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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d0eedc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #51544 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/51544) diff --git a/old/51544-0.txt b/old/51544-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index db33eeb..0000000 --- a/old/51544-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6408 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The State, by Franz Oppenheimer - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: The State - Its History and Development Viewed Sociologically - -Author: Franz Oppenheimer - -Translator: John Gitterman - -Release Date: March 24, 2016 [EBook #51544] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE STATE *** - - - - -Produced by Julie Barkley, Charlie Howard,, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - - - - - - - - - THE STATE - - _ITS HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT VIEWED - SOCIOLOGICALLY_ - - _By_ FRANZ OPPENHEIMER, M.D., PH.D. - Professor of Political Science in the University of Frankfort-on-Main - - _Authorized Translation_ - _By_ JOHN M. GITTERMAN, PH.D., LL.B. - (Of the New York County Bar) - - [Illustration] - - NEW YORK - VANGUARD PRESS - - - - - _Copyright_, 1914 - THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY - - _Copyright_, 1922 - B. W. HUEBSCH, INC. - - - VANGUARD PRINTINGS - - _First--August, 1926_ - _Second--February, 1928_ - - - PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - - - - -THE MAN (1864--): - - _Franz Oppenheimer_, one of a fairly large number of British, - French and German physicians who abandoned their medical pursuits - and rose to fame as political economists, was born in Berlin. - He studied and practiced medicine, became private Lecturer of - Economics at the Berlin University in 1909, and Professor of - Sociology at the Frankfort University in 1919. His libertarian - views made him, for many years, the target of academic - persecutions, until the growing fame of his masterpiece, _The - State_, effectively silenced his detractors. - - -THE BOOK (1908): - - The organic history of the State is a long and exciting - adventure, usually rendered dull in learned accounts. Not so - in Oppenheimer’s _The State_ which extracts that history, in - a highly stimulating manner, from the sharp necessities and - homicidal conflicts of all sorts and conditions of men, from the - Stone Age to the Age of Henry Ford. The easy flow of important - information derivable from this German volume has rendered it - highly acceptable to American readers. - - - - -OTHER BOOKS BY DOCTOR FRANZ OPPENHEIMER - - - Die Siedlungsgenossenschaft 1896 - - Grossgrundeigentum und Soziale Frage 1898 - - Das Grundgesetz der Marxschen Gesellschaftslehre 1903 - - Robertus’ Angriff auf Ricardos Renten-theorie - und der Lexis-Diehl’sche Rettungsversuch 1908 - - David Ricardos Grundrententheorie 1909 - - Theorie der Reinen und Politischen Ökonomie 1910 - - - - -AUTHOR’S PREFACE - -TO THE SECOND AMERICAN EDITION - - -This little book has made its way. In addition to the present -translation into English, there are authorized editions in French, -Hungarian and Serbian. I am also informed that there are translations -published in Japanese, Russian, Hebrew and Yiddish; but these, of -course, are pirated. The book has stood the test of criticism, and has -been judged both favorably and unfavorably. It has, unquestionably, -revived the discussion on the origin and essence of the State. - -Several prominent ethnologists, particularly Holsti, the present -Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Finnish Free State, have attacked -the basic principle formulated and demonstrated in this Work, but they -have failed, because their definition of the State assumed the very -matter that required to be proven. They have brought together a large -array of facts in proof of the existence of some forms of _Government_ -and _Leadership_, even where no classes obtained, and to the substance -of these forms they have given the name of “The State.” It is not -my intention to controvert these facts. It is self-evident, that in -any group of human beings, be it ever so small, there must exist an -authority which determines conflicts and, in extraordinary situations, -assumes the leadership. But this authority is not “The State,” in -the sense in which I use the word. The State may be defined as an -organization of _one class_ dominating over the other classes. Such -a class organization can come about in one way only, namely, through -conquest and the subjection of ethnic groups by the dominating group. -This can be demonstrated with almost mathematical certainty. Not one of -my critics has brought proofs to invalidate this thesis. Most modern -sociologists, among whom may be named Albion Small, Alfred Vierkandt -and Wilhelm Wundt, accept this thesis. Wilhelm Wundt, in particular, -asserts in unmistakable language, that “the political society (a -term identical with the State in the sense employed in this book) -first came about and could originate only in the period of migration -and conquest,” whereby the subjugation of one people by another was -effected. - -But even some of my opponents are favorably inclined to my arguments, -as in the case of the venerable Adolf Wagner, whose words I am proud -to quote. In his article on “The State” in the _Handwörterbuch der -Staatswissenschaften_, he writes: “The sociologic concept of the State, -to which I have referred, particularly in the broad scope and treatment -of it given by Oppenheimer, deserves careful consideration, especially -from political economists and political historians. The vista opened -out, from this point of view, of the economic development of peoples -and that of the State during historic times, should be attractive even -to the opponents of the concept itself.” - -The “sociologic concept of the State,” as Ludwig Gumplowicz termed it, -is assured of ultimate general acceptance. Its opponents are strenuous -and persevering, and I once called them “the sociologic root of all -evil;” but the concept, none the less, is the basic principle of -“bourgeoisie” sociology, and will be found of value in the study, not -only of economics and history, but in that of Law and Constitutional -History. I permit myself to make a few remarks on this point. - -The earliest evidence of the recognition of the idea underlying the -_law of previous accumulation_, may be traced back, at the latest, to -the period of the decay of classical civilization, at the time when -the capitalistic slave economy brought the city states to ruin as -though their peoples had suffered from a galloping consumption. As -in our modern capitalistic age, which resembles that period in many -respects, there occurred a breach in all those naturally developed -relations in which the individual has found protection. What Ferdinand -Toennies calls the “community bonds” were loosened. The individual -found himself unprotected, compelled to rely on his own efforts and -on his own reason in the seething sea of competition which followed. -The collective reason, the product of the wisdom of thousands of years -of experience, could no longer guide or safeguard him. It had become -scattered. Out of this need for an individual reason, there arose the -idea of _nationalism_. This idea had its justification at first, as a -line of development and a method in the newly born science of social -government; but when later it became what Rubenstein (in his work -_Romantic Socialism_) calls a “tendency,” it was not justified. The -community, to use Toennies’ term, changed into a “society.” “Contract” -seemed to be the only bond that held men together--the contract based -on the purely rationalistic relation of service for service, the _do -ut des_, the “Contrat Social” of Rousseau. A “society” would thus -appear to be a union of self-seeking individuals who hoped through -combination to obtain their personal satisfactions. Aristotle had -taught that the State had developed, by gradual growth, from the family -group. The Stoics and Epicureans held that individuals formed the -State--with this difference, that the former viewed the individual as -being socially inclined by nature, and the latter that he was naturally -anti-social. To the Stoics, therefore, the “State of Nature” was a -peaceful union; to the Epicureans it was a war of each against the -other, with Society as a compelling means for a decent modus vivendi. -With the one a Society was conditioned “physei” (by nature); with the -other it was “nomo” (by decree). - -In spite, however, of this fundamental difference between these -schools, both assumed the premise that, at the beginning, individuals -were _free_, _equal_ politically and economically, and that it was from -such an original social order there had developed, through gradual -differentiation, the fully developed State with its class hierarchy. -This is the _law of previous accumulation_. - -But we should err if we believed that this thesis was originally -intended as a historical account. Rationalism is essentially -unhistoric, even anti-historic. On the contrary, the thesis was -originally put forward as a “fiction,” a theory, a conscious -unhistorical assumption. In this form it acquired the name of _natural -law_. It was under this name that it came into modern thought, -tinctured stoically in Grotius and Puffendorf, and epicureanally in -Hobbes. It became the operative weapon of thought among the rising -third estate of the capitalists. - -The capitalists used the weapon, first against the feudal state with -its privileged class, and, later against the fourth estate, with its -class theory of Socialism. Against the feudal domination it argued -that a “Law of Nature” knows and permits no privileges. After its -victories in the English Revolution of 1648, and the great French -Revolution of 1789, it justified, by the same reasoning, its own _de -facto_ pre-eminence, its own social and economic class superiority, -against the claims of the working classes. According to Adam Smith, the -classes in a society are the results of “natural” development. From an -original state of equality, these arose from no other cause than the -exercise of the economic virtues of industry, frugality and providence. -Since these virtues are pre-eminently those of a bourgeoisie society, -the capitalist rule, thus sanctioned by natural law, is just and -unassailable. As a corollary to this theorem the claims of Socialism -cannot be admitted. - -Thus, what originally was put forward as a “fiction,” became first, a -hypothesis and finally the _axiom_ of all bourgeoisie sociology. Those -who support it accept the axiom as self-evident, as not requiring -proof. For them, class domination, on this theory, is the result of a -gradual differentiation from an original state of general equality and -freedom, with no implication in it of any extra-economic power. Robert -Malthus applied this alleged law to the future, in his attempt to -demonstrate any kind of Socialism to be purely Utopian. His celebrated -_Law of Population_ is nothing but the _law of original accumulation_ -projected into the future. He claims that if any attempt were made to -restore the state of economic equality, the workings of the law would -have the effect--because of the difference in economic efficiency--of -restoring modern class conditions. All orthodox sociology begins -with the struggle against this supposed law of class formations. Yet -every step of progress made in the various fields of the science of -sociology, has been made by tearing up, one by one, the innumerable and -far-spreading roots which have proceeded from this supposed axiom. A -sound sociology has to recall the fact that class formation in historic -times, did not take place through gradual differentiation in pacific -economic competition, but was the result of violent conquest and -subjugation. - -As both Capitalism and Socialism had their origins in England, -these new ideas were certain to find their first expression in that -country. So that we find Gerrard Winstanley, the leader of the “true -levellers” of Cromwell’s time, arraying the facts of history against -this anti-historical theoretical assumption. He showed that the -English ruling class (the Squirearchy) was composed essentially of the -victorious conquerors, the Normans, and that the subject class were the -conquered English Saxons. But his demonstration had little influence. -It was only when the great French Revolution brought the contrast out -sharply that the thought sunk in. No less a person than Count St. -Simon, acknowledged as the founder of the science of modern sociology, -and the no less scientific Socialism, discovered in the dominant class -of his country the Frankish and Burgundian conquerors, and in its -subject population, the descendants of the Romanized Celts. It was -the publication of this discovery that gave birth to Western European -sociology. The conclusions drawn from it were carried further by St. -Simon’s disciple, August Comte, in his _Philosophy of History_, and -by the Saint Simonists, Enfantin and Bazard. These thinkers had great -influence on the economic development of the next century; but their -chief contribution was the elaboration of the sociologic idea of the -State. - -Among the peoples of Western Europe, the new sociology found a readier -acceptance than it did among those of Eastern Europe. The reason for -this can easily be seen when it is remembered that in the East the -contrast between the “State” and “Society,” had not been so definitely -realized, as it had been in the West. Even in the West, this contrast -was only fully appreciated, as a social fact, in England, France, the -Netherlands and Italy, because in these countries only the class of -mobile wealth which had worked its way up as the third estate, had -succeeded in ousting the feudal “State.” In France, the league of the -capitalists with the Crown against the then armed and active nobility -had succeeded in subjecting the Frondeurs under the absolute power of -the King. From this time on, this new estate represented itself as -the Nation, and the term “National Economy” takes the place of the -older term “Political Economy.” The members of this third estate felt -themselves to be those subjects of the State whose rights and liberties -had been curtailed by the privileges of the two dominant estates of -the nobility and the clergy. Henceforth, the Third Estate proclaims -the rights of “Society” and against the “State,” opposes the eternal -Law of Nature--that of original equality and freedom--against the -theoretic-historical rights of the Estates. The concept of Society as a -contrast to the concept of the State, first appears in Locke, and from -his time on this contrast was more and more defined, especially in the -writings of the physiocrat school of economists. - -In this struggle between classes and ideas, neither Middle nor Eastern -Europe played any important part. In Germany there had once developed -a Capitalist class (in the period of the Fuggers of Augsburg) which -attained to almost American magnitude. But it was crushed by the -Religious Wars and the various French invasions of the sixteenth and -seventeenth centuries, which left Germany a devastated, depopulated -desert. At the end of the period there remained a few cities and small -states under the absolute domination of princes. Within the cities -the artisans were bound together in their craft-leagues, and the rest -consisted of those of educational pursuits and academic officials. In -a large degree all these were dependent on the State--the members of -the craft-guilds because they accepted a privileged condition, the -officials because they were servants of the State, and the professional -men, because they belonged to the upper estate of the society. For this -reason there was no economic or social movement of the third estate in -Germany; there was only a literary movement influenced by the flow of -ideas from the West. This explains why the contrast between the two -ideas of the State and of Society was not present in the minds of the -German people. On the contrary, the two terms were used as synonyms, -both connotating an essentially necessary conformity to nature. - -But there is still another cause for this difference in the mental -attitude between Western and Eastern Europe. In England and France, -from the time of Descartes, the problems and inquiries of science -were set by men trained in mathematics and the natural sciences. -Especially in the new study of the philosophy of history, the beginning -of our modern sociology, did these men act as guides. In Germany, on -the contrary, it was the theologians and especially the Protestant -theologians who were the leaders of thought. In their hands the State -came to be looked upon as an instrument of Divine fashioning, and, -indeed, of immanent divinity. This thought resulted in a worship of -the State, which reached its height in the well-known Hegelian system. -It thus happened that two rivers of thought flowed for a time side by -side--the Sociology of Western Europe, and the philosophy of History of -Germany--with occasional intercommunicating streams, such as Althusios -and Puffendorf into the French, English and Dutch teaching of natural -law, and that of Rousseau into Hegel. In 1840, however, a direct -junction was effected through Lorenz Stein, one of Hegel’s most gifted -pupils who, later, became the leading German teacher of administrative -law, and influenced generations of thinkers. He came to Paris, as a -young man, for the purpose of studying Socialism at the fountain head. -He became acquainted with the celebrated men of that heroic time--with -Enfintin and Bazard, with Louis Blanc, Reybaud, and Proudhon. - -Lorenz Stein absorbed the new thought with enthusiasm, and in his -fertile mind there was precipitated the creative synthesis between the -Western Europe scientific sociological thought and the metaphysical -German philosophy of history. The product was called by him the Science -of Society (_Gesellschaftswissenschaft_). It is from the writings of -Stein that almost all the important developments of German sociologic -thought received their first impulses. Karl Marx, especially (as Struve -has shown), as well as Schaeffle, Othmar Spann and Gumplowicz are -largely indebted to him. - -It is not my purpose to develop this historical theme. I am concerned -only in tracing the development of the sociologic idea of the State. -The first effect of this meeting of the two streams of thought was a -mischievous confusion of terminology. The writers in Western Europe had -long ago lost control of the unification of expressions in thinking. -As stated above, the Third Estate began by thinking itself to be -“Society,” as opposed to the State. But when the Fourth Estate grew to -class consciousness and became aware of its own theoretic existence, -it arrogated to itself the term “Society” (as may be seen from the -selection of the word Socialism), and it treated the Bourgeoisie as a -form of the “State,” of the class state. There were thus two widely -differing concepts of “Society.” Yet here was an underlying idea common -to both Bourgeoisie and Socialist, since they conceived the State as -a collection of privileges arising and maintained _in violation_ of -natural law, while Society was thought of as the prescribed form of -human union in _conformity_ with natural law. They differed in one -essential only, namely, that while the Third Estate declared its -capitalistic Society to be the result of the processes of natural law, -the Socialists regarded their aims as not yet attained, and proclaimed -that the ideal society of the future which would really be the product -of the processes of natural law, could only be realized by the -elimination of all “surplus value.” Though both were in conflict with -regard to fundamentals, both agreed in viewing the “State” as _civitas -diaboli_ and “Society” as _civitas dei_. - -Stein, however, reversed the objectives of the two concepts. As an -Hegelian, and pre-eminently a worshipper of the State, he conceived the -State as _civitas coelestis_. Society, which he understood to mean only -the dominant bourgeoisie Society, he viewed through the eyes of his -Socialist friends and teachers, and conceived it as _civitas terrena_. - -What in Plato’s sense is the “pure idea,” the “ordre naturel” of the -early physiocrats and termed by Frenchmen and Englishmen “Society,” -was to Stein, the “State.” What had been contaminated and made impure -by the admixture of coarse matter, they termed the “State,” while -the German called it “Society.” In reality, however, there is little -difference between the two. Stein realized with pain, that Hegel’s pure -concept of a State based on right and freedom, was bound to remain -an “idea” only. Eternally fettered, as he assumed it must be, by the -forces of property and the culture proceeding from them, it could never -be a fact. This is his conclusion regarding “Society,” so that its -effective development is obstructed by the beneficent association of -human beings, as Stein conceived that association. - -Thus was attained the very pinnacle of confused thinking. All German -sociologists, with the single exception of Carl Dietzel, soon realized -that the Hegelian concept of the State was impotent, existing only in -the “Idea.” In no point did it touch the reality of historical growth, -and in no sense could it be made to stand for what had always been -considered as the State. Long ago both Marx and Bakunin--respectively -the founders of scientific collectivism and practical anarchism--and -especially Ludwig Gumplowicz, abandoned the Hegelian terminology and -accepted that of Western Europe and this has been generally accepted -everywhere. - -In this little book I have followed the Western European terminology. -By the “State,” I do not mean the human aggregation which may perchance -_come about to be_, or, as it properly _should be_. I mean by it -that summation of privileges and dominating positions which are -brought into being by extra-economic power. And in contrast to this, -I mean by Society, the totality of concepts of all purely natural -relations and institutions between man and man, which will not be -fully realized until the last remnant of the creations of the barbaric -“ages of conquest and migration,” has been eliminated from community -life. Others may call any form of leadership and government or some -other ideal, the “State.” That is a matter of personal choice. It is -useless to quarrel about definitions. But it might be well if those -other thinkers were to understand that they have not controverted the -sociologic idea of the “State,” if a concept of the “State” grounded on -a different basis, does not correspond to that which they have evolved. -And they must guard themselves particularly against the danger of -applying any definition other than that used in this book to those -actual historical products which have hitherto been called “States,” -the essence, development, course and future of which must be explained -by any true teaching or philosophy of the State. - - FRANZ OPPENHEIMER. - - Frankfort-on-Main, April 1922. - - - - -CONTENTS - - - CHAPTER PAGE - - AUTHOR’S PREFACE iii - - I THEORIES OF THE STATE 1 - - The Sociological Idea of the State 15 - - - II THE GENESIS OF THE STATE 22 - - (a) Political and Economic Means 24 - - (b) Peoples Without a State: Huntsmen and Grubbers 27 - - (c) Peoples Preceding the State: Herdsmen and Vikings 33 - - (d) The Genesis of the State 51 - - - III THE PRIMITIVE FEUDAL STATE 82 - - (a) The Form of Dominion 82 - - (b) The Integration 89 - - (c) The Differentiation: Group Theories and Group - Psychology 92 - - (d) The Primitive Feudal State of Higher Grade 105 - - - IV THE MARITIME STATE 121 - - (a) Traffic in Prehistoric Times 122 - - (b) Trade and the Primitive State 135 - - (c) The Genesis of the Maritime State 140 - - (d) Essence and Issue of the Maritime States 155 - - - V THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEUDAL STATE 174 - - (a) The Genesis of Landed Property 174 - - (b) The Central Power in the Primitive Feudal State 182 - - (c) The Political and Social Disintegration of the - Primitive Feudal State 191 - - (d) The Ethnic Amalgamation 213 - - (e) The Developed Feudal State 221 - - - VI THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 229 - - (a) The Emancipation of the Peasantry 231 - - (b) The Genesis of the Industrial State 236 - - (c) The Influences of Money Economy 243 - - (d) The Modern Constitutional State 257 - - - VII THE TENDENCY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE 274 - - - NOTES 293 - - - - -THE STATE - - - - -CHAPTER I - -THEORIES OF THE STATE - - -This treatise regards the State from the sociological standpoint only, -not from the juristic--sociology, as I understand the word, being both -a philosophy of history and a theory of economics. Our object is to -trace the development of the State from its socio-psychological genesis -up to its modern constitutional form; after that, we shall endeavor to -present a well-founded prognosis concerning its future development. -Since we shall trace only the State’s inner, essential being, we need -not concern ourselves with the external forms of law under which its -international and intra-national life is assumed. This treatise, in -short, is a contribution to the philosophy of State development; but -only in so far as the law of development here traced from its generic -form affects also the social problems common to all forms of the modern -State. - -With this limitation of treatment in mind, we may at the outset dismiss -all received doctrines of public law. Even a cursory examination of -conventional theories of the State is sufficient to show that they -furnish no explanation of its genesis, essence and purpose. These -theories represent all possible shadings between all imaginable -extremes. Rousseau derives the State from a social contract, while -Carey ascribes its origin to a band of robbers. Plato and the followers -of Karl Marx endow the State with omnipotence, making it the absolute -lord over the citizen in all political and economic matters; while -Plato even goes so far as to wish the State to regulate sexual -relations. The Manchester school, on the other hand, going to the -opposite extreme of liberalism, would have the State exercise only -needful police functions, and would thus logically have as a result -a scientific anarchism which must utterly exterminate the State. -From these various and conflicting views, it is impossible either to -establish a fixed principle, or to formulate a satisfactory concept of -the real essence of the State. - -This irreconcilable conflict of theories is easily explained by the -fact that none of the conventional theories treats the State from the -sociological view-point. Nevertheless, the State is a phenomenon common -to all history, and its essential nature can only be made plain by a -broad and comprehensive study of universal history. Except in the field -of sociology, the king’s highway of science, no treatment of the State -has heretofore taken this path. All previous theories of the State -have been class theories. To anticipate somewhat the outcome of our -researches, every State has been and is a class State, and every theory -of the State has been and is a class theory. - -A class theory is, however, of necessity, not the result of -investigation and reason, but a by-product of desires and will. Its -arguments are used, not to establish truth, but as weapons in the -contest for material interests. The result, therefore, is not science, -but nescience. By understanding the State, we may indeed recognize the -essence of theories concerning the State. But the converse is not true. -An understanding of theories about the State will give us no clue to -its essence. - -The following may be stated as a ruling concept, especially prevalent -in university teaching, of the origin and essence of the State. It -represents a view which, in spite of manifold attacks, is still -affirmed. - -It is maintained that the State is an organization of human community -life, which originates by reason of a social instinct implanted in men -by nature (Stoic Doctrine); or else is brought about by an irresistible -impulse to end the “war of all against all,” and to coerce the savage, -who opposes organized effort, to a peaceable community life in place -of the anti-social struggle in which all budding shoots of advancement -are destroyed (Epicurean Doctrine). These two apparently irreconcilable -concepts were fused by the intermediation of mediæval philosophy. -This, founded on theologic reasoning and belief in the Bible, developed -the opinion that man, originally and by nature a social creature, is, -through original sin, the fratricide of Cain and the transgression at -the tower of Babel, divided into innumerable tribes, which fight to the -hilt, until they unite peaceably as a State. - -This view is utterly untenable. It confuses the logical concept of a -class with some subordinate species thereof. Granted that the State is -_one_ form of organized political cohesion, it is also to be remembered -that it is a form having _specific_ characteristics. Every state in -history was or is a _state of classes_, a polity of superior and -inferior social groups, based upon distinctions either of rank or of -property. This phenomenon must, then, be called the “State.” With it -alone history occupies itself. - -We should, therefore, be justified in designating every other -form of political organization by the same term, without further -differentiation, had there never existed any other than a class-state, -or were it the only conceivable form. At least, proof might properly -be called for, to show that each conceivable political organization, -even though originally it did not represent a polity of superior and -inferior social and economic classes, since it is of necessity subject -to inherent laws of development, must in the end be resolved into the -specific class form of history. Were such proof forthcoming, it would -offer in fact only one form of political amalgamation, calling in -turn for differentiation at various stages of development, viz., the -preparatory stage, when class distinction does not exist, and the stage -of maturity, when it is fully developed. - -Former students of the philosophy of the State were dimly aware of this -problem. And they tried to adduce the required proof, that because of -inherent tendencies of development, every human political organization -must gradually become a class-state. Philosophers of the canon law -handed this theory down to philosophers of the law of nature. From -these, through the mediation of Rousseau, it became a part of the -teachings of the economists; and even to this day it rules their views -and diverts them from the facts. - -This assumed proof is based upon the concept of a “primitive -accumulation,” or an original store of wealth, in lands and in movable -property, brought about by means of purely economic forces; a doctrine -justly derided by Karl Marx as a “fairy tale.” Its scheme of reasoning -approximates this: - -Somewhere, in some far-stretching, fertile country, a number of free -men, of equal status, form a union for mutual protection. Gradually -they differentiate into property classes. Those best endowed with -strength, wisdom, capacity for saving, industry and caution, slowly -acquire a basic amount of real or movable property; while the stupid -and less efficient, and those given to carelessness and waste, remain -without possessions. The well-to-do lend their productive property to -the less well-off in return for tribute, either ground rent or profit, -and become thereby continually richer, while the others always remain -poor. These differences in possession gradually develop social class -distinctions; since everywhere the rich have preference, while they -alone have the time and the means to devote to public affairs and -to turn the laws administered by them to their own advantage. Thus, -in time, there develops a ruling and property-owning estate, and a -proletariate, a class without property. The primitive state of free and -equal fellows becomes a class-state, by an inherent law of development, -because in every conceivable mass of men there are, as may readily be -seen, strong and weak, clever and foolish, cautious and wasteful ones. - -This seems quite plausible, and it coincides with the experience of our -daily life. It is not at all unusual to see an especially gifted member -of the lower class rise from his former surroundings, and even attain -a leading position in the upper class; or conversely, to see some -spendthrift or weaker member of the higher group “lose his class” and -drop into the proletariate. - -And yet this entire theory is utterly mistaken; it is a “fairy tale,” -or it is a class theory used to justify the privileges of the upper -classes. The class-state never originated in this fashion, and never -could have so originated. History shows that it did not; and economics -shows deductively, with a testimony absolute, mathematical and binding, -that it could not. A simple problem in elementary arithmetic shows that -the assumption of an original accumulation is totally erroneous, and -has nothing to do with the development of the class-state. - -The proof is as follows: All teachers of natural law, etc., have -unanimously declared that the differentiation into income-receiving -classes and propertyless classes can only take place when all fertile -lands have been occupied. For so long as man has ample opportunity -to take up unoccupied land, “no one,” says Turgot, “would think of -entering the service of another;” we may add, “at least for wages, -which are not apt to be higher than the earnings of an independent -peasant working an unmortgaged and sufficiently large property;” while -mortgaging is not possible as long as land is yet free for the working -or taking, as free as air and water. Matter that is obtainable for the -taking has no value that enables it to be pledged, since no one loans -on things that can be had for nothing. - -The philosophers of natural law, then, assumed that complete occupancy -of the ground must have occurred quite early, because of the natural -increase of an originally small population. They were under the -impression that at their time, in the eighteenth century, it had taken -place many centuries previous, and they naïvely deduced the existing -class aggroupment from the assumed conditions of that long-past point -of time. It never entered their heads to work out their problem; and -with few exceptions their error has been copied by sociologists, -historians and economists. It is only quite recently that my figures -were worked out, and they are truly astounding.[A] - -[A] Franz Oppenheimer, _Theorie der Reinen und Politischen Œkonomie_. -Berlin, 1912.--_Translator._ - -We can determine with approximate accuracy the amount of land of -average fertility in the temperate zone, and also what amount is -sufficient to enable a family of peasants to exist comfortably, or -how much such a family can work with its own forces, without engaging -outside help or permanent farm servants. At the time of the migration -of the barbarians (350 to 750 A. D.), the lot of each able-bodied man -was about thirty morgen (equal to twenty acres) on average lands, on -very good ground only ten to fifteen morgen (equal to seven or ten -acres), four morgen being equal to one hectare. Of this land, at least -a third, and sometimes a half, was left uncultivated each year. The -remainder of the fifteen to twenty morgen sufficed to feed and fatten -into giants the immense families of these child-producing Germans, and -this in spite of the primitive technique, whereby at least half the -productive capacity of a day was lost. Let us assume that, in these -modern times, thirty morgen (equal to twenty acres) for the average -peasant suffices to support a family. We have then assumed a block -of land sufficiently large to meet any objection. Modern Germany, -populated as it is, contains an agricultural area of thirty-four -million hectares (equal to eighty-four million, fifteen thousand, four -hundred and eighty acres). The agricultural population, including -farm laborers and their families, amounts to seventeen million; so -that, assuming five persons to a family and an equal division of the -farm lands, each family would have ten hectares (equal to twenty-five -acres). In other words, not even in the Germany of our own day would -the point have been reached where, according to the theories of the -adherents of natural law, differentiation into classes would begin. - -Apply the same process to countries less densely settled, such, for -example, as the Danube States, Turkey, Hungary and Russia, and still -more astounding results will appear. As a matter of fact, there are -still on the earth’s surface, seventy-three billion, two hundred -million hectares (equal to one hundred eighty billion, eight hundred -eighty million and four hundred sixteen thousand acres); dividing -into the first amount the number of human beings of all professions -whatever, viz., one billion, eight hundred million, every family of -five persons could possess about thirty morgen (equal to eighteen -and a half acres), _and still leave about two-thirds of the planet -unoccupied_. - -If, therefore, purely economic causes are ever to bring about a -differentiation into classes by the growth of a propertyless laboring -class, the time has not yet arrived; and the critical point at which -ownership of land will cause a natural scarcity is thrust into the dim -future--if indeed it ever can arrive. - -As a matter of fact, however, for centuries past, in all parts of the -world, we have had a class-state, with possessing classes on top and -a propertyless laboring class at the bottom, even when population was -much less dense than it is to-day. Now it is true that the class-state -can arise only where all fertile acreage has been _occupied_ -completely; and since I have shown that even at the present time, all -the ground is not occupied economically, this must mean that it has -been preëmpted politically. Since land could not have acquired “natural -scarcity,” the scarcity must have been “legal.” This means that the -land has been preëmpted by a ruling class against its subject class, -and settlement prevented. Therefore the State, as a class-state, can -have originated in no other way than through conquest and subjugation. - -This view, the so-called “sociologic idea of the state,” as the -following will show, is supported in ample manner by well-known -historical facts. And yet most modern historians have rejected it, -holding that both groups, amalgamated by war into one State, before -that time had, each for itself formed a “State.” As there is no method -of obtaining historical proof to the contrary, since the beginnings -of human history are unknown, we should arrive at a verdict of “not -proven,” were it not that, deductively, there is the absolute certainty -that the State, as history shows it, the class-state, could not have -come about except through warlike subjugation. The mass of evidence -shows that our simple calculation excludes any other result. - - -THE SOCIOLOGICAL IDEA OF THE STATE - -To the originally, purely sociological, idea of the State, I have added -the economic phase and formulated it as follows: - -What, then, is the State as a sociological concept? The State, -completely in its genesis, essentially and almost completely during the -first stages of its existence, is a social institution, forced by a -victorious group of men on a defeated group, with the sole purpose of -regulating the dominion of the victorious group over the vanquished, -and securing itself against revolt from within and attacks from abroad. -Teleologically, this dominion had no other purpose than the economic -exploitation of the vanquished by the victors. - -No primitive state known to history originated in any other manner.[1] -Wherever a reliable tradition reports otherwise, either it concerns -the amalgamation of two fully developed primitive states into one body -of more complete organization; or else it is an adaptation to men of -the fable of the sheep which made a bear their king in order to be -protected against the wolf. But even in this latter case, the form and -content of the State became precisely the same as in those states where -nothing intervened, and which became immediately “wolf states.” - -The little history learned in our school-days suffices to prove this -generic doctrine. Everywhere we find some warlike tribe of wild men -breaking through the boundaries of some less warlike people, settling -down as nobility and founding its State. In Mesopotamia, wave follows -wave, state follows state--Babylonians, Amoritans, Assyrians, Arabs, -Medes, Persians, Macedonians, Parthians, Mongols, Seldshuks, Tartars, -Turks; on the Nile, Hyksos, Nubians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, -Turks; in Greece, the Doric States are typical examples; in Italy, -Romans, Ostrogoths, Lombards, Franks, Germans; in Spain, Carthaginians, -Visigoths, Arabs; in Gaul, Romans, Franks, Burgundians, Normans; in -Britain, Saxons, Normans. In India wave upon wave of wild warlike -clans has flooded over the country even to the islands of the Indian -Ocean. So also is it with China. In the European colonies, we find -the selfsame type, wherever a settled element of the population has -been found, as for example, in South America and Mexico. Where that -element is lacking, where only roving huntsmen are found, who may be -exterminated but not subjugated, the conquerors resort to the device -of importing from afar masses of men to be exploited, to be subject -perpetually to forced labor, and thus the slave trade arises. - -An apparent exception is found only in those European colonies in -which it is forbidden to replace the lack of a domiciled indigenous -population by the importation of slaves. One of these colonies, the -United States of America, is among the most powerful state-formations -in all history. The exception there found is to be explained by this, -that the mass of men to be exploited and worked without cessation -_imports itself_, by emigration in great hordes from primitive states -or from those in higher stages of development in which exploitation has -become unbearable, while liberty of movement has been attained. In this -case, one may speak of an infection from afar with “statehood” brought -in by the infected of foreign lands. Where, however, in such colonies, -immigration is very limited, either because of excessive distances -and the consequent high charges for moving from home, or because of -regulations limiting the immigration, we perceive an approximation -to the final end of the development of the State, which we nowadays -recognize as the necessary outcome and finale, but for which we have -not yet found a scientific terminology. Here again, in the dialectic -development, a change in the quantity is bound up with a change of -the quality. The old form is filled with new contents. We still find -a “State” in so far as it represents the tense regulation, secured by -external force, whereby is secured the social living together of large -bodies of men; but it is no longer the “State” in its older sense. -It is no longer the instrument of political domination and economic -exploitation of one social group by another; it is no longer a “State -of Classes.” It rather resembles a condition which appears to have -come about through a “social contract.” This stage is approached by -the Australian Colonies, excepting Queensland, which after the feudal -manner still exploits the half enslaved Kanakas. It is almost attained -in New Zealand. - -So long as there is no general assent as to the origin and essence of -states historically known or as to the sociological meaning of the word -“State,” it would be futile to attempt to force into use a new name -for these most advanced commonwealths. They will continue to be called -“states” in spite of all protests, especially because of the pleasure -of using confusing concepts. For the purpose of this study, however, we -propose to employ a new concept, a different verbal lever, and shall -speak of the result of the new process as a “Freemen’s Citizenship.” - -This summary survey of the states of the past and present should, if -space permitted, be supplemented by an examination of the facts offered -by the study of races, and of those states which are not treated in our -falsely called “Universal History.” On this point, the assurance may be -accepted that here again our general rule is valid without exception. -Everywhere, whether in the Malay Archipelago, or in the “great -sociological laboratory of Africa,” at all places on this planet where -the development of tribes has at all attained a higher form, the State -grew from the subjugation of one group of men by another. Its basic -justification, its raison d’être, was and is the economic exploitation -of those subjugated. - -The summary review thus far made may serve as proof of the basic -premise of this sketch. The pathfinder, to whom, before all others, -we are indebted for this line of investigation is Professor Ludwig -Gumplowicz of Graz, jurist and sociologist, who crowned a brave life -by a brave self-chosen death. We can, then, in sharp outlines, follow -in the sufferings of humanity the path which the State has pursued in -its progress through the ages. This we propose now to trace from the -primitive state founded on conquest to the “freemen’s citizenship.” - - - - -CHAPTER II - -THE GENESIS OF THE STATE - - -One single force impels all life; one force developed it, from the -single cell, the particle of albumen floating about in the warm ocean -of prehistoric time, up to the vertebrates, and then to man. This one -force, according to Lippert, is the tendency to provide for life, -bifurcated into “hunger and love.” With man, however, philosophy also -enters into the play of these forces, in order hereafter, together with -“hunger and love, to hold together the structure of the world of men.” -To be sure, this philosophy, this “idea” of Schopenhauer’s, is at its -source nothing else than a creature of the provision for life called -by him “will.” It is an organ of orientation in the world, an arm in -the struggle for existence. Yet in spite of this, we shall come to -know the desire for causation as a self-acting force, and of social -facts as coöperators in the sociological process of development. In the -beginning of human society, and as it gradually develops, this tendency -pushes itself forward in various bizarre ideas called “superstition.” -These are based on purely logical conclusions from incomplete -observations concerning air and water, earth and fire, animals and -plants, which seem endowed with a throng of spirits both kindly and -malevolent. One may say that in the most recent modern times, at a -stage attained only by very few races, there arises also the younger -daughter of the desire for causation, namely science, as a logical -result of complete observation of facts; science, now required to -exterminate widely branched-out superstition, which, with innumerable -threads, has rooted itself in the very soul of mankind. - -But, however powerfully, especially in the moment of “ecstasy,”[2] -superstition may have influenced history, however powerfully, even in -ordinary times, it may have coöperated in the development of human -communal life, the principal force of development is still to be found -in the necessities of life, which force man to acquire for himself -and for his family nourishment, clothing and housing. This remains, -therefore, the “economic” impulse. A sociological--and that means a -socio-psychological--investigation of the development of history can, -therefore, not progress otherwise than by following out the methods by -which economic needs have been satisfied in their gradual unfolding, -and by taking heed of the influences of the causation impulse at its -proper place. - - -(a) POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEANS - -There are two fundamentally opposed means whereby man, requiring -sustenance, is impelled to obtain the necessary means for satisfying -his desires. These are work and robbery, one’s own labor and the -forcible appropriation of the labor of others. Robbery! Forcible -appropriation! These words convey to us ideas of crime and the -penitentiary, since we are the contemporaries of a developed -civilization, specifically based on the inviolability of property. And -this tang is not lost when we are convinced that land and sea robbery -is the primitive relation of life, just as the warriors’ trade--which -also for a long time is only organized mass robbery--constitutes the -most respected of occupations. Both because of this, and also on -account of the need of having, in the further development of this -study, terse, clear, sharply opposing terms for these very important -contrasts, I propose in the following discussion to call one’s own -labor and the equivalent exchange of one’s own labor for the labor of -others, the “economic means” for the satisfaction of needs, while the -unrequited appropriation of the labor of others will be called the -“political means.” - -The idea is not altogether new; philosophers of history have at all -times found this contradiction and have tried to formulate it. But no -one of these formulæ has carried the premise to its complete logical -end. At no place is it clearly shown that the contradiction consists -only in the _means_ by which the _identical purpose_, the acquisition -of economic objects of consumption, is to be obtained. Yet this is the -critical point of the reasoning. In the case of a thinker of the rank -of Karl Marx, one may observe what confusion is brought about when -economic purpose and economic means are not strictly differentiated. -All those errors, which in the end led Marx’s splendid theory so far -away from truth, were grounded in the lack of clear differentiation -between the means of economic satisfaction of needs and its end. This -led him to designate slavery as an “economic category,” and force as -an “economic force”--half truths which are far more dangerous than -total untruths, since their discovery is more difficult, and false -conclusions from them are inevitable. - -On the other hand, our own sharp differentiation between the two -means toward the same end, will help us to avoid any such confusion. -This will be our key to an understanding of the development, the -essence, and the purpose of the State; and since all universal history -heretofore has been only the history of states, to an understanding -of universal history as well. All world history, from primitive times -up to our own civilization, presents a single phase, a contest namely -between the economic and the political means; and it can present only -this phase until we have achieved free citizenship. - - -(b) PEOPLES WITHOUT A STATE: HUNTSMEN AND GRUBBERS - -The state is an organization of the political means. No state, -therefore, can come into being until the economic means has created a -definite number of objects for the satisfaction of needs, which objects -may be taken away or appropriated by warlike robbery. For that reason, -primitive huntsmen are without a state; and even the more highly -developed huntsmen become parts of a state structure only when they -find in their neighborhood an evolved economic organization which they -can subjugate. But primitive huntsmen live in practical anarchy. - -Grosse says concerning primitive huntsmen in general: - -“There are no essential differences of fortune among them, and thus a -principal source for the origin of differences in station is lacking. -Generally, all grown men within the tribe enjoy equal rights. The older -men, thanks to their greater experience, have a certain authority; -but no one feels himself bound to render them obedience. Where in -some cases chiefs are recognized--as with the Botokude, the Central -Californians, the Wedda and the Mincopie--their power is extremely -limited. The chieftain has no means of enforcing his wishes against -the will of the rest. Most tribes of hunters, however, have no -chieftain. The entire society of the males still forms a homogeneous -undifferentiated mass, in which only those individuals achieve -prominence who are believed to possess magical powers.”[3] - -Here, then, there scarcely exists a spark of “statehood,” even in the -sense of ordinary theories of the state, still less in the sense of -the correct “sociologic idea of the state.” - -The social structure of primitive peasants has hardly more resemblance -to a state than has the horde of huntsmen. Where the peasant, working -the ground with a grub, is living in liberty, there is as yet no -“state.” The plow is always the mark of a higher economic condition -which occurs only in a state; that is to say, in a system of plantation -work carried on by subjugated servants.[4] The grubbers live isolated -from one another, scattered over the country in separated curtilages, -perhaps in villages, split up because of quarrels about district or -farm boundaries. In the best cases, they live in feebly organized -associations, bound together by oath, attached only loosely by the -tie which the consciousness of the same descent and speech and the -same belief imposes upon them. They unite perhaps once a year in the -common celebration of renowned ancestors or of the tribal god. There is -no ruling authority over the whole mass; the various chieftains of a -village, or possibly of a district, may have more or less influence in -their circumscribed spheres, this depending usually upon their personal -qualities, and especially upon the magical powers attributed to them. -Cunow describes the Peruvian peasants before the incursion of the Incas -as follows: “An unregulated living side by side of many independent, -mutually warring tribes, who again were split up into more or less -autonomous territorial unions, held together by ties of kinship.”[5] -One may say that all the primitive peasants of the old and new world -were of this type. - -In such a state of society, it is hardly conceivable that a warlike -organization could come about for purposes of attack. It is -sufficiently difficult to mobilize the clan, or still more the tribe, -for common defense. The peasant is always lacking in mobility. He is -as attached to the ground as the plants he cultivates. As a matter of -fact, the working of his field makes him “bound to the soil” (_glebæ -adscriptus_), even though, in the absence of law, he has freedom of -movement. What purpose, moreover, would a looting expedition effect in -a country, which throughout its extent is occupied only by grubbing -peasants? The peasant can carry off from the peasant nothing which he -does not already own. In a condition of society marked by superfluity -of agricultural land, each individual contributes only a little work -to its extensive cultivation. Each occupies as much territory as he -needs. More would be superfluous. Its acquisition would be lost labor, -even were its owner able to conserve for any length of time the grain -products thus secured. Under primitive conditions, however, this spoils -rapidly by reason of change of atmosphere, ants, or other agencies. -According to Ratzel, the Central African peasant must convert the -superfluous portion of his crops into beer as quickly as possible in -order not to lose it entirely! - -For all these reasons, primitive peasants are totally lacking in that -warlike desire to take the offensive which is the distinguishing mark -of hunters and herdsmen: war can not better their condition. And this -peaceable attitude is strengthened by the fact that the occupation of -the peasant does not make him an efficient warrior. It is true his -muscles are strong and he has powers of endurance, but he is sluggish -of movement and slow to come to a determination, while huntsmen and -nomads by their methods of living develop speed of motion and swiftness -of action. For this reason, the primitive peasant is usually of a more -gentle disposition than they.[B] - -[B] This psychological contradiction, though often expressly stated, is -not the absolute rule, Grosse, _Forms of the Family_, says (page 137): -“Some historians of civilization place the peasant in opposition to the -warlike nomads, claiming that the peasants are peace-loving peoples. In -fact one can not state that their economic life leads them to wars, or -educates them for it, as can be said of stock raisers. Nevertheless, -one finds within the scope of this form of cultivation a mass of the -most warlike and cruel peoples to be found anywhere. The wild cannibals -of the Bismarck archipelago, the blood-lusting Vitians, the butchers of -men of Dahome and Ashanti--they all cultivate the ‘peaceable’ acres; -and if other peasants are not quite as bad, it seems that the kindly -disposition of the vast mass appears to be, at least, questionable.” - -To sum up: within the economic and social conditions of the peasant -districts, one finds no differentiation working for the higher forms -of integration. There exists neither the impulse nor the possibility -for the warlike subjection of neighbors. No “State” can therefore -arise; and, as a matter of fact, none ever has arisen from such social -conditions. Had there been no impulse from without, from groups of men -nourished in a different manner, the primitive grubber would never have -discovered the State. - - -(c) PEOPLES PRECEDING THE STATE: HERDSMEN AND VIKINGS - -Herdsmen, on the contrary, even though isolated, have developed a whole -series of the elements of statehood; and in the tribes which have -progressed further, they have developed this in its totality, with the -single exception of the last point of identification which completes -the state in its modern sense, that is to say, with exception only of -the definitive occupation of a circumscribed territory. - -One of these elements is an economic one. Even without the intervention -of extra-economic force, there may still develop among herdsmen a -sufficiently marked differentiation of property and income. Assuming -that, at the start, there was complete equality in the number of -cattle, yet within a short time, the one man may be richer and the -other poorer. An especially clever breeder will see his herd increase -rapidly, while an especially careful watchman and bold hunter will -preserve his from decimation by beasts of prey. The element of luck -also affects the result. One of these herders finds an especially good -grazing ground and healthful watering places; the other one loses his -entire stock through pestilence, or through a snowfall or a sandstorm. - -Distinctions in fortune quickly bring about class distinctions. The -herdsman who has lost all must hire himself to the rich man; and -sinking thus under the other, become dependent on him. Wherever -herdsmen live, from all three parts of the ancient world, we find the -same story. Meitzen reports of the Lapps, nomadic in Norway: “Three -hundred reindeer sufficed for one family; who owned only a hundred -must enter the service of the richer, whose herds ran up to a thousand -head.”[6] The same writer, speaking of the Central Asiatic Nomads, -says: “A family required three hundred head of cattle for comfort; one -hundred head is poverty, followed by a life of debt. The servant must -cultivate the lands of the lord.”[7] Ratzel reports concerning the -Hottentots of Africa a form of “commendatio”: “The poor man endeavors -to hire himself to the rich man, his only object being to obtain -cattle.”[8] Laveleye, who reports the same circumstances from Ireland, -traces the origin and the name of the feudal system (_système féodal_) -to the loaning of cattle by the rich to the poor members of the tribe; -accordingly, a “fee-od” (owning of cattle) was the first feud whereby -so long as the debt existed the magnate bound the small owner to -himself as “his man.” - -We can only hint at the methods whereby, even in peaceable associations -of herdsmen, this economic and consequent social differentiation may -have been furthered by the connection of the patriarchate with the -offices of supreme and sacrificial priesthood if the wise old men -used cleverly the superstition of their clan associates. But this -differentiation, so long as it is unaffected by the political means, -operates within very modest bounds. Cleverness and efficiency are not -hereditary with any degree of certainty. The largest herd will be split -up if many heirs grow up in one tent, and fortune is tricky. In our -own day, the richest man among the Lapps of Sweden, in the shortest -possible time, has been reduced to such complete poverty that the -government has had to support him. All these causes bring it about -that the original condition of economic and social equality is always -approximately restored. “The more peaceable, aboriginal, and genuine -the nomad is, the smaller are the tangible differences of possession. -It is touching to note the pleasure with which an old prince of the -Tsaidam Mongols accepts his tribute or gift, consisting of a handful of -tobacco, a piece of sugar, and twenty-five kopeks.”[9] - -This equality is destroyed permanently and in greater degree by the -political means. “Where war is carried on and booty acquired, greater -differences arise, which find their expression in the ownership of -slaves, women, arms and spirited mounts.”[10] - -The ownership of _slaves_! The nomad is the inventor of slavery, and -thereby has created the seedling of the state, the first economic -exploitation of man by man. - -The huntsman carries on wars and takes captives. But he does not make -them slaves; either he kills them, or else he adopts them into the -tribe. Slaves would be of no use to him. The booty of the chase can -be stowed away even less than grain can be “capitalized.” The idea -of using a human being as a labor motor could only come about on -an economic plane on which a body of wealth has developed, call it -capital, which can be increased only with the assistance of dependent -labor forces. - -This stage is first reached by the herdsmen. The forces of one family, -lacking outside assistance, suffice to hold together a herd of very -limited size, and to protect it from attacks of beasts of prey or human -enemies. Until the political means is brought into play, auxiliary -forces are found very sparingly; such as the poorer members of the -clan already mentioned, together with runaways from foreign tribes, -who are found all over the world as protected dependents in the suite -of the greater owners of herds.[11] In some cases, an entire poor -clan of herdsmen enters, half freely, into the service of some rich -tribe. “Entire peoples take positions corresponding to their relative -wealth. Thus the Tungusen, who are very poor, try to live near the -settlements of the Tschuktsches, because they find occupation as -herdsmen of the reindeer belonging to the wealthy Tschuktsches; they -are paid in reindeer. And the subjection of the Ural-Samojedes by the -Sirjaenes came about through the gradual occupation of their pasturing -grounds.”[12] - -Excepting, however, the last named case, which is already very -state-like, the few existing labor forces, without capital, are not -sufficient to permit the clan to keep very large herds. Furthermore, -methods of herding themselves compel division. For a pasture may -not, as they say in the Swiss Alps, be “overpushed,” that is to say, -have too many cattle on it. The danger of losing the entire stock -is reduced by the measure in which it is distributed over various -pastures. For cattle plagues, storms, etc., can affect only a part; -while even the enemy from abroad can not drive off all at once. For -that reason, the Hereros, for example, “find every well-to-do owner -forced to keep, besides the main herd, several other subsidiary herds. -Younger brothers or other near relatives, or in want of these, tried -old servants, watch them.”[13] - -For that reason, the developed nomad spares his captured enemy; he can -use him as a slave on his pasture. We may note this transition from -killing to enslaving in a customary rite of the Scythians: they offered -up at their places of sacrifice one out of every hundred captured -enemies. Lippert, who reports this, sees in it “the beginning of a -limitation, and the reason thereof is evidently to be found in the -value which a captured enemy has acquired by becoming the servant of a -tribal herdsman.”[14] - -With the introduction of slaves into the tribal economy of the -herdsmen, the state, in its essential elements, is completed, except -that it has not as yet acquired a definitely circumscribed territorial -limit. The state has thus the _form_ of dominion, and its economic -basis is the exploitation of human labor. Henceforth, economic -differentiation and the formation of social classes progress rapidly. -The herds of the great, wisely divided and better guarded by numerous -armed servants than those of the simple freemen, as a rule, maintain -themselves at their original number: they also increase faster than -those of the freemen, since they are augmented by the greater share -in the booty which the rich receive, corresponding to the number of -warriors (slaves) which these place in the field. - -Likewise, the office of supreme priest creates an ever-widening -cleft which divides the numbers of the clan, all formerly equals; -until finally a genuine nobility, the rich descendants of the rich -patriarchs, is placed in juxtaposition to the ordinary freemen. “The -redskins have also in their progressive organization developed -no nobility and no slavery,[C] and in this their organization -distinguishes itself most essentially from those of the old world. -Both arise from the development of the patriarchate of stock-raising -people.”[15] - -[C] This statement of Lippert is not quite correct. The higher -developed domiciled huntsmen and fishermen of Northwest America have -both nobles and slaves. - -Thus we find, with all developed tribes of herdsmen, a social -separation into three distinct classes: nobility (“head of the house -of his fathers” in the biblical phrase), common freemen and slaves. -According to Mommsen, “all Indo-Germanic people have slavery as a -jural institution.”[16] This applies to the Arians and the Semites -of Asia and Africa as well as to the Hamites. Among all the Fulbe of -the Sahara, “society is divided into princes, chieftains, commons and -slaves.”[17] And we find the same facts everywhere, as a matter of -course, wherever slavery is legally established, as among the Hova[18] -and their Polynesian kinsmen, the “Sea Nomads.” Human psychology under -similar circumstances brings about like conditions, independent of -color or race. - -Thus the herdsman gradually becomes accustomed to earning his -livelihood through warfare, and to the exploitation of men as servile -labor motors. And one must admit that his entire mode of life impels -him to make more and more use of the “political means.” - -He is physically stronger and just as adroit and determined as the -primitive huntsman, whose food supply is too irregular to permit him -to attain his greatest natural physical development. The herdsman can, -in all cases, grow to his full stature, since he has uninterrupted -nourishment in the milk of his herds and an unfailing supply of meat. -This is shown in the Arian horse nomad, no less than in the herdsman of -Asia and Africa, e. g., the Zulu. Secondly, tribes of herdsmen increase -faster than hordes of hunters. This is so, not only because the adults -can obtain much more nourishment from a given territory, but still -more because possession of the milk of animals shortens the period of -nursing for the mothers, and consequently permits a greater number -of children to be born and to grow to maturity. As a consequence, the -pastures and steppes of the old world became inexhaustible fountains, -which periodically burst their confines letting loose inundations of -humanity, so that they came to be called the “_vaginæ gentium_.” - -Moreover we find a much larger number of armed warriors among -herdsmen than among hunters. Each one of these herdsmen is stronger -individually, and yet all of them together are at least as mobile -as is a horde of huntsmen; while the camel and horse riders among -them are incomparably more mobile. This greater mass of the best -individual elements is held together by an organization only possible -under the ægis of a slave-holding patriarchate accustomed to rule, an -organization prepared and developed by its occupation, and therefore -superior to that of the young warriors of the huntsmen sworn to the -service of one chief. - -Hunters, it may be observed, work best alone or in small groups. -Herdsmen, on the other hand, move to the best advantage in a great -train, in which each individual is best protected; and which is in -every sense an armed expedition, where every stopping place becomes an -armed camp. Thus there is developed a science of tactical maneuvers, -strict subordination, and firm discipline. “One does not make a -mistake,” as Ratzel says, “if one accounts as the disciplinary forces -in the life of the nomads the order of the tents which, in the same -form, exists since most ancient times. Every one and everything here -has a definite, traditional place; hence the speed and order in setting -up and in breaking camp, in establishment and in rearrangement. It is -unheard of that any one without orders, or without the most pressing -reason, should change his place. Thanks to this strict discipline, the -tents can be packed up and loaded away within the space of an hour.”[19] - -The same tried order, handed down from untold ages, regulates -the warlike march of the tribe of herdsmen while on the hunt, in -war and in peaceable wandering. Thus they become professional -fighters, irresistible until the state develops higher and mightier -organizations. Herdsman and warrior become identical concepts. Ratzel’s -statement concerning the Central Asiatic Nomads applies to them all: -“The nomad is, as herdsman, an economic, as warrior, a political -concept. It is easy for him to turn from any activity to that of the -warrior and robber. Everything in life has for him a pacific and -war-like, an honest and robber-like, side; according to circumstances, -the one or the other of these phases appears uppermost. Even fishing -and navigation, at the hands of the East Caspian Turkomans, developed -into piracy.... The activities of the apparently pacific existence as -a herdsman determine those of the warrior; the pastoral crook becomes -a fighting implement. In the fall, when the horses return strengthened -from the pasture and the second cropping of the sheep is completed, -the nomads’ minds turn to some feud or robbing expedition (_Baranta_, -literally, to make cattle, to lift cattle), adjourned to that time. -This is an expression of the right of self help, which in contentions -over points of law, or in quarrels affecting dignity, or in blood -feuds, seeks both requital and surety in the most valuable things that -the enemy possesses, namely, the animals of his herd. Young men who -have not been on a _baranta_ must first acquire the name _batir_, hero, -and thus earn the claim to honor and respect. The pleasure of ownership -joined to the desire for adventure develops the triple descending -gradation of avenger, hero and robber.”[20] - -An identical development takes place with the sea nomads, the -“Vikings,” as with the land nomads. This is quite natural, since in the -most important cases noted in the history of mankind, sea nomads are -simply land nomads taking to the sea. - -We have noted above one of the innumerable examples which indicate that -the herdsman does not long hesitate to use for marauding expeditions, -instead of the horse or the “ship of the desert,” the “horses of the -sea.” This case is exemplified by the East Caspian Turkomans.[21] -Another example is furnished by the Scythians: “From the moment when -they learn from their neighbors the art of navigating the seas, these -wandering herdsmen, whom Homer (_Iliad_, XIII, 3) calls ‘respected -horsemen, milk-eaters and poor, the most just of men,’ change into -daring navigators like their Baltic and Scandinavian brethren. Strabo -(_Cas._, 301) complains: ‘Since they have ventured on the sea, -carrying on piracy and murdering foreigners, they have become worse; -and associating with many peoples, they adopt their petty trading and -spendthrift habits.’”[22] - -If the Phœnicians really were “Semites,” they furnish an additional -example of incomparable importance of the transformation of land into -“sea Bedouins,” i. e., warlike robbers; and the same is probably -true for the majority of the numerous peoples who looted the rich -countries around the Mediterranean, whether from the coast of Asia -Minor, Dalmatia, or from the North African shore. These begin from the -earliest times, as we see from the Egyptian monuments (the Greeks -were not admitted into Egypt),[23] and continue to the present day: e. -g., the Riff pirates. The North African “Moors,” an amalgamation of -Arabs and of Berbers, both originally land nomads, are perhaps the most -celebrated example of this change. - -There are cases in which sea nomads--that is to say, sea robbers--arise -immediately from fishermen, with no intermediate herdsman stage. -We have already examined the causes which give the herdsmen their -superiority over the peasantry: the relatively numerous population of -the horde, combined with an activity which develops courage and quick -resolution in the individual, and educates the mass as a whole to tense -discipline. All this applies also to fishermen dwelling on the sea. -Rich fishing grounds permit a considerable density of population, as -is shown in the case of the Northwest Indians (Tlinkit, etc.); these -permit also the keeping of slaves, since the slave earns more by -fishing than his keep amounts to. Thus we find, here alone among the -redskins, slavery developed as an institution; and we find, therefore, -along with it, permanent economic differences among the freemen, which -result in a sort of plutocracy similar to that noted among herdsmen. -Here, as there, the habit of command over slaves produces the habit -of rule and a taste for the “political means.” This is favored by the -tense discipline developed in navigation. “Not the least advantage -of fishing in common is found in the discipline of the crews. They -must render implicit obedience to a leader chosen in each of the -larger fishing boats, since every success depends upon obedience. The -command of a ship afterward facilitates the command of the state. We -are accustomed to reckon the Solomon Islanders as complete savages, -and yet their life is subject to one solitary element, which combines -their forces, namely, navigation.”[24] If the Northwest Indians did not -become such celebrated sea robbers as their likes in the old world, -this is due to the fact that the neighborhoods within their reach had -developed no rich civilization; but all more developed fishermen carry -on piracy. - -For this reason, the Vikings have the same capacity to choose the -political means as the basis of their economic existence as have the -cattle raiders; and similarly they have been founders of states on a -large scale. Hereafter, we shall distinguish the states founded by -them as “sea states,” while the states founded by herdsmen--and in the -new world by hunters--will be called “land states.” Sea states will be -treated extensively when we discuss the consequences of the _developed -feudal state_. As long, however, as we are discussing the development -of the state, and the _primitive_ feudal state, we must limit ourselves -to the consideration of the land state and leave the sea state out of -account. This treatment is convenient, since in all essential things -the sea state has the same characteristics, but its development can not -be followed through the various typical stages as can the development -of the land state. - - -(d) THE GENESIS OF THE STATE - -The hordes of huntsmen are incomparably weaker, both in numbers and in -the strength of the single fighters, than are the herdsmen with whom -they occasionally brush. Naturally they can not withstand the impact. -They flee to the highlands and mountains, where the herdsmen have no -inclination to follow them, not only because of the physical hardships -involved, but also because their cattle do not find pasturage there; -or else they enter into a form of cliental relation, as happened often -in Africa, especially in very ancient times. When the Hyksos invaded -Egypt, such dependent huntsmen followed them. The huntsmen usually pay -for protection an inconsiderable tribute in the form of spoils of the -chase, and are used for reconnoitering and watching. But the huntsman, -being a “practical anarchist,” often invites his own destruction rather -than submit to regular labor. For these reasons, no “state” ever arose -from such contact. - -The peasants fight as undisciplined levies, and with their single -combatants undisciplined; so that, in the long run, even though they -are strong in numbers, they are no more able than are the hunters to -withstand the charge of the heavily armed herdsmen. But the peasantry -do not flee. The peasant is attached to his ground, and has been used -to regular work. He remains, yields to subjection, and pays tribute -to his conqueror; _that is the genesis of the land states in the old -world_. - -In the new world, where the larger herding animals, cattle, horses, -camels, were not indigenous, we find that instead of the herdsman the -hunter is the conqueror of the peasant, because of his infinitely -superior adroitness in the use of arms and in military discipline. -“In the old world we found that the contrast of herdsmen and peasants -developed civilization; in the new world the contrast is between the -sedentary and the roving tribes. The Toltecks, devoted to agriculture, -fought wild tribes (with a highly developed military organization) -breaking in from the north, as endlessly as did Iran with Turan.”[25] - -This applies not only to Peru and Mexico, but to all America, a strong -ground for the opinion that the fundamental basis of civilization is -the same all over the world, its development being consistent and -regular under the most varied economic and geographical conditions. -Wherever opportunity offers, and man possesses the power, he prefers -political to economic means for the preservation of his life. And -perhaps this is true not alone of man, for, according to Maeterlinck’s -_Life of the Bees_, a swarm which has once made the experiment of -obtaining honey from a foreign hive, by robbery instead of by tedious -building, is thenceforth spoiled for the “economic means.” From working -bees, robber bees have developed. - -Leaving out of account the state formations of the new world, which -have no great significance in universal history, the cause of the -genesis of all states is the contrast between peasants and herdsmen, -between laborers and robbers, between bottom lands and prairies. -Ratzel, regarding sociology from the geographical view-point, -expresses this cleverly: “It must be remembered that nomads do not -always destroy the opposing civilization of the settled folk. This -applies not only to tribes, but also to states, even to those of some -might. The war-like character of the nomads is a great factor in the -creation of states. It finds expression in the immense nations of -Asia controlled by nomad dynasties and nomad armies, such as Persia, -ruled by the Turks; China, conquered and governed by the Mongols and -Manchus; and in the Mongol and Radjaputa states of India, as well as -in the states on the border of the Soudan, where the amalgamation of -the formerly hostile elements has not yet developed so far, although -they are joined together by mutual benefit. In no place is it shown -so clearly as here on the border of the nomad and peasant peoples, -that the great workings of the impulse making for civilization on -the part of the nomads are not the result of civilizing activity, -but of war-like exploits at first detrimental to pacific work. Their -importance lies in the capacity of the nomads to hold together the -sedentary races who otherwise would easily fall apart. This, however, -does not exclude their learning much from their subjects.... Yet all -these industrious and clever folk did not have and could not have the -will and the power to rule, the military spirit, and the sense for -the order and subordination that befits a state. For this reason, the -desert-born lords of the Soudan rule over their negro folk just as -the Manchus rule their Chinese subjects. This takes place pursuant -to a law, valid from Timbuctoo to Pekin, whereby advantageous state -formations arise in rich peasant lands adjoining a wide prairie; where -a high material culture of sedentary peoples is violently subjugated to -the service of prairie dwellers having energy, war-like capacity, and -desire to rule.”[26] - -In the genesis of the state, from the subjection of a peasant folk by -a tribe of herdsmen or by sea nomads, six stages may be distinguished. -In the following discussion it should not be assumed that the actual -historical development must, in each particular case, climb the -entire scale step by step. Although, even here, the argument does not -depend upon bare theoretical construction, since every particular -stage is found in numerous examples, both in the world’s history and -in ethnology, and there are states which have apparently progressed -through them all. But there are many more which have skipped one or -more of these stages. - -The first stage comprises robbery and killing in border fights, endless -combats broken neither by peace nor by armistice. It is marked by -killing of men, carrying away of children and women, looting of herds, -and burning of dwellings. Even if the offenders are defeated at first, -they return in stronger and stronger bodies, impelled by the duty of -blood feud. Sometimes the peasant group may assemble, may organize -its militia, and perhaps temporarily defeat the nimble enemy; but -mobilization is too slow and supplies to be brought into the desert -too costly for the peasants. The peasants’ militia does not, as does -the enemy, carry its stock of food--its herds--with it into the field. -In Southwest Africa the Germans recently experienced the difficulties -which a well-disciplined and superior force, equipped with a supply -train, with a railway reaching back to its base of supply, and with -the millions of the German Empire behind it, may have with a handful -of herdsmen warriors, who were able to give the Germans a decided -setback. In the case of primitive levies, this difficulty is increased -by the narrow spirit of the peasant, who considers only his own -neighborhood, and by the fact that while the war is going on the lands -are uncultivated. Therefore, in such cases, in the long run, the small -but compact and easily mobilized body constantly defeats the greater -disjointed mass, as the panther triumphs over the buffalo. - -This is the first stage in the formation of states. The state may -remain stationary at this point for centuries, for a thousand years. -The following is a thoroughly characteristic example: - -“Every range of a Turkoman tribe formerly bordered upon a wide belt -which might be designated as its ‘looting district.’ Everything north -and east of Chorassan, though nominally under Persian dominion, has for -decades belonged more to the Turkomans, Jomudes, Goklenes, and other -tribes of the bordering plains, than to the Persians. The Tekinzes, -in a similar manner, looted all the stretches from Kiwa to Bokhara, -until other Turkoman tribes were successfully rounded up either by -force or by corruption to act as a buffer. Numberless further instances -can be found in the history of the chain of oases which extends -between Eastern and Western Asia directly through the steppes of its -central part, where since ancient times the Chinese have exercised -a predominant influence through their possession of all important -strategic centers, such as the Oasis of Chami. The nomads, breaking -through from north and south, constantly tried to land on these islands -of fertile ground, which to them must have appeared like Islands of -the Blessed. And every horde, whether laden down with booty or fleeing -after defeat, was protected by the plains. Although the most immediate -threats were averted by the continued weakening of the Mongols, and the -actual dominion of Thibet, yet the last insurrection of the Dunganes -showed how easily the waves of a mobile tribe break over these islands -of civilization. Only after the destruction of the nomads, impossible -as long as there are open plains in Central Asia, can their existence -be definitely secured.”[27] - -The entire history of the old world is replete with well-known -instances of mass expeditions, which must be assigned to the first -stage of state development, inasmuch as they were intent, not upon -conquest, but directly on looting. Western Europe suffered through -these expeditions at the hands of the Celts, Germans, Huns, Avars, -Arabs, Magyars, Tartars, Mongolians and Turks by land; while the -Vikings and the Saracens harassed it on the waterways. These hordes -inundated entire continents far beyond the limits of their accustomed -looting ground. They disappeared, returned, were absorbed, and left -behind them only wasted lands. In many cases, however, they advanced -in some part of the inundated district directly to the sixth and last -stage of state formation, in cases namely, where they established a -permanent dominion over the peasant population. Ratzel describes these -mass migrations excellently in the following: - -“The expeditions of the great hordes of nomads contrast with this -movement, drop by drop and step by step, since they overflow with -tremendous power, especially Central Asia and all neighboring -countries. The nomads of this district, as of Arabia and Northern -Africa, unite mobility in their way of life with an organization -holding together their entire mass for one single object. It seems to -be a characteristic of the nomads that they easily develop despotic -power and far-reaching might from the patriarchal cohesion of the -tribe. Mass governments thereby come into being, which compare with -other movements among men in the same way that swollen streams compare -with the steady but diffused flow of a tributary. The history of China, -India, and Persia, no less than that of Europe, shows their historical -importance. Just as they moved about on their ranges with their wives -and children, slaves and carts, herds and all their paraphernalia, so -they inundated the borderlands. While this ballast may have deprived -them of speed it increased their momentum. The frightened inhabitants -were driven before them, and like a wave they rolled over the conquered -countries, absorbing their wealth. Since they carried everything with -them, their new abodes were equipped with all their possessions, and -thus their final settlements were of an ethnographic importance. After -this manner, the Magyars flooded Hungary, the Manchus invaded China, -the Turks, the countries from Persia to the Adriatic.”[28] - -What has been said here of Hamites, Semites and Mongolians, may be said -also, at least in part, of the Arian tribes of herdsmen. It applies -also to the true negroes, at least to those who live entirely from -their herds: “The mobile, warlike tribes of the Kafirs possess a power -of expansion which needs only an enticing object in order to attain -violent effects and to overturn the ethnologic relations of vast -districts. Eastern Africa offers such an object. Here the climate did -not forbid stock raising, as in the countries of the interior, and did -not paralyze from the start, the power of impact of the nomads, while -nevertheless numerous peaceable agricultural peoples found room for -their development. Wandering tribes of Kafirs poured like devastating -streams into the fruitful lands of the Zambesi, and up to the highlands -between the Tanganyika and the coast. Here they met the advance guard -of the Watusi, a wave of Hamite eruption, coming from the north. The -former inhabitants of these districts were either exterminated, or as -serfs cultivated the lands which they formerly owned; or they still -continued to fight; or again, they remained undisturbed in settlements -left on one side by the stream of conquest.”[29] - -All this has taken place before our eyes. Some of it is still going -on. During many thousands of years it has “jarred all Eastern Africa -from the Zambesi to the Mediterranean.” The incursion of the Hyksos, -whereby for over five hundred years Egypt was subject to the shepherd -tribes of the eastern and northern deserts--“kinsmen of the peoples -who up to the present day herd their stock between the Nile and the -Red Sea”[30]--is the first authenticated foundation of a state. These -states were followed by many others both in the country of the Nile -itself, and farther southward, as far as the Empire of Muata Jamvo -on the southern rim of the central Congo district, which Portuguese -traders in Angola reported as early as the end of the sixteenth -century, and down to the Empire of Uganda, which only in our own day -has finally succumbed to the superior military organization of Europe. -“Desert land and civilization never lie peaceably alongside one -another; but their battles are all alike and full of repetitions.”[31] - -“Alike and full of repetitions”! That may be said of universal history -on its basic lines. The human ego in its fundamental aspect is much the -same all the world over. It acts uniformly, in obedience to the same -influences of its environment, with races of all colors, in all parts -of the earth, in the tropics as in the temperate zones. One must step -back far enough and choose a point of view so high that the variegated -aspect of the details does not hide the great movements of the mass. In -such a case, our eye misses the “mode” of fighting, wandering, laboring -humanity, while its “substance,” ever similar, ever new, ever enduring -through change, reveals itself under uniform laws. - -Gradually, from this first stage, there develops the second, in which -the peasant, through thousands of unsuccessful attempts at revolt, has -accepted his fate and has ceased every resistance. About this time, -it begins to dawn on the consciousness of the wild herdsman that a -murdered peasant can no longer plow, and that a fruit tree hacked -down will no longer bear. In his own interest, then, wherever it is -possible, he lets the peasant live and the tree stand. The expedition -of the herdsmen comes just as before, every member bristling -with arms, but no longer intending nor expecting war and violent -appropriation. The raiders burn and kill only so far as is necessary -to enforce a wholesome respect, or to break an isolated resistance. -But in general, principally in accordance with a developing customary -right--the first germ of the development of all public law--the -herdsman now appropriates only the surplus of the peasant. That is to -say, he leaves the peasant his house, his gear and his provisions up -to the next crop.[D] The herdsman in the first stage is like the bear, -who for the purpose of robbing the beehive, destroys it. In the second -stage he is like the bee-keeper, who leaves the bees enough honey to -carry them through the winter. - -[D] Ratzel, l. c. II, page 393, in speaking of the Arabs says: “The -difficulty of nourishing slaves makes it impossible to keep them. -Vast populations are kept in subjection and deprived of everything -beyond the necessaries for maintaining life. They turn entire oases -into demesne lands, visited at the harvest time in order to rob the -inhabitants; a domination characteristic of the desert.” - -Great is the progress between the first stage and the second. Long is -the forward step, both economically and politically. In the beginning, -as we have seen, the acquisition by the tribe of herdsmen was purely an -occupying one. Regardless of consequences, they destroyed the source -of future wealth for the enjoyment of the moment. Henceforth the -acquisition becomes economical, because all economy is based on wise -housekeeping, or in other words, on restraining the enjoyment of the -moment in view of the needs of the future. The herdsman has learned to -“capitalize.” It is a vast step forward in politics when an utterly -strange human being, prey heretofore like the wild animals, obtains a -value and is recognized as a source of wealth. Although this is the -beginning of all slavery, subjugation, and exploitation, it is at the -same time the genesis of a higher form of society, that reaches out -beyond the family based upon blood relationship. We saw how, between -the robbers and the robbed, the first threads of a jural relation were -spun across the cleft which separated those who had heretofore been -only “mortal enemies.” The peasant thus obtains a semblance of _right_ -to the bare necessaries of life; so that it comes to be regarded as -_wrong_ to kill an unresisting man or to strip him of everything. - -And better than this, gradually more delicate and softer threads are -woven into a net very thin as yet, but which, nevertheless, brings -about more human relations than the customary arrangement of the -division of spoils. Since the herdsmen no longer meet the peasants -in combat only, they are likely now to grant a respectful request, -or to remedy a well grounded grievance. “The categorical imperative” -of equity, “Do to others as you would have them do unto you,” had -heretofore ruled the herdsmen only in their dealings with their own -tribesmen and kind. Now for the first time it begins to speak, shyly -whispering in behalf of those who are alien to blood relationship. -In this, we find the germ of that magnificent process of external -amalgamation which, out of small hordes, has formed nations and unions -of nations; and which, in the future is to give life to the concept -of “humanity.” We find also the germ of the internal unification -of tribes once separated, from which, in place of the hatred of -“barbarians,” will come the all comprising love of humanity, of -Christianity and Buddhism. - -_The moment when first the conqueror spared his victim in order -permanently to exploit him in productive work, was of incomparable -historical importance. It gave birth to nation and state, to right -and the higher economics, with all the developments and ramifications -which have grown and which will hereafter grow out of them._ The root -of everything human reaches down into the dark soil of the animal--love -and art, no less than state, justice and economics. - -Still another tendency knots yet more closely these psychic relations. -To return to the comparison of the herdsman and the bear, there are -in the desert, beside the bear who guards the bees, other bears who -also lust after honey. But our tribe of herdsmen blocks their way, and -protects its beehives by force of arms. The peasants become accustomed, -when danger threatens, to call on the herdsmen, whom they no longer -regard as robbers and murderers, but as protectors and saviors. Imagine -the joy of the peasants when the returning band of avengers brings back -to the village the looted women and children, with the enemies’ heads -or scalps. These ties are no longer threads, but strong and knotted -bands. - -Here is one of the principal forces of that “integration,” whereby in -the further development, those originally not of the same blood, and -often enough of different groups speaking different languages, will in -the end be welded together into _one_ people, with _one_ speech, _one_ -custom, and _one_ feeling of nationality. This unity grows by degrees -from common suffering and need, common victory and defeat, common -rejoicing and common sorrow. A new and vast domain is open when master -and slave serve the same interests; then arises a stream of sympathy, a -sense of common service. Both sides apprehend, and gradually recognize, -each other’s common humanity. Gradually the points of similarity are -sensed, in place of the differences in build and apparel, of language -and religion, which had heretofore brought about only antipathy and -hatred. Gradually they learn to understand one another, first through a -common speech, and then through a common mental habit. The net of the -psychical inter-relations becomes stronger. - -In this second stage of the formation of states, the ground work, in -its essentials, has been mapped out. No further step can be compared in -importance to the transition whereby the bear becomes a bee-keeper. For -this reason, short references must suffice. - -The third stage arrives when the “surplus” obtained by the peasantry is -brought by them regularly to the tents of the herdsmen as “tribute,” a -regulation which affords to both parties self-evident and considerable -advantages. By this means, the peasantry is relieved entirely from the -little irregularities connected with the former method of taxation, -such as a few men knocked on the head, women violated, or farmhouses -burned down. The herdsmen on the other hand, need no longer apply -to this “business” any “expense” and labor, to use a mercantile -expression; and they devote the time and energy thus set free toward an -“extension of the works,” in other words, to subjugating other peasants. - -This form of tribute is found in many well-known instances in history: -Huns, Magyars, Tartars, Turks, have derived their largest income -from their European tributes. Sometimes the character of the tribute -paid by the subjects to their master is more or less blurred, and -the act assumes the guise of payment for protection, or indeed, of -a subvention. The tale is well known whereby Attila was pictured by -the weakling emperor at Constantinople as a vassal prince; while the -tribute he paid to the Hun appeared as a fee. - -The fourth stage, once more, is of very great importance, since it -adds the decisive factor in the development of the state, as we are -accustomed to see it, namely, the union on one strip of land of both -ethnic groups.[E] (It is well known that no jural definition of a -state can be arrived at without the concept of state territory.) -From now on, the relation of the two groups, which was originally -international, gradually becomes more and more intra-national. - -[E] There is apparently in the case of the Fulbe, a transition stage -between the first three stages and the fourth, in which dominion is -exercised half internationally and half intranationally. According -to Ratzel (l. c. II, page 419): “Like a cuttle-fish, the conquering -race stretches numerous arms hither and thither among the terrified -aborigines, whose lack of cohesion affords plenty of gaps. Thus the -Fulbe are slowly flowing into the Benue countries and quite gradually -permeating them. Later observers have thus quite rightly abstained -from assigning definite boundaries. There are many scattered Fulbe -localities which look to a particular place as their center and as the -center of their power. Thus Muri is the capital of the numerous Fulbe -settlements scattered about the Middle Benue, and the position of Gola -is similar in the Adamawa district. As yet there are no proper kingdoms -with defined frontiers against each other and against independent -tribes. Even these capitals are in other respects still far from being -firmly settled.” - -This territorial union may be caused by foreign influences. It may be -that stronger hordes have crowded the herdsmen forward, or that their -increase in population has reached the limit set by the nutritive -capacity of the steppes or prairies; it may be that a great cattle -plague has forced the herdsmen to exchange the unlimited scope of the -prairies for the narrows of some river valley. In general, however, -internal causes alone suffice to bring it about that the herdsmen stay -in the neighborhood of their peasants. The duty of protecting their -tributaries against other “bears” forces them to keep a levy of young -warriors in the neighborhood of their subjects; and this is at the same -time an excellent measure of defense since it prevents the peasants -from giving way to a desire to break their bonds, or to let some other -herdsmen become their overlords. This latter occurrence is by no means -rare, since, if tradition is correct, it is the means whereby the sons -of Rurik came to Russia. - -As yet the local juxtaposition does not mean a state community in its -narrowest sense; that is to say, a unital organization. - -In case the herdsmen are dealing with utterly unwarlike subjects, -they carry on their nomad life, peaceably wandering up and down and -herding their cattle among their perioike and helots. This is the case -with the light-colored Wahuma,[32] “the handsomest men of the world” -(Kandt), in Central Africa, or the Tuareg clan of the Hadanara of the -Asgars, “who have taken up their seats among the Imrad and have become -wandering freebooters. These Imrad are the serving class of the Asgars, -who live on them, although the Imrad could put into the field ten times -as many warriors; the situation is analogous to that of the Spartans in -relation to their Helots.”[33] The same may be said of the Teda among -the neighboring Borku: “Just as the land is divided into a semi-desert -supporting the nomads, and gardens with date groves, so the population -is divided between nomads and settled folk. Although about equal in -number, ten to twelve thousand altogether, it goes without saying that -these latter are subject to the others.”[34] - -And the same applies to the entire group of herdsmen known as the Galla -Masi and Wahuma. “Although differences in possessions are considerable, -they have few slaves, as a serving class. These are represented by -peoples of a lower caste, who live separate and apart from them. It -is herdsmanship which is the basis of the family, of the state, and -along with these of the principle of political evolution. In this wide -territory, between Scehoa and its southernmost boundaries, on the one -hand, and Zanzibar on the other, there is found no strong political -power, in spite of the highly developed social articulation.”[35] - -In case the country is not adapted to herding cattle on a large -scale--as was universally the case in Western Europe--or where a less -unwarlike population might make attempts at insurrection, the crowd of -lords becomes more or less permanently settled, taking either steep -places or strategically important points for their camps, castles, or -towns. From these centers, they control their “subjects,” mainly for -the purpose of gathering their tribute, paying no attention to them in -other respects. They let them administer their affairs, carry on their -religious worship, settle their disputes, and adjust their methods -of internal economy. Their autochthonous constitution, their local -officials, are, in fact, not interfered with. - -If Frants Buhl reports correctly, that was the beginning of the rule -of the Israelites in Canaan.[36] Abyssinia, that great military force, -though at the first glance it may appear to be a fully developed state, -does not, however, seem to have advanced beyond the fourth stage. At -least Ratzel states: “The principal care of the Abyssinians consists -in the tribute, in which they follow the method of oriental monarchs -in olden and modern times, which is not to interfere with the internal -management and administration of justice of their subject peoples.”[37] - -The best example of the fourth stage is found in the situation in -ancient Mexico before the Spanish conquest: “The confederation under -the leadership of the Mexicans had somewhat more progressive ideas of -conquest. Only those tribes were wiped out that offered resistance. In -other cases, the vanquished were merely plundered, and then required to -pay tribute. The defeated tribe governed itself just as before, through -its own officials. It was different in Peru, where the formation of -a compact empire followed the first attack. In Mexico, intimidation -and exploitation were the only aims of the conquest. And so it came -about that the so-called Empire of Mexico at the time of the conquest -represented merely a group of intimidated Indian tribes, whose -federation with one another was prevented by their fear of plundering -expeditions from some unassailable fort in their midst.”[38] It will be -observed that one can not speak of this as a state in any proper sense. -Ratzel shows this in the note following the above: “It is certain that -the various points held in subjection by the Warriors of Montezuma -were separated from one another by stretches of territory not yet -conquered. A condition very like the rule of the Hova in Madagascar. -One would not say that scattering a few garrisons, or better still, -military colonies, over the land, is a mark of absolute dominion, since -these colonies, with great trouble, maintain a strip of a few miles in -subjection.”[39] - -The logic of events presses quickly from the fourth to the fifth stage, -and fashions almost completely the full state. Quarrels arise between -neighboring villages or clans, which the lords no longer permit to be -fought out, since by this the capacity of the peasants for service -would be impaired. The lords assume the right to arbitrate, and in case -of need, to enforce their judgment. In the end, it happens that at each -“court” of the village king or chief of the clan there is an official -deputy who exercises the power, while the chiefs are permitted to -retain the appearance of authority. The state of the Incas shows, in a -primitive condition, a typical example of this arrangement. - -Here we find the Incas united at Cuzco where they had their patrimonial -lands and dwellings.[40] A representative of the Incas, the Tucricuc, -however, resided in every district at the court of the native -chieftain. He “had supervision over all affairs of his district; -he raised the troops, superintended the delivery of the tribute, -ordered the forced labor on roads and bridges, superintended the -administration of justice, and in short supervised everything in his -district.”[41] - -The same institutions which have been developed by American huntsmen -and Semite shepherds are found also among African herdsmen. In Ashanti, -the system of the Tucricuc has been developed in a typical fashion;[42] -and the Dualla have established for their subjects living in segregated -villages “an institution based on conquest midway between a feudal -system and slavery.”[43] The same author reports that the Barotse have -a constitution corresponding to the earliest stage of the mediæval -feudal organization: “Their villages are ... as a rule surrounded by -a circle of hamlets where their serfs live. These till the fields -of their lords in the immediate neighborhood, grow grain, or herd -the cattle.”[44] The only thing that is not typical here consists in -this, that the lords do not live in isolated castles or halls, but are -settled in villages among their subjects. - -It is only a very small step from the Incas to the Dorians in -Lacedæmon, Messenia, or Crete; and no greater distance separates the -Fulbe, Dualla and Barotse from the comparatively rigidly organized -feudal states of the African Negro Empires of Uganda, Unyoro, etc.; and -the corresponding feudal empires of Eastern and Western Europe and of -all Asia. In all places, the same results are brought about by force -of the same socio-psychological causes. The necessity of keeping the -subjects in order and at the same time of maintaining them at their -full capacity for labor, leads step by step from the fifth to the sixth -stage, in which the state, by acquiring full intra-nationality and by -the evolution of “Nationality,” is developed in every sense. The need -becomes more and more frequent to interfere, to allay difficulties, to -punish, or to coerce obedience; and thus develop the habit of rule and -the usages of government. The two groups, separated, to begin with, -and then united on one territory, are at first merely laid alongside -one another, then are scattered through one another like a mechanical -mixture, as the term is used in chemistry, until gradually they become -more and more of a “chemical combination.” They intermingle, unite, -amalgamate to unity, in customs and habits, in speech and worship. -Soon the bonds of relationship unite the upper and the lower strata. -In nearly all cases the master class picks the handsomest virgins from -the subject races for its concubines. A race of bastards thus develops, -sometimes taken into the ruling class, sometimes rejected, and then -because of the blood of the masters in their veins, becoming the born -leaders of the subject race. In form and in content the primitive state -is completed. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -THE PRIMITIVE FEUDAL STATE - - -(a) THE FORM OF DOMINION - -Its form is domination; the dominion of a small warlike minority, -interrelated and closely allied, over a definitely bounded territory -and its cultivators. Gradually, custom develops some form of law in -accordance with which this dominion is exercised. This law regulates -the rights of primacy and the claims of the lords, and the duty -of obedience and of service on the part of the subjects, in such -wise that the capacity of the peasants for rendering service is not -impaired. This word, _praestationsfaehigkeit_, dates from the reforms -of Frederick the Great. The “bee-keepership,” therefore, is governed -by the law of custom. The duty of paying and working on the part of -the peasants corresponds to the duty of protection on the part of -the lords, who ward off exactions of their own companions, as well as -defend the peasants from the attacks of foreign enemies. - -Although this is one part of the content of the state concept, there is -another, which in the beginning is of much greater magnitude; the idea -of economic exploitation, the political means for the satisfaction of -needs. The peasant surrenders a portion of the product of his labor, -without any equivalent service in return. “_In the beginning was the -ground rent._” - -The forms under which the ground rent is collected or consumed vary. -In some cases, the lords, as a closed union or community, are settled -in some fortified camp and consume as communists the tribute of their -peasantry. This is the situation in the state of the Inca. In some -cases, each individual warrior-noble has a definite strip of land -assigned to him: but generally the produce of this is still, as in -Sparta, consumed in the “syssitia,” by class associates and companions -in arms. In some cases, the landed nobility scatters over the entire -territory, each man housed with his following in his fortified castle, -and consuming, each for himself, the produce of his dominion or lands. -As yet these nobles have not become landlords, in the sense that they -administer their property. Each of them receives tribute from the labor -of his dependents, whom he neither guides nor supervises. This is the -type of the mediæval dominion in the lands of the Germanic nobility. -Finally, the knight becomes the owner and administrator of the knight’s -fee.[F] His former serfs develop into the laborers on his plantation, -and the tribute now appears as the profit of the entrepreneur. This -is the type of the earliest capitalist enterprise of modern times, -the exploitation of large territories in the lands east of the Elbe, -formerly occupied by Slavs and later colonized by Germans. Numerous -transitions lead from one stage to the other. - -[F] _Rittergutsbesitz_ is the ultimate molecule of the German feudal -system, a non-urban territory, approximating the concept of knight’s -fee in the Angevin fiscal legislation; in modern Germanic law, the -possession of an acreage, alienable only as an entity, and by recent -legislation, alienable to non-nobles, but subject to and capable -of certain exceptions in law not inhering in other forms of real -estate.--_Translator._ - -But always, in its essence, is the “State” the same. Its purpose, in -every case, is found to be the political means for the satisfaction -of needs. At first, its method is by exacting a ground rent, so -long as there exists no trade activity the products of which can be -appropriated. Its form, in every case, is that of dominion, whereby -exploitation is regarded as “justice,” maintained as a “constitution,” -insisted on strictly, and in case of need enforced with cruelty. -And yet, in these ways, the absolute right of the conqueror becomes -narrowed within the confines of law, for the sake of permitting the -continuous acquisition of ground rents. The duty of furnishing supplies -on the part of the subjects is limited by their right to maintain -themselves in good condition. The right of taxation on the part of the -lords is supplemented by their duty to afford protection within and -without the state--security under the law and defense of the frontier. - -At this point, the primitive state is completely developed in all its -essentials. It has passed the embryonic condition; whatever follows can -be only phenomena of growth. - -As compared with unions of families, the state represents, doubtless, a -much higher species; since the state embraces a greater mass of men, in -closer articulation, more capable of conquering nature and of warding -off enemies. It changes the half playful occupations of men into -strict methodic labor, and thus brings untold misery to innumerable -generations yet unborn. Henceforth, these must eat their bread in the -sweat of their brow, since the golden age of the free community of -blood relations has been followed by the iron rule of state dominion. -But the state, by discovering labor in its proper sense, starts in this -world that force which alone can bring about the golden age on a much -higher plane of ethical relation and of happiness for all. The state, -to use Schiller’s words, destroys the untutored happiness of the people -while they were children, in order to bring them along a sad path of -suffering to the conscious happiness of maturity. - -A higher species! Paul von Lilienfeld, one of the principal advocates -of the view that society is an organism of a higher kind, has pointed -out that in this respect an especially striking parallel can be drawn -between ordinary organisms and this super-organism. All higher beings -propagate sexually; lower beings asexually, by partition, by budding -and sometimes by conjugation. We have shown that simple partition -corresponds exactly to the growth and the further development of the -association based on blood relationship, which existed before the -state. This grows until it becomes too large for cohesion; it then -loses its unity, divides, and the separate hordes, if they associate -at all, remain in a very loose connection, without any sort of closer -articulation. The amalgamation of exogamic groups is comparable to -conjugation. - -_The state, however, comes into being through sexual propagation._ -All bisexual propagation is accomplished by the following process: -The male element, a small, very active, mobile, vibrating cell--the -spermatozoön--searches out a large inactive cell without mobility -of its own--the ovum, or female principle--enters and fuses with -it. From this process, there results an immense growth; that is to -say, a wonderful differentiation with simultaneous integration. The -inactive peasantry, bound by nature to their fields, is the ovum, -the mobile tribe of herdsmen the spermatozoön, of this sociologic -act of fecundation; and its resultant is the ripening of a higher -social organism more fully differentiated in its organs, and much more -complete in its integrations. It is easy to find further parallels. -One may compare the border feuds to the manner in which innumerable -spermatozoa swarm about the ovum until finally one, the strongest or -most fortunate, discovers and conquers the micropyle. One may compare -the almost magical attraction which the ovum has for the spermatozoön, -to the no less magical power by which the herdsmen from the steppes are -drawn into the cultivated plains. - -But all this is no proof for the “organism.” The problem, however, has -been pointed out. - - -(b) THE INTEGRATION - -We have followed the genesis of the state, from its second stage -onward, in its objective growth as a political and jural form with -economic content. But it is far more important to examine its -subjective growth, its socio-psychological “differentiation and -integration,” since all sociology is nearly always social psychology. -First, then, let us discuss integration. - -We saw in the second stage, as set forth above, how the net of -psychical relations becomes ever tighter and closer enmeshed, as the -economic amalgamation advances. The two dialects become one language; -or one of the two, often of an entirely different stock from the other, -becomes extinct. This, in some cases, is the language of the victors, -but more frequently that of the vanquished. Both cults amalgamate to -one religion, in which the tribal god of the conquerors is adored as -the principal divinity, while the old gods of the vanquished become -either his servants, or, as demons or devils, his adversaries. The -bodily type tends to assimilate, through the influence of the same -climate and similar mode of living. Where a strong difference between -the types existed or is maintained,[45] the bastards, to a certain -extent, fill the gap--so that, in spite of the still existing ethnic -contrast, everybody, more and more, begins to feel that the type of the -enemies beyond the border is more strange, more “foreign” than is the -new co-national type. Lords and subjects view one another as “we,” at -least as concerns the enemy beyond the border; and at length the memory -of the different origin completely disappears. The conquerors are held -to be the sons of the old gods. This, in many cases, they literally -are, since these gods are nothing but the souls of their ancestors -raised to godhead by apotheosis. - -Since the new “states” are much more aggressive than the former -communities bound together by mere blood relationship, the feeling -of being different from the foreigner beyond the borders, growing in -frequent feuds and wars, becomes stronger and stronger among those -within the “realm of peace.” And in the same measure there grows -among them the feeling of belonging to another; so that the spirit -of fraternity and of equity, which formerly existed only within the -horde and which never ceased to hold sway within the association of -nobles, takes root everywhere, and more and more finds its place in the -relations between the lords and their subjects. - -At first these relations are manifested only in infrequent cases: -equity and fraternity are allowed only such play as is consistent -with the right to use the political means; but that much is granted. -A far stronger bond of psychical community between high and low, -more potent than any success against foreign invasion, is woven by -legal protection against the aggression of the mighty. “_Justitia -fundamentum regnorum._” When, pursuant to their own ideals of justice, -the aristocrats as a social group execute one of their own class -for murder or robbery, for having exceeded the bounds of permitted -exploitation, the thanks and the joy of the subjects are even more -heartfelt than after victory over alien foes. - -These, then, are the principal lines of development of the psychical -integration. Common interest in maintaining order and law and peace -produce a strong feeling of solidarity, which may be called “a -consciousness of belonging to the same state.” - - -(c) THE DIFFERENTIATION: GROUP THEORIES AND GROUP PSYCHOLOGY - -On the other hand, as in all organic growth, there develops _pari -passu_ a psychic differentiation just as powerful. The interests of the -group produce strong group feelings; the upper and lower strata develop -a “class consciousness” corresponding to their peculiar interests. - -The separate interest of the master group is served by maintaining -intact the imposed law of political means; such interest makes for -“conservatism.” The interest of the subject group, on the contrary, -points to the removal of the prevailing rule, to the substitution for -it of a new rule, the law of equality for all inhabitants of the state, -and makes for “liberalism” and revolution. - -Herein lies the tap root of all class and party psychology. Hence -there develop, in accordance with definite psychological laws, those -incomparably mighty forms of thought which, as “class theories,” -through thousands of years of struggle guide and justify every social -contest in the consciousness of contemporaries. - -“When the will speaks reason has to be silent,” says Schopenhauer, or -as Ludwig Gumplowicz states the same idea, “Man acts in accordance with -laws of nature, as an afterthought he thinks humanly.” Man’s will being -strictly “determined,” he must act according to the pressure which the -surrounding world exerts upon him; and the same law is valid for every -community of men: groups, classes, and the state itself. They “flow -from the plane of higher economic and social pressure to that of lower -pressure, along the line of least resistance.” But every individual and -each community of men believe themselves free agents; and therefore, by -an unescapable psychical law they are forced to consider the path they -are traversing as a freely chosen means, and the point toward which -they are driven as a freely chosen end. And since man is a rational -and ethical being, that is, a social entity, he is obliged to justify -before reason and morality the method and the objective point of his -movement, and to take account of the social consciousness of his time. - -So long as the relations of both groups were simply those of -internationally opposed border enemies, the exercise of the political -means called for no justification, because a man of alien blood had -no rights. As soon, however, as the psychic integration develops, in -any degree, the community feeling of state consciousness, as soon as -the bond servant acquires “rights,” and the consciousness of essential -equality percolates through the mass, the political means requires a -system of justification; and there arises in the ruling class the -group theory of “legitimacy.” - -Everywhere, the upholders of legitimacy justify dominion and -exploitation with similar anthropological and theological reasoning. -The master group, since it recognizes bravery and warlike efficiency -as the only virtues of a man, declares itself, the victors,--and from -its standpoint quite correctly--to be the more efficient, the better -“race.” This point of view is the more intensified, the lower the -subject race is reduced by hard labor and low fare. And since the -tribal god of the ruling group has become the supreme god in the new -amalgamated state religion, this religion declares--and again from -its view-point quite correctly--that the constitution of the state -has been decreed by heaven, that it is “tabu,” and that interference -with it is sacrilege. In consequence, therefore, of a simple logical -inversion, the exploited or subject group is regarded as an essentially -inferior race, as unruly, tricky, lazy, cowardly and utterly incapable -of self-rule or self-defense, so that any uprising against the imposed -dominion must necessarily appear as a revolt against God Himself and -against His moral ordinances. For these reasons, the dominant group at -all times stands in closest union with the priesthood, which, in its -highest positions, at least, nearly always recruits itself from their -sons, sharing their political rights and economic privileges. - -This has been, and is at this day, the class theory of the ruling -group; nothing has been taken from it, not an item has been added to -it. Even the very modern argument by which, for example, the landed -nobility of old France and of modern Prussia attempted to put out -of court the claims of the peasantry to the ownership of lands, on -the allegation that they had owned the land from time immemorial, -while their peasants had only been granted a life tenure therein,--is -reproduced among the Wahuma, of Africa,[46] and probably could be shown -in many other instances. - -Like their class theory, their class psychology has been, and is, -at all times the same. Its most important characteristic, the -“aristocrat’s pride,” shows itself in contempt for the lower laboring -strata. This is so inherent, that herdsmen, even after they have lost -their herds and become economically dependent, still retain their pride -as former lords: “Even the Galla, who have been despoiled of their -wealth of herds by the Somali north of the Tana, and who thus have -become watchers of other men’s herds, and even in some cases along -the Sabaki become peasants, still look with contempt upon the peasant -Watokomo, who are subject to them and resemble the Suaheli. But their -attitude is quite different toward their tributary hunting peoples, -namely, the Waboni, the Wassanai, and the Walangulo (Ariangulo) who -resemble the Galla.”[47] - -The following description of the Tibbu applies, as though it had been -originally told of them, to Walter Havenaught and the rest of the poor -knights who, in the crusades, looked for booty and lordly domain. It -applies no less to many a noble fighting cock from Germany east of the -Elbe, and to many a ragged Polish gentleman. “They are men full of -self-consciousness. They may be beggars, but they are no pariahs. Many -a people under these circumstances would be thoroughly miserable and -depressed; the Tibbu have steel in their nature. They are splendidly -fitted to be robbers, warriors, and rulers. Even their system of -robbery is imposing, although it is base as a jackal’s. These ragged -Tibbus, fighting against extreme poverty and constantly on the verge -of starvation, raise the most impudent claims with apparent or real -belief in their validity. The right of the jackal, which regards the -possessions of a stranger as common property, is the protection of -greedy men against want. The insecurity of an all but perpetual state -of war brings it about that life becomes an insistent challenge, and -at the same time the reward of extortion!”[48] This phenomenon is in -nowise limited to Eastern Africa, for it is said of the Abyssinian -soldier: “Thus equipped he comes along. Proudly he looks down on every -one: his is the land, and for him the peasant must work.”[49] - -Deeply as the aristocrat at all times despises the economic means and -the peasants who employ it, he admits frankly his reliance on the -political means. Honest war and “honest thievery”[G] are his occupation -as a lord, are his good right. His right--except over those who belong -to the same clique--extends just as far as his power. One finds this -high praise of the political means nowhere so well stated as in the -well-known Doric drinking song: - - “I have great treasures; the spear and the sword; - Wherewith to guard my body, the bull hide shield well tried. - With these I can plough, and harvest my crop, - With these I can garner the sweet grape wine, - By them I bear the name ‘Lord’ with my serfs. - - “But these never dare to bear spear and sword, - Still less the guard of the body, the bull hide shield well tried. - They lie at my feet stretched out on the ground, - My hand is licked by them as by hounds, - I am their Persian king--terrifying them by my name.”[50] - -[G] Compare this with the prevalent justification of “honest graft” in -municipal or political contracts.--_Translator._ - -In these wanton lines is expressed the pride of warlike lords. -The following verses, taken from an entirely different phase of -civilization, show that the robber still has part in the warrior in -spite of Christianity, the Peace of God, and the Holy Roman Empire of -the German Nation. These lines also praise the political means, but in -its most crude form, simple robbery: - - “Would you eke out your life, my young noble squire, - Follow then my teaching, upon your horse and join the gang! - Take to the greenwood, when the peasant comes up, - Run him down quickly, grab him then by the collar, - Rejoice in your heart, taking from him whatever he has, - Unharness his horses and get you away!”[51] - -“Unless,” as Sombart adds, “he preferred to hunt nobler game and to -relieve merchants of their valuable consignments.” The nobles carried -on robbery as a natural method of supplementing their earnings, -extending it more and more as the income from their property no longer -sufficed to pay for the increasing demands of daily consumption and -luxury. The system of freebooting was considered a thoroughly honorable -occupation, since it met the demand of the essence of chivalry, that -every one should appropriate whatever was within reach of his spear -point or of the blade of his sword. The nobles learned freebooting as -the cobbler was brought up to his trade. The ballad has put this in -merry wise: - - “To pillage, to rob, that is no shame, - The best in the land do quite the same.” - -Besides this principal point of the “squire-archical” psychology, a -second distinguishing mark scarcely less characteristic is found in -the piety of these folk whether it be of conviction or merely strongly -accentuated in public. - -It seems as though the same social ideas always force identical -characteristics on the ruling class. This is illustrated by the form -under which God, in their view, appears as their special National God -and preponderatingly as a God of War. Although they profess God as the -creator of all men, even of their enemies, and since Christianity, as -the God of Love, this does not counteract the force with which class -interests formulate their appropriate ideology. - -In order to complete the sketch of the psychology of the ruling class, -we must not forget the tendency to squander, easily understood in those -“ignorant of the taste of toil,” which appears sometimes in a higher -form as generosity; nor must we forget, as their supreme trait, that -death-despising bravery, which is called forth by the coercion imposed -on a minority, their need to defend their rights at any time with arms, -and which is favored by a freedom from all labor which permits the -development of the body in hunting, sport and feuds. Its caricature -is combativeness, and a supersensitiveness to personal honor, which -degenerates into madness. - -At this point a small digression: Cæsar found the Celts just at that -stage of their development, in which the nobles had obtained dominion -over their fellow clansmen. Since that time, his classic narrative -has stood as a norm--their class psychology appears as the race -psychology of all Celts. Not even Mommsen escaped this error. The -result is that now, in every book on universal history or sociology, -one may read the palpable error, repeated until contradiction is of -no avail, although a mere glance would have sufficed to show that all -peoples of all races, in the same stage of their development, have -showed the same characteristics; in Europe, Thessalians, Apulians, -Campanians, Germans, Poles, etc. Meanwhile the Celts, and specifically -the French, in different stages of their development, have showed quite -different traits of character. The psychology belongs to the stage of -development, not to the race! - -Whenever, on the other hand, the religious sanctions of the “state” are -weak, or become so, there develops as a group theory on the part of the -subjects, the concept, either clear or blurred, of _Natural Law_. The -lower class regards the race pride and the assumed superiority of the -nobles as presumptuous, claims to be of as good race and blood as the -ruling class--and from their standpoint again quite correctly, since -according to their views, labor, efficiency and order are accounted the -only virtues. They are skeptical also as to the religion which is the -helper of their adversaries; and are as firmly convinced as are the -nobles of the directly opposite opinion, namely, that the privileges of -the master group violate law as well as reason. Later development is -not able to add any essential point to the factors originally given. - -Under the influence of these ideas, now clearly, now obscurely brought -out, the two groups henceforth fight out their battles, each for its -own interests. The young state would be burst apart under the strain -of such centrifugal forces, were it not for the centripetal pull of -common interests, of the still more powerful state-consciousness. The -pressure of foreigners from without, of common enemies, overcomes the -inner strain of conflicting class interests. An example may be found in -the tale of the secession of the “Plebs” and the successful mission of -Menenius Agrippa. And so the young state would, like a planet, swing -through all eternity in its predetermined orbit, in accordance with -the parallelogram of forces, were it not that it and its surrounding -world is changed and developed until it produces new external and inner -energies. - - -(d) THE PRIMITIVE FEUDAL STATE OF HIGHER GRADE - -Growth in itself conditions important changes; and the young state must -grow. The same forces that brought it into being, urge its extension, -require it to grasp more power. Even were such a young state “sated,” -as many a modern state claims to be, it would still be forced to -stretch and grow under penalty of extinction. Under primitive social -conditions Goethe’s lines apply with absolute truth: “You must rise or -fall, conquer or yield, be hammer or anvil.” - -States are maintained in accordance with the same principles that -called them into being. The primitive state is the creation of warlike -robbery; and only by warlike robbery can it be preserved. - -The economic want of the master group has no limits; no man is -sufficiently rich to satisfy his desires. The political means are -turned on new groups of peasants not yet subjected, or new coasts -yet unpilfered are sought out. The primitive state expands, until a -collision takes place on the edge of the “sphere of interests” of -another primitive state, which itself originated in precisely the same -way. Then we have for the first time, in place of the warlike robbery -heretofore carried on, true war in its narrower sense, since henceforth -equally organized and disciplined masses are hurled at one another. - -The object of the contest remains always the same, the produce of the -economic means of the working classes, such as loot, tribute, taxes -and ground rent; but the contest no longer takes place between a group -intent on exploiting and another mass to be exploited, but between two -master groups for the possession of the entire booty. - -The final result of the conflict, in nearly all instances, is the -amalgamation of both primitive states into a greater. This in turn, -naturally and by force of the same causes, reaches beyond its borders, -devours its smaller neighbors, and is perhaps in its turn devoured by -some greater state. - -The subjected laboring group may not take much interest in the final -issue of these contests for the mastery; it is a matter of indifference -whether it pays tribute to one or the other set of lords. Their chief -interest lies in the course of the particular fight, which is, in any -case, paid for with their own hides. Therefore, except in cases of -gross ill treatment and exploitation, the lower classes are rightly -governed by their “state-consciousness” when, with all their might they -aid their hereditary master group in times of war. For if their master -group is vanquished, the subjects suffer most severely from the utter -devastation of war. They fight literally for wife and children, for -home and hearth, when they fight to prevent the rule of foreign masters. - -The master group is involved completely in the issue of this fight for -dominion. In extreme cases, it may be completely exterminated, as were -the local nobility of the Germanic tribes in the Frankish Empire. -Nearly as bad, if not worse, is the prospect of being thrust into the -group of the serfs. Sometimes a well-timed treaty of peace preserves -their social position as master groups of subordinate rank: e. g., the -Saxon nobility in Norman England, or the Suppans in German territory -taken from the Slavs. In other cases, where the forces are about equal, -the two groups amalgamate into one master group with equal rights, -which forms a nobility whose members intermarry. This, for instance, -was the situation in the Slavic Territories, where isolated Wendish -chieftains were treated as the equals of the Germans, or in mediæval -Rome, in the case of prominent families from the Alban Hills and -Tuscany. - -In this new “primitive feudal state of higher grade,” as we shall call -it, the ruling group may, therefore, disintegrate into a number of -more or less powerful and privileged strata. The organization may show -many varieties because of the well-known fact, that often the master -group separates into two subordinated economic and social layers, -developed as we saw them in the herdsmen stage: the owners of large -herds and of many slaves, and the ordinary freemen. Possibly the less -complete differentiation into social ranks in the states created by -huntsmen in the new world, is to be assigned to the circumstance that -in the absence of herds, the concomitants of that form of ownership, -and the original separation into classes, were not introduced into the -state. We shall, later, see what force was exerted on the political and -economic development of states in the old world by the differences in -rank and property of the two strata of rulers. - -Similarly, as in the case of the ruling group, a corresponding process -of differentiation divides the subject group in the “primitive feudal -state of a higher grade” into various strata more or less despised -and compelled to render service. It is only necessary to recall the -very marked difference in the social and jural position occupied by -the peasantry in the Doric States, Lacedæmon and Crete, and among the -Thessalians, where the perioiki had clear rights of possession and -fairly well protected political rights, while the helots, in the latter -case the _penestai_, were almost unprotected in life and property. -Among the old Saxons also we find a class, the liti, intermediate -between the common freemen and the serfs.[52] These examples could be -multiplied; apparently they are caused by the same tendencies that -brought about the differentiation among the nobility mentioned above. -When two primitive feudal states amalgamate, their social layers -stratify in a variety of ways, which to a certain extent are comparable -to the combinations resulting from mixing together two packs of cards. - -It is certain that this mechanical mixture caused by political forces, -influences the development of _castes_, that is to say, of hereditary -professions, which at the same time form a hierarchy of social classes. -“Castes are usually, if not always, consequences of conquest and -subjugation by foreigners.”[53] Although this problem has not been -completely solved, it may be said that the formation of castes has been -very strongly influenced by economic and religious factors. It is -probable that castes came about in some such way as this: state-forming -forces penetrated into existing economic organizations, and vocations -underwent adaptation, and then became petrified under the influence -of religious concepts, which, however, may also have influenced their -original formation. This seems to follow from the fact that even as -between man and woman there exist certain separations of vocation, -which, so to say, are taboo and impassable. Thus among all huntsmen, -tilling the ground is woman’s work, while among many African shepherds, -as soon as the ox-plow is used, agriculture becomes man’s work, and -then women may not, under pain of sacrilege, use the domestic cattle.[H] - -[H] Similarly there are North Asiatic tribes of huntsmen, where women -are definitely forbidden to touch the hunting gear or to cross a -hunting trail.--Ratzel I, page 650. - -It is likely that such religious concepts may have brought it about -that a vocation became hereditary, and then compulsorily hereditary, -especially where a tribe or a village carried on a particular craft. -This happens with all tribes in a state of nature, where intercourse -is easily possible, especially in the case of islanders. When some -such group has been conquered by another tribe, the subjects, with -their developed hereditary vocations, tend to form within the new state -entity a pure “caste.” Their caste position depends partly upon the -esteem they had heretofore enjoyed among their own people, and partly -upon the advantage which their vocation affords their new masters. -If, as was often the case, waves of conquest followed one another in -series, the formation of castes might be multiplied, especially if -in the meantime economic development had worked out many vocational -classes. - -This development is probably best seen in the group of smiths, who, in -nearly all cases, have occupied a peculiar position, half feared and -half despised. In Africa especially, since the beginning of time, we -find tribes of expert smiths, as followers and dependents of shepherd -tribes. The Hyksos brought such tribes with them into the Nile country, -and perhaps owed their decisive victory to arms made by them; and -until recent times the Dinka kept the iron working Djur in a sort of -subject relation. The same applied also to the nomads of the Sahara; -while our northern sagas are filled with the tribal contrast to the -“dwarfs” and the fear of their magical powers. All the elements were at -hand in a developed state for the formation of sharply differentiated -castes.[54] - -How the coöperation of religious concepts affects the beginning of -these formations may be well illustrated by an example from Polynesia. -Here, “although many natives have the ability to do ship-building, -only one privileged class may exercise the craft, so closely is the -interest of the states and the societies bound up in this art. All over -the archipelago formerly, and to this day in Fiji, the carpenters, who -are almost exclusively ship-builders, form a special caste, bear the -high sounding title of ‘the king’s workmen,’ and enjoy the prerogative -of having their own chieftains.... Everything is done in accordance -with ancient tradition; the laying the keel, the completion of the -ship, and the launching, all take place amidst religious ceremonies and -feasts.”[55] - -Where superstition has been strongly developed, a genuine system -of castes may come about, based partly on economic and partly on -ethnic foundations. In Polynesia, for example, the articulation of -the classes, through the operation of the taboo, has brought about -a state of affairs very like a most thoroughgoing caste system.[56] -Similar results may be seen in Southern Arabia.[57] It is unnecessary -at this place to enlarge on the important place which religion had in -the origin and maintenance of separate castes in ancient Egypt and in -modern India.[I] - -[I] Besides, it seems that the rigidity of the Indian caste-system is -not so harsh in practise. The guild seems as often to break through the -barriers of caste as the converse.--Ratzel II, page 596. - -These are the elements of the primitive feudal state of higher -grade. They are more manifold and more numerous than in the lower -primitive state; but in both, legal constitution and political-economic -distribution are fundamentally the same. The products of the economic -means are still the object of the group struggle. This remains now as -ever the moving impulse of the domestic policy of the state, while the -political means continues now as ever to constitute the moving impulse -of its foreign policy in attack or in defense. Identical group theories -continue to justify, both for the upper classes and the lower, the -objects and means of external and domestic struggles. - -But the development can not remain stationary. Growth differs from mere -increase in bulk; growth means a constantly heightening differentiation -and integration. - -The farther the primitive feudal state extends its dominion, the more -numerous its subjects, and the denser its population, the more there -develops a political-economic division of labor, which calls forth new -needs and new means of supplying them; and the more there come into -sharp contrasts the distinctions of economic, and consequently of -social, class strata, in accordance with what I have called the “law -of the agglomeration about existing nuclei of wealth.” This growing -differentiation becomes decisive for the further development of the -primitive feudal state, and still more for its conclusion. - -This conclusion is not meant to be, in any sense, the physical end -of such a state. We do not mean the death of a state, whereby such a -feudal state of the higher type disappears, in consequence of conflict -with a more powerful state, either on the same or on a higher plane -of development, as was the case of the Mogul states of India or of -Uganda in their conflicts with Great Britain. Neither does it mean -such a stagnation as that into which Persia and Turkey have fallen, -which represents for a time only a pause in development, since these -countries, either of their own force or by foreign conquest, must -soon be pushed on the way of their destiny. Neither have we meant the -rigidity of the gigantic Chinese Empire, which can last only so long as -foreign powers refrain from forcing its mysterious gates.[J] - -[J] Had we the space, a detailed exposition of this exceptional -development of a feudal state would be tempting. China would be well -worth a more detailed discussion, since, in many aspects it has -approached the condition of “free citizenship” more closely than any -people of Western Europe. China has overcome the consequences of the -feudal system more thoroughly than we Europeans have; and has made, -early in its development, the great property interests in the land -harmless, so that their bastard offspring, capitalism, hardly came into -being; while in addition, it has worked out to a considerable degree -the problems of coöperative production and of coöperative distribution. - -The outcome here spoken of means the further development of the -primitive feudal state, a matter of importance to our understanding of -universal history as a _process_. The principal lines of development -into which this issue branches off are twofold and of fundamentally -different character. _But this polar opposition is conditioned by -a like contrast between two sorts of economic wealth each of which -increases in accordance with the “law of agglomeration about existing -nuclei.”_ In the one case, it is movable property; in the other, landed -property. Here it is the capital of commerce, there property in land, -accumulating in the hands of a smaller and smaller number, and thereby -overturning radically the articulation of classes, and with it the -whole State. - -The maritime State is the scene of the development of movable wealth; -the territorial State is the embodiment of the development of landed -property. The final issue of the first is _capitalistic exploitation_ -by slavery, the outcome of the latter is, first of all, the _developed -feudal State_. - -Capitalistic exploitation by slavery, the typical result of the -development of the so-called “antique States” on the Mediterranean, -does not end in the death of states, which is of no importance, but in -the death of peoples, because of the consumption of population. In the -pedigree of the historical development of the State, it forms a side -branch, from which no further immediate growth can take place. - -The developed feudal State, however, represents the principal branch, -the continuation of the trunk; and is therefore the origin for -the further growth of the State. Thence it has developed into the -State governed by feudal systems; into absolutism; into the modern -constitutional State; and if we are right in our prognosis, it will -become a “free citizenship.” - -So long as the trunk grew only in one direction, i. e., to include the -primitive feudal State of higher grade, our sketch of its growth and -development could and did comprise both forms. Henceforth, after the -bifurcation, our story branches and follows each branch to its last -twig. - -We begin, then, with the maritime states, although they are not the -older form. On the contrary, as far back as the dawn of history clears -the fog of prehistoric existence, the first strong states were formed -as territorial states, which then, by their own powers, attained the -scale of developed feudal States. But beyond this stage, at least as -regards those States most interesting to our culture, most of them -either remained stationary or fell into the power of maritime states; -and then, infected with the deadly poison of capitalistic exploitation -through slavery, were destroyed by the same plague. - -The further progress of the expanded feudal states of higher grade -could take place only after the maritime states had run their -course: mighty forms of domination and statescraft these became, and -they subsequently influenced and furthered the conformation of the -territorial states that grew from their ruins. - -For that reason the story of the fate of maritime states must be first -traced, as these are the introduction to the higher forms of state -life. After first tracing the lateral branch, we shall then return to -the starting point, the primitive feudal State, follow the main trunk -to the development of the modern constitutional State, and anticipating -actual history, sketch the “free citizenship” of the future. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -THE MARITIME STATE - - -The course of life and the path of suffering of the State founded by -sea nomads, as has been stated above, is determined by commercial -capital; just as that of the territorial State is determined by capital -vested in realty; and, we may add, that of the modern constitutional -State by productive capital. The sea nomad, however, did not invent -trade or merchandising, fairs or markets or cities; these preëxisted, -and since they served his purpose, were now developed to suit his -interests. All these institutions, serving the economic means, the -barter for equivalents, had long since been discovered. - -Here for the first time in our survey we find the economic means not -the object of exploitation by the political means, but as a coöperating -agent in originating the State, one might call it the “chain” passing -into the “lift” created by the feudal state to bring forth a more -elaborate structure. The genesis of the maritime State would not be -thoroughly intelligible, were we not to premise a statement concerning -traffic and interchange of wares in prehistoric times. Furthermore, no -prognosis of the modern state is complete, which does not take into -account the independently formed economic means of aboriginal barter. - - -(a) TRAFFIC IN PREHISTORIC TIMES - -The psychological explanation of barter has brought forth the theory -of the marginal utility, its greatest merit. According to this theory, -the subjective valuation of any economic good decreases in proportion -to the number of objects of the same kind possessed by the same owner. -When even two proprietors meet, each having a number of similar -articles, they will gladly barter, provided political means are barred, -i. e., if both parts are apparently equally strong and well-armed, or -in the very early stage, are within the sacred circle of relationship. -By barter, each one receives property of very high subjective value, -in place of property of very low subjective value, so that both -parties are gainers in the transaction. The desire of primitive people -for bartering must be stronger than that of cultured ones. For at -this stage man does not value his own goods, but covets the things -belonging to strangers, and is hardly affected by calculated economic -considerations. - -On the other hand, we must not forget that there are primitive -peoples for whom barter has no attraction whatever. “Cook tells of -tribes in Polynesia, with whom no intercourse was possible, since -presents made absolutely no impression on them, and were afterward -thrown away; everything shown them they regarded with indifference, -and with no desire to own it, while with their own things they -would not part; in fact, they had no conception of either trade or -barter.”[58] So Westermarck is of the opinion that “barter and traffic -are comparatively late inventions.” In this he stands in opposition -to Peschel, who would have it that man in the earliest known stage -of development engaged in barter. Westermarck states that there is no -proof “that the cave-dwellers of Périgord from the reindeer period -obtained their rock-crystals, their shells from the Atlantic, and the -horns of the Saiga antelope from (modern) Poland by way of barter.”[59] - -In spite of these exceptions, which admit other explanations--perhaps -the natives feared sorcery--the history of primitive peoples shows that -the desire to trade and barter is a universal human characteristic. -It can, however, take effect only when these primitive men on meeting -with strangers are offered new enticing objects, since in the immediate -circle of their own blood kinsmen every one has the same kinds of -property, and in their natural communism, on the average about the same -amount. - -Yet even then, barter, the beginning of all regular trading, can take -place only when the meeting with foreigners is a peaceable one. But is -there any possibility for peaceable meeting with foreigners? Is not -primitive man, through his entire life, and especially at the period -when barter begins, still under the apprehension that every one of a -different horde is an enemy to be feared as the wolf? - -After trade is developed, it is, as a rule, strongly influenced by the -“political means,” “trade generally follows robbery.”[60] But its first -beginnings are chiefly the result of the economic means, the outcome of -pacific, not warlike, intercourse. - -The international relations of primitive huntsmen with one another -must not be confused with those existing either between the huntsmen -or herdsmen and their peasants, or amongst the herdsmen themselves. -There are, undoubtedly, blood-feuds, or feuds because of looted women, -or possibly because of violation of the districts set aside for -hunting grounds; but these lack that strong incentive, which is the -consequence of avarice alone, of the desire to despoil other men of the -products of their labor. Therefore, the “wars” of primitive huntsmen -are scarcely real wars, but rather scuffles and single combats, -carried on frequently--as are the German student duels--according -to an established ceremonial, and prolonged only up to the point -of incapacity to fight, as one might say, “until claret has been -drawn.”[61] These tribes, numerically very weak, wisely limit bloodshed -to the indispensable amount--e. g., in case of a blood vendetta -feud--and thus avoid starting new vendetta blood feuds. - -For this reason, pacific relations with their neighbors on an equal -economic scale are much stronger, and also freer from the incentive to -use political means, both among huntsmen and among primitive peasants, -than among herdsmen. There are numerous examples where the former -meet peaceably to exploit natural resources in common. “While yet -in primitive stages of civilization, great masses of people gather -together, from time to time, at places where useful objects may be -found. The Indians of a large part of America made regular pilgrimages -to the flint grounds; others assembled annually at harvest time at the -Zizania swamps of the lakes of the Northwest. The Australians, living -scattered in the Barku district, assemble from all directions for the -harvest festivals at the swamp beds of the corn bearing Marsiliacae. -When the bonga-bonga trees in Queensland produce a superabundant crop, -and a greater store is on hand than the tribe can consume, foreign -tribes are permitted to share therein.”[63] “Various tribes agree on -the common ownership of definite strips of territory, and likewise of -the quarries of phonolite for hatchets.”[64] Numerous Australian tribes -have common consultations and sessions of the elders for judgment. In -these, the remainder of the population form the bystanders, a custom -similar to the Germanic “_Umstand_” in the primitive folkmoot.[65] - -It is but natural that such meetings should bring about barter. Perhaps -this explains the origin of those “weekly fairs held by the Negroes -of Central Africa in the midst of the primæval forest _under special -arrangements for the peace_,”[66] and likewise the great fairs, said -to be very ancient, of the fur hunters of the extreme north of the -Tschuktsche. - -All these things presuppose the development of pacific forms of -intercourse between neighboring groups. These forms are to be found -almost universally. They could very easily be developed at this period, -since the discovery had not yet been made that men can be utilized as -labor motors. At this stage, the stranger is treated as an enemy only -in doubtful cases. If he comes with apparently peaceable intent, he is -treated as a friend. Therefore, a whole code of public law ceremonies -grew up, intended to demonstrate the pacific intent of the newcomer.[K] -One puts aside one’s arms and shows one’s unarmed hand, or one sends -heralds in advance, who are always inviolable. - -[K] In this category must be reckoned the salutation, still in use in -some parts, “Peace Be With You.” It is expressive of the perversity of -Tolstoi’s later years that he misapprehends this characteristic mark of -a time when war was the normal state of affairs, as the remnant of a -golden age of peace. _The Importance of the Russian Revolution_ (German -translation by A. Hess, p. 17). - -It is clear that these forms represent some kind of claim to -hospitality, and in fact it is by this guest-right that peaceful trade -is first made possible. The exchange of guest-gifts precedes, and -appears to introduce, barter proper. It becomes, therefore, important -to investigate the source of hospitality. - -Westermarck, in his recent monumental work (1907), _Origin and -Development of Moral Concepts_,[68] states that the custom of -hospitality results from two causes, curiosity for news from the -stranger from afar, and still more from the fear that the stranger -may be endowed with powers of sorcery, imputed to him just because he -is a stranger.[L] In the Bible, hospitality is recommended for the -reason that one can not know that the stranger may not be an angel. -The superstitious race fears his curse (the Erinys of the Greeks) and -hastens to propitiate the stranger. Having been accepted as a guest he -is inviolable and enjoys the sacred right of the blood-related group, -and is regarded as belonging to it during his stay. Therefore he -partakes of the benefits of the aboriginal communism reigning in the -group, and shares its property. The host demands and receives whatever -he claims, the stranger obtains in turn what he asks for. When the -peaceable intercourse becomes more frequent, the mutual giving of -guest-presents may develop into a trading arrangement, because the -trader gladly returns to the spot where he found good entertainment -and a profitable exchange and where he is protected by the laws of -hospitality, instead of seeking new places, where, often with danger to -his life, he would first have to acquire the right to hospitality. - -[L] This may account for the use made of old women as heralds. They -are doubly available for that purpose, since they are worthless for -warfare, and are supposed to be endowed with specific powers of sorcery -(Westermarck), even more than old men, who also are treated cautiously, -since they may soon become “ghosts.” - -The existence of an “international” division of labor is, of course, -presupposed before the development of a regular trade relation can -begin. Such a division of labor exists much earlier and to a greater -extent than is generally believed. “It is quite erroneous to suppose -that the division of labor takes place only on a high scale of -economic development. There are in the interior of Africa villages of -iron-smiths, nay, of such as only turn out dart-knives; New Guinea has -its villages of potters, North America its arrow-head makers.”[69] -From such specialties there develops trade, whether through roving -merchants, or by gifts to one’s hosts, or by peace-gifts from tribe -to tribe. In North America, the Kaddu trade in bows. “Obsidian was -universally employed for arrow heads and knives; on the Yellowstone, on -the Snake River, in New Mexico, but especially in Mexico. Thence the -precious article was distributed all over the entire country as far as -Ohio and Tennessee, a distance of nearly two thousand miles.”[70] - -According to Vierkandt: “From the purely home-made products of -primitive peoples, there results a system of trade totally distinct -from that prevailing under modern conditions.... Each separate tribe -has developed special aptitudes, leading to interexchange. Even among -the comparatively uncivilized Indian tribes of South America, we find -such differentiations.... By such a trade, products may be distributed -over extraordinary distances, not in any direct way through -professional traders, but through a gradual passing along from tribe -to tribe. The origin of such a trade, as Buecher has shown, is to be -traced back to the exchange of guest-gifts.”[71] - -Besides this exchange of guest-gifts, a trade may grow from the peace -offerings which adversaries after a fight exchange as a sign of -reconciliation. Sartorius reports on Polynesia: “After a war between -different islands, the peace offerings for each group were something -novel; and if the present and return present pleased both parties, a -repetition took place, and thus again the way for exchange of products -was opened. But, these, in contrast to guest-gifts, were the bases of -continuing intercourse. Here, in place of the contact of individuals, -tribes and peoples met. Women are the first object of barter; they form -the connecting link between strange tribes, and according to evidence -from many sources, women are exchanged for cattle.”[72] - -We meet here an object of trade, exchangeable even without -“international division of labor.” And it appears as though the -_exchange of women_ had, in many ways, smoothed the way for the -traffic in merchandise, as though it had been the first step toward -the _peaceable_ integration of tribes, which accompanied the _warlike_ -integration of the formation of the State. Lippert, however, believes -that the peaceful _exchange of fire_ antedates this barter.[73] -Conceding that this custom is very ancient, he can nevertheless trace -it only from rudiments of observances and of law; and since proof is -no longer accessible, we shall not pursue the question further in this -place. - -On the other hand, the exchange of women is observed universally, -and doubtless exerts an extraordinarily strong influence in the -development of peaceable intercourse between neighboring tribes, -and in the preparation for barter of merchandise. The story of the -Sabine women, who threw themselves between their brothers and their -husbands, as these were about to engage in battle, must have been an -actuality in a thousand instances in the course of the development of -the human race. All over the world, the marriage of near relatives is -considered an outrage, as “incest,” for reasons not within the scope -of this book.[74] This directs the sexual longing toward the women of -neighboring tribes, and thus makes the loot of women a part of the -primary intertribal relations; and in nearly all cases, unless strong -feelings of race counteract it, the violent carrying off of women -is gradually commuted to barter and purchase, the custom resulting -from the relative undesirability of the women of one’s own blood in -comparison to the wives to be had from other tribes.[75]* - -Where division of labor made at all possible the exchange of goods, the -relations among the various tribes would thereafter be made serviceable -to it; the exogamic groups gradually become accustomed regularly to -meet on a peaceful basis. The peace, originally protecting the horde of -blood relations, thereafter comes to be extended over a wider circle. -One example from numberless instances: “Each of the two Camerun tribes -has its own ‘bush countries,’ places where its own tribesmen trade, -and where, by intermarriage, they have relatives. Here also exogamy -shows its tribe-linking power.” - -These are the principal lines of growth of peaceful barter and traffic; -from the right to hospitality and the exchange of women, perhaps also -from the exchange of fire, to the trade in commodities. In addition -to this, markets and fairs, and perhaps also traders, were almost -uniformly regarded as being under the protection of a god who preserved -peace and avenged its violation. Thus we have brought the fundamentals -of this most important sociological factor to the point where the -political means enters as a cause to disturb, rearrange, and then to -develop and affect the creations of the economic means. - - -(b) TRADE AND THE PRIMITIVE STATE - -There are two very important reasons why the robber-warrior should not -unduly interfere with such markets and fairs as he may find within his -conquered domain. - -The first, which is extra-economic, is the superstitious fear that -the godhead will avenge a breach of the peace. The second, which is -economic, and probably is the more important--and I think I am the -first to point out this connection--is that the conquerors can not well -do without the markets. - -The booty of the primitive victors consists of much property which is -unavailable for their immediate use and consumption. Since valuable -articles at that period exist in but few forms, while these few occur -in large quantity, the “marginal utility” of any one kind is held very -low. This applies especially to the most important product of the -political means, slaves. Let us first take up the case of the herdsman: -his need of slaves is limited by the size of his herds; he is very -likely to exchange his surplus for other objects of greater value to -him: for salt, ornaments, arms, metals, woven materials, utensils, etc. -For that reason, the herdsman is not only at all times a robber, always -in addition he is a merchant and trader and he protects trade. - -He protects trade coming his way in order to exchange his loot against -the products of another civilization--from the earliest times, nomads -have convoyed the caravans passing through their steppes or deserts in -consideration of protection money--but he also protects trade even in -places conquered by him in prehistoric times. Quite the same sort of -consideration which influenced the herdsmen to change from bear stage -to bee-keeper stage, must have influenced them to maintain and protect -ancient markets and fairs. One single looting, in this case, would -mean killing the hen that lays the golden eggs. It is more profitable -to preserve the market and rather to extend the prevailing peace over -it, since there is not only the profit to be had from an exchange -of foreign wares against loot, but also the protection money, the -lords’ toll, to be collected. For that reason princes of feudal states -of every stage of development extended over markets, highways and -merchants, their especial protection, the “king’s peace,” often indeed -reserving to themselves the monopoly of foreign trade. Everywhere we -see them busily engaged in calling into being new fairs and cities by -the grant of protection and immunity. - -This interest in the system of fairs and markets makes it thoroughly -credible that tribes of herdsmen respected existing market places in -their sphere of influence to such an extent that they suspended the -exertion of the political means so completely as not even to exercise -“dominion” over them. The story told by Herodotus is inherently -probable, though he was astonished that the Argippæans had a sacred -market amidst the lawless Scythian herdsmen, and that their unarmed -inhabitants were effectively protected through the hallowed peace of -their market place. Many similar phenomena make this the more easily -believable. - -“No one dare harm them, since they are considered _holy_; and yet they -have no arms; but it is they who allay the quarrels of their neighbors, -and whoever has escaped to them as a runaway may not be touched by any -other man.”[76] Similar instances are found frequently: “It is always -the same story of the Argippæans, the story of the ‘holy,’ ‘unarmed,’ -‘just,’ bartering, and strife-settling tribelet in the midst of a -Bedouin-like, nomadic population.”[77] Cære may be taken as an example -of a higher type. Strabo says of its inhabitants: “The Greeks thought -highly of their bravery and justice, because although powerful in a -great degree, they abstained from robbery.” Mommsen, who quotes this -passage, adds: “This does not exclude piracy, which was engaged in by -the merchants of Cære as well as by all other merchants, but rather -that Cære was a sort of free harbor for the Phœnicians as for the -Greeks.”[78] - -Cære is not like the fair of the Argippæans, a market place in the -interior _of a district of land nomads, but is in the midst of a domain -of sea nomads, a port endowed with its own peace_. This is one of those -typical formations whose importance, in my estimation, has not been -appreciated at its real value. They have, it seems to me, exercised a -mighty influence on the genesis of maritime states. - -Those reasons by which we saw the land nomads forced to preserve, if -not to create, market places, must with even more intensity, have -coerced the sea nomads to similar demeanor. For the transportation of -loot, especially of herds and of slaves, is difficult and dangerous on -the trails across the desert or the steppes: the slow progress invites -pursuit. But with war-canoe and “dragon-ship” this transportation -is easy and safe. For that reason, the Viking is even much more a -trader and merchant than is the herdsman. As is said in _Faust_, “War, -Commerce, and Piracy are inseparable.” - - -(c) THE GENESIS OF THE MARITIME STATE - -In many cases, I believe, trade in the loot of piracy is the origin of -those cities around which, as political centers, the city-states of the -antique or Mediterranean civilization grew up; while in very many other -cases, the same trade coöperated to bring them to the same point of -political development. - -These harbor markets developed from probably two general types: they -grew up either as piratical fortresses directly and intentionally -placed in hostile territory, or else as “merchant colonies” based on -treaty rights in the harbors of foreign primitive or developed feudal -states. - -Of the first type, we have a number of important examples from ancient -history which correspond exactly to the fourth stage of our scheme, -where an armed colony of pirates plants itself down at a commercially -and strategically defendable point on the seacoast of a foreign state. -The most notable instance is Carthage; and in like manner, the Greek -sea nomads, Ionians, Dorians and Achæans, settled in their sea castles -on the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian coasts of Southern Italy, on the -islands of these seas, and on the gulfs of Southern Gaul. Phœnicians, -Etruscans,[M] Greeks, and according to modern investigation, Carians, -all about the Mediterranean, founded their “States” after the same -type, with identical class division into masters and servile peasantry -of the neighboring territory.[79] - -[M] Whether the Etruscans were immigrants into Italy by land who took -up piracy after having made war successfully on land, or whether as sea -nomads they had already settled the country along the sea named after -them, has not been determined. - -Some of these states on the coast developed into feudal states -of the type of the territorial states; and the master class then -became a landed aristocracy. The factors in this change were: first, -geographical conditions, lack of good harbors, and a wide stretch -of _hinterland_ cultivated by peaceful peasants; and secondly, very -probably, the acquired organization into classes taken with them from -their original homes. In many cases, they were fugitive nobles, the -vanquished of domestic feuds, or younger sons, sometimes an entire -generation of youth of both sexes, who thus started “on the viking,” -and having at home had lands and serfs, as petty lords, they again -sought in foreign lands what they regarded as their due. The occupation -of England by the Anglo-Saxons, and of Southern Italy by the Normans, -are examples of this method; so too are the Spanish and Portuguese -colonizations of Mexico and of South America. The Achæan colonies of -Greater Greece in Southern Italy furnish additional and very important -instances of this development of territorial feudal states by sea -nomads: “This Achæan League of cities was a true colonization. The -cities were without harbors--Croton only had a fair roadstead--_and -were without any trade of their own_; the Sybarite could boast of -his growing gray in his water town between his home bridges, while -buying and selling were carried on by Milesians and Etruscans. On the -other hand, the Greeks in this region not only controlled the fringe -of the shore, but ruled from sea to sea; ... the native agricultural -inhabitants were forced into a relation of clientage or serfdom, and -were required to work the farms of their masters or to pay tribute to -them.”[80] It is probable that most of the Doric colonies in Crete were -similarly organized. - -But in the course of universal history these “territorial states,” -whether they arose more or less frequently, did not acquire any such -importance as did those maritime cities which devoted their principal -energies to commerce and to privateering. Mommsen contrasts in distinct -and well chosen sentences the Achæan landed squire with the “royal -merchants” of the Greek Colonies in Southern Italy: “In no way did -they spurn agriculture or the increase of territory; the Greeks were -not satisfied, at least not after they became powerful, to remain -within the confined space of a fortified commercial factory in the -midst of the country of the barbarians, as the Phœnicians had done. -Their cities were founded primarily and exclusively for purposes of -trade, and unlike the Achæan colonies, were universally situated at the -best harbors and landing places.”[81] We are certain, in the case of -the Ionic colonies, and may well assume it for the other cases, that -the founders of these cities were not landed squires, but seafaring -merchants. - -But such maritime states or cities, in the strict sense, came into -being not only through warlike conquest, but also through peaceable -beginnings, by a more or less mixed _pénétration pacifique_. - -Where, however, the Vikings did not meet peaceable peasants, but feudal -states in the primitive stage, willing to fight, they offered and -accepted terms of peace and settled down as colonies of merchants. - -We know of such cases from every part of the world, in harbors and on -markets held on shore. To take the instances with which Germans are -most conversant, there are the settlements of North German merchants -in countries along the German ocean and the Baltic Sea, the German -Steel Yard in London, the Hansa in Sweden and Norway, on the Island -of Schönen, and in Russia, at Novgorod. In Wilna, the capital of the -Grand Dukes of Lithuania, there was such a colony; and the Fondaco -dei Tedeschi in Venice is another example of a similar institution. -The strangers in nearly every instance settle down as a compact mass, -subject to their own laws and their own jurisdiction. They often -acquire great political influence, sometimes extending to dominion over -the state. One would think the following tale of Ratzel, concerning -the coast and islands of the Indian Ocean, were a contemporaneous -narrative of the Phœnician or Greek invasion of the Mediterranean at -about 1,000 B. C.: “Whole nations have, so to say, been liquefied by -trade, especially the proverbially clever, zealous, omnipresent Malays -of Sumatra; as well as the treacherous Bugi of Celebes. These can -be met with at every place from Singapore to New Guinea. Latterly, -especially in Borneo, they have immigrated in masses on the call of -the Borneo chieftains. Their influence was so strong that they were -permitted _to govern themselves according to their own laws_, and they -felt themselves so strong _that repeatedly they attempted to achieve -independence_. The Achinese formerly occupied a similar position. -Malacca had been made the principal mart by Malays from Sumatra, and -after its decline, Achin became the most frequented harbor of this -distant east, especially for the first quarter of the seventeenth -century, the pivotal period of the development of that corner of the -world.”[82] The following, from among numberless instances, demonstrate -the universality of this form of settlement: “In Urga, _where they -politically dominate_, the merchants are crowded together into a -separate Chinese Town.”[83] In the Jewish States there were “small -colonies of foreign merchants and mechanics, set apart in distinct -quarters of the cities. Here, under the king’s protection, they could -live according to their own religious customs.”[84] We may also compare -with this, First Kings XX, 34. “King Omri of Ephraim was forced by the -military success of his opponent, the King of Damascus, to grant to -the Aramaic merchants the use of certain parts of the city of Samaria, -where under royal protection they could trade. Later, when the turn of -war favored his successor, Ahab, the latter demanded the same privilege -for the Ephraimitic merchants in Damascus.”[85] “The inhabitants of -Italy, wherever they were, held together as solid and organized -masses, the soldiers as legionaries, the merchants of all large cities -as corporations; while the Roman citizens domiciled or dwelling in the -various provincial _circuits_, were organized as a ‘convention of Roman -citizens’ with their own communal government.”[86] We may recall the -mediæval Ghettos, which, before the great persecution of the Jews in -the Middle Ages, were similar merchant colonies. The settlements of -Europeans in the ports of strong foreign empires at the present time -show similar corporate organizations, having their own constitution and -(consular) jurisdiction. China, Turkey and Morocco must continue to -bear this mark of inferiority, while recently Japan has been able to -rid herself of that badge. - -The most interesting point about these colonies, at least for our -study, consists in their general tendency to extend their political -influence into complete domination. And there is good reason for this. -Merchants have a mass of movable wealth, which is likely to be used as -a decisive factor in the political upheavals constantly disturbing -all feudal states, be it in international wars between two neighboring -states, or in intra-national fights, such as wars of succession. In -addition to this the colonists, in many cases, may rely on the power of -their home state, basing their claim on ties of blood and on uncommonly -strong commercial interests; while there is besides, the fact that in -many cases they have in their warlike sailor-folk and their numerous -slaves an effective and compact force of their own, capable of -accomplishing much in a limited sphere. - -The following story of the rôle played by Arab merchants in East Africa -appears to me to show a historical type heretofore not sufficiently -appreciated: “When Speke, as the first European, made this trip in -1857, the Arabs were merchants, living as aliens in the land. When -in 1861 he passed the same way, the Arabs resembled great landed -proprietors with rich estates and were waging war with the native -territorial ruler. This process, repeatedly found in many other regions -in the interior of Africa, is the necessary consequence of the balance -of power. The foreign merchants, be they Arabs or Suaheli, ask the -privilege of transit and pay tribute for it; they establish warehouses, -which the chiefs favor, as these seem both to satisfy their vanity and -to extend their connections; then incurring the suspicion, oppression -and persecution of the chiefs, the merchants refuse to pay the rack -tolls and dues, which have grown with their increased prosperity. At -last, in one of the inevitable fights for the succession, the Arabs -take the side of one pretender if he is pliable enough, and are thus -brought into internal quarrels of the country and take part in the -often endless wars.”[87] - -This political activity of the merchant denizens (_metoikoi_) is -a constantly recurring type. “In Borneo there developed from the -settlements of Chinese gold diggers separate states.”[88] Properly -speaking, the entire history of colonization by Europeans is a series -of examples of the law that, with any superior force, the factories -and larger settlements of foreigners tend to grow into domination, -unless they approximate to the primal type of simple piracy, such as -the Spanish and Portuguese conquests, or the East India Companies, both -the English and the Dutch. “There lies a robber state beside the ocean, -between the Rhine and the Scheldt,” are the accusing words of the Dutch -Multatuli. All East Asiatic, American and African colonies of all -European peoples arose as one or the other of these two types. - -But the aliens do not always obtain unconditional mastery. Sometimes -the host state is too strong, and the newcomers remain politically -powerless but protected aliens; as, for example, the Germans in -England. Sometimes the host state, although subjugated, becomes strong -enough to shake off the foreign domination; so, for instance, Sweden -drove out the Hanseats who had imposed on her their sovereignty. In -some cases, a conqueror overcomes both merchants and host state, and -subjugates both; as happened to the republics of Novgorod and Pskov, -when the Russians annexed them. In many cases, however, the rich -foreigners and the domestic nobility amalgamate into one group of -rulers, following the type of the formation of territorial states, in -which we saw this take place whenever two about equally strong groups -of rulers came into conflict. It seems to me that this last named -situation is the most probable assumption for the genesis of the most -important city states of antiquity, for the Greek maritime cities, and -for Rome. - -Of Greek history, to use the terms of Kurt Breysig, we know only -the “Middle Ages,” of Roman history, only its “Modern Times.” For -the matters that preceded, we must be extremely careful in drawing -deductions from fancied analogies. But it seems to me that enough facts -are proved and admitted to permit the conclusion that Athens, Corinth, -Mycenæ, Rome, etc., became states in the manner already set forth. -And this would follow, even if the data from all known demography and -general history were not of such universal validity as to permit the -conclusion in itself. - -We know accurately from the names of places (Salamis: Island of Peace, -equivalent to Market-Island), from the names of heroes, from monuments, -and from immediate tradition, that in many Greek harbors there existed -Phœnician factories, while the _hinterland_ was occupied by small -feudal states with the typical articulation of nobles, common freemen, -and slaves. It can not seriously be disputed that the development of -the city states was powerfully advanced by foreign influences; and -this is true, though no specific evidence can be adduced to show that -any of the Phœnician, or of the still more powerful Carian merchants -were either allowed to intermarry with the families of the resident -nobility, or were made full citizens, or finally even became princes. - -The same applies to Rome, concerning which Mommsen, a cautious author, -states: “Rome owes its importance, if not its origin, to these -commercial and strategic relations. Evidence of this is found in -many traces of far greater value than the tales of historical novels -pretending to be authentic. Take an instance of the primæval relations -existing between Rome and Cære, which was for Etruria what Rome was for -Latium, and thereafter was its nearest neighbor and commercial friend; -or the uncommon importance attributed to the bridge over Tiber and the -bridge building (Pontifex Maximus) in every part of the Roman State; or -the galley in the municipal coat of arms. To this source may be traced -the primitive Roman harbor dues to which, from early times, only those -goods were subject which were intended for sale (_promercale_) and not -what entered the harbor of Ostia, for the proper use of the charterer -(_usuarium_), and which constituted therefore an impost on trade. For -that reason we find the comparatively early use of minted money, and -the commercial treaties of states oversea with Rome. In this sense, -then, Rome may, as the story of its origin states, have been rather a -created than a developed city, and among the Latin cities rather the -youngest than the eldest.”[89] - -It would require the work of a lifetime of historical research to -investigate these possibilities, or rather these probabilities; -and then to write the constitutional history of these preëminently -important city states, and to draw thence the very necessary -conclusions. It seems to me that along this path there would be found -much information on many an obscure question, such as the Etruscan -dominion in Rome, or the origin of the rich families of Plebeians, or -concerning the Athenian _metoikoi_, and many other problems. - -Here we can only follow the thread which holds out the hope of leading -us through the labyrinth of historical tradition to the issue. - - -(d) ESSENCE AND ISSUE OF THE MARITIME STATES - -All these are true “States” in the sociologic sense, whether they -arose from the fortresses of sea-robbers, or from harbors of original -land nomads as merchant colonies which obtained dominion or which -amalgamated with the dominating group of the host people. For they are -nothing but the organization of the political means, their form is -domination, their content the economic exploitation of the subject by -the master group. - -So far as the principle is concerned, they are not to be differentiated -from the States founded by land nomads; and yet they have taken a -different form, both from internal and external reasons, and show a -different psychology of classes. - -One must not believe that class feeling was at all different in these -and in the territorial states. Here as there the master class looks -down with the same contempt on the subjects, on the “_Rantuses_,” -on the “man with the blue fingernails,” as the German patrician in -the Middle Ages looked on a being with whom, even when free born, no -intermarriage or social intercourse was permitted. Little indeed does -the class theory of the καλοκἀγαθοί (well-born) or of the patricians -(children of ancestors) differ from that of the country squires. But -other circumstances here bring about differences, consonant, naturally, -with class interests. In any district ruled by merchants, highway -robbery can not be tolerated, and therefore it is considered, e. g., -among the maritime Greeks, a vulgar crime. The tale of Theseus would -not in a territorial state have been pointed against the highwaymen. -On the other hand, “piracy was regarded by them, in most remote -times, as a trade nowise dishonorable ... of which ample proof may be -found in the Homeric poems; while at a much later period Polycrates -had organized a well developed robber state on the Island of Samos.” -“In the _Corpus Juris_, mention is made of a law of Solon in which -the association of pirates (ἐπὶ λείαν οἰχόμενοι) is recognized as a -permissible company.”[90] - -But quite apart from such details, mentioned only because they serve to -cast a clear light on the growth of the “ideologic superstructure,”[N] -the basic conditions of existence of maritime states, utterly different -from those of territorial states, called into being two exceedingly -important phenomena, which are of universal historical importance, -viz., the growth of a _democratic constitution_, whereby the gigantic -contest between the sultanism of the Orient and the civic freedom of -the West was to be fought out (according to Mommsen the true content -of universal history); and in the second place the development of -_capitalistic slave-work_, which in the end was to annihilate all these -states. - -[N] How characteristic of these relations it is that Great Britain, -the only “maritime state” of Europe, even at this present day will not -surrender the right to arm privateers. - -Let us first consider the inner or socio-psychological causes of this -contrast between the territorial and the maritime state. - -States are maintained by the same principle from which they -arise. Conquest of land and populations is the _ratio essendi_ of -a territorial state; and by the repeated conquest of lands and -populations it must grow, until its natural growth is checked by -mountain ranges, desert, or ocean, or its sociological bounds are -determined by contact with other states of its own kind, which it can -not subjugate. The maritime state, on the other hand, came into being -from piracy and trade; and through these two means, it must strive -to extend its power. For this purpose, no extended territory need -be absolutely subjected to its sway. There is no need to carry its -development beyond the first five stages. The maritime states rarely, -and only when compelled, proceed beyond the fifth stage, and attain to -complete intra-nationality and amalgamation. Usually, it is enough if -other sea nomads and traders are kept away, if the monopoly of robbery -and trade is secured, and if the “subjects” are kept quiet by forts -and garrisons. Important places of production are, of course, actually -“dominated”; and this applies especially to mines, to a few fertile -grain belts, to woods with good lumber, to salt works, and to important -fisheries. Domination here, therefore, means permanent administration, -by making the subjects work these for the ruling class. It is only -later in the development, that there arises a taste for “lands and -serfs” and large domains for the ruling class _beyond the confines of -the narrow and original limits of the State_. This happens when the -maritime state by the incorporation of subjugated territories has -become a mixture of the territorial and the maritime forms. But even in -that case, and in contradistinction to territorial states, large landed -properties are merely a source of money rentals, and are in nearly all -cases administered as absentee-property. This we find in Carthage and -in the later Roman Empire. - -The interests of the master class, which in the maritime state as well -as in every other state, governs according to its own advantage, are -different from those in the territorial state. In the latter the feudal -territorial magnate is powerful because of his ownership of lands -and people; while conversely, the patrician of the maritime city is -powerful because of his wealth. The territorial magnate can dominate -his “State” only by the number of men-at-arms maintained by him, and -in order to have as many of these as possible, he must increase his -territory as much as possible. The patrician, on the other hand, can -control his “state” only by movable wealth, with which he can hire -strong arms or bribe weak souls; such wealth is won faster by piracy -and by trade than by land wars and the possession of large estates -in distant territories. Furthermore, in order thoroughly to use such -property, he would be obliged to leave his city to settle down on it, -and to become a regular squire; because in a period when money has not -yet become general, where a profitable division of labor between town -and country has not yet come about, the exploitation of large estates -can only be carried on by actually consuming their products, and -absentee ownership as a source of income is inconceivable. Thus far, -however, we have not reached that portion of the development. We are -still examining primitive conditions. No patrician of any city-state -would, at this time, think of leaving his lively rich home, in order -to bury himself among barbarians, and thus with one move cut himself -off in his state from any political rôle. All his economic, social and -political interests impel him with one accord toward maritime ventures. -Not landed property, but movable capital, is the sinew of his life. - -These were the moving causes of the actions of the master class in -the maritime cities; and even where geographical conditions permitted -an extensive expansion beyond the adjoining _hinterland_ of these -cities, they turned the weight of effort toward sea-power rather than -toward territorial growth. Even in the case of Carthage, its colossal -territory was of far less importance to it than its maritime interests. -Primarily it conquered Sicily and Corsica more in order to check the -competition of the Greek and Etruscan traders than for the sake of -owning these islands; it extended its territories toward the Lybians -largely to insure the security of its other home possessions; and -finally, when it conquered Spain, its ultimate reason was the need -of owning the mines. The history of the _Hansa_ shows many points -of similarity to the above. The majority of these maritime cities, -moreover, were not capable of subjugating a large district. Even had -there been the will to conquer, there were extraneous, geographical -conditions that hindered. All along the Mediterranean, with the -exception of some few places, the coastal plain is extremely narrow, -a small strip fenced off by high mountain ranges. That was one cause -which prevented most of the states grouped about some trading harbor -from growing to anything like the size we should naturally assume to be -probable; while in the open country, ruled by herdsmen, and this very -early, immense realms came into being. The second cause for the small -beginnings of these states is found in this, that the _hinterland_ -whether in the hills or on the few plains of the Mediterranean was -occupied by warlike tribes. These tribesmen, either hunters or warlike -herdsmen, or else primitive feudal states of the same master race as -the sea nomads, were not likely to be subjugated without a severe -contest. Thus in Greece the interior was saved from the maritime states. - -For these reasons the maritime State, even when most developed, always -remains centralized, one is tempted to say centered, on its trading -harbor; while the territorial State, strongly decentralized from the -start, for a long time continues to develop as it expands a still -more pronounced decentralization. Later, we shall see how this is -affected by the adoption of those forms of government and of economic -achievement which first were perfected in the “city-state,” and which -thus obtained the strength to counteract the centrifugal forces, and to -build up the central organization which is characteristic of our modern -states. This is the first great contrast between the two forms of the -State. - -No less decisive is the second point of contrast, whereby the -territorial State remains tied up to natural economies as opposed to -money economies, toward which the maritime State quickly turns. This -contrast grows also out of the basic conditions of their existence. - -Wherever a State lives in natural economy, money is a superfluous -luxury--so superfluous that an economy developed to the use of -money retrogrades again into a system of payments in kind as soon -as the community drops back into the primitive form. Thus after -Charlemagne had issued good coins, the economic situation expelled -them. Neustria--not to mention Austrasia--under the stress of the -migration of the peoples reverted to payment in kind. Such a system -can well do without money as a standard of values, since it is without -any developed intercourse and traffic. The lord’s tenants furnish -as tribute those things that the lord and his followers consume -immediately; while his ornaments, fine fabrics, damascened arms, or -rare horses, salt, etc., are procured in exchange with wandering -merchants for slaves, wax, furs and other products of a warlike -economic system of exchange in kind. - -In city life, at any advanced stage of development, it is impossible to -exist without a common measure of values. The free mechanic in a city -can not, except in rare cases, find some other craftsman in need of the -special thing which he produces, prepared to consume it immediately. -Then, too, in cities the inevitable retail trade in food products, -where every one must purchase nearly everything required, makes the -use of coined money quite inevitable. It is impossible to conduct -trade in its more limited sense, not between merchant and customers, -but between merchant and merchant, without having a common measure of -value. Imagine the case of a trader entering a port with a cargo of -slaves, wishing to take cloth as a return cargo, and finding a cloth -merchant who at the time may not want slaves but iron, or cattle, -or furs. To accomplish this exchange, at least a dozen intermediate -trades would have to take place before the object could be achieved. -That can be avoided only if there exists some one commodity desired by -all. In the system of payment in kind of the territorial states this -may be taken by cattle or horses, since they may be used by any one at -some time; but the ship owner can not load with cattle as a means of -payment, and thus gold and silver become recognized as “money.” - -From centralization and from the use of money, which are the necessary -properties of the maritime or the _city State_, as we shall hereafter -call it, its fate follows of necessity. - -The psychology of the townsman, and especially of the dweller in the -maritime commercial city, is radically different from that of the -countryman. His point of view is freer and more inclusive, even though -it be more superficial; he is livelier, because more impressions strike -him in a day than a peasant in a year. He becomes used to constant -changes and news, and thus is always _novarum rerum cupidus_. He is -more remote from nature and less dependent on it than is the peasant, -and therefore he has less fear of “ghosts.” One consequence of this is -that an underling in a city State is less apt to regard the “taboo” -regulations imposed on him by the first and second estates of rulers. -And as he is compelled to live in compact masses with his fellow -subjects, he early finds his strength in numbers, so that he becomes -more unruly and seditious than the serf who lives in such isolation -that he never becomes conscious of the mass to which he belongs and -ever remains under the impression that his overlord with his followers -would have the upper hand in every fight. - -This in itself brings about an ever progressive dissolution of the -rigid system of subordinated groups first created by the feudal state. -In Greece the territorial states alone were able to keep their subjects -for a long time in a state of subjection: Sparta its Helots, Thessaly -its _Penestæ_. In all the city States, on the other hand, we early -find an uprising of the proletariat against which the master class was -unable to oppose an effective resistance. - -The economic situation tends toward the same result as the conditions -of settlement. Movable wealth had far less stability than landed -property: the sea is tricky, and the fortunes of maritime war and -piracy not less so. The rich man of to-day may lose all by a turn of -Fortune’s wheel; while the poorest man may, by the same swing, land -on top. But in a commonwealth based entirely on possessions, loss -of fortune brings with it loss of rank and of “class,” just as the -converse takes place. The rich Plebeian becomes the leader of the -mass of the people in their constitutional fight for equal rights and -places all his fortune at risk in that struggle. The position of the -patricians becomes untenable; when coerced they have ever conceded -the claims of the lower class. As soon as the first rich Plebeian has -been taken into their ranks, the right of rule by birth, defended as a -holy institution, has forever become impossible. Henceforth it follows -that what is fair for one is fair for the other; and the aristocratic -rule is followed first by the plutocratic, then by the democratic, -finally by the ochlocratic régime, until either foreign conquest or -the “tyranny” of some “Savior of the Sword” rescues the community from -chaos. - -This end affects not only the State, but in most cases its inhabitants -so profoundly that one may speak of a literal _death of the peoples_, -caused by the _capitalistic exploitation of slave labor_. This latter -is a social institution inevitably bound to exist in every state -founded on piracy and maritime ventures and thus coming to use money as -a means of exchange. In the primitive stages of feudalism, whence it -was derived, slavery was harmless, as is true in all economic systems -based on exchange and use in kind, only to become an ulcerating cancer, -utterly destructive of the entire life of the State as soon as it is -exploited by the “capitalist” method, i. e., as soon as slave labor is -applied, not to be used in a system of a feudal payment in kind, but to -supply a market paying in money. - -Numberless slaves are brought into the country by piracy, privateering, -or by the commercial wars. The wealth of their owners permits them -to work the ground more intensively, and the owners of realty within -the confines of the city limits draw ever increasing revenues from -their possessions, and become more and more greedy of land. The small -freeholder in the country, overburdened by the taxes and military -service of wars waged in the interests of this great merchant class, -sinks into debt, becomes a slave for debt, or migrates into the city -as a pauper. But even so there is no hope for him, since the removal -of the peasants has damaged the craftsmen and small traders, for the -peasants were wont to purchase in the city, while the great estates, -constantly increasing by the removal of the peasantry, supply their -own needs by their own slave products. The evil attacks other parts -of the body politic. The remaining trades are gradually usurped by -masters exploiting slave labor, which is cheaper than free labor. -The middle class thus goes to pieces; and a pauper, good-for-nothing -mob, a genuine “bob-tail proletariat” comes into being, which, by -reason of the democratic constitution achieved in the interim, is the -sovereign of the commonwealth. The full course, political as well as -military, is then a mere question of time. It may take place without -a foreign invasion; which, however, usually sets in, when by reason -of the physical breakdown caused by the immense depopulation, by the -consumption of the people in its literal sense, the final stage is -attained. This is the end of all these states. Within the scope of this -treatise we can not dilate on this phase. - -Only one city State was able to maintain itself throughout the -centuries, because it was the ultimate conqueror of all the others, -and because it was enabled to counteract the consumption of population -by the only method of sanitation possible; by extensive recreations -of middle class populations, both in cities and in country districts, -as well as by vast colonizations of peasants on lands taken from the -vanquished. - -The Roman Empire was that state. But even this gigantic organism -finally succumbed to the consumption of population, caused by -capitalistic slave exploitation. In the interval, however, it had -created the first _imperium_, i. e., the first tensely centralized -state on a large scale, and had overcome and amalgamated all -territorial states of both the Mediterranean shores and its neighboring -countries, and had thereby for all time set before the world the model -of such an organized dominion. In addition to this it had developed -the organization of cities and of the system of money economy to such -an extent that they never were utterly destroyed, even in the turmoil -of the barbarian migration. In consequence of this, the feudal -territorial states that occupied the territory of the former Roman -Empire either directly or indirectly received those new impulses which -were to carry them beyond the condition of the normal primitive feudal -State. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEUDAL STATE - - -(a) THE GENESIS OF LANDED PROPERTY - -We now return, as stated above, to that point where the primitive -feudal State gave rise to the city State as an offshoot, to follow the -upward growth of the main branch. As the destiny of the city State was -determined by the agglomeration of that form of wealth about which -the State swung in its orbit, so the fate of the territorial State is -conditioned by that agglomeration of wealth which in turn controls its -orbit, the _ownership of landed property_. - -In the preceding, we followed the economic differentiation in the -case of the shepherd tribes, and showed that even here the law of the -agglomeration about existing nuclei of wealth begins to assert its -efficacy, as soon as the political means comes into play, be it in the -form of wars for booty or still more in the form of slavery. We saw -that the tribe had differentiated nobles and common freemen, beneath -whom slaves, being without any political rights, are subordinated as -a third class. This differentiation of wealth is introduced into the -primitive state, and sharpens very markedly the contrast of social -rank. It becomes still more accentuated by settlement, whereby private -ownership in lands is created. Doubtless there existed even at the time -when the primitive feudal state came into being, great differences in -the amount of lands possessed by individuals, especially if within -the tribe of herdsmen the separation had been strongly marked between -the prince-like owners of large herds and many slaves, and the poorer -common freemen. These princes occupy more land than do the small -freemen. - -At first, this happens quite harmlessly, and without a trace of any -consciousness of the fact that extended possession of land will become -the means of a considerable increase of social power and of wealth. -Of this, there is at this time no question, since at this stage the -common freemen would have been powerful enough to prevent the formation -of extended landed estates had they known that it would eventually do -them harm. But no one could have foreseen this possibility. Lands, in -the condition in which we are observing them, have no value. For that -reason the object and the spoils of the contest were not the possession -of _lands_, but of _the land and its peasants, the latter being bound -to the soil_ (_glebæ adscripti_ of our later law) as labor substrat and -labor motors, from the conjunction of which there grows the object of -the political means, viz., ground rent. - -Every one is at liberty to take as much of _the uncultivated land_ -existing in masses as he needs and will or can cultivate. It is quite -as unlikely that any one would care to measure off for another parts -of an apparently limitless supply, as that any one would apportion the -supply of atmospheric air. - -The princes of the noble clans, probably from the start, pursuant to -the usage of the tribe of herdsmen, receive more “lands and peasants” -than do the common freemen. That is their right as princes, because -of their position as patriarchs, war lords, and captains maintaining -their warlike suites of half-free persons, of servants, of clients, or -of refugees. This probably amounts to a considerable difference in the -primitive amounts of land ownership. But this is not all. The princes -need a larger surface of the “_land without peasants_” than do the -common freemen, because they bring with them their servants and slaves. -These have, however, no standing at law, and are incapable, according -to the universal concepts of folk law, of acquiring title to landed -property. Since, however, they must have land in order to live, their -master takes it for them, so as to settle them thereon. In consequence -of this, the richer the prince of the nomad tribe the more powerful the -territorial magnate becomes. - -But this means that wealth, and with it social rank, is consolidated -more firmly and more durably than in the stage of herdsman -ownership. For the greatest herds may be lost, but landed property -is indestructible; and men bound to labor, bringing forth rentals, -reproduce their kind even after the most terrible slaughter, even -should they not be obtainable full grown in slave hunts. - -About this fixed nucleus of wealth, property begins to agglomerate -with increasing rapidity. Harmless as was the first occupation, men -must soon recognize the fact that rental increases with the number of -slaves one can settle on the unoccupied lands. Henceforth, the external -policy of the feudal state is no longer directed toward the acquisition -of land and peasants, but rather of peasants without land, to be -carried off home as serfs, and there to be colonized anew. When the -entire state carries on the war or the robbing expedition, the nobles -obtain the lion’s share. Very often, however, they go off on their own -account, followed only by their suites, and then the common freeman, -staying at home, receives no share in the loot. Thus the vicious circle -constantly tends rapidly to enlarge with the increasing wealth of the -lands owned by the nobles. The more slaves a noble has, the more rental -he can obtain. With this, in turn, he can maintain a warlike following, -composed of servants, of lazy freemen, and of refugees. With their -help, he can, in turn, drive in so many more slaves, to increase his -rentals. - -This process takes place, even where some central power exists, which, -pursuant to the general law of the people, has the right to dispose of -uncultivated lands; while it is, in many cases, not only by sufferance, -but often by the express sanction of that authority. As long as the -feudal magnate remains the submissive vassal of the crown, it lies -in the king’s interest to make him as strong as possible. By this -means his military suite, to be placed at the disposal of the crown -in times of war, is correspondingly increased. We shall adduce only -one illustration to show that the necessary consequence in universal -history is not confined to the well-known effect in the feudal states -of Western Europe, but follows from these premises even under totally -different surroundings: “The principal service in Fiji consisted in -war duty; and if the outcome was successful it meant new grants of -lands, including therein the denizens, as slaves, and thus led to the -assumption of new obligations.”[91] - -This accumulation of landed property in ever increasing quantity in -the hands of the landed nobility brings the primitive feudal state of -a higher stage to the “finished feudal state” with a complete scale of -feudal ranks. - -Reference to a previous work by the author, based on a study of the -sources, will show the same causal connection for German lands;[92] and -in that publication it was pointed out that in all the instances noted -a process takes place, identical in its principal lines of development. -It is only on this line of reasoning that one can explain the fact, -to take Japan as an example, that its feudal system developed into -the precise details which are well known to the students of European -history, although Japan is inhabited by a race fundamentally different -from the Arians; and besides (a strong argument against giving too -great weight to the materialistic view of history) the process of -agriculture is on a totally different technical basis, since the -Japanese are not cultivators with the plow, but with the hoe. - -In this instance, as throughout this book, it is not the fortune of -a single people that is investigated; it is rather the object of the -author to narrate the typical development, the universal consequences, -of the same basic traits of mankind wherever they are placed. -Presupposing a knowledge of the two most magnificent examples of the -expanded feudal state, Western Europe and Japan, we shall, in general, -limit ourselves to cases less well known, and so far as possible give -the preference to material taken from ethnography, rather than from -history in its more restricted sense. - -The process now to be narrated is a change, gradually consummated but -fundamentally revolutionary, of the political and social articulation -of the primitive feudal state: _the central authority loses its -political power to the territorial nobility, the common freeman sinks -from his status, while the “subject” mounts_. - - -(b) THE CENTRAL POWER IN THE PRIMITIVE FEUDAL STATE - -The patriarch of a tribe of herdsmen, though endowed with the authority -which flows from his war-lordship and sacerdotal functions, generally -has no despotic powers. The same may be said of the “king” of a small -settled community, where, generally speaking, he would exercise very -limited command. On the other hand, as soon as some military genius -manages to fuse together numerous tribes of herdsmen into one powerful -mass of warriors, despotic centralized power is the direct, inevitable -consequence.[93] As soon as war exists, the truth of the Homeric - - οὐκ ἀγαθὴ πολυκοιρανιὴ εἶς κοίρανος ἔστω - εἶς βασιλεύς,[O] - -is admitted by the most unruly tribes, and becomes a fact to be -acted on. The free primitive huntsmen render to their elected chief -unconditioned obedience, while on the war-path; the free Cossacks -of the Ukraine, recognizing no authority in times of peace, submit -to their _hetman’s_ power of life and death in times of war. This -obedience toward their war-lord is a trait common to every genuine -warrior psychology. - -[O] “The rule of the many is not a good thing, over the many there -should be one king.” - -The leaders of the great migrations of nomads are all powerful despots: -Attila, Omar, Genghis Khan, Tamerlane, Mosilikatse, Ketchwayo. -Similarly, we find that whenever a mighty territorial state has -come into being as the result of the welding together of a number -of primitive feudal states, there existed in the beginning a strong -central authority. Examples of this may be seen in the case of Sargon -Cyrus, Chlodowech, Charlemagne, Boleslaw the Red. Sometimes, especially -as long as the main state has not yet reached its geographical or -sociologic bounds, the centralized authority is maintained intact in -the hands of a series of strong monarchs, which degenerates, in some -instances, to the maddest despotism and insanity of some of the Cæsars: -especially do we find flagrant examples of this in Mesopotamia and -in Africa. We shall merely touch on this phase: the more so, as it -has little general effect on the final development of the forms of -government. This point should, however, be stated, that the development -of the form of government of a despotism depends in the main, on what -the _sacerdotal_ status of the rulers may be, in addition to their -position as war-lords, and whether or not they hold the monopoly of -trade as an additional regalian right. - -The combination of Cæsar and Pope tends in all cases to develop the -extreme forms of despotism; while the partition of spiritual and -temporal functions brings it about that their exponents mutually check -and counterbalance one another. A characteristic example may be found -in the conditions prevailing among the Malay states of the East Indian -Archipelago, genuine “maritime states,” whose genesis is an exact -counterpart of that of the Greek maritime states. Generally speaking, -the prince has just as little power among these, as, shall we say, the -king at the opening of the history of the Attic states. The chieftains -of the clans (in Sulu the Dato, in Achin the Panglima), as in the case -of Athens, have the real power. But where, “as in Tobah, religious -motives endow the rulers with the position of a Pope in miniature, an -entirely different phase is found. The Panglima then depend entirely -on the Rajah, and are merely officials.”[94] To refer to a well-known -fact, when the aristocrats and chiefs of the clans in Athens and in -Rome abolished the kingdom, they preserved at least the old _title_, -and granted its use to a dignitary otherwise politically impotent, -in order that the gods might have their offerings presented in the -accustomed manner. For the same reason, in many cases, the descendant -of the former tribal king is preserved as a dignitary, otherwise -totally powerless, while the actual power of government has long since -been transferred to some war chief; as in the later Merovingian Empire, -the Carolingian Mayors of the palace (Majordomus) ruled alongside a -“long locked king,” _rex crinitus_, of the race of Merowech, so, in -Japan, the Shogun ruled beside the Mikado, and in the Empire of the -Incas, the commander of the Inca beside the Huillcauma, who had been -gradually limited to his sacerdotal functions.[P][95] - -[P] In Egypt we find a similar state of affairs, beside the bigoted -Amenhotep IV., the Majordomus of the palace Haremheb, who “managed to -unite in his hands the highest military and administrative functions of -the empire, until he exercised the powers of a regent of the state.” -Schneider, _Civilization and Thought of the Ancient Egyptians_. -Leipzig, 1907, page 22. - -In addition to the office of supreme pontiff, the power of the head of -the state is frequently increased enormously by the trading monopoly, a -function exercised by the primitive chieftains as a natural consequence -of the peaceful barter of guest-gifts. Such a trade monopoly, for -example, was exercised by King Solomon; and latterly by the Roman -Emperor Friedrich II.[Q][96] - -[Q] Cf. _Acta Imperii_, or _Huillard-Breholles, H. D. Fred. -II._--_Translator._ - -As a rule, the negro chieftains are “monopolists of trading”;[97] as -is the King of Sulu.[98] Among the Galla, wherever the supremacy of a -head chief is acknowledged, he becomes “as a matter of course, the -tradesman for his tribe; since none of his subjects is allowed to trade -with strangers directly.”[99] Among the Barotse and Mabunda, the king -is “according to the strict interpretation of the law, the only trader -of his country.”[100] - -Ratzel notes, in telling language, the importance of this factor: -“In addition to his witchcraft, the chief increases his power by a -_monopoly of trading_. Since the chief is the sole intermediary in -trade, everything desired by his subjects passes through his hands, -and he becomes the donor of all longed-for gifts, the fulfiller of the -fondest wishes. In such a system, there lie certainly the possibilities -of great power.”[101] If, in conquered districts, where the power of -government is apt to be more tensely exercised, there is added the -monopoly of trade, the royal power may become very great. - -It may be stated as a general rule, that even in the apparently most -extreme cases of _despotism_, no monarchical _absolutism_ exists. The -ruler may, undeterred by fear of punishment, rage against his subject -class; but he is checked in no small degree by his feudal followers. -Ratzel, in speaking of the subject generally, remarks: “The so-called -‘court assemblage’ of African or of ancient American chiefs is probably -always a council.... Although we meet with traces of absolutism with -all peoples on a low scale, even where the form of government is -republican, the cause of absolutism is not in the strength of either -the state or of the chieftain, but in the moral weakness of the -individual, who succumbs without any effective resistance to the powers -wielded over him.”[102] The kingdom of the Zulu is a limited despotism, -in which very powerful ministers of state (Induna) share the power; -with other Caffir tribes it is a council, sometimes dominating both -people and chieftains.[103] In spite of this control “under Tshaka -every sneezing or hawking in the presence of the tyrant, as well as -every lack of tears at the death of some royal kinsman, was punished -with death.”[104] The same limitation applies to the West African -kingdoms of Dahomy and Ashanti, notorious because of their frightful -barbarities. “In spite of the waste of human life, in war, slave trade, -and human sacrifices, there existed at no place absolute despotism.... -Bowditch remarks on the similarity of the system prevailing in Ashanti, -with its ranks and orders, with the old Persian system as described by -Herodotus.”[105] - -One must be very careful, and this may again be insisted upon, not -to confuse despotism with absolutism. Even in the feudal states of -Western Europe, the rulers exercised, in many cases, power of life and -death, free from the trammels of law; but nevertheless such a ruler was -impotent as against his “magnates.” So long as he does not interfere -with the privileges of the classes, he need not restrain his cruelty, -and he may even occasionally sacrifice one of the great men; but woe to -him were he to dare to touch the economic privileges of his magnates. -It is possible to study this very characteristic phase, completely -free, from the standpoint of law, and yet closely hemmed in by -political checks, in the great East African empires: “The government -of Waganda and Wanyoro is, in theory, based on the rule of the king -over the whole territory; but in reality this is only the semblance of -government, since, as a matter of fact, the lands belong to the supreme -chieftains of the empire. It was they who represented the popular -opposition to foreign influences, in the time of Mtesa; and Muanga did -not dare, for fear of them, to carry out any innovations. Although the -kingship is limited in reality, yet in form it occupies an imposing -position in unessentials. The ruler is absolute master over the lives -and limbs of his subjects, the mass of the people, and feels himself -restrained only in the narrowest circle of the chief courtiers.”[106] - -Precisely the same statement applies to the inhabitants of Oceania, to -mention the last of the great societies that created states: “At no -place does one find an entire absence of a representative mediation -between prince and people.... The aristocratic principle corrects -the patriarchal. Therefore, the extremes of _despotism_ depend more -on class and caste pressure than on the overpowering will of any -individual.”[107] - - -(c) THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DISINTEGRATION OF THE PRIMITIVE FEUDAL -STATE - -Space forbids our detailing the innumerable shadings under which the -patriarchal-aristocratic (in some cases plutocratic) mixture of form -of government in the primitive feudal state is shown in either an -ethnographic, historical or juristic survey. This is likewise of the -greatest importance for the subsequent development. - -It is indifferent how much power the ruler may have had at the -beginning, an inevitable fate breaks down his power in a short while; -and does this, one may say, the faster, the greater that power was, i. -e., the larger the territory of the primitive feudal state of higher -grade. - -Taking into account the process already set forth, which, through the -occupation and settlement of unused lands by means of newly acquired -slaves, made for the increase of power of the separate nobles, a -result came about which might prove uncomfortable for the central -power. Mommsen in speaking of the Celts says: “When in a clan numbering -about eighty thousand armed men, a single chieftain could appear at -convocation with ten thousand followers, exclusive of his serfs and -debtors, it becomes clear that such a noble was rather an independent -prince than a mere citizen of his clan.”[108] And the same may apply to -the “Heiu” of the Somali, where a great landed proprietor maintained -hundreds of families in dependence on his lands, “so that conditions -in Somaliland tend to recall those existing in mediæval Europe during -feudal times.”[109] - -Although such a preponderance of isolated territorial magnates can come -about in the feudal state of low development, it nevertheless reaches -its culmination in the feudal state of higher grade, the great feudal -state; this happens by reason of the increased power given to the -landlords by the bestowal of _public official functions_. - -The more the state expands, the more must official power be delegated -by the central government to its representatives on the borders and -marches, who are constantly threatened by wars and insurrectionary -outbreaks. In order to preserve his bailiwick in safety for the state, -such an official must be endowed with supreme military powers, joined -with the functions of the highest administrative officials. Even -should he not require a large number of civil employees, he still must -have a permanent military force. And how is he to pay these men? With -one possible exception, to be noted hereafter, there are no taxes -which flow into the treasury of the central government and then are -poured back again over the land, since these presuppose an economic -development existing only where money is employed. But in communities -having a system of payments in kind, such as these “territorial -states” all are, there are no taxes payable in money. For that reason, -the central government has no alternative but to turn over to the -counts, or border wardens, or satraps, the income of its territorial -jurisdiction. Such an official, then, receives the dues of the -subjects, determines when and where forced labor is to be rendered, -receives the deodands, fees and penalties payable in cattle, etc.; and -in consideration of these must maintain the armed force, place definite -numbers of armed men at the disposal of the central government, build -and maintain highways and bridges, feed and stable the ruler and his -following, or his “royal messengers,” and finally, furnish a definite -“Sergeantry” consisting of highly valuable goods, easily transported to -the court, such as horses, cattle, slaves, precious metals, wines, etc. - -In other words, he receives an immensely large fief for his services. -If previously he was not, he now becomes the greatest man in his -country, though before he probably was the most powerful landlord in -his official district. He will hereafter do exactly what his equals -in rank are doing, although they may not have his official position; -that is to say, he will, only on a larger scale, continue to settle -new lands with ever newly recruited serfs. By this he increases his -military strength; and this must be wished for and aided by the -central government. For it is the fate of these states, that they must -fatten those very local powers, that are to engulf them. - -Conditions arise which enable the warden of the marches to impose the -terms of his military assistance, especially in the inevitable feuds -which arise over the right of succession to the central government. -Thereby he obtains further valuable concessions, especially the -formal acknowledgment of the heritability of his official fief, so -that office and lands come to be held by an identical tenure. By -this means, he gradually becomes almost independent of the central -authority, and the complaint of the Russian peasant, “The sky is high -up and the Tsar is far off,” tends to become of universal application. -Take this characteristic example from Africa: “The empire of Lunda -is an absolute feudal state. The chieftains (Muata, Mona, Muene) are -permitted independent action in all internal affairs, so long as it -pleases the Muata Jamvo. Usually, the great chieftains, living afar, -send their caravans with their tribute once a year to the Mussumba; -but _those living at too great a distance, sometimes for long periods -omit making any payments of their tribute_; while similar chiefs in the -neighborhood of the capital forward tribute many times a year.”[110] - -Nothing can show more plainly than this report, how, because of -inadequate means of transportation, extent of distance becomes -politically effective in these states loosely held together and in a -state of payment in kind. One is tempted to say that the independence -of the feudal masters grows in proportion to the square of their -distance from the seat of the central authority. The crown must pay -more and more for their services, and must gradually confirm them in -all the sovereign powers of the state, or else permit their usurpation -of these powers after they have seized them one after the other. Such -are heritability of fiefs, tolls on highways and commerce, (in a later -stage the right of coinage), high and low justice, the right to exact -for private gain the public duties of repair of ways and bridges (the -old English _trinodis necessitas_) and the disposal of the military -services of the freemen of the country. - -By these means, the powerful frontier wardens gradually attain an -ever greater, and finally a complete, _de facto_ independence, even -though the _formal_ bond of feudal suzerainty may for a long time -apparently keep together the newly developed principalities. The -reader, of course, recalls instances of these typical transitions; -all mediæval history is one chain of them; not only the Merovingian -and Carolingian Empires, not only Germany, but also France, Italy, -Spain, Poland, Bohemia, Hungary, as well as Japan and China,[111] -have passed through this process of decomposition, not only once, -but repeatedly. And this is no less true of the feudal states of -Mesopotamia: great empires follow each other, acquire power, burst -asunder time after time, and again are re-united. In the case of -Persia, we are expressly told: “Separate states and provinces, by a -successful revolt, obtained freedom for a longer or shorter time, and -the ‘great king’ at Susa did not always have the power to force them -to return to their obedience; in other states, the satraps or warlike -chieftains ruled arbitrarily, carrying on the government faithlessly -and violently, either as independent rulers or tributary under-kings of -the king of kings. The Persian world-empire went to its disintegration -an agglomeration of states and lands, without any general law, without -ordered administration, without uniform judicial system, without order -and enforcement of law, and without possibility of help.”[112] - -A similar fate overtook its neighbor in the valley of the Nile: -“Princes spring from the families of the usurpers, free landlords, -who pay land-taxes to nobody but to the king, and rule over certain -strips of land, or districts. These district princes govern a territory -specifically set apart as pertaining to their official position, and -separate from their family possessions. - -“Later successful warlike operations, perhaps filling in the gap -between the Ancient and the Middle (Egyptian) Empire, _together with -the gathering in of captives of the wars, who could be utilized as -labor motors_, brought a more stringent exploitation of the subjects, -a definite determination of the tributes. During the Middle Empire, -the power of the princes of the clans rose to an enormous height, -they maintained great courts, imitating the splendor of the royal -establishment.”[113] “With the decline of the royal authority -during a period of decay, the higher officials use their power for -personal aims, in order to make their offices hereditary within their -families.”[R][114] - -[R] Maspero says, _New Light on Ancient Egypt_, pp. 218-9: “Until -then, in fact, the high priest had been chosen and nominated by the -king; from the time of Rameses III. he was always chosen from the same -family, and the son succeeded his father on the pontifical throne. From -that time events marched quickly. The Theban mortmain was doubled with -a veritable seigniorial fief, which its masters increased by marriages -with the heirs of neighboring fiefs, by continual bequests from one -branch of the family to the other, and by _the placing of cadets of -each generation at the head of the clergy of certain secondary towns_. -The official protocol of the offices filled by their wives shows that a -century or a century and a half after Rameses III., almost the whole of -the Thebaid, about a third of the Egyptian territory was in the hands -of the High Priest of Ammon and of his family.”--_Translator’s Note -(and italics)._ - -But the operation of this historical law is not restricted to the -“historical” peoples. In speaking of the feudal states of India, -Ratzel states: “Even beyond Radshistan, the nobles often enjoyed a -great measure of independence, so that even in Haiderabad, after the -Nizam had acquired the sole rule over the country, the Umara or Nabobs -maintained troops of their own, independently of the army of the Nizam. -These smaller feudatories did not comply with the increased demands of -modern times as regards the administration of Indian states as often as -did the greater princes.”[115] - -In Africa finally, great feudal states come and pass away, as do -bubbles arising and bursting from the stream of eternally similar -phenomena. The powerful Ashanti empire, within one and a half -centuries, has shriveled to less than one-fifth of its territory;[116] -and many of the empires that the Portuguese encountered have since -disappeared without leaving a trace of their existence. And yet these -were strong feudal powers: “Stately and cruel negro empires, such as -Benin, Dahomy or Ashanti, resemble in many respects ancient Peru or -Mexico, having in their vicinity politically disorganized tribes. The -hereditary nobility of the Mfumus, sharply separated from the rest of -the state, had mainly the administration of the districts, and together -with the more transitory nobility of service, formed in Loango strong -pillars of the ruler and his house.”[117] - -But whenever such a state, once powerful, has split into a number of -territorial states either _de facto_ or juristically independent, the -former process begins anew. The great state gobbles up the smaller -ones, until a new empire has arisen. “The greatest territorial magnates -later become emperors,” says Meitzen laconically of Germany.[118] But -even this great demesne vanishes, split up by the need of equipping -warlike vassals with fiefs. “The Kings soon found that they had donated -away all their belongings; their great territorial possessions in the -Delta had melted away,” says Schneider (l. c. page 38) of the Pharaohs -of the sixth dynasty. The same causes brought about like effects in -the Frankish Empire among both Merovingians and Carolingians; and later -in Germany in the case of the Saxon and Hohenstaufen Emperors.[119] -Additional references are unnecessary, as every one is familiar with -these instances. - -In a subsequent part of this treatise, we shall examine into the causes -that finally liberated the primitive feudal state from this witch’s -curse, this circling from agglomeration to disintegration without end. -Our present task is to take up the _social_ side of the process, as -we have already taken up the historical phase of it. It changes the -articulation of classes in the most decisive manner. - -The common freemen, the lower strata of the dominating group, are -struck with overpowering force. They sink into bondsmenship. Their -decay must go along with that of the central power; since both, allied -one might say, by nature, are menaced simultaneously by the expanding -power of the great territorial lords. The crown controls the landed -magnate so long as the levy of the common freemen of the district is -a superior force to his guards, to his “following.” But a fatal need, -already set forth, impels the crown to deliver over the peasants to -the landed lordling, and from the moment when the county levy has -become weaker than his guards, the free peasants are lost. Where the -sovereign powers of the state are delegated to the territorial magnate, -i. e., where he has developed more or less into an independent lord of -the region, the overthrow of the liberties of the peasants is carried -out, at least in part, under the color of law, by forcing excessive -military services, which ruin the peasants, and which are required the -more often as the dynastic interests of the territorial lord require -new lands and new peasants, or by abusing the right to compulsory -labor, or by turning the administration of public justice into military -oppression. - -The common freemen, however, receive the final blow either by the -formal delegation or by the usurpation of the most important powers -of the crown, the disposition of unoccupied lands or “commons.” -Originally, this land belonged to all the “folk” in common; i. e., to -the freemen for common use; but in accordance with an original custom, -probably universal, the patriarch enjoys disposal of it. This right of -disposition passes to the territorial magnate with the remaining royal -privileges--and thus he has obtained the power to strangle any few -remaining freemen. He now declares all unoccupied lands his property, -_and forbids their settlement by free peasants_, while those only are -permitted access who recognize his superior lordship; i. e., who have -commended themselves to him, or are his serfs. - -That is the last nail in the coffin of the common freemen. Heretofore -their equality of possessions has been in some way guaranteed. -Even if a peasant had twelve sons, his patrimony was not split up, -because eleven of them broke new hides of land in the commons of the -community, or else in the general land not yet distributed to other -villages. That is henceforth impossible; hides tend to divide where -large families grow up, others are united when heir and heiress marry: -henceforth there come into existence “laborers,” recruited from the -owners of half, a quarter, or even an eighth of a hide who help work -a larger area. Thus the free peasantry splits into rich and poor; -this begins to loosen the bond which hitherto had made the bundle of -arrows unbreakable. When, therefore, some comrade is overwhelmed by the -exactions of the lord and has become his liegeman, or if bond peasants -are settled among the original owners, either to occupy some hide -vacated by the extinction of the family or fallen into the hands of the -lord because of the indebtedness of its occupant, then every social -cohesion is loosened; and the peasantry, split apart by class and by -economic contrasts, is handed over without power of resistance to the -magnate. - -On the other hand, the result is the same where the magnate has no -usurped regalian powers of the state. In such cases, open force and -shameless violation of rights accomplish the same ends. The ruler, -far off and impotent, bound to rely on the good will and help of the -violators of law and order, has neither the power nor the opportunity -of interference. - -There is hardly any need of adducing instances. The free peasantry -of Germany were put through the process of expropriation and -declassification at least three times. Once it happened in Celtic -times.[120] The second overthrow of the free peasants of the old German -Empire took place in the ninth and tenth centuries. The third tragedy -of the same form began with the fifteenth century, in the countries -formerly Slavic, which they had conquered and colonized.[121] The -peasants fared worse in those lands, in the “republics of nobles,” -where there was no monarchical central authority, whose community of -interests with their subjects tended to deprive oppression of its -worse features. The Celts in the Gaul of Cæsar’s time are one of the -earliest examples. Here “the great families exercised an economic, -military and political preponderance. They monopolized the leases of -the lucrative rights of the state. They forced the common freemen, -overwhelmed by the taxes which they had themselves imposed, to -borrow of them, and then, first as their debtors, afterward legally -as their serfs, to surrender their liberty. For their own advantage -they developed the system of followers: i. e., the privilege of the -nobility to have about them a mass of armed servants in their pay, -called _ambacti_, with whose aid they formed a state within a state. -Relying on these, their own men-at-arms, they defied the lawful -authorities and the levies of the freemen, and thus were able to burst -asunder the commonwealth.... The only protection to be found was in -the relation of serfdom, where personal duty and interest required the -lord to protect his clients and to avenge any wrong to his men. Since -the state no longer had the power to protect the freemen, these in -growing numbers became the vassals of some powerful noble.”[122] We -find these identical conditions fifteen hundred years later in Kurland, -Livonia, in Swedish Pomerania, in Eastern Holstein, in Mecklenburg, -and especially in Poland. In the German territories the petty nobles -subjugated their peasantry, while in Poland their prey was the -formerly free and noble Schlachziz. “Universal history is monotonous,” -says Ratzel. The same procedure overthrew the peasantry of ancient -Egypt: “After a warlike _intermezzo_, there follows a period in the -history of the Middle Empire, which brings about a deterioration of -the position of the peasantry in Lower Egypt. The number of landlords -decreases, while their territorial growth and power increases. The -tribute of the peasants is hereafter determined by an exact assessment -on their estates, and definitely fixed by a sort of Doomsday Book. -Because of this pressure, many peasants soon enter the lord’s court or -the cities of the local rulers, and take employment there either as -servants, mechanics, or even as overseers in the economic organization -of these manors or courts. In common with any available captives, they -contribute to the extension of the prince’s estates, and to further the -general expulsion of the peasantry from their holdings.”[128] - -The example of the Roman Empire shows, as nothing else can, how -inevitable this process becomes. When we first meet Rome in history -the conception of serfdom or bondage has already been forgotten. When -the “modern period” of Rome opens, only slavery is known. And yet, -within fifteen centuries, the free peasantry again sink into economic -dependence, after Rome has become an overextended, unwieldy empire, -whose border districts have more and more dissolved from the central -control. The great landed proprietors, having been endowed with the -lower justice and police administration on their own estates have -“reduced their servants, who may originally have been free proprietors -of the ‘_ager privatus vectigalis_’ to a state of servitude, and -have thus developed a sort of actual _glebæ adscriptus_, within the -boundaries of their ‘immunities.’”[124] The invading Germans found -this feudal order worked out in Gaul and the other provinces. At this -particular time, the immense difference formerly existing between -slaves and free settlers (_coloni_) had been completely obliterated, -first in their economic position, and then, naturally, in their -constitutional rights. - -Wherever the common freemen sink into political and economic dependence -on the great territorial magnates, when, in other words, they become -bound either to the court or to the lands, the social group formerly -subject to them tend in a corresponding measure to improve their -status. Both layers tend to meet half-way, to approximate their -position, and finally to amalgamate. The observations just made -concerning the free settlers and the agricultural slaves of the later -Roman Empire hold true everywhere. Thus in Germany, freemen and serfs -together formed, when fused, the economic and legally unital group of -_Grundholde_, or men bound to the soil.[125] - -The elevation of the former “subjects,” hereafter for the sake of -brevity to be called “plebs,” flows from the same source as the -debasement of the freeman, and arises by the same necessity from the -very foundations on which these states are themselves erected, viz., -the agglomeration of the landed property in ever fewer hands. - -The plebs are the natural opponents of the central government--since -that is their conqueror and tax imposer; while they naturally oppose -the common freemen, who despise them and oppress them politically, -besides crowding them back economically. The great magnate also is the -natural opponent of the central government--an impediment in his path -toward complete independence, and he is at the same time also a natural -enemy of the common freemen, who in turn not only support the central -government; but also block with their possessions his path toward -territorial dominion, while with their claims to equality of political -rights they annoy his princely pride. Since the political and social -interests of the territorial princes and of the plebs coincide, they -must become allies; the prince can attain complete independence only -if, in his fight for power against the crown and the common freemen, -he controls reliable warriors and acquiescent taxpayers; the plebs -can only then be freed from their pariah-like declassification, both -economically and socially, if the hated and proud common freemen are -brought down to their level. - -This is the second time that we have noted the identity of interest -between the princes and their subjects. The first time we found a -weakly developed solidarity in our second stage of state formation. -This causes the semi-sovereign prince to treat his dependent tenants -as kindly as he ill-treats the free peasants of his territory; in -consequence, they will fight the more willingly for him and contribute -taxes, while the more readily will the oppressed freemen succumb to -the pressure, especially as their share of political power in the -state, coincident with the decline of the central power, has become -only a meaningless phrase. In some cases, as in Germany toward the -end of the tenth century, this was done with full consciousness of -its effects[126]--some prince exercises a particularly “mild” rule, -in order to draw the subjects of a neighboring potentate into his -lands, and thus to increase his own strength in war and taxation, -and to weaken his opponent’s. The plebs come to possess, both legally -and actually, constantly increasing rights, enlarged privileges of -the law of ownership, perhaps self-government in common affairs, -and their own administration of justice; thus they rise in the same -degree as the common freemen sink, until the two classes meet and they -are amalgamated into one body on approximately the same jural and -economic plane. Half serfs, half subjects of a state, they represent -a characteristic formation of the feudal state, which does not as -yet recognize any clear distinction between public and private law; -in its turn an immediate consequence of its own historical genesis, -_the dominion in the form of a state for the sake of economic private -rights_. - - -(d) THE ETHNIC AMALGAMATION - -The juristic and social amalgamation of the degraded freemen and -the uplifted plebs henceforth inevitably tends toward ethnic -interpenetration. While at first the subject peoples were not allowed -either to intermarry or to have social intercourse with the freemen, -now no such obstacles can be maintained; in any single village the -social class is no longer determined by descent from the ruling race, -but rather by wealth. And the case may frequently arise where the -pure-blooded descendant of the warrior herdsman must earn his living -as a field hand in the hire of the equally pure-blooded descendant of -the former serfs. The social group of the subjects is now composed of a -part of the former ethnic master group and a part of the former subject -group. - -We say from a part only, because the other part has by this time been -amalgamated with the other part of the old ethnic master group into a -unital social class. In other words, a part of the plebs has not only -attained the position to which the mass of the common freemen have -sunk, but has climbed far beyond it, in that it has been completely -received into the dominating group, which in the meantime, has not only -risen enormously, but has been as greatly diminished in numbers. - -And that, too, is a universal process found in all history; because -everywhere it follows with equally compelling force from the very -premises of feudal dominion. The _primus inter pares_, whether the -holder of the central power or some local potentate, taking the rank -of a prince, requires more supple tools for his dominion than are to -be found among his “peers.” The latter represent a class whom he must -put down if he wants to rise--and that is and must be the aim of every -one, since in this stage aiming for power is identical with the aim of -self-preservation. In this effort he is opposed by his obnoxious and -stiff-necked cousins and by his petty nobles--and for this reason, we -find at every court, from that of the sovereign king of a mighty feudal -empire down to the lord of what is hardly more than a big estate, -men of insignificant descent as confidential officials alongside -representatives of the master group, who in many cases under the mask -of officials of the prince, as a matter of fact, are “ephors,” sharers -of the power of the prince as the plenipotentiaries of their group. -Let us but recall the Induna at the court of the Bantu kings. There -is no wonder, then, that the prince rather places confidence in his -own men than in these annoying and pretentious advisers, in men whose -position is indissolubly bound up with his own, and who would be ruined -by his fall.[S] - -[S] One of the most notable instances may be found in the case of -Markward of Annweiler, Marquis of Ancona and Duke of Ravenna, seneschal -of Henry VI., who after the death of the Emperor Henry VI. disputed the -power of the Regent Constance acting for her son, Frederick II. (See -Boehmer-Ficker, _Regesta Imperii_, V, vol. 1, No. 511. v. ad. annum -1197.)--_Translator._ - -Here, too, historical references are nearly superfluous. Every one -is familiar with the fact that at the courts of the Western European -feudal kingdoms, besides the relatives of the king and some noble -vassals, there were also elements from the lower groups, occupying high -positions, clerics and great warriors of the plebeian class. Among the -immediate following of Charlemagne all the races and peoples of his -empire were represented. Also in the tales of Theodoric the Goth in -the Dietrich Saga of the _Niebelungen Lied_, this rise of brave sons -of the subject races finds its reflection. In addition to these, there -follow some less well-known instances. - -In Egypt, as far back as the Old Empire, there is found alongside the -royal officials of the feudal nobility, who are the descendants of the -Shepherd conquerors, administering their districts as representatives -of the crown, with plenary powers as deputies, “_a mass of court -officials_ trusted with determined functions of government.” It -“originated with the _servants_ employed at the courts of the princes, -_such as prisoners of war, refugees etc._”[127] The fable of Joseph -shows a state of affairs known at that time to be a usual occurrence, -of the rise of a slave to the position of an all powerful minister -of state. At the present day such a career is within the realm of -possibility at any oriental court, such as Persia, Turkey, or Morocco, -etc. In the case of old Marshal Derflinger, in the time of Friedrich -Wilhelm I., the Great Elector, at a much later date, we have an -example from the transition of the developed feudal state to a more -modern form of the state, which might be multiplied by the examples of -innumerable other brave swordsmen. - -Let us add a few instances from the peoples “disregarded by history.” -Ratzel tells of the realm of Bornu: “The freemen have not lost the -consciousness of their free descent, in contrast with the slaves of -the sheik; but the rulers place more confidence in their slaves than -in their own kinsmen and free associates of their tribe. They can -count on the devotion of the former. Not only positions at court, but -the defense of the country was from ancient times preferably confided -to slaves. The brothers of the prince, as well as the more ambitious -or more efficient sons, are objects of suspicion; and while the most -important places at court are in the hands of slaves, the princes are -put at posts far from the seat of government. Their salaries are paid -from the incomes of the offices and the taxes from the provinces.”[128] - -Among the Fulbe “society is divided into princes, chieftains, commons -and slaves. The slaves of the king play a great rôle as soldiers and -officials, and may hope for the highest offices in the state.”[129] - -This nobility of the court’s creation may, in certain cases, be -admitted to the great imperial offices, so that according to the method -stated above, it may achieve the sovereignty over a territory. In the -developed feudal state, it represents the high nobility; and usually -manages to preserve its rank, even when some more powerful neighbor -has mediatized it by incorporating the state. The Frankish higher -nobility certainly contains such elements from the original lower -group;[130] and since from its blood the entire upper nobility of the -European civilized states has been descended at least in direct line by -marriage, we find an ethnic amalgamation, both in the present day group -of subjects and in the highest order of the ruling class. And the same -applies to Egypt: “With the sinking of the royal authority in the time -of the decay, the higher officials abuse their power for personal ends, -to make their offices hereditary in their families, and thereby to call -into existence an official nobility not differentiated from the rest -of the population.”[131] - -And finally, the same process, from the same causes, takes hold of -the present middle class, the lower stratum of the master class, -the officials and officers of the great feudatories. At first there -still exists a social difference between, on the one hand, the free -vassals, the subfeudatories of the great landlord, kinsmen, younger -sons of other noble families, impoverished associates from the same -district, in isolated cases freeborn sons of peasants, free refugees -and professional ruffians of free descent; and on the other, if the -term may be allowed, the subalterns of the guards of plebeian descent. -But lack of freedom advances, while freedom sinks in social value; and -here too the ruler places more reliance on his creatures than on his -peers. Here also, sooner or later, the process of amalgamation becomes -complete. In Germany, as late as 1085, the non-free nobility of the -court ranks between “_servi et litones_” while a century afterward -it is placed with the “_liberi et nobiles_.” In the course of the -thirteenth century, it has been completely absorbed, along with the -free vassals, into the nobility by chivalry. The two orders in the -meantime tend to become equal economically; both have subinfeudations, -fiefs on the obligation of service in warfare, and the service feuds of -the bondsmen; while all the fiefs of the “ministerials” or sergeants -have in the meantime become as heritable as are those of the free -vassals, as much so as are the patrimonies of the few surviving smaller -territorial lords belonging to the original nobility, who may still -have escaped the grasp of the great territorial principalities. - -In ways quite analogous to this the development went on in all other -feudal states of Western Europe; while its exact counterpart is found -in the extremest Orient on the edge of the Eurasian continent, in -Japan. The daimio are the higher nobility; the samurai, the chivalry, -the nobility of the sword. - - -(e) THE DEVELOPED FEUDAL STATE - -With this the feudal state has reached its pinnacle. It forms, -politically and socially, a hierarchy of numerous strata; of which, in -all cases, the lower is bound to render service to the next above it, -and the superior is bound to render protection to the one below. The -pyramid rests on the laboring population, of whom the major part are as -yet peasants; the surplus of their labor, the ground rental, the entire -“surplus value” of the economic means is used to support the upper -strata of society. This ground rent from the majority of estates is -turned over to the small holders of fiefs, except where these estates -are still in the immediate possession of the prince or of the crown and -have not as yet been granted as fiefs. The holders of them are bound in -return to provide the stipulated military service, and also, in certain -cases, to render labor of an economic value. The larger vassal is in -turn bound to serve the great tenants of the crown; who in their turn -are, at least at strict law, under similar obligation toward the bearer -of the central power; while emperor, king, sultan, shah, or Pharaoh -in their turn, are regarded as the vassals of the tribal god. Thus -there starts from the fields, whose peasantry support and nourish all, -and mounts up to the “king of heaven” an artificially graded order of -ranks, which constricts so absolutely all the life of the state, that -according to custom and law neither a bit of land nor a man can be -understood unless within its fold. Since all rights originally created -for the common freemen have either been resumed by the state, or else -have been distorted by the victorious princes of territories, it comes -about that a person not in some feudal relation to some superior must -in fact be “without the law,” be without claim for protection or -justice, i. e., be outside the scope of that power which alone affords -justice. Therefore the rule, _nulle terre sans seigneur_, appearing to -us at first blush as an ebullition of feudal arrogance, is as a matter -of fact the codification of an existing new state of law, or at the -very least the clearing away of some archaic remnants, no longer to be -tolerated, of the completely discarded _primitive_ feudal state. - -Those philosophers of history who pretend to explain every historic -development from the quality of “races,” give as the center of their -strategic position the alleged fact, that only the Germans, thanks -to their superior “political capacity,” have managed to raise the -artistic edifice of the developed feudal state. Some of the vigor of -this argument has departed, since the conviction began to dawn on them -that in Japan, the Mongol race had accomplished this identical result. -No one can tell what the negro races might have done, had not the -irruption of stronger civilizations barred their way, and yet Uganda -does not differ very greatly from the empires of the Carolingians or of -Boleslaw the Red, except that men did not have in Uganda any “values of -tradition” of mediæval culture: and these values were not any merit of -the Germanic races, but a gift wherewith fortune endowed them. - -Shifting the discussion from the negro to the “Semites,” we find the -charge made that this race has absolutely no capacity for the formation -of states. And yet we find, thousands of years ago, this same feudal -system developed, by Semites, if the founders of the Egyptian kingdom -were Semites. One would think the following description of Thurnwald -were taken from the period of the Hohenstaufen emperors: “Whoever -entered the following of some powerful one, was thereafter protected -by him as though he had been the head of the family. This relation ... -betokens a fiduciary relation similar to vassalage. This relation of -protection in return for allegiance tends to become the basis of the -organization of all Egyptian society. It is the basis of the relations -of the feudal lord to his sergeants and peasants, as it is that of the -Pharaoh to his officials. The cohesion of the individuals in groups -subject to common protecting lords, is founded on this view, even up to -the apex of the pyramid, to the king himself regarded as ‘the vicar of -his ancestors,’ as the vassal of the gods on earth.... Whosoever stands -without this social grasp, a ‘man without a master,’ is without the -pale of protection and therefore without the law.”[133] - -The hypothesis of the endowment of any particular race has not been -used by us, and we have no need of it. As Herbert Spencer says, it is -the stupidest of all imaginable attempts to construct a philosophy of -history. - -The first characteristic of the developed feudal state is the manifold -gradation of ranks built up into the one pyramid of mutual dependence. -Its second distinctive mark is the amalgamation of the ethnic groups, -originally separated. - -The consciousness formerly existent of difference of _races_ has -disappeared completely. There remains only the _difference of classes_. - -Henceforth we shall deal only with social classes, and no longer -with ethnic groups. The social contrast is the only ruling factor -in the life of the state. Consistently with this the ethnic group -consciousness changes to a class consciousness, the theories of the -group, to the theories of the class. Yet they do not thereby change in -the least their essence. The new dominating classes are just as full -of their divine right as was the former master group, and it soon is -seen that the new nobility of the sword manages to forget, quickly and -thoroughly, its descent from the vanquished group; while the former -freemen now declassed, or the former petty nobles sunk in the social -scale, henceforth swear just as firmly by “natural law” as did formerly -only the subjected tribes. - -The developed feudal state is, in its essentials, exactly the same -thing as it was when yet in the second stage of state formation. -Its form is that of dominion, its reason for being, the political -exploitation of the economic means, limited by public law, which -compels the master class to give the correlative protection, and which -guarantees to the lower class the right of being protected, to the -extent that they are kept working and paying taxes, that they may -fulfil their duty to their masters. In its essentials government has -not changed, it has only been disposed in more grades; and the same -applies to the exploitation, or as the economic theory puts it, “the -distribution” of wealth. - -Just as formerly, so now, the internal policy of these states swings in -that orbit prescribed by the parallelogram of the centrifugal thrust -of the former group contests, now class wars, counteracted by the -centripetal pull of the common interests. Just as formerly, so now, its -foreign policy is determined by the striving of its master class for -new lands and serfs, a thrust for extension caused at the same time by -the still existing need of self-preservation. Although differentiated -much more minutely, and integrated much more powerfully, the developed -feudal state is in the end nothing more than the primitive state -arrived at its maturity. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE - - -If we understand the outcome of the feudal state, in the sense given -above, as further organic development either forward or backward -conditioned by the power of inner forces, but not as a physical -termination, brought about or conditioned by outside forces, then we -may say that the outcome of the feudal state is determined essentially -by the independent development of social institutions called into being -by the economic means. - -Such influences may come also from without, from foreign states -which, thanks to a more advanced economic development, possess a -more tensely centralized power, a better military organization, and -a greater forward thrust. We have touched on some of these phases. -The independent development of the Mediterranean feudal states was -abruptly stopped by their collision with those maritime states, -which were on a much higher plane of economic growth and wealth, -and more centralized, such as Carthage, and more especially Rome. -The destruction of the Persian Empire by Alexander the Great may -be instanced in this connection, since Macedonia had at that time -appropriated the economic advances of the Hellenic maritime states. -The best example within modern times is the foreign influence in the -case of Japan, whose development was shortened in an almost incredible -manner by the military and peaceful impulses of Western European -civilization. In the space of barely one generation it covered the road -from a fully matured feudal state to the completely developed modern -constitutional state. - -It seems to me that we have only to deal with an abbreviation of -the process of development. As far as we can see--though henceforth -historical evidence becomes meager, and there are scarcely any examples -from ethnography--the rule may be stated that forces from within, -even without strong foreign influences, lead the matured feudal state, -with strict logical consistency, on the same path to the identical -conclusion. - -The creators of the economic means controlling this advance are the -cities and their system of money economy, which gradually supersedes -the system of natural economy, and thereby dislocates the axis about -which the whole life of the state swings; in place of landed property, -mobile capital gradually becomes preponderant. - - -(a) THE EMANCIPATION OF THE PEASANTRY - -All this follows as a natural consequence of the basic premise of the -feudal state. The more the great private landlords become a landed -nobility, the more in the same measure must the feudal system of -natural economy break to pieces. The more great landed property rights -become vested in and nurtured by the princes of territorial states, -the more is the feudal system based on payments in kind bound to -disintegrate; one may say that the two keep step in this development. - -So long as the ownership of great estates is comparatively limited, the -primitive principle of the bee-keeper, allowing his peasants barely -enough for subsistence, can be carried out. When, however, these -expand into territorial dimensions, and include, as is regularly the -case, accretions of land which are the results of successful warfare, -or by the relinquishment and subinfeudation through heritage or -political marriages of smaller land owners, scattered widely about the -country and far from the master’s original domains, then the policy -of the bee-keeper can no longer be carried out. Unless, therefore, -the territorial magnate means to keep in his pay an immense mass of -overseers, which would be both expensive and politically unwise, he -would have to impose on his peasants some fixed tribute, partly rental -and partly tax. The economic need of an administrative reform unites, -therefore, with the political necessity, to elevate the “plebs,” in -the way which has already been discussed. - -The more the territorial magnate ceases to be a private landlord, -the more exclusively he tends to become a subject of public law, -viz., prince of a territory, the more the solidarity mentioned above, -between prince and people grows. We saw that some few magnates even -as far back as the period of transition from great landed estates to -principalities, found it to their greatest interest to carry on a -“mild” government. This accomplished the result, not only of educating -their plebs to a more virile consciousness toward the state, but also -had the effect of making it easy for the few remaining common freemen -to give up their political rights in return for protection; while it -was still more important, in that it deprived their neighbors and -rivals of their precious human material. When the territorial prince -has finally reached complete _de facto_ independence, his self interest -must prompt him steadfastly to persevere in the path thus begun. Should -he, however, again invest his bailiffs or officers with lands and -peasants, he will still have the most pressing political interest to -see to it that his subjects are not delivered over to them without -restraint. In order to retain his control, the prince will limit the -right of the “knights” to incomes from lands to definite payments in -kind and limited forced labor, reserving to himself that required in -the public interests, such as forced labor on highways or on bridges. -We shall soon come to see that the circumstance that in all developed -feudal states the peasants have at least two masters claiming service, -is decisive for their later rise. - -For all these reasons, the services to be required of peasants in a -developed feudal state must in some fashion be limited. Henceforth, -all surplus belongs to him free from the control of the landlord. -With this change, the character of landed property has been utterly -revolutionized. Heretofore the landlord, as of right, was entitled to -the entire revenue saving only what was absolutely necessary to permit -his peasants to subsist and continue their brood; while hereafter, the -total product of his work, as of right, belongs to the peasant, saving -only a fixed charge for his landlord as ground rent. The possession -of vast landed estates has developed into (_manorial_) _rights. This -completes the second important step taken by humanity toward its goal._ -The first step was taken when man made the transition from the stage -of bear to that of the bee-keeper, and thereby discovered slavery; -this step abolishes slavery. Laboring humanity, heretofore only _an -object_ of the law, now for the first time becomes an entity capable -of enjoying rights. The _labor motor_, without rights, belonging to -its master, and without effective guarantees of life and limb, has now -become the taxpaying subject of some prince. Henceforth the economic -means, now for the first time assured of its success, develops its -forces quite differently. The peasant works with incomparably more -industry and care, obtains more than he needs, and thereby calls -into being the “city” in the economic sense of the term, viz., the -industrial city. The surplus produced by the peasantry calls into -being a demand for objects not produced in the peasant economy; while -at the same time, the more intensive agriculture brings about a -reduction of those industrial by-products heretofore worked out by the -peasant house industry. - -Since agriculture and cattle-raising absorb in ever increasing degrees -the energies of the rural family, it becomes possible and necessary to -divide labor between original production and manufacture; the village -tends to become primarily the place of the former, the industrial city -comes into being as the seat of the latter. - - -(b) THE GENESIS OF THE INDUSTRIAL STATE - -Let there be no misunderstanding: we do not maintain that the city -comes thus into being, but only the _industrial city_. There has been -in existence the real historical city, to be found in every developed -feudal state. Such cities came into being either because of a purely -political means, as a stronghold,[134] or by the coöperation of -the political with economic means, _as a market place_, or because -of some religious need, as the environs of some temple.[T] Wherever -such a city in the historical sense exists in the neighborhood, the -newly arising industrial city tends to grow up about it; otherwise it -develops spontaneously from the existing and matured division of labor. -As a rule, it will in its turn grow into a stronghold and have its own -places of worship. - -[T] “Every place of worship gathers about it dwellings of the priests, -schools, and rest-houses for pilgrims.”--Ratzel, l. c. II., p. 575. - -Naturally, every place toward which great pilgrimages proceed becomes -an extended trade center. We may see the remembrances thereof in the -fact that the great wholesale markets, held at stated times in Northern -Europe, are called _Messen_ from the religious ceremony. - -These are but accidental historical admixtures. In its strict economic -sense “city” means the place of the economic means, or the exchange -and interchange for equivalent values between rural production and -manufacture. This corresponds to the common use of language, by which a -stronghold however great, an agglomeration of temples, cloisters and -places of pilgrimage however extensive, were they conceivable without -any place for exchange, would be designated after their external -characteristics as “like a city” or “resembling a city.” - -Although there may have been few changes in the exterior of the -historical city, there has taken place an internal revolution on -a magnificent scale. _The industrial city is directly opposed to -the state._ As the state is the developed political means, _so the -industrial city is the developed economic means_. The great contest -filling universal history, nay its very meaning, henceforth takes place -between city and state. - -The city as an economic, political body undermines the feudal system -with political and economic arms. With the first the city _forces_, -with the second it _lures_, their power away from the feudal master -class. - -This process takes place in the field of politics by the interference -of the city, now a center of its own powers, in the political mechanism -of the developed feudal state, between the central power and the local -territorial magnates and their subjects. The cities are the strongholds -and the dwelling places of warlike men, as well as depots of material -for carrying on war (arms, etc.); and later they become central -supply reservoirs for money used in the contests between the central -government and the growing territorial princes, or between these in -their internecine wars. Thus they are important strategic points or -valuable allies; and may by far-sighted policy acquire important rights. - -As a rule, the cities take the part of the crown in fights against -the feudal nobles, from social reasons, because the landed nobles -refuse to recognize the social equality, demanded as of right by -their more wealthy citizens; from political reasons, because the -central government, thanks to the solidarity between prince and -people, is more apt to be influenced by common interests than is -the territorial magnate, who serves only his private interests; and -finally from economic reasons, because city life can prosper only in -peace and safety. The practises of chivalry, such as club law, and -private warfare, and the knights’ practise of looting caravans are -irreconcilable with the economic means; and therefore, the cities are -faithful allies of the guardians of peace and justice, first to the -emperor, later on, to the sovereign territorial prince; and when the -armed citizenship breaks and pillages some robber baron’s fortress, -the tiny drop reflects the identical process happening in the ocean of -history. - -In order successfully to carry this political rôle the city must -attract as many citizens as possible, an endeavor also forced on it -by purely economic considerations, since both divisions of labor and -wealth increase with increased citizenship. Therefore cities favor -immigration with all their powers; and once more show in this the polar -contrast of their essential difference from the feudal landlords. The -new citizens thus attracted into the cities are withdrawn from the -feudal estates, which are thereby weakened in power of taxation and -military defense in proportion as the cities are strengthened. The -city becomes a mighty competitor at the auction, wherein the serf is -knocked down to the highest bidder, to the one, that is to say, who -offers the most rights. The city offers the peasant _complete liberty_, -and in some cases house and courtyard. The principle, “city air frees -the peasant” is successfully fought out; and the central government, -pleased to strengthen the cities and to weaken the turbulent nobles, -usually confirms by charter the newly acquired rights. - -_The third great move in the progress of universal history is to be -seen in the discovery of the honor of free labor_; or better in its -rediscovery, it having been lost sight of since those far-off times in -which the free huntsman and the subjugated primitive tiller enjoyed -the results of their labor. As yet the peasant bears the mark of the -pariah and his rights are little respected. But in the wall-girt, -well-defended city, the citizen holds his head high. He is a freeman in -every sense of the word, free even at law, since we find in the grants -of rights to many early enfranchised cities (_Ville-franche_) the -provision that a serf residing therein “a year and a day” undisturbed -by his master’s claim is to be deemed free. - -Within the city walls there are still various ranks and grades of -political status. At first the old settlers, the men of rank equal -with the nobles of the surrounding country, the ancient freemen of the -burgh, refuse to the newcomers, usually poor artisans or hucksters, the -right of sharing in the government. But, as we saw in the case of the -maritime cities, such gradations of rank can not be maintained within -a business community. The majority, intelligent, skeptical, closely -organized and compact, forces the concession of equal rights. The only -difference is that the contest is longer in a developed feudal state, -because now the fight concerns not only the parties at interest. The -great territorial magnates of the neighborhood and the princes hinder -the full development of the forces by their interference. In the -maritime states of the ancient world, there was no _tertius gaudens_ -who could derive any profit from the contests within the city, since -outside the cities there existed no system of powerful feudal lords. - -These then, are the political arms of the cities in their contest with -the feudal state: alliances with the crown, direct attack, and the -enticing away of the serfs of the feudal lords into the enfranchising -air of the city. Its economic weapons are no less effective, the change -from payments in kind to the system of _money as a means of exchange_ -is inseparably connected with civic methods, is the means whereby the -method of payment in kind is utterly destroyed, and with it the feudal -state. - - -(c) THE INFLUENCES OF MONEY ECONOMY - -The sociological process set into motion by the system of money economy -is so well known and its mechanics are so generally recognized, that a -few suggestions will suffice. - -Here, as in the case of the maritime states, the consequence of the -invading money system is that the _central government becomes almost -omnipotent, while the local powers are reduced to complete impotence_. - -Dominion is not an end in itself, but merely the means of the rulers -to their essential object, the enjoyment without labor of articles -of consumption as many and as valuable as possible. During the -prevalence of the system of natural economy there is no other way of -obtaining them save by dominion; the wardens of the marches and the -territorial princes obtain their wealth by their political power. The -more peasants who are owned, the greater is the military power and -the larger the scope of the territory subjected, and thus the greater -are the revenues. As soon, however, as the products of agriculture -are exchangeable for enticing wares, it becomes more rational for -every one primarily a private man, i. e., for every feudal lord not a -territorial prince--and this now includes the knights--to decrease as -far as possible the number of peasants, and to leave only such small -numbers as can with the utmost labor turn out the greatest product from -the land, and to leave these as little as possible. The net product -of the real estate, thus tremendously increased, is now taken to the -markets and sold for goods, and is no longer used to keep a fencible -body of guards. Having dissolved this following, the knight becomes -simply the manager of a knight’s fee.[U] With this event, as with one -blow, the central power, that of king or territorial prince, is without -a rival for the dominion, and has become politically omnipotent. The -unruly vassals, who formerly made the weak kings tremble, after a short -attempt at joint rule during the time of the government of the feudal -estates, have changed into the supple courtiers, begging favors at the -hands of some absolute monarch, like Louis XIV. And he furthermore -has become their last resort, since the military power, now solely -exercised by him as the paymaster of the forces, alone can protect them -from the ever-immanent revolt of their tenants, ground to the bone. -While in the time of natural economy the crown was in nearly every -instance allied with peasants and cities against nobility, we now have -the union of the absolute kings, born from the feudal state, with -their nobility, against the representatives of the economic means. - -[U] See reference as to the meaning of _Rittergutsbesitz_, ante, page -84.--_Translator._ - -Since the days of Adam Smith it has been customary to state this -fundamental revolution in some such form, as though the foolish nobles -had sold their birthright for a mess of pottage, when they traded their -dominion for foolish articles of luxury. No view can be more erroneous. -Individuals often err in the safe-guarding of their interests: _a class -for any prolonged period never is in error_. - -The fact of the matter is, that the system of money payments -strengthened the central power so mightily and immediately, that even -without the interposition of the agrarian upheaval, any resistance -of the landed nobility would have been senseless. As is shown in the -history of antiquity, the army of a central government, financially -strong, is always superior to feudal levies. Money permits the armament -of peasant sons, and the drilling of them into professional soldiers, -whose solid organization is always superior to the loose confederation -of an armed mass of knights. Besides, at this stage, the central -government could also count on the aid of the well-armed squares of the -urban guilds. - -Gunpowder did the rest in Western Europe. Firearms, however, are a -product that can be turned out only in the industrial establishments -of a wealthy city. Because of these technical military reasons, even -that feudal landlord who might not care for the newly established -luxuries and who might only be desirous of maintaining or increasing -his independent position, must subject his territories to the same -agrarian revolution; since, in order to be strong, he now before all -else must have _money_, which in the new order of things, has become -the _nervus rerum_, either to buy arms or to engage mercenaries. A -second capitalistic wholesale undertaking, therefore, has come into -being through the system of payments in money; besides the wholesale -management of landed estates, war is carried on as a great business -enterprise--the condottieri appear on the stage. The market is full of -material for armies of mercenaries, the discharged guards of the feudal -lords and the young peasants whose lands have been taken up by the -lords. - -There are instances where some petty noble may mount to the throne of -some territorial principality, as happened many a time in Italy, and as -was accomplished by Albrecht Wallenstein, even as late as the period -of the Thirty Years’ War. But that is a matter of individual fate, not -affecting the final result. The local powers disappear from the contest -of political forces as independent centers of authority and retain -the remnant of their former influence only so long as they serve the -princes as a source of supplies; that is, the state composed of its -feudal estates. - -The infinite increase in the power of the crown is then enhanced by a -second creation of the system of payment in money, by _officialdom_. -We have told in detail of the vicious circle which forced the feudal -state into a cul-de-sac between agglomeration and dissolution, as long -as its bailiffs had to be paid with “lands and peasants” and thereby -were nursed into potential rivals of their creator. With the advent of -payments in money, the vicious circle is broken. Henceforth the central -government carries on its functions through paid employees, permanently -dependent on their paymaster.[135] Henceforth there is possible a -permanently established, tensely centralized government, and empires -come into being, such as had not existed since the developed maritime -states of antiquity, which also were founded on the payments in money. - -This revolution of the political mechanism was everywhere put into -motion by the development of the money economy--with but one exception, -as far as I can see, viz., Egypt. - -Here, according to the statement of experts, no definite information is -to be had, and it seems that the system of money exchanges appears as a -matured institution only in Greek times. Until that time, the tribute -of the peasants was paid in kind;[136] and yet we find, shortly after -the expulsion of the Shepherd Kings, during the New Empire (_circa_ -sixteenth century B. C.), that the absolutism of the kings was fully -developed: “The military power is upheld by foreign mercenaries, the -administration is carried on by a _centralized body of officials_ -dependent on the royal favor, _while the feudal aristocracy has -disappeared_.”[137] - -It may seem that this exception proves the rule. Egypt is a country -of exceptional geographic conformation. Jammed into a narrow compass, -between mountains and the desert, a natural highway, the River Nile, -traverses its entire length, and permits the transportation of bulky -freight with much greater facility than the finest road. And this -highway made it easy for the Pharaoh to assemble the taxes of all his -districts in his own storehouses, the so-called “houses”[138] and from -them to supply his garrisons and civil employees with the products -themselves _in natura_. For that reason Egypt, after it has once -become unified into an empire, stays centralized, until foreign powers -extinguish its life as a “state.” “This circumstance is the source of -the enormous and plenary power exercised by the Pharaoh where payments -are still made in kind; the exclusive and immediate control of the -objects of daily consumption are in his hand. The ruler distributes -to his employees only such quantities of the entire mass of goods as -appears to him good and proper; and since the articles of luxury are -nearly all exclusively in his hands, he enjoys on this account also an -extraordinary plenitude of power.”[139] - -With this one exception, where a mighty force executes the task, the -power of circulating money seems in all cases to have dissolved the -feudal state. - -The cost of the revolution fell on peasants and cities. When peace is -made, the crown and the petty nobles mutually sacrifice the peasantry, -dividing them, so to say, into two ideal halves; the crown grants to -the nobility the major part of the peasants’ common lands, and the -greatest part of their working powers that are not yet expropriated; -the nobility concedes to the crown the right of recruiting and of -taxing both peasantry and cities. The peasant, who had grown wealthy in -freedom, sinks back into poverty and therefore into social inferiority. -The former feudal powers now unite as allies to subjugate the cities, -except where, as in Upper Italy, these become feudal central powers -themselves. (And even in that case they for the most part all fall -into the power of captains of mercenaries, condottieri.) The power of -attack of the adversaries has become stronger, the power of the cities -has diminished. For with the decay of the peasantry, their purchase -power diminishes and with it the prosperity of the cities, based -thereon. The small cities in the country stagnate and become poorer, -and being now incapable of defense, fall a prey to the absolutist rule -of the territorial princes; the larger cities, where the demand for -the luxuries of the nobles has brought into being a strong trading -element, split up into social groups and thus fritter away their -political strength. The immigration now pouring into their walls is -composed of discharged and broken mercenaries, dispossessed peasants, -pauperized mechanics from the smaller towns; it is in other words a -_proletarian_ immigration. For the first time there appears, in the -terminology of Karl Marx, the “free laborer,” in masses, competing -with his own class in the labor markets of the cities. And again, the -“law of agglomeration” enters to form effective class and property -distinctions, and thus to tear apart the civic population. Wild fights -take place in the cities between the classes; through which the -territorial prince, in nearly every instance, again succeeds in gaining -control. The only cities that can permanently escape the deadly embrace -of the prince’s power are the few genuine “maritime states,” or “city -states.” - -As in the case of the maritime states, the pivot of the state’s life -has again shifted over to another place. Instead of circling about -wealth vested in landed estates, it now turns about capitalized wealth, -because in the meantime property in real estate has itself become -“capital.” _Why is it that the development does not, as in the case of -the maritime states, open out into the capitalistic expropriation of -slave labor?_ - -There are two controlling reasons, one internal, the other external. -The external reason is to be found in this, that slave hunting on a -profitable scale is scarcely possible at this time in any part of the -world, since nearly all countries within reach are also organized -as strong states. Wherever it is possible, as for instance, in the -American colonies of the West European powers, it develops at once. - -The external reason may be found in the circumstance that the -peasant of the interior countries, in contrast to the conditions -prevailing in the maritime states, is subject, not to one master, but -to at least two[V] persons entitled to his service, his prince and -his landlord. Both resist any attempt to diminish their peasants’ -capacity for service, since this is essential to their interests. -Especially strong princes did much for their peasants, e. g., those of -Brandenburg-Prussia. For this reason, the peasants, although exploited -miserably, yet retained their personal liberty and their standing as -subjects endowed with personal rights in all states where the feudal -system had been fully developed when the system of payments in money -replaced that of payments in kind. - -[V] In mediæval Germany the peasants pay tribute in many cases not only -to the landlord and to the territorial prince, but also to the provost -and to the bailiff. - -The evidence that this explanation is correct may be found in the -relations of those states which were gripped by the system of exchange -in money, before the feudal system had become worked out. - -This applies especially to those districts of Germany formerly occupied -by Slavs, but particularly to _Poland_. In these districts, the feudal -system had not yet been worked out as thoroughly as in the regions -where the demand for grain products in the great western industrial -centers had changed the nobles, the subjects of public law, into the -owners of a _Rittergut_,[W] the subjects of private economic interests. -In these districts, the peasants were subject to the duty of rendering -service only to _one_ master, who was both their liege lord and -landlord; and because of that, there came into being the republics of -nobles mentioned above, which, as far as the pressure of their more -progressed neighbors would permit, tended to approach the capitalistic -system of exploiting of slave labor.[140] - -[W] See foot-note on page 84. - -The following is so well known that it can be stated briefly. The -system of exchange by means of money matures into capitalism, and -brings into being new classes in juxtaposition to the landowners; the -capitalist demands equal rights with the formerly privileged orders, -and finally obtains them by revolutionizing the lower plebs. In this -attack on the sacredly established order of things, the capitalists -unite with the lower classes, naturally under the banner of “natural -law.” But as soon as the victory has been achieved, the class based on -movable wealth, the so-called middle class, turns its arms on the lower -classes, makes peace with its former opponents, and invokes in its -reactionary fight on the proletarians, its late allies, the theory of -legitimacy, or makes use of an evil mixture of arguments based partly -on legitimacy and partly on pseudo-liberalism. - -In this manner the state has gradually matured from the primitive -robber state, through the stages of the developed feudal state, through -absolutism, to the modern constitutional state. - - -(d) THE MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL STATE - -Let us give the mechanics and kinetics of the modern state a moment’s -time. - -In principle, it is the same entity as the primitive robber state or -the developed feudal state. There has been added, however, one new -element--_officialdom_, which at least will have this object, that -in the contest of the various classes, it will represent the common -interests of the state as a whole. In how far this purpose is subserved -we shall investigate in another place. Let us at this time study the -state in respect to those characteristics which it has brought over -from its youthful stages. - -Its _form_ still continues to be domination, its content still remains -the exploitation of the economic means. The latter continues to be -limited by public law, which on the one hand protects the traditional -“distribution” of the total products of the nation; while on the -other it attempts to maintain at their full efficiency the taxpayers -and those bound to render service. The internal policy of the state -continues to revolve in the path prescribed for it by the parallelogram -of the centrifugal force of class contests and the centripetal impulse -of the common interests in the state; and its foreign policy continues -to be determined by the interests of the master class, now comprising -besides the landed also the moneyed interests. - -In principle, there are now, as before, only two classes to be -distinguished: one a ruling class, which acquires more of the total -product of the labor of the people--the economic means--than it has -contributed, and a subject class, which obtains less of the resultant -wealth than it has contributed. Each of these classes, in turn, -depending on the degree of economic development, is divided into more -or fewer sub-classes or strata, which grade of according to the -fortune or misfortune of their economic standards. - -Among highly developed states there is found introduced between the two -principal classes a transitional class, which also may be subdivided -into various strata. Its members are bound to render service to the -upper class, while they are entitled to receive service from the -classes below them. To illustrate with an example, we find in the -ruling class in modern Germany at least three strata. First come -the great landed magnates, who at the same time are the principal -shareholders in the larger industrial undertakings and mining -companies: next stand the captains of industry and the “bankocrats,” -who also in many cases have become owners of great estates. In -consequence of this they quickly amalgamate with the first layer. -Such, for example, are the Princes Fugger, who were formerly bankers -of Augsburg, and the Counts of Donnersmarck, owners of extensive mines -in Silesia. And finally there are the petty country nobles, whom we -shall hereafter term _junker_ or “squires.” The subject class, at all -events, consists of petty peasants, agricultural laborers, factory and -mine hands, with small artisans and subordinate officials. The “middle -classes” are the classes of the transition: composed of the owners of -large and medium-sized farms, the small manufacturers, and the best -paid mechanics, besides those rich “bourgeois,” such as Jews, who have -not become rich enough to overcome certain traditional difficulties -which oppose their arrival at the stage of intermarriage with the -upper class. All these render unrequited service to the upper class, -and receive unrequited service from the lower classes. This determines -the result which occurs either to the stratum as a whole or to the -individuals in it; that is to say, either a complete acceptance into -the upper class, or an absolute sinking into the lower class. Of the -(German) transitional classes, the large farmers and the manufacturers -of average wealth have risen, while the majority of artisans have -descended to the lower classes. We have thus arrived at the kinetics of -classes. - -The interests of every class set in motion an actual body of associated -forces, which impel it with a definite momentum toward the attainment -of a definite goal. All classes whatever have the same goal; viz., the -total result of the productive labor of all the denizens of a given -state. Every class attempts to obtain as large a share as possible -of the national production; and since all strive for identically the -same object, the _class contest_ results. This contest of classes -is the content of all history of states, except in so far as the -interest of the state as a whole produces common actions. These -we may at this point disregard, since they have been given undue -prominence by the traditional method of historical study, and lead -to one-sided views. Historically this class contest is shown to be a -_party fight_. A party is originally and in its essence nothing save -an organized representation of a class. Wherever a class, by reason -of social differentiation, has split up into numerous sub-classes -with varied separate interests, the party claiming to represent it -disintegrates at the earliest opportunity into a mass of tiny parties, -and these will either be allies or mortal enemies according to the -degree of divergence of the class interests. Where on the other hand -a former class contrast has disappeared by social differentiation, -the two former parties amalgamate in a short time into a new party. -As an example of the first case we may recall the splitting off -of the artisans and Anti-Semite parties from the party of German -Liberalism, as a consequence of the fact that the first represented -descending groups, while the latter represented ascending ones. A -characteristic example of the second category may be found in the -political amalgamation which bound together into the farmers’ union -the petty landed squires of the East Elbian country with West Elbian -rich peasants on large plantations. Since the petty squire sinks and -the farmer rises, they meet half-way. All party policy can have but one -meaning, viz., to procure for the class represented as great a share -as is possible of the total national production. In other words, the -preferred classes intend to maintain their share, at the very least, -at the ancient scale, and if possible, to increase it toward such a -maximum as shall permit the exploited classes just a bare existence, to -keep them fit to do their work, just as in the bee-keeper stages. Their -object is to confiscate the entire surplus product of the economic -means, a surplus which increases enormously as population becomes -more dense and division of labor more specialized. On the other hand, -the group of exploited classes would like to reduce their tribute to -the zero-point, and to consume the entire product themselves; and the -transitional classes work as much as possible toward the reduction of -their tribute to the upper classes, while at the same time they strive -to increase their unrequited income from the classes underneath. - -This is the aim and the content of all party contests. The ruling class -conducts this fight with all those means which its acquired dominion -has handed down to it. In consequence of this, the ruling class sees -to it that legislation is framed in its interest and to serve its -purpose--class legislation. These laws are then applied in such wise -that the blunted back of the sword of justice is turned upward, while -its sharpened edge is turned downward--class justice. The governing -class in every state uses the administration of the state in the -interest of those belonging to it under a twofold aspect. In the first -place it reserves to its adherents all prominent places and all offices -of influence and of profit, in the army, in the superior branches of -government service, and in places on the bench; and secondly, by these -very agencies, it directs the entire policy of the state, causes its -class-politics to bring about commercial wars, colonial policies, -protective tariffs, legislation in some degree improving the conditions -of the laboring classes, electoral reform policies, etc. As long as the -nobles ruled the state, they exploited it as they would have managed an -estate; when the bourgeoisie obtain the mastery, the state is exploited -as though it were a factory. And the class-religion covers all defects, -as long as they can be endured, with its “don’t touch the foundation -of society.” - -There still exist in the public law a number of political privileges -and economic strategic positions, which favor the master class: such -as, in Prussia, a system of voting which gives the plutocrats an -undue advantage over the less favored classes, a limitation of the -constitutional rights of free assembly, regulations for servants, etc. -For that reason, the _constitutional fight_, carried on over thousands -of years and dominating the life of the state, is still uncompleted. -The fight for improved conditions of life, another phase of the party -and class struggle, usually takes place in the halls of legislative -bodies, but often it is carried on by means of demonstrations in the -streets, by general strikes, or by open outbreaks. - -But the plebs have finally and definitely learned that these remnants -of feudal strategic centers, do not, except in belated instances, -constitute the final stronghold of their opponents. It is not in -political, but rather in economic conditions that the cause must -be sought, which has brought it about that even in the modern -constitutional state, the “distribution of wealth” has not been changed -in principle. Just as in feudal times, the great mass of men live in -bitter poverty; even under the best conditions, they have the meager -necessities of life, earned by hard, crushing, stupefying forced -labor, no longer exacted by right of political exploitation, but just -as effectively forced from the laborers by their economic needs. And -just as before in the un-reformed days, the narrow minority, a new -master class, a conglomerate of holders of ancient privileges and of -newly rich, gathers in the tribute, now grown to immensity; and not -only does not render any service therefor, but flaunts its wealth in -the face of labor by riotous living. The class contest henceforth -is devoted more and more to these economic causes, based on vicious -systems of distribution; and it takes shape in a hand-to-hand fight -between exploiters and proletariat, carried on by strikes, coöperative -societies and trades unions. The economic organization first forces -recognition, and then equal rights; then it leads and finally controls -the political destinies of the labor party. In the end therefore the -trade union controls the party. Thus far the development of the state -has progressed in Great Britain and in the United States. - -Were it not that there has been added to the modern state an entirely -new element, its _officialdom_, the constitutional state, though more -finely differentiated and more powerfully integrated, would, so far as -form and content go, be little different from its prototypes. - -As a matter of principle, the state officials, paid from the funds -of the state, are removed from the economic fights of conflicting -interests; and therefore it is rightly considered unbecoming for any -one in the service of the government to be taking part in any money -making undertaking, and in no well ordered bureaucracy is it tolerated. -Were it possible ever thoroughly to realize the principle, and did not -every official, even the best of them, bring with him that concept -of the state held by the class from which he originated, one would -find in officialdom, as a matter of fact, that moderating and order -making force, removed from the conflict of class interests, whereby the -state might be led toward its new goal. It would become the fulcrum of -Archimedes whence the world of the state might be moved. - -But the principle, we are sorry to say, can not be carried out -completely; and furthermore, the officials do not cease being real men, -do not become mere abstractions without class consciousness. This may -be quite apart from the fact that, in Europe at least, a participation -in a definite form of undertakings--viz., handling large landed -estates--is regarded as a favorable means of getting on in the service -of the state, and will continue to be so as long as the landed nobility -preponderates. In consequence of this, many officials on the Continent, -and one may even say the most influential officials, are subject to -pressure by enormous economic interests; and are unconsciously, and -often against their will, brought into the class contests. - -There are factors, such as extra allowances made by either fathers or -fathers-in-law, or hereditary estates, and affinity to the persons in -control of the landed and moneyed interest or allied with them, whereby -the solidarity of interest among the ruling class is if anything -increased from the fact that these officials, practically without -exception, are taken from a class with whom since their boyhood days -they have been on terms of intimacy. Were there, however, no such unity -of economic interests the demeanor of the officials would be influenced -entirely by the pure interests of the state. - -For this reason, as a rule, the most efficient, most objective and -most impartial set of officials is found in poor states. Prussia, for -example, was formerly indebted to its poverty for that incomparable -body of officials who handled it through all its troubles. These -employees of the state were actually, in consonance with the rule laid -down above, dissociated completely from all interests in money making, -directly or indirectly. - -This ideal body of officials is a rare occurrence in the more wealthy -states. The plutocratic development draws the individual more and -more into its vortex, robbing him of his objectivity and of his -impartiality. And yet the officials continue to fulfil the duty which -the modern state requires of them, to preserve the interests of the -state as opposed to the interests of any class. And this interest is -preserved by them, even though against their will, or at least without -clear consciousness of the fact, in such manner that the economic -means, which called the bureaucracy into being, is in the end advanced -on its tedious path of victory, as against the political means. No -one doubts that the officials carry on class politics, prescribed for -them by the constellation of forces operating in the state; and to -that extent, they certainly do represent the master class from which -they sprang. But they do ameliorate the bitterness of the struggle, by -opposing the extremists in either camp, and by advocating amendments -to existing law, when the social development has become ripened for -their enactment, without waiting until the contest over these has -become acute. Where an efficient race of princes governs, whose -momentary representative adopts the policy of King Frederick, which was -to regard himself only as “the first servant of the state,” what has -been said above applies to him in an increased degree, all the more -so as his interests, as the permanent beneficiary of the continued -existence of the state, would before all else prompt him to strengthen -the centripetal forces and to weaken the centrifugal powers. In the -course of the preceding we have in many instances noted the natural -solidarity between prince and people, as an historic force of great -value. In the completed constitutional state, in which the monarch in -but an infinitesimally small degree is a subject of private economic -interests, he tends to be almost completely “an official.” This -community of interests is emphasized here much more strongly than in -either the feudal state or the despotically governed state, where the -dominion, at least for one-half its extent, is based on the private -economic interests of the prince. - -Even in a constitutional state, the outer form of government is not -the decisive factor; the fight of the classes is carried on and leads -to the same result in a republic as in a monarchy. In spite of this, -it must be admitted that there is more probability, that, other things -being equal, the curve of development of the state in a monarchy will -be more sweeping, with less secondary incurvity, because the prince is -less affected by momentary losses of popularity, is not so sensitive -to momentary gusts of disapproval, as is a president elected for a -short term of years, and he can therefore shape his policies for longer -periods of time. - -We must not fail to mention a special form of officialdom, the -scientific staffs of the universities, whose influence on the upward -development of the state must not be underestimated. Not only is this -a creation of the economic means, as were the officials themselves, -but it at the same time represents an historical force, _the need of -causality_, which we found heretofore only as an ally of the conquering -state. We saw that this need created superstition while the state was -on a primitive stage; its bastard, the taboo, we found in all cases -to be an effective means of control by the master class. From these -same needs then, _science_ was developed, attacking and destroying -superstition, and thereby assisting in preparation of the path of -evolution. That is the incalculable historical service of science and -especially of the universities. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -THE TENDENCY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE - - -We have endeavored to discover the development of the state from its -most remote past up to present times, following its course like an -explorer, from its source down the streams to its effluence in the -plains. Broad and powerfully its waves roll by, until it disappears -into the mist of the horizon, into unexplored and, for the present-day -observer, undiscoverable regions. - -Just as broadly and powerfully the stream of history--and until the -present day all history has been the history of states--rolls past -our view, and the course thereof is covered by the blanketing fogs of -the future. Shall we dare to set up hypotheses concerning the future -course, until “with unrestrained joy he sinks into the arms of his -waiting, expectant father”? (Goethe’s _Prometheus_.) Is it possible to -establish a scientifically founded prognosis in regard to the future -development of the state? - -I believe in this possibility. The tendency[141] of state development -unmistakably leads to one point: seen in its essentials the state -will cease to be the “developed political means” and will become “a -freemen’s citizenship.” In other words, its outer shell will remain in -essentials the form which was developed in the constitutional state, -under which the administration will be carried on by an officialdom. -But the content of the states heretofore known will have changed its -vital element by the disappearance of the economic exploitation of one -class by another. And since the state will, by this, come to be without -either classes or class interests, the bureaucracy of the future will -truly have attained that ideal of the impartial guardian of the common -interests, which nowadays it laboriously attempts to reach. The “state” -of the future will be “society” guided by self-government. - -Libraries full of books have been written on the delimitation of the -concepts “state” and “society.” The problem, however, from our point of -view has an easy solution. The “state” is the fully developed political -means, society the fully developed economic means. Heretofore state and -society were indissolubly intertwined: in the “freemen’s citizenship,” -there will be no “state” but only “society.” - -This prognosis of the future development of the state contains by -inclusion all of those famous formulæ, whereby, the great philosophical -historians have endeavored to determine the “resulting value” of -universal history. It contains the “progress from warlike activity to -peaceful labor” of St. Simon, as well as Hegel’s “development from -slavery to freedom”; the “evolution of humanity” of Herder, as well as -“the penetration of reason through nature” of Schleiermacher. - -Our times have lost the glad optimism of the classical and of the -humanist writers; sociologic pessimism rules the spirit of these latter -days. The prognosis here stated can not as yet claim to have many -adherents. Not only do the persons obtaining the profits of dominion, -thanks to their obsession by their class spirit, regard it as an -incredible concept; those belonging to the subjugated class as well -regard it with the utmost skepticism. It is true that the proletarian -theory, as a matter of principle, predicts identically the same result. -But the adherents of that theory do not believe it possible by the path -of evolution but only through revolution. It is then thought of as a -picture of a “society” varying in all respects from that evolved by the -progress of history; in other words, as an organization of the economic -means, as a system of economics without competition and market, as -collectivism. The anarchistic theory makes form and content of the -“state” as inseparable as heads and tails of the coin; no “government” -without exploitation! It would therefore smash both the form and the -content of the state, and thus bring on a condition of anarchy, even -if thereby all the economic advantages of a division of labor should -have to be sacrificed. Even so great a thinker as the late Ludwig -Gumplowicz, who first laid the foundation on which the present theory -of the state has been developed, is a sociological pessimist; and from -the same reasons as are the anarchists, whom he combated so violently. -He too regards as eternally inseparable form and content, government -and class-exploitation; since he however, and I think correctly, -does not consider it possible that many people may live together -without some coercive force vested in some government, he declares the -class-state to be an “immanent” and not only an historical category. - -Only a small fraction of social liberals, or of liberal socialists, -believe in the evolution of a society without class dominion and -class exploitation which shall guarantee to the individual, besides -political, also economic liberty of movement, within of course the -limitations of the economic means. That was the _credo_ of the old -social liberalism, of pre-Manchester days, enunciated by Quesnay and -especially by Adam Smith, and again taken up in modern times by Henry -George and Theodore Hertzka. - -This prognosis may be substantiated in two ways, one through history -and philosophy, the other by political economy, as a tendency of -the development of the state, and as a tendency of the evolution of -economics, both clearly tending toward _one_ point. - -The tendency of the _development of the state_ was shown in the -preceding as a steady and victorious combat of economic means against -political means. We saw that, in the beginning, the right to the -economic means, the right to equality and to peace, was restricted -to the tiny circle of the horde bound together by ties of blood, an -endowment from pre-human conditions of society;[142] while without the -limits of this isle of peace raged the typhoon of the political means. -But we saw expanding more and more the circles from which the laws of -peace crowded out their adversary, and everywhere we saw their advance -connected with the advance of the economic means, of the barter of -groups for equivalents, amongst one another. The first exchange may -have been the exchange of fire, then the barter of women, and finally -the exchange of goods, the domain of peace constantly extending its -borders. It protected the market places, then the streets leading to -them, and finally it protected the merchants traveling on these streets. - -In the course of this discussion it was shown how the “state” absorbed -and developed these organizations making for peace, and how in -consequence these drive back ever further right based on mere might. -Merchants’ law becomes city law; the industrial city, the developed -economic means, undermines the feudal state, the developed political -means; and finally the civic population, in open fight, annihilates the -political remnants of the feudal state, and re-conquers for the entire -population of the state freedom and right to equality, _urban_ law -becomes public law and finally international law. - -Furthermore, on no horizon can be seen any force now capable of -resisting effectively this heretofore efficient tendency. On the -contrary, the interference of the past, which temporarily blocked the -process, is obviously becoming weaker and weaker. The international -relations of commerce and trade acquired among the nations a -preponderating importance over the diminishing warlike and political -relations; and in the intra-national sphere, by reason of the same -process of economic development, movable capital, the creation of the -right to peace, preponderates in ever increasing measure over landed -property rights, the creation of the right of war. At the same time -superstition more and more loses its influence. And therefore one is -justified in concluding that the tendency so marked will work out to -its logical end, excluding the political means and all its works, until -the complete victory of the economic means is attained. - -But it may be objected that in the modern constitutional state all the -more prominent remnants of the antique law of war have already been -chiseled out. - -On the contrary, there survives a considerable remnant of these -institutions, masked it is true in economic garb, and apparently no -longer a legal privilege but only economic right, _the ownership of -large estates--the first creation and the last stronghold of the -political means_. Its mask has preserved it from undergoing the fate of -all other feudal creations. And yet this last remnant of the right of -war is doubtless the last unique obstacle in the pathway of humanity; -and doubtless the _development of economics_ is on its way to destroy -it. - -To substantiate these remarks I must refer the reader to other books, -wherein I have given the detailed evidence of the above and can not in -the space allotted here repeat it at large.[143] I can only re-state -the principal points made in these books. - -There is no difference in principle between the distribution of the -total products of the economic means among the separate classes of a -constitutional state, the so-called “capitalistic distribution,” from -that prevailing in the feudal state. - -All the more important economic schools coincide in finding the cause -in this, that the supply of “free” laborers (i. e., according to Karl -Marx politically free and economically without capital) perpetually -exceeds the demand, and that hence there exists “the social relation of -capital.” There “are constantly two laborers running after one master -for work, and lowering, for one another, the wages”; and therefore the -“surplus value” remains with the capitalist class, while the laborer -never gets a chance to form capital for himself and to become an -employer. - -Whence comes this surplus supply of free laborers? - -The explanation of the “bourgeois” theory, according to which this -surplus supply is caused by the overproduction of children by -proletarian parents, is based on a logical fallacy, and is contradicted -by all known facts?[144] - -The explanation of the proletarian theory according to which the -capitalistic process of production itself produces the “free laborers,” -by setting up again and again new labor-saving machines, is also -based on a logical fallacy and is likewise contradicted by all known -facts.[145] - -The evidence of all facts shows rather, and the conclusion may be -deduced without fear of contradiction, _that the oversupply of “free -laborers” is descended from the right of holding landed property in -large estates_; and that emigration into towns and oversea from these -landed properties are the causes of the capitalistic distribution. - -Doubtless there is a growing tendency in economic development whereby -the ruin of vast landed estates will be accomplished. The system -is their bleeding to death, without hope of salvation, caused by -the freedom of the former serfs--the necessary consequence of the -development of the cities. As soon as the peasants had obtained the -right of moving about without their landlords’ passport (German -_Freizuegigkeit_), there developed the chance of escape from the -countries which formerly oppressed them. The system of emigration -created “the competition from oversea,” together with the fall, -on the Continent, of prices for farm products, and made necessary -perpetually rising wages. By these two factors ground rent is reduced -from two sides, and must gradually sink to the zero point, since here -too no counterforce is to be recognized whereby the process might be -diverted.[146] Thus the system of vast territorial estates falls apart. -When, however, it has disappeared, there can be no oversupply of “free -laborers.” On the contrary “two masters will run after one laborer and -must raise the price on themselves.” There will be no “surplus value” -for the capitalist class, because the laborer himself can form capital -and himself become an employer. By this the last remaining vestige -of the political means will have been destroyed, and economic means -alone will exercise sway. The _content_ of such a society is the “pure -economics”[147] of the equivalent exchange of commodities against -commodities, or of labor force against commodities, and the political -_form_ of this society will be the “freemen’s citizenship.” - -This theoretical deduction is moreover confirmed by the _experience -of history_. Wherever there existed a society in which vast estates -did not exist to draw an increasing rental, there “pure economics” -existed, and society approximated the form of the state to that of the -“freemen’s citizenship.” - -Such a community was found in the Germany of the four centuries[148] -from about A. D. 1000, when the primitive system of vast estates was -developed into the socially harmless dominion over vast territories, -until about the year 1400, when the newly arisen great properties, -created by the political means, the robber wars in the countries -formerly Slavic, shut the settlers from the westward out of lands -eastward of the Elbe.[149] Such a community was the Mormon state of -Utah, which has not been greatly changed in this respect, where a -wise land legislation permitted only small and moderate sized farm -holdings.[150] Such a community was to be found in the city and county -of Vineland, Iowa, U. S. A.,[151] as long as every settler could obtain -land, without increment of rent. Such a commonwealth is, beyond all -others, New Zealand, whose government favors with all its power the -possession of small and middle-sized holdings of land, while at the -same time it narrows and dissolves, by all means at its command the -great landed properties, which by the way, owing to lack of surplus -laborers, are almost incapable of producing rentals.[152] - -In all these cases there is an astoundingly equalized well-being, not -perhaps mechanically equal; but there is no wealth. _Because well-being -is the control over articles of consumption, while wealth is the -dominion over mankind._ In no such cases are the means of production, -“capital,” “producing any surplus values”; there are no “free laborers” -and no capitalism, and the political form of these communities -approximates very closely to a “freemen’s citizenship,” and tends to -approximate it more and more, so far as the pressure of the surrounding -states, organized from and based on the laws of war, permit its -development. The “state” decomposes, or else in new countries such as -Utah or New Zealand, it returns to a rudimentary stage of development; -while the free self-determination of free men, scarcely acquainted -with a class fight constantly tends to pierce through ever more -thoroughly. Thus in the German Empire there was a parallel development -between the political rise of the unions of the imperial free cities, -the decline of the feudal states, the emancipation of the crafts, then -still comprising the entire “plebs” of the cities, and the decay of the -patrician control of the city government. This beneficent development -was stopped by the erection of new primitive feudal states on the -easterly border of the former German Empire, and thus the economic -blossom of German culture was ruined. Whoever believes in a conscious -purpose in history may say that the human race was again required to -pass through another school of suffering before it could be redeemed. -The Middle Ages had discovered the system of free labor, but had not -developed it to its full capacity or efficiency. It was reserved for -the new slavery of capitalism to discover and develop the incomparably -more efficient system of coöperating labor, the division of labor in -the workshops, in order to crown man as the ruler of natural forces, as -king of the planet. Slavery of antiquity and of modern capitalism was -once necessary; now it has become superfluous. According to the story, -every free citizen of Athens disposed of five human slaves; but we -have supplied to our fellow citizens of modern society a vast mass of -enslaved power, slaves of steel, that do not suffer in creating values. -Since then we have ripened toward a civilization as much higher than -the civilization of the time of Pericles, as the population, power and -riches of the modern communities exceeds those of the tiny state of -Athens. - -Athens was doomed to dissolution--by reason of slavery as an economic -institution, by reason of the political means. Having once entered that -pathway, there was no outlet except death to the population. Our path -will lead to life. - -The same conclusion is found by either the historical-philosophical -view, which took into account the tendency of the _development of the -state_, or the study of political economy, which regards the tendency -of _economic development_; viz., that the economic means wins along -the whole line, while the political means disappears from the life of -society, in that one of its creations, which is most ancient and most -tenacious of life; capitalism decays with large landed estates and -ground rentals. - -This has been the path of suffering and of salvation of humanity, its -Golgotha and its resurrection into an eternal kingdom--from war to -peace, from the hostile splitting up of the hordes to the peaceful -unity of mankind, from brutality to humanity, from the exploiting State -of robbery to the Freemen’s Citizenship. - - - - -NOTES - - -[1] “History is unable to demonstrate any one people, wherein the first -traces of division of labor and of agriculture do not coincide with -such agricultural exploitations, wherein the efforts of labor were -not apportioned to one and the fruits of labor were not appropriated -by some one else, wherein, in other words, the division of labor -had not developed itself as the subjection of one set under the -others.”--Robertus-Jagetzow, _Illumination on the social question_, -second edition. Berlin, 1890, p. 124. (Cf. _Immigration and Labor. The -economic aspects of European Immigration to the United States_, by Dr. -Isaac A. Hourwich. Putnam’s, N. Y., 1912.--_Translator._) - -[2] Achelis, _Die Ekstase in ihrer kulturellen Bedeutung_, vol. 1 of -_Kulturprobleme der Gegenwart_, Berlin, 1902. - -[3] Grosse, _Formen der Familie_. Freiburg and Leipzig, 1896, p. 39. - -[4] Ratzel, _Völkerkunde_. Second Edition. Leipzig and Wien, 1894-5, -II, p. 372. - -[5] _Die Soziale Verfassung des Inkareichs._ Stuttgart, 1896, p. 51. - -[6] _Siedlung und Agrarwesen der Westgermanen, etc._ Berlin, 1895, I, -p. 273. - -[7] l. c. I, p. 138. - -[8] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 702. - -[9] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 555. - -[10] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 555. - -[11] For example with the Ovambo according to Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 214, -who in part “seem to be found in slavelike status,” and according to -Laveleye among the ancient Irish (_Fuidhirs_). - -[12] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 648. - -[13] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 99. - -[14] Lippert, _Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit_. Stuttgart, 1886, II, -p. 302. - -[15] Lippert, l. c. II, p. 522. - -[16] _Römische Geschichte._ Sixth Edition. Berlin, 1874, I, p. 17. - -[17] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 518. - -[18] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 425. - -[19] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 545. - -[20] Ratzel, l. c. II, pp. 390-1. - -[21] Ratzel, l. c. II, pp. 390-1. - -[22] Lippert, l. c. I, p. 471. - -[23] Kulischer, “The history of the development of interest from -capital.” _Jahrbücher für National Œkonomie._ III series, vol. 18, p. -318, Jena, 1899: (Says Strabo: “Plunderers and from the scant supplies -of their native land covetous of the lands of others.”) - -[24] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 123. - -[25] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 591. - -[26] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 370. - -[27] Ratzel, l. c. II, pp. 390-1. - -[28] Ratzel, l. c. II, pp. 388-9. - -[29] Ratzel, l. c. II, pp. 103-04. - -[30] Thurnwald, _Staat und Wirtschaft im altem Ægypten. Zeitschrift für -Soz. Wissenchaft_, vol. 4 1901, pp. 700-01. - -[31] Ratzel, l. c. II, pp. 404-05. (Gumplowicz, _Rassenkampf_, p. 264: -“Egypt, rich and self-sufficient, says Ranke, invited the avarice -of neighboring tribes, who served other gods. Under the name of the -Shepherd peoples, foreign dynasts and foreign tribes ruled Egypt for -centuries. - -“Truly, the summary of universal history could not be begun with more -characteristic words than those of Ranke. For in the words applied -to Egypt the quintessence of the whole history of mankind is summed -up.”--_Translator._) - -[32] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 165. - -[33] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 485. - -[34] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 480. - -[35] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 165. - -[36] Buhl, _Soziale Verhältnisse der Israeliten_, p. 13. - -[37] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 455. - -[38] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 628. - -[39] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 625. - -[40] Cieza de Leon, “Seg. parte de la crónica del Peru.” P. 75, cit. by -Cunow, _Inkareich_ (p. 62, note 1). - -[41] Cunow, l. c. p. 61. - -[42] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 346. - -[43] Ratzel, l. c. II, pp. 36-7. - -[44] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 221. (Cf. remarks by Hon. A. J. Sabath, -M. C., _Sociological Argument on Workman’s Compensation Bill_, p. 498, -Senate Document 338, Sixty-second Congress, Second Session, Volume -I. See also _Congressional Record_ for March 1, 1913, Sixty-second -Congress, Third Session, pp. 4503, 4529, _et seq._--_Translator._) - -[45] “Among the Wahuma women occupy a higher position than among the -negroes, and are watched carefully by their men. This makes mixed -marriages difficult. The mass of the Waganda even to-day would not -have remained a genuine negro tribe ‘of dark chocolate colored skin -and short wool hair’ were it not that the two peoples are strictly -opposed to one another as peasants and herdsmen, rulers and subjects, -as despised and honored, in spite of the relations entered into among -the upper classes. In this peculiar position, they represent a typical -phenomenon, which is found repeated at many other points.”--Ratzel, l. -c. II, p. 177. [46] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 178. - -[47] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 198. - -[48] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 476. - -[49] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 453. - -[50] Kopp, _Griechische Staatsaltertümer_, 2, _Aufl._ Berlin, 1893, p. -23. - -[51] Uhland, _Alte hoch und niederdeutsche Volkslieder_ I (1844), p. -339 cited by Sombart: _Der moderne Kapitalismus_, Leipzig, 1902, I, pp. -384-5. - -[52] Inama-Sternegg, _Deutsche Wirtsch.-Gesch._ I, Leipzig, 1879, p. 59. - -[53] Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, London, 1891, p. 368. - -[54] Cf. Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 81. - -[55] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 156. - -[56] Ratzel, l. c. I, pp. 259-60. - -[57] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 434. - -[58] I. Kulischer, l. c., p. 317, where other examples may be found. - -[59] Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p. 400, which contains a -number of ethnographical examples. [60] Westermarck, l. c., p. 546. - -[61] Cf. Ratzel, l. c. I, pp. 318, 540. - -[62] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 106. - -[63] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 335. - -[64] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 346. - -[65] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 347. - -[66] Buecher, _Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft_, Second Edition, -Tübingen, 1898, p. 301. - -[67] Cf., Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 271, speaking of the islanders of -the Pacific Ocean: “Intercourse from tribe to tribe is carried on -by inviolable heralds, preferably old women. These act also as -intermediary agents in trades.” See also page 317 for the same -practises among the Australians. - -[68] German Translation by L. Katscher. Leipzig, 1907. - -[69] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 81. - -[70] Ratzel, l. c. I, pp. 478-9. - -[71] A. Vierkandt, _Die wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse der Naturvölker. -Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft_, II, pp. 177-8. - -[72] Kulischer, l. c. pp. 320-1. - -[73] Lippert, l. c. I, p. 266, _et seq._ - -[74] Cf. Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_. - -[75] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 27. - -[76] Herodotus IV, 23, cited by Lippert, l. c. I, p. 459. - -[77] Lippert, l. c. II, p. 170. - -[78] Mommsen, l. c. I, p. 139. - -[79] Similar conditions may be observed among the islanders near India. -Here the Malays are vikings. “Colonization is an important factor, -as conquest and settlement oversea ... reminding one of the great -rôle played in ancient Hellas by the roving tribes.... Every strip of -coast line shows foreign elements, who enter uncalled for and in most -instances spreading damage among the natives. The right of conquest was -granted by the rulers of Tornate to noble dynasts, who later on became -semi-sovereign viceroys on the islands of Buru, Serang, etc.” [80] -Mommsen, l. c. I, p. 132. - -[81] Mommsen, l. c. I, p. 134. - -[82] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 160. - -[83] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 558. - -[84] Buhl, l. c., p. 48. - -[85] Buhl, l. c., pp. 78-79. - -[86] Mommsen, l. c. II, p. 406. - -[87] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 191; cf. also pp. 207-8. - -[88] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 363. - -[89] Mommsen, l. c., p. 46. - -[90] Both cited by Kulischer, l. c., p. 319, from: Buechsenschuetz, -_Besitz und Erwerb im grieschischen Altertum_; and Goldschmidt, -_History of the Law of Commerce_. - -[91] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 263. - -[92] F. Oppenheimer’s _Grossgrundeigentum und soziale Frage_. Book Two, -Chapter I. Berlin, 1898. - -[93] Nomadism is exceptionally characterized by the facility with -which, from patriarchal conditions, despotic functions are developed -with most far-reaching powers. Ratzel, l. c. Vol. II, pp. 388-9. - -[94] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 408. - -[95] Cunow, l. c. pp. 66-7. Similarly among the inhabitants of the -Malay Islands numerous examples are found in Radak (Ratzel, l. c. I, p. -267). - -[96] Buhl, l. c., p. 17. - -[97] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 66. - -[98] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 118. - -[99] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 167. - -[100] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 218. - -[101] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 125. - -[102] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 124. - -[103] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 118. - -[104] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 125. - -[105] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 346. - -[106] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 245. - -[107] Ratzel, l. c. I. pp. 267-8. - -[108] Mommsen, l. c. III, pp. 234-5. - -[109] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 167. - -[110] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 229. - -[111] Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 128. - -[112] Weber’s _Weltgeschichte_, III, p. 163. - -[113] Thurnwald, l. c., pp. 702-3. - -[114] Thurnwald, l. c., p. 712; cf. Schneider, _Kultur und Denken der -alten ÆEgypter_, Leipzig, 1907, p. 38. - -[115] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 599. - -[116] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 362. - -[117] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 344. - -[118] Meitzen, l. c. II, p. 633. - -[119] Inama-Sternegg, l. c. I, pp. 140-1. - -[120] Mommsen, l. c. V, p. 84. - -[121] Cf. the detailed exposition of this in F. Oppenheimer’s -_Grossgrundeigentum und die soziale Frage_, Book II, Chap. 3. - -[122] Mommsen, l. c. III, pp. 234-5. - -[123] Thurnwald, l. c., p. 771. - -[124] Meitzen, l. c. I, pp. 362f. - -[125] Inama-Sternegg, l. c. I, pp. 373, 386. - -[126] Cf. F. Oppenheimer’s _Grossgrundeigentum_, p. 272. - -[127] Thurnwald, l. c., p. 706. - -[128] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 503. - -[129] Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 518. - -[130] Meitzen, l. c. I, p. 579: “At the time of the compilation of the -Lex Salica, the ancient racial nobility had been reduced to common -freemen or else had been annihilated. The officials, on the other -hand, are rated at threefold wergeld, 600 solidi, and if one be ‘_puer -regis_’ 300 solidi.” - -[131] Thurnwald, l. c. p. 712. - -[132] Inama-Sternegg, l. c. II, p. 61. - -[133] Thurnwald, l. c., p. 705. - -[134] “The larger camps of the army of the Rhine obtained their -municipal annexes partly through army suttlers and camp followers, -and particularly through the veterans, who after the completion of -their services remained in their accustomed quarters. Thus there arose -distinct from the military quarters proper, a distinct town of cabins -(_Canabæ_). In all parts of the Empire, and especially in the various -Germanias, there arose in the course of time, from these camps of the -legionaries, and particularly from the headquarter stations, cities in -the modern sense.”--Mommsen, l. c. V, p. 153. - -[135] Eisenhardt, _Gesch. der National Oekonomie_, p. 9: “Aided by the -new and more liquid means of payment in cash, it became possible to -call into being a new and more independent establishment of soldiers -and of officials. As they were paid only periodically it became -impossible for them to make themselves independent (as the feudatories -had done) and then to turn on their paymaster.” [136] Thurnwald, l. -c., p. 773. - -[137] Thurnwald, l. c., p. 699. - -[138] Thurnwald, l. c., p. 709. - -[139] Thurnwald, l. c., p. 711. - -[140] Cf. with this F. Oppenheimer’s _Grossgrundeigentum etc._, Book -II, Chap. 3. - -[141] “Tendency, i. e., a law, whose absolute execution is checked by -countervailing circumstances, or is by them retarded, or weakened.” -Marx, _Kapital_, vol. III, p. 215. - -[142] Cf. the excellent work of Peter Kropotkin, _Mutual Aid in its -Development_. - -[143] Cf. F. Oppenheimer, _Die Siedlungsgenossenschaft etc._, Berlin, -1896, and his _Grossgrundeigentum und soziale Frage_, Berlin, 1898. - -[144] Cf. F. Oppenheimer, _Bevölkerungsgesetz des T. R. Malthus_. -_Darstellung and Kritik_, Berlin-Bern, 1901. - -[145] Cf. F. Oppenheimer, _Grundgesetz der Marxschen -Gesellschaftslehre, Darstellung und Kritik_, Berlin, 1903. - -[146] Cf. F. Oppenheimer, _Grundgesetz der Marxschen -Gesellschaftslehre_, Part IV., particularly, the twelfth chapter: -“Tendency of the Capitalistic Development.” - -[147] Cf. F. Oppenheimer, _Grossgrundeigentum und soziale Frage_, -Berlin, 1898. Book I, Chapter 2, Section 3, “Philosophy of the Social -Body,” pp. 57 _et seq._ - -[148] Cf. F. Oppenheimer, _Grossgrundeigentum_, Book II, Chap. 2, Sec. -3, p. 322. - -[149] Cf. F. Oppenheimer, _Grossgrundeigentum_, Book II, Chap. 3, Sec. -4, especially pp. 423 _et seq._ - -[150] Cf. F. Oppenheimer, “Die Utopie als Tatsache,” _Zeitschrift für -Sozial-Wissenschaft_, 1899, Vol. II, pp. 190 _et seq._ - -[151] Cf. F. Oppenheimer, _Siedlungsgenossenschaft_, pp. 477 _et seq._ - -[152] Cf. André Siegfried, _La démocratie en Nouvelle Zelande_, Paris, -1904. - - - - -Transcriber’s Notes - - -Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a -predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not -changed. - -The spelling of non-English words was not checked. - -Simple typographical errors were corrected. - -Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. - -Page 100: Closing quotation mark added after “valuable consignments.” - -Page 126 or 127: Missing footnote anchor “62”. - -Page 128 or 129: Missing footnote anchor “67”. - -Pages 134-138: Missing footnote anchor “75”. - -Pages 207-208: Missing footnote anchors “123” through “127”. - -Pages 220-225: Missing footnote anchor “132”. - -Page 254: Paragraph beginning “The external reason” probably should be -“The internal reason”. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The State, by Franz Oppenheimer - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE STATE *** - -***** This file should be named 51544-0.txt or 51544-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/1/5/4/51544/ - -Produced by Julie Barkley, Charlie Howard,, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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- margin-bottom: .1em; - visibility: hidden; - color: white; - width: .01em; - display: none; - } - - blockquote {margin: 1.5em 3% 1.5em 3%;} - - .poem-container {text-align: left; margin-left: 5%;} - .poem {display: block;} - .poem .stanza {page-break-inside: avoid;} - - .transnote { - page-break-inside: avoid; - margin-left: 2%; - margin-right: 2%; - margin-top: 1em; - margin-bottom: 1em; - padding: .5em; - } - .covernote {visibility: visible; display: block; text-align: center;} - - .bbox {margin: 1em 5% 1em 5%;} - -} - </style> - </head> - -<body> - - -<pre> - -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The State, by Franz Oppenheimer - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: The State - Its History and Development Viewed Sociologically - -Author: Franz Oppenheimer - -Translator: John Gitterman - -Release Date: March 24, 2016 [EBook #51544] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE STATE *** - - - - -Produced by Julie Barkley, Charlie Howard,, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<div class="transnote covernote"> -<p class="center">Transcriber’s Note<br /> -Text on the original cover was added by the Transcriber and placed in the Public Domain.</p> -</div> - - - -<h1><span class="large wspace">THE STATE</span></h1> - -<p class="center larger"><i>ITS HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT VIEWED -SOCIOLOGICALLY</i></p> - -<p class="p2 center large"><i>By</i> FRANZ OPPENHEIMER, M.D., <span class="smcap">Ph.D.</span><br /> -<span class="small">Professor of Political Science in the University of Frankfort-on-Main</span></p> - -<p class="p2 center"><i>Authorized Translation</i><br /> -<span class="larger"><i>By</i> JOHN M. GITTERMAN, <span class="smcap">Ph.D.</span>, LL.B.</span><br /> -<span class="smaller">(Of the New York County Bar)</span></p> - -<div class="p2 figcenter" style="width: 119px;"> -<img src="images/tp.jpg" width="119" height="145" alt="Publisher’s logo" /> -</div> - - - -<p class="p2 center vspace"><span class="smcap">New York</span><br /> -<span class="larger gesperrt">VANGUARD PRESS</span> -</p> - - -<hr /> - -<p class="newpage p4 center"> -<i>Copyright</i>, 1914<br /> -<span class="smcap">The Bobbs-Merrill Company</span><br /> -<br /> -<i>Copyright</i>, 1922<br /> -<span class="smcap">B. W. Huebsch, Inc.</span></p> - -<p class="p2 center vspace">VANGUARD PRINTINGS<br /> -<i>First—August, 1926</i><br /> -<i>Second—February, 1928</i></p> - -<p class="p2 center smaller">PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA</p> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p class="in0 larger bold">THE MAN (1864—):</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p><i>Franz Oppenheimer</i>, one of a fairly large number -of British, French and German physicians who abandoned -their medical pursuits and rose to fame as -political economists, was born in Berlin. He studied -and practiced medicine, became private Lecturer of -Economics at the Berlin University in 1909, and Professor -of Sociology at the Frankfort University in -1919. His libertarian views made him, for many -years, the target of academic persecutions, until the -growing fame of his masterpiece, <cite>The State</cite>, effectively -silenced his detractors.</p></blockquote> - - -<p class="in0 p2 larger bold">THE BOOK (1908):</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>The organic history of the State is a long and exciting -adventure, usually rendered dull in learned -accounts. Not so in Oppenheimer’s <cite>The State</cite> which -extracts that history, in a highly stimulating manner, -from the sharp necessities and homicidal conflicts of -all sorts and conditions of men, from the Stone Age -to the Age of Henry Ford. The easy flow of important -information derivable from this German volume -has rendered it highly acceptable to American readers.</p></blockquote> -</div> - -<div class="chapter"> -<div class="newpage p4 bbox"> -<p class="center larger vspace">OTHER BOOKS BY<br /> -DOCTOR FRANZ OPPENHEIMER</p> - - - -<table class="p1" summary="Author’s other books"> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Die Siedlungsgenossenschaft</td> - <td class="tdr">1896</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Grossgrundeigentum und Soziale Frage</td> - <td class="tdr">1898</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Das Grundgesetz der Marxschen Gesellschaftslehre</td> - <td class="tdr">1903</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Robertus’ Angriff auf Ricardos Renten-theorie und der Lexis-Diehl’sche Rettungsversuch</td> - <td class="tdr">1908</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">David Ricardos Grundrententheorie</td> - <td class="tdr">1909</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Theorie der Reinen und Politischen Ökonomie</td> - <td class="tdr">1910</td></tr> -</table> -</div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_iii">iii</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter p4"> -<h2><a id="AUTHORS_PREFACE"></a>AUTHOR’S PREFACE<br /> - -<span class="subhead">TO THE SECOND AMERICAN EDITION</span></h2> - - -<p>This little book has made its way. In addition to -the present translation into English, there are authorized -editions in French, Hungarian and Serbian. I am -also informed that there are translations published in -Japanese, Russian, Hebrew and Yiddish; but these, of -course, are pirated. The book has stood the test of -criticism, and has been judged both favorably and unfavorably. -It has, unquestionably, revived the discussion -on the origin and essence of the State.</p> - -<p>Several prominent ethnologists, particularly Holsti, -the present Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Finnish -Free State, have attacked the basic principle formulated -and demonstrated in this Work, but they have failed, -because their definition of the State assumed the very -matter that required to be proven. They have brought -together a large array of facts in proof of the existence -of some forms of <em>Government</em> and <em>Leadership</em>, even -where no classes obtained, and to the substance of these -forms they have given the name of “The State.” It is -not my intention to controvert these facts. It is self-evident, -that in any group of human beings, be it ever -so small, there must exist an authority which determines -conflicts and, in extraordinary situations, assumes -the leadership. But this authority is not “The State,”<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_iv">iv</a></span> -in the sense in which I use the word. The State may -be defined as an organization of <em>one class</em> dominating -over the other classes. Such a class organization can -come about in one way only, namely, through conquest -and the subjection of ethnic groups by the dominating -group. This can be demonstrated with almost mathematical -certainty. Not one of my critics has brought -proofs to invalidate this thesis. Most modern sociologists, -among whom may be named Albion Small, Alfred -Vierkandt and Wilhelm Wundt, accept this thesis. -Wilhelm Wundt, in particular, asserts in unmistakable -language, that “the political society (a term identical -with the State in the sense employed in this book) -first came about and could originate only in the period -of migration and conquest,” whereby the subjugation of -one people by another was effected.</p> - -<p>But even some of my opponents are favorably inclined -to my arguments, as in the case of the venerable -Adolf Wagner, whose words I am proud to quote. In -his article on “The State” in the <cite>Handwörterbuch der -Staatswissenschaften</cite>, he writes: “The sociologic concept -of the State, to which I have referred, particularly -in the broad scope and treatment of it given by Oppenheimer, -deserves careful consideration, especially -from political economists and political historians. The -vista opened out, from this point of view, of the economic -development of peoples and that of the State during -historic times, should be attractive even to the opponents -of the concept itself.”</p> - -<p>The “sociologic concept of the State,” as Ludwig -Gumplowicz termed it, is assured of ultimate general -acceptance. Its opponents are strenuous and persevering,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_v">v</a></span> -and I once called them “the sociologic root of all -evil;” but the concept, none the less, is the basic principle -of “bourgeoisie” sociology, and will be found of -value in the study, not only of economics and history, -but in that of Law and Constitutional History. I permit -myself to make a few remarks on this point.</p> - -<p>The earliest evidence of the recognition of the idea -underlying the <em>law of previous accumulation</em>, may be -traced back, at the latest, to the period of the decay of -classical civilization, at the time when the capitalistic -slave economy brought the city states to ruin as though -their peoples had suffered from a galloping consumption. -As in our modern capitalistic age, which resembles -that period in many respects, there occurred a -breach in all those naturally developed relations in -which the individual has found protection. What Ferdinand -Toennies calls the “community bonds” were -loosened. The individual found himself unprotected, -compelled to rely on his own efforts and on his own -reason in the seething sea of competition which followed. -The collective reason, the product of the wisdom -of thousands of years of experience, could no -longer guide or safeguard him. It had become scattered. -Out of this need for an individual reason, there arose -the idea of <em>nationalism</em>. This idea had its justification -at first, as a line of development and a method in the -newly born science of social government; but when -later it became what Rubenstein (in his work <cite>Romantic -Socialism</cite>) calls a “tendency,” it was not justified. The -community, to use Toennies’ term, changed into a “society.” -“Contract” seemed to be the only bond that held -men together—the contract based on the purely rationalistic<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vi">vi</a></span> -relation of service for service, the <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">do ut des</i>, the -“Contrat Social” of Rousseau. A “society” would -thus appear to be a union of self-seeking individuals -who hoped through combination to obtain their personal -satisfactions. Aristotle had taught that the State -had developed, by gradual growth, from the family -group. The Stoics and Epicureans held that individuals -formed the State—with this difference, that the -former viewed the individual as being socially inclined -by nature, and the latter that he was naturally anti-social. -To the Stoics, therefore, the “State of Nature” -was a peaceful union; to the Epicureans it was a war -of each against the other, with Society as a compelling -means for a decent modus vivendi. With the one a -Society was conditioned “physei” (by nature); with the -other it was “nomo” (by decree).</p> - -<p>In spite, however, of this fundamental difference between -these schools, both assumed the premise that, at -the beginning, individuals were <em>free</em>, <em>equal</em> politically -and economically, and that it was from such an original -social order there had developed, through gradual differentiation, -the fully developed State with its class -hierarchy. This is the <em>law of previous accumulation</em>.</p> - -<p>But we should err if we believed that this thesis was -originally intended as a historical account. Rationalism -is essentially unhistoric, even anti-historic. On the -contrary, the thesis was originally put forward as a -“fiction,” a theory, a conscious unhistorical assumption. -In this form it acquired the name of <em>natural law</em>. It -was under this name that it came into modern thought, -tinctured stoically in Grotius and Puffendorf, and epicureanally -in Hobbes. It became the operative<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vii">vii</a></span> -weapon of thought among the rising third estate of the -capitalists.</p> - -<p>The capitalists used the weapon, first against the -feudal state with its privileged class, and, later against -the fourth estate, with its class theory of Socialism. -Against the feudal domination it argued that a “Law -of Nature” knows and permits no privileges. After its -victories in the English Revolution of 1648, and the -great French Revolution of 1789, it justified, by the -same reasoning, its own <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">de facto</i> pre-eminence, its own -social and economic class superiority, against the claims -of the working classes. According to Adam Smith, -the classes in a society are the results of “natural” development. -From an original state of equality, these -arose from no other cause than the exercise of the economic -virtues of industry, frugality and providence. -Since these virtues are pre-eminently those of a bourgeoisie -society, the capitalist rule, thus sanctioned by -natural law, is just and unassailable. As a corollary -to this theorem the claims of Socialism cannot be admitted.</p> - -<p>Thus, what originally was put forward as a “fiction,” -became first, a hypothesis and finally the <em>axiom</em> of all -bourgeoisie sociology. Those who support it accept the -axiom as self-evident, as not requiring proof. For -them, class domination, on this theory, is the result of -a gradual differentiation from an original state of general -equality and freedom, with no implication in it of -any extra-economic power. Robert Malthus applied -this alleged law to the future, in his attempt to demonstrate -any kind of Socialism to be purely Utopian. His -celebrated <cite>Law of Population</cite> is nothing but the <em>law of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_viii">viii</a></span> -original accumulation</em> projected into the future. He -claims that if any attempt were made to restore the -state of economic equality, the workings of the law -would have the effect—because of the difference in -economic efficiency—of restoring modern class conditions. -All orthodox sociology begins with the struggle against -this supposed law of class formations. Yet every step -of progress made in the various fields of the science of -sociology, has been made by tearing up, one by one, the -innumerable and far-spreading roots which have proceeded -from this supposed axiom. A sound sociology -has to recall the fact that class formation in historic -times, did not take place through gradual differentiation -in pacific economic competition, but was the result -of violent conquest and subjugation.</p> - -<p>As both Capitalism and Socialism had their origins -in England, these new ideas were certain to find their -first expression in that country. So that we find Gerrard -Winstanley, the leader of the “true levellers” of -Cromwell’s time, arraying the facts of history against -this anti-historical theoretical assumption. He showed -that the English ruling class (the Squirearchy) was -composed essentially of the victorious conquerors, the -Normans, and that the subject class were the conquered -English Saxons. But his demonstration had little influence. -It was only when the great French Revolution -brought the contrast out sharply that the thought sunk -in. No less a person than Count St. Simon, acknowledged -as the founder of the science of modern sociology, -and the no less scientific Socialism, discovered in the -dominant class of his country the Frankish and Burgundian -conquerors, and in its subject population, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_ix">ix</a></span> -descendants of the Romanized Celts. It was the publication -of this discovery that gave birth to Western -European sociology. The conclusions drawn from it -were carried further by St. Simon’s disciple, August -Comte, in his <cite>Philosophy of History</cite>, and by the Saint -Simonists, Enfantin and Bazard. These thinkers had -great influence on the economic development of the next -century; but their chief contribution was the elaboration -of the sociologic idea of the State.</p> - -<p>Among the peoples of Western Europe, the new sociology -found a readier acceptance than it did among -those of Eastern Europe. The reason for this can -easily be seen when it is remembered that in the East -the contrast between the “State” and “Society,” had not -been so definitely realized, as it had been in the West. -Even in the West, this contrast was only fully appreciated, -as a social fact, in England, France, the Netherlands -and Italy, because in these countries only the class -of mobile wealth which had worked its way up as the -third estate, had succeeded in ousting the feudal -“State.” In France, the league of the capitalists with -the Crown against the then armed and active nobility -had succeeded in subjecting the Frondeurs under the -absolute power of the King. From this time on, this -new estate represented itself as the Nation, and the -term “National Economy” takes the place of the older -term “Political Economy.” The members of this third -estate felt themselves to be those subjects of the State -whose rights and liberties had been curtailed by the -privileges of the two dominant estates of the nobility -and the clergy. Henceforth, the Third Estate proclaims -the rights of “Society” and against the “State,”<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_x">x</a></span> -opposes the eternal Law of Nature—that of original -equality and freedom—against the theoretic-historical -rights of the Estates. The concept of Society as a contrast -to the concept of the State, first appears in Locke, -and from his time on this contrast was more and more -defined, especially in the writings of the physiocrat -school of economists.</p> - -<p>In this struggle between classes and ideas, neither -Middle nor Eastern Europe played any important part. -In Germany there had once developed a Capitalist class -(in the period of the Fuggers of Augsburg) which attained -to almost American magnitude. But it was -crushed by the Religious Wars and the various French -invasions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, -which left Germany a devastated, depopulated desert. -At the end of the period there remained a few cities and -small states under the absolute domination of princes. -Within the cities the artisans were bound together in their -craft-leagues, and the rest consisted of those of educational -pursuits and academic officials. In a large degree -all these were dependent on the State—the members -of the craft-guilds because they accepted a privileged -condition, the officials because they were servants -of the State, and the professional men, because they belonged -to the upper estate of the society. For this reason -there was no economic or social movement of the -third estate in Germany; there was only a literary movement -influenced by the flow of ideas from the West. -This explains why the contrast between the two ideas of -the State and of Society was not present in the minds -of the German people. On the contrary, the two terms<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xi">xi</a></span> -were used as synonyms, both connotating an essentially -necessary conformity to nature.</p> - -<p>But there is still another cause for this difference in -the mental attitude between Western and Eastern Europe. -In England and France, from the time of Descartes, -the problems and inquiries of science were set -by men trained in mathematics and the natural sciences. -Especially in the new study of the philosophy of history, -the beginning of our modern sociology, did these men -act as guides. In Germany, on the contrary, it was the -theologians and especially the Protestant theologians -who were the leaders of thought. In their hands the -State came to be looked upon as an instrument of Divine -fashioning, and, indeed, of immanent divinity. This -thought resulted in a worship of the State, which -reached its height in the well-known Hegelian system. -It thus happened that two rivers of thought flowed for -a time side by side—the Sociology of Western Europe, -and the philosophy of History of Germany—with occasional -intercommunicating streams, such as Althusios -and Puffendorf into the French, English and Dutch -teaching of natural law, and that of Rousseau into -Hegel. In 1840, however, a direct junction was effected -through Lorenz Stein, one of Hegel’s most gifted -pupils who, later, became the leading German teacher -of administrative law, and influenced generations of -thinkers. He came to Paris, as a young man, for the -purpose of studying Socialism at the fountain head. He -became acquainted with the celebrated men of that -heroic time—with Enfintin and Bazard, with Louis -Blanc, Reybaud, and Proudhon.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xii">xii</a></span></p> - -<p>Lorenz Stein absorbed the new thought with enthusiasm, -and in his fertile mind there was precipitated the -creative synthesis between the Western Europe scientific -sociological thought and the metaphysical German philosophy -of history. The product was called by him the -Science of Society (<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Gesellschaftswissenschaft</i>). It is -from the writings of Stein that almost all the important -developments of German sociologic thought received -their first impulses. Karl Marx, especially (as Struve -has shown), as well as Schaeffle, Othmar Spann and -Gumplowicz are largely indebted to him.</p> - -<p>It is not my purpose to develop this historical theme. -I am concerned only in tracing the development of the -sociologic idea of the State. The first effect of this -meeting of the two streams of thought was a mischievous -confusion of terminology. The writers in Western -Europe had long ago lost control of the unification of -expressions in thinking. As stated above, the Third Estate -began by thinking itself to be “Society,” as opposed -to the State. But when the Fourth Estate grew -to class consciousness and became aware of its own theoretic -existence, it arrogated to itself the term “Society” -(as may be seen from the selection of the word Socialism), -and it treated the Bourgeoisie as a form of the -“State,” of the class state. There were thus two widely -differing concepts of “Society.” Yet here was an underlying -idea common to both Bourgeoisie and Socialist, -since they conceived the State as a collection of privileges -arising and maintained <em>in violation</em> of natural law, -while Society was thought of as the prescribed form of -human union in <em>conformity</em> with natural law. They differed -in one essential only, namely, that while the Third<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xiii">xiii</a></span> -Estate declared its capitalistic Society to be the result -of the processes of natural law, the Socialists regarded -their aims as not yet attained, and proclaimed that the -ideal society of the future which would really be the -product of the processes of natural law, could only be -realized by the elimination of all “surplus value.” -Though both were in conflict with regard to fundamentals, -both agreed in viewing the “State” as <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">civitas diaboli</i> -and “Society” as <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">civitas dei</i>.</p> - -<p>Stein, however, reversed the objectives of the two -concepts. As an Hegelian, and pre-eminently a worshipper -of the State, he conceived the State as <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">civitas -coelestis</i>. Society, which he understood to mean only -the dominant bourgeoisie Society, he viewed through the -eyes of his Socialist friends and teachers, and conceived -it as <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">civitas terrena</i>.</p> - -<p>What in Plato’s sense is the “pure idea,” the “ordre -naturel” of the early physiocrats and termed by Frenchmen -and Englishmen “Society,” was to Stein, the -“State.” What had been contaminated and made impure -by the admixture of coarse matter, they termed the -“State,” while the German called it “Society.” In reality, -however, there is little difference between the two. -Stein realized with pain, that Hegel’s pure concept of -a State based on right and freedom, was bound to remain -an “idea” only. Eternally fettered, as he assumed -it must be, by the forces of property and the culture -proceeding from them, it could never be a fact. This is -his conclusion regarding “Society,” so that its effective -development is obstructed by the beneficent association -of human beings, as Stein conceived that association.</p> - -<p>Thus was attained the very pinnacle of confused<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xiv">xiv</a></span> -thinking. All German sociologists, with the single exception -of Carl Dietzel, soon realized that the Hegelian -concept of the State was impotent, existing only in the -“Idea.” In no point did it touch the reality of historical -growth, and in no sense could it be made to stand -for what had always been considered as the State. -Long ago both Marx and Bakunin—respectively the -founders of scientific collectivism and practical anarchism—and -especially Ludwig Gumplowicz, abandoned -the Hegelian terminology and accepted that of Western -Europe and this has been generally accepted everywhere.</p> - -<p>In this little book I have followed the Western European -terminology. By the “State,” I do not mean the -human aggregation which may perchance <em>come about to -be</em>, or, as it properly <em>should be</em>. I mean by it that summation -of privileges and dominating positions which are -brought into being by extra-economic power. And in -contrast to this, I mean by Society, the totality of concepts -of all purely natural relations and institutions between -man and man, which will not be fully realized until -the last remnant of the creations of the barbaric “ages -of conquest and migration,” has been eliminated from -community life. Others may call any form of leadership -and government or some other ideal, the “State.” -That is a matter of personal choice. It is useless to -quarrel about definitions. But it might be well if those -other thinkers were to understand that they have not -controverted the sociologic idea of the “State,” if a concept -of the “State” grounded on a different basis, does -not correspond to that which they have evolved. And -they must guard themselves particularly against the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xv">xv</a></span> -danger of applying any definition other than that used -in this book to those actual historical products which -have hitherto been called “States,” the essence, development, -course and future of which must be explained by -any true teaching or philosophy of the State.</p> - -<p class="sigright"><span class="smcap">Franz Oppenheimer.</span></p> - -<p class="p0 in0">Frankfort-on-Main, April 1922.</p> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xvi">xvi</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="CONTENTS"></a>CONTENTS</h2> - - - -<table summary="Contents"> - <tr class="small"> - <td class="tdl in2" colspan="2">CHAPTER</td> - <td class="tdr">PAGE</td></tr> - <tr class="chap"> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Author’s Preface</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_iii">iii</a></td></tr> - <tr class="chap"> - <td class="tdr first">I</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Theories of the State</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h1">1</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">The Sociological Idea of the State</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h15">15</a></td></tr> - <tr class="chap"> - <td class="tdr first">II</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Genesis of the State</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h22">22</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">(a) Political and Economic Means</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h24">24</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">(b) Peoples Without a State: Huntsmen and Grubbers</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h27">27</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">(c) Peoples Preceding the State: Herdsmen and Vikings</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h33">33</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">(d) The Genesis of the State</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h51">51</a></td></tr> - <tr class="chap"> - <td class="tdr first">III</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Primitive Feudal State</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h82">82</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">(a) The Form of Dominion</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h82">82</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">(b) The Integration</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h89">89</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">(c) The Differentiation: Group Theories and Group Psychology</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h92">92</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">(d) The Primitive Feudal State of Higher Grade</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h105">105</a></td></tr> - <tr class="chap"> - <td class="tdr first">IV</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Maritime State</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h121">121</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">(a) Traffic in Prehistoric Times</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h122">122</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">(b) Trade and the Primitive State</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h135">135</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">(c) The Genesis of the Maritime State</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h140">140</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">(d) Essence and Issue of the Maritime States</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h155">155</a></td></tr> - <tr class="chap"> - <td class="tdr first">V</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Development of the Feudal State</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h174">174</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">(a) The Genesis of Landed Property</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h174">174</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">(b) The Central Power in the Primitive Feudal State</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h182">182</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">(c) The Political and Social Disintegration of the Primitive Feudal State</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h191">191</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">(d) The Ethnic Amalgamation</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h213">213</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">(e) The Developed Feudal State</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h221">221</a></td></tr> - <tr class="chap"> - <td class="tdr first">VI</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Development of the Constitutional State</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h229">229</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">(a) The Emancipation of the Peasantry</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h231">231</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">(b) The Genesis of the Industrial State</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h236">236</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">(c) The Influences of Money Economy</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h243">243</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">(d) The Modern Constitutional State</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h257">257</a></td></tr> - <tr class="chap"> - <td class="tdr first">VII</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Tendency of the Development of the State</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h274">274</a></td></tr> - <tr class="chap"> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Notes</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#h293">293</a></td></tr> -</table> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_1">1</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="THE_STATE"></a><span class="larger">THE STATE</span></h2> - - - -<hr /> -<h2 id="h1" class="nobreak p2 vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER I<br /> - -<span class="subhead">THEORIES OF THE STATE</span></h2> - - -<p>This treatise regards the State from the -sociological standpoint only, not from the -juristic—sociology, as I understand the word, -being both a philosophy of history and a theory -of economics. Our object is to trace the development -of the State from its socio-psychological -genesis up to its modern constitutional -form; after that, we shall endeavor to present -a well-founded prognosis concerning its future -development. Since we shall trace only the -State’s inner, essential being, we need not concern -ourselves with the external forms of law -under which its international and intra-national -life is assumed. This treatise, in short, -is a contribution to the philosophy of State development;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_2">2</a></span> -but only in so far as the law of development -here traced from its generic form -affects also the social problems common to all -forms of the modern State.</p> - -<p>With this limitation of treatment in mind, -we may at the outset dismiss all received doctrines -of public law. Even a cursory examination -of conventional theories of the State is -sufficient to show that they furnish no explanation -of its genesis, essence and purpose. -These theories represent all possible shadings -between all imaginable extremes. Rousseau -derives the State from a social contract, while -Carey ascribes its origin to a band of robbers. -Plato and the followers of Karl Marx endow -the State with omnipotence, making it the absolute -lord over the citizen in all political and -economic matters; while Plato even goes so -far as to wish the State to regulate sexual relations. -The Manchester school, on the other -hand, going to the opposite extreme of liberalism, -would have the State exercise only needful -police functions, and would thus logically -have as a result a scientific anarchism which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_3">3</a></span> -must utterly exterminate the State. From -these various and conflicting views, it is impossible -either to establish a fixed principle, -or to formulate a satisfactory concept of the -real essence of the State.</p> - -<p>This irreconcilable conflict of theories is -easily explained by the fact that none of the -conventional theories treats the State from -the sociological view-point. Nevertheless, the -State is a phenomenon common to all history, -and its essential nature can only be made plain -by a broad and comprehensive study of universal -history. Except in the field of sociology, -the king’s highway of science, no treatment -of the State has heretofore taken this -path. All previous theories of the State have -been class theories. To anticipate somewhat -the outcome of our researches, every State has -been and is a class State, and every theory of -the State has been and is a class theory.</p> - -<p>A class theory is, however, of necessity, not -the result of investigation and reason, but a -by-product of desires and will. Its arguments -are used, not to establish truth, but as weapons<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_4">4</a></span> -in the contest for material interests. The result, -therefore, is not science, but nescience. -By understanding the State, we may indeed -recognize the essence of theories concerning the -State. But the converse is not true. An understanding -of theories about the State will -give us no clue to its essence.</p> - -<p>The following may be stated as a ruling concept, -especially prevalent in university teaching, -of the origin and essence of the State. It -represents a view which, in spite of manifold -attacks, is still affirmed.</p> - -<p>It is maintained that the State is an organization -of human community life, which -originates by reason of a social instinct implanted -in men by nature (Stoic Doctrine); -or else is brought about by an irresistible impulse -to end the “war of all against all,” and -to coerce the savage, who opposes organized -effort, to a peaceable community life in place -of the anti-social struggle in which all budding -shoots of advancement are destroyed (Epicurean -Doctrine). These two apparently irreconcilable -concepts were fused by the intermediation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_5">5</a></span> -of mediæval philosophy. This, -founded on theologic reasoning and belief -in the Bible, developed the opinion that -man, originally and by nature a social creature, -is, through original sin, the fratricide of -Cain and the transgression at the tower of -Babel, divided into innumerable tribes, which -fight to the hilt, until they unite peaceably -as a State.</p> - -<p>This view is utterly untenable. It confuses -the logical concept of a class with some subordinate -species thereof. Granted that the -State is <em>one</em> form of organized political cohesion, -it is also to be remembered that it is a -form having <em>specific</em> characteristics. Every -state in history was or is a <em>state of classes</em>, a -polity of superior and inferior social groups, -based upon distinctions either of rank or of -property. This phenomenon must, then, be -called the “State.” With it alone history occupies -itself.</p> - -<p>We should, therefore, be justified in designating -every other form of political organization -by the same term, without further differentiation,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_6">6</a></span> -had there never existed any other than -a class-state, or were it the only conceivable -form. At least, proof might properly be -called for, to show that each conceivable political -organization, even though originally it did -not represent a polity of superior and inferior -social and economic classes, since it is of necessity -subject to inherent laws of development, -must in the end be resolved into the specific -class form of history. Were such proof forthcoming, -it would offer in fact only one form -of political amalgamation, calling in turn for -differentiation at various stages of development, -viz., the preparatory stage, when class -distinction does not exist, and the stage of -maturity, when it is fully developed.</p> - -<p>Former students of the philosophy of the -State were dimly aware of this problem. And -they tried to adduce the required proof, that -because of inherent tendencies of development, -every human political organization must gradually -become a class-state. Philosophers of -the canon law handed this theory down to -philosophers of the law of nature. From<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_7">7</a></span> -these, through the mediation of Rousseau, it -became a part of the teachings of the economists; -and even to this day it rules their views -and diverts them from the facts.</p> - -<p>This assumed proof is based upon the concept -of a “primitive accumulation,” or an original -store of wealth, in lands and in movable -property, brought about by means of purely -economic forces; a doctrine justly derided by -Karl Marx as a “fairy tale.” Its scheme of -reasoning approximates this:</p> - -<p>Somewhere, in some far-stretching, fertile -country, a number of free men, of equal status, -form a union for mutual protection. Gradually -they differentiate into property classes. -Those best endowed with strength, wisdom, -capacity for saving, industry and caution, -slowly acquire a basic amount of real or -movable property; while the stupid and less -efficient, and those given to carelessness -and waste, remain without possessions. The -well-to-do lend their productive property to -the less well-off in return for tribute, either -ground rent or profit, and become thereby continually<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_8">8</a></span> -richer, while the others always remain -poor. These differences in possession gradually -develop social class distinctions; since -everywhere the rich have preference, while -they alone have the time and the means to devote -to public affairs and to turn the laws administered -by them to their own advantage. -Thus, in time, there develops a ruling and -property-owning estate, and a proletariate, a -class without property. The primitive state -of free and equal fellows becomes a class-state, -by an inherent law of development, because in -every conceivable mass of men there are, as -may readily be seen, strong and weak, clever -and foolish, cautious and wasteful ones.</p> - -<p>This seems quite plausible, and it coincides -with the experience of our daily life. It is not -at all unusual to see an especially gifted member -of the lower class rise from his former surroundings, -and even attain a leading position -in the upper class; or conversely, to see some -spendthrift or weaker member of the higher -group “lose his class” and drop into the -proletariate.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_9">9</a></span></p> - -<p>And yet this entire theory is utterly mistaken; -it is a “fairy tale,” or it is a class theory -used to justify the privileges of the upper -classes. The class-state never originated in -this fashion, and never could have so originated. -History shows that it did not; and -economics shows deductively, with a testimony -absolute, mathematical and binding, that it -could not. A simple problem in elementary -arithmetic shows that the assumption of an -original accumulation is totally erroneous, and -has nothing to do with the development of the -class-state.</p> - -<p>The proof is as follows: All teachers of -natural law, etc., have unanimously declared -that the differentiation into income-receiving -classes and propertyless classes can only take -place when all fertile lands have been occupied. -For so long as man has ample opportunity to -take up unoccupied land, “no one,” says Turgot, -“would think of entering the service of -another;” we may add, “at least for wages, -which are not apt to be higher than the earnings -of an independent peasant working an<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_10">10</a></span> -unmortgaged and sufficiently large property;” -while mortgaging is not possible as long as -land is yet free for the working or taking, as -free as air and water. Matter that is obtainable -for the taking has no value that enables -it to be pledged, since no one loans on things -that can be had for nothing.</p> - -<p>The philosophers of natural law, then, assumed -that complete occupancy of the ground -must have occurred quite early, because of the -natural increase of an originally small population. -They were under the impression that -at their time, in the eighteenth century, it had -taken place many centuries previous, and they -naïvely deduced the existing class aggroupment -from the assumed conditions of that long-past -point of time. It never entered their -heads to work out their problem; and with few -exceptions their error has been copied by sociologists, -historians and economists. It is -only quite recently that my figures were -worked out, and they are truly astounding.<a id="FNanchor_A" href="#Footnote_A" class="fnanchor">A</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_11">11</a></span></p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_A" href="#FNanchor_A" class="fnanchor">A</a> Franz Oppenheimer, <cite>Theorie der Reinen und Politischen -Œkonomie</cite>. Berlin, 1912.—<i>Translator.</i></p></div> - -<p>We can determine with approximate accuracy -the amount of land of average fertility -in the temperate zone, and also what amount -is sufficient to enable a family of peasants to -exist comfortably, or how much such a family -can work with its own forces, without engaging -outside help or permanent farm servants. -At the time of the migration of the barbarians -(350 to 750 A. D.), the lot of each -able-bodied man was about thirty morgen -(equal to twenty acres) on average lands, on -very good ground only ten to fifteen morgen -(equal to seven or ten acres), four morgen being -equal to one hectare. Of this land, at -least a third, and sometimes a half, was left uncultivated -each year. The remainder of the -fifteen to twenty morgen sufficed to feed and -fatten into giants the immense families of these -child-producing Germans, and this in spite of -the primitive technique, whereby at least half -the productive capacity of a day was lost. -Let us assume that, in these modern times, -thirty morgen (equal to twenty acres) for the -average peasant suffices to support a family.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_12">12</a></span> -We have then assumed a block of land sufficiently -large to meet any objection. Modern -Germany, populated as it is, contains an agricultural -area of thirty-four million hectares -(equal to eighty-four million, fifteen thousand, -four hundred and eighty acres). The agricultural -population, including farm laborers and -their families, amounts to seventeen million; -so that, assuming five persons to a family and -an equal division of the farm lands, each -family would have ten hectares (equal to -twenty-five acres). In other words, not even -in the Germany of our own day would the -point have been reached where, according to -the theories of the adherents of natural law, -differentiation into classes would begin.</p> - -<p>Apply the same process to countries less -densely settled, such, for example, as the Danube -States, Turkey, Hungary and Russia, and -still more astounding results will appear. As -a matter of fact, there are still on the earth’s -surface, seventy-three billion, two hundred -million hectares (equal to one hundred eighty -billion, eight hundred eighty million and four<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_13">13</a></span> -hundred sixteen thousand acres); dividing into -the first amount the number of human beings -of all professions whatever, viz., one billion, -eight hundred million, every family of five -persons could possess about thirty morgen -(equal to eighteen and a half acres), <em>and still -leave about two-thirds of the planet unoccupied</em>.</p> - -<p>If, therefore, purely economic causes are -ever to bring about a differentiation into -classes by the growth of a propertyless laboring -class, the time has not yet arrived; and -the critical point at which ownership of land -will cause a natural scarcity is thrust into the -dim future—if indeed it ever can arrive.</p> - -<p>As a matter of fact, however, for centuries -past, in all parts of the world, we have had a -class-state, with possessing classes on top and -a propertyless laboring class at the bottom, -even when population was much less dense -than it is to-day. Now it is true that the class-state -can arise only where all fertile acreage -has been <em>occupied</em> completely; and since I have -shown that even at the present time, all the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_14">14</a></span> -ground is not occupied economically, this must -mean that it has been preëmpted politically. -Since land could not have acquired “natural -scarcity,” the scarcity must have been “legal.” -This means that the land has been preëmpted -by a ruling class against its subject class, and -settlement prevented. Therefore the State, -as a class-state, can have originated in no other -way than through conquest and subjugation.</p> - -<p>This view, the so-called “sociologic idea of -the state,” as the following will show, is supported -in ample manner by well-known historical -facts. And yet most modern historians -have rejected it, holding that both groups, -amalgamated by war into one State, before -that time had, each for itself formed a “State.” -As there is no method of obtaining historical -proof to the contrary, since the beginnings of -human history are unknown, we should arrive -at a verdict of “not proven,” were it not that, -deductively, there is the absolute certainty -that the State, as history shows it, the class-state, -could not have come about except -through warlike subjugation. The mass of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_15">15</a></span> -evidence shows that our simple calculation excludes -any other result.</p> - - -<h3 id="h15"><span class="smcap smaller">THE SOCIOLOGICAL IDEA OF THE STATE</span></h3> - -<p>To the originally, purely sociological, idea -of the State, I have added the economic phase -and formulated it as follows:</p> - -<p>What, then, is the State as a sociological -concept? The State, completely in its genesis, -essentially and almost completely during -the first stages of its existence, is a social institution, -forced by a victorious group of men on -a defeated group, with the sole purpose of regulating -the dominion of the victorious group -over the vanquished, and securing itself against -revolt from within and attacks from abroad. -Teleologically, this dominion had no other -purpose than the economic exploitation of the -vanquished by the victors.</p> - -<p>No primitive state known to history originated -in any other manner.<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">1</a> Wherever a reliable -tradition reports otherwise, either it -concerns the amalgamation of two fully developed -primitive states into one body of more<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_16">16</a></span> -complete organization; or else it is an adaptation -to men of the fable of the sheep which -made a bear their king in order to be protected -against the wolf. But even in this latter case, -the form and content of the State became precisely -the same as in those states where nothing -intervened, and which became immediately -“wolf states.”</p> - -<p>The little history learned in our school-days -suffices to prove this generic doctrine. Everywhere -we find some warlike tribe of wild men -breaking through the boundaries of some less -warlike people, settling down as nobility and -founding its State. In Mesopotamia, wave -follows wave, state follows state—Babylonians, -Amoritans, Assyrians, Arabs, Medes, -Persians, Macedonians, Parthians, Mongols, -Seldshuks, Tartars, Turks; on the Nile, Hyksos, -Nubians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, -Arabs, Turks; in Greece, the Doric States are -typical examples; in Italy, Romans, Ostrogoths, -Lombards, Franks, Germans; in Spain, -Carthaginians, Visigoths, Arabs; in Gaul, -Romans, Franks, Burgundians, Normans; in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_17">17</a></span> -Britain, Saxons, Normans. In India wave -upon wave of wild warlike clans has flooded -over the country even to the islands of the Indian -Ocean. So also is it with China. In the -European colonies, we find the selfsame type, -wherever a settled element of the population -has been found, as for example, in South -America and Mexico. Where that element is -lacking, where only roving huntsmen are -found, who may be exterminated but not subjugated, -the conquerors resort to the device of -importing from afar masses of men to be exploited, -to be subject perpetually to forced -labor, and thus the slave trade arises.</p> - -<p>An apparent exception is found only in -those European colonies in which it is forbidden -to replace the lack of a domiciled indigenous -population by the importation of slaves. -One of these colonies, the United States of -America, is among the most powerful state-formations -in all history. The exception -there found is to be explained by this, that the -mass of men to be exploited and worked without -cessation <em>imports itself</em>, by emigration in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_18">18</a></span> -great hordes from primitive states or from -those in higher stages of development in which -exploitation has become unbearable, while liberty -of movement has been attained. In this -case, one may speak of an infection from afar -with “statehood” brought in by the infected of -foreign lands. Where, however, in such colonies, -immigration is very limited, either because -of excessive distances and the consequent -high charges for moving from home, or -because of regulations limiting the immigration, -we perceive an approximation to the final -end of the development of the State, which we -nowadays recognize as the necessary outcome -and finale, but for which we have not yet found -a scientific terminology. Here again, in the -dialectic development, a change in the quantity -is bound up with a change of the quality. -The old form is filled with new contents. We -still find a “State” in so far as it represents the -tense regulation, secured by external force, -whereby is secured the social living together of -large bodies of men; but it is no longer the -“State” in its older sense. It is no longer the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_19">19</a></span> -instrument of political domination and economic -exploitation of one social group by another; -it is no longer a “State of Classes.” It -rather resembles a condition which appears to -have come about through a “social contract.” -This stage is approached by the Australian -Colonies, excepting Queensland, which after -the feudal manner still exploits the half enslaved -Kanakas. It is almost attained in New -Zealand.</p> - -<p>So long as there is no general assent as to -the origin and essence of states historically -known or as to the sociological meaning of the -word “State,” it would be futile to attempt to -force into use a new name for these most advanced -commonwealths. They will continue -to be called “states” in spite of all protests, -especially because of the pleasure of using -confusing concepts. For the purpose of this -study, however, we propose to employ a new -concept, a different verbal lever, and shall -speak of the result of the new process as a -“Freemen’s Citizenship.”</p> - -<p>This summary survey of the states of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_20">20</a></span> -past and present should, if space permitted, be -supplemented by an examination of the facts -offered by the study of races, and of those -states which are not treated in our falsely -called “Universal History.” On this point, the -assurance may be accepted that here again our -general rule is valid without exception. -Everywhere, whether in the Malay Archipelago, -or in the “great sociological laboratory of -Africa,” at all places on this planet where the -development of tribes has at all attained a -higher form, the State grew from the subjugation -of one group of men by another. Its basic -justification, its raison d’être, was and is the -economic exploitation of those subjugated.</p> - -<p>The summary review thus far made may -serve as proof of the basic premise of this -sketch. The pathfinder, to whom, before all -others, we are indebted for this line of investigation -is Professor Ludwig Gumplowicz of -Graz, jurist and sociologist, who crowned a -brave life by a brave self-chosen death. We -can, then, in sharp outlines, follow in the sufferings -of humanity the path which the State<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_21">21</a></span> -has pursued in its progress through the ages. -This we propose now to trace from the primitive -state founded on conquest to the “freemen’s -citizenship.”</p> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_22">22</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h22" class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_II"></a>CHAPTER II<br /> - -<span class="subhead">THE GENESIS OF THE STATE</span></h2> - - -<p>One single force impels all life; one force developed -it, from the single cell, the particle of -albumen floating about in the warm ocean of -prehistoric time, up to the vertebrates, and then -to man. This one force, according to Lippert, -is the tendency to provide for life, bifurcated -into “hunger and love.” With man, however, -philosophy also enters into the play of these -forces, in order hereafter, together with “hunger -and love, to hold together the structure of -the world of men.” To be sure, this philosophy, -this “idea” of Schopenhauer’s, is at its -source nothing else than a creature of the provision -for life called by him “will.” It is an -organ of orientation in the world, an arm in the -struggle for existence. Yet in spite of this, -we shall come to know the desire for causation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_23">23</a></span> -as a self-acting force, and of social -facts as coöperators in the sociological process -of development. In the beginning of -human society, and as it gradually develops, -this tendency pushes itself forward in various -bizarre ideas called “superstition.” These are -based on purely logical conclusions from -incomplete observations concerning air and -water, earth and fire, animals and plants, which -seem endowed with a throng of spirits both -kindly and malevolent. One may say that in -the most recent modern times, at a stage attained -only by very few races, there arises also -the younger daughter of the desire for causation, -namely science, as a logical result of complete -observation of facts; science, now required -to exterminate widely branched-out -superstition, which, with innumerable threads, -has rooted itself in the very soul of mankind.</p> - -<p>But, however powerfully, especially in the -moment of “ecstasy,”<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">2</a> superstition may have -influenced history, however powerfully, even in -ordinary times, it may have coöperated in the -development of human communal life, the principal<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_24">24</a></span> -force of development is still to be found -in the necessities of life, which force man to -acquire for himself and for his family nourishment, -clothing and housing. This remains, -therefore, the “economic” impulse. A sociological—and -that means a socio-psychological—investigation -of the development of history -can, therefore, not progress otherwise than by -following out the methods by which economic -needs have been satisfied in their gradual unfolding, -and by taking heed of the influences of -the causation impulse at its proper place.</p> - - -<h3 id="h24">(a) <span class="smcap smaller">POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEANS</span></h3> - -<p>There are two fundamentally opposed -means whereby man, requiring sustenance, is -impelled to obtain the necessary means for satisfying -his desires. These are work and robbery, -one’s own labor and the forcible appropriation -of the labor of others. Robbery! -Forcible appropriation! These words convey -to us ideas of crime and the penitentiary, since -we are the contemporaries of a developed civilization,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_25">25</a></span> -specifically based on the inviolability -of property. And this tang is not lost when -we are convinced that land and sea robbery is -the primitive relation of life, just as the warriors’ -trade—which also for a long time is only -organized mass robbery—constitutes the most -respected of occupations. Both because of -this, and also on account of the need of having, -in the further development of this study, terse, -clear, sharply opposing terms for these very -important contrasts, I propose in the following -discussion to call one’s own labor and the -equivalent exchange of one’s own labor for the -labor of others, the “economic means” for the -satisfaction of needs, while the unrequited appropriation -of the labor of others will be called -the “political means.”</p> - -<p>The idea is not altogether new; philosophers -of history have at all times found this contradiction -and have tried to formulate it. But no -one of these formulæ has carried the premise to -its complete logical end. At no place is it -clearly shown that the contradiction consists<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_26">26</a></span> -only in the <em>means</em> by which the <em>identical purpose</em>, -the acquisition of economic objects of consumption, -is to be obtained. Yet this is the -critical point of the reasoning. In the case of -a thinker of the rank of Karl Marx, one may -observe what confusion is brought about when -economic purpose and economic means are not -strictly differentiated. All those errors, which -in the end led Marx’s splendid theory so far -away from truth, were grounded in the lack of -clear differentiation between the means of economic -satisfaction of needs and its end. This -led him to designate slavery as an “economic -category,” and force as an “economic force”—half -truths which are far more dangerous than -total untruths, since their discovery is more difficult, -and false conclusions from them are inevitable.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, our own sharp differentiation -between the two means toward the same -end, will help us to avoid any such confusion. -This will be our key to an understanding of the -development, the essence, and the purpose of -the State; and since all universal history heretofore<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_27">27</a></span> -has been only the history of states, to an -understanding of universal history as well. -All world history, from primitive times up to -our own civilization, presents a single phase, -a contest namely between the economic and -the political means; and it can present only this -phase until we have achieved free citizenship.</p> - - -<h3 id="h27">(b) <span class="smcap smaller">PEOPLES WITHOUT A STATE: HUNTSMEN AND GRUBBERS</span></h3> - -<p>The state is an organization of the political -means. No state, therefore, can come into -being until the economic means has created a -definite number of objects for the satisfaction -of needs, which objects may be taken -away or appropriated by warlike robbery. -For that reason, primitive huntsmen are without -a state; and even the more highly developed -huntsmen become parts of a state structure -only when they find in their neighborhood an -evolved economic organization which they can -subjugate. But primitive huntsmen live in -practical anarchy.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_28">28</a></span></p> - -<p>Grosse says concerning primitive huntsmen -in general:</p> - -<p>“There are no essential differences of fortune -among them, and thus a principal source -for the origin of differences in station is lacking. -Generally, all grown men within the -tribe enjoy equal rights. The older men, -thanks to their greater experience, have a certain -authority; but no one feels himself bound -to render them obedience. Where in some -cases chiefs are recognized—as with the Botokude, -the Central Californians, the Wedda and -the Mincopie—their power is extremely -limited. The chieftain has no means of enforcing -his wishes against the will of the rest. -Most tribes of hunters, however, have no chieftain. -The entire society of the males still -forms a homogeneous undifferentiated mass, -in which only those individuals achieve prominence -who are believed to possess magical -powers.”<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">3</a></p> - -<p>Here, then, there scarcely exists a spark -of “statehood,” even in the sense of ordinary<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_29">29</a></span> -theories of the state, still less in the sense -of the correct “sociologic idea of the state.”</p> - -<p>The social structure of primitive peasants -has hardly more resemblance to a state than -has the horde of huntsmen. Where the peasant, -working the ground with a grub, is living -in liberty, there is as yet no “state.” The -plow is always the mark of a higher economic -condition which occurs only in a state; that is to -say, in a system of plantation work carried on -by subjugated servants.<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> The grubbers live -isolated from one another, scattered over the -country in separated curtilages, perhaps in villages, -split up because of quarrels about district -or farm boundaries. In the best cases, -they live in feebly organized associations, bound -together by oath, attached only loosely by the -tie which the consciousness of the same descent -and speech and the same belief imposes upon -them. They unite perhaps once a year in the -common celebration of renowned ancestors or -of the tribal god. There is no ruling authority -over the whole mass; the various chieftains of -a village, or possibly of a district, may have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_30">30</a></span> -more or less influence in their circumscribed -spheres, this depending usually upon their personal -qualities, and especially upon the magical -powers attributed to them. Cunow describes -the Peruvian peasants before the incursion of -the Incas as follows: “An unregulated living -side by side of many independent, mutually -warring tribes, who again were split up into -more or less autonomous territorial unions, held -together by ties of kinship.”<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">5</a> One may say -that all the primitive peasants of the old and -new world were of this type.</p> - -<p>In such a state of society, it is hardly conceivable -that a warlike organization could -come about for purposes of attack. It is -sufficiently difficult to mobilize the clan, or -still more the tribe, for common defense. The -peasant is always lacking in mobility. He is -as attached to the ground as the plants he cultivates. -As a matter of fact, the working of -his field makes him “bound to the soil” (<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">glebæ -adscriptus</i>), even though, in the absence of law, -he has freedom of movement. What purpose, -moreover, would a looting expedition effect in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_31">31</a></span> -a country, which throughout its extent is occupied -only by grubbing peasants? The peasant -can carry off from the peasant nothing -which he does not already own. In a condition -of society marked by superfluity of agricultural -land, each individual contributes only a -little work to its extensive cultivation. Each -occupies as much territory as he needs. More -would be superfluous. Its acquisition would -be lost labor, even were its owner able to conserve -for any length of time the grain products -thus secured. Under primitive conditions, -however, this spoils rapidly by reason of change -of atmosphere, ants, or other agencies. According -to Ratzel, the Central African peasant -must convert the superfluous portion of his -crops into beer as quickly as possible in order -not to lose it entirely!</p> - -<p>For all these reasons, primitive peasants are -totally lacking in that warlike desire to take the -offensive which is the distinguishing mark of -hunters and herdsmen: war can not better their -condition. And this peaceable attitude is -strengthened by the fact that the occupation of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_32">32</a></span> -the peasant does not make him an efficient warrior. -It is true his muscles are strong and he -has powers of endurance, but he is sluggish -of movement and slow to come to a determination, -while huntsmen and nomads by their -methods of living develop speed of motion and -swiftness of action. For this reason, the primitive -peasant is usually of a more gentle disposition -than they.<a id="FNanchor_B" href="#Footnote_B" class="fnanchor">B</a></p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_B" href="#FNanchor_B" class="fnanchor">B</a> This psychological contradiction, though often expressly -stated, is not the absolute rule, Grosse, <cite>Forms of the Family</cite>, -says (page 137): “Some historians of civilization place the -peasant in opposition to the warlike nomads, claiming that -the peasants are peace-loving peoples. In fact one can not -state that their economic life leads them to wars, or educates -them for it, as can be said of stock raisers. Nevertheless, one -finds within the scope of this form of cultivation a mass of -the most warlike and cruel peoples to be found anywhere. -The wild cannibals of the Bismarck archipelago, the blood-lusting -Vitians, the butchers of men of Dahome and Ashanti—they -all cultivate the ‘peaceable’ acres; and if other peasants -are not quite as bad, it seems that the kindly disposition -of the vast mass appears to be, at least, questionable.”</p></div> - -<p>To sum up: within the economic and social -conditions of the peasant districts, one finds -no differentiation working for the higher -forms of integration. There exists neither the -impulse nor the possibility for the warlike subjection -of neighbors. No “State” can therefore<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_33">33</a></span> -arise; and, as a matter of fact, none ever -has arisen from such social conditions. Had -there been no impulse from without, from -groups of men nourished in a different manner, -the primitive grubber would never have -discovered the State.</p> - - -<h3 id="h33">(c) <span class="smcap smaller">PEOPLES PRECEDING THE STATE: HERDSMEN AND VIKINGS</span></h3> - -<p>Herdsmen, on the contrary, even though -isolated, have developed a whole series of the -elements of statehood; and in the tribes which -have progressed further, they have developed -this in its totality, with the single exception -of the last point of identification which completes -the state in its modern sense, that is to -say, with exception only of the definitive occupation -of a circumscribed territory.</p> - -<p>One of these elements is an economic one. -Even without the intervention of extra-economic -force, there may still develop among -herdsmen a sufficiently marked differentiation -of property and income. Assuming that, at -the start, there was complete equality in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_34">34</a></span> -number of cattle, yet within a short time, the -one man may be richer and the other poorer. -An especially clever breeder will see his herd -increase rapidly, while an especially careful -watchman and bold hunter will preserve his -from decimation by beasts of prey. The element -of luck also affects the result. One of -these herders finds an especially good grazing -ground and healthful watering places; the -other one loses his entire stock through -pestilence, or through a snowfall or a sandstorm.</p> - -<p>Distinctions in fortune quickly bring about -class distinctions. The herdsman who has lost -all must hire himself to the rich man; and sinking -thus under the other, become dependent on -him. Wherever herdsmen live, from all three -parts of the ancient world, we find the same -story. Meitzen reports of the Lapps, nomadic -in Norway: “Three hundred reindeer sufficed -for one family; who owned only a hundred -must enter the service of the richer, whose -herds ran up to a thousand head.”<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">6</a> The same -writer, speaking of the Central Asiatic Nomads,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_35">35</a></span> -says: “A family required three hundred -head of cattle for comfort; one hundred -head is poverty, followed by a life of debt. -The servant must cultivate the lands of the -lord.”<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">7</a> Ratzel reports concerning the Hottentots -of Africa a form of “commendatio”: -“The poor man endeavors to hire himself to the -rich man, his only object being to obtain cattle.”<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">8</a> -Laveleye, who reports the same circumstances -from Ireland, traces the origin and -the name of the feudal system (<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">système -féodal</i>) to the loaning of cattle by the rich to -the poor members of the tribe; accordingly, a -“fee-od” (owning of cattle) was the first feud -whereby so long as the debt existed the magnate -bound the small owner to himself as “his -man.”</p> - -<p>We can only hint at the methods whereby, -even in peaceable associations of herdsmen, this -economic and consequent social differentiation -may have been furthered by the connection of -the patriarchate with the offices of supreme and -sacrificial priesthood if the wise old men used -cleverly the superstition of their clan associates.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_36">36</a></span> -But this differentiation, so long as it is -unaffected by the political means, operates -within very modest bounds. Cleverness and -efficiency are not hereditary with any degree -of certainty. The largest herd will be split -up if many heirs grow up in one tent, and fortune -is tricky. In our own day, the richest -man among the Lapps of Sweden, in the shortest -possible time, has been reduced to such complete -poverty that the government has had to -support him. All these causes bring it about -that the original condition of economic and -social equality is always approximately restored. -“The more peaceable, aboriginal, and -genuine the nomad is, the smaller are the tangible -differences of possession. It is touching -to note the pleasure with which an old prince -of the Tsaidam Mongols accepts his tribute or -gift, consisting of a handful of tobacco, a piece -of sugar, and twenty-five kopeks.”<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">9</a></p> - -<p>This equality is destroyed permanently and -in greater degree by the political means. -“Where war is carried on and booty acquired, -greater differences arise, which find their expression<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_37">37</a></span> -in the ownership of slaves, women, -arms and spirited mounts.”<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">10</a></p> - -<p>The ownership of <em>slaves</em>! The nomad is the -inventor of slavery, and thereby has created the -seedling of the state, the first economic exploitation -of man by man.</p> - -<p>The huntsman carries on wars and takes -captives. But he does not make them slaves; -either he kills them, or else he adopts them into -the tribe. Slaves would be of no use to him. -The booty of the chase can be stowed away -even less than grain can be “capitalized.” -The idea of using a human being as a labor -motor could only come about on an economic -plane on which a body of wealth has developed, -call it capital, which can be increased only with -the assistance of dependent labor forces.</p> - -<p>This stage is first reached by the herdsmen. -The forces of one family, lacking outside assistance, -suffice to hold together a herd of very -limited size, and to protect it from attacks of -beasts of prey or human enemies. Until the -political means is brought into play, auxiliary -forces are found very sparingly; such as the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_38">38</a></span> -poorer members of the clan already mentioned, -together with runaways from foreign tribes, -who are found all over the world as protected -dependents in the suite of the greater owners -of herds.<a id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">11</a> In some cases, an entire poor clan -of herdsmen enters, half freely, into the service -of some rich tribe. “Entire peoples take positions -corresponding to their relative wealth. -Thus the Tungusen, who are very poor, try to -live near the settlements of the Tschuktsches, -because they find occupation as herdsmen of -the reindeer belonging to the wealthy Tschuktsches; -they are paid in reindeer. And the -subjection of the Ural-Samojedes by the Sirjaenes -came about through the gradual occupation -of their pasturing grounds.”<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">12</a></p> - -<p>Excepting, however, the last named case, -which is already very state-like, the few existing -labor forces, without capital, are not sufficient -to permit the clan to keep very large -herds. Furthermore, methods of herding -themselves compel division. For a pasture -may not, as they say in the Swiss Alps, be -“overpushed,” that is to say, have too many<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_39">39</a></span> -cattle on it. The danger of losing the entire -stock is reduced by the measure in which it is -distributed over various pastures. For cattle -plagues, storms, etc., can affect only a part; -while even the enemy from abroad can not drive -off all at once. For that reason, the Hereros, -for example, “find every well-to-do owner -forced to keep, besides the main herd, several -other subsidiary herds. Younger brothers or -other near relatives, or in want of these, tried -old servants, watch them.”<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">13</a></p> - -<p>For that reason, the developed nomad spares -his captured enemy; he can use him as a slave -on his pasture. We may note this transition -from killing to enslaving in a customary rite -of the Scythians: they offered up at their -places of sacrifice one out of every hundred -captured enemies. Lippert, who reports this, -sees in it “the beginning of a limitation, and -the reason thereof is evidently to be found in -the value which a captured enemy has acquired -by becoming the servant of a tribal herdsman.”<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">14</a></p> - -<p>With the introduction of slaves into the tribal<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_40">40</a></span> -economy of the herdsmen, the state, in its -essential elements, is completed, except that it -has not as yet acquired a definitely circumscribed -territorial limit. The state has thus -the <em>form</em> of dominion, and its economic basis -is the exploitation of human labor. Henceforth, -economic differentiation and the formation -of social classes progress rapidly. The -herds of the great, wisely divided and better -guarded by numerous armed servants than -those of the simple freemen, as a rule, maintain -themselves at their original number: -they also increase faster than those of the freemen, -since they are augmented by the greater -share in the booty which the rich receive, corresponding -to the number of warriors (slaves) -which these place in the field.</p> - -<p>Likewise, the office of supreme priest creates -an ever-widening cleft which divides the -numbers of the clan, all formerly equals; until -finally a genuine nobility, the rich descendants -of the rich patriarchs, is placed in juxtaposition -to the ordinary freemen. “The redskins -have also in their progressive organization developed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_41">41</a></span> -no nobility and no slavery,<a id="FNanchor_C" href="#Footnote_C" class="fnanchor">C</a> and in -this their organization distinguishes itself most -essentially from those of the old world. Both -arise from the development of the patriarchate -of stock-raising people.”<a id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">15</a></p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_C" href="#FNanchor_C" class="fnanchor">C</a> This statement of Lippert is not quite correct. The higher -developed domiciled huntsmen and fishermen of Northwest -America have both nobles and slaves.</p></div> - -<p>Thus we find, with all developed tribes of -herdsmen, a social separation into three distinct -classes: nobility (“head of the house of -his fathers” in the biblical phrase), common -freemen and slaves. According to Mommsen, -“all Indo-Germanic people have slavery as a -jural institution.”<a id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">16</a> This applies to the -Arians and the Semites of Asia and Africa as -well as to the Hamites. Among all the Fulbe -of the Sahara, “society is divided into princes, -chieftains, commons and slaves.”<a id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">17</a> And we -find the same facts everywhere, as a matter of -course, wherever slavery is legally established, -as among the Hova<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">18</a> and their Polynesian -kinsmen, the “Sea Nomads.” Human psychology -under similar circumstances brings<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_42">42</a></span> -about like conditions, independent of color or -race.</p> - -<p>Thus the herdsman gradually becomes accustomed -to earning his livelihood through warfare, -and to the exploitation of men as servile -labor motors. And one must admit that his -entire mode of life impels him to make more -and more use of the “political means.”</p> - -<p>He is physically stronger and just as adroit -and determined as the primitive huntsman, -whose food supply is too irregular to permit -him to attain his greatest natural physical development. -The herdsman can, in all cases, -grow to his full stature, since he has uninterrupted -nourishment in the milk of his herds -and an unfailing supply of meat. This is -shown in the Arian horse nomad, no less than -in the herdsman of Asia and Africa, e. g., the -Zulu. Secondly, tribes of herdsmen increase -faster than hordes of hunters. This is so, not -only because the adults can obtain much more -nourishment from a given territory, but still -more because possession of the milk of animals -shortens the period of nursing for the mothers,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_43">43</a></span> -and consequently permits a greater number of -children to be born and to grow to maturity. -As a consequence, the pastures and steppes of -the old world became inexhaustible fountains, -which periodically burst their confines letting -loose inundations of humanity, so that they -came to be called the “<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">vaginæ gentium</i>.”</p> - -<p>Moreover we find a much larger number of -armed warriors among herdsmen than among -hunters. Each one of these herdsmen is -stronger individually, and yet all of them together -are at least as mobile as is a horde of -huntsmen; while the camel and horse riders -among them are incomparably more mobile. -This greater mass of the best individual elements -is held together by an organization only -possible under the ægis of a slave-holding -patriarchate accustomed to rule, an organization -prepared and developed by its occupation, -and therefore superior to that of the young -warriors of the huntsmen sworn to the service -of one chief.</p> - -<p>Hunters, it may be observed, work best alone -or in small groups. Herdsmen, on the other<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_44">44</a></span> -hand, move to the best advantage in a great -train, in which each individual is best protected; -and which is in every sense an armed -expedition, where every stopping place becomes -an armed camp. Thus there is developed -a science of tactical maneuvers, strict -subordination, and firm discipline. “One does -not make a mistake,” as Ratzel says, “if one -accounts as the disciplinary forces in the life -of the nomads the order of the tents which, in -the same form, exists since most ancient times. -Every one and everything here has a definite, -traditional place; hence the speed and order in -setting up and in breaking camp, in establishment -and in rearrangement. It is unheard -of that any one without orders, or without the -most pressing reason, should change his place. -Thanks to this strict discipline, the tents can -be packed up and loaded away within the space -of an hour.”<a id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">19</a></p> - -<p>The same tried order, handed down from -untold ages, regulates the warlike march of -the tribe of herdsmen while on the hunt, in war -and in peaceable wandering. Thus they become<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_45">45</a></span> -professional fighters, irresistible until -the state develops higher and mightier organizations. -Herdsman and warrior become -identical concepts. Ratzel’s statement concerning -the Central Asiatic Nomads applies -to them all: “The nomad is, as herdsman, an -economic, as warrior, a political concept. It -is easy for him to turn from any activity to -that of the warrior and robber. Everything -in life has for him a pacific and war-like, an -honest and robber-like, side; according to circumstances, -the one or the other of these phases -appears uppermost. Even fishing and navigation, -at the hands of the East Caspian -Turkomans, developed into piracy.... The -activities of the apparently pacific existence -as a herdsman determine those of the warrior; -the pastoral crook becomes a fighting implement. -In the fall, when the horses return -strengthened from the pasture and the second -cropping of the sheep is completed, the nomads’ -minds turn to some feud or robbing expedition -(<i>Baranta</i>, literally, to make cattle, to lift cattle), -adjourned to that time. This is an expression<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_46">46</a></span> -of the right of self help, which in contentions -over points of law, or in quarrels affecting -dignity, or in blood feuds, seeks both -requital and surety in the most valuable things -that the enemy possesses, namely, the animals -of his herd. Young men who have not been -on a <i>baranta</i> must first acquire the name <i>batir</i>, -hero, and thus earn the claim to honor and respect. -The pleasure of ownership joined to -the desire for adventure develops the triple -descending gradation of avenger, hero and -robber.”<a id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">20</a></p> - -<p>An identical development takes place with -the sea nomads, the “Vikings,” as with the land -nomads. This is quite natural, since in the -most important cases noted in the history of -mankind, sea nomads are simply land nomads -taking to the sea.</p> - -<p>We have noted above one of the innumerable -examples which indicate that the herdsman -does not long hesitate to use for marauding -expeditions, instead of the horse or the -“ship of the desert,” the “horses of the sea.” -This case is exemplified by the East Caspian<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_47">47</a></span> -Turkomans.<a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">21</a> Another example is furnished -by the Scythians: “From the moment when -they learn from their neighbors the art of navigating -the seas, these wandering herdsmen, -whom Homer (<cite>Iliad</cite>, XIII, 3) calls ‘respected -horsemen, milk-eaters and poor, the most just -of men,’ change into daring navigators like -their Baltic and Scandinavian brethren. -Strabo (<cite>Cas.</cite>, 301) complains: ‘Since they -have ventured on the sea, carrying on piracy -and murdering foreigners, they have become -worse; and associating with many peoples, -they adopt their petty trading and spendthrift -habits.’”<a id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">22</a></p> - -<p>If the Phœnicians really were “Semites,” -they furnish an additional example of incomparable -importance of the transformation of -land into “sea Bedouins,” i. e., warlike robbers; -and the same is probably true for the -majority of the numerous peoples who looted -the rich countries around the Mediterranean, -whether from the coast of Asia Minor, Dalmatia, -or from the North African shore. -These begin from the earliest times, as we see<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_48">48</a></span> -from the Egyptian monuments (the Greeks -were not admitted into Egypt),<a id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">23</a> and continue -to the present day: e. g., the Riff pirates. -The North African “Moors,” an amalgamation -of Arabs and of Berbers, both originally -land nomads, are perhaps the most celebrated -example of this change.</p> - -<p>There are cases in which sea nomads—that -is to say, sea robbers—arise immediately -from fishermen, with no intermediate herdsman -stage. We have already examined the causes -which give the herdsmen their superiority over -the peasantry: the relatively numerous population -of the horde, combined with an activity -which develops courage and quick resolution -in the individual, and educates the mass as a -whole to tense discipline. All this applies also -to fishermen dwelling on the sea. Rich fishing -grounds permit a considerable density of population, -as is shown in the case of the Northwest -Indians (Tlinkit, etc.); these permit also -the keeping of slaves, since the slave earns -more by fishing than his keep amounts to.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_49">49</a></span> -Thus we find, here alone among the redskins, -slavery developed as an institution; and we -find, therefore, along with it, permanent -economic differences among the freemen, which -result in a sort of plutocracy similar to that -noted among herdsmen. Here, as there, the -habit of command over slaves produces the -habit of rule and a taste for the “political -means.” This is favored by the tense discipline -developed in navigation. “Not the -least advantage of fishing in common is found -in the discipline of the crews. They must -render implicit obedience to a leader chosen in -each of the larger fishing boats, since every success -depends upon obedience. The command -of a ship afterward facilitates the command -of the state. We are accustomed to -reckon the Solomon Islanders as complete savages, -and yet their life is subject to one solitary -element, which combines their forces, namely, -navigation.”<a id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">24</a> If the Northwest Indians did -not become such celebrated sea robbers as their -likes in the old world, this is due to the fact<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_50">50</a></span> -that the neighborhoods within their reach had -developed no rich civilization; but all more developed -fishermen carry on piracy.</p> - -<p>For this reason, the Vikings have the same -capacity to choose the political means as the -basis of their economic existence as have the -cattle raiders; and similarly they have been -founders of states on a large scale. Hereafter, -we shall distinguish the states founded -by them as “sea states,” while the states -founded by herdsmen—and in the new world -by hunters—will be called “land states.” Sea -states will be treated extensively when we discuss -the consequences of the <em>developed feudal -state</em>. As long, however, as we are discussing -the development of the state, and the <em>primitive</em> -feudal state, we must limit ourselves to the -consideration of the land state and leave the -sea state out of account. This treatment is -convenient, since in all essential things the sea -state has the same characteristics, but its development -can not be followed through the -various typical stages as can the development -of the land state.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_51">51</a></span></p> - - -<h3 id="h51">(d) <span class="smcap smaller">THE GENESIS OF THE STATE</span></h3> - -<p>The hordes of huntsmen are incomparably -weaker, both in numbers and in the strength of -the single fighters, than are the herdsmen with -whom they occasionally brush. Naturally -they can not withstand the impact. They flee -to the highlands and mountains, where the -herdsmen have no inclination to follow them, -not only because of the physical hardships involved, -but also because their cattle do not find -pasturage there; or else they enter into a form -of cliental relation, as happened often in -Africa, especially in very ancient times. -When the Hyksos invaded Egypt, such dependent -huntsmen followed them. The huntsmen -usually pay for protection an inconsiderable -tribute in the form of spoils of the chase, -and are used for reconnoitering and watching. -But the huntsman, being a “practical anarchist,” -often invites his own destruction rather -than submit to regular labor. For these reasons, -no “state” ever arose from such contact.</p> - -<p>The peasants fight as undisciplined levies,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_52">52</a></span> -and with their single combatants undisciplined; -so that, in the long run, even though they are -strong in numbers, they are no more able than -are the hunters to withstand the charge of -the heavily armed herdsmen. But the peasantry -do not flee. The peasant is attached to -his ground, and has been used to regular work. -He remains, yields to subjection, and pays -tribute to his conqueror; <em>that is the genesis of -the land states in the old world</em>.</p> - -<p>In the new world, where the larger herding -animals, cattle, horses, camels, were not indigenous, -we find that instead of the herdsman -the hunter is the conqueror of the peasant, -because of his infinitely superior adroitness in -the use of arms and in military discipline. “In -the old world we found that the contrast of -herdsmen and peasants developed civilization; -in the new world the contrast is between the -sedentary and the roving tribes. The Toltecks, -devoted to agriculture, fought wild -tribes (with a highly developed military -organization) breaking in from the north, as -endlessly as did Iran with Turan.”<a id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">25</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_53">53</a></span></p> - -<p>This applies not only to Peru and Mexico, -but to all America, a strong ground for the -opinion that the fundamental basis of civilization -is the same all over the world, its development -being consistent and regular under the -most varied economic and geographical conditions. -Wherever opportunity offers, and man -possesses the power, he prefers political to -economic means for the preservation of his -life. And perhaps this is true not alone of -man, for, according to Maeterlinck’s <cite>Life of -the Bees</cite>, a swarm which has once made the -experiment of obtaining honey from a foreign -hive, by robbery instead of by tedious building, -is thenceforth spoiled for the “economic -means.” From working bees, robber bees have -developed.</p> - -<p>Leaving out of account the state formations -of the new world, which have no great significance -in universal history, the cause of the -genesis of all states is the contrast between -peasants and herdsmen, between laborers and -robbers, between bottom lands and prairies. -Ratzel, regarding sociology from the geographical<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_54">54</a></span> -view-point, expresses this cleverly: -“It must be remembered that nomads do not -always destroy the opposing civilization of the -settled folk. This applies not only to tribes, -but also to states, even to those of some might. -The war-like character of the nomads is a -great factor in the creation of states. It finds -expression in the immense nations of Asia controlled -by nomad dynasties and nomad armies, -such as Persia, ruled by the Turks; China, -conquered and governed by the Mongols and -Manchus; and in the Mongol and Radjaputa -states of India, as well as in the states on -the border of the Soudan, where the amalgamation -of the formerly hostile elements has -not yet developed so far, although they are -joined together by mutual benefit. In no -place is it shown so clearly as here on the -border of the nomad and peasant peoples, that -the great workings of the impulse making for -civilization on the part of the nomads are not -the result of civilizing activity, but of war-like -exploits at first detrimental to pacific work. -Their importance lies in the capacity of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_55">55</a></span> -nomads to hold together the sedentary races -who otherwise would easily fall apart. This, -however, does not exclude their learning much -from their subjects.... Yet all these industrious -and clever folk did not have and -could not have the will and the power to rule, -the military spirit, and the sense for the order -and subordination that befits a state. For this -reason, the desert-born lords of the Soudan rule -over their negro folk just as the Manchus rule -their Chinese subjects. This takes place pursuant -to a law, valid from Timbuctoo to -Pekin, whereby advantageous state formations -arise in rich peasant lands adjoining a wide -prairie; where a high material culture of -sedentary peoples is violently subjugated to -the service of prairie dwellers having energy, -war-like capacity, and desire to rule.”<a id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">26</a></p> - -<p>In the genesis of the state, from the subjection -of a peasant folk by a tribe of herdsmen or -by sea nomads, six stages may be distinguished. -In the following discussion it should not be -assumed that the actual historical development -must, in each particular case, climb the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_56">56</a></span> -entire scale step by step. Although, even -here, the argument does not depend upon bare -theoretical construction, since every particular -stage is found in numerous examples, both in -the world’s history and in ethnology, and there -are states which have apparently progressed -through them all. But there are many more -which have skipped one or more of these stages.</p> - -<p>The first stage comprises robbery and killing -in border fights, endless combats broken -neither by peace nor by armistice. It is -marked by killing of men, carrying away of -children and women, looting of herds, and -burning of dwellings. Even if the offenders -are defeated at first, they return in stronger -and stronger bodies, impelled by the duty of -blood feud. Sometimes the peasant group -may assemble, may organize its militia, and -perhaps temporarily defeat the nimble enemy; -but mobilization is too slow and supplies to be -brought into the desert too costly for the peasants. -The peasants’ militia does not, as does -the enemy, carry its stock of food—its herds—with -it into the field. In Southwest Africa the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_57">57</a></span> -Germans recently experienced the difficulties -which a well-disciplined and superior force, -equipped with a supply train, with a railway -reaching back to its base of supply, and with -the millions of the German Empire behind it, -may have with a handful of herdsmen warriors, -who were able to give the Germans a -decided setback. In the case of primitive -levies, this difficulty is increased by the narrow -spirit of the peasant, who considers only his -own neighborhood, and by the fact that while -the war is going on the lands are uncultivated. -Therefore, in such cases, in the long run, the -small but compact and easily mobilized body -constantly defeats the greater disjointed mass, -as the panther triumphs over the buffalo.</p> - -<p>This is the first stage in the formation of -states. The state may remain stationary at -this point for centuries, for a thousand years. -The following is a thoroughly characteristic -example:</p> - -<p>“Every range of a Turkoman tribe formerly -bordered upon a wide belt which might be -designated as its ‘looting district.’ Everything<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_58">58</a></span> -north and east of Chorassan, though -nominally under Persian dominion, has for -decades belonged more to the Turkomans, -Jomudes, Goklenes, and other tribes of the -bordering plains, than to the Persians. The -Tekinzes, in a similar manner, looted all the -stretches from Kiwa to Bokhara, until other -Turkoman tribes were successfully rounded -up either by force or by corruption to act as -a buffer. Numberless further instances can -be found in the history of the chain of oases -which extends between Eastern and Western -Asia directly through the steppes of its central -part, where since ancient times the -Chinese have exercised a predominant influence -through their possession of all important -strategic centers, such as the Oasis of Chami. -The nomads, breaking through from north -and south, constantly tried to land on these -islands of fertile ground, which to them must -have appeared like Islands of the Blessed. -And every horde, whether laden down with -booty or fleeing after defeat, was protected by -the plains. Although the most immediate<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_59">59</a></span> -threats were averted by the continued weakening -of the Mongols, and the actual dominion of -Thibet, yet the last insurrection of the Dunganes -showed how easily the waves of a mobile -tribe break over these islands of civilization. -Only after the destruction of the nomads, impossible -as long as there are open plains in -Central Asia, can their existence be definitely -secured.”<a id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">27</a></p> - -<p>The entire history of the old world is replete -with well-known instances of mass expeditions, -which must be assigned to the first stage of -state development, inasmuch as they were -intent, not upon conquest, but directly on looting. -Western Europe suffered through these -expeditions at the hands of the Celts, Germans, -Huns, Avars, Arabs, Magyars, Tartars, Mongolians -and Turks by land; while the Vikings -and the Saracens harassed it on the waterways. -These hordes inundated entire continents far -beyond the limits of their accustomed looting -ground. They disappeared, returned, were -absorbed, and left behind them only wasted -lands. In many cases, however, they advanced<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_60">60</a></span> -in some part of the inundated district directly -to the sixth and last stage of state formation, -in cases namely, where they established a permanent -dominion over the peasant population. -Ratzel describes these mass migrations excellently -in the following:</p> - -<p>“The expeditions of the great hordes of -nomads contrast with this movement, drop by -drop and step by step, since they overflow -with tremendous power, especially Central -Asia and all neighboring countries. The -nomads of this district, as of Arabia and -Northern Africa, unite mobility in their way of -life with an organization holding together their -entire mass for one single object. It seems to -be a characteristic of the nomads that they -easily develop despotic power and far-reaching -might from the patriarchal cohesion of the -tribe. Mass governments thereby come into -being, which compare with other movements -among men in the same way that swollen -streams compare with the steady but diffused -flow of a tributary. The history of China, -India, and Persia, no less than that of Europe,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_61">61</a></span> -shows their historical importance. Just as -they moved about on their ranges with their -wives and children, slaves and carts, herds and -all their paraphernalia, so they inundated the -borderlands. While this ballast may have deprived -them of speed it increased their momentum. -The frightened inhabitants were -driven before them, and like a wave they rolled -over the conquered countries, absorbing their -wealth. Since they carried everything with -them, their new abodes were equipped with all -their possessions, and thus their final settlements -were of an ethnographic importance. -After this manner, the Magyars flooded Hungary, -the Manchus invaded China, the Turks, -the countries from Persia to the Adriatic.”<a id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">28</a></p> - -<p>What has been said here of Hamites, Semites -and Mongolians, may be said also, at least -in part, of the Arian tribes of herdsmen. It -applies also to the true negroes, at least to -those who live entirely from their herds: -“The mobile, warlike tribes of the Kafirs possess -a power of expansion which needs only -an enticing object in order to attain violent<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_62">62</a></span> -effects and to overturn the ethnologic relations -of vast districts. Eastern Africa offers such -an object. Here the climate did not forbid -stock raising, as in the countries of the interior, -and did not paralyze from the start, the power -of impact of the nomads, while nevertheless -numerous peaceable agricultural peoples found -room for their development. Wandering -tribes of Kafirs poured like devastating -streams into the fruitful lands of the Zambesi, -and up to the highlands between the Tanganyika -and the coast. Here they met the -advance guard of the Watusi, a wave of -Hamite eruption, coming from the north. -The former inhabitants of these districts were -either exterminated, or as serfs cultivated the -lands which they formerly owned; or they still -continued to fight; or again, they remained undisturbed -in settlements left on one side by the -stream of conquest.”<a id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">29</a></p> - -<p>All this has taken place before our eyes. -Some of it is still going on. During many -thousands of years it has “jarred all Eastern -Africa from the Zambesi to the Mediterranean.”<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_63">63</a></span> -The incursion of the Hyksos, -whereby for over five hundred years Egypt -was subject to the shepherd tribes of the eastern -and northern deserts—“kinsmen of the -peoples who up to the present day herd their -stock between the Nile and the Red Sea”<a id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">30</a>—is -the first authenticated foundation of a state. -These states were followed by many others -both in the country of the Nile itself, and -farther southward, as far as the Empire of -Muata Jamvo on the southern rim of the central -Congo district, which Portuguese traders -in Angola reported as early as the end of the -sixteenth century, and down to the Empire -of Uganda, which only in our own day has -finally succumbed to the superior military organization -of Europe. “Desert land and -civilization never lie peaceably alongside one -another; but their battles are all alike and full -of repetitions.”<a id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">31</a></p> - -<p>“Alike and full of repetitions”! That may -be said of universal history on its basic lines. -The human ego in its fundamental aspect is -much the same all the world over. It acts uniformly,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_64">64</a></span> -in obedience to the same influences of -its environment, with races of all colors, in all -parts of the earth, in the tropics as in the temperate -zones. One must step back far enough -and choose a point of view so high that the -variegated aspect of the details does not hide -the great movements of the mass. In such a -case, our eye misses the “mode” of fighting, -wandering, laboring humanity, while its “substance,” -ever similar, ever new, ever enduring -through change, reveals itself under uniform -laws.</p> - -<p>Gradually, from this first stage, there develops -the second, in which the peasant, -through thousands of unsuccessful attempts at -revolt, has accepted his fate and has ceased -every resistance. About this time, it begins -to dawn on the consciousness of the wild herdsman -that a murdered peasant can no longer -plow, and that a fruit tree hacked down will -no longer bear. In his own interest, then, -wherever it is possible, he lets the peasant live -and the tree stand. The expedition of the -herdsmen comes just as before, every member<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_65">65</a></span> -bristling with arms, but no longer intending -nor expecting war and violent appropriation. -The raiders burn and kill only so far as is -necessary to enforce a wholesome respect, or -to break an isolated resistance. But in general, -principally in accordance with a developing -customary right—the first germ of the -development of all public law—the herdsman -now appropriates only the surplus of the peasant. -That is to say, he leaves the peasant his -house, his gear and his provisions up to the -next crop.<a id="FNanchor_D" href="#Footnote_D" class="fnanchor">D</a> The herdsman in the first stage -is like the bear, who for the purpose of robbing -the beehive, destroys it. In the second stage -he is like the bee-keeper, who leaves the bees -enough honey to carry them through the -winter.</p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_D" href="#FNanchor_D" class="fnanchor">D</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, page 393, in speaking of the Arabs says: -“The difficulty of nourishing slaves makes it impossible to -keep them. Vast populations are kept in subjection and deprived -of everything beyond the necessaries for maintaining -life. They turn entire oases into demesne lands, visited at the -harvest time in order to rob the inhabitants; a domination -characteristic of the desert.”</p></div> - -<p>Great is the progress between the first stage -and the second. Long is the forward step,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_66">66</a></span> -both economically and politically. In the beginning, -as we have seen, the acquisition by -the tribe of herdsmen was purely an occupying -one. Regardless of consequences, they destroyed -the source of future wealth for the enjoyment -of the moment. Henceforth the acquisition -becomes economical, because all -economy is based on wise housekeeping, or in -other words, on restraining the enjoyment of -the moment in view of the needs of the future. -The herdsman has learned to “capitalize.” It -is a vast step forward in politics when an utterly -strange human being, prey heretofore -like the wild animals, obtains a value and is -recognized as a source of wealth. Although -this is the beginning of all slavery, subjugation, -and exploitation, it is at the same time -the genesis of a higher form of society, that -reaches out beyond the family based upon -blood relationship. We saw how, between the -robbers and the robbed, the first threads of a -jural relation were spun across the cleft which -separated those who had heretofore been only -“mortal enemies.” The peasant thus obtains<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_67">67</a></span> -a semblance of <em>right</em> to the bare necessaries of -life; so that it comes to be regarded as <em>wrong</em> -to kill an unresisting man or to strip him of -everything.</p> - -<p>And better than this, gradually more delicate -and softer threads are woven into a net -very thin as yet, but which, nevertheless, brings -about more human relations than the customary -arrangement of the division of spoils. -Since the herdsmen no longer meet the peasants -in combat only, they are likely now to -grant a respectful request, or to remedy a well -grounded grievance. “The categorical imperative” -of equity, “Do to others as you -would have them do unto you,” had heretofore -ruled the herdsmen only in their dealings with -their own tribesmen and kind. Now for the -first time it begins to speak, shyly whispering -in behalf of those who are alien to blood relationship. -In this, we find the germ of that -magnificent process of external amalgamation -which, out of small hordes, has formed nations -and unions of nations; and which, in the future -is to give life to the concept of “humanity.”<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_68">68</a></span> -We find also the germ of the internal unification -of tribes once separated, from which, in -place of the hatred of “barbarians,” will come -the all comprising love of humanity, of Christianity -and Buddhism.</p> - -<p><em>The moment when first the conqueror -spared his victim in order permanently to exploit -him in productive work, was of incomparable -historical importance. It gave birth -to nation and state, to right and the higher -economics, with all the developments and ramifications -which have grown and which will -hereafter grow out of them.</em> The root of -everything human reaches down into the dark -soil of the animal—love and art, no less than -state, justice and economics.</p> - -<p>Still another tendency knots yet more closely -these psychic relations. To return to the comparison -of the herdsman and the bear, there are -in the desert, beside the bear who guards the -bees, other bears who also lust after honey. -But our tribe of herdsmen blocks their way, -and protects its beehives by force of arms. -The peasants become accustomed, when danger<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_69">69</a></span> -threatens, to call on the herdsmen, whom -they no longer regard as robbers and murderers, -but as protectors and saviors. Imagine -the joy of the peasants when the returning -band of avengers brings back to the village the -looted women and children, with the enemies’ -heads or scalps. These ties are no longer -threads, but strong and knotted bands.</p> - -<p>Here is one of the principal forces of that -“integration,” whereby in the further development, -those originally not of the same blood, -and often enough of different groups speaking -different languages, will in the end be -welded together into <em>one</em> people, with <em>one</em> -speech, <em>one</em> custom, and <em>one</em> feeling of nationality. -This unity grows by degrees from common -suffering and need, common victory -and defeat, common rejoicing and common -sorrow. A new and vast domain is open when -master and slave serve the same interests; then -arises a stream of sympathy, a sense of common -service. Both sides apprehend, and -gradually recognize, each other’s common humanity. -Gradually the points of similarity<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_70">70</a></span> -are sensed, in place of the differences in build -and apparel, of language and religion, which -had heretofore brought about only antipathy -and hatred. Gradually they learn to understand -one another, first through a common -speech, and then through a common mental -habit. The net of the psychical inter-relations -becomes stronger.</p> - -<p>In this second stage of the formation of -states, the ground work, in its essentials, has -been mapped out. No further step can be -compared in importance to the transition -whereby the bear becomes a bee-keeper. For -this reason, short references must suffice.</p> - -<p>The third stage arrives when the “surplus” -obtained by the peasantry is brought by them -regularly to the tents of the herdsmen as “tribute,” -a regulation which affords to both -parties self-evident and considerable advantages. -By this means, the peasantry is relieved -entirely from the little irregularities -connected with the former method of taxation, -such as a few men knocked on the head, women -violated, or farmhouses burned down. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_71">71</a></span> -herdsmen on the other hand, need no longer -apply to this “business” any “expense” and -labor, to use a mercantile expression; and they -devote the time and energy thus set free toward -an “extension of the works,” in other -words, to subjugating other peasants.</p> - -<p>This form of tribute is found in many well-known -instances in history: Huns, Magyars, -Tartars, Turks, have derived their largest income -from their European tributes. Sometimes -the character of the tribute paid by the -subjects to their master is more or less blurred, -and the act assumes the guise of payment for -protection, or indeed, of a subvention. The -tale is well known whereby Attila was pictured -by the weakling emperor at Constantinople -as a vassal prince; while the tribute he -paid to the Hun appeared as a fee.</p> - -<p>The fourth stage, once more, is of very great -importance, since it adds the decisive factor in -the development of the state, as we are accustomed -to see it, namely, the union on one strip -of land of both ethnic groups.<a id="FNanchor_E" href="#Footnote_E" class="fnanchor">E</a> (It is well<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_72">72</a></span> -known that no jural definition of a state can -be arrived at without the concept of state territory.) -From now on, the relation of the two -groups, which was originally international, -gradually becomes more and more intra-national.</p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_E" href="#FNanchor_E" class="fnanchor">E</a> There is apparently in the case of the Fulbe, a transition -stage between the first three stages and the fourth, in which -dominion is exercised half internationally and half intranationally. -According to Ratzel (l. c. II, page 419): -“Like a cuttle-fish, the conquering race stretches numerous -arms hither and thither among the terrified aborigines, whose -lack of cohesion affords plenty of gaps. Thus the Fulbe -are slowly flowing into the Benue countries and quite gradually -permeating them. Later observers have thus quite rightly -abstained from assigning definite boundaries. There are many -scattered Fulbe localities which look to a particular place as -their center and as the center of their power. Thus Muri -is the capital of the numerous Fulbe settlements scattered -about the Middle Benue, and the position of Gola is similar -in the Adamawa district. As yet there are no proper kingdoms -with defined frontiers against each other and against -independent tribes. Even these capitals are in other respects -still far from being firmly settled.”</p></div> - -<p>This territorial union may be caused by -foreign influences. It may be that stronger -hordes have crowded the herdsmen forward, or -that their increase in population has reached -the limit set by the nutritive capacity of the -steppes or prairies; it may be that a great -cattle plague has forced the herdsmen to exchange<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_73">73</a></span> -the unlimited scope of the prairies for -the narrows of some river valley. In general, -however, internal causes alone suffice to bring -it about that the herdsmen stay in the neighborhood -of their peasants. The duty of protecting -their tributaries against other “bears” -forces them to keep a levy of young warriors in -the neighborhood of their subjects; and this -is at the same time an excellent measure of defense -since it prevents the peasants from giving -way to a desire to break their bonds, or to -let some other herdsmen become their overlords. -This latter occurrence is by no means -rare, since, if tradition is correct, it is the means -whereby the sons of Rurik came to Russia.</p> - -<p>As yet the local juxtaposition does not mean -a state community in its narrowest sense; that -is to say, a unital organization.</p> - -<p>In case the herdsmen are dealing with utterly -unwarlike subjects, they carry on their -nomad life, peaceably wandering up and down -and herding their cattle among their perioike -and helots. This is the case with the light-colored -Wahuma,<a id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">32</a> “the handsomest men of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_74">74</a></span> -the world” (Kandt), in Central Africa, or the -Tuareg clan of the Hadanara of the Asgars, -“who have taken up their seats among the Imrad -and have become wandering freebooters. -These Imrad are the serving class of the Asgars, -who live on them, although the Imrad -could put into the field ten times as many warriors; -the situation is analogous to that of the -Spartans in relation to their Helots.”<a id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">33</a> The -same may be said of the Teda among the -neighboring Borku: “Just as the land is divided -into a semi-desert supporting the nomads, -and gardens with date groves, so the -population is divided between nomads and settled -folk. Although about equal in number, -ten to twelve thousand altogether, it goes without -saying that these latter are subject to the -others.”<a id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">34</a></p> - -<p>And the same applies to the entire group of -herdsmen known as the Galla Masi and Wahuma. -“Although differences in possessions -are considerable, they have few slaves, as a -serving class. These are represented by -peoples of a lower caste, who live separate and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_75">75</a></span> -apart from them. It is herdsmanship which is -the basis of the family, of the state, and along -with these of the principle of political evolution. -In this wide territory, between Scehoa -and its southernmost boundaries, on the one -hand, and Zanzibar on the other, there is found -no strong political power, in spite of the highly -developed social articulation.”<a id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">35</a></p> - -<p>In case the country is not adapted to herding -cattle on a large scale—as was universally -the case in Western Europe—or where a less -unwarlike population might make attempts at -insurrection, the crowd of lords becomes more -or less permanently settled, taking either steep -places or strategically important points for -their camps, castles, or towns. From these -centers, they control their “subjects,” mainly -for the purpose of gathering their tribute, paying -no attention to them in other respects. -They let them administer their affairs, carry -on their religious worship, settle their disputes, -and adjust their methods of internal economy. -Their autochthonous constitution, their local -officials, are, in fact, not interfered with.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_76">76</a></span></p> - -<p>If Frants Buhl reports correctly, that was -the beginning of the rule of the Israelites in -Canaan.<a id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">36</a> Abyssinia, that great military -force, though at the first glance it may appear -to be a fully developed state, does not, however, -seem to have advanced beyond the fourth -stage. At least Ratzel states: “The principal -care of the Abyssinians consists in the -tribute, in which they follow the method of -oriental monarchs in olden and modern times, -which is not to interfere with the internal management -and administration of justice of their -subject peoples.”<a id="FNanchor_37" href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">37</a></p> - -<p>The best example of the fourth stage is -found in the situation in ancient Mexico before -the Spanish conquest: “The confederation -under the leadership of the Mexicans had -somewhat more progressive ideas of conquest. -Only those tribes were wiped out that offered -resistance. In other cases, the vanquished -were merely plundered, and then required to -pay tribute. The defeated tribe governed itself -just as before, through its own officials. -It was different in Peru, where the formation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_77">77</a></span> -of a compact empire followed the first attack. -In Mexico, intimidation and exploitation were -the only aims of the conquest. And so it came -about that the so-called Empire of Mexico at -the time of the conquest represented merely a -group of intimidated Indian tribes, whose federation -with one another was prevented by -their fear of plundering expeditions from some -unassailable fort in their midst.”<a id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">38</a> It will be -observed that one can not speak of this as a -state in any proper sense. Ratzel shows this -in the note following the above: “It is certain -that the various points held in subjection by -the Warriors of Montezuma were separated -from one another by stretches of territory not -yet conquered. A condition very like the rule -of the Hova in Madagascar. One would not -say that scattering a few garrisons, or better -still, military colonies, over the land, is a mark -of absolute dominion, since these colonies, with -great trouble, maintain a strip of a few miles -in subjection.”<a id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">39</a></p> - -<p>The logic of events presses quickly from the -fourth to the fifth stage, and fashions almost<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_78">78</a></span> -completely the full state. Quarrels arise between -neighboring villages or clans, which the -lords no longer permit to be fought out, since -by this the capacity of the peasants for service -would be impaired. The lords assume the -right to arbitrate, and in case of need, to enforce -their judgment. In the end, it happens -that at each “court” of the village king or chief -of the clan there is an official deputy who exercises -the power, while the chiefs are permitted -to retain the appearance of authority. -The state of the Incas shows, in a primitive -condition, a typical example of this arrangement.</p> - -<p>Here we find the Incas united at Cuzco -where they had their patrimonial lands and -dwellings.<a id="FNanchor_40" href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">40</a> A representative of the Incas, the -Tucricuc, however, resided in every district at -the court of the native chieftain. He “had -supervision over all affairs of his district; he -raised the troops, superintended the delivery -of the tribute, ordered the forced labor on -roads and bridges, superintended the administration<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_79">79</a></span> -of justice, and in short supervised -everything in his district.”<a id="FNanchor_41" href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">41</a></p> - -<p>The same institutions which have been developed -by American huntsmen and Semite -shepherds are found also among African -herdsmen. In Ashanti, the system of the Tucricuc -has been developed in a typical fashion;<a id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">42</a> -and the Dualla have established for their subjects -living in segregated villages “an institution -based on conquest midway between a -feudal system and slavery.”<a id="FNanchor_43" href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">43</a> The same -author reports that the Barotse have a constitution -corresponding to the earliest stage of -the mediæval feudal organization: “Their villages -are ... as a rule surrounded by a circle -of hamlets where their serfs live. These -till the fields of their lords in the immediate -neighborhood, grow grain, or herd the -cattle.”<a id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">44</a> The only thing that is not typical -here consists in this, that the lords do not live -in isolated castles or halls, but are settled in -villages among their subjects.</p> - -<p>It is only a very small step from the Incas to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_80">80</a></span> -the Dorians in Lacedæmon, Messenia, or -Crete; and no greater distance separates the -Fulbe, Dualla and Barotse from the comparatively -rigidly organized feudal states of the -African Negro Empires of Uganda, Unyoro, -etc.; and the corresponding feudal empires of -Eastern and Western Europe and of all Asia. -In all places, the same results are brought -about by force of the same socio-psychological -causes. The necessity of keeping the subjects -in order and at the same time of maintaining -them at their full capacity for labor, leads step -by step from the fifth to the sixth stage, in -which the state, by acquiring full intra-nationality -and by the evolution of “Nationality,” is -developed in every sense. The need becomes -more and more frequent to interfere, to allay -difficulties, to punish, or to coerce obedience; -and thus develop the habit of rule and the -usages of government. The two groups, separated, -to begin with, and then united on one -territory, are at first merely laid alongside one -another, then are scattered through one another -like a mechanical mixture, as the term is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_81">81</a></span> -used in chemistry, until gradually they become -more and more of a “chemical combination.” -They intermingle, unite, amalgamate to unity, -in customs and habits, in speech and worship. -Soon the bonds of relationship unite the upper -and the lower strata. In nearly all cases the -master class picks the handsomest virgins from -the subject races for its concubines. A race -of bastards thus develops, sometimes taken -into the ruling class, sometimes rejected, and -then because of the blood of the masters in -their veins, becoming the born leaders of the -subject race. In form and in content the -primitive state is completed.</p> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_82">82</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h82" class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER III<br /> - -<span class="subhead">THE PRIMITIVE FEUDAL STATE</span></h2> - - -<h3>(a) <span class="smcap smaller">THE FORM OF DOMINION</span></h3> - -<p>Its form is domination; the dominion of a -small warlike minority, interrelated and -closely allied, over a definitely bounded territory -and its cultivators. Gradually, custom -develops some form of law in accordance with -which this dominion is exercised. This law -regulates the rights of primacy and the claims -of the lords, and the duty of obedience and of -service on the part of the subjects, in such wise -that the capacity of the peasants for rendering -service is not impaired. This word, <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">praestationsfaehigkeit</i>, -dates from the reforms of -Frederick the Great. The “bee-keepership,” -therefore, is governed by the law of custom. -The duty of paying and working on the part -of the peasants corresponds to the duty of protection<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_83">83</a></span> -on the part of the lords, who ward off -exactions of their own companions, as well as -defend the peasants from the attacks of foreign enemies.</p> - -<p>Although this is one part of the content of -the state concept, there is another, which in the -beginning is of much greater magnitude; the -idea of economic exploitation, the political -means for the satisfaction of needs. The -peasant surrenders a portion of the product of -his labor, without any equivalent service in return. -“<em>In the beginning was the ground -rent.</em>”</p> - -<p>The forms under which the ground rent is -collected or consumed vary. In some cases, -the lords, as a closed union or community, are -settled in some fortified camp and consume as -communists the tribute of their peasantry. -This is the situation in the state of the Inca. -In some cases, each individual warrior-noble -has a definite strip of land assigned to him: but -generally the produce of this is still, as in -Sparta, consumed in the “syssitia,” by class -associates and companions in arms. In some<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_84">84</a></span> -cases, the landed nobility scatters over the -entire territory, each man housed with his -following in his fortified castle, and consuming, -each for himself, the produce of his dominion -or lands. As yet these nobles have not -become landlords, in the sense that they administer -their property. Each of them receives -tribute from the labor of his dependents, -whom he neither guides nor supervises. This -is the type of the mediæval dominion in the -lands of the Germanic nobility. Finally, the -knight becomes the owner and administrator -of the knight’s fee.<a id="FNanchor_F" href="#Footnote_F" class="fnanchor">F</a> His former serfs develop -into the laborers on his plantation, and -the tribute now appears as the profit of the -entrepreneur. This is the type of the earliest -capitalist enterprise of modern times, the exploitation -of large territories in the lands east -of the Elbe, formerly occupied by Slavs and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_85">85</a></span> -later colonized by Germans. Numerous transitions -lead from one stage to the other.</p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_F" href="#FNanchor_F" class="fnanchor">F</a> <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Rittergutsbesitz</i> is the ultimate molecule of the German -feudal system, a non-urban territory, approximating the -concept of knight’s fee in the Angevin fiscal legislation; in -modern Germanic law, the possession of an acreage, alienable -only as an entity, and by recent legislation, alienable to non-nobles, -but subject to and capable of certain exceptions in -law not inhering in other forms of real estate.—<i>Translator.</i></p></div> - -<p>But always, in its essence, is the “State” the -same. Its purpose, in every case, is found to -be the political means for the satisfaction of -needs. At first, its method is by exacting a -ground rent, so long as there exists no trade -activity the products of which can be appropriated. -Its form, in every case, is that of -dominion, whereby exploitation is regarded as -“justice,” maintained as a “constitution,” insisted -on strictly, and in case of need enforced -with cruelty. And yet, in these ways, -the absolute right of the conqueror becomes -narrowed within the confines of law, for -the sake of permitting the continuous acquisition -of ground rents. The duty of furnishing -supplies on the part of the subjects is limited -by their right to maintain themselves in good -condition. The right of taxation on the part -of the lords is supplemented by their duty to -afford protection within and without the state—security -under the law and defense of the -frontier.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_86">86</a></span></p> - -<p>At this point, the primitive state is completely -developed in all its essentials. It has -passed the embryonic condition; whatever follows -can be only phenomena of growth.</p> - -<p>As compared with unions of families, the -state represents, doubtless, a much higher -species; since the state embraces a greater mass -of men, in closer articulation, more capable -of conquering nature and of warding off -enemies. It changes the half playful occupations -of men into strict methodic labor, and -thus brings untold misery to innumerable generations -yet unborn. Henceforth, these must -eat their bread in the sweat of their brow, -since the golden age of the free community of -blood relations has been followed by the iron -rule of state dominion. But the state, by discovering -labor in its proper sense, starts in this -world that force which alone can bring about -the golden age on a much higher plane of ethical -relation and of happiness for all. The -state, to use Schiller’s words, destroys the untutored -happiness of the people while they -were children, in order to bring them along<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_87">87</a></span> -a sad path of suffering to the conscious happiness -of maturity.</p> - -<p>A higher species! Paul von Lilienfeld, one -of the principal advocates of the view that society -is an organism of a higher kind, has -pointed out that in this respect an especially -striking parallel can be drawn between ordinary -organisms and this super-organism. All -higher beings propagate sexually; lower beings -asexually, by partition, by budding and -sometimes by conjugation. We have shown -that simple partition corresponds exactly to -the growth and the further development of the -association based on blood relationship, which -existed before the state. This grows until it -becomes too large for cohesion; it then loses its -unity, divides, and the separate hordes, if they -associate at all, remain in a very loose connection, -without any sort of closer articulation. -The amalgamation of exogamic groups is comparable -to conjugation.</p> - -<p><em>The state, however, comes into being -through sexual propagation.</em> All bisexual -propagation is accomplished by the following<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_88">88</a></span> -process: The male element, a small, very active, -mobile, vibrating cell—the spermatozoön—searches -out a large inactive cell without -mobility of its own—the ovum, or female principle—enters -and fuses with it. From this -process, there results an immense growth; that -is to say, a wonderful differentiation with -simultaneous integration. The inactive peasantry, -bound by nature to their fields, is the -ovum, the mobile tribe of herdsmen the spermatozoön, -of this sociologic act of fecundation; -and its resultant is the ripening of a higher social -organism more fully differentiated in its -organs, and much more complete in its integrations. -It is easy to find further parallels. -One may compare the border feuds to the -manner in which innumerable spermatozoa -swarm about the ovum until finally one, the -strongest or most fortunate, discovers and conquers -the micropyle. One may compare the -almost magical attraction which the ovum has -for the spermatozoön, to the no less magical -power by which the herdsmen from the steppes -are drawn into the cultivated plains.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_89">89</a></span></p> - -<p>But all this is no proof for the “organism.” -The problem, however, has been pointed out.</p> - - -<h3 id="h89">(b) <span class="smcap smaller">THE INTEGRATION</span></h3> - -<p>We have followed the genesis of the state, -from its second stage onward, in its objective -growth as a political and jural form with economic -content. But it is far more important -to examine its subjective growth, its socio-psychological -“differentiation and integration,” -since all sociology is nearly always social -psychology. First, then, let us discuss integration.</p> - -<p>We saw in the second stage, as set forth -above, how the net of psychical relations becomes -ever tighter and closer enmeshed, as the -economic amalgamation advances. The two -dialects become one language; or one of the -two, often of an entirely different stock from -the other, becomes extinct. This, in some -cases, is the language of the victors, but -more frequently that of the vanquished. -Both cults amalgamate to one religion, in -which the tribal god of the conquerors is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_90">90</a></span> -adored as the principal divinity, while the -old gods of the vanquished become either -his servants, or, as demons or devils, his adversaries. -The bodily type tends to assimilate, -through the influence of the same climate and -similar mode of living. Where a strong difference -between the types existed or is maintained,<a id="FNanchor_45" href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">45</a> -the bastards, to a certain extent, fill -the gap—so that, in spite of the still existing -ethnic contrast, everybody, more and more, begins -to feel that the type of the enemies beyond -the border is more strange, more “foreign” -than is the new co-national type. Lords and -subjects view one another as “we,” at least as -concerns the enemy beyond the border; and at -length the memory of the different origin -completely disappears. The conquerors are -held to be the sons of the old gods. This, in -many cases, they literally are, since these gods -are nothing but the souls of their ancestors -raised to godhead by apotheosis.</p> - -<p>Since the new “states” are much more aggressive -than the former communities bound -together by mere blood relationship, the feeling<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_91">91</a></span> -of being different from the foreigner beyond -the borders, growing in frequent feuds and -wars, becomes stronger and stronger among -those within the “realm of peace.” And in the -same measure there grows among them the -feeling of belonging to another; so that the -spirit of fraternity and of equity, which formerly -existed only within the horde and which -never ceased to hold sway within the association -of nobles, takes root everywhere, and more -and more finds its place in the relations between -the lords and their subjects.</p> - -<p>At first these relations are manifested only -in infrequent cases: equity and fraternity are -allowed only such play as is consistent with the -right to use the political means; but that much -is granted. A far stronger bond of psychical -community between high and low, more potent -than any success against foreign invasion, is -woven by legal protection against the aggression -of the mighty. “<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">Justitia fundamentum -regnorum.</i>” When, pursuant to their own -ideals of justice, the aristocrats as a social -group execute one of their own class for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_92">92</a></span> -murder or robbery, for having exceeded the -bounds of permitted exploitation, the thanks -and the joy of the subjects are even more heartfelt -than after victory over alien foes.</p> - -<p>These, then, are the principal lines of development -of the psychical integration. Common -interest in maintaining order and law and -peace produce a strong feeling of solidarity, -which may be called “a consciousness of belonging -to the same state.”</p> - - -<h3 id="h92">(c) <span class="smcap smaller">THE DIFFERENTIATION: GROUP THEORIES AND GROUP PSYCHOLOGY</span></h3> - -<p>On the other hand, as in all organic growth, -there develops <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">pari passu</i> a psychic differentiation -just as powerful. The interests of the -group produce strong group feelings; the -upper and lower strata develop a “class consciousness” -corresponding to their peculiar interests.</p> - -<p>The separate interest of the master group -is served by maintaining intact the imposed -law of political means; such interest makes for -“conservatism.” The interest of the subject<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_93">93</a></span> -group, on the contrary, points to the removal -of the prevailing rule, to the substitution for -it of a new rule, the law of equality for all inhabitants -of the state, and makes for “liberalism” -and revolution.</p> - -<p>Herein lies the tap root of all class and -party psychology. Hence there develop, in -accordance with definite psychological laws, -those incomparably mighty forms of thought -which, as “class theories,” through thousands of -years of struggle guide and justify every social -contest in the consciousness of contemporaries.</p> - -<p>“When the will speaks reason has to be -silent,” says Schopenhauer, or as Ludwig -Gumplowicz states the same idea, “Man acts -in accordance with laws of nature, as an afterthought -he thinks humanly.” Man’s will -being strictly “determined,” he must act according -to the pressure which the surrounding -world exerts upon him; and the same law is -valid for every community of men: groups, -classes, and the state itself. They “flow from -the plane of higher economic and social pressure<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_94">94</a></span> -to that of lower pressure, along the line -of least resistance.” But every individual and -each community of men believe themselves free -agents; and therefore, by an unescapable -psychical law they are forced to consider the -path they are traversing as a freely chosen -means, and the point toward which they are -driven as a freely chosen end. And since man -is a rational and ethical being, that is, a social -entity, he is obliged to justify before reason -and morality the method and the objective -point of his movement, and to take account of -the social consciousness of his time.</p> - -<p>So long as the relations of both groups were -simply those of internationally opposed border -enemies, the exercise of the political means -called for no justification, because a man of -alien blood had no rights. As soon, however, -as the psychic integration develops, in any degree, -the community feeling of state consciousness, -as soon as the bond servant acquires -“rights,” and the consciousness of essential -equality percolates through the mass, the political -means requires a system of justification;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_95">95</a></span> -and there arises in the ruling class the group -theory of “legitimacy.”</p> - -<p>Everywhere, the upholders of legitimacy -justify dominion and exploitation with similar -anthropological and theological reasoning. -The master group, since it recognizes bravery -and warlike efficiency as the only virtues of a -man, declares itself, the victors,—and from its -standpoint quite correctly—to be the more efficient, -the better “race.” This point of view -is the more intensified, the lower the subject -race is reduced by hard labor and low fare. -And since the tribal god of the ruling group -has become the supreme god in the new amalgamated -state religion, this religion declares—and -again from its view-point quite correctly—that -the constitution of the state has been decreed -by heaven, that it is “tabu,” and that -interference with it is sacrilege. In consequence, -therefore, of a simple logical inversion, -the exploited or subject group is regarded -as an essentially inferior race, as unruly, -tricky, lazy, cowardly and utterly incapable -of self-rule or self-defense, so that any uprising<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_96">96</a></span> -against the imposed dominion must necessarily -appear as a revolt against God Himself -and against His moral ordinances. For -these reasons, the dominant group at all times -stands in closest union with the priesthood, -which, in its highest positions, at least, nearly -always recruits itself from their sons, sharing -their political rights and economic privileges.</p> - -<p>This has been, and is at this day, the class -theory of the ruling group; nothing has been -taken from it, not an item has been added to it. -Even the very modern argument by which, for -example, the landed nobility of old France and -of modern Prussia attempted to put out of -court the claims of the peasantry to the ownership -of lands, on the allegation that they had -owned the land from time immemorial, while -their peasants had only been granted a life -tenure therein,—is reproduced among the Wahuma, -of Africa,<a id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">46</a> and probably could be -shown in many other instances.</p> - -<p>Like their class theory, their class psychology -has been, and is, at all times the same. -Its most important characteristic, the “aristocrat’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_97">97</a></span> -pride,” shows itself in contempt for the -lower laboring strata. This is so inherent, -that herdsmen, even after they have lost their -herds and become economically dependent, still -retain their pride as former lords: “Even the -Galla, who have been despoiled of their wealth -of herds by the Somali north of the Tana, and -who thus have become watchers of other men’s -herds, and even in some cases along the Sabaki -become peasants, still look with contempt upon -the peasant Watokomo, who are subject to -them and resemble the Suaheli. But their attitude -is quite different toward their tributary -hunting peoples, namely, the Waboni, the -Wassanai, and the Walangulo (Ariangulo) -who resemble the Galla.”<a id="FNanchor_47" href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">47</a></p> - -<p>The following description of the Tibbu -applies, as though it had been originally told -of them, to Walter Havenaught and the rest of -the poor knights who, in the crusades, looked -for booty and lordly domain. It applies no -less to many a noble fighting cock from Germany -east of the Elbe, and to many a ragged -Polish gentleman. “They are men full of self-<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_98">98</a></span>consciousness. -They may be beggars, but -they are no pariahs. Many a people under -these circumstances would be thoroughly -miserable and depressed; the Tibbu have steel -in their nature. They are splendidly fitted -to be robbers, warriors, and rulers. Even their -system of robbery is imposing, although it is -base as a jackal’s. These ragged Tibbus, -fighting against extreme poverty and constantly -on the verge of starvation, raise the -most impudent claims with apparent or real -belief in their validity. The right of the -jackal, which regards the possessions of a -stranger as common property, is the protection -of greedy men against want. The insecurity -of an all but perpetual state of war -brings it about that life becomes an insistent -challenge, and at the same time the reward of -extortion!”<a id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">48</a> This phenomenon is in nowise -limited to Eastern Africa, for it is said of the -Abyssinian soldier: “Thus equipped he -comes along. Proudly he looks down on -every one: his is the land, and for him the peasant -must work.”<a id="FNanchor_49" href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">49</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_99">99</a></span></p> - -<p>Deeply as the aristocrat at all times despises -the economic means and the peasants who employ -it, he admits frankly his reliance on the -political means. Honest war and “honest -thievery”<a id="FNanchor_G" href="#Footnote_G" class="fnanchor">G</a> are his occupation as a lord, are his -good right. His right—except over those who -belong to the same clique—extends just as far -as his power. One finds this high praise of the -political means nowhere so well stated as in -the well-known Doric drinking song:</p> - -<div class="poem-container"> -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<span class="iq">“I have great treasures; the spear and the sword;<br /></span> -<span class="i2">Wherewith to guard my body, the bull hide shield well tried.<br /></span> -<span class="i0">With these I can plough, and harvest my crop,<br /></span> -<span class="i2">With these I can garner the sweet grape wine,<br /></span> -<span class="i0">By them I bear the name ‘Lord’ with my serfs.<br /></span> -</div><div class="stanza"> -<span class="iq">“But these never dare to bear spear and sword,<br /></span> -<span class="i2">Still less the guard of the body, the bull hide shield well tried.<br /></span> -<span class="i0">They lie at my feet stretched out on the ground,<br /></span> -<span class="i2">My hand is licked by them as by hounds,<br /></span> -<span class="i0">I am their Persian king—terrifying them by my name.”<a id="FNanchor_50" href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">50</a><br /></span> -</div></div> -</div> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_G" href="#FNanchor_G" class="fnanchor">G</a> Compare this with the prevalent justification of “honest -graft” in municipal or political contracts.—<i>Translator.</i></p></div> - -<p>In these wanton lines is expressed the pride<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_100">100</a></span> -of warlike lords. The following verses, taken -from an entirely different phase of civilization, -show that the robber still has part in the warrior -in spite of Christianity, the Peace of God, -and the Holy Roman Empire of the German -Nation. These lines also praise the political -means, but in its most crude form, simple robbery:</p> - -<div class="poem-container"> -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<span class="iq">“Would you eke out your life, my young noble squire,<br /></span> -<span class="i2">Follow then my teaching, upon your horse and join the gang!<br /></span> -<span class="i0">Take to the greenwood, when the peasant comes up,<br /></span> -<span class="i2">Run him down quickly, grab him then by the collar,<br /></span> -<span class="i0">Rejoice in your heart, taking from him whatever he has,<br /></span> -<span class="i2">Unharness his horses and get you away!”<a id="FNanchor_51" href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">51</a><br /></span> -</div></div> -</div> - -<p>“Unless,” as Sombart adds, “he preferred -to hunt nobler game and to relieve merchants -of their valuable consignments.” The nobles -carried on robbery as a natural method of supplementing -their earnings, extending it more -and more as the income from their property no -longer sufficed to pay for the increasing demands -of daily consumption and luxury. The -system of freebooting was considered a -thoroughly honorable occupation, since it met<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_101">101</a></span> -the demand of the essence of chivalry, that -every one should appropriate whatever was -within reach of his spear point or of the blade -of his sword. The nobles learned freebooting -as the cobbler was brought up to his trade. -The ballad has put this in merry wise:</p> - -<div class="poem-container"> -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<span class="iq">“To pillage, to rob, that is no shame,<br /></span> -<span class="i0">The best in the land do quite the same.”<br /></span> -</div></div> -</div> - -<p>Besides this principal point of the “squire-archical” -psychology, a second distinguishing -mark scarcely less characteristic is found in the -piety of these folk whether it be of conviction -or merely strongly accentuated in public.</p> - -<p>It seems as though the same social ideas -always force identical characteristics on the ruling -class. This is illustrated by the form under -which God, in their view, appears as their -special National God and preponderatingly as -a God of War. Although they profess God -as the creator of all men, even of their enemies, -and since Christianity, as the God of Love, this -does not counteract the force with which class -interests formulate their appropriate ideology.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_102">102</a></span></p> - -<p>In order to complete the sketch of the psychology -of the ruling class, we must not forget -the tendency to squander, easily understood -in those “ignorant of the taste of toil,” which -appears sometimes in a higher form as generosity; -nor must we forget, as their supreme -trait, that death-despising bravery, which is -called forth by the coercion imposed on a minority, -their need to defend their rights at any -time with arms, and which is favored by a freedom -from all labor which permits the development -of the body in hunting, sport and feuds. -Its caricature is combativeness, and a supersensitiveness -to personal honor, which degenerates -into madness.</p> - -<p>At this point a small digression: Cæsar -found the Celts just at that stage of their development, -in which the nobles had obtained -dominion over their fellow clansmen. Since -that time, his classic narrative has stood as a -norm—their class psychology appears as the -race psychology of all Celts. Not even -Mommsen escaped this error. The result is -that now, in every book on universal history or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_103">103</a></span> -sociology, one may read the palpable error, repeated -until contradiction is of no avail, although -a mere glance would have sufficed to -show that all peoples of all races, in the same -stage of their development, have showed the -same characteristics; in Europe, Thessalians, -Apulians, Campanians, Germans, Poles, etc. -Meanwhile the Celts, and specifically the -French, in different stages of their development, -have showed quite different traits of -character. The psychology belongs to the -stage of development, not to the race!</p> - -<p>Whenever, on the other hand, the religious -sanctions of the “state” are weak, or become so, -there develops as a group theory on the part of -the subjects, the concept, either clear or -blurred, of <em>Natural Law</em>. The lower class regards -the race pride and the assumed superiority -of the nobles as presumptuous, claims to -be of as good race and blood as the ruling -class—and from their standpoint again quite -correctly, since according to their views, labor, -efficiency and order are accounted the only -virtues. They are skeptical also as to the religion<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_104">104</a></span> -which is the helper of their adversaries; -and are as firmly convinced as are the nobles of -the directly opposite opinion, namely, that the -privileges of the master group violate law as -well as reason. Later development is not able -to add any essential point to the factors originally -given.</p> - -<p>Under the influence of these ideas, now -clearly, now obscurely brought out, the two -groups henceforth fight out their battles, each -for its own interests. The young state would -be burst apart under the strain of such centrifugal -forces, were it not for the centripetal -pull of common interests, of the still more -powerful state-consciousness. The pressure -of foreigners from without, of common enemies, -overcomes the inner strain of conflicting -class interests. An example may be found -in the tale of the secession of the “Plebs” and -the successful mission of Menenius Agrippa. -And so the young state would, like a planet, -swing through all eternity in its predetermined -orbit, in accordance with the parallelogram of -forces, were it not that it and its surrounding<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_105">105</a></span> -world is changed and developed until it produces -new external and inner energies.</p> - - -<h3 id="h105">(d) <span class="smcap smaller">THE PRIMITIVE FEUDAL STATE OF HIGHER GRADE</span></h3> - -<p>Growth in itself conditions important -changes; and the young state must grow. The -same forces that brought it into being, urge -its extension, require it to grasp more power. -Even were such a young state “sated,” as -many a modern state claims to be, it would -still be forced to stretch and grow under -penalty of extinction. Under primitive social -conditions Goethe’s lines apply with absolute -truth: “You must rise or fall, conquer or -yield, be hammer or anvil.”</p> - -<p>States are maintained in accordance with -the same principles that called them into being. -The primitive state is the creation of warlike -robbery; and only by warlike robbery can it be -preserved.</p> - -<p>The economic want of the master group has -no limits; no man is sufficiently rich to satisfy -his desires. The political means are turned on<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_106">106</a></span> -new groups of peasants not yet subjected, or -new coasts yet unpilfered are sought out. The -primitive state expands, until a collision takes -place on the edge of the “sphere of interests” -of another primitive state, which itself originated -in precisely the same way. Then we -have for the first time, in place of the warlike -robbery heretofore carried on, true war -in its narrower sense, since henceforth equally -organized and disciplined masses are hurled at -one another.</p> - -<p>The object of the contest remains always -the same, the produce of the economic means -of the working classes, such as loot, tribute, -taxes and ground rent; but the contest no -longer takes place between a group intent on -exploiting and another mass to be exploited, -but between two master groups for the possession -of the entire booty.</p> - -<p>The final result of the conflict, in nearly all -instances, is the amalgamation of both primitive -states into a greater. This in turn, -naturally and by force of the same causes, -reaches beyond its borders, devours its smaller<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_107">107</a></span> -neighbors, and is perhaps in its turn devoured -by some greater state.</p> - -<p>The subjected laboring group may not take -much interest in the final issue of these contests -for the mastery; it is a matter of indifference -whether it pays tribute to one or the -other set of lords. Their chief interest lies in -the course of the particular fight, which is, -in any case, paid for with their own hides. -Therefore, except in cases of gross ill treatment -and exploitation, the lower classes are -rightly governed by their “state-consciousness” -when, with all their might they aid their -hereditary master group in times of war. For -if their master group is vanquished, the subjects -suffer most severely from the utter -devastation of war. They fight literally for -wife and children, for home and hearth, when -they fight to prevent the rule of foreign masters.</p> - -<p>The master group is involved completely -in the issue of this fight for dominion. In extreme -cases, it may be completely exterminated, -as were the local nobility of the Germanic<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_108">108</a></span> -tribes in the Frankish Empire. Nearly -as bad, if not worse, is the prospect of being -thrust into the group of the serfs. Sometimes -a well-timed treaty of peace preserves -their social position as master groups of subordinate -rank: e. g., the Saxon nobility in -Norman England, or the Suppans in German -territory taken from the Slavs. In other -cases, where the forces are about equal, the -two groups amalgamate into one master group -with equal rights, which forms a nobility whose -members intermarry. This, for instance, was -the situation in the Slavic Territories, where -isolated Wendish chieftains were treated as -the equals of the Germans, or in mediæval -Rome, in the case of prominent families from -the Alban Hills and Tuscany.</p> - -<p>In this new “primitive feudal state of higher -grade,” as we shall call it, the ruling group -may, therefore, disintegrate into a number of -more or less powerful and privileged strata. -The organization may show many varieties -because of the well-known fact, that often the -master group separates into two subordinated<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_109">109</a></span> -economic and social layers, developed as we -saw them in the herdsmen stage: the owners -of large herds and of many slaves, and the ordinary -freemen. Possibly the less complete -differentiation into social ranks in the states -created by huntsmen in the new world, is to -be assigned to the circumstance that in the -absence of herds, the concomitants of that -form of ownership, and the original separation -into classes, were not introduced into the state. -We shall, later, see what force was exerted on -the political and economic development of -states in the old world by the differences in -rank and property of the two strata of rulers.</p> - -<p>Similarly, as in the case of the ruling group, -a corresponding process of differentiation divides -the subject group in the “primitive feudal -state of a higher grade” into various strata -more or less despised and compelled to render -service. It is only necessary to recall the very -marked difference in the social and jural position -occupied by the peasantry in the Doric -States, Lacedæmon and Crete, and among -the Thessalians, where the perioiki had clear<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_110">110</a></span> -rights of possession and fairly well protected -political rights, while the helots, in the latter -case the <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">penestai</i>, were almost unprotected in -life and property. Among the old Saxons also -we find a class, the liti, intermediate between -the common freemen and the serfs.<a id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">52</a> These -examples could be multiplied; apparently they -are caused by the same tendencies that brought -about the differentiation among the nobility -mentioned above. When two primitive feudal -states amalgamate, their social layers stratify -in a variety of ways, which to a certain extent -are comparable to the combinations resulting -from mixing together two packs of cards.</p> - -<p>It is certain that this mechanical mixture -caused by political forces, influences the development -of <em>castes</em>, that is to say, of hereditary -professions, which at the same time form a -hierarchy of social classes. “Castes are -usually, if not always, consequences of conquest -and subjugation by foreigners.”<a id="FNanchor_53" href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">53</a> Although -this problem has not been completely -solved, it may be said that the formation of -castes has been very strongly influenced by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_111">111</a></span> -economic and religious factors. It is probable -that castes came about in some such way -as this: state-forming forces penetrated into -existing economic organizations, and vocations -underwent adaptation, and then became petrified -under the influence of religious concepts, -which, however, may also have influenced -their original formation. This seems to follow -from the fact that even as between man -and woman there exist certain separations of -vocation, which, so to say, are taboo and impassable. -Thus among all huntsmen, tilling -the ground is woman’s work, while among -many African shepherds, as soon as the ox-plow -is used, agriculture becomes man’s -work, and then women may not, under pain -of sacrilege, use the domestic cattle.<a id="FNanchor_H" href="#Footnote_H" class="fnanchor">H</a></p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_H" href="#FNanchor_H" class="fnanchor">H</a> Similarly there are North Asiatic tribes of huntsmen, -where women are definitely forbidden to touch the hunting -gear or to cross a hunting trail.—Ratzel I, page 650.</p></div> - -<p>It is likely that such religious concepts may -have brought it about that a vocation became -hereditary, and then compulsorily hereditary, -especially where a tribe or a village carried on<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_112">112</a></span> -a particular craft. This happens with all -tribes in a state of nature, where intercourse -is easily possible, especially in the case of -islanders. When some such group has been -conquered by another tribe, the subjects, with -their developed hereditary vocations, tend to -form within the new state entity a pure -“caste.” Their caste position depends partly -upon the esteem they had heretofore enjoyed -among their own people, and partly upon the -advantage which their vocation affords their -new masters. If, as was often the case, waves -of conquest followed one another in series, the -formation of castes might be multiplied, especially -if in the meantime economic development -had worked out many vocational classes.</p> - -<p>This development is probably best seen in -the group of smiths, who, in nearly all cases, -have occupied a peculiar position, half feared -and half despised. In Africa especially, since -the beginning of time, we find tribes of expert -smiths, as followers and dependents of shepherd -tribes. The Hyksos brought such tribes -with them into the Nile country, and perhaps<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_113">113</a></span> -owed their decisive victory to arms made by -them; and until recent times the Dinka kept -the iron working Djur in a sort of subject relation. -The same applied also to the nomads -of the Sahara; while our northern sagas are -filled with the tribal contrast to the “dwarfs” -and the fear of their magical powers. All the -elements were at hand in a developed state -for the formation of sharply differentiated -castes.<a id="FNanchor_54" href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">54</a></p> - -<p>How the coöperation of religious concepts -affects the beginning of these formations may -be well illustrated by an example from Polynesia. -Here, “although many natives have -the ability to do ship-building, only one privileged -class may exercise the craft, so closely is -the interest of the states and the societies -bound up in this art. All over the archipelago -formerly, and to this day in Fiji, the carpenters, -who are almost exclusively ship-builders, -form a special caste, bear the high sounding -title of ‘the king’s workmen,’ and enjoy the -prerogative of having their own chieftains.... -Everything is done in accordance with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_114">114</a></span> -ancient tradition; the laying the keel, the completion -of the ship, and the launching, all -take place amidst religious ceremonies and -feasts.”<a id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">55</a></p> - -<p>Where superstition has been strongly developed, -a genuine system of castes may come -about, based partly on economic and partly -on ethnic foundations. In Polynesia, for example, -the articulation of the classes, through -the operation of the taboo, has brought about -a state of affairs very like a most thoroughgoing -caste system.<a id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">56</a> Similar results may be -seen in Southern Arabia.<a id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">57</a> It is unnecessary -at this place to enlarge on the important place -which religion had in the origin and maintenance -of separate castes in ancient Egypt and -in modern India.<a id="FNanchor_I" href="#Footnote_I" class="fnanchor">I</a></p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_I" href="#FNanchor_I" class="fnanchor">I</a> Besides, it seems that the rigidity of the Indian caste-system -is not so harsh in practise. The guild seems as often to -break through the barriers of caste as the converse.—Ratzel -II, page 596.</p></div> - -<p>These are the elements of the primitive -feudal state of higher grade. They are more -manifold and more numerous than in the lower<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_115">115</a></span> -primitive state; but in both, legal constitution -and political-economic distribution are fundamentally -the same. The products of the -economic means are still the object of the group -struggle. This remains now as ever the moving -impulse of the domestic policy of the state, -while the political means continues now as ever -to constitute the moving impulse of its foreign -policy in attack or in defense. Identical -group theories continue to justify, both for -the upper classes and the lower, the objects -and means of external and domestic struggles.</p> - -<p>But the development can not remain stationary. -Growth differs from mere increase -in bulk; growth means a constantly heightening -differentiation and integration.</p> - -<p>The farther the primitive feudal state extends -its dominion, the more numerous its subjects, -and the denser its population, the more -there develops a political-economic division of -labor, which calls forth new needs and new -means of supplying them; and the more there -come into sharp contrasts the distinctions of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_116">116</a></span> -economic, and consequently of social, class -strata, in accordance with what I have called -the “law of the agglomeration about existing -nuclei of wealth.” This growing differentiation -becomes decisive for the further development -of the primitive feudal state, and still -more for its conclusion.</p> - -<p>This conclusion is not meant to be, in any -sense, the physical end of such a state. We -do not mean the death of a state, whereby such -a feudal state of the higher type disappears, -in consequence of conflict with a more powerful -state, either on the same or on a higher -plane of development, as was the case of the -Mogul states of India or of Uganda in their -conflicts with Great Britain. Neither does it -mean such a stagnation as that into which -Persia and Turkey have fallen, which represents -for a time only a pause in development, -since these countries, either of their own force -or by foreign conquest, must soon be pushed -on the way of their destiny. Neither have we -meant the rigidity of the gigantic Chinese Empire, -which can last only so long as foreign<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_117">117</a></span> -powers refrain from forcing its mysterious -gates.<a id="FNanchor_J" href="#Footnote_J" class="fnanchor">J</a></p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_J" href="#FNanchor_J" class="fnanchor">J</a> Had we the space, a detailed exposition of this exceptional -development of a feudal state would be tempting. China -would be well worth a more detailed discussion, since, in many -aspects it has approached the condition of “free citizenship” -more closely than any people of Western Europe. China -has overcome the consequences of the feudal system more thoroughly -than we Europeans have; and has made, early in its -development, the great property interests in the land harmless, -so that their bastard offspring, capitalism, hardly came -into being; while in addition, it has worked out to a considerable -degree the problems of coöperative production and of -coöperative distribution.</p></div> - -<p>The outcome here spoken of means the -further development of the primitive feudal -state, a matter of importance to our understanding -of universal history as a <em>process</em>. -The principal lines of development into which -this issue branches off are twofold and of -fundamentally different character. <em>But this -polar opposition is conditioned by a like contrast -between two sorts of economic wealth -each of which increases in accordance with the -“law of agglomeration about existing nuclei.”</em> -In the one case, it is movable property; in -the other, landed property. Here it is the -capital of commerce, there property in land,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_118">118</a></span> -accumulating in the hands of a smaller and -smaller number, and thereby overturning radically -the articulation of classes, and with it the -whole State.</p> - -<p>The maritime State is the scene of the development -of movable wealth; the territorial -State is the embodiment of the development of -landed property. The final issue of the first -is <em>capitalistic exploitation</em> by slavery, the outcome -of the latter is, first of all, the <em>developed -feudal State</em>.</p> - -<p>Capitalistic exploitation by slavery, the -typical result of the development of the so-called -“antique States” on the Mediterranean, -does not end in the death of states, which is of -no importance, but in the death of peoples, because -of the consumption of population. In -the pedigree of the historical development of -the State, it forms a side branch, from which -no further immediate growth can take place.</p> - -<p>The developed feudal State, however, represents -the principal branch, the continuation of -the trunk; and is therefore the origin for the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_119">119</a></span> -further growth of the State. Thence it has -developed into the State governed by feudal -systems; into absolutism; into the modern constitutional -State; and if we are right in our -prognosis, it will become a “free citizenship.”</p> - -<p>So long as the trunk grew only in one direction, -i. e., to include the primitive feudal -State of higher grade, our sketch of its growth -and development could and did comprise both -forms. Henceforth, after the bifurcation, -our story branches and follows each branch to -its last twig.</p> - -<p>We begin, then, with the maritime states, -although they are not the older form. On -the contrary, as far back as the dawn of history -clears the fog of prehistoric existence, -the first strong states were formed as territorial -states, which then, by their own powers, -attained the scale of developed feudal States. -But beyond this stage, at least as regards those -States most interesting to our culture, most of -them either remained stationary or fell into -the power of maritime states; and then, infected<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_120">120</a></span> -with the deadly poison of capitalistic -exploitation through slavery, were destroyed -by the same plague.</p> - -<p>The further progress of the expanded feudal -states of higher grade could take place only -after the maritime states had run their course: -mighty forms of domination and statescraft -these became, and they subsequently influenced -and furthered the conformation of the territorial -states that grew from their ruins.</p> - -<p>For that reason the story of the fate of maritime -states must be first traced, as these are -the introduction to the higher forms of state -life. After first tracing the lateral branch, -we shall then return to the starting point, the -primitive feudal State, follow the main trunk -to the development of the modern constitutional -State, and anticipating actual history, -sketch the “free citizenship” of the future.</p> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_121">121</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h121" class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV<br /> - -<span class="subhead">THE MARITIME STATE</span></h2> - - -<p>The course of life and the path of suffering -of the State founded by sea nomads, as has -been stated above, is determined by commercial -capital; just as that of the territorial -State is determined by capital vested in realty; -and, we may add, that of the modern constitutional -State by productive capital. The -sea nomad, however, did not invent trade or -merchandising, fairs or markets or cities; these -preëxisted, and since they served his purpose, -were now developed to suit his interests. All -these institutions, serving the economic means, -the barter for equivalents, had long since been -discovered.</p> - -<p>Here for the first time in our survey we find -the economic means not the object of exploitation -by the political means, but as a coöperating -agent in originating the State, one might<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_122">122</a></span> -call it the “chain” passing into the “lift” -created by the feudal state to bring forth a -more elaborate structure. The genesis of the -maritime State would not be thoroughly intelligible, -were we not to premise a statement -concerning traffic and interchange of wares in -prehistoric times. Furthermore, no prognosis -of the modern state is complete, which does -not take into account the independently -formed economic means of aboriginal barter.</p> - - -<h3 id="h122">(a) <span class="smcap smaller">TRAFFIC IN PREHISTORIC TIMES</span></h3> - -<p>The psychological explanation of barter has -brought forth the theory of the marginal utility, -its greatest merit. According to this -theory, the subjective valuation of any economic -good decreases in proportion to the number -of objects of the same kind possessed by the -same owner. When even two proprietors meet, -each having a number of similar articles, they -will gladly barter, provided political means are -barred, i. e., if both parts are apparently -equally strong and well-armed, or in the very -early stage, are within the sacred circle of relationship.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_123">123</a></span> -By barter, each one receives property -of very high subjective value, in place of -property of very low subjective value, so that -both parties are gainers in the transaction. -The desire of primitive people for bartering -must be stronger than that of cultured ones. -For at this stage man does not value his own -goods, but covets the things belonging to -strangers, and is hardly affected by calculated -economic considerations.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, we must not forget that -there are primitive peoples for whom barter -has no attraction whatever. “Cook tells of -tribes in Polynesia, with whom no intercourse -was possible, since presents made absolutely -no impression on them, and were afterward -thrown away; everything shown them they regarded -with indifference, and with no desire -to own it, while with their own things they -would not part; in fact, they had no conception -of either trade or barter.”<a id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">58</a> So Westermarck -is of the opinion that “barter and traffic are -comparatively late inventions.” In this he -stands in opposition to Peschel, who would<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_124">124</a></span> -have it that man in the earliest known stage -of development engaged in barter. Westermarck -states that there is no proof “that the -cave-dwellers of Périgord from the reindeer -period obtained their rock-crystals, their shells -from the Atlantic, and the horns of the Saiga -antelope from (modern) Poland by way of -barter.”<a id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">59</a></p> - -<p>In spite of these exceptions, which admit -other explanations—perhaps the natives feared -sorcery—the history of primitive peoples shows -that the desire to trade and barter is a universal -human characteristic. It can, however, -take effect only when these primitive men on -meeting with strangers are offered new enticing -objects, since in the immediate circle of -their own blood kinsmen every one has the -same kinds of property, and in their natural -communism, on the average about the same -amount.</p> - -<p>Yet even then, barter, the beginning of all -regular trading, can take place only when the -meeting with foreigners is a peaceable one. -But is there any possibility for peaceable meeting<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_125">125</a></span> -with foreigners? Is not primitive man, -through his entire life, and especially at the -period when barter begins, still under the apprehension -that every one of a different horde -is an enemy to be feared as the wolf?</p> - -<p>After trade is developed, it is, as a rule, -strongly influenced by the “political means,” -“trade generally follows robbery.”<a id="FNanchor_60" href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">60</a> But its -first beginnings are chiefly the result of the -economic means, the outcome of pacific, not -warlike, intercourse.</p> - -<p>The international relations of primitive -huntsmen with one another must not be confused -with those existing either between the -huntsmen or herdsmen and their peasants, or -amongst the herdsmen themselves. There -are, undoubtedly, blood-feuds, or feuds because -of looted women, or possibly because of -violation of the districts set aside for hunting -grounds; but these lack that strong incentive, -which is the consequence of avarice alone, of -the desire to despoil other men of the products -of their labor. Therefore, the “wars” of primitive -huntsmen are scarcely real wars, but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_126">126</a></span> -rather scuffles and single combats, carried on -frequently—as are the German student duels—according -to an established ceremonial, and -prolonged only up to the point of incapacity to -fight, as one might say, “until claret has been -drawn.”<a id="FNanchor_61" href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">61</a> These tribes, numerically very -weak, wisely limit bloodshed to the indispensable -amount—e. g., in case of a blood vendetta -feud—and thus avoid starting new vendetta -blood feuds.</p> - -<p>For this reason, pacific relations with their -neighbors on an equal economic scale are much -stronger, and also freer from the incentive to -use political means, both among huntsmen and -among primitive peasants, than among herdsmen. -There are numerous examples where -the former meet peaceably to exploit natural -resources in common. “While yet in primitive -stages of civilization, great masses of -people gather together, from time to time, at -places where useful objects may be found. -The Indians of a large part of America made -regular pilgrimages to the flint grounds; -others assembled annually at harvest time at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_127">127</a></span> -the Zizania swamps of the lakes of the Northwest. -The Australians, living scattered in the -Barku district, assemble from all directions for -the harvest festivals at the swamp beds of -the corn bearing Marsiliacae. When the -bonga-bonga trees in Queensland produce a -superabundant crop, and a greater store is on -hand than the tribe can consume, foreign tribes -are permitted to share therein.”<a id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">63</a> “Various -tribes agree on the common ownership of definite -strips of territory, and likewise of the -quarries of phonolite for hatchets.”<a id="FNanchor_64" href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">64</a> Numerous -Australian tribes have common consultations -and sessions of the elders for judgment. -In these, the remainder of the population -form the bystanders, a custom similar to -the Germanic “<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Umstand</i>” in the primitive folkmoot.<a id="FNanchor_65" href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">65</a></p> - -<p>It is but natural that such meetings should -bring about barter. Perhaps this explains the -origin of those “weekly fairs held by the Negroes -of Central Africa in the midst of the -primæval forest <em>under special arrangements -for the peace</em>,”<a id="FNanchor_66" href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">66</a> and likewise the great fairs,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_128">128</a></span> -said to be very ancient, of the fur hunters of -the extreme north of the Tschuktsche.</p> - -<p>All these things presuppose the development -of pacific forms of intercourse between neighboring -groups. These forms are to be found -almost universally. They could very easily be -developed at this period, since the discovery -had not yet been made that men can be utilized -as labor motors. At this stage, the stranger is -treated as an enemy only in doubtful cases. -If he comes with apparently peaceable intent, -he is treated as a friend. Therefore, a whole -code of public law ceremonies grew up, intended -to demonstrate the pacific intent of the -newcomer.<a id="FNanchor_K" href="#Footnote_K" class="fnanchor">K</a> One puts aside one’s arms and -shows one’s unarmed hand, or one sends heralds -in advance, who are always inviolable.</p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_K" href="#FNanchor_K" class="fnanchor">K</a> In this category must be reckoned the salutation, still -in use in some parts, “Peace Be With You.” It is expressive -of the perversity of Tolstoi’s later years that he misapprehends -this characteristic mark of a time when war was the -normal state of affairs, as the remnant of a golden age of -peace. <cite>The Importance of the Russian Revolution</cite> (German -translation by A. Hess, p. 17).</p></div> - -<p>It is clear that these forms represent some -kind of claim to hospitality, and in fact it is by -this guest-right that peaceful trade is first<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_129">129</a></span> -made possible. The exchange of guest-gifts -precedes, and appears to introduce, barter -proper. It becomes, therefore, important to -investigate the source of hospitality.</p> - -<p>Westermarck, in his recent monumental -work (1907), <cite>Origin and Development of -Moral Concepts</cite>,<a id="FNanchor_68" href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">68</a> states that the custom of -hospitality results from two causes, curiosity -for news from the stranger from afar, and still -more from the fear that the stranger may be -endowed with powers of sorcery, imputed to -him just because he is a stranger.<a id="FNanchor_L" href="#Footnote_L" class="fnanchor">L</a> In the -Bible, hospitality is recommended for the reason -that one can not know that the stranger -may not be an angel. The superstitious race -fears his curse (the Erinys of the Greeks) -and hastens to propitiate the stranger. Having -been accepted as a guest he is inviolable -and enjoys the sacred right of the blood-related -group, and is regarded as belonging to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_130">130</a></span> -it during his stay. Therefore he partakes of -the benefits of the aboriginal communism -reigning in the group, and shares its property. -The host demands and receives whatever he -claims, the stranger obtains in turn what he -asks for. When the peaceable intercourse becomes -more frequent, the mutual giving of -guest-presents may develop into a trading -arrangement, because the trader gladly returns -to the spot where he found good entertainment -and a profitable exchange and where -he is protected by the laws of hospitality, instead -of seeking new places, where, often with -danger to his life, he would first have to acquire -the right to hospitality.</p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_L" href="#FNanchor_L" class="fnanchor">L</a> This may account for the use made of old women as -heralds. They are doubly available for that purpose, since -they are worthless for warfare, and are supposed to be endowed -with specific powers of sorcery (Westermarck), even -more than old men, who also are treated cautiously, since they -may soon become “ghosts.”</p></div> - -<p>The existence of an “international” division -of labor is, of course, presupposed before the -development of a regular trade relation can -begin. Such a division of labor exists much -earlier and to a greater extent than is generally -believed. “It is quite erroneous to suppose -that the division of labor takes place only -on a high scale of economic development. -There are in the interior of Africa villages of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_131">131</a></span> -iron-smiths, nay, of such as only turn out dart-knives; -New Guinea has its villages of potters, -North America its arrow-head makers.”<a id="FNanchor_69" href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">69</a> -From such specialties there develops trade, -whether through roving merchants, or by gifts -to one’s hosts, or by peace-gifts from tribe to -tribe. In North America, the Kaddu trade -in bows. “Obsidian was universally employed -for arrow heads and knives; on the Yellowstone, -on the Snake River, in New Mexico, but -especially in Mexico. Thence the precious -article was distributed all over the entire -country as far as Ohio and Tennessee, a distance -of nearly two thousand miles.”<a id="FNanchor_70" href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">70</a></p> - -<p>According to Vierkandt: “From the -purely home-made products of primitive peoples, -there results a system of trade totally -distinct from that prevailing under modern -conditions.... Each separate tribe has developed -special aptitudes, leading to interexchange. -Even among the comparatively uncivilized -Indian tribes of South America, we -find such differentiations.... By such a -trade, products may be distributed over extraordinary<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_132">132</a></span> -distances, not in any direct way -through professional traders, but through a -gradual passing along from tribe to tribe. -The origin of such a trade, as Buecher has -shown, is to be traced back to the exchange of -guest-gifts.”<a id="FNanchor_71" href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">71</a></p> - -<p>Besides this exchange of guest-gifts, a trade -may grow from the peace offerings which adversaries -after a fight exchange as a sign of -reconciliation. Sartorius reports on Polynesia: -“After a war between different -islands, the peace offerings for each group -were something novel; and if the present and -return present pleased both parties, a repetition -took place, and thus again the way for -exchange of products was opened. But, these, -in contrast to guest-gifts, were the bases of -continuing intercourse. Here, in place of the -contact of individuals, tribes and peoples met. -Women are the first object of barter; they -form the connecting link between strange -tribes, and according to evidence from many -sources, women are exchanged for cattle.”<a id="FNanchor_72" href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">72</a></p> - -<p>We meet here an object of trade, exchangeable<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_133">133</a></span> -even without “international division of -labor.” And it appears as though the <em>exchange -of women</em> had, in many ways, smoothed -the way for the traffic in merchandise, as -though it had been the first step toward the -<em>peaceable</em> integration of tribes, which accompanied -the <em>warlike</em> integration of the formation -of the State. Lippert, however, believes that -the peaceful <em>exchange of fire</em> antedates this -barter.<a id="FNanchor_73" href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">73</a> Conceding that this custom is very -ancient, he can nevertheless trace it only from -rudiments of observances and of law; and since -proof is no longer accessible, we shall not pursue -the question further in this place.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the exchange of women -is observed universally, and doubtless exerts an -extraordinarily strong influence in the development -of peaceable intercourse between -neighboring tribes, and in the preparation for -barter of merchandise. The story of the Sabine -women, who threw themselves between -their brothers and their husbands, as these were -about to engage in battle, must have been an -actuality in a thousand instances in the course<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_134">134</a></span> -of the development of the human race. All -over the world, the marriage of near relatives -is considered an outrage, as “incest,” for -reasons not within the scope of this book.<a id="FNanchor_74" href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">74</a> -This directs the sexual longing toward the -women of neighboring tribes, and thus makes -the loot of women a part of the primary intertribal -relations; and in nearly all cases, unless -strong feelings of race counteract it, the violent -carrying off of women is gradually commuted -to barter and purchase, the custom resulting -from the relative undesirability of the women -of one’s own blood in comparison to the wives -to be had from other tribes.<a id="FNanchor_75" href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">75</a>*</p> - -<p>Where division of labor made at all possible -the exchange of goods, the relations among the -various tribes would thereafter be made serviceable -to it; the exogamic groups gradually -become accustomed regularly to meet on a -peaceful basis. The peace, originally protecting -the horde of blood relations, thereafter -comes to be extended over a wider circle. One -example from numberless instances: “Each -of the two Camerun tribes has its own ‘bush<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_135">135</a></span> -countries,’ places where its own tribesmen -trade, and where, by intermarriage, they have -relatives. Here also exogamy shows its tribe-linking -power.”</p> - -<p>These are the principal lines of growth of -peaceful barter and traffic; from the right to -hospitality and the exchange of women, perhaps -also from the exchange of fire, to the -trade in commodities. In addition to this, -markets and fairs, and perhaps also traders, -were almost uniformly regarded as being under -the protection of a god who preserved peace -and avenged its violation. Thus we have -brought the fundamentals of this most important -sociological factor to the point where the -political means enters as a cause to disturb, rearrange, -and then to develop and affect the -creations of the economic means.</p> - - -<h3 id="h135">(b) <span class="smcap smaller">TRADE AND THE PRIMITIVE STATE</span></h3> - -<p>There are two very important reasons why -the robber-warrior should not unduly interfere -with such markets and fairs as he may find -within his conquered domain.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_136">136</a></span></p> - -<p>The first, which is extra-economic, is the -superstitious fear that the godhead will avenge -a breach of the peace. The second, which is -economic, and probably is the more important—and -I think I am the first to point out this -connection—is that the conquerors can not well -do without the markets.</p> - -<p>The booty of the primitive victors consists -of much property which is unavailable for their -immediate use and consumption. Since valuable -articles at that period exist in but few -forms, while these few occur in large quantity, -the “marginal utility” of any one kind is held -very low. This applies especially to the most -important product of the political means, -slaves. Let us first take up the case of the -herdsman: his need of slaves is limited by the -size of his herds; he is very likely to exchange -his surplus for other objects of greater value to -him: for salt, ornaments, arms, metals, woven -materials, utensils, etc. For that reason, the -herdsman is not only at all times a robber, always -in addition he is a merchant and trader -and he protects trade.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_137">137</a></span></p> - -<p>He protects trade coming his way in order -to exchange his loot against the products of -another civilization—from the earliest times, -nomads have convoyed the caravans passing -through their steppes or deserts in consideration -of protection money—but he also protects -trade even in places conquered by him in prehistoric -times. Quite the same sort of consideration -which influenced the herdsmen to -change from bear stage to bee-keeper stage, -must have influenced them to maintain and -protect ancient markets and fairs. One -single looting, in this case, would mean killing -the hen that lays the golden eggs. It is more -profitable to preserve the market and rather to -extend the prevailing peace over it, since there -is not only the profit to be had from an exchange -of foreign wares against loot, but also -the protection money, the lords’ toll, to be collected. -For that reason princes of feudal -states of every stage of development extended -over markets, highways and merchants, their -especial protection, the “king’s peace,” often -indeed reserving to themselves the monopoly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_138">138</a></span> -of foreign trade. Everywhere we see them -busily engaged in calling into being new fairs -and cities by the grant of protection and immunity.</p> - -<p>This interest in the system of fairs and markets -makes it thoroughly credible that tribes -of herdsmen respected existing market places -in their sphere of influence to such an extent -that they suspended the exertion of the political -means so completely as not even to exercise -“dominion” over them. The story told by -Herodotus is inherently probable, though he -was astonished that the Argippæans had a -sacred market amidst the lawless Scythian -herdsmen, and that their unarmed inhabitants -were effectively protected through the hallowed -peace of their market place. Many similar -phenomena make this the more easily believable.</p> - -<p>“No one dare harm them, since they are considered -<em>holy</em>; and yet they have no arms; but it -is they who allay the quarrels of their neighbors, -and whoever has escaped to them as a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_139">139</a></span> -runaway may not be touched by any other -man.”<a id="FNanchor_76" href="#Footnote_76" class="fnanchor">76</a> Similar instances are found frequently: -“It is always the same story of the -Argippæans, the story of the ‘holy,’ ‘unarmed,’ -‘just,’ bartering, and strife-settling tribelet in -the midst of a Bedouin-like, nomadic population.”<a id="FNanchor_77" href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">77</a> -Cære may be taken as an example of -a higher type. Strabo says of its inhabitants: -“The Greeks thought highly of their bravery -and justice, because although powerful in a -great degree, they abstained from robbery.” -Mommsen, who quotes this passage, adds: -“This does not exclude piracy, which was engaged -in by the merchants of Cære as well as -by all other merchants, but rather that Cære -was a sort of free harbor for the Phœnicians as -for the Greeks.”<a id="FNanchor_78" href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">78</a></p> - -<p>Cære is not like the fair of the Argippæans, -a market place in the interior <em>of a district of -land nomads, but is in the midst of a domain of -sea nomads, a port endowed with its own peace</em>. -This is one of those typical formations whose -importance, in my estimation, has not been appreciated<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_140">140</a></span> -at its real value. They have, it -seems to me, exercised a mighty influence on -the genesis of maritime states.</p> - -<p>Those reasons by which we saw the land nomads -forced to preserve, if not to create, -market places, must with even more intensity, -have coerced the sea nomads to similar demeanor. -For the transportation of loot, especially -of herds and of slaves, is difficult and -dangerous on the trails across the desert or the -steppes: the slow progress invites pursuit. -But with war-canoe and “dragon-ship” this -transportation is easy and safe. For that reason, -the Viking is even much more a trader -and merchant than is the herdsman. As is -said in <cite>Faust</cite>, “War, Commerce, and Piracy -are inseparable.”</p> - - -<h3 id="h140">(c) <span class="smcap smaller">THE GENESIS OF THE MARITIME STATE</span></h3> - -<p>In many cases, I believe, trade in the loot of -piracy is the origin of those cities around which, -as political centers, the city-states of the antique -or Mediterranean civilization grew up; -while in very many other cases, the same trade<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_141">141</a></span> -coöperated to bring them to the same point of -political development.</p> - -<p>These harbor markets developed from probably -two general types: they grew up either as -piratical fortresses directly and intentionally -placed in hostile territory, or else as “merchant -colonies” based on treaty rights in the harbors -of foreign primitive or developed feudal states.</p> - -<p>Of the first type, we have a number of important -examples from ancient history which -correspond exactly to the fourth stage of our -scheme, where an armed colony of pirates -plants itself down at a commercially and strategically -defendable point on the seacoast of a -foreign state. The most notable instance is -Carthage; and in like manner, the Greek sea -nomads, Ionians, Dorians and Achæans, settled -in their sea castles on the Adriatic and -Tyrrhenian coasts of Southern Italy, on the -islands of these seas, and on the gulfs of Southern -Gaul. Phœnicians, Etruscans,<a id="FNanchor_M" href="#Footnote_M" class="fnanchor">M</a> Greeks,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_142">142</a></span> -and according to modern investigation, Carians, -all about the Mediterranean, founded their -“States” after the same type, with identical -class division into masters and servile peasantry -of the neighboring territory.<a id="FNanchor_79" href="#Footnote_79" class="fnanchor">79</a></p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_M" href="#FNanchor_M" class="fnanchor">M</a> Whether the Etruscans were immigrants into Italy by land -who took up piracy after having made war successfully on -land, or whether as sea nomads they had already settled the -country along the sea named after them, has not been determined.</p></div> - -<p>Some of these states on the coast developed -into feudal states of the type of the territorial -states; and the master class then became a -landed aristocracy. The factors in this change -were: first, geographical conditions, lack of -good harbors, and a wide stretch of <em>hinterland</em> -cultivated by peaceful peasants; and secondly, -very probably, the acquired organization into -classes taken with them from their original -homes. In many cases, they were fugitive -nobles, the vanquished of domestic feuds, or -younger sons, sometimes an entire generation -of youth of both sexes, who thus started “on -the viking,” and having at home had lands and -serfs, as petty lords, they again sought in foreign -lands what they regarded as their due. -The occupation of England by the Anglo-<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_143">143</a></span>Saxons, -and of Southern Italy by the Normans, -are examples of this method; so too are -the Spanish and Portuguese colonizations of -Mexico and of South America. The Achæan -colonies of Greater Greece in Southern Italy -furnish additional and very important instances -of this development of territorial feudal -states by sea nomads: “This Achæan -League of cities was a true colonization. The -cities were without harbors—Croton only had -a fair roadstead—<em>and were without any trade -of their own</em>; the Sybarite could boast of his -growing gray in his water town between his -home bridges, while buying and selling were -carried on by Milesians and Etruscans. On -the other hand, the Greeks in this region not -only controlled the fringe of the shore, but -ruled from sea to sea; ... the native agricultural -inhabitants were forced into a relation of -clientage or serfdom, and were required to -work the farms of their masters or to pay tribute -to them.”<a id="FNanchor_80" href="#Footnote_80" class="fnanchor">80</a> It is probable that most of -the Doric colonies in Crete were similarly organized.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_144">144</a></span></p> - -<p>But in the course of universal history these -“territorial states,” whether they arose more -or less frequently, did not acquire any such -importance as did those maritime cities which -devoted their principal energies to commerce -and to privateering. Mommsen contrasts in -distinct and well chosen sentences the Achæan -landed squire with the “royal merchants” of -the Greek Colonies in Southern Italy: “In -no way did they spurn agriculture or the increase -of territory; the Greeks were not satisfied, -at least not after they became powerful, to -remain within the confined space of a fortified -commercial factory in the midst of the country -of the barbarians, as the Phœnicians had done. -Their cities were founded primarily and exclusively -for purposes of trade, and unlike the -Achæan colonies, were universally situated at -the best harbors and landing places.”<a id="FNanchor_81" href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">81</a> We -are certain, in the case of the Ionic colonies, -and may well assume it for the other cases, that -the founders of these cities were not landed -squires, but seafaring merchants.</p> - -<p>But such maritime states or cities, in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_145">145</a></span> -strict sense, came into being not only through -warlike conquest, but also through peaceable -beginnings, by a more or less mixed <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">pénétration -pacifique</i>.</p> - -<p>Where, however, the Vikings did not meet -peaceable peasants, but feudal states in the -primitive stage, willing to fight, they offered -and accepted terms of peace and settled down -as colonies of merchants.</p> - -<p>We know of such cases from every part of -the world, in harbors and on markets held on -shore. To take the instances with which Germans -are most conversant, there are the settlements -of North German merchants in -countries along the German ocean and the -Baltic Sea, the German Steel Yard in London, -the Hansa in Sweden and Norway, on the -Island of Schönen, and in Russia, at Novgorod. -In Wilna, the capital of the Grand -Dukes of Lithuania, there was such a colony; -and the Fondaco dei Tedeschi in Venice is another -example of a similar institution. The -strangers in nearly every instance settle down -as a compact mass, subject to their own laws<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_146">146</a></span> -and their own jurisdiction. They often acquire -great political influence, sometimes extending -to dominion over the state. One -would think the following tale of Ratzel, concerning -the coast and islands of the Indian -Ocean, were a contemporaneous narrative of -the Phœnician or Greek invasion of the Mediterranean -at about 1,000 B. C.: “Whole nations -have, so to say, been liquefied by trade, -especially the proverbially clever, zealous, omnipresent -Malays of Sumatra; as well as the -treacherous Bugi of Celebes. These can be -met with at every place from Singapore to -New Guinea. Latterly, especially in Borneo, -they have immigrated in masses on the call of -the Borneo chieftains. Their influence was so -strong that they were permitted <em>to govern -themselves according to their own laws</em>, and -they felt themselves so strong <em>that repeatedly -they attempted to achieve independence</em>. The -Achinese formerly occupied a similar position. -Malacca had been made the principal mart by -Malays from Sumatra, and after its decline, -Achin became the most frequented harbor of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_147">147</a></span> -this distant east, especially for the first quarter -of the seventeenth century, the pivotal period -of the development of that corner of the -world.”<a id="FNanchor_82" href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">82</a> The following, from among numberless -instances, demonstrate the universality -of this form of settlement: “In Urga, <em>where -they politically dominate</em>, the merchants are -crowded together into a separate Chinese -Town.”<a id="FNanchor_83" href="#Footnote_83" class="fnanchor">83</a> In the Jewish States there were -“small colonies of foreign merchants and mechanics, -set apart in distinct quarters of the -cities. Here, under the king’s protection, they -could live according to their own religious customs.”<a id="FNanchor_84" href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">84</a> -We may also compare with this, -First Kings XX, 34. “King Omri of Ephraim -was forced by the military success of his opponent, -the King of Damascus, to grant to the -Aramaic merchants the use of certain parts of -the city of Samaria, where under royal protection -they could trade. Later, when the turn of -war favored his successor, Ahab, the latter demanded -the same privilege for the Ephraimitic -merchants in Damascus.”<a id="FNanchor_85" href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">85</a> “The inhabitants -of Italy, wherever they were, held together as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_148">148</a></span> -solid and organized masses, the soldiers as legionaries, -the merchants of all large cities as -corporations; while the Roman citizens domiciled -or dwelling in the various provincial <em>circuits</em>, -were organized as a ‘convention of -Roman citizens’ with their own communal government.”<a id="FNanchor_86" href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">86</a> -We may recall the mediæval -Ghettos, which, before the great persecution of -the Jews in the Middle Ages, were similar -merchant colonies. The settlements of Europeans -in the ports of strong foreign empires -at the present time show similar corporate organizations, -having their own constitution and -(consular) jurisdiction. China, Turkey and -Morocco must continue to bear this mark of -inferiority, while recently Japan has been able -to rid herself of that badge.</p> - -<p>The most interesting point about these colonies, -at least for our study, consists in their -general tendency to extend their political -influence into complete domination. And -there is good reason for this. Merchants have -a mass of movable wealth, which is likely to be -used as a decisive factor in the political upheavals<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_149">149</a></span> -constantly disturbing all feudal states, -be it in international wars between two neighboring -states, or in intra-national fights, such -as wars of succession. In addition to this -the colonists, in many cases, may rely on -the power of their home state, basing their -claim on ties of blood and on uncommonly -strong commercial interests; while there is -besides, the fact that in many cases they -have in their warlike sailor-folk and their numerous -slaves an effective and compact force -of their own, capable of accomplishing much -in a limited sphere.</p> - -<p>The following story of the rôle played by -Arab merchants in East Africa appears to me -to show a historical type heretofore not sufficiently -appreciated: “When Speke, as the -first European, made this trip in 1857, the -Arabs were merchants, living as aliens in the -land. When in 1861 he passed the same way, -the Arabs resembled great landed proprietors -with rich estates and were waging war with -the native territorial ruler. This process, repeatedly -found in many other regions in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_150">150</a></span> -interior of Africa, is the necessary consequence -of the balance of power. The foreign merchants, -be they Arabs or Suaheli, ask the privilege -of transit and pay tribute for it; they -establish warehouses, which the chiefs favor, -as these seem both to satisfy their vanity and -to extend their connections; then incurring the -suspicion, oppression and persecution of the -chiefs, the merchants refuse to pay the rack -tolls and dues, which have grown with their -increased prosperity. At last, in one of the -inevitable fights for the succession, the Arabs -take the side of one pretender if he is pliable -enough, and are thus brought into internal -quarrels of the country and take part in the -often endless wars.”<a id="FNanchor_87" href="#Footnote_87" class="fnanchor">87</a></p> - -<p>This political activity of the merchant denizens -(<em>metoikoi</em>) is a constantly recurring type. -“In Borneo there developed from the settlements -of Chinese gold diggers separate -states.”<a id="FNanchor_88" href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">88</a> Properly speaking, the entire history -of colonization by Europeans is a series -of examples of the law that, with any superior -force, the factories and larger settlements of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_151">151</a></span> -foreigners tend to grow into domination, unless -they approximate to the primal type of simple -piracy, such as the Spanish and Portuguese -conquests, or the East India Companies, both -the English and the Dutch. “There lies a -robber state beside the ocean, between the -Rhine and the Scheldt,” are the accusing words -of the Dutch Multatuli. All East Asiatic, -American and African colonies of all European -peoples arose as one or the other of these -two types.</p> - -<p>But the aliens do not always obtain unconditional -mastery. Sometimes the host state -is too strong, and the newcomers remain politically -powerless but protected aliens; as, for -example, the Germans in England. Sometimes -the host state, although subjugated, becomes -strong enough to shake off the foreign -domination; so, for instance, Sweden drove out -the Hanseats who had imposed on her their -sovereignty. In some cases, a conqueror overcomes -both merchants and host state, and -subjugates both; as happened to the republics -of Novgorod and Pskov, when the Russians<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_152">152</a></span> -annexed them. In many cases, however, the -rich foreigners and the domestic nobility amalgamate -into one group of rulers, following the -type of the formation of territorial states, in -which we saw this take place whenever two -about equally strong groups of rulers came -into conflict. It seems to me that this last -named situation is the most probable assumption -for the genesis of the most important city -states of antiquity, for the Greek maritime -cities, and for Rome.</p> - -<p>Of Greek history, to use the terms of Kurt -Breysig, we know only the “Middle Ages,” -of Roman history, only its “Modern Times.” -For the matters that preceded, we must be -extremely careful in drawing deductions from -fancied analogies. But it seems to me that -enough facts are proved and admitted to permit -the conclusion that Athens, Corinth, -Mycenæ, Rome, etc., became states in the manner -already set forth. And this would follow, -even if the data from all known demography -and general history were not of such universal -validity as to permit the conclusion in itself.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_153">153</a></span></p> - -<p>We know accurately from the names of -places (Salamis: Island of Peace, equivalent -to Market-Island), from the names of heroes, -from monuments, and from immediate tradition, -that in many Greek harbors there existed -Phœnician factories, while the <em>hinterland</em> was -occupied by small feudal states with the typical -articulation of nobles, common freemen, -and slaves. It can not seriously be disputed -that the development of the city states was -powerfully advanced by foreign influences; -and this is true, though no specific evidence can -be adduced to show that any of the Phœnician, -or of the still more powerful Carian merchants -were either allowed to intermarry with the -families of the resident nobility, or were made -full citizens, or finally even became princes.</p> - -<p>The same applies to Rome, concerning which -Mommsen, a cautious author, states: “Rome -owes its importance, if not its origin, to these -commercial and strategic relations. Evidence -of this is found in many traces of far greater -value than the tales of historical novels pretending -to be authentic. Take an instance of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_154">154</a></span> -the primæval relations existing between Rome -and Cære, which was for Etruria what Rome -was for Latium, and thereafter was its nearest -neighbor and commercial friend; or the uncommon -importance attributed to the bridge over -Tiber and the bridge building (Pontifex Maximus) -in every part of the Roman State; or -the galley in the municipal coat of arms. To -this source may be traced the primitive Roman -harbor dues to which, from early times, only -those goods were subject which were intended -for sale (<em>promercale</em>) and not what entered -the harbor of Ostia, for the proper use of the -charterer (<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">usuarium</i>), and which constituted -therefore an impost on trade. For that reason -we find the comparatively early use of minted -money, and the commercial treaties of states -oversea with Rome. In this sense, then, -Rome may, as the story of its origin states, -have been rather a created than a developed -city, and among the Latin cities rather the -youngest than the eldest.”<a id="FNanchor_89" href="#Footnote_89" class="fnanchor">89</a></p> - -<p>It would require the work of a lifetime of -historical research to investigate these possibilities,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_155">155</a></span> -or rather these probabilities; and then -to write the constitutional history of these preëminently -important city states, and to draw -thence the very necessary conclusions. It -seems to me that along this path there would -be found much information on many an -obscure question, such as the Etruscan dominion -in Rome, or the origin of the rich families -of Plebeians, or concerning the Athenian -<em>metoikoi</em>, and many other problems.</p> - -<p>Here we can only follow the thread which -holds out the hope of leading us through the -labyrinth of historical tradition to the issue.</p> - - -<h3 id="h155">(d) <span class="smcap smaller">ESSENCE AND ISSUE OF THE MARITIME STATES</span></h3> - -<p>All these are true “States” in the sociologic -sense, whether they arose from the fortresses -of sea-robbers, or from harbors of original land -nomads as merchant colonies which obtained -dominion or which amalgamated with the dominating -group of the host people. For they -are nothing but the organization of the political -means, their form is domination, their content<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_156">156</a></span> -the economic exploitation of the subject -by the master group.</p> - -<p>So far as the principle is concerned, they -are not to be differentiated from the States -founded by land nomads; and yet they have -taken a different form, both from internal and -external reasons, and show a different psychology -of classes.</p> - -<p>One must not believe that class feeling was -at all different in these and in the territorial -states. Here as there the master class looks -down with the same contempt on the subjects, -on the “<em>Rantuses</em>,” on the “man with the blue -fingernails,” as the German patrician in the -Middle Ages looked on a being with whom, -even when free born, no intermarriage or -social intercourse was permitted. Little indeed -does the class theory of the καλοκἀγαθοί -(well-born) or of the patricians -(children of ancestors) differ from that of the -country squires. But other circumstances -here bring about differences, consonant, -naturally, with class interests. In any district -ruled by merchants, highway robbery can not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_157">157</a></span> -be tolerated, and therefore it is considered, e. g., -among the maritime Greeks, a vulgar -crime. The tale of Theseus would not in a -territorial state have been pointed against -the highwaymen. On the other hand, “piracy -was regarded by them, in most remote times, as -a trade nowise dishonorable ... of which -ample proof may be found in the Homeric -poems; while at a much later period Polycrates -had organized a well developed robber state -on the Island of Samos.” “In the <cite>Corpus -Juris</cite>, mention is made of a law of Solon in -which the association of pirates (ἐπὶ λείαν οἰχόμενοι) -is recognized as a permissible company.”<a id="FNanchor_90" href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">90</a></p> - -<p>But quite apart from such details, mentioned -only because they serve to cast a clear -light on the growth of the “ideologic superstructure,”<a id="FNanchor_N" href="#Footnote_N" class="fnanchor">N</a> -the basic conditions of existence -of maritime states, utterly different from those -of territorial states, called into being two exceedingly -important phenomena, which are of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_158">158</a></span> -universal historical importance, viz., the -growth of a <em>democratic constitution</em>, whereby -the gigantic contest between the sultanism of -the Orient and the civic freedom of the West -was to be fought out (according to Mommsen -the true content of universal history); and in -the second place the development of <em>capitalistic -slave-work</em>, which in the end was to annihilate -all these states.</p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_N" href="#FNanchor_N" class="fnanchor">N</a> How characteristic of these relations it is that Great -Britain, the only “maritime state” of Europe, even at this -present day will not surrender the right to arm privateers.</p></div> - -<p>Let us first consider the inner or socio-psychological -causes of this contrast between the -territorial and the maritime state.</p> - -<p>States are maintained by the same principle -from which they arise. Conquest of land and -populations is the <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ratio essendi</i> of a territorial -state; and by the repeated conquest of lands -and populations it must grow, until its natural -growth is checked by mountain ranges, desert, -or ocean, or its sociological bounds are determined -by contact with other states of its -own kind, which it can not subjugate. The -maritime state, on the other hand, came into -being from piracy and trade; and through -these two means, it must strive to extend its<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_159">159</a></span> -power. For this purpose, no extended territory -need be absolutely subjected to its sway. -There is no need to carry its development beyond -the first five stages. The maritime states -rarely, and only when compelled, proceed beyond -the fifth stage, and attain to complete -intra-nationality and amalgamation. Usually, -it is enough if other sea nomads and traders -are kept away, if the monopoly of robbery and -trade is secured, and if the “subjects” are kept -quiet by forts and garrisons. Important -places of production are, of course, actually -“dominated”; and this applies especially to -mines, to a few fertile grain belts, to woods -with good lumber, to salt works, and to important -fisheries. Domination here, therefore, -means permanent administration, by -making the subjects work these for the ruling -class. It is only later in the development, that -there arises a taste for “lands and serfs” and -large domains for the ruling class <em>beyond the -confines of the narrow and original limits of -the State</em>. This happens when the maritime -state by the incorporation of subjugated territories<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_160">160</a></span> -has become a mixture of the territorial -and the maritime forms. But even in that case, -and in contradistinction to territorial states, -large landed properties are merely a source -of money rentals, and are in nearly all cases -administered as absentee-property. This we -find in Carthage and in the later Roman Empire.</p> - -<p>The interests of the master class, which in -the maritime state as well as in every other -state, governs according to its own advantage, -are different from those in the territorial state. -In the latter the feudal territorial magnate is -powerful because of his ownership of lands and -people; while conversely, the patrician of the -maritime city is powerful because of his wealth. -The territorial magnate can dominate his -“State” only by the number of men-at-arms -maintained by him, and in order to have as -many of these as possible, he must increase his -territory as much as possible. The patrician, -on the other hand, can control his “state” only -by movable wealth, with which he can hire -strong arms or bribe weak souls; such wealth<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_161">161</a></span> -is won faster by piracy and by trade than by -land wars and the possession of large estates -in distant territories. Furthermore, in order -thoroughly to use such property, he would be -obliged to leave his city to settle down on it, -and to become a regular squire; because in a -period when money has not yet become general, -where a profitable division of labor between -town and country has not yet come -about, the exploitation of large estates can -only be carried on by actually consuming their -products, and absentee ownership as a source -of income is inconceivable. Thus far, however, -we have not reached that portion of the -development. We are still examining primitive -conditions. No patrician of any city-state -would, at this time, think of leaving his lively -rich home, in order to bury himself among barbarians, -and thus with one move cut himself -off in his state from any political rôle. All his -economic, social and political interests impel -him with one accord toward maritime ventures. -Not landed property, but movable capital, is -the sinew of his life.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_162">162</a></span></p> - -<p>These were the moving causes of the actions -of the master class in the maritime cities; and -even where geographical conditions permitted -an extensive expansion beyond the adjoining -<em>hinterland</em> of these cities, they turned the -weight of effort toward sea-power rather than -toward territorial growth. Even in the case -of Carthage, its colossal territory was of far -less importance to it than its maritime interests. -Primarily it conquered Sicily and -Corsica more in order to check the competition -of the Greek and Etruscan traders than for -the sake of owning these islands; it extended -its territories toward the Lybians largely to -insure the security of its other home possessions; -and finally, when it conquered Spain, its -ultimate reason was the need of owning the -mines. The history of the <em>Hansa</em> shows many -points of similarity to the above. The majority -of these maritime cities, moreover, were not -capable of subjugating a large district. Even -had there been the will to conquer, there were -extraneous, geographical conditions that hindered. -All along the Mediterranean, with the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_163">163</a></span> -exception of some few places, the coastal plain -is extremely narrow, a small strip fenced off -by high mountain ranges. That was one -cause which prevented most of the states -grouped about some trading harbor from growing -to anything like the size we should naturally -assume to be probable; while in the -open country, ruled by herdsmen, and this very -early, immense realms came into being. The -second cause for the small beginnings of these -states is found in this, that the <em>hinterland</em> -whether in the hills or on the few plains of the -Mediterranean was occupied by warlike tribes. -These tribesmen, either hunters or warlike -herdsmen, or else primitive feudal states of the -same master race as the sea nomads, were not -likely to be subjugated without a severe contest. -Thus in Greece the interior was saved -from the maritime states.</p> - -<p>For these reasons the maritime State, even -when most developed, always remains centralized, -one is tempted to say centered, on its -trading harbor; while the territorial State, -strongly decentralized from the start, for a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_164">164</a></span> -long time continues to develop as it expands -a still more pronounced decentralization. -Later, we shall see how this is affected by the -adoption of those forms of government and of -economic achievement which first were perfected -in the “city-state,” and which thus -obtained the strength to counteract the centrifugal -forces, and to build up the central organization -which is characteristic of our modern -states. This is the first great contrast between -the two forms of the State.</p> - -<p>No less decisive is the second point of contrast, -whereby the territorial State remains -tied up to natural economies as opposed to -money economies, toward which the maritime -State quickly turns. This contrast grows -also out of the basic conditions of their existence.</p> - -<p>Wherever a State lives in natural economy, -money is a superfluous luxury—so superfluous -that an economy developed to the use of money -retrogrades again into a system of payments -in kind as soon as the community drops back -into the primitive form. Thus after Charlemagne<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_165">165</a></span> -had issued good coins, the economic -situation expelled them. Neustria—not to -mention Austrasia—under the stress of the -migration of the peoples reverted to payment in -kind. Such a system can well do without -money as a standard of values, since it is without -any developed intercourse and traffic. The -lord’s tenants furnish as tribute those things -that the lord and his followers consume immediately; -while his ornaments, fine fabrics, damascened -arms, or rare horses, salt, etc., are -procured in exchange with wandering merchants -for slaves, wax, furs and other products -of a warlike economic system of exchange in -kind.</p> - -<p>In city life, at any advanced stage of development, -it is impossible to exist without a -common measure of values. The free mechanic -in a city can not, except in rare cases, -find some other craftsman in need of the special -thing which he produces, prepared to consume -it immediately. Then, too, in cities -the inevitable retail trade in food products, -where every one must purchase nearly everything<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_166">166</a></span> -required, makes the use of coined -money quite inevitable. It is impossible -to conduct trade in its more limited sense, -not between merchant and customers, but -between merchant and merchant, without having -a common measure of value. Imagine -the case of a trader entering a port with a -cargo of slaves, wishing to take cloth as a return -cargo, and finding a cloth merchant who -at the time may not want slaves but iron, or -cattle, or furs. To accomplish this exchange, -at least a dozen intermediate trades would -have to take place before the object could be -achieved. That can be avoided only if there -exists some one commodity desired by all. In -the system of payment in kind of the territorial -states this may be taken by cattle or -horses, since they may be used by any one at -some time; but the ship owner can not load -with cattle as a means of payment, and -thus gold and silver become recognized as -“money.”</p> - -<p>From centralization and from the use of -money, which are the necessary properties of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_167">167</a></span> -the maritime or the <em>city State</em>, as we shall hereafter -call it, its fate follows of necessity.</p> - -<p>The psychology of the townsman, and especially -of the dweller in the maritime commercial -city, is radically different from that -of the countryman. His point of view is freer -and more inclusive, even though it be more -superficial; he is livelier, because more impressions -strike him in a day than a peasant in a -year. He becomes used to constant changes -and news, and thus is always <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">novarum rerum -cupidus</i>. He is more remote from nature and -less dependent on it than is the peasant, and -therefore he has less fear of “ghosts.” One -consequence of this is that an underling in a -city State is less apt to regard the “taboo” regulations -imposed on him by the first and second -estates of rulers. And as he is compelled to -live in compact masses with his fellow subjects, -he early finds his strength in numbers, so that -he becomes more unruly and seditious than the -serf who lives in such isolation that he never -becomes conscious of the mass to which he belongs -and ever remains under the impression<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_168">168</a></span> -that his overlord with his followers would have -the upper hand in every fight.</p> - -<p>This in itself brings about an ever progressive -dissolution of the rigid system of subordinated -groups first created by the feudal state. -In Greece the territorial states alone were able -to keep their subjects for a long time in a state -of subjection: Sparta its Helots, Thessaly its -<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">Penestæ</i>. In all the city States, on the other -hand, we early find an uprising of the proletariat -against which the master class was unable -to oppose an effective resistance.</p> - -<p>The economic situation tends toward the -same result as the conditions of settlement. -Movable wealth had far less stability than -landed property: the sea is tricky, and the fortunes -of maritime war and piracy not less so. -The rich man of to-day may lose all by a turn -of Fortune’s wheel; while the poorest man -may, by the same swing, land on top. But in -a commonwealth based entirely on possessions, -loss of fortune brings with it loss of rank and -of “class,” just as the converse takes place. -The rich Plebeian becomes the leader of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_169">169</a></span> -mass of the people in their constitutional fight -for equal rights and places all his fortune at -risk in that struggle. The position of the patricians -becomes untenable; when coerced they -have ever conceded the claims of the lower -class. As soon as the first rich Plebeian has -been taken into their ranks, the right of rule -by birth, defended as a holy institution, has forever -become impossible. Henceforth it follows -that what is fair for one is fair for the -other; and the aristocratic rule is followed first -by the plutocratic, then by the democratic, -finally by the ochlocratic régime, until either -foreign conquest or the “tyranny” of some -“Savior of the Sword” rescues the community -from chaos.</p> - -<p>This end affects not only the State, but in -most cases its inhabitants so profoundly that -one may speak of a literal <em>death of the peoples</em>, -caused by the <em>capitalistic exploitation of slave -labor</em>. This latter is a social institution inevitably -bound to exist in every state founded on -piracy and maritime ventures and thus coming -to use money as a means of exchange. In the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_170">170</a></span> -primitive stages of feudalism, whence it was -derived, slavery was harmless, as is true in all -economic systems based on exchange and use -in kind, only to become an ulcerating cancer, -utterly destructive of the entire life of the -State as soon as it is exploited by the “capitalist” -method, i. e., as soon as slave labor is -applied, not to be used in a system of a feudal -payment in kind, but to supply a market paying -in money.</p> - -<p>Numberless slaves are brought into the -country by piracy, privateering, or by the commercial -wars. The wealth of their owners permits -them to work the ground more intensively, -and the owners of realty within the confines -of the city limits draw ever increasing revenues -from their possessions, and become more and -more greedy of land. The small freeholder in -the country, overburdened by the taxes and -military service of wars waged in the interests -of this great merchant class, sinks into debt, -becomes a slave for debt, or migrates into the -city as a pauper. But even so there is no hope -for him, since the removal of the peasants has<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_171">171</a></span> -damaged the craftsmen and small traders, for -the peasants were wont to purchase in the city, -while the great estates, constantly increasing -by the removal of the peasantry, supply their -own needs by their own slave products. The -evil attacks other parts of the body politic. -The remaining trades are gradually usurped -by masters exploiting slave labor, which is -cheaper than free labor. The middle class -thus goes to pieces; and a pauper, good-for-nothing -mob, a genuine “bob-tail proletariat” -comes into being, which, by reason of the democratic -constitution achieved in the interim, is -the sovereign of the commonwealth. The full -course, political as well as military, is then a -mere question of time. It may take place -without a foreign invasion; which, however, -usually sets in, when by reason of the physical -breakdown caused by the immense depopulation, -by the consumption of the people in its -literal sense, the final stage is attained. This -is the end of all these states. Within the scope -of this treatise we can not dilate on this phase.</p> - -<p>Only one city State was able to maintain itself<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_172">172</a></span> -throughout the centuries, because it was -the ultimate conqueror of all the others, and -because it was enabled to counteract the consumption -of population by the only method of -sanitation possible; by extensive recreations of -middle class populations, both in cities and in -country districts, as well as by vast colonizations -of peasants on lands taken from the -vanquished.</p> - -<p>The Roman Empire was that state. But -even this gigantic organism finally succumbed -to the consumption of population, caused by -capitalistic slave exploitation. In the interval, -however, it had created the first <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">imperium</i>, i. e., -the first tensely centralized state on a large -scale, and had overcome and amalgamated all -territorial states of both the Mediterranean -shores and its neighboring countries, and had -thereby for all time set before the world the -model of such an organized dominion. In addition -to this it had developed the organization -of cities and of the system of money economy -to such an extent that they never were utterly -destroyed, even in the turmoil of the barbarian<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_173">173</a></span> -migration. In consequence of this, the feudal -territorial states that occupied the territory of -the former Roman Empire either directly or -indirectly received those new impulses which -were to carry them beyond the condition of the -normal primitive feudal State.</p> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_174">174</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h174" class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_V"></a>CHAPTER V<br /> - -<span class="subhead">THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEUDAL STATE</span></h2> - - -<h3>(a) <span class="smcap smaller">THE GENESIS OF LANDED PROPERTY</span></h3> - -<p>We now return, as stated above, to that -point where the primitive feudal State gave -rise to the city State as an offshoot, to follow -the upward growth of the main branch. As -the destiny of the city State was determined by -the agglomeration of that form of wealth about -which the State swung in its orbit, so the fate -of the territorial State is conditioned by that -agglomeration of wealth which in turn controls -its orbit, the <em>ownership of landed property</em>.</p> - -<p>In the preceding, we followed the economic -differentiation in the case of the shepherd -tribes, and showed that even here the law of the -agglomeration about existing nuclei of wealth -begins to assert its efficacy, as soon as the political -means comes into play, be it in the form<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_175">175</a></span> -of wars for booty or still more in the form of -slavery. We saw that the tribe had differentiated -nobles and common freemen, beneath -whom slaves, being without any political -rights, are subordinated as a third class. -This differentiation of wealth is introduced -into the primitive state, and sharpens very -markedly the contrast of social rank. It becomes -still more accentuated by settlement, -whereby private ownership in lands is created. -Doubtless there existed even at the time when -the primitive feudal state came into being, -great differences in the amount of lands possessed -by individuals, especially if within the -tribe of herdsmen the separation had been -strongly marked between the prince-like -owners of large herds and many slaves, and the -poorer common freemen. These princes -occupy more land than do the small freemen.</p> - -<p>At first, this happens quite harmlessly, and -without a trace of any consciousness of the fact -that extended possession of land will become -the means of a considerable increase of social -power and of wealth. Of this, there is at this<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_176">176</a></span> -time no question, since at this stage the common -freemen would have been powerful -enough to prevent the formation of extended -landed estates had they known that it would -eventually do them harm. But no one could -have foreseen this possibility. Lands, in the -condition in which we are observing them, have -no value. For that reason the object and the -spoils of the contest were not the possession of -<em>lands</em>, but of <em>the land and its peasants, the latter -being bound to the soil</em> (<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">glebæ adscripti</i> of -our later law) as labor substrat and labor motors, -from the conjunction of which there -grows the object of the political means, viz., -ground rent.</p> - -<p>Every one is at liberty to take as much of -<em>the uncultivated land</em> existing in masses as he -needs and will or can cultivate. It is quite as -unlikely that any one would care to measure -off for another parts of an apparently limitless -supply, as that any one would apportion the -supply of atmospheric air.</p> - -<p>The princes of the noble clans, probably -from the start, pursuant to the usage of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_177">177</a></span> -tribe of herdsmen, receive more “lands and -peasants” than do the common freemen. That -is their right as princes, because of their position -as patriarchs, war lords, and captains -maintaining their warlike suites of half-free -persons, of servants, of clients, or of refugees. -This probably amounts to a considerable difference -in the primitive amounts of land ownership. -But this is not all. The princes need a -larger surface of the “<em>land without peasants</em>” -than do the common freemen, because they -bring with them their servants and slaves. -These have, however, no standing at law, and -are incapable, according to the universal concepts -of folk law, of acquiring title to landed -property. Since, however, they must have -land in order to live, their master takes it for -them, so as to settle them thereon. In consequence -of this, the richer the prince of the nomad -tribe the more powerful the territorial -magnate becomes.</p> - -<p>But this means that wealth, and with it -social rank, is consolidated more firmly and -more durably than in the stage of herdsman<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_178">178</a></span> -ownership. For the greatest herds may be -lost, but landed property is indestructible; and -men bound to labor, bringing forth rentals, reproduce -their kind even after the most terrible -slaughter, even should they not be obtainable -full grown in slave hunts.</p> - -<p>About this fixed nucleus of wealth, property -begins to agglomerate with increasing rapidity. -Harmless as was the first occupation, men must -soon recognize the fact that rental increases -with the number of slaves one can settle on the -unoccupied lands. Henceforth, the external -policy of the feudal state is no longer directed -toward the acquisition of land and peasants, -but rather of peasants without land, to be carried -off home as serfs, and there to be colonized -anew. When the entire state carries on the -war or the robbing expedition, the nobles -obtain the lion’s share. Very often, however, -they go off on their own account, followed only -by their suites, and then the common freeman, -staying at home, receives no share in the loot. -Thus the vicious circle constantly tends rapidly -to enlarge with the increasing wealth of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_179">179</a></span> -lands owned by the nobles. The more slaves a -noble has, the more rental he can obtain. -With this, in turn, he can maintain a warlike -following, composed of servants, of lazy freemen, -and of refugees. With their help, he -can, in turn, drive in so many more slaves, to -increase his rentals.</p> - -<p>This process takes place, even where some -central power exists, which, pursuant to the -general law of the people, has the right to dispose -of uncultivated lands; while it is, in many -cases, not only by sufferance, but often by the -express sanction of that authority. As long as -the feudal magnate remains the submissive vassal -of the crown, it lies in the king’s interest to -make him as strong as possible. By this means -his military suite, to be placed at the disposal -of the crown in times of war, is correspondingly -increased. We shall adduce only one illustration -to show that the necessary consequence -in universal history is not confined to -the well-known effect in the feudal states of -Western Europe, but follows from these premises -even under totally different surroundings:<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_180">180</a></span> -“The principal service in Fiji consisted in war -duty; and if the outcome was successful it -meant new grants of lands, including therein -the denizens, as slaves, and thus led to the assumption -of new obligations.”<a id="FNanchor_91" href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">91</a></p> - -<p>This accumulation of landed property in -ever increasing quantity in the hands of the -landed nobility brings the primitive feudal -state of a higher stage to the “finished feudal -state” with a complete scale of feudal ranks.</p> - -<p>Reference to a previous work by the author, -based on a study of the sources, will show the -same causal connection for German lands;<a id="FNanchor_92" href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">92</a> -and in that publication it was pointed out that -in all the instances noted a process takes place, -identical in its principal lines of development. -It is only on this line of reasoning that one can -explain the fact, to take Japan as an example, -that its feudal system developed into the precise -details which are well known to the students -of European history, although Japan is -inhabited by a race fundamentally different -from the Arians; and besides (a strong argument -against giving too great weight to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_181">181</a></span> -materialistic view of history) the process of -agriculture is on a totally different technical -basis, since the Japanese are not cultivators -with the plow, but with the hoe.</p> - -<p>In this instance, as throughout this book, it -is not the fortune of a single people that is investigated; -it is rather the object of the author -to narrate the typical development, the universal -consequences, of the same basic traits of -mankind wherever they are placed. Presupposing -a knowledge of the two most magnificent -examples of the expanded feudal state, -Western Europe and Japan, we shall, in general, -limit ourselves to cases less well known, -and so far as possible give the preference to -material taken from ethnography, rather than -from history in its more restricted sense.</p> - -<p>The process now to be narrated is a change, -gradually consummated but fundamentally -revolutionary, of the political and social articulation -of the primitive feudal state: <em>the central -authority loses its political power to the territorial -nobility, the common freeman sinks from -his status, while the “subject” mounts</em>.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_182">182</a></span></p> - - -<h3 id="h182">(b) <span class="smcap smaller">THE CENTRAL POWER IN THE PRIMITIVE FEUDAL STATE</span></h3> - -<p>The patriarch of a tribe of herdsmen, though -endowed with the authority which flows from -his war-lordship and sacerdotal functions, generally -has no despotic powers. The same may -be said of the “king” of a small settled community, -where, generally speaking, he would -exercise very limited command. On the other -hand, as soon as some military genius manages -to fuse together numerous tribes of herdsmen -into one powerful mass of warriors, despotic -centralized power is the direct, inevitable consequence.<a id="FNanchor_93" href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">93</a> -As soon as war exists, the truth of -the Homeric</p> - -<div class="poem-container"> -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<span class="i0">οὐκ ἀγαθὴ πολυκοιρανιὴ εἶς κοίρανος ἔστω<br /></span> -<span class="i0">εἶς βασιλεύς,<a id="FNanchor_O" href="#Footnote_O" class="fnanchor">O</a><br /></span> -</div></div> -</div> - -<p class="in0">is admitted by the most unruly tribes, and becomes -a fact to be acted on. The free primitive -huntsmen render to their elected chief unconditioned -obedience, while on the war-path;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_183">183</a></span> -the free Cossacks of the Ukraine, recognizing -no authority in times of peace, submit to their -<em>hetman’s</em> power of life and death in times of -war. This obedience toward their war-lord is -a trait common to every genuine warrior -psychology.</p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_O" href="#FNanchor_O" class="fnanchor">O</a> “The rule of the many is not a good thing, over the many -there should be one king.”</p></div> - -<p>The leaders of the great migrations of nomads -are all powerful despots: Attila, Omar, -Genghis Khan, Tamerlane, Mosilikatse, -Ketchwayo. Similarly, we find that whenever -a mighty territorial state has come into being -as the result of the welding together of a number -of primitive feudal states, there existed in -the beginning a strong central authority. Examples -of this may be seen in the case of Sargon -Cyrus, Chlodowech, Charlemagne, Boleslaw -the Red. Sometimes, especially as long -as the main state has not yet reached its geographical -or sociologic bounds, the centralized -authority is maintained intact in the hands of a -series of strong monarchs, which degenerates, -in some instances, to the maddest despotism -and insanity of some of the Cæsars: especially -do we find flagrant examples of this in Mesopotamia<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_184">184</a></span> -and in Africa. We shall merely -touch on this phase: the more so, as it has little -general effect on the final development of the -forms of government. This point should, -however, be stated, that the development of the -form of government of a despotism depends -in the main, on what the <em>sacerdotal</em> status of -the rulers may be, in addition to their position -as war-lords, and whether or not they hold the -monopoly of trade as an additional regalian -right.</p> - -<p>The combination of Cæsar and Pope tends -in all cases to develop the extreme forms of despotism; -while the partition of spiritual and -temporal functions brings it about that their -exponents mutually check and counterbalance -one another. A characteristic example may -be found in the conditions prevailing among -the Malay states of the East Indian Archipelago, -genuine “maritime states,” whose genesis -is an exact counterpart of that of the Greek -maritime states. Generally speaking, the -prince has just as little power among these, as, -shall we say, the king at the opening of the history<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_185">185</a></span> -of the Attic states. The chieftains of the -clans (in Sulu the Dato, in Achin the Panglima), -as in the case of Athens, have the real -power. But where, “as in Tobah, religious -motives endow the rulers with the position of -a Pope in miniature, an entirely different -phase is found. The Panglima then depend -entirely on the Rajah, and are merely officials.”<a id="FNanchor_94" href="#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">94</a> -To refer to a well-known fact, -when the aristocrats and chiefs of the clans in -Athens and in Rome abolished the kingdom, -they preserved at least the old <em>title</em>, and -granted its use to a dignitary otherwise politically -impotent, in order that the gods might -have their offerings presented in the accustomed -manner. For the same reason, in many -cases, the descendant of the former tribal king -is preserved as a dignitary, otherwise totally -powerless, while the actual power of government -has long since been transferred to some -war chief; as in the later Merovingian Empire, -the Carolingian Mayors of the palace (Majordomus) -ruled alongside a “long locked king,” -<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">rex crinitus</i>, of the race of Merowech, so, in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_186">186</a></span> -Japan, the Shogun ruled beside the Mikado, -and in the Empire of the Incas, the commander -of the Inca beside the Huillcauma, who had -been gradually limited to his sacerdotal functions.<a id="FNanchor_P" href="#Footnote_P" class="fnanchor">P</a><a id="FNanchor_95" href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">95</a></p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_P" href="#FNanchor_P" class="fnanchor">P</a> In Egypt we find a similar state of affairs, beside the -bigoted Amenhotep IV., the Majordomus of the palace -Haremheb, who “managed to unite in his hands the highest -military and administrative functions of the empire, until he -exercised the powers of a regent of the state.” Schneider, -<cite>Civilization and Thought of the Ancient Egyptians</cite>. Leipzig, -1907, page 22.</p></div> - -<p>In addition to the office of supreme pontiff, -the power of the head of the state is frequently -increased enormously by the trading monopoly, -a function exercised by the primitive -chieftains as a natural consequence of the -peaceful barter of guest-gifts. Such a trade -monopoly, for example, was exercised by King -Solomon; and latterly by the Roman Emperor -Friedrich II.<a id="FNanchor_Q" href="#Footnote_Q" class="fnanchor">Q</a><a id="FNanchor_96" href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">96</a></p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_Q" href="#FNanchor_Q" class="fnanchor">Q</a> Cf. <cite>Acta Imperii</cite>, or <cite>Huillard-Breholles, H. D. -Fred. II.</cite>—<i>Translator.</i></p></div> - -<p>As a rule, the negro chieftains are “monopolists -of trading”;<a id="FNanchor_97" href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">97</a> as is the King of Sulu.<a id="FNanchor_98" href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">98</a> -Among the Galla, wherever the supremacy of -a head chief is acknowledged, he becomes “as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_187">187</a></span> -a matter of course, the tradesman for his tribe; -since none of his subjects is allowed to trade -with strangers directly.”<a id="FNanchor_99" href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">99</a> Among the Barotse -and Mabunda, the king is “according to -the strict interpretation of the law, the only -trader of his country.”<a id="FNanchor_100" href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">100</a></p> - -<p>Ratzel notes, in telling language, the importance -of this factor: “In addition to his -witchcraft, the chief increases his power by a -<em>monopoly of trading</em>. Since the chief is the -sole intermediary in trade, everything desired -by his subjects passes through his hands, and -he becomes the donor of all longed-for gifts, -the fulfiller of the fondest wishes. In such a -system, there lie certainly the possibilities of -great power.”<a id="FNanchor_101" href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">101</a> If, in conquered districts, -where the power of government is apt to be -more tensely exercised, there is added the monopoly -of trade, the royal power may become -very great.</p> - -<p>It may be stated as a general rule, that even -in the apparently most extreme cases of <em>despotism</em>, -no monarchical <em>absolutism</em> exists. The -ruler may, undeterred by fear of punishment,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_188">188</a></span> -rage against his subject class; but he is checked -in no small degree by his feudal followers. -Ratzel, in speaking of the subject generally, -remarks: “The so-called ‘court assemblage’ -of African or of ancient American chiefs is -probably always a council.... Although we -meet with traces of absolutism with all peoples -on a low scale, even where the form of government -is republican, the cause of absolutism is -not in the strength of either the state or of the -chieftain, but in the moral weakness of the individual, -who succumbs without any effective -resistance to the powers wielded over him.”<a id="FNanchor_102" href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">102</a> -The kingdom of the Zulu is a limited despotism, -in which very powerful ministers of state -(Induna) share the power; with other Caffir -tribes it is a council, sometimes dominating -both people and chieftains.<a id="FNanchor_103" href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">103</a> In spite of this -control “under Tshaka every sneezing or -hawking in the presence of the tyrant, as well -as every lack of tears at the death of some royal -kinsman, was punished with death.”<a id="FNanchor_104" href="#Footnote_104" class="fnanchor">104</a> The -same limitation applies to the West African -kingdoms of Dahomy and Ashanti, notorious<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_189">189</a></span> -because of their frightful barbarities. “In -spite of the waste of human life, in war, slave -trade, and human sacrifices, there existed at no -place absolute despotism.... Bowditch remarks -on the similarity of the system prevailing -in Ashanti, with its ranks and orders, with -the old Persian system as described by Herodotus.”<a id="FNanchor_105" href="#Footnote_105" class="fnanchor">105</a></p> - -<p>One must be very careful, and this may -again be insisted upon, not to confuse despotism -with absolutism. Even in the feudal states -of Western Europe, the rulers exercised, in -many cases, power of life and death, free from -the trammels of law; but nevertheless such a -ruler was impotent as against his “magnates.” -So long as he does not interfere with the privileges -of the classes, he need not restrain his -cruelty, and he may even occasionally sacrifice -one of the great men; but woe to him were he -to dare to touch the economic privileges of his -magnates. It is possible to study this very -characteristic phase, completely free, from the -standpoint of law, and yet closely hemmed in -by political checks, in the great East African<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_190">190</a></span> -empires: “The government of Waganda and -Wanyoro is, in theory, based on the rule of the -king over the whole territory; but in reality this -is only the semblance of government, since, as a -matter of fact, the lands belong to the supreme -chieftains of the empire. It was they who represented -the popular opposition to foreign influences, -in the time of Mtesa; and Muanga -did not dare, for fear of them, to carry out any -innovations. Although the kingship is limited -in reality, yet in form it occupies an imposing -position in unessentials. The ruler is absolute -master over the lives and limbs of his subjects, -the mass of the people, and feels himself restrained -only in the narrowest circle of the -chief courtiers.”<a id="FNanchor_106" href="#Footnote_106" class="fnanchor">106</a></p> - -<p>Precisely the same statement applies to the -inhabitants of Oceania, to mention the last of -the great societies that created states: “At no -place does one find an entire absence of a representative -mediation between prince and people.... -The aristocratic principle corrects -the patriarchal. Therefore, the extremes of -<em>despotism</em> depend more on class and caste<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_191">191</a></span> -pressure than on the overpowering will of any -individual.”<a id="FNanchor_107" href="#Footnote_107" class="fnanchor">107</a></p> - - -<h3 id="h191">(c) <span class="smcap smaller">THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DISINTEGRATION OF THE PRIMITIVE FEUDAL STATE</span></h3> - -<p>Space forbids our detailing the innumerable -shadings under which the patriarchal-aristocratic -(in some cases plutocratic) mixture of -form of government in the primitive feudal -state is shown in either an ethnographic, historical -or juristic survey. This is likewise of -the greatest importance for the subsequent development.</p> - -<p>It is indifferent how much power the ruler -may have had at the beginning, an inevitable -fate breaks down his power in a short while; -and does this, one may say, the faster, the -greater that power was, i. e., the larger the -territory of the primitive feudal state of higher -grade.</p> - -<p>Taking into account the process already set -forth, which, through the occupation and settlement -of unused lands by means of newly -acquired slaves, made for the increase of power<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_192">192</a></span> -of the separate nobles, a result came about -which might prove uncomfortable for the central -power. Mommsen in speaking of the -Celts says: “When in a clan numbering about -eighty thousand armed men, a single chieftain -could appear at convocation with ten thousand -followers, exclusive of his serfs and debtors, it -becomes clear that such a noble was rather an -independent prince than a mere citizen of his -clan.”<a id="FNanchor_108" href="#Footnote_108" class="fnanchor">108</a> And the same may apply to the -“Heiu” of the Somali, where a great landed -proprietor maintained hundreds of families in -dependence on his lands, “so that conditions -in Somaliland tend to recall those existing -in mediæval Europe during feudal times.”<a id="FNanchor_109" href="#Footnote_109" class="fnanchor">109</a></p> - -<p>Although such a preponderance of isolated -territorial magnates can come about in the feudal -state of low development, it nevertheless -reaches its culmination in the feudal state of -higher grade, the great feudal state; this happens -by reason of the increased power given -to the landlords by the bestowal of <em>public official -functions</em>.</p> - -<p>The more the state expands, the more must<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_193">193</a></span> -official power be delegated by the central government -to its representatives on the borders -and marches, who are constantly threatened by -wars and insurrectionary outbreaks. In order -to preserve his bailiwick in safety for the state, -such an official must be endowed with supreme -military powers, joined with the functions of -the highest administrative officials. Even -should he not require a large number of civil -employees, he still must have a permanent military -force. And how is he to pay these men? -With one possible exception, to be noted hereafter, -there are no taxes which flow into the -treasury of the central government and then -are poured back again over the land, since -these presuppose an economic development -existing only where money is employed. But -in communities having a system of payments -in kind, such as these “territorial states” all are, -there are no taxes payable in money. For that -reason, the central government has no alternative -but to turn over to the counts, or border -wardens, or satraps, the income of its territorial -jurisdiction. Such an official, then, receives<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_194">194</a></span> -the dues of the subjects, determines -when and where forced labor is to be rendered, -receives the deodands, fees and penalties payable -in cattle, etc.; and in consideration of these -must maintain the armed force, place definite -numbers of armed men at the disposal of the -central government, build and maintain highways -and bridges, feed and stable the ruler and -his following, or his “royal messengers,” and -finally, furnish a definite “Sergeantry” consisting -of highly valuable goods, easily transported -to the court, such as horses, cattle, slaves, precious -metals, wines, etc.</p> - -<p>In other words, he receives an immensely -large fief for his services. If previously he -was not, he now becomes the greatest man in -his country, though before he probably was the -most powerful landlord in his official district. -He will hereafter do exactly what his equals -in rank are doing, although they may not have -his official position; that is to say, he will, only -on a larger scale, continue to settle new lands -with ever newly recruited serfs. By this he -increases his military strength; and this must<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_195">195</a></span> -be wished for and aided by the central government. -For it is the fate of these states, that -they must fatten those very local powers, that -are to engulf them.</p> - -<p>Conditions arise which enable the warden -of the marches to impose the terms of his military -assistance, especially in the inevitable -feuds which arise over the right of succession -to the central government. Thereby he obtains -further valuable concessions, especially -the formal acknowledgment of the heritability -of his official fief, so that office and lands come -to be held by an identical tenure. By this -means, he gradually becomes almost independent -of the central authority, and the complaint -of the Russian peasant, “The sky is high up -and the Tsar is far off,” tends to become of universal -application. Take this characteristic example -from Africa: “The empire of Lunda is -an absolute feudal state. The chieftains (Muata, -Mona, Muene) are permitted independent -action in all internal affairs, so long as it -pleases the Muata Jamvo. Usually, the great -chieftains, living afar, send their caravans with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_196">196</a></span> -their tribute once a year to the Mussumba; but -<em>those living at too great a distance, sometimes -for long periods omit making any payments of -their tribute</em>; while similar chiefs in the neighborhood -of the capital forward tribute many -times a year.”<a id="FNanchor_110" href="#Footnote_110" class="fnanchor">110</a></p> - -<p>Nothing can show more plainly than this report, -how, because of inadequate means of -transportation, extent of distance becomes politically -effective in these states loosely held -together and in a state of payment in kind. -One is tempted to say that the independence -of the feudal masters grows in proportion to -the square of their distance from the seat of the -central authority. The crown must pay more -and more for their services, and must gradually -confirm them in all the sovereign powers of the -state, or else permit their usurpation of these -powers after they have seized them one after -the other. Such are heritability of fiefs, tolls -on highways and commerce, (in a later stage -the right of coinage), high and low justice, the -right to exact for private gain the public -duties of repair of ways and bridges (the old<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_197">197</a></span> -English <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">trinodis necessitas</i>) and the disposal -of the military services of the freemen of the -country.</p> - -<p>By these means, the powerful frontier -wardens gradually attain an ever greater, and -finally a complete, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">de facto</i> independence, even -though the <em>formal</em> bond of feudal suzerainty -may for a long time apparently keep together -the newly developed principalities. The -reader, of course, recalls instances of these typical -transitions; all mediæval history is one -chain of them; not only the Merovingian and -Carolingian Empires, not only Germany, but -also France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Bohemia, -Hungary, as well as Japan and China,<a id="FNanchor_111" href="#Footnote_111" class="fnanchor">111</a> have -passed through this process of decomposition, -not only once, but repeatedly. And this is no -less true of the feudal states of Mesopotamia: -great empires follow each other, acquire power, -burst asunder time after time, and again are -re-united. In the case of Persia, we are expressly -told: “Separate states and provinces, -by a successful revolt, obtained freedom for a -longer or shorter time, and the ‘great king’<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_198">198</a></span> -at Susa did not always have the power to -force them to return to their obedience; in -other states, the satraps or warlike chieftains -ruled arbitrarily, carrying on the government -faithlessly and violently, either as independent -rulers or tributary under-kings of the king of -kings. The Persian world-empire went to its -disintegration an agglomeration of states and -lands, without any general law, without ordered -administration, without uniform judicial -system, without order and enforcement of law, -and without possibility of help.”<a id="FNanchor_112" href="#Footnote_112" class="fnanchor">112</a></p> - -<p>A similar fate overtook its neighbor in the -valley of the Nile: “Princes spring from -the families of the usurpers, free landlords, who -pay land-taxes to nobody but to the king, and -rule over certain strips of land, or districts. -These district princes govern a territory specifically -set apart as pertaining to their official -position, and separate from their family possessions.</p> - -<p>“Later successful warlike operations, perhaps -filling in the gap between the Ancient and -the Middle (Egyptian) Empire, <em>together with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_199">199</a></span> -the gathering in of captives of the wars, who -could be utilized as labor motors</em>, brought a -more stringent exploitation of the subjects, a -definite determination of the tributes. During -the Middle Empire, the power of the -princes of the clans rose to an enormous height, -they maintained great courts, imitating the -splendor of the royal establishment.”<a id="FNanchor_113" href="#Footnote_113" class="fnanchor">113</a> -“With the decline of the royal authority during -a period of decay, the higher officials use -their power for personal aims, in order to make -their offices hereditary within their families.”<a id="FNanchor_R" href="#Footnote_R" class="fnanchor">R</a><a id="FNanchor_114" href="#Footnote_114" class="fnanchor">114</a></p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_R" href="#FNanchor_R" class="fnanchor">R</a> Maspero says, <cite>New Light on Ancient Egypt</cite>, pp. 218–9: -“Until then, in fact, the high priest had been chosen and nominated -by the king; from the time of Rameses III. he was always -chosen from the same family, and the son succeeded his -father on the pontifical throne. From that time events marched -quickly. The Theban mortmain was doubled with a veritable -seigniorial fief, which its masters increased by marriages with -the heirs of neighboring fiefs, by continual bequests from one -branch of the family to the other, and by <em>the placing of cadets -of each generation at the head of the clergy of certain secondary -towns</em>. The official protocol of the offices filled by their -wives shows that a century or a century and a half after -Rameses III., almost the whole of the Thebaid, about a third -of the Egyptian territory was in the hands of the High Priest -of Ammon and of his family.”—<i>Translator’s Note (and italics).</i></p></div> - -<p>But the operation of this historical law is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_200">200</a></span> -not restricted to the “historical” peoples. In -speaking of the feudal states of India, Ratzel -states: “Even beyond Radshistan, the nobles -often enjoyed a great measure of independence, -so that even in Haiderabad, after the -Nizam had acquired the sole rule over the -country, the Umara or Nabobs maintained -troops of their own, independently of the army -of the Nizam. These smaller feudatories did -not comply with the increased demands of -modern times as regards the administration of -Indian states as often as did the greater -princes.”<a id="FNanchor_115" href="#Footnote_115" class="fnanchor">115</a></p> - -<p>In Africa finally, great feudal states come -and pass away, as do bubbles arising and bursting -from the stream of eternally similar -phenomena. The powerful Ashanti empire, -within one and a half centuries, has shriveled -to less than one-fifth of its territory;<a id="FNanchor_116" href="#Footnote_116" class="fnanchor">116</a> and -many of the empires that the Portuguese encountered -have since disappeared without -leaving a trace of their existence. And yet -these were strong feudal powers: “Stately -and cruel negro empires, such as Benin,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_201">201</a></span> -Dahomy or Ashanti, resemble in many respects -ancient Peru or Mexico, having in their -vicinity politically disorganized tribes. The -hereditary nobility of the Mfumus, sharply -separated from the rest of the state, had mainly -the administration of the districts, and together -with the more transitory nobility of -service, formed in Loango strong pillars of -the ruler and his house.”<a id="FNanchor_117" href="#Footnote_117" class="fnanchor">117</a></p> - -<p>But whenever such a state, once powerful, -has split into a number of territorial states -either <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">de facto</i> or juristically independent, the -former process begins anew. The great state -gobbles up the smaller ones, until a new empire -has arisen. “The greatest territorial -magnates later become emperors,” says Meitzen -laconically of Germany.<a id="FNanchor_118" href="#Footnote_118" class="fnanchor">118</a> But even this -great demesne vanishes, split up by the need -of equipping warlike vassals with fiefs. “The -Kings soon found that they had donated -away all their belongings; their great territorial -possessions in the Delta had melted away,” -says Schneider (l. c. page 38) of the Pharaohs -of the sixth dynasty. The same causes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_202">202</a></span> -brought about like effects in the Frankish Empire -among both Merovingians and Carolingians; -and later in Germany in the case of the -Saxon and Hohenstaufen Emperors.<a id="FNanchor_119" href="#Footnote_119" class="fnanchor">119</a> Additional -references are unnecessary, as every -one is familiar with these instances.</p> - -<p>In a subsequent part of this treatise, we -shall examine into the causes that finally -liberated the primitive feudal state from this -witch’s curse, this circling from agglomeration -to disintegration without end. Our present -task is to take up the <em>social</em> side of the process, -as we have already taken up the historical -phase of it. It changes the articulation of -classes in the most decisive manner.</p> - -<p>The common freemen, the lower strata of -the dominating group, are struck with overpowering -force. They sink into bondsmenship. -Their decay must go along with that of -the central power; since both, allied one might -say, by nature, are menaced simultaneously -by the expanding power of the great territorial -lords. The crown controls the landed magnate -so long as the levy of the common freemen<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_203">203</a></span> -of the district is a superior force to his -guards, to his “following.” But a fatal need, -already set forth, impels the crown to deliver -over the peasants to the landed lordling, and -from the moment when the county levy has -become weaker than his guards, the free peasants -are lost. Where the sovereign powers of -the state are delegated to the territorial magnate, -i. e., where he has developed more or less -into an independent lord of the region, the overthrow -of the liberties of the peasants is carried -out, at least in part, under the color of law, -by forcing excessive military services, which -ruin the peasants, and which are required the -more often as the dynastic interests of the -territorial lord require new lands and new -peasants, or by abusing the right to compulsory -labor, or by turning the administration of public -justice into military oppression.</p> - -<p>The common freemen, however, receive the -final blow either by the formal delegation or by -the usurpation of the most important powers -of the crown, the disposition of unoccupied -lands or “commons.” Originally, this land belonged<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_204">204</a></span> -to all the “folk” in common; i. e., to the -freemen for common use; but in accordance -with an original custom, probably universal, -the patriarch enjoys disposal of it. This right -of disposition passes to the territorial -magnate with the remaining royal privileges—and -thus he has obtained the power -to strangle any few remaining freemen. He -now declares all unoccupied lands his property, -<em>and forbids their settlement by free peasants</em>, -while those only are permitted access who -recognize his superior lordship; i. e., who have -commended themselves to him, or are his serfs.</p> - -<p>That is the last nail in the coffin of the common -freemen. Heretofore their equality of -possessions has been in some way guaranteed. -Even if a peasant had twelve sons, his patrimony -was not split up, because eleven of them -broke new hides of land in the commons of -the community, or else in the general land not -yet distributed to other villages. That is -henceforth impossible; hides tend to divide -where large families grow up, others are -united when heir and heiress marry: henceforth<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_205">205</a></span> -there come into existence “laborers,” recruited -from the owners of half, a quarter, or -even an eighth of a hide who help work a larger -area. Thus the free peasantry splits into rich -and poor; this begins to loosen the bond which -hitherto had made the bundle of arrows unbreakable. -When, therefore, some comrade is -overwhelmed by the exactions of the lord and -has become his liegeman, or if bond peasants -are settled among the original owners, either -to occupy some hide vacated by the extinction -of the family or fallen into the hands of the -lord because of the indebtedness of its occupant, -then every social cohesion is loosened; -and the peasantry, split apart by class and by -economic contrasts, is handed over without -power of resistance to the magnate.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the result is the same -where the magnate has no usurped regalian -powers of the state. In such cases, open -force and shameless violation of rights accomplish -the same ends. The ruler, far off -and impotent, bound to rely on the good will -and help of the violators of law and order, has<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_206">206</a></span> -neither the power nor the opportunity of interference.</p> - -<p>There is hardly any need of adducing instances. -The free peasantry of Germany were -put through the process of expropriation and -declassification at least three times. Once it -happened in Celtic times.<a id="FNanchor_120" href="#Footnote_120" class="fnanchor">120</a> The second overthrow -of the free peasants of the old German -Empire took place in the ninth and tenth -centuries. The third tragedy of the same form -began with the fifteenth century, in the countries -formerly Slavic, which they had conquered -and colonized.<a id="FNanchor_121" href="#Footnote_121" class="fnanchor">121</a> The peasants fared worse -in those lands, in the “republics of nobles,” -where there was no monarchical central authority, -whose community of interests with -their subjects tended to deprive oppression of -its worse features. The Celts in the Gaul of -Cæsar’s time are one of the earliest examples. -Here “the great families exercised an economic, -military and political preponderance. -They monopolized the leases of the lucrative -rights of the state. They forced the common -freemen, overwhelmed by the taxes which they<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_207">207</a></span> -had themselves imposed, to borrow of them, and -then, first as their debtors, afterward legally -as their serfs, to surrender their liberty. For -their own advantage they developed the system -of followers: i. e., the privilege of the nobility -to have about them a mass of armed servants -in their pay, called <i>ambacti</i>, with whose -aid they formed a state within a state. Relying -on these, their own men-at-arms, they defied -the lawful authorities and the levies of the -freemen, and thus were able to burst asunder -the commonwealth.... The only protection -to be found was in the relation of serfdom, -where personal duty and interest required the -lord to protect his clients and to avenge any -wrong to his men. Since the state no longer -had the power to protect the freemen, these in -growing numbers became the vassals of some -powerful noble.”<a id="FNanchor_122" href="#Footnote_122" class="fnanchor">122</a> We find these identical -conditions fifteen hundred years later in Kurland, -Livonia, in Swedish Pomerania, in Eastern -Holstein, in Mecklenburg, and especially -in Poland. In the German territories the -petty nobles subjugated their peasantry, while<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_208">208</a></span> -in Poland their prey was the formerly free and -noble Schlachziz. “Universal history is monotonous,” -says Ratzel. The same procedure -overthrew the peasantry of ancient Egypt: -“After a warlike <i>intermezzo</i>, there follows a -period in the history of the Middle Empire, -which brings about a deterioration of the position -of the peasantry in Lower Egypt. The -number of landlords decreases, while their territorial -growth and power increases. The -tribute of the peasants is hereafter determined -by an exact assessment on their estates, and -definitely fixed by a sort of Doomsday Book. -Because of this pressure, many peasants soon -enter the lord’s court or the cities of the local -rulers, and take employment there either as -servants, mechanics, or even as overseers in the -economic organization of these manors or -courts. In common with any available captives, -they contribute to the extension of the -prince’s estates, and to further the general expulsion -of the peasantry from their holdings.”[128]</p> - -<p>The example of the Roman Empire shows,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_209">209</a></span> -as nothing else can, how inevitable this process -becomes. When we first meet Rome in history -the conception of serfdom or bondage has already -been forgotten. When the “modern -period” of Rome opens, only slavery is known. -And yet, within fifteen centuries, the free -peasantry again sink into economic dependence, -after Rome has become an overextended, -unwieldy empire, whose border districts have -more and more dissolved from the central control. -The great landed proprietors, having -been endowed with the lower justice and police -administration on their own estates have “reduced -their servants, who may originally have -been free proprietors of the ‘<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ager privatus -vectigalis</i>’ to a state of servitude, and have -thus developed a sort of actual <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">glebæ adscriptus</i>, -within the boundaries of their ‘immunities.’”<a id="FNanchor_124" href="#Footnote_124" class="fnanchor">124</a> -The invading Germans found this -feudal order worked out in Gaul and the other -provinces. At this particular time, the immense -difference formerly existing between -slaves and free settlers (<em>coloni</em>) had been completely -obliterated, first in their economic position,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_210">210</a></span> -and then, naturally, in their constitutional -rights.</p> - -<p>Wherever the common freemen sink into -political and economic dependence on the great -territorial magnates, when, in other words, -they become bound either to the court or to -the lands, the social group formerly subject -to them tend in a corresponding measure to -improve their status. Both layers tend to -meet half-way, to approximate their position, -and finally to amalgamate. The observations -just made concerning the free settlers and the -agricultural slaves of the later Roman Empire -hold true everywhere. Thus in Germany, -freemen and serfs together formed, when -fused, the economic and legally unital -group of <em>Grundholde</em>, or men bound to the -soil.<a id="FNanchor_125" href="#Footnote_125" class="fnanchor">125</a></p> - -<p>The elevation of the former “subjects,” -hereafter for the sake of brevity to be called -“plebs,” flows from the same source as the debasement -of the freeman, and arises by the -same necessity from the very foundations on -which these states are themselves erected, viz.,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_211">211</a></span> -the agglomeration of the landed property in -ever fewer hands.</p> - -<p>The plebs are the natural opponents of the -central government—since that is their conqueror -and tax imposer; while they naturally -oppose the common freemen, who despise them -and oppress them politically, besides crowding -them back economically. The great magnate -also is the natural opponent of the central government—an -impediment in his path toward -complete independence, and he is at the same -time also a natural enemy of the common freemen, -who in turn not only support the central -government; but also block with their possessions -his path toward territorial dominion, -while with their claims to equality of political -rights they annoy his princely pride. Since -the political and social interests of the territorial -princes and of the plebs coincide, they -must become allies; the prince can attain complete -independence only if, in his fight for -power against the crown and the common freemen, -he controls reliable warriors and acquiescent -taxpayers; the plebs can only then be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_212">212</a></span> -freed from their pariah-like declassification, -both economically and socially, if the hated -and proud common freemen are brought down -to their level.</p> - -<p>This is the second time that we have noted -the identity of interest between the princes and -their subjects. The first time we found a -weakly developed solidarity in our second stage -of state formation. This causes the semi-sovereign -prince to treat his dependent tenants as -kindly as he ill-treats the free peasants of his -territory; in consequence, they will fight the -more willingly for him and contribute taxes, -while the more readily will the oppressed freemen -succumb to the pressure, especially as their -share of political power in the state, coincident -with the decline of the central power, has become -only a meaningless phrase. In some -cases, as in Germany toward the end of the -tenth century, this was done with full consciousness -of its effects<a id="FNanchor_126" href="#Footnote_126" class="fnanchor">126</a>—some prince exercises -a particularly “mild” rule, in order to -draw the subjects of a neighboring potentate -into his lands, and thus to increase his own<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_213">213</a></span> -strength in war and taxation, and to weaken -his opponent’s. The plebs come to possess, -both legally and actually, constantly increasing -rights, enlarged privileges of the law of -ownership, perhaps self-government in common -affairs, and their own administration of -justice; thus they rise in the same degree -as the common freemen sink, until the two -classes meet and they are amalgamated into -one body on approximately the same jural -and economic plane. Half serfs, half subjects -of a state, they represent a characteristic formation -of the feudal state, which does not as -yet recognize any clear distinction between -public and private law; in its turn an immediate -consequence of its own historical genesis, -<em>the dominion in the form of a state for the sake -of economic private rights</em>.</p> - - -<h3 id="h213">(d) <span class="smcap smaller">THE ETHNIC AMALGAMATION</span></h3> - -<p>The juristic and social amalgamation of the -degraded freemen and the uplifted plebs -henceforth inevitably tends toward ethnic interpenetration. -While at first the subject<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_214">214</a></span> -peoples were not allowed either to intermarry -or to have social intercourse with the freemen, -now no such obstacles can be maintained; in -any single village the social class is no longer -determined by descent from the ruling race, -but rather by wealth. And the case may frequently -arise where the pure-blooded descendant -of the warrior herdsman must earn his living -as a field hand in the hire of the equally -pure-blooded descendant of the former serfs. -The social group of the subjects is now composed -of a part of the former ethnic master -group and a part of the former subject group.</p> - -<p>We say from a part only, because the other -part has by this time been amalgamated with -the other part of the old ethnic master group -into a unital social class. In other words, a -part of the plebs has not only attained the position -to which the mass of the common freemen -have sunk, but has climbed far beyond it, in -that it has been completely received into the -dominating group, which in the meantime, has -not only risen enormously, but has been as -greatly diminished in numbers.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_215">215</a></span></p> - -<p>And that, too, is a universal process found -in all history; because everywhere it follows -with equally compelling force from the very -premises of feudal dominion. The <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">primus -inter pares</i>, whether the holder of the central -power or some local potentate, taking the rank -of a prince, requires more supple tools for his -dominion than are to be found among his -“peers.” The latter represent a class whom -he must put down if he wants to rise—and that -is and must be the aim of every one, since in -this stage aiming for power is identical with -the aim of self-preservation. In this effort he -is opposed by his obnoxious and stiff-necked -cousins and by his petty nobles—and for this -reason, we find at every court, from that of the -sovereign king of a mighty feudal empire down -to the lord of what is hardly more than a big -estate, men of insignificant descent as confidential -officials alongside representatives of -the master group, who in many cases under -the mask of officials of the prince, as a matter -of fact, are “ephors,” sharers of the power of -the prince as the plenipotentiaries of their<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_216">216</a></span> -group. Let us but recall the Induna at the -court of the Bantu kings. There is no wonder, -then, that the prince rather places confidence -in his own men than in these annoying -and pretentious advisers, in men whose position -is indissolubly bound up with his own, and -who would be ruined by his fall.<a id="FNanchor_S" href="#Footnote_S" class="fnanchor">S</a></p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_S" href="#FNanchor_S" class="fnanchor">S</a> One of the most notable instances may be found in the -case of Markward of Annweiler, Marquis of Ancona and Duke -of Ravenna, seneschal of Henry VI., who after the death -of the Emperor Henry VI. disputed the power of the Regent -Constance acting for her son, Frederick II. (See Boehmer-Ficker, -<cite>Regesta Imperii</cite>, V, vol. 1, No. 511. v. ad. annum -1197.)—<i>Translator.</i></p></div> - -<p>Here, too, historical references are nearly -superfluous. Every one is familiar with the -fact that at the courts of the Western European -feudal kingdoms, besides the relatives of -the king and some noble vassals, there were -also elements from the lower groups, occupying -high positions, clerics and great warriors -of the plebeian class. Among the immediate -following of Charlemagne all the races and -peoples of his empire were represented. Also -in the tales of Theodoric the Goth in the -Dietrich Saga of the <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Niebelungen Lied</i>, this<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_217">217</a></span> -rise of brave sons of the subject races finds -its reflection. In addition to these, there follow -some less well-known instances.</p> - -<p>In Egypt, as far back as the Old Empire, -there is found alongside the royal officials of -the feudal nobility, who are the descendants of -the Shepherd conquerors, administering their -districts as representatives of the crown, with -plenary powers as deputies, “<em>a mass of court -officials</em> trusted with determined functions of -government.” It “originated with the <em>servants</em> -employed at the courts of the princes, -<em>such as prisoners of war, refugees etc.</em>”<a id="FNanchor_127" href="#Footnote_127" class="fnanchor">127</a> -The fable of Joseph shows a state of affairs -known at that time to be a usual occurrence, of -the rise of a slave to the position of an all -powerful minister of state. At the present -day such a career is within the realm of possibility -at any oriental court, such as Persia, -Turkey, or Morocco, etc. In the case of old -Marshal Derflinger, in the time of Friedrich -Wilhelm I., the Great Elector, at a much -later date, we have an example from the transition -of the developed feudal state to a more<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_218">218</a></span> -modern form of the state, which might be multiplied -by the examples of innumerable other -brave swordsmen.</p> - -<p>Let us add a few instances from the peoples -“disregarded by history.” Ratzel tells of the -realm of Bornu: “The freemen have not lost -the consciousness of their free descent, in contrast -with the slaves of the sheik; but the rulers -place more confidence in their slaves than in -their own kinsmen and free associates of their -tribe. They can count on the devotion of the -former. Not only positions at court, but the -defense of the country was from ancient times -preferably confided to slaves. The brothers -of the prince, as well as the more ambitious or -more efficient sons, are objects of suspicion; -and while the most important places at court -are in the hands of slaves, the princes are put -at posts far from the seat of government. -Their salaries are paid from the incomes of the -offices and the taxes from the provinces.”<a id="FNanchor_128" href="#Footnote_128" class="fnanchor">128</a></p> - -<p>Among the Fulbe “society is divided into -princes, chieftains, commons and slaves. The -slaves of the king play a great rôle as soldiers<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_219">219</a></span> -and officials, and may hope for the highest -offices in the state.”<a id="FNanchor_129" href="#Footnote_129" class="fnanchor">129</a></p> - -<p>This nobility of the court’s creation may, -in certain cases, be admitted to the great imperial -offices, so that according to the method -stated above, it may achieve the sovereignty -over a territory. In the developed feudal -state, it represents the high nobility; and -usually manages to preserve its rank, even -when some more powerful neighbor has -mediatized it by incorporating the state. The -Frankish higher nobility certainly contains -such elements from the original lower group;<a id="FNanchor_130" href="#Footnote_130" class="fnanchor">130</a> -and since from its blood the entire upper -nobility of the European civilized states has -been descended at least in direct line by -marriage, we find an ethnic amalgamation, -both in the present day group of subjects and -in the highest order of the ruling class. And -the same applies to Egypt: “With the sinking -of the royal authority in the time of the -decay, the higher officials abuse their power for -personal ends, to make their offices hereditary -in their families, and thereby to call into existence<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_220">220</a></span> -an official nobility not differentiated from -the rest of the population.”<a id="FNanchor_131" href="#Footnote_131" class="fnanchor">131</a></p> - -<p>And finally, the same process, from the same -causes, takes hold of the present middle class, -the lower stratum of the master class, -the officials and officers of the great feudatories. -At first there still exists a social difference -between, on the one hand, the free vassals, -the subfeudatories of the great landlord, -kinsmen, younger sons of other noble families, -impoverished associates from the same district, -in isolated cases freeborn sons of peasants, free -refugees and professional ruffians of free -descent; and on the other, if the term may be -allowed, the subalterns of the guards of -plebeian descent. But lack of freedom advances, -while freedom sinks in social value; -and here too the ruler places more reliance on -his creatures than on his peers. Here also, -sooner or later, the process of amalgamation -becomes complete. In Germany, as late as -1085, the non-free nobility of the court ranks -between “<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">servi et litones</i>” while a century -afterward it is placed with the “<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">liberi et<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_221">221</a></span> -nobiles</i>.” In the course of the thirteenth century, -it has been completely absorbed, along -with the free vassals, into the nobility by -chivalry. The two orders in the meantime -tend to become equal economically; both -have subinfeudations, fiefs on the obligation of -service in warfare, and the service feuds of the -bondsmen; while all the fiefs of the “ministerials” -or sergeants have in the meantime become -as heritable as are those of the free vassals, as -much so as are the patrimonies of the few surviving -smaller territorial lords belonging to -the original nobility, who may still have escaped -the grasp of the great territorial principalities.</p> - -<p>In ways quite analogous to this the development -went on in all other feudal states of -Western Europe; while its exact counterpart -is found in the extremest Orient on the edge of -the Eurasian continent, in Japan. The daimio -are the higher nobility; the samurai, the -chivalry, the nobility of the sword.</p> - - -<h3 id="h221">(e) <span class="smcap smaller">THE DEVELOPED FEUDAL STATE</span></h3> - -<p>With this the feudal state has reached its -pinnacle. It forms, politically and socially, a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_222">222</a></span> -hierarchy of numerous strata; of which, in all -cases, the lower is bound to render service to -the next above it, and the superior is bound to -render protection to the one below. The -pyramid rests on the laboring population, of -whom the major part are as yet peasants; the -surplus of their labor, the ground rental, the -entire “surplus value” of the economic means -is used to support the upper strata of society. -This ground rent from the majority of estates -is turned over to the small holders of fiefs, except -where these estates are still in the immediate -possession of the prince or of the -crown and have not as yet been granted as -fiefs. The holders of them are bound in return -to provide the stipulated military service, -and also, in certain cases, to render labor of -an economic value. The larger vassal is in -turn bound to serve the great tenants of the -crown; who in their turn are, at least at strict -law, under similar obligation toward the bearer -of the central power; while emperor, king, -sultan, shah, or Pharaoh in their turn, are regarded -as the vassals of the tribal god. Thus<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_223">223</a></span> -there starts from the fields, whose peasantry -support and nourish all, and mounts up to the -“king of heaven” an artificially graded order -of ranks, which constricts so absolutely all the -life of the state, that according to custom and -law neither a bit of land nor a man can be understood -unless within its fold. Since all -rights originally created for the common freemen -have either been resumed by the state, or -else have been distorted by the victorious -princes of territories, it comes about that a person -not in some feudal relation to some superior -must in fact be “without the law,” be -without claim for protection or justice, i. e., -be outside the scope of that power which alone -affords justice. Therefore the rule, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">nulle -terre sans seigneur</i>, appearing to us at first -blush as an ebullition of feudal arrogance, is as -a matter of fact the codification of an existing -new state of law, or at the very least the clearing -away of some archaic remnants, no longer -to be tolerated, of the completely discarded -<em>primitive</em> feudal state.</p> - -<p>Those philosophers of history who pretend<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_224">224</a></span> -to explain every historic development from the -quality of “races,” give as the center of their -strategic position the alleged fact, that only -the Germans, thanks to their superior “political -capacity,” have managed to raise the artistic -edifice of the developed feudal state. -Some of the vigor of this argument has departed, -since the conviction began to dawn on -them that in Japan, the Mongol race had accomplished -this identical result. No one can -tell what the negro races might have done, had -not the irruption of stronger civilizations -barred their way, and yet Uganda does not -differ very greatly from the empires of the -Carolingians or of Boleslaw the Red, except -that men did not have in Uganda any “values -of tradition” of mediæval culture: and these -values were not any merit of the Germanic -races, but a gift wherewith fortune endowed -them.</p> - -<p>Shifting the discussion from the negro to -the “Semites,” we find the charge made that -this race has absolutely no capacity for the -formation of states. And yet we find, thousands<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_225">225</a></span> -of years ago, this same feudal system developed, -by Semites, if the founders of the -Egyptian kingdom were Semites. One would -think the following description of Thurnwald -were taken from the period of the Hohenstaufen -emperors: “Whoever entered the -following of some powerful one, was thereafter -protected by him as though he had been the -head of the family. This relation ... -betokens a fiduciary relation similar to vassalage. -This relation of protection in return -for allegiance tends to become the basis of the -organization of all Egyptian society. It is -the basis of the relations of the feudal lord to -his sergeants and peasants, as it is that of the -Pharaoh to his officials. The cohesion of the -individuals in groups subject to common protecting -lords, is founded on this view, even up -to the apex of the pyramid, to the king himself -regarded as ‘the vicar of his ancestors,’ as -the vassal of the gods on earth.... Whosoever -stands without this social grasp, a ‘man -without a master,’ is without the pale of protection -and therefore without the law.”<a id="FNanchor_133" href="#Footnote_133" class="fnanchor">133</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_226">226</a></span></p> - -<p>The hypothesis of the endowment of any -particular race has not been used by us, and -we have no need of it. As Herbert Spencer -says, it is the stupidest of all imaginable attempts -to construct a philosophy of history.</p> - -<p>The first characteristic of the developed -feudal state is the manifold gradation of -ranks built up into the one pyramid of mutual -dependence. Its second distinctive mark -is the amalgamation of the ethnic groups, -originally separated.</p> - -<p>The consciousness formerly existent of difference -of <em>races</em> has disappeared completely. -There remains only the <em>difference of classes</em>.</p> - -<p>Henceforth we shall deal only with social -classes, and no longer with ethnic groups. -The social contrast is the only ruling factor -in the life of the state. Consistently with -this the ethnic group consciousness changes to -a class consciousness, the theories of the group, -to the theories of the class. Yet they do -not thereby change in the least their essence. -The new dominating classes are just as full of -their divine right as was the former master<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_227">227</a></span> -group, and it soon is seen that the new nobility -of the sword manages to forget, quickly -and thoroughly, its descent from the vanquished -group; while the former freemen now -declassed, or the former petty nobles sunk in -the social scale, henceforth swear just as firmly -by “natural law” as did formerly only the subjected -tribes.</p> - -<p>The developed feudal state is, in its essentials, -exactly the same thing as it was when -yet in the second stage of state formation. Its -form is that of dominion, its reason for being, -the political exploitation of the economic -means, limited by public law, which compels -the master class to give the correlative protection, -and which guarantees to the lower class -the right of being protected, to the extent that -they are kept working and paying taxes, that -they may fulfil their duty to their masters. In -its essentials government has not changed, it -has only been disposed in more grades; and -the same applies to the exploitation, or as the -economic theory puts it, “the distribution” -of wealth.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_228">228</a></span></p> - -<p>Just as formerly, so now, the internal policy -of these states swings in that orbit prescribed -by the parallelogram of the centrifugal thrust -of the former group contests, now class wars, -counteracted by the centripetal pull of the -common interests. Just as formerly, so now, -its foreign policy is determined by the striving -of its master class for new lands and serfs, -a thrust for extension caused at the same time -by the still existing need of self-preservation. -Although differentiated much more minutely, -and integrated much more powerfully, the developed -feudal state is in the end nothing more -than the primitive state arrived at its maturity.</p> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_229">229</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h229" class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI<br /> - -<span class="subhead">THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE</span></h2> - - -<p>If we understand the outcome of the feudal -state, in the sense given above, as further organic -development either forward or backward -conditioned by the power of inner forces, but -not as a physical termination, brought about -or conditioned by outside forces, then we may -say that the outcome of the feudal state is determined -essentially by the independent development -of social institutions called into being -by the economic means.</p> - -<p>Such influences may come also from without, -from foreign states which, thanks to a -more advanced economic development, possess -a more tensely centralized power, a better -military organization, and a greater forward -thrust. We have touched on some of these -phases. The independent development of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_230">230</a></span> -Mediterranean feudal states was abruptly -stopped by their collision with those maritime -states, which were on a much higher plane of -economic growth and wealth, and more centralized, -such as Carthage, and more especially -Rome. The destruction of the Persian -Empire by Alexander the Great may be instanced -in this connection, since Macedonia -had at that time appropriated the economic -advances of the Hellenic maritime states. -The best example within modern times is the -foreign influence in the case of Japan, whose -development was shortened in an almost incredible -manner by the military and peaceful -impulses of Western European civilization. -In the space of barely one generation it -covered the road from a fully matured feudal -state to the completely developed modern constitutional -state.</p> - -<p>It seems to me that we have only to deal -with an abbreviation of the process of development. -As far as we can see—though henceforth -historical evidence becomes meager, and -there are scarcely any examples from ethnography—the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_231">231</a></span> -rule may be stated that forces -from within, even without strong foreign influences, -lead the matured feudal state, with -strict logical consistency, on the same path to -the identical conclusion.</p> - -<p>The creators of the economic means controlling -this advance are the cities and their -system of money economy, which gradually supersedes -the system of natural economy, and -thereby dislocates the axis about which the -whole life of the state swings; in place of -landed property, mobile capital gradually becomes -preponderant.</p> - - -<h3 id="h231">(a) <span class="smcap smaller">THE EMANCIPATION OF THE PEASANTRY</span></h3> - -<p>All this follows as a natural consequence -of the basic premise of the feudal state. The -more the great private landlords become a -landed nobility, the more in the same measure -must the feudal system of natural economy -break to pieces. The more great landed -property rights become vested in and nurtured -by the princes of territorial states, the -more is the feudal system based on payments<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_232">232</a></span> -in kind bound to disintegrate; one may say -that the two keep step in this development.</p> - -<p>So long as the ownership of great estates is -comparatively limited, the primitive principle -of the bee-keeper, allowing his peasants barely -enough for subsistence, can be carried out. -When, however, these expand into territorial -dimensions, and include, as is regularly the -case, accretions of land which are the results of -successful warfare, or by the relinquishment -and subinfeudation through heritage or political -marriages of smaller land owners, scattered -widely about the country and far from the -master’s original domains, then the policy of -the bee-keeper can no longer be carried out. -Unless, therefore, the territorial magnate -means to keep in his pay an immense mass of -overseers, which would be both expensive and -politically unwise, he would have to impose -on his peasants some fixed tribute, partly -rental and partly tax. The economic need of -an administrative reform unites, therefore, -with the political necessity, to elevate the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_233">233</a></span> -“plebs,” in the way which has already been -discussed.</p> - -<p>The more the territorial magnate ceases to -be a private landlord, the more exclusively he -tends to become a subject of public law, viz., -prince of a territory, the more the solidarity -mentioned above, between prince and people -grows. We saw that some few magnates -even as far back as the period of transition -from great landed estates to principalities, -found it to their greatest interest to carry on -a “mild” government. This accomplished the -result, not only of educating their plebs to a -more virile consciousness toward the state, but -also had the effect of making it easy for the -few remaining common freemen to give up -their political rights in return for protection; -while it was still more important, in that it deprived -their neighbors and rivals of their precious -human material. When the territorial -prince has finally reached complete <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">de facto</i> -independence, his self interest must prompt -him steadfastly to persevere in the path thus -begun. Should he, however, again invest his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_234">234</a></span> -bailiffs or officers with lands and peasants, he -will still have the most pressing political interest -to see to it that his subjects are not delivered -over to them without restraint. In order -to retain his control, the prince will limit -the right of the “knights” to incomes from -lands to definite payments in kind and limited -forced labor, reserving to himself that required -in the public interests, such as forced labor on -highways or on bridges. We shall soon come -to see that the circumstance that in all developed -feudal states the peasants have at least -two masters claiming service, is decisive for -their later rise.</p> - -<p>For all these reasons, the services to be required -of peasants in a developed feudal state -must in some fashion be limited. Henceforth, -all surplus belongs to him free from the control -of the landlord. With this change, the -character of landed property has been utterly -revolutionized. Heretofore the landlord, as -of right, was entitled to the entire revenue saving -only what was absolutely necessary to permit -his peasants to subsist and continue their<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_235">235</a></span> -brood; while hereafter, the total product of -his work, as of right, belongs to the peasant, -saving only a fixed charge for his landlord as -ground rent. The possession of vast landed -estates has developed into (<em>manorial</em>) <em>rights. -This completes the second important step -taken by humanity toward its goal.</em> The -first step was taken when man made the -transition from the stage of bear to that of -the bee-keeper, and thereby discovered slavery; -this step abolishes slavery. Laboring humanity, -heretofore only <em>an object</em> of the law, now -for the first time becomes an entity capable -of enjoying rights. The <em>labor motor</em>, without -rights, belonging to its master, and without -effective guarantees of life and limb, has -now become the taxpaying subject of some -prince. Henceforth the economic means, now -for the first time assured of its success, -develops its forces quite differently. The -peasant works with incomparably more industry -and care, obtains more than he needs, -and thereby calls into being the “city” in the -economic sense of the term, viz., the industrial<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_236">236</a></span> -city. The surplus produced by the peasantry -calls into being a demand for objects not produced -in the peasant economy; while at the -same time, the more intensive agriculture -brings about a reduction of those industrial -by-products heretofore worked out by the -peasant house industry.</p> - -<p>Since agriculture and cattle-raising absorb -in ever increasing degrees the energies of the -rural family, it becomes possible and necessary -to divide labor between original production -and manufacture; the village tends to become -primarily the place of the former, the -industrial city comes into being as the seat of -the latter.</p> - - -<h3 id="h236">(b) <span class="smcap smaller">THE GENESIS OF THE INDUSTRIAL STATE</span></h3> - -<p>Let there be no misunderstanding: we do -not maintain that the city comes thus into being, -but only the <em>industrial city</em>. There has -been in existence the real historical city, to be -found in every developed feudal state. Such -cities came into being either because of a purely -political means, as a stronghold,<a id="FNanchor_134" href="#Footnote_134" class="fnanchor">134</a> or by the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_237">237</a></span> -coöperation of the political with economic -means, <em>as a market place</em>, or because of some -religious need, as the environs of some temple.<a id="FNanchor_T" href="#Footnote_T" class="fnanchor">T</a> -Wherever such a city in the historical sense -exists in the neighborhood, the newly arising -industrial city tends to grow up about it; -otherwise it develops spontaneously from the -existing and matured division of labor. As a -rule, it will in its turn grow into a stronghold -and have its own places of worship.</p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_T" href="#FNanchor_T" class="fnanchor">T</a> “Every place of worship gathers about it dwellings of the -priests, schools, and rest-houses for pilgrims.”—Ratzel, l. c. II., -p. 575. -</p> -<p> -Naturally, every place toward which great pilgrimages proceed -becomes an extended trade center. We may see the remembrances -thereof in the fact that the great wholesale markets, -held at stated times in Northern Europe, are called -<em>Messen</em> from the religious ceremony.</p></div> - -<p>These are but accidental historical admixtures. -In its strict economic sense “city” -means the place of the economic means, or the -exchange and interchange for equivalent -values between rural production and manufacture. -This corresponds to the common use -of language, by which a stronghold however -great, an agglomeration of temples, cloisters<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_238">238</a></span> -and places of pilgrimage however extensive, -were they conceivable without any place for -exchange, would be designated after their external -characteristics as “like a city” or “resembling -a city.”</p> - -<p>Although there may have been few changes -in the exterior of the historical city, there has -taken place an internal revolution on a magnificent -scale. <em>The industrial city is directly -opposed to the state.</em> As the state is the developed -political means, <em>so the industrial city -is the developed economic means</em>. The great -contest filling universal history, nay its very -meaning, henceforth takes place between city -and state.</p> - -<p>The city as an economic, political body undermines -the feudal system with political and -economic arms. With the first the city -<em>forces</em>, with the second it <em>lures</em>, their power -away from the feudal master class.</p> - -<p>This process takes place in the field of politics -by the interference of the city, now a -center of its own powers, in the political -mechanism of the developed feudal state, between<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_239">239</a></span> -the central power and the local territorial -magnates and their subjects. The cities -are the strongholds and the dwelling places of -warlike men, as well as depots of material for -carrying on war (arms, etc.); and later they -become central supply reservoirs for money -used in the contests between the central government -and the growing territorial princes, -or between these in their internecine wars. -Thus they are important strategic points or -valuable allies; and may by far-sighted policy -acquire important rights.</p> - -<p>As a rule, the cities take the part of the -crown in fights against the feudal nobles, from -social reasons, because the landed nobles refuse -to recognize the social equality, demanded -as of right by their more wealthy citizens; -from political reasons, because the central government, -thanks to the solidarity between -prince and people, is more apt to be influenced -by common interests than is the territorial -magnate, who serves only his private interests; -and finally from economic reasons, because -city life can prosper only in peace and safety.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_240">240</a></span> -The practises of chivalry, such as club law, and -private warfare, and the knights’ practise of -looting caravans are irreconcilable with the -economic means; and therefore, the cities are -faithful allies of the guardians of peace and -justice, first to the emperor, later on, to the -sovereign territorial prince; and when the -armed citizenship breaks and pillages some -robber baron’s fortress, the tiny drop reflects -the identical process happening in the ocean -of history.</p> - -<p>In order successfully to carry this political -rôle the city must attract as many citizens as -possible, an endeavor also forced on it by -purely economic considerations, since both divisions -of labor and wealth increase with increased -citizenship. Therefore cities favor -immigration with all their powers; and once -more show in this the polar contrast of their -essential difference from the feudal landlords. -The new citizens thus attracted into the cities -are withdrawn from the feudal estates, which -are thereby weakened in power of taxation and -military defense in proportion as the cities are<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_241">241</a></span> -strengthened. The city becomes a mighty -competitor at the auction, wherein the serf is -knocked down to the highest bidder, to the -one, that is to say, who offers the most rights. -The city offers the peasant <em>complete liberty</em>, -and in some cases house and courtyard. The -principle, “city air frees the peasant” is successfully -fought out; and the central government, -pleased to strengthen the cities and to -weaken the turbulent nobles, usually confirms -by charter the newly acquired rights.</p> - -<p><em>The third great move in the progress of universal -history is to be seen in the discovery -of the honor of free labor</em>; or better in its rediscovery, -it having been lost sight of since -those far-off times in which the free huntsman -and the subjugated primitive tiller enjoyed -the results of their labor. As yet the peasant -bears the mark of the pariah and his rights are -little respected. But in the wall-girt, well-defended -city, the citizen holds his head high. -He is a freeman in every sense of the word, -free even at law, since we find in the grants of -rights to many early enfranchised cities<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_242">242</a></span> -(<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Ville-franche</i>) the provision that a serf residing -therein “a year and a day” undisturbed -by his master’s claim is to be deemed free.</p> - -<p>Within the city walls there are still various -ranks and grades of political status. At first -the old settlers, the men of rank equal with -the nobles of the surrounding country, the -ancient freemen of the burgh, refuse to the -newcomers, usually poor artisans or hucksters, -the right of sharing in the government. -But, as we saw in the case of the maritime -cities, such gradations of rank can not be maintained -within a business community. The majority, -intelligent, skeptical, closely organized -and compact, forces the concession of equal -rights. The only difference is that the contest -is longer in a developed feudal state, because -now the fight concerns not only the parties -at interest. The great territorial magnates -of the neighborhood and the princes hinder -the full development of the forces by their -interference. In the maritime states of the -ancient world, there was no <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">tertius gaudens</i> -who could derive any profit from the contests<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_243">243</a></span> -within the city, since outside the cities there -existed no system of powerful feudal lords.</p> - -<p>These then, are the political arms of the -cities in their contest with the feudal state: alliances -with the crown, direct attack, and the -enticing away of the serfs of the feudal lords -into the enfranchising air of the city. Its economic -weapons are no less effective, the change -from payments in kind to the system of <em>money -as a means of exchange</em> is inseparably connected -with civic methods, is the means -whereby the method of payment in kind is utterly -destroyed, and with it the feudal state.</p> - - -<h3 id="h243">(c) <span class="smcap smaller">THE INFLUENCES OF MONEY ECONOMY</span></h3> - -<p>The sociological process set into motion by -the system of money economy is so well known -and its mechanics are so generally recognized, -that a few suggestions will suffice.</p> - -<p>Here, as in the case of the maritime states, -the consequence of the invading money system -is that the <em>central government becomes almost -omnipotent, while the local powers are reduced -to complete impotence</em>.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_244">244</a></span></p> - -<p>Dominion is not an end in itself, but merely -the means of the rulers to their essential object, -the enjoyment without labor of articles -of consumption as many and as valuable as -possible. During the prevalence of the system -of natural economy there is no other way -of obtaining them save by dominion; the wardens -of the marches and the territorial princes -obtain their wealth by their political power. -The more peasants who are owned, the greater -is the military power and the larger the scope -of the territory subjected, and thus the greater -are the revenues. As soon, however, as the -products of agriculture are exchangeable for -enticing wares, it becomes more rational for -every one primarily a private man, i. e., for -every feudal lord not a territorial prince—and -this now includes the knights—to decrease as -far as possible the number of peasants, and to -leave only such small numbers as can with the -utmost labor turn out the greatest product -from the land, and to leave these as little as -possible. The net product of the real estate, -thus tremendously increased, is now taken to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_245">245</a></span> -the markets and sold for goods, and is no -longer used to keep a fencible body of guards. -Having dissolved this following, the knight -becomes simply the manager of a knight’s -fee.<a id="FNanchor_U" href="#Footnote_U" class="fnanchor">U</a> With this event, as with one blow, -the central power, that of king or territorial -prince, is without a rival for the dominion, and -has become politically omnipotent. The unruly -vassals, who formerly made the weak -kings tremble, after a short attempt at joint -rule during the time of the government of the -feudal estates, have changed into the supple -courtiers, begging favors at the hands of some -absolute monarch, like Louis XIV. And he -furthermore has become their last resort, since -the military power, now solely exercised by -him as the paymaster of the forces, alone can -protect them from the ever-immanent revolt -of their tenants, ground to the bone. While -in the time of natural economy the crown was -in nearly every instance allied with peasants -and cities against nobility, we now have the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_246">246</a></span> -union of the absolute kings, born from the -feudal state, with their nobility, against the -representatives of the economic means.</p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_U" href="#FNanchor_U" class="fnanchor">U</a> See reference as to the meaning of <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Rittergutsbesitz</i>, ante, -page 84.—<i>Translator.</i></p></div> - -<p>Since the days of Adam Smith it has been -customary to state this fundamental revolution -in some such form, as though the foolish -nobles had sold their birthright for a mess of -pottage, when they traded their dominion for -foolish articles of luxury. No view can be -more erroneous. Individuals often err in the -safe-guarding of their interests: <em>a class for any -prolonged period never is in error</em>.</p> - -<p>The fact of the matter is, that the system -of money payments strengthened the central -power so mightily and immediately, that even -without the interposition of the agrarian upheaval, -any resistance of the landed nobility -would have been senseless. As is shown in -the history of antiquity, the army of a central -government, financially strong, is always -superior to feudal levies. Money permits the -armament of peasant sons, and the drilling of -them into professional soldiers, whose solid organization -is always superior to the loose confederation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_247">247</a></span> -of an armed mass of knights. -Besides, at this stage, the central government -could also count on the aid of the well-armed -squares of the urban guilds.</p> - -<p>Gunpowder did the rest in Western Europe. -Firearms, however, are a product that -can be turned out only in the industrial establishments -of a wealthy city. Because of these -technical military reasons, even that feudal -landlord who might not care for the newly -established luxuries and who might only be -desirous of maintaining or increasing his independent -position, must subject his territories -to the same agrarian revolution; since, -in order to be strong, he now before all else -must have <em>money</em>, which in the new order of -things, has become the <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">nervus rerum</i>, either to -buy arms or to engage mercenaries. A -second capitalistic wholesale undertaking, -therefore, has come into being through the -system of payments in money; besides the -wholesale management of landed estates, war -is carried on as a great business enterprise—the -condottieri appear on the stage. The market<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_248">248</a></span> -is full of material for armies of mercenaries, -the discharged guards of the feudal -lords and the young peasants whose lands have -been taken up by the lords.</p> - -<p>There are instances where some petty noble -may mount to the throne of some territorial -principality, as happened many a time in -Italy, and as was accomplished by Albrecht -Wallenstein, even as late as the period of the -Thirty Years’ War. But that is a matter of -individual fate, not affecting the final result. -The local powers disappear from the contest -of political forces as independent centers of -authority and retain the remnant of their -former influence only so long as they serve the -princes as a source of supplies; that is, the -state composed of its feudal estates.</p> - -<p>The infinite increase in the power of the -crown is then enhanced by a second creation -of the system of payment in money, by -<em>officialdom</em>. We have told in detail of the -vicious circle which forced the feudal state into -a cul-de-sac between agglomeration and dissolution, -as long as its bailiffs had to be paid<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_249">249</a></span> -with “lands and peasants” and thereby were -nursed into potential rivals of their creator. -With the advent of payments in money, the -vicious circle is broken. Henceforth the central -government carries on its functions -through paid employees, permanently dependent -on their paymaster.<a id="FNanchor_135" href="#Footnote_135" class="fnanchor">135</a> Henceforth -there is possible a permanently established, -tensely centralized government, and empires -come into being, such as had not existed since -the developed maritime states of antiquity, -which also were founded on the payments in -money.</p> - -<p>This revolution of the political mechanism -was everywhere put into motion by the development -of the money economy—with but -one exception, as far as I can see, viz., Egypt.</p> - -<p>Here, according to the statement of experts, -no definite information is to be had, and it -seems that the system of money exchanges appears -as a matured institution only in Greek -times. Until that time, the tribute of the -peasants was paid in kind;<a id="FNanchor_136" href="#Footnote_136" class="fnanchor">136</a> and yet we find, -shortly after the expulsion of the Shepherd<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_250">250</a></span> -Kings, during the New Empire (<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">circa</i> sixteenth -century B. C.), that the absolutism of -the kings was fully developed: “The military -power is upheld by foreign mercenaries, the -administration is carried on by a <em>centralized -body of officials</em> dependent on the royal -favor, <em>while the feudal aristocracy has disappeared</em>.”<a id="FNanchor_137" href="#Footnote_137" class="fnanchor">137</a></p> - -<p>It may seem that this exception proves the -rule. Egypt is a country of exceptional -geographic conformation. Jammed into a -narrow compass, between mountains and the -desert, a natural highway, the River Nile, -traverses its entire length, and permits the -transportation of bulky freight with much -greater facility than the finest road. And -this highway made it easy for the Pharaoh to -assemble the taxes of all his districts in his own -storehouses, the so-called “houses”<a id="FNanchor_138" href="#Footnote_138" class="fnanchor">138</a> and -from them to supply his garrisons and civil -employees with the products themselves <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">in -natura</i>. For that reason Egypt, after it has -once become unified into an empire, stays centralized, -until foreign powers extinguish its<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_251">251</a></span> -life as a “state.” “This circumstance is the -source of the enormous and plenary power exercised -by the Pharaoh where payments are -still made in kind; the exclusive and immediate -control of the objects of daily consumption -are in his hand. The ruler distributes to his -employees only such quantities of the entire -mass of goods as appears to him good and -proper; and since the articles of luxury are -nearly all exclusively in his hands, he enjoys -on this account also an extraordinary plenitude -of power.”<a id="FNanchor_139" href="#Footnote_139" class="fnanchor">139</a></p> - -<p>With this one exception, where a mighty -force executes the task, the power of circulating -money seems in all cases to have dissolved -the feudal state.</p> - -<p>The cost of the revolution fell on peasants -and cities. When peace is made, the crown -and the petty nobles mutually sacrifice the -peasantry, dividing them, so to say, into two -ideal halves; the crown grants to the nobility -the major part of the peasants’ common lands, -and the greatest part of their working powers -that are not yet expropriated; the nobility<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_252">252</a></span> -concedes to the crown the right of recruiting -and of taxing both peasantry and cities. The -peasant, who had grown wealthy in freedom, -sinks back into poverty and therefore into -social inferiority. The former feudal powers -now unite as allies to subjugate the cities, except -where, as in Upper Italy, these become -feudal central powers themselves. (And even -in that case they for the most part all fall into -the power of captains of mercenaries, condottieri.) -The power of attack of the adversaries -has become stronger, the power of -the cities has diminished. For with the decay -of the peasantry, their purchase power diminishes -and with it the prosperity of the -cities, based thereon. The small cities in the -country stagnate and become poorer, and being -now incapable of defense, fall a prey to the -absolutist rule of the territorial princes; the -larger cities, where the demand for the luxuries -of the nobles has brought into being a strong -trading element, split up into social groups and -thus fritter away their political strength. -The immigration now pouring into their walls<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_253">253</a></span> -is composed of discharged and broken mercenaries, -dispossessed peasants, pauperized mechanics -from the smaller towns; it is in other -words a <em>proletarian</em> immigration. For the -first time there appears, in the terminology of -Karl Marx, the “free laborer,” in masses, competing -with his own class in the labor markets -of the cities. And again, the “law of agglomeration” -enters to form effective class and -property distinctions, and thus to tear apart -the civic population. Wild fights take place -in the cities between the classes; through which -the territorial prince, in nearly every instance, -again succeeds in gaining control. The only -cities that can permanently escape the deadly -embrace of the prince’s power are the few genuine -“maritime states,” or “city states.”</p> - -<p>As in the case of the maritime states, the -pivot of the state’s life has again shifted over to -another place. Instead of circling about wealth -vested in landed estates, it now turns about -capitalized wealth, because in the meantime -property in real estate has itself become “capital.” -<em>Why is it that the development does<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_254">254</a></span> -not, as in the case of the maritime states, open -out into the capitalistic expropriation of slave -labor?</em></p> - -<p>There are two controlling reasons, one internal, -the other external. The external reason -is to be found in this, that slave hunting on -a profitable scale is scarcely possible at this -time in any part of the world, since nearly all -countries within reach are also organized as -strong states. Wherever it is possible, as for -instance, in the American colonies of the West -European powers, it develops at once.</p> - -<p>The external reason may be found in the circumstance -that the peasant of the interior -countries, in contrast to the conditions prevailing -in the maritime states, is subject, not to one -master, but to at least two<a id="FNanchor_V" href="#Footnote_V" class="fnanchor">V</a> persons entitled -to his service, his prince and his landlord. -Both resist any attempt to diminish their peasants’ -capacity for service, since this is essential -to their interests. Especially strong princes -did much for their peasants, e. g., those of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_255">255</a></span> -Brandenburg-Prussia. For this reason, the -peasants, although exploited miserably, yet retained -their personal liberty and their standing -as subjects endowed with personal rights -in all states where the feudal system had been -fully developed when the system of payments -in money replaced that of payments in kind.</p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_V" href="#FNanchor_V" class="fnanchor">V</a> In mediæval Germany the peasants pay tribute in many -cases not only to the landlord and to the territorial prince, but -also to the provost and to the bailiff.</p></div> - -<p>The evidence that this explanation is correct -may be found in the relations of those states -which were gripped by the system of exchange -in money, before the feudal system had become -worked out.</p> - -<p>This applies especially to those districts of -Germany formerly occupied by Slavs, but -particularly to <em>Poland</em>. In these districts, the -feudal system had not yet been worked out as -thoroughly as in the regions where the demand -for grain products in the great western industrial -centers had changed the nobles, the -subjects of public law, into the owners of a -<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Rittergut</i>,<a id="FNanchor_W" href="#Footnote_W" class="fnanchor">W</a> the subjects of private economic interests. -In these districts, the peasants were -subject to the duty of rendering service only to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_256">256</a></span> -<em>one</em> master, who was both their liege lord and -landlord; and because of that, there came into -being the republics of nobles mentioned above, -which, as far as the pressure of their more progressed -neighbors would permit, tended to approach -the capitalistic system of exploiting of -slave labor.<a id="FNanchor_140" href="#Footnote_140" class="fnanchor">140</a></p> - -<div class="footnote inline"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_W" href="#FNanchor_W" class="fnanchor">W</a> See <a href="#Footnote_F">foot-note</a> on page 84.</p></div> - -<p>The following is so well known that it can -be stated briefly. The system of exchange by -means of money matures into capitalism, and -brings into being new classes in juxtaposition -to the landowners; the capitalist demands -equal rights with the formerly privileged -orders, and finally obtains them by revolutionizing -the lower plebs. In this attack on the -sacredly established order of things, the capitalists -unite with the lower classes, naturally -under the banner of “natural law.” But as -soon as the victory has been achieved, the class -based on movable wealth, the so-called middle -class, turns its arms on the lower classes, makes -peace with its former opponents, and invokes in -its reactionary fight on the proletarians, its late -allies, the theory of legitimacy, or makes use<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_257">257</a></span> -of an evil mixture of arguments based partly -on legitimacy and partly on pseudo-liberalism.</p> - -<p>In this manner the state has gradually matured -from the primitive robber state, through -the stages of the developed feudal state, -through absolutism, to the modern constitutional -state.</p> - - -<h3 id="h257">(d) <span class="smcap smaller">THE MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL STATE</span></h3> - -<p>Let us give the mechanics and kinetics of -the modern state a moment’s time.</p> - -<p>In principle, it is the same entity as the -primitive robber state or the developed feudal -state. There has been added, however, one -new element—<em>officialdom</em>, which at least will -have this object, that in the contest of the various -classes, it will represent the common interests -of the state as a whole. In how far this -purpose is subserved we shall investigate in another -place. Let us at this time study the state -in respect to those characteristics which it has -brought over from its youthful stages.</p> - -<p>Its <em>form</em> still continues to be domination, its -content still remains the exploitation of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_258">258</a></span> -economic means. The latter continues to be -limited by public law, which on the one hand -protects the traditional “distribution” of the -total products of the nation; while on the other -it attempts to maintain at their full efficiency -the taxpayers and those bound to render service. -The internal policy of the state continues -to revolve in the path prescribed for it by the -parallelogram of the centrifugal force of class -contests and the centripetal impulse of the common -interests in the state; and its foreign policy -continues to be determined by the interests -of the master class, now comprising besides the -landed also the moneyed interests.</p> - -<p>In principle, there are now, as before, only -two classes to be distinguished: one a ruling -class, which acquires more of the total product -of the labor of the people—the economic means—than -it has contributed, and a subject class, -which obtains less of the resultant wealth than -it has contributed. Each of these classes, in -turn, depending on the degree of economic development, -is divided into more or fewer sub-classes -or strata, which grade of according to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_259">259</a></span> -the fortune or misfortune of their economic -standards.</p> - -<p>Among highly developed states there is -found introduced between the two principal -classes a transitional class, which also may be -subdivided into various strata. Its members -are bound to render service to the upper class, -while they are entitled to receive service from -the classes below them. To illustrate with an -example, we find in the ruling class in modern -Germany at least three strata. First come -the great landed magnates, who at the same -time are the principal shareholders in the -larger industrial undertakings and mining companies: -next stand the captains of industry -and the “bankocrats,” who also in many cases -have become owners of great estates. In consequence -of this they quickly amalgamate with -the first layer. Such, for example, are the -Princes Fugger, who were formerly bankers of -Augsburg, and the Counts of Donnersmarck, -owners of extensive mines in Silesia. And -finally there are the petty country nobles, whom -we shall hereafter term <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">junker</i> or “squires.”<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_260">260</a></span> -The subject class, at all events, consists of petty -peasants, agricultural laborers, factory and -mine hands, with small artisans and subordinate -officials. The “middle classes” are the -classes of the transition: composed of the -owners of large and medium-sized farms, the -small manufacturers, and the best paid mechanics, -besides those rich “bourgeois,” such as -Jews, who have not become rich enough to overcome -certain traditional difficulties which oppose -their arrival at the stage of intermarriage -with the upper class. All these render unrequited -service to the upper class, and receive -unrequited service from the lower classes. -This determines the result which occurs either -to the stratum as a whole or to the individuals -in it; that is to say, either a complete acceptance -into the upper class, or an absolute sinking -into the lower class. Of the (German) -transitional classes, the large farmers and the -manufacturers of average wealth have risen, -while the majority of artisans have descended -to the lower classes. We have thus arrived at -the kinetics of classes.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_261">261</a></span></p> - -<p>The interests of every class set in motion an -actual body of associated forces, which impel -it with a definite momentum toward the attainment -of a definite goal. All classes whatever -have the same goal; viz., the total result of the -productive labor of all the denizens of a given -state. Every class attempts to obtain as large -a share as possible of the national production; -and since all strive for identically the same object, -the <em>class contest</em> results. This contest of -classes is the content of all history of states, -except in so far as the interest of the state as -a whole produces common actions. These we -may at this point disregard, since they have -been given undue prominence by the traditional -method of historical study, and lead to one-sided -views. Historically this class contest is -shown to be a <em>party fight</em>. A party is originally -and in its essence nothing save an organized -representation of a class. Wherever -a class, by reason of social differentiation, has -split up into numerous sub-classes with varied -separate interests, the party claiming to represent -it disintegrates at the earliest opportunity<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_262">262</a></span> -into a mass of tiny parties, and these will either -be allies or mortal enemies according to the degree -of divergence of the class interests. -Where on the other hand a former class contrast -has disappeared by social differentiation, -the two former parties amalgamate in a short -time into a new party. As an example of the -first case we may recall the splitting off of the -artisans and Anti-Semite parties from the -party of German Liberalism, as a consequence -of the fact that the first represented descending -groups, while the latter represented ascending -ones. A characteristic example of the -second category may be found in the political -amalgamation which bound together into the -farmers’ union the petty landed squires of the -East Elbian country with West Elbian rich -peasants on large plantations. Since the petty -squire sinks and the farmer rises, they meet -half-way. All party policy can have but one -meaning, viz., to procure for the class represented -as great a share as is possible of the total -national production. In other words, the preferred<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_263">263</a></span> -classes intend to maintain their share, at -the very least, at the ancient scale, and if possible, -to increase it toward such a maximum -as shall permit the exploited classes just a bare -existence, to keep them fit to do their work, -just as in the bee-keeper stages. Their object -is to confiscate the entire surplus product of the -economic means, a surplus which increases -enormously as population becomes more dense -and division of labor more specialized. On the -other hand, the group of exploited classes -would like to reduce their tribute to the zero-point, -and to consume the entire product themselves; -and the transitional classes work as much -as possible toward the reduction of their tribute -to the upper classes, while at the same time they -strive to increase their unrequited income from -the classes underneath.</p> - -<p>This is the aim and the content of all party -contests. The ruling class conducts this fight -with all those means which its acquired dominion -has handed down to it. In consequence -of this, the ruling class sees to it that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_264">264</a></span> -legislation is framed in its interest and to serve -its purpose—class legislation. These laws are -then applied in such wise that the blunted back -of the sword of justice is turned upward, while -its sharpened edge is turned downward—class -justice. The governing class in every state -uses the administration of the state in the interest -of those belonging to it under a twofold -aspect. In the first place it reserves to its -adherents all prominent places and all offices -of influence and of profit, in the army, in the -superior branches of government service, and -in places on the bench; and secondly, by these -very agencies, it directs the entire policy of the -state, causes its class-politics to bring about -commercial wars, colonial policies, protective -tariffs, legislation in some degree improving -the conditions of the laboring classes, electoral -reform policies, etc. As long as the nobles -ruled the state, they exploited it as they would -have managed an estate; when the bourgeoisie -obtain the mastery, the state is exploited as -though it were a factory. And the class-religion -covers all defects, as long as they can be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_265">265</a></span> -endured, with its “don’t touch the foundation -of society.”</p> - -<p>There still exist in the public law a number -of political privileges and economic strategic -positions, which favor the master class: such as, -in Prussia, a system of voting which gives the -plutocrats an undue advantage over the less -favored classes, a limitation of the constitutional -rights of free assembly, regulations for -servants, etc. For that reason, the <em>constitutional -fight</em>, carried on over thousands of years -and dominating the life of the state, is still uncompleted. -The fight for improved conditions -of life, another phase of the party and class -struggle, usually takes place in the halls of -legislative bodies, but often it is carried on by -means of demonstrations in the streets, by general -strikes, or by open outbreaks.</p> - -<p>But the plebs have finally and definitely -learned that these remnants of feudal strategic -centers, do not, except in belated instances, -constitute the final stronghold of their opponents. -It is not in political, but rather in -economic conditions that the cause must be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_266">266</a></span> -sought, which has brought it about that even in -the modern constitutional state, the “distribution -of wealth” has not been changed in principle. -Just as in feudal times, the great mass of -men live in bitter poverty; even under the -best conditions, they have the meager necessities -of life, earned by hard, crushing, stupefying -forced labor, no longer exacted by right -of political exploitation, but just as effectively -forced from the laborers by their economic -needs. And just as before in the un-reformed -days, the narrow minority, a new master class, -a conglomerate of holders of ancient privileges -and of newly rich, gathers in the tribute, now -grown to immensity; and not only does not -render any service therefor, but flaunts its -wealth in the face of labor by riotous living. -The class contest henceforth is devoted more -and more to these economic causes, based on -vicious systems of distribution; and it takes -shape in a hand-to-hand fight between exploiters -and proletariat, carried on by strikes, -coöperative societies and trades unions. The -economic organization first forces recognition, -and then equal rights; then it leads and finally<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_267">267</a></span> -controls the political destinies of the labor -party. In the end therefore the trade union -controls the party. Thus far the development -of the state has progressed in Great Britain -and in the United States.</p> - -<p>Were it not that there has been added to the -modern state an entirely new element, its -<em>officialdom</em>, the constitutional state, though -more finely differentiated and more powerfully -integrated, would, so far as form and -content go, be little different from its prototypes.</p> - -<p>As a matter of principle, the state officials, -paid from the funds of the state, are removed -from the economic fights of conflicting interests; -and therefore it is rightly considered unbecoming -for any one in the service of the -government to be taking part in any money -making undertaking, and in no well ordered -bureaucracy is it tolerated. Were it possible -ever thoroughly to realize the principle, and -did not every official, even the best of them, -bring with him that concept of the state held by -the class from which he originated, one would -find in officialdom, as a matter of fact, that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_268">268</a></span> -moderating and order making force, removed -from the conflict of class interests, whereby the -state might be led toward its new goal. It -would become the fulcrum of Archimedes -whence the world of the state might be moved.</p> - -<p>But the principle, we are sorry to say, can -not be carried out completely; and furthermore, -the officials do not cease being real men, -do not become mere abstractions without class consciousness. -This may be quite apart from -the fact that, in Europe at least, a participation -in a definite form of undertakings—viz., -handling large landed estates—is regarded as -a favorable means of getting on in the service -of the state, and will continue to be so as long -as the landed nobility preponderates. In consequence -of this, many officials on the Continent, -and one may even say the most influential -officials, are subject to pressure by -enormous economic interests; and are unconsciously, -and often against their will, brought -into the class contests.</p> - -<p>There are factors, such as extra allowances -made by either fathers or fathers-in-law, or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_269">269</a></span> -hereditary estates, and affinity to the persons -in control of the landed and moneyed interest -or allied with them, whereby the solidarity of -interest among the ruling class is if anything -increased from the fact that these officials, -practically without exception, are taken from -a class with whom since their boyhood days -they have been on terms of intimacy. Were -there, however, no such unity of economic interests -the demeanor of the officials would be -influenced entirely by the pure interests of the -state.</p> - -<p>For this reason, as a rule, the most efficient, -most objective and most impartial set of -officials is found in poor states. Prussia, for -example, was formerly indebted to its poverty -for that incomparable body of officials who -handled it through all its troubles. These employees -of the state were actually, in consonance -with the rule laid down above, dissociated -completely from all interests in money making, -directly or indirectly.</p> - -<p>This ideal body of officials is a rare occurrence -in the more wealthy states. The plutocratic<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_270">270</a></span> -development draws the individual more -and more into its vortex, robbing him of his objectivity -and of his impartiality. And yet the -officials continue to fulfil the duty which the -modern state requires of them, to preserve the -interests of the state as opposed to the interests -of any class. And this interest is preserved -by them, even though against their will, -or at least without clear consciousness of the -fact, in such manner that the economic means, -which called the bureaucracy into being, is in -the end advanced on its tedious path of victory, -as against the political means. No one -doubts that the officials carry on class politics, -prescribed for them by the constellation of -forces operating in the state; and to that extent, -they certainly do represent the master -class from which they sprang. But they do -ameliorate the bitterness of the struggle, by opposing -the extremists in either camp, and by -advocating amendments to existing law, when -the social development has become ripened for -their enactment, without waiting until the contest -over these has become acute. Where an<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_271">271</a></span> -efficient race of princes governs, whose momentary -representative adopts the policy of -King Frederick, which was to regard himself -only as “the first servant of the state,” what has -been said above applies to him in an increased -degree, all the more so as his interests, as the -permanent beneficiary of the continued existence -of the state, would before all else prompt -him to strengthen the centripetal forces and to -weaken the centrifugal powers. In the course -of the preceding we have in many instances -noted the natural solidarity between prince -and people, as an historic force of great value. -In the completed constitutional state, in which -the monarch in but an infinitesimally small degree -is a subject of private economic interests, -he tends to be almost completely “an official.” -This community of interests is emphasized here -much more strongly than in either the feudal -state or the despotically governed state, where -the dominion, at least for one-half its extent, is -based on the private economic interests of the -prince.</p> - -<p>Even in a constitutional state, the outer form<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_272">272</a></span> -of government is not the decisive factor; the -fight of the classes is carried on and leads to -the same result in a republic as in a monarchy. -In spite of this, it must be admitted that there -is more probability, that, other things being -equal, the curve of development of the state in -a monarchy will be more sweeping, with less -secondary incurvity, because the prince is less -affected by momentary losses of popularity, is -not so sensitive to momentary gusts of disapproval, -as is a president elected for a short -term of years, and he can therefore shape his -policies for longer periods of time.</p> - -<p>We must not fail to mention a special form -of officialdom, the scientific staffs of the universities, -whose influence on the upward development -of the state must not be underestimated. -Not only is this a creation of the -economic means, as were the officials themselves, -but it at the same time represents an -historical force, <em>the need of causality</em>, which -we found heretofore only as an ally of the conquering -state. We saw that this need created -superstition while the state was on a primitive<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_273">273</a></span> -stage; its bastard, the taboo, we found in all -cases to be an effective means of control by -the master class. From these same needs then, -<em>science</em> was developed, attacking and destroying -superstition, and thereby assisting in -preparation of the path of evolution. That is -the incalculable historical service of science and -especially of the universities.</p> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_274">274</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h274" class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_VII"></a>CHAPTER VII<br /> - -<span class="subhead">THE TENDENCY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE</span></h2> - - -<p>We have endeavored to discover the development -of the state from its most remote -past up to present times, following its course -like an explorer, from its source down the -streams to its effluence in the plains. Broad -and powerfully its waves roll by, until it disappears -into the mist of the horizon, into unexplored -and, for the present-day observer, undiscoverable -regions.</p> - -<p>Just as broadly and powerfully the stream of -history—and until the present day all history -has been the history of states—rolls past our -view, and the course thereof is covered by the -blanketing fogs of the future. Shall we dare -to set up hypotheses concerning the future -course, until “with unrestrained joy he sinks -into the arms of his waiting, expectant father”?<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_275">275</a></span> -(Goethe’s <cite>Prometheus</cite>.) Is it possible to establish -a scientifically founded prognosis in -regard to the future development of the state?</p> - -<p>I believe in this possibility. The tendency<a id="FNanchor_141" href="#Footnote_141" class="fnanchor">141</a> -of state development unmistakably -leads to one point: seen in its essentials the -state will cease to be the “developed political -means” and will become “a freemen’s citizenship.” -In other words, its outer shell will -remain in essentials the form which was developed -in the constitutional state, under which -the administration will be carried on by an -officialdom. But the content of the states heretofore -known will have changed its vital element -by the disappearance of the economic exploitation -of one class by another. And since -the state will, by this, come to be without either -classes or class interests, the bureaucracy of -the future will truly have attained that ideal -of the impartial guardian of the common interests, -which nowadays it laboriously attempts -to reach. The “state” of the future -will be “society” guided by self-government.</p> - -<p>Libraries full of books have been written<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_276">276</a></span> -on the delimitation of the concepts “state” and -“society.” The problem, however, from our -point of view has an easy solution. The -“state” is the fully developed political means, -society the fully developed economic means. -Heretofore state and society were indissolubly -intertwined: in the “freemen’s citizenship,” -there will be no “state” but only “society.”</p> - -<p>This prognosis of the future development of -the state contains by inclusion all of those famous -formulæ, whereby, the great philosophical -historians have endeavored to determine the -“resulting value” of universal history. It contains -the “progress from warlike activity to -peaceful labor” of St. Simon, as well as -Hegel’s “development from slavery to freedom”; -the “evolution of humanity” of Herder, -as well as “the penetration of reason through -nature” of Schleiermacher.</p> - -<p>Our times have lost the glad optimism of the -classical and of the humanist writers; sociologic -pessimism rules the spirit of these latter days. -The prognosis here stated can not as yet claim -to have many adherents. Not only do the persons<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_277">277</a></span> -obtaining the profits of dominion, thanks -to their obsession by their class spirit, regard -it as an incredible concept; those belonging to -the subjugated class as well regard it with the -utmost skepticism. It is true that the proletarian -theory, as a matter of principle, predicts -identically the same result. But the adherents -of that theory do not believe it possible -by the path of evolution but only through revolution. -It is then thought of as a picture of a -“society” varying in all respects from that -evolved by the progress of history; in other -words, as an organization of the economic -means, as a system of economics without competition -and market, as collectivism. The anarchistic -theory makes form and content of the -“state” as inseparable as heads and tails of the -coin; no “government” without exploitation! -It would therefore smash both the form and -the content of the state, and thus bring on a -condition of anarchy, even if thereby all the -economic advantages of a division of labor -should have to be sacrificed. Even so great -a thinker as the late Ludwig Gumplowicz, who<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_278">278</a></span> -first laid the foundation on which the present -theory of the state has been developed, is a -sociological pessimist; and from the same reasons -as are the anarchists, whom he combated -so violently. He too regards as eternally inseparable -form and content, government and -class-exploitation; since he however, and I -think correctly, does not consider it possible -that many people may live together without -some coercive force vested in some government, -he declares the class-state to be an “immanent” -and not only an historical category.</p> - -<p>Only a small fraction of social liberals, or of -liberal socialists, believe in the evolution of a -society without class dominion and class exploitation -which shall guarantee to the individual, -besides political, also economic liberty -of movement, within of course the limitations -of the economic means. That was the <em>credo</em> -of the old social liberalism, of pre-Manchester -days, enunciated by Quesnay and especially -by Adam Smith, and again taken up in modern -times by Henry George and Theodore -Hertzka.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_279">279</a></span></p> - -<p>This prognosis may be substantiated in two -ways, one through history and philosophy, the -other by political economy, as a tendency of the -development of the state, and as a tendency of -the evolution of economics, both clearly tending -toward <em>one</em> point.</p> - -<p>The tendency of the <em>development of the -state</em> was shown in the preceding as a steady -and victorious combat of economic means -against political means. We saw that, in the -beginning, the right to the economic means, -the right to equality and to peace, was restricted -to the tiny circle of the horde -bound together by ties of blood, an endowment -from pre-human conditions of society;<a id="FNanchor_142" href="#Footnote_142" class="fnanchor">142</a> -while without the limits of this isle of -peace raged the typhoon of the political means. -But we saw expanding more and more the circles -from which the laws of peace crowded out -their adversary, and everywhere we saw their -advance connected with the advance of the -economic means, of the barter of groups for -equivalents, amongst one another. The first -exchange may have been the exchange of fire,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_280">280</a></span> -then the barter of women, and finally the exchange -of goods, the domain of peace constantly -extending its borders. It protected the -market places, then the streets leading to them, -and finally it protected the merchants traveling -on these streets.</p> - -<p>In the course of this discussion it was shown -how the “state” absorbed and developed these -organizations making for peace, and how in -consequence these drive back ever further right -based on mere might. Merchants’ law becomes -city law; the industrial city, the developed -economic means, undermines the feudal -state, the developed political means; and -finally the civic population, in open fight, annihilates -the political remnants of the feudal -state, and re-conquers for the entire population -of the state freedom and right to equality, -<em>urban</em> law becomes public law and finally international -law.</p> - -<p>Furthermore, on no horizon can be seen any -force now capable of resisting effectively this -heretofore efficient tendency. On the contrary, -the interference of the past, which temporarily<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_281">281</a></span> -blocked the process, is obviously -becoming weaker and weaker. The international -relations of commerce and trade acquired -among the nations a preponderating importance -over the diminishing warlike and political -relations; and in the intra-national sphere, -by reason of the same process of economic development, -movable capital, the creation of the -right to peace, preponderates in ever increasing -measure over landed property rights, the creation -of the right of war. At the same time -superstition more and more loses its influence. -And therefore one is justified in concluding -that the tendency so marked will work out to -its logical end, excluding the political means -and all its works, until the complete victory of -the economic means is attained.</p> - -<p>But it may be objected that in the modern -constitutional state all the more prominent -remnants of the antique law of war have already -been chiseled out.</p> - -<p>On the contrary, there survives a considerable -remnant of these institutions, masked it is -true in economic garb, and apparently no<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_282">282</a></span> -longer a legal privilege but only economic -right, <em>the ownership of large estates—the first -creation and the last stronghold of the political -means</em>. Its mask has preserved it from undergoing -the fate of all other feudal creations. -And yet this last remnant of the right of war -is doubtless the last unique obstacle in the pathway -of humanity; and doubtless the <em>development -of economics</em> is on its way to destroy it.</p> - -<p>To substantiate these remarks I must refer -the reader to other books, wherein I have given -the detailed evidence of the above and can not -in the space allotted here repeat it at large.<a id="FNanchor_143" href="#Footnote_143" class="fnanchor">143</a> -I can only re-state the principal points made -in these books.</p> - -<p>There is no difference in principle between -the distribution of the total products of the -economic means among the separate classes of -a constitutional state, the so-called “capitalistic -distribution,” from that prevailing in the feudal -state.</p> - -<p>All the more important economic schools -coincide in finding the cause in this, that the -supply of “free” laborers (i. e., according to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_283">283</a></span> -Karl Marx politically free and economically -without capital) perpetually exceeds the demand, -and that hence there exists “the social -relation of capital.” There “are constantly -two laborers running after one master for -work, and lowering, for one another, the -wages”; and therefore the “surplus value” remains -with the capitalist class, while the laborer -never gets a chance to form capital for himself -and to become an employer.</p> - -<p>Whence comes this surplus supply of free -laborers?</p> - -<p>The explanation of the “bourgeois” theory, -according to which this surplus supply is -caused by the overproduction of children by -proletarian parents, is based on a logical -fallacy, and is contradicted by all known -facts?<a id="FNanchor_144" href="#Footnote_144" class="fnanchor">144</a></p> - -<p>The explanation of the proletarian theory -according to which the capitalistic process of -production itself produces the “free laborers,” -by setting up again and again new labor-saving -machines, is also based on a logical fallacy and -is likewise contradicted by all known facts.<a id="FNanchor_145" href="#Footnote_145" class="fnanchor">145</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_284">284</a></span></p> - -<p>The evidence of all facts shows rather, and -the conclusion may be deduced without fear of -contradiction, <em>that the oversupply of “free laborers” -is descended from the right of holding -landed property in large estates</em>; and that emigration -into towns and oversea from these -landed properties are the causes of the capitalistic -distribution.</p> - -<p>Doubtless there is a growing tendency in -economic development whereby the ruin of vast -landed estates will be accomplished. The system -is their bleeding to death, without hope of -salvation, caused by the freedom of the former -serfs—the necessary consequence of the development -of the cities. As soon as the peasants -had obtained the right of moving about -without their landlords’ passport (German -<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Freizuegigkeit</i>), there developed the chance -of escape from the countries which formerly -oppressed them. The system of emigration -created “the competition from oversea,” together -with the fall, on the Continent, of prices -for farm products, and made necessary perpetually -rising wages. By these two factors<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_285">285</a></span> -ground rent is reduced from two sides, and -must gradually sink to the zero point, since -here too no counterforce is to be recognized -whereby the process might be diverted.<a id="FNanchor_146" href="#Footnote_146" class="fnanchor">146</a> -Thus the system of vast territorial estates falls -apart. When, however, it has disappeared, -there can be no oversupply of “free laborers.” -On the contrary “two masters will run after -one laborer and must raise the price on themselves.” -There will be no “surplus value” for -the capitalist class, because the laborer himself -can form capital and himself become an employer. -By this the last remaining vestige of -the political means will have been destroyed, -and economic means alone will exercise sway. -The <em>content</em> of such a society is the “pure economics”<a id="FNanchor_147" href="#Footnote_147" class="fnanchor">147</a> -of the equivalent exchange of commodities -against commodities, or of labor force -against commodities, and the political <em>form</em> of -this society will be the “freemen’s citizenship.”</p> - -<p>This theoretical deduction is moreover confirmed -by the <em>experience of history</em>. Wherever -there existed a society in which vast estates -did not exist to draw an increasing rental,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_286">286</a></span> -there “pure economics” existed, and society -approximated the form of the state to that of -the “freemen’s citizenship.”</p> - -<p>Such a community was found in the Germany -of the four centuries<a id="FNanchor_148" href="#Footnote_148" class="fnanchor">148</a> from about A. D. -1000, when the primitive system of vast estates -was developed into the socially harmless dominion -over vast territories, until about the -year 1400, when the newly arisen great properties, -created by the political means, the robber -wars in the countries formerly Slavic, shut -the settlers from the westward out of lands -eastward of the Elbe.<a id="FNanchor_149" href="#Footnote_149" class="fnanchor">149</a> Such a community -was the Mormon state of Utah, which has not -been greatly changed in this respect, where a -wise land legislation permitted only small and -moderate sized farm holdings.<a id="FNanchor_150" href="#Footnote_150" class="fnanchor">150</a> Such a community -was to be found in the city and county -of Vineland, Iowa, U. S. A.,<a id="FNanchor_151" href="#Footnote_151" class="fnanchor">151</a> as long as every -settler could obtain land, without increment of -rent. Such a commonwealth is, beyond all -others, New Zealand, whose government favors -with all its power the possession of small and -middle-sized holdings of land, while at the same<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_287">287</a></span> -time it narrows and dissolves, by all means at -its command the great landed properties, which -by the way, owing to lack of surplus laborers, -are almost incapable of producing rentals.<a id="FNanchor_152" href="#Footnote_152" class="fnanchor">152</a></p> - -<p>In all these cases there is an astoundingly -equalized well-being, not perhaps mechanically -equal; but there is no wealth. <em>Because well-being -is the control over articles of consumption, -while wealth is the dominion over -mankind.</em> In no such cases are the means of -production, “capital,” “producing any surplus -values”; there are no “free laborers” and no -capitalism, and the political form of these communities -approximates very closely to a “freemen’s -citizenship,” and tends to approximate -it more and more, so far as the pressure of -the surrounding states, organized from and -based on the laws of war, permit its development. -The “state” decomposes, or else in -new countries such as Utah or New Zealand, -it returns to a rudimentary stage of development; -while the free self-determination of -free men, scarcely acquainted with a class fight -constantly tends to pierce through ever more<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_288">288</a></span> -thoroughly. Thus in the German Empire -there was a parallel development between the -political rise of the unions of the imperial free -cities, the decline of the feudal states, the -emancipation of the crafts, then still comprising -the entire “plebs” of the cities, and -the decay of the patrician control of the city -government. This beneficent development -was stopped by the erection of new primitive -feudal states on the easterly border of the -former German Empire, and thus the economic -blossom of German culture was ruined. Whoever -believes in a conscious purpose in history -may say that the human race was again required -to pass through another school of suffering -before it could be redeemed. The -Middle Ages had discovered the system of free -labor, but had not developed it to its full capacity -or efficiency. It was reserved for the -new slavery of capitalism to discover and develop -the incomparably more efficient system of -coöperating labor, the division of labor in the -workshops, in order to crown man as the ruler -of natural forces, as king of the planet.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_289">289</a></span> -Slavery of antiquity and of modern capitalism -was once necessary; now it has become superfluous. -According to the story, every free -citizen of Athens disposed of five human -slaves; but we have supplied to our fellow citizens -of modern society a vast mass of enslaved -power, slaves of steel, that do not suffer in creating -values. Since then we have ripened -toward a civilization as much higher than the -civilization of the time of Pericles, as the population, -power and riches of the modern communities -exceeds those of the tiny state of -Athens.</p> - -<p>Athens was doomed to dissolution—by reason -of slavery as an economic institution, by -reason of the political means. Having once -entered that pathway, there was no outlet except -death to the population. Our path will -lead to life.</p> - -<p>The same conclusion is found by either the -historical-philosophical view, which took into -account the tendency of the <em>development of the -state</em>, or the study of political economy, which -regards the tendency of <em>economic development</em>;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_290">290</a></span> -viz., that the economic means wins along -the whole line, while the political means disappears -from the life of society, in that one of -its creations, which is most ancient and most -tenacious of life; capitalism decays with large -landed estates and ground rentals.</p> - -<p>This has been the path of suffering and of -salvation of humanity, its Golgotha and its -resurrection into an eternal kingdom—from -war to peace, from the hostile splitting up of -the hordes to the peaceful unity of mankind, -from brutality to humanity, from the exploiting -State of robbery to the Freemen’s Citizenship.</p> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_293">293</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<div class="footnotes"> -<h2 id="h293" class="nobreak p2"><a id="NOTES"></a>NOTES</h2> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="fnanchor">1</a> “History is unable to demonstrate any one people, -wherein the first traces of division of labor and of agriculture -do not coincide with such agricultural exploitations, -wherein the efforts of labor were not apportioned -to one and the fruits of labor were not appropriated by -some one else, wherein, in other words, the division of -labor had not developed itself as the subjection of one -set under the others.”—Robertus-Jagetzow, <cite>Illumination -on the social question</cite>, second edition. Berlin, 1890, p. -124. (Cf. <em>Immigration and Labor. The economic -aspects of European Immigration to the United States</em>, -by Dr. Isaac A. Hourwich. Putnam’s, N. Y., 1912.—<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="fnanchor">2</a> Achelis, <cite>Die Ekstase in ihrer kulturellen Bedeutung</cite>, -vol. 1 of <cite>Kulturprobleme der Gegenwart</cite>, Berlin, -1902.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="fnanchor">3</a> Grosse, <cite>Formen der Familie</cite>. Freiburg and Leipzig, -1896, p. 39.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> Ratzel, <cite>Völkerkunde</cite>. Second Edition. Leipzig -and Wien, 1894–5, II, p. 372.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="fnanchor">5</a> <cite>Die Soziale Verfassung des Inkareichs.</cite> Stuttgart, -1896, p. 51.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="fnanchor">6</a> <cite>Siedlung und Agrarwesen der Westgermanen, etc.</cite> -Berlin, 1895, I, p. 273.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="fnanchor">7</a> l. c. I, p. 138.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="fnanchor">8</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 702.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_294">294</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="fnanchor">9</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 555.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="fnanchor">10</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 555.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="fnanchor">11</a> For example with the Ovambo according to Ratzel, -l. c. II, p. 214, who in part “seem to be found in slavelike -status,” and according to Laveleye among the ancient -Irish (<cite>Fuidhirs</cite>).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="fnanchor">12</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 648.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="fnanchor">13</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 99.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14" class="fnanchor">14</a> Lippert, <cite>Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit</cite>. Stuttgart, -1886, II, p. 302.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15" class="fnanchor">15</a> Lippert, l. c. II, p. 522.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16" class="fnanchor">16</a> <cite>Römische Geschichte.</cite> Sixth Edition. Berlin, -1874, I, p. 17.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17" class="fnanchor">17</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 518.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18" class="fnanchor">18</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 425.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19" class="fnanchor">19</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 545.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20" class="fnanchor">20</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, pp. 390–1.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_21" href="#FNanchor_21" class="fnanchor">21</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, pp. 390–1.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_22" href="#FNanchor_22" class="fnanchor">22</a> Lippert, l. c. I, p. 471.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_23" href="#FNanchor_23" class="fnanchor">23</a> Kulischer, “The history of the development of interest -from capital.” <cite>Jahrbücher für National Œkonomie.</cite> -III series, vol. 18, p. 318, Jena, 1899: (Says -Strabo: “Plunderers and from the scant supplies of -their native land covetous of the lands of others.”)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_24" href="#FNanchor_24" class="fnanchor">24</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 123.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_25" href="#FNanchor_25" class="fnanchor">25</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 591.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_26" href="#FNanchor_26" class="fnanchor">26</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 370.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_27" href="#FNanchor_27" class="fnanchor">27</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, pp. 390–1.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_28" href="#FNanchor_28" class="fnanchor">28</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, pp. 388–9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_29" href="#FNanchor_29" class="fnanchor">29</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, pp. 103–04.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_30" href="#FNanchor_30" class="fnanchor">30</a> Thurnwald, <cite>Staat und Wirtschaft im altem -Ægypten. Zeitschrift für Soz. Wissenchaft</cite>, vol. 4 -1901, pp. 700–01.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_295">295</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_31" href="#FNanchor_31" class="fnanchor">31</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, pp. 404–05. (Gumplowicz, <cite>Rassenkampf</cite>, -p. 264: “Egypt, rich and self-sufficient, -says Ranke, invited the avarice of neighboring tribes, -who served other gods. Under the name of the Shepherd -peoples, foreign dynasts and foreign tribes ruled -Egypt for centuries. -</p> -<p> -“Truly, the summary of universal history could not -be begun with more characteristic words than those of -Ranke. For in the words applied to Egypt the quintessence -of the whole history of mankind is summed up.”—<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_32" href="#FNanchor_32" class="fnanchor">32</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 165.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_33" href="#FNanchor_33" class="fnanchor">33</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 485.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_34" href="#FNanchor_34" class="fnanchor">34</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 480.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_35" href="#FNanchor_35" class="fnanchor">35</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 165.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_36" href="#FNanchor_36" class="fnanchor">36</a> Buhl, <cite>Soziale Verhältnisse der Israeliten</cite>, p. 13.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_37" href="#FNanchor_37" class="fnanchor">37</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 455.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_38" href="#FNanchor_38" class="fnanchor">38</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 628.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_39" href="#FNanchor_39" class="fnanchor">39</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 625.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_40" href="#FNanchor_40" class="fnanchor">40</a> Cieza de Leon, “Seg. parte de la crónica del -Peru.” P. 75, cit. by Cunow, <cite>Inkareich</cite> (p. 62, note 1).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_41" href="#FNanchor_41" class="fnanchor">41</a> Cunow, l. c. p. 61.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_42" href="#FNanchor_42" class="fnanchor">42</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 346.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_43" href="#FNanchor_43" class="fnanchor">43</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, pp. 36–7.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_44" href="#FNanchor_44" class="fnanchor">44</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 221. (Cf. remarks by Hon. -A. J. Sabath, M. C., <cite>Sociological Argument on Workman’s -Compensation Bill</cite>, p. 498, Senate Document -338, Sixty-second Congress, Second Session, Volume I. -See also <cite>Congressional Record</cite> for March 1, 1913, Sixty-second -Congress, Third Session, pp. 4503, 4529, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">et -seq.</i>—<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_45" href="#FNanchor_45" class="fnanchor">45</a> “Among the Wahuma women occupy a higher position -than among the negroes, and are watched carefully -by their men. This makes mixed marriages difficult. -The mass of the Waganda even to-day would not have -remained a genuine negro tribe ‘of dark chocolate colored -skin and short wool hair’ were it not that the two peoples -are strictly opposed to one another as peasants and herdsmen, -rulers and subjects, as despised and honored, in -spite of the relations entered into among the upper -classes. In this peculiar position, they represent a -typical phenomenon, which is found repeated at many -other points.”—Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 177.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_296">296</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_46" href="#FNanchor_46" class="fnanchor">46</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 178.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_47" href="#FNanchor_47" class="fnanchor">47</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 198.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_48" href="#FNanchor_48" class="fnanchor">48</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 476.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_49" href="#FNanchor_49" class="fnanchor">49</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 453.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_50" href="#FNanchor_50" class="fnanchor">50</a> Kopp, <cite>Griechische Staatsaltertümer</cite>, 2, <cite>Aufl.</cite> -Berlin, 1893, p. 23.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_51" href="#FNanchor_51" class="fnanchor">51</a> Uhland, <cite>Alte hoch und niederdeutsche Volkslieder</cite> -I (1844), p. 339 cited by Sombart: <cite>Der moderne Kapitalismus</cite>, -Leipzig, 1902, I, pp. 384–5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_52" href="#FNanchor_52" class="fnanchor">52</a> Inama-Sternegg, <cite>Deutsche Wirtsch.-Gesch.</cite> I, -Leipzig, 1879, p. 59.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_53" href="#FNanchor_53" class="fnanchor">53</a> Westermarck, <cite>History of Human Marriage</cite>, London, -1891, p. 368.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_54" href="#FNanchor_54" class="fnanchor">54</a> Cf. Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 81.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_55" href="#FNanchor_55" class="fnanchor">55</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 156.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_56" href="#FNanchor_56" class="fnanchor">56</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, pp. 259–60.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_57" href="#FNanchor_57" class="fnanchor">57</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 434.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_58" href="#FNanchor_58" class="fnanchor">58</a> I. Kulischer, l. c., p. 317, where other examples -may be found.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_59" href="#FNanchor_59" class="fnanchor">59</a> Westermarck, <cite>History of Human Marriage</cite>, p. -400, which contains a number of ethnographical examples.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_297">297</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_60" href="#FNanchor_60" class="fnanchor">60</a> Westermarck, l. c., p. 546.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_61" href="#FNanchor_61" class="fnanchor">61</a> Cf. Ratzel, l. c. I, pp. 318, 540.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">62</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 106.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_63" href="#FNanchor_63" class="fnanchor">63</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 335.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_64" href="#FNanchor_64" class="fnanchor">64</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 346.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_65" href="#FNanchor_65" class="fnanchor">65</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 347.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_66" href="#FNanchor_66" class="fnanchor">66</a> Buecher, <cite>Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft</cite>, Second -Edition, Tübingen, 1898, p. 301.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">67</a> Cf., Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 271, speaking of the -islanders of the Pacific Ocean: “Intercourse from tribe -to tribe is carried on by inviolable heralds, preferably old -women. These act also as intermediary agents in -trades.” See also page 317 for the same practises among -the Australians.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_68" href="#FNanchor_68" class="fnanchor">68</a> German Translation by L. Katscher. Leipzig, -1907.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_69" href="#FNanchor_69" class="fnanchor">69</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 81.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_70" href="#FNanchor_70" class="fnanchor">70</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, pp. 478–9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_71" href="#FNanchor_71" class="fnanchor">71</a> A. Vierkandt, <cite>Die wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse -der Naturvölker. Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft</cite>, -II, pp. 177–8.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_72" href="#FNanchor_72" class="fnanchor">72</a> Kulischer, l. c. pp. 320–1.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_73" href="#FNanchor_73" class="fnanchor">73</a> Lippert, l. c. I, p. 266, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_74" href="#FNanchor_74" class="fnanchor">74</a> Cf. Westermarck, <cite>History of Human Marriage</cite>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">75</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 27.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_76" href="#FNanchor_76" class="fnanchor">76</a> Herodotus IV, 23, cited by Lippert, l. c. I, p. -459.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_77" href="#FNanchor_77" class="fnanchor">77</a> Lippert, l. c. II, p. 170.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_78" href="#FNanchor_78" class="fnanchor">78</a> Mommsen, l. c. I, p. 139.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_79" href="#FNanchor_79" class="fnanchor">79</a> Similar conditions may be observed among the -islanders near India. Here the Malays are vikings. -“Colonization is an important factor, as conquest and -settlement oversea ... reminding one of the great -rôle played in ancient Hellas by the roving tribes.... -Every strip of coast line shows foreign elements, who -enter uncalled for and in most instances spreading damage -among the natives. The right of conquest was -granted by the rulers of Tornate to noble dynasts, who -later on became semi-sovereign viceroys on the islands of -Buru, Serang, etc.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_298">298</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_80" href="#FNanchor_80" class="fnanchor">80</a> Mommsen, l. c. I, p. 132.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_81" href="#FNanchor_81" class="fnanchor">81</a> Mommsen, l. c. I, p. 134.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_82" href="#FNanchor_82" class="fnanchor">82</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 160.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_83" href="#FNanchor_83" class="fnanchor">83</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 558.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_84" href="#FNanchor_84" class="fnanchor">84</a> Buhl, l. c., p. 48.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_85" href="#FNanchor_85" class="fnanchor">85</a> Buhl, l. c., pp. 78–79.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_86" href="#FNanchor_86" class="fnanchor">86</a> Mommsen, l. c. II, p. 406.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_87" href="#FNanchor_87" class="fnanchor">87</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 191; cf. also pp. 207–8.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_88" href="#FNanchor_88" class="fnanchor">88</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 363.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_89" href="#FNanchor_89" class="fnanchor">89</a> Mommsen, l. c., p. 46.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_90" href="#FNanchor_90" class="fnanchor">90</a> Both cited by Kulischer, l. c., p. 319, from: -Buechsenschuetz, <cite>Besitz und Erwerb im grieschischen -Altertum</cite>; and Goldschmidt, <cite>History of the Law of Commerce</cite>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_91" href="#FNanchor_91" class="fnanchor">91</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 263.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_92" href="#FNanchor_92" class="fnanchor">92</a> F. Oppenheimer’s <cite>Grossgrundeigentum und soziale -Frage</cite>. Book Two, Chapter I. Berlin, 1898.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_93" href="#FNanchor_93" class="fnanchor">93</a> Nomadism is exceptionally characterized by the -facility with which, from patriarchal conditions, despotic -functions are developed with most far-reaching powers. -Ratzel, l. c. Vol. II, pp. 388–9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_94" href="#FNanchor_94" class="fnanchor">94</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 408.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_299">299</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_95" href="#FNanchor_95" class="fnanchor">95</a> Cunow, l. c. pp. 66–7. Similarly among the inhabitants -of the Malay Islands numerous examples are -found in Radak (Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 267).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_96" href="#FNanchor_96" class="fnanchor">96</a> Buhl, l. c., p. 17.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_97" href="#FNanchor_97" class="fnanchor">97</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 66.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_98" href="#FNanchor_98" class="fnanchor">98</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 118.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_99" href="#FNanchor_99" class="fnanchor">99</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 167.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_100" href="#FNanchor_100" class="fnanchor">100</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 218.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_101" href="#FNanchor_101" class="fnanchor">101</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 125.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_102" href="#FNanchor_102" class="fnanchor">102</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 124.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_103" href="#FNanchor_103" class="fnanchor">103</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 118.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_104" href="#FNanchor_104" class="fnanchor">104</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 125.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_105" href="#FNanchor_105" class="fnanchor">105</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 346.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_106" href="#FNanchor_106" class="fnanchor">106</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 245.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_107" href="#FNanchor_107" class="fnanchor">107</a> Ratzel, l. c. I. pp. 267–8.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_108" href="#FNanchor_108" class="fnanchor">108</a> Mommsen, l. c. III, pp. 234–5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_109" href="#FNanchor_109" class="fnanchor">109</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 167.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_110" href="#FNanchor_110" class="fnanchor">110</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 229.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_111" href="#FNanchor_111" class="fnanchor">111</a> Ratzel, l. c. I, p. 128.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_112" href="#FNanchor_112" class="fnanchor">112</a> Weber’s <cite>Weltgeschichte</cite>, III, p. 163.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_113" href="#FNanchor_113" class="fnanchor">113</a> Thurnwald, l. c., pp. 702–3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_114" href="#FNanchor_114" class="fnanchor">114</a> Thurnwald, l. c., p. 712; cf. Schneider, <cite>Kultur -und Denken der alten ÆEgypter</cite>, Leipzig, 1907, p. 38.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_115" href="#FNanchor_115" class="fnanchor">115</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 599.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_116" href="#FNanchor_116" class="fnanchor">116</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 362.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_117" href="#FNanchor_117" class="fnanchor">117</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 344.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_118" href="#FNanchor_118" class="fnanchor">118</a> Meitzen, l. c. II, p. 633.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_119" href="#FNanchor_119" class="fnanchor">119</a> Inama-Sternegg, l. c. I, pp. 140–1.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_120" href="#FNanchor_120" class="fnanchor">120</a> Mommsen, l. c. V, p. 84.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_121" href="#FNanchor_121" class="fnanchor">121</a> Cf. the detailed exposition of this in F. Oppenheimer’s -<cite>Grossgrundeigentum und die soziale Frage</cite>, -Book II, Chap. 3.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_300">300</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_122" href="#FNanchor_122" class="fnanchor">122</a> Mommsen, l. c. III, pp. 234–5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_123" class="fnanchor">123</a> Thurnwald, l. c., p. 771.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_124" class="fnanchor">124</a> Meitzen, l. c. I, pp. 362f.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_125" class="fnanchor">125</a> Inama-Sternegg, l. c. I, pp. 373, 386.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_126" class="fnanchor">126</a> Cf. F. Oppenheimer’s <cite>Grossgrundeigentum</cite>, p. -272.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_127" class="fnanchor">127</a> Thurnwald, l. c., p. 706.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_128" href="#FNanchor_128" class="fnanchor">128</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 503.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_129" href="#FNanchor_129" class="fnanchor">129</a> Ratzel, l. c. II, p. 518.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_130" href="#FNanchor_130" class="fnanchor">130</a> Meitzen, l. c. I, p. 579: “At the time of the -compilation of the Lex Salica, the ancient racial nobility -had been reduced to common freemen or else had been -annihilated. The officials, on the other hand, are rated -at threefold wergeld, 600 solidi, and if one be ‘<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">puer -regis</i>’ 300 solidi.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_131" href="#FNanchor_131" class="fnanchor">131</a> Thurnwald, l. c. p. 712.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_132" class="fnanchor">132</a> Inama-Sternegg, l. c. II, p. 61.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_133" href="#FNanchor_133" class="fnanchor">133</a> Thurnwald, l. c., p. 705.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_134" href="#FNanchor_134" class="fnanchor">134</a> “The larger camps of the army of the Rhine -obtained their municipal annexes partly through army -suttlers and camp followers, and particularly through -the veterans, who after the completion of their services -remained in their accustomed quarters. Thus there -arose distinct from the military quarters proper, a distinct -town of cabins (<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">Canabæ</i>). In all parts of the -Empire, and especially in the various Germanias, there -arose in the course of time, from these camps of the -legionaries, and particularly from the headquarter stations, -cities in the modern sense.”—Mommsen, l. c. V, -p. 153.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_135" href="#FNanchor_135" class="fnanchor">135</a> Eisenhardt, <cite>Gesch. der National Oekonomie</cite>, p. -9: “Aided by the new and more liquid means of payment -in cash, it became possible to call into being a new -and more independent establishment of soldiers and of -officials. As they were paid only periodically it became -impossible for them to make themselves independent (as -the feudatories had done) and then to turn on their paymaster.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_301">301</a></span></p></div> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_136" href="#FNanchor_136" class="fnanchor">136</a> Thurnwald, l. c., p. 773.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_137" href="#FNanchor_137" class="fnanchor">137</a> Thurnwald, l. c., p. 699.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_138" href="#FNanchor_138" class="fnanchor">138</a> Thurnwald, l. c., p. 709.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_139" href="#FNanchor_139" class="fnanchor">139</a> Thurnwald, l. c., p. 711.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_140" href="#FNanchor_140" class="fnanchor">140</a> Cf. with this F. Oppenheimer’s <cite>Grossgrundeigentum -etc.</cite>, Book II, Chap. 3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_141" href="#FNanchor_141" class="fnanchor">141</a> “Tendency, i. e., a law, whose absolute execution -is checked by countervailing circumstances, or -is by them retarded, or weakened.” Marx, <cite>Kapital</cite>, vol. -III, p. 215.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_142" href="#FNanchor_142" class="fnanchor">142</a> Cf. the excellent work of Peter Kropotkin, <cite>Mutual -Aid in its Development</cite>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_143" href="#FNanchor_143" class="fnanchor">143</a> Cf. F. Oppenheimer, <cite>Die Siedlungsgenossenschaft -etc.</cite>, Berlin, 1896, and his <cite>Grossgrundeigentum -und soziale Frage</cite>, Berlin, 1898.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_144" href="#FNanchor_144" class="fnanchor">144</a> Cf. F. Oppenheimer, <cite>Bevölkerungsgesetz des -T. R. Malthus</cite>. <cite>Darstellung and Kritik</cite>, Berlin-Bern, -1901.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_145" href="#FNanchor_145" class="fnanchor">145</a> Cf. F. Oppenheimer, <cite>Grundgesetz der Marxschen -Gesellschaftslehre, Darstellung und Kritik</cite>, Berlin, 1903.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_146" href="#FNanchor_146" class="fnanchor">146</a> Cf. F. Oppenheimer, <cite>Grundgesetz der Marxschen -Gesellschaftslehre</cite>, Part IV., particularly, the twelfth -chapter: “Tendency of the Capitalistic Development.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_147" href="#FNanchor_147" class="fnanchor">147</a> Cf. F. Oppenheimer, <cite>Grossgrundeigentum und -soziale Frage</cite>, Berlin, 1898. Book I, Chapter 2, Section -3, “Philosophy of the Social Body,” pp. 57 <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">et seq.</i></p> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_302">302</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_148" href="#FNanchor_148" class="fnanchor">148</a> Cf. F. Oppenheimer, <cite>Grossgrundeigentum</cite>, Book -II, Chap. 2, Sec. 3, p. 322.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_149" href="#FNanchor_149" class="fnanchor">149</a> Cf. F. Oppenheimer, <cite>Grossgrundeigentum</cite>, Book -II, Chap. 3, Sec. 4, especially pp. 423 <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_150" href="#FNanchor_150" class="fnanchor">150</a> Cf. F. Oppenheimer, “Die Utopie als Tatsache,” -<cite>Zeitschrift für Sozial-Wissenschaft</cite>, 1899, Vol. II, pp. -190 <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_151" href="#FNanchor_151" class="fnanchor">151</a> Cf. F. Oppenheimer, <cite>Siedlungsgenossenschaft</cite>, -pp. 477 <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_152" href="#FNanchor_152" class="fnanchor">152</a> Cf. André Siegfried, <cite>La démocratie en Nouvelle -Zelande</cite>, Paris, 1904.</p></div> - -</div></div> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<div class="transnote"> -<h2 class="nobreak p1"><a id="Transcribers_Notes"></a>Transcriber’s Notes</h2> - - -<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant -preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.</p> - -<p>The spelling of non-English words was not checked.</p> - -<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected.</p> - -<p>Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.</p> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_100">100</a>: Closing quotation mark added after “valuable consignments.”</p> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_126">126 or 127</a>: Missing footnote anchor “62”.</p> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_128">128 or 129</a>: Missing footnote anchor “67”.</p> - -<p>Pages <a href="#Page_134">134–138</a>: Missing footnote anchor “75”.</p> - -<p>Pages <a href="#Page_207">207–208</a>: Missing footnote anchors “123” through “127”.</p> - -<p>Pages <a href="#Page_220">220–225</a>: Missing footnote anchor “132”.</p> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_254">254</a>: Paragraph beginning “The external reason” probably -should be “The internal reason”.</p> -</div></div> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The State, by Franz Oppenheimer - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE STATE *** - -***** This file should be named 51544-h.htm or 51544-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/1/5/4/51544/ - -Produced by Julie Barkley, Charlie Howard,, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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