our own day -has finally succumbed to the superior military organization of Europe. -“Desert land and civilization never lie peaceably alongside one -another; but their battles are all alike and full of repetitions.”[31] - -“Alike and full of repetitions”! That may be said of universal history -on its basic lines. The human ego in its fundamental aspect is much the -same all the world over. It acts uniformly, in obedience to the same -influences of its environment, with races of all colors, in all parts -of the earth, in the tropics as in the temperate zones. One must step -back far enough and choose a point of view so high that the variegated -aspect of the details does not hide the great movements of the mass. In -such a case, our eye misses the “mode” of fighting, wandering, laboring -humanity, while its “substance,” ever similar, ever new, ever enduring -through change, reveals itself under uniform laws. - -Gradually, from this first stage, there develops the second, in which -the peasant, through thousands of unsuccessful attempts at revolt, has -accepted his fate and has ceased every resistance. About this time, -it begins to dawn on the consciousness of the wild herdsman that a -murdered peasant can no longer plow, and that a fruit tree hacked -down will no longer bear. In his own interest, then, wherever it is -possible, he lets the peasant live and the tree stand. The expedition -of the herdsmen comes just as before, every member bristling -with arms, but no longer intending nor expecting war and violent -appropriation. The raiders burn and kill only so far as is necessary -to enforce a wholesome respect, or to break an isolated resistance. -But in general, principally in accordance with a developing customary -right--the first germ of the development of all public law--the -herdsman now appropriates only the surplus of the peasant. That is to -say, he leaves the peasant his house, his gear and his provisions up -to the next crop.[D] The herdsman in the first stage is like the bear, -who for the purpose of robbing the beehive, destroys it. In the second -stage he is like the bee-keeper, who leaves the bees enough honey to -carry them through the winter. - -[D] Ratzel, l. c. II, page 393, in speaking of the Arabs says: “The -difficulty of nourishing slaves makes it impossible to keep them. -Vast populations are kept in subjection and deprived of everything -beyond the necessaries for maintaining life. They turn entire oases -into demesne lands, visited at the harvest time in order to rob the -inhabitants; a domination characteristic of the desert.” - -Great is the progress between the first stage and the second. Long is -the forward step, both economically and politically. In the beginning, -as we have seen, the acquisition by the tribe of herdsmen was purely an -occupying one. Regardless of consequences, they destroyed the source -of future wealth for the enjoyment of the moment. Henceforth the -acquisition becomes economical, because all economy is based on wise -housekeeping, or in other words, on restraining the enjoyment of the -moment in view of the needs of the future. The herdsman has learned to -“capitalize.” It is a vast step forward in politics when an utterly -strange human being, prey heretofore like the wild animals, obtains a -value and is recognized as a source of wealth. Although this is the -beginning of all slavery, subjugation, and exploitation, it is at the -same time the genesis of a higher form of society, that reaches out -beyond the family based upon blood relationship. We saw how, between -the robbers and the robbed, the first threads of a jural relation were -spun across the cleft which separated those who had heretofore been -only “mortal enemies.” The peasant thus obtains a semblance of _right_ -to the bare necessaries of life; so that it comes to be regarded as -_wrong_ to kill an unresisting man or to strip him of everything. - -And better than this, gradually more delicate and softer threads are -woven into a net very thin as yet, but which, nevertheless, brings -about more human relations than the customary arrangement of the -division of spoils. Since the herdsmen no longer meet the peasants -in combat only, they are likely now to grant a respectful request, -or to remedy a well grounded grievance. “The categorical imperative” -of equity, “Do to others as you would have them do unto you,” had -heretofore ruled the herdsmen only in their dealings with their own -tribesmen and kind. Now for the first time it begins to speak, shyly -whispering in behalf of those who are alien to blood relationship. -In this, we find the germ of that magnificent process of external -amalgamation which, out of small hordes, has formed nations and unions -of nations; and which, in the future is to give life to the concept -of “humanity.” We find also the germ of the internal unification -of tribes once separated, from which, in place of the hatred of -“barbarians,” will come the all comprising love of humanity, of -Christianity and Buddhism. - -_The moment when first the conqueror spared his victim in order -permanently to exploit him in productive work, was of incomparable -historical importance. It gave birth to nation and state, to right -and the higher economics, with all the developments and ramifications -which have grown and which will hereafter grow out of them._ The root -of everything human reaches down into the dark soil of the animal--love -and art, no less than state, justice and economics. - -Still another tendency knots yet more closely these psychic relations. -To return to the comparison of the herdsman and the bear, there are -in the desert, beside the bear who guards the bees, other bears who -also lust after honey. But our tribe of herdsmen blocks their way, and -protects its beehives by force of arms. The peasants become accustomed, -when danger threatens, to call on the herdsmen, whom they no longer -regard as robbers and murderers, but as protectors and saviors. Imagine -the joy of the peasants when the returning band of avengers brings back -to the village the looted women and children, with the enemies’ heads -or scalps. These ties are no longer threads, but strong and knotted -bands. - -Here is one of the principal forces of that “integration,” whereby in -the further development, those originally not of the same blood, and -often enough of different groups speaking different languages, will in -the end be welded together into _one_ people, with _one_ speech, _one_ -custom, and _one_ feeling of nationality. This unity grows by degrees -from common suffering and need, common victory and defeat, common -rejoicing and common sorrow. A new and vast domain is open when master -and slave serve the same interests; then arises a stream of sympathy, a -sense of common service. Both sides apprehend, and gradually recognize, -each other’s common humanity. Gradually the points of similarity are -sensed, in place of the differences in build and apparel, of language -and religion, which had heretofore brought about only antipathy and -hatred. Gradually they learn to understand one another, first through a -common speech, and then through a common mental habit. The net of the -psychical inter-relations becomes stronger. - -In this second stage of the formation of states, the ground work, in -its essentials, has been mapped out. No further step can be compared in -importance to the transition whereby the bear becomes a bee-keeper. For -this reason, short references must suffice. - -The third stage arrives when the “surplus” obtained by the peasantry is -brought by them regularly to the tents of the herdsmen as “tribute,” a -regulation which affords to both parties self-evident and considerable -advantages. By this means, the peasantry is relieved entirely from the -little irregularities connected with the former method of taxation, -such as a few men knocked on the head, women violated, or farmhouses -burned down. The herdsmen on the other hand, need no longer apply -to this “business” any “expense” and labor, to use a mercantile -expression; and they devote the time and energy thus set free toward an -“extension of the works,” in other words, to subjugating other peasants. - -This form of tribute is found in many well-known instances in history: -Huns, Magyars, Tartars, Turks, have derived their largest income -from their European tributes. Sometimes the character of the tribute -paid by the subjects to their master is more or less blurred, and -the act assumes the guise of payment for protection, or indeed, of -a subvention. The tale is well known whereby Attila was pictured by -the weakling emperor at Constantinople as a vassal prince; while the -tribute he paid to the Hun appeared as a fee. - -The fourth stage, once more, is of very great importance, since it -adds the decisive factor in the development of the state, as we are -accustomed to see it, namely, the union on one strip of land of both -ethnic groups.[E] (It is well known that no jural definition of a -state can be arrived at without the concept of state territory.) -From now on, the relation of the two groups, which was originally -international, gradually becomes more and more intra-national. - -[E] There is apparently in the case of the Fulbe, a transition stage -between the first three stages and the fourth, in which dominion is -exercised half internationally and half intranationally. According -to Ratzel (l. c. II, page 419): “Like a cuttle-fish, the conquering -race stretches numerous arms hither and thither among the terrified -aborigines, whose lack of cohesion affords plenty of gaps. Thus the -Fulbe are slowly flowing into the Benue countries and quite gradually -permeating them. Later observers have thus quite rightly abstained -from assigning definite boundaries. There are many scattered Fulbe -localities which look to a particular place as their center and as the -center of their power. Thus Muri is the capital of the numerous Fulbe -settlements scattered about the Middle Benue, and the position of Gola -is similar in the Adamawa district. As yet there are no proper kingdoms -with defined frontiers against each other and against independent -tribes. Even these capitals are in other respects still far from being -firmly settled.” - -This territorial union may be caused by foreign influences. It may be -that stronger hordes have crowded the herdsmen forward, or that their -increase in population has reached the limit set by the nutritive -capacity of the steppes or prairies; it may be that a great cattle -plague has forced the herdsmen to exchange the unlimited scope of the -prairies for the narrows of some river valley. In general, however, -internal causes alone suffice to bring it about that the herdsmen stay -in the neighborhood of their peasants. The duty of protecting their -tributaries against other “bears” forces them to keep a levy of young -warriors in the neighborhood of their subjects; and this is at the same -time an excellent measure of defense since it prevents the peasants -from giving way to a desire to break their bonds, or to let some other -herdsmen become their overlords. This latter occurrence is by no means -rare, since, if tradition is correct, it is the means whereby the sons -of Rurik came to Russia. - -As yet the local juxtaposition does not mean a state community in its -narrowest sense; that is to say, a unital organization. - -In case the herdsmen are dealing with utterly unwarlike subjects, -they carry on their nomad life, peaceably wandering up and down and -herding their cattle among their perioike and helots. This is the case -with the light-colored Wahuma,[32] “the handsomest men of the world” -(Kandt), in Central Africa, or the Tuareg clan of the Hadanara of the -Asgars, “who have taken up their seats among the Imrad and have become -wandering freebooters. These Imrad are the serving class of the Asgars, -who live on them, although the Imrad could put into the field ten times -as many warriors; the situation is analogous to that of the Spartans in -relation to their Helots.”[33] The same may be said of the Teda among -the neighboring Borku: “Just as the land is divided into a semi-desert -supporting the nomads, and gardens with date groves, so the population -is divided between nomads and settled folk. Although about equal in -number, ten to twelve thousand altogether, it goes without saying that -these latter are subject to the others.”[34] - -And the same applies to the entire group of herdsmen known as the Galla -Masi and Wahuma. “Although differences in possessions are considerable, -they have few slaves, as a serving class. These are represented by -peoples of a lower caste, who live separate and apart from them. It -is herdsmanship which is the basis of the family, of the state, and -along with these of the principle of political evolution. In this wide -territory, between Scehoa and its southernmost boundaries, on the one -hand, and Zanzibar on the other, there is found no strong political -power, in spite of the highly developed social articulation.”[35] - -In case the country is not adapted to herding cattle on a large -scale--as was universally the case in Western Europe--or where a less -unwarlike population might make attempts at insurrection, the crowd of -lords becomes more or less permanently settled, taking either steep -places or strategically important points for their camps, castles, or -towns. From these centers, they control their “subjects,” mainly for -the purpose of gathering their tribute, paying no attention to them in -other respects. They let them administer their affairs, carry on their -religious worship, settle their disputes, and adjust their methods -of internal economy. Their autochthonous constitution, their local -officials, are, in fact, not interfered with. - -If Frants Buhl reports correctly, that was the beginning of the rule -of the Israelites in Canaan.[36] Abyssinia, that great military force, -though at the first glance it may appear to be a fully developed state, -does not, however, seem to have advanced beyond the fourth stage. At -least Ratzel states: “The principal care of the Abyssinians consists -in the tribute, in which they follow the method of oriental monarchs -in olden and modern times, which is not to interfere with the internal -management and administration of justice of their subject peoples.”[37] - -The best example of the fourth stage is found in the situation in -ancient Mexico before the Spanish conquest: “The confederation under -the leadership of the Mexicans had somewhat more progressive ideas of -conquest. Only those tribes were wiped out that offered resistance. In -other cases, the vanquished were merely plundered, and then required to -pay tribute. The defeated tribe governed itself just as before, through -its own officials. It was different in Peru, where the formation of -a compact empire followed the first attack. In Mexico, intimidation -and exploitation were the only aims of the conquest. And so it came -about that the so-called Empire of Mexico at the time of the conquest -represented merely a group of intimidated Indian tribes, whose -federation with one another was prevented by their fear of plundering -expeditions from some unassailable fort in their midst.”[38] It will be -observed that one can not speak of this as a state in any proper sense. -Ratzel shows this in the note following the above: “It is certain that -the various points held in subjection by the Warriors of Montezuma -were separated from one another by stretches of territory not yet -conquered. A condition very like the rule of the Hova in Madagascar. -One would not say that scattering a few garrisons, or better still, -military colonies, over the land, is a mark of absolute dominion, since -these colonies, with great trouble, maintain a strip of a few miles in -subjection.”[39] - -The logic of events presses quickly from the fourth to the fifth stage, -and fashions almost completely the full state. Quarrels arise between -neighboring villages or clans, which the lords no longer permit to be -fought out, since by this the capacity of the peasants for service -would be impaired. The lords assume the right to arbitrate, and in case -of need, to enforce their judgment. In the end, it happens that at each -“court” of the village king or chief of the clan there is an official -deputy who exercises the power, while the chiefs are permitted to -retain the appearance of authority. The state of the Incas shows, in a -primitive condition, a typical example of this arrangement. - -Here we find the Incas united at Cuzco where they had their patrimonial -lands and dwellings.[40] A representative of the Incas, the Tucricuc, -however, resided in every district at the court of the native -chieftain. He “had supervision over all affairs of his district; -he raised the troops, superintended the delivery of the tribute, -ordered the forced labor on roads and bridges, superintended the -administration of justice, and in short supervised everything in his -district.”[41] - -The same institutions which have been developed by American huntsmen -and Semite shepherds are found also among African herdsmen. In Ashanti, -the system of the Tucricuc has been developed in a typical fashion;[42] -and the Dualla have established for their subjects living in segregated -villages “an institution based on conquest midway between a feudal -system and slavery.”[43] The same author reports that the Barotse have -a constitution corresponding to the earliest stage of the mediæval -feudal organization: “Their villages are ... as a rule surrounded by -a circle of hamlets where their serfs live. These till the fields -of their lords in the immediate neighborhood, grow grain, or herd -the cattle.”[44] The only thing that is not typical here consists in -this, that the lords do not live in isolated castles or halls, but are -settled in villages among their subjects. - -It is only a very small step from the Incas to the Dorians in -Lacedæmon, Messenia, or Crete; and no greater distance separates the -Fulbe, Dualla and Barotse from the comparatively rigidly organized -feudal states of the African Negro Empires of Uganda, Unyoro, etc.; and -the corresponding feudal empires of Eastern and Western Europe and of -all Asia. In all places, the same results are brought about by force -of the same socio-psychological causes. The necessity of keeping the -subjects in order and at the same time of maintaining them at their -full capacity for labor, leads step by step from the fifth to the sixth -stage, in which the state, by acquiring full intra-nationality and by -the evolution of “Nationality,” is developed in every sense. The need -becomes more and more frequent to interfere, to allay difficulties, to -punish, or to coerce obedience; and thus develop the habit of rule and -the usages of government. The two groups, separated, to begin with, -and then united on one territory, are at first merely laid alongside -one another, then are scattered through one another like a mechanical -mixture, as the term is used in chemistry, until gradually they become -more and more of a “chemical combination.” They intermingle, unite, -amalgamate to unity, in customs and habits, in speech and worship. -Soon the bonds of relationship unite the upper and the lower strata. -In nearly all cases the master class picks the handsomest virgins from -the subject races for its concubines. A race of bastards thus develops, -sometimes taken into the ruling class, sometimes rejected, and then -because of the blood of the masters in their veins, becoming the born -leaders of the subject race. In form and in content the primitive state -is completed. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -THE PRIMITIVE FEUDAL STATE - - -(a) THE FORM OF DOMINION - -Its form is domination; the dominion of a small warlike minority, -interrelated and closely allied, over a definitely bounded territory -and its cultivators. Gradually, custom develops some form of law in -accordance with which this dominion is exercised. This law regulates -the rights of primacy and the claims of the lords, and the duty -of obedience and of service on the part of the subjects, in such -wise that the capacity of the peasants for rendering service is not -impaired. This word, _praestationsfaehigkeit_, dates from the reforms -of Frederick the Great. The “bee-keepership,” therefore, is governed -by the law of custom. The duty of paying and working on the part of -the peasants corresponds to the duty of protection on the part of -the lords, who ward off exactions of their own companions, as well as -defend the peasants from the attacks of foreign enemies. - -Although this is one part of the content of the state concept, there is -another, which in the beginning is of much greater magnitude; the idea -of economic exploitation, the political means for the satisfaction of -needs. The peasant surrenders a portion of the product of his labor, -without any equivalent service in return. “_In the beginning was the -ground rent._” - -The forms under which the ground rent is collected or consumed vary. -In some cases, the lords, as a closed union or community, are settled -in some fortified camp and consume as communists the tribute of their -peasantry. This is the situation in the state of the Inca. In some -cases, each individual warrior-noble has a definite strip of land -assigned to him: but generally the produce of this is still, as in -Sparta, consumed in the “syssitia,” by class associates and companions -in arms. In some cases, the landed nobility scatters over the entire -territory, each man housed with his following in his fortified castle, -and consuming, each for himself, the produce of his dominion or lands. -As yet these nobles have not become landlords, in the sense that they -administer their property. Each of them receives tribute from the labor -of his dependents, whom he neither guides nor supervises. This is the -type of the mediæval dominion in the lands of the Germanic nobility. -Finally, the knight becomes the owner and administrator of the knight’s -fee.[F] His former serfs develop into the laborers on his plantation, -and the tribute now appears as the profit of the entrepreneur. This -is the type of the earliest capitalist enterprise of modern times, -the exploitation of large territories in the lands east of the Elbe, -formerly occupied by Slavs and later colonized by Germans. Numerous -transitions lead from one stage to the other. - -[F] _Rittergutsbesitz_ is the ultimate molecule of the German feudal -system, a non-urban territory, approximating the concept of knight’s -fee in the Angevin fiscal legislation; in modern Germanic law, the -possession of an acreage, alienable only as an entity, and by recent -legislation, alienable to non-nobles, but subject to and capable -of certain exceptions in law not inhering in other forms of real -estate.--_Translator._ - -But always, in its essence, is the “State” the same. Its purpose, in -every case, is found to be the political means for the satisfaction -of needs. At first, its method is by exacting a ground rent, so -long as there exists no trade activity the products of which can be -appropriated. Its form, in every case, is that of dominion, whereby -exploitation is regarded as “justice,” maintained as a “constitution,” -insisted on strictly, and in case of need enforced with cruelty. -And yet, in these ways, the absolute right of the conqueror becomes -narrowed within the confines of law, for the sake of permitting the -continuous acquisition of ground rents. The duty of furnishing supplies -on the part of the subjects is limited by their right to maintain -themselves in good condition. The right of taxation on the part of the -lords is supplemented by their duty to afford protection within and -without the state--security under the law and defense of the frontier. - -At this point, the primitive state is completely developed in all its -essentials. It has passed the embryonic condition; whatever follows can -be only phenomena of growth. - -As compared with unions of families, the state represents, doubtless, a -much higher species; since the state embraces a greater mass of men, in -closer articulation, more capable of conquering nature and of warding -off enemies. It changes the half playful occupations of men into -strict methodic labor, and thus brings untold misery to innumerable -generations yet unborn. Henceforth, these must eat their bread in the -sweat of their brow, since the golden age of the free community of -blood relations has been followed by the iron rule of state dominion. -But the state, by discovering labor in its proper sense, starts in this -world that force which alone can bring about the golden age on a much -higher plane of ethical relation and of happiness for all. The state, -to use Schiller’s words, destroys the untutored happiness of the people -while they were children, in order to bring them along a sad path of -suffering to the conscious happiness of maturity. - -A higher species! Paul von Lilienfeld, one of the principal advocates -of the view that society is an organism of a higher kind, has pointed -out that in this respect an especially striking parallel can be drawn -between ordinary organisms and this super-organism. All higher beings -propagate sexually; lower beings asexually, by partition, by budding -and sometimes by conjugation. We have shown that simple partition -corresponds exactly to the growth and the further development of the -association based on blood relationship, which existed before the -state. This grows until it becomes too large for cohesion; it then -loses its unity, divides, and the separate hordes, if they associate -at all, remain in a very loose connection, without any sort of closer -articulation. The amalgamation of exogamic groups is comparable to -conjugation. - -_The state, however, comes into being through sexual propagation._ -All bisexual propagation is accomplished by the following process: -The male element, a small, very active, mobile, vibrating cell--the -spermatozoön--searches out a large inactive cell without mobility -of its own--the ovum, or female principle--enters and fuses with -it. From this process, there results an immense growth; that is to -say, a wonderful differentiation with simultaneous integration. The -inactive peasantry, bound by nature to their fields, is the ovum, -the mobile tribe of herdsmen the spermatozoön, of this sociologic -act of fecundation; and its resultant is the ripening of a higher -social organism more fully differentiated in its organs, and much more -complete in its integrations. It is easy to find further parallels. -One may compare the border feuds to the manner in which innumerable -spermatozoa swarm about the ovum until finally one, the strongest or -most fortunate, discovers and conquers the micropyle. One may compare -the almost magical attraction which the ovum has for the spermatozoön, -to the no less magical power by which the herdsmen from the steppes are -drawn into the cultivated plains. - -But all this is no proof for the “organism.” The problem, however, has -been pointed out. - - -(b) THE INTEGRATION - -We have followed the genesis of the state, from its second stage -onward, in its objective growth as a political and jural form with -economic content. But it is far more important to examine its -subjective growth, its socio-psychological “differentiation and -integration,” since all sociology is nearly always social psychology. -First, then, let us discuss integration. - -We saw in the second stage, as set forth above, how the net of -psychical relations becomes ever tighter and closer enmeshed, as the -economic amalgamation advances. The two dialects become one language; -or one of the two, often of an entirely different stock from the other, -becomes extinct. This, in some cases, is the language of the victors, -but more frequently that of the vanquished. Both cults amalgamate to -one religion, in which the tribal god of the conquerors is adored as -the principal divinity, while the old gods of the vanquished become -either his servants, or, as demons or devils, his adversaries. The -bodily type tends to assimilate, through the influence of the same -climate and similar mode of living. Where a strong difference between -the types existed or is maintained,[45] the bastards, to a certain -extent, fill the gap--so that, in spite of the still existing ethnic -contrast, everybody, more and more, begins to feel that the type of the -enemies beyond the border is more strange, more “foreign” than is the -new co-national type. Lords and subjects view one another as “we,” at -least as concerns the enemy beyond the border; and at length the memory -of the different origin completely disappears. The conquerors are held -to be the sons of the old gods. This, in many cases, they literally -are, since these gods are nothing but the souls of their ancestors -raised to godhead by apotheosis. - -Since the new “states” are much more aggressive than the former -communities bound together by mere blood relationship, the feeling -of being different from the foreigner beyond the borders, growing in -frequent feuds and wars, becomes stronger and stronger among those -within the “realm of peace.” And in the same measure there grows -among them the feeling of belonging to another; so that the spirit -of fraternity and of equity, which formerly existed only within the -horde and which never ceased to hold sway within the association of -nobles, takes root everywhere, and more and more finds its place in the -relations between the lords and their subjects. - -At first these relations are manifested only in infrequent cases: -equity and fraternity are allowed only such play as is consistent -with the right to use the political means; but that much is granted. -A far stronger bond of psychical community between high and low, -more potent than any success against foreign invasion, is woven by -legal protection against the aggression of the mighty. “_Justitia -fundamentum regnorum._” When, pursuant to their own ideals of justice, -the aristocrats as a social group execute one of their own class -for murder or robbery, for having exceeded the bounds of permitted -exploitation, the thanks and the joy of the subjects are even more -heartfelt than after victory over alien foes. - -These, then, are the principal lines of development of the psychical -integration. Common interest in maintaining order and law and peace -produce a strong feeling of solidarity, which may be called “a -consciousness of belonging to the same state.” - - -(c) THE DIFFERENTIATION: GROUP THEORIES AND GROUP PSYCHOLOGY - -On the other hand, as in all organic growth, there develops _pari -passu_ a psychic differentiation just as powerful. The interests of the -group produce strong group feelings; the upper and lower strata develop -a “class consciousness” corresponding to their peculiar interests. - -The separate interest of the master group is served by maintaining -intact the imposed law of political means; such interest makes for -“conservatism.” The interest of the subject group, on the contrary, -points to the removal of the prevailing rule, to the substitution for -it of a new rule, the law of equality for all inhabitants of the state, -and makes for “liberalism” and revolution. - -Herein lies the tap root of all class and party psychology. Hence -there develop, in accordance with definite psychological laws, those -incomparably mighty forms of thought which, as “class theories,” -through thousands of years of struggle guide and justify every social -contest in the consciousness of contemporaries. - -“When the will speaks reason has to be silent,” says Schopenhauer, or -as Ludwig Gumplowicz states the same idea, “Man acts in accordance with -laws of nature, as an afterthought he thinks humanly.” Man’s will being -strictly “determined,” he must act according to the pressure which the -surrounding world exerts upon him; and the same law is valid for every -community of men: groups, classes, and the state itself. They “flow -from the plane of higher economic and social pressure to that of lower -pressure, along the line of least resistance.” But every individual and -each community of men believe themselves free agents; and therefore, by -an unescapable psychical law they are forced to consider the path they -are traversing as a freely chosen means, and the point toward which -they are driven as a freely chosen end. And since man is a rational -and ethical being, that is, a social entity, he is obliged to justify -before reason and morality the method and the objective point of his -movement, and to take account of the social consciousness of his time. - -So long as the relations of both groups were simply those of -internationally opposed border enemies, the exercise of the political -means called for no justification, because a man of alien blood had -no rights. As soon, however, as the psychic integration develops, in -any degree, the community feeling of state consciousness, as soon as -the bond servant acquires “rights,” and the consciousness of essential -equality percolates through the mass, the political means requires a -system of justification; and there arises in the ruling class the -group theory of “legitimacy.” - -Everywhere, the upholders of legitimacy justify dominion and -exploitation with similar anthropological and theological reasoning. -The master group, since it recognizes bravery and warlike efficiency -as the only virtues of a man, declares itself, the victors,--and from -its standpoint quite correctly--to be the more efficient, the better -“race.” This point of view is the more intensified, the lower the -subject race is reduced by hard labor and low fare. And since the -tribal god of the ruling group has become the supreme god in the new -amalgamated state religion, this religion declares--and again from -its view-point quite correctly--that the constitution of the state -has been decreed by heaven, that it is “tabu,” and that interference -with it is sacrilege. In consequence, therefore, of a simple logical -inversion, the exploited or subject group is regarded as an essentially -inferior race, as unruly, tricky, lazy, cowardly and utterly incapable -of self-rule or self-defense, so that any uprising against the imposed -dominion must necessarily appear as a revolt against God Himself and -against His moral ordinances. For these reasons, the dominant group at -all times stands in closest union with the priesthood, which, in its -highest positions, at least, nearly always recruits itself from their -sons, sharing their political rights and economic privileges. - -This has been, and is at this day, the class theory of the ruling -group; nothing has been taken from it, not an item has been added to -it. Even the very modern argument by which, for example, the landed -nobility of old France and of modern Prussia attempted to put out -of court the claims of the peasantry to the ownership of lands, on -the allegation that they had owned the land from time immemorial, -while their peasants had only been granted a life tenure therein,--is -reproduced among the Wahuma, of Africa,[46] and probably could be shown -in many other instances. - -Like their class theory, their class psychology has been, and is, -at all times the same. Its most important characteristic, the -“aristocrat’s pride,” shows itself in contempt for the lower laboring -strata. This is so inherent, that herdsmen, even after they have lost -their herds and become economically dependent, still retain their pride -as former lords: “Even the Galla, who have been despoiled of their -wealth of herds by the Somali north of the Tana, and who thus have -become watchers of other men’s herds, and even in some cases along -the Sabaki become peasants, still look with contempt upon the peasant -Watokomo, who are subject to them and resemble the Suaheli. But their -attitude is quite different toward their tributary hunting peoples, -namely, the Waboni, the Wassanai, and the Walangulo (Ariangulo) who -resemble the Galla.”[47] - -The following description of the Tibbu applies, as though it had been -originally told of them, to Walter Havenaught and the rest of the poor -knights who, in the crusades, looked for booty and lordly domain. It -applies no less to many a noble fighting cock from Germany east of the -Elbe, and to many a ragged Polish gentleman. “They are men full of -self-consciousness. They may be beggars, but they are no pariahs. Many -a people under these circumstances would be thoroughly miserable and -depressed; the Tibbu have steel in their nature. They are splendidly -fitted to be robbers, warriors, and rulers. Even their system of -robbery is imposing, although it is base as a jackal’s. These ragged -Tibbus, fighting against extreme poverty and constantly on the verge -of starvation, raise the most impudent claims with apparent or real -belief in their validity. The right of the jackal, which regards the -possessions of a stranger as common property, is the protection of -greedy men against want. The insecurity of an all but perpetual state -of war brings it about that life becomes an insistent challenge, and -at the same time the reward of extortion!”[48] This phenomenon is in -nowise limited to Eastern Africa, for it is said of the Abyssinian -soldier: “Thus equipped he comes along. Proudly he looks down on every -one: his is the land, and for him the peasant must work.”[49] - -Deeply as the aristocrat at all times despises the economic means and -the peasants who employ it, he admits frankly his reliance on the -political means. Honest war and “honest thievery”[G] are his occupation -as a lord, are his good right. His right--except over those who belong -to the same clique--extends just as far as his power. One finds this -high praise of the political means nowhere so well stated as in the -well-known Doric drinking song: - - “I have great treasures; the spear and the sword; - Wherewith to guard my body, the bull hide shield well tried. - With these I can plough, and harvest my crop, - With these I can garner the sweet grape wine, - By them I bear the name ‘Lord’ with my serfs. - - “But these never dare to bear spear and sword, - Still less the guard of the body, the bull hide shield well tried. - They lie at my feet stretched out on the ground, - My hand is licked by them as by hounds, - I am their Persian king--terrifying them by my name.”[50] - -[G] Compare this with the prevalent justification of “honest graft” in -municipal or political contracts.--_Translator._ - -In these wanton lines is expressed the pride of warlike lords. -The following verses, taken from an entirely different phase of -civilization, show that the robber still has part in the warrior in -spite of Christianity, the Peace of God, and the Holy Roman Empire of -the German Nation. These lines also praise the political means, but in -its most crude form, simple robbery: - - “Would you eke out your life, my young noble squire, - Follow then my teaching, upon your horse and join the gang! - Take to the greenwood, when the peasant comes up, - Run him down quickly, grab him then by the collar, - Rejoice in your heart, taking from him whatever he has, - Unharness his horses and get you away!”[51] - -“Unless,” as Sombart adds, “he preferred to hunt nobler game and to -relieve merchants of their valuable consignments.” The nobles carried -on robbery as a natural method of supplementing their earnings, -extending it more and more as the income from their property no longer -sufficed to pay for the increasing demands of daily consumption and -luxury. The system of freebooting was considered a thoroughly honorable -occupation, since it met the demand of the essence of chivalry, that -every one should appropriate whatever was within reach of his spear -point or of the blade of his sword. The nobles learned freebooting as -the cobbler was brought up to his trade. The ballad has put this in -merry wise: - - “To pillage, to rob, that is no shame, - The best in the land do quite the same.” - -Besides this principal point of the “squire-archical” psychology, a -second distinguishing mark scarcely less characteristic is found in -the piety of these folk whether it be of conviction or merely strongly -accentuated in public. - -It seems as though the same social ideas always force identical -characteristics on the ruling class. This is illustrated by the form -under which God, in their view, appears as their special National God -and preponderatingly as a God of War. Although they profess God as the -creator of all men, even of their enemies, and since Christianity, as -the God of Love, this does not counteract the force with which class -interests formulate their appropriate ideology. - -In order to complete the sketch of the psychology of the ruling class, -we must not forget the tendency to squander, easily understood in those -“ignorant of the taste of toil,” which appears sometimes in a higher -form as generosity; nor must we forget, as their supreme trait, that -death-despising bravery, which is called forth by the coercion imposed -on a minority, their need to defend their rights at any time with arms, -and which is favored by a freedom from all labor which permits the -development of the body in hunting, sport and feuds. Its caricature -is combativeness, and a supersensitiveness to personal honor, which -degenerates into madness. - -At this point a small digression: Cæsar found the Celts just at that -stage of their development, in which the nobles had obtained dominion -over their fellow clansmen. Since that time, his classic narrative -has stood as a norm--their class psychology appears as the race -psychology of all Celts. Not even Mommsen escaped this error. The -result is that now, in every book on universal history or sociology, -one may read the palpable error, repeated until contradiction is of -no avail, although a mere glance would have sufficed to show that all -peoples of all races, in the same stage of their development, have -showed the same characteristics; in Europe, Thessalians, Apulians, -Campanians, Germans, Poles, etc. Meanwhile the Celts, and specifically -the French, in different stages of their development, have showed quite -different traits of character. The psychology belongs to the stage of -development, not to the race! - -Whenever, on the other hand, the religious sanctions of the “state” are -weak, or become so, there develops as a group theory on the part of the -subjects, the concept, either clear or blurred, of _Natural Law_. The -lower class regards the race pride and the assumed superiority of the -nobles as presumptuous, claims to be of as good race and blood as the -ruling class--and from their standpoint again quite correctly, since -according to their views, labor, efficiency and order are accounted the -only virtues. They are skeptical also as to the religion which is the -helper of their adversaries; and are as firmly convinced as are the -nobles of the directly opposite opinion, namely, that the privileges of -the master group violate law as well as reason. Later development is -not able to add any essential point to the factors originally given. - -Under the influence of these ideas, now clearly, now obscurely brought -out, the two groups henceforth fight out their battles, each for its -own interests. The young state would be burst apart under the strain -of such centrifugal forces, were it not for the centripetal pull of -common interests, of the still more powerful state-consciousness. The -pressure of foreigners from without, of common enemies, overcomes the -inner strain of conflicting class interests. An example may be found in -the tale of the secession of the “Plebs” and the successful mission of -Menenius Agrippa. And so the young state would, like a planet, swing -through all eternity in its predetermined orbit, in accordance with -the parallelogram of forces, were it not that it and its surrounding -world is changed and developed until it produces new external and inner -energies. - - -(d) THE PRIMITIVE FEUDAL STATE OF HIGHER GRADE - -Growth in itself conditions important changes; and the young state must -grow. The same forces that brought it into being, urge its extension, -require it to grasp more power. Even were such a young state “sated,” -as many a modern state claims to be, it would still be forced to -stretch and grow under penalty of extinction. Under primitive social -conditions Goethe’s lines apply with absolute truth: “You must rise or -fall, conquer or yield, be hammer or anvil.” - -States are maintained in accordance with the same principles that -called them into being. The primitive state is the creation of warlike -robbery; and only by warlike robbery can it be preserved. - -The economic want of the master group has no limits; no man is -sufficiently rich to satisfy his desires. The political means are -turned on new groups of peasants not yet subjected, or new coasts -yet unpilfered are sought out. The primitive state expands, until a -collision takes place on the edge of the “sphere of interests” of -another primitive state, which itself originated in precisely the same -way. Then we have for the first time, in place of the warlike robbery -heretofore carried on, true war in its narrower sense, since henceforth -equally organized and disciplined masses are hurled at one another. - -The object of the contest remains always the same, the produce of the -economic means of the working classes, such as loot, tribute, taxes -and ground rent; but the contest no longer takes place between a group -intent on exploiting and another mass to be exploited, but between two -master groups for the possession of the entire booty. - -The final result of the conflict, in nearly all instances, is the -amalgamation of both primitive states into a greater. This in turn, -naturally and by force of the same causes, reaches beyond its borders, -devours its smaller neighbors, and is perhaps in its turn devoured by -some greater state. - -The subjected laboring group may not take much interest in the final -issue of these contests for the mastery; it is a matter of indifference -whether it pays tribute to one or the other set of lords. Their chief -interest lies in the course of the particular fight, which is, in any -case, paid for with their own hides. Therefore, except in cases of -gross ill treatment and exploitation, the lower classes are rightly -governed by their “state-consciousness” when, with all their might they -aid their hereditary master group in times of war. For if their master -group is vanquished, the subjects suffer most severely from the utter -devastation of war. They fight literally for wife and children, for -home and hearth, when they fight to prevent the rule of foreign masters. - -The master group is involved completely in the issue of this fight for -dominion. In extreme cases, it may be completely exterminated, as were -the local nobility of the Germanic tribes in the Frankish Empire. -Nearly as bad, if not worse, is the prospect of being thrust into the -group of the serfs. Sometimes a well-timed treaty of peace preserves -their social position as master groups of subordinate rank: e. g., the -Saxon nobility in Norman England, or the Suppans in German territory -taken from the Slavs. In other cases, where the forces are about equal, -the two groups amalgamate into one master group with equal rights, -which forms a nobility whose members intermarry. This, for instance, -was the situation in the Slavic Territories, where isolated Wendish -chieftains were treated as the equals of the Germans, or in mediæval -Rome, in the case of prominent families from the Alban Hills and -Tuscany. - -In this new “primitive feudal state of higher grade,” as we shall call -it, the ruling group may, therefore, disintegrate into a number of -more or less powerful and privileged strata. The organization may show -many varieties because of the well-known fact, that often the master -group separates into two subordinated economic and social layers, -developed as we saw them in the herdsmen stage: the owners of large -herds and of many slaves, and the ordinary freemen. Possibly the less -complete differentiation into social ranks in the states created by -huntsmen in the new world, is to be assigned to the circumstance that -in the absence of herds, the concomitants of that form of ownership, -and the original separation into classes, were not introduced into the -state. We shall, later, see what force was exerted on the political and -economic development of states in the old world by the differences in -rank and property of the two strata of rulers. - -Similarly, as in the case of the ruling group, a corresponding process -of differentiation divides the subject group in the “primitive feudal -state of a higher grade” into various strata more or less despised -and compelled to render service. It is only necessary to recall the -very marked difference in the social and jural position occupied by -the peasantry in the Doric States, Lacedæmon and Crete, and among the -Thessalians, where the perioiki had clear rights of possession and -fairly well protected political rights, while the helots, in the latter -case the _penestai_, were almost unprotected in life and property. -Among the old Saxons also we find a class, the liti, intermediate -between the common freemen and the serfs.[52] These examples could be -multiplied; apparently they are caused by the same tendencies that -brought about the differentiation among the nobility mentioned above. -When two primitive feudal states amalgamate, their social layers -stratify in a variety of ways, which to a certain extent are comparable -to the combinations resulting from mixing together two packs of cards. - -It is certain that this mechanical mixture caused by political forces, -influences the development of _castes_, that is to say, of hereditary -professions, which at the same time form a hierarchy of social classes. -“Castes are usually, if not always, consequences of conquest and -subjugation by foreigners.”[53] Although this problem has not been -completely solved, it may be said that the formation of castes has been -very strongly influenced by economic and religious factors. It is -probable that castes came about in some such way as this: state-forming -forces penetrated into existing economic organizations, and vocations -underwent adaptation, and then became petrified under the influence -of religious concepts, which, however, may also have influenced their -original formation. This seems to follow from the fact that even as -between man and woman there exist certain separations of vocation, -which, so to say, are taboo and impassable. Thus among all huntsmen, -tilling the ground is woman’s work, while among many African shepherds, -as soon as the ox-plow is used, agriculture becomes man’s work, and -then women may not, under pain of sacrilege, use the domestic cattle.[H] - -[H] Similarly there are North Asiatic tribes of huntsmen, where women -are definitely forbidden to touch the hunting gear or to cross a -hunting trail.--Ratzel I, page 650. - -It is likely that such religious concepts may have brought it about -that a vocation became hereditary, and then compulsorily hereditary, -especially where a tribe or a village carried on a particular craft. -This happens with all tribes in a state of nature, where intercourse -is easily possible, especially in the case of islanders. When some -such group has been conquered by another tribe, the subjects, with -their developed hereditary vocations, tend to form within the new state -entity a pure “caste.” Their caste position depends partly upon the -esteem they had heretofore enjoyed among their own people, and partly -upon the advantage which their vocation affords their new masters. -If, as was often the case, waves of conquest followed one another in -series, the formation of castes might be multiplied, especially if -in the meantime economic development had worked out many vocational -classes. - -This development is probably best seen in the group of smiths, who, in -nearly all cases, have occupied a peculiar position, half feared and -half despised. In Africa especially, since the beginning of time, we -find tribes of expert smiths, as followers and dependents of shepherd -tribes. The Hyksos brought such tribes with them into the Nile country, -and perhaps owed their decisive victory to arms made by them; and -until recent times the Dinka kept the iron working Djur in a sort of -subject relation. The same applied also to the nomads of the Sahara; -while our northern sagas are filled with the tribal contrast to the -“dwarfs” and the fear of their magical powers. All the elements were at -hand in a developed state for the formation of sharply differentiated -castes.[54] - -How the coöperation of religious concepts affects the beginning of -these formations may be well illustrated by an example from Polynesia. -Here, “although many natives have the ability to do ship-building, -only one privileged class may exercise the craft, so closely is the -interest of the states and the societies bound up in this art. All over -the archipelago formerly, and to this day in Fiji, the carpenters, who -are almost exclusively ship-builders, form a special caste, bear the -high sounding title of ‘the king’s workmen,’ and enjoy the prerogative -of having their own chieftains.... Everything is done in accordance -with ancient tradition; the laying the keel, the completion of the -ship, and the launching, all take place amidst religious ceremonies and -feasts.”[55] - -Where superstition has been strongly developed, a genuine system -of castes may come about, based partly on economic and partly on -ethnic foundations. In Polynesia, for example, the articulation of -the classes, through the operation of the taboo, has brought about -a state of affairs very like a most thoroughgoing caste system.[56] -Similar results may be seen in Southern Arabia.[57] It is unnecessary -at this place to enlarge on the important place which religion had in -the origin and maintenance of separate castes in ancient Egypt and in -modern India.[I] - -[I] Besides, it seems that the rigidity of the Indian caste-system is -not so harsh in practise. The guild seems as often to break through the -barriers of caste as the converse.--Ratzel II, page 596. - -These are the elements of the primitive feudal state of higher -grade. They are more manifold and more numerous than in the lower -primitive state; but in both, legal constitution and political-economic -distribution are fundamentally the same. The products of the economic -means are still the object of the group struggle. This remains now as -ever the moving impulse of the domestic policy of the state, while the -political means continues now as ever to constitute the moving impulse -of its foreign policy in attack or in defense. Identical group theories -continue to justify, both for the upper classes and the lower, the -objects and means of external and domestic struggles. - -But the development can not remain stationary. Growth differs from mere -increase in bulk; growth means a constantly heightening differentiation -and integration. - -The farther the primitive feudal state extends its dominion, the more -numerous its subjects, and the denser its population, the more there -develops a political-economic division of labor, which calls forth new -needs and new means of supplying them; and the more there come into -sharp contrasts the distinctions of economic, and consequently of -social, class strata, in accordance with what I have called the “law -of the agglomeration about existing nuclei of wealth.” This growing -differentiation becomes decisive for the further development of the -primitive feudal state, and still more for its conclusion. - -This conclusion is not meant to be, in any sense, the physical end -of such a state. We do not mean the death of a state, whereby such a -feudal state of the higher type disappears, in consequence of conflict -with a more powerful state, either on the same or on a higher plane -of development, as was the case of the Mogul states of India or of -Uganda in their conflicts with Great Britain. Neither does it mean -such a stagnation as that into which Persia and Turkey have fallen, -which represents for a time only a pause in development, since these -countries, either of their own force or by foreign conquest, must -soon be pushed on the way of their destiny. Neither have we meant the -rigidity of the gigantic Chinese Empire, which can last only so long as -foreign powers refrain from forcing its mysterious gates.[J] - -[J] Had we the space, a detailed exposition of this exceptional -development of a feudal state would be tempting. China would be well -worth a more detailed discussion, since, in many aspects it has -approached the condition of “free citizenship” more closely than any -people of Western Europe. China has overcome the consequences of the -feudal system more thoroughly than we Europeans have; and has made, -early in its development, the great property interests in the land -harmless, so that their bastard offspring, capitalism, hardly came into -being; while in addition, it has worked out to a considerable degree -the problems of coöperative production and of coöperative distribution. - -The outcome here spoken of means the further development of the -primitive feudal state, a matter of importance to our understanding of -universal history as a _process_. The principal lines of development -into which this issue branches off are twofold and of fundamentally -different character. _But this polar opposition is conditioned by -a like contrast between two sorts of economic wealth each of which -increases in accordance with the “law of agglomeration about existing -nuclei.”_ In the one case, it is movable property; in the other, landed -property. Here it is the capital of commerce, there property in land, -accumulating in the hands of a smaller and smaller number, and thereby -overturning radically the articulation of classes, and with it the -whole State. - -The maritime State is the scene of the development of movable wealth; -the territorial State is the embodiment of the development of landed -property. The final issue of the first is _capitalistic exploitation_ -by slavery, the outcome of the latter is, first of all, the _developed -feudal State_. - -Capitalistic exploitation by slavery, the typical result of the -development of the so-called “antique States” on the Mediterranean, -does not end in the death of states, which is of no importance, but in -the death of peoples, because of the consumption of population. In the -pedigree of the historical development of the State, it forms a side -branch, from which no further immediate growth can take place. - -The developed feudal State, however, represents the principal branch, -the continuation of the trunk; and is therefore the origin for -the further growth of the State. Thence it has developed into the -State governed by feudal systems; into absolutism; into the modern -constitutional State; and if we are right in our prognosis, it will -become a “free citizenship.” - -So long as the trunk grew only in one direction, i. e., to include the -primitive feudal State of higher grade, our sketch of its growth and -development could and did comprise both forms. Henceforth, after the -bifurcation, our story branches and follows each branch to its last -twig. - -We begin, then, with the maritime states, although they are not the -older form. On the contrary, as far back as the dawn of history clears -the fog of prehistoric existence, the first strong states were formed -as territorial states, which then, by their own powers, attained the -scale of developed feudal States. But beyond this stage, at least as -regards those States most interesting to our culture, most of them -either remained stationary or fell into the power of maritime states; -and then, infected with the deadly poison of capitalistic exploitation -through slavery, were destroyed by the same plague. - -The further progress of the expanded feudal states of higher grade -could take place only after the maritime states had run their -course: mighty forms of domination and statescraft these became, and -they subsequently influenced and furthered the conformation of the -territorial states that grew from their ruins. - -For that reason the story of the fate of maritime states must be first -traced, as these are the introduction to the higher forms of state -life. After first tracing the lateral branch, we shall then return to -the starting point, the primitive feudal State, follow the main trunk -to the development of the modern constitutional State, and anticipating -actual history, sketch the “free citizenship” of the future. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -THE MARITIME STATE - - -The course of life and the path of suffering of the State founded by -sea nomads, as has been stated above, is determined by commercial -capital; just as that of the territorial State is determined by capital -vested in realty; and, we may add, that of the modern constitutional -State by productive capital. The sea nomad, however, did not invent -trade or merchandising, fairs or markets or cities; these preëxisted, -and since they served his purpose, were now developed to suit his -interests. All these institutions, serving the economic means, the -barter for equivalents, had long since been discovered. - -Here for the first time in our survey we find the economic means not -the object of exploitation by the political means, but as a coöperating -agent in originating the State, one might call it the “chain” passing -into the “lift” created by the feudal state to bring forth a more -elaborate structure. The genesis of the maritime State would not be -thoroughly intelligible, were we not to premise a statement concerning -traffic and interchange of wares in prehistoric times. Furthermore, no -prognosis of the modern state is complete, which does not take into -account the independently formed economic means of aboriginal barter. - - -(a) TRAFFIC IN PREHISTORIC TIMES - -The psychological explanation of barter has brought forth the theory -of the marginal utility, its greatest merit. According to this theory, -the subjective valuation of any economic good decreases in proportion -to the number of objects of the same kind possessed by the same owner. -When even two proprietors meet, each having a number of similar -articles, they will gladly barter, provided political means are barred, -i. e., if both parts are apparently equally strong and well-armed, or -in the very early stage, are within the sacred circle of relationship. -By barter, each one receives property of very high subjective value, -in place of property of very low subjective value, so that both -parties are gainers in the transaction. The desire of primitive people -for bartering must be stronger than that of cultured ones. For at -this stage man does not value his own goods, but covets the things -belonging to strangers, and is hardly affected by calculated economic -considerations. - -On the other hand, we must not forget that there are primitive -peoples for whom barter has no attraction whatever. “Cook tells of -tribes in Polynesia, with whom no intercourse was possible, since -presents made absolutely no impression on them, and were afterward -thrown away; everything shown them they regarded with indifference, -and with no desire to own it, while with their own things they -would not part; in fact, they had no conception of either trade or -barter.”[58] So Westermarck is of the opinion that “barter and traffic -are comparatively late inventions.” In this he stands in opposition -to Peschel, who would have it that man in the earliest known stage -of development engaged in barter. Westermarck states that there is no -proof “that the cave-dwellers of Périgord from the reindeer period -obtained their rock-crystals, their shells from the Atlantic, and the -horns of the Saiga antelope from (modern) Poland by way of barter.”[59] - -In spite of these exceptions, which admit other explanations--perhaps -the natives feared sorcery--the history of primitive peoples shows that -the desire to trade and barter is a universal human characteristic. -It can, however, take effect only when these primitive men on meeting -with strangers are offered new enticing objects, since in the immediate -circle of their own blood kinsmen every one has the same kinds of -property, and in their natural communism, on the average about the same -amount. - -Yet even then, barter, the beginning of all regular trading, can take -place only when the meeting with foreigners is a peaceable one. But is -there any possibility for peaceable meeting with foreigners? Is not -primitive man, through his entire life, and especially at the period -when barter begins, still under the apprehension that every one of a -different horde is an enemy to be feared as the wolf? - -After trade is developed, it is, as a rule, strongly influenced by the -“political means,” “trade generally follows robbery.”[60] But its first -beginnings are chiefly the result of the economic means, the outcome of -pacific, not warlike, intercourse. - -The international relations of primitive huntsmen with one another -must not be confused with those existing either between the huntsmen -or herdsmen and their peasants, or amongst the herdsmen themselves. -There are, undoubtedly, blood-feuds, or feuds because of looted women, -or possibly because of violation of the districts set aside for -hunting grounds; but these lack that strong incentive, which is the -consequence of avarice alone, of the desire to despoil other men of the -products of their labor. Therefore, the “wars” of primitive huntsmen -are scarcely real wars, but rather scuffles and single combats, -carried on frequently--as are the German student duels--according -to an established ceremonial, and prolonged only up to the point -of incapacity to fight, as one might say, “until claret has been -drawn.”[61] These tribes, numerically very weak, wisely limit bloodshed -to the indispensable amount--e. g., in case of a blood vendetta -feud--and thus avoid starting new vendetta blood feuds. - -For this reason, pacific relations with their neighbors on an equal -economic scale are much stronger, and also freer from the incentive to -use political means, both among huntsmen and among primitive peasants, -than among herdsmen. There are numerous examples where the former -meet peaceably to exploit natural resources in common. “While yet -in primitive stages of civilization, great masses of people gather -together, from time to time, at places where useful objects may be -found. The Indians of a large part of America made regular pilgrimages -to the flint grounds; others assembled annually at harvest time at the -Zizania swamps of the lakes of the Northwest. The Australians, living -scattered in the Barku district, assemble from all directions for the -harvest festivals at the swamp beds of the corn bearing Marsiliacae. -When the bonga-bonga trees in Queensland produce a superabundant crop, -and a greater store is on hand than the tribe can consume, foreign -tribes are permitted to share therein.”[63] “Various tribes agree on -the common ownership of definite strips of territory, and likewise of -the quarries of phonolite for hatchets.”[64] Numerous Australian tribes -have common consultations and sessions of the elders for judgment. In -these, the remainder of the population form the bystanders, a custom -similar to the Germanic “_Umstand_” in the primitive folkmoot.[65] - -It is but natural that such meetings should bring about barter. Perhaps -this explains the origin of those “weekly fairs held by the Negroes -of Central Africa in the midst of the primæval forest _under special -arrangements for the peace_,”[66] and likewise the great fairs, said -to be very ancient, of the fur hunters of the extreme north of the -Tschuktsche. - -All these things presuppose the development of pacific forms of -intercourse between neighboring groups. These forms are to be found -almost universally. They could very easily be developed at this period, -since the discovery had not yet been made that men can be utilized as -labor motors. At this stage, the stranger is treated as an enemy only -in doubtful cases. If he comes with apparently peaceable intent, he is -treated as a friend. Therefore, a whole code of public law ceremonies -grew up, intended to demonstrate the pacific intent of the newcomer.[K] -One puts aside one’s arms and shows one’s unarmed hand, or one sends -heralds in advance, who are always inviolable. - -[K] In this category must be reckoned the salutation, still in use in -some parts, “Peace Be With You.” It is expressive of the perversity of -Tolstoi’s later years that he misapprehends this characteristic mark of -a time when war was the normal state of affairs, as the remnant of a -golden age of peace. _The Importance of the Russian Revolution_ (German -translation by A. Hess, p. 17). - -It is clear that these forms represent some kind of claim to -hospitality, and in fact it is by this guest-right that peaceful trade -is first made possible. The exchange of guest-gifts precedes, and -appears to introduce, barter proper. It becomes, therefore, important -to investigate the source of hospitality. - -Westermarck, in his recent monumental work (1907), _Origin and -Development of Moral Concepts_,[68] states that the custom of -hospitality results from two causes, curiosity for news from the -stranger from afar, and still more from the fear that the stranger -may be endowed with powers of sorcery, imputed to him just because he -is a stranger.[L] In the Bible, hospitality is recommended for the -reason that one can not know that the stranger may not be an angel. -The superstitious race fears his curse (the Erinys of the Greeks) and -hastens to propitiate the stranger. Having been accepted as a guest he -is inviolable and enjoys the sacred right of the blood-related group, -and is regarded as belonging to it during his stay. Therefore he -partakes of the benefits of the aboriginal communism reigning in the -group, and shares its property. The host demands and receives whatever -he claims, the stranger obtains in turn what he asks for. When the -peaceable intercourse becomes more frequent, the mutual giving of -guest-presents may develop into a trading arrangement, because the -trader gladly returns to the spot where he found good entertainment -and a profitable exchange and where he is protected by the laws of -hospitality, instead of seeking new places, where, often with danger to -his life, he would first have to acquire the right to hospitality. - -[L] This may account for the use made of old women as heralds. They -are doubly available for that purpose, since they are worthless for -warfare, and are supposed to be endowed with specific powers of sorcery -(Westermarck), even more than old men, who also are treated cautiously, -since they may soon become “ghosts.” - -The existence of an “international” division of labor is, of course, -presupposed before the development of a regular trade relation can -begin. Such a division of labor exists much earlier and to a greater -extent than is generally believed. “It is quite erroneous to suppose -that the division of labor takes place only on a high scale of -economic development. There are in the interior of Africa villages of -iron-smiths, nay, of such as only turn out dart-knives; New Guinea has -its villages of potters, North America its arrow-head makers.”[69] -From such specialties there develops trade, whether through roving -merchants, or by gifts to one’s hosts, or by peace-gifts from tribe -to tribe. In North America, the Kaddu trade in bows. “Obsidian was -universally employed for arrow heads and knives; on the Yellowstone, on -the Snake River, in New Mexico, but especially in Mexico. Thence the -precious article was distributed all over the entire country as far as -Ohio and Tennessee, a distance of nearly two thousand miles.”[70] - -According to Vierkandt: “From the purely home-made products of -primitive peoples, there results a system of trade totally distinct -from that prevailing under modern conditions.... Each separate tribe -has developed special aptitudes, leading to interexchange. Even among -the comparatively uncivilized Indian tribes of South America, we find -such differentiations.... By such a trade, products may be distributed -over extraordinary distances, not in any direct way through -professional traders, but through a gradual passing along from tribe -to tribe. The origin of such a trade, as Buecher has shown, is to be -traced back to the exchange of guest-gifts.”[71] - -Besides this exchange of guest-gifts, a trade may grow from the peace -offerings which adversaries after a fight exchange as a sign of -reconciliation. Sartorius reports on Polynesia: “After a war between -different islands, the peace offerings for each group were something -novel; and if the present and return present pleased both parties, a -repetition took place, and thus again the way for exchange of products -was opened. But, these, in contrast to guest-gifts, were the bases of -continuing intercourse. Here, in place of the contact of individuals, -tribes and peoples met. Women are the first object of barter; they form -the connecting link between strange tribes, and according to evidence -from many sources, women are exchanged for cattle.”[72] - -We meet here an object of trade, exchangeable even without -“international division of labor.” And it appears as though the -_exchange of women_ had, in many ways, smoothed the way for the -traffic in merchandise, as though it had been the first step toward -the _peaceable_ integration of tribes, which accompanied the _warlike_ -integration of the formation of the State. Lippert, however, believes -that the peaceful _exchange of fire_ antedates this barter.[73] -Conceding that this custom is very ancient, he can nevertheless trace -it only from rudiments of observances and of law; and since proof is -no longer accessible, we shall not pursue the question further in this -place. - -On the other hand, the exchange of women is observed universally, -and doubtless exerts an extraordinarily strong influence in the -development of peaceable intercourse between neighboring tribes, -and in the preparation for barter of merchandise. The story of the -Sabine women, who threw themselves between their brothers and their -husbands, as these were about to engage in battle, must have been an -actuality in a thousand instances in the course of the development of -the human race. All over the world, the marriage of near relatives is -considered an outrage, as “incest,” for reasons not within the scope -of this book.[74] This directs the sexual longing toward the women of -neighboring tribes, and thus makes the loot of women a part of the -primary intertribal relations; and in nearly all cases, unless strong -feelings of race counteract it, the violent carrying off of women -is gradually commuted to barter and purchase, the custom resulting -from the relative undesirability of the women of one’s own blood in -comparison to the wives to be had from other tribes.[75]* - -Where division of labor made at all possible the exchange of goods, the -relations among the various tribes would thereafter be made serviceable -to it; the exogamic groups gradually become accustomed regularly to -meet on a peaceful basis. The peace, originally protecting the horde of -blood relations, thereafter comes to be extended over a wider circle. -One example from numberless instances: “Each of the two Camerun tribes -has its own ‘bush countries,’ places where its own tribesmen trade, -and where, by intermarriage, they have relatives. Here also exogamy -shows its tribe-linking power.” - -These are the principal lines of growth of peaceful barter and traffic; -from the right to hospitality and the exchange of women, perhaps also -from the exchange of fire, to the trade in commodities. In addition -to this, markets and fairs, and perhaps also traders, were almost -uniformly regarded as being under the protection of a god who preserved -peace and avenged its violation. Thus we have brought the fundamentals -of this most important sociological factor to the point where the -political means enters as a cause to disturb, rearrange, and then to -develop and affect the creations of the economic means. - - -(b) TRADE AND THE PRIMITIVE STATE - -There are two very important reasons why the robber-warrior should not -unduly interfere with such markets and fairs as he may find within his -conquered domain. - -The first, which is extra-economic, is the superstitious fear that -the godhead will avenge a breach of the peace. The second, which is -economic, and probably is the more important--and I think I am the -first to point out this connection--is that the conquerors can not well -do without the markets. - -The booty of the primitive victors consists of much property which is -unavailable for their immediate use and consumption. Since valuable -articles at that period exist in but few forms, while these few occur -in large quantity, the “marginal utility” of any one kind is held very -low. This applies especially to the most important product of the -political means, slaves. Let us first take up the case of the herdsman: -his need of slaves is limited by the size of his herds; he is very -likely to exchange his surplus for other objects of greater value to -him: for salt, ornaments, arms, metals, woven materials, utensils, etc. -For that reason, the herdsman is not only at all times a robber, always -in addition he is a merchant and trader and he protects trade. - -He protects trade coming his way in order to exchange his loot against -the products of another civilization--from the earliest times, nomads -have convoyed the caravans passing through their steppes or deserts in -consideration of protection money--but he also protects trade even in -places conquered by him in prehistoric times. Quite the same sort of -consideration which influenced the herdsmen to change from bear stage -to bee-keeper stage, must have influenced them to maintain and protect -ancient markets and fairs. One single looting, in this case, would -mean killing the hen that lays the golden eggs. It is more profitable -to preserve the market and rather to extend the prevailing peace over -it, since there is not only the profit to be had from an exchange -of foreign wares against loot, but also the protection money, the -lords’ toll, to be collected. For that reason princes of feudal states -of every stage of development extended over markets, highways and -merchants, their especial protection, the “king’s peace,” often indeed -reserving to themselves the monopoly of foreign trade. Everywhere we -see them busily engaged in calling into being new fairs and cities by -the grant of protection and immunity. - -This interest in the system of fairs and markets makes it thoroughly -credible that tribes of herdsmen respected existing market places in -their sphere of influence to such an extent that they suspended the -exertion of the political means so completely as not even to exercise -“dominion” over them. The story told by Herodotus is inherently -probable, though he was astonished that the Argippæans had a sacred -market amidst the lawless Scythian herdsmen, and that their unarmed -inhabitants were effectively protected through the hallowed peace of -their market place. Many similar phenomena make this the more easily -believable. - -“No one dare harm them, since they are considered _holy_; and yet they -have no arms; but it is they who allay the quarrels of their neighbors, -and whoever has escaped to them as a runaway may not be touched by any -other man.”[76] Similar instances are found frequently: “It is always -the same story of the Argippæans, the story of the ‘holy,’ ‘unarmed,’ -‘just,’ bartering, and strife-settling tribelet in the midst of a -Bedouin-like, nomadic population.”[77] Cære may be taken as an example -of a higher type. Strabo says of its inhabitants: “The Greeks thought -highly of their bravery and justice, because although powerful in a -great degree, they abstained from robbery.” Mommsen, who quotes this -passage, adds: “This does not exclude piracy, which was engaged in by -the merchants of Cære as well as by all other merchants, but rather -that Cære was a sort of free harbor for the Phœnicians as for the -Greeks.”[78] - -Cære is not like the fair of the Argippæans, a market place in the -interior _of a district of land nomads, but is in the midst of a domain -of sea nomads, a port endowed with its own peace_. This is one of those -typical formations whose importance, in my estimation, has not been -appreciated at its real value. They have, it seems to me, exercised a -mighty influence on the genesis of maritime states. - -Those reasons by which we saw the land nomads forced to preserve, if -not to create, market places, must with even more intensity, have -coerced the sea nomads to similar demeanor. For the transportation of -loot, especially of herds and of slaves, is difficult and dangerous on -the trails across the desert or the steppes: the slow progress invites -pursuit. But with war-canoe and “dragon-ship” this transportation -is easy and safe. For that reason, the Viking is even much more a -trader and merchant than is the herdsman. As is said in _Faust_, “War, -Commerce, and Piracy are inseparable.” - - -(c) THE GENESIS OF THE MARITIME STATE - -In many cases, I believe, trade in the loot of piracy is the origin of -those cities around which, as political centers, the city-states of the -antique or Mediterranean civilization grew up; while in very many other -cases, the same trade coöperated to bring them to the same point of -political development. - -These harbor markets developed from probably two general types: they -grew up either as piratical fortresses directly and intentionally -placed in hostile territory, or else as “merchant colonies” based on -treaty rights in the harbors of foreign primitive or developed feudal -states. - -Of the first type, we have a number of important examples from ancient -history which correspond exactly to the fourth stage of our scheme, -where an armed colony of pirates plants itself down at a commercially -and strategically defendable point on the seacoast of a foreign state. -The most notable instance is Carthage; and in like manner, the Greek -sea nomads, Ionians, Dorians and Achæans, settled in their sea castles -on the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian coasts of Southern Italy, on the -islands of these seas, and on the gulfs of Southern Gaul. Phœnicians, -Etruscans,[M] Greeks, and according to modern investigation, Carians, -all about the Mediterranean, founded their “States” after the same -type, with identical class division into masters and servile peasantry -of the neighboring territory.[79] - -[M] Whether the Etruscans were immigrants into Italy by land who took -up piracy after having made war successfully on land, or whether as sea -nomads they had already settled the country along the sea named after -them, has not been determined. - -Some of these states on the coast developed into feudal states -of the type of the territorial states; and the master class then -became a landed aristocracy. The factors in this change were: first, -geographical conditions, lack of good harbors, and a wide stretch -of _hinterland_ cultivated by peaceful peasants; and secondly, very -probably, the acquired organization into classes taken with them from -their original homes. In many cases, they were fugitive nobles, the -vanquished of domestic feuds, or younger sons, sometimes an entire -generation of youth of both sexes, who thus started “on the viking,” -and having at home had lands and serfs, as petty lords, they again -sought in foreign lands what they regarded as their due. The occupation -of England by the Anglo-Saxons, and of Southern Italy by the Normans, -are examples of this method; so too are the Spanish and Portuguese -colonizations of Mexico and of South America. The Achæan colonies of -Greater Greece in Southern Italy furnish additional and very important -instances of this development of territorial feudal states by sea -nomads: “This Achæan League of cities was a true colonization. The -cities were without harbors--Croton only had a fair roadstead--_and -were without any trade of their own_; the Sybarite could boast of -his growing gray in his water town between his home bridges, while -buying and selling were carried on by Milesians and Etruscans. On the -other hand, the Greeks in this region not only controlled the fringe -of the shore, but ruled from sea to sea; ... the native agricultural -inhabitants were forced into a relation of clientage or serfdom, and -were required to work the farms of their masters or to pay tribute to -them.”[80] It is probable that most of the Doric colonies in Crete were -similarly organized. - -But in the course of universal history these “territorial states,” -whether they arose more or less frequently, did not acquire any such -importance as did those maritime cities which devoted their principal -energies to commerce and to privateering. Mommsen contrasts in distinct -and well chosen sentences the Achæan landed squire with the “royal -merchants” of the Greek Colonies in Southern Italy: “In no way did -they spurn agriculture or the increase of territory; the Greeks were -not satisfied, at least not after they became powerful, to remain -within the confined space of a fortified commercial factory in the -midst of the country of the barbarians, as the Phœnicians had done. -Their cities were founded primarily and exclusively for purposes of -trade, and unlike the Achæan colonies, were universally situated at the -best harbors and landing places.”[81] We are certain, in the case of -the Ionic colonies, and may well assume it for the other cases, that -the founders of these cities were not landed squires, but seafaring -merchants. - -But such maritime states or cities, in the strict sense, came into -being not only through warlike conquest, but also through peaceable -beginnings, by a more or less mixed _pénétration pacifique_. - -Where, however, the Vikings did not meet peaceable peasants, but feudal -states in the primitive stage, willing to fight, they offered and -accepted terms of peace and settled down as colonies of merchants. - -We know of such cases from every part of the world, in harbors and on -markets held on shore. To take the instances with which Germans are -most conversant, there are the settlements of North German merchants -in countries along the German ocean and the Baltic Sea, the German -Steel Yard in London, the Hansa in Sweden and Norway, on the Island -of Schönen, and in Russia, at Novgorod. In Wilna, the capital of the -Grand Dukes of Lithuania, there was such a colony; and the Fondaco -dei Tedeschi in Venice is another example of a similar institution. -The strangers in nearly every instance settle down as a compact mass, -subject to their own laws and their own jurisdiction. They often -acquire great political influence, sometimes extending to dominion over -the state. One would think the following tale of Ratzel, concerning -the coast and islands of the Indian Ocean, were a contemporaneous -narrative of the Phœnician or Greek invasion of the Mediterranean at -about 1,000 B. C.: “Whole nations have, so to say, been liquefied by -trade, especially the proverbially clever, zealous, omnipresent Malays -of Sumatra; as well as the treacherous Bugi of Celebes. These can -be met with at every place from Singapore to New Guinea. Latterly, -especially in Borneo, they have immigrated in masses on the call of -the Borneo chieftains. Their influence was so strong that they were -permitted _to govern themselves according to their own laws_, and they -felt themselves so strong _that repeatedly they attempted to achieve -independence_. The Achinese formerly occupied a similar position. -Malacca had been made the principal mart by Malays from Sumatra, and -after its decline, Achin became the most frequented harbor of this -distant east, especially for the first quarter of the seventeenth -century, the pivotal period of the development of that corner of the -world.”[82] The following, from among numberless instances, demonstrate -the universality of this form of settlement: “In Urga, _where they -politically dominate_, the merchants are crowded together into a -separate Chinese Town.”[83] In the Jewish States there were “small -colonies of foreign merchants and mechanics, set apart in distinct -quarters of the cities. Here, under the king’s protection, they could -live according to their own religious customs.”[84] We may also compare -with this, First Kings XX, 34. “King Omri of Ephraim was forced by the -military success of his opponent, the King of Damascus, to grant to -the Aramaic merchants the use of certain parts of the city of Samaria, -where under royal protection they could trade. Later, when the turn of -war favored his successor, Ahab, the latter demanded the same privilege -for the Ephraimitic merchants in Damascus.”[85] “The inhabitants of -Italy, wherever they were, held together as solid and organized -masses, the soldiers as legionaries, the merchants of all large cities -as corporations; while the Roman citizens domiciled or dwelling in the -various provincial _circuits_, were organized as a ‘convention of Roman -citizens’ with their own communal government.”[86] We may recall the -mediæval Ghettos, which, before the great persecution of the Jews in -the Middle Ages, were similar merchant colonies. The settlements of -Europeans in the ports of strong foreign empires at the present time -show similar corporate organizations, having their own constitution and -(consular) jurisdiction. China, Turkey and Morocco must continue to -bear this mark of inferiority, while recently Japan has been able to -rid herself of that badge. - -The most interesting point about these colonies, at least for our -study, consists in their general tendency to extend their political -influence into complete domination. And there is good reason for this. -Merchants have a mass of movable wealth, which is likely to be used as -a decisive factor in the political upheavals constantly disturbing -all feudal states, be it in international wars between two neighboring -states, or in intra-national fights, such as wars of succession. In -addition to this the colonists, in many cases, may rely on the power of -their home state, basing their claim on ties of blood and on uncommonly -strong commercial interests; while there is besides, the fact that in -many cases they have in their warlike sailor-folk and their numerous -slaves an effective and compact force of their own, capable of -accomplishing much in a limited sphere. - -The following story of the rôle played by Arab merchants in East Africa -appears to me to show a historical type heretofore not sufficiently -appreciated: “When Speke, as the first European, made this trip in -1857, the Arabs were merchants, living as aliens in the land. When -in 1861 he passed the same way, the Arabs resembled great landed -proprietors with rich estates and were waging war with the native -territorial ruler. This process, repeatedly found in many other regions -in the interior of Africa, is the necessary consequence of the balance -of power. The foreign merchants, be they Arabs or Suaheli, ask the -privilege of transit and pay tribute for it; they establish warehouses, -which the chiefs favor, as these seem both to satisfy their vanity and -to extend their connections; then incurring the suspicion, oppression -and persecution of the chiefs, the merchants refuse to pay the rack -tolls and dues, which have grown with their increased prosperity. At -last, in one of the inevitable fights for the succession, the Arabs -take the side of one pretender if he is pliable enough, and are thus -brought into internal quarrels of the country and take part in the -often endless wars.”[87] - -This political activity of the merchant denizens (_metoikoi_) is -a constantly recurring type. “In Borneo there developed from the -settlements of Chinese gold diggers separate states.”[88] Properly -speaking, the entire history of colonization by Europeans is a series -of examples of the law that, with any superior force, the factories -and larger settlements of foreigners tend to grow into domination, -unless they approximate to the primal type of simple piracy, such as -the Spanish and Portuguese conquests, or the East India Companies, both -the English and the Dutch. “There lies a robber state beside the ocean, -between the Rhine and the Scheldt,” are the accusing words of the Dutch -Multatuli. All East Asiatic, American and African colonies of all -European peoples arose as one or the other of these two types. - -But the aliens do not always obtain unconditional mastery. Sometimes -the host state is too strong, and the newcomers remain politically -powerless but protected aliens; as, for example, the Germans in -England. Sometimes the host state, although subjugated, becomes strong -enough to shake off the foreign domination; so, for instance, Sweden -drove out the Hanseats who had imposed on her their sovereignty. In -some cases, a conqueror overcomes both merchants and host state, and -subjugates both; as happened to the republics of Novgorod and Pskov, -when the Russians annexed them. In many cases, however, the rich -foreigners and the domestic nobility amalgamate into one group of -rulers, following the type of the formation of territorial states, in -which we saw this take place whenever two about equally strong groups -of rulers came into conflict. It seems to me that this last named -situation is the most probable assumption for the genesis of the most -important city states of antiquity, for the Greek maritime cities, and -for Rome. - -Of Greek history, to use the terms of Kurt Breysig, we know only -the “Middle Ages,” of Roman history, only its “Modern Times.” For -the matters that preceded, we must be extremely careful in drawing -deductions from fancied analogies. But it seems to me that enough facts -are proved and admitted to permit the conclusion that Athens, Corinth, -Mycenæ, Rome, etc., became states in the manner already set forth. -And this would follow, even if the data from all known demography and -general history were not of such universal validity as to permit the -conclusion in itself. - -We know accurately from the names of places (Salamis: Island of Peace, -equivalent to Market-Island), from the names of heroes, from monuments, -and from immediate tradition, that in many Greek harbors there existed -Phœnician factories, while the _hinterland_ was occupied by small -feudal states with the typical articulation of nobles, common freemen, -and slaves. It can not seriously be disputed that the development of -the city states was powerfully advanced by foreign influences; and -this is true, though no specific evidence can be adduced to show that -any of the Phœnician, or of the still more powerful Carian merchants -were either allowed to intermarry with the families of the resident -nobility, or were made full citizens, or finally even became princes. - -The same applies to Rome, concerning which Mommsen, a cautious author, -states: “Rome owes its importance, if not its origin, to these -commercial and strategic relations. Evidence of this is found in -many traces of far greater value than the tales of historical novels -pretending to be authentic. Take an instance of the primæval relations -existing between Rome and Cære, which was for Etruria what Rome was for -Latium, and thereafter was its nearest neighbor and commercial friend; -or the uncommon importance attributed to the bridge over Tiber and the -bridge building (Pontifex Maximus) in every part of the Roman State; or -the galley in the municipal coat of arms. To this source may be traced -the primitive Roman harbor dues to which, from early times, only those -goods were subject which were intended for sale (_promercale_) and not -what entered the harbor of Ostia, for the proper use of the charterer -(_usuarium_), and which constituted therefore an impost on trade. For -that reason we find the comparatively early use of minted money, and -the commercial treaties of states oversea with Rome. In this sense, -then, Rome may, as the story of its origin states, have been rather a -created than a developed city, and among the Latin cities rather the -youngest than the eldest.”[89] - -It would require the work of a lifetime of historical research to -investigate these possibilities, or rather these probabilities; -and then to write the constitutional history of these preëminently -important city states, and to draw thence the very necessary -conclusions. It seems to me that along this path there would be found -much information on many an obscure question, such as the Etruscan -dominion in Rome, or the origin of the rich families of Plebeians, or -concerning the Athenian _metoikoi_, and many other problems. - -Here we can only follow the thread which holds out the hope of leading -us through the labyrinth of historical tradition to the issue. - - -(d) ESSENCE AND ISSUE OF THE MARITIME STATES - -All these are true “States” in the sociologic sense, whether they -arose from the fortresses of sea-robbers, or from harbors of original -land nomads as merchant colonies which obtained dominion or which -amalgamated with the dominating group of the host people. For they are -nothing but the organization of the political means, their form is -domination, their content the economic exploitation of the subject by -the master group. - -So far as the principle is concerned, they are not to be differentiated -from the States founded by land nomads; and yet they have taken a -different form, both from internal and external reasons, and show a -different psychology of classes. - -One must not believe that class feeling was at all different in these -and in the territorial states. Here as there the master class looks -down with the same contempt on the subjects, on the “_Rantuses_,” -on the “man with the blue fingernails,” as the German patrician in -the Middle Ages looked on a being with whom, even when free born, no -intermarriage or social intercourse was permitted. Little indeed does -the class theory of the καλοκἀγαθοί (well-born) or of the patricians -(children of ancestors) differ from that of the country squires. But -other circumstances here bring about differences, consonant, naturally, -with class interests. In any district ruled by merchants, highway -robbery can not be tolerated, and therefore it is considered, e. g., -among the maritime Greeks, a vulgar crime. The tale of Theseus would -not in a territorial state have been pointed against the highwaymen. -On the other hand, “piracy was regarded by them, in most remote -times, as a trade nowise dishonorable ... of which ample proof may be -found in the Homeric poems; while at a much later period Polycrates -had organized a well developed robber state on the Island of Samos.” -“In the _Corpus Juris_, mention is made of a law of Solon in which -the association of pirates (ἐπὶ λείαν οἰχόμενοι) is recognized as a -permissible company.”[90] - -But quite apart from such details, mentioned only because they serve to -cast a clear light on the growth of the “ideologic superstructure,”[N] -the basic conditions of existence of maritime states, utterly different -from those of territorial states, called into being two exceedingly -important phenomena, which are of universal historical importance, -viz., the growth of a _democratic constitution_, whereby the gigantic -contest between the sultanism of the Orient and the civic freedom of -the West was to be fought out (according to Mommsen the true content -of universal history); and in the second place the development of -_capitalistic slave-work_, which in the end was to annihilate all these -states. - -[N] How characteristic of these relations it is that Great Britain, -the only “maritime state” of Europe, even at this present day will not -surrender the right to arm privateers. - -Let us first consider the inner or socio-psychological causes of this -contrast between the territorial and the maritime state. - -States are maintained by the same principle from which they -arise. Conquest of land and populations is the _ratio essendi_ of -a territorial state; and by the repeated conquest of lands and -populations it must grow, until its natural growth is checked by -mountain ranges, desert, or ocean, or its sociological bounds are -determined by contact with other states of its own kind, which it can -not subjugate. The maritime state, on the other hand, came into being -from piracy and trade; and through these two means, it must strive -to extend its power. For this purpose, no extended territory need -be absolutely subjected to its sway. There is no need to carry its -development beyond the first five stages. The maritime states rarely, -and only when compelled, proceed beyond the fifth stage, and attain to -complete intra-nationality and amalgamation. Usually, it is enough if -other sea nomads and traders are kept away, if the monopoly of robbery -and trade is secured, and if the “subjects” are kept quiet by forts -and garrisons. Important places of production are, of course, actually -“dominated”; and this applies especially to mines, to a few fertile -grain belts, to woods with good lumber, to salt works, and to important -fisheries. Domination here, therefore, means permanent administration, -by making the subjects work these for the ruling class. It is only -later in the development, that there arises a taste for “lands and -serfs” and large domains for the ruling class _beyond the confines of -the narrow and original limits of the State_. This happens when the -maritime state by the incorporation of subjugated territories has -become a mixture of the territorial and the maritime forms. But even in -that case, and in contradistinction to territorial states, large landed -properties are merely a source of money rentals, and are in nearly all -cases administered as absentee-property. This we find in Carthage and -in the later Roman Empire. - -The interests of the master class, which in the maritime state as well -as in every other state, governs according to its own advantage, are -different from those in the territorial state. In the latter the feudal -territorial magnate is powerful because of his ownership of lands -and people; while conversely, the patrician of the maritime city is -powerful because of his wealth. The territorial magnate can dominate -his “State” only by the number of men-at-arms maintained by him, and -in order to have as many of these as possible, he must increase his -territory as much as possible. The patrician, on the other hand, can -control his “state” only by movable wealth, with which he can hire -strong arms or bribe weak souls; such wealth is won faster by piracy -and by trade than by land wars and the possession of large estates -in distant territories. Furthermore, in order thoroughly to use such -property, he would be obliged to leave his city to settle down on it, -and to become a regular squire; because in a period when money has not -yet become general, where a profitable division of labor between town -and country has not yet come about, the exploitation of large estates -can only be carried on by actually consuming their products, and -absentee ownership as a source of income is inconceivable. Thus far, -however, we have not reached that portion of the development. We are -still examining primitive conditions. No patrician of any city-state -would, at this time, think of leaving his lively rich home, in order -to bury himself among barbarians, and thus with one move cut himself -off in his state from any political rôle. All his economic, social and -political interests impel him with one accord toward maritime ventures. -Not landed property, but movable capital, is the sinew of his life. - -These were the moving causes of the actions of the master class in -the maritime cities; and even where geographical conditions permitted -an extensive expansion beyond the adjoining _hinterland_ of these -cities, they turned the weight of effort toward sea-power rather than -toward territorial growth. Even in the case of Carthage, its colossal -territory was of far less importance to it than its maritime interests. -Primarily it conquered Sicily and Corsica more in order to check the -competition of the Greek and Etruscan traders than for the sake of -owning these islands; it extended its territories toward the Lybians -largely to insure the security of its other home possessions; and -finally, when it conquered Spain, its ultimate reason was the need -of owning the mines. The history of the _Hansa_ shows many points -of similarity to the above. The majority of these maritime cities, -moreover, were not capable of subjugating a large district. Even had -there been the will to conquer, there were extraneous, geographical -conditions that hindered. All along the Mediterranean, with the -exception of some few places, the coastal plain is extremely narrow, -a small strip fenced off by high mountain ranges. That was one cause -which prevented most of the states grouped about some trading harbor -from growing to anything like the size we should naturally assume to be -probable; while in the open country, ruled by herdsmen, and this very -early, immense realms came into being. The second cause for the small -beginnings of these states is found in this, that the _hinterland_ -whether in the hills or on the few plains of the Mediterranean was -occupied by warlike tribes. These tribesmen, either hunters or warlike -herdsmen, or else primitive feudal states of the same master race as -the sea nomads, were not likely to be subjugated without a severe -contest. Thus in Greece the interior was saved from the maritime states. - -For these reasons the maritime State, even when most developed, always -remains centralized, one is tempted to say centered, on its trading -harbor; while the territorial State, strongly decentralized from the -start, for a long time continues to develop as it expands a still -more pronounced decentralization. Later, we shall see how this is -affected by the adoption of those forms of government and of economic -achievement which first were perfected in the “city-state,” and which -thus obtained the strength to counteract the centrifugal forces, and to -build up the central organization which is characteristic of our modern -states. This is the first great contrast between the two forms of the -State. - -No less decisive is the second point of contrast, whereby the -territorial State remains tied up to natural economies as opposed to -money economies, toward which the maritime State quickly turns. This -contrast grows also out of the basic conditions of their existence. - -Wherever a State lives in natural economy, money is a superfluous -luxury--so superfluous that an economy developed to the use of -money retrogrades again into a system of payments in kind as soon -as the community drops back into the primitive form. Thus after -Charlemagne had issued good coins, the economic situation expelled -them. Neustria--not to mention Austrasia--under the stress of the -migration of the peoples reverted to payment in kind. Such a system -can well do without money as a standard of values, since it is without -any developed intercourse and traffic. The lord’s tenants furnish -as tribute those things that the lord and his followers consume -immediately; while his ornaments, fine fabrics, damascened arms, or -rare horses, salt, etc., are procured in exchange with wandering -merchants for slaves, wax, furs and other products of a warlike -economic system of exchange in kind. - -In city life, at any advanced stage of development, it is impossible to -exist without a common measure of values. The free mechanic in a city -can not, except in rare cases, find some other craftsman in need of the -special thing which he produces, prepared to consume it immediately. -Then, too, in cities the inevitable retail trade in food products, -where every one must purchase nearly everything required, makes the -use of coined money quite inevitable. It is impossible to conduct -trade in its more limited sense, not between merchant and customers, -but between merchant and merchant, without having a common measure of -value. Imagine the case of a trader entering a port with a cargo of -slaves, wishing to take cloth as a return cargo, and finding a cloth -merchant who at the time may not want slaves but iron, or cattle, -or furs. To accomplish this exchange, at least a dozen intermediate -trades would have to take place before the object could be achieved. -That can be avoided only if there exists some one commodity desired by -all. In the system of payment in kind of the territorial states this -may be taken by cattle or horses, since they may be used by any one at -some time; but the ship owner can not load with cattle as a means of -payment, and thus gold and silver become recognized as “money.” - -From centralization and from the use of money, which are the necessary -properties of the maritime or the _city State_, as we shall hereafter -call it, its fate follows of necessity. - -The psychology of the townsman, and especially of the dweller in the -maritime commercial city, is radically different from that of the -countryman. His point of view is freer and more inclusive, even though -it be more superficial; he is livelier, because more impressions strike -him in a day than a peasant in a year. He becomes used to constant -changes and news, and thus is always _novarum rerum cupidus_. He is -more remote from nature and less dependent on it than is the peasant, -and therefore he has less fear of “ghosts.” One consequence of this is -that an underling in a city State is less apt to regard the “taboo” -regulations imposed on him by the first and second estates of rulers. -And as he is compelled to live in compact masses with his fellow -subjects, he early finds his strength in numbers, so that he becomes -more unruly and seditious than the serf who lives in such isolation -that he never becomes conscious of the mass to which he belongs and -ever remains under the impression that his overlord with his followers -would have the upper hand in every fight. - -This in itself brings about an ever progressive dissolution of the -rigid system of subordinated groups first created by the feudal state. -In Greece the territorial states alone were able to keep their subjects -for a long time in a state of subjection: Sparta its Helots, Thessaly -its _Penestæ_. In all the city States, on the other hand, we early -find an uprising of the proletariat against which the master class was -unable to oppose an effective resistance. - -The economic situation tends toward the same result as the conditions -of settlement. Movable wealth had far less stability than landed -property: the sea is tricky, and the fortunes of maritime war and -piracy not less so. The rich man of to-day may lose all by a turn of -Fortune’s wheel; while the poorest man may, by the same swing, land -on top. But in a commonwealth based entirely on possessions, loss -of fortune brings with it loss of rank and of “class,” just as the -converse takes place. The rich Plebeian becomes the leader of the -mass of the people in their constitutional fight for equal rights and -places all his fortune at risk in that struggle. The position of the -patricians becomes untenable; when coerced they have ever conceded -the claims of the lower class. As soon as the first rich Plebeian has -been taken into their ranks, the right of rule by birth, defended as a -holy institution, has forever become impossible. Henceforth it follows -that what is fair for one is fair for the other; and the aristocratic -rule is followed first by the plutocratic, then by the democratic, -finally by the ochlocratic régime, until either foreign conquest or -the “tyranny” of some “Savior of the Sword” rescues the community from -chaos. - -This end affects not only the State, but in most cases its inhabitants -so profoundly that one may speak of a literal _death of the peoples_, -caused by the _capitalistic exploitation of slave labor_. This latter -is a social institution inevitably bound to exist in every state -founded on piracy and maritime ventures and thus coming to use money as -a means of exchange. In the primitive stages of feudalism, whence it -was derived, slavery was harmless, as is true in all economic systems -based on exchange and use in kind, only to become an ulcerating cancer, -utterly destructive of the entire life of the State as soon as it is -exploited by the “capitalist” method, i. e., as soon as slave labor is -applied, not to be used in a system of a feudal payment in kind, but to -supply a market paying in money. - -Numberless slaves are brought into the country by piracy, privateering, -or by the commercial wars. The wealth of their owners permits them -to work the ground more intensively, and the owners of realty within -the confines of the city limits draw ever increasing revenues from -their possessions, and become more and more greedy of land. The small -freeholder in the country, overburdened by the taxes and military -service of wars waged in the interests of this great merchant class, -sinks into debt, becomes a slave for debt, or migrates into the city -as a pauper. But even so there is no hope for him, since the removal -of the peasants has damaged the craftsmen and small traders, for the -peasants were wont to purchase in the city, while the great estates, -constantly increasing by the removal of the peasantry, supply their -own needs by their own slave products. The evil attacks other parts -of the body politic. The remaining trades are gradually usurped by -masters exploiting slave labor, which is cheaper than free labor. -The middle class thus goes to pieces; and a pauper, good-for-nothing -mob, a genuine “bob-tail proletariat” comes into being, which, by -reason of the democratic constitution achieved in the interim, is the -sovereign of the commonwealth. The full course, political as well as -military, is then a mere question of time. It may take place without -a foreign invasion; which, however, usually sets in, when by reason -of the physical breakdown caused by the immense depopulation, by the -consumption of the people in its literal sense, the final stage is -attained. This is the end of all these states. Within the scope of this -treatise we can not dilate on this phase. - -Only one city State was able to maintain itself throughout the -centuries, because it was the ultimate conqueror of all the others, -and because it was enabled to counteract the consumption of population -by the only method of sanitation possible; by extensive recreations -of middle class populations, both in cities and in country districts, -as well as by vast colonizations of peasants on lands taken from the -vanquished. - -The Roman Empire was that state. But even this gigantic organism -finally succumbed to the consumption of population, caused by -capitalistic slave exploitation. In the interval, however, it had -created the first _imperium_, i. e., the first tensely centralized -state on a large scale, and had overcome and amalgamated all -territorial states of both the Mediterranean shores and its neighboring -countries, and had thereby for all time set before the world the model -of such an organized dominion. In addition to this it had developed -the organization of cities and of the system of money economy to such -an extent that they never were utterly destroyed, even in the turmoil -of the barbarian migration. In consequence of this, the feudal -territorial states that occupied the territory of the former Roman -Empire either directly or indirectly received those new impulses which -were to carry them beyond the condition of the normal primitive feudal -State. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEUDAL STATE - - -(a) THE GENESIS OF LANDED PROPERTY - -We now return, as stated above, to that point where the primitive -feudal State gave rise to the city State as an offshoot, to follow the -upward growth of the main branch. As the destiny of the city State was -determined by the agglomeration of that form of wealth about which -the State swung in its orbit, so the fate of the territorial State is -conditioned by that agglomeration of wealth which in turn controls its -orbit, the _ownership of landed property_. - -In the preceding, we followed the economic differentiation in the -case of the shepherd tribes, and showed that even here the law of the -agglomeration about existing nuclei of wealth begins to assert its -efficacy, as soon as the political means comes into play, be it in the -form of wars for booty or still more in the form of slavery. We saw -that the tribe had differentiated nobles and common freemen, beneath -whom slaves, being without any political rights, are subordinated as -a third class. This differentiation of wealth is introduced into the -primitive state, and sharpens very markedly the contrast of social -rank. It becomes still more accentuated by settlement, whereby private -ownership in lands is created. Doubtless there existed even at the time -when the primitive feudal state came into being, great differences in -the amount of lands possessed by individuals, especially if within -the tribe of herdsmen the separation had been strongly marked between -the prince-like owners of large herds and many slaves, and the poorer -common freemen. These princes occupy more land than do the small -freemen. - -At first, this happens quite harmlessly, and without a trace of any -consciousness of the fact that extended possession of land will become -the means of a considerable increase of social power and of wealth. -Of this, there is at this time no question, since at this stage the -common freemen would have been powerful enough to prevent the formation -of extended landed estates had they known that it would eventually do -them harm. But no one could have foreseen this possibility. Lands, in -the condition in which we are observing them, have no value. For that -reason the object and the spoils of the contest were not the possession -of _lands_, but of _the land and its peasants, the latter being bound -to the soil_ (_glebæ adscripti_ of our later law) as labor substrat and -labor motors, from the conjunction of which there grows the object of -the political means, viz., ground rent. - -Every one is at liberty to take as much of _the uncultivated land_ -existing in masses as he needs and will or can cultivate. It is quite -as unlikely that any one would care to measure off for another parts -of an apparently limitless supply, as that any one would apportion the -supply of atmospheric air. - -The princes of the noble clans, probably from the start, pursuant to -the usage of the tribe of herdsmen, receive more “lands and peasants” -than do the common freemen. That is their right as princes, because -of their position as patriarchs, war lords, and captains maintaining -their warlike suites of half-free persons, of servants, of clients, or -of refugees. This probably amounts to a considerable difference in the -primitive amounts of land ownership. But this is not all. The princes -need a larger surface of the “_land without peasants_” than do the -common freemen, because they bring with them their servants and slaves. -These have, however, no standing at law, and are incapable, according -to the universal concepts of folk law, of acquiring title to landed -property. Since, however, they must have land in order to live, their -master takes it for them, so as to settle them thereon. In consequence -of this, the richer the prince of the nomad tribe the more powerful the -territorial magnate becomes. - -But this means that wealth, and with it social rank, is consolidated -more firmly and more durably than in the stage of herdsman -ownership. For the greatest herds may be lost, but landed property -is indestructible; and men bound to labor, bringing forth rentals, -reproduce their kind even after the most terrible slaughter, even -should they not be obtainable full grown in slave hunts. - -About this fixed nucleus of wealth, property begins to agglomerate -with increasing rapidity. Harmless as was the first occupation, men -must soon recognize the fact that rental increases with the number of -slaves one can settle on the unoccupied lands. Henceforth, the external -policy of the feudal state is no longer directed toward the acquisition -of land and peasants, but rather of peasants without land, to be -carried off home as serfs, and there to be colonized anew. When the -entire state carries on the war or the robbing expedition, the nobles -obtain the lion’s share. Very often, however, they go off on their own -account, followed only by their suites, and then the common freeman, -staying at home, receives no share in the loot. Thus the vicious circle -constantly tends rapidly to enlarge with the increasing wealth of the -lands owned by the nobles. The more slaves a noble has, the more rental -he can obtain. With this, in turn, he can maintain a warlike following, -composed of servants, of lazy freemen, and of refugees. With their -help, he can, in turn, drive in so many more slaves, to increase his -rentals. - -This process takes place, even where some central power exists, which, -pursuant to the general law of the people, has the right to dispose of -uncultivated lands; while it is, in many cases, not only by sufferance, -but often by the express sanction of that authority. As long as the -feudal magnate remains the submissive vassal of the crown, it lies -in the king’s interest to make him as strong as possible. By this -means his military suite, to be placed at the disposal of the crown -in times of war, is correspondingly increased. We shall adduce only -one illustration to show that the necessary consequence in universal -history is not confined to the well-known effect in the feudal states -of Western Europe, but follows from these premises even under totally -different surroundings: “The principal service in Fiji consisted in -war duty; and if the outcome was successful it meant new grants of -lands, including therein the denizens, as slaves, and thus led to the -assumption of new obligations.”[91] - -This accumulation of landed property in ever increasing quantity in -the hands of the landed nobility brings the primitive feudal state of -a higher stage to the “finished feudal state” with a complete scale of -feudal ranks. - -Reference to a previous work by the author, based on a study of the -sources, will show the same causal connection for German lands;[92] and -in that publication it was pointed out that in all the instances noted -a process takes place, identical in its principal lines of development. -It is only on this line of reasoning that one can explain the fact, -to take Japan as an example, that its feudal system developed into -the precise details which are well known to the students of European -history, although Japan is inhabited by a race fundamentally different -from the Arians; and besides (a strong argument against giving too -great weight to the materialistic view of history) the process of -agriculture is on a totally different technical basis, since the -Japanese are not cultivators with the plow, but with the hoe. - -In this instance, as throughout this book, it is not the fortune of -a single people that is investigated; it is rather the object of the -author to narrate the typical development, the universal consequences, -of the same basic traits of mankind wherever they are placed. -Presupposing a knowledge of the two most magnificent examples of the -expanded feudal state, Western Europe and Japan, we shall, in general, -limit ourselves to cases less well known, and so far as possible give -the preference to material taken from ethnography, rather than from -history in its more restricted sense. - -The process now to be narrated is a change, gradually consummated but -fundamentally revolutionary, of the political and social articulation -of the primitive feudal state: _the central authority loses its -political power to the territorial nobility, the common freeman sinks -from his status, while the “subject” mounts_. - - -(b) THE CENTRAL POWER IN THE PRIMITIVE FEUDAL STATE - -The patriarch of a tribe of herdsmen, though endowed with the authority -which flows from his war-lordship and sacerdotal functions, generally -has no despotic powers. The same may be said of the “king” of a small -settled community, where, generally speaking, he would exercise very -limited command. On the other hand, as soon as some military genius -manages to fuse together numerous tribes of herdsmen into one powerful -mass of warriors, despotic centralized power is the direct, inevitable -consequence.[93] As soon as war exists, the truth of the Homeric - - οὐκ ἀγαθὴ πολυκοιρανιὴ εἶς κοίρανος ἔστω - εἶς βασιλεύς,[O] - -is admitted by the most unruly tribes, and becomes a fact to be -acted on. The free primitive huntsmen render to their elected chief -unconditioned obedience, while on the war-path; the free Cossacks -of the Ukraine, recognizing no authority in times of peace, submit -to their _hetman’s_ power of life and death in times of war. This -obedience toward their war-lord is a trait common to every genuine -warrior psychology. - -[O] “The rule of the many is not a good thing, over the many there -should be one king.” - -The leaders of the great migrations of nomads are all powerful despots: -Attila, Omar, Genghis Khan, Tamerlane, Mosilikatse, Ketchwayo. -Similarly, we find that whenever a mighty territorial state has -come into being as the result of the welding together of a number -of primitive feudal states, there existed in the beginning a strong -central authority. Examples of this may be seen in the case of Sargon -Cyrus, Chlodowech, Charlemagne, Boleslaw the Red. Sometimes, especially -as long as the main state has not yet reached its geographical or -sociologic bounds, the centralized authority is maintained intact in -the hands of a series of strong monarchs, which degenerates, in some -instances, to the maddest despotism and insanity of some of the Cæsars: -especially do we find flagrant examples of this in Mesopotamia and -in Africa. We shall merely touch on this phase: the more so, as it -has little general effect on the final development of the forms of -government. This point should, however, be stated, that the development -of the form of government of a despotism depends in the main, on what -the _sacerdotal_ status of the rulers may be, in addition to their -position as war-lords, and whether or not they hold the monopoly of -trade as an additional regalian right. - -The combination of Cæsar and Pope tends in all cases to develop the -extreme forms of despotism; while the partition of spiritual and -temporal functions brings it about that their exponents mutually check -and counterbalance one another. A characteristic example may be found -in the conditions prevailing among the Malay states of the East Indian -Archipelago, genuine “maritime states,” whose genesis is an exact -counterpart of that of the Greek maritime states. Generally speaking, -the prince has just as little power among these, as, shall we say, the -king at the opening of the history of the Attic states. The chieftains -of the clans (in Sulu the Dato, in Achin the Panglima), as in the case -of Athens, have the real power. But where, “as in Tobah, religious -motives endow the rulers with the position of a Pope in miniature, an -entirely different phase is found. The Panglima then depend entirely -on the Rajah, and are merely officials.”[94] To refer to a well-known -fact, when the aristocrats and chiefs of the clans in Athens and in -Rome abolished the kingdom, they preserved at least the old _title_, -and granted its use to a dignitary otherwise politically impotent, -in order that the gods might have their offerings presented in the -accustomed manner. For the same reason, in many cases, the descendant -of the former tribal king is preserved as a dignitary, otherwise -totally powerless, while the actual power of government has long since -been transferred to some war chief; as in the later Merovingian Empire, -the Carolingian Mayors of the palace (Majordomus) ruled alongside a -“long locked king,” _rex crinitus_, of the race of Merowech, so, in -Japan, the Shogun ruled beside the Mikado, and in the Empire of the -Incas, the commander of the Inca beside the Huillcauma, who had been -gradually limited to his sacerdotal functions.[P][95] - -[P] In Egypt we find a similar state of affairs, beside the bigoted -Amenhotep IV., the Majordomus of the palace Haremheb, who “managed to -unite in his hands the highest military and administrative functions of -the empire, until he exercised the powers of a regent of the state.” -Schneider, _Civilization and Thought of the Ancient Egyptians_. -Leipzig, 1907, page 22. - -In addition to the office of supreme pontiff, the power of the head of -the state is frequently increased enormously by the trading monopoly, a -function exercised by the primitive chieftains as a natural consequence -of the peaceful barter of guest-gifts. Such a trade monopoly, for -example, was exercised by King Solomon; and latterly by the Roman -Emperor Friedrich II.[Q][96] - -[Q] Cf. _Acta Imperii_, or _Huillard-Breholles, H. D. Fred. -II._--_Translator._ - -As a rule, the negro chieftains are “monopolists of trading”;[97] as -is the King of Sulu.[98] Among the Galla, wherever the supremacy of a -head chief is acknowledged, he becomes “as a matter of course, the -tradesman for his tribe; since none of his subjects is allowed to trade -with strangers directly.”[99] Among the Barotse and Mabunda, the king -is “according to the strict interpretation of the law, the only trader -of his country.”[100] - -Ratzel notes, in telling language, the importance of this factor: -“In addition to his witchcraft, the chief increases his power by a -_monopoly of trading_. Since the chief is the sole intermediary in -trade, everything desired by his subjects passes through his hands, -and he becomes the donor of all longed-for gifts, the fulfiller of the -fondest wishes. In such a system, there lie certainly the possibilities -of great power.”[101] If, in conquered districts, where the power of -government is apt to be more tensely exercised, there is added the -monopoly of trade, the royal power may become very great. - -It may be stated as a general rule, that even in the apparently most -extreme cases of _despotism_, no monarchical _absolutism_ exists. The -ruler may, undeterred by fear of punishment, rage against his subject -class; but he is checked in no small degree by his feudal followers. -Ratzel, in speaking of the subject generally, remarks: “The so-called -‘court assemblage’ of African or of ancient American chiefs is probably -always a council.... Although we meet with traces of absolutism with -all peoples on a low scale, even where the form of government is -republican, the cause of absolutism is not in the strength of either -the state or of the chieftain, but in the moral weakness of the -individual, who succumbs without any effective resistance to the powers -wielded over him.”[102] The kingdom of the Zulu is a limited despotism, -in which very powerful ministers of state (Induna) share the power; -with other Caffir tribes it is a council, sometimes dominating both -people and chieftains.[103] In spite of this control “under Tshaka -every sneezing or hawking in the presence of the tyrant, as well as -every lack of tears at the death of some royal kinsman, was punished -with death.”[104] The same limitation applies to the West African -kingdoms of Dahomy and Ashanti, notorious because of their frightful -barbarities. “In spite of the waste of human life, in war, slave trade, -and human sacrifices, there existed at no place absolute despotism.... -Bowditch remarks on the similarity of the system prevailing in Ashanti, -with its ranks and orders, with the old Persian system as described by -Herodotus.”[105] - -One must be very careful, and this may again be insisted upon, not -to confuse despotism with absolutism. Even in the feudal states of -Western Europe, the rulers exercised, in many cases, power of life and -death, free from the trammels of law; but nevertheless such a ruler was -impotent as against his “magnates.” So long as he does not interfere -with the privileges of the classes, he need not restrain his cruelty, -and he may even occasionally sacrifice one of the great men; but woe to -him were he to dare to touch the economic privileges of his magnates. -It is possible to study this very characteristic phase, completely -free, from the standpoint of law, and yet closely hemmed in by -political checks, in the great East African empires: “The government -of Waganda and Wanyoro is, in theory, based on the rule of the king -over the whole territory; but in reality this is only the semblance of -government, since, as a matter of fact, the lands belong to the supreme -chieftains of the empire. It was they who represented the popular -opposition to foreign influences, in the time of Mtesa; and Muanga did -not dare, for fear of them, to carry out any innovations. Although the -kingship is limited in reality, yet in form it occupies an imposing -position in unessentials. The ruler is absolute master over the lives -and limbs of his subjects, the mass of the people, and feels himself -restrained only in the narrowest circle of the chief courtiers.”[106] - -Precisely the same statement applies to the inhabitants of Oceania, to -mention the last of the great societies that created states: “At no -place does one find an entire absence of a representative mediation -between prince and people.... The aristocratic principle corrects -the patriarchal. Therefore, the extremes of _despotism_ depend more -on class and caste pressure than on the overpowering will of any -individual.”[107] - - -(c) THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DISINTEGRATION OF THE PRIMITIVE FEUDAL -STATE - -Space forbids our detailing the innumerable shadings under which the -patriarchal-aristocratic (in some cases plutocratic) mixture of form -of government in the primitive feudal state is shown in either an -ethnographic, historical or juristic survey. This is likewise of the -greatest importance for the subsequent development. - -It is indifferent how much power the ruler may have had at the -beginning, an inevitable fate breaks down his power in a short while; -and does this, one may say, the faster, the greater that power was, i. -e., the larger the territory of the primitive feudal state of higher -grade. - -Taking into account the process already set forth, which, through the -occupation and settlement of unused lands by means of newly acquired -slaves, made for the increase of power of the separate nobles, a -result came about which might prove uncomfortable for the central -power. Mommsen in speaking of the Celts says: “When in a clan numbering -about eighty thousand armed men, a single chieftain could appear at -convocation with ten thousand followers, exclusive of his serfs and -debtors, it becomes clear that such a noble was rather an independent -prince than a mere citizen of his clan.”[108] And the same may apply to -the “Heiu” of the Somali, where a great landed proprietor maintained -hundreds of families in dependence on his lands, “so that conditions -in Somaliland tend to recall those existing in mediæval Europe during -feudal times.”[109] - -Although such a preponderance of isolated territorial magnates can come -about in the feudal state of low development, it nevertheless reaches -its culmination in the feudal state of higher grade, the great feudal -state; this happens by reason of the increased power given to the -landlords by the bestowal of _public official functions_. - -The more the state expands, the more must official power be delegated -by the central government to its representatives on the borders and -marches, who are constantly threatened by wars and insurrectionary -outbreaks. In order to preserve his bailiwick in safety for the state, -such an official must be endowed with supreme military powers, joined -with the functions of the highest administrative officials. Even -should he not require a large number of civil employees, he still must -have a permanent military force. And how is he to pay these men? With -one possible exception, to be noted hereafter, there are no taxes -which flow into the treasury of the central government and then are -poured back again over the land, since these presuppose an economic -development existing only where money is employed. But in communities -having a system of payments in kind, such as these “territorial -states” all are, there are no taxes payable in money. For that reason, -the central government has no alternative but to turn over to the -counts, or border wardens, or satraps, the income of its territorial -jurisdiction. Such an official, then, receives the dues of the -subjects, determines when and where forced labor is to be rendered, -receives the deodands, fees and penalties payable in cattle, etc.; and -in consideration of these must maintain the armed force, place definite -numbers of armed men at the disposal of the central government, build -and maintain highways and bridges, feed and stable the ruler and his -following, or his “royal messengers,” and finally, furnish a definite -“Sergeantry” consisting of highly valuable goods, easily transported to -the court, such as horses, cattle, slaves, precious metals, wines, etc. - -In other words, he receives an immensely large fief for his services. -If previously he was not, he now becomes the greatest man in his -country, though before he probably was the most powerful landlord in -his official district. He will hereafter do exactly what his equals -in rank are doing, although they may not have his official position; -that is to say, he will, only on a larger scale, continue to settle -new lands with ever newly recruited serfs. By this he increases his -military strength; and this must be wished for and aided by the -central government. For it is the fate of these states, that they must -fatten those very local powers, that are to engulf them. - -Conditions arise which enable the warden of the marches to impose the -terms of his military assistance, especially in the inevitable feuds -which arise over the right of succession to the central government. -Thereby he obtains further valuable concessions, especially the -formal acknowledgment of the heritability of his official fief, so -that office and lands come to be held by an identical tenure. By -this means, he gradually becomes almost independent of the central -authority, and the complaint of the Russian peasant, “The sky is high -up and the Tsar is far off,” tends to become of universal application. -Take this characteristic example from Africa: “The empire of Lunda -is an absolute feudal state. The chieftains (Muata, Mona, Muene) are -permitted independent action in all internal affairs, so long as it -pleases the Muata Jamvo. Usually, the great chieftains, living afar, -send their caravans with their tribute once a year to the Mussumba; -but _those living at too great a distance, sometimes for long periods -omit making any payments of their tribute_; while similar chiefs in the -neighborhood of the capital forward tribute many times a year.”[110] - -Nothing can show more plainly than this report, how, because of -inadequate means of transportation, extent of distance becomes -politically effective in these states loosely held together and in a -state of payment in kind. One is tempted to say that the independence -of the feudal masters grows in proportion to the square of their -distance from the seat of the central authority. The crown must pay -more and more for their services, and must gradually confirm them in -all the sovereign powers of the state, or else permit their usurpation -of these powers after they have seized them one after the other. Such -are heritability of fiefs, tolls on highways and commerce, (in a later -stage the right of coinage), high and low justice, the right to exact -for private gain the public duties of repair of ways and bridges (the -old English _trinodis necessitas_) and the disposal of the military -services of the freemen of the country. - -By these means, the powerful frontier wardens gradually attain an -ever greater, and finally a complete, _de facto_ independence, even -though the _formal_ bond of feudal suzerainty may for a long time -apparently keep together the newly developed principalities. The -reader, of course, recalls instances of these typical transitions; -all mediæval history is one chain of them; not only the Merovingian -and Carolingian Empires, not only Germany, but also France, Italy, -Spain, Poland, Bohemia, Hungary, as well as Japan and China,[111] -have passed through this process of decomposition, not only once, -but repeatedly. And this is no less true of the feudal states of -Mesopotamia: great empires follow each other, acquire power, burst -asunder time after time, and again are re-united. In the case of -Persia, we are expressly told: “Separate states and provinces, by a -successful revolt, obtained freedom for a longer or shorter time, and -the ‘great king’ at Susa did not always have the power to force them -to return to their obedience; in other states, the satraps or warlike -chieftains ruled arbitrarily, carrying on the government faithlessly -and violently, either as independent rulers or tributary under-kings of -the king of kings. The Persian world-empire went to its disintegration -an agglomeration of states and lands, without any general law, without -ordered administration, without uniform judicial system, without order -and enforcement of law, and without possibility of help.”[112] - -A similar fate overtook its neighbor in the valley of the Nile: -“Princes spring from the families of the usurpers, free landlords, -who pay land-taxes to nobody but to the king, and rule over certain -strips of land, or districts. These district princes govern a territory -specifically set apart as pertaining to their official position, and -separate from their family possessions. - -“Later successful warlike operations, perhaps filling in the gap -between the Ancient and the Middle (Egyptian) Empire, _together with -the gathering in of captives of the wars, who could be utilized as -labor motors_, brought a more stringent exploitation of the subjects, -a definite determination of the tributes. During the Middle Empire, -the power of the princes of the clans rose to an enormous height, -they maintained great courts, imitating the splendor of the royal -establishment.”[113] “With the decline of the royal authority -during a period of decay, the higher officials use their power for -personal aims, in order to make their offices hereditary within their -families.”[R][114] - -[R] Maspero says, _New Light on Ancient Egypt_, pp. 218-9: “Until -then, in fact, the high priest had been chosen and nominated by the -king; from the time of Rameses III. he was always chosen from the same -family, and the son succeeded his father on the pontifical throne. From -that time events marched quickly. The Theban mortmain was doubled with -a veritable seigniorial fief, which its masters increased by marriages -with the heirs of neighboring fiefs, by continual bequests from one -branch of the family to the other, and by _the placing of cadets of -each generation at the head of the clergy of certain secondary towns_. -The official protocol of the offices filled by their wives shows that a -century or a century and a half after Rameses III., almost the whole of -the Thebaid, about a third of the Egyptian territory was in the hands -of the High Priest of Ammon and of his family.”--_Translator’s Note -(and italics)._ - -But the operation of this historical law is not restricted to the -“historical” peoples. In speaking of the feudal states of India, -Ratzel states: “Even beyond Radshistan, the nobles often enjoyed a -great measure of independence, so that even in Haiderabad, after the -Nizam had acquired the sole rule over the country, the Umara or Nabobs -maintained troops of their own, independently of the army of the Nizam. -These smaller feudatories did not comply with the increased demands of -modern times as regards the administration of Indian states as often as -did the greater princes.”[115] - -In Africa finally, great feudal states come and pass away, as do -bubbles arising and bursting from the stream of eternally similar -phenomena. The powerful Ashanti empire, within one and a half -centuries, has shriveled to less than one-fifth of its territory;[116] -and many of the empires that the Portuguese encountered have since -disappeared without leaving a trace of their existence. And yet these -were strong feudal powers: “Stately and cruel negro empires, such as -Benin, Dahomy or Ashanti, resemble in many respects ancient Peru or -Mexico, having in their vicinity politically disorganized tribes. The -hereditary nobility of the Mfumus, sharply separated from the rest of -the state, had mainly the administration of the districts, and together -with the more transitory nobility of service, formed in Loango strong -pillars of the ruler and his house.”[117] - -But whenever such a state, once powerful, has split into a number of -territorial states either _de facto_ or juristically independent, the -former process begins anew. The great state gobbles up the smaller -ones, until a new empire has arisen. “The greatest territorial magnates -later become emperors,” says Meitzen laconically of Germany.[118] But -even this great demesne vanishes, split up by the need of equipping -warlike vassals with fiefs. “The Kings soon found that they had donated -away all their belongings; their great territorial possessions in the -Delta had melted away,” says Schneider (l. c. page 38) of the Pharaohs -of the sixth dynasty. The same causes brought about like effects in -the Frankish Empire among both Merovingians and Carolingians; and later -in Germany in the case of the Saxon and Hohenstaufen Emperors.[119] -Additional references are unnecessary, as every one is familiar with -these instances. - -In a subsequent part of this treatise, we shall examine into the causes -that finally liberated the primitive feudal state from this witch’s -curse, this circling from agglomeration to disintegration without end. -Our present task is to take up the _social_ side of the process, as -we have already taken up the historical phase of it. It changes the -articulation of classes in the most decisive manner. - -The common freemen, the lower strata of the dominating group, are -struck with overpowering force. They sink into bondsmenship. Their -decay must go along with that of the central power; since both, allied -one might say, by nature, are menaced simultaneously by the expanding -power of the great territorial lords. The crown controls the landed -magnate so long as the levy of the common freemen of the district is -a superior force to his guards, to his “following.” But a fatal need, -already set forth, impels the crown to deliver over the peasants to -the landed lordling, and from the moment when the county levy has -become weaker than his guards, the free peasants are lost. Where the -sovereign powers of the state are delegated to the territorial magnate, -i. e., where he has developed more or less into an independent lord of -the region, the overthrow of the liberties of the peasants is carried -out, at least in part, under the color of law, by forcing excessive -military services, which ruin the peasants, and which are required the -more often as the dynastic interests of the territorial lord require -new lands and new peasants, or by abusing the right to compulsory -labor, or by turning the administration of public justice into military -oppression. - -The common freemen, however, receive the final blow either by the -formal delegation or by the usurpation of the most important powers -of the crown, the disposition of unoccupied lands or “commons.” -Originally, this land belonged to all the “folk” in common; i. e., to -the freemen for common use; but in accordance with an original custom, -probably universal, the patriarch enjoys disposal of it. This right of -disposition passes to the territorial magnate with the remaining royal -privileges--and thus he has obtained the power to strangle any few -remaining freemen. He now declares all unoccupied lands his property, -_and forbids their settlement by free peasants_, while those only are -permitted access who recognize his superior lordship; i. e., who have -commended themselves to him, or are his serfs. - -That is the last nail in the coffin of the common freemen. Heretofore -their equality of possessions has been in some way guaranteed. -Even if a peasant had twelve sons, his patrimony was not split up, -because eleven of them broke new hides of land in the commons of the -community, or else in the general land not yet distributed to other -villages. That is henceforth impossible; hides tend to divide where -large families grow up, others are united when heir and heiress marry: -henceforth there come into existence “laborers,” recruited from the -owners of half, a quarter, or even an eighth of a hide who help work -a larger area. Thus the free peasantry splits into rich and poor; -this begins to loosen the bond which hitherto had made the bundle of -arrows unbreakable. When, therefore, some comrade is overwhelmed by the -exactions of the lord and has become his liegeman, or if bond peasants -are settled among the original owners, either to occupy some hide -vacated by the extinction of the family or fallen into the hands of the -lord because of the indebtedness of its occupant, then every social -cohesion is loosened; and the peasantry, split apart by class and by -economic contrasts, is handed over without power of resistance to the -magnate. - -On the other hand, the result is the same where the magnate has no -usurped regalian powers of the state. In such cases, open force and -shameless violation of rights accomplish the same ends. The ruler, -far off and impotent, bound to rely on the good will and help of the -violators of law and order, has neither the power nor the opportunity -of interference. - -There is hardly any need of adducing instances. The free peasantry -of Germany were put through the process of expropriation and -declassification at least three times. Once it happened in Celtic -times.[120] The second overthrow of the free peasants of the old German -Empire took place in the ninth and tenth centuries. The third tragedy -of the same form began with the fifteenth century, in the countries -formerly Slavic, which they had conquered and colonized.[121] The -peasants fared worse in those lands, in the “republics of nobles,” -where there was no monarchical central authority, whose community of -interests with their subjects tended to deprive oppression of its -worse features. The Celts in the Gaul of Cæsar’s time are one of the -earliest examples. Here “the great families exercised an economic, -military and political preponderance. They monopolized the leases of -the lucrative rights of the state. They forced the common freemen, -overwhelmed by the taxes which they had themselves imposed, to -borrow of them, and then, first as their debtors, afterward legally -as their serfs, to surrender their liberty. For their own advantage -they developed the system of followers: i. e., the privilege of the -nobility to have about them a mass of armed servants in their pay, -called _ambacti_, with whose aid they formed a state within a state. -Relying on these, their own men-at-arms, they defied the lawful -authorities and the levies of the freemen, and thus were able to burst -asunder the commonwealth.... The only protection to be found was in -the relation of serfdom, where personal duty and interest required the -lord to protect his clients and to avenge any wrong to his men. Since -the state no longer had the power to protect the freemen, these in -growing numbers became the vassals of some powerful noble.”[122] We -find these identical conditions fifteen hundred years later in Kurland, -Livonia, in Swedish Pomerania, in Eastern Holstein, in Mecklenburg, -and especially in Poland. In the German territories the petty nobles -subjugated their peasantry, while in Poland their prey was the -formerly free and noble Schlachziz. “Universal history is monotonous,” -says Ratzel. The same procedure overthrew the peasantry of ancient -Egypt: “After a warlike _intermezzo_, there follows a period in the -history of the Middle Empire, which brings about a deterioration of -the position of the peasantry in Lower Egypt. The number of landlords -decreases, while their territorial growth and power increases. The -tribute of the peasants is hereafter determined by an exact assessment -on their estates, and definitely fixed by a sort of Doomsday Book. -Because of this pressure, many peasants soon enter the lord’s court or -the cities of the local rulers, and take employment there either as -servants, mechanics, or even as overseers in the economic organization -of these manors or courts. In common with any available captives, they -contribute to the extension of the prince’s estates, and to further the -general expulsion of the peasantry from their holdings.”[128] - -The example of the Roman Empire shows, as nothing else can, how -inevitable this process becomes. When we first meet Rome in history -the conception of serfdom or bondage has already been forgotten. When -the “modern period” of Rome opens, only slavery is known. And yet, -within fifteen centuries, the free peasantry again sink into economic -dependence, after Rome has become an overextended, unwieldy empire, -whose border districts have more and more dissolved from the central -control. The great landed proprietors, having been endowed with the -lower justice and police administration on their own estates have -“reduced their servants, who may originally have been free proprietors -of the ‘_ager privatus vectigalis_’ to a state of servitude, and -have thus developed a sort of actual _glebæ adscriptus_, within the -boundaries of their ‘immunities.’”[124] The invading Germans found -this feudal order worked out in Gaul and the other provinces. At this -particular time, the immense difference formerly existing between -slaves and free settlers (_coloni_) had been completely obliterated, -first in their economic position, and then, naturally, in their -constitutional rights. - -Wherever the common freemen sink into political and economic dependence -on the great territorial magnates, when, in other words, they become -bound either to the court or to the lands, the social group formerly -subject to them tend in a corresponding measure to improve their -status. Both layers tend to meet half-way, to approximate their -position, and finally to amalgamate. The observations just made -concerning the free settlers and the agricultural slaves of the later -Roman Empire hold true everywhere. Thus in Germany, freemen and serfs -together formed, when fused, the economic and legally unital group of -_Grundholde_, or men bound to the soil.[125] - -The elevation of the former “subjects,” hereafter for the sake of -brevity to be called “plebs,” flows from the same source as the -debasement of the freeman, and arises by the same necessity from the -very foundations on which these states are themselves erected, viz., -the agglomeration of the landed property in ever fewer hands. - -The plebs are the natural opponents of the central government--since -that is their conqueror and tax imposer; while they naturally oppose -the common freemen, who despise them and oppress them politically, -besides crowding them back economically. The great magnate also is the -natural opponent of the central government--an impediment in his path -toward complete independence, and he is at the same time also a natural -enemy of the common freemen, who in turn not only support the central -government; but also block with their possessions his path toward -territorial dominion, while with their claims to equality of political -rights they annoy his princely pride. Since the political and social -interests of the territorial princes and of the plebs coincide, they -must become allies; the prince can attain complete independence only -if, in his fight for power against the crown and the common freemen, -he controls reliable warriors and acquiescent taxpayers; the plebs -can only then be freed from their pariah-like declassification, both -economically and socially, if the hated and proud common freemen are -brought down to their level. - -This is the second time that we have noted the identity of interest -between the princes and their subjects. The first time we found a -weakly developed solidarity in our second stage of state formation. -This causes the semi-sovereign prince to treat his dependent tenants -as kindly as he ill-treats the free peasants of his territory; in -consequence, they will fight the more willingly for him and contribute -taxes, while the more readily will the oppressed freemen succumb to -the pressure, especially as their share of political power in the -state, coincident with the decline of the central power, has become -only a meaningless phrase. In some cases, as in Germany toward the -end of the tenth century, this was done with full consciousness of -its effects[126]--some prince exercises a particularly “mild” rule, -in order to draw the subjects of a neighboring potentate into his -lands, and thus to increase his own strength in war and taxation, -and to weaken his opponent’s. The plebs come to possess, both legally -and actually, constantly increasing rights, enlarged privileges of -the law of ownership, perhaps self-government in common affairs, -and their own administration of justice; thus they rise in the same -degree as the common freemen sink, until the two classes meet and they -are amalgamated into one body on approximately the same jural and -economic plane. Half serfs, half subjects of a state, they represent -a characteristic formation of the feudal state, which does not as -yet recognize any clear distinction between public and private law; -in its turn an immediate consequence of its own historical genesis, -_the dominion in the form of a state for the sake of economic private -rights_. - - -(d) THE ETHNIC AMALGAMATION - -The juristic and social amalgamation of the degraded freemen and -the uplifted plebs henceforth inevitably tends toward ethnic -interpenetration. While at first the subject peoples were not allowed -either to intermarry or to have social intercourse with the freemen, -now no such obstacles can be maintained; in any single village the -social class is no longer determined by descent from the ruling race, -but rather by wealth. And the case may frequently arise where the -pure-blooded descendant of the warrior herdsman must earn his living -as a field hand in the hire of the equally pure-blooded descendant of -the former serfs. The social group of the subjects is now composed of a -part of the former ethnic master group and a part of the former subject -group. - -We say from a part only, because the other part has by this time been -amalgamated with the other part of the old ethnic master group into a -unital social class. In other words, a part of the plebs has not only -attained the position to which the mass of the common freemen have -sunk, but has climbed far beyond it, in that it has been completely -received into the dominating group, which in the meantime, has not only -risen enormously, but has been as greatly diminished in numbers. - -And that, too, is a universal process found in all history; because -everywhere it follows with equally compelling force from the very -premises of feudal dominion. The _primus inter pares_, whether the -holder of the central power or some local potentate, taking the rank -of a prince, requires more supple tools for his dominion than are to -be found among his “peers.” The latter represent a class whom he must -put down if he wants to rise--and that is and must be the aim of every -one, since in this stage aiming for power is identical with the aim of -self-preservation. In this effort he is opposed by his obnoxious and -stiff-necked cousins and by his petty nobles--and for this reason, we -find at every court, from that of the sovereign king of a mighty feudal -empire down to the lord of what is hardly more than a big estate, -men of insignificant descent as confidential officials alongside -representatives of the master group, who in many cases under the mask -of officials of the prince, as a matter of fact, are “ephors,” sharers -of the power of the prince as the plenipotentiaries of their group. -Let us but recall the Induna at the court of the Bantu kings. There -is no wonder, then, that the prince rather places confidence in his -own men than in these annoying and pretentious advisers, in men whose -position is indissolubly bound up with his own, and who would be ruined -by his fall.[S] - -[S] One of the most notable instances may be found in the case of -Markward of Annweiler, Marquis of Ancona and Duke of Ravenna, seneschal -of Henry VI., who after the death of the Emperor Henry VI. disputed the -power of the Regent Constance acting for her son, Frederick II. (See -Boehmer-Ficker, _Regesta Imperii_, V, vol. 1, No. 511. v. ad. annum -1197.)--_Translator._ - -Here, too, historical references are nearly superfluous. Every one -is familiar with the fact that at the courts of the Western European -feudal kingdoms, besides the relatives of the king and some noble -vassals, there were also elements from the lower groups, occupying high -positions, clerics and great warriors of the plebeian class. Among the -immediate following of Charlemagne all the races and peoples of his -empire were represented. Also in the tales of Theodoric the Goth in -the Dietrich Saga of the _Niebelungen Lied_, this rise of brave sons -of the subject races finds its reflection. In addition to these, there -follow some less well-known instances. - -In Egypt, as far back as the Old Empire, there is found alongside the -royal officials of the feudal nobility, who are the descendants of the -Shepherd conquerors, administering their districts as representatives -of the crown, with plenary powers as deputies, “_a mass of court -officials_ trusted with determined functions of government.” It -“originated with the _servants_ employed at the courts of the princes, -_such as prisoners of war, refugees etc._”[127] The fable of Joseph -shows a state of affairs known at that time to be a usual occurrence, -of the rise of a slave to the position of an all powerful minister -of state. At the present day such a career is within the realm of -possibility at any oriental court, such as Persia, Turkey, or Morocco, -etc. In the case of old Marshal Derflinger, in the time of Friedrich -Wilhelm I., the Great Elector, at a much later date, we have an -example from the transition of the developed feudal state to a more -modern form of the state, which might be multiplied by the examples of -innumerable other brave swordsmen. - -Let us add a few instances from the peoples “disregarded by history.” -Ratzel tells of the realm of Bornu: “The freemen have not lost the -consciousness of their free descent, in contrast with the slaves of -the sheik; but the rulers place more confidence in their slaves than -in their own kinsmen and free associates of their tribe. They can -count on the devotion of the former. Not only positions at court, but -the defense of the country was from ancient times preferably confided -to slaves. The brothers of the prince, as well as the more ambitious -or more efficient sons, are objects of suspicion; and while the most -important places at court are in the hands of slaves, the princes are -put at posts far from the seat of government. Their salaries are paid -from the incomes of the offices and the taxes from the provinces.”[128] - -Among the Fulbe “society is divided into princes, chieftains, commons -and slaves. The slaves of the king play a great rôle as soldiers and -officials, and may hope for the highest offices in the state.”[129] - -This nobility of the court’s creation may, in certain cases, be -admitted to the great imperial offices, so that according to the method -stated above, it may achieve the sovereignty over a territory. In the -developed feudal state, it represents the high nobility; and usually -manages to preserve its rank, even when some more powerful neighbor -has mediatized it by incorporating the state. The Frankish higher -nobility certainly contains such elements from the original lower -group;[130] and since from its blood the entire upper nobility of the -European civilized states has been descended at least in direct line by -marriage, we find an ethnic amalgamation, both in the present day group -of subjects and in the highest order of the ruling class. And the same -applies to Egypt: “With the sinking of the royal authority in the time -of the decay, the higher officials abuse their power for personal ends, -to make their offices hereditary in their families, and thereby to call -into existence an official nobility not differentiated from the rest -of the population.”[131] - -And finally, the same process, from the same causes, takes hold of -the present middle class, the lower stratum of the master class, -the officials and officers of the great feudatories. At first there -still exists a social difference between, on the one hand, the free -vassals, the subfeudatories of the great landlord, kinsmen, younger -sons of other noble families, impoverished associates from the same -district, in isolated cases freeborn sons of peasants, free refugees -and professional ruffians of free descent; and on the other, if the -term may be allowed, the subalterns of the guards of plebeian descent. -But lack of freedom advances, while freedom sinks in social value; and -here too the ruler places more reliance on his creatures than on his -peers. Here also, sooner or later, the process of amalgamation becomes -complete. In Germany, as late as 1085, the non-free nobility of the -court ranks between “_servi et litones_” while a century afterward -it is placed with the “_liberi et nobiles_.” In the course of the -thirteenth century, it has been completely absorbed, along with the -free vassals, into the nobility by chivalry. The two orders in the -meantime tend to become equal economically; both have subinfeudations, -fiefs on the obligation of service in warfare, and the service feuds of -the bondsmen; while all the fiefs of the “ministerials” or sergeants -have in the meantime become as heritable as are those of the free -vassals, as much so as are the patrimonies of the few surviving smaller -territorial lords belonging to the original nobility, who may still -have escaped the grasp of the great territorial principalities. - -In ways quite analogous to this the development went on in all other -feudal states of Western Europe; while its exact counterpart is found -in the extremest Orient on the edge of the Eurasian continent, in -Japan. The daimio are the higher nobility; the samurai, the chivalry, -the nobility of the sword. - - -(e) THE DEVELOPED FEUDAL STATE - -With this the feudal state has reached its pinnacle. It forms, -politically and socially, a hierarchy of numerous strata; of which, in -all cases, the lower is bound to render service to the next above it, -and the superior is bound to render protection to the one below. The -pyramid rests on the laboring population, of whom the major part are as -yet peasants; the surplus of their labor, the ground rental, the entire -“surplus value” of the economic means is used to support the upper -strata of society. This ground rent from the majority of estates is -turned over to the small holders of fiefs, except where these estates -are still in the immediate possession of the prince or of the crown and -have not as yet been granted as fiefs. The holders of them are bound in -return to provide the stipulated military service, and also, in certain -cases, to render labor of an economic value. The larger vassal is in -turn bound to serve the great tenants of the crown; who in their turn -are, at least at strict law, under similar obligation toward the bearer -of the central power; while emperor, king, sultan, shah, or Pharaoh -in their turn, are regarded as the vassals of the tribal god. Thus -there starts from the fields, whose peasantry support and nourish all, -and mounts up to the “king of heaven” an artificially graded order of -ranks, which constricts so absolutely all the life of the state, that -according to custom and law neither a bit of land nor a man can be -understood unless within its fold. Since all rights originally created -for the common freemen have either been resumed by the state, or else -have been distorted by the victorious princes of territories, it comes -about that a person not in some feudal relation to some superior must -in fact be “without the law,” be without claim for protection or -justice, i. e., be outside the scope of that power which alone affords -justice. Therefore the rule, _nulle terre sans seigneur_, appearing to -us at first blush as an ebullition of feudal arrogance, is as a matter -of fact the codification of an existing new state of law, or at the -very least the clearing away of some archaic remnants, no longer to be -tolerated, of the completely discarded _primitive_ feudal state. - -Those philosophers of history who pretend to explain every historic -development from the quality of “races,” give as the center of their -strategic position the alleged fact, that only the Germans, thanks -to their superior “political capacity,” have managed to raise the -artistic edifice of the developed feudal state. Some of the vigor of -this argument has departed, since the conviction began to dawn on them -that in Japan, the Mongol race had accomplished this identical result. -No one can tell what the negro races might have done, had not the -irruption of stronger civilizations barred their way, and yet Uganda -does not differ very greatly from the empires of the Carolingians or of -Boleslaw the Red, except that men did not have in Uganda any “values of -tradition” of mediæval culture: and these values were not any merit of -the Germanic races, but a gift wherewith fortune endowed them. - -Shifting the discussion from the negro to the “Semites,” we find the -charge made that this race has absolutely no capacity for the formation -of states. And yet we find, thousands of years ago, this same feudal -system developed, by Semites, if the founders of the Egyptian kingdom -were Semites. One would think the following description of Thurnwald -were taken from the period of the Hohenstaufen emperors: “Whoever -entered the following of some powerful one, was thereafter protected -by him as though he had been the head of the family. This relation ... -betokens a fiduciary relation similar to vassalage. This relation of -protection in return for allegiance tends to become the basis of the -organization of all Egyptian society. It is the basis of the relations -of the feudal lord to his sergeants and peasants, as it is that of the -Pharaoh to his officials. The cohesion of the individuals in groups -subject to common protecting lords, is founded on this view, even up to -the apex of the pyramid, to the king himself regarded as ‘the vicar of -his ancestors,’ as the vassal of the gods on earth.... Whosoever stands -without this social grasp, a ‘man without a master,’ is without the -pale of protection and therefore without the law.”[133] - -The hypothesis of the endowment of any particular race has not been -used by us, and we have no need of it. As Herbert Spencer says, it is -the stupidest of all imaginable attempts to construct a philosophy of -history. - -The first characteristic of the developed feudal state is the manifold -gradation of ranks built up into the one pyramid of mutual dependence. -Its second distinctive mark is the amalgamation of the ethnic groups, -originally separated. - -The consciousness formerly existent of difference of _races_ has -disappeared completely. There remains only the _difference of classes_. - -Henceforth we shall deal only with social classes, and no longer -with ethnic groups. The social contrast is the only ruling factor -in the life of the state. Consistently with this the ethnic group -consciousness changes to a class consciousness, the theories of the -group, to the theories of the class. Yet they do not thereby change in -the least their essence. The new dominating classes are just as full -of their divine right as was the former master group, and it soon is -seen that the new nobility of the sword manages to forget, quickly and -thoroughly, its descent from the vanquished group; while the former -freemen now declassed, or the former petty nobles sunk in the social -scale, henceforth swear just as firmly by “natural law” as did formerly -only the subjected tribes. - -The developed feudal state is, in its essentials, exactly the same -thing as it was when yet in the second stage of state formation. -Its form is that of dominion, its reason for being, the political -exploitation of the economic means, limited by public law, which -compels the master class to give the correlative protection, and which -guarantees to the lower class the right of being protected, to the -extent that they are kept working and paying taxes, that they may -fulfil their duty to their masters. In its essentials government has -not changed, it has only been disposed in more grades; and the same -applies to the exploitation, or as the economic theory puts it, “the -distribution” of wealth. - -Just as formerly, so now, the internal policy of these states swings in -that orbit prescribed by the parallelogram of the centrifugal thrust -of the former group contests, now class wars, counteracted by the -centripetal pull of the common interests. Just as formerly, so now, its -foreign policy is determined by the striving of its master class for -new lands and serfs, a thrust for extension caused at the same time by -the still existing need of self-preservation. Although differentiated -much more minutely, and integrated much more powerfully, the developed -feudal state is in the end nothing more than the primitive state -arrived at its maturity. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE - - -If we understand the outcome of the feudal state, in the sense given -above, as further organic development either forward or backward -conditioned by the power of inner forces, but not as a physical -termination, brought about or conditioned by outside forces, then we -may say that the outcome of the feudal state is determined essentially -by the independent development of social institutions called into being -by the economic means. - -Such influences may come also from without, from foreign states -which, thanks to a more advanced economic development, possess a -more tensely centralized power, a better military organization, and -a greater forward thrust. We have touched on some of these phases. -The independent development of the Mediterranean feudal states was -abruptly stopped by their collision with those maritime states, -which were on a much higher plane of economic growth and wealth, -and more centralized, such as Carthage, and more especially Rome. -The destruction of the Persian Empire by Alexander the Great may -be instanced in this connection, since Macedonia had at that time -appropriated the economic advances of the Hellenic maritime states. -The best example within modern times is the foreign influence in the -case of Japan, whose development was shortened in an almost incredible -manner by the military and peaceful impulses of Western European -civilization. In the space of barely one generation it covered the road -from a fully matured feudal state to the completely developed modern -constitutional state. - -It seems to me that we have only to deal with an abbreviation of -the process of development. As far as we can see--though henceforth -historical evidence becomes meager, and there are scarcely any examples -from ethnography--the rule may be stated that forces from within, -even without strong foreign influences, lead the matured feudal state, -with strict logical consistency, on the same path to the identical -conclusion. - -The creators of the economic means controlling this advance are the -cities and their system of money economy, which gradually supersedes -the system of natural economy, and thereby dislocates the axis about -which the whole life of the state swings; in place of landed property, -mobile capital gradually becomes preponderant. - - -(a) THE EMANCIPATION OF THE PEASANTRY - -All this follows as a natural consequence of the basic premise of the -feudal state. The more the great private landlords become a landed -nobility, the more in the same measure must the feudal system of -natural economy break to pieces. The more great landed property rights -become vested in and nurtured by the princes of territorial states, -the more is the feudal system based on payments in kind bound to -disintegrate; one may say that the two keep step in this development. - -So long as the ownership of great estates is comparatively limited, the -primitive principle of the bee-keeper, allowing his peasants barely -enough for subsistence, can be carried out. When, however, these -expand into territorial dimensions, and include, as is regularly the -case, accretions of land which are the results of successful warfare, -or by the relinquishment and subinfeudation through heritage or -political marriages of smaller land owners, scattered widely about the -country and far from the master’s original domains, then the policy -of the bee-keeper can no longer be carried out. Unless, therefore, -the territorial magnate means to keep in his pay an immense mass of -overseers, which would be both expensive and politically unwise, he -would have to impose on his peasants some fixed tribute, partly rental -and partly tax. The economic need of an administrative reform unites, -therefore, with the political necessity, to elevate the “plebs,” in -the way which has already been discussed. - -The more the territorial magnate ceases to be a private landlord, -the more exclusively he tends to become a subject of public law, -viz., prince of a territory, the more the solidarity mentioned above, -between prince and people grows. We saw that some few magnates even -as far back as the period of transition from great landed estates to -principalities, found it to their greatest interest to carry on a -“mild” government. This accomplished the result, not only of educating -their plebs to a more virile consciousness toward the state, but also -had the effect of making it easy for the few remaining common freemen -to give up their political rights in return for protection; while it -was still more important, in that it deprived their neighbors and -rivals of their precious human material. When the territorial prince -has finally reached complete _de facto_ independence, his self interest -must prompt him steadfastly to persevere in the path thus begun. Should -he, however, again invest his bailiffs or officers with lands and -peasants, he will still have the most pressing political interest to -see to it that his subjects are not delivered over to them without -restraint. In order to retain his control, the prince will limit the -right of the “knights” to incomes from lands to definite payments in -kind and limited forced labor, reserving to himself that required in -the public interests, such as forced labor on highways or on bridges. -We shall soon come to see that the circumstance that in all developed -feudal states the peasants have at least two masters claiming service, -is decisive for their later rise. - -For all these reasons, the services to be required of peasants in a -developed feudal state must in some fashion be limited. Henceforth, -all surplus belongs to him free from the control of the landlord. -With this change, the character of landed property has been utterly -revolutionized. Heretofore the landlord, as of right, was entitled to -the entire revenue saving only what was absolutely necessary to permit -his peasants to subsist and continue their brood; while hereafter, the -total product of his work, as of right, belongs to the peasant, saving -only a fixed charge for his landlord as ground rent. The possession -of vast landed estates has developed into (_manorial_) _rights. This -completes the second important step taken by humanity toward its goal._ -The first step was taken when man made the transition from the stage -of bear to that of the bee-keeper, and thereby discovered slavery; -this step abolishes slavery. Laboring humanity, heretofore only _an -object_ of the law, now for the first time becomes an entity capable -of enjoying rights. The _labor motor_, without rights, belonging to -its master, and without effective guarantees of life and limb, has now -become the taxpaying subject of some prince. Henceforth the economic -means, now for the first time assured of its success, develops its -forces quite differently. The peasant works with incomparably more -industry and care, obtains more than he needs, and thereby calls -into being the “city” in the economic sense of the term, viz., the -industrial city. The surplus produced by the peasantry calls into -being a demand for objects not produced in the peasant economy; while -at the same time, the more intensive agriculture brings about a -reduction of those industrial by-products heretofore worked out by the -peasant house industry. - -Since agriculture and cattle-raising absorb in ever increasing degrees -the energies of the rural family, it becomes possible and necessary to -divide labor between original production and manufacture; the village -tends to become primarily the place of the former, the industrial city -comes into being as the seat of the latter. - - -(b) THE GENESIS OF THE INDUSTRIAL STATE - -Let there be no misunderstanding: we do not maintain that the city -comes thus into being, but only the _industrial city_. There has been -in existence the real historical city, to be found in every developed -feudal state. Such cities came into being either because of a purely -political means, as a stronghold,[134] or by the coöperation of -the political with economic means, _as a market place_, or because -of some religious need, as the environs of some temple.[T] Wherever -such a city in the historical sense exists in the neighborhood, the -newly arising industrial city tends to grow up about it; otherwise it -develops spontaneously from the existing and matured division of labor. -As a rule, it will in its turn grow into a stronghold and have its own -places of worship. - -[T] “Every place of worship gathers about it dwellings of the priests, -schools, and rest-houses for pilgrims.”--Ratzel, l. c. II., p. 575. - -Naturally, every place toward which great pilgrimages proceed becomes -an extended trade center. We may see the remembrances thereof in the -fact that the great wholesale markets, held at stated times in Northern -Europe, are called _Messen_ from the religious ceremony. - -These are but accidental historical admixtures. In its strict economic -sense “city” means the place of the economic means, or the exchange -and interchange for equivalent values between rural production and -manufacture. This corresponds to the common use of language, by which a -stronghold however great, an agglomeration of temples, cloisters and -places of pilgrimage however extensive, were they conceivable without -any place for exchange, would be designated after their external -characteristics as “like a city” or “resembling a city.” - -Although there may have been few changes in the exterior of the -historical city, there has taken place an internal revolution on -a magnificent scale. _The industrial city is directly opposed to -the state._ As the state is the developed political means, _so the -industrial city is the developed economic means_. The great contest -filling universal history, nay its very meaning, henceforth takes place -between city and state. - -The city as an economic, political body undermines the feudal system -with political and economic arms. With the first the city _forces_, -with the second it _lures_, their power away from the feudal master -class. - -This process takes place in the field of politics by the interference -of the city, now a center of its own powers, in the political mechanism -of the developed feudal state, between the central power and the local -territorial magnates and their subjects. The cities are the strongholds -and the dwelling places of warlike men, as well as depots of material -for carrying on war (arms, etc.); and later they become central -supply reservoirs for money used in the contests between the central -government and the growing territorial princes, or between these in -their internecine wars. Thus they are important strategic points or -valuable allies; and may by far-sighted policy acquire important rights. - -As a rule, the cities take the part of the crown in fights against -the feudal nobles, from social reasons, because the landed nobles -refuse to recognize the social equality, demanded as of right by -their more wealthy citizens; from political reasons, because the -central government, thanks to the solidarity between prince and -people, is more apt to be influenced by common interests than is -the territorial magnate, who serves only his private interests; and -finally from economic reasons, because city life can prosper only in -peace and safety. The practises of chivalry, such as club law, and -private warfare, and the knights’ practise of looting caravans are -irreconcilable with the economic means; and therefore, the cities are -faithful allies of the guardians of peace and justice, first to the -emperor, later on, to the sovereign territorial prince; and when the -armed citizenship breaks and pillages some robber baron’s fortress, -the tiny drop reflects the identical process happening in the ocean of -history. - -In order successfully to carry this political rôle the city must -attract as many citizens as possible, an endeavor also forced on it -by purely economic considerations, since both divisions of labor and -wealth increase with increased citizenship. Therefore cities favor -immigration with all their powers; and once more show in this the polar -contrast of their essential difference from the feudal landlords. The -new citizens thus attracted into the cities are withdrawn from the -feudal estates, which are thereby weakened in power of taxation and -military defense in proportion as the cities are strengthened. The -city becomes a mighty competitor at the auction, wherein the serf is -knocked down to the highest bidder, to the one, that is to say, who -offers the most rights. The city offers the peasant _complete liberty_, -and in some cases house and courtyard. The principle, “city air frees -the peasant” is successfully fought out; and the central government, -pleased to strengthen the cities and to weaken the turbulent nobles, -usually confirms by charter the newly acquired rights. - -_The third great move in the progress of universal history is to be -seen in the discovery of the honor of free labor_; or better in its -rediscovery, it having been lost sight of since those far-off times in -which the free huntsman and the subjugated primitive tiller enjoyed -the results of their labor. As yet the peasant bears the mark of the -pariah and his rights are little respected. But in the wall-girt, -well-defended city, the citizen holds his head high. He is a freeman in -every sense of the word, free even at law, since we find in the grants -of rights to many early enfranchised cities (_Ville-franche_) the -provision that a serf residing therein “a year and a day” undisturbed -by his master’s claim is to be deemed free. - -Within the city walls there are still various ranks and grades of -political status. At first the old settlers, the men of rank equal -with the nobles of the surrounding country, the ancient freemen of the -burgh, refuse to the newcomers, usually poor artisans or hucksters, the -right of sharing in the government. But, as we saw in the case of the -maritime cities, such gradations of rank can not be maintained within -a business community. The majority, intelligent, skeptical, closely -organized and compact, forces the concession of equal rights. The only -difference is that the contest is longer in a developed feudal state, -because now the fight concerns not only the parties at interest. The -great territorial magnates of the neighborhood and the princes hinder -the full development of the forces by their interference. In the -maritime states of the ancient world, there was no _tertius gaudens_ -who could derive any profit from the contests within the city, since -outside the cities there existed no system of powerful feudal lords. - -These then, are the political arms of the cities in their contest with -the feudal state: alliances with the crown, direct attack, and the -enticing away of the serfs of the feudal lords into the enfranchising -air of the city. Its economic weapons are no less effective, the change -from payments in kind to the system of _money as a means of exchange_ -is inseparably connected with civic methods, is the means whereby the -method of payment in kind is utterly destroyed, and with it the feudal -state. - - -(c) THE INFLUENCES OF MONEY ECONOMY - -The sociological process set into motion by the system of money economy -is so well known and its mechanics are so generally recognized, that a -few suggestions will suffice. - -Here, as in the case of the maritime states, the consequence of the -invading money system is that the _central government becomes almost -omnipotent, while the local powers are reduced to complete impotence_. - -Dominion is not an end in itself, but merely the means of the rulers -to their essential object, the enjoyment without labor of articles -of consumption as many and as valuable as possible. During the -prevalence of the system of natural economy there is no other way of -obtaining them save by dominion; the wardens of the marches and the -territorial princes obtain their wealth by their political power. The -more peasants who are owned, the greater is the military power and -the larger the scope of the territory subjected, and thus the greater -are the revenues. As soon, however, as the products of agriculture -are exchangeable for enticing wares, it becomes more rational for -every one primarily a private man, i. e., for every feudal lord not a -territorial prince--and this now includes the knights--to decrease as -far as possible the number of peasants, and to leave only such small -numbers as can with the utmost labor turn out the greatest product from -the land, and to leave these as little as possible. The net product -of the real estate, thus tremendously increased, is now taken to the -markets and sold for goods, and is no longer used to keep a fencible -body of guards. Having dissolved this following, the knight becomes -simply the manager of a knight’s fee.[U] With this event, as with one -blow, the central power, that of king or territorial prince, is without -a rival for the dominion, and has become politically omnipotent. The -unruly vassals, who formerly made the weak kings tremble, after a short -attempt at joint rule during the time of the government of the feudal -estates, have changed into the supple courtiers, begging favors at the -hands of some absolute monarch, like Louis XIV. And he furthermore -has become their last resort, since the military power, now solely -exercised by him as the paymaster of the forces, alone can protect them -from the ever-immanent revolt of their tenants, ground to the bone. -While in the time of natural economy the crown was in nearly every -instance allied with peasants and cities against nobility, we now have -the union of the absolute kings, born from the feudal state, with -their nobility, against the representatives of the economic means. - -[U] See reference as to the meaning of _Rittergutsbesitz_, ante, page -84.--_Translator._ - -Since the days of Adam Smith it has been customary to state this -fundamental revolution in some such form, as though the foolish nobles -had sold their birthright for a mess of pottage, when they traded their -dominion for foolish articles of luxury. No view can be more erroneous. -Individuals often err in the safe-guarding of their interests: _a class -for any prolonged period never is in error_. - -The fact of the matter is, that the system of money payments -strengthened the central power so mightily and immediately, that even -without the interposition of the agrarian upheaval, any resistance -of the landed nobility would have been senseless. As is shown in the -history of antiquity, the army of a central government, financially -strong, is always superior to feudal levies. Money permits the armament -of peasant sons, and the drilling of them into professional soldiers, -whose solid organization is always superior to the loose confederation -of an armed mass of knights. Besides, at this stage, the central -government could also count on the aid of the well-armed squares of the -urban guilds. - -Gunpowder did the rest in Western Europe. Firearms, however, are a -product that can be turned out only in the industrial establishments -of a wealthy city. Because of these technical military reasons, even -that feudal landlord who might not care for the newly established -luxuries and who might only be desirous of maintaining or increasing -his independent position, must subject his territories to the same -agrarian revolution; since, in order to be strong, he now before all -else must have _money_, which in the new order of things, has become -the _nervus rerum_, either to buy arms or to engage mercenaries. A -second capitalistic wholesale undertaking, therefore, has come into -being through the system of payments in money; besides the wholesale -management of landed estates, war is carried on as a great business -enterprise--the condottieri appear on the stage. The market is full of -material for armies of mercenaries, the discharged guards of the feudal -lords and the young peasants whose lands have been taken up by the -lords. - -There are instances where some petty noble may mount to the throne of -some territorial principality, as happened many a time in Italy, and as -was accomplished by Albrecht Wallenstein, even as late as the period -of the Thirty Years’ War. But that is a matter of individual fate, not -affecting the final result. The local powers disappear from the contest -of political forces as independent centers of authority and retain -the remnant of their former influence only so long as they serve the -princes as a source of supplies; that is, the state composed of its -feudal estates. - -The infinite increase in the power of the crown is then enhanced by a -second creation of the system of payment in money, by _officialdom_. -We have told in detail of the vicious circle which forced the feudal -state into a cul-de-sac between agglomeration and dissolution, as long -as its bailiffs had to be paid with “lands and peasants” and thereby -were nursed into potential rivals of their creator. With the advent of -payments in money, the vicious circle is broken. Henceforth the central -government carries on its functions through paid employees, permanently -dependent on their paymaster.[135] Henceforth there is possible a -permanently established, tensely centralized government, and empires -come into being, such as had not existed since the developed maritime -states of antiquity, which also were founded on the payments in money. - -This revolution of the political mechanism was everywhere put into -motion by the development of the money economy--with but one exception, -as far as I can see, viz., Egypt. - -Here, according to the statement of experts, no definite information is -to be had, and it seems that the system of money exchanges appears as a -matured institution only in Greek times. Until that time, the tribute -of the peasants was paid in kind;[136] and yet we find, shortly after -the expulsion of the Shepherd Kings, during the New Empire (_circa_ -sixteenth century B. C.), that the absolutism of the kings was fully -developed: “The military power is upheld by foreign mercenaries, the -administration is carried on by a _centralized body of officials_ -dependent on the royal favor, _while the feudal aristocracy has -disappeared_.”[137] - -It may seem that this exception proves the rule. Egypt is a country -of exceptional geographic conformation. Jammed into a narrow compass, -between mountains and the desert, a natural highway, the River Nile, -traverses its entire length, and permits the transportation of bulky -freight with much greater facility than the finest road. And this -highway made it easy for the Pharaoh to assemble the taxes of all his -districts in his own storehouses, the so-called “houses”[138] and from -them to supply his garrisons and civil employees with the products -themselves _in natura_. For that reason Egypt, after it has once -become unified into an empire, stays centralized, until foreign powers -extinguish its life as a “state.” “This circumstance is the source of -the enormous and plenary power exercised by the Pharaoh where payments -are still made in kind; the exclusive and immediate control of the -objects of daily consumption are in his hand. The ruler distributes -to his employees only such quantities of the entire mass of goods as -appears to him good and proper; and since the articles of luxury are -nearly all exclusively in his hands, he enjoys on this account also an -extraordinary plenitude of power.”[139] - -With this one exception, where a mighty force executes the task, the -power of circulating money seems in all cases to have dissolved the -feudal state. - -The cost of the revolution fell on peasants and cities. When peace is -made, the crown and the petty nobles mutually sacrifice the peasantry, -dividing them, so to say, into two ideal halves; the crown grants to -the nobility the major part of the peasants’ common lands, and the -greatest part of their working powers that are not yet expropriated; -the nobility concedes to the crown the right of recruiting and of -taxing both peasantry and cities. The peasant, who had grown wealthy in -freedom, sinks back into poverty and therefore into social inferiority. -The former feudal powers now unite as allies to subjugate the cities, -except where, as in Upper Italy, these become feudal central powers -themselves. (And even in that case they for the most part all fall -into the power of captains of mercenaries, condottieri.) The power of -attack of the adversaries has become stronger, the power of the cities -has diminished. For with the decay of the peasantry, their purchase -power diminishes and with it the prosperity of the cities, based -thereon. The small cities in the country stagnate and become poorer, -and being now incapable of defense, fall a prey to the absolutist rule -of the territorial princes; the larger cities, where the demand for -the luxuries of the nobles has brought into being a strong trading -element, split up into social groups and thus fritter away their -political strength. The immigration now pouring into their walls is -composed of discharged and broken mercenaries, dispossessed peasants, -pauperized mechanics from the smaller towns; it is in other words a -_proletarian_ immigration. For the first time there appears, in the -terminology of Karl Marx, the “free laborer,” in masses, competing -with his own class in the labor markets of the cities. And again, the -“law of agglomeration” enters to form effective class and property -distinctions, and thus to tear apart the civic population. Wild fights -take place in the cities between the classes; through which the -territorial prince, in nearly every instance, again succeeds in gaining -control. The only cities that can permanently escape the deadly embrace -of the prince’s power are the few genuine “maritime states,” or “city -states.” - -As in the case of the maritime states, the pivot of the state’s life -has again shifted over to another place. Instead of circling about -wealth vested in landed estates, it now turns about capitalized wealth, -because in the meantime property in real estate has itself become -“capital.” _Why is it that the development does not, as in the case of -the maritime states, open out into the capitalistic expropriation of -slave labor?_ - -There are two controlling reasons, one internal, the other external. -The external reason is to be found in this, that slave hunting on a -profitable scale is scarcely possible at this time in any part of the -world, since nearly all countries within reach are also organized -as strong states. Wherever it is possible, as for instance, in the -American colonies of the West European powers, it develops at once. - -The external reason may be found in the circumstance that the -peasant of the interior countries, in contrast to the conditions -prevailing in the maritime states, is subject, not to one master, but -to at least two[V] persons entitled to his service, his prince and -his landlord. Both resist any attempt to diminish their peasants’ -capacity for service, since this is essential to their interests. -Especially strong princes did much for their peasants, e. g., those of -Brandenburg-Prussia. For this reason, the peasants, although exploited -miserably, yet retained their personal liberty and their standing as -subjects endowed with personal rights in all states where the feudal -system had been fully developed when the system of payments in money -replaced that of payments in kind. - -[V] In mediæval Germany the peasants pay tribute in many cases not only -to the landlord and to the territorial prince, but also to the provost -and to the bailiff. - -The evidence that this explanation is correct may be found in the -relations of those states which were gripped by the system of exchange -in money, before the feudal system had become worked out. - -This applies especially to those districts of Germany formerly occupied -by Slavs, but particularly to _Poland_. In these districts, the feudal -system had not yet been worked out as thoroughly as in the regions -where the demand for grain products in the great western industrial -centers had changed the nobles, the subjects of public law, into the -owners of a _Rittergut_,[W] the subjects of private economic interests. -In these districts, the peasants were subject to the duty of rendering -service only to _one_ master, who was both their liege lord and -landlord; and because of that, there came into being the republics of -nobles mentioned above, which, as far as the pressure of their more -progressed neighbors would permit, tended to approach the capitalistic -system of exploiting of slave labor.[140] - -[W] See foot-note on page 84. - -The following is so well known that it can be stated briefly. The -system of exchange by means of money matures into capitalism, and -brings into being new classes in juxtaposition to the landowners; the -capitalist demands equal rights with the formerly privileged orders, -and finally obtains them by revolutionizing the lower plebs. In this -attack on the sacredly established order of things, the capitalists -unite with the lower classes, naturally under the banner of “natural -law.” But as soon as the victory has been achieved, the class based on -movable wealth, the so-called middle class, turns its arms on the lower -classes, makes peace with its former opponents, and invokes in its -reactionary fight on the proletarians, its late allies, the theory of -legitimacy, or makes use of an evil mixture of arguments based partly -on legitimacy and partly on pseudo-liberalism. - -In this manner the state has gradually matured from the primitive -robber state, through the stages of the developed feudal state, through -absolutism, to the modern constitutional state. - - -(d) THE MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL STATE - -Let us give the mechanics and kinetics of the modern state a moment’s -time. - -In principle, it is the same entity as the primitive robber state or -the developed feudal state. There has been added, however, one new -element--_officialdom_, which at least will have this object, that -in the contest of the various classes, it will represent the common -interests of the state as a whole. In how far this purpose is subserved -we shall investigate in another place. Let us at this time study the -state in respect to those characteristics which it has brought over -from its youthful stages. - -Its _form_ still continues to be domination, its content still remains -the exploitation of the economic means. The latter continues to be -limited by public law, which on the one hand protects the traditional -“distribution” of the total products of the nation; while on the -other it attempts to maintain at their full efficiency the taxpayers -and those bound to render service. The internal policy of the state -continues to revolve in the path prescribed for it by the parallelogram -of the centrifugal force of class contests and the centripetal impulse -of the common interests in the state; and its foreign policy continues -to be determined by the interests of the master class, now comprising -besides the landed also the moneyed interests. - -In principle, there are now, as before, only two classes to be -distinguished: one a ruling class, which acquires more of the total -product of the labor of the people--the economic means--than it has -contributed, and a subject class, which obtains less of the resultant -wealth than it has contributed. Each of these classes, in turn, -depending on the degree of economic development, is divided into more -or fewer sub-classes or strata, which grade of according to the -fortune or misfortune of their economic standards. - -Among highly developed states there is found introduced between the two -principal classes a transitional class, which also may be subdivided -into various strata. Its members are bound to render service to the -upper class, while they are entitled to receive service from the -classes below them. To illustrate with an example, we find in the -ruling class in modern Germany at least three strata. First come -the great landed magnates, who at the same time are the principal -shareholders in the larger industrial undertakings and mining -companies: next stand the captains of industry and the “bankocrats,” -who also in many cases have become owners of great estates. In -consequence of this they quickly amalgamate with the first layer. -Such, for example, are the Princes Fugger, who were formerly bankers -of Augsburg, and the Counts of Donnersmarck, owners of extensive mines -in Silesia. And finally there are the petty country nobles, whom we -shall hereafter term _junker_ or “squires.” The subject class, at all -events, consists of petty peasants, agricultural laborers, factory and -mine hands, with small artisans and subordinate officials. The “middle -classes” are the classes of the transition: composed of the owners of -large and medium-sized farms, the small manufacturers, and the best -paid mechanics, besides those rich “bourgeois,” such as Jews, who have -not become rich enough to overcome certain traditional difficulties -which oppose their arrival at the stage of intermarriage with the -upper class. All these render unrequited service to the upper class, -and receive unrequited service from the lower classes. This determines -the result which occurs either to the stratum as a whole or to the -individuals in it; that is to say, either a complete acceptance into -the upper class, or an absolute sinking into the lower class. Of the -(German) transitional classes, the large farmers and the manufacturers -of average wealth have risen, while the majority of artisans have -descended to the lower classes. We have thus arrived at the kinetics of -classes. - -The interests of every class set in motion an actual body of associated -forces, which impel it with a definite momentum toward the attainment -of a definite goal. All classes whatever have the same goal; viz., the -total result of the productive labor of all the denizens of a given -state. Every class attempts to obtain as large a share as possible -of the national production; and since all strive for identically the -same object, the _class contest_ results. This contest of classes -is the content of all history of states, except in so far as the -interest of the state as a whole produces common actions. These -we may at this point disregard, since they have been given undue -prominence by the traditional method of historical study, and lead -to one-sided views. Historically this class contest is shown to be a -_party fight_. A party is originally and in its essence nothing save -an organized representation of a class. Wherever a class, by reason -of social differentiation, has split up into numerous sub-classes -with varied separate interests, the party claiming to represent it -disintegrates at the earliest opportunity into a mass of tiny parties, -and these will either be allies or mortal enemies according to the -degree of divergence of the class interests. Where on the other hand -a former class contrast has disappeared by social differentiation, -the two former parties amalgamate in a short time into a new party. -As an example of the first case we may recall the splitting off -of the artisans and Anti-Semite parties from the party of German -Liberalism, as a consequence of the fact that the first represented -descending groups, while the latter represented ascending ones. A -characteristic example of the second category may be found in the -political amalgamation which bound together into the farmers’ union -the petty landed squires of the East Elbian country with West Elbian -rich peasants on large plantations. Since the petty squire sinks and -the farmer rises, they meet half-way. All party policy can have but one -meaning, viz., to procure for the class represented as great a share -as is possible of the total national production. In other words, the -preferred classes intend to maintain their share, at the very least, -at the ancient scale, and if possible, to increase it toward such a -maximum as shall permit the exploited classes just a bare existence, to -keep them fit to do their work, just as in the bee-keeper stages. Their -object is to confiscate the entire surplus product of the economic -means, a surplus which increases enormously as population becomes -more dense and division of labor more specialized. On the other hand, -the group of exploited classes would like to reduce their tribute to -the zero-point, and to consume the entire product themselves; and the -transitional classes work as much as possible toward the reduction of -their tribute to the upper classes, while at the same time they strive -to increase their unrequited income from the classes underneath. - -This is the aim and the content of all party contests. The ruling class -conducts this fight with all those means which its acquired dominion -has handed down to it. In consequence of this, the ruling class sees -to it that legislation is framed in its interest and to serve its -purpose--class legislation. These laws are then applied in such wise -that the blunted back of the sword of justice is turned upward, while -its sharpened edge is turned downward--class justice. The governing -class in every state uses the administration of the state in the -interest of those belonging to it under a twofold aspect. In the first -place it reserves to its adherents all prominent places and all offices -of influence and of profit, in the army, in the superior branches of -government service, and in places on the bench; and secondly, by these -very agencies, it directs the entire policy of the state, causes its -class-politics to bring about commercial wars, colonial policies, -protective tariffs, legislation in some degree improving the conditions -of the laboring classes, electoral reform policies, etc. As long as the -nobles ruled the state, they exploited it as they would have managed an -estate; when the bourgeoisie obtain the mastery, the state is exploited -as though it were a factory. And the class-religion covers all defects, -as long as they can be endured, with its “don’t touch the foundation -of society.” - -There still exist in the public law a number of political privileges -and economic strategic positions, which favor the master class: such -as, in Prussia, a system of voting which gives the plutocrats an -undue advantage over the less favored classes, a limitation of the -constitutional rights of free assembly, regulations for servants, etc. -For that reason, the _constitutional fight_, carried on over thousands -of years and dominating the life of the state, is still uncompleted. -The fight for improved conditions of life, another phase of the party -and class struggle, usually takes place in the halls of legislative -bodies, but often it is carried on by means of demonstrations in the -streets, by general strikes, or by open outbreaks. - -But the plebs have finally and definitely learned that these remnants -of feudal strategic centers, do not, except in belated instances, -constitute the final stronghold of their opponents. It is not in -political, but rather in economic conditions that the cause must -be sought, which has brought it about that even in the modern -constitutional state, the “distribution of wealth” has not been changed -in principle. Just as in feudal times, the great mass of men live in -bitter poverty; even under the best conditions, they have the meager -necessities of life, earned by hard, crushing, stupefying forced -labor, no longer exacted by right of political exploitation, but just -as effectively forced from the laborers by their economic needs. And -just as before in the un-reformed days, the narrow minority, a new -master class, a conglomerate of holders of ancient privileges and of -newly rich, gathers in the tribute, now grown to immensity; and not -only does not render any service therefor, but flaunts its wealth in -the face of labor by riotous living. The class contest henceforth -is devoted more and more to these economic causes, based on vicious -systems of distribution; and it takes shape in a hand-to-hand fight -between exploiters and proletariat, carried on by strikes, coöperative -societies and trades unions. The economic organization first forces -recognition, and then equal rights; then it leads and finally controls -the political destinies of the labor party. In the end therefore the -trade union controls the party. Thus far the development of the state -has progressed in Great Britain and in the United States. - -Were it not that there has been added to the modern state an entirely -new element, its _officialdom_, the constitutional state, though more -finely differentiated and more powerfully integrated, would, so far as -form and content go, be little different from its prototypes. - -As a matter of principle, the state officials, paid from the funds -of the state, are removed from the economic fights of conflicting -interests; and therefore it is rightly considered unbecoming for any -one in the service of the government to be taking part in any money -making undertaking, and in no well ordered bureaucracy is it tolerated. -Were it possible ever thoroughly to realize the principle, and did not -every official, even the best of them, bring with him that concept -of the state held by the class from which he originated, one would -find in officialdom, as a matter of fact, that moderating and order -making force, removed from the conflict of class interests, whereby the -state might be led toward its new goal. It would become the fulcrum of -Archimedes whence the world of the state might be moved. - -But the principle, we are sorry to say, can not be carried out -completely; and furthermore, the officials do not cease being real men, -do not become mere abstractions without class consciousness. This may -be quite apart from the fact that, in Europe at least, a participation -in a definite form of undertakings--viz., handling large landed -estates--is regarded as a favorable means of getting on in the service -of the state, and will continue to be so as long as the landed nobility -preponderates. In consequence of this, many officials on the Continent, -and one may even say the most influential officials, are subject to -pressure by enormous economic interests; and are unconsciously, and -often against their will, brought into the class contests. - -There are factors, such as extra allowances made by either fathers or -fathers-in-law, or hereditary estates, and affinity to the persons in -control of the landed and moneyed interest or allied with them, whereby -the solidarity of interest among the ruling class is if anything -increased from the fact that these officials, practically without -exception, are taken from a class with whom since their boyhood days -they have been on terms of intimacy. Were there, however, no such unity -of economic interests the demeanor of the officials would be influenced -entirely by the pure interests of the state. - -For this reason, as a rule, the most efficient, most objective and -most impartial set of officials is found in poor states. Prussia, for -example, was formerly indebted to its poverty for that incomparable -body of officials who handled it through all its troubles. These -employees of the state were actually, in consonance with the rule laid -down above, dissociated completely from all interests in money making, -directly or indirectly. - -This ideal body of officials is a rare occurrence in the more wealthy -states. The plutocratic development draws the individual more and -more into its vortex, robbing him of his objectivity and of his -impartiality. And yet the officials continue to fulfil the duty which -the modern state requires of them, to preserve the interests of the -state as opposed to the interests of any class. And this interest is -preserved by them, even though against their will, or at least without -clear consciousness of the fact, in such manner that the economic -means, which called the bureaucracy into being, is in the end advanced -on its tedious path of victory, as against the political means. No -one doubts that the officials carry on class politics, prescribed for -them by the constellation of forces operating in the state; and to -that extent, they certainly do represent the master class from which -they sprang. But they do ameliorate the bitterness of the struggle, by -opposing the extremists in either camp, and by advocating amendments -to existing law, when the social development has become ripened for -their enactment, without waiting until the contest over these has -become acute. Where an efficient race of princes governs, whose -momentary representative adopts the policy of King Frederick, which was -to regard himself only as “the first servant of the state,” what has -been said above applies to him in an increased degree, all the more -so as his interests, as the permanent beneficiary of the continued -existence of the state, would before all else prompt him to strengthen -the centripetal forces and to weaken the centrifugal powers. In the -course of the preceding we have in many instances noted the natural -solidarity between prince and people, as an historic force of great -value. In the completed constitutional state, in which the monarch in -but an infinitesimally small degree is a subject of private economic -interests, he tends to be almost completely “an official.” This -community of interests is emphasized here much more strongly than in -either the feudal state or the despotically governed state, where the -dominion, at least for one-half its extent, is based on the private -economic interests of the prince. - -Even in a constitutional state, the outer form of government is not -the decisive factor; the fight of the classes is carried on and leads -to the same result in a republic as in a monarchy. In spite of this, -it must be admitted that there is more probability, that, other things -being equal, the curve of development of the state in a monarchy will -be more sweeping, with less secondary incurvity, because the prince is -less affected by momentary losses of popularity, is not so sensitive -to momentary gusts of disapproval, as is a president elected for a -short term of years, and he can therefore shape his policies for longer -periods of time. - -We must not fail to mention a special form of officialdom, the -scientific staffs of the universities, whose influence on the upward -development of the state must not be underestimated. Not only is this -a creation of the economic means, as were the officials themselves, -but it at the same time represents an historical force, _the need of -causality_, which we found heretofore only as an ally of the conquering -state. We saw that this need created superstition while the state was -on a primitive stage; its bastard, the taboo, we found in all cases -to be an effective means of control by the master class. From these -same needs then, _science_ was developed, attacking and destroying -superstition, and thereby assisting in preparation of the path of -evolution. That is the incalculable historical service of science and -especially of the universities. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -THE TENDENCY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE - - -We have endeavored to discover the development of the state from its -most remote past up to present times, following its course like an -explorer, from its source down the streams to its effluence in the -plains. Broad and powerfully its waves roll by, until it disappears -into the mist of the horizon, into unexplored and, for the present-day -observer, undiscoverable regions. - -Just as broadly and powerfully the stream of history--and until the -present day all history has been the history of states--rolls past -our view, and the course thereof is covered by the blanketing fogs of -the future. Shall we dare to set up hypotheses concerning the future -course, until “with unrestrained joy he sinks into the arms of his -waiting, expectant father”? (Goethe’s _Prometheus_.) Is it possible to -establish a scientifically founded prognosis in regard to the future -development of the state? - -I believe in this possibility. The tendency[141] of state development -unmistakably leads to one point: seen in its essentials the state -will cease to be the “developed political means” and will become “a -freemen’s citizenship.” In other words, its outer shell will remain in -essentials the form which was developed in the constitutional state, -under which the administration will be carried on by an officialdom. -But the content of the states heretofore known will have changed its -vital element by the disappearance of the economic exploitation of one -class by another. And since the state will, by this, come to be without -either classes or class interests, the bureaucracy of the future will -truly have attained that ideal of the impartial guardian of the common -interests, which nowadays it laboriously attempts to reach. The “state” -of the future will be “society” guided by self-government. - -Libraries full of books have been written on the delimitation of the -concepts “state” and “society.” The problem, however, from our point of -view has an easy solution. The “state” is the fully developed political -means, society the fully developed economic means. Heretofore state and -society were indissolubly intertwined: in the “freemen’s citizenship,” -there will be no “state” but only “society.” - -This prognosis of the future development of the state contains by -inclusion all of those famous formulæ, whereby, the great philosophical -historians have endeavored to determine the “resulting value” of -universal history. It contains the “progress from warlike activity to -peaceful labor” of St. Simon, as well as Hegel’s “development from -slavery to freedom”; the “evolution of humanity” of Herder, as well as -“the penetration of reason through nature” of Schleiermacher. - -Our times have lost the glad optimism of the classical and of the -humanist writers; sociologic pessimism rules the spirit of these latter -days. The prognosis here stated can not as yet claim to have many -adherents. Not only do the persons obtaining the profits of dominion, -thanks to their obsession by their class spirit, regard it as an -incredible concept; those belonging to the subjugated class as well -regard it with the utmost skepticism. It is true that the proletarian -theory, as a matter of principle, predicts identically the same result. -But the adherents of that theory do not believe it possible by the path -of evolution but only through revolution. It is then thought of as a -picture of a “society” varying in all respects from that evolved by the -progress of history; in other words, as an organization of the economic -means, as a system of economics without competition and market, as -collectivism. The anarchistic theory makes form and content of the -“state” as inseparable as heads and tails of the coin; no “government” -without exploitation! It would therefore smash both the form and the -content of the state, and thus bring on a condition of anarchy, even -if thereby all the economic advantages of a division of labor should -have to be sacrificed. Even so great a thinker as the late Ludwig -Gumplowicz, who first laid the foundation on which the present theory -of the state has been developed, is a sociological pessimist; and from -the same reasons as are the anarchists, whom he combated so violently. -He too regards as eternally inseparable form and content, government -and class-exploitation; since he however, and I think correctly, -does not consider it possible that many people may live together -without some coercive force vested in some government, he declares the -class-state to be an “immanent” and not only an historical category. - -Only a small fraction of social liberals, or of liberal socialists, -believe in the evolution of a society without class dominion and -class exploitation which shall guarantee to the individual, besides -political, also economic liberty of movement, within of course the -limitations of the economic means. That was the _credo_ of the old -social liberalism, of pre-Manchester days, enunciated by Quesnay and -especially by Adam Smith, and again taken up in modern times by Henry -George and Theodore Hertzka. - -This prognosis may be substantiated in two ways, one through history -and philosophy, the other by political economy, as a tendency of -the development of the state, and as a tendency of the evolution of -economics, both clearly tending toward _one_ point. - -The tendency of the _development of the state_ was shown in the -preceding as a steady and victorious combat of economic means against -political means. We saw that, in the beginning, the right to the -economic means, the right to equality and to peace, was restricted -to the tiny circle of the horde bound together by ties of blood, an -endowment from pre-human conditions of society;[142] while without the -limits of this isle of peace raged the typhoon of the political means. -But we saw expanding more and more the circles from which the laws of -peace crowded out their adversary, and everywhere we saw their advance -connected with the advance of the economic means, of the barter of -groups for equivalents, amongst one another. The first exchange may -have been the exchange of fire, then the barter of women, and finally -the exchange of goods, the domain of peace constantly extending its -borders. It protected the market places, then the streets leading to -them, and finally it protected the merchants traveling on these streets. - -In the course of this discussion it was shown how the “state” absorbed -and developed these organizations making for peace, and how in -consequence these drive back ever further right based on mere might. -Merchants’ law becomes city law; the industrial city, the developed -economic means, undermines the feudal state, the developed political -means; and finally the civic population, in open fight, annihilates the -political remnants of the feudal state, and re-conquers for the entire -population of the state freedom and right to equality, _urban_ law -becomes public law and finally international law. - -Furthermore, on no horizon can be seen any force now capable of -resisting effectively this heretofore efficient tendency. On the -contrary, the interference of the past, which temporarily blocked the -process, is obviously becoming weaker and weaker. The international -relations of commerce and trade acquired among the nations a -preponderating importance over the diminishing warlike and political -relations; and in the intra-national sphere, by reason of the same -process of economic development, movable capital, the creation of the -right to peace, preponderates in ever increasing measure over landed -property rights, the creation of the right of war. At the same time -superstition more and more loses its influence. And therefore one is -justified in concluding that the tendency so marked will work out to -its logical end, excluding the political means and all its works, until -the complete victory of the economic means is attained. - -But it may be objected that in the modern constitutional state all the -more prominent remnants of the antique law of war have already been -chiseled out. - -On the contrary, there survives a considerable remnant of these -institutions, masked it is true in economic garb, and apparently no -longer a legal privilege but only economic right, _the ownership of -large estates--the first creation and the last stronghold of the -political means_. Its mask has preserved it from undergoing the fate of -all other feudal creations. And yet this last remnant of the right of -war is doubtless the last unique obstacle in the pathway of humanity; -and doubtless the _development of economics_ is on its way to destroy -it. - -To substantiate these remarks I must refer the reader to other books, -wherein I have given the detailed evidence of the above and can not in -the space allotted here repeat it at large.[143] I can only re-state -the principal points made in these books. - -There is no difference in principle between the distribution of the -total products of the economic means among the separate classes of a -constitutional state, the so-called “capitalistic distribution,” from -that prevailing in the feudal state. - -All the more important economic schools coincide in finding the cause -in this, that the supply of “free” laborers (i. e., according to Karl -Marx politically free and economically without capital) perpetually -exceeds the demand, and that hence there exists “the social relation of -capital.” There “are constantly two laborers running after one master -for work, and lowering, for one another, the wages”; and therefore the -“surplus value” remains with the capitalist class, while the laborer -never gets a chance to form capital for himself and to become an -employer. - -Whence comes this surplus supply of free laborers? - -The explanation of the “bourgeois” theory, according to which this -surplus supply is caused by the overproduction of children by -proletarian parents, is based on a logical fallacy, and is contradicted -by all known facts?[144] - -The explanation of the proletarian theory according to which the -capitalistic process of production itself produces the “free laborers,” -by setting up again and again new labor-saving machines, is also -based on a logical fallacy and is likewise contradicted by all known -facts.[145] - -The evidence of all facts shows rather, and the conclusion may be -deduced without fear of contradiction, _that the oversupply of “free -laborers” is descended from the right of holding landed property in -large estates_; and that emigration into towns and oversea from these -landed properties are the causes of the capitalistic distribution. - -Doubtless there is a growing tendency in economic development whereby -the ruin of vast landed estates will be accomplished. The system -is their bleeding to death, without hope of salvation, caused by -the freedom of the former serfs--the necessary consequence of the -development of the cities. As soon as the peasants had obtained the -right of moving about without their landlords’ passport (German -_Freizuegigkeit_), there developed the chance of escape from the -countries which formerly oppressed them. The system of emigration -created “the competition from oversea,” together with the fall, -on the Continent, of prices for farm products, and made necessary -perpetually rising wages. By these two factors ground rent is reduced -from two sides, and must gradually sink to the zero point, since here -too no counterforce is to be recognized whereby the process might be -diverted.[146] Thus the system of vast territorial estates falls apart. -When, however, it has disappeared, there can be no oversupply of “free -laborers.” On the contrary “two masters will run after one laborer and -must raise the price on themselves.” There will be no “surplus value” -for the capitalist class, because the laborer himself can form capital -and himself become an employer. By this the last remaining vestige -of the political means will have been destroyed, and economic means -alone will exercise sway. The _content_ of such a society is the “pure -economics”[147] of the equivalent exchange of commodities against -commodities, or of labor force against commodities, and the political -_form_ of this society will be the “freemen’s citizenship.” - -This theoretical deduction is moreover confirmed by the _experience -of history_. Wherever there existed a society in which vast estates -did not exist to draw an increasing rental, there “pure economics” -existed, and society approximated the form of the state to that of the -“freemen’s citizenship.” - -Such a community was found in the Germany of the four centuries[148] -from about A. D. 1000, when the primitive system of vast estates was -developed into the socially harmless dominion over vast territories, -until about the year 1400, when the newly arisen great properties, -created by the political means, the robber wars in the countries -formerly Slavic, shut the settlers from the westward out of lands -eastward of the Elbe.[149] Such a community was the Mormon state of -Utah, which has not been greatly changed in this respect, where a -wise land legislation permitted only small and moderate sized farm -holdings.[150] Such a community was to be found in the city and county -of Vineland, Iowa, U. S. A.,[151] as long as every settler could obtain -land, without increment of rent. Such a commonwealth is, beyond all -others, New Zealand, whose government favors with all its power the -possession of small and middle-sized holdings of land, while at the -same time it narrows and dissolves, by all means at its command the -great landed properties, which by the way, owing to lack of surplus -laborers, are almost incapable of producing rentals.[152] - -In all these cases there is an astoundingly equalized well-being, not -perhaps mechanically equal; but there is no wealth. _Because well-being -is the control over articles of consumption, while wealth is the -dominion over mankind._ In no such cases are the means of production, -“capital,” “producing any surplus values”; there are no “free laborers” -and no capitalism, and the political form of these communities -approximates very closely to a “freemen’s citizenship,” and tends to -approximate it more and more, so far as the pressure of the surrounding -states, organized from and based on the laws of war, permit its -development. The “state” decomposes, or else in new countries such as -Utah or New Zealand, it returns to a rudimentary stage of development; -while the free self-determination of free men, scarcely acquainted -with a class fight constantly tends to pierce through ever more -thoroughly. Thus in the German Empire there was a parallel development -between the political rise of the unions of the imperial free cities, -the decline of the feudal states, the emancipation of the crafts, then -still comprising the entire “plebs” of the cities, and the decay of the -patrician control of the city government. This beneficent development -was stopped by the erection of new primitive feudal states on the -easterly border of the former German Empire, and thus the economic -blossom of German culture was ruined. Whoever believes in a conscious -purpose in history may say that the human race was again required to -pass through another school of suffering before it could be redeemed. -The Middle Ages had discovered the system of free labor, but had not -developed it to its full capacity or efficiency. It was reserved for -the new slavery of capitalism to discover and develop the incomparably -more efficient system of coöperating labor, the division of labor in -the workshops, in order to crown man as the ruler of natural forces, as -king of the planet. Slavery of antiquity and of modern capitalism was -once necessary; now it has become superfluous. According to the story, -every free citizen of Athens disposed of five human slaves; but we -have supplied to our fellow citizens of modern society a vast mass of -enslaved power, slaves of steel, that do not suffer in creating values. -Since then we have ripened toward a civilization as much higher than -the civilization of the time of Pericles, as the population, power and -riches of the modern communities exceeds those of the tiny state of -Athens. - -Athens was doomed to dissolution--by reason of slavery as an economic -institution, by reason of the political means. Having once entered that -pathway, there was no outlet except death to the population. Our path -will lead to life. - -The same conclusion is found by either the historical-philosophical -view, which took into account the tendency of the _development of the -state_, or the study of political economy, which regards the tendency -of _economic development_; viz., that the economic means wins along -the whole line, while the political means disappears from the life of -society, in that one of its creations, which is most ancient and most -tenacious of life; capitalism decays with large landed estates and -ground rentals. - -This has been the path of suffering and of salvation of humanity, its -Golgotha and its resurrection into an eternal kingdom--from war to -peace, from the hostile splitting up of the hordes to the peaceful -unity of mankind, from brutality to humanity, from the exploiting State -of robbery to the Freemen’s Citizenship. - - - - -NOTES - - -[1] “History is unable to demonstrate any one people, wherein the first -traces of division of labor and of agriculture do not coincide with -such agricultural exploitations, wherein the efforts of labor were -not apportioned to one and the fruits of labor were not appropriated -by some one else, wherein, in other words, the division of labor -had not developed itself as the subjection of one set under the -others.”--Robertus-Jagetzow, _Illumination on the social question_, -second edition. Berlin, 1890, p. 124. (Cf. _Immigration and Labor. The -economic aspects of European Immigration to the United States_, by Dr. -Isaac A. Hourwich. Putnam’s, N. Y., 1912.--_Translator._) - -[2] Achelis, _Die Ekstase in ihrer kulturellen Bedeutung_, vol. 1 of -_Kulturprobleme der Gegenwart_, Berlin, 1902. - -[3] Grosse, _Formen der Familie_. Freiburg and Leipzig, 1896, p. 39. - -[4] Ratzel, _Völkerkunde_. Second Edition. Leipzig and Wien, 1894-5, -II, p. 372. - -[5] _Die Soziale Verfassung des Inkareichs._ Stuttgart, 1896, p. 51. - -[6] _Siedlung und Agrarwesen der Westgermanen, etc._ Berlin, 1895, I, -p. 273. - -[7] l. c. I, p. 138. - -[8] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 702. - -[9] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 555. - -[10] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 555. - -[11] For example with the Ovambo according to Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 214, -who in part “seem to be found in slavelike status,” and according to -Laveleye among the ancient Irish (_Fuidhirs_). - -[12] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 648. - -[13] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 99. - -[14] Lippert, _Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit_. Stuttgart, 1886, II, -p. 302. - -[15] Lippert, l. c. II, p. 522. - -[16] _Römische Geschichte._ Sixth Edition. Berlin, 1874, I, p. 17. - -[17] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 518. - -[18] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 425. - -[19] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 545. - -[20] Ratzel, l. c. II, pp. 390-1. - -[21] Ratzel, l. c. II, pp. 390-1. - -[22] Lippert, l. c. I, p. 471. - -[23] Kulischer, “The history of the development of interest from -capital.” _Jahrbücher für National Œkonomie._ III series, vol. 18, p. -318, Jena, 1899: (Says Strabo: “Plunderers and from the scant supplies -of their native land covetous of the lands of others.”) - -[24] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 123. - -[25] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 591. - -[26] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 370. - -[27] Ratzel, l. c. II, pp. 390-1. - -[28] Ratzel, l. c. II, pp. 388-9. - -[29] Ratzel, l. c. II, pp. 103-04. - -[30] Thurnwald, _Staat und Wirtschaft im altem Ægypten. Zeitschrift für -Soz. Wissenchaft_, vol. 4 1901, pp. 700-01. - -[31] Ratzel, l. c. II, pp. 404-05. (Gumplowicz, _Rassenkampf_, p. 264: -“Egypt, rich and self-sufficient, says Ranke, invited the avarice -of neighboring tribes, who served other gods. Under the name of the -Shepherd peoples, foreign dynasts and foreign tribes ruled Egypt for -centuries. - -“Truly, the summary of universal history could not be begun with more -characteristic words than those of Ranke. For in the words applied -to Egypt the quintessence of the whole history of mankind is summed -up.”--_Translator._) - -[32] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 165. - -[33] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 485. - -[34] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 480. - -[35] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 165. - -[36] Buhl, _Soziale Verhältnisse der Israeliten_, p. 13. - -[37] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 455. - -[38] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 628. - -[39] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 625. - -[40] Cieza de Leon, “Seg. parte de la crónica del Peru.” P. 75, cit. by -Cunow, _Inkareich_ (p. 62, note 1). - -[41] Cunow, l. c. p. 61. - -[42] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 346. - -[43] Ratzel, l. c. II, pp. 36-7. - -[44] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 221. (Cf. remarks by Hon. A. J. Sabath, -M. C., _Sociological Argument on Workman’s Compensation Bill_, p. 498, -Senate Document 338, Sixty-second Congress, Second Session, Volume -I. See also _Congressional Record_ for March 1, 1913, Sixty-second -Congress, Third Session, pp. 4503, 4529, _et seq._--_Translator._) - -[45] “Among the Wahuma women occupy a higher position than among the -negroes, and are watched carefully by their men. This makes mixed -marriages difficult. The mass of the Waganda even to-day would not -have remained a genuine negro tribe ‘of dark chocolate colored skin -and short wool hair’ were it not that the two peoples are strictly -opposed to one another as peasants and herdsmen, rulers and subjects, -as despised and honored, in spite of the relations entered into among -the upper classes. In this peculiar position, they represent a typical -phenomenon, which is found repeated at many other points.”--Ratzel, l. -c. II, p. 177. [46] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 178. - -[47] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 198. - -[48] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 476. - -[49] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 453. - -[50] Kopp, _Griechische Staatsaltertümer_, 2, _Aufl._ Berlin, 1893, p. -23. - -[51] Uhland, _Alte hoch und niederdeutsche Volkslieder_ I (1844), p. -339 cited by Sombart: _Der moderne Kapitalismus_, Leipzig, 1902, I, pp. -384-5. - -[52] Inama-Sternegg, _Deutsche Wirtsch.-Gesch._ I, Leipzig, 1879, p. 59. - -[53] Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, London, 1891, p. 368. - -[54] Cf. Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 81. - -[55] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 156. - -[56] Ratzel, l. c. I, pp. 259-60. - -[57] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 434. - -[58] I. Kulischer, l. c., p. 317, where other examples may be found. - -[59] Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p. 400, which contains a -number of ethnographical examples. [60] Westermarck, l. c., p. 546. - -[61] Cf. Ratzel, l. c. I, pp. 318, 540. - -[62] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 106. - -[63] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 335. - -[64] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 346. - -[65] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 347. - -[66] Buecher, _Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft_, Second Edition, -Tübingen, 1898, p. 301. - -[67] Cf., Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 271, speaking of the islanders of -the Pacific Ocean: “Intercourse from tribe to tribe is carried on -by inviolable heralds, preferably old women. These act also as -intermediary agents in trades.” See also page 317 for the same -practises among the Australians. - -[68] German Translation by L. Katscher. Leipzig, 1907. - -[69] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 81. - -[70] Ratzel, l. c. I, pp. 478-9. - -[71] A. Vierkandt, _Die wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse der Naturvölker. -Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft_, II, pp. 177-8. - -[72] Kulischer, l. c. pp. 320-1. - -[73] Lippert, l. c. I, p. 266, _et seq._ - -[74] Cf. Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_. - -[75] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 27. - -[76] Herodotus IV, 23, cited by Lippert, l. c. I, p. 459. - -[77] Lippert, l. c. II, p. 170. - -[78] Mommsen, l. c. I, p. 139. - -[79] Similar conditions may be observed among the islanders near India. -Here the Malays are vikings. “Colonization is an important factor, -as conquest and settlement oversea ... reminding one of the great -rôle played in ancient Hellas by the roving tribes.... Every strip of -coast line shows foreign elements, who enter uncalled for and in most -instances spreading damage among the natives. The right of conquest was -granted by the rulers of Tornate to noble dynasts, who later on became -semi-sovereign viceroys on the islands of Buru, Serang, etc.” [80] -Mommsen, l. c. I, p. 132. - -[81] Mommsen, l. c. I, p. 134. - -[82] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 160. - -[83] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 558. - -[84] Buhl, l. c., p. 48. - -[85] Buhl, l. c., pp. 78-79. - -[86] Mommsen, l. c. II, p. 406. - -[87] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 191; cf. also pp. 207-8. - -[88] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 363. - -[89] Mommsen, l. c., p. 46. - -[90] Both cited by Kulischer, l. c., p. 319, from: Buechsenschuetz, -_Besitz und Erwerb im grieschischen Altertum_; and Goldschmidt, -_History of the Law of Commerce_. - -[91] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 263. - -[92] F. Oppenheimer’s _Grossgrundeigentum und soziale Frage_. Book Two, -Chapter I. Berlin, 1898. - -[93] Nomadism is exceptionally characterized by the facility with -which, from patriarchal conditions, despotic functions are developed -with most far-reaching powers. Ratzel, l. c. Vol. II, pp. 388-9. - -[94] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 408. - -[95] Cunow, l. c. pp. 66-7. Similarly among the inhabitants of the -Malay Islands numerous examples are found in Radak (Ratzel, l. c. I, p. -267). - -[96] Buhl, l. c., p. 17. - -[97] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 66. - -[98] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 118. - -[99] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 167. - -[100] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 218. - -[101] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 125. - -[102] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 124. - -[103] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 118. - -[104] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 125. - -[105] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 346. - -[106] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 245. - -[107] Ratzel, l. c. I. pp. 267-8. - -[108] Mommsen, l. c. III, pp. 234-5. - -[109] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 167. - -[110] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 229. - -[111] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 128. - -[112] Weber’s _Weltgeschichte_, III, p. 163. - -[113] Thurnwald, l. c., pp. 702-3. - -[114] Thurnwald, l. c., p. 712; cf. Schneider, _Kultur und Denken der -alten ÆEgypter_, Leipzig, 1907, p. 38. - -[115] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 599. - -[116] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 362. - -[117] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 344. - -[118] Meitzen, l. c. II, p. 633. - -[119] Inama-Sternegg, l. c. I, pp. 140-1. - -[120] Mommsen, l. c. V, p. 84. - -[121] Cf. the detailed exposition of this in F. Oppenheimer’s -_Grossgrundeigentum und die soziale Frage_, Book II, Chap. 3. - -[122] Mommsen, l. c. III, pp. 234-5. - -[123] Thurnwald, l. c., p. 771. - -[124] Meitzen, l. c. I, pp. 362f. - -[125] Inama-Sternegg, l. c. I, pp. 373, 386. - -[126] Cf. F. Oppenheimer’s _Grossgrundeigentum_, p. 272. - -[127] Thurnwald, l. c., p. 706. - -[128] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 503. - -[129] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 518. - -[130] Meitzen, l. c. I, p. 579: “At the time of the compilation of the -Lex Salica, the ancient racial nobility had been reduced to common -freemen or else had been annihilated. The officials, on the other -hand, are rated at threefold wergeld, 600 solidi, and if one be ‘_puer -regis_’ 300 solidi.” - -[131] Thurnwald, l. c. p. 712. - -[132] Inama-Sternegg, l. c. II, p. 61. - -[133] Thurnwald, l. c., p. 705. - -[134] “The larger camps of the army of the Rhine obtained their -municipal annexes partly through army suttlers and camp followers, -and particularly through the veterans, who after the completion of -their services remained in their accustomed quarters. Thus there arose -distinct from the military quarters proper, a distinct town of cabins -(_Canabæ_). In all parts of the Empire, and especially in the various -Germanias, there arose in the course of time, from these camps of the -legionaries, and particularly from the headquarter stations, cities in -the modern sense.”--Mommsen, l. c. V, p. 153. - -[135] Eisenhardt, _Gesch. der National Oekonomie_, p. 9: “Aided by the -new and more liquid means of payment in cash, it became possible to -call into being a new and more independent establishment of soldiers -and of officials. As they were paid only periodically it became -impossible for them to make themselves independent (as the feudatories -had done) and then to turn on their paymaster.” [136] Thurnwald, l. -c., p. 773. - -[137] Thurnwald, l. c., p. 699. - -[138] Thurnwald, l. c., p. 709. - -[139] Thurnwald, l. c., p. 711. - -[140] Cf. with this F. Oppenheimer’s _Grossgrundeigentum etc._, Book -II, Chap. 3. - -[141] “Tendency, i. e., a law, whose absolute execution is checked by -countervailing circumstances, or is by them retarded, or weakened.” -Marx, _Kapital_, vol. III, p. 215. - -[142] Cf. the excellent work of Peter Kropotkin, _Mutual Aid in its -Development_. - -[143] Cf. F. Oppenheimer, _Die Siedlungsgenossenschaft etc._, Berlin, -1896, and his _Grossgrundeigentum und soziale Frage_, Berlin, 1898. - -[144] Cf. F. Oppenheimer, _Bevölkerungsgesetz des T. R. Malthus_. -_Darstellung and Kritik_, Berlin-Bern, 1901. - -[145] Cf. F. Oppenheimer, _Grundgesetz der Marxschen -Gesellschaftslehre, Darstellung und Kritik_, Berlin, 1903. - -[146] Cf. F. Oppenheimer, _Grundgesetz der Marxschen -Gesellschaftslehre_, Part IV., particularly, the twelfth chapter: -“Tendency of the Capitalistic Development.” - -[147] Cf. F. Oppenheimer, _Grossgrundeigentum und soziale Frage_, -Berlin, 1898. Book I, Chapter 2, Section 3, “Philosophy of the Social -Body,” pp. 57 _et seq._ - -[148] Cf. F. Oppenheimer, _Grossgrundeigentum_, Book II, Chap. 2, Sec. -3, p. 322. - -[149] Cf. F. Oppenheimer, _Grossgrundeigentum_, Book II, Chap. 3, Sec. -4, especially pp. 423 _et seq._ - -[150] Cf. F. Oppenheimer, “Die Utopie als Tatsache,” _Zeitschrift für -Sozial-Wissenschaft_, 1899, Vol. II, pp. 190 _et seq._ - -[151] Cf. F. Oppenheimer, _Siedlungsgenossenschaft_, pp. 477 _et seq._ - -[152] Cf. André Siegfried, _La démocratie en Nouvelle Zelande_, Paris, -1904. - - - - -Transcriber’s Notes - - -Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a -predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not -changed. - -The spelling of non-English words was not checked. - -Simple typographical errors were corrected. - -Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. - -Page 100: Closing quotation mark added after “valuable consignments.” - -Page 126 or 127: Missing footnote anchor “62”. - -Page 128 or 129: Missing footnote anchor “67”. - -Pages 134-138: Missing footnote anchor “75”. - -Pages 207-208: Missing footnote anchors “123” through “127”. - -Pages 220-225: Missing footnote anchor “132”. - -Page 254: Paragraph beginning “The external reason” probably should be -“The internal reason”. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The State, by Franz Oppenheimer - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE STATE *** - -***** This file should be named 51544-0.txt or 51544-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/1/5/4/51544/ - -Produced by Julie Barkley, Charlie Howard,, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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