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+This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements,
+metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be
+in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES.
+
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+Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for
+eBook #51183 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/51183)
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-Project Gutenberg's History of Greece, Volume 10 (of 12), by George Grote
-
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
-other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
-whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of
-the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
-www.gutenberg.org.  If you are not located in the United States, you'll have
-to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook.
-
-Title: History of Greece, Volume 10 (of 12)
-
-Author: George Grote
-
-Release Date: February 11, 2016 [EBook #51183]
-
-Language: English
-
-Character set encoding: UTF-8
-
-*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF GREECE, VOLUME 10 OF 12 ***
-
-
-
-
-Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Ramon Pajares Box and the
-Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net
-(This file was produced from images generously made
-available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE
-
-  * Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_.
-  * Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS.
-  * Letter spaced Greek text is enclosed in tildes as in ~καὶ τὰ
-    λοιπά~.
-  * Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after
-    comparison with a later edition of this work. Greek text has
-    also been checked with this later edition and with Perseus,
-    when the reference was found.
-  * Original spelling, hyphenation and punctuation have been kept,
-    but variant spellings were made consistent when a predominant
-    usage was found.
-  * Some inconsistencies in the use of diæresis (like “reorganize”
-    and “reörganize”) and in the use of accents over proper nouns
-    (like “Autokles” and “Autoklês”) have been retained.
-  * Throughout the text, “Mövers” has been changed to “Movers”, when
-    referring to Franz Karl Movers, as it is the spelling used in the
-    title pages of his main works in German.
-  * The following changes were also made, after checking with other
-    editions:
-
-    page  27:   “Phokæn” → “Phokæan”    (that Phokæan lady).
-    page  94:     “from” → “at”         (arriving at Sparta)
-    page  96: “Kannônes” → “Kannônus”   (psephism of Kannônus).
-    page 374:    “troad” → “Troad”      (especially in the Troad).
-    note 711:  “vii, 39” → “vii, 4, 39” (“Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 39”)
-
-  * In note 965, the printed book version has been retained: “Μὴ
-    κινεῖ Καμάριναν, ἀκίνητόν περ ἐοῦσαν”, but the original English
-    edition has “Μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριναν, ἀκινητὸς γὰρ ἀμείνων”.
-
-
-
-
-  HISTORY OF GREECE.
-
-  BY
-  GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.
-
-  VOL. X.
-
-  REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION.
-
-  NEW YORK:
-  HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
-  329 AND 331 PEARL STREET.
-
-
-
-
-PREFACE TO VOL. X.
-
-
-The present Volume is already extended to an unusual number of pages;
-yet I have been compelled to close it at an inconvenient moment,
-midway in the reign of the Syracusan despot Dionysius. To carry that
-reign to its close, one more chapter will be required, which must be
-reserved for the succeeding volume.
-
-The history of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, forming as it does
-a stream essentially distinct from that of the Peloponnesians,
-Athenians, etc., is peculiarly interesting during the interval
-between 409 B.C. (the date of the second Carthaginian invasion) and
-the death of Timoleon in 336 B.C. It is, moreover, reported to us
-by authors (Diodorus and Plutarch), who, though not themselves very
-judicious as selectors, had before them good contemporary witnesses.
-And it includes some of the most prominent and impressive characters
-of the Hellenic world,—Dionysius I., Dion with Plato as instructor,
-and Timoleon.
-
-I thought it indispensable to give adequate development to this
-important period of Grecian history, even at the cost of that
-inconvenient break which terminates my tenth volume. At one time I
-had hoped to comprise in that volume not only the full history of
-Dionysius I., but also that of Dionysius II. and Dion—and that of
-Timoleon besides. Three new chapters, including all this additional
-matter, are already composed and ready. But the bulk of the present
-volume compels me to reserve them for the commencement of my next,
-which will carry Grecian history down to the battle of Chæroneia
-and the death of Philip of Macedon—and which will, I trust, appear
-without any long interval of time.
-
-  G. G.
-
-  LONDON, FEB. 15, 1852.
-
-
-
-
-CONTENTS.
-
-VOL. X.
-
-
-PART II.
-
-CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXXVI.
-
-  FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS DOWN TO THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS
-  BY SPARTA.
-
-  Peace or convention of Antalkidas. Its import and character.
-  Separate partnership between Sparta and Persia.—Degradation
-  in the form of the convention—an edict drawn up, issued, and
-  enforced, by Persia upon Greece.—Gradual loss of Pan-hellenic
-  dignity, and increased submission towards Persia as a means
-  of purchasing Persian help—on the part of Sparta.—Her
-  first application before the Peloponnesian war; subsequent
-  applications.—Active partnership between Sparta and Persia
-  against Athens, after the Athenian catastrophe at Syracuse.
-  Athens is ready to follow her example.—The Persian force aids
-  Athens against Sparta, and breaks up her maritime empire.—No
-  excuse for the subservience of Sparta to the Persians. Evidence
-  that Hellenic independence was not destined to last much
-  longer.—Promise of universal autonomy—popular to the Grecian
-  ear—how carried out.—The Spartans never intended to grant,
-  nor ever really granted, general autonomy.—Immediate point
-  made against Corinth and Thebes—isolation of Athens.—Persian
-  affairs—unavailing efforts of the Great King to reconquer
-  Egypt.—Evagoras, despot of Salamis in Cyprus.—Descent of
-  Evagoras—condition of the island of Cyprus.—Greek princes of
-  Salamis are dispossessed by a Phœnician dynasty.—Evagoras
-  dethrones the Phœnician, and becomes despot of Salamis.—Able
-  and beneficent government of Evagoras.—His anxiety to revive
-  Hellenism in Cyprus—he looks to the aid of Athens.—Relations
-  of Evagoras with Athens during the closing years of the
-  Peloponnesian war.—Evagoras at war with the Persians—he receives
-  aid both from Athens and from Egypt—he is at first very
-  successful, so as even to capture Tyre.—Struggle of Evagoras
-  against the whole force of the Persian empire after the peace
-  of Antalkidas.—Evagoras, after a ten years’ war, is reduced,
-  but obtains an honorable peace, mainly owing to the dispute
-  between the two satraps jointly commanding.—Assassination of
-  Evagoras, as well as of his son Pnytagoras, by an eunuch slave
-  of Nikokreon.—Nikoklês, son of Evagoras, becomes despot of
-  Salamis. Great power gained by Sparta through the peace of
-  Antalkidas. She becomes practically mistress of Corinth, and the
-  Corinthian isthmus. Miso-Theban tendencies of Sparta—especially
-  of Agesilaus.—The Spartans restore Platæa. Former conduct of
-  Sparta towards Platæa.—Motives of Sparta in restoring Platæa.
-  A politic step, as likely to sever Thebes from Athens.—Platæa
-  becomes a dependency and outpost of Sparta. Main object of Sparta
-  to prevent the reconstitution of the Bœotiad federation—Spartan
-  policy at this time directed by the partisan spirit of
-  Agesilaus, opposed by his colleague Agesipolis.—Oppressive
-  behavior of the Spartans towards Mantinea. They require the
-  walls of the city to be demolished.—Agesipolis blockades the
-  city, and forces it to surrender, by damming up the river
-  Ophis. The Mantineans are forced to break up their city into
-  villages.—Democratical leaders of Mantinea—owed their lives
-  to the mediation of the exiled king Pausanias.—Mantinea is
-  pulled down and distributed into five villages.—High-handed
-  despotism of Sparta towards Mantinea—signal partiality of
-  Xenophon. Return of the philo-Laconian exiles in the various
-  cities, as partisans for the purposes of Sparta—case of
-  Phlius.—Competition of Athens with Sparta for ascendency at
-  sea. Athens gains ground, and gets together some rudiments of a
-  maritime confederacy.—Ideas entertained by some of the Spartan
-  leaders, of acting against the Persians for the rescue of the
-  Asiatic Greeks.—Panegyrical Discourse of Isokrates.—State of
-  Macedonia and Chalkidikê—growth of Macedonian power during
-  the last years of the Peloponnesian war.—Perdikkas and
-  Archelaus—energy and ability of the latter.—Contrast of Macedonia
-  and Athens.—Succeeding Macedonian kings—Orestes, Æropus,
-  Pausanias, Amyntas. Assassination frequent.—Amyntas is expelled
-  from Macedonia by the Illyrians.—Chalkidians of Olynthus—they
-  take into their protection the Macedonian cities on the coast,
-  when Amyntas runs away before the Illyrians. Commencement of the
-  Olynthian confederacy.—Equal and liberal principles on which the
-  confederacy was framed from the beginning. Accepted willingly
-  by the Macedonian and Greco-Macedonian cities.—The Olynthians
-  extend their confederacy among the Grecian cities in Chalkidic
-  Thrace—their liberal procedure—several cities join.—Akanthus
-  and Apollonia resist the proposition. Olynthus menaces. They
-  then solicit Spartan intervention against her.—Speech of
-  Kleigenes the Akanthian envoy at Sparta.—Envoys from Amyntas at
-  Sparta.—The Spartan Eudamidas is sent against Olynthus at once,
-  with such force as could be got ready. He checks the career
-  of the Olynthians.—Phœbidas, brother of Eudamidas, remains
-  behind to collect fresh force, and march to join his brother
-  in Thrace. He passes through the Theban territory and near
-  Thebes.—Conspiracy of Leontiades and the philo-Laconian party in
-  Thebes, to betray the town and citadel to Phœbidas.—The opposing
-  leaders—Leontiades and Ismenias—were both Polemarchs.—Leontiades
-  overawes the Senate, and arrests Ismenias: Pelopidas and
-  the leading friends of Ismenias go into exile.—Phœbidas in
-  the Kadmeia—terror and submission at Thebes.—Mixed feelings
-  at Sparta—great importance of the acquisition to Spartan
-  interests.—Displeasure at Sparta more pretended than real,
-  against Phœbidas; Agesilaus defends him.—Leontiades at Sparta—his
-  humble protestations and assurances—the ephors decide that they
-  will retain the Kadmeia, but at the same time fine Phœbidas.—The
-  Lacedæmonians cause Ismenias to be tried and put to death.
-  Iniquity of this proceeding.—Vigorous action of the Spartans
-  against Olynthus—Teleutias is sent there with a large force,
-  including a considerable Theban contingent. Derdas coöperates
-  with him.—Teleutias being at first successful, and having become
-  over-confident, sustains a terrible defeat from the Olynthians
-  under the walls of their city.—Agesipolis is sent to Olynthus
-  from Sparta with a reinforcement. He dies of a fever.—Polybiades
-  succeeds Agesipolis as commander—he reduces Olynthus to
-  submission—extinction of the Olynthian federation. Olynthus and
-  the other cities are enrolled as allies of Sparta.—Intervention
-  of Sparta with the government of Phlius.—Agesilaus marches an
-  army against Phlius—reduces the town by blockade, after a long
-  resistance. The Lacedæmonians occupy the acropolis, naming a
-  council of one hundred as governors.                            1-72
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXXVII.
-
-  FROM THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY THE LACEDÆMONIANS DOWN TO THE
-  CONGRESS AT SPARTA, AND PARTIAL PEACE, IN 371 B.C.
-
-  Great ascendency of Sparta on land in 379 B.C.—Sparta is now
-  feared as the great despot of Greece.—Strong complaint of
-  the rhetor Lysias, expressed at the Olympic festival of 384
-  B.C.—Panegyrical oration of Isokrates.—Censure upon Sparta
-  pronounced by the philo-Laconian Xenophon.—His manner of marking
-  the point of transition in his history—from Spartan glory to
-  Spartan disgrace.—Thebes under Leontiades and the philo-Spartan
-  oligarchy, with the Spartan garrison in the Kadmeia—oppressive
-  and tyrannical government.—Discontent at Thebes, though under
-  compression. Theban exiles at Athens.—The Theban exiles at
-  Athens, after waiting some time in hopes of a rising at Thebes,
-  resolve to begin a movement themselves.—Pelopidas takes the
-  lead—he, with Mellon and five other exiles, undertakes the task
-  of destroying the rulers of Thebes. Coöperation of Phyllidas the
-  secretary, and Charon at Thebes.—Plans of Phyllidas for admitting
-  the conspirators into Thebes and the government-house—he
-  invites the polemarchs to a banquet.—The scheme very nearly
-  frustrated—accident which prevented Chlidon from delivering
-  his message.—Pelopidas and Mellon get secretly into Thebes,
-  and conceal themselves in the house of Charon.—Leontiades
-  and Hypates are slain in their houses.—Phyllidas opens the
-  prison, and sets free the prisoners. Epaminondas and many other
-  citizens appear in arms.—Universal joy among the citizens on
-  the ensuing morning, when the event was known. General assembly
-  in the market-place—Pelopidas, Mellon, and Charon are named
-  the first Bœotarchs.—Aid to the conspirators from private
-  sympathizers in Attica.—Pelopidas and the Thebans prepare to
-  storm the Kadmeia—the Lacedæmonian garrison capitulate and
-  are dismissed—several of the oligarchical Thebans are put to
-  death in trying to go away along with them. The harmost who
-  surrendered the Kadmeia is put to death by the Spartans.—Powerful
-  sensation produced by this incident throughout the Grecian
-  world.—Indignation in Sparta at the revolution of Thebes—a
-  Spartan army sent forth at once under king Kleombrotus. He
-  retires from Bœotia without achieving anything.—Kleombrotus
-  passes by the Athenian frontier—alarm at Athens—condemnation
-  of the two Athenian generals who had favored the enterprise of
-  Pelopidas.—Attempt of Sphodrias from Thespiæ to surprise the
-  Peiræus by a night-march. He fails.—Different constructions
-  put upon this attempt and upon the character of Sphodrias.—The
-  Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens seized, but dismissed.—Trial of
-  Sphodrias at Sparta; acquitted through the private favor and
-  sympathies of Agesilaus.—Comparison of Spartan with Athenian
-  procedure.—The Athenians declare war against Sparta, and contract
-  alliance with Thebes.—Exertions of Athens to form a new maritime
-  confederacy, like the Confederacy of Delos. Thebes enrolls
-  herself as a member.—Athens sends round envoys to the islands
-  in the Ægean. Liberal principles on which the new confederacy
-  is formed.—Envoys sent round by Athens—Chabrias, Timotheus,
-  Kallistratus.—Service of Iphikrates in Thrace after the peace of
-  Antalkidas. He marries the daughter of the Thracian prince Kotys,
-  and acquires possession of a Thracian seaport, Drys.—Timotheus
-  and Kallistratus.—Synod of the new confederates assembled at
-  Athens—votes for war on a large scale.—Members of the confederacy
-  were at first willing and harmonious—a fleet is equipped.—New
-  property-tax imposed at Athens. The Solonian census.—The
-  Solonian census retained in the main, though with modifications,
-  at the restoration under the archonship of Eukleides in 403
-  B.C.—Archonship of Nausinikus in 378 B.C.—New census and
-  schedule then introduced, of all citizens worth twenty minæ and
-  upwards, distributed into classes, and entered for a fraction of
-  their total property; each class for a different fraction.—All
-  metics, worth more than twenty-five minæ, were registered in
-  the schedule; all in one class, each man for one-sixth of his
-  property. Aggregate schedule.—The Symmories—containing the
-  twelve hundred wealthiest citizens—the three hundred wealthiest
-  leaders of the Symmories.—Citizens not wealthy enough to be
-  included in the Symmories, yet still entered in the schedule,
-  and liable to property-tax. Purpose of the Symmories—extension
-  of the principle to the trierarchy.—Enthusiasm at Thebes
-  in defence of the new government and against Sparta.
-  Military training—the Sacred Band.—Epaminondas.—His previous
-  character and training—musical and intellectual, as well as
-  gymnastic. Conversation with philosophers, Sokratic as well as
-  Pythagorean.—His eloquence—his unambitious disposition—gentleness
-  of his political resentments.—Conduct of Epaminondas at the
-  Theban revolution of 379 B.C.—he acquires influence, through
-  Pelopidas, in the military organization of the city.—Agesilaus
-  marches to attack Thebes with the full force of the Spartan
-  confederacy—good system of defence adopted by Thebes—aid from
-  Athens under Chabrias. Increase of the Theban strength in
-  Bœotia, against the philo-Spartan oligarchies in the Bœotian
-  cities.—Second expedition of Agesilaus into Bœotia—he gains no
-  decisive advantage. The Thebans acquire greater and greater
-  strength. Agesilaus retires—he is disabled by a hurt in the
-  leg.—Kleombrotus conducts the Spartan force to invade Bœotia.—He
-  retires without reaching Bœotia.—Resolution of Sparta to equip
-  a large fleet, under the admiral Pollis. The Athenians send
-  out a fleet under Chabrias—Victory of Chabrias at sea near
-  Naxos. Recollections of the battle of Arginusæ.—Extension
-  of the Athenian maritime confederacy, in consequence of the
-  victory at Naxos.—Circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by Timotheus
-  with an Athenian fleet—his victory over the Lacedæmonian
-  fleet—his success in extending the Athenian confederacy—his
-  just dealing.—Financial difficulties of Athens.—She becomes
-  jealous of the growing strength of Thebes—steady and victorious
-  progress of Thebes in Bœotia.—Victory of Pelopidas at Tegyra
-  over the Lacedæmonians.—The Thebans expel the Lacedæmonians out
-  of all Bœotia, except Orchomenus—they reorganize the Bœotian
-  federation.—They invade Phokis—Kleombrotus is sent thither
-  with an army for defence—Athens makes a separate peace with
-  the Lacedæmonians.—Jason of Pheræ—his energetic character and
-  formidable power.—His prudent dealing with Polydamas.—The
-  Lacedæmonians find themselves unable to spare any aid for
-  Thessaly—they dismiss Polydamas with a refusal. He comes to terms
-  with Jason, who becomes Tagus of Thessaly.—Peace between Athens
-  and Sparta—broken off almost immediately. The Lacedæmonians
-  declare war again, and resume their plans upon Zakynthus and
-  Korkyra.—Lacedæmonian armament under Mnasippus, collected from
-  all the confederates, invades Korkyra.—Mnasippus besieges the
-  city—high cultivation of the adjoining lands.—The Korkyræans
-  blocked up in the city—supplies intercepted—want begins—no hope
-  of safety except in aid from Athens. Reinforcement arrives from
-  Athens—large Athenian fleet preparing under Timotheus. Mnasippus
-  is defeated and slain—the city supplied with provisions.—Approach
-  of the Athenian reinforcement—Hypermenês, successor of Mnasippus,
-  conveys away the armament, leaving his sick and much property
-  behind.—Tardy arrival of the Athenian fleet—it is commanded not
-  by Timotheus, but by Iphikrates—causes of the delay—preliminary
-  voyage of Timotheus, very long protracted.—Discontent at Athens,
-  in consequence of the absence of Timotheus—distress of the
-  armament assembled at Kalauria—Iphikrates and Kallistratus
-  accuse Timotheus. Iphikrates named admiral in his place.—Return
-  of Timotheus—an accusation is entered against him, but trial is
-  postponed until the return of Iphikrates from Korkyra.—Rapid
-  and energetic movements of Iphikrates towards Korkyra—his
-  excellent management of the voyage. On reaching Kephallenia,
-  he learns the flight of the Lacedæmonians from Korkyra.—He
-  goes on to Korkyra, and captures by surprise the ten Syracusan
-  triremes sent by Dionysius to the aid of Sparta.—Iphikrates in
-  want of money—he sends home Kallistratus to Athens—he finds
-  work for his seamen at Korkyra—he obtains funds by service
-  in Akarnania.—Favorable tone of public opinion at Athens, in
-  consequence of the success at Korkyra—the trial of Timotheus
-  went off easily—Jason and Alketas come to support him—his
-  quæstor is condemned to death.—Timotheus had been guilty
-  of delay, not justifiable under the circumstances—though
-  acquitted, his reputation suffered—he accepts command under
-  Persia.—Discouragement of Sparta in consequence of her defeat at
-  Korkyra, and of the triumphant position of Iphikrates.—Helikê
-  and Bura are destroyed by an earthquake.—The Spartans again send
-  Antalkidas to Persia, to sue for a fresh intervention—the Persian
-  satraps send down an order that the Grecian belligerents shall
-  make up their differences.—Athens disposed towards peace.—Athens
-  had ceased to be afraid of Sparta, and had become again jealous
-  of Thebes.—Equivocal position of the restored Platæa, now that
-  the Lacedæmonians had been expelled from Bœotia.—The Thebans
-  forestall a negotiation by seizing Platæa, and expelling the
-  inhabitants, who again take refuge at Athens.—Strong feeling
-  excited in Athens against the Thebans, on account of their
-  dealings with Platæa and Thespiæ. The Plataic discourse of
-  Isokrates.—Increased tendency of the Athenians towards peace
-  with Sparta—Athens and the Athenian confederacy give notice to
-  Thebes. General congress for peace at Sparta.—Speeches of the
-  Athenian envoys Kallias, Autokles, Kallistratus.—Kallistratus
-  and his policy.—He proposes that Sparta and Athens shall divide
-  between them the headship of Greece—Sparta on land, Athens at
-  sea—recognizing general autonomy.—Peace is concluded. Autonomy of
-  each city to be recognized: Sparta to withdraw her harmosts and
-  garrisons.—Oaths exchanged. Sparta takes the oath for herself and
-  her allies. Athens takes it for herself: her allies take it after
-  her, successively.—The oath proposed to the Thebans. Epaminondas,
-  the Theban envoy, insists upon taking the oath in the name of
-  the Bœotian federation. Agesilaus and the Spartans require that
-  he shall take it for Thebes alone.—Daring and emphatic speeches
-  delivered by Epaminondas in the congress—protesting against the
-  overweening pretensions of Sparta. He claims recognition of the
-  ancient institutions of Bœotia, with Thebes as president of
-  the federation.—Indignation of the Spartans, and especially of
-  Agesilaus—brief questions exchanged—Thebes is excluded from the
-  treaty.—General peace sworn, including Athens, Sparta, and the
-  rest—Thebes alone is excluded.—Terms of peace—compulsory and
-  indefeasible confederacies are renounced—voluntary alliances
-  alone maintained.—Real point in debate between Agesilaus and
-  Epaminondas.                                                  72-174
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXXVIII.
-
-  BATTLE OF LEUKTRA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.
-
-  Measures for executing the stipulations made at the congress of
-  Sparta.—Violent impulse of the Spartans against Thebes.—King
-  Kleombrotus is ordered to march into Bœotia, and encamps at
-  Leuktra.—New order of battle adopted by Epaminondas.—Confidence
-  of the Spartans and of Kleombrotus.—Battle of Leuktra.—Defeat
-  of the Spartans and death of Kleombrotus.—Faint adherence of
-  the Spartan allies.—Spartan camp after the defeat—confession of
-  defeat by sending to solicit the burial-truce.—Great surprise,
-  and immense alteration of feeling, produced throughout Greece
-  by the Theban victory.—Effect of the news at Sparta—heroic
-  self-command.—Reinforcements sent from Sparta.—Proceedings in
-  Bœotia after the battle of Leuktra. The Theban victory not
-  well received at Athens.—Jason of Pheræ arrives at Leuktra—the
-  Spartan army retires from Bœotia under capitulation.—Treatment
-  of the defeated citizens on reaching Sparta—suspension of
-  the law.—Lowered estimation of Sparta in Greece—prestige of
-  military superiority lost.—Extension of the power of Thebes.
-  Treatment of Orchomenus and Thespiæ.—Power and ambition of
-  Jason.—Plans of Jason—Pythian festival.—Assassination of Jason
-  at Pheræ.—Relief to Thebes by the death of Jason—satisfaction in
-  Greece.—Proceedings in Peloponnesus after the defeat of Leuktra.
-  Expulsion of the Spartan harmosts and dekarchies.—Skytalism at
-  Argos—violent intestine feud.—Discouragement and helplessness of
-  Sparta.—Athens places herself at the head of a new Peloponnesian
-  land-confederacy.—Accusation preferred in the Amphyctionic
-  assembly, by Thebes against Sparta.—The Spartans are condemned
-  to a fine—importance of this fact as an indication.—Proceedings
-  in Arcadia.—Reëstablishment of the city of Mantinea by its own
-  citizens.—Humiliating refusal experienced by Agesilaus from the
-  Mantineans—keenly painful to a Spartan.—Feeling against Agesilaus
-  at Sparta.—Impulse among the Arcadians towards Pan-Arcadian
-  union. Opposition from Orchomenus and Tegea.—Revolution at
-  Tegea—the philo-Spartan party are put down or expelled.—Tegea
-  becomes anti-Spartan, and favorable to the Pan-Arcadian
-  union.—Pan-Arcadian union is formed.—March of Agesilaus against
-  Mantinea. Evidence of lowered sentiment in Sparta.—Application by
-  the Arcadians to Athens for aid against Sparta; it is refused:
-  they then apply to the Thebans.—Proceedings and views of
-  Epaminondas since the battle of Leuktra.—Plans of Epaminondas for
-  restoring the Messenians in Peloponnesus.—Also, for consolidating
-  the Arcadians against Sparta.—Epaminondas and the Theban army
-  arrive in Arcadia. Great allied force assembled there. The
-  allies entreat him to invade Laconia.—Reluctance of Epaminondas
-  to invade Laconia—reasonable grounds for it.—He marches into
-  Laconia—four lines of invasion.—He crosses the Eurotas and
-  approaches close to Sparta.—Alarm at Sparta—arrival of various
-  allies to her aid by sea.—Discontent in Laconia among the Periœki
-  and Helots—danger to Sparta from that cause.—Vigilant defence of
-  Sparta by Agesilaus.—Violent emotion of the Spartans, especially
-  the women. Partial attack upon Sparta by Epaminondas.—He retires
-  without attempting to storm Sparta: ravages Laconia down to
-  Gythium. He returns into Arcadia.—Great effect of this invasion
-  upon Grecian opinion—Epaminondas is exalted, and Sparta farther
-  lowered.—Foundation of the Arcadian Megalopolis.—Foundation of
-  Messênê.—Abstraction of Western Laconia from Sparta.—Periœki
-  and Helots established as freemen along with the Messenians
-  on the Lacedæmonian border.—The details of this reorganizing
-  process unhappily unknown.—Megalopolis—the Pan-Arcadian Ten
-  Thousand.—Epaminondas and his army evacuate Peloponnesus.—The
-  Spartans solicit aid from Athens—language of their envoys, as
-  well as those from Corinth and Phlius, at Athens.—Reception of
-  the envoys—the Athenians grant the prayer.—Vote passed to aid
-  Sparta—Iphikrates is named general.—March of Iphikrates and his
-  army to the Isthmus.—Trial of Epaminondas at Thebes for retaining
-  his command beyond the legal time—his honorable and easy
-  acquittal.                                                   174-241
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXXIX.
-
-  FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO THE DEATH OF
-  PELOPIDAS.
-
-  Changes in Peloponnesus since the battle of Leuktra.—Changes
-  out of Peloponnesus.—Amyntas prince of Macedonia.—Ambitious
-  views of Athens after the battle of Leuktra.—Her aspirations to
-  maritime empire, and to the partial recovery of kleruchies.—She
-  wishes to recover Amphipolis—Amyntas recognizes her right to the
-  place.—Athens and Amphipolis.—Death of Jason and Amyntas—state
-  of Thessaly and Macedonia.—Alexander of Pheræ—he is opposed
-  by Pelopidas—influence of Thebes in Thessaly.—State of
-  Macedonia—Alexander son of Amyntas—Euridikê—Ptolemy.—Assistance
-  rendered by the Athenian Iphikrates to the family of
-  Amyntas.—Iphikrates and Timotheus.—The Spartan allied
-  army defends the line of Mount Oneium—Epaminondas breaks
-  through it, and marches into Peloponnesus.—Sikyon joins the
-  Thebans—Phlius remains faithful to Sparta.—Reinforcement from
-  Syracuse to Peloponnesus, in aid of Sparta.—Forbearance and
-  mildness of Epaminondas.—Energetic action and insolence of the
-  Arcadians—Lykomedes animates and leads them on.—Great influence
-  of Lykomedes.—Elis tries to recover her supremacy over the
-  Triphylian towns, which are admitted into the Arcadian union,
-  to the great offence of Elis.—Mission of Philiskus to Greece
-  by Ariobarzanes.—Political importance of the reconstitution
-  of Messênê, which now becomes the great subject of discord.
-  Messenian victor proclaimed at Olympia.—Expedition of Pelopidas
-  into Thessaly.—The Tearless Battle—victory of the Spartan
-  Archidamus over the Arcadians.—Third expedition of Epaminondas
-  into Peloponnesus—his treatment of the Achæan cities.—The Thebans
-  reverse the policy of Epaminondas, on complaint of the Arcadians
-  and others. They do not reëlect him Bœotarch.—Disturbed state of
-  Sikyon. Euphron makes himself despot—his rapacious and sanguinary
-  conduct.—Sufferings of the Phliasians—their steady adherence
-  to Sparta.—Assistance rendered to Phlius by the Athenian
-  Chares—surprise of the fort of Thyamia.—Euphron is expelled from
-  Sikyon by the Arcadians and Thebans—he retires to the harbor,
-  which he surrenders to the Spartans.—Euphron returns to Sikyon—he
-  goes to Thebes, and is there assassinated.—The assassins are put
-  upon their trial at Thebes—their defence.—They are acquitted by
-  the Theban Senate.—Sentiment among the Many of Sikyon, favorable
-  to Euphron—honors shown to his body and memory.—The Sikyonians
-  recapture their harbor from the Spartans.—Application of Thebes
-  for Persian countenance to her headship—mission of Pelopidas and
-  other envoys to Susa.—Pelopidas obtains from Persia a favorable
-  rescript.—Protest of the Athenians and Arcadians against the
-  rescript.—Pelopidas brings back the rescript. It is read publicly
-  before the Greek states convoked at Thebes.—The states convoked
-  at Thebes refuse to receive the rescript. The Arcadian deputies
-  protest against the headship of Thebes.—The Thebans send the
-  rescript to be received at Corinth; the Corinthians refuse:
-  failure of the Theban object.—Mission of Pelopidas to Thessaly.
-  He is seized and detained prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ.—The
-  Thebans despatch an army to rescue Pelopidas. The army, defeated
-  and retreating, is only saved by Epaminondas, then a private
-  man.—Triumph of Alexander in Thessaly and discredit of Thebes.
-  Harsh treatment of Pelopidas.—Second Theban army sent into
-  Thessaly, under Epaminondas, for the rescue of Pelopidas, who
-  is at length released by Alexander under a truce.—Oropus is
-  taken from Athens and placed in the hands of the Thebans. The
-  Athenians recall Chares from Corinth.—Athens discontented with
-  her Peloponnesian allies; she enters into alliance with Lykomedes
-  and the Arcadians. Death of Lykomedes.—Epaminondas is sent as
-  envoy into Arcadia; he speaks against Kallistratus.—Project of
-  the Athenians to seize Corinth; they are disappointed.—They
-  apply to Sparta.—Refusal of the Spartans to acknowledge the
-  independence of Messênê; they reproach their allies with
-  consenting.—Corinth, Epidaurus, Phlius, etc., conclude peace
-  with Thebes, but without Sparta—recognizing the independence of
-  Messênê.—Athens sends a fresh embassy to the Persian king—altered
-  rescript from him, pronouncing Amphipolis to be an Athenian
-  possession.—Timotheus sent with a fleet to Asia—Agesilaus—revolt
-  of Ariobarzanes.—Conquest of Samos by Timotheus.—Partial
-  readmission to the Chersonese obtained by Timotheus.—Athenian
-  kleruchs or settlers sent thither as proprietors.—Difficulties
-  of Athens in establishing kleruchs in the Chersonese.—Kotys
-  of Thrace.—Timotheus supersedes Iphikrates.—Timotheus acts
-  with success on the coast of Macedonia and Chalkidikê. He
-  fails at Amphipolis.—Timotheus acts against Kotys and near the
-  Chersonese.—Measures of the Thebans in Thessaly—Pelopidas is sent
-  with an army against Alexander of Pheræ.—Epaminondas exhorts the
-  Thebans to equip a fleet against Athens.—Discussion between him
-  and Menekleidas in the Theban assembly.—Menekleidas seemingly
-  right in dissuading naval preparations.—Epaminondas in command
-  of a Theban fleet in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. Pelopidas
-  attacks Alexander of Pheræ—his success in battle—his rashness—he
-  is slain.—Excessive grief of the Thebans and Thessalians for his
-  death.—The Thebans completely subdue Alexander of Pheræ.     242-310
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXXX.
-
-  FROM THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA.
-
-  Conspiracy of the knights of Orchomenus against
-  Thebes—destruction of Orchomenus by the Thebans.—Repugnance
-  excited against the Thebans—regret and displeasure of
-  Epaminondas.—Return of Epaminondas from his cruise—renewed
-  complications in Peloponnesus.—State of Peloponnesus—Eleians and
-  Achæans in alliance with Sparta.—The Eleians aim at recovering
-  Triphylia—the Spartans, at recovering Messênê.—War between
-  the Eleians and Arcadians; the latter occupy Olympia.—Second
-  invasion of Elis by the Arcadians. Distress of the Eleians.
-  Archidamus and the Spartans invade Arcadia.—Archidamus
-  establishes a Spartan garrison at Kromnus. The Arcadians gain
-  advantages over him—armistice.—The Arcadians blockade Kromnus,
-  and capture the Spartan garrison.—The Arcadians celebrate
-  the Olympic festival along with the Pisatans—excluding the
-  Eleians.—The Eleians invade the festival by arms—conflict
-  on the plain of Olympia—bravery of the Eleians.—Feelings of
-  the spectators at Olympia.—The Arcadians take the treasures
-  of Olympia to pay their militia.—Violent dissensions arising
-  among the members of the Arcadian communion, in consequence
-  of this appropriation. The Arcadian assembly pronounces
-  against it.—Farther dissensions in Arcadia—invitation sent to
-  the Thebans—peace concluded with Elis.—The peace generally
-  popular—celebrated at Tegea—seizure of many oligarchical
-  members at Tegea by the Theban harmost.—Conduct of the Theban
-  harmost.—View taken by Epaminondas.—His view is more consistent
-  with the facts recounted by Xenophon, than the view of Xenophon
-  himself.—Policy of Epaminondas and the Thebans.—Epaminondas
-  marches with a Theban army into Peloponnesus, to muster at
-  Tegea.—Agesilaus and the Spartans are sent for.—Night-march of
-  Epaminondas to surprise Sparta. Agesilaus is informed in time
-  to prevent surprise.—Epaminondas comes up to Sparta, but finds
-  it defended.—He marches back to Tegea—despatches his cavalry
-  from thence to surprise Mantinea.—The surprise is baffled,
-  by the accidental arrival of the Athenian cavalry—battle
-  of cavalry near Mantinea, in which the Athenians have the
-  advantage.—Epaminondas resolves to attack the enemy near
-  Mantinea.—View of Xenophon—that this resolution was forced upon
-  him by despair—examined.—Alacrity of the army of Epaminondas,
-  when the order for fighting is given.—Mantinico-Tegeatic
-  plain—position of the Lacedæmonians and Mantineans.—March of
-  Epaminondas from Tegea.—False impression produced upon the
-  enemy by his manœuvres.—Theban order of battle—plans of the
-  commander.—Disposition of the cavalry on both sides.—Unprepared
-  state of the Lacedæmonian army.—Battle of Mantinea—complete
-  success of the dispositions of Epaminondas.—Victory of the
-  Thebans—Epaminondas is mortally wounded.—Extreme discouragement
-  caused by his death among the troops, even when in full victory
-  and pursuit.—Victory claimed by both sides—nevertheless the
-  Lacedæmonians are obliged to solicit the burial-truce.—Dying
-  moments of Epaminondas.—The two other best Theban officers
-  are slain also in the battle.—Who slew Epaminondas? Different
-  persons honored for it.—Peace concluded—_statu quo_ recognized,
-  including the independence of Messênê—Sparta alone stands
-  out—the Thebans return home.—Results of the battle of Mantinea,
-  as appreciated by Xenophon—unfair to the Thebans.—Character of
-  Epaminondas.—Disputes among the inhabitants of Megalopolis. The
-  Thebans send thither a force under Pammenes, which maintains the
-  incorporation.—Agesilaus and Archidamus.—State of Persia—revolted
-  satraps and provinces—Datames.—Formidable revolt of the satraps
-  in Asia Minor—it is suppressed by the Persian court, through
-  treachery.—Agesilaus goes as commander to Egypt—Chabrias is
-  there also.—Death and character of Agesilaus.—State of Egypt
-  and Persia.—Death of Artaxerxes Mnemon. Murders in the royal
-  family.—Athenian maritime operations—Timotheus makes war
-  against Amphipolis and against Kotys.—Ergophilus succeeds
-  Timotheus at the Chersonese—Kallisthenes succeeds him against
-  Amphipolis—war at sea against Alexander of Pheræ.—Ergophilus
-  and Kallisthenes both unsuccessful—both tried.—Autokles in the
-  Hellespont and Bosphorus—convoy for the corn-ships out of the
-  Euxine.—Miltokythes revolts from Kotys in Thrace—ill-success of
-  the Athenians.—Menon—Timomachus—as commanders in the Chersonese.
-  The Athenians lose Sestos.—Kephisodotus in the Chersonese.
-  Charidemus crosses thither from Abydos.—Assassination of
-  Kotys.—Kersobleptes succeeds Kotys. Berisades and Amadokus, his
-  rivals—ill-success of Athens—Kephisodotus.—Improved prospects of
-  Athens in the Chersonese—Athenodorus—Charidemus.—Charidemus is
-  forced to accept the convention of Athenodorus—his evasions—the
-  Chersonese with Sestos is restored to Athens.—The transmarine
-  empire of Athens now at its maximum. Mischievous effects of her
-  conquests made against Olynthus.—Maximum of second Athenian
-  empire—accession of Philip of Macedon.                       311-383
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXXXI.
-
-  SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT
-  BEFORE SYRACUSE.
-
-  Syracuse after the destruction of the Athenian
-  armament.—Anticipation of the impending ruin of Athens—revolution
-  at Thurii.—Syracusan squadron under Hermokrates goes to
-  act against Athens in the Ægean.—Disappointed hopes—defeat
-  at Kynossema—second ruinous defeat at Kyzikus.—Sufferings
-  of the Syracusan seamen—disappointment and displeasure at
-  Syracuse.—Banishment of Hermokrates and his colleagues. Sentence
-  communicated by Hermokrates to the armament.—Internal state of
-  Syracuse—constitution of Diokles.—Difficulty of determining
-  what that constitution was.—Invasion from Carthage.—State of
-  the Carthaginians.—Extent of Carthaginian empire—power, and
-  population—Liby-Phœnicians.—Harsh dealing of Carthage towards
-  her subjects. Colonies sent out from Carthage.—Military force of
-  Carthage.—Political constitution of Carthage.—Oligarchical system
-  and sentiment at Carthage.—Powerful families at Carthage—Mago,
-  Hamilkar, Hasdrubal.—Quarrel between Egesta and Selinus in
-  Sicily.—Application of Egesta to Carthage for aid—application
-  granted—eagerness of Hannibal.—Carthaginian envoys sent to
-  Sicily.—Hannibal crosses over to Sicily with a very large
-  armament. He lays siege to Selinus.—Vigorous assault on
-  Selinus—gallant resistance—the town is at length stormed.—Selinus
-  is sacked and plundered—merciless slaughter.—Delay of the
-  Syracusans and others in sending aid. Answer of Hannibal to
-  their embassy.—Hannibal marches to Himera and besieges it.
-  Aid from Syracuse under Diokles—sally from Himera. Hannibal
-  destroys Himera, and slaughters three thousand prisoners, as an
-  expiation to the memory of his grandfather.—Alarm throughout
-  the Greeks of Sicily—Hannibal dismisses his army, and returns
-  to Carthage.—New intestine discord in Syracuse—Hermokrates
-  comes to Sicily.—He levies troops to effect his return by
-  force.—He is obliged to retire—he establishes himself in the
-  ruins of Selinus, and acts against the Carthaginians.—His
-  father attempts to reënter Syracuse, with the bones of the
-  Syracusans slain near Himera. Banishment of Diokles.—Hermokrates
-  tries again to penetrate into Syracuse with an armed force.—He
-  is defeated and slain.—First appearance of Dionysius at
-  Syracuse.—Weakness of Syracuse, arising out of this political
-  discord—party of Hermokrates. Danger from Carthage.—Fresh
-  invasion of Sicily, by the Carthaginians. Immense host under
-  Hannibal and Imilkon.—Great alarm in Sicily—active preparations
-  for defence at Agrigentum.—Grandeur, wealth, and population of
-  Agrigentum.—The Carthaginians attack Agrigentum. They demolish
-  the tombs near its walls. Distemper among their army. Religious
-  terrors—sacrifice.—Syracusan reinforcement to Agrigentum,
-  under Daphnæus. His victory over the Iberians. He declines to
-  pursue them.—Daphnæus enters Agrigentum. Discontent against
-  the Agrigentine generals, for having been backward in attack.
-  They are put to death.—Privations in both armies—Hamilkar
-  captures the provision-ships of the Syracusans—Agrigentum
-  is evacuated.—Agrigentum taken and plundered by the
-  Carthagians.—Terror throughout Sicily.—Bitter complaints against
-  the Syracusan generals.—The Hermokratean party at Syracuse comes
-  forward to subvert the government and elevate Dionysius.—Harangue
-  of Dionysius in the Syracusan assembly against the generals,
-  who are deposed by vote of the people, and Dionysius with others
-  appointed in their room.—Ambitious arts of Dionysius—he intrigues
-  against his colleagues, and frustrates all their proceedings. He
-  procures a vote for restoring the Hermokratean exiles.—Dionysius
-  is sent with a Syracusan reinforcement to Gela. He procures the
-  execution or banishment of the Geloan oligarchy.—He returns
-  to Syracuse with an increased force—he accuses his colleagues
-  of gross treason.—Dionysius is named general, single-handed,
-  with full powers.—Apparent repentance of the people after the
-  vote. Stratagem of Dionysius to obtain a vote ensuring to him a
-  body of paid guards.—March of Dionysius to Leontini.—Dionysius
-  establishes himself at Syracuse as despot.—Dionysius as
-  despot—the means whereby he attained the power.              383-446
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXXXII.
-
-  SICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS AT SYRACUSE.
-
-  Imilkon with the Carthaginian army marches from Agrigentum to
-  attack Gela.—Brave defence of the Geloans—Dionysius arrives
-  with an army to relieve them.—Plan of Dionysius for a general
-  attack on the Carthaginian army.—He is defeated and obliged
-  to retreat.—He evacuates Gela and Kamarina—flight of the
-  population of both places, which are taken and sacked by the
-  Carthaginians.—Indignation and charges of treachery against
-  Dionysius.—Mutiny of the Syracusan horsemen—they ride off to
-  Syracuse, and declare against Dionysius.—Their imprudence.
-  Dionysius master of Syracuse.—Propositions of peace come from
-  Imilkon. Terms of peace.—Collusion of Dionysius with the
-  Carthaginians, who confirm his dominion over Syracuse. Pestilence
-  in the Carthaginian army.—Near coincidence, in time, of this
-  peace, with the victory of Lysander at Ægospotami—sympathy
-  of Sparta with Dionysius.—Depressed condition of the towns
-  of Southern Sicily, from Cape Pachynus to Lilybæum.—Strong
-  position of Dionysius.—Strong fortifications and other
-  buildings erected by Dionysius, in and about Ortygia.—He
-  assigns houses in Ortygia to his soldiers and partisans—he
-  distributes the lands of Syracuse anew.—Exorbitant exactions
-  of Dionysius—discontent at Syracuse.—Dionysius marches out of
-  Syracuse against the Sikels—mutiny of the Syracusan soldiers
-  at Herbesa—Dorikus the commander is slain.—The Syracusan
-  insurgents, with assistance from Rhegium and Messênê, besiege
-  Dionysius in Ortygia.—Despair of Dionysius—he applies to a
-  body of Campanians in the Carthaginian service, for aid.—He
-  amuses the assailants with feigned submission—arrival of the
-  Campanians—victory of Dionysius.—Dionysius strengthens his
-  despotism more than before—assistance lent to him by the
-  Spartan Aristus—Nikoteles the Corinthian is put to death.—He
-  disarms the Syracusan citizens—strengthens the fortifications
-  of Ortygia—augments his mercenary force.—Dionysius conquers
-  Naxus, Katana, and Leontini.—Great power of Dionysius.
-  Foundation of Alæsa by Archonides.—Resolution of Dionysius to
-  make war upon Carthage.—Locality of Syracuse—danger to which
-  the town had been exposed, in the Athenian siege.—Additional
-  fortifications made by Dionysius along the northern ridge of
-  the cliffs of Epipolæ, up the Euryalus.—Popularity of the
-  work—efforts made by all the Syracusans as well as by Dionysius
-  himself.—Preparations of Dionysius for aggressive war against
-  the Carthaginians.—Improvement in the behavior of Dionysius
-  towards the Syracusans.—His conciliatory offers to other
-  Grecian cities in Sicily. Hostile sentiment of the Rhegines
-  towards him. Their application to Messênê.—He makes peace with
-  Messênê and Rhegium.—He desires to marry a Rhegine wife. His
-  proposition is declined by the city. He is greatly incensed.—He
-  makes a proposition to marry a wife from Lokri—his wish is
-  granted—he marries a Lokrian maiden named Doris.—Immense warlike
-  equipment of Dionysius at Syracuse—arms, engines, etc.—Naval
-  preparations in the harbor of Syracuse. Enlargement of the bulk
-  of ships of war—quadriremes and quinqueremes.—General sympathy
-  of the Syracusans in his projects against Carthage.—He hires
-  soldiers from all quarters.—He celebrates his nuptials with two
-  wives on the same day—Doris and Aristomachê. Temporary good
-  feeling at Syracuse towards him.—He convokes the Syracusan
-  assembly, and exhorts them to war against Carthage.—He desires
-  to arrest the emigration of those who were less afraid of the
-  Carthaginian dominion than of his.—He grants permission to
-  plunder the Carthaginian residents and ships at Syracuse. Alarm
-  at Carthage—suffering in Africa from the pestilence.—Dionysius
-  marches out from Syracuse with a prodigious army against
-  the Carthaginians in Sicily.—Insurrection against Carthage,
-  among the Sicilian Greeks subject to her. Terrible tortures
-  inflicted on the Carthaginians.—Dionysius besieges the
-  Carthaginian seaport Motyê.—Situation of Motyê—operations of
-  the siege—vigorous defence.—Dionysius overruns the neighboring
-  dependencies of Carthage—doubtful result of the siege of
-  Motyê—appearance of Imilkon with a Carthaginian fleet—he is
-  obliged to return.—Desperate defence of Motyê. It is at length
-  taken by a nocturnal attack.—Plunder of Motyê—the inhabitants
-  either slaughtered or sold for slaves.—Farther operations of
-  Dionysius.—Arrival of Imilkon with a Carthaginian armament—his
-  successful operations—he retakes Motyê.—Dionysius retires to
-  Syracuse.—Imilkon captures Messênê.—Revolt of the Sikels from
-  Dionysius. Commencement of Tauromenium.—Provisions of Dionysius
-  for the defence of Syracuse—he strengthens Leontini—he advances
-  to Katana with his land-army as well as his fleet.—Naval battle
-  off Katana—great victory of the Carthaginian fleet under
-  Magon.—Arrival of Imilkon to join the fleet of Magon near
-  Katana—fruitless invitation to the Campanians of Ætna.—Dionysius
-  retreats to Syracuse—discontent of his army.—Imilkon marches
-  close up to Syracuse—the Carthaginian fleet come up to occupy
-  the Great Harbor—their imposing entry. Fortified position
-  of Imilkon near the Harbor.—Imilkon plunders the suburb of
-  Achradina—blockades Syracuse by sea.—Naval victory gained by the
-  Syracusan fleet during the absence of Dionysius.—Effect of this
-  victory in exalting the spirits of the Syracusans.—Public meeting
-  convened by Dionysius—mutinous spirit against him—vehement
-  speech by Thedorus.—Sympathy excited by the speech in the
-  Syracusan assembly.—The Spartan Pharakidas upholds Dionysius—who
-  finally dismisses the assembly, and silences the adverse
-  movement.—Alliance of Sparta with Dionysius—suitable to her
-  general policy at the time. The emancipation of Syracuse depended
-  upon Pharakidas.—Dionysius tries to gain popularity.—Terrific
-  pestilence among the Carthaginian army before Syracuse.—Dionysius
-  attacks the Carthaginian camp. He deliberately sacrifices a
-  detachment of his mercenaries.—Success of Dionysius, both by sea
-  and by land, against the Syracusan position.—Conflagration of
-  the Carthaginian camp—exultation at Syracuse.—Imilkon concludes
-  a secret treaty with Dionysius, to be allowed to escape with the
-  Carthaginians, on condition of abandoning his remaining army.
-  Destruction of the remaining Carthaginian army, except Sikels and
-  Iberians.—Distress at Carthage—miserable end of Imilkon.—Danger
-  of Carthage—anger and revolt of her African subjects—at length
-  put down.                                                    446-512
-
-
-
-
-HISTORY OF GREECE.
-
-
-
-
-PART II.
-
-CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXVI.
-
-FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS DOWN TO THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY
-SPARTA.
-
-
-The peace or convention[1] which bears the name of Antalkidas, was an
-incident of serious and mournful import in Grecian history. Its true
-character cannot be better described than in a brief remark and reply
-which we find cited in Plutarch. “Alas for Hellas (observed some one
-to Agesilaus) when we see our Laconians _medising_!”—“Nay (replied
-the Spartan king), say rather the Medes (Persians) _laconising_.”[2]
-
-  [1] It goes by both names; Xenophon more commonly speaks of ἡ
-  εἰρήνη—Isokrates, of αἱ συνθῆκαι.
-
-  Though we say, the peace _of_ Antalkidas, the Greek authors say ἡ
-  ἐπ’ Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνη; I do not observe that they ever phrase it
-  with the genitive case Ἀνταλκίδου simply, without a preposition.
-
-  [2] Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 22 (compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 23;
-  and his Apophtheg. Lacon. p. 213 B). Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀγησίλαος, πρὸς
-  τὸν εἰπόντα—Φεῦ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ὅπου μηδίζουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ Λάκωνες!...
-  Μᾶλλον, εἶπεν, οἱ Μῆδοι λακωνίζουσι.
-
-These two propositions do not exclude each other. Both were perfectly
-true. The convention emanated from a separate partnership between
-Spartan and Persian interests. It was solicited by the Spartan
-Antalkidas, and propounded by him to Tiribazus on the express
-ground, that it was exactly calculated to meet the Persian king’s
-purposes and wishes,—as we learn even from the philo-Laconian
-Xenophon.[3] While Sparta and Persia were both great gainers, no
-other Grecian state gained anything, as the convention was originally
-framed. But after the first rejection, Antalkidas saw the necessity
-of conciliating Athens by the addition of a special article providing
-that Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros should be restored to her.[4] This
-addition seems to have been first made in the abortive negotiations
-which form the subject of the discourse already mentioned, pronounced
-by Andokides. It was continued afterwards and inserted in the final
-decree which Antalkidas and Tiribazus brought down in the king’s name
-from Susa; and it doubtless somewhat contributed to facilitate the
-adherence of Athens, though the united forces of Sparta and Persia
-had become so overwhelming, that she could hardly have had the means
-of standing out, even if the supplementary article had been omitted.
-Nevertheless, this condition undoubtedly did secure to Athens a
-certain share in the gain, conjointly with the far larger shares both
-of Sparta and Persia. It is, however, not less true, that Athens,
-as well as Thebes,[5] assented to the peace only under fear and
-compulsion. As to the other states of Greece, they were interested
-merely in the melancholy capacity of partners in the general loss and
-degradation.
-
-  [3] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 14.
-
-  [4] The restoration of these three islands forms the basis
-  of historical truth in the assertion of Isokrates, that the
-  Lacedæmonians were so subdued by the defeat of Knidus, as to come
-  and tender maritime empire to Athens—(ἐλθεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν δώσοντας)
-  Orat. vii, (Areopagit.) s. 74; Or. ix, (Evagor.); s. 83. But the
-  assertion is true respecting a later time; for the Lacedæmonians
-  really did make this proposition to Athens after they had been
-  enfeebled and humiliated by the battle of Leuktra; but not before
-  (Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 1, 3).
-
-  [5] Diodor. xiv, 111.
-
-That degradation stood evidently marked in the form, origin, and
-transmission, of the convention, even apart from its substance.
-It was a fiat issued from the court of Susa; as such it was
-ostentatiously proclaimed and “sent down” from thence to Greece. Its
-authority was derived from the king’s seal, and its sanction from his
-concluding threat, that he would make war against all recusants. It
-was brought down by the satrap Tiribazus (along with Antalkidas),
-read by him aloud, and heard with submission by the assembled
-Grecian envoys, after he had called their special attention to the
-regal seal.[6] Such was the convention which Sparta, the ancient
-president of the Grecian world had been the first to solicit at
-the hands of the Persian king, and which she now not only set the
-example of sanctioning by her own spontaneous obedience, but even
-avouched as guarantee and champion against all opponents; preparing
-to enforce it at the point of the sword against any recusant state,
-whether party to it or not. Such was the convention which was now
-inscribed on stone, and placed as a permanent record in the temples
-of the Grecian cities;[7] nay, even in the common sanctuaries,—the
-Olympic, Pythian, and others,—the great _foci_ and rallying points of
-Pan-hellenic sentiment. Though called by the name of a convention,
-it was on the very face of it a peremptory mandate proceeding from
-the ancient enemy of Greece, an acceptance of which was nothing less
-than an act of obedience. While to him it was a glorious trophy, to
-all Pan-hellenic patriots it was the deepest disgrace and insult.[8]
-Effacing altogether the idea of an independent Hellenic world,
-bound together and regulated by the self-acting forces and common
-sympathies of its own members,—even the words of the convention
-proclaimed it as an act of intrusive foreign power, and erected the
-barbarian king into a dictatorial settler of Grecian differences; a
-guardian[9] who cared for the peace of Greece more than the Greeks
-themselves. And thus, looking to the form alone, it was tantamount to
-that symbol of submission—the cession of earth and water—which had
-been demanded a century before by the ancestor of Artaxerxes from the
-ancestors of the Spartans and Athenians; a demand, which both Sparta
-and Athens then not only repudiated, but resented so cruelly, as to
-put to death the heralds by whom it was brought,—stigmatizing the
-Æginetans and others as traitors to Hellas for complying with it.[10]
-Yet nothing more would have been implied in such cession than what
-stood embodied in the inscription on that “colonna infame,” which
-placed the peace of Antalkidas side by side with the Pan-hellenic
-glories and ornaments at Olympia.[11]
-
-  [6] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 30, 31. Ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ παρήγγειλεν ὁ Τιρίβαζος
-  παρεῖναι ~τοὺς βουλομένους ὑπακοῦσαι~, ἣν βασιλεὺς εἰρήνην
-  καταπέμποι, ταχέως πάντες παρεγένοντο. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ξυνῆλθον,
-  ~ἐπιδείξας ὁ Τιρίβαζος τὰ βασιλέως σημεῖα~, ἀνεγίνωσκε τὰ
-  γεγραμμένα, εἶχε δὲ ὧδε·
-
-  Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς ~νομίζει δίκαιον~, τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις
-  ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομένας καὶ Κύπρον· τὰς δὲ ἄλλας
-  Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας, αὐτονόμους εἶναι, πλὴν
-  Λήμνου, καὶ Ἴμβρου καὶ Σκύρου, ταύτας δὲ, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον, εἶναι
-  Ἀθηναίων. Ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται, ~τούτοις
-  ἐγὼ πολεμήσω~, μετὰ τῶν ταὐτα βουλομένων, καὶ πέζῇ καὶ κατὰ
-  θάλασσαν, καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ χρήμασιν.
-
-  [7] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 211. Καὶ ταύτας ἡμᾶς
-  ἠνάγκασεν (the Persian king) ἐν στήλαις λιθίναις ἀναγράψαντας ἐν
-  τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν ἱερῶν ἀναθεῖναι, πολὺ κάλλιον τρόπαιον τῶν ἐν
-  ταῖς μάχαις γιγνομένων.
-
-  The Oratio Panegyrica of Isokrates (published about 380
-  B.C., seven years afterwards) from which I here copy, is
-  the best evidence of the feelings with which an intelligent
-  and patriotic Greek looked upon this treaty at the time;
-  when it was yet recent, but when there had been full time
-  to see how the Lacedæmonians carried it out. His other
-  orations, though valuable and instructive, were published
-  later, and represent the feelings of after-time.
-
-  Another contemporary, Plato in his Menexenus (c. 17, p. 245
-  D), stigmatizes severely “the base and unholy act (αἰσχρὸν καὶ
-  ἀνόσιον ἔργον) of surrendering Greeks to the foreigner,” and
-  asserts that the Athenians resolutely refused to sanction it.
-  This is a sufficient mark of his opinion respecting the peace of
-  Antalkidas.
-
-  [8] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 207. Ἃ χρῆν ἀναιρεῖν,
-  καὶ μηδεμίαν ἐᾷν ἡμέραν, νομίζοντες, ~προστάγματα καὶ οὐ
-  συνθήκας~ εἶναι, etc. (s. 213). Αἰσχρὸν ἡμᾶς ~ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος
-  ὑβριζομένης~, μηδεμίαν ποιήσασθαι κοινὴν τιμωρίαν, etc.
-
-  The word προστάγματα exactly corresponds with an expression of
-  Xenophon (put in the mouth of Autokles the Athenian envoy at
-  Sparta), respecting the dictation of the peace of Antalkidas by
-  Artaxerxes—Καὶ ὅτε μὲν ~Βασιλεὺς προσέταττεν~ αὐτονόμους τὰς
-  πόλεις εἶναι, etc. (Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 9).
-
-  [9] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 205. Καίτοι πῶς οὐ χρὴ
-  διαλύειν ταύτας τὰς ὁμολογίας, ἐξ ὧν τοιαύτη δόξα γέγονεν, ὥστε
-  ὁ μὲν Βάρβαρος κήδεται τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης ἐστὶν,
-  ἡμῶν δέ τινές εἰσιν οἱ λυμαινόμενοι καὶ κακῶς ποιοῦντες αὐτήν;
-
-  The word employed by Photius in his abstract of Theopompus
-  (whether it be the expression of Theopompus himself, we cannot
-  be certain—see Fragm. 111, ed. Didot), to designate the position
-  taken by Artaxerxes in reference to this peace, is—τὴν εἰρήνην
-  ἣν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐβράβευσεν—which implies the peremptory decision
-  of an official judge, analogous to another passage (139) of the
-  Panegyr. Orat. of Isokrates—Νῦν δ’ ἐκεῖνός (Artaxerxes) ἐστιν, ὁ
-  διοικῶν τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ μόνον οὐκ ἐπιστάθμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
-  καθιστάς. Πλὴν γὰρ τούτου τί τῶν ἄλλων ὑπόλοιπόν ἐστιν; Οὐ καὶ
-  τοῦ πολέμου κύριος ἐγένετο, καὶ ~τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπρυτάνευσε~, καὶ
-  τῶν παρόντων πραγμάτων ἐπιστάτης καθέστηκεν;
-
-  [10] Herodot. vi, 49. κατηγόρεον Αἰγινητέων τὰ πεποιήκοιεν,
-  προδόντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα.
-
-  [11] Isokrates, Orat. xii, (Panathen.) s. 112-114.
-
-  Plutarch (Agesil. c. 23; Artaxerxes, c. 21, 22) expresses
-  himself in terms of bitter and well-merited indignation of this
-  peace,—“if indeed (says he) we are to call this ignominy and
-  betrayal of Greece by the name of _peace_, which brought with it
-  as much infamy as the most disastrous war.” Sparta (he says) lost
-  her headship by her defeat at Leuktra, but her honor had been
-  lost before, by the convention of Antalkidas.
-
-  It is in vain, however, that Plutarch tries to exonerate
-  Agesilaus from any share in the peace. From the narrative
-  (in Xenophon’s Hellenica, v. i, 33) of his conduct at
-  the taking of the oaths, we see that he espoused it most
-  warmly. Xenophon (in the Encomium of Agesilaus, vii, 7)
-  takes credit to Agesilaus for being μισοπέρσης, which was
-  true, from the year B.C. 396 to B.C. 394. But in B.C. 387,
-  at the time of the peace of Antalkidas, he had become
-  μισοθηβαῖος; his hatred of Persia had given place to hatred
-  of Thebes.
-
-  See also a vigorous passage of Justin (viii, 4), denouncing
-  the disgraceful position of the Greek cities at a later time
-  in calling in Philip of Macedon as arbiter; a passage not less
-  applicable to the peace of Antalkidas; and perhaps borrowed from
-  Theopompus.
-
-Great must have been the change wrought by the intermediate
-events, when Sparta, the ostensible president of Greece,—in her
-own estimation even more than in that of others,[12]—had so lost
-all Pan-hellenic conscience and dignity, as to descend into an
-obsequious minister, procuring and enforcing a Persian mandate for
-political objects of her own. How insane would such an anticipation
-have appeared to Æschylus, or the audience who heard the Persæ! to
-Herodotus or Thucydides! to Perikles and Archidamus! nay, even to
-Kallikratidas or Lysander! It was the last consummation of a series
-of previous political sins, invoking more and more the intervention
-of Persia to aid her against her Grecian enemies.
-
-  [12] Compare the language in which the Ionians, on their revolt
-  from Darius king of Persia about 500 B.C., had implored the aid
-  of Sparta (Herodot. v, 49). Τὰ κατήκοντα γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα· Ἰώνων
-  παῖδας δούλους εἶναι ἀντ’ ἐλευθέρων—ὄνειδος καὶ ἄλγος μέγιστον
-  μὲν αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν, ~ἔτι δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑμῖν, ὅσῳ προεστέατε τῆς
-  Ἑλλάδος~.
-
-  How striking is the contrast between these words and the peace of
-  Antalkidas! and what would have been the feelings of Herodotus
-  himself if he could have heard of the latter event!
-
-Her first application to the Great King for this purpose dates from
-the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, and is prefaced by an
-apology, little less than humiliating, from king Archidamus; who, not
-unconscious of the sort of treason which he was meditating, pleads
-that Sparta, when the Athenians are conspiring against her, ought
-not to be blamed for asking from foreigners as well as from Greeks
-aid for her own preservation.[13] From the earliest commencement to
-the seventh year of the war, many separate and successive envoys
-were despatched by the Spartans to Susa; two of whom were seized in
-Thrace, brought to Athens, and there put to death. The rest reached
-their destination, but talked in so confused a way, and contradicted
-each other so much, that the Persian court, unable to understand
-what they meant,[14] sent Artaphernes with letters to Sparta (in the
-seventh year of the war) complaining of such stupidity, and asking
-for clearer information. Artaphernes fell into the hands of an
-Athenian squadron at Eion on the Strymon, and was conveyed to Athens;
-where he was treated with great politeness, and sent back (after the
-letters which he carried had been examined) to Ephesus. What is more
-important to note is, that Athenian envoys were sent along with him,
-with a view of bringing Athens into friendly communication with the
-Great King; which was only prevented by the fact that Artaxerxes
-Longimanus just then died. Here we see the fatal practice, generated
-by intestine war, of invoking Persian aid; begun by Sparta as an
-importunate solicitor,—and partially imitated by Athens, though we do
-not know what her envoys were instructed to say, had they been able
-to reach Susa.
-
-  [13] Thucyd. i, 82. Κἀν τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν ἐξαρτύεσθαι
-  ξυμμάχων τε προσαγωγῇ καὶ Ἑλλήνων ~καὶ βαρβάρων~, εἴ ποθέν τινα
-  ~ἢ ναυτικοῦ ἢ χρημάτων~ δύναμιν προσληψόμεθα, (~ἀνεπίφθονον~ δὲ,
-  ὅσοι ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων ἐπιβουλευόμεθα, μὴ Ἕλληνας
-  μόνον ~ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρους~ προσλαβόντας διασωθῆναι), etc. Compare
-  also Plato, Menexenus, c. 14, p. 243 B.
-
-  [14] Thucyd. ii, 7, 67; iv, 50.
-
-Nothing more is heard about Persian intervention until the year of
-the great Athenian disasters before Syracuse. Elate with the hopes
-arising out of that event, the Persians required no solicitation, but
-were quite as eager to tender interference for their own purposes, as
-Sparta was to invite them for hers. How ready Sparta was to purchase
-their aid by the surrender of the Asiatic Greeks, and that too
-without any stipulations in their favor,—has been recounted in my
-last volume.[15] She had not now the excuse,—for it stands only as an
-excuse and not as a justification—of self-defence against aggression
-from Athens, which Archidamus had produced at the beginning of the
-war. Even then it was only a colorable excuse, not borne out by the
-reality of the case; but now, the avowed as well as the real object
-was something quite different,—not to repel, but to crush, Athens.
-Yet to accomplish that object, not even of pretended safety, but
-of pure ambition, Sparta sacrificed unconditionally the liberty of
-her Asiatic kinsmen; a price which Archidamus at the beginning of
-the war would certainly never have endured the thoughts of paying,
-notwithstanding the then formidable power of Athens. Here, too,
-we find Athens following the example; and consenting, in hopes of
-procuring Persian aid, to the like sacrifice, though the bargain was
-never consummated. It is true that she was then contending for her
-existence. Nevertheless, the facts afford melancholy proof how much
-the sentiment of Pan-hellenic independence became enfeebled in both
-the leaders, amidst the fierce intestine conflict terminated by the
-battle of Ægospotami.[16]
-
-  [15] See Vol. IX, Ch. LXXV, p. 360.
-
-  Compare the expressions of Demosthenes (cont. Aristokrat. c. 33,
-  p. 666) attesting the prevalent indignation among the Athenians
-  of his time, about this surrender of the Asiatic Greeks by
-  Sparta,—and his oration De Rhodior. Libertate, c. 13, p. 199,
-  where he sets the peace of Kallias, made by Athens with Persia in
-  449 B.C., in contrast with the peace of Antalkidas, contracted
-  under the auspices of Sparta.
-
-  [16] This is strikingly set forth by Isokrates, Or. xii,
-  (Panathen.) s. 167-173. In this passage, however, he distributes
-  his blame too equally between Sparta and Athens, whereas the
-  blame belongs of right to the former, in far greater proportion.
-  Sparta not only began the practice of invoking the Great King,
-  and invoking his aid by disgraceful concessions,—but she also
-  carried it, at the peace of Antalkidas, to a more extreme point
-  of selfishness and subservience. Athens is guilty of following
-  the bad example of her rival, but to a less extent, and under
-  greater excuse on the plea of necessity.
-
-  Isokrates says in another place of this discourse, respecting
-  the various acts of wrong-doing towards the general interest
-  of Hellas—ἐπιδεικτέον τοὺς μὲν ἡμετέρους ~ὀψιμαθεῖς~ αὐτῶν
-  γεγενημένους, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ ~τὰ μὲν πρώτους, τὰ δὲ μόνους~,
-  ἐξαμαρτόντας (Panath. s. 103). Which is much nearer the truth
-  than the passage before referred to.
-
-After that battle, the bargain between Sparta and Persia would
-doubtless have been fulfilled, and the Asiatic Greeks would have
-passed at once under the dominion of the latter,—had not an entirely
-new train of circumstances arisen out of the very peculiar position
-and designs of Cyrus. That young prince did all in his power to
-gain the affections of the Greeks, as auxiliaries for his ambitious
-speculations; in which speculations both Sparta and the Asiatic
-Greeks took part, compromising themselves irrevocably against
-Artaxerxes, and still more against Tissaphernes. Sparta thus became
-unintentionally the enemy of Persia, and found herself compelled to
-protect the Asiatic Greeks against his hostility, with which they
-were threatened; a protection easy for her to confer, not merely
-from the unbounded empire which she then enjoyed over the Grecian
-world, but from the presence of the renowned Cyreian Ten Thousand,
-and the contempt for Persian military strength which they brought
-home from their retreat. She thus finds herself in the exercise of a
-Pan-hellenic protectorate or presidency, first through the ministry
-of Derkyllidas, next of Agesilaus, who even sacrifices at Aulis,
-takes up the sceptre of Agamemnon, and contemplates large schemes of
-aggression against the Great King. Here, however, the Persians play
-against her the same game which she had invoked them to assist in
-playing against Athens. Their fleet, which fifteen years before she
-had invited for her own purposes, is now brought in against herself,
-and with far more effect, since her empire was more odious as well as
-more oppressive than the Athenian. It is now Athens and her allies
-who call in Persian aid; without any direct engagement, indeed, to
-surrender the Asiatic Greeks, for we are told that after the battle
-of Knidus, Konon incurred the displeasure of the Persians by his
-supposed plans for reuniting them with Athens,[17] and Athenian aid
-was still continued to Evagoras,—yet, nevertheless, indirectly paving
-the way for that consummation. If Athens and her allies here render
-themselves culpable of an abnegation of Pan-hellenic sentiment, we
-may remark, as before, that they act under the pressure of stronger
-necessities than could ever be pleaded by Sparta; and that they might
-employ on their own behalf, with much greater truth, the excuse of
-self-preservation preferred by king Archidamus.
-
-  [17] Cornelius Nepos, Conon. c. 5.
-
-But never on any occasion did that excuse find less real place than
-in regard to the mission of Antalkidas. Sparta was at that time
-so powerful, even after the loss of her maritime empire, that the
-allies at the Isthmus of Corinth, jealous of each other and held
-together only by common terror, could hardly stand on the defensive
-against her, and would probably have been disunited by reasonable
-offers on her part; nor would she have needed even to recall
-Agesilaus from Asia. Nevertheless, the mission was probably dictated
-in great measure by a groundless panic, arising from the sight of
-the revived Long Walls and refortified Piræus, and springing at
-once to the fancy, that a new Athenian empire, such as had existed
-forty years before, was about to start into life; a fancy little
-likely to be realized, since the very peculiar circumstances which
-had created the first Athenian empire were now totally reversed.
-Debarred from maritime empire herself, the first object with Sparta
-was, to shut out Athens from the like; the next, to put down all
-partial federations or political combinations, and to enforce
-universal autonomy, or the maximum of political isolation; in
-order that there might nowhere exist a power capable of resisting
-herself, the strongest of all individual states. As a means to this
-end, which was no less in the interest of Persia than in hers, she
-outbid all prior subserviences to the Great King, betrayed to him
-not only one entire division of her Hellenic kinsmen, but also the
-general honor of the Hellenic name in the most flagrant manner,—and
-volunteered to _medise_ in order that the Persians might repay her by
-_laconising_.[18] To ensure fully the obedience of all the satraps,
-who had more than once manifested dissentient views of their own,
-Antalkidas procured and brought down a formal order signed and sealed
-at Susa; and Sparta undertook, without shame or scruple, to enforce
-the same order,—“the convention sent down by the king,”—upon all her
-countrymen; thus converting them into the subjects, and herself into
-a sort of viceroy or satrap, of Artaxerxes. Such an act of treason
-to the Pan-hellenic cause was far more flagrant and destructive than
-that alleged confederacy with the Persian king, for which the Theban
-Ismenias was afterwards put to death, and that, too, by the Spartans
-themselves.[19] Unhappily it formed a precedent for the future, and
-was closely copied afterwards by Thebes;[20] foreboding but too
-clearly the short career which Grecian political independence had to
-run.
-
-  [18] Isok. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 145. Καὶ τῷ βαρβάρῳ τῷ τῆς Ἀσίας
-  κρατοῦντι συμπράττουσι (the Lacedæmonians) ὅπως ὡς μεγίστην ἀρχὴν
-  ἕξουσιν.
-
-  [19] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 35.
-
-  [20] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-39.
-
-That large patriotic sentiment, which dictated the magnanimous answer
-sent by the Athenians[21] to the offers of Mardonius in 479 B.C.,
-refusing in the midst of ruin present and prospective, all temptation
-to betray the sanctity of Pan-hellenic fellowship,—that sentiment
-which had been during the two following generations the predominant
-inspiration of Athens, and had also been powerful, though always
-less powerful, at Sparta,—was now, in the former, overlaid by more
-pressing apprehensions, and in the latter completely extinguished.
-Now it was to the leading states that Greece had to look, for holding
-up the great banner of Pan-hellenic independence; from the smaller
-states nothing more could be required than that they should adhere
-to and defend it, when upheld.[22] But so soon as Sparta was seen to
-solicit and enforce, and Athens to accept (even under constraint),
-the proclamation under the king’s hand and seal brought down by
-Antalkidas,—that banner was no longer a part of the public emblems
-of Grecian political life. The grand idea represented by it,—of
-collective self-determining Hellenism,—was left to dwell in the
-bosoms of individual patriots.
-
-  [21] Herodot. viii, 143.
-
-  The explanation which the Athenians give to the Spartan envoys,
-  of the reasons and feelings which dictated their answer of
-  refusal to Alexander (viii, 144), are not less impressive than
-  the answer itself.
-
-  But whoever would duly feel and appreciate the treason of the
-  Spartans in soliciting the convention of Antalkidas, should read
-  in contrast with it that speech which their envoys address to the
-  Athenians, in order to induce the latter to stand out against the
-  temptations of Mardonius (viii, 142).
-
-  [22] The sixth oration (called Archidamus) of Isokrates sets
-  forth emphatically the magnanimous sentiments, and comprehensive
-  principles, on which it becomes Sparta to model her public
-  conduct,—as altogether different from the simple considerations
-  of prudence and security which are suitable to humbler states
-  like Corinth, Epidaurus, or Phlius (Archidamus, s. 105, 106, 110).
-
-  Contrast these lofty pretensions with the dishonorable realities
-  of the convention of Antalkidas,—not thrust upon Sparta by
-  superior force, but both originally sued out, and finally
-  enforced by her, for her own political ends.
-
-  Compare also Isokrates, Or. xii. (Panathen.) s. 169-172, about
-  the dissension of the leading Grecian states, and its baneful
-  effects.
-
-If we look at the convention of Antalkidas apart from its form and
-warranty, and with reference to its substance, we shall find that
-though its first article was unequivocally disgraceful, its last was
-at least popular as a promise to the ear. Universal autonomy, to
-each city, small or great, was dear to Grecian political instinct.
-I have already remarked more than once that the exaggerated force
-of this desire was the chief cause of the short duration of Grecian
-freedom. Absorbing all the powers of life to the separate parts,
-it left no vital force or integrity to the whole; especially, it
-robbed both each and all of the power of self-defence against foreign
-assailants. Though indispensable up to a certain point and under
-certain modifications, yet beyond these modifications, which Grecian
-political instinct was far from recognizing, it produced a great
-preponderance of mischief. Although, therefore, this item of the
-convention was in its promise acceptable and popular,—and although
-we shall find it hereafter invoked as a protection in various
-individual cases of injustice,—we must inquire how it was carried
-into execution, before we can pronounce whether it was good or evil,
-the present of a friend or of an enemy.
-
-The succeeding pages will furnish an answer to this inquiry. The
-Lacedæmonians, as “presidents (guarantees or executors) of the peace,
-sent down by the king,”[23] undertook the duty of execution; and
-we shall see that from the beginning they meant nothing sincerely.
-They did not even attempt any sincere and steady compliance with the
-honest, though undistinguishing, political instinct of the Greek
-mind; much less did they seek to grant as much as was really good,
-and to withhold the remainder. They defined autonomy in such manner,
-and meted it out in such portions, as suited their own political
-interests and purposes. The promise made by the convention,
-except in so far as it enabled them to increase their own power by
-dismemberment or party intervention, proved altogether false and
-hollow. For if we look back to the beginning of the Peloponnesian
-war, when they sent to Athens to require general autonomy throughout
-Greece, we shall find that the word had then a distinct and serious
-import; demanding that the cities held in dependence by Athens should
-be left free, which freedom Sparta might have ensured for them
-herself at the close of the war, had she not preferred to convert
-it into a far harsher empire. But in 387 (the date of the peace of
-Antalkidas) there were no large body of subjects to be emancipated,
-except the allies of Sparta herself, to whom it was by no means
-intended to apply. So that in fact, what was promised, as well as
-what was realized, even by the most specious item of this disgraceful
-convention, was—“that cities should enjoy autonomy, not for their
-own comfort and in their own way, but for Lacedæmonian convenience;”
-a significant phrase (employed by Perikles,[24] in the debates
-preceding the Peloponnesian war) which forms a sort of running text
-for Grecian history during the sixteen years between the peace of
-Antalkidas and the battle of Leuktra.
-
-  [23] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36.
-
-  Ἐν δὲ τῷ πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἀντιῤῥόπως τοῖς ἐναντίοις πράττοντες
-  οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ~πολὺ ἐπικυδέστεροι ἐγένοντο~ ἐκ τῆς ἐπ’
-  Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνης καλουμένης· ~προστάται γὰρ γενόμενοι τῆς ὑπὸ
-  βασιλέως καταπεμφθείσης εἰρήνης~ καὶ τὴν αὐτονομίαν ταῖς πόλεσι
-  πράττοντες, etc.
-
-  [24] Thucyd. i, 144. Νῦν δὲ τούτοις (to the Lacedæmonian envoys)
-  ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀποπέμψωμεν ... τὰς δὲ πόλεις ὅτι αὐτονόμους
-  ἀφήσομεν, εἰ καὶ αὐτονόμους ἔχοντες ἐσπεισάμεθα, καὶ ὅταν
-  κἀκεῖνοι ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀποδῶσι πόλεσι ~μὴ σφίσι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις
-  ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ αὐτοῖς ἑκάστοις, ὡς βούλονται~.
-
-I have already mentioned that the first two applications of
-the newly-proclaimed autonomy, made by the Lacedæmonians, were
-to extort from the Corinthian government the dismissal of its
-Argeian auxiliaries, and to compel Thebes to renounce her ancient
-presidency of the Bœotian federation. The latter especially was an
-object which they had long had at heart;[25] and by both, their
-ascendency in Greece was much increased. Athens, too, terrified by
-the new development of Persian force as well as partially bribed
-by the restoration of her three islands, into an acceptance of the
-peace,—was thus robbed of her Theban and Corinthian allies, and
-disabled from opposing the Spartan projects. But before we enter upon
-these projects, it will be convenient to turn for a short time to the
-proceedings of the Persians.
-
-  [25] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36. οὗπερ πάλαι ἐπεθύμουν.
-
-Even before the death of Darius Nothus (father of Artaxerxes and
-Cyrus) Egypt had revolted from the Persians, under a native prince
-named Amyrtæus. To the Grecian leaders who accompanied Cyrus in his
-expedition against his brother, this revolt was well known to have
-much incensed the Persians; so that Klearchus, in the conversation
-which took place after the death of Cyrus about accommodation with
-Artaxerxes, intimated that the Ten Thousand could lend him effectual
-aid in reconquering Egypt.[26] It was not merely these Greeks who
-were exposed to danger by the death of Cyrus, but also the various
-Persians and other subjects who had lent assistance to him; all of
-whom made submission and tried to conciliate Artaxerxes, except
-Tamos, who had commanded the fleet of Cyrus on the coasts both of
-Ionia and Kilikia. Such was the alarm of Tamos when Tissaphernes
-came down in full power to the coast, that he fled with his fleet
-and treasures to Egypt, to seek protection from king Psammetichus,
-to whom he had rendered valuable service. This traitor, however,
-having so valuable a deposit brought to him, forgot every thing
-else in his avidity to make it sure, and put to death Tamos with
-all his children.[27] About 395 B.C., we find Nephereus king of
-Egypt lending aid to the Lacedæmonian fleet against Artaxerxes.[28]
-Two years afterwards (392-390 B.C.), during the years immediately
-succeeding the victory of Knidus, and the voyage of Pharnabazus
-across the Ægean to Peloponnesus,—we hear of that satrap as employed
-with Abrokomas and Tithraustes in strenuous but unavailing efforts
-to reconquer Egypt.[29] Having thus repulsed the Persians, the
-Egyptian king Akoras is found between 390-380 B.C.,[30] sending aid
-to Evagoras in Cyprus against the same enemy. And in spite of farther
-efforts made afterwards by Artaxerxes to reconquer Egypt, the native
-kings in that country maintained their independence for about sixty
-years in all, until the reign of his successor Ochus.
-
-  [26] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 13.
-
-  It would appear that the revolt of Egypt from Persia must date
-  between 414-411 B.C.; but this point is obscure. See Boeckh,
-  Manetho und die Hundsstern-Periode, pp. 358, 363, Berlin 1845; and
-  Ley, Fata et Conditio Ægypti sub Imperio Persarum, p. 55.
-
-  M. Rehdautz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Timothei, et Chabriæ, p. 240, places
-  the revolt rather earlier, about 414 B.C.; and Mr. Fynes Clinton
-  (Fasti Hellen. Appendix, ch. 18, p. 317) countenances the same
-  date.
-
-  [27] Diodor. xiv, 35.
-
-  This Psammetichus is presumed by Ley (in his Dissertation above
-  cited, p. 20) to be the same person as Amyrtæus the Saite in the
-  list of Manetho, under a different name. It is also possible,
-  however, that he may have been king over a part of Egypt,
-  contemporaneous with Amyrtæus.
-
-  [28] Diodor. xiv, 79.
-
-  [29] This is the chronology laid down by M. Rehdautz (Vitæ
-  Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, Epimetr. ii, pp. 241, 242) on
-  very probable grounds, principally from Isokrates, Orat. iv,
-  (Panegyr.) s. 161, 162.
-
-  [30] Diodor. xv, 2, 3.
-
-But it was a Grecian enemy,—of means inferior, yet of qualities much
-superior, to any of these Egyptians,—who occupied the chief attention
-of the Persians immediately after the peace of Antalkidas: Evagoras,
-despot of Salamis in Cyprus. Respecting that prince we possess a
-discourse of the most glowing and superabundant eulogy, composed
-after his death for the satisfaction (and probably paid for with
-the money) of his son and successor Nikoklês, by the contemporary
-Isokrates. Allowing as we must do for exaggeration and partiality,
-even the trustworthy features of the picture are sufficiently
-interesting.
-
-Evagoras belonged to a Salaminian stock or Gens called the Teukridæ,
-which numbered among its ancestors the splendid legendary names of
-Teukrus, Telamon, and Æakus; taking its departure, through them,
-from the divine name of Zeus. It was believed that the archer
-Teukrus, after returning from the siege of Troy to (the Athenian)
-Salamis, had emigrated under a harsh order from his father Telamon,
-and given commencement to the city of that name on the eastern
-coast of Cyprus.[31] As in Sicily, so in Cyprus, the Greek and
-Phœnician elements were found in near contact, though in very
-different proportions. Of the nine or ten separate city communities,
-which divided among them the whole sea-coast, the inferior towns
-being all dependent upon one or other of them,—seven pass for
-Hellenic, the two most considerable being Salamis and Soli; three
-for Phœnician,—Paphos, Amathus, and Kitium. Probably, however,
-there was in each a mixture of Greek and Phœnician population, in
-different proportions.[32] Each was ruled by its own separate prince
-or despot, Greek or Phœnician. The Greek immigrations (though their
-exact date cannot be assigned) appear to have been later in date
-than the Phœnician. At the time of the Ionic revolt (B.C. 496), the
-preponderance was on the side of Hellenism; yet with considerable
-intermixture of Oriental custom. Hellenism was, however, greatly
-crushed by the Persian reconquest of the revolters, accomplished
-through the aid of the Phœnicians[33] on the opposite continent. And
-though doubtless the victories of Kimon and the Athenians (470-450
-B.C.) partially revived it, yet Perikles, in his pacification with
-the Persians, had prudently relinquished Cyprus as well as Egypt;[34]
-so that the Grecian element in the former, receiving little
-extraneous encouragement, became more and more subordinate to the
-Phœnician.
-
-  [31] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokl.) s. 50; Or. ix, (Evagoras) s.
-  21; Pausanias, ii, 29, 4; Diodor. xiv, 98.
-
-  The historian Theopompus, when entering upon the history of
-  Evagoras, seems to have related many legendary tales respecting
-  the Greek Gentes in Cyprus, and to have represented Agamemnon
-  himself as ultimately migrating to it (Theopompus, Frag. 111, ed.
-  Wichers; and ed. Didot. ap. Photium).
-
-  The tomb of the archer Teukrus was shown at Salamis in Cyprus.
-  See the Epigram of Aristotle, Antholog. i, 8, 112.
-
-  [32] Movers, in his very learned investigations respecting the
-  Phœnicians (vol. iii, ch. 5, p. 203-221 _seq._), attempts to
-  establish the existence of an ancient population in Cyprus,
-  called Kitians; once extended over the island, and of which the
-  town called Kitium was the remnant. He supposes them to have
-  been a portion of the Canaanitish population, anterior to the
-  Jewish occupation of Palestine. The Phœnician colonies in Cyprus
-  he reckons as of later date, superadded to, and depressing these
-  natives. He supposes the Kilikian population to have been in
-  early times Canaanitish also. Engel (Kypros, vol. i, p. 166)
-  inclines to admit the same hypothesis as highly probable.
-
-  The sixth century B.C. (from 600 downwards) appears to have been
-  very unfavorable to the Phœnicians, bringing upon Tyre severe
-  pressure from the Chaldeans, as it brought captivity upon the
-  Jews. During the same period, the Grecian commerce with Egypt was
-  greatly extended, especially by the reign of the Phil-hellenic
-  Amasis, who acquired possession of Cyprus. Much of the Grecian
-  immigration into Cyprus probably took place at this time; we know
-  of one body of settlers invited by Philokyprus to Soli, under the
-  assistance of the Athenian Solon (Movers, p. 244 _seq._).
-
-  [33] Herodot. v, 109.
-
-  Compare the description given by Herodotus of the costume and
-  arms of the Cypriots in the armament of Xerxes,—half Oriental
-  (vii, 90). The Salaminians used chariots of war in battle (v,
-  113); as the Carthaginians did, before they learnt the art of
-  training elephants (Diodor. xvi, 80; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27).
-
-  [34] See Vol. V. of this History, Ch. xlv, p. 335.
-
-It was somewhere about this time that the reigning princes of
-Salamis, who at the time of the Ionic revolt had been Greeks of
-the Teukrid Gens,[35] were supplanted and dethroned by a Phœnician
-exile who gained their confidence and made himself despot in their
-place.[36] To insure his own sceptre, this usurper did everything
-in his power to multiply and strengthen the Phœnician population,
-as well as to discourage and degrade the Hellenic. The same policy
-was not only continued by his successor at Salamis, but seems also
-to have been imitated in several of the other towns; insomuch that
-during most part of the Peloponnesian war, Cyprus became sensibly
-dis-hellenized. The Greeks in the island were harshly oppressed; new
-Greek visitors and merchants were kept off by the most repulsive
-treatment, as well as by threats of those cruel mutilations of the
-body which were habitually employed as penalties by the Orientals;
-while Grecian arts, education, music, poetry, and intelligence, were
-rapidly on the decline.[37]
-
-  [35] One of these princes, however, is mentioned as bearing the
-  Phœnician name of Siromus (Herod. v, 104).
-
-  [36] We may gather this by putting together Herodot. iv, 102; v,
-  104-114, with Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 22.
-
-  [37] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 23, 55, 58.
-
-  Παραλαβὼν γὰρ (Evagoras) ~τὴν πόλιν ἐκβεβαρβαρωμένην~, καὶ διὰ
-  τὴν τῶν Φοινίκων ἀρχὴν οὔτε τοὺς Ἕλληνας προσδεχομένην, οὔτε τέχνας
-  ἐπισταμένην, οὔτ’ ἐμπορίῳ χρωμένην, οὔτε λιμένα κεκτημένην, etc.
-
-  Πρὶν μὲν γὰρ λαβεῖν Εὐαγόραν τὴν ἀρχὴν, οὕτως ἀπροσοίστως καὶ
-  χαλεπῶς εἶχον, ὥστε καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων τούτους ἐνόμιζον εἶναι
-  βελτίστους οἵ ~τινες ὠμότατα πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας διακείμενοι~
-  τυγχάνοιεν, etc.
-
-  This last passage receives remarkable illustration from the
-  oration of Lysias against Andokides, in which he alludes to the
-  visit of the latter to Cyprus—μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἔπλευσεν ὡς τὸν
-  Κιτιέων βασιλέα, καὶ προδιδοὺς ληφθεὶς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐδέθη, καὶ οὐ
-  μόνον τὸν θάνατον ἐφοβεῖτο ἀλλὰ τὰ καθ’ ἡμέραν αἰκίσματα,
-  ~οἰόμενος τὰ ἀκρωτήρια ζῶντος~ ἀποτμηθήσεσθαι (s. 26).
-
-  Engel (Kypros, vol. i, p. 286) impugns the general correctness of
-  this narrative of Isokrates. He produces no adequate reasons, nor
-  do I myself see any, for this contradiction.
-
-  Not only Konon, but also his friend Nikophemus, had a wife and
-  family at Cyprus, besides another family in Athens (Lysias, De
-  Bonis Aristophanis, Or. xix, s. 38).
-
-Notwithstanding such untoward circumstances, in which the youth of
-the Teukrid Evagoras at Salamis was passed, he manifested at an
-early age so much energy both of mind and body, and so much power of
-winning popularity, that he became at once a marked man both among
-Greeks and Phœnicians. It was about this time that the Phœnician
-despot was slain, through a conspiracy formed by a Kitian or Tyrian
-named Abdêmon, who got possession of his sceptre.[38] The usurper,
-mistrustful of his position, and anxious to lay hands upon all
-conspicuous persons who might be capable of doing him mischief,
-tried to seize Evagoras; but the latter escaped and passed over to
-Soli and Kilikia. Though thus to all appearance a helpless exile,
-he found means to strike a decisive blow, while the new usurpation,
-stained by its first violences and rapacity, was surrounded by
-enemies, doubters, or neutrals, without having yet established any
-firm footing. He crossed over from Soli in Kilikia, with a small but
-determined band of about fifty followers,—obtained secret admission
-by a postern gate of Salamis,—and assaulted Abdêmon by night in
-his palace. In spite of a vastly superior number of guards, this
-enterprise was conducted with such extraordinary daring and judgment,
-that Abdêmon perished, and Evagoras became despot in his place.[39]
-
-  [38] Theopompus (Fr. 111) calls Abdêmon a Kitian; Diodorus
-  (xiv, 98) calls him a Tyrian. Movers (p. 206) thinks that both
-  are correct, and that he was a Kitian living at Tyre, who had
-  migrated from Salamis during the Athenian preponderance there.
-  There were Kitians, not natives of the town of Kition, but
-  belonging to the ancient population of the island, living in the
-  various towns of Cyprus; and there were also Kitians mentioned as
-  resident at Sidon (Diogen. Laert. Vit. Zenon. s. 6).
-
-  [39] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 29-35; also Or. iii,
-  (Nikokl.) s. 33; Theopomp. Fragm. 111, ed. Wichers and ed. Didot.
-  Diodor. xiv, 98.
-
-  The two latter mention the name, Audymon or Abdêmon, which
-  Isokrates does not specify.
-
-The splendor of this exploit was quite sufficient to seat Evagoras
-unopposed on the throne, amidst a population always accustomed to
-princely government; while among the Salaminian Greeks he was still
-farther endeared by his Teukrid descent.[40] His conduct fully
-justified the expectations entertained. Not merely did he refrain
-from bloodshed, or spoliation, or violence for the gratification
-of personal appetite; abstinences remarkable enough in any Grecian
-despot to stamp his reign with letters of gold, and the more
-remarkable in Evagoras, since he had the susceptible temperament
-of a Greek, though his great mental force always kept it under due
-control.[41] But he was also careful in inquiring into, and strict in
-punishing crime, yet without those demonstrations of cruel infliction
-by which an Oriental prince displayed his energy.[42] His government
-was at the same time highly popular and conciliating, as well towards
-the multitude as towards individuals. Indefatigable in his own
-personal supervision, he examined everything for himself, shaped out
-his own line of policy, and kept watch over its execution.[43] He was
-foremost in all effort and in all danger. Maintaining undisturbed
-security, he gradually doubled the wealth, commerce, industry, and
-military force, of the city, while his own popularity and renown went
-on increasing.
-
-  [40] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 33.
-
-  [41] Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 53. ἡγούμενος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ
-  ἀγόμενος ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, etc.
-
-  [42] Isokr. Or. ix, 51. οὐδένα μὲν ἀδικῶν, τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς
-  τιμῶν, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἁπάντων ἄρχων, ~νομίμως δὲ τοὺς
-  ἐξαμαρτάνοντας~ κολάζων (s. 58)—ὃς οὐ μόνον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόλιν
-  πλείονος ἀξίαν ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν τόπον ὅλον, τὸν περιέχοντα
-  τὴν νῆσον, ~ἐπὶ πρᾳότητα καὶ μετριότητα~ προήγαγεν, etc.; compare
-  s. 81.
-
-  These epithets, _lawful_ punishment, _mild_ dealing, etc., cannot
-  be fully understood except in contrast with the mutilations
-  alluded to by Lysias, in the passage cited in a note on page
-  16, above; also with exactly similar mutilations, mentioned by
-  Xenophon as systematically inflicted upon offenders by Cyrus
-  the younger (Xenoph. Anabas. i, 9, 13). Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν (says
-  Isokrates about the Persians) οὕτως αἰκίζεται τοὺς οἰκέτας, ὡς
-  ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους κολάζουσιν—Or. iv, (Paneg.) 142.
-
-  [43] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 50-56.
-
-  The language of the encomiast, though exaggerated, must doubtless
-  be founded in truth, as the result shows.
-
-Above all, it was his first wish to renovate, both in Salamis and
-in Cyprus, that Hellenism which the Phœnician despots of the last
-fifty years had done so much to extinguish or corrupt. For aid in
-this scheme, he seems to have turned his thoughts to Athens, with
-which city he was connected as a Teukrid, by gentile and legendary
-sympathies,—and which was then only just ceasing to be the great
-naval power of the Ægean. For though we cannot exactly make out the
-date at which Evagoras began to reign, we may conclude it to have
-been about 411 or 410 B.C. It seems to have been shortly after that
-period that he was visited by Andokides the Athenian;[44] moreover,
-he must have been a prince not merely established, but powerful,
-when he ventured to harbor Konon in 405 B.C., after the battle of
-Ægospotami. He invited to Salamis fresh immigrants from Attica and
-other parts of Greece, as the prince Philokyprus of Soli had done
-under the auspices of Solon,[45] a century and a half before. He
-took especial pains to revive and improve Grecian letters, arts,
-teaching, music, and intellectual tendencies. Such encouragement was
-so successfully administered, that in a few years, without constraint
-or violence, the face of Salamis was changed. The gentleness and
-sociability, the fashions and pursuits, of Hellenism, became again
-predominant; with great influence of example over all the other towns
-of the island.
-
-  [44] Lysias cont. Andokid. s. 28.
-
-  [45] Plutarch, Solon, c. 26.
-
-Had the rise of Evagoras taken place a few years earlier, Athens
-might perhaps have availed herself of the opening to turn her
-ambition eastward, in preference to that disastrous impulse which
-led her westward to Sicily. But coming as he did only at that later
-moment when she was hard pressed to keep up even a defensive war, he
-profited rather by her weakness than by her strength. During those
-closing years of the war, when the Athenian empire was partially
-broken up, and when the Ægean, instead of the tranquillity which it
-had enjoyed for fifty years under Athens, became a scene of contest
-between two rival money-levying fleets,—many out-settlers from
-Athens, who had acquired property in the islands, the Chersonesus, or
-elsewhere, under her guarantee, found themselves insecure in every
-way, and were tempted to change their abodes. Finally, by the defeat
-of Ægospotami (B.C. 405), all such out-settlers as then remained
-were expelled, and forced to seek shelter either at Athens (at that
-moment the least attractive place in Greece), or in some other
-locality. To such persons, not less than to the Athenian admiral
-Konon with his small remnant of Athenian triremes saved out of the
-great defeat, the proclaimed invitations of Evagoras would present
-a harbor of refuge nowhere else to be found. Accordingly, we learn
-that numerous settlers of the best character, from different parts
-of Greece, crowded to Salamis.[46] Many Athenian women, during the
-years of destitution and suffering which preceded as well as followed
-the battle of Ægospotami, were well pleased to emigrate and find
-husbands in that city;[47] while throughout the wide range of the
-Lacedæmonian empire, the numerous victims exiled by the harmosts and
-dekarchies had no other retreat on the whole so safe and tempting.
-The extensive plain of Salamis afforded lands for many colonists. On
-what conditions, indeed, they were admitted, we do not know; but the
-conduct of Evagoras as a ruler, gave universal satisfaction.
-
-  [46] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 59-61; compare Lysias, Or.
-  xix, (De Aristoph. Bon.) s. 38-46; and Diodor. xiv, 98.
-
-  [47] Isokrates, _l. c._ παιδοποιεῖσθαι δὲ τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν
-  γυναῖκας λαμβάνοντες παρ’ ἡμῶν, etc.
-
-  For the extreme distress of Athenian women during these trying
-  times consult the statement in Xenophon, Memorab. ii, 7, 2-4.
-
-  The Athenian Andokides is accused of having carried out a young
-  woman of citizen family,—his own cousin, and daughter of an
-  Athenian named Aristeides,—to Cyprus, and there to have sold
-  her to the despot of Kitium for a cargo of wheat. But being
-  threatened with prosecution for this act before the Athenian
-  Dikastery, he stole her away again and brought her back to
-  Athens; in which act, however, he was detected by the prince, and
-  punished with imprisonment from which he had the good fortune
-  to escape. (Plutarch, Vit. X, Orat. p. 834; Photius, Cod. 261;
-  Tzetzes, Chiliad. vi, 367).
-
-  How much there may be of truth in this accusation, we have no
-  means of determining. But it illustrates the way in which the
-  Athenian maidens, who had no dowry at home, were provided for by
-  their relatives elsewhere. Probably Andokides took this young
-  woman out, under the engagement to find a Grecian husband for her
-  in Cyprus. Instead of doing this, he sold her for his own profit
-  to the harem of the prince; or at least, is accused of having so
-  sold her.
-
-During the first years of his reign, Evagoras doubtless paid his
-tribute regularly, and took no steps calculated to offend the Persian
-king. But as his power increased, his ambition increased also. We
-find him towards the year 390 B.C., engaged in a struggle not merely
-with the Persian king, but with Amathus and Kitium in his own island,
-and with the great Phœnician cities on the mainland. By what steps,
-or at what precise period, this war began, we cannot determine. At
-the time of the battle of Knidus (394 B.C.) Evagoras had not only
-paid his tribute, but was mainly instrumental in getting the Persian
-fleet placed under Konon to act against the Lacedæmonians, himself
-serving aboard.[48] It was in fact (if we may believe Isokrates)
-to the extraordinary energy, ability, and power, displayed by him
-on that occasion in the service of Artaxerxes himself, that the
-jealousy and alarm of the latter against him are to be ascribed.
-Without any provocation, and at the very moment when he was profiting
-by the zealous services of Evagoras, the Great King treacherously
-began to manœuvre against him, and forced him into the war in
-self-defence.[49] Evagoras accepted the challenge, in spite of the
-disparity of strength, with such courage and efficiency, that he at
-first gained marked successes. Seconded by his son Pnytagoras, he not
-only worsted and humbled Amathus, Kitium, and Soli, which cities,
-under the prince Agyris, adhered to Artaxerxes,—but also equipped a
-large fleet, attacked the Phœnicians on the mainland with so much
-vigor as even to take the great city of Tyre; prevailing, moreover,
-upon some of the Kilikian towns to declare against the Persians.[50]
-He received powerful aid from Akoris, the native and independent
-king in Egypt, as well as from Chabrias and the force sent out by
-the Athenians.[51] Beginning apparently about 390 B.C., the war
-against Evagoras lasted something more than ten years, costing the
-Persians great efforts and an immense expenditure of money. Twice
-did Athens send a squadron to his assistance, from gratitude for his
-long protection to Konon and his energetic efforts before and in the
-battle of Knidus,—though she thereby ran every risk of making the
-Persians her enemies.
-
-  [48] This much appears even from the meagre abstract of Ktesias,
-  given by Photius (Ktesiæ Persica, c. 63, p. 80, ed. Bähr).
-
-  Both Ktesias and Theopompus (Fr. iii, ed. Wichers, and ed. Didot)
-  recounted the causes which brought about the war between the
-  Persian king and Evagoras.
-
-  [49] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 71, 73, 74. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτον
-  (Evagoras) οὕτως ἐκ πολλοῦ περιδεῶς ἔσχε (Artaxerxes), ~ὥστε
-  μεταξὺ πάσχων εὖ~, πολεμεῖν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπεχείρησε, δίκαια μὲν οὐ
-  ποιῶν, etc.—ἐπειδὴ ~ἠναγκάσθη πολεμεῖν~ (_i. e._ Evagoras).
-
-  [50] Isokr. Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 75, 76; Diodor. xiv, 98; Ephorus,
-  Frag. 134, ed. Didot.
-
-  [51] Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 2; Demosthenes adv. Leptinem,
-  p. 479, s. 84.
-
-The satrap Tiribazus saw that so long as he had on his hands a
-war in Greece, it was impossible for him to concentrate his force
-against the prince of Salamis and the Egyptians. Hence, in part, the
-extraordinary effort made by the Persians to dictate, in conjunction
-with Sparta, the peace of Antalkidas, and to get together such a
-fleet in Ionia as should overawe Athens and Thebes into submission.
-It was one of the conditions of that peace that Evagoras should be
-abandoned;[52] the whole island of Cyprus being acknowledged as
-belonging to the Persian king. Though thus cut off from Athens, and
-reduced to no other Grecian aid than such mercenaries as he could
-pay, Evagoras was still assisted by Akoris of Egypt, and even by
-Hekatomnus prince of Karia with a secret present of money.[53] But
-the peace of Antalkidas being now executed in Asia, the Persian
-satraps were completely masters of the Grecian cities on the Asiatic
-sea-board, and were enabled to convey round to Kilikia and Cyprus not
-only their whole fleet from Ionia, but also additional contingents
-from these very Grecian cities. A large portion of the Persian
-force acting against Cyprus was thus Greek, yet seemingly acting by
-constraint, neither well paid nor well used,[54] and therefore not
-very efficient.
-
-  [52] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 162. Εὐαγόραν—ὃς ἐν ταῖς
-  συνθήκαις ἔκδοτός ἐστιν, etc.
-
-  We must observe, however, that Cyprus had been secured to the
-  king of Persia, even under the former peace, so glorious to
-  Athens, concluded by Perikles about 449 B.C., and called the
-  peace of Kallias. It was, therefore, neither a new demand on
-  the part of Artaxerxes, nor a new concession on the part of the
-  Greeks, at the peace of Antalkidas.
-
-  [53] Diodor. xv, 2.
-
-  It appears that Artaxerxes had counted much upon the aid of
-  Hekatomnus for conquering Evagoras (Diodor. xiv, 98).
-
-  About 380 B.C., Isokrates reckons Hekatomnus as being merely
-  dependent in name on Persia; and ready to revolt openly on the
-  first opportunity (Isokrates, Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 189).
-
-  [54] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 153, 154, 179.
-
-The satraps Tiribazus and Orontes commanded the land force, a large
-portion of which was transported across to Cyprus; the admiral Gaos
-was at the head of the fleet, which held its station at Kitium in the
-south of the island. It was here that Evagoras, having previously
-gained a battle on land, attacked them. By extraordinary efforts he
-had got together a fleet of two hundred triremes, nearly equal in
-number to theirs; but after a hard-fought contest, in which he at
-first seemed likely to be victorious, he underwent a complete naval
-defeat, which disqualified him from keeping the sea, and enabled the
-Persians to block up Salamis as well by sea as by land.[55] Though
-thus reduced to his own single city, however, Evagoras defended
-himself with unshaken resolution, still sustained by aid from Akoris
-in Egypt; while Tyre and several towns in Kilikia also continued
-in revolt against Artaxerxes; so that the efforts of the Persians
-were distracted, and the war was not concluded until ten years
-after its commencement.[56] It cost them on the whole (if we may
-believe Isokrates)[57] fifteen thousand talents in money, and such
-severe losses in men, that Tiribazus acceded to the propositions
-of Evagoras for peace, consenting to leave him in full possession
-of Salamis, under payment of a stipulated tribute, “like a slave
-to his master.” These last words were required by the satrap to be
-literally inserted in the convention; but Evagoras peremptorily
-refused his consent, demanding that the tribute should be recognized
-as paid by “one king to another.” Rather than concede this point
-of honor, he even broke off the negotiation, and resolved again to
-defend himself to the uttermost. He was rescued, after the siege had
-been yet farther prolonged, by a dispute which broke out between
-the two commanders of the Persian army. Orontes, accusing Tiribazus
-of projected treason and rebellion against the king, in conjunction
-with Sparta, caused him to be sent for as prisoner to Susa, and thus
-became sole commander. But as the besieging army was already wearied
-out by the obstinate resistance of Salamis, he consented to grant
-the capitulation, stipulating only for the tribute, and exchanging
-the offensive phrase enforced by Tiribazus, for the amendment of the
-other side.[58]
-
-  [55] Diodor. xv, 4.
-
-  [56] Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 187, 188—with
-  Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 77.
-
-  The war was not concluded,—and Tyre as well as much of
-  Kilikia was still in revolt,—when Isokrates published the
-  Panegyrical Oration. At that time, Evagoras had maintained
-  the contest six years, counting either from the peace of
-  Antalkidas (387 B.C.) or from his naval defeat about a year
-  or two afterwards; for Isokrates does not make it quite
-  clear from what point of commencement he reckons the six
-  years.
-
-  We know that the war between the king of Persia and
-  Evagoras had begun as early as 390 B.C., in which year
-  an Athenian fleet was sent to assist the latter (Xenoph.
-  Hellen. iv, 8, 24). Both Isokrates and Diodorus state
-  that it lasted ten years; and I therefore place the
-  conclusion of it in 380 or 379 B.C., soon after the date
-  of the Panegyrical Oration of Isokrates. I dissent on
-  this point from Mr. Clinton (see Fasti Hellenici, ad
-  annos 387-376 B.C., and his Appendix, No. 12—where the
-  point is discussed). He supposes the war to have begun
-  after the peace of Antalkidas, and to have ended in 376
-  B.C. I agree with him in making light of Diodorus, but he
-  appears to me on this occasion to contradict the authority
-  of Xenophon,—or at least only to evade the necessity
-  of contradicting him by resorting to an inconvenient
-  hypothesis, and by representing the two Athenian
-  expeditions sent to assist Evagoras in Cyprus, first in 390
-  B.C., next in 388 B.C., as relating to “_hostile measures
-  before the war began_” (p. 280). To me it appears more
-  natural and reasonable to include these as a part of the
-  war.
-
-  [57] Isokrates, Or. ix, s. 73-76.
-
-  [58] Diodor. xv. 8, 9.
-
-  This remarkable anecdote, of susceptible Grecian honor on the
-  part of Evagoras, is noway improbable, and seems safe to admit
-  on the authority of Diodorus. Nevertheless, it forms so choice
-  a morsel for a panegyrical discourse such as that of Isokrates,
-  that one cannot but think he would have inserted it had it come
-  to his knowledge. His silence causes great surprise—not without
-  some suspicion as to the truth of the story.
-
-It was thus that Evagoras was relieved from his besieging enemies,
-and continued for the remainder of his life as tributary prince
-of Salamis under the Persians. He was no farther engaged in war,
-nor was his general popularity among the Salaminians diminished
-by the hardships which they had gone through along with him.[59]
-His prudence calmed the rankling antipathy of the Great King, who
-would gladly have found a pretext for breaking the treaty. His
-children were numerous, and lived in harmony as well with him as
-with each other. Isokrates specially notices this fact, standing as
-it did in marked contrast with the family-relations of most of the
-Grecian despots, usually stained with jealousies, antipathies, and
-conflict, often with actual bloodshed.[60] But he omits to notice
-the incident whereby Evagoras perished; an incident not in keeping
-with that superhuman good fortune and favor from the gods, of which
-the Panegyrical Oration boasts as having been vouchsafed to the hero
-throughout his life.[61] It was seemingly not very long after the
-peace, that a Salaminian named Nikokreon formed a conspiracy against
-his life and dominion, but was detected, by a singular accident,
-before the moment of execution, and forced to seek safety in flight.
-He left behind him a youthful daughter in his harem, under the care
-of an eunuch (a Greek, born in Elis) named Thrasydæus; who, full of
-vindictive sympathy in his master’s cause, made known the beauty of
-the young lady both to Evagoras himself and to Pnytagoras, the most
-distinguished of his sons, partner in the gallant defence of Salamis
-against the Persians. Both of them were tempted, each unknown to
-the other, to make a secret assignation for being conducted to her
-chamber by the eunuch; both of them were there assassinated by his
-hand.[62]
-
-  [59] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 40,—a passage which must
-  be more true of Evagoras than of Nikokles.
-
-  [60] Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 88. Compare his Orat. viii, (De Pace) s.
-  138.
-
-  [61] Isokrates, ib. s. 85. εὐτυχέστερον καὶ θεοφιλέστερον, etc.
-
-  [62] I give this incident, in the main, as it is recounted in the
-  fragment of Theopompus, preserved as a portion of the abstract
-  of that author by Photius (Theopom. Fr. 111, ed. Wichers and ed.
-  Didot).
-
-  Both Aristotle (Polit. v, 8, 10) and Diodorus (xv, 47) allude
-  to the assassination of Evagoras by the eunuch; but both these
-  authors conceive the story differently from Theopompus. Thus
-  Diodorus says—Nikoklês, the eunuch, assassinated Evagoras, and
-  became “despot of Salamis.” This appears to be a confusion of
-  Nikoklês with Nikokreon. Nikoklês was the son of Evagoras, and
-  the manner in which Isokrates addresses him affords the surest
-  proof that _he_ had no hand in the death of his father.
-
-  The words of Aristotle are—ἡ (ἐπίθεσις) τοῦ εὐνούχου Εὐαγόρᾳ
-  τῷ Κυπρίῳ· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν γυναῖκα παρελέσθαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ
-  ἀπέκτεινεν ὡς ὑβρισμένος. So perplexing is the passage in its
-  literal sense, that M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, in the note to his
-  translation, conceives ὁ εὐνοῦχος to be a surname or _sobriquet_
-  given to the conspirator, whose real name was Nikoklês. But this
-  supposition is, in my judgment, contradicted by the fact, that
-  Theopompus marks the same fact, of the assassin being an eunuch,
-  by another word—Θρασυδαίου ~τοῦ ἡμιάῤῥενος~, ὃς ἦν Ἠλεῖος τὸ
-  γένος, etc.
-
-  It is evident that Aristotle had heard the story differently
-  from Theopompus, and we have to choose between the two. I
-  prefer the version of the latter; which is more marked as well
-  as more intelligible, and which furnishes the explanation why
-  Pnytagoras,—who seems to have been the most advanced of the sons,
-  being left in command of the besieged Salamis when Evagoras
-  quitted it to solicit aid in Egypt,—did not succeed his father,
-  but left the succession to Nikoklês, who was evidently (from the
-  representation even of an eulogist like Isokrates) not a man
-  of much energy. The position of this eunuch in the family of
-  Nikokreon seems to mark the partial prevalence of Oriental habits.
-
-Thus perished a Greek of preëminent vigor and intelligence,
-remarkably free from the vices usual in Grecian despots, and
-forming a strong contrast in this respect with his contemporary
-Dionysius, whose military energy is so deeply stained by crime and
-violence. Nikoklês, the son of Evagoras, reigned at Salamis after
-him, and showed much regard, accompanied by munificent presents,
-to the Athenian Isokrates; who compliments him as a pacific and
-well-disposed prince, attached to Greek pursuits and arts, conversant
-by personal study with Greek philosophy, and above all, copying his
-father in that just dealing and absence of wrong towards person or
-property, which had so much promoted the comfort as well as the
-prosperity of the city.[63]
-
-  [63] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikoklês) s. 38-48; Or. ix, (Evagoras)
-  s. 100; Or. xv, (Permut.) s. 43. Diodorus (xv, 47) places the
-  assassination of Evagoras in 374 B.C.
-
-We now revert from the episode respecting Evagoras,—interesting not
-less from the eminent qualities of that prince than from the glimpse
-of Hellenism struggling with the Phœnician element in Cyprus,—to the
-general consequences of the peace of Antalkidas in Central Greece.
-For the first time since the battle of Mykalê in 479 B.C., the
-Persians were now really masters of all the Greeks on the Asiatic
-coast. The satraps lost no time in confirming their dominion. In all
-the cities which they suspected, they built citadels and planted
-permanent garrisons. In some cases, their mistrust or displeasure was
-carried so far as to raze the town altogether.[64] And thus these
-cities, having already once changed their position greatly for the
-worse, by passing from easy subjection under Athens to the harsh rule
-of Lacedæmonian harmosts and native decemvirs,—were now transferred
-to masters yet more oppressive and more completely without the pale
-of Hellenic sympathy. Both in public extortion, and in wrong doing
-towards individuals, the commandant and his mercenaries, whom the
-satrap maintained, were probably more rapacious, and certainly more
-unrestrained, than even the harmosts of Sparta. Moreover, the Persian
-grandees required beautiful boys as eunuchs for their service, and
-beautiful women as inmates of their harems.[65] What was taken
-for their convenience admitted neither of recovery nor redress;
-and Grecian women, if not more beautiful than many of the native
-Asiatics, were at least more intelligent, lively, and seductive,—as
-we may read in the history of that Phokæan lady, the companion of
-Cyrus, who was taken captive at Kunaxa. Moreover, these Asiatic
-Greeks, when passing into the hands of Oriental masters, came under
-the maxims and sentiment of Orientals, respecting the infliction of
-pain or torture,—maxims not only more cruel than those of the Greeks,
-but also making little distinction between freemen and slaves.[66]
-The difference between the Greeks and Phœnicians in Cyprus, on this
-point, has been just noticed; and doubtless the difference between
-Greeks and Persians was still more marked. While the Asiatic Greeks
-were thus made over by Sparta and the Perso-Spartan convention of
-Antalkidas, to a condition in every respect worse, they were at the
-same time thrown in, as reluctant auxiliaries, to strengthen the
-hands of the Great King against other Greeks,—against Evagoras in
-Cyprus,—and above all, against the islands adjoining the coast of
-Asia,—Chios, Samos, Rhodes, etc.[67] These islands were now exposed
-to the same hazard, from their overwhelming Persian neighbors, as
-that from which they had been rescued nearly a century before by the
-Confederacy of Delos, and by the Athenian empire into which that
-Confederacy was transformed. All the tutelary combination that the
-genius, the energy, and the Pan-hellenic ardor, of Athens had first
-organized, and so long kept up,—was now broken up; while Sparta, to
-whom its extinction was owing, in surrendering the Asiatic Greeks,
-had destroyed the security even of the islanders.
-
-  [64] Isokrates. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142, 156, 190. Τάς τε πόλεις
-  τὰς Ἑλληνίδας οὕτω κυρίως παρείληφεν, ὥστε τὰς μὲν κατασκάπτειν,
-  ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀκροπόλεις ἐντειχίζειν.
-
-  [65] See Herodot. vi, 9; ix, 76.
-
-  [66] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142.
-
-  Οἷς (to the Asiatic Greeks after the peace of Antalkidas) οὐκ
-  ἐξαρκεῖ δασμολογεῖσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀκροπόλεις ὁρᾷν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν
-  κατεχομένας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ταῖς κοιναῖς συμφοραῖς δεινότερα πάσχουσι
-  τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀργυρωνήτων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὕτως αἰκίζεται τοὺς
-  οἰκέτας, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους κολάζουσιν.
-
-  [67] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 143, 154, 189, 190. How
-  immediately the inland kings, who had acquired possession of the
-  continental Grecian cities, aimed at acquiring the islands also,
-  is seen in Herodot. i, 27. Chios and Samos indeed, surrendered
-  without resisting, to the first Cyrus, when he was master of
-  the continental towns, though he had no naval force (Herod. i,
-  143-169). Even after the victory of Mykalê, the Spartans deemed
-  it impossible to protect these islanders against the Persian
-  masters of the continent (Herod. ix, 106). Nothing except the
-  energy and organization of the Athenians proved that it was
-  possible to do so.
-
-It soon appeared, however, how much Sparta herself had gained by
-this surrender in respect to dominion nearer home. The government
-of Corinth,—wrested from the party friendly to Argos, deprived of
-Argeian auxiliaries, and now in the hands of the restored Corinthian
-exiles who were the most devoted partisans of Sparta,—looked to her
-for support, and made her mistress of the Isthmus, either for offence
-or for defence. She thus gained the means of free action against
-Thebes, the enemy upon whom her attention was first directed. Thebes
-was now the object of Spartan antipathy, not less than Athens had
-formerly been; especially on the part of King Agesilaus, who had to
-avenge the insult offered to himself at the sacrifice near Aulis,
-as well as the strenuous resistance on the field of Koroneia. He
-was at the zenith of his political influence; so that his intense
-miso-Theban sentiment made Sparta, now becoming aggressive on all
-sides, doubly aggressive against Thebes. More prudent Spartans,
-like Antalkidas, warned him[68] that his persevering hostility
-would ultimately kindle in the Thebans a fatal energy of military
-resistance and organization. But the warning was despised until it
-was too fully realized in the development of the great military
-genius of Epaminondas, and in the defeat of Leuktra.
-
-  [68] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 26; Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 13.
-
-I have already mentioned that in the solemnity of exchanging oaths
-to the peace of Antalkidas, the Thebans had hesitated at first to
-recognize the autonomy of the other Bœotian cities; upon which
-Agesilaus had manifested a fierce impatience to exclude them from the
-treaty, and attack them single-handed.[69] Their timely accession
-balked him in this impulse; but it enabled him to enter upon a series
-of measures highly humiliating to the dignity as well as to the power
-of Thebes. All the Bœotian cities were now proclaimed autonomous
-under the convention. As solicitor, guarantee, and interpreter, of
-that convention, Sparta either had, or professed to have, the right
-of guarding their autonomy against dangers, actual or contingent,
-from their previous Vorort or presiding city. For this purpose she
-availed herself of this moment of change to organize in each of them
-a local oligarchy, composed of partisans adverse to Thebes as well as
-devoted to herself, and upheld in case of need by a Spartan harmost
-and garrison.[70] Such an internal revolution grew almost naturally
-out of the situation; since the previous leaders, and the predominant
-sentiment in most of the towns, seem to have been favorable to
-Bœotian unity, and to the continued presidency of Thebes. These
-leaders would therefore find themselves hampered, intimidated, and
-disqualified, under the new system, while those who had before been
-an opposition minority would come forward with a bold and decided
-policy, like Kritias and Theramenes at Athens after the surrender of
-the city to Lysander. The new leaders doubtless would rather invite
-than repel the establishment of a Spartan harmost in their town, as a
-security to themselves against resistance from their own citizens as
-well as against attacks from Thebes, and as a means of placing them
-under the assured conditions of a Lysandrian dekarchy. Though most of
-the Bœotian cities were thus, on the whole, favorable to Thebes,—and
-though Sparta thrust upon them the boon, which she called autonomy,
-from motives of her own, and not from their solicitation,—yet,
-Orchomenus and Thespiæ, over whom the presidency of Thebes appears to
-have been harshly exercised, were adverse to her, and favorable to
-the Spartan alliance.[71] These two cities were strongly garrisoned
-by Sparta, and formed her main stations in Bœotia.[72]
-
-  [69] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 33.
-
-  [70] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46. Ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι
-  καθειστήκεσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις. Respecting the Bœotian city
-  of Tanagra, he says—ἔτι γὰρ τότε καὶ τὴν Τανάγραν οἱ περὶ
-  Ὑπατόδωρον, φίλοι ὄντες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, εἶχον (v, 4, 49).
-
-  Schneider, in his note on the former of these two passages,
-  explains the word δυναστεῖαι as follows—“Sunt factiones
-  optimatium qui Lacedæmoniis favebant, cum præsidio et harmostâ
-  Laconico.” This is perfectly just; but the words ὥσπερ ἐν
-  Θήβαις seem also to require an explanation. These words allude
-  to the “factio optimatium” at Thebes, of whom Leontiades was
-  the chief; who betrayed the Kadmeia (the citadel of Thebes) to
-  the Lacedæmonian troops under Phœbidas in 382 B.C.; and who
-  remained masters of Thebes, subservient to Sparta and upheld by
-  a standing Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia, until they were
-  overthrown by the memorable conspiracy of Pelopidas and Mellon
-  in 379 B.C. It is to this oligarchy under Leontiades at Thebes,
-  devoted to Spartan interests and resting on Spartan support,—that
-  Xenophon compares the governments planted by Sparta, after the
-  peace of Antalkidas, in each of the Bœotian cities. What he says,
-  of the government of Leontiades and his colleagues at Thebes,
-  is—“that they deliberately introduced the Lacedæmonians into the
-  acropolis, and enslaved Thebes to them, in order that they might
-  themselves exercise a despotism”—τούς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγαγόντας
-  εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν
-  πόλιν δουλεύειν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν (v, 4, 1: compare v, 2,
-  36). This character—conveying a strong censure in the mouth
-  of the philo-Laconian Xenophon—belongs to all the governments
-  planted by Sparta in the Bœotian cities after the peace of
-  Antalkidas, and, indeed, to the Dekarchies generally which she
-  established throughout her empire.
-
-  [71] Xenoph. Memorab. iii, 5, 2; Thucyd. iv, 133; Diodor. xv, 79.
-
-  [72] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 15-20; Diodor. xv, 32-37; Isokrates, Or.
-  xiv, (Plataic.) s. 14. 15.
-
-The presence of such garrisons, one on each side of Thebes,—the
-discontinuance of the Bœotarchs, with the breaking up of all symbols
-and proceedings of the Bœotian federation,—and the establishment of
-oligarchies devoted to Sparta in the other cities,—was doubtless a
-deep wound to the pride of the Thebans. But there was another wound
-still deeper, and this the Lacedæmonians forthwith proceeded to
-inflict,—the restoration of Platæa.
-
-A melancholy interest attaches both to the locality of this town, as
-one of the brightest scenes of Grecian glory,—and to its brave and
-faithful population, victims of an exposed position combined with
-numerical feebleness. Especially, we follow with a sort of repugnance
-the capricious turns of policy which dictated the Spartan behavior
-towards them. One hundred and twenty years before, the Platæans had
-thrown themselves upon Sparta, to entreat her protection against
-Thebes. The Spartan king Kleomenes had then declined the obligation
-as too distant, and had recommended them to ally themselves with
-Athens.[73] This recommendation, though dictated chiefly by a wish
-to raise contention between Athens and Thebes, was complied with;
-and the alliance, severing Platæa altogether from the Bœotian
-confederacy, turned out both advantageous and honorable to her until
-the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. At that time, it suited
-the policy of the Spartans to uphold and strengthen in every way
-the supremacy of Thebes over the Bœotian cities; it was altogether
-by Spartan intervention, indeed, that the power of Thebes was
-reëstablished, after the great prostration as well as disgrace which
-she had undergone, as traitor to Hellas and zealous in the service
-of Mardonius.[74] Athens, on the other hand, was at that time doing
-her best to break up the Bœotian federation, and to enrol its various
-cities as her allies; in which project, though doubtless suggested
-by and conducive to her own ambition, she was at that time (460-445
-B.C.) perfectly justifiable on Pan-hellenic grounds; seeing that
-Thebes as their former chief had so recently enlisted them all in
-the service of Xerxes, and might be expected to do the same again
-if a second Persian invasion should be attempted. Though for a
-time successful, Athens was expelled from Bœotia by the defeat of
-Korôneia; and at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the whole
-Bœotian federation (except Platæa), was united under Thebes, in bitter
-hostility against her. The first blow of the war, even prior to any
-declaration, was struck by Thebes in her abortive nocturnal attempt
-to surprise Platæa. In the third year of the war, king Archidamus,
-at the head of the full Lacedæmonian force, laid siege to the latter
-town; which, after an heroic defence and a long blockade, at length
-surrendered under the extreme pressure of famine; yet not before one
-half its brave defenders had forced their way out over the blockading
-wall, and escaped to Athens, where all the Platæan old men, women,
-and children, had been safely lodged before the siege. By a cruel
-act which stands among the capital iniquities of Grecian warfare,
-the Lacedæmonians had put to death all the Platæan captives, two
-hundred in number, who fell into their hands; the town of Platæa
-had been razed, and its whole territory, joined to Thebes, had
-remained ever since cultivated on Theban account.[75] The surviving
-Platæans had been dealt with kindly and hospitably by the Athenians.
-A qualified right of citizenship was conceded to them at Athens, and
-when Skionê was recaptured in 420 B.C., that town (vacant by the
-slaughter of its captive citizens) was handed over to the Platæans
-as a residence.[76] Compelled to evacuate Skionê, they were obliged
-at the close of the Peloponnesian war,[77] to return to Athens,
-where the remainder of them were residing at the time of the peace
-of Antalkidas; little dreaming that those who had destroyed their
-town and their fathers forty years before, would now turn round and
-restore it.[78]
-
-  [73] Herodot. vi, 108.
-
-  [74] See Vol. V. Ch. xlv, p. 327 of this History.
-
-  [75] Thucyd. iii, 68.
-
-  [76] Thucyd. v, 32; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 126; Or.
-  xii, (Panathen.) s. 101.
-
-  [77] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14.
-
-  [78] Pausanias, ix, 1, 3.
-
-Such restoration, whatever might be the ostensible grounds on which
-the Spartans pretended to rest it, was not really undertaken either
-to carry out the convention of Antalkidas, which guaranteed only the
-autonomy of _existing_ towns,—or to repair previous injustice, since
-the prior destruction had been the deliberate act of themselves, and
-of King Archidamus the father of Agesilaus,—but simply as a step
-conducive to the present political views of Sparta. And towards
-this object it was skilfully devised. It weakened the Thebans, not
-only by wresting from them what had been, for about forty years,
-a part of their territory and property; but also by establishing
-upon it a permanent stronghold in the occupation of their bitter
-enemies, assisted by a Spartan garrison. It furnished an additional
-station for such a garrison in Bœotia, with the full consent of the
-newly-established inhabitants. And more than all, it introduced
-a subject of contention between Athens and Thebes, calculated to
-prevent the two from hearty coöperation afterwards against Sparta.
-As the sympathy of the Platæans with Athens was no less ancient
-and cordial than their antipathy against Thebes, we may probably
-conclude that the restoration of the town was an act acceptable to
-the Athenians; at least, at first, until they saw the use made of
-it, and the position which Sparta came to occupy in reference to
-Greece generally. Many of the Platæans, during their residence at
-Athens, had intermarried with Athenian women,[79] who now, probably,
-accompanied their husbands to the restored little town on the north
-of Kithæron, near the southern bank of the river Asôpus.
-
-  [79] Isokrates, Or. xiv. (Plataic.) s. 54.
-
-Had the Platæans been restored to a real and honorable autonomy, such
-as they enjoyed in alliance with Athens before the Peloponnesian
-war, we should have cordially sympathized with the event. But the
-sequel will prove—and their own subsequent statement emphatically
-sets forth—that they were a mere dependency of Sparta, and an outpost
-of Spartan operations against Thebes.[80] They were a part of the
-great revolution which the Spartans now brought about in Bœotia;
-whereby Thebes was degraded from the president of a federation into
-an isolated autonomous city, while the other Bœotian cities, who had
-been before members of the federation, were elevated each for itself
-into the like autonomy; or rather (to substitute the real truth[81]
-in place of Spartan professions) they became enrolled and sworn in
-as dependent allies of Sparta, under oligarchical factions devoted
-to her purposes and resting upon her for support. That the Thebans
-should submit to such a revolution, and, above all, to the sight of
-Platæa as an independent neighbor with a territory abstracted from
-themselves,—proves how much they felt their own weakness, and how
-irresistible at this moment was the ascendency of their great enemy,
-in perverting to her own ambition the popular lure of universal
-autonomy held out by the peace of Antalkidas. Though compelled to
-acquiesce, the Thebans waited in hopes of some turn of fortune
-which would enable them to reörganize the Bœotian federation; while
-their hostile sentiment towards Sparta was not the less bitter for
-being suppressed. Sparta on her part kept constant watch to prevent
-the reunion of Bœotia;[82] an object in which she was for a time
-completely successful, and was even enabled, beyond her hopes, to
-become possessed of Thebes itself,[83] through a party of traitors
-within,—as will presently appear.
-
-  [80] See the Orat. xiv, (called Plataicus) of Isokrates; which
-  is a pleading probably delivered in the Athenian assembly by
-  the Platæans (after the second destruction of their city),
-  and, doubtless, founded upon their own statements. The painful
-  dependence and compulsion under which they were held by Sparta,
-  is proclaimed in the most unequivocal terms (s. 31, 33, 48);
-  together with the presence of a Spartan harmost and garrison in
-  their town (s. 14).
-
-  [81] Xenophon says, truly enough, that Sparta made the Bœotian
-  cities αὐτονόμους ἀπὸ τῶν Θηβαίων (v. 1, 36), which she had long
-  desired to do. Autonomy, in the sense of disconnection from
-  Thebes, was insured to them,—but in no other sense.
-
-  [82] To illustrate the relations of Thebes, the other Bœotian
-  cities, and Sparta, between the peace of Antalkidas and the
-  seizure of the Kadmeia by Sparta (387-382 B.C.)—compare
-  the speech of the Akanthian envoys, and that of the Theban
-  Leontiades, at Sparta (Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 16-34). Ὑμᾶς
-  (the Spartans) τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως μὴ καθ’
-  ἓν εἴη, etc. Καὶ ὑμεῖς γε τότε μὲν ἀεὶ προσείχετε τὸν νοῦν,
-  πότε ἀκούσεσθε βιαζομένους αὐτοὺς (the Thebans) τὴν Βοιωτίαν
-  ὑφ’ αὑτοῖς εἶναι· νῦν δὲ, ἐπεὶ τάδε πέπρακται, οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς δεῖ
-  Θηβαίους φοβεῖσθαι, etc. Compare Diodor. xv, 20.
-
-  [83] In the Orat. (14) Plataic. of Isokrates, s. 30—we find it
-  stated among the accusations against the Thebans, that during
-  this period (_i. e._ between the peace of Antalkidas and the
-  seizure of the Kadmeia) they became sworn in as members of the
-  Spartan alliance and as ready to act with Sparta conjointly
-  against Athens. If we could admit this as true, we might also
-  admit the story of Epaminondas and Pelopidas serving in the
-  Spartan army at Mantinea (Plutarch, Pelop. c. 3). But I do not
-  see how it can be even partially true. If it had been true, I
-  think Xenophon could not have failed to mention it: all that he
-  does say, tends to contradict it.
-
-In these measures regarding Bœotia, we recognize the vigorous hand,
-and the miso-Theban spirit, of Agesilaus. He was at this time the
-great director of Spartan foreign policy, though opposed by his more
-just and moderate colleague king Agesipolis,[84] as well as by a
-section of the leading Spartans, who reproached Agesilaus with his
-project of ruling Greece by means of subservient local despots or
-oligarchies in the various cities,[85] and who contended that the
-autonomy promised by the peace of Antalkidas ought to be left to
-develop itself freely, without any coërcive intervention on the part
-of Sparta.[86]
-
-  [84] Diodor. xv. 29.
-
-  [85] How currently this reproach was advanced against Agesilaus,
-  may be seen in more than one passage of the Hellenica
-  of Xenophon; whose narrative is both so partial, and so
-  ill-constructed, that the most instructive information is dropped
-  only in the way of unintentional side-wind, where we should
-  not naturally look for it. Xen. Hellen. v. 3, 16. πολλῶν δὲ
-  λεγόντων Λακεδαιμονίων ὡς ὀλίγων ἕνεκεν ἀνθρώπων πόλει (Phlius)
-  ἀπεχθάνοιτο (Agesilaus) πλέον πεντακισχιλίων ἀνδρῶν. Again,
-  v, 4, 13. (Ἀγησίλαος) εὖ εἰδὼς, ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγοίη, λέξειαν οἱ
-  πολῖται, ὡς Ἀγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσειε τοῖς τυράννοις, πράγματα τῇ
-  πόλει παρέχοι, etc. Compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24-26.
-
-  [86] Diodorus indeed affirms, that this was really done, for
-  a short time; that the cities which had before been dependent
-  allies of Sparta were now emancipated and left to themselves;
-  that a reaction immediately ensued against those dekarchies
-  or oligarchies which had hitherto managed the cities in the
-  interests of Sparta; that this reaction was so furious, as
-  everywhere to kill, banish, or impoverish, the principal
-  partisans of Spartan supremacy; and that the accumulated
-  complaints and sufferings of these exiles drove the Spartans,
-  after having “endured the peace like a heavy burthen” (ὥσπερ
-  βαρὺ φόρτιον—xv, 5) for a few months, to shake it off, and
-  to reëstablish by force their own supremacy as well as the
-  government of their friends in all the various cities. In this
-  statement there is nothing intrinsically improbable. After what
-  we have heard of the dekarchies under Sparta, no extent of
-  violence in the reaction against them is incredible, nor can we
-  doubt that such reaction would carry with it some new injustice,
-  along with much well-merited retribution. Hardly any but Athenian
-  citizens were capable of the forbearance displayed by Athens both
-  after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty. Nevertheless, I
-  believe that Diodorus is here mistaken, and that he has assigned
-  to the period immediately succeeding the peace of Antalkidas,
-  those reactionary violences which took place in many cities
-  about sixteen years subsequently, _after the battle of Leuktra_.
-  For Xenophon, in recounting what happened after the peace of
-  Antalkidas, mentions nothing about any real autonomy granted by
-  Sparta to her various subject-allies, and subsequently revoked;
-  which he would never have omitted to tell us, had the fact been
-  so, because it would have supplied a plausible apology for the
-  high-handed injustice of the Spartans, and would have thus lent
-  aid to the current of partiality which manifests itself in his
-  history.
-
-Far from any wish thus to realize the terms of peace which they
-had themselves imposed, the Lacedæmonians took advantage of an
-early moment after becoming free from their enemies in Bœotia and
-Corinth, to strain their authority over their allies beyond its
-previous limits. Passing in review[87] the conduct of each during
-the war, they resolved to make an example of the city of Mantinea.
-Some acts, not of positive hostility, but of equivocal fidelity,
-were imputed to the Mantineans. They were accused of having been
-slack in performance of their military obligations, sometimes even
-to the length of withholding their contingent altogether, under
-pretence of a season of religious truce; of furnishing corn in
-time of war to the hostile Argeians; and of plainly manifesting
-their disaffected feeling towards Sparta,—chagrin at every success
-which she obtained,—satisfaction, when she chanced to experience
-a reverse.[88] The Spartan ephors now sent an envoy to Mantinea,
-denouncing all such past behavior, and peremptorily requiring that
-the walls of the city should be demolished, as the only security
-for future penitence and amendment. As compliance was refused, they
-despatched an army, summoning the allied contingents generally for
-the purpose of enforcing the sentence. They intrusted the command
-to king Agesipolis, since Agesilaus excused himself from the duty,
-on the ground that the Mantineans had rendered material service to
-his father Archidamus in the dangerous Messenian war which had beset
-Sparta during the early part of his reign.[89]
-
-  [87] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 1-8. Αἰσθόμενοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους
-  ἐπισκοποῦντας τοὺς ξυμμάχους, ὁποῖοί τινες ἕκαστοι ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ
-  αὐτοῖς ἐγεγένηντο, etc.
-
-  [88] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 2. He had before stated, that the
-  Mantineans had really shown themselves pleased, when the
-  Lacedæmonian Mora was destroyed near Corinth by Iphikrates (iv,
-  5, 18).
-
-  [89] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 3.
-
-Having first attempted to intimidate the Mantineans by ravaging
-their lands, Agesipolis commenced the work of blockade by digging
-a ditch around the town; half of his soldiers being kept on guard,
-while the rest worked with the spade. The ditch being completed, he
-prepared to erect a wall of circumvallation. But being apprised that
-the preceding harvest had been so good, as to leave a large stock
-of provision in the town, and to render the process of starving it
-out tedious both for Sparta and for her allies,—he tried a more
-rapid method of accomplishing his object. As the river Ophis, of
-considerable breadth for a Grecian stream, passed through the middle
-of the town, he dammed up its efflux on the lower side;[90] thus
-causing it to inundate the interior of the city and threaten the
-stability of the walls; which seem to have been of no great height,
-and built of sun-burnt bricks. Disappointed in their application to
-Athens for aid,[91] and unable to provide extraneous support for
-their tottering towers, the Mantineans were compelled to solicit a
-capitulation. But Agesipolis now refused to grant the request, except
-on condition that not only the fortifications of their city, but
-the city itself, should be in great part demolished; and that the
-inhabitants should be re-distributed into those five villages, which
-had been brought together, many years before, to form the aggregate
-city of Mantinea. To this also the Mantineans were obliged to submit,
-and the capitulation was ratified.
-
-  [90] In 1627, during the Thirty years’ War, the German town of
-  Wolfenbüttel was constrained to surrender in the same manner, by
-  damming up the river Ocker which flowed through it; a contrivance
-  of General Count Pappenheim, the Austrian besieging commander.
-  See Colonel Mitchell’s Life of Wallenstein, p. 107.
-
-  The description given by Xenophon of Mantinea as it stood in
-  385 B.C., with the river Ophis, a considerable stream, passing
-  through the middle of it, is perfectly clear. When the city,
-  after having been now broken up, was rebuilt in 370 B.C., the
-  site was so far changed that the river no longer ran through it.
-  But the present course of the river Ophis, as given by excellent
-  modern topographical examiners, Colonel Leake and Kiepert, is
-  at a very considerable distance from the Mantinea rebuilt in
-  370 B.C.; the situation of which is accurately known, since
-  the circuit of its walls still remains distinctly marked. The
-  Mantinea of 370 B.C., therefore, as compared with the Mantinea in
-  385 B.C., must have been removed to a considerable distance—or
-  else the river Ophis must have altered its course. Colonel
-  Leake supposes that the Ophis had been artificially diverted
-  from its course, in order that it might be brought through the
-  town of Mantinea; a supposition, which he founds on the words
-  of Xenophon,—σοφωτέρων γενομένων ταύτῃ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὸ μὴ
-  διὰ τειχῶν ποταμὸν ποιεῖσθαι (Hellen. v, 2, 7). But it is very
-  difficult to agree with him on this point, when we look at his
-  own map (annexed to the Peloponnesiaca) of the Mantinice and
-  Tegeatis, and observe the great distance between the river Ophis
-  and Mantinea; nor do the words of Xenophon seem necessarily to
-  imply any artificial diversion of the river. It appears easier to
-  believe that the river has changed its course. See Leake, Travels
-  in Morea, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 71; and Peloponnesiaca, p. 380;
-  and Ernst Curtius, Peloponnesos, p. 239—who still, however,
-  leaves the point obscure.
-
-  [91] Diodor. xv, 5.
-
-Though nothing was said in the terms of it about the chiefs of the
-Mantinean democratical government, yet these latter, conscious that
-they were detested both by their own oligarchical opposition and
-by the Lacedæmonians, accounted themselves certain of being put
-to death. And such would assuredly have been their fate, had not
-Pausanias (the late king of Sparta, now in exile at Tegea), whose
-good opinion they had always enjoyed, obtained as a personal favor
-from his son Agesipolis the lives of the most obnoxious, sixty in
-number, on condition that they should depart into exile. Agesipolis
-had much difficulty in accomplishing the wishes of his father. His
-Lacedæmonian soldiers were ranged in arms on both sides of the
-gate by which the obnoxious men went out; and Xenophon notices it
-as a signal mark of Lacedæmonian discipline, that they could keep
-their spears unemployed when disarmed enemies were thus within
-their reach; especially as the oligarchical Mantineans manifested
-the most murderous propensities, and were exceedingly difficult to
-control.[92] As at Peiræus before, so here at Mantinea again,—the
-liberal, but unfortunate, king Pausanias is found interfering in the
-character of mediator to soften the ferocity of political antipathies.
-
-  [92] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 6. Οἰομένων δὲ ἀποθανεῖσθαι τῶν
-  ἀργολιζόντων, καὶ τῶν τοῦ δήμου προστατῶν, διεπράξατο ὁ πατὴρ
-  (see before, v, 2, 3) παρὰ τοῦ Ἀγησιπόλιδος, ἀσφάλειαν αὐτοῖς
-  ἔσεσθαι, ἀπαλλαττομένοις ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἑξήκοντα οὖσι. Καὶ
-  ἀμφοτέρωθεν μὲν τῆς ὁδοῦ, ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῶν πυλῶν ἔχοντες τὰ
-  δόρατα οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἔστησαν, θεώμενοι τοὺς ἐξιόντας· ~καὶ
-  μισοῦντες αὐτοὺς ὅμως ἀπείχοντο αὐτῶν ῥᾷον ἢ οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν
-  Μαντινέων~· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν εἰρήσθω μέγα τεκμήριον πειθαρχίας.
-
-  I have remarked more than once, and the reader will here observe
-  a new example, how completely the word βέλτιστοι—which is applied
-  to the wealthy or aristocratical party in politics, as its
-  equivalent is in other languages, by writers who sympathize with
-  them—is divested of all genuine ethical import as to character.
-
-The city of Mantinea was now broken up, and the inhabitants were
-distributed again into the five constituent villages. Out of
-four-fifths of the population, each man pulled down his house in
-the city, and rebuilt it in the village near to which his property
-lay. The remaining fifth continued to occupy Mantinea as a village.
-Each village was placed under oligarchical government, and left
-unfortified. Though at first (says Xenophon) the change proved
-troublesome and odious, yet presently, when men found themselves
-resident upon their landed properties,—and still more, when they felt
-themselves delivered from the vexatious demagogues,—the new situation
-became more popular than the old. The Lacedæmonians were still better
-satisfied. Instead of one city of Mantinea, five distinct Arcadian
-villages now stood enrolled in their catalogue of allies. They
-assigned to each a separate xenâgus (Spartan officer destined to the
-command of each allied contingent), and the military service of all
-was henceforward performed with the utmost regularity.[93]
-
-  [93] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 7.
-
-  He says of this breaking up of the city of Mantinea, διῳκίσθη ἡ
-  Μαντίνεια τετραχῆ, καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ᾤκουν. Ephorus (Fr. 138,
-  ed. Didot) states that it was distributed into the five original
-  villages; and Strabo affirms that there were _five_ original
-  constituent villages (viii, p. 337). Hence it is probable that
-  Mantinea the city was still left, after this διοίκισις, to
-  subsist as one of the five unfortified villages; so that Ephorus,
-  Strabo, and Xenophon may be thus made to agree, in substance.
-
-Such was the dissection or cutting into parts of the ancient city
-Mantinea; one of the most odious acts of high-handed Spartan
-despotism. Its true character is veiled by the partiality of the
-historian, who recounts it with a confident assurance, that after
-the trouble of moving was over, the population felt themselves
-decidedly bettered by the change. Such an assurance is only to be
-credited, on the ground that, being captives under the Grecian laws
-of war, they may have been thankful to escape the more terrible
-liabilities of death or personal slavery, at the price of forfeiting
-their civic community. That their feelings towards the change were
-those of genuine aversion, is shown by their subsequent conduct after
-the battle of Leuktra. As soon as the fear of Sparta was removed,
-they flocked together, with unanimous impulse, to reconstitute and
-refortify their dismantled city.[94] It would have been strange
-indeed had the fact been otherwise; for attachment to a civic
-community was the strongest political instinct of the Greek mind.
-The citizen of a town was averse—often most unhappily averse—to
-compromise the separate and autonomous working of his community
-by joining in any larger political combination, however equitably
-framed, and however it might promise on the whole an increase of
-Hellenic dignity. But still more vehemently did he shrink from the
-idea of breaking up his town into separate villages, and exchanging
-the character of a citizen for that of a villager, which was nothing
-less than great social degradation, in the eyes of Greeks generally,
-Spartans not excepted.[95]
-
-  [94] This is mentioned by Xenophon himself (Hellen. vi, 5,
-  3). The Lacedæmonians, though they remonstrated against it,
-  were at that time too much humiliated to interfere by force
-  and prevent it. The reason why they did not interfere by force
-  (according to Xenophon) was that a general peace had just then
-  been sworn, guaranteeing autonomy to every distinct town, so
-  that the Mantineans under this peace had a right to do what
-  they did—στρατεύειν γε μέντοι ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς οὐ δυνατὸν ἐδόκει
-  εἶναι, ἐπ’ αὐτονομίᾳ τῆς εἰρήνης γεγενημένης (vi, 5, 5). Of
-  this second peace, Athens was the originator and the voucher;
-  but the autonomy which it guaranteed was only the same as had
-  been professedly guaranteed by the peace of Antalkidas, of which
-  Sparta had been the voucher.
-
-  General autonomy, as interpreted by Athens, was a different thing
-  from general autonomy as it had been when interpreted by Sparta.
-  The Spartans, when they had in their own hands both the power
-  of interpretation and the power of enforcement, did not scruple
-  to falsify autonomy so completely as to lay siege to Mantinea
-  and break up the city by force; while, when interpretation and
-  enforcement had passed to Athens, they at once recognized that
-  the treaty precluded them from a much less violent measure of
-  interference.
-
-  We may see by this, how thoroughly partial and Laconian is
-  the account given by Xenophon of the διοίκισις of Mantinea;
-  how completely he keeps out of view the odious side of that
-  proceeding.
-
-  [95] See the remarkable sentence of the Spartans, in which they
-  reject the claim of the Pisatans to preside over and administer
-  the Olympic festival (which had been their ancient privilege)
-  because they were χωρίται and not fit for the task (Xen. Hellen.
-  iii, 2, 31): compare χωριτικῶς (Xen. Cyrop. iv. 5, 54).
-
-In truth the sentence executed by the Spartans against Mantinea was
-in point of dishonor, as well as of privation, one of the severest
-which could be inflicted on free Greeks. All the distinctive glory
-and superiority of Hellenism,—all the intellectual and artistic
-manifestations,—all that there was of literature and philosophy, or
-of refined and rational sociality,—depended upon the city-life of the
-people. And the influence of Sparta, during the period of her empire,
-was peculiarly mischievous and retrograde, as tending not only to
-decompose the federations such as Bœotia into isolated towns, but
-even to decompose suspected towns such as Mantinea into villages;
-all for the purpose of rendering each of them exclusively dependent
-upon herself. Athens, during her period of empire, had exercised no
-such disuniting influence; still less Thebes, whom we shall hereafter
-find coming forward actively to found the new and great cities of
-Megalopolis and Messênê. The imperial tendencies of Sparta are worse
-than those of either Athens or Thebes; including less of improving
-or Pan-hellenic sympathies, and leaning the most systematically upon
-subservient factions in each subordinate city. In the very treatment
-of Mantinea just recounted, it is clear that the attack of Sparta was
-welcomed at least, if not originally invited, by the oligarchical
-party of the place, who sought to grasp the power into their own
-hands and to massacre their political opponents. In the first object
-they completely succeeded, and their government probably was more
-assured in the five villages than it would have been in the entire
-town. In the second, nothing prevented them from succeeding except
-the accidental intervention of the exile Pausanias; an accident,
-which alone rescued the Spartan name from the additional disgrace
-of a political massacre, over and above the lasting odium incurred
-by the act itself; by breaking up an ancient autonomous city, which
-had shown no act of overt enmity, and which was so moderate in its
-democratical manifestations as to receive the favorable criticism
-of judges rather disinclined towards democracy generally.[96] Thirty
-years before, when Mantinea had conquered certain neighboring
-Arcadian districts, and had been at actual war with Sparta to
-preserve them, the victorious Spartans exacted nothing more than
-the reduction of the city to its original district;[97] now they
-are satisfied with nothing less than the partition of the city into
-unfortified villages, though there had been no actual war preceding.
-So much had Spartan power, as well as Spartan despotic propensity,
-progressed during this interval.
-
-  [96] Aristot. Polit. vi, 2, 2.
-
-  [97] Thucyd. v, 81.
-
-The general language of Isokrates, Xenophon, and Diodorus,[98]
-indicates that this severity towards Mantinea was only the most
-stringent among a series of severities, extended by the Lacedæmonians
-through their whole confederacy, and operating upon all such of
-its members as gave them ground for dissatisfaction or mistrust.
-During the ten years after the surrender of Athens, they had been
-lords of the Grecian world both by land and sea, with a power never
-before possessed by any Grecian state; until the battle of Knidus,
-and the combination of Athens, Thebes, Argos, and Corinth, seconded
-by Persia, had broken up their empire at sea, and much endangered
-it on land. At length the peace of Antalkidas, enlisting Persia on
-their side (at the price of the liberty of the Asiatic Greeks), had
-enabled them to dissolve the hostile combination against them. The
-general autonomy, of which they were the authorized interpreters,
-meant nothing more than a separation of the Bœotian cities from
-Thebes,[99] and of Corinth from Argos,—being noway intended to apply
-to the relation between Sparta and her allies. Having thus their
-hands free, the Lacedæmonians applied themselves to raise their
-ascendency on land to the point where it had stood before the battle
-of Knidus, and even to regain as much as possible of their empire at
-sea. To bring back a dominion such as that of the Lysandrian harmosts
-and dekarchies, and to reconstitute a local oligarchy of their most
-devoted partisans, in each of those cities where the government had
-been somewhat liberalized during the recent period of war,—was their
-systematic policy.
-
-  [98] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 133, 134, 146, 206; Or.
-  viii, (De Pace) s. 123; Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 1-8; Diodor. xv, 5,
-  9-19.
-
-  [99] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 35.
-
-Those exiles who had incurred the condemnation of their
-fellow-citizens for subservience to Sparta, now found the season
-convenient for soliciting Spartan intervention to procure their
-return. It was in this manner that a body of exiled political
-leaders from Phlius,—whose great merit it was that the city when
-under their government had been zealous in service to Sparta, but
-had now become lukewarm or even disaffected in the hands of their
-opponents,—obtained from the ephors a message, polite in form but
-authoritative in substance, addressed to the Phliasians, requiring
-that the exiles should be restored, as friends of Sparta banished
-without just cause.[100]
-
-  [100] Xen. Hellen. v. 2, 8-10.
-
-  The consequences of this forced return are difficult to foresee;
-  they will appear in a subsequent page.
-
-While the Spartan power, for the few years succeeding the peace of
-Antalkidas, was thus decidedly in ascending movement on land, efforts
-were also made to reëstablish it at sea. Several of the Cyclades
-and other smaller islands were again rendered tributary. In this
-latter sphere, however, Athens became her competitor. Since the
-peace, and the restoration of Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, combined
-with the refortified Peiræus and its Long Walls,—Athenian commerce
-and naval power had been reviving, though by slow and humble steps.
-Like the naval force of England compared with France, the warlike
-marine of Athens rested upon a considerable commercial marine, which
-latter hardly existed at all in Laconia. Sparta had no seamen except
-constrained Helots or paid foreigners;[101] while the commerce of
-Peiræus had both required and maintained a numerous population of
-this character. The harbor of Peiræus was convenient in respect of
-accommodation, and well-stocked with artisans,—while Laconia had few
-artisans, and was notoriously destitute of harbors.[102] Accordingly,
-in this maritime competition, Athens, though but the shadow of her
-former self, started at an advantage as compared with Sparta, and
-in spite of the superiority of the latter on land, was enabled to
-compete with her in acquiring tributary dependencies among the
-smaller islands of the Ægean. To these latter, who had no marine of
-their own, and who (like Athens herself) required habitual supplies
-of imported corn, it was important to obtain both access to Peiræus
-and protection from the Athenian triremes against that swarm of
-pirates, who showed themselves after the peace of Antalkidas, when
-there was no predominant maritime state; besides which, the market of
-Peiræus was often supplied with foreign corn from the Crimea, through
-the preference shown by the princes of Bosphorus to Athens, at a time
-when vessels from other places could obtain no cargo.[103] A moderate
-tribute paid to Athens would secure to the tributary island greater
-advantages than if paid to Sparta,—with at least equal protection.
-Probably, the influence of Athens over these islanders was farther
-aided by the fact, that she administered the festivals, and lent
-out the funds, of the holy temple at Delos. We know by inscriptions
-remaining, that large sums were borrowed at interest from the
-temple-treasure, not merely by individual islanders, but also by the
-island-cities collectively,—Naxos, Andros, Tenos, Siphnos, Seriphos.
-The Amphiktyonic council who dispensed these loans (or at least the
-presiding members) were Athenians named annually at Athens.[104]
-Moreover, these islanders rendered religious homage and attendance
-at the Delian festivals, and were thus brought within the range of a
-central Athenian influence, capable, under favorable circumstances,
-of being strengthened and rendered even politically important.
-
-  [101] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 3-12.
-
-  [102] Xen. Hell. iv, 8, 7.
-
-  [103] Isokrates, Orat. xvii, (Trapezit.) s. 71.
-
-  [104] See the valuable inscription called the Marmor Sandvicense,
-  which contains the accounts rendered by the annual Amphiktyons at
-  Delos, from 377-373 B.C.
-
-  Boeckh, Staats-haushaltung der Athener, vol. ii, p. 214, ed. 1;
-  vol. ii, p. 78 _seq._, ed. 2nd.
-
-  The list of cities and individuals who borrowed money from the
-  temple is given in these accounts, together with the amount of
-  interest either paid by them, or remaining in arrear.
-
-By such helps, Athens was slowly acquiring to herself a second
-maritime confederacy, which we shall presently find to be of
-considerable moment, though never approaching the grandeur of
-her former empire; so that in the year 380 B.C., when Isokrates
-published his Panegyrical Discourse (seven years after the peace of
-Antalkidas), though her general power was still slender compared with
-the overruling might of Sparta,[105] yet her navy had already made
-such progress, that he claims for her the right of taking the command
-by sea, in that crusade which he strenuously enforces, of Athens and
-Sparta in harmonious unity at the head of all Greece, against the
-Asiatic barbarians.[106]
-
-  [105] This is the description which Isokrates himself gives
-  (Orat. xv, (Permutat.) s. 61) of the state of the Grecian world
-  when he published his Panegyrical Discourse—ὅτε Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν
-  ἦρχον τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταπεινῶς ἐπράττομεν, etc.
-
-  [106] The Panegyrical Discourse of Isokrates, the date of it
-  being pretty exactly known, is of great value for enabling us
-  to understand the period immediately succeeding the peace of
-  Antalkidas.
-
-  He particularly notices the multiplication of pirates, and the
-  competition between Athens and Sparta about tribute from the
-  islands in the Ægean (s. 133). Τίς γὰρ ἂν τοιαύτης καταστάσεως
-  ἐπιθυμήσειεν, ἐν ᾗ καταποντισταὶ μὲν τὴν θάλασσαν κατέχουσι,
-  πελτασταὶ δὲ τὰς πόλεις καταλαμβάνουσι, etc.
-
-  ... Καίτοι χρὴ τοὺς φύσει καὶ μὴ διὰ τύχην μέγα φρονοῦντας
-  τοιούτοις ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ~τοὺς νησιώτας
-  δασμολογεῖν~, οὓς ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἐλέειν, ὁρῶντας τούτους μὲν διὰ
-  σπανιότητα τῆς γῆς ὄρη γεωργεῖν ἀναγκαζομένους, τοὺς δ’ ἠπειρώτας
-  δι’ ἀφθονίαν τῆς χώρας τὴν μὲν πλείστην αὐτῆς ἀργὸν περιορῶντας,
-  etc. (s. 151).
-
-  ... Ὧν ἡμεῖς (Athenians and Spartans) οὐδεμίαν ποιούμεθα
-  πρόνοιαν, ἀλλὰ ~περὶ μὲν τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων ἀμφισβητοῦμεν~,
-  τοσαύτας δὲ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τηλικαύτας τὸ μέγεθος δυνάμεις οὕτως
-  εἰκῇ τῷ βαρβάρῳ παραδεδώκαμεν.
-
-  Compare Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 12—μὴ εἰς νησύδρια ἀποβλέποντας,
-  etc.
-
-It would seem that a few years after the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta
-became somewhat ashamed of having surrendered the Asiatic Greeks
-to Persia; and that king Agesipolis and other leading Spartans
-encouraged the scheme of a fresh Grecian expedition against Asia,
-in compliance with propositions from some disaffected subjects of
-Artaxerxes.[107] Upon some such project, currently discussed though
-never realized, Isokrates probably built his Panegyrical Oration,
-composed in a lofty strain of patriotic eloquence (380 B.C.) to
-stimulate both Sparta and Athens in the cause, and calling on both,
-as joint chiefs of Greece, to suspend dissensions at home for a great
-Pan-hellenic manifestation against the common enemy abroad. But
-whatever ideas of this kind the Spartan leaders may have entertained,
-their attention was taken off, about 382 B.C. by movements in a
-more remote region of the Grecian world, which led to important
-consequences.
-
-  [107] Diodor. xv, 9, 19.
-
-Since the year 414 B.C. (when the Athenians were engaged in the
-siege of Syracuse), we have heard nothing either of the kings of
-Macedonia, or of the Chalkidic Grecian cities in the peninsula of
-Thrace adjoining Macedonia. Down to that year, Athens still retained
-a portion of her maritime empire in those regions. The Platæans
-were still in possession of Skiônê (on the isthmus of Pallênê)
-which she had assigned to them; while the Athenian admiral Euetion,
-seconded by many hired Thracians, and even by Perdikkas king of
-Macedonia, undertook a fruitless siege to reconquer Amphipolis on
-the Strymon.[108] But the fatal disaster at Syracuse having disabled
-Athens from maintaining such distant interests, they were lost to
-her along with her remaining empire,—perhaps earlier; though we
-do not know how. At the same time, during the last years of the
-Peloponnesian war, the kingdom of Macedonia greatly increased in
-power; partly, we may conceive, from the helpless condition of
-Athens,—but still more from the abilities and energy of Archelaus,
-son and successor of Perdikkas.
-
-  [108] Thucyd. vii, 9.
-
-The course of succession among the Macedonian princes seems not to
-have been settled, so that disputes and bloodshed took place at
-the death of several of them. Moreover, there were distinct tribes
-of Macedonians, who, though forming part, really or nominally, of
-the dominion of the Temenid princes, nevertheless were immediately
-subject to separate but subordinate princes of their own. The reign
-of Perdikkas had been troubled in this manner. In the first instance,
-he had stripped his own brother Alketas of the crown,[109] who
-appears (so far as we can make out) to have had the better right to
-it; next he had also expelled his younger brother Philippus from his
-subordinate principality. To restore Amyntas the son of Philippus,
-was one of the purposes of the Thrakian prince Sitalkês, in the
-expedition undertaken conjointly with Athens, during the second year
-of the Peloponnesian war.[110] On the death of Perdikkas (about
-413 B.C.), his eldest or only legitimate son was a child of seven
-years old; but his natural son[111] Archelaus was of mature age and
-unscrupulous ambition. The dethroned Alketas was yet alive, and had
-now considerable chance of reëstablishing himself on the throne;
-Archelaus, inviting him and his son under pretence that he would
-himself bring about their reëstablishment, slew them both amidst
-the intoxication of a banquet. He next despatched the boy, his
-legitimate brother, by suffocating him in a well; and through these
-crimes made himself king. His government, however, was so energetic
-and able, that Macedonia reached a degree of military power such as
-none of his predecessors had ever possessed. His troops, military
-equipments, and fortified places, were much increased in numbers;
-while he also cut straight roads of communication between the various
-portions of his territory,—a novelty seemingly everywhere, at that
-time.[112] Besides such improved organization (which unfortunately we
-are not permitted to know in detail), Archelaus founded a splendid
-periodical Olympic festival, in honor of the Olympian Zeus and
-the Muses,[113] and maintained correspondence with the poets and
-philosophers of Athens. He prevailed upon the tragic poets Euripides
-and Agathon, as well as the epic poet Chœrilus, to visit him in
-Macedonia, where Euripides especially was treated with distinguished
-favor and munificence,[114] remaining there until his death in
-406 or 405 B.C. Archelaus also invited Sokrates, who declined the
-invitation,—and appears to have shown some favor to Plato.[115] He
-perished in the same year as Sokrates (399 B.C.), by a violent
-death; two Thessalian youths, Krateuas and Hellanokrates, together
-with a Macedonian named Dekamnichus, being his assassins during a
-hunting-party. The first two were youths to whom he was strongly
-attached, but whose dignity he had wounded by insulting treatment and
-non-performance of promises; the third was a Macedonian, who, for
-having made an offensive remark upon the bad breath of Euripides, had
-been given up by the order of Archelaus to the poet, in order that
-he might be flogged for it. Euripides actually caused the sentence
-to be inflicted; but it was not till six years after his death that
-Dekamnichus, who had neither forgotten nor forgiven the affront,
-found the opportunity of taking revenge by instigating and aiding the
-assassins of Archelaus.[116]
-
-  [109] This is attested by Plato, Gorgias, c. 26. p. 471 A.
-
-  ... Ὅς γε (Archelaus son of Perdikkas) πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν
-  τὸν δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον (Alketas) μεταπεμψάμενος, ~ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν
-  ἀρχὴν ἣν Περδίκκας αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο~, etc.
-
-  This statement of Plato, that Perdikkas expelled his brother
-  Alketas from the throne, appears not to be adverted to by the
-  commentators. Perhaps it may help to explain the chronological
-  embarrassments connected with the reign of Perdikkas, the years
-  of which are assigned by different authors, as 23, 28, 35, 40,
-  41. See Mr. Clinton, Fasti Hellen. ch. iv, p. 222—where he
-  discusses the chronology of the Macedonian kings: also Krebs,
-  Lection. Diodoreæ, p. 159.
-
-  There are no means of determining when the reign of Perdikkas
-  began—nor exactly, when it ended. We know from Thucydides that he
-  was king in 432, and in 414 B.C. But the fact of his acquiring
-  the crown by the expulsion of an elder brother, renders it less
-  wonderful that the beginning of his reign should be differently
-  stated by different authors; though these authors seem mostly
-  to conceive Perdikkas as the immediate successor of Alexander,
-  without any notice of Alketas.
-
-  [110] Thucyd. i, 57; ii, 97-100.
-
-  [111] The mother of Archelaus was a female slave belonging
-  to Alketas; it is for this reason that Plato calls Alketas
-  ~δεσπότην~ καὶ θεῖον of Archelaus (Plato, Gorgias, c. 26. p. 471
-  A.)
-
-  [112] Thucyd. ii, 100. ὁδοὺς εὐθείας ἔτεμε, etc. See the note in
-  Ch. lxix, p. 17 of Vol. ix.
-
-  [113] Arrian, i, 11; Diodor. xvii, 16.
-
-  [114] Plutarch, De Vitioso Pudore, c. 7, p. 531 E.
-
-  [115] Aristotel. Rhetoric, ii, 24; Seneca, de Beneficiis, v, 6;
-  Ælian, V. H. xiv, 17.
-
-  [116] See the statements, unfortunately very brief, of Aristotle
-  (Politic. v, 8, 10-13). Plato (Alkibiad. ii, c. 5, p. 141 D),
-  while mentioning the assassination of Archelaus by his παιδικὰ
-  represents the motive of the latter differently from Aristotle,
-  as having been an ambitious desire to possess himself of the
-  throne. Diodorus (xiv, 37) represents Krateuas as having killed
-  Archelaus unintentionally in a hunting-party.
-
-  Καὶ τῆς Ἀρχελάου δ’ ἐπιθέσεως Δεκάμνιχος ἡγεμὼν ἐγένετο,
-  παροξύνων τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους πρῶτος· αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς, ὅτι αὐτὸν
-  ἐξέδωκε μαστιγῶσαι Εὐριπίδῃ τῷ ποιητῇ· ὁ δὲ Εὐριπίδης ἐχαλέπαινεν
-  εἰπόντος τι αὐτοῦ εἰς δυσώδειαν τοῦ στόματος (Arist. Pol. _l.
-  c._).
-
-  Dekamnichus is cited by Aristotle as one among the examples of
-  persons actually scourged; which proves that Euripides availed
-  himself of the privilege accorded by Archelaus.
-
-These incidents, recounted on the authority of Aristotle, and
-relating as well to the Macedonian king Archelaus as to the Athenian
-citizen and poet Euripides, illustrate the political contrast
-between Macedonia and Athens. The government of the former is one
-wholly personal,—dependent on the passions, tastes, appetites, and
-capacities, of the king. The ambition of Archelaus leads both to his
-crimes for acquiring the throne, and to his improved organization of
-the military force of the state afterwards; his admiration for the
-poets and philosophers of Athens makes him sympathize warmly with
-Euripides, and ensure to the latter personal satisfaction for an
-offensive remark; his appetites, mingling license with insult, end by
-drawing upon him personal enemies of a formidable character. _L’Etat,
-c’est moi_—stands marked in the whole series of proceedings; the
-personality of the monarch is the determining element. Now at Athens,
-no such element exists. There is, on the one hand, no easy way of
-bringing to bear the ascendency of an energetic chief to improve the
-military organization,—as Athens found to her cost, when she was
-afterwards assailed by Philip, the successor after some interval, and
-in many respects the parallel, of Archelaus. But on the other hand,
-neither the personal tastes nor the appetites, of any individual
-Athenian, count as active causes in the march of public affairs,
-which is determined by the established law and by the pronounced
-sentiments of the body of citizens. However gross an insult might
-have been offered to Euripides at Athens, the dikasts would never
-have sentenced that the offender should be handed over to him to be
-flogged. They would have inflicted such measure of punishment as the
-nature of the wrong, and the preëxisting law appeared to them to
-require. Political measures, or judicial sentences, at Athens, might
-be well or ill-judged; but at any rate, they were always dictated
-by regard to a known law and to the public conceptions entertained
-of state-interests, state-dignity, and state-obligations, without
-the avowed intrusion of any man’s personality. To Euripides,—who
-had throughout his whole life been the butt of Aristophanes and
-other comic writers, and who had been compelled to hear, in the
-crowded theatre, taunts far more galling than what is ascribed to
-Dekamnichus,—the contrast must have been indeed striking, to have
-the offender made over to him, and the whip placed at his disposal,
-by order of his new patron. And it is little to his honor, that
-he should have availed himself of the privilege, by causing the
-punishment to be really administered; a punishment which he could
-never have seen inflicted, during the fifty years of his past life,
-upon any free Athenian citizen.
-
-Krateuas did not survive the deed more than three or four days, after
-which Orestes, son of Archelaus, a child, was placed on the throne,
-under the guardianship of Æropus. The latter, however, after about
-four years, made away with his ward, and reigned in his stead for
-two years. He then died of sickness, and was succeeded by his son
-Pausanias; who, after a reign of only one year, was assassinated and
-succeeded by Amyntas.[117] This Amyntas (chiefly celebrated as the
-father of Philip and the grandfather of Alexander the Great), though
-akin to the royal family, had been nothing more than an attendant
-of Æropus,[118] until he made himself king by putting to death
-Pausanias.[119] He reigned, though with interruptions, twenty-four
-years (393-369 B.C.); years, for the most part, of trouble and
-humiliation for Macedonia, and of occasional exile for himself. The
-vigorous military organization introduced by Archelaus appears to
-have declined; while the frequent dethronements and assassinations
-of kings, beginning even with Perdikkas the father of Archelaus,
-and continued down to Amyntas, unhinged the central authority
-and disunited the various portions of the Macedonian name; which
-naturally tended to separation, and could only be held together by a
-firm hand.
-
-  [117] Diodor. xiv. 84-89.
-
-  [118] Ælian, V. H. xii, 43; Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 263; Justin,
-  vii, 4.
-
-  [119] Diodor. xiv, 89. Ἐτελεύτησε δὲ καὶ Παυσανίας ὁ τῶν
-  Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς, ἀναιρεθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἀμύντου δόλῳ, ἄρξας ἐνιαυτόν·
-  τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν κατέσχεν Ἀμύντας, etc.
-
-The interior regions of Macedonia were bordered, to the north,
-north-east, and north-west, by warlike barbarian tribes, Thracian and
-Illyrian, whose invasions were not unfrequent and often formidable.
-Tempted, probably, by the unsettled position of the government,
-the Illyrians poured in upon Amyntas during the first year of his
-reign; perhaps they may have been invited by other princes of the
-interior,[120] and at all events their coming would operate as
-a signal for malcontents to declare themselves. Amyntas,—having
-only acquired the sceptre a few months before by assassinating his
-predecessor, and having little hold on the people,—was not only
-unable to repel them, but found himself obliged to evacuate Pella,
-and even to retire from Macedonia altogether. Despairing of his
-position, he made over to the Olynthians a large portion of the
-neighboring territory,—Lower Macedonia or the coast and cities round
-the Thermaic Gulf.[121] As this cession is represented to have been
-made at the moment of his distress and expatriation, we may fairly
-suspect that it was made for some reciprocal benefit or valuable
-equivalent; of which Amyntas might well stand in need, at a moment of
-so much exigency.
-
-  [120] See in Thucyd. iv, 112—the relations of Arrhibæus, prince
-  of the Macedonians called Lynkestæ in the interior country, with
-  the Illyrian invaders—B.C. 423.
-
-  Archelaus had been engaged at a more recent period in war with a
-  prince of the interior named Arrhibæus,—perhaps the same person
-  (Aristot. Polit. v, 8, 11).
-
-  [121] Diodor. xiv, 92; xv, 19. Ἀπογνοὺς δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν, Ὀλυνθίοις
-  μὲν τὴν συνεγγὺς χώραν ἐδωρήσατο, etc. Τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ὀλυνθίων
-  δωρησαμένου πολλὴν τῆς ὁμόρου χώρας, διὰ τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ
-  δυναστείας, etc.
-
-  The flight of Amyntas, after a year’s reign, is confirmed by
-  Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 263.
-
-It is upon this occasion that we begin to hear again of the
-Chalkidians of Olynthus, and the confederacy which they gradually
-aggregated around their city as a centre. The confederacy seems to
-have taken its start from this cession of Amyntas,—or rather, to
-speak more properly, from his abdication; for the cession of what
-he could not keep was of comparatively little moment, and we shall
-see that he tried to resume it as soon as he acquired strength.
-The effect of his flight was, to break up the government of Lower
-or maritime Macedonia, and to leave the cities therein situated
-defenceless against the Illyrians or other invaders from the
-interior. To these cities, the only chance of security, was to throw
-themselves upon the Greek cities on the coast, and to organize in
-conjunction with the latter a confederacy for mutual support. Among
-all the Greeks on that coast, the most strenuous and persevering
-(so they had proved themselves in their former contentions against
-Athens when at the summit of her power) as well as the nearest, were
-the Chalkidians of Olynthus. These Olynthians now put themselves
-forward,—took into their alliance and under their protection the
-smaller towns of maritime Macedonia immediately near them,—and soon
-extended their confederacy so as to comprehend all the larger towns
-in this region,—including even Pella, the most considerable city
-of the country.[122] As they began this enterprise at a time when
-the Illyrians were masters of the country so as to drive Amyntas
-to despair and flight, we may be sure that it must have cost them
-serious efforts, not without great danger if they failed. We may
-also be sure that the cities themselves must have been willing, not
-to say eager, coadjutors; just as the islanders and Asiatic Greeks
-clung to Athens at the first formation of the confederacy of Delos.
-The Olynthians could have had no means of conquering even the less
-considerable Macedonian cities, much less Pella, by force and against
-the will of the inhabitants.
-
-  [122] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 12. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης
-  μεγίστη πόλις Ὄλυνθος σχεδὸν πάντες ἐπίστασθε. Οὗτοι τῶν πόλεων
-  προσηγάγοντο ἔστιν ἃς, ἐφ’ ᾧτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι νόμοις καὶ
-  συμπολιτεύειν· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν μειζόνων προσέλαβόν τινας. Ἐκ
-  δὲ τούτου ἐπεχείρησαν καὶ τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν
-  ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου, τοῦ βασιλέως Μακεδόνων. Ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰσήκουσαν αἱ
-  ἐγγύτατα αὐτῶν, ταχὺ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς πόῤῥω καὶ μείζους ἐπορεύοντο·
-  καὶ κατελίπομεν ἡμεῖς ἔχοντας ἤδη ἄλλας τε πολλὰς, καὶ Πέλλαν,
-  ἥπερ μεγίστη τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ πόλεων. Καὶ Ἀμύνταν δὲ αἰσθανόμεθα
-  ἀποχωροῦντά τε ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἐκπεπτωκότα ἤδη ἐκ
-  πάσης Μακεδονίας.
-
-  We know from Diodorus that Amyntas fled the country in despair,
-  and ceded a large proportion at least of Lower Macedonia to the
-  Olynthians. Accordingly, the struggle between the latter and
-  Amyntas (here alluded to), must have taken place when he came
-  back and tried to resume his dominion.
-
-How the Illyrians were compelled to retire, and by what steps the
-confederacy was got together, we are not permitted to know. Our
-information (unhappily very brief) comes from the Akanthian envoy
-Kleigenês, speaking at Sparta about ten years afterwards (B.C. 383),
-and describing in a few words the confederacy as it then stood.
-But there is one circumstance which this witness,—himself hostile
-to Olynthus and coming to solicit Spartan aid against her,—attests
-emphatically; the equal, generous, and brotherly principles, upon
-which the Olynthians framed their scheme from the beginning. They
-did not present themselves as an imperial city enrolling a body of
-dependent allies, but invited each separate city to adopt common
-laws and reciprocal citizenship with Olynthus, with full liberty
-of intermarriage, commercial dealing, and landed proprietorship.
-That the Macedonian cities near the sea should welcome so liberal a
-proposition as this, coming from the most powerful of their Grecian
-neighbors, cannot at all surprise us; especially at a time when they
-were exposed to the Illyrian invaders, and when Amyntas had fled the
-country. They had hitherto always been subjects;[123] their cities
-had not (like the Greek cities) enjoyed each its own separate
-autonomy within its own walls; the offer, now made to them by the
-Olynthians, was one of freedom in exchange for their past subjection
-under the Macedonian kings, combined with a force adequate to protect
-them against Illyrian and other invaders. Perhaps also these various
-cities,—Anthemus, Therma, Chalastra, Pella, Alôrus, Pydna, etc.,—may
-have contained, among the indigenous population, a certain proportion
-of domiciliated Grecian inhabitants, to whom the proposition of the
-Olynthians would be especially acceptable.
-
-  [123] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 12—τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν
-  ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου, etc.; compare v, 2, 38.
-
-We may thus understand why the offer of Olynthus was gladly
-welcomed by the Macedonian maritime cities. They were the first who
-fraternized as voluntary partners in the confederacy; which the
-Olynthians, having established this basis, proceeded to enlarge
-farther, by making the like liberal propositions to the Greek cities
-in their neighborhood. Several of these latter joined voluntarily;
-others were afraid to refuse; insomuch that the confederacy came
-to include a considerable number of Greeks,—especially, Potidæa,
-situated on the Isthmus of Pallênê, and commanding the road of
-communication between the cities within Pallênê and the continent.
-The Olynthians carried out with scrupulous sincerity their professed
-principles of equal and intimate partnership, avoiding all
-encroachment or offensive preëminence in favor of their own city. But
-in spite of this liberal procedure, they found among their Grecian
-neighbors obstructions which they had not experienced from the
-Macedonian. Each of the Grecian cities had been accustomed to its own
-town-autonomy and separate citizenship, with its peculiar laws and
-customs. All of them were attached to this kind of distinct political
-life, by one of the most tenacious and universal instincts of the
-Greek mind; all of them would renounce it with reluctance, even on
-consenting to enter the Olynthian confederacy, with its generous
-promise, its enlarged security, and its manifest advantages; and
-there were even some who, disdaining every prospective consideration,
-refused to change their condition at all except at the point of the
-sword.
-
-Among these last were Akanthus and Apollonia, the largest cities
-(next to Olynthus) in the Chalkidic peninsula, and, therefore,
-the least unable to stand alone. To these the Olynthians did not
-make application, until they had already attracted within their
-confederacy a considerable number of other Grecian as well as
-Macedonian cities. They then invited Akanthus and Apollonia to come
-in, upon the same terms of equal union and fellow-citizenship. The
-proposition being declined, they sent a second message intimating
-that, unless it were accepted within a certain time, they would
-enforce it by compulsory measures. So powerful already was the
-military force of the Olynthian confederacy, that Akanthus and
-Apollonia, incompetent to resist without foreign aid, despatched
-envoys to Sparta to set forth the position of affairs in the
-Chalkidic peninsula, and to solicit intervention against Olynthus.
-
-Their embassy reached Sparta about B.C. 383, when the Spartans,
-having broken up the city of Mantinea into villages, and coërced
-Phlius, were in the full swing of power over Peloponnesus,—and when
-they had also dissolved the Bœotian federation, placing harmosts
-in Platæa and Thespiæ as checks upon any movement of Thebes. The
-Akanthian Kleigenês, addressing himself to the Assembly of Spartans
-and their allies, drew an alarming picture of the recent growth
-and prospective tendencies of Olynthus, invoking the interference
-of Sparta against that city. The Olynthian confederacy (he said)
-already comprised many cities, small and great, Greek as well as
-Macedonian,—Amyntas having lost his kingdom. Its military power,
-even at present great, was growing every day.[124] The territory,
-comprising a large breadth of fertile corn-land, could sustain a
-numerous population. Wood for ship-building was close at hand, while
-the numerous harbors of the confederate cities ensured a thriving
-trade as well as a steady revenue from custom-duties. The neighboring
-Thracian tribes would be easily kept in willing dependence, and would
-thus augment the military force of Olynthus; even the gold mines of
-Mount Pangæus would speedily come within her assured reach. “All
-that I now tell you (such was the substance of his speech) is matter
-of public talk among the Olynthian people, who are full of hope and
-confidence. How can you Spartans, who are taking anxious pains to
-prevent the union of the Bœotian cities,[125] permit the aggregation
-of so much more formidable a power, both by land and by sea, as this
-of Olynthus? Envoys have already been sent thither from Athens and
-Thebes,—and the Olynthians have decreed to send an embassy in return
-for contracting alliance with those cities; hence, your enemies will
-derive a large additional force. We of Akanthus and Apollonia, having
-declined the proposition to join the confederacy voluntarily, have
-received notice that, if we persist, they will constrain us. Now we
-are anxious to retain our paternal laws and customs, continuing as
-a city by ourselves.[126] But if we cannot obtain aid from you, we
-shall be under the necessity of joining them,—as several other cities
-have already done, from not daring to refuse; cities, who would have
-sent envoys along with us, had they not been afraid of offending
-the Olynthians. These cities, if you interfere forthwith, and with
-a powerful force, will now revolt from the new confederacy. But if
-you postpone your interference, and allow time for the confederacy
-to work, their sentiments will soon alter. They will come to be knit
-together in attached unity, by the co-burgership, the intermarriage,
-and the reciprocity of landed possessions, which have already been
-enacted prospectively. All of them will become convinced that they
-have a common interest both in belonging to, and in strengthening the
-confederacy,—just as the Arcadians, when they follow you, Spartans,
-as allies, are not only enabled to preserve their own property, but
-also to plunder others. If, by your delay, the attractive tendencies
-of the confederacy should come into real operation, you will
-presently find it not so much within your power to dissolve.[127]”
-
-  [124] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 14.
-
-  The number of Olynthian troops is given in Xenophon as eight
-  hundred hoplites—a far greater number of peltasts—and one
-  thousand horsemen, assuming that Akanthus and Apollonia joined
-  the confederacy. It has been remarked by Mr. Mitford and others,
-  that these numbers, as they here stand, must be decidedly smaller
-  than the reality. But we have no means of correction open to us.
-  Mr. Mitford’s suggestion of eight thousand hoplites in place of
-  eight hundred, rests upon no authority.
-
-  Demosthenes states that Olynthus by herself, and before she had
-  brought all the Chalkidians into confederacy (οὔπω Χαλκιδέων
-  πάντων εἰς ἓν συνῳκισμένων—De Fals. Leg. c. 75, p. 425) possessed
-  four hundred horsemen, and a citizen population of 5000; no more
-  than this (he says) at the time when the Lacedæmonians attacked
-  them. The historical statements of the great orator, for a time
-  which nearly coincides with his own birth, are to be received
-  with caution.
-
-  [125] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 16. Ἐννοήσατε δὲ καὶ τόδε, πῶς εἰκὸς,
-  ὑμᾶς τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως μὴ καθ’ ἓν εἴη, πολὺ δὲ
-  μείζονος ἀθροιζομένης δυνάμεως ἀμελῆσαι, etc.
-
-  I translate here the substance of the speech, not the exact words.
-
-  [126] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 14. Ἡμεῖς δὲ, ὦ ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι,
-  βουλόμεθα μὲν τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι, καὶ αὐτοπολῖται
-  εἶναι· εἰ μέντοι μὴ βοηθήσει τις, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡμῖν μετ’ ἐκείνων
-  γίγνεσθαι.
-
-  [127] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 18. Δεῖ γε μὴν ὑμᾶς καὶ τόδε εἰδέναι,
-  ὡς, ἣν εἰρήκαμεν δύναμιν μεγάλην οὖσαν, οὔπω δυσπάλαιστός τις
-  ἐστίν· αἱ γὰρ ἄκουσαι τῶν πόλεων ~τῆς πολιτείας κοινωνοῦσαι~,
-  αὗται, ἄν τι ἴδωσιν ἀντίπαλον, ταχὺ ἀποστήσονται· ~εἰ μέντοι
-  συγκλεισθήσονται ταῖς τε ἐπιγαμίαις καὶ ἐγκτήσεσι παρ’ ἀλλήλαις,
-  ἃς ἐψηφισμένοι εἰσὶ—καὶ γνώσονται, ὅτι μετὰ τῶν κρατούντων
-  ἕπεσθαι κερδαλέον ἐστὶν~, ὥσπερ Ἄρκαδες, ὅταν μεθ’ ὑμῶν ἴωσι, τά
-  τε αὐτῶν σώζουσι καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἁρπάζουσιν—~ἴσως οὔκεθ’ ὁμοίως
-  εὔλυτα ἔσται~.
-
-This speech of the Akanthian envoy is remarkable in more than one
-respect. Coming from the lips of an enemy, it is the best of all
-testimonies to the liberal and comprehensive spirit in which the
-Olynthians were acting. They are accused,—not of injustice, nor of
-selfish ambition, nor of degrading those around them,—but literally,
-of organizing a new partnership on principles too generous and too
-seductive; of gently superseding, instead of violently breaking
-down, the barriers between the various cities, by reciprocal ties
-of property and family among the citizens of each; of uniting them
-all into a new political aggregate, in which not only all would
-enjoy equal rights, but all without exception would be gainers. The
-advantage, both in security and in power, accruing prospectively to
-all, is not only admitted by the orator, but stands in the front of
-his argument. “Make haste and break up the confederacy (he impresses
-upon Sparta) before its fruit is ripe, so that the confederates may
-never taste it nor find out how good it is; for if they do, you
-will not prevail on them to forego it.” By implication, he also
-admits,—and he says nothing tending even to raise a doubt,—that the
-cities which he represents, Akanthus and Apollonia, would share
-along with the rest in this same benefit. But the Grecian political
-instinct was nevertheless predominant,—“We wish to preserve our
-paternal laws, and to be a city by ourselves.” Thus nakedly is
-the objection stated; when the question was, not whether Akanthus
-should lose its freedom and become subject to an imperial city like
-Athens,—but whether it should become a free and equal member of a
-larger political aggregate, cemented by every tie which could make
-union secure, profitable, and dignified. It is curious to observe
-how perfectly the orator is conscious that this repugnance, though
-at the moment preponderant, was nevertheless essentially transitory,
-and would give place to attachment when the union came to be felt as
-a reality; and how eagerly he appeals to Sparta to lose no time in
-clenching the repugnance, while it lasted. He appeals to her, not for
-any beneficial or Pan-hellenic objects, but in the interests of her
-own dominion, which required that the Grecian world should be as it
-were pulverized into minute, self-acting, atoms without cohesion,—so
-that each city, or each village, while protected against subjection
-to any other, should farther be prevented from equal political union
-or fusion with any other; being thus more completely helpless and
-dependent in reference to Sparta.
-
-It was not merely from Akanthus and Apollonia, but also from the
-dispossessed Macedonian king Amyntas, that envoys reached Sparta to
-ask for aid against Olynthus. It seems that Amyntas, after having
-abandoned the kingdom and made his cession to the Olynthians, had
-obtained some aid from Thessaly and tried to reinstate himself
-by force. In this scheme he had failed, being defeated by the
-Olynthians. Indeed we find another person named Argæus, mentioned
-as competitor for the Macedonian sceptre, and possessing it for two
-years.[128]
-
-  [128] Diodor. xiv, 92; xv, 19.
-
-  Demosthenes speaks of Amyntas as having been expelled from his
-  kingdom by the Thessalians (cont. Aristokrat. c. 29, p. 657).
-  If this be historically correct, it must be referred to some
-  subsequent war in which he was engaged with the Thessalians,
-  perhaps to the time when Jason of Pheræ acquired dominion over
-  Macedonia (Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 11).
-
-After hearing these petitioners, the Lacedæmonians first declared
-their own readiness to comply with the prayer, and to put down
-Olynthus; next, they submitted the same point to the vote of the
-assembled allies.[129] Among these latter, there was no genuine
-antipathy against the Olynthians, such as that which had prevailed
-against Athens before the Peloponnesian war, in the synod then
-held at Sparta. But the power of Sparta over her allies was now
-far greater than it had been then. Most of their cities were under
-oligarchies, dependent upon her support for authority over their
-fellow-citizens; moreover, the recent events in Bœotia and at
-Mantinea had operated as a serious intimidation. Anxiety to keep
-the favor of Sparta was accordingly paramount, so that most of the
-speakers as well as most of the votes, declared for war,[130] and a
-combined army of ten thousand men was voted to be raised. To make
-up such total, a proportional contingent was assessed upon each
-confederate; combined with the proviso now added for the first
-time, that each might furnish money instead of men, at the rate of
-three Æginæan oboli (half an Æginæan drachma) for each hoplite. A
-cavalry-soldier, to those cities which furnished such, was reckoned
-as equivalent to four hoplites; a hoplite, as equivalent to two
-peltasts; or pecuniary contribution on the same scale. All cities in
-default were made liable to a forfeit of one stater (four drachmæ)
-per day, for every soldier not sent; the forfeit to be enforced by
-Sparta.[131] Such licensed substitution of pecuniary payment for
-personal service, is the same as I have already described to have
-taken place nearly a century before in the confederacy of Delos
-under the presidency of Athens.[132] It was a system not likely to
-be extensively acted upon among the Spartan allies, who were at once
-poorer and more warlike than those of Athens. But in both cases it
-was favorable to the ambition of the leading state; and the tendency
-becomes here manifest, to sanction, by the formality of a public
-resolution, that increased Lacedæmonian ascendency which had already
-grown up in practice.
-
-  [129] See above in this History, Vol. VI. Ch. xlviii. p. 79.
-
-  [130] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 20. Ἐκ τούτου μέντοι, πολλοὶ μὲν
-  ξυνηγόρευον στρατιὰν ποιεῖν, μάλιστα δὲ οἱ βουλόμενοι
-  Λακεδαιμονίοις χαρίζεσθαι, etc.
-
-  [131] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 21, 22.
-
-  Diodorus (xv, 31) mentions the fact that an hoplite was reckoned
-  equivalent to two peltasts, in reference to a Lacedæmonian
-  muster-roll of a few years afterwards; but it must have been
-  equally necessary to fix the proportion on the present occasion.
-
-  [132] See Vol. V. Ch. xlv, p. 302 of this History.
-
-The Akanthian envoys, while expressing their satisfaction with
-the vote just passed, intimated that the muster of these numerous
-contingents would occupy some time, and again insisted on the
-necessity of instant intervention, even with a small force; before
-the Olynthians could find time to get their plans actually in work or
-appreciated by the surrounding cities. A moderate Lacedæmonian force
-(they said), if despatched forthwith, would not only keep those
-who had refused to join Olynthus, steady to their refusal, but also
-induce others, who had joined reluctantly, to revolt. Accordingly the
-ephors appointed Eudamidas at once, assigning to him two thousand
-hoplites,—Neodamodes (or enfranchised Helots), Periœki, and Skiritæ
-or Arcadian borderers. Such was the anxiety of the Akanthians for
-haste, that they would not let him delay even to get together the
-whole of this moderate force. He was put in march immediately, with
-such as were ready; while his brother Phœbidas was left behind
-to collect the remainder and follow him. And it seems that the
-Akanthians judged correctly. For Eudamidas, arriving in Thrace after
-a rapid march, though he was unable to contend against the Olynthians
-in the field, yet induced Potidæa to revolt from them, and was
-able to defend those cities, such as Akanthus and Apollonia, which
-resolutely stood aloof.[133] Amyntas brought a force to coöperate
-with him.
-
-  [133] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 24; Diodor. xv, 21.
-
-The delay in the march of Phœbidas was productive of consequences no
-less momentous than unexpected. The direct line from Peloponnesus
-to Olynthus lay through the Theban territory; a passage which the
-Thebans, whatever might have been their wishes, were not powerful
-enough to refuse, though they had contracted an alliance with
-Olynthus,[134] and though proclamation was made that no Theban
-citizens should join the Lacedæmonian force. Eudamidas, having
-departed at a moment’s notice, passed through Bœotia without a halt,
-in his way to Thrace. But it was known that his brother Phœbidas was
-presently to follow; and upon this fact the philo-Laconian party in
-Thebes organized a conspiracy.
-
-  [134] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 27-34.
-
-They obtained from the ephors, and from the miso-Theban feelings
-of Agesilaus, secret orders to Phœbidas, that he should coöperate
-with them in any party movement which they might find opportunity
-of executing;[135] and when he halted with his detachment near the
-gymnasium a little way without the walls, they concerted matters as
-well with him as among themselves. Leontiades, Hypatês, and Archias,
-were the chiefs of the party in Thebes favorable to Sparta; a party
-decidedly in minority, yet still powerful, and at this moment so
-strengthened by the unbounded ascendency of the Spartan name, that
-Leontiades himself was one of the polemarchs of the city. Of the
-anti-Spartan, or predominant sentiment in Thebes,—which included most
-of the wealthy and active citizens, those who came successively into
-office as hipparchs or generals of the cavalry,[136]—the leaders were
-Ismenias and Androkleides. The former, especially, the foremost as
-well as ablest conductor of the late war against Sparta, was now in
-office as Polemarch, conjointly with his rival Leontiades.
-
-  [135] This is the statement of Diodorus (xv, 20), and
-  substantially that of Plutarch (Agesil. c. 24), who intimates
-  that it was the general belief of the time. And it appears to me
-  much more probable than the representation of Xenophon—that the
-  first idea arose when Phœbidas was under the walls of Thebes,
-  and that the Spartan leader was persuaded by Leontiades to act
-  on his own responsibility. The behavior of Agesilaus and of the
-  ephors after the fact is like that of persons who had previously
-  contemplated the possibility of it. But the original suggestion
-  must have come from the Theban faction themselves.
-
-  [136] Plutarch (De Genio Socratis, c. 5, p. 578 B.) states that
-  most of these generals of cavalry (τῶν ἱππαρχηκότων νομίμως) were
-  afterwards in exile with Pelopidas at Athens.
-
-  We have little or no information respecting the government of
-  Thebes. It would seem to have been at this moment a liberalized
-  oligarchy. There was a Senate, and two Polemarchs (perhaps the
-  Polemarchs may have been more than two in all, though the words
-  of Xenophon rather lead us to suppose _only_ two)—and there seems
-  also to have been a civil magistrate, chosen by lot (ὁ κυαμιστὸς
-  ἄρχων) and renewed annually, whose office was marked by his
-  constantly having in his possession the sacred spear of state (τὸ
-  ἱερὸν δόρυ) and the city-seal (Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 31. p.
-  597—B.—C.).
-
-  At this moment, it must be recollected, there were no such
-  officers as Bœotarchs; since the Lacedæmonians, enforcing the
-  peace of Antalkidas, had put an end to the Bœotian federation.
-
-While Ismenias, detesting the Spartans, kept aloof from Phœbidas,
-Leontiades assiduously courted him and gained his confidence. On the
-day of the Thesmophoria,[137] a religious festival celebrated by
-the women apart from the men, during which the acropolis or Kadmeia
-was consecrated to their exclusive use,—Phœbidas, affecting to have
-concluded his halt, put himself in march to proceed as if towards
-Thrace; seemingly rounding the walls of Thebes, but not going into
-it. The Senate was actually assembled in the portico of the agora,
-and the heat of a summer’s noon had driven every one out of the
-streets, when Leontiades, stealing away from the Senate, hastened
-on horseback to overtake Phœbidas, caused him to face about, and
-conducted the Lacedæmonians straight up to the Kadmeia; the gates
-of which, as well as those of the town, were opened by his order as
-polemarch. There were not only no citizens in the streets, but none
-even in the Kadmeia; no male person being permitted to be present
-at the feminine Thesmophoria; so that Phœbidas and his army became
-possessed of the Kadmeia without the smallest opposition. At the
-same time they became possessed of an acquisition of hardly less
-importance,—the persons of all the assembled Theban women; who served
-as hostages for the quiet submission, however reluctant, of the
-citizens in the town below. Leontiades handed to Phœbidas the key of
-the gates, and then descended into the town, giving orders that no
-man should go up without his order.[138]
-
-  [137] The rhetor Aristeides (Or. xix, Eleusin. p. 452 Cant.;
-  p. 419 Dind.) states that the Kadmeia was seized during the
-  Pythian festival. This festival would take place, July or August
-  382 B.C.; near the beginning of the third year of the (99th)
-  Olympiad. See above in this History, Vol. VI. Ch. liv, p. 455,
-  note. Respecting the year and month in which the Pythian festival
-  was held, there is a difference of opinion among commentators.
-  I agree with those who assign it to the first quarter of the
-  third Olympic year. And the date of the march of Phœbidas would
-  perfectly harmonize with this supposition.
-
-  Xenophon mentions nothing about the Pythian festival as being in
-  course of celebration when Phœbidas was encamped near Thebes: for
-  it had no particular reference to Thebes.
-
-  [138] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 28, 29.
-
-The assembled Senate heard with consternation the occupation of the
-acropolis by Phœbidas. Before any deliberation could be taken among
-the senators, Leontiades came down to resume his seat. The lochages
-and armed citizens of his party, to whom he had previously given
-orders, stood close at hand. “Senators (said he), be not intimidated
-by the news that the Spartans are in the Kadmeia; for they assure
-us that they have no hostile purpose against any one who does not
-court war against them. But I, as polemarch, am empowered by law to
-seize any one whose behavior is manifestly and capitally criminal.
-Accordingly, I seize this man Ismenias, as the great inflamer of
-war. Come forward, captains and soldiers, lay hold of him, and carry
-him off where your orders direct.” Ismenias was accordingly seized
-and hurried off as a prisoner to the Kadmeia; while the senators,
-thunderstruck and overawed, offered no resistance. Such of them as
-were partisans of the arrested polemarch, and many even of the more
-neutral members, left the Senate and went home, thankful to escape
-with their lives. Three hundred of them, including Androkleidas,
-Pelopidas, Mellon, and others, sought safety by voluntary exile to
-Athens; after which, the remainder of the Senate, now composed of
-few or none except philo-Spartan partisans, passed a vote formally
-dismissing Ismenias, and appointing a new polemarch in his place.[139]
-
-  [139] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 30, 31.
-
-This blow of high-handed violence against Ismenias forms a
-worthy counterpart to the seizure of Theramenes by Kritias,[140]
-twenty-two years before, in the Senate of Athens under the Thirty.
-Terror-striking in itself, it was probably accompanied by similar
-deeds of force against others of the same party. The sudden explosion
-and complete success of the conspiracy, plotted by the Executive
-Chief himself, the most irresistible of all conspirators,—the
-presence of Phœbidas in the Kadmeia, and of a compliant Senate in
-the town,—the seizure or flight of Ismenias and all his leading
-partisans,—were more than sufficient to crush all spirit of
-resistance on the part of the citizens; whose first anxiety probably
-was, to extricate their wives and daughters from the custody of
-the Lacedæmonians in the Kadmeia. Having such a price to offer,
-Leontiades would extort submission the more easily, and would
-probably procure a vote of the people ratifying the new _régime_,
-the Spartan alliance, and the continued occupation of the acropolis.
-Having accomplished the first settlement of his authority, he
-proceeded without delay to Sparta, to make known the fact that “order
-reigned” at Thebes.
-
-  [140] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3. See above in this History, Vol. VIII.
-  Ch. lxv. p. 252.
-
-The news of the seizure of the Kadmeia and of the revolution at
-Thebes had been received at Sparta with the greatest surprise, as
-well as with a mixed feeling of shame and satisfaction. Everywhere
-throughout Greece, probably, it excited a greater sensation than any
-event since the battle of Ægospotami. Tried by the recognized public
-law of Greece, it was a flagitious iniquity, for which Sparta had not
-the shadow of a pretence. It was even worse than the surprise of
-Platæa by the Thebans before the Peloponnesian war, which admitted
-of the partial excuse that war was at any rate impending; whereas
-in this case, the Thebans had neither done nor threatened anything
-to violate the peace of Antalkidas. It stood condemned by the
-indignant sentiment of all Greece, unwillingly testified even by the
-philo-Laconian Xenophon[141] himself. But it was at the same time
-an immense accession to Spartan power. It had been achieved with
-preëminent skill and success; and Phœbidas might well claim to have
-struck for Sparta the most important blow since Ægospotami, relieving
-her from one of her two really formidable enemies.[142]
-
-  [141] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 1.
-
-  [142] It is curious that Xenophon, treating Phœbidas as a man
-  more warm-hearted than wise, speaks of him as if he had rendered
-  no real service to Sparta by the capture of the Kadmeia (v, 2,
-  28). The explanation of this is, that Xenophon wrote his history
-  at a later period, after the defeat at Leuktra and the downfall
-  of Sparta; which downfall was brought about by the reaction
-  against her overweening and oppressive dominion, especially after
-  the capture of the Kadmeia,—or (in the pious creed of Xenophon)
-  by the displeasure of the gods, which such iniquity drew down
-  upon her (v, 4, 1). In this way, therefore, it is made out that
-  Phœbidas had not acted with true wisdom, and that he had done
-  his country more harm than good; a criticism, which we may be
-  sure that no man advanced, at the time of the capture itself, or
-  during the three years after it.
-
-Nevertheless, far from receiving thanks at Sparta, he became the
-object of wrath and condemnation, both with the ephors and the
-citizens generally. Every one was glad to throw upon him the odium
-of the proceeding, and to denounce him as having acted without
-orders. Even the ephors, who had secretly authorized him beforehand
-to coöperate generally with the faction at Thebes, having doubtless
-never given any specific instructions, now indignantly disavowed
-him. Agesilaus alone stood forward in his defence, contending
-that the only question was, whether his proceeding at Thebes had
-been injurious or beneficial to Sparta. If the former, he merited
-punishment; if the latter, it was always lawful to render service,
-even _impromptu_ and without previous orders.
-
-Tried by this standard, the verdict was not doubtful. For every man
-at Sparta felt how advantageous the act was in itself; and felt it
-still more, when Leontiades reached the city, humble in solicitation
-as well as profuse in promise. In his speech addressed to the
-assembled ephors and Senate, he first reminded them how hostile
-Thebes had hitherto been to them, under Ismenias and the party just
-put down,—and how constantly they had been in jealous alarm, lest
-Thebes should reconstitute by force the Bœotian federation. “Now
-(added he) your fears may be at an end; only take as good care to
-uphold our government, as we shall take to obey your orders. For the
-future, you will have nothing to do but to send us a short despatch,
-to get every service which you require.[143]” It was resolved by the
-Lacedæmonians, at the instance of Agesilaus, to retain their garrison
-now in the Kadmeia, to uphold Leontiades with his colleagues in the
-government of Thebes, and to put Ismenias upon his trial. Yet they
-at the same time, as a sort of atonement to the opinion of Greece,
-passed a vote of censure on Phœbidas, dismissed him from his command,
-and even condemned him to a fine. The fine, however, most probably
-was never exacted; for we shall see by the conduct of Sphodrias
-afterwards that the displeasure against Phœbidas, if at first
-genuine, was certainly of no long continuance.
-
-  [143] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 34.
-
-  Καὶ ὑμεῖς γε (says Leontiades to the Lacedæmonian ephors) τότε
-  μὲν ἀεὶ προσείχετε τὸν νοῦν, πότε ἀκούσεσθε βιαζομένους αὐτοὺς
-  τὴν Βοιωτίαν ὑφ’ αὑτοῖς εἶναι· νῦν δ’, ἐπεὶ τάδε πέπρακται, οὐδὲν
-  ὑμᾶς δεῖ Θηβαίους φοβεῖσθαι· ἀλλ’ ἀρκέσει ὑμῖν μικρὰ σκυτάλη,
-  ὥστε ἐκεῖθεν πάντα πράττεσθαι, ὅσων ἂν δέησθε—ἐὰν, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς
-  ὑμῶν, οὕτω καὶ ὑμεῖς ἡμῶν, ἐπιμελῆσθε.
-
-  Xenophon mentions the displeasure of the ephors and the Spartans
-  generally against Phœbidas (χαλεπῶς ἔχοντας τῷ Φοιβίδᾳ) but not
-  the fine, which is certified by Diodorus (xv, 20), by Plutarch
-  (Pelopidas, c. 6, and De Genio Socratis, p. 576 A), and Cornelius
-  Nepos (Pelopid. c. 1).
-
-That the Lacedæmonians should at the same time condemn Phœbidas
-and retain the Kadmeia—has been noted as a gross contradiction.
-Nevertheless, we ought not to forget, that had they evacuated the
-Kadmeia, the party of Leontiades at Thebes, which had compromised
-itself for Sparta as well as for its own aggrandizement, would have
-been irretrievably sacrificed. The like excuse, if excuse it be,
-cannot be urged in respect to their treatment of Ismenias; whom they
-put upon his trial at Thebes, before a court consisting of three
-Lacedæmonian commissioners, and one from each allied city. He was
-accused, probably by Leontiades and his other enemies, of having
-entered into friendship and conspiracy with the Persian king to the
-detriment of Greece,[144]—of having partaken in the Persian funds
-brought into Greece by Timokrates the Rhodian,—and of being the real
-author of that war which had disturbed Greece from 395 B.C. down
-to the peace of Antalkidas. After an unavailing defence, he was
-condemned and executed. Had this doom been inflicted upon him by his
-political antagonists as a consequence of their intestine victory,
-it would have been too much in the analogy of Grecian party-warfare
-to call for any special remark. But there is something peculiarly
-revolting in the prostitution of judicial solemnity and Pan-hellenic
-pretence, which the Lacedæmonians here committed. They could have no
-possible right to try Ismenias as a criminal at all; still less to
-try him as a criminal on the charge of confederacy with the Persian
-king,—when they had themselves, only five years before, acted not
-merely as allies, but even as instruments, of that monarch, in
-enforcing the peace of Antalkidas. If Ismenias had received money
-from one Persian satrap, the Spartan Antalkidas had profited in
-like manner by another,—and for the like purpose too of carrying on
-Grecian war. The real motive of the Spartans was doubtless to revenge
-themselves upon this distinguished Theban for having raised against
-them the war which began in 395 B.C. But the mockery of justice
-by which that revenge was masked, and the impudence of punishing
-in him as treason that same foreign alliance with which they had
-ostentatiously identified themselves, lends a deeper enormity to the
-whole proceeding.
-
-  [144] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 35; Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, p. 576
-  A. Plutarch in another place (Pelopid. c. 5) represents Ismenias
-  as having been conveyed to Sparta and tried there.
-
-Leontiades and his partisans were now established as rulers in
-Thebes, with a Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia to sustain them
-and execute their orders. The once-haughty Thebes was enrolled as
-a member of Lacedæmonian confederacy. Sparta was now enabled to
-prosecute her Olynthian expedition with redoubled vigor. Eudamidas
-and Amyntas, though they repressed the growth of the Olynthian
-confederacy, had not been strong enough to put it down; so that a
-larger force was necessary, and the aggregate of ten thousand men,
-which had been previously decreed, was put into instant requisition,
-to be commanded by Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus. The new general,
-a man of very popular manners, was soon on his march at the head of
-this large army, which comprised many Theban hoplites as well as
-horsemen, furnished by the new rulers in their unqualified devotion
-to Sparta. He sent forward envoys to Amyntas in Macedonia, urging
-upon him the most strenuous efforts for the purpose of recovering
-the Macedonian cities which had joined the Olynthians,—and also to
-Derdas, prince of the district of Upper Macedonia called Elimeia,
-inviting his coöperation against that insolent city, which would
-speedily extend her dominion (he contended) from the maritime region
-to the interior, unless she were put down.[145]
-
-  [145] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 38.
-
-Though the Lacedæmonians were masters everywhere and had their
-hands free,—though Teleutias was a competent officer with powerful
-forces,—and though Derdas joined with four hundred excellent
-Macedonian horse,—yet the conquest of Olynthus was found no easy
-enterprise.[146] The Olynthian cavalry, in particular, was numerous
-and efficient. Unable as they were to make head against Teleutias
-in the field or repress his advance, nevertheless in a desultory
-engagement which took place near the city gates, they defeated
-the Lacedæmonian and Theban cavalry, threw even the infantry into
-confusion, and were on the point of gaining a complete victory, had
-not Derdas with his cavalry on the other wing, made a diversion which
-forced them to come back for the protection of the city. Teleutias,
-remaining master of the field, continued to ravage the Olynthian
-territory during the summer, for which, however, the Olynthians
-retaliated by frequent marauding expeditions against the cities in
-alliance with him.[147]
-
-  [146] Demosthenes (De Fals. Leg. c. 75, p. 425) speaks with
-  proper commendation of the brave resistance made by the
-  Olynthians against the great force of Sparta. But his expressions
-  are altogether misleading as to the tenor and result of the
-  war. If we had no other information than his, we should be led
-  to imagine that the Olynthians had been victorious, and the
-  Lacedæmonians baffled.
-
-  [147] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 40-43.
-
-In the ensuing spring, the Olynthians sustained various partial
-defeats, especially one near Apollonia, from Derdas. They were more
-and more confined to their walls; insomuch that Teleutias became
-confident and began to despise them. Under these dispositions on
-his part, a body of Olynthian cavalry showed themselves one morning,
-passed the river near their city, and advanced in calm array towards
-the Lacedæmonian camp. Indignant at such an appearance of daring,
-Teleutias directed Tlemonidas with the peltasts to disperse them;
-upon which the Olynthians slowly retreated, while the peltasts rushed
-impatiently to pursue them, even when they recrossed the river. No
-sooner did the Olynthians see that half the peltasts had crossed
-it, than they suddenly turned, charged them vigorously, and put
-them to flight with the loss of their commander Tlemonidas and a
-hundred others. All this passed in sight of Teleutias, who completely
-lost his temper. Seizing his arms, he hurried forward to cover the
-fugitives with the hoplites around him, sending orders to all his
-troops, hoplites, peltasts, and horsemen, to advance also. But the
-Olynthians, again retreating, drew him on towards the city, with
-such inconsiderate forwardness, that many of his soldiers ascending
-the eminence on which the city was situated, rushed close up to the
-walls.[148] Here, however, they were received by a shower of missiles
-which forced them to recede in disorder; upon which the Olynthians
-again sallied forth, probably, from more than one gate at once, and
-charged them first with cavalry and peltasts, next with hoplites.
-The Lacedæmonians and their allies, disturbed and distressed by the
-first, were unable to stand against the compact charge of the last;
-Teleutias himself, fighting in the foremost ranks, was slain, and his
-death was a signal for the flight of all around. The whole besieging
-force dispersed and fled in different directions,—to Akanthus, to
-Spartôlus, to Potidæa, to Apollonia. So vigorous and effective was
-the pursuit of the Olynthians, that the loss of the fugitives was
-immense. The whole army was in fact ruined;[149] for probably many of
-the allies who escaped became discouraged and went home.
-
-  [148] Thucyd. i, 63—with the Scholiast.
-
-  [149] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 4-6. παμπλήθεις ἀπέκτειναν ἀνθρώπους καὶ
-  ὅτι περ ὄφελος ἦν τούτου τοῦ στρατεύματος.
-
-  Diodorus (xv, 21) states the loss at twelve hundred men.
-
-At another time, probably, a victory so decisive might have deterred
-the Lacedæmonians from farther proceedings, and saved Olynthus. But
-now, they were so completely masters everywhere else, that they
-thought only of repairing the dishonor by a still more imposing
-demonstration. Their king Agesipolis was placed at the head of an
-expedition on the largest scale; and his name called forth eager
-coöperation, both in men and money, from the allies. He marched
-with thirty Spartan counsellors, as Agesilaus had gone to Asia;
-besides a select body of energetic youth as volunteers, from the
-Periœki, from the illegitimate sons of Spartans, and from strangers
-or citizens who had lost their franchise through poverty, introduced
-as friends of richer Spartan citizens to go through the arduous
-Lykurgean training.[150] Amyntas and Derdas also were instigated to
-greater exertions than before, so that Agesipolis was enabled, after
-receiving their reinforcements in his march through Macedonia, to
-present himself before Olynthus with an overwhelming force, and to
-confine the citizens within their walls. He then completed the ravage
-of their territory, which had been begun by Teleutias; and even took
-Torônê by storm. But the extreme heat of the summer weather presently
-brought upon him a fever, which proved fatal in a week’s time;
-although he had caused himself to be carried for repose to the shady
-grove, and clear waters, near the temple of Dionysus at Aphytis. His
-body was immersed in honey and transported to Sparta, where it was
-buried with the customary solemnities.[151]
-
-  [150] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 9. Πολλοὶ δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν περιοίκων
-  ἐθελονταὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἠκολούθουν, καὶ ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων
-  καλουμένων, καὶ νόθοι τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, μάλα εὐειδεῖς τε καὶ τῶν ἐν
-  τῇ πόλει καλῶν οὐκ ἄπειροι.
-
-  The phrase—ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων—is illustrated by a passage from
-  Phylarchus in Athenæus, vi, p. 271 (referred to by Schneider
-  in his note here). I have already stated that the political
-  franchise of a Spartan citizen depended upon his being able to
-  furnish constantly his quota to the public mess-table. Many of
-  the poor families became unable to do this, and thus lost their
-  qualification and their training; but rich citizens sometimes
-  paid their quota for them, and enabled them by such aid to
-  continue their training as ξύντροφοι, τρόφιμοι, μόθακες, etc.
-  as companions of their own sons. The two sons of Xenophon were
-  educated at Sparta (Diog. Laert. ii, 54), and would thus be ξένοι
-  τῶν τροφίμων καλουμένων. If either of them was now old enough, he
-  might probably have been one among the volunteers to accompany
-  Agesipolis.
-
-  [151] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 18; Pausan. iii, 5, 9.
-
-Polybiades, who succeeded Agesipolis in the command, prosecuted the
-war with undiminished vigor; and the Olynthians, debarred from their
-home produce as well as from importation, were speedily reduced to
-such straits as to be compelled to solicit peace. They were obliged
-to break up their own federation, and to enrol themselves as sworn
-members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, with its obligations of
-service to Sparta.[152] The Olynthian union being dissolved, the
-component Grecian cities were enrolled severally as allies of Sparta,
-while the maritime cities of Macedonia were deprived of their
-neighboring Grecian protector, and passed again under the dominion of
-Amyntas.
-
-  [152] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 26; Diodor. xv, 22, 23.
-
-Both the dissolution of this growing confederacy, and the
-reconstitution of maritime Macedonia, were signal misfortunes to
-the Grecian world. Never were the arms of Sparta more mischievously
-or more unwarrantably employed. That a powerful Grecian confederacy
-should be formed in the Chalkidic peninsula, in the border region
-where Hellas joined the non-Hellenic tribes,—was an incident of
-signal benefit to the Hellenic world generally. It would have
-served as a bulwark to Greece against the neighboring Macedonians
-and Thracians, at whose expense its conquests, if it made any,
-would have been achieved. That Olynthus did not oppress her Grecian
-neighbors—that the principles of her confederacy were of the most
-equal, generous, and seducing character,—that she employed no greater
-compulsion than was requisite to surmount an unreflecting instinct
-of town-autonomy,—and that the very towns who obeyed this instinct
-would have become sensible themselves, in a very short time, of the
-benefits conferred by the confederacy on each and every one,—these
-are facts certified by the urgency of the reluctant Akanthians,
-when they entreat Sparta to leave no interval for the confederacy
-to make its workings felt. Nothing but the intervention of Sparta
-could have crushed this liberal and beneficent promise; nothing but
-the accident, that during the three years from 382 to 379 B.C., she
-was at the maximum of her power and had her hands quite free, with
-Thebes and its Kadmeia under her garrison. Such prosperity did not
-long continue unabated. Only a few months after the submission of
-Olynthus, the Kadmeia was retaken by the Theban exiles, who raised
-so vigorous a war against Sparta, that she would have been disabled
-from meddling with Olynthus,—as we shall find illustrated by the
-fact (hereafter to be recounted), that she declined interfering in
-Thessaly to protect the Thessalian cities against Jason of Pheræ.
-Had the Olynthian confederacy been left to its natural working,
-it might well have united all the Hellenic cities around it in
-harmonious action, so as to keep the sea coast in possession of a
-confederacy of free and self-determining communities, confining
-the Macedonian princes to the interior. But Sparta threw in her
-extraneous force, alike irresistible and inauspicious, to defeat
-these tendencies; and to frustrate that salutary change,—from
-fractional autonomy and isolated action into integral and equal
-autonomy with collective action,—which Olynthus was laboring to
-bring about. She gave the victory to Amyntas, and prepared the
-indispensable basis upon which his son Philip afterwards rose, to
-reduce not only Olynthus, but Akanthus, Apollonia, and the major part
-of the Grecian world, to one common level of subjection. Many of
-those Akanthians, who spurned the boon of equal partnership and free
-communion with Greeks and neighbors, lived to discover how impotent
-were their own separate walls as a bulwark against Macedonian
-neighbors; and to see themselves confounded in that common servitude
-which the imprudence of their fathers had entailed upon them. By
-the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta had surrendered the Asiatic Greeks
-to Persia; by crushing the Olynthian confederacy, she virtually
-surrendered the Thracian Greeks to the Macedonian princes. Never
-again did the opportunity occur of placing Hellenism on a firm,
-consolidated, and self-supporting basis, round the coast of the
-Thermaic Gulf.
-
-While the Olynthian expedition was going on, the Lacedæmonians
-were carrying on, under Agesilaus, another intervention within
-Peloponnesus, against the city of Phlius. It has already been
-mentioned that certain exiles of this city had recently been
-recalled, at the express command of Sparta. The ruling party in
-Phlius had at the same time passed a vote to restore the confiscated
-property of these exiles; reimbursing out of the public treasury,
-to those who had purchased it, the price which they had paid,—and
-reserving all disputed points for judicial decision.[153] The
-returned exiles now again came to Sparta, to prefer complaint that
-they could obtain no just restitution of their property; that the
-tribunals of the city were in the hands of their opponents, many of
-them directly interested as purchasers, who refused them the right
-of appealing to any extraneous and impartial authority; and that
-there were even in the city itself many who thought them wronged.
-Such allegations were, probably, more or less founded in truth. At
-the same time, the appeal to Sparta, abrogating the independence
-of Phlius, so incensed the ruling Phliasians that they passed a
-sentence of fine against all the appellants. The latter insisted on
-this sentence as a fresh count for strengthening their complaints
-at Sparta; and as a farther proof of anti-Spartan feeling, as well
-as of high-handed injustice, in the Phliasian rulers.[154] Their
-cause was warmly espoused by Agesilaus, who had personal relations
-of hospitality with some of the exiles; while it appears that his
-colleague, King Agesipolis, was on good terms with the ruling party
-at Phlius,—had received from them zealous aid, both in men and money,
-for his Olynthian expedition,—and had publicly thanked them for their
-devotion to Sparta.[155] The Phliasian government, emboldened by the
-proclaimed testimonial of Agesipolis, certifying their fidelity,
-had fancied that they stood upon firm ground, and that no Spartan
-coërcion would be enforced against them. But the marked favor of
-Agesipolis, now absent in Thrace, told rather against them in the
-mind of Agesilaus; pursuant to that jealousy which usually prevailed
-between the two Spartan kings. In spite of much remonstrance at
-Sparta, from many who deprecated hostilities against a city of five
-thousand citizens, for the profit of a handful of exiles,—he not only
-seconded the proclamation of war against Phlius by the ephors, but
-also took the command of the army.[156]
-
-  [153] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 10.
-
-  [154] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 10, 11.
-
-  [155] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 10. ἡ Φλιασίων πόλις, ἐπαινεθεῖσα μὲν
-  ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀγησιπόλιδος, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ταχέως αὐτῷ χρήματα ἐς τὴν
-  στρατιὰν ἔδοσαν, etc.
-
-  [156] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 12, 13; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24; Diodor.
-  xv, 20.
-
-The army being mustered, and the border sacrifices favorable,
-Agesilaus marched with his usual rapidity towards Phlius; dismissing
-those Phliasian envoys, who met him on the road and bribed or
-entreated him to desist, with the harsh reply that the government
-had already deceived Sparta once, and that he would be satisfied
-with nothing less than the surrender of the acropolis. This being
-refused, he marched to the city, and blocked it up by a wall of
-circumvallation. The besieged defended themselves with resolute
-bravery and endurance, under a citizen named Delphion; who, with a
-select troop of three hundred, maintained constant guard at every
-point, and even annoyed the besiegers by frequent sallies. By public
-decree, every citizen was put upon half-allowance of bread, so that
-the siege was prolonged to double the time which Agesilaus, from the
-information of the exiles as to the existing stock of provisions, had
-supposed to be possible. Gradually, however, famine made itself felt;
-desertions from within increased, among those who were favorable,
-or not decidedly averse, to the exiles; desertions, which Agesilaus
-took care to encourage by an ample supply of food, and by enrolment
-as Phliasian emigrants on the Spartan side. At length, after about a
-year’s blockade,[157] the provisions within were exhausted, so that
-the besieged were forced to entreat permission from Agesilaus to
-despatch envoys to Sparta and beg for terms. Agesilaus granted their
-request. But being at the same time indignant that they submitted
-to Sparta rather than to him, he sent to ask the ephors that the
-terms might be referred to his dictation. Meanwhile he redoubled his
-watch over the city; in spite of which, Delphion, with one of his
-most active subordinates, contrived to escape at this last hour.
-Phlius was now compelled to surrender at discretion to Agesilaus,
-who named a Council of One Hundred (half from the exiles, half from
-those within the city) vested with absolute powers of life and death
-over all the citizens, and authorized to frame a constitution for the
-future government of the city. Until this should be done, he left a
-garrison in the acropolis, with assured pay for six months.[158]
-
-  [157] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 25.
-
-  Καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ Φλιοῦντα οὕτως αὖ ἐπετετέλεστο ἐν ὀκτὼ μησὶ καὶ
-  ἐνιαυτῷ.
-
-  This general expression “the matters relative to Phlius,”
-  comprises not merely the blockade, but the preliminary treatment
-  and complaints of the Phliasian exiles. One year, therefore, will
-  be as much as we can allow for the blockade,—perhaps more than we
-  ought to allow.
-
-  [158] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 17-26.
-
-Had Agesipolis been alive, perhaps the Phliasians might have obtained
-better terms. How the omnipotent Hekatontarchy named by the partisan
-feelings of Agesilaus,[159] conducted themselves, we do not know.
-But the presumptions are all unfavorable, seeing that their situation
-as well as their power was analogous to that of the Thirty at Athens
-and the Lysandrian Dekarchies elsewhere.
-
-  [159] The panegyrist of Agesilaus finds little to commend
-  in these Phliasian proceedings, except the φιλεταιρεία or
-  partisan-attachment of his hero (Xenoph. Agesil. ii, 21).
-
-The surrender of Olynthus to Polybiades, and of Phlius to Agesilaus,
-seem to have taken place nearly at the same time.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXVII.
-
-FROM THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY THE LACEDÆMONIANS DOWN TO THE
-CONGRESS AT SPARTA, AND PARTIAL PEACE, IN 371 B.C.
-
-
-At the beginning of 379 B.C., the empire of the Lacedæmonians on
-land had reached a pitch never before paralleled. On the sea, their
-fleet was but moderately powerful, and they seem to have held divided
-empire with Athens over the smaller islands; while the larger islands
-(so far as we can make out) were independent of both. But the whole
-of inland Greece, both within and without Peloponnesus,—except Argos,
-Attica, and perhaps the more powerful Thessalian cities,—was now
-enrolled in the confederacy dependent on Sparta. Her occupation of
-Thebes, by a Spartan garrison and an oligarchy of local partisans,
-appeared to place her empire beyond all chance of successful
-attack; while the victorious close of the war against Olynthus
-carried everywhere an intimidating sense of her far-reaching power.
-Her allies, too,—governed as they were in many cases by Spartan
-harmosts, and by oligarchies whose power rested on Sparta,—were much
-more dependent upon her than they had been during the time of the
-Peloponnesian war.
-
-Such a position of affairs rendered Sparta an object of the same
-mingled fear and hatred (the first preponderant) as had been felt
-towards imperial Athens fifty years before, when she was designated
-as the “despot city.[160]” And this sentiment was farther aggravated
-by the recent peace of Antalkidas, in every sense the work of
-Sparta; which she had first procured, and afterwards carried into
-execution. That peace was disgraceful enough, as being dictated by
-the king of Persia, enforced in his name, and surrendering to him
-all the Asiatic Greeks. But it became yet more disgraceful when the
-universal autonomy which it promised was seen to be so executed, as
-to mean nothing better than subjection to Sparta. Of all the acts
-yet committed by Sparta, not only in perversion of the autonomy
-promised to every city, but in violation of all the acknowledged
-canons of right dealing between city and city,—the most flagrant
-was, her recent seizure and occupation of the Kadmeia at Thebes. Her
-subversion (in alliance with, and partly for the benefit of, Amyntas
-king of Macedonia) of the free Olynthian confederacy was hardly
-less offensive to every Greek of large or Pan-hellenic patriotism.
-She appeared as the confederate of the Persian king on one side, of
-Amyntas the Macedonian, on another, of the Syracusan despot Dionysius
-on a third,—as betraying the independence of Greece to the foreigner,
-and seeking to put down, everywhere within it, that free spirit which
-stood in the way of her own harmosts and partisan oligarchies.
-
-  [160] Thucyd. i, 124. πόλιν τύραννον.
-
-Unpopular as Sparta was, however, she stood out incontestably as the
-head of Greece. No man dared to call into question her headship,
-or to provoke resistance against it. The tone of patriotic and
-free-spoken Greeks at this moment is manifested in two eminent
-residents at Athens,—Lysias and Isokrates. Of these two rhetors, the
-former composed an oration which he publicly read at Olympia during
-the celebration of the 99th Olympiad, B.C. 384, three years after
-the peace of Antalkidas. In this oration (of which unhappily only a
-fragment remains, preserved by Dionysius of Halikarnassus), Lysias
-raises the cry of danger to Greece, partly from the Persian king,
-partly from the despot Dionysius of Syracuse.[161] He calls upon all
-Greeks to lay aside hostility and jealousies one with the other,
-and to unite in making head against these two really formidable
-enemies, as their ancestors had previously done, with equal zeal for
-putting down despots and for repelling the foreigner. He notes the
-number of Greeks (in Asia) handed over to the Persian king, whose
-great wealth would enable him to hire an indefinite number of Grecian
-soldiers, and whose naval force was superior to anything which the
-Greeks could muster; while the strongest naval force in Greece was
-that of the Syracusan Dionysius. Recognizing the Lacedæmonians as
-chiefs of Greece, Lysias expresses his astonishment that they should
-quietly permit the fire to extend itself from one city to another.
-They ought to look upon the misfortunes of those cities which had
-been destroyed, both by the Persians and by Dionysius, as coming home
-to themselves; not to wait patiently, until the two hostile powers
-had united their forces to attack the centre of Greece, which yet
-remained independent.
-
-  [161] Lysias, Frag. Orat. xxxiii, (Olympic.) ed. Bekker ap.
-  Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 520-525, Reisk.
-
-  ... Ὁρῶν οὕτως αἰσχρῶς διακειμένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν
-  αὐτῆς ὄντα ὑπὸ τῷ βαρβάρῳ, πολλὰς δὲ πόλεις ὑπὸ τυράννων
-  ἀναστάτους γεγενημένας.
-
-  ... Ὁρῶμεν γὰρ τοὺς κινδύνους καὶ μεγάλους καὶ παντάχοθεν
-  περιεστηκότας. Ἐπίστασθε δὲ, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῶν κρατούντων τῆς
-  θαλάσσης, τῶν δὲ χρημάτων βασιλεὺς ταμίας· ~τὰ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων
-  σώματα, τῶν δαπανᾶσθαι δυναμένων~· ναῦς δὲ πολλὰς αὐτὸς κέκτηται,
-  πολλὰς δ’ ὁ τύραννος τῆς Σικελίας....
-
-  ... Ὥστε ἄξιον—τοὺς προγόνους μιμεῖσθαι, οἱ τοὺς μὲν βαρβάρους
-  ἐποίησαν, τῆς ἀλλοτρίας ἐπιθυμοῦντας, τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν
-  ἐστερῆσθαι· τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ἐξελάσαντες, κοινὴν ἅπασι τὴν
-  ἐλευθερίαν κατέστησαν. Θαυμάζω δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους πάντων μάλιστα,
-  τίνι ποτε γνώμῃ χρώμενοι, ~καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν~,
-  ἡγεμόνες ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, etc.
-
-  ... Οὐ τοίνυν ὁ ἐπιὼν καιρὸς τοῦ παρόντος βελτίων· οὐ γὰρ
-  ἀλλοτρίας δεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς νομίζειν, ἀλλ’ οἰκείας·
-  οὐδ’ ἀναμεῖναι, ἕως ἂν ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς αἱ δυνάμεις ~ἀμφοτέρων~
-  (of Artaxerxes and Dionysius) ἔλθωσιν, ἀλλ’ ἕως ἔτι ἔξεστι, τὴν
-  τούτων ὕβριν κωλῦσαι.
-
-  Ephorus appears to have affirmed that there was a plan concerted
-  between the Persian king and Dionysius, for attacking Greece in
-  concert and dividing it between them (see Ephori Fragm. 141,
-  ed. Didot). The assertion is made by the rhetor Aristeides,
-  and the allusion to Ephorus is here preserved by the Scholiast
-  on Aristeides (who, however, is mistaken, in referring it to
-  Dionysius _the younger_). Aristeides ascribes the frustration of
-  this attack to the valor of two Athenian generals, Iphikrates,
-  and Timotheus; the former of whom captured the fleet of
-  Dionysius, while the latter defeated the Lacedæmonian fleet at
-  Leukas. But these events happened in 373-372 B.C., when the
-  power of Dionysius was not so formidable or aggressive as it had
-  been between 387-382 B.C.: moreover, the ships of Dionysius
-  taken by Iphikrates were only ten in number, a small squadron.
-  Aristeides appears to me to have misconceived the date to which
-  the assertion of Ephorus really referred.
-
-Of the two common enemies,—Artaxerxes and Dionysius,—whom Lysias
-thus denounces, the latter had sent to this very Olympic festival
-a splendid Theôry, or legation to offer solemn sacrifice in his
-name; together with several chariots to contend in the race, and
-some excellent rhapsodes to recite poems composed by himself. The
-Syracusan legation, headed by Thearides, brother of Dionysius, were
-clothed with rich vestments, and lodged in a tent of extraordinary
-magnificence, decorated with gold and purple; such, probably, as had
-not been seen since the ostentatious display made by Alkibiades[162]
-in the ninetieth Olympiad (B.C. 420). While instigating the
-spectators present to exert themselves as Greeks for the liberation
-of their fellow-Greeks enslaved by Dionysius, Lysias exhorted them
-to begin forthwith their hostile demonstration against the latter,
-by plundering the splendid tent before them, which insulted the
-sacred plain of Olympia with the spectacle of wealth extorted from
-Grecian sufferers. It appears that this exhortation was partially,
-but only partially, acted upon.[163] Some persons assailed the
-tents, but were, probably, restrained by the Eleian superintendents
-without difficulty. Yet the incident, taken in conjunction with
-the speech of Lysias, helps us to understand the apprehensions and
-sympathies which agitated the Olympic crowd in B.C. 384. This was
-the first Olympic festival after the peace of Antalkidas; a festival
-memorable, not only because it again brought thither Athenians,
-Bœotians, Corinthians, and Argeians, who must have been prevented
-by the preceding war from coming either in B.C. 388 or in B.C.
-392,—but also as it exhibited the visitors and Theôries from the
-Asiatic Greeks, for the first time since they had been handed over
-by Sparta to the Persians,—and the like also from those numerous
-Italians and Sicilian Greeks whom Dionysius had enslaved. All these
-sufferers, especially the Asiatics, would doubtless be full of
-complaints respecting the hardships of their new lot, and against
-Sparta as having betrayed them; complaints, which would call forth
-genuine sympathy in the Athenians, Thebans, and all others who had
-submitted reluctantly to the peace of Antalkidas. There was thus a
-large body of sentiment prepared to respond to the declamations of
-Lysias. And many a Grecian patriot, who would be ashamed to lay hands
-on the Syracusan tents or envoys, would yet yield a mournful assent
-to the orator’s remark, that the free Grecian world was on fire[164]
-at both sides; that Asiatics, Italians, and Sicilians, had already
-passed into the hands of Artaxerxes and Dionysius; and that, if these
-two formidable enemies should coalesce, the liberties even of central
-Greece would be in great danger.
-
-  [162] See Pseudo-Andokides cont. Alkibiad. s. 30; and Vol. VII.
-  of this History, Ch. lv, p. 53.
-
-  [163] Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 519; Diodor. xiv, 109.
-  ὥστε τινας τολμῆσαι διαρπάζειν τὰς σκηνάς.
-
-  Dionysius does not specify the date of this oration of Lysias;
-  but Diodorus places it at Olympiad 98—B.C. 388—the year before
-  the peace of Antalkidas. On this point I venture to depart from
-  him, and assign it to Olympiad 99, or 384 B.C., three years
-  after the peace; the rather as his Olympic chronology appears not
-  clear, as may be seen by comparing xv, 7 with xiv, 109.
-
-  1. The year 388 B.C. was a year of war, in which Sparta with
-  her allies on one side,—and Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos
-  on the other,—were carrying on strenuous hostilities. The war
-  would hinder the four last-mentioned states from sending any
-  public legation to sacrifice at the Olympic festival. Lysias, as
-  an Athenian metic, could hardly have gone there at all; but he
-  certainly could not have gone there to make a public and bold
-  oratorical demonstration.
-
-  2. The language of Lysias implies that the speech was delivered
-  after the cession of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia,—ὁρῶν πολλὰ μὲν
-  αὐτῆς (Ἑλλάδος) ὄντα ὑπὸ τῷ Βαρβάρῳ, etc. This is quite pertinent
-  after the peace of Antalkidas; but not at all admissible before
-  that peace. The same may be said about the phrase,—οὐ γὰρ
-  ἀλλοτρίας δεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς νομίζειν, ἀλλ’ οἰκείας;
-  which must be referred to the recent subjection of the Asiatic
-  Greeks by Persia, and of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks by
-  Dionysius.
-
-  3. In 388 B.C.—when Athens and so large a portion of the
-  greater cities of Greece were at war with Sparta, and therefore
-  contesting her headship,—Lysias would hardly have publicly
-  talked of the Spartans as ἡγεμόνες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐκ ἀδίκως, καὶ
-  διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον ἀρετὴν καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιστήμην.
-  This remark is made also by Sievers (Geschich. Griech. bis zur
-  Schlacht von Mantinea, p. 138). Nor would he have declaimed so
-  ardently against the Persian king, at a time when Athens was
-  still not despairing of Persian aid against Sparta.
-
-  On these grounds (as well as on others which I shall state when
-  I recount the history of Dionysius), it appears to me that this
-  oration of Lysias is unsuitable to B.C. 388—but perfectly
-  suitable to 384 B.C.
-
-  [164] Lysias, Orat. Olymp. Frag. καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν,
-  etc.
-
-It is easy to see how much such feeling of grief and shame would
-tend to raise antipathy against Sparta. Lysias, in that portion of
-his speech which we possess, disguises his censure against her under
-the forms of surprise. But Isokrates, who composed an analogous
-discourse four years afterwards (which may perhaps have been read at
-the next Olympic festival of B.C. 380), speaks out more plainly. He
-denounces the Lacedæmonians as traitors to the general security and
-freedom of Greece, and as seconding foreign kings as well as Grecian
-despots to aggrandize themselves at the cost of autonomous Grecian
-cities,—all in the interest of their own selfish ambition. No wonder
-(he says) that the free and self-acting Hellenic world was every day
-becoming contracted into a narrower space, when the presiding city
-Sparta assisted Artaxerxes, Amyntas, and Dionysius to absorb it,—and
-herself undertook unjust aggressions against Thebes, Olynthus,
-Phlius, and Mantinea.[165]
-
-  [165] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 145, 146: compare his
-  Orat. viii, (De Pace) s. 122; and Diodor. xv, 23.
-
-  Dionysius of Syracuse had sent twenty triremes to join the
-  Lacedæmonians at the Hellespont, a few months before the peace of
-  Antalkidas (Xenophon, Hellen. v, 1, 26).
-
-The preceding citations, from Lysias and Isokrates, would be
-sufficient to show the measure which intelligent contemporaries
-took, both of the state of Greece and of the conduct of Sparta,
-during the eight years succeeding the peace of Antalkidas (387-379
-B.C.). But the philo-Laconian Xenophon is still more emphatic in his
-condemnation of Sparta. Having described her triumphant and seemingly
-unassailable position after the subjugation of Olynthus and Phlius,
-he proceeds to say,[166]—“I could produce numerous other incidents,
-both in and out of Greece, to prove that the gods take careful note
-of impious men and of evil-doers; but the events which I am now about
-to relate are quite sufficient. The Lacedæmonians, who had sworn to
-leave each city autonomous, having violated their oaths by seizing
-the citadel of Thebes, were punished by the very men whom they had
-wronged,—though no one on earth had ever before triumphed over them.
-And the Theban faction who had introduced them into the citadel, with
-the deliberate purpose that their city should be enslaved to Sparta
-in order that they might rule despotically themselves,—were put down
-by no more than seven assailants, among the exiles whom they had
-banished.”
-
-  [166] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 1. Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἄν τις ἔχοι καὶ
-  ἄλλα λέγειν, καὶ Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ βαρβαρικὰ, ὡς θεοὶ οὔτε τῶν
-  ἀσεβούντων οὔτε τῶν ἀνόσια ποιούντων ἀμελοῦσι· νῦν γε μὴν λέξω τὰ
-  προκείμενα. Λακεδαιμόνιοί τε γὰρ, οἱ ὀμόσαντες αὐτονόμους ἐάσειν
-  τὰς πόλεις, τὴν ἐν Θήβαις ἀκρόπολιν κατασχόντες, ὑπ’ αὐτῶν μόνων
-  τῶν ἀδικηθέντων ἐκολάσθησαν, πρῶτον οὐδ’ ὑφ’ ἑνὸς τῶν πώποτε
-  ἀνθρώπων κρατηθέντες. Τούς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγαγόντας εἰς τὴν
-  ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν πόλιν
-  δουλεύειν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν ... τὴν τούτων ἀρχὴν ἑπτὰ μόνον
-  τῶν φυγόντων ἤρκεσαν καταλῦσαι.
-
-  This passage is properly characterized by Dr. Peter (in his
-  Commentatio Critica in Xenophontis Hellenica, Hall. 1837, p. 82)
-  as the turning-point in the history:—
-
-  “Hoc igitur in loco quasi editiore operis sui Xenophon subsistit,
-  atque uno in conspectu Spartanos, et ad suæ felicitatis
-  fastigium ascendere videt, et rursus ab eo delabi: tantâ autem
-  divinæ justitiæ conscientiâ tangitur in hac Spartanorum fortunâ
-  conspicuæ, ut vix suum judicium, quanquam id solet facere,
-  suppresserit.”
-
-What must have been the hatred, and sense of abused ascendency,
-entertained towards Sparta by neutral or unfriendly Greeks, when
-Xenophon, alike conspicuous for his partiality to her and for his
-dislike of Thebes, could employ these decisive words in ushering
-in the coming phase of Spartan humiliation, representing it as a
-well-merited judgment from the gods? The sentence which I have just
-translated marks, in the commonplace manner of the Xenophontic
-Hellenica, the same moment of pointed contrast and transition,—past
-glory suddenly and unexpectedly darkened by supervening
-misfortune,—which is foreshadowed in the narrative of Thucydides by
-the dialogue between the Athenian envoys and the Melian[167] council;
-or in the Œdipus and Antigonê of Sophokles,[168] by the warnings of
-the prophet Teiresias.
-
-  [167] See Vol. VII. of this History,—the close of Chapter lvi.
-
-  [168] Soph. Œdip. Tyr. 450; Antigon. 1066.
-
-The government of Thebes had now been for three years (since the blow
-struck by Phœbidas) in the hands of Leontiades and his oligarchical
-partisans, upheld by the Spartan garrison in the Kadmeia. Respecting
-the details of its proceedings we have scarce any information. We can
-only (as above remarked) judge of it by the analogy of the Thirty
-tyrants at Athens, and of the Lysandrian Dekarchies, to which it was
-exactly similar in origin, position, and interests. That the general
-spirit of it must have been cruel, oppressive, and rapacious,—we
-cannot doubt; though in what degree we have no means of knowing.
-The appetites of uncontrolled rulers, as well as those of a large
-foreign garrison, would ensure such a result; besides which, those
-rulers must have been in constant fear of risings or conspiracies
-amidst a body of high-spirited citizens who saw their city degraded,
-from being the chief of the Bœotian federation, into nothing better
-than a captive dependency of Sparta. Such fear was aggravated by
-the vicinity of a numerous body of Theban exiles, belonging to the
-opposite or anti-Spartan party; three or four hundred of whom had
-fled to Athens at the first seizure of their leader Ismenias, and had
-been doubtless joined subsequently by others. So strongly did the
-Theban rulers apprehend mischief from these exiles, that they hired
-assassins to take them off by private murder at Athens; and actually
-succeeded in thus killing Androkleidas, chief of the band and chief
-successor of the deceased Ismenias,—though they missed their blows at
-the rest.[169] And we may be sure that they made the prison in Thebes
-subservient to multiplied enormities and executions, when we read not
-only that one hundred and fifty prisoners were found in it when the
-government was put down,[170] but also that in the fervor of that
-revolutionary movement, the slain gaoler was an object of such fierce
-antipathy, that his corpse was trodden and spit upon by a crowd
-of Theban women.[171] In Thebes, as in other Grecian cities, the
-women not only took no part in political disputes, but rarely even
-showed themselves in public;[172] so that this furious demonstration
-of vindictive sentiment must have been generated by the loss or
-maltreatment of sons, husbands, and brothers.
-
-  [169] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 6: compare Plutarch, De Gen. Socr.
-  c. 29, p. 596 B.
-
-  [170] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 14.
-
-  [171] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 33, p. 598 B, C. ᾧ καὶ μεθ’
-  ἡμέραν ἐπενέβησαν καὶ προσέπτυσαν οὐκ ὀλίγαι γυναῖκες.
-
-  Among the prisoners was a distinguished Theban of the democratic
-  party, named Amphitheus. He was about to be shortly executed,
-  and the conspirators, personally attached to him, seem to have
-  accelerated the hour of their plot partly to preserve his life
-  (Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. p. 577 D, p. 586 F.).
-
-  [172] The language of Plutarch (De Gen. Socrat. c. 33, p. 598
-  C.) is illustrated by the description given in the harangue of
-  Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. (c. xi, s. 40)—of the universal alarm
-  prevalent in Athens after the battle of Chæroneia, such that
-  even the women could not stay in their houses—ἀναξίως αὐτῶν καὶ
-  τῆς πόλεως ὁρωμένας, etc. Compare also the words of Makaria, in
-  the Herakleidæ of Euripides, 475; and Diodor. xiii, 55, in his
-  description of the capture of Selinus in Sicily.
-
-The Theban exiles found at Athens not only secure shelter, but
-genuine sympathy with their complaints against Lacedæmonian
-injustice. The generous countenance which had been shown by the
-Thebans, twenty-four years before, to Thrasybulus and the other
-Athenian refugees, during the omnipotence of the Thirty, was
-now gratefully requited under this reversal of fortune to both
-cities;[173] and requited too in defiance of the menaces of Sparta,
-who demanded that the exiles should be expelled,—as she had in the
-earlier occasion demanded that the Athenian refugees should be
-dismissed from Thebes. To protect these Theban exiles, however, was
-all that Athens could do. Their restoration was a task beyond her
-power,—and seemingly yet more beyond their own. For the existing
-government of Thebes was firmly seated, and had the citizens
-completely under control. Administered by a small faction, Archias,
-Philippus, Hypatês, and Leontiades (among whom the first two were at
-this moment polemarchs, though the last was the most energetic and
-resolute)—it was at the same time sustained by the large garrison of
-fifteen hundred Lacedæmonians and allies,[174] under Lysanoridas and
-two other harmosts, in the Kadmeia,—as well as by the Lacedæmonian
-posts in the other Bœotian cities around,—Orchomenus, Thespiæ,
-Platæa, Tanagra, etc. Though the general body of Theban sentiment
-in the city was decidedly adverse to the government, and though the
-young men while exercising in the palæstra (gymnastic exercises being
-more strenuously prosecuted at Thebes than anywhere else except at
-Sparta) kept up by private communication the ardor of an earnest,
-but compressed, patriotism,—yet all manifestation or assemblage was
-forcibly kept down, and the commanding posts of the lower town, as
-well as the citadel, were held in vigilant occupation by the ruling
-minority.[175]
-
-  [173] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 6.
-
-  See this sentiment of gratitude on the part of Athenian
-  democrats, towards those Thebans who had sheltered them at Thebes
-  during the exile along with Thrasybulus,—strikingly brought out
-  in an oration of Lysias, of which unfortunately only a fragment
-  remains (Lysias, Frag. 46, 47, Bekk.; Dionys. Hal. Judic. de
-  Isæo, p. 594). The speaker of this oration had been received at
-  Thebes by Kephisodotus the father of Pherenikus; the latter was
-  now in exile at Athens; and the speaker had not only welcomed
-  him (Pherenikus) to his house with brotherly affection, but
-  also delivered this oration on his behalf before the Dikastery;
-  Pherenikus having rightful claims on the property left behind by
-  the assassinated Androkleidas.
-
-  [174] Diodor. xv, 25; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 12; Plutarch, De
-  Gen. Socr. c. 17, p. 586 E.
-
-  In another passage of this treatise (the last sentence but one)
-  he sets down the numbers in the Kadmeia at five thousand: but the
-  smaller number is most likely to be true.
-
-  [175] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 4, p. 577 B; c. 17, p. 587 B; c.
-  25, p. 594 C; c. 27, p. 595 A.
-
-For a certain time the Theban exiles at Athens waited in hopes of
-some rising at home, or some positive aid from the Athenians. At
-length, in the third winter after their flight, they began to despair
-of encouragement from either quarter, and resolved to take the
-initiative upon themselves. Among them were numbered several men of
-the richest and highest families at Thebes, proprietors of chariots,
-jockeys, and training establishments, for contending at the various
-festivals: Pelopidas, Mellon, Damokleidas, Theopompus, Pherenikus,
-and others.[176]
-
-  [176] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 7, 8.
-
-  Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 17, p. 587 D. Τῶν Μέλλωνος ἁρματηλατῶν
-  ἐπιστάτης.... Ἆρ’ οὐ Χλίδωνα λέγεις, τὸν κέλητι τὰ Ἡραῖα νικῶντα
-  πέρυσιν;
-
-Of these the most forward in originating aggressive measures, though
-almost the youngest, was Pelopidas; whose daring and self-devotion,
-in an enterprise which seemed utterly desperate, soon communicated
-itself to a handful of his comrades. The exiles, keeping up constant
-private correspondence with their friends in Thebes, felt assured of
-the sympathy of the citizens generally, if they could once strike a
-blow. Yet nothing less would be sufficient than the destruction of
-the four rulers, Leontiades and his colleagues,—nor would any one
-within the city devote himself to so hopeless a danger. It was this
-conspiracy which Pelopidas, Mellon, and five or ten other exiles (the
-entire band is differently numbered, by some as seven, by others,
-twelve[177]) undertook to execute. Many of their friends in Thebes
-came in as auxiliaries to them, who would not have embarked in the
-design as primary actors. Of all auxiliaries, the most effective and
-indispensable was Phyllidas, the secretary of the polemarchs; next
-to him, Charon, an eminent and earnest patriot. Phyllidas, having
-been despatched to Athens on official business, entered into secret
-conference with the conspirators, concerted with them the day for
-their coming to Thebes, and even engaged to provide for them access
-to the persons of the polemarchs. Charon not only promised them
-concealment in his house, from their first coming within the gates
-until the moment of striking their blow should have arrived,—but
-also entered his name to share in the armed attack. Nevertheless,
-in spite of such partial encouragements, the plan still appeared
-desperate to many who wished heartily for its success. Epaminondas,
-for example,—who now for the first time comes before us,—resident
-at Thebes, and not merely sympathizing with the political views of
-Pelopidas, but also bound to him by intimate friendship,—dissuaded
-others from the attempt, and declined participating in it. He
-announced distinctly that he would not become an accomplice in civil
-bloodshed. It appears that there were men among the exiles whose
-violence made him fear that they would not, like Pelopidas, draw the
-sword exclusively against Leontiades and his colleagues, but would
-avail themselves of success to perpetrate unmeasured violence against
-other political enemies.[178]
-
-  [177] Xenophon says _seven_ (Hellen. v, 4, 1, 2); Plutarch and
-  Cornelius Nepos say _twelve_ (Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 2, p.
-  576 C.; Plutarch, Pelopidas c. 8-13; Cornel. Nepos, Pelopidas, c.
-  2).
-
-  It is remarkable that Xenophon never mentions the name of
-  Pelopidas in this conspiracy; nor indeed (with one exception)
-  throughout his Hellenica.
-
-  [178] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 3, p. 576 E.; p. 577 A.
-
-The day for the enterprise was determined by Phyllidas the secretary,
-who had prepared an evening banquet for Archias and Philippus, in
-celebration of the period when they were going out of office as
-polemarchs,—and who had promised on that occasion to bring into
-their company some women remarkable for beauty, as well as of the
-best families in Thebes.[179] In concert with the general body of
-Theban exiles at Athens, who held themselves ready on the borders
-of Attica, together with some Athenian sympathizers, to march to
-Thebes the instant that they should receive intimation,—and in
-concert also with two out of the ten Stratêgi of Athens, who took
-on themselves privately to countenance the enterprise, without any
-public vote,—Pelopidas and Mellon, and their five companions,[180]
-crossed Kithæron from Athens to Thebes. It was wet weather, about
-December B.C. 379; they were disguised as rustics or hunters, with
-no other arms than a concealed dagger; and they got within the gates
-of Thebes one by one at nightfall, just when the latest farming men
-were coming home from their fields. All of them arrived safe at the
-house of Charon, the appointed rendezvous.
-
-  [179] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 4. τὰς σεμνοτάτας καὶ καλλίστας τῶν
-  ἐν Θήβαις. Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 4, p. 577 C.; Plutarch,
-  Pelopid. c. 9.
-
-  The Theban women were distinguished for majestic figure and
-  beauty (Dikæarchus, Vit. Græc. p. 144, ed Fuhr.).
-
-  [180] Plutarch, (Pelopid. c. 25; De Gen. Socr. c. 26, p. 594 D.)
-  mentions Menekleidês, Damokleidas, and Theopompus among them.
-  Compare Cornel. Nepos, Pelopid. c. 2.
-
-It was, however, by mere accident that they had not been turned back,
-and the whole scheme frustrated. For a Theban named Hipposthenidas,
-friendly to the conspiracy, but faint-hearted, who had been let into
-the secret against the will of Phyllidas,—became so frightened as the
-moment of execution approached, that he took upon himself, without
-the knowledge of the rest, to despatch Chlidon, a faithful slave of
-Mellon, ordering him to go forth on horseback from Thebes, to meet
-his master on the road, and to desire that he and his comrades would
-go back to Attica, since circumstances had happened to render the
-project for the moment impracticable. Chlidon, going home to fetch
-his bridle, but not finding it in its usual place, asked his wife
-where it was. The woman, at first pretending to look for it, at last
-confessed that she had lent it to a neighbor. Chlidon became so
-irritated with this delay, that he got into a loud altercation with
-his wife, who on her part wished him ill luck with his journey. He
-at last beat her, until neighbors ran in to interpose. His departure
-was thus accidentally frustrated, so that the intended message of
-countermand never reached the conspirators on their way.[181]
-
-  [181] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 8; Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. c. 17,
-  p. 586 B.; c. 18, p. 587 D-E.
-
-In the house of Charon they remained concealed all the ensuing day,
-on the evening of which the banquet of Archias and Philippus was to
-take place. Phyllidas had laid his plan for introducing them at that
-banquet, at the moment when the two polemarchs had become full of
-wine, in female attire, as being the women whose visit was expected.
-The hour had nearly arrived, and they were preparing to play their
-parts, when an unexpected messenger knocked at the door, summoning
-Charon instantly into the presence of the polemarchs. All within
-were thunderstruck with the summons, which seemed to imply that the
-plot had been divulged, perhaps by the timid Hipposthenidas. It was
-agreed among them that Charon must obey at once. Nevertheless, he
-himself, even in the perilous uncertainty which beset him, was most
-of all apprehensive lest the friends whom he had sheltered should
-suspect him of treachery towards themselves and their cause. Before
-departing, therefore, he sent for his only son, a youth of fifteen,
-and of conspicuous promise in every way. This youth he placed in the
-hands of Pelopidas, as a hostage for his own fidelity. But Pelopidas
-and the rest, vehemently disclaiming all suspicion, entreated Charon
-to put his son away, out of the reach of that danger in which all
-were now involved. Charon, however, could not be prevailed on to
-comply, and left his son among them to share the fate of the rest.
-He went into the presence of Archias and Philippus; whom he found
-already half-intoxicated, but informed, by intelligence from Athens,
-that some plot, they knew not by whom, was afloat. They had sent for
-him to question him, as a known friend of the exiles; but he had
-little difficulty, aided by the collusion of Phyllidas, in blinding
-the vague suspicions of drunken men, anxious only to resume their
-conviviality.[182] He was allowed to retire and rejoin his friends.
-Nevertheless, soon after his departure,—so many were the favorable
-chances which befel these improvident men,—a fresh message was
-delivered to Archias the polemarch, from his namesake Archias the
-Athenian Hierophant, giving an exact account of the names and scheme
-of the conspirators, which had become known to the philo-Laconian
-party at Athens. The messenger who bore this despatch delivered it to
-Archias with an intimation, that it related to very serious matters.
-“Serious matters for to-morrow,” said the polemarch, as he put the
-despatch, unopened and unread, under the pillow of the couch on which
-he was reclining.[183]
-
-  [182] Xenophon does not mention this separate summons and visit
-  of Charon to the polemarchs,—nor anything about the scene
-  with his son. He only notices Charon as having harbored the
-  conspirators in his house, and seems even to speak of him as a
-  person of little consequence—παρὰ Χαρωνί τινι, etc. (v, 4, 3).
-
-  The anecdote is mentioned in both the compositions of Plutarch
-  (De Gen. Socr. c. 28, p. 595; and Pelopidas, c. 9), and is too
-  interesting to be omitted, being perfectly consistent with
-  what we read in Xenophon; though it has perhaps somewhat of a
-  theatrical air.
-
-  [183] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 10; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 30,
-  p. 596 F. Εἰς αὔριον τὰ σπουδαῖα.
-
-  This occurrence also finds no place in the narrative of Xenophon.
-  Cornelius Nepos, Pelopidas, c. 3. Æneas (Poliorcetic. c. 31)
-  makes a general reference to the omission of immediate opening
-  of letters arrived, as having caused the capture of the Kadmeia;
-  which was, however, only its remote consequence.
-
-Returning to their carousal, Archias and Philippus impatiently called
-upon Phyllidas to introduce the women according to his promise. Upon
-this the secretary retired, and brought the conspirators, clothed
-in female attire, into an adjoining chamber; then going back to
-the polemarchs, he informed them that the women would not come in
-unless all the domestics were first dismissed. An order was forthwith
-given that these latter should depart, while Phyllidas took care
-that they should be well provided with wine at the lodging of one
-among their number. The polemarchs were thus left only with one or
-two friends at table, half-intoxicated as well as themselves; among
-them Kabeirichus, the archon of the year, who always throughout his
-term kept the consecrated spear of office in actual possession,
-and had it at that moment close to his person. Phyllidas now
-conducted the pretended women into the banqueting-room; three of
-them attired as ladies of distinction, the four others following as
-female attendants. Their long veils, and ample folds of clothing,
-were quite sufficient as disguise,—even had the guests at table
-been sober,—until they sat down by the side of the polemarchs; and
-the instant of lifting their veils was the signal for using their
-daggers. Archias and Philippus were slain at once and with little
-resistance; but Kabeirichus with his spear tried to defend himself,
-and thus perished with the others, though the conspirators had not
-originally intended to take his life.[184]
-
-  [184] The description given by Xenophon, of this assassination
-  of the polemarchs at Thebes, differs materially from that of
-  Plutarch. I follow Xenophon in the main; introducing, however,
-  several of the details found in Plutarch, which are interesting,
-  and which have the air of being authentic.
-
-  Xenophon himself intimates (Hellen. v, 4, 7), that besides the
-  story given in the text, there was also another story told by
-  some,—that Mellon and his companions had got access to the
-  polemarchs in the guise of drunken revellers. It is this latter
-  story which Plutarch has adopted, and which carries him into
-  many details quite inconsistent with the narrative of Xenophon.
-  I think the story, of the conspirators having been introduced in
-  female attire, the more probable of the two. It is borne out by
-  the exact analogy of what Herodotus tells us respecting Alexander
-  son of Amyntas, prince of Macedonia (Herod. v, 20).
-
-  Compare Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 10, 11; Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat.
-  c. 31, p. 597. Polyænus (ii, 4, 3) gives a story with many
-  different circumstances, yet agreeing in the fact that Pelopidas
-  in female attire killed the Spartan general. The story alluded to
-  by Aristotle (Polit. v, 5, 10), though he names both Thebes and
-  Archias, can hardly refer to this event.
-
-  It is Plutarch, however, who mentions the presence of Kabeirichus
-  the archon at the banquet, and the curious Theban custom that
-  the archon during his year of office never left out of his hand
-  the consecrated spear. As a Bœotian born, Plutarch was doubtless
-  familiar with these old customs.
-
-  From what other authors Plutarch copied the abundant details of
-  this revolution at Thebes, which he interweaves in the life of
-  Pelopidas and in the treatise called De Genio Socratis—we do not
-  know. Some critics suppose him to have borrowed from Dionysodôrus
-  and Anaxis—Bœotian historians whose work comprised this period,
-  but of whom not a single fragment is preserved (see Fragm.
-  Histor. Græc. ed. Didot, vol. ii, p. 84).
-
-Having been thus far successful, Phyllidas conducted three of the
-conspirators,—Pelopidas, Kephisodôrus, and Damokleidas,—to the house
-of Leontiades, into which he obtained admittance by announcing
-himself as the bearer of an order from the polemarchs. Leontiades was
-reclining after supper, with his wife sitting spinning wool by his
-side, when they entered his chamber. Being a brave and powerful man,
-he started up, seized his sword, and mortally wounded Kephisodôrus
-in the throat; a desperate struggle then ensued between him and
-Pelopidas in the narrow doorway, where there was no room for a third
-to approach. At length, however, Pelopidas overthrew and killed him,
-after which they retired, enjoining the wife with threats to remain
-silent, and closing the door after them with peremptory commands
-that it should not be again opened. They then went to the house
-of Hypatês, whom they slew while he attempted to escape over the
-roof.[185]
-
-  [185] Xen. Hell. v, 4, 9; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 11, 12; and De Gen.
-  Socr. p. 597 D-F. Here again Xenophon and Plutarch differ; the
-  latter represents that Pelopidas got into the house of Leontiades
-  _without_ Phyllidas,—which appears to me altogether improbable.
-  On the other hand, Xenophon mentions nothing about the defence
-  of Leontiades and his personal conflict with Pelopidas, which
-  I copy from Plutarch. So brave a man as Leontiades, awake and
-  sober, would not let himself be slain without a defence dangerous
-  to assailants. Plutarch, in another place, singles out the death
-  of Leontiades as the marking circumstance of the whole glorious
-  enterprise, and the most impressive to Pelopidas (Plutarch—Non
-  posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum—p. 1099 A-E.).
-
-The four great rulers of the philo-Laconian party in Thebes having
-been now put to death, Phyllidas proceeded with the conspirators to
-the prison. Here the gaoler, a confidential agent in the oppressions
-of the deceased governors, hesitated to admit him; but was slain by a
-sudden thrust with his spear, so as to ensure free admission to all.
-To liberate the prisoners, probably, for the most part men of kindred
-politics with the conspirators,—to furnish them with arms taken
-from the battle-spoils hanging up in the neighboring porticos,—and
-to range them in battle order near the temple of Amphion,—were the
-next proceedings; after which they began to feel some assurance
-of safety and triumph.[186] Epaminondas and Gorgidas, apprised of
-what had occurred, were the first who appeared in arms with a few
-friends to sustain the cause; while proclamation was everywhere made
-aloud, through heralds, that the despots were slain,—that Thebes
-was free,—and that all Thebans who valued freedom should muster in
-arms in the market-place. There were at that moment in Thebes many
-trumpeters who had come to contend for the prize at the approaching
-festival of the Herakleia. Hipposthenidas engaged these men to blow
-their trumpets in different parts of the city, and thus everywhere to
-excite the citizens to arms.[187]
-
-  [186] Xenoph. Hell. v, 4, 8; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 12; De Gen.
-  Socr. p. 598 B.
-
-  [187] This is a curious piece of detail, which we learn from
-  Plutarch (De Gen. Socr. c. 34. p. 598 D.).
-
-  The Orchomenian Inscriptions in Boeckh’s Collection record the
-  prizes given to these Σαλπιγκταὶ or trumpeters (see Boeckh, Corp.
-  Inscr. No. 1584, 1585, etc.).
-
-Although during the darkness surprise was the prevalent feeling,
-and no one knew what to do,—yet so soon as day dawned, and the
-truth became known, there was but one feeling of joy and patriotic
-enthusiasm among the majority of the citizens.[188] Both horsemen
-and hoplites hastened in arms to the agora. Here for the first time
-since the seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas, a formal assembly
-of the Theban people was convened, before which Pelopidas and his
-fellow-conspirators presented themselves. The priests of the city
-crowned them with wreaths, and thanked them in the name of the local
-gods; while the assembly hailed them with acclamations of delight and
-gratitude, nominating with one voice Pelopidas, Mellon, and Charon,
-as the first renewed Bœotarchs.[189] The revival of this title, which
-had been dropped since the peace of Antalkidas, was in itself an
-event of no mean significance; implying not merely that Thebes had
-waked up again into freedom, but that the Bœotian confederacy also
-had been, or would be, restored.
-
-  [188] The unanimous joy with which the consummation of the
-  revolution was welcomed in Thebes,—and the ardor with which the
-  citizens turned out to support it by armed force,—is attested by
-  Xenophon, no very willing witness,—Hellen. v, 4, 9. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡμέρα
-  ἦν καὶ φανερὸν ἦν τὸ γεγενημένον, ταχὺ δὴ καὶ οἱ ὁπλῖται καὶ οἱ
-  ἱππεῖς σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐξεβοήθουν.
-
-  [189] Plutarch, Pelop. c. 12.
-
-Messengers had been forthwith despatched by the conspirators to
-Attica to communicate their success; upon which all the remaining
-exiles, with the two Athenian generals privy to the plot, and a body
-of Athenian volunteers, or _corps francs_, all of whom were ready on
-the borders awaiting the summons,—flocked to Thebes to complete the
-work. The Spartan generals, on their side also, sent to Platæa and
-Thespiæ for aid. During the whole night, they had been distracted and
-alarmed by the disturbance in the city; lights showing themselves
-here and there, with trumpets sounding and shouts for the recent
-success.[190] Apprised speedily of the slaughter of the polemarchs,
-from whom they had been accustomed to receive orders, they knew not
-whom to trust or to consult, while they were doubtless beset by
-affrighted fugitives of the now defeated party, who would hurry up
-the Kadmeia for safety. They reckoned at first on a diversion in
-their favor from the forces at Platæa and Thespiæ. But these forces
-were not permitted even to approach the city gate; being vigorously
-charged, as soon as they came in sight, by the newly-mustered Theban
-cavalry, and forced to retreat with loss. The Lacedæmonians in the
-citadel were thus not only left without support, but saw their
-enemies in the city reinforced by the other exiles, and by the
-auxiliary volunteers.[191]
-
-  [190] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 598 E.; Pelop. c. 12.
-
-  [191] Xenophon expressly mentions that the Athenians who were
-  invited to come, and who actually did come, to Thebes, were the
-  two generals and the volunteers; all of whom were before privy
-  to the plot, and were in readiness on the borders of Attica—τοὺς
-  ~πρὸς τοῖς ὁρίοις~ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοὺς δύο τῶν στρατηγῶν—οἱ
-  Ἀθηναῖοι ~ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρίων~ ἤδη παρῆσαν (Hellen. v, 4, 9, 10).
-
-Meanwhile, Pelopidas and the other new Bœotarchs found themselves at
-the head of a body of armed citizens, full of devoted patriotism
-and unanimous in hailing the recent revolution. They availed
-themselves of this first burst of fervor to prepare for storming
-the Kadmeia without delay, knowing the importance of forestalling
-all aid from Sparta. And the citizens were already rushing up to
-the assault,—proclamation being made of large rewards to those who
-should first force their way in,—when the Lacedæmonian commander sent
-proposals for a capitulation.[192] Undisturbed egress from Thebes,
-with the honors of war, being readily guaranteed to him by oath,
-the Kadmeia was then surrendered. As the Spartans were marching out
-of the gates, many Thebans of the defeated party came forth also.
-But against these latter the exasperation of the victors was so
-ungovernable, that several of the most odious were seized as they
-passed, and put to death; in some cases, even their children along
-with them. And more of them would have been thus despatched, had not
-the Athenian auxiliaries, with generous anxiety, exerted every effort
-to get them out of sight and put them into safety.[193] We are not
-told,—nor is it certain,—that these Thebans were protected under the
-capitulation. Even had they been so, however, the wrathful impulse
-might still have prevailed against them. Of the three harmosts who
-thus evacuated the Kadmeia without a blow, two were put to death,
-the third was heavily fined and banished, by the authorities at
-Sparta.[194] We do not know what the fortifications of the Kadmeia
-were, nor how far it was provisioned. But we can hardly wonder that
-these officers were considered to have dishonored the Lacedæmonian
-arms, by making no attempt to defend it; when we recollect that
-hardly more than four or five days would be required to procure
-adequate relief from home,—and that forty-three years afterwards, the
-Macedonian garrison in the same place maintained itself against the
-Thebans in the city for more than fourteen days, until the return of
-Alexander from Illyria.[195] The first messenger who brought news to
-Sparta of the conspiracy and revolution at Thebes, appears to have
-communicated at the same time that the garrison had evacuated the
-Kadmeia and was in full retreat, with a train of Theban exiles from
-the defeated party.[196]
-
-  [192] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 10, 11. προσέβαλον πρὸς τὴν
-  ἀκρόπολιν—τὴν προθυμίαν τῶν προσιόντων ἁπάντων ἑώρων, etc.
-
-  Diodorus, xv, 25. ἔπειτα τοὺς πολίτας ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν
-  παρακαλέσαντες (the successful Theban conspirators, Pelopidas,
-  etc.) ~συνέργους ἔσχον ἅπαντας τοὺς Θηβαίους~.
-
-  [193] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 12.
-
-  [194] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 13; Diodor. xv, 27.
-
-  Plutarch (Pelopid. c. 13) augments the theatrical effect by
-  saying that the Lacedæmonian garrison on its retreat, actually
-  met at Megara the reinforcements under king Kleombrotus, which
-  had advanced thus far, on their march to relieve the Kadmeia.
-  But this is highly improbable. The account of Xenophon intimates
-  clearly that the Kadmeia was surrounded on the next morning after
-  the nocturnal movement. The commanders capitulated in the first
-  moment of distraction and despair, without even standing an
-  assault.
-
-  [195] Arrian, i, 6.
-
-  [196] In recounting this revolution at Thebes, and the
-  proceedings of the Athenians in regard to it, I have followed
-  Xenophon almost entirely.
-
-  Diodorus (xv, 25, 26) concurs with Xenophon in stating that the
-  Theban exiles got back from Attica to Thebes by night, partly
-  through the concurrence of the Athenians (συνεπιλαβομένων τῶν
-  Ἀθηναίων)—slew the rulers—called the citizens to freedom next
-  morning, finding all hearty in the cause—and then proceeded to
-  besiege the fifteen hundred Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesians in
-  the Kadmeia.
-
-  But after thus much of agreement, Diodorus states what followed,
-  in a manner quite inconsistent with Xenophon; thus (he tells us)—
-
-  The Lacedæmonian commander sent instant intelligence to Sparta
-  of what had happened, with request for a reinforcement. The
-  Thebans at once attempted to storm the Kadmeia, but were repulsed
-  with great loss, both of killed and wounded. Fearing that they
-  might not be able to take the fort before reinforcement should
-  come from Sparta, they sent envoys to Athens to ask for aid,
-  reminding the Athenians that they (the Thebans) had helped to
-  emancipate Athens from the Thirty, and to restore the democracy
-  (ὑπομιμνήσκοντες μὲν ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ ~συγκατήγαγον τὸν δῆμον~ τῶν
-  Ἀθηναίων καθ’ ὃν καιρὸν ὑπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα κατεδουλώθησαν). The
-  Athenians, partly from desire to requite this favor, partly from
-  a wish to secure the Thebans as allies against Sparta, passed a
-  public vote to assist them forthwith. Demophon the general got
-  together five thousand hoplites and five hundred horsemen, with
-  whom he hastened to Thebes on the next day; and all the remaining
-  population were prepared to follow, if necessary (πανδημεί).
-  All the other cities in Bœotia also sent aid to Thebes too,—so
-  that there was assembled there a large force of twelve thousand
-  hoplites and two thousand horsemen. This united force, the
-  Athenians being among them, assaulted the Kadmeia day and night,
-  relieving each other; but were repelled with great loss of killed
-  and wounded. At length the garrison found themselves without
-  provisions; the Spartans were tardy in sending reinforcement;
-  and sedition broke out among the Peloponnesian allies who formed
-  the far larger part of the garrison. These Peloponnesians,
-  refusing to fight longer, insisted upon capitulating; which the
-  Lacedæmonian governor was obliged perforce to do, though both he
-  and the Spartans along with him desired to hold out to the death.
-  The Kadmeia was accordingly surrendered, and the garrison went
-  back to Peloponnesus. The Lacedæmonian reinforcement from Sparta
-  arrived only a little too late.
-
-  All these circumstances stated by Diodorus are not only
-  completely different from Xenophon, but irreconcilable with his
-  conception of the event. We must reject either the one or the
-  other.
-
-  Now Xenophon is not merely the better witness of the two, but is
-  in this case sustained by all the collateral probabilities of the
-  case.
-
-  1. Diodorus represents the Athenians as having despatched by
-  public vote, assistance to Thebes, in order to requite the
-  assistance which the Thebans had before sent to restore the
-  Athenian democracy against the Thirty. Now this is incorrect
-  in point of fact. The Thebans had _never sent any assistance_,
-  positive or ostensible, to Thrasybulus and the Athenian democrats
-  against the Thirty. They had assisted Thrasybulus underhand,
-  and without any public government-act; and they had refused to
-  serve along with the Spartans against him. But they never sent
-  any force to help him against the Thirty. Consequently, the
-  Athenians _could not_ now have sent any public force to Thebes,
-  _in requital_ for a similar favor done before by the Thebans to
-  them.
-
-  2. Had the Athenians passed a formal vote, sent a large public
-  army, and taken vigorous part in several bloody assaults on
-  the Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia,—this would have been
-  the most flagrant and unequivocal commencement of hostilities
-  against Sparta. No Spartan envoys could, after that, have gone
-  to Athens, and stayed safely in the house of the Proxenus,—as we
-  know from Xenophon that they did. Besides,—the story of Sphodrias
-  (presently to be recounted) proves distinctly that Athens was at
-  peace with Sparta, and had committed no act of hostility against
-  her, for three or four months at least after the revolution at
-  Thebes. It therefore refutes the narrative of Diodorus about
-  the public vote of the Athenians, and the public Athenian force
-  under Demophon, aiding in the attack of the Kadmeia. Strange
-  to say,—Diodorus himself, three chapters afterwards (xv, 29),
-  relates this story about Sphodrias, just in the same manner
-  (with little difference) as Xenophon; ushering in the story with
-  a declaration, that _the Athenians were still at peace with
-  Sparta_, and forgetting that he had himself recounted a distinct
-  rupture of that peace on the part of the Athenians.
-
-  3. The news of the revolution at Thebes must necessarily have
-  taken the Athenian public completely by surprise (though some
-  few Athenians were privy to the scheme), because it was a scheme
-  which had no chance of succeeding except by profound secrecy.
-  Now, that the Athenian public, hearing the news for the first
-  time,—having no positive act to complain of on the part of
-  Sparta, and much reason to fear her power,—having had no previous
-  circumstances to work them up, or prepare them for any dangerous
-  resolve,—should identify themselves at once with Thebes,
-  and provoke war with Sparta in the impetuous manner stated
-  by Diodorus,—this is, in my judgment, eminently improbable,
-  requiring good evidence to induce us to believe it.
-
-  4. Assume the statement of Diodorus to be true,—what reasonable
-  explanation can be given of the erroneous version which we
-  read in Xenophon? The facts as he recounts them conflict most
-  pointedly with his philo-Laconian partialities; first, the
-  overthrow of the Lacedæmonian power at Thebes, by a handful
-  of exiles; still more, the whole story of Sphodrias and his
-  acquittal.
-
-  But assume the statement of Xenophon to be true,—and we can
-  give a very plausible explanation how the erroneous version
-  in Diodorus arose. A few months later, after the acquittal of
-  Sphodrias at Sparta, the Athenians did enter heartily into
-  the alliance of Thebes, and sent a large public force (indeed
-  five thousand hoplites, the same number as those of Demophon,
-  according to Diodorus, c. 32) to assist her in repelling
-  Agesilaus with the Spartan army. It is by no means unnatural
-  that their public vote and expedition undertaken about July 378
-  B.C.,—should have been erroneously thrown back to December 379
-  B.C. The Athenian orators were fond of boasting that Athens
-  had saved the Thebans from Sparta; and this might be said with
-  some truth, in reference to the aid which she really rendered
-  afterwards. Isokrates (Or. Plataic. s. 31) makes this boast in
-  general terms; but Deinarchus (cont. Demosthen. s. 40) is more
-  distinct, and gives in a few words a version the same as that
-  which we find in Diodorus; so also does Aristeides, in two very
-  brief allusions (Panathen. p. 172, and Or. xxxviii, Socialis, p.
-  486-498). Possibly Aristeides as well as Diodorus may have copied
-  from Ephorus; but however this may be, it is easy to understand
-  the mistake out of which their version grew.
-
-  5. Lastly, Plutarch mentions nothing about the public vote of
-  the Athenians, and the regular division of troops under Demophon
-  which Diodorus asserts to have aided in the storming of the
-  Kadmeia. See Plutarch (De Gen. Socrat. ad fin. Agesil. c. 23;
-  Pelopid. 12, 13). He intimates only, as Xenophon does, that there
-  were some Athenian volunteers who assisted the exiles.
-
-  M. Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 38-43) discusses
-  this discrepancy at considerable length, and cites the opinion
-  of various German authors in respect to it, with none of whom I
-  altogether concur.
-
-  In my judgment, the proper solution is, to reject altogether (as
-  belonging to a later time) the statement of Diodorus, respecting
-  the public vote at Athens, and the army said to have been sent to
-  Thebes under Demophon; and to accept the more credible narrative
-  of Xenophon; which ascribes to Athens a reasonable prudence, and
-  great fear of Sparta,—qualities such as Athenian orators would
-  not be disposed to boast of. According to that narrative, the
-  question about sending Athenians to aid in storming the Kadmeia
-  could hardly have been submitted for public discussion, since
-  that citadel was surrendered at once by the intimidated garrison.
-
-This revolution at Thebes came like an electric shock upon the
-Grecian world. With a modern reader, the assassination of the four
-leaders, in their houses and at the banquet, raises a sentiment of
-repugnance which withdraws his attention from the other features
-of this memorable deed. Now an ancient Greek not only had no such
-repugnance, but sympathized with the complete revenge for the seizure
-of the Kadmeia and the death of Ismenias; while he admired, besides,
-the extraordinary personal daring of Pelopidas and Mellon,—the
-skilful forecast of the plot,—and the sudden overthrow, by a force
-so contemptibly small, of a government which the day before seemed
-unassailable.[197] It deserves note that we here see the richest
-men in Thebes undertaking a risk, single-handed and with their
-own persons, which must have appeared on a reasonable estimate
-little less than desperate. From the Homeric Odysseus and Achilles
-down to the end of free Hellenism, the rich Greek strips in the
-Palæstra,[198] and exposes his person in the ranks as a soldier like
-the poorest citizens; being generally superior to them in strength
-and bodily efficiency.
-
-  [197] The daring _coup de main_ of Pelopidas and Mellon, against
-  the government of Thebes, bears a remarkable analogy to that by
-  which Evagoras got into Salamis and overthrew the previous despot
-  (Isokrates, Or. ix, Evagor. s. 34).
-
-  [198] See, in illustration of Greek sentiment on this point,
-  Xenophon, Hellen. iii, 4, 19; and Xenophon, Enc. Ages. i, 28.
-
-As the revolution in Thebes acted forcibly on the Grecian mind from
-the manner in which it was accomplished, so by its positive effects
-it altered forthwith the balance of power in Greece. The empire of
-Sparta, far from being undisputed and nearly universal over Greece,
-is from henceforward only maintained by more or less effort, until at
-length it is completely overthrown.[199]
-
-  [199] If, indeed, we could believe Isokrates, speaking through
-  the mouth of a Platæan, it would seem that the Thebans,
-  immediately after their revolution, sent an humble embassy to
-  Sparta deprecating hostility, entreating to be admitted as
-  allies, and promising service, even against their benefactors
-  the Athenians, just as devoted as the deposed government had
-  rendered; an embassy which the Spartans haughtily answered by
-  desiring them to receive back their exiles, and to cast out the
-  assassins Pelopidas and his comrades. It is possible that the
-  Thebans may have sent to try the possibility of escaping Spartan
-  enmity; but it is highly improbable that they made any such
-  promises as those here mentioned; and it is certain that they
-  speedily began to prepare vigorously for that hostility which
-  they saw to be approaching.
-
-  See Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 31.
-
-  This oration is put into the mouth of a Platæan, and seems to be
-  an assemblage of nearly all the topics which could possibly be
-  enforced, truly or falsely, against Thebes.
-
-The exiles from Thebes, arriving at Sparta, inflamed both the ephors,
-and the miso-Theban Agesilaus, to the highest pitch. Though it was
-then the depth of winter,[200] an expedition was decreed forthwith
-against Thebes, and the allied contingents were summoned. Agesilaus
-declined to take the command of it, on the ground that he was above
-sixty years of age, and therefore no longer liable to compulsory
-foreign service. But this (says Xenophon[201]) was not his real
-reason. He was afraid that his enemies at Sparta would say,—“Here
-is Agesilaus again putting us to expense, in order that he may
-uphold despots in other cities,”—as he had just done, and had been
-reproached with doing, at Phlius; a second proof that the reproaches
-against Sparta (which I have cited a few pages above from Lysias and
-Isokrates) of allying herself with Greek despots as well as with
-foreigners to put down Grecian freedom, found an echo even in Sparta
-herself. Accordingly Kleombrotus, the other king of Sparta, took the
-command. He had recently succeeded his brother Agesipolis, and had
-never commanded before.
-
-  [200] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 14. μάλα χειμῶνος ὄντος.
-
-  [201] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 13. εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγοίη, λέξειαν
-  οἱ πολῖται, ὡς Ἀγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσειε τοῖς τυράννοις, πράγματα
-  τῇ πόλει παρέχοι. Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24.
-
-Kleombrotus conducted his army along the Isthmus of Corinth through
-Megara to Platæa, cutting to pieces an outpost of Thebans, composed
-chiefly of the prisoners set free by the recent revolution, who had
-been placed for the defence of the intervening mountain-pass. From
-Platæa he went forward to Thespiæ, and from thence to Kynoskephalæ in
-the Theban territory, where he lay encamped for sixteen days; after
-which he retreated to Thespiæ. It appears that he did nothing, and
-that his inaction was the subject of much wonder in his army, who
-are said to have even doubted whether he was really and earnestly
-hostile to Thebes. Perhaps the exiles, with customary exaggeration,
-may have led him to hope that they could provoke a rising in Thebes,
-if he would only come near. At any rate the bad weather must have
-been a serious impediment to action; since in his march back to
-Peloponnesus through Kreusis and Ægosthenæ the wind blew a hurricane,
-so that his soldiers could not proceed without leaving their shields
-and coming back afterwards to fetch them. Kleombrotus did not quit
-Bœotia, however, without leaving Sphodrias as harmost at Thespiæ,
-with one third of the entire army, and with a considerable sum of
-money to employ in hiring mercenaries and acting vigorously against
-the Thebans.[202]
-
-  [202] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 15-18.
-
-The army of Kleombrotus, in its march from Megara to Platæa, had
-passed by the skirts of Attica; causing so much alarm to the
-Athenians, that they placed Chabrias with a body of peltasts, to
-guard their frontier and the neighboring road through Eleutheræ
-into Bœotia. This was the first time that a Lacedæmonian army had
-touched Attica (now no longer guarded by the lines of Corinth, as
-in the war between 394 and 388 B.C.) since the retirement of king
-Pausanias in 404 B.C.; furnishing a proof of the exposure of the
-country, such as to revive in the Athenian mind all the terrible
-recollections of Dekeleia and the Peloponnesian war. It was during
-the first prevalence of this alarm,—and seemingly while Kleombrotus
-was still with his army at Thespiæ or Kynoskephalæ, close on the
-Athenian frontier,—that three Lacedæmonian envoys, Etymoklês and
-two others, arrived at Athens to demand satisfaction for the part
-taken by the two Athenian generals and the Athenian volunteers, in
-concerting and aiding the enterprise of Pelopidas and his comrades.
-So overpowering was the anxiety in the public mind to avoid giving
-offence to Sparta, that these two generals were both of them accused
-before the dikastery. The first of them was condemned and executed;
-the second, profiting by this warning (since, pursuant to the
-psephism of Kannônus,[203] the two would be put on trial separately),
-escaped, and a sentence of banishment was passed against him.[204]
-These two generals had been unquestionably guilty of a grave abuse
-of their official functions. They had brought the state into public
-hazard, not merely without consulting the senate or assembly, but
-even without taking the sense of their own board of Ten. Nevertheless
-the severity of the sentence pronounced indicates the alarm, as well
-as the displeasure, of the general body of Athenians; while it served
-as a disclaimer in fact, if not in form, of all political connection
-with Thebes.[205]
-
-  [203] See Vol. VIII. of this History, Ch. lxiv, p. 196—about the
-  psephism of Kannônus.
-
-  [204] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 19; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 14.
-
-  Xenophon mentions the Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens, but does
-  not expressly say that they were sent to demand reparation for
-  the conduct of these two generals or of the volunteers. I cannot
-  doubt, however, that the fact was so; for in those times, there
-  were no resident envoys,—none but envoys sent on special missions.
-
-  [205] The trial and condemnation of these two generals has
-  served as the groundwork for harsh reproach against the Athenian
-  democracy. Wachsmuth (Hellen. Alterth. i, p. 654) denounces
-  it as “a judicial horror, or abomination—ein Greul-gericht.”
-  Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 44, 45) says,—“Quid?
-  quia invasionem Lacedæmoniorum viderant in Bœotiam factam esse,
-  non puduit eos, damnare imperatores quorum facta suis decretis
-  comprobaverant?” ... “Igitur hanc _illius facinoris excusationem_
-  habebimus: Rebus quæ a Thebanis agebantur (_i. e._ by the
-  propositions of the Thebans seeking peace from Sparta, and trying
-  to get enrolled as her allies,—alleged by Isokrates, which I
-  have noticed above as being, in my judgment, very inaccurately
-  recorded) cognitis, Athenienses, quo _enixius subvenerant,
-  eo majore pœnitentiâ perculsi_ sunt.... Sed tantum abfuit ut
-  sibimet irascerentur, ut, _e more Atheniensium, punirentur qui
-  perfecerant id quod tum populus exoptaverat_.”
-
-  The censures of Wachsmuth, Rehdantz, etc. assume as matter of
-  fact,—1. That the Athenians had passed a formal vote in the
-  public assembly to send assistance to Thebes, under two generals,
-  who accordingly went out in command of the army and performed
-  their instructions. 2. That the Athenians, becoming afterwards
-  repentant or terrified, tried and condemned these two generals
-  for having executed the commission entrusted to them.
-
-  I have already shown grounds (in a previous note) for believing
-  that the first of these affirmations is incorrect; the second, as
-  dependent on it, will therefore be incorrect also.
-
-  These authors here appear to me to single out a portion of each
-  of the two _inconsistent_ narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus,
-  and blend them together in a way which contradicts both.
-
-  Thus, they take from Diodorus the allegation, that the Athenians
-  sent to Thebes by public vote a large army, which fought along
-  with the Thebans against the Kadmeia,—an allegation which, not
-  only is not to be found in Xenophon, but which his narrative
-  plainly, though indirectly, excludes.
-
-  Next, they take from Xenophon the allegation, that the Athenians
-  tried and condemned the two generals who were accomplices in the
-  conspiracy of Mellon against the Theban rulers,—τὼ δύω στρατηγὼ,
-  οἳ συνηπιστάσθην τὴν τοῦ Μέλλωνος ἐπὶ τοὺς περὶ Λεοντιάδην
-  ἐπανάστασιν (v, 4, 19). Now the mention of these two generals
-  follows naturally and consistently in _Xenophon_. He had before
-  told us that there were _two_ out of the Athenian generals, who
-  both assisted underhand in organizing the plot, and afterwards
-  went with the volunteers to Thebes. But it cannot be fitted
-  on to the narrative of _Diodorus, who never says a word about
-  this condemnation by the Athenians_—nor even mentions _any two
-  Athenian generals_, at all. He tells us that the Athenian army
-  which went to Thebes was commanded by Demophon; he notices
-  no colleague whatever. He says in general words, that the
-  conspiracy was organized “with the assistance of the Athenians”
-  (συνεπιλαβομένων Ἀθηναίων); not saying a word about any _two
-  generals_ as especially active.
-
-  Wachsmuth and Rehdantz take it for granted, most gratuitously,
-  that these two condemned generals (mentioned by Xenophon and not
-  by Diodorus) are identical with Demophon and another colleague,
-  commanders of an army which went out by public vote (mentioned by
-  Diodorus and not by Xenophon).
-
-  The narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus (as I have before
-  observed) are distinct and inconsistent with each other. We have
-  to make our option between them. I adhere to that of Xenophon,
-  for reasons previously given. But if any one prefers that of
-  Diodorus, he ought then to reject altogether the story of the
-  condemnation of the two Athenian generals (_who nowhere appear
-  in Diodorus_), and to suppose that Xenophon was misinformed upon
-  that point, as upon the other facts of the case.
-
-  That the two Athenian generals (assuming the Xenophontic
-  narrative as true) should be tried and punished, when the
-  consequences of their unauthorized proceeding were threatening to
-  come with severity upon Athens,—appears to me neither improbable
-  nor unreasonable. Those who are shocked by the very severity
-  of the sentence, will do well to read the remarks which the
-  Lacedæmonian envoys make (Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 23) on the conduct
-  of Sphodrias.
-
-  To turn from one severe sentence to another,—whoever believes the
-  narrative of Diodorus in preference to that of Xenophon, ought
-  to regard the execution of those two Lacedæmonian commanders
-  who surrendered the Kadmeia as exceedingly cruel. According to
-  Diodorus, these officers had done everything which brave men
-  could do; they had resisted a long time, repelled many attacks,
-  and were only prevented from farther holding out by a mutiny
-  among their garrison.
-
-  Here again, we see the superiority of the narrative of
-  Xenophon over that of Diodorus. According to the former, these
-  Lacedæmonian commanders surrendered the Kadmeia without any
-  resistance at all. Their condemnation, like that of the Athenian
-  two generals, becomes a matter easy to understand and explain.
-
-Even before the Lacedæmonian envoys had quitted Athens, however,
-an incident, alike sudden and memorable, completely altered the
-Athenian temper. The Lacedæmonian harmost Sphodrias (whom Kleombrotus
-had left at Thespiæ to prosecute the war against Thebes), being
-informed that Peiræus on its land side was without gates or night
-watch,—since there was no suspicion of attack,—conceived the idea of
-surprising it by a night-march from Thespiæ, and thus of mastering
-at one stroke the commerce, the wealth, and the naval resources of
-Athens. Putting his troops under march one evening after an early
-supper, he calculated on reaching the Peiræus the next morning before
-daylight. But his reckoning proved erroneous. Morning overtook
-him when he had advanced no farther than the Thriasian plain near
-Eleusis; from whence, as it was useless to proceed farther, he turned
-back and retreated to Thespiæ; not, however, without committing
-various acts of plunder against the neighboring Athenian residents.
-
-This plan against Peiræus appears to have been not ill conceived. Had
-Sphodrias been a man competent to organize and execute movements as
-rapid as those of Brasidas, there is no reason why it might not have
-succeeded; in which case the whole face of the war would have been
-changed, since the Lacedæmonians, if once masters of Peiræus, both
-could and would have maintained the place. But it was one of those
-injustices, which no one ever commends until it has been successfully
-consummated,—“consilium quod non potest laudari nisi peractum.[206]”
-As it failed, it has been considered, by critics as well as by
-contemporaries, not merely as a crime but as a fault, and its author
-Sphodrias as a brave man, but singularly weak and hot-headed.[207]
-Without admitting the full extent of this censure, we may see
-that his present aggression grew out of an untoward emulation of
-the glory which Phœbidas, in spite of the simulated or transient
-displeasure of his countrymen, had acquired by seizing the Kadmeia.
-That Sphodrias received private instructions from Kleombrotus (as
-Diodorus states) is not sufficiently proved; while the suspicion,
-intimated by Xenophon as being abroad, that he was wrought upon
-by secret emissaries and bribes from his enemies the Thebans, for
-the purpose of plunging Athens into war with Sparta, is altogether
-improbable;[208] and seems merely an hypothesis suggested by the
-consequences of the act,—which were such, that if his enemies had
-bribed him, he could not have served them better.
-
-  [206] Tacit. Histor. i, 38.
-
-  Compare (in Plutarch, Anton. c. 32) the remark of Sextus Pompey
-  to his captain Menas, when the latter asked his permission to
-  cut the cables of the ship, while Octavius and Antony were
-  dining on board, and to seize their persons,—“I cannot permit
-  any such thing; but you ought to have done it without asking my
-  permission.” A reply familiar to the readers of Shakspeare’s
-  Antony and Cleopatra.
-
-  [207] Kallisthenes, Frag. 2, ed. Didot, apud Harpokration, v.
-  Σφοδρίας; Diodor. xv, 29; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 14; Plutarch,
-  Agesil. c. 24. The miscalculation of Sphodrias as to the time
-  necessary for his march to Peiræus is not worse than other
-  mistakes which Polybius (in a very instructive discourse, ix,
-  12, 20, seemingly extracted from his lost commentaries on
-  Tactics) recounts as having been committed by various other able
-  commanders.
-
-  [208] Πείθουσι τὸν ἐν ταῖς Θεσπιαῖς ἁρμοστὴν Σφοδρίαν, χρήματα
-  δόντες, ὡς ὑπωπτεύετο—Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 20; Diodor. xv, 29;
-  Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 14; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24, 25.
-
-  Diodorus affirms private orders from Kleombrotus to Sphodrias.
-
-  In rejecting the suspicion mentioned by Xenophon,—that it was
-  the Theban leaders who instigated and bribed Sphodrias,—we may
-  remark—1. That the plan might very possibly have succeeded; and
-  its success would have been ruinous to the Thebans. Had they
-  been the instigators, they would not have failed to give notice
-  of it at Athens at the same time; which they certainly did not
-  do. 2. That if the Lacedæmonians had punished Sphodrias, no war
-  would have ensued. Now every man would have predicted, that
-  assuming the scheme to fail, they certainly would punish him.
-  3. The strong interest taken by Agesilaus afterwards in the
-  fate of Sphodrias, and the high encomium which he passed on the
-  general character of the latter,—are quite consistent with a
-  belief on his part that Sphodrias (like Phœbidas) may have done
-  wrong towards a foreign city from over-ambition in the service
-  of his country. But if Agesilaus (who detested the Thebans
-  beyond measure) had believed that Sphodrias was acting under the
-  influence of bribes from them, he would not merely have been
-  disposed to let justice take its course, but would have approved
-  and promoted the condemnation.
-
-  On a previous occasion (Hellen. iii, 5, 3) Xenophon had imputed
-  to the Thebans a similar refinement of stratagem; seemingly with
-  just as little cause.
-
-The presence of Sphodrias and his army in the Thriasian plain was
-communicated shortly after daybreak at Athens, where it excited
-no less terror than surprise. Every man instantly put himself
-under arms for defence; but news soon arrived that the invader had
-retired. When thus reassured, the Athenians passed from fear to
-indignation. The Lacedæmonian envoys, who were lodging at the house
-of Kallias the proxenus of Sparta, were immediately put under arrest
-and interrogated. But all three affirmed that they were not less
-astonished, and not less exasperated, by the march of Sphodrias, than
-the Athenians themselves; adding, by way of confirmation, that had
-they been really privy to any design of seizing the Peiræus, they
-would have taken care not to let themselves be found in the city,
-and in their ordinary lodging at the house of the proxenus, where
-of course their persons would be at once seized. They concluded by
-assuring the Athenians, that Sphodrias would not only be indignantly
-disavowed, but punished capitally, at Sparta. And their reply was
-deemed so satisfactory, that they were allowed to depart; while an
-Athenian embassy was sent to Sparta, to demand the punishment of the
-offending general.[209]
-
-  [209] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24.
-
-The Ephors immediately summoned Sphodrias home to Sparta, to take
-his trial on a capital charge. So much did he himself despair of
-his case, that he durst not make his appearance; while the general
-impression was, both at Sparta and elsewhere, that he would certainly
-be condemned. Nevertheless, though thus absent and undefended, he was
-acquitted, purely through private favor and esteem for his general
-character. He was of the party of Kleombrotus, so that all the
-friends of that prince espoused his cause, as a matter of course.
-But as he was of the party opposed to Agesilaus, his friends dreaded
-that the latter would declare against him, and bring about his
-condemnation. Nothing saved Sphodrias except the peculiar intimacy
-between his son Kleonymus and Archidamus son of Agesilaus. The
-mournful importunity of Archidamus induced Agesilaus, when this
-important cause was brought before the Senate of Sparta, to put aside
-his judicial conviction, and give his vote in the following manner:
-“To be sure, Sphodrias is guilty; upon that there cannot be two
-opinions. Nevertheless, we cannot put to death a man like him, who,
-as boy, youth, and man, has stood unblemished in all Spartan honor.
-Sparta cannot part with soldiers like Sphodrias.[210]” The friends
-of Agesilaus, following this opinion and coinciding with those of
-Kleombrotus, ensured a favorable verdict. And it is remarkable,
-that Etymoklês himself, who as envoy at Athens had announced as a
-certainty that Sphodrias would be put to death,—as senator and friend
-of Agesilaus voted for his acquittal.[211]
-
-  [210] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 32. Ἐκεῖνός γε (Ἀγησίλαος) πρὸς πάντας
-  ὅσοις διείλεκται, ταῦτὰ λέγει· Μὴ ἀδικεῖν μὲν Σφοδρίαν ἀδύνατον
-  εἶναι· ὅστις μέντοι, παῖς τε ὢν καὶ παιδίσκος καὶ ἡβῶν, πάντα τὰ
-  καλὰ ποιῶν διετέλεσε, χαλεπὸν εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἀποκτιννύναι·
-  τὴν γὰρ Σπάρτην τοιούτων δεῖσθαι στρατιωτῶν.
-
-  Xenophon explains at some length (v, 4, 25-33) and in a very
-  interesting manner, both the relations between Kleonymus and
-  Archidamus, and the appeal of Archidamus to his father. The
-  statement has all the air of being derived from personal
-  knowledge, and nothing but the fear of prolixity hinders me from
-  giving it in full.
-
-  Compare Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 25; Diodor. xv, 29.
-
-  [211] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 22-32.
-
-This remarkable incident (which comes to us from a witness not merely
-philo-Laconian, but also personally intimate with Agesilaus) shows
-how powerfully the course of justice at Sparta was overruled by
-private sympathy and interests,—especially, those of the two kings.
-It especially illustrates what has been stated in a former chapter
-respecting the oppressions exercised by the Spartan harmosts and the
-dekadarchies, for which no redress was attainable at Sparta. Here
-was a case where not only the guilt of Sphodrias stood confessed,
-but in which also his acquittal was sure to be followed by a war
-with Athens. If, under such circumstances, the Athenian demand for
-redress was overruled by the favor of the two kings, what chance
-was there of any justice to the complaint of a dependent city, or
-an injured individual, against the harmost? The contrast between
-Spartan and Athenian proceeding is also instructive. Only a few days
-before, the Athenians condemned, at the instance of Sparta, their two
-generals who had without authority lent aid to the Theban exiles.
-In so doing, the Athenian dikastery enforced the law against clear
-official misconduct,—and that, too, in a case where their sympathies
-went along with the act, though their fear of a war with Sparta was
-stronger. But the most important circumstance to note is, that at
-Athens there is neither private influence, nor kingly influence,
-capable of overruling the sincere judicial conscience of a numerous
-and independent dikastery.
-
-The result of the acquittal of Sphodrias must have been well known
-beforehand to all parties at Sparta. Even by the general voice
-of Greece, the sentence was denounced as iniquitous.[212] But
-the Athenians, who had so recently given strenuous effect to the
-remonstrances of Sparta against their own generals, were stung by
-it to the quick; and only the more stung, in consequence of the
-extraordinary compliments to Sphodrias on which the acquittal was
-made to turn. They immediately contracted hearty alliance with
-Thebes, and made vigorous preparations for war against Sparta both
-by land and sea. After completing the fortifications of Peiræus, so
-as to place it beyond the reach of any future attempt, they applied
-themselves to the building of new ships of war, and to the extension
-of their naval ascendency, at the expense of Sparta.[213]
-
-  [212] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 24.
-
-  [213] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 34-63.
-
-From this moment, a new combination began in Grecian politics. The
-Athenians thought the moment favorable to attempt the construction
-of a new confederacy, analogous to the Confederacy of Delos, formed
-a century before; the basis on which had been reared the formidable
-Athenian empire, lost at the close of the Peloponnesian war. Towards
-such construction there was so far a tendency, that Athens had
-already a small body of maritime allies; while rhetors like Isokrates
-(in his Panegyrical Discourse, published two years before) had been
-familiarizing the public mind with larger ideas. But the enterprise
-was now pressed with the determination and vehemence of men smarting
-under recent insult. The Athenians had good ground to build upon;
-since, while the discontent against the ascendency of Sparta was
-widely spread, the late revolution in Thebes had done much to lessen
-that sentiment of fear upon which such ascendency chiefly rested. To
-Thebes, the junction with Athens was preëminently welcome, and her
-leaders gladly enrolled their city as a constituent member of the
-new confederacy.[214] They cheerfully acknowledged the presidency of
-Athens,—reserving, however, tacitly or expressly, their own rights
-as presidents of the Bœotian federation, as soon as that could be
-reconstituted; which reconstitution was at this moment desirable even
-for Athens, seeing that the Bœotian towns were now dependent allies
-of Sparta under harmosts and oligarchies.
-
-  [214] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 34; Xen. de Vectigal. v, 7; Isokrates,
-  Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 20, 23, 37; Diodor. xv, 29.
-
-The Athenians next sent envoys round to the principal islands and
-maritime cities in the Ægean, inviting all of them to an alliance
-on equal and honorable terms. The principles were in the main the
-same as those upon which the confederacy of Delos had been formed
-against the Persians, almost a century before. It was proposed that
-a congress of deputies should meet at Athens, one from each city,
-small as well as great, each with one vote; that Athens should be
-president, yet each individual city autonomous; that a common fund
-should be raised, with a common naval force, through assessment
-imposed by this congress upon each, and applied as the same authority
-might prescribe; the general purpose being defined to be, maintenance
-of freedom and security from foreign aggression, to each confederate,
-by the common force of all. Care was taken to banish as much as
-possible those associations of tribute and subjection which rendered
-the recollection of the former Athenian empire unpopular.[215]
-And as there were many Athenian citizens, who, during those times
-of supremacy, had been planted out as kleruchs or out-settlers in
-various dependencies, but had been deprived of their properties at
-the close of the war,—it was thought necessary to pass a formal
-decree,[216] renouncing and barring all revival of these suspended
-rights. It was farther decreed that henceforward no Athenian should
-on any pretence hold property, either in house or land, in the
-territory of any one of the confederates; neither by purchase, nor
-as security for money lent, nor by any other mode of acquisition.
-Any Athenian infringing this law, was rendered liable to be informed
-against before the synod; who, on proof of the fact, were to deprive
-him of the property,—half of it going to the informer, half to the
-general purposes of the confederacy.
-
-  [215] The contribution was now called σύνταξις, not φόρος;
-  see Isokrates, De Pace, s. 37-46; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7;
-  Harpokration, v. Σύνταξις.
-
-  Plutarch, De Fortunâ Athen. p. 351. ἰσόψηφον αὐτοῖς τὴν Ἑλλάδα
-  κατέστησαν.
-
-  [216] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 47. Καὶ ~τῶν μὲν κτημάτων
-  τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν ἀπέστητε~, βουλόμενοι τὴν συμμαχίαν ὡς
-  μεγίστην ποιῆσαι, etc.
-
-  Diodor. xv, 28, 29. Ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ καὶ ~τὰς γενομένας κληρουχίας
-  ἀποκαταστῆσαι τοῖς πρότερον κυρίοις γεγονόσι~, καὶ νόμον ἔθεντο
-  μηδένα τῶν Ἀθηναίων γεωργεῖν ἐκτὸς τῆς Ἀττικῆς. Διὰ δὲ ταύτης
-  τῆς φιλανθρωπίας ἀνακτησάμενοι τὴν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εὔνοιαν,
-  ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἰδίαν ἡγεμονίαν.
-
-  Isokrates and Diodorus speak loosely of this vote, in language
-  which might make us imagine that it was one of distinct
-  restitution, giving back property _actually enjoyed_. But the
-  Athenians had never actually regained the outlying private
-  property lost at the close of the war, though they had much
-  desired it, and had cherished hopes that a favorable turn of
-  circumstances might enable them to effect the recovery. As the
-  recovery, if effected, would be at the cost of those whom they
-  were now soliciting as allies, the public and formal renunciation
-  of such rights was a measure of much policy, and contributed
-  greatly to appease uneasiness in the islands; though in point of
-  fact nothing was given up except rights to property not really
-  enjoyed.
-
-  An Inscription has recently been discovered at Athens, recording
-  the original Athenian decree, of which the main provisions
-  are mentioned in my text. It bears date in the archonship of
-  Nausinikus. It stands, with the restorations of M. Boeckh
-  (fortunately a portion of it has been found in tolerably good
-  preservation), in the Appendix to the new edition of his
-  work,—“Über die Staats-haushaltung der Athener—Verbesserungen und
-  Nachträge zu den drei Banden der Staats-haushaltung der Athener,”
-  p. xx.
-
-  Ἀπὸ δὲ Ναυσινίκου ἄρχοντος μὴ ἐξεῖναι μήτε ἰδίᾳ μήτε δημοσίᾳ
-  Ἀθηναίων μηδενὶ ἐγκτήσασθαι ἐν ταῖς τῶν συμμάχων χώραις μήτε
-  οἰκίαν μήτε χώριον, μήτε πριαμένῳ, μήτε ὑποθεμένῳ, μήτε ἄλλῳ
-  τρόπῳ μηδενί. Ἐὰν δέ τις ὠνῆται ἢ κτᾶται ἢ τίθηται τρόπῳ ὁτῳοῦν,
-  ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλομένῳ τῶν συμμάχων φῆναι πρὸς τοὺς συνέδρους τῶν
-  συμμάχων. Οἱ δὲ σύνεδροι ἀπο- -μενοι ἀποδόντων [τὸ μὲν ἥ]μισυ
-  τῷ φῄναντι, τὸ δὲ ἄ[λλο κοιν]ὸν ἔστω τῶν συνμμάχων. Ἐὰν δέ τις
-  [ἴῃ] ἐπὶ πολέμῳ ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιησαμένους τὴν συμμαχίαν, ἢ κατὰ γῆν
-  ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν, βοηθεῖν Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τούτοις καὶ
-  κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. Ἐὰν δέ
-  τις εἴπῃ ἢ ἐπιψηφίσῃ, ἢ ἄρχων ἢ ἰδιώτης, παρὰ τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα,
-  ὡς λύειν τι δεῖ τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ψηφίσματι εἰρημένων, ὑπαρχέτω μὲν
-  αὐτῷ ἀτίμῳ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημόσια ἔστω καὶ τῆς θεοῦ
-  τὸ ἐπιδέκατον· καὶ κρινέσθω ἐν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ὡς
-  διαλύων τὴν συμμαχίαν. Ζημιούντων δὲ αὐτὸν θανάτῳ ἢ φυγῇ ὅπου
-  Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι κρατοῦσι. Ἐὰν δὲ θανάτῳ τιμήθῃ, μὴ
-  ταφήτω ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ μηδὲ ἐν τῇ τῶν συμμάχων.
-
-  Then follows a direction, that the Secretary of the Senate of
-  Five Hundred shall inscribe the decree on a column of stone,
-  and place it by the side of the statue of Zeus Eleutherius;
-  with orders to the Treasurers of the goddess to disburse sixty
-  drachmas for the cost of so doing.
-
-  It appears that there is annexed to this Inscription a list of
-  such cities as had already joined the confederacy, together with
-  certain other names added afterwards, of cities which joined
-  subsequently. The Inscription itself directs such list to be
-  recorded,—εἰς δὲ τὴν στήλην ταύτην ἀναγράφειν τῶν τε οὐσῶν πόλεων
-  συμμαχίδων τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ ἥτις ἂν ἄλλη σύμμαχος γίγνηται.
-
-  Unfortunately M. Boeckh has not annexed this list, which,
-  moreover, he states to have been preserved only in a very partial
-  and fragmentary condition. He notices only, as contained in it,
-  the towns of Poiessa and Korêsus in the island of Keos,—and
-  Antissa and Eresus in Lesbos; all four as autonomous communities.
-
-Such were the liberal principles of confederacy now proposed by
-Athens,—who, as a candidate for power, was straightforward and
-just, like the Herodotean Deiokês,[217]—and formally ratified, as
-well by the Athenians as by the general voice of the confederate
-deputies assembled within their walls. The formal decree and compact
-of alliance was inscribed on a stone column and placed by the side
-of the statue of Zeus Eleutherius or the Liberator; a symbol, of
-enfranchisement from Sparta accomplished, as well as of freedom to
-be maintained against Persia and other enemies.[218] Periodical
-meetings of the confederate deputies were provided to be held (how
-often, we do not know) at Athens, and the synod was recognized as
-competent judge of all persons, even Athenian citizens, charged with
-treason against the confederacy. To give fuller security to the
-confederates generally, it was provided in the original compact, that
-if any Athenian citizen should either speak, or put any question to
-the vote, in the Athenian assembly, contrary to the tenor of that
-document,—he should be tried before the synod for treason; and
-that, if found guilty, he might be condemned by them to the severest
-punishment.
-
-  [217] Herodot. i, 96. Ὁ δὲ, οἷα δὴ μνεώμενος ἀρχὴν, ἰθύς τε καὶ
-  δίκαιος ἦν.
-
-  [218] This is the sentiment connected with Ζεὺς
-  Ἐλευθέριος,—Pausanias the victor of Platæa, offers to Zeus
-  Eleutherius a solemn sacrifice and thanksgiving immediately
-  after the battle, in the agora of the town (Thucyd. ii, 71). So
-  the Syracusans immediately after the expulsion of the Gelonian
-  dynasty (Diodor. xi, 72)—and Mæandrius at Samos (Herodot. iii,
-  142).
-
-Three Athenian leaders stood prominent as commissioners in the
-first organization of the confederacy, and in the dealings with
-those numerous cities whose junction was to be won by amicable
-inducement,—Chabrias, Timotheus son of Konon, and Kallistratus.[219]
-
-  [219] Diodor. xv, 29.
-
-The first of the three is already known to the reader. He and
-Iphikrates were the most distinguished warriors whom Athens numbered
-among her citizens. But not having been engaged in any war, since
-the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B.C., she had had no need of their
-services; hence both of them had been absent from the city during
-much of the last nine years, and Iphikrates seems still to have
-been absent. At the time when that peace was concluded, Iphikrates
-was serving in the Hellespont and Thrace, Chabrias with Evagoras
-in Cyprus; each having been sent thither by Athens at the head of
-a body of mercenary peltasts. Instead of dismissing their troops,
-and returning to Athens as peaceful citizens, it was not less
-agreeable to the military tastes of these generals, than conducive
-to their importance and their profit, to keep together their bands,
-and to take foreign service. Accordingly, Chabrias had continued
-in service first in Cyprus, next with the native Egyptian king
-Akoris. The Persians, against whom he served, found his hostility so
-inconvenient, that Pharnabazus demanded of the Athenians to recall
-him, on pain of the Great King’s displeasure; and requested at the
-same time that Iphikrates might be sent to aid the Persian satraps
-in organizing a great expedition against Egypt. The Athenians, to
-whom the goodwill of Persia was now of peculiar importance, complied
-on both points; recalled Chabrias, who thus became disposable for
-the Athenian service,[220] and despatched Iphikrates to take command
-along with the Persians.
-
-  [220] Diodor. xv, 29.
-
-Iphikrates, since the peace of Antalkidas, had employed his peltasts
-in the service of the kings of Thrace: first of Seuthes, near the
-shores of the Propontis, whom he aided in the recovery of certain
-lost dominions,—next of Kotys, whose favor he acquired, and whose
-daughter he presently married.[221] Not only did he enjoy great
-scope for warlike operations and plunder, among the “butter-eating
-Thracians,”[222]—but he also acquired, as dowry, a large stock of
-such produce as Thracian princes had at their disposal, together
-with a boon even more important,—a seaport village not far from the
-mouth of the Hebrus, called Drys, where he established a fortified
-post, and got together a Grecian colony dependent on himself.[223]
-Miltiades, Alkibiades, and other eminent Athenians had done the same
-thing before him; though Xenophon had refused a similar proposition
-when made to him by the earlier Seuthes.[224] Iphikrates thus became
-a great man in Thrace, yet by no means abandoning his connection with
-Athens, but making his position in each subservient to his importance
-in the other. While he was in a situation to favor the projects of
-Athenian citizens for mercantile and territorial acquisitions in the
-Chersonese and other parts of Thrace,—he could also lend the aid of
-Athenian naval and military art, not merely to princes in Thrace,
-but to others even beyond those limits,—since we learn that Amyntas
-king of Macedonia became so attached or indebted to him as to adopt
-him for his son.[225] When sent by the Athenians to Persia, at the
-request of Pharnabazus (about 378 B.C. apparently), Iphikrates had
-fair ground for anticipating that a career yet more lucrative was
-opening before him.[226]
-
-  [221] Cornel. Nepos, Iphicrates, c. 2; Chabrias, c. 2, 3.
-
-  [222] See an interesting Fragment (preserved by Athenæus, iv,
-  p. 131) of the comedy called _Protesilaus_—by the Athenian poet
-  Anaxandrides (Meineke, Comic. Græc. Frag. iii, p. 182). It
-  contains a curious description of the wedding of Iphikrates with
-  the daughter of Kotys in Thrace; enlivened by an abundant banquet
-  and copious draughts of wine given to crowds of Thracians in the
-  market-place:—
-
-      δειπνεῖν δ’ ~ἄνδρας βουτυροφάγας~
-      αὐχμηροκόμας μυριοπληθεῖς, etc.,
-
-  brazen vessels as large as wine vats, full of broth,—Kotys
-  himself girt round, and serving the broth in a golden basin,
-  then going about to taste all the bowls of wine and water ready
-  mixed, until he was himself the first man intoxicated. Iphikrates
-  brought from Athens several of the best players on the harp and
-  flute.
-
-  The distinction between the _butter_ eaten, or rubbed on the
-  skin, by the Thracians, and the _olive-oil_ habitually consumed
-  in Greece, deserves notice. The word αὐχμηροκόμας seems to
-  indicate the absence of those scented unguents which, at the
-  banquet of Greeks, would have been applied to the hair of the
-  guests, giving to it a shining gloss and moisture. It appears
-  that the Lacedæmonian women, however, sometimes anointed
-  themselves with butter, and not with oil; see Plutarch, adv.
-  Koloten, p. 1109 B.
-
-  The number of warlike stratagems in Thrace, ascribed to
-  Iphikrates by Polyænus and other Tactic writers, indicates that
-  his exploits there were renowned as well as long-continued.
-
-  [223] Theopomp. Fragm. 175, ed. Didot; Demosth. cont. Aristokrat.
-  p. 664.
-
-  [224] Xenoph. Anab. vii, 2, 38; vii, 5, 8; vii, 6, 43. Xen.
-  Hellen. i, 5, 17; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 36.
-
-  See also a striking passage (in Lysias Orat. xxviii, cont.
-  Ergokl. s. 5) about the advice given to Thrasybulus by a
-  discontented fellow-citizen, to seize Byzantium, marry the
-  daughter of Seuthes, and defy Athens.
-
-  [225] Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 13. p. 249.
-
-  At what time this adoption took place, we cannot distinctly
-  make out; Amyntas died in 370 B.C., while from 378-371 B.C.,
-  Iphikrates seems to have been partly on service with the Persian
-  satraps, partly in command of the Athenian fleet in the Ionian
-  Sea (see Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, etc. ch. 4). Therefore, the
-  adoption took place at some time between 387-378 B.C.; perhaps
-  after the restoration of Amyntas to his maritime dominions by
-  the Lacedæmonian expedition against Olynthus—382-380 B.C.
-  Amyntas was so weak and insecure, from the Thessalians, and
-  other land-neighbors (see Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s.
-  112), that it was much to his advantage to cultivate the favor
-  of a warlike Athenian established on the Thracian coast, like
-  Iphikrates.
-
-  [226] From these absences of men like Iphikrates and Chabrias,
-  a conclusion has been drawn severely condemning the Athenian
-  people. They were so envious and ill-tempered (it has been said),
-  that none of their generals could live with comfort at Athens;
-  all lived abroad as they could. Cornelius Nepos (Chabrias, c. 3)
-  makes the remark, borrowed originally from Theopompus (Fr. 117,
-  ed. Didot), and transcribed by many modern commentators as if
-  it were exact and literal truth—“Hoc Chabrias nuntio (i. e. on
-  being recalled from Egypt, in consequence of the remonstrance of
-  Pharnabazus) Athenas rediit neque ibi diutius est moratus quam
-  fuit necesse. Non enim libenter erat ante oculos civium suorum,
-  quod et vivebat laute, et indulgebat sibi liberalius, quam ut
-  invidiam vulgi posset effugere. Est enim hoc commune vitium in
-  magnis liberisque civitatibus, ut invidia gloriæ comes sit, et
-  libenter de his detrahant, quos eminere videant altius; neque
-  animo æquo pauperes alienam opulentium intuentur fortunam. Itaque
-  Chabrias, quoad ei licebat, plurimum aberat. Neque vero solus
-  ille aberat Athenis libenter, sed omnes fere principes fecerunt
-  idem, quod tantum se ab invidiâ putabant abfuturos, quantum a
-  conspectu suorum recessissent. Itaque Conon plurimum Cypri vixit,
-  Iphicrates in Thraciâ, Timotheus Lesbi, Chares in Sigeo.”
-
-  That the people of Athens, among other human frailties, had their
-  fair share of envy and jealousy, is not to be denied; but that
-  these attributes belonged to them in a marked or peculiar manner,
-  cannot (in my judgment) be shown by any evidence extant,—and most
-  assuredly is not shown by the evidence here alluded to.
-
-  “Chabrias was fond of a life of enjoyment and luxurious
-  indulgence.” If instead of being an Athenian, he had been a
-  Spartan, he would undoubtedly have been compelled to expatriate
-  in order to gratify this taste; for it was the express drift and
-  purpose of the Spartan discipline, not to equalize property,
-  but to equalize the habits, enjoyments, and personal toils,
-  of the rich and poor. This is a point which the admirers of
-  Lykurgus,—Xenophon and Plutarch,—attest not less clearly than
-  Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, and others. If then it were
-  considered a proof of envy and ill-temper, to debar rich men
-  from spending their money in procuring enjoyments, we might
-  fairly consider the reproach as made out against Lykurgus and
-  Sparta. Not so against Athens. There was no city in Greece
-  where the means of luxurious and comfortable living were more
-  abundantly exhibited for sale, nor where a rich man was more
-  perfectly at liberty to purchase them. Of this the proofs are
-  everywhere to be found. Even the son of this very Chabrias,
-  Ktesippus, who inherited the appetite for enjoyment, without the
-  greater qualities of his father,—found the means of gratifying
-  his appetite so unfortunately easy at Athens, that he wasted
-  his whole substance in such expenses (Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7;
-  Athenæus, iv, p. 165). And Chares was even better liked at Athens
-  in consequence of his love of enjoyment and license,—if we are to
-  believe another Fragment (238) of the same Theopompus.
-
-  The allegation of Theopompus and Nepos, therefore, is neither
-  true as matter of fact, nor sufficient, if it had been true, to
-  sustain the hypothesis of a malignant Athenian public, with which
-  they connect it. Iphikrates and Chabrias did not stay away from
-  Athens because they loved enjoyments or feared the envy of their
-  countrymen; but because both of them were large gainers by doing
-  so, in importance, in profit, and in tastes. Both of them were
-  men πολεμικοὶ καὶ φιλοπόλεμοι ἐσχάτως (to use an expression of
-  Xenophon respecting the Lacedæmonian Klearchus—Anab. ii, 6, 1);
-  both of them loved war and had great abilities for war,—qualities
-  quite compatible with strong appetite for enjoyment; while
-  neither of them had either taste or talent for the civil routine
-  and debate of Athens when at peace. Besides, each of them was
-  commander of a body of peltasts, through whose means he could
-  obtain lucrative service as well as foreign distinction; so that
-  we can assign a sufficient reason why both of them preferred to
-  be absent from Athens during most part of the nine years that
-  the peace of Antalkidas continued. Afterwards, Iphikrates was
-  abroad three or four years, in service with the Persian satraps,
-  by order of the Athenians; Chabrias also went a long time
-  afterwards, again on foreign service, to Egypt, at the same time
-  when the Spartan king Agesilaus was there (yet without staying
-  long away, since we find him going out on command from Athens
-  to the Chersonese in 359-358 B.C.—Demosth. cont. Aristokr. p.
-  677, s. 204); but neither he nor Agesilaus, went there to escape
-  the mischief of envious countrymen. Demosthenes does not talk of
-  Iphikrates as being uncomfortable in Athens, or anxious to get
-  out of it; see Orat. cont. Meidiam, p. 535, s. 83.
-
-  Again, as to the case of Konon and his residence in Cyprus; it
-  is truly surprising to see this fact cited as an illustration of
-  Athenian jealousy or ill-temper. Konon went to Cyprus immediately
-  after the disaster of Ægospotami, and remained there, or remained
-  away from Athens, for eleven years (405-393 B.C.) until the
-  year after his victory at Knidus. It will be recollected that
-  he was one of the six Athenian generals who commanded the fleet
-  at Ægospotami. That disaster, while it brought irretrievable
-  ruin upon Athens, was at the same time such as to brand with
-  well-merited infamy the generals commanding. Konon was so far
-  less guilty than his colleagues, as he was in a condition to
-  escape with eight ships when the rest were captured. But he could
-  not expect, and plainly did not expect, to be able to show his
-  face again in Athens, unless he could redeem the disgrace by some
-  signal fresh service. He nobly paid this debt to his country,
-  by the victory of Knidus in 394 B.C.; and then came back the
-  year afterwards, to a grateful and honorable welcome at Athens.
-  About a year or more after this, he went out again as envoy to
-  Persia in the service of his country. He was there seized and
-  imprisoned by the satrap Tiribazus, but contrived to make his
-  escape, and died at Cyprus, as it would appear, about 390 B.C.
-  Nothing therefore can be more unfounded than the allegation of
-  Theopompus, “that Konon lived abroad at Cyprus, because he was
-  afraid of undeserved ill-temper from the public at Athens.” For
-  what time Timotheus may have lived at Lesbos, we have no means of
-  saying. But from the year 370 B.C. down to his death, we hear of
-  him so frequently elsewhere, in the service of his country, that
-  his residence cannot have been long.
-
-Iphikrates being thus abroad, the Athenians joined with Chabrias, in
-the mission and measures for organizing their new confederacy, two
-other colleagues, of whom we now hear for the first time—Timotheus
-son of Konon, and Kallistratus the most celebrated orator of
-his time.[227] The abilities of Kallistratus were not military
-at all; while Timotheus and Chabrias were men of distinguished
-military merit. But in acquiring new allies and attracting deputies
-to her proposed congress, Athens stood in need of persuasive
-appeal, conciliatory dealing, and substantial fairness in all
-her propositions, not less than of generalship. We are told that
-Timotheus, doubtless as son of the liberator Konon, from the
-recollections of the battle of Knidus—was especially successful in
-procuring new adhesions; and probably Kallistratus,[228] going round
-with him to the different islands, contributed by his eloquence
-not a little to the same result. On their invitation, many cities
-entered as confederates.[229] At this time (as in the earlier
-confederacy of Delos) all who joined must have been unconstrained
-members. And we may understand the motives of their junction, when
-we read the picture drawn by Isokrates (in 380 B.C.) of the tyranny
-of the Persians on the Asiatic mainland, threatening, to absorb the
-neighboring islands. Not only was there now a new basis of imposing
-force, presented by Athens and Thebes in union—but there was also
-a wide-spread hatred of imperial Sparta, aggravated since her
-perversion of the pretended boon of autonomy, promised by the peace
-of Antalkidas; and the conjunction of these sentiments caused the
-Athenian mission of invitation to be extremely successful. All the
-cities in Eubœa (except Histiæa, at the north of the island)—as well
-as Chios, Mitylênê, Byzantium, and Rhodes—the three former of whom
-had continued favorably inclined to Athens ever since the peace of
-Antalkidas,[230]—all entered into the confederacy. An Athenian fleet
-under Chabrias, sailing among the Cyclades and the other islands of
-the Ægean, aided in the expulsion of the Lacedæmonian harmosts,[231]
-together with their devoted local oligarchies, wherever they still
-subsisted; and all the cities thus liberated became equal members of
-the newly-constituted congress at Athens. After a certain interval,
-there came to be not less than seventy cities, many of them
-separately powerful, which sent deputies to it;[232] an aggregate
-sufficient to intimidate Sparta, and even to flatter Athens with the
-hope of restoration to something like her former lustre.
-
-  [227] Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 40, p. 283.
-
-  [228] The employment of the new word συντάξεις, instead
-  of the unpopular term φόρους, is expressly ascribed to
-  Kallistratus,—Harpokration in Voce.
-
-  [229] Isokrates gives the number twenty-four cities (Or. xv,
-  Permut. s. 120). So also Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. s. 15;
-  cont. Philokl. s. 17. The statement of Æschines, that Timotheus
-  brought seventy-five cities into the confederacy, appears large,
-  and must probably include all that that general either acquired
-  or captured (Æsch. Fals. Leg. c. 24, p. 263). Though I think
-  the number twenty-four probable enough, yet it is difficult
-  to identify what towns they were. For Isokrates, so far as he
-  particularizes, includes Samos, Sestos, and Krithôtê, which were
-  not acquired until many years afterwards,—in 366-365 B.C.
-
-  Neither of these orators distinguish between those cities which
-  Timotheus brought or persuaded to come into the confederacy, when
-  it was first formed (among which we may reckon Eubœa, or most
-  part of it—Plutarch, De Glor. Athen. p. 351 A.)—from those others
-  which he afterwards took by siege, like Samos.
-
-  [230] Isokrates, Or. xiv, Plataic. s. 30.
-
-  [231] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 20. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑφ’ ὑμῶν κατὰ
-  κράτος ἁλόντες εὐθὺς μὲν ἁρμοστοῦ καὶ δουλείας ἀπηλλάγησαν, νῦν
-  δὲ τοῦ συνεδρίου καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσιν, etc.
-
-  The adverb of time here used indicates about 372 B.C., about a
-  year before the battle of Leuktra.
-
-  [232] Diodor. xv, 30.
-
-The first votes both of Athens herself, and of the newly-assembled
-congress, threatened war upon the largest scale. A resolution was
-passed to equip twenty thousand hoplites, five hundred horsemen, and
-two hundred triremes.[233] Probably the insular and Ionic deputies
-promised each a certain contribution of money, but nothing beyond.
-We do not, however, know how much,—nor how far the engagements,
-large or small, were realized,—nor whether Athens was authorized to
-enforce execution against defaulters,—or was in circumstances to act
-upon such authority, if granted to her by the congress. It was in
-this way (as the reader will recollect from my fifth volume) that
-Athens had first rendered herself unpopular in the confederacy of
-Delos,—by enforcing the resolutions of the confederate synod against
-evasive or seceding members. It was in this way that what was at
-first a voluntary association had ultimately slid into an empire
-by constraint. Under the new circumstances of 378 B.C., we may
-presume that the confederates, though ardent and full of promises
-on first assembling at Athens, were even at the outset not exact,
-and became afterwards still less exact, in performance; yet that
-Athens was forced to be reserved in claiming, or in exercising,
-the right of enforcement. To obtain a vote of contribution by the
-majority of deputies present, was only the first step in the process;
-to obtain punctual payment, when the Athenian fleet was sent round
-for the purpose of collecting,—yet without incurring dangerous
-unpopularity,—was the second step, but by far the most doubtful and
-difficult.
-
-  [233] Diodor. xv, 29.
-
-  Polybius (ii, 62) states that the Athenians _sent out_ (not
-  merely, _voted_ to send out) ten thousand hoplites, and manned
-  one hundred triremes.
-
-  Both these authors treat the resolution as if it were taken by
-  the Athenians alone; but we must regard it in conjunction with
-  the newly-assembled synod of allies.
-
-It must, however, be borne in mind that at this moment, when the
-confederacy was first formed, both Athens and the other cities
-came together from a spontaneous impulse of hearty mutuality and
-coöperation. A few years afterwards, we shall find this changed;
-Athens selfish, and the confederates reluctant.[234] Inflamed, as
-well by their position of renovated headship, as by fresh animosity
-against Sparta, the Athenians made important efforts of their own,
-both financial and military. Equipping a fleet, which for the time
-was superior in the Ægean, they ravaged the hostile territory of
-Histiæa in Eubœa, and annexed to their confederacy the islands of
-Peparêthus and Skiathus. They imposed upon themselves also a direct
-property-tax; to what amount, however, we do not know.
-
-  [234] Xen. De Vectigal. v, 6. οὔκουν καὶ τότ’, ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν
-  ἀπεσχόμεθα, πάλιν ~ὑπὸ τῶν νησιωτῶν ἑκόντων προστάται~ τοῦ
-  ναυτικοῦ ἐγενόμεθα;
-
-  In the early years of this confederacy, votive offerings of
-  wreaths or crowns, in token of gratitude to Athens, were decreed
-  by the Eubœans, as well as by the general body of allies. These
-  crowns were still to be seen thirty years afterwards at Athens,
-  with commemorative inscriptions (Demosthen. cont. Androtion. c.
-  21, p. 616; cont. Timokrat. c. 41, p. 756).
-
-It was on the occasion of this tax that they introduced a great
-change in the financial arrangements and constitution of the city;
-a change conferring note upon the archonship of Nausinikus, (B.C.
-378-377). The great body of substantial Athenian citizens as well as
-metics were now classified anew for purposes of taxation. It will
-be remembered that even from the time of Solon[235] the citizens of
-Athens had been distributed into four classes,—Pentakosiomedimni,
-Hippeis, Zeugitæ, Thêtes,—distinguished from each other by the
-amount of their respective properties. Of these Solonian classes,
-the fourth, or poorest, paid no direct taxes; while the three former
-were taxed according to assessments representing a certain proportion
-of their actual property. The taxable property of the richest (or
-Pentakosiomedimni, including all at or above the minimum income of
-five hundred medimni of corn per annum) was entered in the tax-book
-at a sum equal to twelve times their income; that of the Hippeis
-(comprising all who possessed between three hundred and five hundred
-medimni of annual income) at ten times their income; that of the
-Zeugitæ (or possessors of an annual income between two hundred and
-three hundred medimni) at five times their income. A medimnus of
-corn was counted as equivalent to a drachma; which permitted the
-application of this same class-system to movable property as well
-as to land. So that, when an actual property-tax (or _eisphora_)
-was imposed, it operated as an equal or proportional tax, so far as
-regarded all the members of the same class; but as a graduated or
-progressive tax, upon all the members of the richer class as compared
-with those of the poorer.
-
-  [235] For the description of the Solonian census, see Vol. III,
-  Ch. xi, p. 117, of this History.
-
-The three Solonian property-classes above named appear to have
-lasted, though probably not without modifications, down to the
-close of the Peloponnesian war; and to have been in great part
-preserved, after the renovation of the democracy in B.C. 403,
-during the archonship of Eukleides.[236] Though eligibility to the
-great offices of state had before that time ceased to be dependent
-on pecuniary qualification, it was still necessary to possess some
-means of distinguishing the wealthier citizens, not merely in case
-of direct taxation being imposed, but also because the liability to
-serve in liturgies or burdensome offices was consequent on a man’s
-enrolment as possessor of more than a given minimum of property. It
-seems, therefore, that the Solonian census, in its main principles
-of classification and graduation, was retained. Each man’s property
-being valued, he was ranged in one of three or more classes according
-to its amount. For each of the classes, a fixed proportion of taxable
-capital to each man’s property was assumed, and each was entered in
-the schedule, not for his whole property, but for the sum of taxable
-capital corresponding to his property, according to the proportion
-assumed. In the first or richest class, the taxable capital bore a
-greater ratio to the actual property than in the less rich; in the
-second, a greater ratio than in the third. The sum of all these items
-of taxable capital, in all the different classes, set opposite to
-each man’s name in the schedule, constituted the aggregate census
-of Attica; upon which all direct property-tax was imposed, in equal
-proportion upon every man.
-
-  [236] This is M. Boeckh’s opinion, seemingly correct, as far
-  as can be made out on a subject very imperfectly known (Public
-  Economy of Athens, B, iv, ch. 5).
-
-Respecting the previous modifications in the register of taxable
-property, or the particulars of its distribution into classes, which
-had been introduced in 403 B.C. at the archonship of Eukleides, we
-have no information. Nor can we make out how large or how numerous
-were the assessments of direct property-tax, imposed at Athens
-between that archonship and the archonship of Nausinikus in 378
-B.C. But at this latter epoch the register was again considerably
-modified, at the moment when Athens was bracing herself up for
-increased exertions. A new valuation was made of the property of
-every man possessing property to the amount of twenty-five minæ
-(or twenty-five hundred drachmæ) and upwards. Proceeding upon this
-valuation, every one was entered in the schedule for a sum of taxable
-capital equal to a given fraction of what he possessed. But this
-fraction was different in each of the different classes. How many
-classes there were, we do not certainly know; nor can we tell, except
-in reference to the lowest class taxed, what sum was taken as the
-minimum for any one of them. There could hardly have been less,
-however, than three classes, and there may probably have been four.
-But respecting the first or richest class, we know that each man was
-entered in the schedule for a taxable capital equal to one-fifth of
-his estimated property; and that possessors of fifteen talents were
-included in it. The father of Demosthenes died in this year, and the
-boy Demosthenes was returned by his guardians to the first class, as
-possessor of fifteen talents; upon which his name was entered on the
-schedule with a taxable capital of three talents set against him;
-being one-fifth of his actual property. The taxable capital of the
-second class was entered at a fraction less than one-fifth of their
-actual property (probably enough, one-sixth, the same as all the
-registered metics); that of the third, at a fraction still smaller;
-of the fourth (if there was a fourth), even smaller than the third.
-This last class descended down to the minimum of twenty-five minæ, or
-twenty-five hundred drachmæ; below which no account was taken.[237]
-
-  [237] Demosthen. cont. Aphob. i, p. 815, 816; cont. Aphob. ii, p.
-  836; cont. Aphob. de Perjur. p. 862. Compare Boeckh, Publ. Econ.
-  Ath. iv, 7.
-
-  In the exposition which M. Boeckh gives of the new
-  property-schedule introduced under the archonship of Nausinikus,
-  he inclines to the hypothesis of four distinct Classes, thus
-  distributed (p. 671 of the new edition of his Staats-haushaltung
-  der Athener):—
-
-  1. The first class included all persons who possessed property to
-  the value of twelve talents and upwards. They were entered on the
-  schedule, each for one-fifth, or twenty per cent. of his property.
-
-  2. The second class comprised all who possessed property to
-  the amount of six talents, but below twelve talents. Each was
-  enrolled in the schedule, for the amount of sixteen per cent.
-  upon his property.
-
-  3. The third class included all whose possessions amounted to the
-  value of two talents, but did not reach six talents. Each was
-  entered in the schedule at the figure of twelve per cent. upon
-  his property.
-
-  4. The fourth class comprised all, from the minimum of
-  twenty-five minæ, but below the maximum of two talents. Each was
-  entered in the schedule for the amount of eight per cent. upon
-  his property.
-
-  This detail rests upon no positive proof; but it serves to
-  illustrate the principle of distribution, and of graduation, then
-  adopted.
-
-Besides the taxable capitals of the citizens, thus graduated, the
-schedule also included those of the metics or resident aliens; who
-were each enrolled (without any difference of greater or smaller
-property, above twenty-five minæ) at a taxable capital equal to
-one-sixth of his actual property;[238] being a proportion less than
-the richest class of citizens, and probably equal to the second
-class in order of wealth. All these items summed up amounted to
-five thousand seven hundred and fifty or six thousand talents,[239]
-forming the aggregate schedule of taxable property; that is,
-something near about six thousand talents. A property-tax was no part
-of the regular ways and means of the state. It was imposed only on
-special occasions; and whenever it was imposed, it was assessed upon
-this schedule,—every man, rich or poor, being rated equally according
-to his taxable capital as there entered. A property-tax of one per
-cent. would thus produce sixty talents; two per cent., one hundred
-and twenty talents, etc. It is highly probable that the exertions of
-Athens during the archonship of Nausinikus, when this new schedule
-was first prepared, may have caused a property-tax to be then
-imposed, but we do not know to what amount.[240]
-
-  [238] Demosthen. cont. Androtion. p. 612, c. 17. τὸ ἑκτὸν μέρος
-  εἰσφέρειν μετὰ τῶν μετοίκων.
-
-  [239] Polybius states the former sum (ii, 62), Demosthenes the
-  latter (De Symmoriis, p. 183, c. 6). Boeckh however has shown,
-  that Polybius did not correctly conceive what the sum which he
-  stated really meant.
-
-  [240] I am obliged again, upon this point, to dissent from
-  M. Boeckh, who sets it down as positive matter of fact that
-  a property-tax of five per cent., amounting to three hundred
-  talents, was imposed and levied in the archonship of Nausinikus
-  (Publ. Econ. Ath. iv, 7, 8; p. 517-521, Eng. Transl.). The
-  evidence upon which this is asserted, is, a passage of
-  Demosthenes cont. Androtion. (p. 606. c. 14). Ὑμῖν ~παρὰ τὰς
-  εἰσφορὰς τὰς ἀπὸ Ναυσινίκου~, παρ’ ἴσως τάλαντα τριακόσια ἢ
-  μικρῷ πλείω, ἔλλειμμα τέτταρα καὶ δέκα ἐστὶ τάλαντα· ὧν ἑπτὰ
-  οὗτος (Androtion) εἰσέπραξεν. Now these words imply,—not that
-  a property-tax of about three hundred talents had been levied
-  or called for _during_ the archonship of Nausinikus, but—that
-  a total sum of three hundred talents, or thereabouts, had been
-  levied (or called for) by all the various property-taxes imposed
-  _from the archonship of Nausinikus down to the date of the
-  speech_. The oration was spoken about 355 B.C.; the archonship
-  of Nausinikus was in 378 B.C. What the speaker affirms,
-  therefore, is, that a sum of three hundred talents had been
-  levied or called for by all the various property-taxes imposed
-  between these two dates; and that the aggregate sum of arrears
-  due upon all of them, at the time when Androtion entered upon his
-  office, was fourteen talents.
-
-  Taylor, indeed, in his note, thinking that the sum of three
-  hundred talents is very small, as the aggregate of all
-  property-taxes imposed for twenty-three years, suggests that
-  it might be proper to read ~ἐπὶ~ Ναυσινίκου instead of ~ἀπὸ~
-  Ναυσινίκου; and I presume that M. Boeckh adopts that reading.
-  But it would be unsafe to found an historical assertion upon
-  such a change of text, even if the existing text were more
-  indefensible than it actually is. And surely the plural number
-  τὰς εἰσφορὰς proves that the orator has in view, not the single
-  property-tax imposed in the archonship of Nausinikus, but two
-  or more property-taxes, imposed at different times. Besides,
-  Androtion devoted himself to the collection of outstanding
-  arrears generally, in whatever year they might have accrued. He
-  would have no motive to single out those which had accrued in
-  the year 378 B.C.; moreover, those arrears would probably have
-  become confounded with others, long before 355 B.C. Demosthenes
-  selects the year of Nausinikus as his initial period, because it
-  was then that the new schedule and a new reckoning, began.
-
-Along with this new schedule of taxable capital, a new distribution
-of the citizens now took place into certain bodies called Symmories.
-As far as we can make out, on a very obscure subject, it seems that
-these Symmories were twenty in number, two to each tribe; that each
-contained sixty citizens, thus making one thousand two hundred in
-all; that these one thousand two hundred were the wealthiest citizens
-of the schedule,—containing, perhaps, the two first out of the four
-classes enrolled. Among these one thousand two hundred, however, the
-three hundred wealthiest stood out as a separate body; thirty from
-each tribe. These three hundred were the wealthiest men in the city,
-and were called “the leaders or chiefs of the Symmories.” The three
-hundred and the twelve hundred corresponded, speaking roughly, to
-the old Solonian classes of Pentakosiomedimni and Hippeis; of which
-latter class there had also been twelve hundred, at the beginning of
-the Peloponnesian war.[241] The liturgies, or burdensome and costly
-offices, were discharged principally by the Three Hundred, but partly
-also by the Twelve Hundred. It would seem that the former was a body
-essentially fluctuating, and that after a man had been in it for
-some time, discharging the burdens belonging to it, the Stratêgi
-or Generals suffered him to be mingled with the Twelve Hundred,
-and promoted one of the latter body to take his place in the Three
-Hundred. As between man and man, too, the Attic law always admitted
-the process called Antidosis, or Exchange of Property. Any citizen
-who believed himself to have been overcharged with costly liturgies,
-and that another citizen, as rich or richer than himself, had not
-borne his fair share,—might, if saddled with a new liturgy, require
-the other to undertake it in his place; and in case of refusal, might
-tender to him an exchange of properties, under an engagement that he
-would undertake the new charge, if the property of the other were
-made over to him.
-
-  [241] Respecting the Symmories, compare Boeckh,
-  Staats-haushaltung der Athener, iv, 9, 10; Schömann, Antiq. Jur.
-  Publ. Græcor. s. 78; Parreidt, De Symmoriis, p. 18 _seq._
-
-It is to be observed, that besides the twelve hundred wealthiest
-citizens who composed the Symmories, there were a more considerable
-number of less wealthy citizens not included in them, yet still
-liable to the property-tax; persons who possessed property from the
-minimum of twenty-five minæ, up to some maximum that we do not know,
-at which point the Symmories began,—and who corresponded, speaking
-loosely, to the third class or Zeugitæ of the Solonian census.
-The two Symmories of each tribe (comprising its one hundred and
-twenty richest members) superintended the property-register of each
-tribe, and collected the contributions due from its less wealthy
-registered members. Occasionally, when the state required immediate
-payment, the thirty richest men in each tribe (making up altogether
-the three hundred) advanced the whole sum of tax chargeable upon
-the tribe, having their legal remedy of enforcement against the
-other members for the recovery of the sum chargeable upon each. The
-richest citizens were thus both armed with rights and charged with
-duties, such as had not belonged to them before the archonship of
-Nausinikus. By their intervention (it was supposed) the schedule
-would be kept nearer to the truth as respects the assessment on each
-individual, while the sums actually imposed would be more immediately
-forthcoming, than if the state directly interfered by officers of
-its own. Soon after, the system of the Symmories was extended to the
-trierarchy; a change which had not at first been contemplated. Each
-Symmory had its chiefs, its curators, its assessors, acting under the
-general presidency of the Stratêgi. Twenty-five years afterwards, we
-also find Demosthenes (then about thirty years of age) recommending a
-still more comprehensive application of the same principle, so that
-men, money, ships, and all the means and forces of the state, might
-thus be parcelled into distinct fractions, and consigned to distinct
-Symmories, each with known duties of limited extent for the component
-persons to perform, and each exposed not merely to legal process,
-but also to loss of esteem, in the event of non-performance. It will
-rather appear, however, that, in practice, the system of Symmories
-came to be greatly abused, and to produce pernicious effects never
-anticipated.
-
-At present, however, I only notice this new financial and political
-classification introduced in 378 B.C., as one evidence of the ardor
-with which Athens embarked in her projected war against Sparta. The
-feeling among her allies, the Thebans, was no less determined. The
-government of Leontiades and the Spartan garrison had left behind
-it so strong an antipathy, that the large majority of citizens,
-embarking heartily in the revolution against them, lent themselves
-to all the orders of Pelopidas and his colleagues; who, on their
-part, had no other thought but to repel the common enemy. The Theban
-government now became probably democratical in form; and still more
-democratical in spirit, from the unanimous ardor pervading the
-whole mass. Its military force was put under the best training; the
-most fertile portion of the plain north of Thebes, from which the
-chief subsistence of the city came, was surrounded by a ditch and
-a palisade,[242] to repel the expected Spartan invasion; and the
-memorable Sacred Band was now for the first time organized. This was
-a brigade of three hundred hoplites, called the Lochus, or regiment
-of the city, as being consecrated to the defence of the Kadmeia, or
-acropolis.[243] It was put under constant arms and training, at the
-public expense, like the Thousand at Argos, of whom mention was made
-in my seventh volume.[244] It consisted of youthful citizens from the
-best families, distinguished for their strength and courage amidst
-the severe trials of the palæstra in Thebes, and was marshalled in
-such manner, that each pair of neighboring soldiers were at the same
-time intimate friends; so that the whole band were thus kept together
-by ties which no dangers could sever. At first its destination, under
-Gorgidas its commander (as we see by the select Three Hundred who
-fought in 424 B.C. at the battle of Delium),[245] was to serve as
-front rank men, for the general body of hoplites to follow. But from
-a circumstance to be mentioned presently, it came to be employed by
-Pelopidas and Epaminondas as a regiment by itself, and in a charge
-was then found irresistible.[246]
-
-  [242] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 38.
-
-  [243] Plutarch. Pelopid. c. 18, 19.
-
-  [244] Hist. of Greece. Vol. VII, ch. lv, p. 11.
-
-  [245] Diodor. xii, 70.
-
-  These pairs of neighbors who fought side by side at Delium, were
-  called Heniochi and Parabatæ,—Charioteers and Side Companions; a
-  name borrowed from the analogy of chariot-fighting, as described
-  in the Iliad and probably in many of the lost epic poems; the
-  charioteer being himself an excellent warrior, though occupied
-  for the moment with other duties,—Diomedes and Sthenelus,
-  Pandarus and Æneas, Patroklus and Automedon, etc.
-
-  [246] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18, 19.
-
-  Ὁ συνταχθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἐπαμινώνδου ἱερὸς λόχος (Hieronymus apud
-  Athenæum, xiii, p. 602 A.). There was a Carthaginian military
-  division which bore the same title, composed of chosen and
-  wealthy citizens, two thousand five hundred in number (Diodor.
-  xvi, 80).
-
-We must remark that the Thebans had always been good soldiers, both
-as hoplites and as cavalry. The existing enthusiasm, therefore, with
-the more sustained training, only raised good soldiers into much
-better. But Thebes was now blessed with another good fortune, such as
-had never yet befallen her. She found among her citizens a leader of
-the rarest excellence. It is now for the first time that Epaminondas,
-the son of Polymnis, begins to stand out in the public life of
-Greece. His family, poor rather than rich, was among the most ancient
-in Thebes, belonging to those Gentes called Sparti, whose heroic
-progenitors were said to have sprung from the dragon’s teeth sown
-by Kadmus.[247] He seems to have been now of middle age; Pelopidas
-was younger, and of a very rich family; yet the relations between
-the two were those of equal and intimate friendship, tested in a day
-of battle, wherein the two were ranged side by side as hoplites,
-and where Epaminondas had saved the life of his wounded friend, at
-the cost of several wounds, and the greatest possible danger, to
-himself.[248]
-
-  [247] Pausan. viii, 11, 5.
-
-  Dikæarchus, only one generation afterwards, complained that
-  he could not find out the name of the mother of Epaminondas
-  (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19).
-
-  [248] Plutarch, Pelop. c. 4; Pausan. ix, 13, 1. According to
-  Plutarch, Epaminondas had attained the age of forty years, before
-  he became publicly known (De Occult. Vivendo, p. 1129 C.).
-
-  Plutarch affirms that the battle (in which Pelopidas was
-  desperately wounded, and saved by Epaminondas) took place
-  at Mantinea, when they were fighting on the side of the
-  Lacedæmonians, under king Agesipolis, against the Arcadians; the
-  Thebans being at that time friends of Sparta, and having sent a
-  contingent to her aid.
-
-  I do not understand what battle Plutarch can here mean. The
-  Thebans were never so united with Sparta as to send any
-  contingent to her aid, after the capture of Athens (in 404 B.C.).
-  Most critics think that the war referred to by Plutarch, is, the
-  expedition conducted by Agesipolis against Mantinea, whereby the
-  city was broken up into villages—in 385 B.C.; see Mr. Clinton’s
-  Fasti Hellenici ad 385 B.C. But, in the first place, there cannot
-  have been any Theban contingent then assisting Agesipolis; for
-  Thebes was on terms unfriendly with Sparta,—and certainly was not
-  her ally. In the next place, there does not seem to have been any
-  battle, according to Xenophon’s account.
-
-  I therefore am disposed to question Plutarch’s account, as to
-  this alleged battle of Mantinea; though I think it probable that
-  Epaminondas may have saved the life of Pelopidas at some earlier
-  conflict, before the peace of Antalkidas.
-
-Epaminondas had discharged, with punctuality, those military and
-gymnastic duties which were incumbent on every Theban citizen.
-But we are told that in the gymnasia he studied to acquire the
-maximum of activity rather than of strength; the nimble movements
-of a runner and wrestler,—not the heavy muscularity, purchased in
-part by excessive nutriment, of the Bœotian pugilist.[249] He also
-learned music, vocal and instrumental, and dancing; by which, in
-those days, was meant, not simply the power of striking the lyre or
-blowing the flute, but all that belonged to the graceful, expressive,
-and emphatic management, either of the voice or of the body;
-rhythmical pronunciation, exercised by repetition of the poets,—and
-disciplined movements, for taking part in a choric festival with
-becoming consonance amidst a crowd of citizen performers. Of such
-gymnastic and musical training, the combination of which constituted
-an accomplished Grecian citizen, the former predominated at Thebes,
-the latter at Athens. Moreover, at Thebes the musical training
-was based more upon the flute (for the construction of which,
-excellent reeds grew near the Lake Kopaïs); at Athens more upon
-the lyre, which admitted of vocal accompaniment by the player. The
-Athenian Alkibiades[250] was heard to remark, when he threw away
-his flute in disgust, that flute-playing was a fit occupation for
-the Thebans, since they did not know how to speak; and in regard
-to the countrymen of Pindar[251] generally, the remark was hardly
-less true than contemptuous. On this capital point, Epaminondas
-formed a splendid exception. Not only had he learnt the lyre[252]
-as well as the flute from the best masters, but also, dissenting
-from his brother Kapheisias and his friend Pelopidas, he manifested
-from his earliest years an ardent intellectual impulse, which would
-have been remarkable even in an Athenian. He sought with eagerness
-the conversation of the philosophers within his reach, among whom
-were the Theban Simmias and the Tarentine Spintharus, both of
-them once companions of Sokrates; so that the stirring influence
-of the Sokratic method would thus find its way, partially and at
-second-hand, to the bosom of Epaminondas. As the relations between
-Thebes and Athens, ever since the close of the Peloponnesian war, had
-become more and more friendly, growing at length into alliance and
-joint war against the Spartans,—we may reasonably presume that he
-profited by teachers at the latter city as well as at the former. But
-the person to whom he particularly devoted himself, and whom he not
-only heard as a pupil, but tended almost as a son, during the close
-of an aged life,—was a Tarentine exile, named Lysis; a member of the
-Pythagorean brotherhood, who, from causes which we cannot make out,
-had sought shelter at Thebes, and dwelt there until his death.[253]
-With him, as well as with other philosophers, Epaminondas discussed
-all the subjects of study and inquiry then afloat. By perseverance
-in this course for some years, he not only acquired considerable
-positive instruction, but also became practised in new and enlarged
-intellectual combinations; and was, like Perikles,[254] emancipated
-from that timorous interpretation of nature, which rendered so many
-Grecian commanders the slaves of signs and omens. His patience as a
-listener, and his indifference to showy talk on his own account, were
-so remarkable, that Spintharus (the father of Aristoxenus), after
-numerous conversations with him, affirmed that he had never met with
-any one who understood more, or talked less.[255]
-
-  [249] Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 2; Plutarch, Apophth. Reg. p. 192
-  D.; Aristophan. Acharn. 872.
-
-  Compare the citations in Athenæus, x, p. 417. The perfection of
-  form required in the runner was also different from that required
-  in the wrestler (Xenoph. Memor. iii, 8, 4; iii, 10, 6).
-
-  [250] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 2.
-
-  [251] Pindar, Olymp. vi, 90.
-
-      ἀρχαῖον ὄνειδος—Βοιώτιον ὗν, etc.
-
-  [252] Aristoxenus mentions the flute, Cicero and Cornelius Nepos
-  the lyre (Aristoxen. Fr. 60, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. iv, p. 184;
-  Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i, 2, 4; Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 2).
-
-  [253] Aristoxenus, Frag. 11, ed. Didot; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr.
-  p. 583, Cicero, De Offic. i, 44, 155; Pausan. ix, 13, 1; Ælian,
-  V. H. iii, 17.
-
-  The statement (said to have been given by Aristoxenus, and copied
-  by Plutarch as well as by Jamblichus) that Lysis, who taught
-  Epaminondas, had been one of the persons actually present in
-  the synod of Pythagoreans at Kroton when Kylon burnt down the
-  house, and that he with another had been the only persons who
-  escaped—cannot be reconciled with chronology.
-
-  [254] Compare Diodor. xv, 52 with Plutarch, Perikles, c. 6, and
-  Plutarch, Demosthenes, c. 20.
-
-  [255] Plutarch, De Gen. Sokrat. p. 576 D. μετείληφε παιδείας
-  διαφόρου καὶ περιττῆς—(p. 585 D.) τὴν ἀρίστην τροφὴν ἐν
-  φιλοσοφίᾳ—(p. 592 F.) Σπίνθαρος ὁ Ταραντῖνος οὐκ ὀλίγον αὐτῷ
-  (Epaminondas) συνδιατρίψας ἐνταῦθα χρόνον, ἀεὶ δήπου λέγει,
-  μηδενί που τῶν καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρώπων ἐντετευχέναι, μήτε πλείονα
-  γιγνώσκοντι μήτε ἐλάττονα φθεγγομένῳ. Compare Cornel. Nepos,
-  Epamin. c. 3—and Plutarch, De Audiend. c. 3, p. 39 F.
-
-  We may fairly presume that this judgment of Spintharus was
-  communicated by him to his son Aristoxenus, from whom Plutarch
-  copied it; and we know that Aristoxenus in his writings mentioned
-  other particulars respecting Epaminondas (Athenæus, iv, p.
-  184). We see thus that Plutarch had access to good sources of
-  information respecting the latter. And as he had composed a life
-  of Epaminondas (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 28), though unfortunately
-  it has not reached us, we may be confident that he had taken
-  some pains to collect materials for the purpose, which materials
-  would naturally be employed in his dramatic dialogue, “De Genio
-  Socratis.” This strengthens our confidence in the interesting
-  statements which that dialogue furnishes respecting the
-  character of Epaminondas; as well as in the incidental allusions
-  interspersed among Plutarch’s other writings.
-
-Nor did such reserve proceed from any want of ready powers of
-expression. On the contrary, the eloquence of Epaminondas, when
-he entered upon his public career, was shown to be not merely
-preëminent among Thebans, but effective even against the best
-Athenian opponents.[256] But his disposition was essentially modest
-and unambitious, combined with a strong intellectual curiosity
-and a great capacity; a rare combination amidst a race usually
-erring on the side of forwardness and self-esteem. Little moved by
-personal ambition, and never cultivating popularity by unworthy
-means, Epaminondas was still more indifferent on the score of
-money. He remained in contented poverty to the end of his life,
-not leaving enough to pay his funeral expenses, yet repudiating
-not merely the corrupting propositions of foreigners, but also the
-solicitous tenders of personal friends;[257] though we are told
-that, when once serving the costly office of choregus, he permitted
-his friend Pelopidas to bear a portion of the expense.[258] As
-he thus stood exempt from two of the besetting infirmities which
-most frequently misguided eminent Greek statesmen, so there was a
-third characteristic not less estimable in his moral character;
-the gentleness of his political antipathies,—his repugnance to
-harsh treatment of conquered enemies,—and his refusal to mingle in
-intestine bloodshed. If ever there were men whose conduct seemed
-to justify unmeasured retaliation, it was Leontiades and his
-fellow-traitors. They had opened the doors of the Kadmeia to the
-Spartan Phœbidas, and had put to death the Theban leader Ismenias.
-Yet Epaminondas disapproved of the scheme of Pelopidas and the
-other exiles to assassinate them, and declined to take part in it;
-partly on prudential grounds, but partly, also, on conscientious
-scruples.[259] None of his virtues was found so difficult to imitate
-by his subsequent admirers, as this mastery over the resentful and
-vindictive passions.[260]
-
-  [256] Cornel. Nepos, Epaminond. c. 5; Plutarch, Præcept. Reip.
-  Gerend. p. 819 C. Cicero notices him as the only man with any
-  pretensions to oratorical talents, whom Thebes, Corinth, or Argos
-  had ever produced (Brutus, c. 13, 50).
-
-  [257] Plutarch (De Gen. Socr. p. 583, 584; Pelopid. c. 3; Fab.
-  Max. c. 27. Compar. Alcibiad. and Coriol. c. 4): Cornel. Nepos.
-  Epamin. c. 4.
-
-  [258] Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 1; Justin, vi, 8.
-
-  [259] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 576 F. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ, μὴ
-  πείθων ὡς οἴεται βέλτιον εἶναι ταῦτα μὴ πράσσειν· εἰκότως
-  ἀντιτείνει πρὸς ἃ μὴ πέφυκε, μηδὲ δοκιμάζει, παρακαλούμενος.
-
-  ... Ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ πείθει τοὺς πολλοὺς, ἀλλὰ ταύτην ὡρμήκαμεν τὴν
-  ὁδὸν, ἐᾷν αὐτὸν κελεύει φόνου καθαρὸν ὄντα καὶ ἀναίτιον ἐφεστᾶναι
-  τοῖς καιροῖς, μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου τῷ συμφέροντι προσοισόμενον.
-
-  Compare the same dialogue, p. 594 B.; and Cornelius Nepos,
-  Pelopidas, c. 4.
-
-  Isokrates makes a remark upon Evagoras of Salamis, which may
-  be well applied to Epaminondas; that the objectionable means,
-  without which the former could not have got possession of the
-  sceptre, were performed by others and not by him; while all the
-  meritorious and admirable functions of command were reserved for
-  Evagoras (Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 28).
-
-  [260] See the striking statements of Plutarch and Pausanias about
-  Philopœmen,—καίπερ Ἐπαμεινώνδου βουλόμενος εἶναι μάλιστα ζηλωτὴς,
-  τὸ δραστήριον καὶ συνετὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ χρημάτων ἀπαθὲς ἰσχυρῶς
-  ἐμιμεῖτο, τῷ δὲ πράῳ καὶ βαθεῖ καὶ φιλανθρώπῳ παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς
-  διαφορὰς ἐμμένειν οὐ δυνάμενος, δι’ ὀργὴν καὶ φιλονεικίαν, μᾶλλον
-  ἐδόκει στρατιωτικῆς ἢ πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς οἰκεῖος εἶναι. To the like
-  purpose, Pausanias, viii, 49, 2; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25:
-  Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 3—“patiens admirandum in modum.”
-
-Before Epaminondas could have full credit for these virtues, however,
-it was necessary that he should give proof of the extraordinary
-capacities for action with which they were combined, and that he
-should achieve something to earn that exclamation of praise which
-we shall find his enemy Agesilaus afterwards pronouncing, on seeing
-him at the head of the invading Theban army near Sparta,—“Oh! thou
-man of great deeds!”[261] In the year B.C. 379, when the Kadmeia
-was emancipated, he was as yet undistinguished in public life,
-and known only to Pelopidas with his other friends; among whom,
-too, his unambitious and inquisitive disposition was a subject of
-complaint as keeping him unduly in the background.[262] But the
-unparalleled phenomena of that year supplied a spur which overruled
-all backwardness, and smothered all rival inclinations. The Thebans,
-having just recovered their city by an incredible turn of fortune,
-found themselves exposed single-handed to the full attack of Sparta
-and her extensive confederacy. Not even Athens had yet declared
-in their favor, nor had they a single other ally. Under such
-circumstances, Thebes could only be saved by the energy of all her
-citizens,—the unambitious and philosophical as well as the rest. As
-the necessities of the case required such simultaneous devotion, so
-the electric shock of the recent revolution was sufficient to awaken
-enthusiasm in minds much less patriotic than that of Epaminondas.
-He was among the first to join the victorious exiles in arms, after
-the contest had been transferred from the houses of Archias and
-Leontiades to the open market-place; and he would probably have been
-among the first to mount the walls of the Kadmeia, had the Spartan
-harmost awaited an assault. Pelopidas being named Bœotarch, his
-friend Epaminondas was naturally placed among the earliest and most
-forward organizers of the necessary military resistance against the
-common enemy; in which employment his capacities speedily became
-manifest. Though at this moment almost an unknown man, he had
-acquired, in B.C. 371, seven years afterwards, so much reputation
-both as speaker and as general, that he was chosen as the expositor
-of Theban policy at Sparta, and trusted with the conduct of the
-battle of Leuktra, upon which the fate of Thebes hinged. Hence we
-may fairly conclude, that the well-planned and successful system of
-defence, together with the steady advance of Thebes against Sparta,
-during the intermediate years, was felt to have been in the main his
-work.[263]
-
-  [261] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 32. Ὦ τοῦ μεγαλοπράγμονος ἀνθρώπου!
-
-  [262] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 576 E. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ, Βοιωτῶν
-  ἁπάντων τῷ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀξιῶν διαφέρειν, ἀμβλὺς ἐστι
-  καὶ ἀπρόθυμος.
-
-  [263] Bauch, in his instructive biography of Epaminondas
-  (Epaminondas, und Thebens Kampf um die Hegemonie: Breslau, 1834,
-  p. 26), seems to conceive that Epaminondas was never employed
-  in any public official post by his countrymen, until the period
-  immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra. I cannot concur in
-  this opinion. It appears to me that he must have been previously
-  employed in such posts as enabled him to show his military
-  worth. For all the proceedings of 371 B.C. prove that in that
-  year he actually possessed a great and established reputation,
-  which must have been acquired by previous acts in a conspicuous
-  position; and as he had no great family position to start from,
-  his reputation was probably acquired only by slow degrees.
-
-  The silence of Xenophon proves nothing in contradiction of this
-  supposition; for he does not mention Epaminondas even at Leuktra.
-
-The turn of politics at Athens which followed the acquittal of
-Sphodrias was an unspeakable benefit to the Thebans, in seconding as
-well as encouraging their defence; and the Spartans, not unmoved at
-the new enemies raised up by their treatment of Sphodrias, thought
-it necessary to make some efforts on their side. They organized on
-a more systematic scale the military force of their confederacy,
-and even took some conciliatory steps with the view of effacing
-the odium of their past misrule.[264] The full force of their
-confederacy,—including, as a striking mark of present Spartan power,
-even the distant Olynthians,[265]—was placed in motion against
-Thebes in the course of the summer under Agesilaus; who contrived,
-by putting in sudden requisition a body of mercenaries acting in
-the service of the Arcadian town Kleitor against its neighbor
-the Arcadian Orchomenus, to make himself master of the passes of
-Kithæron, before the Thebans and Athenians could have notice of his
-passing the Lacedæmonian border.[266] Then crossing Kithæron into
-Bœotia, he established his head-quarters at Thespiæ, a post already
-under Spartan occupation. From thence he commenced his attacks
-upon the Theban territory, which he found defended partly by a
-considerable length of ditch and palisade—partly by the main force of
-Thebes, assisted by a division of mixed Athenians and mercenaries,
-sent from Athens under Chabrias. Keeping on their own side of the
-palisade, the Thebans suddenly sent out their cavalry, and attacked
-Agesilaus by surprise, occasioning some loss. Such sallies were
-frequently repeated, until, by a rapid march at break of day, he
-forced his way through an opening in the breastwork into their
-inner country, which he laid waste nearly to the city walls.[267]
-The Thebans and Athenians, though not offering him battle on equal
-terms, nevertheless kept the field against him, taking care to hold
-positions advantageous for defence. Agesilaus on his side did not
-feel confident enough to attack them against such odds. Yet on one
-occasion he had made up his mind to do so; and was marching up to
-the charge, when he was daunted by the firm attitude and excellent
-array of the troops of Chabrias. They had received orders to await
-his approach, on a high and advantageous ground, without moving
-until signal should be given; with their shields resting on the
-knee, and their spears protended. So imposing was their appearance,
-that Agesilaus called off his troops without daring to complete the
-charge.[268] After a month or more of devastations on the lands of
-Thebes, and a string of desultory skirmishes in which he seems to
-have lost rather than gained, Agesilaus withdrew to Thespiæ; the
-fortifications of which he strengthened, leaving Phœbidas with a
-considerable force in occupation, and then leading back his army to
-Peloponnesus.
-
-  [264] Diodor. xv, 31.
-
-  [265] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 54; Diodor. xv, 31.
-
-  [266] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 36-38.
-
-  [267] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 41.
-
-  [268] Diodor. xv, 32; Polyæn. ii, 1, 2; Cornel. Nepos, Chabrias,
-  c. 1,—“obnixo genu scuto,”—Demosthen. cont. Leptinem, p. 479.
-
-  The Athenian public having afterwards voted a statue to the honor
-  of Chabrias, he made choice of this attitude for the design
-  (Diodor. xv, 33).
-
-Phœbidas,—the former captor of the Kadmeia,—thus stationed at
-Thespiæ, carried on vigorous warfare against Thebes; partly with his
-own Spartan division, partly with the Thespian hoplites, who promised
-him unshrinking support. His incursions soon brought on reprisals
-from the Thebans; who invaded Thespiæ, but were repulsed by Phœbidas
-with the loss of all their plunder. In the pursuit, however, hurrying
-incautiously forward, he was slain by a sudden turn of the Theban
-cavalry;[269] upon which all his troops fled, chased by the Thebans
-to the very gates of Thespiæ. Though the Spartans, in consequence of
-this misfortune, despatched by sea another general and division to
-replace Phœbidas, the cause of the Thebans was greatly strengthened
-by their recent victory. They pushed their success not only against
-Thespiæ, but against the other Bœotian cities, still held by local
-oligarchies in dependence on Sparta. At the same time, these
-oligarchies were threatened by the growing strength of their own
-popular or philo-Theban citizens, who crowded in considerable numbers
-as exiles to Thebes.[270]
-
-  [269] Xen. Hellen. v, 4. 42-45; Diodor. xv, 33.
-
-  [270] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου πάλιν αὖ τὰ τῶν Θηβαίων
-  ἀνεζωπυρεῖτο, καὶ ἐστρατεύοντο εἰς Θεσπιὰς, καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας
-  τὰς περιοικίδας πόλεις. Ὁ μέντοι δῆμος ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰς τὰς Θήβας
-  ἀπεχώρει· ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι καθειστήκεσαν,
-  ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις· ὥστε καὶ οἱ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσι φίλοι τῶν
-  Λακεδαιμονίων βοηθείας ἐδέοντο.
-
-A second expedition against Thebes, undertaken by Agesilaus in the
-ensuing summer with the main army of the confederacy, was neither
-more decisive nor more profitable than the preceding. Though he
-contrived, by a well-planned stratagem, to surprize the Theban
-palisade, and lay waste the plain, he gained no serious victory;
-and even showed, more clearly than before, his reluctance to engage
-except upon perfectly equal terms.[271] It became evident that
-the Thebans were not only strengthening their position in Bœotia,
-but also acquiring practice in warfare and confidence against
-the Spartans; insomuch that Antalkidas and some other companions
-remonstrated with Agesilaus, against carrying on the war so as only
-to give improving lessons to his enemies in military practice,—and
-called upon him to strike some decisive blow. He quitted Bœotia,
-however, after the summer’s campaign, without any such step.[272] In
-his way he appeased an intestine conflict which was about to break
-out in Thespiæ. Afterwards, on passing to Megara, he experienced
-a strain or hurt, which grievously injured his sound leg, (it has
-been mentioned already that he was lame of one leg,) and induced his
-surgeon to open a vein in the limb for reducing the inflammation.
-When this was done, however, the blood could not be stopped until he
-swooned. Having been conveyed home to Sparta in great suffering, he
-was confined to his couch for several months; and he remained during
-a much longer time unfit for active command.[273]
-
-  [271] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 47, 51.
-
-  The anecdotes in Polyænus (ii, 1, 18-20), mentioning
-  faint-heartedness and alarm among the allies of Agesilaus, are
-  likely to apply (certainly in part) to this campaign.
-
-  [272] Diodor. xv, 33, 34; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 26.
-
-  [273] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 58.
-
-The functions of general now devolved upon the other king
-Kleombrotus, who in the next spring conducted the army of the
-confederacy to invade Bœotia anew. But on this occasion, the
-Athenians and Thebans had occupied the passes of Kithæron, so that he
-was unable even to enter the country, and was obliged to dismiss his
-troops without achieving anything.[274]
-
-  [274] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 59.
-
-His inglorious retreat excited such murmurs among the allies when
-they met at Sparta, that they resolved to fit out a large naval
-force, sufficient both to intercept the supplies of imported corn
-to Athens, and to forward an invading army by sea against Thebes,
-to the Bœotian port of Kreusis in the Krissæan Gulf. The former
-object was attempted first. Towards midsummer, a fleet of sixty
-triremes, fitted out under the Spartan admiral Pollis, was cruising
-in the Ægean; especially round the coast of Attica, near Ægina,
-Keos, and Andros. The Athenians, who, since their recently renewed
-confederacy, had been undisturbed by any enemies at sea, found
-themselves thus threatened, not merely with loss of power, but also
-with loss of trade and even famine; since their corn-ships from the
-Euxine, though safely reaching Geræstus (the southern extremity of
-Eubœa), were prevented from doubling Cape Sunium. Feeling severely
-this interruption, they fitted out at Peiræus a fleet of eighty
-triremes,[275] with crews mainly composed of citizens; who, under
-the admiral Chabrias, in a sharply contested action near Naxos,
-completely defeated the fleet of Pollis, and regained for Athens the
-mastery of the sea. Forty-nine Lacedæmonian triremes were disabled
-or captured, eight with their entire crews.[276] Moreover, Chabrias
-might have destroyed all or most of the rest, had he not suspended
-his attack, having eighteen of his own ships disabled, to pick up
-both the living men and the dead bodies on board, as well as all
-Athenians who were swimming for their lives. He did this (we are
-told[277]), from distinct recollection of the fierce displeasure
-of the people against the victorious generals after the battle of
-Arginusæ. And we may thus see, that though the proceedings on that
-memorable occasion were stained both by illegality and by violence,
-they produced a salutary effect upon the public conduct of subsequent
-commanders. Many a brave Athenian (the crews consisting principally
-of citizens) owed his life, after the battle of Naxos, to the
-terrible lesson administered by the people to their generals in 406
-B.C., thirty years before.
-
-  [275] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 61. ἐνέβησαν αὐτοὶ εἰς τὰς ναῦς, etc.
-  Boeckh (followed by Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. 38, vol. v, p.
-  58) connects with this maritime expedition an Inscription (Corp.
-  Insc. No. 84, p. 124) recording a vote of gratitude, passed by
-  the Athenian assembly in favor of Phanokritus, a native of Parium
-  in the Propontis. But I think that the vote can hardly belong
-  to the present expedition. The Athenians could not need to be
-  informed by a native of Parium about the movements of a hostile
-  fleet near Ægina and Keos. The information given by Phanokritus
-  must have related more probably, I think, to some occasion of the
-  transit of hostile ships along the Hellespont, which a native
-  of Parium would be the likely person first to discover and
-  communicate.
-
-  [276] Diodor. xv, 35; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 17, p. 480.
-
-  I give the number of prize-ships taken in this action, as stated
-  by Demosthenes; in preference to Diodorus, who mentions a smaller
-  number. The orator, in enumerating the exploits of Chabrias in
-  this oration, not only speaks from a written memorandum in his
-  hand, which he afterwards causes to be read by the clerk,—but
-  also seems exact and special as to numbers, so as to inspire
-  greater confidence than usual.
-
-  [277] Diodor. xv, 35. Chabrias ἀπέσχετο παντελῶς τοῦ διωγμοῦ,
-  ἀναμνησθεὶς τῆς ἐν Ἀργινούσαις ναυμαχίας, ἐν ᾗ τοὺς νικήσαντας
-  στρατηγοὺς ὁ δῆμος ἀντὶ μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας θανάτῳ περιέβαλεν,
-  ~αἰτιασάμενος ὅτι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας κατὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν οὐκ
-  ἔθαψαν~· εὐλαβήθη οὖν (see Wesseling and Stephens’s note)
-  μή ποτε τῆς περιστάσεως ὁμοίας γενομένης κινδυνεύσῃ παθεῖν
-  παραπλήσια. Διόπερ ~ἀποστὰς τοῦ διώκειν, ἀνελέγετο τῶν πολιτῶν
-  τοὺς διανηχομένους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἔτι ζῶντας διέσωσε, τοὺς
-  δὲ τετελευτηκότας ἔθαψεν~. Εἰ δὲ μὴ περὶ ταύτην ἐγένετο τὴν
-  ἐπιμέλειαν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἅπαντα τὸν πολεμίων στόλον διέφθειρε.
-
-  This passage illustrates what I remarked in my preceding volume
-  (Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 175), respecting the battle of Arginusæ
-  and the proceedings at Athens afterwards. I noticed that Diodorus
-  incorrectly represented the excitement at Athens against the
-  generals as arising from their having neglected to pick up the
-  bodies of the _slain_ warriors for burial,—and that he omitted
-  the more important fact, that they left many living and wounded
-  warriors to perish.
-
-  It is curious, that in the first of the two sentences above
-  cited, Diodorus repeats his erroneous affirmation about the
-  battle of Arginusæ; while in the second sentence he corrects the
-  error, telling us that Chabrias, profiting by the warning, took
-  care to pick up the _living_ men on the wrecks and in the water,
-  as well as the dead bodies.
-
-This was the first great victory (in September, 376 B.C.[278])
-which the Athenians had gained at sea since the Peloponnesian war;
-and while it thus filled them with joy and confidence, it led to
-a material enlargement of their maritime confederacy. The fleet
-of Chabrias,—of which a squadron was detached under the orders of
-Phokion, a young Athenian now distinguishing himself for the first
-time and often hereafter to be mentioned,—sailed victorious round
-the Ægean, made prize of twenty other triremes in single ships,
-brought in three thousand prisoners with one hundred and ten talents
-in money, and annexed seventeen new cities to the confederacy,
-as sending deputies to the synod and furnishing contributions.
-The discreet and conciliatory behavior of Phokion, especially
-obtained much favor among the islanders, and determined several
-new adhesions to Athens.[279] To the inhabitants of Abdêra in
-Thrace, Chabrias rendered an inestimable service, by aiding them to
-repulse a barbarous horde of Triballi, who quitting their abode from
-famine, had poured upon the sea-coast, defeating the Abderites and
-plundering their territory. The citizens, grateful for a force left
-to defend their town, willingly allied themselves with Athens, whose
-confederacy thus extended itself to the coast of Thrace.[280]
-
-  [278] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 6; Plutarch, Camillus, c. 19.
-
-  [279] Demosthen. cont. Leptin. p. 480; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7.
-
-  [280] Diodor. xv, 36. He states by mistake, that Chabrias was
-  afterwards assassinated at Abdera.
-
-Having prosperously enlarged their confederacy to the east of
-Peloponnesus, the Athenians began to aim at the acquisition of new
-allies in the west. The fleet of sixty triremes, which had recently
-served under Chabrias, was sent, under the command of Timotheus, the
-son of Konon, to circumnavigate Peloponnesus and alarm the coast of
-Laconia; partly at the instance of the Thebans, who were eager to
-keep the naval force of Sparta occupied, so as to prevent her from
-conveying troops across the Krissæan Gulf from Corinth to the Bœotian
-port of Kreusis.[281] This Periplus of Peloponnesus,—the first
-which the fleet of Athens had attempted since her humiliation at
-Ægospotami,—coupled with the ensuing successes, was long remembered
-by the countrymen of Timotheus. His large force, just dealing,
-and conciliatory professions, won new and valuable allies. Not
-only Kephallenia, but the still more important island of Korkyra,
-voluntarily accepted his propositions; and as he took care to avoid
-all violence or interference with the political constitution, his
-popularity all around augmented every day. Alketas, prince of
-the Molossi,—the Chaonians with other Epirotic tribes,—and the
-Akarnanians on the coast,—all embraced his alliance.[282] While near
-Alyzia and Leukas on this coast, he was assailed by the Peloponnesian
-ships under Nikolochus, rather inferior in number to his fleet. He
-defeated them, and being shortly afterwards reinforced by other
-triremes from Korkyra, he became so superior in those waters, that
-the hostile fleet did not dare to show itself. Having received only
-thirteen talents on quitting Athens, we are told that he had great
-difficulty in paying his fleet; that he procured an advance of
-money, from each of the sixty trierarchs in his fleet, of seven minæ
-towards the pay of their respective ships; and that he also sent
-home requests for large remittances from the public treasury;[283]
-measures which go to bear out that honorable repugnance to the
-plunder of friends or neutrals, and care to avoid even the suspicion
-of plunder, which his panegyrist Isokrates ascribes to him.[284]
-This was a feature unhappily rare among the Grecian generals on
-both sides, and tending to become still rarer, from the increased
-employment of mercenary bands.
-
-  [281] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 62.
-
-  [282] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 64; Diodor. xv, 36.
-
-  [283] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 66; Isokrates, De Permutat. s. 116;
-  Cornelius Nepos, Timotheus, c. 2.
-
-  The advance of seven minæ respectively, obtained by Timotheus
-  from the sixty trierarchs under his command, is mentioned by
-  Demosthenes cont. Timotheum (c. 3, p. 1187). I agree with M.
-  Boeckh (Public Economy of Athens, ii, 24, p. 294) in referring
-  this advance to his expedition to Korkyra and other places in the
-  Ionian Sea in 375-374 B.C.; not to his subsequent expedition of
-  373 B.C., to which Rehdantz, Lachmann, Schlosser, and others
-  would refer it (Vitæ Iphicratis, etc. p. 89). In the second
-  expedition, it does not appear that he ever had really sixty
-  triremes, or sixty trierarchs, under him. Xenophon (Hellen. v,
-  4, 63) tells us that the fleet sent with Timotheus to Korkyra
-  consisted of sixty ships; which is the exact number of trierarchs
-  named by Demosthenes.
-
-  [284] Isokrates, Orat. De Permutat. s. 128, 131, 135.
-
-The demands of Timotheus on the treasury of Athens were not favorably
-received. Though her naval position was now more brilliant and
-commanding than it had been since the battle of Ægospotami,—though
-no Lacedæmonian fleet showed itself to disturb her in the
-Ægean,[285]—yet the cost of the war began to be seriously felt.
-Privateers from the neighboring island of Ægina annoyed her commerce,
-requiring a perpetual coast-guard; while the contributions from the
-deputies to the confederate synod were not sufficient to dispense
-with the necessity of a heavy direct property tax at home.[286]
-
-  [285] Isokrates, De Permutat. s. 117; Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c. 2.
-
-  [286] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1.
-
-In this synod the Thebans, as members of the confederacy, were
-represented.[287] Application was made to them to contribute towards
-the cost of the naval war; the rather, as it was partly at their
-instance that the fleet had been sent round to the Ionian Sea. But
-the Thebans declined compliance,[288] nor were they probably in any
-condition to furnish pecuniary aid. Their refusal occasioned much
-displeasure at Athens, embittered by jealousy at the strides which
-they had been making during the two last years, partly through the
-indirect effect of the naval successes of Athens. At the end of the
-year 377 B.C., after the two successive invasions of Agesilaus, the
-ruin of two home crops had so straitened the Thebans, that they were
-forced to import corn from Pagasæ in Thessaly; in which enterprise
-their ships and seamen were at first captured by the Lacedæmonian
-harmost at Oreus in Eubœa, Alketas. His negligence, however, soon
-led not only to an outbreak of their seamen who had been taken
-prisoners, but also to the revolt of the town from Sparta, so that
-the communication of Thebes with Pagasæ became quite unimpeded.
-For the two succeeding years, there had been no Spartan invasion
-of Bœotia; since, in 376 B.C., Kleombrotus could not surmount the
-heights of Kithæron,—while in 375 B.C., the attention of Sparta had
-been occupied by the naval operations of Timotheus in the Ionian
-Sea. During these two years, the Thebans had exerted themselves
-vigorously against the neighboring cities of Bœotia, in most of which
-a strong party, if not the majority of the population, was favorable
-to them, though the government was in the hands of the philo-Spartan
-oligarchy, seconded by Spartan harmosts and garrison.[289] We hear of
-one victory gained by the Theban cavalry near Platæa, under Charon;
-and of another near Tanagra, in which Panthöides, the Lacedæmonian
-harmost in that town, was slain.[290]
-
-  [287] See Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 21, 23, 37.
-
-  [288] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1. Οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι, αὐξανομένους μὲν
-  ὁρῶντες διὰ σφᾶς τοὺς Θηβαίους, χρήματά δ’ οὐ συμβαλλομένους
-  εἰς τὸ ναυτικὸν, αὐτοὶ δ’ ἀποκναιόμενοι καὶ χρημάτων εἰσφοραῖς
-  καὶ λῃστείαις ἐξ Αἰγίνης, καὶ φυλακαῖς τῆς χώρας, ἐπεθύμησαν
-  παύσασθαι τοῦ πολέμου.
-
-  [289] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46-55.
-
-  [290] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 15-25.
-
-But the most important of all their successes was that of Pelopidas
-near Tegyra. That commander, hearing that the Spartan harmost, with
-his two (moræ or) divisions in garrison at Orchomenus, had gone
-away on an excursion into the Lokrian territory, made a dash from
-Thebes with the Sacred Band and a few cavalry, to surprise the place.
-It was the season in which the waters of the Lake Kopaïs were at
-the fullest, so that he was obliged to take a wide circuit to the
-north-west, and to pass by Tegyra, on the road between Orchomenus and
-the Opuntian Lokris. On arriving near Orchomenus, he ascertained
-that there were still some Lacedæmonians in the town, and that no
-surprise could be effected; upon which he retraced his steps. But
-on reaching Tegyra, he fell in with the Lacedæmonian commanders,
-Gorgoleon and Theopompus, returning with their troops from the
-Lokrian excursion. As his numbers were inferior to theirs by half,
-they rejoiced in the encounter; while the troops of Pelopidas were
-at first dismayed, and required all his encouragement to work them
-up. But in the fight that ensued, closely and obstinately contested
-in a narrow pass, the strength, valor, and compact charge of the
-Sacred Band proved irresistible. The two Lacedæmonian commanders were
-both slain; their troops opened, to allow the Thebans an undisturbed
-retreat; but Pelopidas, disdaining this opportunity, persisted in the
-combat until all his enemies dispersed and fled. The neighborhood of
-Orchomenus forbade any long pursuit, so that Pelopidas could only
-erect his trophy, and strip the dead, before returning to Thebes.[291]
-
-  [291] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 17; Diodor. xv, 37.
-
-  Xenophon does not mention the combat at Tegyra. Diodorus
-  mentions, what is evidently this battle, near Orchomenus; but he
-  does not name Tegyra.
-
-  Kallisthenes seems to have described the battle of Tegyra, and to
-  have given various particulars respecting the religious legends
-  connected with that spot (Kallisthenes, Fragm. 3, ed. Didot, ap.
-  Stephan. Byz. v. Τεγύρα).
-
-This combat, in which the Lacedæmonians were for the first time
-beaten in fair field by numbers inferior to their own, produced a
-strong sensation in the minds of both the contending parties. The
-confidence of the Thebans, as well as their exertion, was redoubled;
-so that by the year 374 B.C., they had cleared Bœotia of the
-Lacedæmonians, as well as of the local oligarchies which sustained
-them; persuading or constraining the cities again to come into
-union with Thebes, and reviving the Bœotian confederacy. Haliartus,
-Korôneia, Lebadeia, Tanagra, Thespiæ, Platæa, and the rest, thus
-became again Bœotian;[292] leaving out Orchomenus alone, (with its
-dependency Chæroneia,) which was on the borders of Phokis, and still
-continued under Lacedæmonian occupation. In most of these cities, the
-party friendly to Thebes was numerous, and the change, on the whole,
-popular; though in some the prevailing sentiment was such, that
-adherence was only obtained by intimidation. The change here made by
-Thebes, was not to absorb these cities into herself, but to bring
-them back to the old federative system of Bœotia; a policy which she
-had publicly proclaimed on surprising Platæa in 431 B.C.[293] While
-resuming her own ancient rights and privileges as head of the Bœotian
-federation, she at the same time guaranteed to the other cities,—by
-convention, probably express, but certainly implied,—their ancient
-rights, their security, and their qualified autonomy, as members; the
-system which had existed down to the peace of Antalkidas.
-
-  [292] That the Thebans thus became again presidents of all
-  Bœotia, and revived the Bœotian confederacy,—is clearly stated by
-  Xenophon, Hellen. v, 4, 63; vi, 1, 1.
-
-  [293] Thucyd. ii, 2. Ἀνεῖπεν ὁ κήρυξ (the Theban herald after the
-  Theban troops had penetrated by night into the middle of Platæa)
-  εἴ τις βούλεται ~κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν~ ξυμμαχεῖν,
-  τίθεσθαι παρ’ αὐτοὺς τὰ ὅπλα, νομίζοντες σφίσι ῥᾳδίως τούτῳ τῷ
-  τρόπῳ προσχωρήσειν τὴν πόλιν.
-
-  Compare the language of the Thebans about τὰ πάτρια τῶν Βοιωτῶν
-  (iii, 61, 65, 66). The description which the Thebans give of
-  their own professions and views, when they attacked Platæa in 431
-  B.C., may be taken as fair analogy to judge of their professions
-  and views towards the recovered Bœotian towns in 376-375 B.C.
-
-The position of the Thebans was materially improved by this
-reconquest or reconfederation of Bœotia. Becoming masters of Kreusis,
-the port of Thespiæ,[294] they fortified it, and built some triremes
-to repel any invasion from Peloponnesus by sea across the Krissæan
-Gulf. Feeling thus secure against invasion, they began to retaliate
-upon their neighbors and enemies the Phokians, allies of Sparta, and
-auxiliaries in the recent attacks on Thebes,—yet also, from ancient
-times, on friendly terms with Athens.[295] So hard pressed were
-the Phokians,—especially as Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly was at the
-same time their bitter enemy,[296]—that unless assisted, they would
-have been compelled to submit to the Thebans, and along with them
-Orchomenus, including the Lacedæmonian garrison then occupying it;
-while the treasures of the Delphian Temple would also have been laid
-open, in case the Thebans should think fit to seize them. Intimation
-being sent by the Phokians to Sparta, King Kleombrotus was sent to
-their aid, by sea across the Gulf, with four Lacedæmonian divisions
-of troops, and an auxiliary body of allies.[297] This reinforcement,
-compelling the Thebans to retire, placed both Phokis and Orchomenus
-in safety. While Sparta thus sustained them, even Athens looked upon
-the Phokian cause with sympathy. When she saw that the Thebans had
-passed from the defensive to the offensive,—partly by her help, yet
-nevertheless refusing to contribute to the cost of her navy,—her
-ancient jealousy of them became again so powerful, that she sent
-envoys to Sparta, to propose terms of peace. What these terms were,
-we are not told; nor does it appear that the Thebans even received
-notice of the proceeding. But the peace was accepted at Sparta, and
-two of the Athenian envoys were despatched at once from thence,
-without even going home, to Korkyra, for the purpose of notifying the
-peace to Timotheus, and ordering him forthwith to conduct his fleet
-back to Athens.[298]
-
-  [294] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3; Compare Diodor. xv, 53.
-
-  [295] Diodor. xv, 31; Xen. Hellen, vi, 3, 1; iii, 6, 21.
-
-  [296] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 21-27.
-
-  [297] Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 1; vi, 21.
-
-  This expedition of Kleombrotus to Phokis is placed by Mr. Fynes
-  Clinton in 375 B.C. (Fast. Hel. ad 375 B.C.). To me it seems
-  to belong rather to 374 B.C. It was not undertaken until the
-  Thebans had reconquered all the Bœotian cities (Xen. Hell. vi, 1,
-  1); and this operation seems to have occupied them all the two
-  years,—376 and 375 B.C. See v, 4, 63, where the words οὔτ’ ἐν ᾧ
-  Τιμόθεος περιέπλευσε must be understood to include, not simply
-  the time which Timotheus took in _actually circumnavigating_
-  Peloponnesus, but the year which he spent afterwards in the
-  Ionian Sea, and the time which he occupied in performing his
-  exploits near Korkyra, Leukas, and the neighborhood generally.
-  The “Periplus” for which Timotheus was afterwards honored at
-  Athens (see Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. c. 90, p. 458) meant the
-  exploits performed by him during the year and with the fleet of
-  the “Periplus.”
-
-  It is worth notice that the Pythian games were celebrated in this
-  year 374 B.C.,—ἐπὶ Σωκρατίδου ἄρχοντος; that is, in the first
-  quarter of that archon, or the third Olympic year; about the
-  beginning of August, Chabrias won a prize at these games with a
-  chariot and four; in celebration of which, he afterwards gave a
-  splendid banquet at the point of sea-shore called Kôlias, near
-  Athens (Demosthen. cont. Neæram. c. 11, p. 1356).
-
-  [298] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1, 2.
-
-  Kallias seems to have been one of the Athenian envoys (Xen.
-  Hellen. vi, 3, 4).
-
-This proposition of the Athenians, made seemingly in a moment of
-impetuous dissatisfaction, was made to the advantage of Sparta, and
-served somewhat to countervail a mortifying revelation which had
-reached the Spartans a little before from a different quarter.
-
-Polydamas, an eminent citizen of Pharsalus in Thessaly, came to
-Sparta to ask for aid. He had long been on terms of hospitality
-with the Lacedæmonians; while Pharsalus had not merely been in
-alliance with them, but was for some time occupied by one of their
-garrisons.[299] In the usual state of Thessaly, the great cities
-Larissa, Pheræ, Pharsalus, and others, each holding some smaller
-cities in a state of dependent alliance, were in disagreement with
-each other,—often even in actual war. It was rare that they could
-be brought to concur in a common vote for the election of a supreme
-chief or Tagus. At his own city of Pharsalus, Polydamas was now
-in the ascendant, enjoying the confidence of all the great family
-factions who usually contended for predominance; to such a degree,
-indeed, that he was entrusted with the custody of the citadel and the
-entire management of the revenues, receipts as well as disbursements.
-Being a wealthy man, “hospitable and ostentatious in the Thessalian
-fashion,” he advanced money from his own purse to the treasury
-whenever it was low, and repaid himself when public funds came
-in.[300]
-
-  [299] Diodor. xiv, 82.
-
-  [300] Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 3. Καὶ ὁπότε μὲν ἐνδεὴς εἴη,
-  παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ προσετίθει· ὁπότε δὲ περιγένοιτο τῆς προσόδου,
-  ἀπελάμβανεν· ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως φιλόξενός τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τὸν
-  Θετταλικὸν τρόπον.
-
-  Such loose dealing of the Thessalians with their public revenues
-  helps us to understand how Philip of Macedon afterwards got into
-  his hands the management of their harbors and customs-duties
-  (Demosthen. Olynth. i, p. 15; ii. p. 20). It forms a striking
-  contrast with the exactness of the Athenian people about
-  their public receipts and disbursements, as testified in the
-  inscriptions yet remaining.
-
-But a greater man than Polydamas had now arisen in Thessaly,—Jason,
-despot of Pheræ; whose formidable power, threatening the independence
-of Pharsalus, he now came to Sparta to denounce. Though the force of
-Jason can hardly have been very considerable when the Spartans passed
-through Thessaly, six years before, in their repeated expeditions
-against Olynthus, he was now not only despot of Pheræ, but master of
-nearly all the Thessalian cities (as Lykophron of Pheræ had partially
-succeeded in becoming thirty years before),[301] as well as of a
-large area of tributary circumjacent territory. The great instrument
-of his dominion was, a standing and well-appointed force of six
-thousand mercenary troops, from all parts of Greece. He possessed
-all the personal qualities requisite for conducting soldiers with
-the greatest effect. His bodily strength was great; his activity
-indefatigable; his self-command, both as to hardship and as to
-temptation, alike conspicuous. Always personally sharing both in the
-drill and in the gymnastics of the soldiers, and encouraging military
-merits with the utmost munificence, he had not only disciplined them,
-but inspired them with extreme warlike ardor and devotion to his
-person. Several of the neighboring tribes, together with Alketas,
-prince of the Molossi in Epirus, had been reduced to the footing
-of his dependent allies. Moreover, he had already defeated the
-Pharsalians, and stripped them of many of the towns which had once
-been connected with them, so that it only remained for him now to
-carry his arms against their city. But Jason was prudent, as well as
-daring. Though certain of success, he wished to avoid the odium of
-employing force, and the danger of having malcontents for subjects.
-He therefore proposed to Polydamas, in a private interview, that he
-(Polydamas) should bring Pharsalus under Jason’s dominion, accepting
-for himself the second place in Thessaly, under Jason installed as
-Tagus or president. The whole force of Thessaly thus united, with
-its array of tributary nations around, would be decidedly the first
-power in Greece, superior on land either to Sparta or Thebes, and
-at sea to Athens. And as to the Persian king, with his multitudes
-of unwarlike slaves, Jason regarded him as an enemy yet easier to
-overthrow; considering what had been achieved first by the Cyreians,
-and afterwards by Agesilaus.
-
-  [301] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 4.
-
-  The story (told in Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. p. 583 F.) of Jason
-  sending a large sum of money to Thebes, at some period anterior
-  to the recapture of the Kadmeia, for the purpose of corrupting
-  Epaminondas,—appears not entitled to credit. Before that time,
-  Epaminondas was too little known to be worth corrupting;
-  moreover, Jason did not become _tagus_ of Thessaly until long
-  after the recapture of the Kadmeia (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 18, 19).
-
-Such were the propositions, and such the ambitious hopes, which the
-energetic despot of Pheræ had laid before Polydamas; who replied,
-that he himself had long been allied with Sparta, and that he could
-take no resolution hostile to her interests. “Go to Sparta, then
-(rejoined Jason), and give notice there, that I intend to attack
-Pharsalus, and that it is for them to afford you protection. If
-they cannot comply with the demand, you will be unfaithful to the
-interests of your city if you do not embrace my offers.” It was on
-this mission that Polydamas was now come to Sparta, to announce that
-unless aid could be sent to him, he should be compelled unwillingly
-to sever himself from her. “Recollect (he concluded) that the enemy
-against whom you will have to contend is formidable in every way,
-both from personal qualities and from power; so that nothing short of
-a first-rate force and commander will suffice. Consider, and tell me
-what you can do.”
-
-The Spartans, having deliberated on the point, returned a reply in
-the negative. Already a large force had been sent under Kleombrotus
-as essential to the defence of Phokis; moreover, the Athenians were
-now the stronger power at sea. Lastly, Jason had hitherto lent no
-active assistance to Thebes and Athens—which he would assuredly be
-provoked to do, if a Spartan army interfered against him in Thessaly.
-Accordingly the ephors told Polydamas plainly, that they were unable
-to satisfy his demands, recommending him to make the best terms that
-he could, both for Pharsalus and for himself. Returning to Thessaly,
-he resumed his negotiation with Jason, and promised substantial
-compliance with what was required. But he entreated to be spared the
-dishonor of admitting a foreign garrison into the citadel which had
-been confidentially entrusted to his care; engaging at the same time
-to bring his fellow-citizens into voluntary union with Jason, and
-tendering his two sons as hostages for faithful performance. All this
-was actually brought to pass. The politics of the Pharsalians were
-gently brought round, so that Jason, by their votes as well as the
-rest, was unanimously elected Tagus of Thessaly.[302]
-
-  [302] See the interesting account of this mission, and the speech
-  of Polydamas, which I have been compelled greatly to abridge (in
-  Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 4-18).
-
-The dismissal of Polydamas implied a mortifying confession of
-weakness on the part of Sparta. It marks, too, an important stage in
-the real decline of her power. Eight years before, at the instance
-of the Akanthian envoys, backed by the Macedonian Amyntas, she had
-sent three powerful armies in succession to crush the liberal and
-promising confederacy of Olynthus, and to re-transfer the Grecian
-cities on the sea-coast to the Macedonian crown. The region to
-which her armies had been sent, was the extreme verge of Hellas.
-The parties in whose favor she acted, had scarcely the shadow of a
-claim, as friends or allies; while those _against_ whom she acted,
-had neither done nor threatened any wrong to her: moreover, the
-main ground on which her interference was invoked, was to hinder
-the free and equal confederation of Grecian cities. _Now_, a claim,
-and a strong claim, is made upon her by Polydamas of Pharsalus,
-an old friend and ally. It comes from a region much less distant;
-lastly, her political interest would naturally bid her arrest the
-menacing increase of an aggressive power already so formidable as
-that of Jason. Yet so seriously has the position of Sparta altered
-in the last eight years (382-374 B.C.), that she is now compelled
-to decline a demand which justice, sympathy, and political policy
-alike prompted her to grant. So unfortunate was it for the Olynthian
-confederacy, that their honorable and well-combined aspirations
-fell exactly during those few years in which Sparta was at her
-maximum of power! So unfortunate was such coincidence of time, not
-only for Olynthus, but for Greece generally:—since nothing but
-Spartan interference restored the Macedonian kings to the sea-coast,
-while the Olynthian confederacy, had it been allowed to expand,
-might probably have confined them to the interior, and averted the
-death-blow which came upon Grecian freedom in the next generation
-from their hands.
-
-The Lacedæmonians found some compensation for their reluctant
-abandonment of Polydamas, in the pacific propositions from Athens
-which liberated them from one of their chief enemies. But the peace
-thus concluded was scarcely even brought to execution. Timotheus,
-being ordered home from Korkyra, obeyed and set sail with his fleet.
-He had serving along with him some exiles from Zakynthus; and as
-he passed by that island in his homeward voyage, he disembarked
-these exiles upon it, aiding them in establishing a fortified post.
-Against this proceeding the Zakynthian government laid complaints
-at Sparta, where it was so deeply resented, that redress having
-been in vain demanded at Athens, the peace was at once broken off,
-and war again declared. A Lacedæmonian squadron of twenty-five sail
-was despatched to assist the Zakynthians,[303] while plans were
-formed for the acquisition of the more important island of Korkyra.
-The fleet of Timotheus having now been removed home, a malcontent
-Korkyræan party formed a conspiracy to introduce the Lacedæmonians
-as friends, and betray the island to them. A Lacedæmonian fleet of
-twenty-two triremes accordingly sailed thither, under color of a
-voyage to Sicily. But the Korkyræan government, having detected the
-plot, refused to receive them, took precautions for defence, and sent
-envoys to Athens to entreat assistance.
-
-  [303] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 3; Diodor. xv, 45.
-
-  The statements of Diodorus are not clear in themselves; besides
-  that on some points, though not in the main, they contradict
-  Xenophon. Diodorus states that those exiles whom Timotheus
-  brought back to Zakynthus, were the philo-Spartan leaders, who
-  had been recently expelled for their misrule under the empire of
-  Sparta. This statement must doubtless be incorrect. The exiles
-  whom Timotheus restored must have belonged to the anti-Spartan
-  party in the island.
-
-  But Diodorus appears to me to have got into confusion by
-  representing that universal and turbulent reaction against the
-  philo-Spartan oligarchies, which really did not take place until
-  after the battle of Leuktra—as if it had taken place some three
-  years earlier. The events recounted in Diodor. xv, 40, seem to me
-  to belong to a period _after_ the battle of Leuktra.
-
-  Diodorus also seems to have made a mistake in saying that the
-  Athenians sent _Ktesikles_ as auxiliary commander to _Zakynthus_
-  (xv, 46); whereas this very commander is announced by himself
-  in the next chapter (as well as by Xenophon, who calls him
-  _Stesikles_) as sent to _Korkyra_ (Hellen. v, 2, 10).
-
-  I conceive Diodorus to have inadvertently mentioned this Athenian
-  expedition under Stesiklês or Ktesiklês, twice over; once as sent
-  to Zakynthus—then again, as sent to _Korkyra_. The latter is the
-  truth. No Athenian expedition at all appears on this occasion to
-  have gone to Zakynthus; for Xenophon enumerates the Zakynthians
-  among those who helped to fit out the fleet of Mnasippus (v, 2,
-  3).
-
-  On the other hand, I see no reason for calling in question the
-  reality of the two Lacedæmonian expeditions, in the last half of
-  374 B.C.—one under Aristokrates to Zakynthus, the other under
-  Alkidas to Korkyra—which Diodorus mentions (Diod. xv, 45, 46). It
-  is true that Xenophon does not notice either of them; but they
-  are noway inconsistent with the facts which he does state.
-
-The Lacedæmonians now resolved to attack Korkyra openly, with
-the full naval force of their confederacy. By the joint efforts
-of Sparta, Corinth, Leukas, Ambrakia, Elis, Zakynthus, Achaia,
-Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis,—strengthened by pecuniary
-payments from other confederates, who preferred commuting their
-obligation to serve beyond sea,—a fleet of sixty triremes and a body
-of one thousand five hundred mercenary hoplites were assembled;
-besides some Lacedæmonians, probably Helots or Neodamodes.[304]
-At the same time, application was sent to Dionysius the Syracusan
-despot, for his coöperation against Korkyra, on the ground that the
-connection of that island with Athens had proved once, and might
-prove again, dangerous to his city.
-
-  [304] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 3, 5, 16: compare v, 2, 21—about the
-  commutation of personal service for money.
-
-  Diodorus (xv, 47) agrees with Xenophon in the main about the
-  expedition of Mnasippus, though differing on several other
-  contemporary points.
-
-It was in the spring of 373 B.C. that this force proceeded against
-Korkyra, under the command of the Lacedæmonian Mnasippus; who, having
-driven in the Korkyræan fleet with the loss of four triremes, landed
-on the island, gained a victory, and confined the inhabitants within
-the walls of the city. He next carried his ravages round the adjacent
-lands, which were found in the highest state of cultivation, and
-full of the richest produce; fields admirably tilled,—vineyards in
-surpassing condition,—with splendid farm-buildings, well-appointed
-wine-cellars, and abundance of cattle as well as laboring-slaves.
-The invading soldiers, while enriching themselves by depredations
-on cattle and slaves, became so pampered with the plentiful stock
-around, that they refused to drink any wine that was not of the first
-quality.[305] Such is the picture given by Xenophon, an unfriendly
-witness, of the democratical Korkyra, in respect of its lauded
-economy, at the time when it was invaded by Mnasippus; a picture not
-less memorable than that presented by Thucydides (in the speech of
-Archidamus), of the flourishing agriculture surrounding democratical
-Athens, at the moment when the hand of the Peloponnesian devastator
-was first felt there in 431 B.C.[306]
-
-  [305] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 6. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀπέβη (when Mnasippus
-  landed), ἐκράτει τε τῆς γῆς καὶ ἐδῄου ἐξειργασμένην μὲν παγκαλῶς
-  καὶ πεφυτευμένην τὴν χώραν, μεγαλοπρεπεῖς δὲ οἰκήσεις καὶ
-  οἰνῶνας κατεσκευασμένους ἔχουσαν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν· ὥστ’ ἔφασαν τοὺς
-  στρατιώτας εἰς τοῦτο τρυφῆς ἐλθεῖν, ὥστ’ οὐκ ἐθέλειν πίνειν,
-  εἰ μὴ ἀνθοσμίας εἴη. Καὶ ἀνδράποδα δὲ καὶ βοσκήματα πάμπολλα
-  ἡλίσκετο ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν.
-
-  Οἶνον, implied in the antecedent word οἰνῶνας, is understood
-  after πίνειν.
-
-  [306] Thucyd. i, 82. (Speech of Archidamus) μὴ γὰρ ἄλλο τι
-  νομίσητε τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν (of the Athenians) ἢ ὅμηρον ἔχειν, καὶ οὐχ
-  ἧσσον ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ἐξείργασται.
-
-  Compare the earlier portion of the same speech (c. 80), and the
-  second speech of the same Archidamus (ii, 11).
-
-  To the same purpose Thucydides speaks, respecting the properties
-  of the wealthy men established throughout the area of
-  Attica,—οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ καλὰ κτήματα κατὰ τὴν χώραν οἰκοδομίαις
-  τε καὶ πολυτελέσι κατασκευαῖς ἀπολωλεκότες (_i. e._ by the
-  invasion)—Thucyd. ii, 65.
-
-With such plentiful quarters for his soldiers, Mnasippus encamped
-on a hill near the city walls, cutting off those within from
-supplies out of the country, while he at the same time blocked
-up the harbor with his fleet. The Korkyræans soon began to be in
-want. Yet they seemed to have no chance of safety except through
-aid from the Athenians; to whom they had sent envoys with pressing
-entreaties,[307] and who had now reason to regret their hasty consent
-(in the preceding year) to summon home the fleet of Timotheus from
-the island. However, Timotheus was again appointed admiral of a new
-fleet to be sent thither; while a division of six hundred peltasts,
-under Stesiklês, was directed to be despatched by the quickest
-route, to meet the immediate necessities of the Korkyræans, during
-the delays unavoidable in the preparation of the main fleet and its
-circumnavigation of Peloponnesus. These peltasts were conveyed by
-land across Thessaly and Epirus, to the coast opposite Korkyra; upon
-which island they were enabled to land through the intervention of
-Alketas solicited by the Athenians. They were fortunate enough to
-get into the town; where they not only brought the news that a large
-Athenian fleet might be speedily expected, but also contributed much
-to the defence. Without such encouragement and aid, the Korkyræans
-would hardly have held out; for the famine within the walls increased
-daily; and at length became so severe, that many of the citizens
-deserted, and numbers of slaves were thrust out. Mnasippus refused to
-receive them, making public proclamation that every one who deserted
-should be sold into slavery; and since deserters nevertheless
-continued to come, he caused them to be scourged back to the
-city-gates. As for the unfortunate slaves, being neither received by
-him, nor re-admitted within, many perished outside of the gates from
-sheer hunger.[308]
-
-  [307] The envoys from Korkyra to Athens (mentioned by Xenophon,
-  v, 2, 9) would probably cross Epirus and Thessaly, through the
-  aid of Alketas. This would be a much quicker way for them than
-  the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus: and it would suggest
-  the same way for the detachment of Stesiklês presently to be
-  mentioned.
-
-  [308] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 15.
-
-Such spectacles of misery portended so visibly the approaching hour
-of surrender, that the besieging army became careless, and the
-general insolent. Though his military chest was well-filled, through
-the numerous pecuniary payments which he had received from allies in
-commutation of personal service,—yet he had dismissed several of his
-mercenaries without pay, and had kept all of them unpaid for the last
-two months. His present temper made him not only more harsh towards
-his own soldiers,[309] but also less vigilant in the conduct of the
-siege. Accordingly the besieged, detecting from their watch-towers
-the negligence of the guards, chose a favorable opportunity and
-made a vigorous sally. Mnasippus, on seeing his outposts driven in,
-armed himself and hastened forward with the Lacedæmonians around him
-to sustain them; giving orders to the officers of the mercenaries
-to bring their men forward also. But these officers replied, that
-they could not answer for the obedience of soldiers without pay;
-upon which Mnasippus was so incensed, that he struck them with his
-stick and with the shaft of his spear. Such an insult inflamed still
-farther the existing discontent. Both officers and soldiers came to
-the combat discouraged and heartless, while the Athenian peltasts and
-the Korkyræan hoplites, rushing out of several gates at once, pressed
-their attack with desperate energy. Mnasippus, after displaying
-great personal valor, was at length slain, and all his troops, being
-completely routed, fled back to the fortified camp in which their
-stores were preserved. Even this too might have been taken, and the
-whole armament destroyed, had the besieged attacked it at once. But
-they were astonished at their own success. Mistaking the numerous
-camp-followers for soldiers in reserve, they retired back to the city.
-
-  [309] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 16.
-
-  Ὁ δ’ αὖ Μνάσιππος ὁρῶν ταῦτα, ἐνόμιζέ τε ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη ἔχειν τὴν
-  πόλιν, καὶ περὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους, ἐκαινούργει, καὶ τοὺς μέν τινας
-  αὐτῶν ἀπομίσθους ἐπεποιήκει, τοῖς δ’ οὖσι καὶ δυοῖν ἤδη μηνοῖν
-  ὤφειλε τὸν μισθὸν, οὐκ ἀπορῶν, ὡς ἐλέγετο, χρημάτων, etc.
-
-Their victory was however so complete, as to reopen easy
-communication with the country, to procure sufficient temporary
-supplies, and to afford a certainty of holding out until
-reinforcement from Athens should arrive. Such reinforcement, indeed,
-was already on its way, and had been announced as approaching to
-Hypermenês (second under the deceased Mnasippus), who had now
-succeeded to the command. Terrified at the news, he hastened to sail
-round from his station,—which he had occupied with the fleet to
-block up the harbor,—to the fortified camp. Here he first put the
-slaves, as well as the property, aboard of his transports, and sent
-them away; remaining himself to defend the camp with the soldiers
-and marines,—but remaining only a short time, and then taking these
-latter also aboard the triremes. He thus completely evacuated the
-island, making off for Leukas. But such had been the hurry,—and so
-great the terror lest the Athenian fleet should arrive,—that much
-corn and wine, many slaves, and even many sick and wounded soldiers,
-were left behind. To the victorious Korkyræans, these acquisitions
-were not needed to enhance the value of a triumph which rescued them
-from capture, slavery, or starvation.[310]
-
-  [310] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 18-26; Diodor. xv, 47.
-
-The Athenian fleet had not only been tardy in arriving, so as to
-incur much risk of finding the island already taken,—but when it
-did come, it was commanded by Iphikrates, Chabrias, and the orator
-Kallistratus,[311]—not by Timotheus, whom the original vote of the
-people had nominated. It appears that Timotheus,—who (in April
-373 B.C.), when the Athenians first learned that the formidable
-Lacedæmonian fleet had begun to attack Korkyra, had been directed to
-proceed thither forthwith with a fleet of sixty triremes,—found a
-difficulty in manning his ships at Athens, and therefore undertook
-a preliminary cruise to procure both seamen and contributory funds,
-from the maritime allies. His first act was to transport the six
-hundred peltasts under Stesiklês to Thessaly, where he entered into
-relations with Jason of Pheræ. He persuaded the latter to become
-the ally of Athens, and to further the march of Stesiklês with
-his division by land across Thessaly over the passes of Pindus, to
-Epirus; where Alketas, who was at once the ally of Athens, and the
-dependent of Jason, conveyed them by night across the strait from
-Epirus to Korkyra. Having thus opened important connection with the
-powerful Thessalian despot, and obtained from him a very seasonable
-service, together (perhaps) with some seamen from Pagasæ to man his
-fleet,—Timotheus proceeded onward to the ports of Macedonia, where he
-also entered into relations with Amyntas, receiving from him signal
-marks of private favor,—and then to Thrace as well as the neighboring
-islands. His voyage procured for him valuable subsidies in money and
-supplies of seamen, besides some new adhesions and deputies to the
-Athenian confederacy.
-
-  [311] Xen. Hellen. vi. 2, 39.
-
-This preliminary cruise of Timotheus, undertaken with the general
-purpose of collecting means for the expedition to Korkyra, began
-in the month of April or commencement of May 373 B.C.[312] On
-departing, it appears, he had given orders to such of the allies
-as were intended to form part of the expedition, to assemble at
-Kalauria (an island off Trœzen, consecrated to Poseidon) where he
-would himself come and take them up to proceed onward. Pursuant to
-such order, several contingents mustered at this island,—among them
-the Bœotians, who sent several triremes, though in the preceding
-year it had been alleged against them that they contributed nothing
-to sustain the naval exertions of Athens. But Timotheus stayed out a
-long time. Reliance was placed upon him, and upon the money which he
-was to bring home, for the pay of the fleet; and the unpaid triremes
-accordingly fell into distress and disorganization at Kalauria,
-awaiting his return.[313] In the mean time fresh news reached Athens
-that Korkyra was much pressed; so that great indignation was felt
-against the absent admiral, for employing in his present cruise
-a precious interval essential to enable him to reach the island
-in time. Iphikrates (who had recently come back from serving with
-Pharnabazus, in an unavailing attempt to reconquer Egypt for the
-Persian king) and the orator Kallistratus, were especially loud in
-their accusations against him. And as the very salvation of Korkyra
-required pressing haste, the Athenians cancelled the appointment of
-Timotheus even during his absence,—naming Iphikrates, Kallistratus,
-and Chabrias, to equip a fleet and go round to Korkyra without
-delay.[314]
-
-  [312] The manner in which I have described the preliminary
-  cruise of Timotheus, will be found (I think) the only way of
-  uniting into one consistent narrative the scattered fragments of
-  information which we possess respecting his proceedings in this
-  year.
-
-  The date of his setting out from Athens is exactly determined by
-  Demosthenes, adv. Timoth. p. 1186—the month Munychion, in the
-  archonship of Sokratidês—April 373 B.C. Diodorus says that he
-  proceeded to Thrace, and that he acquired several new members for
-  the confederacy (xv, 47); Xenophon states that he sailed towards
-  the islands (Hellen. vi, 2, 12); two statements not directly the
-  same, yet not incompatible with each other. In his way to Thrace,
-  he would naturally pass up the Eubœan strait and along the coast
-  of Thessaly.
-
-  We know that Stesikles and his peltasts must have got to Korkyra,
-  not by sea circumnavigating Peloponnesus, but by land across
-  Thessaly and Epirus; a much quicker way. Xenophon tells us that
-  the Athenians “asked Alketas to help them to cross over from
-  the mainland of Epirus to the opposite island of Korkyra: and
-  that they were in consequence carried across by night,”—Ἀλκέτου
-  δὲ ἐδεήθησαν ~συνδιαβιβάσαι~ τούτους· καὶ οὗτοι μὲν ~νυκτὸς
-  διακομισθέντες~ που τῆς χώρας, εἰσῆλθον εἰς τὴν πόλιν.
-
-  Now these troops could not have got to Epirus without crossing
-  Thessaly; nor could they have crossed Thessaly without the
-  permission and escort of Jason. Moreover, Alketas himself was the
-  dependent of Jason, whose goodwill was therefore doubly necessary
-  (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 7).
-
-  We farther know that in the year preceding (374 B.C.), Jason
-  was not yet in alliance with Athens, nor even inclined to
-  become so, though the Athenians were very anxious for it (Xen.
-  Hellen. vi, 1, 10). But in November 373 B.C., Jason (as well as
-  Alketas) appears as the established ally of Athens; not as then
-  becoming her ally for the first time, but as so completely an
-  established ally, that he comes to Athens for the express purpose
-  of being present at the trial of Timotheus and of deposing in his
-  favor—Ἀφικομένου γὰρ Ἀλκέτου καὶ Ἰάσονος ὡς τοῦτον (Timotheus)
-  ἐν τῷ Μαιμακτηριῶνι μηνὶ τῷ ἐπ’ Ἀστείου ἄρχοντος, ~ἐπὶ τὸν
-  ἀγῶνα τὸν τούτου, βοηθησόντων αὐτῷ~ καὶ καταγομένων εἰς τὴν
-  οἰκίαν τὴν ἐν Πειραιεῖ, etc. (Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 5, p.
-  1190). Again,—Αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτον (Timotheus) ~ἐξαιτουμένων μὲν~
-  τῶν ἐπιτηδείων καὶ οἰκείων αὐτῷ ἁπάντων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ~Ἀλκέτου
-  καὶ Ἰάσονος, συμμάχων ὄντων ὑμῖν~, μόλις μὲν ἐπείσθητε ἀφεῖναι
-  (Demosthen. ib. c, 3, p. 1187.) We see from hence, therefore,
-  that the first alliance between Jason and Athens had been
-  contracted in the early part of 373 B.C.; we see farther that it
-  had been contracted by Timotheus in his preliminary cruise, which
-  is the only reasonable way of explaining the strong interest felt
-  by Jason as well as by Alketas in the fate of Timotheus, inducing
-  them to take the remarkable step of coming to Athens to promote
-  his acquittal. It was Timotheus who had first made the alliance
-  of Athens with Alketas (Diodor. xv, 36; Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c.
-  2), a year or two before.
-
-  Combining all the circumstances here stated, I infer with
-  confidence, that Timotheus, in his preliminary cruise, visited
-  Jason, contracted alliance between him and Athens, and prevailed
-  upon him to forward the division of Stesikles across Thessaly to
-  Epirus and Korkyra.
-
-  In this oration of Demosthenes, there are three or four exact
-  dates mentioned, which are a great aid to the understanding of
-  the historical events of the time. That oration is spoken by
-  Apollodorus, claiming from Timotheus the repayment of money lent
-  to him by Pasion the banker, father of Apollodorus; and the dates
-  specified are copied from entries made by Pasion at the time in
-  his commercial books (c. 1. p. 1186; c. 9. p. 1197).
-
-  [313] Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 3, p. 1188. ἄμισθον μὲν τὸ
-  στράτευμα καταλελύσθαι ἐν Καλαυρίᾳ, etc.—ibid. c. 10, p. 1199.
-  προσῆκε γὰρ τῷ μὲν Βοιωτίῳ ἄρχοντι παρὰ τούτου (Timotheus) τὴν
-  τροφὴν τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ παραλαμβάνειν· ~ἐκ γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν
-  συντάξεων ἡ μισθοφορία ἦν τῷ στρατεύματι· τὰ δὲ χρήματα σὺ~
-  (Timotheus) ~ἅπαντα ἐξέλεξας ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων~· καὶ σὲ ἔδει αὐτῶν
-  λόγον ἀποδοῦναι.
-
-  [314] Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 2, 12, 13, 39; Demosthen. adv. Timoth.
-  c. 3. p. 1188.
-
-Before they could get ready, Timotheus returned; bringing several new
-adhesions to the confederacy, with a flourishing account of general
-success.[315] He went down to Kalauria to supply the deficiencies
-of funds, and make up for the embarrassments which his absence had
-occasioned. But he could not pay the Bœotian trierarchs without
-borrowing money for the purpose on his own credit; for though the sum
-brought home from his voyage was considerable, it would appear that
-the demands upon him had been greater still. At first an accusation,
-called for in consequence of the pronounced displeasure of the
-public, was entered against him by Iphikrates and Kallistratus. But
-as these two had been named joint admirals for the expedition to
-Korkyra, which admitted of no delay,—his trial was postponed until
-the autumn; a postponement advantageous to the accused, and doubtless
-seconded by his friends.[316]
-
-  [315] Diodor. xv, 47.
-
-  [316] I collect what is here stated from Demosthen. adv. Timoth.
-  c. 3. p. 1188; c. 10. p. 1199. It is there said that Timotheus
-  was about to sail home from Kalauria to take his trial; yet it
-  is certain that his trial did not take place until the month
-  Mæmakterion or November. Accordingly, the trial must have been
-  postponed, in consequence of the necessity for Iphikrates and
-  Kallistratus going away at once to preserve Korkyra.
-
-Meanwhile Iphikrates adopted the most strenuous measures for
-accelerating the equipment of his fleet. In the present temper of
-the public, and in the known danger of Korkyra, he was allowed
-(though perhaps Timotheus, a few weeks earlier, would not have
-been allowed) not only to impress seamen in the port, but even to
-coërce the trierarchs with severity,[317] and to employ all the
-triremes reserved for the coast-guard of Attica, as well as the two
-sacred triremes called Paralus and Salaminia. He thus completed a
-fleet of seventy sail, promising to send back a large portion of it
-directly, if matters took a favorable turn at Korkyra. Expecting to
-find on the watch for him a Lacedæmonian fleet fully equal to his
-own, he arranged his voyage so as to combine the maximum of speed
-with training to his seamen, and with preparation for naval combat.
-The larger sails of an ancient trireme were habitually taken out
-of the ship previous to a battle, as being inconvenient aboard:
-Iphikrates left such sails at Athens,—employed even the smaller sails
-sparingly,—and kept his seamen constantly at the oar; which greatly
-accelerated his progress, at the same time that it kept the men in
-excellent training. Every day he had to stop, for meals and rest, on
-an enemy’s shore; and these halts were conducted with such extreme
-dexterity as well as precision, that the least possible time was
-consumed, not enough for any local hostile force to get together. On
-reaching Sphakteria, Iphikrates learnt for the first time the defeat
-and death of Mnasippus. Yet not fully trusting the correctness of
-his information, he still persevered both in his celerity and his
-precautions, until he reached Kephallenia, where he first fully
-satisfied himself that the danger of Korkyra was past. The excellent
-management of Iphikrates throughout this expedition is spoken of in
-terms of admiration by Xenophon.[318]
-
-  [317] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 14. Ὁ δὲ (Iphikrates) ἐπεὶ κατέστη
-  στρατηγὸς, μάλα ὀξέως τὰς ναῦς ἐπληροῦτο, καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους
-  ἠνάγκαζε.
-
-  [318] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 27, 32.
-
-Having no longer any fear of the Lacedæmonian fleet, the Athenian
-commander probably now sent back the home-squadron of Attica which
-he had been allowed to take, but which could ill be spared from
-the defence of the coast.[319] After making himself master of some
-of the Kephallenian cities, he then proceeded onward to Korkyra;
-where the squadron of ten triremes from Syracuse was now on the
-point of arriving; sent by Dionysius to aid the Lacedæmonians, but
-as yet uninformed of their flight. Iphikrates, posting scouts on the
-hills to give notice of their approach, set apart twenty triremes
-to be ready for moving at the first signal. So excellent was his
-discipline, (says Xenophon,) that “the moment the signal was made,
-the ardor of all the crews was a fine thing to see; there was not a
-man who did not hasten at a run to take his place aboard.”[320] The
-ten Syracusan triremes, after their voyage across from the Iapygian
-cape, had halted to rest their men on one of the northern points of
-Korkyra; where they were found by Iphikrates and captured, with all
-their crews and the admiral Anippus; one alone escaping, through the
-strenuous efforts of her captain, the Rhodian Melanôpus. Iphikrates
-returned in triumph, towing his nine prizes into the harbor of
-Korkyra. The crews, being sold or ransomed, yielded to him a sum
-of sixty talents; the admiral Anippus was retained in expectation
-of a higher ransom, but slew himself shortly afterwards from
-mortification.[321]
-
-  [319] Compare vi, 2, 14—with vi, 2, 39.
-
-  [320] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 34.
-
-  [321] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 35, 38; Diodor. xv, 47.
-
-  We find a story recounted by Diodorus (xvi, 57), that the
-  Athenians under Iphikrates captured, off Korkyra, some triremes
-  of Dionysius, carrying sacred ornaments to Delphi and Olympia.
-  They detained and appropriated the valuable cargo, of which
-  Dionysius afterwards loudly complained.
-
-  This story (if there be any truth in it) can hardly allude to
-  any other triremes than those under Anippus. Yet Xenophon would
-  probably have mentioned the story, if he had heard it; since
-  it presents the enemies of Sparta as committing sacrilege. And
-  whether the triremes were carrying sacred ornaments or not, it is
-  certain that they were coming to take part in the war, and were
-  therefore legitimate prizes.
-
-Though the sum thus realized enabled Iphikrates for the time to pay
-his men, yet the suicide of Anippus was a pecuniary disappointment
-to him, and he soon began to need money. This consideration induced
-him to consent to the return of his colleague Kallistratus; who,—an
-orator by profession, and not on friendly terms with Iphikrates,—had
-come out against his own consent. Iphikrates had himself singled
-out both Kallistratus and Chabrias as his colleagues. He was
-not indifferent to the value of their advice, nor did he fear
-the criticisms, even of rivals, on what they really saw in his
-proceedings. But he had accepted the command under hazardous
-circumstances; not only from the insulting displacement of Timotheus,
-and the provocation consequently given to a powerful party attached
-to the son of Konon,—but also in great doubts whether he could
-succeed in relieving Korkyra, in spite of the rigorous coërcion
-which he applied to man his fleet. Had the island been taken and had
-Iphikrates failed, he would have found himself exposed to severe
-crimination, and multiplied enemies, at Athens. Perhaps Kallistratus
-and Chabrias, if left at home, might in that case have been among
-his assailants,—so that it was important to him to identify both of
-them with his good or ill success, and to profit by the military
-ability of the latter, as well as by the oratorical talent of the
-former.[322] As the result of the expedition, however, was altogether
-favorable, all such anxieties were removed. Iphikrates could well
-afford to part with both his colleagues; and Kallistratus engaged,
-that if permitted to go home, he would employ all his efforts to
-keep the fleet well paid from the public treasury; or if this were
-impracticable, that he would labor to procure peace.[323] So terrible
-are the difficulties which the Grecian generals now experience in
-procuring money from Athens, (or from other cities in whose service
-they are acting,) for payment of their troops! Iphikrates suffered
-the same embarrassment which Timotheus had experienced the year
-before,—and which will be found yet more painfully felt as we advance
-forward in the history. For the present, he subsisted his seamen
-by finding work for them on the farms of the Korkyræans, where
-there must doubtless have been ample necessity for repairs after
-the devastations of Mnasippus, while he crossed over to Akarnania
-with his peltasts and hoplites, and there obtained service with the
-townships friendly to Athens against such others as were friendly to
-Sparta; especially against the warlike inhabitants of the strong town
-called Thyrieis.[324]
-
-  [322] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 39. The meaning of Xenophon here is not
-  very clear, nor is even the text perfect.
-
-  Ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ ταύτην τὴν στρατηγίαν τῶν Ἰφικράτους οὐχ ἥκιστα
-  ἐπαινῶ· ἔπειτα καὶ τὸ ~προσελέσθαι κελεῦσαι ἑαυτῷ~ (this shows
-  that Iphikrates himself singled them out) Καλλίστρατόν τε τὸν
-  δημήγορον, οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον ὄντα, καὶ Χαβρίαν, μάλα στρατηγικὸν
-  νομιζόμενον. Εἴτε γὰρ φρονίμους αὐτοὺς ἡγούμενος εἶναι,
-  συμβούλους λαβεῖν ἐβούλετο, σῶφρόν μοι δοκεῖ διαπράξασθαι· ~εἴτε
-  ἀντιπάλους νομίζων~, οὕτω θρασέως (some words in the text seem to
-  be wanting) ... μήτε καταῤῥᾳθυμῶν μήτε καταμελῶν φαίνεσθαι μηδὲν,
-  μεγαλοφρονοῦντος ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι.
-
-  I follow Dr. Thirlwall’s translation of οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον, which
-  appears to me decidedly preferable. The word ἠφίει (vi, 3, 3)
-  shows that Kallistratus was an unwilling colleague.
-
-  [323] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3. ὑποσχόμενος γὰρ Ἰφικράτει
-  (Kallistratus) ~εἰ αὐτὸν ἠφίει~, ἢ χρήματα πέμψειν τῷ ναυτικῷ, ἢ
-  εἰρήνην ποιήσειν, etc.
-
-  [324] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 37, 38.
-
-The happy result of the Korkyræan expedition, imparting universal
-satisfaction at Athens, was not less beneficial to Timotheus than
-to Iphikrates. It was in November, 373 B.C., that the former, as
-well as his quæstor or military treasurer Antimachus, underwent each
-his trial. Kallistratus, having returned home, pleaded against the
-quæstor, perhaps against Timotheus also, as one of the accusers;[325]
-though probably in a spirit of greater gentleness and moderation,
-in consequence of his recent joint success and of the general good
-temper prevalent in the city. And while the edge of the accusation
-against Timotheus was thus blunted, the defence was strengthened
-not merely by numerous citizen friends speaking in his favor with
-increased confidence, but also by the unusual phenomenon of two
-powerful foreign supporters. At the request of Timotheus, both
-Alketas of Epirus, and Jason of Pheræ, came to Athens a little
-before the trial, to appear as witnesses in his favor. They were
-received and lodged by him in his house in the Hippodamian Agora,
-the principal square of the Peiræus. And as he was then in some
-embarrassment for want of money, he found it necessary to borrow
-various articles of finery in order to do them honor,—clothes,
-bedding, and two silver drinking bowls,—from Pasion, a wealthy
-banker near at hand. These two important witnesses would depose to
-the zealous service and estimable qualities of Timotheus; who had
-inspired them with warm interest, and had been the means of bringing
-them into alliance with Athens; an alliance, which they had sealed
-at once by conveying Stesikles and his division across Thessaly and
-Epirus to Korkyra. The minds of the dikastery would be powerfully
-affected by seeing before them such a man as Jason of Pheræ, at
-that moment the most powerful individual in Greece; and we are
-not surprised to learn that Timotheus was acquitted. His treasurer
-Antimachus, not tried by the same dikastery, and doubtless not so
-powerfully befriended, was less fortunate. He was condemned to death,
-and his property confiscated; the dikastery doubtless believing (on
-what evidence we do not know) that he had been guilty of fraud in
-dealing with the public money, which had caused serious injury at a
-most important crisis. Under the circumstances of the case, he was
-held responsible as treasurer, for the pecuniary department of the
-money-levying command confided to Timotheus by the people.
-
-  [325] Demosthen. cont. Timoth. c. 9, p. 1197, 1198.
-
-As to the military conduct, for which Timotheus himself would be
-personally accountable, we can only remark that having been invested
-with the command for the special purpose of relieving the besieged
-Korkyra, he appears to have devoted an unreasonable length of time
-to his own self-originated cruise elsewhere; though such cruise was
-in itself beneficial to Athens; insomuch that if Korkyra had really
-been taken, the people would have had good reason for imputing the
-misfortune to his delay.[326] And although he was now acquitted, his
-reputation suffered so much by the whole affair, that in the ensuing
-spring he was glad to accept an invitation of the Persian satraps,
-who offered him the command of the Grecian mercenaries in their
-service for the Egyptian war; the same command from which Iphikrates
-had retired a little time before.[327]
-
-  [326] The narrative here given of the events of 373 B.C., so far
-  as they concern Timotheus and Iphikrates, appears to me the only
-  way of satisfying the exigencies of the case, and following the
-  statements of Xenophon and Demosthenes.
-
-  Schneider in his note, indeed, implies, and Rehdantz (Vitæ
-  Iphicratis, etc. p. 86) contends, that Iphikrates did not take
-  command of the fleet, nor depart from Athens, until _after_ the
-  trial of Timotheus. There are some expressions in the oration of
-  Demosthenes, which might seem to countenance this supposition;
-  but it will be found hardly admissible, if we attentively study
-  the series of facts.
-
-  1. Mnasippus arrived with his armament at Korkyra, and began the
-  siege, either before April, or at the first opening of April, 373
-  B.C. For his arrival there, and the good condition of his fleet,
-  was known at Athens _before_ Timotheus received his appointment
-  as admiral of the fleet for the relief of the island (Xen.
-  Hellen. vi, 2, 10, 11, 12).
-
-  2. Timotheus sailed from Peiræus on this appointed voyage, in
-  April 373 B.C.
-
-  3. Timotheus was tried at Athens in November 373 B.C.; Alketas
-  and Jason being then present, as allies of Athens and witnesses
-  in his favor.
-
-  Now, if the truth were, that Iphikrates did not depart from
-  Athens with his fleet until after the trial of Timotheus in
-  November, we must suppose that the siege of Korkyra by Mnasippus
-  lasted seven months, and the cruise of Timotheus nearly five
-  months. Both the one and the other are altogether improbable. The
-  Athenians would never have permitted Korkyra to incur so terrible
-  a chance of capture, simply in order to wait for the trial of
-  Timotheus. Xenophon does not expressly say how long the siege of
-  Korkyra lasted; but from his expressions about the mercenaries of
-  Mnasippus (that already pay was owing to them for _as much as two
-  months_,—καὶ δυοῖν ~ἤδη~ μηνοῖν—vi, 2, 16), we should infer that
-  it could hardly have lasted more than three months in all. Let
-  us say, that it lasted four months; the siege would then be over
-  in August, and we know that the fleet of Iphikrates arrived just
-  after the siege was concluded.
-
-  Besides, is it credible, that Timotheus—named as admiral for the
-  express purpose of relieving Korkyra, and knowing that Mnasippus
-  was already besieging the place with a formidable fleet—would
-  have spent so long a time as _five_ months in his preliminary
-  cruise?
-
-  I presume Timotheus to have stayed out in this cruise about _two_
-  months; and even this length of time would be quite sufficient to
-  raise strong displeasure against him at Athens, when the danger
-  and privations of Korkyra were made known as hourly increasing.
-  At the time when Timotheus came back to Athens, he found all
-  this displeasure actually afloat against him, excited in part
-  by the strong censures of Iphikrates and Kallistratus (Dem.
-  cont. Timoth. p. 1187. c. 3). The adverse orations in the public
-  assembly, besides inflaming the wrath of the Athenians against
-  him, caused a vote to be passed deposing him from his command to
-  Korkyra, and nominating in his place Iphikrates, with Chabrias
-  and Kallistratus. Probably those who proposed this vote would at
-  the same time give notice that they intended to prefer a judicial
-  accusation against Timotheus for breach or neglect of duty. But
-  it would be the interest of all parties to postpone _actual
-  trial_ until the fate of Korkyra should be determined, for which
-  purpose the saving of time would be precious. Already too much
-  time had been lost, and Iphikrates was well aware that his whole
-  chance of success depended on celerity; while Timotheus and his
-  friends would look upon postponement as an additional chance
-  of softening the public displeasure, besides enabling them to
-  obtain the attendance of Jason and Alketas. Still, though trial
-  was postponed, Timotheus was from this moment under impeachment.
-  The oration composed by Demosthenes therefore (delivered by
-  Apollodorus as plaintiff, several years afterwards),—though
-  speaking loosely, and not distinguishing the angry speeches
-  against Timotheus _in the public assembly_ (in June 373 B.C.,
-  or thereabouts, whereby his deposition was obtained), from the
-  accusing speeches against him at his actual trial in November
-  373 B.C., _before the dikastery_—is nevertheless not incorrect
-  in saying,—ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἀπεχειροτονήθη μὲν ὑφ’ ὑμῶν στρατηγὸς
-  διὰ τὸ μὴ περιπλεῦσαι Πελοπόννησον, ἐπὶ ~κρίσει δὲ παρεδέδοτο
-  εἰς τὸν δῆμον~, αἰτίας τῆς μεγίστης τυχὼν (c. 3, p. 1187)—and
-  again respecting his coming from Kalauria to Athens—μέλλων
-  τοίνυν καταπλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν κρίσιν, ἐν Καλαυρίᾳ δανείζεται, etc.
-  (p. 1188, 1189.) That Timotheus had been handed over to the
-  people for trial—that he was sailing back from Kalauria _for
-  his trial_—might well be asserted respecting his position in
-  the month of June, though his trial did not actually take place
-  until November. I think it cannot be doubted that the triremes at
-  Kalauria would form a part of that fleet which actually went to
-  Korkyra under Iphikrates; not waiting to go thither until after
-  the trial of Timotheus in November, but departing as soon as
-  Iphikrates could get ready, probably about July 373 B.C.
-
-  Rehdantz argues that if Iphikrates departed with the fleet in
-  July, he must have returned to Athens in November to the trial
-  of Timotheus, which is contrary to Xenophon’s affirmation that
-  he remained in the Ionian sea until 371 B.C. But if we look
-  attentively at the oration of Demosthenes, we shall see that
-  there is no certain ground for affirming Iphikrates to have
-  been present in Athens in November, during the actual trial of
-  Timotheus. The phrases in p. 1187—ἐφειστήκει δ’ αὐτῷ Καλλίστρατος
-  καὶ Ἰφικράτης ... οὕτω δὲ διέθεσαν ὑμᾶς κατηγοροῦντες τούτου
-  αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ συναγορεύοντες αὐτοῖς, etc., may be well
-  explained, so far as Iphikrates is concerned, by supposing them
-  to allude to those pronounced censures in the public assembly
-  whereby the vote of deposition against Timotheus was obtained,
-  and whereby the general indignation against him was first
-  excited. I therefore see no reason for affirming that Iphikrates
-  was actually present at the trial of Timotheus in November. But
-  Kallistratus was really present at the trial (see c. 9. p. 1197,
-  1198); which consists well enough with the statement of Xenophon,
-  that this orator obtained permission from Iphikrates to leave
-  him at Korkyra and come back to Athens (vi, 3, 3). Kallistratus
-  directed his accusation mainly against Antimachus, the treasurer
-  of Timotheus. And it appears to me that under the circumstances
-  of the case, Iphikrates, having carried his point of superseding
-  Timotheus in the command and gaining an important success at
-  Korkyra—might be well-pleased to be dispensed from the obligation
-  of formally accusing him before the dikastery, in opposition to
-  Jason and Alketas, as well as to a powerful body of Athenian
-  friends.
-
-  Diodorus (xv, 47) makes a statement quite different from
-  Xenophon. He says that Timotheus was at first deposed from
-  his command, but afterwards forgiven and re-appointed by the
-  people (jointly with Iphikrates) in consequence of the great
-  accession of force which he had procured in his preliminary
-  cruise. Accordingly the fleet, one hundred and thirty triremes
-  in number, was despatched to Korkyra under the joint command
-  of Iphikrates and Timotheus. Diodorus makes no mention of the
-  trial of Timotheus. This account is evidently quite distinct
-  from that of Xenophon, which latter is on all grounds to be
-  preferred, especially as its main points are in conformity with
-  the Demosthenic oration.
-
-  [327] Demosth. cont. Timoth. c. 6. p. 1191; c. 8. p. 1194.
-
-  We see from another passage of the same oration, that the
-  creditors of Timotheus reckoned upon his making a large sum
-  of money in the Persian service (c. 1, p. 1185). This farther
-  illustrates what I have said in a previous note, about the
-  motives of the distinguished Athenian officers to take service in
-  foreign parts away from Athens.
-
-That admiral, whose naval force had been reinforced by a large
-number of Korkyræan triremes, was committing without opposition
-incursions against Akarnania, and the western coast of Peloponnesus;
-insomuch that the expelled Messenians, in their distant exile at
-Hesperides in Libya, began to conceive hopes of being restored by
-Athens to Naupaktus, which they had occupied under her protection
-during the Peloponnesian war.[328] And while the Athenians were
-thus masters at sea both east and west of Peloponnesus,[329] Sparta
-and her confederates, discouraged by the ruinous failure of their
-expedition against Korkyra in the preceding year, appear to have
-remained inactive. With such mental predispositions, they were
-powerfully affected by religious alarm arising from certain frightful
-earthquakes and inundations with which Peloponnesus was visited
-during this year, and which were regarded as marks of the wrath of
-the god Poseidon. More of these formidable visitations occurred this
-year in Peloponnesus than had ever before been known; especially one,
-the worst of all, whereby the two towns of Helikê and Bura in Achaia
-were destroyed, together with a large portion of their population.
-Ten Lacedæmonian triremes, which happened to be moored on this shore
-on the night when the calamity occurred, were destroyed by the rush
-of the waters.[330]
-
-  [328] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 38; Pausanias, iv, 26, 3.
-
-  [329] See a curious testimony to this fact in Demosthen. cont.
-  Neæram, c. 12, p. 1357.
-
-  [330] Diodor. xi, 48, 49; Pausan. vii, 25; Ælian. Hist. Animal.
-  xi, 19.
-
-  Kallisthenes seems to have described at large, with appropriate
-  religious comments, numerous physical portents which occurred
-  about this time (see Kallisthen. Fragm. 8, ed. Didot).
-
-Under these depressing circumstances, the Lacedæmonians had recourse
-to the same manœuvre which had so well served their purpose fifteen
-years before, in 388-387 B.C. They sent Antalkidas again as envoy
-to Persia, to entreat both pecuniary aid,[331] and a fresh Persian
-intervention enforcing anew the peace which bore his name; which
-peace had now been infringed (according to Lacedæmonian construction)
-by the reconstitution of the Bœotian confederacy under Thebes as
-president. And it appears that in the course of the autumn or
-winter, Persian envoys actually did come to Greece, requiring that
-the belligerents should all desist from war, and wind up their
-dissensions on the principles of the peace of Antalkidas.[332] The
-Persian satraps, at this time renewing their efforts against Egypt,
-were anxious for the cessation of hostilities in Greece, as a means
-of enlarging their numbers of Grecian mercenaries; of which troops
-Timotheus had left Athens a few months before to take the command.
-
-  [331] This second mission of Antalkidas is sufficiently verified
-  by an indirect allusion of Xenophon (vi, 3, 12). His known
-  philo-Laconian sentiments sufficiently explain why he avoids
-  directly mentioning it.
-
-  [332] Diodor. xv, 50.
-
-  Diodorus had stated (a few chapters before, xv, 38) that Persian
-  envoys had also come into Greece a little before the peace of 374
-  B.C., and had been the originators of that previous peace. But
-  this appears to me one of the cases (not a few altogether in his
-  history) in which he repeats himself, or gives the same event
-  twice over under analogous circumstances. The intervention of the
-  Persian envoys bears much more suitably on the period immediately
-  preceding the peace of 371 B.C., than upon that which preceded
-  the peace of 374 B.C., when, in point of fact, no peace was ever
-  fully executed.
-
-  Dionysius of Halikarnassus also (Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 479)
-  represents the king of Persia as a party to the peace sworn by
-  Athens and Sparta in 371 B.C.
-
-Apart, however, from this prospect of Persian intervention, which
-doubtless was not without effect,—Athens herself was becoming more
-and more disposed towards peace. That common fear and hatred of the
-Lacedæmonians, which had brought her into alliance with Thebes in 378
-B.C., was now no longer predominant. She was actually at the head
-of a considerable maritime confederacy; and this she could hardly
-hope to increase by continuing the war, since the Lacedæmonian naval
-power had already been humbled. Moreover, she found the expense of
-warlike operations very burdensome, nowise defrayed either by the
-contributions of her allies or by the results of victory. The orator
-Kallistratus,—who had promised either to procure remittances from
-Athens to Iphikrates, or to recommend the conclusion of peace,—was
-obliged to confine himself to the latter alternative, and contributed
-much to promote the pacific dispositions of his countrymen.[333]
-
-  [333] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3.
-
-Moreover, the Athenians had become more and more alienated from
-Thebes. The ancient antipathy between these two neighbors had for
-a time been overlaid by common fear of Sparta. But as soon as
-Thebes had reëstablished her authority in Bœotia, the jealousies
-of Athens again began to arise. In 374 B.C., she had concluded a
-peace with the Spartans, without the concurrence of Thebes; which
-peace was broken almost as soon as made, by the Spartans themselves,
-in consequence of the proceedings of Timotheus at Zakynthus. The
-Phokians,—against whom, as having been active allies of Sparta in her
-invasions of Bœotia, Thebes was now making war,—had also been ancient
-friends of Athens, who sympathized with their sufferings.[334]
-Moreover, the Thebans on their side probably resented the unpaid and
-destitute condition in which their seamen had been left by Timotheus
-at Kalauria, during the expedition for the relief of Korkyra in the
-preceding year;[335] an expedition of which Athens alone reaped
-both the glory and the advantage. Though they remained members of
-the confederacy, sending deputies to the congress at Athens, the
-unfriendly spirit on both sides continued on the increase, and was
-farther exasperated by their violent proceeding against Platæa in the
-first half of 372 B.C.
-
-  [334] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 1.
-
-  [335] Demosthen. cont. Timoth. p. 1188, s. 17.
-
-During the last three or four years, Platæa, like the other towns of
-Bœotia, had been again brought into the confederacy under Thebes.
-Reëstablished by Sparta after the peace of Antalkidas as a so-called
-autonomous town, it had been garrisoned by her as a post against
-Thebes, and was no longer able to maintain a real autonomy after
-the Spartans had been excluded from Bœotia in 376 B.C. While other
-Bœotian cities were glad to find themselves emancipated from their
-philo-Laconian oligarchies and rejoined to the federation under
-Thebes, Platæa,—as well as Thespiæ,—submitted to the union only by
-constraint; awaiting any favorable opportunity for breaking off,
-either by means of Sparta or of Athens. Aware probably of the growing
-coldness between the Athenians and Thebans, the Platæans were
-secretly trying to persuade Athens to accept and occupy their town,
-annexing Platæa to Attica;[336] a project hazardous both to Thebes
-and Athens, since it would place them at open war with each other,
-while neither was yet at peace with Sparta.
-
-  [336] Diodor. xv, 46. I do not know from whom Diodorus copied
-  this statement; but it seems extremely reasonable.
-
-This intrigue, coming to the knowledge of the Thebans, determined
-them to strike a decisive blow. Their presidency, over more than one
-of the minor Bœotian cities, had always been ungentle, suitable to
-the roughness of their dispositions. Towards Platæa, especially, they
-not only bore an ancient antipathy, but regarded the reëstablished
-town as little better than a Lacedæmonian encroachment, abstracting
-from themselves a portion of territory which had become Theban, by
-prescriptive enjoyment lasting for forty years from the surrender
-of Platæa in 427 B.C. As it would have been to them a loss as
-well as embarrassment, if Athens should resolve to close with the
-tender of Platæa,—they forestalled the contingency by seizing the
-town for themselves. Since the reconquest of Bœotia by Thebes, the
-Platæans had come again, though reluctantly, under the ancient
-constitution of Bœotia; they were living at peace with Thebes,
-acknowledging her rights as president of the federation, and having
-their own rights as members guaranteed in return by her, probably
-under positive engagement,—that is, their security, their territory,
-and their qualified autonomy, subject to the federal restrictions
-and obligations. But though thus at peace with Thebes,[337] the
-Platæans knew well what was her real sentiment towards them,
-and their own towards her. If we are to believe, what seems very
-probable, that they were secretly negotiating with Athens to help
-them in breaking off from the federation,—the consciousness of
-such an intrigue tended still farther to keep them in anxiety and
-suspicion. Accordingly, being apprehensive of some aggression from
-Thebes, they kept themselves habitually on their guard. But their
-vigilance was somewhat relaxed and most of them went out of the city
-to their farms in the country, on the days, well known beforehand,
-when the public assemblies in Thebes were held. Of this relaxation
-the Bœotarch Neokles took advantage.[338] He conducted a Theban armed
-force, immediately from the assembly, by a circuitous route through
-Hysiæ to Platæa; which town he found deserted by most of its male
-adults, and unable to make resistance. The Platæans,—dispersed in the
-fields, finding their walls, their wives, and their families, all in
-possession of the victor,—were under the necessity of accepting the
-terms proposed to them. They were allowed to depart in safety, and to
-carry away all their movable property; but their town was destroyed,
-and its territory again annexed to Thebes. The unhappy fugitives
-were constrained for the second time to seek refuge at Athens, where
-they were again kindly received, and restored to the same qualified
-right of citizenship as they had enjoyed prior to the peace of
-Antalkidas.[339]
-
-  [337] This seems to me what is meant by the Platæan speaker in
-  Isokrates, when he complains more than once that Platæa had
-  been taken by the Thebans in time of peace,—εἰρήνης οὔσης. The
-  speaker, in protesting against the injustice of the Thebans,
-  appeals to two guarantees which they have violated; for the
-  purpose of his argument, however, the two are not clearly
-  distinguished, but run together into one. The first guarantee
-  was, the peace of Antalkidas, under which Platæa had been
-  restored, and to which Thebes, Sparta, and Athens, were all
-  parties. The second guarantee, was that given by Thebes when she
-  conquered the Bœotian cities in 377-370 B.C., and reconstituted
-  the federation; whereby she ensured to the Platæans existence
-  as a city, with so much of autonomy as was consistent with the
-  obligations of a member of the Bœotian federation. When the
-  Platæan speaker accuses the Thebans of having violated “the oaths
-  and the agreement” (ὅρκους καὶ ξυνθήκας), he means the terms of
-  the peace of Antalkidas, subject to the limits afterwards imposed
-  by the submission of Platæa to the federal system of Bœotia. He
-  calls for the tutelary interference of Athens, as a party to the
-  peace of Antalkidas.
-
-  Dr. Thirlwall thinks (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 38. p. 70-72) that
-  the Thebans were parties to the peace of 374 B.C. between Sparta
-  and Athens; that they accepted it, intending deliberately to
-  break it; and that under that peace, the Lacedæmonian harmosts
-  and garrisons were withdrawn from Thespiæ and other places in
-  Bœotia. I am unable to acquiesce in this view; which appears to
-  me negatived by Xenophon, and neither affirmed nor implied in
-  the Plataic discourse of Isokrates. In my opinion, there were
-  no Lacedæmonian harmosts in Bœotia (except at Orchomenus in the
-  north) in 374 B.C. Xenophon tells (Hellen. v, 4, 63; vi, 1, 1)
-  that the Thebans “were recovering the Bœotian cities—had subdued
-  the Bœotian cities”—in or before 375 B.C., so that they were
-  able to march out of Bœotia and invade Phokis; which implies the
-  expulsion or retirement of all the Lacedæmonian forces from the
-  southern part of Bœotia.
-
-  The reasoning in the Plataic discourse of Isokrates is not very
-  clear or discriminating; nor have we any right to expect that it
-  should be, in the pleading of a suffering and passionate man.
-  But the expression εἰρήνης οὔσης and εἰρήνη may always (in my
-  judgment) be explained, without referring it, as Dr. Thirlwall
-  does, to the peace of 374 B.C., or supposing Thebes to have been
-  a party to that peace.
-
-  [338] Pausanias, ix, 1, 3.
-
-  [339] Diodor. xv, 47.
-
-  Pausanias (ix, 1, 3) places this capture of Platæa in the third
-  year (counting the years from midsummer to midsummer) before
-  the battle of Leuktra; or in the year of the archon Asteius at
-  Athens; which seems to me the true date, though Mr. Clinton
-  supposes it (without ground, I think) to be contradicted by
-  Xenophon. The year of the archon Asteius reaches from midsummer
-  373 to 372 B.C. It is in the latter half of the year that I
-  suppose Platæa to have been taken.
-
-It was not merely with Platæa, but also with Thespiæ, that Thebes
-was now meddling. Mistrusting the dispositions of the Thespians, she
-constrained them to demolish the fortifications of their town;[340]
-as she had caused to be done fifty-two years before, after the
-victory of Delium,[341] on suspicion of leanings favorable to Athens.
-
-  [340] I infer this from Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 21-38;
-  compare also sect. 10. The Platæan speaker accuses the Thebans
-  of having destroyed the walls of some Bœotian cities (over and
-  above what they had done to Platæa,) and I venture to apply this
-  to Thespiæ. Xenophon indeed states that the Thespians were at
-  this very period treated exactly like the Platæans; that is,
-  driven out of Bœotia, and their town destroyed; except that they
-  had not the same claim on Athens (Hellen. vi, 3, 1—ἀπόλιδας
-  γενομένους: compare also vi, 3, 5). Diodorus also (xv, 46)
-  speaks of the Thebans as having destroyed Thespiæ. But against
-  this, I gather, from the Plataic Oration of Isokrates, that the
-  Thespians were not in the same plight with the Platæans when
-  that oration was delivered; that is, they were not expelled
-  collectively out of Bœotia. Moreover, Pausanias also expressly
-  says that the Thespians were present in Bœotia at the time of
-  the battle of Leuktra, and that they were expelled shortly
-  afterwards. Pausanias at the same time gives a distinct story,
-  about the conduct of the Thespians, which it would not be
-  reasonable to reject (ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1). I believe therefore
-  that Xenophon has spoken inaccurately in saying that the
-  Thespians were ἀπόλιδες _before_ the battle of Leuktra. It is
-  quite possible that they might have sent supplications to Athens
-  (ἱκετεύοντας—Xen. Hell. vi, 3, 1) in consequence of the severe
-  mandate to demolish their walls.
-
-  [341] Thucyd. iv, 133.
-
-Such proceedings on the part of the Thebans in Bœotia excited
-strong emotion at Athens; where the Platæans not only appeared as
-suppliants, with the tokens of misery conspicuously displayed, but
-also laid their case pathetically before the assembly, and invoked
-aid to regain their town, of which they had been just bereft. On a
-question at once so touching and so full of political consequences,
-many speeches were doubtless composed and delivered, one of which has
-fortunately reached us; composed by Isokrates, and perhaps actually
-delivered by a Platæan speaker before the public assembly. The hard
-fate of this interesting little community is here impressively set
-forth; including the bitterest reproaches, stated with not a little
-of rhetorical exaggeration, against the multiplied wrongs done
-by Thebes, as well towards Athens as towards Platæa. Much of his
-invective is more vehement than conclusive. Thus when the orator
-repeatedly claims for Platæa her title to autonomous existence,
-under the guarantee of universal autonomy sworn at the peace of
-Antalkidas,[342]—the Thebans would doubtless reply, that at the
-time of that peace, Platæa was no longer in existence; but had
-been extinct for forty years, and was only renovated afterwards by
-the Lacedæmonians for their own political purposes. And the orator
-intimates plainly, that the Thebans were noway ashamed of their
-proceeding, but came to Athens to justify it, openly and avowedly;
-moreover, several of the most distinguished Athenian speakers
-espoused the same side.[343] That the Platæans had coöperated with
-Sparta in her recent operations in Bœotia against both Athens and
-Thebes, was an undeniable fact; which the orator himself can only
-extenuate by saying that they acted under constraint from a present
-Spartan force,—but which was cited on the opposite side as a proof
-of their philo-Spartan dispositions, and of their readiness again
-to join the common enemy as soon as he presented himself.[344]
-The Thebans would accuse Platæa of subsequent treason to the
-confederacy; and they even seem to have contended, that they had
-rendered a positive service to the general Athenian confederacy
-of which they were members,[345] by expelling the inhabitants of
-Platæa and dismantling Thespiæ; both towns being not merely devoted
-to Sparta, but also adjoining Kithæron, the frontier line whereby
-a Spartan army would invade Bœotia. Both in the public assembly of
-Athens, and in the general congress of the confederates at that
-city, animated discussions were raised upon the whole subject;[346]
-discussions, wherein, as it appears, Epaminondas, as the orator and
-representative of Thebes, was found a competent advocate against
-Kallistratus, the most distinguished speaker in Athens; sustaining
-the Theban cause with an ability which greatly enhanced his growing
-reputation.[347]
-
-  [342] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 11, 13, 18, 42, 46, 47,
-  68.
-
-  [343] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 3. Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ Θηβαίους
-  ἑωρῶμεν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου παρεσκευασμένους πείθειν ὑμᾶς ὡς οὐδὲν
-  εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐξημαρτήκασι, διὰ βραχέων ἂν ἐποιησάμεθα τοὺς λόγους·
-  ἐπειδὴ δ’ εἰς τοῦτ’ ἀτυχίας ἤλθομεν, ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸν
-  ἀγῶνα πρὸς τούτους ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ῥητόρων τοὺς δυνατωτάτους, οὓς
-  ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων αὑτοῖς οὗτοι παρεσκευάσαντο συνηγόρους, etc.
-
-  Compare sect. 36.
-
-  [344] Isokr. Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 12, 13, 14, 16, 28, 33, 48.
-
-  [345] Isokrat. Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 23-27. λέγουσιν ὡς ὑπὲρ τοῦ
-  κοινοῦ τῶν συμμάχων ταῦτ’ ἔπραξαν—φασὶ τὸ Θηβαίους ἔχειν τὴν
-  ἡμετέραν, τοῦτο σύμφερον εἶναι τοῖς συμμάχοις, etc.
-
-  [346] Isokrat. Or. 14, (Plat.) s. 23, 24.
-
-  [347] Diodorus, (xv, 38) mentions the parliamentary conflict
-  between Epaminondas and _Kallistratus_, assigning it to the
-  period immediately antecedent to the abortive peace concluded
-  between Athens and Sparta three years before. I agree with
-  Wesseling (see his note _ad loc._) in thinking that these debates
-  more properly belong to the time immediately preceding the peace
-  of 371 B.C. Diodorus has made great confusion between the two;
-  sometimes repeating twice over the same antecedent phenomena,
-  as if they belonged to both,—sometimes assigning to one what
-  properly belongs to the other.
-
-  The altercation between Epaminondas and _Kallistratus_ (ἐν τῷ
-  κοινῷ συνεδρίῳ) seems to me more properly appertaining to debates
-  in the assembly of the confederacy at Athens,—rather than to
-  debates at Sparta, in the preliminary discussions for peace,
-  where the altercations between Epaminondas and _Agesilaus_
-  occurred.
-
-But though the Thebans and their Athenian supporters, having all the
-prudential arguments on their side, carried the point so that no step
-was taken to restore the Platæans, nor any hostile declaration made
-against those to whom they owed their expulsion,—yet the general
-result of the debates, animated by keen sympathy with the Platæan
-sufferers, tended decidedly to poison the good feeling, and loosen
-the ties, between Athens and Thebes. This change showed itself
-by an increased gravitation towards peace with Sparta; strongly
-advocated by the orator Kallistratus, and now promoted not merely by
-the announced Persian intervention, but by the heavy cost of war,
-and the absence of all prospective gain from its continuance. The
-resolution was at length taken,—first by Athens, and next, probably,
-by the majority of the confederates assembled at Athens,—to make
-propositions of peace to Sparta, where it was well known that similar
-dispositions prevailed towards peace. Notice of this intention was
-given to the Thebans, who were invited to send envoys thither also,
-if they chose to become parties. In the spring of 371 B.C., at the
-time when the members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy were assembled
-at Sparta, both the Athenian and Theban envoys, and those from the
-various members of the Athenian confederacy, arrived there. Among
-the Athenian envoys, two at least,—Kallias (the hereditary daduch or
-torchbearer of the Eleusinian ceremonies) and Autoklês,—were men of
-great family at Athens; and they were accompanied by Kallistratus the
-orator.[348] From the Thebans, the only man of note was Epaminondas,
-then one of the Bœotarchs.
-
-  [348] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3.
-
-  It seems doubtful, from the language of Xenophon, whether
-  Kallistratus was one of the envoys appointed, or only a companion.
-
-Of the debates which took place at this important congress, we
-have very imperfect knowledge; and of the more private diplomatic
-conversations, not less important than the debates, we have no
-knowledge at all. Xenophon gives us a speech from each of the three
-Athenians, and from no one else. That of Kallias, who announces
-himself as hereditary proxenus of Sparta at Athens, is boastful
-and empty, but eminently philo-Laconian in spirit;[349] that of
-Autoklês is in the opposite tone, full of severe censure on the past
-conduct of Sparta; that of Kallistratus, delivered after the other
-two,—while the enemies of Sparta were elate, her friends humiliated,
-and both parties silent from the fresh effect of the reproaches of
-Autoklês,[350]—is framed in a spirit of conciliation; admitting
-faults on both sides, but deprecating the continuance of war, as
-injurious to both, and showing how much the joint interests of both
-pointed towards peace.[351]
-
-  [349] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 4-6.
-
-  [350] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 7-10. Ταῦτ’ εἰπὼν, σιωπὴν μὲν παρὰ
-  πάντων ἐποίησεν (Autoklês), ἡδομένους δὲ τοὺς ἀχθομένους τοῖς
-  Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐποίησε.
-
-  [351] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 10-17.
-
-This orator, representing the Athenian diplomacy of the time,
-recognizes distinctly the peace of Antalkidas as the basis upon which
-Athens was prepared to treat,—autonomy to each city, small as well
-as great; and in this way, coinciding with the views of the Persian
-king, he dismisses with indifference the menace that Antalkidas was
-on his way back from Persia with money to aid the Lacedæmonians in
-the war. It was not from fear of the Persian treasures (he urged),—as
-the enemies of peace asserted,—that Athens sought peace.[352] Her
-affairs were now so prosperous, both by sea and land, as to prove
-that she only did so on consideration of the general evils of
-prolonged war, and on a prudent abnegation of that rash confidence
-which was always ready to contend for extreme stakes,[353] like a
-gamester playing double or quits. The time had come for both Sparta
-and Athens now to desist from hostilities. The former had the
-strength on land, the latter was predominant at sea; so that each
-could guard the other; while the reconciliation of the two would
-produce peace throughout the Hellenic world, since in each separate
-city, one of the two opposing local parties rested on Athens, the
-other on Sparta.[354] But it was indispensably necessary that
-Sparta should renounce that system of aggression (already pointedly
-denounced by the Athenian, Autoklês) on which she had acted since
-the peace of Antalkidas; a system, from which she had at last reaped
-bitter fruits, since her unjust seizure of the Kadmeia had ended by
-throwing into the arms of the Thebans all those Bœotian cities, whose
-separate autonomy she had bent her whole policy to ensure.[355]
-
-  [352] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 12, 13.
-
-  [353] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 16.
-
-  [354] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 14. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ γῆν μὲν τις ἂν,
-  ὑμῶν φίλων ὄντων, ἱκανὸς γένοιτο ἡμᾶς λυπῆσαι; κατὰ θάλαττάν γε
-  μὴν τις ἂν ὑμᾶς βλάψαι τι, ἡμῶν ὑμῖν ἐπιτηδείων ὄντων;
-
-  [355] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 11. Καὶ ὑμῖν δὲ ἔγωγε ὁρῶ διὰ τὰ
-  ἀγνωμόνως πραχθέντα ἔστιν ὅτε πολλὰ ἀντίτυπα γιγνόμενα· ὧν ἦν καὶ
-  ἡ καταληφθεῖσα ἐν Θήβαις Καδμεία· νῦν γοῦν, ὡς (?) ἐσπουδάσατε
-  αὐτονόμους τὰς πόλεις γίγνεσθαι, πᾶσαι πάλιν, ἐπεὶ ἠδικήθησαν οἱ
-  Θηβαῖοι, ἐπ’ ἐκείνοις γεγένηνται.
-
-Two points stand out in this remarkable speech, which takes a
-judicious measure of the actual position of affairs;—first, autonomy
-to every city; and autonomy in the genuine sense, not construed and
-enforced by the separate interests of Sparta, as it had been at the
-peace of Antalkidas; next, the distribution of such preëminence or
-headship, as was consistent with this universal autonomy, between
-Sparta and Athens; the former on land, the latter at sea,—as the
-means of ensuring tranquillity in Greece. That “autonomy perverted
-to Lacedæmonian purposes,”—which Perikles had denounced before
-the Peloponnesian war as the condition of Peloponnesus, and which
-had been made the political canon of Greece by the peace of
-Antalkidas,—was now at an end. On the other hand, Athens and Sparta
-were to become mutual partners and guarantees; dividing the headship
-of Greece by an ascertained line of demarcation, yet neither of them
-interfering with the principle of universal autonomy. Thebes, and
-her claim to the presidency of Bœotia, were thus to be set aside by
-mutual consent.
-
-It was upon this basis that the peace was concluded. The armaments
-on both sides were to be disbanded; the harmosts and garrisons
-everywhere withdrawn, in order that each city might enjoy full
-autonomy. If any city should fail in observance of these conditions,
-and continue in a career of force against any other, all were at
-liberty to take arms for the support of the injured party; but no
-one who did not feel disposed, was bound so to take arms. This last
-stipulation exonerated the Lacedæmonian allies from one of their most
-vexatious chains.
-
-To the conditions here mentioned, all parties agreed; and on the
-ensuing day the oaths were exchanged. Sparta took the oath for
-herself and her allies; Athens took the oath for herself only; her
-allies afterwards took it severally, each city for itself. Why such
-difference was made, we are not told; for it would seem that the
-principle of severance applied to both confederacies alike.
-
-Next came the turn of the Thebans to swear; and here the fatal hitch
-was disclosed. Epaminondas, the Theban envoy, insisted on taking the
-oath, not for Thebes separately, but for Thebes as president of the
-Bœotian federation, including all the Bœotian cities. The Spartan
-authorities on the other hand, and Agesilaus as the foremost of all,
-strenuously opposed him. They required that he should swear for
-Thebes alone, leaving the Bœotian cities to take the oath each for
-itself.
-
-Already in the course of the preliminary debates, Epaminondas
-had spoken out boldly against the ascendency of Sparta. While
-most of the deputies stood overawed by her dignity, represented
-by the energetic Agesilaus as spokesman,—he, like the Athenian
-Autoklês, and with strong sympathy from many of the deputies
-present, had proclaimed that nothing kept alive the war except her
-unjust pretensions, and that no peace could be durable unless such
-pretensions were put aside.[356] Accepting the conditions of peace
-as finally determined, he presented himself to swear to them in the
-name of the Bœotian federation. But Agesilaus, requiring that each
-of the Bœotian cities should take the oath for itself, appealed to
-those same principles of liberty which Epaminondas himself had just
-invoked, and asked him whether each of the Bœotian cities had not as
-good a title to autonomy as Thebes. Epaminondas might have replied
-by asking, why Sparta had just been permitted to take the oath for
-her allies as well as for herself. But he took a higher ground. He
-contended that the presidency of Bœotia was held by Thebes on as
-good a title as the sovereignty of Laconia by Sparta.[357] He would
-remind the assembly that when Bœotia was first conquered and settled
-by its present inhabitants, the other towns had all been planted out
-from Thebes as their chief and mother-city; that the federal union of
-all, administered by Bœotarchs chosen by and from all, with Thebes
-as president, was coeval with the first settlement of the country;
-that the separate autonomy of each was qualified by an established
-institution, devolving on the Bœotarchs and councils sitting at
-Thebes the management of the foreign relations of all jointly.
-All this had been already pleaded by the Theban orator fifty-six
-years earlier, before the five Spartan commissioners, assembled to
-determine the fate of the captives after the surrender of Platæa;
-when he required the condemnation of the Platæans as guilty of
-treason to the ancestral institutions of Bœotia;[358] and the Spartan
-commissioners had recognized the legitimacy of these institutions
-by a sweeping sentence of death against the transgressors. Moreover,
-at a time when the ascendency of Thebes over the Bœotian cities
-had been greatly impaired by her anti-Hellenic coöperation with
-the invading Persians, the Spartans themselves had assisted her
-with all their power to reëstablish it, as a countervailing force
-against Athens.[359] Epaminondas could show, that the presidency of
-Thebes over the Bœotian cities was the keystone of the federation;
-a right not only of immemorial antiquity, but pointedly recognized
-and strenuously vindicated by the Spartans themselves. He could show
-farther that it was as old, and as good, as their own right to govern
-the Laconian townships; which latter was acquired and held (as one of
-the best among their own warriors had boastfully proclaimed)[360] by
-nothing but Spartan valor and the sharpness of the Spartan sword.
-
-  [356] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 27.
-
-  [357] Plutarch. Agesil. c. 28.
-
-  [358] Thucyd. iii, 61. ἡμῶν (the Thebans) κτισάντων Πλάταιαν
-  ὕστερον τῆς ἄλλης Βοιωτίας καὶ ἄλλα χωρία μετ’ αὐτῆς, ἃ
-  ξυμμίκτους ἀνθρώπους ἐξελάσαντες ἔσχομεν, οὐκ ἠξίουν οὗτοι (the
-  Platæans), ~ὥσπερ ἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον~, ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ’ ἡμῶν,
-  ~ἔξω δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωτῶν παραβαίνοντες τὰ πάτρια~, ἐπειδὴ
-  προσηναγκάζοντο, προσεχώρησαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, etc.
-
-  Again (c. 65) he says respecting the oligarchical Platæans who
-  admitted the Theban detachment when it came by night to surprise
-  Platæa,—εἰ δὲ ἄνδρες ὑμῶν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ γένει,
-  βουλόμενοι τῆς μὲν ἔξω ξυμμαχίας ὑμᾶς παῦσαι, ~ἐς δὲ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν
-  πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια καταστῆσαι~, ἐπεκαλέσαντο ἕκοντες, etc.
-
-  Again (c. 66), κατὰ τὰ πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια, etc. Compare ii, 2.
-
-  [359] Diodor. xi, 81.
-
-  [360] Thucyd. iv, 126.
-
-  Brasidas, addressing his soldiers when serving in Macedonia, on
-  the approach of the Illyrians:—
-
-  Ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ εἶναι προσήκει ὑμῖν τὰ πολέμια, οὐ διὰ ξυμμάχων
-  παρουσίαν ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ δι’ οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν, καὶ μηδὲν πλῆθος
-  πεφοβῆσθαι ἑτέρων· οἵ γε μηδὲ ἀπὸ πολιτειῶν τοιούτων ἥκετε, ἐν
-  αἷς οὐ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων ἄρχουσιν, ἀλλὰ πλειόνων μᾶλλον ἐλάσσους·
-  ~οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ κτησάμενοι τὴν δυναστείαν ἢ τῷ μαχόμενοι κρατεῖν~.
-
-An emphatic speech of this tenor, delivered amidst the deputies
-assembled at Sparta, and arraigning the Spartans not merely in their
-supremacy over Greece, but even in their dominion at home,—was as it
-were the shadow cast before, by coming events. It opened a question
-such as no Greek had ever ventured to raise. It was a novelty
-startling to all,—extravagant probably in the eyes of Kallistratus
-and the Athenians,—but to the Spartans themselves, intolerably
-poignant and insulting.[361] They had already a long account of
-antipathy to clear off with Thebes; their own wrong-doing in seizing
-the Kadmeia,—their subsequent humiliation in losing it and being
-unable to recover it,—their recent short-comings and failures, in
-the last seven years of war against Athens and Thebes jointly. To
-aggravate this deep-seated train of hostile associations, their
-pride was now wounded in an unforeseen point, the tenderest of all.
-Agesilaus, full to overflowing of the national sentiment, which in
-the mind of a Spartan passed for the first of virtues, was stung to
-the quick. Had he been an Athenian orator like Kallistratus, his
-wrath would have found vent in an animated harangue. But a king of
-Sparta was anxious only to close these offensive discussions with
-scornful abruptness, thus leaving to the presumptuous Theban no
-middle ground between humble retraction and acknowledged hostility.
-Indignantly starting from his seat, he said to Epaminondas,—“Speak
-plainly,—will you, or will you not, leave to each of the Bœotian
-cities its separate autonomy?” To which the other replied—“Will
-_you_ leave each of the Laconian towns autonomous?” Without saying
-another word, Agesilaus immediately caused the name of the Thebans
-to be struck out of the roll, and proclaimed them excluded from the
-treaty.[362]
-
-  [361] One may judge of the revolting effect produced by such
-  a proposition, before the battle of Leuktra,—by reading the
-  language which Isokrates puts into the mouth of the Spartan
-  prince Archidamus, five or six years after that battle,
-  protesting that all Spartan patriots ought to perish rather than
-  consent to the relinquishment of Messenia,—περὶ μὲν ἄλλων τινῶν
-  ἀμφισβητήσεις, ἐγίγνοντο, περὶ δὲ Μεσσήνης, οὔτε βασιλεὺς, οὐθ’
-  ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλις, οὐδὲ πώποθ’ ἡμῖν ἐνεκάλεσεν ὡς ἀδίκως
-  κεκτημένοις αὐτήν (Isok. Arch. s. 32). In the spring of 371 B.C.,
-  what had once been Messenia, was only a portion of Laconia, which
-  no one thought of distinguishing from the other portions (see
-  Thucyd. iv, 3, 11).
-
-  [362] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 28; Pausanias, ix, 13, 1; compare
-  Diodor. xv, 51. Pausanias erroneously assigns the debate to the
-  congress preceding the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B.C.; at which
-  time Epaminondas was an unknown man.
-
-  Plutarch gives this interchange of brief questions, between
-  Agesilaus and Epaminondas, which is in substance the same as that
-  given by Pausanias, and has every appearance of being the truth.
-  But he introduces it in a very bold and abrupt way, such as
-  cannot be conformable to the reality. To raise a question about
-  the right of Sparta to govern Laconia, was a most daring novelty.
-  A courageous and patriotic Theban might venture upon it as a
-  retort against those Spartans who questioned the right of Thebes
-  to her presidency of Bœotia; but he would never do so without
-  assigning his reasons to justify an assertion so startling to a
-  large portion of his hearers. The reasons which I here ascribe to
-  Epaminondas are such as we know to have formed the Theban creed,
-  in reference to the Bœotian cities; such as were actually urged
-  by the Theban orator in 427 B.C., when the fate of the Platæan
-  captives was under discussion. After Epaminondas had once laid
-  out the reasons in support of his assertion, he might then, if
-  the same brief question were angrily put to him a second time,
-  meet it with another equally brief counter-question or retort. It
-  is this final interchange of thrusts which Plutarch has given,
-  omitting the arguments previously stated by Epaminondas, and
-  necessary to warrant the seeming paradox which he advances. We
-  must recollect that Epaminondas does not contend that Thebes was
-  entitled to _as much power_ in Bœotia as Sparta in Laconia. He
-  only contends that Bœotia, under the presidency of Thebes, was as
-  much an integral political aggregate, as Laconia under Sparta,—in
-  reference to the Grecian world.
-
-  Xenophon differs from Plutarch in his account of the conduct of
-  the Theban envoys. He does not mention Epaminondas at all, nor
-  any envoy by name; but he says that “the Thebans, having entered
-  their name among the cities which had taken the oaths, came on
-  the next day and requested, that the entry might be altered,
-  and that ‘_the Bœotians_’ might be substituted in place of _the
-  Thebans_, as having taken the oath. Agesilaus told them that he
-  could make no change; but he would strike their names out if they
-  chose, and he accordingly did strike them out” (vi, 3, 19). It
-  seems to me that this account is far less probable than that of
-  Plutarch, and bears every mark of being incorrect. Why should
-  such a man as Epaminondas (who doubtless was the envoy) consent
-  at first to waive the presidential pretensions of Thebes, and to
-  swear for her alone? If he did consent, why should he retract
-  the next day? Xenophon is anxious to make out Agesilaus to be as
-  much in the right as may be; since the fatal consequences of his
-  proceedings manifested themselves but too soon.
-
-Such was the close of this memorable congress at Sparta in June,
-371 B.C. Between the Spartans and Athenians, and their respective
-allies, peace was sworn. But the Thebans were excluded, and their
-deputies returned home (if we may believe Xenophon[363]) discouraged
-and mournful. Yet such a man as Epaminondas must have been well
-aware that neither his claims nor his arguments would be admitted by
-Sparta. If therefore he was disappointed with the result, this must
-be because he had counted upon, but did not obtain, support from the
-Athenians or others.
-
-  [363] Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 3, 20.
-
-The leaning of the Athenian deputies had been adverse rather than
-favorable to Thebes throughout the congress. They were disinclined,
-from their sympathies with the Platæans, to advocate the presidential
-claims of Thebes, though on the whole it was the political interest
-of Athens that the Bœotian federation should be maintained, as
-a bulwark to herself against Sparta. Yet the relations of Athens
-with Thebes, after the congress as before it, were still those of
-friendship, nominal rather than sincere. It was only with Sparta, and
-her allies, that Thebes was at war, without a single ally attached to
-her. On the whole, Kallistratus and his colleagues had managed the
-interests of Athens in this congress with great prudence and success.
-They had disengaged her from the alliance with Thebes, which had been
-dictated seven years before by common fear and dislike of Sparta,
-but which had no longer any adequate motive to countervail the cost
-of continuing the war; at the same time, the disengagement had been
-accomplished without bad faith. The gains of Athens, during the last
-seven years of war, had been considerable. She had acquired a great
-naval power, and a body of maritime confederates; while her enemies
-the Spartans had lost their naval power in the like proportion.
-Athens was now the ascendent leader of maritime and insular
-Greece,—while Sparta still continued to be the leading power on land,
-but only on land; and a tacit partnership was now established between
-the two, each recognizing the other in their respective halves of the
-Hellenic hegemony.[364] Moreover, Athens had the prudence to draw her
-stake, and quit the game, when at the maximum of her acquisitions,
-without taking the risk of future contingencies.
-
-  [364] Diodor. xv, 38-82.
-
-On both sides, the system of compulsory and indefeasable
-confederacies was renounced; a renunciation which had already been
-once sworn to, sixteen years before, at the peace of Antalkidas, but
-treacherously perverted by Sparta in the execution. Under this new
-engagement, the allies of Sparta or Athens ceased to constitute an
-organized permanent body, voting by its majority, passing resolutions
-permanently binding upon dissentients, arming the chief state with
-more or less power of enforcement against all, and forbidding
-voluntary secessions of individual members. They became a mere
-uncemented aggregate of individuals, each acting for himself; taking
-counsel together as long as they chose, and coöperating so far as
-all were in harmony; but no one being bound by any decision of the
-others, nor recognizing any right in the others to compel him even
-to performance of what he had specially promised, if it became
-irksome. By such change, therefore, both Athens and Sparta were
-losers in power; yet the latter to a much greater extent than the
-former, inasmuch as her reach of power over her allies had been more
-comprehensive and stringent.
-
-We here see the exact point upon which the requisition addressed
-by Sparta to Thebes, and the controversy between Epaminondas and
-Agesilaus, really turned. Agesilaus contended that the relation
-between Thebes and the other Bœotian cities was the same as what
-subsisted between Sparta and her allies; that accordingly, when
-Sparta renounced the indefeasible and compulsory character of
-her confederacy, and agreed to deal with each of its members as
-a self-acting and independent unit, she was entitled to demand
-that Thebes should do the same in reference to the Bœotian towns.
-Epaminondas, on the contrary, denied the justice of this parallel.
-He maintained that the proper subject of comparison to be taken, was
-the relation of Sparta, not to her extra-Laconian allies, but to
-the Laconian townships; that the federal union of the Bœotian towns
-under Thebes was coeval with the Bœotian settlement, and among the
-most ancient phenomena of Greece; that in reference to other states,
-Bœotia, like Laconia or Attica, was the compound and organized
-whole, of which each separate city was only a fraction; that other
-Greeks had no more right to meddle with the internal constitution
-of these fractions, and convert each of them into an integer,—than
-to insist on separate independence for each of the townships of
-Laconia. Epaminondas did not mean to contend that the power of Thebes
-over the Bœotian cities was as complete and absolute in degree, as
-that of Sparta over the Laconian townships; but merely that her
-presidential power, and the federal system of which it formed a part,
-were established, indefeasible, and beyond the interference of any
-Hellenic convention,—quite as much as the internal government of
-Sparta in Laconia.
-
-Once already this question had been disputed between Sparta and
-Thebes at the peace of Antalkidas; and already decided once by the
-superior power of the former, extorting submission from the latter.
-The last sixteen years had reversed the previous decision, and
-enabled the Thebans to reconquer those presidential rights of which
-the former peace had deprived them. Again, therefore, the question
-stood for decision, with keener antipathy on both sides,—with
-diminished power in Sparta,—but with increased force, increased
-confidence, and a new leader whose inestimable worth was even yet
-but half-known,—in Thebes. The Athenians,—friendly with both, yet
-allies of neither,—suffered the dispute to be fought out without
-interfering. How it was settled will appear in the next chapter.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXVIII.
-
-BATTLE OF LEUKTRA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.
-
-
-Immediately after the congress at Sparta in June 371 B.C., the
-Athenians and Lacedæmonians both took steps to perform the covenants
-sworn respectively to each other as well as to the allies generally.
-The Athenians despatched orders to Iphikrates, who was still at
-Korkyra or in the Ionian Sea, engaged in incursions against the
-Lacedæmonian or Peloponnesian coasts,—that he should forthwith
-conduct his fleet home, and that if he had made any captures
-subsequent to the exchange of oaths at Sparta, they should all be
-restored;[365] so as to prevent the misunderstanding which had
-occurred fifty-two years before with Brasidas,[366] in the peninsula
-of Pallênê. The Lacedæmonians on their side sent to withdraw their
-harmosts and their garrisons from every city still under occupation.
-Since they had already made such promise once before, at the peace
-of Antalkidas, but had never performed it,—commissioners,[367] not
-Spartans, were now named from the general congress, to enforce the
-execution of the agreement.
-
-  [365] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 1.
-
-  [366] Thucyd. iv.
-
-  [367] Diodorus, xv, 38. ἐξαγωγεῖς, Xen. Hellen. _l. c._
-
-  Diodorus refers the statements in this chapter to the peace
-  between Athens and Sparta in 374 B.C. I have already remarked
-  that they belong properly to the peace of 371 B.C.; as Wesseling
-  suspects in his note.
-
-No great haste, however, was probably shown in executing this part
-of the conditions; for the whole soul and sentiment of the Spartans
-were absorbed by their quarrel with Thebes. The miso-Theban impulse
-now drove them on with a fury which overcame all other thoughts;
-and which, though doubtless Agesilaus and others considered it at
-the time as legitimate patriotic resentment for the recent insult,
-appeared to the philo-Laconian Xenophon, when he looked back upon it
-from the subsequent season of Spartan humiliation, to be a misguiding
-inspiration sent by the gods,[368]—like that of the Homeric Atê. Now
-that Thebes stood isolated from Athens and all other allies out of
-Bœotia, Agesilaus had full confidence of being able to subdue her
-thoroughly. The same impression of the superiority of Spartan force
-was also entertained both by the Athenians and by other Greeks; to a
-great degree even by the Thebans themselves. It was anticipated that
-the Spartans would break up the city of Thebes into villages (as they
-had done at Mantinea) or perhaps retaliate upon her the fate which
-she had inflicted upon Platæa—or even decimate her citizens and her
-property to the profit of the Delphian god, pursuant to the vow that
-had been taken more than a century before, in consequence of the
-assistance lent by the Thebans to Xerxes.[369] Few persons out of
-Bœotia doubted of the success of Sparta.
-
-  [368] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3. ἤδη γὰρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ δαιμόνιον
-  ἦγεν, etc.
-
-  [369] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 20; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 20; Diodor.
-  xv, 51.
-
-To attack Thebes, however, an army was wanted; and as Sparta, by the
-peace just sworn, had renounced everything like imperial ascendency
-over her allies, leaving each of them free to send or withhold
-assistance as they chose,—to raise an army was no easy task; for
-the allies, generally speaking, being not at all inflamed with the
-Spartan antipathy against Thebes, desired only to be left to enjoy
-their newly-acquired liberty. But it so happened, that at the moment
-when peace was sworn, the Spartan king Kleombrotus was actually at
-the head of an army, of Lacedæmonians and allies, in Phokis, on the
-north-western frontier of Bœotia. Immediately on hearing of the
-peace, Kleombrotus sent home to ask for instructions as to his future
-proceedings. By the unanimous voice of the Spartan authorities and
-assembly, with Agesilaus as the most vehement of all,[370] he was
-directed to march against the Thebans, unless they should flinch
-at the last moment (as they had done at the peace of Antalkidas),
-and relinquish their presidency over the other Bœotian cities.
-One citizen alone, named Prothöus, interrupted this unanimity. He
-protested against the order, first, as a violation of their oaths,
-which required them to disband the army and reconstitute it on the
-voluntary principle,—next, as imprudent in regard to the allies, who
-now looked upon such liberty as their right, and would never serve
-with cordiality unless it were granted to them. But Prothöus was
-treated with disdain as a silly alarmist,[371] and the peremptory
-order was despatched to Kleombrotus; accompanied, probably, by a
-reinforcement of Spartans and Lacedæmonians, the number of whom, in
-the ensuing battle, seems to have been greater than can reasonably be
-imagined to have been before serving in Phokis.
-
-  [370] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 28.
-
-  [371] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 2, 3. ἐκεῖνον μὲν φλυαρεῖν ἡγήσατο, etc.
-
-Meanwhile no symptoms of concession were manifested at Thebes.[372]
-Epaminondas, on his return, had found cordial sympathy with the
-resolute tone which he had adopted both in defence of the Bœotian
-federation and against Sparta. Though every one felt the magnitude
-of the danger, it was still hoped that the enemy might be prevented
-from penetrating out of Phokis into Bœotia. Epaminondas accordingly
-occupied with a strong force the narrow pass near Koroneia, lying
-between a spur of Mount Helikon on one side and the Lake Kopaïs on
-the other; the same position as had been taken by the Bœotians, and
-forced by the army returning from Asia under Agesilaus, twenty-three
-years before. Orchomenus lay northward (that is, on the Phokian side)
-of this position; and its citizens, as well as its Lacedæmonian
-garrison, now doubtless formed part of the invading army of
-Kleombrotus. That prince, with a degree of military skill rare in
-the Spartan commanders, baffled all the Theban calculations. Instead
-of marching by the regular road from Phokis into Bœotia, he turned
-southward by a mountain-road scarcely deemed practicable, defeated
-the Theban division under Chæreas which guarded it, and crossed the
-ridge of Helikon to the Bœotian port of Kreusis on the Crissæan Gulf.
-Coming upon this place by surprise, he stormed it, capturing twelve
-Theban triremes which lay in the harbor. He then left a garrison
-to occupy the port, and marched without delay over the mountainous
-ground into the territory of Thespiæ on the eastern declivity
-of Helikon; where he encamped on the high ground, at a place of
-ever-memorable name, called Leuktra.[373]
-
-  [372] It is stated that either the Lacedæmonians from Sparta,
-  or Kleombrotus from Phokis, sent a new formal requisition to
-  Thebes, that the Bœotian cities should be left autonomous; and
-  the requisition was repudiated (Diodor. xv, 51; Aristeides, Or.
-  (Leuktr.) ii, xxxiv, p. 644, ed. Dindorf). But such mission seems
-  very doubtful.
-
-  [373] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3, 4; Diodor. xv, 53; Pausan. ix, 13, 2.
-
-Here was an important success, skilfully gained; not only placing
-Kleombrotus within an easy march of Thebes, but also opening a sure
-communication by sea with Sparta, through the port of Kreusis, and
-thus eluding the difficulties of Mount Kithæron. Both the king
-and the Lacedæmonians around him were full of joy and confidence;
-while the Thebans on their side were struck with dismay as well as
-surprise. It required all the ability of Epaminondas, and all the
-daring of Pelopidas, to uphold the resolution of their countrymen,
-and to explain away or neutralize the terrific signs and portents,
-which a dispirited Greek was sure to see in every accident of the
-road. At length, however, they succeeded in this, and the Thebans
-with their allied Bœotians were marched out from Thebes to Leuktra,
-where they were posted on a declivity opposite to the Spartan camp.
-They were commanded by the seven Bœotarchs, of whom Epaminondas
-was one. But such was the prevalent apprehension of joining battle
-with the Spartans on equal terms, that even when actually on the
-ground, three of these Bœotarchs refused to concur in the order for
-fighting, and proposed to shut themselves up in Thebes for a siege,
-sending their wives and families away to Athens. Epaminondas was
-vainly combatting their determination, when the seventh Bœotarch,
-Branchylides, arrived from the passes of Kithæron, where he had been
-on guard, and was prevailed upon to vote in favor of the bolder
-course. Though a majority was thus secured for fighting, yet the
-feeling throughout the Theban camp was more that of brave despair
-than of cheering hope; a conviction that it was better to perish in
-the field, than to live in exile with the Lacedæmonians masters
-of the Kadmeia. Some encouraging omens, however, were transmitted
-to the camp, from the temples in Thebes as well as from that of
-Trophonius at Lebadeia:[374] and a Spartan exile named Leandrias,
-serving in the Theban ranks, ventured to assure them that they were
-now on the very spot foredoomed for the overthrow of the Lacedæmonian
-empire. Here stood the tomb of two females (daughters of a Leuktrian
-named Skedasus) who had been violated by two Lacedæmonians and had
-afterwards slain themselves. Skedasus, after having in vain attempted
-to obtain justice from the Spartans for this outrage, came back,
-imprecating curses on them, and slew himself also. The vengeance of
-these departed sufferers would now be sure to pour itself out on
-Sparta, when her army was in their own district and near their own
-tomb. And the Theban leaders, to whom the tale was full of opportune
-encouragement, crowned the tomb with wreaths, invoking the aid of its
-inmates against the common enemy now present.[375]
-
-  [374] Kallisthenes, apud Cic. de Divinatione, i, 34, Fragm. 9,
-  ed. Didot.
-
-  [375] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 7; Diodor. xv, 54; Pausan. ix, 13, 3;
-  Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 20, 21; Polyænus, ii, 3, 8.
-
-  The latter relates that Pelopidas in a dream saw Skedasus,
-  who directed him to offer on this tomb “an auburn virgin” to
-  the deceased females. Pelopidas and his friends were greatly
-  perplexed about the fulfilment of this command; many urged
-  that it was necessary for some maiden to devote herself, or to
-  be devoted by her parents, as a victim for the safety of the
-  country, like Menœkeus and Makaria in the ancient legends; others
-  denounced the idea as cruel and inadmissible. In the midst of the
-  debate, a mare, with a chestnut filly, galloped up, and stopped
-  not far off; upon which the prophet Theokritus exclaimed,—“Here
-  comes the victim required, sent by the special providence of the
-  gods.” The chestnut filly was caught and offered as a sacrifice
-  on the tomb; every one being in high spirits from a conviction
-  that the mandate of the gods had been executed.
-
-  The prophet Theokritus figures in the treatise of Plutarch De
-  Genio Socratis (c. 3, p. 576 D.) as one of the companions of
-  Pelopidas in the conspiracy whereby the Theban oligarchy was put
-  down and the Lacedæmonians expelled from the Kadmeia.
-
-While others were thus comforted by the hope of superhuman aid,
-Epaminondas, to whom the order of the coming battle had been
-confided, took care that no human precautions should be wanting. His
-task was arduous; for not only were his troops dispirited, while
-those of the enemy were confident,—but their numbers were inferior,
-and some of the Bœotians present were hardly even trustworthy.
-What the exact numbers were on either side, we are not permitted
-to know. Diodorus assigns about six thousand men to the Thebans;
-Plutarch states the numbers of Kleombrotus at eleven thousand.[376]
-Without placing faith in these figures, we see good reason for
-believing that the Theban total was decidedly inferior. For such
-inferiority Epaminondas strove to make up by skilful tactics, and by
-a combination at that time novel as well as ingenious. In all former
-Grecian battles, the opposite armies had been drawn up in line,
-and had fought along the whole line; or at least such had been the
-intention of the generals,—and if it was not realized, the cause was
-to be sought in accidents of the ground, or backwardness or disorder
-on the part of some division of the soldiers. Departing from this
-habit, Epaminondas now arrayed his troops so as to bring his own left
-to bear with irresistible force upon the Spartan right, and to keep
-back the rest of his army comparatively out of action. Knowing that
-Kleombrotus, with the Spartans and all the official persons, would be
-on the right of their own line, he calculated that, if successful on
-this point against the best troops, he should find little resistance
-from the remainder. Accordingly he placed on his own left wing
-chosen Theban hoplites, to the prodigious depth of fifty shields,
-with Pelopidas and the Sacred Band in front. His order of advance
-was disposed obliquely or in echelon, so that the deep column on
-the left should join battle first, while the centre and right kept
-comparatively back and held themselves more in a defensive attitude.
-
-  [376] Diodor. xv, 52-56; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 20.
-
-In 371 B.C., such a combination was absolutely new, and betokened
-high military genius. It is therefore no disgrace to Kleombrotus
-that he was not prepared for it, and that he adhered to the ordinary
-Grecian tactics of joining battle at once along the whole line.
-But so unbounded was the confidence reigning among the Spartans,
-that there never was any occasion on which peculiar precautions
-were less thought of. When, from their entrenched camp on the
-Leuktrian eminence, they saw the Thebans encamped on an opposite
-eminence, separated from them by a small breadth of low ground and
-moderate declivities,—their only impatience was to hurry on the
-decisive moment, so as to prevent the enemy from escaping. Both the
-partisans and the opponents of Kleombrotus united in provoking
-the order for battle, each in their own language. The former urged
-him, since he had never yet done anything against the Thebans, to
-strike a blow, and clear himself from the disparaging comparisons
-which rumor instituted between him and Agesilaus; the latter gave
-it to be understood, that if Kleombrotus were now backward, their
-suspicions would be confirmed that he leaned in his heart towards
-the Thebans.[377] Probably the king was himself sufficiently eager
-to fight, and so would any other Spartan general have been, under
-the same circumstances, before the battle of Leuktra. But even had
-he been otherwise, the impatience, prevalent among the Lacedæmonian
-portion of his army, left him no option. Accordingly, the decided
-resolution to fight was taken. The last council was held, and the
-final orders issued by Kleombrotus, after his morning meal, where
-copious libations of wine both attested and increased the confident
-temper of every man. The army was marched out of the camp, and
-arrayed on the lower portion of the declivity; Kleombrotus with
-the Spartans and most of the Lacedæmonians being on the right, in
-an order of twelve deep. Some Lacedæmonians were also on the left,
-but respecting the order of the other parts of the line, we have no
-information. The cavalry was chiefly posted along the front.
-
-  [377] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5.
-
-Meanwhile, Epaminondas also marched down his declivity, in his
-own chosen order of battle: his left wing being both forward, and
-strengthened into very deep order, for desperate attack. His cavalry
-too were posted in front of his line. But before he commenced his
-march, he sent away his baggage and attendants home to Thebes;
-while at the same time he made proclamation that any of his Bœotian
-hoplites, who were not hearty in the cause, might also retire, if
-they chose. Of such permission the Thespians immediately availed
-themselves;[378] so many were there, in the Theban camp, who
-estimated the chances to be all in favor of Lacedæmonian victory. But
-when these men, a large portion of them unarmed, were seen retiring,
-a considerable detachment from the army of Kleombrotus, either with
-or without orders, ran after to prevent their escape, and forced
-them to return for safety to the main Theban army. The most zealous
-among the allies of Sparta present,—the Phokians, the Phliasians, and
-the Herakleots, together with a body of mercenaries,—executed this
-movement; which seems to have weakened the Lacedæmonians in the main
-battle, without doing any mischief to the Thebans.
-
-  [378] Polyæn. ii, 2, 2; Pausanias, ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1.
-
-The cavalry first engaged, in front of both lines; and here the
-superiority of the Thebans soon became manifest. The Lacedæmonian
-cavalry,—at no time very good, but at this moment unusually bad,
-composed of raw and feeble novices, mounted on horses provided by
-the rich,—was soon broken and driven back upon the infantry, whose
-ranks were disturbed by the fugitives. To reëstablish the battle,
-Kleombrotus gave the word for the infantry to advance, himself
-personally leading the right. The victorious Theban cavalry probably
-hung upon the Lacedæmonian infantry of the centre and left, and
-prevented them from making much forward movement; while Epaminondas
-and Pelopidas with their left, advanced according to their intention
-to bear down Kleombrotus and his right wing. The shock here was
-terrible; on both sides victory was resolutely and desperately
-disputed, in a close hand-combat, with pushing of opposite shields
-and opposite masses. But such was the overwhelming force of the
-Theban charge,—with the sacred band or chosen warriors in front,
-composed of men highly trained in the palæstra,[379] and the deep
-column of fifty shields propelling behind,—that even the Spartans,
-with all their courage, obstinacy, and discipline, were unable to
-stand up against it. Kleombrotus, himself either in or near the
-front, was mortally wounded, apparently early in the battle; and
-it was only by heroic and unexampled efforts, on the part of his
-comrades around, that he was carried off yet alive, so as to preserve
-him from falling into the hands of the enemy. Around him also fell
-the most eminent members of the Spartan official staff; Deinon the
-polemarch, Sphodrias, with his son Kleonymus, and several others.
-After an obstinate resistance and a fearful slaughter, the right wing
-of the Spartans was completely beaten, and driven back to their camp
-on the higher ground.
-
-  [379] Plutarch, Symposiac. ii. 5, p. 639 F.
-
-It was upon this Spartan right wing, where the Theban left was
-irresistibly strong, that all the stress of the battle fell,—as
-Epaminondas had intended that it should. In no other part of the line
-does there appear to have been any serious fighting; partly through
-his deliberate scheme of not pushing forward either his centre or
-his right,—partly through the preliminary victory of the Theban
-cavalry, which probably checked a part of the forward march of the
-enemy’s line,—and partly also through the lukewarm adherence, or even
-suppressed hostility, of the allies marshalled under the command of
-Kleombrotus.[380] The Phokians and Herakleots,—zealous in the cause
-from hatred of Thebes,—had quitted the line to strike a blow at the
-retiring baggage and attendants; while the remaining allies, after
-mere nominal fighting and little or no loss, retired to the camp
-as soon as they saw the Spartan right defeated and driven back to
-it. Moreover, even some Lacedæmonians on the left wing, probably
-astounded by the lukewarmness of those around them, and by the
-unexpected calamity on their own right, fell back in the same manner.
-The whole Lacedæmonian force, with the dying king, was thus again
-assembled and formed behind the entrenchment on the higher ground,
-where the victorious Thebans did not attempt to molest them.[381]
-
-  [380] Pausanias (ix, 13, 4; compare viii, 6, 1) lays great stress
-  upon this indifference or even treachery of the allies. Xenophon
-  says quite enough to authenticate the reality of the fact (Hellen.
-  vi, 4, 15-24); see also Cicero De Offic. ii, 7, 26.
-
-  Polyænus has more than one anecdote respecting the dexterity of
-  Agesilaus in dealing with faint-hearted conduct or desertion on
-  the part of the allies of Sparta (Polyæn. ii, 1, 18-20).
-
-  [381] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 13, 14.
-
-But very different were their feelings as they now stood arrayed
-in the camp, from that exulting boastfulness with which they had
-quitted it an hour or two before; and fearful was the loss when
-it came to be verified. Of seven hundred Spartans who had marched
-forth from the camp, only three hundred returned to it.[382] One
-thousand Lacedæmonians, besides, had been left on the field, even
-by the admission of Xenophon; probably the real number was even
-larger. Apart from this, the death of Kleombrotus was of itself an
-event impressive to every one, the like of which had never occurred
-since the fatal day of Thermopylæ. But this was not all. The allies
-who stood alongside of them in arms were now altered men. All were
-sick of their cause, and averse to farther exertion; some scarcely
-concealed a positive satisfaction at the defeat. And when the
-surviving polemarchs, now commanders, took counsel with the principal
-officers as to the steps proper in the emergency, there were a few,
-but very few, Spartans who pressed for renewal of the battle, and for
-recovering by force their slain brethren in the field, or perishing
-in the attempt. All the rest felt like beaten men; so that the
-polemarchs, giving effect to the general sentiment, sent a herald to
-solicit the regular truce for burial of their dead. This the Thebans
-granted, after erecting their own trophy.[383] But Epaminondas,
-aware that the Spartans would practise every stratagem to conceal
-the magnitude of their losses, coupled the grant with a condition
-that the allies should bury their dead first. It was found that the
-allies had scarce any dead to pick up, and that nearly every slain
-warrior on the field was a Lacedæmonian.[384] And thus the Theban
-general, while he placed the loss beyond possibility of concealment,
-proclaimed at the same time such public evidence of Spartan courage,
-as to rescue the misfortune of Leuktra from all aggravation on the
-score of dishonor. What the Theban loss was, Xenophon does not tell
-us. Pausanias states it at forty-seven men,[385] Diodorus at three
-hundred. The former number is preposterously small, and even the
-latter is doubtless under the truth; for a victory in close fight,
-over soldiers like the Spartans, must have been dearly purchased.
-Though the bodies of the Spartans were given up to burial, their arms
-were retained; and the shields of the principal officers were seen by
-the traveller Pausanias at Thebes five hundred years afterwards.[386]
-
-  [382] Xen. Hellen. l. c. Plutarch (Agesil. c. 28) states a
-  thousand Lacedæmonians to have been slain; Pausanias (ix, 13, 4)
-  gives the number as more than a thousand; Diodorus mentions four
-  thousand (xv. 56), which is doubtless above the truth, though the
-  number given by Xenophon may be fairly presumed as somewhat below
-  it. Dionysius of Halikarnassus (Antiq. Roman. ii, 17) states that
-  seventeen hundred Spartans perished.
-
-  [383] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 15.
-
-  [384] Pausan. ix, 13, 4; Plutarch, Apotheg. Reg. p. 193 B.;
-  Cicero, de officiis, ii, 7.
-
-  [385] Pausan. ix, 13, 4; Diodor. xv, 55.
-
-  [386] Pausan. ix, 16, 3.
-
-Twenty days only had elapsed, from the time when Epaminondas quitted
-Sparta after Thebes had been excluded from the general peace, to
-the day when he stood victorious on the field of Leuktra.[387]
-The event came like a thunderclap upon every one in Greece, upon
-victors as well as vanquished,—upon allies and neutrals, near and
-distant, alike. The general expectation had been that Thebes would
-be speedily overthrown and dismantled; instead of which, not only
-she had escaped, but had inflicted a crushing blow on the military
-majesty of Sparta. It is in vain that Xenophon,—whose account of the
-battle is obscure, partial, and imprinted with that chagrin which
-the event occasioned to him,[388]—ascribes the defeat to untoward
-accidents,[389] or to the rashness and convivial carelessness of
-Kleombrotus; upon whose generalship Agesilaus and his party at Sparta
-did not scruple to cast ungenerous reproach,[390] while others
-faintly exculpated him by saying that he had fought contrary to
-his better judgment, under fear of unpopularity. Such criticisms,
-coming from men wise after the fact, and consoling themselves for
-the public calamity by censuring the unfortunate commander, will
-not stand examination. Kleombrotus represented on this occasion the
-feeling universal among his countrymen. He was ordered to march
-against Thebes with the full belief, entertained by Agesilaus and all
-the Spartan leaders, that her unassisted force could not resist him.
-To fight the Thebans on open ground was exactly what he and every
-other Spartan desired. While his manner of forcing the entrance of
-Bœotia, and his capture of Kreusis, was a creditable manœuvre, he
-seems to have arranged his order of battle in the manner usual with
-Grecian generals at the time. There appears no reason to censure
-his generalship, except in so far as he was unable to divine,—what
-no one else divined,—the superior combinations of his adversary,
-then for the first time applied to practice. To the discredit of
-Xenophon, Epaminondas is never named in his narrative of the battle,
-though he recognizes in substance that the battle was decided by
-the irresistible Theban force brought to bear upon one point of
-the enemy’s phalanx; a fact which both Plutarch and Diodorus[391]
-expressly refer to the genius of the general. All the calculations
-of Epaminondas turned out successful. The bravery of the Thebans,
-cavalry as well as infantry, seconded by the training which they had
-received during the last few years, was found sufficient to carry
-his plans into full execution. To this circumstance, principally,
-was owing the great revolution of opinion throughout Greece which
-followed the battle. Every one felt that a new military power had
-arisen, and that the Theban training, under the generalship of
-Epaminondas, had proved itself more than a match on a fair field,
-with shield and spear, and with numbers on the whole inferior,—for
-the ancient Lykurgean discipline; which last had hitherto stood
-without a parallel as turning out artists and craftsmen in war,
-against mere citizens in the opposite ranks, armed but without the
-like training.[392] Essentially stationary and old-fashioned, the
-Lykurgean discipline was now overborne by the progressive military
-improvement of other states, handled by a preëminent tactician; a
-misfortune predicted by the Corinthians[393] at Sparta sixty years
-before, and now realised, to the conviction of all Greece, on the
-field of Leuktra.
-
-  [387] This is an important date, preserved by Plutarch (Agesil.
-  c. 28). The congress was broken up at Sparta on the fourteenth of
-  the Attic month Skirrophorion (June), the last month of the year
-  of the Athenian archon Alkisthenes; the battle was fought on the
-  fifth of the Attic month of Hekatombæon, the first month of the
-  next Attic year, of the archon Phrasikleidês; about the beginning
-  of July.
-
-  [388] Diodorus differs from Xenophon on one important matter
-  connected with the battle; affirming that Archidamus son of
-  Agesilaus was present and fought, together with various other
-  circumstances, which I shall discuss presently, in a future note.
-  I follow Xenophon.
-
-  [389] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 8. Εἰς δ’ οὖν τὴν μάχην τοῖς μὲν
-  Λακεδαιμονίοις πάντα τἀναντία ἐγίγνετο, τοῖς δὲ (to the Thebans)
-  πάντα καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης κατωρθοῦτο.
-
-  [390] Isokrates, in the Oration vi, called _Archidamus_ (composed
-  about five years after the battle, as if to be spoken by
-  Archidamus son of Agesilaus), puts this statement distinctly
-  into the mouth of Archidamus—μέχρι μὲν ταυτησὶ τῆς ἡμέρας
-  δεδυστυχηκέναι δοκοῦμεν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τῇ πρὸς Θηβαίους, καὶ τοῖς μὲν
-  σώμασι κρατηθῆναι ~διὰ τὸν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡγησάμενον~, etc. (s. 9).
-
-  I take his statement as good evidence of the real opinion
-  entertained both by Agesilaus and by Archidamus; an opinion the
-  more natural, since the two contemporary kings of Sparta were
-  almost always at variance, and at the head of opposing parties;
-  especially true about Agesilaus and Kleombrotus, during the life
-  of the latter.
-
-  Cicero (probably copying Kallisthenes or Ephorus) says, de
-  Officiis, i, 24, 84—“Illa plaga (Lacedæmoniis) pestifera,
-  quâ, quum Cleombrotus invidiam timens temere cum Epaminondâ
-  conflixisset, Lacedæmoniorum opes corruerunt.” Polybius remarks
-  (ix. 23, we know not from whom he borrowed) that all the
-  proceedings of Kleombrotus during the empire of Sparta, were
-  marked with a generous regard for the interests and feelings
-  of the allies; while the proceedings of Agesilaus were of the
-  opposite character.
-
-  [391] Diodor. xv, 55. Epaminondas, ἰδίᾳ τινι καὶ περιττῇ τάξει
-  χρησάμενος, διὰ τῆς ἰδίας στρατηγίας περιεποιήσατο τὴν περιβόητον
-  νίκην ... διὸ καὶ λοξὴν ποιήσας τὴν φάλαγγα, τῷ τοὺς ἐπιλέκτους
-  ἔχοντι κέρατι ἔγνω κρίνειν τὴν μάχην, etc. Compare Plutarch,
-  Pelop. c. 23.
-
-  [392] See Aristotel. Politic. viii, 3, 3, 5.
-
-  Compare Xenophon, De Repub. Laced. xiii, 5. τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους
-  αὐτοσχεδιαστὰς εἶναι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ μόνους
-  τῷ ὄντι τεχνίτας τῶν πολεμικῶν—and Xenoph. Memorab. iii, 5, 13,
-  14.
-
-  [393] Thucyd. i, 71. ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν (of you Spartans) τὰ
-  ἐπιτηδεύματα πρὸς αὐτούς ἐστιν. ~Ἀνάγκη δ’ ὥσπερ τέχνης ἀεὶ τὰ
-  ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρατεῖν~· καὶ ἡσυχαζούσῃ μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα
-  ἄριστα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκαζομένοις ἰέναι, ~πολλῆς καὶ τῆς
-  ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ~, etc.
-
-But if the Spartan system was thus invaded and overpassed in its
-privilege of training soldiers, there was another species of teaching
-wherein it neither was nor could be overpassed,—the hard lesson of
-enduring pain and suppressing emotion. Memorable indeed was the
-manner in which the news of this fatal catastrophe was received at
-Sparta. To prepare the reader by an appropriate contrast, we may turn
-to the manifestation at Athens twenty-seven years before, when the
-trireme called Paralus arrived from Ægospotami, bearing tidings of
-the capture of the entire Athenian fleet. “The moan of distress (says
-the historian)[394] reached all up the Long Walls from Peiræus to
-Athens, as each man communicated the news to his neighbor: on that
-night, not a man slept, from bewailing for his lost fellow-citizens
-and for his own impending ruin.” Not such was the scene at Sparta,
-when the messenger arrived from the field of Leuktra, although there
-was everything calculated to render the shock violent. For not only
-was the defeat calamitous and humiliating beyond all former parallel,
-but it came at a moment when every man reckoned on victory. As soon
-as Kleombrotus, having forced his way into Bœotia, saw the unassisted
-Thebans on plain ground before him, no Spartan entertained any doubt
-of the result. Under this state of feeling, a messenger arrived
-with the astounding revelation, that the army was totally defeated,
-with the loss of the king, of four hundred Spartans, and more than
-a thousand Lacedæmonians; and that defeat stood confessed by having
-solicited the truce for interment of the slain. At the moment when
-he arrived, the festival called the Gymnopædia was actually being
-celebrated, on its last day; and the chorus of grown men was going
-through its usual solemnity in the theatre. In spite of all the
-poignancy of the intelligence, the ephors would not permit the
-solemnity to be either interrupted or abridged. “_Of necessity, I
-suppose, they were grieved_,—but they went through the whole as if
-nothing had happened, only communicating the names of the slain to
-their relations, and issuing a general order to the women, to make
-no noise or wailing, but to bear the misfortune in silence.” That
-such an order should be issued, is sufficiently remarkable; that it
-should be issued and obeyed, is what could not be expected; that it
-should not only be issued and obeyed, but overpassed, is what no man
-could believe, if it were not expressly attested by the contemporary
-historian. “On the morrow (says he) you might see those whose
-relations had been slain, walking about in public with bright and
-cheerful countenances; but of those whose relatives survived, scarce
-one showed himself; and the few who were abroad, looked mournful and
-humbled.”[395]
-
-  [394] Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 3.
-
-  [395] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 16. Γενομένων δὲ τούτων, ὁ μὲν εἰς τὴν
-  Λακεδαίμονα ἀγγελῶν τὸ πάθος ἀφικνεῖται, Γυμνοπαιδιῶν τε οὐσῶν
-  τῆς τελευταίας, καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρικοῦ χόρου ἔνδον ὄντος· Οἱ δὲ ἔφοροι,
-  ἐπεὶ ἤκουσαν τὸ πάθος, ἐλυποῦντο μὲν, ὥσπερ οἶμαι, ἀνάγκῃ· τὸν
-  μέντοι χόρον οὐκ ἐξήγαγον, ἀλλὰ διαγωνίσασθαι εἴων. Καὶ τὰ μὲν
-  ὀνόματα πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους ἑκάστου τῶν τεθνηκότων ἀπέδοσαν·
-  προεῖπον δὲ ταῖς γυναιξὶ, μὴ ποιεῖν κραυγὴν, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ τὸ πάθος
-  φέρειν. Τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ ἦν ὁρᾷν, ὧν μὲν ἐτέθνασαν οἱ προσήκοντες,
-  λιπαροὺς καὶ φαιδροὺς ἐν τῷ φανερῷ ἀναστρεφομένους· ὧν δὲ ζῶντες
-  ἠγγελμένοι ἦσαν, ὀλίγους ἂν εἶδες, τούτους δὲ σκυθρωποὺς καὶ
-  ταπεινοὺς περιϊόντας—and Plutarch, Agesil. c. 29.
-
-  See a similar statement of Xenophon, after he has recounted the
-  cutting in pieces of the Lacedæmonian mora near Lechæum, about
-  the satisfaction and even triumph of those of the Lacedæmonians
-  who had lost relations in the battle; while every one else was
-  mournful (Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 10). Compare also Justin, xxviii,
-  4—the behavior after the defeat of Sellasia.
-
-In comparing this extraordinary self-constraint and obedience to
-orders, at Sparta, under the most trying circumstances,—with the
-sensitive and demonstrative temper, and spontaneous outburst of
-feeling at Athens, so much more nearly approaching to the Homeric
-type of Greeks,—we must at the same time remark, that in reference
-to active and heroic efforts for the purpose of repairing past
-calamities and making head against preponderant odds, the Athenians
-were decidedly the better of the two. I have already recounted
-the prodigious and unexpected energy displayed by Athens, after
-the ruinous loss of her two armaments before Syracuse, when no one
-expected that she could have held out for six months: I am now
-about to recount the proceedings of Sparta, after the calamity at
-Leuktra,—a calamity great and serious indeed, yet in positive amount
-inferior to what had befallen the Athenians at Syracuse. The reader
-will find that, looking to the intensity of active effort in both
-cases, the comparison is all to the advantage of Athens; excusing at
-least, if not justifying, the boast of Perikles[396] in his memorable
-funeral harangue,—that his countrymen, without the rigorous drill
-of Spartans, were yet found noway inferior to Spartans in daring
-exertion, when the hour of actual trial arrived.
-
-  [396] Thucyd. ii, 39.
-
-It was the first obligation of the ephors to provide for the safety
-of their defeated army in Bœotia; for which purpose they put in march
-nearly the whole remaining force of Sparta. Of the Lacedæmonian
-moræ, or military divisions (seemingly six in the aggregate), two
-or three had been sent with Kleombrotus; all the remainder were now
-despatched, even including elderly citizens up to near sixty years of
-age, and all who had been left behind in consequence of other public
-offices. Archidamus took the command (Agesilaus still continuing
-to be disabled), and employed himself in getting together the aid
-promised from Tegea,—from the villages representing the disintegrated
-Mantinea,—from Corinth, Sikyon, Phlius, and Achaia; all these places
-being still under the same oligarchies which had held them under
-Lacedæmonian patronage, and still adhering to Sparta. Triremes were
-equipped at Corinth, as a means of transporting the new army across
-to Kreusis, and thus joining the defeated troops at Leuktra; the port
-of Kreusis, the recent acquisition of Kleombrotus, being now found
-inestimable, as the only means of access into Bœotia.[397]
-
-  [397] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 17-19.
-
-Meanwhile the defeated army still continued in its entrenched camp
-at Leuktra, where the Thebans were at first in no hurry to disturb
-it. Besides that this was a very arduous enterprise, even after the
-recent victory,—we must recollect the actual feeling of the Thebans
-themselves, upon whom their own victory had come by surprise, at a
-moment when they were animated more by despair than by hope. They
-were doubtless absorbed in the intoxicating triumph and exultation
-of the moment, with the embraces and felicitations of their families
-in Thebes, rescued from impending destruction by their valor. Like
-the Syracusans after their last great victory[398] over the Athenian
-fleet in the Great Harbor, they probably required an interval to give
-loose to their feelings of ecstasy, before they would resume action.
-Epaminondas and the other leaders, aware how much the value of Theban
-alliance was now enhanced, endeavored to obtain reinforcement from
-without, before they proceeded to follow up the blow. To Athens they
-sent a herald, crowned with wreaths of triumph, proclaiming their
-recent victory. They invited the Athenians to employ the present
-opportunity for taking full revenge on Sparta, by joining their hands
-with those of Thebes. But the sympathies of the Athenians were now
-rather hostile than friendly to Thebes, besides that they had sworn
-peace with Sparta, not a month before. The Senate, who were assembled
-in the acropolis when the herald arrived, heard his news with evident
-chagrin, and dismissed him without even a word of courtesy; while
-the unfortunate Platæans, who were doubtless waiting in the city in
-expectation of the victory of Kleombrotus, and of their own speedy
-reëstablishment, found themselves again struck down and doomed to
-indefinite exile.
-
-  [398] See Thucyd. vii, 73.
-
-To Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly, another Theban herald was sent for the
-same purpose, and very differently received. The despot sent back
-word that he would come forthwith by sea, and ordered triremes to be
-equipped for the purpose. But this was a mere deception; for at the
-same time, he collected the mercenaries and cavalry immediately near
-to him, and began his march by land. So rapid were his movements,
-that he forestalled all opposition,—though he had to traverse the
-territory of the Herakleots and Phokians, who were his bitter
-enemies,—and joined the Thebans safely in Bœotia.[399] But when the
-Theban leaders proposed that he should attack the Lacedæmonian camp
-in flank, from the high ground, while they would march straight
-up the hill and attack it in front,—Jason strongly dissuaded the
-enterprise as too perilous; recommending that they should permit the
-enemy’s departure under capitulation. “Be content (said he) with the
-great victory which you have already gained. Do not compromise it
-by attempting something yet more hazardous, against Lacedæmonians
-driven to despair in their camp. Recollect that a few days ago,
-_you_ yourselves were in despair, and that your recent victory is
-the fruit of that very feeling. Remember that the gods take pleasure
-in bringing about these sudden changes of fortune.”[400] Having by
-such representations convinced the Thebans, he addressed a friendly
-message to the Lacedæmonians, reminding them of their dangerous
-position, as well as of the little trust to be reposed in their
-allies,—and offering himself as mediator to negotiate for their safe
-retreat. Their acquiescence was readily given; and at his instance,
-a truce was agreed to by both parties, assuring to the Lacedæmonians
-the liberty of quitting Bœotia. In spite of the agreement, however,
-the Lacedæmonian commander placed little faith either in the Thebans
-or in Jason, apprehending a fraud for the purpose of inducing him
-to quit the camp and of attacking him on the march. Accordingly,
-he issued public orders in the camp for every man to be ready for
-departure after the evening meal, and to march in the night to
-Kithæron, with a view of passing that mountain on the next morning.
-Having put the enemy on this false scent, he directed his real
-night-march by a different and not very easy way, first to Kreusis,
-next to Ægosthena in the Megarian territory.[401] The Thebans offered
-no opposition; nor is it at all probable that they intended any
-fraud, considering that Jason was here the guarantee, and that he had
-at least no motive to break his word.
-
-  [399] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 20, 21.
-
-  However, since the Phokians formed part of the beaten army at
-  Leuktra, it must be confessed that Jason had less to fear from
-  them at this moment, than at any other.
-
-  [400] Pausanias states that immediately after the battle,
-  Epaminondas gave permission to the allies of Sparta to depart and
-  go home, by which permission they profited, so that the Spartans
-  now stood alone in the camp (Paus. ix, 14, 1). This however is
-  inconsistent with the account of Xenophon (vi, 4, 26), and I
-  think improbable.
-
-  Sievers (Geschichte, etc. p. 247) thinks that Jason preserved
-  the Spartans by outwitting and deluding Epaminondas. But it
-  appears to me that the storming of the Spartan camp was an
-  arduous enterprise, wherein more Thebans than Spartans would
-  have been slain: moreover, the Spartans were masters of the port
-  of Kreusis, so that there was little chance of starving out the
-  camp before reinforcements arrived. The capitulation granted by
-  Epaminondas seems to have been really the wisest proceeding.
-
-  [401] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 22-25.
-
-  The road from Kreusis to Leuktra, however, must have been that by
-  which Kleombrotus arrived.
-
-It was at Ægosthena that the retreating Lacedæmonians met Archidamus,
-who had advanced to that point with the Laconian forces, and was
-awaiting the junction of his Peloponnesian allies. The purpose of his
-march being now completed, he advanced no farther. The armament was
-disbanded, and Lacedæmonians as well as allies returned home.[402]
-
-  [402] This is the most convenient place for noticing the
-  discrepancy, as to the battle of Leuktra, between Diodorus and
-  Xenophon. I have followed Xenophon.
-
-  Diodorus (xv, 54) states both the arrival of Jason in Bœotia, and
-  the out-march of Archidamus from Sparta, to have taken place,
-  _not after_ the battle of Leuktra, but _before_ it. Jason (he
-  says) came with a considerable force to the aid of the Thebans.
-  He prevailed upon Kleombrotus, who doubted the sufficiency of
-  his own numbers, to agree to a truce and to evacuate Bœotia.
-  But as Kleombrotus was marching homeward, he met Archidamus
-  with a second Lacedæmonian army, on his way to Bœotia, by order
-  of the ephors, for the purpose of reinforcing him. Accordingly
-  Kleombrotus, finding himself thus unexpectedly strengthened,
-  openly broke the truce just concluded, and marched back with
-  Archidamus to Leuktra. Here they fought the battle, Kleombrotus
-  commanding the right wing, and Archidamus the left. They
-  sustained a complete defeat, in which Kleombrotus was slain; the
-  result being the same on both statements.
-
-  We must here make our election between the narrative of
-  Xenophon and that of Diodorus. That the authority of the
-  former is greater, speaking generally, I need hardly remark;
-  nevertheless his philo-Laconian partialities become so glaring
-  and preponderant, during these latter books of the Hellenica
-  (where he is discharging the mournful duty of recounting
-  the humiliation of Sparta), as to afford some color for the
-  suspicions of Palmerius, Morus, and Schneider, who think that
-  Xenophon has concealed the direct violation of truce on the part
-  of the Spartans, and that the facts really occurred as Diodorus
-  has described them. See Schneider ad Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5, 6.
-
-  It will be found, however, on examining the facts, that such
-  suspicion ought not to be admitted, and that there are grounds
-  for preferring the narrative of Xenophon.
-
-  1. He explains to us how it happened that the remains of the
-  Spartan army, after the defeat of Leuktra, escaped out of Bœotia.
-  Jason arrives after the battle, and prevails upon the Thebans
-  to allow them to retreat under a truce; Archidamus also arrives
-  after the battle to take them up. If the defeat had taken place
-  under the circumstances mentioned by Diodorus,—Archidamus and the
-  survivors would have found it scarcely possible to escape out of
-  Bœotia.
-
-  2. If Diodorus relates correctly, there must have been
-  a violation of truce on the part of Kleombrotus and the
-  Lacedæmonians, as glaring as any that occurs in Grecian history.
-  But such violation is never afterwards alluded to by any one,
-  among the misdeeds of the Lacedæmonians.
-
-  3. A part, and an essential part, of the story of Diodorus,
-  is, that Archidamus was present and fought at Leuktra. But we
-  have independent evidence rendering it almost certain that
-  he was not there. Whoever reads the Discourse of Isokrates
-  called _Archidamus_ (Or. vi, sect. 9, 10, 129), will see that
-  such observations could not have been put into the mouth of
-  Archidamus, if he had been present there, and (of course) in
-  joint command with Kleombrotus.
-
-  4. If Diodorus be correct, Sparta must have levied a new army
-  from her allies, just after having sworn the peace, which peace
-  exonerated her allies from everything like obligation to follow
-  her headship; and a new army, not for the purpose of extricating
-  defeated comrades in Bœotia, but for pure aggression against
-  Thebes. This, to say the least, is eminently improbable.
-
-  On these grounds, I adhere to Xenophon and depart from Diodorus.
-
-In all communities, the return of so many defeated soldiers,
-liberated under a capitulation by the enemy, would have been a
-scene of mourning. But in Sparta it was pregnant with grave and
-dangerous consequences. So terrible was the scorn and ignominy
-heaped upon the Spartan citizen who survived a defeat, that life
-became utterly intolerable to him. The mere fact sufficed for his
-condemnation, without any inquiry into justifying or extenuating
-circumstances. No citizen at home would speak to him, or be seen
-consorting with him in tent, game, or chorus; no other family would
-intermarry with his; if he was seen walking about with an air of
-cheerfulness, he was struck and ill-used by the passers-by, until
-he assumed that visible humility which was supposed to become his
-degraded position. Such rigorous treatment (which we learn from
-the panegyrist Xenophon)[403] helps to explain the satisfaction of
-the Spartan father and mother, when they learned that their son
-was among the slain and not among the survivors. Defeat of Spartan
-troops had hitherto been rare. But in the case of the prisoners
-at Sphakteria, when released from captivity and brought back to a
-degraded existence at Sparta, some uneasiness had been felt, and some
-precautions deemed necessary to prevent them from becoming dangerous
-malcontents.[404] Here was another case yet more formidable. The
-vanquished returning from Leuktra were numerous, while the severe
-loss sustained in the battle amply attested their bravery. Aware of
-the danger of enforcing against them the established custom, the
-ephors referred the case to Agesilaus; who proposed that for that
-time and case the customary penalties should be allowed to sleep;
-but should be revived afterwards and come into force as before. Such
-was the step accordingly taken;[405] so that the survivors from
-this fatal battle-field were enabled to mingle with the remaining
-citizens without dishonor or degradation. The step was indeed doubly
-necessary, considering the small aggregate number of fully qualified
-citizens; which number always tended to decline,—from the nature
-of the Spartan political franchise combined with the exigencies of
-Spartan training,[406]—and could not bear even so great a diminution
-as that of the four hundred slain at Leuktra. “Sparta (says
-Aristotle) could not stand up against a single defeat, but was ruined
-through the small number of her citizens.”[407]
-
-  [403] Xenoph. Rep. Lac. c. ix; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.
-
-  [404] Thucyd. v, 34.
-
-  [405] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30; Plutarch, Apophtheg. Lacon. p. 214
-  B.; Apophtheg. Reg. p. 191 C.; Polyænus, ii, 1, 13.
-
-  A similar suspension of penalties, for the special occasion, was
-  enacted after the great defeat of Agis and the Lacedæmonians by
-  Antipater, B.C. 330. Akrotatus, son of King Kleomenes, was the
-  only person at Sparta who opposed the suspension (Diodor. xix,
-  70). He incurred the strongest unpopularity for such opposition.
-  Compare also Justin, xxviii, 4—describing the public feeling at
-  Sparta after the defeat at Sellasia.
-
-  [406] The explanation of Spartan citizenship will be found in an
-  earlier part of this History, Vol. II, Ch. vi.
-
-  [407] Aristotel. Polit. ii, 6, 12. Μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν
-  ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ’ ἀπώλετο διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν.
-
-The cause here adverted to by Aristotle, as explaining the utter
-loss of ascendency abroad, and the capital diminution both of power
-and of inviolability at home, which will now be found to come thick
-upon Sparta, was undoubtedly real and important. But a fact still
-more important was, the alteration of opinion produced everywhere
-in Greece with regard to Sparta, by the sudden shock of the battle
-of Leuktra. All the prestige and old associations connected with
-her long-established power vanished; while the hostility and
-fears, inspired both by herself and by her partisans, but hitherto
-reluctantly held back in silence,—now burst forth into open
-manifestation.
-
-The ascendency, exercised down to this time by Sparta north of the
-Corinthian Gulf, in Phokis and elsewhere, passed away from her,
-and became divided between the victorious Thebans and Jason of
-Pheræ. The Thebans, and the Bœotian confederates who were now in
-cordial sympathy with them, excited to enthusiasm by their recent
-success, were eager for fresh glories, and readily submitted to the
-full exigencies of military training; while under a leader like
-Epaminondas, their ardor was turned to such good account, that
-they became better soldiers every month.[408] The Phokians, unable
-to defend themselves single-handed, were glad to come under the
-protection of the Thebans, as less bitterly hostile to them than
-the Thessalian Jason,—and concluded with them obligations of mutual
-defence and alliance.[409] The cities of Eubœa, together with the
-Lokrians (both Epiknemidian and Opuntian,) the Malians and the
-town of Heraklea, followed the example. The latter town was now
-defenceless; for Jason, in returning from Bœotia to Thessaly, had
-assaulted it and destroyed its fortifications; since by its important
-site near the pass of Thermopylæ, it might easily be held as a
-position to bar his entrance into Southern Greece.[410] The Bœotian
-town of Orchomenus, which had held with the Lacedæmonians even until
-the late battle, was now quite defenceless; and the Thebans, highly
-exasperated against its inhabitants, were disposed to destroy the
-city, reducing the inhabitants to slavery. Severe as this proposition
-was, it would not have exceeded the customary rigors of war, nor
-even what might have befallen Thebes herself, had Kleombrotus been
-victorious at Leuktra. But the strenuous remonstrance of Epaminondas
-prevented it from being carried into execution. Alike distinguished
-for mild temper and for long-sighted views, he reminded his
-countrymen that in their present aspiring hopes towards ascendency in
-Greece, it was essential to establish a character for moderation of
-dealing[411] not inferior to their military courage, as attested by
-the recent victory. Accordingly, the Orchomenians were pardoned upon
-submission, and re-admitted as members of the Bœotian confederacy. To
-the Thespians, however, the same lenity was not extended. They were
-expelled from Bœotia, and their territory annexed to Thebes. It will
-be recollected, that immediately before the battle of Leuktra, when
-Epaminondas caused proclamation to be made that such of the Bœotians
-as were disaffected to the Theban cause might march away, the
-Thespians had availed themselves of the permission and departed.[412]
-The fugitive Thespians found shelter, like the Platæans, at
-Athens.[413]
-
-  [408] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 24. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ πάντες
-  ἐγυμνάζοντο περὶ τὰ ὅπλα, ἀγαλλόμενοι τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις νίκῃ, etc.
-
-  These are remarkable words from the unwilling pen of Xenophon:
-  compare vii, 5, 12.
-
-  [409] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 23; vii, 5, 4; Diodor. xv, 57.
-
-  [410] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 27; vi, 5, 23.
-
-  [411] Diodor. xv, 57.
-
-  [412] Pausan. ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1.
-
-  [413] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 1.
-
-  I have already given my reasons (in a note on the preceding
-  chapter) for believing that the Thespians were not ἀπόλιδες
-  _before_ the battle of Leuktra.
-
-While Thebes was commemorating her recent victory by the erection
-of a treasury chamber,[414] and the dedication of pious offerings
-at Delphi,—while the military organization of Bœotia was receiving
-such marked improvement, and the cluster of dependent states attached
-to Thebes was thus becoming larger, under the able management of
-Epaminondas,—Jason in Thessaly was also growing more powerful every
-day. He was tagus of all Thessaly; with its tributary neighbors under
-complete obedience,—with Macedonia partly dependent on him,—and with
-a mercenary force, well paid and trained, greater than had ever
-been assembled in Greece. By dismantling Heraklea, in his return
-home from Bœotia, he had laid open the strait of Thermopylæ, so
-as to be sure of access into southern Greece whenever he chose.
-His personal ability and ambition, combined with his great power,
-inspired universal alarm; for no man knew whither he would direct
-his arms; whether to Asia, against the Persian king, as he was fond
-of boasting,[415]—or northward against the cities in Chalkidikê—or
-southward against Greece.
-
-  [414] Pausanias, x, 11, 4.
-
-  [415] Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 141.
-
-The last-mentioned plan seemed the most probable, at the beginning
-of 370 B.C., half a year after the battle of Leuktra: for Jason
-proclaimed distinctly his intention of being present at the Pythian
-festival (the season for which was about August 1, 370 B.C.,
-near Delphi), not only with splendid presents and sacrifices to
-Apollo, but also at the head of a numerous army. Orders had been
-given that his troops should hold themselves ready for military
-service,[416]—about the time when the festival was to be celebrated;
-and requisitions had been sent round, demanding from all his
-tributaries victims for the Pythian sacrifice, to a total of not
-less than one thousand bulls, and ten thousand sheep, goats, and
-swine; besides a prize-bull to take the lead in the procession, for
-which a wreath of gold was to be given. Never before had such honor
-been done to the god; for those who came to offer sacrifice were
-usually content with one or more beasts bred on the neighboring
-plain of Kirrha.[417] We must recollect, however, that this Pythian
-festival of 370 B.C. occurred under peculiar circumstances; for the
-two previous festivals in 374 B.C. and 378 B.C. must have been
-comparatively unfrequented; in consequence of the war between Sparta
-and her allies on one side, and Athens and Thebes on the other,—and
-also of the occupation of Phokis by Kleombrotus. Hence the festival
-of 370 B.C., following immediately after the peace, appeared to
-justify an extraordinary burst of pious magnificence, to make up for
-the niggardly tributes to the god during the two former; while the
-hostile dispositions of the Phokians would be alleged as an excuse
-for the military force intended to accompany Jason.
-
-  [416] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 30. παρήγγειλε δὲ καὶ ὡς
-  στρατευσομένοις εἰς τὸν περὶ τὰ Πύθια χρόνον Θετταλοῖς
-  παρασκευάζεσθαι.
-
-  I agree with Dr. Arnold’s construction of this passage (see his
-  Appendix ad. Thucyd. v, 1, at the end of the second volume of his
-  edition of Thucydides) as opposed to that of Mr. Fynes Clinton.
-  At the same time, I do not think that the passage proves much
-  either in favor of his view, or against the view of Mr. Clinton,
-  about the month of the Pythian festival; which I incline to
-  conceive as celebrated about August 1; a little later than Dr.
-  Arnold, a little earlier than Mr. Clinton, supposes. Looking
-  to the lunar months of the Greeks, we must recollect that the
-  festival would not always coincide with the same month or week of
-  our year.
-
-  I cannot concur with Dr. Arnold in setting aside the statement of
-  Plutarch respecting the coincidence of the Pythian festival with
-  the battle of Koroneia.
-
-  [417] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 29, 30. βοῦν ἠγεμόνα, etc.
-
-But there were other intentions, generally believed though not
-formally announced, which no Greek could imagine without uneasiness.
-It was affirmed that Jason was about to arrogate to himself the
-presidency and celebration of the festival, which belonged of
-right to the Amphiktyonic assembly. It was feared, moreover, that
-he would lay hands on the rich treasures of the Delphian temple; a
-scheme said to have been conceived by the Syracusan despot Dionysius
-fifteen years before, in conjunction with the epirot Alketas, who
-was now dependent upon Jason.[418] As there were no visible means
-of warding off this blow, the Delphians consulted the god to know
-what they were to do if Jason approached the treasury; upon which
-the god replied, that he would himself take care of it,—and he kept
-his word. This enterprising despot, in the flower of his age and at
-the summit of his power, perished most unexpectedly before the day
-of the festival arrived.[419] He had been reviewing his cavalry near
-Pheræ, and was sitting to receive and answer petitioners, when seven
-young men approached, apparently in hot dispute with each other, and
-appealing to him for a settlement. As soon as they got near, they set
-upon him and slew him.[420] One was killed on the spot by the guards,
-and another also as he was mounting on horseback; but the remaining
-five contrived to reach horses ready prepared for them and to gallop
-away out of the reach of pursuit. In most of the Grecian cities which
-these fugitives visited, they were received with distinguished honor,
-as having relieved the Grecian world from one who inspired universal
-alarm,[421] now that Sparta was unable to resist him, while no other
-power had as yet taken her place.
-
-  [418] Diodor. xv, 13.
-
-  [419] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 30. ἀποκρίνασθαι τὸν θεὸν, ὅτι αὐτῷ
-  μελήσει. ~Ὁ δ’ οὖν ἀνὴρ, τηλικοῦτος ὢν, καὶ τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα
-  διανοούμενος~, etc.
-
-  Xenophon evidently considers the sudden removal of Jason as a
-  consequence of the previous intention expressed by the god to
-  take care of his own treasure.
-
-  [420] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 31, 32.
-
-  The cause which provoked these young men is differently stated:
-  compare Diodor. xv, 60; Valer. Maxim. ix, 10, 2.
-
-  [421] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 32.
-
-  The death of Jason in the spring or early summer of 370 B.C.,
-  refutes the compliment which Cornelius Nepos (Timoth. c. 4) pays
-  to Timotheus; who can never have made war upon Jason after 373
-  B.C., when he received the latter at Athens in his house.
-
-Jason was succeeded in his dignity, but neither in his power, nor
-ability, by two brothers,—Polyphron and Polydorus. Had he lived
-longer, he would have influenced most seriously the subsequent
-destinies of Greece. What else he would have done, we cannot say; but
-he would have interfered materially with the development of Theban
-power. Thebes was a great gainer by his death, though perfectly
-innocent of it, and though in alliance with him to the last; insomuch
-that his widow went to reside there for security.[422] Epaminondas
-was relieved from a most formidable rival, while the body of Theban
-allies north of Bœotia became much more dependent than they would
-have remained, if there had been a competing power like that of Jason
-in Thessaly. The treasures of the god were preserved a few years
-longer, to be rifled by another hand.
-
-  [422] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 37.
-
-While these proceedings were going on in Northern Greece, during
-the months immediately succeeding the battle of Leuktra, events
-not less serious and stirring had occurred in Peloponnesus. The
-treaty sworn at Sparta twenty days before that battle, bound the
-Lacedæmonians to disband their forces, remove all their harmosts
-and garrisons, and leave every subordinate city to its own liberty
-of action. As they did not scruple to violate the treaty by the
-orders sent to Kleombrotus, so they probably were not zealous in
-executing the remaining conditions; though officers were named, for
-the express purpose of going round to see that the evacuation of the
-cities was really carried into effect.[423] But it probably was not
-accomplished in twenty days; nor would it perhaps have been ever more
-than nominally accomplished, if Kleombrotus had been successful in
-Bœotia. But after these twenty days came the portentous intelligence
-of the fate of that prince and his army. The invincible arm of
-Sparta was broken; she had not a man to spare for the maintenance
-of foreign ascendency. Her harmosts disappeared at once, (as they
-had disappeared from the Asiatic and insular cities twenty-three
-years before, immediately after the battle of Knidus,[424]) and
-returned home. Nor was this all. The Lacedæmonian ascendency had
-been maintained everywhere by local oligarchies or dekarchies,
-which had been for the most part violent and oppressive. Against
-these governments, now deprived of their foreign support, the
-long-accumulated flood of internal discontent burst with irresistible
-force, stimulated probably by returning exiles. Their past
-misgovernment was avenged by severe sentences and proscription, to
-the length of great reactionary injustice; and the parties banished
-by this anti-Spartan revolution became so numerous, as to harass and
-alarm seriously the newly-established governments. Such were the
-commotions which, during the latter half of 371 B.C., disturbed
-many of the Peloponnesian towns,—Phigaleia, Phlius, Corinth, Sikyon,
-Megara, etc., though with great local difference, both of detail and
-of result.[425]
-
-  [423] Diodor. xv, 38. ἐξαγωγεῖς.
-
-  [424] Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-5.
-
-  [425] Diodor. xv, 39, 40.
-
-  Diodorus mentions these commotions as if they had taken place
-  after the peace concluded in 374 B.C., and not after the peace
-  of 371 B.C. But it is impossible that they can have taken place
-  after the former, which in point of fact, was broken off almost
-  as soon as sworn,—was never carried into effect,—and comprised no
-  one but Athens and Sparta. I have before remarked that Diodorus
-  seems to have confounded, both in his mind and in his history,
-  these two treaties of peace together, and has predicated of the
-  former what really belongs to the latter. The commotions which he
-  mentions come in, most naturally and properly, immediately after
-  the battle of Leuktra.
-
-  He affirms the like reaction against Lacedæmonian supremacy and
-  its local representatives in the various cities, to have taken
-  place even after the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B.C. (xv, 5).
-  But if such reaction began at that time, it must have been
-  promptly repressed by Sparta, then in undiminished and even
-  advancing power.
-
-  Another occurrence, alleged to have happened after the battle of
-  Leuktra, may be properly noticed here. Polybius (ii, 39), and
-  Strabo seemingly copying him (viii, p. 384), assert that both
-  Sparta and Thebes agreed to leave their disputed questions of
-  power to the arbitration of the Achæans, and to abide by their
-  decision. Though I greatly respect the authority of Polybius, I
-  am unable here to reconcile his assertion either with the facts
-  which unquestionably occurred, or with general probability. If
-  any such arbitration was ever consented to, it must have come to
-  nothing; for the war went on without interruption. But I cannot
-  bring myself to believe that it was even consented to, either by
-  Thebes or by Sparta. The exuberant confidence of the former, the
-  sense of dignity on the part of the latter, must have indisposed
-  both to such a proceeding; especially to the acknowledgment of
-  umpires like the Achæan cities, who enjoyed little estimation in
-  370 B.C., though they acquired a good deal a century and a half
-  afterwards.
-
-But the city where intestine commotion took place in its most violent
-form was Argos. We do not know how this fact was connected with
-the general state of Grecian politics at the time, for Argos had
-not been in any way subject to Sparta, nor a member of the Spartan
-confederacy, nor (so far as we know) concerned in the recent war,
-since the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B.C. The Argeian government
-was a democracy, and the popular leaders were vehement in their
-denunciations against the oligarchical opposition party—who were men
-of wealth and great family position. These last, thus denounced,
-formed a conspiracy for the forcible overthrow of the government.
-But the conspiracy was discovered prior to execution, and some of
-the suspected conspirators were interrogated under the torture, to
-make them reveal their accomplices; under which interrogation one of
-them deposed against thirty conspicuous citizens. The people, after
-a hasty trial, put these thirty men to death, and confiscated their
-property, while others slew themselves to escape the same fate. So
-furious did the fear and wrath of the people become, exasperated by
-the popular leaders, that they continued their executions until they
-had put to death twelve hundred (or, as some say, fifteen hundred)
-of the principal citizens. At length the popular leaders became
-themselves tired and afraid of what they had done; upon which the
-people were animated to fury against them, and put them to death
-also.[426]
-
-  [426] Diodor. xv, 57, 58.
-
-This gloomy series of events was termed the Skytalism, or Cudgelling,
-from the instrument (as we are told) by which these multiplied
-executions were consummated; though the name seems more to indicate
-an impetuous popular insurrection than deliberate executions. We know
-the facts too imperfectly to be able to infer anything more than
-the brutal working of angry political passion amidst a population
-like that of Argos or Korkyra, where there was not (as at Athens)
-either a taste for speech, or the habit of being guided by speech,
-and of hearing both sides of every question fully discussed. Cicero
-remarks that he had never heard of an Argeian orator. The acrimony
-of Demosthenes and Æschines was discharged by mutual eloquence of
-vituperation, while the assembly or the dikastery afterwards decided
-between them. We are told that the assembled Athenian people, when
-they heard the news of the Skytalism at Argos, were so shocked at it,
-that they caused the solemnity of purification to be performed round
-the assembly.[427]
-
-  [427] Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. p. 814 B.; Isokrates.
-  Or. v, (Philip.) s. 58.; compare Dionys. Halic. Antiq. Rom. vii,
-  66.
-
-Though Sparta thus saw her confidential partisans deposed, expelled,
-or maltreated, throughout so many of the Peloponnesian cities,—and
-though as yet there was no Theban interference within the isthmus,
-either actual or prospective,—yet she was profoundly discouraged,
-and incapable of any effort either to afford protection or to uphold
-ascendency. One single defeat had driven her to the necessity of
-contending for home and family;[428] probably too the dispositions of
-her own Periœki and Helots in Laconia, were such as to require all
-her force as well as all her watchfulness. At any rate, her empire
-and her influence over the sentiments of Greeks out of Laconia,
-became suddenly extinct, to a degree which astonishes us, when
-we recollect that it had become a sort of tradition in the Greek
-mind, and that, only nine years before, it had reached as far as
-Olynthus. How completely her ascendency had passed away, is shown in
-a remarkable step taken by Athens, seemingly towards the close of
-371 B.C., about four months after the battle of Leuktra. Many of
-the Peloponnesian cities, though they had lost both their fear and
-their reverence for Sparta, were still anxious to continue members
-of a voluntary alliance under the presidency of some considerable
-city. Of this feeling the Athenians took advantage, to send envoys
-and invite them to enter into a common league at Athens, on the
-basis of the peace of Antalkidas, and of the peace recently sworn
-at Sparta.[429] Many of them, obeying the summons, entered into an
-engagement to the following effect: “I will adhere to the peace sent
-down by the Persian king, and to the resolutions of the Athenians and
-the allies generally. If any of the cities who have sworn this oath
-shall be attacked, I will assist her with all my might.” What cities,
-or how many, swore to this engagement, we are not told; we make out
-indirectly that Corinth was one;[430] but the Eleians refused it,
-on the ground that their right of sovereignty over the Marganeis,
-the Triphylians, and the Skilluntians, was not recognized. The
-formation of the league itself, however, with Athens as president, is
-a striking fact, as evidence of the sudden dethronement of Sparta,
-and as a warning that she would henceforward have to move in her
-own separate orbit, like Athens after the Peloponnesian war. Athens
-stepped into the place of Sparta, as president of the Peloponnesian
-confederacy, and guarantee of the sworn peace; though the cities
-which entered into this new compact were not for that reason
-understood to break with their ancient president.[431]
-
-  [428] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 10.
-
-  The discouragement of the Spartans is revealed by the unwilling,
-  though indirect, intimations of Xenophon,—not less than by
-  their actual conduct—Hellen. vi, 5, 21; vii, 1, 30-32; compare
-  Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.
-
-  [429] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 1-3.
-
-  Ἐνθυμηθέντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὅτι οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἔτι οἴονται, χρῆναι
-  ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ οὔπω διακέοιντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὥσπερ τοὺς
-  Ἀθηναίους διέθεσαν—μεταπέμπονται τὰς πόλεις, ὅσοι βούλονται τῆς
-  εἰρήνης μετέχειν, ἣν βασιλεὺς κατέπεμψεν.
-
-  In this passage, Morus and some other critics maintain that
-  we ought to read οὔπω (which seems not to be supported by any
-  MSS.), in place of οὕτω. Zeune and Schneider have admitted the
-  new reading into the text; yet they doubt the propriety of the
-  change, and I confess that I share their doubts. The word οὕτω
-  will construe, and gives a clear sense; a very different sense
-  from οὔπω, indeed,—yet more likely to have been intended by
-  Xenophon.
-
-  [430] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 37.
-
-  [431] Thus the Corinthians still continued allies of Sparta (Xen.
-  Hellen. vii, 4, 8).
-
-Another incident too, apparently occurring about the present time,
-though we cannot mark its exact date,—serves to mark the altered
-position of Sparta. The Thebans preferred in the assembly of
-Amphiktyons an accusation against her, for the unlawful capture of
-their citadel the Kadmeia by Phœbidas, while under a sworn peace; and
-for the sanction conferred by the Spartan authorities on this act, in
-detaining and occupying the place. The Amphiktyonic assembly found
-the Spartans guilty, and condemned them to a fine of five hundred
-talents. As the fine was not paid, the assembly, after a certain
-interval, doubled it; but the second sentence remained unexecuted as
-well as the first, since there were no means of enforcement.[432]
-Probably neither those who preferred the charge, nor those who
-passed the vote, expected that the Lacedæmonians would really submit
-to pay the fine. The utmost which could be done, by way of punishment
-for such contumacy, would be to exclude them from the Pythian games,
-which were celebrated under the presidency of the Amphiktyons; and we
-may perhaps presume that they really were thus excluded.
-
-  [432] Diodor. xvi, 23-29; Justin, viii, 1.
-
-  We may fairly suppose that both of them borrow from Theopompus,
-  who treated at large of the memorable Sacred War against the
-  Phokians, which began in 355 B.C., and in which the conduct of
-  Sparta was partly determined by this previous sentence of the
-  Amphiktyons. See Theopompi Fragm. 182-184, ed. Didot.
-
-The incident however deserves peculiar notice, in more than one
-point of view. First, as indicating the lessened dignity of Sparta.
-Since the victory of Leuktra and the death of Jason, Thebes had
-become preponderant, especially in Northern Greece, where the
-majority of the nations or races voting in the Amphiktyonic assembly
-were situated. It is plainly through the ascendency of Thebes,
-that this condemnatory vote was passed. Next, as indicating the
-incipient tendency, which we shall hereafter observe still farther
-developed, to extend the functions of the Amphiktyonic assembly
-beyond its special sphere of religious solemnities, and to make it
-the instrument of political coërcion or revenge in the hands of
-the predominant state. In the previous course of this history, an
-entire century has passed without giving occasion to mention the
-Amphiktyonic assembly as taking part in political affairs. Neither
-Thucydides nor Xenophon, though their united histories cover seventy
-years, chiefly of Hellenic conflict, ever speak of that assembly.
-The latter, indeed, does not even notice this fine imposed upon the
-Lacedæmonians, although it falls within the period of his history. We
-know the fact only from Diodorus and Justin; and unfortunately merely
-as a naked fact, without any collateral or preliminary details.
-During the sixty or seventy years preceding the battle of Leuktra,
-Sparta had always had her regular political confederacy and synod of
-allies convened by herself: her political ascendency was exercised
-over them, _eo nomine_, by a method more direct and easy than that of
-perverting the religious authority of the Amphiktyonic assembly, even
-if such a proceeding were open to her.[433] But when Thebes, after
-the battle of Leuktra, became the more powerful state individually,
-she had no such established confederacy and synod of allies, to
-sanction her propositions, and to share or abet her antipathies.
-The Amphiktyonic assembly, meeting alternately at Delphi and at
-Thermopylæ, and composed of twelve ancient races, principally
-belonging to Northern Greece, as well as most of them inconsiderable
-in power,—presented itself as a convenient instrument for her
-purposes. There was a certain show of reason for considering the
-seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas as a religious offence; since it
-was not only executed during the Pythian festival, but was in itself
-a glaring violation of the public law and interpolitical obligations
-recognized between Grecian cities; which, like other obligations,
-were believed to be under the sanction of the gods; though probably,
-if the Athenians and Platæans had preferred a similar complaint to
-the Amphiktyons against Thebes for her equally unjust attempt to
-surprise Platæa under full peace in the spring of 431 B.C.,—both
-Spartans and Thebans would have resisted it. In the present case,
-however, the Thebans had a case against Sparta sufficiently
-plausible, when combined with their overruling ascendency, to carry a
-majority in the Amphiktyonic assembly, and to procure the imposition
-of this enormous fine. In itself the sentence produced no direct
-effect,—which will explain the silence of Xenophon. But it is the
-first of a series of proceedings, connected with the Amphiktyons,
-which will be found hereafter pregnant with serious results for
-Grecian stability and independence.
-
-  [433] See Tittmann, Ueber den Bund der Amphiktyonen, pp. 192-197
-  (Berlin, 1812).
-
-Among all the inhabitants of Peloponnesus, none were more powerfully
-affected, by the recent Spartan overthrow at Leuktra, than the
-Arcadians. Tegea, their most important city, situated on the border
-of Laconia, was governed by an oligarchy wholly in the interest of
-Sparta: Orchomenus was of like sentiment; and Mantinea had been
-broken up into separate villages (about fifteen years before) by the
-Lacedæmonians themselves—an act of high-handed injustice committed
-at the zenith of their power after the peace of Antalkidas. The
-remaining Arcadian population were in great proportion villagers;
-rude men, but excellent soldiers, and always ready to follow the
-Lacedæmonian banners, as well from old habit and military deference,
-as from the love of plunder.[434]
-
-  [434] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 19.
-
-The defeat of Leuktra effaced this ancient sentiment. The Arcadians
-not only ceased to count upon victory and plunder in the service of
-Sparta, but began to fancy that their own military prowess was not
-inferior to that of the Spartans; while the disappearance of the
-harmosts left them free to follow their own inclinations. It was by
-the Mantineans that the movement was first commenced. Divested of
-Grecian city-life, and condemned to live in separate villages, each
-under its own philo-Spartan oligarchy, they had nourished a profound
-animosity, which manifested itself on the first opportunity of
-deposing these oligarchies and coming again together. The resolution
-was unanimously adopted, to re-establish Mantinea with its walls, and
-resume their political consolidation; while the leaders banished by
-the Spartans at their former intervention, now doubtless returned to
-become foremost in the work.[435] As the breaking up of Mantinea had
-been one of the most obnoxious acts of Spartan omnipotence, so there
-was now a strong sympathy in favor of its re-establishment. Many
-Arcadians from other quarters came to lend auxiliary labor, while the
-Eleians sent three talents as a contribution towards the cost. Deeply
-mortified by this proceeding, yet too weak to prevent it by force,
-the Spartans sent Agesilaus with a friendly remonstrance. Having
-been connected with the city by paternal ties of hospitality, he had
-declined the command of the army of coërcion previously employed
-against it; nevertheless, on this occasion, the Mantinean leaders
-refused to convene their public assembly to hear his communication,
-desiring that he would make known his purpose to them. Accordingly,
-he intimated that he had come with no view of hindering the
-re-establishment of the city, but simply to request that they would
-defer it until the consent of Sparta could be formally given; which
-(he promised) should soon be forthcoming, together with a handsome
-subscription to lighten the cost. But the Mantinean leaders answered,
-that compliance was impossible, since a public resolution had already
-been taken to prosecute the work forthwith. Enraged at such a rebuff,
-yet without power to resent it, Agesilaus was compelled to return
-home.[436] The Mantineans persevered and completed the rebuilding of
-their city, on a level site, and in an elliptical form, surrounded
-with elaborate walls and towers.
-
-  [435] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 6; vi, 5, 3.
-
-  [436] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 4, 5.
-
-  Pausanias (viii, 8, 6: ix, 14, 2) states that the Thebans
-  reëstablished the city of Mantinea. The act emanated from the
-  spontaneous impulse of the Mantineans and other Arcadians, before
-  the Thebans had yet begun to interfere actively in Peloponnesus,
-  which we shall presently find them doing. But it was doubtless
-  done in reliance upon Theban support, and was in all probability
-  made known to, and encouraged by, Epaminondas. It formed the
-  first step to that series of anti-Spartan measures in Arcadia,
-  which I shall presently relate.
-
-  Either the city of Mantinea now built was not exactly in the
-  same situation as the one dismantled in 385 B.C., since the
-  river Ophis did not run through it, as it had run through the
-  former,—or else the course of the Ophis has altered. If the
-  former, there would be three successive sites, the oldest of
-  them being on the hill called Ptolis, somewhat north of Gurzuli.
-  Ptolis was perhaps the larger of the primary constituent
-  villages. Ernst Curtius (Peloponnesos, p. 242) makes the hill
-  Gurzuli to be the same as the hill called Ptolis; Colonel Leake
-  distinguishes the two, and places Ptolis on his map northward
-  of Gurzuli (Peloponnesiaca, p. 378-381). The summit of Gurzuli
-  is about one mile distant from the centre of Mantinea (Leake,
-  Peloponnes. p. 383).
-
-  The walls of Mantinea, as rebuilt in 370 B.C., form an ellipse
-  of about eighteen stadia, or a little more than two miles in
-  circumference. The greater axis of the ellipse points north and
-  south. It was surrounded with a wet ditch, whose waters join into
-  one course at the west of the town, and form a brook which Sir
-  William Gell calls the Ophis (Itinerary of the Morea, p. 142).
-  The face of the wall is composed of regularly cut square stones;
-  it is about ten feet thick in all,—four feet for an outer wall,
-  two feet for an inner wall, and an intermediate space of four
-  feet filled up with rubbish. There were eight principal double
-  gates, each with a narrow winding approach, defended by a round
-  tower on each side. There were quadrangular towers, eighty feet
-  apart, all around the circumference of the walls (Ernst Curtius,
-  Peloponnesos, p. 236, 237).
-
-  These are instructive remains, indicating the ideas of the Greeks
-  respecting fortification in the time of Epaminondas. It appears
-  that Mantinea was not so large as Tegea, to which last Curtius
-  assigns a circumference of more than three miles (p. 253).
-
-The affront here offered, probably studiously offered, by Mantinean
-leaders who had either been exiles themselves, or sympathized with
-the exiles,—was only the prelude to a series of others (presently
-to be recounted) yet more galling and intolerable. But it was
-doubtless felt to the quick both by the ephors and by Agesilaus,
-as a public symptom of that prostration into which they had so
-suddenly fallen. To appreciate fully such painful sentiment, we must
-recollect that an exaggerated pride and sense of dignity, individual
-as well as collective, founded upon military excellence and earned
-by incredible rigor of training,—was the chief mental result imbibed
-by every pupil of Lykurgus, and hitherto ratified as legitimate by
-the general testimony of Greece. This was his principal recompense
-for the severe fatigue, the intense self-suppression, the narrow,
-monotonous, and unlettered routine, wherein he was born and died.
-As an individual, the Spartan citizen was pointed out by the finger
-of admiration at the Olympic and other festivals;[437] while he
-saw his city supplicated from the most distant regions of Greece,
-and obeyed almost everywhere near her own border, as Pan-hellenic
-president. On a sudden, with scarce any preparatory series of events,
-he now felt this proud prerogative sentiment not only robbed of its
-former tribute, but stung in the most mortifying manner. Agesilaus,
-especially, was the more open to such humiliation, since he was not
-only a Spartan to the core, but loaded with the consciousness of
-having exercised more influence than any other king before him,—of
-having succeeded to the throne at a moment when Sparta was at the
-maximum of her power,—and of having now in his old age accompanied
-her, in part brought her by his misjudgments, into her present
-degradation.
-
-  [437] Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus) s. 111.
-
-Agesilaus had, moreover, incurred unpopularity among the Spartans
-themselves, whose chagrin took the form of religious scruple and
-uneasiness. It has been already stated that he was, and had been
-from childhood, lame; which deformity had been vehemently insisted
-on by his opponents (during the dispute between him and Leotychides
-in 398 B.C. for the vacant throne) as disqualifying him for the
-regal dignity, and as being the precise calamity against which an
-ancient oracle—“Beware of a lame reign”—had given warning. Ingenious
-interpretation by Lysander, combined with superior personal merit
-in Agesilaus, and suspicions about the legitimacy of Leotychides,
-had caused the objection to be then overruled. But there had always
-been a party, even during the palmy days of Agesilaus, who thought
-that he had obtained the crown under no good auspices. And when
-the humiliation of Sparta arrived, every man’s religion suggested
-to him readily the cause of it,[438]—“See what comes of having set
-at nought the gracious warning of the gods, and put upon ourselves
-a lame reign!” In spite of such untoward impression, however, the
-real energy and bravery of Agesilaus, which had not deserted even
-an infirm body and an age of seventy years, was more than ever
-indispensable to his country. He was still the chief leader of
-her affairs, condemned to the sad necessity of submitting to this
-Mantinean affront, and much worse that followed it, without the least
-power of hindrance.
-
-  [438] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30, 31, 34.
-
-The reëstablishment of Mantinea was probably completed during the
-autumn and winter of B.C. 371-370. Such coalescence of villages
-into a town, coupled with the predominance of feelings hostile to
-Sparta, appears to have suggested the idea of a larger political
-union among all who bore the Arcadian name. As yet, no such union
-had ever existed; the fractions of the Arcadian name had nothing in
-common, apart from other Greeks, except many legendary and religious
-sympathies, with a belief in the same heroic lineage and indigenous
-antiquity.[439] But now the idea and aspiration, espoused with
-peculiar ardor by a leading Mantinean named Lykomedes, spread itself
-rapidly over the country, to form a “commune Arcadum,” or central
-Arcadian authority, composed in certain proportions out of all the
-sections now autonomous,—and invested with peremptory power of
-determining by the vote of its majority. Such central power, however,
-was not intended to absorb or set aside the separate governments, but
-only to be exercised for certain definite purposes; in maintaining
-unanimity at home, together with concurrent, independent action, as
-to foreign states.[440] This plan of Pan-Arcadian federation was
-warmly promoted by the Mantineans, who looked to it as a protection
-to themselves in case the Spartan power should revive; as well as
-by the Thebans and Argeians, from whom aid was expected in case of
-need. It found great favor in most parts of Arcadia, especially in
-the small districts bordering on Laconia, which stood most in need
-of union to protect themselves against the Spartans,—the Mænalians,
-Parrhasians, Eutresians, Ægytes,[441] etc. But the jealousies among
-the more considerable cities made some of them adverse to any scheme
-emanating from Mantinea. Among these unfriendly opponents were
-Heræa, on the west of Arcadia bordering on Elis,—Orchomenus,[442]
-conterminous with Mantinea to the north—and Tegea, conterminous
-to the south. The hold of the Spartans on Arcadia had been always
-maintained chiefly through Orchomenus and Tegea. The former was the
-place where they deposited their hostages taken from other suspected
-towns; the latter was ruled by Stasippus and an oligarchy devoted to
-their interests.[443]
-
-  [439] It seems, however, doubtful whether there were not some
-  common Arcadian coins struck, even before the battle of Leuktra.
-
-  Some such are extant; but they are referred by K. O. Müller, as
-  well as by M. Boeckh (Metrologisch. Untersuchungen, p. 92) to a
-  later date subsequent to the foundation of Megalopolis.
-
-  On the other hand, Ernst Curtius (Beyträge zur Aeltern Münzkunde,
-  p. 85-90, Berlin, 1851) contends that there is a great difference
-  in the style and execution of these coins, and that several
-  in all probability belong to a date earlier than the battle
-  of Leuktra. He supposes that these older coins were struck in
-  connection with the Pan-Arcadian sanctuary and temple of Zeus
-  Lykæus, and probably out of a common treasury at the temple of
-  that god for religious purposes; perhaps also in connection
-  with the temple of Artemis Hymnia (Pausan. viii, 5, 11) between
-  Mantinea and Orchomenus.
-
-  [440] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 6. συνῆγον ἐπὶ τὸ συνιέναι πᾶν τὸ
-  Ἀρκαδικὸν, καὶ ὅ,τι νικῴη ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῶν
-  πόλεων, etc.
-
-  Compare Diodor. xv, 59-62.
-
-  [441] See Pausanias, viii, 27, 2, 3.
-
-  [442] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 11.
-
-  [443] For the relations of these Arcadian cities, with Sparta and
-  with each other, see Thucyd. iv, 134; v, 61, 64, 77.
-
-Among the population of Tegea, however, a large proportion were
-ardent partisans of the new Pan-Arcadian movement, and desirous
-of breaking off their connection with Sparta. At the head of
-this party were Proxenus and Kallibius; while Stasippus and his
-friends, supported by a senate composed chiefly of their partisans,
-vehemently opposed any alteration of the existing system. Proxenus
-and his partisans resolved to appeal to the assembled people, whom
-accordingly they convoked in arms; pacific popular assemblies, with
-free discussion, forming seemingly no part of the constitution
-of the city. Stasippus and his friends appeared in armed numbers
-also; and a conflict ensued, in which each party charged the other
-with bad faith and with striking the first blow.[444] At first
-Stasippus had the advantage. Proxenus with a few of the opposite
-party were slain, while Kallibius with the remainder maintained
-himself near the town-wall, and in possession of the gate on the
-side towards Mantinea. To that city he had before despatched an
-express, entreating aid, while he opened a parley with the opponents.
-Presently the Mantinean force arrived, and was admitted within
-the gates; upon which Stasippus, seeing that he could no longer
-maintain himself, escaped by another gate towards Pallantium. He took
-sanctuary with a few friends in a neighboring temple of Artemis,
-whither he was pursued by his adversaries, who removed the roof,
-and began to cast the tiles down upon them. The unfortunate men
-were obliged to surrender. Fettered and placed on a cart, they were
-carried back to Tegea, and put on their trial before the united
-Tegeans and Mantineans, who condemned them and put them to death.
-Eight hundred Tegeans, of the defeated party, fled as exiles to
-Sparta.[445]
-
-  [444] Xenophon in his account represents Stasippus and his
-  friends as being quite in the right, and as having behaved
-  not only with justice but with clemency. But we learn from an
-  indirect admission, in another place, that there was also another
-  story, totally different, which represented Stasippus as having
-  begun unjust violence. Compare Hellenic. vi, 5, 7, 8 with vi, 5,
-  36.
-
-  The manifest partiality of Xenophon, in these latter books,
-  greatly diminishes the value of his own belief on such a matter.
-
-  [445] Xen. Hellen. vi. 5. 8, 9, 10.
-
-Such was the important revolution which now took place at Tegea; a
-struggle of force on both sides, and not of discussion,—as was in
-the nature of the Greek oligarchical governments, where scarce any
-serious change of policy in the state could be brought about without
-violence. It decided the success of the Pan-Arcadian movement, which
-now proceeded with redoubled enthusiasm. Both Mantinea and Tegea were
-cordially united in its favor; though Orchomenus, still strenuous in
-opposing it, hired for that purpose, as well as for her own defence,
-a body of mercenaries from Corinth under Polytropus. A full assembly
-of the Arcadian name was convoked at a small town called Asea, in
-the mountainous district west of Tegea. It appears to have been
-numerously attended; for we hear of one place, Eutæa (in the district
-of Mount Mænalus,[446] and near the borders of Laconia), from whence
-every single male adult went to the assembly. It was here that the
-consummation of the Pan-Arcadian confederacy was finally determined;
-though Orchomenus and Heræa still stood aloof.[447]
-
-  [446] Pausanias, viii, 27, 3.
-
-  [447] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 11, 12.
-
-There could hardly be a more fatal blow to Sparta than this loss
-to herself, and transfer to her enemies, of Tegea, the most
-powerful of her remaining allies.[448] To assist the exiles and
-avenge Stasippus, as well as to arrest the Arcadian movement,
-she resolved on a march into the country, in spite of her present
-dispirited condition; while Heræa and Lepreum, but no other places,
-sent contingents to her aid. From Elis and Argos, on the other
-hand, reinforcements came to Mantinea and Tegea. Proclaiming that
-the Mantineans had violated the recent peace by their entry into
-Tegea, Agesilaus marched across the border against them. The first
-Arcadian town which he reached was Eutæa,[449] where he found
-that all the male adults had gone to the great Arcadian assembly.
-Though the feebler population, remaining behind, were completely
-in his power, he took scrupulous care to respect both person and
-property, and even lent aid to rebuild a decayed portion of the
-wall. At Eutæa he halted a day or two, thinking it prudent to wait
-for the junction of the mercenary force and the Bœotian exiles under
-Polytropus, now at Orchomenus. Against the latter place, however,
-the Mantineans had marched under Lykomêdes, while Polytropus, coming
-forth from the walls to meet them, had been defeated with loss, and
-slain.[450] Hence Agesilaus was compelled to advance onward with
-his own unassisted forces, through the territory of Tegea up to the
-neighborhood of Mantinea. His onward march left the way from Asea
-to Tegea free, upon which the Arcadians assembled at Asea broke up,
-and marched by night to Tegea; from whence, on the next day, they
-proceeded to Mantinea, along the mountain range eastward of the
-Tegeatic plain; so that the whole Arcadian force thus became united.
-Agesilaus on his side, having ravaged the fields and encamped within
-little more than two miles from the walls of Mantinea, was agreeably
-surprised by the junction of his allies from Orchomenus, who had
-eluded by a night-march the vigilance of the enemy. Both on one side
-and on the other, the forces were thus concentrated. Agesilaus found
-himself on the first night, without intending it, embosomed in a
-recess of the mountains near Mantinea, where the Mantineans gathered
-on the high ground around, in order to attack him from above, the
-next morning. By a well-managed retreat, he extricated himself from
-this inconvenient position, and regained the plain; where he remained
-three days, prepared to give battle if the enemy came forth, in order
-that he might “not seem (says Xenophon) to hasten his departure
-through fear.”[451] As the enemy kept within their walls, he marched
-homeward, on the fourth day, to his former camp in the Tegean
-territory. The enemy did not pursue, and he then pushed on his march,
-though it was late in the evening, to Eutæa; “wishing (says Xenophon)
-to get his troops off before even the enemies’ fires could be seen,
-in order that no one might say that his return was a flight. He
-thought that he had raised the spirit of Sparta out of the previous
-discouragement, by invading Arcadia and ravaging the country without
-any enemy coming forth to fight him.”[452] The army was then brought
-back to Sparta and disbanded.
-
-  [448] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 2.
-
-  See the prodigious anxiety manifested by the Lacedæmonians
-  respecting the sure adhesion of Tegea (Thucyd. v, 64).
-
-  [449] I cannot but think that Eutæa stands marked upon the maps
-  of Kiepert at a point too far from the frontier of Laconia, and
-  so situated in reference to Asea, that Agesilaus must have passed
-  very near Asea in order to get to it; which is difficult to
-  suppose, seeing that the Arcadian convocation was assembled at
-  Asea. Xenophon calls Eutæa πόλιν ὅμορον with reference to Laconia
-  (Hellen. vi, 5, 12); this will hardly suit with the position
-  marked by Kiepert.
-
-  The district called Mænalia must have reached farther southward
-  than Kiepert indicates on his map. It included Oresteion, which
-  was on the straight road from Sparta to Tegea (Thucyd. v, 64;
-  Herodot. ix, 11). Kiepert has placed Oresteion in his map
-  agreeably to what seems the meaning of Pausanias, viii, 44, 3.
-  But it rather appears that the place mentioned by Pausanias must
-  have been _Oresthasion_, and that _Oresteion_ must have been a
-  different place, though Pausanias considers them the same. See
-  the geographical Appendix to K. O. Müller’s Dorians, vol. ii, p.
-  442—Germ. edit.
-
-  [450] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 13, 14; Diodor. xv, 62.
-
-  [451] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 20. ὅπως μὴ δοκοίη φοβούμενος σπεύδειν
-  τὴν ἔφοδον.
-
-  See Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, c. xxiv, p. 74, 75.
-  The exact spot designated by the words τὸν ὄπισθεν κόλπον τῆς
-  Μαντινικῆς, seems hardly to be identified.
-
-  [452] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 21. βουλόμενος ἀπαγαγεῖν τοὺς ὁπλίτας,
-  πρὶν καὶ τὰ πυρὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἰδεῖν, ἵνα μή τις εἴπῃ, ὡς φεύγων
-  ἀπαγάγοι. Ἐκ γὰρ τῆς πρόσθεν ἀθυμίας ἐδόκει τε ἀνειληφέναι τὴν
-  πόλιν, ὅτι καὶ ἐμβεβλήκει εἰς τὴν Ἀρκαδίαν, καὶ δῃοῦντι τὴν χώραν
-  οὐδεὶς ἠθελήκει μάχεσθαι: compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.
-
-It had now become a matter of boast for Agesilaus (according to his
-own friendly historian) to keep the field for three or four days,
-without showing fear of Arcadians and Eleians! So fatally had Spartan
-pride broken down, since the day (less than eighteen months before)
-when the peremptory order had been sent to Kleombrotus, to march out
-of Phokis straight against Thebes!
-
-Nevertheless it was not from fear of Agesilaus, but from a wise
-discretion, that the Arcadians and Eleians had kept within the
-walls of Mantinea. Epaminondas with the Theban army was approaching
-to their aid, and daily expected; a sum of ten talents having been
-lent by the Eleians to defray the cost.[453] He had been invited by
-them and by others of the smaller Peloponnesian states, who felt
-the necessity of some external protector against Sparta,—and who
-even before they applied to Thebes for aid, had solicited the like
-interference from Athens (probably under the general presidency
-accepted by Athens, and the oaths interchanged by her with various
-inferior cities, since the battle of Leuktra), but had experienced a
-refusal.[454]
-
-  [453] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 19.
-
-  [454] Diodor. xv, 62. Compare Demosthenes, Orat. pro Megalopolit.
-  pp. 205-207, s. 13-23.
-
-Epaminondas had been preparing for this contingency ever since the
-battle of Leuktra. The first use made of his victory had been to
-establish or confirm the ascendency of Thebes both over the recusant
-Bœotian cities and over the neighboring Phokians and Lokrians,
-etc. After this had been accomplished, he must have been occupied
-(during the early part of 370 B.C.) in anxiously watching the
-movements of Jason of Pheræ,—who had already announced his design
-of marching with an imposing force to Delphi for the celebration of
-the Pythian games (about August 1.) Though this despot was the ally
-of Thebes, yet as both his power, and his aspirations towards the
-headship of Greece,[455] were well known, no Theban general, even
-of prudence inferior to Epaminondas, could venture in the face of
-such liabilities to conduct away the Theban force into Peloponnesus,
-leaving Bœotia uncovered. The assassination of Jason relieved Thebes
-from such apprehensions, and a few weeks sufficed to show that his
-successors were far less formidable in power as well as in ability.
-Accordingly, in the autumn of 370 B.C. Epaminondas had his attention
-free to turn to Peloponnesus, for the purpose both of maintaining
-the anti-Spartan revolution which had taken place in Tegea, and
-of seconding the pronounced impulse among the Arcadians towards
-federative coalition.
-
-  [455] Diodor. xv, 60.
-
-But the purposes of this distinguished man went farther still;
-embracing long-sighted and permanent arrangements, such as should
-forever disable Sparta from recovering her prominent station in the
-Grecian world. While with one hand he organized Arcadia, with the
-other he took measures for replacing the exiled Messenians on their
-ancient territory. To achieve this, it was necessary to dispossess
-the Spartans of the region once known as independent Messenia, under
-its own line of kings, but now, for near three centuries, the best
-portion of Laconia, tilled by Helots for the profit of proprietors
-at Sparta. While converting these Helots into free Messenians, as
-their forefathers had once been, Epaminondas proposed to invite back
-all the wanderers of the same race who were dispersed in various
-portions of Greece; so as at once to impoverish Sparta by loss of
-territory, and to plant upon her flank a neighbor bitterly hostile.
-It has been already mentioned, that during the Peloponnesian war, the
-exiled Messenians had been among the most active allies of Athens
-and Sparta,—at Naupaktus, at Sphakteria, at Pylus, in Kephallenia,
-and elsewhere. Expelled at the close of that war by the triumphant
-Spartans,[456] not only from Peloponnesus, but also from Naupaktus
-and Kephallenia, these exiles had since been dispersed among various
-Hellenic colonies; at Rhegium in Italy, at Messênê in Sicily, at
-Hesperides in Libya. From 404 B.C. (the close of the war) to 373
-B.C., they had remained thus without a home. At length, about the
-latter year (when the Athenian confederate navy again became equal
-or superior to the Lacedæmonian on the west coast of Peloponnesus),
-they began to indulge the hope of being restored to Naupaktus.[457]
-Probably their request may have been preferred and discussed in the
-synod of Athenian allies, where the Thebans sat as members. Nothing
-however had been done towards it by the Athenians,—who soon became
-fatigued with the war, and at length made peace with Sparta,—when the
-momentous battle of Leuktra altered, both completely and suddenly,
-the balance of power in Greece. A chance of protection was now opened
-to the Messenians from Thebes, far more promising than they had
-ever had from Athens. Epaminondas, well aware of the loss as well
-as humiliation that he should inflict upon Sparta by restoring them
-to their ancient territory, entered into communication with them,
-and caused them to be invited to Peloponnesus from all their distant
-places of emigration.[458] By the time of his march into Arcadia, in
-the late autumn of 370 B.C., many of them had already joined him,
-burning with all their ancient hatred of Sparta, and contributing to
-aggravate the same sentiment among Thebans and allies.
-
-  [456] Diodor. xiv, 34.
-
-  [457] Pausanias. iv, 26, 3.
-
-  [458] Diodor. xv, 66; Pausanias, iv, 26, 3, 4.
-
-With the scheme of restoring the Messenians, was combined in the
-mind of Epaminondas another, for the political consolidation of
-the Arcadians; both being intended as parts of one strong and
-self-supporting organization against Sparta on her own border. Of
-course he could have accomplished nothing of the kind, if there had
-not been a powerful spontaneous movement towards consolidation among
-the Arcadians themselves. But without his guidance and protection,
-the movement would have proved abortive, through the force of local
-jealousies within the country, fomented and seconded by Spartan aid
-from without. Though the general vote for federative coalition had
-been passed with enthusiasm, yet to carry out such a vote to the
-satisfaction of all, without quarrelling on points of detail, would
-have required far more of public-minded sentiment, as well as of
-intelligence, than what could be reckoned upon among the Arcadians.
-It was necessary to establish a new city; since the standing jealousy
-between Mantinea and Tegea, now for the first time embarked in one
-common cause, would never have permitted that either should be
-preferred as the centre of the new consolidation.[459] Besides fixing
-upon the new site required, it was indispensable also to choose
-between conflicting exigencies, and to break up ancient habits, in a
-way such as could hardly have been enforced by any majority purely
-Arcadian. The authority here deficient was precisely supplied by
-Epaminondas; who brought with him a victorious army and a splendid
-personal name, combined with impartiality as to the local politics of
-Arcadia, and single-minded hostility to Sparta.
-
-  [459] To illustrate small things by great—At the first formation
-  of the Federal Constitution of the United States of America, the
-  rival pretensions of New York and Philadelphia were among the
-  principal motives for creating the new federal city of Washington.
-
-It was with a view to these two great foundations, as well as to
-expel Agesilaus, that Epaminondas now marched the Theban army
-into Arcadia; the command being voluntarily intrusted to him by
-Pelopidas and the other Bœotarchs present. He arrived shortly after
-the retirement of Agesilaus, while the Arcadians and Eleians
-were ravaging the lands of the recusant town of Heræa. As they
-speedily came back to greet his arrival, the aggregate confederate
-body,—Argeians, Arcadians, and Eleians, united with the Thebans
-and their accompanying allies,—is said to have amounted to forty
-thousand, or according to some, even to seventy thousand men.[460]
-Not merely had Epaminondas brought with him a choice body of
-auxiliaries,—Phokians, Lokrians, Eubœans, Akarnanians, Herakleots,
-Malians, and Thessalian cavalry and peltasts,—but the Bœotian bands
-themselves were so brilliant and imposing, as to excite universal
-admiration. The victory of Leuktra had awakened among them an
-enthusiastic military ardor, turned to account by the genius of
-Epaminondas, and made to produce a finished discipline which even the
-unwilling Xenophon cannot refuse to acknowledge.[461] Conscious of
-the might of their assembled force, within a day’s march of Laconia,
-the Arcadians, Argeians, and Eleians pressed Epaminondas to invade
-that country, now that no allies could approach the frontier to its
-aid. At first he was unwilling to comply. He had not come prepared
-for the enterprise; being well aware, from his own journey to Sparta
-(when the peace-congress was held there prior to the battle of
-Leuktra), of the impracticable nature of the intervening country, so
-easy to be defended, especially during the winter-season, by troops
-like the Lacedæmonians, whom he believed to be in occupation of all
-the passes. Nor was his reluctance overcome until the instances
-of his allies were backed by assurances from the Arcadians on the
-frontier, that the passes were not all guarded; as well as by
-invitations from some of the discontented Periœki, in Laconia. These
-Periœki engaged to revolt openly, if he would only show himself
-in the country. They told him that there was a general slackness
-throughout Laconia in obeying the military requisitions from Sparta;
-and tendered their lives as atonement if they should be found to
-speak falsely. By such encouragements, as well as by the general
-impatience of all around him to revenge upon Sparta her long career
-of pride and abused ascendency, Epaminondas was at length induced to
-give the order of invasion.[462]
-
-  [460] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 31; and compare Agesil. and Pomp. c.
-  4; Diodor. xv, 62. Compare Xenophon, Agesilaus, 2, 24.
-
-  [461] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 23. Οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες καὶ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ
-  Ἠλεῖοι ἔπειθον αὐτοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι ὡς τάχιστα εἰς τὴν Λακωνικήν,
-  ἐπιδείκνυντες μὲν τὸ ἑαυτῶν πλῆθος, ὑπερεπαινοῦντες δὲ τὸ τῶν
-  Θηβαίων στράτευμα. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ ἐγυμνάζοντο πάντες περὶ
-  τὰ ὅπλα, ἀγαλλόμενοι τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις νίκῃ, etc.
-
-  [462] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 24, 25.
-
-That he should have hesitated in taking this responsibility, will
-not surprise us, if we recollect, that over and above the real
-difficulties of the country, invasion of Laconia by land was
-an unparalleled phenomenon,—that the force of Sparta was most
-imperfectly known,—that no such thought had been entertained when he
-left Thebes,—that the legal duration of command, for himself and his
-colleagues, would not permit it,—and that though his Peloponnesian
-allies were forward in the scheme, the rest of his troops and his
-countrymen might well censure him, if the unknown force of resistance
-turned out as formidable as their associations from old time led them
-to apprehend.
-
-The invading army was distributed into four portions, all penetrating
-by different passes. The Eleians had the westernmost and easiest
-road, the Argeians the easternmost;[463] while the Thebans themselves
-and the Arcadians formed the two central divisions. The latter
-alone experienced any serious resistance. More daring even than
-the Thebans, they encountered Ischolaus the Spartan at Ium or Oeum
-in the district called Skiritis, attacked him in the village, and
-overpowered him by vehemence of assault, by superior numbers, and
-seemingly also by some favor or collusion[464] on the part of the
-inhabitants. After a desperate resistance, this brave Spartan with
-nearly all his division perished. At Karyæ, the Thebans also found
-and surmounted some resistance; but the victory of the Arcadians
-over Ischolaus operated as an encouragement to all, so that the four
-divisions reached Sellasia[465] and were again united in safety.
-Undefended and deserted (seemingly) by the Spartans, Sellasia was
-now burnt and destroyed by the invaders, who, continuing their march
-along the plain or valley towards the Eurotas, encamped in the sacred
-grove of Apollo. On the next day they reached the Eurotas, at the
-foot of the bridge which crossed that river and led to the city of
-Sparta.
-
-  [463] Diodor. xv, 64.
-
-  See Colonel Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, ch. 23, p. 29.
-
-  [464] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 26. When we read that the Arcadians got
-  on the roofs of the houses to attack Ischolaus, this fact seems
-  to imply that they were admitted into the houses by the villagers.
-
-  [465] Respecting the site of Sellasia, Colonel Leake thinks, and
-  advances various grounds for supposing, that Sellasia was on the
-  road from Sparta to the north-east, towards the Thyreatis; and
-  that Karyæ was on the road from Sparta northward, towards Tegea.
-  The French investigators of the Morea, as well as Professor Ross
-  and Kiepert, hold a different opinion, and place Sellasia on the
-  road from Sparta northward towards Tegea (Leake, Peloponnesiaca,
-  p. 342-352; Ross, Reisen im Peloponnes. p. 187; Berlin, 1841).
-
-  Upon such a point, the authority of Colonel Leake is very high;
-  yet the opposite opinion respecting the site of Sellasia seems to
-  me preferable.
-
-Epaminondas found the bridge too well-guarded to attempt forcing it;
-a strong body of Spartan hoplites being also discernible on the other
-side, in the sacred ground of Athênê Alea. He therefore marched down
-the left bank of the river, burning and plundering the houses in his
-way, as far as Amyklæ, between two and three miles below Sparta. Here
-he found a ford, though the river was full, from the winter season;
-and accomplished the passage, defeating, after a severe contest, a
-body of Spartans who tried to oppose it. He was now on the same side
-of the river as Sparta, to which city he slowly and cautiously made
-his approach; taking care to keep his Theban troops always in the
-best battle order, and protecting them, when encamped, by felled
-trees; while the Arcadians and other Peloponnesian allies dispersed
-around to plunder the neighboring houses and property.[466]
-
-Great was the consternation which reigned in the city; destitute
-of fortifications, yet hitherto inviolate in fact and unassailable
-even in idea. Besides their own native force, the Spartans had
-no auxiliaries except those mercenaries from Orchomenus who had
-come back with Agesilaus; nor was it certain beforehand that
-even these troops would remain with them, if the invasion became
-formidable.[467] On the first assemblage of the irresistible army
-on their frontier, they had despatched one of their commanders of
-foreign contingents (called Xenâgi) to press the instant coming of
-such Peloponnesian allies as remained faithful to them; and also
-envoys to Athens, entreating assistance from that city. Auxiliaries
-were obtained, and rapidly put under march, from Pellênê, Sikyon,
-Phlius, Corinth, Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis.[468] But
-the ordinary line of march into Laconia was now impracticable to
-them; the whole frontier being barred by Argeians and Arcadians.
-Accordingly they were obliged to proceed first to the Argolic
-peninsula, and from thence to cross by sea (embarking probably at
-Halieis on the south-western coast of the peninsula) to Prasiæ on the
-eastern coast of Laconia; from whence they made their way over the
-Laconian mountains to Sparta. Being poorly provided with vessels,
-they were forced to cross in separate detachments, and to draw lots
-for priority.[469] By this chance the Phliasian contingent did not
-come over until the last; while the xenagus, eager to reach Sparta,
-left them behind, and conducted the rest thither, arriving only
-just before the confederate enemies debouched from Sellasia. The
-Phliasians, on crossing to Prasiæ, found neither their comrades nor
-the xenagus, but were obliged to hire a guide to Sparta. Fortunately
-they arrived there both safely and in time, eluding the vigilance of
-the enemy, who were then near Amyklæ.
-
-  [466] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 30; Diodor. xv, 65.
-
-  [467] This I apprehend to be the meaning of the phrase—ἐπεὶ
-  μέντοι ἔμενον μὲν οἱ ἐξ Ὀρχομένου μισθόφοροι, etc.
-
-  [468] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 29; vii, 2, 2.
-
-  [469] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 2. Καὶ ~διαβαίνειν τελευταῖοι
-  λαχόντες~ (the Phliasians) εἰς Πρασιὰς τῶν συμβοηθησάντων
-  ... οὐ γὰρ πώποτε ἀφέστασαν, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’, ἐπεὶ ὁ ξεναγὸς ~τοὺς
-  προδιαβεβῶτας~ λαβὼν ἀπολιπὼν αὐτοὺς ᾤχετο, οὐδ’ ὡς ἀπεστράφησαν,
-  ἀλλ’ ἡγεμόνα μισθωσάμενοι ἐκ Πρασιῶν, ὄντων τῶν πολεμίων περὶ
-  Ἀμύκλας, ὅπως ἐδύναντο διαδύντες ἐς Σπάρτην ἀφίκοντο.
-
-These reinforcements were no less seasonable to Sparta, than
-creditable to the fidelity of the allies. For the bad feeling which
-habitually reigned in Laconia, between the Spartan citizens on one
-side, and the Periœki and Helots on the other, produced in this hour
-of danger its natural fruits of desertion, alarm, and weakness.
-Not only were the Periœki and Helots in standing discontent, but
-even among the Spartan citizens themselves, a privileged fraction
-called Peers had come to monopolize political honors; while the
-remainder,—poorer men, yet ambitious and active, and known under
-the ordinary name of the Inferiors,—were subject to a degrading
-exclusion, and rendered bitterly hostile. The account given in a
-previous chapter of the conspiracy of Kinadon, will have disclosed
-the fearful insecurity of the Spartan citizen, surrounded by so many
-disaffected companions; Periœki and Helots in Laconia, inferior
-citizens at Sparta. On the appearance of the invading enemy,
-indeed, a certain feeling of common interest arose, since even the
-disaffected might reasonably imagine that a plundering soldiery, if
-not repelled at the point of the sword, would make their condition
-worse instead of better. And accordingly, when the ephors made public
-proclamation, that any Helot who would take heavy armor and serve
-in the ranks as an hoplite, should be manumitted,—not less than
-six thousand Helots gave in their names to serve. But a body thus
-numerous, when seen in arms, became itself the object of mistrust to
-the Spartans; so that the arrival of their new allies from Prasiæ
-was welcomed as a security, not less against the armed Helots within
-the city, than against the Thebans without.[470] Open enmity,
-however, was not wanting. A considerable number both of Periœki and
-Helots actually took arms on behalf of the Thebans; others remained
-inactive, disregarding the urgent summons from the ephors, which
-could not now be enforced.[471]
-
-  [470] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 28, 29. ὥστε φόβον αὖ οὗτοι παρεῖχον
-  συντεταγμένοι καὶ λίαν ἐδόκουν πολλοὶ εἶναι, etc.
-
-  [471] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 25; vi, 5, 32; vii, 2, 2.
-
-  It is evident from the last of these three passages, that the
-  number of Periœki and Helots who actually revolted, was very
-  considerable; and that the contrast between the second and third
-  passages evinces the different feelings with which the two seem
-  to have been composed by Xenophon.
-
-  In the second, he is recounting the invasion of Epaminondas,
-  with a wish to soften the magnitude of the Spartan disgrace and
-  calamity as much as he can. Accordingly, he tells us no more
-  than this,—“there were some among the Periœki, who even took
-  active service in the attack of Gythium, and fought along with
-  the Thebans,”—ἦσαν δέ τινες τῶν Περιοίκων, οἳ καὶ ἐπέθεντο καὶ
-  συνεστρατεύοντο τοῖς μετὰ Θηβαίων.
-
-  But in the third passage (vii, 2, 2: compare his biography called
-  Agesilaus, ii, 24) Xenophon is extolling the fidelity of the
-  Phliasians to Sparta under adverse circumstances of the latter.
-  Hence it then suits his argument, to magnify these adverse
-  circumstances, in order to enhance the merit of the Phliasians;
-  and he therefore tells us,—“_Many_ of the Periœki, all the
-  Helots, and all the allies except a few, had revolted from
-  Sparta,”—σφαλέντων δ’ αὐτῶν τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχῃ, καὶ ἀποστάντων
-  μὲν πολλῶν Περιοίκων, ἀποστάντων δὲ πάντων τῶν Εἱλώτων, ἔτι δὲ
-  τῶν συμμάχων πλὴν πάνυ ὀλίγων, ἐπιστρατευόντων δ’ αὐτοῖς, ὡς
-  εἰπεῖν, πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πιστοὶ διέμειναν (the Phliasians).
-
-  I apprehend that both statements depart from the reality, though
-  in opposite directions. I have adopted in the text something
-  between the two.
-
-Under such wide-spread feelings of disaffection the defence even of
-Sparta itself against the assailing enemy was a task requiring all
-the energy of Agesilaus. After having vainly tried to hinder the
-Thebans from crossing the Eurotas, he was forced to abandon Amyklæ
-and to throw himself back upon the city of Sparta, towards which they
-immediately advanced. More than one conspiracy was on the point of
-breaking out, had not his vigilance forestalled the projects. Two
-hundred young soldiers of doubtful fidelity were marching, without
-orders, to occupy a strong post (sacred to Artemis) called the
-Issorium. Those around him were about to attack them, but Agesilaus,
-repressing their zeal, went up alone to the band, addressed them in
-language betokening no suspicion, yet warning them that they had
-mistaken his orders: their services were needed, not at the Issorium,
-but in another part of the city. They obeyed his orders, and moved to
-the spot indicated; upon which he immediately occupied the Issorium
-with troops whom he could trust. In the ensuing night, he seized
-and put to death fifteen of the leaders of the two hundred. Another
-conspiracy, said to have been on the point of breaking out, was
-repressed by seizing the conspirators in the house where they were
-assembled, and putting them to death untried; the first occasion
-(observes Plutarch) on which any Spartan was ever put to death
-untried,[472]—a statement which I hesitate to believe without knowing
-from whom he borrowed it, but which, if true, proves that the Spartan
-kings and ephors did not apply to Spartan citizens the same measure
-as to Periœki and Helots.
-
-  [472] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 32; Polyænus, ii, 1, 14; Ælian, V. H.
-  xiv, 27.
-
-By such severe proceedings, disaffection was kept under; while the
-strong posts of the city were effectively occupied, and the wider
-approaches barricaded by heaps of stones and earth.[473] Though
-destitute of walls, Sparta was extremely defensible by position.
-Epaminondas marched slowly up to it from Amyklæ; the Arcadians and
-others in his army spreading themselves to burn and plunder the
-neighborhood. On the third or fourth day his cavalry occupied the
-Hippodrome (probably a space of level ground near the river, under
-the hilly site of the town), where the Spartan cavalry, though
-inferior both in number and in goodness, gained an advantage
-over them, through the help of three hundred chosen hoplites whom
-Agesilaus had planted in ambush hard by, in a precinct sacred to the
-Dioskuri. Though this action was probably of little consequence, yet
-Epaminondas did not dare to attempt the city by storm. Satisfied with
-having defied the Spartans and manifested his mastery of the field
-even to their own doors, he marched away southward down to Eurotas.
-To them, in their present depression, it was matter of consolation
-and even of boasting,[474] that he had not dared to assail them
-in their last stronghold. The agony of their feelings,—grief,
-resentment, and wounded honor,—was intolerable. Many wished to go out
-and fight, at all hazard; but Agesilaus resisted them with the same
-firmness as Perikles had shown at Athens, when the Peloponnesians
-first invaded Attica at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.
-Especially the Spartan women, who had never before beheld an enemy,
-are said to have manifested emotions so furious and distressing, as
-to increase much the difficulty of defence.[475] We are even told
-that Antalkidas, at that time one of the ephors, sent his children
-for safety away from Sparta to the island of Kythêra. Epaminondas
-knew well how desperate the resistance of the Spartans would be if
-their city were attacked; while to himself, in the midst of a hostile
-and impracticable country, repulse would be absolute ruin.[476]
-
-  [473] Æneas, Poliorceticus, c. 2, p. 16.
-
-  [474] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 32. Καὶ τὸ μὲν μὴ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν
-  προσβαλεῖν ἂν ἔτι αὐτοὺς, ἤδη τι ἐδόκει θαῤῥαλεώτερον, εἶναι.
-
-  This passage is not very clear, nor are the commentators
-  unanimous either as to the words or as to the meaning. Some omit
-  μὴ, construe ἐδόκει as if it were ἐδόκει τοῖς Θηβαίοις, and
-  translate θαῤῥαλεώτερον “excessively rash.”
-
-  I agree with Schneider in dissenting from this alteration and
-  construction. I have given in the text what I believe to be the
-  meaning.
-
-  [475] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 28; Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 8;
-  Plutarch, Agesil. c. 32, 33; Plutarch, comp. Agesil. and Pomp. c.
-  4.
-
-  [476] Aristotle (in his Politica, iv, 10, 5), discussing the
-  opinion of those political philosophers who maintained that a
-  city ought to have no walls, but to be defended only by the
-  bravery of its inhabitants,—gives various reasons against such
-  opinion, and adds “that these are old-fashioned thinkers; that
-  the cities which made such ostentatious display of personal
-  courage, have been proved to be wrong by actual results”—λίαν
-  ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσι, καὶ ταῦθ’ ὁρῶντες ἐλεγχομένας ἔργῳ τὰς
-  ἐκείνως καλλωπισαμένας.
-
-  The commentators say (see the note of M. Barth. St. Hilaire) that
-  Aristotle has in his view Sparta at the moment of this Theban
-  invasion. I do not see what else he can mean; yet at the same
-  time, if such be his meaning, the remark is surely difficult to
-  admit. Epaminondas came close up to Sparta, but did not dare
-  to attempt to carry it by assault. If the city had had walls
-  like those of Babylon, they could not have procured for her
-  any greater protection. To me the fact appears rather to show
-  (contrary to the assertion of Aristotle) that Sparta was so
-  strong by position, combined with the military character of her
-  citizens, that she could dispense with walls.
-
-  Polyænus (ii, 2, 5) has an anecdote, I know not from whom
-  borrowed, to the effect that Epaminondas might have taken
-  Sparta, but designedly refrained from doing so, on the ground
-  that the Arcadians and others would then no longer stand in need
-  of Thebes. Neither the alleged matter of fact, nor the reason,
-  appear to me worthy of any credit. Ælian (V. H. iv, 8) has the
-  same story, but with a different reason assigned.
-
-On leaving Sparta, Epaminondas carried his march as far as Helos
-and Gythium on the sea-coast; burning and plundering the country,
-and trying for three days to capture Gythium, which contained the
-Lacedæmonian arsenal and ships. Many of the Laconian Periœki joined
-and took service in his army; nevertheless his attempt on Gythium
-did not succeed; upon which he turned back and retraced his steps to
-the Arcadian frontier. It was the more necessary for him to think of
-quitting Laconia, since his Peloponnesian allies, the Arcadians and
-others, were daily stealing home with the rich plunder which they had
-acquired, while his supplies were also becoming deficient.[477]
-
-  [477] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 50; Diodor. xv, 67.
-
-Epaminondas had thus accomplished far more than he had projected
-when quitting Thebes; for the effect of the expedition on Grecian
-opinion was immense. The reputation of his army, as well as his
-own, was prodigiously exalted; and even the narrative of Xenophon,
-unfriendly as well as obscure, bears involuntary testimony both to
-the excellence of his generalship and to the good discipline of his
-troops. He made his Thebans keep in rank and hold front against the
-enemy, even while their Arcadian allies were dispersing around for
-plunder. Moreover, the insult and humiliation to Sparta were still
-greater than that inflicted by the battle of Leuktra; which had
-indeed shown that she was no longer invincible in the field, but
-had still left her with the admitted supposition of an inviolable
-territory and an unapproachable city.
-
-The resistance of the Spartans indeed (except in so far as regards
-their city) had been far less than either friends or enemies
-expected; the belief in their power was thus proportionally
-abridged. It now remained for Epaminondas to complete their
-humiliation by executing those two enterprises which had formed the
-special purpose of his expedition: the reëstablishment of Messênê,
-and the consolidation of the Arcadians.
-
-The recent invasion of Laconia, victorious as well as lucrative,
-had inspired the Arcadians with increased confidence and antipathy
-against Sparta, and increased disposition to listen to Epaminondas.
-When that eminent man proclaimed the necessity of establishing a
-strong frontier against Sparta on the side of Arcadia, and when
-he announced his intention of farther weakening Sparta by the
-restoration of the exiled Messenians,—the general feeling of the
-small Arcadian communities, already tending in the direction of
-coalescence, became strong enough to overbear all such impediments
-of detail as the breaking up of ancient abode and habit involves.
-Respecting early Athenian history, we are told by Thucydides,[478]
-that the legendary Theseus, “having become powerful, in addition
-to his great capacity,” had effected the discontinuance of those
-numerous independent governments which once divided Attica, and had
-consolidated them all into one common government at Athens. Just
-such was the revolution now operated by Epaminondas, through the
-like combination of intelligence and power. A Board of Œkists or
-Founders was named to carry out the resolution taken by the Arcadian
-assemblies at Asea and Tegea, for the establishment of a Pan-Arcadian
-city and centre. Of this Board, two were from Tegea, two from
-Mantinea, two from Kleitor, two from the district of Menalus, two
-from that of the Parrhasians. A convenient site being chosen upon
-the river Helisson (which flowed through and divided the town in
-two), about twenty miles west of Tegea, well-fitted to block up the
-marches of Sparta in a north-westerly direction,—the foundation of
-the new Great City (Megalopolis) was laid by the Œkists jointly with
-Epaminondas. Forty distinct Arcadian townships,[479] from all sides
-of this centre, were persuaded to join the new community. Ten were
-from the Mænalii, eight from the Parrhasii, six from the Eutresii,
-three great sections of the Arcadian name, each an aggregate of
-villages. Four little townships, occupying a portion of the area
-intended for the new territory, yet being averse to the scheme, were
-constrained to join; but in one of them, Trapezus, the aversion was
-so strong, that most of the inhabitants preferred to emigrate, and
-went to join the Trapezuntines in the Euxine Sea (Trebizond), who
-received them kindly. Some of the leading Trapezuntines were even
-slain by the violent temper of the Arcadian majority. The walls of
-the new city enclosed an area of fifty stadia in circumference (more
-than five miles and a half); while an ample rural territory was also
-gathered around it, extending northward as much as twenty-four miles
-from the city, and conterminous on the east with Tegea, Mantinea,
-Orchomenus, and Kaphyæ,—on the west with Messênê,[480] Phigalia, and
-Heræa.
-
-  [478] Thucyd. ii, 15. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ Θησεὺς ἐβασίλευσε, γενόμενος μετὰ
-  τοῦ ξυνετοῦ καὶ δυνατὸς, etc.
-
-  [479] Diodor. xv, 72.
-
-  [480] Pausan. viii, 27; viii, 35, 5. Diodor. xv, 63.
-
-  See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, p. 418, where
-  the facts respecting Megalopolis are brought together and
-  discussed.
-
-  It is remarkable that though Xenophon (Hellen. v, 2, 7) observes
-  that the capture of Mantinea by Agesipolis had made the
-  Mantineans see the folly of having a river run through their
-  town,—yet in choosing the site of Megalopolis, this same feature
-  was deliberately reproduced: and in this choice the Mantineans
-  were parties concerned.
-
-The other new city,—Messênê,—was founded under the joint auspices
-of the Thebans and their allies, Argeians and others; Epitelês
-being especially chosen by the Argeians for that purpose.[481]
-The Messenian exiles, though eager and joyful at the thought of
-regaining their name and nationality, were averse to fix their new
-city either at Œchalia or Andania, which had been the scenes of their
-calamities in the early wars with Sparta. Moreover the site of Mount
-Ithômê is said to have been pointed out by the hero Kaukon, in a
-dream, to the Ageian general Epitelês. The local circumstances of
-this mountain (on which the last gallant resistance of the revolted
-Messenians against Sparta had been carried on, between the Persian
-and Peloponnesian wars) were such, that the indications of dreams,
-prophets, and religious signs coincided fully with the deliberate
-choice of a judge like Epaminondas. In after days, this hill Ithômê
-(then bearing the town and citadel of Messênê), together with the
-Akrocorinthus, were marked out by Demetrius of Pharus as the two
-horns of Peloponnesus: whoever held these two horns, was master of
-the bull.[482] Ithômê was near two thousand five hundred feet above
-the level of the sea, having upon its summit an abundant spring of
-water, called Klepsydra. Upon this summit the citadel or acropolis
-of the new town of Messênê was built; while the town itself was
-situated lower down on the slope, though connected by a continuous
-wall with its acropolis. First, solemn sacrifices were offered,
-by Epaminondas, who was recognized as Œkist or Founder,[483] to
-Dionysius and Apollo Ismenius,—by the Argeians, to the Argeian Hêrê
-and Zeus Nemeius,—by the Messenians, to Zeus Ithomatês and the
-Dioskuri. Next, prayer was made to the ancient Heroes and Heroines
-of the Messenian nation, especially to the invincible warrior
-Aristomenes, that they would now come back and again take up their
-residence as inmates in enfranchised Messênê. After this, the ground
-was marked out and the building was begun, under the sound of Argeian
-and Bœotian flutes, playing the strains of Pronomus and Sakadas.
-The best masons and architects were invited from all Greece, to
-lay out the streets with regularity, as well as to ensure a proper
-distribution and construction of the sacred edifices.[484] In respect
-of the fortifications, too, Epaminondas was studiously provident.
-Such was their excellence and solidity, that they exhibited matter
-for admiration even in the after-days of the traveller Pausanias.[485]
-
-  [481] Pausan. iv, 26, 6.
-
-  [482] Strabo. viii, p. 361: Polybius, vii, 11.
-
-  [483] Pausan. ix, 14, 2: compare the inscription on the statue of
-  Epaminondas (ix, 15, 4).
-
-  [484] Pausan. iv, 27, 3.
-
-  [485] Pausan. iv, 31, 5.
-
-From their newly-established city on the hill of Ithômê, the
-Messenians enjoyed a territory extending fifteen miles southward
-down to the Messenian Gulf, across a plain, then as well as now, the
-richest and most fertile in Peloponnesus; while to the eastward,
-their territory was conterminous with that of Arcadia and the
-contemporary establishment of Megalopolis. All the newly-appropriated
-space was land cut off from the Spartan dominion. How much was cut
-off in the direction south-east of Ithômê (along the north-eastern
-coast of the Messenian Gulf), we cannot exactly say. But it would
-appear that the Periœki of Thuria, situated in that neighborhood,
-were converted into an independent community and protected by
-the vicinity of Messênê.[486] What is of more importance to
-notice, however, is,—that all the extensive district westward
-and south-westward of Ithômê,—all the south-western corner of
-Peloponnesus, from the river Neda southward to Cape Akritas,—was now
-also subtracted from Sparta. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian
-war, the Spartan Brasidas had been in garrison near Methônê[487] (not
-far from Cape Akritas); Pylus,—where the Athenian Demosthenes erected
-his hostile fort, near which the important capture at Sphakteria
-was effected,—had been a maritime point belonging to Sparta, about
-forty-six miles from the city;[488] Aulon (rather farther north, near
-the river Neda) had been at the time of the conspiracy of Kinadon a
-township of Spartan Periœki, of very doubtful fidelity.[489] Now all
-this wide area, from the north-eastern corner of the Messenian Gulf
-westward, the best half of the Spartan territory, was severed from
-Sparta to become the property of Periœki and Helots, converted into
-freemen; not only sending no rent or tribute to Sparta, as before,
-but bitterly hostile to her from the very nature of their tenure.
-It was in the ensuing year that the Arcadian army cut to pieces the
-Lacedæmonian garrison at Asinê,[490] killing the Spartan polemarch
-Geranor; and probably about the same time the other Lacedæmonian
-garrisons in the south-western peninsula must have been expelled.
-Thus liberated, the Periœki of the region welcomed the new Messênê as
-the guarantee of their independence. Epaminondas, besides confirming
-the independence of Methônê and Asinê, reconstituted some other
-towns,[491] which under Lacedæmonian dominion had probably been kept
-unfortified and had dwindled away.
-
-  [486] Pausan. iv, 31, 2.
-
-  [487] Thucyd. ii, 25.
-
-  [488] Thucyd. iv, 3.
-
-  [489] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 8.
-
-  [490] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 25.
-
-  [491] Pausan. iv, 27, 4. ἀνῴκιζον δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πολίσματα, etc.
-  Pausanias, following the line of coast from the mouth of the
-  river Pamisus in the Messenian Gulf, round Cape Akritas to the
-  mouth of the Neda in the Western Sea,—enumerates the following
-  towns and places,—Kôronê, Kolônides, Asinê, the Cape Akritas,
-  the Harbor Phœnikus, Methônê, or Mothônê, Pylus, Aulon (Pausan.
-  iv, 34, 35, 36). The account given by Skylax (Periplus, c.
-  46, 47) of the coast of these regions, appears to me confused
-  and unintelligible. He reckons Asinê and Mothônê as cities of
-  Laconia; but he seems to have conceived these cities as being in
-  the _central southern_ projection of Peloponnesus (whereof Cape
-  Tænarus forms the extremity); and not to have conceived at all
-  the _south-western_ projection, whereof Cape Akritas forms the
-  extremity. He recognizes Messene, but he pursues the Paraplus of
-  the Messenian coast from the mouth of the river Neda to the coast
-  of the Messenian Gulf south of Ithômê without interruption. Then
-  after that, he mentions Asinê, Mothônê, Achilleios Limên, and
-  Psamathus, with Cape Tænarus between them. Besides, he introduces
-  in Messenia two different cities,—one called Messênê, the other
-  called Ithômê; whereas there was only one Messênê situated on
-  Mount Ithome.
-
-  I cannot agree with Niebuhr, who, resting mainly upon this
-  account of Skylax, considers that the south-western corner of
-  Peloponnesus remained a portion of Laconia and belonging to
-  Sparta, long after the establishment of the city of Messênê. See
-  the Dissertation of Niebuhr on the age of Skylax of Karyanda,—in
-  his Kleine Schriften, p. 119.
-
-In the spring of 425 B.C., when Demosthenes landed at Pylus,
-Thucydides considers it a valuable acquisition for Athens, and
-a serious injury to Sparta, to have lodged a small garrison of
-Messenians in that insignificant post, as plunderers of Spartan
-territory and instigators of Helots to desertion,[492]—especially as
-their dialect could not be distinguished from that of the Spartans
-themselves. How prodigious must have been the impression throughout
-Greece, when Epaminondas, by planting the Messenian exiles and others
-on the strong frontier city and position of Ithômê, deprived Sparta
-in a short time of all the wide space between that mountain and the
-western sea, enfranchising the Periœki and Helots contained in it!
-We must recollect that the name Messênê had been from old times
-applied generally to this region, and that it was never bestowed
-upon any city before the time of Epaminondas. When therefore the
-Spartans complained of “the liberation of Messênê,”—“the loss of
-Messênê,”—they included in the word, not simply the city on Mount
-Ithômê, but all this territory besides; though it was not all
-comprised in the domain of the new city.
-
-  [492] Thucyd. iv, 3, 42.
-
-They complained yet more indignantly, that along with the genuine
-Messenians, now brought back from exile,—a rabble of their own
-emancipated Periœki and Helots had been domiciled on their
-border.[493] Herein were included, not only such of these two
-classes as, having before dwelt in servitude throughout the
-territory westward of Ithômê, now remained there in a state of
-freedom—but also doubtless a number of others who deserted from
-other parts of Laconia. For as we know that such desertions had
-been not inconsiderable, even when there was no better shelter than
-the outlying posts of Pylus and Kythêra—so we may be sure that they
-became much more numerous, when the neighboring city of Messênê
-was founded under adequate protection, and when there was a chance
-of obtaining, westward of the Messenian Gulf, free lands with a
-new home. Moreover, such Periœki and Helots as had actually joined
-the invading army of Epaminondas in Laconia, would be forced from
-simple insecurity to quit the country when he retired, and would be
-supplied with fresh residences in the newly-enfranchised territory.
-All these men would pass at once, out of a state of peculiarly harsh
-servitude, into the dignity of free and equal Hellens,[494] sending
-again a solemn Messenian legation or Theôry to the Olympic festival,
-after an interval of more than three centuries,[495]—outdoing their
-former masters in the magnitude of their offerings from the same
-soil,—and requiting them for previous ill-usage by words of defiance
-and insult, instead of that universal deference and admiration which
-a Spartan had hitherto been accustomed to look upon as his due.
-
-  [493] The Oration (vi,) called Archidamus, by Isokrates. exhibits
-  powerfully the Spartan feeling of the time, respecting this
-  abstraction of territory, and emancipation of serfs, for the
-  purpose of restoring Messênê, s. 30. Καὶ εἰ μὲν τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς
-  Μεσσηνίους κατῆγον (the Thebans), ἠδίκουν μὲν ἂν, ὅμως δ’
-  εὐλογωτέρως ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐξημάρτανον· νῦν δὲ τοὺς Εἵλωτας ὁμόρους
-  ἡμῖν παρακατοικίζουσιν, ὥστε μὴ τοῦτ’ εἶναι χαλεπώτατον, εἰ τῆς
-  χώρας στερησόμεθα παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ’ εἰ τοὺς δούλους ἡμετέρους
-  ἐποψόμεθα κυρίους αὐτῆς ὄντας.
-
-  Again—s. 101. ἢν γὰρ παρακατοικισώμεθα τοὺς Εἵλωτας, καὶ τὴν
-  πόλιν ταύτην περιΐδωμεν αὐξηθεῖσαν, τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι πάντα τὸν
-  βίον ἐν ταραχαῖς καὶ κινδύνοις διατελοῦμεν ὄντες; compare also
-  sections 8 and 102.
-
-  [494] Isokrates, Orat. vi, (Archidam.) s. 111. Ἄξιον δὲ καὶ τὴν
-  Ὀλυμπιάδα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσχυνθῆναι πανηγύρεις, ἐν αἷς ἕκαστος
-  ἡμῶν (Spartans) ζηλωτότερος ἦν καὶ θαυμαστότερος τῶν ἀθλητῶν
-  τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τὰς νίκας ἀναιρουμένων. Εἰς ἃς τίς ἂν ἐλθεῖν
-  τολμήσειεν, ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι καταφρονηθησόμενος—ἔτι δὲ πρὸς
-  ~τούτοις ὀψόμενος μὲν τοὺς οἰκέτας ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας~ ἧς οἱ πατέρες
-  ἡμῖν κατέλιπον ἀπαρχὰς καὶ θυσίας μείζους ἡμῶν ποιουμένους,
-  ἀκουσόμενος δ’ ~αὐτῶν τοιαύταις βλασφημίαις χρωμένων, οἵαις περ
-  εἰκὸς τοὺς χαλεπώτερον τῶν ἄλλων δεδουλευκότας~, ἐξ ἴσου δὲ νῦν
-  τὰς συνθήκας τοῖς δεσπόταις πεποιημένους.
-
-  This oration, composed only five or six years after the battle of
-  Leuktra, is exceedingly valuable as a testimony of the Spartan
-  feeling under such severe humiliations.
-
-  [495] The freedom of the Messenians had been put down by the
-  first Messenian war, after which they became subjects of Sparta.
-  The second Messenian war arose from their revolt.
-
-  No free Messenian legation could therefore have visited Olympia
-  since the termination of the first war; which is placed by
-  Pausanias (iv, 13, 4) in 723 B.C.; though the date is not to be
-  trusted. Pausanias (iv, 27, 3) gives two hundred and eighty-seven
-  years between the end of the second Messenian war and the
-  foundation of Messênê by Epaminondas. See the note of Siebelis on
-  this passage. Exact dates of these early wars cannot be made out.
-
-The enfranchisement and reörganization of all Western Laconia, the
-renovation of the Messenian name, the foundation of the two new
-cities (Messênê and Megalopolis) in immediate neighborhood and
-sympathy,—while they completed the degradation of Sparta, constituted
-in all respects the most interesting political phenomena that Greece
-had witnessed for many years. To the profound mortification of the
-historian,—he is able to recount nothing more than the bare facts,
-with such inferences as these facts themselves warrant. Xenophon,
-under whose eyes all must have passed, designedly omits to notice
-them;[496] Pausanias, whom we have to thank for most of what we
-know, is prompted by his religious imagination to relate many divine
-signs and warnings, but little matter of actual occurrence. Details
-are altogether withheld from us. We know neither how long a time was
-occupied in the building of the two cities, nor who furnished the
-cost; though both the one and the other must have been considerable.
-Of the thousand new arrangements, incident to the winding up of many
-small townships, and the commencement of two large cities, we are
-unable to render any account. Yet there is no point of time wherein
-social phenomena are either so interesting or so instructive. In
-describing societies already established and ancient, we find the
-force of traditional routine almost omnipotent in its influence
-both on men’s actions and on their feelings; bad as well as good
-is preserved in one concrete, since the dead weight of the past
-stifles all constructive intelligence, and leaves little room even
-for improving aspirations. But the forty small communities which
-coalesced into Megalopolis, and the Messenians and other settlers
-who came for the first time together on the hill of Ithômê, were in
-a state in which new exigencies of every kind pressed for immediate
-satisfaction. There was no file to afford a precedent, nor any
-resource left except to submit all the problems to discussion by
-those whose character and judgment was most esteemed. Whether the
-problems were well- or ill-solved, there must have been now a genuine
-and earnest attempt to strike out as good a solution as the lights of
-the time and place permitted, with a certain latitude for conflicting
-views. Arrangements must have been made for the apportionment of
-houses and lands among the citizens, by purchase, or grant, or both
-together; for the political and judicial constitution; for religious
-and recreative ceremonies, for military defence, for markets, for
-the security and transmission of property, etc. All these and many
-other social wants of a nascent community must now have been provided
-for, and it would have been highly interesting to know how. Unhappily
-the means are denied to us. We can record little more than the bare
-fact that these two youngest members of the Hellenic brotherhood of
-cities were born at the same time, and under the auspices of the
-same presiding genius, Epaminondas; destined to sustain each other
-in neighborly sympathy and in repelling all common danger from the
-attacks of Sparta; a purpose, which, even two centuries afterwards,
-remained engraven on the mind of a Megalopolitan patriot like
-Polybius.[497]
-
-  [496] The partiality towards Sparta, visible even from the
-  beginning of Xenophon’s history, becomes more and more
-  exaggerated throughout the two latter books wherein he recounts
-  her misfortunes; it is moreover intensified by spite against the
-  Thebans and Epaminondas as her conquerors. But there is hardly
-  any instance of this feeling, so glaring or so discreditable,
-  as the case now before us. In describing the expedition of
-  Epaminondas into Peloponnesus in the winter of 370-369 B.C., he
-  totally omits the foundation both of Messênê and Megalopolis;
-  though in the after part of his history, he alludes (briefly)
-  both to one and to the other as facts accomplished. He represents
-  the Thebans to have come into Arcadia with their magnificent
-  army, for the simple purpose of repelling Agesilaus and the
-  Spartans, and to have been desirous of returning to Bœotia, as
-  soon as it was ascertained that the latter had already returned
-  to Sparta (vi, 5, 23). Nor does he once mention the name of
-  Epaminondas as general of the Thebans in the expedition, any more
-  than he mentions him at Leuktra.
-
-  Considering the momentous and striking character of these
-  facts, and the eminence of the Theban general by whom they were
-  achieved, such silence on the part of an historian, who professes
-  to recount the events of the time, is an inexcusable dereliction
-  of his duty to state the _whole truth_. It is plain that
-  Messênê and Megalopolis wounded to the quick the philo-Spartan
-  sentiment of Xenophon. They stood as permanent evidences of
-  the degradation of Sparta, even after the hostile armies had
-  withdrawn from Laconia. He prefers to ignore them altogether. Yet
-  he can find space to recount, with disproportionate prolixity,
-  the two applications of the Spartans to Athens for aid, with the
-  favorable reception which they obtained,—also the exploits of the
-  Phliasians in their devoted attachment to Sparta.
-
-  [497] See a striking passage in Polybius, iv, 32. Compare also
-  Pausan. v, 29, 3; and viii, 27, 2.
-
-Megalopolis was intended not merely as a great city in itself, but as
-the centre of the new confederacy; which appears to have comprised
-all Arcadia, except Orchomenus and Heræa. It was enacted that a synod
-or assembly, from all the separate members of the Arcadian name,
-and in which probably every Arcadian citizen from the constituent
-communities had the right of attending, should be periodically
-convoked there. This assembly was called the Ten Thousand, or the
-Great Number. A body of Arcadian troops, called the Epariti, destined
-to uphold the federation, and receiving pay when on service, was
-also provided. Assessments were levied upon each city for their
-support, and a Pan-Arcadian general (probably also other officers)
-was named. The Ten Thousand, on behalf of all Arcadia, received
-foreign envoys,—concluded war, or peace, or alliance,—and tried all
-officers or other Arcadians brought before them on accusations of
-public misconduct.[498] The great Athenian orators, Kallistratus,
-Demosthenes, Æschines, on various occasions pleaded before it.[499]
-What were its times of meeting, we are unable to say. It contributed
-seriously, for a certain time, to sustain a Pan-Arcadian communion
-of action and sentiment which had never before existed;[500] and to
-prevent, or soften, those dissensions which had always a tendency
-to break out among the separate Arcadian cities. The patriotic
-enthusiasm, however, out of which Megalopolis had first arisen,
-gradually became enfeebled. The city never attained that preëminence
-or power which its founders contemplated, and which had caused the
-city to be laid out on a scale too large for the population actually
-inhabiting it.[501]
-
-  [498] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 38; vii, 4, 2, 33, 34; vii, 3, 1.
-
-  [499] Demosthen. Fals. Legat. p. 344, s. 11, p. 403, s. 220,
-  Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 296, c. 49; Cornel. Nepos. Epamin. c. 6.
-
-  [500] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 38; vii, 4, 33; Diodor. xv, 59;
-  Aristotle—Ἀρκάδων Πολιτεία—ap. Harpokration, v. Μύριοι, p. 106,
-  ed. Neumann.
-
-  [501] Polybius, ii, 55.
-
-Not only was the portion of Laconia west of the Messenian Gulf now
-rendered independent of Sparta, but also much of the territory which
-lies north of Sparta, between that city and Arcadia. Thus the Skiritæ
-(hardy mountaineers of Arcadian race, heretofore dependent upon
-Sparta, and constituting a valuable contingent to her armies),[502]
-with their territory forming the northern frontier of Laconia
-towards Arcadia, became from this time independent of and hostile to
-Sparta.[503] The same is the case even with a place much nearer to
-Sparta,—Sellasia; though this latter was retaken by the Lacedæmonians
-four or five years afterwards.[504]
-
-  [502] Thucyd. v, 66.
-
-  [503] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 21.
-
-  [504] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 12; Diodor. xv, 64.
-
-Epaminondas remained about four months beyond the legal duration of
-his command in Arcadia and Laconia.[505] The sufferings of a severe
-mid-winter were greatly mitigated to his soldiers by the Arcadians,
-who, full of devoted friendship, pressed upon them an excess of
-hospitality which he could not permit consistently with his military
-duties.[506] He stayed long enough to settle all the preliminary
-debates and difficulties, and to put in train of serious execution
-the establishment of Messênê and Megalopolis. For the completion
-of a work thus comprehensive, which changed the face and character
-of Peloponnesus, much time was of course necessary. Accordingly, a
-Theban division under Pammenes was left to repel all obstruction from
-Sparta;[507] while Tegea also, from this time forward, for some
-years, was occupied as a post by a Theban harmost and garrison.[508]
-
-  [505] The exact number of eighty-five days, given by Diodorus
-  (xv. 67), seems to show that he had copied literally from Ephorus
-  or some other older author.
-
-  Plutarch, in one place (Agesil. c. 32), mentions “three entire
-  months,” which differs little from eighty-five days. He expresses
-  himself as if Epaminondas spent all this time in ravaging
-  Laconia. Yet again, in the Apophth. Reg. p. 194 B. (compare
-  Ælian, V. H. xiii, 42), and in the life of Pelopidas (c. 25),
-  Plutarch states, that Epaminondas and his colleagues held the
-  command four whole months over and above the legal time, being
-  engaged in their operations in Laconia and Messenia. This seems
-  to me the more probable interpretation of the case; for the
-  operations seem too large to have been accomplished in either
-  three or four months.
-
-  [506] See a remarkable passage in Plutarch—An Seni sit gerenda
-  Respublica (c. 8, p. 788 A.).
-
-  [507] Pausan. viii, 27, 2. Pammenes is said to have been an
-  earnest friend of Epaminondas, but of older political standing;
-  to whom Epaminondas partly owed his rise (Plutarch, Reip. Ger.
-  Præcep. p. 805 F.).
-
-  Pausanias places the foundation of Megalopolis in the same
-  Olympic year as the battle of Leuktra, and a few months after
-  that battle, during the archonship of Phrasikleides at Athens;
-  that is, between Midsummer 371 and Midsummer 370 B.C. (Pausan.
-  viii, 27, 6). He places the foundation of Messênê in the next
-  Olympic year, under the archonship of Dyskinêtus at Athens; that
-  is, between Midsummer 370 and Midsummer 369 B.C. (iv, 27, 5).
-
-  The foundation of Megalopolis would probably be understood to
-  date from the initial determination taken by the assembled
-  Arcadians, soon after the revolution at Tegea, to found a
-  Pan-Arcadian city and federative league. This was probably taken
-  before Midsummer 370 B.C., and the date of Pausanias would thus
-  be correct.
-
-  The foundation of Messênê would doubtless take its æra from the
-  expedition of Epaminondas,—between November and March 370-369
-  B.C. which would be during the archonship of Dyskinêtus at
-  Athens, as Pausanias affirms.
-
-  What length of time was required to complete the erection and
-  establishment of either city, we are not informed.
-
-  Diodorus places the foundation of Megalopolis in 368 B.C. (xv,
-  72).
-
-  [508] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 36.
-
-Meanwhile the Athenians were profoundly affected by these proceedings
-of Epaminondas in Peloponnesus. The accumulation of force against
-Sparta was so powerful, that under a chief like him, it seemed
-sufficient to crush her; and though the Athenians were now neutral in
-the contest, such a prospect was not at all agreeable to them,[509]
-involving the aggrandizement of Thebes to a point inconsistent with
-their security. It was in the midst of the successes of Epaminondas
-that envoys came to Athens from Sparta, Corinth, and Phlius, to
-entreat her aid. The message was one not merely humiliating to the
-Lacedæmonians, who had never previously sent the like request to any
-Grecian city,—but also difficult to handle in reference to Athens.
-History showed abundant acts of jealousy and hostility, little
-either of good feeling or consentient interest, on the part of the
-Lacedæmonians towards her. What little was to be found, the envoys
-dexterously brought forward; going back to the dethronement of the
-Peisistratids from Athens by Spartan help, the glorious expulsion
-of Xerxes from Greece by the joint efforts of both cities,—and the
-auxiliaries sent by Athens into Laconia in 465 B.C., to assist the
-Spartans against the revolted Messenians on Mount Ithômê. In these
-times (he reminded the Athenian assembly) Thebes had betrayed the
-Hellenic cause by joining Xerxes, and had been an object of common
-hatred to both. Moreover the maritime forces of Greece had been
-arrayed under Athens in the Confederacy of Delos, with full sanction
-and recommendation from Sparta; while the headship of the latter by
-land had in like manner been accepted by the Athenians. He called on
-the assembly, in the name of these former glories, to concur with
-Sparta in forgetting all the deplorable hostilities which had since
-intervened, and to afford to her a generous relief against the old
-common enemy. The Thebans might even now be decimated (according to
-the vow said to have been taken after the repulse of Xerxes), in
-spite of their present menacing ascendency,—if Athens and Sparta
-could be brought heartily to coöperate; and might be dealt with as
-Thebes herself had wished to deal with Athens after the Peloponnesian
-war, when Sparta refused to concur in pronouncing the sentence of
-utter ruin.[510]
-
-  [509] Isokrates (Archidamus), Or. vi, s. 129.
-
-  [510] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 34, 35.
-
-This appeal from Sparta was earnestly seconded by the envoys
-from Corinth and Phlius. The Corinthian speaker contended, that
-Epaminondas and his army, passing through the territory of Corinth
-and inflicting damage upon it in their passage into Peloponnesus,
-had committed a glaring violation of the general peace, sworn in
-371 B.C., first at Sparta and afterwards at Athens, guaranteeing
-universal autonomy to every Grecian city. The envoy from
-Phlius,—while complimenting Athens on the proud position which she
-now held, having the fate of Sparta in her hands,—dwelt on the meed
-of honor which she would earn in Greece, if she now generously
-interfered to rescue her ancient rival, forgetting past injuries and
-remembering only past benefits. In adopting such policy, too, she
-would act in accordance with her own true interests; since, should
-Sparta be crushed, the Thebans would become undisputed heads of
-Greece, and more formidable still to Athens.[511]
-
-  [511] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 38-48.
-
-It was not among the least marks of the prostration of Sparta, that
-she should be compelled to send such an embassy to Athens, and to
-entreat an amnesty for so many untoward realities during the past.
-The contrast is indeed striking, when we set her present language
-against that which she had held respecting Athens, before and through
-the Peloponnesian war.
-
-At first, her envoys were heard with doubtful favor; the sentiment
-of the assembly being apparently rather against than for them. “Such
-language from the Spartans (murmured the assembled citizens) is
-intelligible enough during their present distress; but so long as
-they were in good circumstances, we received nothing but ill-usage
-from them.”[512] Nor was the complaint of the Spartans, that the
-invasion of Laconia was contrary to the sworn peace guaranteeing
-universal autonomy, admitted without opposition. Some said that
-the Lacedæmonians had drawn the invasion upon themselves, by their
-previous interference with Tegea and in Arcadia; and that the
-intervention of the Mantineans at Tegea had been justifiable, since
-Stasippus and the philo-Laconian party in that city had been the
-first to begin unjust violence. On the other hand, the appeal made
-by the envoys to the congress of Peloponnesian allies held in 404
-B.C., after the surrender of Athens,—when the Theban deputy had
-proposed that Athens should be totally destroyed, while the Spartans
-had strenuously protested against so cruel a sentence—made a powerful
-impression on the assembly, and contributed more than anything else
-to determine them in favor of the proposition.[513] “As Athens was
-then, so Sparta is now, on the brink of ruin, from the fiat of the
-same enemy: Athens was then rescued by Sparta, and shall she now
-leave the rescue unrequited?” Such was the broad and simple issue
-which told upon the feelings of the assembled Athenians, disposing
-them to listen with increasing favor both to the envoys from Corinth
-and Phlius, and to their own speakers on the same side.
-
-  [512] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 35. Οἱ μέντοι Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ πάνυ
-  ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλὰ θροῦς τις τοιοῦτος διῆλθεν, ὡς νῦν μὲν ταῦτα
-  λέγοιεν· ὅτε δὲ εὖ ἔπραττον, ἐπέκειντο ἡμῖν.
-
-  [513] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 35. Μέγιστον δὲ τῶν λεχθέντων παρὰ
-  Λακεδαιμονίων ἐδόκει εἶναι, etc.
-
-To rescue Sparta, indeed, was prudent as well as generous. A
-counterpoise would thus be maintained against the excessive
-aggrandizement of Thebes, which at this moment doubtless caused
-serious alarm and jealousy to the Athenians. And thus, after the
-first ebullition of resentment against Sparta, naturally suggested
-by the history of the past, the philo-Spartan view of the situation
-gradually became more and more predominant in the assembly.
-Kallistratus[514] the orator spoke eloquently in support of the
-Lacedæmonians; while the adverse speakers were badly listened to,
-as pleading in favor of Thebes, whom no one wished to aggrandize
-farther. A vote, decisive and enthusiastic, was passed for assisting
-the Spartans with the full force of Athens; under the command of
-Iphikrates, then residing as a private citizen[515] at Athens, since
-the peace of the preceding year, which had caused him to be recalled
-from Korkyra.
-
-  [514] Demosthenes cont. Neær. p. 1353.
-
-  Xenokleides, a poet, spoke in opposition to the vote for
-  supporting Sparta (ib.).
-
-  [515] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 49; Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p.
-  479.
-
-As soon as the sacrifices, offered in contemplation of this
-enterprise were announced to be favorable, Iphikrates made
-proclamation that the citizens destined for service should equip
-themselves and muster in arms in the grove of Akadêmus (outside the
-gates), there to take their evening meal, and to march the next
-morning at daybreak. Such was the general ardor, that many citizens
-went forth from the gates even in advance of Iphikrates himself;
-and the total force which followed him is said to have been twelve
-thousand men,—not named under conscription by the general, but
-volunteers.[516] He first marched to Corinth, where he halted some
-days; much to the discontent of his soldiers, who were impatient to
-accomplish their project of carrying rescue to Sparta. But Iphikrates
-was well aware that all beyond Corinth was hostile ground, and that
-he had formidable enemies to deal with. After having established his
-position at Corinth, and obtained information regarding the enemy,
-he marched into Arcadia, and there made war without any important
-result. Epaminondas and his army had quitted Laconia, while many of
-the Arcadians and Eleians had gone home with the plunder acquired;
-so that Sparta was, for the time, out of danger. Impelled in part
-by the recent manifestation of Athens,[517] the Theban general
-himself soon commenced his march of return into Bœotia, in which
-it was necessary for him to pass the line of Mount Oneium between
-Corinth and Kenchreæ. This line was composed of difficult ground,
-and afforded good means of resistance to the passage of an army;
-nevertheless Iphikrates, though he occupied its two extremities, did
-not attempt directly to bar the passage of the Thebans. He contented
-himself with sending out from Corinth all his cavalry, both Athenian
-and Corinthian, to harass them in their march. But Epaminondas beat
-them back with some loss, and pursued them to the gates of Corinth.
-Excited by this spectacle, the Athenian main body within the town
-were eager to march out and engage in general battle. Their ardor was
-however repressed by Iphikrates; who, refusing to go forth, suffered
-the Thebans to continue their retreat unmolested.[518]
-
-  [516] This number is stated by Diodorus (xv, 63).
-
-  [517] To this extent we may believe what is said by Cornelius
-  Nepos (Iphicrates, c. 2).
-
-  [518] The account here given in the text coincides as to the
-  matter of fact with Xenophon, as well as with Plutarch; and also
-  (in my belief) with Pausanias (Xen. Hell. vi, 5, 51; Plutarch,
-  Pelop. c. 24; Pausan. ix, 14, 3).
-
-  But though I accept the facts of Xenophon, I cannot accept either
-  his suppositions as to the purpose, or his criticisms on the
-  conduct, of Iphikrates. Other modern critics appear to me not
-  to have sufficiently distinguished Xenophon’s _facts_ from his
-  _suppositions_.
-
-  Iphikrates (says Xenophon), while attempting to guard the line
-  of Mount Oneium, in order that the Thebans might not be able
-  to reach Bœotia,—left the excellent road adjoining to Kenchreæ
-  unguarded. Then,—wishing to inform himself, whether the Thebans
-  had as yet passed the Mount Oneium, he sent out as scouts all the
-  Athenian and all the Corinthian cavalry. Now (observes Xenophon)
-  a few scouts can see and report as well as a great number; while
-  the great number find it more difficult to get back in safety.
-  By this foolish conduct of Iphikrates, in sending out so large a
-  body, several horsemen were lost in the retreat; which would not
-  have happened if he had only sent out a few.
-
-  The criticism here made by Xenophon appears unfounded. It is
-  plain, from the facts which he himself states, that Iphikrates
-  never intended to bar the passage of the Thebans; and that he
-  sent out his whole body of cavalry, not simply as scouts, but to
-  harass the enemy on ground which he thought advantageous for the
-  purpose. That so able a commander as Iphikrates should have been
-  guilty of the gross blunders with which Xenophon here reproaches
-  him, is in a high degree improbable; it seems to me more probable
-  that Xenophon has misconceived his real purpose. Why indeed
-  should Iphikrates wish to expose the whole Athenian army in a
-  murderous conflict for the purpose of preventing the homeward
-  march of the Thebans? His mission was, to rescue Sparta; but
-  Sparta was now no longer in danger; and it was for the advantage
-  of Athens that the Thebans should go back to Bœotia, rather than
-  remain in Peloponnesus. That he should content himself with
-  harassing the Thebans, instead of barring their retreat directly,
-  is a policy which we should expect from him.
-
-  There is another circumstance in this retreat which has excited
-  discussion among the commentators, and on which I dissent from
-  their views. It is connected with the statement of Pausanias, who
-  says,—Ὡς προϊὼν τῷ στρατῷ (Epaminondas) κατὰ Λέχαιον ἐγίνετο,
-  καὶ διεξιέναι τῆς ὁδοῦ τὰ στενὰ καὶ δύσβατα ἔμελλεν, Ἰφικράτης
-  ὁ Τιμοθέου πελταστὰς καὶ ἄλλην Ἀθηναίων ἔχων δύναμιν, ἐπιχειρεῖ
-  τοῖς Θηβαίοις. Ἐπαμινώνδας δὲ τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους τρέπεται, ~καὶ
-  πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀφικόμενος Ἀθηναίων τὸ ἄστυ~, ὡς ἐπεξιέναι μαχουμένους
-  τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐκώλυεν Ἰφικράτης, ὁ δὲ αὖθις ἐς τὰς Θήβας
-  ἀπήλαυνε.
-
-  In this statement there are some inaccuracies, as that of calling
-  Iphikrates “son of Timotheus;” and speaking of _Lechæum_, where
-  Pausanias ought to have named _Kenchreæ_. For Epaminondas could
-  not have passed Corinth on the side of Lechæum, since the Long
-  Walls, reaching from one to the other, would prevent him;
-  moreover, the “rugged ground” was between Corinth and Kenchreæ,
-  not between Corinth and Lechæum.
-
-  But the words which occasion most perplexity are those which
-  follow: “Epaminondas repulses the assailants, and _having come to
-  the city itself of the Athenians_, when Iphikrates forbade the
-  Athenians to come out and fight, he (Epaminondas) again marched
-  away to Thebes.”
-
-  What are we to understand _by the city of the Athenians_? The
-  natural sense of the word is certainly Athens; and so most of
-  the commentators relate. But when the battle was fought between
-  Corinth and Kenchreæ, can we reasonably believe that Epaminondas
-  pursued the fugitives to Athens—through the city of Megara, which
-  lay in the way, and which seems then (Diodor. xv, 68) to have
-  been allied with Athens? The station of Iphikrates was _Corinth_;
-  from thence he had marched out,—and thither his cavalry, when
-  repulsed, would go back, as the nearest shelter.
-
-  Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Greece, vol. v, ch. 39, p. 141) understands
-  Pausanias to mean, that Iphikrates retired with his defeated
-  cavalry to Corinth,—that Epaminondas then marched straight on
-  to Athens,—and that Iphikrates followed him. “Possibly (he
-  says) the only mistake in this statement is, that it represents
-  the _presence_ of Iphikrates, instead of his _absence_, as the
-  cause which prevented the Athenians from fighting. According to
-  Xenophon, Iphikrates must have been in the rear of Epaminondas.”
-
-  I cannot think that we obtain this from the words of Xenophon.
-  Neither he nor Plutarch countenance the idea that Epaminondas
-  marched to the walls of Athens, which supposition is derived
-  solely from the words of Pausanias. Xenophon and Plutarch
-  intimate only that Iphikrates interposed some opposition, and not
-  very effective opposition, near Corinth, to the retreating march
-  of Epaminondas, from Peloponnesus into Bœotia.
-
-  That Epaminondas should have marched to Athens at all, under
-  the circumstances of the case, when he was returning to Bœotia,
-  appears to me in itself improbable, and to be rendered still more
-  improbable by the silence of Xenophon. Nor is it indispensable
-  to put this construction even upon Pausanias; who may surely
-  have meant by the words—πρὸς αὐτὸ Ἀθηναίων τὸ ἄστυ,—not Athens,
-  but _the city then occupied by the Athenians engaged_,—that is,
-  _Corinth_. _The city of the Athenians_, in reference to this
-  battle, was Corinth; it was the city out of which the troops of
-  Iphikrates had just marched, and to which, on being defeated,
-  they naturally retired for safety, pursued by Epaminondas to the
-  gates. The statement of Pausanias,—that Iphikrates would not let
-  the Athenians in the town (Corinth) go out to fight,—then follows
-  naturally. Epaminondas, finding that they would not come out,
-  drew back his troops, and resumed his march to Thebes.
-
-  The stratagem of Iphikrates noticed by Polyænus (iii, 9, 29),
-  can hardly be the same incident as this mentioned by Pausanias.
-  It purports to be a nocturnal surprise planned by the Thebans
-  against Athens; which certainly must be quite different (if it
-  be in itself a reality) from this march of Epaminondas. And the
-  stratagem ascribed by Polyænus to Iphikrates is of a strange and
-  highly improbable character.
-
-On returning to Thebes, Epaminondas with Pelopidas and the other
-Bœotarchs, resigned the command. They had already retained it for
-four months longer than the legal expiration of their term. Although,
-by the constitutional law of Thebes, any general who retained his
-functions longer than the period fixed by law was pronounced worthy
-of death, yet Epaminondas, while employed in his great projects
-for humiliating Sparta and founding the two hostile cities on her
-border, had taken upon himself to brave this illegality, persuading
-all his colleagues to concur with him. On resigning the command, all
-of them had to undergo that trial of accountability which awaited
-every retiring magistrate, as a matter of course,—but which, in the
-present case, was required on special ground, since all had committed
-an act notoriously punishable as well as of dangerous precedent.
-Epaminondas undertook the duty of defending his colleagues as well
-as himself. That he as well as Pelopidas had political enemies,
-likely to avail themselves of any fair pretext for accusing him,—is
-not to be doubted. But we may well doubt, whether on the present
-occasion any of these enemies actually came forward to propose that
-the penalty legally incurred should be inflicted; not merely because
-this proposition, in the face of a victorious army, returning elate
-with their achievements and proud of their commanders, was full of
-danger to the mover himself,—but also for another reason,—because
-Epaminondas would hardly be imprudent enough to wait for the case
-to be stated by his enemies. Knowing that the illegality committed
-was flagrant and of hazardous example,—having also the reputation
-of his colleagues as well as his own to protect,—he would forestall
-accusation by coming forward himself to explain and justify the
-proceeding. He set forth the glorious results of the expedition
-just finished; the invasion and devastation of Laconia, hitherto
-unvisited by any enemy,—the confinement of the Spartans within their
-walls,—the liberation of all Western Laconia, and the establishment
-of Messênê as a city,—the constitution of a strong new Arcadian city,
-forming, with Tegea on one flank and Messênê on the other, a line
-of defence on the Spartan frontier, so as to ensure the permanent
-depression of the great enemy of Thebes,—the emancipation of Greece
-generally, from Spartan ascendency, now consummated.
-
-Such justification,—whether delivered in reply to a substantive
-accuser, or (which is more probable) tendered spontaneously by
-Epaminondas himself,—was not merely satisfactory, but triumphant.
-He and the other generals were acquitted by acclamation; without
-even going through the formality of collecting the votes.[519] And
-it appears that both Epaminondas and Pelopidas were immediately
-re-appointed among the Bœotarchs of the year.[520]
-
-  [519] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25; Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 194
-  B.; Pausan. ix, 14, 4; Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 7, 8;
-  Ælian, V. H. xiii, 42.
-
-  Pausanias states the fact plainly and clearly; the others,
-  especially Nepos and Ælian, though agreeing in the main fact,
-  surround it with colors exaggerated and false. They represent
-  Epaminondas as in danger of being put to death by ungrateful
-  and malignant fellow-citizens; Cornelius Nepos puts into his
-  mouth a justificatory speech of extreme insolence (compare
-  Arist. Or. xlvi, περὶ τοῦ παραφθέγματος—p. 385 Jebb.; p. 520
-  Dindorf.); which, had it been really made, would have tended more
-  than anything else to set the public against him,—and which is
-  moreover quite foreign to the character of Epaminondas. To carry
-  the exaggeration still farther, Plutarch (De Vitioso Pudore, p.
-  540 E.) describes Pelopidas as trembling and begging for his life.
-
-  Epaminondas had committed a grave illegality, which could not be
-  passed over without notice in his trial of accountability. But
-  he had a good justification. It was necessary that he should put
-  in the justification; when put in, it passed triumphantly. What
-  more could be required? The facts, when fairly stated, will not
-  serve as an illustration of the alleged ingratitude of the people
-  towards great men.
-
-  [520] Diodorus (xv, 81) states that Pelopidas was Bœotarch
-  without interruption, annually re-appointed, from the revolution
-  of Thebes down to his decease. Plutarch also (Pelopid. c. 34)
-  affirms that when Pelopidas died, he was in the thirteenth year
-  of his appointment; which may be understood as the same assertion
-  in other words. Whether Epaminondas was rechosen, does not appear.
-
-  Sievers denies the reappointment as well of Pelopidas as of
-  Epaminondas. But I do not see upon what grounds; for, in my
-  judgment, Epaminondas appears again as commander in Peloponnesus
-  during this same year (369 B.C.) Sievers holds Epaminondas to
-  have commanded without being Bœotarch; but no reason is produced
-  for this (Sievers, Geschicht. Griech. bis zur Schlacht von
-  Mantinea, p. 277).
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXIX.
-
-FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO THE DEATH OF
-PELOPIDAS.
-
-
-Prodigious was the change operated throughout the Grecian world
-during the eighteen months between June 371 B.C. (when the general
-peace, including all except Thebes, was sworn at Sparta, twenty days
-before the battle of Leuktra), and the spring of 369 B.C., when
-the Thebans, after a victorious expedition into Peloponnesus, were
-reconducted home by Epaminondas.
-
-How that change worked in Peloponnesus, amounting to a partial
-reconstitution of the peninsula, has been sketched in the preceding
-chapter. Among most of the cities and districts hitherto dependent
-allies of Sparta, the local oligarchies, whereby Spartan influence
-had been maintained, were overthrown, not without harsh and violent
-reaction. Laconia had been invaded and laid waste, while the Spartans
-were obliged to content themselves with guarding their central hearth
-and their families from assault. The western and best half of Laconia
-had been wrested from them; Messênê had been constituted as a free
-city on their frontier; a large proportion of their Periœki and
-Helots had been converted into independent Greeks bitterly hostile
-to them; moreover the Arcadian population had been emancipated from
-their dependence, and organized into self-acting jealous neighbors in
-the new city of Megalopolis, as well as in Tegea and Mantinea. The
-once philo-Laconian Tegea was now among the chief enemies of Sparta;
-and the Skiritæ, so long numbered as the bravest of the auxiliary
-troops of the latter, were now identified in sentiment with Arcadians
-and Thebans against her.
-
-Out of Peloponnesus, the change wrought had also been considerable;
-partly, in the circumstances of Thessaly and Macedonia, partly in the
-position and policy of Athens.
-
-At the moment of the battle of Leuktra (July, 371 B.C.) Jason was
-tagus of Thessaly, and Amyntas king of Macedonia. Amyntas was
-dependent on, if not tributary to, Jason, whose dominion, military
-force, and revenue, combined with extraordinary personal energy and
-ability, rendered him decidedly the first potentate in Greece, and
-whose aspirations were known to be unbounded; so that he inspired
-more or less alarm everywhere, especially to weaker neighbors like
-the Macedonian prince. Throughout a reign of twenty-three years, full
-of trouble and peril, Amyntas had cultivated the friendship both of
-Sparta and of Athens,[521] especially the former. It was by Spartan
-aid only that he had been enabled to prevail over the Olynthian
-confederacy, which would otherwise have proved an overmatch for
-him. At the time when Sparta aided him to crush that promising and
-liberal confederacy, she was at the maximum of her power (382-379
-B.C.), holding even Thebes under garrison among her subject allies.
-But the revolution of Thebes, and the war against Thebes and Athens
-(from 378 B.C. downward) had sensibly diminished her power on land;
-while the newly-organized naval force and maritime confederacy of
-the Athenians, had overthrown her empire at sea. Moreover, the
-great power of Jason in Thessaly had so grown up (combined with the
-resistance of the Thebans) as to cut off the communication of Sparta
-with Macedonia, and even to forbid her (in 374 B.C.) from assisting
-her faithful ally, the Pharsalian Polydamas, against him.[522]
-To Amyntas, accordingly, the friendship of Athens, now again the
-greatest maritime potentate in Greece, had become more important than
-that of Sparta. We know that he tried to conciliate the powerful
-Athenian generals, Iphikrates and Timotheus. He adopted the former as
-his son;[523] at what exact period, cannot be discovered; but I have
-already stated that Iphikrates had married the daughter of Kotys king
-of Thrace, and had acquired a maritime settlement called Drys, on the
-Thracian coast. In the years 373-372 B.C., we find Timotheus also in
-great favor with Amyntas, testified by a valuable present sent to him
-at Athens; a cargo of timber, the best produce of Macedonia.[524]
-Amyntas was at this period on the best footing with Athens, sent his
-deputies as a confederate to the regular synod there assembled, and
-was treated with considerable favor.[525]
-
-  [521] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 249; Isokrates, Or. v,
-  (Philipp.) s. 124. Ὁ γὰρ πατήρ σου (Isokrates to Philip) πρὸς
-  τὰς πόλεις ταύτας (Sparta, Athens, Argos, and Thebes), αἷς σοι
-  παραινῶ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, πρὸς ἁπάσας οἰκείως εἶχε.
-
-  The connection of Amyntas with Thebes could hardly have been
-  considerable; that with Argos, was based upon a strong legendary
-  and ancestral sentiment rather than on common political grounds;
-  with Athens, it was both political and serious; with Sparta, it
-  was attested by the most essential military aid and coöperation.
-
-  [522] Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 17.
-
-  [523] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 249.
-
-  [524] Demosthen. cont. Timotheum. c. 8, p. 1194; Xenoph. Hellen.
-  vi, 1, 11.
-
-  [525] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 248. τὴν πατρικὴν
-  εὔνοιαν, καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας ἃς ὑμεῖς ὑπήρξατε Ἀμύντᾳ, τῷ Φιλίππου
-  πατρὶ, etc.
-
-  Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. c. 30, p. 660. τὴν πατρικὴν φιλίαν
-  ἀνανεοῦθαι (Philip to the Athenians): compare ibid. c. 29, p. 657.
-
-The battle of Leuktra (July 371 B.C.) tended to knit more closely
-the connection between Amyntas and the Athenians, who were now the
-auxiliaries most likely to sustain him against the ascendency of
-Jason. It produced at the same time the more important effect of
-stimulating the ambition of Athens in every direction. Not only
-her ancient rival, Sparta, beaten in the field and driven from
-one humiliation to another, was disabled from opposing her, and
-even compelled to solicit her aid,—but new rivals, the Thebans,
-were suddenly lifted into an ascendency inspiring her with mingled
-jealousy and apprehension. Hence fresh hopes as well as fresh
-jealousies conspired to push Athens in a career of aspiration such as
-had never appeared open to her since the disasters of 404 B.C. Such
-enlargement of her views was manifested conspicuously by the step
-taken two or three months after the battle of Leuktra (mentioned in
-my preceding chapter),—of causing the peace, which had already been
-sworn at Sparta in the preceding month of June, to be resworn under
-the presidency and guarantee of Athens, by cities binding themselves
-mutually to each other as defensive allies of Athens;[526] thus
-silently disenthroning Sparta and taking her place.
-
-On land, however, Athens had never held, and could hardly expect to
-hold, anything above the second rank, serving as a bulwark against
-Theban aggrandizement. At sea she already occupied the first place,
-at the head of an extensive confederacy; and it was to farther
-maritime aggrandizement that her present chances, as well as her past
-traditions, pointed. Such is the new path upon which we now find
-her entering. At the first formation of her new confederacy, in 378
-B.C., she had distinctly renounced all idea of resuming the large
-amount of possessions, public and private, which had been snatched
-from her along with her empire at the close of the Peloponnesian
-war; and had formally proclaimed that no Athenian citizen should
-for the future possess or cultivate land out of Attica—a guarantee
-against renovation of the previous kleruchies or out-possessions.
-This prudent self-restraint, which had contributed so much during
-the last seven years to raise her again into naval preëminence, is
-now gradually thrown aside, under the tempting circumstances of the
-moment. Henceforward, the Athenian maritime force becomes employed
-for the recovery of lost possessions as well as for protection or
-enlargement of the confederacy. The prohibition against kleruchies
-out of Attica will soon appear to be forgotten. Offence is given to
-the prominent members of the maritime confederacy; so that the force
-of Athens, misemployed and broken into fragments, is found twelve or
-thirteen years afterwards unable to repel a new aggressor, who starts
-up, alike able and unexpected, in the Macedonian prince Philip, son
-of Amyntas.
-
-  [526] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.
-
-Very different was the position of Amyntas himself towards Athens, in
-371 B.C. He was an unpretending ally, looking for help in case of
-need against Jason, and sending his envoy to the meeting at Athens
-about September or October 371 B.C., when the general peace was
-resworn under Athenian auspices. It was at this meeting that Athens
-seems to have first put forth her new maritime pretensions. While
-guaranteeing to every Grecian city, great and small, the enjoyment
-of autonomy, she made exception of some cities which she claimed as
-belonging to herself. Among these was certainly Amphipolis; probably
-also the towns in the Thracian Chersonesus and Potidæa; all which
-we find, a few years afterwards, occupied by Athenians.[527] How
-much of their lost possessions the Athenians thought it prudent now
-to reclaim, we cannot distinctly make out. But we know that their
-aspirations grasped much more than Amphipolis;[528] and the moment
-was probably thought propitious for making other demands besides.
-Amyntas through his envoy, together with the rest of the assembled
-envoys, recognized without opposition the right of the Athenians to
-Amphipolis.[529]
-
-  [527] Demosthen. (Philippic. ii, c. 4, p. 71; De Halonneso, c. 3,
-  p. 79; De Rebus Chersones. c. 2, p. 91); also Epistol. Philipp.
-  ap. Demosthen. c. 6, p. 163.
-
-  [528] Compare the aspirations of Athens, as stated in 391 B.C.,
-  when the propositions of peace recommended by Andokides were
-  under consideration, aspirations, which were then regarded as
-  beyond all hope of attainment, and imprudent even to talk about
-  (Andokides, De Pace, s. 15). φέρε, ἀλλὰ Χεῤῥόνησον καὶ τὰς
-  ἀποικίας καὶ τὰ ἐγκτήματα καὶ τὰ χρέα ἵνα ἀπολάβωμεν; Ἀλλ’ οὔτε
-  βασιλεὺς, οὔτε οἱ σύμμαχοι, συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν, μεθ’ ὧν αὐτὰ δεῖ
-  πολεμοῦντας κτήσασθαι.
-
-  [529] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 250.
-
-  Συμμαχίας γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων συνελθούσης,
-  εἷς ὢν τούτων Ἀμύντας ὁ Φιλίππου πατὴρ, καὶ πέμπων σύνεδρον,
-  καὶ τῆς καθ’ ἐαυτὸν ψήφου κύριος ὢν, ~ἐψηφίσατο Ἀμφίπολιν τὴν
-  Ἀθηναίων συνεξαιρεῖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίοις~. Καὶ τοῦτο
-  τὸ κοινὸν δόγμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ τοὺς ψηφισαμένους, ~ἐκ τῶν
-  δημοσίων γραμμάτων~ μάρτυρας παρεσχόμην.
-
-  The remarkable event to which Æschines here makes allusion, must
-  have taken place either in the congress held at Sparta, in the
-  month preceding the battle of Leuktra, where the general peace
-  was sworn, with universal autonomy guaranteed,—leaving out only
-  Thebes; or else, at the subsequent congress held three or four
-  months afterwards at Athens, where a peace, on similar conditions
-  generally, was again sworn under the auspices of Athens as
-  president.
-
-  My conviction is, that it took place on the latter occasion,—at
-  Athens. First, the reference of Æschines to the δημόσια γράμματα
-  leads us to conclude that the affair was transacted in that city;
-  secondly, I do not think that the Athenians would have been in
-  any situation to exact such a reserve in their favor, prior to
-  the battle of Leuktra; thirdly, the congress at Sparta was held,
-  not for the purpose of συμμαχία or alliance, but for that of
-  terminating the war and concluding peace; while the subsequent
-  congress at Athens formed the basis of a defensive alliance, to
-  which, either then or soon afterwards, Sparta acceded.
-
-Such recognition was not indeed in itself either any loss to
-Amyntas, or any gain to Athens; for Amphipolis, though bordering
-on his kingdom, had never belonged to him, nor had he any power of
-transferring it. Originally an Athenian colony,[530] next taken from
-Athens in 424-423 B.C. by Brasidas, through the improvidence of
-the Athenian officers Euklês and Thucydides, then recolonized under
-Lacedæmonian auspices,—it had ever since remained an independent
-city; though Sparta had covenanted to restore it by the peace of
-Nikias (421 B.C.), but had never performed her covenant. Its
-unparalleled situation, near to both the bridge and mouth of the
-Strymon, in the midst of a fertile territory, within reach of the
-mining district of Pangæus,—rendered it a tempting prize; and
-the right of Athens to it was indisputable; so far as original
-colonization before the capture by Brasidas, and formal treaty of
-cession by Sparta after the capture, could confer a right. But this
-treaty, not fulfilled at the time, was now fifty years old. The
-repugnance of the Amphipolitan population, which had originally
-prevented its fulfilment, was strengthened by all the sanction of
-a long prescription; while the tomb and chapel of Brasidas their
-second founder, consecrated in the agora, served as an imperishable
-admonition to repel all pretensions on the part of Athens. Such
-pretensions, whatever might be the right, were deplorably impolitic
-unless Athens was prepared to back them by strenuous efforts of men
-and money; from which we shall find her shrinking now as she had
-done (under the unwise advice of Nikias) in 421 B.C., and the years
-immediately succeeding. In fact, the large renovated pretensions of
-Athens both to Amphipolis and to other places on the Macedonian and
-Chalkidic coast, combined with her languor and inertness in military
-action,—will be found henceforward among the greatest mischiefs
-to the general cause of Hellenic independence, and among the most
-effective helps to the well-conducted aggressions of Philip of
-Macedon.
-
-  [530] The pretensions advanced by Philip of Macedon (in
-  his Epistola ad Athenienses, ap. Demosthen. p. 164), that
-  Amphipolis or its locality originally belonged to his ancestor
-  Alexander son of Amyntas, as having expelled the Persians from
-  it,—are unfounded, and contradicted by Thucydides. At least,
-  if (which is barely possible) Alexander ever did acquire the
-  spot, he must have lost it afterwards; for it was occupied by
-  the Edonian Thracians, both in 465 B.C., when Athens made her
-  first unsuccessful attempt to plant a colony there,—and in 437
-  B.C., when she tried again with better success under Agnon, and
-  established Amphipolis (Thucyd. iv, 102).
-
-  The expression of Æschines, that Amyntas in 371 B.C. “gave up or
-  receded from” Amphipolis (ὧν δ’ Ἀμύντας ἀπέστη—De Fals. Leg. 1
-  c.) can at most only be construed as referring to rights which he
-  may have claimed, since he was never in actual possession of it;
-  though we cannot wonder that the orator should use such language
-  in addressing Philip son of Amyntas, who was really master of the
-  town.
-
-Though the claim of Athens to the recovery of a portion of her lost
-transmarine possessions was thus advanced and recognized in the
-congress of autumn 371 B.C., she does not seem to have been able to
-take any immediate steps for prosecuting it. Six months afterwards,
-the state of northern Greece was again completely altered by the
-death, nearly at the same time, of Jason in Thessaly, and of Amyntas
-in Macedonia.[531] The former was cut off (as has been mentioned
-in the preceding chapter) by assassination, while in the plenitude
-of his vigor; and his great power could not be held together by an
-inferior hand. His two brothers, Polyphron and Polydorus, succeeded
-him in the post of tagus of Thessaly. Polyphron, having put to death
-his brother, enjoyed the dignity for a short time; after which he
-too was slain by a third brother, Alexander of Pheræ; but not before
-he had committed gross enormities by killing and banishing many of
-the most eminent citizens of Larissa and Pharsalus; among them the
-estimable Polydamas.[532] The Larissæan exiles, many belonging to
-the great family of the Aleuadæ, took refuge in Macedonia, where
-Amyntas (having died in 370 B.C.) had been succeeded in the throne
-by his youthful son Alexander. The latter, being persuaded to invade
-Thessaly for the purpose of restoring them, succeeded in getting
-possession of Larissa and Krannon; both which cities he kept under
-his own garrisons, in spite of unavailing resistance from Polyphron
-and Alexander of Pheræ.[533]
-
-  [531] Diodor. xv, 60.
-
-  [532] Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 4, 33, 34.
-
-  Diodorus (xv, 61) calls Alexander of Pheræ brother of Polydorus;
-  Plutarch (Pelopid. c. 29) calls him nephew. Xenophon does not
-  expressly say which; but his narrative seems to countenance the
-  statement of Diodorus rather than that of Plutarch.
-
-  [533] Diodor. xv, 61.
-
-This Alexander, who succeeded to Jason’s despotism in Pheræ, and
-to a considerable portion of his military power, was nevertheless
-unable to keep together the whole of it, or to retain Thessaly and
-its circumjacent tributaries in one united dominion. The Thessalian
-cities hostile to him invited assistance, not merely from Alexander
-of Macedon, but also from the Thebans; who despatched Pelopidas
-into the country, seemingly in 369 B.C., soon after the return of
-the army under Epaminondas from its victorious progress in Laconia
-and Arcadia. Pelopidas entered Thessaly at the head of an army,
-and took Larissa with various other cities into Theban protection;
-apparently under the acquiescence of Alexander of Macedon, with whom
-he contracted an alliance.[534] A large portion of Thessaly thus came
-under the protection of Thebes in hostility to the dynasty of Pheræ,
-and to the brutal tyrant Alexander who now ruled in that city.
-
-Alexander of Macedon found that he had difficulty enough in
-maintaining his own dominion at home, without holding Thessalian
-towns in garrison. He was harassed by intestine dissensions, and
-after a reign of scarcely two years, was assassinated (368 B.C.) by
-some conspirators of Alôrus and Pydna, two cities (half Macedonian,
-half Hellenic) near the western coast of the Thermaic Gulf. Ptolemæus
-(or Ptolemy) of Alôrus is mentioned as leader of the enterprise,
-and Apollophanês of Pydna as one of the agents.[535] But besides
-these conspirators, there was also another enemy, Pausanias,—a
-man of the royal lineage and a pretender to the throne;[536] who,
-having been hitherto in banishment, was now returning at the head
-of a considerable body of Greeks, supported by numerous partisans
-in Macedonia,—and was already master of Anthemus, Thermê, Strepsa,
-and other places in or near the Thermaic Gulf. He was making war
-both against Ptolemy and against the remaining family of Amyntas.
-Eurydikê, the widow of that prince, was now left with her two younger
-children, Perdikkas, a young man, and Philip, yet a youth. She was in
-the same interest with Ptolemy, the successful conspirator against
-her son Alexander, and there was even a tale which represented her
-as his accomplice in the deed. Ptolemy was regent, administering her
-affairs and those of her minor children, against Pausanias.[537]
-
-  [534] Diodor. xv, 67.
-
-  The transactions of Macedonia and Thessaly at this period are
-  difficult to make out clearly. What is stated in the text comes
-  from Diodorus; who affirms, however, farther,—that Pelopidas
-  marched into Macedonia, and brought back as a hostage to
-  Thebes the youthful Philip, brother of Alexander. This latter
-  affirmation is incorrect; we know that Philip was in Macedonia,
-  and free, _after_ the death of Alexander. And I believe that the
-  march of Pelopidas into Macedonia, with the bringing back of
-  Philip as a hostage, took place in the following year 368 B.C.
-
-  Justin also states (vii, 5) erroneously, that Alexander of
-  Macedon gave his brother Philip as a hostage, first to the
-  Illyrians, next to the Thebans.
-
-  [535] Demosthen. De Fals. Leg. c. 58, p. 402; Diodorus, xv, 71.
-
-  Diodorus makes the mistake of calling this Ptolemy son of Amyntas
-  and brother of Perdikkas; though he at the same time describes
-  him as Πτολεμαῖος Ἀλωρίτης, which description would hardly be
-  applied to one of the royal brothers. Moreover, the passage of
-  Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 250, shows that Ptolemy was not
-  son of Amyntas; and Dexippus (ap. Syncellum, p. 263) confirms the
-  fact.
-
-  See these points discussed in Mr. Fynes Clinton’s Fasti
-  Hellenici, Appendix, c. 4.
-
-  [536] Diodor. xvi, 2.
-
-  [537] Æschines, Fals. Legat. c. 13, 14, p. 249, 250; Justin, vii,
-  6.
-
-  Æschines mentions Ptolemy as regent, on behalf of Eurydikê and
-  her younger sons. Æschines also mentions Alexander as having
-  recently died, but says nothing about his assassination.
-  Nevertheless there is no reason to doubt that he was
-  assassinated, which we know both from Demosthenes and Diodorus;
-  and assassinated by Ptolemy, which we know from Plutarch (Pelop.
-  c. 27), Marsyas (ap. Athenæum, xiv. p. 629), and Diodorus.
-  Justin states that Eurydikê conspired both against her husband
-  Amyntas, and against her children, in concert with a paramour.
-  The statements of Æschines rather tend to disprove the charge of
-  her having been concerned in the death of Amyntas, but to support
-  that of her having been accomplice with Ptolemy in the murder of
-  Alexander.
-
-  Assassination was a fate which frequently befel the Macedonian
-  kings. When we come to the history of Olympias, mother of
-  Alexander the Great, it will be seen that Macedonian queens were
-  capable of greater crimes than those imputed to Eurydikê.
-
-Deserted by many of their most powerful friends, Eurydikê and Ptolemy
-would have been forced to yield the country to Pausanias, had they
-not found by accident a foreign auxiliary near at hand. The Athenian
-admiral Iphikrates, with a squadron of moderate force, was then on
-the coast of Macedonia. He had been sent thither by his countrymen
-(369 B.C.) (soon after his partial conflict near Corinth with the
-retreating army of Epaminondas, on its way from Peloponnesus to
-Bœotia), for the purpose of generally surveying the maritime region
-of Macedonia and Thrace, opening negotiations with parties in the
-country, and laying his plans for future military operations. At the
-period when Alexander was slain, and when Pausanias was carrying on
-his invasion, Iphikrates happened to be on the Macedonian coast.
-He was there visited by Eurydikê with her two sons Perdikkas and
-Philip; the latter seemingly about thirteen or fourteen years of age,
-the former somewhat older. She urgently implored him to assist the
-family in their present emergency, reminding him that Amyntas had
-not only throughout his life been a faithful ally of Athens, but had
-also adopted him (Iphikrates) as his son, and had thus constituted
-him brother to the two young princes. Placing Perdikkas in his hands,
-and causing Philip to embrace his knees, she appealed to his generous
-sympathies, and invoked his aid as the only chance of restoration,
-or even of personal safety, to the family. Iphikrates, moved by this
-affecting supplication, declared in her favor, acted so vigorously
-against Pausanias as to expel him from Macedonia, and secured the
-sceptre to the family of Amyntas; under Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent
-for the time.
-
-This striking incident is described by the orator Æschines[538] in
-an oration delivered many years afterwards at Athens. The boy, who
-then clasped the knees of Iphikrates, lived afterwards to overthrow
-the independence, not of Athens alone, but of Greece generally. The
-Athenian general had not been sent to meddle in the disputes of
-succession to the Macedonian crown. Nevertheless, looking at the
-circumstances of the time, his interference may really have promised
-beneficial consequences to Athens; so that we have no right to blame
-him for the unforeseen ruin which it was afterwards found to occasion.
-
-  [538] Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 13, 14, p. 249, 250; Cornelius
-  Nepos, Iphicrates, c. 3.
-
-Though the interference of Iphikrates maintained the family of
-Amyntas, and established Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent, it did not
-procure to Athens the possession of Amphipolis; which was not in
-the power of the Macedonian kings to bestow. Amphipolis was at
-that time a free Greek city, inhabited by a population in the
-main seemingly Chalkidic, and in confederacy with Olynthus.[539]
-Iphikrates prosecuted his naval operations on the coast of Thrace
-and Macedonia for a period of three years (368-365 B.C.). We make
-out very imperfectly what he achieved. He took into his service a
-general named Charidemus, a native of Oreus in Eubœa; one of those
-Condottieri (to use an Italian word familiar in the fourteenth
-century), who, having a band of mercenaries under his command, hired
-himself to the best bidder and to the most promising cause. These
-mercenaries served under Iphikrates for three years,[540] until he
-was dismissed by the Athenians from his command and superseded by
-Timotheus. What successes they enabled him to obtain for Athens,
-is not clear; but it is certain that he did not succeed in taking
-Amphipolis. He seems to have directed one or two attempts against the
-town by other officers, which proved abortive; but he got possession
-of some Amphipolitan prisoners or hostages,[541] which opened a
-prospect of accomplishing the surrender of the town.
-
-  [539] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 150.
-
-  ... μισθοῖ πάλιν αὑτὸν (Charidemus) τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις, τοῖς ὑμετέροις
-  ἐχθροῖς καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσιν Ἀμφίπολιν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον.
-
-  Demosthenes is here speaking of the time when Timotheus
-  superseded Iphikrates in the command, that is, about 365-364 B.C.
-  But we are fairly entitled to presume that the same is true of
-  369 or 368 B.C.
-
-  [540] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 149, c. 37.
-
-  [541] Demosthen. cont. Aristokr. p. 669, s. 149, c. 37.
-
-  The passage in which the orator alludes to these _hostages_ of
-  the Amphipolitans in the hands of Iphikrates, is unfortunately
-  not fully intelligible without farther information.
-
-  (Charidemus) Πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς ~Ἀμφιπολιτῶν ὁμήρους, οὓς παρ’
-  Ἁρπάλου λαβὼν Ἰφικράτης ἔδωκε φυλάττειν αὐτῷ, ψηφισαμένων ὑμῶν~
-  ὡς ὑμᾶς κομίσαι, παρέδωκεν Ἀμφιπολίταις· καὶ τοῦ μὴ λαβεῖν
-  Ἀμφίπολιν, τοῦτ’ ἐμπόδιον κατέστη.
-
-  Who Harpalus was,—or what is meant by Iphikrates “obtaining
-  (or capturing) from him the Amphipolitan hostages”—we cannot
-  determine. Possibly Harpalus may have been commander of a
-  body of Macedonians or Thracians acting as auxiliaries to the
-  Amphipolitans, and in this character exacting hostages from them
-  as security. Charidemus, as we see afterwards when acting for
-  Kersobleptes, received hostages from the inhabitants of Sestos
-  (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 679. c. 40 s. 177).
-
-It seems evident, however, in spite of our great dearth of
-information, that Iphikrates during his command between 369-365
-B.C. did not satisfy the expectations of his countrymen. At that
-time, those expectations were large, as testified by sending out not
-only Iphikrates to Macedonia and Thrace, but also Timotheus (who
-had returned from his service with the Persians in 372-371 B.C.)
-to Ionia and the Hellespont, in conjunction with Ariobarzanes the
-satrap of Phrygia.[542] That satrap was in possession of Sestos, as
-well as of various other towns in the Thracian Chersonesus, towards
-which Athenian ambition now tended, according to that new turn,
-towards more special and separate acquisitions for Athens, which it
-had taken since the battle of Leuktra. But before we advert to the
-achievements of Timotheus (366-365 B.C.) in these regions, we must
-notice the main course of political conflict in Greece Proper, down
-to the partial pacification of 366 B.C.
-
-  [542] Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libertat. c. 5, p. 193.
-
-Though the Athenians had sent Iphikrates (in the winter of 370-369
-B.C.) to rescue Sparta from the grasp of Epaminondas, the terms of
-a permanent alliance had not yet been settled between them; envoys
-from Sparta and her allies visited Athens shortly afterwards for
-that purpose.[543] All pretensions to exclusive headship on the
-part of Sparta were now at an end. Amidst abundant discussion in
-the public assembly, all the speakers, Lacedæmonian and others as
-well as Athenian, unanimously pronounced that the headship must be
-vested jointly and equally in Sparta and Athens; and the only point
-in debate was, how such an arrangement could be most suitably carried
-out. It was at first proposed that the former should command on
-land, the latter at sea; a distribution, which, on first hearing,
-found favor both as equitable and convenient, until an Athenian
-named Kephisodotus reminded his countrymen, that the Lacedæmonians
-had few ships of war, and those manned chiefly by Helots; while the
-land-force of Athens consisted of her horsemen and hoplites, the
-choice citizens of the state. Accordingly, on the distribution now
-pointed out, Athenians, in great numbers and of the best quality,
-would be placed under Spartan command; while few Lacedæmonians, and
-those of little dignity, would go under Athenian command; which would
-be, not equality, but the reverse. Kephisodotus proposed that both
-on land and at sea, the command should alternate between Athens and
-Sparta, in periods of five days; and his amendment was adopted.[544]
-
-  [543] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 1.
-
-  The words τῷ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει must denote the year beginning in the
-  spring of 369 B.C. On this point I agree with Dr. Thirlwall
-  (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 40, p. 145 note); differing from him
-  however (p. 146 note), as well as from Mr. Clinton, in this,—that
-  I place the second expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus
-  (as Sievers places it, p. 278) in 369 B.C.; not in 368 B.C.
-
-  The narrative of Xenophon carries to my mind conviction that this
-  is what he meant to affirm. In the beginning of Book VII, he
-  says, τῷ δ’ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων πρέσβεις
-  ἦλθον αὐτοκράτορες Ἀθήναζε, βουλευσόμενοι καθ’ ὅ,τι ἡ συμμαχία
-  ἔσοιτο Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις.
-
-  Now the words τῷ δ’ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει denote the spring of 369 B.C.
-
-  Xenophon goes on to describe the assembly and the discussion
-  at Athens, respecting the terms of alliance. This description
-  occupies, from vii, 1, 1 to vii, 1, 14, where the final vote and
-  agreement is announced.
-
-  Immediately after this vote, Xenophon goes on to
-  say,—Στρατευομένων δ’ ἀμφοτέρων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων
-  (Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and allies) εἰς Κόρινθον, ἔδοξε κοινῇ
-  φυλάττειν τὸ Ὄνειον. Καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐπορεύοντο οἱ Θηβαῖοι καὶ οἱ
-  σύμμαχοι, παραταξάμενοι ἐφύλαττον ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν τοῦ Ὀνείου.
-
-  I conceive that the decision of the Athenian assembly,—the
-  march of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to guard the lines of
-  Oneion,—and the march of the Thebans to enter Peloponnesus,—are
-  here placed by Xenophon as events in immediate sequence, with no
-  long interval of time between them. I see no ground to admit the
-  interval of a year between the vote of the assembly and the march
-  of the Thebans; the more so, as Epaminondas might reasonably
-  presume that the building of Megalopolis and Messene, recently
-  begun, would need to be supported by another Theban army in
-  Peloponnesus during 369 B.C.
-
-  It is indeed contended (and admitted even by Sievers) that
-  Epaminondas could not have been reëlected Bœotarch in 369 B.C.
-  But in this point I do not concur. It appears to me that the
-  issue of the trial at Thebes was triumphant for him; thus making
-  it more probable,—not less probable,—that he and Pelopidas were
-  reëlected Bœotarchs immediately.
-
-  [544] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 10-14.
-
-Though such amendment had the merit of perfect equality between the
-two competitors for headship, it was by no means well-calculated for
-success in joint operations against a general like Epaminondas. The
-allies determined to occupy Corinth as a main station, and to guard
-the line of Mount Oneium between that city and Kenchreæ,[545] so as
-to prevent the Thebans from again penetrating into Peloponnesus.
-It is one mark of the depression in the fortunes of Sparta, that
-this very station, now selected for the purpose of keeping a Theban
-invader away from her frontier, had been held, during the war from
-394-387 B.C., by the Athenians and Thebans against herself, to
-prevent her from breaking out of Peloponnesus into Attica and Bœotia.
-Never since the invasion of Xerxes had there been any necessity for
-defending the Isthmus of Corinth against an extra-Peloponnesian
-assailant. But now, even to send a force from Sparta to Corinth,
-recourse must have been had to transport by sea, either across the
-Argolic Gulf from Prasiæ to Halieis, or round Cape Skyllæum to the
-Saronic Gulf and Kenchreæ; for no Spartan troops could march by land
-across Arcadia or Argos. This difficulty however was surmounted, and
-a large allied force (not less than twenty thousand men according
-to Diodorus),—consisting of Athenians with auxiliary mercenaries
-under Chabrias, Lacedæmonians, Pellenians, Epidaurians, Megarians,
-Corinthians, and all the other allies still adhering to Sparta,—was
-established in defensive position along the line of Oneium.
-
-  [545] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 15, 16; Diodor. xv, 68.
-
-It was essential for Thebes to reopen communication with her
-Peloponnesian allies. Accordingly Epaminondas, at the head of the
-Thebans and their northern allies, arrived during the same summer in
-front of this position, on his march into Peloponnesus. His numbers
-were inferior to those of his assembled enemies, whose position
-prevented him from joining his Arcadian, Argeian, and Eleian allies,
-already assembled in Peloponnesus. After having vainly challenged
-the enemy to come down and fight in the plain, Epaminondas laid
-his plan for attacking the position. Moving from his camp a little
-before daybreak, so as to reach the enemy just when the night-guards
-were retiring, but before the general body had yet risen and got
-under arms,[546]—he directed an assault along the whole line. But
-his principal effort, at the head of the chosen Theban troops, was
-made against the Lacedæmonians and Pellenians, who were posted in
-the most assailable part of the line.[547] So skilfully was his
-movement conducted, that he completely succeeded in surprising them.
-The Lacedæmonian polemarch, taken unprepared, was driven from his
-position, and forced to retire to another point of the hilly ground.
-He presently sent to solicit a truce for burying his dead; agreeing
-to abandon the line of Oneium, which had now become indefensible. The
-other parts of the Theban army made no impression by their attack,
-nor were they probably intended to do more than occupy attention,
-while Epaminondas himself vigorously assailed the weak point of
-the position. Yet Xenophon censures the Lacedæmonian polemarch as
-faint-hearted, for having evacuated the whole line as soon as his
-own position was forced; alleging, that he might easily have found
-another good position on one of the neighboring eminences, and might
-have summoned reinforcements from his allies,—and that the Thebans,
-in spite of their partial success, were so embarrassed how to descend
-on the Peloponnesian side of Oneium, that they were half disposed to
-retreat. The criticism of Xenophon indicates doubtless an unfavorable
-judgment pronounced by many persons in the army; the justice of which
-we are not in a condition to appreciate. But whether the Lacedæmonian
-commander was to blame or not, Epaminondas, by his skilful and
-victorious attack upon this strong position, enhanced his already
-high military renown.[548]
-
-  [546] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 16; Polyænus, ii, 2, 9.
-
-  This was an hour known to be favorable to sudden assailants,
-  affording a considerable chance that the enemy might be off their
-  guard. It was at the same hour that the Athenian Thrasybulus
-  surprised the troops of the Thirty, near Phylê in Attica (Xen.
-  Hellen. ii, 4, 6).
-
-  [547] Xen. Hellen. ib.; Pausanias, ix, 15, 2.
-
-  Pausanias describes the battle as having been fought περὶ
-  Λέχαιον; not very exact, topographically, since it was on the
-  other side of Corinth, between Corinth and Kenchreæ.
-
-  Diodorus (xv, 68) states that the whole space across, from
-  Kenchreæ on one sea to Lechæum on the other, was trenched and
-  palisaded by the Athenians and Spartans. But this cannot be true,
-  because the Long Walls were a sufficient defence between Corinth
-  and Lechæum; and even between Corinth and Kenchreæ, it is not
-  probable that any such continuous line of defence was drawn,
-  though the assailable points were probably thus guarded. Xenophon
-  does not mention either trench or palisade.
-
-  [548] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 14-17; Diodor. xv, 68.
-
-Having joined his Peloponnesian allies, Arcadians, Eleians, and
-Argeians, he was more than a match for the Spartan and Athenian
-force, which appears now to have confined itself to Corinth, Lechæum,
-and Kenchreæ. He ravaged the territories of Epidaurus, Trœzen, and
-Phlius; and obtained possession of Sikyon as well as of Pellênê.[549]
-At Sikyon, a vote of the people being taken, it was resolved to
-desert Sparta, to form alliance with Thebes, and to admit a Theban
-harmost and garrison into the acropolis; Euphron, a citizen hitherto
-preponderant in the city by means of Sparta and devoted to her
-interest, now altered his politics and went along with the stronger
-tide.[550] We cannot doubt also that Epaminondas went into Arcadia to
-encourage and regulate the progress of his two great enterprises,—the
-foundation of Messênê and Megalopolis; nor does the silence of
-Xenophon on such a matter amount to any disproof. These new towns
-having been commenced less than a year before, cannot have been yet
-finished, and may probably have required the reappearance of his
-victorious army. The little town of Phlius,—situated south of Sikyon
-and west of Corinth,—which was one of the most faithful allies of
-Sparta, was also in great hazard of being captured by the Phliasian
-exiles. When the Arcadians and Eleians were marching through Nemea to
-join Epaminondas at Oneium, these exiles entreated them only to show
-themselves near Phlius; with the assurance that such demonstration
-would suffice to bring about the capture of the town. The exiles then
-stole by night to the foot of the town walls with scaling-ladders,
-and there lay hid, until, as day began to break, the scouts from the
-neighboring hill Trikaranum announced that the allied enemies were in
-sight. While the attention of the citizens within was thus engaged
-on the other side, the concealed exiles planted their ladders,
-overpowered the few unprepared guards, and got possession of the
-acropolis. Instead of contenting themselves with this position until
-the allied force came up, they strove also to capture the town; but
-in this they were defeated by the citizens, who, by desperate efforts
-of bravery, repulsed both the intruders within and the enemy without;
-thus preserving their town.[551] The fidelity of the Phliasians to
-Sparta entailed upon them severe hardships through the superiority
-of their enemies in the field, and through perpetual ravage of their
-territory from multiplied hostile neighbors (Argos, Arcadia, and
-Sikyon), who had established fortified posts on their borders; for it
-was only on the side of Corinth that the Phliasians had a friendly
-neighbor to afford them the means of purchasing provisions.[552]
-
-  [549] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 18; vii, 2, 11; Diodor. xv, 69.
-
-  This march against Sikyon seems alluded to by Pausanias (vi, 3,
-  1); the Eleian horse were commanded by Stomius, who slew the
-  enemy’s commander with his own hand.
-
-  The stratagem of the Bœotian Pammenes in attacking the harbor
-  of Sikyon (Polyænus, v, 16, 4) may perhaps belong to this
-  undertaking.
-
-  [550] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 18, 22, 44; vii, 3, 2-8.
-
-  [551] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 5-9.
-
-  This incident may have happened in 369 B.C., just about the
-  time when Epaminondas surprised and broke through the defensive
-  lines of Mount Oneium. In the second chapter of the seventh Book,
-  Xenophon takes up the history of Phlius, and carries it on from
-  the winter of 370-369 B.C., when Epaminondas invaded Laconia,
-  through 369, 368, 367 B.C.
-
-  [552] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 17.
-
-Amidst general success, the Thebans experienced partial reverses.
-Their march carrying them near to Corinth, a party of them had the
-boldness to rush at the gates, and to attempt a surprise of the town.
-But the Athenian Chabrias, then commanding within it, disposed his
-troops so skilfully, and made so good a resistance, that he defeated
-them with loss and reduced them to the necessity of asking for the
-ordinary truce to bury their dead, which were lying very near to
-the walls.[553] This advantage over the victorious Thebans somewhat
-raised the spirits of the Spartan allies; who were still farther
-encouraged by the arrival in Lechæum of a squadron from Syracuse,
-bringing a body of two thousand mercenary Gauls and Iberians,
-with fifty horsemen, as a succor from the despot Dionysius. Such
-foreigners had never before been seen in Peloponnesus. Their bravery,
-and singular nimbleness of movement, gave them the advantage in
-several partial skirmishes, and disconcerted the Thebans. But the
-Spartans and Athenians were not bold enough to hazard a general
-battle, and the Syracusan detachment returned home after no very long
-stay,[554] while the Thebans also went back to Bœotia.
-
-  [553] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 19; Diodor. xv, 69.
-
-  [554] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 22; Diodor. xv, 70.
-
-  Diodorus states that these mercenaries had been furnished with
-  pay for five months; if this is correct, I presume that we must
-  understand it as comprehending the time of their voyage from
-  Sicily and back to Sicily. Nevertheless, the language of Xenophon
-  would not lead us to suppose that they remained in Peloponnesus
-  even so long as three months.
-
-  I think it certain however that much more must have passed in
-  this campaign than what Xenophon indicates. Epaminondas would
-  hardly have forced the passage of the Oneium for such small
-  objects as we find mentioned in the Hellenica.
-
-  An Athenian Inscription, extremely defective, yet partially
-  restored and published by M. Boeckh (Corp. Inscr. No. 85 a.
-  Addenda to vol. i, p. 897), records a vote of the Athenian people
-  and of the synod of Athenian confederates—praising Dionysius of
-  Syracuse,—and recording him with his two sons as benefactors of
-  Athens. It was probably passed somewhere near this time; and we
-  know from Demosthenes that the Athenians granted the freedom
-  of their city to Dionysius and his descendants (Demosthenes ad
-  Philipp. Epistol. p. 161, as well as the Epistle of Philip, on
-  which this is a comment). The Inscription is too defective to
-  warrant any other inferences.
-
-One proceeding of Epaminondas during this expedition merits especial
-notice. It was the general practice of the Thebans to put to death
-all the Bœotian exiles who fell into their hands as prisoners, while
-they released under ransom all other Greek prisoners. At the capture
-of a village named Phœbias in the Sikyonian territory, Epaminondas
-took captive a considerable body of Bœotian exiles. With the least
-possible delay, he let them depart under ransom, professing to regard
-them as belonging to other cities.[555] We find him always trying
-to mitigate the rigorous dealing then customary towards political
-opponents.
-
-  [555] Pausanias, ix, 15, 2.
-
-Throughout this campaign of 369 B.C., all the Peloponnesian allies
-had acted against Sparta cheerfully under Epaminondas and the
-Thebans. But in the ensuing year the spirit of the Arcadians had
-been so raised, by the formation of the new Pan-Arcadian communion,
-by the progress of Messênê and Megalopolis, and the conspicuous
-depression of Sparta,—that they fancied themselves not only capable
-of maintaining their independence by themselves, but also entitled
-to divide headship with Thebes, as Athens divided it with Sparta.
-Lykomedes the Mantinean, wealthy, energetic, and able, stood forward
-as the exponent of this new aspiration, and as the champion of
-Arcadian dignity. He reminded the Ten Thousand (the Pan-Arcadian
-synod),—that while all other residents in Peloponnesus were
-originally immigrants, they alone were the indigenous occupants of
-the peninsula; that they were the most numerous section, as well as
-the bravest and hardiest men, who bore the Hellenic name,—of which
-proof was afforded by the fact, that Arcadian mercenary soldiers were
-preferred to all others; that the Lacedæmonians had never ventured to
-invade Attica, nor the Thebans to invade Laconia, without Arcadian
-auxiliaries. “Let us follow no man’s lead (he concluded), but stand
-up for ourselves. In former days, we built up the power of Sparta by
-serving in her armies; and now, if we submit quietly to follow the
-Thebans, without demanding alternate headship for ourselves, we shall
-presently find them to be Spartans under another name.”[556]
-
-  [556] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 23.
-
-Such exhortations were heard with enthusiasm by the assembled
-Arcadians, to whom political discussion and the sentiment of
-collective dignity was a novelty. Impressed with admiration for
-Lykomedes, they chose as officers every man whom he recommended
-calling upon him to lead them into active service, so as to
-justify their new pretensions. He conducted them into the
-territory of Epidaurus, now under invasion by the Argeians; who
-were however in the greatest danger of being cut off, having
-their retreat intercepted by a body of troops from Corinth under
-Chabrias,—Athenians and Corinthians. Lykomêdês with his Arcadians,
-fighting his way through enemies as well as through a difficult
-country, repelled the division of Chabrias, and extricated the
-embarrassed Argeians. He next invaded the territory south of the
-new city of Messene and west of the Messenian Gulf, part of which
-was still held by Spartan garrisons. He penetrated as far as
-Asinê, where the Spartan commander, Geranor, drew out his garrison
-to resist them, but was defeated with loss, and slain, while the
-suburbs of Asinê were destroyed.[557] Probably the Spartan mastery
-of the south-western corner of the Peloponnesus was terminated by
-this expedition. The indefatigable activity which these Arcadians
-now displayed under their new commander, overpowering all enemies,
-and defying all hardships and difficulties of marching over the
-most rugged mountains, by night as well as by day, throughout the
-winter season,—excited everywhere astonishment and alarm; not
-without considerable jealousy even on the part of their allies the
-Thebans.[558]
-
-  [557] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 25.
-
-  Στρατευσάμενοι δὲ καὶ εἰς Ἀσίνην τῆς Λακωνικῆς, ἐνίκησάν τε τὴν
-  τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων φρουρὰν, καὶ τὸν Γεράνορα, τὸν πολέμαρχον
-  Σπαρτιάτην γεγενημένον, ἀπέκτειναν, καὶ τὸ προάστειον τῶν
-  Ἀσιναίων ἐπόρθησαν.
-
-  Diodorus states that Lykomedes and the Arcadians took Pellênê,
-  which is in a different situation, and can hardly refer to the
-  same expedition (xv, 67).
-
-  [558] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 26.
-
-While such jealousy tended to loosen the union between the Arcadians
-and Thebes, other causes tended at the same time to disunite them
-from Elis. The Eleians claimed rights of supremacy over Lepreon and
-the other towns of Triphylia, which rights they had been compelled
-by the Spartan arms to forego thirty years before.[559] Ever since
-that period, these towns had ranked as separate communities, each
-for itself as a dependent ally of Sparta. Now that the power of
-the latter was broken, the Eleians aimed at resumption of their
-lost supremacy. But the formation of the new “commune Arcadum” at
-Megalopolis, interposed an obstacle never before thought of. The
-Tryphilian towns, affirming themselves to be of Arcadian origin, and
-setting forth as their eponymous Hero Triphylus son of Arkas,[560]
-solicited to be admitted as fully qualified members of the incipient
-Pan-Arcadian communion. They were cordially welcomed by the general
-Arcadian body (with a degree of sympathy similar to that recently
-shown by the Germans towards Sleswick-Holstein), received as
-political brethren, and guaranteed as independent against Elis.[561]
-The Eleians, thus finding themselves disappointed of the benefits
-which they had anticipated from the humiliation of Sparta, became
-greatly alienated from the Arcadians.
-
-  [559] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30, 31.
-
-  [560] Polyb. iv, 77.
-
-  [561] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 26; vii, 4, 12.
-
-Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Phrygia, with whom the Athenians had
-just established a correspondence, now endeavored (perhaps at their
-instance) to mediate for peace in Greece, sending over a citizen
-of Abydus named Philiskus, furnished with a large sum of money.
-Choosing Delphi as a centre, Philiskus convoked thither, in the name
-of the Persian king, deputies from all the belligerent parties,
-Theban, Lacedæmonian, Athenian, etc., to meet him. These envoys
-never consulted the god as to the best means of attaining peace
-(says Xenophon), but merely took counsel among themselves; hence,
-he observes, little progress was made towards peace; since the
-Spartans[562] peremptorily insisted that Messênê should again be
-restored to them, while the Thebans were not less firm in resisting
-the proposition. It rather seems that the allies of Sparta were
-willing to concede the point, and even tried, though in vain, to
-overcome her reluctance. The congress accordingly broke up; while
-Philiskus, declaring himself in favor of Sparta and Athens, employed
-his money in levying mercenaries for the professed purpose of aiding
-them in the war.[563] We do not find, however, that he really lent
-them any aid. It would appear that his mercenaries were intended for
-the service of the satrap himself, who was then organizing his revolt
-from Artaxerxes; and that his probable purpose in trying to close
-the war was, that he might procure Grecian soldiers more easily and
-abundantly. Though the threats of Philiskus produced no immediate
-result, however, they so alarmed the Thebans as to determine them to
-send an embassy up to the Great King; the rather, as they learnt that
-the Lacedæmonian Euthykles had already gone up to the Persian court,
-to solicit on behalf of Sparta.[564]
-
-  [562] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27. Ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐλθόντες, τῷ μὲν θεῷ οὐδὲν
-  ἐκοινώσαντο, ὅπως ἂν ἡ εἰρήνη γένοιτο, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐβουλεύοντο.
-
-  [563] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27; Diodor. xv, 70.
-
-  Diodorus states that Philiskus was sent by Artaxerxes; which
-  seems not exact; he was sent by Ariobarzanes in the name
-  of Artaxerxes. Diodorus also says that Philiskus left two
-  thousand mercenaries with pay provided, for the service of the
-  Lacedæmonians; which troops are never afterwards mentioned.
-
-  [564] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33.
-
-How important had been the move made by Epaminondas in reconstituting
-the autonomous Messenians, was shown, among other evidences, by
-the recent abortive congress at Delphi. Already this formed the
-capital article in Grecian political discussion; an article, too,
-on which Sparta stood nearly alone. For not only the Thebans (whom
-Xenophon[565] specifies as if there were no others of the same
-sentiment), but all the allies of Thebes, felt hearty sympathy and
-identity of interest with the newly-enfranchised residents in Mount
-Ithômê and in Western Laconia; while the allies even of Sparta were,
-at most, only lukewarm against them, if not positively inclined in
-their favor.[566] A new phenomenon soon presented itself, which
-served as a sort of recognition of the new-born, or newly-revived,
-Messenian community, by the public voice of Greece. At the one
-hundred and third Olympic festival (Midsummer 368 B.C.),—which
-occurred within less than two years after Epaminondas laid the
-foundation-stone of Messênê,—a Messenian boy named Damiskus gained
-the wreath as victor in the foot-race of boys. Since the first
-Messenian war, whereby the nation became subject to Sparta,[567] no
-Messenian victor had ever been enrolled; though before that war, in
-the earliest half-century of recorded Olympiads, several Messenian
-victors are found on the register. No competitor was admitted to
-enter the lists, except as a free Greek from a free community;
-accordingly so long as these Messenians had been either enslaved,
-or in exile, they would never have been allowed to contend for the
-prize under that designation. So much the stronger was the impression
-produced, when, in 368 B.C., after an interval of more than three
-centuries, Damiscus the Messenian was proclaimed victor. No Theôry
-(or public legation for sacrifice) could have come to Olympia from
-Sparta, since she was then at war both with Eleians and Arcadians;
-probably few individual Lacedæmonians were present; so that the
-spectators, composed generally of Greeks unfriendly to Sparta,
-would hail the proclamation of the new name as being an evidence of
-her degradation, as well as from sympathy with the long and severe
-oppression of the Messenians.[568] This Olympic festival,—the first
-after the great revolution occasioned by the battle of Leuktra,—was
-doubtless a scene of earnest anti-Spartan emotion.
-
-  [565] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27.
-
-  [566] See this fact indicated in Isokrates, Archidamus (Or. vi,)
-  s. 2-11.
-
-  [567] Pausanias, vi, 2, 5.
-
-  Two Messenian victors had been proclaimed during the interval;
-  but they were inhabitants of Messênê in Sicily. And these two
-  were ancient citizens of Zanklê, the name which the Sicilian
-  Messênê bore before Anaxilaus the despot chose to give to it this
-  last-mentioned name.
-
-  [568] See the contrary, or Spartan, feeling,—disgust at the idea
-  of persons who had just been their slaves, presenting themselves
-  as spectators and competitors in the plain of Olympia,—set forth
-  in Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus) s. 111, 112.
-
-During this year 368 B.C., the Thebans undertook no march into
-Peloponnesus; the peace-congress at Delphi probably occupied their
-attention, while the Arcadians neither desired nor needed their aid.
-But Pelopidas conducted in this year a Theban force into Thessaly,
-in order to protect Larissa and the other cities against Alexander
-of Pheræ, and to counter-work the ambitious projects of that despot,
-who was soliciting reinforcement from Athens. In his first object
-he succeeded. Alexander was compelled to visit him at Larissa, and
-solicit peace. This despot, however, alarmed at the complaints which
-came from all sides against his cruelty,—and at the language, first,
-admonitory, afterwards, menacing, of Pelopidas—soon ceased to think
-himself in safety, and fled home to Pheræ. Pelopidas established a
-defensive union against him among the other Thessalian cities, and
-then marched onward into Macedonia, where the regent Ptolemy, not
-strong enough to resist, entered into alliance with the Thebans;
-surrendering to them thirty hostages from the most distinguished
-families in Macedonia, as a guarantee for his faithful adherence.
-Among the hostages was the youthful Philip, son of Amyntas, who
-remained in this character at Thebes for some years, under the
-care of Pammenês.[569] It was thus that Ptolemy and the family of
-Amyntas, though they had been maintained in Macedonia by the active
-intervention of Iphikrates and the Athenians not many months before,
-nevertheless now connected themselves by alliance with the Thebans,
-the enemies of Athens. Æschines the Athenian orator denounces them
-for ingratitude; but possibly the superior force of the Thebans left
-them no option. Both the Theban and Macedonian force became thus
-enlisted for the protection of the freedom of Amphipolis against
-Athens.[570] And Pelopidas returned to Thebes, having extended the
-ascendency of Thebes not only over Thessaly, but also over Macedonia,
-assured by the acquisition of the thirty hostages.
-
-  [569] Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 26.
-
-  [570] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 249.
-
-  ... διδάσκων, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὑπὲρ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἀντέπραττε (Ptolemy)
-  τῇ πόλει (to Athens), καὶ πρὸς Θηβαίους διαφερομένων Ἀθηναίων,
-  συμμαχίαν ἐποιήσατο, etc.
-
-  Neither Plutarch nor Diodorus appear to me precise in specifying
-  and distinguishing the different expeditions of Pelopidas
-  into Thessaly. I cannot but think that he made four different
-  expeditions; two before his embassy to the Persian court (which
-  embassy took place in 367 B.C.; see Mr. Clinton, Fast. Hellen.
-  on that year, who rightly places the date of the embassy), and
-  two after it.
-
-  1. The first was, in 369 B.C., after the death of Amyntas, but
-  during the short reign, less than two years, of his son Alexander
-  of Macedon.
-
-  Diodorus mentions this fact (xv, 67), but he adds, what is
-  erroneous, that Pelopidas on this occasion brought back Philip as
-  a hostage.
-
-  2. The second was in 368 B.C.; also mentioned by Diodorus (xv,
-  71) and by Plutarch (Pelop. c. 26).
-
-  Diodorus (erroneously, as I think) connects this expedition with
-  the seizure and detention of Pelopidas by Alexander of Pheræ. But
-  it was really on this occasion that Pelopidas brought back the
-  hostages.
-
-  3. The third (which was rather a mission than an expedition) was
-  in 366 B.C., after the return of Pelopidas from the Persian
-  court, which happened seemingly in the beginning of 366 B.C.
-  In this third march, Pelopidas was seized and made prisoner
-  by Alexander of Pheræ, until he was released by Epaminondas.
-  Plutarch mentions this expedition, clearly distinguishing it
-  from the second (Pelopidas, c. 27—μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν, etc.);
-  but with this mistake, in my judgment, that he places it before
-  the journey of Pelopidas to the Persian court; whereas it really
-  occurred after and in consequence of that journey, which dates in
-  367 B.C.
-
-  4. The fourth and last, in 364-363 B.C.; wherein he was slain
-  (Diodor. xv. 80; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 32).
-
-Such extension of the Theban power, in Northern Greece, disconcerted
-the maritime projects of Athens on the coast of Macedonia, at the
-same time that it laid the foundation of an alliance between her
-and Alexander of Pheræ. While she was thus opposing the Thebans in
-Thessaly, a second squadron and reinforcement arrived at Corinth
-from Syracuse, under Kissidas, despatched by the despot Dionysius.
-Among the synod of allies assembled at Corinth, debate being held
-as to the best manner of employing them, the Athenians strenuously
-urged that they should be sent to act in Thessaly. But the Spartans
-took an opposite view, and prevailed to have them sent round to the
-southern coast of Laconia, in order that they might coöperate in
-repelling or invading the Arcadians.[571] Reinforced by these Gauls
-and other mercenaries, Archidamus led out the Lacedæmonian forces
-against Arcadia. He took Karyæ by assault, putting to death every
-man whom he captured in the place; and he farther ravaged all the
-Arcadian territory, in the district named after the Parrhasii, until
-the joint Arcadian and Argeian forces arrived to oppose him; upon
-which he retreated to an eminence near Midea.[572] Here Kissidas, the
-Syracusan commander, gave notice that he must retire, as the period
-to which his orders reached had expired. He accordingly marched back
-to Sparta; but midway in the march, in a narrow pass, the Messenian
-troops arrested his advance, and so hampered him, that he was forced
-to send to Archidamus for aid. The latter soon appeared, while the
-main body of Arcadians and Argeians followed also; and Archidamus
-resolved to attack them in general battle near Midea. Imploring his
-soldiers, in an emphatic appeal, to rescue the great name of Sparta
-from the disgrace into which it had fallen, he found them full of
-responsive ardor. They rushed with such fierceness to the charge,
-that the Arcadians and Argeians were thoroughly daunted, and fled
-with scarce any resistance. The pursuit was vehement, especially by
-the Gallic mercenaries, and the slaughter frightful. Ten thousand
-men (if we are to believe Diodorus) were slain, without the loss
-of a single Lacedæmonian. Of this easy and important victory,—or,
-as it came to be called, “the tearless battle,”—news was forthwith
-transmitted by the herald Demotelês to Sparta. So powerful was the
-emotion produced by his tale, that all the Spartans who heard it
-burst into tears; Agesilaus, the Senators, and the ephors, setting
-the example;[573]—a striking proof how humbled, and disaccustomed
-to the idea of victory, their minds had recently become!—a striking
-proof also, when we compare it with the inflexible self-control which
-marked their reception of the disastrous tidings from Leuktra, how
-much more irresistible is unexpected joy than unexpected grief, in
-working on these minds of iron temper!
-
-  [571] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28.
-
-  [572] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28. The place here called Midea cannot
-  be identified. The only place of that name known, is in the
-  territory of Argos, quite different from what is here mentioned.
-  O. Müller proposes to substitute Malæa for Midea; a conjecture,
-  which there are no means of verifying.
-
-  [573] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28-32; Diodor. xv, 72; Plutarch,
-  Agesil. c. 33.
-
-So offensive had been the insolence of the Arcadians, that the news
-of their defeat was not unwelcome even to their allies the Thebans
-and Eleians. It made them feel that they were not independent of
-Theban aid, and determined Epaminondas again to show himself in
-Peloponnesus, with the special view of enrolling the Achæans in his
-alliance. The defensive line of Oneium was still under occupation
-by the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, who had their head-quarters at
-Corinth. Yet having remained unattacked all the preceding year, it
-was now so negligently guarded, that Peisias, the general of Argos,
-instigated by a private request of Epaminondas, was enabled suddenly
-to seize the heights above Kenchreæ, with a force of two thousand
-men and seven days’ provision. The Theban commander, hastening his
-march, thus found the line of Oneium open near Kenchreæ, and entered
-Peloponnesus without resistance; after which he proceeded, joined by
-his Peloponnesian allies, against the cities in Achaia.[574] Until
-the battle of Leuktra, these cities had been among the dependent
-allies of Sparta, governed by local oligarchies in her interest.
-Since that event, they had broken off from her, but were still
-under oligarchical governments (though doubtless not the same men),
-and had remained neutral without placing themselves in connection
-either with Arcadians or Thebans.[575] Not being in a condition to
-resist so formidable an invading force, they opened negotiations
-with Epaminondas, and solicited to be enrolled as allies of Thebes;
-engaging to follow her lead whenever summoned, and to do their duty
-as members of her synod. They tendered securities which Epaminondas
-deemed sufficient for the fulfilment of their promise. Accordingly,
-by virtue of his own personal ascendency, he agreed to accept them
-as they stood, without requiring either the banishment of the
-existing rulers or substitution of democratical forms in place of
-the oligarchical.[576] Such a proceeding was not only suitable to
-the moderation of dealing so remarkable in Epaminondas, but also
-calculated to strengthen the interests of Thebes in Peloponnesus,
-in the present jealous and unsatisfactory temper of the Arcadians,
-by attaching to her on peculiar grounds Achæans as well as Eleians;
-the latter being themselves half-alienated from the Arcadians.
-Epaminondas farther liberated Naupaktus and Kalydon,[577] which were
-held by Achæan garrisons, and which he enrolled as separate allies of
-Thebes; whither he then returned, without any other achievements (so
-far as we are informed) in Peloponnesus.
-
-  [574] I think that this third expedition of Epaminondas into
-  Peloponnesus belongs to 367 B.C.; being simultaneous with the
-  embassy of Pelopidas to the Persian court. Many chronologers
-  place it in 366 B.C., after the conclusion of that embassy;
-  because the mention of it occurs in Xenophon after he has brought
-  the embassy to a close. But I do not conceive that this proves
-  the fact of subsequent date. For we must recollect that the
-  embassy lasted several months; moreover the expedition was made
-  while Epaminondas was Bœotarch; and he ceased to be so during the
-  year 366 B.C. Besides, if we place the expedition in 366 B.C.,
-  there will hardly be time left for the whole career of Euphron at
-  Sikyon, which intervened before the peace of 366 B.C. between
-  Thebes and Corinth (see Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 44 _seq._).
-
-  The relation of cotemporaneousness between the embassy of
-  Pelopidas to Persia, and the expedition of Epaminondas, seems
-  indicated when we compare vii, 1, 33 with vii, 1, 48—Συνεχῶς
-  δὲ βουλευόμενοι οἱ Θηβαῖοι, ὅπως ἂν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν λάβοιεν τῆς
-  Ἑλλάδος, ἐνόμισαν εἰ πέμψειαν πρὸς τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα, etc. Then
-  Xenophon proceeds to recount the whole embassy, together with its
-  unfavorable reception on returning, which takes up the entire
-  space until vii, 2, 41, when he says—Αὖθις δ’ Ἐπαμεινώνδας,
-  βουληθεὶς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς προσυπαγαγέσθαι, ὅπως μᾶλλον σφίσι καὶ
-  οἱ Ἀρκάδες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι προσέχοιεν τὸν νοῦν, ἔγνωκε
-  στρατευτέον εἶναι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀχαΐαν.
-
-  This fresh expedition of Epaminondas is one of the modes adopted
-  by the Thebans of manifesting their general purpose expressed in
-  the former words,—συνεχῶς βουλευόμενοι, etc.
-
-  [575] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 42-44.
-
-  The neutrality before observed, is implied in the phrase whereby
-  Xenophon describes their conduct afterwards; ἐπεὶ δὲ κατελθόντες
-  ~οὐκέτι ἐμέσευον~, etc.
-
-  [576] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 42.
-
-  His expression marks how completely these terms were granted
-  by the personal determination of Epaminondas, overruling
-  opposition,—~ἐνδυναστεύει~ ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ὥστε μὴ φυγαδεῦσαι
-  τοὺς κρατίστους, μηδὲ τὰς πολιτείας μεταστῆσαι, etc.
-
-  [577] Diodor. xv, 75.
-
-But the generous calculations of this eminent man found little favor
-with his countrymen. Both the Arcadians, and the opposition-party
-in the Achæan cities, preferred accusations against him, alleging
-that he had discouraged and humiliated all the real friends of
-Thebes; leaving power in the hands of men who would join Sparta
-on the first opportunity. The accusation was farther pressed
-by Menekleidas, a Theban speaker of ability, strongly adverse
-to Epaminondas, as well as to Pelopidas. So pronounced was the
-displeasure of the Thebans,—partly perhaps from reluctance to offend
-the Arcadians,—that they not only reversed the policy of Epaminondas
-in Achaia, but also refrained from reëlecting him as Bœotarch during
-the ensuing year.[578] They sent harmosts of their own to each of
-the Achæan cities,—put down the existing oligarchies,—sent the chief
-oligarchical members and partisans into exile,—and established
-democratical governments in each. Hence a great body of exiles soon
-became accumulated; who, watching for a favorable opportunity and
-combining their united forces against each city successively, were
-strong enough to overthrow the newly-created democracies, and to
-expel the Theban harmosts. Thus restored, the Achæan oligarchs took
-decided and active part with Sparta;[579] vigorously pressing the
-Arcadians on one side, while the Lacedæmonians, encouraged by the
-recent Tearless Battle, exerted themselves actively on the other.
-
-  [578] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 43; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 25.
-
-  Diodorus (xv, 72) refers the displeasure of the Thebans against
-  Epaminondas to the events of the preceding year. They believed
-  (according to Diodorus) that Epaminondas had improperly spared
-  the Spartans, and not pushed his victory so far as might have
-  been done, when he forced the lines of Mount Oneium in 369 B.C.
-  But it is scarcely credible that the Thebans should have been
-  displeased on this account; for the forcing of the lines was a
-  capital exploit, and we may see from Xenophon that Epaminondas
-  achieved much more than the Spartans and their friends believed
-  to be possible.
-
-  Xenophon tells us that the Thebans were displeased with
-  Epaminondas, on complaint from the Arcadians and others, for his
-  conduct in Achaia two years after the action at Oneium; that
-  is, in 367 B.C. This is much more probable in itself, and much
-  more consistent with the general series of facts, than the cause
-  assigned by Diodorus.
-
-  [579] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 23.
-
-  For a similar case, in which exiles from many different cities,
-  congregating in a body, became strong enough to carry their
-  restoration in each city successively, see Thucyd. i, 113.
-
-The town of Sikyon, closely adjoining to Achaia, was at this time in
-alliance with Thebes, having a Theban harmost and garrison in its
-acropolis. But its government, which had always been oligarchical,
-still remained unaltered. The recent counter-revolution in the Achæan
-cities, followed closely by their junction with Sparta, alarmed
-the Arcadians and Argeians, lest Sikyon also should follow the
-example. Of this alarm a leading Sikyonian citizen named Euphron,
-took advantage. He warned them that if the oligarchy were left in
-power, they would certainly procure aid from the garrison at Corinth,
-and embrace the interests of Sparta. To prevent such defection (he
-said) it was indispensable that Sikyon should be democratized. He
-then offered himself, with their aid, to accomplish the revolution,
-seasoning his offer with strong protestations of disgust against the
-intolerable arrogance and oppression of Sparta: protestations not
-unnecessary, since he had himself, prior to the battle of Leuktra,
-carried on the government of his native city as local agent for her
-purposes and interest. The Arcadians and Argeians, entering into
-the views of Euphron, sent to Sikyon a large force, under whose
-presence and countenance he summoned a general assembly in the
-market-place, proclaimed the oligarchy to be deposed, and proposed
-an equal democracy for the future. His proposition being adopted, he
-next invited the people to choose generals; and the persons chosen
-were, as might naturally be expected, himself with five partisans.
-The prior oligarchy had not been without a previous mercenary force
-in their service, under the command of Lysimenês; but these men were
-overawed by the new foreign force introduced. Euphron now proceeded
-to reorganize them, to place them under the command of his son Adeas
-instead of Lysimenês, and to increase their numerical strength.
-Selecting from them a special body-guard for his own personal safety,
-and being thus master of the city under the ostensible color of chief
-of the new democracy, he commenced a career of the most rapacious
-and sanguinary tyranny.[580] He caused several of his colleagues to
-be assassinated, and banished others. He expelled also by wholesale
-the wealthiest and most eminent citizens, on suspicion of Laconism;
-confiscating their properties to supply himself with money, pillaging
-the public treasure, and even stripping the temples of all their rich
-stock of consecrated gold and silver ornaments. He farther procured
-for himself adherents by liberating numerous slaves, exalting them
-to the citizenship, and probably enrolling them among his paid
-force.[581] The power which he thus acquired became very great. The
-money seized enabled him not only to keep in regular pay his numerous
-mercenaries, but also to bribe the leading Arcadians and Argeians, so
-that they connived at his enormities; while he was farther ready and
-active in the field to lend them military support. The Theban harmost
-still held the acropolis with his garrison, though Euphron was master
-of the town and harbor.
-
-  [580] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 44-46; Diodor. xv, 70.
-
-  [581] Xen. Hellen, vii, 3, 8.
-
-During the height of Euphron’s power at Sikyon, the neighboring city
-of Phlius was severely pressed. The Phliasians had remained steadily
-attached to Sparta throughout all her misfortunes; notwithstanding
-incessant hostilities from Argos, Arcadia, Pellênê, and Sikyon, which
-destroyed their crops and inflicted upon them serious hardships. I
-have already recounted, that in the year 369 B.C., a little before
-the line of Oneium was forced by Epaminondas, the town of Phlius,
-having been surprised by its own exiles with the aid of Eleians
-and Arcadians, had only been saved by the desperate bravery and
-resistance of its citizens.[582] In the ensuing year, 368 B.C.,
-the Argeian and Arcadian force again ravaged the Phliasian plain,
-doing great damage; yet not without some loss to themselves in their
-departure, from the attack of the chosen Phliasian hoplites and of
-some Athenian horsemen from Corinth.[583] In the ensuing year 367
-B.C., a second invasion of the Phliasian territory was attempted by
-Euphron, with his own mercenaries to the number of two thousand,—the
-armed force of Sikyon and Pellênê,—and the Theban harmost and
-garrison from the acropolis of Sikyon. On arriving near Phlius, the
-Sikyonians and Pellenians were posted near the gate of the city which
-looked towards Corinth, in order to resist any sally from within;
-while the remaining invaders made a circuit round, over an elevated
-line of ground called the _Trikaranum_ (which had been fortified
-by the Argeians and was held by their garrison), to approach and
-ravage the Phliasian plain. But the Phliasian cavalry and hoplites
-so bravely resisted them, as to prevent them from spreading over the
-plain to do damage, until at the end of the day they retreated to
-rejoin the Sikyonians and Pellenians. From these last, however, they
-happened to be separated by a ravine which forced them to take a
-long circuit; while the Phliasians, passing by a shorter road close
-under their own walls, were beforehand in reaching the Sikyonians
-and Pellenians, whom they vigorously attacked and defeated with
-loss. Euphron with his mercenaries, and the Theban division, arrived
-too late to prevent the calamity, which they made no effort to
-repair.[584]
-
-  [582] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 6-9.
-
-  [583] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 10.
-
-  [584] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 11-15.
-
-An eminent Pellenian citizen, named Proxenus having been here made
-prisoner, the Phliasians, in spite of all their sufferings, released
-him without ransom. This act of generosity—coupled with the loss
-sustained by the Pellenians in the recent engagement, as well as
-with the recent oligarchical counter-revolutions which had disjoined
-the other Achæan cities from Thebes—altered the politics of Pellênê,
-bringing about a peace between that city and Phlius.[585] Such
-an accession afforded sensible relief,—it might almost be said,
-salvation,—to the Phliasians, in the midst of cruel impoverishment;
-since even their necessary subsistence, except what was obtained by
-marauding excursions from the enemy, being derived by purchase from
-Corinth, was found difficult to pay for, and still more difficult
-to bring home, in the face of an enemy. They were now enabled, by
-the aid of the Athenian general Charês and his mercenary troops from
-Corinth, to escort their families and their non-military population
-to Pellênê, where a kindly shelter was provided by the citizens. The
-military Phliasians, while escorting back a stock of supplies to
-Phlius, broke through and defeated an ambuscade of the enemy in their
-way; and afterwards, in conjunction with Charês, surprised the fort
-of Thyamia, which the Sikyonians were fortifying as an aggressive
-post on their borders. The fort became not only a defence for Phlius,
-but a means of aggression against the enemy, affording also great
-facility for the introduction of provisions from Corinth.[586]
-
-  [585] This change of politics at Pellênê is not mentioned by
-  Xenophon, at the time, though it is noticed afterwards (vii,
-  4, 17) as a fact accomplished; but we must suppose it to have
-  occurred now, in order to reconcile sections 11-14 with sections
-  18-20 of vii, 2.
-
-  The strong Laconian partialities of Xenophon induce him to allot
-  not only warm admiration, but a space disproportionate compared
-  with other parts of his history, to the exploits of the brave
-  little Phliasian community. Unfortunately, here, as elsewhere,
-  he is obscure in the description of particular events, and still
-  more perplexing when we try to draw from him a clear idea of the
-  general series.
-
-  With all the defects and partiality of Xenophon’s narrative,
-  however, we must recollect that it is a description of real
-  events by a contemporary author who had reasonable means of
-  information. This is a precious ingredient, which gives value to
-  all that he says; inasmuch as we are so constantly obliged to
-  borrow our knowledge of Grecian history either from authors who
-  write at second-hand and after the time,—or from orators whose
-  purposes are usually different from those of the historian. Hence
-  I have given a short abridgment of these Phliasian events as
-  described by Xenophon, though they were too slight to exercise
-  influence on the main course of the war.
-
-  [586] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 18-23.
-
-Another cause, both of these successes and of general relief to
-the Phliasians, arose out of the distracted state of affairs in
-Sikyon. So intolerable had the tyranny of Euphron become, that the
-Arcadians, who had helped to raise him up, became disgusted. Æneas of
-Stymphalus, general of the collective Arcadian force, marched with a
-body of troops to Sikyon, joined the Theban harmost in the Acropolis,
-and there summoned the Sikyonian _notables_ to an assembly. Under
-his protection, the intense sentiment against Euphron was freely
-manifested, and it was resolved to recall the numerous exiles, whom
-he had banished without either trial or public sentence. Dreading
-the wrath of these numerous and bitter enemies, Euphron thought
-it prudent to retire with his mercenaries to the harbor; where he
-invited Pasimêlus the Lacedæmonian to come, with a portion of the
-garrison of Corinth, and immediately declared himself an open
-partisan of Sparta. The harbor, a separate town and fortification at
-some little distance from the city (as Lechæum was from Corinth),
-was thus held by and for the Spartans; while Sikyon adhered to the
-Thebans and Arcadians. In Sikyon itself however, though evacuated
-by Euphron, there still remained violent dissensions. The returning
-exiles were probably bitter in reactionary measures; the humbler
-citizens were fearful of losing their newly-acquired political
-privileges; and the liberated slaves, yet more fearful of forfeiting
-that freedom, which the recent revolution had conferred upon them.
-
-Hence Euphron still retained so many partisans, that having procured
-from Athens a reinforcement of mercenary troops, he was enabled to
-return to Sikyon, and again to establish himself as master of the
-town in conjunction with the popular party. But as his opponents,
-the principal men in the place, found shelter along with the
-Theban garrison in the acropolis, which he vainly tried to take
-by assault,[587]—his possession even of the town was altogether
-precarious, until such formidable neighbors could be removed.
-Accordingly he resolved to visit Thebes, in hopes of obtaining from
-the authorities an order for expelling his opponents and handing over
-Sikyon a second time to his rule. On what grounds, after so recent
-a defection to the Spartans, he rested his hopes of success, we do
-not know; except that he took with him a large sum of money for the
-purpose of bribery.[588] His Sikyonian opponents, alarmed lest he
-should really carry his point, followed him to Thebes, where their
-alarm was still farther increased by seeing him in familiar converse
-with the magistrates. Under the first impulse of terror and despair,
-they assassinated Euphron in broad daylight,—on the Kadmeia, and even
-before the doors of the Theban Senate-house, wherein both magistrates
-and Senate were sitting.
-
-  [587] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 9.
-
-  [588] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 4-6.
-
-For an act of violence thus patent, they were of course seized
-forthwith, and put upon their trial, before the Senate. The
-magistrates invoked upon their heads the extreme penalty of death,
-insisting upon the enormity and even impudence of the outrage,
-committed almost under the eyes of the authorities,—as well as upon
-the sacred duty of vindicating not merely the majesty, but even the
-security of the city, by exemplary punishment upon offenders who had
-despised its laws. How many in number were the persons implicated,
-we do not know. All, except one, denied actual hand-participation;
-but that one avowed it frankly, and stood up to justify it before the
-Theban Senate. He spoke in substance nearly as follows,—taking up the
-language of the accusing magistrates:—
-
-“Despise you I cannot, men of Thebes; for you are masters of my
-person and life. It was on other grounds of confidence that I slew
-this man: first, I had the conviction of acting justly; next, I
-trusted in your righteous judgment. I knew that _you_ did not wait
-for trial and sentence to slay Archias and Hypatês,[589] whom you
-caught after a career similar to that of Euphron,—but punished them
-at the earliest practicable opportunity, under the conviction that
-men manifest in sacrilege, treason, and despotism, were already
-under sentence by all men. Well! and was not Euphron, too, guilty
-of all these crimes? Did not he find the temples full of gold and
-silver offerings, and strip them until they were empty? How can
-there be a traitor more palpable than the man, who, favored and
-upheld by Sparta, first betrayed her to you; and then again, after
-having received every mark of confidence from you, betrayed you to
-her,—handing over the harbor of Sikyon to your enemies? Was not he
-a despot without reserve, the man who exalted slaves, not only into
-freemen, but into citizens? the man who despoiled, banished, or slew,
-not criminals, but all whom he chose, and most of all, the chief
-citizens? And now, after having vainly attempted, in conjunction
-with your enemies the Athenians, to expel your harmost by force from
-Sikyon, he has collected a great stock of money, and come hither to
-turn it to account. Had he assembled arms and soldiers against you,
-you would have thanked me for killing him. How then can you punish me
-for giving him his due, when he has come with money to corrupt you,
-and to purchase from you again the mastery of Sikyon, to your own
-disgrace as well as mischief? Had he been my enemy and your friend,
-I should undoubtedly have done wrong to kill him in your city; but
-as he is a traitor, playing you false, how is he more my enemy
-than yours? I shall be told that he came hither of his own accord,
-confiding in the laws of the city. Well! you would have thanked me
-for killing him anywhere out of Thebes; why not _in_ Thebes also,
-when he has come hither only for the purpose of doing you new wrong
-in addition to the past? Where among Greeks has impunity ever been
-assured to traitors, deserters, or despots? Recollect, that you have
-passed a vote that exiles from any one of your allied cities might
-be seized as outlaws in any other. Now Euphron is a condemned exile,
-who has ventured to come back to Sikyon without any vote of the
-general body of allies. How can any one affirm that he has not justly
-incurred death? I tell you in conclusion, men of Thebes,—if you put
-me to death, you will have made yourselves the avengers of your very
-worst enemy,—if you adjudge me to have done right, you will manifest
-yourselves publicly as just avengers, both on your own behalf and on
-that of your whole body of allies.”[590]
-
-  [589] This refers to the secret expedition of Pelopidas and the
-  six other Theban conspirators from Athens to Thebes, at the time
-  when the Lacedæmonians were masters of that town and garrisoned
-  the Kadmeia. The conspirators, through the contrivance of the
-  secretary Phyllidas, got access in disguise to the oligarchical
-  leaders of Thebes, who were governing under Lacedæmonian
-  ascendency, and put them to death. This event is described in a
-  former chapter, Ch. lxxvii, p. 85 _seq._
-
-  [590] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 7-11.
-
-  To the killing of Euphron, followed by a defence so
-  characteristic and emphatic on the part of the agent,—Schneider
-  and others refer, with great probability, the allusion in
-  the Rhetoric of Aristotle (ii, 24, 2)—καὶ περὶ τοῦ Θήβῃσιν
-  ἀποθανόντος, περὶ οὗ ἐκέλευε κρῖναι, εἰ δίκαιος ἦν ἀποθανεῖν ὡς
-  οὐκ ἄδικον ὂν ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν δικαίως ἀποθανόντα.
-
-This impressive discourse induced the Theban Senate to pronounce
-that Euphron had met with his due. It probably came from one of the
-principal citizens of Sikyon, among whom were most of the enemies
-as well as the victims of the deceased despot. It appeals, in a
-characteristic manner, to that portion of Grecian morality which bore
-upon men, who by their very crimes procured for themselves the means
-of impunity; against whom there was no legal force to protect others,
-and who were therefore considered as not being entitled to protection
-themselves, if the daggers of others could ever be made to reach
-them. The tyrannicide appeals to this sentiment with confidence, as
-diffused throughout all the free Grecian cities. It found responsive
-assent in the Theban Senate, and would probably have found the like
-assent, if set forth with equal emphasis, in most Grecian senates or
-assemblies elsewhere.
-
-Very different, however, was the sentiment in Sikyon. The body
-of Euphron was carried thither, and enjoyed the distinguished
-preëminence of being buried in the market-place.[591] There, along
-with his tomb, a chapel was erected, in which he was worshipped
-as Archêgetês, or Patron-hero and Second Founder, of the city.
-He received the same honors as had been paid to Brasidas at
-Amphipolis. The humbler citizens and the slaves, upon whom he had
-conferred liberty and political franchise,—or at least the name of
-a political franchise,—remembered him with grateful admiration as
-their benefactor, forgetting or excusing the atrocities which he
-had wreaked upon their political opponents. Such is the retributive
-Nemesis which always menaces, and sometimes overtakes, an oligarchy
-who keep the mass of the citizens excluded from political privileges.
-A situation is thus created, enabling some ambitious and energetic
-citizen to confer favors and earn popularity among the many, and thus
-to acquire power, which, whether employed or not for the benefit
-of the many, goes along with their antipathies when it humbles or
-crushes the previously monopolizing few.
-
-  [591] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 12.
-
-We may presume from these statements that the government of Sikyon
-became democratical. But the provoking brevity of Xenophon does
-not inform us of the subsequent arrangements made with the Theban
-harmost in the acropolis,—nor how the intestine dissensions, between
-the democracy in the town and the refugees in the citadel, were
-composed,—nor what became of those citizens who slew Euphron. We
-learn only that not long afterwards, the harbor of Sikyon, which
-Euphron had held in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians and Athenians,
-was left imperfectly defended by the recall of the latter to Athens;
-and that it was accordingly retaken by the forces from the town,
-aided by the Arcadians.[592]
-
-  [592] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1.
-
-It appears that these proceedings of Euphron (from his first
-proclamation of the democracy at Sikyon and real acquisition of
-despotism to himself, down to his death and the recovery of the
-harbor) took place throughout the year 367 B.C. and the earlier half
-of 366 B.C. No such enemy, probably, would have arisen to embarrass
-Thebes, unless the policy recommended by Epaminondas in Achaia had
-been reversed, and unless he himself had fallen under the displeasure
-of his countrymen. His influence too was probably impaired, and the
-policy of Thebes affected for the worse, by the accidental absence
-of his friend Pelopidas, who was then on his mission to the Persian
-court at Susa. Such a journey and return, with the transaction of the
-business in hand, must have occupied the greater part of the year 367
-B.C., being terminated probably by the return of the envoys in the
-beginning of 366 B.C.
-
-The leading Thebans had been alarmed by the language of
-Philiskus,—who had come over a few months before as envoy from the
-satrap Ariobarzanes and had threatened to employ Asiatic money in
-the interest of Athens and Sparta against Thebes, though his threats
-seem never to have been realized, as well as by the presence of the
-Lacedæmonian Euthyklês (after the failure of Antalkidas[593]) at the
-Persian court, soliciting aid. Moreover Thebes had now pretensions to
-the headship of Greece, at least as good as either of her two rivals;
-while since the fatal example set by Sparta at the peace called by
-the name of Antalkidas in 387 B.C., and copied by Athens after the
-battle of Leuktra in 371 B.C.,—it had become a sort of recognized
-fashion that the leading Grecian state should sue out its title
-from the terror-striking rescript of the Great King, and proclaim
-itself as enforcing terms which he had dictated. On this ground of
-borrowed elevation Thebes now sought to place herself. There was in
-her case a peculiar reason which might partly excuse the value set
-upon it by her leaders. It had been almost the capital act of her
-policy to establish the two new cities, Megalopolis and Messênê. The
-vitality and chance for duration, of both,—especially that of the
-latter, which had the inextinguishable hostility of Sparta to contend
-with,—would be materially improved, in the existing state of the
-Greek mind, if they were recognized as autonomous under a Persian
-rescript. To attain this object,[594] Pelopidas and Ismenias now
-proceeded as envoys to Susa; doubtless under a formal vote of the
-allied synod, since the Arcadian Antiochus, a celebrated pankratiast,
-the Eleian Archidamus, and a citizen from Argos, accompanied them.
-Informed of the proceeding, the Athenians also sent Timagoras and
-Leon to Susa; and we read with some surprise that these hostile
-envoys all went up thither in the same company.[595]
-
-  [593] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.
-
-  [594] It is plain that Messênê was the great purpose with
-  Pelopidas in his mission to the Persian court; we see this not
-  only from Cornelius Nepos (Pelop. c. 4) and Diodorus (xv, 81),
-  but also even from Xenophon, Hellen. vii, 1, 36.
-
-  [595] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-38; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30;
-  Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.
-
-  The words of Xenophon ἠκολούθει δὲ καὶ Ἀργεῖος must allude to
-  some Argeian envoy; though the name is not mentioned, and must
-  probably have dropped out,—or perhaps the word τις, as Xenophon
-  may not have heard the name.
-
-  It would appear that in the mission which Pharnabazus conducted
-  up to the Persian court (or at least undertook to conduct) in 408
-  B.C., envoys from hostile Greek cities were included in the same
-  company (Xen. Hellen. i, 3, 13), as on the present occasion.
-
-Pelopidas, though he declined to perform the usual ceremony of
-prostration,[596] was favorably received by the Persian court.
-Xenophon,—who recounts the whole proceeding in a manner unfairly
-invidious towards the Thebans, forgetting that they were now only
-copying the example of Sparta in courting Persian aid,—affirms that
-his application was greatly furthered by the recollection of the
-ancient alliance of Thebes with Xerxes, against Athens and Sparta,
-at the time of the battle of Platæa; and by the fact that Thebes had
-not only refused to second, but had actually discountenanced, the
-expedition of Agesilaus against Asia. We may perhaps doubt, whether
-this plea counted for much; or the straightforward eloquence of
-Pelopidas, so much extolled by Plutarch,[597] which could only reach
-Persian ears through an interpreter. But the main fact for the Great
-King to know was, that the Thebans had been victorious at Leuktra;
-that they had subsequently trodden down still farther the glory
-of Sparta, by carrying their arms over Laconia, and emancipating
-the conquered half of the country; that when they were no longer
-in Peloponnesus, their allies the Arcadians and Argeians had been
-shamefully defeated by the Lacedæmonians (in the Tearless Battle).
-Such boasts on the part of Pelopidas,—confirmed as matters of fact
-even by the Athenian Timagoras,—would convince the Persian ministers
-that it was their interest to exercise ascendency over Greece through
-Thebes in preference to Sparta. Accordingly Pelopidas being asked
-by the Great King what sort of rescript he wished, obtained his own
-terms. Messênê was declared autonomous and independent of Sparta:
-Amphipolis also was pronounced to be a free and autonomous city: the
-Athenians were directed to order home and lay up their ships of war
-now in active service, on pain of Persian intervention against them,
-in case of disobedience. Moreover Thebes was declared the head city
-of Greece, and any city refusing to follow her headship was menaced
-with instant compulsion by Persian force.[598] In reference to the
-points in dispute between Elis and Arcadia (the former claiming
-sovereignty over Triphylia, which professed itself Arcadian and had
-been admitted into the Arcadian communion), the rescript pronounced
-in favor of the Eleians;[599] probably at the instance of Pelopidas,
-since there now subsisted much coldness between the Thebans and
-Arcadians.
-
-  [596] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.
-
-  His colleague Ismenias, however, is said to have dropped his
-  ring, and then to have stooped to pick it up, immediately before
-  the king; thus going through the prostration.
-
-  [597] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30.
-
-  [598] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 36. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ
-  βασιλέως ὁ Πελοπίδας τί βούλοιτο ἑαυτῷ γραφῆναι, εἶπεν ὅτι
-  Μεσσήνην τε αὐτόνομον εἶναι ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ Ἀθηναίους
-  ἀνέλκειν τὰς ναῦς: εἰ δὲ ταῦτα μὴ πείθοιντο, στρατεύειν ἐπ’
-  αὐτούς· ~εἴ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι ἀκολουθεῖν~, ἐπὶ ταύτην πρῶτον
-  ἰέναι.
-
-  It is clear that these are not the exact words of the rescript of
-  367 B.C., though in the former case of the peace of Antalkidas
-  (387 B.C.) Xenophon seems to have given the rescript in its
-  exact words (v, 1, 31).
-
-  What he states afterwards (vii, 1, 38) about Elis and Arcadia
-  proves that other matters were included. Accordingly I do not
-  hesitate to believe that Amphipolis also was recognized as
-  autonomous. This we read in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 383,
-  c. 42. Καὶ γάρ τοι πρῶτον μὲν Ἀμφίπολιν πόλιν ἡμετέραν δούλην
-  κατέστησεν (the king of Persia), ~ἣν τότε σύμμαχον αὐτῷ καὶ
-  φίλην~ ἔγραψεν. Demosthenes is here alluding to the effect
-  produced on the mind of the Great King, and to the alteration in
-  his proceedings, when he learnt that Timagoras had been put to
-  death on returning to Athens; the adverb of time τότε alludes to
-  the rescript given when Timagoras was present.
-
-  In the words of Xenophon,—εἴ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι
-  ~ἀκολουθεῖν~,—the headship of Thebes is declared or implied.
-  Compare the convention imposed by Sparta upon Olynthus, after the
-  latter was subdued (v, 3, 26.)
-
-  [599] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38. Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πρέσβεων ὁ μὲν Ἠλεῖος
-  Ἀρχίδαμος, ὅτι ~προὐτίμησε τὴν Ἦλιν πρὸ τῶν Ἀρκάδων~, ἐπήνει τὰ
-  τοῦ βασιλέως· ὁ δ’ Ἀντίοχος, ὅτι ~ἠλαττοῦτο τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν~, οὔτε
-  τὰ δῶρα ἐδέξατο, etc.
-
-Leon the Athenian protested against the Persian rescript, observing
-aloud when he heard it read,—“By Zeus, Athenians, I think it is time
-for you to look out for some other friend than the Great King.”
-This remark, made in the King’s hearing and interpreted to him,
-produced the following addition to the rescript: “If the Athenians
-have anything juster to propose, let them come to the King and
-inform him.” So vague a modification, however, did little to appease
-the murmurs of the Athenians. On the return of their two envoys to
-Athens, Leon accused his colleague Timagoras of having not only
-declined to associate with him during the journey, but also of having
-lent himself to the purposes of Pelopidas, of being implicated in
-treasonable promises, and of receiving large bribes from the Persian
-King. On these charges Timagoras was condemned and executed.[600]
-The Arcadian envoy Antiochus was equally indignant at the rescript;
-refusing even to receive such presents of formal courtesy as were
-tendered to all, and accepted by Pelopidas himself, who however
-strictly declined everything beyond. The conduct of this eminent
-Theban thus exhibited a strong contrast with the large acquisitions
-of the Athenian Timagoras.[601] Antiochus, on returning to Arcadia,
-made report of his mission to the Pan-Arcadian synod, called the Ten
-Thousand, at Megalopolis. He spoke in the most contemptuous terms
-of all that he had seen at the Persian court. There were (he said)
-plenty of bakers, cooks, wine-pourers, porters, etc., but as for men
-competent to fight against Greeks, though he looked out for them with
-care, he could see none; and even the vaunted golden plane-tree was
-not large enough to furnish shade for a grasshopper.[602]
-
-  [600] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. c. 42, p. 383.
-
-  In another passage of the same oration (c. 57, p. 400),
-  Demosthenes says that Leon had been joint envoy with Timagoras
-  _for four years_. Certainly this mission of Pelopidas to the
-  Persian court cannot have lasted four years; and Xenophon states
-  that the Athenians sent the two envoys when they heard that
-  Pelopidas was going thither. I imagine that Leon and Timagoras
-  may have been sent up to the Persian court shortly after the
-  battle of Leuktra, at the time when the Athenians caused the
-  former rescript of the Persian king to be resworn, putting Athens
-  as head into the place of Sparta (Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 1, 2).
-  This was exactly four years before (371-367 B.C.). Leon and
-  Timagoras having jointly undertaken and perhaps recently returned
-  from their first embassy, were now sent _jointly_ on a second.
-  Demosthenes has summed up the time of the two as if it were one.
-
-  [601] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30.
-
-  Demosthenes speaks of the amount received, in money, by Timagoras
-  from the Persian king as having been forty talents, ὡς λέγεται
-  (Fals. Leg. p. 383), besides other presents and conveniences.
-  Compare also Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 22.
-
-  [602] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38.
-
-On the other hand, the Eleian envoy returned with feelings of
-satisfaction, and the Thebans with triumph. Deputies from each of
-their allied cities were invited to Thebes, to hear the Persian
-rescript. It was produced by a native Persian, their official
-companion from Susa,—the first Persian probably ever seen in Thebes
-since the times immediately preceding the battle of Platæa,—who,
-after exhibiting publicly the regal seal, read the document aloud;
-as the satrap Tiribazus had done on the occasion of the peace of
-Antalkidas.[603]
-
-  [603] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 30.
-
-But though the Theban leaders thus closely copied the conduct of
-Sparta both as to means and as to end, they by no means found the
-like ready acquiescence, when they called on the deputies present
-to take an oath to the rescript, to the Great King, and to Thebes.
-All replied that they had come with instructions, authorizing them
-to hear and report, but no more; and that acceptance or rejection
-must be decided in their respective cities. Nor was this the worst.
-Lykomedes and the other deputies from Arcadia, already jealous of
-Thebes, and doubtless farther alienated by the angry report of their
-envoy Antiochus, went yet farther, and entered a general protest
-against the headship of Thebes; affirming that the synod ought not
-to be held constantly in that city, but in the seat of war, wherever
-that might be. Incensed at such language, the Thebans accused
-Lykomedes of violating the cardinal principle of the confederacy;
-upon which he and his Arcadian comrades forthwith retired and went
-home, declaring that they would no longer sit in the synod. The other
-deputies appear to have followed his example. Indeed, as they had
-refused to take the oath submitted to them, the special purpose of
-the synod was defeated.
-
-Having thus failed in carrying their point with the allies
-collectively, the Thebans resolved to try the efficacy of
-applications individually. They accordingly despatched envoys, with
-the Persian rescript in hand, to visit the cities successively,
-calling upon each for acceptance with an oath of adhesion. Each
-city separately (they thought) would be afraid to refuse, under
-peril of united hostility from the Great King and from Thebes. So
-confident were they in the terrors of the king’s name and seal, that
-they addressed this appeal not merely to the cities in alliance
-with them, but even to several among their enemies. Their envoys
-first set forth the proposition at Corinth; a city, not only at
-variance with them, but even serving as a centre of operation for
-the Athenian and Lacedæmonian forces to guard the line of Oneium,
-and prevent the entrance of a Theban army into Peloponnesus. But the
-Corinthians rejected the proposition altogether, declining formally
-to bind themselves by any common oaths towards the Persian king.
-The like refusal was experienced by the envoys as they passed on to
-Peloponnesus, if not from all the cities visited, at least from so
-large a proportion, that the mission was completely frustrated. And
-thus the rescript, which Thebes had been at such pains to procure,
-was found practically inoperative in confirming or enforcing her
-headship;[604] though doubtless the mere fact, that it comprised and
-recognized Messênê, contributed to strengthen the vitality, and exalt
-the dignity, of that new-born city.
-
-  [604] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 40. Καὶ αὐτὴ μὲν ἡ Πελοπίδου καὶ τῶν
-  Θηβαίων τῆς ἀρχῆς περιβολὴ οὕτω διελύθη.
-
-In their efforts to make the Persian rescript available towards
-the recognition of their headship throughout Greece, the Thebans
-would naturally visit Thessaly and the northern districts as well
-as Peloponnesus. It appears that Pelopidas and Ismenias themselves
-undertook this mission; and that in the execution of it they were
-seized and detained as prisoners by Alexander of Pheræ. That despot
-seems to have come to meet them, under pacific appearances, at
-Pharsalus. They indulged hopes of prevailing on him as well as the
-other Thessalians to accept the Persian rescript; for we see by the
-example of Corinth, that they had tried their powers of persuasion
-on enemies as well as friends. But the Corinthians, while refusing
-the application, had nevertheless respected the public morality held
-sacred even between enemies in Greece, and had dismissed the envoys
-(whether Pelopidas was among them, we cannot assert) inviolate. Not
-so the tyrant of Pheræ. Perceiving that Pelopidas and Ismenias were
-unaccompanied by any military force, he seized their persons, and
-carried them off to Pheræ as prisoners.
-
-Treacherous as this proceeding was, it proved highly profitable
-to Alexander. Such was the personal importance of Pelopidas, that
-his imprisonment struck terror among the partisans of Thebes in
-Thessaly, and induced several of them to submit to the despot of
-Pheræ; who moreover sent to apprise the Athenians of his capture,
-and to solicit their aid against the impending vengeance of Thebes.
-Greatly impressed with the news, the Athenians looked upon Alexander
-as a second Jason, likely to arrest the menacing ascendency of their
-neighbor and rival.[605] They immediately despatched to his aid
-thirty triremes and one thousand hoplites under Autoklês; who, unable
-to get through the Euripus, when Bœotia and Eubœa were both hostile
-to Athens, were forced to circumnavigate the latter island. He
-reached Pheræ just in time; for the Thebans, incensed beyond measure
-at the seizure of Pelopidas, had despatched without delay eight
-thousand hoplites and six hundred cavalry to recover or avenge him.
-Unfortunately for them, Epaminondas had not been rechosen commander
-since his last year’s proceedings in Achaia. He was now serving as an
-hoplite in the ranks, while Kleomenes with other Bœotarchs had the
-command. On entering Thessaly, they were joined by various allies
-in the country. But the army of Alexander, aided by the Athenians,
-and placed under the command of Autoklês, was found exceedingly
-formidable, especially in cavalry. The Thessalian allies of Thebes,
-acting with their habitual treachery, deserted in the hour of danger;
-and the enterprise, thus difficult and perilous, was rendered
-impracticable by the incompetence of the Bœotarchs. Unable to make
-head against Alexander and the Athenians, they were forced to retreat
-homeward. But their generalship was so unskilful, and the enemy’s
-cavalry so active, that the whole army was in imminent danger of
-being starved or destroyed. Nothing saved them now, but the presence
-of Epaminondas as a common soldier in the ranks. Indignant as well
-as dismayed, the whole army united to depose their generals, and
-with one voice called upon him to extricate them from their perils.
-Epaminondas accepted the duty,—marshalled the retreat in consummate
-order,—took for himself the command of the rear-guard, beating off
-all the attacks of the enemy,—and conducted the army safely back to
-Thebes.[606]
-
-  [605] The strong expressions of Demosthenes show what a
-  remarkable effect was produced by the news at Athens (cont.
-  Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 142).
-
-  Τί δ’; Ἀλέξανδρον ἐκεῖνον τὸν Θετταλὸν, ἡνίκ’ εἶχε μὲν αἰχμάλωτον
-  δήσας Πελοπίδαν, ἐχθρὸς δ’ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἦν Θηβαίοις, ὑμῖν δ’ οἰκείως
-  διέκειτο, οὕτως ὥστε παρ’ ὑμῶν στρατηγὸν αἰτεῖν, ἐβοηθεῖτε δ’
-  αὐτῷ καὶ πάντ’ ἦν Ἀλέξανδρος, etc.
-
-  Alexander is said to have promised to the Athenians so ample a
-  supply of cattle as should keep the price of meat very low at
-  Athens (Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 193 E.)
-
-  [606] Diodor. xv, 71; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 28; Pausanias ix, 15, 1.
-
-This memorable exploit, while it disgraced the unsuccessful
-Bœotarchs, who were condemned to fine and deposition from their
-office, raised higher than ever the reputation of Epaminondas among
-his countrymen. But the failure of the expedition was for the time a
-fatal blow to the influence of Thebes in Thessaly; where Alexander
-now reigned victorious and irresistible, with Pelopidas still in
-his dungeon. The cruelties and oppressions, at all times habitual
-to the despot of Pheræ, were pushed to an excess beyond all former
-parallel. Besides other brutal deeds of which we read with horror, he
-is said to have surrounded by his military force the unarmed citizens
-of Melibœa and Skotussa, and slaughtered them all in mass. In such
-hands, the life of Pelopidas hung by a thread; yet he himself, with
-that personal courage which never forsook him, held the language of
-unsubdued defiance and provocation against the tyrant. Great sympathy
-was manifested by many Thessalians, and even by Thêbê the wife of
-Alexander, for so illustrious a prisoner; and Alexander, fearful
-of incurring the implacable enmity of Thebes, was induced to spare
-his life, though retaining him as a prisoner. His confinement, too,
-appears to have lasted some time before the Thebans, discouraged
-by their late ill-success, were prepared to undertake a second
-expedition.
-
-At length they sent a force for the purpose; which was placed, on
-this occasion, under the command of Epaminondas. The renown of his
-name rallied many adherents in the country; and his prudence, no less
-than his military skill, was conspicuously exhibited, in defeating
-and intimidating Alexander, yet without reducing him to such despair
-as might prove fatal to the prisoner. The despot was at length
-compelled to send an embassy excusing his recent violence, offering
-to restore Pelopidas, and soliciting to be admitted to peace and
-alliance with Thebes. But Epaminondas would grant nothing more than
-a temporary truce,[607] coupled with the engagement of evacuating
-Thessaly; while he required in exchange the release of Pelopidas
-and Ismenias. His terms were acceded to, so that he had the delight
-of conveying his liberated friend in safety to Thebes. Though this
-primary object was thus effected, however, it is plain that he did
-not restore Thebes to the same influence in Thessaly which she had
-enjoyed prior to the seizure of Pelopidas.[608] That event with
-its consequences still remained a blow to Thebes and a profit to
-Alexander; who again became master of all or most part of Thessaly,
-together with the Magnêtes, the Phthiot Achæans, and other tributary
-nations dependent on Thessaly—maintaining unimpaired his influence
-and connection at Athens.[609]
-
-  [607] Plutarch (Pelopidas, c. 29) says, a truce for thirty days;
-  but it is difficult to believe that Alexander would have been
-  satisfied with a term so very short.
-
-  [608] The account of the seizure of Pelopidas by Alexander,
-  with its consequences, is contained chiefly in Diodorus, xv,
-  71-75; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 27-29; Cornel. Nep. Pelop. c. 5;
-  Pausanias, ix, 15, 1. Xenophon does not mention it.
-
-  I have placed the seizure in the year 366 B.C., after the return
-  of Pelopidas from his embassy in Persia; which embassy I agree
-  with Mr. Fynes Clinton in referring to the year 367 B.C. Plutarch
-  places the seizure before the embassy; Diodorus places it in the
-  year between Midsummer 368 and Midsummer 367 B.C.; but he does
-  not mention the embassy at all, in its regular chronological
-  order; he only alludes to it in summing up the exploits at the
-  close of the career of Pelopidas.
-
-  Assuming the embassy to the Persian court to have occurred in 367
-  B.C., the seizure cannot well have happened before that time.
-
-  The year 368 B.C. seems to have been that wherein Pelopidas
-  made his second expedition into Thessaly, from which he returned
-  victorious, bringing back the hostages. See above, p. 264, note.
-
-  The seizure of Pelopidas was accomplished at a time when
-  Epaminondas was not Bœotarch, nor in command of the Theban army.
-  Now it seems to have been not until the close of 367 B.C., after
-  the accusations arising out of his proceedings in Achaia, that
-  Epaminondas missed being rechosen as general.
-
-  Xenophon, in describing the embassy of Pelopidas to Persia,
-  mentions his grounds for expecting a favorable reception, and
-  the matters which he had to boast of (Hell. vii, 1, 35). Now if
-  Pelopidas, immediately before, had been seized and detained for
-  some months in prison by Alexander of Pheræ, surely Xenophon
-  would have alluded to it as an item on the other side. I know
-  that this inference from the silence of Xenophon is not always to
-  be trusted. But in this case, we must recollect that he dislikes
-  both the Theban leaders; and we may fairly conclude, that where
-  he is enumerating the trophies of Pelopidas, he would hardly
-  have failed to mention a signal disgrace, if there had been one,
-  immediately preceding.
-
-  Pelopidas was taken prisoner by Alexander, not in battle, but
-  when in pacific mission, and under circumstances in which
-  no man less infamous than Alexander would have seized him
-  (παρασπονδηθεὶς—Plutarch, Apoph. p. 194 D.; Pausan. ix, 15, 1;
-  “legationis jure satis tectum se arbitraretur” Corn. Nep.). His
-  imprudence in trusting himself under any circumstances to such
-  a man as Alexander, is blamed by Polybius (viii, 1) and others.
-  But we must suppose such imprudence to be partly justified or
-  explained by some plausible circumstances; and the proclamation
-  of the Persian rescript appears to me to present the most
-  reasonable explanation of his proceeding.
-
-  On these grounds, which, in my judgment, outweigh any
-  probabilities on the contrary side, I have placed the seizure of
-  Pelopidas in 366 B.C., after the embassy to Persia; not without
-  feeling, however, that the chronology of this period cannot be
-  rendered absolutely certain.
-
-  [609] Plutarch. Pelopid c. 31-35.
-
-While the Theban arms were thus losing ground in Thessaly, an
-important point was gained in their favor on the other side of
-Bœotia. Orôpus, on the north-eastern frontier of Attica adjoining
-Bœotia, was captured and wrested from Athens by a party of exiles
-who crossed over from Eretria in Eubœa, with the aid of Themison,
-despot of the last-mentioned town. It had been more than once
-lost and regained between Athens and Thebes; being seemingly in
-its origin Bœotian, and never incorporated as a Deme or equal
-constituent member of the Athenian commonwealth, but only recognized
-as a dependency of Athens; though, as it was close on the frontier,
-many of its inhabitants were also citizens of Athens, demots of
-the neighboring Deme Græa.[610] So recently before as the period
-immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra, angry remonstrances had
-been exchanged between Athens and Thebes respecting a portion of
-the Oropian territory. At that time, it appears, the Thebans were
-forced to yield, and their partisans in Oropus were banished.[611]
-It was these partisans who, through the aid of Themison and the
-Eretrians, now effected their return, so as to repossess themselves
-of Oropus, and doubtless to banish the principal citizens friendly to
-Athens.[612] So great was the sensation produced among the Athenians,
-that they not only marched with all their force to recover the place,
-but also recalled their general, Chares, with that mercenary force
-which he commanded in the territories of Corinth and Phlius. They
-farther requested aid from the Corinthians and their other allies in
-Peloponnesus. These allies did not obey the summons; but the Athenian
-force alone would have sufficed to retake Oropus, had not the Thebans
-occupied it so as to place it beyond their attack. Athens was obliged
-to acquiesce in their occupation of it; though under protest, and
-with the understanding that the disputed right should be referred to
-impartial arbitration.[613]
-
-  [610] See the instructive Inscription and comments published by
-  Professor Ross, in which the Deme Γραῆς, near Oropus, was first
-  distinctly made known (Ross, Die Demen von Attika, p. 6, 7—Halle,
-  1846).
-
-  [611] Isokrates, Orat. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 22-40.
-
-  [612] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1; Diodor. xv, 76.
-
-  The previous capture of Oropus, when Athens lost it in 411 B.C.,
-  was accomplished under circumstances very analogous (Thucyd.
-  viii, 60).
-
-  [613] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1; Diodor. xv, 76.
-
-  Compare Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 259, s. 123; Æschines cont.
-  Ktesiphont. p. 397, s. 85.
-
-  It would seem that we are to refer to this loss of Oropus the
-  trial of Chabrias and Kallistratus in Athens, together with
-  the memorable harangue of the latter which Demosthenes heard
-  as a youth with such strong admiration. But our information is
-  so vague and scanty, that we can make out nothing certainly on
-  the point. Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p.
-  109-114) brings together all the scattered testimonies in an
-  instructive chapter.
-
-This seizure of Oropus produced more than one material consequence.
-Owing to the recall of Chares from Corinth, the harbor of Sikyon
-could no longer be maintained against the Sikyonians in the town;
-who, with the aid of the Arcadians, recaptured it, so that both
-town and harbor again came into the league of Thebans and Arcadians.
-Moreover, Athens became discontented with her Peloponnesian allies,
-for having neglected her summons on the emergency at Oropus,
-although Athenian troops had been constantly in service for the
-protection of Peloponnesus against the Thebans. The growth of such
-dispositions at Athens became known to the Mantinean Lykomedes;
-the ablest and most ambitious leader in Arcadia, who was not only
-jealous of the predominance of the Thebans, but had come to a formal
-rupture with them at the synod held for the reception of the Persian
-rescript.[614] Anxious to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes as well
-as from Sparta, Lykomedes now took advantage of the discontent of
-Athens to open negotiations with that city; persuading the majority
-of the Arcadian Ten Thousand to send him thither as ambassador. There
-was difficulty among the Athenians in entertaining his proposition,
-from the alliance subsisting between them and Sparta. But they were
-reminded, that to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes, was no less
-in the interest of Sparta than of Athens; and a favorable answer was
-then given to Lykomedes. The latter took ship at Peiræus for his
-return, but never reached Arcadia; for he happened to land at the
-spot where the Arcadian exiles of the opposite party were assembled,
-and these men put him to death at once.[615] In spite of his death,
-however, the alliance between Arcadia and Athens was still brought to
-pass, though not without opposition.
-
-  [614] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 39; vii, 4, 2.
-
-  [615] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 3.
-
-  Xenophon notices the singularity of the accident. There were
-  plenty of vessels in Peiræus; Lykomedes had only to make his
-  choice, and to determine where he would disembark. He fixed upon
-  the exact spot where the exiles were assembled, not knowing that
-  they were there—δαιμονιώτατα ἀποθνήσκει.
-
-Thebes was during this year engaged in her unsuccessful campaign in
-Thessaly (alluded to already) for the rescue of Pelopidas, which
-disabled her from effective efforts in Peloponnesus. But as soon as
-that rescue had been accomplished, Epaminondas, her greatest man, and
-her only conspicuous orator, was despatched into Arcadia to offer,
-in conjunction with an envoy from Argos, diplomatic obstruction to
-the proposed Athenian alliance. He had to speak against Kallistratus,
-the most distinguished orator at Athens, who had been sent by his
-countrymen to plead their cause amidst the Arcadian Ten Thousand, and
-who, among other arguments, denounced the enormities which darkened
-the heroic legends both of Thebes and Argos. “Were not Orestes and
-Alkmæon, both murderers of their mothers (asked Kallistratus),
-natives of Argos? Was not Œdipus, who slew his father and married his
-mother, a native of Thebes?”—“Yes (said Epaminondas, in his reply)
-they were. But Kallistratus has forgotten to tell you, that these
-persons, while they lived at home were innocent, or reputed to be so.
-As soon as their crimes became known, Argos and Thebes banished them;
-and then it was that Athens received them, stained with confessed
-guilt.”[616] This clever retort told much to the credit of the
-rhetorical skill of Epaminondas; but his speech as a whole, was not
-successful. The Arcadians concluded alliance with Athens; yet without
-formally renouncing friendship with Thebes.
-
-  [616] Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 6: Plutarch, Repub. Ger.
-  Præc. p. 810 F.; Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 193 D.
-
-  Compare a similar reference, on the part of others, to the crimes
-  embodied in Theban legend (Justin, ix, 3).
-
-  Perhaps it may have been during this embassy into Peloponnesus,
-  that Kallistratus addressed the discourse to the public assembly
-  at Mêssenê, to which Aristotle makes allusion (Rhetoric, iii, 17,
-  3); possibly enough, against Epaminondas also.
-
-As soon as such new alliance had been ratified, it became important
-to Athens to secure a free and assured entrance into Peloponnesus;
-while at the same time the recent slackness of the Corinthians, in
-regard to the summons to Oropus, rendered her mistrustful of their
-fidelity. Accordingly it was resolved in the Athenian assembly, on
-the motion of a citizen named Demotion, to seize and occupy Corinth;
-there being already some scattered Athenian garrisons, on various
-points of the Corinthian territory, ready to be concentrated and
-rendered useful for such a purpose. A fleet and land-force under
-Chares was made ready and despatched. But on reaching the Corinthian
-port of Kenchreæ, Chares found himself shut out even from admittance.
-The proposition of Demotion, and the resolution of the Athenians
-had become known to the Corinthians; who forthwith stood upon their
-guard, sent soldiers of their own to relieve the various Athenian
-outposts on their territory, and called upon these latter to give
-in any complaints for which they might have ground, as their
-services were no longer needed. Chares pretended to have learnt that
-Corinth was in danger. But both he and the remaining Athenians were
-dismissed, though with every expression of thanks and politeness.[617]
-
-  [617] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 4-6.
-
-  The public debates of the Athenian assembly were not favorable to
-  the success of a scheme, like that proposed by Demotion, to which
-  secrecy was indispensable. Compare another scheme, divulged in
-  like manner, in Thucydides, iii, 3.
-
-The treacherous purpose of Athens was thus baffled, and the
-Corinthians were for the moment safe. Yet their position was
-precarious and uncomfortable; for their enemies, Thebes and Argos,
-were already their masters by land, and Athens had now been converted
-from an ally into an enemy. Hence they resolved to assemble a
-sufficient mercenary force in their own pay;[618] but while thus
-providing for military security, they sent envoys to Thebes to open
-negotiations for peace. Permission was granted to them by the Thebans
-to go and consult their allies, and to treat for peace in conjunction
-with as many as could be brought to share their views. Accordingly
-the Corinthians went to Sparta and laid their case before the full
-synod of allies, convoked for the occasion. “We are on the point
-of ruin (said the Corinthian envoy), and must make peace. We shall
-rejoice to make it in conjunction with you, if you will consent; but
-if you think proper to persevere in the war, be not displeased if we
-make peace without you.” The Epidaurians and Phliasians, reduced to
-the like distress, held the same language of weariness and impatience
-for peace.[619]
-
-  [618] It seems probable that these were the mercenaries placed by
-  the Corinthians under the command of Timophanes, and employed by
-  him afterwards as instruments for establishing a despotism.
-
-  Plutarch (Timoleon, c. 3, 4) alludes briefly to mercenaries
-  equipped about this time (as far as we can verify his chronology)
-  and to the Corinthian mercenaries now assembled, in connection
-  with Timoleon and Timophanes, of whom I shall have to say much in
-  a future chapter.
-
-  [619] Compare Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 8, 9 with Isokrates, Or. vi,
-  (Archidamus), s. 106.
-
-It had been ascertained at Thebes, that no propositions for peace
-could be entertained, which did not contain a formal recognition of
-the independence of Messênê. To this the Corinthians and other allies
-of Sparta had no difficulty in agreeing. But they vainly endeavored
-to prevail upon Sparta herself to submit to the same concession.
-The Spartans resolutely refused to relinquish a territory inherited
-from victorious forefathers, and held under so long a prescription.
-They repudiated yet more indignantly the idea of recognizing as
-free Greeks and equal neighbors, those who had so long been their
-slaves; and they proclaimed their determination of continuing the
-war, even single-handed and with all its hazards, to regain what they
-had lost;[620] and although they could not directly prohibit the
-Corinthians and other allies, whose sickness of the war had become
-intolerable, from negotiating a separate peace for themselves,—yet
-they gave only a reluctant consent. Archidamus son of Agesilaus even
-reproached the allies with timorous selfishness, partly in deserting
-their benefactress Sparta at her hour of need, partly in recommending
-her to submit to a sacrifice ruinous to her honor.[621] The Spartan
-prince conjured his countrymen, in the name of all their ancient
-dignity, to spurn the mandates of Thebes; to shrink neither from
-effort nor from peril for the reconquest of Messênê, even if they
-had to fight alone against all Greece; and to convert their military
-population into a permanent camp, sending away their women and
-children to an asylum in friendly foreign cities.
-
-  [620] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 9.
-
-  [621] This sentiment of dissatisfaction against the allies is
-  strongly and repeatedly set forth in the oration of Isokrates
-  called Archidamus, composed as if to be spoken in this
-  synod,—and good evidence (whether actually spoken or not) of
-  the feelings animating the prince and a large party at Sparta.
-  Archidamus treats those allies who recommended the Spartans to
-  surrender Messênê, as worse enemies even than those who had
-  broken off altogether. He specifies Corinthians, Phliasians,
-  and Epidaurians, sect. 11-13,—εἰς τοῦτο δ’ ἥκουσι πλεονεξίας,
-  καὶ τοσαύτην ἡμῶν κατεγνώκασιν ἀνανδρίαν, ὥστε πολλάκις ἡμᾶς
-  ἀξιώσαντες ὑπὲρ τῆς αὑτῶν πολεμεῖν, ὑπὲρ Μεσσήνης οὐκ οἴονται
-  δεῖν κινδυνεύειν· ἀλλ’ ἵν’ αὐτοὶ τὴν σφετέραν αὐτῶν ἀσφαλῶς
-  καρπῶνται, πειρῶνται διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς ὡς χρὴ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς τῆς
-  ἡμετέρας παραχωρῆσαι, καὶ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπαπειλοῦσιν, ὡς, εἰ
-  μὴ ταῦτα συγχωρήσομεν, ποιησόμενοι τὴν εἰρήνην κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτούς.
-  Compare sect. 67, 87, 99, 105, 106, 123.
-
-  We may infer from this discourse of Isokrates, that the
-  displeasure of the Spartans against their allies, because the
-  latter advised them to relinquish Messênê,—was much greater than
-  the narrative of Xenophon (Hellen. vii, 4, 8-11) would lead us to
-  believe.
-
-  In the argument prefixed to the discourse, it is asserted (among
-  various other inaccuracies), that the Spartans had sent to Thebes
-  to ask for peace, and that the Thebans had said in reply,—peace
-  would be granted, εἰ Μεσσήνην ἀνοικίσωσι καὶ αὐτόνομον ἐάσωσι.
-  Now the Spartans had never sent to Thebes for this purpose; the
-  Corinthians went to Thebes, and there learnt the peremptory
-  condition requiring that Messênê should be recognized. Next, the
-  Thebans would never require Sparta to recolonize or reconstitute
-  (ἀνοικίσαι) Messênê; that had been already done by the Thebans
-  themselves.
-
-Though the Spartans were not inclined to adopt the desperate
-suggestions of Archidamus, yet this important congress ended
-by a scission between them and their allies. The Corinthians,
-Phliasians, Epidaurians, and others, went to Thebes, and concluded
-peace; recognizing the independence of Messênê, and affirming the
-independence of each separate city within its own territory, without
-either obligatory alliance, or headship on the part of any city. Yet
-when the Thebans invited them to contract an alliance, they declined,
-saying that this would be only embarking in war on the other side;
-whereas that which they sighed for was peace. Peace was accordingly
-sworn, upon the terms indicated in the Persian rescript, so far as
-regarded the general autonomy of each separate town, and specially
-that of Messênê; but not including any sanction, direct or indirect,
-of Theban headship.[622]
-
-  [622] Diodorus (xv, 76) states that the Persian king sent envoys
-  to Greece who caused this peace to be concluded. But there seems
-  no ground for believing that any Persian envoys had visited
-  Greece since the return of Pelopidas, whose return with the
-  rescript did in fact constitute a Persian intervention. The peace
-  now concluded was upon the general basis of that rescript; so
-  far, but no farther (as I conceive), the assertion of Diodorus
-  about Persian intervention is exact.
-
-This treaty removed out of the war, and placed in a position of
-neutrality, a considerable number of Grecian states; chiefly those
-near the Isthmus,—Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus; probably Trœzen and
-Hermionê, since we do not find them again mentioned among the
-contending parties. But it left the more powerful states, Thebes and
-Argos,—Sparta and Athens,[623]—still at war; as well as Arcadia,
-Achaia, and Elis. The relations between these states, however, were
-now somewhat complicated; for Thebes was at war with Sparta, and in
-alliance, though not altogether hearty alliance, with the Arcadians;
-while Athens was at war with Thebes, yet in alliance with Sparta
-as well as with Arcadia. The Argeians were in alliance with Thebes
-and Arcadia, and at war with Sparta; the Eleians were on unfriendly
-terms, though not yet at actual war, with Arcadia—yet still (it
-would appear) in alliance with Thebes. Lastly, the Arcadians
-themselves were losing their internal coöperation and harmony one
-with another, which had only so recently begun. Two parties were
-forming among them, under the old conflicting auspices of Mantinea
-and Tegea. Tegea, occupied by a Theban harmost and garrison, held
-strenuously with Megalopolis and Messênê as well as with Thebes, thus
-constituting a strong and united frontier against Sparta.
-
-  [623] Diodorus (xv, 76) is farther inaccurate in stating the
-  peace as universally accepted, and as being a conclusion of the
-  Bœotian and Lacedæmonian war, which had begun with the battle of
-  Leuktra.
-
-As the Spartans complained of their Peloponnesian allies, for urging
-the recognition of Messênê as an independent state,—so they were
-no less indignant with the Persian king; who, though still calling
-himself their ally, had inserted the same recognition in the rescript
-granted to Pelopidas.[624] The Athenians also were dissatisfied with
-this rescript. They had (as has been already stated) condemned to
-death Timagoras, one of their envoys who had accompanied Pelopidas,
-for having received bribes. They now availed themselves of the
-opening left for them in the very words of the rescript, to send a
-fresh embassy up to the Persian court, and solicit more favorable
-terms. Their new envoys, communicating the fact that Timagoras had
-betrayed his trust and had been punished for it, obtained from the
-Great King a fresh rescript, pronouncing Amphipolis to be an Athenian
-possession instead of a free city.[625] Whether that other article
-also in the former rescript, which commanded Athens to call in
-all her armed ships, was now revoked, we cannot say; but it seems
-probable.
-
-  [624] Xenophon, Enc. Agesil. ii, 30. ἐνόμιζε—τῷ Πέρσῃ δίκην
-  ἐπιθήσειν καὶ τῶν πρόσθεν, καὶ ὅτι νῦν, σύμμαχος εἶναι φάσκων,
-  ἐπέταττε Μεσσήνην ἀφιέναι.
-
-  [625] This second mission of the Athenians to the Persian court
-  (pursuant to the invitation contained in the rescript given to
-  Pelopidas, Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 37), appears to me implied in
-  Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 384, s. 150, p. 420, s. 283; Or. De
-  Halonneso, p. 84, s. 30.
-
-  If the king of Persia was informed that Timagoras had been put
-  to death by his countrymen on returning to Athens,—and if he
-  sent down (κατέπεμψεν) a fresh rescript about Amphipolis,—this
-  information can only have been communicated, and the new rescript
-  only obtained, by a second embassy sent to him from Athens.
-
-  Perhaps the Lacedæmonian Kallias may have accompanied this second
-  Athenian mission to Susa; we hear of him as having come back with
-  a friendly letter from the Persian king to Agesilaus (Xenophon,
-  Enc. Ages. viii, 3; Plutarch, Apophth. Lacon. p. 1213 E.),
-  brought by a Persian messenger. But the statement is too vague to
-  enable us to verify this as the actual occasion.
-
-At the same time that the Athenians sent this second embassy, they
-also despatched an armament under Timotheus to the coast of Asia
-Minor, yet with express instructions not to violate the peace with
-the Persian king. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, went to the same
-scene, though without any public force; availing himself only of
-his long-established military reputation to promote the interests
-of his country as negotiator. Both Spartan and Athenian attention
-was now turned, directly and specially, towards Ariobarzanes the
-satrap of Phrygia; who (as has been already related) had sent over to
-Greece, two years before, Philiskus of Abydus, with the view either
-of obtaining from the Thebans peace on terms favorable to Sparta,
-or of aiding the latter against them.[626] Ariobarzanes was then
-preparing, and apparently had since openly consummated, his revolt
-from the Persian king, which Agesilaus employed all his influence in
-fomenting. The Athenians, however, still wishing to avoid a distinct
-breach with Persia, instructed Timotheus to assist Ariobarzanes,—yet
-with a formal proviso, that he should not break truce with the Great
-King. They also conferred both upon Ariobarzanes (with his three
-sons), and upon Philiskus, the gift of Athenian citizenship.[627]
-That satrap seems now to have had a large mercenary force, and to
-have been in possession of both sides of the Hellespont, as well as
-of Perinthus on the Propontis; while Philiskus, as his chief officer,
-exercised extensive ascendency, disgraced by much tyranny and
-brutality, over the Grecian cities in that region.
-
-  [626] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27.
-
-  [627] Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libert. p. 193, s. 10, cont.
-  Aristokrat. p. 666, s. 165; p. 687, s. 242.
-
-Precluded by his instructions from openly aiding the revolted
-Ariobarzanes, Timotheus turned his force against the island of Samos;
-which was now held by Kyprothemis, a Grecian chief with a military
-force in the service of Tigranes, Persian satrap on the opposite
-mainland. How or when Tigranes had acquired it we do not know; but
-the Persians, when once left by the peace of Antalkidas in quiet
-possession of the continental Asiatic Greeks, naturally tended to
-push their dominion over the neighboring islands. After carrying on
-his military operations in Samos, with eight thousand peltasts and
-thirty triremes, for ten or eleven months, Timotheus became master
-of it. His success was the more gratifying, as he had found means
-to pay and maintain his troops during the whole time at the cost
-of enemies; without either drawing upon the Athenian treasury, or
-extorting contributions from allies.[628] An important possession
-was thus acquired for Athens, while a considerable number of Samians
-of the opposite party went into banishment, with the loss of their
-properties. Since Samos was not among the legitimate possessions
-of the king of Persia, this conquest was not understood to import
-war between him and Athens. Indeed it appears that the revolt of
-Ariobarzanes, and the uncertain fidelity of various neighboring
-satraps, shook for some time the king’s authority, and absorbed his
-revenues in these regions. Autophradates, the satrap of Lydia,—and
-Mausôlus, native prince of Karia under Persian supremacy,—attacked
-Ariobarzanes, with the view, real or pretended, of quelling his
-revolt; and laid siege to Assus and Adramyttium. But they are
-said to have been induced to desist by the personal influence
-of Agesilaus.[629] As the latter had no army, nor any means of
-allurement (except perhaps some money derived from Ariobarzanes),
-we may fairly presume that the two besiegers were not very earnest
-in the cause. Moreover, we shall find both of them, a few years
-afterwards, in joint revolt with Ariobarzanes himself against the
-Persian king.[630] Agesilaus obtained, from all three, pecuniary aid
-for Sparta.[631]
-
-  [628] Demosth. _ut sup._; Isokrates, Or. xv, (De Permut.) s. 118;
-  Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c. 1.
-
-  The stratagems whereby Timotheus procured money for his troops
-  at Samos, are touched upon in the Pseudo-Aristoteles, Œconomic.
-  ii, 23; and in Polyæn. iii, 10, 9; so far as we can understand
-  them, they appear to be only contributions, levied under a thin
-  disguise, upon the inhabitants.
-
-  Since Ariobarzanes gave money to Agesilaus, he may perhaps have
-  given some to Timotheus during this siege.
-
-  [629] Xenoph. Enc. Ages. ii, 26; Polyænus, vii, 26.
-
-  I do not know whether it is to this period that we are to refer
-  the siege of Atarneus by Autophradates, which he was induced to
-  relinquish by an ingenious proposition of Eubulus, who held the
-  place (Aristot. Politic. ii, 4, 10).
-
-  [630] It is with the greatest difficulty that we make out
-  anything like a thread of events at this period; so miserably
-  scanty and indistinct are our authorities.
-
-  Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, chap. v, p.
-  118-130) is an instructive auxiliary in putting together the
-  scraps of information; compare also Weissenborn, Hellen. p.
-  192-194 (Jena, 1844).
-
-  [631] Xen. Enc. Ages. ii, 26, 27.
-
-The acquisition of Samos, while it exalted the reputation of
-Timotheus, materially enlarged the maritime dominion of Athens.
-It seems also to have weakened the hold of the Great King on Asia
-Minor,—to have disposed the residents, both satraps and Grecian
-cities, to revolt,—and thus to have helped Ariobarzanes, who rewarded
-both Agesilaus and Timotheus. Agesilaus was enabled to carry home
-a sum of money to his embarrassed countrymen; but Timotheus,
-declining pecuniary aid, obtained for Athens the more valuable boon
-of readmission to the Thracian Chersonese. Ariobarzanes made over
-to him Sestus and Krithôtê in that peninsula; possessions doubly
-precious, as they secured to the Athenians a partial mastery of the
-passage of the Hellespont; with a large circumjacent territory for
-occupation.[632]
-
-  [632] Isokrates, Or. xv, (De Permut.) s. 115-119; Cornelius
-  Nepos, Timotheus, c. 1.
-
-  Isokrates particularly dwells upon the fact that the conquests
-  of Timotheus secured to Athens a large circumjacent territory—ὧν
-  ληφθεισῶν ἅπας ὁ τόπος περιέχων οἰκεῖος ἠναγκάσθη τῇ πόλει
-  γενέσθαι, etc. (s. 114).
-
-  From the value of the Hellespont to Athens as ensuring a regular
-  supply of corn imported from the Euxine, Sestus was sometimes
-  called “the flour-board of the Peiræus”—ἡ τηλία τοῦ Πειραιῶς
-  (Aristot. Rhetor. iii, 10, 3).
-
-Samos and the Chersonese were not simply new tributary confederates
-aggregated to the Athenian synod. They were, in large proportion,
-new territories acquired to Athens, open to be occupied by Athenian
-citizens as out-settlers or kleruchs. Much of the Chersonese had
-been possessed by Athenian citizens, even from the time of the first
-Miltiades and afterwards down to the destruction of the Athenian
-empire in 405 B.C. Though all these proprietors had been then driven
-home and expropriated, they had never lost the hope of a favorable
-turn of fortune and eventual reëntry.[633] That moment had now
-arrived. The formal renunciation of all private appropriations of
-land out of Attica, which Athens had proclaimed at the formation
-of her second confederacy in 378 B.C., as a means of conciliating
-maritime allies—was forgotten, now that she stood no longer in
-fear of Sparta. The same system of kleruchies, which had so much
-discredited her former empire, was again partially commenced. Many
-kleruchs, or lot-holders, were sent out to occupy lands both at Samos
-and in the Chersonese. These men were Athenian citizens, who still
-remained citizens of Athens even in their foreign domicile, and
-whose properties formed part of the taxable schedule of Athens. The
-particulars of this important measure are unknown to us. At Samos
-the emigrants must have been new men; for there had never been any
-kleruchs there before.[634] But in the Chersonese, the old Athenian
-proprietors, who had been expropriated forty years before (or their
-descendants), doubtless now went back, and tried, with more or less
-of success, to regain their previous lands; reinforced by bands of
-new emigrants. And Timotheus, having once got footing at Sestus and
-Krithôtê, soon extended his acquisitions to Elæus and other places;
-whereby Athens was emboldened publicly to claim the whole Chersonese,
-or at least most part of it, as her own ancient possession,—from its
-extreme northern boundary at a line drawn across the isthmus north of
-Kardia, down to Elæus at its southern extremity.[635]
-
-  [633] See Andokides de Pace, s. 15.
-
-  [634] That the Athenian occupation of Samos (doubtless only in
-  part) by kleruchs, _began_ in 366 or 365 B.C.,—is established
-  by Diodorus, xviii, 8-18, when he mentions the restoration of
-  the Samians forty-three years afterwards by the Macedonian
-  Perdikkas. This is not inconsistent with the fact that additional
-  detachments of kleruchs were sent out in 361 and in 352 B.C.,
-  as mentioned by the Scholiast on Æschines cont. Timarch. p. 31
-  c. 12; and by Philochorus, Fr. 131, ed. Didot. See the note of
-  Wesseling, who questions the accuracy of the date in Diodorus. I
-  dissent from his criticism, though he is supported both by Boeckh
-  (Public Econ. of Athens, b. iii, p. 428) and by Mr. Clinton (F.
-  H. ad ann. 352). I think it highly improbable that so long an
-  interval should have elapsed between the capture of the island
-  and the sending of the kleruchs, or that this latter measure,
-  offensive as it was in the eyes of Greece, should have been
-  _first_ resorted to by Athens in 352 B.C., when she had been
-  so much weakened both by the Social War, and by the Progress of
-  Philip. Strabo mentions two thousand kleruchs as having been
-  sent to Samos. But whether he means the first batch alone, or
-  altogether, we cannot say (Strabo xiv, p. 638). The father of the
-  philosopher Epikurus was among these kleruchs; compare Diogen.
-  Laert. x, 1.
-
-  Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ et Timothei, p. 127) seems to
-  me to take a just view of the very difficult chronology of this
-  period.
-
-  Demosthenes mentions the property of the kleruchs, in his general
-  review of the ways and means of Athens; in a speech delivered in
-  Olym. 106, before 352 B.C. (De Symmoriis, p. 182, s. 19).
-
-  [635] See Demosthenes, De Halonneso, p. 86, s. 40-42; Æschines, De
-  Fals. Legat. 264, s. 74.
-
-  This transfer of lands in Samos to Athenian proprietors, combined
-  with the resumption of the Chersonese, appears to have excited
-  a strong sensation throughout Greece, as a revival of ambitious
-  tendencies on the part of Athens, and a manifest departure from
-  those disinterested professions which she had set forth in 378
-  B.C. Even in the Athenian assembly, a citizen named Kydias
-  pronounced an emphatic protest against the emigration of the
-  kleruchs to Samos.[636] However, obnoxious as the measure was to
-  criticism, yet having been preceded by a conquering siege and the
-  expulsion of many native proprietors, it does not seem to have
-  involved Athens in so much real difficulty as the resumption of
-  her old rights in the Chersonese. Not only did she here come into
-  conflict with independent towns, like Kardia,[637] which resisted
-  her pretensions,—and with resident proprietors whom she was to
-  aid her citizens in dispossessing,—but also with a new enemy,
-  Kotys, king of Thrace. That prince, claiming the Chersonese as
-  Thracian territory, was himself on the point of seizing Sestus,
-  when Agesilaus or Ariobarzanes drove him away,[638] to make room
-  for Timotheus and the Athenians.
-
-  [636] Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii, 8, 4.
-
-  [637] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 201; p. 679, s. 209.
-
-  [638] Xenophon, Enc. Agesil. ii, 26.
-
-It has been already mentioned, that Kotys,[639]—the new Thracian
-enemy, but previously the friend and adopted citizen, of Athens,—was
-father-in-law of the Athenian general Iphikrates, whom he had enabled
-to establish and people the town and settlement called Drys, on
-the coast of Thrace. Iphikrates had been employed by the Athenians
-for the last three or four years on the coasts of Macedonia and
-Chalkidikê, and especially against Amphipolis; but he had neither
-taken the latter place, nor obtained (so far as we know) any other
-success; though he had incurred the expense for three years of
-a mercenary general named Charidemus with a body of troops. How
-so unprofitable a result, on the part of an energetic man like
-Iphikrates, is to be explained,—we cannot tell. But it naturally
-placed him before the eyes of his countrymen in disadvantageous
-contrast with Timotheus, who had just acquired Samos and the
-Chersonese. An additional reason for mistrusting Iphikrates, too,
-was presented by the fact, that Athens was now at war with his
-father-in-law Kotys. Hence it was now resolved by the Athenians to
-recall him, and appoint Timotheus[640] to an extensive command,
-including Thrace and Macedonia as well as the Chersonese. Perhaps
-party enmities between the two Athenian chiefs, with their respective
-friends, may have contributed to the change. As Iphikrates had been
-the accuser of Timotheus a few years before, so the latter may have
-seized this opportunity of retaliating.[641] At all events the
-dismissed general conducted himself in such a manner as to justify
-the mistrust of his countrymen; taking part with his father-in-law
-Kotys in the war, and actually fighting against Athens.[642] He had
-got into his possession some hostages of Amphipolis, surrendered to
-him by Harpalus; which gave great hopes of extorting the surrender
-of the town. These hostages he had consigned to the custody of the
-mercenary general Charidemus, though a vote had been passed in the
-Athenian assembly that they should be sent to Athens.[643] As soon
-as the appointment of Iphikrates was cancelled, Charidemus forthwith
-surrendered the hostages to the Amphipolitans themselves, thus
-depriving Athens of a material advantage. And this was not all.
-Though Charidemus had been three years with his band in the service
-of Athens under Iphikrates, yet when the new general Timotheus
-wished to reëngage him, he declined the proposition; conveying
-away his troops in Athenian transports, to enter into the pay of a
-decided enemy of Athens—Kotys; and in conjunction with Iphikrates
-himself.[644] He was subsequently coming by sea from Kardia to take
-service under her other enemies, Olynthus and Amphipolis, when he was
-captured by the Athenian fleet. Under these circumstances, he was
-again prevailed on to serve Athens.
-
-  [639] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 141.
-
-  [640] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 174. Ἐπειδὴ τὸν μὲν
-  Ἰφικράτην ἀποστράτηγον ἐποιήσατε, Τιμόθεον δ’ ἐπ’ Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ
-  Χεῤῥόνησον ἐξεπέμψατε στρατηγὸν, etc.
-
-  [641] See Demosthen. cont. Timoth. p. 1187, 1188, s. 10-15.
-
-  Timotheus swore and pledged himself publicly in the Athenian
-  assembly, on one occasion, to prefer against Iphikrates a γραφὴν
-  ξενίας; but he never realized this engagement, and he even
-  afterwards became so far reconciled with Iphikrates, as to give
-  his daughter in marriage to the son of the latter (ibid. p. 1204,
-  s. 78).
-
-  To what precise date, or circumstance, this sworn engagement is
-  to be referred, we cannot determine. Possibly the γραφὴ ξενίας
-  may refer to the connection of Iphikrates with Kotys, which
-  might entail in some manner the forfeiture of his right of
-  citizenship; for it is difficult to understand how γραφὴ ξενίας,
-  in its usual sense (implying the negation of any original right
-  of citizenship), could ever be preferred as a charge against
-  Iphikrates; who not only performed all the active duties of a
-  citizen, but served in the highest post, and received from the
-  people distinguished honors.
-
-  [642] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 153. ἐτόλμησεν ὑπὲρ
-  τῶν Κότυος πραγμάτων ἐναντία τοῖς ὑμετέροις στρατηγοῖς ναυμαχεῖν.
-
-  [643] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669. s. 174-177. Respecting
-  these hostages, I can do nothing more than repeat the brief
-  and obscure notice of Demosthenes. Of the various conjectures
-  proposed to illustrate it, none appear to me at all satisfactory.
-  Who Harpalus was, I cannot presume to say.
-
-  [644] Demosthen. cont. Aristocrat. p. 669. s. 175.
-
-  The orator refers to letters written by Iphikrates and Timotheus
-  to the Athenian people, in support of these allegations.
-  Unfortunately these letters are not cited in substance.
-
-It was against these two cities, and to the general coast of
-Macedonia and the Chalkidic Thrace, that Timotheus devoted his first
-attention, postponing for the moment Kotys and the Chersonese. In
-this enterprise he found means to obtain the alliance of Macedonia,
-which had been hostile to his predecessor Iphikrates. Ptolemy of
-Alôrus, regent of that country, who had assassinated the preceding
-king, Alexander son of Amyntas, was himself assassinated (365 B.C.)
-by Perdikkas, brother of Alexander.[645] Perdikkas, during the first
-year or two of his reign, seems to have been friendly and not hostile
-to Athens. He lent aid to Timotheus, who turned his force against
-Olynthus and other towns both in the Chalkidic Thrace and on the
-coast of Macedonia.[646] Probably the Olynthian confederacy may have
-been again acquiring strength during the years of recent Spartan
-humiliation; so that Perdikkas now found his account in assisting
-Athens to subdue or enfeeble it, just as his father Amyntas had
-invoked Sparta for the like purpose. Timotheus, with the assistance
-of Perdikkas, was very successful in these parts; making himself
-master of Torônê, Potidæa, Pydna, Methônê, and various other places.
-As he mastered many of the Chalkidic towns allied with Olynthus,
-the means and adherents still retained by that city became so much
-diminished, that Timotheus is spoken of loosely as having conquered
-it.[647] Here, as at Samos, he obtained his successes not only
-without cost to Athens, but also (as we are told) without severities
-upon the allies, simply from the regular contributions of the
-Thracian confederates of Athens, assisted by the employment of a
-temporary coinage of base metal.[648] Yet though Timotheus was thus
-victorious in and near the Thermaic Gulf, he was not more fortunate
-than his predecessor in his attempt to achieve that which Athens had
-most at heart,—the capture of Amphipolis; although, by the accidental
-capture of Charidemus at sea, he was enabled again to enlist that
-chief with his band, whose services seem to have been gratefully
-appreciated at Athens.[649] Timotheus first despatched Alkimachus,
-who was repulsed,—then landed himself and attacked the city. But the
-Amphipolitans, aided by the neighboring Thracians, in large numbers
-(and perhaps by the Thracian Kotys), made so strenuous a resistance,
-that he was forced to retire with loss; and even to burn some
-triremes, which, having been carried across to assail the city from
-the wide part of the river Strymon above, could not be brought off
-in the face of the enemy.[650]
-
-  [645] Diodorus, xv, 77; Æschines de Fals. Leg. p. 250. c. 14.
-
-  [646] Demosthenes (Olynth. 1, p. 21. s. 14) mentions the
-  assistance of the Macedonians to Timotheus against Olynthus.
-  Compare also his oration ad Philippi Epistolam (p. 154. s. 9).
-  This can hardly allude to anything else than the war carried on
-  by Timotheus on those coasts in 364 B.C. See also Polyæn. iii,
-  10, 14.
-
-  [647] Diodor. xv, 81; Cornelius Nepos, Timoth. 1; Isokrates, Or.
-  xv, (De Permut.) s. 115-119; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. s. 14.
-  cont. Philokl. s. 19.
-
-  I give in the text what I apprehend to be the real truth
-  contained in the large assertion of Isokrates,—Χαλκιδεῖς ἅπαντας
-  κατεπολέμησεν (s. 119). The orator states that Timotheus acquired
-  twenty-four cities in all; but this total probably comprises
-  his conquests in other times as well as in other places. The
-  expression of Nepos—“Olynthios bello subegit” is vague.
-
-  [648] Isokrates, _l. c._; Aristotel. Œconomic. ii, 22: Polyæn.
-  iii, 10, 14.
-
-  [649] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669. s. 177.
-
-  [650] Polyænus (iii, 10, 8) mentions this fact, which is
-  explained by comparing (in Thucydides, vii, 9) the description of
-  the attack made by the Athenian Euetion upon Amphipolis in 414
-  B.C.
-
-  These ill-successes of Timotheus stand enumerated, as I conceive,
-  in that catalogue of _nine_ defeats, which the Scholiast on
-  Æschines (De Fals. Leg. p. 755, Reiske) specifies as having been
-  undergone by Athens at the territory called _Nine Ways_ (Ἐννέα
-  Ὁδοὶ), the previous name of the spot where Amphipolis was built.
-  They form the eighth and ninth items of the catalogue.
-
-  The third item, is the capture of Amphipolis by Brasidas. The
-  fourth is, the defeat of Kleon by Brasidas. Then come,—
-
-  5. οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ἐπ’ Ἠϊόνα Ἀθηναῖοι ἐξελάθησαν. The only way
-  in which I can make historical fact out of these words, is,
-  by supposing that they allude to the driving in of all the
-  out-resident Athenians to Athens, after the defeat of Ægospotami.
-  We know from Thucydides that when Amphipolis was taken by
-  Brasidas, many of the Athenians who were there settled retired
-  to Eion; where they probably remained until the close of the
-  Peloponnesian war, and were then forced back to Athens. We should
-  then have to construe οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ἐπ’ Ἠϊόνα Ἀθηναῖοι—“the
-  Athenians residing at Eion;” which, though not a usual sense
-  of the preposition ἐπὶ with an accusative case, seems the only
-  definite meaning which can be made out here.
-
-  6. οἱ μετὰ Σιμμίχου στρατηγοῦντος διεφθάρησαν.
-
-  7. ὅτε Πρωτόμαχος ἀπέτυχεν (Ἀμφιπολιτῶν αὐτοὺς παραδόντων τοῖς
-  ὁμόροις Θρᾳξί, these last words are inserted by Bekker from
-  a MS.). These two last-mentioned occurrences are altogether
-  unknown. We may perhaps suppose them to refer to the period when
-  Iphikrates was commanding the forces of Athens in these regions,
-  from 368-365 B.C.
-
-  8. ἐκπεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Τιμοθέου Ἀλκíμαχος ἀπέτυχεν αὐτοῦ, παραδόντων
-  αὑτοὺς Θρᾳξὶν ἐπὶ Τιμοκράτους Ἀθήνῃσιν ἄρχοντος.
-
-  The word Τιμοθέου is here inserted by Bekker from a MS., in place
-  of Τιμοσθένους, which appeared in Reiske’s edition.
-
-  9. Τιμόθεος ἐπιστρατεύσας ἡττήθη ἐπὶ Καλαμιώνος.
-
-  Here are two defeats of Timotheus specified, one in the
-  archonship of Timokrates, which exactly coincides with the
-  command of Timotheus in these regions (Midsummer 364 to Midsummer
-  363 B.C.). But the other archon Kalamion, is unknown in the Fasti
-  of Athens. Winiewski (Comment. in Demosth. de Corona, p. 39),
-  Böhnecke, and other commentators follow Corsini in representing
-  Kalamion to be a corruption of _Kallimedes_, who was archon
-  from Midsummer 360-359 B.C.; and Mr. Clinton even inserts the
-  fact in his tables for that year. But I agree with Rehdantz
-  (Vit. Iph. Chab. et Tim. p. 153) that such an occurrence after
-  Midsummer 360 B.C., can hardly be reconciled with the proceedings
-  in the Chersonese before and after that period, as reported by
-  Demosthenes in the Oration against Aristokrates. Without being
-  able to explain the mistake about the name of the archon, and
-  without determining whether the real mistake may not consist
-  in having placed ἐπὶ in place of ὑπὸ,—I cannot but think that
-  Timotheus underwent two repulses, one by his lieutenant, and
-  another by himself, near Amphipolis,—both of them occurring in
-  364 or the early part of 363 B.C. During great part of 363 B.C.,
-  the attention of Timotheus seems to have been turned to the
-  Chersonese, Byzantium, Kotys, etc.
-
-  My view of the chronology of this period agrees generally with
-  that of Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 42, p. 244-257).
-
-Timotheus next turned his attention to the war against Kotys in
-Thrace, and to the defence of the newly-acquired Athenian possessions
-in the Chersonese, now menaced by the appearance of a new and
-unexpected enemy to Athens in the eastern waters of the Ægean,—a
-Theban fleet.
-
-I have already mentioned that in 366 B.C., Thebes had sustained
-great misfortunes in Thessaly. Pelopidas had been fraudulently seized
-and detained as prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ; a Theban army had
-been sent to rescue him, but had been dishonorably repulsed, and had
-only been enabled to effect its retreat by the genius of Epaminondas,
-then serving as a private, and called upon by the soldiers to take
-the command. Afterwards, Epaminondas himself had been sent at the
-head of a second army to extricate his captive friend, which he had
-accomplished, but not without relinquishing Thessaly and leaving
-Alexander more powerful than ever. For a certain time after this
-defeat, the Thebans remained comparatively humbled and quiet. At
-length, the aggravated oppressions of the tyrant Alexander occasioned
-such suffering, and provoked such missions of complaint on the part
-of the Thessalians to Thebes, that Pelopidas, burning with ardor
-to revenge both his city and himself, prevailed on the Thebans to
-place him at the head of a fresh army for the purpose of invading
-Thessaly.[651]
-
-  [651] Plutarch Pelopid. c. 31; Diodor. xv, 80.
-
-At the same time, probably, the remarkable successes of the Athenians
-under Timotheus, at Samos and the Chersonese, had excited uneasiness
-throughout Greece, and jealousy on the part of the Thebans.
-Epaminondas ventured to propose to his countrymen that they should
-grapple with Athens on her own element, and compete for the headship
-of Greece not only on land but at sea. In fact the rescript brought
-down by Pelopidas from the Persian court sanctioned this pretension,
-by commanding Athens to lay up her ships of war, on pain of incurring
-the chastisement of the Great King;[652] a mandate, which she had so
-completely defied as to push her maritime efforts more energetically
-than before. Epaminondas employed all his eloquence to impress upon
-his countrymen, that, Sparta being now humbled, Athens was their
-actual and prominent enemy. He reminded them,—in language such as had
-been used by Brasidas in the early years of the Peloponnesian war,
-and by Hermokrates at Syracuse,[653]—that men such as the Thebans,
-brave and trained soldiers on land, could soon acquire the like
-qualities on shipboard; and that the Athenians themselves had once
-been mere landsmen, until the exigencies of the Persian war forced
-them to take to the sea.[654] “We must put down this haughty rival
-(he exhorted his countrymen); we must transfer to our own citadel,
-the Kadmeia, those magnificent Propylæa which adorn the entrance of
-the acropolis at Athens.”[655]
-
-  [652] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 36.
-
-  [653] Thucyd ii, 87; vii, 21.
-
-  [654] Diodor. xv, 78.
-
-  [655] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 276, c. 32, s. 111. Ἐπαμινώνδας,
-  οὐχ ὑποπτήξας τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀξίωμα, εἶπε διαῤῥήδην ἐν τῷ
-  πλήθει τῶν Θηβαίων, ὡς δεῖ τὰ τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀκροπόλεως προπύλαια
-  μετενεγκεῖν εἰς τὴν προστασίαν τῆς Καδμείας.
-
-Such emphatic language, as it long lived in the hostile recollection
-of Athenian orators, so it excited at the moment extreme ardor on
-the part of the Theban hearers. They resolved to build and equip
-one hundred triremes, and to construct docks with ship-houses fit
-for the constant maintenance of such a number. Epaminondas himself
-was named commander, to sail with the first fleet, as soon as it
-should be ready, to the Hellespont and the islands near Ionia;
-while invitations were at the same time despatched to Rhodes,
-Chios, and Byzantium, encouraging them to prepare for breaking with
-Athens.[656] Some opposition however was made in the assembly to the
-new undertaking; especially by Menekleidas, an opposition speaker,
-who, being frequent and severe in his criticisms upon the leading men
-such as Pelopidas and Epaminondas, has been handed down by Nepos
-and Plutarch in odious colors. Demagogues like him, whose power
-resided in the public assembly, are commonly represented as if they
-had a natural interest in plunging their cities into war, in order
-that there might be more matter of accusation against the leading
-men. This representation is founded mainly on the picture which
-Thucydides gives of Kleon in the first half of the Peloponnesian war:
-I have endeavored in my sixth volume to show,[657] that it is not a
-fair estimate even of Kleon separately, much less of the demagogues
-generally, unwarlike men both in tastes and aptitudes. Menekleidas
-at Thebes, far from promoting warlike expeditions in order that
-he might denounce the generals when they came back, advocated the
-prudence of continued peace, and accused Epaminondas of involving his
-country in distant and dangerous schemes, with a view to emulate the
-glories of Agamemnon by sailing from Aulis in Bœotia, as commander
-of an imposing fleet to make conquests in the Hellespont. “By the
-help of Thebes (replied Epaminondas) I have already done more than
-Agamemnon. He, with the forces of Sparta and all Greece besides, was
-ten years in taking a single city; while _I_, with the single force
-of Thebes and at the single day of Leuktra, have crushed the power of
-the Agamemnonian Sparta.”[658] While repelling the charge of personal
-motives, Epaminondas contended that peace would be equivalent to an
-abnegation of the headship of Greece; and that, if Thebes wished
-to maintain that ascendant station, she must keep her citizens in
-constant warlike training and action.
-
-  [656] Diodor. xv, 78, 79.
-
-  [657] See Vol. VI. Ch. liv. p. 475.
-
-  [658] Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 5; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c.
-  25; Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 542 A.
-
-  Neither of these the authors appear to me to conceive rightly
-  either the attack, or the reply, in which the name of Agamemnon
-  is here brought forward. As I have given it in the text, there is
-  a real foundation for the attack, and a real point in the reply;
-  as it appears in Cornelius Nepos, there is neither one nor the
-  other.
-
-  That the Spartans regarded themselves as having inherited the
-  leadership of Greece from Agamemnon, may be seen by Herodotus,
-  vii, 159.
-
-To err with Epaminondas may be considered, by some readers, as
-better than being right with Menekleidas. But on the main point of
-this debate, Menekleidas appears to have been really right. For
-the general exhortations ascribed to Epaminondas resemble but too
-closely those feverish stimulants, which Alkibiades administered at
-Athens to wind up his countrymen for the fatal expedition against
-Syracuse.[659] If we should even grant his advice to be wise, in
-reference to land-warfare, we must recollect that he was here
-impelling Thebes into a new and untried maritime career, for which
-she had neither aptitude nor facilities. To maintain ascendency
-on land alone, would require all her force, and perhaps prove
-too hard for her; to maintain ascendency by land and sea at once
-would be still more impracticable. By grasping at both she would
-probably keep neither. Such considerations warrant us in suspecting,
-that the project of stretching across the Ægean for ultramarine
-dependencies was suggested to this great man not so much by a sound
-appreciation of the permanent interests of Thebes, as by jealousy of
-Athens,—especially since the recent conquests of Timotheus.[660]
-
-  [659] Thucyd. vi, 17, 18.
-
-  [660] Plutarch (Philopœmen, c. 14) mentions that some authors
-  represented Epaminondas as having consented unwillingly to this
-  maritime expedition. He explains such reluctance by reference
-  to the disparaging opinion expressed by Plato about maritime
-  service. But this opinion of Plato is founded upon reasons
-  foreign to the character of Epaminondas; and it seems to me
-  evident that the authors whom Plutarch here followed, introduced
-  the opinion only as an hypothesis to explain why so great a
-  general on land as Epaminondas had accomplished so little at sea,
-  when he took command of a fleet; putting himself in a function
-  for which he had little capacity, like Philopœmen (Plutarch,
-  Reipublic. Gerend. Præcep. p. 812 E.).
-
-  Bauch (in his tract, Epaminondas und Thebens Kampf um die
-  Hegemonie, Breslau, 1834, p. 70, 71) maintains that Epaminondas
-  was constrained against his own better judgment to undertake this
-  maritime enterprise. I cannot coincide in his opinion. The oracle
-  which Bauch cites from Pausanias (viii, 11, 6) proves as little
-  as the above extract from Plutarch.
-
-The project however was really executed, and a large Theban fleet
-under Epaminondas crossed the Ægean in 363 B.C. In the same year,
-apparently, Pelopidas marched into Thessaly, at the head of a Theban
-land-force, against Alexander of Pheræ. What the fleet achieved,
-we are scarcely permitted to know. It appears that Epaminondas
-visited Byzantium; and we are told that he drove off the Athenian
-guard-squadron under Laches, prevailing upon several of the allies
-of Athens to declare in his favor.[661] Both he and Timotheus
-appear to have been in these seas, if not at the same time, at least
-with no great interval of time between. Both were solicited by the
-oligarchy of the Pontic Herakleia against the people; and both
-declined to furnish aid.[662] Timotheus is said to have liberated
-the besieged town of Kyzikus: by whom it was besieged, we do not
-certainly know, but probably by the Theban fleet.[663] Epaminondas
-brought back his fleet at the end of the year, without having gained
-any splendid victory or acquired any tenable possession for Thebes;
-yet not without weakening Athens, unsettling her hold upon her
-dependencies, and seconding indirectly the hostilities carried on
-by Kotys; insomuch that the Athenian affairs in the Chersonese and
-Thrace were much less prosperous in 362 B.C. than they had been in
-364 B.C. Probably Epaminondas intended to return with his fleet in
-the next year (362 B.C.), and to push his maritime enterprises still
-farther;[664] but we shall find him imperatively called elsewhere, to
-another and a fatal battle-field. And thus the first naval expedition
-of Thebes was likewise the last.
-
-  [661] Isokrates. Or. v, (Philip.) s. 53; Diodor. xv, 78. ἰδίας
-  τὰς πόλεις τοῖς Θηβαίοις ἐποίησεν. I do not feel assured that
-  these general words apply to Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, which
-  had before been mentioned.
-
-  [662] Justin, xvi, 4.
-
-  [663] Diodor. xv, 81; Cornel. Nepos, Timotheus, c. 1.
-
-  [664] Diodor. xv, 79.
-
-Meanwhile his friend and colleague Pelopidas had marched into
-Thessaly against the despot Alexander; who was now at the height of
-his power, holding in dependence a large portion of Thessaly together
-with the Phthiot Achæans and the Magnetes, and having Athens as his
-ally. Nevertheless, so revolting had been his cruelties, and so
-numerous were the malcontents who had sent to invite aid from Thebes,
-that Pelopidas did not despair of overpowering him. Nor was he
-daunted even by an eclipse of the sun, which is said to have occurred
-just as he was commencing his march, nor by the gloomy warnings which
-the prophets founded upon it; though this event intimidated many of
-his fellow-citizens, so that his force was rendered less numerous
-as well as less confident. Arriving at Pharsalus, and strengthening
-himself by the junction of his Thessalian allies, he found Alexander
-approaching to meet him at the head of a well-appointed mercenary
-force, greatly superior in number. The two chiefs contended who
-should occupy first the hills called Kynos Kephalæ, or the Dog’s
-Heads. Pelopidas arrived there first with his cavalry, beat the
-cavalry of the enemy, and pursued them to some distance; but he thus
-left the hills open to be occupied by the numerous infantry of the
-enemy, while his own infantry, coming up later, were repulsed with
-loss in their attempt to carry the position. Thus unpromising did the
-battle appear, when Pelopidas returned from the pursuit. Ordering
-his victorious cavalry to charge the infantry on the hill in flank,
-he immediately dismounted, seized his shield, and put himself at
-the head of his own discouraged infantry, whom he again led up the
-hill to attack the position. His presence infused so much fresh
-ardor, that his troops, in spite of being twice repulsed, succeeded
-in a third attempt to drive the enemy from the summit of the hill.
-Thus master of the hill, Pelopidas saw before him the whole army
-of the enemy, retiring in some disorder, though not yet beaten;
-while Alexander in person was on the right wing, exerting himself
-to rally and encourage them. When Pelopidas beheld, as it were
-within his reach, this detested enemy,—whose treacherous arrest and
-dungeon he had himself experienced, and whose cruelties filled every
-one’s mouth,—he was seized with a transport of rage and madness,
-like Cyrus the younger on the field of Kunaxa at the sight of his
-brother Artaxerxes. Without thinking of his duties as a general, or
-even looking to see by whom he was followed, he rushed impetuously
-forward, with loud cries and challenges to Alexander to come forth
-and fight. The latter, declining the challenge, retired among his
-guards, into the midst of whom Pelopidas plunged, with the few who
-followed him; and there, while fighting with desperate bravery, met
-his death. So rapidly had this rash proceeding been consummated, that
-his army behind did not at first perceive it. But they presently
-hastened forward to rescue or avenge him, vigorously charged the
-troops of Alexander, and put them to flight with severe loss.[665]
-
-  [665] For the description of this memorable scene, see Plutarch,
-  Pelopidas, c. 31, 32; Diodor. xv, 80, 81; Cornel. Nepos. Pelopid.
-  c. 5.
-
-Yet this victory, though important to the Thebans, and still more
-important to the Thessalians, was to both of them robbed of all its
-sensible value by the death of Pelopidas. The demonstrations of grief
-throughout the army were unbounded and universal. The soldiers yet
-warm from their victory, the wounded men with wounds yet untended,
-flocked around the corpse, piling up near to it as a trophy the arms
-of the slain enemies. Many, refusing either to kindle fire, or to
-touch their evening meal, testified their affliction by cutting off
-their own hair as well as the manes of their horses. The Thessalian
-cities vied with each other in tokens of affectionate respect, and
-obtained from the Thebans permission to take the chief share in
-his funeral, as their lost guardian and protector. At Thebes, the
-emotion was no less strikingly manifested. Endeared to his countrymen
-first as the head of that devoted handful of exiles who braved
-every peril to rescue the city from the Lacedæmonians, Pelopidas
-had been reëlected without interruption to the annual office of
-Bœotarch during all the years that had since elapsed[666] (378-364
-B.C.). He had taken a leading part in all their struggles, and
-all their glories; he had been foremost to cheer them in the hour
-of despondency; he had lent himself, with the wisdom of a patriot
-and the generosity of a friend, to second the guiding ascendency
-of Epaminondas, and his moderation of dealing towards conquered
-enemies.[667]
-
-  [666] Diodor. xv, 81. Plutarch (Pelop. c. 34) states
-  substantially the same.
-
-  [667] Plutarch, Compar. Pelopid. and Marcell. c. 1.
-
-All that Thebes could do, was, to avenge the death of Pelopidas. The
-Theban generals, Malkitas and Diogeiton,[668] conducted a powerful
-force of seven thousand hoplites into Thessaly, and put themselves at
-the head of their partisans in that country. With this united army,
-they pressed Alexander hard, completely worsted him, and reduced him
-to submit to their own terms. He was compelled to relinquish all
-his dependencies in Thessaly; to confine himself to Pheræ, with its
-territory near the Gulf of Pagasæ; and to swear adherence to Thebes
-as a leader. All Thessaly, together with the Phthiot Achæans and the
-Magnêtes, became annexed to the headship of the Thebans, who thus
-acquired greater ascendency in Northern Greece than they had ever
-enjoyed before.[669] The power of Alexander was effectually put down
-on land; but he still continued both powerful and predatory at sea,
-as will be seen in the ensuing year.
-
-  [668] Diodor. (xv, 78) places in one and the same year both,—1.
-  The maritime project of Epaminondas, including his recommendation
-  of it, the equipment of the fleet, and the actual expedition. 2.
-  The expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly, with its immediate
-  consequences.—He mentions the former of the two first, but he
-  places both in the first year of Olympiad 104, the year in which
-  Timokrates was archon at Athens; that is, from Midsummer 364
-  to Midsummer 363 B.C. He passes immediately from the maritime
-  expedition into an allusion to the battle of Mantinea, which (he
-  says) proved fatal to Epaminondas and hindered him from following
-  up his ideas of maritime activity.
-
-  The battle of Mantinea took place in June or July 362 B.C. The
-  maritime expedition, immediately preceding that battle, would
-  therefore naturally take place in the summer of 363 B.C.; the
-  year 364 B.C. having been occupied in the requisite naval
-  equipments.
-
-  I incline to think that the march of Pelopidas into Thessaly also
-  took place during 363 B.C., and that his death thus occurred
-  while Epaminondas was absent on shipboard. A probable reason is
-  thus supplied why the second Theban army which went to avenge
-  Pelopidas, was commanded, not by his friend and colleague
-  Epaminondas, but by other generals. Had Epaminondas been then at
-  home, this would hardly have been.
-
-  The eclipse of the sun, which both Plutarch and Diodorus mention
-  to have immediately preceded the out-march of Pelopidas, does
-  not seem to have been as yet certainly identified. Dodwell, on
-  the authority of an astronomical friend, places it on the 13th
-  of June, 364 B.C., at five o’clock in the morning. On the other
-  hand, Calvisius places it on the 13th of July in the same Julian
-  year, at a quarter before eleven o’clock in the day (see L’Art de
-  Vérifier les Dates, tom. i, p. 257). We may remark, that the day
-  named by Dodwell (as he himself admits) would not fall within the
-  Olympic year 364-363 B.C., but during the months preceding the
-  commencement of that year. Moreover Dodwell speaks as if there
-  were no other months in the year, except June, July, and August,
-  fit for military expeditions; an hypothesis not reasonable to
-  admit.
-
-  Sievers and Dr. Thirlwall both accept the eclipse mentioned by
-  Dodwell, as marking the time when the expedition of Pelopidas
-  commenced—June 364 B.C. But against this, Mr. Clinton takes
-  no notice of it in his tables; which seems to show that he was
-  not satisfied as to the exactness of Dodwell’s statement or
-  the chronological identity. If it should turn out, on farther
-  astronomical calculations, that there occurred no eclipse of
-  the sun in the year 363 B.C., visible at Thebes,—I should then
-  fix upon the eclipse mentioned by Calvisius (13 July 364 B.C.)
-  as identifying the time of the expedition of Pelopidas; which
-  would, on that supposition, precede by eight or nine months
-  the commencement of the transmarine cruise of Epaminondas. The
-  eclipse mentioned by Calvisius is preferable to that mentioned by
-  Dodwell, because it falls within the Olympic year indicated by
-  Diodorus.
-
-  But it appears to me that farther astronomical information is
-  here required.
-
-  [669] Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 35.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXX.
-
-FROM THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA.
-
-
-It was during this period,—while Epaminondas was absent with the
-fleet, and while Pelopidas was engaged in that Thessalian campaign
-from whence he never returned,—that the Thebans destroyed Orchomenus.
-That city, the second in the Bœotian federation, had always been
-disaffected towards Thebes; and the absence of the two great leaders,
-as well as of a large Theban force in Thessaly, seems to have been
-regarded by the Orchomenian Knights or Horsemen (the first and
-richest among the citizens, three hundred in number) as a favorable
-moment for attack. Some Theban exiles took part in this scheme, with
-a view to overthrow the existing government; and a day, appointed
-for a military review near Thebes, was fixed for execution. A large
-number of conspirators joined, with apparent ardor. But before the
-day arrived, several of them repented and betrayed the plot to the
-Bœotarchs; upon which the Orchomenian horsemen were seized, brought
-before the Theban assembly, condemned to death, and executed.
-But besides this, the resolution was taken to destroy the town,
-to kill the male adults, and to sell the women and children into
-slavery.[670] This barbarous decree was executed, though probably a
-certain fraction found means to escape, forming the kernel of that
-population which was afterwards restored. The full measure of ancient
-Theban hatred was thus satiated; a hatred, tracing its origin even
-to those mythical times when Thebes was said to have paid tribute to
-Orchomenus. But the erasure of this venerable city from the list of
-autonomous units in Hellas, with the wholesale execution and sale of
-so many free kinsmen into slavery, excited strong sympathy throughout
-the neighbors, as well as repugnance against Theban cruelty;[671] a
-sentiment probably aggravated by the fact, which we must presume to
-have been concurrent,—that the Thebans appropriated the territory
-among their own citizens. It would seem that the neighboring town of
-Koroneia shared the same fate; at least the two are afterwards spoken
-of together in such manner as to make us suppose so.[672] Thebes thus
-absorbed into herself these two towns and territories to the north of
-her own city, as well as Platæa and Thespiæ to the south.
-
-  [670] Diodor. xv, 79.
-
-  [671] See the sentiment expressed by Demosthenes cont. Leptinem,
-  p. 489, s. 121,—an oration delivered in 355 B.C.; eight years
-  after the destruction of Orchomenus.
-
-  [672] Demosth. De Pace, p. 62, s. 21; Philippic. II, p. 69, s.
-  13; s. 15; Fals. Leg. p. 375, s. 122; p. 387, s. 162; p. 445, s.
-  373.
-
-We must recollect that during the supremacy of Sparta and the
-period of Theban struggle and humiliation, before the battle of
-Leuktra, Orchomenus had actively embraced the Spartan cause.
-Shortly after that victory, the Thebans had been anxious under
-their first impulse of resentment to destroy the city, but had been
-restrained by the lenient recommendations of Epaminondas.[673] All
-their half-suppressed wrath was revived by the conspiracy of the
-Orchomenian Knights; yet the extreme severity of the proceeding would
-never have been consummated, but for the absence of Epaminondas, who
-was deeply chagrined on his return.[674] He well knew the bitter
-censures which Thebes would draw upon herself by punishing the entire
-city for the conspiracy of the wealthy Knights, and in a manner even
-more rigorous than Platæa and Thespiæ; since the inhabitants of these
-two latter were expelled with their families out of Bœotia, while the
-Orchomenian male adults were slain, and the women and children sold
-into slavery.
-
-  [673] Diodor. xv, 57.
-
-  [674] Pausan. ix, 15, 2.
-
-  Diodorus places in the same year all the three facts:—1. The
-  maritime expedition of Epaminondas. 2. The expedition of
-  Pelopidas into Thessaly, his death, and the following Theban
-  victories over Alexander of Pheræ. 3. The conspiracy of the
-  Orchomenian Knights, and the destruction of Orchomenus.
-
-  The year in which he places them is, the archonship of
-  Timokrates,—from Midsummer 364 to Midsummer 363 B.C.
-
-  That the destruction of Orchomenus occurred during the absence
-  of Epaminondas, and that he was greatly distressed at it on
-  his return,—is distinctly stated by Pausanias; who however is
-  (in my judgment) so far mistaken, that he refers the absence
-  of Epaminondas to that previous occasion when he had gone into
-  Thessaly to rescue Pelopidas from the dungeon of Alexander, 366
-  B.C.
-
-  This date is not so probable as the date assigned by Diodorus;
-  nor do the chronological conceptions of Pausanias seem to me
-  exact.
-
-On returning from his maritime expedition at the end of 363 B.C.,
-Epaminondas was reëlected one of the Bœotarchs. He had probably
-intended to renew his cruise during the coming year. But his
-chagrin for the Orchomenian affair, and his grief for the death of
-Pelopidas,—an intimate friend, as well as a political colleague whom
-he could trust,—might deter him from a second absence; while the
-affairs of Peloponnesus also were now becoming so complicated, as to
-render the necessity of renewed Theban interference again probable.
-
-Since the peace concluded in 366 B.C. with Corinth, Phlius, etc.,
-Thebes had sent no army into that peninsula; though her harmost
-and garrison still continued at Tegea, perhaps at Megalopolis and
-Messênê also. The Arcadians, jealous of her as well as disunited
-among themselves, had even gone so far as to contract an alliance
-with her enemy Athens. The main conflict however now was, between the
-Arcadians and the Eleians, respecting the possession of Triphylia
-and the Pisatid. The Eleians about this time (365 B.C.) came into
-alliance again with Sparta,[675] relinquishing their alliance with
-Thebes; while the Achæans, having come into vigorous coöperation with
-Sparta[676] ever since 367 B.C. (by reaction against the Thebans,
-who, reserving the judicious and moderate policy of Epaminondas,
-violently changed the Achæan governments), allied themselves with
-Elis also, in or before 365 B.C.[677] And thus Sparta, though
-robbed by the pacification of 366 B.C. of the aid of Corinth,
-Phlius, Epidaurus, etc., had now acquired in exchange Elis and
-Achaia,—confederates not less valuable.
-
-  [675] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 19.
-
-  [676] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 43.
-
-  [677] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 17.
-
-Triphylia, the territory touching the western coast of Peloponnesus,
-immediately north of the river Neda,—and the Pisatid (including
-the lower course of the river Alpheius and the plain of Olympia),
-immediately north of Triphylia,—both of them between Messenia and
-Elis,—had been in former times conquered and long held by the
-Eleians, but always as discontented subjects. Sparta, in the days of
-her unquestioned supremacy, had found it politic to vindicate their
-independence, and had compelled the Eleians, after a war of two or
-three years, to renounce formally all dominion over them.[678] No
-sooner, however, had the battle of Leuktra disarmed Sparta, than
-the Eleians reclaimed their lost dominion;[679] while the subjects
-on their side found new protectors in the Arcadians, and were even
-admitted, under pretence of kindred race, into the Pan-Arcadian
-confederacy.[680] The Persian rescript brought down by Pelopidas
-(367-366 B.C.) seems to have reversed this arrangement, recognizing
-the imperial rights of the Eleians.[681] But as the Arcadians had
-repudiated the rescript, it remained for the Eleians to enforce their
-imperial rights by arms, if they could. They found Sparta in the same
-interest as themselves; not only equally hostile to the Arcadians,
-but also complaining that she had been robbed of Messênê, as they
-complained of the loss of Triphylia. Sparta had just gained a slight
-advantage over the Arcadians, in the recapture of Sellasia; chiefly
-through the aid of a Syracusan reinforcement of twelve triremes,
-sent to them by the younger Dionysius, but with orders speedily to
-return.[682]
-
-  [678] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 30, 31.
-
-  [679] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.
-
-  [680] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 26.
-
-  [681] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38.
-
-  [682] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 12.
-
-Besides the imperial claims over Triphylia and the Pisatid, which
-thus placed Elis in alliance with Sparta and in conflict with
-Arcadia,—there was also a territory lying north of the Alpheius
-(on the hilly ground forming the western or Eleian side of Mount
-Erymanthus, between Elis and the north-western portion of Arcadia),
-which included Lasion and the highland townships called Akroreii, and
-which was disputed between Elis and Arcadia. At this moment, it was
-included as a portion of the Pan-Arcadian aggregate;[683] but the
-Eleians, claiming it as their own and suddenly marching in along with
-a body of Arcadian exiles, seized and occupied Lasion as well as some
-of the neighboring Akroreii. The Arcadians were not slow in avenging
-the affront. A body of their Pan-Arcadian militia called the epariti,
-collected from the various cities and districts, marched to Lasion,
-defeated the Eleian hoplites with considerable loss both of men and
-arms, and drove them out of the district. The victors recovered
-both Lasion and all the Akroreii, except Thraustus; after which they
-proceeded to the sacred ground of Olympia, and took formal possession
-of it, planting a garrison, protected by a regular stockaded circle,
-on the hill called Kronion. Having made good this position, they
-marched on even to the city of Elis itself, which was unfortified
-(though it had a tenable acropolis), so that they were enabled to
-enter it, finding no resistance until they reached the agora. Here
-they found mustered the Eleian horsemen and the chosen hoplites, who
-repulsed them with some loss. But Elis was in great consternation;
-while a democratical opposition now manifested itself against the
-ruling oligarchy,—seizing the acropolis in hopes of admitting the
-Arcadians. The bravery of the horsemen and hoplites, however, put
-down this internal movement, recovered the acropolis, and forced the
-malcontents, to the number of four hundred, to evacuate the city.
-Thus expelled, the latter seized and established themselves at Pylus
-(in the Eleian territory, about nine miles from Elis towards the
-Arcadian border[684]), where they were reinforced not only by a body
-of Arcadians, but also by many of their partisans who came from the
-city to join them. From this fortified post, planted in the country
-like Dekeleia in Attica, they carried on harassing war against the
-Eleians in the city, and reduced them after some time to great
-straits. There were even hopes of compelling the city to surrender,
-and a fresh invasion of the Arcadians was invited to complete the
-enterprise. The Eleians were only rescued by a reinforcement from
-their allies in Achaia, who came in large force and placed the city
-in safety; so that the Arcadians could do nothing more than lay waste
-the territory around.[685]
-
-  [683] It had been taken from Elis by Agis, at the peace of 399
-  B.C. after his victorious war (Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31).
-
-  [684] Pausanias, vi, 22, 3.
-
-  [685] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 13-18; Diodor. xv, 77.
-
-Retiring on this occasion, the Arcadians renewed their invasion not
-long afterwards; their garrison still occupying Olympia, and the
-exiles continuing at Pylus. They now marched all across the country,
-even approaching Kyllênê, the harbor of Elis on the western sea.
-Between the harbor and the city, the Eleians ventured to attack them,
-but were defeated with such loss, that their general Andromachus (who
-had prompted the attack) fell upon his sword in despair. The distress
-of the Eleians became greater than ever. In hopes of drawing off
-the Arcadian invaders, they sent an envoy to Sparta, entreating that
-the Lacedæmonians would make a diversion on their side of Arcadia.
-Accordingly, the Spartan prince Archidamus (son of king Agesilaus),
-invading the south-western portion of Arcadia, occupied a hill-town
-or post called Kromnus (seemingly in the territory of Megalopolis,
-and cutting off the communication between that city and Messênê),
-which he fortified and garrisoned with about two hundred Spartans and
-Periœki. The effect which the Eleians contemplated was produced. The
-Arcadian army (except the garrison of Olympia) being withdrawn home,
-they had leisure to act against Pylus. The Pylian exiles had recently
-made an abortive attempt upon Thalamæ, on their return from which
-they were overtaken and worsted by the Eleians, with severe loss in
-killed, and two hundred of their number ultimately made prisoners.
-Among these latter, all the Eleian exiles were at once put to death;
-all the remainder sold for slaves.[686]
-
-  [686] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 26.
-
-Meanwhile the main Arcadian force, which had returned from Elis,
-was joined by allies,—Thebans,[687] Argeians, and Messenians,—and
-marched at once to Kromnus. They there blocked up the Lacedæmonian
-garrison by a double palisade carried all around, which they kept
-a numerous force to occupy. In vain did Archidamus attempt to draw
-them off, by carrying his devastations into the Skiritis and other
-portions of Arcadia; for the Skiritæ, in former days dependents of
-Sparta and among the most valuable constituents of the Lacedæmonian
-armies,[688] had now become independent Arcadians. The blockade was
-still continued without interruption. Archidamus next tried to get
-possession of a hill-top which commanded the Arcadian position. But
-in marching along the road up, he encountered the enemy in great
-force, and was repulsed with some loss; himself being thrust through
-the thigh with a spear, and his relatives Polyænidas and Chilon
-slain.[689] The Lacedæmonian troops retreated for some space into
-a wider breadth of ground, where they were again formed in battle
-order, yet greatly discouraged both by the repulse and by the
-communication of the names of the slain, who were among the most
-distinguished soldiers of Sparta. The Arcadians on the contrary were
-advancing to the charge in high spirits, when an ancient Spartan,
-stepping forth from the ranks, shouted with a loud voice “What
-need to fight, gentlemen? Is it not better to conclude a truce and
-separate?” Both armies accepted the proposition joyfully. The truce
-was concluded; the Lacedæmonians took up their dead and retired: the
-Arcadians also retreated to the spot where they had gained their
-advantage, and there erected their trophy.[690]
-
-  [687] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27.
-
-  The Thebans who are here mentioned must have been soldiers in
-  garrison at Tegea, Megalopolis, or Messênê. No fresh Theban
-  troops had come into Peloponnesus.
-
-  [688] Thucyd. v, 68; Xen. Rep. Laced, xii, 3; xiii, 6.
-
-  [689] The seizure of Kromnus by the Lacedæmonians, and the wound
-  received by Archidamus, are alluded to by Justin, vi, 6.
-
-  [690] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 20-25. Ὡς δὲ, πλησίον ὄντων, ἀναβοήσας
-  τις τῶν πρεσβυτέρων εἶπε—Τί δεῖ ἡμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες, μάχεσθαι, ἀλλ’
-  οὐ σπεισαμένους διαλυθῆναι; ἄσμενοι δὴ ἀμφότεροι ἀκούσαντες,
-  ἐσπείσαντο.
-
-Under the graphic description here given by Xenophon, seems to be
-concealed a defeat of the Lacedæmonians more serious than he likes to
-enunciate. The Arcadians completely gained their point, by continuing
-the blockade without interruption. One more attempt was made by the
-Lacedæmonians for the relief of their countrymen. Suddenly assailing
-the palisade at night, they succeeded in mastering the portion
-of it guarded by the Argeians.[691] They broke down an opening,
-and called to the besieged to hasten out. But the relief had come
-unexpected, so that only a few of those near at hand could profit by
-it to escape. The Arcadians, hurrying to the spot in large force,
-drove off the assailants and reënclosed the besieged, who were soon
-compelled to surrender for want of provisions. More than a hundred
-prisoners, Spartans and Periœki together, were distributed among the
-captors,—Argeians, Thebans, Arcadians, and Messenians,—one share to
-each.[692] Sixty years before, the capture of two hundred and twenty
-Spartans and Lacedæmonians in Sphakteria, by Kleon and Demosthenes,
-had excited the extreme of incredulous wonder throughout all Greece;
-emphatically noted by the impartial Thucydides.[693] Now, not a trace
-of such sentiment appears, even in the philo-Laconian Xenophon. So
-sadly had Spartan glory declined!
-
-  [691] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27. The conjecture of Palmerius,—τοῦ
-  κατὰ τοὺς Ἀργείους,—seems here just and necessary.
-
-  [692] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27.
-
-  [693] Thucyd. iv, 40.
-
-Having thus put an end to the Spartan attack, the Arcadians resumed
-their aggression against Elis, in conjunction with a new project of
-considerable moment. It was now the spring immediately preceding the
-celebration of the great quadrennial Olympic festival, which came
-about midsummer. The presidency over this sacred ceremony had long
-been the cherished privilege of the Eleians, who had acquired it when
-they conquered the Pisatans—the inhabitants of the region immediately
-around Olympia, and the first curators of the festival in its most
-primitive state. These Pisatans, always reluctant subjects of Elis,
-had never lost the conviction that the presidency of the festival
-belonged to them of right; and had entreated Sparta to restore to
-them their right, thirty-five years before, when Agis as conqueror
-imposed terms of peace upon the Eleians.[694] Their request had
-been then declined, on the ground that they were too poor and rude
-to do worthy honor to the ceremony. But on now renewing it, they
-found the Arcadians more compliant than the Spartans had been. The
-Arcadian garrison, which had occupied the sacred plain of Olympia
-for more than a year, being strongly reinforced, preparation was
-made for celebrating the festival by the Pisatans under Arcadian
-protection.[695] The Grecian states would receive with surprise, on
-this occasion, two distinct notices from official heralds, announcing
-to them the commencement of the hieromenia or sacred season, and
-the precise day when the ceremonies would begin: for doubtless the
-Eleians, though expelled by force from Olympia, still asserted their
-rights and sent round their notices as usual.
-
-  [694] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31.
-
-  [695] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 29. Compare Pausanias, vi, 22, 2.
-
-It was evident that this memorable plain, consecrated as it was to
-Hellenic brotherhood and communion, would on the present occasion be
-dishonored by dispute and perhaps by bloodshed: for the Arcadians
-summoned to the spot, besides their own military strength, a
-considerable body of allies: two thousand hoplites from Argos,
-and four hundred horsemen from Athens. So imposing a force being
-considered sufficient to deter the unwarlike Eleians from any idea of
-asserting their rights by arms, the Arcadians and Pisatans began the
-festival with its ordinary routine of sacrifice and matches. Having
-gone through the chariot-race, they entered upon the pentathlon, or
-quintuple contest, wherein the running match and the wrestling-match
-came first in order. The running-match had already been completed,
-and those who had been successful enough in it to go on contending
-for the prize in the other four points, had begun to wrestle in the
-space between the stadium and the great altar,[696]—when suddenly the
-Eleians were seen entering the sacred ground in arms, accompanied
-by their allies the Achæans, and marching up to the opposite bank
-of the little river Kladeus,—which flowed at a little distance to
-the westward of the Altis, or interior enclosed precinct of Zeus,
-falling afterwards into the Alpheius. Upon this the Arcadians drew
-up in armed order, on their own side of the Kladeus, to resist the
-farther approach of the Eleians.[697] The latter, with a boldness
-for which no one gave them credit, forded the rivulet, headed by
-Stratolas with his chosen band of three hundred, and vigorously
-charged first the Arcadians, next the Argeians; both of whom were
-defeated and driven back. The victorious Eleians forced their way
-into the Altis, and pressed forward to reach the great altar. But at
-every step of their advance the resistance became stronger, aided as
-it was by numerous buildings,—the senate-house, the temple of Zeus,
-and various porticos,—which both deranged their ranks, and furnished
-excellent positions of defence for darters and archers on the roofs.
-Stratolas was here slain; while his troops, driven out of the sacred
-ground, were compelled to recross the Kladeus. The festival was then
-resumed and prosecuted in its usual order. But the Arcadians were so
-afraid of a renewed attack on the following day, that they not only
-occupied the roofs of all the buildings more completely than before,
-but passed the night in erecting a palisade of defence; tearing down
-for that purpose the temporary booths which had been carefully put up
-to accommodate the crowd of visitors.[698] Such precautions rendered
-the place unassailable, so that the Eleians were obliged to return
-home on the next day; not without sympathy and admiration among many
-of the Greeks, for the unwonted boldness which they had displayed.
-They revenged themselves by pronouncing the 104th Olympiad to be no
-Olympiad at all, and by registering it as such in their catalogue,
-when they regained power; preserving however the names of those who
-had been proclaimed victors, which appeared in the lists like the
-rest.[699]
-
-  [696] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 29. Καὶ τὴν μὲν ἱπποδρομίαν ἤδη
-  ἐπεποιήκεσαν, καὶ τὰ δρομικὰ τοῦ πεντάθλου· οἱ δ’ εἰς πάλην
-  ἀφικόμενοι ~οὐκέτι ἐν τῷ δρόμῳ~, ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ τοῦ δρόμου καὶ τοῦ
-  βωμοῦ ἐπάλαιον. ~Οἱ γὰρ Ἠλεῖοι~ παρῆσαν ἤδη, etc.
-
-  Diodorus erroneously represents (xv, 78) the occurrence as if the
-  Eleians had been engaged in celebrating the festival, and as if
-  the Pisatans and Arcadians had marched up and attacked them while
-  doing so. The Eleians were really the assailants.
-
-  [697] Xen. Hellen. _l. c._ Οἱ γὰρ Ἠλεῖοι παρῆσαν σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις
-  ~εἰς τὸ τέμενος~. Οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες ποῤῥωτέρω μὲν οὐκ ἀπήντησαν, ἐπὶ
-  δὲ τοῦ Κλαδάου ποτάμου παρετάξαντο, ὃς παρὰ τὴν Ἄλτιν καταῤῥέων
-  εἰς τὸν Ἄλφειον ἐμβάλλει. Καὶ μὴν ~οἱ Ἠλεῖοι τἀπὶ θάτερα τοῦ
-  ποτάμου παρετάξαντο~, σφαγιασάμενοι δὲ εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν.
-
-  The τέμενος must here be distinguished from the Altis; as meaning
-  the entire breadth of consecrated ground at Olympia, of which the
-  Altis formed a smaller interior portion enclosed with a wall. The
-  Eleians entered into the τέμενος before they crossed the river
-  Kladeus, which flowed _through_ the τέμενος, but _alongside_ of
-  the Altis. The tomb of Œnomaus, which was doubtless included in
-  the τέμενος, was on the right bank of the Kladeus (Pausan. vi,
-  21, 3); while the Altis was on the left bank of the river.
-
-  Colonel Leake (in his Peloponnesiaca, pp. 6, 107) has given a
-  copious and instructive exposition of the ground of Olympia,
-  as well as of the notices left by Pausanias respecting it.
-  Unfortunately, little can be made out certainly, except the
-  position of the great temple of Zeus in the Altis. Neither the
-  positions assigned to the various buildings, the Stadion, or
-  the Hippodrome, by Colonel Leake,—nor those proposed by Kiepert
-  in the plan comprised in his maps—nor by Ernst Curtius, in
-  the Plan annexed to his recent Dissertation called _Olympia_
-  (Berlin, 1852)—rest upon very sufficient evidence. Perhaps future
-  excavations may hereafter reveal much that is now unknown.
-
-  I cannot agree with Colonel Leake however in supposing that Pisa
-  was at any time a _city_, and afterwards deserted.
-
-  [698] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4. 32. ὥστε οὐδ’ ἀνεπαύσαντο τῆς νυκτὸς
-  ἐκκόπτοντες τὰ διαπεπονημένα σκηνώματα, etc.
-
-  [699] Diodor. xv, 78; Pausanias, vi, 8, 2.
-
-Such was the unholy combat which dishonored the sanctuary of
-Pan-hellenic brotherhood, and in which the great temple, with its
-enthroned inmate the majestic Zeus of Pheidias, was for the first
-time turned into a fortress against its habitual presidents the
-Eleians. It was a combat wherein, though both Thebes and Sparta, the
-competing leaders of Greece, stand clear, Athens as well as most of
-the Peloponnesian chief states were implicated. It had been brought
-on by the rapacious ambition of the Arcadians, and its result seemed
-to confirm them, under color of Pisatan presidency, in the permanent
-mastery of Olympia. But in spite of such apparent promise, it was
-an event which carried in itself the seeds of violent reaction. We
-cannot doubt that the crowd of Grecian spectators present were not
-merely annoyed by the interruption of the proceedings and by the
-demolition of their tents, but also deeply shocked by the outrage
-to the sacred ground,—“imminentium templorum religio.”[700] Most of
-them probably believed the Eleians to be the rightful presidents,
-having never either seen or heard of any one else in that capacity.
-And they could hardly help feeling strong sympathy for the unexpected
-courage of these dispossessed presidents; which appeared so striking
-to Xenophon (himself perhaps a spectator) that he ascribes it to a
-special inspiration of the gods.[701]
-
-  [700] Tacitus, Hist. i, 40. He is describing the murder of Galba
-  in the Forum at Rome, by the Othonian soldiers:—
-
-  “Igitur milites Romani, quasi Vologesen aut Pacorum avito
-  Arsacidarum solio depulsuri, ac non Imperatorem suum, inermem et
-  senem, trucidare pergerent—disjectâ plebe, proculcato Senatu,
-  truces armis, rapidis equis, forum irrumpunt: nec illos Capitolii
-  aspectus, et imminentium templorum religio, et priores et futuri
-  Principes, terruere, quominus facerent scelus, cujus ultor est
-  quisquis successit.”
-
-  [701] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 32.
-
-If they disapproved of the conduct of the Arcadians and Pisatans
-as an unjust intrusion, they would disapprove yet more of that
-spoliation of the rich temples at Olympia, whereby the intruders
-rewarded themselves. The Arcadians, always on the look-out for
-plunder and pay as mercenary soldiers, found themselves supplied with
-both, in abundant measure, from this war: the one from the farms, the
-stock, and the field-laborers, of the Eleian neighborhood generally,
-more plentiful than in any part of Peloponnesus;[702] the other from
-the ample accumulation, both of money and of precious offerings,
-distributed over the numerous temples at Olympia. The Pisatans, now
-installed as administrators, would readily consent to appropriate
-these treasures to the pay of their own defenders, whom they
-doubtless considered as acting in the service of the Olympian Zeus.
-Accordingly the Epariti, the militia of joint Arcadia, were better
-paid than ever they had been before so that the service attracted
-numerous volunteers of the poorer class.[703]
-
-  [702] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 20; Polybius, iv, 73.
-
-  [703] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33, 34.
-
-At the outset of the Peloponnesian war, the Corinthians and Spartans
-had talked of prosecuting it in part by borrowed money from the
-treasuries of Delphi and Olympia.[704] How far the project had
-ever been executed, we have no information. But at least, it had
-not been realized in any such way as to form a precedent for the
-large sums now appropriated by the Pisatans and Arcadians; which
-appropriation accordingly excited much outcry, as flagrant rapacity
-and sacrilege. This sentiment was felt with peculiar force among
-many even of the Arcadians themselves, the guilty parties. Moreover
-some of the leaders employed had made important private acquisitions
-for themselves, so as to provoke both resentment and jealousy among
-their rivals. The Pan-Arcadian communion, recently brought together
-and ill-cemented, was little calculated to resist the effect of any
-strong special cause of dissension. It was composed of cities which
-had before been accustomed to act apart and even in hostility to each
-other; especially Mantinea and Tegea. These two cities now resumed
-their ancient rivalry.[705] The Mantineans, jealous both of Tegea
-and Megalopolis, began to labor underhand against Arcadian unity
-and the Theban alliance,—with a view to renewed connection with
-Sparta; though only five years before, they had owed to Thebes the
-reëstablishment of their own city, after it had been broken up into
-villages by Spartan force. The appropriation of the sacred funds,
-offensive as it was to much of sincere sentiment, supplied them with
-a convenient ground for commencing opposition. In the Mantinean
-assembly, a resolution was passed, renouncing all participation in
-the Olympic treasures; while at the same time an adequate sum was
-raised among the citizens, to furnish pay for all members of the
-Epariti who came from their city. This sum was forwarded to the
-officers in command; who however not only refused to receive it;
-but even summoned the authors of the proceeding to take their trial
-before the Pan-Arcadian assembly,—the Ten Thousand at Megalopolis,—on
-the charge of breaking up the integrity of Arcadia.[706] The
-Mantinean leaders thus summoned, having refused to appear, and
-being condemned in their absence by the Ten Thousand,—a detachment
-of the epariti was sent to Mantinea to secure their persons. But the
-gates were found shut, and the order was set at defiance. So much
-sympathy was manifested in Arcadia towards the Mantineans, that many
-other towns copied their protest. Nay, even the majority of the Ten
-Thousand themselves, moved by repeated appeals made to them in the
-name of the offended gods, were gradually induced to adopt it also,
-publicly renouncing and interdicting all farther participation in the
-Olympian treasures.
-
-  [704] Thucyd. i, 121.
-
-  Perikles in his speech at Athens alludes to this understood
-  purpose of the Spartans and their confederacy (Thucyd. i, 143).
-
-  [705] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33, 34; Diodor. xv, 82; Pausanias,
-  vii, 8, 6.
-
-  [706] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33. φάσκοντες αὐτοὺς λυμαίνεσθαι τὸ
-  Ἀρκαδικὸν, ἀνεκαλοῦντο εἰς τοὺς μυρίους τοὺς προστάτας αὐτῶν, etc.
-
-Here was a just point carried, and an important advantage gained,
-in desisting from a scandalous misappropriation. The party which
-had gained it immediately sought to push it farther. Beginning as
-the advocates of justice and of the Olympian Zeus, the Mantineans
-speedily pronounced themselves more clearly as the champions of
-oligarchy; friendly to Sparta and adverse to Thebes. Supplies from
-Olympia being no longer obtained, the means presently failed, of
-paying the epariti or public militia. Accordingly, such members
-of that corps as were too poor to continue without pay, gradually
-relinquished the service; while on the other hand, the more wealthy
-and powerful citizens, by preconcerted understanding with each other,
-enrolled themselves in large numbers, for the purpose of getting
-the national force out of the hands of the opposite party and into
-their own.[707] The leaders of that opposite party saw plainly,
-that this oligarchical movement would not only bring them to severe
-account for the appropriation of the sacred treasure, but would also
-throw Arcadia again into alliance with Sparta. Accordingly they sent
-intimation to the Thebans of the impending change of policy, inviting
-them to prevent it by an immediate expedition into Arcadia. Informed
-of this proceeding,[708] the opposite leaders brought it before the
-Pan-Arcadian assembly; in which they obtained a resolution, that
-envoys should be despatched to Thebes, desiring that no Theban army
-might enter into Arcadia until formally summoned,—and cancelling the
-preceding invitation as unauthorized. At the same time, the assembly
-determined to conclude peace with the Eleians, and to restore to them
-the locality of Olympia with all their previous rights. The Eleians
-gladly consented, and peace was accordingly concluded.[709]
-
-  [707] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 34.
-
-  [708] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 34. ~Οἱ δὲ τὰ κράτιστα τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ
-  βουλευόμενοι~ ἔπεισαν τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων, πέμψαντας πρέσβεις
-  εἰπεῖν τοῖς Θηβαίοις, etc.
-
-  The phrase here used by Xenophon, to describe the oligarchical
-  party, marks his philo-Laconian sentiment. Compare vii, 5, 1. οἱ
-  κηδόμενοι τῆς Πελοποννήσου, etc.
-
-  [709] Xen. Hellen. _l. c._
-
-The transactions just recounted occupied about one year and nine
-or ten months, from Midsummer 364 B.C. (the time of the battle at
-Olympia) to about April 362 B.C. The peace was generally popular
-throughout Arcadia, seemingly even among the cities which adhered to
-Thebes, though it had been concluded without consulting the Thebans.
-Even at Tegea, the centre of Theban influence, satisfaction was felt
-at the abandonment of the mischievous aggression and spoliation of
-Olympia, wherein the Thebans had had no concern. Accordingly when the
-peace, having been first probably sworn in other Arcadian cities,
-came to be sworn also at Tegea,—not only the city authorities, but
-also the Theban harmost, who occupied the town with a garrison of
-three hundred Bœotians, were present and took part in the ceremony.
-After it had been finished, most of the Mantineans went home; their
-city being both unfriendly to Tegea and not far distant. But many
-other Arcadians passed the evening in the town, celebrating the
-peace by libations, pæans, and feasting. On a sudden the gates were
-shut by order, and the most prominent of the oligarchical party
-were arrested as they sat at the feast, by the Bœotian garrison and
-the Arcadian Epariti of the opposite party. The leaders seized were
-in such considerable number, as to fill both the prison and the
-government-house; though there were few Mantineans among them, since
-most of these last had gone home. Among the rest the consternation
-was extreme. Some let themselves down from the walls, others escaped
-surreptitiously by the gates. Great was the indignation excited at
-Mantinea on the following morning, when the news of this violent
-arrest was brought thither. The authorities,—while they sent
-round the intelligence to the remaining Arcadian cities, inviting
-them at once to arms,—despatched heralds to Tegea, demanding all
-the Mantinean prisoners there detained. They at the same time
-protested emphatically against the arrest or the execution of any
-Arcadian, without previous trial before the Pan-Arcadian community;
-and they pledged themselves in the name of Mantinea, to answer
-for the appearance of any Arcadian against whom charges might be
-preferred.[710]
-
-  [710] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 37, 38.
-
-Upon receiving this requisition, the Theban harmost forthwith
-released all his prisoners. He then called together an
-assembly,—seemingly attended by only a few persons, from feelings of
-mistrust,[711]—wherein he explained that he had been misled, and that
-he had ordered the arrest upon a false report that a Lacedæmonian
-force was on the borders, prepared to seize the city in concert with
-treacherous correspondents within. A vote was passed accepting the
-explanation, though (according to Xenophon) no one believed it. Yet
-envoys were immediately sent to Thebes probably from the Mantineans
-and other Arcadians, complaining loudly of his conduct, and insisting
-that he should be punished with death.
-
-  [711] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 39. συγκαλέσας τῶν Ἀρκάδων ὁπόσοι γε
-  δὴ συνελθεῖν ἠθέλησαν, ἀπελογεῖτο, ὡς ἐξαπατηθείη.
-
-On a review of the circumstances, there seems reason for believing
-that the Theban officer gave a true explanation of the motives
-under which he had acted. The fact of his releasing the prisoners
-at the first summons, is more consistent with this supposition than
-with any other. Xenophon indeed says that his main object was to
-get possession of the Mantineans, and that, when he found but few
-of the latter among the persons seized, he was indifferent to the
-detention of the rest. But if such had been his purpose, he would
-hardly have set about it in so blind and clumsy a manner. He would
-have done it while the Mantineans were still in the town, instead of
-waiting until after their departure. He would not have perpetrated
-an act offensive as well as iniquitous, without assuring himself
-that it was done at a time when the determining purpose was yet
-attainable. On the other hand, nothing can be more natural than the
-supposition that the more violent among the Arcadian epariti believed
-in the existence of a plot to betray Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, and
-impressed the Theban with a persuasion of the like impending danger.
-To cause a revolution in Tegea, would be a great point gained for the
-oligarchical party, and would be rendered comparatively practicable
-by the congregation of a miscellaneous body of Arcadians in the
-town. It is indeed not impossible, that the idea of such a plot may
-really have been conceived; but it is at least highly probable, that
-the likelihood of such an occurrence was sincerely believed in by
-opponents.[712]
-
-  [712] The representation of Diodorus (xv, 82), though very loose
-  and vague, gives us to understand that the two opposing parties
-  at Tegea came to an actual conflict of arms, on occasion of the
-  peace.
-
-The explanation of the Theban governor, affirming that his order for
-arrest had either really averted, or appeared to him indispensable
-to avert, a projected treacherous betrayal,—reached Thebes at the
-same time as the complaints against him. It was not only received
-as perfectly satisfactory, but Epaminondas even replied to the
-complainants by counter-complaints of his own,—“The arrest (he said)
-was an act more justifiable than the release of those arrested.
-You Arcadians have already committed treason against us. It was on
-your account, and at your request, that we carried the war into
-Peloponnesus,—and you now conclude peace without consulting us! Be
-assured that we shall presently come in arms into Arcadia, and make
-war to support our partisans in the country.”[713]
-
-  [713] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 40.
-
-Such was the peremptory reply which the Arcadian envoy brought
-back from Thebes, announcing to his countrymen that they must
-prepare for war forthwith. They accordingly concerted measures for
-resistance with the Eleians and Achæans. They sent an invitation to
-the Lacedæmonians to march into Arcadia, and assist in repelling
-any enemy who should approach for the purpose of subjugating
-Peloponnesus,—yet with the proviso, as to headship, that each state
-should take the lead when the war was in its own territory; and they
-farther sent to solicit aid from Athens. Such were the measures taken
-by the Mantineans and their partisans, now forming the majority in
-the Pan-Arcadian aggregate, who (to use the language of Xenophon)
-“were really solicitous for Peloponnesus.”[714] “Why do these Thebans
-(said they) march into our country when we desire them not to come?
-For what other purpose, except to do us mischief? to make us do
-mischief to each other, in order that both parties may stand in need
-of _them_? to enfeeble Peloponnesus as much as possible, in order
-that they may hold it the more easily in slavery?”[715] Such is the
-language which Xenophon repeats, with a sympathy plainly evincing
-his philo-Laconian bias. For when we follow the facts as he himself
-narrates them, we shall find them much more in harmony with the
-reproaches which he puts into the mouth of Epaminondas. Epaminondas
-had first marched into Peloponnesus (in 369 B.C.) at the request
-of both Arcadians and Eleians, for the purpose of protecting them
-against Sparta. He had been the first to give strength and dignity
-to the Arcadians, by organizing them into a political aggregate, and
-by forming a strong frontier for them against Sparta, in Messênê and
-Megalopolis. When thus organized, the Arcadians had manifested both
-jealousy of Thebes, and incompetence to act wisely for themselves.
-They had caused the reversal of the gentle and politic measures
-adopted by Epaminondas towards the Achæan cities, whom they had thus
-thrown again into the arms of Sparta. They had, of their own accord,
-taken up the war against Elis and the mischievous encroachment
-at Olympia. On the other hand, the Thebans had not marched into
-Peloponnesus since 367 B.C.—an interval now of nearly five years.
-They had tried to persuade the Arcadians to accept the Persian
-rescript, and to desist from the idea of alliance with Athens; but
-when refused, they had made no attempt to carry either of these
-points by force. Epaminondas had a fair right now to complain of them
-for having made peace with Elis and Achaia, the friends and allies of
-Sparta, without any consultation with Thebes. He probably believed
-that there had been a real plot to betray Tegea to the Lacedæmonians,
-as one fruit of this treacherous peace; and he saw plainly that the
-maintenance of the frontier line against Sparta,—Tegea, Megalopolis,
-and Messênê,—could no longer be assured without a new Theban invasion.
-
-  [714] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 1. Οἱ κηδόμενοι τῆς Πελοποννήσου.
-
-  [715] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 2, 3.
-
-This appears to me the reasonable estimate of the situation in
-Peloponnesus, in June 362 B.C.—immediately before the last invasion
-of Epaminondas. We cannot trust the unfavorable judgment of Xenophon
-with regard either to this great man or to the Thebans. It will not
-stand good, even if compared with the facts related by himself; still
-less probably would it stand, if we had the facts from an impartial
-witness.
-
-I have already recounted as much as can be made out of the
-proceedings of the Thebans, between the return of Pelopidas from
-Persia with the rescript (in the winter 367-366 B.C.) to the close
-of 363 B.C. In 366-365 B.C., they had experienced great loss and
-humiliation in Thessaly connected with the detention of Pelopidas,
-whom they had with difficulty rescued from the dungeon of Pheræ. In
-364-363 B.C., Pelopidas had been invested with a fresh command in
-Thessaly, and though he was slain, the Theban arms had been eminently
-successful, acquiring more complete mastery of the country than
-ever they possessed before; while Epaminondas, having persuaded his
-countrymen to aim at naval supremacy, had spent the summer of 363
-B.C. as admiral of a powerful Theban fleet on the coast of Asia.
-Returning to Thebes at the close of 363 B.C., he found his friend
-Pelopidas slain; while the relations of Thebes, both in Peloponnesus
-and in Thessaly, were becoming sufficiently complicated to absorb
-his whole attention on land, without admitting farther aspirations
-towards maritime empire. He had doubtless watched, as it went on,
-the gradual change of politics in Arcadia (in the winter and spring
-of 363-362 B.C.), whereby the Mantinean and oligarchical party,
-profiting by the reaction of sentiment against the proceedings at
-Olympia, had made itself a majority in the Pan-Arcadian assembly
-and militia, so as to conclude peace with Elis, and to present the
-prospect of probable alliance with Sparta, Elis, and Achaia. This
-political tendency was doubtless kept before Epaminondas by the
-Tegean party in Arcadia, opposed to the party of Mantinea; being
-communicated to him with partisan exaggerations even beyond the
-reality. The danger, actual or presumed, of Tegea, with the arrest
-which had been there operated, satisfied him that a powerful Theban
-intervention could be no longer deferred. As Bœotarch, he obtained
-the consent of his countrymen to assemble a Bœotian force, to summon
-the allied contingents, and to conduct this joint expedition into
-Peloponnesus.
-
-The army with which he began his march was numerous and imposing.
-It comprised all the Bœotians and Eubœans, with a large number
-of Thessalians (some even sent by Alexander of Pheræ, who had now
-become a dependent ally of Thebes), the Lokrians, Malians, Ænianes,
-and probably various other allies from Northern Greece; though the
-Phokians declined to join, alleging that their agreement with Thebes
-was for alliance purely defensive.[716] Having passed the line of
-Mount Oneium,—which was no longer defended, as it had been at his
-former entrance,—he reached Nemea, where he was probably joined
-by the Sikyonian contingent,[717] and where he halted, in hopes
-of intercepting the Athenian contingent in their way to join his
-enemies. He probably had information which induced him to expect
-them;[718] but the information turned out false. The Athenians never
-appeared, and it was understood that they were preparing to cross
-by sea to the eastern coast of Laconia. After a fruitless halt,
-he proceeded onward to Tegea, where his Peloponnesian allies all
-presently joined him: the Arcadians of Tegea, Pallantium, Asea, and
-Megalopolis, the Messenians—(all these forming the line of frontier
-against Laconia)—and the Argeians.
-
-  [716] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 5; Diodor. xv, 85.
-
-  [717] Diodor. xv, 85.
-
-  [718] The explanation which Xenophon gives of this halt at
-  Nemea,—as if Epaminondas was determined to it by a peculiar
-  hatred of Athens (Hellen. vii, 5, 6)—seems alike fanciful and
-  ill-tempered.
-
-The halt at Nemea, since Epaminondas missed its direct purpose,
-was injurious in another way, as it enabled the main body of his
-Peloponnesian enemies to concentrate at Mantinea; which junction
-might probably have been prevented, had he entered Arcadia without
-delay. A powerful Peloponnesian army was there united, consisting
-of the Mantineans with the major part of the other Arcadians,—the
-Eleians,—and the Achæans. Invitation had been sent to the Spartans;
-and old Agesilaus, now in his eightieth year, was in full march with
-the Lacedæmonian forces to Mantinea. Besides this, the Athenian
-contingent was immediately expected; especially valuable from its
-cavalry, since the Peloponnesians were not strong in that description
-of force,—some of them indeed having none at all.
-
-Epaminondas established his camp and place of arms within the walls
-of Tegea; a precaution which Xenophon praises, as making his troops
-more secure and comfortable, and his motions less observable by the
-enemy.[719] He next marched to Mantinea, to provoke the enemy to
-an action before the Spartans and Athenians joined; but they kept
-carefully on their guard, close to Mantinea, too strongly posted to
-be forced.[720] On returning to his camp in Tegea, he was apprised
-that Agesilaus with the Spartan force, having quitted Sparta on
-the march to Mantinea, had already made some progress and reached
-Pellênê. Upon this he resolved to attempt the surprise of Sparta
-by a sudden night-march from Tegea, which lay in the direct road
-from Sparta to Mantinea, while Agesilaus in getting from Sparta to
-Mantinea had to pursue a more circuitous route to the westward.
-Moving shortly after the evening meal, Epaminondas led the Theban
-force with all speed towards Sparta; and he had well-nigh come upon
-that town, “like a nest of unprotected young birds,” at a moment
-when no resistance could have been made. Neither Agesilaus, nor any
-one else, expected so daring and well-aimed a blow, the success of
-which would have changed the face of Greece. Nothing saved Sparta
-except the providential interposition of the gods,[721] signified
-by the accident that a Kretan runner hurried to Agesilaus, with the
-news that the Thebans were in full march southward from Tegea, and
-happened to arrest in time his farther progress towards Mantinea.
-Agesilaus instantly returned back with the troops around him to
-Sparta, which was thus put in a sufficient posture of defence before
-the Thebans arrived. Though sufficient for the emergency, however,
-his troops were not numerous; for the Spartan cavalry and mercenary
-forces were still absent, having been sent forward to Mantinea.
-Orders were sent for the main army at that city to hasten immediately
-to the relief of Sparta.[722]
-
-  [719] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 8.
-
-  [720] Plutarch, De Gloriâ Athen. p. 346 B.
-
-  [721] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 10. Καὶ εἰ μὴ Κρὴς, θείᾳ τινὶ μοίρᾳ
-  προσελθὼν, ἐξήγγειλε τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ προσιὸν τὸ στράτευμα, ἔλαβεν ἂν
-  τὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ νεοττιὰν, παντάπασιν ἔρημον τῶν ἀμυνουμένων.
-
-  Diodorus coincides in the main fact (xv, 82, 83), though with
-  many inaccuracies of detail. He gives a very imperfect idea
-  of this narrow escape of Sparta, which is fully attested by
-  Xenophon, even against his own partialities.
-
-  Kallisthenes asserted that the critical intelligence had been
-  conveyed to Agesilaus by a Thespian named Euthynus (Plutarch,
-  Agesilaus, c. 34).
-
-  [722] Xenophon (Hellen. vii, 5, 10, 11) describes these facts
-  in a manner different on several points from Polybius (ix, 8),
-  and from Diodorus (xv, 83). Xenophon’s authority appears to me
-  better in itself, while his narrative is also more probable. He
-  states distinctly that Agesilaus heard the news of the Theban
-  march while he was yet at Pellênê (on the road to Mantinea, to
-  which place a large portion of the Spartan troops had already
-  gone forward),—that he turned back forthwith, and reached Sparta
-  before Epaminondas, with a division not numerous, yet sufficient
-  to put the town in a state of defence. Whereas Polybius affirms,
-  that Agesilaus heard the news when he was at Mantinea,—that he
-  marched from thence with the whole army to Sparta, but that
-  Epaminondas reached Sparta before him, had already attacked the
-  town and penetrated into the market-place, when Agesilaus arrived
-  and drove him back. Diodorus relates that Agesilaus never left
-  Sparta, but that the other king Agis, who had been sent with the
-  army to Mantinea, divining the plans of Epaminondas, sent word by
-  some swift Kretan runners to Agesilaus and put him upon his guard.
-
-  Wesseling remarks justly, that the mention of Agis must be a
-  mistake; that the second king of Sparta at that time was named
-  Kleomenes.
-
-  Polyænus (ii, 3, 10) states correctly that Agesilaus reached
-  Sparta before Epaminondas; but he adds many other details which
-  are too uncertain to copy.
-
-The march of Epaminondas had been undertaken only on the probability,
-well-nigh realized, of finding Sparta undefended. He was in no
-condition to assault the city, if tolerably occupied,—still less
-to spend time before it; for he knew that the enemy from Mantinea
-would immediately follow him into Laconia, within which he did not
-choose to hazard a general action. He found it impracticable to take
-this unfortified, yet unassailable city, Sparta, even at his former
-invasion of 370-369 B.C.; when he had most part of Peloponnesus in
-active coöperation with him, and when the Lacedæmonians had no army
-in the field. Accordingly, though he crossed the Eurotas and actually
-entered into the city of Sparta[723] (which had no walls to keep him
-out), yet as soon as he perceived the roofs manned with soldiers and
-other preparations for resistance, he advanced with great caution,
-not adventuring into the streets and amidst the occupied houses.
-He only tried to get possession of various points of high ground
-commanding the city, from whence it might be possible to charge down
-upon the defenders with advantage. But even here, though inferior in
-number they prevented him from making any impression. And Archidamus
-son of Agesilaus, sallying forth unexpectedly beyond the line of
-defence, with a small company of one hundred hoplites, scrambled over
-some difficult ground in his front, and charged the Thebans even up
-the hill, with such gallantry, that he actually beat them back with
-some loss; pursuing them for a space, until he was himself repulsed
-and forced to retreat.[724] The bravery of the Spartan Isidas, too,
-son of Phœbidas the captor of the Theban Kadmeia, did signal honor
-to Sparta, in this day of her comparative decline. Distinguished for
-beauty and stature, this youth sallied forth naked and unshielded,
-with his body oiled as in the palæstra. Wielding in his right hand
-a spear and in his left a sword, he rushed among the enemy, dealing
-death and destruction; in spite of which he was suffered to come back
-unwounded: so great was the awe inspired by his singular appearance
-and desperate hardihood. The ephors decorated him afterwards with a
-wreath of honor, but at the same time fined him for exposing himself
-without defensive armor.[725]
-
-  [723] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 11. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένετο Ἐπαμινώνδας ~ἐν τῇ
-  πόλει~ τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, etc.
-
-  [724] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 12, 13.
-
-  Justin (vi, 7) greatly exaggerates the magnitude and violence of
-  the contest. He erroneously represents that Agesilaus did not
-  reach Sparta till after Epaminondas.
-
-  [725] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 34.
-
-Though the Spartans displayed here an honorable gallantry, yet these
-successes, in themselves trifling, are magnified into importance only
-by the partiality of Xenophon. The capital fact was, that Agesilaus
-had been accidentally forewarned so as to get back to Sparta and put
-it in defence before the Thebans arrived. As soon as Epaminondas
-ascertained this, he saw that his project was no longer practicable;
-nor did he do more than try the city round, to see if he could detect
-any vulnerable point, without involving himself in a hazardous
-assault. Baffled in his first scheme, he applied himself, with equal
-readiness of resource and celerity of motion, to the execution of
-a second. He knew that the hostile army from Mantinea would be
-immediately put in march for Sparta, to ward off all danger from that
-city. Now the straight road from Mantinea to Sparta (a course nearly
-due south all the way) lying through Tegea, was open to Epaminondas,
-but not to the enemy, who would be forced to take another and more
-circuitous route, probably by Asea and Pallantion; so that he was
-actually nearer to Mantinea than they. He determined to return to
-Tegea forthwith, while they were on their march towards Sparta, and
-before they could be apprised of his change of purpose. Breaking
-up accordingly, with scarce any interval of rest, he marched back
-to Tegea; where it became absolutely indispensable to give repose
-to his hoplites, after such severe fatigue. But he sent forward
-his cavalry without any delay, to surprise Mantinea, which would
-be now (he well knew) unprepared and undefended; with its military
-force absent on the march to Sparta, and its remaining population,
-free as well as slave, largely engaged in the fields upon the
-carrying of harvest. Nothing less than the extraordinary ascendency
-of Epaminondas,—coupled with his earnestness in setting forth the
-importance of the purpose, as well as the probable plunder,—could
-have prevailed upon the tired horsemen to submit to such additional
-toil, while their comrades were enjoying refreshment and repose at
-Tegea.[726]
-
-  [726] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 14. Πάλιν δὲ πορευθεὶς ὡς ἐδύνατο
-  τάχιστα εἰς τὴν Τεγέαν, τοὺς μὲν ὁπλίτας ἀνέπαυσε, τοὺς δὲ ἱππέας
-  ἔπεμψεν εἰς τὴν Μαντίνειαν, δεηθεὶς αὐτῶν προσκαρτερῆσαι, καὶ
-  διδάσκων ὡς πάντα μὲν εἰκὸς ἔξω εἶναι τὰ τῶν Μαντινέων βοσκήματα,
-  πάντας δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἄλλως τε καὶ σίτου συγκομιδῆς οὔσης.
-
-Everything near Mantinea was found in the state which Epaminondas
-anticipated. Yet the town was preserved, and his well-laid scheme
-defeated, by an unexpected contingency which the Mantineans doubtless
-ascribed to the providence of the gods,—as Xenophon regards the
-previous warning given to Agesilaus. The Athenian cavalry had
-arrived, not an hour before, and had just dismounted from their
-horses within the walls of Mantinea. Having departed from Eleusis
-(probably after ascertaining that Epaminondas no longer occupied
-Nemea), they took their evening meal and rested at the isthmus
-of Corinth, where they seem to have experienced some loss or
-annoyance.[727] They then passed forward through Kleonæ to Mantinea,
-arriving thither without having broken fast, either themselves or
-their horses, on that day. It was just after they reached Mantinea,
-and when they had yet taken no refreshment,—that the Theban and
-Thessalian cavalry suddenly made their appearance, having advanced
-even to the temple of Poseidon, within less than a mile of the
-gates.[728]
-
-  [727] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 15, 16.
-
-  The words—δυστυχήματος γεγενημένου ἐν Κορίνθῳ τοῖς
-  ἱππεῦσιν—allude to something which we have no means of making
-  out. It is possible that the Corinthians, who were at peace with
-  Thebes and had been ill-used by Athens (vii, 4, 6-10), may have
-  seen with displeasure, and even molested, the Athenian horsemen
-  while resting on their territory.
-
-  [728] Polybius, ix, 8.
-
-The Mantineans were terror-struck at this event. Their military
-citizens were absent on the march to Sparta, while the remainder
-were dispersed about the fields. In this helpless condition, they
-implored aid from the newly-arrived Athenian cavalry; who, though
-hungry and tired, immediately went forth,—and indeed were obliged
-to do so, since their own safety depended upon it. The assailants
-were excellent cavalry, Thebans and Thessalians, and more numerous
-than the Athenians. Yet such was the gallantry with which the
-latter fought, in a close and bloody action, that on the whole they
-gained the advantage, forced the assailants to retire, and had
-the satisfaction to preserve Mantinea with all its citizens and
-property. Xenophon extols[729] (and doubtless with good reason) the
-generous energy of the Athenians, in going forth hungry and fatigued.
-But we must recollect that the Theban cavalry had undergone yet
-more severe hunger and fatigue,—that Epaminondas would never have
-sent them forward in such condition, had he expected any serious
-resistance; and that they probably dispersed to some extent, for
-the purpose of plundering and seizing subsistence in the fields
-through which they passed, so that they were found in disorder when
-the Athenians sallied out upon them. The Athenian cavalry-commander
-Kephisodôrus,[730] together with Gryllus (son of the historian
-Xenophon), then serving with his brother Diodorus among the Athenian
-horse, were both slain in the battle. A memorable picture at Athens
-by the contemporary painter Euphranor, commemorated both the battle
-and the personal gallantry of Gryllus, to whose memory the Mantineans
-also paid distinguished honors.
-
-  [729] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 15, 16, 17.
-
-  Plutarch (De Gloriâ Athen. p. 346 D.—E.) recounts the general
-  fact of this battle and the rescue of Mantinea; yet with several
-  inaccuracies which we refute by means of Xenophon.
-
-  Diodor. (xv, 84) mentions the rescue of Mantinea by the
-  unexpected arrival of the Athenians; but he states them as being
-  six thousand soldiers, that is hoplites, under Hegelochus; and
-  he says nothing about the cavalry battle. Hegesilaus is named by
-  Ephorus (ap. Diog. Laert. ii, 54,—compare Xenoph. De Vectigal.
-  iii, 7) as the general of the entire force sent out by Athens on
-  this occasion, consisting of infantry as well as cavalry. The
-  infantry must have come up somewhat later.
-
-  Polybius also (ix, 8), though concurring in the main with
-  Xenophon, differs in several details. I follow the narrative of
-  Xenophon.
-
-  [730] Harpokration v, Κηφισόδωρος, Ephorus ap. Diogen. Laert. ii,
-  53; Pausan. 1, 3, 4; viii, 9, 8; viii, 11, 5.
-
-  There is a confusion, on several points, between this cavalry
-  battle near Mantinea,—and the great or general battle, which
-  speedily followed it, wherein Epaminondas was slain. Gryllus is
-  sometimes said to have been slain in the battle of Mantinea, and
-  even to have killed Epaminondas with his own hand. It would seem
-  as if the picture of Euphranor represented Gryllus in the act
-  of killing the Theban commander; and as if the latter tradition
-  of Athens as well as of Thebes, erroneously bestowed upon that
-  Theban commander the name of Epaminondas.
-
-  See this confusion discussed and cleared up, in a good article
-  on the Battle of Mantinea, by Arnold Schäfer, p. 58, 59, in the
-  Rheinisches Museum für Philologie (1846—Fünfter Jahrgang, Erstes
-  Heft).
-
-Here were two successive movements of Epaminondas, both
-well-conceived, yet both disappointed by accident, without any
-omission of his own. He had his forces concentrated at Tegea, while
-his enemies on their side, returning from Sparta, formed a united
-camp in the neighborhood of Mantinea. They comprised Lacedæmonians,
-Eleians, Arcadians, Achæans, and Athenians; to the number, in all, of
-twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse, if we could trust the
-assertion of Diodorus;[731] who also gives the numbers of Epaminondas
-as thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse. Little value can be
-assigned to either of these estimates; nor is it certain which of the
-two armies was the more numerous. But Epaminondas saw that he had now
-no chance left for striking a blow except through a pitched battle,
-nor did he at all despair of the result.[732] He had brought out his
-northern allies for a limited time; which time they were probably not
-disposed to prolong, as the season of harvest was now approaching.
-Moreover, his stock of provisions was barely sufficient;[733] the new
-crop being not yet gathered in, while the crop of the former year was
-probably almost exhausted. He took his resolution therefore to attack
-the enemy forthwith.
-
-  [731] Diodor. xv, 84.
-
-  [732] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 8. καὶ μὴν οἰόμενος κρείττων τῶν
-  ἀντιπάλων εἶναι, etc.
-
-  [733] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 19. σπάνια δὲ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔχοντας
-  ὅμως πείθεσθαι ἐθέλειν, etc.
-
-But I cannot adopt the view of Xenophon, that such resolution was
-forced upon Epaminondas, against his own will, by a desperate
-position, rendering it impossible for him to get away without
-fighting,—by the disappointment of finding so few allies on his
-own side, and so many assembled against him,—and by the necessity
-of wiping off the shame of his two recent failures (at Sparta and
-at Mantinea) or perishing in the attempt.[734] This is an estimate
-of the position of Epaminondas, not consistent with the facts
-narrated by Xenophon himself. It could have been no surprise to the
-Theban general that the time had arrived for ordering a battle.
-With what other view had he come into Peloponnesus? Or for what
-other purpose could he have brought so numerous an army? Granting
-that he expected greater support in Peloponnesus than he actually
-found, we cannot imagine him to have hoped that his mere presence,
-without fighting, would suffice to put down enemies courageous as
-well as powerful. Xenophon exaggerates the importance of the recent
-defeats (as he terms them) before Sparta and Mantinea. These were
-checks or disappointments rather than defeats. On arriving at Tegea,
-Epaminondas had found it practicable (which he could not have known
-beforehand) to attempt a _coup de main_, first against Sparta, next
-against Mantinea. Here were accidental opportunities which his
-genius discerned and turned to account. Their success, so near to
-actual attainment, would have been a prodigious point gained;[735]
-but their accidental failure left him not worse off than he was
-before. It remained for him then, having the enemy before him in the
-field, and no farther opportunities of striking at them unawares by
-side-blows, to fight them openly; which he and all around him must
-have contemplated, from their first entrance into Peloponnesus, as
-the only probable way of deciding the contest.
-
-  [734] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 18. αὐτὸς δὲ λελυμασμένος παντάπασι
-  τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δόξῃ ἔσοιτο, ἡττημένος μὲν ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι σὺν πολλῷ
-  ὁπλιτικῷ ὑπ’ ὀλίγων, ἡττημένος δὲ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ ἱππομαχίᾳ, αἴτιος
-  δὲ γεγενημένος διὰ τὴν ἐς Πελοπόννησον στράτειαν τοῦ συνεστάναι
-  Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Ἀρκάδας καὶ Ἠλείους καὶ Ἀθηναίους· ὥστε οὐκ
-  ἐδόκει δυνατὸν εἶναι ἀμαχεὶ παρελθεῖν, etc.
-
-  [735] Polybius, ix. 8, 2.
-
-The army of Epaminondas, far from feeling that sentiment of
-disappointed hope and stern necessity which Xenophon ascribes to
-their commander, were impatient to fight under his orders, and full
-of enthusiastic alacrity when he at last proclaimed his intention.
-He had kept them within the walls of Tegea, thus not only giving
-them better quarters and fuller repose, but also concealing his
-proceedings from the enemy; who on their side were encamped on the
-border of the Mantinean territory. Rejoicing in the prospect of
-going forth to battle, the horsemen and hoplites of Epaminondas all
-put themselves in their best equipment. The horsemen whitened their
-helmets,—the hoplites burnished up their shields, and sharpened
-their spears and swords. Even the rustic and half-armed Arcadian
-villagers, who had nothing but clubs in place of sword or spear, were
-eager to share the dangers of the Thebans, and inscribed upon their
-shields (probably nothing but miserable squares of wood) the Theban
-ensign.[736] The best spirit and confidence animated all the allies,
-as they quitted the gates of Tegea, and disposed themselves in the
-order of march commanded by Epaminondas.
-
-  [736] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 20. Προθύμως μὲν ἐλευκοῦντο οἱ ἱππεῖς
-  τὰ κράνη, κελεύοντος ἐκείνου· ἐπεγράφοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἀρκάδων
-  ὁπλῖται, ῥόπαλα ἔχοντες, ὡς Θηβαῖοι ὄντες· πάντες δὲ ἠκονῶντο καὶ
-  λόγχας καὶ μαχαίρας, καὶ ἐλαμπρύνοντο τὰς ἀσπίδας.
-
-  There seems a sort of sneer in these latter words, both at the
-  Arcadians and Thebans. The Arcadian club-men are called ὁπλῖται;
-  and are represented as passing themselves off to be as good as
-  Thebans.
-
-  Sievers (Geschicht. p. 342) and Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. c. 40,
-  p. 200) follow Eckhel in translating this passage to mean that
-  “the Arcadian hoplites inscribed upon their shields the figure
-  of a club, that being the ensign of the Thebans.” I cannot think
-  this interpretation is the best,—at least until some evidence
-  is produced, that the Theban symbol on the shield was a club.
-  Xenophon does not disdain on other occasions to speak sneeringly
-  of the Theban hoplites,—see vii, 5, 12. The mention of λόγχας καὶ
-  μαχαίρας, immediately afterwards, sustains the belief that ῥόπαλα
-  ἔχοντες, immediately before, means “men armed with clubs”; the
-  natural sense of the words.
-
-  The horsemen are said to have “whitened their helmets (or
-  head-pieces).” Hence I presume that these head-pieces were not
-  made of metal, but of wood or wicker-work. Compare Xen. Hellen.
-  ii, 4, 25.
-
-The lofty Mantinico-Tegeatic plain, two thousand feet above the level
-of the sea (now known as the plain of Tripolitza)—“is the greatest
-of that cluster of valleys in the centre of Peloponnesus, each of
-which is so closely shut in by the intersecting mountains that no
-outlet is afforded to the waters except through the mountains
-themselves.”[737] Its length stretches from north to south, bordered
-by the mountain range of Mænalus on the west, and of Artemisium and
-Parthenion on the east. It has a breadth of about eight miles in the
-broadest part, and of one mile in the narrowest. Mantinea is situated
-near its northern extremity, Tegea near its southern; the direct
-distance between the two cities, in a line not much different from
-north and south, being about ten English miles. The frontier line
-between their two domains was formed by a peculiarly narrow part of
-the valley, where a low ridge projecting from the range of Mænalus on
-the one side, and another from Artemisium on the opposite, contract
-the space and make a sort of defensible pass near four miles south
-of Mantinea;[738] thus about six miles distant from Tegea. It was at
-this position, covering the whole Mantinean territory, that the army
-opposed to Epaminondas was concentrated; the main Lacedæmonian force
-as well as the rest having now returned from Sparta.[739]
-
-  [737] See Colonel Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, ch. 24,
-  p. 45.
-
-  [738] Three miles from Mantinea (Leake, ib. p. 51-94) “a low
-  ridge of rocks, which, advancing into the plain from a projecting
-  part of the Mænalium, formed a natural division between the
-  districts of Tegea and Mantineia.”
-
-  Compare the same work, vol. i, ch. 3, p. 100, 112, 114, and the
-  recent valuable work of Ernst Curtius, Peloponnesos (Gotha,
-  1851), pp. 232-247. Gell says that a wall has once been carried
-  across the plain at this boundary (Itinerary of the Morea, p.
-  141-143).
-
-  [739] See the indications of the locality of the battle in
-  Pausanias, viii, 11, 4, 5; and Colonel Leake—as above referred to.
-
-Epaminondas, having marched out from Tegea by the northern gate,
-arrayed his army in columns proper for advancing towards the enemy;
-himself with the Theban columns forming the van. His array being
-completed, he at first began his forward march in a direction
-straight towards the enemy. But presently he changed his course,
-turning to the left towards the Mænalian range of mountains which
-forms the western border of the plain, and which he probably reached
-somewhere near the site of the present Tripolitza. From thence he
-pursued his march northward, skirting the flank of the mountain on
-the side which lies over against or fronts towards Tegea;[740] until
-at length he neared the enemy’s position, upon their right flank.
-He here halted, and caused his columns to face to the right; thus
-forming a line, or phalanx of moderate depth, fronting towards the
-enemy. During the march, each lochus or company had marched in single
-file with the lochage or captain (usually the strongest and best
-soldier in it), at the head; though we do not know how many of these
-lochages marched abreast, or what was the breadth of the column. When
-the phalanx or front towards the enemy was formed, each lochage was
-of course in line with his company, and at its left hand; while the
-Thebans and Epaminondas himself were at the left of the whole line.
-In this position, Epaminondas gave the order to ground arms.[741]
-
-  [740] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 21.
-
-  Tripolitza is reckoned by Colonel Leake as about three miles and
-  a half from the site of Tegea; Mr. Dodwell states it as about
-  four miles, and Gell’s Itinerary of the Morea much the same.
-
-  Colonel Leake reckons about eight miles from Tripolitza to
-  Mantinea. Gell states it as two hours and three minutes, Dodwell
-  as two hours and five minutes,—or seven miles.
-
-  Colonel Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. i, p. 88-100; Gell’s
-  Itinerary, p. 141; Dodwell’s Travels, vol. ii, p. 418-422.
-
-  It would seem that Epaminondas, in this latter half of his march,
-  must have followed nearly the road from Mantinea to Pallantium.
-  Pallantium was situated west by south from Tegea.
-
-  [741] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22.
-
-The enemy, having watched him ever since he had left Tegea and formed
-his marching array, had supposed at first that he was coming straight
-up to the front of their position, and thus expected speedy battle.
-But when he turned to the left towards the mountains, so that for
-some time he did not approach sensibly nearer to their position, they
-began to fancy that he had no intention of fighting on that day.
-Such belief, having been once raised, still continued, even though,
-by advancing along the skirts of the mountain, he gradually arrived
-very close upon their right flank. They were farther confirmed in the
-same supposition, when they saw his phalanx ground arms; which they
-construed as an indication that he was about to encamp on the spot
-where he stood. It is probable that Epaminondas may have designedly
-simulated some other preliminaries of encampment, since his march
-from Tegea seems to have been arranged for the purpose partly of
-raising such false impression in his enemies, partly of getting upon
-their right flank instead of their front. He completely succeeded
-in his object. The soldiers on the Lacedæmonian side, believing
-that there would be no battle until the next day, suffered their
-ranks to fall into disorder, and scattered about the field. Many
-of the horsemen even took off their breast-plates and unbridled
-their horses. And what was of hardly less consequence,—that mental
-preparation of the soldier, whereby he was wound up for the moment of
-action, and which provident commanders never omitted, if possible, to
-inflame by a special harangue at the moment,—was allowed to slacken
-and run down.[742] So strongly was the whole army persuaded of the
-intention of Epaminondas to encamp, that they suffered him not only
-without hindrance, but even without suspicion, to make all his
-movements and dispositions preparatory to immediate attack.
-
-  [742] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ, ὡς πρὸς τῷ ὄρει
-  ἐγένετο, ἐπεὶ ἐξετάθη αὐτῷ ἡ φάλαγξ, ὑπὸ τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς ἔθετο τὰ
-  ὅπλα· ὥστε εἰκάσθη στρατοπεδευομένῳ. Τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσας, ἔλυσε μὲν
-  τῶν πλείστων πολεμίων τὴν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πρὸς μάχην παρασκευήν,
-  ἔλυσε δὲ τὴν ἐν ταῖς συντάξεσιν.
-
-Such improvidence is surprising, when we recollect that the ablest
-commander and the best troops in Greece were so close upon the right
-of their position. It is to be in part explained, probably, by the
-fact that the Spartan headship was now at an end, and that there was
-no supreme chief to whom the whole body of Lacedæmonian allies paid
-deference. If either of the kings of Sparta was present,—a point
-not distinctly ascertainable,—he would have no command except over
-the Lacedæmonian troops. In the entire allied army, the Mantineans
-occupied the extreme right (as on a former occasion, because the
-battle was in their territory,[743] and because the Lacedæmonians
-had lost their once-recognized privilege), together with the other
-Arcadians. On the right-centre and centre were the Lacedæmonians,
-Eleians, and Achæans; on the extreme left, the Athenians.[744] There
-was cavalry on both the wings; Athenian on the left,—Eleian on the
-right; spread out with no more than the ordinary depth, and without
-any intermixture of light infantry along with the horsemen.[745]
-
-  [743] Thucyd. v, 67; Pausanias, viii, 9, 5; viii. 10, 4.
-
-  [744] Diodor. xv. 85.
-
-  That the Athenians were on the left, we also know from Xenophon
-  (Hell. vii, 5, 24), though he gives no complete description of
-  the arrangement of the allies on either side.
-
-  [745] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 23.
-
-In the phalanx of Epaminondas, he himself with the Thebans and
-Bœotians was on the left; the Argeians on the right; the Arcadians,
-Messenians, Eubœans, Sikyonians and other allies in the centre.[746]
-It was his purpose to repeat the same general plan of attack
-which had succeeded so perfectly at Leuktra; to head the charge
-himself with his Bœotians on the left against the opposing right
-or right-centre, and to bear down the enemy on that side with
-irresistible force, both of infantry and cavalry; while he kept
-back his right and centre, composed of less trustworthy troops,
-until the battle should have been thus wholly or partially decided.
-Accordingly, he caused the Bœotian hoplites,—occupying the left of
-his line in lochi or companies, with the lochage or captain at the
-left extremity of each,—to wheel to the right and form in column
-fronting the enemy, in advance of his remaining line. The Theban
-lochages thus became placed immediately in face of the enemy, as
-the heads of a column of extraordinary depth; all the hoplites of
-each lochus, and perhaps of more than one lochus, being ranged in
-file behind them.[747] What the actual depth was, or what was the
-exact number of the lochus, we do not know. At Leuktra, Epaminondas
-had attacked with fifty shields of depth; at Mantinea, the depth of
-his column was probably not less. Himself, with the chosen Theban
-warriors, were at the head of it, and he relied upon breaking through
-the enemy’s phalanx at whatever point he charged; since their files
-would hardly be more than eight deep, and very inadequate to resist
-so overwhelming a shock. His column would cut through the phalanx of
-the enemy, like the prow of a trireme impelled in sea-fight against
-the midships of her antagonist.
-
-  [746] Here again, we know from Xenophon that the Thebans were on
-  the left; but the general arrangement of the other contingents we
-  obtain only from Diodorus (xv, 85).
-
-  The Tactica of Arrian, also (xi, 2) inform us that Epaminondas
-  formed his attacking column, at Leuktra, of the Thebans—at
-  Mantinea, of all the Bœotians.
-
-  About the practice of the Thebans, both at and after the battle
-  of Leuktra, to make their attack with the left, see Plutarch.
-  Quæst. Roman. p. 282 D.
-
-  [747] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22. Ἐπεί γε μὴν, παραγαγὼν τοὺς ἐπὶ
-  κέρως πορευομένους λόχους εἰς μέτωπον, ἰσχυρὸν ἐποιήσατο τὸ περὶ
-  ἑαυτὸν ἔμβολον, τότε δὴ ἀναλαβεῖν παραγγείλας τὰ ὅπλα, ἡγεῖτο·
-  οἱ δ’ ἠκολούθουν ... Ὁ δὲ τὸ στράτευμα ἀντίπρωρον ὥσπερ τριήρη
-  προσῆγε, νομίζων, ὅπη ἐμβαλὼν διακόψειε, διαφθερεῖν ὅλον τὸ τῶν
-  ἐναντίων στράτευμα, etc.
-
-It was apparently only the Bœotian hoplites who were thus formed in
-column, projecting forward in advance; while the remaining allies
-were still left in their ordinary phalanx or lines.[748] Epaminondas
-calculated, that when he should have once broken through the enemy’s
-phalanx at a single point, the rest would either take flight, or
-become so dispirited, that his allies coming up in phalanx could
-easily deal with them.
-
-  [748] I agree with Folard (Traité de la Colonne, p. lv-lxi,
-  prefixed to the translation of Polybius) in considering
-  ἔμβολον to be a column,—rather than a wedge tapering towards
-  the front. And I dissent from Schneider’s explanation, who
-  says,—“Epaminondas phalangem contrahit sensim et colligit in
-  frontem, ut cunei seu rostri navalis formam efficeret. Copiæ
-  igitur ex utroque latere explicatæ transeunt in frontem; hoc
-  est, παράγειν εἰς μέτωπον.” It appears to me that the troops
-  which Epaminondas caused to wheel into the front and to form the
-  advancing column, consisted only of the left or Theban division,
-  the best troops in the army,—τῷ μὲν ἰσχυροτάτῳ παρεσκευάζετο
-  ἀγωνίζεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀσθενέστατον πόῤῥω ἀπέστησεν. Moreover,
-  the whole account of Xenophon implies that Epaminondas made
-  the attack from his own left against the enemy’s right, or
-  right-centre. He was afraid that the Athenians would take him in
-  flank from their own left.
-
-Against the cavalry on the enemy’s right, which was marshaled only
-with the ordinary depth of a phalanx of hoplites (four, six, or
-perhaps eight deep),[749] and without any light infantry intermingled
-with the ranks—the Theban general opposed on his left his own
-excellent cavalry, Theban and Thessalian, but in strong and deep
-column, so as to ensure to them also a superior weight of attack.
-He farther mingled in their ranks some active footmen, darters and
-slingers, of whom he had many from Thessaly and the Maliac Gulf.[750]
-
-  [749] Compare a similar case in Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 13, where
-  the Grecian cavalry, in the Asiatic army of Agesilaus, is said to
-  be drawn up ὥσπερ φάλαγξ ἐπὶ τεσσάρων, etc.
-
-  [750] These πέζοι ἅμιπποι—light-armed footmen, intermingled with
-  the ranks of the cavalry,—are numbered as an important item
-  in the military establishment of the Syracusan despot Gelon
-  (Herodot. vii. 158).
-
-There remained one other precaution to take. His deep Theban and
-Bœotian column, in advancing to the charge, would be exposed on its
-right or unshielded side to the attack of the Athenians, especially
-the Athenian cavalry, from the enemy’s left. To guard against any
-such movement, he posted, upon some rising ground near his right, a
-special body of reserve, both horse and foot, in order to take the
-Athenians in the rear if they should attempt it.
-
-All these fresh dispositions for attack, made on the spot, must have
-occupied time, and caused much apparent movement. To constitute
-both the column of infantry, and the column of cavalry, for attack
-on his left—and to post the body of reserve on the rising ground at
-his right against the Athenians—were operations which the enemy from
-their neighboring position could not help seeing. Yet they either did
-not heed, or did not understand, what was going on.[751] Nor was it
-until Epaminondas, perceiving all to be completed, actually gave the
-word of command to “take up arms,” that they had any suspicion of
-the impending danger. As soon as they saw him in full march moving
-rapidly towards them, surprise and tumultuous movement pervaded
-their body. The scattered hoplites ran to their places; the officers
-exerted every effort to establish regular array; the horsemen
-hastened to bridle their horses and resume their breast-plates.[752]
-And though the space dividing the two armies was large enough to
-allow such mischief to be partially corrected,—yet soldiers thus
-taken unawares, hurried, and troubled, were not in condition to stand
-the terrific shock of chosen Theban hoplites in deep column.
-
-  [751] Perhaps Epaminondas may have contrived in part to conceal
-  what was going on by means of cavalry-movements in his front.
-  Something of the kind seems alluded to by Polyænus (ii, 3, 14).
-
-  [752] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22.
-
-The grand force of attack, both of cavalry and infantry, which
-Epaminondas organized on his left, was triumphant in both its
-portions. His cavalry, powerfully aided by the intermingled darters
-and light troops from Thessaly, broke and routed the enemy’s cavalry
-opposed to them, and then restraining themselves from pursuit,
-turned to fall upon the phalanx of infantry. Epaminondas, on his
-part, with his Theban column, came into close conflict with the
-Mantinean and Lacedæmonian line of infantry, whom, after a desperate
-struggle of shield, spear, and sword, he bore down by superior force
-and weight. He broke through the enemy’s line of infantry at this
-point, compelling the Lacedæmonians opposed to him, after a brave
-and murderous resistance, to turn their backs and take to flight.
-The remaining troops of the enemy’s line, seeing the best portion of
-their army defeated and in flight, turned and fled also. The centre
-and right of Epaminondas, being on a less advanced front, hardly came
-into conflict with the enemy until the impression of his charge had
-been felt, and therefore found the troops opposed to them already
-wavering and disheartened. The Achæan, Eleian, and other infantry on
-that side, gave way after a short resistance; chiefly as it would
-appear, from contagion and alarm, when they saw the Lacedæmonians
-broken. The Athenians however, especially the cavalry, on the
-left wing of their own army, seem to have been engaged in serious
-encounter with the cavalry opposite to them. Diodorus affirms them
-to have been beaten, after a gallant fight,[753] until the Eleian
-cavalry from the right came to their aid. Here, as on many other
-points, it is difficult to reconcile his narrative with Xenophon, who
-plainly intimates that the stress of the action fell on the Theban
-left and Lacedæmonian right and centre,—and from whose narrative we
-should rather have gathered, that the Eleian cavalry, beaten on their
-own right, may have been aided by the Athenian cavalry from the left;
-reversing the statement of Diodorus.
-
-  [753] Diodor. xv, 85.
-
-  The orator Æschines fought among the Athenian hoplites on this
-  occasion (Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 300. c. 53.)
-
-In regard to this important battle, however, we cannot grasp with
-confidence anything beyond the capital determining feature and
-the ultimate result.[754] The calculations of Epaminondas were
-completely realized. The irresistible charge, both of infantry and
-cavalry, made by himself with his left wing, not only defeated the
-troops immediately opposed, but caused the enemy’s whole army to
-take flight. It was under these victorious circumstances, and while
-he was pressing on the retiring enemy at the head of his Theban
-column of infantry, that he received a mortal wound with a spear in
-the breast. He was by habit and temper, always foremost in braving
-danger, and on this day probably exposed himself preëminently, as
-a means of encouraging those around him, and ensuring the success
-of his own charge, on which so much depended; moreover, a Grecian
-general fought on foot in the ranks, and carried the same arms
-(spear, shield, etc.) as a private soldier. Diodorus tells us that
-the Lacedæmonian infantry were making a prolonged resistance, when
-Epaminondas put himself at the head of the Thebans for a fresh and
-desperate effort; that he stepped forward, darted his javelin,
-and slew the Lacedæmonian commander; that having killed several
-warriors, and intimidated others, he forced them to give way; that
-the Lacedæmonians, seeing him in advance of his comrades, turned upon
-him and overwhelmed him with darts, some of which he avoided, others
-he turned off with his shield, while others, after they had actually
-entered his body and wounded him, he plucked out and employed them
-in repelling the enemy. At length he received a mortal wound in his
-breast with a spear.[755] I cannot altogether admit to notice these
-details; which once passed as a portion of Grecian history, though
-they seem rather the offspring of an imagination fresh from the
-perusal of the Iliad than a recital of an actual combat of Thebans
-and Lacedæmonians, both eminent for close-rank fighting, with long
-spear and heavy shield. The mortal wound of Epaminondas, with a
-spear in the breast, is the only part of the case which we really
-know. The handle of the spear broke, and the point was left sticking
-in his breast. He immediately fell, and as the enemy were at that
-moment in retreat, fell into the arms of his own comrades. There was
-no dispute for the possession of his body, as there had been for
-Kleombrotus at Leuktra.
-
-  [754] The remark made by Polybius upon this battle deserves
-  notice. He states that the description given of the battle
-  by Ephorus was extremely incorrect and absurd, arguing great
-  ignorance both of the ground where it was fought and of
-  the possible movements of the armies. He says that Ephorus
-  had displayed the like incompetence also in describing the
-  battle of Leuktra; in which case, however, his narrative was
-  less misleading, because that battle was simple and easily
-  intelligible, involving movements only of one wing of each
-  army. But in regard to the battle of Mantinea (he says), the
-  misdescription of Ephorus was of far more deplorable effect;
-  because that battle exhibited much complication and generalship,
-  which Ephorus did not at all comprehend, as might be seen by any
-  one who measured the ground and studied the movements reported in
-  his narrative (Polybius, xii, 25).
-
-  Polybius adds that Theopompus and Timæus were as little to be
-  trusted in the description of land-battles as Ephorus. Whether
-  this remark has special application to the battle of Mantinea,
-  I do not clearly make out. He gives credit however to Ephorus
-  for greater judgment and accuracy, in the description of naval
-  battles.
-
-  Unfortunately, Polybius has not given us his own description of
-  this battle of Mantinea. He only says enough to make us feel how
-  imperfectly we know its details. There is too much reason to fear
-  that the account which we now read in Diodorus may be borrowed in
-  large proportion from that very narrative of Ephorus here so much
-  disparaged.
-
-  [755] Diodor. xv, 87. Cornelius Nepos (Epam. c. 9) seems to copy
-  the same authority as Diodorus, though more sparing of details.
-  He does not seem to have read Xenophon.
-
-  I commend the reader again to an excellent note of Dr. Arnold, on
-  Thucydides, iv, 11; animadverting upon similar exaggerations and
-  embellishments of Diodorus, in the description of the conduct of
-  Brasidas at Pylus.
-
-The news of his mortal wound spread like wild-fire through his
-army; and the effect produced is among the most extraordinary
-phenomena in all Grecian military history. I give it in the words
-of the contemporary historian. “It was thus (says Xenophon) that
-Epaminondas arranged his order of attack; and he was not disappointed
-in his expectation. For having been victorious, on the point where
-he himself charged, he caused the whole army of the enemy to take
-flight. But so soon as he fell, those who remained had no longer
-any power even of rightly using the victory. Though the phalanx
-of the enemy’s infantry was in full flight, the Theban hoplites
-neither killed a single man more, nor advanced a step beyond the
-actual ground of conflict. Though the enemy’s cavalry was also in
-full flight, yet neither did the Theban horsemen continue their
-pursuit, nor kill any more either of horsemen or of hoplites, but
-fell back through the receding enemies with the timidity of beaten
-men. The light troops and peltasts, who had been mingled with the
-Theban cavalry and had aided in their victory, spread themselves over
-towards the enemy’s left with the security of conquerors; but there
-(being unsupported by their own horsemen) they were mostly cut to
-pieces by the Athenians.”[756]
-
-  [756] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 25. Τὴν μὲν δὴ συμβολὴν οὕτως
-  ἐποιήσατο, καὶ οὐκ ἐψεύσθη τῆς ἐλπίδος· ~κρατήσας γὰρ ἧ
-  προσέβαλεν, ὅλον ἐποίησε~ φεύγειν τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων. Ἐπεί γε μὴν
-  ἐκεῖνος ἔπεσεν, οἱ λοιποὶ οὐδὲ τῇ νίκῃ ὀρθῶς ἔτι ἐδυνάσθησαν
-  χρήσασθαι, ἀλλὰ φυγούσης μὲν αὐτοῖς τῆς ἐναντίας φάλαγγος, οὐδένα
-  ἀπέκτειναν οἱ ὁπλῖται, οὐδὲ προῆλθον ἐκ τοῦ χωρίου ἔνθα ἡ συμβολὴ
-  ἐγένετο· φυγόντων δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν ἱππέων, ἀπέκτειναν μὲν οὐδὲ
-  οἱ ἱππεῖς διώκοντες οὔτε ἱππέας οὔθ’ ὁπλίτας, ὥσπερ δὲ ἡττώμενοι
-  πεφοβημένως διὰ τῶν φευγόντων πολεμίων διέπεσον. Καὶ μὴν οἱ
-  ἅμιπποι καὶ οἱ πελτασταὶ, συννενικηκότες τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν, ἀφίκοντο
-  μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ εὐωνύμου, ὡς κρατοῦντες· ἐκεῖ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ
-  πλεῖστοι αὐτῶν ἀπέθανον.
-
-Astonishing as this recital is, we cannot doubt that it is
-literally true, since it contradicts the sympathies of the
-reciting witness. Nothing but the pressure of undeniable evidence
-could have constrained Xenophon to record a scene so painful to
-him as the Lacedæmonian army beaten, in full flight, and rescued
-from destruction only by the untimely wound of the Theban general.
-That Epaminondas would leave no successor either equal or second
-to himself, now that Pelopidas was no more,—that the army which
-he commanded should be incapable of executing new movements or of
-completing an unfinished campaign,—we can readily conceive. But that
-on the actual battle-field, when the moment of dangerous and doubtful
-struggle has been already gone through, and when the soldier’s
-blood is up, to reap his reward in pursuit of an enemy whom he sees
-fleeing before him—that at this crisis of exuberant impatience, when
-Epaminondas, had he been unwounded, would have found it difficult to
-restrain his soldiers from excessive forwardness, they should have
-become at once paralyzed and disarmed on hearing of his fall,—this
-is what we could not have believed, had we not found it attested by
-a witness at once contemporary and hostile. So striking a proof has
-hardly ever been rendered, on the part of soldiers towards their
-general, of devoted and absorbing sentiment. All the hopes of this
-army, composed of such diverse elements, were centred in Epaminondas;
-all their confidence of success, all their security against defeat,
-were derived from the idea of acting under his orders; all their
-power, even of striking down a defeated enemy, appeared to vanish
-when those orders were withdrawn. We are not indeed to speak of such
-a proceeding with commendation. Thebes and her allied cities had
-great reason to complain of their soldiers, for a grave dereliction
-of military duty, and a capital disappointment of well-earned
-triumph,—whatever may be our feelings about the motive. Assuredly the
-man who would be most chagrined of all, and whose dying moments must
-have been embittered if he lived to hear it,—was Epaminondas himself.
-But when we look at the fact simply as a mark and measure of the
-ascendency established by him over the minds of his soldiers, it will
-be found hardly paralleled in history. I have recounted, a few pages
-ago, the intense grief displayed by the Thebans and their allies
-in Thessaly over the dead body of Pelopidas[757] on the hill of
-Kynoskephalæ. But all direct and deliberate testimonies of attachment
-to a dead or dying chief (and doubtless these too were abundant on
-the field of Mantinea) fall short of the involuntary suspension of
-arms in the tempting hour of victory.
-
-  [757] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 33, 34.
-
-That the real victory, the honors of the day, belonged to Epaminondas
-and the Thebans, we know from the conclusive evidence of Xenophon.
-But as the vanquished, being allowed to retire unpursued, were only
-separated by a short distance from the walls of Mantinea, and perhaps
-rallied even before reaching the town,—as the Athenian cavalry had
-cut to pieces some of the straggling light troops,—they too pretended
-to have gained a victory. Trophies were erected on both sides.
-Nevertheless the Thebans were masters of the field of battle; so
-that the Lacedæmonians, after some hesitation, were forced to send a
-herald to solicit truce for the burial of the slain, and to grant for
-burial such Theban bodies as they had in their possession.[758] This
-was the understood confession of defeat.
-
-  [758] The statement of Diodorus (xv, 87) on this point appears to
-  me more probable than that of Xenophon (vii, 5, 26).
-
-  The Athenians boasted much of this slight success with their
-  cavalry, enhancing its value by acknowledging that all their
-  allies had been defeated around them (Plutarch, De Gloriâ Athen.
-  p. 350 A.).
-
-The surgeons, on examining the wound of Epaminondas, with the
-spear-head yet sticking in it, pronounced that he must die as soon as
-that was withdrawn. He first inquired whether his shield was safe;
-and his shield-bearer, answering in the affirmative, produced it
-before his eyes. He next asked about the issue of the battle, and
-was informed that his own army was victorious.[759] He then desired
-to see Iolaidas and Daiphantus, whom he intended to succeed him
-as commanders; but received the mournful reply, that both of them
-had been slain.[760] “Then (said he) you must make peace with the
-enemy.” He ordered the spear-head to be withdrawn, when the efflux of
-blood speedily terminated his life.
-
-  [759] Diodor. xv, 88; Cicero, De Finibus, ii, 30, 97; Epistol. ad
-  Familiares, v, 12, 5.
-
-  [760] Plutarch, Apophthegm. Regum, p. 194 C.; Ælian, V. H. xii, 3.
-
-  Both Plutarch and Diodorus talk of Epaminondas being carried back
-  to the _camp_. But it seems that there could hardly have been any
-  camp. Epaminondas had marched out only a few hours before from
-  Tegea. A tent may have been erected on the field to receive him.
-  Five centuries afterwards, the Mantineans showed to the traveller
-  Pausanias a spot called Skiopê near the field of battle, to which
-  (they affirmed) the wounded Epaminondas had been carried off, in
-  great pain, and with his hand on his wound—from whence he had
-  looked with anxiety on the continuing battle (Pausan. viii, 11,
-  4).
-
-Of the three questions here ascribed to the dying chief, the third
-is the gravest and most significant. The death of these two other
-citizens, the only men in the camp whom Epaminondas could trust,
-shows how aggravated and irreparable was the Theban loss, not indeed
-as to number, but as to quality. Not merely Epaminondas himself, but
-the only two men qualified in some measure to replace him, perished
-in the same field; and Pelopidas had fallen in the preceding year.
-Such accumulation of individual losses must be borne in mind when
-we come to note the total suspension of Theban glory and dignity,
-after this dearly-bought victory. It affords emphatic evidence of the
-extreme forwardness with which their leaders exposed themselves, as
-well as of the gallant resistance which they experienced.
-
-The death of Epaminondas spread rejoicing in the Lacedæmonian camp
-proportioned to the sorrow of the Theban. To more than one warrior
-was assigned the honor of having struck the blow. The Mantineans
-gave it to their citizen Machærion; the Athenians, to Gryllus son
-of Xenophon; the Spartans, to their countryman Antikrates.[761] At
-Sparta, distinguished honor was shown, even in the days of Plutarch,
-to the posterity of Antikrates, who was believed to have rescued the
-city from her most formidable enemy. Such tokens afford precious
-testimony, from witnesses beyond all suspicion, to the memory of
-Epaminondas.
-
-  [761] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 35; Pausanias, i, 3, 3; viii, 9,
-  2-5; viii, 11, 4; ix, 15, 3.
-
-  The reports however which Pausanias gives, and the name of
-  Machærion which he heard both at Mantinea and at Sparta, are
-  confused, and are hardly to be reconciled with the story of
-  Plutarch.
-
-  Moreover, it would seem that the subsequent Athenians did not
-  clearly distinguish between the first battle fought by the
-  Athenian cavalry, immediately after their arrival at Mantinea,
-  when they rescued that town from being surprised by the Thebans
-  and Thessalians—and the general action which followed a few days
-  afterwards wherein Epaminondas was slain.
-
-How the news of his death was received at Thebes, we have no
-positive account. But there can be no doubt that the sorrow, so
-paralysing to the victorious soldiers on the field of Mantinea, was
-felt with equal acuteness, and with an effect not less depressing,
-in the senate-house and market-place of Thebes. The city, the
-citizen-soldiers, and the allies, would be alike impressed with the
-mournful conviction, that the dying injunction of Epaminondas must
-be executed. Accordingly, negotiations were opened, and peace was
-concluded,—probably at once, before the army left Peloponnesus.
-The Thebans and their Arcadian allies exacted nothing more than
-the recognition of the _statu quo;_ to leave everything exactly as
-it was, without any change or reactionary measure, yet admitting
-Megalopolis, with the Pan-Arcadian constitution attached to it,—and
-admitting also Messênê as an independent city. Against this last
-article Sparta loudly and peremptorily protested. But not one of her
-allies sympathized with her feelings. Some, indeed, were decidedly
-against her; to such a degree, that we find the maintenance of
-independent Messênê against Sparta ranking shortly afterwards as
-an admitted principle in Athenian foreign politics.[762] Neither
-Athenians, nor Eleians, nor Arcadians, desired to see Sparta
-strengthened. None had any interest in prolonging the war, with
-prospects doubtful to every one; while all wished to see the large
-armies now in Arcadia dismissed. Accordingly, the peace was sworn to
-on these conditions, and the autonomy of Messênê guaranteed, by all,
-except the Spartans; who alone stood out, keeping themselves without
-friends or auxiliaries, in the hope for better times,—rather than
-submit to what they considered as an intolerable degradation.[763]
-
-  [762] See the oration of Demosthenes on behalf of the
-  Megalopolitans (Orat. xvi, s. 10, p. 204; s. 21, p. 206).
-
-  [763] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 35; Diodor. xv, 89; Polybius, iv,
-  33.
-
-  Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellen. B.C. 361) assigns the
-  conclusion of peace to the succeeding year. I do not know however
-  what ground there is for assuming such an interval between the
-  battle and the peace. Diodorus appears to place the latter
-  immediately after the former. This would not count for much,
-  indeed, against any considerable counter-probability; but the
-  probability here (in my judgment) is rather in favor of immediate
-  sequence between the two events.
-
-Under these conditions, the armies on both sides retired. Xenophon
-is right in saying, that neither party gained anything, either city,
-territory, or dominion; though before the battle, considering the
-magnitude of the two contending armies, every one had expected
-that the victors, whichever they were, would become masters, and
-the vanquished, subjects. But his assertion,—that “there was more
-disturbance, and more matter of dispute, in Greece, after the battle
-than before it,”—must be interpreted, partly as the inspiration of
-a philo-Laconian sentiment, which regards a peace not accepted by
-Sparta as no peace at all,—partly as based on the circumstance,
-that no definite headship was recognized as possessed by any state.
-Sparta had once enjoyed it, and had set the disgraceful example of
-suing out a confirmation of it from the Persian king at the peace of
-Antalkidas. Both Thebes and Athens had aspired to the same dignity,
-and both by the like means, since the battle of Leuktra; neither
-of them had succeeded. Greece was thus left without a head, and
-to this extent the affirmation of Xenophon is true. But it would
-not be correct to suppose that the last expedition of Epaminondas
-into Peloponnesus was unproductive of any results,—though it was
-disappointed of its great and brilliant fruits by his untimely
-death. Before he marched in, the Theban party in Arcadia, (Tegea,
-Megalopolis, etc.), was on the point of being crushed by the
-Mantineans and their allies. His expedition, though ending in an
-indecisive victory, nevertheless broke up the confederacy enlisted
-in support of Mantinea; enabling Tegea and Megalopolis to maintain
-themselves against their Arcadian opponents, and thus leaving the
-frontier against Sparta unimpaired. While therefore we admit the
-affirmation of Xenophon,—that Thebes did not gain by the battle
-either city, or territory, or dominion,—we must at the same time add,
-that she gained the preservation of her Arcadian allies, and of her
-anti-Spartan frontier, including Messênê.
-
-This was a gain of considerable importance. But dearly, indeed, was
-it purchased, by the blood of her first hero, shed on the field of
-Mantinea; not to mention his two seconds, whom we know only from his
-verdict,—Daiphantus and Iolaidas.[764] He was buried on the field of
-battle, and a monumental column was erected on his tomb.
-
-  [764] Pausanias, viii, 11, 4, 5.
-
-Scarcely any character in Grecian history has been judged with
-so much unanimity as Epaminondas. He has obtained a meed of
-admiration,—from all, sincere and hearty,—from some, enthusiastic.
-Cicero pronounces him to be the first man of Greece.[765] The
-judgment of Polybius, though not summed up so emphatically in a
-single epithet, is delivered in a manner hardly less significant
-and laudatory. Nor was it merely historians or critics who formed
-this judgment. The best men of action, combining the soldier and
-the patriot, such as Timoleon and Philopœmen,[766] set before them
-Epaminondas as their model to copy. The remark has been often made,
-and suggests itself whenever we speak of Epaminondas, though its
-full force will be felt only when we come to follow the subsequent
-history,—that with him the dignity and commanding influence of Thebes
-both began and ended. His period of active political life comprehends
-sixteen years, from the resurrection of Thebes into a free community,
-by the expulsion of the Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison, and the
-subversion of the ruling oligarchy,—to the fatal day of Mantinea
-(379-362 B.C.). His prominent and unparalleled ascendency belongs
-to the last eight years, from the victory of Leuktra (371 B.C.).
-Throughout this whole period, both all that we know and all that we
-can reasonably divine, fully bears out the judgment of Polybius and
-Cicero, who had the means of knowing much more. And this too,—let it
-be observed,—though Epaminondas is tried by a severe canon: for the
-chief contemporary witness remaining is one decidedly hostile. Even
-the philo-Laconian Xenophon finds neither misdeeds nor omissions to
-reveal in the capital enemy of Sparta,—mentions him only to record
-what is honorable,—and manifests the perverting bias mainly by
-suppressing or slurring over his triumphs. The man whose eloquence
-bearded Agesilaus at the congress immediately preceding the battle
-of Leuktra,[767]—who in that battle stripped Sparta of her glory,
-and transferred the wreath to Thebes,—who a few months afterwards,
-not only ravaged all the virgin territory of Laconia, but cut off
-the best half of it for the restitution of independent Messênê,
-and erected the hostile Arcadian community of Megalopolis on its
-frontier,—the author of these fatal disasters inspires to Xenophon
-such intolerable chagrin and antipathy, that in the two first he
-keeps back the name, and in the third, suppresses the thing done.
-But in the last campaign, preceding the battle of Mantinea (whereby
-Sparta incurred no positive loss, and where the death of Epaminondas
-softened every predisposition against him), there was no such
-violent pressure upon the fidelity of the historian. Accordingly,
-the concluding chapter of Xenophon’s ‘Hellenica’ contains a
-panegyric,[768] ample and unqualified, upon the military merits of
-the Theban general; upon his daring enterprise, his comprehensive
-foresight, his care to avoid unnecessary exposure of soldiers, his
-excellent discipline, his well-combined tactics, his fertility of
-aggressive resource in striking at the weak points of the enemy,
-who content themselves with following and parrying his blows (to
-use a simile of Demosthenes[769]) like an unskilful pugilist, and
-only succeed in doing so by signal aid from accident. The effort of
-strategic genius, then for the first time devised and applied, of
-bringing an irresistible force of attack to bear on one point of
-the hostile line, while the rest of his army was kept comparatively
-back until the action had been thus decided,—is clearly noted by
-Xenophon, together with its triumphant effect, at the battle of
-Mantinea; though the very same combination on the field of Leuktra is
-slurred over in his description, as if it were so commonplace as not
-to require any mention of the chief with whom it originated. Compare
-Epaminondas with Agesilaus,—how great is the superiority of the
-first,—even in the narrative of Xenophon, the earnest panegyrist of
-the other! How manifestly are we made to see that nothing except the
-fatal spear-wound at Mantinea, prevented him from reaping the fruit
-of a series of admirable arrangements, and from becoming arbiter of
-Peloponnesus, including Sparta herself!
-
-  [765] Cicero, Tusculan. i, 2, 4; De Orator. iii, 34, 139.
-  “Epaminondas, princeps, meo judicio, Græciæ,” etc.
-
-  [766] Plutarch, Philopœmen, c. 3; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36.
-
-  [767] See the inscription of four lines copied by Pausanias from
-  the statue of Epaminondas at Thebes (Paus. ix, 16, 3):—
-
-    Ἡμετέραις βουλαῖς Σπάρτη μὲν ἐκείρατο δόξαν, etc.
-
-  [768] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 5, 8, 9.
-
-  [769] Demosthenes, Philipp. I, p. 51, s. 46.
-
-The military merits alone of Epaminondas, had they merely belonged to
-a general of mercenaries, combined with nothing praiseworthy in other
-ways,—would have stamped him as a man of high and original genius,
-above every other Greek, antecedent or contemporary. But it is the
-peculiar excellence of this great man that we are not compelled
-to borrow from one side of his character in order to compensate
-deficiencies in another.[770] His splendid military capacity was
-never prostituted to personal ends: neither to avarice, nor ambition,
-nor overweening vanity. Poor at the beginning of his life, he left at
-the end of it not enough to pay his funeral expenses; having despised
-the many opportunities for enrichment which his position afforded,
-as well as the richest offers from foreigners.[771] Of ambition he
-had so little, by natural temperament, that his friends accused him
-of torpor. But as soon as the perilous exposure of Thebes required
-it, he displayed as much energy in her defence as the most ambitious
-of her citizens, without any of that captious exigence, frequent
-in ambitious men, as to the amount of glorification or deference
-due to him from his countrymen. And his personal vanity was so
-faintly kindled, even after the prodigious success at Leuktra, that
-we find him serving in Thessaly as a private hoplite in the ranks,
-and in the city as an ædile or inferior street-magistrate, under
-the title of Telearchus. An illustrious specimen of that capacity
-and goodwill, both to command and to be commanded, which Aristotle
-pronounces to form in their combination the characteristic feature
-of the worthy citizen.[772] He once incurred the displeasure of his
-fellow-citizens, for his wise and moderate policy in Achaia, which
-they were ill-judged enough to reverse. We cannot doubt also that
-he was frequently attacked by political censors and enemies,—the
-condition of eminence in every free state; but neither of these
-causes ruffled the dignified calmness of his political course. As he
-never courted popularity by unworthy arts, so he bore unpopularity
-without murmurs, and without angry renunciation of patriotic
-duty.[773]
-
-  [770] The remark of Diodorus (xv, 88) upon Epaminondas is more
-  emphatic than we usually find in him,—Παρὰ μὲν γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τῶν
-  ἄλλων ἓν ἂν εὕροι προτέρημα τῆς δόξης, παρὰ δὲ τούτῳ πάσας τὰς
-  ἀρετὰς ἠθροισμένας.
-
-  [771] Polybius, xxxii, 8, 6. Cornelius Nepos (Epaminondas, c.
-  4) gives one anecdote, among several which he affirms to have
-  found on record, of large pecuniary presents tendered to, and
-  repudiated by, Epaminondas; an anecdote recounted with so much
-  precision of detail, that it appears to deserve credit, though we
-  cannot assign the exact time when the alleged briber Diomedon of
-  Kyzicus, came to Thebes.
-
-  Plutarch (De Genio Socratis, p. 583 F.) relates an incident about
-  Jason of Pheræ tendering money in vain to Epaminondas, which
-  cannot well have happened before the liberation of the Kadmeia
-  (the period to which Plutarch’s dialogue assigns it), but may
-  have happened afterwards.
-
-  Compare Plutarch, Apophthegm. Reg. p. 193 C.; and Plutarch’s Life
-  of Fabius Maximus, c. 27.
-
-  [772] Aristotel. Politic. iii, 2, 10.
-
-  [773] Plutarch, Compar. Alkibiad. and Coriolanus, c. 4. Ἐπεὶ τό
-  γε μὴ λιπαρῆ μηδὲ θεραπευτικὸν ὄχλων εἶναι, καὶ Μέτελλος εἶχε
-  καὶ Ἀριστείδης καὶ Ἐπαμεινώνδας· ἀλλὰ τῷ καταφρονεῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς
-  ὧν δῆμός ἐστι καὶ δοῦναι καὶ ἀφελέσθαι κύριος, ἐξοστρακιζόμενοι
-  καὶ ἀποχειροτονούμενοι καὶ καταδικαζόμενοι πολλάκις οὐκ ὠργίζοντο
-  τοῖς πολίταις ἀγνωμονοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ ἠγάπων αὖθις μεταμελομένους καὶ
-  διηλλάττοντο παρακαλούντων.
-
-The mildness of his antipathies against political opponents at home
-was undeviating; and, what is even more remarkable, amidst the
-precedence and practice of the Grecian world, his hostility against
-foreign enemies, Bœotian dissentients, and Theban exiles, was
-uniformly free from reactionary vengeance. Sufficient proofs have
-been adduced in the preceding pages of this rare union of attributes
-in the same individual; of lofty disinterestedness, not merely
-as to corrupt gains, but as to the more seductive irritabilities
-of ambition, combined with a just measure of attachment towards
-partisans, and unparalleled gentleness towards enemies. His
-friendship with Pelopidas was never disturbed during the fifteen
-years of their joint political career; an absence of jealousy signal
-and creditable to both, though most creditable to Pelopidas, the
-richer, as well as the inferior, man of the two. To both, and to
-the harmonious coöperation of both, Thebes owed her short-lived
-splendor and ascendency. Yet when we compare the one with the other,
-we not only miss in Pelopidas the transcendent strategic genius and
-conspicuous eloquence, but even the constant vigilance and prudence,
-which never deserted his friend. If Pelopidas had had Epaminondas as
-his companion in Thessaly, he would hardly have trusted himself to
-the good faith, nor tasted the dungeon, of the Pheræan Alexander; nor
-would he have rushed forward to certain destruction, in a transport
-of phrensy, at the view of that hated tyrant in the subsequent battle.
-
-In eloquence, Epaminondas would doubtless have found superiors at
-Athens; but at Thebes, he had neither equal, nor predecessor, nor
-successor. Under the new phase into which Thebes passed by the
-expulsion of the Lacedæmonians out of the Kadmeia, such a gift was
-second in importance only to the great strategic qualities; while
-the combination of both elevated their possessor into the envoy,
-the counsellor, the debater, of his country,[774] as well as her
-minister at war and commander-in-chief. The shame of acknowledging
-Thebes as leading state in Greece, embodied in the current phrases
-about Bœotian stupidity, would be sensibly mitigated, when her
-representative in an assembled congress spoke with the flowing
-abundance of the Homeric Odysseus, instead of the loud, brief, and
-hurried bluster of Menelaus.[775] The possession of such eloquence,
-amidst the uninspiring atmosphere of Thebes, implied far greater
-mental force than a similar accomplishment would have betokened at
-Athens. In Epaminondas, it was steadily associated with thought and
-action,—that triple combination of thinking, speaking, and acting,
-which Isokrates and other Athenian sophists[776] set before their
-hearers as the stock and qualification for meritorious civic life. To
-the bodily training and soldier-like practice, common to all Thebans,
-Epaminondas added an ardent intellectual impulse and a range of
-discussion with the philosophical men around, peculiar to himself.
-He was not floated into public life by the accident of birth or
-wealth,—nor hoisted and propped up by oligarchical clubs,—nor even
-determined to it originally by any spontaneous ambition of his own.
-But the great revolution of 379 B.C., which expelled from Thebes
-both the Lacedæmonian garrison and the local oligarchy who ruled
-by its aid, forced him forward by the strongest obligations both
-of duty and interest; since nothing but an energetic defence could
-rescue both him and every other free Theban from slavery. It was
-by the like necessity that the American revolution, and the first
-French revolution, thrust into the front rank the most instructed and
-capable men of the country, whether ambitious by temperament or not.
-As the pressure of the time impelled Epaminondas forward, so it also
-disposed his countrymen to look out for a competent leader wherever
-he was to be found; and in no other living man could they obtain the
-same union of the soldier, the general, the orator, and the patriot.
-Looking through all Grecian history, it is only in Perikles that we
-find the like many-sided excellence; for though much inferior to
-Epaminondas as a general, Perikles must be held superior to him as a
-statesman. But it is alike true of both,—and the remark tends much
-to illustrate the sources of Grecian excellence,—that neither sprang
-exclusively from the school of practice and experience. They both
-brought to that school minds exercised in the conversation of the
-most instructed philosophers and sophists accessible to them,—trained
-to varied intellectual combinations and to a larger range of subjects
-than those that came before the public assembly,—familiarized with
-reasonings which the scrupulous piety of Nikias forswore, and which
-the devoted military patriotism of Pelopidas disdained.
-
-  [774] See an anecdote about Epaminondas as the diplomatist and
-  negotiator on behalf of Thebes against Athens—δικαιολογούμενος,
-  etc. Athenæus, xiv, p. 650 E.
-
-  [775] Homer, Iliad, iii, 210-220 (Menelaus and Odysseus)—
-
-    Ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ Τρώεσσιν ἀγειρομένοισιν ἔμιχθεν,
-    Ἤτοι μὲν Μενέλαος ἐπιτροχάδην ἀγόρευε,
-    Παῦρα μὲν, ἀλλὰ μάλα λιγέως· ἐπεὶ οὐ πολύμυθος, etc.
-    ... Ἀλλ’ ὅτε δή ῥ’ ὄπα τε μεγάλην ἐκ στήθεος ἵει (Odysseus),
-    Καὶ ἔπεα νιφάδεσσιν ἐοικότα χειμερίῃσιν,
-    Οὐκέτ’ ἔπειτ’ Ὀδυσῆΐ γ’ ἐρίσσειε βροτὸς ἄλλος, etc.
-
-  [776] See Vol. VIII. of this History, Ch. lxvii, p.
-  357-397—φρονεῖν, λέγειν, καὶ πράττειν, etc.
-
-On one point, as I have already noticed, the policy recommended by
-Epaminondas to his countrymen appears of questionable wisdom,—his
-advice to compete with Athens for transmarine and naval power.
-One cannot recognize in this advice the same accurate estimate of
-permanent causes,—the same long-sighted view, of the conditions of
-strength to Thebes and of weakness to her enemies, which dictated the
-foundation of Messênê and Megalopolis. These two towns, when once
-founded, took such firm root, that Sparta could not persuade even
-her own allies to aid in effacing them; a clear proof of the sound
-reasoning on which their founder had proceeded. What Epaminondas
-would have done,—whether he would have followed out maxims equally
-prudent and penetrating,—if he had survived the victory of
-Mantinea,—is a point which we cannot pretend to divine. He would
-have found himself then on a pinnacle of glory, and invested with a
-plenitude of power, such as no Greek ever held without abusing. But
-all that we know of Epaminondas justifies the conjecture that he
-would have been found equal, more than any other Greek, even to this
-great trial; and that his untimely death shut him out from a future
-not less honorable to himself, than beneficial to Thebes and to
-Greece generally.
-
-Of the private life and habits of Epaminondas we know scarcely
-anything. We are told that he never married; and we find brief
-allusions, without any details, to attachments in which he is said
-to have indulged.[777] Among the countrymen of Pindar,[778] devoted
-attachment between mature men and beautiful youths was more frequent
-than in other parts of Greece. It was confirmed by interchange of
-mutual oaths at the tomb of Iolaus, and was reckoned upon as the
-firmest tie of military fidelity in the hour of battle. Asopichus
-and Kaphisodorus are named as youths to whom Epaminondas was much
-devoted. The first fought with desperate bravery at the battle of
-Leuktra, and after the victory caused an image of the Leuktrian
-trophy to be carved on his shield, which he dedicated at Delphi;[779]
-the second perished along with his illustrious friend and chief on
-the field of Mantinea, and was buried in a grave closely adjacent to
-him.[780]
-
-  [777] Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 192 E. Athenæ. xiii, p. 590 C.
-
-  [778] Hieronymus ap. Athenæ. xiii, p. 602 A.; Plutarch,
-  Pelopidas, c. 18; Xen. Rep. Lacedæmon. ii, 12.
-
-  See the striking and impassioned fragment of Pindar, addressed by
-  him when old to the youth Theoxenus of Tenedos, Fragm. 2 of the
-  Skolia, in Dissen’s edition, and Boeckh’s edition of Pindar, vol.
-  iii, p. 611, ap. Athenæum, xiii, p. 605 C.
-
-  [779] See Theopompus, Frag. 182, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. xiii, p.
-  605 A.
-
-  [780] Plutarch, Pelopid. _ut sup._; Plutarch, Amatorius, p. 761
-  D.; compare Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 39.
-
-It rather appears that the Spartans, deeply incensed against their
-allies for having abandoned them in reference to Messênê, began to
-turn their attention away from the affairs of Greece to those of Asia
-and Egypt. But the dissensions in Arcadia were not wholly appeased
-even by the recent peace. The city of Megalopolis had been founded
-only eight years before by the coalescence of many smaller townships,
-all previously enjoying a separate autonomy more or less perfect. The
-vehement anti-Spartan impulse, which marked the two years immediately
-succeeding the battle of Leuktra, had overruled to so great a degree
-the prior instincts of these townships, that they had lent themselves
-to the plans of Lykomedes and Epaminondas for an enlarged community
-in the new city. But since that period, reaction had taken place. The
-Mantineans had come to be at the head of an anti-Megalopolitan party
-in Arcadia; and several of the communities which had been merged
-in Megalopolis, counting upon aid from them and from the Eleians,
-insisted on seceding, and returning to their original autonomy. But
-for foreign aid, Megalopolis would now have been in great difficulty.
-A pressing request was sent to the Thebans, who despatched into
-Arcadia three thousand hoplites under Pammenes. This force enabled
-the Megalopolitans, though not without measures of considerable
-rigor, to uphold the integrity of their city, and keep the refractory
-members in communion.[781] And it appears that the interference thus
-obtained was permanently efficacious, so that the integrity of this
-recent Pan-Arcadian community was no farther disturbed.
-
-  [781] Diodor. xv, 94.
-
-  I venture here to depart from Diodorus, who states that these
-  three thousand men were _Athenians_, not _Thebans_; that the
-  Megalopolitans sent to ask aid from _Athens_, and that the
-  _Athenians_ sent these three thousand men under Pammenes.
-
-  That Diodorus (or the copyist) has here mistaken Thebans for
-  Athenians, appears to me, on the following grounds:—
-
-  1. Whoever reads attentively the oration delivered by Demosthenes
-  in the Athenian assembly (about ten years after this period)
-  respecting the propriety of sending an armed force to defend
-  Megalopolis against the threats of Sparta—will see, I think,
-  that Athens can never before have sent any military assistance
-  to Megalopolis. Both the arguments which Demosthenes urges, and
-  those which he combats as having been urged by opponents, exclude
-  the reality of any such previous proceeding.
-
-  2. Even at the time when the above-mentioned oration was
-  delivered, the Megalopolitans were still (compare Diodorus,
-  xvi, 39) under special alliance with, and guardianship of,
-  Thebes—though the latter had then been so much weakened by the
-  Sacred War and other causes, that it seemed doubtful whether
-  she could give them complete protection against Sparta. But
-  in the year next after the battle of Mantinea, the alliance
-  between Megalopolis and Thebes, as well as the hostility between
-  Megalopolis and Athens, was still fresher and more intimate. The
-  Thebans (then in unimpaired power), who had fought for them in
-  the preceding year,—not the Athenians, who had fought against
-  them,—would be the persons invoked for aid to Megalopolis; nor
-  had any positive reverses as yet occurred to disable the Thebans
-  from furnishing aid.
-
-  3. Lastly, Pammenes is a _Theban_ general, friend of Epaminondas.
-  He is mentioned as such not only by Diodorus himself in another
-  place (xvi, 34), but also by Pausanias (viii, 27, 2), as
-  the general who had been sent to watch over the building of
-  Megalopolis, by Plutarch (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 26; Plutarch,
-  Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 805 F.), and by Polyænus (v, 16, 3).
-  We find a private Athenian citizen named Pammenes, a goldsmith,
-  mentioned in the oration of Demosthenes against Meidias (s. 31.
-  p. 521); but no Athenian officer or public man of that time so
-  named.
-
-  Upon these grounds, I cannot but feel convinced that Pammenes and
-  his troops were Thebans, and not Athenians.
-
-  I am happy to find myself in concurrence with Dr. Thirlwall on
-  this point (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. xliii, p. 368 note).
-
-The old king Agesilaus was compelled, at the age of eighty, to see
-the dominion of Sparta thus irrevocably narrowed, her influence in
-Arcadia overthrown, and the loss of Messênê formally sanctioned even
-by her own allies. All his protests, and those of his son Archidamus,
-so strenuously set forth by Isokrates, had only ended by isolating
-Sparta more than ever from Grecian support and sympathy. Archidamus
-probably never seriously attempted to execute the desperate scheme
-which he had held out as a threat some two or three years before the
-battle of Mantinea; that the Lacedæmonians would send away their
-wives and families, and convert their military population into
-a perpetual camp, never to lay down arms until they should have
-reconquered Messênê or perished in the attempt.[782] Yet he and his
-father, though deserted by all Grecian allies, had not yet abandoned
-the hope that they might obtain aid, in the shape of money for
-levying mercenary troops, from the native princes in Egypt and the
-revolted Persian satraps in Asia, with whom they seem to have been
-for some time in a sort of correspondence.[783]
-
-  [782] See Isokrates, Orat. vi, (Archidamus) s. 85-93.
-
-  [783] Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archid.) s. 73.
-
-About the time of the battle of Mantinea,—and as it would seem,
-for some years before,—a large portion of the western dominions of
-the Great King were in a state partly of revolt, partly of dubious
-obedience. Egypt had been for some years in actual revolt, and
-under native princes, whom the Persians had vainly endeavored to
-subdue (employing for that purpose the aid of the Athenian generals
-Iphikrates and Timotheus) both in 374 and 371 B.C. Ariobarzanes,
-satrap of the region near the Propontis and the Hellespont, appears
-to have revolted about the year 367-366 B.C. In other parts of Asia
-Minor, too,—Paphlagonia, Pisidia, etc.,—the subordinate princes or
-governors became disaffected to Artaxerxes. But their disaffection
-was for a certain time kept down by the extraordinary ability and
-vigor of a Karian named Datames, commander for the king in a part
-of Kappadokia, who gained several important victories over them
-by rapidity of movement and well-combined stratagem. At length
-the services of Datames became so distinguished as to excite the
-jealousy of many of the Persian grandees; who poisoned the royal
-mind against him, and thus drove him to raise the standard of revolt
-in his own district of Kappadokia, under alliance and concert with
-Ariobarzanes. It was in vain that Autophradates, satrap of Lydia,
-was sent by Artaxerxes with a powerful force to subdue Datames. The
-latter resisted all the open force of Persia, and was at length
-overcome only by the treacherous conspiracy of Mithridates (son of
-Ariobarzanes), who, corrupted by the Persian court and becoming a
-traitor both to his father Ariobarzanes and to Datames, simulated
-zealous coöperation, tempted the latter to a confidential interview,
-and there assassinated him.[784]
-
-  [784] Cornelius Nepos has given a biography of Datames at some
-  length, recounting his military exploits and stratagems. He
-  places Datames, in point of military talent, above all _barbari_,
-  except Hamilcar Barca and Hannibal (c. 1). Polyænus also (vii,
-  29) recounts several memorable proceedings of the same chief.
-  Compare too Diodorus, xv, 91; and Xen. Cyropæd. viii, 8, 4.
-
-  We cannot make out with any certainty either the history, or the
-  chronology, of Datames. His exploits seem to belong to the last
-  ten years of Artaxerxes Mnemon, and his death seems to have taken
-  place a little before the death of that prince; which last event
-  is to be assigned to 359-358 B.C. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast.
-  Hell. ch. 18. p. 316, Appendix.
-
-Still, however, there remained powerful princes and satraps in Asia
-Minor, disaffected to the court; Mausôlus, prince of Karia; Orontes,
-satrap of Mysia, and Autophradates, satrap of Lydia,—the last having
-now apparently joined the revolters, though he had before been
-active in upholding the authority of the king. It seems too that the
-revolt extended to Syria and Phœnicia, so that all the western coast
-with its large revenues, as well as Egypt, was at once subtracted
-from the empire. Tachos, native king of Egypt, was prepared to lend
-assistance to this formidable combination of disaffected commanders,
-who selected Orontes as their chief; confiding to him their united
-forces, and sending Rheomithres to Egypt to procure pecuniary
-aid. But the Persian court broke the force of this combination
-by corrupting both Orontes and Rheomithres, who betrayed their
-confederates, and caused the enterprise to fail. Of the particulars
-we know little or nothing.[785]
-
-  [785] Diodor. xv, 91, 92; Xenophon, Cyropæd. viii, 8, 4.
-
-  Our information about these disturbances in the interior of
-  the Persian empire is so scanty and confused, that few of the
-  facts can be said to be certainly known. Diodorus has evidently
-  introduced into the year 362-361 B.C. a series of events, many
-  of them belonging to years before and after. Rehdantz (Vit.
-  Iphicrat. Chabr. et. Timoth. p. 154-161) brings together all the
-  statements; but unfortunately with little result.
-
-Both the Spartan king Agesilaus, with a thousand Lacedæmonian or
-Peloponnesian hoplites,—and the Athenian general Chabrias, were
-invited to Egypt to command the forces of Tachos; the former on
-land, the latter at sea. Chabrias came simply as a volunteer,
-without any public sanction or order from Athens. But the service of
-Agesilaus was undertaken for the purposes and with the consent of the
-authorities at home, attested by the presence of thirty Spartans who
-came out as his counsellors. The Spartans were displeased with the
-Persian king for having sanctioned the independence of Messênê; and
-as the prospect of overthrowing or enfeebling his empire appeared
-at this moment considerable, they calculated on reaping a large
-reward for their services to the Egyptian prince, who would in return
-lend them assistance towards their views in Greece. But dissension
-and bad judgment marred all the combinations against the Persian
-king. Agesilaus, on reaching Egypt,[786] was received with little
-respect. The Egyptians saw with astonishment, that one, whom they
-had invited as a formidable warrior, was a little deformed old man,
-of mean attire, and sitting on the grass with his troops, careless
-of show or luxury. They not only vented their disappointment in
-sarcastic remarks, but also declined to invest him with the supreme
-command, as he had anticipated. He was only recognized as general
-of the mercenary land force, while Tachos himself commanded in
-chief, and Chabrias was at the head of the fleet. Great efforts
-were made to assemble a force competent to act against the Great
-King; and Chabrias is said to have suggested various stratagems
-for obtaining money from the Egyptians.[787] The army having been
-thus strengthened, Agesilaus, though discontented and indignant,
-nevertheless accompanied Tachos on an expedition against the Persian
-forces in Phœnicia; from whence they were forced to return by the
-revolt of Nektanebis, cousin of Tachos, who caused himself to be
-proclaimed king of Egypt. Tachos was now full of supplications to
-Agesilaus to sustain him against his competitor for the Egyptian
-throne; while Nektanebis, also on his side, began to bid high for
-the favor of the Spartans. With the sanction of the authorities at
-home, but in spite of the opposition of Chabrias, Agesilaus decided
-in favor of Nektanebis, withdrawing the mercenaries from the camp of
-Tachos,[788] who was accordingly obliged to take flight. Chabrias
-returned home to Athens; either not choosing to abandon Tachos, whom
-he had come to serve,—or recalled by special order of his countrymen,
-in consequence of the remonstrance of the Persian king. A competitor
-for the throne presently arose in the Mendesian division of Egypt.
-Agesilaus, vigorously maintaining the cause of Nektanebis, defeated
-all the efforts of his opponent. Yet his great schemes against
-the Persian empire were abandoned, and nothing was effected as
-the result of his Egyptian expedition except the establishment of
-Nektanebis; who, having in vain tried to prevail upon him to stay
-longer, dismissed him in the winter season with large presents, and
-with a public donation to Sparta of two hundred and thirty talents.
-Agesilaus marched from the Nile towards Kyrênê, in order to obtain
-from that town and its ports ships for the passage home. But he died
-on the march, without reaching Kyrênê. His body was conveyed home by
-his troops, for burial, in a preparation of wax, since honey was not
-to be obtained.[789]
-
-  [786] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 36; Athenæus, xiv, p. 616 D.;
-  Cornelius Nepos, Agesil. c. 8.
-
-  [787] See Pseudo-Aristotel. Œconomic. ii, 25.
-
-  [788] Diodorus (xv, 93) differs from Plutarch and others (whom
-  I follow) in respect to the relations of Tachos and Nektanebis
-  with Agesilaus; affirming that Agesilaus supported Tachos, and
-  supported him with success, against Nektanebis.
-
-  Compare Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 2, 3.
-
-  We find Chabrias serving Athens in the Chersonese—in 359-358 B.C.
-  (Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 204).
-
-  [789] Diodor. xv, 93; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 38-40; Cornelius
-  Nepos, Agesil. 8.
-
-Thus expired, at an age somewhat above eighty, the ablest and most
-energetic of the Spartan kings. He has enjoyed the advantage,
-denied to every other eminent Grecian leader, that his character
-and exploits have been set out in the most favorable point of view
-by a friend and companion,—Xenophon. Making every allowance for
-partiality in this picture, there will still remain a really great
-and distinguished character. We find the virtues of a soldier, and
-the abilities of a commander, combined with strenuous personal will
-and decision, in such measure as to ensure for Agesilaus constant
-ascendency over the minds of others far beyond what was naturally
-incident to his station; and that, too, in spite of conspicuous
-bodily deformity, amidst a nation eminently sensitive on that point.
-Of the merits which Xenophon ascribes to him, some are the fair
-results of a Spartan education;—his courage, simplicity of life, and
-indifference to indulgences,—his cheerful endurance of hardship under
-every form. But his fidelity to engagements, his uniform superiority
-to pecuniary corruption, and those winning and hearty manners which
-attached to him all around—were virtues not Spartan but personal
-to himself. We find in him, however, more analogy to Lysander—a
-man equally above reproach on the score of pecuniary gain—than to
-Brasidas or Kallikratidas. Agesilaus succeeded to the throne, with
-a disputed title, under the auspices and through the intrigues of
-Lysander; whose influence, at that time predominant both at Sparta
-and in Greece, had planted everywhere dekarchies and harmosts as
-instruments of ascendency for imperial Sparta—and under the name of
-Sparta, for himself. Agesilaus, too high-spirited to comport himself
-as second to any one, speedily broke through so much of the system as
-had been constructed to promote the personal dominion of Lysander;
-yet without following out the same selfish aspirations, or seeking
-to build up the like individual dictatorship, on his own account.
-His ambition was indeed unbounded, but it was for Sparta in the
-first place, and for himself only in the second. The misfortune was,
-that in his measures for upholding and administering the imperial
-authority of Sparta, he still continued that mixture of domestic and
-foreign coërcion (represented by the dekarchy and the harmost) which
-had been introduced by Lysander; a sad contrast with the dignified
-equality, and emphatic repudiation of partisan interference,
-proclaimed by Brasidas, as the watchword of Sparta, at Akanthus and
-Torônê—and with the still nobler Pan-hellenic aims of Kallikratidas.
-
-The most glorious portion of the life of Agesilaus was that spent
-in his three Asiatic campaigns, when acting under the miso-Persian
-impulse for which his panegyrist gives him so much credit.[790]
-
-  [790] Xenoph. Encom. Ages. vii, 7. Εἰ δ’ αὖ καλὸν καὶ μισοπέρσην
-  εἶναι, etc.
-
-He was here employed in a Pan-hellenic purpose, to protect the
-Asiatic Greeks against that subjection to Persia which Sparta herself
-had imposed upon them a few years before, as the price of Persian aid
-against Athens.
-
-The Persians presently succeeded in applying the lessons of Sparta
-against herself, and in finding Grecian allies to make war upon her
-near home. Here was an end of the Pan-hellenic sentiment, and of the
-truly honorable ambition, in the bosom of Agesilaus. He was recalled
-to make war nearer home. His obedience to the order of recall is
-greatly praised by Plutarch and Xenophon—in my judgment, with little
-reason, since he had no choice but to come back. But he came back an
-altered man. His miso-Persian feeling had disappeared, and had been
-exchanged for a miso-Theban sentiment which gradually acquired the
-force of a passion. As principal conductor of the war between 394-387
-B.C., he displayed that vigor and ability which never forsook him
-in military operations. But when he found that the empire of Sparta
-near home could not be enforced except by making her the ally of
-Persia and the executor of a Persian rescript, he was content to
-purchase such aid, in itself dishonorable, by the still greater
-dishonor of sacrificing the Asiatic Greeks. For the time, his policy
-seemed to succeed. From 387-379 B.C. (that is, down to the time of
-the revolution at Thebes, effected by Pelopidas and his small band),
-the ascendency of Sparta on land, in Central Greece, was continually
-rising. But her injustice and oppression stand confessed even by her
-panegyrist Xenophon; and this is just the period when the influence
-of Agesilaus was at its maximum. Afterwards we find him personally
-forward in sheltering Sphodrias from punishment, and thus bringing
-upon his countrymen a war with Athens as well as with Thebes. In the
-conduct of that war his military operations were, as usual, strenuous
-and able, with a certain measure of success. But on the whole, the
-war turns out unfavorably for Sparta. In 371 B.C., she is obliged to
-accept peace on terms very humiliating, as compared with her position
-in 387 B.C.; and the only compensation which she receives, is, the
-opportunity of striking the Thebans out of the treaty, thus leaving
-them to contend single-handed against what seemed overwhelming odds.
-Of this intense miso-Theban impulse, which so speedily brought about
-the unexpected and crushing disaster at Leuktra, Agesilaus stands
-out as the prominent spokesman. In the days of Spartan misfortune
-which followed, we find his conduct creditable and energetic, so
-far as the defensive position, in which Sparta then found herself,
-allowed; and though Plutarch seems displeased with him[791] for
-obstinacy in refusing to acknowledge the autonomy of Messênê (at the
-peace concluded after the battle of Mantinea), when acknowledged
-by all the other Greeks,—yet it cannot be shown that this refusal
-brought any actual mischief to Sparta; and circumstances might well
-have so turned out, that it would have been a gain.
-
-  [791] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 35.
-
-On the whole, in spite of the many military and personal merits of
-Agesilaus, as an adviser and politician he deserves little esteem.
-We are compelled to remark the melancholy contrast between the state
-in which he found Sparta at his accession, and that wherein he left
-her at his death—“Marmoream invenit, lateritiam reliquit.” Nothing
-but the death of Epaminondas at Mantinea saved her from something
-yet worse; though it would be unfair to Agesilaus, while we are
-considering the misfortunes of Sparta during his reign, not to
-recollect that Epaminondas was an enemy more formidable than she had
-ever before encountered.
-
-The efficient service rendered by Agesilaus during his last
-expedition to Egypt, had the effect of establishing firmly the
-dominion of Nektanebis the native king, and of protecting that
-country for the time from being reconquered by the Persians; an event
-that did not happen until a few years afterwards, during the reign of
-the next Persian king. Of the extensive revolt, however, which at one
-time threatened to wrest from the Persian crown Asia Minor as well as
-Egypt, no permanent consequence remained. The treachery of Orontes
-and Rheomithres so completely broke up the schemes of the revolters,
-that Artaxerxes Mnemon still maintained the Persian empire (with the
-exception of Egypt), unimpaired.
-
-He died not long after the suppression of the revolt (apparently
-about a year after it, in 359-358 B.C.), having reigned forty-five
-or forty-six years.[792] His death was preceded by one of those
-bloody tragedies which so frequently stained the transmission of
-a Persian sceptre. Darius, the eldest son of Artaxerxes, had been
-declared by his father successor to the throne. According to Persian
-custom, the successor thus declared was entitled to prefer any
-petition which he pleased; the monarch being held bound to grant
-it. Darius availed himself of the privilege to ask for one of the
-favorite inmates of his father’s harem, for whom he had contracted a
-passion. The request so displeased Artaxerxes, that he seemed likely
-to make a new appointment as to the succession; discarding Darius
-and preferring his younger son Ochus, whose interests were warmly
-espoused by Atossa, wife as well as daughter of the monarch. Alarmed
-at this prospect, Darius was persuaded by a discontented courtier,
-named Teribazus, to lay a plot for assassinating Artaxerxes; but the
-plot was betrayed, and the king caused both Darius and Teribazus
-to be put to death. By this catastrophe the chance of Ochus was
-improved, and his ambition yet farther stimulated. But there still
-remained two princes, older than he—Arsames and Ariaspes. Both these
-brothers he contrived to put out of the way; the one by a treacherous
-deceit, entrapping him to take poison,—the other by assassination.
-Ochus thus stood next as successor to the crown, which was not long
-denied to him,—for Artaxerxes, now very old and already struck down
-by the fatal consummation respecting his eldest son, Darius, did not
-survive the additional sorrow of seeing his two other sons die so
-speedily afterwards.[793] He expired, and his son Ochus, taking the
-name of Artaxerxes, succeeded to him without opposition; manifesting
-as king the same sanguinary dispositions as those by which he had
-placed himself on the throne.
-
-  [792] Diodor. xv, 93.
-
-  There is a difference between Diodorus and the Astronomical
-  Canon, in the statements about the length of reign, and date of
-  death, of Artaxerxes Mnemon, of about two years—361 or 359 B.C.
-  See Mr. Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, ch. 18. p. 316—where
-  the statements are brought together and discussed. Plutarch
-  states the reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon to have lasted sixty-two
-  years (Plutarch, Artax. c. 33); which cannot be correct, though
-  in what manner the error is to be amended, we cannot determine.
-
-  An Inscription of Mylasa in Karia recognizes the forty-fifth year
-  of the reign of Artaxerxes, and thus supports the statement in
-  the Astronomical Canon, which assigns to him forty-six years of
-  reign. See Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. No. 2691, with his comments, p.
-  470.
-
-  This same inscription affords ground of inference respecting the
-  duration of the revolt; for it shows that the Karian Mausolus
-  recognized himself as satrap, and Artaxerxes as his sovereign, in
-  the year beginning November 359 B.C., which corresponds with the
-  forty-fifth year of Artaxerxes Mnemon. The revolt therefore must
-  have been suppressed before that period: see Sievers, Geschichte
-  von Griechenland bis zur Schlacht von Mantineia, p. 373, note.
-
-  [793] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 29, 30; Justin, x, 1-3.
-
-  Plutarch states that the lady whom the prince Darius asked for,
-  was, Aspasia of Phokæa—the Greek mistress of Cyrus the younger,
-  who had fallen into the hands of Artaxerxes after the battle of
-  Kunaxa, and had acquired a high place in the monarch’s affections.
-
-  But if we look at the chronology of the case, it will appear
-  hardly possible that the lady who inspired so strong a passion
-  to Darius, in or about 361 B.C., as to induce him to risk the
-  displeasure of his father—and so decided a reluctance on the
-  part of Artaxerxes to give her up—can have been the person who
-  accompanied Cyrus to Kunaxa _forty years_ before; for the battle
-  of Kunaxa was fought in 401 B.C. The chronological improbability
-  would be still greater, if we adopted Plutarch’s statement that
-  Artaxerxes reigned sixty-two years; for it is certain that the
-  battle of Kunaxa occurred very near the beginning of his reign,
-  and the death of his son Darius near the end of it.
-
-  Justin states the circumstances which preceded the death of
-  Artaxerxes Mnemon in a manner yet more tragical. He affirms that
-  the plot against the life of Artaxerxes was concerted by Darius
-  in conjunction with several of his brothers; and that, on the
-  plot being discovered, all these brothers, together with their
-  wives and children, were put to death. Ochus, on coming to the
-  throne, put to death a great number of his kinsmen and of the
-  principal persons about the court, together with their wives and
-  children—fearing a like conspiracy against himself.
-
-During the two years following the battle of Mantinea, Athens, though
-relieved by the general peace from land-war, appears to have been
-entangled in serious maritime contests and difficulties. She had been
-considerably embarrassed by two events; by the Theban naval armament
-under Epaminondas, and by the submission of Alexander of Pheræ to
-Thebes,—both events belonging to 364-363 B.C. It was in 363-362 B.C.
-that the Athenian Timotheus,—having carried on war with eminent
-success against Olynthus and the neighboring cities in the Thermaic
-Gulf, but with very bad success against Amphipolis,—transferred his
-forces to the war against Kotys king of Thrace near the Thracian
-Chersonese. The arrival of the Theban fleet in the Hellespont
-greatly distracted the Athenian general, and served as a powerful
-assistance to Kotys; who was moreover aided by the Athenian general
-Iphikrates, on this occasion serving his father-in-law against his
-country.[794] Timotheus is said to have carried on war against Kotys
-with advantage, and to have acquired for Athens a large plunder.[795]
-It would appear that his operations were of an aggressive character,
-and that during his command in those regions the Athenian possessions
-in the Chersonese were safe from Kotys; for Iphikrates would only
-lend his aid to Kotys towards defensive warfare; retiring from his
-service when he began to attack the Athenian possessions in the
-Chersonese.[796]
-
-  [794] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 153.
-
-  [795] The affirmation of Cornelius Nepos (Timotheus, c. 1), that
-  Timotheus made war on Kotys with such success as to bring into
-  the Athenian treasury twelve hundred talents, appears extravagant
-  as to amount; even if we accept it as generally true.
-
-  [796] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 155.
-
-We do not know what circumstances brought about the dismissal or
-retirement of Timotheus from the command. But in the next year,
-we find Ergophilus as Athenian commander in the Chersonese,
-and Kallisthenes (seemingly) as Athenian commander against
-Amphipolis.[797] The transmarine affairs of Athens, however, were
-far from improving. Besides that under the new general she seems
-to have been losing strength near the Chersonese, she had now upon
-her hands a new maritime enemy—Alexander of Pheræ. A short time
-previously, he had been her ally against Thebes, but the victories
-of the Thebans during the preceding year had so completely humbled
-him, that he now identified his cause with theirs; sending troops
-to join the expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus,[798] and
-equipping a fleet to attack the maritime allies of Athens. His fleet
-captured the island of Tenos, ravaged several of the other Cyclades,
-and laid siege to Peparethos. Great alarm prevailed in Athens, and
-about the end of August (362 B.C.),[799] two months after the battle
-of Mantinea, a fleet was equipped with the utmost activity, for the
-purpose of defending the insular allies, as well as of acting in the
-Hellespont. Vigorous efforts were required from all the trierarchs,
-and really exerted by some, to accelerate the departure of this
-fleet. But that portion of it, which, while the rest went to the
-Hellespont, was sent under Leosthenes to defend Peparethos,—met with
-a defeat from the ships of Alexander, with the loss of five triremes
-and six hundred prisoners.[800] We are even told that soon after this
-naval advantage, the victors were bold enough to make a dash into the
-Peiræus itself (as Teleutias had done twenty-seven years before),
-where they seized both property on shipboard and men on the quay,
-before there was any force ready to repel them.[801] The Thessalian
-marauders were ultimately driven back to their harbor of Pegasæ; yet
-not without much annoyance to the insular confederates, and some
-disgrace to Athens. The defeated admiral Leosthenes was condemned to
-death; while several trierarchs,—who, instead of serving in person,
-had performed the duties incumbent on them by deputy and by contract,
-were censured or put upon trial.[802]
-
-  [797] See Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p.
-  151, and the preceding page.
-
-  M. Rehdantz has put together, with great care and sagacity, all
-  the fragments of evidence respecting this obscure period; and
-  has elicited, as it seems to me, the most probable conclusions
-  deducible from such scanty premises.
-
-  [798] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 5, 4.
-
-  [799] We are fortunate enough to get this date exactly,—the
-  twenty third of the month Metageitnion, in the archonship of
-  Molon,—mentioned by Demosthenes adv. Polyklem, p. 1207, s. 5, 6.
-
-  [800] Diodor xvi, 95; Polyænus, vi, 2, 1.
-
-  [801] Polyænus, vi, 2, 2.
-
-  It must have been about this time (362-361 B.C.) that Alexander
-  of Pheræ sent envoys into Asia to engage the service of
-  Charidemus and his mercenary band, then in or near the troad. His
-  application was not accepted (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 675,
-  s. 192).
-
-  [802] Demosthenes, de Coronâ Trierarch. p. 1230, s. 9.
-
-  Diodorus farther states that the Athenians placed Chares in
-  command of a fleet for the protection of the Ægean; but that this
-  admiral took himself off to Korkyra, and did nothing but plunder
-  the allies (Diodor. xvi, 95).
-
-Not only had the affairs of Athens in the Hellespont become worse
-under Ergophilus than under Timotheus, but Kallisthenes also, who had
-succeeded Timotheus in the operations against Amphipolis, achieved no
-permanent result. It would appear that the Amphipolitans, to defend
-themselves against Athens, had invoked the aid of the Macedonian
-king Perdikkas; and placed their city in his hands. That prince had
-before acted in conjunction with the Athenian force under Timotheus
-against Olynthus; and their joint invasion had so much weakened
-the Olynthians as to disable them from affording aid to Amphipolis.
-At least, this hypothesis explains how Amphipolis came now, for the
-first time, to be no longer a free city; but to be disjoined from
-Olynthus, and joined with (probably garrisoned by) Perdikkas, as a
-possession of Macedonia.[803] Kallisthenes thus found himself at
-war under greater disadvantages than Timotheus; having Perdikkas
-as his enemy, together with Amphipolis. Nevertheless, it would
-appear, he gained at first great advantages, and reduced Perdikkas
-to the necessity of purchasing a truce by the promise to abandon
-the Amphipolitans. The Macedonian prince, however, having gained
-time during the truce to recover his strength, no longer thought of
-performing his promise, but held Amphipolis against the Athenians as
-obstinately as before. Kallisthenes had let slip an opportunity which
-never again returned. After having announced at Athens the victorious
-truce and the approaching surrender, he seems to have been compelled,
-on his return, to admit that he had been cheated into suspending
-operations, at a moment when (as it seemed) Amphipolis might have
-been conquered. For this misjudgment or misconduct he was put upon
-trial at Athens, on returning to his disappointed countrymen; and at
-the same time Ergophilus also, who had been summoned home from the
-Chersonesus for his ill-success or bad management of the war against
-Kotys.[804] The people were much incensed against both; but most
-against Ergophilus. Nevertheless it happened that Kallisthenes was
-tried first, and condemned to death. On the next day, Ergophilus was
-tried. But the verdict of the preceding day had discharged the wrath
-of the dikasts, and rendered them so much more indulgent, that they
-acquitted him.[805]
-
-  [803] Compare Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 174-176;
-  and Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 250, c. 14.
-
-  [804] The facts as stated in the text are the most probable
-  result, as it seems to me, derivable from Æschines, Fals. Leg. p.
-  250, c. 14.
-
-  [805] Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii, 3, 3.
-
-  Ergophilus seems to have been fined (Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p.
-  398, s. 200).
-
-Autokles was sent in place of Ergophilus to carry on war for Athens
-in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. It was not merely against Kotys
-that his operations were necessary. The Prokonnesians, allies of
-Athens, required protection against the attacks of Kyzikus; besides
-which, there was another necessity yet more urgent. The stock of
-corn was becoming short, and the price rising, not merely at Athens,
-but at many of the islands in the Ægean, and at Byzantium and other
-places. There prevailed therefore unusual anxiety, coupled with keen
-competition, for the corn in course of importation from the Euxine.
-The Byzantines, Chalkedonians, and Kyzikenes, had already begun to
-detain the passing corn-ships, for the supply of their own markets;
-and nothing less than a powerful Athenian fleet could ensure the safe
-transit of such supplies to Athens herself.[806] The Athenian fleet,
-guarding the Bosphorus even from the Hieron inwards (the chapel near
-the junction of the Bosphorus with the Euxine), provided safe convoy
-for the autumnal exports of this essential article.
-
-  [806] Demosthen. adv. Polyklem. p. 1207. s. 6.
-
-In carrying on operations against Kotys, Autokles was favored with
-an unexpected advantage by the recent revolt of a powerful Thracian
-named Miltokythes against that prince. This revolt so alarmed Kotys,
-that he wrote a letter to Athens in a submissive tone, and sent
-envoys to purchase peace by various concessions. At the same time
-Miltokythes also first sent envoys—next, went in person—to Athens, to
-present his own case and solicit aid. He was however coldly received.
-The vote of the Athenian assembly, passed on hearing the case (and
-probably procured in part through the friends of Iphikrates), was so
-unfavorable,[807] as to send him away not merely in discouragement,
-but in alarm; while Kotys recovered all his power in Thrace, and
-even became master of the Sacred Mountain with its abundance of
-wealthy deposits. Nevertheless, in spite of this imprudent vote,
-the Athenians really intended to sustain Miltokythes against Kotys.
-Their general Autokles was recalled after a few months, and put
-upon his trial for having suffered Kotys to put down this enemy
-unassisted.[808] How the trial ended or how the justice of the
-case stood, we are unable to make out from the passing allusions of
-Demosthenes.
-
-  [807] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 655, s. 122; cont.
-  Polyklem. p. 1207.
-
-  ὅτε Μιλτοκύθης ἀπέστη Κότυος ... ἐγράφη τι παρ’ ὑμῖν ψήφισμα
-  τοιοῦτον, δι’ οὗ Μιλτοκύθης μὲν ~ἀπῆλθε~ φοβηθεὶς καὶ νομίσας
-  ὑμᾶς οὐ προσέχειν αὐτῷ, Κότυς δὲ ἐγκρατὴς τοῦ τε ὄρους τοῦ ἱεροῦ
-  καὶ τῶν θησαυρῶν ἐγένετο.
-
-  The word ἀπῆλθε implies that Miltokythes was at Athens in person.
-
-  The humble letter written by Kotys, in his first alarm at the
-  revolt of Miltokythes, is referred to by the orator, p. 658, s.
-  136, 137.
-
-  [808] Demosthenes adv. Polykl. p. 1210, s. 16; Demosthenes cont.
-  Aristok. p. 655, s. 123.
-
-Menon was sent as commander to the Hellespont to supersede Autokles;
-and was himself again superseded after a few months, by Timomachus.
-Convoy for the corn-vessels out of the Euxine became necessary anew,
-as in the preceding year; and was furnished a second time during the
-autumn of 361 B.C. by the Athenian ships of war;[809] not merely for
-provisions under transport to Athens, but also for those going to
-Maroneia, Thasos, and other places in or near Thrace. But affairs in
-the Chersonese became yet more unfavorable to Athens. In the winter
-of 361-360 B.C., Kotys, with the coöperation of a body of Abydene
-citizens and Sestian exiles, who crossed the Hellespont from Abydos,
-contrived to surprise Sestos;[810] the most important place in the
-Chersonese, and the guard-post of the Hellespont on its European
-side, for all vessels passing in or out. The whole Chersonese was now
-thrown open to his aggressions. He made preparations for attacking
-Elæus and Krithôtê, the two other chief possessions of Athens, and
-endeavored to prevail on Iphikrates to take part in his projects. But
-that general, though he had assisted Kotys in defence against Athens,
-refused to commit the more patent treason involved in aggressive
-hostility against her. He even quitted Thrace, but not daring at once
-to visit Athens, retired to Lesbos.[811] In spite of his refusal,
-however, the settlers and possessions of Athens in the Chersonese
-were attacked and imperiled by Kotys, who claimed the whole peninsula
-as his own, and established toll-gatherers at Sestos to levy the dues
-both of strait and harbor.[812]
-
-  [809] Demosthen. adv. Polyklem, p. 1212, s. 24-26; p. 1213, s.
-  27; p. 1225, s. 71.
-
-  [810] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 673, s. 187. Ἐκ γὰρ
-  Ἀβύδου, τῆς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ὑμῖν ἐχθρᾶς, καὶ ὅθεν ἦσαν οἱ
-  Σηστὸν καταλαβόντες, εἰς Σηστὸν διέβαινεν, ἣν εἶχε Κότυς. (He is
-  speaking of Charidemus.)
-
-  The other oration of Demosthenes (adv. Polykl. p. 1212) contains
-  distinct intimation that Sestos was not lost by the Athenians
-  _until after November 361_ B.C. Apollodorus the Athenian
-  trierarch was in the town at that time, as well as various
-  friends whom he mentions; so that Sestos must have been still an
-  Athenian possession in November 361 B.C.
-
-  It is lucky for some points of historical investigation, that
-  the purpose of this oration against Polykles (composed by
-  Demosthenes, but spoken by Apollodorus) requires great precision
-  and specification of dates, even to months and days. Apollodorus
-  complains that he has been constrained to bear the expense of
-  a trierarchy, for four months beyond the year in which it was
-  incumbent upon him jointly with a colleague. He sues the person
-  whose duty it was to have relieved him as successor at the end of
-  the year, but who had kept aloof and cheated him. The trierarchy
-  of Apollodorus began in August 362 B.C., and lasted (not merely
-  to Aug. 361 B.C., its legal term, but) to November 361 B.C.
-
-  Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 144, note), in the
-  valuable chapters which he devotes to the obscure chronology of
-  the period, has overlooked this exact indication of the time
-  _after which_ the Athenians lost Sestos. He supposes the loss to
-  have taken place two or three years earlier.
-
-  [811] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 155.
-
-  [812] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 658, s. 136; p. 679, s.
-  211.
-
-  What is said in the latter passage about the youthful
-  Kersobleptes, is doubtless not less true of his father Kotys.
-
-The fortune of Athens in these regions was still unpropitious. All
-her late commanders, Ergophilus, Autokles, Menon, Timomachus, had
-been successively deficient in means, in skill, or in fidelity, and
-had undergone accusation at home.[813] Timomachus was now superseded
-by Kephisodotus, a man of known enmity towards both Iphikrates and
-Kotys.[814] But Kephisodotus achieved no more than his predecessors,
-and had even to contend against a new enemy, who crossed over from
-Abydos to Sestos to reinforce Kotys—Charidemus with the mercenary
-division under his command. That officer, since his service three
-years before under Timotheus against Amphipolis, had been for some
-time in Asia, especially in the Troad. He hired himself to the
-satrap Artabazus; of whose embarrassments he took advantage to
-seize by fraud the towns of Skepsis, Kebren, and Ilium; intending
-to hold them as a little principality.[815] Finding his position,
-however, ultimately untenable against the probable force of the
-satrap, he sent a letter across to the Chersonese, to the Athenian
-commander Kephisodotus, asking for Athenian triremes to transport
-his division across to Europe; in return for which, if granted, he
-engaged to crush Kotys and reconquer the Chersonese for Athens.
-This proposition, whether accepted or not, was never realized; for
-Charidemus was enabled, through a truce unexpectedly granted to
-him by the satrap, to cross over from Abydos to Sestos without any
-Athenian ships. But as soon as he found himself in the Chersonese,
-far from aiding Athens to recover that peninsula, he actually took
-service with Kotys against her; so that Elæeus and Krithôtê, her
-chief remaining posts, were in greater peril than ever.[816]
-
-  [813] Demosthen. pro Phormione, p. 960, s. 64; Demosth. Fals.
-  Leg. p. 398, s. 200.
-
-  [814] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 672, s. 184.
-
-  [815] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 671, s. 183. Compare
-  Pseudo-Aristot. Œconomic. ii, 30.
-
-  [816] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 672, 673.
-
-  The orator reads a letter (not cited however) from the governor
-  of Krithôtê, announcing the formidable increase of force which
-  threatened the place since the arrival of Charidemus.
-
-The victorious prospects of Kotys, however, were now unexpectedly
-arrested. After a reign of twenty-four years he was assassinated by
-two brothers, Python and Herakleides, Greeks from the city of Ænus in
-Thrace, and formerly students under Plato at Athens. They committed
-the act to avenge their father; upon whom, as it would appear, Kotys
-had inflicted some brutal insult, under the influence of that violent
-and licentious temper which was in him combined with an energetic
-military character.[817] Having made their escape, Python and his
-brother retired to Athens, where they were received with every
-demonstration of honor, and presented with the citizenship as well
-as with golden wreaths; partly as tyrannicides, partly as having
-relieved the Athenians from an odious and formidable enemy.[818]
-Disclaiming the warm eulogies heaped upon him by various speakers in
-the assembly, Python is said to have replied—“It was a god who did
-the deed; we only lent our hands:”[819] an anecdote, which, whether
-it be truth or fiction, illustrates powerfully the Greek admiration
-of tyrannicide.
-
-  [817] Aristotle (Politic. v, 8, 12) mentions the act and states
-  that the two young men did it to avenge their father. He does
-  not expressly say what Kotys had done to the father; but he
-  notices the event in illustration of the general category,—Πολλαὶ
-  δ’ ἐπιθέσεις γεγένηνται καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχύνεσθαι
-  τῶν μονάρχων τινάς (compare what Tacitus says about _mos
-  regius_—Annal. vi, 1). Aristotle immediately adds another case of
-  cruel mutilation inflicted by Kotys,—Ἀδάμας δ’ ἀπέστη Κότυος διὰ
-  τὸ ἐκτμηθῆναι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ παῖς ὢν, ὡς ὑβρισμένος.
-
-  Compare, about Kotys, Theopompus, Fragm. 33, ed. Didot, ap.
-  Athenæ. xii, p. 531, 532.
-
-  Böhnecke (Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte, p. 725,
-  726) places the death of Kotys in 359 B.C.; and seems to infer
-  from Athenæus (vi, p. 248; xii, p. 531) that he had actual
-  communication with Philip of Macedon as king, whose accession
-  took place between Midsummer 360 and Midsummer 359 B.C. But the
-  evidence does not appear to me to bear out such a conclusion.
-
-  The story cited by Athenæus from Hegesander, about letters
-  reaching Philip from Kotys, cannot be true about this Kotys;
-  because it seems impossible that Philip, in the first year of
-  his reign, can have had any such flatterer as Kleisophus; Philip
-  being at that time in the greatest political embarrassments, out
-  of which he was only rescued by his indefatigable energy and
-  ability. And the journey of Philip to Onokarsis, also mentioned
-  by Athenæus out of Theopompus, does not imply any personal
-  communication with Kotys.
-
-  My opinion is, that the assassination of Kotys dates more
-  probably in 360 B.C.
-
-  [818] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 142; p. 662, s.
-  150; p. 675, s. 193. Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 542 E.; Plutarch,
-  adv. Koloten, p. 1126, B.
-
-  [819] Plutarch, De Sui Laude, _ut sup._
-
-The death of Kotys gave some relief to Athenian affairs in the
-Chersonese. Of his children, even the eldest, Kersobleptes, was only
-a youth:[820] moreover two other Thracian chiefs, Berisades and
-Amadokus, now started up as pretenders to shares in the kingdom of
-Thrace. Kersobleptes employed as his main support and minister the
-mercenary general Charidemus, who either had already married, or
-did now marry, his sister; a nuptial connection had been formed in
-like manner by Amadokus with two Greeks named Simon and Bianor—and
-by Berisades with an Athenian citizen named Athenodorus, who (like
-Iphikrates and others) had founded a city, and possessed a certain
-independent dominion, in or near the Chersonese.[821] These Grecian
-mercenary chiefs thus united themselves by nuptial ties to the
-princes whom they served, as Seuthes had proposed to Xenophon, and as
-the Italian Condottieri of the fifteenth century ennobled themselves
-by similar alliance with princely families—for example, Sforza
-with the Visconti of Milan. All these three Thracian competitors
-were now represented by Grecian agents. But at first, it seems,
-Charidemus on behalf of Kersobleptes was the strongest. He and his
-army were near Perinthus on the north coast of the Propontis, where
-the Athenian commander, Kephisodotus, visited him, with a small
-squadron of ten triremes, in order to ask for the fulfilment of those
-fair promises which Charidemus had made in his letter from Asia. But
-Charidemus treated the Athenians as enemies, attacked by surprise
-the seamen on shore, and inflicted upon them great damage. He then
-pressed the Chersonese severely for several months, and marched
-even into the midst of it, to protect a nest of pirates whom the
-Athenians were besieging at the neighboring islet on its western
-coast—Alopekonnesus. At length, after seven months of unprofitable
-warfare (dating from the death of Kotys), he forced Kephisodotus
-to conclude with him a convention so disastrous and dishonorable,
-that as soon as known at Athens, it was indignantly repudiated.[822]
-Kephisodotus, being recalled in disgrace, was put upon his trial, and
-fined; the orator Demosthenes (we are told), who had served as one of
-the trierarchs in the fleet, being among his accusers.[823]
-
-  [820] Demosthen. cont. Aristokr. p. 674, s. 193. μειρακύλλιον,
-  etc.
-
-  [821] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 623, 624, s. 8-12; p. 664, s.
-  153 (in which passage κηδεστὴς may be fairly taken to mean any
-  near connection by marriage).
-
-  About Athenodorus compare Isokrates, Or. viii, (de Pace) s. 31.
-
-  [822] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 674-676, s. 193-199.
-
-  In sect. 194, are the words, ~ἧκε δὲ Κηφισόδοτος στρατηγῶν~,
-  πρὸς ὃν αὐτὸς (Charidemus) ἔπεμψε τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐκείνην, καὶ
-  αἱ τριήρεις, αἳ, ὅτ’ ἦν ἄδηλα τὰ τῆς σωτηρίας αὐτῷ, καὶ μὴ
-  συγχωροῦντος Ἀρταβάζου σώζειν ἔμελλον αὐτόν.
-
-  The verb ἧκε, in my judgment—not to the _first coming out_ of
-  Kephisodotus from Athens to take the command, as Weber (Comment.
-  ad Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 460) and other commentators
-  think, but—to the coming of Kephisodotus with ten triremes _to
-  Perinthus_, near which place Charidemus was, for the purpose of
-  demanding fulfilment of what the latter had promised; see s.
-  196. When Kephisodotus came to him at Perinthus (παρόντος τοῦ
-  στρατηγοῦ—πρὸς ὃν τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐπεπόμφει—s. 195) to make this
-  demand, then Charidemus, instead of behaving honestly, acted like
-  a traitor and an enemy. The allusion to this antecedent letter
-  from Charidemus to Kephisodotus, shows that the latter must have
-  been on the spot for some time, and therefore that ἧκε cannot
-  refer to his first coming out.
-
-  The term ἑπτὰ μῆνας (s. 196) counts, I presume, from the death of
-  Kotys.
-
-  [823] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 199; Æschines cont.
-  Ktesiphont. p. 384, c. 20.
-
-  Demosthenes himself may probably have been among the trierarchs
-  called before the dikastery as witnesses to prove what took place
-  at Perinthus and Alopekonnesus (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p.
-  676, s. 200); Euthykles, the speaker of the discourse against
-  Aristokrates, had been himself also among the officers serving
-  (p. 675, s. 196; p. 683, s. 223).
-
-Among the articles of this unfavorable convention, one was that
-the Greek city of Kardia should be specially reserved to Charidemus
-himself. That city—eminently convenient from its situation on
-the isthmus connecting the Chersonese with Thrace—claimed by the
-Athenians as within the Chersonese, yet at the same time intensely
-hostile to Athens—became his principal station.[824] He was fortunate
-enough to seize, through treachery, the person of the Thracian
-Miltokythes, who had been the pronounced enemy of Kotys, and had
-coöperated with Athens. But he did not choose to hand over this
-important prisoner to Kersobleptes, because the life of Miltokythes
-would thus have been saved: it not being the custom of Thracians,
-in their intestine disputes, to put each other to death.[825] We
-remark with surprise a practice milder than that of Greece, amidst a
-people decidedly more barbarous and blood-thirsty than the Greeks.
-Charidemus accordingly surrendered Miltokythes to the Kardians,
-who put the prisoner with his son into a boat, took them a little
-way out to sea, slew the son before the eyes of the father, and
-then drowned the father himself.[826] It is not improbable that
-there may have been some special antecedent causes, occasioning
-intense antipathy on the part of the Kardians towards Miltokythes,
-and inducing Charidemus to hand him over to them as an acceptable
-subject for revenge. However this may be, their savage deed kindled
-violent indignation among all the Thracians, and did much injury to
-the cause of Kersobleptes and Charidemus. Though Kephisodotus had
-been recalled, and though a considerable interval elapsed before any
-successor came from Athens, yet Berisades and Amadokus joined their
-forces in one common accord, and sent to the Athenians propositions
-of alliance, with request for pecuniary aid. Athenodorus, the general
-of Berisades, putting himself at the head of Thracians and Athenians
-together, found himself superior in the field to Kersobleptes and
-Charidemus; whom he constrained to accept a fresh convention dictated
-by himself. Herein it was provided, that the kingdom of Thrace should
-be divided in equal portions between the three competitors; that
-all three should concur in surrendering the Chersonese to Athens;
-and that the son of a leading man named Iphiades at Sestos, held
-by Charidemus as hostage for the adherence of that city, should be
-surrendered to Athens also.[827]
-
-  [824] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 679, s. 209; p. 681, s.
-  216. Demosthen. de Halonneso, p. 87, s. 42.
-
-  [825] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 201. οὐκ ὄντος
-  νομίμου τοῖς Θρᾳξὶν ἀλλήλους ἀποκτιννύναι, etc.
-
-  [826] Demosthenes, cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 201.
-
-  [827] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 202-204.
-
-  Aristotle (Politic. v. 5, 9) mentions the association or faction
-  of Iphiades as belonging to Abydos, not to Sestos. Perhaps there
-  may have been an Abydene association now exercising influence at
-  Sestos; at least we are told, that the revolution which deprived
-  the Athenians of Sestos, was accomplished in part by exiles who
-  crossed from Abydos; something like the relation between Argos
-  and Corinth in the years immediately preceding the peace of
-  Antalkidas.
-
-This new convention, sworn on both sides, promised to Athens the full
-acquisition which she desired. Considering the thing as done, the
-Athenians sent Chabrias as commander in one trireme to receive the
-surrender, but omitted to send the money requested by Athenodorus;
-who was accordingly constrained to disband his army for want of
-pay. Upon this Kersobleptes and Charidemus at once threw up their
-engagement, refused to execute the convention just sworn, and
-constrained Chabrias, who had come without any force, to revert to
-the former convention concluded with Kephisodotus. Disappointed and
-indignant, the Athenians disavowed the act of Chabrias, in spite
-of his high reputation. They sent ten envoys to the Chersonese,
-insisting that the convention of Athenodorus should be resworn by all
-the three Thracian competitors—Berisades, Amadokus, Kersobleptes;
-if the third declined, the envoys were instructed to take measures
-for making war upon him, while they received the engagements of
-the other two. But such a mission, without arms, obtained nothing
-from Charidemus and Kersobleptes, except delay or refusal; while
-Berisades and Amadokus sent to Athens bitter complaints respecting
-the breach of faith. At length, after some months—just after the
-triumphant conclusion of the expedition of Athens against Eubœa (358
-B.C.)—the Athenian Chares arrived in the Chersonese, at the head
-of a considerable mercenary force. Then at length the two recusants
-were compelled to swear anew to the convention of Athenodorus, in the
-presence of the latter as well as of Berisades and Amadokus.[828]
-And it would appear that before long, its conditions were realized.
-Charidemus surrendered the Chersonese, of course including its
-principal town Sestos, to Athens;[829] yet he retained for himself
-Kardia,[830] which was affirmed (though the Athenians denied it)
-not to be included in the boundaries of that peninsula. The kingdom
-of Thrace was also divided between Kersobleptes, Berisades, and
-Amadokus; which triple division, diminishing the strength of each,
-was regarded by Athens as a great additional guarantee for her secure
-possession of the Chersonese.[831]
-
-  [828] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 678, p. 205, 206; p. 680.
-  s. 211, 212. The arrival of Chares in the Hellespont is marked by
-  Demosthenes as immediately following the expedition of Athens to
-  drive the Thebans out of Eubœa, which took place about the middle
-  of 358 B.C.
-
-  [829] We see that Sestos must have been surrendered on this
-  occasion, although Diodorus describes it as having been conquered
-  by Chares five years afterwards, in the year 353 B.C. (Diod.
-  xvi, 34). It is evident from the whole tenor of the oration
-  of Demosthenes, that Charidemus did actually surrender the
-  Chersonese at this time. Had he still refused to surrender
-  Sestos, the orator would not have failed to insist on the fact
-  emphatically against him. Besides, Demosthenes says, comparing
-  the conduct of Philip towards the Olynthians, with that of
-  Kersobleptes towards Athens—ἐκεῖνος ἐκείνοις Ποτίδαιαν οὐχὶ
-  τηνικαῦτ’ ἀπέδωκεν, ἥνικ’ ἀποστερεῖν οὐκέθ’ οἷός τ’ ἦν, ὥσπερ
-  ὑμῖν Κερσοβλέπτης Χεῤῥόνησον (p. 656. s. 128). This distinctly
-  announces that the Chersonese was _given back_ to Athens, though
-  reluctantly and tardily, by Kersobleptes. Sestos must have been
-  given up along with it, as the principal and most valuable post
-  upon all accounts. If it be true (as Diodorus states) that
-  Chares in 353 B.C. took Sestos by siege, slew the inhabitants
-  of military age and reduced the rest to slavery—we must suppose
-  the town again to have revolted between 358 and 353 B.C.; that
-  is, during the time of the Social War; which is highly probable.
-  But there is much in the statement of Diodorus which I cannot
-  distinctly make out; for he says that Kersobleptes in 353 B.C.,
-  on account of his hatred towards Philip, surrendered to Athens
-  all the cities in the Chersonese except Kardia. That had already
-  been done in 358 B.C., and without any reference to Philip; and
-  if after surrendering the Chersonese in 358 B.C., Kersobleptes
-  had afterwards reconquered it, so as to have it again in his
-  possession in the beginning of 353 B.C.—it seems unaccountable
-  that Demosthenes should say nothing about the reconquest in his
-  oration against Aristokrates, where he is trying to make all
-  points possible against Kersobleptes.
-
-  [830] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 681, s. 216.
-
-  [831] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 623, s. 8; p. 654, s. 121.
-  The chronology of these events as given by Rehdantz (Vitæ
-  Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 147) appears to me nearly correct,
-  in spite of the strong objection expressed against it by Weber
-  (Prolegg. ad Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. lxxiii.)—and more
-  exact than the chronology of Böhnecke, Forschungen, p. 727,
-  who places the coming out of Kephisodotus as general to the
-  Chersonese in 358 B.C., which is, I think, a full year too late.
-  Rehdantz does not allow, as I think he ought to do, for a certain
-  interval between Kephisodotus and the Ten Envoys, during which
-  Athenodorus acted for Athens.
-
-It was thus that Athens at length made good her possession of the
-Chersonese against the neighboring Thracian potentates. And it
-would seem that her transmarine power, with its dependencies and
-confederates, now stood at a greater height than it had ever reached
-since the terrible reverses of 405 B.C. Among them were numbered not
-only a great number of the Ægean islands (even the largest, Eubœa,
-Chios, Samos, and Rhodes), but also the continental possessions of
-Byzantium—the Chersonese—Maroneia[832] with other places on the
-southern coast of Thrace—and Pydna, Methônê, and Potidæa, with most
-of the region surrounding the Thermaic Gulf.[833] This last portion
-of empire had been acquired at the cost of the Olynthian fraternal
-alliance of neighboring cities, against which Athens too, as well as
-Sparta, by an impulse most disastrous for the future independence of
-Greece, had made war with inauspicious success. The Macedonian king
-Perdikkas, with a just instinct towards the future aggrandizement of
-his dynasty, had assisted her in thus weakening Olynthus; feeling
-that the towns on the Thermaic Gulf, if they formed parts of a
-strong Olynthian confederacy of brothers and neighbors, reciprocally
-attached and self-sustaining, would resist Macedonia more
-effectively, than if they were half-reluctant dependencies of Athens,
-even with the chances of Athenian aid by sea. The aggressive hand of
-Athens against Olynthus, indeed, between 368-363 B.C., was hardly
-less mischievous, to Greece generally, than that of Sparta had been
-between 382-380 B.C. Sparta had crushed the Olynthian confederacy in
-its first brilliant promise—Athens prevented it from rearing its head
-anew. Both conspired to break down the most effective barrier against
-Macedonian aggrandizement; neither were found competent to provide
-any adequate protection to Greece in its room.
-
-  [832] Demosthen. cont. Polyklem, p. 1212, s. 26.
-
-  [833] Demosthen. Philippic. I, p. 41, s. 6. εἴχομέν ποτε ἡμεῖς, ὦ
-  ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Πύδναν καὶ Ποτίδαιαν καὶ Μεθώνην ~καὶ πάντα τὸν
-  τόπον τοῦτον οἰκεῖον κύκλῳ~, etc.
-
-The maximum of her second empire, which I have remarked that Athens
-attained by the recovery of the Chersonese,[834] lasted but for a
-moment. During the very same year, there occurred that revolt among
-her principal allies, known by the name of the Social War, which gave
-to her power a fatal shock, and left the field comparatively clear
-for the early aggressions of her yet more formidable enemy—Philip
-of Macedon. That prince had already emerged from his obscurity as a
-hostage in Thebes, and had succeeded his brother Perdikkas, slain
-in a battle with the Illyrians, as king (360-359 B.C.). At first,
-his situation appeared not merely difficult, but almost hopeless.
-Not the most prescient eye in Greece could have recognized, in the
-inexperienced youth struggling at his first accession against rivals
-at home, enemies abroad, and embarrassments of every kind—the future
-conqueror of Chæroneia, and destroyer of Grecian independence. How,
-by his own genius, energy, and perseverance, assisted by the faults
-and dissensions of his Grecian enemies, he attained his inauspicious
-eminence—will be recounted in my subsequent volume.
-
-  [834] I have not made any mention of the expedition against Eubœa
-  (whereby Athens drove the Theban invaders out of that island),
-  though it occurred just about the same time as the recovery of
-  the Chersonese.
-
-  That expedition will more properly come to be spoken of in my
-  next volume. But the recovery of the Chersonese was the closing
-  event of a series of proceedings which had been going on for four
-  years; so that I could hardly leave that series unfinished.
-
-       *       *       *       *       *
-
-At the opening of my ninth volume, after the surrender of Athens,
-Greece was under the Spartan empire. Its numerous independent
-city-communities were more completely regimented under one chief than
-they had ever been before, Athens and Thebes being both numbered
-among the followers of Sparta.
-
-But the conflicts recounted in these two volumes (during an interval
-of forty-four years—404-403 B.C. to 360-359 B.C.) have wrought
-the melancholy change of leaving Greece more disunited, and more
-destitute of presiding Hellenic authority, than she had been at
-any time since the Persian invasion. Thebes, Sparta, and Athens,
-had all been engaged in weakening each other; in which, unhappily,
-each has been far more successful than in strengthening herself.
-The maritime power of Athens is now indeed considerable, and may be
-called very great, if compared with the state of degradation to which
-she had been brought in 403 B.C. But it will presently be seen how
-unsubstantial is the foundation of her authority, and how fearfully
-she has fallen off from that imperial feeling and energy which
-ennobled her ancestors under the advice of Perikles.
-
-It is under these circumstances, so untoward for defence, that the
-aggressor from Macedonia arises.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXXI.
-
-SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT
-BEFORE SYRACUSE.
-
-
-In the sixtieth chapter of this work, I brought down the history
-of the Grecian communities in Sicily to the close of the Athenian
-siege of Syracuse, where Nikias and Demosthenes with nearly their
-entire armament perished by so lamentable a fate. I now resume from
-that point the thread of Sicilian events, which still continues so
-distinct from those of Peloponnesus and Eastern Greece, that it is
-inconvenient to include both in the same chapters.
-
-If the destruction of the great Athenian armament (in September 413
-B.C.) excited the strongest sensation throughout every part of the
-Grecian world, we may imagine the intoxication of triumph with which
-it must have been hailed in Sicily. It had been achieved (Gylippus
-and the Peloponnesian allies aiding) by the united efforts of nearly
-all the Grecian cities in the island,—for all of them had joined
-Syracuse as soon as her prospects became decidedly encouraging;
-except Naxos and Katana, which were allied with the Athenians,—and
-Agrigentum, which remained neutral.[835] Unfortunately we know
-little or nothing of the proceedings of the Syracusans, immediately
-following upon circumstances of so much excitement and interest. They
-appear to have carried on war against Katana, where some fugitives
-from the vanquished Athenian army contributed to the resistance
-against them.[836] But both this city and Naxos, though exposed to
-humiliation and danger as allies of the defeated Athenians, contrived
-to escape without the loss of their independence. The allies of
-Syracuse were probably not eager to attack them, and thereby to
-aggrandize that city farther; while the Syracusans themselves also
-would be sensible of great exhaustion, arising from the immense
-efforts through which alone their triumph had been achieved. The
-pecuniary burdens to which they had been obliged to submit—known
-to Nikias during the last months of the siege,[837] and fatally
-misleading his judgment,—were so heavy as to task severely their
-powers of endurance. After paying, and dismissing with appropriate
-gratitude, the numerous auxiliaries whom they had been obliged to
-hire,—after celebrating the recent triumph, and decorating the
-temples, in a manner satisfactory to the exuberant joy of the
-citizens[838]—there would probably be a general disposition to repose
-rather than to aggressive warfare. There would be much destruction to
-be repaired throughout their territory, poorly watched or cultivated
-during the year of the siege.
-
-  [835] Thucyd. vii, 50-58.
-
-  [836] Lysias, Orat. xx, (pro Polystrato) s. 26, 27.
-
-  [837] Thucyd. vii, 48, 49.
-
-  [838] Diodor. xiii, 34.
-
-In spite of such exhaustion, however, the sentiment of exasperation
-and vengeance against Athens, combined with gratitude towards the
-Lacedæmonians, was too powerful to be balked. A confident persuasion
-reigned throughout Greece that Athens[839] could not hold out for one
-single summer after her late terrific disaster; a persuasion, founded
-greatly on the hope of a large auxiliary squadron to act against her
-from Syracuse and her other enemies in Sicily and Italy. In this day
-of Athenian distress, such enemies of course became more numerous.
-Especially the city of Thurii in Italy,[840] which had been friendly
-to Athens and had furnished aid to Demosthenes in his expedition
-to Sicily, now underwent a change, banished three hundred of the
-leading philo-Athenian citizens (among them the rhetor Lysias), and
-espoused the Peloponnesian cause with ardor. The feeling of reaction
-at Thurii, and of vengeance at Syracuse, stimulated the citizens of
-both places to take active part in an effort promising to be easy
-and glorious, for the destruction of Athens and her empire. And
-volunteers were doubtless the more forward, as the Persian satraps of
-the sea-board were now competing with each other in invitations to
-the Greeks, with offers of abundant pay.
-
-  [839] Thucyd. viii, 2; compare vii, 55.
-
-  [840] Thucyd. vii, 33-57; Dionysius Halikarn. Judic. de Lysiâ, p.
-  453.
-
-Accordingly, in the summer of the year 412 B.C. (the year following
-the catastrophe of the Athenian armament,) a Sicilian squadron of
-twenty triremes from Syracuse and two from Selinus, under the command
-of Hermokrates, reached Peloponnesus and joined the Lacedæmonian
-fleet in its expedition across the Ægean to Miletus. Another
-squadron of ten triremes from Thurii, under the Rhodian Dorieus,
-and a farther reinforcement from Tarentum, and Lokri, followed soon
-after. It was Hermokrates who chiefly instigated his countrymen to
-this effort.[841] Throughout the trying months of the siege, he
-had taken a leading part in the defence of Syracuse, seconding the
-plans of Gylippus with equal valor and discretion. As commander of
-the Syracusan squadron in the main fleet now acting against Athens
-in the Ægean (events already described in my sixty-first chapter),
-his conduct was not less distinguished. He was energetic in action,
-and popular in his behavior towards those under his command; but
-what stood out most conspicuously as well as most honorably, was
-his personal incorruptibility. While the Peloponnesian admiral and
-trierarchs accepted the bribes of Tissaphernes, conniving at his
-betrayal of the common cause and breach of engagement towards the
-armament, with indifference to the privations of their own unpaid
-seamen,—Hermokrates and Dorieus were strenuous in remonstrance, even
-to the extent of drawing upon themselves the indignant displeasure
-of the Peloponnesian admiral Astyochus, as well as of the satrap
-himself.[842] They were the more earnest in performing this duty,
-because the Syracusan and Thurian triremes were manned by freemen in
-larger proportion than the remaining fleet.[843]
-
-  [841] Thucyd. viii, 26, 35, 91.
-
-  [842] Thucyd. viii, 29, 45, 78, 84.
-
-  [843] Thucyd. viii, 84.
-
-The sanguine expectation, however, entertained by Hermokrates and his
-companions in crossing the sea from Sicily,—that one single effort
-would gloriously close the war,—was far from being realized. Athens
-resisted with unexpected energy; the Lacedæmonians were so slack
-and faint-hearted, that they even let slip the golden opportunity
-presented to them by the usurpation of the Athenian Four Hundred.
-Tissaphernes was discovered to be studiously starving and protracting
-the war for purposes of his own, which Hermokrates vainly tried
-to counter-work by a personal visit and protest at Sparta.[844]
-Accordingly, the war trailed on with fluctuating success, and even
-renovated efficiency on the part of Athens; so that the Syracusans
-at home, far from hearing announced the accomplishment of those
-splendid anticipations under which their squadron had departed,
-received news generally unfavorable, and at length positively
-disastrous. They were informed that their seamen were ill-paid and
-distressed; while Athens, far from striking her colors, had found
-means to assemble a fleet at Samos competent still to dispute the
-mastery of the Ægean. They heard of two successive naval defeats,
-which the Peloponnesian and Syracusan fleets sustained in the
-Hellespont[845] (one at Kynossema,—411 B.C.,—a second between Abydos
-and Dardanus,—410 B.C.); and at length of a third, more decisive and
-calamitous than the preceding,—the battle of Kyzikus (409 B.C.),
-wherein the Lacedæmonian admiral Mindarus was slain, and the whole
-of his fleet captured or destroyed. In this defeat the Syracusan
-squadron were joint sufferers. Their seamen were compelled to burn
-all their triremes without exception, in order to prevent them from
-falling into the hands of the enemy; and were left destitute, without
-clothing or subsistence, on the shores of the Propontis amidst the
-satrapy of Pharnabazus.[846] That satrap, with generous forwardness,
-took them into his pay, advanced to them clothing and provision for
-two months, and furnished them with timber from the woods of Mount
-Ida to build fresh ships. At Antandrus (in the Gulf of Adramyttium,
-one great place of export for Idæan timber), where the reconstruction
-took place, the Syracusans made themselves so acceptable and useful
-to the citizens, that a vote of thanks and a grant of citizenship was
-passed to all of them who chose to accept it.[847]
-
-  [844] Thucyd. viii, 85.
-
-  [845] Thucyd. viii, 105; Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 7.
-
-  [846] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 19.
-
-  [847] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 23-26.
-
-In recounting this battle, I cited the brief and rude despatch,
-addressed to the Lacedæmonians by Hippokrates, surviving second
-officer of the slain Mindarus, describing the wretched condition of
-the defeated armament—“Our honor is gone. Mindarus is slain. The men
-are hungry. We know not what to do.”[848] This curious despatch has
-passed into history, because it was intercepted by the Athenians, and
-never reached its destination. But without doubt the calamitous state
-of facts, which it was intended to make known, flew rapidly, under
-many different forms of words, both to Peloponnesus and to Syracuse.
-Sad as the reality was, the first impression made by the news would
-probably be yet sadder; since the intervention of Pharnabazus,
-whereby the sufferers were so much relieved, would hardly be felt
-or authenticated until after some interval. At Syracuse, the event
-on being made known excited not only powerful sympathy with the
-sufferers, but also indignant displeasure against Hermokrates and
-his colleagues; who, having instigated their countrymen three years
-before, by sanguine hopes and assurances, to commence a foreign
-expedition for the purpose of finally putting down Athens, had not
-only achieved nothing, but had sustained a series of reverses, ending
-at length in utter ruin, from the very enemy whom they had pronounced
-to be incapable of farther resistance.
-
-  [848] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 23. Ἔῤῥει τὰ καλά. Μίνδαρος ἀπεσσούα·
-  πεινῶντι τὤνδρες· ἀπορέομες τί χρὴ δρᾷν.
-
-It was under such sentiment of displeasure, shortly after the defeat
-of Kyzikus, that a sentence of banishment was passed at Syracuse
-against Hermokrates and his colleagues. The sentence was transmitted
-to Asia, and made known by Hermokrates himself to the armament,
-convoked in public meeting. While lamenting and protesting against
-its alleged injustice and illegality, he entreated the armament to
-maintain unabated good behavior for the future, and to choose new
-admirals for the time, until the successors nominated at Syracuse
-should arrive. The news was heard with deep regret by the trierarchs,
-the pilots, and the maritime soldiers or marines; who, attached
-to Hermokrates from his popular manner, his constant openness of
-communication with them, and his anxiety to collect their opinions,
-loudly proclaimed that they would neither choose, nor serve under,
-any other leaders.[849] But the admirals repressed this disposition,
-deprecating any resistance to the decree of the city. They laid down
-their command, inviting any man dissatisfied with them to prefer his
-complaint at once publicly, and reminding the soldiers of the many
-victories and glorious conflicts, both by land and sea, which had
-knit them together by the ties of honorable fellowship. No man stood
-forward to accuse them; and they consented, on the continued request
-of the armament, to remain in command, until their three successors
-arrived—Demarchus, Myskon, and Potamis. They then retired amidst
-universal regret; many of the trierarchs even binding themselves
-by oath, that on returning to Syracuse they would procure their
-restoration. The change of commanders took place at Miletus.[850]
-
-  [849] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 27.
-
-  [850] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 27-31.
-
-Though Hermokrates, in his address to the soldiers, would doubtless
-find response when he invoked the remembrance of past victories, yet
-he would hardly have found the like response in a Syracusan assembly.
-For if we review the proceedings of the armament since he conducted
-it from Syracuse to join the Peloponnesian fleet, we shall find that
-on the whole his expedition had been a complete failure, and that
-his assurances of success against Athens had ended in nothing but
-disappointment. There was therefore ample cause for the discontent
-of his countrymen. But on the other hand, as far as our limited
-means of information enable us to judge, the sentence of banishment
-against him appears to have been undeserved and unjust. For we
-cannot trace the ill-success of Hermokrates to any misconduct or
-omission on his part; while in regard to personal incorruptibility,
-and strenuous resistance to the duplicity of Tissaphernes, he stood
-out as an honorable exception among a body of venal colleagues. That
-satrap, indeed, as soon as Hermokrates had fallen into disgrace,
-circulated a version of his own, pretending that the latter, having
-asked money from him and been refused, had sought by calumnious
-means to revenge such refusal.[851] But this story, whether believed
-elsewhere or not, found no credit with the other satrap Pharnabazus;
-who warmly espoused the cause of the banished general, presenting
-him with a sum of money even unsolicited. This money Hermokrates
-immediately employed in getting together triremes and mercenary
-soldiers to accomplish his restoration to Syracuse by force.[852]
-We shall presently see how he fared in this attempt. Meanwhile we
-may remark that the sentence of banishment, though in itself unjust,
-would appear amply justified in the eyes of his countrymen by his own
-subsequent resort to hostile measures against them.
-
-  [851] Thucyd. viii, 85.
-
-  [852] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 31; Diodor. xiii, 63.
-
-The party opposed to Hermokrates had now the preponderance in
-Syracuse, and by their influence probably the sentence against him
-was passed, under the grief and wrath occasioned by the defeat of
-Kyzikus. Unfortunately we have only the most scanty information as
-to the internal state of Syracuse during the period immediately
-succeeding the Athenian siege; a period of marked popular sentiment
-and peculiar interest. As at Athens under the pressure of the
-Xerxeian invasion—the energies of all the citizens, rich and poor,
-young and old, had been called forth for repulse of the common
-enemy, and had been not more than enough to achieve it. As at Athens
-after the battles of Salamis and Platæa, so at Syracuse after the
-destruction of the Athenian besiegers—the people, elate with the
-plenitude of recent effort, and conscious that the late successful
-defence had been the joint work of all, were in a state of animated
-democratical impulse, eager for the utmost extension and equality
-of political rights. Even before the Athenian siege, the government
-had been democratical; a fact, which Thucydides notices as among the
-causes of the successful defence, by rendering the citizens unanimous
-in resistance, and by preventing the besiegers from exciting
-intestine discontent.[853] But in the period immediately after the
-siege, it underwent changes which are said to have rendered it still
-more democratical. On the proposition of an influential citizen named
-Dioklês, a commission of Ten was named, of which he was president,
-for the purpose of revising both the constitution and the legislation
-of the city. Some organic alterations were adopted, one of which
-was, that the lot should be adopted, instead of the principle of
-election, in the nomination of magistrates. Furthermore, a new code,
-or collection of criminal and civil enactments, was drawn up and
-sanctioned. We know nothing of its details, but we are told that
-its penalties were extremely severe, its determination of offences
-minute and special, and its language often obscure as well as brief.
-It was known by the name of the Laws of Dioklês, the chief of the
-Committee who had prepared it. Though now adopted at Syracuse, it did
-not last long; for we shall find in five or six years the despotism
-of Dionysius extinguishing it, just as Peisistratus had put down
-the Solonian legislation at Athens. But it was again revived at the
-extinction of the Dionysian dynasty, after the lapse of more than
-sixty years; with comments and modifications by a committee, among
-whose members were the Corinthians Kephalus and Timoleon. It is also
-said to have been copied in various other Sicilian cities, and to
-have remained in force until the absorption of all Sicily under the
-dominion of the Romans.[854]
-
-  [853] Thucyd. vii, 55.
-
-  [854] Diodor. xiii, 33-35.
-
-We have the austere character of Dioklês illustrated by a story (of
-more than dubious credit,[855] and of which the like is recounted
-respecting other Grecian legislators), that having inadvertently
-violated one of his own enactments, he enforced the duty of obedience
-by falling on his own sword. But unfortunately we are not permitted
-to know the substance of his laws, which would have thrown so much
-light on the sentiments and position of the Sicilian Greeks. Nor can
-we distinctly make out to what extent the political constitution
-of Syracuse was now changed. For though Diodorus tells us that the
-lot was now applied to the nomination of magistrates, yet he does
-not state whether it was applied to all magistrates, or under what
-reserves and exceptions—such, for example, as those adopted at
-Athens. Aristotle too states that the Syracusan people, after the
-Athenian siege, changed their constitution from a partial democracy
-into an entire democracy. Yet he describes Dionysius, five or six
-years afterwards, as pushing himself up to the despotism, by the most
-violent demagogic opposition; and as having accused, disgraced, and
-overthrown certain rich leaders then in possession of the functions
-of government.[856] If the constitutional forms were rendered more
-democratical, it would seem that the practice cannot have materially
-changed, and that the persons actually in leading function still
-continued to be rich men.
-
-  [855] Compare Diodor. xiii, 75—about the banishment of Dioklês.
-
-  [856] Aristotel. Politic. v, 3, 6. Καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ὁ δῆμος,
-  αἴτιος γενόμενος τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐκ
-  πολιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλε.
-
-  v, 4, 4, 5. Καὶ Διονύσιος κατηγορῶν Δαφναίου καὶ τῶν πλουσίων
-  ἠξιώθη τῆς τυραννίδος, διὰ τὴν ἔχθραν πιστευθεὶς ὡς δημοτικὸς ὤν.
-
-The war carried on by the Syracusans against Naxos and Katana, after
-continuing more than three years,[857] was brought to a close by an
-enemy from without, even more formidable than Athens. This time, the
-invader was not Hellenic, but Phœnician—the ancient foe of Hellas,
-Carthage.
-
-  [857] Diodor. xiii, 56.
-
-It has been already recounted, how in the same eventful year (480
-B.C.) which transported Xerxes across the Hellespont to meet his
-defeat at Salamis, the Carthaginians had poured into Sicily a vast
-mercenary host under Hamilkar, for the purpose of reinstating in
-Himera the despot Terillus, who had been expelled by Theron of
-Agrigentum. On that occasion, Hamilkar had been slain, and his large
-army defeated, by the Syracusan despot Gelon, in the memorable battle
-of Himera. So deep had been the impression left by this defeat, that
-for the seventy years which intervened between 480-410 B.C., the
-Carthaginians had never again invaded the island. They resumed their
-aggressions shortly after the destruction of the Athenian power
-before Syracuse; which same event had also stimulated the Persians,
-who had been kept in restraint while the Athenian empire remained
-unimpaired, again to act offensively for the recovery of their
-dominion over the Asiatic Greeks. The great naval power of Athens,
-inspiring not merely reserve but even alarm to Carthage,[858] had
-been a safeguard to the Hellenic world both at its eastern and its
-western extremity. No sooner was that safeguard overthrown, than the
-hostile pressure of the foreigner began to be felt, as well upon
-Western Sicily as on the eastern coast of the Ægean.
-
-  [858] Thucyd. vi, 34. Speech of Hermokrates to his countrymen at
-  Syracuse—δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ἐς Καρχηδόνα ἄμεινον εἶναι πέμψαι. Οὐ
-  γὰρ ἀνέλπιστον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ διὰ φόβου εἰσὶ μή ποτε Ἀθηναῖοι
-  αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔλθωσιν, etc.
-
-From this time forward for two centuries, down to the conclusion of
-the second Punic war, the Carthaginians will be found frequent in
-their aggressive interventions in Sicily, and upon an extensive
-scale, so as to act powerfully on the destinies of the Sicilian
-Greeks. Whether any internal causes had occurred to make them
-abstain from intervention during the preceding generations, we are
-unable to say. The history of this powerful and wealthy city is very
-little known. We make out a few facts, which impart a general idea
-both of her oligarchical government and of her extensive colonial
-possessions, but which leave us in the dark as to her continuous
-history. Her possessions were most extensive, along the coast of
-Africa both eastward and westward from her city; comprehending also
-Sardinia and the Balearic isles, but (at this time, probably) few
-settlements in Spain. She had quite enough to occupy her attention
-elsewhere, without meddling in Sicilian affairs; the more so, as
-her province in Sicily was rather a dependent ally than a colonial
-possession. In the early treaties made with Rome, the Carthaginians
-restrict and even interdict the traffic of the Romans both with
-Sardinia and Africa (except Carthage itself), but they grant the
-amplest license of intercourse with the Carthaginian province of
-Sicily; which they consider as standing in the same relation to
-Carthage as the cities of Latium stood in to Rome.[859] While the
-connection of Carthage with Sicily was thus less close, it would
-appear that her other dependencies gave her much trouble, chiefly in
-consequence of her own harsh and extortionate dominion.
-
-  [859] Polybius, iii, 22, 23, 24.
-
-  He gives three separate treaties (either wholly or in part)
-  between the Carthaginians and Romans. The latest of the three
-  belongs to the days of Pyrrhus, about 278 B.C.; the earliest to
-  508 B.C. The intermediate treaty is not marked as to date by
-  any specific evidence, but I see no ground for supposing that
-  it is so late as 345 B.C., which is the date assigned to it by
-  Casaubon, identifying it with the treaty alluded to by Livy, vii,
-  27. I cannot but think that it is more likely to be of earlier
-  date, somewhere between 480-410 B.C. This second treaty is far
-  more restrictive than the first, against the Romans; for it
-  interdicts them from all traffic either with Sardinia or Africa,
-  except the city of Carthage itself; the first treaty permitted
-  such trade under certain limitations and conditions. The second
-  treaty argues a comparative superiority of Carthage to Rome,
-  which would rather seem to belong to the latter half of the fifth
-  century B.C., than to the latter half of the fourth.
-
-All our positive information, scanty as it is, about Carthage and
-her institutions, relates to the fourth, third, or second centuries
-B.C., yet it may be held to justify presumptive conclusions as to the
-fifth century B.C., especially in reference to the general system
-pursued. The maximum of her power was attained before her first war
-with Rome, which began in 264 B.C.; the first and second Punic wars
-both of them greatly reduced her strength and dominion. Yet in spite
-of such reduction we learn that about 150 B.C., shortly before the
-third Punic war, which ended in the capture and depopulation of the
-city, not less than seven hundred thousand souls[860] were computed
-in it, as occupants of a fortified circumference of above twenty
-miles, covering a peninsula with its isthmus. Upon this isthmus its
-citadel Byrsa was situated, surrounded by a triple wall of its own,
-and crowned at its summit by a magnificent temple of Æsculapius.
-The numerous population is the more remarkable, since Utica (a
-considerable city, colonized from Phœnicia more anciently than even
-Carthage itself, and always independent of the Carthaginians, though
-in the condition of an inferior and discontented ally), was within
-the distance of seven miles from Carthage[861] on the one side, and
-Tunis seemingly not much farther off on the other. Even at that time,
-too, the Carthaginians are said to have possessed three hundred
-tributary cities in Libya.[862] Yet this was but a small fraction of
-the prodigious empire which had belonged to them certainly in the
-fourth century B.C., and in all probability also between 480-410 B.C.
-That empire extended eastward as far as the Altars of the Philæni,
-near the Great Syrtis,—westward, all along the coast to the Pillars
-of Herakles and the western coast of Morocco. The line of coast
-south-east of Carthage, as far as the bay called the Lesser Syrtis,
-was proverbial (under the name of Byzacium and the Emporia) for its
-fertility. Along this extensive line were distributed indigenous
-Libyan tribes, living by agriculture; and a mixed population called
-Liby-Phœnicians, formed by intermarriage and coalition of some of
-these tribes either with colonists from Tyre and Sidon, or perhaps
-with a Canaanitish population akin in race to the Phœnicians, yet of
-still earlier settlement in the country.[863] These Liby-Phœnicians
-dwelt in towns, seemingly of moderate size and unfortified, but each
-surrounded by a territory ample and fertile, yielding large produce.
-They were assiduous cultivators, but generally unwarlike, which
-latter quality was ascribed by ancient theory to the extreme richness
-of their soil.[864] Of the Liby-Phœnician towns the number is not
-known to us, but it must have been prodigiously great, since we are
-told that both Agathokles and Regulus in their respective invasions
-captured no less than two hundred. A single district, called Tuska,
-is also spoken of as having fifty towns.[865]
-
-  [860] Strabo, xvii, p. 832, 833; Livy, Epitome, lib. 51.
-
-  Strabo gives the circumference as three hundred and sixty stadia,
-  and the breadth of the isthmus as sixty stadia. But this is
-  noticed by Barth as much exaggerated (Wanderungen auf der Küste
-  des Mittelmeers, p. 85).
-
-  [861] Appian. Reb. Punic, viii, 75.
-
-  [862] Strabo, _ut sup._
-
-  [863] This is the view of Movers, sustained with much
-  plausibility, in his learned and instructive work—Geschichte der
-  Phœnizier, vol. ii, part ii, p. 435-455. See Diodor. xx, 55.
-
-  [864] Livy, xxix, 25. Compare the last chapter of the history of
-  Herodotus.
-
-  [865] Diodor. xx, 17; Appian, viii, 3, 68.
-
-A few of the towns along the coast,—Hippo, Utica, Adrumetum, Thapsus,
-Leptis, etc.,—were colonies from Tyre, like Carthage herself.
-With respect to Carthage, therefore, they stood upon a different
-footing from the Liby-Phœnician towns, either maritime or in the
-interior. Yet the Carthaginians contrived in time to render every
-town tributary, with the exception of Utica. They thus derived
-revenue from all the inhabitants of this fertile region, Tyrian,
-Liby-Phœnician, and indigenous Libyan; and the amount which they
-imposed appears to have been exorbitant. At one time, immediately
-after the first Punic war, they took from the rural cultivators as
-much as one-half of their produce,[866] and doubled at one stroke
-the tribute levied upon the towns. The town and district of Leptis
-paid to them a tribute of one talent per day, or three hundred and
-sixty-five talents annually. Such exactions were not collected
-without extreme harshness of enforcement, sometimes stripping the
-tax-payer of all that he possessed, and even tearing him from his
-family to be sold in person for a slave.[867] Accordingly the general
-sentiment among the dependencies towards Carthage was one of mingled
-fear and hatred, which rendered them eager to revolt on the landing
-of any foreign invader. In some cases the Carthaginians seem to have
-guarded against such contingencies by paid garrisons; but they also
-provided a species of garrison from among their own citizens; by
-sending out from Carthage poor men, and assigning to them lots of
-land with the cultivators attached. This provision for poor citizens
-as emigrants (mainly analogous to the Roman colonies), was a standing
-feature in the Carthaginian political system, serving the double
-purpose of obviating discontent among their own town population at
-home, and of keeping watch over their dependencies abroad.[868]
-
-  [866] Colonel Leake observes, with respect to the modern Greeks,
-  who work on the plains of Turkey, upon the landed property of
-  Turkish proprietors—“The Helots seem to have resembled the
-  Greeks, who labor on the Turkish farms _in the plains_ of Turkey,
-  and who are bound to account to their masters for one-half of the
-  produce of the soil, as Tyrtæus says of the Messenians of his
-  time—
-
-      Ὥσπερ ὄνοι μεγάλοις ἄχθεσι τειρόμενοι
-    Δεσποσύνοισι φέροντες, ἀναγκαίης ὑπὸ λυγρῆς,
-      Ἥμισυ πᾶν, ὅσσον κάρπον ἄρουρα φέροι.
-                                    (Tyrtæus, Frag. 5, ed. Schneid.)
-
-  The condition of the Greeks in the mountainous regions is not so
-  hard” (Leake, Peloponnesiaca, p. 168).
-
-  [867] Polybius, i, 72; Livy, xxxiv, 62.
-
-  Movers (Geschichte der Phœnizier, ii, 2, p. 455) assigns this
-  large assessment to Leptis Magna; but the passage of Livy can
-  relate only to Leptis Parva, in the region called Emporia.
-
-  Leptis Magna was at a far greater distance from Carthage, near
-  the Great Syrtis.
-
-  Dr. Barth (Wanderungen durch die Küstenländer des
-  Mittelländischen Meers, p. 81-146) has given a recent and
-  valuable examination of the site of Carthage and of the
-  neighboring regions. On his map, however, the territory called
-  Emporia is marked near the Lesser Syrtis, two hundred miles from
-  Carthage (Pliny, H. N. v, 3). Yet it seems certain that the name
-  Emporia must have comprised the territory south of Carthage and
-  approaching very near to the city; for Scipio Africanus, in his
-  expedition from Sicily, directed his pilots to steer for Emporia.
-  He intended to land very near Carthage; and he actually did land
-  on the White Cape, near to that city, but on the north side, and
-  still nearer to Utica. This region north of Carthage was probably
-  not included in the name Emporia (Livy, xxix, 25-27).
-
-  [868] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 8, 9; vi, 3, 5.
-
-In the fifth century B.C., the Carthaginians had no apprehension
-of any foreign enemy invading them from seaward; an enterprise
-first attempted in 316 B.C., to the surprise of every one, by the
-boldness of the Syracusan Agathokles. Nor were their enemies on
-the land side formidable as conquerors, though they were extremely
-annoying as plunderers. The Numidians and other native tribes,
-half-naked and predatory horsemen, distinguished for speed as
-well as for indefatigable activity, so harassed the individual
-cultivators of the soil, that the Carthaginians dug a long line of
-ditch to keep them off.[869] But these barbarians did not acquire
-sufficient organization to act for permanent objects, until the
-reign of Masinissa and the second Punic war with Rome. During the
-fifth and fourth centuries B.C., therefore (prior to the invasion
-of Agathokles), the warfare carried on by the Carthaginians was
-constantly aggressive and in foreign parts. For these purposes they
-chiefly employed foreign mercenaries, hired for the occasion from
-Italy, Gaul, Spain, and the islands of the Western Mediterranean,
-together with conscripts from their Libyan dependencies. The native
-Carthaginians,[870] though encouraged by honorary marks to undertake
-this military service, were generally averse to it, and sparingly
-employed. But these citizens, though not often sent on foreign
-service, constituted a most formidable force when called upon. No
-less then forty thousand hoplites went forth from the gates of
-Carthage to resist Agathokles, together with one thousand cavalry,
-and two thousand war-chariots.[871] An immense public magazine,—of
-arms, muniments of war of all kinds, and provisions,—appears to have
-been kept in the walls of Byrsa, the citadel of Carthage.[872] A
-chosen division of two thousand five hundred citizens, men of wealth
-and family, formed what was called the Sacred Band of Carthage,[873]
-distinguished for their bravery in the field as well as for the
-splendor of their arms, and the gold and silver plate which
-formed part of their baggage. We shall find these citizen-troops
-occasionally employed on service in Sicily: but most part of the
-Carthaginian armies consists of Gauls, Iberians, Libyans, etc., a
-mingled host got together for the occasion, discordant in language as
-well as in customs. Such men had never any attachment to the cause
-in which they fought,—seldom, to the commanders under whom they
-served; while they were often treated by Carthage with bad faith,
-and recklessly abandoned to destruction.[874] A military system such
-as this was pregnant with danger, if ever the mercenary soldiers got
-footing in Africa; as happened after the first Punic war, when the
-city was brought to the brink of ruin. But on foreign service in
-Sicily, these mercenaries often enabled Carthage to make conquest at
-the cost only of her money, without any waste of the blood of her own
-citizens. The Carthaginian generals seem generally to have relied,
-like Persians, upon numbers,—manifesting little or no military skill;
-until we come to the Punic wars with Rome, conducted under Hamilkar
-Barca and his illustrious son Hannibal.
-
-  [869] Appian, viii, 32, 54, 59; Phlegon, Trall. de Mirabilibus,
-  c. 18. Εὔμαχος δέ φησιν ἐν Περιηγήσει, Καρχηδονίους
-  περιταφρεύοντας τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπαρχίαν, εὑρεῖν ὀρύσσοντας δύο
-  σκελετοὺς ἐν σόρῳ κειμένους, etc.
-
-  The line of trench however was dug apparently at an early stage
-  of the Carthaginian dominion; for the Carthaginians afterwards,
-  as they grew more powerful, extended their possessions beyond the
-  trench; as we see by the passages of Appian above referred to.
-
-  Movers (Gesch. der Phœniz. ii, 2, p. 457) identifies this trench
-  with the one which Pliny names near Thenæ on the Lesser Syrtis,
-  as having been dug by order of the second Africanus—to form a
-  boundary between the Roman province of Africa, and the dominion
-  of the native kings (Pliny, H. N. v, 3). But I greatly doubt such
-  identity. It appears to me that this last is distinct from the
-  Carthaginian trench.
-
-  [870] A Carthaginian citizen wore as many rings as he had served
-  campaigns (Aristotel. Politic. vii, 2, 6).
-
-  [871] Diodor. xx, 10.
-
-  [872] Appian, viii, 80. Twenty thousand panoplies, together with
-  an immense stock of weapons and engines of siege, were delivered
-  up to the perfidious manœuvres of the Romans, a little before the
-  last siege of Carthage.
-
-  See Bötticher, Geschichte der Carthager, p. 20-25.
-
-  [873] Diodor. xvi, 8.
-
-  [874] See the striking description in Livy, of the motley
-  composition of the Carthaginian mercenary armies, where he
-  bestows just admiration on the genius of Hannibal, for having
-  always maintained his ascendency over them, and kept them in
-  obedience and harmony (Livy, xxviii, 12). Compare Polybius, i,
-  65-67, and the manner in which Imilkon abandoned his mercenaries
-  to destruction at Syracuse (Diodor. xiv, 75-77).
-
-Respecting the political constitution of Carthage, the facts
-known are too few, and too indistinct, to enable us to comprehend
-its real working. The magistrates most conspicuous in rank and
-precedence were, the two kings or suffetes, who presided over the
-Senate.[875] They seem to have been renewed annually, though how
-far the same persons were reëligible, or actually rechosen, we do
-not know, but they were always selected out of some few principal
-families or Gentes. There is reason for believing that the genuine
-Carthaginian citizens were distributed into three tribes, thirty
-curiæ, and three hundred gentes—something in the manner of the Roman
-patricians. From these gentes emanated a Senate of three hundred,
-out of which again was formed a smaller council or committee of
-thirty _principes_ representing the curiæ;[876] sometimes a still
-smaller, of only ten _principes_. These little councils are both
-frequently mentioned in the political proceedings of Carthage; and
-perhaps the Thirty may coincide with what Polybius calls the Gerusia,
-or Council of Ancients,—the Three Hundred, with that which he calls
-the Senate.[877] Aristotle assimilates the two kings (suffetes) of
-Carthage to the two kings of Sparta—and the Gerusia of Carthage also
-to that of Sparta;[878] which latter consisted of thirty members,
-including the kings who sat in it. But Aristotle does not allude to
-any assembly at Carthage analogous to what Polybius calls the Senate.
-He mentions two Councils, one of one hundred members, the other of
-one hundred and four; and certain Boards of Five,—the pentarchies. He
-compares the Council of one hundred and four to the Spartan ephors;
-yet again he talks of the pentarchies as invested with extensive
-functions, and terms the Council of one hundred the greatest
-authority in the state. Perhaps this last Council was identical with
-the assembly of one hundred Judges (said to have been chosen from the
-Senate as a check upon the generals employed), or Ordo Judicum; of
-which Livy speaks after the second Punic war, as existing with its
-members perpetual and so powerful that it overruled all the other
-assemblies and magistracies of the state. Through the influence
-of Hannibal, a law was passed to lessen the overweening power of
-this Order of Judges; causing them to be elected only for one year,
-instead of being perpetual.[879]
-
-  [875] There were in like manner two suffetes in Gades and each
-  of the other Phœnician colonies (Livy, xxviii, 37). Cornelius
-  Nepos (Hannibal, c. 7) talks of Hannibal as having been made
-  _king_ (rex) when he was invested with his great foreign military
-  command, at twenty-two years of age. So Diodorus (xiv, 54) talks
-  about Imilkon, and Herodotus (vii, 166) about Hamilkar.
-
-  [876] See Movers, Die Phönizier, ii, 1, p. 483-499.
-
-  [877] Polybius, x, 18; Livy, xxx, 16.
-
-  Yet again Polybius in another place speaks of the Gerontion at
-  Carthage as representing the aristocratical force, and as opposed
-  to the πλῆθος or people (vi, 51). It would seem that by Γερόντιον
-  he must mean the same as the assembly called in another passage
-  (x, 18) Σύγκλητος.
-
-  [878] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 8, 2.
-
-  [879] Livy, xxxiii, 46. Justin (xix, 2) mentions the one hundred
-  select Senators set apart as judges.
-
-These statements, though coming from valuable authors, convey so
-little information and are withal so difficult to reconcile, that
-both the structure and working of the political machine at Carthage
-may be said to be unknown.[880] But it seems clear that the general
-spirit of the government was highly oligarchical; that a few rich,
-old, and powerful families, divided among themselves the great
-offices and influence of the state; that they maintained themselves
-in pointed and even insolent distinction from the multitude;[881]
-that they stood opposed to each other in bitter feuds, often stained
-by gross perfidy and bloodshed; and that the treatment with which,
-through these violent party-antipathies, unsuccessful generals were
-visited, was cruel in the extreme.[882] It appears that wealth was
-one indispensable qualification, and that magistrates and generals
-procured their appointments in a great measure by corrupt means. Of
-such corruption, one variety was, the habit of constantly regaling
-the citizens in collective banquets of the _curiæ_ or the political
-associations; a habit so continual, and embracing so wide a circle of
-citizens, that Aristotle compares these banquets to the _phiditia_
-or public mess of Sparta.[883] There was a demos or people at
-Carthage, who were consulted on particular occasions, and before whom
-propositions were publicly debated, in cases where the suffetes and
-the small Council were not all of one mind.[884] How numerous this
-demos was, or what proportion of the whole population it comprised,
-we have no means of knowing. But it is plain, that whether more or
-less considerable, its multitude was kept under dependence to the
-rich families by stratagems such as the banquets, the lucrative
-appointments with lots of land in foreign dependencies, etc. The
-purposes of government were determined, its powers wielded and the
-great offices held—suffetes, senators, generals, or judges,—by
-the members of a small number of wealthy families; and the chief
-opposition which they encountered, was from their feuds against
-each other. In the main, the government was conducted with skill
-and steadiness, as well for internal tranquillity as for systematic
-foreign and commercial aggrandizement. Within the knowledge of
-Aristotle, Carthage had never suffered either the successful
-usurpation of a despot, or any violent intestine commotion.[885]
-
-  [880] Heeren (Ideen über den Verkehr der Alten Welt, part ii, p.
-  138, 3rd edit.) and Kluge (in his Dissertation, Aristoteles de
-  Politiâ Carthaginiensium, Wratisl. 1824) have discussed all these
-  passages with ability. But their materials do not enable them to
-  reach any certainty.
-
-  [881] Valerius Max. ix, 5, 4. “Insolentiæ inter Carthaginiensem
-  et Campanum senatum quasi æmulatio fuit. Ille enim separato à
-  plebe balneo lavabatur, hic diverso foro utebatur.”
-
-  [882] Diodor. xx, 10; xxiii, 9; Valer. Max. ii, 7, 1.
-
-  [883] Aristotel Politic. iii, 5, 6.
-
-  These banquets must have been settled, daily proceedings,—as
-  well as multitudinous, in order to furnish even apparent warrant
-  for the comparison which Aristotle makes with the Spartan public
-  mess. But even granting the analogy on these external points,—the
-  intrinsic difference of character and purpose between the two
-  must have been so great, that the comparison seems not happy.
-
-  Livy (xxxiv, 61) talks of the _circuli et convivia_ at Carthage;
-  but this is probably a general expression, without particular
-  reference to the public banquets mentioned by Aristotle.
-
-  [884] Aristotel. Polit. ii, 8, 3.
-
-  [885] Aristot. Polit. ii, 8, 1. He briefly alludes to the
-  abortive conspiracy of Hanno (v, 6, 2), which is also mentioned
-  in Justin (xxi, 4). Hanno is said to have formed the plan of
-  putting to death the Senate, and making himself despot. But he
-  was detected, and executed under the severest tortures; all his
-  family being put to death along with him.
-
-  Not only is it very difficult to make out Aristotle’s statements
-  about the Carthaginian government,—but some of them are even
-  contradictory. One of these (v, 10, 3) has been pointed out by M.
-  Barthélemy St. Hilaire, who proposes to read ἐν Χαλκηδόνι instead
-  of ἐν Καρχηδόνι. In another place (v, 10, 4) Aristotle calls
-  Carthage (ἐν Καρχηδόνι δημοκρατουμένῃ) a state democratically
-  governed; which cannot be reconciled with what he says in ii, 8,
-  respecting its government.
-
-  Aristotle compares the Council of One Hundred and Four at
-  Carthage to the Spartan ephors. But it is not easy to see how so
-  numerous a body could have transacted the infinite diversity of
-  administrative and other business performed by the five ephors.
-
-The first eminent Carthaginian leader brought to our notice, is
-Mago (seemingly about 530-500 B.C.), who is said to have mainly
-contributed to organize the forces, and extend the dominion,
-of Carthage. Of his two sons, one, Hasdrubal, perished after a
-victorious career in Sardinia;[886] the other, Hamilkar, commanding
-at the battle of Himera in Sicily, was there defeated and slain by
-Gelon, as has been already recounted. After the death of Hamilkar,
-his son Giskon was condemned to perpetual exile, and passed his
-life in Sicily at the Greek city of Selinus.[887] But the sons of
-Hasdrubal still remained at Carthage, the most powerful citizens
-in the state; carrying on hostilities against the Moors and other
-indigenous Africans, whom they compelled to relinquish the tribute
-which Carthage had paid, down to that time, for the ground whereon
-the city was situated. This family are said indeed to have been so
-powerful, that a check upon their ascendency was supposed to be
-necessary; and for that purpose the select One Hundred Senators
-sitting as judges were now nominated for the first time.[888] Such
-wars in Africa doubtless tended to prevent the Carthaginians from
-farther interference in Sicily, during the interval between 480-410
-B.C. There were probably other causes also, not known to us,—and
-down to the year 413 B.C., the formidable naval power of Athens
-(as has been already remarked) kept them on the watch even for
-themselves. But now, after the great Athenian catastrophe before
-Syracuse, apprehensions from that quarter were dissipated; so that
-Carthage again found leisure, as well as inclination, to seek in
-Sicily both aggrandizement and revenge.
-
-  [886] Justin. xix, 1.
-
-  [887] Diodor. xiii.
-
-  [888] Justin, xix, 2.
-
-It is remarkable that the same persons, acting in the same quarrel,
-who furnished the pretext or the motive for the recent invasion by
-Athens, now served in the like capacity as prompters to Carthage.
-The inhabitants of Egesta, engaged in an unequal war with rival
-neighbors at Selinus, were in both cases the soliciting parties.
-They had applied to Carthage first, without success,[889] before
-they thought of sending to invoke aid from Athens. This war indeed
-had been for the time merged and forgotten in the larger Athenian
-enterprise against Syracuse; but it revived after that catastrophe,
-wherein Athens and her armament were shipwrecked. The Egestæans had
-not only lost their protectors, but had incurred aggravated hostility
-from their neighbors, for having brought upon Sicily so formidable an
-ultramarine enemy. Their original quarrel with Selinus had related
-to a disputed portion of border territory. This point they no longer
-felt competent to maintain, under their present disadvantageous
-circumstances. But the Selinuntines, confident as well as angry,
-were now not satisfied with success in their original claim. They
-proceeded to strip the Egestæans of other lands indisputably
-belonging to them, and seriously menaced the integrity as well as the
-independence of the city. To no other quarter could the Egestæans
-turn, with any chance of finding both will and power to protect them,
-except to Carthage.[890]
-
-  [889] Diodor. xii, 82.
-
-  It seems probable that the war which Diodorus mentions to have
-  taken place in 452 B.C., between the Egestæans and Lilybæans—was
-  really a war between Egesta and Selinus (see Diodor, xi, 86—with
-  Wesseling’s note). Lilybæum as a town attained no importance
-  until after the capture of Motyê by the older Dionysius in 393
-  B.C.
-
-  [890] Diodor. xiii, 43.
-
-The town of Egesta (non-Hellenic or at least only semi-Hellenic) was
-situated on or near the northern line of Sicilian coast, not far from
-the western cape of the island, and in the immediate neighborhood
-of the Carthaginian settlements,—Motyê, Panormus (now Palermo), and
-Soloeis or Soluntum. Selinus also was near the western cape, but on
-the southern coast of Sicily, with its territory conterminous to
-the southern portion of Egesta. When therefore the Egestæan envoys
-presented their urgent supplications at Carthage for aid, proclaiming
-that unless assisted they must be subjugated and become a dependency
-of Selinus,—the Carthaginians would not unreasonably conceive,
-that their own Sicilian settlements would be endangered, if their
-closest Hellenic neighbor were allowed thus to aggrandize herself.
-Accordingly they agreed to grant the aid solicited; yet not without
-much debate and hesitation. They were uneasy at the idea of resuming
-military operations in Sicily,—which had been laid aside for seventy
-years, and had moreover left such disastrous recollections[891]—at a
-moment when Syracusan courage stood in high renown, from the recent
-destruction of the Athenian armament. But the recollections of the
-Gelonian victory at Himera, while they suggested apprehension,
-also kindled the appetite of revenge; especially in the bosom of
-Hannibal, the grandson of that general Hamilkar who had there met his
-death. Hannibal was at this moment king, or rather first of the two
-suffetes, chief executive magistrates of Carthage, as his grandfather
-had been seventy years before. So violent had been the impression
-made upon the Carthaginians by the defeat of Himera, that they had
-banished Giskon, son of the slain general Hamilkar and father of
-Hannibal, and had condemned him to pass his whole life in exile. He
-had chosen the Greek city of Selinus; where probably Hannibal also
-had spent his youth, though restored since to his country and to
-his family consequence,—and from whence he brought back an intense
-antipathy to the Greek name, as well as an impatience to wipe off by
-a signal revenge the dishonor both of his country and of his family.
-Accordingly, espousing with warmth the request of the Egestæans, he
-obtained from the Senate authority to take effective measures for
-their protection.[892]
-
-  [891] Diodor. xiii, 43.
-
-  [892] Diodor. xiii, 43. Κατέστησαν στρατηγὸν τὸν Ἀννίβαν, κατὰ
-  νόμους τότε βασιλεύοντα. Οὗτος δὲ ἦν υἱωνὸς μὲν τοῦ πρὸς Γέλωνα
-  πολεμήσαντος Ἁμίλκου, καὶ πρὸς Ἱμέρᾳ τελευτήσαντος, υἱὸς δὲ
-  Γέσκωνος, ὃς διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἧτταν ἐφυγαδεύθη, καὶ κατεβίωσεν
-  ἐν τῇ Σελινοῦντι. Ὁ δ’ οὖν Ἀννίβας, ὢν μὲν καὶ ~φύσει μισέλλην~,
-  ὅμως δὲ τὰς τῶν προγόνων ἀτιμίας διορθώσασθαι βουλόμενος, etc.
-
-  The banishment of Giskon, and that too for the whole of his
-  life, deserves notice, as a point of comparison between the
-  Greek republics and Carthage. A defeated general in Greece, if
-  he survived his defeat, was not unfrequently banished, even
-  where there seems neither proof nor probability that he had
-  been guilty of misconduct, or misjudgment, or omission. But I
-  do not recollect any case in which, when a Grecian general thus
-  apparently innocent was not merely defeated but slain in the
-  battle, his son was banished for life, as Giskon was banished
-  by the Carthaginians. In appreciating the manner in which the
-  Grecian states, both democratical and oligarchical, dealt with
-  their officers, the contemporary republic of Carthage is one
-  important standard of comparison. Those who censure the Greeks,
-  will have to find stronger terms of condemnation when they review
-  the proceedings of the Carthaginians.
-
-His first proceeding was to send envoys to Egesta and Selinus, to
-remonstrate against the encroachments of the Selinuntines; with
-farther instructions, in case remonstrance proved ineffectual, to
-proceed with the Egestæans to Syracuse, and there submit the whole
-dispute to the arbitration of the Syracusans. He foresaw that the
-Selinuntines, having superiority of force on their side, would refuse
-to acknowledge any arbitration; and that the Syracusans, respectfully
-invoked by one party but rejected by the other, would stand aside
-from the quarrel altogether. It turned out as he had expected.
-The Selinuntines sent envoys to Syracuse, to protest against the
-representations from Egesta and Carthage; but declined to refer
-their case to arbitration. Accordingly, the Syracusans passed a vote
-that they would maintain their alliance with Selinus, yet without
-impeachment of their pacific relations with Carthage: thus leaving
-the latter free to act without obstruction. Hannibal immediately sent
-over a body of troops to the aid of Egesta: five thousand Libyans
-or Africans; and eight hundred Campanian mercenaries, who had been
-formerly in the pay and service of the Athenians before Syracuse, but
-had quitted that camp before the final catastrophe occurred.[893]
-
-  [893] Diodor. xiii, 43, 44.
-
-In spite of the reinforcement and the imposing countenance of
-Carthage, the Selinuntines, at this time in full power and
-prosperity, still believed themselves strong enough to subdue Egesta.
-Under such persuasion, they invaded the territory with their full
-force. They began to ravage the country, yet at first with order
-and precaution; but presently, finding no enemy in the field to
-oppose them, they became careless, and spread themselves about for
-disorderly plunder. This was the moment for which the Egestæans
-and Carthaginians were watching. They attacked the Selinuntines
-by surprise, defeated them with the loss of a thousand men, and
-recaptured the whole booty.[894]
-
-  [894] Diodor. xiii, 44.
-
-The war, as hitherto carried on, was one offensive on the part of
-the Selinuntines, for the purpose of punishing or despoiling their
-ancient enemy Egesta. Only so far as was necessary for the defence of
-the latter, had the Carthaginians yet interfered. But against such an
-interference the Selinuntines, if they had taken a prudent measure of
-their own force, would have seen that they were not likely to achieve
-any conquest. Moreover, they might perhaps have obtained peace now,
-had they sought it; as a considerable minority among them, headed
-by a citizen named Empedion,[895] urgently recommended: for Selinus
-appears always to have been on more friendly terms with Carthage
-than any other Grecian city in Sicily. Even at the great battle of
-Himera, the Selinuntine troops had not only not assisted Gelon, but
-had actually fought in the Carthaginian army under Hamilkar;[896]
-a plea, which, had it been pressed, might probably have had weight
-with Hannibal. But this claim upon the goodwill of Carthage appears
-only to have rendered them more confident and passionate in braving
-her force and in prosecuting the war. They sent to Syracuse to ask
-for aid, which the Syracusans, under present circumstances, promised
-to send them. But the promise was given with little cordiality,
-as appears by the manner in which they fulfilled it, as well as
-from the neutrality which they had professed so recently before;
-for the contest seemed to be aggressive on the part of Selinus, so
-that Syracuse had little interest in helping her to conquer Egesta.
-Neither Syracusans nor Selinuntines were prepared for the immense
-preparations, and energetic rapidity of movement by which Hannibal at
-once altered the character, and enlarged the purposes, of the war. He
-employed all the ensuing autumn and winter in collecting a numerous
-host of mercenary troops from Africa, Spain, and Campania, with
-various Greeks who were willing to take service.[897]
-
-  [895] Diodor. xiii, 59.
-
-  [896] Diodor. xiii, 55; xi, 21.
-
-  [897] Diodor. xiii, 54-58. οἱ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις Ἕλληνες
-  ξυμμαχοῦντες, etc.
-
-  It cannot therefore be exact,—that which Plutarch affirms,
-  Timoleon, c. 30,—that the Carthaginians had never employed Greeks
-  in their service, at the time of the battle of the Krimêsus,—B.C.
-  340.
-
-In the spring of the memorable year 409 B.C., through the exuberant
-wealth of Carthage, he was in a condition to leave Africa with a
-great fleet of sixty triremes, and fifteen hundred transports or
-vessels of burthen;[898] conveying an army, which, according to
-the comparatively low estimate of Timæus, amounted to more than
-one hundred thousand men; while Ephorus extended the number to two
-hundred thousand infantry, and four thousand cavalry, together
-with muniments of war and battering machines for siege. With these
-he steered directly for the western Cape of Sicily, Lilybæum;
-taking care, however, to land his troops and to keep his fleet on
-the northern side of that cape, in the bay near Motyê,—and not to
-approach the southern shore, lest he should alarm the Syracusans with
-the idea that he was about to prosecute his voyage farther eastward
-along the southern coast towards their city. By this precaution, he
-took the best means for prolonging the period of Syracusan inaction.
-The Selinuntines, panic-struck at the advent of an enemy so much more
-overwhelming than they had expected, sent pressing messengers to
-Syracuse to accelerate the promised help. They had made no provision
-for standing on the defensive against a really formidable aggressor.
-Their walls, though strong enough to hold out against Sicilian
-neighbors, had been neglected during the long-continued absence of
-any foreign besieger, and were now in many places out of repair.
-Hannibal left them no time to make good past deficiencies. Instead
-of wasting his powerful armament (as the unfortunate Nikias had done
-five years before) by months of empty flourish and real inaction,
-he waited only until he was joined by the troops from Egesta and
-the neighboring Carthaginian dependencies, and then marched his
-whole force straight from Lilybæum to Selinus. Crossing the river
-Mazara in his way, and storming the fort which lay near its mouth,
-he soon found himself under the Selinuntine walls. He distributed
-his army into two parts, each provided with battering machines and
-movable wooden towers; and then assailed the walls on many points at
-once, choosing the points where they were most accessible or most
-dilapidated. Archers and slingers in great numbers were posted near
-the walls, to keep up a discharge of missiles and chase away the
-defenders from the battlements. Under cover of such discharge, six
-wooden towers were rolled up to the foot of the wall, to which they
-were equal or nearly equal in height, so that the armed men in their
-interior were prepared to contend with the defenders almost on a
-level. Against other portions of the wall, battering-rams with iron
-heads were driven by the combined strength of multitudes, shaking or
-breaking through its substance, especially where it showed symptoms
-of neglect or decay. Such were the methods of attack which Hannibal
-now brought to bear upon the unprepared Selinuntines. He was eager to
-forestal the arrival of auxiliaries, by the impetuous movements of
-his innumerable barbaric host, the largest seen in Sicily since his
-grandfather Hamilkar had been defeated before Himera. Collected from
-all the shores of the western Mediterranean, it presented soldiers
-heterogeneous in race, in arms, in language,—in everything, except
-bravery and common appetite for blood as well as plunder.[899]
-
-  [898] Thucyd. vi, 34. δυνατοὶ δέ εἰσι (the Carthaginians) μάλιστα
-  τῶν νῦν, βουληθέντες· χρυσὸν γὰρ καὶ ἄργυρον πλεῖστον κέκτηνται,
-  ὅθεν ὅ τε πόλεμος καὶ τἄλλα εὐπορεῖ.
-
-  [899] Diodor. xiii, 54, 55.
-
-The dismay of the Selinuntines, when they suddenly found themselves
-under the sweep of this destroying hurricane, is not to be described.
-It was no part of the scheme of Hannibal to impose conditions or
-grant capitulation; for he had promised the plunder of their town
-to his soldiers. The only chance of the besieged was, to hold out
-with the courage of desperation, until they could receive aid from
-their Hellenic brethren on the southern coast,—Agrigentum, Gela,
-and especially Syracuse,—all of whom they had sent to warn and to
-supplicate. Their armed population crowded to man the walls, with a
-resolution worthy of Greeks and citizens; while the old men and the
-females, though oppressed with agony from the fate which seemed to
-menace them, lent all the aid and encouragement in their power. Under
-the sound of trumpets, and every variety of war-cry, the assailants
-approached the walls, encountering everywhere a valiant resistance.
-They were repulsed again and again, with the severest loss. But fresh
-troops came up to relieve those who were slain or fatigued; and at
-length, after a murderous struggle, a body of Campanians forced their
-way over the walls into the town. Yet in spite of such temporary
-advantage, the heroic efforts of the besieged drove them out again
-or slew them, so that night arrived without the capture being
-accomplished. For nine successive days was the assault thus renewed
-with undiminished fury; for nine successive days did this heroic
-population maintain a successful resistance, though their enemies
-were numerous enough to relieve each other perpetually,—though their
-own strength was every day failing,—and though not a single friend
-arrived to their aid. At length, on the tenth day, and after terrible
-loss to the besiegers, a sufficient breach was made in the weak part
-of the wall, for the Iberians to force their way into the city.
-Still however the Selinuntines, even after their walls were carried,
-continued with unabated resolution to barricade and defend their
-narrow streets, in which their women also assisted, by throwing down
-stones and tiles upon the assailants from the house-tops. All these
-barriers were successively overthrown, by the unexhausted numbers,
-and increasing passion, of the barbaric host; so that the defenders
-were driven back from all sides into the agora, where most of them
-closed their gallant defence by an honorable death. A small minority,
-among whom was Empedion, escaped to Agrigentum, where they received
-the warmest sympathy and the most hospitable treatment.[900]
-
-  [900] Diodor. xiii, 56, 57.
-
-Resistance being thus at an end, the assailants spread themselves
-through the town in all the fury of insatiate appetites,—murderous,
-lustful, and rapacious. They slaughtered indiscriminately elders
-and children, preserving only the grown women as captives. The sad
-details of a town taken by storm are to a great degree the same
-in every age and nation; but the destroying barbarians at Selinus
-manifested one peculiarity, which marks them as lying without the
-pale of Hellenic sympathy and sentiment. They mutilated the bodies
-of the slain; some were seen with amputated hands strung together
-in a row and fastened round their girdles; while others brandished
-heads on the points of their spears and javelins.[901] The Greeks
-(seemingly not numerous) who served under Hannibal, far from sharing
-in these ferocious manifestations, contributed somewhat to mitigate
-the deplorable fate of the sufferers. Sixteen thousand Selinuntines
-are said to have been slain, five thousand to have been taken
-captive; while two thousand six hundred escaped to Agrigentum.[902]
-These figures are probably under, rather than above, the truth. Yet
-they do not seem entitled to any confidence; nor do they give us any
-account of the entire population in its different categories,—old and
-young,—men and women,—freemen and slaves,—citizens and metics. We
-can only pretend to appreciate this mournful event in the gross. All
-exact knowledge of its details is denied to us.
-
-  [901] Diodor. xiii, 57.
-
-  [902] Diodor. xiii, 57, 58.
-
-It does little honor either to the generosity or to the prudence
-of the Hellenic neighbors of Selinus, that this unfortunate city
-should have been left to its fate unassisted. In vain was messenger
-after messenger despatched, as the defence became more and more
-critical, to Agrigentum, Gela, and Syracuse. The military force
-of the two former was indeed made ready, but postponed its march
-until joined by that of the last; so formidable was the account
-given of the invading host. Meanwhile the Syracusans were not
-ready. They thought it requisite, first, to close the war which
-they were prosecuting against Katana and Naxos,—next, to muster a
-large and carefully-appointed force. Before these preliminaries
-were finished, the nine days of siege were past, and the death-hour
-of Selinus had sounded. Probably the Syracusans were misled by the
-Sicilian operations of Nikias, who, beginning with a long interval
-of inaction, had then approached their town by slow blockade, such
-as the circumstances of his case required. Expecting in the case
-of Selinus that Hannibal would enter upon the like elaborate
-siege,—and not reflecting that he was at the head of a vast host
-of miscellaneous foreigners hired for the occasion, of whose lives
-he could afford to be prodigal, while Nikias commanded citizens of
-Athens and other Grecian states, whom he could not expose to the
-murderous but thorough-going process of ever-renewed assault against
-strong walls recently erected,—they were thunderstruck on being
-informed that nine days of carnage had sufficed for the capture. The
-Syracusan soldiers, a select body of three thousand, who at length
-joined the Geloans and Agrigentines at Agrigentum, only arrived in
-time to partake in the general dismay everywhere diffused. A joint
-embassy was sent by three cities to Hannibal, entreating him to
-permit the ransom of the captives, and to spare the temples of the
-gods; while Empedion went at the same time to sue for compassion on
-behalf of his own fugitive fellow-citizens. To the former demand
-the victorious Carthaginian returned an answer at once haughty and
-characteristic,—“The Selinuntines have not been able to preserve
-their freedom, and must now submit to a trial of slavery. The gods
-have become offended with them, and have taken their departure
-from the town.”[903] To Empedion, an ancient friend and pronounced
-partisan of the Carthaginians, his reply was more indulgent. All
-the relatives of Empedion, found alive among the captives, were
-at once given up; moreover permission was granted to the fugitive
-Selinuntines to return, if they pleased, and reoccupy the town with
-its lands, as tributary subjects of Carthage. At the same time
-that he granted such permission, however, Hannibal at once caused
-the walls to be razed, and even the town with its temples to be
-destroyed.[904] What was done about the proposed ransom, we do not
-hear.
-
-  [903] Diodor. xiii, 59. Ὁ δὲ Ἀννίβας ἀπεκρίθη, τοὺς μὲν
-  Σελινουντίους μὴ δυναμένους τηρεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, πεῖραν τῆς
-  δουλείας λήψεσθαι· τοὺς δὲ θεοὺς ἐκτὸς Σελινοῦντος οἴχεσθαι,
-  προσκόψαντας τοῖς ἐνοικοῦσιν.
-
-  [904] Diodor. xiii, 59. The ruins, yet remaining, of the ancient
-  temples of Selinus, are vast and imposing; characteristic as
-  specimens of Doric art, during the fifth and sixth centuries
-  B.C. From the great magnitude of the fallen columns, it has been
-  supposed that they were overthrown by an earthquake. But the
-  ruins afford distinct evidence, that these columns have been
-  first undermined, and then overthrown by crow-bars.
-
-  This impressive fact, demonstrating the agency of the
-  Carthaginian destroyers, is stated by Niebuhr, Vorträge über alte
-  Geschichte, vol. iii. p. 207.
-
-Having satiated his troops with this rich plunder Hannibal now
-quitted the scene of bloodshed and desolation, and marched across
-the island to Himera on its northern coast. Though Selinus, as the
-enemy of Egesta, had received the first shock of his arms, yet it was
-against Himera that the grand purpose of his soul was directed. Here
-it was that Hamilkar had lost both his army and his life, entailing
-inexpiable disgrace upon the whole life of his son Giskon: here it
-was that his grandson intended to exact full vengeance and requital
-from the grandchildren of those who then occupied the fated spot.
-Not only was the Carthaginian army elate with the past success,
-but a number of fresh Sikels and Sikans, eager to share in plunder
-as well as to gratify the antipathies of their races against the
-Grecian intruders, flocked to join it; thus making up the losses
-sustained in the recent assault. Having reached Himera, and disposed
-his army in appropriate positions around, Hannibal proceeded to
-instant attack, as at Selinus; pushing up his battering machines and
-towers against the vulnerable portions of the walls, and trying at
-the same time to undermine them. The Himeræans defended themselves
-with desperate bravery; and on this occasion the defence was not
-unassisted; for four thousand allies, chiefly Syracusans, and headed
-by the Syracusan Dioklês, had come to the city as a reinforcement.
-For a whole day they repelled with slaughter repeated assaults.
-No impression being made upon the city, the besieged became so
-confident in their own valor, that they resolved not to copy the
-Selinuntines in confining themselves to defence, but to sally out
-at daybreak the next morning and attack the besiegers in the field.
-Ten thousand gallant men,—Himeræans, Syracusans, and other Grecian
-allies,—accordingly marched out with the dawn; while the battlements
-were lined with old men and women as anxious spectators of their
-exploits. The Carthaginians near the walls, who, preparing to renew
-the assault, looked for nothing less than for a sally, were taken
-by surprise. In spite of their great superiority of number, and in
-spite of great personal bravery, they fell into confusion, and were
-incapable of long resisting the gallant and orderly charge of the
-Greeks. At length they gave way and fled towards the neighboring
-hill, where Hannibal himself with his body of reserve was posted to
-cover the operations of assault. The Greeks pursued them fiercely
-and slaughtered great numbers (six thousand according to Timæus,
-but not less than twenty thousand, if we are to accept the broad
-statement of Ephorus), exhorting each other not to think of making
-prisoners. But in the haste and exultation of pursuit, they became
-out of breath, and their ranks fell into disorder. In this untoward
-condition, they found themselves face to face with the fresh body of
-reserve brought up by Hannibal, who marched down the hill to receive
-and succor his own defeated fugitives. The fortune of the battle
-was now so completely turned, that the Himeræans, after bravely
-contending for some time against these new enemies, found themselves
-overpowered and driven back to their own gates. Three thousand of
-their bravest warriors, however, despairing of their city and mindful
-of the fate of Selinus, disdained to turn their backs, and perished
-to a man in obstinate conflict with the overwhelming numbers of the
-Carthaginians.[905]
-
-  [905] Diodor. xiii, 60.
-
-Violent was the sorrow and dismay in Himera, when the flower of her
-troops were thus driven in as beaten men, with the loss of half
-their numbers. At this moment there chanced to arrive at the port
-a fleet of twenty-five triremes, belonging to Syracuse and other
-Grecian cities in Sicily; which triremes had been sent to aid the
-Peloponnesians in the Ægean, but had since come back, and were now
-got together for the special purpose of relieving the besieged city.
-So important a reinforcement ought to have revived the spirit of
-the Himeræans. It announced that the Syracusans were in full march
-across the island, with the main force of the city, to the relief
-of Himera. But this good news was more than countervailed by the
-statement, that Hannibal was ordering out the Carthaginian fleet in
-the bay of Motyê, in order that it might sail round cape Lilybæum and
-along the southern coast into the harbor of Syracuse, now defenceless
-through the absence of its main force. Apparently the Syracusan
-fleet, in sailing from Syracuse to Himera, had passed by the bay of
-Motyê, observed maritime movement among the Carthaginians there, and
-picked up these tidings in explanation. Here was intelligence more
-than sufficient to excite alarm for home, in the bosom of Dioklês
-and the Syracusans at Himera; especially under the despondency
-now reigning. Dioklês not only enjoined the captains of the fleet
-to sail back immediately to Syracuse, in order to guard against
-the apprehended surprise, but also insisted upon marching back
-thither himself by land with the Syracusan forces, and abandoning
-the farther defence of Himera. He would in his march home meet his
-fellow-citizens on their march outward, and conduct them back along
-with him. To the Himeræans, this was a sentence of death, or worse
-than death. It plunged them into an agony of fright and despair. But
-there was no safer counsel to suggest, nor could they prevail upon
-Dioklês to grant anything more than means of transport for carrying
-off the Himeræan population, when the city was relinquished to the
-besiegers. It was agreed that the fleet, instead of sailing straight
-to Syracuse, should employ itself in carrying off as much of the
-population as could be put on board, and in depositing them safely
-at Messênê; after which it would return to fetch the remainder, who
-would in the mean time defend the city with their utmost force.
-
-Such was the frail chance of refuge now alone open to these unhappy
-Greeks, against the devouring enemy without. Immediately the feebler
-part of the population,—elders, women, and children,—crowding on
-board until the triremes could hold no more, sailed away along the
-northern coast to Messênê. On the same night, Dioklês also marched
-out of the city with his Syracusan soldiers; in such haste to get
-home, that he could not even tarry to bury the numerous Syracusan
-soldiers who had been just slain in the recent disastrous sally.
-Many of the Himeræans, with their wives and children, took their
-departure along with Dioklês, as their only chance of escape; since
-it was but too plain that the triremes could not carry away all.
-The bravest and most devoted portion of the Himeræan warriors still
-remained, to defend their city until the triremes came back. After
-keeping armed watch on the walls all night, they were again assailed
-on the next morning by the Carthaginians, elate with their triumph
-of the preceding day and with the flight of so many defenders. Yet
-notwithstanding all the pressure of numbers, ferocity, and battering
-machines, the resistance was still successfully maintained; so
-that night found Himera still a Grecian city. On the next day, the
-triremes came back, having probably deposited their unfortunate cargo
-in some place of safety not so far off as Messênê. If the defenders
-could have maintained their walls until another sunset, many of them
-might yet have escaped. But the good fortune, and probably the
-physical force, of these brave men, was now at an end. The gods were
-quitting Himera, as they had before quitted Selinus. At the moment
-when the triremes were seen coming near to the port, the Iberian
-assailants broke down a wide space of the fortification with their
-battering-rams, poured in through the breach, and overcame all
-opposition. Encouraged by their shouts, the barbaric host now on all
-sides forced the walls, and spread themselves over the city, which
-became one scene of wholesale slaughter and plunder. It was no part
-of the scheme of Hannibal to interrupt the plunder, which he made
-over as a recompense to his soldiers. But he speedily checked the
-slaughter, being anxious to take as many prisoners as possible, and
-increasing the number by dragging away all who had taken sanctuary in
-the temples. A few among this wretched population may have contrived
-to reach the approaching triremes; all the rest either perished or
-fell into the hands of the victor.[906]
-
-  [906] Diodor. xiii, 61, 62.
-
-It was a proud day for the Carthaginian general when he stood as
-master on the ground of Himera; enabled to fulfil the duty, and
-satisfy the exigencies, of revenge for his slain grandfather.
-Tragical indeed was the consummation of this long-cherished purpose.
-Not merely the walls and temples (as at Selinus), but all the houses
-in Himera, were razed to the ground. Its temples, having been first
-stripped of their ornaments and valuables, were burnt. The women
-and children taken captive were distributed as prizes among the
-soldiers. But all the male captives, three thousand in number, were
-conveyed to the precise spot where Hamilkar had been slain, and there
-put to death with indignity,[907] as an expiatory satisfaction to
-his lost honor. Lastly, in order that even the hated name of Himera
-might pass into oblivion, a new town called Therma (so designated
-because of some warm springs) was shortly afterwards founded by the
-Carthaginians in the neighborhood.[908]
-
-  [907] Diodor. xiii, 62. Τῶν δ’ αἰχμαλώτων γυναικάς τε καὶ παῖδας
-  διαδοὺς εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον παρεφύλαττε· τῶν δ’ ἀνδρῶν τοὺς
-  ἁλόντας, εἰς τρισχιλίους ὄντας, παρήγαγεν ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ
-  πρότερον Ἀμίλκας ὁ πάππος αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ Γέλωνος ἀνῃρέθη, καὶ πάντας
-  αἰκισάμενος κατέσφαξε.
-
-  The Carthaginians, after their victory over Agathokles in 307
-  B.C., sacrificed their finest prisoners as offerings of thanks to
-  the gods (Diodor. xx, 65.)
-
-  [908] Diodor. xiii, 79.
-
-No man can now read the account of this wholesale massacre without
-horror and repugnance. Yet we cannot doubt, that among all the acts
-of Hannibal’s life, this was the one in which he most gloried; that
-it realized, in the most complete and emphatic manner, his concurrent
-inspirations of filial sentiment, religious obligation, and honor
-as a patriot; that to show mercy would have been regarded as a mean
-dereliction of these esteemed impulses; and that if the prisoners had
-been even more numerous, all of them would have been equally slain,
-rendering the expiatory fulfilment only so much the more honorable
-and efficacious. In the Carthaginian religion, human sacrifices were
-not merely admitted, but passed for the strongest manifestation
-of devotional fervor, and were especially resorted to in times of
-distress, when the necessity for propitiating the gods was accounted
-most pressing. Doubtless the feelings of Hannibal were cordially
-shared, and the plenitude of his revenge envied, by the army around
-him. So different, sometimes so totally contrary, is the tone and
-direction of the moral sentiments, among different ages and nations.
-
-In the numerous wars of Greeks against Greeks, which we have been
-unfortunately called upon to study, we have found few or no examples
-of any considerable town taken by storm. So much the more terrible
-was the shock throughout the Grecian world, of the events just
-recounted; Selinus and Himera, two Grecian cities of ancient standing
-and uninterrupted prosperity,—had both of them been stormed, ruined,
-and depopulated, by a barbaric host, within the space of three
-months.[909] No event at all parallel had occurred since the sack
-of Miletus by the Persians after the Ionic revolt (495 B.C.),[910]
-which raised such powerful sympathy and mourning in Athens. The
-war now raging in the Ægean, between Athens and Sparta with their
-respective allies, doubtless contributed to deaden, throughout
-Central Greece, the impression of calamities sustained by Greeks at
-the western extremity of Sicily. But within that island, the sympathy
-with the sufferers was most acute, and aggravated by terror for the
-future. The Carthaginian general had displayed a degree of energy
-equal to any Grecian officer throughout the war, with a command of
-besieging and battering machinery surpassing even the best equipped
-Grecian cities.
-
-The mercenaries whom he had got together were alike terrible from
-their bravery and ferocity; encouraging Carthaginian ambition to
-follow up its late rapid successes by attacks against the other
-cities of the island. No such prospects indeed were at once realized.
-Hannibal, having completed his revenge at Himera, and extended the
-Carthaginian dominion all across the north-west corner of Sicily
-(from Selinus on the southern sea to the site of Himera or Therma
-on the northern), dismissed his mercenary troops and returned home.
-Most of them were satiated with plunder as well as pay, though the
-Campanians, who had been foremost at the capture of Selinus, thought
-themselves unfairly stinted, and retired in disgust.[911] Hannibal
-carried back a rich spoil, with glorious trophies, to Carthage, where
-he was greeted with enthusiastic welcome and admiration.[912]
-
-  [909] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 37.
-
-  [910] Herodot. vi, 28.
-
-  [911] Diodor. xiii, 62-80.
-
-  [912] Diodor. xiii, 62.
-
-Never was there a time when the Greek cities in Sicily,—and Syracuse
-especially, upon whom the others would greatly rest in the event of
-a second Carthaginian invasion,—had stronger motives for keeping
-themselves in a condition of efficacious defence. Unfortunately,
-it was just at this moment that a new cause of intestine discord
-burst upon Syracuse; fatally impairing her strength, and proving in
-its consequences destructive to her liberty. The banished Syracusan
-general Hermokrates had recently arrived at Messênê in Sicily;
-where he appears to have been, at the time when the fugitives
-came from Himera. It has already been mentioned that he, with two
-colleagues, had commanded the Syracusan contingent serving with the
-Peloponnesians under Mindarus in Asia. After the disastrous defeat
-of Kyzikus, in which Mindarus was slain and every ship in the fleet
-taken or destroyed, sentence of banishment was passed at Syracuse
-against the three admirals. Hermokrates was exceedingly popular
-among the trierarchs and the officers; he had stood conspicuous for
-incorruptibility, and had conducted himself (so far as we have means
-of judging) with energy and ability in his command. The sentence,
-unmerited by his behavior, was dictated by acute vexation for the
-loss of the fleet, and for the disappointment of those expectations
-which Hermokrates had held out; combined with the fact that Diokles
-and the opposite party were now in the ascendant at Syracuse. When
-the banished general, in making it known to the armament, complained
-of its injustice and illegality, he obtained warm sympathy, and even
-exhortations still to retain the command, in spite of orders from
-home. He forbade them earnestly to think of raising sedition against
-their common city and country;[913] upon which the trierarchs, when
-they took their last and affectionate leave of him, bound themselves
-by oath, as soon as they should return to Syracuse, to leave no means
-untried for procuring his restoration.
-
-  [913] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 28. Οἱ δ’ οὐκ ἔφασαν δεῖν στασιάζειν
-  πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν, etc.
-
-The admonitory words addressed by Hermokrates to the forwardness
-of the trierarchs, would have been honorable to his patriotism,
-had not his own conduct at the same time been worthy of the worst
-enemies of his country. For immediately on being superseded by the
-new admirals, he went to the satrap Pharnabazus, in whose favor he
-stood high; and obtained from him a considerable present of money,
-which he employed in collecting mercenary troops and building ships,
-to levy war against his opponents in Syracuse and procure his own
-restoration.[914] Thus strengthened, he returned from Asia to Sicily,
-and reached the Sicilian Messênê rather before the capture of Himera
-by the Carthaginians. At Messênê he caused five fresh triremes to
-be built, besides taking into his pay one thousand of the expelled
-Himeræans. At the head of these troops, he attempted to force his
-way into Syracuse, under concert with his friends in the city,
-who engaged to assist his admission by arms. Possibly some of the
-trierarchs of his armament, who had before sworn to lend him their
-aid, had now returned and were among this body of interior partisans.
-
-  [914] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 31; Diodor. xiii, 63.
-
-The moment was well chosen for such an enterprise. As the disaster
-at Kyzikus had exasperated the Syracusans against Hermokrates, so
-we cannot doubt that there must have been a strong reaction against
-Diokles and his partisans, in consequence of the fall of Selinus
-unaided, and the subsequent abandonment of Himera. What degree of
-blame may fairly attach to Diokles for these misfortunes, we are not
-in a condition to judge. But such reverses in themselves were sure
-to discredit him more or less, and to lend increased strength and
-stimulus to the partisans of the banished Hermokrates. Nevertheless
-that leader, though he came to the gates of Syracuse, failed in
-his attempt to obtain admission, and was compelled to retire; upon
-which he marched his little army across the interior of the island,
-and took possession of the dismantled Selinus. Here he established
-himself as the chief of a new settlement, got together as many as
-he could of the expelled inhabitants (among whom probably some had
-already come back along with Empedion), and invited many fresh
-colonists from other quarters. Reëstablishing a portion of the
-demolished fortifications, he found himself gradually strengthened
-by so many new-comers, as to place at his command a body of six
-thousand chosen hoplites,—probably independent of other soldiers of
-inferior merit. With these troops he began to invade the Carthaginian
-settlements in the neighborhood, Motyê and Panormus.[915] Having
-defeated the forces of both in the field, he carried his ravages
-successfully over their territories, with large acquisitions of
-plunder. The Carthaginians had now no army remaining in Sicily;
-for their immense host of the preceding year had consisted only of
-mercenaries levied for the occasion, and then disbanded.
-
-  [915] Diodor. xiii, 63.
-
-These events excited strong sensation throughout Sicily. The valor of
-Hermokrates, who had restored Selinus and conquered the Carthaginians
-on the very ground where they had stood so recently in terrific
-force, was contrasted with the inglorious proceeding of Diokles at
-Himera. In the public assemblies of Syracuse, this topic, coupled
-with the unjust sentence whereby Hermokrates had been banished, was
-emphatically set forth by his partisans; producing some reaction
-in his favor, and a still greater effect in disgracing his rival
-Diokles. Apprised that the tide of Syracusan opinion was turning
-towards him, Hermokrates made renewed preparations for his return,
-and resorted to a new stratagem for the purpose of smoothing the
-difficulty. He marched from Selinus to the ruined site of Himera,
-informed himself of the spot where the Syracusan troops had undergone
-their murderous defeat, and collected together the bones of his slain
-fellow-citizens; which (or rather the unburied bodies) must have
-lain upon the field unheeded for about two years. Having placed
-these bones on cars richly decorated, he marched with his forces and
-conveyed them across the island from Himera to the Syracusan border.
-Here as an exile he halted; thinking it suitable now to display
-respect for the law,—though in his previous attempt he had gone up
-to the very gates of the city, without any similar scruples. But he
-sent forward some friends with the cars and the bones, tendering
-them to the citizens for the purpose of being honored with due
-funeral solemnities. Their arrival was the signal for a violent
-party discussion, and for an outburst of aggravated displeasure
-against Diokles, who had left the bodies unburied on the field of
-battle. “It was to Hermokrates (so his partisans urged) and to his
-valiant efforts against the Carthaginians, that the recovery of
-these remnants of the slain, and the opportunity of administering
-to them the funeral solemnities, was now owing. Let the Syracusans,
-after duly performing such obsequies, testify their gratitude to
-Hermokrates by a vote of restoration, and their displeasure against
-Diokles by a sentence of banishment.”[916] Diokles with his partisans
-was thus placed at great disadvantage. In opposing the restoration of
-Hermokrates, he thought it necessary also to oppose the proposition
-for welcoming and burying the bones of the slain citizens. Here the
-feelings of the people went vehemently against him; the bones were
-received and interred, amidst the respectful attendance of all; and
-so strong was the reactionary sentiment generally, that the partisans
-of Hermokrates carried their proposition for sentencing Diokles to
-banishment. But on the other hand, they could not so far prevail as
-to obtain the restoration of Hermokrates himself. The purposes of the
-latter had been so palpably manifested, in trying a few months before
-to force his way into the city by surprise, and in now presenting
-himself at the frontier with an armed force under his command,—that
-his readmission would have been nothing less than a deliberate
-surrender of the freedom of the city to a despot.[917]
-
-  [916] Diodor. xiii, 63, 75.
-
-  [917] Diodor. xiii, 75. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Διοκλῆς ἐφυγαδεύθη, τὸν δὲ
-  Ἑρμοκράτην οὐδ’ ὡς προσεδέξαντο· ὑπώπτευον γὰρ τὴν τἀνδρὸς
-  τόλμαν, μή ποτε τυχὼν ἡγεμονίας, ἀναδείξῃ ἑαυτὸν τύραννον.
-
-Having failed in this well-laid stratagem for obtaining a vote
-of consent, Hermokrates saw that his return could not at that
-moment be consummated by open force. He therefore retired from the
-Syracusan frontier; yet only postponing his purposes of armed attack
-until his friends in the city could provide for him a convenient
-opportunity. We see plainly that his own party within had been much
-strengthened, and his opponents enfeebled, by the recent manœuvre.
-Of this a proof is to be found in the banishment of Diokles, who
-probably was not succeeded by any other leader of equal influence.
-After a certain interval, the partisans of Hermokrates contrived a
-plan which they thought practicable, for admitting him into the city
-by night. Forewarned by them, he marched from Selinus at the head
-of three thousand soldiers, crossed the territory of Gela,[918] and
-reached the concerted spot near the gate of Achradina during the
-night. From the rapidity of his advance, he had only a few troops
-along with him; the main body not having been able to keep up. With
-these few, however, he hastened to the gate, which he found already
-in possession of his friends, who had probably (like Pasimêlus at
-Corinth[919]) awaited a night on which they were posted to act as
-sentinels. Master of the gate, Hermokrates, though joined by his
-partisans within in arms, thought it prudent to postpone decisive
-attack until his own main force came up. But during this interval,
-the Syracusan authorities in the city, apprised of what had happened,
-mustered their full military strength in the agora, and lost no time
-in falling upon the band of aggressors. After a sharply contested
-combat, these aggressors were completely worsted, and Hermokrates
-himself slain with a considerable proportion of his followers. The
-remainder having fled, sentence of banishment was passed upon them.
-Several among the wounded, however, were reported by their relatives
-as slain, in order that they might escape being comprised in such a
-condemnation.[920]
-
-  [918] Diodor. xiii, 75. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἑρμοκράτης τότε τὸν καιρὸν οὐχ
-  ὁρῶν εὔθετον εἰς τὸ βιάσασθαι, πάλιν ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς Σελινοῦντα.
-  Μετὰ δέ τινα χρόνον, τῶν φίλων αὐτὸν μεταπεμπομένων, ὥρμησε μετὰ
-  τρισχιλίων στρατιωτῶν, καὶ πορευθεὶς διὰ τῆς Γελώας, ἧκε νυκτὸς
-  ἐπὶ τὸν συντεταγμένον τόπον.
-
-  [919] Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 4, 8.
-
-  [920] Diodor. xiii, 75.
-
-  Xenophon (Hellen. i, 3, 13) states that Hermokrates, ἤδη φεύγων
-  ἐκ Συρακουσῶν, was among those who accompanied Pharnabazus along
-  with the envoys intended to go to Susa, but who only went as far
-  as Gordium in Phrygia, and were detained by Pharnabazus (on the
-  requisition of Cyrus) for three years. This must have been in the
-  year 407 B.C. Now I cannot reconcile this with the proceedings
-  of Hermokrates as described by Diodorus; his coming to the
-  Sicilian Messênê,—his exploits near Selinus,—his various attempts
-  to procure restoration to Syracuse:—all of which must have
-  occurred in 408-407 B.C., ending with the death of Hermokrates.
-
-  It seems to me impossible that the person mentioned by Xenophon
-  as accompanying Pharnabazus into the interior can have been the
-  eminent Hermokrates. Whether it was another person of the same
-  name,—or whether Xenophon was altogether misinformed,—I will not
-  take upon me to determine. There were really two contemporary
-  Syracusans bearing that name, for the father of Dionysius the
-  despot was named Hermokrates.
-
-  Polybius (xii, 25) states that Hermokrates fought with the
-  Lacedæmonians at Ægospotami. He means the eminent general so
-  called; who however cannot have been at Ægospotami in the summer
-  or autumn of 405 B.C. There is some mistake in the assertion of
-  Polybius, but I do not know how to explain it.
-
-Thus perished one of the most energetic of the Syracusan citizens; a
-man not less effective as a defender of his country against foreign
-enemies, than himself dangerous as a formidable enemy to her internal
-liberties. It would seem, as far as we can make out, that his attempt
-to make himself master of his country was powerfully seconded, and
-might well have succeeded. But it lacked that adventitious support
-arising from present embarrassment and danger in the foreign
-relations of the city, which we shall find so efficacious two years
-afterwards in promoting the ambitious projects of Dionysius.
-
-Dionysius,—for the next coming generation the most formidable name
-in the Grecian world,—now appears for the first time in history. He
-was a young Syracusan of no consideration from family or position,
-described as even of low birth and low occupation; as a scribe or
-secretary, which was looked upon as a subordinate, though essential,
-function.[921] He was the son of Hermokrates,—not that eminent person
-whose death has been just described, but another person of the same
-name, whether related or not, we do not know.[922] It is highly
-probable that he was a man of literary ability and instruction, since
-we read of him in after-days as a composer of odes and tragedies;
-and it is certain that he stood distinguished in all the talents
-for military action,—bravery, force of will, and quickness of
-discernment. On the present occasion, he espoused strenuously the
-party of Hermokrates, and was one of those who took arms in the
-city on his behalf. Having distinguished himself in the battle,
-and received several wounds, he was among those given out for dead
-by his relations.[923] In this manner he escaped the sentence of
-banishment passed against the survivors. And when, in the course of
-a certain time, after recovering from his wounds, he was produced
-as unexpectedly living,—we may presume that his opponents and the
-leading men in the city left him unmolested, not thinking it worth
-while to reopen political inquisition in reference to matters already
-passed and finished. He thus remained in the city, marked out by his
-daring and address to the Hermokratæan party, as the person most fit
-to take up the mantle, and resume the anti-popular designs, of their
-late leader. It will presently be seen how the chiefs of this party
-lent their aid to exalt him.
-
-  [921] Diodor. xiii, 96; xiv, 66.
-
-  Isokrates, Or. v, Philipp. s. 73—Dionysius, πολλοστὸς ὢν
-  Συρακοσίων καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν, etc.
-
-  Demosthenes, adv. Leptinem, p. 506, s. 178. γραμματέως, ὥς φασι,
-  etc. Polybius (xv, 35), ἐκ δημοτικῆς καὶ ταπεινῆς ὑποθέσεως
-  ὁρμηθεὶς, etc. Compare Polyænus, v, 2, 2.
-
-  [922] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 24. Διονύσιος ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους. Diodor.
-  xiii, 91.
-
-  [923] Diodor. xiii, 75.
-
-Meanwhile the internal condition of Syracuse was greatly enfeebled by
-this division. Though the three several attempts of Hermokrates to
-penetrate by force or fraud into the city had all failed, yet they
-had left a formidable body of malcontents behind; while the opponents
-also, the popular government and its leaders, had been materially
-reduced in power and consideration by the banishment of Diokles. This
-magistrate was succeeded by Daphnæus and others, of whom we know
-nothing, except that they are spoken of as rich men and representing
-the sentiments of the rich,—and that they seem to have manifested but
-little ability. Nothing could be more unfortunate than the weakness
-of Syracuse at this particular juncture: for the Carthaginians, elate
-with their successes at Selinus and Himera, and doubtless also piqued
-by the subsequent retaliation of Hermokrates upon their dependencies
-at Motyê and Panormus, were just now meditating a second invasion of
-Sicily on a still larger scale. Not uninformed of their projects,
-the Syracusan leaders sent envoys to Carthage to remonstrate against
-them, and to make propositions for peace. But no satisfactory answer
-could be obtained, nor were the preparations discontinued.[924]
-
-  [924] Diodor. xiii, 79.
-
-In the ensuing spring, the storm gathering from Africa burst with
-destructive violence upon this fated island. A mercenary force had
-been got together during the winter, greater than that which had
-sacked Selinus and Himera; three hundred thousand men, according to
-Ephorus,—one hundred and twenty thousand, according to Xenophon and
-Timæus. Hannibal was again placed in command; but his predominant
-impulses of family and religion having been satiated by the great
-sacrifice of Himera, he excused himself on the score of old age,
-and was only induced to accept the duty by having his relative
-Imilkon named as colleague. By their joint efforts, the immense
-host of Iberians, Mediterranean islanders, Campanians, Libyans, and
-Numidians, was united at Carthage, and made ready to be conveyed
-across, in a fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes, with no less
-than one thousand five hundred transports.[925] To protect the
-landing, forty Carthaginian triremes were previously sent over to
-the Bay of Motyê. The Syracusan leaders, with commendable energy and
-watchfulness, immediately despatched the like number of triremes
-to attack them, in hopes of thereby checking the farther arrival
-of the grand armament. They were victorious, destroying fifteen of
-the Carthaginian triremes, and driving the rest back to Africa; yet
-their object was not attained; for Hannibal himself, coming forth
-immediately with fifty fresh triremes, constrained the Syracusans
-to retire. Presently afterwards the grand armament appeared,
-disembarking its motley crowd of barbaric warriors near the western
-cape of Sicily.
-
-  [925] Diodor. xiii, 80; Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 21.
-
-Great was the alarm caused throughout Sicily by their arrival. All
-the Greek cities either now began to prepare for war, or pushed with
-a more vigorous hand equipments previously begun, since they seem
-to have had some previous knowledge of the purpose of the enemy.
-The Syracusans sent to entreat assistance both from the Italian
-Greeks and from Sparta. From the latter city, however, little was
-to be expected, since her whole efforts were now devoted to the
-prosecution of the war against Athens; this being the year wherein
-Kallikratidas commanded, and when the battle of Arginusæ was fought.
-
-Of all Sicilian Greeks, the Agrigentines were both the most
-frightened and the most busily employed. Conterminous as they were
-with Selinus on their western frontier, and foreseeing that the first
-shock of the invasion would fall upon them, they immediately began
-to carry in their outlying property within the walls, as well as
-to accumulate a stock of provisions for enduring blockade. Sending
-for Dexippus, a Lacedæmonian then in Gela as commander of a body of
-mercenaries for the defence of that town, they engaged him in their
-service, with one thousand five hundred hoplites; reinforced by eight
-hundred of those Campanians who had served with Hannibal at Himera,
-but had quitted him in disgust.[926]
-
-  [926] Diodor. xiii, 81-84.
-
-Agrigentum was at this time in the highest state of prosperity and
-magnificence; a tempting prize for any invader. Its population
-was very great; comprising, according to one account, twenty
-thousand citizens among an aggregate total of two hundred thousand
-males,—citizens, metics, and slaves; according to another account, an
-aggregate total of no less than eight hundred thousand persons;[927]
-numbers unauthenticated, and not to be trusted farther than as
-indicating a very populous city. Situated a little more than two
-miles from the sea, and possessing a spacious territory highly
-cultivated, especially with vines and olives, Agrigentum carried on a
-lucrative trade with the opposite coast of Africa, where at that time
-no such plantations flourished. Its temples and porticos, especially
-the spacious temple of Zeus Olympius,—its statues and pictures,—its
-abundance of chariots and horses,—its fortifications,—its sewers,—its
-artificial lake of near a mile in circumference, abundantly stocked
-with fish,—all these placed it on a par with the most splendid
-cities of the Hellenic world.[928] Of the numerous prisoners taken
-at the defeat of the Carthaginians near Himera seventy years before,
-a very large proportion had fallen to the lot of the Agrigentines,
-and had been employed by them in public works contributing to the
-advantage or ornament of the city.[929] The hospitality of the
-wealthy citizens,—Gellias, Antisthenes, and others,—was carried
-even to profusion. The surrounding territory was celebrated for its
-breed of horses,[930] which the rich Agrigentines vied with each
-other in training and equipping for the chariot-race. At the last
-Olympic games immediately preceding this fatal Carthaginian invasion
-(that is at the 93rd Olympiad,—408 B.C.), the Agrigentine Exænetus
-gained the prize in a chariot-race. On returning to Sicily after his
-victory, he was welcomed by many of his friends, who escorted him
-home in procession with three hundred chariots, each drawn by a pair
-of white horses, and all belonging to native Agrigentines. Of the
-festival by which the wealthy Antisthenes celebrated the nuptials of
-his daughter, we read an account almost fabulous. Amidst all this
-wealth and luxury, it is not surprising to hear that the rough duties
-of military exercise were imperfectly kept up, and that indulgences,
-not very consistent with soldier-like efficiency, were allowed to the
-citizens on guard.
-
-  [927] Diogen. Laert. viii, 63.
-
-  [928] Diodor. xiii, 81-84; Polyb. ix, 7.
-
-  [929] Diodor. xi, 25.
-
-  [930] Virgil, Æneid. iii, 704.
-
-Such was Agrigentum in May 406 B.C., when Hannibal and Imilkon
-approached it with their powerful army. Their first propositions,
-however, were not of a hostile character. They invited the
-Agrigentines to enter into alliance with Carthage; or if this were
-not acceptable, at any rate to remain neutral and at peace. Both
-propositions were declined.[931]
-
-  [931] Diodor. xiii, 85.
-
-Besides having taken engagements with Gela and Syracuse, the
-Agrigentines also felt a confidence, not unreasonable, in the
-strength of their own walls and situation. Agrigentum with its
-citadel was placed on an aggregate of limestone hills, immediately
-above the confluence of two rivers, both flowing from the north; the
-river Akragas on the eastern and southern sides of the city, and the
-Hypsas on its western side. Of this aggregate of hills, separated
-from each other by clefts and valleys, the northern half is the
-loftiest, being about eleven hundred feet above the level of the
-sea—the southern half is less lofty. But on all sides, except on the
-south-west, it rises by a precipitous ascent; on the side towards
-the sea, it springs immediately out of the plain, thus presenting a
-fine prospect to ships passing along the coast. The whole of this
-aggregate of hills was encompassed by a continuous wall, built round
-the declivity, and in some parts hewn out of the solid rock. The
-town of Agrigentum was situated in the southern half of the walled
-enclosure. The citadel, separated from it by a ravine, and accessible
-only by one narrow ascent, stood on the north-eastern hill; it was
-the most conspicuous feature in the place, called the Athenæum,
-and decorated by temples of Athênê and of Zeus Atabyrius. In the
-plain under the southern wall of the city stood the Agrigentine
-sepulchres.[932]—Reinforced by eight hundred Campanian mercenaries,
-with the fifteen hundred other mercenaries brought by Dexippus from
-Gela,—the Agrigentines awaited confidently the attack upon their
-walls, which were not only in far better condition than those of
-Selinus, but also unapproachable by battering-machines or movable
-towers, except on one part of the south-western side. It was here
-that Hannibal, after reconnoitering the town all round, began his
-attack. But after hard fighting without success for one day, he was
-forced to retire at nightfall; and even lost his battering train,
-which was burnt during the night by a sally of the besieged.[933]
-Desisting from farther attempts on that point, Hannibal now ordered
-his troops to pull down the tombs; which were numerous on the lower
-or southern side of the city, and many of which, especially that of
-the despot Theron, were of conspicuous grandeur. By this measure he
-calculated on providing materials adequate to the erection of immense
-mounds, equal in height to the southern wall, and sufficiently
-close to it for the purpose of assault. His numerous host had made
-considerable progress in demolishing these tombs, and were engaged
-in breaking down the monument of Theron, when their progress was
-arrested by a thunderbolt falling upon it. This event was followed
-by religious terrors, suddenly overspreading the camp. The prophets
-declared that the violation of the tombs was an act of criminal
-sacrilege. Every night the spectres of those whose tombs had been
-profaned manifested themselves, to the affright of the soldiers on
-guard; while the judgment of the gods was manifested in a violent
-pestilential distemper. Numbers of the army perished, Hannibal
-himself among them; and even of those who escaped death, many were
-disabled from active duty by distress and suffering. Imilkon was
-compelled to appease the gods, and to calm the agony of the troops,
-by a solemn supplication according to the Carthaginian rites. He
-sacrificed a child, considered as the most propitiatory of all
-offerings, to Kronus; and cast into the sea a number of animal
-victims as offerings to Poseidon.[934]
-
-  [932] See about the Topography of Agrigentum,—Seyfert, Akragas,
-  p. 21, 23, 40 (Hamburg, 1845).
-
-  The modern town of Girgenti stands on one of the hills of this
-  vast aggregate, which is overspread with masses of ruins, and
-  around which the traces of the old walls may be distinctly made
-  out, with considerable remains of them in some particular parts.
-
-  Compare Polybius, i, 18; ix, 27.
-
-  Pindar calls the town ποταμίᾳ τ’ Ἀκράγαντι—Pyth. vi, 6: ἱερὸν
-  οἴκημα ποταμοῦ—Olymp. ii, 10.
-
-  [933] Diodor. xiii, 85.
-
-  We read of a stratagem in Polyænus (v, 10, 4), whereby Imilkon is
-  said to have enticed the Agrigentines, in one of their sallies,
-  into incautious pursuit, by a simulated flight; and thus to have
-  inflicted upon them a serious defeat.
-
-  [934] Diodor. xiii, 86.
-
-These religious rites calmed the terrors of the army, and mitigated,
-or were supposed to have mitigated, the distemper; so that Imilkon,
-while desisting from all farther meddling with the tombs, was enabled
-to resume his batteries and assaults against the walls, though
-without any considerable success. He also dammed up the western river
-Hypsas, so as to turn the stream against the wall; but this manœuvre
-produced no effect. His operations were presently interrupted by
-the arrival of a powerful army which marched from Syracuse, under
-Daphnæus, to the relief of Agrigentum. Reinforced in its road by
-the military strength of Kamarina and Gela, it amounted to thirty
-thousand foot and five thousand horse, on reaching the river Himera,
-the eastern frontier of the Agrigentine territory; while a fleet
-of thirty Syracusan triremes sailed along the coast to second its
-efforts. As these troops neared the town, Imilkon despatched against
-them a body of Iberians and Campanians;[935] who however, after a
-strenuous combat, were completely defeated, and driven back to the
-Carthaginian camp near the city, where they found themselves under
-the protection of the main army. Daphnæus, having secured the victory
-and inflicted severe loss upon the enemy, was careful to prevent his
-troops from disordering their ranks in the ardor of pursuit, in the
-apprehension that Imilkon with the main body might take advantage
-of that disorder to turn the fortune of the day,—as had happened in
-the terrible defeat before Himera, three years before. The routed
-Iberians were thus allowed to get back to the camp. At the same time
-the Agrigentines, witnessing from the walls, with joyous excitement,
-the flight of their enemies, vehemently urged their generals to lead
-them forth for an immediate sally, in order that the destruction
-of the fugitives might thus be consummated. But the generals were
-inflexible in resisting such demand; conceiving that the city itself
-would thus be stripped of its defenders, and that Imilkon might seize
-the occasion for assaulting it with his main body, when there was not
-sufficient force to repel them. The defeated Iberians thus escaped
-to the main camp; neither pursued by the Syracusans, nor impeded, as
-they passed near the Agrigentine walls, by the population within.
-
-  [935] Diodor. xiii, 87.
-
-  It appears that an eminence a little way eastward from Agrigentum
-  still bears the name of _Il Campo Cartaginese_, raising some
-  presumption that it was once occupied by the Carthaginians.
-  Evidently, the troops sent out by Imilkon to meet and repel
-  Daphnæus, must have taken post to the eastward of Agrigentum,
-  from which side the Syracusan army of relief was approaching.
-  Seyfert (Akragas, p. 41) contests this point, and supposes that
-  they must have been on the western side; misled by the analogy
-  of the Roman siege in 262 B.C., when the Carthaginian relieving
-  army under Hanno were coming from the westward,—from Heraklei
-  (Polyb. i, 19).
-
-Presently Daphnæus with his victorious army reached Agrigentum,
-and joined the citizens; who flocked in crowds, along with the
-Lacedæmonian Dexippus, to meet and welcome them. But the joy of
-meeting, and the reciprocal congratulations on the recent victory,
-were fatally poisoned by general indignation for the unmolested
-escape of the defeated Iberians; occasioned by nothing less than
-remissness, cowardice, or corruption, (so it was contended), on the
-part of the generals,—first the Syracusan generals, and next the
-Agrigentine. Against the former, little was now said, though much
-was held in reserve, as we shall soon hear. But against the latter,
-the discontent of the Agrigentine population burst forth instantly
-and impetuously. A public assembly being held on the spot, the
-Agrigentine generals, five in number, were put under accusation.
-Among many speakers who denounced them as guilty of treason, the most
-violent of all was the Kamarinæan Menês,—himself one of the leaders,
-seemingly of the Kamarinæan contingent in the army of Daphnæus. The
-concurrence of Menês, carrying to the Agrigentines a full sanction of
-their sentiments, wrought them up to such a pitch of fury, that the
-generals, when they came to defend themselves, found neither sympathy
-nor even common fairness of hearing. Four out of the five were stoned
-and put to death on the spot; the fifth, Argeius, was spared only
-on the ground of his youth; and even the Lacedæmonian Dexippus was
-severely censured.[936]
-
-  [936] Diodor. xiii, 87.
-
-  The youth of Argeius, combined with the fact of his being in high
-  command, makes us rather imagine that he was of noble birth:
-  compare Thucydid. vi, 38,—the speech of Athenagoras.
-
-How far, in regard to these proceedings, the generals were really
-guilty, or how far their defence, had it been fairly heard, would
-have been valid,—is a point which our scanty information does not
-enable us to determine. But it is certain that the arrival of the
-victorious Syracusans at Agrigentum completely altered the relative
-position of affairs. Instead of farther assaulting the walls, Imilkon
-was attacked in his camp by Daphnæus. The camp, however, was so
-fortified as to repel all attempts, and the siege from this time
-forward became only a blockade; a contest of patience and privation
-between the city and the besiegers, lasting seven or eight months
-from the commencement of the siege. At first Daphnæus, with his own
-force united to the Agrigentines, was strong enough to harass the
-Carthaginians and intercept their supplies, so that the greatest
-distress began to prevail among their army. The Campanian mercenaries
-even broke out into mutiny, crowding, with clamorous demands for
-provision and with menace of deserting, around the tent of Imilkon;
-who barely pacified them by pledging to them the gold and silver
-drinking-cups of the chief Carthaginians around him,[937] coupled
-with entreaties that they would wait yet a few days. During that
-short interval, he meditated and executed a bold stroke of relief.
-The Syracusans and Agrigentines were mainly supplied by sea from
-Syracuse; from whence a large transport of provision-ships was now
-expected, under convoy of some Syracusan triremes. Apprised of
-their approach, Imilkon silently brought out forty Carthaginian
-triremes from Motyê and Panormus, with which he suddenly attacked the
-Syracusan convoy, no way expecting such a surprise. Eight Syracusan
-triremes were destroyed; the remainder were driven ashore, and the
-whole fleet of transports fell into the hands of Imilkon. Abundance
-and satisfaction now reigned in the camp of the Carthaginians,
-while the distress, and with it the discontent, was transferred to
-Agrigentum. The Campanian mercenaries in the service of Dexippus
-began the mutiny, complaining to him of their condition. Perhaps he
-had been alarmed and disgusted at the violent manifestation of the
-Agrigentines against their generals, extending partly to himself
-also. At any rate, he manifested no zeal in the defence, and was even
-suspected of having received a bribe of fifteen talents from the
-Carthaginians. He told the Campanians that Agrigentum was no longer
-tenable, for want of supplies; upon which they immediately retired,
-and marched away to Messênê, affirming that the time stipulated
-for their stay had expired. Such a secession struck every one with
-discouragement. The Agrigentine generals immediately instituted an
-examination, to ascertain the quantity of provision still remaining
-in the city. Having made the painful discovery that there remained
-but very little, they took the resolution of causing the city to be
-evacuated by its population during the coming night.[938]
-
-  [937] Mention is again made, sixty-five years afterwards, in the
-  description of the war of Timoleon against the Carthaginians,—of
-  the abundance of gold and silver drinking cups, and rich personal
-  ornaments, carried by the native Carthaginians on military
-  service (Diodor. xvi, 81; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 28, 29).
-
-  There was a select body of Carthaginians,—a Sacred
-  Band,—mentioned in these later times, consisting of two thousand
-  five hundred men of distinguished bravery as well as of
-  conspicuous position in the city (Diodor. xvi, 80; xx, 10).
-
-  [938] Diodor. xiii, 88.
-
-A night followed, even more replete with woe and desolation than
-that which had witnessed the flight of Diokles with the inhabitants
-of Himera from their native city. Few scenes can be imagined more
-deplorable than the vast population of Agrigentum obliged to hurry
-out of their gates during a December night, as their only chance of
-escape from famine or the sword of a merciless enemy. The road to
-Gela was beset by a distracted crowd, of both sexes and of every age
-and condition, confounded in one indiscriminate lot of suffering.
-No thought could be bestowed on the preservation of property
-or cherished possessions. Happy were they who could save their
-lives; for not a few, through personal weakness or the immobility
-of despair, were left behind. Perhaps here and there a citizen,
-combining the personal strength with the filial piety of Æneas, might
-carry away his aged father with the household gods on his shoulders;
-but for the most part, the old, the sick, and the impotent, all
-whose years were either too tender or too decrepit to keep up with a
-hurried flight, were of necessity abandoned. Some remained and slew
-themselves, refusing even to survive the loss of their homes and
-the destruction of their city; others, among whom was the wealthy
-Gellias, consigned themselves to the protection of the temples, but
-with little hope that it would procure them safety. The morning’s
-dawn exhibited to Imilkon unguarded walls, a deserted city, and a
-miserable population of exiles huddled together in disorderly flight
-on the road to Gela.
-
-For these fugitives, however, the Syracusan and Agrigentine soldiers
-formed a rear-guard sufficient to keep off the aggravated torture of
-a pursuit. But the Carthaginian army found enough to occupy them in
-the undefended prey which was before their eyes. They rushed upon
-the town with the fury of men who had been struggling and suffering
-before it for eight months. They ransacked the houses, slew every
-living person that was left, and found plunder enough to satiate
-even a ravenous appetite. Temples as well as private dwellings were
-alike stripped, so that those who had taken sanctuary in them became
-victims like the rest: a fate which Gellius only avoided by setting
-fire to the temple in which he stood and perishing in its ruins.
-The great public ornaments and trophies of the city,—the bull of
-Phalaris, together with the most precious statues and pictures,—were
-preserved by Imilkon and sent home as decorations to Carthage.[939]
-While he gave up the houses of Agrigentum to be thus gutted, he still
-kept them standing, and caused them to serve as winter-quarters for
-the repose of his soldiers, after the hardships of an eight months’
-siege. The unhappy Agrigentine fugitives first found shelter and kind
-hospitality at Gela; from whence they were afterwards, by permission
-of the Syracusans, transferred to Leontini.
-
-  [939] Diodor. xiii, 89, 90.
-
-I have described, as far as the narrative of Diodorus permits us to
-know, this momentous and tragical portion of Sicilian history; a
-suitable preface to the long despotism of Dionysius. It is evident
-that the seven or eight months (the former of these numbers is
-authenticated by Xenophon, while the latter is given by Diodorus)
-of the siege or blockade must have contained matters of the
-greatest importance which are not mentioned, and that even of the
-main circumstances which brought about the capture, we are most
-imperfectly informed. But though we cannot fully comprehend its
-causes, its effects are easy to understand. They were terror-striking
-and harrowing in the extreme. When the storm which had beaten down
-Selinus and Himera was now perceived to have extended its desolation
-to a city so much more conspicuous, among the wealthiest and most
-populous in the Grecian world,—when the surviving Agrigentine
-population, including women and children, and the great proprietors
-of chariots whose names stood recorded as victors at Olympia, were
-seen all confounded in one common fate of homeless flight and
-nakedness—when the victorious host and its commanders took up their
-quarters in the deserted houses, ready to spread their conquests
-farther after a winter of repose,—there was hardly a Greek in Sicily
-who did not tremble for his life and property.[940] Several of them
-sought shelter at Syracuse, while others even quitted the island
-altogether, emigrating to Italy.
-
-  [940] Diodor. xiii, 91.
-
-Amidst so much anguish, humiliation, and terror, there were loud
-complaints against the conduct of the Syracusan generals under whose
-command the disaster had occurred. The censure which had been cast
-upon them before, for not having vigorously pursued the defeated
-Iberians, was now revived, and aggravated tenfold by the subsequent
-misfortune. To their inefficiency the capture of Agrigentum was
-ascribed, and apparently not without substantial cause; for the town
-was so strongly placed as to defy assault, and could only be taken
-by blockade; now we discern no impediments adequate to hinder the
-Syracusan generals from procuring supplies of provisions; and it
-seems clear that the surprise of the Syracusan store-ships might
-have been prevented by proper precautions; upon which surprise the
-whole question turned, between famine in the Carthaginian camp and
-famine in Agrigentum.[941] The efficiency of Dexippus and the other
-generals, in defending Agrigentum (as depicted by Diodorus), stands
-sadly inferior to the vigor and ability displayed by Gylippus before
-Syracuse, as described by Thucydides: and we can hardly wonder that
-by men in the depth of misery, like the Agrigentines,—or in extreme
-alarm, like the other Sicilian Greeks—these generals, incompetent or
-treasonable, should be regarded as the cause of the ruin.
-
-  [941] Diodor. xiii, 88.
-
-  Xenophon confirms the statement of Diodorus, that Agrigentum was
-  taken by famine (Hellen. i, 5, 21; ii, 2, 24).
-
-Such a state of sentiment, under ordinary circumstances, would have
-led to the condemnation of the generals and to the nomination of
-others, with little farther result. But it became of far graver
-import, when combined with the actual situation of parties in
-Syracuse. The Hermokratean opposition party,—repelled during the
-preceding year with the loss of its leader, yet nowise crushed,—now
-re-appeared more formidable than ever, under a new leader more
-aggressive even than Hermokrates himself. Throughout ancient as
-well as modern history, defeat and embarrassment in the foreign
-relations have proved fruitful causes of change in the internal
-government. Such auxiliaries had been wanting to the success of
-Hermokrates in the preceding year; but alarms of every kind now
-overhung the city in terrific magnitude, and when the first Syracusan
-assembly was convoked on returning from Agrigentum, a mournful
-silence reigned;[942] as in the memorable description given by
-Demosthenes of the Athenian assembly held immediately after the
-taking of Elateia.[943] The generals had lost the confidence of their
-fellow-citizens; yet no one else was forward, at a juncture so full
-of peril, to assume their duty, by proffering fit counsel for the
-future conduct of the war. Now was the time for the Hermokratean
-party to lay their train for putting down the government. Dionysius,
-though both young and of mean family, was adopted as leader in
-consequence of that audacity and bravery which even already he
-had displayed, both in the fight along with Hermokrates and in the
-battles against the Carthaginians. Hipparinus, a Syracusan of rich
-family, who had ruined himself by dissolute expenses, was eager to
-renovate his fortunes by seconding the elevation of Dionysius to the
-despotism;[944] Philistus (the subsequent historian of Syracuse),
-rich, young, and able, threw himself ardently into the same cause;
-and doubtless other leading persons, ancient Hermokrateans and
-others, stood forward as partisans in the conspiracy. But it either
-was, from the beginning, or speedily became, a movement organized
-for the purpose of putting the sceptre into the hands of Dionysius,
-to whom all the rest, though several among them were of far greater
-wealth and importance, served but as satellites and auxiliaries.
-
-  [942] Diodor. xiii, 91.
-
-  [943] Demosthenes de Coronâ, p. 286, s. 220.
-
-  This comparison is made by M. Brunet de Presle, in his valuable
-  historical work (Recherches sur les Establissemens des Grecs en
-  Sicile, Part ii, s. 39, p. 219).
-
-  [944] Aristotel. Politic. v, 5, 6. Γίνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς
-  ὀλιγαρχίας, καὶ ὅταν ἀναλώσωσι τὰ ἴδια, ζῶντες ἀσελγῶς· καὶ γὰρ
-  οἱ τοιοῦτοι καινοτομεῖν ζητοῦσι, καὶ ἢ τυραννίδι ἐπιτίθενται
-  αὐτοὶ, ἢ κατασκευάζουσιν ἕτερον· ὥσπερ Ἱππαρῖνος Διονύσιον ἐν
-  Συρακούσαις.
-
-  Hipparinus was the father of Dion, respecting whom more hereafter.
-
-  Plato, in his warm sympathy for Dion, assigns to Hipparinus more
-  of an equality of rank and importance with the elder Dionysius,
-  than the subsequent facts justify (Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 353
-  A.; p. 355 F.).
-
-Amidst the silence and disquietude which reigned in the Syracusan
-assembly, Dionysius was the first who rose to address them. He
-enlarged upon a topic suitable alike to the temper of his auditors
-and to his own views. He vehemently denounced the generals as having
-betrayed the security of Syracuse to the Carthaginians,—and as the
-persons to whom the ruin of Agrigentum, together with the impending
-peril of every man around, was owing. He set forth their misdeeds,
-real or alleged, not merely with fulness and acrimony, but with a
-ferocious violence outstripping all the limits of admissible debate,
-and intended to bring upon them a lawless murder, like the death of
-the generals recently at Agrigentum. “There they sit, the traitors!
-Do not wait for legal trial or verdict; but lay hands upon them at
-once, and inflict upon them summary justice.”[945] Such a brutal
-exhortation, not unlike that of the Athenian Kritias, when he
-caused the execution of Theramenes in the oligarchical senate, was
-an offence against law as well as against parliamentary order. The
-presiding magistrates reproved Dionysius as a disturber of order,
-and fined him, as they were empowered by law.[946] But his partisans
-were loud in his support. Philistus not only paid down the fine for
-him on the spot, but publicly proclaimed that he would go on for
-the whole day paying all similar fines which might be imposed,—and
-incited Dionysius to persist in such language as he thought proper.
-That which had begun as illegality, was now aggravated into open
-defiance of the law. Yet so enfeebled was the authority of the
-magistrates, and so vehement the cry against them, in the actual
-position of the city, that they were unable either to punish or
-to repress the speaker. Dionysius pursued his harangue in a tone
-yet more inflammatory, not only accusing the generals of having
-corruptly betrayed Agrigentum, but also denouncing the conspicuous
-and wealthy citizens generally, as oligarchs who held tyrannical
-sway,—who treated the many with scorn, and made their own profit out
-of the misfortunes of the city. Syracuse (he contended) could never
-be saved, unless men of a totally different character were invested
-with authority; men, not chosen from wealth and station, but of
-humble birth, belonging to the people by position, and kind in their
-deportment from consciousness of their own weakness.[947] His bitter
-invective against generals already discredited, together with the
-impetuous warmth of his apparent sympathy for the people against
-the rich, were both alike favorably received. Plato states that the
-assembly became so furiously exasperated, as to follow literally
-the lawless and blood-thirsty inspirations of Dionysius, and to
-stone all these generals, ten in number, on the spot, without any
-form of trial. But Diodorus simply tells us, that a vote was passed
-to cashier the generals, and to name in their places Dionysius,
-Hipparinus, and others.[948] This latter statement is, in my opinion,
-the more probable.
-
-  [945] Diodor. xiii, 91. Ἀπορουμένων δὲ πάντων παρελθών Διονύσιος
-  ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους, τῶν μὲν στρατηγῶν κατηγόρησεν, ὡς προδιδόντων τὰ
-  πράγματα τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις· τὰ δὲ πλήθη παρώξυνε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν
-  τιμωρίαν, παρακαλῶν μὴ περιμεῖναι τὸν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους κλῆρον,
-  ἀλλ’ ἐκ χειρὸς εὐθέως ἐπιθεῖναι τὴν δίκην.
-
-  [946] Diodor. xiii, 91. Τῶν δ’ ἀρχόντων ζημιούντων τὸν Διονύσιον
-  κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, ὡς θορυβοῦντα, Φίλιστος, ὁ τὰς ἱστορίας ὕστερον
-  συγγράψας, οὐσίαν ἔχων μεγάλην, etc.
-
-  In the description given by Thucydides (vi, 32-39) of the debate
-  in the Syracusan assembly (prior to the arrival of the Athenian
-  expedition) in which Hermokrates and Athenagoras speak, we find
-  the magistrates interfering to prevent the continuance of a
-  debate which had become very personal and acrimonious; though
-  there was nothing in it at all brutal, nor any exhortation to
-  personal violence or infringement of the law.
-
-  [947] Diodor. xiii, 91.
-
-  [948] Plato, Epistol. viii, p. 354. Οἱ γὰρ πρὸ Διονυσίου καὶ
-  Ἱππαρίνου ἀρξάντων Σικελιῶται τότε ὡς ᾤοντο εὐδαιμόνως ἔζων,
-  τρυφῶντές τε καὶ ἅμα ἀρχόντων ἄρχοντες· οἱ καὶ τοῦς δέκα
-  στρατηγοὺς κατέλευσαν βάλλοντες τοὺς πρὸ Διονυσίου, κατὰ νόμον
-  οὐδένα κρίναντες, ἵνα δὴ δουλεύοιεν μηδένι μήτε σὺν δίκῃ μήτε
-  νόμῳ δεσπότῃ, ἐλεύθεροι δ’ εἶεν πάντῃ πάντως· ὅθεν αἱ τυραννίδες
-  ἐγένοντο αὐτοῖς.
-
-  Diodor. xiii, 92. παραυτίκα τοὺς μὲν ἔλυσε τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἑτέρους δὲ
-  εἵλετο στρατηγοὺς, ἐν οἷς καὶ τὸν Διονύσιον. Some little time
-  afterwards, Diodorus farther mentions that Dionysius accused
-  before the public assembly, and caused to be put to death,
-  Daphnæus and Demarchus (xiii, 96); now Daphnæus was one of the
-  generals (xiii, 86-88).
-
-  If we assume the fact to have occurred as Plato affirms it,
-  we cannot easily explain how something so impressive and
-  terror-striking came to be transformed into the more commonplace
-  statement of Diodorus, by Ephorus, Theopompus, Hermeias, Timæus,
-  or Philistus, from one of whom probably his narrative is borrowed.
-
-  But if we assume Diodorus to be correct, we can easily account
-  for the erroneous belief in the mind of Plato. A very short
-  time before this scene at Syracuse, an analogous circumstance
-  had really occurred at Agrigentum. The assembled Agrigentines,
-  being inflamed against their generals for what they believed
-  to be slackness or treachery in the recent fight with the
-  Carthaginians, had stoned four of them on the spot, and only
-  spared the fifth on the score of his youth (Diodor. xiii, 87).
-
-  I cannot but think that Plato confounded in his memory the scene
-  and proceedings at Syracuse with the other events, so recently
-  antecedent, at Agrigentum. His letter (from which the above
-  citation is made) was written in his old age,—fifty years after
-  the event.
-
-  This is one inaccuracy as to matter-of-fact, which might be
-  produced in support of the views of those who reject the
-  letters of Plato as spurious, though Ast does not notice it,
-  while going through the letters _seriatim_, and condemning
-  them not only as un-Platonic but as despicable compositions.
-  After attentively studying both the letters themselves, and his
-  reasoning, I dissent entirely from Ast’s conclusion. The first
-  letter, that which purports to come not from Plato, but from
-  Dion, is the only one against which he seems to me to have made
-  out a good case (see Ast, Ueber Platon’s Leben und Schriften,
-  p. 504-530). Against the others, I cannot think that he has
-  shown any sufficient ground for pronouncing them to be spurious
-  and I therefore continue to treat them as genuine, following
-  the opinion of Cicero and Plutarch. It is admitted by Ast that
-  their authenticity was not suspected in antiquity, as far as our
-  knowledge extends. Without considering the presumption hence
-  arising as conclusive, I think it requires to be countervailed by
-  stronger substantive grounds than those which Ast has urged.
-
-  Among the total number of thirteen letters, those relating
-  to Dion and Dionysius (always setting aside the first
-  letter)—that is the second, third, fourth, seventh, eighth, and
-  thirteenth,—are the most full of allusions to fact and details.
-  Some of them go very much into detail. Now had they been the
-  work of a forger, it is fair to contend that he could hardly
-  avoid laying himself more open to contradiction than he has done,
-  on the score of inaccuracy and inconsistency with the supposed
-  situation. I have already mentioned one inaccuracy which I take
-  to be a _fault_ of memory, both conceivable and pardonable. Ast
-  mentions another, to disprove the authenticity of the eighth
-  letter, respecting the son of Dion. Plato, in this eighth
-  letter, speaking in the name of the deceased Dion, recommends
-  the Syracusans to name Dion’s son as one of the members of a
-  tripartite kingship, along with Hipparinus (son of the elder
-  Dionysius) and the younger Dionysius. This (contends Ast, p. 523)
-  cannot be correct, because Dion’s son died before his father. To
-  make the argument of Ast complete, we ought to be sure that Dion
-  had only _one_ son; for which there is doubtless the evidence
-  of Plutarch, who after having stated that the son of Dion, a
-  youth nearly grown up, threw himself from the roof of the house
-  and was killed, goes on to say that Kallippus, the political
-  enemy of Dion, founded upon this misfortune a false rumor which
-  he circulated,—ὡς ὁ Δίων ~ἄπαις γεγονὼς~ ἔγνωκε τὸν Διονυσίου
-  καλεῖν Ἀπολλοκράτην καὶ ποιεῖσθαι διάδοχον (Plutarch, Dion. c.
-  55, 56: compare also c. 21,—τοῦ παιδίου). But since the rumor was
-  altogether false, we may surely imagine that Kallippus, taking
-  advantage of a notorious accident which had just proved fatal to
-  the eldest son of Dion, may have fabricated a false statement
-  about the family of Dion, though there might be a younger boy at
-  home. It is not certain that the number of Dion’s children was
-  familiarly known among the population of Syracuse; nor was Dion
-  himself in the situation of an assured king, able to transfer
-  his succession at once to a boy not yet adult. And when we find
-  in another chapter of Plutarch’s Life of Dion (c. 31), that the
-  son of Dion was called by Timæus, _Aretæus_,—and by Timonides,
-  _Hipparinus_,—this surely affords some presumption that there
-  were _two_ sons, and not one son called by two different names.
-
-  I cannot therefore admit that Ast has proved the eighth Platonic
-  letter to be inaccurate in respect to matter of fact. I will add
-  that the letter does not mention the _name_ of Dion’s son (though
-  Ast says that it calls him _Hipparinus_); and that it does
-  specify the _three_ partners in the tripartite kingship suggested
-  (though Ast says that it only mentioned _two_).
-
-  Most of Ast’s arguments against the authenticity of the letters,
-  however, are founded, not upon alleged inaccuracies of fact,
-  but upon what he maintains to be impropriety and meanness of
-  thought, childish intrusion of philosophy, unseasonable mysticism
-  and pedantry, etc. In some of his criticisms I coincide, though
-  by no means in all. But I cannot accept them as evidence to
-  prove the point for which he contends,—the spuriousness of the
-  letters. The proper conclusion from his premises appears to me
-  to be, that Plato wrote letters which, when tried by our canons
-  about letter-writing, seem awkward, pedantic, and in bad taste.
-  Dionysius of Halikarnassus (De adm. vi dicend. in Demosth.
-  p. 1025-1044), while emphatically extolling the admirable
-  composition of Plato’s dialogues, does not scruple to pass an
-  unfavorable criticism upon him as a speech-writer; referring to
-  the speeches in the Symposion as well as to the funeral harangue
-  in the Menexenus. Still less need we be afraid to admit, that
-  Plato was not a graceful letter-writer.
-
-  That Plato would feel intensely interested, and even personally
-  involved, in the quarrel between Dionysius II. and Dion, cannot
-  be doubted. That he would write letters to Dionysius on the
-  subject,—that he would anxiously seek to maintain influence over
-  him, on all grounds,—that he would manifest a lofty opinion
-  of himself and his own philosophy,—is perfectly natural and
-  credible. And when we consider both the character and the station
-  of Dionysius, it is difficult to lay down beforehand any assured
-  canon as to the epistolary tone which Plato would think most
-  suitable to address him.
-
-Such was the first stage of what we may term the despot’s progress,
-successfully consummated. The pseudo-demagogue Dionysius outdoes,
-in fierce professions of antipathy against the rich, anything that
-we read as coming from the real demagogues, Athenagoras at Syracuse,
-or Kleon at Athens. Behold him now sitting as a member of the new
-Board of generals, at a moment when the most assiduous care and
-energy, combined with the greatest unanimity, were required to put
-the Syracusan military force into an adequate state of efficiency. It
-suited the policy of Dionysius not only to bestow no care or energy
-himself, but to nullify all that was bestowed by his colleagues, and
-to frustrate deliberately all chance of unanimity. He immediately
-began a systematic opposition and warfare against his colleagues. He
-refused to attend at their Board, or to hold any communication with
-them. At the frequent assemblies held during this agitated state of
-the public mind, he openly denounced them as engaged in treasonable
-correspondence with the enemy. It is obvious that his colleagues, men
-newly chosen in the same spirit with himself, could not as yet have
-committed any such treason in favor of the Carthaginians. But among
-them was his accomplice Hipparinus;[949] while probably the rest
-also, nominated by a party devoted to him personally, were selected
-in a spirit of collusion, as either thorough-going partisans, or
-worthless and incompetent men, easy for him to set aside. At any
-rate, his calumnies, though received with great repugnance by the
-leading and more intelligent citizens, found favor with the bulk of
-the assembly, predisposed at that moment from the terrors of the
-situation to suspect every one. The new Board of generals being thus
-discredited, Dionysius alone was listened to as an adviser. His
-first and most strenuous recommendation was, that a vote should be
-passed for restoring the exiles; men (he affirmed) attached to their
-country, and burning to serve her, having already refused the offers
-of her enemies; men who had been thrown into banishment by previous
-political dispute, but who, if now generously recalled, would
-manifest their gratitude by devoted patriotism, and serve Syracuse
-far more warmly than the allies invoked from Italy and Peloponnesus.
-His discredited colleagues either could not, or would not, oppose the
-proposition; which, being warmly pressed by Dionysius and all his
-party, was at length adopted by the assembly. The exiles accordingly
-returned, comprising all the most violent men who had been in arms
-with Hermokrates when he was slain. They returned glowing with
-party-antipathy and revenge, prepared to retaliate upon others the
-confiscation under which themselves had suffered, and looking to the
-despotism of Dionysius as their only means of success.[950]
-
-  [949] Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.
-
-  [950] Diodor. xiii, 93.
-
-The second step of the despot’s progress was now accomplished.
-Dionysius had filled up the ranks of the Hermokratean party, and
-obtained an energetic band of satellites, whose hopes and interests
-were thoroughly identified with his own. Meanwhile letters arrived
-from Gela, entreating reinforcements, as Imilkon was understood to be
-about to march thither. Dionysius being empowered to march thither
-a body of two thousand hoplites, with four hundred horsemen, turned
-the occasion to profitable account. A regiment of mercenaries,
-under the Lacedæmonian Dexippus, was in garrison at Gela; while the
-government of the town is said to have been oligarchical, in the
-hands of the rich, though with a strong and discontented popular
-opposition. On reaching Gela, Dionysius immediately took part with
-the latter; originating the most violent propositions against the
-governing rich, as he had done at Syracuse. Accusing them of treason
-in the public assembly, he obtained a condemnatory vote under
-which they were put to death and their properties confiscated. With
-the funds so acquired, he paid the arrears due to the soldiers of
-Dexippus, and doubled the pay of his own Syracusan division. These
-measures procured for him immense popularity, not merely with all the
-soldiers, but also with the Geloan Demos, whom he had relieved from
-the dominion of their wealthy oligarchy. Accordingly, after passing a
-public vote testifying their gratitude, and bestowing upon him large
-rewards, they despatched envoys to carry the formal expression of
-their sentiments to Syracuse. Dionysius resolved to go back thither
-at the same time, with his Syracusan soldiers; and tried to prevail
-on Dexippus to accompany him with his own division. This being
-refused, he went thither with his Syracusans alone. To the Geloans,
-who earnestly entreated that they might not be forsaken when the
-enemy was daily expected, he contented himself with replying that he
-would presently return with a larger force.[951]
-
-  [951] Diodor. xiii, 93.
-
-A third step was thus obtained. Dionysius was going back to Syracuse
-with a testimonial of admiration and gratitude from Gela,—with
-increased attachment on the part of his own soldiers, on account of
-the double pay,—and with the means of coining and circulating a new
-delusion. It was on the day of a solemn festival that he reached
-the town, just as the citizens were coming in crowds out of the
-theatre. Amidst the bustle of such a scene as well as of the return
-of the soldiers, many citizens flocked around him to inquire, What
-news about the Carthaginians? “Do not ask about your foreign enemies
-(was the reply of Dionysius); you have much worse enemies within
-among you. Your magistrates,—these very men upon whose watch you
-rely during the indulgence of the festival,—they are the traitors
-who are pillaging the public money, leaving the soldiers unpaid, and
-neglecting all necessary preparation, at a moment when the enemy
-with an immense host is on the point of assailing you. I knew their
-treachery long ago, but I have now positive proof of it. For Imilkon
-sent to me an envoy, under pretence of treating about the prisoners,
-but in reality to purchase my silence and connivance; he tendered to
-me a larger bribe than he had given to them, if I would consent to
-refrain from hindering them, since I could not be induced to take
-part in their intrigues. This is too much. I am come home now to
-throw up my command. While my colleagues are corruptly bartering away
-their country, I am willing to take my share as a citizen in the
-common risk, but I cannot endure to incur shame as an accomplice in
-their treachery.”
-
-Such bold allegations, scattered by Dionysius among the crowd
-pressing round him,—renewed at length, with emphatic formality in
-the regular assembly held the next day,—and concluding with actual
-resignation,—struck deep terror into the Syracusan mind. He spoke
-with authority, not merely as one fresh from the frontier exposed,
-but also as bearing the grateful testimonial of the Geloans, echoed
-by the soldiers whose pay he had recently doubled. His assertion of
-the special message from Imilkon, probably an impudent falsehood,
-was confidently accepted and backed by all these men, as well as
-by his other partisans, the Hermokratean party, and most of all by
-the restored exiles. What defence the accused generals made, or
-tried to make, we are not told. It was not likely to prevail, nor
-did it prevail, against the positive deposition of a witness so
-powerfully seconded. The people, persuaded of their treason, were
-incensed against them, and trembled at the thought of being left, by
-the resignation of Dionysius, to the protection of such treacherous
-guardians against the impending invasion. Now was the time for his
-partisans to come forward with their main proposition: “Why not get
-rid of these traitors, and keep Dionysius alone? Leave them to be
-tried and punished at a more convenient season; but elect him at
-once general with full powers, to make head against the pressing
-emergency from without. Do not wait until the enemy is actually
-assaulting our walls. Dionysius is the man for our purpose, the only
-one with whom we have a chance of safety. Recollect that our glorious
-victory over the three hundred thousand Carthaginians at Himera was
-achieved by Gelon acting as general with full powers.” Such rhetoric
-was irresistible in the present temper of the assembly,—when the
-partisans of Dionysius were full of audacity and acclamation,—when
-his opponents were discomfited, suspicious of each other, and without
-any positive scheme to propose,—and when the storm, which had already
-overwhelmed Selinus, Himera, and Agrigentum, was about to burst on
-Gela and Syracuse. A vote of the assembly was passed, appointing
-Dionysius general of the city, alone, and with full powers;[952] by
-what majority we do not know.
-
-  [952] Diodor. xiii, 94.
-
-The first use which the new general-plenipotentiary made of his
-dignity was to propose, in the same assembly, that the pay of the
-soldiers should be doubled. Such liberality (he said) would be the
-best means of stimulating their zeal; while in regard to expense,
-there need be no hesitation; the money might easily be provided.
-
-Thus was consummated the fourth, and most important, act of the
-despot’s progress. A vote of the assembly had been obtained, passed
-in constitutional forms, vesting in Dionysius a single-handed power
-unknown to and above the laws,—unlimited and unresponsible. But he
-was well aware that the majority of those who thus voted had no
-intention of permanently abnegating their freedom,—that they meant
-only to create a temporary dictatorship, under the pressing danger
-of the moment, for the express purpose of preserving that freedom
-against a foreign enemy,—and that even thus much had been obtained
-by impudent delusion and calumny, which subsequent reflection would
-speedily dissipate. No sooner had the vote passed, than symptoms of
-regret and alarm became manifest among the people. What one assembly
-had conferred, a second repentant assembly might revoke.[953] It
-therefore now remained for Dionysius to ensure the perpetuity of his
-power by some organized means; so as to prevent the repentance, of
-which he already discerned the commencement, from realizing itself
-in any actual revocation. For this purpose he required a military
-force extra-popular and anti-popular; bound to himself and not to
-the city. He had indeed acquired popularity with the Syracusan as
-well as with the mercenary soldiers, by doubling and ensuring their
-pay. He had energetic adherents, prepared to go all lengths on his
-behalf, especially among the restored exiles. This was an important
-basis, but not sufficient for his objects without the presence of a
-special body of guards, constantly and immediately available, chosen
-as well as controlled by himself, yet acting in such vocation under
-the express mandate and sanction of the people. He required a farther
-vote of the people, legalizing for his use such a body of guards.
-
-  [953] Diodor. xiii, 95. Διαλυθείσης δὲ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, οὐκ ὀλίγοι
-  τῶν Συρακουσίων κατηγόρουν τῶν πραχθέντων, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ
-  ταῦτα κεκυρωκότες· τοῖς γὰρ λογισμοῖς εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἐρχόμενοι,
-  τὴν ἐσομένην δυναστείαν ἀνεθεώρουν. Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν βεβαιῶσαι
-  βουλόμενοι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἔλαθον ἑαυτοὺς δεσπότην τῆς πατρίδος
-  καθεστακότες. Ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος, ~τὴν μετάνοιαν τῶν ὄχλων φθάσαι
-  βουλόμενος~, ἐπεζήτει δι’ οὗ τρόπου δύναιτο φύλακας αἰτήσασθαι
-  τοῦ σώματος· τούτου γὰρ συγχωρηθέντος, ῥᾳδίως ἤμελλε κυριεύσειν
-  τῆς τυραννίδος.
-
-But with all his powers of delusion, and all the zeal of his
-partisans, he despaired of getting any such vote from an assembly
-held at Syracuse. Accordingly, he resorted to a manœuvre, proclaiming
-that he had resolved on a march to Leontini, and summoning the full
-military force of Syracuse (up to the age of forty) to march along
-with him, with orders for each man to bring with him thirty days’
-provision. Leontini had been, a few years before, an independent
-city; but was now an outlying fortified post, belonging to the
-Syracusans; wherein various foreign settlers, and exiles from the
-captured Sicilian cities, had obtained permission to reside. Such
-men, thrown out of their position and expectations as citizens, were
-likely to lend either their votes or their swords willingly to the
-purposes of Dionysius. While he thus found many new adherents there,
-besides those whom he brought with him, he foresaw that the general
-body of the Syracusans, and especially those most disaffected to him,
-would not be disposed to obey his summons or accompany him.[954]
-For nothing could be more preposterous, in a public point of view,
-than an out-march of the whole Syracusan force for thirty days to
-Leontini, where there was neither danger to be averted nor profit to
-be reaped; at a moment too when the danger on the side of Gela was
-most serious, from the formidable Carthaginian host at Agrigentum.
-
-  [954] Diodor. xiii, 95. Αὐτὴ δ’ ἡ πόλις (Leontini) τότε φρούριον
-  ἦν τοῖς Συρακουσίοις, πλῆρες ὕπαρχον φυγάδων καὶ ξένων ἀνθρώπων.
-  Ἤλπιζε γὰρ τούτους συναγωνιστὰς ἕξειν, ἀνθρώπους δεομένους
-  μεταβολῆς· τῶν δὲ Συρακουσίων τοὺς πλείστους οὐδ’ ἥξειν εἰς
-  Λεοντίνους.
-
-  Many of the expelled Agrigentines settled at Leontini, by
-  permission of the Syracusans (Diodor. xiii, 89).
-
-Dionysius accordingly set out with a force which purported,
-ostensibly and according to summons, to be the full military
-manifestation of Syracuse; but which, in reality, comprised mainly
-his own adherents. On encamping for the night near to Leontini, he
-caused a factitious clamor and disturbance to be raised during the
-darkness, around his own tent,—ordered fires to be kindled,—summoned
-on a sudden his most intimate friends,—and affected to retire under
-their escort to the citadel. On the morrow an assembly was convened,
-of the Syracusans and residents present, purporting to be a Syracusan
-assembly; Syracuse in military guise, or as it were in Comitia
-Centuriata,—to employ an ancient phrase belonging to the Roman
-republic. Before this assembly Dionysius appeared, and threw himself
-upon their protection; affirming that his life had been assailed
-during the preceding night,—calling upon them emphatically to stand
-by him against the incessant snares of his enemies,—and demanding
-for that purpose a permanent body of guards. His appeal, plausibly
-and pathetically turned, and doubtless warmly seconded by zealous
-partisans, met with complete success. The assembly,—Syracusan or
-quasi-Syracusan, though held at Leontini,—passed a formal decree,
-granting to Dionysius a body-guard of six hundred men, selected
-by himself and responsible to him alone.[955] One speaker indeed
-proposed to limit the guards to such a number as should be sufficient
-to protect him against any small number of personal enemies, but not
-to render him independent of, or formidable to, the many.[956] But
-such precautionary refinement was not likely to be much considered,
-when the assembly was dishonest or misguided enough to pass the
-destructive vote here solicited; and even if embodied in the words
-of the resolution, there were no means of securing its observance
-in practice. The regiment of guards being once formally sanctioned,
-Dionysius heeded little the limit of number prescribed to him. He
-immediately enrolled more than one thousand men, selected as well
-for their bravery as from their poverty and desperate position. He
-provided them with the choicest arms, and promised to them the most
-munificent pay. To this basis of a certain, permanent, legalized,
-regiment of household troops, he added farther a sort of standing
-army, composed of mercenaries hardly less at his devotion than the
-guards properly so called. In addition to the mercenaries already
-around him, he invited others from all quarters, by tempting offers;
-choosing by preference outlaws and profligates, and liberating
-slaves for the purpose.[957] Next, summoning from Gela Dexippus the
-Lacedæmonian, with the troops under his command, he sent this officer
-away to Peloponnesus,—as a man not trustworthy for his purpose and
-likely to stand forward on behalf of the freedom of Syracuse. He then
-consolidated all the mercenaries under one organization, officering
-them anew with men devoted to himself.
-
-  [955] Diodor. xiii, 95.
-
-  [956] Aristotel. Politic. iii, 10, 10. Καὶ Διονυσίῳ τις, ὅτ’ ᾔτει
-  τοὺς φύλακας, συνεβούλευε τοῖς Συρακουσίοις διδόναι τοσούτους
-  τοὺς φύλακας—i. e. τοσαύτην τὴν ἴσχυν, ὥσθ’ ἑκάστου μὲν καὶ ἑνὸς
-  καὶ συμπλειόνων κρείττω, τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἥττω, εἶναι.
-
-  [957] Diodor. xiv, 7. τοὺς ἠλευθερωμένους δούλους, etc.
-
-This fresh military levy and organization was chiefly accomplished
-during his stay at Leontini, without the opposition which would
-probably have arisen if it had been done at Syracuse; to which latter
-place Dionysius marched back, in an attitude far more imposing than
-when he left it. He now entered the gates at the head not only of his
-chosen body-guard, but also of a regular army of mercenaries, hired
-by and dependent upon himself. He marched them at once into the islet
-of Ortygia (the interior and strongest part of the city, commanding
-the harbor), established his camp in that acropolis of Syracuse, and
-stood forth as despot conspicuously in the eyes of all. Though the
-general sentiment among the people was one of strong repugnance, yet
-his powerful military force and strong position rendered all hope
-of open resistance desperate. And the popular assembly,—convoked
-under the pressure of this force, and probably composed of none but
-his partisans,—was found so subservient, as to condemn and execute,
-upon his requisition, Daphnæus and Demarchus. These two men, both
-wealthy and powerful in Syracuse, had been his chief opponents,
-and were seemingly among the very generals whom he had incited the
-people to massacre on the spot without any form of trial, in one
-of the previous public assemblies.[958] One step alone remained to
-decorate the ignoble origin of Dionysius, and to mark the triumph of
-the Hermokratean party by whom its elevation had been mainly brought
-about. He immediately married the daughter of Hermokrates; giving his
-own sister in marriage to Polyxenus, the brother of that deceased
-chief.[959]
-
-  [958] Diodor. xiii, 96.
-
-  [959] Diodor. 1, c.; Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.
-
-Thus was consummated the fifth or closing act of the despot’s
-progress, rendering Dionysius master of the lives and fortunes of
-his fellow-countrymen. The successive stages of his rise I have
-detailed from Diodorus, who (excepting a hint or two from Aristotle)
-is our only informant. His authority is on this occasion better than
-usual, since he had before him not merely Ephorus and Timæus, but
-also Philistus. He is, moreover, throughout this whole narrative at
-least clear and consistent with himself. We understand enough of the
-political strategy pursued by Dionysius, to pronounce that it was
-adapted to his end with a degree of skill that would have greatly
-struck a critical eye like Machiavel; whose analytical appreciation
-of means, when he is canvassing men like Dionysius, has been often
-unfairly construed as if it implied sympathy with and approbation
-of their end. We see that Dionysius, in putting himself forward as
-the chief and representative of the Hermokratean party, acquired
-the means of employing a greater measure of fraud and delusion than
-an exile like Hermokrates, in prosecution of the same ambitious
-purposes. Favored by the dangers of the state and the agony of the
-public mind, he was enabled to simulate an ultra-democratical ardor
-both in defence of the people against the rich, and in denunciation
-of the unsuccessful or incompetent generals, as if they were corrupt
-traitors. Though it would seem that the government of Syracuse, in
-406 B.C., must have been strongly democratical, yet Dionysius in his
-ardor for popular rights, treats it as an anti-popular oligarchy;
-and tries to acquire the favor of the people by placing himself in
-the most open quarrel and antipathy to the rich. Nine years before,
-in the debate between Hermokrates and Athenagoras in the Syracusan
-assembly, the former stood forth, or at least was considered to
-stand forth, as champion of the rich; while the latter spoke as a
-conservative democrat, complaining of conspiracies on the part of
-the rich. In 406 B.C., the leader of the Hermokratean party has
-reversed this policy, assuming a pretended democratical fervor much
-more violent than that of Athenagoras. Dionysius, who took up the
-trade of what is called a demagogue on this one occasion, simply
-for the purpose of procuring one single vote in his own favor, and
-then shutting the door by force against all future voting and all
-correction,—might resort to grosser falsehood than Athenagoras; who,
-as an habitual speaker, was always before the people, and even if
-successful by fraud at one meeting, was nevertheless open to exposure
-at a second.
-
-In order that the voting of any public assembly shall be really
-available as a protection to the people, its votes must not only be
-preceded by full and free discussion, but must also be open from
-time to time to rediscussion and correction. That error will from
-time to time be committed, as well by the collective people as by
-particular fractions of the people, is certain; opportunity for
-amendment is essential. A vote which is understood to be final, and
-never afterwards to be corrigible, is one which can hardly turn to
-the benefit of the people themselves, though it may often, as in the
-case of Dionysius, promote the sinister purposes of some designing
-protector.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXXII.
-
-SICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS AT SYRACUSE.
-
-
-The proceedings, recounted at the close of my last chapter, whereby
-Dionysius erected his despotism, can hardly have occupied less
-than three months; coinciding nearly with the first months of 405
-B.C., inasmuch as Agrigentum was taken about the winter solstice
-of 406 B.C.[960] He was not molested during this period by the
-Carthaginians, who were kept inactive in quarters at Agrigentum, to
-repose after the hardships of the blockade; employed in despoiling
-the city of its movable ornaments, for transmission to Carthage, and
-in burning or defacing, with barbarous antipathy, such as could not
-be carried away.[961] In the spring Imilkon moved forward towards
-Gela, having provided himself with fresh siege-machines, and ensured
-his supplies from the Carthaginian territory in his rear. Finding
-no army to oppose him, he spread his troops over the territory both
-of Gela and of Kamarina, where much plunder was collected and much
-property ruined. He then returned to attack Gela, and established
-a fortified camp by clearing some plantation-ground near the river
-of the same name, between the city and the sea. On this spot stood,
-without the walls, a colossal statue of Apollo, which Imilkon caused
-to be carried off and sent as a present to Tyre.
-
-  [960] Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 24. Ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς ἔληγεν, ἐν ᾧ μεσοῦντι
-  Διονύσιος ἐτυράννησε, etc.
-
-  The year meant here is an Olympic year, from Midsummer to
-  Midsummer; so that the middle months of it would fall in the
-  first quarter of the Julian year.
-
-  If we compare however Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 21 with ii, 2, 24, we
-  shall see that the indications of time cannot both be correct;
-  for the acquisition of the despotism by Dionysius followed
-  immediately, and as a consequence directly brought about, upon
-  the capture of Agrigentum by the Carthaginians.
-
-  It seems to me that the mark of time is not quite accurate in
-  either one passage or the other. The capture of Agrigentum took
-  place at the close of B.C. 406; the acquisition of the despotism
-  by Dionysius, in the early months of 405 B.C., as Diodorus places
-  them. Both events are in the same Olympic year, between Midsummer
-  406 B.C. and Midsummer 405 B.C. But this year is exactly the
-  year which falls between the two passages above referred to in
-  Xenophon; not coinciding exactly with either one or the other.
-  Compare Dodwell, Chronolog. Xenoph. ad ann. 407 B.C.
-
-  [961] Diodor. xiii, 82, 96, 108. τὰς γλυφὰς καὶ τὰ περιττοτέρως
-  εἰργασμένα κατέσκαψεν, etc.
-
-Gela was at this moment defended only by its own citizens, for
-Dionysius had called away Dexippus with the mercenary troops. Alarmed
-at the approach of the formidable enemy who had already mastered
-Agrigentum, Himera, and Selinus,—the Geloans despatched pressing
-entreaties to Dionysius for aid; at the same time resolving to
-send away their women and children for safety to Syracuse. But the
-women, to whom the idea of separation was intolerable, supplicated
-so earnestly to be allowed to stay and share the fortunes of their
-fathers and husbands, that this resolution was abandoned. In
-expectation of speedy relief from Dionysius, the defence was brave
-and energetic. While parties of the Geloans, well-acquainted with the
-country, sallied out and acted with great partial success against
-the Carthaginian plunderers,—the mass of the citizens repelled the
-assaults of Imilkon against the walls. His battering-machines and
-storming-parties were brought to bear on several places at once; the
-walls themselves,—being neither in so good a condition, nor placed
-upon so unassailable an eminence, as those of Agrigentum,—gave
-way on more than one point. Yet still the besieged, with obstinate
-valor, frustrated every attempt to penetrate within; reëstablishing
-during the night the breaches which had been made during the day.
-The feebler part of their population aided, by every means in
-their power, the warriors on the battlements; so the defence was
-thus made good until Dionysius appeared with the long-expected
-reinforcement. It comprised his newly-levied mercenaries, with the
-Syracusan citizens, and succors from the Italian as well as from the
-Sicilian Greeks; amounting in all to fifty thousand men, according to
-Ephorus,—to thirty thousand foot, and one thousand horse, as Timæus
-represented. A fleet of fifty ships of war sailed round Cape Pachynus
-to coöperate with them off Gela.[962]
-
-  [962] Diodor. xiii, 109.
-
-Dionysius fixed his position between Gela and the sea, opposite to
-that of the Carthaginians, and in immediate communication with his
-fleet. His presence having suspended the assaults upon the town, he
-became in his turn the aggressor; employing both his cavalry and his
-fleet to harass the Carthaginians and intercept their supplies. The
-contest now assumed a character nearly the same as had taken place
-before Agrigentum, and which had ended so unfavorably to the Greeks.
-At length, after twenty days of such desultory warfare, Dionysius,
-finding that he had accomplished little, laid his plan for a direct
-attack upon the Carthaginian camp. On the side towards the sea, as no
-danger had been expected, that camp was unfortified; it was there,
-accordingly, that Dionysius resolved to make his principal attack
-with his left division, consisting principally of Italiot Greeks,
-sustained by the Syracusan ships, who were to attack simultaneously
-from seaward. He designed at the same time also to strike blows from
-two other points. His right division, consisting of Sicilian allies,
-was ordered to march on the right or western side of the town of
-Gela, and thus fall upon the left of the Carthaginian camp; while he
-himself, with the mercenary troops which he kept specially around
-him, intended to advance through the town itself, and assail the
-advanced or central portion of their position near the walls, where
-their battering-machinery was posted. His cavalry were directed to
-hold themselves in reserve for pursuit, in case the attack proved
-successful; or for protection to the retreating infantry, in case it
-failed.[963]
-
-  [963] Diodor. xiii, 109.
-
-Of this combined scheme, the attack upon the left or seaward side
-of the Carthaginian camp, by the Italiot division and the fleet
-in concert, was effectively executed, and promised at first to be
-successful. The assailants overthrew the bulwarks, forced their way
-into the camp, and were only driven out by extraordinary efforts
-on the part of the defenders; chiefly Iberians and Campanians, but
-reinforced from the other portions of the army, which were as yet
-unmolested. But of the two other divisions of Dionysius, the right
-did not attack until long after the moment intended, and the centre
-never attacked at all. The right had to make a circuitous march, over
-the Geloan plain round the city, which occupied longer time than had
-been calculated; while Dionysius with the mercenaries around him,
-intending to march through the city, found themselves so obstructed
-and embarrassed that they made very slow progress, and were yet
-longer before they could emerge on the Carthaginian side. Probably
-the streets, as in so many other ancient towns, were crooked, narrow,
-and irregular; perhaps also, farther blocked up by precautions
-recently taken for defence. And thus the Sicilians on the right,
-not coming up to the attack until the Italians on the left had been
-already repulsed, were compelled to retreat, after a brave struggle,
-by the concurrent force of the main Carthaginian army. Dionysius and
-his mercenaries, coming up later still, found that the moment for
-attack had passed altogether, and returned back into the city without
-fighting at all.
-
-Whether the plan or the execution was here at fault,—or both the
-one and the other,—we are unable certainly to determine. There will
-appear reasons for suspecting, that Dionysius was not displeased at a
-repulse which should discourage his army, and furnish an excuse for
-abandoning Gela. After retiring again within the walls, he called
-together his principal friends to consult what was best to be done.
-All were of opinion that it was imprudent to incur farther hazard for
-the preservation of the town. Dionysius now found himself in the same
-position as Diokles after the defeat near Himera, and as Daphnæus
-and the other Syracusan generals before Agrigentum, after the capture
-of their provision-fleet by the Carthaginians. He felt constrained
-to abandon Gela, taking the best means in his power for protecting
-the escape of the inhabitants. Accordingly, to keep the intention of
-flight secret, he sent a herald to Imilkon to solicit a burial-truce
-for the ensuing day; he also set apart a body of two thousand light
-troops, with orders to make noises in front of the enemy throughout
-the whole night, and to keep the lights and fires burning, so as to
-prevent any suspicion on the part of the Carthaginians.[964] Under
-cover of these precautions, he caused the Geloan population to
-evacuate their city in mass at the commencement of night, while he
-himself with his main army followed at midnight to protect them. All
-hurried forward on their march to Syracuse, turning to best account
-the hours of darkness. On their way thither lay Kamarina,—Kamarina
-the immovable,[965] as it was pronounced by an ancient oracle or
-legend, yet on that fatal night seeming to falsify the epithet. Not
-thinking himself competent to defend this city, Dionysius forced
-all the Kamarinæan population to become partners in the flight of
-the Geloans. The same heart-rending scene, which has already been
-recounted at Agrigentum and Himera, was now seen repeated on the road
-from Gela to Syracuse: a fugitive multitude, of all ages and of both
-sexes, free as well as slave, destitute and terror-stricken, hurrying
-they knew not whither, to get beyond the reach of a merciless enemy.
-The flight to Syracuse, however, was fortunately not molested by any
-pursuit. At daybreak the Carthaginians, discovering the abandonment
-of the city, immediately rushed in and took possession of it. As very
-little of the valuable property within it had been removed, a rich
-plunder fell into the hands of the conquering host, whose barbarous
-hands massacred indiscriminately the miserable remnant left behind:
-old men, sick, and children, unable to accompany a flight so sudden
-and so rapid. Some of the conquerors farther satiated their ferocious
-instincts by crucifying or mutilating these unhappy prisoners.[966]
-
-  [964] Diodor. xiii, 111.
-
-  [965] Μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριναν, ἀκίνητόν περ ἐοῦσαν—
-
-                  “fatis nunquam concessa moveri
-      Apparet Camarina procul.”—Virgil. Æneid, iii, 701.
-
-  [966] Diodor. xiii. 111. Οὐδεμία γὰρ ἦν παρ’ αὐτοῖς φειδὼ τῶν
-  ἁλισκομένων, ἀλλ’ ἀσυμπαθῶς τῶν ἠτυχηκότων οὓς μὲν ἀνεσταύρουν,
-  οἷς δ’ ἀφορήτους ἐπῆγον ὕβρεις.
-
-Amidst the sufferings of this distressed multitude, however, and
-the compassion of the protecting army, other feelings also were
-powerfully aroused. Dionysius, who had been so unmeasured and so
-effective in calumniating unsuccessful generals before, was now
-himself exposed to the same arrows. Fierce were the bursts of wrath
-and hatred against him, both among the fugitives and among the army.
-He was accused of having betrayed to the Carthaginians, not only
-the army, but also Gela and Kamarina, in order that the Syracusans,
-intimidated by these formidable neighbors so close to their borders,
-might remain in patient servitude under his dominion. It was remarked
-that his achievements for the relief of Gela had been unworthy of
-the large force which he brought with him; that the loss sustained
-in the recent battle had been nowise sufficient to compel, or even
-to excuse, a disgraceful flight; that the mercenaries, especially,
-the force upon which he most relied, had not only sustained no loss,
-but had never been brought into action; that while his measures
-taken against the enemy had thus been partial and inefficient, they
-on their side had manifested no disposition to pursue him in his
-flight,—thus affording a strong presumption of connivance between
-them. Dionysius was denounced as a traitor by all,—except his own
-mercenaries, whom he always kept near him for security. The Italiot
-allies, who had made the attack and sustained the main loss during
-the recent battle, were so incensed against him for having left them
-thus unsupported, that they retired in a body, and marched across the
-centre of the island home to Italy.
-
-But the Syracusans in the army, especially the horsemen, the
-principal persons in the city, had a double ground of anger against
-Dionysius; partly from his misconduct or supposed treachery in
-this recent enterprise, but still more from the despotism which he
-had just erected over his fellow-citizens. This despotism, having
-been commenced in gross fraud and consummated by violence, was now
-deprived of the only plausible color which it had ever worn, since
-Dionysius had been just as disgracefully unsuccessful against the
-Carthaginians as those other generals whom he had denounced and
-superseded. Determined to rid themselves of one whom they hated at
-once as a despot and as a traitor, the Syracusan horsemen watched
-for an opportunity of setting upon Dionysius during the retreat, and
-killing him. But finding him too carefully guarded by the mercenaries
-who always surrounded his person, they went off in a body, and
-rode at their best speed to Syracuse, with the full purpose of
-reëstablishing the freedom of the city, and keeping out Dionysius. As
-they arrived before any tidings had been received of the defeat and
-flight at Gela, they obtained admission without impediment into the
-islet of Ortygia; the primitive interior city, commanding the docks
-and harbor, set apart by the despot for his own residence and power.
-They immediately assaulted and plundered the house of Dionysius,
-which they found richly stocked with gold, silver, and valuables
-of every kind. He had been despot but a few weeks; so that he must
-have begun betimes to despoil others, since it seems ascertained
-that his own private property was by no means large. The assailants
-not only plundered his house with all its interior wealth, but also
-maltreated his wife so brutally that she afterwards died of the
-outrage.[967] Against this unfortunate woman they probably cherished
-a double antipathy, not only as the wife of Dionysius, but also as
-the daughter of Hermokrates. They at the same time spread abroad the
-news that Dionysius had fled never to return; for they fully confided
-in the disruption which they had witnessed among the retiring army,
-and in the fierce wrath which they had heard universally expressed
-against him.[968] After having betrayed his army, together with Gela
-and Kamarina, to the Carthaginians, by a flight without any real
-ground of necessity (they asserted),—he had been exposed, disgraced,
-and forced to flee in reality, before the just displeasure of his own
-awakened fellow-citizens. Syracuse was now free; and might, on the
-morrow, reconstitute formally her popular government.
-
-  [967] Diodor. xiii, 112; xiv, 44. Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.
-
-  [968] Diodor. xiii, 112.
-
-Had these Syracusans taken any reasonable precautions against adverse
-possibilities, their assurances would probably have proved correct.
-The career of Dionysius would here have ended. But while they
-abandoned themselves to the plunder of his house and brutal outrage
-against his wife, they were so rashly confident in his supposed
-irretrievable ruin, and in their own mastery of the insular portion
-of the city, that they neglected to guard the gate of Achradina
-(the outer city) against his reëntry. The energy and promptitude
-of Dionysius proved too much for them. Informed of their secession
-from the army, and well knowing their sentiments, he immediately
-divined their projects, and saw that he could only defeat them by
-audacity and suddenness of attack. Accordingly, putting himself
-at the head of his best and most devoted soldiers,—one hundred
-horsemen and six hundred foot,—he left his army and proceeded by a
-forced march to Syracuse; a distance of about four hundred stadia,
-or about forty-five English miles. He arrived there about midnight,
-and presented himself, not at the gate of Ortygia, which he had
-probably ascertained to be in possession of his enemies, but at that
-of Achradina; which latter (as has been already mentioned) formed
-a separate fortification from Ortygia, with the Nekropolis between
-them.[969] Though the gate was shut, he presently discovered it to be
-unguarded, and was enabled to apply to it some reeds gathered in the
-marshes on his road, so as to set it on fire and burn it. So eager
-had he been for celerity of progress, that at the moment when he
-reached the gate, a part only of his division were with him. But as
-the rest arrived while the flames were doing their work, he entered,
-with the whole body, into Achradina or the outer city. Marching
-rapidly through the streets, he became master, without resistance,
-of all this portion of the city, and of the agora, or market-place,
-which formed its chief open space. His principal enemies, astounded
-by this alarming news, hastened out of Ortygia into Achradina, and
-tried to occupy the agora. But they found it already in possession
-of Dionysius; and being themselves very few in number, having taken
-no time to get together any considerable armed body, they were
-overpowered and slain by his mercenaries. Dionysius was thus strong
-enough to vanquish all his enemies, who entered Achradina in small
-and successive parties, without any order, as they came out of
-Ortygia. He then proceeded to attack the houses of those whom he knew
-to be unfriendly to his dominion, slew such as he could find within,
-and forced the rest to seek shelter in exile. The great body of the
-Syracusan horsemen,—who but the evening before were masters of the
-city, and might with common prudence have maintained themselves in
-it, were thus either destroyed or driven into banishment. As exiles
-they established themselves in the town of Ætna.[970]
-
-  [969] Diodor. xiii, 113. παρῆν περὶ μέσας νύκτας πρὸς τὴν πύλην
-  τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς ... εἰσήλαυνε διὰ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς, etc.
-
-  [970] Diodor. xiii, 113. Compare Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 5.
-
-Thus master of the city, Dionysius was joined on the ensuing day by
-the main body of his mercenaries, and also by the Sicilian allies,
-who had now completed their march. The miserable sufferers from
-Gela and Kamarina, who looked upon him with indignation as their
-betrayer,—went to reside at Leontini; seemingly as companions of the
-original Leontine citizens, who had been for some time domiciliated
-at Syracuse, but who no longer chose to remain there under Dionysius.
-Leontini thus became again an independent city.[971]
-
-  [971] Xenophon (Hellen. ii, 3, 5) states that “the Leontines,
-  co-residents at Syracuse, revolted to their own city from
-  Dionysius and the Syracusans.”
-
-  This migration to Leontini seems a part of the same transaction
-  as what Diodorus notices (xiii, 113). Leontini, recognized as
-  independent by the peace which speedily followed, is mentioned
-  again shortly afterwards as independent (xiv, 14). It had been
-  annexed to Syracuse before the Athenian siege.
-
-Though the disasters at Gela had threatened to ruin Dionysius, yet
-he was now, through his recent victory, more master of Syracuse
-than ever; and had more completely trodden down his opponents. The
-horsemen, whom he had just destroyed and chased away, were for the
-most part the rich and powerful citizens of Syracuse. To have put
-down such formidable enemies, almost indispensable as leaders to
-any party which sought to rise against him, was the strongest of
-all negative securities for the prolongation of his reign. There
-was no public assembly any longer at Syracuse, to which he had to
-render account of his proceedings at Gela and Kamarina, and before
-which he was liable to be arraigned,—as he himself had arraigned
-his predecessors who had commanded at Himera and Agrigentum. All
-such popular securities he had already overridden or subverted. The
-superiority of force, and intimidation of opponents, upon which his
-rule rested, were now more manifest and more decisive than ever.
-
-Notwithstanding such confirmed position, however, Dionysius might
-still have found defence difficult, if Imilkon had marched on with
-his victorious army, fresh from the plunder of Gela and Kamarina, and
-had laid energetic siege to Syracuse. From all hazard and alarm of
-this sort he was speedily relieved, by propositions for peace, which
-came spontaneously tendered by the Carthaginian general. Peace was
-concluded between them, on the following terms:—
-
-1. The Carthaginians shall retain all their previous possessions,
-and all their Sikanian dependencies, in Sicily. They shall keep,
-besides, Selinus, Himera, Agrigentum. The towns of Gela and Kamarina
-may be reoccupied by their present fugitive inhabitants; but on
-condition of paying tribute to Carthage, and destroying their walls
-and fortifications.
-
-2. The inhabitants of Leontini and Messênê, as well as all the Sikel
-inhabitants, shall be independent and autonomous.
-
-3. The Syracusans shall be subject to Dionysius.[972]
-
-  [972] Diodor. xiii, 114. καὶ Συρακουσίους μὲν ὑπὸ Διονύσιον
-  τετάχθαι, etc.
-
-4. All the captives, and all the ships, taken on both sides, shall be
-mutually restored.
-
-Such were the conditions upon which peace was now concluded. Though
-they were extremely advantageous to Carthage, assigning to her,
-either as subject or as tributary, the whole of the southern shore
-of Sicily,—yet as Syracuse was, after all, the great prize to be
-obtained, the conquest of which was essential to the security of
-all the remainder, we are astonished that Imilkon did not push
-forward to attack it, at a moment so obviously promising. It
-appears that immediately after the conquest of Gela and Kamarina,
-the Carthaginian army was visited by a pestilential distemper,
-which is said to have destroyed nearly the half of it, and to
-have forbidden future operations. The announcement of this event
-however, though doubtless substantially exact, comes to us in a way
-somewhat confused.[973] And when we read, as one of the articles in
-the treaty, the express and formal provision that “The Syracusans
-shall be subject to Dionysius,”—we discern plainly, that there was
-also an additional cause for this timely overture, so suitable to
-his interests. There was real ground for those bitter complaints
-against Dionysius, which charged him with having betrayed Gela and
-Kamarina to the Carthaginians in order to assure his own dominion
-at Syracuse. The Carthaginians, in renouncing all pretensions to
-Syracuse and recognizing its autonomy, could have no interest in
-dictating its internal government. If they determined to recognize by
-formal treaty the sovereignty as vested in Dionysius, we may fairly
-conclude that he had purchased the favor from them by some underhand
-service previously rendered. In like manner both Hiketas and
-Agathoklês,—the latter being the successor, and in so many points the
-parallel of Dionysius, ninety years afterwards,—availed themselves
-of Carthaginian support as one stepping-stone to the despotism of
-Syracuse.[974]
-
-  [973] Diodor. xiii, 114.
-
-  Diodorus begins this chapter with the words,—~Διόπερ ὑπὸ τῶν
-  πραγμάτων ἀναγκαζόμενος~ Ἰμίλκων, ἔπεμψεν εἰς Συρακούσας κήρυκα,
-  παρακαλῶν τοὺς ἡττημένους διαλύσασθαι. Ἀσμένως δ’ ὑπακούσαντος
-  τοῦ Διονυσίου, τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἔθεντο, etc.
-
-  Now there is not the smallest matter of fact either mentioned
-  or indicated before, to which the word διόπερ can have
-  reference. Nothing is mentioned but success on the part of the
-  Carthaginians, and disaster on the part of the Greeks; the
-  repulse of the attack made by Dionysius upon the Carthaginian
-  camp,—his retreat and evacuation of Gela and Kamarina,—the
-  occupation of Gela by the Carthaginians,—the disorder, mutiny,
-  and partial dispersion of the army of Dionysius in its
-  retreat,—the struggle within the walls of Syracuse. There is
-  nothing in all this to which διόπερ can refer. But a few lines
-  farther on, after the conditions of peace have been specified,
-  Diodorus alludes to _the_ terrible disease (ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου) which
-  laid waste the Carthaginian army, as if he had mentioned it
-  before.
-
-  I find in Niebuhr (Vorträge über alte Geschichte, vol. iii, p.
-  212, 213) the opinion expressed, that here is a gap in Diodorus
-  “intentionally disguised in the MSS., and not yet noticed by any
-  editor.” Some such conclusion seems to me unavoidable. Niebuhr
-  thinks, that in the lost portion of the text, it was stated that
-  Imilkon marched on to Syracuse, formed the siege of the place,
-  and was there visited with the terrific pestilence to which
-  allusion is made in the remaining portion of the text. This also
-  is nowise improbable; yet I do not venture to assert it,—since
-  the pestilence may possibly have broken out while Imilkon was
-  still at Gela.
-
-  Niebuhr farther considers, that Dionysius lost the battle of
-  Gela through miserable generalship,—that he lost it by design,
-  as suitable to his political projects,—and that by the terms of
-  the subsequent treaty, he held the territory around Syracuse only
-  under Carthaginian supremacy.
-
-  [974] Justin, xxii, 2; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 2, 7, 9.
-
-The pestilence, however, among the Carthaginian army is said to have
-been so terrible as to destroy nearly the half of their numbers.
-The remaining half, on returning to Africa, either found it already
-there, or carried it with them; for the mortality at and around
-Carthage was not less deplorable than in Sicily.[975]
-
-  [975] Diodor. xiii, 114.
-
-It was in the summer of 405 B.C., that this treaty was concluded,
-which consigned all the Hellenic ground on the south of Sicily to
-the Carthaginian dominion, and Syracuse with its population to
-that of Dionysius. It was in September or October of the same year
-that Lysander effected his capture of the entire Athenian fleet at
-Ægospotami, destroyed the maritime ascendency and power of Athens,
-and gave commencement to the Lacedæmonian empire, completed by the
-actual surrender of Athens during the ensuing year. The dekarchies
-and harmosts, planted by Lysander in so many cities of the central
-Hellenic world, commenced their disastrous working nearly at the same
-time as the despotism of Dionysius in Syracuse. This is a point to be
-borne in mind, in reference to the coming period. The new position
-and policy wherein Sparta now became involved, imparted to her a
-sympathy with Dionysius such as in earlier times she probably would
-not have felt; and which contributed materially, in a secondary way,
-to the durability of his dominion, as well by positive intrigues
-of Lacedæmonian agents, as by depriving the oppressed Syracusans
-of effective aid or countenance from Corinth or other parts of
-Greece.[976]
-
-  [976] Diodor. xiv, 10.
-
-  The valuable support lent to Dionysius by the Spartans is
-  emphatically denounced by Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegyric.) s.
-  145; Orat. viii, (De Pace) s. 122.
-
-The period immediately succeeding this peace was one of distress,
-depression, and alarm, throughout all the south of Sicily. According
-to the terms of the treaty, Gela and Kamarina might be reoccupied by
-their fugitive population; yet with demolished walls,—with all traces
-of previous opulence and comfort effaced by the plunderers,—and
-under the necessity of paying tribute to Carthage. The condition
-of Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera, now actually portions of
-Carthaginian territory, was worse; especially Agrigentum, hurled
-at one blow from the loftiest pinnacle of prosperous independence.
-No free Hellenic territory was any longer to be found between Cape
-Pachynus and Cape Lilybæum, beyond the Syracusan frontier.
-
-Amidst the profound discouragement of the Syracusan mind, the
-withdrawal from Sicily of the terror-striking Carthaginian
-army would be felt as a relief, and would procure credit for
-Dionysius.[977] It had been brought about under him, though not
-as a consequence of his exploits; for his military operations
-against Imilkon at Gela had been completely unsuccessful (and even
-worse); and the Carthaginians had suffered no harm except from the
-pestilence. While his partisans had thus a plea for extolling him
-as the savior of the city, he also gathered strength in other ways
-out of the recent events. He had obtained a formal recognition of
-his government from the Carthaginians; he had destroyed or banished
-the chief Syracusan citizens opposed to his dominion, and struck
-terror into the rest; he had brought back all his mercenary troops
-and guards, without loss or dissatisfaction. He now availed himself
-of his temporary strength to provide precautions for perpetuity,
-before the Syracusans should recover spirit, or obtain a favorable
-opportunity, to resist.
-
-  [977] Plato, while he speaks of Dionysius and Hipparinus on
-  this occasion as the saviors of Syracuse, does not insist upon
-  extraordinary valor and ability on their parts, but assigns
-  the result mainly to fortune and the favor of the gods (Plato,
-  Epistol. viii, p. 353 B.; p. 355 F.).
-
-  His letter is written with a view of recommending a compromise at
-  Syracuse, between the party of freedom, and the descendants of
-  Dionysius and Hipparinus; he thus tries to set up as good a case
-  as he can, in favor of the title of both the two latter to the
-  gratitude of the Syracusans.
-
-  He reluctantly admits how much Dionysius the elder afterwards
-  abused the confidence placed in him by the Syracusans (p. 353 C.).
-
-His first measure was to increase the fortifications of the islet
-called Ortygia, strengthening it as a position to be held separately
-from Achradina and the remaining city. He constructed a new wall,
-provided with lofty turrets and elaborate defences of every kind,
-immediately outside of the mole which connected this islet with
-Sicily. On the outside of this new wall, he provided convenient
-places for transacting business, porticos spacious enough to shelter
-a considerable multitude, and seemingly a distinct strong fort,
-destined for a public magazine of corn.[978] It suited his purpose
-that the trade of the town should be carried on, and the persons
-of the traders congregated, under or near the outer walls of his
-peculiar fortress. As a farther means of security, he also erected
-a distinct citadel or acropolis within the islet and behind the new
-wall. The citadel was close to the Lesser Harbor or Portus Lakkius.
-Its walls were so extended as to embrace the whole of this harbor,
-closing it up in such a way as to admit only one ship at a time,
-though there was room for sixty ships within. He was thus provided
-with an almost impregnable stronghold, not only securing him against
-attack from the more numerous population in the outer city, but
-enabling him to attack them whenever he chose,—and making him master,
-at the same time, of the grand means of war and defence against
-foreign enemies.
-
-  [978] That this was the situation of the fortified _horrea
-  publica_ at Syracuse, we see from Livy, xxiv, 21. I think we may
-  presume that they were begun at this time by Dionysius, as they
-  form a natural part of his scheme.
-
-To provide a fortress in the islet of Ortygia, was one step towards
-perpetual dominion at Syracuse; to fill it with devoted adherents,
-was another. For Dionysius, the instruments of dominion were his
-mercenary troops and body-guards; men chosen by himself from
-their aptitude to his views, identified with him in interest, and
-consisting in large proportion not merely of foreigners, but even of
-liberated slaves. To these men he now proceeded to assign a permanent
-support and residence. He distributed among them the houses in the
-islet or inferior stronghold, expelling the previous proprietors, and
-permitting no one to reside there except his own intimate partisans
-and soldiers. Their quarters were in the islet, while he dwelt in
-the citadel,—a fortress within a fortress, sheltering his own person
-against the very garrison or standing army, by means of which he kept
-Syracuse in subjection.[979] Having provided houses for his soldiers,
-by extruding the residents in Ortygia,—he proceeded to assign to them
-a comfortable maintenance, by the like wholesale dispossession of
-proprietors, and reappropriation of lands, without. He distributed
-anew the entire Syracusan territory; reserving the best lands, and
-the best shares, for his own friends and for the officers in command
-of his mercenaries,—and apportioning the remaining territory in equal
-shares to all the inhabitants, citizens as well as non-citizens. By
-this distribution the latter became henceforward citizens as well as
-the former; so far at least, as any man could be properly called a
-citizen under his despotism. Even the recently enfranchised slaves
-became new citizens and proprietors as well as the rest.[980]
-
-  [979] Diodor. xiv, 7.
-
-  The residence of Dionysius in the acropolis, and the quarters
-  of his mercenaries without the acropolis, but still within
-  Ortygia,—are noticed in Plato’s account of his visit to the
-  younger Dionysius (Plato, Epistol. vii, p. 350; Epist. iii, p.
-  315).
-
-  [980] Diodor. xiv, 7. Τῆς δὲ χώρας τὴν μὲν ἀρίστην ἐξελόμενος
-  ἐδωρήσατο τοῖς τε φίλοις καὶ τοῖς ἐφ’ ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένοις·
-  ~τὴν δ’ ἄλλην ἐμέρισεν ἐπίσης ξένῳ τε καὶ πολίτῃ~, συμπεριλαβὼν
-  τῷ τῶν πολιτῶν ὀνόματι τοὺς ἠλευθερωμένους δούλους, οὓς ἐκάλει
-  νεοπολίτας. Διέδωκε δὲ καὶ τὰς οἰκίας τοῖς ὄχλοις, πλὴν τῶν ἐν τῇ
-  Νήσῳ· ταύτας δὲ τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τοῖς μισθοφόροις ἐδωρήσατο. Ἐπεὶ
-  δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὴν τυραννίδα καλῶς ἐδόκει διῳκηκέναι, etc.
-
-Respecting this sweeping change of property, it is mortifying to
-have no farther information than is contained in two or three brief
-sentences of Diodorus. As a basis for entire redivision of lands,
-Dionysius would find himself already possessed of the property
-of those Syracusan Horsemen or Knights whom he had recently put
-down or banished. As a matter of course, their property would be
-confiscated, and would fall into his possession for reassignment. It
-would doubtless be considerable, inasmuch as these Horsemen were for
-the most part wealthy men. From this basis, Dionysius enlarged his
-scheme to the more comprehensive idea of a general spoliation and
-reappropriation, for the benefit of his partisans and his mercenary
-soldiers. The number of these last we do not know; but on an occasion
-not very long afterwards, the mercenaries under him are mentioned as
-amounting to about ten thousand.[981] To ensure landed properties
-to each of these men, together with the monopoly of residence in
-Ortygia, nothing less than a sweeping confiscation would suffice.
-How far the equality of share, set forth in principle, was or could
-be adhered to in practice, we cannot say. The maxim of allowing
-residence in Ortygia to none but friends and partisans, passed from
-Dionysius into a traditional observance for future anti-popular
-governments of Syracuse. The Roman consul Marcellus, when he subdued
-the city near two centuries afterwards, prescribed the rule of
-admitting into the islet none but Romans, and of excluding all native
-Syracusan residents.[982]
-
-  [981] Diodor. xiv, 78.
-
-  So also, after the death of the elder Dionysius, Plutarch speaks
-  of his military force as having been βαρβάρων μυρíανδρον φυλακήν
-  (Plutarch, Dion. c. 10). These expressions however have little
-  pretence to numerical accuracy.
-
-  [982] Cicero in Verrem, v. 32, 84; 38, 98.
-
-Such mighty works of fortification, combined with so extensive
-a revolution both in property and in domicile, cannot have been
-accomplished in less than a considerable time, nor without provoking
-considerable resistance in detail. Nor is it to be forgotten that
-the pecuniary cost of such fortifications must have been very
-heavy. How Dionysius contrived to levy the money, we do not know.
-Aristotle informs us that the contributions which he exacted from the
-Syracusans were so exorbitant, that within the space of five years,
-the citizens had paid into his hands their entire property; that is,
-twenty per cent. per annum upon their whole property.[983] To what
-years this statement refers, we do not know; nor what was the amount
-of contribution exacted on the special occasion now before us. But
-we may justly infer from it that Dionysius would not scruple to lay
-his hand heavily upon the Syracusans for the purpose of defraying
-the cost of his fortifications; and that the simultaneous burthen
-of large contributions would thus come to aggravate the painful
-spoliation and transfers of property, and the still more intolerable
-mischiefs of a numerous standing army domiciled as masters in the
-heart of the city. Under such circumstances, we are not surprised
-to learn that the discontent among the Syracusans was extreme, and
-that numbers of them were greatly mortified at having let slip the
-favorable opportunity of excluding Dionysius, when the Horsemen were
-actually for a moment masters of Syracuse, before he suddenly came
-back from Gela.[984]
-
-  [983] Aristotel. Politic. v, 9, 4. Καὶ ἡ εἰσφορὰ τῶν τελῶν
-  (τυραννικόν ἐστι) ἐν πέντε γὰρ ἔτεσιν ἐπὶ Διονυσίου τὴν οὐσίαν
-  ἅπασαν εἰσενηνοχέναι συνέβαινε.
-
-  [984] Diodorus, xiv, 7.
-
-Whatever might be the extent of indignation actually felt, there
-could be no concert or manifestation in Syracuse, under a watchful
-despot with the overwhelming force assembled in Ortygia. But a
-suitable moment speedily occurred. Having completed his fortress and
-new appropriation for the assured maintenance of the mercenaries,
-Dionysius resolved to attempt a conquest of the autonomous Sikel
-tribes in the interior of the island, some of whom had sided with
-Carthage in the recent war. He accordingly marched out with a
-military force, consisting partly of his mercenary troops, partly
-of armed Syracusan citizens under a commander named Dorikus.
-While he was laying siege to the town of Erbessus, the Syracusan
-troops, finding themselves assembled in arms and animated with one
-common sentiment, began to concert measures for open resistance
-to Dionysius. The commander Dorikus, in striving to repress these
-manifestations, lifted up his hand to chastise one of the most
-mutinous speakers;[985] upon which the soldiers rushed forward in
-a body to defend him. They slew Dorikus, and proclaimed themselves
-again, with loud shouts, free Syracusan citizens; calling upon all
-their comrades in the camp to unite against the despot. They also
-sent a message forthwith to the town of Ætna, inviting the immediate
-junction of the Syracusan Horsemen, who had sought shelter there in
-their exile from Dionysius. Their appeal found the warmest sympathy
-among the Syracusan soldiers in the camp, all of whom declared
-themselves decisively against the despot, and prepared for every
-effort to recover their liberty.
-
-  [985] Diodor. xiv, 7. Compare an occurrence very similar, at
-  Mendê in Thrace (Thucyd. iv, 130).
-
-So rapidly did this sentiment break out into vehement and unanimous
-action, that Dionysius was too much intimidated to attempt to put
-it down at once by means of his mercenaries. Profiting by the
-lesson which he had received, after the return march from Gela, he
-raised the siege of Erbessus forthwith, and returned to Syracuse to
-make sure of his position in Ortygia, before his Syracusan enemies
-could arrive there. Meanwhile the latter, thus left full of joy and
-confidence, as well as masters of the camp, chose for their leaders
-those soldiers who had slain Dorikus, and found themselves speedily
-reinforced by the Horsemen, or returning exiles from Ætna. Resolved
-to spare no effort for liberating Syracuse, they sent envoys to
-Messênê and Rhegium, as well as to Corinth, for aid; while they at
-the same time marched with all their force to Syracuse, and encamped
-on the heights of Epipolæ. It is not clear whether they remained in
-this position, or whether they were enabled, through the sympathy
-of the population, to possess themselves farther of the outer city
-Achradina, and with its appendages Tycha and Neapolis. Dionysius
-was certainly cut off from all communication with the country; but
-he maintained himself in his impregnable position in Ortygia, now
-exclusively occupied by his chosen partisans and mercenaries. If he
-even continued master of Achradina, he must have been prevented from
-easy communication with it. The assailants extended themselves under
-the walls of Ortygia, from Epipolæ to the Greater as well as the
-Lesser Harbor.[986] A considerable naval force was sent to their aid
-from Messênê and Rhegium, giving to them the means of blocking him
-up on the seaside; while the Corinthians, though they could grant no
-farther assistance, testified their sympathy by sending Nikoteles as
-adviser.[987] The leaders of the movement proclaimed Syracuse again
-a free city, offered large rewards for the head of Dionysius, and
-promised equal citizenship to all the mercenaries who should desert
-him.
-
-  [986] Diodor. xiv, 8.
-
-  [987] Diodor. xiv, 10.
-
-Several of the mercenaries, attracted by such offers, as well
-as intimidated by that appearance of irresistible force which
-characterizes the first burst of a popular movement, actually came
-over and were well received. Everything seemed to promise success to
-the insurgents, who, not content with the slow process of blockade,
-brought up battering-machines, and vehemently assaulted the walls
-of Ortygia. Nothing now saved Dionysius except those elaborate
-fortifications which he had so recently erected, defying all attack.
-And even though sheltered by them, his position appeared to be so
-desperate, that desertion from Ortygia every day increased. He
-himself began to abandon the hope of maintaining his dominion;
-discussing with his intimate friends the alternative, between death
-under a valiant but hopeless resistance, and safety purchased by
-a dishonorable flight. There remained but one means of rescue: to
-purchase the immediate aid of a body of twelve hundred mercenary
-Campanian cavalry, now in the Carthaginian service, and stationed
-probably at Gela or Agrigentum. His brother-in-law Polyxenus
-advised him to mount his swiftest horse, to visit in person the
-Campanians, and bring them to the relief of Ortygia. But this
-counsel was strenuously resisted by two intimate friends,—Helôris
-and Megaklês,—who both impressed upon him, that the royal robe was
-the only honorable funeral garment, and that, instead of quitting
-his post at full speed, he ought to cling to it until he was dragged
-away by the leg.[988] Accordingly, Dionysius determined to hold out,
-without quitting Ortygia; sending private envoys to the Campanians,
-with promises of large pay if they would march immediately to his
-defence. The Carthaginians were probably under obligation not to
-oppose this, having ensured to Dionysius by special article of treaty
-the possession of Syracuse.
-
-  [988] Diodor. xiv, 8; xx, 78. Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus)
-  sect. 49.
-
-  It appears that Timæus the historian ascribed this last
-  observation to Philistus; and Diodorus copies Timæus in one of
-  the passages above referred to, though not in the other. But
-  Philistus himself in his history asserted that the observation
-  had been made by another person (Plutarch, Dion. c. 35).
-
-  The saying seems to have been remembered and cited long
-  afterwards in Syracuse; but cited as having been delivered by
-  Dionysius himself, not as addressed to him (Livy, xxiv, 22).
-
-  Isokrates, while recording the saying, represents it as having
-  been delivered when the Carthaginians were pressing Syracuse
-  hardly by siege; having in mind doubtless the siege or blockade
-  undertaken by Imilkon seven years afterwards. But I apprehend
-  this to be a misconception. The story seems to suit better to the
-  earlier occasion named by Diodorus.
-
-To gain time for their arrival, by deluding and disarming the
-assailants, Dionysius affected to abandon all hope of prolonged
-defence, and sent to request permission to quit the city, along with
-his private friends and effects. Permission was readily granted
-to him to depart with five triremes. But as soon as this evidence
-of success had been acquired, the assailants without abandoned
-themselves to extravagant joy and confidence, considering Dionysius
-as already subdued, and the siege as concluded. Not merely was all
-farther attack suspended, but the forces were in a great measure
-broken up. The Horsemen were disbanded, by a proceeding alike unjust
-and ungrateful, to be sent back to Ætna; while the hoplites dispersed
-about the country to their various lands and properties. The same
-difficulty of keeping a popular force long together for any military
-operation requiring time, which had been felt when the Athenians
-besieged their usurpers Kylon and Peisistratus in the acropolis,[989]
-was now experienced in regard to the siege of Ortygia. Tired with
-the length of the siege, the Syracusans blindly abandoned themselves
-to the delusive assurance held out by Dionysius; without taking
-heed to maintain their force and efficiency undiminished, until
-his promised departure should be converted into a reality. In this
-unprepared and disorderly condition, they were surprised by the
-sudden arrival of the Campanians,[990] who, attacking and defeating
-them with considerable loss, forced their way through to join
-Dionysius in Ortygia. At the same time, a reinforcement of three
-hundred fresh mercenaries reached him by sea. The face of affairs
-was now completely changed. The recent defeat produced among the
-assailants not only discouragement, but also mutual recrimination
-and quarrel. Some insisted upon still prosecuting the siege of
-Ortygia, while others, probably the friends of the recently dismissed
-Horsemen, declared in favor of throwing it up altogether and joining
-the Horsemen at Ætna; a resolution, which they seem at once to
-have executed. Observing his opponents thus enfeebled and torn by
-dissension, Dionysius sallied out and attacked them, near the suburb
-called Neapolis or Newtown, on the south-west of Achradina. He was
-victorious, and forced them to disperse. But he took great pains to
-prevent slaughter of the fugitives, riding up himself to restrain his
-own troops; and he subsequently buried the slain with due solemnity.
-He was anxious by these proceedings to conciliate the remainder;
-for the most warlike portion of his opponents had retired to Ætna,
-where no less than seven thousand hoplites were now assembled along
-with the Horsemen. Dionysius sent thither envoys to invite them to
-return to Syracuse, promising the largest amnesty for the past. But
-it was in vain that his envoys expatiated upon his recent forbearance
-towards the fugitives and decent interment of the slain. Few could
-be induced to come back, except such as had left their wives and
-families at Syracuse in his power. The larger proportion, refusing
-all trust in his word and all submission to his command, remained
-in exile at Ætna. Such as did return were well treated, in hopes of
-inducing the rest gradually to follow their example.[991]
-
-  [989] Herodotus, v, 71; Thucydides, i, 112.
-
-  [990] It is said that the Campanians, on their way to Syracuse,
-  passed by Agyrium, and deposited their baggage in the care of
-  Agyris the despot of that town (Diodor. xiv, 9). But if we
-  look at the position of Agyrium on the map, it seems difficult
-  to understand how mercenaries coming from the Carthaginian
-  territory, and in great haste to reach Syracuse, can have passed
-  anywhere near to it.
-
-  [991] Diodor. xiv, 9.
-
-Thus was Dionysius rescued from a situation apparently desperate, and
-reëstablished in his dominion; chiefly through the rash presumption
-(as on the former occasion after the retreat from Gela), the want of
-persevering union, and the absence of any commanding leader, on the
-part of his antagonists. His first proceeding was to dismiss the
-newly-arrived Campanians. For though he had to thank them mainly for
-his restoration, he was well aware that they were utterly faithless,
-and that on the first temptation they were likely to turn against
-him.[992] But he adopted more efficient means for strengthening
-his dominion in Syracuse, and for guarding against a repetition of
-that danger from which he had so recently escaped. He was assisted
-in his proceedings by a Lacedæmonian envoy named Aristus, recently
-despatched by the Spartans for the ostensible purpose of bringing
-about an amicable adjustment of parties at Syracuse. While Nikoteles,
-who had been sent from Corinth, espoused the cause of the Syracusan
-people, and put himself at their head to obtain for them more or
-less of free government,—Aristus, on the contrary, lent himself to
-the schemes of Dionysius. He seduced the people away from Nikoteles,
-whom he impeached and caused to be slain. Next, pretending himself
-to act along with the people, and to employ the great ascendency of
-Sparta in defence of their freedom,[993] he gained their confidence
-and then betrayed them. The despot was thus enabled to strengthen
-himself more decisively than before, and probably to take off the
-effective popular leaders thus made known to him; while the mass of
-the citizens were profoundly discouraged by finding Sparta enlisted
-in the conspiracy against their liberties.
-
-  [992] Diodor. xiv, 9. The subsequent proceedings of the
-  Campanians justified his wisdom in dismissing them. They went
-  to Entella (a town among the dependencies of Carthage, in the
-  south-western portion of Sicily,—Diod. xiv, 48), where they were
-  welcomed and hospitably treated by the inhabitants. In the night,
-  they set upon the Entellan citizens by surprise, put them all to
-  death, married their widows and daughters, and kept possession of
-  the town for themselves.
-
-  [993] Diodor. xiv, 10. Ἀπέστειλαν (οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι) Ἄριστον,
-  ἄνδρα τῶν ἐπιφανῶν, εἰς Συρακούσας, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ προσποιούμενοι
-  καταλιπεῖν τὴν δυναστείαν, τῇ δ’ ἀληθείᾳ σπεύδοντες αὐξῆσαι τὴν
-  τυραννίδα· ἤλπιζον γὰρ συγκατασκευάζοντες τὴν ἀρχὴν, ὑπήκοον
-  ἕξειν τὸν Διονύσιον διὰ τὰς εὐεργεσίας. Ὁ δ’ Ἄριστος καταπλεύσας
-  εἰς Συρακούσας, καὶ τῷ τυράννῳ λάθρα περὶ τούτων διαλεχθεὶς, τούς
-  τε Συρακοσίους ἀνασείων, Νικοτέλην τὸν Κορίνθιον ἀνεῖλεν,
-  ἀφηγούμενον τῶν Συρακοσίων· τοὺς δὲ πιστεύσαντας προδοὺς, τὸν μὲν
-  τύραννον ἰσχυρὸν κατέστησε, διὰ δὲ τῆς πράξεως ταύτης ἀσχημονεῖν
-  ἐποίησεν αὑτὸν ἅμα καὶ τὴν πατρίδα. Compare xiv, 70.
-
-Of this renovated tide of success Dionysius took advantage, to
-strike another important blow. During the season of harvest, while
-the citizens were busy in the fields, he caused the houses to be
-searched, and seized all the arms found therein. Not satisfied
-with thus robbing his opponents of the means of attack, he farther
-proceeded to construct additional fortifications around the islet of
-Ortygia, to augment his standing army of mercenaries, and to build
-fresh ships. Feeling more than ever that his dominion was repugnant
-to the Syracusans, and rested only on naked force, he thus surrounded
-himself with precautions probably stronger than any other Grecian
-despot had ever accumulated. He was yet farther strengthened by the
-pronounced and active support of Sparta, now at the maximum of her
-imperial ascendency;[994] and by the presence of the mighty Lysander
-at Syracuse as her ambassador to countenance and exalt him.[995]
-The Spartan alliance, however, did not prevent him from enrolling
-among his mercenaries a considerable fraction of the Messenians, the
-bitter enemies of Sparta; who were now driven out of Naupaktus and
-Kephallenia, with no other possession left except their arms[996]—and
-whose restoration to Peloponnesus by Epaminondas, about thirty years
-afterwards, has been described in a preceding chapter.
-
-  [994] Diodor. xiv, 10. Καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ παρεσκευάζετο πρὸς τὴν
-  ἀσφάλειαν τῆς τυραννίδος, ὡς ἂν ἔργοις ἤδη πεῖραν εἰληφὼς, ὅτι
-  πᾶν ὑπομένουσιν οἱ Συρακούσιοι χάριν τοῦ μὴ δουλεύειν.
-
-  [995] Plutarch, Lysander, c. 2.
-
-  [996] Diodor. xiv, 34.
-
-So large a mercenary force, while the people in Syracuse were
-prostrate and in no condition for resistance, naturally tempted
-Dionysius to seek conquest as well as plunder beyond the border. Not
-choosing as yet to provoke a war with Carthage, he turned his arms
-to the north and north-west of the Syracusan territory; the Grecian
-(Chalkidic or Ionic) cities, Naxus, Katana, and Leontini—and the
-Sikels, towards the centre of Sicily. The three Chalkidic cities
-were the old enemies of Syracuse, but Leontini had been conquered by
-the Syracusans even before the Athenian expedition, and remained as
-a Syracusan possession until the last peace with the Carthaginians,
-when it had been declared independent. Naxus and Katana had contrived
-to retain their independence against Syracuse, even after the ruin
-of the Athenian armament under Nikias. At the head of a powerful
-force, Dionysius marched out from Syracuse first against the town of
-Ætna, occupied by a considerable body of Syracusan exiles hostile
-to his dominion. Though the place was strong by situation,[997]
-yet these men, too feeble to resist, were obliged to evacuate it;
-upon which he proceeded to attack Leontini. But on summoning the
-inhabitants to surrender, he found his propositions rejected, and
-every preparation made for a strenuous defence; so that he could do
-nothing more than plunder the territory around, and then advanced
-onward into the interior Sikel territory, towards Enna and Erbita.
-But his march in this direction was little more than a feint, for the
-purpose of masking his real views upon Naxus and Katana, with both
-which cities he had already opened intrigues. Arkesilaus, general
-of Katana, and Prokles, general of Naxus, were both carrying on
-corrupt negotiations for the purpose of selling to him the liberty
-of their native cities. Until the negotiations were completed,
-Dionysius wished to appear as if turning his arms elsewhere, and
-therefore marched against Enna. Here he entered into conspiracy with
-an Ennæan citizen named Aeimnestus, whom he instigated to seize the
-sceptre of his native town,—by promises of assistance, on condition
-of being himself admitted afterwards. Aeimnestus made the attempt
-and succeeded, but did not fulfil his engagement to Dionysius; who
-resented this proceeding so vehemently, that he assisted the Ennæans
-in putting down Aeimnestus, delivered him as prisoner into their
-hands, and then retired, satisfied with such revenge, without farther
-meddling. He next marched against Erbita, before which he passed his
-time with little or no result, until the bribes promised at Naxus
-and Katana had taken effect. At length the terms were fully settled.
-Dionysius was admitted at night by Arkesilaus into Katana, seized
-the city, disarmed the inhabitants, and planted there a powerful
-garrison. Naxus was next put into his hands, by the like corruption
-on the part of Prokles; who was rewarded with a large bribe, and with
-the privilege of preserving his kinsmen. Both cities were given up
-to be plundered by his soldiers; after which the walls as well as
-the houses were demolished, and the inhabitants sold as slaves. The
-dismantled site of Katana was then assigned to a body of Campanian
-mercenaries in the service of Dionysius, who however retained in his
-possession hostages for their fidelity;[998] the site of Naxus to the
-indigenous Sikels in the neighborhood. These captures struck so much
-terror into the Leontines, that when Dionysius renewed his attack
-upon them, they no longer felt competent to resist. He required them
-to surrender their city, to remove to Syracuse, and there to reside
-for the future as citizens; which term meant, at the actual time, as
-subjects of his despotism. The Leontines obeyed the requisition, and
-their city thus again became an appendage of Syracuse.[999]
-
-  [997] Diodor. xiv, 58.
-
-  [998] Diodor. xiv, 61.
-
-  [999] Diodor. xiv, 15.
-
-These conquests of Dionysius, achieved mainly by corrupting the
-generals of Naxos and Katana, were of serious moment, and spread so
-much alarm among the Sikels of the interior, that Archonides, the
-Sikel prince of Erbita, thought it prudent to renounce his town and
-soil; withdrawing to a new site beyond the Nebrode mountains, on the
-northern coast of the island, more out of the reach of Syracusan
-attack. Here, with his mercenary soldiers and with a large portion of
-his people who voluntarily accompanied him, he founded the town of
-Alæsa.[1000]
-
-  [1000] Diodor. xiv, 16. This Archonides may probably have been
-  son of the Sikel prince Archonides, who, having taken active part
-  as an ally of Nikias and the Athenian invaders against Syracuse,
-  died just before Gylippus reached Sicily (Thucyd. vii, 1).
-
-Strengthened at home by these successes abroad, the sanguine despot
-of Syracuse was stimulated to still greater enterprises. He resolved
-to commence aggressive war with the Carthaginians. But against such
-formidable enemies, large preparations were indispensable, defensive
-as well as offensive, before his design could be proclaimed. First,
-he took measures to ensure the defensibility of Syracuse against all
-contingencies. Five Grecian cities on the south of the island, one
-of them the second in Sicily, had already undergone the deplorable
-fate of being sacked by a Carthaginian host; a calamity, which might
-possibly be in reserve for Syracuse also, especially if she herself
-provoked a war, unless the most elaborate precautions were taken to
-render a successful blockade impossible.
-
-Now the Athenian blockade under Nikias had impressed valuable lessons
-on the mind of every Syracusan. The city had then been well-nigh
-blocked up by a wall of circumvallation carried from sea to sea;
-which was actually more than half completed, and would have been
-entirely completed, had the original commander been Demosthenes
-instead of Nikias. The prodigious importance of the slope of
-Epipolæ to the safety of the city had been demonstrated by the most
-unequivocal evidence. In my seventh volume, I have already described
-the site of Syracuse and the relation of this slope to the outer city
-called Achradina. Epipolæ was a gentle ascent west of Achradina.
-It was bordered, along both the north side and the south side, by
-lines of descending cliff, cut down precipitously, about twenty feet
-deep in their lowest part. These lines of cliff nearly converged at
-the summit of the slope, called Euryalus; leaving a narrow pass or
-road between elevated banks, which communicated with the country
-both north and west of Syracuse. Epipolæ thus formed a triangle upon
-an inclined plane, sloping upward from its base, the outer wall of
-Achradina, to its apex at Euryalus; and having its two sides formed,
-the one by the northern, the other by the southern, line of cliffs.
-This apex formed a post of the highest importance, commanding the
-narrow road which approached Epipolæ from its western extremity or
-summit, and through which alone it was easy for an army to get on
-the declivity of Epipolæ, since the cliffs on each side were steep,
-though less steep on the northern side than on the southern.[1001]
-Unless an enemy acquired possession of this slope, Syracuse could
-never be blocked up from the northern sea at Trogilus to the Great
-Harbor; an enterprise, which Nikias and the Athenians were near
-accomplishing, because they first surprised from the northward the
-position of Euryalus, and from thence poured down upon the slope
-of Epipolæ. I have already described, in my seventh volume, how
-the arrival of Gylippus deprived them of superiority in the field,
-at a time when their line of circumvallation was already half
-finished,—having been carried from the centre of Epipolæ southward
-down to Great Harbor, and being partially completed from the same
-point across the northern half of Epipolæ to the sea at Trogilus; how
-he next intercepted their farther progress, by carrying out, from the
-outer wall of Achradina, a cross wall traversing their intended line
-of circumvallation and ending at the northern cliff; how he finally
-erected a fort or guard-post on the summit of Euryalus, which he
-connected with the cross-wall just mentioned by a single wall of
-junction carried down the slope of Epipolæ.[1002]
-
-  [1001] See the Dissertation of Saverio Cavallari,—Zur Topographie
-  von Syrakus (Göttingen, 1845), p. 22.
-
-  [1002] See, for a farther exposition of these points, my account
-  of the siege of Syracuse by the Athenians, Vol. VII, ch. lix, lx.
-
-Both the danger which Syracuse had then incurred, and the means
-whereby it had been obviated, were fresh in the recollection of
-Dionysius. Since the Athenian siege, the Syracusans may perhaps
-have preserved the fort erected by Gylippus near Euryalus; but
-they had pulled down the wall of junction, the cross-wall, and the
-outer wall of protection constructed between the arrival of Nikias
-in Sicily and his commencement of the siege, enclosing the sacred
-precinct of Apollo Temenites. The outer city of Syracuse was thus
-left with nothing but the wall of Achradina, with its two suburbs or
-excrescences, Tychê and Neapolis. Dionysius now resolved to provide
-for Syracuse a protection substantially similar to that contrived
-by Gylippus, yet more comprehensive, elaborate, and permanent.
-He carried out an outer line of defence, starting from the sea
-near the port called Trogilus, enclosing the suburb called Tychê
-(which adjoined Achradina to the north-west), and then ascending
-westward, along the brink of the northern cliff of Epipolæ, to the
-summit of that slope at Euryalus. The two extremities thus became
-connected together,—not as in the time of Gylippus,[1003] by a single
-cross-wall carried out from the city-wall to the northern cliff, and
-then joined at an angle by another single wall descending the slope
-of Epipolæ from Euryalus, but,—by one continuous new line bordering
-the northern cliff down to the sea. And the new line, instead of
-being a mere single wall, was now built under the advice of the best
-engineers, with lofty and frequent towers interspersed throughout its
-length, to serve both as means of defence and as permanent quarters
-for soldiers. Its length was thirty stadia (about three and a half
-English miles); it was constructed of large stones carefully hewn,
-some of them four feet in length.[1004] The quarries at hand supplied
-abundant materials, and for the labor necessary, Dionysius brought
-together all the population of the city and its neighborhood, out of
-whom he selected sixty thousand of the most effective hands, to work
-on the wall. Others were ordered to cut the stones in the quarry,
-while six thousand teams of oxen were put in harness to draw them to
-the spot. The work was set out by furlongs and by smaller spaces of
-one hundred feet each, to regiments of suitable number, each under
-the direction of an overseer.[1005]
-
-  [1003] Thucyd. vi, 75.
-
-  [1004] Diodor. xiv, 18. λίθων τετραπόδων. The stones may have
-  been cubes of four feet; but this does not certainly appear.
-
-  [1005] Diodor. xiv, 18.
-
-As yet, we have heard little about Dionysius except acts of fraud,
-violence, and spoliation, for the purpose of establishing his own
-dominion over Syracuse, and aggrandizing himself by new conquests
-on the borders. But this new fortification was a work of different
-import. Instead of being, like his forts and walls in Ortygia,
-a guardhouse both of defence and aggression merely for himself
-against the people of Syracuse,—it was a valuable protection to the
-people, and to himself along with them, against foreign besiegers.
-It tended much to guarantee Syracuse from those disasters which had
-so recently befallen Agrigentum and the other cities. Accordingly,
-it was exceeding popular among the Syracusans, and produced between
-them and Dionysius a sentiment of friendship and harmony such as had
-not before been seen. Every man labored at the work not merely with
-good will, but with enthusiasm; while the despot himself displayed
-unwearied zeal, passing whole days on the spot, and taking part in
-all the hardship and difficulty. He showed himself everywhere amidst
-the mass, as an unguarded citizen, without suspicion or reserve, in
-marked contrast with the harshness of his previous demeanor,[1006]
-proclaiming rewards for the best and most rapid workmen; he also
-provided attendance or relief for those whose strength gave way.
-Such was the emulation thus inspired, that the numbers assembled,
-often toiling by night as well as by day, completed the whole wall
-in the space of twenty days. The fort at Euryalus, which formed the
-termination of this newly-constructed line of wall, is probably not
-to be understood as comprised within so short a period of execution;
-at least in its complete consummation. For the defences provided
-at this fort (either now or at a later period) were prodigious
-in extent as well as elaborate in workmanship; and the remains of
-them exhibit, even to modern observers, the most complete specimen
-preserved to us of ancient fortification.[1007] To bring them into
-such a condition must have occupied a longer time than twenty days.
-Even as to the wall, perhaps, twenty days is rather to be understood
-as indicating the time required for the essential continuity of its
-line, leaving towers, gates, etc., to be added afterwards.
-
-  [1006] Diodor. xiv, 18. Καθόλου δὲ ἀποθέμενος τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς βάρος,
-  ἰδιώτην αὑτὸν ἀπεδείκνυε, etc.
-
-  Compare cap. 45 and cap. 47—μισοῦντες τὸ βάρος τῆς τῶν Φοινίκων
-  ἐπικρατείας, etc.
-
-  [1007] According to the testimony of Saverio Cavallari, the
-  architect under whose directions the excavations were made in
-  1839, whereby these remains were first fully disclosed (Zur
-  Topographie von Syrakus, p. 21).
-
-To provide defence for Syracuse against a besieging army, however,
-was only a small part of the extensive schemes of Dionysius. What he
-meditated was aggressive war against the Carthaginians; for which
-purpose, he not only began to accumulate preparations of every kind
-on the most extensive scale, but also modified his policy both
-towards the Syracusans and towards the other Sicilian Greeks.
-
-Towards the Syracusans his conduct underwent a material change.
-The cruelty and oppression which had hitherto marked his dominion
-was discontinued; he no longer put men to death, or sent them into
-banishment, with the same merciless hand as before. In place of such
-tyranny, he now substituted comparative mildness, forbearance, and
-conciliation.[1008] Where the system had before been so fraught with
-positive maltreatment to many and alarm to all, the mitigation of
-it must have been sensibly as well as immediately felt. And when we
-make present to our minds the relative position of Dionysius and
-the Syracusans, we shall see that the evil inflicted by his express
-order by no means represented the whole amount of evil which they
-suffered. He occupied the impregnable fortress of Ortygia, with the
-entire harbor, docks, and maritime means of the city. The numerous
-garrison in his pay, and devoted to him, consisted in great part of
-barbaric or non-Hellenic soldiers and of liberated slaves, probably
-also non-Hellenic. The Syracusans resident in the outer city and
-around were not only destitute of the means of defensive concert
-and organization, but were also disarmed. For these mercenaries
-either pay was to be provided from the contributions of the citizens,
-or lands from their properties; for them, and for other partisans
-also, Dionysius had enforced spoliations and transfers of land and
-house-property by wholesale.[1009] Now, while the despot himself
-was inflicting tyrannical sentences for his own purposes, we may be
-sure that these men, the indispensable instruments of his tyranny,
-would neither of themselves be disposed to respect the tranquillity
-of the other citizens, nor be easily constrained to do so. It was
-not, therefore, merely from the systematic misrule of the chief that
-the Syracusans had to suffer, but also from the insolence and unruly
-appetites of the subordinates. And accordingly they would be doubly
-gainers, when Dionysius, from anxiety to attack the Carthaginians,
-thought it prudent to soften the rigor of his own proceedings; since
-his example, and in case of need his interference, would restrict the
-license of his own partisans. The desire for foreign conquest made
-it now his interest to conciliate some measure of goodwill from the
-Syracusans; or at least to silence antipathies which might become
-embarrassing if they broke out in the midst of a war. And he had in
-this case the advantage of resting on another antipathy, powerful
-and genuine in their minds. Hating as well as fearing Carthage,
-the Syracusans cordially sympathized in the aggressive schemes of
-Dionysius against her; which held out a prospect of relief from the
-tyranny under which they groaned, and some chance of procuring a
-restoration of the arms snatched from them.[1010]
-
-  [1008] Diodor. xiv, 45. Ἀπετίθετο γὰρ ἤδη τὸ πικρὸν τῆς
-  τυραννίδος, καὶ μεταβαλλόμενος εἰς ἐπιείκειαν, φιλανθρωπότερον
-  ἦρχε τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων, οὔτε φονεύων, οὔτε φυγάδας ποιῶν,
-  ~καθάπερ εἰώθει~.
-
-  [1009] Diodor. xiv, 7.
-
-  [1010] Diodor. xiv, 45.
-
-Towards the Sicilian Greeks, also, the conduct of Dionysius was
-mainly influenced by his anti-Carthaginian projects, which made him
-eager to put aside, or at least to defer, all possibilities of war
-in other quarters. The inhabitants of Rhegium, on the Italian side
-of the Strait of Messina, had recently manifested a disposition to
-attack him. They were of common Chalkidic origin with Naxos and
-Katana, the two cities which Dionysius had recently conquered and
-enslaved. Sixteen years before, when the powerful Athenian armament
-visited Sicily with the ostensible view of protecting the Chalkidic
-cities against Syracuse, the Rhegines in spite of their fellowship of
-race, had refused the invitation of Nikias[1011] to lend assistance,
-being then afraid of Athens. But subsequent painful experience had
-taught them, that to residents in or near Sicily, Syracuse was the
-more formidable enemy of the two. The ruin of Naxus and Katana, with
-the great extension of Syracusan dominion northward, had filled
-them with apprehension from Dionysius, similar to the fears of
-Carthage, inspired to the Syracusans themselves by the disasters
-of Agrigentum and Gela. Anxious to revenge their enslaved kinsmen,
-the Rhegines projected an attack upon Dionysius before his power
-should become yet more formidable; a resolution, in which they were
-greatly confirmed by the instigations of the Syracusan exiles (now
-driven from Ætna and the other neighboring cities to Rhegium),
-confident in their assurances that insurrection would break out
-against Dionysius at Syracuse, so soon as any foreign succor should
-be announced as approaching. Envoys were sent across the strait to
-Messênê, soliciting coöperation against Dionysius, upon the urgent
-plea that the ruin of Naxus and Katana could not be passed over,
-either in generosity or in prudence, by neighbors on either side of
-the strait. These representations made so much impression on the
-generals of Messênê, that without consulting the public assembly,
-they forthwith summoned the military force of the city, and marched
-along with the Rhegines towards the Syracusan frontier,—six thousand
-Rhegine and four thousand Messenian hoplites,—six hundred Rhegine and
-four hundred Messenian horsemen,—with fifty Rhegine triremes. But
-when they reached the frontiers of the Messenian territory, a large
-portion of the soldiers refused to follow their generals farther. A
-citizen named Laomedon headed the opposition, contending that the
-generals had no authority to declare war without a public vote of
-the city, and that it was imprudent to attack Dionysius unprovoked.
-Such was the effect of these remonstrances, that the Messenian
-soldiers returned back to their city; while the Rhegines, believing
-themselves to be inadequate to the enterprise single handed, went
-home also.[1012]
-
-  [1011] Thucyd. vi, 46.
-
-  [1012] Diodor. xiv, 40.
-
-Apprised of the attack meditated, Dionysius had already led his
-troops to defend the Syracusan frontier. But he now reconducted them
-back to Syracuse, and listened favorably to propositions for peace
-which speedily reached him, from Rhegium and Messênê.[1013] He was
-anxious to conciliate them for the present, at all price, in order
-that the Carthaginians, when he came to execute his plans, might
-find no Grecian allies to coöperate with them in Sicily. He acquired
-an influence in Messênê, by making to the city large concessions of
-conterminous territory; on which side of the border, or how acquired,
-we do not know. He farther endeavored to open an intimate connection
-with Rhegium by marrying a Rhegine wife; with which view he sent a
-formal message to the citizens, asking permission to contract such an
-alliance, accompanied with a promise to confer upon them important
-benefits, both in territorial aggrandizement and in other ways.
-After a public debate, the Rhegines declined his proposition. The
-feeling in their city was decidedly hostile to Dionysius, as the
-recent destroyer of Naxus and Katana; and it appears that some of the
-speakers expressed themselves with contemptuous asperity, remarking
-that the daughter of the public executioner was the only fit wife for
-him.[1014] Taken by itself, the refusal would be sufficiently galling
-to Dionysius. But when coupled with such insulting remarks (probably
-made in public debate in the presence of his own envoys, for it seems
-not credible that the words should have been embodied in the formal
-reply or resolution of the assembly[1015]), it left the bitterest
-animosity; a feeling, which we shall hereafter find in full operation.
-
-  [1013] Diodor. xiv, 40.
-
-  [1014] Diodor. xiv, 44, 106, 107.
-
-  [1015] Diodorus, when he first mentions the answer, does not give
-  this remark as comprised in it; though he afterwards alludes to
-  it as having been _said_ to be (φασὶ) so comprised (xix, 44-107).
-
-Refused at Rhegium, Dionysius sent to prefer a similar request,
-with similar offers, at the neighboring city of Lokri; where it was
-favorably entertained. It is remarkable that Aristotle comments upon
-this acquiescence of the Lokrians as an act of grave imprudence, and
-as dictated only by the anxiety of the principal citizens, in an
-oligarchical government, to seek for aggrandizement to themselves
-out of such an alliance. The request would not have been granted
-(Aristotle observes) either in a democracy or in a well-regulated
-aristocracy. The marital connection now contracted by Dionysius with
-a Lokrian female, Doris, the daughter of a citizen of distinction
-named Xenetus, produced as an ultimate consequence the overthrow
-of the oligarchy of Lokri.[1016] And even among the Lokrians,
-the request was not granted without opposition. A citizen named
-Aristeides (one of the companions of Plato), whose daughter Dionysius
-had solicited in marriage, returned for answer that he would
-rather see her dead than united to a despot. In revenge for this
-bitter reply, Dionysius caused the sons of Aristeides to be put to
-death.[1017]
-
-  [1016] Aristot. Politic. v, 6, 7. Ἔτι διὰ τὸ πάσας τὰς
-  ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι, μᾶλλον πλεονεκτοῦσιν
-  οἱ γνώριμοι· οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσίαι
-  ἔρχονται, καὶ ἔξεστι ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν θέλωσι τοῖς γνωρίμοις μᾶλλον,
-  καὶ κηδεύειν ὅτῳ θέλουσι. Διὸ καὶ ἡ Λοκρῶν πολιτεία ἀπώλετο ἐκ
-  τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον κηδείας· ὃ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, οὐδ’
-  ἂν ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εὖ μεμιγμένῃ.
-
-  [1017] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 6.
-
-But the amicable relations which Dionysius was at so much pains to
-establish with the Greek cities near the Strait of Messênê, were
-destined chiefly to leave him free for preparations against Carthage;
-which preparations he now commenced on a gigantic scale. Efforts so
-great and varied, combined not merely with forecast but with all
-the scientific appliances then available, have not hitherto come
-before us throughout this history. The terrible effect with which
-Hannibal had recently employed his battering-machines against Selinus
-and Himera, stimulated Dionysius to provide himself with the like
-implements in greater abundance than any Greek general had ever
-before possessed. He collected at Syracuse, partly by constraint,
-partly by allurement, all the best engineers, mechanists, armorers,
-artisans, etc., whom Sicily or Italy could furnish. He set them
-upon the construction of machines and other muniments of war, and
-upon the manufacture of arms offensive as well as defensive, with
-the greatest possible assiduity. The arms provided were of great
-variety; not merely such as were suitable for Grecian soldiers, heavy
-or light, but also such as were in use among the different barbaric
-tribes around the Mediterranean, Gauls, Iberians, Tyrrhenians, etc.,
-from whom Dionysius intended to hire mercenaries; so that every
-different soldier would be furnished, on arriving, with the sort
-of weapon which had become habitual to him. All Syracuse became a
-bustling military workshop,—not only the market-places, porticos,
-palæstræ, and large private houses, but also the fore-chambers and
-back-chambers of the various temples. Dionysius distributed the
-busy multitude into convenient divisions, each with some eminent
-citizen as superintendent. Visiting them in person frequently, and
-reviewing their progress, he recompensed largely, and invited to his
-table, those who produced the greatest amount of finished work. As
-he farther offered premiums for inventive skill, the competition of
-ingenious mechanists originated several valuable warlike novelties;
-especially the great projectile engine for stones and darts, called
-Catapulta, which was now for the first time devised. We are told that
-the shields fabricated during this season of assiduous preparation
-were not less than one hundred and forty thousand in number, and
-the breast-plates fourteen thousand, many of them unrivalled in
-workmanship, destined for the body-guard and the officers. Helmets,
-spears, daggers, etc., with other arms and weapons in indefinite
-variety, were multiplied in corresponding proportion.[1018] The
-magazines of arms, missiles, machines, and muniments of war in every
-variety, accumulated in Ortygia, continued stupendous in amount
-through the whole life of Dionysius, and even down to the downfall of
-his son.[1019]
-
-  [1018] Diodor. xiv, 42, 43.
-
-  The historian Philistus had described with much minuteness these
-  warlike preparations of Dionysius. Diodorus has probably abridged
-  from him (Philisti Fragment. xxxiv, ed. Marx and ed. Didot.)
-
-  [1019] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13.
-
-If the preparations for land-warfare were thus stupendous, those
-for sea-warfare were fully equal, if not superior. The docks of
-Syracuse were filled with the best ship-builders, carpenters, and
-artisans; numerous wood-cutters were sent to cut ship-timber on
-the well-clothed slopes of Ætna and the Calabrian Apennines; teams
-of oxen were then provided to drag it to the coast, from whence it
-was towed in rafts to Syracuse. The existing naval establishment
-of Syracuse comprised one hundred and ten triremes; the existing
-docks contained one hundred and fifty ship-houses, or covered slips
-for the purpose either of building or housing a trireme. But this
-was very inadequate to the conceptions of Dionysius, who forthwith
-undertook the construction of one hundred and sixty new ship-houses,
-each competent to hold two vessels,—and then commenced the building
-of new ships of war to the number of two hundred; while he at the
-same time put all the existing vessels and docks into the best
-state of repair. Here too, as in the case of the catapulta, the
-ingenuity of his architects enabled him to stand forth as a maritime
-inventor. As yet, the largest ship of war which had ever moved on
-the Grecian or Mediterranean waters, was the trireme, which was
-rowed by three banks or tiers of oars. It was now three centuries
-since the first trireme had been constructed at Corinth and Samos by
-the inventive skill of the Corinthian Ameinokles:[1020] it was not
-until the period succeeding the Persian invasion that even triremes
-had become extensively employed; nor had any larger vessels ever
-been thought of. The Athenians, who during the interval between the
-Persian invasion and their great disaster at Syracuse had stood
-preëminent and set the fashion in all nautical matters, were under no
-inducement to build above the size of the trireme. As their style of
-manœuvring consisted of rapid evolutions and changes in the ship’s
-direction, for the purpose of striking the weak parts of an enemy’s
-ship with the beak of their own,—so, if the size of their ship had
-been increased, her capacity for such nimble turns and movements
-would have been diminished. But the Syracusans had made no attempt to
-copy the rapid evolutions of the Athenian navy. On the contrary, when
-fighting against the latter in the confined harbor of Syracuse,[1021]
-they had found every advantage in their massive build of ships, and
-straightforward impact of bow driven against bow. For them, the
-larger ships were the more suitable and efficient; so that Dionysius
-or his naval architects, full of ambitious aspirations, now struck
-out the plan of building ships of war with four or five banks of oars
-instead of three; that is, quadriremes, or quinqueremes, instead of
-triremes.[1022] Not only did the Syracusan despot thus equip a naval
-force equal in number of ships to Athens in her best days; but he
-also exhibited ships larger than Athens had ever possessed, or than
-Greece had ever conceived.
-
-  [1020] Thucyd. i, 13.
-
-  [1021] Thucyd. vii, 36-62.
-
-  [1022] Diodor. xiv, 42.
-
-In all these offensive preparations against Carthage, as in the
-previous defences on Epipolæ, the spontaneous impulse of the
-Syracusans generally went hand in hand with Dionysius.[1023] Their
-sympathy and concurrence greatly promoted the success of his efforts,
-for this immense equipment against the common enemy. Even with all
-this sympathy, indeed, we are at a loss to understand, nor are we at
-all informed, how he found money to meet so prodigious an outlay.
-
-  [1023] Diodor. xiv, 41. Συμπροθυμουμένων δὲ τῶν Συρακουσίων
-  τῇ τοῦ Διονυσίου προαιρέσει, πολλὴν συνέβαινε γενέσθαι τὴν
-  φιλοτιμίαν περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων κατασκευήν.
-
-After the material means for war had thus been completed,—an
-operation which can hardly have occupied less than two or three
-years,—it remained to levy men. On this point, the ideas of Dionysius
-were not less aspiring. Besides his own numerous standing force,
-he enlisted all the most effective among the Syracusan citizens,
-as well as from the cities in his dependency. He sent friendly
-addresses, and tried to acquire popularity, among the general body
-of Greeks throughout the island. Of his large fleet, one-half was
-manned with Syracusan rowers, marines, and officers; the other half
-with seamen enlisted from abroad. He farther sent envoys both to
-Italy and to Peloponnesus to obtain auxiliaries, with offers of the
-most liberal pay. From Sparta, now at the height of her power, and
-courting his alliance as a means of perpetuity to her own empire,
-he received such warm encouragement, that he was enabled to enlist
-no inconsiderable numbers in Peloponnesus; while many barbaric or
-non-Hellenic soldiers from the western regions near the Mediterranean
-were hired also.[1024] He at length succeeded, to his satisfaction,
-in collecting an aggregate army, formidable not less from numbers and
-bravery, than from elaborate and diversified equipment. His large and
-well-stocked armory (already noticed) enabled him to furnish each
-newly-arrived soldier, from all the different nations, with native
-and appropriate weapons.[1025]
-
-  [1024] Diodor. xiv, 43, 44, 45.
-
-  [1025] Diodor. xiv, 41.
-
-When all his preparations were thus complete, his last step was
-to celebrate his nuptials, a few days previous to the active
-commencement of the war. He married, at one and the same time, two
-wives,—the Lokrian Doris (already mentioned), and a Syracusan woman
-named Aristomachê, daughter of his partisan Hipparinus (and sister
-of Dion, respecting whom much will occur hereafter). The first use
-made of one among his newly-invented quinquereme vessels, was to sail
-to Lokri, decked out in the richest ornaments of gold and silver,
-for the purpose of conveying Doris in state to Ortygia. Aristomachê
-was also brought to his house in a splendid chariot with four white
-horses.[1026] He celebrated his nuptials with both of them in his
-house on the same day; no one knew which bedchamber he visited first;
-and both of them continued constantly to live with him at the same
-table, with equal dignity, for many years. He had three children by
-Doris, the eldest of whom was Dionysius the Younger; and four by
-Aristomachê; but the latter was for a considerable time childless;
-which greatly chagrined Dionysius. Ascribing her barrenness to
-magical incantations, he put to death the mother of his other wife
-Doris, as the alleged worker of these mischievous influences.[1027]
-It was the rumor at Syracuse that Aristomachê was the most beloved
-of the two. But Dionysius treated both of them well, and both of
-them equally; moreover his son by Doris succeeded him, though he had
-two sons by the other. His nuptials were celebrated with banquets
-and festive recreations, wherein all the Syracusan citizens as well
-as the soldiers partook. The scene was probably the more grateful
-to Dionysius, as he seems at this moment, when every man’s mind was
-full of vindictive impulse and expected victory against Carthage, to
-have enjoyed a real short-lived popularity, and to have been able
-to move freely among the people; without that fear of assassination
-which habitually tormented his life even in his inmost privacy and
-bedchamber—and that extremity of suspicion which did not except
-either his wives or his daughters.[1028]
-
-  [1026] Diodor. xiv, 44; xvi, 6.
-
-  [1027] Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.
-
-  [1028] Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v, 20, 57-63; Valer. Maxim. ix, 13;
-  Diodor. xiv, 2.
-
-After a few days devoted to such fellowship and festivity, Dionysius
-convoked a public assembly, for the purpose of formally announcing
-the intended war. He reminded the Syracusans that the Carthaginians
-were common enemies to Greeks in general, but most of all to the
-Sicilian Greeks—as recent events but too plainly testified. He
-appealed to their generous sympathies on behalf of the five Hellenic
-cities, in the southern part of the island, which had lately
-undergone the miseries of capture by the generals of Carthage, and
-were still groaning under her yoke. Nothing prevented Carthage
-(he added) from attempting to extend her dominion over the rest
-of the island, except the pestilence under which she had herself
-been suffering in Africa. To the Syracusans this ought to be an
-imperative stimulus for attacking her at once, and rescuing their
-Hellenic brethren, before she had time to recover.[1029]
-
-  [1029] Diodor. xiv, 45.
-
-These motives were really popular and impressive. There was besides
-another inducement, which weighed with Dionysius to hasten the war,
-though he probably did not dwell upon it in his public address to the
-Syracusans. He perceived that various Sicilian Greeks were migrating
-voluntarily with their properties into the territory of Carthage;
-whose dominion, though hateful and oppressive, was, at least while
-untried, regarded by many with less terror than his dominion when
-actually suffered. By commencing hostilities at once, he expected
-not only to arrest such emigration, but to induce such Greeks as
-were actually subjects of Carthage to throw off her yoke and join
-him.[1030]
-
-  [1030] Diodor. xiv, 41.
-
-Loud acclamations from the Syracusan assembly hailed the proposition
-for war with Carthage; a proposition, which only converted into
-reality what had been long the familiar expectation of every man.
-And the war was rendered still more popular by the permission,
-which Dionysius granted forthwith, to plunder all the Carthaginian
-residents and mercantile property either in Syracuse or in any of
-his dependent cities. We are told that there were not only several
-domiciliated Carthaginians at Syracuse, but also many loaded vessels
-belonging to Carthage in the harbor, so that the plunder was
-lucrative.[1031] But though such may have been the case in ordinary
-times, it seems hardly credible, that under the actual circumstances,
-any Carthaginian (person or property) can have been at Syracuse
-except by accident; for war with Carthage had been long announced,
-not merely in current talk, but in the more unequivocal language
-of overwhelming preparation. Nor is it easy to understand how the
-prudent Carthaginian Senate (who probably were not less provided with
-spies at Syracuse than Dionysius was at Carthage)[1032] can have
-been so uninformed as to be taken by surprise at the last moment,
-when Dionysius sent thither a herald formally declaring war; which
-herald was not sent until after the license for private plunder had
-been previously granted. He peremptorily required the Carthaginians
-to relinquish their dominion over the Greek cities in Sicily,[1033]
-as the only means of avoiding war. To such a proposition no answer
-was returned, nor probably expected. But the Carthaginians were
-now so much prostrated (like Athens in the second or third years
-of the Peloponnesian war) by depopulation, suffering, terrors, and
-despondency, arising out of the pestilence which beset them in
-Africa, that they felt incompetent to any serious effort, and heard
-with alarm the letter read from Dionysius. There was, however,
-no alternative, so that they forthwith despatched some of their
-ablest citizens to levy troops for the defence of their Sicilian
-possessions.[1034]
-
-  [1031] Diodor. xiv, 46.
-
-  There were also Greeks, and seemingly Greeks of some
-  consideration, who resided at Carthage, and seemed to have
-  continued resident there throughout the war between the
-  Carthaginians and Dionysius (Diodor. xiv, 77). We should infer,
-  from their continuing to reside there, that the Carthaginians did
-  not retaliate upon them the plunder now authorized by Dionysius
-  against their countrymen resident at Syracuse; and farther, it
-  affords additional probability that the number of Carthaginians
-  actually plundered at Syracuse was not considerable.
-
-  For instances of intermarriage, and inter-residence, between
-  Carthage and Syracuse, see Herodot. vii, 166; Livy, xxiv, 6.
-
-  Phœnician coins have been found in Ortygia, bearing a Phœnician
-  inscription signifying _The Island_,—which was the usual
-  denomination of Ortygia (Movers, Die Phönizier, ii, 2, p. 327).
-
-  [1032] Diodor. xiv, 55. Τοῦτο δ’ ἐμηχανήσατο (Ἰμίλκων) πρὸς τὸ
-  μηδένα τῶν κατασκόπων ἀπαγγεῖλαι τὸν κατάπλουν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, etc.
-
-  [1033] Diodor. xiv, 46, 47.
-
-  [1034] Diodor. xiv, 47.
-
-The first news that reached them was indeed appalling. Dionysius had
-marched forth with his full power, Syracusan as well as foreign,
-accumulated by so long a preparation. It was a power, the like of
-which had never been beheld in Greece; greater even than that wielded
-by his predecessor Gelon eighty years before. If the contemporaries
-of Gelon had been struck with awe[1035] at the superiority of his
-force to anything that Hellas could show elsewhere, as much or more
-would the same sentiment be felt by those who surrounded Dionysius.
-More intimately still was a similar comparison, with the mighty
-victor of Himera, present to Dionysius himself. He exulted in setting
-out with an army yet more imposing, against the same enemy, and for
-the same purpose of liberating the maritime cities of Sicily subject
-to Carthage;[1036] cities, whose number and importance had since
-fearfully augmented.
-
-  [1035] Herodot. vii, 145. Τὰ δὲ Γέλωνος πρήγματα μεγάλα ἐλέγετο
-  εἶναι, οὐδαμῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τῶν οὐ πολλὸν μέζω. Compare c. 160-162.
-
-  [1036] Herodot. vii, 158. Gelon’s speech to the Lacedæmonians who
-  come to solicit his aid against Xerxes.
-
-  Αὐτοὶ δὲ, ἐμεῦ πρότερον δεηθέντος βαρβαρικοῦ στρατοῦ
-  συνεπάψασθαι, ὅτε μοι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους νεῖκος συνῆπτο ...
-  ~ὑποτείνοντός τε τὰ ἐμπόρια συνελευθεροῦν~, etc.
-
-These subject-cities, from Kamarina on one side of the island to
-Selinus and Himera on the other, though there were a certain number
-of Carthaginian residents established there, had no effective
-standing force to occupy or defend them on the part of Carthage;
-whose habit it was to levy large mercenary hosts for the special
-occasion and then to disband them afterwards. Accordingly, as soon
-as Dionysius with his powerful army passed the Syracusan border,
-and entered upon his march westward along the southern coast of
-the island, proclaiming himself as liberator—the most intense
-anti-Carthaginian manifestations burst forth at once, at Kamarina,
-Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera. These Greeks did not merely
-copy the Syracusans in plundering the property of all Carthaginians
-found among them, but also seized their persons, and put them to
-death with every species of indignity and torture. A frightful
-retaliation now took place for the cruelties recently committed by
-the Carthaginian armies, in the sacking of Selinus, Agrigentum, and
-the other conquered cities.[1037] The Hellenic war-practice, in
-itself sufficiently rigorous, was aggravated into a merciless and
-studied barbarity, analogous to that which had disfigured the late
-proceedings of Carthage and her western mercenaries. These “Sicilian
-vespers,” which burst out throughout all the south of Sicily against
-the Carthaginian residents, surpassed even the memorable massacre
-known under that name in the thirteenth century, wherein the Angevine
-knights and soldiers were indeed assassinated, but not tortured.
-Diodorus tells us that the Carthaginians learnt from the retaliation
-thus suffered, a lesson of forbearance. It will not appear however,
-from their future conduct, that the lesson was much laid to heart;
-while it is unhappily certain, that such interchange of cruelties
-with less humanized neighbors, contributed to lower in the Sicilian
-Greeks that measure of comparative forbearance which characterized
-the Hellenic race in its own home.
-
-  [1037] Diodor. xiv, 46. Οὐ μόνον γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς οὐσίας διήρπασαν,
-  ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὺς συλλαμβάνοντες, πᾶσαν αἰκίαν καὶ ὕβριν εἰς
-  τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν ἀπετίθεντο, μνημονεύοντες ὧν αὐτοὶ κατὰ τὴν
-  αἰχμαλωσίαν ἔπαθον. Ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ τῆς κατὰ τῶν Φοινίκων
-  τιμωρίας προέβησαν, καὶ τότε καὶ κατὰ τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον,
-  ὥστε τοὺς Καρχηδονίους διδαχθῆναι μηκέτι παρανομεῖν εἰς τοὺς
-  ὑποπεσόντας.
-
-Elate with this fury of revenge, the citizens of Kamarina, Gela,
-Agrigentum, and Selinus joined Dionysius on his march along the
-coast. He was enabled, from his abundant stock of recently fabricated
-arms, to furnish them with panoplies and weapons; for it is probable
-that as subjects of Carthage they had been disarmed. Strengthened
-by all these reinforcements, he mustered a force of eighty thousand
-men, besides more than three thousand cavalry; while the ships of war
-which accompanied him along the coast were nearly two hundred, and
-the transports, with stores and battering machines, not less than
-five hundred. With this prodigious army, the most powerful hitherto
-assembled under Grecian command, he appeared before the Carthaginian
-settlement of Motyê, a fortified seaport in a little bay immediately
-north of Cape Lilybæum.[1038]
-
-  [1038] Diodor. xiv, 47.
-
-Of the three principal establishments of Carthage in Sicily,—Motyê,
-Panormus (Palermo), and Soloeis,—Motyê was at once the nearest to the
-mother-city,[1039] the most important, and the most devoted. It was
-situated (like the original Syracuse in Ortygia) upon a little islet,
-separated from Sicily by a narrow strait about two-thirds of a mile
-in breadth, which its citizens had bridged over by means of a mole,
-so as to form a regular, though narrow, footpath. It was populous,
-wealthy, flourishing, and distinguished for the excellence both of
-its private houses and its fortifications. Perceiving the approach of
-Dionysius, and not intimidated by the surrender of their neighbors
-and allies, the Elymi at Eryx, who did not dare to resist so powerful
-a force,—the Motyênes put themselves in the best condition of
-defence. They broke up their mole, and again insulated themselves
-from Sicily, in the hope of holding out until relief should be
-sent from Carthage. Resolved to avenge upon Motyê the sufferings
-of Agrigentum and Selinus, Dionysius took a survey of the place in
-conjunction with his principal engineers. It deserves notice, that
-this is among the earliest sieges recorded in Grecian history wherein
-we read of a professed engineer as being directly and deliberately
-called on to advise the best mode of proceeding.[1040]
-
-  [1039] Thucyd. vi, 2; Pausan. v, 25, 3.
-
-  [1040] Diodor. xiv, 48. Διονύσιος δὲ μετὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτόνων
-  κατασκεψάμενος τοὺς τόπους, etc.
-
-  Artemon the engineer was consulted by Perikles at the siege of
-  Samos (Plutarch, Perikles, c. 27).
-
-Having formed his plans, he left his admiral Leptines with a portion
-of the army to begin the necessary works, while he himself with
-the remainder laid waste the neighboring territory dependent on or
-allied with Carthage. The Sikani and others submitted to him; but
-Ankyræ, Soloeis, Panormus, Egesta, and Entella, all held out, though
-the citizens were confined to their walls, and obliged to witness,
-without being able to prevent, the destruction of their lands.[1041]
-Returning from this march, Dionysius pressed the siege of Motyê with
-the utmost ardor, and with all the appliances which his engineers
-could devise. Having moored his transports along the beach, and
-hauled his ships of war ashore in the harbor, he undertook the
-laborious task of filling up the strait (probably of no great depth)
-which divided Motyê from the main island;[1042]—or at least as much
-of the length of the strait as was sufficient to march across both
-with soldiers and with battering engines, and to bring them up close
-against the walls of the city. The numbers under his command enabled
-him to achieve this enterprise, though not without a long period
-of effort, during which the Carthaginians tried more than once to
-interrupt his proceedings. Not having a fleet capable of contending
-in pitched battle against the besiegers, the Carthaginian general
-Imilkon tried two successive manœuvres. He first sent a squadron of
-ten ships of war to sail suddenly into the harbor of Syracuse, in
-hopes that the diversion thus operated would constrain Dionysius to
-detach a portion of his fleet from Motyê. Though the attack, however,
-was so far successful as to destroy many merchantmen in the harbor,
-yet the assailants were beaten off without making any more serious
-impression, or creating the diversion intended.[1043] Imilkon next
-made an attempt to surprise the armed ships of Dionysius, as they
-lay hauled ashore in the harbor near Motyê. Crossing over from
-Carthage by night, with one hundred ships of war, to the Selinuntine
-coast, he sailed round Cape Lilybæum, and appeared at daybreak off
-Motyê. His appearance took every man by surprise. He destroyed or put
-to flight the ships on guard, and sailed into the harbor prepared
-for attack while as yet only a few of the Syracusan ships had been
-got afloat. As the harbor was too confined to enable Dionysius to
-profit by his great superiority in number and size of ships, a great
-portion of his fleet would have been now destroyed, had it not been
-saved by his numerous land force and artillery on the beach. Showers
-of missiles, from this assembled crowd as well as from the decks of
-the Syracusan ships, prevented Imilkon from advancing far enough to
-attack with effect. The newly-invented engine called the catapulta,
-of which the Carthaginians had as yet had no experience, was
-especially effective; projecting large masses to a great distance,
-it filled them with astonishment and dismay. While their progress
-was thus arrested, Dionysius employed a new expedient to rescue his
-fleet from the dilemma in which it had been caught. His numerous
-soldiers were directed to haul the ships, not down to the harbor,
-but landward, across a level tongue of land, more than two miles in
-breadth, which separated the harbor of Motyê from the outer sea.
-Wooden planks were laid so as to form a pathway for the ships; and
-in spite of the great size of the newly-constructed quadriremes and
-quinqueremes, the strength and ardor of the army sufficed for this
-toilsome effort of transporting eighty ships across in one day. The
-entire fleet, double in number to that of the Carthaginians, being at
-length got afloat, Imilkon did not venture on a pitched battle, but
-returned at once back to Africa.[1044]
-
-  [1041] Diodor. xiv, 48, 49.
-
-  [1042] Diodor. xiv, 49. ἐχώννυε τὸν μεταξὺ πόρον, καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς
-  ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ λόγον ἅμα τῇ τοῦ χώματος αὐξήσει προσήγαγε τοῖς
-  τείχεσι.
-
-  [1043] Diodor. xiv, 50.
-
-  [1044] Diodor. xiv, 50; Polyænus, v, 2, 6.
-
-Though the citizens of Motyê saw from the walls the mournful
-spectacle of their friends retiring, their courage was nowise
-abated. They knew well that they had no mercy to expect; that the
-general ferocity of the Carthaginians in their hour of victory,
-and especially the cruel treatment of Greek captives even in Motyê
-itself, would now be retaliated; and that their only chance lay in
-a brave despair. The road across the strait having been at length
-completed, Dionysius brought up his engines and began his assault.
-While the catapulta with its missiles prevented defenders from
-showing themselves on the battlements, battering-rams were driven
-up to shake or overthrow the walls. At the same time large towers
-on wheels were rolled up, with six different stories in them one
-above the other, and in height equal to the houses. Against these
-means of attack the besieged on their side elevated lofty masts
-above the walls, with yards projecting outwards. Upon these yards
-stood men protected from the missiles by a sort of breastwork,
-and holding burning torches, pitch, and other combustibles, which
-they cast down upon the machines of the assailants. Many machines
-took fire in the woodwork, and it was not without difficulty that
-the conflagration was extinguished. After a long and obstinate
-resistance, however, the walls were at length overthrown or carried
-by assault, and the besiegers rushed in, imagining the town to be in
-their power. But the indefatigable energy of the besieged had already
-put the houses behind into a state of defence, and barricaded the
-streets, so that a fresh assault, more difficult than the first,
-remained to be undertaken. The towers on wheels were rolled near,
-but probably could not be pushed into immediate contact with the
-houses in consequence of the ruins of the overthrown wall which
-impeded their approach. Accordingly the assailants were compelled
-to throw out wooden platforms or bridges from the towers to the
-houses, and to march along these to the attack. But here they were
-at great disadvantage, and suffered severe loss. The Motyenes,
-resisting desperately, prevented them from setting firm foot on the
-houses, slew many of them in hand-combat, and precipitated whole
-companies to the ground, by severing or oversetting the platform.
-For several days this desperate combat was renewed. Not a step was
-gained by the besiegers, yet the unfortunate Motyenes became each
-day more exhausted, while portions of the foremost houses were
-also overthrown. Every evening Dionysius recalled his troops to
-their night’s repose, renewing the assault next morning. Having
-thus brought the enemy into an expectation that the night would be
-undisturbed, he on one fatal night took them by surprise, sending the
-Thurian Archylus with a chosen body of troops to attack the foremost
-defences. This detachment, planting ladders and climbing up by means
-of the half-demolished houses, established themselves firmly in a
-position within the town before resistance could be organized. In
-vain did the Motyenes, discovering the stratagem too late, endeavor
-to dislodge them. The main force of Dionysius was speedily brought
-up across the artificial earth-way to confirm their success, and the
-town was thus carried, in spite of the most gallant resistance, which
-continued even after it had become hopeless.[1045]
-
-  [1045] Diodor. xiv, 51, 52, 53.
-
-The victorious host who now poured into Motyê, incensed not merely
-by the length and obstinacy of the defence, but also by antecedent
-Carthaginian atrocities at Agrigentum and elsewhere, gave full
-loose to the sanguinary impulses of retaliation. They butchered
-indiscriminately men and women, the aged and the children, without
-mercy to any one. The streets were thus strewed with the slain,
-in spite of all efforts on the part of Dionysius, who desired
-to preserve the captives that they might be sold as slaves, and
-thus bring in a profitable return. But his orders to abstain from
-slaughter were not obeyed, nor could he do anything more than invite
-the sufferers by proclamation to take refuge in the temples; a step,
-which most of them would probably resort to uninvited. Restrained
-from farther slaughter by the sanctuary of the temples, the victors
-now turned to pillage. Abundance of gold, silver, precious vestments,
-and other marks of opulence, the accumulations of a long period of
-active prosperity, fell into their hands; and Dionysius allowed to
-them the full plunder of the town, as a recompense for the toils
-of the siege. He farther distributed special recompenses to those
-who had distinguished themselves; one hundred minæ being given to
-Archylus, the leader of the successful night-surprise. All the
-surviving Motyenes he sold into slavery; but he reserved for a more
-cruel fate Daimenês and various other Greeks who had been taken among
-them. These Greeks he caused to be crucified;[1046] a specimen of
-the Phœnician penalties transferred by example to their Hellenic
-neighbors and enemies.
-
-  [1046] Diodor. xiv, 53.
-
-The siege of Motyê having occupied nearly all the summer, Dionysius
-now reconducted his army homeward. He left at the place a Sikel
-garrison under the command of the Syracusan Biton, as well as a
-large portion of his fleet, one hundred and twenty ships, under the
-command of his brother Leptines; who was instructed to watch for
-the arrival of any force from Carthage, and to employ himself in
-besieging the neighboring towns of Egesta and Entella. The operations
-against these two towns however had little success. The inhabitants
-defended themselves bravely, and the Egestæans were even successful,
-through a well-planned nocturnal sally, in burning the enemy’s camp,
-with many horses, and stores of all kinds in the tents. Neither of
-the two towns was yet reduced, when, in the ensuing spring, Dionysius
-himself returned with his main force from Syracuse. He reduced the
-inhabitants of Halikyæ to submission, but effected no other permanent
-conquest, nor anything more than devastation of the neighboring
-territory dependent upon Carthage.[1047]
-
-  [1047] Diodor. xiv, 54.
-
-  Leptines was brother of Dionysius (xiv, 102; xv, 7), though he
-  afterwards married the daughter of Dionysius,—a marriage not
-  condemned by Grecian sentiment.
-
-Presently the face of the war was changed by the arrival of Imilkon
-from Carthage. Having been elevated to the chief magistracy of the
-city, he now brought with him an overwhelming force, collected as
-well from the subjects in Africa as from Iberia and the Western
-Mediterranean. It amounted, even in the low estimate of Timæus,
-to one hundred thousand men, reinforced afterwards in Sicily
-by thirty thousand more,—and in the more ample computations of
-Ephorus, to three hundred thousand foot, four thousand horse, four
-hundred chariots of war, four hundred ships of war, and six hundred
-transports carrying stores and engines. Dionysius had his spies at
-Carthage,[1048] even among men of rank and politicians, to apprise
-him of all movements or public orders. But Imilkon, to obviate
-knowledge of the precise point in Sicily where he intended to land,
-gave to the pilots sealed instructions, to be opened only when
-they were out at sea, indicating Panormus (Palermo) as the place
-of rendezvous.[1049] The transports made directly for that port,
-without nearing the land elsewhere; while Imilkon with the ships of
-war approached the harbor of Motyê and sailed from thence along the
-coast to Panormus. He probably entertained the hope of intercepting
-some portion of the Syracusan fleet. But nothing of the kind was
-found practicable; while Leptines on his side was even fortunate
-enough to be able to attack, with thirty triremes, the foremost
-vessels of the large transport-fleet on their voyage to Panormus. He
-destroyed no less than fifty of them, with five thousand men, and
-two hundred chariots of war; but the remaining fleet reached the
-port in safety, and were there joined by Imilkon with the ships of
-war. The land force being disembarked, the Carthaginian general led
-them to Motyê, ordering his ships of war to accompany him along the
-coast. In his way he regained Eryx, which was at heart Carthaginian,
-having only been intimidated into submission to Dionysius during the
-preceding year. He then attacked Motyê, which he retook, seemingly
-after very little resistance. It had held out obstinately against
-the Syracusans a few months before, while in the hands of its
-own Carthaginian inhabitants, with their families and properties
-around them; but the Sikel garrison had far less motive for stout
-defence.[1050]
-
-  [1048] Justin, xx, 5. One of these Carthaginians of rank, who,
-  from political enmity to Hanno, wrote letters in Greek to
-  communicate information to Dionysius, was detected and punished
-  as a traitor. On this occasion, the Carthaginian senate is
-  said to have enacted a law, forbidding all citizens to learn
-  Greek,—either to write it or to speak it.
-
-  [1049] Diodor. xiv, 54; Polyænus, v, 10, 1.
-
-  [1050] Diodor. xiv, 55.
-
-Thus was Dionysius deprived of the conquest which had cost him so
-much blood and toil during the preceding summer. We are surprised
-to learn that he made no effort to prevent its recapture, though he
-was then not far off, besieging Egesta,—and though his soldiers,
-elate with the successes of the preceding year were eager for a
-general battle. But Dionysius, deeming this measure too adventurous,
-resolved to retreat to Syracuse. His provisions were failing, and
-he was at a great distance from allies, so that defeat would have
-been ruinous. He therefore returned to Syracuse, carrying with him
-some of the Sikanians, whom he persuaded to evacuate their abode in
-the Carthaginian neighborhood, promising to provide them with better
-homes elsewhere. Most of them, however, declined his offers; some
-(among them, the Halikyæans) preferring to resume their alliance
-with Carthage. Of the recent acquisitions nothing now remained to
-Dionysius beyond the Selinuntine boundary; but Gela, Kamarina,
-Agrigentum, and Selinus had been emancipated from Carthage, and
-were still in a state of dependent alliance with him; a result
-of moment,—yet seemingly very inadequate to the immense warlike
-preparations whereby it had been attained. Whether he exercised a
-wise discretion in declining to fight the Carthaginians, we have not
-sufficient information to determine. But his army appear to have been
-dissatisfied with it, and it was among the causes of the outbreak
-against him shortly afterwards at Syracuse.[1051]
-
-  [1051] Diodor. xiv, 55.
-
-Thus left master of the country, Imilkon, instead of trying to
-reconquer Selinus and Himera, which had probably been impoverished
-by recent misfortunes,—resolved to turn his arms against Messênê in
-the north-east of the island; a city as yet fresh and untouched,—so
-little prepared for attack that its walls were not in good
-repair,—and moreover at the present moment yet farther enfeebled
-by the absence of its horsemen in the army of Dionysius.[1052]
-Accordingly, he marched along the northern coast of Sicily, with his
-fleet coasting in the same direction to coöperate with him. He made
-terms with Kephalœdium and Therma, captured the island of Lipara, and
-at length reached Cape Pelôrus, a few miles from Messênê. His rapid
-march and unexpected arrival struck the Messenians with dismay. Many
-of them, conceiving defence to be impossible against so numerous a
-host, sent away their families and their valuable property to Rhegium
-or elsewhere. On the whole, however, a spirit of greater confidence
-prevailed, arising in part from an ancient prophecy preserved among
-the traditions of the town, purporting that the Carthaginians should
-one day carry water in Messênê. The interpreters affirmed that “to
-carry water” meant, of course, “to be a slave,”—and the Messenians,
-persuading themselves that this portended defeat to Imilkon, sent out
-their chosen military force to meet him at Pelôrus, and oppose his
-disembarkation. The Carthaginian commander, seeing these troops on
-their march, ordered his fleet to sail forward into the harbor of the
-city, and attack it from seaward during the absence of the defenders.
-A north wind so favored the advance of the ships, that they entered
-the harbor full sail, and found the city on that side almost
-unguarded. The troops who had marched out towards Pelôrus hastened
-back, but were too late;[1053] while Imilkon himself also, pushing
-forward by land, forced his way into the town over the neglected
-parts of the wall. Messênê was taken; and its unhappy population
-fled in all directions for their lives. Some found refuge in the
-neighboring cities; others ran to the hill-forts of the Messenian
-territory, planted as a protection against the indigenous Sikels;
-while about two hundred of them near the harbor, cast themselves into
-the sea, and undertook the arduous task of swimming across to the
-Italian coast, in which fifty of them succeeded.[1054]
-
-  [1052] Diodor. xiv, 56, 57. τῶν ἰδίων ἱππέων ἐν Συρακούσαις
-  ὄντων, etc. διὰ τῶν πεπτωκότων τειχῶν εἰσβιασάμενοι, etc. τὰ
-  τείχη καταπεπτωκότα, etc.
-
-  Compare another example of inattention to the state of their
-  walls, on the part of the Messenians (xix, 65).
-
-  [1053] Kleon and the Athenians took Torônê by a similar manœuvre
-  (Thucyd. v, 2).
-
-  [1054] Diodor. xiv, 57.
-
-Though Imilkon tried in vain to carry by assault some of the
-Messenian hill-forts, which were both strongly placed and gallantly
-defended,—yet his capture of Messênê itself was an event both
-imposing and profitable. It deprived Dionysius of an important ally,
-and lessened his facilities for obtaining succor from Italy. But
-most of all, it gratified the anti-Hellenic sentiment of the Punic
-general and his army, counterbalancing the capture of Motyê in the
-preceding year. Having taken scarce any captives, Imilkon had nothing
-but unconscious stone and wood upon which to vent his antipathy. He
-ordered the town, the walls, and all the buildings, to be utterly
-burnt and demolished; a task which his numerous host are said to
-have executed so effectually, that there remained hardly anything
-but ruins, without a trace of human residence.[1055] He received
-adhesion and reinforcements from most of the Sikels[1056] of the
-interior, who had been forced to submit to Dionysius a year or two
-before, but detested his dominion. To some of these Sikels, the
-Syracusan despot had assigned the territory of the conquered Naxians,
-with their city probably unwalled. But anxious as they were to escape
-from him, many had migrated to a point somewhat north of Naxus,—to
-the hill of Taurus, immediately over the sea, unfavorably celebrated
-among the Sikel population as being the spot where the first Greek
-colonists had touched on arriving in the island. Their migration was
-encouraged, multiplied, and organized, under the auspices of Imilkon,
-who prevailed upon them to construct, upon the strong eminence of
-Taurus, a fortified post, which formed the beginning of the city
-afterwards known as Tauromenium.[1057] Magon was sent with the
-Carthaginian fleet to assist in the enterprise.
-
-  [1055] Diodor. xiv, 58. Ἰμίλκων δὲ τῆς Μεσσήνης τὰ τείχη
-  κατασκάψας, προσέταξε τοῖς στρατιώταις καταβαλεῖν τὰς οἰκίας
-  εἰς ἔδαφος, καὶ μήτε κέραμον, μήθ’ ὕλην, μήτ’ ἄλλο μηδὲν
-  ὑπολιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν κατακαῦσαι, τὰ δὲ συντρίψαι. Ταχὺ δὲ τῇ
-  τῶν στρατιωτῶν πολυχειρίᾳ λαβόντων τῶν ἔργων συντέλειαν, ἡ πόλις
-  ἄγνωστος ἦν, ὅπου πρότερον αὐτὴν οἰκεῖσθαι συνέβαινεν. Ὁρῶν γὰρ
-  τὸν τόπον πόῤῥω μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν συμμαχίδων πόλεων κεχωρισμένον,
-  εὐκαιρότατον δὲ τῶν περὶ Σικελίαν ὄντα, προῄρητο δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ
-  τελέως ἀοίκητον διατηρεῖν, ἢ δυσχερῆ καὶ πολυχρόνιον τὴν κτίσιν
-  αὐτῆς γίνεσθαι.
-
-  Ἐναποδειξάμενος οὖν τὸ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας μῖσος ἐν τῇ τῶν
-  Μεσσηνίων ἀτυχίᾳ, etc.
-
-  It would appear, however, that the demolition of Messênê can
-  hardly have been carried so far in fact as Imilkon intended;
-  since the city reappears shortly afterwards in renewed dignity.
-
-  [1056] Diodor. xiv, 59-76.
-
-  [1057] Diodor. xiv, 59.
-
-Meanwhile Dionysius, greatly disquieted at the capture of Messênê,
-exerted himself to put Syracuse in an effective position of defence
-on her northern frontier. Naxus and Katana being both unfortified, he
-was forced to abandon them, and he induced the Campanians whom he had
-planted in Katana to change their quarters to the strong town called
-Ætna, on the skirt of the mountain so named. He made Leontini his
-chief position; strengthening as much as possible the fortifications
-of the city as well as those of the neighboring country forts,
-wherein he accumulated magazines of provisions from the fertile
-plains around. He had still a force of thirty thousand foot and more
-than three thousand horse; he had also a fleet of one hundred and
-eighty ships of war,—triremes and others. During the year preceding,
-he had brought out both a land force and a naval force much superior
-to this, even for purposes of aggression; how it happened that he
-could now command no more, even for defence and at home,—or what had
-become of the difference,—we are not told. Of the one hundred and
-eighty ships of war, sixty only were manned by the extraordinary
-proceeding of liberating slaves. Such sudden and serious changes
-in the amount of military force from year to year, are perceptible
-among Carthaginians as well as Greeks,—indeed throughout most part
-of Grecian history;—the armies being got together chiefly for
-special occasions, and then dismissed. Dionysius farther despatched
-envoys to Sparta, soliciting a reinforcement of a thousand mercenary
-auxiliaries. Having thus provided the best defence that he could
-through the territory, he advanced forward with his main land-force
-to Katana, having his fleet also moving in coöperation, immediately
-off shore.
-
-Towards this same point of Katana the Carthaginians were now moving,
-in their march against Syracuse. Magon was directed to coast along
-with the fleet from Taurus (Tauromenium) to Katana, while Imilkon
-intended himself to march with the land force on shore, keeping
-constantly near the fleet for the purpose of mutual support. But
-his scheme was defeated by a remarkable accident. A sudden eruption
-took place from Ætna; so that the stream of lava from the mountain
-to the sea forbade all possibility of marching along the shore to
-Katana, and constrained him to make a considerable circuit with
-his army on the land-side of the mountain. Though he accelerated
-his march as much as possible, yet for two days or more he was
-unavoidably cut off from the fleet; which under the command of Magon
-was sailing southward towards Katana. Dionysius availed himself of
-this circumstance to advance beyond Katana along the beach stretching
-northward, to meet Magon in his approach, and attack him separately.
-The Carthaginian fleet was much superior in number, consisting of
-five hundred sail in all; a portion of which, however, were not
-strictly ships of war, but armed merchantmen,—that is, furnished
-with brazen bows for impact against an enemy, and rowed with oars.
-But on the other hand, Dionysius had a land-force close at hand
-to coöperate with his fleet; an advantage which in ancient naval
-warfare counted for much, serving in case of defeat as a refuge to
-the ships, and in case of victory as intercepting or abridging the
-enemy’s means of escape. Magon, alarmed when he came in sight of
-the Grecian land-force mustered on the beach, and the Grecian fleet
-rowing up to attack him,—was nevertheless constrained unwillingly
-to accept the battle. Leptines, the Syracusan admiral,—though
-ordered by Dionysius to concentrate his ships as much as possible,
-in consequence of his inferior numbers,—attacked with boldness, and
-even with temerity; advancing himself with thirty ships greatly
-before the rest, and being apparently farther out to sea than the
-enemy. His bravery at first appeared successful, destroying or
-damaging the headmost ships of the enemy. But their superior numbers
-presently closed around him, and after a desperate combat, fought
-in the closest manner, ship to ship and hand to hand, he was forced
-to sheer off, and to seek escape seaward. His main fleet, coming
-up in disorder, and witnessing his defeat, were beaten also, after
-a strenuous contest. All of them fled, either landward or seaward
-as they could, under vigorous pursuit by the Carthaginian vessels;
-and in the end, no less than a hundred of the Syracusan ships, with
-twenty thousand men, were numbered as taken, or destroyed. Many of
-the crews, swimming or floating in the water on spars, strove to get
-to land to the protection of their comrades. But the Carthaginian
-small craft, sailing very near to the shore, slew or drowned these
-unfortunate men, even under the eyes of friends ashore who could
-render no assistance. The neighboring water became strewed, both
-with dead bodies and with fragments of broken ships. As victors, the
-Carthaginians were enabled to save many of their own seamen, either
-on board of damaged ships, or swimming for their lives. Yet their own
-loss too was severe; and their victory, complete as it proved, was
-dearly purchased.
-
-Though the land-force of Dionysius had not been at all engaged,
-yet the awful defeat of his fleet induced him to give immediate
-orders for retreating, first to Katana and afterwards yet farther to
-Syracuse. As soon as the Syracusan army had evacuated the adjoining
-shore, Magon towed all his prizes to land, and there hauled them up
-on the beach; partly for repair, wherever practicable,—partly as
-visible proofs of the magnitude of the triumph, for encouragement to
-his own armament. Stormy weather just then supervening, he was forced
-to haul his own ships ashore also for safety, and remained there for
-several days refreshing the crews. To keep the sea under such weather
-would have been scarcely practicable; so that if Dionysius, instead
-of retreating, had continued to occupy the shore with his unimpaired
-land-force, it appears that the Carthaginian ships would have been
-in the greatest danger; constrained either to face the storm, to run
-back a considerable distance northward, or to make good their landing
-against a formidable enemy, without being able to wait for the
-arrival of Imilkon.[1058] The latter, after no very long interval,
-came up, so that the land-force and the navy of the Carthaginians
-were now again in coöperation. While allowing his troops some
-days of repose and enjoyment of the victory, he sent envoys to the
-town of Ætna, inviting the Campanian mercenary soldiers to break
-with Dionysius and join him. Reminding them that their countrymen
-at Entella were living in satisfaction as a dependency of Carthage
-(which they had recently testified by resisting the Syracusan
-invasion), he promised to them an accession of territory, and a share
-in the spoils of the war, to be wrested from Greeks who were enemies
-of Campanians not less than of Carthaginians.[1059] The Campanians of
-Ætna would gladly have complied with his invitation, and were only
-restrained from joining him by the circumstance that they had given
-hostages to the despot of Syracuse, in whose army also their best
-soldiers were now serving.
-
-  [1058] Diodor. xiv, 60, 61. Compare the speech of Theodôrus at
-  Syracuse afterwards (c. 68), from which we gather a more complete
-  idea of what passed after the battle.
-
-  [1059] Diodor. xiv, 61. Καὶ καθόλου δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος
-  ἀπεδείκνυε πολέμιον ὕπαρχον τῶν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν.
-
-  These manifestations of anti-Hellenic sentiment, among the
-  various neighbors of the Sicilian Greeks, are important to
-  notice, though they are not often brought before us.
-
-Meanwhile Dionysius, in marching back to Syracuse, found his army
-grievously discontented. Withdrawn from the scene of action without
-even using their arms, they looked forward to nothing better than a
-blockade at Syracuse, full of hardship and privation. Accordingly
-many of them protested against retreat, conjuring him to lead them
-again to the scene of action, that they might either assail the
-Carthaginian fleet in the confusion of landing, or join battle
-with the advancing land-force under Imilkon. At first, Dionysius
-consented to such change of scheme. But he was presently reminded
-that unless he hastened back to Syracuse, Magon with the victorious
-fleet might sail thither, enter the harbor, and possess himself of
-the city; in the same manner as Imilkon had recently succeeded at
-Messênê. Under these apprehensions he renewed his original order for
-retreat, in spite of the vehement protest of his Sicilian allies;
-who were indeed so incensed that most of them quitted him at once.
-Which of the two was the wiser plan, we have no sufficient means
-to determine. But the circumstances seem not to have been the same
-as those preceding the capture of Messênê; for Magon was not in a
-condition to move forward at once with the fleet, partly from his
-loss in the recent action, partly from the stormy weather; and
-might perhaps have been intercepted in the very act of landing,
-if Dionysius had moved rapidly back to the shore. As far as we can
-judge, it would appear that the complaints of the army against the
-hasty retreat of Dionysius rested on highly plausible grounds. He
-nevertheless persisted, and reached Syracuse with his army not only
-much discouraged, but greatly diminished by the desertion of allies.
-He lost no time in sending forth envoys to the Italian Greeks and
-to Peloponnesus, with ample funds for engaging soldiers, and urgent
-supplications to Sparta as well as to Corinth.[1060] Polyxenus, his
-brother-in-law, employed on this mission, discharged his duty with
-such diligence, that he came back in a comparatively short space
-of time, with thirty-two ships of war under the command of the
-Lacedæmonian Pharakidas.[1061]
-
-  [1060] Diodor. xiv, 61.
-
-  [1061] Diodor. xiv, 63.
-
-  Polyænus (v, 8, 2) recounts a manœuvre of _Leptines_, practised
-  in bringing back a Lacedæmonian reinforcement from Sparta to
-  Sicily on his voyage along the Tarentine coast. Perhaps this may
-  be the Lacedæmonian division intended.
-
-Meanwhile Imilkon, having sufficiently refreshed his troops after
-the naval victory off Katana, moved forward towards Syracuse both
-with the fleet and the land-force. The entry of his fleet into the
-Great Harbor was ostentatious and imposing; far above even that of
-the second Athenian armament, when Demosthenes first exhibited its
-brilliant but short-lived force.[1062] Two hundred and eight ships
-of war first rowed in, marshalled in the best order, and adorned
-with the spoils of the captured Syracusan ships. These were followed
-by transports, five hundred of them carrying soldiers, and one
-thousand others either empty or bringing stores and machines. The
-total number of vessels, we are told, reached almost two thousand,
-covering a large portion of the Great Harbor.[1063] The numerous
-land-force marched up about the same time; Imilkon establishing his
-head quarters in the temple of Zeus Olympius, nearly one English mile
-and a half from the city. He presently drew up his forces in order
-of battle, and advanced nearly to the city walls; while his ships of
-war also, being divided into two fleets of one hundred ships each,
-showed themselves in face of the two interior harbors or docks (on
-each side of the connecting strait between Ortygia and the main land)
-wherein the Syracusan ships were safely lodged. He thus challenged
-the Syracusans to combat on both elements; but neither challenge was
-accepted.
-
-  [1062] Thucyd. vii, 42; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 21; Diodor. xiii, 11.
-
-  [1063] Diodor. xiv, 62.
-
-  The text of Diodorus is here so perplexed as to require
-  conjectural alteration, which Rhodomannus has supplied; yet not
-  so as to remove all that is obscure. The word εἰσθεόμεναι still
-  remains to be explained or corrected.
-
-Having by such defiance farther raised the confidence of his own
-troops, he first spread them over the Syracusan territory, and
-allowed them for thirty days to enrich themselves by unlimited
-plunder. Next, he proceeded to establish fortified posts, as
-essential to the prosecution of a blockade which he foresaw would
-be tedious. Besides fortifying the temple of the Olympian Zeus, he
-constructed two other forts; one at Cape Plemmyrium (on the southern
-entrance of the harbor, immediately opposite to Ortygia, where
-Nikias had erected a post also), the other on the Great Harbor,
-midway between Plemmyrium and the temple of the Olympian Zeus, at
-the little bay called Daskon. He farther encircled his whole camp,
-near the last-mentioned temple, with a wall; the materials of which
-were derived in part from the demolition of the numerous tombs
-around; especially one tomb, spacious and magnificent, commemorating
-Gelon and his wife Damaretê. In these various fortified posts he was
-able to store up the bread, wine, and other provisions which his
-transports were employed in procuring from Africa and Sardinia, for
-the continuous subsistence of so mighty an host.
-
-It would appear as if Imilkon had first hoped to take the city by
-assault; for he pushed up his army as far as the very walls of
-Achradina (the outer city). He even occupied the open suburb of that
-city, afterwards separately fortified under the name of Neapolis,
-wherein were situated the temples of Demeter and Persephonê, which he
-stripped of their rich treasures.[1064] But if such was his plan,
-he soon abandoned it, and confined himself to the slower process
-of reducing the city by famine. His progress in this enterprise,
-however, was by no means encouraging. We must recollect that he was
-not, like Nikias, master of the centre of Epipolæ; able from thence
-to stretch his right arm southward to the Great Harbor, and his left
-arm northward to the sea at Trogilus. As far as we are able to make
-out, he never ascended the southern cliff, nor got upon the slope of
-Epipolæ; though it seems that at this time there was no line of wall
-along the southern cliff, as Dionysius had recently built along the
-northern. The position of Imilkon was confined to the Great Harbor
-and to the low lands adjoining, southward of the cliff of Epipolæ;
-so that the communications of Syracuse with the country around
-remained partially open on two sides,—westward, through the Euryalus
-at the upper extremity of Epipolæ,—and northward towards Thapsus
-and Megara, through the Hexapylon, or the principal gate in the new
-fortification constructed by Dionysius along the northern cliff of
-Epipolæ. The full value was now felt of that recent fortification,
-which, protecting Syracuse both to the north and west, and guarding
-the precious position of Euryalus, materially impeded the operations
-of Imilkon. The city was thus open, partially at least, on two
-sides, to receive supplies by land. And even by sea means were
-found to introduce provisions. Though Imilkon had a fleet so much
-stronger that the Syracusans did not dare to offer pitched battle,
-yet he found it difficult to keep such constant watch as to exclude
-their store-ships, and ensure the arrival of his own. Dionysius and
-Leptines went forth themselves from the harbor with armed squadrons
-to accelerate and protect the approach of their supplies; while
-several desultory encounters took place, both of land-force and of
-shipping, which proved advantageous to the Syracusans, and greatly
-raised their spirits.
-
-  [1064] Diodor. xiv, 63. Κατελάβετο δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς
-  προάστειον, καὶ τοὺς νέως τῆς τε Δήμητρος καὶ Κόρης ἐσύλησεν.
-
-  Cicero (in Verrem, iv, 52, 53) distinctly mentions the temples
-  of Demeter and Persephonê, and the statue of Apollo Temenites,
-  among the characteristic features of Neapolis; which proves the
-  identity of Neapolis with what Diodorus calls the suburb of
-  Achradina. This identity, recognized by Serra di Falco, Colonel
-  Leake, and other authors, is disputed by Saverio Cavallari, on
-  grounds which do not appear to me sufficient.
-
-  See Colonel Leake, notes on Syracuse, pp. 7-10; Cavallari, Zur
-  Topographie von Syrakus, p. 20.
-
-One naval conflict especially, which occurred while Dionysius was
-absent on his cruise, was of serious moment. A corn-ship belonging to
-Imilkon’s fleet being seen entering the Great Harbor, the Syracusans
-suddenly manned five ships of war, mastered it, and hauled it into
-their own dock. To prevent such capture, the Carthaginians from
-their station sent out forty ships of war; upon which the Syracusans
-equipped their whole naval force, bore down upon the forty with
-numbers decidedly superior, and completely defeated them. They
-captured the admiral’s ship, damaged twenty-four others, and pursued
-the rest to the naval station; in front of which they paraded,
-challenging the enemy to battle. As the challenge was not accepted,
-they returned to their own dock, towing in their prizes in triumph.
-
-This naval victory indicated, and contributed much to occasion, that
-turn in the fortune of the siege which each future day still farther
-accelerated. Its immediate effect was to fill the Syracusan public
-with unbounded exultation. “Without Dionysius we conquer our enemies;
-under his command we are beaten; why submit to slavery under him any
-longer?” Such was the burst of indignant sentiment which largely
-pervaded the groups and circles in the city; strengthened by the
-consciousness that they were now all armed and competent to extort
-freedom,—since Dionysius, when the besieging enemy actually appeared
-before the city, had been obliged, as the less of two hazards, to
-produce and redistribute the arms which he had previously taken from
-them. In the midst of this discontent, Dionysius himself returned
-from his cruise. To soothe the prevalent temper, he was forced to
-convene a public assembly; wherein he warmly extolled the recent
-exploit of the Syracusans, and exhorted them to strenuous confidence,
-promising that he would speedily bring the war to a close.
-
-It is possible that Dionysius, throughout his despotism, may have
-occasionally permitted what were called public assemblies; but we
-may be very sure, that, if ever convened, they were mere matters of
-form, and that no free discussion or opposition to his will was ever
-tolerated. On the present occasion, he anticipated the like passive
-acquiescence; and after having delivered a speech, doubtless much
-applauded by his own partisans, he was about to dismiss the assembly,
-when a citizen named Theodôrus unexpectedly rose. He was a Horseman
-or Knight,—a person of wealth and station in the city, of high
-character and established reputation for courage. Gathering boldness
-from the time and circumstances, he now stood forward to proclaim
-publicly that hatred of Dionysius, and anxiety for freedom, which so
-many of his fellow-citizens around had been heard to utter privately
-and were well known to feel.[1065]
-
-  [1065] Diodor. xiv, 64. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοιούτων λόγων γινομένων,
-  Διονύσιος κατέπλευσε, καὶ συναγαγὼν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπῄνει τοὺς
-  Συρακοσίους, καὶ παρεκάλει θαῤῥεῖν, ἐπαγγελλόμενος ταχέως
-  καταλύσειν τὸν πόλεμον. Ἤδη δ’ αὐτοῦ μέλλοντος διαλύειν τὴν
-  ἐκκλησίαν, ἀναστὰς Θεόδωρος ὁ Συρακούσιος, ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν
-  εὐδοκιμῶν καὶ δοκῶν εἶναι πρακτικὸς, ἀπετόλμησε περὶ τῆς
-  ἐλευθερίας τοιούτοις χρήσασθαι λόγοις.
-
-Diodorus in his history gives us a long harangue (whether composed
-by himself, or copied from others, we cannot tell) as pronounced by
-Theodôrus. The main topics of it are such as we should naturally
-expect, and are probably, on the whole, genuine. It is a full review,
-and an emphatic denunciation, of the past conduct of Dionysius,
-concluding with an appeal to the Syracusans to emancipate themselves
-from his dominion. “Dionysius (the speaker contends, in substance) is
-a worse enemy than the Carthaginians: who, if victorious, would be
-satisfied with a regular tribute, leaving us to enjoy our properties
-and our paternal polity. Dionysius has robbed us of both. He has
-pillaged our temples of their sacred deposits. He has slain or
-banished our wealthy citizens, and then seized their properties by
-wholesale, to be transferred to his own satellites. He has given
-the wives of these exiles in marriage to his barbarian soldiers. He
-has liberated our slaves, and taken them into his pay, in order to
-keep their masters in slavery. He has garrisoned our own citadel
-against us, by means of these slaves, together with a host of other
-mercenaries. He has put to death every citizen who ventured to raise
-his voice in defence of the laws and constitution. He has abused
-our confidence,—once, unfortunately, carried so far as to nominate
-him general,—by employing his powers to subvert our freedom, and
-rule us according to his own selfish rapacity in place of justice.
-He has farther stripped us of our arms; these, recent necessity has
-compelled him to restore,—and these, if we are men, we shall now
-employ for the recovery of our own freedom.”[1066]
-
-  [1066] Diodor. xiv, 65. Οὗτος δὲ, τὰ μὲν ἱερὰ συλήσας, τοὺς δὲ
-  τῶν ἰδιωτῶν πλούτους ἅμα ταῖς τῶν κεκτημένων ψυχαῖς ἀφελόμενος,
-  τοὺς οἰκέτας μισθοδοτεῖ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν δεσποτῶν δουλείας....
-
-  c. 66. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρόπολις, δούλων ὅπλοις τηρουμένη, κατὰ τῆς
-  πόλεως ἐπιτετείχισται· τὸ δὲ τῶν μισθοφόρων πλῆθος ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ
-  τῶν Συρακοσίων ἤθροισται. Καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἐπίσης
-  βραβεύων τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ μόναρχος πλεονεξίᾳ κρίνων πράττειν
-  πάντα. Καὶ νῦν μὲν οἱ πολέμιοι βραχὺ μέρος ἔχουσι τῆς χώρας·
-  Διονύσιος δὲ, πᾶσαν ποιήσας ἀνάστατον, τοῖς τὴν τυραννίδα
-  συναύξουσιν ἐδωρήσατο....
-
-  ... Καὶ πρὸς μὲν Καρχηδονίους δύο μάχας ἐνστησάμενος ἐν ἑκατέραις
-  ἥττηται· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς πολίταις πιστευθεὶς ἅπαξ στρατηγίαν, εὐθέως
-  ἀφείλετο τὴν ἐλευθερίαν· φονεύων μὲν τοὺς παῤῥησίαν ἄγοντας ὑπὲρ
-  τῶν νόμων, φυγαδεύων δὲ τοὺς ταῖς οὐσίαις προέχοντας· καὶ τὰς μὲν
-  τῶν φυγάδων γυναῖκας οἰκέταις καὶ μιγάσιν ἀνθρώποις συνοικίζων,
-  τῶν δὲ πολιτικῶν ὅπλων βαρβάρους καὶ ξένους ποιῶν κυρίους....
-
-  c. 67. Οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα τὸν πολέμιον ἔχοντες ἡγεμόνα, τὸν τὰ κατὰ
-  τὴν πόλιν ἱερὰ σεσυληκότα;
-
-  c. 69. Διόπερ ἕτερον ἡγεμόνα ζητητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὸν σεσυληκότα
-  τοὺς τῶν θεῶν ναοὺς στρατηγὸν ἔχοντες ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ θεομαχῶμεν....
-
-“If the conduct of Dionysius towards Syracuse has been thus infamous,
-it has been no better towards the Sicilian Greeks generally.
-He betrayed Gela and Kamarina, for his own purposes, to the
-Carthaginians. He suffered Messênê to fall into their hands without
-the least help. He reduced to slavery, by gross treachery, our
-Grecian brethren and neighbors of Naxus and Katana; transferring the
-latter to the non-Hellenic Campanians, and destroying the former.
-He might have attacked the Carthaginians immediately after their
-landing from Africa at Panormus, before they had recovered from the
-fatigue of the voyage. He might have fought the recent naval combat
-near the port of Katana, instead of near the beach north of that
-town; so as to ensure to our fleet, if worsted, an easy and sure
-retreat. Had he chosen to keep his land-force on the spot, he might
-have prevented the victorious Carthaginian fleet from approaching
-land, when the storm came on shortly after the battle; or he might
-have attacked them, if they tried to land, at the greatest advantage.
-He has conducted the war, altogether, with disgraceful incompetence;
-not wishing sincerely, indeed, to get rid of them as enemies, but
-preserving the terrors of Carthage, as an indirect engine to keep
-Syracuse in subjection to himself. As long as we fought with him,
-we have been constantly unsuccessful; now that we have come to
-fight without him, recent experience tells us that we can beat the
-Carthaginians, even with inferior numbers.
-
-“Let us look out for another leader (concluded Theodôrus), in place
-of a sacrilegious temple-robber whom the gods have now abandoned. If
-Dionysius will consent to relinquish his dominion, let him retire
-from the city with his property unmolested; if he will not, we are
-here all assembled, we are possessed of our arms, and we have both
-Italian and Peloponnesian allies by our side. The assembly will
-determine whether it will choose leaders from our own citizens,—or
-from our metropolis Corinth,—or from the Spartans, the presidents of
-all Greece.”
-
-Such are the main points of the long harangue ascribed to Theodôrus;
-the first occasion, for many years, on which the voice of free speech
-had been heard publicly in Syracuse. Among the charges advanced
-against Dionysius, which go to impeach his manner of carrying on
-the war against the Carthaginians, there are several which we can
-neither admit nor reject, from our insufficient knowledge of the
-facts. But the enormities ascribed to him in his dealing with the
-Syracusans,—the fraud, violence, spoliation, and bloodshed, whereby
-he had first acquired, and afterwards upheld, his dominion over
-them,—these are assertions of matters of fact, which coincide in the
-main with the previous narrative of Diodorus, and which we have no
-ground for contesting.
-
-Hailed by the assembly with great sympathy and acclamation, this
-harangue seriously alarmed Dionysius. In his concluding words,
-Theodôrus had invoked the protection of Corinth as well as of Sparta,
-against the despot, whom with such signal courage he had thus
-ventured publicly to arraign. Corinthians as well as Spartans were
-now lending aid in the defence, under the command of Pharakidas.
-That Spartan officer came forward to speak next after Theodôrus.
-Among various other sentiments of traditional respect towards
-Sparta, there still prevailed a remnant of the belief that she was
-adverse to despots; as she really had once been, at an earlier
-period of her history.[1067] Hence the Syracusans hoped, and even
-expected, that Pharakidas would second the protest of Theodôrus, and
-stand forward as champion of freedom to the first Grecian city in
-Sicily.[1068] Bitterly indeed were they disappointed. Dionysius had
-established with Pharakidas relations as friendly as those of the
-Thirty tyrants at Athens with Kallibius the Lacedæmonian harmost in
-the acropolis.[1069] Accordingly Pharakidas in his speech not only
-discountenanced the proposition just made, but declared himself
-emphatically in favor of the despot; intimating that he had been sent
-to aid the Syracusans and Dionysius against the Carthaginians,—not
-to put down the dominion of Dionysius. To the Syracusans this
-declaration was a denial of all hope. They saw plainly that in
-any attempt to emancipate themselves, they would have against
-them not merely the mercenaries of Dionysius, but also the whole
-force of Sparta, then imperial and omnipotent; represented on the
-present occasion by Pharakidas, as it had been in a previous year
-by Aristus. They were condemned to bear their chains in silence,
-not without unavailing curses against Sparta. Meanwhile Dionysius,
-thus powerfully sustained, was enabled to ride over the perilous
-and critical juncture. His mercenaries crowded in haste around his
-person,—having probably been sent for, as soon as the voice of a
-free spokesman was heard.[1070] And he was thus enabled to dismiss
-an assembly, which had seemed for one short instant to threaten the
-perpetuity of his dominion, and to promise emancipation for Syracuse.
-
-  [1067] Thucyd. i, 18; Herodot. v, 92.
-
-  [1068] Diodor. xiv, 70. Τοιούτοις τοῦ Θεοδώρου χρησαμένου λόγοις,
-  οἱ μὲν Συρακούσιοι μετέωροι ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγένοντο, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς
-  συμμάχους ἀπέβλεπον. Φαρακίδου δὲ τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίου ναυαρχοῦντος
-  τῶν συμμάχων, καὶ παρελθόντος ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα, πάντες προσεδόκων
-  ἀρχηγὸν ἔσεσθαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας.
-
-  [1069] Diodor. xiv, 70. Ὁ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸν τύραννον ἔχων οἰκείως,
-  etc.; compare Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 14.
-
-  [1070] Diodor. xiv, 70. Παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσδοκίαν γενομένης τῆς
-  ἀποφάσεως, οἱ μὲν μισθόφοροι συνέδραμον πρὸς τὸν Διονύσιον,
-  οἱ δὲ Συρακούσιοι καταπλαγέντες τὴν ἡσυχίαν, εἶχον, πολλὰ
-  τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις καταρώμενοι. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ πρότερον Ἀρέτης ὁ
-  Λακεδαιμόνιος (he is called previously _Aristus_, xiv, 10),
-  ἀντιλαμβανομένων αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας, ἐγένετο προδότης· καὶ τότε
-  Φαρακίδας ἐνέστη ταῖς ὁρμαῖς τῶν Συρακουσίων.
-
-During this interesting and momentous scene, the fate of Syracuse
-had hung upon the decision of Pharakidas: for Theodôrus, well aware
-that with a besieging enemy before the gates, the city could not be
-left without a supreme authority, had conjured the Spartan commander,
-with his Lacedæmonian and Corinthian allies, to take into his own
-hands the control and organization of the popular force. There can
-be little doubt that Pharakidas could have done this, if he had been
-so disposed, so as at once to make head against the Carthaginians
-without, and to restrain, if not to put down, the despotism within.
-Instead of undertaking the tutelary intervention solicited by the
-people, he threw himself into the opposite scale, and strengthened
-Dionysius more than ever, at the moment of his greatest peril.
-The proceeding of Pharakidas was doubtless conformable to his
-instructions from home, as well as to the oppressive and crushing
-policy which Sparta, in these days of her unresisted empire (between
-the victory of Ægospotami and the defeat of Knidus), pursued
-throughout the Grecian world.
-
-Dionysius was fully sensible of the danger which he had thus been
-assisted to escape. Under the first impressions of alarm, he strove
-to gain something like popularity; by a conciliatory language and
-demeanor, by presents adroitly distributed, and by invitations to
-his table. Whatever may have been the success of such artifices, the
-lucky turn, which the siege was now taking, was the most powerful of
-all aids for building up his full power anew.
-
-It was not the arms of the Syracusans, but the wrath of Demeter and
-Persephonê, whose temple (in the suburb of Achradina) Imilkon had
-pillaged, that ruined the besieging army before Syracuse. So the
-piety of the citizens interpreted that terrific pestilence which
-now began to rage among the multitude of their enemies without. The
-divine wrath was indeed seconded (as the historian informs us[1071])
-by physical causes of no ordinary severity. The vast numbers of
-the host were closely packed together; it was now the beginning
-of autumn, the most unhealthy period of the year; moreover this
-summer had been preternaturally hot, and the low marshy ground
-near the Great Harbor, under the chill of morning contrasted with
-the burning sun of noon, was the constant source of fever and
-pestilence. These unseen and irresistible enemies fell with appalling
-force upon the troops of Imilkon; especially upon the Libyans, or
-native Africans, who were found the most susceptible. The intense
-and varied bodily sufferings of this distemper,—the rapidity with
-which it spread from man to man,—and the countless victims which it
-speedily accumulated,—appear to have equalled, if not surpassed,
-the worst days of the pestilence of Athens in 429 B.C. Care and
-attendance upon the sick, or even interment of the dead, became
-impracticable; so that the whole camp presented a scene of deplorable
-agony, aggravated by the horrors and stench of one hundred and
-fifty thousand unburied bodies.[1072] The military strength of the
-Carthaginians was completely prostrated by such a visitation. Far
-from being able to make progress in the siege, they were not even
-able to defend themselves against moderate energy on the part of the
-Syracusans; who (like the Peloponnesians during the great plague of
-Athens) were themselves untouched by the distemper.[1073]
-
-  [1071] Diodor. xiv, 70. Συνεπελάβετο δὲ καὶ τῇ τοῦ δαιμονίου
-  συμφορᾷ τὸ μυριάδας εἰς ταὐτὸ συναθροισθῆναι, καὶ τὸ τῆς ὥρας
-  εἶναι πρὸς τὰς νόσους ἐνεργότατον, etc.
-
-  [1072] Diodor. xiv, 71-76. πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδας ἐπεῖδον ἀτάφους
-  διὰ τὸν λοιμὸν σεσωρευμένους.
-
-  I give the figure as I find it, without pretending to trust it as
-  anything more than an indication of a great number.
-
-  [1073] Thucyd. ii, 54.
-
-  When the Roman general Marcellus was besieging Syracuse in 212
-  B.C., a terrific pestilence, generated by causes similar to
-  that of this year, broke out. All parties, Romans, Syracusans,
-  and Carthaginians, suffered from it considerably; but the
-  Carthaginians worst of all; they are said to have all perished
-  (Livy, xxv, 26).
-
-Such was the wretched spectacle of the Carthaginian army, clearly
-visible from the walls of Syracuse. To overthrow it by a vigorous
-attack, was an enterprise not difficult; indeed, so sure, in the
-opinion of Dionysius, that in organizing his plan of operation, he
-made it the means of deliberately getting rid of some troops in the
-city who had become inconvenient to him. Concerting measures for a
-simultaneous assault upon the Carthaginian station both by sea and
-land, he entrusted eighty ships of war to Pharakidas and Leptines,
-with orders to move at daybreak; while he himself conducted a body
-of troops out of the city, during the darkness of night; issuing
-forth by Epipolæ and Euryalus (as Gylippus had formerly done when he
-surprised Plemmyrium[1074]), and making a circuit until he came, on
-the other side of the Anapus, to the temple of Kyanê; thus getting on
-the land-side or south-west of the Carthaginian position. He first
-despatched his horsemen, together with a regiment of one thousand
-mercenary foot-soldiers, to commence the attack. These latter troops
-had become peculiarly obnoxious to him, having several times engaged
-in revolt and disturbance. Accordingly, while he now ordered them
-up to the assault in conjunction with the horse, he at the same
-time gave secret directions to the horse, to desert their comrades
-and take flight. Both his orders were obeyed. The onset having been
-made jointly, in the heat of combat the horsemen fled, leaving their
-comrades all to be cut to pieces by the Carthaginians.[1075] We have
-as yet heard nothing about difficulties arising to Dionysius from
-his mercenary troops, on whose arms his dominion rested; and what we
-are here told is enough merely to raise curiosity without satisfying
-it. These men are said to have been mutinous and disaffected; a
-fact, which explains, if it does not extenuate, the gross perfidy of
-deliberately inveigling them to destruction, while he still professed
-to keep them under his command.
-
-  [1074] Thucyd. vii, 22, 23.
-
-  [1075] Diodor. xiv, 72. Οὗτοι δ’ ἦσαν οἱ μισθόφοροι τῷ Διονυσίῳ
-  παρὰ πάντας ἀλλοτριώτατοι, καὶ πλεονάκις ἀποστάσεις καὶ ταραχὰς
-  ποιοῦντες. Διόπερ ὁ μὲν Διονύσιος τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν ἦν παρηγγελκὼς,
-  ὅταν ἐξάπτωνται τῶν πολεμίων, φεύγειν, καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους
-  ἐγκαταλιπεῖν· ὧν ποιησάντων τὸ προσταχθὲν, οὗτοι μὲν ἅπαντες
-  κατεκόπησαν.
-
-In the actual state of the Carthaginian army, Dionysius could afford
-to make them a present of this obnoxious division. His own attack,
-first upon the fort of Polichnê, next upon that near the naval
-station at Daskon, was conducted with spirit and success. While the
-defenders, thinned and enfeebled by the pestilence, were striving
-to repel him on the land-side, the Syracusan fleet came forth from
-its docks in excellent spirits and order to attack the ships at the
-station. These Carthaginian ships, though afloat and moored, were
-very imperfectly manned. Before the crews could get aboard to put
-them on their defence, the Syracusan triremes and quinqueremes,
-ably rowed and with their brazen beaks well directed, drove against
-them on the quarter or midships, and broke through the line of
-their timbers. The crash of such impact was heard afar off, and the
-best ships were thus speedily disabled.[1076] Following up their
-success, the Syracusans jumped aboard, overpowered the crews, or
-forced them to seek safety as they could in flight. The distracted
-Carthaginians being thus pressed at the same time by sea and by land,
-the soldiers of Dionysius from the land-side forced their way through
-the entrenchment to the shore, where forty pentekonters were hauled
-up, while immediately near them were moored both merchantmen and
-triremes. The assailants set fire to the pentekonters; upon which the
-flames, rapidly spreading under a strong wind, communicated presently
-to all the merchantmen and triremes adjacent. Unable to arrest this
-terrific conflagration, the crews were obliged to leap overboard;
-while the vessels, severed from their moorings by the burning of the
-cables, drifted against each other under the wind, until the naval
-station at Daskon became one scene of ruin.
-
-  [1076] Diodor. xiv, 72. Πάντη δὲ τῶν ἐξοχωτάτων νεῶν θραυομένων,
-  αἱ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐμβόλων ἀναῤῥηττόμεναι λακίδες ἐξαίσιον ἐποιοῦντο
-  ψόφον, etc.
-
-Such a volume of flame, though destroying the naval resources of the
-Carthaginians, must at the same time have driven off the assailing
-Syracusan ships of war, and probably also the assailants by land.
-But to those who contemplated it from the city of Syracuse, across
-the breadth of the Great Harbor, it presented a spectacle grand and
-stimulating in the highest degree; especially when the fire was seen
-towering aloft amidst the masts, yards, and sails of the merchantmen.
-The walls of the city were crowded with spectators, women, children,
-and aged men, testifying their exultation by loud shouts, and
-stretching their hands to heaven,—as on the memorable day, near
-twenty years before, when they gained their final victory in the
-same harbor, over the Athenian fleet. Many lads and elders, too much
-excited to remain stationary, rushed into such small craft as they
-could find, and rowed across the harbor to the scene of action, where
-they rendered much service by preserving part of the cargoes, and
-towing away some of the enemy’s vessels deserted but not yet on fire.
-The evening of this memorable day left Dionysius and the Syracusans
-victorious by land as well as by sea; encamped near the temple of
-Olympian Zeus which had so recently been occupied by Imilkon. Though
-they had succeeded in forcing the defences of the latter both at
-Polichnê and at Daskon, and in inflicting upon him a destructive
-defeat, yet they would not aim at occupying his camp, in its infected
-and deplorable condition.
-
-On two former occasions during the last few years, we have seen the
-Carthaginian armies decimated by pestilence,—near Agrigentum and near
-Gela,—previous to this last and worst calamity. Imilkon, copying the
-weakness of Nikias rather than the resolute prudence of Demosthenes,
-had clung to his insalubrious camp near the Great Harbor, long
-after all hope of reducing Syracuse had ceased, and while suffering
-and death to the most awful extent were daily accumulating around
-him. But the recent defeat satisfied even him that his position
-was no longer tenable. Retreat was indispensable; yet nowise
-impracticable,—with the brave men, Iberians and others, in his army,
-and with the Sikels of the interior on his side,—had he possessed the
-good qualities as well as the defects of Nikias, or been capable of
-anything like that unconquerable energy which ennobled the closing
-days of the latter. Instead of taking the best measures available for
-a retiring march, Imilkon despatched a secret envoy to Dionysius,
-unknown to the Syracusans generally; tendering to him the sum of
-three hundred talents which yet remained in the camp, on condition
-of the fleet and army being allowed to sail to Africa unmolested.
-Dionysius would not consent, nor would the Syracusans have confirmed
-any such consent, to let them all escape; but he engaged to permit
-the departure of Imilkon himself with the native Carthaginians. The
-sum of three hundred talents was accordingly sent across by night to
-Ortygia; and the fourth night ensuing was fixed for the departure of
-Imilkon and his Carthaginians, without opposition from Dionysius.
-During that night forty of their ships, filled with Carthaginians,
-put to sea and sailed in silence out of the harbor. Their stealthy
-flight, however, did not altogether escape the notice of the
-Corinthian seamen in Syracuse; who not only apprised Dionysius, but
-also manned some of their own ships and started in pursuit. They
-overtook and destroyed one or two of the slowest sailers; but all the
-rest with Imilkon himself, accomplished their flight to Carthage.
-
-Dionysius,—while he affected to obey the warning of the Corinthians,
-with movements intentionally tardy and unavailing,—applied himself
-with earnest activity to act against the forsaken army remaining.
-During the same night he led out his troops from the city to the
-vicinity of their camp. The flight of Imilkon speedily promulgated,
-had filled the whole army with astonishment and consternation. No
-command,—no common cause,—no bond of union,—now remained among this
-miscellaneous host, already prostrated by previous misfortune. The
-Sikels in the army, being near to their own territory and knowing the
-roads, retired at once, before daybreak, and reached their homes.
-Scarcely had they passed, when the Syracusan soldiers occupied the
-roads, and barred the like escape to others. Amidst the general
-dispersion of the abandoned soldiers, some perished in vain attempts
-to force the passes, others threw down their arms and solicited
-mercy. The Iberians alone, maintaining their arms and order with
-unshaken resolution, sent to Dionysius propositions to transfer to
-him their service; which he thought proper to accept, enrolling them
-among his mercenaries. All the remaining host, principally Libyans,
-being stripped and plundered by his soldiers, became his captives,
-and were probably sold as slaves.[1077]
-
-  [1077] Diodor. xiv, 75.
-
-The heroic efforts of Nikias, to open for his army a retreat in
-the face of desperate obstacles, had ended in a speedy death as
-prisoner at Syracuse,—yet without anything worse than the usual fate
-of prisoners of war. But the base treason of Imilkon, though he
-insured a safe retreat home by betraying the larger portion of his
-army, earned for him only a short prolongation of life amidst the
-extreme of ignominy and remorse. When he landed at Carthage with the
-fraction of his army preserved, the city was in the deepest distress.
-Countless family losses, inflicted by the pestilence, added a keener
-sting to the unexampled public loss and humiliation now fully made
-known. Universal mourning prevailed; all public and private business
-was suspended, all the temples were shut, while the authorities and
-the citizens met Imilkon in sad procession on the shore. The defeated
-commander strove to disarm their wrath, by every demonstration of
-a broken and prostrate spirit. Clothed in the sordid garment of a
-slave, he acknowledged himself as the cause of all the ruin, by his
-impiety towards the gods; for it was they, and not the Syracusans,
-who had been his real enemies and conquerors. He visited all the
-temples, with words of atonement and supplication,—replied to all the
-inquiries about relatives who had perished under the distemper,—and
-then retiring, blocked up the doors of his house, where he starved
-himself to death.
-
-But the season of misfortune to Carthage was not closed by his
-decease. Her dominion over her Libyan subjects was always harsh
-and unpopular, rendering them disposed to rise against her at any
-moment of calamity. Her recent disaster in Sicily would have been
-in itself perhaps sufficient to stimulate them into insurrection;
-but its effect was aggravated by their resentment for the deliberate
-betrayal of their troops serving under Imilkon, not one of whom lived
-to come back. All the various Libyan subject towns had on this matter
-one common feeling of indignation; all came together in congress,
-agreed to unite their forces, and formed an army which is said to
-have reached one hundred and twenty thousand men. They established
-their head-quarters at Tunês (Tunis), a town within a short distance
-of Carthage itself, and were for a certain time so much stronger in
-the field, that the Carthaginians were obliged to remain within their
-walls. For a moment it seemed as if the star of this great commercial
-city was about to set for ever. The Carthaginians themselves were
-in the depth of despondency, believing themselves to be under the
-wrath of the goddesses Demeter and her daughter Persephonê; who, not
-content with the terrible revenge already taken in Sicily, for the
-sacrilege committed by Imilkon, were still pursuing them into Africa.
-Under the extreme religious terror which beset the city, every means
-were tried to appease the offended goddesses. Had it been supposed
-that the Carthaginian gods had been insulted, expiation would have
-been offered by the sacrifice of human victims,—and those too the
-most precious, such as beautiful captives, or children of conspicuous
-citizens. But on this occasion, the insult had been offered to
-Grecian gods, and atonement was to be made according to the milder
-ceremonies of Greece. The Carthaginians had never yet instituted in
-their city any worship of Demeter or Persephonê; they now established
-temples in honor of these goddesses, appointed several of their most
-eminent citizens to be priests, and consulted the Greeks resident
-among them, as to the form of worship most suitable to be offered.
-After having done this, and cleared their own consciences, they
-devoted themselves to the preparation of ships and men for the
-purpose of carrying on the war. It was soon found that Demeter and
-Persephonê were not implacable, and that the fortune of Carthage was
-returning. The insurgents, though at first irresistible, presently
-fell into discord among themselves about the command. Having no
-fleet, they became straitened for want of provisions, while Carthage
-was well supplied by sea from Sardinia. From these and similar
-causes, their numerous host gradually melted away, and rescued the
-Carthaginians from alarm at the point where they were always weakest.
-The relations of command and submission, between Carthage and her
-Libyan subjects, were established as they had previously stood,
-leaving her to recover slowly from her disastrous reverses.[1078]
-
-  [1078] Diodor. xiv, 77.
-
-But though the power of Carthage in Africa was thus restored, in
-Sicily it was reduced to the lowest ebb. It was long before she
-could again make head with effect against Dionysius, who was left
-at liberty to push his conquests in another direction, against the
-Italiot Greeks. The remaining operations of his reign,—successful
-against the Italiots, unsuccessful against Carthage,—will come to be
-recounted in my next succeeding chapter and volume.
-
-
-
-
-
-End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of History of Greece, Volume 10 (of 12), by 
-George Grote
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-Title: History of Greece, Volume 10 (of 12)
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-Author: George Grote
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-*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF GREECE, VOLUME 10 OF 12 ***
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-
-
-<div class="front">
-  <p><a href="#tnote">Transcriber's note</a></p>
-  <p><a href="#ToC">Table of Contents</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="screenonly">
-  <div class="figcenter">
-    <img src="images/cover.jpg"
-         alt="Book cover" />
-  </div>
-</div>
-
-<div class="tit">
-  <hr class="chap" />
-
-  <h1>HISTORY OF GREECE</h1>
-
-  <p class="xl p2"><small>BY</small><br />
-  GEORGE GROTE, <span class="smcap">Esq.</span></p>
-
-  <p class="large p2">VOL. X.</p>
-
-  <p class="xs p4">REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION.</p>
-
-  <p class="medium p2">NEW YORK:<br />
-  HARPER &amp; BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,<br />
-  <span class="small">329 <small>AND</small> 331 <small>PEARL STREET.</small></span></p>
-
-  <hr class="chap" />
-</div>
-
-
-<div class="chapter">
-  <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iii">[p. iii]</span></p>
-  <h2 class="nobreak">PREFACE TO VOL. X.</h2>
-</div>
-
-<p class="large noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span> present
-Volume is already extended to an unusual number of pages; yet I have
-been compelled to close it at an inconvenient moment, midway in the
-reign of the Syracusan despot Dionysius. To carry that reign to its
-close, one more chapter will be required, which must be reserved for
-the succeeding volume.</p>
-
-<p class="large">The history of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks,
-forming as it does a stream essentially distinct from that of the
-Peloponnesians, Athenians, etc., is peculiarly interesting during
-the interval between 409 <small>B.C.</small> (the date of the
-second Carthaginian invasion) and the death of Timoleon in 336
-<small>B.C.</small> It is, moreover, reported to us by authors
-(Diodorus and Plutarch), who, though not themselves very judicious
-as selectors, had before them good contemporary witnesses. And it
-includes some of the most prominent and impressive characters of the
-Hellenic world,—Dionysius I., Dion with Plato as instructor, and
-Timoleon.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iv">[p. iv]</span></p>
-
-<p class="large">I thought it indispensable to give adequate
-development to this important period of Grecian history, even at the
-cost of that inconvenient break which terminates my tenth volume. At
-one time I had hoped to comprise in that volume not only the full
-history of Dionysius I., but also that of Dionysius II. and Dion—and
-that of Timoleon besides. Three new chapters, including all this
-additional matter, are already composed and ready. But the bulk of
-the present volume compels me to reserve them for the commencement
-of my next, which will carry Grecian history down to the battle of
-Chæroneia and the death of Philip of Macedon—and which will, I trust,
-appear without any long interval of time.</p>
-
-<p class="large goright">G. G.</p>
-
-<p class="large"><span class="smcap">London, Feb. 15, 1852.</span></p>
-
-<hr class="chap" />
-
-
-<div class="chapter" id="ToC">
-  <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_v">[p. v]</span></p>
-  <h2>CONTENTS.<br />
-  <span class="large">VOL. X.</span></h2>
-  <hr class="sep2" />
-  <p class="xl center">PART II.</p>
-  <p class="large center">CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.</p>
-  <hr class="sep2" />
-</div>
-
-<div class="contents">
-
-<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXVI.</p>
-<p class="small center">FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS DOWN TO THE SUBJUGATION OF
-OLYNTHUS BY SPARTA.</p>
-
-<p class="p1">Peace or convention of Antalkidas. Its import and
-character. Separate partnership between Sparta and Persia. —
-Degradation in the form of the convention — an edict drawn up,
-issued, and enforced, by Persia upon Greece. — Gradual loss of
-Pan-hellenic dignity, and increased submission towards Persia as a
-means of purchasing Persian help — on the part of Sparta. — Her first
-application before the Peloponnesian war; subsequent applications. —
-Active partnership between Sparta and Persia against Athens, after
-the Athenian catastrophe at Syracuse. Athens is ready to follow her
-example. — The Persian force aids Athens against Sparta, and breaks
-up her maritime empire. — No excuse for the subservience of Sparta to
-the Persians. Evidence that Hellenic independence was not destined
-to last much longer. — Promise of universal autonomy — popular to
-the Grecian ear — how carried out. — The Spartans never intended to
-grant, nor ever really granted, general autonomy. — Immediate point
-made against Corinth and Thebes — isolation of Athens. — Persian
-affairs — unavailing efforts of the Great King to reconquer Egypt.
-— Evagoras, despot of Salamis in Cyprus. — Descent of Evagoras
-— condition of the island of Cyprus. — Greek princes of Salamis
-are dispossessed by a Phœnician dynasty. — Evagoras dethrones the
-Phœnician, and becomes despot of Salamis. — Able and beneficent
-government of Evagoras. — His anxiety to revive Hellenism in Cyprus
-— he looks to the aid of Athens. — Relations of Evagoras with Athens
-during the closing years of the Peloponnesian war. — Evagoras at
-war with the Persians — he receives aid both from Athens and from
-Egypt — he is at first very successful, so as even to capture Tyre.
-— Struggle of Evagoras against the whole force of the Persian empire
-after the peace of Antalkidas. — Evagoras, after a ten years’ war,
-is reduced, but obtains an honorable peace, mainly owing to the
-dispute between the two satraps jointly commanding. — Assassination
-of Evagoras, as well as of his son Pnytagoras, by an eunuch slave of
-Nikokreon. — Nikoklês, son of Evagoras, becomes despot of Salamis.
-Great power gained by Sparta through the peace of Antalkidas. She
-becomes practically mistress of Corinth, and the Corinthian isthmus.
-Miso-Theban tendencies of Sparta — especially of Agesilaus. — The
-Spartans restore Platæa. Former conduct of Sparta towards Platæa. —
-Motives of Sparta in restoring Platæa. A politic step, as likely to
-sever Thebes from Athens. — Platæa becomes a dependency and outpost
-of Sparta. Main object of Sparta to prevent the reconstitution of
-the Bœotiad federation — Spartan policy at this time directed by the
-partisan spirit of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_vi">[p. vi]</span>
-Agesilaus, opposed by his colleague Agesipolis. — Oppressive behavior
-of the Spartans towards Mantinea. They require the walls of the
-city to be demolished. — Agesipolis blockades the city, and forces
-it to surrender, by damming up the river Ophis. The Mantineans are
-forced to break up their city into villages. — Democratical leaders
-of Mantinea — owed their lives to the mediation of the exiled king
-Pausanias. — Mantinea is pulled down and distributed into five
-villages. — High-handed despotism of Sparta towards Mantinea — signal
-partiality of Xenophon. Return of the philo-Laconian exiles in the
-various cities, as partisans for the purposes of Sparta — case of
-Phlius. — Competition of Athens with Sparta for ascendency at sea.
-Athens gains ground, and gets together some rudiments of a maritime
-confederacy. — Ideas entertained by some of the Spartan leaders, of
-acting against the Persians for the rescue of the Asiatic Greeks.
-— Panegyrical Discourse of Isokrates. — State of Macedonia and
-Chalkidikê — growth of Macedonian power during the last years of the
-Peloponnesian war. — Perdikkas and Archelaus — energy and ability
-of the latter. — Contrast of Macedonia and Athens. — Succeeding
-Macedonian kings — Orestes, Æropus, Pausanias, Amyntas. Assassination
-frequent. — Amyntas is expelled from Macedonia by the Illyrians.
-— Chalkidians of Olynthus — they take into their protection the
-Macedonian cities on the coast, when Amyntas runs away before the
-Illyrians. Commencement of the Olynthian confederacy. — Equal and
-liberal principles on which the confederacy was framed from the
-beginning. Accepted willingly by the Macedonian and Greco-Macedonian
-cities. — The Olynthians extend their confederacy among the Grecian
-cities in Chalkidic Thrace — their liberal procedure — several
-cities join. — Akanthus and Apollonia resist the proposition.
-Olynthus menaces. They then solicit Spartan intervention against
-her. — Speech of Kleigenes the Akanthian envoy at Sparta. — Envoys
-from Amyntas at Sparta. — The Spartan Eudamidas is sent against
-Olynthus at once, with such force as could be got ready. He checks
-the career of the Olynthians. — Phœbidas, brother of Eudamidas,
-remains behind to collect fresh force, and march to join his brother
-in Thrace. He passes through the Theban territory and near Thebes.
-— Conspiracy of Leontiades and the philo-Laconian party in Thebes,
-to betray the town and citadel to Phœbidas. — The opposing leaders
-— Leontiades and Ismenias — were both Polemarchs. — Leontiades
-overawes the Senate, and arrests Ismenias: Pelopidas and the leading
-friends of Ismenias go into exile. — Phœbidas in the Kadmeia —
-terror and submission at Thebes. — Mixed feelings at Sparta — great
-importance of the acquisition to Spartan interests. — Displeasure
-at Sparta more pretended than real, against Phœbidas; Agesilaus
-defends him. — Leontiades at Sparta — his humble protestations
-and assurances — the ephors decide that they will retain the
-Kadmeia, but at the same time fine Phœbidas. — The Lacedæmonians
-cause Ismenias to be tried and put to death. Iniquity of this
-proceeding. — Vigorous action of the Spartans against Olynthus —
-Teleutias is sent there with a large force, including a considerable
-Theban contingent. Derdas coöperates with him. — Teleutias being
-at first successful, and having become over-confident, sustains a
-terrible defeat from the Olynthians under the walls of their city.
-— Agesipolis is sent to Olynthus from Sparta with a reinforcement.
-He dies of a fever. — Polybiades succeeds Agesipolis as commander
-— he reduces Olynthus to submission — extinction of the Olynthian
-federation. Olynthus and the other cities are enrolled as allies
-of Sparta. — Intervention of Sparta with the government of Phlius.
-— Agesilaus marches an army against Phlius — reduces the town by
-blockade, after a long resistance. The Lacedæmonians occupy <span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_vii">[p. vii]</span>the acropolis, naming
-a council of one hundred as governors.</p>
-<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_76">1-72</a></p>
-
-
-<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXVII.</p>
-<p class="small center">FROM THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY THE LACEDÆMONIANS
-DOWN TO THE CONGRESS AT SPARTA, AND PARTIAL PEACE, IN 371
-<small>B.C.</small></p>
-
-<p class="p1">Great ascendency of Sparta on land in 379
-<small>B.C.</small> — Sparta is now feared as the great despot of
-Greece. — Strong complaint of the rhetor Lysias, expressed at the
-Olympic festival of 384 <small>B.C.</small> — Panegyrical oration of
-Isokrates. — Censure upon Sparta pronounced by the philo-Laconian
-Xenophon. — His manner of marking the point of transition in his
-history — from Spartan glory to Spartan disgrace. — Thebes under
-Leontiades and the philo-Spartan oligarchy, with the Spartan garrison
-in the Kadmeia — oppressive and tyrannical government. — Discontent
-at Thebes, though under compression. Theban exiles at Athens. — The
-Theban exiles at Athens, after waiting some time in hopes of a rising
-at Thebes, resolve to begin a movement themselves. — Pelopidas takes
-the lead — he, with Mellon and five other exiles, undertakes the task
-of destroying the rulers of Thebes. Coöperation of Phyllidas the
-secretary, and Charon at Thebes. — Plans of Phyllidas for admitting
-the conspirators into Thebes and the government-house — he invites
-the polemarchs to a banquet. — The scheme very nearly frustrated
-— accident which prevented Chlidon from delivering his message. —
-Pelopidas and Mellon get secretly into Thebes, and conceal themselves
-in the house of Charon. — Leontiades and Hypates are slain in their
-houses. — Phyllidas opens the prison, and sets free the prisoners.
-Epaminondas and many other citizens appear in arms. — Universal joy
-among the citizens on the ensuing morning, when the event was known.
-General assembly in the market-place — Pelopidas, Mellon, and Charon
-are named the first Bœotarchs. — Aid to the conspirators from private
-sympathizers in Attica. — Pelopidas and the Thebans prepare to storm
-the Kadmeia — the Lacedæmonian garrison capitulate and are dismissed
-— several of the oligarchical Thebans are put to death in trying to
-go away along with them. The harmost who surrendered the Kadmeia
-is put to death by the Spartans. — Powerful sensation produced by
-this incident throughout the Grecian world. — Indignation in Sparta
-at the revolution of Thebes — a Spartan army sent forth at once
-under king Kleombrotus. He retires from Bœotia without achieving
-anything. — Kleombrotus passes by the Athenian frontier — alarm at
-Athens — condemnation of the two Athenian generals who had favored
-the enterprise of Pelopidas. — Attempt of Sphodrias from Thespiæ
-to surprise the Peiræus by a night-march. He fails. — Different
-constructions put upon this attempt and upon the character of
-Sphodrias. — The Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens seized, but dismissed.
-— Trial of Sphodrias at Sparta; acquitted through the private favor
-and sympathies of Agesilaus. — Comparison of Spartan with Athenian
-procedure. — The Athenians declare war against Sparta, and contract
-alliance with Thebes. — Exertions of Athens to form a new maritime
-confederacy, like the Confederacy of Delos. Thebes enrolls herself as
-a member. — Athens sends round envoys to the islands in the Ægean.
-Liberal principles on which the new confederacy is formed. — Envoys
-sent round by Athens — Chabrias, Timotheus, Kallistratus. — Service
-of Iphikrates in Thrace after the peace of Antalkidas. He marries
-the daughter of the Thracian prince Kotys, and acquires possession
-of a Thracian seaport, Drys. — Timotheus and Kallistratus. — Synod
-of the new confederates assembled at Athens — votes for war on a
-large scale. — Members of the confederacy were at first willing
-and harmonious — a fleet is equipped. — New property-tax imposed
-at Athens. The Solonian<span class="pagenum" id="Page_viii">[p.
-viii]</span> census. — The Solonian census retained in the main,
-though with modifications, at the restoration under the archonship of
-Eukleides in 403 <small>B.C.</small> — Archonship of Nausinikus in
-378 <small>B.C.</small> — New census and schedule then introduced, of
-all citizens worth twenty minæ and upwards, distributed into classes,
-and entered for a fraction of their total property; each class for
-a different fraction. — All metics, worth more than twenty-five
-minæ, were registered in the schedule; all in one class, each man
-for one-sixth of his property. Aggregate schedule. — The Symmories —
-containing the twelve hundred wealthiest citizens — the three hundred
-wealthiest leaders of the Symmories. — Citizens not wealthy enough
-to be included in the Symmories, yet still entered in the schedule,
-and liable to property-tax. Purpose of the Symmories — extension of
-the principle to the trierarchy. — Enthusiasm at Thebes in defence
-of the new government and against Sparta. Military training — the
-Sacred Band. — Epaminondas. — His previous character and training —
-musical and intellectual, as well as gymnastic. Conversation with
-philosophers, Sokratic as well as Pythagorean. — His eloquence
-— his unambitious disposition — gentleness of his political
-resentments. — Conduct of Epaminondas at the Theban revolution of
-379 <small>B.C.</small> — he acquires influence, through Pelopidas,
-in the military organization of the city. — Agesilaus marches to
-attack Thebes with the full force of the Spartan confederacy — good
-system of defence adopted by Thebes — aid from Athens under Chabrias.
-Increase of the Theban strength in Bœotia, against the philo-Spartan
-oligarchies in the Bœotian cities. — Second expedition of Agesilaus
-into Bœotia — he gains no decisive advantage. The Thebans acquire
-greater and greater strength. Agesilaus retires — he is disabled
-by a hurt in the leg. — Kleombrotus conducts the Spartan force to
-invade Bœotia. — He retires without reaching Bœotia. — Resolution
-of Sparta to equip a large fleet, under the admiral Pollis. The
-Athenians send out a fleet under Chabrias — Victory of Chabrias at
-sea near Naxos. Recollections of the battle of Arginusæ. — Extension
-of the Athenian maritime confederacy, in consequence of the victory
-at Naxos. — Circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by Timotheus with an
-Athenian fleet — his victory over the Lacedæmonian fleet — his
-success in extending the Athenian confederacy — his just dealing.
-— Financial difficulties of Athens. — She becomes jealous of the
-growing strength of Thebes — steady and victorious progress of Thebes
-in Bœotia. — Victory of Pelopidas at Tegyra over the Lacedæmonians.
-— The Thebans expel the Lacedæmonians out of all Bœotia, except
-Orchomenus — they reorganize the Bœotian federation. — They invade
-Phokis — Kleombrotus is sent thither with an army for defence —
-Athens makes a separate peace with the Lacedæmonians. — Jason of
-Pheræ — his energetic character and formidable power. — His prudent
-dealing with Polydamas. — The Lacedæmonians find themselves unable to
-spare any aid for Thessaly — they dismiss Polydamas with a refusal.
-He comes to terms with Jason, who becomes Tagus of Thessaly. —
-Peace between Athens and Sparta — broken off almost immediately.
-The Lacedæmonians declare war again, and resume their plans upon
-Zakynthus and Korkyra. — Lacedæmonian armament under Mnasippus,
-collected from all the confederates, invades Korkyra. — Mnasippus
-besieges the city — high cultivation of the adjoining lands. — The
-Korkyræans blocked up in the city — supplies intercepted — want
-begins — no hope of safety except in aid from Athens. Reinforcement
-arrives from Athens — large Athenian fleet preparing under Timotheus.
-Mnasippus is defeated and slain — the city supplied with provisions.
-— Approach of the Athenian reinforcement — Hypermenês, successor
-of Mnasippus, conveys away the armament, leaving his sick and much
-property behind. — Tardy arrival of the Athenian fleet — it is
-commanded<span class="pagenum" id="Page_ix">[p. ix]</span> not by
-Timotheus, but by Iphikrates — causes of the delay — preliminary
-voyage of Timotheus, very long protracted. — Discontent at Athens, in
-consequence of the absence of Timotheus — distress of the armament
-assembled at Kalauria — Iphikrates and Kallistratus accuse Timotheus.
-Iphikrates named admiral in his place. — Return of Timotheus — an
-accusation is entered against him, but trial is postponed until the
-return of Iphikrates from Korkyra. — Rapid and energetic movements
-of Iphikrates towards Korkyra — his excellent management of the
-voyage. On reaching Kephallenia, he learns the flight of the
-Lacedæmonians from Korkyra. — He goes on to Korkyra, and captures by
-surprise the ten Syracusan triremes sent by Dionysius to the aid of
-Sparta. — Iphikrates in want of money — he sends home Kallistratus
-to Athens — he finds work for his seamen at Korkyra — he obtains
-funds by service in Akarnania. — Favorable tone of public opinion
-at Athens, in consequence of the success at Korkyra — the trial of
-Timotheus went off easily — Jason and Alketas come to support him —
-his quæstor is condemned to death. — Timotheus had been guilty of
-delay, not justifiable under the circumstances — though acquitted,
-his reputation suffered — he accepts command under Persia. —
-Discouragement of Sparta in consequence of her defeat at Korkyra,
-and of the triumphant position of Iphikrates. — Helikê and Bura are
-destroyed by an earthquake. — The Spartans again send Antalkidas to
-Persia, to sue for a fresh intervention — the Persian satraps send
-down an order that the Grecian belligerents shall make up their
-differences. — Athens disposed towards peace. — Athens had ceased
-to be afraid of Sparta, and had become again jealous of Thebes. —
-Equivocal position of the restored Platæa now that the Lacedæmonians
-had been expelled from Bœotia. — The Thebans forestall a negotiation
-by seizing Platæa, and expelling the inhabitants, who again take
-refuge at Athens. — Strong feeling excited in Athens against the
-Thebans, on account of their dealings with Platæa and Thespiæ. The
-Plataic discourse of Isokrates. — Increased tendency of the Athenians
-towards peace with Sparta — Athens and the Athenian confederacy give
-notice to Thebes. General congress for peace at Sparta. — Speeches of
-the Athenian envoys Kallias, Autokles, Kallistratus. — Kallistratus
-and his policy. — He proposes that Sparta and Athens shall divide
-between them the headship of Greece — Sparta on land, Athens at
-sea — recognizing general autonomy. — Peace is concluded. Autonomy
-of each city to be recognized: Sparta to withdraw her harmosts and
-garrisons. — Oaths exchanged. Sparta takes the oath for herself and
-her allies. Athens takes it for herself: her allies take it after
-her, successively. — The oath proposed to the Thebans. Epaminondas,
-the Theban envoy, insists upon taking the oath in the name of the
-Bœotian federation. Agesilaus and the Spartans require that he shall
-take it for Thebes alone. — Daring and emphatic speeches delivered
-by Epaminondas in the congress — protesting against the overweening
-pretensions of Sparta. He claims recognition of the ancient
-institutions of Bœotia, with Thebes as president of the federation.
-— Indignation of the Spartans, and especially of Agesilaus — brief
-questions exchanged — Thebes is excluded from the treaty. — General
-peace sworn, including Athens, Sparta, and the rest — Thebes
-alone is excluded. — Terms of peace — compulsory and indefeasible
-confederacies are renounced — voluntary alliances alone maintained.
-— Real point in debate <span class="pagenum" id="Page_x">[p.
-x]</span>between Agesilaus and Epaminondas.</p>
-<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_77">72-174</a></p>
-
-<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXVIII.</p>
-<p class="small center">BATTLE OF LEUKTRA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.</p>
-
-<p class="p1">Measures for executing the stipulations made at the
-congress of Sparta. — Violent impulse of the Spartans against Thebes.
-— King Kleombrotus is ordered to march into Bœotia, and encamps at
-Leuktra. — New order of battle adopted by Epaminondas. — Confidence
-of the Spartans and of Kleombrotus. — Battle of Leuktra. — Defeat
-of the Spartans and death of Kleombrotus. — Faint adherence of the
-Spartan allies. — Spartan camp after the defeat — confession of
-defeat by sending to solicit the burial-truce. — Great surprise, and
-immense alteration of feeling, produced throughout Greece by the
-Theban victory. — Effect of the news at Sparta — heroic self-command.
-— Reinforcements sent from Sparta. — Proceedings in Bœotia after the
-battle of Leuktra. The Theban victory not well received at Athens.
-— Jason of Pheræ arrives at Leuktra — the Spartan army retires from
-Bœotia under capitulation. — Treatment of the defeated citizens on
-reaching Sparta — suspension of the law. — Lowered estimation of
-Sparta in Greece — prestige of military superiority lost. — Extension
-of the power of Thebes. Treatment of Orchomenus and Thespiæ. —
-Power and ambition of Jason. — Plans of Jason — Pythian festival.
-— Assassination of Jason at Pheræ. — Relief to Thebes by the death
-of Jason — satisfaction in Greece. — Proceedings in Peloponnesus
-after the defeat of Leuktra. Expulsion of the Spartan harmosts
-and dekarchies. — Skytalism at Argos — violent intestine feud. —
-Discouragement and helplessness of Sparta. — Athens places herself
-at the head of a new Peloponnesian land-confederacy. — Accusation
-preferred in the Amphyctionic assembly, by Thebes against Sparta.
-— The Spartans are condemned to a fine — importance of this fact
-as an indication. — Proceedings in Arcadia. — Reëstablishment of
-the city of Mantinea by its own citizens. — Humiliating refusal
-experienced by Agesilaus from the Mantineans — keenly painful to a
-Spartan. — Feeling against Agesilaus at Sparta. — Impulse among the
-Arcadians towards Pan-Arcadian union. Opposition from Orchomenus
-and Tegea. — Revolution at Tegea — the philo-Spartan party are put
-down or expelled. — Tegea becomes anti-Spartan, and favorable to
-the Pan-Arcadian union. — Pan-Arcadian union is formed. — March
-of Agesilaus against Mantinea. Evidence of lowered sentiment in
-Sparta. — Application by the Arcadians to Athens for aid against
-Sparta; it is refused: they then apply to the Thebans. — Proceedings
-and views of Epaminondas since the battle of Leuktra. — Plans of
-Epaminondas for restoring the Messenians in Peloponnesus. — Also,
-for consolidating the Arcadians against Sparta. — Epaminondas and
-the Theban army arrive in Arcadia. Great allied force assembled
-there. The allies entreat him to invade Laconia. — Reluctance of
-Epaminondas to invade Laconia — reasonable grounds for it. — He
-marches into Laconia — four lines of invasion. — He crosses the
-Eurotas and approaches close to Sparta. — Alarm at Sparta — arrival
-of various allies to her aid by sea. — Discontent in Laconia among
-the Periœki and Helots — danger to Sparta from that cause. — Vigilant
-defence of Sparta by Agesilaus. — Violent emotion of the Spartans,
-especially the women. Partial attack upon Sparta by Epaminondas. —
-He retires without attempting to storm Sparta: ravages Laconia down
-to Gythium. He returns into Arcadia. — Great effect of this invasion
-upon Grecian opinion — Epaminondas is exalted, and Sparta farther
-lowered. — Foundation of the Arcadian Megalopolis. — Foundation of
-Messênê. — Abstraction of Western Laconia from Sparta. — Periœki
-and Helots established as freemen along with the Messenians on
-the Lacedæmonian border. — The details of this reorganiz<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_xi">[p. xi]</span>ing process unhappily
-unknown. — Megalopolis — the Pan-Arcadian Ten Thousand. — Epaminondas
-and his army evacuate Peloponnesus. — The Spartans solicit aid from
-Athens — language of their envoys, as well as those from Corinth
-and Phlius, at Athens. — Reception of the envoys — the Athenians
-grant the prayer. — Vote passed to aid Sparta — Iphikrates is named
-general. — March of Iphikrates and his army to the Isthmus. — Trial
-of Epaminondas at Thebes for retaining his command beyond the legal
-time — his honorable and easy acquittal.</p>
-<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_78">174-241</a></p>
-
-<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXIX.</p>
-<p class="small center">FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO THE DEATH
-OF PELOPIDAS.</p>
-
-<p class="p1">Changes in Peloponnesus since the battle of Leuktra.
-— Changes out of Peloponnesus. — Amyntas prince of Macedonia.
-— Ambitious views of Athens after the battle of Leuktra. — Her
-aspirations to maritime empire, and to the partial recovery of
-kleruchies. — She wishes to recover Amphipolis — Amyntas recognizes
-her right to the place. — Athens and Amphipolis. — Death of Jason
-and Amyntas — state of Thessaly and Macedonia. — Alexander of Pheræ
-— he is opposed by Pelopidas — influence of Thebes in Thessaly. —
-State of Macedonia — Alexander son of Amyntas — Euridikê — Ptolemy.
-— Assistance rendered by the Athenian Iphikrates to the family of
-Amyntas. — Iphikrates and Timotheus. — The Spartan allied army
-defends the line of Mount Oneium — Epaminondas breaks through
-it, and marches into Peloponnesus. — Sikyon joins the Thebans —
-Phlius remains faithful to Sparta. — Reinforcement from Syracuse
-to Peloponnesus, in aid of Sparta. — Forbearance and mildness of
-Epaminondas. — Energetic action and insolence of the Arcadians —
-Lykomedes animates and leads them on. — Great influence of Lykomedes.
-— Elis tries to recover her supremacy over the Triphylian towns,
-which are admitted into the Arcadian union, to the great offence of
-Elis. — Mission of Philiskus to Greece by Ariobarzanes. — Political
-importance of the reconstitution of Messênê, which now becomes the
-great subject of discord. Messenian victor proclaimed at Olympia.
-— Expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly. — The Tearless Battle
-— victory of the Spartan Archidamus over the Arcadians. — Third
-expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus — his treatment of the
-Achæan cities. — The Thebans reverse the policy of Epaminondas,
-on complaint of the Arcadians and others. They do not reëlect him
-Bœotarch. — Disturbed state of Sikyon. Euphron makes himself despot —
-his rapacious and sanguinary conduct. — Sufferings of the Phliasians
-— their steady adherence to Sparta. — Assistance rendered to Phlius
-by the Athenian Chares — surprise of the fort of Thyamia. — Euphron
-is expelled from Sikyon by the Arcadians and Thebans — he retires
-to the harbor, which he surrenders to the Spartans. — Euphron
-returns to Sikyon — he goes to Thebes, and is there assassinated. —
-The assassins are put upon their trial at Thebes — their defence.
-— They are acquitted by the Theban Senate. — Sentiment among the
-Many of Sikyon, favorable to Euphron — honors shown to his body and
-memory. — The Sikyonians recapture their harbor from the Spartans.
-— Application of Thebes for Persian countenance to her headship —
-mission of Pelopidas and other envoys to Susa. — Pelopidas obtains
-from Persia a favorable rescript. — Protest of the Athenians and
-Arcadians against the rescript. — Pelopidas brings back the rescript.
-It is read publicly before the Greek states convoked at Thebes.
-— The states convoked at Thebes refuse to receive the rescript.
-The Arcadian deputies protest against the headship of Thebes. —
-The Thebans send the re<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xii">[p.
-xii]</span>script to be received at Corinth; the Corinthians refuse:
-failure of the Theban object. — Mission of Pelopidas to Thessaly.
-He is seized and detained prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ. — The
-Thebans despatch an army to rescue Pelopidas. The army, defeated
-and retreating, is only saved by Epaminondas, then a private man.
-— Triumph of Alexander in Thessaly and discredit of Thebes. Harsh
-treatment of Pelopidas. — Second Theban army sent into Thessaly,
-under Epaminondas, for the rescue of Pelopidas, who is at length
-released by Alexander under a truce. — Oropus is taken from Athens
-and placed in the hands of the Thebans. The Athenians recall Chares
-from Corinth. — Athens discontented with her Peloponnesian allies;
-she enters into alliance with Lykomedes and the Arcadians. Death of
-Lykomedes. — Epaminondas is sent as envoy into Arcadia; he speaks
-against Kallistratus. — Project of the Athenians to seize Corinth;
-they are disappointed. — They apply to Sparta. — Refusal of the
-Spartans to acknowledge the independence of Messênê; they reproach
-their allies with consenting. — Corinth, Epidaurus, Phlius, etc.,
-conclude peace with Thebes, but without Sparta — recognizing the
-independence of Messênê. — Athens sends a fresh embassy to the
-Persian king — altered rescript from him, pronouncing Amphipolis to
-be an Athenian possession. — Timotheus sent with a fleet to Asia —
-Agesilaus — revolt of Ariobarzanes. — Conquest of Samos by Timotheus.
-— Partial readmission to the Chersonese obtained by Timotheus.
-— Athenian kleruchs or settlers sent thither as proprietors. —
-Difficulties of Athens in establishing kleruchs in the Chersonese.
-— Kotys of Thrace. — Timotheus supersedes Iphikrates. — Timotheus
-acts with success on the coast of Macedonia and Chalkidikê. He
-fails at Amphipolis. — Timotheus acts against Kotys and near the
-Chersonese. — Measures of the Thebans in Thessaly — Pelopidas is
-sent with an army against Alexander of Pheræ. — Epaminondas exhorts
-the Thebans to equip a fleet against Athens. — Discussion between
-him and Menekleidas in the Theban assembly. — Menekleidas seemingly
-right in dissuading naval preparations. — Epaminondas in command of
-a Theban fleet in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. Pelopidas attacks
-Alexander of Pheræ — his success in battle — his rashness — he is
-slain. — Excessive grief of the Thebans and Thessalians for his
-death. — The Thebans completely subdue Alexander of Pheræ.</p>
-<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_79">242-310</a></p>
-
-<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXX.</p>
-<p class="small center">FROM THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA.</p>
-
-<p class="p1">Conspiracy of the knights of Orchomenus against Thebes
-— destruction of Orchomenus by the Thebans. — Repugnance excited
-against the Thebans — regret and displeasure of Epaminondas. —
-Return of Epaminondas from his cruise — renewed complications in
-Peloponnesus. — State of Peloponnesus — Eleians and Achæans in
-alliance with Sparta. — The Eleians aim at recovering Triphylia —
-the Spartans, at recovering Messênê. — War between the Eleians and
-Arcadians; the latter occupy Olympia. — Second invasion of Elis by
-the Arcadians. Distress of the Eleians. Archidamus and the Spartans
-invade Arcadia. — Archidamus establishes a Spartan garrison at
-Kromnus. The Arcadians gain advantages over him — armistice. — The
-Arcadians blockade Kromnus, and capture the Spartan garrison. — The
-Arcadians celebrate the Olympic festival along with the Pisatans —
-excluding the Eleians. — The Eleians invade the festival by arms —
-conflict on the plain of Olympia — bravery of the Eleians. — Feelings
-of the spectators at Olympia. — The Arcadians take the treasures of
-Olympia to pay their militia. — Violent dissensions arising among
-the members of the Arcadian communion, in<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_xiii">[p. xiii]</span> consequence of this appropriation.
-The Arcadian assembly pronounces against it. — Farther dissensions in
-Arcadia — invitation sent to the Thebans — peace concluded with Elis.
-— The peace generally popular — celebrated at Tegea — seizure of
-many oligarchical members at Tegea by the Theban harmost. — Conduct
-of the Theban harmost. — View taken by Epaminondas. — His view is
-more consistent with the facts recounted by Xenophon, than the view
-of Xenophon himself. — Policy of Epaminondas and the Thebans. —
-Epaminondas marches with a Theban army into Peloponnesus, to muster
-at Tegea. — Agesilaus and the Spartans are sent for. — Night-march
-of Epaminondas to surprise Sparta. Agesilaus is informed in time
-to prevent surprise. — Epaminondas comes up to Sparta, but finds
-it defended. — He marches back to Tegea — despatches his cavalry
-from thence to surprise Mantinea. — The surprise is baffled, by the
-accidental arrival of the Athenian cavalry — battle of cavalry near
-Mantinea, in which the Athenians have the advantage. — Epaminondas
-resolves to attack the enemy near Mantinea. — View of Xenophon —
-that this resolution was forced upon him by despair — examined. —
-Alacrity of the army of Epaminondas, when the order for fighting is
-given. — Mantinico-Tegeatic plain — position of the Lacedæmonians and
-Mantineans. — March of Epaminondas from Tegea. — False impression
-produced upon the enemy by his manœuvres. — Theban order of battle —
-plans of the commander. — Disposition of the cavalry on both sides.
-— Unprepared state of the Lacedæmonian army. — Battle of Mantinea —
-complete success of the dispositions of Epaminondas. — Victory of the
-Thebans — Epaminondas is mortally wounded. — Extreme discouragement
-caused by his death among the troops, even when in full victory
-and pursuit. — Victory claimed by both sides — nevertheless the
-Lacedæmonians are obliged to solicit the burial-truce. — Dying
-moments of Epaminondas. — The two other best Theban officers are
-slain also in the battle. — Who slew Epaminondas? Different persons
-honored for it. — Peace concluded — <i>statu quo</i> recognized, including
-the independence of Messênê — Sparta alone stands out — the Thebans
-return home. — Results of the battle of Mantinea, as appreciated
-by Xenophon — unfair to the Thebans. — Character of Epaminondas.
-— Disputes among the inhabitants of Megalopolis. The Thebans send
-thither a force under Pammenes, which maintains the incorporation.
-— Agesilaus and Archidamus. — State of Persia — revolted satraps
-and provinces — Datames. — Formidable revolt of the satraps in Asia
-Minor — it is suppressed by the Persian court, through treachery.
-— Agesilaus goes as commander to Egypt — Chabrias is there also. —
-Death and character of Agesilaus. — State of Egypt and Persia. —
-Death of Artaxerxes Mnemon. Murders in the royal family. — Athenian
-maritime operations — Timotheus makes war against Amphipolis and
-against Kotys. — Ergophilus succeeds Timotheus at the Chersonese —
-Kallisthenes succeeds him against Amphipolis — war at sea against
-Alexander of Pheræ. — Ergophilus and Kallisthenes both unsuccessful
-— both tried. — Autokles in the Hellespont and Bosphorus — convoy
-for the corn-ships out of the Euxine. — Miltokythes revolts from
-Kotys in Thrace — ill-success of the Athenians. — Menon — Timomachus
-— as commanders in the Chersonese. The Athenians lose Sestos. —
-Kephisodotus in the Chersonese. Charidemus crosses thither from
-Abydos. — Assassination of Kotys. — Kersobleptes succeeds Kotys.
-Berisades and Amadokus, his rivals — ill-success of Athens —
-Kephisodotus. — Improved prospects of Athens in the Chersonese —
-Athenodorus — Charidemus. — Charidemus is forced to accept the
-convention of Athenodorus — his evasions — the Chersonese with Sestos
-is restored to Athens. — The transmarine empire of Athens now at its
-maximum. Mischievous effects of her conquests<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_xiv">[p. xiv]</span> made against Olynthus. — Maximum of
-second Athenian empire — accession of Philip of Macedon.</p>
-<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_80">311-383</a></p>
-
-<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXXI.</p>
-<p class="small center">SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT
-BEFORE SYRACUSE.</p>
-
-<p class="p1">Syracuse after the destruction of the Athenian
-armament. — Anticipation of the impending ruin of Athens — revolution
-at Thurii. — Syracusan squadron under Hermokrates goes to act against
-Athens in the Ægean. — Disappointed hopes — defeat at Kynossema —
-second ruinous defeat at Kyzikus. — Sufferings of the Syracusan
-seamen — disappointment and displeasure at Syracuse. — Banishment of
-Hermokrates and his colleagues. Sentence communicated by Hermokrates
-to the armament. — Internal state of Syracuse — constitution of
-Diokles. — Difficulty of determining what that constitution was. —
-Invasion from Carthage. — State of the Carthaginians. — Extent of
-Carthaginian empire — power, and population — Liby-Phœnicians. —
-Harsh dealing of Carthage towards her subjects. Colonies sent out
-from Carthage. — Military force of Carthage. — Political constitution
-of Carthage. — Oligarchical system and sentiment at Carthage. —
-Powerful families at Carthage — Mago, Hamilkar, Hasdrubal. — Quarrel
-between Egesta and Selinus in Sicily. — Application of Egesta to
-Carthage for aid — application granted — eagerness of Hannibal. —
-Carthaginian envoys sent to Sicily. — Hannibal crosses over to Sicily
-with a very large armament. He lays siege to Selinus. — Vigorous
-assault on Selinus — gallant resistance — the town is at length
-stormed. — Selinus is sacked and plundered — merciless slaughter. —
-Delay of the Syracusans and others in sending aid. Answer of Hannibal
-to their embassy. — Hannibal marches to Himera and besieges it. Aid
-from Syracuse under Diokles — sally from Himera. Hannibal destroys
-Himera, and slaughters three thousand prisoners, as an expiation
-to the memory of his grandfather. — Alarm throughout the Greeks of
-Sicily — Hannibal dismisses his army, and returns to Carthage. —
-New intestine discord in Syracuse — Hermokrates comes to Sicily. —
-He levies troops to effect his return by force. — He is obliged to
-retire — he establishes himself in the ruins of Selinus, and acts
-against the Carthaginians. — His father attempts to reënter Syracuse,
-with the bones of the Syracusans slain near Himera. Banishment of
-Diokles. — Hermokrates tries again to penetrate into Syracuse with
-an armed force. — He is defeated and slain. — First appearance of
-Dionysius at Syracuse. — Weakness of Syracuse, arising out of this
-political discord — party of Hermokrates. Danger from Carthage. —
-Fresh invasion of Sicily, by the Carthaginians. Immense host under
-Hannibal and Imilkon. — Great alarm in Sicily — active preparations
-for defence at Agrigentum. — Grandeur, wealth, and population of
-Agrigentum. — The Carthaginians attack Agrigentum. They demolish
-the tombs near its walls. Distemper among their army. Religious
-terrors — sacrifice. — Syracusan reinforcement to Agrigentum, under
-Daphnæus. His victory over the Iberians. He declines to pursue them.
-— Daphnæus enters Agrigentum. Discontent against the Agrigentine
-generals, for having been backward in attack. They are put to death.
-— Privations in both armies — Hamilkar captures the provision-ships
-of the Syracusans — Agrigentum is evacuated. — Agrigentum taken and
-plundered by the Carthagians. — Terror throughout Sicily. — Bitter
-complaints against the Syracusan generals. — The Hermokratean party
-at Syracuse comes forward to subvert the government and elevate
-Dionysius. — Harangue of Diony<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xv">[p.
-xv]</span>sius in the Syracusan assembly against the generals,
-who are deposed by vote of the people, and Dionysius with others
-appointed in their room. — Ambitious arts of Dionysius — he intrigues
-against his colleagues, and frustrates all their proceedings. He
-procures a vote for restoring the Hermokratean exiles. — Dionysius
-is sent with a Syracusan reinforcement to Gela. He procures the
-execution or banishment of the Geloan oligarchy. — He returns to
-Syracuse with an increased force — he accuses his colleagues of
-gross treason. — Dionysius is named general, single-handed, with
-full powers. — Apparent repentance of the people after the vote.
-Stratagem of Dionysius to obtain a vote ensuring to him a body
-of paid guards. — March of Dionysius to Leontini. — Dionysius
-establishes himself at Syracuse as despot. — Dionysius as despot —
-the means whereby he attained the power.</p>
-<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_81">383-446</a></p>
-
-<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXXII.</p>
-<p class="small center">SICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS AT SYRACUSE.</p>
-
-<p class="p1">Imilkon with the Carthaginian army marches from
-Agrigentum to attack Gela. — Brave defence of the Geloans —
-Dionysius arrives with an army to relieve them. — Plan of Dionysius
-for a general attack on the Carthaginian army. — He is defeated
-and obliged to retreat. — He evacuates Gela and Kamarina — flight
-of the population of both places, which are taken and sacked by
-the Carthaginians. — Indignation and charges of treachery against
-Dionysius. — Mutiny of the Syracusan horsemen — they ride off
-to Syracuse, and declare against Dionysius. — Their imprudence.
-Dionysius master of Syracuse. — Propositions of peace come from
-Imilkon. Terms of peace. — Collusion of Dionysius with the
-Carthaginians, who confirm his dominion over Syracuse. Pestilence in
-the Carthaginian army. — Near coincidence, in time, of this peace,
-with the victory of Lysander at Ægospotami — sympathy of Sparta with
-Dionysius. — Depressed condition of the towns of Southern Sicily,
-from Cape Pachynus to Lilybæum. — Strong position of Dionysius. —
-Strong fortifications and other buildings erected by Dionysius, in
-and about Ortygia. — He assigns houses in Ortygia to his soldiers and
-partisans — he distributes the lands of Syracuse anew. — Exorbitant
-exactions of Dionysius — discontent at Syracuse. — Dionysius marches
-out of Syracuse against the Sikels — mutiny of the Syracusan soldiers
-at Herbesa — Dorikus the commander is slain. — The Syracusan
-insurgents, with assistance from Rhegium and Messênê, besiege
-Dionysius in Ortygia. — Despair of Dionysius — he applies to a body
-of Campanians in the Carthaginian service, for aid. — He amuses the
-assailants with feigned submission — arrival of the Campanians —
-victory of Dionysius. — Dionysius strengthens his despotism more than
-before — assistance lent to him by the Spartan Aristus — Nikoteles
-the Corinthian is put to death. — He disarms the Syracusan citizens
-— strengthens the fortifications of Ortygia — augments his mercenary
-force. — Dionysius conquers Naxus, Katana, and Leontini. — Great
-power of Dionysius. Foundation of Alæsa by Archonides. — Resolution
-of Dionysius to make war upon Carthage. — Locality of Syracuse —
-danger to which the town had been exposed, in the Athenian siege.
-— Additional fortifications made by Dionysius along the northern
-ridge of the cliffs of Epipolæ, up the Euryalus. — Popularity of the
-work — efforts made by all the Syracusans as well as by Dionysius
-himself. — Preparations of Dionysius for aggressive war against the
-Carthaginians. — Improvement in the behavior of Dionysius towards
-the Syracusans. — His conciliatory offers to other Grecian cities in
-Sicily. Hostile sentiment of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xvi">[p.
-xvi]</span> the Rhegines towards him. Their application to Messênê.
-— He makes peace with Messênê and Rhegium. — He desires to marry a
-Rhegine wife. His proposition is declined by the city. He is greatly
-incensed. — He makes a proposition to marry a wife from Lokri — his
-wish is granted — he marries a Lokrian maiden named Doris. — Immense
-warlike equipment of Dionysius at Syracuse — arms, engines, etc. —
-Naval preparations in the harbor of Syracuse. Enlargement of the bulk
-of ships of war — quadriremes and quinqueremes. — General sympathy of
-the Syracusans in his projects against Carthage. — He hires soldiers
-from all quarters. — He celebrates his nuptials with two wives on the
-same day — Doris and Aristomachê. Temporary good feeling at Syracuse
-towards him. — He convokes the Syracusan assembly, and exhorts them
-to war against Carthage. — He desires to arrest the emigration of
-those who were less afraid of the Carthaginian dominion than of his.
-— He grants permission to plunder the Carthaginian residents and
-ships at Syracuse. Alarm at Carthage — suffering in Africa from the
-pestilence. — Dionysius marches out from Syracuse with a prodigious
-army against the Carthaginians in Sicily. — Insurrection against
-Carthage, among the Sicilian Greeks subject to her. Terrible tortures
-inflicted on the Carthaginians. — Dionysius besieges the Carthaginian
-seaport Motyê. — Situation of Motyê — operations of the siege —
-vigorous defence. — Dionysius overruns the neighboring dependencies
-of Carthage — doubtful result of the siege of Motyê — appearance
-of Imilkon with a Carthaginian fleet — he is obliged to return. —
-Desperate defence of Motyê. It is at length taken by a nocturnal
-attack. — Plunder of Motyê — the inhabitants either slaughtered or
-sold for slaves. — Farther operations of Dionysius. — Arrival of
-Imilkon with a Carthaginian armament — his successful operations — he
-retakes Motyê. — Dionysius retires to Syracuse. — Imilkon captures
-Messênê. — Revolt of the Sikels from Dionysius. Commencement of
-Tauromenium. — Provisions of Dionysius for the defence of Syracuse —
-he strengthens Leontini — he advances to Katana with his land-army
-as well as his fleet. — Naval battle off Katana — great victory
-of the Carthaginian fleet under Magon. — Arrival of Imilkon to
-join the fleet of Magon near Katana — fruitless invitation to the
-Campanians of Ætna. — Dionysius retreats to Syracuse — discontent of
-his army. — Imilkon marches close up to Syracuse — the Carthaginian
-fleet come up to occupy the Great Harbor — their imposing entry.
-Fortified position of Imilkon near the Harbor. — Imilkon plunders
-the suburb of Achradina — blockades Syracuse by sea. — Naval victory
-gained by the Syracusan fleet during the absence of Dionysius. —
-Effect of this victory in exalting the spirits of the Syracusans. —
-Public meeting convened by Dionysius — mutinous spirit against him —
-vehement speech by Thedorus. — Sympathy excited by the speech in the
-Syracusan assembly. — The Spartan Pharakidas upholds Dionysius — who
-finally dismisses the assembly, and silences the adverse movement. —
-Alliance of Sparta with Dionysius — suitable to her general policy
-at the time. The emancipation of Syracuse depended upon Pharakidas.
-— Dionysius tries to gain popularity. — Terrific pestilence among
-the Carthaginian army before Syracuse. — Dionysius attacks the
-Carthaginian camp. He deliberately sacrifices a detachment of his
-mercenaries. — Success of Dionysius, both by sea and by land,
-against the Syracusan position. — Conflagration of the Carthaginian
-camp — exultation at Syracuse. — Imilkon concludes a secret treaty
-with Dionysius, to be allowed to escape with the Carthaginians,
-on condition of abandoning his remaining army. Destruction of the
-remaining Carthaginian army, except Sikels and Iberians. — Distress
-at Carthage — miserable end of Imilkon. — Danger of Carthage — anger
-and revolt of her African subjects — at length put down.</p>
-<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_82">446-512</a></p>
-
-</div>
-
-<hr class="chap" />
-
-
-<div class="chapter" id="Chap_76">
-  <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_1">[p. 1]</a></span></p>
-  <p class="falseh1">HISTORY OF GREECE.</p>
-  <hr class="sep2" />
-  <p class="xl center">PART II.<br />
-  <small>CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.</small></p>
-  <hr class="sep2" />
-  <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXVI.<br />
-  FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS DOWN TO THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY SPARTA.</h2>
-</div>
-
-<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span>
-peace or convention<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1"
-class="fnanchor">[1]</a> which bears the name of Antalkidas, was an
-incident of serious and mournful import in Grecian history. Its true
-character cannot be better described than in a brief remark and reply
-which we find cited in Plutarch. “Alas for Hellas (observed some one
-to Agesilaus) when we see our Laconians <i>medising</i>!”—“Nay (replied
-the Spartan king), say rather the Medes (Persians) <i>laconising</i>.”<a
-id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p>
-
-<p>These two propositions do not exclude each other. Both were
-perfectly true. The convention emanated from a separate partnership
-between Spartan and Persian interests. It was solicited by the
-Spartan Antalkidas, and propounded by him to Tiribazus<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_2">[p. 2]</span> on the express ground,
-that it was exactly calculated to meet the Persian king’s purposes
-and wishes,—as we learn even from the philo-Laconian Xenophon.<a
-id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> While
-Sparta and Persia were both great gainers, no other Grecian state
-gained anything, as the convention was originally framed. But after
-the first rejection, Antalkidas saw the necessity of conciliating
-Athens by the addition of a special article providing that Lemnos,
-Imbros, and Skyros should be restored to her.<a id="FNanchor_4"
-href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> This addition seems
-to have been first made in the abortive negotiations which form
-the subject of the discourse already mentioned, pronounced by
-Andokides. It was continued afterwards and inserted in the final
-decree which Antalkidas and Tiribazus brought down in the king’s
-name from Susa; and it doubtless somewhat contributed to facilitate
-the adherence of Athens, though the united forces of Sparta and
-Persia had become so overwhelming, that she could hardly have had
-the means of standing out, even if the supplementary article had
-been omitted. Nevertheless, this condition undoubtedly did secure to
-Athens a certain share in the gain, conjointly with the far larger
-shares both of Sparta and Persia. It is, however, not less true,
-that Athens, as well as Thebes,<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5"
-class="fnanchor">[5]</a> assented to the peace only under fear and
-compulsion. As to the other states of Greece, they were interested
-merely in the melancholy capacity of partners in the general loss and
-degradation.</p>
-
-<p>That degradation stood evidently marked in the form, origin, and
-transmission, of the convention, even apart from its substance.
-It was a fiat issued from the court of Susa; as such it was
-ostentatiously proclaimed and “sent down” from thence to Greece.
-Its authority was derived from the king’s seal, and its sanction
-from his concluding threat, that he would make war against all
-recusants. It was brought down by the satrap Tiribazus (along<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_3">[p. 3]</span> with Antalkidas), read by
-him aloud, and heard with submission by the assembled Grecian envoys,
-after he had called their special attention to the regal seal.<a
-id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> Such was
-the convention which Sparta, the ancient president of the Grecian
-world had been the first to solicit at the hands of the Persian
-king, and which she now not only set the example of sanctioning by
-her own spontaneous obedience, but even avouched as guarantee and
-champion against all opponents; preparing to enforce it at the point
-of the sword against any recusant state, whether party to it or
-not. Such was the convention which was now inscribed on stone, and
-placed as a permanent record in the temples of the Grecian cities;<a
-id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> nay, even
-in the common sanctuaries,—the Olympic, Pythian, and others,—the
-great <i>foci</i> and rallying points of Pan-hellenic sentiment. Though
-called by the name of a convention, it was on the very face of it
-a peremptory mandate proceeding from the ancient enemy of Greece,
-an acceptance of which was nothing less than an act of obedience.
-While to him it was a glorious trophy, to all<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_4">[p. 4]</span> Pan-hellenic patriots it was the
-deepest disgrace and insult.<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8"
-class="fnanchor">[8]</a> Effacing altogether the idea of an
-independent Hellenic world, bound together and regulated by the
-self-acting forces and common sympathies of its own members,—even the
-words of the convention proclaimed it as an act of intrusive foreign
-power, and erected the barbarian king into a dictatorial settler of
-Grecian differences; a guardian<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9"
-class="fnanchor">[9]</a> who cared for the peace of Greece more
-than the Greeks themselves. And thus, looking to the form alone, it
-was tantamount to that symbol of submission—the cession of earth
-and water—which had been demanded a century before by the ancestor
-of Artaxerxes from the ancestors of the Spartans and Athenians;
-a demand, which both Sparta and Athens then not only repudiated,
-but resented so cruelly, as to put to death the heralds by whom it
-was brought,—stigmatizing the Æginetans and others as traitors to
-Hellas for complying with it.<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10"
-class="fnanchor">[10]</a> Yet nothing more would have been implied
-in such cession than what stood embodied in the inscription on
-that “colonna infame,” which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">[p.
-5]</span> placed the peace of Antalkidas side by side with the
-Pan-hellenic glories and ornaments at Olympia.<a id="FNanchor_11"
-href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p>
-
-<p>Great must have been the change wrought by the intermediate
-events, when Sparta, the ostensible president of Greece,—in her own
-estimation even more than in that of others,<a id="FNanchor_12"
-href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a>—had so lost all
-Pan-hellenic conscience and dignity, as to descend into an obsequious
-minister, procuring and enforcing a Persian mandate for political
-objects of her own. How insane would such an anticipation have
-appeared to Æschylus, or the audience who heard the Persæ! to
-Herodotus or Thucydides! to Perikles and Archidamus! nay, even to
-Kallikratidas or Lysander! It was the last consummation of a series
-of previous political sins, invoking more and more the intervention
-of Persia to aid her against her Grecian enemies.</p>
-
-<p>Her first application to the Great King for this purpose dates
-from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">[p. 6]</span> the commencement
-of the Peloponnesian war, and is prefaced by an apology, little
-less than humiliating, from king Archidamus; who, not unconscious
-of the sort of treason which he was meditating, pleads that Sparta,
-when the Athenians are conspiring against her, ought not to be
-blamed for asking from foreigners as well as from Greeks aid for
-her own preservation.<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13"
-class="fnanchor">[13]</a> From the earliest commencement to the
-seventh year of the war, many separate and successive envoys
-were despatched by the Spartans to Susa; two of whom were seized
-in Thrace, brought to Athens, and there put to death. The rest
-reached their destination, but talked in so confused a way, and
-contradicted each other so much, that the Persian court, unable to
-understand what they meant,<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14"
-class="fnanchor">[14]</a> sent Artaphernes with letters to Sparta
-(in the seventh year of the war) complaining of such stupidity, and
-asking for clearer information. Artaphernes fell into the hands of an
-Athenian squadron at Eion on the Strymon, and was conveyed to Athens;
-where he was treated with great politeness, and sent back (after the
-letters which he carried had been examined) to Ephesus. What is more
-important to note is, that Athenian envoys were sent along with him,
-with a view of bringing Athens into friendly communication with the
-Great King; which was only prevented by the fact that Artaxerxes
-Longimanus just then died. Here we see the fatal practice, generated
-by intestine war, of invoking Persian aid; begun by Sparta as an
-importunate solicitor,—and partially imitated by Athens, though we do
-not know what her envoys were instructed to say, had they been able
-to reach Susa.</p>
-
-<p>Nothing more is heard about Persian intervention until the year of
-the great Athenian disasters before Syracuse. Elate with the hopes
-arising out of that event, the Persians required no solicitation, but
-were quite as eager to tender interference for their own purposes, as
-Sparta was to invite them for hers. How ready Sparta was to purchase
-their aid by the surrender of the Asiatic<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_7">[p. 7]</span> Greeks, and that too without any
-stipulations in their favor,—has been recounted in my last volume.<a
-id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> She
-had not now the excuse,—for it stands only as an excuse and not as a
-justification—of self-defence against aggression from Athens, which
-Archidamus had produced at the beginning of the war. Even then it was
-only a colorable excuse, not borne out by the reality of the case;
-but now, the avowed as well as the real object was something quite
-different,—not to repel, but to crush, Athens. Yet to accomplish that
-object, not even of pretended safety, but of pure ambition, Sparta
-sacrificed unconditionally the liberty of her Asiatic kinsmen; a
-price which Archidamus at the beginning of the war would certainly
-never have endured the thoughts of paying, notwithstanding the then
-formidable power of Athens. Here, too, we find Athens following the
-example; and consenting, in hopes of procuring Persian aid, to the
-like sacrifice, though the bargain was never consummated. It is true
-that she was then contending for her existence. Nevertheless, the
-facts afford melancholy proof how much the sentiment of Pan-hellenic
-independence became enfeebled in both the leaders, amidst the
-fierce intestine conflict terminated by the battle of Ægospotami.<a
-id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">[p. 8]</span></p>
-
-<p>After that battle, the bargain between Sparta and Persia would
-doubtless have been fulfilled, and the Asiatic Greeks would have
-passed at once under the dominion of the latter,—had not an entirely
-new train of circumstances arisen out of the very peculiar position
-and designs of Cyrus. That young prince did all in his power to
-gain the affections of the Greeks, as auxiliaries for his ambitious
-speculations; in which speculations both Sparta and the Asiatic
-Greeks took part, compromising themselves irrevocably against
-Artaxerxes, and still more against Tissaphernes. Sparta thus became
-unintentionally the enemy of Persia, and found herself compelled to
-protect the Asiatic Greeks against his hostility, with which they
-were threatened; a protection easy for her to confer, not merely
-from the unbounded empire which she then enjoyed over the Grecian
-world, but from the presence of the renowned Cyreian Ten Thousand,
-and the contempt for Persian military strength which they brought
-home from their retreat. She thus finds herself in the exercise of a
-Pan-hellenic protectorate or presidency, first through the ministry
-of Derkyllidas, next of Agesilaus, who even sacrifices at Aulis,
-takes up the sceptre of Agamemnon, and contemplates large schemes of
-aggression against the Great King. Here, however, the Persians play
-against her the same game which she had invoked them to assist in
-playing against Athens. Their fleet, which fifteen years before she
-had invited for her own purposes, is now brought in against herself,
-and with far more effect, since her empire was more odious as well as
-more oppressive than the Athenian. It is now Athens and her allies
-who call in Persian aid; without any direct engagement, indeed, to
-surrender the Asiatic Greeks, for we are told that after the battle
-of Knidus, Konon incurred the displeasure of the Persians by his
-supposed plans for reuniting them with Athens,<a id="FNanchor_17"
-href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> and Athenian aid was
-still continued to Evagoras,—yet, nevertheless, indirectly paving
-the way for that consummation. If Athens and her allies here render
-themselves culpable of an abnegation of Pan-hellenic sentiment, we
-may remark, as before, that they act under the pressure of stronger
-necessities than could ever be pleaded by Sparta; and that they might
-employ on their own behalf, with much greater truth, the excuse
-of self-preservation preferred by king Archidamus.</p> <p><span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_9">[p. 9]</span></p> <p>But never on any
-occasion did that excuse find less real place than in regard to
-the mission of Antalkidas. Sparta was at that time so powerful,
-even after the loss of her maritime empire, that the allies at the
-Isthmus of Corinth, jealous of each other and held together only
-by common terror, could hardly stand on the defensive against her,
-and would probably have been disunited by reasonable offers on her
-part; nor would she have needed even to recall Agesilaus from Asia.
-Nevertheless, the mission was probably dictated in great measure by
-a groundless panic, arising from the sight of the revived Long Walls
-and refortified Piræus, and springing at once to the fancy, that a
-new Athenian empire, such as had existed forty years before, was
-about to start into life; a fancy little likely to be realized, since
-the very peculiar circumstances which had created the first Athenian
-empire were now totally reversed. Debarred from maritime empire
-herself, the first object with Sparta was, to shut out Athens from
-the like; the next, to put down all partial federations or political
-combinations, and to enforce universal autonomy, or the maximum of
-political isolation; in order that there might nowhere exist a power
-capable of resisting herself, the strongest of all individual states.
-As a means to this end, which was no less in the interest of Persia
-than in hers, she outbid all prior subserviences to the Great King,
-betrayed to him not only one entire division of her Hellenic kinsmen,
-but also the general honor of the Hellenic name in the most flagrant
-manner,—and volunteered to <i>medise</i> in order that the Persians might
-repay her by <i>laconising</i>.<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18"
-class="fnanchor">[18]</a> To ensure fully the obedience of all the
-satraps, who had more than once manifested dissentient views of their
-own, Antalkidas procured and brought down a formal order signed and
-sealed at Susa; and Sparta undertook, without shame or scruple, to
-enforce the same order,—“the convention sent down by the king,”—upon
-all her countrymen; thus converting them into the subjects, and
-herself into a sort of viceroy or satrap, of Artaxerxes. Such an
-act of treason to the Pan-hellenic cause was far more flagrant and
-destructive than that alleged confederacy with the Persian king,
-for which the Theban Ismenias was afterwards put to death, and
-that, too, by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">[p. 10]</span>
-the Spartans themselves.<a id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19"
-class="fnanchor">[19]</a> Unhappily it formed a precedent for
-the future, and was closely copied afterwards by Thebes;<a
-id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a>
-foreboding but too clearly the short career which Grecian political
-independence had to run.</p>
-
-<p>That large patriotic sentiment, which dictated the magnanimous
-answer sent by the Athenians<a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21"
-class="fnanchor">[21]</a> to the offers of Mardonius in 479
-<small>B.C.</small>, refusing in the midst of ruin present and
-prospective, all temptation to betray the sanctity of Pan-hellenic
-fellowship,—that sentiment which had been during the two following
-generations the predominant inspiration of Athens, and had also been
-powerful, though always less powerful, at Sparta,—was now, in the
-former, overlaid by more pressing apprehensions, and in the latter
-completely extinguished. Now it was to the leading states that
-Greece had to look, for holding up the great banner of Pan-hellenic
-independence; from the smaller states nothing more could be required
-than that they should adhere to and defend it, when upheld.<a
-id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> But so
-soon as Sparta was seen to solicit and enforce, and Athens to accept
-(even under constraint), the proclamation under the king’s hand and
-seal brought down by Antalkidas,—that banner was no longer a part
-of the public emblems of Gre<span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">[p.
-11]</span>cian political life. The grand idea represented by it,—of
-collective self-determining Hellenism,—was left to dwell in the
-bosoms of individual patriots.</p>
-
-<p>If we look at the convention of Antalkidas apart from its form and
-warranty, and with reference to its substance, we shall find that
-though its first article was unequivocally disgraceful, its last was
-at least popular as a promise to the ear. Universal autonomy, to
-each city, small or great, was dear to Grecian political instinct.
-I have already remarked more than once that the exaggerated force
-of this desire was the chief cause of the short duration of Grecian
-freedom. Absorbing all the powers of life to the separate parts,
-it left no vital force or integrity to the whole; especially, it
-robbed both each and all of the power of self-defence against foreign
-assailants. Though indispensable up to a certain point and under
-certain modifications, yet beyond these modifications, which Grecian
-political instinct was far from recognizing, it produced a great
-preponderance of mischief. Although, therefore, this item of the
-convention was in its promise acceptable and popular,—and although
-we shall find it hereafter invoked as a protection in various
-individual cases of injustice,—we must inquire how it was carried
-into execution, before we can pronounce whether it was good or evil,
-the present of a friend or of an enemy.</p>
-
-<p>The succeeding pages will furnish an answer to this inquiry.
-The Lacedæmonians, as “presidents (guarantees or executors) of the
-peace, sent down by the king,”<a id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23"
-class="fnanchor">[23]</a> undertook the duty of execution; and we
-shall see that from the beginning they meant nothing sincerely. They
-did not even attempt any sincere and steady compliance with the
-honest, though undistinguishing, political instinct of the Greek
-mind; much less did they seek to grant as much as was really good,
-and to withhold the remainder. They defined autonomy in such manner,
-and meted it out in such portions, as suited their own political
-interests and purposes. The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">[p.
-12]</span> promise made by the convention, except in so far as it
-enabled them to increase their own power by dismemberment or party
-intervention, proved altogether false and hollow. For if we look
-back to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when they sent to
-Athens to require general autonomy throughout Greece, we shall find
-that the word had then a distinct and serious import; demanding that
-the cities held in dependence by Athens should be left free, which
-freedom Sparta might have ensured for them herself at the close of
-the war, had she not preferred to convert it into a far harsher
-empire. But in 387 (the date of the peace of Antalkidas) there were
-no large body of subjects to be emancipated, except the allies of
-Sparta herself, to whom it was by no means intended to apply. So
-that in fact, what was promised, as well as what was realized, even
-by the most specious item of this disgraceful convention, was—“that
-cities should enjoy autonomy, not for their own comfort and in
-their own way, but for Lacedæmonian convenience;” a significant
-phrase (employed by Perikles,<a id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24"
-class="fnanchor">[24]</a> in the debates preceding the Peloponnesian
-war) which forms a sort of running text for Grecian history during
-the sixteen years between the peace of Antalkidas and the battle of
-Leuktra.</p>
-
-<p>I have already mentioned that the first two applications of
-the newly-proclaimed autonomy, made by the Lacedæmonians, were to
-extort from the Corinthian government the dismissal of its Argeian
-auxiliaries, and to compel Thebes to renounce her ancient presidency
-of the Bœotian federation. The latter especially was an object which
-they had long had at heart;<a id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25"
-class="fnanchor">[25]</a> and by both, their ascendency in Greece
-was much increased. Athens, too, terrified by the new development
-of Persian force as well as partially bribed by the restoration of
-her three islands, into an acceptance of the peace,—was thus robbed
-of her Theban and Corinthian allies, and disabled from opposing the
-Spartan projects. But before we enter upon these projects, it will
-be convenient to turn for a short time to the proceedings of the
-Persians.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">[p. 13]</span></p>
-
-<p>Even before the death of Darius Nothus (father of Artaxerxes and
-Cyrus) Egypt had revolted from the Persians, under a native prince
-named Amyrtæus. To the Grecian leaders who accompanied Cyrus in his
-expedition against his brother, this revolt was well known to have
-much incensed the Persians; so that Klearchus, in the conversation
-which took place after the death of Cyrus about accommodation with
-Artaxerxes, intimated that the Ten Thousand could lend him effectual
-aid in reconquering Egypt.<a id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26"
-class="fnanchor">[26]</a> It was not merely these Greeks who were
-exposed to danger by the death of Cyrus, but also the various
-Persians and other subjects who had lent assistance to him; all of
-whom made submission and tried to conciliate Artaxerxes, except
-Tamos, who had commanded the fleet of Cyrus on the coasts both of
-Ionia and Kilikia. Such was the alarm of Tamos when Tissaphernes
-came down in full power to the coast, that he fled with his fleet
-and treasures to Egypt, to seek protection from king Psammetichus,
-to whom he had rendered valuable service. This traitor, however,
-having so valuable a deposit brought to him, forgot every thing
-else in his avidity to make it sure, and put to death Tamos
-with all his children.<a id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27"
-class="fnanchor">[27]</a> About 395 <small>B.C.</small>, we
-find Nephereus king of Egypt lending aid to the Lacedæmonian
-fleet against Artaxerxes.<a id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28"
-class="fnanchor">[28]</a> Two years afterwards (392-390
-<small>B.C.</small>), during the years immediately succeeding the
-victory of Knidus, and the voyage of Pharnabazus across the Ægean to
-Peloponnesus,—we hear of that satrap as employed with Abrokomas and
-Tithraustes in strenuous but unavailing efforts to reconquer Egypt.<a
-id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a>
-Having thus<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">[p. 14]</span>
-repulsed the Persians, the Egyptian king Akoras is found between
-390-380 <small>B.C.</small>,<a id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30"
-class="fnanchor">[30]</a> sending aid to Evagoras in Cyprus against
-the same enemy. And in spite of farther efforts made afterwards by
-Artaxerxes to reconquer Egypt, the native kings in that country
-maintained their independence for about sixty years in all, until the
-reign of his successor Ochus.</p>
-
-<p>But it was a Grecian enemy,—of means inferior, yet of qualities
-much superior, to any of these Egyptians,—who occupied the chief
-attention of the Persians immediately after the peace of Antalkidas:
-Evagoras, despot of Salamis in Cyprus. Respecting that prince we
-possess a discourse of the most glowing and superabundant eulogy,
-composed after his death for the satisfaction (and probably paid
-for with the money) of his son and successor Nikoklês, by the
-contemporary Isokrates. Allowing as we must do for exaggeration
-and partiality, even the trustworthy features of the picture are
-sufficiently interesting.</p>
-
-<p>Evagoras belonged to a Salaminian stock or Gens called the
-Teukridæ, which numbered among its ancestors the splendid legendary
-names of Teukrus, Telamon, and Æakus; taking its departure, through
-them, from the divine name of Zeus. It was believed that the
-archer Teukrus, after returning from the siege of Troy to (the
-Athenian) Salamis, had emigrated under a harsh order from his father
-Telamon, and given commencement to the city of that name on the
-eastern coast of Cyprus.<a id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31"
-class="fnanchor">[31]</a> As in Sicily, so in Cyprus, the Greek
-and Phœnician elements were found in near contact, though in very
-different proportions. Of the nine or ten separate city communities,
-which divided among them the whole sea-coast, the inferior towns
-being all dependent upon one<span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">[p.
-15]</span> or other of them,—seven pass for Hellenic, the two most
-considerable being Salamis and Soli; three for Phœnician,—Paphos,
-Amathus, and Kitium. Probably, however, there was in each a mixture
-of Greek and Phœnician population, in different proportions.<a
-id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> Each
-was ruled by its own separate prince or despot, Greek or Phœnician.
-The Greek immigrations (though their exact date cannot be assigned)
-appear to have been later in date than the Phœnician. At the time
-of the Ionic revolt (<small>B.C.</small> 496), the preponderance
-was on the side of Hellenism; yet with considerable intermixture
-of Oriental custom. Hellenism was, however, greatly crushed by
-the Persian reconquest of the revolters, accomplished through
-the aid of the Phœnicians<a id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33"
-class="fnanchor">[33]</a> on the opposite continent. And though
-doubtless the victories of Kimon and the Athenians (470-450
-<small>B.C.</small>) partially revived it, yet Perikles, in
-his pacification with the Persians, had prudently relinquished
-Cyprus as well as Egypt;<a id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34"
-class="fnanchor">[34]</a> so that the Grecian element in the
-former,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">[p. 16]</span> receiving
-little extraneous encouragement, became more and more subordinate to
-the Phœnician.</p>
-
-<p>It was somewhere about this time that the reigning princes
-of Salamis, who at the time of the Ionic revolt had been Greeks
-of the Teukrid Gens,<a id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35"
-class="fnanchor">[35]</a> were supplanted and dethroned by a
-Phœnician exile who gained their confidence and made himself
-despot in their place.<a id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36"
-class="fnanchor">[36]</a> To insure his own sceptre, this usurper
-did everything in his power to multiply and strengthen the Phœnician
-population, as well as to discourage and degrade the Hellenic. The
-same policy was not only continued by his successor at Salamis, but
-seems also to have been imitated in several of the other towns;
-insomuch that during most part of the Peloponnesian war, Cyprus
-became sensibly dis-hellenized. The Greeks in the island were harshly
-oppressed; new Greek visitors and merchants were kept off by the
-most repulsive treatment, as well as by threats of those cruel
-mutilations of the body which were habitually employed as penalties
-by the Orientals; while Grecian arts, education, music, poetry,
-and intelligence, were rapidly on the decline.<a id="FNanchor_37"
-href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">[p. 17]</span></p>
-
-<p>Notwithstanding such untoward circumstances, in which the youth
-of the Teukrid Evagoras at Salamis was passed, he manifested at
-an early age so much energy both of mind and body, and so much
-power of winning popularity, that he became at once a marked man
-both among Greeks and Phœnicians. It was about this time that the
-Phœnician despot was slain, through a conspiracy formed by a Kitian
-or Tyrian named Abdêmon, who got possession of his sceptre.<a
-id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> The
-usurper, mistrustful of his position, and anxious to lay hands upon
-all conspicuous persons who might be capable of doing him mischief,
-tried to seize Evagoras; but the latter escaped and passed over to
-Soli and Kilikia. Though thus to all appearance a helpless exile,
-he found means to strike a decisive blow, while the new usurpation,
-stained by its first violences and rapacity, was surrounded by
-enemies, doubters, or neutrals, without having yet established any
-firm footing. He crossed over from Soli in Kilikia, with a small but
-determined band of about fifty followers,—obtained secret admission
-by a postern gate of Salamis,—and assaulted Abdêmon by night in
-his palace. In spite of a vastly superior number of guards, this
-enterprise was conducted with such extraordinary daring and judgment,
-that Abdêmon perished, and Evagoras became despot in his place.<a
-id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a></p>
-
-<p>The splendor of this exploit was quite sufficient to seat Evagoras
-unopposed on the throne, amidst a population always accustomed
-to princely government; while among the Salaminian Greeks he was
-still farther endeared by his Teukrid descent.<a id="FNanchor_40"
-href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> His conduct fully
-justified the expectations entertained. Not merely did he refrain
-from bloodshed, or spoliation, or violence for<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_18">[p. 18]</span> the gratification of personal appetite;
-abstinences remarkable enough in any Grecian despot to stamp his
-reign with letters of gold, and the more remarkable in Evagoras,
-since he had the susceptible temperament of a Greek, though his great
-mental force always kept it under due control.<a id="FNanchor_41"
-href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> But he was also careful
-in inquiring into, and strict in punishing crime, yet without
-those demonstrations of cruel infliction by which an Oriental
-prince displayed his energy.<a id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42"
-class="fnanchor">[42]</a> His government was at the same time
-highly popular and conciliating, as well towards the multitude as
-towards individuals. Indefatigable in his own personal supervision,
-he examined everything for himself, shaped out his own line of
-policy, and kept watch over its execution.<a id="FNanchor_43"
-href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> He was foremost in
-all effort and in all danger. Maintaining undisturbed security,
-he gradually doubled the wealth, commerce, industry, and military
-force, of the city, while his own popularity and renown went on
-increasing.</p>
-
-<p>Above all, it was his first wish to renovate, both in Salamis
-and in Cyprus, that Hellenism which the Phœnician despots of
-the last fifty years had done so much to extinguish or corrupt.
-For aid in this scheme, he seems to have turned his thoughts to
-Athens, with which city he was connected as a Teukrid, by gentile
-and legendary sympathies,—and which was then only just ceasing
-to be the great naval power of the Ægean. For though we cannot
-exactly make out the date at which Evagoras began to reign,
-we<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">[p. 19]</span> may conclude
-it to have been about 411 or 410 <small>B.C.</small> It seems
-to have been shortly after that period that he was visited by
-Andokides the Athenian;<a id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44"
-class="fnanchor">[44]</a> moreover, he must have been a prince
-not merely established, but powerful, when he ventured to harbor
-Konon in 405 <small>B.C.</small>, after the battle of Ægospotami.
-He invited to Salamis fresh immigrants from Attica and other
-parts of Greece, as the prince Philokyprus of Soli had done under
-the auspices of Solon,<a id="FNanchor_45" href="#Footnote_45"
-class="fnanchor">[45]</a> a century and a half before. He took
-especial pains to revive and improve Grecian letters, arts, teaching,
-music, and intellectual tendencies. Such encouragement was so
-successfully administered, that in a few years, without constraint
-or violence, the face of Salamis was changed. The gentleness and
-sociability, the fashions and pursuits, of Hellenism, became again
-predominant; with great influence of example over all the other towns
-of the island.</p>
-
-<p>Had the rise of Evagoras taken place a few years earlier, Athens
-might perhaps have availed herself of the opening to turn her
-ambition eastward, in preference to that disastrous impulse which
-led her westward to Sicily. But coming as he did only at that later
-moment when she was hard pressed to keep up even a defensive war, he
-profited rather by her weakness than by her strength. During those
-closing years of the war, when the Athenian empire was partially
-broken up, and when the Ægean, instead of the tranquillity which it
-had enjoyed for fifty years under Athens, became a scene of contest
-between two rival money-levying fleets,—many out-settlers from
-Athens, who had acquired property in the islands, the Chersonesus, or
-elsewhere, under her guarantee, found themselves insecure in every
-way, and were tempted to change their abodes. Finally, by the defeat
-of Ægospotami (<small>B.C.</small> 405), all such out-settlers as
-then remained were expelled, and forced to seek shelter either at
-Athens (at that moment the least attractive place in Greece), or in
-some other locality. To such persons, not less than to the Athenian
-admiral Konon with his small remnant of Athenian triremes saved out
-of the great defeat, the proclaimed invitations of Evagoras would
-present a harbor of refuge nowhere else to be found. Accordingly,
-we learn that numerous settlers of the best character, from<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_20">[p. 20]</span> different parts of
-Greece, crowded to Salamis.<a id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46"
-class="fnanchor">[46]</a> Many Athenian women, during the years
-of destitution and suffering which preceded as well as followed
-the battle of Ægospotami, were well pleased to emigrate and find
-husbands in that city;<a id="FNanchor_47" href="#Footnote_47"
-class="fnanchor">[47]</a> while throughout the wide range of the
-Lacedæmonian empire, the numerous victims exiled by the harmosts and
-dekarchies had no other retreat on the whole so safe and tempting.
-The extensive plain of Salamis afforded lands for many colonists. On
-what conditions, indeed, they were admitted, we do not know; but the
-conduct of Evagoras as a ruler, gave universal satisfaction.</p>
-
-<p>During the first years of his reign, Evagoras doubtless paid
-his tribute regularly, and took no steps calculated to offend the
-Persian king. But as his power increased, his ambition increased
-also. We find him towards the year 390 <small>B.C.</small>,
-engaged in a struggle not merely with the Persian king, but with
-Amathus and Kitium in his own island, and with the great Phœnician
-cities on the mainland. By what steps, or at what precise period,
-this war began, we cannot determine. At the time of the battle
-of Knidus (394 <small>B.C.</small>) Evagoras had not only paid
-his tribute, but was mainly instrumental in getting the Persian
-fleet placed under Konon to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">[p.
-21]</span> act against the Lacedæmonians, himself serving aboard.<a
-id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> It
-was in fact (if we may believe Isokrates) to the extraordinary
-energy, ability, and power, displayed by him on that occasion in the
-service of Artaxerxes himself, that the jealousy and alarm of the
-latter against him are to be ascribed. Without any provocation, and
-at the very moment when he was profiting by the zealous services of
-Evagoras, the Great King treacherously began to manœuvre against
-him, and forced him into the war in self-defence.<a id="FNanchor_49"
-href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> Evagoras accepted the
-challenge, in spite of the disparity of strength, with such courage
-and efficiency, that he at first gained marked successes. Seconded
-by his son Pnytagoras, he not only worsted and humbled Amathus,
-Kitium, and Soli, which cities, under the prince Agyris, adhered to
-Artaxerxes,—but also equipped a large fleet, attacked the Phœnicians
-on the mainland with so much vigor as even to take the great city
-of Tyre; prevailing, moreover, upon some of the Kilikian towns to
-declare against the Persians.<a id="FNanchor_50" href="#Footnote_50"
-class="fnanchor">[50]</a> He received powerful aid from Akoris,
-the native and independent king in Egypt, as well as from Chabrias
-and the force sent out by the Athenians.<a id="FNanchor_51"
-href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> Beginning apparently
-about 390 <small>B.C.</small>, the war against Evagoras lasted
-something more than ten years, costing the Persians great efforts and
-an immense expenditure of money. Twice did Athens send a squadron to
-his assistance, from gratitude for his long protection to Konon and
-his energetic efforts before and in the battle of Knidus,—though she
-thereby ran every risk of making the Persians her enemies.</p>
-
-<p>The satrap Tiribazus saw that so long as he had on his hands<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_22">[p. 22]</span> a war in Greece, it was
-impossible for him to concentrate his force against the prince of
-Salamis and the Egyptians. Hence, in part, the extraordinary effort
-made by the Persians to dictate, in conjunction with Sparta, the
-peace of Antalkidas, and to get together such a fleet in Ionia as
-should overawe Athens and Thebes into submission. It was one of
-the conditions of that peace that Evagoras should be abandoned;<a
-id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a>
-the whole island of Cyprus being acknowledged as belonging to the
-Persian king. Though thus cut off from Athens, and reduced to no
-other Grecian aid than such mercenaries as he could pay, Evagoras
-was still assisted by Akoris of Egypt, and even by Hekatomnus
-prince of Karia with a secret present of money.<a id="FNanchor_53"
-href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> But the peace of
-Antalkidas being now executed in Asia, the Persian satraps were
-completely masters of the Grecian cities on the Asiatic sea-board,
-and were enabled to convey round to Kilikia and Cyprus not only
-their whole fleet from Ionia, but also additional contingents from
-these very Grecian cities. A large portion of the Persian force
-acting against Cyprus was thus Greek, yet seemingly acting by
-constraint, neither well paid nor well used,<a id="FNanchor_54"
-href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> and therefore not very
-efficient.</p>
-
-<p>The satraps Tiribazus and Orontes commanded the land force, a
-large portion of which was transported across to Cyprus; the admiral
-Gaos was at the head of the fleet, which held its station at Kitium
-in the south of the island. It was here that Evagoras, having
-previously gained a battle on land, attacked them. By extraordinary
-efforts he had got together a fleet of two hundred triremes,
-nearly equal in number to theirs; but after a hard-fought<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_23">[p. 23]</span> contest, in which he at
-first seemed likely to be victorious, he underwent a complete naval
-defeat, which disqualified him from keeping the sea, and enabled
-the Persians to block up Salamis as well by sea as by land.<a
-id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a>
-Though thus reduced to his own single city, however, Evagoras
-defended himself with unshaken resolution, still sustained by aid
-from Akoris in Egypt; while Tyre and several towns in Kilikia also
-continued in revolt against Artaxerxes; so that the efforts of the
-Persians were distracted, and the war was not concluded until ten
-years after its commencement.<a id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56"
-class="fnanchor">[56]</a> It cost them on the whole (if we
-may believe Isokrates)<a id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57"
-class="fnanchor">[57]</a> fifteen thousand talents in money, and such
-severe losses in men, that Tiribazus acceded to the propositions
-of Evagoras for peace, consenting to leave him in full possession
-of Salamis, under payment of a stipulated tribute, “like a slave
-to his master.” These last words were required by the satrap to be
-literally inserted in the convention; but Evagoras peremptorily
-refused his consent, demanding that the tribute should be recognized
-as paid by “one<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">[p. 24]</span>
-king to another.” Rather than concede this point of honor, he even
-broke off the negotiation, and resolved again to defend himself
-to the uttermost. He was rescued, after the siege had been yet
-farther prolonged, by a dispute which broke out between the two
-commanders of the Persian army. Orontes, accusing Tiribazus of
-projected treason and rebellion against the king, in conjunction
-with Sparta, caused him to be sent for as prisoner to Susa, and
-thus became sole commander. But as the besieging army was already
-wearied out by the obstinate resistance of Salamis, he consented
-to grant the capitulation, stipulating only for the tribute, and
-exchanging the offensive phrase enforced by Tiribazus, for the
-amendment of the other side.<a id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58"
-class="fnanchor">[58]</a></p>
-
-<p>It was thus that Evagoras was relieved from his besieging enemies,
-and continued for the remainder of his life as tributary prince
-of Salamis under the Persians. He was no farther engaged in war,
-nor was his general popularity among the Salaminians diminished
-by the hardships which they had gone through along with him.<a
-id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a>
-His prudence calmed the rankling antipathy of the Great King, who
-would gladly have found a pretext for breaking the treaty. His
-children were numerous, and lived in harmony as well with him as
-with each other. Isokrates specially notices this fact, standing
-as it did in marked contrast with the family-relations of most of
-the Grecian despots, usually stained with jealousies, antipathies,
-and conflict, often with actual bloodshed.<a id="FNanchor_60"
-href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> But he omits to notice
-the incident whereby Evagoras perished; an incident not in keeping
-with that superhuman good fortune and favor from the gods, of which
-the Panegyrical Oration boasts as having been vouchsafed to the
-hero throughout his life.<a id="FNanchor_61" href="#Footnote_61"
-class="fnanchor">[61]</a> It was seemingly not very long after
-the peace, that a Sa<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">[p.
-25]</span>laminian named Nikokreon formed a conspiracy against his
-life and dominion, but was detected, by a singular accident, before
-the moment of execution, and forced to seek safety in flight. He
-left behind him a youthful daughter in his harem, under the care of
-an eunuch (a Greek, born in Elis) named Thrasydæus; who, full of
-vindictive sympathy in his master’s cause, made known the beauty
-of the young lady both to Evagoras himself and to Pnytagoras, the
-most distinguished of his sons, partner in the gallant defence
-of Salamis against the Persians. Both of them were tempted, each
-unknown to the other, to make a secret assignation for being
-conducted to her chamber by the eunuch; both of them were there
-assassinated by his hand.<a id="FNanchor_62" href="#Footnote_62"
-class="fnanchor">[62]</a></p>
-
-<p>Thus perished a Greek of preëminent vigor and intelligence,
-remarkably free from the vices usual in Grecian despots, and
-form<span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">[p. 26]</span>ing a strong
-contrast in this respect with his contemporary Dionysius, whose
-military energy is so deeply stained by crime and violence. Nikoklês,
-the son of Evagoras, reigned at Salamis after him, and showed
-much regard, accompanied by munificent presents, to the Athenian
-Isokrates; who compliments him as a pacific and well-disposed prince,
-attached to Greek pursuits and arts, conversant by personal study
-with Greek philosophy, and above all, copying his father in that just
-dealing and absence of wrong towards person or property, which had so
-much promoted the comfort as well as the prosperity of the city.<a
-id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a></p>
-
-<p>We now revert from the episode respecting Evagoras,—interesting
-not less from the eminent qualities of that prince than from the
-glimpse of Hellenism struggling with the Phœnician element in
-Cyprus,—to the general consequences of the peace of Antalkidas in
-Central Greece. For the first time since the battle of Mykalê in
-479 <small>B.C.</small>, the Persians were now really masters of
-all the Greeks on the Asiatic coast. The satraps lost no time in
-confirming their dominion. In all the cities which they suspected,
-they built citadels and planted permanent garrisons. In some
-cases, their mistrust or displeasure was carried so far as to
-raze the town altogether.<a id="FNanchor_64" href="#Footnote_64"
-class="fnanchor">[64]</a> And thus these cities, having already once
-changed their position greatly for the worse, by passing from easy
-subjection under Athens to the harsh rule of Lacedæmonian harmosts
-and native decemvirs,—were now transferred to masters yet more
-oppressive and more completely without the pale of Hellenic sympathy.
-Both in public extortion, and in wrong doing towards individuals,
-the commandant and his mercenaries, whom the satrap maintained, were
-probably more rapacious, and certainly more unrestrained, than even
-the harmosts of Sparta. Moreover, the Persian grandees required
-beautiful boys as eunuchs for their service, and beautiful women
-as inmates of their harems.<a id="FNanchor_65" href="#Footnote_65"
-class="fnanchor">[65]</a> What was taken for their convenience
-admitted neither<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">[p. 27]</span>
-of recovery nor redress; and Grecian women, if not more beautiful
-than many of the native Asiatics, were at least more intelligent,
-lively, and seductive,—as we may read in the history of that
-<span class="replace" id="tn_1" title="In the printed book:
-Phokæn">Phokæan</span> lady, the companion of Cyrus, who was taken
-captive at Kunaxa. Moreover, these Asiatic Greeks, when passing into
-the hands of Oriental masters, came under the maxims and sentiment
-of Orientals, respecting the infliction of pain or torture,—maxims
-not only more cruel than those of the Greeks, but also making
-little distinction between freemen and slaves.<a id="FNanchor_66"
-href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a> The difference between
-the Greeks and Phœnicians in Cyprus, on this point, has been just
-noticed; and doubtless the difference between Greeks and Persians
-was still more marked. While the Asiatic Greeks were thus made
-over by Sparta and the Perso-Spartan convention of Antalkidas, to
-a condition in every respect worse, they were at the same time
-thrown in, as reluctant auxiliaries, to strengthen the hands of the
-Great King against other Greeks,—against Evagoras in Cyprus,—and
-above all, against the islands adjoining the coast of Asia,—Chios,
-Samos, Rhodes, etc.<a id="FNanchor_67" href="#Footnote_67"
-class="fnanchor">[67]</a> These islands were now exposed to the same
-hazard, from their overwhelming Persian neighbors, as that from which
-they had been rescued nearly a century before by the Confederacy
-of Delos, and by the Athenian empire into which that Confederacy
-was transformed. All the tutelary combination that the genius, the
-energy, and the Pan-hellenic ardor, of Athens had first organized,
-and so long kept up,—was now broken up; while Sparta, to whom
-its<span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">[p. 28]</span> extinction was
-owing, in surrendering the Asiatic Greeks, had destroyed the security
-even of the islanders.</p>
-
-<p>It soon appeared, however, how much Sparta herself had gained by
-this surrender in respect to dominion nearer home. The government
-of Corinth,—wrested from the party friendly to Argos, deprived of
-Argeian auxiliaries, and now in the hands of the restored Corinthian
-exiles who were the most devoted partisans of Sparta,—looked to her
-for support, and made her mistress of the Isthmus, either for offence
-or for defence. She thus gained the means of free action against
-Thebes, the enemy upon whom her attention was first directed. Thebes
-was now the object of Spartan antipathy, not less than Athens had
-formerly been; especially on the part of King Agesilaus, who had to
-avenge the insult offered to himself at the sacrifice near Aulis,
-as well as the strenuous resistance on the field of Koroneia. He
-was at the zenith of his political influence; so that his intense
-miso-Theban sentiment made Sparta, now becoming aggressive on all
-sides, doubly aggressive against Thebes. More prudent Spartans,
-like Antalkidas, warned him<a id="FNanchor_68" href="#Footnote_68"
-class="fnanchor">[68]</a> that his persevering hostility would
-ultimately kindle in the Thebans a fatal energy of military
-resistance and organization. But the warning was despised until it
-was too fully realized in the development of the great military
-genius of Epaminondas, and in the defeat of Leuktra.</p>
-
-<p>I have already mentioned that in the solemnity of exchanging
-oaths to the peace of Antalkidas, the Thebans had hesitated at
-first to recognize the autonomy of the other Bœotian cities; upon
-which Agesilaus had manifested a fierce impatience to exclude them
-from the treaty, and attack them single-handed.<a id="FNanchor_69"
-href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> Their timely accession
-balked him in this impulse; but it enabled him to enter upon a
-series of measures highly humiliating to the dignity as well as to
-the power of Thebes. All the Bœotian cities were now proclaimed
-autonomous under the convention. As solicitor, guarantee, and
-interpreter, of that convention, Sparta either had, or professed to
-have, the right of guarding their autonomy against dangers, actual
-or contingent, from their previous Vorort or presiding city. For
-this purpose she availed herself of this<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_29">[p. 29]</span> moment of change to organize in each
-of them a local oligarchy, composed of partisans adverse to Thebes
-as well as devoted to herself, and upheld in case of need by a
-Spartan harmost and garrison.<a id="FNanchor_70" href="#Footnote_70"
-class="fnanchor">[70]</a> Such an internal revolution grew almost
-naturally out of the situation; since the previous leaders, and
-the predominant sentiment in most of the towns, seem to have been
-favorable to Bœotian unity, and to the continued presidency of
-Thebes. These leaders would therefore find themselves hampered,
-intimidated, and disqualified, under the new system, while those who
-had before been an opposition minority would come forward with a bold
-and decided policy, like Kritias and Theramenes at Athens after the
-surrender of the city to Lysander. The new leaders doubtless would
-rather invite than repel the establishment of a Spartan harmost in
-their town, as a security to themselves against resistance from their
-own citizens as well as against attacks from<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_30">[p. 30]</span> Thebes, and as a means of placing them
-under the assured conditions of a Lysandrian dekarchy. Though most of
-the Bœotian cities were thus, on the whole, favorable to Thebes,—and
-though Sparta thrust upon them the boon, which she called autonomy,
-from motives of her own, and not from their solicitation,—yet,
-Orchomenus and Thespiæ, over whom the presidency of Thebes appears
-to have been harshly exercised, were adverse to her, and favorable
-to the Spartan alliance.<a id="FNanchor_71" href="#Footnote_71"
-class="fnanchor">[71]</a> These two cities were strongly garrisoned
-by Sparta, and formed her main stations in Bœotia.<a id="FNanchor_72"
-href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a></p>
-
-<p>The presence of such garrisons, one on each side of Thebes,—the
-discontinuance of the Bœotarchs, with the breaking up of all symbols
-and proceedings of the Bœotian federation,—and the establishment of
-oligarchies devoted to Sparta in the other cities,—was doubtless a
-deep wound to the pride of the Thebans. But there was another wound
-still deeper, and this the Lacedæmonians forthwith proceeded to
-inflict,—the restoration of Platæa.</p>
-
-<p>A melancholy interest attaches both to the locality of this
-town, as one of the brightest scenes of Grecian glory,—and to its
-brave and faithful population, victims of an exposed position
-combined with numerical feebleness. Especially, we follow with a
-sort of repugnance the capricious turns of policy which dictated
-the Spartan behavior towards them. One hundred and twenty years
-before, the Platæans had thrown themselves upon Sparta, to entreat
-her protection against Thebes. The Spartan king Kleomenes had then
-declined the obligation as too distant, and had recommended them to
-ally themselves with Athens.<a id="FNanchor_73" href="#Footnote_73"
-class="fnanchor">[73]</a> This recommendation, though dictated
-chiefly by a wish to raise contention between Athens and Thebes,
-was complied with; and the alliance, severing Platæa altogether
-from the Bœotian confederacy, turned out both advantageous and
-honorable to her until the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.
-At that time, it suited the policy of the Spartans to uphold and
-strengthen in every way the supremacy of Thebes over the Bœotian
-cities; it was altogether by Spartan intervention, indeed, that the
-power of Thebes was reës<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">[p.
-31]</span>tablished, after the great prostration as well as disgrace
-which she had undergone, as traitor to Hellas and zealous in the
-service of Mardonius.<a id="FNanchor_74" href="#Footnote_74"
-class="fnanchor">[74]</a> Athens, on the other hand, was at that
-time doing her best to break up the Bœotian federation, and to enrol
-its various cities as her allies; in which project, though doubtless
-suggested by and conducive to her own ambition, she was at that time
-(460-445 <small>B.C.</small>) perfectly justifiable on Pan-hellenic
-grounds; seeing that Thebes as their former chief had so recently
-enlisted them all in the service of Xerxes, and might be expected to
-do the same again if a second Persian invasion should be attempted.
-Though for a time successful, Athens was expelled from Bœotia by
-the defeat of Korôneia; and at the beginning of the Peloponnesian
-war, the whole Bœotian federation (except Platæa, was united under
-Thebes, in bitter hostility against her. The first blow of the war,
-even prior to any declaration, was struck by Thebes in her abortive
-nocturnal attempt to surprise Platæa. In the third year of the war,
-king Archidamus, at the head of the full Lacedæmonian force, laid
-siege to the latter town; which, after an heroic defence and a long
-blockade, at length surrendered under the extreme pressure of famine;
-yet not before one half its brave defenders had forced their way
-out over the blockading wall, and escaped to Athens, where all the
-Platæan old men, women, and children, had been safely lodged before
-the siege. By a cruel act which stands among the capital iniquities
-of Grecian warfare, the Lacedæmonians had put to death all the
-Platæan captives, two hundred in number, who fell into their hands;
-the town of Platæa had been razed, and its whole territory, joined
-to Thebes, had remained ever since cultivated on Theban account.<a
-id="FNanchor_75" href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> The
-surviving Platæans had been dealt with kindly and hospitably by the
-Athenians. A qualified right of citizenship was conceded to them at
-Athens, and when Skionê was recaptured in 420 <small>B.C.</small>,
-that town (vacant by the slaughter of its captive citizens) was
-handed over to the Platæans as a residence.<a id="FNanchor_76"
-href="#Footnote_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a> Compelled to evacuate
-Skionê, they were obliged at the close of the Peloponnesian war,<a
-id="FNanchor_77" href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a>
-to return to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">[p. 32]</span>
-Athens, where the remainder of them were residing at the time
-of the peace of Antalkidas; little dreaming that those who had
-destroyed their town and their fathers forty years before, would now
-turn round and restore it.<a id="FNanchor_78" href="#Footnote_78"
-class="fnanchor">[78]</a></p>
-
-<p>Such restoration, whatever might be the ostensible grounds on
-which the Spartans pretended to rest it, was not really undertaken
-either to carry out the convention of Antalkidas, which guaranteed
-only the autonomy of <i>existing</i> towns,—or to repair previous
-injustice, since the prior destruction had been the deliberate act
-of themselves, and of King Archidamus the father of Agesilaus,—but
-simply as a step conducive to the present political views of Sparta.
-And towards this object it was skilfully devised. It weakened the
-Thebans, not only by wresting from them what had been, for about
-forty years, a part of their territory and property; but also by
-establishing upon it a permanent stronghold in the occupation of
-their bitter enemies, assisted by a Spartan garrison. It furnished
-an additional station for such a garrison in Bœotia, with the full
-consent of the newly-established inhabitants. And more than all,
-it introduced a subject of contention between Athens and Thebes,
-calculated to prevent the two from hearty coöperation afterwards
-against Sparta. As the sympathy of the Platæans with Athens was no
-less ancient and cordial than their antipathy against Thebes, we
-may probably conclude that the restoration of the town was an act
-acceptable to the Athenians; at least, at first, until they saw
-the use made of it, and the position which Sparta came to occupy
-in reference to Greece generally. Many of the Platæans, during
-their residence at Athens, had intermarried with Athenian women,<a
-id="FNanchor_79" href="#Footnote_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a> who
-now, probably, accompanied their husbands to the restored little
-town on the north of Kithæron, near the southern bank of the river
-Asôpus.</p>
-
-<p>Had the Platæans been restored to a real and honorable autonomy,
-such as they enjoyed in alliance with Athens before the Peloponnesian
-war, we should have cordially sympathized with the event. But the
-sequel will prove—and their own subsequent statement emphatically
-sets forth—that they were a mere dependency of Sparta, and an outpost
-of Spartan operations against<span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">[p.
-33]</span> Thebes.<a id="FNanchor_80" href="#Footnote_80"
-class="fnanchor">[80]</a> They were a part of the great revolution
-which the Spartans now brought about in Bœotia; whereby Thebes
-was degraded from the president of a federation into an isolated
-autonomous city, while the other Bœotian cities, who had been
-before members of the federation, were elevated each for itself
-into the like autonomy; or rather (to substitute the real truth<a
-id="FNanchor_81" href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> in
-place of Spartan professions) they became enrolled and sworn in as
-dependent allies of Sparta, under oligarchical factions devoted to
-her purposes and resting upon her for support. That the Thebans
-should submit to such a revolution, and, above all, to the sight of
-Platæa as an independent neighbor with a territory abstracted from
-themselves,—proves how much they felt their own weakness, and how
-irresistible at this moment was the ascendency of their great enemy,
-in perverting to her own ambition the popular lure of universal
-autonomy held out by the peace of Antalkidas. Though compelled to
-acquiesce, the Thebans waited in hopes of some turn of fortune
-which would enable them to reörganize the Bœotian federation; while
-their hostile sentiment towards Sparta was not the less bitter for
-being suppressed. Sparta on her part kept constant watch to prevent
-the reunion of Bœotia;<a id="FNanchor_82" href="#Footnote_82"
-class="fnanchor">[82]</a> an object in which she was for a
-time completely successful, and was even<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_34">[p. 34]</span> enabled, beyond her hopes, to become
-possessed of Thebes itself,<a id="FNanchor_83" href="#Footnote_83"
-class="fnanchor">[83]</a> through a party of traitors within,—as will
-presently appear.</p>
-
-<p>In these measures regarding Bœotia, we recognize the vigorous
-hand, and the miso-Theban spirit, of Agesilaus. He was at this time
-the great director of Spartan foreign policy, though opposed by his
-more just and moderate colleague king Agesipolis,<a id="FNanchor_84"
-href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a> as well as by a
-section of the leading Spartans, who reproached Agesilaus with
-his project of ruling Greece by means of subservient local
-despots or oligarchies in the various cities,<a id="FNanchor_85"
-href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a> and who contended
-that the autonomy promised by the peace of Antalkidas ought to be
-left to develop itself freely, without any coërcive intervention
-on the part of Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_86" href="#Footnote_86"
-class="fnanchor">[86]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">[p. 35]</span></p>
-
-<p>Far from any wish thus to realize the terms of peace which they
-had themselves imposed, the Lacedæmonians took advantage of an early
-moment after becoming free from their enemies in Bœotia and Corinth,
-to strain their authority over their allies beyond its previous
-limits. Passing in review<a id="FNanchor_87" href="#Footnote_87"
-class="fnanchor">[87]</a> the conduct of each during the war,
-they resolved to make an example of the city of Mantinea. Some
-acts, not of positive hostility, but of equivocal fidelity, were
-imputed to the Mantineans. They were accused of having been slack
-in performance of their military obligations, sometimes even to the
-length of withholding their contingent altogether, under pretence of
-a season of religious truce; of furnishing corn in time of war to
-the hostile Argeians; and of plainly manifesting their disaffected
-feeling towards Sparta,—chagrin at every success which she
-obtained,—satisfaction, when she chanced to experience a reverse.<a
-id="FNanchor_88" href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a>
-The Spartan ephors now sent an envoy to Mantinea, denouncing all
-such past behavior, and peremptorily requiring that the walls of
-the city should be demolished, as the only security for future
-penitence and amendment. As compliance was refused, they despatched
-an army, summoning the allied contingents generally for the purpose
-of enforcing the sentence.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">[p.
-36]</span> They intrusted the command to king Agesipolis, since
-Agesilaus excused himself from the duty, on the ground that the
-Mantineans had rendered material service to his father Archidamus
-in the dangerous Messenian war which had beset Sparta during the
-early part of his reign.<a id="FNanchor_89" href="#Footnote_89"
-class="fnanchor">[89]</a></p>
-
-<p>Having first attempted to intimidate the Mantineans by ravaging
-their lands, Agesipolis commenced the work of blockade by digging
-a ditch around the town; half of his soldiers being kept on guard,
-while the rest worked with the spade. The ditch being completed, he
-prepared to erect a wall of circumvallation. But being apprised that
-the preceding harvest had been so good, as to leave a large stock
-of provision in the town, and to render the process of starving it
-out tedious both for Sparta and for her allies,—he tried a more
-rapid method of accomplishing his object. As the river Ophis, of
-considerable breadth for a Grecian stream, passed through the
-middle of the town, he dammed up its efflux on the lower side;<a
-id="FNanchor_90" href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a> thus
-causing it to inundate the interior of the<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_37">[p. 37]</span> city and threaten the stability of the
-walls; which seem to have been of no great height, and built of
-sun-burnt bricks. Disappointed in their application to Athens for
-aid,<a id="FNanchor_91" href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a>
-and unable to provide extraneous support for their tottering towers,
-the Mantineans were compelled to solicit a capitulation. But
-Agesipolis now refused to grant the request, except on condition
-that not only the fortifications of their city, but the city itself,
-should be in great part demolished; and that the inhabitants
-should be re-distributed into those five villages, which had been
-brought together, many years before, to form the aggregate city of
-Mantinea. To this also the Mantineans were obliged to submit, and the
-capitulation was ratified.</p>
-
-<p>Though nothing was said in the terms of it about the chiefs of
-the Mantinean democratical government, yet these latter, conscious
-that they were detested both by their own oligarchical opposition
-and by the Lacedæmonians, accounted themselves certain of being put
-to death. And such would assuredly have been their fate, had not
-Pausanias (the late king of Sparta, now in exile at Tegea), whose
-good opinion they had always enjoyed, obtained as a personal favor
-from his son Agesipolis the lives of the most obnoxious, sixty in
-number, on condition that they should depart into exile. Agesipolis
-had much difficulty in accomplishing the wishes of his father. His
-Lacedæmonian soldiers were ranged in arms on both sides of the gate
-by which the obnoxious men went out; and Xenophon notices it as a
-signal mark of Lacedæmonian discipline, that they could keep their
-spears unemployed when disarmed enemies were thus within their
-reach; especially as the oligarchical Mantineans manifested the most
-murderous propensities, and were exceedingly difficult to control.<a
-id="FNanchor_92" href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a> As at
-Peiræus before, so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">[p. 38]</span>
-here at Mantinea again,—the liberal, but unfortunate, king Pausanias
-is found interfering in the character of mediator to soften the
-ferocity of political antipathies.</p>
-
-<p>The city of Mantinea was now broken up, and the inhabitants
-were distributed again into the five constituent villages. Out of
-four-fifths of the population, each man pulled down his house in
-the city, and rebuilt it in the village near to which his property
-lay. The remaining fifth continued to occupy Mantinea as a village.
-Each village was placed under oligarchical government, and left
-unfortified. Though at first (says Xenophon) the change proved
-troublesome and odious, yet presently, when men found themselves
-resident upon their landed properties,—and still more, when they felt
-themselves delivered from the vexatious demagogues,—the new situation
-became more popular than the old. The Lacedæmonians were still
-better satisfied. Instead of one city of Mantinea, five distinct
-Arcadian villages now stood enrolled in their catalogue of allies.
-They assigned to each a separate xenâgus (Spartan officer destined
-to the command of each allied contingent), and the military service
-of all was henceforward performed with the utmost regularity.<a
-id="FNanchor_93" href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a></p>
-
-<p>Such was the dissection or cutting into parts of the ancient
-city Mantinea; one of the most odious acts of high-handed Spartan
-despotism. Its true character is veiled by the partiality of the
-historian, who recounts it with a confident assurance, that after the
-trouble of moving was over, the population felt themselves deci<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_39">[p. 39]</span>dedly bettered by the
-change. Such an assurance is only to be credited, on the ground that,
-being captives under the Grecian laws of war, they may have been
-thankful to escape the more terrible liabilities of death or personal
-slavery, at the price of forfeiting their civic community. That their
-feelings towards the change were those of genuine aversion, is shown
-by their subsequent conduct after the battle of Leuktra. As soon as
-the fear of Sparta was removed, they flocked together, with unanimous
-impulse, to reconstitute and refortify their dismantled city.<a
-id="FNanchor_94" href="#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a> It
-would have been strange indeed had the fact been otherwise; for
-attachment to a civic community was the strongest political instinct
-of the Greek mind. The citizen of a town was averse—often most
-unhappily averse—to compromise the separate and autonomous working of
-his community by joining in any larger political combination, however
-equitably framed, and however it might promise on the whole an
-increase of Hellenic dignity. But still more vehemently did he shrink
-from the idea of breaking up his town into separate villages, and
-exchanging the character of a citizen for that of a villager, which
-was nothing less than great<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">[p.
-40]</span> social degradation, in the eyes of Greeks generally,
-Spartans not excepted.<a id="FNanchor_95" href="#Footnote_95"
-class="fnanchor">[95]</a></p>
-
-<p>In truth the sentence executed by the Spartans against Mantinea
-was in point of dishonor, as well as of privation, one of the
-severest which could be inflicted on free Greeks. All the distinctive
-glory and superiority of Hellenism,—all the intellectual and artistic
-manifestations,—all that there was of literature and philosophy,
-or of refined and rational sociality,—depended upon the city-life
-of the people. And the influence of Sparta, during the period of
-her empire, was peculiarly mischievous and retrograde, as tending
-not only to decompose the federations such as Bœotia into isolated
-towns, but even to decompose suspected towns such as Mantinea into
-villages; all for the purpose of rendering each of them exclusively
-dependent upon herself. Athens, during her period of empire, had
-exercised no such disuniting influence; still less Thebes, whom we
-shall hereafter find coming forward actively to found the new and
-great cities of Megalopolis and Messênê. The imperial tendencies of
-Sparta are worse than those of either Athens or Thebes; including
-less of improving or Pan-hellenic sympathies, and leaning the most
-systematically upon subservient factions in each subordinate city. In
-the very treatment of Mantinea just recounted, it is clear that the
-attack of Sparta was welcomed at least, if not originally invited, by
-the oligarchical party of the place, who sought to grasp the power
-into their own hands and to massacre their political opponents. In
-the first object they completely succeeded, and their government
-probably was more assured in the five villages than it would have
-been in the entire town. In the second, nothing prevented them
-from succeeding except the accidental intervention of the exile
-Pausanias; an accident, which alone rescued the Spartan name from
-the additional disgrace of a political massacre, over and above the
-lasting odium incurred by the act itself; by breaking up an ancient
-autonomous city, which had shown no act of overt enmity, and which
-was so moderate in its democratical manifestations as to receive
-the fa<span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">[p. 41]</span>vorable
-criticism of judges rather disinclined towards democracy generally.<a
-id="FNanchor_96" href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a>
-Thirty years before, when Mantinea had conquered certain neighboring
-Arcadian districts, and had been at actual war with Sparta to
-preserve them, the victorious Spartans exacted nothing more than the
-reduction of the city to its original district;<a id="FNanchor_97"
-href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> now they are satisfied
-with nothing less than the partition of the city into unfortified
-villages, though there had been no actual war preceding. So much had
-Spartan power, as well as Spartan despotic propensity, progressed
-during this interval.</p>
-
-<p>The general language of Isokrates, Xenophon, and Diodorus,<a
-id="FNanchor_98" href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a>
-indicates that this severity towards Mantinea was only the most
-stringent among a series of severities, extended by the Lacedæmonians
-through their whole confederacy, and operating upon all such of its
-members as gave them ground for dissatisfaction or mistrust. During
-the ten years after the surrender of Athens, they had been lords of
-the Grecian world both by land and sea, with a power never before
-possessed by any Grecian state; until the battle of Knidus, and
-the combination of Athens, Thebes, Argos, and Corinth, seconded by
-Persia, had broken up their empire at sea, and much endangered it on
-land. At length the peace of Antalkidas, enlisting Persia on their
-side (at the price of the liberty of the Asiatic Greeks), had enabled
-them to dissolve the hostile combination against them. The general
-autonomy, of which they were the authorized interpreters, meant
-nothing more than a separation of the Bœotian cities from Thebes,<a
-id="FNanchor_99" href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a> and
-of Corinth from Argos,—being noway intended to apply to the relation
-between Sparta and her allies. Having thus their hands free, the
-Lacedæmonians applied themselves to raise their ascendency on land to
-the point where it had stood before the battle of Knidus, and even to
-regain as much as possible of their empire at sea. To bring back a
-dominion such as that of the Lysandrian harmosts and dekarchies, and
-to reconstitute a local oligarchy of their most devoted partisans,
-in each of those cities where the government had been somewhat
-liberalized during the recent period of war,—was their systematic
-policy.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">[p. 42]</span></p>
-
-<p>Those exiles who had incurred the condemnation of their
-fellow-citizens for subservience to Sparta, now found the season
-convenient for soliciting Spartan intervention to procure their
-return. It was in this manner that a body of exiled political
-leaders from Phlius,—whose great merit it was that the city when
-under their government had been zealous in service to Sparta, but
-had now become lukewarm or even disaffected in the hands of their
-opponents,—obtained from the ephors a message, polite in form but
-authoritative in substance, addressed to the Phliasians, requiring
-that the exiles should be restored, as friends of Sparta banished
-without just cause.<a id="FNanchor_100" href="#Footnote_100"
-class="fnanchor">[100]</a></p>
-
-<p>While the Spartan power, for the few years succeeding the peace
-of Antalkidas, was thus decidedly in ascending movement on land,
-efforts were also made to reëstablish it at sea. Several of the
-Cyclades and other smaller islands were again rendered tributary. In
-this latter sphere, however, Athens became her competitor. Since the
-peace, and the restoration of Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, combined
-with the refortified Peiræus and its Long Walls,—Athenian commerce
-and naval power had been reviving, though by slow and humble steps.
-Like the naval force of England compared with France, the warlike
-marine of Athens rested upon a considerable commercial marine,
-which latter hardly existed at all in Laconia. Sparta had no seamen
-except constrained Helots or paid foreigners;<a id="FNanchor_101"
-href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a> while the commerce
-of Peiræus had both required and maintained a numerous population
-of this character. The harbor of Peiræus was convenient in respect
-of accommodation, and well-stocked with artisans,—while Laconia
-had few artisans, and was notoriously destitute of harbors.<a
-id="FNanchor_102" href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a>
-Accordingly, in this maritime competition, Athens, though but the
-shadow of her former self, started at an advantage as compared with
-Sparta, and in spite of the superiority of the latter on land, was
-enabled to compete with her in acquiring tributary dependencies
-among the smaller islands of the Ægean. To these latter, who had
-no marine of their own, and who (like Athens herself) required
-habitual supplies of imported corn, it was important to<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_43">[p. 43]</span> obtain both access to
-Peiræus and protection from the Athenian triremes against that swarm
-of pirates, who showed themselves after the peace of Antalkidas, when
-there was no predominant maritime state; besides which, the market
-of Peiræus was often supplied with foreign corn from the Crimea,
-through the preference shown by the princes of Bosphorus to Athens,
-at a time when vessels from other places could obtain no cargo.<a
-id="FNanchor_103" href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a>
-A moderate tribute paid to Athens would secure to the tributary
-island greater advantages than if paid to Sparta,—with at least
-equal protection. Probably, the influence of Athens over these
-islanders was farther aided by the fact, that she administered the
-festivals, and lent out the funds, of the holy temple at Delos.
-We know by inscriptions remaining, that large sums were borrowed
-at interest from the temple-treasure, not merely by individual
-islanders, but also by the island-cities collectively,—Naxos, Andros,
-Tenos, Siphnos, Seriphos. The Amphiktyonic council who dispensed
-these loans (or at least the presiding members) were Athenians
-named annually at Athens.<a id="FNanchor_104" href="#Footnote_104"
-class="fnanchor">[104]</a> Moreover, these islanders rendered
-religious homage and attendance at the Delian festivals, and were
-thus brought within the range of a central Athenian influence,
-capable, under favorable circumstances, of being strengthened and
-rendered even politically important.</p>
-
-<p>By such helps, Athens was slowly acquiring to herself a second
-maritime confederacy, which we shall presently find to be of
-considerable moment, though never approaching the grandeur of her
-former empire; so that in the year 380 <small>B.C.</small>, when
-Isokrates published his Panegyrical Discourse (seven years after the
-peace of Antalkidas), though her general power was still slender
-compared with the overruling might of Sparta,<a id="FNanchor_105"
-href="#Footnote_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a> yet her navy had
-already<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">[p. 44]</span> made such
-progress, that he claims for her the right of taking the command
-by sea, in that crusade which he strenuously enforces, of Athens
-and Sparta in harmonious unity at the head of all Greece, against
-the Asiatic barbarians.<a id="FNanchor_106" href="#Footnote_106"
-class="fnanchor">[106]</a></p>
-
-<p>It would seem that a few years after the peace of Antalkidas,
-Sparta became somewhat ashamed of having surrendered the Asiatic
-Greeks to Persia; and that king Agesipolis and other leading
-Spartans encouraged the scheme of a fresh Grecian expedition
-against Asia, in compliance with propositions from some disaffected
-subjects of Artaxerxes.<a id="FNanchor_107" href="#Footnote_107"
-class="fnanchor">[107]</a> Upon some such project, currently
-discussed though never realized, Isokrates probably built his
-Panegyrical Oration, composed in a lofty strain of patriotic
-eloquence (380 <small>B.C.</small>) to stimulate both Sparta and
-Athens in the cause, and calling on both, as joint chiefs of Greece,
-to suspend dissensions at home for a great Pan-hellenic manifestation
-against the common enemy abroad. But whatever ideas of this kind the
-Spartan leaders may have entertained, their attention was taken off,
-about 382 <small>B.C.</small> by movements in a more remote region
-of the Grecian world, which led to important consequences.</p>
-
-<p>Since the year 414 <small>B.C.</small> (when the Athenians were
-engaged in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">[p. 45]</span> the
-siege of Syracuse), we have heard nothing either of the kings of
-Macedonia, or of the Chalkidic Grecian cities in the peninsula of
-Thrace adjoining Macedonia. Down to that year, Athens still retained
-a portion of her maritime empire in those regions. The Platæans were
-still in possession of Skiônê (on the isthmus of Pallênê) which she
-had assigned to them; while the Athenian admiral Euetion, seconded
-by many hired Thracians, and even by Perdikkas king of Macedonia,
-undertook a fruitless siege to reconquer Amphipolis on the Strymon.<a
-id="FNanchor_108" href="#Footnote_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a>
-But the fatal disaster at Syracuse having disabled Athens from
-maintaining such distant interests, they were lost to her along with
-her remaining empire,—perhaps earlier; though we do not know how.
-At the same time, during the last years of the Peloponnesian war,
-the kingdom of Macedonia greatly increased in power; partly, we may
-conceive, from the helpless condition of Athens,—but still more
-from the abilities and energy of Archelaus, son and successor of
-Perdikkas.</p>
-
-<p>The course of succession among the Macedonian princes seems not
-to have been settled, so that disputes and bloodshed took place at
-the death of several of them. Moreover, there were distinct tribes
-of Macedonians, who, though forming part, really or nominally, of
-the dominion of the Temenid princes, nevertheless were immediately
-subject to separate but subordinate princes of their own. The
-reign of Perdikkas had been troubled in this manner. In the first
-instance, he had stripped his own brother Alketas of the crown,<a
-id="FNanchor_109" href="#Footnote_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a> who
-appears (so far as we can make out) to have had<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_46">[p. 46]</span> the better right to it; next he had
-also expelled his younger brother Philippus from his subordinate
-principality. To restore Amyntas the son of Philippus, was one of
-the purposes of the Thrakian prince Sitalkês, in the expedition
-undertaken conjointly with Athens, during the second year of
-the Peloponnesian war.<a id="FNanchor_110" href="#Footnote_110"
-class="fnanchor">[110]</a> On the death of Perdikkas (about 413
-<small>B.C.</small>), his eldest or only legitimate son was a
-child of seven years old; but his natural son<a id="FNanchor_111"
-href="#Footnote_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a> Archelaus was
-of mature age and unscrupulous ambition. The dethroned Alketas
-was yet alive, and had now considerable chance of reëstablishing
-himself on the throne; Archelaus, inviting him and his son under
-pretence that he would himself bring about their reëstablishment,
-slew them both amidst the intoxication of a banquet. He next
-despatched the boy, his legitimate brother, by suffocating him in a
-well; and through these crimes made himself king. His government,
-however, was so energetic and able, that Macedonia reached a
-degree of military power such as none of his predecessors had ever
-possessed. His troops, military equipments, and fortified places,
-were much increased in numbers; while he also cut straight roads
-of communication between the various portions of his territory,—a
-novelty seemingly everywhere, at that time.<a id="FNanchor_112"
-href="#Footnote_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a> Besides such improved
-organization (which unfortunately we are not permitted to know in
-detail), Archelaus founded a splendid periodical Olympic festival,
-in honor of the Olympian Zeus and the Muses,<a id="FNanchor_113"
-href="#Footnote_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a> and maintained
-correspondence with the poets and philosophers of Athens. He
-prevailed upon the tragic poets Euripides and Agathon, as well as
-the epic poet Chœrilus, to visit him in Macedonia, where Euripides
-especially was treated with distinguished favor and munificence,<a
-id="FNanchor_114" href="#Footnote_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a>
-remaining<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">[p. 47]</span> there
-until his death in 406 or 405 <small>B.C.</small> Archelaus also
-invited Sokrates, who declined the invitation,—and appears to have
-shown some favor to Plato.<a id="FNanchor_115" href="#Footnote_115"
-class="fnanchor">[115]</a> He perished in the same year as Sokrates
-(399 <small>B.C.</small>), by a violent death; two Thessalian
-youths, Krateuas and Hellanokrates, together with a Macedonian
-named Dekamnichus, being his assassins during a hunting-party. The
-first two were youths to whom he was strongly attached, but whose
-dignity he had wounded by insulting treatment and non-performance
-of promises; the third was a Macedonian, who, for having made an
-offensive remark upon the bad breath of Euripides, had been given
-up by the order of Archelaus to the poet, in order that he might
-be flogged for it. Euripides actually caused the sentence to be
-inflicted; but it was not till six years after his death that
-Dekamnichus, who had neither forgotten nor forgiven the affront,
-found the opportunity of taking revenge by instigating and aiding
-the assassins of Archelaus.<a id="FNanchor_116" href="#Footnote_116"
-class="fnanchor">[116]</a></p>
-
-<p>These incidents, recounted on the authority of Aristotle, and
-relating as well to the Macedonian king Archelaus as to the Athenian
-citizen and poet Euripides, illustrate the political contrast
-between Macedonia and Athens. The government of the former is one
-wholly personal,—dependent on the passions, tastes, appetites, and
-capacities, of the king. The ambition of Archelaus leads both to his
-crimes for acquiring the throne, and to his improved organization
-of the military force of the state afterwards; his admiration for
-the poets and philosophers of Athens makes<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_48">[p. 48]</span> him sympathize warmly with Euripides,
-and ensure to the latter personal satisfaction for an offensive
-remark; his appetites, mingling license with insult, end by drawing
-upon him personal enemies of a formidable character. <i>L’Etat,
-c’est moi</i>—stands marked in the whole series of proceedings; the
-personality of the monarch is the determining element. Now at Athens,
-no such element exists. There is, on the one hand, no easy way of
-bringing to bear the ascendency of an energetic chief to improve the
-military organization,—as Athens found to her cost, when she was
-afterwards assailed by Philip, the successor after some interval, and
-in many respects the parallel, of Archelaus. But on the other hand,
-neither the personal tastes nor the appetites, of any individual
-Athenian, count as active causes in the march of public affairs,
-which is determined by the established law and by the pronounced
-sentiments of the body of citizens. However gross an insult might
-have been offered to Euripides at Athens, the dikasts would never
-have sentenced that the offender should be handed over to him to be
-flogged. They would have inflicted such measure of punishment as the
-nature of the wrong, and the preëxisting law appeared to them to
-require. Political measures, or judicial sentences, at Athens, might
-be well or ill-judged; but at any rate, they were always dictated
-by regard to a known law and to the public conceptions entertained
-of state-interests, state-dignity, and state-obligations, without
-the avowed intrusion of any man’s personality. To Euripides,—who
-had throughout his whole life been the butt of Aristophanes and
-other comic writers, and who had been compelled to hear, in the
-crowded theatre, taunts far more galling than what is ascribed to
-Dekamnichus,—the contrast must have been indeed striking, to have
-the offender made over to him, and the whip placed at his disposal,
-by order of his new patron. And it is little to his honor, that
-he should have availed himself of the privilege, by causing the
-punishment to be really administered; a punishment which he could
-never have seen inflicted, during the fifty years of his past life,
-upon any free Athenian citizen.</p>
-
-<p>Krateuas did not survive the deed more than three or four days,
-after which Orestes, son of Archelaus, a child, was placed on the
-throne, under the guardianship of Æropus. The latter, however,
-after about four years, made away with his ward, and reigned
-in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">[p. 49]</span> his stead for
-two years. He then died of sickness, and was succeeded by his son
-Pausanias; who, after a reign of only one year, was assassinated
-and succeeded by Amyntas.<a id="FNanchor_117" href="#Footnote_117"
-class="fnanchor">[117]</a> This Amyntas (chiefly celebrated as
-the father of Philip and the grandfather of Alexander the Great),
-though akin to the royal family, had been nothing more than an
-attendant of Æropus,<a id="FNanchor_118" href="#Footnote_118"
-class="fnanchor">[118]</a> until he made himself king by putting
-to death Pausanias.<a id="FNanchor_119" href="#Footnote_119"
-class="fnanchor">[119]</a> He reigned, though with interruptions,
-twenty-four years (393-369 <small>B.C.</small>); years, for the most
-part, of trouble and humiliation for Macedonia, and of occasional
-exile for himself. The vigorous military organization introduced by
-Archelaus appears to have declined; while the frequent dethronements
-and assassinations of kings, beginning even with Perdikkas the father
-of Archelaus, and continued down to Amyntas, unhinged the central
-authority and disunited the various portions of the Macedonian name;
-which naturally tended to separation, and could only be held together
-by a firm hand.</p>
-
-<p>The interior regions of Macedonia were bordered, to the north,
-north-east, and north-west, by warlike barbarian tribes, Thracian
-and Illyrian, whose invasions were not unfrequent and often
-formidable. Tempted, probably, by the unsettled position of the
-government, the Illyrians poured in upon Amyntas during the first
-year of his reign; perhaps they may have been invited by other
-princes of the interior,<a id="FNanchor_120" href="#Footnote_120"
-class="fnanchor">[120]</a> and at all events their coming would
-operate as a signal for malcontents to declare themselves.
-Amyntas,—having only acquired the sceptre a few months before
-by assassinating his predecessor, and having little hold on the
-people,—was not only unable to repel them, but found himself obliged
-to evacuate Pella, and even to retire from Macedonia altogether.
-Despairing of his position, he made over to the Olynthians a
-large<span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">[p. 50]</span> portion of
-the neighboring territory,—Lower Macedonia or the coast and cities
-round the Thermaic Gulf.<a id="FNanchor_121" href="#Footnote_121"
-class="fnanchor">[121]</a> As this cession is represented to have
-been made at the moment of his distress and expatriation, we may
-fairly suspect that it was made for some reciprocal benefit or
-valuable equivalent; of which Amyntas might well stand in need, at a
-moment of so much exigency.</p>
-
-<p>It is upon this occasion that we begin to hear again of the
-Chalkidians of Olynthus, and the confederacy which they gradually
-aggregated around their city as a centre. The confederacy seems to
-have taken its start from this cession of Amyntas,—or rather, to
-speak more properly, from his abdication; for the cession of what
-he could not keep was of comparatively little moment, and we shall
-see that he tried to resume it as soon as he acquired strength.
-The effect of his flight was, to break up the government of Lower
-or maritime Macedonia, and to leave the cities therein situated
-defenceless against the Illyrians or other invaders from the
-interior. To these cities, the only chance of security, was to throw
-themselves upon the Greek cities on the coast, and to organize in
-conjunction with the latter a confederacy for mutual support. Among
-all the Greeks on that coast, the most strenuous and persevering
-(so they had proved themselves in their former contentions against
-Athens when at the summit of her power) as well as the nearest, were
-the Chalkidians of Olynthus. These Olynthians now put themselves
-forward,—took into their alliance and under their protection the
-smaller towns of maritime Macedonia immediately near them,—and
-soon extended their confederacy so as to comprehend all the larger
-towns in this region,—including even Pella, the most considerable
-city of the country.<a id="FNanchor_122" href="#Footnote_122"
-class="fnanchor">[122]</a> As they began<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_51">[p. 51]</span> this enterprise at a time when the
-Illyrians were masters of the country so as to drive Amyntas to
-despair and flight, we may be sure that it must have cost them
-serious efforts, not without great danger if they failed. We may
-also be sure that the cities themselves must have been willing, not
-to say eager, coadjutors; just as the islanders and Asiatic Greeks
-clung to Athens at the first formation of the confederacy of Delos.
-The Olynthians could have had no means of conquering even the less
-considerable Macedonian cities, much less Pella, by force and against
-the will of the inhabitants.</p>
-
-<p>How the Illyrians were compelled to retire, and by what steps
-the confederacy was got together, we are not permitted to know.
-Our information (unhappily very brief) comes from the Akanthian
-envoy Kleigenês, speaking at Sparta about ten years afterwards
-(<small>B.C.</small> 383), and describing in a few words the
-confederacy as it then stood. But there is one circumstance which
-this witness,—himself hostile to Olynthus and coming to solicit
-Spartan aid against her,—attests emphatically; the equal, generous,
-and brotherly principles, upon which the Olynthians framed their
-scheme from the beginning. They did not present themselves as an
-imperial city enrolling a body of dependent allies, but invited each
-separate city to adopt common laws and reciprocal citizenship with
-Olynthus, with full liberty of intermarriage, commercial dealing,
-and landed proprietorship. That the Macedonian cities near the sea
-should welcome so liberal a proposition as this, coming from the
-most powerful of their Grecian neighbors, cannot at all surprise
-us; especially at a time when they were exposed to the Illyrian
-invaders, and when Amyntas had fled the country. They had hitherto
-always been subjects;<a id="FNanchor_123" href="#Footnote_123"
-class="fnanchor">[123]</a> their cities had not<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_52">[p. 52]</span> (like the Greek cities) enjoyed each its
-own separate autonomy within its own walls; the offer, now made to
-them by the Olynthians, was one of freedom in exchange for their past
-subjection under the Macedonian kings, combined with a force adequate
-to protect them against Illyrian and other invaders. Perhaps also
-these various cities,—Anthemus, Therma, Chalastra, Pella, Alôrus,
-Pydna, etc.,—may have contained, among the indigenous population, a
-certain proportion of domiciliated Grecian inhabitants, to whom the
-proposition of the Olynthians would be especially acceptable.</p>
-
-<p>We may thus understand why the offer of Olynthus was gladly
-welcomed by the Macedonian maritime cities. They were the first who
-fraternized as voluntary partners in the confederacy; which the
-Olynthians, having established this basis, proceeded to enlarge
-farther, by making the like liberal propositions to the Greek cities
-in their neighborhood. Several of these latter joined voluntarily;
-others were afraid to refuse; insomuch that the confederacy came
-to include a considerable number of Greeks,—especially, Potidæa,
-situated on the Isthmus of Pallênê, and commanding the road of
-communication between the cities within Pallênê and the continent.
-The Olynthians carried out with scrupulous sincerity their professed
-principles of equal and intimate partnership, avoiding all
-encroachment or offensive preëminence in favor of their own city. But
-in spite of this liberal procedure, they found among their Grecian
-neighbors obstructions which they had not experienced from the
-Macedonian. Each of the Grecian cities had been accustomed to its own
-town-autonomy and separate citizenship, with its peculiar laws and
-customs. All of them were attached to this kind of distinct political
-life, by one of the most tenacious and universal instincts of the
-Greek mind; all of them would renounce it with reluctance, even on
-consenting to enter the Olynthian confederacy, with its generous
-promise, its enlarged security, and its manifest advantages; and
-there were even some who, disdaining every prospective consideration,
-refused to change their condition at all except at the point of the
-sword.</p>
-
-<p>Among these last were Akanthus and Apollonia, the largest cities
-(next to Olynthus) in the Chalkidic peninsula, and, therefore,
-the least unable to stand alone. To these the Olynthians<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_53">[p. 53]</span> did not make application,
-until they had already attracted within their confederacy a
-considerable number of other Grecian as well as Macedonian cities.
-They then invited Akanthus and Apollonia to come in, upon the same
-terms of equal union and fellow-citizenship. The proposition being
-declined, they sent a second message intimating that, unless it were
-accepted within a certain time, they would enforce it by compulsory
-measures. So powerful already was the military force of the Olynthian
-confederacy, that Akanthus and Apollonia, incompetent to resist
-without foreign aid, despatched envoys to Sparta to set forth the
-position of affairs in the Chalkidic peninsula, and to solicit
-intervention against Olynthus.</p>
-
-<p>Their embassy reached Sparta about <small>B.C.</small> 383,
-when the Spartans, having broken up the city of Mantinea into
-villages, and coërced Phlius, were in the full swing of power
-over Peloponnesus,—and when they had also dissolved the Bœotian
-federation, placing harmosts in Platæa and Thespiæ as checks upon
-any movement of Thebes. The Akanthian Kleigenês, addressing himself
-to the Assembly of Spartans and their allies, drew an alarming
-picture of the recent growth and prospective tendencies of Olynthus,
-invoking the interference of Sparta against that city. The Olynthian
-confederacy (he said) already comprised many cities, small and great,
-Greek as well as Macedonian,—Amyntas having lost his kingdom. Its
-military power, even at present great, was growing every day.<a
-id="FNanchor_124" href="#Footnote_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a> The
-territory, comprising a large breadth of fertile corn-land, could
-sustain a numerous population. Wood for ship-building was close at
-hand, while the numerous<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">[p.
-54]</span> harbors of the confederate cities ensured a thriving trade
-as well as a steady revenue from custom-duties. The neighboring
-Thracian tribes would be easily kept in willing dependence, and
-would thus augment the military force of Olynthus; even the gold
-mines of Mount Pangæus would speedily come within her assured reach.
-“All that I now tell you (such was the substance of his speech) is
-matter of public talk among the Olynthian people, who are full of
-hope and confidence. How can you Spartans, who are taking anxious
-pains to prevent the union of the Bœotian cities,<a id="FNanchor_125"
-href="#Footnote_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a> permit the
-aggregation of so much more formidable a power, both by land and
-by sea, as this of Olynthus? Envoys have already been sent thither
-from Athens and Thebes,—and the Olynthians have decreed to send an
-embassy in return for contracting alliance with those cities; hence,
-your enemies will derive a large additional force. We of Akanthus and
-Apollonia, having declined the proposition to join the confederacy
-voluntarily, have received notice that, if we persist, they will
-constrain us. Now we are anxious to retain our paternal laws and
-customs, continuing as a city by ourselves.<a id="FNanchor_126"
-href="#Footnote_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a> But if we cannot
-obtain aid from you, we shall be under the necessity of joining
-them,—as several other cities have already done, from not daring
-to refuse; cities, who would have sent envoys along with us, had
-they not been afraid of offending the Olynthians. These cities, if
-you interfere forthwith, and with a powerful force, will now revolt
-from the new confederacy. But if you postpone your interference,
-and allow time for the confederacy to work, their sentiments will
-soon alter. They will come to be knit together in attached unity,
-by the co-burgership, the intermarriage, and the reciprocity of
-landed possessions, which have already been enacted prospectively.
-All of them will become convinced that they have a common interest
-both in belonging to, and in strengthening the confederacy,—just as
-the Arcadians, when they follow you, Spartans, as allies, are not
-only enabled to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">[p. 55]</span>
-preserve their own property, but also to plunder others. If, by your
-delay, the attractive tendencies of the confederacy should come
-into real operation, you will presently find it not so much within
-your power to dissolve.<a id="FNanchor_127" href="#Footnote_127"
-class="fnanchor">[127]</a>”</p>
-
-<p>This speech of the Akanthian envoy is remarkable in more than one
-respect. Coming from the lips of an enemy, it is the best of all
-testimonies to the liberal and comprehensive spirit in which the
-Olynthians were acting. They are accused,—not of injustice, nor of
-selfish ambition, nor of degrading those around them,—but literally,
-of organizing a new partnership on principles too generous and too
-seductive; of gently superseding, instead of violently breaking
-down, the barriers between the various cities, by reciprocal ties
-of property and family among the citizens of each; of uniting them
-all into a new political aggregate, in which not only all would
-enjoy equal rights, but all without exception would be gainers. The
-advantage, both in security and in power, accruing prospectively to
-all, is not only admitted by the orator, but stands in the front of
-his argument. “Make haste and break up the confederacy (he impresses
-upon Sparta) before its fruit is ripe, so that the confederates may
-never taste it nor find out how good it is; for if they do, you
-will not prevail on them to forego it.” By implication, he also
-admits,—and he says nothing tending even to raise a doubt,—that the
-cities which he represents, Akanthus and Apollonia, would share
-along with the rest in this same benefit. But the Grecian political
-instinct was nevertheless predominant,—“We wish to preserve our
-paternal laws, and to be a city by ourselves.” Thus nakedly is
-the objection stated; when the question was, not whether Akanthus
-should lose its freedom and become subject to an imperial city like
-Athens,—but whether it should become a free and equal member of a
-larger political aggregate, cemented by every tie which could make
-union<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">[p. 56]</span> secure,
-profitable, and dignified. It is curious to observe how perfectly
-the orator is conscious that this repugnance, though at the moment
-preponderant, was nevertheless essentially transitory, and would give
-place to attachment when the union came to be felt as a reality;
-and how eagerly he appeals to Sparta to lose no time in clenching
-the repugnance, while it lasted. He appeals to her, not for any
-beneficial or Pan-hellenic objects, but in the interests of her own
-dominion, which required that the Grecian world should be as it were
-pulverized into minute, self-acting, atoms without cohesion,—so that
-each city, or each village, while protected against subjection to
-any other, should farther be prevented from equal political union
-or fusion with any other; being thus more completely helpless and
-dependent in reference to Sparta.</p>
-
-<p>It was not merely from Akanthus and Apollonia, but also from
-the dispossessed Macedonian king Amyntas, that envoys reached
-Sparta to ask for aid against Olynthus. It seems that Amyntas,
-after having abandoned the kingdom and made his cession to the
-Olynthians, had obtained some aid from Thessaly and tried to
-reinstate himself by force. In this scheme he had failed, being
-defeated by the Olynthians. Indeed we find another person named
-Argæus, mentioned as competitor for the Macedonian sceptre, and
-possessing it for two years.<a id="FNanchor_128" href="#Footnote_128"
-class="fnanchor">[128]</a></p>
-
-<p>After hearing these petitioners, the Lacedæmonians first
-declared their own readiness to comply with the prayer, and to put
-down Olynthus; next, they submitted the same point to the vote of
-the assembled allies.<a id="FNanchor_129" href="#Footnote_129"
-class="fnanchor">[129]</a> Among these latter, there was no genuine
-antipathy against the Olynthians, such as that which had prevailed
-against Athens before the Peloponnesian war, in the synod then
-held at Sparta. But the power of Sparta over her allies was now
-far greater than it had been then. Most of their cities were
-under oligarchies, dependent upon her support for authority over
-their fellow-citizens; moreover, the recent events in Bœotia and
-at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">[p. 57]</span> Mantinea had
-operated as a serious intimidation. Anxiety to keep the favor of
-Sparta was accordingly paramount, so that most of the speakers as
-well as most of the votes, declared for war,<a id="FNanchor_130"
-href="#Footnote_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a> and a combined
-army of ten thousand men was voted to be raised. To make up such
-total, a proportional contingent was assessed upon each confederate;
-combined with the proviso now added for the first time, that each
-might furnish money instead of men, at the rate of three Æginæan
-oboli (half an Æginæan drachma) for each hoplite. A cavalry-soldier,
-to those cities which furnished such, was reckoned as equivalent
-to four hoplites; a hoplite, as equivalent to two peltasts; or
-pecuniary contribution on the same scale. All cities in default
-were made liable to a forfeit of one stater (four drachmæ) per day,
-for every soldier not sent; the forfeit to be enforced by Sparta.<a
-id="FNanchor_131" href="#Footnote_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a>
-Such licensed substitution of pecuniary payment for personal
-service, is the same as I have already described to have taken
-place nearly a century before in the confederacy of Delos under
-the presidency of Athens.<a id="FNanchor_132" href="#Footnote_132"
-class="fnanchor">[132]</a> It was a system not likely to be
-extensively acted upon among the Spartan allies, who were at once
-poorer and more warlike than those of Athens. But in both cases it
-was favorable to the ambition of the leading state; and the tendency
-becomes here manifest, to sanction, by the formality of a public
-resolution, that increased Lacedæmonian ascendency which had already
-grown up in practice.</p>
-
-<p>The Akanthian envoys, while expressing their satisfaction with
-the vote just passed, intimated that the muster of these numerous
-contingents would occupy some time, and again insisted on the
-necessity of instant intervention, even with a small force; before
-the Olynthians could find time to get their plans actually in work
-or appreciated by the surrounding cities. A moderate Lacedæmonian
-force (they said), if despatched forthwith, would not only<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_58">[p. 58]</span> keep those who had
-refused to join Olynthus, steady to their refusal, but also induce
-others, who had joined reluctantly, to revolt. Accordingly the
-ephors appointed Eudamidas at once, assigning to him two thousand
-hoplites,—Neodamodes (or enfranchised Helots), Periœki, and Skiritæ
-or Arcadian borderers. Such was the anxiety of the Akanthians for
-haste, that they would not let him delay even to get together the
-whole of this moderate force. He was put in march immediately, with
-such as were ready; while his brother Phœbidas was left behind
-to collect the remainder and follow him. And it seems that the
-Akanthians judged correctly. For Eudamidas, arriving in Thrace after
-a rapid march, though he was unable to contend against the Olynthians
-in the field, yet induced Potidæa to revolt from them, and was
-able to defend those cities, such as Akanthus and Apollonia, which
-resolutely stood aloof.<a id="FNanchor_133" href="#Footnote_133"
-class="fnanchor">[133]</a> Amyntas brought a force to coöperate with
-him.</p>
-
-<p>The delay in the march of Phœbidas was productive of
-consequences no less momentous than unexpected. The direct line
-from Peloponnesus to Olynthus lay through the Theban territory; a
-passage which the Thebans, whatever might have been their wishes,
-were not powerful enough to refuse, though they had contracted an
-alliance with Olynthus,<a id="FNanchor_134" href="#Footnote_134"
-class="fnanchor">[134]</a> and though proclamation was made that no
-Theban citizens should join the Lacedæmonian force. Eudamidas, having
-departed at a moment’s notice, passed through Bœotia without a halt,
-in his way to Thrace. But it was known that his brother Phœbidas was
-presently to follow; and upon this fact the philo-Laconian party in
-Thebes organized a conspiracy.</p>
-
-<p>They obtained from the ephors, and from the miso-Theban
-feelings of Agesilaus, secret orders to Phœbidas, that he should
-coöperate with them in any party movement which they might find
-opportunity of executing;<a id="FNanchor_135" href="#Footnote_135"
-class="fnanchor">[135]</a> and when he halted with his<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_59">[p. 59]</span> detachment near the
-gymnasium a little way without the walls, they concerted matters as
-well with him as among themselves. Leontiades, Hypatês, and Archias,
-were the chiefs of the party in Thebes favorable to Sparta; a party
-decidedly in minority, yet still powerful, and at this moment so
-strengthened by the unbounded ascendency of the Spartan name, that
-Leontiades himself was one of the polemarchs of the city. Of the
-anti-Spartan, or predominant sentiment in Thebes,—which included most
-of the wealthy and active citizens, those who came successively into
-office as hipparchs or generals of the cavalry,<a id="FNanchor_136"
-href="#Footnote_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a>—the leaders were
-Ismenias and Androkleides. The former, especially, the foremost as
-well as ablest conductor of the late war against Sparta, was now in
-office as Polemarch, conjointly with his rival Leontiades.</p>
-
-<p>While Ismenias, detesting the Spartans, kept aloof from Phœbidas,
-Leontiades assiduously courted him and gained his confidence. On the
-day of the Thesmophoria,<a id="FNanchor_137" href="#Footnote_137"
-class="fnanchor">[137]</a> a religious festival<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_60">[p. 60]</span> celebrated by the women apart from the
-men, during which the acropolis or Kadmeia was consecrated to their
-exclusive use,—Phœbidas, affecting to have concluded his halt,
-put himself in march to proceed as if towards Thrace; seemingly
-rounding the walls of Thebes, but not going into it. The Senate
-was actually assembled in the portico of the agora, and the heat
-of a summer’s noon had driven every one out of the streets, when
-Leontiades, stealing away from the Senate, hastened on horseback
-to overtake Phœbidas, caused him to face about, and conducted the
-Lacedæmonians straight up to the Kadmeia; the gates of which, as
-well as those of the town, were opened by his order as polemarch.
-There were not only no citizens in the streets, but none even in the
-Kadmeia; no male person being permitted to be present at the feminine
-Thesmophoria; so that Phœbidas and his army became possessed of
-the Kadmeia without the smallest opposition. At the same time they
-became possessed of an acquisition of hardly less importance,—the
-persons of all the assembled Theban women; who served as hostages
-for the quiet submission, however reluctant, of the citizens in the
-town below. Leontiades handed to Phœbidas the key of the gates,
-and then descended into the town, giving orders that no man should
-go up without his order.<a id="FNanchor_138" href="#Footnote_138"
-class="fnanchor">[138]</a></p>
-
-<p>The assembled Senate heard with consternation the occupation of
-the acropolis by Phœbidas. Before any deliberation could be taken
-among the senators, Leontiades came down to resume his seat. The
-lochages and armed citizens of his party, to whom he had previously
-given orders, stood close at hand. “Senators (said he), be not
-intimidated by the news that the Spartans are in the Kadmeia;
-for they assure us that they have no hostile purpose against any
-one who does not court war against them. But I, as polemarch, am
-empowered by law to seize any one whose behavior is manifestly and
-capitally criminal. Accordingly, I seize this man Ismenias, as the
-great inflamer of war. Come forward, captains and soldiers, lay
-hold of him, and carry him off where your orders direct.” Ismenias
-was accordingly seized and hurried off<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_61">[p. 61]</span> as a prisoner to the Kadmeia; while
-the senators, thunderstruck and overawed, offered no resistance.
-Such of them as were partisans of the arrested polemarch, and
-many even of the more neutral members, left the Senate and went
-home, thankful to escape with their lives. Three hundred of them,
-including Androkleidas, Pelopidas, Mellon, and others, sought safety
-by voluntary exile to Athens; after which, the remainder of the
-Senate, now composed of few or none except philo-Spartan partisans,
-passed a vote formally dismissing Ismenias, and appointing a new
-polemarch in his place.<a id="FNanchor_139" href="#Footnote_139"
-class="fnanchor">[139]</a></p>
-
-<p>This blow of high-handed violence against Ismenias forms a
-worthy counterpart to the seizure of Theramenes by Kritias,<a
-id="FNanchor_140" href="#Footnote_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a>
-twenty-two years before, in the Senate of Athens under the Thirty.
-Terror-striking in itself, it was probably accompanied by similar
-deeds of force against others of the same party. The sudden explosion
-and complete success of the conspiracy, plotted by the Executive
-Chief himself, the most irresistible of all conspirators,—the
-presence of Phœbidas in the Kadmeia, and of a compliant Senate in
-the town,—the seizure or flight of Ismenias and all his leading
-partisans,—were more than sufficient to crush all spirit of
-resistance on the part of the citizens; whose first anxiety probably
-was, to extricate their wives and daughters from the custody of
-the Lacedæmonians in the Kadmeia. Having such a price to offer,
-Leontiades would extort submission the more easily, and would
-probably procure a vote of the people ratifying the new <i>régime</i>,
-the Spartan alliance, and the continued occupation of the acropolis.
-Having accomplished the first settlement of his authority, he
-proceeded without delay to Sparta, to make known the fact that “order
-reigned” at Thebes.</p>
-
-<p>The news of the seizure of the Kadmeia and of the revolution at
-Thebes had been received at Sparta with the greatest surprise, as
-well as with a mixed feeling of shame and satisfaction. Everywhere
-throughout Greece, probably, it excited a greater sensation than
-any event since the battle of Ægospotami. Tried by the recognized
-public law of Greece, it was a flagitious iniquity, for which Sparta
-had not the shadow of a pretence. It was even<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_62">[p. 62]</span> worse than the surprise of Platæa by the
-Thebans before the Peloponnesian war, which admitted of the partial
-excuse that war was at any rate impending; whereas in this case, the
-Thebans had neither done nor threatened anything to violate the peace
-of Antalkidas. It stood condemned by the indignant sentiment of all
-Greece, unwillingly testified even by the philo-Laconian Xenophon<a
-id="FNanchor_141" href="#Footnote_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a>
-himself. But it was at the same time an immense accession to Spartan
-power. It had been achieved with preëminent skill and success;
-and Phœbidas might well claim to have struck for Sparta the most
-important blow since Ægospotami, relieving her from one of her two
-really formidable enemies.<a id="FNanchor_142" href="#Footnote_142"
-class="fnanchor">[142]</a></p>
-
-<p>Nevertheless, far from receiving thanks at Sparta, he became
-the object of wrath and condemnation, both with the ephors and the
-citizens generally. Every one was glad to throw upon him the odium
-of the proceeding, and to denounce him as having acted without
-orders. Even the ephors, who had secretly authorized him beforehand
-to coöperate generally with the faction at Thebes, having doubtless
-never given any specific instructions, now indignantly disavowed
-him. Agesilaus alone stood forward in his defence, contending
-that the only question was, whether his proceeding at Thebes had
-been injurious or beneficial to Sparta. If the former, he merited
-punishment; if the latter, it was always lawful to render service,
-even <i>impromptu</i> and without previous orders.</p>
-
-<p>Tried by this standard, the verdict was not doubtful. For
-every man at Sparta felt how advantageous the act was in itself;
-and felt it still more, when Leontiades reached the city, humble
-in solicitation as well as profuse in promise. In his speech
-addressed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">[p. 63]</span> to the
-assembled ephors and Senate, he first reminded them how hostile
-Thebes had hitherto been to them, under Ismenias and the party just
-put down,—and how constantly they had been in jealous alarm, lest
-Thebes should reconstitute by force the Bœotian federation. “Now
-(added he) your fears may be at an end; only take as good care to
-uphold our government, as we shall take to obey your orders. For
-the future, you will have nothing to do but to send us a short
-despatch, to get every service which you require.<a id="FNanchor_143"
-href="#Footnote_143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a>” It was resolved by
-the Lacedæmonians, at the instance of Agesilaus, to retain their
-garrison now in the Kadmeia, to uphold Leontiades with his colleagues
-in the government of Thebes, and to put Ismenias upon his trial.
-Yet they at the same time, as a sort of atonement to the opinion of
-Greece, passed a vote of censure on Phœbidas, dismissed him from
-his command, and even condemned him to a fine. The fine, however,
-most probably was never exacted; for we shall see by the conduct of
-Sphodrias afterwards that the displeasure against Phœbidas, if at
-first genuine, was certainly of no long continuance.</p>
-
-<p>That the Lacedæmonians should at the same time condemn Phœbidas
-and retain the Kadmeia—has been noted as a gross contradiction.
-Nevertheless, we ought not to forget, that had they evacuated the
-Kadmeia, the party of Leontiades at Thebes, which had compromised
-itself for Sparta as well as for its own aggrandizement, would have
-been irretrievably sacrificed. The like excuse, if excuse it be,
-cannot be urged in respect to their treatment of Ismenias; whom
-they put upon his trial at Thebes, before a court consisting of
-three Lacedæmonian commissioners, and one from each allied city.
-He was accused, probably by Leontiades and his other enemies,
-of having entered into friendship and con<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_64">[p. 64]</span>spiracy with the Persian king to the
-detriment of Greece,<a id="FNanchor_144" href="#Footnote_144"
-class="fnanchor">[144]</a>—of having partaken in the Persian
-funds brought into Greece by Timokrates the Rhodian,—and of being
-the real author of that war which had disturbed Greece from 395
-<small>B.C.</small> down to the peace of Antalkidas. After an
-unavailing defence, he was condemned and executed. Had this doom been
-inflicted upon him by his political antagonists as a consequence of
-their intestine victory, it would have been too much in the analogy
-of Grecian party-warfare to call for any special remark. But there
-is something peculiarly revolting in the prostitution of judicial
-solemnity and Pan-hellenic pretence, which the Lacedæmonians here
-committed. They could have no possible right to try Ismenias as a
-criminal at all; still less to try him as a criminal on the charge
-of confederacy with the Persian king,—when they had themselves,
-only five years before, acted not merely as allies, but even as
-instruments, of that monarch, in enforcing the peace of Antalkidas.
-If Ismenias had received money from one Persian satrap, the Spartan
-Antalkidas had profited in like manner by another,—and for the like
-purpose too of carrying on Grecian war. The real motive of the
-Spartans was doubtless to revenge themselves upon this distinguished
-Theban for having raised against them the war which began in 395
-<small>B.C.</small> But the mockery of justice by which that revenge
-was masked, and the impudence of punishing in him as treason that
-same foreign alliance with which they had ostentatiously identified
-themselves, lends a deeper enormity to the whole proceeding.</p>
-
-<p>Leontiades and his partisans were now established as rulers in
-Thebes, with a Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia to sustain them
-and execute their orders. The once-haughty Thebes was enrolled as
-a member of Lacedæmonian confederacy. Sparta was now enabled to
-prosecute her Olynthian expedition with redoubled vigor. Eudamidas
-and Amyntas, though they repressed the growth of the Olynthian
-confederacy, had not been strong enough to put it down; so that a
-larger force was necessary, and the aggregate of ten thousand men,
-which had been previously decreed, was put into instant requisition,
-to be commanded by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">[p. 65]</span>
-Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus. The new general, a man of very
-popular manners, was soon on his march at the head of this large
-army, which comprised many Theban hoplites as well as horsemen,
-furnished by the new rulers in their unqualified devotion to Sparta.
-He sent forward envoys to Amyntas in Macedonia, urging upon him the
-most strenuous efforts for the purpose of recovering the Macedonian
-cities which had joined the Olynthians,—and also to Derdas, prince
-of the district of Upper Macedonia called Elimeia, inviting his
-coöperation against that insolent city, which would speedily extend
-her dominion (he contended) from the maritime region to the interior,
-unless she were put down.<a id="FNanchor_145" href="#Footnote_145"
-class="fnanchor">[145]</a></p>
-
-<p>Though the Lacedæmonians were masters everywhere and had
-their hands free,—though Teleutias was a competent officer with
-powerful forces,—and though Derdas joined with four hundred
-excellent Macedonian horse,—yet the conquest of Olynthus was found
-no easy enterprise.<a id="FNanchor_146" href="#Footnote_146"
-class="fnanchor">[146]</a> The Olynthian cavalry, in particular,
-was numerous and efficient. Unable as they were to make head
-against Teleutias in the field or repress his advance, nevertheless
-in a desultory engagement which took place near the city gates,
-they defeated the Lacedæmonian and Theban cavalry, threw even the
-infantry into confusion, and were on the point of gaining a complete
-victory, had not Derdas with his cavalry on the other wing, made a
-diversion which forced them to come back for the protection of the
-city. Teleutias, remaining master of the field, continued to ravage
-the Olynthian territory during the summer, for which, however, the
-Olynthians retaliated by frequent marauding expeditions against the
-cities in alliance with him.<a id="FNanchor_147" href="#Footnote_147"
-class="fnanchor">[147]</a></p>
-
-<p>In the ensuing spring, the Olynthians sustained various partial
-defeats, especially one near Apollonia, from Derdas. They were
-more and more confined to their walls; insomuch that Teleutias
-became confident and began to despise them. Under these dispo<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_66">[p. 66]</span>sitions on his part, a
-body of Olynthian cavalry showed themselves one morning, passed
-the river near their city, and advanced in calm array towards the
-Lacedæmonian camp. Indignant at such an appearance of daring,
-Teleutias directed Tlemonidas with the peltasts to disperse them;
-upon which the Olynthians slowly retreated, while the peltasts
-rushed impatiently to pursue them, even when they recrossed the
-river. No sooner did the Olynthians see that half the peltasts had
-crossed it, than they suddenly turned, charged them vigorously,
-and put them to flight with the loss of their commander Tlemonidas
-and a hundred others. All this passed in sight of Teleutias, who
-completely lost his temper. Seizing his arms, he hurried forward to
-cover the fugitives with the hoplites around him, sending orders to
-all his troops, hoplites, peltasts, and horsemen, to advance also.
-But the Olynthians, again retreating, drew him on towards the city,
-with such inconsiderate forwardness, that many of his soldiers
-ascending the eminence on which the city was situated, rushed
-close up to the walls.<a id="FNanchor_148" href="#Footnote_148"
-class="fnanchor">[148]</a> Here, however, they were received by a
-shower of missiles which forced them to recede in disorder; upon
-which the Olynthians again sallied forth, probably, from more
-than one gate at once, and charged them first with cavalry and
-peltasts, next with hoplites. The Lacedæmonians and their allies,
-disturbed and distressed by the first, were unable to stand against
-the compact charge of the last; Teleutias himself, fighting in
-the foremost ranks, was slain, and his death was a signal for the
-flight of all around. The whole besieging force dispersed and fled
-in different directions,—to Akanthus, to Spartôlus, to Potidæa,
-to Apollonia. So vigorous and effective was the pursuit of the
-Olynthians, that the loss of the fugitives was immense. The whole
-army was in fact ruined;<a id="FNanchor_149" href="#Footnote_149"
-class="fnanchor">[149]</a> for probably many of the allies who
-escaped became discouraged and went home.</p>
-
-<p>At another time, probably, a victory so decisive might have
-deterred the Lacedæmonians from farther proceedings, and saved
-Olynthus. But now, they were so completely masters everywhere
-else, that they thought only of repairing the dishonor by a
-still<span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">[p. 67]</span> more
-imposing demonstration. Their king Agesipolis was placed at the
-head of an expedition on the largest scale; and his name called
-forth eager coöperation, both in men and money, from the allies.
-He marched with thirty Spartan counsellors, as Agesilaus had gone
-to Asia; besides a select body of energetic youth as volunteers,
-from the Periœki, from the illegitimate sons of Spartans, and from
-strangers or citizens who had lost their franchise through poverty,
-introduced as friends of richer Spartan citizens to go through the
-arduous Lykurgean training.<a id="FNanchor_150" href="#Footnote_150"
-class="fnanchor">[150]</a> Amyntas and Derdas also were instigated to
-greater exertions than before, so that Agesipolis was enabled, after
-receiving their reinforcements in his march through Macedonia, to
-present himself before Olynthus with an overwhelming force, and to
-confine the citizens within their walls. He then completed the ravage
-of their territory, which had been begun by Teleutias; and even took
-Torônê by storm. But the extreme heat of the summer weather presently
-brought upon him a fever, which proved fatal in a week’s time;
-although he had caused himself to be carried for repose to the shady
-grove, and clear waters, near the temple of Dionysus at Aphytis.
-His body was immersed in honey and transported to Sparta, where
-it was buried with the customary solemnities.<a id="FNanchor_151"
-href="#Footnote_151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a></p>
-
-<p>Polybiades, who succeeded Agesipolis in the command, prosecuted
-the war with undiminished vigor; and the Olynthians, debarred
-from their home produce as well as from importation, were<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_68">[p. 68]</span> speedily reduced to
-such straits as to be compelled to solicit peace. They were obliged
-to break up their own federation, and to enrol themselves as sworn
-members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, with its obligations
-of service to Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_152" href="#Footnote_152"
-class="fnanchor">[152]</a> The Olynthian union being dissolved,
-the component Grecian cities were enrolled severally as allies of
-Sparta, while the maritime cities of Macedonia were deprived of their
-neighboring Grecian protector, and passed again under the dominion of
-Amyntas.</p>
-
-<p>Both the dissolution of this growing confederacy, and the
-reconstitution of maritime Macedonia, were signal misfortunes to
-the Grecian world. Never were the arms of Sparta more mischievously
-or more unwarrantably employed. That a powerful Grecian confederacy
-should be formed in the Chalkidic peninsula, in the border region
-where Hellas joined the non-Hellenic tribes,—was an incident of
-signal benefit to the Hellenic world generally. It would have
-served as a bulwark to Greece against the neighboring Macedonians
-and Thracians, at whose expense its conquests, if it made any,
-would have been achieved. That Olynthus did not oppress her Grecian
-neighbors—that the principles of her confederacy were of the most
-equal, generous, and seducing character,—that she employed no greater
-compulsion than was requisite to surmount an unreflecting instinct
-of town-autonomy,—and that the very towns who obeyed this instinct
-would have become sensible themselves, in a very short time, of the
-benefits conferred by the confederacy on each and every one,—these
-are facts certified by the urgency of the reluctant Akanthians,
-when they entreat Sparta to leave no interval for the confederacy
-to make its workings felt. Nothing but the intervention of Sparta
-could have crushed this liberal and beneficent promise; nothing
-but the accident, that during the three years from 382 to 379
-<small>B.C.</small>, she was at the maximum of her power and had her
-hands quite free, with Thebes and its Kadmeia under her garrison.
-Such prosperity did not long continue unabated. Only a few months
-after the submission of Olynthus, the Kadmeia was retaken by the
-Theban exiles, who raised so vigorous a war against Sparta, that
-she would have been disabled from meddling with Olynthus,—as we
-shall find illustrated by the fact (hereafter to be recounted), that
-she declined interfering in Thessaly to pro<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_69">[p. 69]</span>tect the Thessalian cities against Jason
-of Pheræ. Had the Olynthian confederacy been left to its natural
-working, it might well have united all the Hellenic cities around it
-in harmonious action, so as to keep the sea coast in possession of
-a confederacy of free and self-determining communities, confining
-the Macedonian princes to the interior. But Sparta threw in her
-extraneous force, alike irresistible and inauspicious, to defeat
-these tendencies; and to frustrate that salutary change,—from
-fractional autonomy and isolated action into integral and equal
-autonomy with collective action,—which Olynthus was laboring to
-bring about. She gave the victory to Amyntas, and prepared the
-indispensable basis upon which his son Philip afterwards rose, to
-reduce not only Olynthus, but Akanthus, Apollonia, and the major part
-of the Grecian world, to one common level of subjection. Many of
-those Akanthians, who spurned the boon of equal partnership and free
-communion with Greeks and neighbors, lived to discover how impotent
-were their own separate walls as a bulwark against Macedonian
-neighbors; and to see themselves confounded in that common servitude
-which the imprudence of their fathers had entailed upon them. By
-the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta had surrendered the Asiatic Greeks
-to Persia; by crushing the Olynthian confederacy, she virtually
-surrendered the Thracian Greeks to the Macedonian princes. Never
-again did the opportunity occur of placing Hellenism on a firm,
-consolidated, and self-supporting basis, round the coast of the
-Thermaic Gulf.</p>
-
-<p>While the Olynthian expedition was going on, the Lacedæmonians
-were carrying on, under Agesilaus, another intervention within
-Peloponnesus, against the city of Phlius. It has already been
-mentioned that certain exiles of this city had recently been
-recalled, at the express command of Sparta. The ruling party
-in Phlius had at the same time passed a vote to restore the
-confiscated property of these exiles; reimbursing out of the public
-treasury, to those who had purchased it, the price which they had
-paid,—and reserving all disputed points for judicial decision.<a
-id="FNanchor_153" href="#Footnote_153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a> The
-returned exiles now again came to Sparta, to prefer complaint that
-they could obtain no just restitution of their property; that the
-tribunals of the city were in the hands of their opponents,<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_70">[p. 70]</span> many of them directly
-interested as purchasers, who refused them the right of appealing
-to any extraneous and impartial authority; and that there were even
-in the city itself many who thought them wronged. Such allegations
-were, probably, more or less founded in truth. At the same time, the
-appeal to Sparta, abrogating the independence of Phlius, so incensed
-the ruling Phliasians that they passed a sentence of fine against
-all the appellants. The latter insisted on this sentence as a fresh
-count for strengthening their complaints at Sparta; and as a farther
-proof of anti-Spartan feeling, as well as of high-handed injustice,
-in the Phliasian rulers.<a id="FNanchor_154" href="#Footnote_154"
-class="fnanchor">[154]</a> Their cause was warmly espoused by
-Agesilaus, who had personal relations of hospitality with some of the
-exiles; while it appears that his colleague, King Agesipolis, was on
-good terms with the ruling party at Phlius,—had received from them
-zealous aid, both in men and money, for his Olynthian expedition,—and
-had publicly thanked them for their devotion to Sparta.<a
-id="FNanchor_155" href="#Footnote_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a> The
-Phliasian government, emboldened by the proclaimed testimonial of
-Agesipolis, certifying their fidelity, had fancied that they stood
-upon firm ground, and that no Spartan coërcion would be enforced
-against them. But the marked favor of Agesipolis, now absent in
-Thrace, told rather against them in the mind of Agesilaus; pursuant
-to that jealousy which usually prevailed between the two Spartan
-kings. In spite of much remonstrance at Sparta, from many who
-deprecated hostilities against a city of five thousand citizens,
-for the profit of a handful of exiles,—he not only seconded the
-proclamation of war against Phlius by the ephors, but also took
-the command of the army.<a id="FNanchor_156" href="#Footnote_156"
-class="fnanchor">[156]</a></p>
-
-<p>The army being mustered, and the border sacrifices favorable,
-Agesilaus marched with his usual rapidity towards Phlius;
-dismissing those Phliasian envoys, who met him on the road and
-bribed or entreated him to desist, with the harsh reply that the
-government had already deceived Sparta once, and that he would be
-satisfied with nothing less than the surrender of the acropolis.
-This being refused, he marched to the city, and blocked it up by
-a wall of circumvallation. The besieged defended themselves<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_71">[p. 71]</span> with resolute bravery
-and endurance, under a citizen named Delphion; who, with a select
-troop of three hundred, maintained constant guard at every point, and
-even annoyed the besiegers by frequent sallies. By public decree,
-every citizen was put upon half-allowance of bread, so that the
-siege was prolonged to double the time which Agesilaus, from the
-information of the exiles as to the existing stock of provisions, had
-supposed to be possible. Gradually, however, famine made itself felt;
-desertions from within increased, among those who were favorable,
-or not decidedly averse, to the exiles; desertions, which Agesilaus
-took care to encourage by an ample supply of food, and by enrolment
-as Phliasian emigrants on the Spartan side. At length, after
-about a year’s blockade,<a id="FNanchor_157" href="#Footnote_157"
-class="fnanchor">[157]</a> the provisions within were exhausted, so
-that the besieged were forced to entreat permission from Agesilaus to
-despatch envoys to Sparta and beg for terms. Agesilaus granted their
-request. But being at the same time indignant that they submitted
-to Sparta rather than to him, he sent to ask the ephors that the
-terms might be referred to his dictation. Meanwhile he redoubled his
-watch over the city; in spite of which, Delphion, with one of his
-most active subordinates, contrived to escape at this last hour.
-Phlius was now compelled to surrender at discretion to Agesilaus,
-who named a Council of One Hundred (half from the exiles, half from
-those within the city) vested with absolute powers of life and death
-over all the citizens, and authorized to frame a constitution for
-the future government of the city. Until this should be done, he
-left a garrison in the acropolis, with assured pay for six months.<a
-id="FNanchor_158" href="#Footnote_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a></p>
-
-<p>Had Agesipolis been alive, perhaps the Phliasians might have
-obtained better terms. How the omnipotent Hekatontarchy named
-by the partisan feelings of Agesilaus,<a id="FNanchor_159"
-href="#Footnote_159" class="fnanchor">[159]</a> conducted themselves,
-we<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">[p. 72]</span> do not know. But
-the presumptions are all unfavorable, seeing that their situation as
-well as their power was analogous to that of the Thirty at Athens and
-the Lysandrian Dekarchies elsewhere.</p>
-
-<p>The surrender of Olynthus to Polybiades, and of Phlius to
-Agesilaus, seem to have taken place nearly at the same time.</p>
-
-<hr class="chap" />
-
-
-<div class="chapter" id="Chap_77">
-  <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXVII.<br />
-  FROM THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY THE LACEDÆMONIANS
-  DOWN TO THE CONGRESS AT SPARTA, AND PARTIAL
-  PEACE, IN 371&nbsp;<small>B.C.</small></h2>
-</div>
-
-<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">At</span>
-the beginning of 379 <small>B.C.</small>, the empire of the
-Lacedæmonians on land had reached a pitch never before paralleled.
-On the sea, their fleet was but moderately powerful, and they seem
-to have held divided empire with Athens over the smaller islands;
-while the larger islands (so far as we can make out) were independent
-of both. But the whole of inland Greece, both within and without
-Peloponnesus,—except Argos, Attica, and perhaps the more powerful
-Thessalian cities,—was now enrolled in the confederacy dependent
-on Sparta. Her occupation of Thebes, by a Spartan garrison and an
-oligarchy of local partisans, appeared to place her empire beyond
-all chance of successful attack; while the victorious close of the
-war against Olynthus carried everywhere an intimidating sense of her
-far-reaching power. Her allies, too,—governed as they were in many
-cases by Spartan harmosts, and by oligarchies whose power rested on
-Sparta,—were much more dependent upon her than they had been during
-the time of the Peloponnesian war.</p>
-
-<p>Such a position of affairs rendered Sparta an object of the same
-mingled fear and hatred (the first preponderant) as had been felt
-towards imperial Athens fifty years before, when she was designated
-as the “despot city.<a id="FNanchor_160" href="#Footnote_160"
-class="fnanchor">[160]</a>” And this sentiment was farther<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_73">[p. 73]</span> aggravated by the recent
-peace of Antalkidas, in every sense the work of Sparta; which she had
-first procured, and afterwards carried into execution. That peace
-was disgraceful enough, as being dictated by the king of Persia,
-enforced in his name, and surrendering to him all the Asiatic Greeks.
-But it became yet more disgraceful when the universal autonomy which
-it promised was seen to be so executed, as to mean nothing better
-than subjection to Sparta. Of all the acts yet committed by Sparta,
-not only in perversion of the autonomy promised to every city,
-but in violation of all the acknowledged canons of right dealing
-between city and city,—the most flagrant was, her recent seizure and
-occupation of the Kadmeia at Thebes. Her subversion (in alliance
-with, and partly for the benefit of, Amyntas king of Macedonia)
-of the free Olynthian confederacy was hardly less offensive to
-every Greek of large or Pan-hellenic patriotism. She appeared as
-the confederate of the Persian king on one side, of Amyntas the
-Macedonian, on another, of the Syracusan despot Dionysius on a
-third,—as betraying the independence of Greece to the foreigner, and
-seeking to put down, everywhere within it, that free spirit which
-stood in the way of her own harmosts and partisan oligarchies.</p>
-
-<p>Unpopular as Sparta was, however, she stood out incontestably
-as the head of Greece. No man dared to call into question her
-headship, or to provoke resistance against it. The tone of patriotic
-and free-spoken Greeks at this moment is manifested in two eminent
-residents at Athens,—Lysias and Isokrates. Of these two rhetors,
-the former composed an oration which he publicly read at Olympia
-during the celebration of the 99th Olympiad, <small>B.C.</small>
-384, three years after the peace of Antalkidas. In this oration
-(of which unhappily only a fragment remains, preserved by
-Dionysius of Halikarnassus), Lysias raises the cry of danger to
-Greece, partly from the Persian king, partly from the despot
-Dionysius of Syracuse.<a id="FNanchor_161" href="#Footnote_161"
-class="fnanchor">[161]</a> He calls upon all Greeks to lay aside
-hos<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">[p. 74]</span>tility and
-jealousies one with the other, and to unite in making head against
-these two really formidable enemies, as their ancestors had
-previously done, with equal zeal for putting down despots and for
-repelling the foreigner. He notes the number of Greeks (in Asia)
-handed over to the Persian king, whose great wealth would enable
-him to hire an indefinite number of Grecian soldiers, and whose
-naval force was superior to anything which the Greeks could muster;
-while the strongest naval force in Greece was that of the Syracusan
-Dionysius. Recognizing the Lacedæmonians as chiefs of Greece, Lysias
-expresses his astonishment that they should quietly permit the fire
-to extend itself from one city to another. They ought to look upon
-the misfortunes of those cities which had been destroyed, both by
-the Persians and by Dionysius, as coming home to themselves; not to
-wait patiently, until the two hostile powers had united their forces
-to attack the centre of Greece, which yet remained independent.</p>
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">[p. 75]</span></p> <p>Of
-the two common enemies,—Artaxerxes and Dionysius,—whom Lysias
-thus denounces, the latter had sent to this very Olympic festival
-a splendid Theôry, or legation to offer solemn sacrifice in his
-name; together with several chariots to contend in the race, and
-some excellent rhapsodes to recite poems composed by himself. The
-Syracusan legation, headed by Thearides, brother of Dionysius, were
-clothed with rich vestments, and lodged in a tent of extraordinary
-magnificence, decorated with gold and purple; such, probably, as had
-not been seen since the ostentatious display made by Alkibiades<a
-id="FNanchor_162" href="#Footnote_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a> in
-the ninetieth Olympiad (<small>B.C.</small> 420). While instigating
-the spectators present to exert themselves as Greeks for the
-liberation of their fellow-Greeks enslaved by Dionysius, Lysias
-exhorted them to begin forthwith their hostile demonstration against
-the latter, by plundering the splendid tent before them, which
-insulted the sacred plain of Olympia with the spectacle of wealth
-extorted from Grecian sufferers. It appears that this exhortation
-was partially, but only partially, acted upon.<a id="FNanchor_163"
-href="#Footnote_163" class="fnanchor">[163]</a> Some persons
-assailed the tents, but were, probably, re<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_76">[p. 76]</span>strained by the Eleian superintendents
-without difficulty. Yet the incident, taken in conjunction with
-the speech of Lysias, helps us to understand the apprehensions and
-sympathies which agitated the Olympic crowd in <small>B.C.</small>
-384. This was the first Olympic festival after the peace of
-Antalkidas; a festival memorable, not only because it again brought
-thither Athenians, Bœotians, Corinthians, and Argeians, who must
-have been prevented by the preceding war from coming either in
-<small>B.C.</small> 388 or in <small>B.C.</small> 392,—but also as
-it exhibited the visitors and Theôries from the Asiatic Greeks, for
-the first time since they had been handed over by Sparta to the
-Persians,—and the like also from those numerous Italians and Sicilian
-Greeks whom Dionysius had enslaved. All these sufferers, especially
-the Asiatics, would doubtless be full of complaints respecting the
-hardships of their new lot, and against Sparta as having betrayed
-them; complaints, which would call forth genuine sympathy in the
-Athenians, Thebans, and all others who had submitted reluctantly to
-the peace of Antalkidas. There was thus a large body of sentiment
-prepared to respond to the declamations of Lysias. And many a
-Grecian patriot, who would be ashamed to lay hands on the Syracusan
-tents or envoys, would yet yield a mournful assent to the orator’s
-remark, that the free Grecian world was on fire<a id="FNanchor_164"
-href="#Footnote_164" class="fnanchor">[164]</a> at both sides; that
-Asiatics, Italians, and Sicilians, had already passed into the hands
-of Artaxerxes and Dionysius; and that, if these two formidable
-enemies should coalesce, the liberties even of central Greece would
-be in great danger.</p>
-
-<p>It is easy to see how much such feeling of grief and shame
-would<span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">[p. 77]</span> tend to
-raise antipathy against Sparta. Lysias, in that portion of his
-speech which we possess, disguises his censure against her under
-the forms of surprise. But Isokrates, who composed an analogous
-discourse four years afterwards (which may perhaps have been read
-at the next Olympic festival of <small>B.C.</small> 380), speaks
-out more plainly. He denounces the Lacedæmonians as traitors to the
-general security and freedom of Greece, and as seconding foreign
-kings as well as Grecian despots to aggrandize themselves at the
-cost of autonomous Grecian cities,—all in the interest of their own
-selfish ambition. No wonder (he says) that the free and self-acting
-Hellenic world was every day becoming contracted into a narrower
-space, when the presiding city Sparta assisted Artaxerxes, Amyntas,
-and Dionysius to absorb it,—and herself undertook unjust aggressions
-against Thebes, Olynthus, Phlius, and Mantinea.<a id="FNanchor_165"
-href="#Footnote_165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a></p>
-
-<p>The preceding citations, from Lysias and Isokrates, would be
-sufficient to show the measure which intelligent contemporaries
-took, both of the state of Greece and of the conduct of Sparta,
-during the eight years succeeding the peace of Antalkidas (387-379
-<small>B.C.</small>). But the philo-Laconian Xenophon is still
-more emphatic in his condemnation of Sparta. Having described her
-triumphant and seemingly unassailable position after the subjugation
-of Olynthus and Phlius, he proceeds to say,<a id="FNanchor_166"
-href="#Footnote_166" class="fnanchor">[166]</a>—“I could produce
-numerous oth<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">[p. 78]</span>er
-incidents, both in and out of Greece, to prove that the gods take
-careful note of impious men and of evil-doers; but the events which
-I am now about to relate are quite sufficient. The Lacedæmonians,
-who had sworn to leave each city autonomous, having violated their
-oaths by seizing the citadel of Thebes, were punished by the very
-men whom they had wronged,—though no one on earth had ever before
-triumphed over them. And the Theban faction who had introduced them
-into the citadel, with the deliberate purpose that their city should
-be enslaved to Sparta in order that they might rule despotically
-themselves,—were put down by no more than seven assailants, among the
-exiles whom they had banished.”</p>
-
-<p>What must have been the hatred, and sense of abused ascendency,
-entertained towards Sparta by neutral or unfriendly Greeks, when
-Xenophon, alike conspicuous for his partiality to her and for his
-dislike of Thebes, could employ these decisive words in ushering
-in the coming phase of Spartan humiliation, representing it as a
-well-merited judgment from the gods? The sentence which I have just
-translated marks, in the commonplace manner of the Xenophontic
-Hellenica, the same moment of pointed contrast and transition,—past
-glory suddenly and unexpectedly darkened by supervening
-misfortune,—which is foreshadowed in the narrative of Thucydides
-by the dialogue between the Athenian envoys and the Melian<a
-id="FNanchor_167" href="#Footnote_167" class="fnanchor">[167]</a>
-council; or in the Œdipus and Antigonê of Sophokles,<a
-id="FNanchor_168" href="#Footnote_168" class="fnanchor">[168]</a> by
-the warnings of the prophet Teiresias.</p>
-
-<p>The government of Thebes had now been for three years (since
-the blow struck by Phœbidas) in the hands of Leontiades and his
-oligarchical partisans, upheld by the Spartan garrison in the
-Kadmeia. Respecting the details of its proceedings we have scarce
-any information. We can only (as above remarked) judge of it by
-the analogy of the Thirty tyrants at Athens, and of the Lysandrian
-Dekarchies, to which it was exactly similar in origin, position,
-and interests. That the general spirit of it must have been cruel,
-oppressive, and rapacious,—we cannot doubt; though in what degree
-we have no means of knowing. The appetites<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_79">[p. 79]</span> of uncontrolled rulers, as well as
-those of a large foreign garrison, would ensure such a result;
-besides which, those rulers must have been in constant fear of
-risings or conspiracies amidst a body of high-spirited citizens
-who saw their city degraded, from being the chief of the Bœotian
-federation, into nothing better than a captive dependency of Sparta.
-Such fear was aggravated by the vicinity of a numerous body of
-Theban exiles, belonging to the opposite or anti-Spartan party;
-three or four hundred of whom had fled to Athens at the first
-seizure of their leader Ismenias, and had been doubtless joined
-subsequently by others. So strongly did the Theban rulers apprehend
-mischief from these exiles, that they hired assassins to take them
-off by private murder at Athens; and actually succeeded in thus
-killing Androkleidas, chief of the band and chief successor of the
-deceased Ismenias,—though they missed their blows at the rest.<a
-id="FNanchor_169" href="#Footnote_169" class="fnanchor">[169]</a>
-And we may be sure that they made the prison in Thebes subservient
-to multiplied enormities and executions, when we read not only
-that one hundred and fifty prisoners were found in it when the
-government was put down,<a id="FNanchor_170" href="#Footnote_170"
-class="fnanchor">[170]</a> but also that in the fervor of that
-revolutionary movement, the slain gaoler was an object of such
-fierce antipathy, that his corpse was trodden and spit upon by a
-crowd of Theban women.<a id="FNanchor_171" href="#Footnote_171"
-class="fnanchor">[171]</a> In Thebes, as in other Grecian cities, the
-women not only took no part in political disputes, but rarely even
-showed themselves in public;<a id="FNanchor_172" href="#Footnote_172"
-class="fnanchor">[172]</a> so that this furious demonstration
-of vin<span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">[p. 80]</span>dictive
-sentiment must have been generated by the loss or maltreatment of
-sons, husbands, and brothers.</p>
-
-<p>The Theban exiles found at Athens not only secure shelter,
-but genuine sympathy with their complaints against Lacedæmonian
-injustice. The generous countenance which had been shown by the
-Thebans, twenty-four years before, to Thrasybulus and the other
-Athenian refugees, during the omnipotence of the Thirty, was now
-gratefully requited under this reversal of fortune to both cities;<a
-id="FNanchor_173" href="#Footnote_173" class="fnanchor">[173]</a> and
-requited too in defiance of the menaces of Sparta, who demanded that
-the exiles should be expelled,—as she had in the earlier occasion
-demanded that the Athenian refugees should be dismissed from Thebes.
-To protect these Theban exiles, however, was all that Athens could
-do. Their restoration was a task beyond her power,—and seemingly
-yet more beyond their own. For the existing government of Thebes
-was firmly seated, and had the citizens completely under control.
-Administered by a small faction, Archias, Philippus, Hypatês, and
-Leontiades (among whom the first two were at this moment polemarchs,
-though the last was the most energetic and resolute)—it was at
-the same time sustained by the large garrison of fifteen hundred
-Lacedæmonians and allies,<a id="FNanchor_174" href="#Footnote_174"
-class="fnanchor">[174]</a> under Lysanoridas and two other harmosts,
-in the Kadmeia,—as well as by the Lacedæmonian posts in the other
-Bœotian cities around,—Orchomenus, Thespiæ, Platæa, Tanagra, etc.
-Though the general body of Theban senti<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_81">[p. 81]</span>ment in the city was decidedly adverse
-to the government, and though the young men while exercising
-in the palæstra (gymnastic exercises being more strenuously
-prosecuted at Thebes than anywhere else except at Sparta) kept up
-by private communication the ardor of an earnest, but compressed,
-patriotism,—yet all manifestation or assemblage was forcibly kept
-down, and the commanding posts of the lower town, as well as the
-citadel, were held in vigilant occupation by the ruling minority.<a
-id="FNanchor_175" href="#Footnote_175" class="fnanchor">[175]</a></p>
-
-<p>For a certain time the Theban exiles at Athens waited in hopes
-of some rising at home, or some positive aid from the Athenians.
-At length, in the third winter after their flight, they began to
-despair of encouragement from either quarter, and resolved to take
-the initiative upon themselves. Among them were numbered several
-men of the richest and highest families at Thebes, proprietors of
-chariots, jockeys, and training establishments, for contending at
-the various festivals: Pelopidas, Mellon, Damokleidas, Theopompus,
-Pherenikus, and others.<a id="FNanchor_176" href="#Footnote_176"
-class="fnanchor">[176]</a></p>
-
-<p>Of these the most forward in originating aggressive measures,
-though almost the youngest, was Pelopidas; whose daring and
-self-devotion, in an enterprise which seemed utterly desperate, soon
-communicated itself to a handful of his comrades. The exiles, keeping
-up constant private correspondence with their friends in Thebes, felt
-assured of the sympathy of the citizens generally, if they could
-once strike a blow. Yet nothing less would be sufficient than the
-destruction of the four rulers, Leontiades and his colleagues,—nor
-would any one within the city devote himself to so hopeless a danger.
-It was this conspiracy which Pelopidas, Mellon, and five or ten
-other exiles (the entire band is differently numbered, by some as
-seven, by others, twelve<a id="FNanchor_177" href="#Footnote_177"
-class="fnanchor">[177]</a>) un<span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">[p.
-82]</span>dertook to execute. Many of their friends in Thebes came
-in as auxiliaries to them, who would not have embarked in the design
-as primary actors. Of all auxiliaries, the most effective and
-indispensable was Phyllidas, the secretary of the polemarchs; next
-to him, Charon, an eminent and earnest patriot. Phyllidas, having
-been despatched to Athens on official business, entered into secret
-conference with the conspirators, concerted with them the day for
-their coming to Thebes, and even engaged to provide for them access
-to the persons of the polemarchs. Charon not only promised them
-concealment in his house, from their first coming within the gates
-until the moment of striking their blow should have arrived,—but
-also entered his name to share in the armed attack. Nevertheless,
-in spite of such partial encouragements, the plan still appeared
-desperate to many who wished heartily for its success. Epaminondas,
-for example,—who now for the first time comes before us,—resident
-at Thebes, and not merely sympathizing with the political views of
-Pelopidas, but also bound to him by intimate friendship,—dissuaded
-others from the attempt, and declined participating in it. He
-announced distinctly that he would not become an accomplice in civil
-bloodshed. It appears that there were men among the exiles whose
-violence made him fear that they would not, like Pelopidas, draw the
-sword exclusively against Leontiades and his colleagues, but would
-avail themselves of success to perpetrate unmeasured violence against
-other political enemies.<a id="FNanchor_178" href="#Footnote_178"
-class="fnanchor">[178]</a></p>
-
-<p>The day for the enterprise was determined by Phyllidas the
-secretary, who had prepared an evening banquet for Archias and
-Philippus, in celebration of the period when they were going out of
-office as polemarchs,—and who had promised on that occasion to bring
-into their company some women remarkable for beauty, as well as of
-the best families in Thebes.<a id="FNanchor_179" href="#Footnote_179"
-class="fnanchor">[179]</a> In concert with the general body of
-Theban exiles at Athens, who held themselves ready on the borders
-of Attica, together with some Athenian sympathizers, to march to
-Thebes the instant that they should receive<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_83">[p. 83]</span> intimation,—and in concert also with two
-out of the ten Stratêgi of Athens, who took on themselves privately
-to countenance the enterprise, without any public vote,—Pelopidas
-and Mellon, and their five companions,<a id="FNanchor_180"
-href="#Footnote_180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a> crossed Kithæron
-from Athens to Thebes. It was wet weather, about December
-<small>B.C.</small> 379; they were disguised as rustics or hunters,
-with no other arms than a concealed dagger; and they got within the
-gates of Thebes one by one at nightfall, just when the latest farming
-men were coming home from their fields. All of them arrived safe at
-the house of Charon, the appointed rendezvous.</p>
-
-<p>It was, however, by mere accident that they had not been
-turned back, and the whole scheme frustrated. For a Theban named
-Hipposthenidas, friendly to the conspiracy, but faint-hearted, who
-had been let into the secret against the will of Phyllidas,—became so
-frightened as the moment of execution approached, that he took upon
-himself, without the knowledge of the rest, to despatch Chlidon, a
-faithful slave of Mellon, ordering him to go forth on horseback from
-Thebes, to meet his master on the road, and to desire that he and his
-comrades would go back to Attica, since circumstances had happened to
-render the project for the moment impracticable. Chlidon, going home
-to fetch his bridle, but not finding it in its usual place, asked his
-wife where it was. The woman, at first pretending to look for it, at
-last confessed that she had lent it to a neighbor. Chlidon became
-so irritated with this delay, that he got into a loud altercation
-with his wife, who on her part wished him ill luck with his journey.
-He at last beat her, until neighbors ran in to interpose. His
-departure was thus accidentally frustrated, so that the intended
-message of countermand never reached the conspirators on their way.<a
-id="FNanchor_181" href="#Footnote_181" class="fnanchor">[181]</a></p>
-
-<p>In the house of Charon they remained concealed all the ensuing
-day, on the evening of which the banquet of Archias and Philippus
-was to take place. Phyllidas had laid his plan for introducing them
-at that banquet, at the moment when the two polemarchs had become
-full of wine, in female attire, as being the<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_84">[p. 84]</span> women whose visit was expected. The
-hour had nearly arrived, and they were preparing to play their
-parts, when an unexpected messenger knocked at the door, summoning
-Charon instantly into the presence of the polemarchs. All within
-were thunderstruck with the summons, which seemed to imply that the
-plot had been divulged, perhaps by the timid Hipposthenidas. It was
-agreed among them that Charon must obey at once. Nevertheless, he
-himself, even in the perilous uncertainty which beset him, was most
-of all apprehensive lest the friends whom he had sheltered should
-suspect him of treachery towards themselves and their cause. Before
-departing, therefore, he sent for his only son, a youth of fifteen,
-and of conspicuous promise in every way. This youth he placed in the
-hands of Pelopidas, as a hostage for his own fidelity. But Pelopidas
-and the rest, vehemently disclaiming all suspicion, entreated Charon
-to put his son away, out of the reach of that danger in which all
-were now involved. Charon, however, could not be prevailed on
-to comply, and left his son among them to share the fate of the
-rest. He went into the presence of Archias and Philippus; whom he
-found already half-intoxicated, but informed, by intelligence from
-Athens, that some plot, they knew not by whom, was afloat. They
-had sent for him to question him, as a known friend of the exiles;
-but he had little difficulty, aided by the collusion of Phyllidas,
-in blinding the vague suspicions of drunken men, anxious only to
-resume their conviviality.<a id="FNanchor_182" href="#Footnote_182"
-class="fnanchor">[182]</a> He was allowed to retire and rejoin
-his friends. Nevertheless, soon after his departure,—so many were
-the favorable chances which befel these improvident men,—a fresh
-message was delivered to Archias the polemarch, from his namesake
-Archias the Athenian Hierophant, giving an exact account of the
-names and scheme of the conspirators, which had become known<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_85">[p. 85]</span> to the philo-Laconian
-party at Athens. The messenger who bore this despatch delivered
-it to Archias with an intimation, that it related to very serious
-matters. “Serious matters for to-morrow,” said the polemarch, as he
-put the despatch, unopened and unread, under the pillow of the couch
-on which he was reclining.<a id="FNanchor_183" href="#Footnote_183"
-class="fnanchor">[183]</a></p>
-
-<p>Returning to their carousal, Archias and Philippus impatiently
-called upon Phyllidas to introduce the women according to his
-promise. Upon this the secretary retired, and brought the
-conspirators, clothed in female attire, into an adjoining chamber;
-then going back to the polemarchs, he informed them that the women
-would not come in unless all the domestics were first dismissed.
-An order was forthwith given that these latter should depart,
-while Phyllidas took care that they should be well provided with
-wine at the lodging of one among their number. The polemarchs were
-thus left only with one or two friends at table, half-intoxicated
-as well as themselves; among them Kabeirichus, the archon of the
-year, who always throughout his term kept the consecrated spear of
-office in actual possession, and had it at that moment close to
-his person. Phyllidas now conducted the pretended women into the
-banqueting-room; three of them attired as ladies of distinction, the
-four others following as female attendants. Their long veils, and
-ample folds of clothing, were quite sufficient as disguise,—even
-had the guests at table been sober,—until they sat down by the side
-of the polemarchs; and the instant of lifting their veils was the
-signal for using their daggers. Archias and Philippus were slain
-at once and with little resistance; but Kabeirichus with his spear
-tried to defend himself, and thus perished with the others, though
-the conspirators had not originally intended to take his life.<a
-id="FNanchor_184" href="#Footnote_184" class="fnanchor">[184]</a></p>
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">[p. 86]</span></p> <p>Having
-been thus far successful, Phyllidas conducted three of the
-conspirators,—Pelopidas, Kephisodôrus, and Damokleidas,—to the house
-of Leontiades, into which he obtained admittance by announcing
-himself as the bearer of an order from the polemarchs. Leontiades was
-reclining after supper, with his wife sitting spinning wool by his
-side, when they entered his chamber. Being a brave and powerful man,
-he started up, seized his sword, and mortally wounded Kephisodôrus
-in the throat; a desperate struggle then ensued between him and
-Pelopidas in the narrow doorway, where there was no room for a third
-to approach. At length, however, Pelopidas overthrew and killed him,
-after which they retired, enjoining the wife with threats to remain
-silent, and closing the door after them with peremptory commands
-that it should not be again opened. They then went to the house of
-Hypatês, whom they slew while he attempted to escape over the roof.<a
-id="FNanchor_185" href="#Footnote_185" class="fnanchor">[185]</a></p>
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">[p. 87]</span></p> <p>The
-four great rulers of the philo-Laconian party in Thebes having been
-now put to death, Phyllidas proceeded with the conspirators to the
-prison. Here the gaoler, a confidential agent in the oppressions of
-the deceased governors, hesitated to admit him; but was slain by a
-sudden thrust with his spear, so as to ensure free admission to all.
-To liberate the prisoners, probably, for the most part men of kindred
-politics with the conspirators,—to furnish them with arms taken
-from the battle-spoils hanging up in the neighboring porticos,—and
-to range them in battle order near the temple of Amphion,—were the
-next proceedings; after which they began to feel some assurance
-of safety and triumph.<a id="FNanchor_186" href="#Footnote_186"
-class="fnanchor">[186]</a> Epaminondas and Gorgidas, apprised of
-what had occurred, were the first who appeared in arms with a few
-friends to sustain the cause; while proclamation was everywhere made
-aloud, through heralds, that the despots were slain,—that Thebes
-was free,—and that all Thebans who valued freedom should muster in
-arms in the market-place. There were at that moment in Thebes many
-trumpeters who had come to contend for the prize at the approaching
-festival of the Herakleia. Hipposthenidas engaged these men to blow
-their trumpets in different parts of the city, and thus everywhere to
-excite the citizens to arms.<a id="FNanchor_187" href="#Footnote_187"
-class="fnanchor">[187]</a></p>
-
-<p>Although during the darkness surprise was the prevalent
-feeling, and no one knew what to do,—yet so soon as day dawned,
-and the truth became known, there was but one feeling of joy
-and patriotic enthusiasm among the majority of the citizens.<a
-id="FNanchor_188" href="#Footnote_188" class="fnanchor">[188]</a>
-Both<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">[p. 88]</span> horsemen and
-hoplites hastened in arms to the agora. Here for the first time
-since the seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas, a formal assembly
-of the Theban people was convened, before which Pelopidas and his
-fellow-conspirators presented themselves. The priests of the city
-crowned them with wreaths, and thanked them in the name of the
-local gods; while the assembly hailed them with acclamations of
-delight and gratitude, nominating with one voice Pelopidas, Mellon,
-and Charon, as the first renewed Bœotarchs.<a id="FNanchor_189"
-href="#Footnote_189" class="fnanchor">[189]</a> The revival of this
-title, which had been dropped since the peace of Antalkidas, was
-in itself an event of no mean significance; implying not merely
-that Thebes had waked up again into freedom, but that the Bœotian
-confederacy also had been, or would be, restored.</p>
-
-<p>Messengers had been forthwith despatched by the conspirators to
-Attica to communicate their success; upon which all the remaining
-exiles, with the two Athenian generals privy to the plot, and a
-body of Athenian volunteers, or <i>corps francs</i>, all of whom were
-ready on the borders awaiting the summons,—flocked to Thebes to
-complete the work. The Spartan generals, on their side also, sent
-to Platæa and Thespiæ for aid. During the whole night, they had
-been distracted and alarmed by the disturbance in the city; lights
-showing themselves here and there, with trumpets sounding and shouts
-for the recent success.<a id="FNanchor_190" href="#Footnote_190"
-class="fnanchor">[190]</a> Apprised speedily of the slaughter of
-the polemarchs, from whom they had been accustomed to receive
-orders, they knew not whom to trust or to consult, while they were
-doubtless beset by affrighted fugitives of the now defeated party,
-who would hurry up the Kadmeia for safety. They reckoned at first on
-a diversion in their favor from the forces at Platæa and Thespiæ.
-But these forces were not permitted even to approach the city gate;
-being vigorously charged, as soon as they came in sight, by the
-newly-mustered Theban cavalry, and forced to retreat with loss. The
-Lacedæmonians in the citadel were thus not only left without support,
-but saw their enemies in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">[p.
-89]</span> the city reinforced by the other exiles, and by the
-auxiliary volunteers.<a id="FNanchor_191" href="#Footnote_191"
-class="fnanchor">[191]</a></p>
-
-<p>Meanwhile, Pelopidas and the other new Bœotarchs found themselves
-at the head of a body of armed citizens, full of devoted patriotism
-and unanimous in hailing the recent revolution. They availed
-themselves of this first burst of fervor to prepare for storming
-the Kadmeia without delay, knowing the importance of forestalling
-all aid from Sparta. And the citizens were already rushing up
-to the assault,—proclamation being made of large rewards to
-those who should first force their way in,—when the Lacedæmonian
-commander sent proposals for a capitulation.<a id="FNanchor_192"
-href="#Footnote_192" class="fnanchor">[192]</a> Undisturbed egress
-from Thebes, with the honors of war, being readily guaranteed to
-him by oath, the Kadmeia was then surrendered. As the Spartans were
-marching out of the gates, many Thebans of the defeated party came
-forth also. But against these latter the exasperation of the victors
-was so ungovernable, that several of the most odious were seized as
-they passed, and put to death; in some cases, even their children
-along with them. And more of them would have been thus despatched,
-had not the Athenian auxiliaries, with generous anxiety, exerted
-every effort to get them out of sight and put them into safety.<a
-id="FNanchor_193" href="#Footnote_193" class="fnanchor">[193]</a>
-We are not told,—nor is it certain,—that these Thebans were
-protected under the capitulation. Even had they been so, however,
-the wrathful impulse might still have prevailed against them. Of
-the three harmosts who thus evacuated the Kadmeia without a blow,
-two were put to death, the third was heavily fined and banished, by
-the authorities at Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_194" href="#Footnote_194"
-class="fnanchor">[194]</a> We do not know what the fortifi<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_90">[p. 90]</span>cations of the Kadmeia
-were, nor how far it was provisioned. But we can hardly wonder that
-these officers were considered to have dishonored the Lacedæmonian
-arms, by making no attempt to defend it; when we recollect that
-hardly more than four or five days would be required to procure
-adequate relief from home,—and that forty-three years afterwards, the
-Macedonian garrison in the same place maintained itself against the
-Thebans in the city for more than fourteen days, until the return
-of Alexander from Illyria.<a id="FNanchor_195" href="#Footnote_195"
-class="fnanchor">[195]</a> The first messenger who brought news
-to Sparta of the conspiracy and revolution at Thebes, appears to
-have communicated at the same time that the garrison had evacuated
-the Kadmeia and was in full retreat, with a train of Theban exiles
-from the defeated party.<a id="FNanchor_196" href="#Footnote_196"
-class="fnanchor">[196]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">[p. 91]</span></p>
-
-<p>This revolution at Thebes came like an electric shock upon the
-Grecian world. With a modern reader, the assassination of the<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_92">[p. 92]</span> four leaders, in their
-houses and at the banquet, raises a sentiment of repugnance which
-withdraws his attention from the other fea<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_93">[p. 93]</span>tures of this memorable deed. Now an
-ancient Greek not only had no such repugnance, but sympathized
-with the complete revenge for the seizure of the Kadmeia and the
-death of Ismenias; while he admired, besides, the extraordinary
-personal daring of Pelopidas and Mellon,—the skilful forecast of
-the plot,—and the sudden overthrow, by a force so contemptibly
-small, of a government which the day before seemed unassailable.<a
-id="FNanchor_197" href="#Footnote_197" class="fnanchor">[197]</a> It
-deserves note that we here see the richest men in Thebes undertaking
-a risk, single-handed and with their own persons, which must have
-appeared on a reasonable estimate little less than desperate.
-From the Homeric Odysseus and Achilles down to the end of free
-Hellenism, the rich Greek strips in the Palæstra,<a id="FNanchor_198"
-href="#Footnote_198" class="fnanchor">[198]</a> and exposes his
-person in the ranks as a soldier like the poorest citizens; being
-generally superior to them in strength and bodily efficiency.</p>
-
-<p>As the revolution in Thebes acted forcibly on the Grecian
-mind from the manner in which it was accomplished, so by its
-positive effects it altered forthwith the balance of power in
-Greece. The empire of Sparta, far from being undisputed and nearly
-universal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">[p. 94]</span> over
-Greece, is from henceforward only maintained by more or less effort,
-until at length it is completely overthrown.<a id="FNanchor_199"
-href="#Footnote_199" class="fnanchor">[199]</a></p>
-
-<p>The exiles from Thebes, arriving <span class="replace" id="tn_4"
-title="In the printed book: from">at</span> Sparta, inflamed
-both the ephors, and the miso-Theban Agesilaus, to the highest
-pitch. Though it was then the depth of winter,<a id="FNanchor_200"
-href="#Footnote_200" class="fnanchor">[200]</a> an expedition was
-decreed forthwith against Thebes, and the allied contingents were
-summoned. Agesilaus declined to take the command of it, on the
-ground that he was above sixty years of age, and therefore no longer
-liable to compulsory foreign service. But this (says Xenophon<a
-id="FNanchor_201" href="#Footnote_201" class="fnanchor">[201]</a>)
-was not his real reason. He was afraid that his enemies at Sparta
-would say,—“Here is Agesilaus again putting us to expense, in order
-that he may uphold despots in other cities,”—as he had just done, and
-had been reproached with doing, at Phlius; a second proof that the
-reproaches against Sparta (which I have cited a few pages above from
-Lysias and Isokrates) of allying herself with Greek despots as well
-as with foreigners to put down Grecian freedom, found an echo even in
-Sparta herself. Accordingly Kleombrotus, the other king of Sparta,
-took the command. He had recently succeeded his brother Agesipolis,
-and had never commanded before.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">[p. 95]</span></p>
-
-<p>Kleombrotus conducted his army along the Isthmus of Corinth
-through Megara to Platæa, cutting to pieces an outpost of
-Thebans, composed chiefly of the prisoners set free by the recent
-revolution, who had been placed for the defence of the intervening
-mountain-pass. From Platæa he went forward to Thespiæ, and from
-thence to Kynoskephalæ in the Theban territory, where he lay encamped
-for sixteen days; after which he retreated to Thespiæ. It appears
-that he did nothing, and that his inaction was the subject of much
-wonder in his army, who are said to have even doubted whether he was
-really and earnestly hostile to Thebes. Perhaps the exiles, with
-customary exaggeration, may have led him to hope that they could
-provoke a rising in Thebes, if he would only come near. At any rate
-the bad weather must have been a serious impediment to action; since
-in his march back to Peloponnesus through Kreusis and Ægosthenæ
-the wind blew a hurricane, so that his soldiers could not proceed
-without leaving their shields and coming back afterwards to fetch
-them. Kleombrotus did not quit Bœotia, however, without leaving
-Sphodrias as harmost at Thespiæ, with one third of the entire army,
-and with a considerable sum of money to employ in hiring mercenaries
-and acting vigorously against the Thebans.<a id="FNanchor_202"
-href="#Footnote_202" class="fnanchor">[202]</a></p>
-
-<p>The army of Kleombrotus, in its march from Megara to Platæa,
-had passed by the skirts of Attica; causing so much alarm to the
-Athenians, that they placed Chabrias with a body of peltasts, to
-guard their frontier and the neighboring road through Eleutheræ into
-Bœotia. This was the first time that a Lacedæmonian army had touched
-Attica (now no longer guarded by the lines of Corinth, as in the war
-between 394 and 388 <small>B.C.</small>) since the retirement of
-king Pausanias in 404 <small>B.C.</small>; furnishing a proof of
-the exposure of the country, such as to revive in the Athenian mind
-all the terrible recollections of Dekeleia and the Peloponnesian
-war. It was during the first prevalence of this alarm,—and
-seemingly while Kleombrotus was still with his army at Thespiæ or
-Kynoskephalæ, close on the Athenian frontier,—that three Lacedæmonian
-envoys, Etymoklês and two others, arrived at Athens to demand
-satisfaction for the part taken by the two Athenian generals and the
-Athenian volunteers, in concerting and aid<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_96">[p. 96]</span>ing the enterprise of Pelopidas and his
-comrades. So overpowering was the anxiety in the public mind to avoid
-giving offence to Sparta, that these two generals were both of them
-accused before the dikastery. The first of them was condemned and
-executed; the second, profiting by this warning (since, pursuant
-to the psephism of <span class="replace" id="tn_2" title="In the
-printed book: Kannônes">Kannônus</span>,<a id="FNanchor_203"
-href="#Footnote_203" class="fnanchor">[203]</a> the two would be
-put on trial separately), escaped, and a sentence of banishment
-was passed against him.<a id="FNanchor_204" href="#Footnote_204"
-class="fnanchor">[204]</a> These two generals had been unquestionably
-guilty of a grave abuse of their official functions. They had brought
-the state into public hazard, not merely without consulting the
-senate or assembly, but even without taking the sense of their own
-board of Ten. Nevertheless the severity of the sentence pronounced
-indicates the alarm, as well as the displeasure, of the general body
-of Athenians; while it served as a disclaimer in fact, if not in
-form, of all political connection with Thebes.<a id="FNanchor_205"
-href="#Footnote_205" class="fnanchor">[205]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">[p. 97]</span></p>
-
-<p>Even before the Lacedæmonian envoys had quitted Athens,
-however, an incident, alike sudden and memorable, completely<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_98">[p. 98]</span> altered the Athenian
-temper. The Lacedæmonian harmost Sphodrias (whom Kleombrotus had left
-at Thespiæ to prosecute the war against Thebes), being informed that
-Peiræus on its land side was without gates or night watch,—since
-there was no suspicion of attack,—conceived the idea of surprising
-it by a night-march from Thespiæ, and thus of mastering at one
-stroke the commerce, the wealth, and the naval resources of Athens.
-Putting his troops under march one evening after an early supper, he
-calculated on reaching the Peiræus the next morning before daylight.
-But his reckoning proved erroneous. Morning overtook him when he
-had advanced no farther than the Thriasian plain near Eleusis; from
-whence, as it was useless to proceed farther, he turned back and
-retreated to Thespiæ; not, however, without committing various acts
-of plunder against the neighboring Athenian residents.</p>
-
-<p>This plan against Peiræus appears to have been not ill conceived.
-Had Sphodrias been a man competent to organize and execute movements
-as rapid as those of Brasidas, there is no reason why it might
-not have succeeded; in which case the whole face of the war would
-have been changed, since the Lacedæmonians, if once masters of
-Peiræus, both could and would have maintained the place. But it
-was one of those injustices, which no one ever commends until it
-has been successfully consummated,—“consilium quod non potest
-laudari nisi peractum.<a id="FNanchor_206" href="#Footnote_206"
-class="fnanchor">[206]</a>” As it<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_99">[p. 99]</span> failed, it has been considered, by
-critics as well as by contemporaries, not merely as a crime but as
-a fault, and its author Sphodrias as a brave man, but singularly
-weak and hot-headed.<a id="FNanchor_207" href="#Footnote_207"
-class="fnanchor">[207]</a> Without admitting the full extent of
-this censure, we may see that his present aggression grew out of
-an untoward emulation of the glory which Phœbidas, in spite of the
-simulated or transient displeasure of his countrymen, had acquired
-by seizing the Kadmeia. That Sphodrias received private instructions
-from Kleombrotus (as Diodorus states) is not sufficiently proved;
-while the suspicion, intimated by Xenophon as being abroad, that he
-was wrought upon by secret emissaries and bribes from his enemies the
-Thebans, for the purpose of plunging Athens into war with Sparta,
-is altogether improbable;<a id="FNanchor_208" href="#Footnote_208"
-class="fnanchor">[208]</a> and seems merely an hypothesis suggested
-by the consequences of the act,—which were such, that if his enemies
-had bribed him, he could not have served them better.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">[p. 100]</span></p>
-
-<p>The presence of Sphodrias and his army in the Thriasian plain
-was communicated shortly after daybreak at Athens, where it excited
-no less terror than surprise. Every man instantly put himself
-under arms for defence; but news soon arrived that the invader had
-retired. When thus reassured, the Athenians passed from fear to
-indignation. The Lacedæmonian envoys, who were lodging at the house
-of Kallias the proxenus of Sparta, were immediately put under arrest
-and interrogated. But all three affirmed that they were not less
-astonished, and not less exasperated, by the march of Sphodrias, than
-the Athenians themselves; adding, by way of confirmation, that had
-they been really privy to any design of seizing the Peiræus, they
-would have taken care not to let themselves be found in the city,
-and in their ordinary lodging at the house of the proxenus, where
-of course their persons would be at once seized. They concluded by
-assuring the Athenians, that Sphodrias would not only be indignantly
-disavowed, but punished capitally, at Sparta. And their reply was
-deemed so satisfactory, that they were allowed to depart; while an
-Athenian embassy was sent to Sparta, to demand the punishment of
-the offending general.<a id="FNanchor_209" href="#Footnote_209"
-class="fnanchor">[209]</a></p>
-
-<p>The Ephors immediately summoned Sphodrias home to Sparta, to take
-his trial on a capital charge. So much did he himself despair of
-his case, that he durst not make his appearance; while the general
-impression was, both at Sparta and elsewhere, that he would certainly
-be condemned. Nevertheless, though thus absent and undefended, he
-was acquitted, purely through private favor and esteem for his
-general character. He was of the party of Kleombrotus, so that
-all the friends of that prince espoused his cause, as a matter
-of course. But as he was of the party opposed to Agesilaus, his
-friends dreaded that the latter would declare<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_101">[p. 101]</span> against him, and bring about his
-condemnation. Nothing saved Sphodrias except the peculiar intimacy
-between his son Kleonymus and Archidamus son of Agesilaus. The
-mournful importunity of Archidamus induced Agesilaus, when this
-important cause was brought before the Senate of Sparta, to put aside
-his judicial conviction, and give his vote in the following manner:
-“To be sure, Sphodrias is guilty; upon that there cannot be two
-opinions. Nevertheless, we cannot put to death a man like him, who,
-as boy, youth, and man, has stood unblemished in all Spartan honor.
-Sparta cannot part with soldiers like Sphodrias.<a id="FNanchor_210"
-href="#Footnote_210" class="fnanchor">[210]</a>” The friends of
-Agesilaus, following this opinion and coinciding with those of
-Kleombrotus, ensured a favorable verdict. And it is remarkable,
-that Etymoklês himself, who as envoy at Athens had announced as
-a certainty that Sphodrias would be put to death,—as senator and
-friend of Agesilaus voted for his acquittal.<a id="FNanchor_211"
-href="#Footnote_211" class="fnanchor">[211]</a></p>
-
-<p>This remarkable incident (which comes to us from a witness not
-merely philo-Laconian, but also personally intimate with Agesilaus)
-shows how powerfully the course of justice at Sparta was overruled by
-private sympathy and interests,—especially, those of the two kings.
-It especially illustrates what has been stated in a former chapter
-respecting the oppressions exercised by the Spartan harmosts and the
-dekadarchies, for which no redress was attainable at Sparta. Here
-was a case where not only the guilt of Sphodrias stood confessed,
-but in which also his acquittal was sure to be followed by a war
-with Athens. If, under such circumstances, the Athenian demand for
-redress was overruled by the favor of the two kings, what chance
-was there of any justice to the complaint of a dependent city, or
-an injured individual,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">[p.
-102]</span> against the harmost? The contrast between Spartan and
-Athenian proceeding is also instructive. Only a few days before,
-the Athenians condemned, at the instance of Sparta, their two
-generals who had without authority lent aid to the Theban exiles.
-In so doing, the Athenian dikastery enforced the law against clear
-official misconduct,—and that, too, in a case where their sympathies
-went along with the act, though their fear of a war with Sparta was
-stronger. But the most important circumstance to note is, that at
-Athens there is neither private influence, nor kingly influence,
-capable of overruling the sincere judicial conscience of a numerous
-and independent dikastery.</p>
-
-<p>The result of the acquittal of Sphodrias must have been well known
-beforehand to all parties at Sparta. Even by the general voice of
-Greece, the sentence was denounced as iniquitous.<a id="FNanchor_212"
-href="#Footnote_212" class="fnanchor">[212]</a> But the Athenians,
-who had so recently given strenuous effect to the remonstrances
-of Sparta against their own generals, were stung by it to the
-quick; and only the more stung, in consequence of the extraordinary
-compliments to Sphodrias on which the acquittal was made to turn.
-They immediately contracted hearty alliance with Thebes, and made
-vigorous preparations for war against Sparta both by land and sea.
-After completing the fortifications of Peiræus, so as to place it
-beyond the reach of any future attempt, they applied themselves to
-the building of new ships of war, and to the extension of their
-naval ascendency, at the expense of Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_213"
-href="#Footnote_213" class="fnanchor">[213]</a></p>
-
-<p>From this moment, a new combination began in Grecian politics. The
-Athenians thought the moment favorable to attempt the construction
-of a new confederacy, analogous to the Confederacy of Delos, formed
-a century before; the basis on which had been reared the formidable
-Athenian empire, lost at the close of the Peloponnesian war. Towards
-such construction there was so far a tendency, that Athens had
-already a small body of maritime allies; while rhetors like Isokrates
-(in his Panegyrical Discourse, published two years before) had been
-familiarizing the public mind with larger ideas. But the enterprise
-was now pressed with the determination and vehemence of men smarting
-under recent insult. The Athenians had good ground to build upon;
-since,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">[p. 103]</span> while the
-discontent against the ascendency of Sparta was widely spread, the
-late revolution in Thebes had done much to lessen that sentiment
-of fear upon which such ascendency chiefly rested. To Thebes, the
-junction with Athens was preëminently welcome, and her leaders gladly
-enrolled their city as a constituent member of the new confederacy.<a
-id="FNanchor_214" href="#Footnote_214" class="fnanchor">[214]</a>
-They cheerfully acknowledged the presidency of Athens,—reserving,
-however, tacitly or expressly, their own rights as presidents of the
-Bœotian federation, as soon as that could be reconstituted; which
-reconstitution was at this moment desirable even for Athens, seeing
-that the Bœotian towns were now dependent allies of Sparta under
-harmosts and oligarchies.</p>
-
-<p>The Athenians next sent envoys round to the principal islands and
-maritime cities in the Ægean, inviting all of them to an alliance
-on equal and honorable terms. The principles were in the main the
-same as those upon which the confederacy of Delos had been formed
-against the Persians, almost a century before. It was proposed that
-a congress of deputies should meet at Athens, one from each city,
-small as well as great, each with one vote; that Athens should be
-president, yet each individual city autonomous; that a common fund
-should be raised, with a common naval force, through assessment
-imposed by this congress upon each, and applied as the same
-authority might prescribe; the general purpose being defined to be,
-maintenance of freedom and security from foreign aggression, to each
-confederate, by the common force of all. Care was taken to banish as
-much as possible those associations of tribute and subjection which
-rendered the recollection of the former Athenian empire unpopular.<a
-id="FNanchor_215" href="#Footnote_215" class="fnanchor">[215]</a>
-And as there were many Athenian citizens, who, during those times
-of supremacy, had been planted out as kleruchs or out-settlers
-in various dependencies, but had been deprived of their
-properties at the close of the war,—it was thought necessary to
-pass a formal decree,<a id="FNanchor_216" href="#Footnote_216"
-class="fnanchor">[216]</a> re<span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">[p.
-104]</span>nouncing and barring all revival of these suspended
-rights. It was farther decreed that henceforward no Athenian should
-on any<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">[p. 105]</span> pretence
-hold property, either in house or land, in the territory of any
-one of the confederates; neither by purchase, nor as security for
-money lent, nor by any other mode of acquisition. Any Athenian
-infringing this law, was rendered liable to be informed against
-before the synod; who, on proof of the fact, were to deprive him of
-the property,—half of it going to the informer, half to the general
-purposes of the confederacy.</p>
-
-<p>Such were the liberal principles of confederacy now proposed by
-Athens,—who, as a candidate for power, was straightforward and just,
-like the Herodotean Deiokês,<a id="FNanchor_217" href="#Footnote_217"
-class="fnanchor">[217]</a>—and formally ratified, as well by the
-Athenians as by the general voice of the confederate deputies
-assembled within their walls. The formal decree and compact of
-alliance was inscribed on a stone column and placed by the side
-of the statue of Zeus Eleutherius or the Liberator; a symbol, of
-enfranchisement from Sparta accomplished, as well as of freedom to
-be maintained against Persia and other enemies.<a id="FNanchor_218"
-href="#Footnote_218" class="fnanchor">[218]</a> Periodical meetings
-of the confederate deputies were provided to be held (how often, we
-do not know) at Athens, and the synod was recognized as competent
-judge of all persons, even Athenian citizens, charged with treason
-against the confederacy. To give fuller security to the confederates
-generally, it was provided in the original compact, that if any
-Athenian citizen should either speak, or put any question to the
-vote, in the Athenian assembly, contrary to the tenor of that
-document,—he should be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">[p.
-106]</span> tried before the synod for treason; and that, if found
-guilty, he might be condemned by them to the severest punishment.</p>
-
-<p>Three Athenian leaders stood prominent as commissioners in the
-first organization of the confederacy, and in the dealings with
-those numerous cities whose junction was to be won by amicable
-inducement,—Chabrias, Timotheus son of Konon, and Kallistratus.<a
-id="FNanchor_219" href="#Footnote_219" class="fnanchor">[219]</a></p>
-
-<p>The first of the three is already known to the reader. He and
-Iphikrates were the most distinguished warriors whom Athens numbered
-among her citizens. But not having been engaged in any war, since
-the peace of Antalkidas in 387 <small>B.C.</small>, she had had no
-need of their services; hence both of them had been absent from the
-city during much of the last nine years, and Iphikrates seems still
-to have been absent. At the time when that peace was concluded,
-Iphikrates was serving in the Hellespont and Thrace, Chabrias with
-Evagoras in Cyprus; each having been sent thither by Athens at the
-head of a body of mercenary peltasts. Instead of dismissing their
-troops, and returning to Athens as peaceful citizens, it was not less
-agreeable to the military tastes of these generals, than conducive
-to their importance and their profit, to keep together their bands,
-and to take foreign service. Accordingly, Chabrias had continued
-in service first in Cyprus, next with the native Egyptian king
-Akoris. The Persians, against whom he served, found his hostility so
-inconvenient, that Pharnabazus demanded of the Athenians to recall
-him, on pain of the Great King’s displeasure; and requested at the
-same time that Iphikrates might be sent to aid the Persian satraps
-in organizing a great expedition against Egypt. The Athenians, to
-whom the goodwill of Persia was now of peculiar importance, complied
-on both points; recalled Chabrias, who thus became disposable for
-the Athenian service,<a id="FNanchor_220" href="#Footnote_220"
-class="fnanchor">[220]</a> and despatched Iphikrates to take command
-along with the Persians.</p>
-
-<p>Iphikrates, since the peace of Antalkidas, had employed his
-peltasts in the service of the kings of Thrace: first of Seuthes,
-near the shores of the Propontis, whom he aided in the recovery of
-certain lost dominions,—next of Kotys, whose favor he acquired,
-and whose daughter he presently married.<a id="FNanchor_221"
-href="#Footnote_221" class="fnanchor">[221]</a> Not only did
-he enjoy great scope for warlike operations and plunder,
-among the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">[p. 107]</span>
-“butter-eating Thracians,”<a id="FNanchor_222" href="#Footnote_222"
-class="fnanchor">[222]</a>—but he also acquired, as dowry, a
-large stock of such produce as Thracian princes had at their
-disposal, together with a boon even more important,—a seaport
-village not far from the mouth of the Hebrus, called Drys, where
-he established a fortified post, and got together a Grecian colony
-dependent on himself.<a id="FNanchor_223" href="#Footnote_223"
-class="fnanchor">[223]</a> Miltiades, Alkibiades, and other
-eminent Athenians had done the same thing before him; though
-Xenophon had refused a similar proposition when made to him by
-the earlier Seuthes.<a id="FNanchor_224" href="#Footnote_224"
-class="fnanchor">[224]</a> Iphikrates thus became a great man in
-Thrace, yet by no means abandoning his connection with Athens,
-but making his position in each subservient to his importance in
-the other. While he was in a situation to favor the projects of
-Athenian citizens for mercantile and territorial acquisitions in the
-Chersonese and other parts<span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">[p.
-108]</span> of Thrace,—he could also lend the aid of Athenian naval
-and military art, not merely to princes in Thrace, but to others even
-beyond those limits,—since we learn that Amyntas king of Macedonia
-became so attached or indebted to him as to adopt him for his son.<a
-id="FNanchor_225" href="#Footnote_225" class="fnanchor">[225]</a>
-When sent by the Athenians to Persia, at the request of Pharnabazus
-(about 378 <small>B.C.</small> apparently), Iphikrates had fair
-ground for anticipating that a career yet more lucrative was
-opening before him.<a id="FNanchor_226" href="#Footnote_226"
-class="fnanchor">[226]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">[p. 109]</span></p>
-
-<p>Iphikrates being thus abroad, the Athenians joined with Chabrias,
-in the mission and measures for organizing their new confed<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_110">[p. 110]</span>eracy, two other
-colleagues, of whom we now hear for the first time—Timotheus son of
-Konon, and Kallistratus the most celebrated orator of his time.<a
-id="FNanchor_227" href="#Footnote_227" class="fnanchor">[227]</a>
-The abilities of Kallistratus were not military at all; while
-Timotheus and Chabrias were men of distinguished military merit.
-But in acquiring new allies and attracting deputies to her proposed
-congress, Athens stood in need of persuasive appeal, conciliatory
-dealing, and substantial fairness in all her propositions, not less
-than of generalship. We are told that Timotheus, doubtless as son
-of the liberator Konon, from the recollections of the battle of
-Knidus—was especially successful in procuring new adhesions; and
-probably Kallistratus,<a id="FNanchor_228" href="#Footnote_228"
-class="fnanchor">[228]</a> going round with him to the different
-islands, contributed by his eloquence not a little to the same
-result. On their invitation, many cities entered as con<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_111">[p. 111]</span>federates.<a
-id="FNanchor_229" href="#Footnote_229" class="fnanchor">[229]</a>
-At this time (as in the earlier confederacy of Delos) all who
-joined must have been unconstrained members. And we may understand
-the motives of their junction, when we read the picture drawn by
-Isokrates (in 380 <small>B.C.</small>) of the tyranny of the
-Persians on the Asiatic mainland, threatening, to absorb the
-neighboring islands. Not only was there now a new basis of imposing
-force, presented by Athens and Thebes in union—but there was also
-a wide-spread hatred of imperial Sparta, aggravated since her
-perversion of the pretended boon of autonomy, promised by the peace
-of Antalkidas; and the conjunction of these sentiments caused the
-Athenian mission of invitation to be extremely successful. All the
-cities in Eubœa (except Histiæa, at the north of the island)—as
-well as Chios, Mitylênê, Byzantium, and Rhodes—the three former
-of whom had continued favorably inclined to Athens ever since the
-peace of Antalkidas,<a id="FNanchor_230" href="#Footnote_230"
-class="fnanchor">[230]</a>—all entered into the confederacy. An
-Athenian fleet under Chabrias, sailing among the Cyclades and
-the other islands of the Ægean, aided in the expulsion of the
-Lacedæmonian harmosts,<a id="FNanchor_231" href="#Footnote_231"
-class="fnanchor">[231]</a> together with their devoted local
-oligarchies, wherever they still subsisted; and all the cities
-thus liberated became equal members of the newly-constituted
-congress at Athens. After a certain interval, there came to be
-not less than<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">[p. 112]</span>
-seventy cities, many of them separately powerful, which sent
-deputies to it;<a id="FNanchor_232" href="#Footnote_232"
-class="fnanchor">[232]</a> an aggregate sufficient to intimidate
-Sparta, and even to flatter Athens with the hope of restoration to
-something like her former lustre.</p>
-
-<p>The first votes both of Athens herself, and of the newly-assembled
-congress, threatened war upon the largest scale. A resolution was
-passed to equip twenty thousand hoplites, five hundred horsemen,
-and two hundred triremes.<a id="FNanchor_233" href="#Footnote_233"
-class="fnanchor">[233]</a> Probably the insular and Ionic deputies
-promised each a certain contribution of money, but nothing beyond.
-We do not, however, know how much,—nor how far the engagements,
-large or small, were realized,—nor whether Athens was authorized to
-enforce execution against defaulters,—or was in circumstances to act
-upon such authority, if granted to her by the congress. It was in
-this way (as the reader will recollect from my fifth volume) that
-Athens had first rendered herself unpopular in the confederacy of
-Delos,—by enforcing the resolutions of the confederate synod against
-evasive or seceding members. It was in this way that what was at
-first a voluntary association had ultimately slid into an empire by
-constraint. Under the new circumstances of 378 <small>B.C.</small>,
-we may presume that the confederates, though ardent and full of
-promises on first assembling at Athens, were even at the outset not
-exact, and became afterwards still less exact, in performance; yet
-that Athens was forced to be reserved in claiming, or in exercising,
-the right of enforcement. To obtain a vote of contribution by the
-majority of deputies present, was only the first step in the process;
-to obtain punctual payment, when the Athenian fleet was sent round
-for the purpose of collecting,—yet without incurring dangerous
-unpopularity,—was the second step, but by far the most doubtful and
-difficult.</p>
-
-<p>It must, however, be borne in mind that at this moment, when the
-confederacy was first formed, both Athens and the other cities<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_113">[p. 113]</span> came together from
-a spontaneous impulse of hearty mutuality and coöperation. A few
-years afterwards, we shall find this changed; Athens selfish, and
-the confederates reluctant.<a id="FNanchor_234" href="#Footnote_234"
-class="fnanchor">[234]</a> Inflamed, as well by their position
-of renovated headship, as by fresh animosity against Sparta, the
-Athenians made important efforts of their own, both financial and
-military. Equipping a fleet, which for the time was superior in the
-Ægean, they ravaged the hostile territory of Histiæa in Eubœa, and
-annexed to their confederacy the islands of Peparêthus and Skiathus.
-They imposed upon themselves also a direct property-tax; to what
-amount, however, we do not know.</p>
-
-<p>It was on the occasion of this tax that they introduced a great
-change in the financial arrangements and constitution of the
-city; a change conferring note upon the archonship of Nausinikus,
-(<small>B.C.</small> 378-377). The great body of substantial Athenian
-citizens as well as metics were now classified anew for purposes of
-taxation. It will be remembered that even from the time of Solon<a
-id="FNanchor_235" href="#Footnote_235" class="fnanchor">[235]</a>
-the citizens of Athens had been distributed into four
-classes,—Pentakosiomedimni, Hippeis, Zeugitæ, Thêtes,—distinguished
-from each other by the amount of their respective properties. Of
-these Solonian classes, the fourth, or poorest, paid no direct
-taxes; while the three former were taxed according to assessments
-representing a certain proportion of their actual property. The
-taxable property of the richest (or Pentakosiomedimni, including all
-at or above the minimum income of five hundred medimni of corn per
-annum) was entered in the tax-book at a sum equal to twelve times
-their income; that of the Hippeis (comprising all who possessed
-between three hundred and five hundred medimni of annual income) at
-ten times their income; that of the Zeugitæ (or possessors of an
-annual income between two hundred and three<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_114">[p. 114]</span> hundred medimni) at five times their
-income. A medimnus of corn was counted as equivalent to a drachma;
-which permitted the application of this same class-system to movable
-property as well as to land. So that, when an actual property-tax
-(or <i>eisphora</i>) was imposed, it operated as an equal or proportional
-tax, so far as regarded all the members of the same class; but as
-a graduated or progressive tax, upon all the members of the richer
-class as compared with those of the poorer.</p>
-
-<p>The three Solonian property-classes above named appear to have
-lasted, though probably not without modifications, down to the close
-of the Peloponnesian war; and to have been in great part preserved,
-after the renovation of the democracy in <small>B.C.</small>
-403, during the archonship of Eukleides.<a id="FNanchor_236"
-href="#Footnote_236" class="fnanchor">[236]</a> Though eligibility
-to the great offices of state had before that time ceased to be
-dependent on pecuniary qualification, it was still necessary to
-possess some means of distinguishing the wealthier citizens, not
-merely in case of direct taxation being imposed, but also because the
-liability to serve in liturgies or burdensome offices was consequent
-on a man’s enrolment as possessor of more than a given minimum of
-property. It seems, therefore, that the Solonian census, in its main
-principles of classification and graduation, was retained. Each man’s
-property being valued, he was ranged in one of three or more classes
-according to its amount. For each of the classes, a fixed proportion
-of taxable capital to each man’s property was assumed, and each was
-entered in the schedule, not for his whole property, but for the
-sum of taxable capital corresponding to his property, according to
-the proportion assumed. In the first or richest class, the taxable
-capital bore a greater ratio to the actual property than in the less
-rich; in the second, a greater ratio than in the third. The sum of
-all these items of taxable capital, in all the different classes,
-set opposite to each man’s name in the schedule, constituted the
-aggregate census of Attica; upon which all direct property-tax was
-imposed, in equal proportion upon every man.</p>
-
-<p>Respecting the previous modifications in the register of taxable
-property, or the particulars of its distribution into classes,
-which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">[p. 115]</span> had
-been introduced in 403 <small>B.C.</small> at the archonship of
-Eukleides, we have no information. Nor can we make out how large or
-how numerous were the assessments of direct property-tax, imposed
-at Athens between that archonship and the archonship of Nausinikus
-in 378 <small>B.C.</small> But at this latter epoch the register
-was again considerably modified, at the moment when Athens was
-bracing herself up for increased exertions. A new valuation was
-made of the property of every man possessing property to the amount
-of twenty-five minæ (or twenty-five hundred drachmæ) and upwards.
-Proceeding upon this valuation, every one was entered in the schedule
-for a sum of taxable capital equal to a given fraction of what he
-possessed. But this fraction was different in each of the different
-classes. How many classes there were, we do not certainly know; nor
-can we tell, except in reference to the lowest class taxed, what sum
-was taken as the minimum for any one of them. There could hardly
-have been less, however, than three classes, and there may probably
-have been four. But respecting the first or richest class, we know
-that each man was entered in the schedule for a taxable capital
-equal to one-fifth of his estimated property; and that possessors
-of fifteen talents were included in it. The father of Demosthenes
-died in this year, and the boy Demosthenes was returned by his
-guardians to the first class, as possessor of fifteen talents; upon
-which his name was entered on the schedule with a taxable capital
-of three talents set against him; being one-fifth of his actual
-property. The taxable capital of the second class was entered at
-a fraction less than one-fifth of their actual property (probably
-enough, one-sixth, the same as all the registered metics); that of
-the third, at a fraction still smaller; of the fourth (if there was
-a fourth), even smaller than the third. This last class descended
-down to the minimum of twenty-five minæ, or twenty-five hundred
-drachmæ; below which no account was taken.<a id="FNanchor_237"
-href="#Footnote_237" class="fnanchor">[237]</a></p> <p><span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_116">[p. 116]</span></p> <p>Besides the
-taxable capitals of the citizens, thus graduated, the schedule also
-included those of the metics or resident aliens; who were each
-enrolled (without any difference of greater or smaller property,
-above twenty-five minæ) at a taxable capital equal to one-sixth
-of his actual property;<a id="FNanchor_238" href="#Footnote_238"
-class="fnanchor">[238]</a> being a proportion less than the richest
-class of citizens, and probably equal to the second class in order
-of wealth. All these items summed up amounted to five thousand seven
-hundred and fifty or six thousand talents,<a id="FNanchor_239"
-href="#Footnote_239" class="fnanchor">[239]</a> forming the aggregate
-schedule of taxable property; that is, something near about six
-thousand talents. A property-tax was no part of the regular ways and
-means of the state. It was imposed only on special occasions; and
-whenever it was imposed, it was assessed upon this schedule,—every
-man, rich or poor, being rated equally according to his taxable
-capital as there entered. A property-tax of one per cent. would
-thus produce sixty talents; two per cent., one hundred and twenty
-talents, etc. It is highly probable that the exertions of Athens
-during the archonship of Nausinikus, when this new schedule was first
-prepared, may have caused a property-tax to be then imposed, but we
-do not know to what amount.<a id="FNanchor_240" href="#Footnote_240"
-class="fnanchor">[240]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">[p. 117]</span></p>
-
-<p>Along with this new schedule of taxable capital, a new
-distribution of the citizens now took place into certain bodies
-called Symmories. As far as we can make out, on a very obscure
-subject, it seems that these Symmories were twenty in number, two
-to each tribe; that each contained sixty citizens, thus making one
-thousand two hundred in all; that these one thousand two hundred
-were the wealthiest citizens of the schedule,—containing, perhaps,
-the two first out of the four classes enrolled. Among these one
-thousand two hundred, however, the three hundred wealthiest stood
-out as a separate body; thirty from each tribe. These three hundred
-were the wealthiest men in the city, and were called “the leaders
-or chiefs of the Symmories.” The three hundred and the twelve
-hundred corresponded, speaking roughly, to the old Solonian classes
-of Pentakosiomedimni and Hippeis; of which<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_118">[p. 118]</span> latter class there had also been
-twelve hundred, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.<a
-id="FNanchor_241" href="#Footnote_241" class="fnanchor">[241]</a>
-The liturgies, or burdensome and costly offices, were discharged
-principally by the Three Hundred, but partly also by the Twelve
-Hundred. It would seem that the former was a body essentially
-fluctuating, and that after a man had been in it for some time,
-discharging the burdens belonging to it, the Stratêgi or Generals
-suffered him to be mingled with the Twelve Hundred, and promoted
-one of the latter body to take his place in the Three Hundred. As
-between man and man, too, the Attic law always admitted the process
-called Antidosis, or Exchange of Property. Any citizen who believed
-himself to have been overcharged with costly liturgies, and that
-another citizen, as rich or richer than himself, had not borne his
-fair share,—might, if saddled with a new liturgy, require the other
-to undertake it in his place; and in case of refusal, might tender
-to him an exchange of properties, under an engagement that he would
-undertake the new charge, if the property of the other were made over
-to him.</p>
-
-<p>It is to be observed, that besides the twelve hundred wealthiest
-citizens who composed the Symmories, there were a more considerable
-number of less wealthy citizens not included in them, yet still
-liable to the property-tax; persons who possessed property from
-the minimum of twenty-five minæ, up to some maximum that we do not
-know, at which point the Symmories began,—and who corresponded,
-speaking loosely, to the third class or Zeugitæ of the Solonian
-census. The two Symmories of each tribe (comprising its one hundred
-and twenty richest members) superintended the property-register
-of each tribe, and collected the contributions due from its less
-wealthy registered members. Occasionally, when the state required
-immediate payment, the thirty richest men in each tribe (making
-up altogether the three hundred) advanced the whole sum of tax
-chargeable upon the tribe, having their legal remedy of enforcement
-against the other members for the recovery of the sum chargeable
-upon each. The richest citizens were thus both armed with rights
-and charged with duties,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">[p.
-119]</span> such as had not belonged to them before the archonship
-of Nausinikus. By their intervention (it was supposed) the schedule
-would be kept nearer to the truth as respects the assessment on each
-individual, while the sums actually imposed would be more immediately
-forthcoming, than if the state directly interfered by officers of
-its own. Soon after, the system of the Symmories was extended to the
-trierarchy; a change which had not at first been contemplated. Each
-Symmory had its chiefs, its curators, its assessors, acting under the
-general presidency of the Stratêgi. Twenty-five years afterwards, we
-also find Demosthenes (then about thirty years of age) recommending a
-still more comprehensive application of the same principle, so that
-men, money, ships, and all the means and forces of the state, might
-thus be parcelled into distinct fractions, and consigned to distinct
-Symmories, each with known duties of limited extent for the component
-persons to perform, and each exposed not merely to legal process,
-but also to loss of esteem, in the event of non-performance. It will
-rather appear, however, that, in practice, the system of Symmories
-came to be greatly abused, and to produce pernicious effects never
-anticipated.</p>
-
-<p>At present, however, I only notice this new financial and
-political classification introduced in 378 <small>B.C.</small>,
-as one evidence of the ardor with which Athens embarked in her
-projected war against Sparta. The feeling among her allies, the
-Thebans, was no less determined. The government of Leontiades and
-the Spartan garrison had left behind it so strong an antipathy, that
-the large majority of citizens, embarking heartily in the revolution
-against them, lent themselves to all the orders of Pelopidas and
-his colleagues; who, on their part, had no other thought but to
-repel the common enemy. The Theban government now became probably
-democratical in form; and still more democratical in spirit, from
-the unanimous ardor pervading the whole mass. Its military force
-was put under the best training; the most fertile portion of the
-plain north of Thebes, from which the chief subsistence of the city
-came, was surrounded by a ditch and a palisade,<a id="FNanchor_242"
-href="#Footnote_242" class="fnanchor">[242]</a> to repel the expected
-Spartan invasion; and the memorable Sacred Band was now for the first
-time organized. This was a brigade of three<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_120">[p. 120]</span> hundred hoplites, called the Lochus,
-or regiment of the city, as being consecrated to the defence of the
-Kadmeia, or acropolis.<a id="FNanchor_243" href="#Footnote_243"
-class="fnanchor">[243]</a> It was put under constant arms and
-training, at the public expense, like the Thousand at Argos, of
-whom mention was made in my seventh volume.<a id="FNanchor_244"
-href="#Footnote_244" class="fnanchor">[244]</a> It consisted of
-youthful citizens from the best families, distinguished for their
-strength and courage amidst the severe trials of the palæstra
-in Thebes, and was marshalled in such manner, that each pair of
-neighboring soldiers were at the same time intimate friends; so
-that the whole band were thus kept together by ties which no
-dangers could sever. At first its destination, under Gorgidas its
-commander (as we see by the select Three Hundred who fought in 424
-<small>B.C.</small> at the battle of Delium),<a id="FNanchor_245"
-href="#Footnote_245" class="fnanchor">[245]</a> was to serve as front
-rank men, for the general body of hoplites to follow. But from a
-circumstance to be mentioned presently, it came to be employed by
-Pelopidas and Epaminondas as a regiment by itself, and in a charge
-was then found irresistible.<a id="FNanchor_246" href="#Footnote_246"
-class="fnanchor">[246]</a></p>
-
-<p>We must remark that the Thebans had always been good soldiers,
-both as hoplites and as cavalry. The existing enthusiasm, therefore,
-with the more sustained training, only raised good soldiers into much
-better. But Thebes was now blessed with another good fortune, such as
-had never yet befallen her. She found among her citizens a leader of
-the rarest excellence. It is now for the first time that Epaminondas,
-the son of Polymnis, begins to stand out in the public life of
-Greece. His family, poor rather than rich, was among the most ancient
-in Thebes, belonging to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">[p.
-121]</span> those Gentes called Sparti, whose heroic progenitors
-were said to have sprung from the dragon’s teeth sown by Kadmus.<a
-id="FNanchor_247" href="#Footnote_247" class="fnanchor">[247]</a> He
-seems to have been now of middle age; Pelopidas was younger, and of
-a very rich family; yet the relations between the two were those of
-equal and intimate friendship, tested in a day of battle, wherein the
-two were ranged side by side as hoplites, and where Epaminondas had
-saved the life of his wounded friend, at the cost of several wounds,
-and the greatest possible danger, to himself.<a id="FNanchor_248"
-href="#Footnote_248" class="fnanchor">[248]</a></p>
-
-<p>Epaminondas had discharged, with punctuality, those military
-and gymnastic duties which were incumbent on every Theban citizen.
-But we are told that in the gymnasia he studied to acquire the
-maximum of activity rather than of strength; the nimble movements
-of a runner and wrestler,—not the heavy muscularity, purchased
-in part by excessive nutriment, of the Bœotian pugilist.<a
-id="FNanchor_249" href="#Footnote_249" class="fnanchor">[249]</a> He
-also learned music, vocal and instrumental, and<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_122">[p. 122]</span> dancing; by which, in those days,
-was meant, not simply the power of striking the lyre or blowing
-the flute, but all that belonged to the graceful, expressive, and
-emphatic management, either of the voice or of the body; rhythmical
-pronunciation, exercised by repetition of the poets,—and disciplined
-movements, for taking part in a choric festival with becoming
-consonance amidst a crowd of citizen performers. Of such gymnastic
-and musical training, the combination of which constituted an
-accomplished Grecian citizen, the former predominated at Thebes,
-the latter at Athens. Moreover, at Thebes the musical training
-was based more upon the flute (for the construction of which,
-excellent reeds grew near the Lake Kopaïs); at Athens more upon
-the lyre, which admitted of vocal accompaniment by the player.
-The Athenian Alkibiades<a id="FNanchor_250" href="#Footnote_250"
-class="fnanchor">[250]</a> was heard to remark, when he threw away
-his flute in disgust, that flute-playing was a fit occupation for
-the Thebans, since they did not know how to speak; and in regard to
-the countrymen of Pindar<a id="FNanchor_251" href="#Footnote_251"
-class="fnanchor">[251]</a> generally, the remark was hardly
-less true than contemptuous. On this capital point, Epaminondas
-formed a splendid exception. Not only had he learnt the lyre<a
-id="FNanchor_252" href="#Footnote_252" class="fnanchor">[252]</a>
-as well as the flute from the best masters, but also, dissenting
-from his brother Kapheisias and his friend Pelopidas, he manifested
-from his earliest years an ardent intellectual impulse, which would
-have been remarkable even in an Athenian. He sought with eagerness
-the conversation of the philosophers within his reach, among whom
-were the Theban Simmias and the Tarentine Spintharus, both of
-them once companions of Sokrates; so that the stirring influence
-of the Sokratic method would thus find its way, partially and at
-second-hand, to the bosom of Epaminondas. As the relations between
-Thebes and Athens, ever since the close of the Peloponnesian war,
-had become more and more<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">[p.
-123]</span> friendly, growing at length into alliance and joint war
-against the Spartans,—we may reasonably presume that he profited
-by teachers at the latter city as well as at the former. But the
-person to whom he particularly devoted himself, and whom he not only
-heard as a pupil, but tended almost as a son, during the close of
-an aged life,—was a Tarentine exile, named Lysis; a member of the
-Pythagorean brotherhood, who, from causes which we cannot make out,
-had sought shelter at Thebes, and dwelt there until his death.<a
-id="FNanchor_253" href="#Footnote_253" class="fnanchor">[253]</a>
-With him, as well as with other philosophers, Epaminondas discussed
-all the subjects of study and inquiry then afloat. By perseverance
-in this course for some years, he not only acquired considerable
-positive instruction, but also became practised in new and
-enlarged intellectual combinations; and was, like Perikles,<a
-id="FNanchor_254" href="#Footnote_254" class="fnanchor">[254]</a>
-emancipated from that timorous interpretation of nature, which
-rendered so many Grecian commanders the slaves of signs and omens.
-His patience as a listener, and his indifference to showy talk on
-his own account, were so remarkable, that Spintharus (the father of
-Aristoxenus), after numerous conversations with him, affirmed that
-he had never met with any one who understood more, or talked less.<a
-id="FNanchor_255" href="#Footnote_255" class="fnanchor">[255]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">[p. 124]</span></p>
-
-<p>Nor did such reserve proceed from any want of ready powers of
-expression. On the contrary, the eloquence of Epaminondas, when
-he entered upon his public career, was shown to be not merely
-preëminent among Thebans, but effective even against the best
-Athenian opponents.<a id="FNanchor_256" href="#Footnote_256"
-class="fnanchor">[256]</a> But his disposition was essentially
-modest and unambitious, combined with a strong intellectual
-curiosity and a great capacity; a rare combination amidst a race
-usually erring on the side of forwardness and self-esteem. Little
-moved by personal ambition, and never cultivating popularity by
-unworthy means, Epaminondas was still more indifferent on the score
-of money. He remained in contented poverty to the end of his life,
-not leaving enough to pay his funeral expenses, yet repudiating
-not merely the corrupting propositions of foreigners, but also
-the solicitous tenders of personal friends;<a id="FNanchor_257"
-href="#Footnote_257" class="fnanchor">[257]</a> though we are
-told that, when once serving the costly office of choregus, he
-permitted his friend Pelopidas to bear a portion of the expense.<a
-id="FNanchor_258" href="#Footnote_258" class="fnanchor">[258]</a>
-As he thus stood exempt from two of the besetting infirmities which
-most frequently misguided eminent Greek statesmen, so there was a
-third characteristic not less estimable in his moral character;
-the gentleness of his political antipathies,—his repugnance to
-harsh treatment of conquered enemies,—and his refusal to mingle in
-intestine bloodshed. If ever there were men whose conduct seemed
-to justify unmeasured retaliation, it was Leontiades and his
-fellow-traitors. They had opened the doors of the Kadmeia to the
-Spartan Phœbidas, and had put to death the Theban leader Ismenias.
-Yet Epaminondas disapproved of the scheme of Pelopidas and the other
-exiles to assassinate them, and declined to take part in it; partly
-on prudential grounds, but partly, also,<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_125">[p. 125]</span> on conscientious scruples.<a
-id="FNanchor_259" href="#Footnote_259" class="fnanchor">[259]</a>
-None of his virtues was found so difficult to imitate by his
-subsequent admirers, as this mastery over the resentful and
-vindictive passions.<a id="FNanchor_260" href="#Footnote_260"
-class="fnanchor">[260]</a></p>
-
-<p>Before Epaminondas could have full credit for these virtues,
-however, it was necessary that he should give proof of the
-extraordinary capacities for action with which they were combined,
-and that he should achieve something to earn that exclamation
-of praise which we shall find his enemy Agesilaus afterwards
-pronouncing, on seeing him at the head of the invading Theban army
-near Sparta,—“Oh! thou man of great deeds!”<a id="FNanchor_261"
-href="#Footnote_261" class="fnanchor">[261]</a> In the year
-<small>B.C.</small> 379, when the Kadmeia was emancipated, he was
-as yet undistinguished in public life, and known only to Pelopidas
-with his other friends; among whom, too, his unambitious and
-inquisitive disposition was a subject of complaint as keeping him
-unduly in the background.<a id="FNanchor_262" href="#Footnote_262"
-class="fnanchor">[262]</a> But the unparalleled phenomena of that
-year supplied a spur which overruled all backwardness, and smothered
-all rival inclinations. The Thebans, having just recovered their
-city by an incredible turn of fortune, found themselves exposed
-single-handed to the full<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">[p.
-126]</span> attack of Sparta and her extensive confederacy. Not
-even Athens had yet declared in their favor, nor had they a single
-other ally. Under such circumstances, Thebes could only be saved by
-the energy of all her citizens,—the unambitious and philosophical
-as well as the rest. As the necessities of the case required such
-simultaneous devotion, so the electric shock of the recent revolution
-was sufficient to awaken enthusiasm in minds much less patriotic than
-that of Epaminondas. He was among the first to join the victorious
-exiles in arms, after the contest had been transferred from the
-houses of Archias and Leontiades to the open market-place; and he
-would probably have been among the first to mount the walls of the
-Kadmeia, had the Spartan harmost awaited an assault. Pelopidas
-being named Bœotarch, his friend Epaminondas was naturally placed
-among the earliest and most forward organizers of the necessary
-military resistance against the common enemy; in which employment
-his capacities speedily became manifest. Though at this moment
-almost an unknown man, he had acquired, in <small>B.C.</small>
-371, seven years afterwards, so much reputation both as speaker and
-as general, that he was chosen as the expositor of Theban policy
-at Sparta, and trusted with the conduct of the battle of Leuktra,
-upon which the fate of Thebes hinged. Hence we may fairly conclude,
-that the well-planned and successful system of defence, together
-with the steady advance of Thebes against Sparta, during the
-intermediate years, was felt to have been in the main his work.<a
-id="FNanchor_263" href="#Footnote_263" class="fnanchor">[263]</a></p>
-
-<p>The turn of politics at Athens which followed the acquittal
-of Sphodrias was an unspeakable benefit to the Thebans, in
-second<span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">[p. 127]</span>ing as
-well as encouraging their defence; and the Spartans, not unmoved
-at the new enemies raised up by their treatment of Sphodrias,
-thought it necessary to make some efforts on their side. They
-organized on a more systematic scale the military force of their
-confederacy, and even took some conciliatory steps with the view
-of effacing the odium of their past misrule.<a id="FNanchor_264"
-href="#Footnote_264" class="fnanchor">[264]</a> The full force
-of their confederacy,—including, as a striking mark of present
-Spartan power, even the distant Olynthians,<a id="FNanchor_265"
-href="#Footnote_265" class="fnanchor">[265]</a>—was placed in motion
-against Thebes in the course of the summer under Agesilaus; who
-contrived, by putting in sudden requisition a body of mercenaries
-acting in the service of the Arcadian town Kleitor against its
-neighbor the Arcadian Orchomenus, to make himself master of the
-passes of Kithæron, before the Thebans and Athenians could have
-notice of his passing the Lacedæmonian border.<a id="FNanchor_266"
-href="#Footnote_266" class="fnanchor">[266]</a> Then crossing
-Kithæron into Bœotia, he established his head-quarters at Thespiæ,
-a post already under Spartan occupation. From thence he commenced
-his attacks upon the Theban territory, which he found defended
-partly by a considerable length of ditch and palisade—partly by the
-main force of Thebes, assisted by a division of mixed Athenians and
-mercenaries, sent from Athens under Chabrias. Keeping on their own
-side of the palisade, the Thebans suddenly sent out their cavalry,
-and attacked Agesilaus by surprise, occasioning some loss. Such
-sallies were frequently repeated, until, by a rapid march at break
-of day, he forced his way through an opening in the breastwork into
-their inner country, which he laid waste nearly to the city walls.<a
-id="FNanchor_267" href="#Footnote_267" class="fnanchor">[267]</a>
-The Thebans and Athenians, though not offering him battle on equal
-terms, nevertheless kept the field against him, taking care to hold
-positions advantageous for defence. Agesilaus on his side did not
-feel confident enough to attack them against such odds. Yet on one
-occasion he had made up his mind to do so; and was marching up to
-the charge, when he was daunted by the firm attitude and excellent
-array of the troops of Chabrias. They had received orders to await
-his approach, on a high and advantageous ground, without moving until
-signal should be given; with their shields resting on the<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_128">[p. 128]</span> knee, and their
-spears protended. So imposing was their appearance, that Agesilaus
-called off his troops without daring to complete the charge.<a
-id="FNanchor_268" href="#Footnote_268" class="fnanchor">[268]</a>
-After a month or more of devastations on the lands of Thebes, and a
-string of desultory skirmishes in which he seems to have lost rather
-than gained, Agesilaus withdrew to Thespiæ; the fortifications of
-which he strengthened, leaving Phœbidas with a considerable force in
-occupation, and then leading back his army to Peloponnesus.</p>
-
-<p>Phœbidas,—the former captor of the Kadmeia,—thus stationed at
-Thespiæ, carried on vigorous warfare against Thebes; partly with
-his own Spartan division, partly with the Thespian hoplites, who
-promised him unshrinking support. His incursions soon brought on
-reprisals from the Thebans; who invaded Thespiæ, but were repulsed
-by Phœbidas with the loss of all their plunder. In the pursuit,
-however, hurrying incautiously forward, he was slain by a sudden
-turn of the Theban cavalry;<a id="FNanchor_269" href="#Footnote_269"
-class="fnanchor">[269]</a> upon which all his troops fled, chased by
-the Thebans to the very gates of Thespiæ. Though the Spartans, in
-consequence of this misfortune, despatched by sea another general and
-division to replace Phœbidas, the cause of the Thebans was greatly
-strengthened by their recent victory. They pushed their success not
-only against Thespiæ, but against the other Bœotian cities, still
-held by local oligarchies in dependence on Sparta. At the same time,
-these oligarchies were threatened by the growing strength of their
-own popular or philo-Theban citizens, who crowded in considerable
-numbers as exiles to Thebes.<a id="FNanchor_270" href="#Footnote_270"
-class="fnanchor">[270]</a></p>
-
-<p>A second expedition against Thebes, undertaken by Agesilaus
-in the ensuing summer with the main army of the confederacy, was
-neither more decisive nor more profitable than the preceding. Though
-he contrived, by a well-planned stratagem, to surprize the<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_129">[p. 129]</span> Theban palisade, and
-lay waste the plain, he gained no serious victory; and even showed,
-more clearly than before, his reluctance to engage except upon
-perfectly equal terms.<a id="FNanchor_271" href="#Footnote_271"
-class="fnanchor">[271]</a> It became evident that the Thebans
-were not only strengthening their position in Bœotia, but also
-acquiring practice in warfare and confidence against the Spartans;
-insomuch that Antalkidas and some other companions remonstrated with
-Agesilaus, against carrying on the war so as only to give improving
-lessons to his enemies in military practice,—and called upon him
-to strike some decisive blow. He quitted Bœotia, however, after
-the summer’s campaign, without any such step.<a id="FNanchor_272"
-href="#Footnote_272" class="fnanchor">[272]</a> In his way he
-appeased an intestine conflict which was about to break out in
-Thespiæ. Afterwards, on passing to Megara, he experienced a strain or
-hurt, which grievously injured his sound leg, (it has been mentioned
-already that he was lame of one leg,) and induced his surgeon to open
-a vein in the limb for reducing the inflammation. When this was done,
-however, the blood could not be stopped until he swooned. Having been
-conveyed home to Sparta in great suffering, he was confined to his
-couch for several months; and he remained during a much longer time
-unfit for active command.<a id="FNanchor_273" href="#Footnote_273"
-class="fnanchor">[273]</a></p>
-
-<p>The functions of general now devolved upon the other king
-Kleombrotus, who in the next spring conducted the army of the
-confederacy to invade Bœotia anew. But on this occasion, the
-Athenians and Thebans had occupied the passes of Kithæron, so
-that he was unable even to enter the country, and was obliged to
-dismiss his troops without achieving anything.<a id="FNanchor_274"
-href="#Footnote_274" class="fnanchor">[274]</a></p>
-
-<p>His inglorious retreat excited such murmurs among the allies when
-they met at Sparta, that they resolved to fit out a large naval
-force, sufficient both to intercept the supplies of imported corn to
-Athens, and to forward an invading army by sea against Thebes, to
-the Bœotian port of Kreusis in the Krissæan Gulf. The former object
-was attempted first. Towards midsummer, a fleet of sixty triremes,
-fitted out under the Spartan admiral Pollis,<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_130">[p. 130]</span> was cruising in the Ægean; especially
-round the coast of Attica, near Ægina, Keos, and Andros. The
-Athenians, who, since their recently renewed confederacy, had been
-undisturbed by any enemies at sea, found themselves thus threatened,
-not merely with loss of power, but also with loss of trade and
-even famine; since their corn-ships from the Euxine, though safely
-reaching Geræstus (the southern extremity of Eubœa), were prevented
-from doubling Cape Sunium. Feeling severely this interruption, they
-fitted out at Peiræus a fleet of eighty triremes,<a id="FNanchor_275"
-href="#Footnote_275" class="fnanchor">[275]</a> with crews
-mainly composed of citizens; who, under the admiral Chabrias, in
-a sharply contested action near Naxos, completely defeated the
-fleet of Pollis, and regained for Athens the mastery of the sea.
-Forty-nine Lacedæmonian triremes were disabled or captured, eight
-with their entire crews.<a id="FNanchor_276" href="#Footnote_276"
-class="fnanchor">[276]</a> Moreover, Chabrias might have destroyed
-all or most of the rest, had he not suspended his attack, having
-eighteen of his own ships disabled, to pick up both the living
-men and the dead bodies on board, as well as all Athenians
-who were swimming for their lives. He did this (we are told<a
-id="FNanchor_277" href="#Footnote_277" class="fnanchor">[277]</a>),
-from distinct<span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">[p. 131]</span>
-recollection of the fierce displeasure of the people against the
-victorious generals after the battle of Arginusæ. And we may thus
-see, that though the proceedings on that memorable occasion were
-stained both by illegality and by violence, they produced a salutary
-effect upon the public conduct of subsequent commanders. Many a brave
-Athenian (the crews consisting principally of citizens) owed his
-life, after the battle of Naxos, to the terrible lesson administered
-by the people to their generals in 406 <small>B.C.</small>, thirty
-years before.</p>
-
-<p>This was the first great victory (in September, 376
-<small>B.C.</small><a id="FNanchor_278" href="#Footnote_278"
-class="fnanchor">[278]</a>) which the Athenians had gained at sea
-since the Peloponnesian war; and while it thus filled them with
-joy and confidence, it led to a material enlargement of their
-maritime confederacy. The fleet of Chabrias,—of which a squadron
-was detached under the orders of Phokion, a young Athenian now
-distinguishing himself for the first time and often hereafter to
-be mentioned,—sailed victorious round the Ægean, made prize of
-twenty other triremes in single ships, brought in three thousand
-prisoners with one hundred and ten talents in money, and annexed
-seventeen new cities to the confederacy, as sending deputies to the
-synod and furnishing contributions. The discreet and conciliatory
-behavior of Phokion, especially obtained much favor among the
-islanders, and determined several new adhesions to Athens.<a
-id="FNanchor_279" href="#Footnote_279" class="fnanchor">[279]</a> To
-the inhabitants<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">[p. 132]</span>
-of Abdêra in Thrace, Chabrias rendered an inestimable service, by
-aiding them to repulse a barbarous horde of Triballi, who quitting
-their abode from famine, had poured upon the sea-coast, defeating
-the Abderites and plundering their territory. The citizens,
-grateful for a force left to defend their town, willingly allied
-themselves with Athens, whose confederacy thus extended itself
-to the coast of Thrace.<a id="FNanchor_280" href="#Footnote_280"
-class="fnanchor">[280]</a></p>
-
-<p>Having prosperously enlarged their confederacy to the east of
-Peloponnesus, the Athenians began to aim at the acquisition of new
-allies in the west. The fleet of sixty triremes, which had recently
-served under Chabrias, was sent, under the command of Timotheus, the
-son of Konon, to circumnavigate Peloponnesus and alarm the coast
-of Laconia; partly at the instance of the Thebans, who were eager
-to keep the naval force of Sparta occupied, so as to prevent her
-from conveying troops across the Krissæan Gulf from Corinth to the
-Bœotian port of Kreusis.<a id="FNanchor_281" href="#Footnote_281"
-class="fnanchor">[281]</a> This Periplus of Peloponnesus,—the first
-which the fleet of Athens had attempted since her humiliation at
-Ægospotami,—coupled with the ensuing successes, was long remembered
-by the countrymen of Timotheus. His large force, just dealing,
-and conciliatory professions, won new and valuable allies. Not
-only Kephallenia, but the still more important island of Korkyra,
-voluntarily accepted his propositions; and as he took care to avoid
-all violence or interference with the political constitution,
-his popularity all around augmented every day. Alketas, prince
-of the Molossi,—the Chaonians with other Epirotic tribes,—and
-the Akarnanians on the coast,—all embraced his alliance.<a
-id="FNanchor_282" href="#Footnote_282" class="fnanchor">[282]</a>
-While near Alyzia and Leukas on this coast, he was assailed by the
-Peloponnesian ships under Nikolochus, rather inferior in number to
-his fleet. He defeated them, and being shortly afterwards reinforced
-by other triremes from Korkyra, he became so superior in those
-waters, that the hostile fleet did not dare to show itself. Having
-received only thirteen talents on quitting Athens, we are told that
-he had great difficulty in paying his fleet; that he procured an
-advance of money, from each of the sixty trierarchs in his fleet,
-of seven minæ towards the pay of their respective ships;<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_133">[p. 133]</span> and that he also sent
-home requests for large remittances from the public treasury;<a
-id="FNanchor_283" href="#Footnote_283" class="fnanchor">[283]</a>
-measures which go to bear out that honorable repugnance to the
-plunder of friends or neutrals, and care to avoid even the suspicion
-of plunder, which his panegyrist Isokrates ascribes to him.<a
-id="FNanchor_284" href="#Footnote_284" class="fnanchor">[284]</a>
-This was a feature unhappily rare among the Grecian generals on
-both sides, and tending to become still rarer, from the increased
-employment of mercenary bands.</p>
-
-<p>The demands of Timotheus on the treasury of Athens were not
-favorably received. Though her naval position was now more
-brilliant and commanding than it had been since the battle of
-Ægospotami,—though no Lacedæmonian fleet showed itself to disturb
-her in the Ægean,<a id="FNanchor_285" href="#Footnote_285"
-class="fnanchor">[285]</a>—yet the cost of the war began to be
-seriously felt. Privateers from the neighboring island of Ægina
-annoyed her commerce, requiring a perpetual coast-guard; while
-the contributions from the deputies to the confederate synod were
-not sufficient to dispense with the necessity of a heavy direct
-property tax at home.<a id="FNanchor_286" href="#Footnote_286"
-class="fnanchor">[286]</a></p>
-
-<p>In this synod the Thebans, as members of the confederacy,
-were represented.<a id="FNanchor_287" href="#Footnote_287"
-class="fnanchor">[287]</a> Application was made to them to
-contribute towards the cost of the naval war; the rather, as
-it was partly at their instance that the fleet had been sent
-round to the Ionian Sea. But the Thebans declined compliance,<a
-id="FNanchor_288" href="#Footnote_288" class="fnanchor">[288]</a>
-nor were they<span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">[p. 134]</span>
-probably in any condition to furnish pecuniary aid. Their refusal
-occasioned much displeasure at Athens, embittered by jealousy at
-the strides which they had been making during the two last years,
-partly through the indirect effect of the naval successes of Athens.
-At the end of the year 377 <small>B.C.</small>, after the two
-successive invasions of Agesilaus, the ruin of two home crops had
-so straitened the Thebans, that they were forced to import corn
-from Pagasæ in Thessaly; in which enterprise their ships and seamen
-were at first captured by the Lacedæmonian harmost at Oreus in
-Eubœa, Alketas. His negligence, however, soon led not only to an
-outbreak of their seamen who had been taken prisoners, but also to
-the revolt of the town from Sparta, so that the communication of
-Thebes with Pagasæ became quite unimpeded. For the two succeeding
-years, there had been no Spartan invasion of Bœotia; since, in 376
-<small>B.C.</small>, Kleombrotus could not surmount the heights
-of Kithæron,—while in 375 <small>B.C.</small>, the attention of
-Sparta had been occupied by the naval operations of Timotheus in
-the Ionian Sea. During these two years, the Thebans had exerted
-themselves vigorously against the neighboring cities of Bœotia, in
-most of which a strong party, if not the majority of the population,
-was favorable to them, though the government was in the hands of the
-philo-Spartan oligarchy, seconded by Spartan harmosts and garrison.<a
-id="FNanchor_289" href="#Footnote_289" class="fnanchor">[289]</a>
-We hear of one victory gained by the Theban cavalry near Platæa,
-under Charon; and of another near Tanagra, in which Panthöides, the
-Lacedæmonian harmost in that town, was slain.<a id="FNanchor_290"
-href="#Footnote_290" class="fnanchor">[290]</a></p>
-
-<p>But the most important of all their successes was that of
-Pelopidas near Tegyra. That commander, hearing that the Spartan
-harmost, with his two (moræ or) divisions in garrison at Orchomenus,
-had gone away on an excursion into the Lokrian territory, made a
-dash from Thebes with the Sacred Band and a few cavalry, to surprise
-the place. It was the season in which the waters of the Lake Kopaïs
-were at the fullest, so that he was obliged to take a wide circuit
-to the north-west, and to pass by Tegyra, on the road between
-Orchomenus and the Opuntian Lokris. On arriving<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_135">[p. 135]</span> near Orchomenus, he ascertained that
-there were still some Lacedæmonians in the town, and that no surprise
-could be effected; upon which he retraced his steps. But on reaching
-Tegyra, he fell in with the Lacedæmonian commanders, Gorgoleon and
-Theopompus, returning with their troops from the Lokrian excursion.
-As his numbers were inferior to theirs by half, they rejoiced in the
-encounter; while the troops of Pelopidas were at first dismayed, and
-required all his encouragement to work them up. But in the fight
-that ensued, closely and obstinately contested in a narrow pass,
-the strength, valor, and compact charge of the Sacred Band proved
-irresistible. The two Lacedæmonian commanders were both slain;
-their troops opened, to allow the Thebans an undisturbed retreat;
-but Pelopidas, disdaining this opportunity, persisted in the combat
-until all his enemies dispersed and fled. The neighborhood of
-Orchomenus forbade any long pursuit, so that Pelopidas could only
-erect his trophy, and strip the dead, before returning to Thebes.<a
-id="FNanchor_291" href="#Footnote_291" class="fnanchor">[291]</a></p>
-
-<p>This combat, in which the Lacedæmonians were for the first time
-beaten in fair field by numbers inferior to their own, produced
-a strong sensation in the minds of both the contending parties.
-The confidence of the Thebans, as well as their exertion, was
-redoubled; so that by the year 374 <small>B.C.</small>, they
-had cleared Bœotia of the Lacedæmonians, as well as of the local
-oligarchies which sustained them; persuading or constraining the
-cities again to come into union with Thebes, and reviving the
-Bœotian confederacy. Haliartus, Korôneia, Lebadeia, Tanagra,
-Thespiæ, Platæa, and the rest, thus became again Bœotian;<a
-id="FNanchor_292" href="#Footnote_292" class="fnanchor">[292]</a>
-leaving out Orchomenus alone, (with its dependency Chæroneia,)
-which was on the borders of Phokis, and still continued under
-Lacedæmonian occupation. In most of these cities, the party friendly
-to Thebes was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">[p. 136]</span>
-numerous, and the change, on the whole, popular; though in some the
-prevailing sentiment was such, that adherence was only obtained by
-intimidation. The change here made by Thebes, was not to absorb these
-cities into herself, but to bring them back to the old federative
-system of Bœotia; a policy which she had publicly proclaimed on
-surprising Platæa in 431 <small>B.C.</small><a id="FNanchor_293"
-href="#Footnote_293" class="fnanchor">[293]</a> While resuming her
-own ancient rights and privileges as head of the Bœotian federation,
-she at the same time guaranteed to the other cities,—by convention,
-probably express, but certainly implied,—their ancient rights, their
-security, and their qualified autonomy, as members; the system which
-had existed down to the peace of Antalkidas.</p>
-
-<p>The position of the Thebans was materially improved by this
-reconquest or reconfederation of Bœotia. Becoming masters of Kreusis,
-the port of Thespiæ,<a id="FNanchor_294" href="#Footnote_294"
-class="fnanchor">[294]</a> they fortified it, and built some triremes
-to repel any invasion from Peloponnesus by sea across the Krissæan
-Gulf. Feeling thus secure against invasion, they began to retaliate
-upon their neighbors and enemies the Phokians, allies of Sparta,
-and auxiliaries in the recent attacks on Thebes,—yet also, from
-ancient times, on friendly terms with Athens.<a id="FNanchor_295"
-href="#Footnote_295" class="fnanchor">[295]</a> So hard pressed
-were the Phokians,—especially as Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly
-was at the same time their bitter enemy,<a id="FNanchor_296"
-href="#Footnote_296" class="fnanchor">[296]</a>—that unless
-assisted, they would have been compelled to submit to the Thebans,
-and along with them Orchomenus, including the Lacedæmonian garrison
-then occupying it; while the treasures of the Delphian Temple
-would also have been laid open, in case the Thebans should think
-fit to seize them. Intimation being sent by<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_137">[p. 137]</span> the Phokians to Sparta, King
-Kleombrotus was sent to their aid, by sea across the Gulf, with four
-Lacedæmonian divisions of troops, and an auxiliary body of allies.<a
-id="FNanchor_297" href="#Footnote_297" class="fnanchor">[297]</a>
-This reinforcement, compelling the Thebans to retire, placed both
-Phokis and Orchomenus in safety. While Sparta thus sustained
-them, even Athens looked upon the Phokian cause with sympathy.
-When she saw that the Thebans had passed from the defensive to
-the offensive,—partly by her help, yet nevertheless refusing to
-contribute to the cost of her navy,—her ancient jealousy of them
-became again so powerful, that she sent envoys to Sparta, to propose
-terms of peace. What these terms were, we are not told; nor does it
-appear that the Thebans even received notice of the proceeding. But
-the peace was accepted at Sparta, and two of the Athenian envoys were
-despatched at once from thence, without even going home, to Korkyra,
-for the purpose of notifying the peace to Timotheus, and ordering him
-forthwith to conduct his fleet back to Athens.<a id="FNanchor_298"
-href="#Footnote_298" class="fnanchor">[298]</a></p>
-
-<p>This proposition of the Athenians, made seemingly in a moment of
-impetuous dissatisfaction, was made to the advantage of Sparta,<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_138">[p. 138]</span> and served somewhat to
-countervail a mortifying revelation which had reached the Spartans a
-little before from a different quarter.</p>
-
-<p>Polydamas, an eminent citizen of Pharsalus in Thessaly, came to
-Sparta to ask for aid. He had long been on terms of hospitality
-with the Lacedæmonians; while Pharsalus had not merely been
-in alliance with them, but was for some time occupied by one
-of their garrisons.<a id="FNanchor_299" href="#Footnote_299"
-class="fnanchor">[299]</a> In the usual state of Thessaly, the great
-cities Larissa, Pheræ, Pharsalus, and others, each holding some
-smaller cities in a state of dependent alliance, were in disagreement
-with each other,—often even in actual war. It was rare that they
-could be brought to concur in a common vote for the election of a
-supreme chief or Tagus. At his own city of Pharsalus, Polydamas was
-now in the ascendant, enjoying the confidence of all the great family
-factions who usually contended for predominance; to such a degree,
-indeed, that he was entrusted with the custody of the citadel and the
-entire management of the revenues, receipts as well as disbursements.
-Being a wealthy man, “hospitable and ostentatious in the Thessalian
-fashion,” he advanced money from his own purse to the treasury
-whenever it was low, and repaid himself when public funds came in.<a
-id="FNanchor_300" href="#Footnote_300" class="fnanchor">[300]</a></p>
-
-<p>But a greater man than Polydamas had now arisen in
-Thessaly,—Jason, despot of Pheræ; whose formidable power, threatening
-the independence of Pharsalus, he now came to Sparta to denounce.
-Though the force of Jason can hardly have been very considerable when
-the Spartans passed through Thessaly, six years before, in their
-repeated expeditions against Olynthus, he was now not only despot of
-Pheræ, but master of nearly all the Thessalian cities (as Lykophron
-of Pheræ had partially succeeded in becoming thirty years before),<a
-id="FNanchor_301" href="#Footnote_301" class="fnanchor">[301]</a> as
-well as of a large area of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">[p.
-139]</span> tributary circumjacent territory. The great instrument
-of his dominion was, a standing and well-appointed force of six
-thousand mercenary troops, from all parts of Greece. He possessed
-all the personal qualities requisite for conducting soldiers with
-the greatest effect. His bodily strength was great; his activity
-indefatigable; his self-command, both as to hardship and as to
-temptation, alike conspicuous. Always personally sharing both in the
-drill and in the gymnastics of the soldiers, and encouraging military
-merits with the utmost munificence, he had not only disciplined them,
-but inspired them with extreme warlike ardor and devotion to his
-person. Several of the neighboring tribes, together with Alketas,
-prince of the Molossi in Epirus, had been reduced to the footing
-of his dependent allies. Moreover, he had already defeated the
-Pharsalians, and stripped them of many of the towns which had once
-been connected with them, so that it only remained for him now to
-carry his arms against their city. But Jason was prudent, as well as
-daring. Though certain of success, he wished to avoid the odium of
-employing force, and the danger of having malcontents for subjects.
-He therefore proposed to Polydamas, in a private interview, that he
-(Polydamas) should bring Pharsalus under Jason’s dominion, accepting
-for himself the second place in Thessaly, under Jason installed as
-Tagus or president. The whole force of Thessaly thus united, with
-its array of tributary nations around, would be decidedly the first
-power in Greece, superior on land either to Sparta or Thebes, and
-at sea to Athens. And as to the Persian king, with his multitudes
-of unwarlike slaves, Jason regarded him as an enemy yet easier to
-overthrow; considering what had been achieved first by the Cyreians,
-and afterwards by Agesilaus.</p>
-
-<p>Such were the propositions, and such the ambitious hopes, which
-the energetic despot of Pheræ had laid before Polydamas; who
-replied, that he himself had long been allied with Sparta, and that
-he could take no resolution hostile to her interests. “Go to<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_140">[p. 140]</span> Sparta, then (rejoined
-Jason), and give notice there, that I intend to attack Pharsalus, and
-that it is for them to afford you protection. If they cannot comply
-with the demand, you will be unfaithful to the interests of your
-city if you do not embrace my offers.” It was on this mission that
-Polydamas was now come to Sparta, to announce that unless aid could
-be sent to him, he should be compelled unwillingly to sever himself
-from her. “Recollect (he concluded) that the enemy against whom you
-will have to contend is formidable in every way, both from personal
-qualities and from power; so that nothing short of a first-rate
-force and commander will suffice. Consider, and tell me what you can
-do.”</p>
-
-<p>The Spartans, having deliberated on the point, returned a reply in
-the negative. Already a large force had been sent under Kleombrotus
-as essential to the defence of Phokis; moreover, the Athenians were
-now the stronger power at sea. Lastly, Jason had hitherto lent no
-active assistance to Thebes and Athens—which he would assuredly be
-provoked to do, if a Spartan army interfered against him in Thessaly.
-Accordingly the ephors told Polydamas plainly, that they were unable
-to satisfy his demands, recommending him to make the best terms that
-he could, both for Pharsalus and for himself. Returning to Thessaly,
-he resumed his negotiation with Jason, and promised substantial
-compliance with what was required. But he entreated to be spared the
-dishonor of admitting a foreign garrison into the citadel which had
-been confidentially entrusted to his care; engaging at the same time
-to bring his fellow-citizens into voluntary union with Jason, and
-tendering his two sons as hostages for faithful performance. All this
-was actually brought to pass. The politics of the Pharsalians were
-gently brought round, so that Jason, by their votes as well as the
-rest, was unanimously elected Tagus of Thessaly.<a id="FNanchor_302"
-href="#Footnote_302" class="fnanchor">[302]</a></p>
-
-<p>The dismissal of Polydamas implied a mortifying confession of
-weakness on the part of Sparta. It marks, too, an important stage in
-the real decline of her power. Eight years before, at the instance
-of the Akanthian envoys, backed by the Macedonian Amyntas, she had
-sent three powerful armies in succession to<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_141">[p. 141]</span> crush the liberal and promising
-confederacy of Olynthus, and to re-transfer the Grecian cities on
-the sea-coast to the Macedonian crown. The region to which her
-armies had been sent, was the extreme verge of Hellas. The parties
-in whose favor she acted, had scarcely the shadow of a claim, as
-friends or allies; while those <i>against</i> whom she acted, had neither
-done nor threatened any wrong to her: moreover, the main ground on
-which her interference was invoked, was to hinder the free and equal
-confederation of Grecian cities. <i>Now</i>, a claim, and a strong claim,
-is made upon her by Polydamas of Pharsalus, an old friend and ally.
-It comes from a region much less distant; lastly, her political
-interest would naturally bid her arrest the menacing increase of
-an aggressive power already so formidable as that of Jason. Yet so
-seriously has the position of Sparta altered in the last eight years
-(382-374 <small>B.C.</small>), that she is now compelled to decline
-a demand which justice, sympathy, and political policy alike prompted
-her to grant. So unfortunate was it for the Olynthian confederacy,
-that their honorable and well-combined aspirations fell exactly
-during those few years in which Sparta was at her maximum of power!
-So unfortunate was such coincidence of time, not only for Olynthus,
-but for Greece generally:—since nothing but Spartan interference
-restored the Macedonian kings to the sea-coast, while the Olynthian
-confederacy, had it been allowed to expand, might probably have
-confined them to the interior, and averted the death-blow which came
-upon Grecian freedom in the next generation from their hands.</p>
-
-<p>The Lacedæmonians found some compensation for their reluctant
-abandonment of Polydamas, in the pacific propositions from Athens
-which liberated them from one of their chief enemies. But the peace
-thus concluded was scarcely even brought to execution. Timotheus,
-being ordered home from Korkyra, obeyed and set sail with his fleet.
-He had serving along with him some exiles from Zakynthus; and as
-he passed by that island in his homeward voyage, he disembarked
-these exiles upon it, aiding them in establishing a fortified post.
-Against this proceeding the Zakynthian government laid complaints at
-Sparta, where it was so deeply resented, that redress having been
-in vain demanded at Athens, the peace was at once broken off, and
-war again declared. A Lacedæmonian squadron of twenty-five sail was
-despatched to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">[p. 142]</span>
-assist the Zakynthians,<a id="FNanchor_303" href="#Footnote_303"
-class="fnanchor">[303]</a> while plans were formed for the
-acquisition of the more important island of Korkyra. The fleet of
-Timotheus having now been removed home, a malcontent Korkyræan party
-formed a conspiracy to introduce the Lacedæmonians as friends,
-and betray the island to them. A Lacedæmonian fleet of twenty-two
-triremes accordingly sailed thither, under color of a voyage to
-Sicily. But the Korkyræan government, having detected the plot,
-refused to receive them, took precautions for defence, and sent
-envoys to Athens to entreat assistance.</p>
-
-<p>The Lacedæmonians now resolved to attack Korkyra openly, with
-the full naval force of their confederacy. By the joint efforts
-of Sparta, Corinth, Leukas, Ambrakia, Elis, Zakynthus, Achaia,
-Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis,—strengthened by<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_143">[p. 143]</span> pecuniary payments
-from other confederates, who preferred commuting their obligation
-to serve beyond sea,—a fleet of sixty triremes and a body of one
-thousand five hundred mercenary hoplites were assembled; besides some
-Lacedæmonians, probably Helots or Neodamodes.<a id="FNanchor_304"
-href="#Footnote_304" class="fnanchor">[304]</a> At the same time,
-application was sent to Dionysius the Syracusan despot, for his
-coöperation against Korkyra, on the ground that the connection of
-that island with Athens had proved once, and might prove again,
-dangerous to his city.</p>
-
-<p>It was in the spring of 373 <small>B.C.</small> that this force
-proceeded against Korkyra, under the command of the Lacedæmonian
-Mnasippus; who, having driven in the Korkyræan fleet with the loss
-of four triremes, landed on the island, gained a victory, and
-confined the inhabitants within the walls of the city. He next
-carried his ravages round the adjacent lands, which were found in
-the highest state of cultivation, and full of the richest produce;
-fields admirably tilled,—vineyards in surpassing condition,—with
-splendid farm-buildings, well-appointed wine-cellars, and abundance
-of cattle as well as laboring-slaves. The invading soldiers,
-while enriching themselves by depredations on cattle and slaves,
-became so pampered with the plentiful stock around, that they
-refused to drink any wine that was not of the first quality.<a
-id="FNanchor_305" href="#Footnote_305" class="fnanchor">[305]</a>
-Such is the picture given by Xenophon, an unfriendly witness, of
-the democratical Korkyra, in respect of its lauded economy, at the
-time when it was invaded by Mnasippus; a picture not less memorable
-than that presented by Thucydides (in the speech of Archidamus),
-of the flourishing agriculture surrounding democratical Athens,
-at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">[p. 144]</span> the moment
-when the hand of the Peloponnesian devastator was first felt there
-in 431 <small>B.C.</small><a id="FNanchor_306" href="#Footnote_306"
-class="fnanchor">[306]</a></p>
-
-<p>With such plentiful quarters for his soldiers, Mnasippus encamped
-on a hill near the city walls, cutting off those within from supplies
-out of the country, while he at the same time blocked up the harbor
-with his fleet. The Korkyræans soon began to be in want. Yet they
-seemed to have no chance of safety except through aid from the
-Athenians; to whom they had sent envoys with pressing entreaties,<a
-id="FNanchor_307" href="#Footnote_307" class="fnanchor">[307]</a> and
-who had now reason to regret their hasty consent (in the preceding
-year) to summon home the fleet of Timotheus from the island.
-However, Timotheus was again appointed admiral of a new fleet to
-be sent thither; while a division of six hundred peltasts, under
-Stesiklês, was directed to be despatched by the quickest route,
-to meet the immediate necessities of the Korkyræans, during the
-delays unavoidable in the preparation of the main fleet and its
-circumnavigation of Peloponnesus. These peltasts were conveyed by
-land across Thessaly and Epirus, to the coast opposite Korkyra; upon
-which island they were enabled to land through the intervention of
-Alketas solicited by the Athenians. They were fortunate enough to
-get into the town; where they not only brought the news that a large
-Athenian fleet might be speedily expected, but also contributed much
-to the defence. Without such encouragement and aid, the Korkyræans
-would hardly have held out; for the famine within the walls increased
-daily; and at length became so severe, that<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_145">[p. 145]</span> many of the citizens deserted, and
-numbers of slaves were thrust out. Mnasippus refused to receive them,
-making public proclamation that every one who deserted should be sold
-into slavery; and since deserters nevertheless continued to come,
-he caused them to be scourged back to the city-gates. As for the
-unfortunate slaves, being neither received by him, nor re-admitted
-within, many perished outside of the gates from sheer hunger.<a
-id="FNanchor_308" href="#Footnote_308" class="fnanchor">[308]</a></p>
-
-<p>Such spectacles of misery portended so visibly the approaching
-hour of surrender, that the besieging army became careless, and
-the general insolent. Though his military chest was well-filled,
-through the numerous pecuniary payments which he had received from
-allies in commutation of personal service,—yet he had dismissed
-several of his mercenaries without pay, and had kept all of them
-unpaid for the last two months. His present temper made him not
-only more harsh towards his own soldiers,<a id="FNanchor_309"
-href="#Footnote_309" class="fnanchor">[309]</a> but also less
-vigilant in the conduct of the siege. Accordingly the besieged,
-detecting from their watch-towers the negligence of the guards, chose
-a favorable opportunity and made a vigorous sally. Mnasippus, on
-seeing his outposts driven in, armed himself and hastened forward
-with the Lacedæmonians around him to sustain them; giving orders to
-the officers of the mercenaries to bring their men forward also. But
-these officers replied, that they could not answer for the obedience
-of soldiers without pay; upon which Mnasippus was so incensed, that
-he struck them with his stick and with the shaft of his spear. Such
-an insult inflamed still farther the existing discontent. Both
-officers and soldiers came to the combat discouraged and heartless,
-while the Athenian peltasts and the Korkyræan hoplites, rushing
-out of several gates at once, pressed their attack with desperate
-energy. Mnasippus, after displaying great personal valor, was at
-length slain, and all his troops, being completely routed, fled back
-to the fortified camp in which their stores were preserved. Even
-this too might have been taken, and the whole armament destroyed,
-had the besieged attacked it<span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">[p.
-146]</span> at once. But they were astonished at their own success.
-Mistaking the numerous camp-followers for soldiers in reserve, they
-retired back to the city.</p>
-
-<p>Their victory was however so complete, as to reopen easy
-communication with the country, to procure sufficient temporary
-supplies, and to afford a certainty of holding out until
-reinforcement from Athens should arrive. Such reinforcement, indeed,
-was already on its way, and had been announced as approaching to
-Hypermenês (second under the deceased Mnasippus), who had now
-succeeded to the command. Terrified at the news, he hastened to sail
-round from his station,—which he had occupied with the fleet to
-block up the harbor,—to the fortified camp. Here he first put the
-slaves, as well as the property, aboard of his transports, and sent
-them away; remaining himself to defend the camp with the soldiers
-and marines,—but remaining only a short time, and then taking these
-latter also aboard the triremes. He thus completely evacuated the
-island, making off for Leukas. But such had been the hurry,—and so
-great the terror lest the Athenian fleet should arrive,—that much
-corn and wine, many slaves, and even many sick and wounded soldiers,
-were left behind. To the victorious Korkyræans, these acquisitions
-were not needed to enhance the value of a triumph which rescued
-them from capture, slavery, or starvation.<a id="FNanchor_310"
-href="#Footnote_310" class="fnanchor">[310]</a></p>
-
-<p>The Athenian fleet had not only been tardy in arriving, so as
-to incur much risk of finding the island already taken,—but when
-it did come, it was commanded by Iphikrates, Chabrias, and the
-orator Kallistratus,<a id="FNanchor_311" href="#Footnote_311"
-class="fnanchor">[311]</a>—not by Timotheus, whom the original vote
-of the people had nominated. It appears that Timotheus,—who (in
-April 373 <small>B.C.</small>), when the Athenians first learned
-that the formidable Lacedæmonian fleet had begun to attack Korkyra,
-had been directed to proceed thither forthwith with a fleet of sixty
-triremes,—found a difficulty in manning his ships at Athens, and
-therefore undertook a preliminary cruise to procure both seamen and
-contributory funds, from the maritime allies. His first act was to
-transport the six hundred peltasts under Stesiklês to Thessaly,
-where he entered into relations with Jason of Pheræ. He persuaded
-the latter to become the ally of Athens, and to further<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_147">[p. 147]</span> the march of Stesiklês
-with his division by land across Thessaly over the passes of Pindus,
-to Epirus; where Alketas, who was at once the ally of Athens, and the
-dependent of Jason, conveyed them by night across the strait from
-Epirus to Korkyra. Having thus opened important connection with the
-powerful Thessalian despot, and obtained from him a very seasonable
-service, together (perhaps) with some seamen from Pagasæ to man his
-fleet,—Timotheus proceeded onward to the ports of Macedonia, where he
-also entered into relations with Amyntas, receiving from him signal
-marks of private favor,—and then to Thrace as well as the neighboring
-islands. His voyage procured for him valuable subsidies in money and
-supplies of seamen, besides some new adhesions and deputies to the
-Athenian confederacy.</p>
-
-<p>This preliminary cruise of Timotheus, undertaken with the
-general purpose of collecting means for the expedition to
-Korkyra, began in the month of April or commencement of May 373
-<small>B.C.</small><a id="FNanchor_312" href="#Footnote_312"
-class="fnanchor">[312]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">[p.
-148]</span> On departing, it appears, he had given orders to such
-of the allies as were intended to form part of the expedition,
-to assemble at Kalauria (an island off Trœzen, consecrated to
-Poseidon) where he would himself come and take them up to proceed
-onward. Pursuant to such order, several contingents mustered at
-this island,—among them the Bœotians, who sent several triremes,
-though in the preceding year it had been alleged against them
-that they contributed nothing to sustain the naval exertions of
-Athens. But Timotheus stayed out a long time. Reliance was placed
-upon him, and upon the money which he was to bring home, for the
-pay of the fleet; and the unpaid triremes accordingly fell into
-distress and disorganization at Kalauria, awaiting his return.<a
-id="FNanchor_313" href="#Footnote_313" class="fnanchor">[313]</a> In
-the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">[p. 149]</span> mean time
-fresh news reached Athens that Korkyra was much pressed; so that
-great indignation was felt against the absent admiral, for employing
-in his present cruise a precious interval essential to enable him to
-reach the island in time. Iphikrates (who had recently come back from
-serving with Pharnabazus, in an unavailing attempt to reconquer Egypt
-for the Persian king) and the orator Kallistratus, were especially
-loud in their accusations against him. And as the very salvation
-of Korkyra required pressing haste, the Athenians cancelled the
-appointment of Timotheus even during his absence,—naming Iphikrates,
-Kallistratus, and Chabrias, to equip a fleet and go round to
-Korkyra without delay.<a id="FNanchor_314" href="#Footnote_314"
-class="fnanchor">[314]</a></p>
-
-<p>Before they could get ready, Timotheus returned; bringing several
-new adhesions to the confederacy, with a flourishing account
-of general success.<a id="FNanchor_315" href="#Footnote_315"
-class="fnanchor">[315]</a> He went down to Kalauria to supply the
-deficiencies of funds, and make up for the embarrassments which his
-absence had occasioned. But he could not pay the Bœotian trierarchs
-without borrowing money for the purpose on his own credit; for
-though the sum brought home from his voyage was considerable, it
-would appear that the demands upon him had been greater still. At
-first an accusation, called for in consequence of the pronounced
-displeasure of the public, was entered against him by Iphikrates and
-Kallistratus. But as these two had been named joint admirals for
-the expedition to Korkyra, which admitted of no delay,—his trial
-was postponed until the autumn; a postponement advantageous to the
-accused, and doubtless seconded by his friends.<a id="FNanchor_316"
-href="#Footnote_316" class="fnanchor">[316]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">[p. 150]</span></p>
-
-<p>Meanwhile Iphikrates adopted the most strenuous measures for
-accelerating the equipment of his fleet. In the present temper of the
-public, and in the known danger of Korkyra, he was allowed (though
-perhaps Timotheus, a few weeks earlier, would not have been allowed)
-not only to impress seamen in the port, but even to coërce the
-trierarchs with severity,<a id="FNanchor_317" href="#Footnote_317"
-class="fnanchor">[317]</a> and to employ all the triremes reserved
-for the coast-guard of Attica, as well as the two sacred triremes
-called Paralus and Salaminia. He thus completed a fleet of seventy
-sail, promising to send back a large portion of it directly, if
-matters took a favorable turn at Korkyra. Expecting to find on
-the watch for him a Lacedæmonian fleet fully equal to his own, he
-arranged his voyage so as to combine the maximum of speed with
-training to his seamen, and with preparation for naval combat.
-The larger sails of an ancient trireme were habitually taken out
-of the ship previous to a battle, as being inconvenient aboard:
-Iphikrates left such sails at Athens,—employed even the smaller
-sails sparingly,—and kept his seamen constantly at the oar; which
-greatly accelerated his progress, at the same time that it kept the
-men in excellent training. Every day he had to stop, for meals and
-rest, on an enemy’s shore; and these halts were conducted with such
-extreme dexterity as well as precision, that the least possible
-time was consumed, not enough for any local hostile force to get
-together. On reaching Sphakteria, Iphikrates learnt for the first
-time the defeat and death of Mnasippus. Yet not fully trusting the
-correctness of his information, he still persevered both in his
-celerity and his precautions, until he reached Kephallenia, where he
-first fully satisfied himself that the danger of Korkyra was past.
-The excellent management of Iphikrates throughout this expedition is
-spoken of in terms of admiration by Xenophon.<a id="FNanchor_318"
-href="#Footnote_318" class="fnanchor">[318]</a></p>
-
-<p>Having no longer any fear of the Lacedæmonian fleet, the Athenian
-commander probably now sent back the home-squadron of Attica which
-he had been allowed to take, but which could ill be spared from
-the defence of the coast.<a id="FNanchor_319" href="#Footnote_319"
-class="fnanchor">[319]</a> After making himself master of some of
-the Kephallenian cities, he then proceeded<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_151">[p. 151]</span> onward to Korkyra; where the squadron
-of ten triremes from Syracuse was now on the point of arriving; sent
-by Dionysius to aid the Lacedæmonians, but as yet uninformed of their
-flight. Iphikrates, posting scouts on the hills to give notice of
-their approach, set apart twenty triremes to be ready for moving at
-the first signal. So excellent was his discipline, (says Xenophon,)
-that “the moment the signal was made, the ardor of all the crews was
-a fine thing to see; there was not a man who did not hasten at a run
-to take his place aboard.”<a id="FNanchor_320" href="#Footnote_320"
-class="fnanchor">[320]</a> The ten Syracusan triremes, after their
-voyage across from the Iapygian cape, had halted to rest their men
-on one of the northern points of Korkyra; where they were found
-by Iphikrates and captured, with all their crews and the admiral
-Anippus; one alone escaping, through the strenuous efforts of her
-captain, the Rhodian Melanôpus. Iphikrates returned in triumph,
-towing his nine prizes into the harbor of Korkyra. The crews, being
-sold or ransomed, yielded to him a sum of sixty talents; the admiral
-Anippus was retained in expectation of a higher ransom, but slew
-himself shortly afterwards from mortification.<a id="FNanchor_321"
-href="#Footnote_321" class="fnanchor">[321]</a></p>
-
-<p>Though the sum thus realized enabled Iphikrates for the time
-to pay his men, yet the suicide of Anippus was a pecuniary
-disappointment to him, and he soon began to need money. This
-consideration induced him to consent to the return of his colleague
-Kallistratus; who,—an orator by profession, and not on friendly
-terms with Iphikrates,—had come out against his own consent.
-Iphikrates had himself singled out both Kallistratus and Chabrias
-as his colleagues. He was not indifferent to the value of their
-advice, nor did he fear the criticisms, even of rivals, on what
-they<span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">[p. 152]</span> really saw
-in his proceedings. But he had accepted the command under hazardous
-circumstances; not only from the insulting displacement of Timotheus,
-and the provocation consequently given to a powerful party attached
-to the son of Konon,—but also in great doubts whether he could
-succeed in relieving Korkyra, in spite of the rigorous coërcion
-which he applied to man his fleet. Had the island been taken and had
-Iphikrates failed, he would have found himself exposed to severe
-crimination, and multiplied enemies, at Athens. Perhaps Kallistratus
-and Chabrias, if left at home, might in that case have been among his
-assailants,—so that it was important to him to identify both of them
-with his good or ill success, and to profit by the military ability
-of the latter, as well as by the oratorical talent of the former.<a
-id="FNanchor_322" href="#Footnote_322" class="fnanchor">[322]</a> As
-the result of the expedition, however, was altogether favorable, all
-such anxieties were removed. Iphikrates could well afford to part
-with both his colleagues; and Kallistratus engaged, that if permitted
-to go home, he would employ all his efforts to keep the fleet well
-paid from the public treasury; or if this were impracticable,
-that he would labor to procure peace.<a id="FNanchor_323"
-href="#Footnote_323" class="fnanchor">[323]</a> So terrible are the
-difficulties which the Grecian generals now experience in procuring
-money from Athens, (or from other cities in whose service they are
-acting,) for payment of their troops! Iphikrates suffered the same
-embarrassment which Timotheus had experienced the year before,—and
-which will be found yet more painfully felt as we advance forward in
-the history. For the present, he subsisted his seamen by find<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_153">[p. 153]</span>ing work for them on the
-farms of the Korkyræans, where there must doubtless have been ample
-necessity for repairs after the devastations of Mnasippus, while he
-crossed over to Akarnania with his peltasts and hoplites, and there
-obtained service with the townships friendly to Athens against such
-others as were friendly to Sparta; especially against the warlike
-inhabitants of the strong town called Thyrieis.<a id="FNanchor_324"
-href="#Footnote_324" class="fnanchor">[324]</a></p>
-
-<p>The happy result of the Korkyræan expedition, imparting universal
-satisfaction at Athens, was not less beneficial to Timotheus than
-to Iphikrates. It was in November, 373 <small>B.C.</small>, that
-the former, as well as his quæstor or military treasurer Antimachus,
-underwent each his trial. Kallistratus, having returned home,
-pleaded against the quæstor, perhaps against Timotheus also, as
-one of the accusers;<a id="FNanchor_325" href="#Footnote_325"
-class="fnanchor">[325]</a> though probably in a spirit of greater
-gentleness and moderation, in consequence of his recent joint success
-and of the general good temper prevalent in the city. And while
-the edge of the accusation against Timotheus was thus blunted, the
-defence was strengthened not merely by numerous citizen friends
-speaking in his favor with increased confidence, but also by the
-unusual phenomenon of two powerful foreign supporters. At the
-request of Timotheus, both Alketas of Epirus, and Jason of Pheræ,
-came to Athens a little before the trial, to appear as witnesses
-in his favor. They were received and lodged by him in his house in
-the Hippodamian Agora, the principal square of the Peiræus. And as
-he was then in some embarrassment for want of money, he found it
-necessary to borrow various articles of finery in order to do them
-honor,—clothes, bedding, and two silver drinking bowls,—from Pasion,
-a wealthy banker near at hand. These two important witnesses would
-depose to the zealous service and estimable qualities of Timotheus;
-who had inspired them with warm interest, and had been the means of
-bringing them into alliance with Athens; an alliance, which they
-had sealed at once by conveying Stesikles and his division across
-Thessaly and Epirus to Korkyra. The minds of the dikastery would
-be powerfully affected by seeing before them such a man as Jason
-of Pheræ, at that moment the most powerful individual in Greece;
-and we are<span class="pagenum" id="Page_154">[p. 154]</span> not
-surprised to learn that Timotheus was acquitted. His treasurer
-Antimachus, not tried by the same dikastery, and doubtless not so
-powerfully befriended, was less fortunate. He was condemned to death,
-and his property confiscated; the dikastery doubtless believing (on
-what evidence we do not know) that he had been guilty of fraud in
-dealing with the public money, which had caused serious injury at a
-most important crisis. Under the circumstances of the case, he was
-held responsible as treasurer, for the pecuniary department of the
-money-levying command confided to Timotheus by the people.</p>
-
-<p>As to the military conduct, for which Timotheus himself would be
-personally accountable, we can only remark that having been invested
-with the command for the special purpose of relieving the besieged
-Korkyra, he appears to have devoted an unreasonable length of time
-to his own self-originated cruise elsewhere; though such cruise was
-in itself beneficial to Athens; insomuch that if Korkyra had really
-been taken, the people would have had good reason for imputing the
-misfortune to his delay.<a id="FNanchor_326" href="#Footnote_326"
-class="fnanchor">[326]</a> And although<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_155">[p. 155]</span> he was now acquitted, his reputation
-suffered so much by the whole affair, that in the ensuing spring
-he was glad to accept an<span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">[p.
-156]</span> invitation of the Persian satraps, who offered him the
-command of the Grecian mercenaries in their service for the Egyptian
-war;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">[p. 157]</span> the same
-command from which Iphikrates had retired a little time before.<a
-id="FNanchor_327" href="#Footnote_327" class="fnanchor">[327]</a></p>
-
-<p>That admiral, whose naval force had been reinforced by a
-large number of Korkyræan triremes, was committing without
-opposition incursions against Akarnania, and the western coast
-of Peloponnesus; insomuch that the expelled Messenians, in
-their distant exile at Hesperides in Libya, began to conceive
-hopes of being restored by Athens to Naupaktus, which they had
-occupied under her protection during the Peloponnesian war.<a
-id="FNanchor_328" href="#Footnote_328" class="fnanchor">[328]</a>
-And while the Athenians were thus masters at sea both east and
-west of Peloponnesus,<a id="FNanchor_329" href="#Footnote_329"
-class="fnanchor">[329]</a> Sparta and her confederates, discouraged
-by the ruinous failure of their expedition against Korkyra in the
-preceding year, appear to have remained inactive. With such mental
-predispositions, they were powerfully affected by religious alarm
-arising from certain frightful earthquakes and inundations with
-which Peloponnesus was visited during this year, and which were
-regarded as marks of the wrath of the god Poseidon. More of these
-formidable visitations occurred this year in Peloponnesus than had
-ever before been known; especially one, the worst of all, whereby
-the two towns of Helikê and Bura in Achaia were destroyed, together
-with a large portion of their population. Ten Lacedæmonian triremes,
-which happened to be moored on this shore on the night when the
-calamity occurred, were destroyed by the rush of the waters.<a
-id="FNanchor_330" href="#Footnote_330" class="fnanchor">[330]</a></p>
-
-<p>Under these depressing circumstances, the Lacedæmonians had
-recourse to the same manœuvre which had so well served their purpose
-fifteen years before, in 388-387 <small>B.C.</small> They sent
-Antal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">[p. 158]</span>kidas
-again as envoy to Persia, to entreat both pecuniary aid,<a
-id="FNanchor_331" href="#Footnote_331" class="fnanchor">[331]</a> and
-a fresh Persian intervention enforcing anew the peace which bore his
-name; which peace had now been infringed (according to Lacedæmonian
-construction) by the reconstitution of the Bœotian confederacy
-under Thebes as president. And it appears that in the course of
-the autumn or winter, Persian envoys actually did come to Greece,
-requiring that the belligerents should all desist from war, and wind
-up their dissensions on the principles of the peace of Antalkidas.<a
-id="FNanchor_332" href="#Footnote_332" class="fnanchor">[332]</a> The
-Persian satraps, at this time renewing their efforts against Egypt,
-were anxious for the cessation of hostilities in Greece, as a means
-of enlarging their numbers of Grecian mercenaries; of which troops
-Timotheus had left Athens a few months before to take the command.</p>
-
-<p>Apart, however, from this prospect of Persian intervention, which
-doubtless was not without effect,—Athens herself was becoming more
-and more disposed towards peace. That common fear and hatred of the
-Lacedæmonians, which had brought her into alliance with Thebes in
-378 <small>B.C.</small>, was now no longer predominant. She was
-actually at the head of a considerable maritime confederacy; and
-this she could hardly hope to increase by continuing the war, since
-the Lacedæmonian naval power had already been humbled. Moreover,
-she found the expense of warlike operations very burdensome,
-nowise defrayed either by the contributions of her allies or by
-the results of victory. The orator Kallistratus,—who had promised
-either to procure remittances from Athens to<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_159">[p. 159]</span> Iphikrates, or to recommend the
-conclusion of peace,—was obliged to confine himself to the latter
-alternative, and contributed much to promote the pacific dispositions
-of his countrymen.<a id="FNanchor_333" href="#Footnote_333"
-class="fnanchor">[333]</a></p>
-
-<p>Moreover, the Athenians had become more and more alienated from
-Thebes. The ancient antipathy between these two neighbors had for a
-time been overlaid by common fear of Sparta. But as soon as Thebes
-had reëstablished her authority in Bœotia, the jealousies of Athens
-again began to arise. In 374 <small>B.C.</small>, she had concluded
-a peace with the Spartans, without the concurrence of Thebes; which
-peace was broken almost as soon as made, by the Spartans themselves,
-in consequence of the proceedings of Timotheus at Zakynthus. The
-Phokians,—against whom, as having been active allies of Sparta in
-her invasions of Bœotia, Thebes was now making war,—had also been
-ancient friends of Athens, who sympathized with their sufferings.<a
-id="FNanchor_334" href="#Footnote_334" class="fnanchor">[334]</a>
-Moreover, the Thebans on their side probably resented the unpaid and
-destitute condition in which their seamen had been left by Timotheus
-at Kalauria, during the expedition for the relief of Korkyra in
-the preceding year;<a id="FNanchor_335" href="#Footnote_335"
-class="fnanchor">[335]</a> an expedition of which Athens alone reaped
-both the glory and the advantage. Though they remained members of
-the confederacy, sending deputies to the congress at Athens, the
-unfriendly spirit on both sides continued on the increase, and was
-farther exasperated by their violent proceeding against Platæa in the
-first half of 372 <small>B.C.</small></p>
-
-<p>During the last three or four years, Platæa, like the other towns
-of Bœotia, had been again brought into the confederacy under Thebes.
-Reëstablished by Sparta after the peace of Antalkidas as a so-called
-autonomous town, it had been garrisoned by her as a post against
-Thebes, and was no longer able to maintain a real autonomy after the
-Spartans had been excluded from Bœotia in 376 <small>B.C.</small>
-While other Bœotian cities were glad to find themselves emancipated
-from their philo-Laconian oligarchies and rejoined to the federation
-under Thebes, Platæa,—as well as Thespiæ,—submitted to the union
-only by constraint; awaiting any favorable opportunity for breaking
-off, either by means of Sparta or of Athens. Aware probably of
-the growing coldness<span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">[p.
-160]</span> between the Athenians and Thebans, the Platæans were
-secretly trying to persuade Athens to accept and occupy their town,
-annexing Platæa to Attica;<a id="FNanchor_336" href="#Footnote_336"
-class="fnanchor">[336]</a> a project hazardous both to Thebes and
-Athens, since it would place them at open war with each other, while
-neither was yet at peace with Sparta.</p>
-
-<p>This intrigue, coming to the knowledge of the Thebans, determined
-them to strike a decisive blow. Their presidency, over more than one
-of the minor Bœotian cities, had always been ungentle, suitable to
-the roughness of their dispositions. Towards Platæa, especially, they
-not only bore an ancient antipathy, but regarded the reëstablished
-town as little better than a Lacedæmonian encroachment, abstracting
-from themselves a portion of territory which had become Theban, by
-prescriptive enjoyment lasting for forty years from the surrender
-of Platæa in 427 <small>B.C.</small> As it would have been to
-them a loss as well as embarrassment, if Athens should resolve to
-close with the tender of Platæa,—they forestalled the contingency
-by seizing the town for themselves. Since the reconquest of Bœotia
-by Thebes, the Platæans had come again, though reluctantly, under
-the ancient constitution of Bœotia; they were living at peace with
-Thebes, acknowledging her rights as president of the federation,
-and having their own rights as members guaranteed in return by her,
-probably under positive engagement,—that is, their security, their
-territory, and their qualified autonomy, subject to the federal
-restrictions and obligations. But though thus at peace with Thebes,<a
-id="FNanchor_337" href="#Footnote_337" class="fnanchor">[337]</a> the
-Platæans knew<span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">[p. 161]</span>
-well what was her real sentiment towards them, and their own towards
-her. If we are to believe, what seems very probable, that they were
-secretly negotiating with Athens to help them in breaking off from
-the federation,—the consciousness of such an intrigue tended still
-farther to keep them in anxiety and suspicion. Accordingly, being
-apprehensive of some aggression from Thebes, they kept themselves
-habitually on their guard. But their vigilance was somewhat
-relaxed and most of them went out of the city to their farms in
-the country, on the days, well known beforehand, when the public
-assemblies in Thebes were held. Of this relaxation the Bœotarch
-Neokles took advantage.<a id="FNanchor_338" href="#Footnote_338"
-class="fnanchor">[338]</a> He conducted a Theban armed force,
-immediately from the assembly, by a circuitous route through
-Hysiæ to Platæa; which town he found deserted by most of its male
-adults, and unable to make resistance. The Platæans,—dispersed in
-the fields, finding their walls, their wives, and their families,
-all in possession of the victor,—were under the necessity of
-accepting the terms proposed to them. They were allowed to depart
-in safety, and to carry away all their mov<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_162">[p. 162]</span>able property; but their town was
-destroyed, and its territory again annexed to Thebes. The unhappy
-fugitives were constrained for the second time to seek refuge at
-Athens, where they were again kindly received, and restored to the
-same qualified right of citizenship as they had enjoyed prior to
-the peace of Antalkidas.<a id="FNanchor_339" href="#Footnote_339"
-class="fnanchor">[339]</a></p>
-
-<p>It was not merely with Platæa, but also with Thespiæ, that Thebes
-was now meddling. Mistrusting the dispositions of the Thespians, she
-constrained them to demolish the fortifications of their town;<a
-id="FNanchor_340" href="#Footnote_340" class="fnanchor">[340]</a>
-as she had caused to be done fifty-two years before, after the
-victory of Delium,<a id="FNanchor_341" href="#Footnote_341"
-class="fnanchor">[341]</a> on suspicion of leanings favorable to
-Athens.</p>
-
-<p>Such proceedings on the part of the Thebans in Bœotia excited
-strong emotion at Athens; where the Platæans not only appeared<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_163">[p. 163]</span> as suppliants, with
-the tokens of misery conspicuously displayed, but also laid their
-case pathetically before the assembly, and invoked aid to regain
-their town, of which they had been just bereft. On a question
-at once so touching and so full of political consequences, many
-speeches were doubtless composed and delivered, one of which has
-fortunately reached us; composed by Isokrates, and perhaps actually
-delivered by a Platæan speaker before the public assembly. The hard
-fate of this interesting little community is here impressively
-set forth; including the bitterest reproaches, stated with not a
-little of rhetorical exaggeration, against the multiplied wrongs
-done by Thebes, as well towards Athens as towards Platæa. Much
-of his invective is more vehement than conclusive. Thus when
-the orator repeatedly claims for Platæa her title to autonomous
-existence, under the guarantee of universal autonomy sworn at the
-peace of Antalkidas,<a id="FNanchor_342" href="#Footnote_342"
-class="fnanchor">[342]</a>—the Thebans would doubtless reply, that at
-the time of that peace, Platæa was no longer in existence; but had
-been extinct for forty years, and was only renovated afterwards by
-the Lacedæmonians for their own political purposes. And the orator
-intimates plainly, that the Thebans were noway ashamed of their
-proceeding, but came to Athens to justify it, openly and avowedly;
-moreover, several of the most distinguished Athenian speakers
-espoused the same side.<a id="FNanchor_343" href="#Footnote_343"
-class="fnanchor">[343]</a> That the Platæans had coöperated with
-Sparta in her recent operations in Bœotia against both Athens
-and Thebes, was an undeniable fact; which the orator himself can
-only extenuate by saying that they acted under constraint from a
-present Spartan force,—but which was cited on the opposite side as
-a proof of their philo-Spartan dispositions, and of their readiness
-again to join the common enemy as soon as he presented himself.<a
-id="FNanchor_344" href="#Footnote_344" class="fnanchor">[344]</a>
-The Thebans would accuse Platæa of subsequent treason to the<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_164">[p. 164]</span> confederacy; and
-they even seem to have contended, that they had rendered a
-positive service to the general Athenian confederacy of which
-they were members,<a id="FNanchor_345" href="#Footnote_345"
-class="fnanchor">[345]</a> by expelling the inhabitants of Platæa and
-dismantling Thespiæ; both towns being not merely devoted to Sparta,
-but also adjoining Kithæron, the frontier line whereby a Spartan
-army would invade Bœotia. Both in the public assembly of Athens, and
-in the general congress of the confederates at that city, animated
-discussions were raised upon the whole subject;<a id="FNanchor_346"
-href="#Footnote_346" class="fnanchor">[346]</a> discussions, wherein,
-as it appears, Epaminondas, as the orator and representative of
-Thebes, was found a competent advocate against Kallistratus, the
-most distinguished speaker in Athens; sustaining the Theban cause
-with an ability which greatly enhanced his growing reputation.<a
-id="FNanchor_347" href="#Footnote_347" class="fnanchor">[347]</a></p>
-
-<p>But though the Thebans and their Athenian supporters, having all
-the prudential arguments on their side, carried the point so that no
-step was taken to restore the Platæans, nor any hostile declaration
-made against those to whom they owed their expulsion,—yet the general
-result of the debates, animated by keen sympathy with the Platæan
-sufferers, tended decidedly to poison the good feeling, and loosen
-the ties, between Athens and Thebes. This change showed itself by an
-increased gravitation towards peace with Sparta; strongly advocated
-by the orator Kallistratus, and now promoted not merely by the
-announced Persian inter<span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">[p.
-165]</span>vention, but by the heavy cost of war, and the absence
-of all prospective gain from its continuance. The resolution was at
-length taken,—first by Athens, and next, probably, by the majority
-of the confederates assembled at Athens,—to make propositions of
-peace to Sparta, where it was well known that similar dispositions
-prevailed towards peace. Notice of this intention was given to the
-Thebans, who were invited to send envoys thither also, if they chose
-to become parties. In the spring of 371 <small>B.C.</small>, at the
-time when the members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy were assembled
-at Sparta, both the Athenian and Theban envoys, and those from the
-various members of the Athenian confederacy, arrived there. Among
-the Athenian envoys, two at least,—Kallias (the hereditary daduch
-or torchbearer of the Eleusinian ceremonies) and Autoklês,—were
-men of great family at Athens; and they were accompanied by
-Kallistratus the orator.<a id="FNanchor_348" href="#Footnote_348"
-class="fnanchor">[348]</a> From the Thebans, the only man of note was
-Epaminondas, then one of the Bœotarchs.</p>
-
-<p>Of the debates which took place at this important congress, we
-have very imperfect knowledge; and of the more private diplomatic
-conversations, not less important than the debates, we have no
-knowledge at all. Xenophon gives us a speech from each of the three
-Athenians, and from no one else. That of Kallias, who announces
-himself as hereditary proxenus of Sparta at Athens, is boastful and
-empty, but eminently philo-Laconian in spirit;<a id="FNanchor_349"
-href="#Footnote_349" class="fnanchor">[349]</a> that of Autoklês is
-in the opposite tone, full of severe censure on the past conduct of
-Sparta; that of Kallistratus, delivered after the other two,—while
-the enemies of Sparta were elate, her friends humiliated, and both
-parties silent from the fresh effect of the reproaches of Autoklês,<a
-id="FNanchor_350" href="#Footnote_350" class="fnanchor">[350]</a>—is
-framed in a spirit of conciliation; admitting faults on both sides,
-but deprecating the continuance of war, as injurious to both, and
-showing how much the joint interests of both pointed towards peace.<a
-id="FNanchor_351" href="#Footnote_351" class="fnanchor">[351]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">[p. 166]</span></p>
-
-<p>This orator, representing the Athenian diplomacy of the time,
-recognizes distinctly the peace of Antalkidas as the basis upon which
-Athens was prepared to treat,—autonomy to each city, small as well
-as great; and in this way, coinciding with the views of the Persian
-king, he dismisses with indifference the menace that Antalkidas was
-on his way back from Persia with money to aid the Lacedæmonians
-in the war. It was not from fear of the Persian treasures (he
-urged),—as the enemies of peace asserted,—that Athens sought peace.<a
-id="FNanchor_352" href="#Footnote_352" class="fnanchor">[352]</a>
-Her affairs were now so prosperous, both by sea and land, as
-to prove that she only did so on consideration of the general
-evils of prolonged war, and on a prudent abnegation of that rash
-confidence which was always ready to contend for extreme stakes,<a
-id="FNanchor_353" href="#Footnote_353" class="fnanchor">[353]</a>
-like a gamester playing double or quits. The time had come for both
-Sparta and Athens now to desist from hostilities. The former had
-the strength on land, the latter was predominant at sea; so that
-each could guard the other; while the reconciliation of the two
-would produce peace throughout the Hellenic world, since in each
-separate city, one of the two opposing local parties rested on
-Athens, the other on Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_354" href="#Footnote_354"
-class="fnanchor">[354]</a> But it was indispensably necessary that
-Sparta should renounce that system of aggression (already pointedly
-denounced by the Athenian, Autoklês) on which she had acted since
-the peace of Antalkidas; a system, from which she had at last reaped
-bitter fruits, since her unjust seizure of the Kadmeia had ended
-by throwing into the arms of the Thebans all those Bœotian cities,
-whose separate autonomy she had bent her whole policy to ensure.<a
-id="FNanchor_355" href="#Footnote_355" class="fnanchor">[355]</a></p>
-
-<p>Two points stand out in this remarkable speech, which takes a
-judicious measure of the actual position of affairs;—first, autonomy
-to every city; and autonomy in the genuine sense, not construed
-and enforced by the separate interests of Sparta, as it<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_167">[p. 167]</span> had been at the
-peace of Antalkidas; next, the distribution of such preëminence or
-headship, as was consistent with this universal autonomy, between
-Sparta and Athens; the former on land, the latter at sea,—as the
-means of ensuring tranquillity in Greece. That “autonomy perverted
-to Lacedæmonian purposes,”—which Perikles had denounced before
-the Peloponnesian war as the condition of Peloponnesus, and which
-had been made the political canon of Greece by the peace of
-Antalkidas,—was now at an end. On the other hand, Athens and Sparta
-were to become mutual partners and guarantees; dividing the headship
-of Greece by an ascertained line of demarcation, yet neither of them
-interfering with the principle of universal autonomy. Thebes, and
-her claim to the presidency of Bœotia, were thus to be set aside by
-mutual consent.</p>
-
-<p>It was upon this basis that the peace was concluded. The armaments
-on both sides were to be disbanded; the harmosts and garrisons
-everywhere withdrawn, in order that each city might enjoy full
-autonomy. If any city should fail in observance of these conditions,
-and continue in a career of force against any other, all were at
-liberty to take arms for the support of the injured party; but no
-one who did not feel disposed, was bound so to take arms. This last
-stipulation exonerated the Lacedæmonian allies from one of their most
-vexatious chains.</p>
-
-<p>To the conditions here mentioned, all parties agreed; and on
-the ensuing day the oaths were exchanged. Sparta took the oath for
-herself and her allies; Athens took the oath for herself only; her
-allies afterwards took it severally, each city for itself. Why such
-difference was made, we are not told; for it would seem that the
-principle of severance applied to both confederacies alike.</p>
-
-<p>Next came the turn of the Thebans to swear; and here the fatal
-hitch was disclosed. Epaminondas, the Theban envoy, insisted on
-taking the oath, not for Thebes separately, but for Thebes as
-president of the Bœotian federation, including all the Bœotian
-cities. The Spartan authorities on the other hand, and Agesilaus as
-the foremost of all, strenuously opposed him. They required that he
-should swear for Thebes alone, leaving the Bœotian cities to take the
-oath each for itself.</p>
-
-<p>Already in the course of the preliminary debates, Epaminondas
-had spoken out boldly against the ascendency of Sparta.<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_168">[p. 168]</span> While most of
-the deputies stood overawed by her dignity, represented by the
-energetic Agesilaus as spokesman,—he, like the Athenian Autoklês,
-and with strong sympathy from many of the deputies present, had
-proclaimed that nothing kept alive the war except her unjust
-pretensions, and that no peace could be durable unless such
-pretensions were put aside.<a id="FNanchor_356" href="#Footnote_356"
-class="fnanchor">[356]</a> Accepting the conditions of peace as
-finally determined, he presented himself to swear to them in the
-name of the Bœotian federation. But Agesilaus, requiring that each
-of the Bœotian cities should take the oath for itself, appealed to
-those same principles of liberty which Epaminondas himself had just
-invoked, and asked him whether each of the Bœotian cities had not as
-good a title to autonomy as Thebes. Epaminondas might have replied
-by asking, why Sparta had just been permitted to take the oath for
-her allies as well as for herself. But he took a higher ground. He
-contended that the presidency of Bœotia was held by Thebes on as good
-a title as the sovereignty of Laconia by Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_357"
-href="#Footnote_357" class="fnanchor">[357]</a> He would remind the
-assembly that when Bœotia was first conquered and settled by its
-present inhabitants, the other towns had all been planted out from
-Thebes as their chief and mother-city; that the federal union of
-all, administered by Bœotarchs chosen by and from all, with Thebes
-as president, was coeval with the first settlement of the country;
-that the separate autonomy of each was qualified by an established
-institution, devolving on the Bœotarchs and councils sitting at
-Thebes the management of the foreign relations of all jointly.
-All this had been already pleaded by the Theban orator fifty-six
-years earlier, before the five Spartan commissioners, assembled to
-determine the fate of the captives after the surrender of Platæa;
-when he required the condemnation of the Platæans as guilty of
-treason to the ancestral institutions of Bœotia;<a id="FNanchor_358"
-href="#Footnote_358" class="fnanchor">[358]</a> and the Spartan
-commis<span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">[p. 169]</span>sioners
-had recognized the legitimacy of these institutions by a sweeping
-sentence of death against the transgressors. Moreover, at a time
-when the ascendency of Thebes over the Bœotian cities had been
-greatly impaired by her anti-Hellenic coöperation with the invading
-Persians, the Spartans themselves had assisted her with all their
-power to reëstablish it, as a countervailing force against Athens.<a
-id="FNanchor_359" href="#Footnote_359" class="fnanchor">[359]</a>
-Epaminondas could show, that the presidency of Thebes over the
-Bœotian cities was the keystone of the federation; a right not only
-of immemorial antiquity, but pointedly recognized and strenuously
-vindicated by the Spartans themselves. He could show farther that
-it was as old, and as good, as their own right to govern the
-Laconian townships; which latter was acquired and held (as one of
-the best among their own warriors had boastfully proclaimed)<a
-id="FNanchor_360" href="#Footnote_360" class="fnanchor">[360]</a> by
-nothing but Spartan valor and the sharpness of the Spartan sword.</p>
-
-<p>An emphatic speech of this tenor, delivered amidst the deputies
-assembled at Sparta, and arraigning the Spartans not merely in their
-supremacy over Greece, but even in their dominion at home,—was as it
-were the shadow cast before, by coming events. It opened a question
-such as no Greek had ever ventured to raise. It was a novelty
-startling to all,—extravagant probably in the eyes of Kallistratus
-and the Athenians,—but to the Spartans themselves, intolerably
-poignant and insulting.<a id="FNanchor_361" href="#Footnote_361"
-class="fnanchor">[361]</a> They had already a long<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_170">[p. 170]</span> account of antipathy
-to clear off with Thebes; their own wrong-doing in seizing the
-Kadmeia,—their subsequent humiliation in losing it and being unable
-to recover it,—their recent short-comings and failures, in the last
-seven years of war against Athens and Thebes jointly. To aggravate
-this deep-seated train of hostile associations, their pride was now
-wounded in an unforeseen point, the tenderest of all. Agesilaus,
-full to overflowing of the national sentiment, which in the mind of
-a Spartan passed for the first of virtues, was stung to the quick.
-Had he been an Athenian orator like Kallistratus, his wrath would
-have found vent in an animated harangue. But a king of Sparta was
-anxious only to close these offensive discussions with scornful
-abruptness, thus leaving to the presumptuous Theban no middle ground
-between humble retraction and acknowledged hostility. Indignantly
-starting from his seat, he said to Epaminondas,—“Speak plainly,—will
-you, or will you not, leave to each of the Bœotian cities its
-separate autonomy?” To which the other replied—“Will <i>you</i> leave
-each of the Laconian towns autonomous?” Without saying another word,
-Agesilaus immediately caused the name of the Thebans to be struck
-out of the roll, and proclaimed them excluded from the treaty.<a
-id="FNanchor_362" href="#Footnote_362" class="fnanchor">[362]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">[p. 171]</span></p>
-
-<p>Such was the close of this memorable congress at Sparta
-in June, 371 <small>B.C.</small> Between the Spartans and
-Athenians, and their respective allies, peace was sworn. But the
-Thebans were excluded, and their deputies returned home (if we
-may believe Xenophon<a id="FNanchor_363" href="#Footnote_363"
-class="fnanchor">[363]</a>) discouraged and mournful. Yet such a man
-as Epaminondas must have been well aware that neither his claims
-nor his arguments would be admitted by Sparta. If therefore he was
-disappointed with the result, this must be because he had counted
-upon, but did not obtain, support from the Athenians or others.</p>
-
-<p>The leaning of the Athenian deputies had been adverse rather than
-favorable to Thebes throughout the congress. They were disinclined,
-from their sympathies with the Platæans, to advocate the presidential
-claims of Thebes, though on the whole it was the political interest
-of Athens that the Bœotian federation should be<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_172">[p. 172]</span> maintained, as a bulwark to herself
-against Sparta. Yet the relations of Athens with Thebes, after the
-congress as before it, were still those of friendship, nominal rather
-than sincere. It was only with Sparta, and her allies, that Thebes
-was at war, without a single ally attached to her. On the whole,
-Kallistratus and his colleagues had managed the interests of Athens
-in this congress with great prudence and success. They had disengaged
-her from the alliance with Thebes, which had been dictated seven
-years before by common fear and dislike of Sparta, but which had no
-longer any adequate motive to countervail the cost of continuing
-the war; at the same time, the disengagement had been accomplished
-without bad faith. The gains of Athens, during the last seven years
-of war, had been considerable. She had acquired a great naval
-power, and a body of maritime confederates; while her enemies the
-Spartans had lost their naval power in the like proportion. Athens
-was now the ascendent leader of maritime and insular Greece,—while
-Sparta still continued to be the leading power on land, but only
-on land; and a tacit partnership was now established between the
-two, each recognizing the other in their respective halves of
-the Hellenic hegemony.<a id="FNanchor_364" href="#Footnote_364"
-class="fnanchor">[364]</a> Moreover, Athens had the prudence to
-draw her stake, and quit the game, when at the maximum of her
-acquisitions, without taking the risk of future contingencies.</p>
-
-<p>On both sides, the system of compulsory and indefeasable
-confederacies was renounced; a renunciation which had already been
-once sworn to, sixteen years before, at the peace of Antalkidas, but
-treacherously perverted by Sparta in the execution. Under this new
-engagement, the allies of Sparta or Athens ceased to constitute an
-organized permanent body, voting by its majority, passing resolutions
-permanently binding upon dissentients, arming the chief state with
-more or less power of enforcement against all, and forbidding
-voluntary secessions of individual members. They became a mere
-uncemented aggregate of individuals, each acting for himself; taking
-counsel together as long as they chose, and coöperating so far as
-all were in harmony; but no one being bound by any decision of
-the others, nor recognizing any right in the others to compel him
-even to performance of what he had specially<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_173">[p. 173]</span> promised, if it became irksome. By
-such change, therefore, both Athens and Sparta were losers in power;
-yet the latter to a much greater extent than the former, inasmuch as
-her reach of power over her allies had been more comprehensive and
-stringent.</p>
-
-<p>We here see the exact point upon which the requisition addressed
-by Sparta to Thebes, and the controversy between Epaminondas and
-Agesilaus, really turned. Agesilaus contended that the relation
-between Thebes and the other Bœotian cities was the same as what
-subsisted between Sparta and her allies; that accordingly, when
-Sparta renounced the indefeasible and compulsory character of
-her confederacy, and agreed to deal with each of its members as
-a self-acting and independent unit, she was entitled to demand
-that Thebes should do the same in reference to the Bœotian towns.
-Epaminondas, on the contrary, denied the justice of this parallel.
-He maintained that the proper subject of comparison to be taken, was
-the relation of Sparta, not to her extra-Laconian allies, but to
-the Laconian townships; that the federal union of the Bœotian towns
-under Thebes was coeval with the Bœotian settlement, and among the
-most ancient phenomena of Greece; that in reference to other states,
-Bœotia, like Laconia or Attica, was the compound and organized
-whole, of which each separate city was only a fraction; that other
-Greeks had no more right to meddle with the internal constitution
-of these fractions, and convert each of them into an integer,—than
-to insist on separate independence for each of the townships of
-Laconia. Epaminondas did not mean to contend that the power of Thebes
-over the Bœotian cities was as complete and absolute in degree, as
-that of Sparta over the Laconian townships; but merely that her
-presidential power, and the federal system of which it formed a part,
-were established, indefeasible, and beyond the interference of any
-Hellenic convention,—quite as much as the internal government of
-Sparta in Laconia.</p>
-
-<p>Once already this question had been disputed between Sparta and
-Thebes at the peace of Antalkidas; and already decided once by the
-superior power of the former, extorting submission from the latter.
-The last sixteen years had reversed the previous decision, and
-enabled the Thebans to reconquer those presidential rights of which
-the former peace had deprived them. Again, therefore, the question
-stood for decision, with keener antipathy<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_174">[p. 174]</span> on both sides,—with diminished power
-in Sparta,—but with increased force, increased confidence, and a
-new leader whose inestimable worth was even yet but half-known,—in
-Thebes. The Athenians,—friendly with both, yet allies of
-neither,—suffered the dispute to be fought out without interfering.
-How it was settled will appear in the next chapter.</p>
-
-<hr class="chap" />
-
-
-<div class="chapter" id="Chap_78">
-  <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXVIII.<br />
-  BATTLE OF LEUKTRA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.</h2>
-</div>
-
-<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">Immediately</span>
-after the congress at Sparta in June 371 <small>B.C.</small>,
-the Athenians and Lacedæmonians both took steps to perform the
-covenants sworn respectively to each other as well as to the allies
-generally. The Athenians despatched orders to Iphikrates, who
-was still at Korkyra or in the Ionian Sea, engaged in incursions
-against the Lacedæmonian or Peloponnesian coasts,—that he should
-forthwith conduct his fleet home, and that if he had made any
-captures subsequent to the exchange of oaths at Sparta, they
-should all be restored;<a id="FNanchor_365" href="#Footnote_365"
-class="fnanchor">[365]</a> so as to prevent the misunderstanding
-which had occurred fifty-two years before with Brasidas,<a
-id="FNanchor_366" href="#Footnote_366" class="fnanchor">[366]</a>
-in the peninsula of Pallênê. The Lacedæmonians on their side sent
-to withdraw their harmosts and their garrisons from every city
-still under occupation. Since they had already made such promise
-once before, at the peace of Antalkidas, but had never performed
-it,—commissioners,<a id="FNanchor_367" href="#Footnote_367"
-class="fnanchor">[367]</a> not Spartans, were now named from the
-general congress, to enforce the execution of the agreement.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">[p. 175]</span></p>
-
-<p>No great haste, however, was probably shown in executing this
-part of the conditions; for the whole soul and sentiment of the
-Spartans were absorbed by their quarrel with Thebes. The miso-Theban
-impulse now drove them on with a fury which overcame all other
-thoughts; and which, though doubtless Agesilaus and others considered
-it at the time as legitimate patriotic resentment for the recent
-insult, appeared to the philo-Laconian Xenophon, when he looked
-back upon it from the subsequent season of Spartan humiliation, to
-be a misguiding inspiration sent by the gods,<a id="FNanchor_368"
-href="#Footnote_368" class="fnanchor">[368]</a>—like that of the
-Homeric Atê. Now that Thebes stood isolated from Athens and all other
-allies out of Bœotia, Agesilaus had full confidence of being able
-to subdue her thoroughly. The same impression of the superiority of
-Spartan force was also entertained both by the Athenians and by other
-Greeks; to a great degree even by the Thebans themselves. It was
-anticipated that the Spartans would break up the city of Thebes into
-villages (as they had done at Mantinea) or perhaps retaliate upon
-her the fate which she had inflicted upon Platæa—or even decimate
-her citizens and her property to the profit of the Delphian god,
-pursuant to the vow that had been taken more than a century before,
-in consequence of the assistance lent by the Thebans to Xerxes.<a
-id="FNanchor_369" href="#Footnote_369" class="fnanchor">[369]</a> Few
-persons out of Bœotia doubted of the success of Sparta.</p>
-
-<p>To attack Thebes, however, an army was wanted; and as Sparta,
-by the peace just sworn, had renounced everything like imperial
-ascendency over her allies, leaving each of them free to send or
-withhold assistance as they chose,—to raise an army was no easy
-task; for the allies, generally speaking, being not at all inflamed
-with the Spartan antipathy against Thebes, desired only to be left
-to enjoy their newly-acquired liberty. But it so happened, that at
-the moment when peace was sworn, the Spartan king Kleombrotus was
-actually at the head of an army, of Lacedæmonians and allies, in
-Phokis, on the north-western frontier of Bœotia. Immediately on
-hearing of the peace, Kleombrotus sent home to ask for instructions
-as to his future proceedings. By the unanimous voice of the Spartan
-authorities and assembly, with Agesilaus as<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_176">[p. 176]</span> the most vehement of all,<a
-id="FNanchor_370" href="#Footnote_370" class="fnanchor">[370]</a> he
-was directed to march against the Thebans, unless they should flinch
-at the last moment (as they had done at the peace of Antalkidas),
-and relinquish their presidency over the other Bœotian cities.
-One citizen alone, named Prothöus, interrupted this unanimity. He
-protested against the order, first, as a violation of their oaths,
-which required them to disband the army and reconstitute it on the
-voluntary principle,—next, as imprudent in regard to the allies,
-who now looked upon such liberty as their right, and would never
-serve with cordiality unless it were granted to them. But Prothöus
-was treated with disdain as a silly alarmist,<a id="FNanchor_371"
-href="#Footnote_371" class="fnanchor">[371]</a> and the peremptory
-order was despatched to Kleombrotus; accompanied, probably, by a
-reinforcement of Spartans and Lacedæmonians, the number of whom, in
-the ensuing battle, seems to have been greater than can reasonably be
-imagined to have been before serving in Phokis.</p>
-
-<p>Meanwhile no symptoms of concession were manifested at Thebes.<a
-id="FNanchor_372" href="#Footnote_372" class="fnanchor">[372]</a>
-Epaminondas, on his return, had found cordial sympathy with the
-resolute tone which he had adopted both in defence of the Bœotian
-federation and against Sparta. Though every one felt the magnitude
-of the danger, it was still hoped that the enemy might be prevented
-from penetrating out of Phokis into Bœotia. Epaminondas accordingly
-occupied with a strong force the narrow pass near Koroneia, lying
-between a spur of Mount Helikon on one side and the Lake Kopaïs on
-the other; the same position as had been taken by the Bœotians, and
-forced by the army returning from Asia under Agesilaus, twenty-three
-years before. Orchomenus lay northward (that is, on the Phokian side)
-of this position; and its citizens, as well as its Lacedæmonian
-garrison, now doubtless formed part of the invading army of
-Kleombrotus. That prince, with a degree of military skill rare in
-the Spartan commanders, baffled all the Theban calculations. Instead
-of march<span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">[p. 177]</span>ing by
-the regular road from Phokis into Bœotia, he turned southward by
-a mountain-road scarcely deemed practicable, defeated the Theban
-division under Chæreas which guarded it, and crossed the ridge of
-Helikon to the Bœotian port of Kreusis on the Crissæan Gulf. Coming
-upon this place by surprise, he stormed it, capturing twelve Theban
-triremes which lay in the harbor. He then left a garrison to occupy
-the port, and marched without delay over the mountainous ground
-into the territory of Thespiæ on the eastern declivity of Helikon;
-where he encamped on the high ground, at a place of ever-memorable
-name, called Leuktra.<a id="FNanchor_373" href="#Footnote_373"
-class="fnanchor">[373]</a></p>
-
-<p>Here was an important success, skilfully gained; not only placing
-Kleombrotus within an easy march of Thebes, but also opening a sure
-communication by sea with Sparta, through the port of Kreusis, and
-thus eluding the difficulties of Mount Kithæron. Both the king
-and the Lacedæmonians around him were full of joy and confidence;
-while the Thebans on their side were struck with dismay as well as
-surprise. It required all the ability of Epaminondas, and all the
-daring of Pelopidas, to uphold the resolution of their countrymen,
-and to explain away or neutralize the terrific signs and portents,
-which a dispirited Greek was sure to see in every accident of the
-road. At length, however, they succeeded in this, and the Thebans
-with their allied Bœotians were marched out from Thebes to Leuktra,
-where they were posted on a declivity opposite to the Spartan camp.
-They were commanded by the seven Bœotarchs, of whom Epaminondas
-was one. But such was the prevalent apprehension of joining battle
-with the Spartans on equal terms, that even when actually on the
-ground, three of these Bœotarchs refused to concur in the order for
-fighting, and proposed to shut themselves up in Thebes for a siege,
-sending their wives and families away to Athens. Epaminondas was
-vainly combatting their determination, when the seventh Bœotarch,
-Branchylides, arrived from the passes of Kithæron, where he had been
-on guard, and was prevailed upon to vote in favor of the bolder
-course. Though a majority was thus secured for fighting, yet the
-feeling throughout the Theban camp was more that of brave despair
-than of cheering hope; a conviction that it was better to perish
-in the field, than to live in exile with the Lacedæmonians<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_178">[p. 178]</span> masters of the
-Kadmeia. Some encouraging omens, however, were transmitted to
-the camp, from the temples in Thebes as well as from that of
-Trophonius at Lebadeia:<a id="FNanchor_374" href="#Footnote_374"
-class="fnanchor">[374]</a> and a Spartan exile named Leandrias,
-serving in the Theban ranks, ventured to assure them that they were
-now on the very spot foredoomed for the overthrow of the Lacedæmonian
-empire. Here stood the tomb of two females (daughters of a Leuktrian
-named Skedasus) who had been violated by two Lacedæmonians and had
-afterwards slain themselves. Skedasus, after having in vain attempted
-to obtain justice from the Spartans for this outrage, came back,
-imprecating curses on them, and slew himself also. The vengeance of
-these departed sufferers would now be sure to pour itself out on
-Sparta, when her army was in their own district and near their own
-tomb. And the Theban leaders, to whom the tale was full of opportune
-encouragement, crowned the tomb with wreaths, invoking the aid of its
-inmates against the common enemy now present.<a id="FNanchor_375"
-href="#Footnote_375" class="fnanchor">[375]</a></p>
-
-<p>While others were thus comforted by the hope of superhuman
-aid, Epaminondas, to whom the order of the coming battle had been
-confided, took care that no human precautions should be wanting.
-His task was arduous; for not only were his troops dispirited,
-while those of the enemy were confident,—but their numbers were
-inferior, and some of the Bœotians present were hardly even<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_179">[p. 179]</span> trustworthy. What
-the exact numbers were on either side, we are not permitted to
-know. Diodorus assigns about six thousand men to the Thebans;
-Plutarch states the numbers of Kleombrotus at eleven thousand.<a
-id="FNanchor_376" href="#Footnote_376" class="fnanchor">[376]</a>
-Without placing faith in these figures, we see good reason for
-believing that the Theban total was decidedly inferior. For such
-inferiority Epaminondas strove to make up by skilful tactics, and
-by a combination at that time novel as well as ingenious. In all
-former Grecian battles, the opposite armies had been drawn up in
-line, and had fought along the whole line; or at least such had
-been the intention of the generals,—and if it was not realized, the
-cause was to be sought in accidents of the ground, or backwardness
-or disorder on the part of some division of the soldiers. Departing
-from this habit, Epaminondas now arrayed his troops so as to bring
-his own left to bear with irresistible force upon the Spartan right,
-and to keep back the rest of his army comparatively out of action.
-Knowing that Kleombrotus, with the Spartans and all the official
-persons, would be on the right of their own line, he calculated that,
-if successful on this point against the best troops, he should find
-little resistance from the remainder. Accordingly he placed on his
-own left wing chosen Theban hoplites, to the prodigious depth of
-fifty shields, with Pelopidas and the Sacred Band in front. His order
-of advance was disposed obliquely or in echelon, so that the deep
-column on the left should join battle first, while the centre and
-right kept comparatively back and held themselves more in a defensive
-attitude.</p>
-
-<p>In 371 <small>B.C.</small>, such a combination was absolutely
-new, and betokened high military genius. It is therefore no disgrace
-to Kleombrotus that he was not prepared for it, and that he adhered
-to the ordinary Grecian tactics of joining battle at once along
-the whole line. But so unbounded was the confidence reigning among
-the Spartans, that there never was any occasion on which peculiar
-precautions were less thought of. When, from their entrenched camp
-on the Leuktrian eminence, they saw the Thebans encamped on an
-opposite eminence, separated from them by a small breadth of low
-ground and moderate declivities,—their only impatience was to hurry
-on the decisive moment, so as to prevent the enemy from escaping.
-Both the partisans and the opponents of Kleom<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_180">[p. 180]</span>brotus united in provoking the order
-for battle, each in their own language. The former urged him, since
-he had never yet done anything against the Thebans, to strike a
-blow, and clear himself from the disparaging comparisons which rumor
-instituted between him and Agesilaus; the latter gave it to be
-understood, that if Kleombrotus were now backward, their suspicions
-would be confirmed that he leaned in his heart towards the Thebans.<a
-id="FNanchor_377" href="#Footnote_377" class="fnanchor">[377]</a>
-Probably the king was himself sufficiently eager to fight, and
-so would any other Spartan general have been, under the same
-circumstances, before the battle of Leuktra. But even had he been
-otherwise, the impatience, prevalent among the Lacedæmonian portion
-of his army, left him no option. Accordingly, the decided resolution
-to fight was taken. The last council was held, and the final orders
-issued by Kleombrotus, after his morning meal, where copious
-libations of wine both attested and increased the confident temper
-of every man. The army was marched out of the camp, and arrayed on
-the lower portion of the declivity; Kleombrotus with the Spartans and
-most of the Lacedæmonians being on the right, in an order of twelve
-deep. Some Lacedæmonians were also on the left, but respecting the
-order of the other parts of the line, we have no information. The
-cavalry was chiefly posted along the front.</p>
-
-<p>Meanwhile, Epaminondas also marched down his declivity, in his
-own chosen order of battle: his left wing being both forward,
-and strengthened into very deep order, for desperate attack.
-His cavalry too were posted in front of his line. But before he
-commenced his march, he sent away his baggage and attendants home
-to Thebes; while at the same time he made proclamation that any of
-his Bœotian hoplites, who were not hearty in the cause, might also
-retire, if they chose. Of such permission the Thespians immediately
-availed themselves;<a id="FNanchor_378" href="#Footnote_378"
-class="fnanchor">[378]</a> so many were there, in the Theban camp,
-who estimated the chances to be all in favor of Lacedæmonian victory.
-But when these men, a large portion of them unarmed, were seen
-retiring, a considerable detachment from the army of Kleombrotus,
-either with or without orders, ran after to prevent their escape,
-and forced them to return for safety to the<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_181">[p. 181]</span> main Theban army. The most zealous
-among the allies of Sparta present,—the Phokians, the Phliasians, and
-the Herakleots, together with a body of mercenaries,—executed this
-movement; which seems to have weakened the Lacedæmonians in the main
-battle, without doing any mischief to the Thebans.</p>
-
-<p>The cavalry first engaged, in front of both lines; and here the
-superiority of the Thebans soon became manifest. The Lacedæmonian
-cavalry,—at no time very good, but at this moment unusually bad,
-composed of raw and feeble novices, mounted on horses provided by
-the rich,—was soon broken and driven back upon the infantry, whose
-ranks were disturbed by the fugitives. To reëstablish the battle,
-Kleombrotus gave the word for the infantry to advance, himself
-personally leading the right. The victorious Theban cavalry probably
-hung upon the Lacedæmonian infantry of the centre and left, and
-prevented them from making much forward movement; while Epaminondas
-and Pelopidas with their left, advanced according to their intention
-to bear down Kleombrotus and his right wing. The shock here was
-terrible; on both sides victory was resolutely and desperately
-disputed, in a close hand-combat, with pushing of opposite shields
-and opposite masses. But such was the overwhelming force of the
-Theban charge,—with the sacred band or chosen warriors in front,
-composed of men highly trained in the palæstra,<a id="FNanchor_379"
-href="#Footnote_379" class="fnanchor">[379]</a> and the deep column
-of fifty shields propelling behind,—that even the Spartans, with
-all their courage, obstinacy, and discipline, were unable to stand
-up against it. Kleombrotus, himself either in or near the front,
-was mortally wounded, apparently early in the battle; and it was
-only by heroic and unexampled efforts, on the part of his comrades
-around, that he was carried off yet alive, so as to preserve him from
-falling into the hands of the enemy. Around him also fell the most
-eminent members of the Spartan official staff; Deinon the polemarch,
-Sphodrias, with his son Kleonymus, and several others. After an
-obstinate resistance and a fearful slaughter, the right wing of the
-Spartans was completely beaten, and driven back to their camp on the
-higher ground.</p>
-
-<p>It was upon this Spartan right wing, where the Theban left was
-irresistibly strong, that all the stress of the battle fell,—as<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_182">[p. 182]</span> Epaminondas had
-intended that it should. In no other part of the line does there
-appear to have been any serious fighting; partly through his
-deliberate scheme of not pushing forward either his centre or
-his right,—partly through the preliminary victory of the Theban
-cavalry, which probably checked a part of the forward march of
-the enemy’s line,—and partly also through the lukewarm adherence,
-or even suppressed hostility, of the allies marshalled under the
-command of Kleombrotus.<a id="FNanchor_380" href="#Footnote_380"
-class="fnanchor">[380]</a> The Phokians and Herakleots,—zealous in
-the cause from hatred of Thebes,—had quitted the line to strike a
-blow at the retiring baggage and attendants; while the remaining
-allies, after mere nominal fighting and little or no loss, retired
-to the camp as soon as they saw the Spartan right defeated and
-driven back to it. Moreover, even some Lacedæmonians on the left
-wing, probably astounded by the lukewarmness of those around them,
-and by the unexpected calamity on their own right, fell back in
-the same manner. The whole Lacedæmonian force, with the dying
-king, was thus again assembled and formed behind the entrenchment
-on the higher ground, where the victorious Thebans did not
-attempt to molest them.<a id="FNanchor_381" href="#Footnote_381"
-class="fnanchor">[381]</a></p>
-
-<p>But very different were their feelings as they now stood arrayed
-in the camp, from that exulting boastfulness with which they
-had quitted it an hour or two before; and fearful was the loss
-when it came to be verified. Of seven hundred Spartans who had
-marched forth from the camp, only three hundred returned to it.<a
-id="FNanchor_382" href="#Footnote_382" class="fnanchor">[382]</a> One
-thousand Lacedæmonians, besides, had been left on the field, even
-by the admission of Xenophon; probably the real number was<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_183">[p. 183]</span> even larger. Apart from
-this, the death of Kleombrotus was of itself an event impressive to
-every one, the like of which had never occurred since the fatal day
-of Thermopylæ. But this was not all. The allies who stood alongside
-of them in arms were now altered men. All were sick of their cause,
-and averse to farther exertion; some scarcely concealed a positive
-satisfaction at the defeat. And when the surviving polemarchs, now
-commanders, took counsel with the principal officers as to the steps
-proper in the emergency, there were a few, but very few, Spartans
-who pressed for renewal of the battle, and for recovering by force
-their slain brethren in the field, or perishing in the attempt.
-All the rest felt like beaten men; so that the polemarchs, giving
-effect to the general sentiment, sent a herald to solicit the regular
-truce for burial of their dead. This the Thebans granted, after
-erecting their own trophy.<a id="FNanchor_383" href="#Footnote_383"
-class="fnanchor">[383]</a> But Epaminondas, aware that the Spartans
-would practise every stratagem to conceal the magnitude of their
-losses, coupled the grant with a condition that the allies should
-bury their dead first. It was found that the allies had scarce
-any dead to pick up, and that nearly every slain warrior on the
-field was a Lacedæmonian.<a id="FNanchor_384" href="#Footnote_384"
-class="fnanchor">[384]</a> And thus the Theban general, while he
-placed the loss beyond possibility of concealment, proclaimed
-at the same time such public evidence of Spartan courage, as to
-rescue the misfortune of Leuktra from all aggravation on the score
-of dishonor. What the Theban loss was, Xenophon does not tell
-us. Pausanias states it at forty-seven men,<a id="FNanchor_385"
-href="#Footnote_385" class="fnanchor">[385]</a> Diodorus at three
-hundred. The former number is preposterously small, and even the
-latter is doubtless under the truth; for a victory in close fight,
-over soldiers like the Spartans, must have been dearly purchased.
-Though the bodies of the Spartans were given up to burial, their arms
-were retained; and the shields of the principal officers were seen by
-the traveller Pausanias at Thebes five hundred years afterwards.<a
-id="FNanchor_386" href="#Footnote_386" class="fnanchor">[386]</a></p>
-
-<p>Twenty days only had elapsed, from the time when Epaminondas
-quitted Sparta after Thebes had been excluded from the general
-peace, to the day when he stood victorious on the field of<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_184">[p. 184]</span> Leuktra.<a
-id="FNanchor_387" href="#Footnote_387" class="fnanchor">[387]</a>
-The event came like a thunderclap upon every one in Greece, upon
-victors as well as vanquished,—upon allies and neutrals, near
-and distant, alike. The general expectation had been that Thebes
-would be speedily overthrown and dismantled; instead of which, not
-only she had escaped, but had inflicted a crushing blow on the
-military majesty of Sparta. It is in vain that Xenophon,—whose
-account of the battle is obscure, partial, and imprinted with that
-chagrin which the event occasioned to him,<a id="FNanchor_388"
-href="#Footnote_388" class="fnanchor">[388]</a>—ascribes the defeat
-to untoward accidents,<a id="FNanchor_389" href="#Footnote_389"
-class="fnanchor">[389]</a> or to the rashness and convivial
-carelessness of Kleombrotus; upon whose generalship Agesilaus and
-his party at Sparta did not scruple to cast ungenerous reproach,<a
-id="FNanchor_390" href="#Footnote_390" class="fnanchor">[390]</a>
-while others faintly exculpated him by saying that he had fought
-contrary to his better judgment, under<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_185">[p. 185]</span> fear of unpopularity. Such criticisms,
-coming from men wise after the fact, and consoling themselves for
-the public calamity by censuring the unfortunate commander, will
-not stand examination. Kleombrotus represented on this occasion the
-feeling universal among his countrymen. He was ordered to march
-against Thebes with the full belief, entertained by Agesilaus and all
-the Spartan leaders, that her unassisted force could not resist him.
-To fight the Thebans on open ground was exactly what he and every
-other Spartan desired. While his manner of forcing the entrance of
-Bœotia, and his capture of Kreusis, was a creditable manœuvre, he
-seems to have arranged his order of battle in the manner usual with
-Grecian generals at the time. There appears no reason to censure
-his generalship, except in so far as he was unable to divine,—what
-no one else divined,—the superior combinations of his adversary,
-then for the first time applied to practice. To the discredit of
-Xenophon, Epaminondas is never named in his narrative of the battle,
-though he recognizes in substance that the battle was decided by
-the irresistible Theban force brought to bear upon one point of
-the enemy’s phalanx; a fact which both Plutarch and Diodorus<a
-id="FNanchor_391" href="#Footnote_391" class="fnanchor">[391]</a>
-expressly refer to the genius of the general. All the calculations
-of Epaminondas turned out successful. The bravery of the Thebans,
-cavalry as well as infantry, seconded by the training which they had
-received during the last few years, was found sufficient to carry
-his plans into full execution. To this circumstance, principally,
-was owing the great revolution of opinion throughout Greece which
-followed the battle. Every one felt that a new military power had
-arisen, and that the Theban training, under the generalship of
-Epaminondas, had proved itself more than a match on a fair field,
-with shield and spear, and with numbers on the whole inferior,—for
-the ancient Lykurgean discipline; which last had hitherto stood
-without a parallel as turning out artists and craftsmen in war,
-against mere citizens in the opposite ranks, armed but without
-the like training.<a id="FNanchor_392" href="#Footnote_392"
-class="fnanchor">[392]</a> Essentially stationary and old-fashioned,
-the Lykurgean discipline was now<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_186">[p. 186]</span> overborne by the progressive military
-improvement of other states, handled by a preëminent tactician;
-a misfortune predicted by the Corinthians<a id="FNanchor_393"
-href="#Footnote_393" class="fnanchor">[393]</a> at Sparta sixty years
-before, and now realised, to the conviction of all Greece, on the
-field of Leuktra.</p>
-
-<p>But if the Spartan system was thus invaded and overpassed in its
-privilege of training soldiers, there was another species of teaching
-wherein it neither was nor could be overpassed,—the hard lesson of
-enduring pain and suppressing emotion. Memorable indeed was the
-manner in which the news of this fatal catastrophe was received at
-Sparta. To prepare the reader by an appropriate contrast, we may
-turn to the manifestation at Athens twenty-seven years before, when
-the trireme called Paralus arrived from Ægospotami, bearing tidings
-of the capture of the entire Athenian fleet. “The moan of distress
-(says the historian)<a id="FNanchor_394" href="#Footnote_394"
-class="fnanchor">[394]</a> reached all up the Long Walls from Peiræus
-to Athens, as each man communicated the news to his neighbor: on that
-night, not a man slept, from bewailing for his lost fellow-citizens
-and for his own impending ruin.” Not such was the scene at Sparta,
-when the messenger arrived from the field of Leuktra, although there
-was everything calculated to render the shock violent. For not only
-was the defeat calamitous and humiliating beyond all former parallel,
-but it came at a moment when every man reckoned on victory. As soon
-as Kleombrotus, having forced his way into Bœotia, saw the unassisted
-Thebans on plain ground before him, no Spartan entertained any doubt
-of the result. Under this state of feeling, a messenger arrived
-with the astounding revelation, that the army was totally defeated,
-with the loss of the king, of four hundred Spartans, and more than
-a thousand Lacedæmonians; and that defeat stood confessed by having
-solicited the truce for interment of the slain. At the moment when
-he arrived, the festival called the Gymnopædia<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_187">[p. 187]</span> was actually being celebrated, on
-its last day; and the chorus of grown men was going through its
-usual solemnity in the theatre. In spite of all the poignancy of
-the intelligence, the ephors would not permit the solemnity to be
-either interrupted or abridged. “<i>Of necessity, I suppose, they were
-grieved</i>,—but they went through the whole as if nothing had happened,
-only communicating the names of the slain to their relations, and
-issuing a general order to the women, to make no noise or wailing,
-but to bear the misfortune in silence.” That such an order should
-be issued, is sufficiently remarkable; that it should be issued and
-obeyed, is what could not be expected; that it should not only be
-issued and obeyed, but overpassed, is what no man could believe, if
-it were not expressly attested by the contemporary historian. “On
-the morrow (says he) you might see those whose relations had been
-slain, walking about in public with bright and cheerful countenances;
-but of those whose relatives survived, scarce one showed himself;
-and the few who were abroad, looked mournful and humbled.”<a
-id="FNanchor_395" href="#Footnote_395" class="fnanchor">[395]</a></p>
-
-<p>In comparing this extraordinary self-constraint and obedience to
-orders, at Sparta, under the most trying circumstances,—with the
-sensitive and demonstrative temper, and spontaneous outburst of
-feeling at Athens, so much more nearly approaching to the Homeric
-type of Greeks,—we must at the same time remark, that in reference
-to active and heroic efforts for the purpose of repairing past
-calamities and making head against preponderant odds, the Athenians
-were decidedly the better of the two. I have al<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_188">[p. 188]</span>ready recounted the prodigious and
-unexpected energy displayed by Athens, after the ruinous loss of
-her two armaments before Syracuse, when no one expected that she
-could have held out for six months: I am now about to recount the
-proceedings of Sparta, after the calamity at Leuktra,—a calamity
-great and serious indeed, yet in positive amount inferior to what
-had befallen the Athenians at Syracuse. The reader will find that,
-looking to the intensity of active effort in both cases, the
-comparison is all to the advantage of Athens; excusing at least,
-if not justifying, the boast of Perikles<a id="FNanchor_396"
-href="#Footnote_396" class="fnanchor">[396]</a> in his memorable
-funeral harangue,—that his countrymen, without the rigorous drill
-of Spartans, were yet found noway inferior to Spartans in daring
-exertion, when the hour of actual trial arrived.</p>
-
-<p>It was the first obligation of the ephors to provide for the
-safety of their defeated army in Bœotia; for which purpose they
-put in march nearly the whole remaining force of Sparta. Of the
-Lacedæmonian moræ, or military divisions (seemingly six in the
-aggregate), two or three had been sent with Kleombrotus; all the
-remainder were now despatched, even including elderly citizens up
-to near sixty years of age, and all who had been left behind in
-consequence of other public offices. Archidamus took the command
-(Agesilaus still continuing to be disabled), and employed himself
-in getting together the aid promised from Tegea,—from the villages
-representing the disintegrated Mantinea,—from Corinth, Sikyon,
-Phlius, and Achaia; all these places being still under the same
-oligarchies which had held them under Lacedæmonian patronage, and
-still adhering to Sparta. Triremes were equipped at Corinth, as
-a means of transporting the new army across to Kreusis, and thus
-joining the defeated troops at Leuktra; the port of Kreusis, the
-recent acquisition of Kleombrotus, being now found inestimable,
-as the only means of access into Bœotia.<a id="FNanchor_397"
-href="#Footnote_397" class="fnanchor">[397]</a></p>
-
-<p>Meanwhile the defeated army still continued in its entrenched camp
-at Leuktra, where the Thebans were at first in no hurry to disturb
-it. Besides that this was a very arduous enterprise, even after the
-recent victory,—we must recollect the actual feeling of the Thebans
-themselves, upon whom their own victory had come by surprise, at
-a moment when they were animated more by <span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_189">[p. 189]</span>despair than by hope. They were
-doubtless absorbed in the intoxicating triumph and exultation of
-the moment, with the embraces and felicitations of their families
-in Thebes, rescued from impending destruction by their valor. Like
-the Syracusans after their last great victory<a id="FNanchor_398"
-href="#Footnote_398" class="fnanchor">[398]</a> over the Athenian
-fleet in the Great Harbor, they probably required an interval to give
-loose to their feelings of ecstasy, before they would resume action.
-Epaminondas and the other leaders, aware how much the value of Theban
-alliance was now enhanced, endeavored to obtain reinforcement from
-without, before they proceeded to follow up the blow. To Athens they
-sent a herald, crowned with wreaths of triumph, proclaiming their
-recent victory. They invited the Athenians to employ the present
-opportunity for taking full revenge on Sparta, by joining their hands
-with those of Thebes. But the sympathies of the Athenians were now
-rather hostile than friendly to Thebes, besides that they had sworn
-peace with Sparta, not a month before. The Senate, who were assembled
-in the acropolis when the herald arrived, heard his news with evident
-chagrin, and dismissed him without even a word of courtesy; while
-the unfortunate Platæans, who were doubtless waiting in the city in
-expectation of the victory of Kleombrotus, and of their own speedy
-reëstablishment, found themselves again struck down and doomed to
-indefinite exile.</p>
-
-<p>To Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly, another Theban herald was sent for
-the same purpose, and very differently received. The despot sent back
-word that he would come forthwith by sea, and ordered triremes to be
-equipped for the purpose. But this was a mere deception; for at the
-same time, he collected the mercenaries and cavalry immediately near
-to him, and began his march by land. So rapid were his movements,
-that he forestalled all opposition,—though he had to traverse the
-territory of the Herakleots and Phokians, who were his bitter
-enemies,—and joined the Thebans safely in Bœotia.<a id="FNanchor_399"
-href="#Footnote_399" class="fnanchor">[399]</a> But when the Theban
-leaders proposed that he should attack the Lacedæmonian camp in
-flank, from the high ground, while they would march straight up
-the hill and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">[p. 190]</span>
-attack it in front,—Jason strongly dissuaded the enterprise as too
-perilous; recommending that they should permit the enemy’s departure
-under capitulation. “Be content (said he) with the great victory
-which you have already gained. Do not compromise it by attempting
-something yet more hazardous, against Lacedæmonians driven to despair
-in their camp. Recollect that a few days ago, <i>you</i> yourselves were
-in despair, and that your recent victory is the fruit of that very
-feeling. Remember that the gods take pleasure in bringing about these
-sudden changes of fortune.”<a id="FNanchor_400" href="#Footnote_400"
-class="fnanchor">[400]</a> Having by such representations convinced
-the Thebans, he addressed a friendly message to the Lacedæmonians,
-reminding them of their dangerous position, as well as of the little
-trust to be reposed in their allies,—and offering himself as mediator
-to negotiate for their safe retreat. Their acquiescence was readily
-given; and at his instance, a truce was agreed to by both parties,
-assuring to the Lacedæmonians the liberty of quitting Bœotia. In
-spite of the agreement, however, the Lacedæmonian commander placed
-little faith either in the Thebans or in Jason, apprehending a fraud
-for the purpose of inducing him to quit the camp and of attacking him
-on the march. Accordingly, he issued public orders in the camp for
-every man to be ready for departure after the evening meal, and to
-march in the night to Kithæron, with a view of passing that mountain
-on the next morning. Having put the enemy on this false scent, he
-directed his real night-march by a different and not very easy way,
-first to Kreusis, next to Ægosthena in the Megarian territory.<a
-id="FNanchor_401" href="#Footnote_401" class="fnanchor">[401]</a>
-The Thebans offered no opposition; nor is<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_191">[p. 191]</span> it at all probable that they intended
-any fraud, considering that Jason was here the guarantee, and that he
-had at least no motive to break his word.</p>
-
-<p>It was at Ægosthena that the retreating Lacedæmonians met
-Archidamus, who had advanced to that point with the Laconian
-forces, and was awaiting the junction of his Peloponnesian allies.
-The purpose of his march being now completed, he advanced no
-farther. The armament was disbanded, and Lacedæmonians as well as
-allies returned home.<a id="FNanchor_402" href="#Footnote_402"
-class="fnanchor">[402]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_192">[p. 192]</span></p> <p>In all communities, the return
-of so many defeated soldiers, liberated under a capitulation by the
-enemy, would have been a scene of mourning. But in Sparta it was
-pregnant with grave and dangerous consequences. So terrible was the
-scorn and ignominy heaped upon the Spartan citizen who survived a
-defeat, that life became utterly intolerable to him. The mere fact
-sufficed for his condemnation, without any inquiry into justifying
-or extenuating circumstances. No citizen at home would speak to him,
-or be seen consorting with him in tent, game, or chorus; no other
-family would intermarry with his; if he was seen walking about with
-an air of cheerfulness, he was struck and ill-used by the passers-by,
-until he assumed that visible humility which was supposed to become
-his degraded position. Such rigorous treatment (which we learn from
-the panegyrist Xenophon)<a id="FNanchor_403" href="#Footnote_403"
-class="fnanchor">[403]</a> helps to explain the satisfaction of the
-Spartan father and mother, when they learned that their son was among
-the slain and not among the survivors. Defeat of Spartan troops had
-hitherto been rare. But in the case of the prisoners at Sphakteria,
-when released from captivity and brought back to a degraded existence
-at Sparta, some uneasiness had been felt, and some precautions deemed
-necessary to prevent them from becoming dangerous malcontents.<a
-id="FNanchor_404" href="#Footnote_404" class="fnanchor">[404]</a>
-Here was another<span class="pagenum" id="Page_193">[p. 193]</span>
-case yet more formidable. The vanquished returning from Leuktra
-were numerous, while the severe loss sustained in the battle amply
-attested their bravery. Aware of the danger of enforcing against them
-the established custom, the ephors referred the case to Agesilaus;
-who proposed that for that time and case the customary penalties
-should be allowed to sleep; but should be revived afterwards and
-come into force as before. Such was the step accordingly taken;<a
-id="FNanchor_405" href="#Footnote_405" class="fnanchor">[405]</a>
-so that the survivors from this fatal battle-field were enabled to
-mingle with the remaining citizens without dishonor or degradation.
-The step was indeed doubly necessary, considering the small aggregate
-number of fully qualified citizens; which number always tended to
-decline,—from the nature of the Spartan political franchise combined
-with the exigencies of Spartan training,<a id="FNanchor_406"
-href="#Footnote_406" class="fnanchor">[406]</a>—and could not bear
-even so great a diminution as that of the four hundred slain at
-Leuktra. “Sparta (says Aristotle) could not stand up against a single
-defeat, but was ruined through the small number of her citizens.”<a
-id="FNanchor_407" href="#Footnote_407" class="fnanchor">[407]</a></p>
-
-<p>The cause here adverted to by Aristotle, as explaining the utter
-loss of ascendency abroad, and the capital diminution both of power
-and of inviolability at home, which will now be found to come thick
-upon Sparta, was undoubtedly real and important. But a fact still
-more important was, the alteration of opinion produced everywhere
-in Greece with regard to Sparta, by the sudden shock of the battle
-of Leuktra. All the prestige and old associations connected with
-her long-established power vanished; while the hostility and
-fears, inspired both by herself and by her partisans, but hitherto
-reluctantly held back in silence,—now burst forth into open
-manifestation.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">[p. 194]</span></p>
-
-<p>The ascendency, exercised down to this time by Sparta north of
-the Corinthian Gulf, in Phokis and elsewhere, passed away from her,
-and became divided between the victorious Thebans and Jason of
-Pheræ. The Thebans, and the Bœotian confederates who were now in
-cordial sympathy with them, excited to enthusiasm by their recent
-success, were eager for fresh glories, and readily submitted to
-the full exigencies of military training; while under a leader
-like Epaminondas, their ardor was turned to such good account,
-that they became better soldiers every month.<a id="FNanchor_408"
-href="#Footnote_408" class="fnanchor">[408]</a> The Phokians, unable
-to defend themselves single-handed, were glad to come under the
-protection of the Thebans, as less bitterly hostile to them than
-the Thessalian Jason,—and concluded with them obligations of mutual
-defence and alliance.<a id="FNanchor_409" href="#Footnote_409"
-class="fnanchor">[409]</a> The cities of Eubœa, together with the
-Lokrians (both Epiknemidian and Opuntian,) the Malians and the
-town of Heraklea, followed the example. The latter town was now
-defenceless; for Jason, in returning from Bœotia to Thessaly,
-had assaulted it and destroyed its fortifications; since by its
-important site near the pass of Thermopylæ, it might easily be
-held as a position to bar his entrance into Southern Greece.<a
-id="FNanchor_410" href="#Footnote_410" class="fnanchor">[410]</a> The
-Bœotian town of Orchomenus, which had held with the Lacedæmonians
-even until the late battle, was now quite defenceless; and the
-Thebans, highly exasperated against its inhabitants, were disposed
-to destroy the city, reducing the inhabitants to slavery. Severe
-as this proposition was, it would not have exceeded the customary
-rigors of war, nor even what might have befallen Thebes herself,
-had Kleombrotus been victorious at Leuktra. But the strenuous
-remonstrance of Epaminondas prevented it from being carried into
-execution. Alike distinguished for mild temper and for long-sighted
-views, he reminded his countrymen that in their present aspiring
-hopes towards ascendency in Greece, it was essential to establish
-a character for moderation of dealing<a id="FNanchor_411"
-href="#Footnote_411" class="fnanchor">[411]</a> not inferior to their
-military courage, as attested by the recent victory. Accordingly,
-the Orchomenians were par<span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">[p.
-195]</span>doned upon submission, and re-admitted as members of the
-Bœotian confederacy. To the Thespians, however, the same lenity was
-not extended. They were expelled from Bœotia, and their territory
-annexed to Thebes. It will be recollected, that immediately before
-the battle of Leuktra, when Epaminondas caused proclamation to be
-made that such of the Bœotians as were disaffected to the Theban
-cause might march away, the Thespians had availed themselves of the
-permission and departed.<a id="FNanchor_412" href="#Footnote_412"
-class="fnanchor">[412]</a> The fugitive Thespians found shelter, like
-the Platæans, at Athens.<a id="FNanchor_413" href="#Footnote_413"
-class="fnanchor">[413]</a></p>
-
-<p>While Thebes was commemorating her recent victory by the erection
-of a treasury chamber,<a id="FNanchor_414" href="#Footnote_414"
-class="fnanchor">[414]</a> and the dedication of pious offerings at
-Delphi,—while the military organization of Bœotia was receiving such
-marked improvement, and the cluster of dependent states attached
-to Thebes was thus becoming larger, under the able management of
-Epaminondas,—Jason in Thessaly was also growing more powerful every
-day. He was tagus of all Thessaly; with its tributary neighbors
-under complete obedience,—with Macedonia partly dependent on
-him,—and with a mercenary force, well paid and trained, greater
-than had ever been assembled in Greece. By dismantling Heraklea,
-in his return home from Bœotia, he had laid open the strait of
-Thermopylæ, so as to be sure of access into southern Greece whenever
-he chose. His personal ability and ambition, combined with his great
-power, inspired universal alarm; for no man knew whither he would
-direct his arms; whether to Asia, against the Persian king, as he
-was fond of boasting,<a id="FNanchor_415" href="#Footnote_415"
-class="fnanchor">[415]</a>—or northward against the cities in
-Chalkidikê—or southward against Greece.</p>
-
-<p>The last-mentioned plan seemed the most probable, at the
-beginning of 370 <small>B.C.</small>, half a year after the
-battle of Leuktra: for Jason proclaimed distinctly his intention
-of being present at the Pythian festival (the season for which
-was about August 1, 370 <small>B.C.</small>, near Delphi), not
-only with splendid presents and sacrifices to Apollo, but also
-at the head of a numerous army. Orders had<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_196">[p. 196]</span> been given that his troops should
-hold themselves ready for military service,<a id="FNanchor_416"
-href="#Footnote_416" class="fnanchor">[416]</a>—about the time when
-the festival was to be celebrated; and requisitions had been sent
-round, demanding from all his tributaries victims for the Pythian
-sacrifice, to a total of not less than one thousand bulls, and ten
-thousand sheep, goats, and swine; besides a prize-bull to take
-the lead in the procession, for which a wreath of gold was to be
-given. Never before had such honor been done to the god; for those
-who came to offer sacrifice were usually content with one or more
-beasts bred on the neighboring plain of Kirrha.<a id="FNanchor_417"
-href="#Footnote_417" class="fnanchor">[417]</a> We must recollect,
-however, that this Pythian festival of 370 <small>B.C.</small>
-occurred under peculiar circumstances; for the two previous festivals
-in 374 <small>B.C.</small> and 378 <small>B.C.</small> must have been
-comparatively unfrequented; in consequence of the war between Sparta
-and her allies on one side, and Athens and Thebes on the other,—and
-also of the occupation of Phokis by Kleombrotus. Hence the festival
-of 370 <small>B.C.</small>, following immediately after the peace,
-appeared to justify an extraordinary burst of pious magnificence, to
-make up for the niggardly tributes to the god during the two former;
-while the hostile dispositions of the Phokians would be alleged as an
-excuse for the military force intended to accompany Jason.</p>
-
-<p>But there were other intentions, generally believed though not
-formally announced, which no Greek could imagine without uneasiness.
-It was affirmed that Jason was about to arrogate to himself the
-presidency and celebration of the festival, which belonged<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_197">[p. 197]</span> of right to the
-Amphiktyonic assembly. It was feared, moreover, that he would lay
-hands on the rich treasures of the Delphian temple; a scheme said
-to have been conceived by the Syracusan despot Dionysius fifteen
-years before, in conjunction with the epirot Alketas, who was now
-dependent upon Jason.<a id="FNanchor_418" href="#Footnote_418"
-class="fnanchor">[418]</a> As there were no visible means of warding
-off this blow, the Delphians consulted the god to know what they
-were to do if Jason approached the treasury; upon which the god
-replied, that he would himself take care of it,—and he kept his
-word. This enterprising despot, in the flower of his age and at
-the summit of his power, perished most unexpectedly before the day
-of the festival arrived.<a id="FNanchor_419" href="#Footnote_419"
-class="fnanchor">[419]</a> He had been reviewing his cavalry near
-Pheræ, and was sitting to receive and answer petitioners, when seven
-young men approached, apparently in hot dispute with each other, and
-appealing to him for a settlement. As soon as they got near, they
-set upon him and slew him.<a id="FNanchor_420" href="#Footnote_420"
-class="fnanchor">[420]</a> One was killed on the spot by the guards,
-and another also as he was mounting on horseback; but the remaining
-five contrived to reach horses ready prepared for them and to gallop
-away out of the reach of pursuit. In most of the Grecian cities
-which these fugitives visited, they were received with distinguished
-honor, as having relieved the Grecian world from one who inspired
-universal alarm,<a id="FNanchor_421" href="#Footnote_421"
-class="fnanchor">[421]</a> now that Sparta was unable to resist him,
-while no other power had as yet taken her place.</p>
-
-<p>Jason was succeeded in his dignity, but neither in his
-power,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_198">[p. 198]</span> nor
-ability, by two brothers,—Polyphron and Polydorus. Had he lived
-longer, he would have influenced most seriously the subsequent
-destinies of Greece. What else he would have done, we cannot say; but
-he would have interfered materially with the development of Theban
-power. Thebes was a great gainer by his death, though perfectly
-innocent of it, and though in alliance with him to the last; insomuch
-that his widow went to reside there for security.<a id="FNanchor_422"
-href="#Footnote_422" class="fnanchor">[422]</a> Epaminondas was
-relieved from a most formidable rival, while the body of Theban
-allies north of Bœotia became much more dependent than they would
-have remained, if there had been a competing power like that of Jason
-in Thessaly. The treasures of the god were preserved a few years
-longer, to be rifled by another hand.</p>
-
-<p>While these proceedings were going on in Northern Greece, during
-the months immediately succeeding the battle of Leuktra, events
-not less serious and stirring had occurred in Peloponnesus. The
-treaty sworn at Sparta twenty days before that battle, bound the
-Lacedæmonians to disband their forces, remove all their harmosts and
-garrisons, and leave every subordinate city to its own liberty of
-action. As they did not scruple to violate the treaty by the orders
-sent to Kleombrotus, so they probably were not zealous in executing
-the remaining conditions; though officers were named, for the express
-purpose of going round to see that the evacuation of the cities was
-really carried into effect.<a id="FNanchor_423" href="#Footnote_423"
-class="fnanchor">[423]</a> But it probably was not accomplished in
-twenty days; nor would it perhaps have been ever more than nominally
-accomplished, if Kleombrotus had been successful in Bœotia. But
-after these twenty days came the portentous intelligence of the
-fate of that prince and his army. The invincible arm of Sparta
-was broken; she had not a man to spare for the maintenance of
-foreign ascendency. Her harmosts disappeared at once, (as they had
-disappeared from the Asiatic and insular cities twenty-three years
-before, immediately after the battle of Knidus,<a id="FNanchor_424"
-href="#Footnote_424" class="fnanchor">[424]</a>) and returned home.
-Nor was this all. The Lacedæmonian ascendency had been maintained
-everywhere by local oligarchies or dekarchies, which had been for
-the most part violent and oppressive. Against these governments, now
-deprived<span class="pagenum" id="Page_199">[p. 199]</span> of their
-foreign support, the long-accumulated flood of internal discontent
-burst with irresistible force, stimulated probably by returning
-exiles. Their past misgovernment was avenged by severe sentences
-and proscription, to the length of great reactionary injustice;
-and the parties banished by this anti-Spartan revolution became so
-numerous, as to harass and alarm seriously the newly-established
-governments. Such were the commotions which, during the latter half
-of 371 <small>B.C.</small>, disturbed many of the Peloponnesian
-towns,—Phigaleia, Phlius, Corinth, Sikyon, Megara, etc., though
-with great local difference, both of detail and of result.<a
-id="FNanchor_425" href="#Footnote_425" class="fnanchor">[425]</a></p>
-
-<p>But the city where intestine commotion took place in its most
-violent form was Argos. We do not know how this fact was con<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_200">[p. 200]</span>nected with the general
-state of Grecian politics at the time, for Argos had not been in any
-way subject to Sparta, nor a member of the Spartan confederacy, nor
-(so far as we know) concerned in the recent war, since the peace
-of Antalkidas in 387 <small>B.C.</small> The Argeian government
-was a democracy, and the popular leaders were vehement in their
-denunciations against the oligarchical opposition party—who were men
-of wealth and great family position. These last, thus denounced,
-formed a conspiracy for the forcible overthrow of the government.
-But the conspiracy was discovered prior to execution, and some of
-the suspected conspirators were interrogated under the torture, to
-make them reveal their accomplices; under which interrogation one
-of them deposed against thirty conspicuous citizens. The people,
-after a hasty trial, put these thirty men to death, and confiscated
-their property, while others slew themselves to escape the same
-fate. So furious did the fear and wrath of the people become,
-exasperated by the popular leaders, that they continued their
-executions until they had put to death twelve hundred (or, as some
-say, fifteen hundred) of the principal citizens. At length the
-popular leaders became themselves tired and afraid of what they had
-done; upon which the people were animated to fury against them, and
-put them to death also.<a id="FNanchor_426" href="#Footnote_426"
-class="fnanchor">[426]</a></p>
-
-<p>This gloomy series of events was termed the Skytalism, or
-Cudgelling, from the instrument (as we are told) by which these
-multiplied executions were consummated; though the name seems more
-to indicate an impetuous popular insurrection than deliberate
-executions. We know the facts too imperfectly to be able to infer
-anything more than the brutal working of angry political passion
-amidst a population like that of Argos or Korkyra, where there
-was not (as at Athens) either a taste for speech, or the habit
-of being guided by speech, and of hearing both sides of every
-question fully discussed. Cicero remarks that he had never heard
-of an Argeian orator. The acrimony of Demosthenes and Æschines
-was discharged by mutual eloquence of vituperation, while the
-assembly or the dikastery afterwards decided between them. We are
-told that the assembled Athenian people, when they heard the news
-of the Skytalism at Argos, were so shocked at it, that they<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_201">[p. 201]</span> caused the solemnity of
-purification to be performed round the assembly.<a id="FNanchor_427"
-href="#Footnote_427" class="fnanchor">[427]</a></p>
-
-<p>Though Sparta thus saw her confidential partisans deposed,
-expelled, or maltreated, throughout so many of the Peloponnesian
-cities,—and though as yet there was no Theban interference within
-the isthmus, either actual or prospective,—yet she was profoundly
-discouraged, and incapable of any effort either to afford protection
-or to uphold ascendency. One single defeat had driven her to the
-necessity of contending for home and family;<a id="FNanchor_428"
-href="#Footnote_428" class="fnanchor">[428]</a> probably too the
-dispositions of her own Periœki and Helots in Laconia, were such
-as to require all her force as well as all her watchfulness. At
-any rate, her empire and her influence over the sentiments of
-Greeks out of Laconia, became suddenly extinct, to a degree which
-astonishes us, when we recollect that it had become a sort of
-tradition in the Greek mind, and that, only nine years before,
-it had reached as far as Olynthus. How completely her ascendency
-had passed away, is shown in a remarkable step taken by Athens,
-seemingly towards the close of 371 <small>B.C.</small>, about
-four months after the battle of Leuktra. Many of the Peloponnesian
-cities, though they had lost both their fear and their reverence
-for Sparta, were still anxious to continue members of a voluntary
-alliance under the presidency of some considerable city. Of this
-feeling the Athenians took advantage, to send envoys and invite
-them to enter into a common league at Athens, on the basis of the
-peace of Antalkidas, and of the peace recently sworn at Sparta.<a
-id="FNanchor_429" href="#Footnote_429" class="fnanchor">[429]</a>
-Many<span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">[p. 202]</span> of them,
-obeying the summons, entered into an engagement to the following
-effect: “I will adhere to the peace sent down by the Persian king,
-and to the resolutions of the Athenians and the allies generally.
-If any of the cities who have sworn this oath shall be attacked,
-I will assist her with all my might.” What cities, or how many,
-swore to this engagement, we are not told; we make out indirectly
-that Corinth was one;<a id="FNanchor_430" href="#Footnote_430"
-class="fnanchor">[430]</a> but the Eleians refused it, on the ground
-that their right of sovereignty over the Marganeis, the Triphylians,
-and the Skilluntians, was not recognized. The formation of the league
-itself, however, with Athens as president, is a striking fact, as
-evidence of the sudden dethronement of Sparta, and as a warning
-that she would henceforward have to move in her own separate orbit,
-like Athens after the Peloponnesian war. Athens stepped into the
-place of Sparta, as president of the Peloponnesian confederacy, and
-guarantee of the sworn peace; though the cities which entered into
-this new compact were not for that reason understood to break with
-their ancient president.<a id="FNanchor_431" href="#Footnote_431"
-class="fnanchor">[431]</a></p>
-
-<p>Another incident too, apparently occurring about the present
-time, though we cannot mark its exact date,—serves to mark the
-altered position of Sparta. The Thebans preferred in the assembly of
-Amphiktyons an accusation against her, for the unlawful capture of
-their citadel the Kadmeia by Phœbidas, while under a sworn peace; and
-for the sanction conferred by the Spartan authorities on this act, in
-detaining and occupying the place. The Amphiktyonic assembly found
-the Spartans guilty, and condemned them to a fine of five hundred
-talents. As the fine was not paid, the assembly, after a certain
-interval, doubled it; but the second sentence remained unexecuted
-as well as the first, since there were no means of enforcement.<a
-id="FNanchor_432" href="#Footnote_432" class="fnanchor">[432]</a>
-Probably neither those who<span class="pagenum" id="Page_203">[p.
-203]</span> preferred the charge, nor those who passed the vote,
-expected that the Lacedæmonians would really submit to pay the
-fine. The utmost which could be done, by way of punishment for such
-contumacy, would be to exclude them from the Pythian games, which
-were celebrated under the presidency of the Amphiktyons; and we may
-perhaps presume that they really were thus excluded.</p>
-
-<p>The incident however deserves peculiar notice, in more than
-one point of view. First, as indicating the lessened dignity of
-Sparta. Since the victory of Leuktra and the death of Jason, Thebes
-had become preponderant, especially in Northern Greece, where the
-majority of the nations or races voting in the Amphiktyonic assembly
-were situated. It is plainly through the ascendency of Thebes,
-that this condemnatory vote was passed. Next, as indicating the
-incipient tendency, which we shall hereafter observe still farther
-developed, to extend the functions of the Amphiktyonic assembly
-beyond its special sphere of religious solemnities, and to make it
-the instrument of political coërcion or revenge in the hands of
-the predominant state. In the previous course of this history, an
-entire century has passed without giving occasion to mention the
-Amphiktyonic assembly as taking part in political affairs. Neither
-Thucydides nor Xenophon, though their united histories cover seventy
-years, chiefly of Hellenic conflict, ever speak of that assembly.
-The latter, indeed, does not even notice this fine imposed upon the
-Lacedæmonians, although it falls within the period of his history.
-We know the fact only from Diodorus and Justin; and unfortunately
-merely as a naked fact, without any collateral or preliminary
-details. During the sixty or seventy years preceding the battle of
-Leuktra, Sparta had always had her regular political confederacy
-and synod of allies convened by herself: her political ascendency
-was exercised over them, <i>eo nomine</i>, by a method more direct
-and easy than that of perverting the religious authority of the
-Amphiktyonic assembly, even if such a proceeding were open to her.<a
-id="FNanchor_433" href="#Footnote_433" class="fnanchor">[433]</a> But
-when Thebes, after the battle of Leuktra, became the more powerful
-state individually, she had no such established confederacy and
-synod of allies, to sanction her propositions, and to share or abet
-her antipathies. The Amphiktyonic assembly,<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_204">[p. 204]</span> meeting alternately at Delphi and
-at Thermopylæ, and composed of twelve ancient races, principally
-belonging to Northern Greece, as well as most of them inconsiderable
-in power,—presented itself as a convenient instrument for her
-purposes. There was a certain show of reason for considering the
-seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas as a religious offence; since it
-was not only executed during the Pythian festival, but was in itself
-a glaring violation of the public law and interpolitical obligations
-recognized between Grecian cities; which, like other obligations,
-were believed to be under the sanction of the gods; though
-probably, if the Athenians and Platæans had preferred a similar
-complaint to the Amphiktyons against Thebes for her equally unjust
-attempt to surprise Platæa under full peace in the spring of 431
-<small>B.C.</small>,—both Spartans and Thebans would have resisted
-it. In the present case, however, the Thebans had a case against
-Sparta sufficiently plausible, when combined with their overruling
-ascendency, to carry a majority in the Amphiktyonic assembly, and
-to procure the imposition of this enormous fine. In itself the
-sentence produced no direct effect,—which will explain the silence of
-Xenophon. But it is the first of a series of proceedings, connected
-with the Amphiktyons, which will be found hereafter pregnant with
-serious results for Grecian stability and independence.</p>
-
-<p>Among all the inhabitants of Peloponnesus, none were more
-powerfully affected, by the recent Spartan overthrow at Leuktra,
-than the Arcadians. Tegea, their most important city, situated on
-the border of Laconia, was governed by an oligarchy wholly in the
-interest of Sparta: Orchomenus was of like sentiment; and Mantinea
-had been broken up into separate villages (about fifteen years
-before) by the Lacedæmonians themselves—an act of high-handed
-injustice committed at the zenith of their power after the peace
-of Antalkidas. The remaining Arcadian population were in great
-proportion villagers; rude men, but excellent soldiers, and always
-ready to follow the Lacedæmonian banners, as well from old habit and
-military deference, as from the love of plunder.<a id="FNanchor_434"
-href="#Footnote_434" class="fnanchor">[434]</a></p>
-
-<p>The defeat of Leuktra effaced this ancient sentiment. The
-Arcadians not only ceased to count upon victory and plunder in
-the service of Sparta, but began to fancy that their own military
-prow<span class="pagenum" id="Page_205">[p. 205]</span>ess was not
-inferior to that of the Spartans; while the disappearance of the
-harmosts left them free to follow their own inclinations. It was by
-the Mantineans that the movement was first commenced. Divested of
-Grecian city-life, and condemned to live in separate villages, each
-under its own philo-Spartan oligarchy, they had nourished a profound
-animosity, which manifested itself on the first opportunity of
-deposing these oligarchies and coming again together. The resolution
-was unanimously adopted, to re-establish Mantinea with its walls, and
-resume their political consolidation; while the leaders banished by
-the Spartans at their former intervention, now doubtless returned to
-become foremost in the work.<a id="FNanchor_435" href="#Footnote_435"
-class="fnanchor">[435]</a> As the breaking up of Mantinea had been
-one of the most obnoxious acts of Spartan omnipotence, so there
-was now a strong sympathy in favor of its re-establishment. Many
-Arcadians from other quarters came to lend auxiliary labor, while
-the Eleians sent three talents as a contribution towards the cost.
-Deeply mortified by this proceeding, yet too weak to prevent it by
-force, the Spartans sent Agesilaus with a friendly remonstrance.
-Having been connected with the city by paternal ties of hospitality,
-he had declined the command of the army of coërcion previously
-employed against it; nevertheless, on this occasion, the Mantinean
-leaders refused to convene their public assembly to hear his
-communication, desiring that he would make known his purpose to them.
-Accordingly, he intimated that he had come with no view of hindering
-the re-establishment of the city, but simply to request that they
-would defer it until the consent of Sparta could be formally given;
-which (he promised) should soon be forthcoming, together with a
-handsome subscription to lighten the cost. But the Mantinean leaders
-answered, that compliance was impossible, since a public resolution
-had already been taken to prosecute the work forthwith. Enraged
-at such a rebuff, yet without power to resent it, Agesilaus was
-compelled to return home.<a id="FNanchor_436" href="#Footnote_436"
-class="fnanchor">[436]</a> The Mantineans persevered and com<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_206">[p. 206]</span>pleted the rebuilding of
-their city, on a level site, and in an elliptical form, surrounded
-with elaborate walls and towers.</p>
-
-<p>The affront here offered, probably studiously offered, by
-Mantinean leaders who had either been exiles themselves, or
-sympathized with the exiles,—was only the prelude to a series of
-others (presently to be recounted) yet more galling and intolerable.
-But it was doubtless felt to the quick both by the ephors and by
-Agesilaus, as a public symptom of that prostration into which they
-had so suddenly fallen. To appreciate fully such painful sentiment,
-we must recollect that an exaggerated pride and sense of dignity,
-individual as well as collective, founded upon military excellence
-and earned by incredible rigor of training,—was the chief mental
-result imbibed by every pupil of Lykurgus, and<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_207">[p. 207]</span> hitherto ratified as legitimate by
-the general testimony of Greece. This was his principal recompense
-for the severe fatigue, the intense self-suppression, the narrow,
-monotonous, and unlettered routine, wherein he was born and died. As
-an individual, the Spartan citizen was pointed out by the finger of
-admiration at the Olympic and other festivals;<a id="FNanchor_437"
-href="#Footnote_437" class="fnanchor">[437]</a> while he saw his
-city supplicated from the most distant regions of Greece, and obeyed
-almost everywhere near her own border, as Pan-hellenic president.
-On a sudden, with scarce any preparatory series of events, he
-now felt this proud prerogative sentiment not only robbed of its
-former tribute, but stung in the most mortifying manner. Agesilaus,
-especially, was the more open to such humiliation, since he was not
-only a Spartan to the core, but loaded with the consciousness of
-having exercised more influence than any other king before him,—of
-having succeeded to the throne at a moment when Sparta was at the
-maximum of her power,—and of having now in his old age accompanied
-her, in part brought her by his misjudgments, into her present
-degradation.</p>
-
-<p>Agesilaus had, moreover, incurred unpopularity among the Spartans
-themselves, whose chagrin took the form of religious scruple and
-uneasiness. It has been already stated that he was, and had been from
-childhood, lame; which deformity had been vehemently insisted on by
-his opponents (during the dispute between him and Leotychides in 398
-<small>B.C.</small> for the vacant throne) as disqualifying him for
-the regal dignity, and as being the precise calamity against which an
-ancient oracle—“Beware of a lame reign”—had given warning. Ingenious
-interpretation by Lysander, combined with superior personal merit
-in Agesilaus, and suspicions about the legitimacy of Leotychides,
-had caused the objection to be then overruled. But there had always
-been a party, even during the palmy days of Agesilaus, who thought
-that he had obtained the crown under no good auspices. And when the
-humiliation of Sparta arrived, every man’s religion suggested to him
-readily the cause of it,<a id="FNanchor_438" href="#Footnote_438"
-class="fnanchor">[438]</a>—“See what comes of having set at nought
-the gracious warning of the gods, and put upon ourselves a lame
-reign!” In spite of such untoward impression, however, the real
-energy and bravery of Agesilaus, which had not deserted<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_208">[p. 208]</span> even an infirm body
-and an age of seventy years, was more than ever indispensable to his
-country. He was still the chief leader of her affairs, condemned to
-the sad necessity of submitting to this Mantinean affront, and much
-worse that followed it, without the least power of hindrance.</p>
-
-<p>The reëstablishment of Mantinea was probably completed during the
-autumn and winter of <small>B.C.</small> 371-370. Such coalescence
-of villages into a town, coupled with the predominance of feelings
-hostile to Sparta, appears to have suggested the idea of a larger
-political union among all who bore the Arcadian name. As yet, no
-such union had ever existed; the fractions of the Arcadian name had
-nothing in common, apart from other Greeks, except many legendary
-and religious sympathies, with a belief in the same heroic lineage
-and indigenous antiquity.<a id="FNanchor_439" href="#Footnote_439"
-class="fnanchor">[439]</a> But now the idea and aspiration, espoused
-with peculiar ardor by a leading Mantinean named Lykomedes, spread
-itself rapidly over the country, to form a “commune Arcadum,” or
-central Arcadian authority, composed in certain proportions out
-of all the sections now autonomous,—and invested with peremptory
-power of determining by the vote of its majority. Such central
-power, however, was not intended to absorb or set aside the separate
-governments, but only to be exercised for certain definite purposes;
-in maintaining unanimity at home, together with concurrent,
-independent action, as to foreign states.<a id="FNanchor_440"
-href="#Footnote_440" class="fnanchor">[440]</a> This plan of
-Pan-Arcadian federation was warmly promoted by the Mantineans, who
-looked to it as a protec<span class="pagenum" id="Page_209">[p.
-209]</span>tion to themselves in case the Spartan power should
-revive; as well as by the Thebans and Argeians, from whom aid was
-expected in case of need. It found great favor in most parts of
-Arcadia, especially in the small districts bordering on Laconia,
-which stood most in need of union to protect themselves against
-the Spartans,—the Mænalians, Parrhasians, Eutresians, Ægytes,<a
-id="FNanchor_441" href="#Footnote_441" class="fnanchor">[441]</a>
-etc. But the jealousies among the more considerable cities made some
-of them adverse to any scheme emanating from Mantinea. Among these
-unfriendly opponents were Heræa, on the west of Arcadia bordering
-on Elis,—Orchomenus,<a id="FNanchor_442" href="#Footnote_442"
-class="fnanchor">[442]</a> conterminous with Mantinea to the
-north—and Tegea, conterminous to the south. The hold of the Spartans
-on Arcadia had been always maintained chiefly through Orchomenus and
-Tegea. The former was the place where they deposited their hostages
-taken from other suspected towns; the latter was ruled by Stasippus
-and an oligarchy devoted to their interests.<a id="FNanchor_443"
-href="#Footnote_443" class="fnanchor">[443]</a></p>
-
-<p>Among the population of Tegea, however, a large proportion were
-ardent partisans of the new Pan-Arcadian movement, and desirous
-of breaking off their connection with Sparta. At the head of
-this party were Proxenus and Kallibius; while Stasippus and his
-friends, supported by a senate composed chiefly of their partisans,
-vehemently opposed any alteration of the existing system. Proxenus
-and his partisans resolved to appeal to the assembled people, whom
-accordingly they convoked in arms; pacific popular assemblies, with
-free discussion, forming seemingly no part of the constitution of
-the city. Stasippus and his friends appeared in armed numbers also;
-and a conflict ensued, in which each party charged the other with
-bad faith and with striking the first blow.<a id="FNanchor_444"
-href="#Footnote_444" class="fnanchor">[444]</a> At first Stasippus
-had the advantage. Proxenus with a few of the<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_210">[p. 210]</span> opposite party were slain, while
-Kallibius with the remainder maintained himself near the town-wall,
-and in possession of the gate on the side towards Mantinea. To that
-city he had before despatched an express, entreating aid, while he
-opened a parley with the opponents. Presently the Mantinean force
-arrived, and was admitted within the gates; upon which Stasippus,
-seeing that he could no longer maintain himself, escaped by another
-gate towards Pallantium. He took sanctuary with a few friends in
-a neighboring temple of Artemis, whither he was pursued by his
-adversaries, who removed the roof, and began to cast the tiles
-down upon them. The unfortunate men were obliged to surrender.
-Fettered and placed on a cart, they were carried back to Tegea, and
-put on their trial before the united Tegeans and Mantineans, who
-condemned them and put them to death. Eight hundred Tegeans, of
-the defeated party, fled as exiles to Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_445"
-href="#Footnote_445" class="fnanchor">[445]</a></p>
-
-<p>Such was the important revolution which now took place at Tegea;
-a struggle of force on both sides, and not of discussion,—as was in
-the nature of the Greek oligarchical governments, where scarce any
-serious change of policy in the state could be brought about without
-violence. It decided the success of the Pan-Arcadian movement, which
-now proceeded with redoubled enthusiasm. Both Mantinea and Tegea were
-cordially united in its favor; though Orchomenus, still strenuous
-in opposing it, hired for that purpose, as well as for her own
-defence, a body of mercenaries from Corinth under Polytropus. A full
-assembly of the Arcadian name was convoked at a small town called
-Asea, in the mountainous district west of Tegea. It appears to have
-been numerously attended; for we hear of one place, Eutæa (in the
-district of Mount Mænalus,<a id="FNanchor_446" href="#Footnote_446"
-class="fnanchor">[446]</a> and near the borders of Laconia), from
-whence every single male adult went to the assembly. It was here
-that the consummation of the Pan-Arcadian confederacy was finally
-determined; though Orchomenus and Heræa still stood aloof.<a
-id="FNanchor_447" href="#Footnote_447" class="fnanchor">[447]</a></p>
-
-<p>There could hardly be a more fatal blow to Sparta than this loss
-to herself, and transfer to her enemies, of Tegea, the most powerful
-of her remaining allies.<a id="FNanchor_448" href="#Footnote_448"
-class="fnanchor">[448]</a> To assist the exiles and avenge
-Stasip<span class="pagenum" id="Page_211">[p. 211]</span>pus, as
-well as to arrest the Arcadian movement, she resolved on a march
-into the country, in spite of her present dispirited condition;
-while Heræa and Lepreum, but no other places, sent contingents to
-her aid. From Elis and Argos, on the other hand, reinforcements
-came to Mantinea and Tegea. Proclaiming that the Mantineans had
-violated the recent peace by their entry into Tegea, Agesilaus
-marched across the border against them. The first Arcadian town
-which he reached was Eutæa,<a id="FNanchor_449" href="#Footnote_449"
-class="fnanchor">[449]</a> where he found that all the male adults
-had gone to the great Arcadian assembly. Though the feebler
-population, remaining behind, were completely in his power, he took
-scrupulous care to respect both person and property, and even lent
-aid to rebuild a decayed portion of the wall. At Eutæa he halted
-a day or two, thinking it prudent to wait for the junction of
-the mercenary force and the Bœotian exiles under Polytropus, now
-at Orchomenus. Against the latter place, however, the Mantineans
-had marched under Lykomêdes, while Polytropus, coming forth from
-the walls to meet them, had been defeated with loss, and slain.<a
-id="FNanchor_450" href="#Footnote_450" class="fnanchor">[450]</a>
-Hence Agesilaus was compelled to advance onward with his own
-unassisted forces, through the territory of Tegea up to the
-neighborhood of Mantinea. His onward march left the way from Asea
-to Tegea free, upon which the Arcadians assembled at Asea broke up,
-and marched by night to Tegea; from whence, on the next day, they
-proceeded to Mantinea, along the mountain range eastward of the
-Tegeatic plain; so that the whole Arcadian force thus became united.
-Agesilaus on his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_212">[p. 212]</span>
-side, having ravaged the fields and encamped within little more
-than two miles from the walls of Mantinea, was agreeably surprised
-by the junction of his allies from Orchomenus, who had eluded by a
-night-march the vigilance of the enemy. Both on one side and on the
-other, the forces were thus concentrated. Agesilaus found himself
-on the first night, without intending it, embosomed in a recess of
-the mountains near Mantinea, where the Mantineans gathered on the
-high ground around, in order to attack him from above, the next
-morning. By a well-managed retreat, he extricated himself from this
-inconvenient position, and regained the plain; where he remained
-three days, prepared to give battle if the enemy came forth,
-in order that he might “not seem (says Xenophon) to hasten his
-departure through fear.”<a id="FNanchor_451" href="#Footnote_451"
-class="fnanchor">[451]</a> As the enemy kept within their walls,
-he marched homeward, on the fourth day, to his former camp in the
-Tegean territory. The enemy did not pursue, and he then pushed on
-his march, though it was late in the evening, to Eutæa; “wishing
-(says Xenophon) to get his troops off before even the enemies’ fires
-could be seen, in order that no one might say that his return was a
-flight. He thought that he had raised the spirit of Sparta out of the
-previous discouragement, by invading Arcadia and ravaging the country
-without any enemy coming forth to fight him.”<a id="FNanchor_452"
-href="#Footnote_452" class="fnanchor">[452]</a> The army was then
-brought back to Sparta and disbanded.</p>
-
-<p>It had now become a matter of boast for Agesilaus (according to
-his own friendly historian) to keep the field for three or four days,
-without showing fear of Arcadians and Eleians! So fatally had Spartan
-pride broken down, since the day (less than eighteen months before)
-when the peremptory order had been sent to Kleombrotus, to march out
-of Phokis straight against Thebes!</p>
-
-<p>Nevertheless it was not from fear of Agesilaus, but from a wise
-discretion, that the Arcadians and Eleians had kept within the<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_213">[p. 213]</span> walls of Mantinea.
-Epaminondas with the Theban army was approaching to their aid,
-and daily expected; a sum of ten talents having been lent by the
-Eleians to defray the cost.<a id="FNanchor_453" href="#Footnote_453"
-class="fnanchor">[453]</a> He had been invited by them and by others
-of the smaller Peloponnesian states, who felt the necessity of
-some external protector against Sparta,—and who even before they
-applied to Thebes for aid, had solicited the like interference from
-Athens (probably under the general presidency accepted by Athens,
-and the oaths interchanged by her with various inferior cities,
-since the battle of Leuktra), but had experienced a refusal.<a
-id="FNanchor_454" href="#Footnote_454" class="fnanchor">[454]</a></p>
-
-<p>Epaminondas had been preparing for this contingency ever since
-the battle of Leuktra. The first use made of his victory had been to
-establish or confirm the ascendency of Thebes both over the recusant
-Bœotian cities and over the neighboring Phokians and Lokrians, etc.
-After this had been accomplished, he must have been occupied (during
-the early part of 370 <small>B.C.</small>) in anxiously watching the
-movements of Jason of Pheræ,—who had already announced his design
-of marching with an imposing force to Delphi for the celebration
-of the Pythian games (about August 1.) Though this despot was the
-ally of Thebes, yet as both his power, and his aspirations towards
-the headship of Greece,<a id="FNanchor_455" href="#Footnote_455"
-class="fnanchor">[455]</a> were well known, no Theban general, even
-of prudence inferior to Epaminondas, could venture in the face of
-such liabilities to conduct away the Theban force into Peloponnesus,
-leaving Bœotia uncovered. The assassination of Jason relieved Thebes
-from such apprehensions, and a few weeks sufficed to show that his
-successors were far less formidable in power as well as in ability.
-Accordingly, in the autumn of 370 <small>B.C.</small> Epaminondas
-had his attention free to turn to Peloponnesus, for the purpose both
-of maintaining the anti-Spartan revolution which had taken place in
-Tegea, and of seconding the pronounced impulse among the Arcadians
-towards federative coalition.</p>
-
-<p>But the purposes of this distinguished man went farther still;
-embracing long-sighted and permanent arrangements, such as should
-forever disable Sparta from recovering her prominent sta<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_214">[p. 214]</span>tion in the Grecian
-world. While with one hand he organized Arcadia, with the other he
-took measures for replacing the exiled Messenians on their ancient
-territory. To achieve this, it was necessary to dispossess the
-Spartans of the region once known as independent Messenia, under
-its own line of kings, but now, for near three centuries, the best
-portion of Laconia, tilled by Helots for the profit of proprietors
-at Sparta. While converting these Helots into free Messenians, as
-their forefathers had once been, Epaminondas proposed to invite
-back all the wanderers of the same race who were dispersed in
-various portions of Greece; so as at once to impoverish Sparta by
-loss of territory, and to plant upon her flank a neighbor bitterly
-hostile. It has been already mentioned, that during the Peloponnesian
-war, the exiled Messenians had been among the most active allies
-of Athens and Sparta,—at Naupaktus, at Sphakteria, at Pylus, in
-Kephallenia, and elsewhere. Expelled at the close of that war by
-the triumphant Spartans,<a id="FNanchor_456" href="#Footnote_456"
-class="fnanchor">[456]</a> not only from Peloponnesus, but also from
-Naupaktus and Kephallenia, these exiles had since been dispersed
-among various Hellenic colonies; at Rhegium in Italy, at Messênê in
-Sicily, at Hesperides in Libya. From 404 <small>B.C.</small> (the
-close of the war) to 373 <small>B.C.</small>, they had remained thus
-without a home. At length, about the latter year (when the Athenian
-confederate navy again became equal or superior to the Lacedæmonian
-on the west coast of Peloponnesus), they began to indulge the hope of
-being restored to Naupaktus.<a id="FNanchor_457" href="#Footnote_457"
-class="fnanchor">[457]</a> Probably their request may have been
-preferred and discussed in the synod of Athenian allies, where the
-Thebans sat as members. Nothing however had been done towards it by
-the Athenians,—who soon became fatigued with the war, and at length
-made peace with Sparta,—when the momentous battle of Leuktra altered,
-both completely and suddenly, the balance of power in Greece. A
-chance of protection was now opened to the Messenians from Thebes,
-far more promising than they had ever had from Athens. Epaminondas,
-well aware of the loss as well as humiliation that he should
-inflict upon Sparta by restoring them to their ancient territory,
-entered into communication with them, and caused them to be invited
-to Peloponnesus from all their distant places of emigration.<a
-id="FNanchor_458" href="#Footnote_458" class="fnanchor">[458]</a> By
-the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_215">[p. 215]</span> time of his
-march into Arcadia, in the late autumn of 370 <small>B.C.</small>,
-many of them had already joined him, burning with all their ancient
-hatred of Sparta, and contributing to aggravate the same sentiment
-among Thebans and allies.</p>
-
-<p>With the scheme of restoring the Messenians, was combined in
-the mind of Epaminondas another, for the political consolidation
-of the Arcadians; both being intended as parts of one strong and
-self-supporting organization against Sparta on her own border. Of
-course he could have accomplished nothing of the kind, if there had
-not been a powerful spontaneous movement towards consolidation among
-the Arcadians themselves. But without his guidance and protection,
-the movement would have proved abortive, through the force of local
-jealousies within the country, fomented and seconded by Spartan aid
-from without. Though the general vote for federative coalition had
-been passed with enthusiasm, yet to carry out such a vote to the
-satisfaction of all, without quarrelling on points of detail, would
-have required far more of public-minded sentiment, as well as of
-intelligence, than what could be reckoned upon among the Arcadians.
-It was necessary to establish a new city; since the standing jealousy
-between Mantinea and Tegea, now for the first time embarked in one
-common cause, would never have permitted that either should be
-preferred as the centre of the new consolidation.<a id="FNanchor_459"
-href="#Footnote_459" class="fnanchor">[459]</a> Besides fixing upon
-the new site required, it was indispensable also to choose between
-conflicting exigencies, and to break up ancient habits, in a way such
-as could hardly have been enforced by any majority purely Arcadian.
-The authority here deficient was precisely supplied by Epaminondas;
-who brought with him a victorious army and a splendid personal name,
-combined with impartiality as to the local politics of Arcadia, and
-single-minded hostility to Sparta.</p>
-
-<p>It was with a view to these two great foundations, as well as
-to expel Agesilaus, that Epaminondas now marched the Theban army
-into Arcadia; the command being voluntarily intrusted to him by
-Pelopidas and the other Bœotarchs present. He arrived shortly after
-the retirement of Agesilaus, while the Arcadi<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_216">[p. 216]</span>ans and Eleians were ravaging the lands
-of the recusant town of Heræa. As they speedily came back to greet
-his arrival, the aggregate confederate body,—Argeians, Arcadians, and
-Eleians, united with the Thebans and their accompanying allies,—is
-said to have amounted to forty thousand, or according to some, even
-to seventy thousand men.<a id="FNanchor_460" href="#Footnote_460"
-class="fnanchor">[460]</a> Not merely had Epaminondas brought with
-him a choice body of auxiliaries,—Phokians, Lokrians, Eubœans,
-Akarnanians, Herakleots, Malians, and Thessalian cavalry and
-peltasts,—but the Bœotian bands themselves were so brilliant
-and imposing, as to excite universal admiration. The victory of
-Leuktra had awakened among them an enthusiastic military ardor,
-turned to account by the genius of Epaminondas, and made to produce
-a finished discipline which even the unwilling Xenophon cannot
-refuse to acknowledge.<a id="FNanchor_461" href="#Footnote_461"
-class="fnanchor">[461]</a> Conscious of the might of their assembled
-force, within a day’s march of Laconia, the Arcadians, Argeians,
-and Eleians pressed Epaminondas to invade that country, now that
-no allies could approach the frontier to its aid. At first he was
-unwilling to comply. He had not come prepared for the enterprise;
-being well aware, from his own journey to Sparta (when the
-peace-congress was held there prior to the battle of Leuktra), of
-the impracticable nature of the intervening country, so easy to
-be defended, especially during the winter-season, by troops like
-the Lacedæmonians, whom he believed to be in occupation of all the
-passes. Nor was his reluctance overcome until the instances of his
-allies were backed by assurances from the Arcadians on the frontier,
-that the passes were not all guarded; as well as by invitations from
-some of the discontented Periœki, in Laconia. These Periœki engaged
-to revolt openly, if he would only show himself in the country. They
-told him that there was a general slackness throughout Laconia in
-obeying the military requisitions from Sparta; and tendered their
-lives as atonement if they should be found to speak falsely. By
-such encouragements, as well as by the general impatience of all
-around him to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_217">[p. 217]</span>
-revenge upon Sparta her long career of pride and abused ascendency,
-Epaminondas was at length induced to give the order of invasion.<a
-id="FNanchor_462" href="#Footnote_462" class="fnanchor">[462]</a></p>
-
-<p>That he should have hesitated in taking this responsibility,
-will not surprise us, if we recollect, that over and above the
-real difficulties of the country, invasion of Laconia by land was
-an unparalleled phenomenon,—that the force of Sparta was most
-imperfectly known,—that no such thought had been entertained when he
-left Thebes,—that the legal duration of command, for himself and his
-colleagues, would not permit it,—and that though his Peloponnesian
-allies were forward in the scheme, the rest of his troops and his
-countrymen might well censure him, if the unknown force of resistance
-turned out as formidable as their associations from old time led them
-to apprehend.</p>
-
-<p>The invading army was distributed into four portions, all
-penetrating by different passes. The Eleians had the westernmost
-and easiest road, the Argeians the easternmost;<a id="FNanchor_463"
-href="#Footnote_463" class="fnanchor">[463]</a> while the Thebans
-themselves and the Arcadians formed the two central divisions. The
-latter alone experienced any serious resistance. More daring even
-than the Thebans, they encountered Ischolaus the Spartan at Ium or
-Oeum in the district called Skiritis, attacked him in the village,
-and overpowered him by vehemence of assault, by superior numbers,
-and seemingly also by some favor or collusion<a id="FNanchor_464"
-href="#Footnote_464" class="fnanchor">[464]</a> on the part of the
-inhabitants. After a desperate resistance, this brave Spartan with
-nearly all his division perished. At Karyæ, the Thebans also found
-and surmounted some resistance; but the victory of the Arcadians
-over Ischolaus operated as an encouragement to all, so that the four
-divisions reached Sellasia<a id="FNanchor_465" href="#Footnote_465"
-class="fnanchor">[465]</a> and were again<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_218">[p. 218]</span> united in safety. Undefended and
-deserted (seemingly) by the Spartans, Sellasia was now burnt and
-destroyed by the invaders, who, continuing their march along the
-plain or valley towards the Eurotas, encamped in the sacred grove of
-Apollo. On the next day they reached the Eurotas, at the foot of the
-bridge which crossed that river and led to the city of Sparta.</p>
-
-<p>Epaminondas found the bridge too well-guarded to attempt forcing
-it; a strong body of Spartan hoplites being also discernible on
-the other side, in the sacred ground of Athênê Alea. He therefore
-marched down the left bank of the river, burning and plundering the
-houses in his way, as far as Amyklæ, between two and three miles
-below Sparta. Here he found a ford, though the river was full, from
-the winter season; and accomplished the passage, defeating, after a
-severe contest, a body of Spartans who tried to oppose it. He was now
-on the same side of the river as Sparta, to which city he slowly and
-cautiously made his approach; taking care to keep his Theban troops
-always in the best battle order, and protecting them, when encamped,
-by felled trees; while the Arcadians and other Peloponnesian allies
-dispersed around to plunder the neighboring houses and property.<a
-id="FNanchor_466" href="#Footnote_466" class="fnanchor">[466]</a></p>
-
-<p>Great was the consternation which reigned in the city; destitute
-of fortifications, yet hitherto inviolate in fact and unassailable
-even in idea. Besides their own native force, the Spartans had no
-auxiliaries except those mercenaries from Orchomenus who had come
-back with Agesilaus; nor was it certain beforehand that even these
-troops would remain with them, if the invasion became formidable.<a
-id="FNanchor_467" href="#Footnote_467" class="fnanchor">[467]</a> On
-the first assemblage of the irresistible army on their frontier, they
-had despatched one of their commanders of foreign contingents (called
-Xenâgi) to press the instant coming of such Peloponnesian allies as
-remained faithful to them; and also envoys to Athens, entreating
-assistance from that city. Auxiliaries were obtained, and rapidly put
-under march, from Pellênê,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_219">[p.
-219]</span> Sikyon, Phlius, Corinth, Epidaurus, Trœzen,
-Hermionê, and Halieis.<a id="FNanchor_468" href="#Footnote_468"
-class="fnanchor">[468]</a> But the ordinary line of march into
-Laconia was now impracticable to them; the whole frontier being
-barred by Argeians and Arcadians. Accordingly they were obliged to
-proceed first to the Argolic peninsula, and from thence to cross by
-sea (embarking probably at Halieis on the south-western coast of the
-peninsula) to Prasiæ on the eastern coast of Laconia; from whence
-they made their way over the Laconian mountains to Sparta. Being
-poorly provided with vessels, they were forced to cross in separate
-detachments, and to draw lots for priority.<a id="FNanchor_469"
-href="#Footnote_469" class="fnanchor">[469]</a> By this chance the
-Phliasian contingent did not come over until the last; while the
-xenagus, eager to reach Sparta, left them behind, and conducted the
-rest thither, arriving only just before the confederate enemies
-debouched from Sellasia. The Phliasians, on crossing to Prasiæ,
-found neither their comrades nor the xenagus, but were obliged to
-hire a guide to Sparta. Fortunately they arrived there both safely
-and in time, eluding the vigilance of the enemy, who were then near
-Amyklæ.</p>
-
-<p>These reinforcements were no less seasonable to Sparta, than
-creditable to the fidelity of the allies. For the bad feeling which
-habitually reigned in Laconia, between the Spartan citizens on one
-side, and the Periœki and Helots on the other, produced in this hour
-of danger its natural fruits of desertion, alarm, and weakness.
-Not only were the Periœki and Helots in standing discontent, but
-even among the Spartan citizens themselves, a privileged fraction
-called Peers had come to monopolize political honors; while the
-remainder,—poorer men, yet ambitious and active, and known under
-the ordinary name of the Inferiors,—were subject to a degrading
-exclusion, and rendered bitterly hostile. The account given in a
-previous chapter of the conspiracy of Kinadon, will have disclosed
-the fearful insecurity of the Spartan citizen, surrounded by so many
-disaffected companions; Periœki and Helots<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_220">[p. 220]</span> in Laconia, inferior citizens at
-Sparta. On the appearance of the invading enemy, indeed, a certain
-feeling of common interest arose, since even the disaffected might
-reasonably imagine that a plundering soldiery, if not repelled at
-the point of the sword, would make their condition worse instead of
-better. And accordingly, when the ephors made public proclamation,
-that any Helot who would take heavy armor and serve in the ranks as
-an hoplite, should be manumitted,—not less than six thousand Helots
-gave in their names to serve. But a body thus numerous, when seen
-in arms, became itself the object of mistrust to the Spartans; so
-that the arrival of their new allies from Prasiæ was welcomed as a
-security, not less against the armed Helots within the city, than
-against the Thebans without.<a id="FNanchor_470" href="#Footnote_470"
-class="fnanchor">[470]</a> Open enmity, however, was not wanting. A
-considerable number both of Periœki and Helots actually took arms on
-behalf of the Thebans; others remained inactive, disregarding the
-urgent summons from the ephors, which could not now be enforced.<a
-id="FNanchor_471" href="#Footnote_471" class="fnanchor">[471]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_221">[p. 221]</span></p>
-
-<p>Under such wide-spread feelings of disaffection the defence even
-of Sparta itself against the assailing enemy was a task requiring
-all the energy of Agesilaus. After having vainly tried to hinder
-the Thebans from crossing the Eurotas, he was forced to abandon
-Amyklæ and to throw himself back upon the city of Sparta, towards
-which they immediately advanced. More than one conspiracy was on
-the point of breaking out, had not his vigilance forestalled the
-projects. Two hundred young soldiers of doubtful fidelity were
-marching, without orders, to occupy a strong post (sacred to Artemis)
-called the Issorium. Those around him were about to attack them,
-but Agesilaus, repressing their zeal, went up alone to the band,
-addressed them in language betokening no suspicion, yet warning them
-that they had mistaken his orders: their services were needed, not
-at the Issorium, but in another part of the city. They obeyed his
-orders, and moved to the spot indicated; upon which he immediately
-occupied the Issorium with troops whom he could trust. In the ensuing
-night, he seized and put to death fifteen of the leaders of the
-two hundred. Another conspiracy, said to have been on the point
-of breaking out, was repressed by seizing the conspirators in the
-house where they were assembled, and putting them to death untried;
-the first occasion (observes Plutarch) on which any Spartan was
-ever put to death untried,<a id="FNanchor_472" href="#Footnote_472"
-class="fnanchor">[472]</a>—a statement which I hesitate to believe
-without knowing from whom he borrowed it, but which, if true, proves
-that the Spartan kings and ephors did not apply to Spartan citizens
-the same measure as to Periœki and Helots.</p>
-
-<p>By such severe proceedings, disaffection was kept under; while
-the strong posts of the city were effectively occupied, and the
-wider approaches barricaded by heaps of stones and earth.<a
-id="FNanchor_473" href="#Footnote_473" class="fnanchor">[473]</a>
-Though destitute of walls, Sparta was extremely defensible by
-position. Epaminondas marched slowly up to it from Amyklæ; the
-Arcadians and others in his army spreading themselves to burn and
-plunder the neighborhood. On the third or fourth day his cavalry
-occupied the Hippodrome (probably a space of level ground near
-the river, under the hilly site of the town), where the Spartan
-cavalry, though inferior both in number and in goodness, gained<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_222">[p. 222]</span> an advantage over
-them, through the help of three hundred chosen hoplites whom
-Agesilaus had planted in ambush hard by, in a precinct sacred to the
-Dioskuri. Though this action was probably of little consequence, yet
-Epaminondas did not dare to attempt the city by storm. Satisfied with
-having defied the Spartans and manifested his mastery of the field
-even to their own doors, he marched away southward down to Eurotas.
-To them, in their present depression, it was matter of consolation
-and even of boasting,<a id="FNanchor_474" href="#Footnote_474"
-class="fnanchor">[474]</a> that he had not dared to assail them
-in their last stronghold. The agony of their feelings,—grief,
-resentment, and wounded honor,—was intolerable. Many wished to go out
-and fight, at all hazard; but Agesilaus resisted them with the same
-firmness as Perikles had shown at Athens, when the Peloponnesians
-first invaded Attica at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.
-Especially the Spartan women, who had never before beheld an enemy,
-are said to have manifested emotions so furious and distressing,
-as to increase much the difficulty of defence.<a id="FNanchor_475"
-href="#Footnote_475" class="fnanchor">[475]</a> We are even told
-that Antalkidas, at that time one of the ephors, sent his children
-for safety away from Sparta to the island of Kythêra. Epaminondas
-knew well how desperate the resistance of the Spartans would be
-if their city were attacked; while to himself, in the midst of a
-hostile and impracticable country, repulse would be absolute ruin.<a
-id="FNanchor_476" href="#Footnote_476" class="fnanchor">[476]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_223">[p. 223]</span></p>
-
-<p>On leaving Sparta, Epaminondas carried his march as far as Helos
-and Gythium on the sea-coast; burning and plundering the country,
-and trying for three days to capture Gythium, which contained the
-Lacedæmonian arsenal and ships. Many of the Laconian Periœki joined
-and took service in his army; nevertheless his attempt on Gythium
-did not succeed; upon which he turned back and retraced his steps to
-the Arcadian frontier. It was the more necessary for him to think of
-quitting Laconia, since his Peloponnesian allies, the Arcadians and
-others, were daily stealing home with the rich plunder which they
-had acquired, while his supplies were also becoming deficient.<a
-id="FNanchor_477" href="#Footnote_477" class="fnanchor">[477]</a></p>
-
-<p>Epaminondas had thus accomplished far more than he had projected
-when quitting Thebes; for the effect of the expedition on Grecian
-opinion was immense. The reputation of his army, as well as his
-own, was prodigiously exalted; and even the narrative of Xenophon,
-unfriendly as well as obscure, bears involuntary testimony both to
-the excellence of his generalship and to the good discipline of his
-troops. He made his Thebans keep in rank and hold front against the
-enemy, even while their Arcadian allies were dispersing around for
-plunder. Moreover, the insult and humiliation to Sparta were still
-greater than that inflicted by the battle of Leuktra; which had
-indeed shown that she was no longer invincible in the field, but
-had still left her with the admitted supposition of an inviolable
-territory and an unapproachable city.</p>
-
-<p>The resistance of the Spartans indeed (except in so far as
-regards their city) had been far less than either friends or enemies
-expected;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_224">[p. 224]</span> the
-belief in their power was thus proportionally abridged. It now
-remained for Epaminondas to complete their humiliation by executing
-those two enterprises which had formed the special purpose of his
-expedition: the reëstablishment of Messênê, and the consolidation of
-the Arcadians.</p>
-
-<p>The recent invasion of Laconia, victorious as well as lucrative,
-had inspired the Arcadians with increased confidence and antipathy
-against Sparta, and increased disposition to listen to Epaminondas.
-When that eminent man proclaimed the necessity of establishing a
-strong frontier against Sparta on the side of Arcadia, and when
-he announced his intention of farther weakening Sparta by the
-restoration of the exiled Messenians,—the general feeling of the
-small Arcadian communities, already tending in the direction of
-coalescence, became strong enough to overbear all such impediments
-of detail as the breaking up of ancient abode and habit involves.
-Respecting early Athenian history, we are told by Thucydides,<a
-id="FNanchor_478" href="#Footnote_478" class="fnanchor">[478]</a>
-that the legendary Theseus, “having become powerful, in addition
-to his great capacity,” had effected the discontinuance of those
-numerous independent governments which once divided Attica, and had
-consolidated them all into one common government at Athens. Just
-such was the revolution now operated by Epaminondas, through the
-like combination of intelligence and power. A Board of Œkists or
-Founders was named to carry out the resolution taken by the Arcadian
-assemblies at Asea and Tegea, for the establishment of a Pan-Arcadian
-city and centre. Of this Board, two were from Tegea, two from
-Mantinea, two from Kleitor, two from the district of Menalus, two
-from that of the Parrhasians. A convenient site being chosen upon
-the river Helisson (which flowed through and divided the town in
-two), about twenty miles west of Tegea, well-fitted to block up the
-marches of Sparta in a north-westerly direction,—the foundation of
-the new Great City (Megalopolis) was laid by the Œkists jointly with
-Epaminondas. Forty distinct Arcadian townships,<a id="FNanchor_479"
-href="#Footnote_479" class="fnanchor">[479]</a> from all sides of
-this centre, were persuaded to join the new community. Ten were from
-the Mænalii, eight from the Parrhasii, six from the Eutresii,<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_225">[p. 225]</span> three great sections
-of the Arcadian name, each an aggregate of villages. Four little
-townships, occupying a portion of the area intended for the new
-territory, yet being averse to the scheme, were constrained to
-join; but in one of them, Trapezus, the aversion was so strong,
-that most of the inhabitants preferred to emigrate, and went to
-join the Trapezuntines in the Euxine Sea (Trebizond), who received
-them kindly. Some of the leading Trapezuntines were even slain by
-the violent temper of the Arcadian majority. The walls of the new
-city enclosed an area of fifty stadia in circumference (more than
-five miles and a half); while an ample rural territory was also
-gathered around it, extending northward as much as twenty-four miles
-from the city, and conterminous on the east with Tegea, Mantinea,
-Orchomenus, and Kaphyæ,—on the west with Messênê,<a id="FNanchor_480"
-href="#Footnote_480" class="fnanchor">[480]</a> Phigalia, and
-Heræa.</p>
-
-<p>The other new city,—Messênê,—was founded under the joint auspices
-of the Thebans and their allies, Argeians and others; Epitelês
-being especially chosen by the Argeians for that purpose.<a
-id="FNanchor_481" href="#Footnote_481" class="fnanchor">[481]</a>
-The Messenian exiles, though eager and joyful at the thought of
-regaining their name and nationality, were averse to fix their new
-city either at Œchalia or Andania, which had been the scenes of
-their calamities in the early wars with Sparta. Moreover the site of
-Mount Ithômê is said to have been pointed out by the hero Kaukon,
-in a dream, to the Ageian general Epitelês. The local circumstances
-of this mountain (on which the last gallant resistance of the
-revolted Messenians against Sparta had been carried on, between the
-Persian and Peloponnesian wars) were such, that the indications
-of dreams, prophets, and religious signs coincided fully with the
-deliberate choice of a judge like Epaminondas. In after days, this
-hill Ithômê (then bearing the town and citadel of Messênê), together
-with the Akrocorinthus, were marked out by De<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_226">[p. 226]</span>metrius of Pharus as the two horns of
-Peloponnesus: whoever held these two horns, was master of the bull.<a
-id="FNanchor_482" href="#Footnote_482" class="fnanchor">[482]</a>
-Ithômê was near two thousand five hundred feet above the level of
-the sea, having upon its summit an abundant spring of water, called
-Klepsydra. Upon this summit the citadel or acropolis of the new
-town of Messênê was built; while the town itself was situated lower
-down on the slope, though connected by a continuous wall with its
-acropolis. First, solemn sacrifices were offered, by Epaminondas,
-who was recognized as Œkist or Founder,<a id="FNanchor_483"
-href="#Footnote_483" class="fnanchor">[483]</a> to Dionysius and
-Apollo Ismenius,—by the Argeians, to the Argeian Hêrê and Zeus
-Nemeius,—by the Messenians, to Zeus Ithomatês and the Dioskuri.
-Next, prayer was made to the ancient Heroes and Heroines of the
-Messenian nation, especially to the invincible warrior Aristomenes,
-that they would now come back and again take up their residence as
-inmates in enfranchised Messênê. After this, the ground was marked
-out and the building was begun, under the sound of Argeian and
-Bœotian flutes, playing the strains of Pronomus and Sakadas. The best
-masons and architects were invited from all Greece, to lay out the
-streets with regularity, as well as to ensure a proper distribution
-and construction of the sacred edifices.<a id="FNanchor_484"
-href="#Footnote_484" class="fnanchor">[484]</a> In respect of the
-fortifications, too, Epaminondas was studiously provident. Such
-was their excellence and solidity, that they exhibited matter for
-admiration even in the after-days of the traveller Pausanias.<a
-id="FNanchor_485" href="#Footnote_485" class="fnanchor">[485]</a></p>
-
-<p>From their newly-established city on the hill of Ithômê, the
-Messenians enjoyed a territory extending fifteen miles southward
-down to the Messenian Gulf, across a plain, then as well as now, the
-richest and most fertile in Peloponnesus; while to the eastward,
-their territory was conterminous with that of Arcadia and the
-contemporary establishment of Megalopolis. All the newly-appropriated
-space was land cut off from the Spartan dominion. How much
-was cut off in the direction south-east of Ithômê (along the
-north-eastern coast of the Messenian Gulf), we cannot exactly say.
-But it would appear that the Periœki of Thuria, situated in that
-neighborhood, were converted into an independent community<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_227">[p. 227]</span> and protected by
-the vicinity of Messênê.<a id="FNanchor_486" href="#Footnote_486"
-class="fnanchor">[486]</a> What is of more importance to
-notice, however, is,—that all the extensive district westward
-and south-westward of Ithômê,—all the south-western corner of
-Peloponnesus, from the river Neda southward to Cape Akritas,—was now
-also subtracted from Sparta. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian
-war, the Spartan Brasidas had been in garrison near Methônê<a
-id="FNanchor_487" href="#Footnote_487" class="fnanchor">[487]</a>
-(not far from Cape Akritas); Pylus,—where the Athenian Demosthenes
-erected his hostile fort, near which the important capture at
-Sphakteria was effected,—had been a maritime point belonging to
-Sparta, about forty-six miles from the city;<a id="FNanchor_488"
-href="#Footnote_488" class="fnanchor">[488]</a> Aulon (rather farther
-north, near the river Neda) had been at the time of the conspiracy of
-Kinadon a township of Spartan Periœki, of very doubtful fidelity.<a
-id="FNanchor_489" href="#Footnote_489" class="fnanchor">[489]</a> Now
-all this wide area, from the north-eastern corner of the Messenian
-Gulf westward, the best half of the Spartan territory, was severed
-from Sparta to become the property of Periœki and Helots, converted
-into freemen; not only sending no rent or tribute to Sparta, as
-before, but bitterly hostile to her from the very nature of their
-tenure. It was in the ensuing year that the Arcadian army cut to
-pieces the Lacedæmonian garrison at Asinê,<a id="FNanchor_490"
-href="#Footnote_490" class="fnanchor">[490]</a> killing the Spartan
-polemarch Geranor; and probably about the same time the other
-Lacedæmonian garrisons in the south-western peninsula must have been
-expelled. Thus liberated, the Periœki of the region welcomed the new
-Messênê as the guarantee of their independence. Epaminondas, besides
-confirming the independence of Methônê and Asinê, reconstituted
-some other towns,<a id="FNanchor_491" href="#Footnote_491"
-class="fnanchor">[491]</a> which under Lacedæmonian dominion had
-probably been kept unfortified and had dwindled away.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_228">[p. 228]</span></p>
-
-<p>In the spring of 425 <small>B.C.</small>, when Demosthenes landed
-at Pylus, Thucydides considers it a valuable acquisition for Athens,
-and a serious injury to Sparta, to have lodged a small garrison of
-Messenians in that insignificant post, as plunderers of Spartan
-territory and instigators of Helots to desertion,<a id="FNanchor_492"
-href="#Footnote_492" class="fnanchor">[492]</a>—especially as
-their dialect could not be distinguished from that of the Spartans
-themselves. How prodigious must have been the impression throughout
-Greece, when Epaminondas, by planting the Messenian exiles and others
-on the strong frontier city and position of Ithômê, deprived Sparta
-in a short time of all the wide space between that mountain and the
-western sea, enfranchising the Periœki and Helots contained in it!
-We must recollect that the name Messênê had been from old times
-applied generally to this region, and that it was never bestowed
-upon any city before the time of Epaminondas. When therefore the
-Spartans complained of “the liberation of Messênê,”—“the loss of
-Messênê,”—they included in the word, not simply the city on Mount
-Ithômê, but all this territory besides; though it was not all
-comprised in the domain of the new city.</p>
-
-<p>They complained yet more indignantly, that along with the genuine
-Messenians, now brought back from exile,—a rabble of their own
-emancipated Periœki and Helots had been domiciled on their border.<a
-id="FNanchor_493" href="#Footnote_493" class="fnanchor">[493]</a>
-Herein were included, not only such of these two classes<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_229">[p. 229]</span> as, having before
-dwelt in servitude throughout the territory westward of Ithômê, now
-remained there in a state of freedom—but also doubtless a number of
-others who deserted from other parts of Laconia. For as we know that
-such desertions had been not inconsiderable, even when there was no
-better shelter than the outlying posts of Pylus and Kythêra—so we may
-be sure that they became much more numerous, when the neighboring
-city of Messênê was founded under adequate protection, and when
-there was a chance of obtaining, westward of the Messenian Gulf,
-free lands with a new home. Moreover, such Periœki and Helots as
-had actually joined the invading army of Epaminondas in Laconia,
-would be forced from simple insecurity to quit the country when
-he retired, and would be supplied with fresh residences in the
-newly-enfranchised territory. All these men would pass at once,
-out of a state of peculiarly harsh servitude, into the dignity of
-free and equal Hellens,<a id="FNanchor_494" href="#Footnote_494"
-class="fnanchor">[494]</a> sending again a solemn Messenian
-legation or Theôry to the Olympic festival, after an interval of
-more than three centuries,<a id="FNanchor_495" href="#Footnote_495"
-class="fnanchor">[495]</a>—outdoing their former masters in the
-magnitude of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">[p. 230]</span>
-their offerings from the same soil,—and requiting them for previous
-ill-usage by words of defiance and insult, instead of that universal
-deference and admiration which a Spartan had hitherto been accustomed
-to look upon as his due.</p>
-
-<p>The enfranchisement and reörganization of all Western Laconia,
-the renovation of the Messenian name, the foundation of the two
-new cities (Messênê and Megalopolis) in immediate neighborhood and
-sympathy,—while they completed the degradation of Sparta, constituted
-in all respects the most interesting political phenomena that
-Greece had witnessed for many years. To the profound mortification
-of the historian,—he is able to recount nothing more than the bare
-facts, with such inferences as these facts themselves warrant.
-Xenophon, under whose eyes all must have passed, designedly
-omits to notice them;<a id="FNanchor_496" href="#Footnote_496"
-class="fnanchor">[496]</a> Pausanias, whom we<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_231">[p. 231]</span> have to thank for most of what we know,
-is prompted by his religious imagination to relate many divine signs
-and warnings, but little matter of actual occurrence. Details are
-altogether withheld from us. We know neither how long a time was
-occupied in the building of the two cities, nor who furnished the
-cost; though both the one and the other must have been considerable.
-Of the thousand new arrangements, incident to the winding up of many
-small townships, and the commencement of two large cities, we are
-unable to render any account. Yet there is no point of time wherein
-social phenomena are either so interesting or so instructive. In
-describing societies already established and ancient, we find the
-force of traditional routine almost omnipotent in its influence
-both on men’s actions and on their feelings; bad as well as good
-is preserved in one concrete, since the dead weight of the past
-stifles all constructive intelligence, and leaves little room even
-for improving aspirations. But the forty small communities which
-coalesced into Megalopolis, and the Messenians and other settlers
-who came for the first time together on the hill of Ithômê, were in
-a state in which new exigencies of every kind pressed for immediate
-satisfaction. There was no file to afford a precedent, nor any
-resource left except to submit all the problems to discussion by
-those whose character and judgment was most esteemed. Whether the
-problems were well- or ill-solved, there must have been now a genuine
-and earnest attempt to strike out as good a solution as the lights of
-the time and place permitted, with a certain latitude for conflicting
-views. Arrangements must have been made for the apportionment of
-houses and lands among the citizens, by purchase, or grant, or both
-together; for the political and judicial constitution; for religious
-and recreative ceremonies, for military defence, for markets, for
-the security and transmission of property, etc. All these and many
-other social wants of a nascent community must now have been provided
-for, and it would have been highly interesting to know how. Unhappily
-the means are denied to us. We can record little more than the bare
-fact that these two youngest members of the Hellenic brotherhood of
-cities were born at the same time, and under the auspices of the
-same presiding genius, Epami<span class="pagenum" id="Page_232">[p.
-232]</span>nondas; destined to sustain each other in neighborly
-sympathy and in repelling all common danger from the attacks of
-Sparta; a purpose, which, even two centuries afterwards, remained
-engraven on the mind of a Megalopolitan patriot like Polybius.<a
-id="FNanchor_497" href="#Footnote_497" class="fnanchor">[497]</a></p>
-
-<p>Megalopolis was intended not merely as a great city in itself, but
-as the centre of the new confederacy; which appears to have comprised
-all Arcadia, except Orchomenus and Heræa. It was enacted that a synod
-or assembly, from all the separate members of the Arcadian name,
-and in which probably every Arcadian citizen from the constituent
-communities had the right of attending, should be periodically
-convoked there. This assembly was called the Ten Thousand, or the
-Great Number. A body of Arcadian troops, called the Epariti, destined
-to uphold the federation, and receiving pay when on service, was
-also provided. Assessments were levied upon each city for their
-support, and a Pan-Arcadian general (probably also other officers)
-was named. The Ten Thousand, on behalf of all Arcadia, received
-foreign envoys,—concluded war, or peace, or alliance,—and tried
-all officers or other Arcadians brought before them on accusations
-of public misconduct.<a id="FNanchor_498" href="#Footnote_498"
-class="fnanchor">[498]</a> The great Athenian orators, Kallistratus,
-Demosthenes, Æschines, on various occasions pleaded before it.<a
-id="FNanchor_499" href="#Footnote_499" class="fnanchor">[499]</a>
-What were its times of meeting, we are unable to say. It contributed
-seriously, for a certain time, to sustain a Pan-Arcadian communion
-of action and sentiment which had never before existed;<a
-id="FNanchor_500" href="#Footnote_500" class="fnanchor">[500]</a> and
-to prevent, or soften, those dissensions which had always a tendency
-to break out among the separate Arcadian cities. The patriotic
-enthusiasm, however, out of which Megalopolis had first arisen,
-gradually became enfeebled. The city never attained that preëminence
-or power which its founders contemplated, and which had caused
-the city to be laid out on a scale too large for the population
-actually inhabiting it.<a id="FNanchor_501" href="#Footnote_501"
-class="fnanchor">[501]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_233">[p. 233]</span></p>
-
-<p>Not only was the portion of Laconia west of the Messenian Gulf
-now rendered independent of Sparta, but also much of the territory
-which lies north of Sparta, between that city and Arcadia. Thus the
-Skiritæ (hardy mountaineers of Arcadian race, heretofore dependent
-upon Sparta, and constituting a valuable contingent to her armies),<a
-id="FNanchor_502" href="#Footnote_502" class="fnanchor">[502]</a>
-with their territory forming the northern frontier of Laconia
-towards Arcadia, became from this time independent of and
-hostile to Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_503" href="#Footnote_503"
-class="fnanchor">[503]</a> The same is the case even with a place
-much nearer to Sparta,—Sellasia; though this latter was retaken by
-the Lacedæmonians four or five years afterwards.<a id="FNanchor_504"
-href="#Footnote_504" class="fnanchor">[504]</a></p>
-
-<p>Epaminondas remained about four months beyond the legal duration
-of his command in Arcadia and Laconia.<a id="FNanchor_505"
-href="#Footnote_505" class="fnanchor">[505]</a> The sufferings
-of a severe mid-winter were greatly mitigated to his soldiers by
-the Arcadians, who, full of devoted friendship, pressed upon them
-an excess of hospitality which he could not permit consistently
-with his military duties.<a id="FNanchor_506" href="#Footnote_506"
-class="fnanchor">[506]</a> He stayed long enough to settle all the
-preliminary debates and difficulties, and to put in train of serious
-execution the establishment of Messênê and Megalopolis. For the
-completion of a work thus comprehensive, which changed the face
-and character of Peloponnesus, much time was of course necessary.
-Accordingly, a Theban division under Pamenes was left to repel all
-obstruction from Sparta;<a id="FNanchor_507" href="#Footnote_507"
-class="fnanchor">[507]</a> while Tegea also, from this time for<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_234">[p. 234]</span>ward, for some
-years, was occupied as a post by a Theban harmost and garrison.<a
-id="FNanchor_508" href="#Footnote_508" class="fnanchor">[508]</a></p>
-
-<p>Meanwhile the Athenians were profoundly affected by these
-proceedings of Epaminondas in Peloponnesus. The accumulation of
-force against Sparta was so powerful, that under a chief like
-him, it seemed sufficient to crush her; and though the Athenians
-were now neutral in the contest, such a prospect was not at all
-agreeable to them,<a id="FNanchor_509" href="#Footnote_509"
-class="fnanchor">[509]</a> involving the aggrandizement of Thebes
-to a point inconsistent with their security. It was in the midst of
-the successes of Epaminondas that envoys came to Athens from Sparta,
-Corinth, and Phlius, to entreat her aid. The message was one not
-merely humiliating to the Lacedæmonians, who had never previously
-sent the like request to any Grecian city,—but also difficult to
-handle in reference to Athens. History showed abundant acts of
-jealousy and hostility, little either of good feeling or consentient
-interest, on the part of the Lacedæmonians towards her. What little
-was to be found, the envoys dexterously brought forward; going back
-to the dethronement of the Peisistratids from Athens by Spartan help,
-the glorious expulsion of Xerxes from Greece by the joint efforts of
-both cities,—and the auxiliaries sent by Athens into Laconia in 465
-<small>B.C.</small>, to assist the Spartans against the revolted
-Messenians<span class="pagenum" id="Page_235">[p. 235]</span> on
-Mount Ithômê. In these times (he reminded the Athenian assembly)
-Thebes had betrayed the Hellenic cause by joining Xerxes, and had
-been an object of common hatred to both. Moreover the maritime
-forces of Greece had been arrayed under Athens in the Confederacy
-of Delos, with full sanction and recommendation from Sparta;
-while the headship of the latter by land had in like manner been
-accepted by the Athenians. He called on the assembly, in the name of
-these former glories, to concur with Sparta in forgetting all the
-deplorable hostilities which had since intervened, and to afford
-to her a generous relief against the old common enemy. The Thebans
-might even now be decimated (according to the vow said to have
-been taken after the repulse of Xerxes), in spite of their present
-menacing ascendency,—if Athens and Sparta could be brought heartily
-to coöperate; and might be dealt with as Thebes herself had wished to
-deal with Athens after the Peloponnesian war, when Sparta refused to
-concur in pronouncing the sentence of utter ruin.<a id="FNanchor_510"
-href="#Footnote_510" class="fnanchor">[510]</a></p>
-
-<p>This appeal from Sparta was earnestly seconded by the envoys
-from Corinth and Phlius. The Corinthian speaker contended, that
-Epaminondas and his army, passing through the territory of Corinth
-and inflicting damage upon it in their passage into Peloponnesus,
-had committed a glaring violation of the general peace, sworn in
-371 <small>B.C.</small>, first at Sparta and afterwards at Athens,
-guaranteeing universal autonomy to every Grecian city. The envoy
-from Phlius,—while complimenting Athens on the proud position which
-she now held, having the fate of Sparta in her hands,—dwelt on the
-meed of honor which she would earn in Greece, if she now generously
-interfered to rescue her ancient rival, forgetting past injuries
-and remembering only past benefits. In adopting such policy, too,
-she would act in accordance with her own true interests; since,
-should Sparta be crushed, the Thebans would become undisputed heads
-of Greece, and more formidable still to Athens.<a id="FNanchor_511"
-href="#Footnote_511" class="fnanchor">[511]</a></p>
-
-<p>It was not among the least marks of the prostration of Sparta,
-that she should be compelled to send such an embassy to Athens, and
-to entreat an amnesty for so many untoward realities during the past.
-The contrast is indeed striking, when we set her present language
-against that which she had held respecting Athens, before and through
-the Peloponnesian war.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_236">[p. 236]</span></p>
-
-<p>At first, her envoys were heard with doubtful favor; the
-sentiment of the assembly being apparently rather against than for
-them. “Such language from the Spartans (murmured the assembled
-citizens) is intelligible enough during their present distress; but
-so long as they were in good circumstances, we received nothing
-but ill-usage from them.”<a id="FNanchor_512" href="#Footnote_512"
-class="fnanchor">[512]</a> Nor was the complaint of the Spartans,
-that the invasion of Laconia was contrary to the sworn peace
-guaranteeing universal autonomy, admitted without opposition. Some
-said that the Lacedæmonians had drawn the invasion upon themselves,
-by their previous interference with Tegea and in Arcadia; and that
-the intervention of the Mantineans at Tegea had been justifiable,
-since Stasippus and the philo-Laconian party in that city had been
-the first to begin unjust violence. On the other hand, the appeal
-made by the envoys to the congress of Peloponnesian allies held
-in 404 <small>B.C.</small>, after the surrender of Athens,—when
-the Theban deputy had proposed that Athens should be totally
-destroyed, while the Spartans had strenuously protested against
-so cruel a sentence—made a powerful impression on the assembly,
-and contributed more than anything else to determine them in favor
-of the proposition.<a id="FNanchor_513" href="#Footnote_513"
-class="fnanchor">[513]</a> “As Athens was then, so Sparta is now, on
-the brink of ruin, from the fiat of the same enemy: Athens was then
-rescued by Sparta, and shall she now leave the rescue unrequited?”
-Such was the broad and simple issue which told upon the feelings of
-the assembled Athenians, disposing them to listen with increasing
-favor both to the envoys from Corinth and Phlius, and to their own
-speakers on the same side.</p>
-
-<p>To rescue Sparta, indeed, was prudent as well as generous.
-A counterpoise would thus be maintained against the excessive
-aggrandizement of Thebes, which at this moment doubtless caused
-serious alarm and jealousy to the Athenians. And thus, after
-the first ebullition of resentment against Sparta, naturally
-suggested by the history of the past, the philo-Spartan view of
-the situation gradually became more and more predominant in the
-assembly. Kallistratus<a id="FNanchor_514" href="#Footnote_514"
-class="fnanchor">[514]</a> the orator spoke eloquently in
-support of the Lace<span class="pagenum" id="Page_237">[p.
-237]</span>dæmonians; while the adverse speakers were badly listened
-to, as pleading in favor of Thebes, whom no one wished to aggrandize
-farther. A vote, decisive and enthusiastic, was passed for assisting
-the Spartans with the full force of Athens; under the command of
-Iphikrates, then residing as a private citizen<a id="FNanchor_515"
-href="#Footnote_515" class="fnanchor">[515]</a> at Athens, since the
-peace of the preceding year, which had caused him to be recalled from
-Korkyra.</p>
-
-<p>As soon as the sacrifices, offered in contemplation of this
-enterprise were announced to be favorable, Iphikrates made
-proclamation that the citizens destined for service should equip
-themselves and muster in arms in the grove of Akadêmus (outside
-the gates), there to take their evening meal, and to march the
-next morning at daybreak. Such was the general ardor, that many
-citizens went forth from the gates even in advance of Iphikrates
-himself; and the total force which followed him is said to have
-been twelve thousand men,—not named under conscription by the
-general, but volunteers.<a id="FNanchor_516" href="#Footnote_516"
-class="fnanchor">[516]</a> He first marched to Corinth, where he
-halted some days; much to the discontent of his soldiers, who were
-impatient to accomplish their project of carrying rescue to Sparta.
-But Iphikrates was well aware that all beyond Corinth was hostile
-ground, and that he had formidable enemies to deal with. After
-having established his position at Corinth, and obtained information
-regarding the enemy, he marched into Arcadia, and there made war
-without any important result. Epaminondas and his army had quitted
-Laconia, while many of the Arcadians and Eleians had gone home with
-the plunder acquired; so that Sparta was, for the time, out of
-danger. Impelled in part by the recent manifestation of Athens,<a
-id="FNanchor_517" href="#Footnote_517" class="fnanchor">[517]</a>
-the Theban general himself soon commenced his march of return into
-Bœotia, in which it was necessary for him to pass the line of
-Mount Oneium between Corinth and Kenchreæ. This line was composed
-of difficult ground, and afforded good means of resistance to the
-passage of an army; nevertheless Iphikrates, though he occupied its
-two extremities, did not attempt directly to<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_238">[p. 238]</span> bar the passage of the Thebans. He
-contented himself with sending out from Corinth all his cavalry,
-both Athenian and Corinthian, to harass them in their march. But
-Epaminondas beat them back with some loss, and pursued them to the
-gates of Corinth. Excited by this spectacle, the Athenian main body
-within the town were eager to march out and engage in general battle.
-Their ardor was however repressed by Iphikrates; who, refusing to go
-forth, suffered the Thebans to continue their retreat unmolested.<a
-id="FNanchor_518" href="#Footnote_518" class="fnanchor">[518]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_239">[p. 239]</span></p>
-
-<p>On returning to Thebes, Epaminondas with Pelopidas and the
-other Bœotarchs, resigned the command. They had already<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_240">[p. 240]</span> retained it for four
-months longer than the legal expiration of their term. Although,
-by the constitutional law of Thebes, any general who retained his
-functions longer than the period fixed by law was pronounced worthy
-of death, yet Epaminondas, while employed in his great projects
-for humiliating Sparta and founding the two hostile cities on her
-border, had taken upon himself to brave this illegality, persuading
-all his colleagues to concur with him. On resigning the command, all
-of them had to undergo that trial of accountability which awaited
-every retiring magistrate, as a matter of course,—but which, in the
-present case, was required on special ground, since all had committed
-an act notoriously punishable as well as of dangerous precedent.
-Epaminondas undertook the duty of defending his colleagues as well
-as himself. That he as well as Pelopidas had political enemies,
-likely to avail themselves of any fair pretext for accusing him,—is
-not to be doubted. But we may well doubt, whether on the present
-occasion any of these enemies actually came forward to propose that
-the penalty legally incurred should be inflicted; not merely because
-this proposition, in the face of a victorious army, returning elate
-with their achievements and proud of their commanders, was full of
-danger to the mover himself,—but also for another reason,—because
-Epaminondas would hardly be imprudent enough to wait for the case
-to be stated by his enemies. Knowing that the illegality committed
-was flagrant and of hazardous example,—having also the reputation
-of his colleagues as well as his own to protect,—he would forestall
-accusation by coming forward himself to explain and justify the
-proceeding. He set forth the glorious results of the expedition just
-finished; the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_241">[p. 241]</span>
-invasion and devastation of Laconia, hitherto unvisited by any
-enemy,—the confinement of the Spartans within their walls,—the
-liberation of all Western Laconia, and the establishment of Messênê
-as a city,—the constitution of a strong new Arcadian city, forming,
-with Tegea on one flank and Messênê on the other, a line of defence
-on the Spartan frontier, so as to ensure the permanent depression of
-the great enemy of Thebes,—the emancipation of Greece generally, from
-Spartan ascendency, now consummated.</p>
-
-<p>Such justification,—whether delivered in reply to a substantive
-accuser, or (which is more probable) tendered spontaneously by
-Epaminondas himself,—was not merely satisfactory, but triumphant.
-He and the other generals were acquitted by acclamation; without
-even going through the formality of collecting the votes.<a
-id="FNanchor_519" href="#Footnote_519" class="fnanchor">[519]</a>
-And it appears that both Epaminondas and Pelopidas were immediately
-re-appointed among the Bœotarchs of the year.<a id="FNanchor_520"
-href="#Footnote_520" class="fnanchor">[520]</a></p>
-
-<hr class="chap" />
-
-
-<div class="chapter" id="Chap_79">
-  <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_242">[p. 242]</span></p>
-  <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXIX.<br />
-  FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO
-  THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS.</h2>
-</div>
-
-<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">Prodigious</span>
-was the change operated throughout the Grecian world during the
-eighteen months between June 371 <small>B.C.</small> (when the
-general peace, including all except Thebes, was sworn at Sparta,
-twenty days before the battle of Leuktra), and the spring of 369
-<small>B.C.</small>, when the Thebans, after a victorious expedition
-into Peloponnesus, were reconducted home by Epaminondas.</p>
-
-<p>How that change worked in Peloponnesus, amounting to a partial
-reconstitution of the peninsula, has been sketched in the preceding
-chapter. Among most of the cities and districts hitherto dependent
-allies of Sparta, the local oligarchies, whereby Spartan influence
-had been maintained, were overthrown, not without harsh and violent
-reaction. Laconia had been invaded and laid waste, while the Spartans
-were obliged to content themselves with guarding their central hearth
-and their families from assault. The western and best half of Laconia
-had been wrested from them; Messênê had been constituted as a free
-city on their frontier; a large proportion of their Periœki and
-Helots had been converted into independent Greeks bitterly hostile
-to them; moreover the Arcadian population had been emancipated from
-their dependence, and organized into self-acting jealous neighbors in
-the new city of Megalopolis, as well as in Tegea and Mantinea. The
-once philo-Laconian Tegea was now among the chief enemies of Sparta;
-and the Skiritæ, so long numbered as the bravest of the auxiliary
-troops of the latter, were now identified in sentiment with Arcadians
-and Thebans against her.</p>
-
-<p>Out of Peloponnesus, the change wrought had also been
-considerable; partly, in the circumstances of Thessaly and Macedonia,
-partly in the position and policy of Athens.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_243">[p. 243]</span></p>
-
-<p>At the moment of the battle of Leuktra (July, 371
-<small>B.C.</small>) Jason was tagus of Thessaly, and Amyntas
-king of Macedonia. Amyntas was dependent on, if not tributary to,
-Jason, whose dominion, military force, and revenue, combined with
-extraordinary personal energy and ability, rendered him decidedly
-the first potentate in Greece, and whose aspirations were known to
-be unbounded; so that he inspired more or less alarm everywhere,
-especially to weaker neighbors like the Macedonian prince. Throughout
-a reign of twenty-three years, full of trouble and peril, Amyntas
-had cultivated the friendship both of Sparta and of Athens,<a
-id="FNanchor_521" href="#Footnote_521" class="fnanchor">[521]</a>
-especially the former. It was by Spartan aid only that he had been
-enabled to prevail over the Olynthian confederacy, which would
-otherwise have proved an overmatch for him. At the time when Sparta
-aided him to crush that promising and liberal confederacy, she was
-at the maximum of her power (382-379 <small>B.C.</small>), holding
-even Thebes under garrison among her subject allies. But the
-revolution of Thebes, and the war against Thebes and Athens (from 378
-<small>B.C.</small> downward) had sensibly diminished her power on
-land; while the newly-organized naval force and maritime confederacy
-of the Athenians, had overthrown her empire at sea. Moreover, the
-great power of Jason in Thessaly had so grown up (combined with
-the resistance of the Thebans) as to cut off the communication
-of Sparta with Macedonia, and even to forbid her (in 374
-<small>B.C.</small>) from assisting her faithful ally, the Pharsalian
-Polydamas, against him.<a id="FNanchor_522" href="#Footnote_522"
-class="fnanchor">[522]</a> To Amyntas, accordingly, the friendship
-of Athens, now again the greatest maritime potentate in Greece,
-had become more important than that of Sparta. We know that he
-tried to conciliate the powerful Athenian generals, Iphikrates and
-Timotheus. He adopted the former as his son;<a id="FNanchor_523"
-href="#Footnote_523" class="fnanchor">[523]</a> at what exact
-period, cannot be discovered; but I have<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_244">[p. 244]</span> already stated that Iphikrates had
-married the daughter of Kotys king of Thrace, and had acquired a
-maritime settlement called Drys, on the Thracian coast. In the years
-373-372 <small>B.C.</small>, we find Timotheus also in great favor
-with Amyntas, testified by a valuable present sent to him at Athens;
-a cargo of timber, the best produce of Macedonia.<a id="FNanchor_524"
-href="#Footnote_524" class="fnanchor">[524]</a> Amyntas was at this
-period on the best footing with Athens, sent his deputies as a
-confederate to the regular synod there assembled, and was treated
-with considerable favor.<a id="FNanchor_525" href="#Footnote_525"
-class="fnanchor">[525]</a></p>
-
-<p>The battle of Leuktra (July 371 <small>B.C.</small>) tended to
-knit more closely the connection between Amyntas and the Athenians,
-who were now the auxiliaries most likely to sustain him against the
-ascendency of Jason. It produced at the same time the more important
-effect of stimulating the ambition of Athens in every direction.
-Not only her ancient rival, Sparta, beaten in the field and driven
-from one humiliation to another, was disabled from opposing her,
-and even compelled to solicit her aid,—but new rivals, the Thebans,
-were suddenly lifted into an ascendency inspiring her with mingled
-jealousy and apprehension. Hence fresh hopes as well as fresh
-jealousies conspired to push Athens in a career of aspiration
-such as had never appeared open to her since the disasters of 404
-<small>B.C.</small> Such enlargement of her views was manifested
-conspicuously by the step taken two or three months after the
-battle of Leuktra (mentioned in my preceding chapter),—of causing
-the peace, which had already been sworn at Sparta in the preceding
-month of June, to be resworn under the presidency and guarantee
-of Athens, by cities binding themselves mutually to each other as
-defensive allies of Athens;<a id="FNanchor_526" href="#Footnote_526"
-class="fnanchor">[526]</a> thus silently disenthroning Sparta and
-taking her place.</p>
-
-<p>On land, however, Athens had never held, and could hardly expect
-to hold, anything above the second rank, serving as a bulwark
-against Theban aggrandizement. At sea she already occupied the
-first place, at the head of an extensive confederacy; and it was
-to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_245">[p. 245]</span> farther
-maritime aggrandizement that her present chances, as well as her
-past traditions, pointed. Such is the new path upon which we now
-find her entering. At the first formation of her new confederacy,
-in 378 <small>B.C.</small>, she had distinctly renounced all idea
-of resuming the large amount of possessions, public and private,
-which had been snatched from her along with her empire at the
-close of the Peloponnesian war; and had formally proclaimed that
-no Athenian citizen should for the future possess or cultivate
-land out of Attica—a guarantee against renovation of the previous
-kleruchies or out-possessions. This prudent self-restraint, which
-had contributed so much during the last seven years to raise her
-again into naval preëminence, is now gradually thrown aside, under
-the tempting circumstances of the moment. Henceforward, the Athenian
-maritime force becomes employed for the recovery of lost possessions
-as well as for protection or enlargement of the confederacy. The
-prohibition against kleruchies out of Attica will soon appear to be
-forgotten. Offence is given to the prominent members of the maritime
-confederacy; so that the force of Athens, misemployed and broken into
-fragments, is found twelve or thirteen years afterwards unable to
-repel a new aggressor, who starts up, alike able and unexpected, in
-the Macedonian prince Philip, son of Amyntas.</p>
-
-<p>Very different was the position of Amyntas himself towards
-Athens, in 371 <small>B.C.</small> He was an unpretending ally,
-looking for help in case of need against Jason, and sending his
-envoy to the meeting at Athens about September or October 371
-<small>B.C.</small>, when the general peace was resworn under
-Athenian auspices. It was at this meeting that Athens seems to have
-first put forth her new maritime pretensions. While guaranteeing
-to every Grecian city, great and small, the enjoyment of autonomy,
-she made exception of some cities which she claimed as belonging to
-herself. Among these was certainly Amphipolis; probably also the
-towns in the Thracian Chersonesus and Potidæa; all which we find,
-a few years afterwards, occupied by Athenians.<a id="FNanchor_527"
-href="#Footnote_527" class="fnanchor">[527]</a> How much of their
-lost possessions the Athenians thought it prudent now to reclaim,
-we cannot distinctly make out. But we know that their aspirations
-grasped<span class="pagenum" id="Page_246">[p. 246]</span> much
-more than Amphipolis;<a id="FNanchor_528" href="#Footnote_528"
-class="fnanchor">[528]</a> and the moment was probably thought
-propitious for making other demands besides. Amyntas through his
-envoy, together with the rest of the assembled envoys, recognized
-without opposition the right of the Athenians to Amphipolis.<a
-id="FNanchor_529" href="#Footnote_529" class="fnanchor">[529]</a></p>
-
-<p>Such recognition was not indeed in itself either any loss to
-Amyntas, or any gain to Athens; for Amphipolis, though bordering
-on his kingdom, had never belonged to him, nor had he any power of
-transferring it. Originally an Athenian colony,<a id="FNanchor_530"
-href="#Footnote_530" class="fnanchor">[530]</a> next taken from<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_247">[p. 247]</span> Athens in 424-423
-<small>B.C.</small> by Brasidas, through the improvidence of the
-Athenian officers Euklês and Thucydides, then recolonized under
-Lacedæmonian auspices,—it had ever since remained an independent
-city; though Sparta had covenanted to restore it by the peace of
-Nikias (421 <small>B.C.</small>), but had never performed her
-covenant. Its unparalleled situation, near to both the bridge and
-mouth of the Strymon, in the midst of a fertile territory, within
-reach of the mining district of Pangæus,—rendered it a tempting
-prize; and the right of Athens to it was indisputable; so far as
-original colonization before the capture by Brasidas, and formal
-treaty of cession by Sparta after the capture, could confer a right.
-But this treaty, not fulfilled at the time, was now fifty years old.
-The repugnance of the Amphipolitan population, which had originally
-prevented its fulfilment, was strengthened by all the sanction of
-a long prescription; while the tomb and chapel of Brasidas their
-second founder, consecrated in the agora, served as an imperishable
-admonition to repel all pretensions on the part of Athens. Such
-pretensions, whatever might be the right, were deplorably impolitic
-unless Athens was prepared to back them by strenuous efforts of men
-and money; from which we shall find her shrinking now as she had done
-(under the unwise advice of Nikias) in 421 <small>B.C.</small>,
-and the years immediately succeeding. In fact, the large renovated
-pretensions of Athens both to Amphipolis and to other places on
-the Macedonian and Chalkidic coast, combined with her languor and
-inertness in military action,—will be found henceforward among the
-greatest mischiefs to the general cause of Hellenic independence, and
-among the most effective helps to the well-conducted aggressions of
-Philip of Macedon.</p> <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_248">[p.
-248]</span></p> <p>Though the claim of Athens to the recovery of
-a portion of her lost transmarine possessions was thus advanced
-and recognized in the congress of autumn 371 <small>B.C.</small>,
-she does not seem to have been able to take any immediate steps
-for prosecuting it. Six months afterwards, the state of northern
-Greece was again completely altered by the death, nearly at the
-same time, of Jason in Thessaly, and of Amyntas in Macedonia.<a
-id="FNanchor_531" href="#Footnote_531" class="fnanchor">[531]</a> The
-former was cut off (as has been mentioned in the preceding chapter)
-by assassination, while in the plenitude of his vigor; and his
-great power could not be held together by an inferior hand. His two
-brothers, Polyphron and Polydorus, succeeded him in the post of tagus
-of Thessaly. Polyphron, having put to death his brother, enjoyed the
-dignity for a short time; after which he too was slain by a third
-brother, Alexander of Pheræ; but not before he had committed gross
-enormities by killing and banishing many of the most eminent citizens
-of Larissa and Pharsalus; among them the estimable Polydamas.<a
-id="FNanchor_532" href="#Footnote_532" class="fnanchor">[532]</a>
-The Larissæan exiles, many belonging to the great family of the
-Aleuadæ, took refuge in Macedonia, where Amyntas (having died in
-370 <small>B.C.</small>) had been succeeded in the throne by his
-youthful son Alexander. The latter, being persuaded to invade
-Thessaly for the purpose of restoring them, succeeded in getting
-possession of Larissa and Krannon; both which cities he kept under
-his own garrisons, in spite of unavailing resistance from Polyphron
-and Alexander of Pheræ.<a id="FNanchor_533" href="#Footnote_533"
-class="fnanchor">[533]</a></p>
-
-<p>This Alexander, who succeeded to Jason’s despotism in Pheræ, and
-to a considerable portion of his military power, was nevertheless
-unable to keep together the whole of it, or to retain Thessaly and
-its circumjacent tributaries in one united dominion. The Thessalian
-cities hostile to him invited assistance, not merely from Alexander
-of Macedon, but also from the Thebans; who despatched Pelopidas
-into the country, seemingly in 369 <small>B.C.</small>, soon
-after the return of the army under Epaminondas from its victorious
-progress<span class="pagenum" id="Page_249">[p. 249]</span> in
-Laconia and Arcadia. Pelopidas entered Thessaly at the head of
-an army, and took Larissa with various other cities into Theban
-protection; apparently under the acquiescence of Alexander of
-Macedon, with whom he contracted an alliance.<a id="FNanchor_534"
-href="#Footnote_534" class="fnanchor">[534]</a> A large portion of
-Thessaly thus came under the protection of Thebes in hostility to the
-dynasty of Pheræ, and to the brutal tyrant Alexander who now ruled in
-that city.</p>
-
-<p>Alexander of Macedon found that he had difficulty enough in
-maintaining his own dominion at home, without holding Thessalian
-towns in garrison. He was harassed by intestine dissensions,
-and after a reign of scarcely two years, was assassinated (368
-<small>B.C.</small>) by some conspirators of Alôrus and Pydna,
-two cities (half Macedonian, half Hellenic) near the western
-coast of the Thermaic Gulf. Ptolemæus (or Ptolemy) of Alôrus is
-mentioned as leader of the enterprise, and Apollophanês of Pydna
-as one of the agents.<a id="FNanchor_535" href="#Footnote_535"
-class="fnanchor">[535]</a> But besides these conspirators, there
-was also another enemy, Pausanias,—a man of the royal lineage and a
-pretender to the throne;<a id="FNanchor_536" href="#Footnote_536"
-class="fnanchor">[536]</a> who, having been hitherto in banishment,
-was now returning at the head of a considerable body of Greeks,
-supported by numerous partisans in Macedonia,—and was already
-master of Anthemus, Thermê, Strepsa, and other places in or<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_250">[p. 250]</span> near the Thermaic Gulf.
-He was making war both against Ptolemy and against the remaining
-family of Amyntas. Eurydikê, the widow of that prince, was now
-left with her two younger children, Perdikkas, a young man, and
-Philip, yet a youth. She was in the same interest with Ptolemy, the
-successful conspirator against her son Alexander, and there was
-even a tale which represented her as his accomplice in the deed.
-Ptolemy was regent, administering her affairs and those of her minor
-children, against Pausanias.<a id="FNanchor_537" href="#Footnote_537"
-class="fnanchor">[537]</a></p>
-
-<p>Deserted by many of their most powerful friends, Eurydikê and
-Ptolemy would have been forced to yield the country to Pausanias,
-had they not found by accident a foreign auxiliary near at hand.
-The Athenian admiral Iphikrates, with a squadron of moderate force,
-was then on the coast of Macedonia. He had been sent thither by
-his countrymen (369 <small>B.C.</small>) (soon after his partial
-conflict near Corinth with the retreating army of Epaminondas, on
-its way from Peloponnesus to Bœotia), for the purpose of generally
-surveying the maritime region of Macedonia and Thrace, opening
-negotiations with parties in the country, and laying his plans for
-future military operations. At the period when Alexander was slain,
-and when Pausanias was carrying on his invasion, Iphikrates happened
-to be on the Macedonian coast. He was there visited by Eurydikê
-with her two sons Perdikkas and Philip; the latter seemingly about
-thirteen or fourteen years of age, the former somewhat older. She
-urgently implored him<span class="pagenum" id="Page_251">[p.
-251]</span> to assist the family in their present emergency,
-reminding him that Amyntas had not only throughout his life been a
-faithful ally of Athens, but had also adopted him (Iphikrates) as his
-son, and had thus constituted him brother to the two young princes.
-Placing Perdikkas in his hands, and causing Philip to embrace his
-knees, she appealed to his generous sympathies, and invoked his aid
-as the only chance of restoration, or even of personal safety, to the
-family. Iphikrates, moved by this affecting supplication, declared in
-her favor, acted so vigorously against Pausanias as to expel him from
-Macedonia, and secured the sceptre to the family of Amyntas; under
-Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent for the time.</p>
-
-<p>This striking incident is described by the orator Æschines<a
-id="FNanchor_538" href="#Footnote_538" class="fnanchor">[538]</a> in
-an oration delivered many years afterwards at Athens. The boy, who
-then clasped the knees of Iphikrates, lived afterwards to overthrow
-the independence, not of Athens alone, but of Greece generally. The
-Athenian general had not been sent to meddle in the disputes of
-succession to the Macedonian crown. Nevertheless, looking at the
-circumstances of the time, his interference may really have promised
-beneficial consequences to Athens; so that we have no right to
-blame him for the unforeseen ruin which it was afterwards found to
-occasion.</p>
-
-<p>Though the interference of Iphikrates maintained the family of
-Amyntas, and established Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent, it did not
-procure to Athens the possession of Amphipolis; which was not in the
-power of the Macedonian kings to bestow. Amphipolis was at that time
-a free Greek city, inhabited by a population in the main seemingly
-Chalkidic, and in confederacy with Olynthus.<a id="FNanchor_539"
-href="#Footnote_539" class="fnanchor">[539]</a> Iphikrates prosecuted
-his naval operations on the coast of Thrace and Macedonia for a
-period of three years (368-365 <small>B.C.</small>). We make out
-very imperfectly what he achieved. He took into his service a general
-named Charidemus, a native of Oreus in Eu<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_252">[p. 252]</span>bœa; one of those Condottieri (to use an
-Italian word familiar in the fourteenth century), who, having a band
-of mercenaries under his command, hired himself to the best bidder
-and to the most promising cause. These mercenaries served under
-Iphikrates for three years,<a id="FNanchor_540" href="#Footnote_540"
-class="fnanchor">[540]</a> until he was dismissed by the Athenians
-from his command and superseded by Timotheus. What successes they
-enabled him to obtain for Athens, is not clear; but it is certain
-that he did not succeed in taking Amphipolis. He seems to have
-directed one or two attempts against the town by other officers,
-which proved abortive; but he got possession of some Amphipolitan
-prisoners or hostages,<a id="FNanchor_541" href="#Footnote_541"
-class="fnanchor">[541]</a> which opened a prospect of accomplishing
-the surrender of the town.</p>
-
-<p>It seems evident, however, in spite of our great dearth of
-information, that Iphikrates during his command between 369-365
-<small>B.C.</small> did not satisfy the expectations of his
-countrymen. At that time, those expectations were large, as
-testified by sending out not only Iphikrates to Macedonia and
-Thrace, but also Timotheus (who had returned from his service with
-the Persians in 372-371 <small>B.C.</small>) to Ionia and the
-Hellespont, in conjunction with Ariobarzanes the satrap of Phrygia.<a
-id="FNanchor_542" href="#Footnote_542" class="fnanchor">[542]</a>
-That satrap was in possession of Sestos, as well as of various other
-towns in the Thracian Chersonesus, towards which Athenian ambition
-now tended, according to that new turn, towards more special and
-separate acquisitions for Athens, which it had taken since the battle
-of Leuktra. But<span class="pagenum" id="Page_253">[p. 253]</span>
-before we advert to the achievements of Timotheus (366-365
-<small>B.C.</small>) in these regions, we must notice the main
-course of political conflict in Greece Proper, down to the partial
-pacification of 366 <small>B.C.</small></p>
-
-<p>Though the Athenians had sent Iphikrates (in the winter of
-370-369 <small>B.C.</small>) to rescue Sparta from the grasp of
-Epaminondas, the terms of a permanent alliance had not yet been
-settled between them; envoys from Sparta and her allies visited
-Athens shortly afterwards for that purpose.<a id="FNanchor_543"
-href="#Footnote_543" class="fnanchor">[543]</a> All pretensions
-to exclusive headship<span class="pagenum" id="Page_254">[p.
-254]</span> on the part of Sparta were now at an end. Amidst abundant
-discussion in the public assembly, all the speakers, Lacedæmonian and
-others as well as Athenian, unanimously pronounced that the headship
-must be vested jointly and equally in Sparta and Athens; and the only
-point in debate was, how such an arrangement could be most suitably
-carried out. It was at first proposed that the former should command
-on land, the latter at sea; a distribution, which, on first hearing,
-found favor both as equitable and convenient, until an Athenian
-named Kephisodotus reminded his countrymen, that the Lacedæmonians
-had few ships of war, and those manned chiefly by Helots; while the
-land-force of Athens consisted of her horsemen and hoplites, the
-choice citizens of the state. Accordingly, on the distribution now
-pointed out, Athenians, in great numbers and of the best quality,
-would be placed under Spartan command; while few Lacedæmonians, and
-those of little dignity, would go under Athenian command; which would
-be, not equality, but the reverse. Kephisodotus proposed that both
-on land and at sea, the command should alternate between Athens and
-Sparta, in periods of five days; and his amendment was adopted.<a
-id="FNanchor_544" href="#Footnote_544" class="fnanchor">[544]</a></p>
-
-<p>Though such amendment had the merit of perfect equality between
-the two competitors for headship, it was by no means well-calculated
-for success in joint operations against a general like Epaminondas.
-The allies determined to occupy Corinth as a main station, and to
-guard the line of Mount Oneium between that city and Kenchreæ,<a
-id="FNanchor_545" href="#Footnote_545" class="fnanchor">[545]</a> so
-as to prevent the Thebans from again penetrating into Peloponnesus.
-It is one mark of the depression in the fortunes of Sparta, that
-this very station, now selected for the purpose of keeping a Theban
-invader away from her frontier, had been held, during the war from
-394-387 <small>B.C.</small>, by the Athenians and Thebans against
-herself, to prevent her from breaking out of Peloponnesus into
-Attica and Bœotia. Never since the invasion of Xerxes had there
-been any necessity for defending the Isthmus of Corinth against an
-extra-Peloponnesian assailant. But now, even to send a force from
-Sparta to Corinth, recourse must have been had to transport by sea,
-either across the Argolic<span class="pagenum" id="Page_255">[p.
-255]</span> Gulf from Prasiæ to Halieis, or round Cape Skyllæum to
-the Saronic Gulf and Kenchreæ; for no Spartan troops could march by
-land across Arcadia or Argos. This difficulty however was surmounted,
-and a large allied force (not less than twenty thousand men according
-to Diodorus),—consisting of Athenians with auxiliary mercenaries
-under Chabrias, Lacedæmonians, Pellenians, Epidaurians, Megarians,
-Corinthians, and all the other allies still adhering to Sparta,—was
-established in defensive position along the line of Oneium.</p>
-
-<p>It was essential for Thebes to reopen communication with her
-Peloponnesian allies. Accordingly Epaminondas, at the head of the
-Thebans and their northern allies, arrived during the same summer
-in front of this position, on his march into Peloponnesus. His
-numbers were inferior to those of his assembled enemies, whose
-position prevented him from joining his Arcadian, Argeian, and
-Eleian allies, already assembled in Peloponnesus. After having
-vainly challenged the enemy to come down and fight in the plain,
-Epaminondas laid his plan for attacking the position. Moving from his
-camp a little before daybreak, so as to reach the enemy just when
-the night-guards were retiring, but before the general body had yet
-risen and got under arms,<a id="FNanchor_546" href="#Footnote_546"
-class="fnanchor">[546]</a>—he directed an assault along the whole
-line. But his principal effort, at the head of the chosen Theban
-troops, was made against the Lacedæmonians and Pellenians, who were
-posted in the most assailable part of the line.<a id="FNanchor_547"
-href="#Footnote_547" class="fnanchor">[547]</a> So skilfully was his
-movement conducted, that he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_256">[p.
-256]</span> completely succeeded in surprising them. The Lacedæmonian
-polemarch, taken unprepared, was driven from his position, and
-forced to retire to another point of the hilly ground. He presently
-sent to solicit a truce for burying his dead; agreeing to abandon
-the line of Oneium, which had now become indefensible. The other
-parts of the Theban army made no impression by their attack, nor
-were they probably intended to do more than occupy attention,
-while Epaminondas himself vigorously assailed the weak point of
-the position. Yet Xenophon censures the Lacedæmonian polemarch as
-faint-hearted, for having evacuated the whole line as soon as his
-own position was forced; alleging, that he might easily have found
-another good position on one of the neighboring eminences, and might
-have summoned reinforcements from his allies,—and that the Thebans,
-in spite of their partial success, were so embarrassed how to descend
-on the Peloponnesian side of Oneium, that they were half disposed to
-retreat. The criticism of Xenophon indicates doubtless an unfavorable
-judgment pronounced by many persons in the army; the justice of which
-we are not in a condition to appreciate. But whether the Lacedæmonian
-commander was to blame or not, Epaminondas, by his skilful and
-victorious attack upon this strong position, enhanced his already
-high military renown.<a id="FNanchor_548" href="#Footnote_548"
-class="fnanchor">[548]</a></p>
-
-<p>Having joined his Peloponnesian allies, Arcadians, Eleians, and
-Argeians, he was more than a match for the Spartan and Athenian
-force, which appears now to have confined itself to Corinth, Lechæum,
-and Kenchreæ. He ravaged the territories of Epidaurus, Trœzen, and
-Phlius; and obtained possession of Sikyon as well as of Pellênê.<a
-id="FNanchor_549" href="#Footnote_549" class="fnanchor">[549]</a>
-At Sikyon, a vote of the people being taken, it was resolved to
-desert Sparta, to form alliance with Thebes, and to admit a Theban
-harmost and garrison into the acropolis; Euphron, a citizen hitherto
-preponderant in the city by means of Sparta and devoted to her
-interest, now altered<span class="pagenum" id="Page_257">[p.
-257]</span> his politics and went along with the stronger tide.<a
-id="FNanchor_550" href="#Footnote_550" class="fnanchor">[550]</a> We
-cannot doubt also that Epaminondas went into Arcadia to encourage and
-regulate the progress of his two great enterprises,—the foundation
-of Messênê and Megalopolis; nor does the silence of Xenophon on
-such a matter amount to any disproof. These new towns having been
-commenced less than a year before, cannot have been yet finished,
-and may probably have required the reappearance of his victorious
-army. The little town of Phlius,—situated south of Sikyon and west
-of Corinth,—which was one of the most faithful allies of Sparta,
-was also in great hazard of being captured by the Phliasian exiles.
-When the Arcadians and Eleians were marching through Nemea to join
-Epaminondas at Oneium, these exiles entreated them only to show
-themselves near Phlius; with the assurance that such demonstration
-would suffice to bring about the capture of the town. The exiles then
-stole by night to the foot of the town walls with scaling-ladders,
-and there lay hid, until, as day began to break, the scouts from the
-neighboring hill Trikaranum announced that the allied enemies were in
-sight. While the attention of the citizens within was thus engaged
-on the other side, the concealed exiles planted their ladders,
-overpowered the few unprepared guards, and got possession of the
-acropolis. Instead of contenting themselves with this position until
-the allied force came up, they strove also to capture the town; but
-in this they were defeated by the citizens, who, by desperate efforts
-of bravery, repulsed both the intruders within and the enemy without;
-thus preserving their town.<a id="FNanchor_551" href="#Footnote_551"
-class="fnanchor">[551]</a> The fidelity of the Phliasians to Sparta
-entailed upon them severe hardships through the superiority of
-their enemies in the field, and through perpetual ravage of their
-territory from multiplied hostile neighbors (Argos, Arcadia, and
-Sikyon), who had established fortified posts on their borders; for
-it was only<span class="pagenum" id="Page_258">[p. 258]</span> on
-the side of Corinth that the Phliasians had a friendly neighbor to
-afford them the means of purchasing provisions.<a id="FNanchor_552"
-href="#Footnote_552" class="fnanchor">[552]</a></p>
-
-<p>Amidst general success, the Thebans experienced partial reverses.
-Their march carrying them near to Corinth, a party of them had
-the boldness to rush at the gates, and to attempt a surprise of
-the town. But the Athenian Chabrias, then commanding within it,
-disposed his troops so skilfully, and made so good a resistance,
-that he defeated them with loss and reduced them to the necessity of
-asking for the ordinary truce to bury their dead, which were lying
-very near to the walls.<a id="FNanchor_553" href="#Footnote_553"
-class="fnanchor">[553]</a> This advantage over the victorious
-Thebans somewhat raised the spirits of the Spartan allies; who were
-still farther encouraged by the arrival in Lechæum of a squadron
-from Syracuse, bringing a body of two thousand mercenary Gauls and
-Iberians, with fifty horsemen, as a succor from the despot Dionysius.
-Such foreigners had never before been seen in Peloponnesus. Their
-bravery, and singular nimbleness of movement, gave them the
-advantage in several partial skirmishes, and disconcerted the
-Thebans. But the Spartans and Athenians were not bold enough to
-hazard a general battle, and the Syracusan detachment returned home
-after no very long stay,<a id="FNanchor_554" href="#Footnote_554"
-class="fnanchor">[554]</a> while the Thebans also went back to
-Bœotia.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_259">[p. 259]</span></p>
-
-<p>One proceeding of Epaminondas during this expedition merits
-especial notice. It was the general practice of the Thebans to put to
-death all the Bœotian exiles who fell into their hands as prisoners,
-while they released under ransom all other Greek prisoners. At the
-capture of a village named Phœbias in the Sikyonian territory,
-Epaminondas took captive a considerable body of Bœotian exiles. With
-the least possible delay, he let them depart under ransom, professing
-to regard them as belonging to other cities.<a id="FNanchor_555"
-href="#Footnote_555" class="fnanchor">[555]</a> We find him always
-trying to mitigate the rigorous dealing then customary towards
-political opponents.</p>
-
-<p>Throughout this campaign of 369 <small>B.C.</small>, all the
-Peloponnesian allies had acted against Sparta cheerfully under
-Epaminondas and the Thebans. But in the ensuing year the spirit
-of the Arcadians had been so raised, by the formation of the new
-Pan-Arcadian communion, by the progress of Messênê and Megalopolis,
-and the conspicuous depression of Sparta,—that they fancied
-themselves not only capable of maintaining their independence by
-themselves, but also entitled to divide headship with Thebes, as
-Athens divided it with Sparta. Lykomedes the Mantinean, wealthy,
-energetic, and able, stood forward as the exponent of this new
-aspiration, and as the champion of Arcadian dignity. He reminded
-the Ten Thousand (the Pan-Arcadian synod),—that while all other
-residents in Peloponnesus were originally immigrants, they alone were
-the indigenous occupants of the peninsula; that they were the most
-numerous section, as well as the bravest and hardiest men, who bore
-the Hellenic name,—of which proof was afforded by the fact, that
-Arcadian mercenary soldiers were preferred to all others; that the
-Lacedæmonians had never ventured to invade Attica, nor the Thebans to
-invade Laconia, without Arcadian auxiliaries. “Let us follow no man’s
-lead (he concluded), but stand up for ourselves. In former days, we
-built up the power of Sparta by serving in her armies; and now, if
-we submit quietly to follow the Thebans, without demanding alternate
-headship for ourselves, we shall presently find them to be Spartans
-under another name.”<a id="FNanchor_556" href="#Footnote_556"
-class="fnanchor">[556]</a></p>
-
-<p>Such exhortations were heard with enthusiasm by the assembled
-Arcadians, to whom political discussion and the sentiment of
-collective dignity was a novelty. Impressed with admiration for
-Ly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_260">[p. 260]</span>komedes,
-they chose as officers every man whom he recommended calling upon
-him to lead them into active service, so as to justify their new
-pretensions. He conducted them into the territory of Epidaurus, now
-under invasion by the Argeians; who were however in the greatest
-danger of being cut off, having their retreat intercepted by a body
-of troops from Corinth under Chabrias,—Athenians and Corinthians.
-Lykomêdês with his Arcadians, fighting his way through enemies
-as well as through a difficult country, repelled the division of
-Chabrias, and extricated the embarrassed Argeians. He next invaded
-the territory south of the new city of Messene and west of the
-Messenian Gulf, part of which was still held by Spartan garrisons.
-He penetrated as far as Asinê, where the Spartan commander, Geranor,
-drew out his garrison to resist them, but was defeated with loss, and
-slain, while the suburbs of Asinê were destroyed.<a id="FNanchor_557"
-href="#Footnote_557" class="fnanchor">[557]</a> Probably the
-Spartan mastery of the south-western corner of the Peloponnesus was
-terminated by this expedition. The indefatigable activity which these
-Arcadians now displayed under their new commander, overpowering all
-enemies, and defying all hardships and difficulties of marching over
-the most rugged mountains, by night as well as by day, throughout the
-winter season,—excited everywhere astonishment and alarm; not without
-considerable jealousy even on the part of their allies the Thebans.<a
-id="FNanchor_558" href="#Footnote_558" class="fnanchor">[558]</a></p>
-
-<p>While such jealousy tended to loosen the union between the
-Arcadians and Thebes, other causes tended at the same time to
-disunite them from Elis. The Eleians claimed rights of supremacy
-over Lepreon and the other towns of Triphylia, which rights they had
-been compelled by the Spartan arms to forego thirty years before.<a
-id="FNanchor_559" href="#Footnote_559" class="fnanchor">[559]</a>
-Ever since that period, these towns had ranked as separate
-communities, each for itself as a dependent ally of Sparta. Now
-that the power of the latter was broken, the Eleians aimed at<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_261">[p. 261]</span> resumption of their
-lost supremacy. But the formation of the new “commune Arcadum” at
-Megalopolis, interposed an obstacle never before thought of. The
-Tryphilian towns, affirming themselves to be of Arcadian origin,
-and setting forth as their eponymous Hero Triphylus son of Arkas,<a
-id="FNanchor_560" href="#Footnote_560" class="fnanchor">[560]</a>
-solicited to be admitted as fully qualified members of the incipient
-Pan-Arcadian communion. They were cordially welcomed by the general
-Arcadian body (with a degree of sympathy similar to that recently
-shown by the Germans towards Sleswick-Holstein), received as
-political brethren, and guaranteed as independent against Elis.<a
-id="FNanchor_561" href="#Footnote_561" class="fnanchor">[561]</a> The
-Eleians, thus finding themselves disappointed of the benefits which
-they had anticipated from the humiliation of Sparta, became greatly
-alienated from the Arcadians.</p>
-
-<p>Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Phrygia, with whom the Athenians
-had just established a correspondence, now endeavored (perhaps
-at their instance) to mediate for peace in Greece, sending over
-a citizen of Abydus named Philiskus, furnished with a large
-sum of money. Choosing Delphi as a centre, Philiskus convoked
-thither, in the name of the Persian king, deputies from all the
-belligerent parties, Theban, Lacedæmonian, Athenian, etc., to meet
-him. These envoys never consulted the god as to the best means of
-attaining peace (says Xenophon), but merely took counsel among
-themselves; hence, he observes, little progress was made towards
-peace; since the Spartans<a id="FNanchor_562" href="#Footnote_562"
-class="fnanchor">[562]</a> peremptorily insisted that Messênê should
-again be restored to them, while the Thebans were not less firm
-in resisting the proposition. It rather seems that the allies of
-Sparta were willing to concede the point, and even tried, though in
-vain, to overcome her reluctance. The congress accordingly broke up;
-while Philiskus, declaring himself in favor of Sparta and Athens,
-employed his money in levying mercenaries for the professed purpose
-of aiding them in the war.<a id="FNanchor_563" href="#Footnote_563"
-class="fnanchor">[563]</a> We do not find,<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_262">[p. 262]</span> however, that he really lent them any
-aid. It would appear that his mercenaries were intended for the
-service of the satrap himself, who was then organizing his revolt
-from Artaxerxes; and that his probable purpose in trying to close
-the war was, that he might procure Grecian soldiers more easily and
-abundantly. Though the threats of Philiskus produced no immediate
-result, however, they so alarmed the Thebans as to determine them
-to send an embassy up to the Great King; the rather, as they
-learnt that the Lacedæmonian Euthykles had already gone up to the
-Persian court, to solicit on behalf of Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_564"
-href="#Footnote_564" class="fnanchor">[564]</a></p>
-
-<p>How important had been the move made by Epaminondas in
-reconstituting the autonomous Messenians, was shown, among other
-evidences, by the recent abortive congress at Delphi. Already this
-formed the capital article in Grecian political discussion; an
-article, too, on which Sparta stood nearly alone. For not only the
-Thebans (whom Xenophon<a id="FNanchor_565" href="#Footnote_565"
-class="fnanchor">[565]</a> specifies as if there were no others
-of the same sentiment), but all the allies of Thebes, felt hearty
-sympathy and identity of interest with the newly-enfranchised
-residents in Mount Ithômê and in Western Laconia; while the
-allies even of Sparta were, at most, only lukewarm against them,
-if not positively inclined in their favor.<a id="FNanchor_566"
-href="#Footnote_566" class="fnanchor">[566]</a> A new phenomenon
-soon presented itself, which served as a sort of recognition of the
-new-born, or newly-revived, Messenian community, by the public voice
-of Greece. At the one hundred and third Olympic festival (Midsummer
-368 <small>B.C.</small>),—which occurred within less than two
-years after Epaminondas laid the foundation-stone of Messênê,—a
-Messenian boy named Damiskus gained the wreath as victor in the
-foot-race of boys. Since the first Messenian war, whereby the nation
-became subject to Sparta,<a id="FNanchor_567" href="#Footnote_567"
-class="fnanchor">[567]</a> no Messenian victor had ever been
-enrolled; though before that war, in the earliest half-century of
-recorded Olympiads, several Messenian victors are found on the
-register. No competitor was admitted to enter the lists, except
-as<span class="pagenum" id="Page_263">[p. 263]</span> a free Greek
-from a free community; accordingly so long as these Messenians had
-been either enslaved, or in exile, they would never have been allowed
-to contend for the prize under that designation. So much the stronger
-was the impression produced, when, in 368 <small>B.C.</small>, after
-an interval of more than three centuries, Damiscus the Messenian was
-proclaimed victor. No Theôry (or public legation for sacrifice) could
-have come to Olympia from Sparta, since she was then at war both
-with Eleians and Arcadians; probably few individual Lacedæmonians
-were present; so that the spectators, composed generally of Greeks
-unfriendly to Sparta, would hail the proclamation of the new name as
-being an evidence of her degradation, as well as from sympathy with
-the long and severe oppression of the Messenians.<a id="FNanchor_568"
-href="#Footnote_568" class="fnanchor">[568]</a> This Olympic
-festival,—the first after the great revolution occasioned by the
-battle of Leuktra,—was doubtless a scene of earnest anti-Spartan
-emotion.</p>
-
-<p>During this year 368 <small>B.C.</small>, the Thebans undertook
-no march into Peloponnesus; the peace-congress at Delphi probably
-occupied their attention, while the Arcadians neither desired nor
-needed their aid. But Pelopidas conducted in this year a Theban
-force into Thessaly, in order to protect Larissa and the other
-cities against Alexander of Pheræ, and to counter-work the ambitious
-projects of that despot, who was soliciting reinforcement from
-Athens. In his first object he succeeded. Alexander was compelled
-to visit him at Larissa, and solicit peace. This despot, however,
-alarmed at the complaints which came from all sides against his
-cruelty,—and at the language, first, admonitory, afterwards,
-menacing, of Pelopidas—soon ceased to think himself in safety, and
-fled home to Pheræ. Pelopidas established a defensive union against
-him among the other Thessalian cities, and then marched onward into
-Macedonia, where the regent Ptolemy, not strong enough to resist,
-entered into alliance with the Thebans; surrendering to them thirty
-hostages from the most distinguished families in Macedonia, as a
-guarantee for his faithful adherence. Among the hostages was the
-youthful Philip, son of Amyntas, who remained in this character
-at Thebes for some<span class="pagenum" id="Page_264">[p.
-264]</span> years, under the care of Pammenês.<a id="FNanchor_569"
-href="#Footnote_569" class="fnanchor">[569]</a> It was thus that
-Ptolemy and the family of Amyntas, though they had been maintained in
-Macedonia by the active intervention of Iphikrates and the Athenians
-not many months before, nevertheless now connected themselves by
-alliance with the Thebans, the enemies of Athens. Æschines the
-Athenian orator denounces them for ingratitude; but possibly the
-superior force of the Thebans left them no option. Both the Theban
-and Macedonian force became thus enlisted for the protection of
-the freedom of Amphipolis against Athens.<a id="FNanchor_570"
-href="#Footnote_570" class="fnanchor">[570]</a> And Pelopidas
-returned to Thebes, having extended the ascendency of Thebes not only
-over Thessaly, but also over Macedonia, assured by the acquisition of
-the thirty hostages.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_265">[p. 265]</span></p>
-
-<p>Such extension of the Theban power, in Northern Greece,
-disconcerted the maritime projects of Athens on the coast of
-Macedonia, at the same time that it laid the foundation of an
-alliance between her and Alexander of Pheræ. While she was thus
-opposing the Thebans in Thessaly, a second squadron and reinforcement
-arrived at Corinth from Syracuse, under Kissidas, despatched by the
-despot Dionysius. Among the synod of allies assembled at Corinth,
-debate being held as to the best manner of employing them, the
-Athenians strenuously urged that they should be sent to act in
-Thessaly. But the Spartans took an opposite view, and prevailed to
-have them sent round to the southern coast of Laconia, in order
-that they might coöperate in repelling or invading the Arcadians.<a
-id="FNanchor_571" href="#Footnote_571" class="fnanchor">[571]</a>
-Reinforced by these Gauls and other mercenaries, Archidamus
-led out the Lacedæmonian forces against Arcadia. He took Karyæ
-by assault, putting to death every man whom he captured in the
-place; and he farther ravaged all the Arcadian territory, in the
-district named after the Parrhasii, until the joint Arcadian and
-Argeian forces arrived to oppose him; upon which he retreated to
-an eminence near Midea.<a id="FNanchor_572" href="#Footnote_572"
-class="fnanchor">[572]</a> Here Kissidas, the Syracusan commander,
-gave notice that he must retire, as the period to which his orders
-reached had expired. He accordingly marched back to Sparta; but
-midway in the march, in a narrow pass, the Messenian troops
-arrested his advance, and so hampered him, that he was forced to
-send to Archidamus for aid. The latter soon appeared, while the
-main body of Arcadians and Argeians followed also; and Archidamus
-resolved to attack them in general battle near Midea. Imploring his
-soldiers, in an emphatic appeal, to rescue the great name of Sparta
-from the disgrace into which it had fallen, he found them full of
-responsive ardor. They rushed with such fierceness to the charge,
-that the Arcadians and Argeians were thoroughly daunted, and fled
-with scarce any resistance. The pursuit was vehement, especially
-by the Gallic mercenaries, and the slaughter frightful. Ten<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_266">[p. 266]</span> thousand men (if we
-are to believe Diodorus) were slain, without the loss of a single
-Lacedæmonian. Of this easy and important victory,—or, as it came to
-be called, “the tearless battle,”—news was forthwith transmitted by
-the herald Demotelês to Sparta. So powerful was the emotion produced
-by his tale, that all the Spartans who heard it burst into tears;
-Agesilaus, the Senators, and the ephors, setting the example;<a
-id="FNanchor_573" href="#Footnote_573" class="fnanchor">[573]</a>—a
-striking proof how humbled, and disaccustomed to the idea of victory,
-their minds had recently become!—a striking proof also, when we
-compare it with the inflexible self-control which marked their
-reception of the disastrous tidings from Leuktra, how much more
-irresistible is unexpected joy than unexpected grief, in working on
-these minds of iron temper!</p>
-
-<p>So offensive had been the insolence of the Arcadians, that
-the news of their defeat was not unwelcome even to their allies
-the Thebans and Eleians. It made them feel that they were not
-independent of Theban aid, and determined Epaminondas again to show
-himself in Peloponnesus, with the special view of enrolling the
-Achæans in his alliance. The defensive line of Oneium was still
-under occupation by the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, who had their
-head-quarters at Corinth. Yet having remained unattacked all the
-preceding year, it was now so negligently guarded, that Peisias, the
-general of Argos, instigated by a private request of Epaminondas,
-was enabled suddenly to seize the heights above Kenchreæ, with a
-force of two thousand men and seven days’ provision. The Theban
-commander, hastening his march, thus found the line of Oneium open
-near Kenchreæ, and entered Peloponnesus without resistance; after
-which he proceeded, joined by his Peloponnesian allies, against
-the cities in Achaia.<a id="FNanchor_574" href="#Footnote_574"
-class="fnanchor">[574]</a> Until the battle of Leuktra, these cities
-had been among<span class="pagenum" id="Page_267">[p. 267]</span>
-the dependent allies of Sparta, governed by local oligarchies in
-her interest. Since that event, they had broken off from her, but
-were still under oligarchical governments (though doubtless not the
-same men), and had remained neutral without placing themselves in
-connection either with Arcadians or Thebans.<a id="FNanchor_575"
-href="#Footnote_575" class="fnanchor">[575]</a> Not being in a
-condition to resist so formidable an invading force, they opened
-negotiations with Epaminondas, and solicited to be enrolled as allies
-of Thebes; engaging to follow her lead whenever summoned, and to do
-their duty as members of her synod. They tendered securities which
-Epaminondas deemed sufficient for the fulfilment of their promise.
-Accordingly, by virtue of his own personal ascendency, he agreed to
-accept them as they stood, without requiring either the banishment
-of the existing rulers or substitution of democratical forms in
-place of the oligarchical.<a id="FNanchor_576" href="#Footnote_576"
-class="fnanchor">[576]</a> Such a proceeding was not only suitable
-to the moderation of dealing so remarkable in Epaminondas, but also
-calculated to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_268">[p. 268]</span>
-strengthen the interests of Thebes in Peloponnesus, in the present
-jealous and unsatisfactory temper of the Arcadians, by attaching
-to her on peculiar grounds Achæans as well as Eleians; the latter
-being themselves half-alienated from the Arcadians. Epaminondas
-farther liberated Naupaktus and Kalydon,<a id="FNanchor_577"
-href="#Footnote_577" class="fnanchor">[577]</a> which were held by
-Achæan garrisons, and which he enrolled as separate allies of Thebes;
-whither he then returned, without any other achievements (so far as
-we are informed) in Peloponnesus.</p>
-
-<p>But the generous calculations of this eminent man found
-little favor with his countrymen. Both the Arcadians, and the
-opposition-party in the Achæan cities, preferred accusations against
-him, alleging that he had discouraged and humiliated all the real
-friends of Thebes; leaving power in the hands of men who would join
-Sparta on the first opportunity. The accusation was farther pressed
-by Menekleidas, a Theban speaker of ability, strongly adverse
-to Epaminondas, as well as to Pelopidas. So pronounced was the
-displeasure of the Thebans,—partly perhaps from reluctance to offend
-the Arcadians,—that they not only reversed the policy of Epaminondas
-in Achaia, but also refrained from reëlecting him as Bœotarch
-during the ensuing year.<a id="FNanchor_578" href="#Footnote_578"
-class="fnanchor">[578]</a> They sent harmosts of their own to each
-of the Achæan cities,—put down the existing oligarchies,—sent the
-chief oligarchical members and partisans into exile,—and established
-democratical governments in each. Hence a great body of exiles soon
-became accumulated; who, watching for a favorable opportunity and
-combining their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_269">[p. 269]</span>
-united forces against each city successively, were strong enough to
-overthrow the newly-created democracies, and to expel the Theban
-harmosts. Thus restored, the Achæan oligarchs took decided and
-active part with Sparta;<a id="FNanchor_579" href="#Footnote_579"
-class="fnanchor">[579]</a> vigorously pressing the Arcadians on one
-side, while the Lacedæmonians, encouraged by the recent Tearless
-Battle, exerted themselves actively on the other.</p>
-
-<p>The town of Sikyon, closely adjoining to Achaia, was at this time
-in alliance with Thebes, having a Theban harmost and garrison in its
-acropolis. But its government, which had always been oligarchical,
-still remained unaltered. The recent counter-revolution in the Achæan
-cities, followed closely by their junction with Sparta, alarmed
-the Arcadians and Argeians, lest Sikyon also should follow the
-example. Of this alarm a leading Sikyonian citizen named Euphron,
-took advantage. He warned them that if the oligarchy were left in
-power, they would certainly procure aid from the garrison at Corinth,
-and embrace the interests of Sparta. To prevent such defection (he
-said) it was indispensable that Sikyon should be democratized. He
-then offered himself, with their aid, to accomplish the revolution,
-seasoning his offer with strong protestations of disgust against the
-intolerable arrogance and oppression of Sparta: protestations not
-unnecessary, since he had himself, prior to the battle of Leuktra,
-carried on the government of his native city as local agent for her
-purposes and interest. The Arcadians and Argeians, entering into
-the views of Euphron, sent to Sikyon a large force, under whose
-presence and countenance he summoned a general assembly in the
-market-place, proclaimed the oligarchy to be deposed, and proposed
-an equal democracy for the future. His proposition being adopted, he
-next invited the people to choose generals; and the persons chosen
-were, as might naturally be expected, himself with five partisans.
-The prior oligarchy had not been without a previous mercenary force
-in their service, under the command of Lysimenês; but these men were
-overawed by the new foreign force introduced. Euphron now proceeded
-to reorganize them, to place them under the command of his son Adeas
-instead of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_270">[p. 270]</span>
-Lysimenês, and to increase their numerical strength. Selecting
-from them a special body-guard for his own personal safety, and
-being thus master of the city under the ostensible color of chief
-of the new democracy, he commenced a career of the most rapacious
-and sanguinary tyranny.<a id="FNanchor_580" href="#Footnote_580"
-class="fnanchor">[580]</a> He caused several of his colleagues to
-be assassinated, and banished others. He expelled also by wholesale
-the wealthiest and most eminent citizens, on suspicion of Laconism;
-confiscating their properties to supply himself with money, pillaging
-the public treasure, and even stripping the temples of all their rich
-stock of consecrated gold and silver ornaments. He farther procured
-for himself adherents by liberating numerous slaves, exalting them to
-the citizenship, and probably enrolling them among his paid force.<a
-id="FNanchor_581" href="#Footnote_581" class="fnanchor">[581]</a>
-The power which he thus acquired became very great. The money seized
-enabled him not only to keep in regular pay his numerous mercenaries,
-but also to bribe the leading Arcadians and Argeians, so that they
-connived at his enormities; while he was farther ready and active in
-the field to lend them military support. The Theban harmost still
-held the acropolis with his garrison, though Euphron was master of
-the town and harbor.</p>
-
-<p>During the height of Euphron’s power at Sikyon, the neighboring
-city of Phlius was severely pressed. The Phliasians had remained
-steadily attached to Sparta throughout all her misfortunes;
-notwithstanding incessant hostilities from Argos, Arcadia, Pellênê,
-and Sikyon, which destroyed their crops and inflicted upon them
-serious hardships. I have already recounted, that in the year 369
-<small>B.C.</small>, a little before the line of Oneium was forced
-by Epaminondas, the town of Phlius, having been surprised by its
-own exiles with the aid of Eleians and Arcadians, had only been
-saved by the desperate bravery and resistance of its citizens.<a
-id="FNanchor_582" href="#Footnote_582" class="fnanchor">[582]</a>
-In the ensuing year, 368 <small>B.C.</small>, the Argeian
-and Arcadian force again ravaged the Phliasian plain, doing
-great damage; yet not without some loss to themselves in their
-departure, from the attack of the chosen Phliasian hoplites and
-of some Athenian horsemen from Corinth.<a id="FNanchor_583"
-href="#Footnote_583" class="fnanchor">[583]</a> In the ensuing year
-367 <small>B.C.</small>, a second invasion of the Phliasian territory
-was attempted by Euphron,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_271">[p.
-271]</span> with his own mercenaries to the number of two
-thousand,—the armed force of Sikyon and Pellênê,—and the Theban
-harmost and garrison from the acropolis of Sikyon. On arriving near
-Phlius, the Sikyonians and Pellenians were posted near the gate of
-the city which looked towards Corinth, in order to resist any sally
-from within; while the remaining invaders made a circuit round,
-over an elevated line of ground called the <i>Trikaranum</i> (which had
-been fortified by the Argeians and was held by their garrison), to
-approach and ravage the Phliasian plain. But the Phliasian cavalry
-and hoplites so bravely resisted them, as to prevent them from
-spreading over the plain to do damage, until at the end of the day
-they retreated to rejoin the Sikyonians and Pellenians. From these
-last, however, they happened to be separated by a ravine which
-forced them to take a long circuit; while the Phliasians, passing
-by a shorter road close under their own walls, were beforehand in
-reaching the Sikyonians and Pellenians, whom they vigorously attacked
-and defeated with loss. Euphron with his mercenaries, and the Theban
-division, arrived too late to prevent the calamity, which they
-made no effort to repair.<a id="FNanchor_584" href="#Footnote_584"
-class="fnanchor">[584]</a></p>
-
-<p>An eminent Pellenian citizen, named Proxenus having been here
-made prisoner, the Phliasians, in spite of all their sufferings,
-released him without ransom. This act of generosity—coupled with
-the loss sustained by the Pellenians in the recent engagement, as
-well as with the recent oligarchical counter-revolutions which had
-disjoined the other Achæan cities from Thebes—altered the politics
-of Pellênê, bringing about a peace between that city and Phlius.<a
-id="FNanchor_585" href="#Footnote_585" class="fnanchor">[585]</a>
-Such an accession afforded sensible<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_272">[p. 272]</span> relief,—it might almost be said,
-salvation,—to the Phliasians, in the midst of cruel impoverishment;
-since even their necessary subsistence, except what was obtained by
-marauding excursions from the enemy, being derived by purchase from
-Corinth, was found difficult to pay for, and still more difficult
-to bring home, in the face of an enemy. They were now enabled, by
-the aid of the Athenian general Charês and his mercenary troops from
-Corinth, to escort their families and their non-military population
-to Pellênê, where a kindly shelter was provided by the citizens. The
-military Phliasians, while escorting back a stock of supplies to
-Phlius, broke through and defeated an ambuscade of the enemy in their
-way; and afterwards, in conjunction with Charês, surprised the fort
-of Thyamia, which the Sikyonians were fortifying as an aggressive
-post on their borders. The fort became not only a defence for
-Phlius, but a means of aggression against the enemy, affording also
-great facility for the introduction of provisions from Corinth.<a
-id="FNanchor_586" href="#Footnote_586" class="fnanchor">[586]</a></p>
-
-<p>Another cause, both of these successes and of general relief to
-the Phliasians, arose out of the distracted state of affairs in
-Sikyon. So intolerable had the tyranny of Euphron become, that the
-Arcadians, who had helped to raise him up, became disgusted. Æneas of
-Stymphalus, general of the collective Arcadian force, marched with a
-body of troops to Sikyon, joined the Theban harmost in the Acropolis,
-and there summoned the Sikyonian <i>notables</i> to an assembly. Under
-his protection, the intense sentiment against Euphron was freely
-manifested, and it was resolved to recall the numerous exiles, whom
-he had banished without either trial or public sentence. Dreading
-the wrath of these numerous and bitter enemies, Euphron thought
-it prudent to retire with his mercenaries to the harbor; where he
-invited Pasimêlus the Lacedæmonian to come, with a portion of the
-garrison of Corinth, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_273">[p.
-273]</span> immediately declared himself an open partisan of Sparta.
-The harbor, a separate town and fortification at some little distance
-from the city (as Lechæum was from Corinth), was thus held by and
-for the Spartans; while Sikyon adhered to the Thebans and Arcadians.
-In Sikyon itself however, though evacuated by Euphron, there still
-remained violent dissensions. The returning exiles were probably
-bitter in reactionary measures; the humbler citizens were fearful of
-losing their newly-acquired political privileges; and the liberated
-slaves, yet more fearful of forfeiting that freedom, which the recent
-revolution had conferred upon them.</p>
-
-<p>Hence Euphron still retained so many partisans, that having
-procured from Athens a reinforcement of mercenary troops, he was
-enabled to return to Sikyon, and again to establish himself as
-master of the town in conjunction with the popular party. But
-as his opponents, the principal men in the place, found shelter
-along with the Theban garrison in the acropolis, which he vainly
-tried to take by assault,<a id="FNanchor_587" href="#Footnote_587"
-class="fnanchor">[587]</a>—his possession even of the town was
-altogether precarious, until such formidable neighbors could be
-removed. Accordingly he resolved to visit Thebes, in hopes of
-obtaining from the authorities an order for expelling his opponents
-and handing over Sikyon a second time to his rule. On what grounds,
-after so recent a defection to the Spartans, he rested his hopes
-of success, we do not know; except that he took with him a large
-sum of money for the purpose of bribery.<a id="FNanchor_588"
-href="#Footnote_588" class="fnanchor">[588]</a> His Sikyonian
-opponents, alarmed lest he should really carry his point, followed
-him to Thebes, where their alarm was still farther increased by
-seeing him in familiar converse with the magistrates. Under the first
-impulse of terror and despair, they assassinated Euphron in broad
-daylight,—on the Kadmeia, and even before the doors of the Theban
-Senate-house, wherein both magistrates and Senate were sitting.</p>
-
-<p>For an act of violence thus patent, they were of course seized
-forthwith, and put upon their trial, before the Senate. The
-magistrates invoked upon their heads the extreme penalty of death,
-insisting upon the enormity and even impudence of the outrage,
-committed almost under the eyes of the authorities,—as well as upon
-the sacred duty of vindicating not merely the majesty, but even
-the security of the city, by exemplary punishment upon of<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_274">[p. 274]</span>fenders who had despised
-its laws. How many in number were the persons implicated, we do not
-know. All, except one, denied actual hand-participation; but that
-one avowed it frankly, and stood up to justify it before the Theban
-Senate. He spoke in substance nearly as follows,—taking up the
-language of the accusing magistrates:—</p>
-
-<p>“Despise you I cannot, men of Thebes; for you are masters of
-my person and life. It was on other grounds of confidence that
-I slew this man: first, I had the conviction of acting justly;
-next, I trusted in your righteous judgment. I knew that <i>you</i> did
-not wait for trial and sentence to slay Archias and Hypatês,<a
-id="FNanchor_589" href="#Footnote_589" class="fnanchor">[589]</a>
-whom you caught after a career similar to that of Euphron,—but
-punished them at the earliest practicable opportunity, under the
-conviction that men manifest in sacrilege, treason, and despotism,
-were already under sentence by all men. Well! and was not Euphron,
-too, guilty of all these crimes? Did not he find the temples full of
-gold and silver offerings, and strip them until they were empty? How
-can there be a traitor more palpable than the man, who, favored and
-upheld by Sparta, first betrayed her to you; and then again, after
-having received every mark of confidence from you, betrayed you to
-her,—handing over the harbor of Sikyon to your enemies? Was not he
-a despot without reserve, the man who exalted slaves, not only into
-freemen, but into citizens? the man who despoiled, banished, or slew,
-not criminals, but all whom he chose, and most of all, the chief
-citizens? And now, after having vainly attempted, in conjunction
-with your enemies the Athenians, to expel your harmost by force from
-Sikyon, he has collected a great stock of money, and come hither to
-turn it to account. Had he assembled arms and soldiers against you,
-you would have thanked me for killing him. How then can you punish
-me for giving him his due, when he has come with money to corrupt
-you, and to purchase from you again the mastery of Sikyon, to your
-own disgrace as well as mis<span class="pagenum" id="Page_275">[p.
-275]</span>chief? Had he been my enemy and your friend, I should
-undoubtedly have done wrong to kill him in your city; but as he is
-a traitor, playing you false, how is he more my enemy than yours? I
-shall be told that he came hither of his own accord, confiding in the
-laws of the city. Well! you would have thanked me for killing him
-anywhere out of Thebes; why not <i>in</i> Thebes also, when he has come
-hither only for the purpose of doing you new wrong in addition to the
-past? Where among Greeks has impunity ever been assured to traitors,
-deserters, or despots? Recollect, that you have passed a vote that
-exiles from any one of your allied cities might be seized as outlaws
-in any other. Now Euphron is a condemned exile, who has ventured to
-come back to Sikyon without any vote of the general body of allies.
-How can any one affirm that he has not justly incurred death? I
-tell you in conclusion, men of Thebes,—if you put me to death, you
-will have made yourselves the avengers of your very worst enemy,—if
-you adjudge me to have done right, you will manifest yourselves
-publicly as just avengers, both on your own behalf and on that of
-your whole body of allies.”<a id="FNanchor_590" href="#Footnote_590"
-class="fnanchor">[590]</a></p>
-
-<p>This impressive discourse induced the Theban Senate to pronounce
-that Euphron had met with his due. It probably came from one of the
-principal citizens of Sikyon, among whom were most of the enemies
-as well as the victims of the deceased despot. It appeals, in a
-characteristic manner, to that portion of Grecian morality which bore
-upon men, who by their very crimes procured for themselves the means
-of impunity; against whom there was no legal force to protect others,
-and who were therefore considered as not being entitled to protection
-themselves, if the daggers of others could ever be made to reach
-them. The tyrannicide appeals to this sentiment with confidence, as
-diffused throughout all the free Grecian cities. It found responsive
-assent in the Theban Senate, and would probably have found the like
-assent, if set<span class="pagenum" id="Page_276">[p. 276]</span>
-forth with equal emphasis, in most Grecian senates or assemblies
-elsewhere.</p>
-
-<p>Very different, however, was the sentiment in Sikyon. The body
-of Euphron was carried thither, and enjoyed the distinguished
-preëminence of being buried in the market-place.<a id="FNanchor_591"
-href="#Footnote_591" class="fnanchor">[591]</a> There, along
-with his tomb, a chapel was erected, in which he was worshipped
-as Archêgetês, or Patron-hero and Second Founder, of the city.
-He received the same honors as had been paid to Brasidas at
-Amphipolis. The humbler citizens and the slaves, upon whom he had
-conferred liberty and political franchise,—or at least the name of
-a political franchise,—remembered him with grateful admiration as
-their benefactor, forgetting or excusing the atrocities which he
-had wreaked upon their political opponents. Such is the retributive
-Nemesis which always menaces, and sometimes overtakes, an oligarchy
-who keep the mass of the citizens excluded from political privileges.
-A situation is thus created, enabling some ambitious and energetic
-citizen to confer favors and earn popularity among the many, and thus
-to acquire power, which, whether employed or not for the benefit
-of the many, goes along with their antipathies when it humbles or
-crushes the previously monopolizing few.</p>
-
-<p>We may presume from these statements that the government of
-Sikyon became democratical. But the provoking brevity of Xenophon
-does not inform us of the subsequent arrangements made with the
-Theban harmost in the acropolis,—nor how the intestine dissensions,
-between the democracy in the town and the refugees in the citadel,
-were composed,—nor what became of those citizens who slew Euphron.
-We learn only that not long afterwards, the harbor of Sikyon, which
-Euphron had held in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians and Athenians,
-was left imperfectly defended by the recall of the latter to Athens;
-and that it was accordingly retaken by the forces from the town,
-aided by the Arcadians.<a id="FNanchor_592" href="#Footnote_592"
-class="fnanchor">[592]</a></p>
-
-<p>It appears that these proceedings of Euphron (from his first
-proclamation of the democracy at Sikyon and real acquisition of
-despotism to himself, down to his death and the recovery of the
-harbor) took place throughout the year 367 <small>B.C.</small>
-and the earlier half of 366 <small>B.C.</small> No such enemy,
-probably, would have arisen<span class="pagenum" id="Page_277">[p.
-277]</span> to embarrass Thebes, unless the policy recommended by
-Epaminondas in Achaia had been reversed, and unless he himself had
-fallen under the displeasure of his countrymen. His influence too
-was probably impaired, and the policy of Thebes affected for the
-worse, by the accidental absence of his friend Pelopidas, who was
-then on his mission to the Persian court at Susa. Such a journey
-and return, with the transaction of the business in hand, must have
-occupied the greater part of the year 367 <small>B.C.</small>, being
-terminated probably by the return of the envoys in the beginning of
-366 <small>B.C.</small></p>
-
-<p>The leading Thebans had been alarmed by the language of
-Philiskus,—who had come over a few months before as envoy from the
-satrap Ariobarzanes and had threatened to employ Asiatic money
-in the interest of Athens and Sparta against Thebes, though his
-threats seem never to have been realized, as well as by the presence
-of the Lacedæmonian Euthyklês (after the failure of Antalkidas<a
-id="FNanchor_593" href="#Footnote_593" class="fnanchor">[593]</a>)
-at the Persian court, soliciting aid. Moreover Thebes had now
-pretensions to the headship of Greece, at least as good as
-either of her two rivals; while since the fatal example set by
-Sparta at the peace called by the name of Antalkidas in 387
-<small>B.C.</small>, and copied by Athens after the battle of Leuktra
-in 371 <small>B.C.</small>,—it had become a sort of recognized
-fashion that the leading Grecian state should sue out its title
-from the terror-striking rescript of the Great King, and proclaim
-itself as enforcing terms which he had dictated. On this ground of
-borrowed elevation Thebes now sought to place herself. There was in
-her case a peculiar reason which might partly excuse the value set
-upon it by her leaders. It had been almost the capital act of her
-policy to establish the two new cities, Megalopolis and Messênê.
-The vitality and chance for duration, of both,—especially that of
-the latter, which had the inextinguishable hostility of Sparta to
-contend with,—would be materially improved, in the existing state
-of the Greek mind, if they were recognized as autonomous under
-a Persian rescript. To attain this object,<a id="FNanchor_594"
-href="#Footnote_594" class="fnanchor">[594]</a> Pelopidas and
-Isme<span class="pagenum" id="Page_278">[p. 278]</span>nias now
-proceeded as envoys to Susa; doubtless under a formal vote of the
-allied synod, since the Arcadian Antiochus, a celebrated pankratiast,
-the Eleian Archidamus, and a citizen from Argos, accompanied them.
-Informed of the proceeding, the Athenians also sent Timagoras and
-Leon to Susa; and we read with some surprise that these hostile
-envoys all went up thither in the same company.<a id="FNanchor_595"
-href="#Footnote_595" class="fnanchor">[595]</a></p>
-
-<p>Pelopidas, though he declined to perform the usual ceremony
-of prostration,<a id="FNanchor_596" href="#Footnote_596"
-class="fnanchor">[596]</a> was favorably received by the Persian
-court. Xenophon,—who recounts the whole proceeding in a manner
-unfairly invidious towards the Thebans, forgetting that they were now
-only copying the example of Sparta in courting Persian aid,—affirms
-that his application was greatly furthered by the recollection of the
-ancient alliance of Thebes with Xerxes, against Athens and Sparta,
-at the time of the battle of Platæa; and by the fact that Thebes
-had not only refused to second, but had actually discountenanced,
-the expedition of Agesilaus against Asia. We may perhaps doubt,
-whether this plea counted for much; or the straightforward eloquence
-of Pelopidas, so much extolled by Plutarch,<a id="FNanchor_597"
-href="#Footnote_597" class="fnanchor">[597]</a> which could only
-reach Persian ears through an interpreter. But the main fact for
-the Great King to know was, that the Thebans had been victorious
-at Leuktra; that they had subsequently trodden down still farther
-the glory of Sparta, by carrying their arms over Laconia, and
-emancipating the conquered half of the country; that when they
-were no longer in Pelopon<span class="pagenum" id="Page_279">[p.
-279]</span>nesus, their allies the Arcadians and Argeians had been
-shamefully defeated by the Lacedæmonians (in the Tearless Battle).
-Such boasts on the part of Pelopidas,—confirmed as matters of fact
-even by the Athenian Timagoras,—would convince the Persian ministers
-that it was their interest to exercise ascendency over Greece through
-Thebes in preference to Sparta. Accordingly Pelopidas being asked
-by the Great King what sort of rescript he wished, obtained his own
-terms. Messênê was declared autonomous and independent of Sparta:
-Amphipolis also was pronounced to be a free and autonomous city:
-the Athenians were directed to order home and lay up their ships of
-war now in active service, on pain of Persian intervention against
-them, in case of disobedience. Moreover Thebes was declared the head
-city of Greece, and any city refusing to follow her headship was
-menaced with instant compulsion by Persian force.<a id="FNanchor_598"
-href="#Footnote_598" class="fnanchor">[598]</a> In reference to the
-points in dispute between Elis and Arcadia (the former claiming
-sovereignty over Triphylia, which professed itself Arcadian and had
-been admitted into the Arcadian communion), the rescript pronounced
-in favor of the Eleians;<a id="FNanchor_599" href="#Footnote_599"
-class="fnanchor">[599]</a> probably at the instance of<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_280">[p. 280]</span> Pelopidas, since there
-now subsisted much coldness between the Thebans and Arcadians.</p>
-
-<p>Leon the Athenian protested against the Persian rescript,
-observing aloud when he heard it read,—“By Zeus, Athenians, I think
-it is time for you to look out for some other friend than the Great
-King.” This remark, made in the King’s hearing and interpreted
-to him, produced the following addition to the rescript: “If the
-Athenians have anything juster to propose, let them come to the
-King and inform him.” So vague a modification, however, did little
-to appease the murmurs of the Athenians. On the return of their
-two envoys to Athens, Leon accused his colleague Timagoras of
-having not only declined to associate with him during the journey,
-but also of having lent himself to the purposes of Pelopidas, of
-being implicated in treasonable promises, and of receiving large
-bribes from the Persian King. On these charges Timagoras was
-condemned and executed.<a id="FNanchor_600" href="#Footnote_600"
-class="fnanchor">[600]</a> The Arcadian envoy Antiochus was equally
-indignant at the rescript; refusing even to receive such presents of
-formal courtesy as were tendered to all, and accepted by Pelopidas
-himself, who however strictly declined everything beyond. The conduct
-of this eminent Theban thus exhibited a strong contrast with the
-large acquisitions of the Athenian Timagoras.<a id="FNanchor_601"
-href="#Footnote_601" class="fnanchor">[601]</a> Antiochus, on
-returning to Arcadia,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_281">[p.
-281]</span> made report of his mission to the Pan-Arcadian synod,
-called the Ten Thousand, at Megalopolis. He spoke in the most
-contemptuous terms of all that he had seen at the Persian court.
-There were (he said) plenty of bakers, cooks, wine-pourers,
-porters, etc., but as for men competent to fight against Greeks,
-though he looked out for them with care, he could see none; and
-even the vaunted golden plane-tree was not large enough to furnish
-shade for a grasshopper.<a id="FNanchor_602" href="#Footnote_602"
-class="fnanchor">[602]</a></p>
-
-<p>On the other hand, the Eleian envoy returned with feelings of
-satisfaction, and the Thebans with triumph. Deputies from each of
-their allied cities were invited to Thebes, to hear the Persian
-rescript. It was produced by a native Persian, their official
-companion from Susa,—the first Persian probably ever seen in Thebes
-since the times immediately preceding the battle of Platæa,—who,
-after exhibiting publicly the regal seal, read the document
-aloud; as the satrap Tiribazus had done on the occasion of the
-peace of Antalkidas.<a id="FNanchor_603" href="#Footnote_603"
-class="fnanchor">[603]</a></p>
-
-<p>But though the Theban leaders thus closely copied the conduct of
-Sparta both as to means and as to end, they by no means found the
-like ready acquiescence, when they called on the deputies present
-to take an oath to the rescript, to the Great King, and to Thebes.
-All replied that they had come with instructions, authorizing them
-to hear and report, but no more; and that acceptance or rejection
-must be decided in their respective cities. Nor was this the worst.
-Lykomedes and the other deputies from Arcadia, already jealous of
-Thebes, and doubtless farther alienated by the angry report of their
-envoy Antiochus, went yet farther, and entered a general protest
-against the headship of Thebes; affirming that the synod ought not
-to be held constantly in that city, but in the seat of war, wherever
-that might be. Incensed at such language, the Thebans accused
-Lykomedes of violating the cardinal principle of the confederacy;
-upon which he and his Arcadian comrades forthwith retired and went
-home, declaring that they would no longer sit in the synod. The other
-deputies appear to have followed his example. Indeed, as they had
-refused to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_282">[p. 282]</span> take
-the oath submitted to them, the special purpose of the synod was
-defeated.</p>
-
-<p>Having thus failed in carrying their point with the allies
-collectively, the Thebans resolved to try the efficacy of
-applications individually. They accordingly despatched envoys, with
-the Persian rescript in hand, to visit the cities successively,
-calling upon each for acceptance with an oath of adhesion. Each
-city separately (they thought) would be afraid to refuse, under
-peril of united hostility from the Great King and from Thebes. So
-confident were they in the terrors of the king’s name and seal, that
-they addressed this appeal not merely to the cities in alliance
-with them, but even to several among their enemies. Their envoys
-first set forth the proposition at Corinth; a city, not only at
-variance with them, but even serving as a centre of operation for
-the Athenian and Lacedæmonian forces to guard the line of Oneium,
-and prevent the entrance of a Theban army into Peloponnesus. But
-the Corinthians rejected the proposition altogether, declining
-formally to bind themselves by any common oaths towards the Persian
-king. The like refusal was experienced by the envoys as they
-passed on to Peloponnesus, if not from all the cities visited, at
-least from so large a proportion, that the mission was completely
-frustrated. And thus the rescript, which Thebes had been at such
-pains to procure, was found practically inoperative in confirming
-or enforcing her headship;<a id="FNanchor_604" href="#Footnote_604"
-class="fnanchor">[604]</a> though doubtless the mere fact, that it
-comprised and recognized Messênê, contributed to strengthen the
-vitality, and exalt the dignity, of that new-born city.</p>
-
-<p>In their efforts to make the Persian rescript available towards
-the recognition of their headship throughout Greece, the Thebans
-would naturally visit Thessaly and the northern districts as well
-as Peloponnesus. It appears that Pelopidas and Ismenias themselves
-undertook this mission; and that in the execution of it they were
-seized and detained as prisoners by Alexander of Pheræ. That despot
-seems to have come to meet them, under pacific appearances, at
-Pharsalus. They indulged hopes of prevailing on him as well as
-the other Thessalians to accept the Persian<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_283">[p. 283]</span> rescript; for we see by the example
-of Corinth, that they had tried their powers of persuasion on
-enemies as well as friends. But the Corinthians, while refusing the
-application, had nevertheless respected the public morality held
-sacred even between enemies in Greece, and had dismissed the envoys
-(whether Pelopidas was among them, we cannot assert) inviolate. Not
-so the tyrant of Pheræ. Perceiving that Pelopidas and Ismenias were
-unaccompanied by any military force, he seized their persons, and
-carried them off to Pheræ as prisoners.</p>
-
-<p>Treacherous as this proceeding was, it proved highly profitable
-to Alexander. Such was the personal importance of Pelopidas, that
-his imprisonment struck terror among the partisans of Thebes in
-Thessaly, and induced several of them to submit to the despot of
-Pheræ; who moreover sent to apprise the Athenians of his capture,
-and to solicit their aid against the impending vengeance of Thebes.
-Greatly impressed with the news, the Athenians looked upon Alexander
-as a second Jason, likely to arrest the menacing ascendency of
-their neighbor and rival.<a id="FNanchor_605" href="#Footnote_605"
-class="fnanchor">[605]</a> They immediately despatched to his aid
-thirty triremes and one thousand hoplites under Autoklês; who,
-unable to get through the Euripus, when Bœotia and Eubœa were
-both hostile to Athens, were forced to circumnavigate the latter
-island. He reached Pheræ just in time; for the Thebans, incensed
-beyond measure at the seizure of Pelopidas, had despatched without
-delay eight thousand hoplites and six hundred cavalry to recover
-or avenge him. Unfortunately for them, Epaminondas had not been
-rechosen commander since his last year’s proceedings in Achaia. He
-was now serving as an hoplite in the ranks, while Kleomenes with
-other Bœotarchs had the command. On entering Thessaly, they were
-joined by various allies in the country. But the army of Alex<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_284">[p. 284]</span>ander, aided by the
-Athenians, and placed under the command of Autoklês, was found
-exceedingly formidable, especially in cavalry. The Thessalian allies
-of Thebes, acting with their habitual treachery, deserted in the
-hour of danger; and the enterprise, thus difficult and perilous, was
-rendered impracticable by the incompetence of the Bœotarchs. Unable
-to make head against Alexander and the Athenians, they were forced
-to retreat homeward. But their generalship was so unskilful, and
-the enemy’s cavalry so active, that the whole army was in imminent
-danger of being starved or destroyed. Nothing saved them now, but the
-presence of Epaminondas as a common soldier in the ranks. Indignant
-as well as dismayed, the whole army united to depose their generals,
-and with one voice called upon him to extricate them from their
-perils. Epaminondas accepted the duty,—marshalled the retreat in
-consummate order,—took for himself the command of the rear-guard,
-beating off all the attacks of the enemy,—and conducted the army
-safely back to Thebes.<a id="FNanchor_606" href="#Footnote_606"
-class="fnanchor">[606]</a></p>
-
-<p>This memorable exploit, while it disgraced the unsuccessful
-Bœotarchs, who were condemned to fine and deposition from their
-office, raised higher than ever the reputation of Epaminondas among
-his countrymen. But the failure of the expedition was for the time a
-fatal blow to the influence of Thebes in Thessaly; where Alexander
-now reigned victorious and irresistible, with Pelopidas still in
-his dungeon. The cruelties and oppressions, at all times habitual
-to the despot of Pheræ, were pushed to an excess beyond all former
-parallel. Besides other brutal deeds of which we read with horror, he
-is said to have surrounded by his military force the unarmed citizens
-of Melibœa and Skotussa, and slaughtered them all in mass. In such
-hands, the life of Pelopidas hung by a thread; yet he himself, with
-that personal courage which never forsook him, held the language of
-unsubdued defiance and provocation against the tyrant. Great sympathy
-was manifested by many Thessalians, and even by Thêbê the wife of
-Alexander, for so illustrious a prisoner; and Alexander, fearful
-of incurring the implacable enmity of Thebes, was induced to spare
-his life, though retaining him as a prisoner. His confinement, too,
-appears to have lasted some time before the Thebans, discouraged
-by their late ill-success, were prepared to undertake a second
-expedition.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_285">[p. 285]</span></p>
-
-<p>At length they sent a force for the purpose; which was placed,
-on this occasion, under the command of Epaminondas. The renown of
-his name rallied many adherents in the country; and his prudence,
-no less than his military skill, was conspicuously exhibited, in
-defeating and intimidating Alexander, yet without reducing him to
-such despair as might prove fatal to the prisoner. The despot was at
-length compelled to send an embassy excusing his recent violence,
-offering to restore Pelopidas, and soliciting to be admitted to peace
-and alliance with Thebes. But Epaminondas would grant nothing more
-than a temporary truce,<a id="FNanchor_607" href="#Footnote_607"
-class="fnanchor">[607]</a> coupled with the engagement of evacuating
-Thessaly; while he required in exchange the release of Pelopidas
-and Ismenias. His terms were acceded to, so that he had the delight
-of conveying his liberated friend in safety to Thebes. Though this
-primary object was thus effected, however, it is plain that he did
-not restore Thebes to the same influence in Thessaly which she had
-enjoyed prior to the seizure of Pelopidas.<a id="FNanchor_608"
-href="#Footnote_608" class="fnanchor">[608]</a> That event with its
-consequences<span class="pagenum" id="Page_286">[p. 286]</span>
-still remained a blow to Thebes and a profit to Alexander; who
-again became master of all or most part of Thessaly, together with
-the Magnêtes, the Phthiot Achæans, and other tributary nations
-dependent on Thessaly—maintaining unimpaired his influence and
-connection at Athens.<a id="FNanchor_609" href="#Footnote_609"
-class="fnanchor">[609]</a></p>
-
-<p>While the Theban arms were thus losing ground in Thessaly, an
-important point was gained in their favor on the other side of
-Bœotia. Orôpus, on the north-eastern frontier of Attica adjoining
-Bœotia, was captured and wrested from Athens by a party of exiles
-who crossed over from Eretria in Eubœa, with the aid of Themison,
-despot of the last-mentioned town. It had been more than once lost
-and regained between Athens and Thebes; being seemingly in its origin
-Bœotian, and never incorporated as a Deme or equal constituent member
-of the Athenian commonwealth, but only recognized as a dependency
-of Athens; though, as it was close on the frontier, many of its
-inhabitants were also citizens of Athens, de<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_287">[p. 287]</span>mots of the neighboring Deme Græa.<a
-id="FNanchor_610" href="#Footnote_610" class="fnanchor">[610]</a> So
-recently before as the period immediately preceding the battle of
-Leuktra, angry remonstrances had been exchanged between Athens and
-Thebes respecting a portion of the Oropian territory. At that time,
-it appears, the Thebans were forced to yield, and their partisans
-in Oropus were banished.<a id="FNanchor_611" href="#Footnote_611"
-class="fnanchor">[611]</a> It was these partisans who, through
-the aid of Themison and the Eretrians, now effected their return,
-so as to repossess themselves of Oropus, and doubtless to banish
-the principal citizens friendly to Athens.<a id="FNanchor_612"
-href="#Footnote_612" class="fnanchor">[612]</a> So great was the
-sensation produced among the Athenians, that they not only marched
-with all their force to recover the place, but also recalled their
-general, Chares, with that mercenary force which he commanded in
-the territories of Corinth and Phlius. They farther requested aid
-from the Corinthians and their other allies in Peloponnesus. These
-allies did not obey the summons; but the Athenian force alone
-would have sufficed to retake Oropus, had not the Thebans occupied
-it so as to place it beyond their attack. Athens was obliged to
-acquiesce in their occupation of it; though under protest, and
-with the understanding that the disputed right should be referred
-to impartial arbitration.<a id="FNanchor_613" href="#Footnote_613"
-class="fnanchor">[613]</a></p>
-
-<p>This seizure of Oropus produced more than one material
-consequence. Owing to the recall of Chares from Corinth, the harbor
-of Sikyon could no longer be maintained against the Sikyonians
-in the town; who, with the aid of the Arcadians, recaptured it,
-so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_288">[p. 288]</span> that both
-town and harbor again came into the league of Thebans and Arcadians.
-Moreover, Athens became discontented with her Peloponnesian allies,
-for having neglected her summons on the emergency at Oropus, although
-Athenian troops had been constantly in service for the protection of
-Peloponnesus against the Thebans. The growth of such dispositions
-at Athens became known to the Mantinean Lykomedes; the ablest and
-most ambitious leader in Arcadia, who was not only jealous of the
-predominance of the Thebans, but had come to a formal rupture with
-them at the synod held for the reception of the Persian rescript.<a
-id="FNanchor_614" href="#Footnote_614" class="fnanchor">[614]</a>
-Anxious to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes as well as from
-Sparta, Lykomedes now took advantage of the discontent of Athens to
-open negotiations with that city; persuading the majority of the
-Arcadian Ten Thousand to send him thither as ambassador. There was
-difficulty among the Athenians in entertaining his proposition,
-from the alliance subsisting between them and Sparta. But they were
-reminded, that to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes, was no less
-in the interest of Sparta than of Athens; and a favorable answer was
-then given to Lykomedes. The latter took ship at Peiræus for his
-return, but never reached Arcadia; for he happened to land at the
-spot where the Arcadian exiles of the opposite party were assembled,
-and these men put him to death at once.<a id="FNanchor_615"
-href="#Footnote_615" class="fnanchor">[615]</a> In spite of his
-death, however, the alliance between Arcadia and Athens was still
-brought to pass, though not without opposition.</p>
-
-<p>Thebes was during this year engaged in her unsuccessful campaign
-in Thessaly (alluded to already) for the rescue of Pelopidas, which
-disabled her from effective efforts in Peloponnesus. But as soon as
-that rescue had been accomplished, Epaminondas, her greatest man, and
-her only conspicuous orator, was despatched into Arcadia to offer,
-in conjunction with an envoy from Argos, diplomatic obstruction to
-the proposed Athenian alliance. He had to speak against Kallistratus,
-the most distinguished orator at Athens,<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_289">[p. 289]</span> who had been sent by his countrymen to
-plead their cause amidst the Arcadian Ten Thousand, and who, among
-other arguments, denounced the enormities which darkened the heroic
-legends both of Thebes and Argos. “Were not Orestes and Alkmæon, both
-murderers of their mothers (asked Kallistratus), natives of Argos?
-Was not Œdipus, who slew his father and married his mother, a native
-of Thebes?”—“Yes (said Epaminondas, in his reply) they were. But
-Kallistratus has forgotten to tell you, that these persons, while
-they lived at home were innocent, or reputed to be so. As soon as
-their crimes became known, Argos and Thebes banished them; and then
-it was that Athens received them, stained with confessed guilt.”<a
-id="FNanchor_616" href="#Footnote_616" class="fnanchor">[616]</a>
-This clever retort told much to the credit of the rhetorical skill
-of Epaminondas; but his speech as a whole, was not successful. The
-Arcadians concluded alliance with Athens; yet without formally
-renouncing friendship with Thebes.</p>
-
-<p>As soon as such new alliance had been ratified, it became
-important to Athens to secure a free and assured entrance into
-Peloponnesus; while at the same time the recent slackness of the
-Corinthians, in regard to the summons to Oropus, rendered her
-mistrustful of their fidelity. Accordingly it was resolved in the
-Athenian assembly, on the motion of a citizen named Demotion, to
-seize and occupy Corinth; there being already some scattered Athenian
-garrisons, on various points of the Corinthian territory, ready to
-be concentrated and rendered useful for such a purpose. A fleet
-and land-force under Chares was made ready and despatched. But on
-reaching the Corinthian port of Kenchreæ, Chares found himself shut
-out even from admittance. The proposition of Demotion, and the
-resolution of the Athenians had become known to the Corinthians;
-who forthwith stood upon their guard, sent soldiers of their own to
-relieve the various Athenian outposts on their territory, and called
-upon these latter to give in any complaints for<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_290">[p. 290]</span> which they might have ground, as their
-services were no longer needed. Chares pretended to have learnt that
-Corinth was in danger. But both he and the remaining Athenians were
-dismissed, though with every expression of thanks and politeness.<a
-id="FNanchor_617" href="#Footnote_617" class="fnanchor">[617]</a></p>
-
-<p>The treacherous purpose of Athens was thus baffled, and the
-Corinthians were for the moment safe. Yet their position was
-precarious and uncomfortable; for their enemies, Thebes and Argos,
-were already their masters by land, and Athens had now been converted
-from an ally into an enemy. Hence they resolved to assemble a
-sufficient mercenary force in their own pay;<a id="FNanchor_618"
-href="#Footnote_618" class="fnanchor">[618]</a> but while thus
-providing for military security, they sent envoys to Thebes to open
-negotiations for peace. Permission was granted to them by the Thebans
-to go and consult their allies, and to treat for peace in conjunction
-with as many as could be brought to share their views. Accordingly
-the Corinthians went to Sparta and laid their case before the full
-synod of allies, convoked for the occasion. “We are on the point
-of ruin (said the Corinthian envoy), and must make peace. We shall
-rejoice to make it in conjunction with you, if you will consent;
-but if you think proper to persevere in the war, be not displeased
-if we make peace without you.” The Epidaurians and Phliasians,
-reduced to the like distress, held the same language of weariness
-and impatience for peace.<a id="FNanchor_619" href="#Footnote_619"
-class="fnanchor">[619]</a></p>
-
-<p>It had been ascertained at Thebes, that no propositions for peace
-could be entertained, which did not contain a formal recognition
-of the independence of Messênê. To this the Corinthians and other
-allies of Sparta had no difficulty in agreeing. But they vainly
-en<span class="pagenum" id="Page_291">[p. 291]</span>deavored to
-prevail upon Sparta herself to submit to the same concession. The
-Spartans resolutely refused to relinquish a territory inherited
-from victorious forefathers, and held under so long a prescription.
-They repudiated yet more indignantly the idea of recognizing as
-free Greeks and equal neighbors, those who had so long been their
-slaves; and they proclaimed their determination of continuing
-the war, even single-handed and with all its hazards, to regain
-what they had lost;<a id="FNanchor_620" href="#Footnote_620"
-class="fnanchor">[620]</a> and although they could not directly
-prohibit the Corinthians and other allies, whose sickness of the
-war had become intolerable, from negotiating a separate peace for
-themselves,—yet they gave only a reluctant consent. Archidamus
-son of Agesilaus even reproached the allies with timorous
-selfishness, partly in deserting their benefactress Sparta at her
-hour of need, partly in recommending her to submit to a sacrifice
-ruinous to her honor.<a id="FNanchor_621" href="#Footnote_621"
-class="fnanchor">[621]</a> The Spartan prince conjured his
-country<span class="pagenum" id="Page_292">[p. 292]</span>men,
-in the name of all their ancient dignity, to spurn the mandates
-of Thebes; to shrink neither from effort nor from peril for the
-reconquest of Messênê, even if they had to fight alone against all
-Greece; and to convert their military population into a permanent
-camp, sending away their women and children to an asylum in friendly
-foreign cities.</p>
-
-<p>Though the Spartans were not inclined to adopt the desperate
-suggestions of Archidamus, yet this important congress ended
-by a scission between them and their allies. The Corinthians,
-Phliasians, Epidaurians, and others, went to Thebes, and concluded
-peace; recognizing the independence of Messênê, and affirming the
-independence of each separate city within its own territory, without
-either obligatory alliance, or headship on the part of any city. Yet
-when the Thebans invited them to contract an alliance, they declined,
-saying that this would be only embarking in war on the other side;
-whereas that which they sighed for was peace. Peace was accordingly
-sworn, upon the terms indicated in the Persian rescript, so far as
-regarded the general autonomy of each separate town, and specially
-that of Messênê; but not including any sanction, direct or indirect,
-of Theban headship.<a id="FNanchor_622" href="#Footnote_622"
-class="fnanchor">[622]</a></p>
-
-<p>This treaty removed out of the war, and placed in a position
-of neutrality, a considerable number of Grecian states; chiefly
-those near the Isthmus,—Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus; probably Trœzen
-and Hermionê, since we do not find them again mentioned among the
-contending parties. But it left the more powerful states, Thebes and
-Argos,—Sparta and Athens,<a id="FNanchor_623" href="#Footnote_623"
-class="fnanchor">[623]</a>—still at war; as well as Arcadia,
-Achaia, and Elis. The relations between these states, however,
-were now somewhat complicated; for Thebes was at war with Sparta,
-and in alliance, though not altogether hearty alliance,<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_293">[p. 293]</span> with the Arcadians;
-while Athens was at war with Thebes, yet in alliance with Sparta
-as well as with Arcadia. The Argeians were in alliance with Thebes
-and Arcadia, and at war with Sparta; the Eleians were on unfriendly
-terms, though not yet at actual war, with Arcadia—yet still (it
-would appear) in alliance with Thebes. Lastly, the Arcadians
-themselves were losing their internal coöperation and harmony one
-with another, which had only so recently begun. Two parties were
-forming among them, under the old conflicting auspices of Mantinea
-and Tegea. Tegea, occupied by a Theban harmost and garrison, held
-strenuously with Megalopolis and Messênê as well as with Thebes, thus
-constituting a strong and united frontier against Sparta.</p>
-
-<p>As the Spartans complained of their Peloponnesian allies, for
-urging the recognition of Messênê as an independent state,—so they
-were no less indignant with the Persian king; who, though still
-calling himself their ally, had inserted the same recognition
-in the rescript granted to Pelopidas.<a id="FNanchor_624"
-href="#Footnote_624" class="fnanchor">[624]</a> The Athenians also
-were dissatisfied with this rescript. They had (as has been already
-stated) condemned to death Timagoras, one of their envoys who had
-accompanied Pelopidas, for having received bribes. They now availed
-themselves of the opening left for them in the very words of the
-rescript, to send a fresh embassy up to the Persian court, and
-solicit more favorable terms. Their new envoys, communicating the
-fact that Timagoras had betrayed his trust and had been punished
-for it, obtained from the Great King a fresh rescript, pronouncing
-Amphipolis to be an Athenian possession instead of a free city.<a
-id="FNanchor_625" href="#Footnote_625" class="fnanchor">[625]</a>
-Whether that other article also in the<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_294">[p. 294]</span> former rescript, which commanded Athens
-to call in all her armed ships, was now revoked, we cannot say; but
-it seems probable.</p>
-
-<p>At the same time that the Athenians sent this second embassy,
-they also despatched an armament under Timotheus to the coast of
-Asia Minor, yet with express instructions not to violate the peace
-with the Persian king. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, went to the same
-scene, though without any public force; availing himself only of
-his long-established military reputation to promote the interests
-of his country as negotiator. Both Spartan and Athenian attention
-was now turned, directly and specially, towards Ariobarzanes the
-satrap of Phrygia; who (as has been already related) had sent over
-to Greece, two years before, Philiskus of Abydus, with the view
-either of obtaining from the Thebans peace on terms favorable to
-Sparta, or of aiding the latter against them.<a id="FNanchor_626"
-href="#Footnote_626" class="fnanchor">[626]</a> Ariobarzanes was then
-preparing, and apparently had since openly consummated, his revolt
-from the Persian king, which Agesilaus employed all his influence in
-fomenting. The Athenians, however, still wishing to avoid a distinct
-breach with Persia, instructed Timotheus to assist Ariobarzanes,—yet
-with a formal proviso, that he should not break truce with the Great
-King. They also conferred both upon Ariobarzanes (with his three
-sons), and upon Philiskus, the gift of Athenian citizenship.<a
-id="FNanchor_627" href="#Footnote_627" class="fnanchor">[627]</a>
-That satrap seems now to have had a large mercenary force, and to
-have been in possession of both sides of the Hellespont, as well as
-of Perinthus on the Propontis; while Philiskus, as his chief officer,
-exercised extensive ascendency, disgraced by much tyranny and
-brutality, over the Grecian cities in that region.</p>
-
-<p>Precluded by his instructions from openly aiding the revolted
-Ariobarzanes, Timotheus turned his force against the island of
-Samos; which was now held by Kyprothemis, a Grecian chief with a
-military force in the service of Tigranes, Persian satrap<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_295">[p. 295]</span> on the opposite
-mainland. How or when Tigranes had acquired it we do not know; but
-the Persians, when once left by the peace of Antalkidas in quiet
-possession of the continental Asiatic Greeks, naturally tended to
-push their dominion over the neighboring islands. After carrying on
-his military operations in Samos, with eight thousand peltasts and
-thirty triremes, for ten or eleven months, Timotheus became master of
-it. His success was the more gratifying, as he had found means to pay
-and maintain his troops during the whole time at the cost of enemies;
-without either drawing upon the Athenian treasury, or extorting
-contributions from allies.<a id="FNanchor_628" href="#Footnote_628"
-class="fnanchor">[628]</a> An important possession was thus acquired
-for Athens, while a considerable number of Samians of the opposite
-party went into banishment, with the loss of their properties.
-Since Samos was not among the legitimate possessions of the king of
-Persia, this conquest was not understood to import war between him
-and Athens. Indeed it appears that the revolt of Ariobarzanes, and
-the uncertain fidelity of various neighboring satraps, shook for
-some time the king’s authority, and absorbed his revenues in these
-regions. Autophradates, the satrap of Lydia,—and Mausôlus, native
-prince of Karia under Persian supremacy,—attacked Ariobarzanes, with
-the view, real or pretended, of quelling his revolt; and laid siege
-to Assus and Adramyttium. But they are said to have been induced to
-desist by the personal influence of Agesilaus.<a id="FNanchor_629"
-href="#Footnote_629" class="fnanchor">[629]</a> As the latter had
-no army, nor any means of allurement (except perhaps some money
-derived from Ariobarzanes), we may fairly presume that the two
-besiegers were not very earnest in the cause. Moreover, we shall find
-both<span class="pagenum" id="Page_296">[p. 296]</span> of them,
-a few years afterwards, in joint revolt with Ariobarzanes himself
-against the Persian king.<a id="FNanchor_630" href="#Footnote_630"
-class="fnanchor">[630]</a> Agesilaus obtained, from all three,
-pecuniary aid for Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_631" href="#Footnote_631"
-class="fnanchor">[631]</a></p>
-
-<p>The acquisition of Samos, while it exalted the reputation of
-Timotheus, materially enlarged the maritime dominion of Athens.
-It seems also to have weakened the hold of the Great King on Asia
-Minor,—to have disposed the residents, both satraps and Grecian
-cities, to revolt,—and thus to have helped Ariobarzanes, who rewarded
-both Agesilaus and Timotheus. Agesilaus was enabled to carry home a
-sum of money to his embarrassed countrymen; but Timotheus, declining
-pecuniary aid, obtained for Athens the more valuable boon of
-readmission to the Thracian Chersonese. Ariobarzanes made over to him
-Sestus and Krithôtê in that peninsula; possessions doubly precious,
-as they secured to the Athenians a partial mastery of the passage of
-the Hellespont; with a large circumjacent territory for occupation.<a
-id="FNanchor_632" href="#Footnote_632" class="fnanchor">[632]</a></p>
-
-<p>Samos and the Chersonese were not simply new tributary
-confederates aggregated to the Athenian synod. They were, in large
-proportion, new territories acquired to Athens, open to be occupied
-by Athenian citizens as out-settlers or kleruchs. Much of the
-Chersonese had been possessed by Athenian citizens, even from the
-time of the first Miltiades and afterwards down to the destruction
-of the Athenian empire in 405 <small>B.C.</small> Though all
-these proprietors had been then driven home and expropriated, they
-had never lost the hope of a favorable turn of fortune and<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_297">[p. 297]</span> eventual reëntry.<a
-id="FNanchor_633" href="#Footnote_633" class="fnanchor">[633]</a>
-That moment had now arrived. The formal renunciation of all private
-appropriations of land out of Attica, which Athens had proclaimed at
-the formation of her second confederacy in 378 <small>B.C.</small>,
-as a means of conciliating maritime allies—was forgotten, now
-that she stood no longer in fear of Sparta. The same system of
-kleruchies, which had so much discredited her former empire, was
-again partially commenced. Many kleruchs, or lot-holders, were sent
-out to occupy lands both at Samos and in the Chersonese. These men
-were Athenian citizens, who still remained citizens of Athens even
-in their foreign domicile, and whose properties formed part of
-the taxable schedule of Athens. The particulars of this important
-measure are unknown to us. At Samos the emigrants must have been
-new men; for there had never been any kleruchs there before.<a
-id="FNanchor_634" href="#Footnote_634" class="fnanchor">[634]</a>
-But in the Chersonese, the old Athenian proprietors, who had been
-expropriated forty years before (or their descendants), doubtless
-now went back, and tried, with more or less of success, to regain
-their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_298">[p. 298]</span> previous
-lands; reinforced by bands of new emigrants. And Timotheus,
-having once got footing at Sestus and Krithôtê, soon extended his
-acquisitions to Elæus and other places; whereby Athens was emboldened
-publicly to claim the whole Chersonese, or at least most part of it,
-as her own ancient possession,—from its extreme northern boundary
-at a line drawn across the isthmus north of Kardia, down to Elæus
-at its southern extremity.<a id="FNanchor_635" href="#Footnote_635"
-class="fnanchor">[635]</a></p>
-
-<p>This transfer of lands in Samos to Athenian proprietors, combined
-with the resumption of the Chersonese, appears to have excited
-a strong sensation throughout Greece, as a revival of ambitious
-tendencies on the part of Athens, and a manifest departure from
-those disinterested professions which she had set forth in 378
-<small>B.C.</small> Even in the Athenian assembly, a citizen named
-Kydias pronounced an emphatic protest against the emigration of
-the kleruchs to Samos.<a id="FNanchor_636" href="#Footnote_636"
-class="fnanchor">[636]</a> However, obnoxious as the measure was
-to criticism, yet having been preceded by a conquering siege and
-the expulsion of many native proprietors, it does not seem to have
-involved Athens in so much real difficulty as the resumption of
-her old rights in the Chersonese. Not only did she here come into
-conflict with independent towns, like Kardia,<a id="FNanchor_637"
-href="#Footnote_637" class="fnanchor">[637]</a> which resisted her
-pretensions,—and with resident proprietors whom she was to aid her
-citizens in dispossessing,—but also with a new enemy, Kotys, king of
-Thrace. That prince, claiming the Chersonese as Thracian territory,
-was himself on the point of seizing Sestus, when Agesilaus or
-Ariobarzanes drove him away,<a id="FNanchor_638" href="#Footnote_638"
-class="fnanchor">[638]</a> to make room for Timotheus and the
-Athenians.</p>
-
-<p>It has been already mentioned, that Kotys,<a id="FNanchor_639"
-href="#Footnote_639" class="fnanchor">[639]</a>—the new Thracian
-enemy, but previously the friend and adopted citizen, of Athens,—was
-father-in-law of the Athenian general Iphikrates, whom he had
-enabled to establish and people the town and settlement called
-Drys, on the coast of Thrace. Iphikrates had been employed by the
-Athenians for the last three or four years on the coasts of Macedonia
-and Chalkidikê, and especially against Am<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_299">[p. 299]</span>phipolis; but he had neither taken the
-latter place, nor obtained (so far as we know) any other success;
-though he had incurred the expense for three years of a mercenary
-general named Charidemus with a body of troops. How so unprofitable
-a result, on the part of an energetic man like Iphikrates, is to be
-explained,—we cannot tell. But it naturally placed him before the
-eyes of his countrymen in disadvantageous contrast with Timotheus,
-who had just acquired Samos and the Chersonese. An additional reason
-for mistrusting Iphikrates, too, was presented by the fact, that
-Athens was now at war with his father-in-law Kotys. Hence it was now
-resolved by the Athenians to recall him, and appoint Timotheus<a
-id="FNanchor_640" href="#Footnote_640" class="fnanchor">[640]</a> to
-an extensive command, including Thrace and Macedonia as well as the
-Chersonese. Perhaps party enmities between the two Athenian chiefs,
-with their respective friends, may have contributed to the change.
-As Iphikrates had been the accuser of Timotheus a few years before,
-so the latter may have seized this opportunity of retaliating.<a
-id="FNanchor_641" href="#Footnote_641" class="fnanchor">[641]</a>
-At all events the dismissed general conducted himself in such
-a manner as to justify the mistrust of his countrymen; taking
-part with his father-in-law Kotys in the war, and actually
-fighting against Athens.<a id="FNanchor_642" href="#Footnote_642"
-class="fnanchor">[642]</a> He had got into his possession some
-hostages of Amphipolis, surrendered to him by Harpalus; which gave
-great hopes of extorting the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_300">[p.
-300]</span> surrender of the town. These hostages he had consigned
-to the custody of the mercenary general Charidemus, though a
-vote had been passed in the Athenian assembly that they should
-be sent to Athens.<a id="FNanchor_643" href="#Footnote_643"
-class="fnanchor">[643]</a> As soon as the appointment of Iphikrates
-was cancelled, Charidemus forthwith surrendered the hostages to
-the Amphipolitans themselves, thus depriving Athens of a material
-advantage. And this was not all. Though Charidemus had been three
-years with his band in the service of Athens under Iphikrates,
-yet when the new general Timotheus wished to reëngage him, he
-declined the proposition; conveying away his troops in Athenian
-transports, to enter into the pay of a decided enemy of Athens—Kotys;
-and in conjunction with Iphikrates himself.<a id="FNanchor_644"
-href="#Footnote_644" class="fnanchor">[644]</a> He was subsequently
-coming by sea from Kardia to take service under her other enemies,
-Olynthus and Amphipolis, when he was captured by the Athenian fleet.
-Under these circumstances, he was again prevailed on to serve
-Athens.</p>
-
-<p>It was against these two cities, and to the general coast of
-Macedonia and the Chalkidic Thrace, that Timotheus devoted his first
-attention, postponing for the moment Kotys and the Chersonese.
-In this enterprise he found means to obtain the alliance of
-Macedonia, which had been hostile to his predecessor Iphikrates.
-Ptolemy of Alôrus, regent of that country, who had assassinated the
-preceding king, Alexander son of Amyntas, was himself assassinated
-(365 <small>B.C.</small>) by Perdikkas, brother of Alexander.<a
-id="FNanchor_645" href="#Footnote_645" class="fnanchor">[645]</a>
-Perdikkas, during the first year or two of his reign, seems to
-have been friendly and not hostile to Athens. He lent aid to
-Timotheus, who turned his force against Olynthus and other towns
-both in the Chalkidic Thrace and on the coast of Macedonia.<a
-id="FNanchor_646" href="#Footnote_646" class="fnanchor">[646]</a>
-Probably the Olynthian confederacy may have been again acquir<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_301">[p. 301]</span>ing strength during
-the years of recent Spartan humiliation; so that Perdikkas now
-found his account in assisting Athens to subdue or enfeeble it,
-just as his father Amyntas had invoked Sparta for the like purpose.
-Timotheus, with the assistance of Perdikkas, was very successful
-in these parts; making himself master of Torônê, Potidæa, Pydna,
-Methônê, and various other places. As he mastered many of the
-Chalkidic towns allied with Olynthus, the means and adherents still
-retained by that city became so much diminished, that Timotheus
-is spoken of loosely as having conquered it.<a id="FNanchor_647"
-href="#Footnote_647" class="fnanchor">[647]</a> Here, as at Samos,
-he obtained his successes not only without cost to Athens, but also
-(as we are told) without severities upon the allies, simply from
-the regular contributions of the Thracian confederates of Athens,
-assisted by the employment of a temporary coinage of base metal.<a
-id="FNanchor_648" href="#Footnote_648" class="fnanchor">[648]</a>
-Yet though Timotheus was thus victorious in and near the Thermaic
-Gulf, he was not more fortunate than his predecessor in his attempt
-to achieve that which Athens had most at heart,—the capture of
-Amphipolis; although, by the accidental capture of Charidemus at
-sea, he was enabled again to enlist that chief with his band, whose
-services seem to have been gratefully appreciated at Athens.<a
-id="FNanchor_649" href="#Footnote_649" class="fnanchor">[649]</a>
-Timotheus first despatched Alkimachus, who was repulsed,—then landed
-himself and attacked the city. But the Amphipolitans, aided by the
-neighboring Thracians, in large numbers (and perhaps by the Thracian
-Kotys), made so strenuous a resistance, that he was forced to retire
-with loss; and even to burn some triremes, which, having been carried
-across to assail the city from the wide part of<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_302">[p. 302]</span> the river Strymon above, could not
-be brought off in the face of the enemy.<a id="FNanchor_650"
-href="#Footnote_650" class="fnanchor">[650]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_303">[p. 303]</span></p>
-
-<p>Timotheus next turned his attention to the war against Kotys in
-Thrace, and to the defence of the newly-acquired Athenian possessions
-in the Chersonese, now menaced by the appearance of a new and
-unexpected enemy to Athens in the eastern waters of the Ægean,—a
-Theban fleet.</p>
-
-<p>I have already mentioned that in 366 <small>B.C.</small>, Thebes
-had sustained great misfortunes in Thessaly. Pelopidas had been
-fraudulently seized and detained as prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ;
-a Theban army had been sent to rescue him, but had been dishonorably
-repulsed, and had only been enabled to effect its retreat by the
-genius of Epaminondas, then serving as a private, and called upon by
-the soldiers to take the command. Afterwards, Epaminondas himself
-had been sent at the head of a second army to extricate his captive
-friend, which he had accomplished, but not without relinquishing
-Thessaly and leaving Alexander more powerful than ever. For a certain
-time after this defeat, the Thebans remained comparatively humbled
-and quiet. At length, the aggravated oppressions of the tyrant
-Alexander occasioned such suffering, and provoked such missions of
-complaint on the part of the Thessalians to Thebes, that Pelopidas,
-burning with ardor to revenge both his city and himself, prevailed on
-the Thebans to place him at the head of a fresh army for the purpose
-of invading Thessaly.<a id="FNanchor_651" href="#Footnote_651"
-class="fnanchor">[651]</a></p>
-
-<p>At the same time, probably, the remarkable successes of the
-Athenians under Timotheus, at Samos and the Chersonese, had
-excited uneasiness throughout Greece, and jealousy on the part of
-the Thebans. Epaminondas ventured to propose to his countrymen
-that they should grapple with Athens on her own element,<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_304">[p. 304]</span> and compete for
-the headship of Greece not only on land but at sea. In fact the
-rescript brought down by Pelopidas from the Persian court sanctioned
-this pretension, by commanding Athens to lay up her ships of
-war, on pain of incurring the chastisement of the Great King;<a
-id="FNanchor_652" href="#Footnote_652" class="fnanchor">[652]</a>
-a mandate, which she had so completely defied as to push her
-maritime efforts more energetically than before. Epaminondas
-employed all his eloquence to impress upon his countrymen, that,
-Sparta being now humbled, Athens was their actual and prominent
-enemy. He reminded them,—in language such as had been used by
-Brasidas in the early years of the Peloponnesian war, and by
-Hermokrates at Syracuse,<a id="FNanchor_653" href="#Footnote_653"
-class="fnanchor">[653]</a>—that men such as the Thebans, brave and
-trained soldiers on land, could soon acquire the like qualities
-on shipboard; and that the Athenians themselves had once been
-mere landsmen, until the exigencies of the Persian war forced
-them to take to the sea.<a id="FNanchor_654" href="#Footnote_654"
-class="fnanchor">[654]</a> “We must put down this haughty rival (he
-exhorted his countrymen); we must transfer to our own citadel, the
-Kadmeia, those magnificent Propylæa which adorn the entrance of
-the acropolis at Athens.”<a id="FNanchor_655" href="#Footnote_655"
-class="fnanchor">[655]</a></p>
-
-<p>Such emphatic language, as it long lived in the hostile
-recollection of Athenian orators, so it excited at the moment extreme
-ardor on the part of the Theban hearers. They resolved to build and
-equip one hundred triremes, and to construct docks with ship-houses
-fit for the constant maintenance of such a number. Epaminondas
-himself was named commander, to sail with the first fleet, as
-soon as it should be ready, to the Hellespont and the islands
-near Ionia; while invitations were at the same time despatched
-to Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, encouraging them to prepare for
-breaking with Athens.<a id="FNanchor_656" href="#Footnote_656"
-class="fnanchor">[656]</a> Some opposition however was made in
-the assembly to the new undertaking; especially by Menekleidas,
-an opposition speaker, who, being frequent and severe in his
-criticisms upon the leading men such as Pelopidas and Epaminon<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_305">[p. 305]</span>das, has been handed
-down by Nepos and Plutarch in odious colors. Demagogues like him,
-whose power resided in the public assembly, are commonly represented
-as if they had a natural interest in plunging their cities into
-war, in order that there might be more matter of accusation against
-the leading men. This representation is founded mainly on the
-picture which Thucydides gives of Kleon in the first half of the
-Peloponnesian war: I have endeavored in my sixth volume to show,<a
-id="FNanchor_657" href="#Footnote_657" class="fnanchor">[657]</a>
-that it is not a fair estimate even of Kleon separately, much less of
-the demagogues generally, unwarlike men both in tastes and aptitudes.
-Menekleidas at Thebes, far from promoting warlike expeditions in
-order that he might denounce the generals when they came back,
-advocated the prudence of continued peace, and accused Epaminondas
-of involving his country in distant and dangerous schemes, with a
-view to emulate the glories of Agamemnon by sailing from Aulis in
-Bœotia, as commander of an imposing fleet to make conquests in the
-Hellespont. “By the help of Thebes (replied Epaminondas) I have
-already done more than Agamemnon. He, with the forces of Sparta
-and all Greece besides, was ten years in taking a single city;
-while <i>I</i>, with the single force of Thebes and at the single day
-of Leuktra, have crushed the power of the Agamemnonian Sparta.”<a
-id="FNanchor_658" href="#Footnote_658" class="fnanchor">[658]</a>
-While repelling the charge of personal motives, Epaminondas contended
-that peace would be equivalent to an abnegation of the headship
-of Greece; and that, if Thebes wished to maintain that ascendant
-station, she must keep her citizens in constant warlike training and
-action.</p>
-
-<p>To err with Epaminondas may be considered, by some readers, as
-better than being right with Menekleidas. But on the main point of
-this debate, Menekleidas appears to have been really right. For the
-general exhortations ascribed to Epaminondas<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_306">[p. 306]</span> resemble but too closely those
-feverish stimulants, which Alkibiades administered at Athens to
-wind up his countrymen for the fatal expedition against Syracuse.<a
-id="FNanchor_659" href="#Footnote_659" class="fnanchor">[659]</a>
-If we should even grant his advice to be wise, in reference
-to land-warfare, we must recollect that he was here impelling
-Thebes into a new and untried maritime career, for which she had
-neither aptitude nor facilities. To maintain ascendency on land
-alone, would require all her force, and perhaps prove too hard
-for her; to maintain ascendency by land and sea at once would be
-still more impracticable. By grasping at both she would probably
-keep neither. Such considerations warrant us in suspecting,
-that the project of stretching across the Ægean for ultramarine
-dependencies was suggested to this great man not so much by a sound
-appreciation of the permanent interests of Thebes, as by jealousy
-of Athens,—especially since the recent conquests of Timotheus.<a
-id="FNanchor_660" href="#Footnote_660" class="fnanchor">[660]</a></p>
-
-<p>The project however was really executed, and a large Theban fleet
-under Epaminondas crossed the Ægean in 363 <small>B.C.</small> In
-the same year, apparently, Pelopidas marched into Thessaly, at the
-head of a Theban land-force, against Alexander of Pheræ. What the
-fleet achieved, we are scarcely permitted to know. It appears that
-Epaminondas visited Byzantium; and we are told that he drove off the
-Athenian guard-squadron under Laches, prevailing upon several of
-the allies of Athens to declare in his favor.<a id="FNanchor_661"
-href="#Footnote_661" class="fnanchor">[661]</a> Both he<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_307">[p. 307]</span> and Timotheus appear
-to have been in these seas, if not at the same time, at least with
-no great interval of time between. Both were solicited by the
-oligarchy of the Pontic Herakleia against the people; and both
-declined to furnish aid.<a id="FNanchor_662" href="#Footnote_662"
-class="fnanchor">[662]</a> Timotheus is said to have liberated
-the besieged town of Kyzikus: by whom it was besieged, we do not
-certainly know, but probably by the Theban fleet.<a id="FNanchor_663"
-href="#Footnote_663" class="fnanchor">[663]</a> Epaminondas brought
-back his fleet at the end of the year, without having gained any
-splendid victory or acquired any tenable possession for Thebes;
-yet not without weakening Athens, unsettling her hold upon her
-dependencies, and seconding indirectly the hostilities carried on
-by Kotys; insomuch that the Athenian affairs in the Chersonese and
-Thrace were much less prosperous in 362 <small>B.C.</small> than they
-had been in 364 <small>B.C.</small> Probably Epaminondas intended to
-return with his fleet in the next year (362 <small>B.C.</small>), and
-to push his maritime enterprises still farther;<a id="FNanchor_664"
-href="#Footnote_664" class="fnanchor">[664]</a> but we shall find him
-imperatively called elsewhere, to another and a fatal battle-field.
-And thus the first naval expedition of Thebes was likewise the
-last.</p>
-
-<p>Meanwhile his friend and colleague Pelopidas had marched into
-Thessaly against the despot Alexander; who was now at the height
-of his power, holding in dependence a large portion of Thessaly
-together with the Phthiot Achæans and the Magnetes, and having Athens
-as his ally. Nevertheless, so revolting had been his cruelties,
-and so numerous were the malcontents who had sent to invite aid
-from Thebes, that Pelopidas did not despair of overpowering him.
-Nor was he daunted even by an eclipse of the sun, which is said
-to have occurred just as he was commencing his march, nor by the
-gloomy warnings which the prophets founded upon it; though this
-event intimidated many of his fellow-citizens, so that his force
-was rendered less numerous as well as less confident. Arriving
-at Pharsalus, and strengthening himself by the junction of his
-Thessalian allies, he found Alexander approaching to meet him at the
-head of a well-appointed mercenary force, greatly superior in number.
-The two chiefs contended who should occupy first the hills called
-Kynos Kephalæ, or the Dog’s Heads. Pelopidas<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_308">[p. 308]</span> arrived there first with his cavalry,
-beat the cavalry of the enemy, and pursued them to some distance; but
-he thus left the hills open to be occupied by the numerous infantry
-of the enemy, while his own infantry, coming up later, were repulsed
-with loss in their attempt to carry the position. Thus unpromising
-did the battle appear, when Pelopidas returned from the pursuit.
-Ordering his victorious cavalry to charge the infantry on the hill in
-flank, he immediately dismounted, seized his shield, and put himself
-at the head of his own discouraged infantry, whom he again led up
-the hill to attack the position. His presence infused so much fresh
-ardor, that his troops, in spite of being twice repulsed, succeeded
-in a third attempt to drive the enemy from the summit of the hill.
-Thus master of the hill, Pelopidas saw before him the whole army
-of the enemy, retiring in some disorder, though not yet beaten;
-while Alexander in person was on the right wing, exerting himself
-to rally and encourage them. When Pelopidas beheld, as it were
-within his reach, this detested enemy,—whose treacherous arrest and
-dungeon he had himself experienced, and whose cruelties filled every
-one’s mouth,—he was seized with a transport of rage and madness,
-like Cyrus the younger on the field of Kunaxa at the sight of his
-brother Artaxerxes. Without thinking of his duties as a general, or
-even looking to see by whom he was followed, he rushed impetuously
-forward, with loud cries and challenges to Alexander to come forth
-and fight. The latter, declining the challenge, retired among his
-guards, into the midst of whom Pelopidas plunged, with the few who
-followed him; and there, while fighting with desperate bravery, met
-his death. So rapidly had this rash proceeding been consummated, that
-his army behind did not at first perceive it. But they presently
-hastened forward to rescue or avenge him, vigorously charged the
-troops of Alexander, and put them to flight with severe loss.<a
-id="FNanchor_665" href="#Footnote_665" class="fnanchor">[665]</a></p>
-
-<p>Yet this victory, though important to the Thebans, and still more
-important to the Thessalians, was to both of them robbed of all
-its sensible value by the death of Pelopidas. The demonstrations
-of grief throughout the army were unbounded and universal. The
-soldiers yet warm from their victory, the wounded men with wounds yet
-untended, flocked around the corpse, piling up near to it as a<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_309">[p. 309]</span> trophy the arms of the
-slain enemies. Many, refusing either to kindle fire, or to touch
-their evening meal, testified their affliction by cutting off their
-own hair as well as the manes of their horses. The Thessalian cities
-vied with each other in tokens of affectionate respect, and obtained
-from the Thebans permission to take the chief share in his funeral,
-as their lost guardian and protector. At Thebes, the emotion was no
-less strikingly manifested. Endeared to his countrymen first as the
-head of that devoted handful of exiles who braved every peril to
-rescue the city from the Lacedæmonians, Pelopidas had been reëlected
-without interruption to the annual office of Bœotarch during all the
-years that had since elapsed<a id="FNanchor_666" href="#Footnote_666"
-class="fnanchor">[666]</a> (378-364 <small>B.C.</small>). He had
-taken a leading part in all their struggles, and all their glories;
-he had been foremost to cheer them in the hour of despondency; he
-had lent himself, with the wisdom of a patriot and the generosity of
-a friend, to second the guiding ascendency of Epaminondas, and his
-moderation of dealing towards conquered enemies.<a id="FNanchor_667"
-href="#Footnote_667" class="fnanchor">[667]</a></p>
-
-<p>All that Thebes could do, was, to avenge the death of Pelopidas.
-The Theban generals, Malkitas and Diogeiton,<a id="FNanchor_668"
-href="#Footnote_668" class="fnanchor">[668]</a> conducted a pow<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_310">[p. 310]</span>erful force of seven
-thousand hoplites into Thessaly, and put themselves at the head of
-their partisans in that country. With this united army, they pressed
-Alexander hard, completely worsted him, and reduced him to submit to
-their own terms. He was compelled to relinquish all his dependencies
-in Thessaly; to confine himself to Pheræ, with its territory near the
-Gulf of Pagasæ; and to swear adherence to Thebes as a leader. All
-Thessaly, together with the Phthiot Achæans and the Magnêtes, became
-annexed to the headship of the Thebans, who thus acquired greater
-ascendency in Northern Greece than they had ever enjoyed before.<a
-id="FNanchor_669" href="#Footnote_669" class="fnanchor">[669]</a> The
-power of Alexander was effectually put down on land; but he still
-continued both powerful and predatory at sea, as will be seen in the
-ensuing year.</p>
-
-<hr class="chap" />
-
-
-<div class="chapter" id="Chap_80">
-  <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_311">[p. 311]</span></p>
-  <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXX.<br />
-  FROM THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA.</h2>
-</div>
-
-<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">It</span>
-was during this period,—while Epaminondas was absent with the fleet,
-and while Pelopidas was engaged in that Thessalian campaign from
-whence he never returned,—that the Thebans destroyed Orchomenus.
-That city, the second in the Bœotian federation, had always been
-disaffected towards Thebes; and the absence of the two great leaders,
-as well as of a large Theban force in Thessaly, seems to have been
-regarded by the Orchomenian Knights or Horsemen (the first and
-richest among the citizens, three hundred in number) as a favorable
-moment for attack. Some Theban exiles took part in this scheme, with
-a view to overthrow the existing government; and a day, appointed
-for a military review near Thebes, was fixed for execution. A large
-number of conspirators joined, with apparent ardor. But before the
-day arrived, several of them repented and betrayed the plot to the
-Bœotarchs; upon which the Orchomenian horsemen were seized, brought
-before the Theban assembly, condemned to death, and executed. But
-besides this, the resolution was taken to destroy the town, to kill
-the male adults, and to sell the women and children into slavery.<a
-id="FNanchor_670" href="#Footnote_670" class="fnanchor">[670]</a>
-This barbarous decree was executed, though probably a certain
-fraction found means to escape, forming the kernel of that population
-which was afterwards restored. The full measure of ancient Theban
-hatred was thus satiated; a hatred, tracing its origin even to
-those mythical times when Thebes was said to have paid tribute to
-Orchomenus. But the erasure of this venerable city from the list of
-autonomous units in Hellas, with the wholesale execution and sale of
-so many free kinsmen into slavery, excited strong sympathy throughout
-the neighbors, as well as repugnance against Theban cruelty;<a
-id="FNanchor_671" href="#Footnote_671" class="fnanchor">[671]</a>
-a sentiment probably aggra<span class="pagenum" id="Page_312">[p.
-312]</span>vated by the fact, which we must presume to have been
-concurrent,—that the Thebans appropriated the territory among their
-own citizens. It would seem that the neighboring town of Koroneia
-shared the same fate; at least the two are afterwards spoken of
-together in such manner as to make us suppose so.<a id="FNanchor_672"
-href="#Footnote_672" class="fnanchor">[672]</a> Thebes thus absorbed
-into herself these two towns and territories to the north of her own
-city, as well as Platæa and Thespiæ to the south.</p>
-
-<p>We must recollect that during the supremacy of Sparta and the
-period of Theban struggle and humiliation, before the battle of
-Leuktra, Orchomenus had actively embraced the Spartan cause.
-Shortly after that victory, the Thebans had been anxious under
-their first impulse of resentment to destroy the city, but had
-been restrained by the lenient recommendations of Epaminondas.<a
-id="FNanchor_673" href="#Footnote_673" class="fnanchor">[673]</a>
-All their half-suppressed wrath was revived by the conspiracy of the
-Orchomenian Knights; yet the extreme severity of the proceeding would
-never have been consummated, but for the absence of Epaminondas,
-who was deeply chagrined on his return.<a id="FNanchor_674"
-href="#Footnote_674" class="fnanchor">[674]</a> He well knew the
-bitter censures which Thebes would draw upon herself by punishing
-the entire city for the conspiracy of the wealthy Knights, and in
-a manner even more rigorous than Platæa and Thespiæ; since the
-inhabitants of these two latter were expelled with their families out
-of Bœotia, while the Orchome<span class="pagenum" id="Page_313">[p.
-313]</span>nian male adults were slain, and the women and children
-sold into slavery.</p>
-
-<p>On returning from his maritime expedition at the end of 363
-<small>B.C.</small>, Epaminondas was reëlected one of the
-Bœotarchs. He had probably intended to renew his cruise during the
-coming year. But his chagrin for the Orchomenian affair, and his
-grief for the death of Pelopidas,—an intimate friend, as well as
-a political colleague whom he could trust,—might deter him from a
-second absence; while the affairs of Peloponnesus also were now
-becoming so complicated, as to render the necessity of renewed Theban
-interference again probable.</p>
-
-<p>Since the peace concluded in 366 <small>B.C.</small> with Corinth,
-Phlius, etc., Thebes had sent no army into that peninsula; though her
-harmost and garrison still continued at Tegea, perhaps at Megalopolis
-and Messênê also. The Arcadians, jealous of her as well as disunited
-among themselves, had even gone so far as to contract an alliance
-with her enemy Athens. The main conflict however now was, between the
-Arcadians and the Eleians, respecting the possession of Triphylia and
-the Pisatid. The Eleians about this time (365 <small>B.C.</small>)
-came into alliance again with Sparta,<a id="FNanchor_675"
-href="#Footnote_675" class="fnanchor">[675]</a> relinquishing their
-alliance with Thebes; while the Achæans, having come into vigorous
-coöperation with Sparta<a id="FNanchor_676" href="#Footnote_676"
-class="fnanchor">[676]</a> ever since 367 <small>B.C.</small>
-(by reaction against the Thebans, who, reserving the judicious
-and moderate policy of Epaminondas, violently changed the Achæan
-governments), allied themselves with Elis also, in or before 365
-<small>B.C.</small><a id="FNanchor_677" href="#Footnote_677"
-class="fnanchor">[677]</a> And thus Sparta, though robbed by the
-pacification of 366 <small>B.C.</small> of the aid of Corinth,
-Phlius, Epidaurus, etc., had now acquired in exchange Elis and
-Achaia,—confederates not less valuable.</p>
-
-<p>Triphylia, the territory touching the western coast of
-Peloponnesus, immediately north of the river Neda,—and the Pisatid
-(including the lower course of the river Alpheius and the plain
-of Olympia), immediately north of Triphylia,—both of them between
-Messenia and Elis,—had been in former times conquered and long held
-by the Eleians, but always as discontented subjects. Sparta, in
-the days of her unquestioned supremacy, had<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_314">[p. 314]</span> found it politic to vindicate their
-independence, and had compelled the Eleians, after a war of two
-or three years, to renounce formally all dominion over them.<a
-id="FNanchor_678" href="#Footnote_678" class="fnanchor">[678]</a>
-No sooner, however, had the battle of Leuktra disarmed Sparta, than
-the Eleians reclaimed their lost dominion;<a id="FNanchor_679"
-href="#Footnote_679" class="fnanchor">[679]</a> while the
-subjects on their side found new protectors in the Arcadians,
-and were even admitted, under pretence of kindred race, into the
-Pan-Arcadian confederacy.<a id="FNanchor_680" href="#Footnote_680"
-class="fnanchor">[680]</a> The Persian rescript brought down by
-Pelopidas (367-366 <small>B.C.</small>) seems to have reversed
-this arrangement, recognizing the imperial rights of the Eleians.<a
-id="FNanchor_681" href="#Footnote_681" class="fnanchor">[681]</a>
-But as the Arcadians had repudiated the rescript, it remained for
-the Eleians to enforce their imperial rights by arms, if they could.
-They found Sparta in the same interest as themselves; not only
-equally hostile to the Arcadians, but also complaining that she had
-been robbed of Messênê, as they complained of the loss of Triphylia.
-Sparta had just gained a slight advantage over the Arcadians, in
-the recapture of Sellasia; chiefly through the aid of a Syracusan
-reinforcement of twelve triremes, sent to them by the younger
-Dionysius, but with orders speedily to return.<a id="FNanchor_682"
-href="#Footnote_682" class="fnanchor">[682]</a></p>
-
-<p>Besides the imperial claims over Triphylia and the Pisatid,
-which thus placed Elis in alliance with Sparta and in conflict with
-Arcadia,—there was also a territory lying north of the Alpheius
-(on the hilly ground forming the western or Eleian side of Mount
-Erymanthus, between Elis and the north-western portion of Arcadia),
-which included Lasion and the highland townships called Akroreii,
-and which was disputed between Elis and Arcadia. At this moment,
-it was included as a portion of the Pan-Arcadian aggregate;<a
-id="FNanchor_683" href="#Footnote_683" class="fnanchor">[683]</a>
-but the Eleians, claiming it as their own and suddenly marching in
-along with a body of Arcadian exiles, seized and occupied Lasion
-as well as some of the neighboring Akroreii. The Arcadians were
-not slow in avenging the affront. A body of their Pan-Arcadian
-militia called the epariti, collected from the various cities and
-districts, marched to Lasion, defeated the Eleian hoplites with
-considerable loss both of men and arms, and<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_315">[p. 315]</span> drove them out of the district. The
-victors recovered both Lasion and all the Akroreii, except Thraustus;
-after which they proceeded to the sacred ground of Olympia, and
-took formal possession of it, planting a garrison, protected by a
-regular stockaded circle, on the hill called Kronion. Having made
-good this position, they marched on even to the city of Elis itself,
-which was unfortified (though it had a tenable acropolis), so that
-they were enabled to enter it, finding no resistance until they
-reached the agora. Here they found mustered the Eleian horsemen and
-the chosen hoplites, who repulsed them with some loss. But Elis
-was in great consternation; while a democratical opposition now
-manifested itself against the ruling oligarchy,—seizing the acropolis
-in hopes of admitting the Arcadians. The bravery of the horsemen
-and hoplites, however, put down this internal movement, recovered
-the acropolis, and forced the malcontents, to the number of four
-hundred, to evacuate the city. Thus expelled, the latter seized and
-established themselves at Pylus (in the Eleian territory, about nine
-miles from Elis towards the Arcadian border<a id="FNanchor_684"
-href="#Footnote_684" class="fnanchor">[684]</a>), where they were
-reinforced not only by a body of Arcadians, but also by many of their
-partisans who came from the city to join them. From this fortified
-post, planted in the country like Dekeleia in Attica, they carried
-on harassing war against the Eleians in the city, and reduced them
-after some time to great straits. There were even hopes of compelling
-the city to surrender, and a fresh invasion of the Arcadians was
-invited to complete the enterprise. The Eleians were only rescued
-by a reinforcement from their allies in Achaia, who came in large
-force and placed the city in safety; so that the Arcadians could do
-nothing more than lay waste the territory around.<a id="FNanchor_685"
-href="#Footnote_685" class="fnanchor">[685]</a></p>
-
-<p>Retiring on this occasion, the Arcadians renewed their invasion
-not long afterwards; their garrison still occupying Olympia, and the
-exiles continuing at Pylus. They now marched all across the country,
-even approaching Kyllênê, the harbor of Elis on the western sea.
-Between the harbor and the city, the Eleians ventured to attack them,
-but were defeated with such loss, that their general Andromachus (who
-had prompted the attack) fell upon his sword in despair. The distress
-of the Eleians became greater<span class="pagenum" id="Page_316">[p.
-316]</span> than ever. In hopes of drawing off the Arcadian invaders,
-they sent an envoy to Sparta, entreating that the Lacedæmonians
-would make a diversion on their side of Arcadia. Accordingly, the
-Spartan prince Archidamus (son of king Agesilaus), invading the
-south-western portion of Arcadia, occupied a hill-town or post called
-Kromnus (seemingly in the territory of Megalopolis, and cutting off
-the communication between that city and Messênê), which he fortified
-and garrisoned with about two hundred Spartans and Periœki. The
-effect which the Eleians contemplated was produced. The Arcadian
-army (except the garrison of Olympia) being withdrawn home, they had
-leisure to act against Pylus. The Pylian exiles had recently made an
-abortive attempt upon Thalamæ, on their return from which they were
-overtaken and worsted by the Eleians, with severe loss in killed, and
-two hundred of their number ultimately made prisoners. Among these
-latter, all the Eleian exiles were at once put to death; all the
-remainder sold for slaves.<a id="FNanchor_686" href="#Footnote_686"
-class="fnanchor">[686]</a></p>
-
-<p>Meanwhile the main Arcadian force, which had returned from
-Elis, was joined by allies,—Thebans,<a id="FNanchor_687"
-href="#Footnote_687" class="fnanchor">[687]</a> Argeians, and
-Messenians,—and marched at once to Kromnus. They there blocked up
-the Lacedæmonian garrison by a double palisade carried all around,
-which they kept a numerous force to occupy. In vain did Archidamus
-attempt to draw them off, by carrying his devastations into the
-Skiritis and other portions of Arcadia; for the Skiritæ, in former
-days dependents of Sparta and among the most valuable constituents
-of the Lacedæmonian armies,<a id="FNanchor_688" href="#Footnote_688"
-class="fnanchor">[688]</a> had now become independent Arcadians. The
-blockade was still continued without interruption. Archidamus next
-tried to get possession of a hill-top which commanded the Arcadian
-position. But in marching along the road up, he encountered the
-enemy in great force, and was repulsed with some loss; himself being
-thrust through the thigh with a spear, and his relatives Polyænidas
-and Chilon slain.<a id="FNanchor_689" href="#Footnote_689"
-class="fnanchor">[689]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_317">[p.
-317]</span> The Lacedæmonian troops retreated for some space into
-a wider breadth of ground, where they were again formed in battle
-order, yet greatly discouraged both by the repulse and by the
-communication of the names of the slain, who were among the most
-distinguished soldiers of Sparta. The Arcadians on the contrary were
-advancing to the charge in high spirits, when an ancient Spartan,
-stepping forth from the ranks, shouted with a loud voice “What
-need to fight, gentlemen? Is it not better to conclude a truce and
-separate?” Both armies accepted the proposition joyfully. The truce
-was concluded; the Lacedæmonians took up their dead and retired: the
-Arcadians also retreated to the spot where they had gained their
-advantage, and there erected their trophy.<a id="FNanchor_690"
-href="#Footnote_690" class="fnanchor">[690]</a></p>
-
-<p>Under the graphic description here given by Xenophon, seems to
-be concealed a defeat of the Lacedæmonians more serious than he
-likes to enunciate. The Arcadians completely gained their point,
-by continuing the blockade without interruption. One more attempt
-was made by the Lacedæmonians for the relief of their countrymen.
-Suddenly assailing the palisade at night, they succeeded in mastering
-the portion of it guarded by the Argeians.<a id="FNanchor_691"
-href="#Footnote_691" class="fnanchor">[691]</a> They broke down
-an opening, and called to the besieged to hasten out. But the
-relief had come unexpected, so that only a few of those near at
-hand could profit by it to escape. The Arcadians, hurrying to
-the spot in large force, drove off the assailants and reënclosed
-the besieged, who were soon compelled to surrender for want of
-provisions. More than a hundred prisoners, Spartans and Periœki
-together, were distributed among the captors,—Argeians, Thebans,
-Arcadians, and Messenians,—one share to each.<a id="FNanchor_692"
-href="#Footnote_692" class="fnanchor">[692]</a> Sixty years before,
-the capture of two hundred and twenty Spartans and Lacedæmonians
-in Sphakteria, by Kleon and Demosthenes, had excited the extreme
-of incredulous wonder throughout all Greece; emphatically noted by
-the impartial Thucydides.<a id="FNanchor_693" href="#Footnote_693"
-class="fnanchor">[693]</a> Now, not a trace of such sentiment
-appears, even in the philo-Laconian Xenophon. So sadly had Spartan
-glory declined!</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_318">[p. 318]</span></p>
-
-<p>Having thus put an end to the Spartan attack, the Arcadians
-resumed their aggression against Elis, in conjunction with a new
-project of considerable moment. It was now the spring immediately
-preceding the celebration of the great quadrennial Olympic
-festival, which came about midsummer. The presidency over this
-sacred ceremony had long been the cherished privilege of the
-Eleians, who had acquired it when they conquered the Pisatans—the
-inhabitants of the region immediately around Olympia, and the
-first curators of the festival in its most primitive state. These
-Pisatans, always reluctant subjects of Elis, had never lost the
-conviction that the presidency of the festival belonged to them of
-right; and had entreated Sparta to restore to them their right,
-thirty-five years before, when Agis as conqueror imposed terms of
-peace upon the Eleians.<a id="FNanchor_694" href="#Footnote_694"
-class="fnanchor">[694]</a> Their request had been then declined,
-on the ground that they were too poor and rude to do worthy
-honor to the ceremony. But on now renewing it, they found the
-Arcadians more compliant than the Spartans had been. The Arcadian
-garrison, which had occupied the sacred plain of Olympia for more
-than a year, being strongly reinforced, preparation was made for
-celebrating the festival by the Pisatans under Arcadian protection.<a
-id="FNanchor_695" href="#Footnote_695" class="fnanchor">[695]</a>
-The Grecian states would receive with surprise, on this occasion,
-two distinct notices from official heralds, announcing to them the
-commencement of the hieromenia or sacred season, and the precise day
-when the ceremonies would begin: for doubtless the Eleians, though
-expelled by force from Olympia, still asserted their rights and sent
-round their notices as usual.</p>
-
-<p>It was evident that this memorable plain, consecrated as it
-was to Hellenic brotherhood and communion, would on the present
-occasion be dishonored by dispute and perhaps by bloodshed: for the
-Arcadians summoned to the spot, besides their own military strength,
-a considerable body of allies: two thousand hoplites from Argos,
-and four hundred horsemen from Athens. So imposing a force being
-considered sufficient to deter the unwarlike Eleians from any idea of
-asserting their rights by arms, the Arcadians and Pisatans began the
-festival with its ordinary routine of sacrifice and matches. Having
-gone through the chariot-race, they entered upon the pentathlon,
-or quintuple contest, wherein the running<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_319">[p. 319]</span> match and the wrestling-match came
-first in order. The running-match had already been completed, and
-those who had been successful enough in it to go on contending for
-the prize in the other four points, had begun to wrestle in the
-space between the stadium and the great altar,<a id="FNanchor_696"
-href="#Footnote_696" class="fnanchor">[696]</a>—when suddenly the
-Eleians were seen entering the sacred ground in arms, accompanied by
-their allies the Achæans, and marching up to the opposite bank of
-the little river Kladeus,—which flowed at a little distance to the
-westward of the Altis, or interior enclosed precinct of Zeus, falling
-afterwards into the Alpheius. Upon this the Arcadians drew up in
-armed order, on their own side of the Kladeus, to resist the farther
-approach of the Eleians.<a id="FNanchor_697" href="#Footnote_697"
-class="fnanchor">[697]</a> The latter, with a boldness for which
-no one gave<span class="pagenum" id="Page_320">[p. 320]</span>
-them credit, forded the rivulet, headed by Stratolas with his
-chosen band of three hundred, and vigorously charged first the
-Arcadians, next the Argeians; both of whom were defeated and driven
-back. The victorious Eleians forced their way into the Altis, and
-pressed forward to reach the great altar. But at every step of
-their advance the resistance became stronger, aided as it was by
-numerous buildings,—the senate-house, the temple of Zeus, and various
-porticos,—which both deranged their ranks, and furnished excellent
-positions of defence for darters and archers on the roofs. Stratolas
-was here slain; while his troops, driven out of the sacred ground,
-were compelled to recross the Kladeus. The festival was then resumed
-and prosecuted in its usual order. But the Arcadians were so afraid
-of a renewed attack on the following day, that they not only occupied
-the roofs of all the buildings more completely than before, but
-passed the night in erecting a palisade of defence; tearing down
-for that purpose the temporary booths which had been carefully
-put up to accommodate the crowd of visitors.<a id="FNanchor_698"
-href="#Footnote_698" class="fnanchor">[698]</a> Such precautions
-rendered the place unassailable, so that the Eleians were obliged
-to return home on the next day; not without sympathy and admiration
-among many of the Greeks, for the unwonted boldness which they
-had displayed. They revenged themselves by pronouncing the 104th
-Olympiad to be no Olympiad at all, and by registering it as such in
-their catalogue, when they regained power; preserving however the
-names of those who had been proclaimed victors, which appeared in
-the lists like the rest.<a id="FNanchor_699" href="#Footnote_699"
-class="fnanchor">[699]</a></p>
-
-<p>Such was the unholy combat which dishonored the sanctuary of
-Pan-hellenic brotherhood, and in which the great temple, with its
-enthroned inmate the majestic Zeus of Pheidias, was for the first
-time turned into a fortress against its habitual presidents the
-Eleians. It was a combat wherein, though both Thebes and Sparta, the
-competing leaders of Greece, stand clear, Athens as well as most of
-the Peloponnesian chief states were implicated. It had been brought
-on by the rapacious ambition of the Arcadians, and its result seemed
-to confirm them, under color of Pisatan presi<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_321">[p. 321]</span>dency, in the permanent mastery of
-Olympia. But in spite of such apparent promise, it was an event
-which carried in itself the seeds of violent reaction. We cannot
-doubt that the crowd of Grecian spectators present were not merely
-annoyed by the interruption of the proceedings and by the demolition
-of their tents, but also deeply shocked by the outrage to the
-sacred ground,—“imminentium templorum religio.”<a id="FNanchor_700"
-href="#Footnote_700" class="fnanchor">[700]</a> Most of them probably
-believed the Eleians to be the rightful presidents, having never
-either seen or heard of any one else in that capacity. And they could
-hardly help feeling strong sympathy for the unexpected courage of
-these dispossessed presidents; which appeared so striking to Xenophon
-(himself perhaps a spectator) that he ascribes it to a special
-inspiration of the gods.<a id="FNanchor_701" href="#Footnote_701"
-class="fnanchor">[701]</a></p>
-
-<p>If they disapproved of the conduct of the Arcadians and Pisatans
-as an unjust intrusion, they would disapprove yet more of that
-spoliation of the rich temples at Olympia, whereby the intruders
-rewarded themselves. The Arcadians, always on the look-out for
-plunder and pay as mercenary soldiers, found themselves supplied with
-both, in abundant measure, from this war: the one from the farms, the
-stock, and the field-laborers, of the Eleian neighborhood generally,
-more plentiful than in any part of Peloponnesus;<a id="FNanchor_702"
-href="#Footnote_702" class="fnanchor">[702]</a> the other from
-the ample accumulation, both of money and of precious offerings,
-distributed over the numerous temples at Olympia. The Pisatans, now
-installed as administrators, would readily consent to appropriate
-these treasures to the pay of their own defenders, whom they
-doubtless considered as acting in the service of the Olympian Zeus.
-Accordingly the Epariti, the militia of joint Arcadia, were better
-paid than ever they had been before so that the service attracted
-numerous volunteers of the poorer class.<a id="FNanchor_703"
-href="#Footnote_703" class="fnanchor">[703]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_322">[p. 322]</span></p>
-
-<p>At the outset of the Peloponnesian war, the Corinthians and
-Spartans had talked of prosecuting it in part by borrowed money
-from the treasuries of Delphi and Olympia.<a id="FNanchor_704"
-href="#Footnote_704" class="fnanchor">[704]</a> How far the project
-had ever been executed, we have no information. But at least, it had
-not been realized in any such way as to form a precedent for the
-large sums now appropriated by the Pisatans and Arcadians; which
-appropriation accordingly excited much outcry, as flagrant rapacity
-and sacrilege. This sentiment was felt with peculiar force among
-many even of the Arcadians themselves, the guilty parties. Moreover
-some of the leaders employed had made important private acquisitions
-for themselves, so as to provoke both resentment and jealousy among
-their rivals. The Pan-Arcadian communion, recently brought together
-and ill-cemented, was little calculated to resist the effect of any
-strong special cause of dissension. It was composed of cities which
-had before been accustomed to act apart and even in hostility to each
-other; especially Mantinea and Tegea. These two cities now resumed
-their ancient rivalry.<a id="FNanchor_705" href="#Footnote_705"
-class="fnanchor">[705]</a> The Mantineans, jealous both of Tegea
-and Megalopolis, began to labor underhand against Arcadian unity
-and the Theban alliance,—with a view to renewed connection with
-Sparta; though only five years before, they had owed to Thebes the
-reëstablishment of their own city, after it had been broken up into
-villages by Spartan force. The appropriation of the sacred funds,
-offensive as it was to much of sincere sentiment, supplied them with
-a convenient ground for commencing opposition. In the Mantinean
-assembly, a resolution was passed, renouncing all participation
-in the Olympic treasures; while at the same time an adequate sum
-was raised among the citizens, to furnish pay for all members of
-the Epariti who came from their city. This sum was forwarded to
-the officers in command; who however not only refused to receive
-it; but even summoned the authors of the proceeding to take their
-trial before the Pan-Arcadian assembly,—the Ten Thousand at
-Megalopolis,—on the charge of breaking up the integrity of Arcadia.<a
-id="FNanchor_706" href="#Footnote_706" class="fnanchor">[706]</a> The
-Mantinean leaders<span class="pagenum" id="Page_323">[p. 323]</span>
-thus summoned, having refused to appear, and being condemned in their
-absence by the Ten Thousand,—a detachment of the epariti was sent to
-Mantinea to secure their persons. But the gates were found shut, and
-the order was set at defiance. So much sympathy was manifested in
-Arcadia towards the Mantineans, that many other towns copied their
-protest. Nay, even the majority of the Ten Thousand themselves, moved
-by repeated appeals made to them in the name of the offended gods,
-were gradually induced to adopt it also, publicly renouncing and
-interdicting all farther participation in the Olympian treasures.</p>
-
-<p>Here was a just point carried, and an important advantage gained,
-in desisting from a scandalous misappropriation. The party which
-had gained it immediately sought to push it farther. Beginning as
-the advocates of justice and of the Olympian Zeus, the Mantineans
-speedily pronounced themselves more clearly as the champions of
-oligarchy; friendly to Sparta and adverse to Thebes. Supplies from
-Olympia being no longer obtained, the means presently failed, of
-paying the epariti or public militia. Accordingly, such members
-of that corps as were too poor to continue without pay, gradually
-relinquished the service; while on the other hand, the more wealthy
-and powerful citizens, by preconcerted understanding with each
-other, enrolled themselves in large numbers, for the purpose of
-getting the national force out of the hands of the opposite party
-and into their own.<a id="FNanchor_707" href="#Footnote_707"
-class="fnanchor">[707]</a> The leaders of that opposite party saw
-plainly, that this oligarchical movement would not only bring them
-to severe account for the appropriation of the sacred treasure, but
-would also throw Arcadia again into alliance with Sparta. Accordingly
-they sent intimation to the Thebans of the impending change of
-policy, inviting them to prevent it by an immediate expedition
-into Arcadia. Informed of this proceeding,<a id="FNanchor_708"
-href="#Footnote_708" class="fnanchor">[708]</a> the opposite leaders
-brought it before the Pan-Arcadian assembly; in which they obtained a
-resolution, that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_324">[p. 324]</span>
-envoys should be despatched to Thebes, desiring that no Theban army
-might enter into Arcadia until formally summoned,—and cancelling the
-preceding invitation as unauthorized. At the same time, the assembly
-determined to conclude peace with the Eleians, and to restore to
-them the locality of Olympia with all their previous rights. The
-Eleians gladly consented, and peace was accordingly concluded.<a
-id="FNanchor_709" href="#Footnote_709" class="fnanchor">[709]</a></p>
-
-<p>The transactions just recounted occupied about one year and nine
-or ten months, from Midsummer 364 <small>B.C.</small> (the time
-of the battle at Olympia) to about April 362 <small>B.C.</small>
-The peace was generally popular throughout Arcadia, seemingly
-even among the cities which adhered to Thebes, though it had been
-concluded without consulting the Thebans. Even at Tegea, the centre
-of Theban influence, satisfaction was felt at the abandonment of the
-mischievous aggression and spoliation of Olympia, wherein the Thebans
-had had no concern. Accordingly when the peace, having been first
-probably sworn in other Arcadian cities, came to be sworn also at
-Tegea,—not only the city authorities, but also the Theban harmost,
-who occupied the town with a garrison of three hundred Bœotians, were
-present and took part in the ceremony. After it had been finished,
-most of the Mantineans went home; their city being both unfriendly
-to Tegea and not far distant. But many other Arcadians passed the
-evening in the town, celebrating the peace by libations, pæans,
-and feasting. On a sudden the gates were shut by order, and the
-most prominent of the oligarchical party were arrested as they sat
-at the feast, by the Bœotian garrison and the Arcadian Epariti of
-the opposite party. The leaders seized were in such considerable
-number, as to fill both the prison and the government-house; though
-there were few Mantineans among them, since most of these last had
-gone home. Among the rest the consternation was extreme. Some let
-themselves down from the walls, others escaped surreptitiously by the
-gates. Great was the indignation excited at Mantinea on the following
-morning, when the news of this violent arrest was brought thither.
-The authorities,—while they sent round the intelligence to the
-remaining Arcadian cities, inviting them at once to arms,—despatched
-heralds to Tegea, demanding all the Mantinean<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_325">[p. 325]</span> prisoners there detained. They at the
-same time protested emphatically against the arrest or the execution
-of any Arcadian, without previous trial before the Pan-Arcadian
-community; and they pledged themselves in the name of Mantinea,
-to answer for the appearance of any Arcadian against whom charges
-might be preferred.<a id="FNanchor_710" href="#Footnote_710"
-class="fnanchor">[710]</a></p>
-
-<p>Upon receiving this requisition, the Theban harmost
-forthwith released all his prisoners. He then called together
-an assembly,—seemingly attended by only a few persons, from
-feelings of mistrust,<a id="FNanchor_711" href="#Footnote_711"
-class="fnanchor">[711]</a>—wherein he explained that he had been
-misled, and that he had ordered the arrest upon a false report that
-a Lacedæmonian force was on the borders, prepared to seize the city
-in concert with treacherous correspondents within. A vote was passed
-accepting the explanation, though (according to Xenophon) no one
-believed it. Yet envoys were immediately sent to Thebes probably
-from the Mantineans and other Arcadians, complaining loudly of his
-conduct, and insisting that he should be punished with death.</p>
-
-<p>On a review of the circumstances, there seems reason for believing
-that the Theban officer gave a true explanation of the motives under
-which he had acted. The fact of his releasing the prisoners at the
-first summons, is more consistent with this supposition than with
-any other. Xenophon indeed says that his main object was to get
-possession of the Mantineans, and that, when he found but few of the
-latter among the persons seized, he was indifferent to the detention
-of the rest. But if such had been his purpose, he would hardly have
-set about it in so blind and clumsy a manner. He would have done
-it while the Mantineans were still in the town, instead of waiting
-until after their departure. He would not have perpetrated an act
-offensive as well as iniquitous, without assuring himself that it was
-done at a time when the determining purpose was yet attainable. On
-the other hand, nothing can be more natural than the supposition that
-the more violent among the Arcadian epariti believed in the existence
-of a plot to betray Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, and impressed the
-Theban with a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_326">[p. 326]</span>
-persuasion of the like impending danger. To cause a revolution in
-Tegea, would be a great point gained for the oligarchical party,
-and would be rendered comparatively practicable by the congregation
-of a miscellaneous body of Arcadians in the town. It is indeed
-not impossible, that the idea of such a plot may really have been
-conceived; but it is at least highly probable, that the likelihood
-of such an occurrence was sincerely believed in by opponents.<a
-id="FNanchor_712" href="#Footnote_712" class="fnanchor">[712]</a></p>
-
-<p>The explanation of the Theban governor, affirming that his
-order for arrest had either really averted, or appeared to him
-indispensable to avert, a projected treacherous betrayal,—reached
-Thebes at the same time as the complaints against him. It was not
-only received as perfectly satisfactory, but Epaminondas even replied
-to the complainants by counter-complaints of his own,—“The arrest (he
-said) was an act more justifiable than the release of those arrested.
-You Arcadians have already committed treason against us. It was on
-your account, and at your request, that we carried the war into
-Peloponnesus,—and you now conclude peace without consulting us! Be
-assured that we shall presently come in arms into Arcadia, and make
-war to support our partisans in the country.”<a id="FNanchor_713"
-href="#Footnote_713" class="fnanchor">[713]</a></p>
-
-<p>Such was the peremptory reply which the Arcadian envoy brought
-back from Thebes, announcing to his countrymen that they must
-prepare for war forthwith. They accordingly concerted measures for
-resistance with the Eleians and Achæans. They sent an invitation to
-the Lacedæmonians to march into Arcadia, and assist in repelling
-any enemy who should approach for the purpose of subjugating
-Peloponnesus,—yet with the proviso, as to headship, that each state
-should take the lead when the war was in its own territory; and they
-farther sent to solicit aid from Athens. Such were the measures taken
-by the Mantineans and their partisans, now forming the majority in
-the Pan-Arcadian aggregate, who (to use the language of Xenophon)
-“were really solicitous for Peloponnesus.”<a id="FNanchor_714"
-href="#Footnote_714" class="fnanchor">[714]</a> “Why do these Thebans
-(said<span class="pagenum" id="Page_327">[p. 327]</span> they)
-march into our country when we desire them not to come? For what
-other purpose, except to do us mischief? to make us do mischief
-to each other, in order that both parties may stand in need of
-<i>them</i>? to enfeeble Peloponnesus as much as possible, in order that
-they may hold it the more easily in slavery?”<a id="FNanchor_715"
-href="#Footnote_715" class="fnanchor">[715]</a> Such is the language
-which Xenophon repeats, with a sympathy plainly evincing his
-philo-Laconian bias. For when we follow the facts as he himself
-narrates them, we shall find them much more in harmony with the
-reproaches which he puts into the mouth of Epaminondas. Epaminondas
-had first marched into Peloponnesus (in 369 <small>B.C.</small>)
-at the request of both Arcadians and Eleians, for the purpose of
-protecting them against Sparta. He had been the first to give
-strength and dignity to the Arcadians, by organizing them into a
-political aggregate, and by forming a strong frontier for them
-against Sparta, in Messênê and Megalopolis. When thus organized, the
-Arcadians had manifested both jealousy of Thebes, and incompetence
-to act wisely for themselves. They had caused the reversal of the
-gentle and politic measures adopted by Epaminondas towards the Achæan
-cities, whom they had thus thrown again into the arms of Sparta.
-They had, of their own accord, taken up the war against Elis and the
-mischievous encroachment at Olympia. On the other hand, the Thebans
-had not marched into Peloponnesus since 367 <small>B.C.</small>—an
-interval now of nearly five years. They had tried to persuade the
-Arcadians to accept the Persian rescript, and to desist from the idea
-of alliance with Athens; but when refused, they had made no attempt
-to carry either of these points by force. Epaminondas had a fair
-right now to complain of them for having made peace with Elis and
-Achaia, the friends and allies of Sparta, without any consultation
-with Thebes. He probably believed that there had been a real plot to
-betray Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, as one fruit of this treacherous
-peace; and he saw plainly that the maintenance of the frontier line
-against Sparta,—Tegea, Megalopolis, and Messênê,—could no longer be
-assured without a new Theban invasion.</p>
-
-<p>This appears to me the reasonable estimate of the situation in
-Peloponnesus, in June 362 <small>B.C.</small>—immediately before
-the last invasion of Epaminondas. We cannot trust the unfavorable
-judg<span class="pagenum" id="Page_328">[p. 328]</span>ment of
-Xenophon with regard either to this great man or to the Thebans.
-It will not stand good, even if compared with the facts related by
-himself; still less probably would it stand, if we had the facts from
-an impartial witness.</p>
-
-<p>I have already recounted as much as can be made out
-of the proceedings of the Thebans, between the return of
-Pelopidas from Persia with the rescript (in the winter 367-366
-<small>B.C.</small>) to the close of 363 <small>B.C.</small> In
-366-365 <small>B.C.</small>, they had experienced great loss and
-humiliation in Thessaly connected with the detention of Pelopidas,
-whom they had with difficulty rescued from the dungeon of Pheræ. In
-364-363 <small>B.C.</small>, Pelopidas had been invested with a fresh
-command in Thessaly, and though he was slain, the Theban arms had
-been eminently successful, acquiring more complete mastery of the
-country than ever they possessed before; while Epaminondas, having
-persuaded his countrymen to aim at naval supremacy, had spent the
-summer of 363 <small>B.C.</small> as admiral of a powerful Theban
-fleet on the coast of Asia. Returning to Thebes at the close of 363
-<small>B.C.</small>, he found his friend Pelopidas slain; while the
-relations of Thebes, both in Peloponnesus and in Thessaly, were
-becoming sufficiently complicated to absorb his whole attention
-on land, without admitting farther aspirations towards maritime
-empire. He had doubtless watched, as it went on, the gradual
-change of politics in Arcadia (in the winter and spring of 363-362
-<small>B.C.</small>), whereby the Mantinean and oligarchical party,
-profiting by the reaction of sentiment against the proceedings at
-Olympia, had made itself a majority in the Pan-Arcadian assembly
-and militia, so as to conclude peace with Elis, and to present the
-prospect of probable alliance with Sparta, Elis, and Achaia. This
-political tendency was doubtless kept before Epaminondas by the
-Tegean party in Arcadia, opposed to the party of Mantinea; being
-communicated to him with partisan exaggerations even beyond the
-reality. The danger, actual or presumed, of Tegea, with the arrest
-which had been there operated, satisfied him that a powerful Theban
-intervention could be no longer deferred. As Bœotarch, he obtained
-the consent of his countrymen to assemble a Bœotian force, to summon
-the allied contingents, and to conduct this joint expedition into
-Peloponnesus.</p>
-
-<p>The army with which he began his march was numerous and
-imposing. It comprised all the Bœotians and Eubœans, with a<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_329">[p. 329]</span> large number of
-Thessalians (some even sent by Alexander of Pheræ, who had now
-become a dependent ally of Thebes), the Lokrians, Malians, Ænianes,
-and probably various other allies from Northern Greece; though
-the Phokians declined to join, alleging that their agreement with
-Thebes was for alliance purely defensive.<a id="FNanchor_716"
-href="#Footnote_716" class="fnanchor">[716]</a> Having passed
-the line of Mount Oneium,—which was no longer defended, as it
-had been at his former entrance,—he reached Nemea, where he was
-probably joined by the Sikyonian contingent,<a id="FNanchor_717"
-href="#Footnote_717" class="fnanchor">[717]</a> and where he
-halted, in hopes of intercepting the Athenian contingent in their
-way to join his enemies. He probably had information which induced
-him to expect them;<a id="FNanchor_718" href="#Footnote_718"
-class="fnanchor">[718]</a> but the information turned out false.
-The Athenians never appeared, and it was understood that they were
-preparing to cross by sea to the eastern coast of Laconia. After a
-fruitless halt, he proceeded onward to Tegea, where his Peloponnesian
-allies all presently joined him: the Arcadians of Tegea, Pallantium,
-Asea, and Megalopolis, the Messenians—(all these forming the line of
-frontier against Laconia)—and the Argeians.</p>
-
-<p>The halt at Nemea, since Epaminondas missed its direct purpose,
-was injurious in another way, as it enabled the main body of his
-Peloponnesian enemies to concentrate at Mantinea; which junction
-might probably have been prevented, had he entered Arcadia without
-delay. A powerful Peloponnesian army was there united, consisting
-of the Mantineans with the major part of the other Arcadians,—the
-Eleians,—and the Achæans. Invitation had been sent to the Spartans;
-and old Agesilaus, now in his eightieth year, was in full march with
-the Lacedæmonian forces to Mantinea. Besides this, the Athenian
-contingent was immediately expected; especially valuable from its
-cavalry, since the Peloponnesians were not strong in that description
-of force,—some of them indeed having none at all.</p>
-
-<p>Epaminondas established his camp and place of arms within the
-walls of Tegea; a precaution which Xenophon praises, as making his
-troops more secure and comfortable, and his motions less ob<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_330">[p. 330]</span>servable by the enemy.<a
-id="FNanchor_719" href="#Footnote_719" class="fnanchor">[719]</a>
-He next marched to Mantinea, to provoke the enemy to an action
-before the Spartans and Athenians joined; but they kept carefully on
-their guard, close to Mantinea, too strongly posted to be forced.<a
-id="FNanchor_720" href="#Footnote_720" class="fnanchor">[720]</a> On
-returning to his camp in Tegea, he was apprised that Agesilaus with
-the Spartan force, having quitted Sparta on the march to Mantinea,
-had already made some progress and reached Pellênê. Upon this he
-resolved to attempt the surprise of Sparta by a sudden night-march
-from Tegea, which lay in the direct road from Sparta to Mantinea,
-while Agesilaus in getting from Sparta to Mantinea had to pursue
-a more circuitous route to the westward. Moving shortly after the
-evening meal, Epaminondas led the Theban force with all speed towards
-Sparta; and he had well-nigh come upon that town, “like a nest of
-unprotected young birds,” at a moment when no resistance could have
-been made. Neither Agesilaus, nor any one else, expected so daring
-and well-aimed a blow, the success of which would have changed
-the face of Greece. Nothing saved Sparta except the providential
-interposition of the gods,<a id="FNanchor_721" href="#Footnote_721"
-class="fnanchor">[721]</a> signified by the accident that a Kretan
-runner hurried to Agesilaus, with the news that the Thebans were
-in full march southward from Tegea, and happened to arrest in time
-his farther progress towards Mantinea. Agesilaus instantly returned
-back with the troops around him to Sparta, which was thus put in a
-sufficient posture of defence before the Thebans arrived. Though
-sufficient for the emergency, however, his troops were not numerous;
-for the Spartan cavalry and mercenary forces were still absent,
-having been sent forward to Mantinea. Orders were sent for the main
-army at that city to hasten immediately to the relief of Sparta.<a
-id="FNanchor_722" href="#Footnote_722" class="fnanchor">[722]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_331">[p. 331]</span></p>
-
-<p>The march of Epaminondas had been undertaken only on the
-probability, well-nigh realized, of finding Sparta undefended. He was
-in no condition to assault the city, if tolerably occupied,—still
-less to spend time before it; for he knew that the enemy from
-Mantinea would immediately follow him into Laconia, within which he
-did not choose to hazard a general action. He found it impracticable
-to take this unfortified, yet unassailable city, Sparta, even at
-his former invasion of 370-369 <small>B.C.</small>; when he had
-most part of Peloponnesus in active coöperation with him, and when
-the Lacedæmonians had no army in the field. Accordingly, though he
-crossed the Eurotas and actually entered into the city of Sparta<a
-id="FNanchor_723" href="#Footnote_723" class="fnanchor">[723]</a>
-(which had no walls to keep him out), yet as soon as he perceived the
-roofs manned with soldiers and other preparations for resistance,
-he advanced with great caution, not adventuring into the streets
-and amidst the occupied houses. He only tried to get possession
-of various points of high ground commanding the city, from whence
-it might be possible to charge down upon the defenders with
-advantage. But even here, though inferior in number they prevented
-him from making any impression. And Archidamus son of Agesilaus,
-sallying forth unexpectedly beyond the line<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_332">[p. 332]</span> of defence, with a small company of
-one hundred hoplites, scrambled over some difficult ground in his
-front, and charged the Thebans even up the hill, with such gallantry,
-that he actually beat them back with some loss; pursuing them for
-a space, until he was himself repulsed and forced to retreat.<a
-id="FNanchor_724" href="#Footnote_724" class="fnanchor">[724]</a> The
-bravery of the Spartan Isidas, too, son of Phœbidas the captor of
-the Theban Kadmeia, did signal honor to Sparta, in this day of her
-comparative decline. Distinguished for beauty and stature, this youth
-sallied forth naked and unshielded, with his body oiled as in the
-palæstra. Wielding in his right hand a spear and in his left a sword,
-he rushed among the enemy, dealing death and destruction; in spite
-of which he was suffered to come back unwounded: so great was the
-awe inspired by his singular appearance and desperate hardihood. The
-ephors decorated him afterwards with a wreath of honor, but at the
-same time fined him for exposing himself without defensive armor.<a
-id="FNanchor_725" href="#Footnote_725" class="fnanchor">[725]</a></p>
-
-<p>Though the Spartans displayed here an honorable gallantry,
-yet these successes, in themselves trifling, are magnified into
-importance only by the partiality of Xenophon. The capital fact
-was, that Agesilaus had been accidentally forewarned so as to get
-back to Sparta and put it in defence before the Thebans arrived. As
-soon as Epaminondas ascertained this, he saw that his project was
-no longer practicable; nor did he do more than try the city round,
-to see if he could detect any vulnerable point, without involving
-himself in a hazardous assault. Baffled in his first scheme, he
-applied himself, with equal readiness of resource and celerity of
-motion, to the execution of a second. He knew that the hostile army
-from Mantinea would be immediately put in march for Sparta, to ward
-off all danger from that city. Now the straight road from Mantinea
-to Sparta (a course nearly due south all the way) lying through
-Tegea, was open to Epaminondas, but not to the enemy, who would be
-forced to take another and more circuitous route, probably by Asea
-and Pallantion; so that he was actually nearer to Mantinea than
-they. He determined to return to Tegea forthwith, while they were
-on their march towards Sparta, and before<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_333">[p. 333]</span> they could be apprised of his change of
-purpose. Breaking up accordingly, with scarce any interval of rest,
-he marched back to Tegea; where it became absolutely indispensable
-to give repose to his hoplites, after such severe fatigue. But he
-sent forward his cavalry without any delay, to surprise Mantinea,
-which would be now (he well knew) unprepared and undefended; with
-its military force absent on the march to Sparta, and its remaining
-population, free as well as slave, largely engaged in the fields
-upon the carrying of harvest. Nothing less than the extraordinary
-ascendency of Epaminondas,—coupled with his earnestness in setting
-forth the importance of the purpose, as well as the probable
-plunder,—could have prevailed upon the tired horsemen to submit to
-such additional toil, while their comrades were enjoying refreshment
-and repose at Tegea.<a id="FNanchor_726" href="#Footnote_726"
-class="fnanchor">[726]</a></p>
-
-<p>Everything near Mantinea was found in the state which Epaminondas
-anticipated. Yet the town was preserved, and his well-laid scheme
-defeated, by an unexpected contingency which the Mantineans
-doubtless ascribed to the providence of the gods,—as Xenophon
-regards the previous warning given to Agesilaus. The Athenian
-cavalry had arrived, not an hour before, and had just dismounted
-from their horses within the walls of Mantinea. Having departed
-from Eleusis (probably after ascertaining that Epaminondas no
-longer occupied Nemea), they took their evening meal and rested
-at the isthmus of Corinth, where they seem to have experienced
-some loss or annoyance.<a id="FNanchor_727" href="#Footnote_727"
-class="fnanchor">[727]</a> They then passed forward through Kleonæ
-to Mantinea, arriving thither without having broken fast, either
-themselves or their horses, on that day. It was just after they
-reached Mantinea, and when they had yet taken no refreshment,—that
-the Theban and Thessalian cavalry suddenly<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_334">[p. 334]</span> made their appearance, having
-advanced even to the temple of Poseidon, within less than a
-mile of the gates.<a id="FNanchor_728" href="#Footnote_728"
-class="fnanchor">[728]</a></p>
-
-<p>The Mantineans were terror-struck at this event. Their military
-citizens were absent on the march to Sparta, while the remainder
-were dispersed about the fields. In this helpless condition, they
-implored aid from the newly-arrived Athenian cavalry; who, though
-hungry and tired, immediately went forth,—and indeed were obliged
-to do so, since their own safety depended upon it. The assailants
-were excellent cavalry, Thebans and Thessalians, and more numerous
-than the Athenians. Yet such was the gallantry with which the
-latter fought, in a close and bloody action, that on the whole they
-gained the advantage, forced the assailants to retire, and had
-the satisfaction to preserve Mantinea with all its citizens and
-property. Xenophon extols<a id="FNanchor_729" href="#Footnote_729"
-class="fnanchor">[729]</a> (and doubtless with good reason) the
-generous energy of the Athenians, in going forth hungry and fatigued.
-But we must recollect that the Theban cavalry had undergone yet
-more severe hunger and fatigue,—that Epaminondas would never have
-sent them forward in such condition, had he expected any serious
-resistance; and that they probably dispersed to some extent, for
-the purpose of plundering and seizing subsistence in the fields
-through which they passed, so that they were found in disorder when
-the Athenians sallied out upon them. The Athenian cavalry-commander
-Kephisodôrus,<a id="FNanchor_730" href="#Footnote_730"
-class="fnanchor">[730]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_335">[p.
-335]</span> together with Gryllus (son of the historian Xenophon),
-then serving with his brother Diodorus among the Athenian horse,
-were both slain in the battle. A memorable picture at Athens by the
-contemporary painter Euphranor, commemorated both the battle and the
-personal gallantry of Gryllus, to whose memory the Mantineans also
-paid distinguished honors.</p>
-
-<p>Here were two successive movements of Epaminondas, both
-well-conceived, yet both disappointed by accident, without any
-omission of his own. He had his forces concentrated at Tegea, while
-his enemies on their side, returning from Sparta, formed a united
-camp in the neighborhood of Mantinea. They comprised Lacedæmonians,
-Eleians, Arcadians, Achæans, and Athenians; to the number, in all,
-of twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse, if we could trust
-the assertion of Diodorus;<a id="FNanchor_731" href="#Footnote_731"
-class="fnanchor">[731]</a> who also gives the numbers of Epaminondas
-as thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse. Little value
-can be assigned to either of these estimates; nor is it certain
-which of the two armies was the more numerous. But Epaminondas saw
-that he had now no chance left for striking a blow except through
-a pitched battle, nor did he at all despair of the result.<a
-id="FNanchor_732" href="#Footnote_732" class="fnanchor">[732]</a>
-He had brought out his northern allies for a limited time; which
-time they were probably not disposed to prolong, as the season of
-harvest was now approaching. Moreover, his stock of provisions
-was barely sufficient;<a id="FNanchor_733" href="#Footnote_733"
-class="fnanchor">[733]</a> the new crop being not yet gathered in,
-while the crop of the former year was probably almost exhausted. He
-took his resolution therefore to attack the enemy forthwith.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_336">[p. 336]</span></p>
-
-<p>But I cannot adopt the view of Xenophon, that such resolution
-was forced upon Epaminondas, against his own will, by a desperate
-position, rendering it impossible for him to get away without
-fighting,—by the disappointment of finding so few allies on his
-own side, and so many assembled against him,—and by the necessity
-of wiping off the shame of his two recent failures (at Sparta and
-at Mantinea) or perishing in the attempt.<a id="FNanchor_734"
-href="#Footnote_734" class="fnanchor">[734]</a> This is an estimate
-of the position of Epaminondas, not consistent with the facts
-narrated by Xenophon himself. It could have been no surprise to the
-Theban general that the time had arrived for ordering a battle.
-With what other view had he come into Peloponnesus? Or for what
-other purpose could he have brought so numerous an army? Granting
-that he expected greater support in Peloponnesus than he actually
-found, we cannot imagine him to have hoped that his mere presence,
-without fighting, would suffice to put down enemies courageous as
-well as powerful. Xenophon exaggerates the importance of the recent
-defeats (as he terms them) before Sparta and Mantinea. These were
-checks or disappointments rather than defeats. On arriving at Tegea,
-Epaminondas had found it practicable (which he could not have known
-beforehand) to attempt a <i>coup de main</i>, first against Sparta,
-next against Mantinea. Here were accidental opportunities which
-his genius discerned and turned to account. Their success, so near
-to actual attainment, would have been a prodigious point gained;<a
-id="FNanchor_735" href="#Footnote_735" class="fnanchor">[735]</a>
-but their accidental failure left him not worse off than he was
-before. It remained for him then, having the enemy before him in the
-field, and no farther opportunities of striking at them unawares by
-side-blows, to fight them openly; which he and all around him must
-have contemplated, from their first entrance into Peloponnesus, as
-the only probable way of deciding the contest.</p>
-
-<p>The army of Epaminondas, far from feeling that sentiment of
-disappointed hope and stern necessity which Xenophon ascribes to
-their commander, were impatient to fight under his orders, and<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_337">[p. 337]</span> full of enthusiastic
-alacrity when he at last proclaimed his intention. He had kept them
-within the walls of Tegea, thus not only giving them better quarters
-and fuller repose, but also concealing his proceedings from the
-enemy; who on their side were encamped on the border of the Mantinean
-territory. Rejoicing in the prospect of going forth to battle, the
-horsemen and hoplites of Epaminondas all put themselves in their
-best equipment. The horsemen whitened their helmets,—the hoplites
-burnished up their shields, and sharpened their spears and swords.
-Even the rustic and half-armed Arcadian villagers, who had nothing
-but clubs in place of sword or spear, were eager to share the dangers
-of the Thebans, and inscribed upon their shields (probably nothing
-but miserable squares of wood) the Theban ensign.<a id="FNanchor_736"
-href="#Footnote_736" class="fnanchor">[736]</a> The best spirit and
-confidence animated all the allies, as they quitted the gates of
-Tegea, and disposed themselves in the order of march commanded by
-Epaminondas.</p>
-
-<p>The lofty Mantinico-Tegeatic plain, two thousand feet above the
-level of the sea (now known as the plain of Tripolitza)—“is the
-greatest of that cluster of valleys in the centre of Peloponnesus,
-each of which is so closely shut in by the intersecting mountains
-that no outlet is afforded to the waters except through the
-moun<span class="pagenum" id="Page_338">[p. 338]</span>tains
-themselves.”<a id="FNanchor_737" href="#Footnote_737"
-class="fnanchor">[737]</a> Its length stretches from north to
-south, bordered by the mountain range of Mænalus on the west, and
-of Artemisium and Parthenion on the east. It has a breadth of
-about eight miles in the broadest part, and of one mile in the
-narrowest. Mantinea is situated near its northern extremity, Tegea
-near its southern; the direct distance between the two cities,
-in a line not much different from north and south, being about
-ten English miles. The frontier line between their two domains
-was formed by a peculiarly narrow part of the valley, where a low
-ridge projecting from the range of Mænalus on the one side, and
-another from Artemisium on the opposite, contract the space and
-make a sort of defensible pass near four miles south of Mantinea;<a
-id="FNanchor_738" href="#Footnote_738" class="fnanchor">[738]</a>
-thus about six miles distant from Tegea. It was at this position,
-covering the whole Mantinean territory, that the army opposed to
-Epaminondas was concentrated; the main Lacedæmonian force as well
-as the rest having now returned from Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_739"
-href="#Footnote_739" class="fnanchor">[739]</a></p>
-
-<p>Epaminondas, having marched out from Tegea by the northern
-gate, arrayed his army in columns proper for advancing towards the
-enemy; himself with the Theban columns forming the van. His array
-being completed, he at first began his forward march in a direction
-straight towards the enemy. But presently he changed his course,
-turning to the left towards the Mænalian range of mountains which
-forms the western border of the plain, and which he probably reached
-somewhere near the site of the present Tripolitza. From thence he
-pursued his march northward, skirting the flank of the mountain
-on the side which lies over against or fronts towards Tegea;<a
-id="FNanchor_740" href="#Footnote_740" class="fnanchor">[740]</a>
-until at length he neared the enemy’s po<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_339">[p. 339]</span>sition, upon their right flank. He here
-halted, and caused his columns to face to the right; thus forming
-a line, or phalanx of moderate depth, fronting towards the enemy.
-During the march, each lochus or company had marched in single file
-with the lochage or captain (usually the strongest and best soldier
-in it), at the head; though we do not know how many of these lochages
-marched abreast, or what was the breadth of the column. When the
-phalanx or front towards the enemy was formed, each lochage was of
-course in line with his company, and at its left hand; while the
-Thebans and Epaminondas himself were at the left of the whole line.
-In this position, Epaminondas gave the order to ground arms.<a
-id="FNanchor_741" href="#Footnote_741" class="fnanchor">[741]</a></p>
-
-<p>The enemy, having watched him ever since he had left Tegea and
-formed his marching array, had supposed at first that he was coming
-straight up to the front of their position, and thus expected speedy
-battle. But when he turned to the left towards the mountains, so that
-for some time he did not approach sensibly nearer to their position,
-they began to fancy that he had no intention of fighting on that day.
-Such belief, having been once raised, still continued, even though,
-by advancing along the skirts of the mountain, he gradually arrived
-very close upon their right flank. They were farther confirmed in the
-same supposition, when they saw his phalanx ground arms; which they
-construed as an indication that he was about to encamp on the spot
-where he stood. It is probable that Epaminondas may have designedly
-simulated some other preliminaries of encampment, since his march
-from Tegea seems to have been arranged for the purpose partly of
-raising such false impression in his enemies, partly of getting upon
-their right flank instead of their front. He completely succeeded in
-his object. The soldiers on the Lacedæmonian side, believing that
-there would be no battle until the next day, suffered their ranks
-to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_340">[p. 340]</span> fall into
-disorder, and scattered about the field. Many of the horsemen even
-took off their breast-plates and unbridled their horses. And what was
-of hardly less consequence,—that mental preparation of the soldier,
-whereby he was wound up for the moment of action, and which provident
-commanders never omitted, if possible, to inflame by a special
-harangue at the moment,—was allowed to slacken and run down.<a
-id="FNanchor_742" href="#Footnote_742" class="fnanchor">[742]</a> So
-strongly was the whole army persuaded of the intention of Epaminondas
-to encamp, that they suffered him not only without hindrance, but
-even without suspicion, to make all his movements and dispositions
-preparatory to immediate attack.</p>
-
-<p>Such improvidence is surprising, when we recollect that the
-ablest commander and the best troops in Greece were so close
-upon the right of their position. It is to be in part explained,
-probably, by the fact that the Spartan headship was now at an
-end, and that there was no supreme chief to whom the whole body
-of Lacedæmonian allies paid deference. If either of the kings
-of Sparta was present,—a point not distinctly ascertainable,—he
-would have no command except over the Lacedæmonian troops. In the
-entire allied army, the Mantineans occupied the extreme right (as
-on a former occasion, because the battle was in their territory,<a
-id="FNanchor_743" href="#Footnote_743" class="fnanchor">[743]</a>
-and because the Lacedæmonians had lost their once-recognized
-privilege), together with the other Arcadians. On the right-centre
-and centre were the Lacedæmonians, Eleians, and Achæans; on the
-extreme left, the Athenians.<a id="FNanchor_744" href="#Footnote_744"
-class="fnanchor">[744]</a> There was cavalry on both the wings;
-Athenian on the left,—Eleian on the right; spread out with no
-more than the ordinary depth, and without any intermixture of
-light infantry along with the horsemen.<a id="FNanchor_745"
-href="#Footnote_745" class="fnanchor">[745]</a></p>
-
-<p>In the phalanx of Epaminondas, he himself with the Thebans and
-Bœotians was on the left; the Argeians on the right; the<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_341">[p. 341]</span> Arcadians,
-Messenians, Eubœans, Sikyonians and other allies in the centre.<a
-id="FNanchor_746" href="#Footnote_746" class="fnanchor">[746]</a> It
-was his purpose to repeat the same general plan of attack which had
-succeeded so perfectly at Leuktra; to head the charge himself with
-his Bœotians on the left against the opposing right or right-centre,
-and to bear down the enemy on that side with irresistible force,
-both of infantry and cavalry; while he kept back his right and
-centre, composed of less trustworthy troops, until the battle should
-have been thus wholly or partially decided. Accordingly, he caused
-the Bœotian hoplites,—occupying the left of his line in lochi or
-companies, with the lochage or captain at the left extremity of
-each,—to wheel to the right and form in column fronting the enemy,
-in advance of his remaining line. The Theban lochages thus became
-placed immediately in face of the enemy, as the heads of a column of
-extraordinary depth; all the hoplites of each lochus, and perhaps
-of more than one lochus, being ranged in file behind them.<a
-id="FNanchor_747" href="#Footnote_747" class="fnanchor">[747]</a>
-What the actual depth was, or what was the exact number of the
-lochus, we do not know. At Leuktra, Epaminondas had attacked with
-fifty shields of depth; at Mantinea, the depth of his column was
-probably not less. Himself, with the chosen Theban warriors, were
-at the head of it, and he relied upon breaking through the enemy’s
-phalanx at whatever point he charged; since their files would
-hardly be more than eight deep, and very inadequate to resist so
-overwhelming a shock. His column would cut through the phalanx of the
-enemy, like the prow of a trireme impelled in sea-fight against the
-midships of her antagonist.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_342">[p. 342]</span></p>
-
-<p>It was apparently only the Bœotian hoplites who were thus formed
-in column, projecting forward in advance; while the remaining
-allies were still left in their ordinary phalanx or lines.<a
-id="FNanchor_748" href="#Footnote_748" class="fnanchor">[748]</a>
-Epaminondas calculated, that when he should have once broken through
-the enemy’s phalanx at a single point, the rest would either take
-flight, or become so dispirited, that his allies coming up in phalanx
-could easily deal with them.</p>
-
-<p>Against the cavalry on the enemy’s right, which was marshaled
-only with the ordinary depth of a phalanx of hoplites (four, six,
-or perhaps eight deep),<a id="FNanchor_749" href="#Footnote_749"
-class="fnanchor">[749]</a> and without any light infantry
-intermingled with the ranks—the Theban general opposed on his
-left his own excellent cavalry, Theban and Thessalian, but in
-strong and deep column, so as to ensure to them also a superior
-weight of attack. He farther mingled in their ranks some active
-footmen, darters and slingers, of whom he had many from Thessaly
-and the Maliac Gulf.<a id="FNanchor_750" href="#Footnote_750"
-class="fnanchor">[750]</a></p>
-
-<p>There remained one other precaution to take. His deep Theban and
-Bœotian column, in advancing to the charge, would be exposed on its
-right or unshielded side to the attack of the Athenians, especially
-the Athenian cavalry, from the enemy’s left. To guard against any
-such movement, he posted, upon some rising ground near his right,
-a special body of reserve, both horse and<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_343">[p. 343]</span> foot, in order to take the Athenians in
-the rear if they should attempt it.</p>
-
-<p>All these fresh dispositions for attack, made on the spot, must
-have occupied time, and caused much apparent movement. To constitute
-both the column of infantry, and the column of cavalry, for attack
-on his left—and to post the body of reserve on the rising ground
-at his right against the Athenians—were operations which the enemy
-from their neighboring position could not help seeing. Yet they
-either did not heed, or did not understand, what was going on.<a
-id="FNanchor_751" href="#Footnote_751" class="fnanchor">[751]</a>
-Nor was it until Epaminondas, perceiving all to be completed,
-actually gave the word of command to “take up arms,” that they had
-any suspicion of the impending danger. As soon as they saw him in
-full march moving rapidly towards them, surprise and tumultuous
-movement pervaded their body. The scattered hoplites ran to their
-places; the officers exerted every effort to establish regular
-array; the horsemen hastened to bridle their horses and resume
-their breast-plates.<a id="FNanchor_752" href="#Footnote_752"
-class="fnanchor">[752]</a> And though the space dividing the two
-armies was large enough to allow such mischief to be partially
-corrected,—yet soldiers thus taken unawares, hurried, and troubled,
-were not in condition to stand the terrific shock of chosen Theban
-hoplites in deep column.</p>
-
-<p>The grand force of attack, both of cavalry and infantry, which
-Epaminondas organized on his left, was triumphant in both its
-portions. His cavalry, powerfully aided by the intermingled darters
-and light troops from Thessaly, broke and routed the enemy’s cavalry
-opposed to them, and then restraining themselves from pursuit,
-turned to fall upon the phalanx of infantry. Epaminondas, on his
-part, with his Theban column, came into close conflict with the
-Mantinean and Lacedæmonian line of infantry, whom, after a desperate
-struggle of shield, spear, and sword, he bore down by superior force
-and weight. He broke through the enemy’s line of infantry at this
-point, compelling the Lacedæmonians opposed to him, after a brave
-and murderous resistance, to turn their backs and take to flight.
-The remaining troops of the enemy’s line, seeing the best portion
-of their army defeated and in flight, turned<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_344">[p. 344]</span> and fled also. The centre and right
-of Epaminondas, being on a less advanced front, hardly came into
-conflict with the enemy until the impression of his charge had been
-felt, and therefore found the troops opposed to them already wavering
-and disheartened. The Achæan, Eleian, and other infantry on that
-side, gave way after a short resistance; chiefly as it would appear,
-from contagion and alarm, when they saw the Lacedæmonians broken. The
-Athenians however, especially the cavalry, on the left wing of their
-own army, seem to have been engaged in serious encounter with the
-cavalry opposite to them. Diodorus affirms them to have been beaten,
-after a gallant fight,<a id="FNanchor_753" href="#Footnote_753"
-class="fnanchor">[753]</a> until the Eleian cavalry from the right
-came to their aid. Here, as on many other points, it is difficult to
-reconcile his narrative with Xenophon, who plainly intimates that the
-stress of the action fell on the Theban left and Lacedæmonian right
-and centre,—and from whose narrative we should rather have gathered,
-that the Eleian cavalry, beaten on their own right, may have been
-aided by the Athenian cavalry from the left; reversing the statement
-of Diodorus.</p>
-
-<p>In regard to this important battle, however, we cannot grasp
-with confidence anything beyond the capital determining feature
-and the ultimate result.<a id="FNanchor_754" href="#Footnote_754"
-class="fnanchor">[754]</a> The calculations of Epaminondas were<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_345">[p. 345]</span> completely realized.
-The irresistible charge, both of infantry and cavalry, made by
-himself with his left wing, not only defeated the troops immediately
-opposed, but caused the enemy’s whole army to take flight. It was
-under these victorious circumstances, and while he was pressing on
-the retiring enemy at the head of his Theban column of infantry,
-that he received a mortal wound with a spear in the breast. He was
-by habit and temper, always foremost in braving danger, and on this
-day probably exposed himself preëminently, as a means of encouraging
-those around him, and ensuring the success of his own charge, on
-which so much depended; moreover, a Grecian general fought on foot
-in the ranks, and carried the same arms (spear, shield, etc.) as a
-private soldier. Diodorus tells us that the Lacedæmonian infantry
-were making a prolonged resistance, when Epaminondas put himself
-at the head of the Thebans for a fresh and desperate effort; that
-he stepped forward, darted his javelin, and slew the Lacedæmonian
-commander; that having killed several warriors, and intimidated
-others, he forced them to give way; that the Lacedæmonians, seeing
-him in advance of his comrades, turned upon him and overwhelmed him
-with darts, some of which he avoided, others he turned off with his
-shield, while others, after they had actually entered his body and
-wounded him, he plucked out and employed them in repelling the enemy.
-At length he received a mortal wound in his breast with a spear.<a
-id="FNanchor_755" href="#Footnote_755" class="fnanchor">[755]</a> I
-cannot altogether admit to notice these details; which once passed as
-a portion of Grecian history, though they seem rather the offspring
-of an imagination fresh from the perusal of the Iliad than a recital
-of an actual combat of Thebans and Lacedæmonians, both eminent
-for close-rank fighting, with long spear and heavy shield.<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_346">[p. 346]</span> The mortal wound of
-Epaminondas, with a spear in the breast, is the only part of the case
-which we really know. The handle of the spear broke, and the point
-was left sticking in his breast. He immediately fell, and as the
-enemy were at that moment in retreat, fell into the arms of his own
-comrades. There was no dispute for the possession of his body, as
-there had been for Kleombrotus at Leuktra.</p>
-
-<p>The news of his mortal wound spread like wild-fire through his
-army; and the effect produced is among the most extraordinary
-phenomena in all Grecian military history. I give it in the words
-of the contemporary historian. “It was thus (says Xenophon) that
-Epaminondas arranged his order of attack; and he was not disappointed
-in his expectation. For having been victorious, on the point where
-he himself charged, he caused the whole army of the enemy to take
-flight. But so soon as he fell, those who remained had no longer
-any power even of rightly using the victory. Though the phalanx
-of the enemy’s infantry was in full flight, the Theban hoplites
-neither killed a single man more, nor advanced a step beyond the
-actual ground of conflict. Though the enemy’s cavalry was also in
-full flight, yet neither did the Theban horsemen continue their
-pursuit, nor kill any more either of horsemen or of hoplites, but
-fell back through the receding enemies with the timidity of beaten
-men. The light troops and peltasts, who had been mingled with the
-Theban cavalry and had aided in their victory, spread themselves over
-towards the enemy’s left with the security of conquerors; but there
-(being unsupported by their own horsemen) they were mostly cut to
-pieces by the Athenians.”<a id="FNanchor_756" href="#Footnote_756"
-class="fnanchor">[756]</a></p>
-
-<p>Astonishing as this recital is, we cannot doubt that it is
-literally<span class="pagenum" id="Page_347">[p. 347]</span> true,
-since it contradicts the sympathies of the reciting witness. Nothing
-but the pressure of undeniable evidence could have constrained
-Xenophon to record a scene so painful to him as the Lacedæmonian army
-beaten, in full flight, and rescued from destruction only by the
-untimely wound of the Theban general. That Epaminondas would leave
-no successor either equal or second to himself, now that Pelopidas
-was no more,—that the army which he commanded should be incapable of
-executing new movements or of completing an unfinished campaign,—we
-can readily conceive. But that on the actual battle-field, when the
-moment of dangerous and doubtful struggle has been already gone
-through, and when the soldier’s blood is up, to reap his reward
-in pursuit of an enemy whom he sees fleeing before him—that at
-this crisis of exuberant impatience, when Epaminondas, had he been
-unwounded, would have found it difficult to restrain his soldiers
-from excessive forwardness, they should have become at once paralyzed
-and disarmed on hearing of his fall,—this is what we could not
-have believed, had we not found it attested by a witness at once
-contemporary and hostile. So striking a proof has hardly ever been
-rendered, on the part of soldiers towards their general, of devoted
-and absorbing sentiment. All the hopes of this army, composed of such
-diverse elements, were centred in Epaminondas; all their confidence
-of success, all their security against defeat, were derived from the
-idea of acting under his orders; all their power, even of striking
-down a defeated enemy, appeared to vanish when those orders were
-withdrawn. We are not indeed to speak of such a proceeding with
-commendation. Thebes and her allied cities had great reason to
-complain of their soldiers, for a grave dereliction of military duty,
-and a capital disappointment of well-earned triumph,—whatever may be
-our feelings about the motive. Assuredly the man who would be most
-chagrined of all, and whose dying moments must have been embittered
-if he lived to hear it,—was Epaminondas himself. But when we look at
-the fact simply as a mark and measure of the ascendency established
-by him over the minds of his soldiers, it will be found hardly
-paralleled in history. I have recounted, a few pages ago, the intense
-grief displayed by the Thebans and their allies in Thessaly over
-the dead body of Pelopidas<a id="FNanchor_757" href="#Footnote_757"
-class="fnanchor">[757]</a> on the<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_348">[p. 348]</span> hill of Kynoskephalæ. But all direct
-and deliberate testimonies of attachment to a dead or dying chief
-(and doubtless these too were abundant on the field of Mantinea) fall
-short of the involuntary suspension of arms in the tempting hour of
-victory.</p>
-
-<p>That the real victory, the honors of the day, belonged to
-Epaminondas and the Thebans, we know from the conclusive evidence of
-Xenophon. But as the vanquished, being allowed to retire unpursued,
-were only separated by a short distance from the walls of Mantinea,
-and perhaps rallied even before reaching the town,—as the Athenian
-cavalry had cut to pieces some of the straggling light troops,—they
-too pretended to have gained a victory. Trophies were erected on both
-sides. Nevertheless the Thebans were masters of the field of battle;
-so that the Lacedæmonians, after some hesitation, were forced to send
-a herald to solicit truce for the burial of the slain, and to grant
-for burial such Theban bodies as they had in their possession.<a
-id="FNanchor_758" href="#Footnote_758" class="fnanchor">[758]</a>
-This was the understood confession of defeat.</p>
-
-<p>The surgeons, on examining the wound of Epaminondas, with the
-spear-head yet sticking in it, pronounced that he must die as
-soon as that was withdrawn. He first inquired whether his shield
-was safe; and his shield-bearer, answering in the affirmative,
-produced it before his eyes. He next asked about the issue of
-the battle, and was informed that his own army was victorious.<a
-id="FNanchor_759" href="#Footnote_759" class="fnanchor">[759]</a>
-He then desired to see Iolaidas and Daiphantus, whom he intended to
-succeed him as commanders; but received the mournful reply, that both
-of them had been slain.<a id="FNanchor_760" href="#Footnote_760"
-class="fnanchor">[760]</a> “Then (said he) you must make<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_349">[p. 349]</span> peace with the enemy.”
-He ordered the spear-head to be withdrawn, when the efflux of blood
-speedily terminated his life.</p>
-
-<p>Of the three questions here ascribed to the dying chief, the third
-is the gravest and most significant. The death of these two other
-citizens, the only men in the camp whom Epaminondas could trust,
-shows how aggravated and irreparable was the Theban loss, not indeed
-as to number, but as to quality. Not merely Epaminondas himself, but
-the only two men qualified in some measure to replace him, perished
-in the same field; and Pelopidas had fallen in the preceding year.
-Such accumulation of individual losses must be borne in mind when
-we come to note the total suspension of Theban glory and dignity,
-after this dearly-bought victory. It affords emphatic evidence of the
-extreme forwardness with which their leaders exposed themselves, as
-well as of the gallant resistance which they experienced.</p>
-
-<p>The death of Epaminondas spread rejoicing in the Lacedæmonian camp
-proportioned to the sorrow of the Theban. To more than one warrior
-was assigned the honor of having struck the blow. The Mantineans
-gave it to their citizen Machærion; the Athenians, to Gryllus
-son of Xenophon; the Spartans, to their countryman Antikrates.<a
-id="FNanchor_761" href="#Footnote_761" class="fnanchor">[761]</a> At
-Sparta, distinguished honor was shown, even in the days of Plutarch,
-to the posterity of Antikrates, who was believed to have rescued the
-city from her most formidable enemy. Such tokens afford precious
-testimony, from witnesses beyond all suspicion, to the memory of
-Epaminondas.</p>
-
-<p>How the news of his death was received at Thebes, we have no
-positive account. But there can be no doubt that the sorrow,<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_350">[p. 350]</span> so paralysing
-to the victorious soldiers on the field of Mantinea, was felt
-with equal acuteness, and with an effect not less depressing,
-in the senate-house and market-place of Thebes. The city, the
-citizen-soldiers, and the allies, would be alike impressed with the
-mournful conviction, that the dying injunction of Epaminondas must
-be executed. Accordingly, negotiations were opened, and peace was
-concluded,—probably at once, before the army left Peloponnesus.
-The Thebans and their Arcadian allies exacted nothing more than
-the recognition of the <i>statu quo;</i> to leave everything exactly as
-it was, without any change or reactionary measure, yet admitting
-Megalopolis, with the Pan-Arcadian constitution attached to it,—and
-admitting also Messênê as an independent city. Against this last
-article Sparta loudly and peremptorily protested. But not one of her
-allies sympathized with her feelings. Some, indeed, were decidedly
-against her; to such a degree, that we find the maintenance of
-independent Messênê against Sparta ranking shortly afterwards as an
-admitted principle in Athenian foreign politics.<a id="FNanchor_762"
-href="#Footnote_762" class="fnanchor">[762]</a> Neither Athenians,
-nor Eleians, nor Arcadians, desired to see Sparta strengthened. None
-had any interest in prolonging the war, with prospects doubtful to
-every one; while all wished to see the large armies now in Arcadia
-dismissed. Accordingly, the peace was sworn to on these conditions,
-and the autonomy of Messênê guaranteed, by all, except the Spartans;
-who alone stood out, keeping themselves without friends or
-auxiliaries, in the hope for better times,—rather than submit to what
-they considered as an intolerable degradation.<a id="FNanchor_763"
-href="#Footnote_763" class="fnanchor">[763]</a></p>
-
-<p>Under these conditions, the armies on both sides retired.
-Xenophon is right in saying, that neither party gained anything,
-either city, territory, or dominion; though before the battle,
-considering<span class="pagenum" id="Page_351">[p. 351]</span>
-the magnitude of the two contending armies, every one had expected
-that the victors, whichever they were, would become masters, and
-the vanquished, subjects. But his assertion,—that “there was more
-disturbance, and more matter of dispute, in Greece, after the battle
-than before it,”—must be interpreted, partly as the inspiration of
-a philo-Laconian sentiment, which regards a peace not accepted by
-Sparta as no peace at all,—partly as based on the circumstance,
-that no definite headship was recognized as possessed by any state.
-Sparta had once enjoyed it, and had set the disgraceful example of
-suing out a confirmation of it from the Persian king at the peace of
-Antalkidas. Both Thebes and Athens had aspired to the same dignity,
-and both by the like means, since the battle of Leuktra; neither
-of them had succeeded. Greece was thus left without a head, and
-to this extent the affirmation of Xenophon is true. But it would
-not be correct to suppose that the last expedition of Epaminondas
-into Peloponnesus was unproductive of any results,—though it was
-disappointed of its great and brilliant fruits by his untimely
-death. Before he marched in, the Theban party in Arcadia, (Tegea,
-Megalopolis, etc.), was on the point of being crushed by the
-Mantineans and their allies. His expedition, though ending in an
-indecisive victory, nevertheless broke up the confederacy enlisted
-in support of Mantinea; enabling Tegea and Megalopolis to maintain
-themselves against their Arcadian opponents, and thus leaving the
-frontier against Sparta unimpaired. While therefore we admit the
-affirmation of Xenophon,—that Thebes did not gain by the battle
-either city, or territory, or dominion,—we must at the same time add,
-that she gained the preservation of her Arcadian allies, and of her
-anti-Spartan frontier, including Messênê.</p>
-
-<p>This was a gain of considerable importance. But dearly, indeed,
-was it purchased, by the blood of her first hero, shed on the field
-of Mantinea; not to mention his two seconds, whom we know only
-from his verdict,—Daiphantus and Iolaidas.<a id="FNanchor_764"
-href="#Footnote_764" class="fnanchor">[764]</a> He was buried on the
-field of battle, and a monumental column was erected on his tomb.</p>
-
-<p>Scarcely any character in Grecian history has been judged
-with so much unanimity as Epaminondas. He has obtained a meed
-of admiration,—from all, sincere and hearty,—from some,<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_352">[p. 352]</span> enthusiastic. Cicero
-pronounces him to be the first man of Greece.<a id="FNanchor_765"
-href="#Footnote_765" class="fnanchor">[765]</a> The judgment of
-Polybius, though not summed up so emphatically in a single epithet,
-is delivered in a manner hardly less significant and laudatory. Nor
-was it merely historians or critics who formed this judgment. The
-best men of action, combining the soldier and the patriot, such as
-Timoleon and Philopœmen,<a id="FNanchor_766" href="#Footnote_766"
-class="fnanchor">[766]</a> set before them Epaminondas as their
-model to copy. The remark has been often made, and suggests itself
-whenever we speak of Epaminondas, though its full force will be felt
-only when we come to follow the subsequent history,—that with him
-the dignity and commanding influence of Thebes both began and ended.
-His period of active political life comprehends sixteen years, from
-the resurrection of Thebes into a free community, by the expulsion
-of the Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison, and the subversion
-of the ruling oligarchy,—to the fatal day of Mantinea (379-362
-<small>B.C.</small>). His prominent and unparalleled ascendency
-belongs to the last eight years, from the victory of Leuktra (371
-<small>B.C.</small>). Throughout this whole period, both all that
-we know and all that we can reasonably divine, fully bears out the
-judgment of Polybius and Cicero, who had the means of knowing much
-more. And this too,—let it be observed,—though Epaminondas is tried
-by a severe canon: for the chief contemporary witness remaining
-is one decidedly hostile. Even the philo-Laconian Xenophon finds
-neither misdeeds nor omissions to reveal in the capital enemy of
-Sparta,—mentions him only to record what is honorable,—and manifests
-the perverting bias mainly by suppressing or slurring over his
-triumphs. The man whose eloquence bearded Agesilaus at the congress
-immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra,<a id="FNanchor_767"
-href="#Footnote_767" class="fnanchor">[767]</a>—who in that
-battle stripped Sparta of her glory, and transferred the wreath
-to Thebes,—who a few months afterwards, not only ravaged all the
-virgin territory of Laconia, but cut off the best half of it for
-the restitution of independent Messênê, and erected the hostile
-Arcadian community of Megalopolis on its frontier,—the author of
-these fatal disasters inspires to Xenophon such intolera<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_353">[p. 353]</span>ble chagrin and
-antipathy, that in the two first he keeps back the name, and in
-the third, suppresses the thing done. But in the last campaign,
-preceding the battle of Mantinea (whereby Sparta incurred no
-positive loss, and where the death of Epaminondas softened every
-predisposition against him), there was no such violent pressure upon
-the fidelity of the historian. Accordingly, the concluding chapter
-of Xenophon’s ‘Hellenica’ contains a panegyric,<a id="FNanchor_768"
-href="#Footnote_768" class="fnanchor">[768]</a> ample and
-unqualified, upon the military merits of the Theban general; upon
-his daring enterprise, his comprehensive foresight, his care to
-avoid unnecessary exposure of soldiers, his excellent discipline,
-his well-combined tactics, his fertility of aggressive resource in
-striking at the weak points of the enemy, who content themselves with
-following and parrying his blows (to use a simile of Demosthenes<a
-id="FNanchor_769" href="#Footnote_769" class="fnanchor">[769]</a>)
-like an unskilful pugilist, and only succeed in doing so by signal
-aid from accident. The effort of strategic genius, then for the
-first time devised and applied, of bringing an irresistible force of
-attack to bear on one point of the hostile line, while the rest of
-his army was kept comparatively back until the action had been thus
-decided,—is clearly noted by Xenophon, together with its triumphant
-effect, at the battle of Mantinea; though the very same combination
-on the field of Leuktra is slurred over in his description, as if it
-were so commonplace as not to require any mention of the chief with
-whom it originated. Compare Epaminondas with Agesilaus,—how great is
-the superiority of the first,—even in the narrative of Xenophon, the
-earnest panegyrist of the other! How manifestly are we made to see
-that nothing except the fatal spear-wound at Mantinea, prevented him
-from reaping the fruit of a series of admirable arrangements, and
-from becoming arbiter of Peloponnesus, including Sparta herself!</p>
-
-<p>The military merits alone of Epaminondas, had they merely
-belonged to a general of mercenaries, combined with nothing
-praiseworthy in other ways,—would have stamped him as a man of
-high and original genius, above every other Greek, antecedent or
-contemporary. But it is the peculiar excellence of this great man
-that we are not compelled to borrow from one side of his character
-in order to compensate deficiencies in another.<a id="FNanchor_770"
-href="#Footnote_770" class="fnanchor">[770]</a> His splendid
-mili<span class="pagenum" id="Page_354">[p. 354]</span>tary capacity
-was never prostituted to personal ends: neither to avarice, nor
-ambition, nor overweening vanity. Poor at the beginning of his life,
-he left at the end of it not enough to pay his funeral expenses;
-having despised the many opportunities for enrichment which his
-position afforded, as well as the richest offers from foreigners.<a
-id="FNanchor_771" href="#Footnote_771" class="fnanchor">[771]</a>
-Of ambition he had so little, by natural temperament, that his
-friends accused him of torpor. But as soon as the perilous
-exposure of Thebes required it, he displayed as much energy in her
-defence as the most ambitious of her citizens, without any of that
-captious exigence, frequent in ambitious men, as to the amount of
-glorification or deference due to him from his countrymen. And his
-personal vanity was so faintly kindled, even after the prodigious
-success at Leuktra, that we find him serving in Thessaly as a private
-hoplite in the ranks, and in the city as an ædile or inferior
-street-magistrate, under the title of Telearchus. An illustrious
-specimen of that capacity and goodwill, both to command and to be
-commanded, which Aristotle pronounces to form in their combination
-the characteristic feature of the worthy citizen.<a id="FNanchor_772"
-href="#Footnote_772" class="fnanchor">[772]</a> He once incurred
-the displeasure of his fellow-citizens, for his wise and moderate
-policy in Achaia, which they were ill-judged enough to reverse.
-We cannot doubt also that he was frequently attacked by political
-censors and enemies,—the condition of eminence in every free state;
-but neither of these causes ruffled the dignified calmness of his
-political course. As he never courted popularity by unworthy arts, so
-he bore unpopularity without murmurs, and without angry renunciation
-of patriotic duty.<a id="FNanchor_773" href="#Footnote_773"
-class="fnanchor">[773]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_355">[p. 355]</span></p>
-
-<p>The mildness of his antipathies against political opponents at
-home was undeviating; and, what is even more remarkable, amidst the
-precedence and practice of the Grecian world, his hostility against
-foreign enemies, Bœotian dissentients, and Theban exiles, was
-uniformly free from reactionary vengeance. Sufficient proofs have
-been adduced in the preceding pages of this rare union of attributes
-in the same individual; of lofty disinterestedness, not merely
-as to corrupt gains, but as to the more seductive irritabilities
-of ambition, combined with a just measure of attachment towards
-partisans, and unparalleled gentleness towards enemies. His
-friendship with Pelopidas was never disturbed during the fifteen
-years of their joint political career; an absence of jealousy signal
-and creditable to both, though most creditable to Pelopidas, the
-richer, as well as the inferior, man of the two. To both, and to
-the harmonious coöperation of both, Thebes owed her short-lived
-splendor and ascendency. Yet when we compare the one with the other,
-we not only miss in Pelopidas the transcendent strategic genius and
-conspicuous eloquence, but even the constant vigilance and prudence,
-which never deserted his friend. If Pelopidas had had Epaminondas as
-his companion in Thessaly, he would hardly have trusted himself to
-the good faith, nor tasted the dungeon, of the Pheræan Alexander; nor
-would he have rushed forward to certain destruction, in a transport
-of phrensy, at the view of that hated tyrant in the subsequent
-battle.</p>
-
-<p>In eloquence, Epaminondas would doubtless have found superiors
-at Athens; but at Thebes, he had neither equal, nor predecessor,
-nor successor. Under the new phase into which Thebes passed by the
-expulsion of the Lacedæmonians out of the Kadmeia, such a gift was
-second in importance only to the great strategic qualities; while
-the combination of both elevated their possessor into the envoy,
-the counsellor, the debater, of his country,<a id="FNanchor_774"
-href="#Footnote_774" class="fnanchor">[774]</a><span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_356">[p. 356]</span> as well as her minister at war and
-commander-in-chief. The shame of acknowledging Thebes as leading
-state in Greece, embodied in the current phrases about Bœotian
-stupidity, would be sensibly mitigated, when her representative
-in an assembled congress spoke with the flowing abundance of
-the Homeric Odysseus, instead of the loud, brief, and hurried
-bluster of Menelaus.<a id="FNanchor_775" href="#Footnote_775"
-class="fnanchor">[775]</a> The possession of such eloquence,
-amidst the uninspiring atmosphere of Thebes, implied far greater
-mental force than a similar accomplishment would have betokened at
-Athens. In Epaminondas, it was steadily associated with thought and
-action,—that triple combination of thinking, speaking, and acting,
-which Isokrates and other Athenian sophists<a id="FNanchor_776"
-href="#Footnote_776" class="fnanchor">[776]</a> set before their
-hearers as the stock and qualification for meritorious civic life. To
-the bodily training and soldier-like practice, common to all Thebans,
-Epaminondas added an ardent intellectual impulse and a range of
-discussion with the philosophical men around, peculiar to himself.
-He was not floated into public life by the accident of birth or
-wealth,—nor hoisted and propped up by oligarchical clubs,—nor even
-determined to it originally by any spontaneous ambition of his own.
-But the great revolution of 379 <small>B.C.</small>, which expelled
-from Thebes both the Lacedæmonian garrison and the local oligarchy
-who ruled by its aid, forced him forward by the strongest obligations
-both of duty and interest; since nothing but an energetic defence
-could rescue both him and every other free Theban from slavery. It
-was by the like necessity that the American revolution, and the first
-French revolution, thrust into the front rank the most instructed and
-capable men of the country, whether ambitious by temperament or not.
-As the pressure of the time impelled Epaminondas forward, so it also
-disposed his countrymen to look out for a competent leader wherever
-he was to be found; and in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_357">[p.
-357]</span> no other living man could they obtain the same union
-of the soldier, the general, the orator, and the patriot. Looking
-through all Grecian history, it is only in Perikles that we find the
-like many-sided excellence; for though much inferior to Epaminondas
-as a general, Perikles must be held superior to him as a statesman.
-But it is alike true of both,—and the remark tends much to illustrate
-the sources of Grecian excellence,—that neither sprang exclusively
-from the school of practice and experience. They both brought
-to that school minds exercised in the conversation of the most
-instructed philosophers and sophists accessible to them,—trained to
-varied intellectual combinations and to a larger range of subjects
-than those that came before the public assembly,—familiarized with
-reasonings which the scrupulous piety of Nikias forswore, and which
-the devoted military patriotism of Pelopidas disdained.</p>
-
-<p>On one point, as I have already noticed, the policy recommended
-by Epaminondas to his countrymen appears of questionable wisdom,—his
-advice to compete with Athens for transmarine and naval power.
-One cannot recognize in this advice the same accurate estimate of
-permanent causes,—the same long-sighted view, of the conditions of
-strength to Thebes and of weakness to her enemies, which dictated the
-foundation of Messênê and Megalopolis. These two towns, when once
-founded, took such firm root, that Sparta could not persuade even
-her own allies to aid in effacing them; a clear proof of the sound
-reasoning on which their founder had proceeded. What Epaminondas
-would have done,—whether he would have followed out maxims equally
-prudent and penetrating,—if he had survived the victory of
-Mantinea,—is a point which we cannot pretend to divine. He would
-have found himself then on a pinnacle of glory, and invested with a
-plenitude of power, such as no Greek ever held without abusing. But
-all that we know of Epaminondas justifies the conjecture that he
-would have been found equal, more than any other Greek, even to this
-great trial; and that his untimely death shut him out from a future
-not less honorable to himself, than beneficial to Thebes and to
-Greece generally.</p>
-
-<p>Of the private life and habits of Epaminondas we know scarcely
-anything. We are told that he never married; and we find brief
-allusions, without any details, to attachments in which he
-is said<span class="pagenum" id="Page_358">[p. 358]</span>
-to have indulged.<a id="FNanchor_777" href="#Footnote_777"
-class="fnanchor">[777]</a> Among the countrymen of Pindar,<a
-id="FNanchor_778" href="#Footnote_778" class="fnanchor">[778]</a>
-devoted attachment between mature men and beautiful youths was
-more frequent than in other parts of Greece. It was confirmed
-by interchange of mutual oaths at the tomb of Iolaus, and was
-reckoned upon as the firmest tie of military fidelity in the hour
-of battle. Asopichus and Kaphisodorus are named as youths to whom
-Epaminondas was much devoted. The first fought with desperate
-bravery at the battle of Leuktra, and after the victory caused an
-image of the Leuktrian trophy to be carved on his shield, which
-he dedicated at Delphi;<a id="FNanchor_779" href="#Footnote_779"
-class="fnanchor">[779]</a> the second perished along with his
-illustrious friend and chief on the field of Mantinea, and was
-buried in a grave closely adjacent to him.<a id="FNanchor_780"
-href="#Footnote_780" class="fnanchor">[780]</a></p>
-
-<p>It rather appears that the Spartans, deeply incensed against their
-allies for having abandoned them in reference to Messênê, began to
-turn their attention away from the affairs of Greece to those of Asia
-and Egypt. But the dissensions in Arcadia were not wholly appeased
-even by the recent peace. The city of Megalopolis had been founded
-only eight years before by the coalescence of many smaller townships,
-all previously enjoying a separate autonomy more or less perfect. The
-vehement anti-Spartan impulse, which marked the two years immediately
-succeeding the battle of Leuktra, had overruled to so great a degree
-the prior instincts of these townships, that they had lent themselves
-to the plans of Lykomedes and Epaminondas for an enlarged community
-in the new city. But since that period, reaction had taken place.
-The Mantineans had come to be at the head of an anti-Megalopolitan
-party in Arcadia; and several of the communities which had been
-merged in Megalopolis, counting upon aid from them and from the
-Eleians, insisted on seceding, and returning to<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_359">[p. 359]</span> their original autonomy. But for
-foreign aid, Megalopolis would now have been in great difficulty.
-A pressing request was sent to the Thebans, who despatched into
-Arcadia three thousand hoplites under Pammenes. This force enabled
-the Megalopolitans, though not without measures of considerable
-rigor, to uphold the integrity of their city, and keep the refractory
-members in communion.<a id="FNanchor_781" href="#Footnote_781"
-class="fnanchor">[781]</a> And it appears that the interference thus
-obtained was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_360">[p. 360]</span>
-permanently efficacious, so that the integrity of this recent
-Pan-Arcadian community was no farther disturbed.</p>
-
-<p>The old king Agesilaus was compelled, at the age of eighty,
-to see the dominion of Sparta thus irrevocably narrowed, her
-influence in Arcadia overthrown, and the loss of Messênê formally
-sanctioned even by her own allies. All his protests, and those of
-his son Archidamus, so strenuously set forth by Isokrates, had only
-ended by isolating Sparta more than ever from Grecian support and
-sympathy. Archidamus probably never seriously attempted to execute
-the desperate scheme which he had held out as a threat some two or
-three years before the battle of Mantinea; that the Lacedæmonians
-would send away their wives and families, and convert their military
-population into a perpetual camp, never to lay down arms until
-they should have reconquered Messênê or perished in the attempt.<a
-id="FNanchor_782" href="#Footnote_782" class="fnanchor">[782]</a> Yet
-he and his father, though deserted by all Grecian allies, had not yet
-abandoned the hope that they might obtain aid, in the shape of money
-for levying mercenary troops, from the native princes in Egypt and
-the revolted Persian satraps in Asia, with whom they seem to have
-been for some time in a sort of correspondence.<a id="FNanchor_783"
-href="#Footnote_783" class="fnanchor">[783]</a></p>
-
-<p>About the time of the battle of Mantinea,—and as it would seem,
-for some years before,—a large portion of the western dominions of
-the Great King were in a state partly of revolt, partly of dubious
-obedience. Egypt had been for some years in actual revolt, and
-under native princes, whom the Persians had vainly endeavored to
-subdue (employing for that purpose the aid of the Athenian generals
-Iphikrates and Timotheus) both in 374 and 371 <small>B.C.</small>
-Ariobarzanes, satrap of the region near the Propontis and the
-Hellespont, appears to have revolted about the year 367-366
-<small>B.C.</small> In other parts of Asia Minor, too,—Paphlagonia,
-Pisidia, etc.,—the subordinate princes or governors became
-disaffected to Artaxerxes. But their disaffection was for a certain
-time kept down by the extraordinary ability and vigor of a Karian
-named Datames, commander for the king in a part of Kappadokia, who
-gained several important victories over them by rapidity of movement
-and well-combined stratagem. At length the services of Datames became
-so distinguished as to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_361">[p.
-361]</span> excite the jealousy of many of the Persian grandees;
-who poisoned the royal mind against him, and thus drove him to
-raise the standard of revolt in his own district of Kappadokia,
-under alliance and concert with Ariobarzanes. It was in vain that
-Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, was sent by Artaxerxes with a
-powerful force to subdue Datames. The latter resisted all the open
-force of Persia, and was at length overcome only by the treacherous
-conspiracy of Mithridates (son of Ariobarzanes), who, corrupted
-by the Persian court and becoming a traitor both to his father
-Ariobarzanes and to Datames, simulated zealous coöperation, tempted
-the latter to a confidential interview, and there assassinated him.<a
-id="FNanchor_784" href="#Footnote_784" class="fnanchor">[784]</a></p>
-
-<p>Still, however, there remained powerful princes and satraps in
-Asia Minor, disaffected to the court; Mausôlus, prince of Karia;
-Orontes, satrap of Mysia, and Autophradates, satrap of Lydia,—the
-last having now apparently joined the revolters, though he had
-before been active in upholding the authority of the king. It seems
-too that the revolt extended to Syria and Phœnicia, so that all
-the western coast with its large revenues, as well as Egypt, was
-at once subtracted from the empire. Tachos, native king of Egypt,
-was prepared to lend assistance to this formidable combination
-of disaffected commanders, who selected Orontes as their chief;
-confiding to him their united forces, and sending Rheomithres to
-Egypt to procure pecuniary aid. But the Persian court broke the force
-of this combination by corrupting both Orontes and Rheomithres, who
-betrayed their confederates, and caused the enterprise to fail.
-Of the particulars we know little or nothing.<a id="FNanchor_785"
-href="#Footnote_785" class="fnanchor">[785]</a></p> <p><span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_362">[p. 362]</span></p> <p>Both the Spartan
-king Agesilaus, with a thousand Lacedæmonian or Peloponnesian
-hoplites,—and the Athenian general Chabrias, were invited to Egypt
-to command the forces of Tachos; the former on land, the latter
-at sea. Chabrias came simply as a volunteer, without any public
-sanction or order from Athens. But the service of Agesilaus was
-undertaken for the purposes and with the consent of the authorities
-at home, attested by the presence of thirty Spartans who came out
-as his counsellors. The Spartans were displeased with the Persian
-king for having sanctioned the independence of Messênê; and as
-the prospect of overthrowing or enfeebling his empire appeared
-at this moment considerable, they calculated on reaping a large
-reward for their services to the Egyptian prince, who would in
-return lend them assistance towards their views in Greece. But
-dissension and bad judgment marred all the combinations against the
-Persian king. Agesilaus, on reaching Egypt,<a id="FNanchor_786"
-href="#Footnote_786" class="fnanchor">[786]</a> was received with
-little respect. The Egyptians saw with astonishment, that one, whom
-they had invited as a formidable warrior, was a little deformed
-old man, of mean attire, and sitting on the grass with his troops,
-careless of show or luxury. They not only vented their disappointment
-in sarcastic remarks, but also declined to invest him with the
-supreme command, as he had anticipated. He was only recognized as
-general of the mercenary land force, while Tachos himself commanded
-in chief, and Chabrias was at the head of the fleet. Great efforts
-were made to assemble a force competent to act against the Great
-King; and Chabrias is said to have suggested various stratagems
-for obtaining money from the Egyptians.<a id="FNanchor_787"
-href="#Footnote_787" class="fnanchor">[787]</a> The army having been
-thus strengthened, Agesilaus, though discontented and indignant,
-nevertheless accompanied Tachos on an expedition against the Persian
-forces in Phœnicia; from whence they were forced to return by the
-revolt of Nektanebis, cousin of Tachos, who caused himself<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_363">[p. 363]</span> to be proclaimed king
-of Egypt. Tachos was now full of supplications to Agesilaus to
-sustain him against his competitor for the Egyptian throne; while
-Nektanebis, also on his side, began to bid high for the favor of
-the Spartans. With the sanction of the authorities at home, but in
-spite of the opposition of Chabrias, Agesilaus decided in favor of
-Nektanebis, withdrawing the mercenaries from the camp of Tachos,<a
-id="FNanchor_788" href="#Footnote_788" class="fnanchor">[788]</a>
-who was accordingly obliged to take flight. Chabrias returned home
-to Athens; either not choosing to abandon Tachos, whom he had
-come to serve,—or recalled by special order of his countrymen, in
-consequence of the remonstrance of the Persian king. A competitor
-for the throne presently arose in the Mendesian division of Egypt.
-Agesilaus, vigorously maintaining the cause of Nektanebis, defeated
-all the efforts of his opponent. Yet his great schemes against
-the Persian empire were abandoned, and nothing was effected as
-the result of his Egyptian expedition except the establishment of
-Nektanebis; who, having in vain tried to prevail upon him to stay
-longer, dismissed him in the winter season with large presents, and
-with a public donation to Sparta of two hundred and thirty talents.
-Agesilaus marched from the Nile towards Kyrênê, in order to obtain
-from that town and its ports ships for the passage home. But he died
-on the march, without reaching Kyrênê. His body was conveyed home
-by his troops, for burial, in a preparation of wax, since honey
-was not to be obtained.<a id="FNanchor_789" href="#Footnote_789"
-class="fnanchor">[789]</a></p>
-
-<p>Thus expired, at an age somewhat above eighty, the ablest and
-most energetic of the Spartan kings. He has enjoyed the advantage,
-denied to every other eminent Grecian leader, that his character and
-exploits have been set out in the most favorable point of view by a
-friend and companion,—Xenophon. Making every allowance for partiality
-in this picture, there will still remain a really great and
-distinguished character. We find the virtues of<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_364">[p. 364]</span> a soldier, and the abilities of a
-commander, combined with strenuous personal will and decision, in
-such measure as to ensure for Agesilaus constant ascendency over
-the minds of others far beyond what was naturally incident to his
-station; and that, too, in spite of conspicuous bodily deformity,
-amidst a nation eminently sensitive on that point. Of the merits
-which Xenophon ascribes to him, some are the fair results of a
-Spartan education;—his courage, simplicity of life, and indifference
-to indulgences,—his cheerful endurance of hardship under every form.
-But his fidelity to engagements, his uniform superiority to pecuniary
-corruption, and those winning and hearty manners which attached to
-him all around—were virtues not Spartan but personal to himself.
-We find in him, however, more analogy to Lysander—a man equally
-above reproach on the score of pecuniary gain—than to Brasidas or
-Kallikratidas. Agesilaus succeeded to the throne, with a disputed
-title, under the auspices and through the intrigues of Lysander;
-whose influence, at that time predominant both at Sparta and in
-Greece, had planted everywhere dekarchies and harmosts as instruments
-of ascendency for imperial Sparta—and under the name of Sparta, for
-himself. Agesilaus, too high-spirited to comport himself as second
-to any one, speedily broke through so much of the system as had been
-constructed to promote the personal dominion of Lysander; yet without
-following out the same selfish aspirations, or seeking to build up
-the like individual dictatorship, on his own account. His ambition
-was indeed unbounded, but it was for Sparta in the first place, and
-for himself only in the second. The misfortune was, that in his
-measures for upholding and administering the imperial authority of
-Sparta, he still continued that mixture of domestic and foreign
-coërcion (represented by the dekarchy and the harmost) which had been
-introduced by Lysander; a sad contrast with the dignified equality,
-and emphatic repudiation of partisan interference, proclaimed by
-Brasidas, as the watchword of Sparta, at Akanthus and Torônê—and with
-the still nobler Pan-hellenic aims of Kallikratidas.</p>
-
-<p>The most glorious portion of the life of Agesilaus was that spent
-in his three Asiatic campaigns, when acting under the miso-Persian
-impulse for which his panegyrist gives him so much credit.<a
-id="FNanchor_790" href="#Footnote_790" class="fnanchor">[790]</a></p>
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_365">[p. 365]</span></p> <p>He
-was here employed in a Pan-hellenic purpose, to protect the Asiatic
-Greeks against that subjection to Persia which Sparta herself had
-imposed upon them a few years before, as the price of Persian aid
-against Athens.</p>
-
-<p>The Persians presently succeeded in applying the lessons of Sparta
-against herself, and in finding Grecian allies to make war upon her
-near home. Here was an end of the Pan-hellenic sentiment, and of the
-truly honorable ambition, in the bosom of Agesilaus. He was recalled
-to make war nearer home. His obedience to the order of recall is
-greatly praised by Plutarch and Xenophon—in my judgment, with little
-reason, since he had no choice but to come back. But he came back
-an altered man. His miso-Persian feeling had disappeared, and had
-been exchanged for a miso-Theban sentiment which gradually acquired
-the force of a passion. As principal conductor of the war between
-394-387 <small>B.C.</small>, he displayed that vigor and ability
-which never forsook him in military operations. But when he found
-that the empire of Sparta near home could not be enforced except by
-making her the ally of Persia and the executor of a Persian rescript,
-he was content to purchase such aid, in itself dishonorable, by the
-still greater dishonor of sacrificing the Asiatic Greeks. For the
-time, his policy seemed to succeed. From 387-379 <small>B.C.</small>
-(that is, down to the time of the revolution at Thebes, effected by
-Pelopidas and his small band), the ascendency of Sparta on land,
-in Central Greece, was continually rising. But her injustice and
-oppression stand confessed even by her panegyrist Xenophon; and
-this is just the period when the influence of Agesilaus was at its
-maximum. Afterwards we find him personally forward in sheltering
-Sphodrias from punishment, and thus bringing upon his countrymen a
-war with Athens as well as with Thebes. In the conduct of that war
-his military operations were, as usual, strenuous and able, with
-a certain measure of success. But on the whole, the war turns out
-unfavorably for Sparta. In 371 <small>B.C.</small>, she is obliged
-to accept peace on terms very humiliating, as compared with her
-position in 387 <small>B.C.</small>; and the only compensation
-which she receives, is, the opportunity of striking the Thebans
-out of the treaty, thus leaving them to contend single-handed
-against what seemed overwhelming odds. Of this intense miso-Theban
-impulse, which so speedily brought about the unexpected and crushing
-disaster at Leuktra, Agesilaus stands<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_366">[p. 366]</span> out as the prominent spokesman. In
-the days of Spartan misfortune which followed, we find his conduct
-creditable and energetic, so far as the defensive position, in
-which Sparta then found herself, allowed; and though Plutarch
-seems displeased with him<a id="FNanchor_791" href="#Footnote_791"
-class="fnanchor">[791]</a> for obstinacy in refusing to acknowledge
-the autonomy of Messênê (at the peace concluded after the battle of
-Mantinea), when acknowledged by all the other Greeks,—yet it cannot
-be shown that this refusal brought any actual mischief to Sparta; and
-circumstances might well have so turned out, that it would have been
-a gain.</p>
-
-<p>On the whole, in spite of the many military and personal merits of
-Agesilaus, as an adviser and politician he deserves little esteem.
-We are compelled to remark the melancholy contrast between the state
-in which he found Sparta at his accession, and that wherein he left
-her at his death—“Marmoream invenit, lateritiam reliquit.” Nothing
-but the death of Epaminondas at Mantinea saved her from something
-yet worse; though it would be unfair to Agesilaus, while we are
-considering the misfortunes of Sparta during his reign, not to
-recollect that Epaminondas was an enemy more formidable than she had
-ever before encountered.</p>
-
-<p>The efficient service rendered by Agesilaus during his last
-expedition to Egypt, had the effect of establishing firmly the
-dominion of Nektanebis the native king, and of protecting that
-country for the time from being reconquered by the Persians; an event
-that did not happen until a few years afterwards, during the reign of
-the next Persian king. Of the extensive revolt, however, which at one
-time threatened to wrest from the Persian crown Asia Minor as well as
-Egypt, no permanent consequence remained. The treachery of Orontes
-and Rheomithres so completely broke up the schemes of the revolters,
-that Artaxerxes Mnemon still maintained the Persian empire (with the
-exception of Egypt), unimpaired.</p>
-
-<p>He died not long after the suppression of the revolt (apparently
-about a year after it, in 359-358 <small>B.C.</small>), having
-reigned forty-five or forty-six years.<a id="FNanchor_792"
-href="#Footnote_792" class="fnanchor">[792]</a> His death was
-preceded by one of those<span class="pagenum" id="Page_367">[p.
-367]</span> bloody tragedies which so frequently stained the
-transmission of a Persian sceptre. Darius, the eldest son of
-Artaxerxes, had been declared by his father successor to the throne.
-According to Persian custom, the successor thus declared was
-entitled to prefer any petition which he pleased; the monarch being
-held bound to grant it. Darius availed himself of the privilege
-to ask for one of the favorite inmates of his father’s harem,
-for whom he had contracted a passion. The request so displeased
-Artaxerxes, that he seemed likely to make a new appointment as to
-the succession; discarding Darius and preferring his younger son
-Ochus, whose interests were warmly espoused by Atossa, wife as well
-as daughter of the monarch. Alarmed at this prospect, Darius was
-persuaded by a discontented courtier, named Teribazus, to lay a
-plot for assassinating Artaxerxes; but the plot was betrayed, and
-the king caused both Darius and Teribazus to be put to death. By
-this catastrophe the chance of Ochus was improved, and his ambition
-yet farther stimulated. But there still remained two princes, older
-than he—Arsames and Ariaspes. Both these brothers he contrived to
-put out of the way; the one by a treacherous deceit, entrapping him
-to take poison,—the other by assassination. Ochus thus stood next
-as successor to the crown, which was not long denied to him,—for
-Artaxerxes, now very old and already struck down by the fatal
-consummation respecting his eldest son, Darius, did not survive the
-additional sorrow of seeing his two other sons die so speedily<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_368">[p. 368]</span> afterwards.<a
-id="FNanchor_793" href="#Footnote_793" class="fnanchor">[793]</a>
-He expired, and his son Ochus, taking the name of Artaxerxes,
-succeeded to him without opposition; manifesting as king the same
-sanguinary dispositions as those by which he had placed himself on
-the throne.</p>
-
-<p>During the two years following the battle of Mantinea, Athens,
-though relieved by the general peace from land-war, appears to
-have been entangled in serious maritime contests and difficulties.
-She had been considerably embarrassed by two events; by the
-Theban naval armament under Epaminondas, and by the submission of
-Alexander of Pheræ to Thebes,—both events belonging to 364-363
-<small>B.C.</small> It was in 363-362 <small>B.C.</small> that the
-Athenian Timotheus,—having carried on war with eminent success
-against Olynthus and the neighboring cities in the Thermaic Gulf, but
-with very bad success against Amphipolis,—transferred his forces to
-the war against Kotys king of Thrace near the Thracian Chersonese.
-The arrival of the Theban fleet in the Hellespont greatly distracted
-the Athenian general, and served as a powerful assistance to Kotys;
-who was moreover aided by the Athenian gen<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_369">[p. 369]</span>eral Iphikrates, on this occasion
-serving his father-in-law against his country.<a id="FNanchor_794"
-href="#Footnote_794" class="fnanchor">[794]</a> Timotheus is
-said to have carried on war against Kotys with advantage, and to
-have acquired for Athens a large plunder.<a id="FNanchor_795"
-href="#Footnote_795" class="fnanchor">[795]</a> It would appear that
-his operations were of an aggressive character, and that during his
-command in those regions the Athenian possessions in the Chersonese
-were safe from Kotys; for Iphikrates would only lend his aid to
-Kotys towards defensive warfare; retiring from his service when
-he began to attack the Athenian possessions in the Chersonese.<a
-id="FNanchor_796" href="#Footnote_796" class="fnanchor">[796]</a></p>
-
-<p>We do not know what circumstances brought about the dismissal
-or retirement of Timotheus from the command. But in the next year,
-we find Ergophilus as Athenian commander in the Chersonese, and
-Kallisthenes (seemingly) as Athenian commander against Amphipolis.<a
-id="FNanchor_797" href="#Footnote_797" class="fnanchor">[797]</a>
-The transmarine affairs of Athens, however, were far from improving.
-Besides that under the new general she seems to have been losing
-strength near the Chersonese, she had now upon her hands a new
-maritime enemy—Alexander of Pheræ. A short time previously, he had
-been her ally against Thebes, but the victories of the Thebans
-during the preceding year had so completely humbled him, that he
-now identified his cause with theirs; sending troops to join the
-expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus,<a id="FNanchor_798"
-href="#Footnote_798" class="fnanchor">[798]</a> and equipping a
-fleet to attack the maritime allies of Athens. His fleet captured
-the island of Tenos, ravaged several of the other Cyclades, and laid
-siege to Peparethos. Great alarm prevailed in Athens, and about
-the end of August (362 <small>B.C.</small>),<a id="FNanchor_799"
-href="#Footnote_799" class="fnanchor">[799]</a> two months after
-the battle of Mantinea,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_370">[p.
-370]</span> a fleet was equipped with the utmost activity, for the
-purpose of defending the insular allies, as well as of acting in the
-Hellespont. Vigorous efforts were required from all the trierarchs,
-and really exerted by some, to accelerate the departure of this
-fleet. But that portion of it, which, while the rest went to the
-Hellespont, was sent under Leosthenes to defend Peparethos,—met with
-a defeat from the ships of Alexander, with the loss of five triremes
-and six hundred prisoners.<a id="FNanchor_800" href="#Footnote_800"
-class="fnanchor">[800]</a> We are even told that soon after this
-naval advantage, the victors were bold enough to make a dash into the
-Peiræus itself (as Teleutias had done twenty-seven years before),
-where they seized both property on shipboard and men on the quay,
-before there was any force ready to repel them.<a id="FNanchor_801"
-href="#Footnote_801" class="fnanchor">[801]</a> The Thessalian
-marauders were ultimately driven back to their harbor of Pegasæ; yet
-not without much annoyance to the insular confederates, and some
-disgrace to Athens. The defeated admiral Leosthenes was condemned
-to death; while several trierarchs,—who, instead of serving in
-person, had performed the duties incumbent on them by deputy and
-by contract, were censured or put upon trial.<a id="FNanchor_802"
-href="#Footnote_802" class="fnanchor">[802]</a></p>
-
-<p>Not only had the affairs of Athens in the Hellespont become
-worse under Ergophilus than under Timotheus, but Kallisthenes also,
-who had succeeded Timotheus in the operations against Amphipolis,
-achieved no permanent result. It would appear that the Amphipolitans,
-to defend themselves against Athens, had invoked the aid of the
-Macedonian king Perdikkas; and placed their city in his hands. That
-prince had before acted in conjunction with the Athenian force
-under Timotheus against Olynthus; and their<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_371">[p. 371]</span> joint invasion had so much weakened
-the Olynthians as to disable them from affording aid to Amphipolis.
-At least, this hypothesis explains how Amphipolis came now, for the
-first time, to be no longer a free city; but to be disjoined from
-Olynthus, and joined with (probably garrisoned by) Perdikkas, as a
-possession of Macedonia.<a id="FNanchor_803" href="#Footnote_803"
-class="fnanchor">[803]</a> Kallisthenes thus found himself at war
-under greater disadvantages than Timotheus; having Perdikkas as his
-enemy, together with Amphipolis. Nevertheless, it would appear,
-he gained at first great advantages, and reduced Perdikkas to the
-necessity of purchasing a truce by the promise to abandon the
-Amphipolitans. The Macedonian prince, however, having gained time
-during the truce to recover his strength, no longer thought of
-performing his promise, but held Amphipolis against the Athenians as
-obstinately as before. Kallisthenes had let slip an opportunity which
-never again returned. After having announced at Athens the victorious
-truce and the approaching surrender, he seems to have been compelled,
-on his return, to admit that he had been cheated into suspending
-operations, at a moment when (as it seemed) Amphipolis might have
-been conquered. For this misjudgment or misconduct he was put upon
-trial at Athens, on returning to his disappointed countrymen;
-and at the same time Ergophilus also, who had been summoned home
-from the Chersonesus for his ill-success or bad management of
-the war against Kotys.<a id="FNanchor_804" href="#Footnote_804"
-class="fnanchor">[804]</a> The people were much incensed against
-both; but most against Ergophilus. Nevertheless it happened that
-Kallisthenes was tried first, and condemned to death. On the next
-day, Ergophilus was tried. But the verdict of the preceding day
-had discharged the wrath of the dikasts, and rendered them so
-much more indulgent, that they acquitted him.<a id="FNanchor_805"
-href="#Footnote_805" class="fnanchor">[805]</a></p>
-
-<p>Autokles was sent in place of Ergophilus to carry on war for
-Athens in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. It was not merely against
-Kotys that his operations were necessary. The Prokon<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_372">[p. 372]</span>nesians, allies of
-Athens, required protection against the attacks of Kyzikus; besides
-which, there was another necessity yet more urgent. The stock of
-corn was becoming short, and the price rising, not merely at Athens,
-but at many of the islands in the Ægean, and at Byzantium and other
-places. There prevailed therefore unusual anxiety, coupled with keen
-competition, for the corn in course of importation from the Euxine.
-The Byzantines, Chalkedonians, and Kyzikenes, had already begun to
-detain the passing corn-ships, for the supply of their own markets;
-and nothing less than a powerful Athenian fleet could ensure the
-safe transit of such supplies to Athens herself.<a id="FNanchor_806"
-href="#Footnote_806" class="fnanchor">[806]</a> The Athenian fleet,
-guarding the Bosphorus even from the Hieron inwards (the chapel near
-the junction of the Bosphorus with the Euxine), provided safe convoy
-for the autumnal exports of this essential article.</p>
-
-<p>In carrying on operations against Kotys, Autokles was favored
-with an unexpected advantage by the recent revolt of a powerful
-Thracian named Miltokythes against that prince. This revolt so
-alarmed Kotys, that he wrote a letter to Athens in a submissive
-tone, and sent envoys to purchase peace by various concessions.
-At the same time Miltokythes also first sent envoys—next, went in
-person—to Athens, to present his own case and solicit aid. He was
-however coldly received. The vote of the Athenian assembly, passed
-on hearing the case (and probably procured in part through the
-friends of Iphikrates), was so unfavorable,<a id="FNanchor_807"
-href="#Footnote_807" class="fnanchor">[807]</a> as to send him away
-not merely in discouragement, but in alarm; while Kotys recovered all
-his power in Thrace, and even became master of the Sacred Mountain
-with its abundance of wealthy deposits. Nevertheless, in spite
-of this imprudent vote, the Athenians really intended to sustain
-Miltokythes against Kotys. Their general Autokles was recalled after
-a few months, and put upon his trial for having suffered Kotys to put
-down this enemy unassisted.<a id="FNanchor_808" href="#Footnote_808"
-class="fnanchor">[808]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_373">[p.
-373]</span> How the trial ended or how the justice of the case
-stood, we are unable to make out from the passing allusions of
-Demosthenes.</p>
-
-<p>Menon was sent as commander to the Hellespont to supersede
-Autokles; and was himself again superseded after a few months, by
-Timomachus. Convoy for the corn-vessels out of the Euxine became
-necessary anew, as in the preceding year; and was furnished a
-second time during the autumn of 361 <small>B.C.</small> by the
-Athenian ships of war;<a id="FNanchor_809" href="#Footnote_809"
-class="fnanchor">[809]</a> not merely for provisions under transport
-to Athens, but also for those going to Maroneia, Thasos, and
-other places in or near Thrace. But affairs in the Chersonese
-became yet more unfavorable to Athens. In the winter of 361-360
-<small>B.C.</small>, Kotys, with the coöperation of a body of
-Abydene citizens and Sestian exiles, who crossed the Hellespont
-from Abydos, contrived to surprise Sestos;<a id="FNanchor_810"
-href="#Footnote_810" class="fnanchor">[810]</a> the most important
-place in the Chersonese, and the guard-post of the Hellespont
-on its European side, for all vessels passing in or out. The
-whole Chersonese was now thrown open to his aggressions. He made
-preparations for attacking Elæus and Krithôtê, the two other chief
-possessions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_374">[p. 374]</span> of
-Athens, and endeavored to prevail on Iphikrates to take part in
-his projects. But that general, though he had assisted Kotys in
-defence against Athens, refused to commit the more patent treason
-involved in aggressive hostility against her. He even quitted
-Thrace, but not daring at once to visit Athens, retired to Lesbos.<a
-id="FNanchor_811" href="#Footnote_811" class="fnanchor">[811]</a> In
-spite of his refusal, however, the settlers and possessions of Athens
-in the Chersonese were attacked and imperiled by Kotys, who claimed
-the whole peninsula as his own, and established toll-gatherers
-at Sestos to levy the dues both of strait and harbor.<a
-id="FNanchor_812" href="#Footnote_812" class="fnanchor">[812]</a></p>
-
-<p>The fortune of Athens in these regions was still unpropitious.
-All her late commanders, Ergophilus, Autokles, Menon, Timomachus,
-had been successively deficient in means, in skill, or in fidelity,
-and had undergone accusation at home.<a id="FNanchor_813"
-href="#Footnote_813" class="fnanchor">[813]</a> Timomachus was now
-superseded by Kephisodotus, a man of known enmity towards both
-Iphikrates and Kotys.<a id="FNanchor_814" href="#Footnote_814"
-class="fnanchor">[814]</a> But Kephisodotus achieved no more than
-his predecessors, and had even to contend against a new enemy, who
-crossed over from Abydos to Sestos to reinforce Kotys—Charidemus with
-the mercenary division under his command. That officer, since his
-service three years before under Timotheus against Amphipolis, had
-been for some time in Asia, especially in the <span class="replace"
-id="tn_5" title="In the printed book: troad">Troad.</span> He hired
-himself to the satrap Artabazus; of whose embarrassments he took
-advantage to seize by fraud the towns of Skepsis, Kebren, and Ilium;
-intending to hold them as a little principality.<a id="FNanchor_815"
-href="#Footnote_815" class="fnanchor">[815]</a> Finding his position,
-however, ultimately untenable against the probable force of the
-satrap, he sent a letter across to the Chersonese, to the Athenian
-commander Kephisodotus, asking for Athenian triremes to transport
-his division across to Europe; in return for which, if granted, he
-engaged to crush Kotys and reconquer the Chersonese for Athens. This
-proposition, whether accepted or not, was never realized; for<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_375">[p. 375]</span> Charidemus was enabled,
-through a truce unexpectedly granted to him by the satrap, to cross
-over from Abydos to Sestos without any Athenian ships. But as soon
-as he found himself in the Chersonese, far from aiding Athens to
-recover that peninsula, he actually took service with Kotys against
-her; so that Elæeus and Krithôtê, her chief remaining posts, were in
-greater peril than ever.<a id="FNanchor_816" href="#Footnote_816"
-class="fnanchor">[816]</a></p>
-
-<p>The victorious prospects of Kotys, however, were now unexpectedly
-arrested. After a reign of twenty-four years he was assassinated by
-two brothers, Python and Herakleides, Greeks from the city of Ænus in
-Thrace, and formerly students under Plato at Athens. They committed
-the act to avenge their father; upon whom, as it would appear, Kotys
-had inflicted some brutal insult, under the influence of that violent
-and licentious temper which was in him combined with an energetic
-military character.<a id="FNanchor_817" href="#Footnote_817"
-class="fnanchor">[817]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_376">[p.
-376]</span> Having made their escape, Python and his brother retired
-to Athens, where they were received with every demonstration of
-honor, and presented with the citizenship as well as with golden
-wreaths; partly as tyrannicides, partly as having relieved the
-Athenians from an odious and formidable enemy.<a id="FNanchor_818"
-href="#Footnote_818" class="fnanchor">[818]</a> Disclaiming the
-warm eulogies heaped upon him by various speakers in the assembly,
-Python is said to have replied—“It was a god who did the deed; we
-only lent our hands:”<a id="FNanchor_819" href="#Footnote_819"
-class="fnanchor">[819]</a> an anecdote, which, whether it be
-truth or fiction, illustrates powerfully the Greek admiration of
-tyrannicide.</p>
-
-<p>The death of Kotys gave some relief to Athenian affairs in
-the Chersonese. Of his children, even the eldest, Kersobleptes,
-was only a youth:<a id="FNanchor_820" href="#Footnote_820"
-class="fnanchor">[820]</a> moreover two other Thracian chiefs,
-Berisades and Amadokus, now started up as pretenders to shares in
-the kingdom of Thrace. Kersobleptes employed as his main support and
-minister the mercenary general Charidemus, who either had already
-married, or did now marry, his sister; a nuptial connection had been
-formed in like manner by Amadokus with two Greeks named Simon and
-Bianor—and by Berisades with an Athenian citizen named Athenodorus,
-who (like Iphikrates and others) had founded a city, and possessed
-a certain independent dominion, in or near the Chersonese.<a
-id="FNanchor_821" href="#Footnote_821" class="fnanchor">[821]</a>
-These Grecian mercenary chiefs thus united themselves by nuptial
-ties to the princes whom they served, as Seuthes had proposed to
-Xenophon, and as the Italian Condottieri of the fifteenth century
-ennobled themselves by similar alliance with princely families—for
-example, Sforza with the Visconti of Milan. All these three Thracian
-competitors were now represented by Grecian agents. But at first,
-it seems, Charidemus on behalf of Kersobleptes was the strongest.
-He and his army were near Perinthus on the north coast of the
-Propontis, where the Athenian<span class="pagenum" id="Page_377">[p.
-377]</span> commander, Kephisodotus, visited him, with a small
-squadron of ten triremes, in order to ask for the fulfilment of those
-fair promises which Charidemus had made in his letter from Asia. But
-Charidemus treated the Athenians as enemies, attacked by surprise
-the seamen on shore, and inflicted upon them great damage. He then
-pressed the Chersonese severely for several months, and marched
-even into the midst of it, to protect a nest of pirates whom the
-Athenians were besieging at the neighboring islet on its western
-coast—Alopekonnesus. At length, after seven months of unprofitable
-warfare (dating from the death of Kotys), he forced Kephisodotus
-to conclude with him a convention so disastrous and dishonorable,
-that as soon as known at Athens, it was indignantly repudiated.<a
-id="FNanchor_822" href="#Footnote_822" class="fnanchor">[822]</a>
-Kephisodotus, being recalled in disgrace, was put upon his trial,
-and fined; the orator Demosthenes (we are told), who had served as
-one of the trierarchs in the fleet, being among his accusers.<a
-id="FNanchor_823" href="#Footnote_823" class="fnanchor">[823]</a></p>
-
-<p>Among the articles of this unfavorable convention, one was
-that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_378">[p. 378]</span> the Greek
-city of Kardia should be specially reserved to Charidemus himself.
-That city—eminently convenient from its situation on the isthmus
-connecting the Chersonese with Thrace—claimed by the Athenians
-as within the Chersonese, yet at the same time intensely hostile
-to Athens—became his principal station.<a id="FNanchor_824"
-href="#Footnote_824" class="fnanchor">[824]</a> He was fortunate
-enough to seize, through treachery, the person of the Thracian
-Miltokythes, who had been the pronounced enemy of Kotys, and had
-coöperated with Athens. But he did not choose to hand over this
-important prisoner to Kersobleptes, because the life of Miltokythes
-would thus have been saved: it not being the custom of Thracians,
-in their intestine disputes, to put each other to death.<a
-id="FNanchor_825" href="#Footnote_825" class="fnanchor">[825]</a>
-We remark with surprise a practice milder than that of Greece,
-amidst a people decidedly more barbarous and blood-thirsty than
-the Greeks. Charidemus accordingly surrendered Miltokythes to the
-Kardians, who put the prisoner with his son into a boat, took
-them a little way out to sea, slew the son before the eyes of the
-father, and then drowned the father himself.<a id="FNanchor_826"
-href="#Footnote_826" class="fnanchor">[826]</a> It is not improbable
-that there may have been some special antecedent causes, occasioning
-intense antipathy on the part of the Kardians towards Miltokythes,
-and inducing Charidemus to hand him over to them as an acceptable
-subject for revenge. However this may be, their savage deed kindled
-violent indignation among all the Thracians, and did much injury to
-the cause of Kersobleptes and Charidemus. Though Kephisodotus had
-been recalled, and though a considerable interval elapsed before any
-successor came from Athens, yet Berisades and Amadokus joined their
-forces in one common accord, and sent to the Athenians propositions
-of alliance, with request for pecuniary aid. Athenodorus, the general
-of Berisades, putting himself at the head of Thracians and Athenians
-together, found himself superior in the field to Kersobleptes and
-Charidemus; whom he constrained to accept a fresh convention dictated
-by himself. Herein it was provided, that the kingdom of Thrace
-should be divided in equal portions between the three competitors;
-that all three should concur in surrendering the Chersonese to
-Athens;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_379">[p. 379]</span> and
-that the son of a leading man named Iphiades at Sestos, held by
-Charidemus as hostage for the adherence of that city, should be
-surrendered to Athens also.<a id="FNanchor_827" href="#Footnote_827"
-class="fnanchor">[827]</a></p>
-
-<p>This new convention, sworn on both sides, promised to Athens
-the full acquisition which she desired. Considering the thing as
-done, the Athenians sent Chabrias as commander in one trireme to
-receive the surrender, but omitted to send the money requested by
-Athenodorus; who was accordingly constrained to disband his army for
-want of pay. Upon this Kersobleptes and Charidemus at once threw up
-their engagement, refused to execute the convention just sworn, and
-constrained Chabrias, who had come without any force, to revert to
-the former convention concluded with Kephisodotus. Disappointed and
-indignant, the Athenians disavowed the act of Chabrias, in spite
-of his high reputation. They sent ten envoys to the Chersonese,
-insisting that the convention of Athenodorus should be resworn by all
-the three Thracian competitors—Berisades, Amadokus, Kersobleptes;
-if the third declined, the envoys were instructed to take measures
-for making war upon him, while they received the engagements of
-the other two. But such a mission, without arms, obtained nothing
-from Charidemus and Kersobleptes, except delay or refusal; while
-Berisades and Amadokus sent to Athens bitter complaints respecting
-the breach of faith. At length, after some months—just after the
-triumphant conclusion of the expedition of Athens against Eubœa
-(358 <small>B.C.</small>)—the Athenian Chares arrived in the
-Chersonese, at the head of a considerable mercenary force. Then
-at length the two recusants were compelled to swear anew to the
-convention of Athenodorus, in the presence of the latter as well as
-of Berisades and Amadokus.<a id="FNanchor_828" href="#Footnote_828"
-class="fnanchor">[828]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_380">[p.
-380]</span> And it would appear that before long, its conditions
-were realized. Charidemus surrendered the Chersonese, of course
-including its principal town Sestos, to Athens;<a id="FNanchor_829"
-href="#Footnote_829" class="fnanchor">[829]</a> yet he retained
-for himself Kardia,<a id="FNanchor_830" href="#Footnote_830"
-class="fnanchor">[830]</a> which was affirmed (though the
-Athenians denied it) not to be included in the boundaries of
-that peninsula. The kingdom of Thrace was also divided between
-Kersobleptes, Berisades, and Amadokus; which triple division,
-diminishing the strength of each, was regarded by Athens as a great
-additional guarantee for her secure possession of the Chersonese.<a
-id="FNanchor_831" href="#Footnote_831" class="fnanchor">[831]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_381">[p. 381]</span></p>
-
-<p>It was thus that Athens at length made good her possession of
-the Chersonese against the neighboring Thracian potentates. And it
-would seem that her transmarine power, with its dependencies and
-confederates, now stood at a greater height than it had ever reached
-since the terrible reverses of 405 <small>B.C.</small> Among them
-were numbered not only a great number of the Ægean islands (even the
-largest, Eubœa, Chios, Samos, and Rhodes), but also the continental
-possessions of Byzantium—the Chersonese—Maroneia<a id="FNanchor_832"
-href="#Footnote_832" class="fnanchor">[832]</a> with other places on
-the southern coast of Thrace—and Pydna, Methônê, and Potidæa, with
-most of the region surrounding the Thermaic Gulf.<a id="FNanchor_833"
-href="#Footnote_833" class="fnanchor">[833]</a> This last portion
-of empire had been acquired at the cost of the Olynthian fraternal
-alliance of neighboring cities, against which Athens too, as well as
-Sparta, by an impulse most disastrous for the future independence of
-Greece, had made war with inauspicious success. The Macedonian king
-Perdikkas, with a just instinct towards the future aggrandizement of
-his dynasty, had assisted her in thus weakening Olynthus; feeling
-that the towns on the Thermaic Gulf, if they formed parts of a
-strong Olynthian confederacy of brothers and neighbors, reciprocally
-attached and self-sustaining, would resist Macedonia more
-effectively, than if they were half-reluctant dependencies of Athens,
-even with the chances of Athenian aid by sea. The aggressive hand of
-Athens against Olynthus, indeed, between 368-363 <small>B.C.</small>,
-was hardly less mischievous, to Greece generally, than that of Sparta
-had been between 382-380 <small>B.C.</small> Sparta had crushed the
-Olynthian confederacy in its first brilliant promise—Athens prevented
-it from rearing its head anew. Both conspired to break down the most
-effective barrier against Macedonian aggrandizement; neither were
-found competent to provide any adequate protection to Greece in its
-room.</p>
-
-<p>The maximum of her second empire, which I have remarked
-that Athens attained by the recovery of the Chersonese,<a
-id="FNanchor_834" href="#Footnote_834" class="fnanchor">[834]</a>
-lasted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_382">[p. 382]</span> but for a
-moment. During the very same year, there occurred that revolt among
-her principal allies, known by the name of the Social War, which gave
-to her power a fatal shock, and left the field comparatively clear
-for the early aggressions of her yet more formidable enemy—Philip
-of Macedon. That prince had already emerged from his obscurity as a
-hostage in Thebes, and had succeeded his brother Perdikkas, slain in
-a battle with the Illyrians, as king (360-359 <small>B.C.</small>).
-At first, his situation appeared not merely difficult, but almost
-hopeless. Not the most prescient eye in Greece could have recognized,
-in the inexperienced youth struggling at his first accession against
-rivals at home, enemies abroad, and embarrassments of every kind—the
-future conqueror of Chæroneia, and destroyer of Grecian independence.
-How, by his own genius, energy, and perseverance, assisted by the
-faults and dissensions of his Grecian enemies, he attained his
-inauspicious eminence—will be recounted in my subsequent volume.</p>
-
-<hr class="tb" />
-
-<p>At the opening of my ninth volume, after the surrender of Athens,
-Greece was under the Spartan empire. Its numerous independent
-city-communities were more completely regimented under one chief than
-they had ever been before, Athens and Thebes being both numbered
-among the followers of Sparta.</p>
-
-<p>But the conflicts recounted in these two volumes (during an
-interval of forty-four years—404-403 <small>B.C.</small> to 360-359
-<small>B.C.</small>) have wrought the melancholy change of leaving
-Greece more disunited, and more destitute of presiding Hellenic
-authority, than she had been at any time since the Persian invasion.
-Thebes, Sparta, and Athens, had all been engaged in weakening each
-other; in which, unhappily, each has been far more successful than
-in strengthening<span class="pagenum" id="Page_383">[p. 383]</span>
-herself. The maritime power of Athens is now indeed considerable, and
-may be called very great, if compared with the state of degradation
-to which she had been brought in 403 <small>B.C.</small> But it
-will presently be seen how unsubstantial is the foundation of her
-authority, and how fearfully she has fallen off from that imperial
-feeling and energy which ennobled her ancestors under the advice of
-Perikles.</p>
-
-<p>It is under these circumstances, so untoward for defence, that the
-aggressor from Macedonia arises.</p>
-
-<hr class="chap" />
-
-
-<div class="chapter" id="Chap_81">
-  <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXXI.<br />
-  SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN
-  ARMAMENT BEFORE SYRACUSE.</h2>
-</div>
-
-<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">In</span>
-the sixtieth chapter of this work, I brought down the history of
-the Grecian communities in Sicily to the close of the Athenian
-siege of Syracuse, where Nikias and Demosthenes with nearly their
-entire armament perished by so lamentable a fate. I now resume from
-that point the thread of Sicilian events, which still continues so
-distinct from those of Peloponnesus and Eastern Greece, that it is
-inconvenient to include both in the same chapters.</p>
-
-<p>If the destruction of the great Athenian armament (in September
-413 <small>B.C.</small>) excited the strongest sensation throughout
-every part of the Grecian world, we may imagine the intoxication
-of triumph with which it must have been hailed in Sicily. It had
-been achieved (Gylippus and the Peloponnesian allies aiding) by the
-united efforts of nearly all the Grecian cities in the island,—for
-all of them had joined Syracuse as soon as her prospects became
-decidedly encouraging; except Naxos and Katana, which were allied
-with the Athenians,—and Agrigentum, which remained neutral.<a
-id="FNanchor_835" href="#Footnote_835" class="fnanchor">[835]</a>
-Unfortunately we know little or nothing of the proceedings<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_384">[p. 384]</span> of the Syracusans,
-immediately following upon circumstances of so much excitement
-and interest. They appear to have carried on war against
-Katana, where some fugitives from the vanquished Athenian army
-contributed to the resistance against them.<a id="FNanchor_836"
-href="#Footnote_836" class="fnanchor">[836]</a> But both this city
-and Naxos, though exposed to humiliation and danger as allies
-of the defeated Athenians, contrived to escape without the loss
-of their independence. The allies of Syracuse were probably not
-eager to attack them, and thereby to aggrandize that city farther;
-while the Syracusans themselves also would be sensible of great
-exhaustion, arising from the immense efforts through which alone
-their triumph had been achieved. The pecuniary burdens to which
-they had been obliged to submit—known to Nikias during the last
-months of the siege,<a id="FNanchor_837" href="#Footnote_837"
-class="fnanchor">[837]</a> and fatally misleading his judgment,—were
-so heavy as to task severely their powers of endurance. After
-paying, and dismissing with appropriate gratitude, the numerous
-auxiliaries whom they had been obliged to hire,—after celebrating
-the recent triumph, and decorating the temples, in a manner
-satisfactory to the exuberant joy of the citizens<a id="FNanchor_838"
-href="#Footnote_838" class="fnanchor">[838]</a>—there would probably
-be a general disposition to repose rather than to aggressive warfare.
-There would be much destruction to be repaired throughout their
-territory, poorly watched or cultivated during the year of the
-siege.</p>
-
-<p>In spite of such exhaustion, however, the sentiment of
-exasperation and vengeance against Athens, combined with gratitude
-towards the Lacedæmonians, was too powerful to be balked. A confident
-persuasion reigned throughout Greece that Athens<a id="FNanchor_839"
-href="#Footnote_839" class="fnanchor">[839]</a> could not hold out
-for one single summer after her late terrific disaster; a persuasion,
-founded greatly on the hope of a large auxiliary squadron to act
-against her from Syracuse and her other enemies in Sicily and Italy.
-In this day of Athenian distress, such enemies of course became more
-numerous. Especially the city of Thurii in Italy,<a id="FNanchor_840"
-href="#Footnote_840" class="fnanchor">[840]</a> which had been
-friendly to Athens and had furnished aid to Demosthenes in his
-expedition to Sicily, now underwent a change, banished three hundred
-of the leading philo-Athenian citizens (among them the rhetor
-Lysias), and espoused<span class="pagenum" id="Page_385">[p.
-385]</span> the Peloponnesian cause with ardor. The feeling of
-reaction at Thurii, and of vengeance at Syracuse, stimulated the
-citizens of both places to take active part in an effort promising to
-be easy and glorious, for the destruction of Athens and her empire.
-And volunteers were doubtless the more forward, as the Persian
-satraps of the sea-board were now competing with each other in
-invitations to the Greeks, with offers of abundant pay.</p>
-
-<p>Accordingly, in the summer of the year 412 <small>B.C.</small>
-(the year following the catastrophe of the Athenian armament,) a
-Sicilian squadron of twenty triremes from Syracuse and two from
-Selinus, under the command of Hermokrates, reached Peloponnesus and
-joined the Lacedæmonian fleet in its expedition across the Ægean
-to Miletus. Another squadron of ten triremes from Thurii, under
-the Rhodian Dorieus, and a farther reinforcement from Tarentum,
-and Lokri, followed soon after. It was Hermokrates who chiefly
-instigated his countrymen to this effort.<a id="FNanchor_841"
-href="#Footnote_841" class="fnanchor">[841]</a> Throughout the trying
-months of the siege, he had taken a leading part in the defence
-of Syracuse, seconding the plans of Gylippus with equal valor and
-discretion. As commander of the Syracusan squadron in the main fleet
-now acting against Athens in the Ægean (events already described in
-my sixty-first chapter), his conduct was not less distinguished.
-He was energetic in action, and popular in his behavior towards
-those under his command; but what stood out most conspicuously as
-well as most honorably, was his personal incorruptibility. While
-the Peloponnesian admiral and trierarchs accepted the bribes of
-Tissaphernes, conniving at his betrayal of the common cause and
-breach of engagement towards the armament, with indifference to
-the privations of their own unpaid seamen,—Hermokrates and Dorieus
-were strenuous in remonstrance, even to the extent of drawing upon
-themselves the indignant displeasure of the Peloponnesian admiral
-Astyochus, as well as of the satrap himself.<a id="FNanchor_842"
-href="#Footnote_842" class="fnanchor">[842]</a> They were the
-more earnest in performing this duty, because the Syracusan and
-Thurian triremes were manned by freemen in larger proportion than
-the remaining fleet.<a id="FNanchor_843" href="#Footnote_843"
-class="fnanchor">[843]</a></p>
-
-<p>The sanguine expectation, however, entertained by Hermokrates
-and his companions in crossing the sea from Sicily,—that one<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_386">[p. 386]</span> single effort would
-gloriously close the war,—was far from being realized. Athens
-resisted with unexpected energy; the Lacedæmonians were so slack
-and faint-hearted, that they even let slip the golden opportunity
-presented to them by the usurpation of the Athenian Four Hundred.
-Tissaphernes was discovered to be studiously starving and protracting
-the war for purposes of his own, which Hermokrates vainly tried
-to counter-work by a personal visit and protest at Sparta.<a
-id="FNanchor_844" href="#Footnote_844" class="fnanchor">[844]</a>
-Accordingly, the war trailed on with fluctuating success, and even
-renovated efficiency on the part of Athens; so that the Syracusans at
-home, far from hearing announced the accomplishment of those splendid
-anticipations under which their squadron had departed, received
-news generally unfavorable, and at length positively disastrous.
-They were informed that their seamen were ill-paid and distressed;
-while Athens, far from striking her colors, had found means to
-assemble a fleet at Samos competent still to dispute the mastery of
-the Ægean. They heard of two successive naval defeats, which the
-Peloponnesian and Syracusan fleets sustained in the Hellespont<a
-id="FNanchor_845" href="#Footnote_845" class="fnanchor">[845]</a>
-(one at Kynossema,—411 <small>B.C.</small>,—a second between Abydos
-and Dardanus,—410 <small>B.C.</small>); and at length of a third,
-more decisive and calamitous than the preceding,—the battle of
-Kyzikus (409 <small>B.C.</small>), wherein the Lacedæmonian admiral
-Mindarus was slain, and the whole of his fleet captured or destroyed.
-In this defeat the Syracusan squadron were joint sufferers. Their
-seamen were compelled to burn all their triremes without exception,
-in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy;
-and were left destitute, without clothing or subsistence, on the
-shores of the Propontis amidst the satrapy of Pharnabazus.<a
-id="FNanchor_846" href="#Footnote_846" class="fnanchor">[846]</a>
-That satrap, with generous forwardness, took them into his pay,
-advanced to them clothing and provision for two months, and furnished
-them with timber from the woods of Mount Ida to build fresh ships. At
-Antandrus (in the Gulf of Adramyttium, one great place of export for
-Idæan timber), where the reconstruction took place, the Syracusans
-made themselves so acceptable and useful to the citizens, that a
-vote of thanks and a grant of citizenship was passed to all of them
-who chose to accept it.<a id="FNanchor_847" href="#Footnote_847"
-class="fnanchor">[847]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_387">[p. 387]</span></p>
-
-<p>In recounting this battle, I cited the brief and rude despatch,
-addressed to the Lacedæmonians by Hippokrates, surviving second
-officer of the slain Mindarus, describing the wretched condition
-of the defeated armament—“Our honor is gone. Mindarus is slain.
-The men are hungry. We know not what to do.”<a id="FNanchor_848"
-href="#Footnote_848" class="fnanchor">[848]</a> This curious
-despatch has passed into history, because it was intercepted by the
-Athenians, and never reached its destination. But without doubt the
-calamitous state of facts, which it was intended to make known, flew
-rapidly, under many different forms of words, both to Peloponnesus
-and to Syracuse. Sad as the reality was, the first impression made
-by the news would probably be yet sadder; since the intervention
-of Pharnabazus, whereby the sufferers were so much relieved, would
-hardly be felt or authenticated until after some interval. At
-Syracuse, the event on being made known excited not only powerful
-sympathy with the sufferers, but also indignant displeasure against
-Hermokrates and his colleagues; who, having instigated their
-countrymen three years before, by sanguine hopes and assurances, to
-commence a foreign expedition for the purpose of finally putting down
-Athens, had not only achieved nothing, but had sustained a series of
-reverses, ending at length in utter ruin, from the very enemy whom
-they had pronounced to be incapable of farther resistance.</p>
-
-<p>It was under such sentiment of displeasure, shortly after the
-defeat of Kyzikus, that a sentence of banishment was passed at
-Syracuse against Hermokrates and his colleagues. The sentence was
-transmitted to Asia, and made known by Hermokrates himself to the
-armament, convoked in public meeting. While lamenting and protesting
-against its alleged injustice and illegality, he entreated the
-armament to maintain unabated good behavior for the future, and to
-choose new admirals for the time, until the successors nominated
-at Syracuse should arrive. The news was heard with deep regret by
-the trierarchs, the pilots, and the maritime soldiers or marines;
-who, attached to Hermokrates from his popular manner, his constant
-openness of communication with them, and his anxiety to collect their
-opinions, loudly proclaimed that they would neither choose, nor
-serve under, any other lead<span class="pagenum" id="Page_388">[p.
-388]</span>ers.<a id="FNanchor_849" href="#Footnote_849"
-class="fnanchor">[849]</a> But the admirals repressed this
-disposition, deprecating any resistance to the decree of the city.
-They laid down their command, inviting any man dissatisfied with them
-to prefer his complaint at once publicly, and reminding the soldiers
-of the many victories and glorious conflicts, both by land and sea,
-which had knit them together by the ties of honorable fellowship.
-No man stood forward to accuse them; and they consented, on the
-continued request of the armament, to remain in command, until their
-three successors arrived—Demarchus, Myskon, and Potamis. They then
-retired amidst universal regret; many of the trierarchs even binding
-themselves by oath, that on returning to Syracuse they would procure
-their restoration. The change of commanders took place at Miletus.<a
-id="FNanchor_850" href="#Footnote_850" class="fnanchor">[850]</a></p>
-
-<p>Though Hermokrates, in his address to the soldiers, would
-doubtless find response when he invoked the remembrance of past
-victories, yet he would hardly have found the like response in a
-Syracusan assembly. For if we review the proceedings of the armament
-since he conducted it from Syracuse to join the Peloponnesian
-fleet, we shall find that on the whole his expedition had been a
-complete failure, and that his assurances of success against Athens
-had ended in nothing but disappointment. There was therefore ample
-cause for the discontent of his countrymen. But on the other hand,
-as far as our limited means of information enable us to judge, the
-sentence of banishment against him appears to have been undeserved
-and unjust. For we cannot trace the ill-success of Hermokrates to
-any misconduct or omission on his part; while in regard to personal
-incorruptibility, and strenuous resistance to the duplicity of
-Tissaphernes, he stood out as an honorable exception among a body
-of venal colleagues. That satrap, indeed, as soon as Hermokrates
-had fallen into disgrace, circulated a version of his own,
-pretending that the latter, having asked money from him and been
-refused, had sought by calumnious means to revenge such refusal.<a
-id="FNanchor_851" href="#Footnote_851" class="fnanchor">[851]</a>
-But this story, whether believed elsewhere or not, found no credit
-with the other satrap Pharnabazus; who warmly espoused the cause
-of the banished general, presenting him with a sum of money even
-unsolicited. This money<span class="pagenum" id="Page_389">[p.
-389]</span> Hermokrates immediately employed in getting together
-triremes and mercenary soldiers to accomplish his restoration
-to Syracuse by force.<a id="FNanchor_852" href="#Footnote_852"
-class="fnanchor">[852]</a> We shall presently see how he fared
-in this attempt. Meanwhile we may remark that the sentence of
-banishment, though in itself unjust, would appear amply justified in
-the eyes of his countrymen by his own subsequent resort to hostile
-measures against them.</p>
-
-<p>The party opposed to Hermokrates had now the preponderance in
-Syracuse, and by their influence probably the sentence against him
-was passed, under the grief and wrath occasioned by the defeat of
-Kyzikus. Unfortunately we have only the most scanty information as
-to the internal state of Syracuse during the period immediately
-succeeding the Athenian siege; a period of marked popular sentiment
-and peculiar interest. As at Athens under the pressure of the
-Xerxeian invasion—the energies of all the citizens, rich and poor,
-young and old, had been called forth for repulse of the common
-enemy, and had been not more than enough to achieve it. As at Athens
-after the battles of Salamis and Platæa, so at Syracuse after the
-destruction of the Athenian besiegers—the people, elate with the
-plenitude of recent effort, and conscious that the late successful
-defence had been the joint work of all, were in a state of animated
-democratical impulse, eager for the utmost extension and equality
-of political rights. Even before the Athenian siege, the government
-had been democratical; a fact, which Thucydides notices as among the
-causes of the successful defence, by rendering the citizens unanimous
-in resistance, and by preventing the besiegers from exciting
-intestine discontent.<a id="FNanchor_853" href="#Footnote_853"
-class="fnanchor">[853]</a> But in the period immediately after
-the siege, it underwent changes which are said to have rendered
-it still more democratical. On the proposition of an influential
-citizen named Dioklês, a commission of Ten was named, of which he
-was president, for the purpose of revising both the constitution and
-the legislation of the city. Some organic alterations were adopted,
-one of which was, that the lot should be adopted, instead of the
-principle of election, in the nomination of magistrates. Furthermore,
-a new code, or collection of criminal and civil enactments, was
-drawn up and sanctioned. We know nothing of its details, but we
-are told that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_390">[p. 390]</span>
-its penalties were extremely severe, its determination of offences
-minute and special, and its language often obscure as well as brief.
-It was known by the name of the Laws of Dioklês, the chief of the
-Committee who had prepared it. Though now adopted at Syracuse, it did
-not last long; for we shall find in five or six years the despotism
-of Dionysius extinguishing it, just as Peisistratus had put down
-the Solonian legislation at Athens. But it was again revived at the
-extinction of the Dionysian dynasty, after the lapse of more than
-sixty years; with comments and modifications by a committee, among
-whose members were the Corinthians Kephalus and Timoleon. It is also
-said to have been copied in various other Sicilian cities, and to
-have remained in force until the absorption of all Sicily under the
-dominion of the Romans.<a id="FNanchor_854" href="#Footnote_854"
-class="fnanchor">[854]</a></p>
-
-<p>We have the austere character of Dioklês illustrated by
-a story (of more than dubious credit,<a id="FNanchor_855"
-href="#Footnote_855" class="fnanchor">[855]</a> and of which the
-like is recounted respecting other Grecian legislators), that having
-inadvertently violated one of his own enactments, he enforced the
-duty of obedience by falling on his own sword. But unfortunately we
-are not permitted to know the substance of his laws, which would have
-thrown so much light on the sentiments and position of the Sicilian
-Greeks. Nor can we distinctly make out to what extent the political
-constitution of Syracuse was now changed. For though Diodorus tells
-us that the lot was now applied to the nomination of magistrates,
-yet he does not state whether it was applied to all magistrates,
-or under what reserves and exceptions—such, for example, as those
-adopted at Athens. Aristotle too states that the Syracusan people,
-after the Athenian siege, changed their constitution from a partial
-democracy into an entire democracy. Yet he describes Dionysius, five
-or six years afterwards, as pushing himself up to the despotism,
-by the most violent demagogic opposition; and as having accused,
-disgraced, and overthrown certain rich leaders then in possession of
-the functions of government.<a id="FNanchor_856" href="#Footnote_856"
-class="fnanchor">[856]</a> If the constitutional forms were rendered
-more democratical, it would seem that the practice cannot have
-materially changed, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_391">[p.
-391]</span> that the persons actually in leading function still
-continued to be rich men.</p>
-
-<p>The war carried on by the Syracusans against Naxos and Katana,
-after continuing more than three years,<a id="FNanchor_857"
-href="#Footnote_857" class="fnanchor">[857]</a> was brought to a
-close by an enemy from without, even more formidable than Athens.
-This time, the invader was not Hellenic, but Phœnician—the ancient
-foe of Hellas, Carthage.</p>
-
-<p>It has been already recounted, how in the same eventful year
-(480 <small>B.C.</small>) which transported Xerxes across the
-Hellespont to meet his defeat at Salamis, the Carthaginians had
-poured into Sicily a vast mercenary host under Hamilkar, for the
-purpose of reinstating in Himera the despot Terillus, who had been
-expelled by Theron of Agrigentum. On that occasion, Hamilkar had been
-slain, and his large army defeated, by the Syracusan despot Gelon,
-in the memorable battle of Himera. So deep had been the impression
-left by this defeat, that for the seventy years which intervened
-between 480-410 <small>B.C.</small>, the Carthaginians had never
-again invaded the island. They resumed their aggressions shortly
-after the destruction of the Athenian power before Syracuse; which
-same event had also stimulated the Persians, who had been kept in
-restraint while the Athenian empire remained unimpaired, again to
-act offensively for the recovery of their dominion over the Asiatic
-Greeks. The great naval power of Athens, inspiring not merely reserve
-but even alarm to Carthage,<a id="FNanchor_858" href="#Footnote_858"
-class="fnanchor">[858]</a> had been a safeguard to the Hellenic world
-both at its eastern and its western extremity. No sooner was that
-safeguard overthrown, than the hostile pressure of the foreigner
-began to be felt, as well upon Western Sicily as on the eastern coast
-of the Ægean.</p>
-
-<p>From this time forward for two centuries, down to the conclusion
-of the second Punic war, the Carthaginians will be found frequent in
-their aggressive interventions in Sicily, and upon an extensive<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_392">[p. 392]</span> scale, so as to act
-powerfully on the destinies of the Sicilian Greeks. Whether any
-internal causes had occurred to make them abstain from intervention
-during the preceding generations, we are unable to say. The history
-of this powerful and wealthy city is very little known. We make out
-a few facts, which impart a general idea both of her oligarchical
-government and of her extensive colonial possessions, but which
-leave us in the dark as to her continuous history. Her possessions
-were most extensive, along the coast of Africa both eastward and
-westward from her city; comprehending also Sardinia and the Balearic
-isles, but (at this time, probably) few settlements in Spain. She
-had quite enough to occupy her attention elsewhere, without meddling
-in Sicilian affairs; the more so, as her province in Sicily was
-rather a dependent ally than a colonial possession. In the early
-treaties made with Rome, the Carthaginians restrict and even
-interdict the traffic of the Romans both with Sardinia and Africa
-(except Carthage itself), but they grant the amplest license of
-intercourse with the Carthaginian province of Sicily; which they
-consider as standing in the same relation to Carthage as the cities
-of Latium stood in to Rome.<a id="FNanchor_859" href="#Footnote_859"
-class="fnanchor">[859]</a> While the connection of Carthage
-with Sicily was thus less close, it would appear that her other
-dependencies gave her much trouble, chiefly in consequence of her own
-harsh and extortionate dominion.</p>
-
-<p>All our positive information, scanty as it is, about Carthage
-and her institutions, relates to the fourth, third, or second
-centuries <small>B.C.</small>, yet it may be held to justify
-presumptive conclusions as to the fifth<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_393">[p. 393]</span> century <small>B.C.</small>,
-especially in reference to the general system pursued. The
-maximum of her power was attained before her first war with
-Rome, which began in 264 <small>B.C.</small>; the first and
-second Punic wars both of them greatly reduced her strength and
-dominion. Yet in spite of such reduction we learn that about 150
-<small>B.C.</small>, shortly before the third Punic war, which ended
-in the capture and depopulation of the city, not less than seven
-hundred thousand souls<a id="FNanchor_860" href="#Footnote_860"
-class="fnanchor">[860]</a> were computed in it, as occupants
-of a fortified circumference of above twenty miles, covering a
-peninsula with its isthmus. Upon this isthmus its citadel Byrsa
-was situated, surrounded by a triple wall of its own, and crowned
-at its summit by a magnificent temple of Æsculapius. The numerous
-population is the more remarkable, since Utica (a considerable
-city, colonized from Phœnicia more anciently than even Carthage
-itself, and always independent of the Carthaginians, though in
-the condition of an inferior and discontented ally), was within
-the distance of seven miles from Carthage<a id="FNanchor_861"
-href="#Footnote_861" class="fnanchor">[861]</a> on the one side,
-and Tunis seemingly not much farther off on the other. Even at that
-time, too, the Carthaginians are said to have possessed three hundred
-tributary cities in Libya.<a id="FNanchor_862" href="#Footnote_862"
-class="fnanchor">[862]</a> Yet this was but a small fraction of the
-prodigious empire which had belonged to them certainly in the fourth
-century <small>B.C.</small>, and in all probability also between
-480-410 <small>B.C.</small> That empire extended eastward as far
-as the Altars of the Philæni, near the Great Syrtis,—westward, all
-along the coast to the Pillars of Herakles and the western coast of
-Morocco. The line of coast south-east of Carthage, as far as the bay
-called the Lesser Syrtis, was proverbial (under the name of Byzacium
-and the Emporia) for its fertility. Along this extensive line were
-distributed indigenous Libyan tribes, living by agriculture; and a
-mixed population called Liby-Phœnicians, formed by intermarriage and
-coalition of some of these tribes either with colonists from Tyre
-and Sidon, or perhaps with a Canaanitish population akin in race to
-the Phœnicians, yet of still earlier settlement in the country.<a
-id="FNanchor_863" href="#Footnote_863" class="fnanchor">[863]</a>
-These Liby-Phœnicians<span class="pagenum" id="Page_394">[p.
-394]</span> dwelt in towns, seemingly of moderate size and
-unfortified, but each surrounded by a territory ample and fertile,
-yielding large produce. They were assiduous cultivators, but
-generally unwarlike, which latter quality was ascribed by ancient
-theory to the extreme richness of their soil.<a id="FNanchor_864"
-href="#Footnote_864" class="fnanchor">[864]</a> Of the Liby-Phœnician
-towns the number is not known to us, but it must have been
-prodigiously great, since we are told that both Agathokles and
-Regulus in their respective invasions captured no less than two
-hundred. A single district, called Tuska, is also spoken of as
-having fifty towns.<a id="FNanchor_865" href="#Footnote_865"
-class="fnanchor">[865]</a></p>
-
-<p>A few of the towns along the coast,—Hippo, Utica, Adrumetum,
-Thapsus, Leptis, etc.,—were colonies from Tyre, like Carthage
-herself. With respect to Carthage, therefore, they stood upon a
-different footing from the Liby-Phœnician towns, either maritime
-or in the interior. Yet the Carthaginians contrived in time to
-render every town tributary, with the exception of Utica. They thus
-derived revenue from all the inhabitants of this fertile region,
-Tyrian, Liby-Phœnician, and indigenous Libyan; and the amount
-which they imposed appears to have been exorbitant. At one time,
-immediately after the first Punic war, they took from the rural
-cultivators as much as one-half of their produce,<a id="FNanchor_866"
-href="#Footnote_866" class="fnanchor">[866]</a> and doubled at one
-stroke the tribute levied upon the towns. The town and district of
-Leptis paid to them a tribute of one talent per day, or three hundred
-and sixty-five talents annually. Such exactions were not collected
-without extreme harshness of enforcement,<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_395">[p. 395]</span> sometimes stripping the tax-payer of
-all that he possessed, and even tearing him from his family to be
-sold in person for a slave.<a id="FNanchor_867" href="#Footnote_867"
-class="fnanchor">[867]</a> Accordingly the general sentiment among
-the dependencies towards Carthage was one of mingled fear and hatred,
-which rendered them eager to revolt on the landing of any foreign
-invader. In some cases the Carthaginians seem to have guarded against
-such contingencies by paid garrisons; but they also provided a
-species of garrison from among their own citizens; by sending out
-from Carthage poor men, and assigning to them lots of land with the
-cultivators attached. This provision for poor citizens as emigrants
-(mainly analogous to the Roman colonies), was a standing feature in
-the Carthaginian political system, serving the double purpose of
-obviating discontent among their own town population at home, and of
-keeping watch over their dependencies abroad.<a id="FNanchor_868"
-href="#Footnote_868" class="fnanchor">[868]</a></p>
-
-<p>In the fifth century <small>B.C.</small>, the Carthaginians had
-no apprehension of any foreign enemy invading them from seaward;
-an enterprise first attempted in 316 <small>B.C.</small>, to the
-surprise of every one, by the boldness of the Syracusan Agathokles.
-Nor were their enemies on the land side formidable as conquerors,
-though they were extremely annoying as plunderers. The Numidians and
-other native tribes, half-naked and predatory horsemen, distinguished
-for speed as well as for indefatigable activity, so harassed the
-individ<span class="pagenum" id="Page_396">[p. 396]</span>ual
-cultivators of the soil, that the Carthaginians dug a long line of
-ditch to keep them off.<a id="FNanchor_869" href="#Footnote_869"
-class="fnanchor">[869]</a> But these barbarians did not acquire
-sufficient organization to act for permanent objects, until the
-reign of Masinissa and the second Punic war with Rome. During
-the fifth and fourth centuries <small>B.C.</small>, therefore
-(prior to the invasion of Agathokles), the warfare carried on by
-the Carthaginians was constantly aggressive and in foreign parts.
-For these purposes they chiefly employed foreign mercenaries,
-hired for the occasion from Italy, Gaul, Spain, and the islands
-of the Western Mediterranean, together with conscripts from their
-Libyan dependencies. The native Carthaginians,<a id="FNanchor_870"
-href="#Footnote_870" class="fnanchor">[870]</a> though encouraged by
-honorary marks to undertake this military service, were generally
-averse to it, and sparingly employed. But these citizens, though
-not often sent on foreign service, constituted a most formidable
-force when called upon. No less then forty thousand hoplites went
-forth from the gates of Carthage to resist Agathokles, together
-with one thousand cavalry, and two thousand war-chariots.<a
-id="FNanchor_871" href="#Footnote_871" class="fnanchor">[871]</a>
-An immense public magazine,—of arms, muniments of war of all kinds,
-and provisions,—appears to have been kept in the walls of Byrsa,
-the citadel of Carthage.<a id="FNanchor_872" href="#Footnote_872"
-class="fnanchor">[872]</a> A chosen division of two thousand five
-hundred citi<span class="pagenum" id="Page_397">[p. 397]</span>zens,
-men of wealth and family, formed what was called the Sacred
-Band of Carthage,<a id="FNanchor_873" href="#Footnote_873"
-class="fnanchor">[873]</a> distinguished for their bravery in the
-field as well as for the splendor of their arms, and the gold and
-silver plate which formed part of their baggage. We shall find these
-citizen-troops occasionally employed on service in Sicily: but most
-part of the Carthaginian armies consists of Gauls, Iberians, Libyans,
-etc., a mingled host got together for the occasion, discordant in
-language as well as in customs. Such men had never any attachment
-to the cause in which they fought,—seldom, to the commanders under
-whom they served; while they were often treated by Carthage with bad
-faith, and recklessly abandoned to destruction.<a id="FNanchor_874"
-href="#Footnote_874" class="fnanchor">[874]</a> A military system
-such as this was pregnant with danger, if ever the mercenary soldiers
-got footing in Africa; as happened after the first Punic war, when
-the city was brought to the brink of ruin. But on foreign service in
-Sicily, these mercenaries often enabled Carthage to make conquest at
-the cost only of her money, without any waste of the blood of her own
-citizens. The Carthaginian generals seem generally to have relied,
-like Persians, upon numbers,—manifesting little or no military skill;
-until we come to the Punic wars with Rome, conducted under Hamilkar
-Barca and his illustrious son Hannibal.</p>
-
-<p>Respecting the political constitution of Carthage, the facts known
-are too few, and too indistinct, to enable us to comprehend its real
-working. The magistrates most conspicuous in rank and precedence
-were, the two kings or suffetes, who presided over the Senate.<a
-id="FNanchor_875" href="#Footnote_875" class="fnanchor">[875]</a>
-They seem to have been renewed annually, though how far the same
-persons were reëligible, or actually rechosen, we do not<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_398">[p. 398]</span> know, but they were
-always selected out of some few principal families or Gentes. There
-is reason for believing that the genuine Carthaginian citizens were
-distributed into three tribes, thirty curiæ, and three hundred
-gentes—something in the manner of the Roman patricians. From these
-gentes emanated a Senate of three hundred, out of which again
-was formed a smaller council or committee of thirty <i>principes</i>
-representing the curiæ;<a id="FNanchor_876" href="#Footnote_876"
-class="fnanchor">[876]</a> sometimes a still smaller, of only ten
-<i>principes</i>. These little councils are both frequently mentioned
-in the political proceedings of Carthage; and perhaps the Thirty
-may coincide with what Polybius calls the Gerusia, or Council of
-Ancients,—the Three Hundred, with that which he calls the Senate.<a
-id="FNanchor_877" href="#Footnote_877" class="fnanchor">[877]</a>
-Aristotle assimilates the two kings (suffetes) of Carthage to the two
-kings of Sparta—and the Gerusia of Carthage also to that of Sparta;<a
-id="FNanchor_878" href="#Footnote_878" class="fnanchor">[878]</a>
-which latter consisted of thirty members, including the kings
-who sat in it. But Aristotle does not allude to any assembly at
-Carthage analogous to what Polybius calls the Senate. He mentions
-two Councils, one of one hundred members, the other of one hundred
-and four; and certain Boards of Five,—the pentarchies. He compares
-the Council of one hundred and four to the Spartan ephors; yet again
-he talks of the pentarchies as invested with extensive functions,
-and terms the Council of one hundred the greatest authority in the
-state. Perhaps this last Council was identical with the assembly
-of one hundred Judges (said to have been chosen from the Senate
-as a check upon the generals employed), or Ordo Judicum; of which
-Livy speaks after the second Punic war, as existing with its
-members perpetual and so powerful that it overruled all the other
-assemblies and magistracies of the state. Through the influence
-of Hannibal, a law was passed to lessen the overweening power of
-this Order of Judges; causing them to be elected only for one year,
-instead of being perpetual.<a id="FNanchor_879" href="#Footnote_879"
-class="fnanchor">[879]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_399">[p. 399]</span></p>
-
-<p>These statements, though coming from valuable authors, convey so
-little information and are withal so difficult to reconcile, that
-both the structure and working of the political machine at Carthage
-may be said to be unknown.<a id="FNanchor_880" href="#Footnote_880"
-class="fnanchor">[880]</a> But it seems clear that the general spirit
-of the government was highly oligarchical; that a few rich, old, and
-powerful families, divided among themselves the great offices and
-influence of the state; that they maintained themselves in pointed
-and even insolent distinction from the multitude;<a id="FNanchor_881"
-href="#Footnote_881" class="fnanchor">[881]</a> that they stood
-opposed to each other in bitter feuds, often stained by gross
-perfidy and bloodshed; and that the treatment with which, through
-these violent party-antipathies, unsuccessful generals were visited,
-was cruel in the extreme.<a id="FNanchor_882" href="#Footnote_882"
-class="fnanchor">[882]</a> It appears that wealth was one
-indispensable qualification, and that magistrates and generals
-procured their appointments in a great measure by corrupt means. Of
-such corruption, one variety was, the habit of constantly regaling
-the citizens in collective banquets of the <i>curiæ</i> or the political
-associations; a habit so continual, and embracing so wide a circle of
-citizens, that Aristotle compares these banquets to the <i>phiditia</i>
-or public mess of Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_883" href="#Footnote_883"
-class="fnanchor">[883]</a> There was a demos or people at Carthage,
-who were consulted on particular occasions, and before whom
-propositions were publicly debated, in cases where the suffetes and
-the small Council were not all of one mind.<a id="FNanchor_884"
-href="#Footnote_884" class="fnanchor">[884]</a> How numerous<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_400">[p. 400]</span> this demos was, or what
-proportion of the whole population it comprised, we have no means of
-knowing. But it is plain, that whether more or less considerable,
-its multitude was kept under dependence to the rich families
-by stratagems such as the banquets, the lucrative appointments
-with lots of land in foreign dependencies, etc. The purposes of
-government were determined, its powers wielded and the great offices
-held—suffetes, senators, generals, or judges,—by the members of a
-small number of wealthy families; and the chief opposition which
-they encountered, was from their feuds against each other. In the
-main, the government was conducted with skill and steadiness, as well
-for internal tranquillity as for systematic foreign and commercial
-aggrandizement. Within the knowledge of Aristotle, Carthage had
-never suffered either the successful usurpation of a despot, or any
-violent intestine commotion.<a id="FNanchor_885" href="#Footnote_885"
-class="fnanchor">[885]</a></p>
-
-<p>The first eminent Carthaginian leader brought to our notice, is
-Mago (seemingly about 530-500 <small>B.C.</small>), who is said
-to have mainly contributed to organize the forces, and extend the
-dominion, of Carthage. Of his two sons, one, Hasdrubal, perished
-after a victorious career in Sardinia;<a id="FNanchor_886"
-href="#Footnote_886" class="fnanchor">[886]</a> the other, Hamilkar,
-commanding at the battle of Himera in Sicily, was there defeated
-and slain by Gelon, as has been already recounted. After the death
-of Hamilkar, his son Giskon was condemned to perpetual exile,
-and passed his life in Sicily at the Greek city of Selinus.<a
-id="FNanchor_887" href="#Footnote_887" class="fnanchor">[887]</a>
-But the sons of Hasdrubal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_401">[p.
-401]</span> still remained at Carthage, the most powerful citizens
-in the state; carrying on hostilities against the Moors and other
-indigenous Africans, whom they compelled to relinquish the tribute
-which Carthage had paid, down to that time, for the ground whereon
-the city was situated. This family are said indeed to have been so
-powerful, that a check upon their ascendency was supposed to be
-necessary; and for that purpose the select One Hundred Senators
-sitting as judges were now nominated for the first time.<a
-id="FNanchor_888" href="#Footnote_888" class="fnanchor">[888]</a>
-Such wars in Africa doubtless tended to prevent the Carthaginians
-from farther interference in Sicily, during the interval between
-480-410 <small>B.C.</small> There were probably other causes also,
-not known to us,—and down to the year 413 <small>B.C.</small>, the
-formidable naval power of Athens (as has been already remarked) kept
-them on the watch even for themselves. But now, after the great
-Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, apprehensions from that quarter
-were dissipated; so that Carthage again found leisure, as well as
-inclination, to seek in Sicily both aggrandizement and revenge.</p>
-
-<p>It is remarkable that the same persons, acting in the same
-quarrel, who furnished the pretext or the motive for the recent
-invasion by Athens, now served in the like capacity as prompters
-to Carthage. The inhabitants of Egesta, engaged in an unequal war
-with rival neighbors at Selinus, were in both cases the soliciting
-parties. They had applied to Carthage first, without success,<a
-id="FNanchor_889" href="#Footnote_889" class="fnanchor">[889]</a>
-before they thought of sending to invoke aid from Athens. This war
-indeed had been for the time merged and forgotten in the larger
-Athenian enterprise against Syracuse; but it revived after that
-catastrophe, wherein Athens and her armament were shipwrecked. The
-Egestæans had not only lost their protectors, but had incurred
-aggravated hostility from their neighbors, for having brought upon
-Sicily so formidable an ultramarine enemy. Their original quarrel
-with Selinus had related to a disputed portion of border territory.
-This point they no longer felt competent to maintain, under<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_402">[p. 402]</span> their present
-disadvantageous circumstances. But the Selinuntines, confident
-as well as angry, were now not satisfied with success in their
-original claim. They proceeded to strip the Egestæans of other lands
-indisputably belonging to them, and seriously menaced the integrity
-as well as the independence of the city. To no other quarter could
-the Egestæans turn, with any chance of finding both will and
-power to protect them, except to Carthage.<a id="FNanchor_890"
-href="#Footnote_890" class="fnanchor">[890]</a></p>
-
-<p>The town of Egesta (non-Hellenic or at least only semi-Hellenic)
-was situated on or near the northern line of Sicilian coast, not
-far from the western cape of the island, and in the immediate
-neighborhood of the Carthaginian settlements,—Motyê, Panormus (now
-Palermo), and Soloeis or Soluntum. Selinus also was near the western
-cape, but on the southern coast of Sicily, with its territory
-conterminous to the southern portion of Egesta. When therefore the
-Egestæan envoys presented their urgent supplications at Carthage
-for aid, proclaiming that unless assisted they must be subjugated
-and become a dependency of Selinus,—the Carthaginians would not
-unreasonably conceive, that their own Sicilian settlements would be
-endangered, if their closest Hellenic neighbor were allowed thus
-to aggrandize herself. Accordingly they agreed to grant the aid
-solicited; yet not without much debate and hesitation. They were
-uneasy at the idea of resuming military operations in Sicily,—which
-had been laid aside for seventy years, and had moreover left such
-disastrous recollections<a id="FNanchor_891" href="#Footnote_891"
-class="fnanchor">[891]</a>—at a moment when Syracusan courage
-stood in high renown, from the recent destruction of the Athenian
-armament. But the recollections of the Gelonian victory at Himera,
-while they suggested apprehension, also kindled the appetite of
-revenge; especially in the bosom of Hannibal, the grandson of
-that general Hamilkar who had there met his death. Hannibal was
-at this moment king, or rather first of the two suffetes, chief
-executive magistrates of Carthage, as his grandfather had been
-seventy years before. So violent had been the impression made upon
-the Carthaginians by the defeat of Himera, that they had banished
-Giskon, son of the slain general Hamilkar and father of Hannibal,
-and had condemned him to pass his whole life in exile. He had chosen
-the Greek city of Selinus; where probably Hannibal also had spent
-his youth, though restored<span class="pagenum" id="Page_403">[p.
-403]</span> since to his country and to his family consequence,—and
-from whence he brought back an intense antipathy to the Greek name,
-as well as an impatience to wipe off by a signal revenge the dishonor
-both of his country and of his family. Accordingly, espousing with
-warmth the request of the Egestæans, he obtained from the Senate
-authority to take effective measures for their protection.<a
-id="FNanchor_892" href="#Footnote_892" class="fnanchor">[892]</a></p>
-
-<p>His first proceeding was to send envoys to Egesta and Selinus,
-to remonstrate against the encroachments of the Selinuntines; with
-farther instructions, in case remonstrance proved ineffectual, to
-proceed with the Egestæans to Syracuse, and there submit the whole
-dispute to the arbitration of the Syracusans. He foresaw that the
-Selinuntines, having superiority of force on their side, would refuse
-to acknowledge any arbitration; and that the Syracusans, respectfully
-invoked by one party but rejected by the other, would stand aside
-from the quarrel altogether. It turned out as he had expected.
-The Selinuntines sent envoys to Syracuse, to protest against the
-representations from Egesta and Carthage; but declined to refer
-their case to arbitration. Accordingly, the Syracusans passed a vote
-that they would maintain their alliance with Selinus, yet without
-impeachment of their pacific relations with Carthage: thus leaving
-the latter free to act without obstruction. Hannibal immediately
-sent over a body of troops to the aid of Egesta: five<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_404">[p. 404]</span> thousand Libyans or
-Africans; and eight hundred Campanian mercenaries, who had been
-formerly in the pay and service of the Athenians before Syracuse,
-but had quitted that camp before the final catastrophe occurred.<a
-id="FNanchor_893" href="#Footnote_893" class="fnanchor">[893]</a></p>
-
-<p>In spite of the reinforcement and the imposing countenance
-of Carthage, the Selinuntines, at this time in full power and
-prosperity, still believed themselves strong enough to subdue Egesta.
-Under such persuasion, they invaded the territory with their full
-force. They began to ravage the country, yet at first with order
-and precaution; but presently, finding no enemy in the field to
-oppose them, they became careless, and spread themselves about for
-disorderly plunder. This was the moment for which the Egestæans
-and Carthaginians were watching. They attacked the Selinuntines
-by surprise, defeated them with the loss of a thousand men, and
-recaptured the whole booty.<a id="FNanchor_894" href="#Footnote_894"
-class="fnanchor">[894]</a></p>
-
-<p>The war, as hitherto carried on, was one offensive on the part of
-the Selinuntines, for the purpose of punishing or despoiling their
-ancient enemy Egesta. Only so far as was necessary for the defence of
-the latter, had the Carthaginians yet interfered. But against such an
-interference the Selinuntines, if they had taken a prudent measure of
-their own force, would have seen that they were not likely to achieve
-any conquest. Moreover, they might perhaps have obtained peace now,
-had they sought it; as a considerable minority among them, headed by
-a citizen named Empedion,<a id="FNanchor_895" href="#Footnote_895"
-class="fnanchor">[895]</a> urgently recommended: for Selinus appears
-always to have been on more friendly terms with Carthage than any
-other Grecian city in Sicily. Even at the great battle of Himera, the
-Selinuntine troops had not only not assisted Gelon, but had actually
-fought in the Carthaginian army under Hamilkar;<a id="FNanchor_896"
-href="#Footnote_896" class="fnanchor">[896]</a> a plea, which, had
-it been pressed, might probably have had weight with Hannibal.
-But this claim upon the goodwill of Carthage appears only to have
-rendered them more confident and passionate in braving her force
-and in prosecuting the war. They sent to Syracuse to ask for aid,
-which the Syracusans, under present circumstances, promised to send
-them. But the promise was given with little cordiality, as appears
-by the manner in which they fulfilled it, as well as from<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_405">[p. 405]</span> the neutrality which
-they had professed so recently before; for the contest seemed to
-be aggressive on the part of Selinus, so that Syracuse had little
-interest in helping her to conquer Egesta. Neither Syracusans
-nor Selinuntines were prepared for the immense preparations, and
-energetic rapidity of movement by which Hannibal at once altered the
-character, and enlarged the purposes, of the war. He employed all the
-ensuing autumn and winter in collecting a numerous host of mercenary
-troops from Africa, Spain, and Campania, with various Greeks who were
-willing to take service.<a id="FNanchor_897" href="#Footnote_897"
-class="fnanchor">[897]</a></p>
-
-<p>In the spring of the memorable year 409 <small>B.C.</small>,
-through the exuberant wealth of Carthage, he was in a condition
-to leave Africa with a great fleet of sixty triremes, and fifteen
-hundred transports or vessels of burthen;<a id="FNanchor_898"
-href="#Footnote_898" class="fnanchor">[898]</a> conveying an army,
-which, according to the comparatively low estimate of Timæus,
-amounted to more than one hundred thousand men; while Ephorus
-extended the number to two hundred thousand infantry, and four
-thousand cavalry, together with muniments of war and battering
-machines for siege. With these he steered directly for the western
-Cape of Sicily, Lilybæum; taking care, however, to land his troops
-and to keep his fleet on the northern side of that cape, in the bay
-near Motyê,—and not to approach the southern shore, lest he should
-alarm the Syracusans with the idea that he was about to prosecute
-his voyage farther eastward along the southern coast towards their
-city. By this precaution, he took the best means for prolonging the
-period of Syracusan inaction. The Selinuntines, panic-struck at the
-advent of an enemy so much more overwhelming than they had expected,
-sent pressing messengers to Syracuse to accelerate the promised help.
-They had made no provision for standing on the defensive against a
-really formidable aggressor. Their walls, though strong enough to
-hold out against Sicilian neighbors, had been neglected during the
-long-continued absence of any foreign besieger, and were now in many
-places out of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_406">[p. 406]</span>
-repair. Hannibal left them no time to make good past deficiencies.
-Instead of wasting his powerful armament (as the unfortunate Nikias
-had done five years before) by months of empty flourish and real
-inaction, he waited only until he was joined by the troops from
-Egesta and the neighboring Carthaginian dependencies, and then
-marched his whole force straight from Lilybæum to Selinus. Crossing
-the river Mazara in his way, and storming the fort which lay near
-its mouth, he soon found himself under the Selinuntine walls. He
-distributed his army into two parts, each provided with battering
-machines and movable wooden towers; and then assailed the walls
-on many points at once, choosing the points where they were most
-accessible or most dilapidated. Archers and slingers in great numbers
-were posted near the walls, to keep up a discharge of missiles and
-chase away the defenders from the battlements. Under cover of such
-discharge, six wooden towers were rolled up to the foot of the
-wall, to which they were equal or nearly equal in height, so that
-the armed men in their interior were prepared to contend with the
-defenders almost on a level. Against other portions of the wall,
-battering-rams with iron heads were driven by the combined strength
-of multitudes, shaking or breaking through its substance, especially
-where it showed symptoms of neglect or decay. Such were the methods
-of attack which Hannibal now brought to bear upon the unprepared
-Selinuntines. He was eager to forestal the arrival of auxiliaries,
-by the impetuous movements of his innumerable barbaric host, the
-largest seen in Sicily since his grandfather Hamilkar had been
-defeated before Himera. Collected from all the shores of the western
-Mediterranean, it presented soldiers heterogeneous in race, in arms,
-in language,—in everything, except bravery and common appetite for
-blood as well as plunder.<a id="FNanchor_899" href="#Footnote_899"
-class="fnanchor">[899]</a></p>
-
-<p>The dismay of the Selinuntines, when they suddenly found
-themselves under the sweep of this destroying hurricane, is not to
-be described. It was no part of the scheme of Hannibal to impose
-conditions or grant capitulation; for he had promised the plunder of
-their town to his soldiers. The only chance of the besieged was, to
-hold out with the courage of desperation, until they could receive
-aid from their Hellenic brethren on the south<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_407">[p. 407]</span>ern coast,—Agrigentum, Gela, and
-especially Syracuse,—all of whom they had sent to warn and to
-supplicate. Their armed population crowded to man the walls, with a
-resolution worthy of Greeks and citizens; while the old men and the
-females, though oppressed with agony from the fate which seemed to
-menace them, lent all the aid and encouragement in their power. Under
-the sound of trumpets, and every variety of war-cry, the assailants
-approached the walls, encountering everywhere a valiant resistance.
-They were repulsed again and again, with the severest loss. But fresh
-troops came up to relieve those who were slain or fatigued; and at
-length, after a murderous struggle, a body of Campanians forced their
-way over the walls into the town. Yet in spite of such temporary
-advantage, the heroic efforts of the besieged drove them out again
-or slew them, so that night arrived without the capture being
-accomplished. For nine successive days was the assault thus renewed
-with undiminished fury; for nine successive days did this heroic
-population maintain a successful resistance, though their enemies
-were numerous enough to relieve each other perpetually,—though
-their own strength was every day failing,—and though not a single
-friend arrived to their aid. At length, on the tenth day, and after
-terrible loss to the besiegers, a sufficient breach was made in the
-weak part of the wall, for the Iberians to force their way into the
-city. Still however the Selinuntines, even after their walls were
-carried, continued with unabated resolution to barricade and defend
-their narrow streets, in which their women also assisted, by throwing
-down stones and tiles upon the assailants from the house-tops. All
-these barriers were successively overthrown, by the unexhausted
-numbers, and increasing passion, of the barbaric host; so that the
-defenders were driven back from all sides into the agora, where most
-of them closed their gallant defence by an honorable death. A small
-minority, among whom was Empedion, escaped to Agrigentum, where they
-received the warmest sympathy and the most hospitable treatment.<a
-id="FNanchor_900" href="#Footnote_900" class="fnanchor">[900]</a></p>
-
-<p>Resistance being thus at an end, the assailants spread themselves
-through the town in all the fury of insatiate appetites,—murderous,
-lustful, and rapacious. They slaughtered indiscrimi<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_408">[p. 408]</span>nately elders and
-children, preserving only the grown women as captives. The sad
-details of a town taken by storm are to a great degree the same
-in every age and nation; but the destroying barbarians at Selinus
-manifested one peculiarity, which marks them as lying without the
-pale of Hellenic sympathy and sentiment. They mutilated the bodies
-of the slain; some were seen with amputated hands strung together
-in a row and fastened round their girdles; while others brandished
-heads on the points of their spears and javelins.<a id="FNanchor_901"
-href="#Footnote_901" class="fnanchor">[901]</a> The Greeks (seemingly
-not numerous) who served under Hannibal, far from sharing in these
-ferocious manifestations, contributed somewhat to mitigate the
-deplorable fate of the sufferers. Sixteen thousand Selinuntines
-are said to have been slain, five thousand to have been taken
-captive; while two thousand six hundred escaped to Agrigentum.<a
-id="FNanchor_902" href="#Footnote_902" class="fnanchor">[902]</a>
-These figures are probably under, rather than above, the truth. Yet
-they do not seem entitled to any confidence; nor do they give us any
-account of the entire population in its different categories,—old and
-young,—men and women,—freemen and slaves,—citizens and metics. We
-can only pretend to appreciate this mournful event in the gross. All
-exact knowledge of its details is denied to us.</p>
-
-<p>It does little honor either to the generosity or to the prudence
-of the Hellenic neighbors of Selinus, that this unfortunate city
-should have been left to its fate unassisted. In vain was messenger
-after messenger despatched, as the defence became more and more
-critical, to Agrigentum, Gela, and Syracuse. The military force
-of the two former was indeed made ready, but postponed its march
-until joined by that of the last; so formidable was the account
-given of the invading host. Meanwhile the Syracusans were not
-ready. They thought it requisite, first, to close the war which
-they were prosecuting against Katana and Naxos,—next, to muster a
-large and carefully-appointed force. Before these preliminaries
-were finished, the nine days of siege were past, and the death-hour
-of Selinus had sounded. Probably the Syracusans were misled by the
-Sicilian operations of Nikias, who, beginning with a long interval
-of inaction, had then approached their town by slow blockade, such
-as the circumstances of his case required. Expecting in the case
-of Selinus that Hannibal would enter upon<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_409">[p. 409]</span> the like elaborate siege,—and not
-reflecting that he was at the head of a vast host of miscellaneous
-foreigners hired for the occasion, of whose lives he could afford
-to be prodigal, while Nikias commanded citizens of Athens and other
-Grecian states, whom he could not expose to the murderous but
-thorough-going process of ever-renewed assault against strong walls
-recently erected,—they were thunderstruck on being informed that nine
-days of carnage had sufficed for the capture. The Syracusan soldiers,
-a select body of three thousand, who at length joined the Geloans
-and Agrigentines at Agrigentum, only arrived in time to partake in
-the general dismay everywhere diffused. A joint embassy was sent by
-three cities to Hannibal, entreating him to permit the ransom of the
-captives, and to spare the temples of the gods; while Empedion went
-at the same time to sue for compassion on behalf of his own fugitive
-fellow-citizens. To the former demand the victorious Carthaginian
-returned an answer at once haughty and characteristic,—“The
-Selinuntines have not been able to preserve their freedom, and must
-now submit to a trial of slavery. The gods have become offended
-with them, and have taken their departure from the town.”<a
-id="FNanchor_903" href="#Footnote_903" class="fnanchor">[903]</a>
-To Empedion, an ancient friend and pronounced partisan of the
-Carthaginians, his reply was more indulgent. All the relatives of
-Empedion, found alive among the captives, were at once given up;
-moreover permission was granted to the fugitive Selinuntines to
-return, if they pleased, and reoccupy the town with its lands, as
-tributary subjects of Carthage. At the same time that he granted
-such permission, however, Hannibal at once caused the walls to
-be razed, and even the town with its temples to be destroyed.<a
-id="FNanchor_904" href="#Footnote_904" class="fnanchor">[904]</a>
-What was done about the proposed ransom, we do not hear.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_410">[p. 410]</span></p>
-
-<p>Having satiated his troops with this rich plunder Hannibal now
-quitted the scene of bloodshed and desolation, and marched across
-the island to Himera on its northern coast. Though Selinus, as the
-enemy of Egesta, had received the first shock of his arms, yet it was
-against Himera that the grand purpose of his soul was directed. Here
-it was that Hamilkar had lost both his army and his life, entailing
-inexpiable disgrace upon the whole life of his son Giskon: here it
-was that his grandson intended to exact full vengeance and requital
-from the grandchildren of those who then occupied the fated spot.
-Not only was the Carthaginian army elate with the past success,
-but a number of fresh Sikels and Sikans, eager to share in plunder
-as well as to gratify the antipathies of their races against the
-Grecian intruders, flocked to join it; thus making up the losses
-sustained in the recent assault. Having reached Himera, and disposed
-his army in appropriate positions around, Hannibal proceeded to
-instant attack, as at Selinus; pushing up his battering machines and
-towers against the vulnerable portions of the walls, and trying at
-the same time to undermine them. The Himeræans defended themselves
-with desperate bravery; and on this occasion the defence was not
-unassisted; for four thousand allies, chiefly Syracusans, and headed
-by the Syracusan Dioklês, had come to the city as a reinforcement.
-For a whole day they repelled with slaughter repeated assaults.
-No impression being made upon the city, the besieged became so
-confident in their own valor, that they resolved not to copy the
-Selinuntines in confining themselves to defence, but to sally out
-at daybreak the next morning and attack the besiegers in the field.
-Ten thousand gallant men,—Himeræans, Syracusans, and other Grecian
-allies,—accordingly marched out with the dawn; while the battlements
-were lined with old men and women as anxious spectators of their
-exploits. The Carthaginians near the walls, who, preparing to renew
-the assault, looked for nothing less than for a sally, were taken
-by surprise. In spite of their great superiority of number, and in
-spite of great personal bravery, they fell into confusion, and were
-incapable of long resisting the gallant and orderly charge of the
-Greeks. At length they gave way and fled towards the neighboring
-hill, where Hannibal himself with his body of reserve was posted to
-cover the operations of assault. The Greeks pursued them fiercely and
-slaughtered great numbers (six thousand according to Timæus,<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_411">[p. 411]</span> but not less than
-twenty thousand, if we are to accept the broad statement of Ephorus),
-exhorting each other not to think of making prisoners. But in the
-haste and exultation of pursuit, they became out of breath, and their
-ranks fell into disorder. In this untoward condition, they found
-themselves face to face with the fresh body of reserve brought up by
-Hannibal, who marched down the hill to receive and succor his own
-defeated fugitives. The fortune of the battle was now so completely
-turned, that the Himeræans, after bravely contending for some time
-against these new enemies, found themselves overpowered and driven
-back to their own gates. Three thousand of their bravest warriors,
-however, despairing of their city and mindful of the fate of Selinus,
-disdained to turn their backs, and perished to a man in obstinate
-conflict with the overwhelming numbers of the Carthaginians.<a
-id="FNanchor_905" href="#Footnote_905" class="fnanchor">[905]</a></p>
-
-<p>Violent was the sorrow and dismay in Himera, when the flower of
-her troops were thus driven in as beaten men, with the loss of half
-their numbers. At this moment there chanced to arrive at the port
-a fleet of twenty-five triremes, belonging to Syracuse and other
-Grecian cities in Sicily; which triremes had been sent to aid the
-Peloponnesians in the Ægean, but had since come back, and were now
-got together for the special purpose of relieving the besieged city.
-So important a reinforcement ought to have revived the spirit of
-the Himeræans. It announced that the Syracusans were in full march
-across the island, with the main force of the city, to the relief
-of Himera. But this good news was more than countervailed by the
-statement, that Hannibal was ordering out the Carthaginian fleet in
-the bay of Motyê, in order that it might sail round cape Lilybæum and
-along the southern coast into the harbor of Syracuse, now defenceless
-through the absence of its main force. Apparently the Syracusan
-fleet, in sailing from Syracuse to Himera, had passed by the bay of
-Motyê, observed maritime movement among the Carthaginians there, and
-picked up these tidings in explanation. Here was intelligence more
-than sufficient to excite alarm for home, in the bosom of Dioklês
-and the Syracusans at Himera; especially under the despondency now
-reigning. Dioklês not only enjoined the captains of the fleet to
-sail back immediately to Syracuse, in order to guard against the
-apprehended<span class="pagenum" id="Page_412">[p. 412]</span>
-surprise, but also insisted upon marching back thither himself by
-land with the Syracusan forces, and abandoning the farther defence
-of Himera. He would in his march home meet his fellow-citizens on
-their march outward, and conduct them back along with him. To the
-Himeræans, this was a sentence of death, or worse than death. It
-plunged them into an agony of fright and despair. But there was
-no safer counsel to suggest, nor could they prevail upon Dioklês
-to grant anything more than means of transport for carrying off
-the Himeræan population, when the city was relinquished to the
-besiegers. It was agreed that the fleet, instead of sailing straight
-to Syracuse, should employ itself in carrying off as much of the
-population as could be put on board, and in depositing them safely
-at Messênê; after which it would return to fetch the remainder, who
-would in the mean time defend the city with their utmost force.</p>
-
-<p>Such was the frail chance of refuge now alone open to these
-unhappy Greeks, against the devouring enemy without. Immediately the
-feebler part of the population,—elders, women, and children,—crowding
-on board until the triremes could hold no more, sailed away along the
-northern coast to Messênê. On the same night, Dioklês also marched
-out of the city with his Syracusan soldiers; in such haste to get
-home, that he could not even tarry to bury the numerous Syracusan
-soldiers who had been just slain in the recent disastrous sally.
-Many of the Himeræans, with their wives and children, took their
-departure along with Dioklês, as their only chance of escape; since
-it was but too plain that the triremes could not carry away all.
-The bravest and most devoted portion of the Himeræan warriors still
-remained, to defend their city until the triremes came back. After
-keeping armed watch on the walls all night, they were again assailed
-on the next morning by the Carthaginians, elate with their triumph
-of the preceding day and with the flight of so many defenders. Yet
-notwithstanding all the pressure of numbers, ferocity, and battering
-machines, the resistance was still successfully maintained; so
-that night found Himera still a Grecian city. On the next day, the
-triremes came back, having probably deposited their unfortunate cargo
-in some place of safety not so far off as Messênê. If the defenders
-could have maintained their walls until another sunset, many of them
-might yet have escaped. But the good fortune, and probably the<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_413">[p. 413]</span> physical force, of
-these brave men, was now at an end. The gods were quitting Himera,
-as they had before quitted Selinus. At the moment when the triremes
-were seen coming near to the port, the Iberian assailants broke down
-a wide space of the fortification with their battering-rams, poured
-in through the breach, and overcame all opposition. Encouraged by
-their shouts, the barbaric host now on all sides forced the walls,
-and spread themselves over the city, which became one scene of
-wholesale slaughter and plunder. It was no part of the scheme of
-Hannibal to interrupt the plunder, which he made over as a recompense
-to his soldiers. But he speedily checked the slaughter, being
-anxious to take as many prisoners as possible, and increasing the
-number by dragging away all who had taken sanctuary in the temples.
-A few among this wretched population may have contrived to reach
-the approaching triremes; all the rest either perished or fell into
-the hands of the victor.<a id="FNanchor_906" href="#Footnote_906"
-class="fnanchor">[906]</a></p>
-
-<p>It was a proud day for the Carthaginian general when he stood
-as master on the ground of Himera; enabled to fulfil the duty,
-and satisfy the exigencies, of revenge for his slain grandfather.
-Tragical indeed was the consummation of this long-cherished purpose.
-Not merely the walls and temples (as at Selinus), but all the
-houses in Himera, were razed to the ground. Its temples, having
-been first stripped of their ornaments and valuables, were burnt.
-The women and children taken captive were distributed as prizes
-among the soldiers. But all the male captives, three thousand in
-number, were conveyed to the precise spot where Hamilkar had been
-slain, and there put to death with indignity,<a id="FNanchor_907"
-href="#Footnote_907" class="fnanchor">[907]</a> as an expiatory
-satisfaction to his lost honor. Lastly, in order that even the hated
-name of Himera might pass into oblivion, a new town called Therma
-(so designated because of some warm springs) was shortly afterwards
-founded by the Carthaginians in the neighborhood.<a id="FNanchor_908"
-href="#Footnote_908" class="fnanchor">[908]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_414">[p. 414]</span></p>
-
-<p>No man can now read the account of this wholesale massacre without
-horror and repugnance. Yet we cannot doubt, that among all the acts
-of Hannibal’s life, this was the one in which he most gloried;
-that it realized, in the most complete and emphatic manner, his
-concurrent inspirations of filial sentiment, religious obligation,
-and honor as a patriot; that to show mercy would have been regarded
-as a mean dereliction of these esteemed impulses; and that if the
-prisoners had been even more numerous, all of them would have been
-equally slain, rendering the expiatory fulfilment only so much the
-more honorable and efficacious. In the Carthaginian religion, human
-sacrifices were not merely admitted, but passed for the strongest
-manifestation of devotional fervor, and were especially resorted to
-in times of distress, when the necessity for propitiating the gods
-was accounted most pressing. Doubtless the feelings of Hannibal were
-cordially shared, and the plenitude of his revenge envied, by the
-army around him. So different, sometimes so totally contrary, is the
-tone and direction of the moral sentiments, among different ages and
-nations.</p>
-
-<p>In the numerous wars of Greeks against Greeks, which we have
-been unfortunately called upon to study, we have found few or no
-examples of any considerable town taken by storm. So much the
-more terrible was the shock throughout the Grecian world, of the
-events just recounted; Selinus and Himera, two Grecian cities of
-ancient standing and uninterrupted prosperity,—had both of them
-been stormed, ruined, and depopulated, by a barbaric host, within
-the space of three months.<a id="FNanchor_909" href="#Footnote_909"
-class="fnanchor">[909]</a> No event at all parallel had occurred
-since the sack of Miletus by the Persians after the Ionic revolt
-(495 <small>B.C.</small>),<a id="FNanchor_910" href="#Footnote_910"
-class="fnanchor">[910]</a> which raised such powerful sympathy and
-mourning in Athens. The war now raging in the Ægean, between Athens
-and Sparta with their respective allies, doubtless contributed to
-deaden, throughout Central Greece, the impression of calamities
-sustained by Greeks at the western extremity of Sicily. But within
-that island, the sympathy with the sufferers was most acute, and
-aggravated by terror for the future. The Carthaginian general
-had displayed a degree of energy equal to any Grecian officer
-throughout the war, with a command of besieging and battering
-machinery surpassing even the best equipped Grecian cities.<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_415">[p. 415]</span> The mercenaries whom
-he had got together were alike terrible from their bravery and
-ferocity; encouraging Carthaginian ambition to follow up its late
-rapid successes by attacks against the other cities of the island.
-No such prospects indeed were at once realized. Hannibal, having
-completed his revenge at Himera, and extended the Carthaginian
-dominion all across the north-west corner of Sicily (from Selinus on
-the southern sea to the site of Himera or Therma on the northern),
-dismissed his mercenary troops and returned home. Most of them were
-satiated with plunder as well as pay, though the Campanians, who
-had been foremost at the capture of Selinus, thought themselves
-unfairly stinted, and retired in disgust.<a id="FNanchor_911"
-href="#Footnote_911" class="fnanchor">[911]</a> Hannibal carried
-back a rich spoil, with glorious trophies, to Carthage, where he was
-greeted with enthusiastic welcome and admiration.<a id="FNanchor_912"
-href="#Footnote_912" class="fnanchor">[912]</a></p>
-
-<p>Never was there a time when the Greek cities in Sicily,—and
-Syracuse especially, upon whom the others would greatly rest in
-the event of a second Carthaginian invasion,—had stronger motives
-for keeping themselves in a condition of efficacious defence.
-Unfortunately, it was just at this moment that a new cause of
-intestine discord burst upon Syracuse; fatally impairing her
-strength, and proving in its consequences destructive to her
-liberty. The banished Syracusan general Hermokrates had recently
-arrived at Messênê in Sicily; where he appears to have been, at
-the time when the fugitives came from Himera. It has already been
-mentioned that he, with two colleagues, had commanded the Syracusan
-contingent serving with the Peloponnesians under Mindarus in Asia.
-After the disastrous defeat of Kyzikus, in which Mindarus was
-slain and every ship in the fleet taken or destroyed, sentence
-of banishment was passed at Syracuse against the three admirals.
-Hermokrates was exceedingly popular among the trierarchs and the
-officers; he had stood conspicuous for incorruptibility, and had
-conducted himself (so far as we have means of judging) with energy
-and ability in his command. The sentence, unmerited by his behavior,
-was dictated by acute vexation for the loss of the fleet, and for
-the disappointment of those expectations which Hermokrates had held
-out; combined with the fact that Diokles and the opposite party were
-now in the ascendant at Sy<span class="pagenum" id="Page_416">[p.
-416]</span>racuse. When the banished general, in making it known
-to the armament, complained of its injustice and illegality, he
-obtained warm sympathy, and even exhortations still to retain the
-command, in spite of orders from home. He forbade them earnestly to
-think of raising sedition against their common city and country;<a
-id="FNanchor_913" href="#Footnote_913" class="fnanchor">[913]</a>
-upon which the trierarchs, when they took their last and affectionate
-leave of him, bound themselves by oath, as soon as they should
-return to Syracuse, to leave no means untried for procuring his
-restoration.</p>
-
-<p>The admonitory words addressed by Hermokrates to the forwardness
-of the trierarchs, would have been honorable to his patriotism,
-had not his own conduct at the same time been worthy of the worst
-enemies of his country. For immediately on being superseded by the
-new admirals, he went to the satrap Pharnabazus, in whose favor he
-stood high; and obtained from him a considerable present of money,
-which he employed in collecting mercenary troops and building
-ships, to levy war against his opponents in Syracuse and procure
-his own restoration.<a id="FNanchor_914" href="#Footnote_914"
-class="fnanchor">[914]</a> Thus strengthened, he returned from Asia
-to Sicily, and reached the Sicilian Messênê rather before the capture
-of Himera by the Carthaginians. At Messênê he caused five fresh
-triremes to be built, besides taking into his pay one thousand of
-the expelled Himeræans. At the head of these troops, he attempted
-to force his way into Syracuse, under concert with his friends in
-the city, who engaged to assist his admission by arms. Possibly some
-of the trierarchs of his armament, who had before sworn to lend him
-their aid, had now returned and were among this body of interior
-partisans.</p>
-
-<p>The moment was well chosen for such an enterprise. As the disaster
-at Kyzikus had exasperated the Syracusans against Hermokrates, so
-we cannot doubt that there must have been a strong reaction against
-Diokles and his partisans, in consequence of the fall of Selinus
-unaided, and the subsequent abandonment of Himera. What degree
-of blame may fairly attach to Diokles for these misfortunes, we
-are not in a condition to judge. But such<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_417">[p. 417]</span> reverses in themselves were sure to
-discredit him more or less, and to lend increased strength and
-stimulus to the partisans of the banished Hermokrates. Nevertheless
-that leader, though he came to the gates of Syracuse, failed in
-his attempt to obtain admission, and was compelled to retire; upon
-which he marched his little army across the interior of the island,
-and took possession of the dismantled Selinus. Here he established
-himself as the chief of a new settlement, got together as many as
-he could of the expelled inhabitants (among whom probably some had
-already come back along with Empedion), and invited many fresh
-colonists from other quarters. Reëstablishing a portion of the
-demolished fortifications, he found himself gradually strengthened
-by so many new-comers, as to place at his command a body of six
-thousand chosen hoplites,—probably independent of other soldiers
-of inferior merit. With these troops he began to invade the
-Carthaginian settlements in the neighborhood, Motyê and Panormus.<a
-id="FNanchor_915" href="#Footnote_915" class="fnanchor">[915]</a>
-Having defeated the forces of both in the field, he carried his
-ravages successfully over their territories, with large acquisitions
-of plunder. The Carthaginians had now no army remaining in Sicily;
-for their immense host of the preceding year had consisted only of
-mercenaries levied for the occasion, and then disbanded.</p>
-
-<p>These events excited strong sensation throughout Sicily. The
-valor of Hermokrates, who had restored Selinus and conquered the
-Carthaginians on the very ground where they had stood so recently
-in terrific force, was contrasted with the inglorious proceeding
-of Diokles at Himera. In the public assemblies of Syracuse, this
-topic, coupled with the unjust sentence whereby Hermokrates had been
-banished, was emphatically set forth by his partisans; producing
-some reaction in his favor, and a still greater effect in disgracing
-his rival Diokles. Apprised that the tide of Syracusan opinion was
-turning towards him, Hermokrates made renewed preparations for his
-return, and resorted to a new stratagem for the purpose of smoothing
-the difficulty. He marched from Selinus to the ruined site of Himera,
-informed himself of the spot where the Syracusan troops had undergone
-their murderous defeat, and collected together the bones of his
-slain fellow-citizens; which (or rather the unburied bodies) must
-have lain<span class="pagenum" id="Page_418">[p. 418]</span> upon
-the field unheeded for about two years. Having placed these bones on
-cars richly decorated, he marched with his forces and conveyed them
-across the island from Himera to the Syracusan border. Here as an
-exile he halted; thinking it suitable now to display respect for the
-law,—though in his previous attempt he had gone up to the very gates
-of the city, without any similar scruples. But he sent forward some
-friends with the cars and the bones, tendering them to the citizens
-for the purpose of being honored with due funeral solemnities. Their
-arrival was the signal for a violent party discussion, and for an
-outburst of aggravated displeasure against Diokles, who had left
-the bodies unburied on the field of battle. “It was to Hermokrates
-(so his partisans urged) and to his valiant efforts against the
-Carthaginians, that the recovery of these remnants of the slain, and
-the opportunity of administering to them the funeral solemnities, was
-now owing. Let the Syracusans, after duly performing such obsequies,
-testify their gratitude to Hermokrates by a vote of restoration, and
-their displeasure against Diokles by a sentence of banishment.”<a
-id="FNanchor_916" href="#Footnote_916" class="fnanchor">[916]</a>
-Diokles with his partisans was thus placed at great disadvantage.
-In opposing the restoration of Hermokrates, he thought it necessary
-also to oppose the proposition for welcoming and burying the
-bones of the slain citizens. Here the feelings of the people went
-vehemently against him; the bones were received and interred, amidst
-the respectful attendance of all; and so strong was the reactionary
-sentiment generally, that the partisans of Hermokrates carried their
-proposition for sentencing Diokles to banishment. But on the other
-hand, they could not so far prevail as to obtain the restoration of
-Hermokrates himself. The purposes of the latter had been so palpably
-manifested, in trying a few months before to force his way into the
-city by surprise, and in now presenting himself at the frontier
-with an armed force under his command,—that his readmission would
-have been nothing less than a deliberate surrender of the freedom
-of the city to a despot.<a id="FNanchor_917" href="#Footnote_917"
-class="fnanchor">[917]</a></p>
-
-<p>Having failed in this well-laid stratagem for obtaining a vote
-of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_419">[p. 419]</span> consent,
-Hermokrates saw that his return could not at that moment be
-consummated by open force. He therefore retired from the Syracusan
-frontier; yet only postponing his purposes of armed attack until his
-friends in the city could provide for him a convenient opportunity.
-We see plainly that his own party within had been much strengthened,
-and his opponents enfeebled, by the recent manœuvre. Of this a proof
-is to be found in the banishment of Diokles, who probably was not
-succeeded by any other leader of equal influence. After a certain
-interval, the partisans of Hermokrates contrived a plan which they
-thought practicable, for admitting him into the city by night.
-Forewarned by them, he marched from Selinus at the head of three
-thousand soldiers, crossed the territory of Gela,<a id="FNanchor_918"
-href="#Footnote_918" class="fnanchor">[918]</a> and reached the
-concerted spot near the gate of Achradina during the night. From the
-rapidity of his advance, he had only a few troops along with him; the
-main body not having been able to keep up. With these few, however,
-he hastened to the gate, which he found already in possession
-of his friends, who had probably (like Pasimêlus at Corinth<a
-id="FNanchor_919" href="#Footnote_919" class="fnanchor">[919]</a>)
-awaited a night on which they were posted to act as sentinels.
-Master of the gate, Hermokrates, though joined by his partisans
-within in arms, thought it prudent to postpone decisive attack
-until his own main force came up. But during this interval, the
-Syracusan authorities in the city, apprised of what had happened,
-mustered their full military strength in the agora, and lost no time
-in falling upon the band of aggressors. After a sharply contested
-combat, these aggressors were completely worsted, and Hermokrates
-himself slain with a considerable proportion of his followers.
-The remainder having fled, sentence of banishment was passed upon
-them. Several among the wounded, however, were reported by their
-relatives as slain, in order that they might escape being comprised
-in such a condemnation.<a id="FNanchor_920" href="#Footnote_920"
-class="fnanchor">[920]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_420">[p. 420]</span></p>
-
-<p>Thus perished one of the most energetic of the Syracusan citizens;
-a man not less effective as a defender of his country against foreign
-enemies, than himself dangerous as a formidable enemy to her internal
-liberties. It would seem, as far as we can make out, that his attempt
-to make himself master of his country was powerfully seconded, and
-might well have succeeded. But it lacked that adventitious support
-arising from present embarrassment and danger in the foreign
-relations of the city, which we shall find so efficacious two years
-afterwards in promoting the ambitious projects of Dionysius.</p>
-
-<p>Dionysius,—for the next coming generation the most formidable
-name in the Grecian world,—now appears for the first time in
-history. He was a young Syracusan of no consideration from family
-or position, described as even of low birth and low occupation;
-as a scribe or secretary, which was looked upon as a subordinate,
-though essential, function.<a id="FNanchor_921" href="#Footnote_921"
-class="fnanchor">[921]</a> He was the son of Hermokrates,—not
-that eminent person whose death has been just described, but
-another person of the same name, whether related or<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_421">[p. 421]</span> not, we do not know.<a
-id="FNanchor_922" href="#Footnote_922" class="fnanchor">[922]</a>
-It is highly probable that he was a man of literary ability and
-instruction, since we read of him in after-days as a composer of
-odes and tragedies; and it is certain that he stood distinguished
-in all the talents for military action,—bravery, force of will,
-and quickness of discernment. On the present occasion, he espoused
-strenuously the party of Hermokrates, and was one of those who took
-arms in the city on his behalf. Having distinguished himself in the
-battle, and received several wounds, he was among those given out
-for dead by his relations.<a id="FNanchor_923" href="#Footnote_923"
-class="fnanchor">[923]</a> In this manner he escaped the sentence of
-banishment passed against the survivors. And when, in the course of
-a certain time, after recovering from his wounds, he was produced
-as unexpectedly living,—we may presume that his opponents and the
-leading men in the city left him unmolested, not thinking it worth
-while to reopen political inquisition in reference to matters already
-passed and finished. He thus remained in the city, marked out by his
-daring and address to the Hermokratæan party, as the person most fit
-to take up the mantle, and resume the anti-popular designs, of their
-late leader. It will presently be seen how the chiefs of this party
-lent their aid to exalt him.</p>
-
-<p>Meanwhile the internal condition of Syracuse was greatly enfeebled
-by this division. Though the three several attempts of Hermokrates to
-penetrate by force or fraud into the city had all failed, yet they
-had left a formidable body of malcontents behind; while the opponents
-also, the popular government and its leaders, had been materially
-reduced in power and consideration by the banishment of Diokles. This
-magistrate was succeeded by Daphnæus and others, of whom we know
-nothing, except that they are spoken of as rich men and representing
-the sentiments of the rich,—and that they seem to have manifested but
-little ability. Nothing could be more unfortunate than the weakness
-of Syracuse at this particular juncture: for the Carthaginians, elate
-with their successes at Selinus and Himera, and doubtless also piqued
-by the subsequent retaliation of Hermokrates upon their dependencies
-at Motyê and Panormus, were just now meditating a second invasion
-of Sicily on a still larger scale. Not uninformed of their<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_422">[p. 422]</span> projects, the Syracusan
-leaders sent envoys to Carthage to remonstrate against them, and to
-make propositions for peace. But no satisfactory answer could be
-obtained, nor were the preparations discontinued.<a id="FNanchor_924"
-href="#Footnote_924" class="fnanchor">[924]</a></p>
-
-<p>In the ensuing spring, the storm gathering from Africa burst with
-destructive violence upon this fated island. A mercenary force had
-been got together during the winter, greater than that which had
-sacked Selinus and Himera; three hundred thousand men, according to
-Ephorus,—one hundred and twenty thousand, according to Xenophon and
-Timæus. Hannibal was again placed in command; but his predominant
-impulses of family and religion having been satiated by the great
-sacrifice of Himera, he excused himself on the score of old age,
-and was only induced to accept the duty by having his relative
-Imilkon named as colleague. By their joint efforts, the immense
-host of Iberians, Mediterranean islanders, Campanians, Libyans, and
-Numidians, was united at Carthage, and made ready to be conveyed
-across, in a fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes, with no less
-than one thousand five hundred transports.<a id="FNanchor_925"
-href="#Footnote_925" class="fnanchor">[925]</a> To protect the
-landing, forty Carthaginian triremes were previously sent over to
-the Bay of Motyê. The Syracusan leaders, with commendable energy and
-watchfulness, immediately despatched the like number of triremes
-to attack them, in hopes of thereby checking the farther arrival
-of the grand armament. They were victorious, destroying fifteen of
-the Carthaginian triremes, and driving the rest back to Africa; yet
-their object was not attained; for Hannibal himself, coming forth
-immediately with fifty fresh triremes, constrained the Syracusans
-to retire. Presently afterwards the grand armament appeared,
-disembarking its motley crowd of barbaric warriors near the western
-cape of Sicily.</p>
-
-<p>Great was the alarm caused throughout Sicily by their arrival. All
-the Greek cities either now began to prepare for war, or pushed with
-a more vigorous hand equipments previously begun, since they seem to
-have had some previous knowledge of the purpose of the enemy. The
-Syracusans sent to entreat assistance both from the Italian Greeks
-and from Sparta. From the latter city, however, little was to be
-expected, since her whole<span class="pagenum" id="Page_423">[p.
-423]</span> efforts were now devoted to the prosecution of the war
-against Athens; this being the year wherein Kallikratidas commanded,
-and when the battle of Arginusæ was fought.</p>
-
-<p>Of all Sicilian Greeks, the Agrigentines were both the most
-frightened and the most busily employed. Conterminous as they were
-with Selinus on their western frontier, and foreseeing that the first
-shock of the invasion would fall upon them, they immediately began
-to carry in their outlying property within the walls, as well as
-to accumulate a stock of provisions for enduring blockade. Sending
-for Dexippus, a Lacedæmonian then in Gela as commander of a body
-of mercenaries for the defence of that town, they engaged him in
-their service, with one thousand five hundred hoplites; reinforced
-by eight hundred of those Campanians who had served with Hannibal
-at Himera, but had quitted him in disgust.<a id="FNanchor_926"
-href="#Footnote_926" class="fnanchor">[926]</a></p>
-
-<p>Agrigentum was at this time in the highest state of prosperity
-and magnificence; a tempting prize for any invader. Its population
-was very great; comprising, according to one account, twenty
-thousand citizens among an aggregate total of two hundred thousand
-males,—citizens, metics, and slaves; according to another account,
-an aggregate total of no less than eight hundred thousand persons;<a
-id="FNanchor_927" href="#Footnote_927" class="fnanchor">[927]</a>
-numbers unauthenticated, and not to be trusted farther than as
-indicating a very populous city. Situated a little more than two
-miles from the sea, and possessing a spacious territory highly
-cultivated, especially with vines and olives, Agrigentum carried on a
-lucrative trade with the opposite coast of Africa, where at that time
-no such plantations flourished. Its temples and porticos, especially
-the spacious temple of Zeus Olympius,—its statues and pictures,—its
-abundance of chariots and horses,—its fortifications,—its sewers,—its
-artificial lake of near a mile in circumference, abundantly stocked
-with fish,—all these placed it on a par with the most splendid cities
-of the Hellenic world.<a id="FNanchor_928" href="#Footnote_928"
-class="fnanchor">[928]</a> Of the numerous prisoners taken at the
-defeat of the Carthaginians near Himera seventy years before, a very
-large proportion had fallen to the lot of the Agrigentines, and had
-been employed by them in public works contributing to the advantage
-or ornament of the city.<a id="FNanchor_929" href="#Footnote_929"
-class="fnanchor">[929]</a> The hospitality of the wealthy
-citizens,—Gellias,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_424">[p.
-424]</span> Antisthenes, and others,—was carried even to profusion.
-The surrounding territory was celebrated for its breed of horses,<a
-id="FNanchor_930" href="#Footnote_930" class="fnanchor">[930]</a>
-which the rich Agrigentines vied with each other in training and
-equipping for the chariot-race. At the last Olympic games immediately
-preceding this fatal Carthaginian invasion (that is at the 93rd
-Olympiad,—408 <small>B.C.</small>), the Agrigentine Exænetus gained
-the prize in a chariot-race. On returning to Sicily after his
-victory, he was welcomed by many of his friends, who escorted him
-home in procession with three hundred chariots, each drawn by a pair
-of white horses, and all belonging to native Agrigentines. Of the
-festival by which the wealthy Antisthenes celebrated the nuptials of
-his daughter, we read an account almost fabulous. Amidst all this
-wealth and luxury, it is not surprising to hear that the rough duties
-of military exercise were imperfectly kept up, and that indulgences,
-not very consistent with soldier-like efficiency, were allowed to the
-citizens on guard.</p>
-
-<p>Such was Agrigentum in May 406 <small>B.C.</small>, when Hannibal
-and Imilkon approached it with their powerful army. Their first
-propositions, however, were not of a hostile character. They invited
-the Agrigentines to enter into alliance with Carthage; or if this
-were not acceptable, at any rate to remain neutral and at peace. Both
-propositions were declined.<a id="FNanchor_931" href="#Footnote_931"
-class="fnanchor">[931]</a></p>
-
-<p>Besides having taken engagements with Gela and Syracuse, the
-Agrigentines also felt a confidence, not unreasonable, in the
-strength of their own walls and situation. Agrigentum with its
-citadel was placed on an aggregate of limestone hills, immediately
-above the confluence of two rivers, both flowing from the north;
-the river Akragas on the eastern and southern sides of the city,
-and the Hypsas on its western side. Of this aggregate of hills,
-separated from each other by clefts and valleys, the northern half
-is the loftiest, being about eleven hundred feet above the level of
-the sea—the southern half is less lofty. But on all sides, except
-on the south-west, it rises by a precipitous ascent; on the side
-towards the sea, it springs immediately out of the plain, thus
-presenting a fine prospect to ships passing along the coast. The
-whole of this aggregate of hills was encompassed by a continuous
-wall, built round the declivity, and in some parts hewn out of
-the solid rock. The town<span class="pagenum" id="Page_425">[p.
-425]</span> of Agrigentum was situated in the southern half of the
-walled enclosure. The citadel, separated from it by a ravine, and
-accessible only by one narrow ascent, stood on the north-eastern
-hill; it was the most conspicuous feature in the place, called
-the Athenæum, and decorated by temples of Athênê and of Zeus
-Atabyrius. In the plain under the southern wall of the city stood
-the Agrigentine sepulchres.<a id="FNanchor_932" href="#Footnote_932"
-class="fnanchor">[932]</a>—Reinforced by eight hundred Campanian
-mercenaries, with the fifteen hundred other mercenaries brought by
-Dexippus from Gela,—the Agrigentines awaited confidently the attack
-upon their walls, which were not only in far better condition than
-those of Selinus, but also unapproachable by battering-machines or
-movable towers, except on one part of the south-western side. It was
-here that Hannibal, after reconnoitering the town all round, began
-his attack. But after hard fighting without success for one day,
-he was forced to retire at nightfall; and even lost his battering
-train, which was burnt during the night by a sally of the besieged.<a
-id="FNanchor_933" href="#Footnote_933" class="fnanchor">[933]</a>
-Desisting from farther attempts on that point, Hannibal now ordered
-his troops to pull down the tombs; which were numerous on the lower
-or southern side of the city, and many of which, especially that of
-the despot Theron, were of conspicuous grandeur. By this measure he
-calculated on providing materials adequate to the erection of immense
-mounds, equal in height to the southern wall, and sufficiently
-close to it for the purpose of assault. His numerous host had made
-considerable progress in demolishing these tombs, and were engaged
-in breaking down the monument of Theron,<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_426">[p. 426]</span> when their progress was arrested by a
-thunderbolt falling upon it. This event was followed by religious
-terrors, suddenly overspreading the camp. The prophets declared that
-the violation of the tombs was an act of criminal sacrilege. Every
-night the spectres of those whose tombs had been profaned manifested
-themselves, to the affright of the soldiers on guard; while the
-judgment of the gods was manifested in a violent pestilential
-distemper. Numbers of the army perished, Hannibal himself among
-them; and even of those who escaped death, many were disabled from
-active duty by distress and suffering. Imilkon was compelled to
-appease the gods, and to calm the agony of the troops, by a solemn
-supplication according to the Carthaginian rites. He sacrificed
-a child, considered as the most propitiatory of all offerings,
-to Kronus; and cast into the sea a number of animal victims as
-offerings to Poseidon.<a id="FNanchor_934" href="#Footnote_934"
-class="fnanchor">[934]</a></p>
-
-<p>These religious rites calmed the terrors of the army, and
-mitigated, or were supposed to have mitigated, the distemper; so
-that Imilkon, while desisting from all farther meddling with the
-tombs, was enabled to resume his batteries and assaults against
-the walls, though without any considerable success. He also dammed
-up the western river Hypsas, so as to turn the stream against the
-wall; but this manœuvre produced no effect. His operations were
-presently interrupted by the arrival of a powerful army which
-marched from Syracuse, under Daphnæus, to the relief of Agrigentum.
-Reinforced in its road by the military strength of Kamarina and Gela,
-it amounted to thirty thousand foot and five thousand horse, on
-reaching the river Himera, the eastern frontier of the Agrigentine
-territory; while a fleet of thirty Syracusan triremes sailed along
-the coast to second its efforts. As these troops neared the town,
-Imilkon despatched against them a body of Iberians and Campanians;<a
-id="FNanchor_935" href="#Footnote_935" class="fnanchor">[935]</a> who
-however, after a strenuous<span class="pagenum" id="Page_427">[p.
-427]</span> combat, were completely defeated, and driven back to the
-Carthaginian camp near the city, where they found themselves under
-the protection of the main army. Daphnæus, having secured the victory
-and inflicted severe loss upon the enemy, was careful to prevent his
-troops from disordering their ranks in the ardor of pursuit, in the
-apprehension that Imilkon with the main body might take advantage
-of that disorder to turn the fortune of the day,—as had happened in
-the terrible defeat before Himera, three years before. The routed
-Iberians were thus allowed to get back to the camp. At the same time
-the Agrigentines, witnessing from the walls, with joyous excitement,
-the flight of their enemies, vehemently urged their generals to lead
-them forth for an immediate sally, in order that the destruction
-of the fugitives might thus be consummated. But the generals were
-inflexible in resisting such demand; conceiving that the city itself
-would thus be stripped of its defenders, and that Imilkon might seize
-the occasion for assaulting it with his main body, when there was not
-sufficient force to repel them. The defeated Iberians thus escaped
-to the main camp; neither pursued by the Syracusans, nor impeded, as
-they passed near the Agrigentine walls, by the population within.</p>
-
-<p>Presently Daphnæus with his victorious army reached Agrigentum,
-and joined the citizens; who flocked in crowds, along with the
-Lacedæmonian Dexippus, to meet and welcome them. But the joy of
-meeting, and the reciprocal congratulations on the recent victory,
-were fatally poisoned by general indignation for the unmolested
-escape of the defeated Iberians; occasioned by nothing less than
-remissness, cowardice, or corruption, (so it was contended), on the
-part of the generals,—first the Syracusan generals, and next the
-Agrigentine. Against the former, little was now said, though much
-was held in reserve, as we shall soon hear. But against the latter,
-the discontent of the Agrigentine population burst forth instantly
-and impetuously. A public assembly being held on the spot, the
-Agrigentine generals, five in number, were put under accusation.
-Among many speakers who denounced them as guilty of treason, the
-most violent of all was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_428">[p.
-428]</span> the Kamarinæan Menês,—himself one of the leaders,
-seemingly of the Kamarinæan contingent in the army of Daphnæus. The
-concurrence of Menês, carrying to the Agrigentines a full sanction of
-their sentiments, wrought them up to such a pitch of fury, that the
-generals, when they came to defend themselves, found neither sympathy
-nor even common fairness of hearing. Four out of the five were
-stoned and put to death on the spot; the fifth, Argeius, was spared
-only on the ground of his youth; and even the Lacedæmonian Dexippus
-was severely censured.<a id="FNanchor_936" href="#Footnote_936"
-class="fnanchor">[936]</a></p>
-
-<p>How far, in regard to these proceedings, the generals were really
-guilty, or how far their defence, had it been fairly heard, would
-have been valid,—is a point which our scanty information does not
-enable us to determine. But it is certain that the arrival of the
-victorious Syracusans at Agrigentum completely altered the relative
-position of affairs. Instead of farther assaulting the walls,
-Imilkon was attacked in his camp by Daphnæus. The camp, however,
-was so fortified as to repel all attempts, and the siege from this
-time forward became only a blockade; a contest of patience and
-privation between the city and the besiegers, lasting seven or
-eight months from the commencement of the siege. At first Daphnæus,
-with his own force united to the Agrigentines, was strong enough to
-harass the Carthaginians and intercept their supplies, so that the
-greatest distress began to prevail among their army. The Campanian
-mercenaries even broke out into mutiny, crowding, with clamorous
-demands for provision and with menace of deserting, around the tent
-of Imilkon; who barely pacified them by pledging to them the gold
-and silver drinking-cups of the chief Carthaginians around him,<a
-id="FNanchor_937" href="#Footnote_937" class="fnanchor">[937]</a>
-coupled with entreaties that they<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_429">[p. 429]</span> would wait yet a few days. During
-that short interval, he meditated and executed a bold stroke of
-relief. The Syracusans and Agrigentines were mainly supplied by sea
-from Syracuse; from whence a large transport of provision-ships was
-now expected, under convoy of some Syracusan triremes. Apprised of
-their approach, Imilkon silently brought out forty Carthaginian
-triremes from Motyê and Panormus, with which he suddenly attacked the
-Syracusan convoy, no way expecting such a surprise. Eight Syracusan
-triremes were destroyed; the remainder were driven ashore, and the
-whole fleet of transports fell into the hands of Imilkon. Abundance
-and satisfaction now reigned in the camp of the Carthaginians,
-while the distress, and with it the discontent, was transferred to
-Agrigentum. The Campanian mercenaries in the service of Dexippus
-began the mutiny, complaining to him of their condition. Perhaps he
-had been alarmed and disgusted at the violent manifestation of the
-Agrigentines against their generals, extending partly to himself
-also. At any rate, he manifested no zeal in the defence, and was
-even suspected of having received a bribe of fifteen talents from
-the Carthaginians. He told the Campanians that Agrigentum was no
-longer tenable, for want of supplies; upon which they immediately
-retired, and marched away to Messênê, affirming that the time
-stipulated for their stay had expired. Such a secession struck
-every one with discouragement. The Agrigentine generals immediately
-instituted an examination, to ascertain the quantity of provision
-still remaining in the city. Having made the painful discovery that
-there remained but very little, they took the resolution of causing
-the city to be evacuated by its population during the coming night.<a
-id="FNanchor_938" href="#Footnote_938" class="fnanchor">[938]</a></p>
-
-<p>A night followed, even more replete with woe and desolation than
-that which had witnessed the flight of Diokles with the inhabitants
-of Himera from their native city. Few scenes can be imagined more
-deplorable than the vast population of Agrigentum obliged to hurry
-out of their gates during a December night, as their only chance of
-escape from famine or the sword of a merciless enemy. The road to
-Gela was beset by a distracted crowd, of both sexes and of every age
-and condition, confounded in one indiscriminate lot of suffering. No
-thought could be bestowed on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_430">[p.
-430]</span> the preservation of property or cherished possessions.
-Happy were they who could save their lives; for not a few, through
-personal weakness or the immobility of despair, were left behind.
-Perhaps here and there a citizen, combining the personal strength
-with the filial piety of Æneas, might carry away his aged father with
-the household gods on his shoulders; but for the most part, the old,
-the sick, and the impotent, all whose years were either too tender
-or too decrepit to keep up with a hurried flight, were of necessity
-abandoned. Some remained and slew themselves, refusing even to
-survive the loss of their homes and the destruction of their city;
-others, among whom was the wealthy Gellias, consigned themselves
-to the protection of the temples, but with little hope that it
-would procure them safety. The morning’s dawn exhibited to Imilkon
-unguarded walls, a deserted city, and a miserable population of
-exiles huddled together in disorderly flight on the road to Gela.</p>
-
-<p>For these fugitives, however, the Syracusan and Agrigentine
-soldiers formed a rear-guard sufficient to keep off the aggravated
-torture of a pursuit. But the Carthaginian army found enough to
-occupy them in the undefended prey which was before their eyes.
-They rushed upon the town with the fury of men who had been
-struggling and suffering before it for eight months. They ransacked
-the houses, slew every living person that was left, and found
-plunder enough to satiate even a ravenous appetite. Temples as
-well as private dwellings were alike stripped, so that those who
-had taken sanctuary in them became victims like the rest: a fate
-which Gellius only avoided by setting fire to the temple in which
-he stood and perishing in its ruins. The great public ornaments
-and trophies of the city,—the bull of Phalaris, together with the
-most precious statues and pictures,—were preserved by Imilkon
-and sent home as decorations to Carthage.<a id="FNanchor_939"
-href="#Footnote_939" class="fnanchor">[939]</a> While he gave up the
-houses of Agrigentum to be thus gutted, he still kept them standing,
-and caused them to serve as winter-quarters for the repose of his
-soldiers, after the hardships of an eight months’ siege. The unhappy
-Agrigentine fugitives first found shelter and kind hospitality
-at Gela; from whence they were afterwards, by permission of the
-Syracusans, transferred to Leontini.</p> <p><span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_431">[p. 431]</span></p> <p>I have described, as far as
-the narrative of Diodorus permits us to know, this momentous and
-tragical portion of Sicilian history; a suitable preface to the long
-despotism of Dionysius. It is evident that the seven or eight months
-(the former of these numbers is authenticated by Xenophon, while
-the latter is given by Diodorus) of the siege or blockade must have
-contained matters of the greatest importance which are not mentioned,
-and that even of the main circumstances which brought about the
-capture, we are most imperfectly informed. But though we cannot fully
-comprehend its causes, its effects are easy to understand. They
-were terror-striking and harrowing in the extreme. When the storm
-which had beaten down Selinus and Himera was now perceived to have
-extended its desolation to a city so much more conspicuous, among the
-wealthiest and most populous in the Grecian world,—when the surviving
-Agrigentine population, including women and children, and the great
-proprietors of chariots whose names stood recorded as victors at
-Olympia, were seen all confounded in one common fate of homeless
-flight and nakedness—when the victorious host and its commanders
-took up their quarters in the deserted houses, ready to spread
-their conquests farther after a winter of repose,—there was hardly
-a Greek in Sicily who did not tremble for his life and property.<a
-id="FNanchor_940" href="#Footnote_940" class="fnanchor">[940]</a>
-Several of them sought shelter at Syracuse, while others even quitted
-the island altogether, emigrating to Italy.</p>
-
-<p>Amidst so much anguish, humiliation, and terror, there were
-loud complaints against the conduct of the Syracusan generals
-under whose command the disaster had occurred. The censure which
-had been cast upon them before, for not having vigorously pursued
-the defeated Iberians, was now revived, and aggravated tenfold by
-the subsequent misfortune. To their inefficiency the capture of
-Agrigentum was ascribed, and apparently not without substantial
-cause; for the town was so strongly placed as to defy assault, and
-could only be taken by blockade; now we discern no impediments
-adequate to hinder the Syracusan generals from procuring supplies of
-provisions; and it seems clear that the surprise of the Syracusan
-store-ships might have been prevented by proper precautions; upon
-which surprise the whole question turned, between famine in<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_432">[p. 432]</span> the Carthaginian camp
-and famine in Agrigentum.<a id="FNanchor_941" href="#Footnote_941"
-class="fnanchor">[941]</a> The efficiency of Dexippus and the other
-generals, in defending Agrigentum (as depicted by Diodorus), stands
-sadly inferior to the vigor and ability displayed by Gylippus before
-Syracuse, as described by Thucydides: and we can hardly wonder that
-by men in the depth of misery, like the Agrigentines,—or in extreme
-alarm, like the other Sicilian Greeks—these generals, incompetent or
-treasonable, should be regarded as the cause of the ruin.</p>
-
-<p>Such a state of sentiment, under ordinary circumstances, would
-have led to the condemnation of the generals and to the nomination
-of others, with little farther result. But it became of far graver
-import, when combined with the actual situation of parties in
-Syracuse. The Hermokratean opposition party,—repelled during the
-preceding year with the loss of its leader, yet nowise crushed,—now
-re-appeared more formidable than ever, under a new leader more
-aggressive even than Hermokrates himself. Throughout ancient as well
-as modern history, defeat and embarrassment in the foreign relations
-have proved fruitful causes of change in the internal government.
-Such auxiliaries had been wanting to the success of Hermokrates in
-the preceding year; but alarms of every kind now overhung the city
-in terrific magnitude, and when the first Syracusan assembly was
-convoked on returning from Agrigentum, a mournful silence reigned;<a
-id="FNanchor_942" href="#Footnote_942" class="fnanchor">[942]</a>
-as in the memorable description given by Demosthenes of the
-Athenian assembly held immediately after the taking of Elateia.<a
-id="FNanchor_943" href="#Footnote_943" class="fnanchor">[943]</a>
-The generals had lost the confidence of their fellow-citizens; yet
-no one else was forward, at a juncture so full of peril, to assume
-their duty, by proffering fit counsel for the future conduct of
-the war. Now was the time for the Hermokratean party to lay their
-train for putting down the government. Dionysius, though both
-young and of mean family, was adopted as leader in consequence of
-that audacity and bravery<span class="pagenum" id="Page_433">[p.
-433]</span> which even already he had displayed, both in the fight
-along with Hermokrates and in the battles against the Carthaginians.
-Hipparinus, a Syracusan of rich family, who had ruined himself by
-dissolute expenses, was eager to renovate his fortunes by seconding
-the elevation of Dionysius to the despotism;<a id="FNanchor_944"
-href="#Footnote_944" class="fnanchor">[944]</a> Philistus (the
-subsequent historian of Syracuse), rich, young, and able, threw
-himself ardently into the same cause; and doubtless other leading
-persons, ancient Hermokrateans and others, stood forward as partisans
-in the conspiracy. But it either was, from the beginning, or speedily
-became, a movement organized for the purpose of putting the sceptre
-into the hands of Dionysius, to whom all the rest, though several
-among them were of far greater wealth and importance, served but as
-satellites and auxiliaries.</p>
-
-<p>Amidst the silence and disquietude which reigned in the Syracusan
-assembly, Dionysius was the first who rose to address them. He
-enlarged upon a topic suitable alike to the temper of his auditors
-and to his own views. He vehemently denounced the generals as having
-betrayed the security of Syracuse to the Carthaginians,—and as the
-persons to whom the ruin of Agrigentum, together with the impending
-peril of every man around, was owing. He set forth their misdeeds,
-real or alleged, not merely with fulness and acrimony, but with
-a ferocious violence outstripping all the limits of admissible
-debate, and intended to bring upon them a lawless murder, like the
-death of the generals recently at Agrigentum. “There they sit,
-the traitors! Do not wait for legal trial or verdict; but lay
-hands upon them at once, and inflict upon them summary justice.”<a
-id="FNanchor_945" href="#Footnote_945" class="fnanchor">[945]</a>
-Such a brutal exhortation, not unlike that of<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_434">[p. 434]</span> the Athenian Kritias, when he caused
-the execution of Theramenes in the oligarchical senate, was an
-offence against law as well as against parliamentary order. The
-presiding magistrates reproved Dionysius as a disturber of order,
-and fined him, as they were empowered by law.<a id="FNanchor_946"
-href="#Footnote_946" class="fnanchor">[946]</a> But his partisans
-were loud in his support. Philistus not only paid down the fine for
-him on the spot, but publicly proclaimed that he would go on for
-the whole day paying all similar fines which might be imposed,—and
-incited Dionysius to persist in such language as he thought proper.
-That which had begun as illegality, was now aggravated into open
-defiance of the law. Yet so enfeebled was the authority of the
-magistrates, and so vehement the cry against them, in the actual
-position of the city, that they were unable either to punish or
-to repress the speaker. Dionysius pursued his harangue in a tone
-yet more inflammatory, not only accusing the generals of having
-corruptly betrayed Agrigentum, but also denouncing the conspicuous
-and wealthy citizens generally, as oligarchs who held tyrannical
-sway,—who treated the many with scorn, and made their own profit
-out of the misfortunes of the city. Syracuse (he contended) could
-never be saved, unless men of a totally different character were
-invested with authority; men, not chosen from wealth and station,
-but of humble birth, belonging to the people by position, and kind
-in their deportment from consciousness of their own weakness.<a
-id="FNanchor_947" href="#Footnote_947" class="fnanchor">[947]</a>
-His bitter invective against generals already discredited, together
-with the impetuous warmth of his apparent sympathy for the people
-against the rich, were both alike favorably received. Plato states
-that the assembly became so furiously exasperated, as to follow
-literally the lawless and blood-thirsty inspirations of Dionysius,
-and to stone all these generals, ten in number, on the spot,
-without any form of trial. But Diodorus simply tells us, that a
-vote was passed to cashier<span class="pagenum" id="Page_435">[p.
-435]</span> the generals, and to name in their places Dionysius,
-Hipparinus, and others.<a id="FNanchor_948" href="#Footnote_948"
-class="fnanchor">[948]</a> This latter statement is, in my opinion,
-the more probable.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_436">[p. 436]</span></p>
-
-<p>Such was the first stage of what we may term the despot’s
-progress, successfully consummated. The pseudo-demagogue Dio<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_437">[p. 437]</span>nysius outdoes, in
-fierce professions of antipathy against the rich, anything that we
-read as coming from the real demagogues, Athenagoras at Syracuse,
-or Kleon at Athens. Behold him now sitting as a member of the new
-Board of generals, at a moment when the most assiduous care and
-energy, combined with the greatest unanimity, were required to put
-the Syracusan military force into an adequate state of efficiency. It
-suited the policy of Dionysius not only to bestow no care or energy
-himself, but to nullify all that was bestowed by his colleagues, and
-to frustrate deliberately all chance of unanimity. He immediately
-began a systematic opposition and warfare against his colleagues. He
-refused to attend at their Board, or to hold any communication with
-them. At the frequent assemblies held during this agitated state of
-the public mind, he openly denounced them as engaged in treasonable
-correspondence with the enemy. It is obvious that his colleagues,
-men newly chosen in the same spirit with himself, could not as yet
-have committed any such treason in favor of the Carthaginians.
-But among them was his accomplice Hipparinus;<a id="FNanchor_949"
-href="#Footnote_949" class="fnanchor">[949]</a> while probably
-the rest also, nominated by a party devoted to him personally,
-were selected in a spirit of collusion, as either thorough-going
-partisans,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_438">[p. 438]</span> or
-worthless and incompetent men, easy for him to set aside. At any
-rate, his calumnies, though received with great repugnance by the
-leading and more intelligent citizens, found favor with the bulk of
-the assembly, predisposed at that moment from the terrors of the
-situation to suspect every one. The new Board of generals being thus
-discredited, Dionysius alone was listened to as an adviser. His
-first and most strenuous recommendation was, that a vote should be
-passed for restoring the exiles; men (he affirmed) attached to their
-country, and burning to serve her, having already refused the offers
-of her enemies; men who had been thrown into banishment by previous
-political dispute, but who, if now generously recalled, would
-manifest their gratitude by devoted patriotism, and serve Syracuse
-far more warmly than the allies invoked from Italy and Peloponnesus.
-His discredited colleagues either could not, or would not, oppose the
-proposition; which, being warmly pressed by Dionysius and all his
-party, was at length adopted by the assembly. The exiles accordingly
-returned, comprising all the most violent men who had been in arms
-with Hermokrates when he was slain. They returned glowing with
-party-antipathy and revenge, prepared to retaliate upon others
-the confiscation under which themselves had suffered, and looking
-to the despotism of Dionysius as their only means of success.<a
-id="FNanchor_950" href="#Footnote_950" class="fnanchor">[950]</a></p>
-
-<p>The second step of the despot’s progress was now accomplished.
-Dionysius had filled up the ranks of the Hermokratean party, and
-obtained an energetic band of satellites, whose hopes and interests
-were thoroughly identified with his own. Meanwhile letters arrived
-from Gela, entreating reinforcements, as Imilkon was understood to be
-about to march thither. Dionysius being empowered to march thither a
-body of two thousand hoplites, with four hundred horsemen, turned the
-occasion to profitable account. A regiment of mercenaries, under the
-Lacedæmonian Dexippus, was in garrison at Gela; while the government
-of the town is said to have been oligarchical, in the hands of the
-rich, though with a strong and discontented popular opposition. On
-reaching Gela, Dionysius immediately took part with the latter;
-originating the most violent propositions against the governing
-rich, as he had done at Syracuse. Accusing them of treason in the
-public assembly, he obtained<span class="pagenum" id="Page_439">[p.
-439]</span> a condemnatory vote under which they were put to death
-and their properties confiscated. With the funds so acquired, he paid
-the arrears due to the soldiers of Dexippus, and doubled the pay of
-his own Syracusan division. These measures procured for him immense
-popularity, not merely with all the soldiers, but also with the
-Geloan Demos, whom he had relieved from the dominion of their wealthy
-oligarchy. Accordingly, after passing a public vote testifying their
-gratitude, and bestowing upon him large rewards, they despatched
-envoys to carry the formal expression of their sentiments to
-Syracuse. Dionysius resolved to go back thither at the same time,
-with his Syracusan soldiers; and tried to prevail on Dexippus to
-accompany him with his own division. This being refused, he went
-thither with his Syracusans alone. To the Geloans, who earnestly
-entreated that they might not be forsaken when the enemy was daily
-expected, he contented himself with replying that he would presently
-return with a larger force.<a id="FNanchor_951" href="#Footnote_951"
-class="fnanchor">[951]</a></p>
-
-<p>A third step was thus obtained. Dionysius was going back to
-Syracuse with a testimonial of admiration and gratitude from
-Gela,—with increased attachment on the part of his own soldiers,
-on account of the double pay,—and with the means of coining and
-circulating a new delusion. It was on the day of a solemn festival
-that he reached the town, just as the citizens were coming in crowds
-out of the theatre. Amidst the bustle of such a scene as well as
-of the return of the soldiers, many citizens flocked around him to
-inquire, What news about the Carthaginians? “Do not ask about your
-foreign enemies (was the reply of Dionysius); you have much worse
-enemies within among you. Your magistrates,—these very men upon whose
-watch you rely during the indulgence of the festival,—they are the
-traitors who are pillaging the public money, leaving the soldiers
-unpaid, and neglecting all necessary preparation, at a moment when
-the enemy with an immense host is on the point of assailing you. I
-knew their treachery long ago, but I have now positive proof of it.
-For Imilkon sent to me an envoy, under pretence of treating about the
-prisoners, but in reality to purchase my silence and connivance; he
-tendered to me a larger bribe than he had given to them, if I would
-consent to refrain from hindering them, since I could not be induced
-to take<span class="pagenum" id="Page_440">[p. 440]</span> part in
-their intrigues. This is too much. I am come home now to throw up
-my command. While my colleagues are corruptly bartering away their
-country, I am willing to take my share as a citizen in the common
-risk, but I cannot endure to incur shame as an accomplice in their
-treachery.”</p>
-
-<p>Such bold allegations, scattered by Dionysius among the crowd
-pressing round him,—renewed at length, with emphatic formality in
-the regular assembly held the next day,—and concluding with actual
-resignation,—struck deep terror into the Syracusan mind. He spoke
-with authority, not merely as one fresh from the frontier exposed,
-but also as bearing the grateful testimonial of the Geloans, echoed
-by the soldiers whose pay he had recently doubled. His assertion of
-the special message from Imilkon, probably an impudent falsehood,
-was confidently accepted and backed by all these men, as well as
-by his other partisans, the Hermokratean party, and most of all by
-the restored exiles. What defence the accused generals made, or
-tried to make, we are not told. It was not likely to prevail, nor
-did it prevail, against the positive deposition of a witness so
-powerfully seconded. The people, persuaded of their treason, were
-incensed against them, and trembled at the thought of being left, by
-the resignation of Dionysius, to the protection of such treacherous
-guardians against the impending invasion. Now was the time for his
-partisans to come forward with their main proposition: “Why not get
-rid of these traitors, and keep Dionysius alone? Leave them to be
-tried and punished at a more convenient season; but elect him at
-once general with full powers, to make head against the pressing
-emergency from without. Do not wait until the enemy is actually
-assaulting our walls. Dionysius is the man for our purpose, the only
-one with whom we have a chance of safety. Recollect that our glorious
-victory over the three hundred thousand Carthaginians at Himera was
-achieved by Gelon acting as general with full powers.” Such rhetoric
-was irresistible in the present temper of the assembly,—when the
-partisans of Dionysius were full of audacity and acclamation,—when
-his opponents were discomfited, suspicious of each other, and without
-any positive scheme to propose,—and when the storm, which had already
-overwhelmed Selinus, Himera, and Agrigentum, was about to burst on
-Gela and Syracuse. A vote of the assembly was<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_441">[p. 441]</span> passed, appointing Dionysius general
-of the city, alone, and with full powers;<a id="FNanchor_952"
-href="#Footnote_952" class="fnanchor">[952]</a> by what majority we
-do not know.</p>
-
-<p>The first use which the new general-plenipotentiary made of his
-dignity was to propose, in the same assembly, that the pay of the
-soldiers should be doubled. Such liberality (he said) would be the
-best means of stimulating their zeal; while in regard to expense,
-there need be no hesitation; the money might easily be provided.</p>
-
-<p>Thus was consummated the fourth, and most important, act of the
-despot’s progress. A vote of the assembly had been obtained, passed
-in constitutional forms, vesting in Dionysius a single-handed power
-unknown to and above the laws,—unlimited and unresponsible. But he
-was well aware that the majority of those who thus voted had no
-intention of permanently abnegating their freedom,—that they meant
-only to create a temporary dictatorship, under the pressing danger
-of the moment, for the express purpose of preserving that freedom
-against a foreign enemy,—and that even thus much had been obtained
-by impudent delusion and calumny, which subsequent reflection would
-speedily dissipate. No sooner had the vote passed, than symptoms
-of regret and alarm became manifest among the people. What one
-assembly had conferred, a second repentant assembly might revoke.<a
-id="FNanchor_953" href="#Footnote_953" class="fnanchor">[953]</a> It
-therefore now remained for Dionysius to ensure the perpetuity of his
-power by some organized means; so as to prevent the repentance, of
-which he already discerned the commencement, from realizing itself
-in any actual revocation. For this purpose he required a military
-force extra-popular and anti-popular; bound to himself and not to
-the city. He had indeed acquired popularity with the Syracusan as
-well as with the mercenary soldiers, by doubling and ensuring their
-pay. He had energetic adherents, prepared to go all lengths on his
-behalf, especially among the restored exiles. This was an<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_442">[p. 442]</span> important basis, but
-not sufficient for his objects without the presence of a special body
-of guards, constantly and immediately available, chosen as well as
-controlled by himself, yet acting in such vocation under the express
-mandate and sanction of the people. He required a farther vote of the
-people, legalizing for his use such a body of guards.</p>
-
-<p>But with all his powers of delusion, and all the zeal of his
-partisans, he despaired of getting any such vote from an assembly
-held at Syracuse. Accordingly, he resorted to a manœuvre, proclaiming
-that he had resolved on a march to Leontini, and summoning the full
-military force of Syracuse (up to the age of forty) to march along
-with him, with orders for each man to bring with him thirty days’
-provision. Leontini had been, a few years before, an independent
-city; but was now an outlying fortified post, belonging to the
-Syracusans; wherein various foreign settlers, and exiles from the
-captured Sicilian cities, had obtained permission to reside. Such
-men, thrown out of their position and expectations as citizens, were
-likely to lend either their votes or their swords willingly to the
-purposes of Dionysius. While he thus found many new adherents there,
-besides those whom he brought with him, he foresaw that the general
-body of the Syracusans, and especially those most disaffected to
-him, would not be disposed to obey his summons or accompany him.<a
-id="FNanchor_954" href="#Footnote_954" class="fnanchor">[954]</a>
-For nothing could be more preposterous, in a public point of view,
-than an out-march of the whole Syracusan force for thirty days to
-Leontini, where there was neither danger to be averted nor profit to
-be reaped; at a moment too when the danger on the side of Gela was
-most serious, from the formidable Carthaginian host at Agrigentum.</p>
-
-<p>Dionysius accordingly set out with a force which purported,
-ostensibly and according to summons, to be the full military
-manifestation of Syracuse; but which, in reality, comprised mainly
-his own adherents. On encamping for the night near to Leontini,
-he caused a factitious clamor and disturbance to be raised during
-the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_443">[p. 443]</span> darkness,
-around his own tent,—ordered fires to be kindled,—summoned on a
-sudden his most intimate friends,—and affected to retire under their
-escort to the citadel. On the morrow an assembly was convened, of
-the Syracusans and residents present, purporting to be a Syracusan
-assembly; Syracuse in military guise, or as it were in Comitia
-Centuriata,—to employ an ancient phrase belonging to the Roman
-republic. Before this assembly Dionysius appeared, and threw himself
-upon their protection; affirming that his life had been assailed
-during the preceding night,—calling upon them emphatically to stand
-by him against the incessant snares of his enemies,—and demanding
-for that purpose a permanent body of guards. His appeal, plausibly
-and pathetically turned, and doubtless warmly seconded by zealous
-partisans, met with complete success. The assembly,—Syracusan or
-quasi-Syracusan, though held at Leontini,—passed a formal decree,
-granting to Dionysius a body-guard of six hundred men, selected
-by himself and responsible to him alone.<a id="FNanchor_955"
-href="#Footnote_955" class="fnanchor">[955]</a> One speaker indeed
-proposed to limit the guards to such a number as should be sufficient
-to protect him against any small number of personal enemies, but
-not to render him independent of, or formidable to, the many.<a
-id="FNanchor_956" href="#Footnote_956" class="fnanchor">[956]</a> But
-such precautionary refinement was not likely to be much considered,
-when the assembly was dishonest or misguided enough to pass the
-destructive vote here solicited; and even if embodied in the words
-of the resolution, there were no means of securing its observance
-in practice. The regiment of guards being once formally sanctioned,
-Dionysius heeded little the limit of number prescribed to him. He
-immediately enrolled more than one thousand men, selected as well
-for their bravery as from their poverty and desperate position. He
-provided them with the choicest arms, and promised to them the most
-munificent pay. To this basis of a certain, permanent, legalized,
-regiment of household troops, he added farther a sort of standing
-army, composed of mercenaries hardly less at his devotion than
-the guards properly so called. In addition to the mercenaries
-already around<span class="pagenum" id="Page_444">[p. 444]</span>
-him, he invited others from all quarters, by tempting offers;
-choosing by preference outlaws and profligates, and liberating
-slaves for the purpose.<a id="FNanchor_957" href="#Footnote_957"
-class="fnanchor">[957]</a> Next, summoning from Gela Dexippus the
-Lacedæmonian, with the troops under his command, he sent this officer
-away to Peloponnesus,—as a man not trustworthy for his purpose and
-likely to stand forward on behalf of the freedom of Syracuse. He then
-consolidated all the mercenaries under one organization, officering
-them anew with men devoted to himself.</p>
-
-<p>This fresh military levy and organization was chiefly accomplished
-during his stay at Leontini, without the opposition which would
-probably have arisen if it had been done at Syracuse; to which latter
-place Dionysius marched back, in an attitude far more imposing than
-when he left it. He now entered the gates at the head not only of his
-chosen body-guard, but also of a regular army of mercenaries, hired
-by and dependent upon himself. He marched them at once into the islet
-of Ortygia (the interior and strongest part of the city, commanding
-the harbor), established his camp in that acropolis of Syracuse, and
-stood forth as despot conspicuously in the eyes of all. Though the
-general sentiment among the people was one of strong repugnance, yet
-his powerful military force and strong position rendered all hope
-of open resistance desperate. And the popular assembly,—convoked
-under the pressure of this force, and probably composed of none but
-his partisans,—was found so subservient, as to condemn and execute,
-upon his requisition, Daphnæus and Demarchus. These two men, both
-wealthy and powerful in Syracuse, had been his chief opponents, and
-were seemingly among the very generals whom he had incited the people
-to massacre on the spot without any form of trial, in one of the
-previous public assemblies.<a id="FNanchor_958" href="#Footnote_958"
-class="fnanchor">[958]</a> One step alone remained to decorate
-the ignoble origin of Dionysius, and to mark the triumph of the
-Hermokratean party by whom its elevation had been mainly brought
-about. He immediately married the daughter of Hermokrates;
-giving his own sister in marriage to Polyxenus, the brother of
-that deceased chief.<a id="FNanchor_959" href="#Footnote_959"
-class="fnanchor">[959]</a></p>
-
-<p>Thus was consummated the fifth or closing act of the despot’s
-progress, rendering Dionysius master of the lives and fortunes
-of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_445">[p. 445]</span> his
-fellow-countrymen. The successive stages of his rise I have detailed
-from Diodorus, who (excepting a hint or two from Aristotle) is
-our only informant. His authority is on this occasion better than
-usual, since he had before him not merely Ephorus and Timæus, but
-also Philistus. He is, moreover, throughout this whole narrative at
-least clear and consistent with himself. We understand enough of the
-political strategy pursued by Dionysius, to pronounce that it was
-adapted to his end with a degree of skill that would have greatly
-struck a critical eye like Machiavel; whose analytical appreciation
-of means, when he is canvassing men like Dionysius, has been often
-unfairly construed as if it implied sympathy with and approbation
-of their end. We see that Dionysius, in putting himself forward as
-the chief and representative of the Hermokratean party, acquired
-the means of employing a greater measure of fraud and delusion than
-an exile like Hermokrates, in prosecution of the same ambitious
-purposes. Favored by the dangers of the state and the agony of the
-public mind, he was enabled to simulate an ultra-democratical ardor
-both in defence of the people against the rich, and in denunciation
-of the unsuccessful or incompetent generals, as if they were corrupt
-traitors. Though it would seem that the government of Syracuse, in
-406 <small>B.C.</small>, must have been strongly democratical,
-yet Dionysius in his ardor for popular rights, treats it as an
-anti-popular oligarchy; and tries to acquire the favor of the people
-by placing himself in the most open quarrel and antipathy to the
-rich. Nine years before, in the debate between Hermokrates and
-Athenagoras in the Syracusan assembly, the former stood forth, or
-at least was considered to stand forth, as champion of the rich;
-while the latter spoke as a conservative democrat, complaining of
-conspiracies on the part of the rich. In 406 <small>B.C.</small>,
-the leader of the Hermokratean party has reversed this policy,
-assuming a pretended democratical fervor much more violent than that
-of Athenagoras. Dionysius, who took up the trade of what is called a
-demagogue on this one occasion, simply for the purpose of procuring
-one single vote in his own favor, and then shutting the door by force
-against all future voting and all correction,—might resort to grosser
-falsehood than Athenagoras; who, as an habitual speaker, was always
-before the people, and even if successful by fraud at one meeting,
-was nevertheless open to exposure at a second.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_446">[p. 446]</span></p>
-
-<p>In order that the voting of any public assembly shall be really
-available as a protection to the people, its votes must not only be
-preceded by full and free discussion, but must also be open from
-time to time to rediscussion and correction. That error will from
-time to time be committed, as well by the collective people as by
-particular fractions of the people, is certain; opportunity for
-amendment is essential. A vote which is understood to be final, and
-never afterwards to be corrigible, is one which can hardly turn to
-the benefit of the people themselves, though it may often, as in the
-case of Dionysius, promote the sinister purposes of some designing
-protector.</p>
-
-<hr class="chap" />
-
-
-<div class="chapter" id="Chap_82">
-  <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXXII.<br />
-  SICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS AT
-  SYRACUSE.</h2>
-</div>
-
-<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span>
-proceedings, recounted at the close of my last chapter, whereby
-Dionysius erected his despotism, can hardly have occupied less
-than three months; coinciding nearly with the first months of 405
-<small>B.C.</small>, inasmuch as Agrigentum was taken about the
-winter solstice of 406 <small>B.C.</small><a id="FNanchor_960"
-href="#Footnote_960" class="fnanchor">[960]</a> He was not molested
-during this<span class="pagenum" id="Page_447">[p. 447]</span>
-period by the Carthaginians, who were kept inactive in quarters
-at Agrigentum, to repose after the hardships of the blockade;
-employed in despoiling the city of its movable ornaments, for
-transmission to Carthage, and in burning or defacing, with barbarous
-antipathy, such as could not be carried away.<a id="FNanchor_961"
-href="#Footnote_961" class="fnanchor">[961]</a> In the spring
-Imilkon moved forward towards Gela, having provided himself with
-fresh siege-machines, and ensured his supplies from the Carthaginian
-territory in his rear. Finding no army to oppose him, he spread his
-troops over the territory both of Gela and of Kamarina, where much
-plunder was collected and much property ruined. He then returned
-to attack Gela, and established a fortified camp by clearing some
-plantation-ground near the river of the same name, between the city
-and the sea. On this spot stood, without the walls, a colossal statue
-of Apollo, which Imilkon caused to be carried off and sent as a
-present to Tyre.</p>
-
-<p>Gela was at this moment defended only by its own citizens, for
-Dionysius had called away Dexippus with the mercenary troops. Alarmed
-at the approach of the formidable enemy who had already mastered
-Agrigentum, Himera, and Selinus,—the Geloans despatched pressing
-entreaties to Dionysius for aid; at the same time resolving to
-send away their women and children for safety to Syracuse. But the
-women, to whom the idea of separation was intolerable, supplicated
-so earnestly to be allowed to stay and share the fortunes of their
-fathers and husbands, that this resolution was abandoned. In
-expectation of speedy relief from Dionysius, the defence was brave
-and energetic. While parties of the Geloans, well-acquainted with the
-country, sallied out and acted with great partial success against
-the Carthaginian plunderers,—the mass of the citizens repelled the
-assaults of Imilkon against the walls. His battering-machines and
-storming-parties were brought to bear on several places at once;
-the walls themselves,—being neither in so good a condition, nor
-placed upon so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_448">[p. 448]</span>
-unassailable an eminence, as those of Agrigentum,—gave way on more
-than one point. Yet still the besieged, with obstinate valor,
-frustrated every attempt to penetrate within; reëstablishing
-during the night the breaches which had been made during the day.
-The feebler part of their population aided, by every means in
-their power, the warriors on the battlements; so the defence was
-thus made good until Dionysius appeared with the long-expected
-reinforcement. It comprised his newly-levied mercenaries, with the
-Syracusan citizens, and succors from the Italian as well as from the
-Sicilian Greeks; amounting in all to fifty thousand men, according
-to Ephorus,—to thirty thousand foot, and one thousand horse, as
-Timæus represented. A fleet of fifty ships of war sailed round
-Cape Pachynus to coöperate with them off Gela.<a id="FNanchor_962"
-href="#Footnote_962" class="fnanchor">[962]</a></p>
-
-<p>Dionysius fixed his position between Gela and the sea, opposite to
-that of the Carthaginians, and in immediate communication with his
-fleet. His presence having suspended the assaults upon the town, he
-became in his turn the aggressor; employing both his cavalry and his
-fleet to harass the Carthaginians and intercept their supplies. The
-contest now assumed a character nearly the same as had taken place
-before Agrigentum, and which had ended so unfavorably to the Greeks.
-At length, after twenty days of such desultory warfare, Dionysius,
-finding that he had accomplished little, laid his plan for a direct
-attack upon the Carthaginian camp. On the side towards the sea, as no
-danger had been expected, that camp was unfortified; it was there,
-accordingly, that Dionysius resolved to make his principal attack
-with his left division, consisting principally of Italiot Greeks,
-sustained by the Syracusan ships, who were to attack simultaneously
-from seaward. He designed at the same time also to strike blows from
-two other points. His right division, consisting of Sicilian allies,
-was ordered to march on the right or western side of the town of
-Gela, and thus fall upon the left of the Carthaginian camp; while he
-himself, with the mercenary troops which he kept specially around
-him, intended to advance through the town itself, and assail the
-advanced or central portion of their position near the walls, where
-their battering-machinery was posted. His cavalry were directed<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_449">[p. 449]</span> to hold themselves
-in reserve for pursuit, in case the attack proved successful; or
-for protection to the retreating infantry, in case it failed.<a
-id="FNanchor_963" href="#Footnote_963" class="fnanchor">[963]</a></p>
-
-<p>Of this combined scheme, the attack upon the left or seaward side
-of the Carthaginian camp, by the Italiot division and the fleet
-in concert, was effectively executed, and promised at first to be
-successful. The assailants overthrew the bulwarks, forced their way
-into the camp, and were only driven out by extraordinary efforts
-on the part of the defenders; chiefly Iberians and Campanians, but
-reinforced from the other portions of the army, which were as yet
-unmolested. But of the two other divisions of Dionysius, the right
-did not attack until long after the moment intended, and the centre
-never attacked at all. The right had to make a circuitous march, over
-the Geloan plain round the city, which occupied longer time than had
-been calculated; while Dionysius with the mercenaries around him,
-intending to march through the city, found themselves so obstructed
-and embarrassed that they made very slow progress, and were yet
-longer before they could emerge on the Carthaginian side. Probably
-the streets, as in so many other ancient towns, were crooked, narrow,
-and irregular; perhaps also, farther blocked up by precautions
-recently taken for defence. And thus the Sicilians on the right,
-not coming up to the attack until the Italians on the left had been
-already repulsed, were compelled to retreat, after a brave struggle,
-by the concurrent force of the main Carthaginian army. Dionysius and
-his mercenaries, coming up later still, found that the moment for
-attack had passed altogether, and returned back into the city without
-fighting at all.</p>
-
-<p>Whether the plan or the execution was here at fault,—or both the
-one and the other,—we are unable certainly to determine. There will
-appear reasons for suspecting, that Dionysius was not displeased at a
-repulse which should discourage his army, and furnish an excuse for
-abandoning Gela. After retiring again within the walls, he called
-together his principal friends to consult what was best to be done.
-All were of opinion that it was imprudent to incur farther hazard
-for the preservation of the town. Dionysius now found himself in
-the same position as Diokles after the defeat<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_450">[p. 450]</span> near Himera, and as Daphnæus and the
-other Syracusan generals before Agrigentum, after the capture of
-their provision-fleet by the Carthaginians. He felt constrained to
-abandon Gela, taking the best means in his power for protecting the
-escape of the inhabitants. Accordingly, to keep the intention of
-flight secret, he sent a herald to Imilkon to solicit a burial-truce
-for the ensuing day; he also set apart a body of two thousand light
-troops, with orders to make noises in front of the enemy throughout
-the whole night, and to keep the lights and fires burning, so
-as to prevent any suspicion on the part of the Carthaginians.<a
-id="FNanchor_964" href="#Footnote_964" class="fnanchor">[964]</a>
-Under cover of these precautions, he caused the Geloan population to
-evacuate their city in mass at the commencement of night, while he
-himself with his main army followed at midnight to protect them. All
-hurried forward on their march to Syracuse, turning to best account
-the hours of darkness. On their way thither lay Kamarina,—Kamarina
-the immovable,<a id="FNanchor_965" href="#Footnote_965"
-class="fnanchor">[965]</a> as it was pronounced by an ancient oracle
-or legend, yet on that fatal night seeming to falsify the epithet.
-Not thinking himself competent to defend this city, Dionysius forced
-all the Kamarinæan population to become partners in the flight of
-the Geloans. The same heart-rending scene, which has already been
-recounted at Agrigentum and Himera, was now seen repeated on the road
-from Gela to Syracuse: a fugitive multitude, of all ages and of both
-sexes, free as well as slave, destitute and terror-stricken, hurrying
-they knew not whither, to get beyond the reach of a merciless enemy.
-The flight to Syracuse, however, was fortunately not molested by any
-pursuit. At daybreak the Carthaginians, discovering the abandonment
-of the city, immediately rushed in and took possession of it. As very
-little of the valuable property within it had been removed, a rich
-plunder fell into the hands of the conquering host, whose barbarous
-hands massacred indiscriminately the miserable remnant left behind:
-old men, sick, and children, unable to accompany a flight so sudden
-and so rapid. Some of the conquerors farther satiated their ferocious
-instincts by crucifying or mutilating these unhappy prisoners.<a
-id="FNanchor_966" href="#Footnote_966" class="fnanchor">[966]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_451">[p. 451]</span></p>
-
-<p>Amidst the sufferings of this distressed multitude, however, and
-the compassion of the protecting army, other feelings also were
-powerfully aroused. Dionysius, who had been so unmeasured and so
-effective in calumniating unsuccessful generals before, was now
-himself exposed to the same arrows. Fierce were the bursts of wrath
-and hatred against him, both among the fugitives and among the army.
-He was accused of having betrayed to the Carthaginians, not only
-the army, but also Gela and Kamarina, in order that the Syracusans,
-intimidated by these formidable neighbors so close to their borders,
-might remain in patient servitude under his dominion. It was remarked
-that his achievements for the relief of Gela had been unworthy of
-the large force which he brought with him; that the loss sustained
-in the recent battle had been nowise sufficient to compel, or even
-to excuse, a disgraceful flight; that the mercenaries, especially,
-the force upon which he most relied, had not only sustained no loss,
-but had never been brought into action; that while his measures
-taken against the enemy had thus been partial and inefficient, they
-on their side had manifested no disposition to pursue him in his
-flight,—thus affording a strong presumption of connivance between
-them. Dionysius was denounced as a traitor by all,—except his own
-mercenaries, whom he always kept near him for security. The Italiot
-allies, who had made the attack and sustained the main loss during
-the recent battle, were so incensed against him for having left them
-thus unsupported, that they retired in a body, and marched across the
-centre of the island home to Italy.</p>
-
-<p>But the Syracusans in the army, especially the horsemen, the
-principal persons in the city, had a double ground of anger against
-Dionysius; partly from his misconduct or supposed treachery in
-this recent enterprise, but still more from the despotism which he
-had just erected over his fellow-citizens. This despotism, having
-been commenced in gross fraud and consummated by violence, was now
-deprived of the only plausible color which it had ever worn, since
-Dionysius had been just as disgracefully unsuccessful against the
-Carthaginians as those other generals whom he had denounced and
-superseded. Determined to rid themselves of one whom they<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_452">[p. 452]</span> hated at once as a
-despot and as a traitor, the Syracusan horsemen watched for an
-opportunity of setting upon Dionysius during the retreat, and killing
-him. But finding him too carefully guarded by the mercenaries
-who always surrounded his person, they went off in a body, and
-rode at their best speed to Syracuse, with the full purpose of
-reëstablishing the freedom of the city, and keeping out Dionysius.
-As they arrived before any tidings had been received of the defeat
-and flight at Gela, they obtained admission without impediment into
-the islet of Ortygia; the primitive interior city, commanding the
-docks and harbor, set apart by the despot for his own residence
-and power. They immediately assaulted and plundered the house of
-Dionysius, which they found richly stocked with gold, silver, and
-valuables of every kind. He had been despot but a few weeks; so
-that he must have begun betimes to despoil others, since it seems
-ascertained that his own private property was by no means large.
-The assailants not only plundered his house with all its interior
-wealth, but also maltreated his wife so brutally that she afterwards
-died of the outrage.<a id="FNanchor_967" href="#Footnote_967"
-class="fnanchor">[967]</a> Against this unfortunate woman they
-probably cherished a double antipathy, not only as the wife of
-Dionysius, but also as the daughter of Hermokrates. They at the
-same time spread abroad the news that Dionysius had fled never to
-return; for they fully confided in the disruption which they had
-witnessed among the retiring army, and in the fierce wrath which they
-had heard universally expressed against him.<a id="FNanchor_968"
-href="#Footnote_968" class="fnanchor">[968]</a> After having betrayed
-his army, together with Gela and Kamarina, to the Carthaginians, by a
-flight without any real ground of necessity (they asserted),—he had
-been exposed, disgraced, and forced to flee in reality, before the
-just displeasure of his own awakened fellow-citizens. Syracuse was
-now free; and might, on the morrow, reconstitute formally her popular
-government.</p>
-
-<p>Had these Syracusans taken any reasonable precautions against
-adverse possibilities, their assurances would probably have proved
-correct. The career of Dionysius would here have ended. But while
-they abandoned themselves to the plunder of his house and brutal
-outrage against his wife, they were so rashly confident in his
-supposed irretrievable ruin, and in their own mastery of the insular
-portion of the city, that they neglected to guard the gate of<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_453">[p. 453]</span> Achradina (the outer
-city) against his reëntry. The energy and promptitude of Dionysius
-proved too much for them. Informed of their secession from the army,
-and well knowing their sentiments, he immediately divined their
-projects, and saw that he could only defeat them by audacity and
-suddenness of attack. Accordingly, putting himself at the head of his
-best and most devoted soldiers,—one hundred horsemen and six hundred
-foot,—he left his army and proceeded by a forced march to Syracuse;
-a distance of about four hundred stadia, or about forty-five English
-miles. He arrived there about midnight, and presented himself, not
-at the gate of Ortygia, which he had probably ascertained to be in
-possession of his enemies, but at that of Achradina; which latter
-(as has been already mentioned) formed a separate fortification
-from Ortygia, with the Nekropolis between them.<a id="FNanchor_969"
-href="#Footnote_969" class="fnanchor">[969]</a> Though the gate was
-shut, he presently discovered it to be unguarded, and was enabled
-to apply to it some reeds gathered in the marshes on his road, so
-as to set it on fire and burn it. So eager had he been for celerity
-of progress, that at the moment when he reached the gate, a part
-only of his division were with him. But as the rest arrived while
-the flames were doing their work, he entered, with the whole body,
-into Achradina or the outer city. Marching rapidly through the
-streets, he became master, without resistance, of all this portion
-of the city, and of the agora, or market-place, which formed its
-chief open space. His principal enemies, astounded by this alarming
-news, hastened out of Ortygia into Achradina, and tried to occupy
-the agora. But they found it already in possession of Dionysius; and
-being themselves very few in number, having taken no time to get
-together any considerable armed body, they were overpowered and slain
-by his mercenaries. Dionysius was thus strong enough to vanquish all
-his enemies, who entered Achradina in small and successive parties,
-without any order, as they came out of Ortygia. He then proceeded
-to attack the houses of those whom he knew to be unfriendly to his
-dominion, slew such as he could find within, and forced the rest to
-seek shelter in exile. The great body of the Syracusan horsemen,—who
-but the evening before were masters of the city, and might with
-common prudence have maintained themselves in it, were thus either
-destroyed or<span class="pagenum" id="Page_454">[p. 454]</span>
-driven into banishment. As exiles they established themselves
-in the town of Ætna.<a id="FNanchor_970" href="#Footnote_970"
-class="fnanchor">[970]</a></p>
-
-<p>Thus master of the city, Dionysius was joined on the ensuing
-day by the main body of his mercenaries, and also by the Sicilian
-allies, who had now completed their march. The miserable sufferers
-from Gela and Kamarina, who looked upon him with indignation as their
-betrayer,—went to reside at Leontini; seemingly as companions of the
-original Leontine citizens, who had been for some time domiciliated
-at Syracuse, but who no longer chose to remain there under Dionysius.
-Leontini thus became again an independent city.<a id="FNanchor_971"
-href="#Footnote_971" class="fnanchor">[971]</a></p>
-
-<p>Though the disasters at Gela had threatened to ruin Dionysius,
-yet he was now, through his recent victory, more master of Syracuse
-than ever; and had more completely trodden down his opponents. The
-horsemen, whom he had just destroyed and chased away, were for the
-most part the rich and powerful citizens of Syracuse. To have put
-down such formidable enemies, almost indispensable as leaders to
-any party which sought to rise against him, was the strongest of
-all negative securities for the prolongation of his reign. There
-was no public assembly any longer at Syracuse, to which he had to
-render account of his proceedings at Gela and Kamarina, and before
-which he was liable to be arraigned,—as he himself had arraigned
-his predecessors who had commanded at Himera and Agrigentum. All
-such popular securities he had already overridden or subverted. The
-superiority of force, and intimidation of opponents, upon which his
-rule rested, were now more manifest and more decisive than ever.</p>
-
-<p>Notwithstanding such confirmed position, however, Dionysius
-might still have found defence difficult, if Imilkon had marched
-on with his victorious army, fresh from the plunder of Gela and
-Kamarina, and had laid energetic siege to Syracuse. From all<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_455">[p. 455]</span> hazard and alarm of
-this sort he was speedily relieved, by propositions for peace, which
-came spontaneously tendered by the Carthaginian general. Peace was
-concluded between them, on the following terms:—</p>
-
-<p>1. The Carthaginians shall retain all their previous possessions,
-and all their Sikanian dependencies, in Sicily. They shall keep,
-besides, Selinus, Himera, Agrigentum. The towns of Gela and Kamarina
-may be reoccupied by their present fugitive inhabitants; but on
-condition of paying tribute to Carthage, and destroying their walls
-and fortifications.</p>
-
-<p>2. The inhabitants of Leontini and Messênê, as well as all the
-Sikel inhabitants, shall be independent and autonomous.</p>
-
-<p>3. The Syracusans shall be subject to Dionysius.<a
-id="FNanchor_972" href="#Footnote_972" class="fnanchor">[972]</a></p>
-
-<p>4. All the captives, and all the ships, taken on both sides, shall
-be mutually restored.</p>
-
-<p>Such were the conditions upon which peace was now concluded.
-Though they were extremely advantageous to Carthage, assigning to
-her, either as subject or as tributary, the whole of the southern
-shore of Sicily,—yet as Syracuse was, after all, the great prize to
-be obtained, the conquest of which was essential to the security
-of all the remainder, we are astonished that Imilkon did not push
-forward to attack it, at a moment so obviously promising. It
-appears that immediately after the conquest of Gela and Kamarina,
-the Carthaginian army was visited by a pestilential distemper,
-which is said to have destroyed nearly the half of it, and to
-have forbidden future operations. The announcement of this event
-however, though doubtless substantially exact, comes to us in a
-way somewhat confused.<a id="FNanchor_973" href="#Footnote_973"
-class="fnanchor">[973]</a> And when we read, as one of the<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_456">[p. 456]</span> articles in the
-treaty, the express and formal provision that “The Syracusans
-shall be subject to Dionysius,”—we discern plainly, that there was
-also an additional cause for this timely overture, so suitable to
-his interests. There was real ground for those bitter complaints
-against Dionysius, which charged him with having betrayed Gela and
-Kamarina to the Carthaginians in order to assure his own dominion
-at Syracuse. The Carthaginians, in renouncing all pretensions to
-Syracuse and recognizing its autonomy, could have no interest in
-dictating its internal government. If they determined to recognize
-by formal treaty the sovereignty as vested in Dionysius, we may
-fairly conclude that he had purchased the favor from them by some
-underhand service previously rendered. In like manner both Hiketas
-and Agathoklês,—the latter being the successor, and in so many
-points the parallel of Dionysius, ninety years afterwards,—availed
-themselves of Carthaginian support as one stepping-stone to the
-despotism of Syracuse.<a id="FNanchor_974" href="#Footnote_974"
-class="fnanchor">[974]</a></p>
-
-<p>The pestilence, however, among the Carthaginian army is said to
-have been so terrible as to destroy nearly the half of their numbers.
-The remaining half, on returning to Africa, either found it already
-there, or carried it with them; for the mortality at and around
-Carthage was not less deplorable than in Sicily.<a id="FNanchor_975"
-href="#Footnote_975" class="fnanchor">[975]</a></p> <p><span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_457">[p. 457]</span></p> <p>It was in the
-summer of 405 <small>B.C.</small>, that this treaty was concluded,
-which consigned all the Hellenic ground on the south of Sicily to
-the Carthaginian dominion, and Syracuse with its population to
-that of Dionysius. It was in September or October of the same year
-that Lysander effected his capture of the entire Athenian fleet at
-Ægospotami, destroyed the maritime ascendency and power of Athens,
-and gave commencement to the Lacedæmonian empire, completed by the
-actual surrender of Athens during the ensuing year. The dekarchies
-and harmosts, planted by Lysander in so many cities of the central
-Hellenic world, commenced their disastrous working nearly at the same
-time as the despotism of Dionysius in Syracuse. This is a point to be
-borne in mind, in reference to the coming period. The new position
-and policy wherein Sparta now became involved, imparted to her a
-sympathy with Dionysius such as in earlier times she probably would
-not have felt; and which contributed materially, in a secondary way,
-to the durability of his dominion, as well by positive intrigues of
-Lacedæmonian agents, as by depriving the oppressed Syracusans of
-effective aid or countenance from Corinth or other parts of Greece.<a
-id="FNanchor_976" href="#Footnote_976" class="fnanchor">[976]</a></p>
-
-<p>The period immediately succeeding this peace was one of distress,
-depression, and alarm, throughout all the south of Sicily. According
-to the terms of the treaty, Gela and Kamarina might be reoccupied by
-their fugitive population; yet with demolished walls,—with all traces
-of previous opulence and comfort effaced by the plunderers,—and
-under the necessity of paying tribute to Carthage. The condition
-of Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera, now actually portions of
-Carthaginian territory, was worse; especially Agrigentum, hurled
-at one blow from the loftiest pinnacle of prosperous independence.
-No free Hellenic territory was any longer to be found between Cape
-Pachynus and Cape Lilybæum, beyond the Syracusan frontier.</p>
-
-<p>Amidst the profound discouragement of the Syracusan mind, the
-withdrawal from Sicily of the terror-striking Carthaginian army<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_458">[p. 458]</span> would be felt as a
-relief, and would procure credit for Dionysius.<a id="FNanchor_977"
-href="#Footnote_977" class="fnanchor">[977]</a> It had been brought
-about under him, though not as a consequence of his exploits; for
-his military operations against Imilkon at Gela had been completely
-unsuccessful (and even worse); and the Carthaginians had suffered
-no harm except from the pestilence. While his partisans had thus a
-plea for extolling him as the savior of the city, he also gathered
-strength in other ways out of the recent events. He had obtained a
-formal recognition of his government from the Carthaginians; he had
-destroyed or banished the chief Syracusan citizens opposed to his
-dominion, and struck terror into the rest; he had brought back all
-his mercenary troops and guards, without loss or dissatisfaction. He
-now availed himself of his temporary strength to provide precautions
-for perpetuity, before the Syracusans should recover spirit, or
-obtain a favorable opportunity, to resist.</p>
-
-<p>His first measure was to increase the fortifications of the
-islet called Ortygia, strengthening it as a position to be held
-separately from Achradina and the remaining city. He constructed
-a new wall, provided with lofty turrets and elaborate defences of
-every kind, immediately outside of the mole which connected this
-islet with Sicily. On the outside of this new wall, he provided
-convenient places for transacting business, porticos spacious enough
-to shelter a considerable multitude, and seemingly a distinct strong
-fort, destined for a public magazine of corn.<a id="FNanchor_978"
-href="#Footnote_978" class="fnanchor">[978]</a> It suited his purpose
-that the trade of the town should be carried on, and the persons
-of the traders congregated, under or near the outer walls of his
-peculiar fortress. As a farther means of security, he also<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_459">[p. 459]</span> erected a distinct
-citadel or acropolis within the islet and behind the new wall. The
-citadel was close to the Lesser Harbor or Portus Lakkius. Its walls
-were so extended as to embrace the whole of this harbor, closing
-it up in such a way as to admit only one ship at a time, though
-there was room for sixty ships within. He was thus provided with an
-almost impregnable stronghold, not only securing him against attack
-from the more numerous population in the outer city, but enabling
-him to attack them whenever he chose,—and making him master, at the
-same time, of the grand means of war and defence against foreign
-enemies.</p>
-
-<p>To provide a fortress in the islet of Ortygia, was one step
-towards perpetual dominion at Syracuse; to fill it with devoted
-adherents, was another. For Dionysius, the instruments of dominion
-were his mercenary troops and body-guards; men chosen by himself from
-their aptitude to his views, identified with him in interest, and
-consisting in large proportion not merely of foreigners, but even of
-liberated slaves. To these men he now proceeded to assign a permanent
-support and residence. He distributed among them the houses in the
-islet or inferior stronghold, expelling the previous proprietors, and
-permitting no one to reside there except his own intimate partisans
-and soldiers. Their quarters were in the islet, while he dwelt in
-the citadel,—a fortress within a fortress, sheltering his own person
-against the very garrison or standing army, by means of which he kept
-Syracuse in subjection.<a id="FNanchor_979" href="#Footnote_979"
-class="fnanchor">[979]</a> Having provided houses for his soldiers,
-by extruding the residents in Ortygia,—he proceeded to assign to them
-a comfortable maintenance, by the like wholesale dispossession of
-proprietors, and reappropriation of lands, without. He distributed
-anew the entire Syracusan territory; reserving the best lands, and
-the best shares, for his own friends and for the officers in command
-of his mercenaries,—and apportioning the remaining territory in equal
-shares to all the inhabitants, citizens as well as non-citizens. By
-this distribution the latter became henceforward citizens as well
-as the former; so far at least, as any man<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_460">[p. 460]</span> could be properly called a citizen
-under his despotism. Even the recently enfranchised slaves became new
-citizens and proprietors as well as the rest.<a id="FNanchor_980"
-href="#Footnote_980" class="fnanchor">[980]</a></p>
-
-<p>Respecting this sweeping change of property, it is mortifying to
-have no farther information than is contained in two or three brief
-sentences of Diodorus. As a basis for entire redivision of lands,
-Dionysius would find himself already possessed of the property
-of those Syracusan Horsemen or Knights whom he had recently put
-down or banished. As a matter of course, their property would be
-confiscated, and would fall into his possession for reassignment.
-It would doubtless be considerable, inasmuch as these Horsemen
-were for the most part wealthy men. From this basis, Dionysius
-enlarged his scheme to the more comprehensive idea of a general
-spoliation and reappropriation, for the benefit of his partisans
-and his mercenary soldiers. The number of these last we do not
-know; but on an occasion not very long afterwards, the mercenaries
-under him are mentioned as amounting to about ten thousand.<a
-id="FNanchor_981" href="#Footnote_981" class="fnanchor">[981]</a>
-To ensure landed properties to each of these men, together with
-the monopoly of residence in Ortygia, nothing less than a sweeping
-confiscation would suffice. How far the equality of share, set forth
-in principle, was or could be adhered to in practice, we cannot
-say. The maxim of allowing residence in Ortygia to none but friends
-and partisans, passed from Dionysius into a traditional observance
-for future anti-popular governments of Syracuse. The Roman consul
-Marcellus, when he subdued the city near two centuries afterwards,
-prescribed the rule of admitting into the islet none but Romans, and
-of excluding all native Syracusan residents.<a id="FNanchor_982"
-href="#Footnote_982" class="fnanchor">[982]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_461">[p. 461]</span></p>
-
-<p>Such mighty works of fortification, combined with so extensive
-a revolution both in property and in domicile, cannot have been
-accomplished in less than a considerable time, nor without provoking
-considerable resistance in detail. Nor is it to be forgotten that
-the pecuniary cost of such fortifications must have been very
-heavy. How Dionysius contrived to levy the money, we do not know.
-Aristotle informs us that the contributions which he exacted from
-the Syracusans were so exorbitant, that within the space of five
-years, the citizens had paid into his hands their entire property;
-that is, twenty per cent. per annum upon their whole property.<a
-id="FNanchor_983" href="#Footnote_983" class="fnanchor">[983]</a> To
-what years this statement refers, we do not know; nor what was the
-amount of contribution exacted on the special occasion now before us.
-But we may justly infer from it that Dionysius would not scruple to
-lay his hand heavily upon the Syracusans for the purpose of defraying
-the cost of his fortifications; and that the simultaneous burthen
-of large contributions would thus come to aggravate the painful
-spoliation and transfers of property, and the still more intolerable
-mischiefs of a numerous standing army domiciled as masters in the
-heart of the city. Under such circumstances, we are not surprised
-to learn that the discontent among the Syracusans was extreme, and
-that numbers of them were greatly mortified at having let slip the
-favorable opportunity of excluding Dionysius, when the Horsemen
-were actually for a moment masters of Syracuse, before he suddenly
-came back from Gela.<a id="FNanchor_984" href="#Footnote_984"
-class="fnanchor">[984]</a></p>
-
-<p>Whatever might be the extent of indignation actually felt,
-there could be no concert or manifestation in Syracuse, under a
-watchful despot with the overwhelming force assembled in Ortygia.
-But a suitable moment speedily occurred. Having completed his
-fortress and new appropriation for the assured maintenance of
-the mercenaries, Dionysius resolved to attempt a conquest of the
-autonomous Sikel tribes in the interior of the island, some of whom
-had sided with Carthage in the recent war. He accordingly marched out
-with a military force, consisting partly of his mercenary troops,
-part<span class="pagenum" id="Page_462">[p. 462]</span>ly of armed
-Syracusan citizens under a commander named Dorikus. While he was
-laying siege to the town of Erbessus, the Syracusan troops, finding
-themselves assembled in arms and animated with one common sentiment,
-began to concert measures for open resistance to Dionysius. The
-commander Dorikus, in striving to repress these manifestations,
-lifted up his hand to chastise one of the most mutinous speakers;<a
-id="FNanchor_985" href="#Footnote_985" class="fnanchor">[985]</a>
-upon which the soldiers rushed forward in a body to defend him. They
-slew Dorikus, and proclaimed themselves again, with loud shouts,
-free Syracusan citizens; calling upon all their comrades in the camp
-to unite against the despot. They also sent a message forthwith to
-the town of Ætna, inviting the immediate junction of the Syracusan
-Horsemen, who had sought shelter there in their exile from Dionysius.
-Their appeal found the warmest sympathy among the Syracusan soldiers
-in the camp, all of whom declared themselves decisively against the
-despot, and prepared for every effort to recover their liberty.</p>
-
-<p>So rapidly did this sentiment break out into vehement and
-unanimous action, that Dionysius was too much intimidated to attempt
-to put it down at once by means of his mercenaries. Profiting by
-the lesson which he had received, after the return march from
-Gela, he raised the siege of Erbessus forthwith, and returned
-to Syracuse to make sure of his position in Ortygia, before his
-Syracusan enemies could arrive there. Meanwhile the latter, thus
-left full of joy and confidence, as well as masters of the camp,
-chose for their leaders those soldiers who had slain Dorikus, and
-found themselves speedily reinforced by the Horsemen, or returning
-exiles from Ætna. Resolved to spare no effort for liberating
-Syracuse, they sent envoys to Messênê and Rhegium, as well as to
-Corinth, for aid; while they at the same time marched with all their
-force to Syracuse, and encamped on the heights of Epipolæ. It is
-not clear whether they remained in this position, or whether they
-were enabled, through the sympathy of the population, to possess
-themselves farther of the outer city Achradina, and with its
-appendages Tycha and Neapolis. Dionysius was certainly cut off from
-all communication with the country; but he maintained himself in his
-impregnable position in Ortygia, now exclusively occupied by his
-chosen<span class="pagenum" id="Page_463">[p. 463]</span> partisans
-and mercenaries. If he even continued master of Achradina, he must
-have been prevented from easy communication with it. The assailants
-extended themselves under the walls of Ortygia, from Epipolæ to
-the Greater as well as the Lesser Harbor.<a id="FNanchor_986"
-href="#Footnote_986" class="fnanchor">[986]</a> A considerable
-naval force was sent to their aid from Messênê and Rhegium, giving
-to them the means of blocking him up on the seaside; while the
-Corinthians, though they could grant no farther assistance, testified
-their sympathy by sending Nikoteles as adviser.<a id="FNanchor_987"
-href="#Footnote_987" class="fnanchor">[987]</a> The leaders of the
-movement proclaimed Syracuse again a free city, offered large rewards
-for the head of Dionysius, and promised equal citizenship to all the
-mercenaries who should desert him.</p>
-
-<p>Several of the mercenaries, attracted by such offers, as well
-as intimidated by that appearance of irresistible force which
-characterizes the first burst of a popular movement, actually came
-over and were well received. Everything seemed to promise success to
-the insurgents, who, not content with the slow process of blockade,
-brought up battering-machines, and vehemently assaulted the walls
-of Ortygia. Nothing now saved Dionysius except those elaborate
-fortifications which he had so recently erected, defying all attack.
-And even though sheltered by them, his position appeared to be so
-desperate, that desertion from Ortygia every day increased. He
-himself began to abandon the hope of maintaining his dominion;
-discussing with his intimate friends the alternative, between death
-under a valiant but hopeless resistance, and safety purchased by
-a dishonorable flight. There remained but one means of rescue: to
-purchase the immediate aid of a body of twelve hundred mercenary
-Campanian cavalry, now in the Carthaginian service, and stationed
-probably at Gela or Agrigentum. His brother-in-law Polyxenus
-advised him to mount his swiftest horse, to visit in person the
-Campanians, and bring them to the relief of Ortygia. But this
-counsel was strenuously resisted by two intimate friends,—Helôris
-and Megaklês,—who both impressed upon him, that the royal robe was
-the only honorable funeral garment, and that, instead of quitting
-his post at full speed, he ought to cling to it until he was
-dragged away by the leg.<a id="FNanchor_988" href="#Footnote_988"
-class="fnanchor">[988]</a> Accordingly, Dionysius determined to
-hold out, without quitting Ortygia; sending private en<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_464">[p. 464]</span>voys to the Campanians,
-with promises of large pay if they would march immediately to his
-defence. The Carthaginians were probably under obligation not to
-oppose this, having ensured to Dionysius by special article of treaty
-the possession of Syracuse.</p>
-
-<p>To gain time for their arrival, by deluding and disarming the
-assailants, Dionysius affected to abandon all hope of prolonged
-defence, and sent to request permission to quit the city, along with
-his private friends and effects. Permission was readily granted
-to him to depart with five triremes. But as soon as this evidence
-of success had been acquired, the assailants without abandoned
-themselves to extravagant joy and confidence, considering Dionysius
-as already subdued, and the siege as concluded. Not merely was all
-farther attack suspended, but the forces were in a great measure
-broken up. The Horsemen were disbanded, by a proceeding alike unjust
-and ungrateful, to be sent back to Ætna; while the hoplites dispersed
-about the country to their various lands and properties. The same
-difficulty of keeping a popular force long together for any military
-operation requiring time, which had been felt when the Athenians
-besieged their usurpers Kylon and Peisistratus in the acropolis,<a
-id="FNanchor_989" href="#Footnote_989" class="fnanchor">[989]</a> was
-now experienced in regard to the siege of Ortygia. Tired with the
-length of the siege, the Syracusans blindly abandoned themselves to
-the delusive assurance held out by Dionysius; without taking heed to
-maintain their force and efficiency undiminished, until his promised
-departure should be converted into a reality. In this unprepared
-and disorderly condition, they were surprised by the sudden arrival
-of the Campanians,<a id="FNanchor_990" href="#Footnote_990"
-class="fnanchor">[990]</a> who, attacking and defeating them with
-considerable loss, forced<span class="pagenum" id="Page_465">[p.
-465]</span> their way through to join Dionysius in Ortygia. At the
-same time, a reinforcement of three hundred fresh mercenaries reached
-him by sea. The face of affairs was now completely changed. The
-recent defeat produced among the assailants not only discouragement,
-but also mutual recrimination and quarrel. Some insisted upon still
-prosecuting the siege of Ortygia, while others, probably the friends
-of the recently dismissed Horsemen, declared in favor of throwing it
-up altogether and joining the Horsemen at Ætna; a resolution, which
-they seem at once to have executed. Observing his opponents thus
-enfeebled and torn by dissension, Dionysius sallied out and attacked
-them, near the suburb called Neapolis or Newtown, on the south-west
-of Achradina. He was victorious, and forced them to disperse. But
-he took great pains to prevent slaughter of the fugitives, riding
-up himself to restrain his own troops; and he subsequently buried
-the slain with due solemnity. He was anxious by these proceedings
-to conciliate the remainder; for the most warlike portion of his
-opponents had retired to Ætna, where no less than seven thousand
-hoplites were now assembled along with the Horsemen. Dionysius sent
-thither envoys to invite them to return to Syracuse, promising the
-largest amnesty for the past. But it was in vain that his envoys
-expatiated upon his recent forbearance towards the fugitives and
-decent interment of the slain. Few could be induced to come back,
-except such as had left their wives and families at Syracuse in his
-power. The larger proportion, refusing all trust in his word and all
-submission to his command, remained in exile at Ætna. Such as did
-return were well treated, in hopes of inducing the rest gradually
-to follow their example.<a id="FNanchor_991" href="#Footnote_991"
-class="fnanchor">[991]</a></p>
-
-<p>Thus was Dionysius rescued from a situation apparently desperate,
-and reëstablished in his dominion; chiefly through the rash
-presumption (as on the former occasion after the retreat from Gela),
-the want of persevering union, and the absence of any commanding
-leader, on the part of his antagonists. His first proceeding was
-to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_466">[p. 466]</span> dismiss the
-newly-arrived Campanians. For though he had to thank them mainly
-for his restoration, he was well aware that they were utterly
-faithless, and that on the first temptation they were likely
-to turn against him.<a id="FNanchor_992" href="#Footnote_992"
-class="fnanchor">[992]</a> But he adopted more efficient means for
-strengthening his dominion in Syracuse, and for guarding against a
-repetition of that danger from which he had so recently escaped.
-He was assisted in his proceedings by a Lacedæmonian envoy named
-Aristus, recently despatched by the Spartans for the ostensible
-purpose of bringing about an amicable adjustment of parties at
-Syracuse. While Nikoteles, who had been sent from Corinth, espoused
-the cause of the Syracusan people, and put himself at their head
-to obtain for them more or less of free government,—Aristus, on
-the contrary, lent himself to the schemes of Dionysius. He seduced
-the people away from Nikoteles, whom he impeached and caused to be
-slain. Next, pretending himself to act along with the people, and to
-employ the great ascendency of Sparta in defence of their freedom,<a
-id="FNanchor_993" href="#Footnote_993" class="fnanchor">[993]</a>
-he gained their confidence and then betrayed them. The despot was
-thus enabled to strengthen himself more decisively than before, and
-probably to take off the effective popular leaders thus made known to
-him; while the mass of the citizens were profoundly discouraged by
-finding Sparta enlisted in the conspiracy against their liberties.</p>
-
-<p>Of this renovated tide of success Dionysius took advantage, to
-strike another important blow. During the season of harvest,<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_467">[p. 467]</span> while the citizens
-were busy in the fields, he caused the houses to be searched, and
-seized all the arms found therein. Not satisfied with thus robbing
-his opponents of the means of attack, he farther proceeded to
-construct additional fortifications around the islet of Ortygia,
-to augment his standing army of mercenaries, and to build fresh
-ships. Feeling more than ever that his dominion was repugnant to
-the Syracusans, and rested only on naked force, he thus surrounded
-himself with precautions probably stronger than any other Grecian
-despot had ever accumulated. He was yet farther strengthened by
-the pronounced and active support of Sparta, now at the maximum of
-her imperial ascendency;<a id="FNanchor_994" href="#Footnote_994"
-class="fnanchor">[994]</a> and by the presence of the mighty Lysander
-at Syracuse as her ambassador to countenance and exalt him.<a
-id="FNanchor_995" href="#Footnote_995" class="fnanchor">[995]</a>
-The Spartan alliance, however, did not prevent him from enrolling
-among his mercenaries a considerable fraction of the Messenians,
-the bitter enemies of Sparta; who were now driven out of Naupaktus
-and Kephallenia, with no other possession left except their arms<a
-id="FNanchor_996" href="#Footnote_996" class="fnanchor">[996]</a>—and
-whose restoration to Peloponnesus by Epaminondas, about thirty years
-afterwards, has been described in a preceding chapter.</p>
-
-<p>So large a mercenary force, while the people in Syracuse were
-prostrate and in no condition for resistance, naturally tempted
-Dionysius to seek conquest as well as plunder beyond the border. Not
-choosing as yet to provoke a war with Carthage, he turned his arms
-to the north and north-west of the Syracusan territory; the Grecian
-(Chalkidic or Ionic) cities, Naxus, Katana, and Leontini—and the
-Sikels, towards the centre of Sicily. The three Chalkidic cities
-were the old enemies of Syracuse, but Leontini had been conquered by
-the Syracusans even before the Athenian expedition, and remained as
-a Syracusan possession until the last peace with the Carthaginians,
-when it had been declared independent. Naxus and Katana had contrived
-to retain their independence against Syracuse, even after the ruin
-of the Athenian armament under Nikias. At the head of a powerful
-force, Dionysius marched out from Syracuse first against the town of
-Ætna, occupied by a considerable body of Syracusan exiles hostile to
-his dominion.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_468">[p. 468]</span>
-Though the place was strong by situation,<a id="FNanchor_997"
-href="#Footnote_997" class="fnanchor">[997]</a> yet these men,
-too feeble to resist, were obliged to evacuate it; upon which he
-proceeded to attack Leontini. But on summoning the inhabitants to
-surrender, he found his propositions rejected, and every preparation
-made for a strenuous defence; so that he could do nothing more than
-plunder the territory around, and then advanced onward into the
-interior Sikel territory, towards Enna and Erbita. But his march
-in this direction was little more than a feint, for the purpose of
-masking his real views upon Naxus and Katana, with both which cities
-he had already opened intrigues. Arkesilaus, general of Katana, and
-Prokles, general of Naxus, were both carrying on corrupt negotiations
-for the purpose of selling to him the liberty of their native cities.
-Until the negotiations were completed, Dionysius wished to appear
-as if turning his arms elsewhere, and therefore marched against
-Enna. Here he entered into conspiracy with an Ennæan citizen named
-Aeimnestus, whom he instigated to seize the sceptre of his native
-town,—by promises of assistance, on condition of being himself
-admitted afterwards. Aeimnestus made the attempt and succeeded,
-but did not fulfil his engagement to Dionysius; who resented this
-proceeding so vehemently, that he assisted the Ennæans in putting
-down Aeimnestus, delivered him as prisoner into their hands, and then
-retired, satisfied with such revenge, without farther meddling. He
-next marched against Erbita, before which he passed his time with
-little or no result, until the bribes promised at Naxus and Katana
-had taken effect. At length the terms were fully settled. Dionysius
-was admitted at night by Arkesilaus into Katana, seized the city,
-disarmed the inhabitants, and planted there a powerful garrison.
-Naxus was next put into his hands, by the like corruption on the
-part of Prokles; who was rewarded with a large bribe, and with the
-privilege of preserving his kinsmen. Both cities were given up to
-be plundered by his soldiers; after which the walls as well as the
-houses were demolished, and the inhabitants sold as slaves. The
-dismantled site of Katana was then assigned to a body of Campanian
-mercenaries in the service of Dionysius, who however retained in
-his possession hostages for their fidelity;<a id="FNanchor_998"
-href="#Footnote_998" class="fnanchor">[998]</a> the site of Naxus
-to the indigenous Sikels in the neighborhood. These captures struck
-so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_469">[p. 469]</span> much terror
-into the Leontines, that when Dionysius renewed his attack upon
-them, they no longer felt competent to resist. He required them to
-surrender their city, to remove to Syracuse, and there to reside
-for the future as citizens; which term meant, at the actual time,
-as subjects of his despotism. The Leontines obeyed the requisition,
-and their city thus again became an appendage of Syracuse.<a
-id="FNanchor_999" href="#Footnote_999" class="fnanchor">[999]</a></p>
-
-<p>These conquests of Dionysius, achieved mainly by corrupting the
-generals of Naxos and Katana, were of serious moment, and spread
-so much alarm among the Sikels of the interior, that Archonides,
-the Sikel prince of Erbita, thought it prudent to renounce his town
-and soil; withdrawing to a new site beyond the Nebrode mountains,
-on the northern coast of the island, more out of the reach of
-Syracusan attack. Here, with his mercenary soldiers and with a large
-portion of his people who voluntarily accompanied him, he founded
-the town of Alæsa.<a id="FNanchor_1000" href="#Footnote_1000"
-class="fnanchor">[1000]</a></p>
-
-<p>Strengthened at home by these successes abroad, the sanguine
-despot of Syracuse was stimulated to still greater enterprises.
-He resolved to commence aggressive war with the Carthaginians.
-But against such formidable enemies, large preparations were
-indispensable, defensive as well as offensive, before his design
-could be proclaimed. First, he took measures to ensure the
-defensibility of Syracuse against all contingencies. Five Grecian
-cities on the south of the island, one of them the second in Sicily,
-had already undergone the deplorable fate of being sacked by a
-Carthaginian host; a calamity, which might possibly be in reserve for
-Syracuse also, especially if she herself provoked a war, unless the
-most elaborate precautions were taken to render a successful blockade
-impossible.</p>
-
-<p>Now the Athenian blockade under Nikias had impressed valuable
-lessons on the mind of every Syracusan. The city had then been
-well-nigh blocked up by a wall of circumvallation carried from sea
-to sea; which was actually more than half completed, and would have
-been entirely completed, had the original com<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_470">[p. 470]</span>mander been Demosthenes instead of
-Nikias. The prodigious importance of the slope of Epipolæ to the
-safety of the city had been demonstrated by the most unequivocal
-evidence. In my seventh volume, I have already described the site
-of Syracuse and the relation of this slope to the outer city called
-Achradina. Epipolæ was a gentle ascent west of Achradina. It was
-bordered, along both the north side and the south side, by lines of
-descending cliff, cut down precipitously, about twenty feet deep
-in their lowest part. These lines of cliff nearly converged at the
-summit of the slope, called Euryalus; leaving a narrow pass or road
-between elevated banks, which communicated with the country both
-north and west of Syracuse. Epipolæ thus formed a triangle upon an
-inclined plane, sloping upward from its base, the outer wall of
-Achradina, to its apex at Euryalus; and having its two sides formed,
-the one by the northern, the other by the southern, line of cliffs.
-This apex formed a post of the highest importance, commanding the
-narrow road which approached Epipolæ from its western extremity or
-summit, and through which alone it was easy for an army to get on
-the declivity of Epipolæ, since the cliffs on each side were steep,
-though less steep on the northern side than on the southern.<a
-id="FNanchor_1001" href="#Footnote_1001" class="fnanchor">[1001]</a>
-Unless an enemy acquired possession of this slope, Syracuse could
-never be blocked up from the northern sea at Trogilus to the Great
-Harbor; an enterprise, which Nikias and the Athenians were near
-accomplishing, because they first surprised from the northward the
-position of Euryalus, and from thence poured down upon the slope
-of Epipolæ. I have already described, in my seventh volume, how
-the arrival of Gylippus deprived them of superiority in the field,
-at a time when their line of circumvallation was already half
-finished,—having been carried from the centre of Epipolæ southward
-down to Great Harbor, and being partially completed from the same
-point across the northern half of Epipolæ to the sea at Trogilus; how
-he next intercepted their farther progress, by carrying out, from
-the outer wall of Achradina, a cross wall traversing their intended
-line of circumvallation and ending at the northern cliff; how he
-finally erected a fort or guard-post on the summit of Euryalus, which
-he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_471">[p. 471]</span> connected with
-the cross-wall just mentioned by a single wall of junction carried
-down the slope of Epipolæ.<a id="FNanchor_1002" href="#Footnote_1002"
-class="fnanchor">[1002]</a></p>
-
-<p>Both the danger which Syracuse had then incurred, and the means
-whereby it had been obviated, were fresh in the recollection of
-Dionysius. Since the Athenian siege, the Syracusans may perhaps
-have preserved the fort erected by Gylippus near Euryalus; but
-they had pulled down the wall of junction, the cross-wall, and the
-outer wall of protection constructed between the arrival of Nikias
-in Sicily and his commencement of the siege, enclosing the sacred
-precinct of Apollo Temenites. The outer city of Syracuse was thus
-left with nothing but the wall of Achradina, with its two suburbs or
-excrescences, Tychê and Neapolis. Dionysius now resolved to provide
-for Syracuse a protection substantially similar to that contrived
-by Gylippus, yet more comprehensive, elaborate, and permanent. He
-carried out an outer line of defence, starting from the sea near
-the port called Trogilus, enclosing the suburb called Tychê (which
-adjoined Achradina to the north-west), and then ascending westward,
-along the brink of the northern cliff of Epipolæ, to the summit of
-that slope at Euryalus. The two extremities thus became connected
-together,—not as in the time of Gylippus,<a id="FNanchor_1003"
-href="#Footnote_1003" class="fnanchor">[1003]</a> by a single
-cross-wall carried out from the city-wall to the northern cliff,
-and then joined at an angle by another single wall descending the
-slope of Epipolæ from Euryalus, but,—by one continuous new line
-bordering the northern cliff down to the sea. And the new line,
-instead of being a mere single wall, was now built under the advice
-of the best engineers, with lofty and frequent towers interspersed
-throughout its length, to serve both as means of defence and as
-permanent quarters for soldiers. Its length was thirty stadia
-(about three and a half English miles); it was constructed of
-large stones carefully hewn, some of them four feet in length.<a
-id="FNanchor_1004" href="#Footnote_1004" class="fnanchor">[1004]</a>
-The quarries at hand supplied abundant materials, and for the labor
-necessary, Dionysius brought together all the population of the city
-and its neighborhood, out of whom he selected sixty thousand of the
-most<span class="pagenum" id="Page_472">[p. 472]</span> effective
-hands, to work on the wall. Others were ordered to cut the stones
-in the quarry, while six thousand teams of oxen were put in harness
-to draw them to the spot. The work was set out by furlongs and by
-smaller spaces of one hundred feet each, to regiments of suitable
-number, each under the direction of an overseer.<a id="FNanchor_1005"
-href="#Footnote_1005" class="fnanchor">[1005]</a></p>
-
-<p>As yet, we have heard little about Dionysius except acts of fraud,
-violence, and spoliation, for the purpose of establishing his own
-dominion over Syracuse, and aggrandizing himself by new conquests
-on the borders. But this new fortification was a work of different
-import. Instead of being, like his forts and walls in Ortygia,
-a guardhouse both of defence and aggression merely for himself
-against the people of Syracuse,—it was a valuable protection to the
-people, and to himself along with them, against foreign besiegers.
-It tended much to guarantee Syracuse from those disasters which had
-so recently befallen Agrigentum and the other cities. Accordingly,
-it was exceeding popular among the Syracusans, and produced between
-them and Dionysius a sentiment of friendship and harmony such as had
-not before been seen. Every man labored at the work not merely with
-good will, but with enthusiasm; while the despot himself displayed
-unwearied zeal, passing whole days on the spot, and taking part in
-all the hardship and difficulty. He showed himself everywhere amidst
-the mass, as an unguarded citizen, without suspicion or reserve,
-in marked contrast with the harshness of his previous demeanor,<a
-id="FNanchor_1006" href="#Footnote_1006" class="fnanchor">[1006]</a>
-proclaiming rewards for the best and most rapid workmen; he also
-provided attendance or relief for those whose strength gave way.
-Such was the emulation thus inspired, that the numbers assembled,
-often toiling by night as well as by day, completed the whole wall
-in the space of twenty days. The fort at Euryalus, which formed the
-termination of this newly-constructed line of wall, is probably
-not to be understood as comprised within so short a period of
-execution; at least in its complete consummation. For the defences
-provided at this fort (either now or at a later<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_473">[p. 473]</span> period) were prodigious in extent as
-well as elaborate in workmanship; and the remains of them exhibit,
-even to modern observers, the most complete specimen preserved to us
-of ancient fortification.<a id="FNanchor_1007" href="#Footnote_1007"
-class="fnanchor">[1007]</a> To bring them into such a condition
-must have occupied a longer time than twenty days. Even as to the
-wall, perhaps, twenty days is rather to be understood as indicating
-the time required for the essential continuity of its line, leaving
-towers, gates, etc., to be added afterwards.</p>
-
-<p>To provide defence for Syracuse against a besieging army, however,
-was only a small part of the extensive schemes of Dionysius. What he
-meditated was aggressive war against the Carthaginians; for which
-purpose, he not only began to accumulate preparations of every kind
-on the most extensive scale, but also modified his policy both
-towards the Syracusans and towards the other Sicilian Greeks.</p>
-
-<p>Towards the Syracusans his conduct underwent a material change.
-The cruelty and oppression which had hitherto marked his dominion
-was discontinued; he no longer put men to death, or sent them into
-banishment, with the same merciless hand as before. In place of
-such tyranny, he now substituted comparative mildness, forbearance,
-and conciliation.<a id="FNanchor_1008" href="#Footnote_1008"
-class="fnanchor">[1008]</a> Where the system had before been so
-fraught with positive maltreatment to many and alarm to all, the
-mitigation of it must have been sensibly as well as immediately
-felt. And when we make present to our minds the relative position of
-Dionysius and the Syracusans, we shall see that the evil inflicted by
-his express order by no means represented the whole amount of evil
-which they suffered. He occupied the impregnable fortress of Ortygia,
-with the entire harbor, docks, and maritime means of the city. The
-numerous garrison in his pay, and devoted to him, consisted in great
-part of barbaric or non-Hellenic soldiers and of liberated slaves,
-probably also non-Hellenic. The Syracusans resident in the outer city
-and around were not only destitute of the means of defensive concert
-and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_474">[p. 474]</span> organization,
-but were also disarmed. For these mercenaries either pay was to
-be provided from the contributions of the citizens, or lands from
-their properties; for them, and for other partisans also, Dionysius
-had enforced spoliations and transfers of land and house-property
-by wholesale.<a id="FNanchor_1009" href="#Footnote_1009"
-class="fnanchor">[1009]</a> Now, while the despot himself was
-inflicting tyrannical sentences for his own purposes, we may be sure
-that these men, the indispensable instruments of his tyranny, would
-neither of themselves be disposed to respect the tranquillity of
-the other citizens, nor be easily constrained to do so. It was not,
-therefore, merely from the systematic misrule of the chief that the
-Syracusans had to suffer, but also from the insolence and unruly
-appetites of the subordinates. And accordingly they would be doubly
-gainers, when Dionysius, from anxiety to attack the Carthaginians,
-thought it prudent to soften the rigor of his own proceedings; since
-his example, and in case of need his interference, would restrict the
-license of his own partisans. The desire for foreign conquest made
-it now his interest to conciliate some measure of goodwill from the
-Syracusans; or at least to silence antipathies which might become
-embarrassing if they broke out in the midst of a war. And he had in
-this case the advantage of resting on another antipathy, powerful
-and genuine in their minds. Hating as well as fearing Carthage,
-the Syracusans cordially sympathized in the aggressive schemes of
-Dionysius against her; which held out a prospect of relief from the
-tyranny under which they groaned, and some chance of procuring a
-restoration of the arms snatched from them.<a id="FNanchor_1010"
-href="#Footnote_1010" class="fnanchor">[1010]</a></p>
-
-<p>Towards the Sicilian Greeks, also, the conduct of Dionysius was
-mainly influenced by his anti-Carthaginian projects, which made him
-eager to put aside, or at least to defer, all possibilities of war
-in other quarters. The inhabitants of Rhegium, on the Italian side
-of the Strait of Messina, had recently manifested a disposition to
-attack him. They were of common Chalkidic origin with Naxos and
-Katana, the two cities which Dionysius had recently conquered and
-enslaved. Sixteen years before, when the powerful Athenian armament
-visited Sicily with the ostensible view of protecting the Chalkidic
-cities against Syracuse, the Rhegines in spite of their fellowship
-of race, had refused the invitation of Nikias<a id="FNanchor_1011"
-href="#Footnote_1011" class="fnanchor">[1011]</a> to lend assistance,
-being then afraid of Athens.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_475">[p.
-475]</span> But subsequent painful experience had taught them, that
-to residents in or near Sicily, Syracuse was the more formidable
-enemy of the two. The ruin of Naxus and Katana, with the great
-extension of Syracusan dominion northward, had filled them with
-apprehension from Dionysius, similar to the fears of Carthage,
-inspired to the Syracusans themselves by the disasters of Agrigentum
-and Gela. Anxious to revenge their enslaved kinsmen, the Rhegines
-projected an attack upon Dionysius before his power should become
-yet more formidable; a resolution, in which they were greatly
-confirmed by the instigations of the Syracusan exiles (now driven
-from Ætna and the other neighboring cities to Rhegium), confident
-in their assurances that insurrection would break out against
-Dionysius at Syracuse, so soon as any foreign succor should be
-announced as approaching. Envoys were sent across the strait to
-Messênê, soliciting coöperation against Dionysius, upon the urgent
-plea that the ruin of Naxus and Katana could not be passed over,
-either in generosity or in prudence, by neighbors on either side of
-the strait. These representations made so much impression on the
-generals of Messênê, that without consulting the public assembly,
-they forthwith summoned the military force of the city, and marched
-along with the Rhegines towards the Syracusan frontier,—six thousand
-Rhegine and four thousand Messenian hoplites,—six hundred Rhegine
-and four hundred Messenian horsemen,—with fifty Rhegine triremes.
-But when they reached the frontiers of the Messenian territory,
-a large portion of the soldiers refused to follow their generals
-farther. A citizen named Laomedon headed the opposition, contending
-that the generals had no authority to declare war without a public
-vote of the city, and that it was imprudent to attack Dionysius
-unprovoked. Such was the effect of these remonstrances, that the
-Messenian soldiers returned back to their city; while the Rhegines,
-believing themselves to be inadequate to the enterprise single
-handed, went home also.<a id="FNanchor_1012" href="#Footnote_1012"
-class="fnanchor">[1012]</a></p>
-
-<p>Apprised of the attack meditated, Dionysius had already led his
-troops to defend the Syracusan frontier. But he now reconducted them
-back to Syracuse, and listened favorably to propositions for peace
-which speedily reached him, from Rhegium and<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_476">[p. 476]</span> Messênê.<a id="FNanchor_1013"
-href="#Footnote_1013" class="fnanchor">[1013]</a> He was anxious
-to conciliate them for the present, at all price, in order that
-the Carthaginians, when he came to execute his plans, might find
-no Grecian allies to coöperate with them in Sicily. He acquired
-an influence in Messênê, by making to the city large concessions
-of conterminous territory; on which side of the border, or how
-acquired, we do not know. He farther endeavored to open an intimate
-connection with Rhegium by marrying a Rhegine wife; with which
-view he sent a formal message to the citizens, asking permission
-to contract such an alliance, accompanied with a promise to confer
-upon them important benefits, both in territorial aggrandizement
-and in other ways. After a public debate, the Rhegines declined
-his proposition. The feeling in their city was decidedly hostile
-to Dionysius, as the recent destroyer of Naxus and Katana; and
-it appears that some of the speakers expressed themselves with
-contemptuous asperity, remarking that the daughter of the public
-executioner was the only fit wife for him.<a id="FNanchor_1014"
-href="#Footnote_1014" class="fnanchor">[1014]</a> Taken by itself,
-the refusal would be sufficiently galling to Dionysius. But when
-coupled with such insulting remarks (probably made in public debate
-in the presence of his own envoys, for it seems not credible
-that the words should have been embodied in the formal reply or
-resolution of the assembly<a id="FNanchor_1015" href="#Footnote_1015"
-class="fnanchor">[1015]</a>), it left the bitterest animosity; a
-feeling, which we shall hereafter find in full operation.</p>
-
-<p>Refused at Rhegium, Dionysius sent to prefer a similar request,
-with similar offers, at the neighboring city of Lokri; where
-it was favorably entertained. It is remarkable that Aristotle
-comments upon this acquiescence of the Lokrians as an act of grave
-imprudence, and as dictated only by the anxiety of the principal
-citizens, in an oligarchical government, to seek for aggrandizement
-to themselves out of such an alliance. The request would not have
-been granted (Aristotle observes) either in a democracy or in a
-well-regulated aristocracy. The marital connection now contracted
-by Dionysius with a Lokrian female, Doris, the daughter of a
-citizen of distinction named Xenetus, produced as an ultimate
-conse<span class="pagenum" id="Page_477">[p. 477]</span>quence
-the overthrow of the oligarchy of Lokri.<a id="FNanchor_1016"
-href="#Footnote_1016" class="fnanchor">[1016]</a> And even among
-the Lokrians, the request was not granted without opposition. A
-citizen named Aristeides (one of the companions of Plato), whose
-daughter Dionysius had solicited in marriage, returned for answer
-that he would rather see her dead than united to a despot. In revenge
-for this bitter reply, Dionysius caused the sons of Aristeides
-to be put to death.<a id="FNanchor_1017" href="#Footnote_1017"
-class="fnanchor">[1017]</a></p>
-
-<p>But the amicable relations which Dionysius was at so much pains
-to establish with the Greek cities near the Strait of Messênê,
-were destined chiefly to leave him free for preparations against
-Carthage; which preparations he now commenced on a gigantic scale.
-Efforts so great and varied, combined not merely with forecast but
-with all the scientific appliances then available, have not hitherto
-come before us throughout this history. The terrible effect with
-which Hannibal had recently employed his battering-machines against
-Selinus and Himera, stimulated Dionysius to provide himself with the
-like implements in greater abundance than any Greek general had ever
-before possessed. He collected at Syracuse, partly by constraint,
-partly by allurement, all the best engineers, mechanists, armorers,
-artisans, etc., whom Sicily or Italy could furnish. He set them
-upon the construction of machines and other muniments of war, and
-upon the manufacture of arms offensive as well as defensive, with
-the greatest possible assiduity. The arms provided were of great
-variety; not merely such as were suitable for Grecian soldiers, heavy
-or light, but also such as were in use among the different barbaric
-tribes around the Mediterranean, Gauls, Iberians, Tyrrhenians, etc.,
-from whom Dionysius intended to hire mercenaries; so that every
-different soldier would be furnished, on arriving, with the sort
-of weapon which had become habitual to him. All Syracuse became a
-bustling military workshop,—not only the market-places, porticos,
-palæstræ, and large private houses, but also the fore-cham<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_478">[p. 478]</span>bers and back-chambers
-of the various temples. Dionysius distributed the busy multitude
-into convenient divisions, each with some eminent citizen as
-superintendent. Visiting them in person frequently, and reviewing
-their progress, he recompensed largely, and invited to his table,
-those who produced the greatest amount of finished work. As he
-farther offered premiums for inventive skill, the competition of
-ingenious mechanists originated several valuable warlike novelties;
-especially the great projectile engine for stones and darts, called
-Catapulta, which was now for the first time devised. We are told that
-the shields fabricated during this season of assiduous preparation
-were not less than one hundred and forty thousand in number, and
-the breast-plates fourteen thousand, many of them unrivalled
-in workmanship, destined for the body-guard and the officers.
-Helmets, spears, daggers, etc., with other arms and weapons in
-indefinite variety, were multiplied in corresponding proportion.<a
-id="FNanchor_1018" href="#Footnote_1018" class="fnanchor">[1018]</a>
-The magazines of arms, missiles, machines, and muniments of war
-in every variety, accumulated in Ortygia, continued stupendous in
-amount through the whole life of Dionysius, and even down to the
-downfall of his son.<a id="FNanchor_1019" href="#Footnote_1019"
-class="fnanchor">[1019]</a></p>
-
-<p>If the preparations for land-warfare were thus stupendous, those
-for sea-warfare were fully equal, if not superior. The docks of
-Syracuse were filled with the best ship-builders, carpenters, and
-artisans; numerous wood-cutters were sent to cut ship-timber on
-the well-clothed slopes of Ætna and the Calabrian Apennines; teams
-of oxen were then provided to drag it to the coast, from whence it
-was towed in rafts to Syracuse. The existing naval establishment
-of Syracuse comprised one hundred and ten triremes; the existing
-docks contained one hundred and fifty ship-houses, or covered slips
-for the purpose either of building or housing a trireme. But this
-was very inadequate to the conceptions of Dionysius, who forthwith
-undertook the construction of one hundred and sixty new ship-houses,
-each competent to hold two vessels,—and then commenced the building
-of new ships of war to the number of two hundred; while he at the
-same time put all<span class="pagenum" id="Page_479">[p. 479]</span>
-the existing vessels and docks into the best state of repair.
-Here too, as in the case of the catapulta, the ingenuity of his
-architects enabled him to stand forth as a maritime inventor. As
-yet, the largest ship of war which had ever moved on the Grecian or
-Mediterranean waters, was the trireme, which was rowed by three banks
-or tiers of oars. It was now three centuries since the first trireme
-had been constructed at Corinth and Samos by the inventive skill of
-the Corinthian Ameinokles:<a id="FNanchor_1020" href="#Footnote_1020"
-class="fnanchor">[1020]</a> it was not until the period succeeding
-the Persian invasion that even triremes had become extensively
-employed; nor had any larger vessels ever been thought of. The
-Athenians, who during the interval between the Persian invasion
-and their great disaster at Syracuse had stood preëminent and set
-the fashion in all nautical matters, were under no inducement to
-build above the size of the trireme. As their style of manœuvring
-consisted of rapid evolutions and changes in the ship’s direction,
-for the purpose of striking the weak parts of an enemy’s ship with
-the beak of their own,—so, if the size of their ship had been
-increased, her capacity for such nimble turns and movements would
-have been diminished. But the Syracusans had made no attempt to copy
-the rapid evolutions of the Athenian navy. On the contrary, when
-fighting against the latter in the confined harbor of Syracuse,<a
-id="FNanchor_1021" href="#Footnote_1021" class="fnanchor">[1021]</a>
-they had found every advantage in their massive build of ships, and
-straightforward impact of bow driven against bow. For them, the
-larger ships were the more suitable and efficient; so that Dionysius
-or his naval architects, full of ambitious aspirations, now struck
-out the plan of building ships of war with four or five banks of
-oars instead of three; that is, quadriremes, or quinqueremes,
-instead of triremes.<a id="FNanchor_1022" href="#Footnote_1022"
-class="fnanchor">[1022]</a> Not only did the Syracusan despot thus
-equip a naval force equal in number of ships to Athens in her best
-days; but he also exhibited ships larger than Athens had ever
-possessed, or than Greece had ever conceived.</p>
-
-<p>In all these offensive preparations against Carthage, as in
-the previous defences on Epipolæ, the spontaneous impulse of
-the Syracusans generally went hand in hand with Dionysius.<a
-id="FNanchor_1023" href="#Footnote_1023" class="fnanchor">[1023]</a>
-Their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_480">[p. 480]</span> sympathy
-and concurrence greatly promoted the success of his efforts, for
-this immense equipment against the common enemy. Even with all this
-sympathy, indeed, we are at a loss to understand, nor are we at all
-informed, how he found money to meet so prodigious an outlay.</p>
-
-<p>After the material means for war had thus been completed,—an
-operation which can hardly have occupied less than two or three
-years,—it remained to levy men. On this point, the ideas of Dionysius
-were not less aspiring. Besides his own numerous standing force, he
-enlisted all the most effective among the Syracusan citizens, as well
-as from the cities in his dependency. He sent friendly addresses,
-and tried to acquire popularity, among the general body of Greeks
-throughout the island. Of his large fleet, one-half was manned with
-Syracusan rowers, marines, and officers; the other half with seamen
-enlisted from abroad. He farther sent envoys both to Italy and to
-Peloponnesus to obtain auxiliaries, with offers of the most liberal
-pay. From Sparta, now at the height of her power, and courting his
-alliance as a means of perpetuity to her own empire, he received such
-warm encouragement, that he was enabled to enlist no inconsiderable
-numbers in Peloponnesus; while many barbaric or non-Hellenic soldiers
-from the western regions near the Mediterranean were hired also.<a
-id="FNanchor_1024" href="#Footnote_1024" class="fnanchor">[1024]</a>
-He at length succeeded, to his satisfaction, in collecting an
-aggregate army, formidable not less from numbers and bravery,
-than from elaborate and diversified equipment. His large and
-well-stocked armory (already noticed) enabled him to furnish each
-newly-arrived soldier, from all the different nations, with native
-and appropriate weapons.<a id="FNanchor_1025" href="#Footnote_1025"
-class="fnanchor">[1025]</a></p>
-
-<p>When all his preparations were thus complete, his last step
-was to celebrate his nuptials, a few days previous to the active
-commencement of the war. He married, at one and the same time,
-two wives,—the Lokrian Doris (already mentioned), and a Syracusan
-woman named Aristomachê, daughter of his partisan Hipparinus
-(and sister of Dion, respecting whom much will occur hereafter).
-The first use made of one among his newly-invented quinquereme
-vessels, was to sail to Lokri, decked out in the richest ornaments
-of gold and silver, for the purpose of conveying Doris<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_481">[p. 481]</span> in state to Ortygia.
-Aristomachê was also brought to his house in a splendid chariot
-with four white horses.<a id="FNanchor_1026" href="#Footnote_1026"
-class="fnanchor">[1026]</a> He celebrated his nuptials with both
-of them in his house on the same day; no one knew which bedchamber
-he visited first; and both of them continued constantly to live
-with him at the same table, with equal dignity, for many years.
-He had three children by Doris, the eldest of whom was Dionysius
-the Younger; and four by Aristomachê; but the latter was for a
-considerable time childless; which greatly chagrined Dionysius.
-Ascribing her barrenness to magical incantations, he put to death
-the mother of his other wife Doris, as the alleged worker of these
-mischievous influences.<a id="FNanchor_1027" href="#Footnote_1027"
-class="fnanchor">[1027]</a> It was the rumor at Syracuse that
-Aristomachê was the most beloved of the two. But Dionysius treated
-both of them well, and both of them equally; moreover his son by
-Doris succeeded him, though he had two sons by the other. His
-nuptials were celebrated with banquets and festive recreations,
-wherein all the Syracusan citizens as well as the soldiers partook.
-The scene was probably the more grateful to Dionysius, as he seems
-at this moment, when every man’s mind was full of vindictive impulse
-and expected victory against Carthage, to have enjoyed a real
-short-lived popularity, and to have been able to move freely among
-the people; without that fear of assassination which habitually
-tormented his life even in his inmost privacy and bedchamber—and
-that extremity of suspicion which did not except either his wives
-or his daughters.<a id="FNanchor_1028" href="#Footnote_1028"
-class="fnanchor">[1028]</a></p>
-
-<p>After a few days devoted to such fellowship and festivity,
-Dionysius convoked a public assembly, for the purpose of formally
-announcing the intended war. He reminded the Syracusans that the
-Carthaginians were common enemies to Greeks in general, but most
-of all to the Sicilian Greeks—as recent events but too plainly
-testified. He appealed to their generous sympathies on behalf of
-the five Hellenic cities, in the southern part of the island, which
-had lately undergone the miseries of capture by the generals of
-Carthage, and were still groaning under her yoke. Nothing prevented
-Carthage (he added) from attempting to extend her dominion over the
-rest of the island, except the pestilence under which she had herself
-been suffering in Africa. To the Syracusans<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_482">[p. 482]</span> this ought to be an imperative
-stimulus for attacking her at once, and rescuing their Hellenic
-brethren, before she had time to recover.<a id="FNanchor_1029"
-href="#Footnote_1029" class="fnanchor">[1029]</a></p>
-
-<p>These motives were really popular and impressive. There was
-besides another inducement, which weighed with Dionysius to hasten
-the war, though he probably did not dwell upon it in his public
-address to the Syracusans. He perceived that various Sicilian Greeks
-were migrating voluntarily with their properties into the territory
-of Carthage; whose dominion, though hateful and oppressive, was,
-at least while untried, regarded by many with less terror than
-his dominion when actually suffered. By commencing hostilities at
-once, he expected not only to arrest such emigration, but to induce
-such Greeks as were actually subjects of Carthage to throw off
-her yoke and join him.<a id="FNanchor_1030" href="#Footnote_1030"
-class="fnanchor">[1030]</a></p>
-
-<p>Loud acclamations from the Syracusan assembly hailed the
-proposition for war with Carthage; a proposition, which only
-converted into reality what had been long the familiar expectation
-of every man. And the war was rendered still more popular by the
-permission, which Dionysius granted forthwith, to plunder all the
-Carthaginian residents and mercantile property either in Syracuse
-or in any of his dependent cities. We are told that there were not
-only several domiciliated Carthaginians at Syracuse, but also many
-loaded vessels belonging to Carthage in the harbor, so that the
-plunder was lucrative.<a id="FNanchor_1031" href="#Footnote_1031"
-class="fnanchor">[1031]</a> But though such may have been the case
-in ordinary times, it seems hardly credible, that under the actual
-circumstances, any Carthaginian (person or property) can have
-been at Syracuse except by accident; for war with Carthage<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_483">[p. 483]</span> had been long
-announced, not merely in current talk, but in the more unequivocal
-language of overwhelming preparation. Nor is it easy to understand
-how the prudent Carthaginian Senate (who probably were not less
-provided with spies at Syracuse than Dionysius was at Carthage)<a
-id="FNanchor_1032" href="#Footnote_1032" class="fnanchor">[1032]</a>
-can have been so uninformed as to be taken by surprise at the last
-moment, when Dionysius sent thither a herald formally declaring
-war; which herald was not sent until after the license for private
-plunder had been previously granted. He peremptorily required
-the Carthaginians to relinquish their dominion over the Greek
-cities in Sicily,<a id="FNanchor_1033" href="#Footnote_1033"
-class="fnanchor">[1033]</a> as the only means of avoiding war. To
-such a proposition no answer was returned, nor probably expected.
-But the Carthaginians were now so much prostrated (like Athens in
-the second or third years of the Peloponnesian war) by depopulation,
-suffering, terrors, and despondency, arising out of the pestilence
-which beset them in Africa, that they felt incompetent to any serious
-effort, and heard with alarm the letter read from Dionysius. There
-was, however, no alternative, so that they forthwith despatched some
-of their ablest citizens to levy troops for the defence of their
-Sicilian possessions.<a id="FNanchor_1034" href="#Footnote_1034"
-class="fnanchor">[1034]</a></p>
-
-<p>The first news that reached them was indeed appalling. Dionysius
-had marched forth with his full power, Syracusan as well as
-foreign, accumulated by so long a preparation. It was a power, the
-like of which had never been beheld in Greece; greater even than
-that wielded by his predecessor Gelon eighty years before. If the
-contemporaries of Gelon had been struck with awe<a id="FNanchor_1035"
-href="#Footnote_1035" class="fnanchor">[1035]</a> at the superiority
-of his force to anything that Hellas could show elsewhere, as much
-or more would the same sentiment be felt by those who surrounded
-Dionysius. More intimately still was a similar comparison, with the
-mighty victor of Himera, present to Dionysius himself. He exulted in
-setting out with an army yet more imposing, against the same enemy,
-and for the same purpose of liberating the maritime cities of Sicily
-subject to Carthage;<a id="FNanchor_1036" href="#Footnote_1036"
-class="fnanchor">[1036]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_484">[p.
-484]</span> cities, whose number and importance had since fearfully
-augmented.</p>
-
-<p>These subject-cities, from Kamarina on one side of the island
-to Selinus and Himera on the other, though there were a certain
-number of Carthaginian residents established there, had no effective
-standing force to occupy or defend them on the part of Carthage;
-whose habit it was to levy large mercenary hosts for the special
-occasion and then to disband them afterwards. Accordingly, as
-soon as Dionysius with his powerful army passed the Syracusan
-border, and entered upon his march westward along the southern
-coast of the island, proclaiming himself as liberator—the most
-intense anti-Carthaginian manifestations burst forth at once, at
-Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera. These Greeks did
-not merely copy the Syracusans in plundering the property of all
-Carthaginians found among them, but also seized their persons, and
-put them to death with every species of indignity and torture. A
-frightful retaliation now took place for the cruelties recently
-committed by the Carthaginian armies, in the sacking of Selinus,
-Agrigentum, and the other conquered cities.<a id="FNanchor_1037"
-href="#Footnote_1037" class="fnanchor">[1037]</a> The Hellenic
-war-practice, in itself sufficiently rigorous, was aggravated
-into a merciless and studied barbarity, analogous to that which
-had disfigured the late proceedings of Carthage and her western
-mercenaries. These “Sicilian vespers,” which burst out throughout
-all the south of Sicily against the Carthaginian residents,
-surpassed even the memorable massacre known under that name in the
-thirteenth century, wherein the Angevine knights and soldiers were
-indeed assassinated, but not tortured. Diodorus tells us that the
-Carthaginians learnt from the retaliation thus suffered, a lesson of
-forbearance. It will not appear however, from their future conduct,
-that the lesson was much laid to heart; while it is unhappily
-cer<span class="pagenum" id="Page_485">[p. 485]</span>tain, that
-such interchange of cruelties with less humanized neighbors,
-contributed to lower in the Sicilian Greeks that measure of
-comparative forbearance which characterized the Hellenic race in its
-own home.</p>
-
-<p>Elate with this fury of revenge, the citizens of Kamarina, Gela,
-Agrigentum, and Selinus joined Dionysius on his march along the
-coast. He was enabled, from his abundant stock of recently fabricated
-arms, to furnish them with panoplies and weapons; for it is probable
-that as subjects of Carthage they had been disarmed. Strengthened
-by all these reinforcements, he mustered a force of eighty thousand
-men, besides more than three thousand cavalry; while the ships of war
-which accompanied him along the coast were nearly two hundred, and
-the transports, with stores and battering machines, not less than
-five hundred. With this prodigious army, the most powerful hitherto
-assembled under Grecian command, he appeared before the Carthaginian
-settlement of Motyê, a fortified seaport in a little bay immediately
-north of Cape Lilybæum.<a id="FNanchor_1038" href="#Footnote_1038"
-class="fnanchor">[1038]</a></p>
-
-<p>Of the three principal establishments of Carthage in
-Sicily,—Motyê, Panormus (Palermo), and Soloeis,—Motyê was at
-once the nearest to the mother-city,<a id="FNanchor_1039"
-href="#Footnote_1039" class="fnanchor">[1039]</a> the most important,
-and the most devoted. It was situated (like the original Syracuse
-in Ortygia) upon a little islet, separated from Sicily by a narrow
-strait about two-thirds of a mile in breadth, which its citizens
-had bridged over by means of a mole, so as to form a regular,
-though narrow, footpath. It was populous, wealthy, flourishing, and
-distinguished for the excellence both of its private houses and
-its fortifications. Perceiving the approach of Dionysius, and not
-intimidated by the surrender of their neighbors and allies, the
-Elymi at Eryx, who did not dare to resist so powerful a force,—the
-Motyênes put themselves in the best condition of defence. They
-broke up their mole, and again insulated themselves from Sicily, in
-the hope of holding out until relief should be sent from Carthage.
-Resolved to avenge upon Motyê the sufferings of Agrigentum and
-Selinus, Dionysius took a survey of the place in conjunction with
-his principal engineers. It deserves notice, that this is among
-the earliest sieges recorded in Grecian history wherein we read of
-a pro<span class="pagenum" id="Page_486">[p. 486]</span>fessed
-engineer as being directly and deliberately called on to advise the
-best mode of proceeding.<a id="FNanchor_1040" href="#Footnote_1040"
-class="fnanchor">[1040]</a></p>
-
-<p>Having formed his plans, he left his admiral Leptines with a
-portion of the army to begin the necessary works, while he himself
-with the remainder laid waste the neighboring territory dependent on
-or allied with Carthage. The Sikani and others submitted to him; but
-Ankyræ, Soloeis, Panormus, Egesta, and Entella, all held out, though
-the citizens were confined to their walls, and obliged to witness,
-without being able to prevent, the destruction of their lands.<a
-id="FNanchor_1041" href="#Footnote_1041" class="fnanchor">[1041]</a>
-Returning from this march, Dionysius pressed the siege of Motyê with
-the utmost ardor, and with all the appliances which his engineers
-could devise. Having moored his transports along the beach, and
-hauled his ships of war ashore in the harbor, he undertook the
-laborious task of filling up the strait (probably of no great depth)
-which divided Motyê from the main island;<a id="FNanchor_1042"
-href="#Footnote_1042" class="fnanchor">[1042]</a>—or at least as much
-of the length of the strait as was sufficient to march across both
-with soldiers and with battering engines, and to bring them up close
-against the walls of the city. The numbers under his command enabled
-him to achieve this enterprise, though not without a long period
-of effort, during which the Carthaginians tried more than once to
-interrupt his proceedings. Not having a fleet capable of contending
-in pitched battle against the besiegers, the Carthaginian general
-Imilkon tried two successive manœuvres. He first sent a squadron of
-ten ships of war to sail suddenly into the harbor of Syracuse, in
-hopes that the diversion thus operated would constrain Dionysius to
-detach a portion of his fleet from Motyê. Though the attack, however,
-was so far successful as to destroy many merchantmen in the harbor,
-yet the assailants were beaten off without making any more serious
-impression, or creating the diversion intended.<a id="FNanchor_1043"
-href="#Footnote_1043" class="fnanchor">[1043]</a> Imilkon next
-made an attempt to surprise the armed ships of Dionysius,<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_487">[p. 487]</span> as they lay hauled
-ashore in the harbor near Motyê. Crossing over from Carthage by
-night, with one hundred ships of war, to the Selinuntine coast, he
-sailed round Cape Lilybæum, and appeared at daybreak off Motyê. His
-appearance took every man by surprise. He destroyed or put to flight
-the ships on guard, and sailed into the harbor prepared for attack
-while as yet only a few of the Syracusan ships had been got afloat.
-As the harbor was too confined to enable Dionysius to profit by his
-great superiority in number and size of ships, a great portion of his
-fleet would have been now destroyed, had it not been saved by his
-numerous land force and artillery on the beach. Showers of missiles,
-from this assembled crowd as well as from the decks of the Syracusan
-ships, prevented Imilkon from advancing far enough to attack with
-effect. The newly-invented engine called the catapulta, of which
-the Carthaginians had as yet had no experience, was especially
-effective; projecting large masses to a great distance, it filled
-them with astonishment and dismay. While their progress was thus
-arrested, Dionysius employed a new expedient to rescue his fleet from
-the dilemma in which it had been caught. His numerous soldiers were
-directed to haul the ships, not down to the harbor, but landward,
-across a level tongue of land, more than two miles in breadth, which
-separated the harbor of Motyê from the outer sea. Wooden planks were
-laid so as to form a pathway for the ships; and in spite of the
-great size of the newly-constructed quadriremes and quinqueremes,
-the strength and ardor of the army sufficed for this toilsome effort
-of transporting eighty ships across in one day. The entire fleet,
-double in number to that of the Carthaginians, being at length got
-afloat, Imilkon did not venture on a pitched battle, but returned
-at once back to Africa.<a id="FNanchor_1044" href="#Footnote_1044"
-class="fnanchor">[1044]</a></p>
-
-<p>Though the citizens of Motyê saw from the walls the mournful
-spectacle of their friends retiring, their courage was nowise
-abated. They knew well that they had no mercy to expect; that the
-general ferocity of the Carthaginians in their hour of victory,
-and especially the cruel treatment of Greek captives even in Motyê
-itself, would now be retaliated; and that their only chance lay in
-a brave despair. The road across the strait having been at length
-completed, Dionysius brought up his engines and began his<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_488">[p. 488]</span> assault. While the
-catapulta with its missiles prevented defenders from showing
-themselves on the battlements, battering-rams were driven up to
-shake or overthrow the walls. At the same time large towers on
-wheels were rolled up, with six different stories in them one above
-the other, and in height equal to the houses. Against these means
-of attack the besieged on their side elevated lofty masts above the
-walls, with yards projecting outwards. Upon these yards stood men
-protected from the missiles by a sort of breastwork, and holding
-burning torches, pitch, and other combustibles, which they cast down
-upon the machines of the assailants. Many machines took fire in the
-woodwork, and it was not without difficulty that the conflagration
-was extinguished. After a long and obstinate resistance, however,
-the walls were at length overthrown or carried by assault, and the
-besiegers rushed in, imagining the town to be in their power. But
-the indefatigable energy of the besieged had already put the houses
-behind into a state of defence, and barricaded the streets, so that
-a fresh assault, more difficult than the first, remained to be
-undertaken. The towers on wheels were rolled near, but probably could
-not be pushed into immediate contact with the houses in consequence
-of the ruins of the overthrown wall which impeded their approach.
-Accordingly the assailants were compelled to throw out wooden
-platforms or bridges from the towers to the houses, and to march
-along these to the attack. But here they were at great disadvantage,
-and suffered severe loss. The Motyenes, resisting desperately,
-prevented them from setting firm foot on the houses, slew many of
-them in hand-combat, and precipitated whole companies to the ground,
-by severing or oversetting the platform. For several days this
-desperate combat was renewed. Not a step was gained by the besiegers,
-yet the unfortunate Motyenes became each day more exhausted,
-while portions of the foremost houses were also overthrown. Every
-evening Dionysius recalled his troops to their night’s repose,
-renewing the assault next morning. Having thus brought the enemy
-into an expectation that the night would be undisturbed, he on one
-fatal night took them by surprise, sending the Thurian Archylus
-with a chosen body of troops to attack the foremost defences.
-This detachment, planting ladders and climbing up by means of the
-half-demolished houses, established themselves firmly in a position
-within the town before re<span class="pagenum" id="Page_489">[p.
-489]</span>sistance could be organized. In vain did the Motyenes,
-discovering the stratagem too late, endeavor to dislodge them. The
-main force of Dionysius was speedily brought up across the artificial
-earth-way to confirm their success, and the town was thus carried,
-in spite of the most gallant resistance, which continued even after
-it had become hopeless.<a id="FNanchor_1045" href="#Footnote_1045"
-class="fnanchor">[1045]</a></p>
-
-<p>The victorious host who now poured into Motyê, incensed not
-merely by the length and obstinacy of the defence, but also by
-antecedent Carthaginian atrocities at Agrigentum and elsewhere,
-gave full loose to the sanguinary impulses of retaliation. They
-butchered indiscriminately men and women, the aged and the children,
-without mercy to any one. The streets were thus strewed with the
-slain, in spite of all efforts on the part of Dionysius, who desired
-to preserve the captives that they might be sold as slaves, and
-thus bring in a profitable return. But his orders to abstain from
-slaughter were not obeyed, nor could he do anything more than invite
-the sufferers by proclamation to take refuge in the temples; a step,
-which most of them would probably resort to uninvited. Restrained
-from farther slaughter by the sanctuary of the temples, the victors
-now turned to pillage. Abundance of gold, silver, precious vestments,
-and other marks of opulence, the accumulations of a long period of
-active prosperity, fell into their hands; and Dionysius allowed to
-them the full plunder of the town, as a recompense for the toils
-of the siege. He farther distributed special recompenses to those
-who had distinguished themselves; one hundred minæ being given to
-Archylus, the leader of the successful night-surprise. All the
-surviving Motyenes he sold into slavery; but he reserved for a more
-cruel fate Daimenês and various other Greeks who had been taken among
-them. These Greeks he caused to be crucified;<a id="FNanchor_1046"
-href="#Footnote_1046" class="fnanchor">[1046]</a> a specimen of
-the Phœnician penalties transferred by example to their Hellenic
-neighbors and enemies.</p>
-
-<p>The siege of Motyê having occupied nearly all the summer,
-Dionysius now reconducted his army homeward. He left at the place a
-Sikel garrison under the command of the Syracusan Biton, as well as a
-large portion of his fleet, one hundred and twenty ships, under the
-command of his brother Leptines; who was in<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_490">[p. 490]</span>structed to watch for the arrival of
-any force from Carthage, and to employ himself in besieging the
-neighboring towns of Egesta and Entella. The operations against
-these two towns however had little success. The inhabitants defended
-themselves bravely, and the Egestæans were even successful, through
-a well-planned nocturnal sally, in burning the enemy’s camp, with
-many horses, and stores of all kinds in the tents. Neither of the
-two towns was yet reduced, when, in the ensuing spring, Dionysius
-himself returned with his main force from Syracuse. He reduced
-the inhabitants of Halikyæ to submission, but effected no other
-permanent conquest, nor anything more than devastation of the
-neighboring territory dependent upon Carthage.<a id="FNanchor_1047"
-href="#Footnote_1047" class="fnanchor">[1047]</a></p>
-
-<p>Presently the face of the war was changed by the arrival of
-Imilkon from Carthage. Having been elevated to the chief magistracy
-of the city, he now brought with him an overwhelming force,
-collected as well from the subjects in Africa as from Iberia and
-the Western Mediterranean. It amounted, even in the low estimate
-of Timæus, to one hundred thousand men, reinforced afterwards in
-Sicily by thirty thousand more,—and in the more ample computations
-of Ephorus, to three hundred thousand foot, four thousand horse,
-four hundred chariots of war, four hundred ships of war, and six
-hundred transports carrying stores and engines. Dionysius had his
-spies at Carthage,<a id="FNanchor_1048" href="#Footnote_1048"
-class="fnanchor">[1048]</a> even among men of rank and politicians,
-to apprise him of all movements or public orders. But Imilkon, to
-obviate knowledge of the precise point in Sicily where he intended
-to land, gave to the pilots sealed instructions, to be opened only
-when they were out at sea, indicating Panormus (Palermo) as the
-place of rendezvous.<a id="FNanchor_1049" href="#Footnote_1049"
-class="fnanchor">[1049]</a> The transports made directly for that
-port, without nearing the land elsewhere; while Imilkon with the
-ships of war approached the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_491">[p.
-491]</span> harbor of Motyê and sailed from thence along the coast
-to Panormus. He probably entertained the hope of intercepting
-some portion of the Syracusan fleet. But nothing of the kind was
-found practicable; while Leptines on his side was even fortunate
-enough to be able to attack, with thirty triremes, the foremost
-vessels of the large transport-fleet on their voyage to Panormus.
-He destroyed no less than fifty of them, with five thousand men,
-and two hundred chariots of war; but the remaining fleet reached
-the port in safety, and were there joined by Imilkon with the
-ships of war. The land force being disembarked, the Carthaginian
-general led them to Motyê, ordering his ships of war to accompany
-him along the coast. In his way he regained Eryx, which was at
-heart Carthaginian, having only been intimidated into submission to
-Dionysius during the preceding year. He then attacked Motyê, which
-he retook, seemingly after very little resistance. It had held out
-obstinately against the Syracusans a few months before, while in
-the hands of its own Carthaginian inhabitants, with their families
-and properties around them; but the Sikel garrison had far less
-motive for stout defence.<a id="FNanchor_1050" href="#Footnote_1050"
-class="fnanchor">[1050]</a></p>
-
-<p>Thus was Dionysius deprived of the conquest which had cost him so
-much blood and toil during the preceding summer. We are surprised
-to learn that he made no effort to prevent its recapture, though he
-was then not far off, besieging Egesta,—and though his soldiers,
-elate with the successes of the preceding year were eager for a
-general battle. But Dionysius, deeming this measure too adventurous,
-resolved to retreat to Syracuse. His provisions were failing, and
-he was at a great distance from allies, so that defeat would have
-been ruinous. He therefore returned to Syracuse, carrying with
-him some of the Sikanians, whom he persuaded to evacuate their
-abode in the Carthaginian neighborhood, promising to provide them
-with better homes elsewhere. Most of them, however, declined his
-offers; some (among them, the Halikyæans) preferring to resume
-their alliance with Carthage. Of the recent acquisitions nothing
-now remained to Dionysius beyond the Selinuntine boundary; but
-Gela, Kamarina, Agrigentum, and Selinus had been emancipated from
-Carthage, and were still in a state of dependent alliance with
-him;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_492">[p. 492]</span> a result
-of moment,—yet seemingly very inadequate to the immense warlike
-preparations whereby it had been attained. Whether he exercised a
-wise discretion in declining to fight the Carthaginians, we have not
-sufficient information to determine. But his army appear to have been
-dissatisfied with it, and it was among the causes of the outbreak
-against him shortly afterwards at Syracuse.<a id="FNanchor_1051"
-href="#Footnote_1051" class="fnanchor">[1051]</a></p>
-
-<p>Thus left master of the country, Imilkon, instead of trying to
-reconquer Selinus and Himera, which had probably been impoverished
-by recent misfortunes,—resolved to turn his arms against Messênê
-in the north-east of the island; a city as yet fresh and
-untouched,—so little prepared for attack that its walls were not
-in good repair,—and moreover at the present moment yet farther
-enfeebled by the absence of its horsemen in the army of Dionysius.<a
-id="FNanchor_1052" href="#Footnote_1052" class="fnanchor">[1052]</a>
-Accordingly, he marched along the northern coast of Sicily, with his
-fleet coasting in the same direction to coöperate with him. He made
-terms with Kephalœdium and Therma, captured the island of Lipara, and
-at length reached Cape Pelôrus, a few miles from Messênê. His rapid
-march and unexpected arrival struck the Messenians with dismay. Many
-of them, conceiving defence to be impossible against so numerous a
-host, sent away their families and their valuable property to Rhegium
-or elsewhere. On the whole, however, a spirit of greater confidence
-prevailed, arising in part from an ancient prophecy preserved among
-the traditions of the town, purporting that the Carthaginians should
-one day carry water in Messênê. The interpreters affirmed that “to
-carry water” meant, of course, “to be a slave,”—and the Messenians,
-persuading themselves that this portended defeat to Imilkon, sent
-out their chosen military force to meet him at Pelôrus, and oppose
-his disembarkation. The Carthaginian commander, seeing these troops
-on their march, ordered his fleet to sail forward into the harbor
-of the city, and attack it from seaward during the absence of the
-defenders. A north wind so fa<span class="pagenum" id="Page_493">[p.
-493]</span>vored the advance of the ships, that they entered the
-harbor full sail, and found the city on that side almost unguarded.
-The troops who had marched out towards Pelôrus hastened back,
-but were too late;<a id="FNanchor_1053" href="#Footnote_1053"
-class="fnanchor">[1053]</a> while Imilkon himself also, pushing
-forward by land, forced his way into the town over the neglected
-parts of the wall. Messênê was taken; and its unhappy population
-fled in all directions for their lives. Some found refuge in the
-neighboring cities; others ran to the hill-forts of the Messenian
-territory, planted as a protection against the indigenous Sikels;
-while about two hundred of them near the harbor, cast themselves into
-the sea, and undertook the arduous task of swimming across to the
-Italian coast, in which fifty of them succeeded.<a id="FNanchor_1054"
-href="#Footnote_1054" class="fnanchor">[1054]</a></p>
-
-<p>Though Imilkon tried in vain to carry by assault some of the
-Messenian hill-forts, which were both strongly placed and gallantly
-defended,—yet his capture of Messênê itself was an event both
-imposing and profitable. It deprived Dionysius of an important ally,
-and lessened his facilities for obtaining succor from Italy. But
-most of all, it gratified the anti-Hellenic sentiment of the Punic
-general and his army, counterbalancing the capture of Motyê in the
-preceding year. Having taken scarce any captives, Imilkon had nothing
-but unconscious stone and wood upon which to vent his antipathy. He
-ordered the town, the walls, and all the buildings, to be utterly
-burnt and demolished; a task which his numerous host are said to
-have executed so effectually, that there remained hardly anything
-but ruins, without a trace of human residence.<a id="FNanchor_1055"
-href="#Footnote_1055" class="fnanchor">[1055]</a><span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_494">[p. 494]</span> He received adhesion
-and reinforcements from most of the Sikels<a id="FNanchor_1056"
-href="#Footnote_1056" class="fnanchor">[1056]</a> of the interior,
-who had been forced to submit to Dionysius a year or two before,
-but detested his dominion. To some of these Sikels, the Syracusan
-despot had assigned the territory of the conquered Naxians, with
-their city probably unwalled. But anxious as they were to escape
-from him, many had migrated to a point somewhat north of Naxus,—to
-the hill of Taurus, immediately over the sea, unfavorably celebrated
-among the Sikel population as being the spot where the first Greek
-colonists had touched on arriving in the island. Their migration
-was encouraged, multiplied, and organized, under the auspices of
-Imilkon, who prevailed upon them to construct, upon the strong
-eminence of Taurus, a fortified post, which formed the beginning
-of the city afterwards known as Tauromenium.<a id="FNanchor_1057"
-href="#Footnote_1057" class="fnanchor">[1057]</a> Magon was sent with
-the Carthaginian fleet to assist in the enterprise.</p>
-
-<p>Meanwhile Dionysius, greatly disquieted at the capture of Messênê,
-exerted himself to put Syracuse in an effective position of defence
-on her northern frontier. Naxus and Katana being both unfortified, he
-was forced to abandon them, and he induced the Campanians whom he had
-planted in Katana to change their quarters to the strong town called
-Ætna, on the skirt of the mountain so named. He made Leontini his
-chief position; strengthening as much as possible the fortifications
-of the city as well as those of the neighboring country forts,
-wherein he accumulated magazines of provisions from the fertile
-plains around. He had still a force of thirty thousand foot and more
-than three thousand horse; he had also a fleet of one hundred and
-eighty ships of war,—triremes and others. During the year preceding,
-he had brought out both a land force and a naval force much superior
-to this, even for purposes of aggression; how it happened that he
-could now command no more, even for defence and at home,—or what had
-become of the difference,—we are not told. Of the one hundred and
-eighty ships of war, sixty only were manned by the extraordinary
-proceeding of liberating slaves. Such sudden and serious changes
-in the amount of military force from year to year, are perceptible
-among Carthaginians as well as Greeks,—indeed throughout most part
-of Grecian history;—the armies being got together chiefly<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_495">[p. 495]</span> for special occasions,
-and then dismissed. Dionysius farther despatched envoys to Sparta,
-soliciting a reinforcement of a thousand mercenary auxiliaries.
-Having thus provided the best defence that he could through the
-territory, he advanced forward with his main land-force to Katana,
-having his fleet also moving in coöperation, immediately off
-shore.</p>
-
-<p>Towards this same point of Katana the Carthaginians were now
-moving, in their march against Syracuse. Magon was directed to coast
-along with the fleet from Taurus (Tauromenium) to Katana, while
-Imilkon intended himself to march with the land force on shore,
-keeping constantly near the fleet for the purpose of mutual support.
-But his scheme was defeated by a remarkable accident. A sudden
-eruption took place from Ætna; so that the stream of lava from the
-mountain to the sea forbade all possibility of marching along the
-shore to Katana, and constrained him to make a considerable circuit
-with his army on the land-side of the mountain. Though he accelerated
-his march as much as possible, yet for two days or more he was
-unavoidably cut off from the fleet; which under the command of Magon
-was sailing southward towards Katana. Dionysius availed himself of
-this circumstance to advance beyond Katana along the beach stretching
-northward, to meet Magon in his approach, and attack him separately.
-The Carthaginian fleet was much superior in number, consisting of
-five hundred sail in all; a portion of which, however, were not
-strictly ships of war, but armed merchantmen,—that is, furnished
-with brazen bows for impact against an enemy, and rowed with oars.
-But on the other hand, Dionysius had a land-force close at hand to
-coöperate with his fleet; an advantage which in ancient naval warfare
-counted for much, serving in case of defeat as a refuge to the ships,
-and in case of victory as intercepting or abridging the enemy’s
-means of escape. Magon, alarmed when he came in sight of the Grecian
-land-force mustered on the beach, and the Grecian fleet rowing up to
-attack him,—was nevertheless constrained unwillingly to accept the
-battle. Leptines, the Syracusan admiral,—though ordered by Dionysius
-to concentrate his ships as much as possible, in consequence of his
-inferior numbers,—attacked with boldness, and even with temerity;
-advancing himself with thirty ships greatly before the rest, and
-being apparently farther out to sea than the enemy. His bravery
-at first appeared successful, destroying or damaging the headmost
-ships of the enemy. But their superior numbers<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_496">[p. 496]</span> presently closed around him, and after
-a desperate combat, fought in the closest manner, ship to ship and
-hand to hand, he was forced to sheer off, and to seek escape seaward.
-His main fleet, coming up in disorder, and witnessing his defeat,
-were beaten also, after a strenuous contest. All of them fled, either
-landward or seaward as they could, under vigorous pursuit by the
-Carthaginian vessels; and in the end, no less than a hundred of the
-Syracusan ships, with twenty thousand men, were numbered as taken, or
-destroyed. Many of the crews, swimming or floating in the water on
-spars, strove to get to land to the protection of their comrades. But
-the Carthaginian small craft, sailing very near to the shore, slew or
-drowned these unfortunate men, even under the eyes of friends ashore
-who could render no assistance. The neighboring water became strewed,
-both with dead bodies and with fragments of broken ships. As victors,
-the Carthaginians were enabled to save many of their own seamen,
-either on board of damaged ships, or swimming for their lives. Yet
-their own loss too was severe; and their victory, complete as it
-proved, was dearly purchased.</p>
-
-<p>Though the land-force of Dionysius had not been at all engaged,
-yet the awful defeat of his fleet induced him to give immediate
-orders for retreating, first to Katana and afterwards yet farther to
-Syracuse. As soon as the Syracusan army had evacuated the adjoining
-shore, Magon towed all his prizes to land, and there hauled them up
-on the beach; partly for repair, wherever practicable,—partly as
-visible proofs of the magnitude of the triumph, for encouragement to
-his own armament. Stormy weather just then supervening, he was forced
-to haul his own ships ashore also for safety, and remained there for
-several days refreshing the crews. To keep the sea under such weather
-would have been scarcely practicable; so that if Dionysius, instead
-of retreating, had continued to occupy the shore with his unimpaired
-land-force, it appears that the Carthaginian ships would have been
-in the greatest danger; constrained either to face the storm, to
-run back a considerable distance northward, or to make good their
-landing against a formidable enemy, without being able to wait for
-the arrival of Imilkon.<a id="FNanchor_1058" href="#Footnote_1058"
-class="fnanchor">[1058]</a> The latter, after no very long interval,
-came up, so that the land-force and the navy of the Carthaginians
-were now<span class="pagenum" id="Page_497">[p. 497]</span> again
-in coöperation. While allowing his troops some days of repose and
-enjoyment of the victory, he sent envoys to the town of Ætna,
-inviting the Campanian mercenary soldiers to break with Dionysius and
-join him. Reminding them that their countrymen at Entella were living
-in satisfaction as a dependency of Carthage (which they had recently
-testified by resisting the Syracusan invasion), he promised to them
-an accession of territory, and a share in the spoils of the war,
-to be wrested from Greeks who were enemies of Campanians not less
-than of Carthaginians.<a id="FNanchor_1059" href="#Footnote_1059"
-class="fnanchor">[1059]</a> The Campanians of Ætna would gladly have
-complied with his invitation, and were only restrained from joining
-him by the circumstance that they had given hostages to the despot of
-Syracuse, in whose army also their best soldiers were now serving.</p>
-
-<p>Meanwhile Dionysius, in marching back to Syracuse, found his
-army grievously discontented. Withdrawn from the scene of action
-without even using their arms, they looked forward to nothing
-better than a blockade at Syracuse, full of hardship and privation.
-Accordingly many of them protested against retreat, conjuring him
-to lead them again to the scene of action, that they might either
-assail the Carthaginian fleet in the confusion of landing, or join
-battle with the advancing land-force under Imilkon. At first,
-Dionysius consented to such change of scheme. But he was presently
-reminded that unless he hastened back to Syracuse, Magon with the
-victorious fleet might sail thither, enter the harbor, and possess
-himself of the city; in the same manner as Imilkon had recently
-succeeded at Messênê. Under these apprehensions he renewed his
-original order for retreat, in spite of the vehement protest of
-his Sicilian allies; who were indeed so incensed that most of them
-quitted him at once. Which of the two was the wiser plan, we have
-no sufficient means to determine. But the circumstances seem not
-to have been the same as those preceding the capture of Messênê;
-for Magon was not in a condition to move forward at once with the
-fleet, partly from his loss in the recent action, partly from the
-stormy weather; and might perhaps have been intercepted in the<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_498">[p. 498]</span> very act of landing,
-if Dionysius had moved rapidly back to the shore. As far as we can
-judge, it would appear that the complaints of the army against the
-hasty retreat of Dionysius rested on highly plausible grounds. He
-nevertheless persisted, and reached Syracuse with his army not only
-much discouraged, but greatly diminished by the desertion of allies.
-He lost no time in sending forth envoys to the Italian Greeks and
-to Peloponnesus, with ample funds for engaging soldiers, and urgent
-supplications to Sparta as well as to Corinth.<a id="FNanchor_1060"
-href="#Footnote_1060" class="fnanchor">[1060]</a> Polyxenus, his
-brother-in-law, employed on this mission, discharged his duty with
-such diligence, that he came back in a comparatively short space
-of time, with thirty-two ships of war under the command of the
-Lacedæmonian Pharakidas.<a id="FNanchor_1061" href="#Footnote_1061"
-class="fnanchor">[1061]</a></p>
-
-<p>Meanwhile Imilkon, having sufficiently refreshed his troops
-after the naval victory off Katana, moved forward towards Syracuse
-both with the fleet and the land-force. The entry of his fleet
-into the Great Harbor was ostentatious and imposing; far above
-even that of the second Athenian armament, when Demosthenes first
-exhibited its brilliant but short-lived force.<a id="FNanchor_1062"
-href="#Footnote_1062" class="fnanchor">[1062]</a> Two hundred and
-eight ships of war first rowed in, marshalled in the best order, and
-adorned with the spoils of the captured Syracusan ships. These were
-followed by transports, five hundred of them carrying soldiers, and
-one thousand others either empty or bringing stores and machines. The
-total number of vessels, we are told, reached almost two thousand,
-covering a large portion of the Great Harbor.<a id="FNanchor_1063"
-href="#Footnote_1063" class="fnanchor">[1063]</a> The numerous
-land-force marched up about the same time; Imilkon establishing his
-head quarters in the temple of Zeus Olympius, nearly one English mile
-and a half from the city. He presently drew up his forces in order
-of battle, and advanced nearly to the city walls; while his ships of
-war also, being<span class="pagenum" id="Page_499">[p. 499]</span>
-divided into two fleets of one hundred ships each, showed themselves
-in face of the two interior harbors or docks (on each side of the
-connecting strait between Ortygia and the main land) wherein the
-Syracusan ships were safely lodged. He thus challenged the Syracusans
-to combat on both elements; but neither challenge was accepted.</p>
-
-<p>Having by such defiance farther raised the confidence of his
-own troops, he first spread them over the Syracusan territory, and
-allowed them for thirty days to enrich themselves by unlimited
-plunder. Next, he proceeded to establish fortified posts, as
-essential to the prosecution of a blockade which he foresaw would
-be tedious. Besides fortifying the temple of the Olympian Zeus, he
-constructed two other forts; one at Cape Plemmyrium (on the southern
-entrance of the harbor, immediately opposite to Ortygia, where
-Nikias had erected a post also), the other on the Great Harbor,
-midway between Plemmyrium and the temple of the Olympian Zeus, at
-the little bay called Daskon. He farther encircled his whole camp,
-near the last-mentioned temple, with a wall; the materials of which
-were derived in part from the demolition of the numerous tombs
-around; especially one tomb, spacious and magnificent, commemorating
-Gelon and his wife Damaretê. In these various fortified posts he was
-able to store up the bread, wine, and other provisions which his
-transports were employed in procuring from Africa and Sardinia, for
-the continuous subsistence of so mighty an host.</p>
-
-<p>It would appear as if Imilkon had first hoped to take the city
-by assault; for he pushed up his army as far as the very walls of
-Achradina (the outer city). He even occupied the open suburb of that
-city, afterwards separately fortified under the name of Neapolis,
-wherein were situated the temples of Demeter and Persephonê,
-which he stripped of their rich treasures.<a id="FNanchor_1064"
-href="#Footnote_1064" class="fnanchor">[1064]</a> But if such<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_500">[p. 500]</span> was his plan, he soon
-abandoned it, and confined himself to the slower process of reducing
-the city by famine. His progress in this enterprise, however,
-was by no means encouraging. We must recollect that he was not,
-like Nikias, master of the centre of Epipolæ; able from thence to
-stretch his right arm southward to the Great Harbor, and his left
-arm northward to the sea at Trogilus. As far as we are able to make
-out, he never ascended the southern cliff, nor got upon the slope of
-Epipolæ; though it seems that at this time there was no line of wall
-along the southern cliff, as Dionysius had recently built along the
-northern. The position of Imilkon was confined to the Great Harbor
-and to the low lands adjoining, southward of the cliff of Epipolæ;
-so that the communications of Syracuse with the country around
-remained partially open on two sides,—westward, through the Euryalus
-at the upper extremity of Epipolæ,—and northward towards Thapsus
-and Megara, through the Hexapylon, or the principal gate in the new
-fortification constructed by Dionysius along the northern cliff of
-Epipolæ. The full value was now felt of that recent fortification,
-which, protecting Syracuse both to the north and west, and guarding
-the precious position of Euryalus, materially impeded the operations
-of Imilkon. The city was thus open, partially at least, on two
-sides, to receive supplies by land. And even by sea means were
-found to introduce provisions. Though Imilkon had a fleet so much
-stronger that the Syracusans did not dare to offer pitched battle,
-yet he found it difficult to keep such constant watch as to exclude
-their store-ships, and ensure the arrival of his own. Dionysius and
-Leptines went forth themselves from the harbor with armed squadrons
-to accelerate and protect the approach of their supplies; while
-several desultory encounters took place, both of land-force and of
-shipping, which proved advantageous to the Syracusans, and greatly
-raised their spirits.</p>
-
-<p>One naval conflict especially, which occurred while Dionysius was
-absent on his cruise, was of serious moment. A corn-ship belonging to
-Imilkon’s fleet being seen entering the Great Harbor, the Syracusans
-suddenly manned five ships of war, mastered it, and hauled it into
-their own dock. To prevent such capture, the Carthaginians from
-their station sent out forty ships of war; upon which the Syracusans
-equipped their whole naval force, bore down upon the forty with
-numbers decidedly superior, and completely<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_501">[p. 501]</span> defeated them. They captured the
-admiral’s ship, damaged twenty-four others, and pursued the rest to
-the naval station; in front of which they paraded, challenging the
-enemy to battle. As the challenge was not accepted, they returned to
-their own dock, towing in their prizes in triumph.</p>
-
-<p>This naval victory indicated, and contributed much to occasion,
-that turn in the fortune of the siege which each future day still
-farther accelerated. Its immediate effect was to fill the Syracusan
-public with unbounded exultation. “Without Dionysius we conquer our
-enemies; under his command we are beaten; why submit to slavery under
-him any longer?” Such was the burst of indignant sentiment which
-largely pervaded the groups and circles in the city; strengthened
-by the consciousness that they were now all armed and competent to
-extort freedom,—since Dionysius, when the besieging enemy actually
-appeared before the city, had been obliged, as the less of two
-hazards, to produce and redistribute the arms which he had previously
-taken from them. In the midst of this discontent, Dionysius himself
-returned from his cruise. To soothe the prevalent temper, he was
-forced to convene a public assembly; wherein he warmly extolled the
-recent exploit of the Syracusans, and exhorted them to strenuous
-confidence, promising that he would speedily bring the war to a
-close.</p>
-
-<p>It is possible that Dionysius, throughout his despotism, may have
-occasionally permitted what were called public assemblies; but we
-may be very sure, that, if ever convened, they were mere matters
-of form, and that no free discussion or opposition to his will was
-ever tolerated. On the present occasion, he anticipated the like
-passive acquiescence; and after having delivered a speech, doubtless
-much applauded by his own partisans, he was about to dismiss the
-assembly, when a citizen named Theodôrus unexpectedly rose. He was
-a Horseman or Knight,—a person of wealth and station in the city,
-of high character and established reputation for courage. Gathering
-boldness from the time and circumstances, he now stood forward to
-proclaim publicly that hatred of Dionysius, and anxiety for freedom,
-which so many of his fellow-citizens around had been heard to
-utter privately and were well known to feel.<a id="FNanchor_1065"
-href="#Footnote_1065" class="fnanchor">[1065]</a></p> <p><span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_502">[p. 502]</span></p> <p>Diodorus in
-his history gives us a long harangue (whether composed by himself,
-or copied from others, we cannot tell) as pronounced by Theodôrus.
-The main topics of it are such as we should naturally expect, and
-are probably, on the whole, genuine. It is a full review, and an
-emphatic denunciation, of the past conduct of Dionysius, concluding
-with an appeal to the Syracusans to emancipate themselves from his
-dominion. “Dionysius (the speaker contends, in substance) is a
-worse enemy than the Carthaginians: who, if victorious, would be
-satisfied with a regular tribute, leaving us to enjoy our properties
-and our paternal polity. Dionysius has robbed us of both. He has
-pillaged our temples of their sacred deposits. He has slain or
-banished our wealthy citizens, and then seized their properties by
-wholesale, to be transferred to his own satellites. He has given
-the wives of these exiles in marriage to his barbarian soldiers. He
-has liberated our slaves, and taken them into his pay, in order to
-keep their masters in slavery. He has garrisoned our own citadel
-against us, by means of these slaves, together with a host of other
-mercenaries. He has put to death every citizen who ventured to raise
-his voice in defence of the laws and constitution. He has abused
-our confidence,—once, unfortunately, carried so far as to nominate
-him general,—by employing his powers to subvert our freedom, and
-rule us according to his own selfish rapacity in place of justice.
-He has farther stripped us of our arms; these, recent necessity has
-compelled him to restore,—and these, if we are men, we shall now
-employ for the recovery of our own freedom.”<a id="FNanchor_1066"
-href="#Footnote_1066" class="fnanchor">[1066]</a></p> <p><span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_503">[p. 503]</span></p> <p>“If the conduct
-of Dionysius towards Syracuse has been thus infamous, it has been no
-better towards the Sicilian Greeks generally. He betrayed Gela and
-Kamarina, for his own purposes, to the Carthaginians. He suffered
-Messênê to fall into their hands without the least help. He reduced
-to slavery, by gross treachery, our Grecian brethren and neighbors
-of Naxus and Katana; transferring the latter to the non-Hellenic
-Campanians, and destroying the former. He might have attacked
-the Carthaginians immediately after their landing from Africa at
-Panormus, before they had recovered from the fatigue of the voyage.
-He might have fought the recent naval combat near the port of Katana,
-instead of near the beach north of that town; so as to ensure to our
-fleet, if worsted, an easy and sure retreat. Had he chosen to keep
-his land-force on the spot, he might have prevented the victorious
-Carthaginian fleet from approaching land, when the storm came on
-shortly after the battle; or he might have attacked them, if they
-tried to land, at the greatest advantage. He has conducted the war,
-altogether, with disgraceful incompetence; not wishing sincerely,
-indeed, to get rid of them as enemies, but preserving the terrors
-of Carthage, as an indirect engine to keep Syracuse in subjection
-to himself. As long as we fought with him, we have been constantly
-unsuccessful; now that we have come to fight without him, recent
-experience tells us that we can beat the Carthaginians, even with
-inferior numbers.</p>
-
-<p>“Let us look out for another leader (concluded Theodôrus),
-in place of a sacrilegious temple-robber whom the gods have now
-abandoned. If Dionysius will consent to relinquish his dominion,
-let him retire from the city with his property unmolested; if he
-will not, we are here all assembled, we are possessed of our arms,
-and we have both Italian and Peloponnesian allies by our side. The
-assembly will determine whether it will choose leaders from our own
-citizens,—or from our metropolis Corinth,—or from the Spartans, the
-presidents of all Greece.”</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_504">[p. 504]</span></p>
-
-<p>Such are the main points of the long harangue ascribed to
-Theodôrus; the first occasion, for many years, on which the voice
-of free speech had been heard publicly in Syracuse. Among the
-charges advanced against Dionysius, which go to impeach his manner
-of carrying on the war against the Carthaginians, there are several
-which we can neither admit nor reject, from our insufficient
-knowledge of the facts. But the enormities ascribed to him in his
-dealing with the Syracusans,—the fraud, violence, spoliation, and
-bloodshed, whereby he had first acquired, and afterwards upheld, his
-dominion over them,—these are assertions of matters of fact, which
-coincide in the main with the previous narrative of Diodorus, and
-which we have no ground for contesting.</p>
-
-<p>Hailed by the assembly with great sympathy and acclamation, this
-harangue seriously alarmed Dionysius. In his concluding words,
-Theodôrus had invoked the protection of Corinth as well as of Sparta,
-against the despot, whom with such signal courage he had thus
-ventured publicly to arraign. Corinthians as well as Spartans were
-now lending aid in the defence, under the command of Pharakidas.
-That Spartan officer came forward to speak next after Theodôrus.
-Among various other sentiments of traditional respect towards
-Sparta, there still prevailed a remnant of the belief that she was
-adverse to despots; as she really had once been, at an earlier
-period of her history.<a id="FNanchor_1067" href="#Footnote_1067"
-class="fnanchor">[1067]</a> Hence the Syracusans hoped, and even
-expected, that Pharakidas would second the protest of Theodôrus,
-and stand forward as champion of freedom to the first Grecian
-city in Sicily.<a id="FNanchor_1068" href="#Footnote_1068"
-class="fnanchor">[1068]</a> Bitterly indeed were they disappointed.
-Dionysius had established with Pharakidas relations as friendly
-as those of the Thirty tyrants at Athens with Kallibius the
-Lacedæmonian harmost in the acropolis.<a id="FNanchor_1069"
-href="#Footnote_1069" class="fnanchor">[1069]</a> Accordingly
-Pharakidas in his speech not only discountenanced the proposition
-just made, but declared himself emphatically in favor of the despot;
-intimating that he had been sent to aid the Syracusans and Dionysius
-against the Carthaginians,—not to put down<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_505">[p. 505]</span> the dominion of Dionysius. To the
-Syracusans this declaration was a denial of all hope. They saw
-plainly that in any attempt to emancipate themselves, they would
-have against them not merely the mercenaries of Dionysius, but also
-the whole force of Sparta, then imperial and omnipotent; represented
-on the present occasion by Pharakidas, as it had been in a previous
-year by Aristus. They were condemned to bear their chains in silence,
-not without unavailing curses against Sparta. Meanwhile Dionysius,
-thus powerfully sustained, was enabled to ride over the perilous
-and critical juncture. His mercenaries crowded in haste around his
-person,—having probably been sent for, as soon as the voice of a
-free spokesman was heard.<a id="FNanchor_1070" href="#Footnote_1070"
-class="fnanchor">[1070]</a> And he was thus enabled to dismiss
-an assembly, which had seemed for one short instant to threaten
-the perpetuity of his dominion, and to promise emancipation for
-Syracuse.</p>
-
-<p>During this interesting and momentous scene, the fate of Syracuse
-had hung upon the decision of Pharakidas: for Theodôrus, well aware
-that with a besieging enemy before the gates, the city could not be
-left without a supreme authority, had conjured the Spartan commander,
-with his Lacedæmonian and Corinthian allies, to take into his own
-hands the control and organization of the popular force. There can
-be little doubt that Pharakidas could have done this, if he had been
-so disposed, so as at once to make head against the Carthaginians
-without, and to restrain, if not to put down, the despotism within.
-Instead of undertaking the tutelary intervention solicited by the
-people, he threw himself into the opposite scale, and strengthened
-Dionysius more than ever, at the moment of his greatest peril.
-The proceeding of Pharakidas was doubtless conformable to his
-instructions from home, as well as to the oppressive and crushing
-policy which Sparta, in these days of her unresisted empire (between
-the victory of Ægospotami and the defeat of Knidus), pursued
-throughout the Grecian world.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_506">[p. 506]</span></p>
-
-<p>Dionysius was fully sensible of the danger which he had thus been
-assisted to escape. Under the first impressions of alarm, he strove
-to gain something like popularity; by a conciliatory language and
-demeanor, by presents adroitly distributed, and by invitations to
-his table. Whatever may have been the success of such artifices, the
-lucky turn, which the siege was now taking, was the most powerful of
-all aids for building up his full power anew.</p>
-
-<p>It was not the arms of the Syracusans, but the wrath of Demeter
-and Persephonê, whose temple (in the suburb of Achradina) Imilkon
-had pillaged, that ruined the besieging army before Syracuse. So the
-piety of the citizens interpreted that terrific pestilence which
-now began to rage among the multitude of their enemies without. The
-divine wrath was indeed seconded (as the historian informs us<a
-id="FNanchor_1071" href="#Footnote_1071" class="fnanchor">[1071]</a>)
-by physical causes of no ordinary severity. The vast numbers of
-the host were closely packed together; it was now the beginning of
-autumn, the most unhealthy period of the year; moreover this summer
-had been preternaturally hot, and the low marshy ground near the
-Great Harbor, under the chill of morning contrasted with the burning
-sun of noon, was the constant source of fever and pestilence. These
-unseen and irresistible enemies fell with appalling force upon the
-troops of Imilkon; especially upon the Libyans, or native Africans,
-who were found the most susceptible. The intense and varied bodily
-sufferings of this distemper,—the rapidity with which it spread
-from man to man,—and the countless victims which it speedily
-accumulated,—appear to have equalled, if not surpassed, the worst
-days of the pestilence of Athens in 429 <small>B.C.</small> Care
-and attendance upon the sick, or even interment of the dead, became
-impracticable; so that the whole camp presented a scene of deplorable
-agony, aggravated by the horrors and stench of one hundred and fifty
-thousand unburied bodies.<a id="FNanchor_1072" href="#Footnote_1072"
-class="fnanchor">[1072]</a> The military strength of the
-Carthaginians was completely prostrated by such a visita<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_507">[p. 507]</span>tion. Far from being
-able to make progress in the siege, they were not even able to defend
-themselves against moderate energy on the part of the Syracusans;
-who (like the Peloponnesians during the great plague of Athens)
-were themselves untouched by the distemper.<a id="FNanchor_1073"
-href="#Footnote_1073" class="fnanchor">[1073]</a></p>
-
-<p>Such was the wretched spectacle of the Carthaginian army, clearly
-visible from the walls of Syracuse. To overthrow it by a vigorous
-attack, was an enterprise not difficult; indeed, so sure, in the
-opinion of Dionysius, that in organizing his plan of operation, he
-made it the means of deliberately getting rid of some troops in the
-city who had become inconvenient to him. Concerting measures for a
-simultaneous assault upon the Carthaginian station both by sea and
-land, he entrusted eighty ships of war to Pharakidas and Leptines,
-with orders to move at daybreak; while he himself conducted a body
-of troops out of the city, during the darkness of night; issuing
-forth by Epipolæ and Euryalus (as Gylippus had formerly done when
-he surprised Plemmyrium<a id="FNanchor_1074" href="#Footnote_1074"
-class="fnanchor">[1074]</a>), and making a circuit until he came, on
-the other side of the Anapus, to the temple of Kyanê; thus getting on
-the land-side or south-west of the Carthaginian position. He first
-despatched his horsemen, together with a regiment of one thousand
-mercenary foot-soldiers, to commence the attack. These latter troops
-had become peculiarly obnoxious to him, having several times engaged
-in revolt and disturbance. Accordingly, while he now ordered them
-up to the assault in conjunction with the horse, he at the same
-time gave secret directions to the horse, to desert their comrades
-and take flight. Both his orders were obeyed. The onset having been
-made jointly, in the heat of combat the horsemen fled, leaving
-their comrades all to be cut to pieces by the Carthaginians.<a
-id="FNanchor_1075" href="#Footnote_1075" class="fnanchor">[1075]</a>
-We have as yet heard nothing about difficulties arising<span
-class="pagenum" id="Page_508">[p. 508]</span> to Dionysius from his
-mercenary troops, on whose arms his dominion rested; and what we are
-here told is enough merely to raise curiosity without satisfying
-it. These men are said to have been mutinous and disaffected; a
-fact, which explains, if it does not extenuate, the gross perfidy of
-deliberately inveigling them to destruction, while he still professed
-to keep them under his command.</p>
-
-<p>In the actual state of the Carthaginian army, Dionysius could
-afford to make them a present of this obnoxious division. His own
-attack, first upon the fort of Polichnê, next upon that near the
-naval station at Daskon, was conducted with spirit and success.
-While the defenders, thinned and enfeebled by the pestilence, were
-striving to repel him on the land-side, the Syracusan fleet came
-forth from its docks in excellent spirits and order to attack the
-ships at the station. These Carthaginian ships, though afloat and
-moored, were very imperfectly manned. Before the crews could get
-aboard to put them on their defence, the Syracusan triremes and
-quinqueremes, ably rowed and with their brazen beaks well directed,
-drove against them on the quarter or midships, and broke through the
-line of their timbers. The crash of such impact was heard afar off,
-and the best ships were thus speedily disabled.<a id="FNanchor_1076"
-href="#Footnote_1076" class="fnanchor">[1076]</a> Following up their
-success, the Syracusans jumped aboard, overpowered the crews, or
-forced them to seek safety as they could in flight. The distracted
-Carthaginians being thus pressed at the same time by sea and by land,
-the soldiers of Dionysius from the land-side forced their way through
-the entrenchment to the shore, where forty pentekonters were hauled
-up, while immediately near them were moored both merchantmen and
-triremes. The assailants set fire to the pentekonters; upon which the
-flames, rapidly spreading under a strong wind, communicated presently
-to all the merchantmen and triremes adjacent. Unable to arrest this
-terrific conflagration, the crews were obliged to leap overboard;
-while the vessels, severed from their moorings by the burning of the
-cables, drifted against each other under the wind, until the naval
-station at Daskon became one scene of ruin.</p>
-
-<p>Such a volume of flame, though destroying the naval
-resources<span class="pagenum" id="Page_509">[p. 509]</span> of the
-Carthaginians, must at the same time have driven off the assailing
-Syracusan ships of war, and probably also the assailants by land.
-But to those who contemplated it from the city of Syracuse, across
-the breadth of the Great Harbor, it presented a spectacle grand and
-stimulating in the highest degree; especially when the fire was seen
-towering aloft amidst the masts, yards, and sails of the merchantmen.
-The walls of the city were crowded with spectators, women, children,
-and aged men, testifying their exultation by loud shouts, and
-stretching their hands to heaven,—as on the memorable day, near
-twenty years before, when they gained their final victory in the
-same harbor, over the Athenian fleet. Many lads and elders, too much
-excited to remain stationary, rushed into such small craft as they
-could find, and rowed across the harbor to the scene of action, where
-they rendered much service by preserving part of the cargoes, and
-towing away some of the enemy’s vessels deserted but not yet on fire.
-The evening of this memorable day left Dionysius and the Syracusans
-victorious by land as well as by sea; encamped near the temple of
-Olympian Zeus which had so recently been occupied by Imilkon. Though
-they had succeeded in forcing the defences of the latter both at
-Polichnê and at Daskon, and in inflicting upon him a destructive
-defeat, yet they would not aim at occupying his camp, in its infected
-and deplorable condition.</p>
-
-<p>On two former occasions during the last few years, we have seen
-the Carthaginian armies decimated by pestilence,—near Agrigentum
-and near Gela,—previous to this last and worst calamity. Imilkon,
-copying the weakness of Nikias rather than the resolute prudence
-of Demosthenes, had clung to his insalubrious camp near the Great
-Harbor, long after all hope of reducing Syracuse had ceased, and
-while suffering and death to the most awful extent were daily
-accumulating around him. But the recent defeat satisfied even him
-that his position was no longer tenable. Retreat was indispensable;
-yet nowise impracticable,—with the brave men, Iberians and others,
-in his army, and with the Sikels of the interior on his side,—had
-he possessed the good qualities as well as the defects of Nikias,
-or been capable of anything like that unconquerable energy which
-ennobled the closing days of the latter. Instead of taking the best
-measures available for a retiring march, Imilkon despatched a secret
-envoy to Dionysius, unknown to the Syracusans generally; tendering to
-him the sum of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_510">[p. 510]</span>
-three hundred talents which yet remained in the camp, on condition
-of the fleet and army being allowed to sail to Africa unmolested.
-Dionysius would not consent, nor would the Syracusans have confirmed
-any such consent, to let them all escape; but he engaged to permit
-the departure of Imilkon himself with the native Carthaginians. The
-sum of three hundred talents was accordingly sent across by night to
-Ortygia; and the fourth night ensuing was fixed for the departure of
-Imilkon and his Carthaginians, without opposition from Dionysius.
-During that night forty of their ships, filled with Carthaginians,
-put to sea and sailed in silence out of the harbor. Their stealthy
-flight, however, did not altogether escape the notice of the
-Corinthian seamen in Syracuse; who not only apprised Dionysius, but
-also manned some of their own ships and started in pursuit. They
-overtook and destroyed one or two of the slowest sailers; but all the
-rest with Imilkon himself, accomplished their flight to Carthage.</p>
-
-<p>Dionysius,—while he affected to obey the warning of
-the Corinthians, with movements intentionally tardy and
-unavailing,—applied himself with earnest activity to act against
-the forsaken army remaining. During the same night he led out his
-troops from the city to the vicinity of their camp. The flight
-of Imilkon speedily promulgated, had filled the whole army with
-astonishment and consternation. No command,—no common cause,—no
-bond of union,—now remained among this miscellaneous host, already
-prostrated by previous misfortune. The Sikels in the army, being
-near to their own territory and knowing the roads, retired at
-once, before daybreak, and reached their homes. Scarcely had they
-passed, when the Syracusan soldiers occupied the roads, and barred
-the like escape to others. Amidst the general dispersion of the
-abandoned soldiers, some perished in vain attempts to force the
-passes, others threw down their arms and solicited mercy. The
-Iberians alone, maintaining their arms and order with unshaken
-resolution, sent to Dionysius propositions to transfer to him their
-service; which he thought proper to accept, enrolling them among
-his mercenaries. All the remaining host, principally Libyans, being
-stripped and plundered by his soldiers, became his captives, and were
-probably sold as slaves.<a id="FNanchor_1077" href="#Footnote_1077"
-class="fnanchor">[1077]</a></p>
-
-<p>The heroic efforts of Nikias, to open for his army a retreat
-in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_511">[p. 511]</span> the face of
-desperate obstacles, had ended in a speedy death as prisoner at
-Syracuse,—yet without anything worse than the usual fate of prisoners
-of war. But the base treason of Imilkon, though he insured a safe
-retreat home by betraying the larger portion of his army, earned for
-him only a short prolongation of life amidst the extreme of ignominy
-and remorse. When he landed at Carthage with the fraction of his
-army preserved, the city was in the deepest distress. Countless
-family losses, inflicted by the pestilence, added a keener sting to
-the unexampled public loss and humiliation now fully made known.
-Universal mourning prevailed; all public and private business was
-suspended, all the temples were shut, while the authorities and the
-citizens met Imilkon in sad procession on the shore. The defeated
-commander strove to disarm their wrath, by every demonstration of
-a broken and prostrate spirit. Clothed in the sordid garment of a
-slave, he acknowledged himself as the cause of all the ruin, by his
-impiety towards the gods; for it was they, and not the Syracusans,
-who had been his real enemies and conquerors. He visited all the
-temples, with words of atonement and supplication,—replied to all the
-inquiries about relatives who had perished under the distemper,—and
-then retiring, blocked up the doors of his house, where he starved
-himself to death.</p>
-
-<p>But the season of misfortune to Carthage was not closed by his
-decease. Her dominion over her Libyan subjects was always harsh
-and unpopular, rendering them disposed to rise against her at any
-moment of calamity. Her recent disaster in Sicily would have been
-in itself perhaps sufficient to stimulate them into insurrection;
-but its effect was aggravated by their resentment for the deliberate
-betrayal of their troops serving under Imilkon, not one of whom
-lived to come back. All the various Libyan subject towns had on
-this matter one common feeling of indignation; all came together in
-congress, agreed to unite their forces, and formed an army which
-is said to have reached one hundred and twenty thousand men. They
-established their head-quarters at Tunês (Tunis), a town within a
-short distance of Carthage itself, and were for a certain time so
-much stronger in the field, that the Carthaginians were obliged
-to remain within their walls. For a moment it seemed as if the
-star of this great commercial city was about to set for ever.
-The Carthaginians themselves were in the depth of despondency,
-believing themselves to be under the wrath<span class="pagenum"
-id="Page_512">[p. 512]</span> of the goddesses Demeter and her
-daughter Persephonê; who, not content with the terrible revenge
-already taken in Sicily, for the sacrilege committed by Imilkon,
-were still pursuing them into Africa. Under the extreme religious
-terror which beset the city, every means were tried to appease the
-offended goddesses. Had it been supposed that the Carthaginian gods
-had been insulted, expiation would have been offered by the sacrifice
-of human victims,—and those too the most precious, such as beautiful
-captives, or children of conspicuous citizens. But on this occasion,
-the insult had been offered to Grecian gods, and atonement was to be
-made according to the milder ceremonies of Greece. The Carthaginians
-had never yet instituted in their city any worship of Demeter or
-Persephonê; they now established temples in honor of these goddesses,
-appointed several of their most eminent citizens to be priests, and
-consulted the Greeks resident among them, as to the form of worship
-most suitable to be offered. After having done this, and cleared
-their own consciences, they devoted themselves to the preparation of
-ships and men for the purpose of carrying on the war. It was soon
-found that Demeter and Persephonê were not implacable, and that the
-fortune of Carthage was returning. The insurgents, though at first
-irresistible, presently fell into discord among themselves about
-the command. Having no fleet, they became straitened for want of
-provisions, while Carthage was well supplied by sea from Sardinia.
-From these and similar causes, their numerous host gradually melted
-away, and rescued the Carthaginians from alarm at the point where
-they were always weakest. The relations of command and submission,
-between Carthage and her Libyan subjects, were established as
-they had previously stood, leaving her to recover slowly from her
-disastrous reverses.<a id="FNanchor_1078" href="#Footnote_1078"
-class="fnanchor">[1078]</a></p>
-
-<p>But though the power of Carthage in Africa was thus restored,
-in Sicily it was reduced to the lowest ebb. It was long before she
-could again make head with effect against Dionysius, who was left
-at liberty to push his conquests in another direction, against the
-Italiot Greeks. The remaining operations of his reign,—successful
-against the Italiots, unsuccessful against Carthage,—will come to be
-recounted in my next succeeding chapter and volume.</p>
-
-<hr class="chap" />
-
-
-<div class="footnotes">
-
-<h2>FOOTNOTES</h2>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1"><a href="#FNanchor_1">[1]</a></span>
-It goes by both names; Xenophon more commonly speaks of ἡ εἰρήνη—Isokrates,
-of αἱ συνθῆκαι.
-</p>
-<p>
-Though we say, the peace <i>of</i> Antalkidas, the Greek authors say ἡ ἐπ’ Ἀνταλκίδου
-εἰρήνη; I do not observe that they ever phrase it with the genitive
-case Ἀνταλκίδου simply, without a preposition.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_2"><a href="#FNanchor_2">[2]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 22 (compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 23; and his
-Apophtheg. Lacon. p. 213 B). Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀγησίλαος, πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα—Φεῦ τῆς Ἑλλάδος,
-ὅπου μηδίζουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ Λάκωνες!... Μᾶλλον, εἶπεν, οἱ Μῆδοι λακωνίζουσι.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_3"><a href="#FNanchor_3">[3]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 14.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_4"><a href="#FNanchor_4">[4]</a></span>
-The restoration of these three islands forms the basis of historical truth
-in the assertion of Isokrates, that the Lacedæmonians were so subdued by
-the defeat of Knidus, as to come and tender maritime empire to Athens—(ἐλθεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν
-δώσοντας) Orat. vii, (Areopagit.) s. 74; Or. ix, (Evagor.);
-s. 83. But the assertion is true respecting a later time; for the Lacedæmonians
-really did make this proposition to Athens after they had been enfeebled
-and humiliated by the battle of Leuktra; but not before (Xenoph.
-Hellen. vii. 1, 3).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_5"><a href="#FNanchor_5">[5]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 111.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_6"><a href="#FNanchor_6">[6]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 30, 31. Ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ παρήγγειλεν ὁ Τιρίβαζος παρεῖναι
-<em class="gesperrt">τοὺς βουλομένους ὑπακοῦσαι</em>, ἣν βασιλεὺς εἰρήνην καταπέμποι, ταχέως πάντες
-παρεγένοντο. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ξυνῆλθον, <em class="gesperrt">ἐπιδείξας ὁ Τιρίβαζος τὰ βασιλέως σημεῖα</em>,
-ἀνεγίνωσκε τὰ γεγραμμένα, εἶχε δὲ ὧδε·
-</p>
-<p>
-Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς <em class="gesperrt">νομίζει δίκαιον</em>, τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι,
-καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομένας καὶ Κύπρον· τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ
-μεγάλας, αὐτονόμους εἶναι, πλὴν Λήμνου, καὶ Ἴμβρου καὶ Σκύρου, ταύτας δὲ, ὥσπερ τὸ
-ἀρχαῖον, εἶναι Ἀθηναίων. Ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται, <em class="gesperrt">τούτοις ἐγὼ
-πολεμήσω</em>, μετὰ τῶν ταὐτα βουλομένων, καὶ πέζῇ καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν, καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ
-χρήμασιν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_7"><a href="#FNanchor_7">[7]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 211. Καὶ ταύτας ἡμᾶς ἠνάγκασεν (the
-Persian king) ἐν στήλαις λιθίναις ἀναγράψαντας ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν ἱερῶν ἀναθεῖναι,
-πολὺ κάλλιον τρόπαιον τῶν ἐν ταῖς μάχαις γιγνομένων.
-</p>
-<p>
-The Oratio Panegyrica of Isokrates (published about 380 <small>B.C.</small>, seven
-years afterwards) from which I here copy, is the best evidence of the feelings
-with which an intelligent and patriotic Greek looked upon this treaty
-at the time; when it was yet recent, but when there had been full time to
-see how the Lacedæmonians carried it out. His other orations, though
-valuable and instructive, were published later, and represent the feelings of
-after-time.
-</p>
-<p>
-Another contemporary, Plato in his Menexenus (c. 17, p. 245 D), stigmatizes
-severely “the base and unholy act (αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀνόσιον ἔργον) of surrendering
-Greeks to the foreigner,” and asserts that the Athenians resolutely
-refused to sanction it. This is a sufficient mark of his opinion respecting
-the peace of Antalkidas.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_8"><a href="#FNanchor_8">[8]</a></span>
-Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 207. Ἃ χρῆν ἀναιρεῖν, καὶ μηδεμίαν
-ἐᾷν ἡμέραν, νομίζοντες, <em class="gesperrt">προστάγματα καὶ οὐ συνθήκας</em> εἶναι, etc. (s.
-213). Αἰσχρὸν ἡμᾶς <em class="gesperrt">ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑβριζομένης</em>, μηδεμίαν ποιήσασθαι
-κοινὴν τιμωρίαν, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-The word προστάγματα exactly corresponds with an expression of Xenophon
-(put in the mouth of Autokles the Athenian envoy at Sparta), respecting
-the dictation of the peace of Antalkidas by Artaxerxes—Καὶ ὅτε μὲν <em class="gesperrt">Βασιλεὺς
-προσέταττεν</em> αὐτονόμους τὰς πόλεις εἶναι, etc. (Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 9).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_9"><a href="#FNanchor_9">[9]</a></span>
-Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 205. Καίτοι πῶς οὐ χρὴ διαλύειν ταύτας
-τὰς ὁμολογίας, ἐξ ὧν τοιαύτη δόξα γέγονεν, ὥστε ὁ μὲν Βάρβαρος κήδεται τῆς Ἑλλάδος
-καὶ φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης ἐστὶν, ἡμῶν δέ τινές εἰσιν οἱ λυμαινόμενοι καὶ κακῶς ποιοῦντες
-αὐτήν;
-</p>
-<p>
-The word employed by Photius in his abstract of Theopompus (whether
-it be the expression of Theopompus himself, we cannot be certain—see
-Fragm. 111, ed. Didot), to designate the position taken by Artaxerxes in
-reference to this peace, is—τὴν εἰρήνην ἣν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐβράβευσεν—which
-implies the peremptory decision of an official judge, analogous to
-another passage (139) of the Panegyr. Orat. of Isokrates—Νῦν δ’ ἐκεῖνός
-(Artaxerxes) ἐστιν, ὁ διοικῶν τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ μόνον οὐκ ἐπιστάθμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
-καθιστάς. Πλὴν γὰρ τούτου τί τῶν ἄλλων ὑπόλοιπόν ἐστιν; Οὐ καὶ τοῦ πολέμου κύριος
-ἐγένετο, καὶ <em class="gesperrt">τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπρυτάνευσε</em>, καὶ τῶν παρόντων πραγμάτων ἐπιστάτης
-καθέστηκεν;</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_10"><a href="#FNanchor_10">[10]</a></span>
-Herodot. vi, 49. κατηγόρεον Αἰγινητέων τὰ πεποιήκοιεν, προδόντες
-τὴν Ἑλλάδα.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_11"><a href="#FNanchor_11">[11]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Orat. xii, (Panathen.) s. 112-114.
-</p>
-<p>
-Plutarch (Agesil. c. 23; Artaxerxes, c. 21, 22) expresses himself in terms
-of bitter and well-merited indignation of this peace,—“if indeed (says he)
-we are to call this ignominy and betrayal of Greece by the name of <i>peace</i>,
-which brought with it as much infamy as the most disastrous war.” Sparta
-(he says) lost her headship by her defeat at Leuktra, but her honor had been
-lost before, by the convention of Antalkidas.
-</p>
-<p>
-It is in vain, however, that Plutarch tries to exonerate Agesilaus from
-any share in the peace. From the narrative (in Xenophon’s Hellenica,
-v. i, 33) of his conduct at the taking of the oaths, we see that he espoused
-it most warmly. Xenophon (in the Encomium of Agesilaus, vii, 7) takes
-credit to Agesilaus for being μισοπέρσης, which was true, from the year <small>B.C.</small>
-396 to <small>B.C.</small> 394. But in <small>B.C.</small> 387, at the time of the peace of Antalkidas,
-he had become μισοθηβαῖος; his hatred of Persia had given place to hatred
-of Thebes.
-</p>
-<p>
-See also a vigorous passage of Justin (viii, 4), denouncing the disgraceful
-position of the Greek cities at a later time in calling in Philip of Macedon
-as arbiter; a passage not less applicable to the peace of Antalkidas;
-and perhaps borrowed from Theopompus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_12"><a href="#FNanchor_12">[12]</a></span>
-Compare the language in which the Ionians, on their revolt from Darius
-king of Persia about 500 <small>B.C.</small>, had implored the aid of Sparta (Herodot. v,
-49). Τὰ κατήκοντα γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα· Ἰώνων παῖδας δούλους εἶναι ἀντ’ ἐλευθέρων—ὄνειδος καὶ ἄλγος
-μέγιστον μὲν αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν, <em class="gesperrt">ἔτι δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑμῖν, ὅσῳ προεστέατε τῆς Ἑλλάδος</em>.
-</p>
-<p>
-How striking is the contrast between these words and the peace of Antalkidas!
-and what would have been the feelings of Herodotus himself if he
-could have heard of the latter event!</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_13"><a href="#FNanchor_13">[13]</a></span>
-Thucyd. i, 82. Κἀν τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν ἐξαρτύεσθαι ξυμμάχων
-τε προσαγωγῇ καὶ Ἑλλήνων <em class="gesperrt">καὶ βαρβάρων</em>, εἴ ποθέν τινα <em class="gesperrt">ἢ ναυτικοῦ ἢ χρημάτων</em>
-δύναμιν προσληψόμεθα, (<em class="gesperrt">ἀνεπίφθονον</em> δὲ, ὅσοι ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων
-ἐπιβουλευόμεθα, μὴ Ἕλληνας μόνον <em class="gesperrt">ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρους</em> προσλαβόντας διασωθῆναι),
-etc. Compare also Plato, Menexenus, c. 14, p. 243 B.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_14"><a href="#FNanchor_14">[14]</a></span>
-Thucyd. ii, 7, 67; iv, 50.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_15"><a href="#FNanchor_15">[15]</a></span>
-See Vol. IX, Ch. LXXV, p. 360.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare the expressions of Demosthenes (cont. Aristokrat. c. 33, p. 666)
-attesting the prevalent indignation among the Athenians of his time, about
-this surrender of the Asiatic Greeks by Sparta,—and his oration De Rhodior.
-Libertate, c. 13, p. 199, where he sets the peace of Kallias, made by
-Athens with Persia in 449 <small>B.C.</small>, in contrast with the peace of Antalkidas,
-contracted under the auspices of Sparta.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_16"><a href="#FNanchor_16">[16]</a></span>
-This is strikingly set forth by Isokrates, Or. xii, (Panathen.) s. 167-173.
-In this passage, however, he distributes his blame too equally between
-Sparta and Athens, whereas the blame belongs of right to the former, in
-far greater proportion. Sparta not only began the practice of invoking the
-Great King, and invoking his aid by disgraceful concessions,—but she also
-carried it, at the peace of Antalkidas, to a more extreme point of selfishness
-and subservience. Athens is guilty of following the bad example of
-her rival, but to a less extent, and under greater excuse on the plea of necessity.
-</p>
-<p>
-Isokrates says in another place of this discourse, respecting the various
-acts of wrong-doing towards the general interest of Hellas—ἐπιδεικτέον τοὺς μὲν
-ἡμετέρους <em class="gesperrt">ὀψιμαθεῖς</em> αὐτῶν γεγενημένους, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ <em class="gesperrt">τὰ μὲν πρώτους,
-τὰ δὲ μόνους</em>, ἐξαμαρτόντας (Panath. s. 103). Which
-is much nearer the truth than the passage before referred to.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_17"><a href="#FNanchor_17">[17]</a></span>
-Cornelius Nepos, Conon. c. 5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_18"><a href="#FNanchor_18">[18]</a></span>
-Isok. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 145. Καὶ τῷ βαρβάρῳ τῷ τῆς Ἀσίας
-κρατοῦντι συμπράττουσι (the Lacedæmonians) ὅπως ὡς μεγίστην ἀρχὴν ἕξουσιν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_19"><a href="#FNanchor_19">[19]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 35.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_20"><a href="#FNanchor_20">[20]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-39.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_21"><a href="#FNanchor_21">[21]</a></span>
-Herodot. viii, 143.
-</p>
-<p>
-The explanation which the Athenians give to the Spartan envoys, of the
-reasons and feelings which dictated their answer of refusal to Alexander
-(viii, 144), are not less impressive than the answer itself.
-</p>
-<p>
-But whoever would duly feel and appreciate the treason of the Spartans
-in soliciting the convention of Antalkidas, should read in contrast with it
-that speech which their envoys address to the Athenians, in order to induce
-the latter to stand out against the temptations of Mardonius (viii, 142).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_22"><a href="#FNanchor_22">[22]</a></span>
-The sixth oration (called Archidamus) of Isokrates sets forth emphatically
-the magnanimous sentiments, and comprehensive principles, on which
-it becomes Sparta to model her public conduct,—as altogether different
-from the simple considerations of prudence and security which are suitable
-to humbler states like Corinth, Epidaurus, or Phlius (Archidamus, s. 105,
-106, 110).
-</p>
-<p>
-Contrast these lofty pretensions with the dishonorable realities of the
-convention of Antalkidas,—not thrust upon Sparta by superior force, but
-both originally sued out, and finally enforced by her, for her own political
-ends.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare also Isokrates, Or. xii. (Panathen.) s. 169-172, about the dissension
-of the leading Grecian states, and its baneful effects.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_23"><a href="#FNanchor_23">[23]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ἐν δὲ τῷ πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἀντιῤῥόπως τοῖς ἐναντίοις πράττοντες οἱ
-Λακεδαιμόνιοι, <em class="gesperrt">πολὺ ἐπικυδέστεροι ἐγένοντο</em> ἐκ τῆς ἐπ’
-Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνης καλουμένης· <em class="gesperrt">προστάται γὰρ γενόμενοι τῆς
-ὑπὸ βασιλέως καταπεμφθείσης εἰρήνης</em> καὶ τὴν αὐτονομίαν
-ταῖς πόλεσι πράττοντες, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_24"><a href="#FNanchor_24">[24]</a></span>
-Thucyd. i, 144. Νῦν δὲ τούτοις (to the Lacedæmonian envoys)
-ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀποπέμψωμεν ... τὰς δὲ πόλεις ὅτι αὐτονόμους ἀφήσομεν, εἰ
-καὶ αὐτονόμους ἔχοντες ἐσπεισάμεθα, καὶ ὅταν κἀκεῖνοι ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀποδῶσι
-πόλεσι <em class="gesperrt">μὴ σφίσι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ
-αὐτοῖς ἑκάστοις, ὡς βούλονται</em>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_25"><a href="#FNanchor_25">[25]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36. οὗπερ πάλαι ἐπεθύμουν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_26"><a href="#FNanchor_26">[26]</a></span>
-Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 13.
-</p>
-<p>
-It would appear that the revolt of Egypt from Persia must date between
-414-411 <small>B.C.</small>; but this point is obscure. See Boeckh, Manetho und die
-Hundsstern-Periode, pp. 358, 363, Berlin 1845; and Ley, Fata et Conditio
-Ægypti sub Imperio Persarum, p. 55.</p>
-<p>
-M. Rehdautz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Timothei, et Chabriæ, p. 240, places the
-revolt rather earlier, about 414 <small>B.C.</small>; and Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellen.
-Appendix, ch. 18, p. 317) countenances the same date.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_27"><a href="#FNanchor_27">[27]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 35.
-</p>
-<p>
-This Psammetichus is presumed by Ley (in his Dissertation above cited,
-p. 20) to be the same person as Amyrtæus the Saite in the list of Manetho,
-under a different name. It is also possible, however, that he may have
-been king over a part of Egypt, contemporaneous with Amyrtæus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_28"><a href="#FNanchor_28">[28]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 79.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_29"><a href="#FNanchor_29">[29]</a></span>
-This is the chronology laid down by M. Rehdautz (Vitæ Iphicratis,
-Chabriæ, et Timothei, Epimetr. ii, pp. 241, 242) on very probable grounds,
-principally from Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 161, 162.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_30"><a href="#FNanchor_30">[30]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 2, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_31"><a href="#FNanchor_31">[31]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokl.) s. 50; Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 21; Pausanias,
-ii, 29, 4; Diodor. xiv, 98.
-</p>
-<p>
-The historian Theopompus, when entering upon the history of Evagoras,
-seems to have related many legendary tales respecting the Greek Gentes in
-Cyprus, and to have represented Agamemnon himself as ultimately migrating
-to it (Theopompus, Frag. 111, ed. Wichers; and ed. Didot. ap.
-Photium).
-</p>
-<p>
-The tomb of the archer Teukrus was shown at Salamis in Cyprus. See
-the Epigram of Aristotle, Antholog. i, 8, 112.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_32"><a href="#FNanchor_32">[32]</a></span>
-Movers, in his very learned investigations respecting the Phœnicians
-(vol. iii, ch. 5, p. 203-221 <i>seq.</i>), attempts to establish the existence of an
-ancient population in Cyprus, called Kitians; once extended over the
-island, and of which the town called Kitium was the remnant. He supposes
-them to have been a portion of the Canaanitish population, anterior to the
-Jewish occupation of Palestine. The Phœnician colonies in Cyprus he
-reckons as of later date, superadded to, and depressing these natives. He
-supposes the Kilikian population to have been in early times Canaanitish
-also. Engel (Kypros, vol. i, p. 166) inclines to admit the same hypothesis
-as highly probable.
-</p>
-<p>
-The sixth century <small>B.C.</small> (from 600 downwards) appears to have been very
-unfavorable to the Phœnicians, bringing upon Tyre severe pressure from
-the Chaldeans, as it brought captivity upon the Jews. During the same
-period, the Grecian commerce with Egypt was greatly extended, especially
-by the reign of the Phil-hellenic Amasis, who acquired possession of Cyprus.
-Much of the Grecian immigration into Cyprus probably took place
-at this time; we know of one body of settlers invited by Philokyprus to
-Soli, under the assistance of the Athenian Solon (Movers, p. 244 <i>seq.</i>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_33"><a href="#FNanchor_33">[33]</a></span>
-Herodot. v, 109.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare the description given by Herodotus of the costume and arms
-of the Cypriots in the armament of Xerxes,—half Oriental (vii, 90). The
-Salaminians used chariots of war in battle (v, 113); as the Carthaginians
-did, before they learnt the art of training elephants (Diodor. xvi, 80; Plutarch,
-Timoleon, c. 27).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_34"><a href="#FNanchor_34">[34]</a></span>
-See Vol. V. of this History, Ch. xlv, p. 335.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_35"><a href="#FNanchor_35">[35]</a></span>
-One of these princes, however, is mentioned as bearing the Phœnician
-name of Siromus (Herod. v, 104).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_36"><a href="#FNanchor_36">[36]</a></span>
-We may gather this by putting together Herodot. iv, 102; v, 104-114,
-with Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 22.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_37"><a href="#FNanchor_37">[37]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 23, 55, 58.
-</p>
-<p>
-Παραλαβὼν γὰρ (Evagoras) <em class="gesperrt">τὴν πόλιν ἐκβεβαρβαρωμένην</em>, καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν Φοινίκων
-ἀρχὴν οὔτε τοὺς Ἕλληνας προσδεχομένην, οὔτε τέχνας ἐπισταμένην, οὔτ’ ἐμπορίῳ
-χρωμένην, οὔτε λιμένα κεκτημένην, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Πρὶν μὲν γὰρ λαβεῖν Εὐαγόραν τὴν ἀρχὴν, οὕτως ἀπροσοίστως καὶ χαλεπῶς εἶχον, ὥστε
-καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων τούτους ἐνόμιζον εἶναι βελτίστους οἵ <em class="gesperrt">τινες ὠμότατα πρὸς
-τοὺς Ἕλληνας διακείμενοι</em> τυγχάνοιεν, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-This last passage receives remarkable illustration from the oration of
-Lysias against Andokides, in which he alludes to the visit of the latter to
-Cyprus—μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἔπλευσεν ὡς τὸν Κιτιέων βασιλέα, καὶ προδιδοὺς ληφθεὶς
-ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐδέθη, καὶ οὐ μόνον τὸν θάνατον ἐφοβεῖτο ἀλλὰ τὰ καθ’ ἡμέραν
-αἰκίσματα, <em class="gesperrt">οἰόμενος τὰ ἀκρωτήρια ζῶντος</em> ἀποτμηθήσεσθαι (s. 26).
-</p>
-<p>
-Engel (Kypros, vol. i, p. 286) impugns the general correctness of this
-narrative of Isokrates. He produces no adequate reasons, nor do I myself
-see any, for this contradiction.
-</p>
-<p>
-Not only Konon, but also his friend Nikophemus, had a wife and family
-at Cyprus, besides another family in Athens (Lysias, De Bonis Aristophanis,
-Or. xix, s. 38).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_38"><a href="#FNanchor_38">[38]</a></span>
-Theopompus (Fr. 111) calls Abdêmon a Kitian; Diodorus (xiv, 98)
-calls him a Tyrian. Movers (p. 206) thinks that both are correct, and that
-he was a Kitian living at Tyre, who had migrated from Salamis during the
-Athenian preponderance there. There were Kitians, not natives of the
-town of Kition, but belonging to the ancient population of the island, living
-in the various towns of Cyprus; and there were also Kitians mentioned as
-resident at Sidon (Diogen. Laert. Vit. Zenon. s. 6).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_39"><a href="#FNanchor_39">[39]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 29-35; also Or. iii, (Nikokl.) s. 33;
-Theopomp. Fragm. 111, ed. Wichers and ed. Didot. Diodor. xiv, 98.
-</p>
-<p>
-The two latter mention the name, Audymon or Abdêmon, which Isokrates
-does not specify.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_40"><a href="#FNanchor_40">[40]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 33.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_41"><a href="#FNanchor_41">[41]</a></span>
-Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 53. ἡγούμενος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀγόμενος
-ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_42"><a href="#FNanchor_42">[42]</a></span>
-Isokr. Or. ix, 51. οὐδένα μὲν ἀδικῶν, τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς τιμῶν,
-καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἁπάντων ἄρχων, <em class="gesperrt">νομίμως δὲ τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας</em> κολάζων
-(s. 58)—ὃς οὐ μόνον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόλιν πλείονος ἀξίαν ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν
-τόπον ὅλον, τὸν περιέχοντα τὴν νῆσον, <em class="gesperrt">ἐπὶ πρᾳότητα καὶ μετριότητα</em>
-προήγαγεν, etc.; compare s. 81.
-</p>
-<p>
-These epithets, <i>lawful</i> punishment, <i>mild</i> dealing, etc., cannot be fully understood
-except in contrast with the mutilations alluded to by Lysias, in
-the passage cited in a note on page 16, above; also with exactly similar
-mutilations, mentioned by Xenophon as systematically inflicted upon offenders
-by Cyrus the younger (Xenoph. Anabas. i, 9, 13). Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν
-(says Isokrates about the Persians) οὕτως αἰκίζεται τοὺς οἰκέτας, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι
-τοὺς ἐλευθέρους κολάζουσιν—Or. iv, (Paneg.) 142.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_43"><a href="#FNanchor_43">[43]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 50-56.
-</p>
-<p>
-The language of the encomiast, though exaggerated, must doubtless be
-founded in truth, as the result shows.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_44"><a href="#FNanchor_44">[44]</a></span>
-Lysias cont. Andokid. s. 28.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_45"><a href="#FNanchor_45">[45]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Solon, c. 26.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_46"><a href="#FNanchor_46">[46]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 59-61; compare Lysias, Or. xix, (De Aristoph.
-Bon.) s. 38-46; and Diodor. xiv, 98.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_47"><a href="#FNanchor_47">[47]</a></span>
-Isokrates, <i>l. c.</i> παιδοποιεῖσθαι δὲ τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν
-γυναῖκας λαμβάνοντες παρ’ ἡμῶν, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-For the extreme distress of Athenian women during these trying times
-consult the statement in Xenophon, Memorab. ii, 7, 2-4.
-</p>
-<p>
-The Athenian Andokides is accused of having carried out a young woman
-of citizen family,—his own cousin, and daughter of an Athenian
-named Aristeides,—to Cyprus, and there to have sold her to the despot of
-Kitium for a cargo of wheat. But being threatened with prosecution for
-this act before the Athenian Dikastery, he stole her away again and brought
-her back to Athens; in which act, however, he was detected by the prince,
-and punished with imprisonment from which he had the good fortune to
-escape. (Plutarch, Vit. X, Orat. p. 834; Photius, Cod. 261; Tzetzes, Chiliad.
-vi, 367).
-</p>
-<p>
-How much there may be of truth in this accusation, we have no means
-of determining. But it illustrates the way in which the Athenian maidens,
-who had no dowry at home, were provided for by their relatives elsewhere.
-Probably Andokides took this young woman out, under the engagement to find
-a Grecian husband for her in Cyprus. Instead of doing this, he sold her for
-his own profit to the harem of the prince; or at least, is accused of having
-so sold her.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_48"><a href="#FNanchor_48">[48]</a></span>
-This much appears even from the meagre abstract of Ktesias, given by
-Photius (Ktesiæ Persica, c. 63, p. 80, ed. Bähr).
-</p>
-<p>
-Both Ktesias and Theopompus (Fr. iii, ed. Wichers, and ed. Didot) recounted
-the causes which brought about the war between the Persian king
-and Evagoras.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_49"><a href="#FNanchor_49">[49]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 71, 73, 74. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτον (Evagoras) οὕτως
-ἐκ πολλοῦ περιδεῶς ἔσχε (Artaxerxes), <em class="gesperrt">ὥστε μεταξὺ πάσχων εὖ</em>, πολεμεῖν πρὸς αὐτὸν
-ἐπεχείρησε, δίκαια μὲν οὐ ποιῶν, etc.—ἐπειδὴ <em class="gesperrt">ἠναγκάσθη πολεμεῖν</em> (<i>i. e.</i> Evagoras).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_50"><a href="#FNanchor_50">[50]</a></span>
-Isokr. Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 75, 76; Diodor. xiv, 98; Ephorus, Frag. 134,
-ed. Didot.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_51"><a href="#FNanchor_51">[51]</a></span>
-Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 2; Demosthenes adv. Leptinem, p. 479,
-s. 84.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_52"><a href="#FNanchor_52">[52]</a></span>
-Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 162. Εὐαγόραν—ὃς ἐν ταῖς
-συνθήκαις ἔκδοτός ἐστιν, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-We must observe, however, that Cyprus had been secured to the king of
-Persia, even under the former peace, so glorious to Athens, concluded by
-Perikles about 449 <small>B.C.</small>, and called the peace of Kallias. It was, therefore,
-neither a new demand on the part of Artaxerxes, nor a new concession on
-the part of the Greeks, at the peace of Antalkidas.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_53"><a href="#FNanchor_53">[53]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 2.
-</p>
-<p>
-It appears that Artaxerxes had counted much upon the aid of Hekatomnus
-for conquering Evagoras (Diodor. xiv, 98).
-</p>
-<p>
-About 380 <small>B.C.</small>, Isokrates reckons Hekatomnus as being merely dependent
-in name on Persia; and ready to revolt openly on the first opportunity
-(Isokrates, Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 189).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_54"><a href="#FNanchor_54">[54]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 153, 154, 179.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_55"><a href="#FNanchor_55">[55]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_56"><a href="#FNanchor_56">[56]</a></span>
-Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 187, 188—with Isokrates, Or.
-ix, (Evag.) s. 77.
-</p>
-<p>
-The war was not concluded,—and Tyre as well as much of Kilikia was
-still in revolt,—when Isokrates published the Panegyrical Oration. At
-that time, Evagoras had maintained the contest six years, counting either
-from the peace of Antalkidas (387 <small>B.C.</small>) or from his naval defeat about a
-year or two afterwards; for Isokrates does not make it quite clear from
-what point of commencement he reckons the six years.
-</p>
-<p>
-We know that the war between the king of Persia and Evagoras had
-begun as early as 390 <small>B.C.</small>, in which year an Athenian fleet was sent to
-assist the latter (Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 24). Both Isokrates and Diodorus
-state that it lasted ten years; and I therefore place the conclusion of it in
-380 or 379 <small>B.C.</small>, soon after the date of the Panegyrical Oration of Isokrates.
-I dissent on this point from Mr. Clinton (see Fasti Hellenici, ad annos 387-376
-<small>B.C.</small>, and his Appendix, No. 12—where the point is discussed). He
-supposes the war to have begun after the peace of Antalkidas, and to have
-ended in 376 <small>B.C.</small> I agree with him in making light of Diodorus, but he
-appears to me on this occasion to contradict the authority of Xenophon,—or
-at least only to evade the necessity of contradicting him by resorting to
-an inconvenient hypothesis, and by representing the two Athenian expeditions
-sent to assist Evagoras in Cyprus, first in 390 <small>B.C.</small>, next in 388 <small>B.C.</small>,
-as relating to “<i>hostile measures before the war began</i>” (p. 280). To me it appears
-more natural and reasonable to include these as a part of the war.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_57"><a href="#FNanchor_57">[57]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. ix, s. 73-76.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_58"><a href="#FNanchor_58">[58]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv. 8, 9.
-</p>
-<p>
-This remarkable anecdote, of susceptible Grecian honor on the part of
-Evagoras, is noway improbable, and seems safe to admit on the authority
-of Diodorus. Nevertheless, it forms so choice a morsel for a panegyrical
-discourse such as that of Isokrates, that one cannot but think he would
-have inserted it had it come to his knowledge. His silence causes great
-surprise—not without some suspicion as to the truth of the story.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_59"><a href="#FNanchor_59">[59]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 40,—a passage which must be more true
-of Evagoras than of Nikokles.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_60"><a href="#FNanchor_60">[60]</a></span>
-Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 88. Compare his Orat. viii, (De Pace) s. 138.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_61"><a href="#FNanchor_61">[61]</a></span>
-Isokrates, ib. s. 85. εὐτυχέστερον καὶ θεοφιλέστερον, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_62"><a href="#FNanchor_62">[62]</a></span>
-I give this incident, in the main, as it is recounted in the fragment of
-Theopompus, preserved as a portion of the abstract of that author by Photius
-(Theopom. Fr. 111, ed. Wichers and ed. Didot).
-</p>
-<p>
-Both Aristotle (Polit. v, 8, 10) and Diodorus (xv, 47) allude to the assassination
-of Evagoras by the eunuch; but both these authors conceive the
-story differently from Theopompus. Thus Diodorus says—Nikoklês, the
-eunuch, assassinated Evagoras, and became “despot of Salamis.” This
-appears to be a confusion of Nikoklês with Nikokreon. Nikoklês was the
-son of Evagoras, and the manner in which Isokrates addresses him affords
-the surest proof that <i>he</i> had no hand in the death of his father.
-</p>
-<p>
-The words of Aristotle are—ἡ (ἐπίθεσις) τοῦ εὐνούχου Εὐαγόρᾳ τῷ Κυπρίῳ·
-διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν γυναῖκα παρελέσθαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἀπέκτεινεν ὡς ὑβρισμένος.
-So perplexing is the passage in its literal sense, that M. Barthélemy
-St. Hilaire, in the note to his translation, conceives ὁ εὐνοῦχος to be a surname
-or <i>sobriquet</i> given to the conspirator, whose real name was Nikoklês.
-But this supposition is, in my judgment, contradicted by the fact, that Theopompus
-marks the same fact, of the assassin being an eunuch, by another
-word—Θρασυδαίου <em class="gesperrt">τοῦ ἡμιάῤῥενος</em>, ὃς ἦν Ἠλεῖος τὸ γένος, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-It is evident that Aristotle had heard the story differently from Theopompus,
-and we have to choose between the two. I prefer the version of
-the latter; which is more marked as well as more intelligible, and which
-furnishes the explanation why Pnytagoras,—who seems to have been the
-most advanced of the sons, being left in command of the besieged Salamis
-when Evagoras quitted it to solicit aid in Egypt,—did not succeed his
-father, but left the succession to Nikoklês, who was evidently (from the
-representation even of an eulogist like Isokrates) not a man of much energy.
-The position of this eunuch in the family of Nikokreon seems to mark
-the partial prevalence of Oriental habits.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_63"><a href="#FNanchor_63">[63]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikoklês) s. 38-48; Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 100; Or.
-xv, (Permut.) s. 43. Diodorus (xv, 47) places the assassination of Evagoras
-in 374 <small>B.C.</small></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_64"><a href="#FNanchor_64">[64]</a></span>
-Isokrates. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142, 156, 190. Τάς τε πόλεις τὰς Ἑλληνίδας
-οὕτω κυρίως παρείληφεν, ὥστε τὰς μὲν κατασκάπτειν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀκροπόλεις ἐντειχίζειν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_65"><a href="#FNanchor_65">[65]</a></span>
-See Herodot. vi, 9; ix, 76.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_66"><a href="#FNanchor_66">[66]</a></span>
-Isokrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142.
-</p>
-<p>
-Οἷς (to the Asiatic Greeks after the peace of Antalkidas) οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ
-δασμολογεῖσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀκροπόλεις ὁρᾷν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν κατεχομένας, ἀλλὰ
-πρὸς ταῖς κοιναῖς συμφοραῖς δεινότερα πάσχουσι τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀργυρωνήτων·
-οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὕτως αἰκίζεται τοὺς οἰκέτας, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους
-κολάζουσιν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_67"><a href="#FNanchor_67">[67]</a></span>
-Isokrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 143, 154, 189, 190.
-How immediately the inland kings, who had acquired possession of the
-continental Grecian cities, aimed at acquiring the islands also, is seen in
-Herodot. i, 27. Chios and Samos indeed, surrendered without resisting, to
-the first Cyrus, when he was master of the continental towns, though he had
-no naval force (Herod. i, 143-169). Even after the victory of Mykalê, the
-Spartans deemed it impossible to protect these islanders against the Persian
-masters of the continent (Herod. ix, 106). Nothing except the energy
-and organization of the Athenians proved that it was possible to do so.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_68"><a href="#FNanchor_68">[68]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Agesil. c. 26; Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 13.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_69"><a href="#FNanchor_69">[69]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 33.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_70"><a href="#FNanchor_70">[70]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46. Ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι
-καθειστήκεσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις. Respecting the Bœotian city of Tanagra,
-he says—ἔτι γὰρ τότε καὶ τὴν Τανάγραν οἱ περὶ Ὑπατόδωρον, φίλοι ὄντες
-τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, εἶχον (v, 4, 49).
-</p>
-<p>
-Schneider, in his note on the former of these two passages, explains the
-word δυναστεῖαι as follows—“Sunt factiones optimatium qui Lacedæmoniis
-favebant, cum præsidio et harmostâ Laconico.” This is perfectly
-just; but the words ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις seem also to require an explanation.
-These words allude to the “factio optimatium” at Thebes, of whom Leontiades
-was the chief; who betrayed the Kadmeia (the citadel of Thebes) to
-the Lacedæmonian troops under Phœbidas in 382 <small>B.C.</small>; and who remained
-masters of Thebes, subservient to Sparta and upheld by a standing Lacedæmonian
-garrison in the Kadmeia, until they were overthrown by the
-memorable conspiracy of Pelopidas and Mellon in 379 <small>B.C.</small> It is to this
-oligarchy under Leontiades at Thebes, devoted to Spartan interests and
-resting on Spartan support,—that Xenophon compares the governments
-planted by Sparta, after the peace of Antalkidas, in each of the Bœotian cities.
-What he says, of the government of Leontiades and his colleagues at
-Thebes, is—“that they deliberately introduced the Lacedæmonians into
-the acropolis, and enslaved Thebes to them, in order that they might themselves
-exercise a despotism”—τούς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγαγόντας εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς,
-καὶ βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν πόλιν δουλεύειν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν (v, 4, 1:
-compare v, 2, 36). This character—conveying a
-strong censure in the mouth of the philo-Laconian Xenophon—belongs to
-all the governments planted by Sparta in the Bœotian cities after the peace
-of Antalkidas, and, indeed, to the Dekarchies generally which she established
-throughout her empire.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_71"><a href="#FNanchor_71">[71]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Memorab. iii, 5, 2; Thucyd. iv, 133; Diodor. xv, 79.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_72"><a href="#FNanchor_72">[72]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 15-20; Diodor. xv, 32-37; Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.)
-s. 14. 15.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_73"><a href="#FNanchor_73">[73]</a></span>
-Herodot. vi, 108.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_74"><a href="#FNanchor_74">[74]</a></span>
-See Vol. V. Ch. xlv, p. 327 of this History.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_75"><a href="#FNanchor_75">[75]</a></span>
-Thucyd. iii, 68.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_76"><a href="#FNanchor_76">[76]</a></span>
-Thucyd. v, 32; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 126; Or. xii, (Panathen.)
-s. 101.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_77"><a href="#FNanchor_77">[77]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_78"><a href="#FNanchor_78">[78]</a></span>
-Pausanias, ix, 1, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_79"><a href="#FNanchor_79">[79]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. xiv. (Plataic.) s. 54.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_80"><a href="#FNanchor_80">[80]</a></span>
-See the Orat. xiv, (called Plataicus) of Isokrates; which is a pleading
-probably delivered in the Athenian assembly by the Platæans (after the
-second destruction of their city), and, doubtless, founded upon their own
-statements. The painful dependence and compulsion under which they
-were held by Sparta, is proclaimed in the most unequivocal terms (s. 31,
-33, 48); together with the presence of a Spartan harmost and garrison in
-their town (s. 14).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_81"><a href="#FNanchor_81">[81]</a></span>
-Xenophon says, truly enough, that Sparta made the Bœotian cities
-αὐτονόμους ἀπὸ τῶν Θηβαίων (v. 1, 36), which she had long desired to do.
-Autonomy, in the sense of disconnection from Thebes, was insured to them,—but
-in no other sense.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_82"><a href="#FNanchor_82">[82]</a></span>
-To illustrate the relations of Thebes, the other Bœotian cities, and
-Sparta, between the peace of Antalkidas and the seizure of the Kadmeia by
-Sparta (387-382 <small>B.C.</small>)—compare the speech of the Akanthian envoys, and
-that of the Theban Leontiades, at Sparta (Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 16-34).
-Ὑμᾶς (the Spartans) τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως μὴ καθ’ ἓν εἴη,
-etc. Καὶ ὑμεῖς γε τότε μὲν ἀεὶ προσείχετε τὸν νοῦν, πότε ἀκούσεσθε βιαζομένους
-αὐτοὺς (the Thebans) τὴν Βοιωτίαν ὑφ’ αὑτοῖς εἶναι· νῦν δὲ, ἐπεὶ τάδε πέπρακται,
-οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς δεῖ Θηβαίους φοβεῖσθαι, etc. Compare Diodor. xv, 20.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_83"><a href="#FNanchor_83">[83]</a></span>
-In the Orat. (14) Plataic. of Isokrates, s. 30—we find it stated among
-the accusations against the Thebans, that during this period (<i>i. e.</i> between
-the peace of Antalkidas and the seizure of the Kadmeia) they became
-sworn in as members of the Spartan alliance and as ready to act with
-Sparta conjointly against Athens. If we could admit this as true, we might
-also admit the story of Epaminondas and Pelopidas serving in the Spartan
-army at Mantinea (Plutarch, Pelop. c. 3). But I do not see how it can be
-even partially true. If it had been true, I think Xenophon could not have
-failed to mention it: all that he does say, tends to contradict it.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_84"><a href="#FNanchor_84">[84]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv. 29.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_85"><a href="#FNanchor_85">[85]</a></span>
-How currently this reproach was advanced against Agesilaus, may be
-seen in more than one passage of the Hellenica of Xenophon; whose narrative
-is both so partial, and so ill-constructed, that the most instructive
-information is dropped only in the way of unintentional side-wind, where
-we should not naturally look for it. Xen. Hellen. v. 3, 16. πολλῶν δὲ λεγόντων Λακεδαιμονίων
-ὡς ὀλίγων ἕνεκεν ἀνθρώπων πόλει (Phlius) ἀπεχθάνοιτο
-(Agesilaus) πλέον πεντακισχιλίων ἀνδρῶν. Again, v, 4, 13. (Ἀγησίλαος)
-εὖ εἰδὼς, ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγοίη, λέξειαν οἱ πολῖται, ὡς Ἀγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσειε τοῖς τυράννοις,
-πράγματα τῇ πόλει παρέχοι, etc. Compare Plutarch,
-Agesil. c. 24-26.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_86"><a href="#FNanchor_86">[86]</a></span>
-Diodorus indeed affirms, that this was really done, for a short time;
-that the cities which had before been dependent allies of Sparta were now
-emancipated and left to themselves; that a reaction immediately ensued
-against those dekarchies or oligarchies which had hitherto managed the
-cities in the interests of Sparta; that this reaction was so furious, as everywhere
-to kill, banish, or impoverish, the principal partisans of Spartan supremacy;
-and that the accumulated complaints and sufferings of these
-exiles drove the Spartans, after having “endured the peace like a heavy
-burthen” (ὥσπερ βαρὺ φόρτιον—xv, 5) for a few months, to shake it off, and
-to reëstablish by force their own supremacy as well as the government of
-their friends in all the various cities. In this statement there is nothing
-intrinsically improbable. After what we have heard of the dekarchies under
-Sparta, no extent of violence in the reaction against them is incredible, nor
-can we doubt that such reaction would carry with it some new injustice,
-along with much well-merited retribution. Hardly any but Athenian citizens
-were capable of the forbearance displayed by Athens both after the
-Four Hundred and after the Thirty. Nevertheless, I believe that Diodorus
-is here mistaken, and that he has assigned to the period immediately succeeding
-the peace of Antalkidas, those reactionary violences which took
-place in many cities about sixteen years subsequently, <i>after the battle of
-Leuktra</i>. For Xenophon, in recounting what happened after the peace of
-Antalkidas, mentions nothing about any real autonomy granted by Sparta
-to her various subject-allies, and subsequently revoked; which he would
-never have omitted to tell us, had the fact been so, because it would have
-supplied a plausible apology for the high-handed injustice of the Spartans,
-and would have thus lent aid to the current of partiality which manifests
-itself in his history.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_87"><a href="#FNanchor_87">[87]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 1-8. Αἰσθόμενοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπισκοποῦντας
-τοὺς ξυμμάχους, ὁποῖοί τινες ἕκαστοι ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ αὐτοῖς ἐγεγένηντο, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_88"><a href="#FNanchor_88">[88]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 2. He had before stated, that the Mantineans had
-really shown themselves pleased, when the Lacedæmonian Mora was destroyed
-near Corinth by Iphikrates (iv, 5, 18).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_89"><a href="#FNanchor_89">[89]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_90"><a href="#FNanchor_90">[90]</a></span>
-In 1627, during the Thirty years’ War, the German town of Wolfenbüttel
-was constrained to surrender in the same manner, by damming up the
-river Ocker which flowed through it; a contrivance of General Count Pappenheim,
-the Austrian besieging commander. See Colonel Mitchell’s Life
-of Wallenstein, p. 107.
-</p>
-<p>
-The description given by Xenophon of Mantinea as it stood in 385 <small>B.C.</small>,
-with the river Ophis, a considerable stream, passing through the middle of
-it, is perfectly clear. When the city, after having been now broken up, was
-rebuilt in 370 <small>B.C.</small>, the site was so far changed that the river no longer ran
-through it. But the present course of the river Ophis, as given by excellent
-modern topographical examiners, Colonel Leake and Kiepert, is at a
-very considerable distance from the Mantinea rebuilt in 370 <small>B.C.</small>; the situation
-of which is accurately known, since the circuit of its walls still remains
-distinctly marked. The Mantinea of 370 <small>B.C.</small>, therefore, as compared
-with the Mantinea in 385 <small>B.C.</small>, must have been removed to a considerable
-distance—or else the river Ophis must have altered its course. Colonel
-Leake supposes that the Ophis had been artificially diverted from its course,
-in order that it might be brought through the town of Mantinea; a supposition,
-which he founds on the words of Xenophon,—σοφωτέρων γενομένων ταύτῃ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων,
-τὸ μὴ διὰ τειχῶν ποταμὸν ποιεῖσθαι (Hellen. v, 2,
-7). But it is very difficult to agree with him on this point, when we look
-at his own map (annexed to the Peloponnesiaca) of the Mantinice and Tegeatis,
-and observe the great distance between the river Ophis and Mantinea;
-nor do the words of Xenophon seem necessarily to imply any artificial
-diversion of the river. It appears easier to believe that the river has
-changed its course. See Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 71;
-and Peloponnesiaca, p. 380; and Ernst Curtius, Peloponnesos, p. 239—who
-still, however, leaves the point obscure.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_91"><a href="#FNanchor_91">[91]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_92"><a href="#FNanchor_92">[92]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 6. Οἰομένων δὲ ἀποθανεῖσθαι τῶν ἀργολιζόντων,
-καὶ τῶν τοῦ δήμου προστατῶν, διεπράξατο ὁ πατὴρ (see before, v, 2, 3) παρὰ τοῦ
-Ἀγησιπόλιδος, ἀσφάλειαν αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι, ἀπαλλαττομένοις ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἑξήκοντα
-οὖσι. Καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν μὲν τῆς ὁδοῦ, ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῶν πυλῶν ἔχοντες τὰ δόρατα
-οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἔστησαν, θεώμενοι τοὺς ἐξιόντας· <em class="gesperrt">καὶ μισοῦντες αὐτοὺς ὅμως
-ἀπείχοντο αὐτῶν ῥᾷον ἢ οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν Μαντινέων</em>· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν εἰρήσθω
-μέγα τεκμήριον πειθαρχίας.
-</p>
-<p>
-I have remarked more than once, and the reader will here observe a new
-example, how completely the word βέλτιστοι—which is applied to the
-wealthy or aristocratical party in politics, as its equivalent is in other languages,
-by writers who sympathize with them—is divested of all genuine
-ethical import as to character.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_93"><a href="#FNanchor_93">[93]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 7.
-</p>
-<p>
-He says of this breaking up of the city of Mantinea, διῳκίσθη ἡ Μαντίνεια τετραχῆ,
-καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ᾤκουν. Ephorus (Fr. 138, ed. Didot)
-states that it was distributed into the five original villages; and Strabo affirms
-that there were <i>five</i> original constituent villages (viii, p. 337). Hence
-it is probable that Mantinea the city was still left, after this διοίκισις, to
-subsist as one of the five unfortified villages; so that Ephorus, Strabo, and
-Xenophon may be thus made to agree, in substance.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_94"><a href="#FNanchor_94">[94]</a></span>
-This is mentioned by Xenophon himself (Hellen. vi, 5, 3). The Lacedæmonians,
-though they remonstrated against it, were at that time too
-much humiliated to interfere by force and prevent it. The reason why
-they did not interfere by force (according to Xenophon) was that a general
-peace had just then been sworn, guaranteeing autonomy to every distinct
-town, so that the Mantineans under this peace had a right to do what they
-did—στρατεύειν γε μέντοι ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς οὐ δυνατὸν ἐδόκει εἶναι, ἐπ’ αὐτονομίᾳ
-τῆς εἰρήνης γεγενημένης (vi, 5, 5). Of this second peace, Athens was the
-originator and the voucher; but the autonomy which it guaranteed was
-only the same as had been professedly guaranteed by the peace of Antalkidas,
-of which Sparta had been the voucher.
-</p>
-<p>
-General autonomy, as interpreted by Athens, was a different thing from
-general autonomy as it had been when interpreted by Sparta. The Spartans,
-when they had in their own hands both the power of interpretation and
-the power of enforcement, did not scruple to falsify autonomy so completely
-as to lay siege to Mantinea and break up the city by force; while, when
-interpretation and enforcement had passed to Athens, they at once recognized
-that the treaty precluded them from a much less violent measure of
-interference.
-</p>
-<p>
-We may see by this, how thoroughly partial and Laconian is the account
-given by Xenophon of the διοίκισις of Mantinea; how completely he keeps
-out of view the odious side of that proceeding.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_95"><a href="#FNanchor_95">[95]</a></span>
-See the remarkable sentence of the Spartans, in which they reject the
-claim of the Pisatans to preside over and administer the Olympic festival
-(which had been their ancient privilege) because they were χωρίται and not fit
-for the task (Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31): compare χωριτικῶς (Xen. Cyrop. iv.
-5, 54).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_96"><a href="#FNanchor_96">[96]</a></span>
-Aristot. Polit. vi, 2, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_97"><a href="#FNanchor_97">[97]</a></span>
-Thucyd. v, 81.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_98"><a href="#FNanchor_98">[98]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 133, 134, 146, 206; Or. viii, (De Pace) s.
-123; Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 1-8; Diodor. xv, 5, 9-19.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_99"><a href="#FNanchor_99">[99]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 35.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_100"><a href="#FNanchor_100">[100]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v. 2, 8-10.
-</p>
-<p>
-The consequences of this forced return are difficult to foresee; they will
-appear in a subsequent page.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_101"><a href="#FNanchor_101">[101]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 3-12.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_102"><a href="#FNanchor_102">[102]</a></span>
-Xen. Hell. iv, 8, 7.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_103"><a href="#FNanchor_103">[103]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Orat. xvii, (Trapezit.) s. 71.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_104"><a href="#FNanchor_104">[104]</a></span>
-See the valuable inscription called the Marmor Sandvicense, which contains
-the accounts rendered by the annual Amphiktyons at Delos, from
-377-373 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-Boeckh, Staats-haushaltung der Athener, vol. ii, p. 214, ed. 1; vol. ii, p.
-78 <i>seq.</i>, ed. 2nd.
-</p>
-<p>
-The list of cities and individuals who borrowed money from the temple is
-given in these accounts, together with the amount of interest either paid by
-them, or remaining in arrear.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_105"><a href="#FNanchor_105">[105]</a></span>
-This is the description which Isokrates himself gives (Orat. xv, (Permutat.)
-s. 61) of the state of the Grecian world when he published his Panegyrical
-Discourse—ὅτε Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν ἦρχον τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταπεινῶς ἐπράττομεν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_106"><a href="#FNanchor_106">[106]</a></span>
-The Panegyrical Discourse of Isokrates, the date of it being pretty exactly
-known, is of great value for enabling us to understand the period immediately
-succeeding the peace of Antalkidas.
-</p>
-<p>
-He particularly notices the multiplication of pirates, and the competition
-between Athens and Sparta about tribute from the islands in the Ægean
-(s. 133). Τίς γὰρ ἂν τοιαύτης καταστάσεως ἐπιθυμήσειεν, ἐν ᾗ καταποντισταὶ
-μὲν τὴν θάλασσαν κατέχουσι, πελτασταὶ δὲ τὰς πόλεις καταλαμβάνουσι, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-... Καίτοι χρὴ τοὺς φύσει καὶ μὴ διὰ τύχην μέγα φρονοῦντας τοιούτοις ἔργοις
-ἐπιχειρεῖν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ <em class="gesperrt">τοὺς νησιώτας δασμολογεῖν</em>, οὓς ἄξιόν ἐστιν
-ἐλέειν, ὁρῶντας τούτους μὲν διὰ σπανιότητα τῆς γῆς ὄρη γεωργεῖν ἀναγκαζομένους,
-τοὺς δ’ ἠπειρώτας δι’ ἀφθονίαν τῆς χώρας τὴν μὲν πλείστην αὐτῆς ἀργὸν
-περιορῶντας, etc. (s. 151).
-</p>
-<p>
-... Ὧν ἡμεῖς (Athenians and Spartans) οὐδεμίαν ποιούμεθα πρόνοιαν,
-ἀλλὰ <em class="gesperrt">περὶ μὲν τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων ἀμφισβητοῦμεν</em>, τοσαύτας δὲ τὸ πλῆθος
-καὶ τηλικαύτας τὸ μέγεθος δυνάμεις οὕτως εἰκῇ τῷ βαρβάρῳ παραδεδώκαμεν.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 12—μὴ εἰς νησύδρια ἀποβλέποντας, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_107"><a href="#FNanchor_107">[107]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 9, 19.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_108"><a href="#FNanchor_108">[108]</a></span>
-Thucyd. vii, 9.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_109"><a href="#FNanchor_109">[109]</a></span>
-This is attested by Plato, Gorgias, c. 26. p. 471 A.
-</p>
-<p>
-... Ὅς γε (Archelaus son of Perdikkas) πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν δεσπότην
-καὶ θεῖον (Alketas) μεταπεμψάμενος, <em class="gesperrt">ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣν Περδίκκας
-αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο</em>, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-This statement of Plato, that Perdikkas expelled his brother Alketas from
-the throne, appears not to be adverted to by the commentators. Perhaps it
-may help to explain the chronological embarrassments connected with the
-reign of Perdikkas, the years of which are assigned by different authors, as
-23, 28, 35, 40, 41. See Mr. Clinton, Fasti Hellen. ch. iv, p. 222—where he
-discusses the chronology of the Macedonian kings: also Krebs, Lection. Diodoreæ,
-p. 159.
-</p>
-<p>
-There are no means of determining when the reign of Perdikkas began—nor
-exactly, when it ended. We know from Thucydides that he was king
-in 432, and in 414 <small>B.C.</small> But the fact of his acquiring the crown by the expulsion
-of an elder brother, renders it less wonderful that the beginning of
-his reign should be differently stated by different authors; though these authors
-seem mostly to conceive Perdikkas as the immediate successor of
-Alexander, without any notice of Alketas.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_110"><a href="#FNanchor_110">[110]</a></span>
-Thucyd. i, 57; ii, 97-100.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_111"><a href="#FNanchor_111">[111]</a></span>
-The mother of Archelaus was a female slave belonging to Alketas; it is
-for this reason that Plato calls Alketas <em class="gesperrt">δεσπότην</em> καὶ θεῖον of Archelaus
-(Plato, Gorgias, c. 26. p. 471 A.)</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_112"><a href="#FNanchor_112">[112]</a></span>
-Thucyd. ii, 100. ὁδοὺς εὐθείας ἔτεμε, etc. See the note in Ch. lxix, p.
-17 of Vol. IX.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_113"><a href="#FNanchor_113">[113]</a></span>
-Arrian, i, 11; Diodor. xvii, 16.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_114"><a href="#FNanchor_114">[114]</a></span>
-Plutarch, De Vitioso Pudore, c. 7, p. 531 E.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_115"><a href="#FNanchor_115">[115]</a></span>
-Aristotel. Rhetoric, ii, 24; Seneca, de Beneficiis, v, 6; Ælian, V. H.
-xiv, 17.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_116"><a href="#FNanchor_116">[116]</a></span>
-See the statements, unfortunately very brief, of Aristotle (Politic. v, 8,
-10-13). Plato (Alkibiad. ii, c. 5, p. 141 D), while mentioning the assassination
-of Archelaus by his παιδικὰ represents the motive of the latter differently
-from Aristotle, as having been an ambitious desire to possess himself
-of the throne. Diodorus (xiv, 37) represents Krateuas as having killed
-Archelaus unintentionally in a hunting-party.
-</p>
-<p>
-Καὶ τῆς Ἀρχελάου δ’ ἐπιθέσεως Δεκάμνιχος ἡγεμὼν ἐγένετο, παροξύνων τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους
-πρῶτος· αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς, ὅτι αὐτὸν ἐξέδωκε μαστιγῶσαι Εὐριπίδῃ τῷ ποιητῇ· ὁ δὲ
-Εὐριπίδης ἐχαλέπαινεν εἰπόντος τι αὐτοῦ εἰς δυσώδειαν τοῦ στόματος (Arist. Pol. <i>l. c.</i>).
-</p>
-<p>
-Dekamnichus is cited by Aristotle as one among the examples of persons
-actually scourged; which proves that Euripides availed himself of the privilege
-accorded by Archelaus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_117"><a href="#FNanchor_117">[117]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv. 84-89.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_118"><a href="#FNanchor_118">[118]</a></span>
-Ælian, V. H. xii, 43; Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 263; Justin, vii, 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_119"><a href="#FNanchor_119">[119]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 89. Ἐτελεύτησε δὲ καὶ Παυσανίας ὁ τῶν Μακεδόνων
-βασιλεὺς, ἀναιρεθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἀμύντου δόλῳ, ἄρξας ἐνιαυτόν· τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν
-κατέσχεν Ἀμύντας, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_120"><a href="#FNanchor_120">[120]</a></span>
-See in Thucyd. iv, 112—the relations of Arrhibæus, prince of the
-Macedonians called Lynkestæ in the interior country, with the Illyrian invaders—<small>B.C.</small>
-423.
-</p>
-<p>
-Archelaus had been engaged at a more recent period in war with a
-prince of the interior named Arrhibæus,—perhaps the same person (Aristot.
-Polit. v, 8, 11).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_121"><a href="#FNanchor_121">[121]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 92; xv, 19. Ἀπογνοὺς δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν, Ὀλυνθίοις
-μὲν τὴν συνεγγὺς χώραν ἐδωρήσατο, etc. Τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ὀλυνθίων δωρησαμένου
-πολλὴν τῆς ὁμόρου χώρας, διὰ τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δυναστείας, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-The flight of Amyntas, after a year’s reign, is confirmed by Dexippus ap.
-Syncell. p. 263.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_122"><a href="#FNanchor_122">[122]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 12. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης μεγίστη
-πόλις Ὄλυνθος σχεδὸν πάντες ἐπίστασθε. Οὗτοι τῶν πόλεων προσηγάγοντο ἔστιν
-ἃς, ἐφ’ ᾧτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι νόμοις καὶ συμπολιτεύειν· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν
-μειζόνων προσέλαβόν τινας. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐπεχείρησαν καὶ τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας
-πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου, τοῦ βασιλέως Μακεδόνων. Ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰσήκουσαν
-αἱ ἐγγύτατα αὐτῶν, ταχὺ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς πόῤῥω καὶ μείζους ἐπορεύοντο· καὶ
-κατελίπομεν ἡμεῖς ἔχοντας ἤδη ἄλλας τε πολλὰς, καὶ Πέλλαν, ἥπερ μεγίστη
-τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ πόλεων. Καὶ Ἀμύνταν δὲ αἰσθανόμεθα ἀποχωροῦντά τε ἐκ τῶν
-πόλεων, καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἐκπεπτωκότα ἤδη ἐκ πάσης Μακεδονίας.
-</p>
-<p>
-We know from Diodorus that Amyntas fled the country in despair, and
-ceded a large proportion at least of Lower Macedonia to the Olynthians.
-Accordingly, the struggle between the latter and Amyntas (here alluded
-to), must have taken place when he came back and tried to resume his dominion.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_123"><a href="#FNanchor_123">[123]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 12—τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν
-ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου, etc.; compare v, 2, 38.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_124"><a href="#FNanchor_124">[124]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 14.
-</p>
-<p>
-The number of Olynthian troops is given in Xenophon as eight hundred
-hoplites—a far greater number of peltasts—and one thousand horsemen,
-assuming that Akanthus and Apollonia joined the confederacy. It has
-been remarked by Mr. Mitford and others, that these numbers, as they here
-stand, must be decidedly smaller than the reality. But we have no means
-of correction open to us. Mr. Mitford’s suggestion of eight thousand hoplites
-in place of eight hundred, rests upon no authority.
-</p>
-<p>
-Demosthenes states that Olynthus by herself, and before she had brought
-all the Chalkidians into confederacy (οὔπω Χαλκιδέων πάντων εἰς ἓν συνῳκισμένων—De
-Fals. Leg. c. 75, p. 425) possessed four hundred horsemen,
-and a citizen population of 5000; no more than this (he says) at the time
-when the Lacedæmonians attacked them. The historical statements of the
-great orator, for a time which nearly coincides with his own birth, are to
-be received with caution.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_125"><a href="#FNanchor_125">[125]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 16. Ἐννοήσατε δὲ καὶ τόδε, πῶς εἰκὸς,
-ὑμᾶς τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως μὴ καθ’ ἓν εἴη, πολὺ δὲ
-μείζονος ἀθροιζομένης δυνάμεως ἀμελῆσαι, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-I translate here the substance of the speech, not the exact words.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_126"><a href="#FNanchor_126">[126]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 14. Ἡμεῖς δὲ, ὦ ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι,
-βουλόμεθα μὲν τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι, καὶ αὐτοπολῖται εἶναι·
-εἰ μέντοι μὴ βοηθήσει τις, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡμῖν μετ’ ἐκείνων γίγνεσθαι.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_127"><a href="#FNanchor_127">[127]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 18. Δεῖ γε μὴν ὑμᾶς καὶ τόδε εἰδέναι,
-ὡς, ἣν εἰρήκαμεν δύναμιν μεγάλην οὖσαν, οὔπω δυσπάλαιστός τις ἐστίν·
-αἱ γὰρ ἄκουσαι τῶν πόλεων <em class="gesperrt">τῆς πολιτείας κοινωνοῦσαι</em>, αὗται,
-ἄν τι ἴδωσιν ἀντίπαλον, ταχὺ ἀποστήσονται· <em class="gesperrt">εἰ μέντοι
-συγκλεισθήσονται ταῖς τε ἐπιγαμίαις καὶ ἐγκτήσεσι παρ’ ἀλλήλαις,
-ἃς ἐψηφισμένοι εἰσὶ—καὶ γνώσονται, ὅτι μετὰ τῶν κρατούντων ἕπεσθαι
-κερδαλέον ἐστὶν</em>, ὥσπερ Ἄρκαδες, ὅταν μεθ’ ὑμῶν ἴωσι, τά τε αὐτῶν
-σώζουσι καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἁρπάζουσιν—<em class="gesperrt">ἴσως οὔκεθ’ ὁμοίως εὔλυτα
-ἔσται</em>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_128"><a href="#FNanchor_128">[128]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 92; xv, 19.
-</p>
-<p>
-Demosthenes speaks of Amyntas as having been expelled from his kingdom
-by the Thessalians (cont. Aristokrat. c. 29, p. 657). If this be historically
-correct, it must be referred to some subsequent war in which he was
-engaged with the Thessalians, perhaps to the time when Jason of Pheræ
-acquired dominion over Macedonia (Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 11).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_129"><a href="#FNanchor_129">[129]</a></span>
-See above in this History, Vol. VI. Ch. xlviii. p. 79.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_130"><a href="#FNanchor_130">[130]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 20. Ἐκ τούτου μέντοι, πολλοὶ μὲν
-ξυνηγόρευον στρατιὰν ποιεῖν, μάλιστα δὲ οἱ βουλόμενοι Λακεδαιμονίοις
-χαρίζεσθαι, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_131"><a href="#FNanchor_131">[131]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 21, 22.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus (xv, 31) mentions the fact that an hoplite was reckoned equivalent
-to two peltasts, in reference to a Lacedæmonian muster-roll of a few
-years afterwards; but it must have been equally necessary to fix the proportion
-on the present occasion.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_132"><a href="#FNanchor_132">[132]</a></span>
-See Vol. V. Ch. xlv, p. 302 of this History.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_133"><a href="#FNanchor_133">[133]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 24; Diodor. xv, 21.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_134"><a href="#FNanchor_134">[134]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 27-34.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_135"><a href="#FNanchor_135">[135]</a></span>
-This is the statement of Diodorus (xv, 20), and substantially that of Plutarch
-(Agesil. c. 24), who intimates that it was the general belief of the time.
-And it appears to me much more probable than the representation of Xenophon—that
-the first idea arose when Phœbidas was under the walls of Thebes,
-and that the Spartan leader was persuaded by Leontiades to act on his own
-responsibility. The behavior of Agesilaus and of the ephors after the fact
-is like that of persons who had previously contemplated the possibility of it.
-But the original suggestion must have come from the Theban faction themselves.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_136"><a href="#FNanchor_136">[136]</a></span>
-Plutarch (De Genio Socratis, c. 5, p. 578 B.) states that most of these generals
-of cavalry (τῶν ἱππαρχηκότων νομίμως) were afterwards in exile with
-Pelopidas at Athens.
-</p>
-<p>
-We have little or no information respecting the government of Thebes.
-It would seem to have been at this moment a liberalized oligarchy. There
-was a Senate, and two Polemarchs (perhaps the Polemarchs may have
-been more than two in all, though the words of Xenophon rather lead us to
-suppose <i>only</i> two)—and there seems also to have been a civil magistrate,
-chosen by lot (ὁ κυαμιστὸς ἄρχων) and renewed annually, whose office was
-marked by his constantly having in his possession the sacred spear of state
-(τὸ ἱερὸν δόρυ) and the city-seal (Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 31. p. 597—B.—C.).
-</p>
-<p>
-At this moment, it must be recollected, there were no such officers as Bœotarchs;
-since the Lacedæmonians, enforcing the peace of Antalkidas, had
-put an end to the Bœotian federation.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_137"><a href="#FNanchor_137">[137]</a></span>
-The rhetor Aristeides (Or. xix, Eleusin. p. 452 Cant.; p. 419 Dind.)
-states that the Kadmeia was seized during the Pythian festival. This festival
-would take place, July or August 382 <small>B.C.</small>; near the beginning of the
-third year of the (99th) Olympiad. See above in this History, Vol. VI.
-Ch. liv, p. 455, note. Respecting the year and month in which the Pythian
-festival was held, there is a difference of opinion among commentators. I
-agree with those who assign it to the first quarter of the third Olympic year.
-And the date of the march of Phœbidas would perfectly harmonize with this
-supposition.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenophon mentions nothing about the Pythian festival as being in
-course of celebration when Phœbidas was encamped near Thebes: for it
-had no particular reference to Thebes.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_138"><a href="#FNanchor_138">[138]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 28, 29.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_139"><a href="#FNanchor_139">[139]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 30, 31.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_140"><a href="#FNanchor_140">[140]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. ii, 3. See above in this History, Vol. VIII. Ch. lxv. p. 252.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_141"><a href="#FNanchor_141">[141]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_142"><a href="#FNanchor_142">[142]</a></span>
-It is curious that Xenophon, treating Phœbidas as a man more warm-hearted
-than wise, speaks of him as if he had rendered no real service to
-Sparta by the capture of the Kadmeia (v, 2, 28). The explanation of this
-is, that Xenophon wrote his history at a later period, after the defeat at
-Leuktra and the downfall of Sparta; which downfall was brought about by
-the reaction against her overweening and oppressive dominion, especially
-after the capture of the Kadmeia,—or (in the pious creed of Xenophon) by
-the displeasure of the gods, which such iniquity drew down upon her (v, 4,
-1). In this way, therefore, it is made out that Phœbidas had not acted
-with true wisdom, and that he had done his country more harm than good;
-a criticism, which we may be sure that no man advanced, at the time of the
-capture itself, or during the three years after it.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_143"><a href="#FNanchor_143">[143]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 34.
-</p>
-<p>
-Καὶ ὑμεῖς γε (says Leontiades to the Lacedæmonian ephors) τότε μὲν ἀεὶ
-προσείχετε τὸν νοῦν, πότε ἀκούσεσθε βιαζομένους αὐτοὺς τὴν Βοιωτίαν ὑφ’
-αὑτοῖς εἶναι· νῦν δ’, ἐπεὶ τάδε πέπρακται, οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς δεῖ Θηβαίους
-φοβεῖσθαι· ἀλλ’ ἀρκέσει ὑμῖν μικρὰ σκυτάλη, ὥστε ἐκεῖθεν πάντα
-πράττεσθαι, ὅσων ἂν δέησθε—ἐὰν, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς ὑμῶν, οὕτω καὶ ὑμεῖς
-ἡμῶν, ἐπιμελῆσθε.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenophon mentions the displeasure of the ephors and the Spartans generally
-against Phœbidas (χαλεπῶς ἔχοντας τῷ Φοιβίδᾳ) but not the fine, which
-is certified by Diodorus (xv, 20), by Plutarch (Pelopidas, c. 6, and De Genio
-Socratis, p. 576 A), and Cornelius Nepos (Pelopid. c. 1).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_144"><a href="#FNanchor_144">[144]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 35; Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, p. 576 A. Plutarch
-in another place (Pelopid. c. 5) represents Ismenias as having been conveyed
-to Sparta and tried there.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_145"><a href="#FNanchor_145">[145]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 38.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_146"><a href="#FNanchor_146">[146]</a></span>
-Demosthenes (De Fals. Leg. c. 75, p. 425) speaks with proper commendation
-of the brave resistance made by the Olynthians against the great
-force of Sparta. But his expressions are altogether misleading as to the
-tenor and result of the war. If we had no other information than his, we
-should be led to imagine that the Olynthians had been victorious, and the
-Lacedæmonians baffled.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_147"><a href="#FNanchor_147">[147]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 40-43.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_148"><a href="#FNanchor_148">[148]</a></span>
-Thucyd. i, 63—with the Scholiast.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_149"><a href="#FNanchor_149">[149]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 4-6. παμπλήθεις ἀπέκτειναν ἀνθρώπους
-καὶ ὅτι περ ὄφελος ἦν τούτου τοῦ στρατεύματος.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus (xv, 21) states the loss at twelve hundred men.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_150"><a href="#FNanchor_150">[150]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 9. Πολλοὶ δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν περιοίκων
-ἐθελονταὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἠκολούθουν, καὶ ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων καλουμένων,
-καὶ νόθοι τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, μάλα εὐειδεῖς τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καλῶν
-οὐκ ἄπειροι.
-</p>
-<p>
-The phrase—ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων—is illustrated by a passage from Phylarchus
-in Athenæus, vi, p. 271 (referred to by Schneider in his note here).
-I have already stated that the political franchise of a Spartan citizen depended
-upon his being able to furnish constantly his quota to the public
-mess-table. Many of the poor families became unable to do this, and thus
-lost their qualification and their training; but rich citizens sometimes paid
-their quota for them, and enabled them by such aid to continue their training
-as ξύντροφοι, τρόφιμοι, μόθακες, etc. as companions of their own sons.
-The two sons of Xenophon were educated at Sparta (Diog. Laert. ii, 54),
-and would thus be ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων καλουμένων. If either of them was
-now old enough, he might probably have been one among the volunteers to
-accompany Agesipolis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_151"><a href="#FNanchor_151">[151]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 18; Pausan. iii, 5, 9.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_152"><a href="#FNanchor_152">[152]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 26; Diodor. xv, 22, 23.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_153"><a href="#FNanchor_153">[153]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 10.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_154"><a href="#FNanchor_154">[154]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 10, 11.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_155"><a href="#FNanchor_155">[155]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 10. ἡ Φλιασίων πόλις, ἐπαινεθεῖσα
-μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀγησιπόλιδος, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ταχέως αὐτῷ χρήματα ἐς
-τὴν στρατιὰν ἔδοσαν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_156"><a href="#FNanchor_156">[156]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 12, 13; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24; Diodor. xv, 20.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_157"><a href="#FNanchor_157">[157]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 25.
-</p>
-<p>
-Καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ Φλιοῦντα οὕτως αὖ ἐπετετέλεστο ἐν ὀκτὼ μησὶ καὶ ἐνιαυτῷ.
-</p>
-<p>
-This general expression “the matters relative to Phlius,” comprises not
-merely the blockade, but the preliminary treatment and complaints of the
-Phliasian exiles. One year, therefore, will be as much as we can allow for
-the blockade,—perhaps more than we ought to allow.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_158"><a href="#FNanchor_158">[158]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 17-26.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_159"><a href="#FNanchor_159">[159]</a></span>
-The panegyrist of Agesilaus finds little to commend in these Phliasian
-proceedings, except the φιλεταιρεία or partisan-attachment of his hero
-(Xenoph. Agesil. ii, 21).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_160"><a href="#FNanchor_160">[160]</a></span>
-Thucyd. i, 124. πόλιν τύραννον.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_161"><a href="#FNanchor_161">[161]</a></span>
-Lysias, Frag. Orat. xxxiii, (Olympic.) ed. Bekker ap. Dionys. Hal. Judic.
-de Lysiâ, p. 520-525, Reisk.
-</p>
-<p>
-... Ὁρῶν οὕτως αἰσχρῶς διακειμένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν αὐτῆς ὄντα
-ὑπὸ τῷ βαρβάρῳ, πολλὰς δὲ πόλεις ὑπὸ τυράννων ἀναστάτους γεγενημένας.
-</p>
-<p>
-... Ὁρῶμεν γὰρ τοὺς κινδύνους καὶ μεγάλους καὶ παντάχοθεν περιεστηκότας.
-Ἐπίστασθε δὲ, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῶν κρατούντων τῆς θαλάσσης, τῶν δὲ χρημάτων
-βασιλεὺς ταμίας· <em class="gesperrt">τὰ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων σώματα, τῶν δαπανᾶσθαι δυναμένων</em>·
-ναῦς δὲ πολλὰς αὐτὸς κέκτηται, πολλὰς δ’ ὁ τύραννος τῆς Σικελίας....
-</p>
-<p>
-... Ὥστε ἄξιον—τοὺς προγόνους μιμεῖσθαι, οἱ τοὺς μὲν βαρβάρους ἐποίησαν,
-τῆς ἀλλοτρίας ἐπιθυμοῦντας, τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν ἐστερῆσθαι· τοὺς δὲ τυράννους
-ἐξελάσαντες, κοινὴν ἅπασι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κατέστησαν. Θαυμάζω δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους
-πάντων μάλιστα, τίνι ποτε γνώμῃ χρώμενοι, <em class="gesperrt">καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν</em>,
-ἡγεμόνες ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-... Οὐ τοίνυν ὁ ἐπιὼν καιρὸς τοῦ παρόντος βελτίων· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλοτρίας δεῖ τὰς
-τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς νομίζειν, ἀλλ’ οἰκείας· οὐδ’ ἀναμεῖναι, ἕως ἂν ἐπ’
-αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς αἱ δυνάμεις <em class="gesperrt">ἀμφοτέρων</em> (of Artaxerxes and Dionysius)
-ἔλθωσιν, ἀλλ’ ἕως ἔτι ἔξεστι, τὴν τούτων ὕβριν κωλῦσαι.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ephorus appears to have affirmed that there was a plan concerted between
-the Persian king and Dionysius, for attacking Greece in concert and
-dividing it between them (see Ephori Fragm. 141, ed. Didot). The assertion
-is made by the rhetor Aristeides, and the allusion to Ephorus is here
-preserved by the Scholiast on Aristeides (who, however, is mistaken, in referring
-it to Dionysius <i>the younger</i>). Aristeides ascribes the frustration of
-this attack to the valor of two Athenian generals, Iphikrates, and Timotheus;
-the former of whom captured the fleet of Dionysius, while the latter
-defeated the Lacedæmonian fleet at Leukas. But these events happened
-in 373-372 <small>B.C.</small>, when the power of Dionysius was not so formidable or
-aggressive as it had been between 387-382 <small>B.C.</small>: moreover, the ships of
-Dionysius taken by Iphikrates were only ten in number, a small squadron.
-Aristeides appears to me to have misconceived the date to which the assertion
-of Ephorus really referred.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_162"><a href="#FNanchor_162">[162]</a></span>
-See Pseudo-Andokides cont. Alkibiad. s. 30; and Vol. VII. of this History,
-Ch. lv, p. 53.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_163"><a href="#FNanchor_163">[163]</a></span>
-Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 519; Diodor. xiv, 109. ὥστε τινας
-τολμῆσαι διαρπάζειν τὰς σκηνάς.
-</p>
-<p>
-Dionysius does not specify the date of this oration of Lysias; but Diodorus
-places it at Olympiad 98—<small>B.C.</small> 388—the year before the peace of Antalkidas.
-On this point I venture to depart from him, and assign it to
-Olympiad 99, or 384 <small>B.C.</small>, three years after the peace; the rather as his
-Olympic chronology appears not clear, as may be seen by comparing xv, 7
-with xiv, 109.
-</p>
-<p>
-1. The year 388 <small>B.C.</small> was a year of war, in which Sparta with her allies
-on one side,—and Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos on the other,—were
-carrying on strenuous hostilities. The war would hinder the four last-mentioned
-states from sending any public legation to sacrifice at the Olympic
-festival. Lysias, as an Athenian metic, could hardly have gone there at
-all; but he certainly could not have gone there to make a public and bold
-oratorical demonstration.
-</p>
-<p>
-2. The language of Lysias implies that the speech was delivered after the
-cession of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia,—ὁρῶν πολλὰ μὲν αὐτῆς (Ἑλλάδος) ὄντα
-ὑπὸ τῷ Βαρβάρῳ, etc. This is quite pertinent after the peace of Antalkidas;
-but not at all admissible before that peace. The same may be
-said about the phrase,—οὐ γὰρ ἀλλοτρίας δεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς
-νομίζειν, ἀλλ’ οἰκείας; which must be referred to the recent subjection
-of the Asiatic Greeks by Persia, and of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks by
-Dionysius.
-</p>
-<p>
-3. In 388 <small>B.C.</small>—when Athens and so large a portion of the greater cities
-of Greece were at war with Sparta, and therefore contesting her headship,—Lysias
-would hardly have publicly talked of the Spartans as ἡγεμόνες τῶν Ἑλλήνων,
-οὐκ ἀδίκως, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον ἀρετὴν καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιστήμην. This
-remark is made also by Sievers (Geschich.
-Griech. bis zur Schlacht von Mantinea, p. 138). Nor would he have declaimed
-so ardently against the Persian king, at a time when Athens was
-still not despairing of Persian aid against Sparta.
-</p>
-<p>
-On these grounds (as well as on others which I shall state when I recount
-the history of Dionysius), it appears to me that this oration of Lysias is
-unsuitable to <small>B.C.</small> 388—but perfectly suitable to 384 <small>B.C.</small></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_164"><a href="#FNanchor_164">[164]</a></span>
-Lysias, Orat. Olymp. Frag. καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_165"><a href="#FNanchor_165">[165]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 145, 146: compare his Orat. viii, (De
-Pace) s. 122; and Diodor. xv, 23.
-</p>
-<p>
-Dionysius of Syracuse had sent twenty triremes to join the Lacedæmonians
-at the Hellespont, a few months before the peace of Antalkidas (Xenophon,
-Hellen. v, 1, 26).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_166"><a href="#FNanchor_166">[166]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 1. Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἄν τις ἔχοι καὶ ἄλλα λέγειν,
-καὶ Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ βαρβαρικὰ, ὡς θεοὶ οὔτε τῶν ἀσεβούντων οὔτε τῶν ἀνόσια ποιούντων
-ἀμελοῦσι· νῦν γε μὴν λέξω τὰ προκείμενα. Λακεδαιμόνιοί τε γὰρ, οἱ ὀμόσαντες
-αὐτονόμους ἐάσειν τὰς πόλεις, τὴν ἐν Θήβαις ἀκρόπολιν κατασχόντες, ὑπ’ αὐτῶν
-μόνον τῶν ἀδικηθέντων ἐκολάσθησαν, πρῶτον οὐδ’ ὑφ’ ἑνὸς τῶν πώποτε ἀνθρώπων
-κρατηθέντες. Τούς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγαγόντας εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ
-βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν πόλιν δουλεύειν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν ... τὴν
-τούτων ἀρχὴν ἑπτὰ μόνον τῶν φυγόντων ἤρκεσαν καταλῦσαι.
-</p>
-<p>
-This passage is properly characterized by Dr. Peter (in his Commentatio
-Critica in Xenophontis Hellenica, Hall. 1837, p. 82) as the turning-point in
-the history:—
-</p>
-<p>
-“Hoc igitur in loco quasi editiore operis sui Xenophon subsistit, atque
-uno in conspectu Spartanos, et ad suæ felicitatis fastigium ascendere videt,
-et rursus ab eo delabi: tantâ autem divinæ justitiæ conscientiâ tangitur in
-hac Spartanorum fortunâ conspicuæ, ut vix suum judicium, quanquam id
-solet facere, suppresserit.”</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_167"><a href="#FNanchor_167">[167]</a></span>
-See Vol. VII. of this History,—the close of Chapter lvi.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_168"><a href="#FNanchor_168">[168]</a></span>
-Soph. Œdip. Tyr. 450; Antigon. 1066.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_169"><a href="#FNanchor_169">[169]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 6: compare Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 29, p.
-596 B.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_170"><a href="#FNanchor_170">[170]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 14.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_171"><a href="#FNanchor_171">[171]</a></span>
-Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 33, p. 598 B, C. ᾧ καὶ μεθ’ ἡμέραν
-ἐπενέβησαν καὶ προσέπτυσαν οὐκ ὀλίγαι γυναῖκες.
-</p>
-<p>
-Among the prisoners was a distinguished Theban of the democratic party,
-named Amphitheus. He was about to be shortly executed, and the
-conspirators, personally attached to him, seem to have accelerated the hour
-of their plot partly to preserve his life (Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. p. 577 D,
-p. 586 F.).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_172"><a href="#FNanchor_172">[172]</a></span>
-The language of Plutarch (De Gen. Socrat. c. 33, p. 598 C.) is illustrated
-by the description given in the harangue of Lykurgus cont. Leokrat.
-(c. xi, s. 40)—of the universal alarm prevalent in Athens after the battle
-of Chæroneia, such that even the women could not stay in their houses—ἀναξίως
-αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πόλεως ὁρωμένας, etc. Compare also the words of
-Makaria, in the Herakleidæ of Euripides, 475; and Diodor. xiii, 55, in his
-description of the capture of Selinus in Sicily.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_173"><a href="#FNanchor_173">[173]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 6.
-</p>
-<p>
-See this sentiment of gratitude on the part of Athenian democrats, towards
-those Thebans who had sheltered them at Thebes during the exile
-along with Thrasybulus,—strikingly brought out in an oration of Lysias,
-of which unfortunately only a fragment remains (Lysias, Frag. 46, 47,
-Bekk.; Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Isæo, p. 594). The speaker of this oration
-had been received at Thebes by Kephisodotus the father of Pherenikus; the
-latter was now in exile at Athens; and the speaker had not only welcomed
-him (Pherenikus) to his house with brotherly affection, but also delivered
-this oration on his behalf before the Dikastery; Pherenikus having rightful
-claims on the property left behind by the assassinated Androkleidas.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_174"><a href="#FNanchor_174">[174]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 25; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 12; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c.
-17, p. 586 E.
-</p>
-<p>
-In another passage of this treatise (the last sentence but one) he sets
-down the numbers in the Kadmeia at five thousand: but the smaller number
-is most likely to be true.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_175"><a href="#FNanchor_175">[175]</a></span>
-Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 4, p. 577 B; c. 17, p. 587 B; c. 25, p. 594 C;
-c. 27, p. 595 A.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_176"><a href="#FNanchor_176">[176]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 7, 8.
-</p>
-<p>
-Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 17, p. 587 D. Τῶν Μέλλωνος ἁρματηλατῶν ἐπιστάτης.... Ἆρ’ οὐ Χλίδωνα
-λέγεις, τὸν κέλητι τὰ Ἡραῖα νικῶντα πέρυσιν;</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_177"><a href="#FNanchor_177">[177]</a></span>
-Xenophon says <i>seven</i> (Hellen. v, 4, 1, 2); Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos
-say <i>twelve</i> (Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 2, p. 576 C.; Plutarch, Pelopidas c.
-8-13; Cornel. Nepos, Pelopidas, c. 2).
-</p>
-<p>
-It is remarkable that Xenophon never mentions the name of Pelopidas in
-this conspiracy; nor indeed (with one exception) throughout his Hellenica.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_178"><a href="#FNanchor_178">[178]</a></span>
-Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 3, p. 576 E.; p. 577 A.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_179"><a href="#FNanchor_179">[179]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 4. τὰς σεμνοτάτας καὶ καλλίστας τῶν ἐν Θήβαις. Plutarch,
-De Gen. Socr. c. 4, p. 577 C.; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 9.
-</p>
-<p>
-The Theban women were distinguished for majestic figure and beauty
-(Dikæarchus, Vit. Græc. p. 144, ed Fuhr.).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_180"><a href="#FNanchor_180">[180]</a></span>
-Plutarch, (Pelopid. c. 25; De Gen. Socr. c. 26, p. 594 D.) mentions
-Menekleidês, Damokleidas, and Theopompus among them. Compare Cornel.
-Nepos, Pelopid. c. 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_181"><a href="#FNanchor_181">[181]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 8; Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. c. 17, p. 586 B.; c.
-18, p. 587 D-E.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_182"><a href="#FNanchor_182">[182]</a></span>
-Xenophon does not mention this separate summons and visit of Charon
-to the polemarchs,—nor anything about the scene with his son. He only
-notices Charon as having harbored the conspirators in his house, and seems
-even to speak of him as a person of little consequence—παρὰ Χαρωνί τινι,
-etc. (v, 4, 3).
-</p>
-<p>
-The anecdote is mentioned in both the compositions of Plutarch (De Gen.
-Socr. c. 28, p. 595; and Pelopidas, c. 9), and is too interesting to be omitted,
-being perfectly consistent with what we read in Xenophon; though it has
-perhaps somewhat of a theatrical air.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_183"><a href="#FNanchor_183">[183]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 10; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 30, p. 596 F. Εἰς
-αὔριον τὰ σπουδαῖα.
-</p>
-<p>
-This occurrence also finds no place in the narrative of Xenophon. Cornelius
-Nepos, Pelopidas, c. 3. Æneas (Poliorcetic. c. 31) makes a general
-reference to the omission of immediate opening of letters arrived, as having
-caused the capture of the Kadmeia; which was, however, only its remote
-consequence.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_184"><a href="#FNanchor_184">[184]</a></span>
-The description given by Xenophon, of this assassination of the polemarchs
-at Thebes, differs materially from that of Plutarch. I follow Xenophon
-in the main; introducing, however, several of the details found in
-Plutarch, which are interesting, and which have the air of being authentic.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenophon himself intimates (Hellen. v, 4, 7), that besides the story given
-in the text, there was also another story told by some,—that Mellon and
-his companions had got access to the polemarchs in the guise of drunken
-revellers. It is this latter story which Plutarch has adopted, and which carries
-him into many details quite inconsistent with the narrative of Xenophon.
-I think the story, of the conspirators having been introduced in female
-attire, the more probable of the two. It is borne out by the exact analogy
-of what Herodotus tells us respecting Alexander son of Amyntas,
-prince of Macedonia (Herod. v, 20).
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 10, 11; Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. c. 31,
-p. 597. Polyænus (ii, 4, 3) gives a story with many different circumstances,
-yet agreeing in the fact that Pelopidas in female attire killed the Spartan
-general. The story alluded to by Aristotle (Polit. v, 5, 10), though he names
-both Thebes and Archias, can hardly refer to this event.
-</p>
-<p>
-It is Plutarch, however, who mentions the presence of Kabeirichus the
-archon at the banquet, and the curious Theban custom that the archon during
-his year of office never left out of his hand the consecrated spear. As a
-Bœotian born, Plutarch was doubtless familiar with these old customs.
-</p>
-<p>
-From what other authors Plutarch copied the abundant details of this revolution
-at Thebes, which he interweaves in the life of Pelopidas and in the
-treatise called De Genio Socratis—we do not know. Some critics suppose
-him to have borrowed from Dionysodôrus and Anaxis—Bœotian historians
-whose work comprised this period, but of whom not a single fragment is
-preserved (see Fragm. Histor. Græc. ed. Didot, vol. ii, p. 84).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_185"><a href="#FNanchor_185">[185]</a></span>
-Xen. Hell. v, 4, 9; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 11, 12; and De Gen. Socr. p. 597
-D-F. Here again Xenophon and Plutarch differ; the latter represents
-that Pelopidas got into the house of Leontiades <i>without</i> Phyllidas,—which
-appears to me altogether improbable. On the other hand, Xenophon mentions
-nothing about the defence of Leontiades and his personal conflict with
-Pelopidas, which I copy from Plutarch. So brave a man as Leontiades, awake
-and sober, would not let himself be slain without a defence dangerous
-to assailants. Plutarch, in another place, singles out the death of Leontiades
-as the marking circumstance of the whole glorious enterprise, and the
-most impressive to Pelopidas (Plutarch—Non posse suaviter vivi secundum
-Epicurum—p. 1099 A-E.).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_186"><a href="#FNanchor_186">[186]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Hell. v, 4, 8; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 12; De Gen. Socr. p. 598 B.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_187"><a href="#FNanchor_187">[187]</a></span>
-This is a curious piece of detail, which we learn from Plutarch (De
-Gen. Socr. c. 34. p. 598 D.).
-</p>
-<p>
-The Orchomenian Inscriptions in Boeckh’s Collection record the prizes
-given to these Σαλπιγκταὶ or trumpeters (see Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. No. 1584,
-1585, etc.).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_188"><a href="#FNanchor_188">[188]</a></span>
-The unanimous joy with which the consummation of the revolution was
-welcomed in Thebes,—and the ardor with which the citizens turned out to
-support it by armed force,—is attested by Xenophon, no very willing witness,—Hellen.
-v, 4, 9. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡμέρα ἦν καὶ φανερὸν ἦν τὸ γεγενημένον, ταχὺ δὴ καὶ οἱ ὁπλῖται
-καὶ οἱ ἱππεῖς σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐξεβοήθουν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_189"><a href="#FNanchor_189">[189]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Pelop. c. 12.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_190"><a href="#FNanchor_190">[190]</a></span>
-Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 598 E.; Pelop. c. 12.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_191"><a href="#FNanchor_191">[191]</a></span>
-Xenophon expressly mentions that the Athenians who were invited to
-come, and who actually did come, to Thebes, were the two generals and the
-volunteers; all of whom were before privy to the plot, and were in readiness
-on the borders of Attica—τοὺς <em class="gesperrt">πρὸς τοῖς ὁρίοις</em> Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοὺς δύο
-τῶν στρατηγῶν—οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι <em class="gesperrt">ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρίων</em> ἤδη παρῆσαν
-(Hellen. v, 4, 9, 10).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_192"><a href="#FNanchor_192">[192]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 10, 11. προσέβαλον πρὸς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν—τὴν
-προθυμίαν τῶν προσιόντων ἁπάντων ἑώρων, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus, xv, 25. ἔπειτα τοὺς πολίτας ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν παρακαλέσαντες
-(the successful Theban conspirators, Pelopidas, etc.) <em class="gesperrt">συνέργους ἔσχον
-ἅπαντας τοὺς Θηβαίους</em>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_193"><a href="#FNanchor_193">[193]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 12.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_194"><a href="#FNanchor_194">[194]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 13; Diodor. xv, 27.
-</p>
-<p>
-Plutarch (Pelopid. c. 13) augments the theatrical effect by saying that the
-Lacedæmonian garrison on its retreat, actually met at Megara the reinforcements
-under king Kleombrotus, which had advanced thus far, on their
-march to relieve the Kadmeia. But this is highly improbable. The account
-of Xenophon intimates clearly that the Kadmeia was surrounded on
-the next morning after the nocturnal movement. The commanders capitulated
-in the first moment of distraction and despair, without even standing
-an assault.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_195"><a href="#FNanchor_195">[195]</a></span>
-Arrian, i, 6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_196"><a href="#FNanchor_196">[196]</a></span>
-In recounting this revolution at Thebes, and the proceedings of the
-Athenians in regard to it, I have followed Xenophon almost entirely.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus (xv, 25, 26) concurs with Xenophon in stating that the Theban
-exiles got back from Attica to Thebes by night, partly through the concurrence
-of the Athenians (συνεπιλαβομένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων)—slew the rulers—called
-the citizens to freedom next morning, finding all hearty in the
-cause—and then proceeded to besiege the fifteen hundred Lacedæmonians
-and Peloponnesians in the Kadmeia.
-</p>
-<p>
-But after thus much of agreement, Diodorus states what followed, in a
-manner quite inconsistent with Xenophon; thus (he tells us)—
-</p>
-<p>
-The Lacedæmonian commander sent instant intelligence to Sparta of
-what had happened, with request for a reinforcement. The Thebans at
-once attempted to storm the Kadmeia, but were repulsed with great loss,
-both of killed and wounded. Fearing that they might not be able to take
-the fort before reinforcement should come from Sparta, they sent envoys to
-Athens to ask for aid, reminding the Athenians that they (the Thebans)
-had helped to emancipate Athens from the Thirty, and to restore the democracy
-(ὑπομιμνήσκοντες μὲν ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ <em class="gesperrt">συγκατήγαγον τὸν δῆμον</em> τῶν Ἀθηναίων
-καθ’ ὃν καιρὸν ὑπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα κατεδουλώθησαν). The
-Athenians, partly from desire to requite this favor, partly from a wish to
-secure the Thebans as allies against Sparta, passed a public vote to assist
-them forthwith. Demophon the general got together five thousand hoplites
-and five hundred horsemen, with whom he hastened to Thebes on the next
-day; and all the remaining population were prepared to follow, if necessary
-(πανδημεί). All the other cities in Bœotia also sent aid to Thebes too,—so
-that there was assembled there a large force of twelve thousand hoplites
-and two thousand horsemen. This united force, the Athenians being among
-them, assaulted the Kadmeia day and night, relieving each other; but were
-repelled with great loss of killed and wounded. At length the garrison
-found themselves without provisions; the Spartans were tardy in sending
-reinforcement; and sedition broke out among the Peloponnesian allies who
-formed the far larger part of the garrison. These Peloponnesians, refusing
-to fight longer, insisted upon capitulating; which the Lacedæmonian governor
-was obliged perforce to do, though both he and the Spartans along
-with him desired to hold out to the death. The Kadmeia was accordingly
-surrendered, and the garrison went back to Peloponnesus. The Lacedæmonian
-reinforcement from Sparta arrived only a little too late.
-</p>
-<p>
-All these circumstances stated by Diodorus are not only completely different
-from Xenophon, but irreconcilable with his conception of the event.
-We must reject either the one or the other.
-</p>
-<p>
-Now Xenophon is not merely the better witness of the two, but is in this
-case sustained by all the collateral probabilities of the case.
-</p>
-<p>
-1. Diodorus represents the Athenians as having despatched by public
-vote, assistance to Thebes, in order to requite the assistance which the Thebans
-had before sent to restore the Athenian democracy against the Thirty.
-Now this is incorrect in point of fact. The Thebans had <i>never sent any assistance</i>,
-positive or ostensible, to Thrasybulus and the Athenian democrats
-against the Thirty. They had assisted Thrasybulus underhand, and without
-any public government-act; and they had refused to serve along with
-the Spartans against him. But they never sent any force to help him
-against the Thirty. Consequently, the Athenians <i>could not</i> now have sent
-any public force to Thebes, <i>in requital</i> for a similar favor done before by the
-Thebans to them.
-</p>
-<p>
-2. Had the Athenians passed a formal vote, sent a large public army,
-and taken vigorous part in several bloody assaults on the Lacedæmonian
-garrison in the Kadmeia,—this would have been the most flagrant and unequivocal
-commencement of hostilities against Sparta. No Spartan envoys
-could, after that, have gone to Athens, and stayed safely in the house of
-the Proxenus,—as we know from Xenophon that they did. Besides,—the
-story of Sphodrias (presently to be recounted) proves distinctly that
-Athens was at peace with Sparta, and had committed no act of hostility
-against her, for three or four months at least after the revolution at Thebes.
-It therefore refutes the narrative of Diodorus about the public vote of the
-Athenians, and the public Athenian force under Demophon, aiding in the
-attack of the Kadmeia. Strange to say,—Diodorus himself, three chapters
-afterwards (xv, 29), relates this story about Sphodrias, just in the same
-manner (with little difference) as Xenophon; ushering in the story with a
-declaration, that <i>the Athenians were still at peace with Sparta</i>, and forgetting
-that he had himself recounted a distinct rupture of that peace on the part
-of the Athenians.
-</p>
-<p>
-3. The news of the revolution at Thebes must necessarily have taken the
-Athenian public completely by surprise (though some few Athenians were
-privy to the scheme), because it was a scheme which had no chance of succeeding
-except by profound secrecy. Now, that the Athenian public, hearing
-the news for the first time,—having no positive act to complain of on
-the part of Sparta, and much reason to fear her power,—having had no
-previous circumstances to work them up, or prepare them for any dangerous
-resolve,—should identify themselves at once with Thebes, and provoke
-war with Sparta in the impetuous manner stated by Diodorus,—this is, in
-my judgment, eminently improbable, requiring good evidence to induce us
-to believe it.
-</p>
-<p>
-4. Assume the statement of Diodorus to be true,—what reasonable explanation
-can be given of the erroneous version which we read in Xenophon?
-The facts as he recounts them conflict most pointedly with his
-philo-Laconian partialities; first, the overthrow of the Lacedæmonian
-power at Thebes, by a handful of exiles; still more, the whole story of
-Sphodrias and his acquittal.
-</p>
-<p>
-But assume the statement of Xenophon to be true,—and we can give a
-very plausible explanation how the erroneous version in Diodorus arose.
-A few months later, after the acquittal of Sphodrias at Sparta, the Athenians
-did enter heartily into the alliance of Thebes, and sent a large public
-force (indeed five thousand hoplites, the same number as those of Demophon,
-according to Diodorus, c. 32) to assist her in repelling Agesilaus with
-the Spartan army. It is by no means unnatural that their public vote and
-expedition undertaken about July 378 <small>B.C.</small>,—should have been erroneously
-thrown back to December 379 <small>B.C.</small> The Athenian orators were fond of
-boasting that Athens had saved the Thebans from Sparta; and this might
-be said with some truth, in reference to the aid which she really rendered
-afterwards. Isokrates (Or. Plataic. s. 31) makes this boast in general terms;
-but Deinarchus (cont. Demosthen. s. 40) is more distinct, and gives in a
-few words a version the same as that which we find in Diodorus; so also
-does Aristeides, in two very brief allusions (Panathen. p. 172, and Or.
-xxxviii, Socialis, p. 486-498). Possibly Aristeides as well as Diodorus may
-have copied from Ephorus; but however this may be, it is easy to understand
-the mistake out of which their version grew.
-</p>
-<p>
-5. Lastly, Plutarch mentions nothing about the public vote of the Athenians,
-and the regular division of troops under Demophon which Diodorus
-asserts to have aided in the storming of the Kadmeia. See Plutarch (De
-Gen. Socrat. ad fin. Agesil. c. 23; Pelopid. 12, 13). He intimates only, as
-Xenophon does, that there were some Athenian volunteers who assisted the
-exiles.
-</p>
-<p>
-M. Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 38-43) discusses this discrepancy
-at considerable length, and cites the opinion of various German
-authors in respect to it, with none of whom I altogether concur.
-</p>
-<p>
-In my judgment, the proper solution is, to reject altogether (as belonging
-to a later time) the statement of Diodorus, respecting the public vote at
-Athens, and the army said to have been sent to Thebes under Demophon;
-and to accept the more credible narrative of Xenophon; which ascribes to
-Athens a reasonable prudence, and great fear of Sparta,—qualities such
-as Athenian orators would not be disposed to boast of. According to that
-narrative, the question about sending Athenians to aid in storming the Kadmeia
-could hardly have been submitted for public discussion, since that citadel
-was surrendered at once by the intimidated garrison.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_197"><a href="#FNanchor_197">[197]</a></span>
-The daring <i>coup de main</i> of Pelopidas and Mellon, against the government
-of Thebes, bears a remarkable analogy to that by which Evagoras got
-into Salamis and overthrew the previous despot (Isokrates, Or. ix, Evagor.
-s. 34).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_198"><a href="#FNanchor_198">[198]</a></span>
-See, in illustration of Greek sentiment on this point, Xenophon, Hellen.
-iii, 4, 19; and Xenophon, Enc. Ages. i, 28.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_199"><a href="#FNanchor_199">[199]</a></span>
-If, indeed, we could believe Isokrates, speaking through the mouth of a
-Platæan, it would seem that the Thebans, immediately after their revolution,
-sent an humble embassy to Sparta deprecating hostility, entreating to
-be admitted as allies, and promising service, even against their benefactors
-the Athenians, just as devoted as the deposed government had rendered;
-an embassy which the Spartans haughtily answered by desiring them to
-receive back their exiles, and to cast out the assassins Pelopidas and his
-comrades. It is possible that the Thebans may have sent to try the possibility
-of escaping Spartan enmity; but it is highly improbable that they
-made any such promises as those here mentioned; and it is certain that
-they speedily began to prepare vigorously for that hostility which they saw
-to be approaching.
-</p>
-<p>
-See Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 31.
-</p>
-<p>
-This oration is put into the mouth of a Platæan, and seems to be an assemblage
-of nearly all the topics which could possibly be enforced, truly or
-falsely, against Thebes.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_200"><a href="#FNanchor_200">[200]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 14. μάλα χειμῶνος ὄντος.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_201"><a href="#FNanchor_201">[201]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 13. εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγοίη, λέξειαν οἱ
-πολῖται, ὡς Ἀγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσειε τοῖς τυράννοις, πράγματα τῇ πόλει
-παρέχοι. Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_202"><a href="#FNanchor_202">[202]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 15-18.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_203"><a href="#FNanchor_203">[203]</a></span>
-See Vol. VIII. of this History, Ch. lxiv, p. 196—about the psephism
-of Kannônus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_204"><a href="#FNanchor_204">[204]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 19; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 14.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenophon mentions the Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens, but does not
-expressly say that they were sent to demand reparation for the conduct of
-these two generals or of the volunteers. I cannot doubt, however, that the
-fact was so; for in those times, there were no resident envoys,—none but
-envoys sent on special missions.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_205"><a href="#FNanchor_205">[205]</a></span>
-The trial and condemnation of these two generals has served as the
-groundwork for harsh reproach against the Athenian democracy. Wachsmuth
-(Hellen. Alterth. i, p. 654) denounces it as “a judicial horror, or abomination—ein
-Greul-gericht.” Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p.
-44, 45) says,—“Quid? quia invasionem Lacedæmoniorum viderant in
-Bœotiam factam esse, non puduit eos, damnare imperatores quorum facta
-suis decretis comprobaverant?” ... “Igitur hanc <i>illius facinoris excusationem</i>
-habebimus: Rebus quæ a Thebanis agebantur (<i>i. e.</i> by the propositions
-of the Thebans seeking peace from Sparta, and trying to get enrolled
-as her allies,—alleged by Isokrates, which I have noticed above as being,
-in my judgment, very inaccurately recorded) cognitis, Athenienses, quo
-<i>enixius subvenerant, eo majore pœnitentiâ perculsi</i> sunt.... Sed tantum abfuit
-ut sibimet irascerentur, ut, <i>e more Atheniensium, punirentur qui perfecerant
-id quod tum populus exoptaverat</i>.”
-</p>
-<p>
-The censures of Wachsmuth, Rehdantz, etc. assume as matter of fact,—1.
-That the Athenians had passed a formal vote in the public assembly to
-send assistance to Thebes, under two generals, who accordingly went out in
-command of the army and performed their instructions. 2. That the Athenians,
-becoming afterwards repentant or terrified, tried and condemned
-these two generals for having executed the commission entrusted to them.
-</p>
-<p>
-I have already shown grounds (in a previous note) for believing that the
-first of these affirmations is incorrect; the second, as dependent on it, will
-therefore be incorrect also.
-</p>
-<p>
-These authors here appear to me to single out a portion of each of the
-two <i>inconsistent</i> narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus, and blend them together
-in a way which contradicts both.
-</p>
-<p>
-Thus, they take from Diodorus the allegation, that the Athenians sent to
-Thebes by public vote a large army, which fought along with the Thebans
-against the Kadmeia,—an allegation which, not only is not to be found in
-Xenophon, but which his narrative plainly, though indirectly, excludes.
-</p>
-<p>
-Next, they take from Xenophon the allegation, that the Athenians tried
-and condemned the two generals who were accomplices in the conspiracy
-of Mellon against the Theban rulers,—τὼ δύω στρατηγὼ, οἳ συνηπιστάσθην
-τὴν τοῦ Μέλλωνος ἐπὶ τοὺς περὶ Λεοντιάδην ἐπανάστασιν (v, 4, 19). Now
-the mention of these two generals follows naturally and consistently in
-<i>Xenophon</i>. He had before told us that there were <i>two</i> out of the Athenian
-generals, who both assisted underhand in organizing the plot, and afterwards
-went with the volunteers to Thebes. But it cannot be fitted on to
-the narrative of <i>Diodorus, who never says a word about this condemnation by
-the Athenians</i>—nor even mentions <i>any two Athenian generals</i>, at all. He
-tells us that the Athenian army which went to Thebes was commanded by
-Demophon; he notices no colleague whatever. He says in general words,
-that the conspiracy was organized “with the assistance of the Athenians”
-(συνεπιλαβομένων Ἀθηναίων); not saying a word about any <i>two generals</i> as
-especially active.
-</p>
-<p>
-Wachsmuth and Rehdantz take it for granted, most gratuitously, that
-these two condemned generals (mentioned by Xenophon and not by Diodorus)
-are identical with Demophon and another colleague, commanders of
-an army which went out by public vote (mentioned by Diodorus and not
-by Xenophon).
-</p>
-<p>
-The narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus (as I have before observed)
-are distinct and inconsistent with each other. We have to make our option
-between them. I adhere to that of Xenophon, for reasons previously given.
-But if any one prefers that of Diodorus, he ought then to reject altogether
-the story of the condemnation of the two Athenian generals (<i>who nowhere
-appear in Diodorus</i>), and to suppose that Xenophon was misinformed upon
-that point, as upon the other facts of the case.
-</p>
-<p>
-That the two Athenian generals (assuming the Xenophontic narrative as
-true) should be tried and punished, when the consequences of their unauthorized
-proceeding were threatening to come with severity upon Athens,—appears
-to me neither improbable nor unreasonable. Those who are
-shocked by the very severity of the sentence, will do well to read the remarks
-which the Lacedæmonian envoys make (Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 23) on
-the conduct of Sphodrias.
-</p>
-<p>
-To turn from one severe sentence to another,—whoever believes the narrative
-of Diodorus in preference to that of Xenophon, ought to regard the
-execution of those two Lacedæmonian commanders who surrendered the
-Kadmeia as exceedingly cruel. According to Diodorus, these officers had
-done everything which brave men could do; they had resisted a long time,
-repelled many attacks, and were only prevented from farther holding out
-by a mutiny among their garrison.
-</p>
-<p>
-Here again, we see the superiority of the narrative of Xenophon over
-that of Diodorus. According to the former, these Lacedæmonian commanders
-surrendered the Kadmeia without any resistance at all. Their
-condemnation, like that of the Athenian two generals, becomes a matter
-easy to understand and explain.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_206"><a href="#FNanchor_206">[206]</a></span>
-Tacit. Histor. i, 38.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare (in Plutarch, Anton. c. 32) the remark of Sextus Pompey to his
-captain Menas, when the latter asked his permission to cut the cables of
-the ship, while Octavius and Antony were dining on board, and to seize
-their persons,—“I cannot permit any such thing; but you ought to have
-done it without asking my permission.” A reply familiar to the readers of
-Shakspeare’s Antony and Cleopatra.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_207"><a href="#FNanchor_207">[207]</a></span>
-Kallisthenes, Frag. 2, ed. Didot, apud Harpokration, v. Σφοδρίας; Diodor.
-xv, 29; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 14; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24. The miscalculation
-of Sphodrias as to the time necessary for his march to Peiræus
-is not worse than other mistakes which Polybius (in a very instructive discourse,
-ix, 12, 20, seemingly extracted from his lost commentaries on Tactics)
-recounts as having been committed by various other able commanders.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_208"><a href="#FNanchor_208">[208]</a></span>
-Πείθουσι τὸν ἐν ταῖς Θεσπιαῖς ἁρμοστὴν Σφοδρίαν, χρήματα δόντες,
-ὡς ὑπωπτεύετο—Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 20; Diodor. xv, 29; Plutarch, Pelopid.
-c. 14; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24, 25.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus affirms private orders from Kleombrotus to Sphodrias.
-</p>
-<p>
-In rejecting the suspicion mentioned by Xenophon,—that it was the
-Theban leaders who instigated and bribed Sphodrias,—we may remark—1.
-That the plan might very possibly have succeeded; and its success
-would have been ruinous to the Thebans. Had they been the instigators,
-they would not have failed to give notice of it at Athens at the same time;
-which they certainly did not do. 2. That if the Lacedæmonians had punished
-Sphodrias, no war would have ensued. Now every man would have
-predicted, that assuming the scheme to fail, they certainly would punish
-him. 3. The strong interest taken by Agesilaus afterwards in the fate of
-Sphodrias, and the high encomium which he passed on the general character
-of the latter,—are quite consistent with a belief on his part that Sphodrias
-(like Phœbidas) may have done wrong towards a foreign city from over-ambition
-in the service of his country. But if Agesilaus (who detested the
-Thebans beyond measure) had believed that Sphodrias was acting under
-the influence of bribes from them, he would not merely have been disposed
-to let justice take its course, but would have approved and promoted the
-condemnation.
-</p>
-<p>
-On a previous occasion (Hellen. iii, 5, 3) Xenophon had imputed to the
-Thebans a similar refinement of stratagem; seemingly with just as little
-cause.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_209"><a href="#FNanchor_209">[209]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_210"><a href="#FNanchor_210">[210]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 32. Ἐκεῖνός γε (Ἀγησίλαος) πρὸς πάντας
-ὅσοις διείλεκται, ταῦτὰ λέγει· Μὴ ἀδικεῖν μὲν Σφοδρίαν ἀδύνατον εἶναι·
-ὅστις μέντοι, παῖς τε ὢν καὶ παιδίσκος καὶ ἡβῶν, πάντα τὰ καλὰ ποιῶν
-διετέλεσε, χαλεπὸν εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἀποκτιννύναι· τὴν γὰρ Σπάρτην
-τοιούτων δεῖσθαι στρατιωτῶν.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenophon explains at some length (v, 4, 25-33) and in a very interesting
-manner, both the relations between Kleonymus and Archidamus, and the
-appeal of Archidamus to his father. The statement has all the air of being
-derived from personal knowledge, and nothing but the fear of prolixity hinders
-me from giving it in full.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 25; Diodor. xv, 29.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_211"><a href="#FNanchor_211">[211]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 22-32.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_212"><a href="#FNanchor_212">[212]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 24.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_213"><a href="#FNanchor_213">[213]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 34-63.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_214"><a href="#FNanchor_214">[214]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 34; Xen. de Vectigal. v, 7; Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.)
-s. 20, 23, 37; Diodor. xv, 29.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_215"><a href="#FNanchor_215">[215]</a></span>
-The contribution was now called σύνταξις, not φόρος; see Isokrates, De
-Pace, s. 37-46; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7; Harpokration, v. Σύνταξις.
-</p>
-<p>
-Plutarch, De Fortunâ Athen. p. 351. ἰσόψηφον αὐτοῖς τὴν Ἑλλάδα κατέστησαν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_216"><a href="#FNanchor_216">[216]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 47. Καὶ <em class="gesperrt">τῶν μὲν κτημάτων τῶν
-ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν ἀπέστητε</em>, βουλόμενοι τὴν συμμαχίαν ὡς μεγίστην ποιῆσαι, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodor. xv, 28, 29. Ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ καὶ <em class="gesperrt">τὰς γενομένας κληρουχίας ἀποκαταστῆσαι
-τοῖς πρότερον κυρίοις γεγονόσι</em>, καὶ νόμον ἔθεντο μηδένα τῶν Ἀθηναίων γεωργεῖν
-ἐκτὸς τῆς Ἀττικῆς. Διὰ δὲ ταύτης τῆς φιλανθρωπίας ἀνακτησάμενοι τὴν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν
-εὔνοιαν, ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἰδίαν ἡγεμονίαν.
-</p>
-<p>
-Isokrates and Diodorus speak loosely of this vote, in language which
-might make us imagine that it was one of distinct restitution, giving back
-property <i>actually enjoyed</i>. But the Athenians had never actually regained
-the outlying private property lost at the close of the war, though they had
-much desired it, and had cherished hopes that a favorable turn of circumstances
-might enable them to effect the recovery. As the recovery, if
-effected, would be at the cost of those whom they were now soliciting as
-allies, the public and formal renunciation of such rights was a measure of
-much policy, and contributed greatly to appease uneasiness in the islands;
-though in point of fact nothing was given up except rights to property not
-really enjoyed.
-</p>
-<p>
-An Inscription has recently been discovered at Athens, recording the
-original Athenian decree, of which the main provisions are mentioned in my
-text. It bears date in the archonship of Nausinikus. It stands, with the
-restorations of M. Boeckh (fortunately a portion of it has been found in
-tolerably good preservation), in the Appendix to the new edition of his
-work,—“Über die Staats-haushaltung der Athener—Verbesserungen und
-Nachträge zu den drei Banden der Staats-haushaltung der Athener,” p. xx.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ἀπὸ δὲ Ναυσινίκου ἄρχοντος μὴ ἐξεῖναι μήτε ἰδίᾳ μήτε δημοσίᾳ Ἀθηναίων μηδενὶ
-ἐγκτήσασθαι ἐν ταῖς τῶν συμμάχων χώραις μήτε οἰκίαν μήτε χώριον, μήτε πριαμένῳ,
-μήτε ὑποθεμένῳ, μήτε ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ μηδενί. Ἐὰν δέ τις ὠνῆται ἢ κτᾶται ἢ τίθηται
-τρόπῳ ὁτῳοῦν, ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλομένῳ τῶν συμμάχων φῆναι πρὸς τοὺς συνέδρους τῶν
-συμμάχων. Οἱ δὲ σύνεδροι ἀπο- -μενοι ἀποδόντων [τὸ μὲν ἥ]μισυ τῷ φῄναντι, τὸ δὲ
-ἄ[λλο κοιν]ὸν ἔστω τῶν συνμμάχων. Ἐὰν δέ τις [ἴῃ] ἐπὶ πολέμῳ ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιησαμένους
-τὴν συμμαχίαν, ἢ κατὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν, βοηθεῖν Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τούτοις
-καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. Ἐὰν δέ τις εἴπῃ ἢ ἐπιψηφίσῃ,
-ἢ ἄρχων ἢ ἰδιώτης, παρὰ τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα, ὡς λύειν τι δεῖ τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ψηφίσματι
-εἰρημένων, ὑπαρχέτω μὲν αὐτῷ ἀτίμῳ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημόσια ἔστω καὶ τῆς θεοῦ
-τὸ ἐπιδέκατον· καὶ κρινέσθω ἐν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ὡς διαλύων τὴν συμμαχίαν.
-Ζημιούντων δὲ αὐτὸν θανάτῳ ἢ φυγῇ ὅπου Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι κρατοῦσι. Ἐὰν δὲ θανάτῳ
-τιμήθῃ, μὴ ταφήτω ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ μηδὲ ἐν τῇ τῶν συμμάχων.
-</p>
-<p>
-Then follows a direction, that the Secretary of the Senate of Five Hundred
-shall inscribe the decree on a column of stone, and place it by the side
-of the statue of Zeus Eleutherius; with orders to the Treasurers of the goddess
-to disburse sixty drachmas for the cost of so doing.
-</p>
-<p>
-It appears that there is annexed to this Inscription a list of such cities as
-had already joined the confederacy, together with certain other names
-added afterwards, of cities which joined subsequently. The Inscription itself
-directs such list to be recorded,—εἰς δὲ τὴν στήλην ταύτην ἀναγράφειν τῶν τε
-οὐσῶν πόλεων συμμαχίδων τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ ἥτις ἂν ἄλλη σύμμαχος γίγνηται.
-</p>
-<p>
-Unfortunately M. Boeckh has not annexed this list, which, moreover, he
-states to have been preserved only in a very partial and fragmentary condition.
-He notices only, as contained in it, the towns of Poiessa and Korêsus
-in the island of Keos,—and Antissa and Eresus in Lesbos; all four as
-autonomous communities.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_217"><a href="#FNanchor_217">[217]</a></span>
-Herodot. i, 96. Ὁ δὲ, οἷα δὴ μνεώμενος ἀρχὴν, ἰθύς τε καὶ δίκαιος ἦν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_218"><a href="#FNanchor_218">[218]</a></span>
-This is the sentiment connected with Ζεὺς Ἐλευθέριος,—Pausanias
-the victor of Platæa, offers to Zeus Eleutherius a solemn sacrifice and thanksgiving
-immediately after the battle, in the agora of the town (Thucyd. ii,
-71). So the Syracusans immediately after the expulsion of the Gelonian
-dynasty (Diodor. xi, 72)—and Mæandrius at Samos (Herodot. iii, 142).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_219"><a href="#FNanchor_219">[219]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 29.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_220"><a href="#FNanchor_220">[220]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 29.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_221"><a href="#FNanchor_221">[221]</a></span>
-Cornel. Nepos, Iphicrates, c. 2; Chabrias, c. 2, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_222"><a href="#FNanchor_222">[222]</a></span>
-See an interesting Fragment (preserved by Athenæus, iv, p. 131) of the
-comedy called <i>Protesilaus</i>—by the Athenian poet Anaxandrides (Meineke,
-Comic. Græc. Frag. iii, p. 182). It contains a curious description of the
-wedding of Iphikrates with the daughter of Kotys in Thrace; enlivened by
-an abundant banquet and copious draughts of wine given to crowds of
-Thracians in the market-place:—
-</p>
-<div class="poetry-container">
-  <div class="poetry">
-    <p>δειπνεῖν&nbsp;δ’&nbsp;<em class="gesperrt">ἄνδρας&nbsp;βουτυροφάγας</em></p>
-    <p>αὐχμηροκόμας μυριοπληθεῖς, etc.,</p>
-  </div>
-</div>
-<p class="ni">brazen vessels as large as wine vats, full of broth,—Kotys himself girt
-round, and serving the broth in a golden basin, then going about to taste
-all the bowls of wine and water ready mixed, until he was himself the first
-man intoxicated. Iphikrates brought from Athens several of the best
-players on the harp and flute.
-</p>
-<p>
-The distinction between the <i>butter</i> eaten, or rubbed on the skin, by the
-Thracians, and the <i>olive-oil</i> habitually consumed in Greece, deserves notice.
-The word αὐχμηροκόμας seems to indicate the absence of those scented unguents
-which, at the banquet of Greeks, would have been applied to the
-hair of the guests, giving to it a shining gloss and moisture. It appears
-that the Lacedæmonian women, however, sometimes anointed themselves
-with butter, and not with oil; see Plutarch, adv. Koloten, p. 1109 B.
-</p>
-<p>
-The number of warlike stratagems in Thrace, ascribed to Iphikrates by
-Polyænus and other Tactic writers, indicates that his exploits there were
-renowned as well as long-continued.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_223"><a href="#FNanchor_223">[223]</a></span>
-Theopomp. Fragm. 175, ed. Didot; Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_224"><a href="#FNanchor_224">[224]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Anab. vii, 2, 38; vii, 5, 8; vii, 6, 43. Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 17;
-Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 36.
-</p>
-<p>
-See also a striking passage (in Lysias Orat. xxviii, cont. Ergokl. s. 5)
-about the advice given to Thrasybulus by a discontented fellow-citizen, to
-seize Byzantium, marry the daughter of Seuthes, and defy Athens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_225"><a href="#FNanchor_225">[225]</a></span>
-Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 13. p. 249.
-</p>
-<p>
-At what time this adoption took place, we cannot distinctly make out;
-Amyntas died in 370 <small>B.C.</small>, while from 378-371 <small>B.C.</small>, Iphikrates seems to
-have been partly on service with the Persian satraps, partly in command of
-the Athenian fleet in the Ionian Sea (see Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, etc. ch.
-4). Therefore, the adoption took place at some time between 387-378 <small>B.C.</small>;
-perhaps after the restoration of Amyntas to his maritime dominions by the
-Lacedæmonian expedition against Olynthus—382-380 <small>B.C.</small> Amyntas
-was so weak and insecure, from the Thessalians, and other land-neighbors
-(see Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s. 112), that it was much to his advantage
-to cultivate the favor of a warlike Athenian established on the
-Thracian coast, like Iphikrates.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_226"><a href="#FNanchor_226">[226]</a></span>
-From these absences of men like Iphikrates and Chabrias, a conclusion
-has been drawn severely condemning the Athenian people. They were so
-envious and ill-tempered (it has been said), that none of their generals
-could live with comfort at Athens; all lived abroad as they could. Cornelius
-Nepos (Chabrias, c. 3) makes the remark, borrowed originally from
-Theopompus (Fr. 117, ed. Didot), and transcribed by many modern commentators
-as if it were exact and literal truth—“Hoc Chabrias nuntio (i.
-e. on being recalled from Egypt, in consequence of the remonstrance of
-Pharnabazus) Athenas rediit neque ibi diutius est moratus quam fuit necesse.
-Non enim libenter erat ante oculos civium suorum, quod et vivebat
-laute, et indulgebat sibi liberalius, quam ut invidiam vulgi posset effugere.
-Est enim hoc commune vitium in magnis liberisque civitatibus, ut invidia
-gloriæ comes sit, et libenter de his detrahant, quos eminere videant altius;
-neque animo æquo pauperes alienam opulentium intuentur fortunam. Itaque
-Chabrias, quoad ei licebat, plurimum aberat. Neque vero solus ille
-aberat Athenis libenter, sed omnes fere principes fecerunt idem, quod
-tantum se ab invidiâ putabant abfuturos, quantum a conspectu suorum
-recessissent. Itaque Conon plurimum Cypri vixit, Iphicrates in Thraciâ,
-Timotheus Lesbi, Chares in Sigeo.”
-</p>
-<p>
-That the people of Athens, among other human frailties, had their fair
-share of envy and jealousy, is not to be denied; but that these attributes
-belonged to them in a marked or peculiar manner, cannot (in my judgment)
-be shown by any evidence extant,—and most assuredly is not shown
-by the evidence here alluded to.
-</p>
-<p>
-“Chabrias was fond of a life of enjoyment and luxurious indulgence.”
-If instead of being an Athenian, he had been a Spartan, he would undoubtedly
-have been compelled to expatriate in order to gratify this taste; for it
-was the express drift and purpose of the Spartan discipline, not to equalize
-property, but to equalize the habits, enjoyments, and personal toils, of the
-rich and poor. This is a point which the admirers of Lykurgus,—Xenophon
-and Plutarch,—attest not less clearly than Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle,
-and others. If then it were considered a proof of envy and ill-temper,
-to debar rich men from spending their money in procuring enjoyments, we
-might fairly consider the reproach as made out against Lykurgus and
-Sparta. Not so against Athens. There was no city in Greece where the
-means of luxurious and comfortable living were more abundantly exhibited
-for sale, nor where a rich man was more perfectly at liberty to purchase
-them. Of this the proofs are everywhere to be found. Even the son of this
-very Chabrias, Ktesippus, who inherited the appetite for enjoyment, without
-the greater qualities of his father,—found the means of gratifying
-his appetite so unfortunately easy at Athens, that he wasted his whole substance
-in such expenses (Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7; Athenæus, iv, p. 165).
-And Chares was even better liked at Athens in consequence of his love of
-enjoyment and license,—if we are to believe another Fragment (238) of
-the same Theopompus.
-</p>
-<p>
-The allegation of Theopompus and Nepos, therefore, is neither true as
-matter of fact, nor sufficient, if it had been true, to sustain the hypothesis
-of a malignant Athenian public, with which they connect it. Iphikrates
-and Chabrias did not stay away from Athens because they loved enjoyments
-or feared the envy of their countrymen; but because both of them were
-large gainers by doing so, in importance, in profit, and in tastes. Both of
-them were men πολεμικοὶ καὶ φιλοπόλεμοι ἐσχάτως (to use an expression of
-Xenophon respecting the Lacedæmonian Klearchus—Anab. ii, 6, 1); both
-of them loved war and had great abilities for war,—qualities quite compatible
-with strong appetite for enjoyment; while neither of them had either
-taste or talent for the civil routine and debate of Athens when at peace.
-Besides, each of them was commander of a body of peltasts, through whose
-means he could obtain lucrative service as well as foreign distinction; so
-that we can assign a sufficient reason why both of them preferred to be absent
-from Athens during most part of the nine years that the peace of Antalkidas
-continued. Afterwards, Iphikrates was abroad three or four years,
-in service with the Persian satraps, by order of the Athenians; Chabrias
-also went a long time afterwards, again on foreign service, to Egypt, at the
-same time when the Spartan king Agesilaus was there (yet without staying
-long away, since we find him going out on command from Athens to the
-Chersonese in 359-358 <small>B.C.</small>—Demosth. cont. Aristokr. p. 677, s. 204); but
-neither he nor Agesilaus, went there to escape the mischief of envious
-countrymen. Demosthenes does not talk of Iphikrates as being uncomfortable
-in Athens, or anxious to get out of it; see Orat. cont. Meidiam, p.
-535, s. 83.
-</p>
-<p>
-Again, as to the case of Konon and his residence in Cyprus; it is truly
-surprising to see this fact cited as an illustration of Athenian jealousy or
-ill-temper. Konon went to Cyprus immediately after the disaster of Ægospotami,
-and remained there, or remained away from Athens, for eleven years
-(405-393 <small>B.C.</small>) until the year after his victory at Knidus. It will be recollected
-that he was one of the six Athenian generals who commanded the
-fleet at Ægospotami. That disaster, while it brought irretrievable ruin upon
-Athens, was at the same time such as to brand with well-merited infamy the
-generals commanding. Konon was so far less guilty than his colleagues, as
-he was in a condition to escape with eight ships when the rest were captured.
-But he could not expect, and plainly did not expect, to be able to
-show his face again in Athens, unless he could redeem the disgrace by some
-signal fresh service. He nobly paid this debt to his country, by the victory
-of Knidus in 394 <small>B.C.</small>; and then came back the year afterwards, to a grateful
-and honorable welcome at Athens. About a year or more after this, he
-went out again as envoy to Persia in the service of his country. He was
-there seized and imprisoned by the satrap Tiribazus, but contrived to make
-his escape, and died at Cyprus, as it would appear, about 390 <small>B.C.</small> Nothing
-therefore can be more unfounded than the allegation of Theopompus,
-“that Konon lived abroad at Cyprus, because he was afraid of undeserved
-ill-temper from the public at Athens.” For what time Timotheus
-may have lived at Lesbos, we have no means of saying. But from the year
-370 <small>B.C.</small> down to his death, we hear of him so frequently elsewhere, in the
-service of his country, that his residence cannot have been long.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_227"><a href="#FNanchor_227">[227]</a></span>
-Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 40, p. 283.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_228"><a href="#FNanchor_228">[228]</a></span>
-The employment of the new word συντάξεις, instead of the unpopular
-term φόρους, is expressly ascribed to Kallistratus,—Harpokration in Voce.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_229"><a href="#FNanchor_229">[229]</a></span>
-Isokrates gives the number twenty-four cities (Or. xv, Permut. s. 120). So
-also Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. s. 15; cont. Philokl. s. 17. The statement
-of Æschines, that Timotheus brought seventy-five cities into the confederacy,
-appears large, and must probably include all that that general either acquired
-or captured (Æsch. Fals. Leg. c. 24, p. 263). Though I think the
-number twenty-four probable enough, yet it is difficult to identify what
-towns they were. For Isokrates, so far as he particularizes, includes Samos,
-Sestos, and Krithôtê, which were not acquired until many years afterwards,—in
-366-365 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-Neither of these orators distinguish between those cities which Timotheus
-brought or persuaded to come into the confederacy, when it was first formed
-(among which we may reckon Eubœa, or most part of it—Plutarch, De
-Glor. Athen. p. 351 A.)—from those others which he afterwards took by
-siege, like Samos.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_230"><a href="#FNanchor_230">[230]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. xiv, Plataic. s. 30.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_231"><a href="#FNanchor_231">[231]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 20. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑφ’ ὑμῶν κατὰ
-κράτος ἁλόντες εὐθὺς μὲν ἁρμοστοῦ καὶ δουλείας ἀπηλλάγησαν, νῦν δὲ τοῦ
-συνεδρίου καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσιν, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-The adverb of time here used indicates about 372 <small>B.C.</small>, about a year before
-the battle of Leuktra.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_232"><a href="#FNanchor_232">[232]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 30.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_233"><a href="#FNanchor_233">[233]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 29.
-</p>
-<p>
-Polybius (ii, 62) states that the Athenians <i>sent out</i> (not merely, <i>voted</i> to
-send out) ten thousand hoplites, and manned one hundred triremes.
-</p>
-<p>
-Both these authors treat the resolution as if it were taken by the Athenians
-alone; but we must regard it in conjunction with the newly-assembled
-synod of allies.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_234"><a href="#FNanchor_234">[234]</a></span>
-Xen. De Vectigal. v, 6. οὔκουν καὶ τότ’, ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἀπεσχόμεθα,
-πάλιν <em class="gesperrt">ὑπὸ τῶν νησιωτῶν ἑκόντων προστάται</em> τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἐγενόμεθα;
-</p>
-<p>
-In the early years of this confederacy, votive offerings of wreaths or
-crowns, in token of gratitude to Athens, were decreed by the Eubœans, as
-well as by the general body of allies. These crowns were still to be seen
-thirty years afterwards at Athens, with commemorative inscriptions (Demosthen.
-cont. Androtion. c. 21, p. 616; cont. Timokrat. c. 41, p. 756).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_235"><a href="#FNanchor_235">[235]</a></span>
-For the description of the Solonian census, see Vol. III, Ch. xi, p. 117,
-of this History.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_236"><a href="#FNanchor_236">[236]</a></span>
-This is M. Boeckh’s opinion, seemingly correct, as far as can be made
-out on a subject very imperfectly known (Public Economy of Athens, B,
-iv, ch. 5).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_237"><a href="#FNanchor_237">[237]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aphob. i, p. 815, 816; cont. Aphob. ii, p. 836; cont.
-Aphob. de Perjur. p. 862. Compare Boeckh, Publ. Econ. Ath. iv, 7.
-</p>
-<p>
-In the exposition which M. Boeckh gives of the new property-schedule
-introduced under the archonship of Nausinikus, he inclines to the hypothesis
-of four distinct Classes, thus distributed (p. 671 of the new edition of
-his Staats-haushaltung der Athener):—
-</p>
-<p>
-1. The first class included all persons who possessed property to the value
-of twelve talents and upwards. They were entered on the schedule, each
-for one-fifth, or twenty per cent. of his property.
-</p>
-<p>
-2. The second class comprised all who possessed property to the amount
-of six talents, but below twelve talents. Each was enrolled in the
-schedule, for the amount of sixteen per cent. upon his property.
-</p>
-<p>
-3. The third class included all whose possessions amounted to the value
-of two talents, but did not reach six talents. Each was entered in the
-schedule at the figure of twelve per cent. upon his property.
-</p>
-<p>
-4. The fourth class comprised all, from the minimum of twenty-five minæ,
-but below the maximum of two talents. Each was entered in the schedule
-for the amount of eight per cent. upon his property.
-</p>
-<p>
-This detail rests upon no positive proof; but it serves to illustrate the
-principle of distribution, and of graduation, then adopted.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_238"><a href="#FNanchor_238">[238]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Androtion. p. 612, c. 17. τὸ ἑκτὸν μέρος εἰσφέρειν μετὰ τῶν μετοίκων.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_239"><a href="#FNanchor_239">[239]</a></span>
-Polybius states the former sum (ii, 62), Demosthenes the latter (De
-Symmoriis, p. 183, c. 6). Boeckh however has shown, that Polybius did
-not correctly conceive what the sum which he stated really meant.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_240"><a href="#FNanchor_240">[240]</a></span>
-I am obliged again, upon this point, to dissent from M. Boeckh, who
-sets it down as positive matter of fact that a property-tax of five per cent.,
-amounting to three hundred talents, was imposed and levied in the archonship
-of Nausinikus (Publ. Econ. Ath. iv, 7, 8; p. 517-521, Eng. Transl.). The
-evidence upon which this is asserted, is, a passage of Demosthenes cont.
-Androtion. (p. 606. c. 14). Ὑμῖν <em class="gesperrt">παρὰ τὰς εἰσφορὰς τὰς ἀπὸ Ναυσινίκου</em>, παρ’ ἴσως
-τάλαντα τριακόσια ἢ μικρῷ πλείω, ἔλλειμμα τέτταρα καὶ δέκα ἐστὶ τάλαντα· ὧν ἑπτὰ οὗτος
-(Androtion) εἰσέπραξεν. Now these
-words imply,—not that a property-tax of about three hundred talents had
-been levied or called for <i>during</i> the archonship of Nausinikus, but—that a
-total sum of three hundred talents, or thereabouts, had been levied (or called
-for) by all the various property-taxes imposed <i>from the archonship of Nausinikus
-down to the date of the speech</i>. The oration was spoken about 355 <small>B.C.</small>;
-the archonship of Nausinikus was in 378 <small>B.C.</small> What the speaker affirms,
-therefore, is, that a sum of three hundred talents had been levied or called for
-by all the various property-taxes imposed between these two dates; and
-that the aggregate sum of arrears due upon all of them, at the time when
-Androtion entered upon his office, was fourteen talents.
-</p>
-<p>
-Taylor, indeed, in his note, thinking that the sum of three hundred talents
-is very small, as the aggregate of all property-taxes imposed for twenty-three
-years, suggests that it might be proper to read <em class="gesperrt">ἐπὶ</em> Ναυσινίκου
-instead of <em class="gesperrt">ἀπὸ</em> Ναυσινίκου; and I presume that M. Boeckh adopts that
-reading. But it would be unsafe to found an historical assertion upon such
-a change of text, even if the existing text were more indefensible than it
-actually is. And surely the plural number τὰς εἰσφορὰς proves that the orator
-has in view, not the single property-tax imposed in the archonship of
-Nausinikus, but two or more property-taxes, imposed at different times.
-Besides, Androtion devoted himself to the collection of outstanding arrears
-generally, in whatever year they might have accrued. He would have no
-motive to single out those which had accrued in the year 378 <small>B.C.</small>; moreover,
-those arrears would probably have become confounded with others,
-long before 355 <small>B.C.</small> Demosthenes selects the year of Nausinikus as his
-initial period, because it was then that the new schedule and a new reckoning,
-began.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_241"><a href="#FNanchor_241">[241]</a></span>
-Respecting the Symmories, compare Boeckh, Staats-haushaltung der
-Athener, iv, 9, 10; Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Publ. Græcor. s. 78; Parreidt,
-De Symmoriis, p. 18 <i>seq.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_242"><a href="#FNanchor_242">[242]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 38.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_243"><a href="#FNanchor_243">[243]</a></span>
-Plutarch. Pelopid. c. 18, 19.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_244"><a href="#FNanchor_244">[244]</a></span>
-Hist. of Greece. Vol. VII, ch. lv, p. 11.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_245"><a href="#FNanchor_245">[245]</a></span>
-Diodor. xii, 70.
-</p>
-<p>
-These pairs of neighbors who fought side by side at Delium, were called
-Heniochi and Parabatæ,—Charioteers and Side Companions; a name borrowed
-from the analogy of chariot-fighting, as described in the Iliad and
-probably in many of the lost epic poems; the charioteer being himself an
-excellent warrior, though occupied for the moment with other duties,—Diomedes
-and Sthenelus, Pandarus and Æneas, Patroklus and Automedon,
-etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_246"><a href="#FNanchor_246">[246]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18, 19.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ὁ συνταχθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἐπαμινώνδου ἱερὸς λόχος (Hieronymus apud Athenæum,
-xiii, p. 602 A.). There was a Carthaginian military division which
-bore the same title, composed of chosen and wealthy citizens, two thousand
-five hundred in number (Diodor. xvi, 80).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_247"><a href="#FNanchor_247">[247]</a></span>
-Pausan. viii, 11, 5.
-</p>
-<p>
-Dikæarchus, only one generation afterwards, complained that he could
-not find out the name of the mother of Epaminondas (Plutarch, Agesil.
-c. 19).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_248"><a href="#FNanchor_248">[248]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Pelop. c. 4; Pausan. ix, 13, 1. According to Plutarch, Epaminondas
-had attained the age of forty years, before he became publicly known
-(De Occult. Vivendo, p. 1129 C.).
-</p>
-<p>
-Plutarch affirms that the battle (in which Pelopidas was desperately
-wounded, and saved by Epaminondas) took place at Mantinea, when they
-were fighting on the side of the Lacedæmonians, under king Agesipolis,
-against the Arcadians; the Thebans being at that time friends of Sparta,
-and having sent a contingent to her aid.
-</p>
-<p>
-I do not understand what battle Plutarch can here mean. The Thebans
-were never so united with Sparta as to send any contingent to her aid, after
-the capture of Athens (in 404 <small>B.C.</small>). Most critics think that the war referred
-to by Plutarch, is, the expedition conducted by Agesipolis against Mantinea,
-whereby the city was broken up into villages—in 385 <small>B.C.</small>; see Mr.
-Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici ad 385 <small>B.C.</small> But, in the first place, there cannot
-have been any Theban contingent then assisting Agesipolis; for Thebes
-was on terms unfriendly with Sparta,—and certainly was not her ally. In
-the next place, there does not seem to have been any battle, according to
-Xenophon’s account.
-</p>
-<p>
-I therefore am disposed to question Plutarch’s account, as to this alleged
-battle of Mantinea; though I think it probable that Epaminondas may have
-saved the life of Pelopidas at some earlier conflict, before the peace of Antalkidas.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_249"><a href="#FNanchor_249">[249]</a></span>
-Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 2; Plutarch, Apophth. Reg. p. 192 D.; Aristophan.
-Acharn. 872.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare the citations in Athenæus, x, p. 417. The perfection of form
-required in the runner was also different from that required in the wrestler
-(Xenoph. Memor. iii, 8, 4; iii, 10, 6).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_250"><a href="#FNanchor_250">[250]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Alkib. c. 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_251"><a href="#FNanchor_251">[251]</a></span>
-Pindar, Olymp. vi, 90.</p>
-<div class="poetry-container">
-  <div class="poetry">
-    <p>ἀρχαῖον ὄνειδος—Βοιώτιον ὗν, etc.</p>
-  </div>
-</div>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_252"><a href="#FNanchor_252">[252]</a></span>
-Aristoxenus mentions the flute, Cicero and Cornelius Nepos the lyre
-(Aristoxen. Fr. 60, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. iv, p. 184; Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i,
-2, 4; Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 2).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_253"><a href="#FNanchor_253">[253]</a></span>
-Aristoxenus, Frag. 11, ed. Didot; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 583,
-Cicero, De Offic. i, 44, 155; Pausan. ix, 13, 1; Ælian, V. H. iii, 17.
-</p>
-<p>
-The statement (said to have been given by Aristoxenus, and copied by
-Plutarch as well as by Jamblichus) that Lysis, who taught Epaminondas,
-had been one of the persons actually present in the synod of Pythagoreans
-at Kroton when Kylon burnt down the house, and that he with another had
-been the only persons who escaped—cannot be reconciled with chronology.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_254"><a href="#FNanchor_254">[254]</a></span>
-Compare Diodor. xv, 52 with Plutarch, Perikles, c. 6, and Plutarch, Demosthenes,
-c. 20.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_255"><a href="#FNanchor_255">[255]</a></span>
-Plutarch, De Gen. Sokrat. p. 576 D. μετείληφε παιδείας διαφόρου
-καὶ περιττῆς—(p. 585 D.) τὴν ἀρίστην τροφὴν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ—(p. 592 F.) Σπίνθαρος
-ὁ Ταραντῖνος οὐκ ὀλίγον αὐτῷ (Epaminondas) συνδιατρίψας ἐνταῦθα χρόνον, ἀεὶ δήπου
-λέγει, μηδενί που τῶν καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρώπων ἐντετευχέναι, μήτε πλείονα γιγνώσκοντι
-μήτε ἐλάττονα φθεγγομένῳ. Compare Cornel.
-Nepos, Epamin. c. 3—and Plutarch, De Audiend. c. 3, p. 39 F.
-</p>
-<p>
-We may fairly presume that this judgment of Spintharus was communicated
-by him to his son Aristoxenus, from whom Plutarch copied it; and
-we know that Aristoxenus in his writings mentioned other particulars
-respecting Epaminondas (Athenæus, iv, p. 184). We see thus that Plutarch
-had access to good sources of information respecting the latter. And as he
-had composed a life of Epaminondas (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 28), though unfortunately
-it has not reached us, we may be confident that he had taken
-some pains to collect materials for the purpose, which materials would naturally
-be employed in his dramatic dialogue, “De Genio Socratis.” This
-strengthens our confidence in the interesting statements which that dialogue
-furnishes respecting the character of Epaminondas; as well as in the
-incidental allusions interspersed among Plutarch’s other writings.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_256"><a href="#FNanchor_256">[256]</a></span>
-Cornel. Nepos, Epaminond. c. 5; Plutarch, Præcept. Reip. Gerend. p.
-819 C. Cicero notices him as the only man with any pretensions to oratorical
-talents, whom Thebes, Corinth, or Argos had ever produced (Brutus,
-c. 13, 50).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_257"><a href="#FNanchor_257">[257]</a></span>
-Plutarch (De Gen. Socr. p. 583, 584; Pelopid. c. 3; Fab. Max. c. 27.
-Compar. Alcibiad. and Coriol. c. 4): Cornel. Nepos. Epamin. c. 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_258"><a href="#FNanchor_258">[258]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 1; Justin, vi, 8.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_259"><a href="#FNanchor_259">[259]</a></span>
-Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 576 F. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ, μὴ πείθων
-ὡς οἴεται βέλτιον εἶναι ταῦτα μὴ πράσσειν· εἰκότως ἀντιτείνει πρὸς ἃ μὴ
-πέφυκε, μηδὲ δοκιμάζει, παρακαλούμενος.
-</p>
-<p>
-... Ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ πείθει τοὺς πολλοὺς, ἀλλὰ ταύτην ὡρμήκαμεν τὴν ὁδὸν, ἐᾷν
-αὐτὸν κελεύει φόνου καθαρὸν ὄντα καὶ ἀναίτιον ἐφεστᾶναι τοῖς καιροῖς, μετὰ
-τοῦ δικαίου τῷ συμφέροντι προσοισόμενον.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare the same dialogue, p. 594 B.; and Cornelius Nepos, Pelopidas,
-c. 4.
-</p>
-<p>
-Isokrates makes a remark upon Evagoras of Salamis, which may be well
-applied to Epaminondas; that the objectionable means, without which the
-former could not have got possession of the sceptre, were performed by
-others and not by him; while all the meritorious and admirable functions
-of command were reserved for Evagoras (Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 28).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_260"><a href="#FNanchor_260">[260]</a></span>
-See the striking statements of Plutarch and Pausanias about
-Philopœmen,—καίπερ Ἐπαμεινώνδου βουλόμενος εἶναι μάλιστα ζηλωτὴς, τὸ
-δραστήριον καὶ συνετὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ χρημάτων ἀπαθὲς ἰσχυρῶς ἐμιμεῖτο, τῷ δὲ
-πράῳ καὶ βαθεῖ καὶ φιλανθρώπῳ παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς διαφορὰς ἐμμένειν οὐ
-δυνάμενος, δι’ ὀργὴν καὶ φιλονεικίαν, μᾶλλον ἐδόκει στρατιωτικῆς ἢ πολιτικῆς
-ἀρετῆς οἰκεῖος εἶναι. To the like purpose, Pausanias, viii, 49, 2; Plutarch,
-Pelopidas, c. 25: Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 3—“patiens admirandum in
-modum.”</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_261"><a href="#FNanchor_261">[261]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 32. Ὦ τοῦ μεγαλοπράγμονος ἀνθρώπου!</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_262"><a href="#FNanchor_262">[262]</a></span>
-Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 576 E. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ, Βοιωτῶν ἁπάντων
-τῷ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀξιῶν διαφέρειν, ἀμβλὺς ἐστι καὶ ἀπρόθυμος.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_263"><a href="#FNanchor_263">[263]</a></span>
-Bauch, in his instructive biography of Epaminondas (Epaminondas,
-und Thebens Kampf um die Hegemonie: Breslau, 1834, p. 26), seems to
-conceive that Epaminondas was never employed in any public official post
-by his countrymen, until the period immediately preceding the battle of
-Leuktra. I cannot concur in this opinion. It appears to me that he must
-have been previously employed in such posts as enabled him to show his
-military worth. For all the proceedings of 371 <small>B.C.</small> prove that in that year
-he actually possessed a great and established reputation, which must have
-been acquired by previous acts in a conspicuous position; and as he had no
-great family position to start from, his reputation was probably acquired
-only by slow degrees.
-</p>
-<p>
-The silence of Xenophon proves nothing in contradiction of this supposition;
-for he does not mention Epaminondas even at Leuktra.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_264"><a href="#FNanchor_264">[264]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 31.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_265"><a href="#FNanchor_265">[265]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 54; Diodor. xv, 31.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_266"><a href="#FNanchor_266">[266]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 36-38.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_267"><a href="#FNanchor_267">[267]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 41.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_268"><a href="#FNanchor_268">[268]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 32; Polyæn. ii, 1, 2; Cornel. Nepos, Chabrias, c. 1,—“obnixo
-genu scuto,”—Demosthen. cont. Leptinem, p. 479.
-</p>
-<p>
-The Athenian public having afterwards voted a statue to the honor of
-Chabrias, he made choice of this attitude for the design (Diodor. xv, 33).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_269"><a href="#FNanchor_269">[269]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4. 42-45; Diodor. xv, 33.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_270"><a href="#FNanchor_270">[270]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου πάλιν αὖ τὰ τῶν Θηβαίων ἀνεζωπυρεῖτο,
-καὶ ἐστρατεύοντο εἰς Θεσπιὰς, καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περιοικίδας πόλεις. Ὁ μέντοι δῆμος
-ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰς τὰς Θήβας ἀπεχώρει· ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι καθειστήκεσαν,
-ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις· ὥστε καὶ οἱ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσι φίλοι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων βοηθείας
-ἐδέοντο.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_271"><a href="#FNanchor_271">[271]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 47, 51.
-</p>
-<p>
-The anecdotes in Polyænus (ii, 1, 18-20), mentioning faint-heartedness
-and alarm among the allies of Agesilaus, are likely to apply (certainly in
-part) to this campaign.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_272"><a href="#FNanchor_272">[272]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 33, 34; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 26.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_273"><a href="#FNanchor_273">[273]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 58.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_274"><a href="#FNanchor_274">[274]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 59.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_275"><a href="#FNanchor_275">[275]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 61. ἐνέβησαν αὐτοὶ εἰς τὰς ναῦς, etc. Boeckh (followed
-by Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. 38, vol. v, p. 58) connects with this
-maritime expedition an Inscription (Corp. Insc. No. 84, p. 124) recording a
-vote of gratitude, passed by the Athenian assembly in favor of Phanokritus,
-a native of Parium in the Propontis. But I think that the vote can
-hardly belong to the present expedition. The Athenians could not need to
-be informed by a native of Parium about the movements of a hostile fleet
-near Ægina and Keos. The information given by Phanokritus must have
-related more probably, I think, to some occasion of the transit of hostile
-ships along the Hellespont, which a native of Parium would be the likely
-person first to discover and communicate.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_276"><a href="#FNanchor_276">[276]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 35; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 17, p. 480.
-</p>
-<p>
-I give the number of prize-ships taken in this action, as stated by Demosthenes;
-in preference to Diodorus, who mentions a smaller number. The
-orator, in enumerating the exploits of Chabrias in this oration, not only
-speaks from a written memorandum in his hand, which he afterwards causes
-to be read by the clerk,—but also seems exact and special as to numbers,
-so as to inspire greater confidence than usual.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_277"><a href="#FNanchor_277">[277]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 35. Chabrias ἀπέσχετο παντελῶς τοῦ διωγμοῦ, ἀναμνησθεὶς
-τῆς ἐν Ἀργινούσαις ναυμαχίας, ἐν ᾗ τοὺς νικήσαντας στρατηγοὺς ὁ δῆμος ἀντὶ μεγάλης
-εὐεργεσίας θανάτῳ περιέβαλεν, <em class="gesperrt">αἰτιασάμενος ὅτι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας κατὰ τὴν
-ναυμαχίαν οὐκ ἔθαψαν</em>· εὐλαβήθη οὖν (see Wesseling and Stephens’s note) μή ποτε
-τῆς περιστάσεως ὁμοίας γενομένης κινδυνεύσῃ παθεῖν παραπλήσια. Διόπερ <em class="gesperrt">ἀποστὰς
-τοῦ διώκειν, ἀνελέγετο τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς διανηχομένους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἔτι ζῶντας
-διέσωσε, τοὺς δὲ τετελευτηκότας ἔθαψεν</em>. Εἰ δὲ μὴ περὶ ταύτην ἐγένετο τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν,
-ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἅπαντα τὸν πολεμίων στόλον διέφθειρε.
-</p>
-<p>
-This passage illustrates what I remarked in my preceding volume (Vol.
-VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 175), respecting the battle of Arginusæ and the proceedings
-at Athens afterwards. I noticed that Diodorus incorrectly represented
-the excitement at Athens against the generals as arising from their having
-neglected to pick up the bodies of the <i>slain</i> warriors for burial,—and that
-he omitted the more important fact, that they left many living and wounded
-warriors to perish.
-</p>
-<p>
-It is curious, that in the first of the two sentences above cited, Diodorus
-repeats his erroneous affirmation about the battle of Arginusæ; while in the
-second sentence he corrects the error, telling us that Chabrias, profiting by
-the warning, took care to pick up the <i>living</i> men on the wrecks and in the
-water, as well as the dead bodies.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_278"><a href="#FNanchor_278">[278]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Phokion, c. 6; Plutarch, Camillus, c. 19.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_279"><a href="#FNanchor_279">[279]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Leptin. p. 480; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_280"><a href="#FNanchor_280">[280]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 36. He states by mistake, that Chabrias was afterwards
-assassinated at Abdera.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_281"><a href="#FNanchor_281">[281]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 62.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_282"><a href="#FNanchor_282">[282]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 64; Diodor. xv, 36.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_283"><a href="#FNanchor_283">[283]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 66; Isokrates, De Permutat. s. 116; Cornelius Nepos,
-Timotheus, c. 2.
-</p>
-<p>
-The advance of seven minæ respectively, obtained by Timotheus from
-the sixty trierarchs under his command, is mentioned by Demosthenes
-cont. Timotheum (c. 3, p. 1187). I agree with M. Boeckh (Public Economy
-of Athens, ii, 24, p. 294) in referring this advance to his expedition to Korkyra
-and other places in the Ionian Sea in 375-374 <small>B.C.</small>; not to his subsequent
-expedition of 373 <small>B.C.</small>, to which Rehdantz, Lachmann, Schlosser,
-and others would refer it (Vitæ Iphicratis, etc. p. 89). In the second expedition,
-it does not appear that he ever had really sixty triremes, or sixty
-trierarchs, under him. Xenophon (Hellen. v, 4, 63) tells us that the fleet sent
-with Timotheus to Korkyra consisted of sixty ships; which is the exact
-number of trierarchs named by Demosthenes.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_284"><a href="#FNanchor_284">[284]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Orat. De Permutat. s. 128, 131, 135.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_285"><a href="#FNanchor_285">[285]</a></span>
-Isokrates, De Permutat. s. 117; Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c. 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_286"><a href="#FNanchor_286">[286]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_287"><a href="#FNanchor_287">[287]</a></span>
-See Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 21, 23, 37.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_288"><a href="#FNanchor_288">[288]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1. Οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι, αὐξανομένους μὲν ὁρῶντες διὰ σφᾶς
-τοὺς Θηβαίους, χρήματά δ’ οὐ συμβαλλομένους εἰς τὸ ναυτικὸν, αὐτοὶ δ’ ἀποκναιόμενοι
-καὶ χρημάτων εἰσφοραῖς καὶ λῃστείαις ἐξ Αἰγίνης, καὶ φυλακαῖς τῆς χώρας, ἐπεθύμησαν
-παύσασθαι τοῦ πολέμου.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_289"><a href="#FNanchor_289">[289]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46-55.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_290"><a href="#FNanchor_290">[290]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 15-25.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_291"><a href="#FNanchor_291">[291]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 17; Diodor. xv, 37.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenophon does not mention the combat at Tegyra. Diodorus mentions,
-what is evidently this battle, near Orchomenus; but he does not name Tegyra.
-</p>
-<p>
-Kallisthenes seems to have described the battle of Tegyra, and to have
-given various particulars respecting the religious legends connected with
-that spot (Kallisthenes, Fragm. 3, ed. Didot, ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Τεγύρα).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_292"><a href="#FNanchor_292">[292]</a></span>
-That the Thebans thus became again presidents of all Bœotia, and revived
-the Bœotian confederacy,—is clearly stated by Xenophon, Hellen. v,
-4, 63; vi, 1, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_293"><a href="#FNanchor_293">[293]</a></span>
-Thucyd. ii, 2. Ἀνεῖπεν ὁ κήρυξ (the Theban herald after the Theban
-troops had penetrated by night into the middle of Platæa εἴ τις βούλεται <em class="gesperrt">κατὰ
-τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν</em> ξυμμαχεῖν, τίθεσθαι παρ’ αὐτοὺς τὰ ὅπλα,
-νομίζοντες σφίσι ῥᾳδίως τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ προσχωρήσειν τὴν πόλιν.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare the language of the Thebans about τὰ πάτρια τῶν Βοιωτῶν (iii,
-61, 65, 66). The description which the Thebans give of their own professions
-and views, when they attacked Platæa in 431 <small>B.C.</small>, may be taken as fair
-analogy to judge of their professions and views towards the recovered Bœotian
-towns in 376-375 <small>B.C.</small></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_294"><a href="#FNanchor_294">[294]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3; Compare Diodor. xv, 53.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_295"><a href="#FNanchor_295">[295]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 31; Xen. Hellen, vi, 3, 1; iii, 6, 21.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_296"><a href="#FNanchor_296">[296]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 21-27.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_297"><a href="#FNanchor_297">[297]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 1; vi, 21.
-</p>
-<p>
-This expedition of Kleombrotus to Phokis is placed by Mr. Fynes Clinton
-in 375 <small>B.C.</small> (Fast. Hel. ad 375 <small>B.C.</small>). To me it seems to belong rather
-to 374 <small>B.C.</small> It was not undertaken until the Thebans had reconquered all
-the Bœotian cities (Xen. Hell. vi, 1, 1); and this operation seems to have
-occupied them all the two years,—376 and 375 <small>B.C.</small> See v, 4, 63, where
-the words οὔτ’ ἐν ᾧ Τιμόθεος περιέπλευσε must be understood to include,
-not simply the time which Timotheus took in <i>actually circumnavigating</i> Peloponnesus,
-but the year which he spent afterwards in the Ionian Sea, and
-the time which he occupied in performing his exploits near Korkyra, Leukas,
-and the neighborhood generally. The “Periplus” for which Timotheus
-was afterwards honored at Athens (see Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. c.
-90, p. 458) meant the exploits performed by him during the year and with
-the fleet of the “Periplus.”
-</p>
-<p>
-It is worth notice that the Pythian games were celebrated in this year
-374 <small>B.C.</small>,—ἐπὶ Σωκρατίδου ἄρχοντος; that is, in the first quarter of that
-archon, or the third Olympic year; about the beginning of August, Chabrias
-won a prize at these games with a chariot and four; in celebration of
-which, he afterwards gave a splendid banquet at the point of sea-shore called
-Kôlias, near Athens (Demosthen. cont. Neæram. c. 11, p. 1356).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_298"><a href="#FNanchor_298">[298]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1, 2.
-</p>
-<p>
-Kallias seems to have been one of the Athenian envoys (Xen. Hellen. vi,
-3, 4).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_299"><a href="#FNanchor_299">[299]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 82.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_300"><a href="#FNanchor_300">[300]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 3. Καὶ ὁπότε μὲν ἐνδεὴς εἴη, παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ
-προσετίθει· ὁπότε δὲ περιγένοιτο τῆς προσόδου, ἀπελάμβανεν· ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως
-φιλόξενός τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τὸν Θετταλικὸν τρόπον.
-</p>
-<p>
-Such loose dealing of the Thessalians with their public revenues helps us
-to understand how Philip of Macedon afterwards got into his hands the
-management of their harbors and customs-duties (Demosthen. Olynth. i, p.
-15; ii. p. 20). It forms a striking contrast with the exactness of the Athenian
-people about their public receipts and disbursements, as testified in the
-inscriptions yet remaining.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_301"><a href="#FNanchor_301">[301]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 4.
-</p>
-<p>
-The story (told in Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. p. 583 F.) of Jason sending
-a large sum of money to Thebes, at some period anterior to the recapture
-of the Kadmeia, for the purpose of corrupting Epaminondas,—appears
-not entitled to credit. Before that time, Epaminondas was too little known
-to be worth corrupting; moreover, Jason did not become <i>tagus</i> of Thessaly
-until long after the recapture of the Kadmeia (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 18, 19).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_302"><a href="#FNanchor_302">[302]</a></span>
-See the interesting account of this mission, and the speech of Polydamas,
-which I have been compelled greatly to abridge (in Xen. Hellen. vi, 1,
-4-18).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_303"><a href="#FNanchor_303">[303]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 3; Diodor. xv, 45.
-</p>
-<p>
-The statements of Diodorus are not clear in themselves; besides that on
-some points, though not in the main, they contradict Xenophon. Diodorus
-states that those exiles whom Timotheus brought back to Zakynthus, were
-the philo-Spartan leaders, who had been recently expelled for their misrule
-under the empire of Sparta. This statement must doubtless be incorrect.
-The exiles whom Timotheus restored must have belonged to the anti-Spartan
-party in the island.
-</p>
-<p>
-But Diodorus appears to me to have got into confusion by representing
-that universal and turbulent reaction against the philo-Spartan oligarchies,
-which really did not take place until after the battle of Leuktra—as if it
-had taken place some three years earlier. The events recounted in Diodor.
-xv, 40, seem to me to belong to a period <i>after</i> the battle of Leuktra.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus also seems to have made a mistake in saying that the Athenians
-sent <i>Ktesikles</i> as auxiliary commander to <i>Zakynthus</i> (xv, 46); whereas
-this very commander is announced by himself in the next chapter (as well
-as by Xenophon, who calls him <i>Stesikles</i>) as sent to <i>Korkyra</i> (Hellen. v,
-2, 10).
-</p>
-<p>
-I conceive Diodorus to have inadvertently mentioned this Athenian expedition
-under Stesiklês or Ktesiklês, twice over; once as sent to Zakynthus—then
-again, as sent to <i>Korkyra</i>. The latter is the truth. No Athenian
-expedition at all appears on this occasion to have gone to Zakynthus;
-for Xenophon enumerates the Zakynthians among those who helped to fit
-out the fleet of Mnasippus (v, 2, 3).
-</p>
-<p>
-On the other hand, I see no reason for calling in question the reality of
-the two Lacedæmonian expeditions, in the last half of 374 <small>B.C.</small>—one under
-Aristokrates to Zakynthus, the other under Alkidas to Korkyra—which
-Diodorus mentions (Diod. xv, 45, 46). It is true that Xenophon does not
-notice either of them; but they are noway inconsistent with the facts which
-he does state.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_304"><a href="#FNanchor_304">[304]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 3, 5, 16: compare v, 2, 21—about the commutation
-of personal service for money.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus (xv, 47) agrees with Xenophon in the main about the expedition
-of Mnasippus, though differing on several other contemporary points.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_305"><a href="#FNanchor_305">[305]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 6. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀπέβη (when Mnasippus landed),
-ἐκράτει τε τῆς γῆς καὶ ἐδῄου ἐξειργασμένην μὲν παγκαλῶς καὶ πεφυτευμένην τὴν χώραν,
-μεγαλοπρεπεῖς δὲ οἰκήσεις καὶ οἰνῶνας κατεσκευασμένους ἔχουσαν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν· ὥστ’
-ἔφασαν τοὺς στρατιώτας εἰς τοῦτο τρυφῆς ἐλθεῖν, ὥστ’ οὐκ ἐθέλειν πίνειν, εἰ μὴ
-ἀνθοσμίας εἴη. Καὶ ἀνδράποδα δὲ καὶ βοσκήματα πάμπολλα ἡλίσκετο ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν.
-</p>
-<p>
-Οἶνον, implied in the antecedent word οἰνῶνας, is understood after πίνειν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_306"><a href="#FNanchor_306">[306]</a></span>
-Thucyd. i, 82. (Speech of Archidamus) μὴ γὰρ ἄλλο τι νομίσητε
-τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν (of the Athenians) ἢ ὅμηρον ἔχειν, καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ἐξείργασται.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare the earlier portion of the same speech (c. 80), and the second
-speech of the same Archidamus (ii, 11).
-</p>
-<p>
-To the same purpose Thucydides speaks, respecting the properties of the
-wealthy men established throughout the area of Attica,—οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ καλὰ κτήματα κατὰ
-τὴν χώραν οἰκοδομίαις τε καὶ πολυτελέσι κατασκευαῖς ἀπολωλεκότες
-(<i>i. e.</i> by the invasion)—Thucyd. ii, 65.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_307"><a href="#FNanchor_307">[307]</a></span>
-The envoys from Korkyra to Athens (mentioned by Xenophon, v, 2, 9)
-would probably cross Epirus and Thessaly, through the aid of Alketas.
-This would be a much quicker way for them than the circumnavigation of
-Peloponnesus: and it would suggest the same way for the detachment of
-Stesiklês presently to be mentioned.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_308"><a href="#FNanchor_308">[308]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 15.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_309"><a href="#FNanchor_309">[309]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 16.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ὁ δ’ αὖ Μνάσιππος ὁρῶν ταῦτα, ἐνόμιζέ τε ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη ἔχειν τὴν πόλιν,
-καὶ περὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους, ἐκαινούργει, καὶ τοὺς μέν τινας αὐτῶν ἀπομίσθους
-ἐπεποιήκει, τοῖς δ’ οὖσι καὶ δυοῖν ἤδη μηνοῖν ὤφειλε τὸν μισθὸν, οὐκ ἀπορῶν,
-ὡς ἐλέγετο, χρημάτων, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_310"><a href="#FNanchor_310">[310]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 18-26; Diodor. xv, 47.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_311"><a href="#FNanchor_311">[311]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi. 2, 39.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_312"><a href="#FNanchor_312">[312]</a></span>
-The manner in which I have described the preliminary cruise of Timotheus,
-will be found (I think) the only way of uniting into one consistent
-narrative the scattered fragments of information which we possess respecting
-his proceedings in this year.
-</p>
-<p>
-The date of his setting out from Athens is exactly determined by Demosthenes,
-adv. Timoth. p. 1186—the month Munychion, in the archonship
-of Sokratidês—April 373 <small>B.C.</small> Diodorus says that he proceeded to Thrace,
-and that he acquired several new members for the confederacy (xv, 47);
-Xenophon states that he sailed towards the islands (Hellen. vi, 2, 12); two
-statements not directly the same, yet not incompatible with each other. In
-his way to Thrace, he would naturally pass up the Eubœan strait and along
-the coast of Thessaly.
-</p>
-<p>
-We know that Stesikles and his peltasts must have got to Korkyra, not
-by sea circumnavigating Peloponnesus, but by land across Thessaly and
-Epirus; a much quicker way. Xenophon tells us that the Athenians
-“asked Alketas to help them to cross over from the mainland of Epirus to
-the opposite island of Korkyra: and that they were in consequence carried
-across by night,”—Ἀλκέτου δὲ ἐδεήθησαν <em class="gesperrt">συνδιαβιβάσαι</em> τούτους· καὶ οὗτοι
-μὲν <em class="gesperrt">νυκτὸς διακομισθέντες</em> που τῆς χώρας, εἰσῆλθον εἰς τὴν πόλιν.
-</p>
-<p>
-Now these troops could not have got to Epirus without crossing Thessaly;
-nor could they have crossed Thessaly without the permission and
-escort of Jason. Moreover, Alketas himself was the dependent of Jason,
-whose goodwill was therefore doubly necessary (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 7).
-</p>
-<p>
-We farther know that in the year preceding (374 <small>B.C.</small>), Jason was not
-yet in alliance with Athens, nor even inclined to become so, though the
-Athenians were very anxious for it (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 10). But in November
-373 <small>B.C.</small>, Jason (as well as Alketas) appears as the established ally
-of Athens; not as then becoming her ally for the first time, but as so completely
-an established ally, that he comes to Athens for the express purpose
-of being present at the trial of Timotheus and of deposing in his favor—Ἀφικομένου
-γὰρ Ἀλκέτου καὶ Ἰάσονος ὡς τοῦτον (Timotheus) ἐν τῷ Μαιμακτηριῶνι μηνὶ τῷ ἐπ’ Ἀστείου
-ἄρχοντος, <em class="gesperrt">ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τὸν τούτου, βοηθησόντων αὐτῷ</em> καὶ καταγομένων εἰς
-τὴν οἰκίαν τὴν ἐν Πειραιεῖ, etc.
-(Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 5, p. 1190). Again,—Αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτον (Timotheus)
-<em class="gesperrt">ἐξαιτουμένων μὲν</em> τῶν ἐπιτηδείων καὶ οἰκείων αὐτῷ ἁπάντων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ <em class="gesperrt">Ἀλκέτου
-καὶ Ἰάσονος, συμμάχων ὄντων ὑμῖν</em>, μόλις μὲν ἐπείσθητε ἀφεῖναι
-(Demosthen. ib. c, 3, p. 1187.) We see from hence,
-therefore, that the first alliance between Jason and Athens had been contracted
-in the early part of 373 <small>B.C.</small>; we see farther that it had been contracted
-by Timotheus in his preliminary cruise, which is the only reasonable
-way of explaining the strong interest felt by Jason as well as by
-Alketas in the fate of Timotheus, inducing them to take the remarkable
-step of coming to Athens to promote his acquittal. It was Timotheus who
-had first made the alliance of Athens with Alketas (Diodor. xv, 36; Cornel.
-Nepos, Timoth. c. 2), a year or two before.
-</p>
-<p>
-Combining all the circumstances here stated, I infer with confidence,
-that Timotheus, in his preliminary cruise, visited Jason, contracted alliance
-between him and Athens, and prevailed upon him to forward the division
-of Stesikles across Thessaly to Epirus and Korkyra.
-</p>
-<p>
-In this oration of Demosthenes, there are three or four exact dates mentioned,
-which are a great aid to the understanding of the historical events
-of the time. That oration is spoken by Apollodorus, claiming from Timotheus
-the repayment of money lent to him by Pasion the banker, father of
-Apollodorus; and the dates specified are copied from entries made by Pasion
-at the time in his commercial books (c. 1. p. 1186; c. 9. p. 1197).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_313"><a href="#FNanchor_313">[313]</a></span>
-Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 3, p. 1188. ἄμισθον μὲν τὸ στράτευμα
-καταλελύσθαι ἐν Καλαυρίᾳ, etc.—ibid. c. 10, p. 1199. προσῆκε γὰρ τῷ μὲν
-Βοιωτίῳ ἄρχοντι παρὰ τούτου (Timotheus) τὴν τροφὴν τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ
-παραλαμβάνειν· <em class="gesperrt">ἐκ γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν συντάξεων ἡ μισθοφορία ἦν τῷ στρατεύματι·
-τὰ δὲ χρήματα σὺ</em> (Timotheus) <em class="gesperrt">ἅπαντα ἐξέλεξας ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων</em>· καὶ
-σὲ ἔδει αὐτῶν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_314"><a href="#FNanchor_314">[314]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 2, 12, 13, 39; Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 3. p. 1188.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_315"><a href="#FNanchor_315">[315]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 47.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_316"><a href="#FNanchor_316">[316]</a></span>
-I collect what is here stated from Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 3. p.
-1188; c. 10. p. 1199. It is there said that Timotheus was about to sail
-home from Kalauria to take his trial; yet it is certain that his trial did not
-take place until the month Mæmakterion or November. Accordingly, the
-trial must have been postponed, in consequence of the necessity for Iphikrates
-and Kallistratus going away at once to preserve Korkyra.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_317"><a href="#FNanchor_317">[317]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 14. Ὁ δὲ (Iphikrates) ἐπεὶ κατέστη
-στρατηγὸς, μάλα ὀξέως τὰς ναῦς ἐπληροῦτο, καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους ἠνάγκαζε.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_318"><a href="#FNanchor_318">[318]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 27, 32.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_319"><a href="#FNanchor_319">[319]</a></span>
-Compare vi, 2, 14—with vi, 2, 39.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_320"><a href="#FNanchor_320">[320]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 34.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_321"><a href="#FNanchor_321">[321]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 35, 38; Diodor. xv, 47.
-</p>
-<p>
-We find a story recounted by Diodorus (xvi, 57), that the Athenians under
-Iphikrates captured, off Korkyra, some triremes of Dionysius, carrying
-sacred ornaments to Delphi and Olympia. They detained and appropriated
-the valuable cargo, of which Dionysius afterwards loudly complained.
-</p>
-<p>
-This story (if there be any truth in it) can hardly allude to any other
-triremes than those under Anippus. Yet Xenophon would probably have
-mentioned the story, if he had heard it; since it presents the enemies of
-Sparta as committing sacrilege. And whether the triremes were carrying
-sacred ornaments or not, it is certain that they were coming to take part
-in the war, and were therefore legitimate prizes.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_322"><a href="#FNanchor_322">[322]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 39. The meaning of Xenophon here is not very
-clear, nor is even the text perfect.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ ταύτην τὴν στρατηγίαν τῶν Ἰφικράτους οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐπαινῶ· ἔπειτα καὶ
-τὸ <em class="gesperrt">προσελέσθαι κελεῦσαι ἑαυτῷ</em> (this shows that Iphikrates
-himself singled them out) Καλλίστρατόν τε τὸν δημήγορον, οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον
-ὄντα, καὶ Χαβρίαν, μάλα στρατηγικὸν νομιζόμενον. Εἴτε γὰρ φρονίμους αὐτοὺς
-ἡγούμενος εἶναι, συμβούλους λαβεῖν ἐβούλετο, σῶφρόν μοι δοκεῖ διαπράξασθαι·
-<em class="gesperrt">εἴτε ἀντιπάλους νομίζων</em>, οὕτω θρασέως (some words
-in the text seem to be wanting) ... μήτε καταῤῥᾳθυμῶν μήτε καταμελῶν
-φαίνεσθαι μηδὲν, μεγαλοφρονοῦντος ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι.
-</p>
-<p>
-I follow Dr. Thirlwall’s translation of οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον, which appears
-to me decidedly preferable. The word ἠφίει (vi, 3, 3) shows that Kallistratus
-was an unwilling colleague.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_323"><a href="#FNanchor_323">[323]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3. ὑποσχόμενος γὰρ Ἰφικράτει (Kallistratus)
-<em class="gesperrt">εἰ αὐτὸν ἠφίει</em>, ἢ χρήματα πέμψειν τῷ ναυτικῷ, ἢ εἰρήνην ποιήσειν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_324"><a href="#FNanchor_324">[324]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 37, 38.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_325"><a href="#FNanchor_325">[325]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Timoth. c. 9, p. 1197, 1198.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_326"><a href="#FNanchor_326">[326]</a></span>
-The narrative here given of the events of 373 <small>B.C.</small>, so far as they concern
-Timotheus and Iphikrates, appears to me the only way of satisfying
-the exigencies of the case, and following the statements of Xenophon and
-Demosthenes.
-</p>
-<p>
-Schneider in his note, indeed, implies, and Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis,
-etc. p. 86) contends, that Iphikrates did not take command of the fleet, nor
-depart from Athens, until <i>after</i> the trial of Timotheus. There are some
-expressions in the oration of Demosthenes, which might seem to countenance
-this supposition; but it will be found hardly admissible, if we attentively
-study the series of facts.
-</p>
-<p>
-1. Mnasippus arrived with his armament at Korkyra, and began the
-siege, either before April, or at the first opening of April, 373 <small>B.C.</small> For his
-arrival there, and the good condition of his fleet, was known at Athens <i>before</i>
-Timotheus received his appointment as admiral of the fleet for the
-relief of the island (Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 10, 11, 12).
-</p>
-<p>
-2. Timotheus sailed from Peiræus on this appointed voyage, in April
-373 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-3. Timotheus was tried at Athens in November 373 <small>B.C.</small>; Alketas and
-Jason being then present, as allies of Athens and witnesses in his favor.
-</p>
-<p>
-Now, if the truth were, that Iphikrates did not depart from Athens with
-his fleet until after the trial of Timotheus in November, we must suppose
-that the siege of Korkyra by Mnasippus lasted seven months, and the cruise
-of Timotheus nearly five months. Both the one and the other are altogether
-improbable. The Athenians would never have permitted Korkyra
-to incur so terrible a chance of capture, simply in order to wait for the trial
-of Timotheus. Xenophon does not expressly say how long the siege of
-Korkyra lasted; but from his expressions about the mercenaries of Mnasippus
-(that already pay was owing to them for <i>as much as two months</i>,—καὶ
-δυοῖν <em class="gesperrt">ἤδη</em> μηνοῖν—vi, 2, 16), we should infer that it could hardly have
-lasted more than three months in all. Let us say, that it lasted four
-months; the siege would then be over in August, and we know that the
-fleet of Iphikrates arrived just after the siege was concluded.
-</p>
-<p>
-Besides, is it credible, that Timotheus—named as admiral for the express
-purpose of relieving Korkyra, and knowing that Mnasippus was
-already besieging the place with a formidable fleet—would have spent so
-long a time as <i>five</i> months in his preliminary cruise?
-</p>
-<p>
-I presume Timotheus to have stayed out in this cruise about <i>two</i> months;
-and even this length of time would be quite sufficient to raise strong displeasure
-against him at Athens, when the danger and privations of Korkyra
-were made known as hourly increasing. At the time when Timotheus
-came back to Athens, he found all this displeasure actually afloat against
-him, excited in part by the strong censures of Iphikrates and Kallistratus
-(Dem. cont. Timoth. p. 1187. c. 3). The adverse orations in the public
-assembly, besides inflaming the wrath of the Athenians against him, caused
-a vote to be passed deposing him from his command to Korkyra, and nominating
-in his place Iphikrates, with Chabrias and Kallistratus. Probably
-those who proposed this vote would at the same time give notice that they
-intended to prefer a judicial accusation against Timotheus for breach or
-neglect of duty. But it would be the interest of all parties to postpone
-<i>actual trial</i> until the fate of Korkyra should be determined, for which purpose
-the saving of time would be precious. Already too much time had
-been lost, and Iphikrates was well aware that his whole chance of success
-depended on celerity; while Timotheus and his friends would look upon
-postponement as an additional chance of softening the public displeasure,
-besides enabling them to obtain the attendance of Jason and Alketas. Still,
-though trial was postponed, Timotheus was from this moment under impeachment.
-The oration composed by Demosthenes therefore (delivered
-by Apollodorus as plaintiff, several years afterwards),—though speaking
-loosely, and not distinguishing the angry speeches against Timotheus <i>in
-the public assembly</i> (in June 373 <small>B.C.</small>, or thereabouts, whereby his deposition
-was obtained), from the accusing speeches against him at his actual trial in
-November 373 <small>B.C.</small>, <i>before the dikastery</i>—is nevertheless not incorrect in
-saying,—ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἀπεχειροτονήθη μὲν ὑφ’ ὑμῶν στρατηγὸς διὰ τὸ μὴ περιπλεῦσαι
-Πελοπόννησον, ἐπὶ <em class="gesperrt">κρίσει δὲ παρεδέδοτο εἰς τὸν δῆμον</em>, αἰτίας τῆς μεγίστης
-τυχὼν (c. 3, p. 1187)—and again respecting his coming
-from Kalauria to Athens—μέλλων τοίνυν καταπλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν κρίσιν, ἐν Καλαυρίᾳ
-δανείζεται, etc. (p. 1188, 1189.) That Timotheus had been handed
-over to the people for trial—that he was sailing back from Kalauria <i>for
-his trial</i>—might well be asserted respecting his position in the month of
-June, though his trial did not actually take place until November. I think
-it cannot be doubted that the triremes at Kalauria would form a part of that
-fleet which actually went to Korkyra under Iphikrates; not waiting to go
-thither until after the trial of Timotheus in November, but departing as
-soon as Iphikrates could get ready, probably about July 373 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-Rehdantz argues that if Iphikrates departed with the fleet in July, he
-must have returned to Athens in November to the trial of Timotheus, which
-is contrary to Xenophon’s affirmation that he remained in the Ionian sea
-until 371 <small>B.C.</small> But if we look attentively at the oration of Demosthenes,
-we shall see that there is no certain ground for affirming Iphikrates to have
-been present in Athens in November, during the actual trial of Timotheus.
-The phrases in p. 1187—ἐφειστήκει δ’ αὐτῷ Καλλίστρατος καὶ Ἰφικράτης ... οὕτω δὲ
-διέθεσαν ὑμᾶς κατηγοροῦντες τούτου αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ συναγορεύοντες αὐτοῖς, etc.,
-may be well explained, so far as Iphikrates is concerned,
-by supposing them to allude to those pronounced censures in the
-public assembly whereby the vote of deposition against Timotheus was
-obtained, and whereby the general indignation against him was first excited.
-I therefore see no reason for affirming that Iphikrates was actually present
-at the trial of Timotheus in November. But Kallistratus was really present
-at the trial (see c. 9. p. 1197, 1198); which consists well enough with
-the statement of Xenophon, that this orator obtained permission from Iphikrates
-to leave him at Korkyra and come back to Athens (vi, 3, 3). Kallistratus
-directed his accusation mainly against Antimachus, the treasurer of
-Timotheus. And it appears to me that under the circumstances of the
-case, Iphikrates, having carried his point of superseding Timotheus in the
-command and gaining an important success at Korkyra—might be well-pleased
-to be dispensed from the obligation of formally accusing him before
-the dikastery, in opposition to Jason and Alketas, as well as to a
-powerful body of Athenian friends.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus (xv, 47) makes a statement quite different from Xenophon.
-He says that Timotheus was at first deposed from his command, but afterwards
-forgiven and re-appointed by the people (jointly with Iphikrates) in
-consequence of the great accession of force which he had procured in his
-preliminary cruise. Accordingly the fleet, one hundred and thirty triremes
-in number, was despatched to Korkyra under the joint command of Iphikrates
-and Timotheus. Diodorus makes no mention of the trial of Timotheus.
-This account is evidently quite distinct from that of Xenophon,
-which latter is on all grounds to be preferred, especially as its main points
-are in conformity with the Demosthenic oration.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_327"><a href="#FNanchor_327">[327]</a></span>
-Demosth. cont. Timoth. c. 6. p. 1191; c. 8. p. 1194.
-</p>
-<p>
-We see from another passage of the same oration, that the creditors of
-Timotheus reckoned upon his making a large sum of money in the Persian
-service (c. 1, p. 1185). This farther illustrates what I have said in a previous
-note, about the motives of the distinguished Athenian officers to take
-service in foreign parts away from Athens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_328"><a href="#FNanchor_328">[328]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 38; Pausanias, iv, 26, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_329"><a href="#FNanchor_329">[329]</a></span>
-See a curious testimony to this fact in Demosthen. cont. Neæram, c. 12,
-p. 1357.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_330"><a href="#FNanchor_330">[330]</a></span>
-Diodor. xi, 48, 49; Pausan. vii, 25; Ælian. Hist. Animal. xi, 19.
-</p>
-<p>
-Kallisthenes seems to have described at large, with appropriate religious
-comments, numerous physical portents which occurred about this time (see
-Kallisthen. Fragm. 8, ed. Didot).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_331"><a href="#FNanchor_331">[331]</a></span>
-This second mission of Antalkidas is sufficiently verified by an indirect
-allusion of Xenophon (vi, 3, 12). His known philo-Laconian sentiments
-sufficiently explain why he avoids directly mentioning it.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_332"><a href="#FNanchor_332">[332]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 50.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus had stated (a few chapters before, xv, 38) that Persian envoys
-had also come into Greece a little before the peace of 374 <small>B.C.</small>, and had
-been the originators of that previous peace. But this appears to me one of
-the cases (not a few altogether in his history) in which he repeats himself,
-or gives the same event twice over under analogous circumstances. The
-intervention of the Persian envoys bears much more suitably on the period
-immediately preceding the peace of 371 <small>B.C.</small>, than upon that which preceded
-the peace of 374 <small>B.C.</small>, when, in point of fact, no peace was ever fully
-executed.
-</p>
-<p>
-Dionysius of Halikarnassus also (Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 479) represents the
-king of Persia as a party to the peace sworn by Athens and Sparta in 371
-<small>B.C.</small></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_333"><a href="#FNanchor_333">[333]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_334"><a href="#FNanchor_334">[334]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_335"><a href="#FNanchor_335">[335]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Timoth. p. 1188, s. 17.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_336"><a href="#FNanchor_336">[336]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 46. I do not know from whom Diodorus copied this statement;
-but it seems extremely reasonable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_337"><a href="#FNanchor_337">[337]</a></span>
-This seems to me what is meant by the Platæan speaker in Isokrates,
-when he complains more than once that Platæa had been taken by the
-Thebans in time of peace,—εἰρήνης οὔσης. The speaker, in protesting
-against the injustice of the Thebans, appeals to two guarantees which they
-have violated; for the purpose of his argument, however, the two are not
-clearly distinguished, but run together into one. The first guarantee was,
-the peace of Antalkidas, under which Platæa had been restored, and to
-which Thebes, Sparta, and Athens, were all parties. The second guarantee,
-was that given by Thebes when she conquered the Bœotian cities in
-377-370 <small>B.C.</small>, and reconstituted the federation; whereby she ensured to the
-Platæans existence as a city, with so much of autonomy as was consistent
-with the obligations of a member of the Bœotian federation. When the
-Platæan speaker accuses the Thebans of having violated “the oaths and
-the agreement” (ὅρκους καὶ ξυνθήκας), he means the terms of the peace of
-Antalkidas, subject to the limits afterwards imposed by the submission of
-Platæa to the federal system of Bœotia. He calls for the tutelary interference
-of Athens, as a party to the peace of Antalkidas.
-</p>
-<p>
-Dr. Thirlwall thinks (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 38. p. 70-72) that the Thebans
-were parties to the peace of 374 <small>B.C.</small> between Sparta and Athens; that they
-accepted it, intending deliberately to break it; and that under that peace,
-the Lacedæmonian harmosts and garrisons were withdrawn from Thespiæ
-and other places in Bœotia. I am unable to acquiesce in this view; which
-appears to me negatived by Xenophon, and neither affirmed nor implied in
-the Plataic discourse of Isokrates. In my opinion, there were no Lacedæmonian
-harmosts in Bœotia (except at Orchomenus in the north) in 374
-B.C. Xenophon tells (Hellen. v, 4, 63; vi, 1, 1) that the Thebans “were
-recovering the Bœotian cities—had subdued the Bœotian cities”—in or
-before 375 <small>B.C.</small>, so that they were able to march out of Bœotia and invade
-Phokis; which implies the expulsion or retirement of all the Lacedæmonian
-forces from the southern part of Bœotia.
-</p>
-<p>
-The reasoning in the Plataic discourse of Isokrates is not very clear or
-discriminating; nor have we any right to expect that it should be, in the
-pleading of a suffering and passionate man. But the expression εἰρήνης οὔσης
-and εἰρήνη may always (in my judgment) be explained, without referring
-it, as Dr. Thirlwall does, to the peace of 374 <small>B.C.</small>, or supposing
-Thebes to have been a party to that peace.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_338"><a href="#FNanchor_338">[338]</a></span>
-Pausanias, ix, 1, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_339"><a href="#FNanchor_339">[339]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 47.
-</p>
-<p>
-Pausanias (ix, 1, 3) places this capture of Platæa in the third year (counting
-the years from midsummer to midsummer) before the battle of Leuktra;
-or in the year of the archon Asteius at Athens; which seems to me the
-true date, though Mr. Clinton supposes it (without ground, I think) to be
-contradicted by Xenophon. The year of the archon Asteius reaches from
-midsummer 373 to 372 <small>B.C.</small> It is in the latter half of the year that I suppose
-Platæa to have been taken.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_340"><a href="#FNanchor_340">[340]</a></span>
-I infer this from Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 21-38; compare also
-sect. 10. The Platæan speaker accuses the Thebans of having destroyed
-the walls of some Bœotian cities (over and above what they had done to
-Platæa,) and I venture to apply this to Thespiæ. Xenophon indeed states
-that the Thespians were at this very period treated exactly like the Platæans;
-that is, driven out of Bœotia, and their town destroyed; except
-that they had not the same claim on Athens (Hellen. vi, 3, 1—ἀπόλιδας γενομένους:
-compare also vi, 3, 5). Diodorus also (xv, 46) speaks of the
-Thebans as having destroyed Thespiæ. But against this, I gather, from
-the Plataic Oration of Isokrates, that the Thespians were not in the same
-plight with the Platæans when that oration was delivered; that is, they
-were not expelled collectively out of Bœotia. Moreover, Pausanias also
-expressly says that the Thespians were present in Bœotia at the time of
-the battle of Leuktra, and that they were expelled shortly afterwards.
-Pausanias at the same time gives a distinct story, about the conduct of the
-Thespians, which it would not be reasonable to reject (ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1).
-I believe therefore that Xenophon has spoken inaccurately in saying that
-the Thespians were ἀπόλιδες <i>before</i> the battle of Leuktra. It is quite possible
-that they might have sent supplications to Athens (ἱκετεύοντας—Xen.
-Hell. vi, 3, 1) in consequence of the severe mandate to demolish their
-walls.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_341"><a href="#FNanchor_341">[341]</a></span>
-Thucyd. iv, 133.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_342"><a href="#FNanchor_342">[342]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 11, 13, 18, 42, 46, 47, 68.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_343"><a href="#FNanchor_343">[343]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 3. Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ Θηβαίους
-ἑωρῶμεν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου παρεσκευασμένους πείθειν ὑμᾶς ὡς οὐδὲν εἰς ἡμᾶς
-ἐξημαρτήκασι, διὰ βραχέων ἂν ἐποιησάμεθα τοὺς λόγους· ἐπειδὴ δ’ εἰς τοῦτ’
-ἀτυχίας ἤλθομεν, ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀγῶνα πρὸς τούτους ἀλλὰ καὶ
-τῶν ῥητόρων τοὺς δυνατωτάτους, οὓς ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων αὑτοῖς οὗτοι
-παρεσκευάσαντο συνηγόρους, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare sect. 36.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_344"><a href="#FNanchor_344">[344]</a></span>
-Isokr. Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 12, 13, 14, 16, 28, 33, 48.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_345"><a href="#FNanchor_345">[345]</a></span>
-Isokrat. Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 23-27. λέγουσιν ὡς ὑπὲρ
-τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν συμμάχων ταῦτ’ ἔπραξαν—φασὶ τὸ Θηβαίους ἔχειν τὴν
-ἡμετέραν, τοῦτο σύμφερον εἶναι τοῖς συμμάχοις, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_346"><a href="#FNanchor_346">[346]</a></span>
-Isokrat. Or. 14, (Plat.) s. 23, 24.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_347"><a href="#FNanchor_347">[347]</a></span>
-Diodorus, (xv, 38) mentions the parliamentary conflict between Epaminondas
-and <i>Kallistratus</i>, assigning it to the period immediately antecedent
-to the abortive peace concluded between Athens and Sparta three years
-before. I agree with Wesseling (see his note <i>ad loc.</i>) in thinking that these
-debates more properly belong to the time immediately preceding the peace
-of 371 <small>B.C.</small> Diodorus has made great confusion between the two; sometimes
-repeating twice over the same antecedent phenomena, as if they belonged
-to both,—sometimes assigning to one what properly belongs to the
-other.
-</p>
-<p>
-The altercation between Epaminondas and <i>Kallistratus</i> (ἐν τῷ κοινῷ συνεδρίῳ)
-seems to me more properly appertaining to debates in the assembly
-of the confederacy at Athens,—rather than to debates at Sparta, in the
-preliminary discussions for peace, where the altercations between Epaminondas
-and <i>Agesilaus</i> occurred.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_348"><a href="#FNanchor_348">[348]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3.
-</p>
-<p>
-It seems doubtful, from the language of Xenophon, whether Kallistratus
-was one of the envoys appointed, or only a companion.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_349"><a href="#FNanchor_349">[349]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 4-6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_350"><a href="#FNanchor_350">[350]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 7-10. Ταῦτ’ εἰπὼν, σιωπὴν μὲν παρὰ πάντων ἐποίησεν
-(Autoklês), ἡδομένους δὲ τοὺς ἀχθομένους τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐποίησε.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_351"><a href="#FNanchor_351">[351]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 10-17.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_352"><a href="#FNanchor_352">[352]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 12, 13.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_353"><a href="#FNanchor_353">[353]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 16.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_354"><a href="#FNanchor_354">[354]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 14. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ γῆν μὲν τις ἂν,
-ὑμῶν φίλων ὄντων, ἱκανὸς γένοιτο ἡμᾶς λυπῆσαι; κατὰ θάλαττάν γε μὴν
-τις ἂν ὑμᾶς βλάψαι τι, ἡμῶν ὑμῖν ἐπιτηδείων ὄντων;</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_355"><a href="#FNanchor_355">[355]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 11. Καὶ ὑμῖν δὲ ἔγωγε ὁρῶ διὰ τὰ
-ἀγνωμόνως πραχθέντα ἔστιν ὅτε πολλὰ ἀντίτυπα γιγνόμενα· ὧν ἦν καὶ
-ἡ καταληφθεῖσα ἐν Θήβαις Καδμεία· νῦν γοῦν, ὡς (?) ἐσπουδάσατε
-αὐτονόμους τὰς πόλεις γίγνεσθαι, πᾶσαι πάλιν, ἐπεὶ ἠδικήθησαν
-οἱ Θηβαῖοι, ἐπ’ ἐκείνοις γεγένηνται.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_356"><a href="#FNanchor_356">[356]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Agesil. c. 27.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_357"><a href="#FNanchor_357">[357]</a></span>
-Plutarch. Agesil. c. 28.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_358"><a href="#FNanchor_358">[358]</a></span>
-Thucyd. iii, 61. ἡμῶν (the Thebans) κτισάντων Πλάταιαν ὕστερον
-τῆς ἄλλης Βοιωτίας καὶ ἄλλα χωρία μετ’ αὐτῆς, ἃ ξυμμίκτους ἀνθρώπους ἐξελάσαντες
-ἔσχομεν, οὐκ ἠξίουν οὗτοι (the Platæans), <em class="gesperrt">ὥσπερ ἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον</em>,
-ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ’ ἡμῶν, <em class="gesperrt">ἔξω δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωτῶν παραβαίνοντες τὰ πάτρια</em>,
-ἐπειδὴ προσηναγκάζοντο, προσεχώρησαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Again (c. 65) he says respecting the oligarchical Platæans who admitted
-the Theban detachment when it came by night to surprise Platæa,—εἰ δὲ ἄνδρες
-ὑμῶν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ γένει, βουλόμενοι τῆς μὲν ἔξω ξυμμαχίας ὑμᾶς παῦσαι,
-<em class="gesperrt">ἐς δὲ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια καταστῆσαι</em>, ἐπεκαλέσαντο ἕκοντες, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Again (c. 66), κατὰ τὰ πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια, etc. Compare ii, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_359"><a href="#FNanchor_359">[359]</a></span>
-Diodor. xi, 81.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_360"><a href="#FNanchor_360">[360]</a></span>
-Thucyd. iv, 126.
-</p>
-<p>
-Brasidas, addressing his soldiers when serving in Macedonia, on the approach
-of the Illyrians:—
-</p>
-<p>
-Ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ εἶναι προσήκει ὑμῖν τὰ πολέμια, οὐ διὰ ξυμμάχων παρουσίαν
-ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ δι’ οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν, καὶ μηδὲν πλῆθος πεφοβῆσθαι ἑτέρων·
-οἵ γε μηδὲ ἀπὸ πολιτειῶν τοιούτων ἥκετε, ἐν αἷς οὐ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων ἄρχουσιν,
-ἀλλὰ πλειόνων μᾶλλον ἐλάσσους· <em class="gesperrt">οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ κτησάμενοι τὴν δυναστείαν
-ἢ τῷ μαχόμενοι κρατεῖν</em>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_361"><a href="#FNanchor_361">[361]</a></span>
-One may judge of the revolting effect produced by such a proposition,
-before the battle of Leuktra,—by reading the language which Isokrates
-puts into the mouth of the Spartan prince Archidamus, five or six years
-after that battle, protesting that all Spartan patriots ought to perish rather
-than consent to the relinquishment of Messenia,—περὶ μὲν ἄλλων τινῶν
-ἀμφισβητήσεις, ἐγίγνοντο, περὶ δὲ Μεσσήνης, οὔτε βασιλεὺς, οὐθ’ ἡ τῶν
-Ἀθηναίων πόλις, οὐδὲ πώποθ’ ἡμῖν ἐνεκάλεσεν ὡς ἀδίκως κεκτημένοις αὐτήν (Isok.
-Arch. s. 32). In the spring of 371 <small>B.C.</small>, what had once been Messenia, was
-only a portion of Laconia, which no one thought of distinguishing from
-the other portions (see Thucyd. iv, 3, 11).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_362"><a href="#FNanchor_362">[362]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Agesil. c. 28; Pausanias, ix, 13, 1; compare Diodor. xv, 51.
-Pausanias erroneously assigns the debate to the congress preceding the
-peace of Antalkidas in 387 <small>B.C.</small>; at which time Epaminondas was an unknown
-man.
-</p>
-<p>
-Plutarch gives this interchange of brief questions, between Agesilaus and
-Epaminondas, which is in substance the same as that given by Pausanias,
-and has every appearance of being the truth. But he introduces it in a
-very bold and abrupt way, such as cannot be conformable to the reality.
-To raise a question about the right of Sparta to govern Laconia, was a most
-daring novelty. A courageous and patriotic Theban might venture upon
-it as a retort against those Spartans who questioned the right of Thebes to
-her presidency of Bœotia; but he would never do so without assigning his
-reasons to justify an assertion so startling to a large portion of his hearers.
-The reasons which I here ascribe to Epaminondas are such as we know to
-have formed the Theban creed, in reference to the Bœotian cities; such as
-were actually urged by the Theban orator in 427 <small>B.C.</small>, when the fate of the
-Platæan captives was under discussion. After Epaminondas had once laid
-out the reasons in support of his assertion, he might then, if the same brief
-question were angrily put to him a second time, meet it with another equally
-brief counter-question or retort. It is this final interchange of thrusts
-which Plutarch has given, omitting the arguments previously stated by Epaminondas,
-and necessary to warrant the seeming paradox which he advances.
-We must recollect that Epaminondas does not contend that
-Thebes was entitled to <i>as much power</i> in Bœotia as Sparta in Laconia. He
-only contends that Bœotia, under the presidency of Thebes, was as much
-an integral political aggregate, as Laconia under Sparta,—in reference to
-the Grecian world.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenophon differs from Plutarch in his account of the conduct of the
-Theban envoys. He does not mention Epaminondas at all, nor any envoy
-by name; but he says that “the Thebans, having entered their name among
-the cities which had taken the oaths, came on the next day and requested,
-that the entry might be altered, and that ‘<i>the Bœotians</i>’ might be substituted
-in place of <i>the Thebans</i>, as having taken the oath. Agesilaus told them
-that he could make no change; but he would strike their names out if they
-chose, and he accordingly did strike them out” (vi, 3, 19). It seems to me
-that this account is far less probable than that of Plutarch, and bears every
-mark of being incorrect. Why should such a man as Epaminondas (who
-doubtless was the envoy) consent at first to waive the presidential pretensions
-of Thebes, and to swear for her alone? If he did consent, why should
-he retract the next day? Xenophon is anxious to make out Agesilaus to
-be as much in the right as may be; since the fatal consequences of his proceedings
-manifested themselves but too soon.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_363"><a href="#FNanchor_363">[363]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 3, 20.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_364"><a href="#FNanchor_364">[364]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 38-82.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_365"><a href="#FNanchor_365">[365]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_366"><a href="#FNanchor_366">[366]</a></span>
-Thucyd. iv.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_367"><a href="#FNanchor_367">[367]</a></span>
-Diodorus, xv, 38. ἐξαγωγεῖς, Xen. Hellen. <i>l. c.</i>
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus refers the statements in this chapter to the peace between Athens
-and Sparta in 374 <small>B.C.</small> I have already remarked that they belong
-properly to the peace of 371 <small>B.C.</small>; as Wesseling suspects in his note.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_368"><a href="#FNanchor_368">[368]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3. ἤδη γὰρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ δαιμόνιον ἦγεν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_369"><a href="#FNanchor_369">[369]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 20; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 20; Diodor. xv, 51.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_370"><a href="#FNanchor_370">[370]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 28.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_371"><a href="#FNanchor_371">[371]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 2, 3. ἐκεῖνον μὲν φλυαρεῖν ἡγήσατο, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_372"><a href="#FNanchor_372">[372]</a></span>
-It is stated that either the Lacedæmonians from Sparta, or Kleombrotus
-from Phokis, sent a new formal requisition to Thebes, that the Bœotian
-cities should be left autonomous; and the requisition was repudiated (Diodor.
-xv, 51; Aristeides, Or. (Leuktr.) ii, xxxiv, p. 644, ed. Dindorf). But
-such mission seems very doubtful.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_373"><a href="#FNanchor_373">[373]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3, 4; Diodor. xv, 53; Pausan. ix, 13, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_374"><a href="#FNanchor_374">[374]</a></span>
-Kallisthenes, apud Cic. de Divinatione, i, 34, Fragm. 9, ed. Didot.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_375"><a href="#FNanchor_375">[375]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 7; Diodor. xv, 54; Pausan. ix, 13, 3; Plutarch, Pelopid.
-c. 20, 21; Polyænus, ii, 3, 8.
-</p>
-<p>
-The latter relates that Pelopidas in a dream saw Skedasus, who directed
-him to offer on this tomb “an auburn virgin” to the deceased females. Pelopidas
-and his friends were greatly perplexed about the fulfilment of this
-command; many urged that it was necessary for some maiden to devote
-herself, or to be devoted by her parents, as a victim for the safety of the
-country, like Menœkeus and Makaria in the ancient legends; others denounced
-the idea as cruel and inadmissible. In the midst of the debate, a
-mare, with a chestnut filly, galloped up, and stopped not far off; upon which
-the prophet Theokritus exclaimed,—“Here comes the victim required,
-sent by the special providence of the gods.” The chestnut filly was caught
-and offered as a sacrifice on the tomb; every one being in high spirits from
-a conviction that the mandate of the gods had been executed.
-</p>
-<p>
-The prophet Theokritus figures in the treatise of Plutarch De Genio Socratis
-(c. 3, p. 576 D.) as one of the companions of Pelopidas in the conspiracy
-whereby the Theban oligarchy was put down and the Lacedæmonians
-expelled from the Kadmeia.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_376"><a href="#FNanchor_376">[376]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 52-56; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 20.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_377"><a href="#FNanchor_377">[377]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_378"><a href="#FNanchor_378">[378]</a></span>
-Polyæn. ii, 2, 2; Pausanias, ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_379"><a href="#FNanchor_379">[379]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Symposiac. ii. 5, p. 639 F.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_380"><a href="#FNanchor_380">[380]</a></span>
-Pausanias (ix, 13, 4; compare viii, 6, 1) lays great stress upon this indifference
-or even treachery of the allies. Xenophon says quite enough to authenticate
-the reality of the fact (Hellen. vi, 4, 15-24); see also Cicero De
-Offic. ii, 7, 26.
-</p>
-<p>
-Polyænus has more than one anecdote respecting the dexterity of Agesilaus
-in dealing with faint-hearted conduct or desertion on the part of the allies
-of Sparta (Polyæn. ii, 1, 18-20).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_381"><a href="#FNanchor_381">[381]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 13, 14.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_382"><a href="#FNanchor_382">[382]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. l. c. Plutarch (Agesil. c. 28) states a thousand Lacedæmonians
-to have been slain; Pausanias (ix, 13, 4) gives the number as more
-than a thousand; Diodorus mentions four thousand (xv. 56), which is doubtless
-above the truth, though the number given by Xenophon may be fairly
-presumed as somewhat below it. Dionysius of Halikarnassus (Antiq. Roman.
-ii, 17) states that seventeen hundred Spartans perished.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_383"><a href="#FNanchor_383">[383]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 15.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_384"><a href="#FNanchor_384">[384]</a></span>
-Pausan. ix, 13, 4; Plutarch, Apotheg. Reg. p. 193 B.; Cicero, de officiis,
-ii, 7.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_385"><a href="#FNanchor_385">[385]</a></span>
-Pausan. ix, 13, 4; Diodor. xv, 55.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_386"><a href="#FNanchor_386">[386]</a></span>
-Pausan. ix, 16, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_387"><a href="#FNanchor_387">[387]</a></span>
-This is an important date, preserved by Plutarch (Agesil. c. 28). The
-congress was broken up at Sparta on the fourteenth of the Attic month Skirrophorion
-(June), the last month of the year of the Athenian archon Alkisthenes;
-the battle was fought on the fifth of the Attic month of Hekatombæon,
-the first month of the next Attic year, of the archon Phrasikleidês;
-about the beginning of July.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_388"><a href="#FNanchor_388">[388]</a></span>
-Diodorus differs from Xenophon on one important matter connected
-with the battle; affirming that Archidamus son of Agesilaus was present
-and fought, together with various other circumstances, which I shall discuss
-presently, in a future note. I follow Xenophon.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_389"><a href="#FNanchor_389">[389]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 8. Εἰς δ’ οὖν τὴν μάχην τοῖς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίοις πάντα τἀναντία
-ἐγίγνετο, τοῖς δὲ (to the Thebans) πάντα καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης κατωρθοῦτο.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_390"><a href="#FNanchor_390">[390]</a></span>
-Isokrates, in the Oration vi, called <i>Archidamus</i> (composed about five years
-after the battle, as if to be spoken by Archidamus son of Agesilaus), puts
-this statement distinctly into the mouth of Archidamus—μέχρι μὲν ταυτησὶ τῆς ἡμέρας
-δεδυστυχηκέναι δοκοῦμεν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τῇ πρὸς Θηβαίους, καὶ τοῖς μὲν σώμασι κρατηθῆναι
-<em class="gesperrt">διὰ τὸν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡγησάμενον</em>, etc. (s. 9).
-</p>
-<p>
-I take his statement as good evidence of the real opinion entertained both
-by Agesilaus and by Archidamus; an opinion the more natural, since the
-two contemporary kings of Sparta were almost always at variance, and at
-the head of opposing parties; especially true about Agesilaus and Kleombrotus,
-during the life of the latter.
-</p>
-<p>
-Cicero (probably copying Kallisthenes or Ephorus) says, de Officiis, i, 24,
-84—“Illa plaga (Lacedæmoniis) pestifera, quâ, quum Cleombrotus invidiam
-timens temere cum Epaminondâ conflixisset, Lacedæmoniorum opes
-corruerunt.” Polybius remarks (ix. 23, we know not from whom he borrowed)
-that all the proceedings of Kleombrotus during the empire of Sparta,
-were marked with a generous regard for the interests and feelings of the allies;
-while the proceedings of Agesilaus were of the opposite character.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_391"><a href="#FNanchor_391">[391]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 55. Epaminondas, ἰδίᾳ τινι καὶ περιττῇ τάξει
-χρησάμενος, διὰ τῆς ἰδίας στρατηγίας περιεποιήσατο τὴν περιβόητον
-νίκην ... διὸ καὶ λοξὴν ποιήσας τὴν φάλαγγα, τῷ τοὺς ἐπιλέκτους
-ἔχοντι κέρατι ἔγνω κρίνειν τὴν μάχην, etc. Compare Plutarch, Pelop. c. 23.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_392"><a href="#FNanchor_392">[392]</a></span>
-See Aristotel. Politic. viii, 3, 3, 5.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare Xenophon, De Repub. Laced. xiii, 5. τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους αὐτοσχεδιαστὰς εἶναι
-τῶν στρατιωτικῶν, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ μόνους τῷ ὄντι τεχνίτας τῶν πολεμικῶν—and Xenoph.
-Memorab. iii, 5, 13, 14.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_393"><a href="#FNanchor_393">[393]</a></span>
-Thucyd. i, 71. ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν (of you Spartans) τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα
-πρὸς αὐτούς ἐστιν. <em class="gesperrt">Ἀνάγκη δ’ ὥσπερ τέχνης ἀεὶ τὰ ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρατεῖν</em>·
-καὶ ἡσυχαζούσῃ μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα ἄριστα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκαζομένοις
-ἰέναι, <em class="gesperrt">πολλῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ</em>, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_394"><a href="#FNanchor_394">[394]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_395"><a href="#FNanchor_395">[395]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 16. Γενομένων δὲ τούτων, ὁ μὲν εἰς τὴν
-Λακεδαίμονα ἀγγελῶν τὸ πάθος ἀφικνεῖται, Γυμνοπαιδιῶν τε οὐσῶν τῆς τελευταίας,
-καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρικοῦ χόρου ἔνδον ὄντος· Οἱ δὲ ἔφοροι, ἐπεὶ ἤκουσαν τὸ πάθος,
-ἐλυποῦντο μὲν, ὥσπερ οἶμαι, ἀνάγκῃ· τὸν μέντοι χόρον οὐκ ἐξήγαγον, ἀλλὰ
-διαγωνίσασθαι εἴων. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους ἑκάστου τῶν
-τεθνηκότων ἀπέδοσαν· προεῖπον δὲ ταῖς γυναιξὶ, μὴ ποιεῖν κραυγὴν, ἀλλὰ
-σιγῇ τὸ πάθος φέρειν. Τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ ἦν ὁρᾷν, ὧν μὲν ἐτέθνασαν οἱ
-προσήκοντες, λιπαροὺς καὶ φαιδροὺς ἐν τῷ φανερῷ ἀναστρεφομένους· ὧν δὲ
-ζῶντες ἠγγελμένοι ἦσαν, ὀλίγους ἂν εἶδες, τούτους δὲ σκυθρωποὺς καὶ
-ταπεινοὺς περιϊόντας—and Plutarch, Agesil. c. 29.
-</p>
-<p>
-See a similar statement of Xenophon, after he has recounted the cutting
-in pieces of the Lacedæmonian mora near Lechæum, about the satisfaction
-and even triumph of those of the Lacedæmonians who had lost relations in
-the battle; while every one else was mournful (Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 10).
-Compare also Justin, xxviii, 4—the behavior after the defeat of Sellasia.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_396"><a href="#FNanchor_396">[396]</a></span>
-Thucyd. ii, 39.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_397"><a href="#FNanchor_397">[397]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 17-19.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_398"><a href="#FNanchor_398">[398]</a></span>
-See Thucyd. vii, 73.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_399"><a href="#FNanchor_399">[399]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 20, 21.
-</p>
-<p>
-However, since the Phokians formed part of the beaten army at Leuktra,
-it must be confessed that Jason had less to fear from them at this moment,
-than at any other.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_400"><a href="#FNanchor_400">[400]</a></span>
-Pausanias states that immediately after the battle, Epaminondas gave
-permission to the allies of Sparta to depart and go home, by which permission
-they profited, so that the Spartans now stood alone in the camp (Paus.
-ix, 14, 1). This however is inconsistent with the account of Xenophon
-(vi, 4, 26), and I think improbable.
-</p>
-<p>
-Sievers (Geschichte, etc. p. 247) thinks that Jason preserved the Spartans
-by outwitting and deluding Epaminondas. But it appears to me that the
-storming of the Spartan camp was an arduous enterprise, wherein more
-Thebans than Spartans would have been slain: moreover, the Spartans
-were masters of the port of Kreusis, so that there was little chance of starving
-out the camp before reinforcements arrived. The capitulation granted
-by Epaminondas seems to have been really the wisest proceeding.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_401"><a href="#FNanchor_401">[401]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 22-25.
-</p>
-<p>
-The road from Kreusis to Leuktra, however, must have been that by
-which Kleombrotus arrived.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_402"><a href="#FNanchor_402">[402]</a></span>
-This is the most convenient place for noticing the discrepancy, as to
-the battle of Leuktra, between Diodorus and Xenophon. I have followed
-Xenophon.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus (xv, 54) states both the arrival of Jason in Bœotia, and the
-out-march of Archidamus from Sparta, to have taken place, <i>not after</i> the
-battle of Leuktra, but <i>before</i> it. Jason (he says) came with a considerable
-force to the aid of the Thebans. He prevailed upon Kleombrotus, who
-doubted the sufficiency of his own numbers, to agree to a truce and to evacuate
-Bœotia. But as Kleombrotus was marching homeward, he met Archidamus
-with a second Lacedæmonian army, on his way to Bœotia, by
-order of the ephors, for the purpose of reinforcing him. Accordingly Kleombrotus,
-finding himself thus unexpectedly strengthened, openly broke
-the truce just concluded, and marched back with Archidamus to Leuktra.
-Here they fought the battle, Kleombrotus commanding the right wing, and
-Archidamus the left. They sustained a complete defeat, in which Kleombrotus
-was slain; the result being the same on both statements.
-</p>
-<p>
-We must here make our election between the narrative of Xenophon and
-that of Diodorus. That the authority of the former is greater, speaking generally,
-I need hardly remark; nevertheless his philo-Laconian partialities
-become so glaring and preponderant, during these latter books of the Hellenica
-(where he is discharging the mournful duty of recounting the humiliation
-of Sparta), as to afford some color for the suspicions of Palmerius,
-Morus, and Schneider, who think that Xenophon has concealed the direct
-violation of truce on the part of the Spartans, and that the facts really occurred
-as Diodorus has described them. See Schneider ad Xen. Hellen.
-vi, 4, 5, 6.
-</p>
-<p>
-It will be found, however, on examining the facts, that such suspicion
-ought not to be admitted, and that there are grounds for preferring the
-narrative of Xenophon.
-</p>
-<p>
-1. He explains to us how it happened that the remains of the Spartan
-army, after the defeat of Leuktra, escaped out of Bœotia. Jason arrives
-after the battle, and prevails upon the Thebans to allow them to retreat
-under a truce; Archidamus also arrives after the battle to take them up.
-If the defeat had taken place under the circumstances mentioned by Diodorus,—Archidamus
-and the survivors would have found it scarcely possible
-to escape out of Bœotia.
-</p>
-<p>
-2. If Diodorus relates correctly, there must have been a violation of truce
-on the part of Kleombrotus and the Lacedæmonians, as glaring as any that
-occurs in Grecian history. But such violation is never afterwards alluded
-to by any one, among the misdeeds of the Lacedæmonians.
-</p>
-<p>
-3. A part, and an essential part, of the story of Diodorus, is, that Archidamus
-was present and fought at Leuktra. But we have independent evidence
-rendering it almost certain that he was not there. Whoever reads
-the Discourse of Isokrates called <i>Archidamus</i> (Or. vi, sect. 9, 10, 129), will
-see that such observations could not have been put into the mouth of Archidamus,
-if he had been present there, and (of course) in joint command
-with Kleombrotus.
-</p>
-<p>
-4. If Diodorus be correct, Sparta must have levied a new army from her
-allies, just after having sworn the peace, which peace exonerated her allies
-from everything like obligation to follow her headship; and a new army,
-not for the purpose of extricating defeated comrades in Bœotia, but for
-pure aggression against Thebes. This, to say the least, is eminently improbable.
-</p>
-<p>
-On these grounds, I adhere to Xenophon and depart from Diodorus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_403"><a href="#FNanchor_403">[403]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Rep. Lac. c. ix; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_404"><a href="#FNanchor_404">[404]</a></span>
-Thucyd. v, 34.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_405"><a href="#FNanchor_405">[405]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30; Plutarch, Apophtheg. Lacon. p. 214 B.; Apophtheg.
-Reg. p. 191 C.; Polyænus, ii, 1, 13.
-</p>
-<p>
-A similar suspension of penalties, for the special occasion, was enacted
-after the great defeat of Agis and the Lacedæmonians by Antipater, <small>B.C.</small>
-330. Akrotatus, son of King Kleomenes, was the only person at Sparta
-who opposed the suspension (Diodor. xix, 70). He incurred the strongest
-unpopularity for such opposition. Compare also Justin, xxviii, 4—describing
-the public feeling at Sparta after the defeat at Sellasia.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_406"><a href="#FNanchor_406">[406]</a></span>
-The explanation of Spartan citizenship will be found in an earlier part
-of this History, Vol. II, Ch. vi.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_407"><a href="#FNanchor_407">[407]</a></span>
-Aristotel. Polit. ii, 6, 12. Μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν ἡ πόλις,
-ἀλλ’ ἀπώλετο διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_408"><a href="#FNanchor_408">[408]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 24. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ
-πάντες ἐγυμνάζοντο περὶ τὰ ὅπλα, ἀγαλλόμενοι τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις νίκῃ, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-These are remarkable words from the unwilling pen of Xenophon: compare
-vii, 5, 12.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_409"><a href="#FNanchor_409">[409]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 23; vii, 5, 4; Diodor. xv, 57.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_410"><a href="#FNanchor_410">[410]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 27; vi, 5, 23.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_411"><a href="#FNanchor_411">[411]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 57.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_412"><a href="#FNanchor_412">[412]</a></span>
-Pausan. ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_413"><a href="#FNanchor_413">[413]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 1.
-</p>
-<p>
-I have already given my reasons (in a note on the preceding chapter) for
-believing that the Thespians were not ἀπόλιδες <i>before</i> the battle of Leuktra.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_414"><a href="#FNanchor_414">[414]</a></span>
-Pausanias, x, 11, 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_415"><a href="#FNanchor_415">[415]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 141.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_416"><a href="#FNanchor_416">[416]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 30. παρήγγειλε δὲ καὶ ὡς στρατευσομένοις
-εἰς τὸν περὶ τὰ Πύθια χρόνον Θετταλοῖς παρασκευάζεσθαι.
-</p>
-<p>
-I agree with Dr. Arnold’s construction of this passage (see his Appendix
-ad. Thucyd. v, 1, at the end of the second volume of his edition of Thucydides)
-as opposed to that of Mr. Fynes Clinton. At the same time, I do
-not think that the passage proves much either in favor of his view, or
-against the view of Mr. Clinton, about the month of the Pythian festival;
-which I incline to conceive as celebrated about August 1; a little later than
-Dr. Arnold, a little earlier than Mr. Clinton, supposes. Looking to the
-lunar months of the Greeks, we must recollect that the festival would not
-always coincide with the same month or week of our year.
-</p>
-<p>
-I cannot concur with Dr. Arnold in setting aside the statement of Plutarch
-respecting the coincidence of the Pythian festival with the battle of
-Koroneia.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_417"><a href="#FNanchor_417">[417]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 29, 30. βοῦν ἠγεμόνα, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_418"><a href="#FNanchor_418">[418]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 13.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_419"><a href="#FNanchor_419">[419]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 30. ἀποκρίνασθαι τὸν θεὸν, ὅτι αὐτῷ
-μελήσει. <em class="gesperrt">Ὁ δ’ οὖν ἀνὴρ, τηλικοῦτος ὢν, καὶ τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα
-διανοούμενος</em>, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenophon evidently considers the sudden removal of Jason as a consequence
-of the previous intention expressed by the god to take care of his
-own treasure.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_420"><a href="#FNanchor_420">[420]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 31, 32.
-</p>
-<p>
-The cause which provoked these young men is differently stated: compare
-Diodor. xv, 60; Valer. Maxim. ix, 10, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_421"><a href="#FNanchor_421">[421]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 32.
-</p>
-<p>
-The death of Jason in the spring or early summer of 370 <small>B.C.</small>, refutes
-the compliment which Cornelius Nepos (Timoth. c. 4) pays to Timotheus;
-who can never have made war upon Jason after 373 <small>B.C.</small>, when he received
-the latter at Athens in his house.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_422"><a href="#FNanchor_422">[422]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 37.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_423"><a href="#FNanchor_423">[423]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 38. ἐξαγωγεῖς.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_424"><a href="#FNanchor_424">[424]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_425"><a href="#FNanchor_425">[425]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 39, 40.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus mentions these commotions as if they had taken place after the
-peace concluded in 374 <small>B.C.</small>, and not after the peace of 371 <small>B.C.</small> But it is
-impossible that they can have taken place after the former, which in point
-of fact, was broken off almost as soon as sworn,—was never carried into
-effect,—and comprised no one but Athens and Sparta. I have before remarked
-that Diodorus seems to have confounded, both in his mind and in
-his history, these two treaties of peace together, and has predicated of the
-former what really belongs to the latter. The commotions which he mentions
-come in, most naturally and properly, immediately after the battle of
-Leuktra.
-</p>
-<p>
-He affirms the like reaction against Lacedæmonian supremacy and its
-local representatives in the various cities, to have taken place even after
-the peace of Antalkidas in 387 <small>B.C.</small> (xv, 5). But if such reaction began at
-that time, it must have been promptly repressed by Sparta, then in undiminished
-and even advancing power.
-</p>
-<p>
-Another occurrence, alleged to have happened after the battle of Leuktra,
-may be properly noticed here. Polybius (ii, 39), and Strabo seemingly
-copying him (viii, p. 384), assert that both Sparta and Thebes agreed to
-leave their disputed questions of power to the arbitration of the Achæans,
-and to abide by their decision. Though I greatly respect the authority of
-Polybius, I am unable here to reconcile his assertion either with the facts
-which unquestionably occurred, or with general probability. If any such
-arbitration was ever consented to, it must have come to nothing; for the
-war went on without interruption. But I cannot bring myself to believe
-that it was even consented to, either by Thebes or by Sparta. The exuberant
-confidence of the former, the sense of dignity on the part of the latter,
-must have indisposed both to such a proceeding; especially to the acknowledgment
-of umpires like the Achæan cities, who enjoyed little estimation
-in 370 <small>B.C.</small>, though they acquired a good deal a century and a half afterwards.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_426"><a href="#FNanchor_426">[426]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 57, 58.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_427"><a href="#FNanchor_427">[427]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. p. 814 B.; Isokrates. Or. v, (Philip.)
-s. 58.; compare Dionys. Halic. Antiq. Rom. vii, 66.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_428"><a href="#FNanchor_428">[428]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 10.
-</p>
-<p>
-The discouragement of the Spartans is revealed by the unwilling, though
-indirect, intimations of Xenophon,—not less than by their actual conduct—Hellen.
-vi, 5, 21; vii, 1, 30-32; compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_429"><a href="#FNanchor_429">[429]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 1-3.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ἐνθυμηθέντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὅτι οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἔτι οἴονται, χρῆναι ἀκολουθεῖν,
-καὶ οὔπω διακέοιντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὥσπερ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους διέθεσαν—μεταπέμπονται
-τὰς πόλεις, ὅσοι βούλονται τῆς εἰρήνης μετέχειν, ἣν βασιλεὺς κατέπεμψεν.
-</p>
-<p>
-In this passage, Morus and some other critics maintain that we ought to
-read οὔπω (which seems not to be supported by any MSS.), in place of
-οὕτω. Zeune and Schneider have admitted the new reading into the text;
-yet they doubt the propriety of the change, and I confess that I share their
-doubts. The word οὕτω will construe, and gives a clear sense; a very different
-sense from οὔπω, indeed,—yet more likely to have been intended by
-Xenophon.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_430"><a href="#FNanchor_430">[430]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 37.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_431"><a href="#FNanchor_431">[431]</a></span>
-Thus the Corinthians still continued allies of Sparta (Xen. Hellen. vii,
-4, 8).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_432"><a href="#FNanchor_432">[432]</a></span>
-Diodor. xvi, 23-29; Justin, viii, 1.
-</p>
-<p>
-We may fairly suppose that both of them borrow from Theopompus, who
-treated at large of the memorable Sacred War against the Phokians, which
-began in 355 <small>B.C.</small>, and in which the conduct of Sparta was partly determined
-by this previous sentence of the Amphiktyons. See Theopompi
-Fragm. 182-184, ed. Didot.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_433"><a href="#FNanchor_433">[433]</a></span>
-See Tittmann, Ueber den Bund der Amphiktyonen, pp. 192-197 (Berlin,
-1812).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_434"><a href="#FNanchor_434">[434]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 19.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_435"><a href="#FNanchor_435">[435]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 6; vi, 5, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_436"><a href="#FNanchor_436">[436]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 4, 5.
-</p>
-<p>
-Pausanias (viii, 8, 6: ix, 14, 2) states that the Thebans reëstablished the
-city of Mantinea. The act emanated from the spontaneous impulse of the
-Mantineans and other Arcadians, before the Thebans had yet begun to interfere
-actively in Peloponnesus, which we shall presently find them doing.
-But it was doubtless done in reliance upon Theban support, and was in all
-probability made known to, and encouraged by, Epaminondas. It formed
-the first step to that series of anti-Spartan measures in Arcadia, which I
-shall presently relate.
-</p>
-<p>
-Either the city of Mantinea now built was not exactly in the same situation
-as the one dismantled in 385 <small>B.C.</small>, since the river Ophis did not run
-through it, as it had run through the former,—or else the course of
-the Ophis has altered. If the former, there would be three successive
-sites, the oldest of them being on the hill called Ptolis, somewhat north of
-Gurzuli. Ptolis was perhaps the larger of the primary constituent villages.
-Ernst Curtius (Peloponnesos, p. 242) makes the hill Gurzuli to be the same
-as the hill called Ptolis; Colonel Leake distinguishes the two, and places
-Ptolis on his map northward of Gurzuli (Peloponnesiaca, p. 378-381). The
-summit of Gurzuli is about one mile distant from the centre of Mantinea
-(Leake, Peloponnes. p. 383).
-</p>
-<p>
-The walls of Mantinea, as rebuilt in 370 <small>B.C.</small>, form an ellipse of about
-eighteen stadia, or a little more than two miles in circumference. The
-greater axis of the ellipse points north and south. It was surrounded with
-a wet ditch, whose waters join into one course at the west of the town, and
-form a brook which Sir William Gell calls the Ophis (Itinerary of the Morea,
-p. 142). The face of the wall is composed of regularly cut square
-stones; it is about ten feet thick in all,—four feet for an outer wall, two feet
-for an inner wall, and an intermediate space of four feet filled up with rubbish.
-There were eight principal double gates, each with a narrow winding approach,
-defended by a round tower on each side. There were quadrangular
-towers, eighty feet apart, all around the circumference of the walls (Ernst
-Curtius, Peloponnesos, p. 236, 237).
-</p>
-<p>
-These are instructive remains, indicating the ideas of the Greeks respecting
-fortification in the time of Epaminondas. It appears that Mantinea
-was not so large as Tegea, to which last Curtius assigns a circumference
-of more than three miles (p. 253).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_437"><a href="#FNanchor_437">[437]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus) s. 111.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_438"><a href="#FNanchor_438">[438]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30, 31, 34.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_439"><a href="#FNanchor_439">[439]</a></span>
-It seems, however, doubtful whether there were not some common Arcadian
-coins struck, even before the battle of Leuktra.
-</p>
-<p>
-Some such are extant; but they are referred by K. O. Müller, as well as
-by M. Boeckh (Metrologisch. Untersuchungen, p. 92) to a later date subsequent
-to the foundation of Megalopolis.
-</p>
-<p>
-On the other hand, Ernst Curtius (Beyträge zur Aeltern Münzkunde, p.
-85-90, Berlin, 1851) contends that there is a great difference in the style
-and execution of these coins, and that several in all probability belong to a
-date earlier than the battle of Leuktra. He supposes that these older coins
-were struck in connection with the Pan-Arcadian sanctuary and temple of
-Zeus Lykæus, and probably out of a common treasury at the temple of that
-god for religious purposes; perhaps also in connection with the temple of
-Artemis Hymnia (Pausan. viii, 5, 11) between Mantinea and Orchomenus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_440"><a href="#FNanchor_440">[440]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 6. συνῆγον ἐπὶ τὸ συνιέναι πᾶν τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν,
-καὶ ὅ,τι νικῴη ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῶν πόλεων, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare Diodor. xv, 59-62.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_441"><a href="#FNanchor_441">[441]</a></span>
-See Pausanias, viii, 27, 2, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_442"><a href="#FNanchor_442">[442]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 11.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_443"><a href="#FNanchor_443">[443]</a></span>
-For the relations of these Arcadian cities, with Sparta and with each
-other, see Thucyd. iv, 134; v, 61, 64, 77.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_444"><a href="#FNanchor_444">[444]</a></span>
-Xenophon in his account represents Stasippus and his friends as being
-quite in the right, and as having behaved not only with justice but with
-clemency. But we learn from an indirect admission, in another place, that
-there was also another story, totally different, which represented Stasippus
-as having begun unjust violence. Compare Hellenic. vi, 5, 7, 8 with vi, 5,
-36.
-</p>
-<p>
-The manifest partiality of Xenophon, in these latter books, greatly diminishes
-the value of his own belief on such a matter.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_445"><a href="#FNanchor_445">[445]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi. 5. 8, 9, 10.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_446"><a href="#FNanchor_446">[446]</a></span>
-Pausanias, viii, 27, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_447"><a href="#FNanchor_447">[447]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 11, 12.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_448"><a href="#FNanchor_448">[448]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 2.
-</p>
-<p>
-See the prodigious anxiety manifested by the Lacedæmonians respecting
-the sure adhesion of Tegea (Thucyd. v, 64).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_449"><a href="#FNanchor_449">[449]</a></span>
-I cannot but think that Eutæa stands marked upon the maps of Kiepert
-at a point too far from the frontier of Laconia, and so situated in reference
-to Asea, that Agesilaus must have passed very near Asea in order to get to
-it; which is difficult to suppose, seeing that the Arcadian convocation was
-assembled at Asea. Xenophon calls Eutæa πόλιν ὅμορον with reference to
-Laconia (Hellen. vi, 5, 12); this will hardly suit with the position marked
-by Kiepert.
-</p>
-<p>
-The district called Mænalia must have reached farther southward than
-Kiepert indicates on his map. It included Oresteion, which was on the
-straight road from Sparta to Tegea (Thucyd. v, 64; Herodot. ix, 11).
-Kiepert has placed Oresteion in his map agreeably to what seems the meaning
-of Pausanias, viii, 44, 3. But it rather appears that the place mentioned
-by Pausanias must have been <i>Oresthasion</i>, and that <i>Oresteion</i> must have been
-a different place, though Pausanias considers them the same. See the geographical
-Appendix to K. O. Müller’s Dorians, vol. ii, p. 442—Germ. edit.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_450"><a href="#FNanchor_450">[450]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 13, 14; Diodor. xv, 62.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_451"><a href="#FNanchor_451">[451]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 20. ὅπως μὴ δοκοίη φοβούμενος σπεύδειν τὴν ἔφοδον.
-</p>
-<p>
-See Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, c. xxiv, p. 74, 75. The exact
-spot designated by the words τὸν ὄπισθεν κόλπον τῆς Μαντινικῆς, seems
-hardly to be identified.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_452"><a href="#FNanchor_452">[452]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 21. βουλόμενος ἀπαγαγεῖν τοὺς ὁπλίτας, πρὶν καὶ
-τὰ πυρὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἰδεῖν, ἵνα μή τις εἴπῃ, ὡς φεύγων ἀπαγάγοι. Ἐκ γὰρ τῆς πρόσθεν
-ἀθυμίας ἐδόκει τε ἀνειληφέναι τὴν πόλιν, ὅτι καὶ ἐμβεβλήκει εἰς τὴν Ἀρκαδίαν, καὶ
-δῃοῦντι τὴν χώραν οὐδεὶς ἠθελήκει μάχεσθαι: compare Plutarch,
-Agesil. c. 30.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_453"><a href="#FNanchor_453">[453]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 19.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_454"><a href="#FNanchor_454">[454]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 62. Compare Demosthenes, Orat. pro Megalopolit. pp. 205-207, s. 13-23.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_455"><a href="#FNanchor_455">[455]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 60.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_456"><a href="#FNanchor_456">[456]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 34.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_457"><a href="#FNanchor_457">[457]</a></span>
-Pausanias. iv, 26, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_458"><a href="#FNanchor_458">[458]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 66; Pausanias, iv, 26, 3, 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_459"><a href="#FNanchor_459">[459]</a></span>
-To illustrate small things by great—At the first formation of the
-Federal Constitution of the United States of America, the rival pretensions
-of New York and Philadelphia were among the principal motives for creating
-the new federal city of Washington.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_460"><a href="#FNanchor_460">[460]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Agesil. c. 31; and compare Agesil. and Pomp. c. 4; Diodor.
-xv, 62. Compare Xenophon, Agesilaus, 2, 24.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_461"><a href="#FNanchor_461">[461]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 23. Οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες καὶ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Ἠλεῖοι
-ἔπειθον αὐτοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι ὡς τάχιστα εἰς τὴν Λακωνικήν, ἐπιδείκνυντες μὲν τὸ
-ἑαυτῶν πλῆθος, ὑπερεπαινοῦντες δὲ τὸ τῶν Θηβαίων στράτευμα. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν
-Βοιωτοὶ ἐγυμνάζοντο πάντες περὶ τὰ ὅπλα, ἀγαλλόμενοι τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις νίκῃ,
-etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_462"><a href="#FNanchor_462">[462]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 24, 25.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_463"><a href="#FNanchor_463">[463]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 64.
-</p>
-<p>
-See Colonel Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, ch. 23, p. 29.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_464"><a href="#FNanchor_464">[464]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 26. When we read that the Arcadians got on the
-roofs of the houses to attack Ischolaus, this fact seems to imply that they
-were admitted into the houses by the villagers.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_465"><a href="#FNanchor_465">[465]</a></span>
-Respecting the site of Sellasia, Colonel Leake thinks, and advances
-various grounds for supposing, that Sellasia was on the road from Sparta
-to the north-east, towards the Thyreatis; and that Karyæ was on the road
-from Sparta northward, towards Tegea. The French investigators of the
-Morea, as well as Professor Ross and Kiepert, hold a different opinion, and
-place Sellasia on the road from Sparta northward towards Tegea (Leake,
-Peloponnesiaca, p. 342-352; Ross, Reisen im Peloponnes. p. 187; Berlin,
-1841).
-</p>
-<p>
-Upon such a point, the authority of Colonel Leake is very high; yet the
-opposite opinion respecting the site of Sellasia seems to me preferable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_466"><a href="#FNanchor_466">[466]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 30; Diodor. xv, 65.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_467"><a href="#FNanchor_467">[467]</a></span>
-This I apprehend to be the meaning of the phrase—ἐπεὶ μέντοι
-ἔμενον μὲν οἱ ἐξ Ὀρχομένου μισθόφοροι, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_468"><a href="#FNanchor_468">[468]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 29; vii, 2, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_469"><a href="#FNanchor_469">[469]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 2. Καὶ <em class="gesperrt">διαβαίνειν τελευταῖοι λαχόντες</em>
-(the Phliasians) εἰς Πρασιὰς τῶν συμβοηθησάντων ... οὐ γὰρ πώποτε ἀφέστασαν,
-ἀλλ’ οὐδ’, ἐπεὶ ὁ ξεναγὸς <em class="gesperrt">τοὺς προδιαβεβῶτας</em> λαβὼν ἀπολιπὼν αὐτοὺς
-ᾤχετο, οὐδ’ ὡς ἀπεστράφησαν, ἀλλ’ ἡγεμόνα μισθωσάμενοι ἐκ Πρασιῶν, ὄντων
-τῶν πολεμίων περὶ Ἀμύκλας, ὅπως ἐδύναντο διαδύντες ἐς Σπάρτην ἀφίκοντο.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_470"><a href="#FNanchor_470">[470]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 28, 29. ὥστε φόβον αὖ οὗτοι παρεῖχον
-συντεταγμένοι καὶ λίαν ἐδόκουν πολλοὶ εἶναι, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_471"><a href="#FNanchor_471">[471]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 25; vi, 5, 32; vii, 2, 2.
-</p>
-<p>
-It is evident from the last of these three passages, that the number of
-Periœki and Helots who actually revolted, was very considerable; and that
-the contrast between the second and third passages evinces the different
-feelings with which the two seem to have been composed by Xenophon.
-</p>
-<p>
-In the second, he is recounting the invasion of Epaminondas, with a wish
-to soften the magnitude of the Spartan disgrace and calamity as much as
-he can. Accordingly, he tells us no more than this,—“there were some
-among the Periœki, who even took active service in the attack of Gythium,
-and fought along with the Thebans,”—ἦσαν δέ τινες τῶν Περιοίκων, οἳ καὶ
-ἐπέθεντο καὶ συνεστρατεύοντο τοῖς μετὰ Θηβαίων.
-</p>
-<p>
-But in the third passage (vii, 2, 2: compare his biography called Agesilaus,
-ii, 24) Xenophon is extolling the fidelity of the Phliasians to Sparta
-under adverse circumstances of the latter. Hence it then suits his argument,
-to magnify these adverse circumstances, in order to enhance the merit
-of the Phliasians; and he therefore tells us,—“<i>Many</i> of the Periœki, all
-the Helots, and all the allies except a few, had revolted from Sparta,”—σφαλέντων
-δ’ αὐτῶν τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχῃ, καὶ ἀποστάντων μὲν πολλῶν Περιοίκων, ἀποστάντων δὲ
-πάντων τῶν Εἱλώτων, ἔτι δὲ τῶν συμμάχων πλὴν πάνυ ὀλίγων, ἐπιστρατευόντων δ’ αὐτοῖς,
-ὡς εἰπεῖν, πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πιστοὶ διέμειναν (the Phliasians).
-</p>
-<p>
-I apprehend that both statements depart from the reality, though in opposite
-directions. I have adopted in the text something between the two.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_472"><a href="#FNanchor_472">[472]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Agesil. c. 32; Polyænus, ii, 1, 14; Ælian, V. H. xiv, 27.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_473"><a href="#FNanchor_473">[473]</a></span>
-Æneas, Poliorceticus, c. 2, p. 16.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_474"><a href="#FNanchor_474">[474]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 32. Καὶ τὸ μὲν μὴ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν
-προσβαλεῖν ἂν ἔτι αὐτοὺς, ἤδη τι ἐδόκει θαῤῥαλεώτερον, εἶναι.
-</p>
-<p>
-This passage is not very clear, nor are the commentators unanimous
-either as to the words or as to the meaning. Some omit μὴ, construe ἐδόκει
-as if it were ἐδόκει τοῖς Θηβαίοις, and translate θαῤῥαλεώτερον “excessively
-rash.”
-</p>
-<p>
-I agree with Schneider in dissenting from this alteration and construction.
-I have given in the text what I believe to be the meaning.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_475"><a href="#FNanchor_475">[475]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 28; Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 8; Plutarch, Agesil. c.
-32, 33; Plutarch, comp. Agesil. and Pomp. c. 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_476"><a href="#FNanchor_476">[476]</a></span>
-Aristotle (in his Politica, iv, 10, 5), discussing the opinion of those political
-philosophers who maintained that a city ought to have no walls, but
-to be defended only by the bravery of its inhabitants,—gives various reasons
-against such opinion, and adds “that these are old-fashioned thinkers;
-that the cities which made such ostentatious display of personal courage,
-have been proved to be wrong by actual results”—λίαν ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσι,
-καὶ ταῦθ’ ὁρῶντες ἐλεγχομένας ἔργῳ τὰς ἐκείνως καλλωπισαμένας.
-</p>
-<p>
-The commentators say (see the note of M. Barth. St. Hilaire) that Aristotle
-has in his view Sparta at the moment of this Theban invasion. I do
-not see what else he can mean; yet at the same time, if such be his meaning,
-the remark is surely difficult to admit. Epaminondas came close up
-to Sparta, but did not dare to attempt to carry it by assault. If the city
-had had walls like those of Babylon, they could not have procured for her
-any greater protection. To me the fact appears rather to show (contrary
-to the assertion of Aristotle) that Sparta was so strong by position, combined
-with the military character of her citizens, that she could dispense
-with walls.
-</p>
-<p>
-Polyænus (ii, 2, 5) has an anecdote, I know not from whom borrowed, to
-the effect that Epaminondas might have taken Sparta, but designedly refrained
-from doing so, on the ground that the Arcadians and others would
-then no longer stand in need of Thebes. Neither the alleged matter of
-fact, nor the reason, appear to me worthy of any credit. Ælian (V. H. iv,
-8) has the same story, but with a different reason assigned.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_477"><a href="#FNanchor_477">[477]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 50; Diodor. xv, 67.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_478"><a href="#FNanchor_478">[478]</a></span>
-Thucyd. ii, 15. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ Θησεὺς ἐβασίλευσε, γενόμενος
-μετὰ τοῦ ξυνετοῦ καὶ δυνατὸς, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_479"><a href="#FNanchor_479">[479]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 72.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_480"><a href="#FNanchor_480">[480]</a></span>
-Pausan. viii, 27; viii, 35, 5. Diodor. xv, 63.
-</p>
-<p>
-See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, p. 418, where the facts
-respecting Megalopolis are brought together and discussed.
-</p>
-<p>
-It is remarkable that though Xenophon (Hellen. v, 2, 7) observes that the
-capture of Mantinea by Agesipolis had made the Mantineans see the folly
-of having a river run through their town,—yet in choosing the site of Megalopolis,
-this same feature was deliberately reproduced: and in this choice
-the Mantineans were parties concerned.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_481"><a href="#FNanchor_481">[481]</a></span>
-Pausan. iv, 26, 6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_482"><a href="#FNanchor_482">[482]</a></span>
-Strabo. viii, p. 361: Polybius, vii, 11.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_483"><a href="#FNanchor_483">[483]</a></span>
-Pausan. ix, 14, 2: compare the inscription on the statue of Epaminondas
-(ix, 15, 4).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_484"><a href="#FNanchor_484">[484]</a></span>
-Pausan. iv, 27, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_485"><a href="#FNanchor_485">[485]</a></span>
-Pausan. iv, 31, 5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_486"><a href="#FNanchor_486">[486]</a></span>
-Pausan. iv, 31, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_487"><a href="#FNanchor_487">[487]</a></span>
-Thucyd. ii, 25.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_488"><a href="#FNanchor_488">[488]</a></span>
-Thucyd. iv, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_489"><a href="#FNanchor_489">[489]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 8.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_490"><a href="#FNanchor_490">[490]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 25.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_491"><a href="#FNanchor_491">[491]</a></span>
-Pausan. iv, 27, 4. ἀνῴκιζον δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πολίσματα, etc. Pausanias, following
-the line of coast from the mouth of the river Pamisus in the Messenian
-Gulf, round Cape Akritas to the mouth of the Neda in the Western
-Sea,—enumerates the following towns and places,—Kôronê, Kolônides,
-Asinê, the Cape Akritas, the Harbor Phœnikus, Methônê, or Mothônê, Pylus,
-Aulon (Pausan. iv, 34, 35, 36). The account given by Skylax (Periplus,
-c. 46, 47) of the coast of these regions, appears to me confused and
-unintelligible. He reckons Asinê and Mothônê as cities of Laconia; but
-he seems to have conceived these cities as being in the <i>central southern</i> projection
-of Peloponnesus (whereof Cape Tænarus forms the extremity); and
-not to have conceived at all the <i>south-western</i> projection, whereof Cape Akritas
-forms the extremity. He recognizes Messene, but he pursues the Paraplus
-of the Messenian coast from the mouth of the river Neda to the coast
-of the Messenian Gulf south of Ithômê without interruption. Then after
-that, he mentions Asinê, Mothônê, Achilleios Limên, and Psamathus, with
-Cape Tænarus between them. Besides, he introduces in Messenia two different
-cities,—one called Messênê, the other called Ithômê; whereas there
-was only one Messênê situated on Mount Ithome.
-</p>
-<p>
-I cannot agree with Niebuhr, who, resting mainly upon this account of
-Skylax, considers that the south-western corner of Peloponnesus remained
-a portion of Laconia and belonging to Sparta, long after the establishment
-of the city of Messênê. See the Dissertation of Niebuhr on the age of Skylax
-of Karyanda,—in his Kleine Schriften, p. 119.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_492"><a href="#FNanchor_492">[492]</a></span>
-Thucyd. iv, 3, 42.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_493"><a href="#FNanchor_493">[493]</a></span>
-The Oration (vi,) called Archidamus, by Isokrates. exhibits powerfully
-the Spartan feeling of the time, respecting this abstraction of territory, and
-emancipation of serfs, for the purpose of restoring Messênê, s. 30. Καὶ εἰ μὲν τοὺς
-ὡς ἀληθῶς Μεσσηνίους κατῆγον (the Thebans), ἠδίκουν μὲν ἂν, ὅμως δ’ εὐλογωτέρως ἂν
-εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐξημάρτανον· νῦν δὲ τοὺς Εἵλωτας ὁμόρους ἡμῖν παρακατοικίζουσιν, ὥστε μὴ
-τοῦτ’ εἶναι χαλεπώτατον, εἰ τῆς χώρας στερησόμεθα παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ’ εἰ τοὺς
-δούλους ἡμετέρους ἐποψόμεθα κυρίους αὐτῆς ὄντας.
-</p>
-<p>
-Again—s. 101. ἢν γὰρ παρακατοικισώμεθα τοὺς Εἵλωτας, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ταύτην περιΐδωμεν
-αὐξηθεῖσαν, τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι πάντα τὸν βίον ἐν ταραχαῖς καὶ κινδύνοις διατελοῦμεν
-ὄντες; compare also sections 8 and 102.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_494"><a href="#FNanchor_494">[494]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Orat. vi, (Archidam.) s. 111. Ἄξιον δὲ καὶ τὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα
-καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσχυνθῆναι πανηγύρεις, ἐν αἷς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν (Spartans) ζηλωτότερος
-ἦν καὶ θαυμαστότερος τῶν ἀθλητῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τὰς νίκας ἀναιρουμένων. Εἰς ἃς
-τίς ἂν ἐλθεῖν τολμήσειεν, ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι καταφρονηθησόμενος—ἔτι δὲ πρὸς
-<em class="gesperrt">τούτοις ὀψόμενος μὲν τοὺς οἰκέτας ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας</em> ἧς οἱ πατέρες ἡμῖν κατέλιπον
-ἀπαρχὰς καὶ θυσίας μείζους ἡμῶν ποιουμένους, ἀκουσόμενος δ’ <em class="gesperrt">αὐτῶν τοιαύταις
-βλασφημίαις χρωμένων, οἵαις περ εἰκὸς τοὺς χαλεπώτερον τῶν ἄλλων δεδουλευκότας</em>,
-ἐξ ἴσου δὲ νῦν τὰς συνθήκας τοῖς δεσπόταις πεποιημένους.
-</p>
-<p>
-This oration, composed only five or six years after the battle of Leuktra,
-is exceedingly valuable as a testimony of the Spartan feeling under such
-severe humiliations.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_495"><a href="#FNanchor_495">[495]</a></span>
-The freedom of the Messenians had been put down by the first Messenian
-war, after which they became subjects of Sparta. The second Messenian
-war arose from their revolt.
-</p>
-<p>
-No free Messenian legation could therefore have visited Olympia since
-the termination of the first war; which is placed by Pausanias (iv, 13, 4) in
-723 <small>B.C.</small>; though the date is not to be trusted. Pausanias (iv, 27, 3) gives
-two hundred and eighty-seven years between the end of the second Messenian
-war and the foundation of Messênê by Epaminondas. See the
-note of Siebelis on this passage. Exact dates of these early wars cannot
-be made out.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_496"><a href="#FNanchor_496">[496]</a></span>
-The partiality towards Sparta, visible even from the beginning of Xenophon’s
-history, becomes more and more exaggerated throughout the two latter
-books wherein he recounts her misfortunes; it is moreover intensified by
-spite against the Thebans and Epaminondas as her conquerors. But there is
-hardly any instance of this feeling, so glaring or so discreditable, as the case
-now before us. In describing the expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus
-in the winter of 370-369 <small>B.C.</small>, he totally omits the foundation both of
-Messênê and Megalopolis; though in the after part of his history, he alludes
-(briefly) both to one and to the other as facts accomplished. He represents
-the Thebans to have come into Arcadia with their magnificent army, for the
-simple purpose of repelling Agesilaus and the Spartans, and to have been
-desirous of returning to Bœotia, as soon as it was ascertained that the latter
-had already returned to Sparta (vi, 5, 23). Nor does he once mention
-the name of Epaminondas as general of the Thebans in the expedition, any
-more than he mentions him at Leuktra.
-</p>
-<p>
-Considering the momentous and striking character of these facts, and the
-eminence of the Theban general by whom they were achieved, such silence
-on the part of an historian, who professes to recount the events of
-the time, is an inexcusable dereliction of his duty to state the <i>whole truth</i>.
-It is plain that Messênê and Megalopolis wounded to the quick the philo-Spartan
-sentiment of Xenophon. They stood as permanent evidences of
-the degradation of Sparta, even after the hostile armies had withdrawn
-from Laconia. He prefers to ignore them altogether. Yet he can find
-space to recount, with disproportionate prolixity, the two applications of
-the Spartans to Athens for aid, with the favorable reception which they obtained,—also
-the exploits of the Phliasians in their devoted attachment to
-Sparta.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_497"><a href="#FNanchor_497">[497]</a></span>
-See a striking passage in Polybius, iv, 32. Compare also Pausan. v,
-29, 3; and viii, 27, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_498"><a href="#FNanchor_498">[498]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 38; vii, 4, 2, 33, 34; vii, 3, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_499"><a href="#FNanchor_499">[499]</a></span>
-Demosthen. Fals. Legat. p. 344, s. 11, p. 403, s. 220, Æschines, Fals.
-Leg. p. 296, c. 49; Cornel. Nepos. Epamin. c. 6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_500"><a href="#FNanchor_500">[500]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 38; vii, 4, 33; Diodor. xv, 59; Aristotle—Ἀρκάδων
-Πολιτεία—ap. Harpokration, v. Μύριοι, p. 106, ed. Neumann.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_501"><a href="#FNanchor_501">[501]</a></span>
-Polybius, ii, 55.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_502"><a href="#FNanchor_502">[502]</a></span>
-Thucyd. v, 66.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_503"><a href="#FNanchor_503">[503]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 21.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_504"><a href="#FNanchor_504">[504]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 12; Diodor. xv, 64.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_505"><a href="#FNanchor_505">[505]</a></span>
-The exact number of eighty-five days, given by Diodorus (xv. 67),
-seems to show that he had copied literally from Ephorus or some other
-older author.
-</p>
-<p>
-Plutarch, in one place (Agesil. c. 32), mentions “three entire months,”
-which differs little from eighty-five days. He expresses himself as if Epaminondas
-spent all this time in ravaging Laconia. Yet again, in the
-Apophth. Reg. p. 194 B. (compare Ælian, V. H. xiii, 42), and in the life of
-Pelopidas (c. 25), Plutarch states, that Epaminondas and his colleagues held
-the command four whole months over and above the legal time, being engaged
-in their operations in Laconia and Messenia. This seems to me the
-more probable interpretation of the case; for the operations seem too large
-to have been accomplished in either three or four months.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_506"><a href="#FNanchor_506">[506]</a></span>
-See a remarkable passage in Plutarch—An Seni sit gerenda Respublica
-(c. 8, p. 788 A.).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_507"><a href="#FNanchor_507">[507]</a></span>
-Pausan. viii, 27, 2. Pammenes is said to have been an earnest friend
-of Epaminondas, but of older political standing; to whom Epaminondas
-partly owed his rise (Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcep. p. 805 F.).
-</p>
-<p>
-Pausanias places the foundation of Megalopolis in the same Olympic
-year as the battle of Leuktra, and a few months after that battle, during the
-archonship of Phrasikleides at Athens; that is, between Midsummer 371
-and Midsummer 370 <small>B.C.</small> (Pausan. viii, 27, 6). He places the foundation
-of Messênê in the next Olympic year, under the archonship of Dyskinêtus
-at Athens; that is, between Midsummer 370 and Midsummer 369 <small>B.C.</small> (iv,
-27, 5).
-</p>
-<p>
-The foundation of Megalopolis would probably be understood to date
-from the initial determination taken by the assembled Arcadians, soon after
-the revolution at Tegea, to found a Pan-Arcadian city and federative league.
-This was probably taken before Midsummer 370 <small>B.C.</small>, and the date of Pausanias
-would thus be correct.
-</p>
-<p>
-The foundation of Messênê would doubtless take its æra from the expedition
-of Epaminondas,—between November and March 370-369 <small>B.C.</small>
-which would be during the archonship of Dyskinêtus at Athens, as Pausanias
-affirms.
-</p>
-<p>
-What length of time was required to complete the erection and establishment
-of either city, we are not informed.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus places the foundation of Megalopolis in 368 <small>B.C.</small> (xv, 72).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_508"><a href="#FNanchor_508">[508]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 36.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_509"><a href="#FNanchor_509">[509]</a></span>
-Isokrates (Archidamus), Or. vi, s. 129.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_510"><a href="#FNanchor_510">[510]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 34, 35.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_511"><a href="#FNanchor_511">[511]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 38-48.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_512"><a href="#FNanchor_512">[512]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 35. Οἱ μέντοι Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ πάνυ ἐδέξαντο,
-ἀλλὰ θροῦς τις τοιοῦτος διῆλθεν, ὡς νῦν μὲν ταῦτα λέγοιεν· ὅτε δὲ εὖ
-ἔπραττον, ἐπέκειντο ἡμῖν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_513"><a href="#FNanchor_513">[513]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 35. Μέγιστον δὲ τῶν λεχθέντων
-παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐδόκει εἶναι, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_514"><a href="#FNanchor_514">[514]</a></span>
-Demosthenes cont. Neær. p. 1353.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenokleides, a poet, spoke in opposition to the vote for supporting Sparta (ib.).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_515"><a href="#FNanchor_515">[515]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 49; Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 479.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_516"><a href="#FNanchor_516">[516]</a></span>
-This number is stated by Diodorus (xv, 63).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_517"><a href="#FNanchor_517">[517]</a></span>
-To this extent we may believe what is said by Cornelius Nepos (Iphicrates,
-c. 2).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_518"><a href="#FNanchor_518">[518]</a></span>
-The account here given in the text coincides as to the matter of fact
-with Xenophon, as well as with Plutarch; and also (in my belief) with
-Pausanias (Xen. Hell. vi, 5, 51; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 24; Pausan. ix, 14, 3).
-</p>
-<p>
-But though I accept the facts of Xenophon, I cannot accept either his
-suppositions as to the purpose, or his criticisms on the conduct, of Iphikrates.
-Other modern critics appear to me not to have sufficiently distinguished
-Xenophon’s <i>facts</i> from his <i>suppositions</i>.
-</p>
-<p>
-Iphikrates (says Xenophon), while attempting to guard the line of Mount
-Oneium, in order that the Thebans might not be able to reach Bœotia,—left
-the excellent road adjoining to Kenchreæ unguarded. Then,—wishing
-to inform himself, whether the Thebans had as yet passed the Mount
-Oneium, he sent out as scouts all the Athenian and all the Corinthian cavalry.
-Now (observes Xenophon) a few scouts can see and report as well as
-a great number; while the great number find it more difficult to get back
-in safety. By this foolish conduct of Iphikrates, in sending out so large a
-body, several horsemen were lost in the retreat; which would not have
-happened if he had only sent out a few.
-</p>
-<p>
-The criticism here made by Xenophon appears unfounded. It is plain,
-from the facts which he himself states, that Iphikrates never intended to
-bar the passage of the Thebans; and that he sent out his whole body of
-cavalry, not simply as scouts, but to harass the enemy on ground which he
-thought advantageous for the purpose. That so able a commander as Iphikrates
-should have been guilty of the gross blunders with which Xenophon
-here reproaches him, is in a high degree improbable; it seems to me more
-probable that Xenophon has misconceived his real purpose. Why indeed
-should Iphikrates wish to expose the whole Athenian army in a murderous
-conflict for the purpose of preventing the homeward march of the Thebans?
-His mission was, to rescue Sparta; but Sparta was now no longer in danger;
-and it was for the advantage of Athens that the Thebans should go
-back to Bœotia, rather than remain in Peloponnesus. That he should content
-himself with harassing the Thebans, instead of barring their retreat
-directly, is a policy which we should expect from him.
-</p>
-<p>
-There is another circumstance in this retreat which has excited discussion
-among the commentators, and on which I dissent from their views. It is
-connected with the statement of Pausanias, who says,—Ὡς προϊὼν τῷ στρατῷ
-(Epaminondas) κατὰ Λέχαιον ἐγίνετο, καὶ διεξιέναι τῆς ὁδοῦ τὰ στενὰ καὶ δύσβατα
-ἔμελλεν, Ἰφικράτης ὁ Τιμοθέου πελταστὰς καὶ ἄλλην Ἀθηναίων ἔχων δύναμιν, ἐπιχειρεῖ
-τοῖς Θηβαίοις. Ἐπαμινώνδας δὲ τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους τρέπεται, <em class="gesperrt">καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀφικόμενος
-Ἀθηναίων τὸ ἄστυ</em>, ὡς ἐπεξιέναι μαχουμένους τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐκώλυεν Ἰφικράτης,
-ὁ δὲ αὖθις ἐς τὰς Θήβας ἀπήλαυνε.
-</p>
-<p>
-In this statement there are some inaccuracies, as that of calling Iphikrates
-“son of Timotheus;” and speaking of <i>Lechæum</i>, where Pausanias
-ought to have named <i>Kenchreæ</i>. For Epaminondas could not have passed
-Corinth on the side of Lechæum, since the Long Walls, reaching from one
-to the other, would prevent him; moreover, the “rugged ground” was between
-Corinth and Kenchreæ, not between Corinth and Lechæum.
-</p>
-<p>
-But the words which occasion most perplexity are those which follow:
-“Epaminondas repulses the assailants, and <i>having come to the city itself of
-the Athenians</i>, when Iphikrates forbade the Athenians to come out and fight,
-he (Epaminondas) again marched away to Thebes.”
-</p>
-<p>
-What are we to understand <i>by the city of the Athenians</i>? The natural
-sense of the word is certainly Athens; and so most of the commentators
-relate. But when the battle was fought between Corinth and Kenchreæ,
-can we reasonably believe that Epaminondas pursued the fugitives to Athens—through
-the city of Megara, which lay in the way, and which seems
-then (Diodor. xv, 68) to have been allied with Athens? The station of
-Iphikrates was <i>Corinth</i>; from thence he had marched out,—and thither his
-cavalry, when repulsed, would go back, as the nearest shelter.
-</p>
-<p>
-Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Greece, vol. v, ch. 39, p. 141) understands Pausanias
-to mean, that Iphikrates retired with his defeated cavalry to Corinth,—that
-Epaminondas then marched straight on to Athens,—and that Iphikrates
-followed him. “Possibly (he says) the only mistake in this statement
-is, that it represents the <i>presence</i> of Iphikrates, instead of his <i>absence</i>,
-as the cause which prevented the Athenians from fighting. According to
-Xenophon, Iphikrates must have been in the rear of Epaminondas.”
-</p>
-<p>
-I cannot think that we obtain this from the words of Xenophon. Neither
-he nor Plutarch countenance the idea that Epaminondas marched to the
-walls of Athens, which supposition is derived solely from the words of
-Pausanias. Xenophon and Plutarch intimate only that Iphikrates interposed
-some opposition, and not very effective opposition, near Corinth, to
-the retreating march of Epaminondas, from Peloponnesus into Bœotia.
-</p>
-<p>
-That Epaminondas should have marched to Athens at all, under the circumstances
-of the case, when he was returning to Bœotia, appears to me
-in itself improbable, and to be rendered still more improbable by the silence
-of Xenophon. Nor is it indispensable to put this construction even upon
-Pausanias; who may surely have meant by the words—πρὸς αὐτὸ Ἀθηναίων τὸ ἄστυ,—not
-Athens, but <i>the city then occupied by the Athenians engaged</i>,—that
-is, <i>Corinth</i>. <i>The city of the Athenians</i>, in reference to this battle, was
-Corinth; it was the city out of which the troops of Iphikrates had just
-marched, and to which, on being defeated, they naturally retired for safety,
-pursued by Epaminondas to the gates. The statement of Pausanias,—that
-Iphikrates would not let the Athenians in the town (Corinth) go out
-to fight,—then follows naturally. Epaminondas, finding that they would
-not come out, drew back his troops, and resumed his march to Thebes.
-</p>
-<p>
-The stratagem of Iphikrates noticed by Polyænus (iii, 9, 29), can hardly
-be the same incident as this mentioned by Pausanias. It purports to be a
-nocturnal surprise planned by the Thebans against Athens; which certainly
-must be quite different (if it be in itself a reality) from this march of Epaminondas.
-And the stratagem ascribed by Polyænus to Iphikrates is of a
-strange and highly improbable character.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_519"><a href="#FNanchor_519">[519]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25; Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 194 B.; Pausan.
-ix, 14, 4; Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 7, 8; Ælian, V. H. xiii, 42.
-</p>
-<p>
-Pausanias states the fact plainly and clearly; the others, especially Nepos
-and Ælian, though agreeing in the main fact, surround it with colors
-exaggerated and false. They represent Epaminondas as in danger of being
-put to death by ungrateful and malignant fellow-citizens; Cornelius Nepos
-puts into his mouth a justificatory speech of extreme insolence (compare
-Arist. Or. xlvi, περὶ τοῦ παραφθέγματος—p. 385 Jebb.; p. 520 Dindorf.);
-which, had it been really made, would have tended more than anything else
-to set the public against him,—and which is moreover quite foreign to the
-character of Epaminondas. To carry the exaggeration still farther, Plutarch
-(De Vitioso Pudore, p. 540 E.) describes Pelopidas as trembling and
-begging for his life.
-</p>
-<p>
-Epaminondas had committed a grave illegality, which could not be
-passed over without notice in his trial of accountability. But he had a
-good justification. It was necessary that he should put in the justification;
-when put in, it passed triumphantly. What more could be required? The
-facts, when fairly stated, will not serve as an illustration of the alleged ingratitude
-of the people towards great men.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_520"><a href="#FNanchor_520">[520]</a></span>
-Diodorus (xv, 81) states that Pelopidas was Bœotarch without interruption,
-annually re-appointed, from the revolution of Thebes down to his decease.
-Plutarch also (Pelopid. c. 34) affirms that when Pelopidas died, he
-was in the thirteenth year of his appointment; which may be understood
-as the same assertion in other words. Whether Epaminondas was rechosen,
-does not appear.
-</p>
-<p>
-Sievers denies the reappointment as well of Pelopidas as of Epaminondas.
-But I do not see upon what grounds; for, in my judgment, Epaminondas
-appears again as commander in Peloponnesus during this same year
-(369 <small>B.C.</small>) Sievers holds Epaminondas to have commanded without being
-Bœotarch; but no reason is produced for this (Sievers, Geschicht. Griech.
-bis zur Schlacht von Mantinea, p. 277).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_521"><a href="#FNanchor_521">[521]</a></span>
-Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 249; Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s.
-124. Ὁ γὰρ πατήρ σου (Isokrates to Philip) πρὸς τὰς πόλεις ταύτας (Sparta,
-Athens, Argos, and Thebes), αἷς σοι παραινῶ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, πρὸς ἁπάσας οἰκείως εἶχε.
-</p>
-<p>
-The connection of Amyntas with Thebes could hardly have been considerable;
-that with Argos, was based upon a strong legendary and ancestral
-sentiment rather than on common political grounds; with Athens, it
-was both political and serious; with Sparta, it was attested by the most essential
-military aid and coöperation.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_522"><a href="#FNanchor_522">[522]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 17.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_523"><a href="#FNanchor_523">[523]</a></span>
-Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 249.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_524"><a href="#FNanchor_524">[524]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Timotheum. c. 8, p. 1194; Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 11.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_525"><a href="#FNanchor_525">[525]</a></span>
-Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 248. τὴν πατρικὴν εὔνοιαν, καὶ τὰς
-εὐεργεσίας ἃς ὑμεῖς ὑπήρξατε Ἀμύντᾳ, τῷ Φιλίππου πατρὶ, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. c. 30, p. 660. τὴν πατρικὴν φιλίαν ἀνανεοῦθαι
-(Philip to the Athenians): compare ibid. c. 29, p. 657.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_526"><a href="#FNanchor_526">[526]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_527"><a href="#FNanchor_527">[527]</a></span>
-Demosthen. (Philippic. ii, c. 4, p. 71; De Halonneso, c. 3, p. 79; De
-Rebus Chersones. c. 2, p. 91); also Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosthen. c. 6,
-p. 163.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_528"><a href="#FNanchor_528">[528]</a></span>
-Compare the aspirations of Athens, as stated in 391 <small>B.C.</small>, when the
-propositions of peace recommended by Andokides were under consideration,
-aspirations, which were then regarded as beyond all hope of attainment,
-and imprudent even to talk about (Andokides, De Pace, s. 15). φέρε, ἀλλὰ Χεῤῥόνησον
-καὶ τὰς ἀποικίας καὶ τὰ ἐγκτήματα καὶ τὰ χρέα ἵνα ἀπολάβωμεν; Ἀλλ’ οὔτε βασιλεὺς, οὔτε
-οἱ σύμμαχοι, συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν, μεθ’ ὧν αὐτὰ δεῖ πολεμοῦντας κτήσασθαι.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_529"><a href="#FNanchor_529">[529]</a></span>
-Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 250.
-</p>
-<p>
-Συμμαχίας γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων συνελθούσης, εἷς ὢν τούτων
-Ἀμύντας ὁ Φιλίππου πατὴρ, καὶ πέμπων σύνεδρον, καὶ τῆς καθ’ ἐαυτὸν ψήφου κύριος
-ὢν, <em class="gesperrt">ἐψηφίσατο Ἀμφίπολιν τὴν Ἀθηναίων συνεξαιρεῖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίοις</em>.
-Καὶ τοῦτο τὸ κοινὸν δόγμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ τοὺς ψηφισαμένους, <em class="gesperrt">ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων
-γραμμάτων</em> μάρτυρας παρεσχόμην.
-</p>
-<p>
-The remarkable event to which Æschines here makes allusion, must have
-taken place either in the congress held at Sparta, in the month preceding
-the battle of Leuktra, where the general peace was sworn, with universal
-autonomy guaranteed,—leaving out only Thebes; or else, at the subsequent
-congress held three or four months afterwards at Athens, where a
-peace, on similar conditions generally, was again sworn under the auspices
-of Athens as president.
-</p>
-<p>
-My conviction is, that it took place on the latter occasion,—at Athens.
-First, the reference of Æschines to the δημόσια γράμματα leads us to conclude
-that the affair was transacted in that city; secondly, I do not think
-that the Athenians would have been in any situation to exact such a reserve
-in their favor, prior to the battle of Leuktra; thirdly, the congress at Sparta
-was held, not for the purpose of συμμαχία or alliance, but for that of terminating
-the war and concluding peace; while the subsequent congress at
-Athens formed the basis of a defensive alliance, to which, either then or
-soon afterwards, Sparta acceded.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_530"><a href="#FNanchor_530">[530]</a></span>
-The pretensions advanced by Philip of Macedon (in his Epistola ad
-Athenienses, ap. Demosthen. p. 164), that Amphipolis or its locality originally
-belonged to his ancestor Alexander son of Amyntas, as having expelled
-the Persians from it,—are unfounded, and contradicted by Thucydides.
-At least, if (which is barely possible) Alexander ever did acquire the
-spot, he must have lost it afterwards; for it was occupied by the Edonian
-Thracians, both in 465 <small>B.C.</small>, when Athens made her first unsuccessful
-attempt to plant a colony there,—and in 437 <small>B.C.</small>, when she tried again
-with better success under Agnon, and established Amphipolis (Thucyd. iv,
-102).
-</p>
-<p>
-The expression of Æschines, that Amyntas in 371 <small>B.C.</small> “gave up or receded
-from” Amphipolis (ὧν δ’ Ἀμύντας ἀπέστη—De Fals. Leg. 1 c.) can
-at most only be construed as referring to rights which he may have claimed,
-since he was never in actual possession of it; though we cannot wonder
-that the orator should use such language in addressing Philip son of Amyntas,
-who was really master of the town.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_531"><a href="#FNanchor_531">[531]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 60.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_532"><a href="#FNanchor_532">[532]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 4, 33, 34.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus (xv, 61) calls Alexander of Pheræ brother of Polydorus; Plutarch
-(Pelopid. c. 29) calls him nephew. Xenophon does not expressly say
-which; but his narrative seems to countenance the statement of Diodorus
-rather than that of Plutarch.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_533"><a href="#FNanchor_533">[533]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 61.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_534"><a href="#FNanchor_534">[534]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 67.
-</p>
-<p>
-The transactions of Macedonia and Thessaly at this period are difficult
-to make out clearly. What is stated in the text comes from Diodorus;
-who affirms, however, farther,—that Pelopidas marched into Macedonia,
-and brought back as a hostage to Thebes the youthful Philip, brother of
-Alexander. This latter affirmation is incorrect; we know that Philip was
-in Macedonia, and free, <i>after</i> the death of Alexander. And I believe that
-the march of Pelopidas into Macedonia, with the bringing back of Philip
-as a hostage, took place in the following year 368 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-Justin also states (vii, 5) erroneously, that Alexander of Macedon gave
-his brother Philip as a hostage, first to the Illyrians, next to the Thebans.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_535"><a href="#FNanchor_535">[535]</a></span>
-Demosthen. De Fals. Leg. c. 58, p. 402; Diodorus, xv, 71.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus makes the mistake of calling this Ptolemy son of Amyntas
-and brother of Perdikkas; though he at the same time describes him as
-Πτολεμαῖος Ἀλωρίτης, which description would hardly be applied to one of
-the royal brothers. Moreover, the passage of Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 14,
-p. 250, shows that Ptolemy was not son of Amyntas; and Dexippus (ap.
-Syncellum, p. 263) confirms the fact.
-</p>
-<p>
-See these points discussed in Mr. Fynes Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, Appendix,
-c. 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_536"><a href="#FNanchor_536">[536]</a></span>
-Diodor. xvi, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_537"><a href="#FNanchor_537">[537]</a></span>
-Æschines, Fals. Legat. c. 13, 14, p. 249, 250; Justin, vii, 6.
-</p>
-<p>
-Æschines mentions Ptolemy as regent, on behalf of Eurydikê and her
-younger sons. Æschines also mentions Alexander as having recently died,
-but says nothing about his assassination. Nevertheless there is no reason
-to doubt that he was assassinated, which we know both from Demosthenes
-and Diodorus; and assassinated by Ptolemy, which we know from Plutarch
-(Pelop. c. 27), Marsyas (ap. Athenæum, xiv. p. 629), and Diodorus.
-Justin states that Eurydikê conspired both against her husband Amyntas,
-and against her children, in concert with a paramour. The statements of
-Æschines rather tend to disprove the charge of her having been concerned
-in the death of Amyntas, but to support that of her having been accomplice
-with Ptolemy in the murder of Alexander.
-</p>
-<p>
-Assassination was a fate which frequently befel the Macedonian kings.
-When we come to the history of Olympias, mother of Alexander the
-Great, it will be seen that Macedonian queens were capable of greater
-crimes than those imputed to Eurydikê.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_538"><a href="#FNanchor_538">[538]</a></span>
-Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 13, 14, p. 249, 250; Cornelius Nepos, Iphicrates,
-c. 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_539"><a href="#FNanchor_539">[539]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 150.
-</p>
-<p>
-μισθοῖ πάλιν αὑτὸν (Charidemus) τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις, τοῖς ὑμετέροις ἐχθροῖς
-καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσιν Ἀμφίπολιν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον.
-</p>
-<p>
-Demosthenes is here speaking of the time when Timotheus superseded
-Iphikrates in the command, that is, about 365-364 <small>B.C.</small> But we are fairly
-entitled to presume that the same is true of 369 or 368 <small>B.C.</small></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_540"><a href="#FNanchor_540">[540]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 149, c. 37.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_541"><a href="#FNanchor_541">[541]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristokr. p. 669, s. 149, c. 37.
-</p>
-<p>
-The passage in which the orator alludes to these <i>hostages</i> of the Amphipolitans
-in the hands of Iphikrates, is unfortunately not fully intelligible
-without farther information.
-</p>
-<p>
-(Charidemus) Πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς <em class="gesperrt">Ἀμφιπολιτῶν ὁμήρους, οὓς παρ’ Ἁρπάλου
-λαβὼν Ἰφικράτης ἔδωκε φυλάττειν αὐτῷ, ψηφισαμένων ὑμῶν</em> ὡς ὑμᾶς
-κομίσαι, παρέδωκεν Ἀμφιπολίταις· καὶ τοῦ μὴ λαβεῖν Ἀμφίπολιν, τοῦτ’
-ἐμπόδιον κατέστη.
-</p>
-<p>
-Who Harpalus was,—or what is meant by Iphikrates “obtaining (or
-capturing) from him the Amphipolitan hostages”—we cannot determine.
-Possibly Harpalus may have been commander of a body of Macedonians
-or Thracians acting as auxiliaries to the Amphipolitans, and in this character
-exacting hostages from them as security. Charidemus, as we see afterwards
-when acting for Kersobleptes, received hostages from the inhabitants
-of Sestos (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 679. c. 40 s. 177).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_542"><a href="#FNanchor_542">[542]</a></span>
-Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libertat. c. 5, p. 193.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_543"><a href="#FNanchor_543">[543]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 1.
-</p>
-<p>
-The words τῷ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει must denote the year beginning in the spring
-of 369 <small>B.C.</small> On this point I agree with Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch.
-40, p. 145 note); differing from him however (p. 146 note), as well as from
-Mr. Clinton, in this,—that I place the second expedition of Epaminondas
-into Peloponnesus (as Sievers places it, p. 278) in 369 <small>B.C.</small>; not in 368
-<small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-The narrative of Xenophon carries to my mind conviction that this is
-what he meant to affirm. In the beginning of Book VII, he says, τῷ δ’ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει
-Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων πρέσβεις ἦλθον αὐτοκράτορες Ἀθήναζε, βουλευσόμενοι
-καθ’ ὅ,τι ἡ συμμαχία ἔσοιτο Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις.
-</p>
-<p>
-Now the words τῷ δ’ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει denote the spring of 369 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenophon goes on to describe the assembly and the discussion at Athens,
-respecting the terms of alliance. This description occupies, from vii, 1, 1
-to vii, 1, 14, where the final vote and agreement is announced.
-</p>
-<p>
-Immediately after this vote, Xenophon goes on to say,—Στρατευομένων δ’ ἀμφοτέρων
-αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων (Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and allies)
-εἰς Κόρινθον, ἔδοξε κοινῇ φυλάττειν τὸ Ὄνειον. Καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐπορεύοντο οἱ Θηβαῖοι
-καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι, παραταξάμενοι ἐφύλαττον ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν τοῦ Ὀνείου.
-</p>
-<p>
-I conceive that the decision of the Athenian assembly,—the march of
-the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to guard the lines of Oneion,—and
-the march of the Thebans to enter Peloponnesus,—are here placed by
-Xenophon as events in immediate sequence, with no long interval of time
-between them. I see no ground to admit the interval of a year between
-the vote of the assembly and the march of the Thebans; the more so, as
-Epaminondas might reasonably presume that the building of Megalopolis
-and Messene, recently begun, would need to be supported by another Theban
-army in Peloponnesus during 369 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-It is indeed contended (and admitted even by Sievers) that Epaminondas
-could not have been reëlected Bœotarch in 369 <small>B.C.</small> But in this point I
-do not concur. It appears to me that the issue of the trial at Thebes was
-triumphant for him; thus making it more probable,—not less probable,—that
-he and Pelopidas were reëlected Bœotarchs immediately.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_544"><a href="#FNanchor_544">[544]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 10-14.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_545"><a href="#FNanchor_545">[545]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 15, 16; Diodor. xv, 68.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_546"><a href="#FNanchor_546">[546]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 16; Polyænus, ii, 2, 9.
-</p>
-<p>
-This was an hour known to be favorable to sudden assailants, affording
-a considerable chance that the enemy might be off their guard. It was at
-the same hour that the Athenian Thrasybulus surprised the troops of the
-Thirty, near Phylê in Attica (Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 6).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_547"><a href="#FNanchor_547">[547]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. ib.; Pausanias, ix, 15, 2.
-</p>
-<p>
-Pausanias describes the battle as having been fought περὶ Λέχαιον; not
-very exact, topographically, since it was on the other side of Corinth, between
-Corinth and Kenchreæ.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus (xv, 68) states that the whole space across, from Kenchreæ on
-one sea to Lechæum on the other, was trenched and palisaded by the Athenians
-and Spartans. But this cannot be true, because the Long Walls
-were a sufficient defence between Corinth and Lechæum; and even between
-Corinth and Kenchreæ, it is not probable that any such continuous line of
-defence was drawn, though the assailable points were probably thus guarded.
-Xenophon does not mention either trench or palisade.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_548"><a href="#FNanchor_548">[548]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 14-17; Diodor. xv, 68.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_549"><a href="#FNanchor_549">[549]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 18; vii, 2, 11; Diodor. xv, 69.
-</p>
-<p>
-This march against Sikyon seems alluded to by Pausanias (vi, 3, 1); the
-Eleian horse were commanded by Stomius, who slew the enemy’s commander
-with his own hand.
-</p>
-<p>
-The stratagem of the Bœotian Pammenes in attacking the harbor of
-Sikyon (Polyænus, v, 16, 4) may perhaps belong to this undertaking.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_550"><a href="#FNanchor_550">[550]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 18, 22, 44; vii, 3, 2-8.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_551"><a href="#FNanchor_551">[551]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 5-9.
-</p>
-<p>
-This incident may have happened in 369 <small>B.C.</small>, just about the time when
-Epaminondas surprised and broke through the defensive lines of Mount
-Oneium. In the second chapter of the seventh Book, Xenophon takes up
-the history of Phlius, and carries it on from the winter of 370-369 <small>B.C.</small>,
-when Epaminondas invaded Laconia, through 369, 368, 367 <small>B.C.</small></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_552"><a href="#FNanchor_552">[552]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 17.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_553"><a href="#FNanchor_553">[553]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 19; Diodor. xv, 69.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_554"><a href="#FNanchor_554">[554]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 22; Diodor. xv, 70.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus states that these mercenaries had been furnished with pay for
-five months; if this is correct, I presume that we must understand it as
-comprehending the time of their voyage from Sicily and back to Sicily.
-Nevertheless, the language of Xenophon would not lead us to suppose that
-they remained in Peloponnesus even so long as three months.
-</p>
-<p>
-I think it certain however that much more must have passed in this campaign
-than what Xenophon indicates. Epaminondas would hardly have
-forced the passage of the Oneium for such small objects as we find mentioned
-in the Hellenica.
-</p>
-<p>
-An Athenian Inscription, extremely defective, yet partially restored and
-published by M. Boeckh (Corp. Inscr. No. 85 a. Addenda to vol. i, p. 897),
-records a vote of the Athenian people and of the synod of Athenian confederates—praising
-Dionysius of Syracuse,—and recording him with his
-two sons as benefactors of Athens. It was probably passed somewhere
-near this time; and we know from Demosthenes that the Athenians granted
-the freedom of their city to Dionysius and his descendants (Demosthenes
-ad Philipp. Epistol. p. 161, as well as the Epistle of Philip, on which this
-is a comment). The Inscription is too defective to warrant any other inferences.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_555"><a href="#FNanchor_555">[555]</a></span>
-Pausanias, ix, 15, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_556"><a href="#FNanchor_556">[556]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 23.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_557"><a href="#FNanchor_557">[557]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 25.
-</p>
-<p>
-Στρατευσάμενοι δὲ καὶ εἰς Ἀσίνην τῆς Λακωνικῆς, ἐνίκησάν τε τὴν τῶν
-Λακεδαιμονίων φρουρὰν, καὶ τὸν Γεράνορα, τὸν πολέμαρχον Σπαρτιάτην
-γεγενημένον, ἀπέκτειναν, καὶ τὸ προάστειον τῶν Ἀσιναίων ἐπόρθησαν.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus states that Lykomedes and the Arcadians took Pellênê, which
-is in a different situation, and can hardly refer to the same expedition (xv,
-67).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_558"><a href="#FNanchor_558">[558]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 26.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_559"><a href="#FNanchor_559">[559]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30, 31.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_560"><a href="#FNanchor_560">[560]</a></span>
-Polyb. iv, 77.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_561"><a href="#FNanchor_561">[561]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 26; vii, 4, 12.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_562"><a href="#FNanchor_562">[562]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27. Ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐλθόντες, τῷ μὲν θεῷ
-οὐδὲν ἐκοινώσαντο, ὅπως ἂν ἡ εἰρήνη γένοιτο, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐβουλεύοντο.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_563"><a href="#FNanchor_563">[563]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27; Diodor. xv, 70.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus states that Philiskus was sent by Artaxerxes; which seems not
-exact; he was sent by Ariobarzanes in the name of Artaxerxes. Diodorus
-also says that Philiskus left two thousand mercenaries with pay provided,
-for the service of the Lacedæmonians; which troops are never afterwards
-mentioned.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_564"><a href="#FNanchor_564">[564]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_565"><a href="#FNanchor_565">[565]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_566"><a href="#FNanchor_566">[566]</a></span>
-See this fact indicated in Isokrates, Archidamus (Or. vi,) s. 2-11.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_567"><a href="#FNanchor_567">[567]</a></span>
-Pausanias, vi, 2, 5.
-</p>
-<p>
-Two Messenian victors had been proclaimed during the interval; but
-they were inhabitants of Messênê in Sicily. And these two were ancient
-citizens of Zanklê, the name which the Sicilian Messênê bore before Anaxilaus
-the despot chose to give to it this last-mentioned name.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_568"><a href="#FNanchor_568">[568]</a></span>
-See the contrary, or Spartan, feeling,—disgust at the idea of persons
-who had just been their slaves, presenting themselves as spectators and
-competitors in the plain of Olympia,—set forth in Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus)
-s. 111, 112.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_569"><a href="#FNanchor_569">[569]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 26.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_570"><a href="#FNanchor_570">[570]</a></span>
-Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 249.
-</p>
-<p>
-... διδάσκων, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὑπὲρ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἀντέπραττε (Ptolemy)
-τῇ πόλει (to Athens), καὶ πρὸς Θηβαίους διαφερομένων Ἀθηναίων, συμμαχίαν ἐποιήσατο, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Neither Plutarch nor Diodorus appear to me precise in specifying and
-distinguishing the different expeditions of Pelopidas into Thessaly. I cannot
-but think that he made four different expeditions; two before his embassy
-to the Persian court (which embassy took place in 367 <small>B.C.</small>; see Mr.
-Clinton, Fast. Hellen. on that year, who rightly places the date of the embassy),
-and two after it.
-</p>
-<p>
-1. The first was, in 369 <small>B.C.</small>, after the death of Amyntas, but during the
-short reign, less than two years, of his son Alexander of Macedon.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus mentions this fact (xv, 67), but he adds, what is erroneous, that
-Pelopidas on this occasion brought back Philip as a hostage.
-</p>
-<p>
-2. The second was in 368 <small>B.C.</small>; also mentioned by Diodorus (xv, 71)
-and by Plutarch (Pelop. c. 26).
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus (erroneously, as I think) connects this expedition with the seizure
-and detention of Pelopidas by Alexander of Pheræ. But it was really
-on this occasion that Pelopidas brought back the hostages.
-</p>
-<p>
-3. The third (which was rather a mission than an expedition) was in 366
-<small>B.C.</small>, after the return of Pelopidas from the Persian court, which happened
-seemingly in the beginning of 366 <small>B.C.</small> In this third march, Pelopidas was
-seized and made prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ, until he was released by
-Epaminondas. Plutarch mentions this expedition, clearly distinguishing
-it from the second (Pelopidas, c. 27—μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν, etc.); but with
-this mistake, in my judgment, that he places it before the journey of Pelopidas
-to the Persian court; whereas it really occurred after and in consequence
-of that journey, which dates in 367 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-4. The fourth and last, in 364-363 <small>B.C.</small>; wherein he was slain (Diodor.
-xv. 80; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 32).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_571"><a href="#FNanchor_571">[571]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_572"><a href="#FNanchor_572">[572]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28. The place here called Midea cannot be identified.
-The only place of that name known, is in the territory of Argos,
-quite different from what is here mentioned. O. Müller proposes to substitute
-Malæa for Midea; a conjecture, which there are no means of verifying.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_573"><a href="#FNanchor_573">[573]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28-32; Diodor. xv, 72; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 33.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_574"><a href="#FNanchor_574">[574]</a></span>
-I think that this third expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus
-belongs to 367 <small>B.C.</small>; being simultaneous with the embassy of Pelopidas to
-the Persian court. Many chronologers place it in 366 <small>B.C.</small>, after the conclusion
-of that embassy; because the mention of it occurs in Xenophon
-after he has brought the embassy to a close. But I do not conceive that
-this proves the fact of subsequent date. For we must recollect that the embassy
-lasted several months; moreover the expedition was made while
-Epaminondas was Bœotarch; and he ceased to be so during the year 366
-<small>B.C.</small> Besides, if we place the expedition in 366 <small>B.C.</small>, there will hardly be
-time left for the whole career of Euphron at Sikyon, which intervened before
-the peace of 366 <small>B.C.</small> between Thebes and Corinth (see Xen. Hellen.
-vii, 1, 44 <i>seq.</i>).
-</p>
-<p>
-The relation of cotemporaneousness between the embassy of Pelopidas
-to Persia, and the expedition of Epaminondas, seems indicated when we
-compare vii, 1, 33 with vii, 1, 48—Συνεχῶς δὲ βουλευόμενοι οἱ Θηβαῖοι, ὅπως ἂν
-τὴν ἡγεμονίαν λάβοιεν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἐνόμισαν εἰ πέμψειαν πρὸς τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα,
-etc. Then Xenophon proceeds to recount the whole embassy,
-together with its unfavorable reception on returning, which takes up
-the entire space until vii, 2, 41, when he says—Αὖθις δ’ Ἐπαμεινώνδας, βουληθεὶς
-τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς προσυπαγαγέσθαι, ὅπως μᾶλλον σφίσι καὶ οἱ Ἀρκάδες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι
-προσέχοιεν τὸν νοῦν, ἔγνωκε στρατευτέον εἶναι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀχαΐαν.
-</p>
-<p>
-This fresh expedition of Epaminondas is one of the modes adopted by
-the Thebans of manifesting their general purpose expressed in the former
-words,—συνεχῶς βουλευόμενοι, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_575"><a href="#FNanchor_575">[575]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 42-44.
-</p>
-<p>
-The neutrality before observed, is implied in the phrase whereby Xenophon
-describes their conduct afterwards; ἐπεὶ δὲ κατελθόντες <em class="gesperrt">οὐκέτι ἐμέσευον</em>, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_576"><a href="#FNanchor_576">[576]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 42.
-</p>
-<p>
-His expression marks how completely these terms were granted by the
-personal determination of Epaminondas, overruling opposition,—<em class="gesperrt">ἐνδυναστεύει</em>
-ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ὥστε μὴ φυγαδεῦσαι τοὺς κρατίστους, μηδὲ τὰς πολιτείας μεταστῆσαι, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_577"><a href="#FNanchor_577">[577]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 75.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_578"><a href="#FNanchor_578">[578]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 43; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 25.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus (xv, 72) refers the displeasure of the Thebans against Epaminondas
-to the events of the preceding year. They believed (according to
-Diodorus) that Epaminondas had improperly spared the Spartans, and not
-pushed his victory so far as might have been done, when he forced the lines
-of Mount Oneium in 369 <small>B.C.</small> But it is scarcely credible that the Thebans
-should have been displeased on this account; for the forcing of the lines
-was a capital exploit, and we may see from Xenophon that Epaminondas
-achieved much more than the Spartans and their friends believed to be possible.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenophon tells us that the Thebans were displeased with Epaminondas,
-on complaint from the Arcadians and others, for his conduct in Achaia two
-years after the action at Oneium; that is, in 367 <small>B.C.</small> This is much more
-probable in itself, and much more consistent with the general series of
-facts, than the cause assigned by Diodorus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_579"><a href="#FNanchor_579">[579]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 23.
-</p>
-<p>
-For a similar case, in which exiles from many different cities, congregating
-in a body, became strong enough to carry their restoration in each city
-successively, see Thucyd. i, 113.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_580"><a href="#FNanchor_580">[580]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 44-46; Diodor. xv, 70.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_581"><a href="#FNanchor_581">[581]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen, vii, 3, 8.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_582"><a href="#FNanchor_582">[582]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 6-9.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_583"><a href="#FNanchor_583">[583]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 10.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_584"><a href="#FNanchor_584">[584]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 11-15.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_585"><a href="#FNanchor_585">[585]</a></span>
-This change of politics at Pellênê is not mentioned by Xenophon, at
-the time, though it is noticed afterwards (vii, 4, 17) as a fact accomplished;
-but we must suppose it to have occurred now, in order to reconcile sections
-11-14 with sections 18-20 of vii, 2.
-</p>
-<p>
-The strong Laconian partialities of Xenophon induce him to allot not
-only warm admiration, but a space disproportionate compared with other
-parts of his history, to the exploits of the brave little Phliasian community.
-Unfortunately, here, as elsewhere, he is obscure in the description of particular
-events, and still more perplexing when we try to draw from him a
-clear idea of the general series.
-</p>
-<p>
-With all the defects and partiality of Xenophon’s narrative, however, we
-must recollect that it is a description of real events by a contemporary author
-who had reasonable means of information. This is a precious ingredient,
-which gives value to all that he says; inasmuch as we are so constantly
-obliged to borrow our knowledge of Grecian history either from
-authors who write at second-hand and after the time,—or from orators
-whose purposes are usually different from those of the historian. Hence I
-have given a short abridgment of these Phliasian events as described by
-Xenophon, though they were too slight to exercise influence on the main
-course of the war.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_586"><a href="#FNanchor_586">[586]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 18-23.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_587"><a href="#FNanchor_587">[587]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 9.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_588"><a href="#FNanchor_588">[588]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 4-6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_589"><a href="#FNanchor_589">[589]</a></span>
-This refers to the secret expedition of Pelopidas and the six other
-Theban conspirators from Athens to Thebes, at the time when the Lacedæmonians
-were masters of that town and garrisoned the Kadmeia. The
-conspirators, through the contrivance of the secretary Phyllidas, got access
-in disguise to the oligarchical leaders of Thebes, who were governing under
-Lacedæmonian ascendency, and put them to death. This event is described
-in a former chapter, Ch. lxxvii, p. 85 <i>seq.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_590"><a href="#FNanchor_590">[590]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 7-11.
-</p>
-<p>
-To the killing of Euphron, followed by a defence so characteristic and
-emphatic on the part of the agent,—Schneider and others refer, with great
-probability, the allusion in the Rhetoric of Aristotle (ii, 24, 2)—καὶ περὶ
-τοῦ Θήβῃσιν ἀποθανόντος, περὶ οὗ ἐκέλευε κρῖναι, εἰ δίκαιος ἦν ἀποθανεῖν ὡς
-οὐκ ἄδικον ὂν ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν δικαίως ἀποθανόντα.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_591"><a href="#FNanchor_591">[591]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 12.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_592"><a href="#FNanchor_592">[592]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_593"><a href="#FNanchor_593">[593]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_594"><a href="#FNanchor_594">[594]</a></span>
-It is plain that Messênê was the great purpose with Pelopidas in his
-mission to the Persian court; we see this not only from Cornelius Nepos
-(Pelop. c. 4) and Diodorus (xv, 81), but also even from Xenophon, Hellen.
-vii, 1, 36.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_595"><a href="#FNanchor_595">[595]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-38; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30; Plutarch, Artaxerx.
-c. 22.
-</p>
-<p>
-The words of Xenophon ἠκολούθει δὲ καὶ Ἀργεῖος must allude to some
-Argeian envoy; though the name is not mentioned, and must probably
-have dropped out,—or perhaps the word τις, as Xenophon may not have
-heard the name.
-</p>
-<p>
-It would appear that in the mission which Pharnabazus conducted up to
-the Persian court (or at least undertook to conduct) in 408 <small>B.C.</small>, envoys
-from hostile Greek cities were included in the same company (Xen. Hellen.
-i, 3, 13), as on the present occasion.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_596"><a href="#FNanchor_596">[596]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.
-</p>
-<p>
-His colleague Ismenias, however, is said to have dropped his ring, and
-then to have stooped to pick it up, immediately before the king; thus going
-through the prostration.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_597"><a href="#FNanchor_597">[597]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_598"><a href="#FNanchor_598">[598]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 36. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ βασιλέως ὁ Πελοπίδας
-τί βούλοιτο ἑαυτῷ γραφῆναι, εἶπεν ὅτι Μεσσήνην τε αὐτόνομον εἶναι ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων,
-καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἀνέλκειν τὰς ναῦς: εἰ δὲ ταῦτα μὴ πείθοιντο, στρατεύειν ἐπ’ αὐτούς·
-<em class="gesperrt">εἴ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι ἀκολουθεῖν</em>, ἐπὶ ταύτην πρῶτον ἰέναι.
-</p>
-<p>
-It is clear that these are not the exact words of the rescript of 367 <small>B.C.</small>,
-though in the former case of the peace of Antalkidas (387 <small>B.C.</small>) Xenophon
-seems to have given the rescript in its exact words (v, 1, 31).
-</p>
-<p>
-What he states afterwards (vii, 1, 38) about Elis and Arcadia proves that
-other matters were included. Accordingly I do not hesitate to believe that
-Amphipolis also was recognized as autonomous. This we read in Demosthenes,
-Fals. Leg. p. 383, c. 42. Καὶ γάρ τοι πρῶτον μὲν Ἀμφίπολιν πόλιν ἡμετέραν
-δούλην κατέστησεν (the king of Persia), <em class="gesperrt">ἣν τότε σύμμαχον αὐτῷ καὶ φίλην</em>
-ἔγραψεν. Demosthenes is here alluding to the effect
-produced on the mind of the Great King, and to the alteration in his proceedings,
-when he learnt that Timagoras had been put to death on returning
-to Athens; the adverb of time τότε alludes to the rescript given when
-Timagoras was present.
-</p>
-<p>
-In the words of Xenophon,—εἴ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι <em class="gesperrt">ἀκολουθεῖν</em>,—the
-headship of Thebes is declared or implied. Compare the convention
-imposed by Sparta upon Olynthus, after the latter was subdued (v, 3, 26.)</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_599"><a href="#FNanchor_599">[599]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38. Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πρέσβεων ὁ μὲν Ἠλεῖος Ἀρχίδαμος,
-ὅτι <em class="gesperrt">προὐτίμησε τὴν Ἦλιν πρὸ τῶν Ἀρκάδων</em>, ἐπήνει τὰ τοῦ βασιλέως· ὁ δ’ Ἀντίοχος,
-ὅτι <em class="gesperrt">ἠλαττοῦτο τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν</em>, οὔτε τὰ δῶρα ἐδέξατο, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_600"><a href="#FNanchor_600">[600]</a></span>
-Demosthen. Fals. Leg. c. 42, p. 383.
-</p>
-<p>
-In another passage of the same oration (c. 57, p. 400), Demosthenes says
-that Leon had been joint envoy with Timagoras <i>for four years</i>. Certainly
-this mission of Pelopidas to the Persian court cannot have lasted four years;
-and Xenophon states that the Athenians sent the two envoys when they
-heard that Pelopidas was going thither. I imagine that Leon and Timagoras
-may have been sent up to the Persian court shortly after the battle of
-Leuktra, at the time when the Athenians caused the former rescript of the
-Persian king to be resworn, putting Athens as head into the place of Sparta
-(Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 1, 2). This was exactly four years before (371-367 <small>B.C.</small>).
-Leon and Timagoras having jointly undertaken and perhaps recently
-returned from their first embassy, were now sent <i>jointly</i> on a second. Demosthenes
-has summed up the time of the two as if it were one.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_601"><a href="#FNanchor_601">[601]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30.
-</p>
-<p>
-Demosthenes speaks of the amount received, in money, by Timagoras
-from the Persian king as having been forty talents, ὡς λέγεται (Fals. Leg.
-p. 383), besides other presents and conveniences. Compare also Plutarch,
-Artaxerxes, c. 22.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_602"><a href="#FNanchor_602">[602]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_603"><a href="#FNanchor_603">[603]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 30.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_604"><a href="#FNanchor_604">[604]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 40. Καὶ αὐτὴ μὲν ἡ Πελοπίδου καὶ
-τῶν Θηβαίων τῆς ἀρχῆς περιβολὴ οὕτω διελύθη.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_605"><a href="#FNanchor_605">[605]</a></span>
-The strong expressions of Demosthenes show what a remarkable effect
-was produced by the news at Athens (cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 142).
-</p>
-<p>
-Τί δ’; Ἀλέξανδρον ἐκεῖνον τὸν Θετταλὸν, ἡνίκ’ εἶχε μὲν αἰχμάλωτον δήσας Πελοπίδαν,
-ἐχθρὸς δ’ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἦν Θηβαίοις, ὑμῖν δ’ οἰκείως διέκειτο, οὕτως ὥστε παρ’ ὑμῶν
-στρατηγὸν αἰτεῖν, ἐβοηθεῖτε δ’ αὐτῷ καὶ πάντ’ ἦν Ἀλέξανδρος, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Alexander is said to have promised to the Athenians so ample a supply
-of cattle as should keep the price of meat very low at Athens (Plutarch,
-Apophtheg. Reg. p. 193 E.)</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_606"><a href="#FNanchor_606">[606]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 71; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 28; Pausanias ix, 15, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_607"><a href="#FNanchor_607">[607]</a></span>
-Plutarch (Pelopidas, c. 29) says, a truce for thirty days; but it is difficult
-to believe that Alexander would have been satisfied with a term so very
-short.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_608"><a href="#FNanchor_608">[608]</a></span>
-The account of the seizure of Pelopidas by Alexander, with its consequences,
-is contained chiefly in Diodorus, xv, 71-75; Plutarch, Pelopidas,
-c. 27-29; Cornel. Nep. Pelop. c. 5; Pausanias, ix, 15, 1. Xenophon does
-not mention it.
-</p>
-<p>
-I have placed the seizure in the year 366 <small>B.C.</small>, after the return of Pelopidas
-from his embassy in Persia; which embassy I agree with Mr. Fynes
-Clinton in referring to the year 367 <small>B.C.</small> Plutarch places the seizure before
-the embassy; Diodorus places it in the year between Midsummer 368 and
-Midsummer 367 <small>B.C.</small>; but he does not mention the embassy at all, in its
-regular chronological order; he only alludes to it in summing up the exploits
-at the close of the career of Pelopidas.
-</p>
-<p>
-Assuming the embassy to the Persian court to have occurred in 367 <small>B.C.</small>,
-the seizure cannot well have happened before that time.
-</p>
-<p>
-The year 368 <small>B.C.</small> seems to have been that wherein Pelopidas made his
-second expedition into Thessaly, from which he returned victorious, bringing
-back the hostages. See above, p. 264, note.
-</p>
-<p>
-The seizure of Pelopidas was accomplished at a time when Epaminondas
-was not Bœotarch, nor in command of the Theban army. Now it seems to
-have been not until the close of 367 <small>B.C.</small>, after the accusations arising out
-of his proceedings in Achaia, that Epaminondas missed being rechosen as
-general.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenophon, in describing the embassy of Pelopidas to Persia, mentions
-his grounds for expecting a favorable reception, and the matters which he
-had to boast of (Hell. vii, 1, 35). Now if Pelopidas, immediately before,
-had been seized and detained for some months in prison by Alexander of
-Pheræ, surely Xenophon would have alluded to it as an item on the other
-side. I know that this inference from the silence of Xenophon is not always
-to be trusted. But in this case, we must recollect that he dislikes both
-the Theban leaders; and we may fairly conclude, that where he is enumerating
-the trophies of Pelopidas, he would hardly have failed to mention a
-signal disgrace, if there had been one, immediately preceding.
-</p>
-<p>
-Pelopidas was taken prisoner by Alexander, not in battle, but when in
-pacific mission, and under circumstances in which no man less infamous
-than Alexander would have seized him (παρασπονδηθεὶς—Plutarch, Apoph.
-p. 194 D.; Pausan. ix, 15, 1; “legationis jure satis tectum se arbitraretur”
-Corn. Nep.). His imprudence in trusting himself under any circumstances
-to such a man as Alexander, is blamed by Polybius (viii, 1) and others.
-But we must suppose such imprudence to be partly justified or explained
-by some plausible circumstances; and the proclamation of the Persian rescript
-appears to me to present the most reasonable explanation of his proceeding.
-</p>
-<p>
-On these grounds, which, in my judgment, outweigh any probabilities on
-the contrary side, I have placed the seizure of Pelopidas in 366 <small>B.C.</small>, after
-the embassy to Persia; not without feeling, however, that the chronology
-of this period cannot be rendered absolutely certain.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_609"><a href="#FNanchor_609">[609]</a></span>
-Plutarch. Pelopid c. 31-35.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_610"><a href="#FNanchor_610">[610]</a></span>
-See the instructive Inscription and comments published by Professor
-Ross, in which the Deme Γραῆς, near Oropus, was first distinctly made
-known (Ross, Die Demen von Attika, p. 6, 7—Halle, 1846).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_611"><a href="#FNanchor_611">[611]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Orat. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 22-40.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_612"><a href="#FNanchor_612">[612]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1; Diodor. xv, 76.
-</p>
-<p>
-The previous capture of Oropus, when Athens lost it in 411 <small>B.C.</small>, was
-accomplished under circumstances very analogous (Thucyd. viii, 60).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_613"><a href="#FNanchor_613">[613]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1; Diodor. xv, 76.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 259, s. 123; Æschines cont. Ktesiphont.
-p. 397, s. 85.
-</p>
-<p>
-It would seem that we are to refer to this loss of Oropus the trial of Chabrias
-and Kallistratus in Athens, together with the memorable harangue of
-the latter which Demosthenes heard as a youth with such strong admiration.
-But our information is so vague and scanty, that we can make out nothing
-certainly on the point. Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei,
-p. 109-114) brings together all the scattered testimonies in an instructive
-chapter.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_614"><a href="#FNanchor_614">[614]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 39; vii, 4, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_615"><a href="#FNanchor_615">[615]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 3.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenophon notices the singularity of the accident. There were plenty of
-vessels in Peiræus; Lykomedes had only to make his choice, and to determine
-where he would disembark. He fixed upon the exact spot where the
-exiles were assembled, not knowing that they were there—δαιμονιώτατα ἀποθνήσκει.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_616"><a href="#FNanchor_616">[616]</a></span>
-Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 6: Plutarch, Repub. Ger. Præc. p.
-810 F.; Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 193 D.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare a similar reference, on the part of others, to the crimes embodied
-in Theban legend (Justin, ix, 3).
-</p>
-<p>
-Perhaps it may have been during this embassy into Peloponnesus, that
-Kallistratus addressed the discourse to the public assembly at Mêssenê, to
-which Aristotle makes allusion (Rhetoric, iii, 17, 3); possibly enough,
-against Epaminondas also.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_617"><a href="#FNanchor_617">[617]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 4-6.
-</p>
-<p>
-The public debates of the Athenian assembly were not favorable to the
-success of a scheme, like that proposed by Demotion, to which secrecy was
-indispensable. Compare another scheme, divulged in like manner, in Thucydides,
-iii, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_618"><a href="#FNanchor_618">[618]</a></span>
-It seems probable that these were the mercenaries placed by the Corinthians
-under the command of Timophanes, and employed by him afterwards
-as instruments for establishing a despotism.
-</p>
-<p>
-Plutarch (Timoleon, c. 3, 4) alludes briefly to mercenaries equipped about
-this time (as far as we can verify his chronology) and to the Corinthian
-mercenaries now assembled, in connection with Timoleon and Timophanes,
-of whom I shall have to say much in a future chapter.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_619"><a href="#FNanchor_619">[619]</a></span>
-Compare Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 8, 9 with Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus),
-s. 106.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_620"><a href="#FNanchor_620">[620]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 9.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_621"><a href="#FNanchor_621">[621]</a></span>
-This sentiment of dissatisfaction against the allies is strongly and repeatedly
-set forth in the oration of Isokrates called Archidamus, composed
-as if to be spoken in this synod,—and good evidence (whether actually
-spoken or not) of the feelings animating the prince and a large party at
-Sparta. Archidamus treats those allies who recommended the Spartans to
-surrender Messênê, as worse enemies even than those who had broken off
-altogether. He specifies Corinthians, Phliasians, and Epidaurians, sect. 11-13,—εἰς τοῦτο
-δ’ ἥκουσι πλεονεξίας, καὶ τοσαύτην ἡμῶν κατεγνώκασιν ἀνανδρίαν, ὥστε πολλάκις ἡμᾶς ἀξιώσαντες
-ὑπὲρ τῆς αὑτῶν πολεμεῖν, ὑπὲρ Μεσσήνης οὐκ οἴονται δεῖν κινδυνεύειν· ἀλλ’ ἵν’ αὐτοὶ τὴν σφετέραν
-αὐτῶν ἀσφαλῶς καρπῶνται, πειρῶνται διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς ὡς χρὴ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς τῆς ἡμετέρας παραχωρῆσαι,
-καὶ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπαπειλοῦσιν, ὡς, εἰ μὴ ταῦτα συγχωρήσομεν, ποιησόμενοι τὴν εἰρήνην κατὰ
-σφᾶς αὐτούς. Compare sect. 67, 87,
-99, 105, 106, 123.
-</p>
-<p>
-We may infer from this discourse of Isokrates, that the displeasure of
-the Spartans against their allies, because the latter advised them to relinquish
-Messênê,—was much greater than the narrative of Xenophon (Hellen.
-vii, 4, 8-11) would lead us to believe.
-</p>
-<p>
-In the argument prefixed to the discourse, it is asserted (among various
-other inaccuracies), that the Spartans had sent to Thebes to ask for peace,
-and that the Thebans had said in reply,—peace would be granted, εἰ Μεσσήνην ἀνοικίσωσι καὶ
-αὐτόνομον ἐάσωσι. Now the Spartans had never sent
-to Thebes for this purpose; the Corinthians went to Thebes, and there
-learnt the peremptory condition requiring that Messênê should be recognized.
-Next, the Thebans would never require Sparta to recolonize or reconstitute
-(ἀνοικίσαι) Messênê; that had been already done by the Thebans
-themselves.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_622"><a href="#FNanchor_622">[622]</a></span>
-Diodorus (xv, 76) states that the Persian king sent envoys to Greece
-who caused this peace to be concluded. But there seems no ground for believing
-that any Persian envoys had visited Greece since the return of Pelopidas,
-whose return with the rescript did in fact constitute a Persian intervention.
-The peace now concluded was upon the general basis of that
-rescript; so far, but no farther (as I conceive), the assertion of Diodorus
-about Persian intervention is exact.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_623"><a href="#FNanchor_623">[623]</a></span>
-Diodorus (xv, 76) is farther inaccurate in stating the peace as universally
-accepted, and as being a conclusion of the Bœotian and Lacedæmonian
-war, which had begun with the battle of Leuktra.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_624"><a href="#FNanchor_624">[624]</a></span>
-Xenophon, Enc. Agesil. ii, 30. ἐνόμιζε—τῷ Πέρσῃ δίκην ἐπιθήσειν
-καὶ τῶν πρόσθεν, καὶ ὅτι νῦν, σύμμαχος εἶναι φάσκων, ἐπέταττε Μεσσήνην ἀφιέναι.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_625"><a href="#FNanchor_625">[625]</a></span>
-This second mission of the Athenians to the Persian court (pursuant
-to the invitation contained in the rescript given to Pelopidas, Xen. Hellen.
-vii, 1, 37), appears to me implied in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 384, s. 150,
-p. 420, s. 283; Or. De Halonneso, p. 84, s. 30.
-</p>
-<p>
-If the king of Persia was informed that Timagoras had been put to death
-by his countrymen on returning to Athens,—and if he sent down (κατέπεμψεν)
-a fresh rescript about Amphipolis,—this information can only
-have been communicated, and the new rescript only obtained, by a second
-embassy sent to him from Athens.
-</p>
-<p>
-Perhaps the Lacedæmonian Kallias may have accompanied this second
-Athenian mission to Susa; we hear of him as having come back with a
-friendly letter from the Persian king to Agesilaus (Xenophon, Enc. Ages.
-viii, 3; Plutarch, Apophth. Lacon. p. 1213 E.), brought by a Persian messenger.
-But the statement is too vague to enable us to verify this as the
-actual occasion.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_626"><a href="#FNanchor_626">[626]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_627"><a href="#FNanchor_627">[627]</a></span>
-Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libert. p. 193, s. 10, cont. Aristokrat. p. 666, s.
-165; p. 687, s. 242.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_628"><a href="#FNanchor_628">[628]</a></span>
-Demosth. <i>ut sup.</i>; Isokrates, Or. xv, (De Permut.) s. 118; Cornel.
-Nepos, Timoth. c. 1.
-</p>
-<p>
-The stratagems whereby Timotheus procured money for his troops at Samos,
-are touched upon in the Pseudo-Aristoteles, Œconomic. ii, 23; and in
-Polyæn. iii, 10, 9; so far as we can understand them, they appear to be only
-contributions, levied under a thin disguise, upon the inhabitants.
-</p>
-<p>
-Since Ariobarzanes gave money to Agesilaus, he may perhaps have given
-some to Timotheus during this siege.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_629"><a href="#FNanchor_629">[629]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Enc. Ages. ii, 26; Polyænus, vii, 26.
-</p>
-<p>
-I do not know whether it is to this period that we are to refer the
-siege of Atarneus by Autophradates, which he was induced to relinquish
-by an ingenious proposition of Eubulus, who held the place (Aristot. Politic.
-ii, 4, 10).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_630"><a href="#FNanchor_630">[630]</a></span>
-It is with the greatest difficulty that we make out anything like a thread
-of events at this period; so miserably scanty and indistinct are our authorities.
-</p>
-<p>
-Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, chap, v. p. 118-130) is
-an instructive auxiliary in putting together the scraps of information; compare
-also Weissenborn, Hellen. p. 192-194 (Jena, 1844).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_631"><a href="#FNanchor_631">[631]</a></span>
-Xen. Enc. Ages. ii, 26, 27.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_632"><a href="#FNanchor_632">[632]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. xv, (De Permut.) s. 115-119; Cornelius Nepos, Timotheus,
-c. 1.
-</p>
-<p>
-Isokrates particularly dwells upon the fact that the conquests of Timotheus
-secured to Athens a large circumjacent territory—ὧν ληφθεισῶν ἅπας ὁ τόπος περιέχων
-οἰκεῖος ἠναγκάσθη τῇ πόλει γενέσθαι, etc. (s. 114).
-</p>
-<p>
-From the value of the Hellespont to Athens as ensuring a regular supply
-of corn imported from the Euxine, Sestus was sometimes called “the flour-board
-of the Peiræus”—ἡ τηλία τοῦ Πειραιῶς (Aristot. Rhetor. iii, 10, 3).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_633"><a href="#FNanchor_633">[633]</a></span>
-See Andokides de Pace, s. 15.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_634"><a href="#FNanchor_634">[634]</a></span>
-That the Athenian occupation of Samos (doubtless only in part) by
-kleruchs, <i>began</i> in 366 or 365 <small>B.C.</small>,—is established by Diodorus, xviii, 8-18,
-when he mentions the restoration of the Samians forty-three years afterwards
-by the Macedonian Perdikkas. This is not inconsistent with the
-fact that additional detachments of kleruchs were sent out in 361 and in
-352 <small>B.C.</small>, as mentioned by the Scholiast on Æschines cont. Timarch. p. 31
-c. 12; and by Philochorus, Fr. 131, ed. Didot. See the note of Wesseling,
-who questions the accuracy of the date in Diodorus. I dissent from his
-criticism, though he is supported both by Boeckh (Public Econ. of Athens,
-b. iii, p. 428) and by Mr. Clinton (F. H. ad ann. 352). I think it highly
-improbable that so long an interval should have elapsed between the capture
-of the island and the sending of the kleruchs, or that this latter measure,
-offensive as it was in the eyes of Greece, should have been <i>first</i> resorted
-to by Athens in 352 <small>B.C.</small>, when she had been so much weakened
-both by the Social War, and by the Progress of Philip. Strabo mentions
-two thousand kleruchs as having been sent to Samos. But whether he
-means the first batch alone, or altogether, we cannot say (Strabo xiv, p.
-638). The father of the philosopher Epikurus was among these kleruchs;
-compare Diogen. Laert. x, 1.
-</p>
-<p>
-Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ et Timothei, p. 127) seems to me
-to take a just view of the very difficult chronology of this period.
-</p>
-<p>
-Demosthenes mentions the property of the kleruchs, in his general review
-of the ways and means of Athens; in a speech delivered in Olym. 106, before
-352 <small>B.C.</small> (De Symmoriis, p. 182, s. 19).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_635"><a href="#FNanchor_635">[635]</a></span>
-See Demosthenes, De Halonneso, p. 86, s. 40-42; Æschines, De Fals.
-Legat. 264, s. 74.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_636"><a href="#FNanchor_636">[636]</a></span>
-Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii, 8, 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_637"><a href="#FNanchor_637">[637]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 201; p. 679, s. 209.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_638"><a href="#FNanchor_638">[638]</a></span>
-Xenophon, Enc. Agesil. ii, 26.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_639"><a href="#FNanchor_639">[639]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 141.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_640"><a href="#FNanchor_640">[640]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 174. Ἐπειδὴ τὸν μὲν Ἰφικράτην
-ἀποστράτηγον ἐποιήσατε, Τιμόθεον δ’ ἐπ’ Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ Χεῤῥόνησον ἐξεπέμψατε
-στρατηγὸν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_641"><a href="#FNanchor_641">[641]</a></span>
-See Demosthen. cont. Timoth. p. 1187, 1188, s. 10-15.
-</p>
-<p>
-Timotheus swore and pledged himself publicly in the Athenian assembly,
-on one occasion, to prefer against Iphikrates a γραφὴν ξενίας; but he never
-realized this engagement, and he even afterwards became so far reconciled
-with Iphikrates, as to give his daughter in marriage to the son of the latter
-(ibid. p. 1204, s. 78).
-</p>
-<p>
-To what precise date, or circumstance, this sworn engagement is to be
-referred, we cannot determine. Possibly the γραφὴ ξενίας may refer to the
-connection of Iphikrates with Kotys, which might entail in some manner
-the forfeiture of his right of citizenship; for it is difficult to understand
-how γραφὴ ξενίας, in its usual sense (implying the negation of any original
-right of citizenship), could ever be preferred as a charge against Iphikrates;
-who not only performed all the active duties of a citizen, but served in the
-highest post, and received from the people distinguished honors.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_642"><a href="#FNanchor_642">[642]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 153. ἐτόλμησεν ὑπὲρ τῶν
-Κότυος πραγμάτων ἐναντία τοῖς ὑμετέροις στρατηγοῖς ναυμαχεῖν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_643"><a href="#FNanchor_643">[643]</a></span>
-Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669. s. 174-177. Respecting these hostages,
-I can do nothing more than repeat the brief and obscure notice of Demosthenes.
-Of the various conjectures proposed to illustrate it, none appear
-to me at all satisfactory. Who Harpalus was, I cannot presume to say.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_644"><a href="#FNanchor_644">[644]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristocrat. p. 669. s. 175.
-</p>
-<p>
-The orator refers to letters written by Iphikrates and Timotheus to the
-Athenian people, in support of these allegations. Unfortunately these letters
-are not cited in substance.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_645"><a href="#FNanchor_645">[645]</a></span>
-Diodorus, xv, 77; Æschines de Fals. Leg. p. 250. c. 14.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_646"><a href="#FNanchor_646">[646]</a></span>
-Demosthenes (Olynth. 1, p. 21. s. 14) mentions the assistance of the
-Macedonians to Timotheus against Olynthus. Compare also his oration
-ad Philippi Epistolam (p. 154. s. 9). This can hardly allude to anything
-else than the war carried on by Timotheus on those coasts in 364 <small>B.C.</small> See
-also Polyæn. iii, 10, 14.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_647"><a href="#FNanchor_647">[647]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 81; Cornelius Nepos, Timoth. 1; Isokrates, Or. xv, (De
-Permut.) s. 115-119; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. s. 14. cont. Philokl. s. 19.
-</p>
-<p>
-I give in the text what I apprehend to be the real truth contained in the
-large assertion of Isokrates,—Χαλκιδεῖς ἅπαντας κατεπολέμησεν (s. 119).
-The orator states that Timotheus acquired twenty-four cities in all; but
-this total probably comprises his conquests in other times as well as in
-other places. The expression of Nepos—“Olynthios bello subegit” is
-vague.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_648"><a href="#FNanchor_648">[648]</a></span>
-Isokrates, <i>l. c.</i>; Aristotel. Œconomic. ii, 22: Polyæn. iii, 10, 14.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_649"><a href="#FNanchor_649">[649]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669. s. 177.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_650"><a href="#FNanchor_650">[650]</a></span>
-Polyænus (iii, 10, 8) mentions this fact, which is explained by comparing
-(in Thucydides, vii, 9) the description of the attack made by the Athenian
-Euetion upon Amphipolis in 414 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-These ill-successes of Timotheus stand enumerated, as I conceive, in
-that catalogue of <i>nine</i> defeats, which the Scholiast on Æschines (De Fals.
-Leg. p. 755, Reiske) specifies as having been undergone by Athens at the
-territory called <i>Nine Ways</i> (Ἐννέα Ὁδοὶ), the previous name of the spot
-where Amphipolis was built. They form the eighth and ninth items of the
-catalogue.
-</p>
-<p>
-The third item, is the capture of Amphipolis by Brasidas. The fourth
-is, the defeat of Kleon by Brasidas. Then come,—
-</p>
-<p>
-5. οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ἐπ’ Ἠϊόνα Ἀθηναῖοι ἐξελάθησαν. The only way in
-which I can make historical fact out of these words, is, by supposing that
-they allude to the driving in of all the out-resident Athenians to Athens,
-after the defeat of Ægospotami. We know from Thucydides that when
-Amphipolis was taken by Brasidas, many of the Athenians who were there
-settled retired to Eion; where they probably remained until the close of the
-Peloponnesian war, and were then forced back to Athens. We should then
-have to construe οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ἐπ’ Ἠϊόνα Ἀθηναῖοι—“the Athenians residing
-at Eion;” which, though not a usual sense of the preposition ἐπὶ with
-an accusative case, seems the only definite meaning which can be made out
-here.
-</p>
-<p>
-6. οἱ μετὰ Σιμμίχου στρατηγοῦντος διεφθάρησαν.
-</p>
-<p>
-7. ὅτε Πρωτόμαχος ἀπέτυχεν (Ἀμφιπολιτῶν αὐτοὺς παραδόντων τοῖς ὁμόροις Θρᾳξί,
-these last words are inserted by Bekker from a MS.). These
-two last-mentioned occurrences are altogether unknown. We may perhaps
-suppose them to refer to the period when Iphikrates was commanding the
-forces of Athens in these regions, from 368-365 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-8. ἐκπεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Τιμοθέου Ἀλκíμαχος ἀπέτυχεν αὐτοῦ, παραδόντων αὑτοὺς Θρᾳξὶν
-ἐπὶ Τιμοκράτους Ἀθήνῃσιν ἄρχοντος.
-</p>
-<p>
-The word Τιμοθέου is here inserted by Bekker from a MS., in place of
-Τιμοσθένους, which appeared in Reiske’s edition.
-</p>
-<p>
-9. Τιμόθεος ἐπιστρατεύσας ἡττήθη ἐπὶ Καλαμιώνος.
-</p>
-<p>
-Here are two defeats of Timotheus specified, one in the archonship of
-Timokrates, which exactly coincides with the command of Timotheus in
-these regions (Midsummer 364 to Midsummer 363 <small>B.C.</small>). But the other
-archon Kalamion, is unknown in the Fasti of Athens. Winiewski (Comment.
-in Demosth. de Corona, p. 39), Böhnecke, and other commentators
-follow Corsini in representing Kalamion to be a corruption of <i>Kallimedes</i>,
-who was archon from Midsummer 360-359 <small>B.C.</small>; and Mr. Clinton
-even inserts the fact in his tables for that year. But I agree with
-Rehdantz (Vit. Iph. Chab. et Tim. p. 153) that such an occurrence after
-Midsummer 360 <small>B.C.</small>, can hardly be reconciled with the proceedings in the
-Chersonese before and after that period, as reported by Demosthenes in the
-Oration against Aristokrates. Without being able to explain the mistake
-about the name of the archon, and without determining whether the real
-mistake may not consist in having placed ἐπὶ in place of ὑπὸ,—I cannot
-but think that Timotheus underwent two repulses, one by his lieutenant,
-and another by himself, near Amphipolis,—both of them occurring in 364
-or the early part of 363 <small>B.C.</small> During great part of 363 <small>B.C.</small>, the attention
-of Timotheus seems to have been turned to the Chersonese, Byzantium,
-Kotys, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-My view of the chronology of this period agrees generally with that of
-Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 42, p. 244-257).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_651"><a href="#FNanchor_651">[651]</a></span>
-Plutarch Pelopid. c. 31; Diodor. xv, 80.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_652"><a href="#FNanchor_652">[652]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 36.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_653"><a href="#FNanchor_653">[653]</a></span>
-Thucyd ii, 87; vii, 21.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_654"><a href="#FNanchor_654">[654]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 78.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_655"><a href="#FNanchor_655">[655]</a></span>
-Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 276, c. 32, s. 111. Ἐπαμινώνδας,
-οὐχ ὑποπτήξας τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀξίωμα, εἶπε διαῤῥήδην ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν
-Θηβαίων, ὡς δεῖ τὰ τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀκροπόλεως προπύλαια μετενεγκεῖν εἰς
-τὴν προστασίαν τῆς Καδμείας.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_656"><a href="#FNanchor_656">[656]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 78, 79.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_657"><a href="#FNanchor_657">[657]</a></span>
-See Vol. VI. Ch. liv. p. 475.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_658"><a href="#FNanchor_658">[658]</a></span>
-Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 5; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25; Plutarch,
-De Sui Laude, p. 542 A.
-</p>
-<p>
-Neither of these the authors appear to me to conceive rightly either the
-attack, or the reply, in which the name of Agamemnon is here brought forward.
-As I have given it in the text, there is a real foundation for the
-attack, and a real point in the reply; as it appears in Cornelius Nepos,
-there is neither one nor the other.
-</p>
-<p>
-That the Spartans regarded themselves as having inherited the leadership
-of Greece from Agamemnon, may be seen by Herodotus, vii, 159.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_659"><a href="#FNanchor_659">[659]</a></span>
-Thucyd. vi, 17, 18.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_660"><a href="#FNanchor_660">[660]</a></span>
-Plutarch (Philopœmen, c. 14) mentions that some authors represented
-Epaminondas as having consented unwillingly to this maritime expedition.
-He explains such reluctance by reference to the disparaging opinion expressed
-by Plato about maritime service. But this opinion of Plato is
-founded upon reasons foreign to the character of Epaminondas; and it
-seems to me evident that the authors whom Plutarch here followed, introduced
-the opinion only as an hypothesis to explain why so great a general
-on land as Epaminondas had accomplished so little at sea, when he took
-command of a fleet; putting himself in a function for which he had little
-capacity, like Philopœmen (Plutarch, Reipublic. Gerend. Præcep. p. 812 E.).
-</p>
-<p>
-Bauch (in his tract, Epaminondas und Thebens Kampf um die Hegemonie,
-Breslau, 1834, p. 70, 71) maintains that Epaminondas was constrained
-against his own better judgment to undertake this maritime enterprise.
-I cannot coincide in his opinion. The oracle which Bauch cites
-from Pausanias (viii, 11, 6) proves as little as the above extract from Plutarch.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_661"><a href="#FNanchor_661">[661]</a></span>
-Isokrates. Or. v, (Philip.) s. 53; Diodor. xv, 78. ἰδίας τὰς πόλεις
-τοῖς Θηβαίοις ἐποίησεν. I do not feel assured that these general words apply
-to Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, which had before been mentioned.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_662"><a href="#FNanchor_662">[662]</a></span>
-Justin, xvi, 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_663"><a href="#FNanchor_663">[663]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 81; Cornel. Nepos, Timotheus, c. 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_664"><a href="#FNanchor_664">[664]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 79.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_665"><a href="#FNanchor_665">[665]</a></span>
-For the description of this memorable scene, see Plutarch, Pelopidas,
-c. 31, 32; Diodor. xv, 80, 81; Cornel. Nepos. Pelopid. c. 5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_666"><a href="#FNanchor_666">[666]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 81. Plutarch (Pelop. c. 34) states substantially the same.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_667"><a href="#FNanchor_667">[667]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Compar. Pelopid. and Marcell. c. 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_668"><a href="#FNanchor_668">[668]</a></span>
-Diodor. (xv, 78) places in one and the same year both,—1. The maritime
-project of Epaminondas, including his recommendation of it, the
-equipment of the fleet, and the actual expedition. 2. The expedition of
-Pelopidas into Thessaly, with its immediate consequences.—He mentions
-the former of the two first, but he places both in the first year of Olympiad
-104, the year in which Timokrates was archon at Athens; that is,
-from Midsummer 364 to Midsummer 363 <small>B.C.</small> He passes immediately
-from the maritime expedition into an allusion to the battle of Mantinea,
-which (he says) proved fatal to Epaminondas and hindered him from following
-up his ideas of maritime activity.
-</p>
-<p>
-The battle of Mantinea took place in June or July 362 <small>B.C.</small> The maritime
-expedition, immediately preceding that battle, would therefore naturally
-take place in the summer of 363 <small>B.C.</small>; the year 364 <small>B.C.</small> having been
-occupied in the requisite naval equipments.
-</p>
-<p>
-I incline to think that the march of Pelopidas into Thessaly also took place
-during 363 <small>B.C.</small>, and that his death thus occurred while Epaminondas was
-absent on shipboard. A probable reason is thus supplied why the second
-Theban army which went to avenge Pelopidas, was commanded, not by his
-friend and colleague Epaminondas, but by other generals. Had Epaminondas
-been then at home, this would hardly have been.
-</p>
-<p>
-The eclipse of the sun, which both Plutarch and Diodorus mention to
-have immediately preceded the out-march of Pelopidas, does not seem to
-have been as yet certainly identified. Dodwell, on the authority of an astronomical
-friend, places it on the 13th of June, 364 <small>B.C.</small>, at five o’clock in
-the morning. On the other hand, Calvisius places it on the 13th of July in
-the same Julian year, at a quarter before eleven o’clock in the day (see
-L’Art de Vérifier les Dates, tom. i, p. 257). We may remark, that the day
-named by Dodwell (as he himself admits) would not fall within the Olympic
-year 364-363 <small>B.C.</small>, but during the months preceding the commencement
-of that year. Moreover Dodwell speaks as if there were no other months
-in the year, except June, July, and August, fit for military expeditions; an
-hypothesis not reasonable to admit.
-</p>
-<p>
-Sievers and Dr. Thirlwall both accept the eclipse mentioned by Dodwell,
-as marking the time when the expedition of Pelopidas commenced—June
-364 <small>B.C.</small> But against this, Mr. Clinton takes no notice of it in his tables;
-which seems to show that he was not satisfied as to the exactness of Dodwell’s
-statement or the chronological identity. If it should turn out, on
-farther astronomical calculations, that there occurred no eclipse of the sun
-in the year 363 <small>B.C.</small>, visible at Thebes,—I should then fix upon the eclipse
-mentioned by Calvisius (13 July 364 <small>B.C.</small>) as identifying the time of the
-expedition of Pelopidas; which would, on that supposition, precede by
-eight or nine months the commencement of the transmarine cruise of Epaminondas.
-The eclipse mentioned by Calvisius is preferable to that mentioned
-by Dodwell, because it falls within the Olympic year indicated by
-Diodorus.
-</p>
-<p>
-But it appears to me that farther astronomical information is here required.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_669"><a href="#FNanchor_669">[669]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 35.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_670"><a href="#FNanchor_670">[670]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 79.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_671"><a href="#FNanchor_671">[671]</a></span>
-See the sentiment expressed by Demosthenes cont. Leptinem, p. 489, s.
-121,—an oration delivered in 355 <small>B.C.</small>; eight years after the destruction of
-Orchomenus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_672"><a href="#FNanchor_672">[672]</a></span>
-Demosth. De Pace, p. 62, s. 21; Philippic. II, p. 69, s. 13; s. 15; Fals.
-Leg. p. 375, s. 122; p. 387, s. 162; p. 445, s. 373.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_673"><a href="#FNanchor_673">[673]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 57.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_674"><a href="#FNanchor_674">[674]</a></span>
-Pausan. ix, 15, 2.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus places in the same year all the three facts:—1. The maritime
-expedition of Epaminondas. 2. The expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly,
-his death, and the following Theban victories over Alexander of Pheræ.
-3. The conspiracy of the Orchomenian Knights, and the destruction of Orchomenus.
-</p>
-<p>
-The year in which he places them is, the archonship of Timokrates,—from
-Midsummer 364 to Midsummer 363 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-That the destruction of Orchomenus occurred during the absence of Epaminondas,
-and that he was greatly distressed at it on his return,—is distinctly
-stated by Pausanias; who however is (in my judgment) so far mistaken,
-that he refers the absence of Epaminondas to that previous occasion
-when he had gone into Thessaly to rescue Pelopidas from the dungeon of
-Alexander, 366 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-This date is not so probable as the date assigned by Diodorus; nor do
-the chronological conceptions of Pausanias seem to me exact.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_675"><a href="#FNanchor_675">[675]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 19.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_676"><a href="#FNanchor_676">[676]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 43.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_677"><a href="#FNanchor_677">[677]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 17.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_678"><a href="#FNanchor_678">[678]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 30, 31.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_679"><a href="#FNanchor_679">[679]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_680"><a href="#FNanchor_680">[680]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 26.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_681"><a href="#FNanchor_681">[681]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_682"><a href="#FNanchor_682">[682]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 12.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_683"><a href="#FNanchor_683">[683]</a></span>
-It had been taken from Elis by Agis, at the peace of 399 <small>B.C.</small> after his
-victorious war (Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_684"><a href="#FNanchor_684">[684]</a></span>
-Pausanias, vi, 22, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_685"><a href="#FNanchor_685">[685]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 13-18; Diodor. xv, 77.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_686"><a href="#FNanchor_686">[686]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 26.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_687"><a href="#FNanchor_687">[687]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27.
-</p>
-<p>
-The Thebans who are here mentioned must have been soldiers in garrison
-at Tegea, Megalopolis, or Messênê. No fresh Theban troops had come
-into Peloponnesus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_688"><a href="#FNanchor_688">[688]</a></span>
-Thucyd. v, 68; Xen. Rep. Laced, xii, 3; xiii, 6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_689"><a href="#FNanchor_689">[689]</a></span>
-The seizure of Kromnus by the Lacedæmonians, and the wound received
-by Archidamus, are alluded to by Justin, vi, 6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_690"><a href="#FNanchor_690">[690]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 20-25. Ὡς δὲ, πλησίον ὄντων, ἀναβοήσας
-τις τῶν πρεσβυτέρων εἶπε—Τί δεῖ ἡμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες, μάχεσθαι, ἀλλ’ οὐ σπεισαμένους
-διαλυθῆναι; ἄσμενοι δὴ ἀμφότεροι ἀκούσαντες, ἐσπείσαντο.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_691"><a href="#FNanchor_691">[691]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27. The conjecture of Palmerius,—τοῦ κατὰ
-τοὺς Ἀργείους,—seems here just and necessary.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_692"><a href="#FNanchor_692">[692]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_693"><a href="#FNanchor_693">[693]</a></span>
-Thucyd. iv, 40.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_694"><a href="#FNanchor_694">[694]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_695"><a href="#FNanchor_695">[695]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 29. Compare Pausanias, vi, 22, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_696"><a href="#FNanchor_696">[696]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 29. Καὶ τὴν μὲν ἱπποδρομίαν ἤδη ἐπεποιήκεσαν,
-καὶ τὰ δρομικὰ τοῦ πεντάθλου· οἱ δ’ εἰς πάλην ἀφικόμενοι <em class="gesperrt">οὐκέτι ἐν τῷ δρόμῳ</em>,
-ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ τοῦ δρόμου καὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ ἐπάλαιον. <em class="gesperrt">Οἱ γὰρ Ἠλεῖοι</em> παρῆσαν ἤδη, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus erroneously represents (xv, 78) the occurrence as if the Eleians
-had been engaged in celebrating the festival, and as if the Pisatans and
-Arcadians had marched up and attacked them while doing so. The Eleians
-were really the assailants.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_697"><a href="#FNanchor_697">[697]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. <i>l. c.</i> Οἱ γὰρ Ἠλεῖοι παρῆσαν σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις <em class="gesperrt">εἰς τὸ
-τέμενος</em>. Οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες ποῤῥωτέρω μὲν οὐκ ἀπήντησαν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ Κλαδάου ποτάμου
-παρετάξαντο, ὃς παρὰ τὴν Ἄλτιν καταῤῥέων εἰς τὸν Ἄλφειον ἐμβάλλει. Καὶ μὴν <em class="gesperrt">οἱ Ἠλεῖοι
-τἀπὶ θάτερα τοῦ ποτάμου παρετάξαντο</em>, σφαγιασάμενοι δὲ εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν.
-</p>
-<p>
-The τέμενος must here be distinguished from the Altis; as meaning the
-entire breadth of consecrated ground at Olympia, of which the Altis formed
-a smaller interior portion enclosed with a wall. The Eleians entered into
-the τέμενος before they crossed the river Kladeus, which flowed <i>through</i> the
-τέμενος, but <i>alongside</i> of the Altis. The tomb of Œnomaus, which was
-doubtless included in the τέμενος, was on the right bank of the Kladeus
-(Pausan. vi, 21, 3); while the Altis was on the left bank of the river.
-</p>
-<p>
-Colonel Leake (in his Peloponnesiaca, pp. 6, 107) has given a copious and
-instructive exposition of the ground of Olympia, as well as of the notices
-left by Pausanias respecting it. Unfortunately, little can be made out certainly,
-except the position of the great temple of Zeus in the Altis. Neither
-the positions assigned to the various buildings, the Stadion, or the
-Hippodrome, by Colonel Leake,—nor those proposed by Kiepert in the
-plan comprised in his maps—nor by Ernst Curtius, in the Plan annexed
-to his recent Dissertation called <i>Olympia</i> (Berlin, 1852)—rest upon very
-sufficient evidence. Perhaps future excavations may hereafter reveal much
-that is now unknown.
-</p>
-<p>
-I cannot agree with Colonel Leake however in supposing that Pisa was
-at any time a <i>city</i>, and afterwards deserted.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_698"><a href="#FNanchor_698">[698]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4. 32. ὥστε οὐδ’ ἀνεπαύσαντο τῆς νυκτὸς
-ἐκκόπτοντες τὰ διαπεπονημένα σκηνώματα, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_699"><a href="#FNanchor_699">[699]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 78; Pausanias, vi, 8, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_700"><a href="#FNanchor_700">[700]</a></span>
-Tacitus, Hist. i, 40. He is describing the murder of Galba in the Forum
-at Rome, by the Othonian soldiers:—
-</p>
-<p>
-“Igitur milites Romani, quasi Vologesen aut Pacorum avito Arsacidarum
-solio depulsuri, ac non Imperatorem suum, inermem et senem, trucidare
-pergerent—disjectâ plebe, proculcato Senatu, truces armis, rapidis
-equis, forum irrumpunt: nec illos Capitolii aspectus, et imminentium templorum
-religio, et priores et futuri Principes, terruere, quominus facerent
-scelus, cujus ultor est quisquis successit.”</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_701"><a href="#FNanchor_701">[701]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 32.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_702"><a href="#FNanchor_702">[702]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 20; Polybius, iv, 73.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_703"><a href="#FNanchor_703">[703]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33, 34.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_704"><a href="#FNanchor_704">[704]</a></span>
-Thucyd. i, 121.
-</p>
-<p>
-Perikles in his speech at Athens alludes to this understood purpose of
-the Spartans and their confederacy (Thucyd. i, 143).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_705"><a href="#FNanchor_705">[705]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33, 34; Diodor. xv, 82; Pausanias, vii, 8, 6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_706"><a href="#FNanchor_706">[706]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33. φάσκοντες αὐτοὺς λυμαίνεσθαι τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν,
-ἀνεκαλοῦντο εἰς τοὺς μυρίους τοὺς προστάτας αὐτῶν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_707"><a href="#FNanchor_707">[707]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 34.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_708"><a href="#FNanchor_708">[708]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 34. <em class="gesperrt">Οἱ δὲ τὰ κράτιστα τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ
-βουλευόμενοι</em> ἔπεισαν τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων, πέμψαντας πρέσβεις εἰπεῖν
-τοῖς Θηβαίοις, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-The phrase here used by Xenophon, to describe the oligarchical party,
-marks his philo-Laconian sentiment. Compare vii, 5, 1. οἱ κηδόμενοι τῆς
-Πελοποννήσου, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_709"><a href="#FNanchor_709">[709]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. <i>l. c.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_710"><a href="#FNanchor_710">[710]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 37, 38.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_711"><a href="#FNanchor_711">[711]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen.
-<span class="replace" id="tn_3" title="In the printed book: vii, 39">vii, 4, 39</span>.
-συγκαλέσας τῶν Ἀρκάδων ὁπόσοι
-γε δὴ συνελθεῖν ἠθέλησαν, ἀπελογεῖτο, ὡς ἐξαπατηθείη.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_712"><a href="#FNanchor_712">[712]</a></span>
-The representation of Diodorus (xv, 82), though very loose and vague,
-gives us to understand that the two opposing parties at Tegea came to an
-actual conflict of arms, on occasion of the peace.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_713"><a href="#FNanchor_713">[713]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 40.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_714"><a href="#FNanchor_714">[714]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 1. Οἱ κηδόμενοι τῆς Πελοποννήσου.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_715"><a href="#FNanchor_715">[715]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 2, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_716"><a href="#FNanchor_716">[716]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 5; Diodor. xv, 85.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_717"><a href="#FNanchor_717">[717]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 85.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_718"><a href="#FNanchor_718">[718]</a></span>
-The explanation which Xenophon gives of this halt at Nemea,—as if
-Epaminondas was determined to it by a peculiar hatred of Athens (Hellen.
-vii, 5, 6)—seems alike fanciful and ill-tempered.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_719"><a href="#FNanchor_719">[719]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 8.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_720"><a href="#FNanchor_720">[720]</a></span>
-Plutarch, De Gloriâ Athen. p. 346 B.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_721"><a href="#FNanchor_721">[721]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 10. Καὶ εἰ μὴ Κρὴς, θείᾳ τινὶ μοίρᾳ προσελθὼν,
-ἐξήγγειλε τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ προσιὸν τὸ στράτευμα, ἔλαβεν ἂν τὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ νεοττιὰν,
-παντάπασιν ἔρημον τῶν ἀμυνουμένων.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus coincides in the main fact (xv, 82, 83), though with many inaccuracies
-of detail. He gives a very imperfect idea of this narrow escape
-of Sparta, which is fully attested by Xenophon, even against his own partialities.
-</p>
-<p>
-Kallisthenes asserted that the critical intelligence had been conveyed to
-Agesilaus by a Thespian named Euthynus (Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 34).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_722"><a href="#FNanchor_722">[722]</a></span>
-Xenophon (Hellen. vii, 5, 10, 11) describes these facts in a manner different
-on several points from Polybius (ix, 8), and from Diodorus (xv, 83).
-Xenophon’s authority appears to me better in itself, while his narrative is
-also more probable. He states distinctly that Agesilaus heard the news
-of the Theban march while he was yet at Pellênê (on the road to Mantinea,
-to which place a large portion of the Spartan troops had already gone forward),—that
-he turned back forthwith, and reached Sparta before Epaminondas,
-with a division not numerous, yet sufficient to put the town in a
-state of defence. Whereas Polybius affirms, that Agesilaus heard the news
-when he was at Mantinea,—that he marched from thence with the whole
-army to Sparta, but that Epaminondas reached Sparta before him, had
-already attacked the town and penetrated into the market-place, when Agesilaus
-arrived and drove him back. Diodorus relates that Agesilaus never
-left Sparta, but that the other king Agis, who had been sent with the army
-to Mantinea, divining the plans of Epaminondas, sent word by some swift
-Kretan runners to Agesilaus and put him upon his guard.
-</p>
-<p>
-Wesseling remarks justly, that the mention of Agis must be a mistake;
-that the second king of Sparta at that time was named Kleomenes.
-</p>
-<p>
-Polyænus (ii, 3, 10) states correctly that Agesilaus reached Sparta before
-Epaminondas; but he adds many other details which are too uncertain
-to copy.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_723"><a href="#FNanchor_723">[723]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 11. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένετο Ἐπαμινώνδας
-<em class="gesperrt">ἐν τῇ πόλει</em> τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_724"><a href="#FNanchor_724">[724]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 12, 13.
-</p>
-<p>
-Justin (vi, 7) greatly exaggerates the magnitude and violence of the
-contest. He erroneously represents that Agesilaus did not reach Sparta
-till after Epaminondas.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_725"><a href="#FNanchor_725">[725]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 34.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_726"><a href="#FNanchor_726">[726]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 14. Πάλιν δὲ πορευθεὶς ὡς ἐδύνατο τάχιστα
-εἰς τὴν Τεγέαν, τοὺς μὲν ὁπλίτας ἀνέπαυσε, τοὺς δὲ ἱππέας ἔπεμψεν εἰς τὴν Μαντίνειαν,
-δεηθεὶς αὐτῶν προσκαρτερῆσαι, καὶ διδάσκων ὡς πάντα μὲν εἰκὸς ἔξω εἶναι τὰ τῶν Μαντινέων
-βοσκήματα, πάντας δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἄλλως τε καὶ σίτου συγκομιδῆς οὔσης.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_727"><a href="#FNanchor_727">[727]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 15, 16.
-</p>
-<p>
-The words—δυστυχήματος γεγενημένου ἐν Κορίνθῳ τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν—allude
-to something which we have no means of making out. It is possible
-that the Corinthians, who were at peace with Thebes and had been ill-used
-by Athens (vii, 4, 6-10), may have seen with displeasure, and even molested,
-the Athenian horsemen while resting on their territory.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_728"><a href="#FNanchor_728">[728]</a></span>
-Polybius, ix, 8.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_729"><a href="#FNanchor_729">[729]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 15, 16, 17.
-</p>
-<p>
-Plutarch (De Gloriâ Athen. p. 346 D.—E.) recounts the general fact of
-this battle and the rescue of Mantinea; yet with several inaccuracies which
-we refute by means of Xenophon.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodor. (xv, 84) mentions the rescue of Mantinea by the unexpected arrival
-of the Athenians; but he states them as being six thousand soldiers,
-that is hoplites, under Hegelochus; and he says nothing about the cavalry
-battle. Hegesilaus is named by Ephorus (ap. Diog. Laert. ii, 54,—compare
-Xenoph. De Vectigal. iii, 7) as the general of the entire force sent out
-by Athens on this occasion, consisting of infantry as well as cavalry. The
-infantry must have come up somewhat later.
-</p>
-<p>
-Polybius also (ix, 8), though concurring in the main with Xenophon, differs
-in several details. I follow the narrative of Xenophon.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_730"><a href="#FNanchor_730">[730]</a></span>
-Harpokration v, Κηφισόδωρος, Ephorus ap. Diogen. Laert. ii, 53; Pausan.
-1, 3, 4; viii, 9, 8; viii, 11, 5.
-</p>
-<p>
-There is a confusion, on several points, between this cavalry battle near
-Mantinea,—and the great or general battle, which speedily followed it,
-wherein Epaminondas was slain. Gryllus is sometimes said to have been
-slain in the battle of Mantinea, and even to have killed Epaminondas with
-his own hand. It would seem as if the picture of Euphranor represented
-Gryllus in the act of killing the Theban commander; and as if the latter
-tradition of Athens as well as of Thebes, erroneously bestowed upon that
-Theban commander the name of Epaminondas.
-</p>
-<p>
-See this confusion discussed and cleared up, in a good article on the Battle
-of Mantinea, by Arnold Schäfer, p. 58, 59, in the Rheinisches Museum
-für Philologie (1846—Fünfter Jahrgang, Erstes Heft).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_731"><a href="#FNanchor_731">[731]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 84.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_732"><a href="#FNanchor_732">[732]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 8. καὶ μὴν οἰόμενος κρείττων τῶν ἀντιπάλων εἶναι,
-etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_733"><a href="#FNanchor_733">[733]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 19. σπάνια δὲ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔχοντας ὅμως πείθεσθαι
-ἐθέλειν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_734"><a href="#FNanchor_734">[734]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 18. αὐτὸς δὲ λελυμασμένος παντάπασι
-τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δόξῃ ἔσοιτο, ἡττημένος μὲν ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι σὺν πολλῷ ὁπλιτικῷ
-ὑπ’ ὀλίγων, ἡττημένος δὲ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ ἱππομαχίᾳ, αἴτιος δὲ γεγενημένος
-διὰ τὴν ἐς Πελοπόννησον στράτειαν τοῦ συνεστάναι Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ
-Ἀρκάδας καὶ Ἠλείους καὶ Ἀθηναίους· ὥστε οὐκ ἐδόκει δυνατὸν εἶναι ἀμαχεὶ
-παρελθεῖν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_735"><a href="#FNanchor_735">[735]</a></span>
-Polybius, ix. 8, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_736"><a href="#FNanchor_736">[736]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 20. Προθύμως μὲν ἐλευκοῦντο οἱ ἱππεῖς τὰ κράνη,
-κελεύοντος ἐκείνου· ἐπεγράφοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἀρκάδων ὁπλῖται, ῥόπαλα ἔχοντες,
-ὡς Θηβαῖοι ὄντες· πάντες δὲ ἠκονῶντο καὶ λόγχας καὶ μαχαίρας, καὶ ἐλαμπρύνοντο
-τὰς ἀσπίδας.
-</p>
-<p>
-There seems a sort of sneer in these latter words, both at the Arcadians
-and Thebans. The Arcadian club-men are called ὁπλῖται; and are represented
-as passing themselves off to be as good as Thebans.
-</p>
-<p>
-Sievers (Geschicht. p. 342) and Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. c. 40, p. 200) follow
-Eckhel in translating this passage to mean that “the Arcadian hoplites
-inscribed upon their shields the figure of a club, that being the ensign of
-the Thebans.” I cannot think this interpretation is the best,—at least
-until some evidence is produced, that the Theban symbol on the shield was
-a club. Xenophon does not disdain on other occasions to speak sneeringly
-of the Theban hoplites,—see vii, 5, 12. The mention of λόγχας καὶ μαχαίρας,
-immediately afterwards, sustains the belief that ῥόπαλα ἔχοντες, immediately
-before, means “men armed with clubs”; the natural sense of the
-words.
-</p>
-<p>
-The horsemen are said to have “whitened their helmets (or head-pieces).”
-Hence I presume that these head-pieces were not made of metal, but of
-wood or wicker-work. Compare Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 25.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_737"><a href="#FNanchor_737">[737]</a></span>
-See Colonel Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, ch. 24, p. 45.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_738"><a href="#FNanchor_738">[738]</a></span>
-Three miles from Mantinea (Leake, ib. p. 51-94) “a low ridge of rocks,
-which, advancing into the plain from a projecting part of the Mænalium,
-formed a natural division between the districts of Tegea and Mantineia.”
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare the same work, vol. i, ch. 3, p. 100, 112, 114, and the recent valuable
-work of Ernst Curtius, Peloponnesos (Gotha, 1851), pp. 232-247.
-Gell says that a wall has once been carried across the plain at this boundary
-(Itinerary of the Morea, p. 141-143).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_739"><a href="#FNanchor_739">[739]</a></span>
-See the indications of the locality of the battle in Pausanias, viii, 11, 4,
-5; and Colonel Leake—as above referred to.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_740"><a href="#FNanchor_740">[740]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 21.
-</p>
-<p>
-Tripolitza is reckoned by Colonel Leake as about three miles and a half
-from the site of Tegea; Mr. Dodwell states it as about four miles, and
-Gell’s Itinerary of the Morea much the same.
-</p>
-<p>
-Colonel Leake reckons about eight miles from Tripolitza to Mantinea.
-Gell states it as two hours and three minutes, Dodwell as two hours and five
-minutes,—or seven miles.
-</p>
-<p>
-Colonel Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. i, p. 88-100; Gell’s Itinerary, p.
-141; Dodwell’s Travels, vol. ii, p. 418-422.
-</p>
-<p>
-It would seem that Epaminondas, in this latter half of his march, must
-have followed nearly the road from Mantinea to Pallantium. Pallantium
-was situated west by south from Tegea.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_741"><a href="#FNanchor_741">[741]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_742"><a href="#FNanchor_742">[742]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ, ὡς πρὸς τῷ ὄρει ἐγένετο,
-ἐπεὶ ἐξετάθη αὐτῷ ἡ φάλαγξ, ὑπὸ τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς ἔθετο τὰ ὅπλα· ὥστε εἰκάσθη
-στρατοπεδευομένῳ. Τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσας, ἔλυσε μὲν τῶν πλείστων πολεμίων τὴν ἐν
-ταῖς ψυχαῖς πρὸς μάχην παρασκευήν, ἔλυσε δὲ τὴν ἐν ταῖς συντάξεσιν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_743"><a href="#FNanchor_743">[743]</a></span>
-Thucyd. v, 67; Pausanias, viii, 9, 5; viii. 10, 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_744"><a href="#FNanchor_744">[744]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv. 85.
-</p>
-<p>
-That the Athenians were on the left, we also know from Xenophon (Hell.
-vii, 5, 24), though he gives no complete description of the arrangement of
-the allies on either side.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_745"><a href="#FNanchor_745">[745]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 23.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_746"><a href="#FNanchor_746">[746]</a></span>
-Here again, we know from Xenophon that the Thebans were on the
-left; but the general arrangement of the other contingents we obtain only
-from Diodorus (xv, 85).
-</p>
-<p>
-The Tactica of Arrian, also (xi, 2) inform us that Epaminondas formed
-his attacking column, at Leuktra, of the Thebans—at Mantinea, of all
-the Bœotians.
-</p>
-<p>
-About the practice of the Thebans, both at and after the battle of Leuktra,
-to make their attack with the left, see Plutarch. Quæst. Roman. p.
-282 D.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_747"><a href="#FNanchor_747">[747]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22. Ἐπεί γε μὴν, παραγαγὼν τοὺς ἐπὶ κέρως
-πορευομένους λόχους εἰς μέτωπον, ἰσχυρὸν ἐποιήσατο τὸ περὶ ἑαυτὸν ἔμβολον,
-τότε δὴ ἀναλαβεῖν παραγγείλας τὰ ὅπλα, ἡγεῖτο· οἱ δ’ ἠκολούθουν ... Ὁ δὲ τὸ
-στράτευμα ἀντίπρωρον ὥσπερ τριήρη προσῆγε, νομίζων, ὅπη ἐμβαλὼν διακόψειε,
-διαφθερεῖν ὅλον τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων στράτευμα, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_748"><a href="#FNanchor_748">[748]</a></span>
-I agree with Folard (Traité de la Colonne, p. lv-lxi, prefixed to the
-translation of Polybius) in considering ἔμβολον to be a column,—rather
-than a wedge tapering towards the front. And I dissent from Schneider’s
-explanation, who says,—“Epaminondas phalangem contrahit sensim et colligit
-in frontem, ut cunei seu rostri navalis formam efficeret. Copiæ igitur
-ex utroque latere explicatæ transeunt in frontem; hoc est, παράγειν εἰς μέτωπον.”
-It appears to me that the troops which Epaminondas caused to
-wheel into the front and to form the advancing column, consisted only of
-the left or Theban division, the best troops in the army,—τῷ μὲν ἰσχυροτάτῳ παρεσκευάζετο
-ἀγωνίζεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀσθενέστατον πόῤῥω ἀπέστησεν. Moreover,
-the whole account of Xenophon implies that Epaminondas made the
-attack from his own left against the enemy’s right, or right-centre. He was
-afraid that the Athenians would take him in flank from their own left.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_749"><a href="#FNanchor_749">[749]</a></span>
-Compare a similar case in Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 13, where the Grecian
-cavalry, in the Asiatic army of Agesilaus, is said to be drawn up ὥσπερ φάλαγξ ἐπὶ
-τεσσάρων, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_750"><a href="#FNanchor_750">[750]</a></span>
-These πέζοι ἅμιπποι—light-armed footmen, intermingled with the
-ranks of the cavalry,—are numbered as an important item in the military
-establishment of the Syracusan despot Gelon (Herodot. vii. 158).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_751"><a href="#FNanchor_751">[751]</a></span>
-Perhaps Epaminondas may have contrived in part to conceal what was
-going on by means of cavalry-movements in his front. Something of the
-kind seems alluded to by Polyænus (ii, 3, 14).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_752"><a href="#FNanchor_752">[752]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_753"><a href="#FNanchor_753">[753]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 85.
-</p>
-<p>
-The orator Æschines fought among the Athenian hoplites on this occasion
-(Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 300. c. 53.)</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_754"><a href="#FNanchor_754">[754]</a></span>
-The remark made by Polybius upon this battle deserves notice. He
-states that the description given of the battle by Ephorus was extremely
-incorrect and absurd, arguing great ignorance both of the ground where it
-was fought and of the possible movements of the armies. He says that
-Ephorus had displayed the like incompetence also in describing the battle
-of Leuktra; in which case, however, his narrative was less misleading,
-because that battle was simple and easily intelligible, involving movements
-only of one wing of each army. But in regard to the battle of Mantinea
-(he says), the misdescription of Ephorus was of far more deplorable effect;
-because that battle exhibited much complication and generalship, which
-Ephorus did not at all comprehend, as might be seen by any one who measured
-the ground and studied the movements reported in his narrative (Polybius,
-xii, 25).
-</p>
-<p>
-Polybius adds that Theopompus and Timæus were as little to be trusted
-in the description of land-battles as Ephorus. Whether this remark has
-special application to the battle of Mantinea, I do not clearly make out.
-He gives credit however to Ephorus for greater judgment and accuracy,
-in the description of naval battles.
-</p>
-<p>
-Unfortunately, Polybius has not given us his own description of this battle
-of Mantinea. He only says enough to make us feel how imperfectly we
-know its details. There is too much reason to fear that the account which
-we now read in Diodorus may be borrowed in large proportion from that
-very narrative of Ephorus here so much disparaged.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_755"><a href="#FNanchor_755">[755]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 87. Cornelius Nepos (Epam. c. 9) seems to copy the same
-authority as Diodorus, though more sparing of details. He does not seem
-to have read Xenophon.
-</p>
-<p>
-I commend the reader again to an excellent note of Dr. Arnold, on Thucydides,
-iv, 11; animadverting upon similar exaggerations and embellishments
-of Diodorus, in the description of the conduct of Brasidas at Pylus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_756"><a href="#FNanchor_756">[756]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 25. Τὴν μὲν δὴ συμβολὴν οὕτως ἐποιήσατο,
-καὶ οὐκ ἐψεύσθη τῆς ἐλπίδος· <em class="gesperrt">κρατήσας γὰρ ἧ προσέβαλεν, ὅλον ἐποίησε</em>
-φεύγειν τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων. Ἐπεί γε μὴν ἐκεῖνος ἔπεσεν, οἱ λοιποὶ οὐδὲ τῇ νίκῃ
-ὀρθῶς ἔτι ἐδυνάσθησαν χρήσασθαι, ἀλλὰ φυγούσης μὲν αὐτοῖς τῆς ἐναντίας
-φάλαγγος, οὐδένα ἀπέκτειναν οἱ ὁπλῖται, οὐδὲ προῆλθον ἐκ τοῦ χωρίου ἔνθα
-ἡ συμβολὴ ἐγένετο· φυγόντων δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν ἱππέων, ἀπέκτειναν μὲν οὐδὲ
-οἱ ἱππεῖς διώκοντες οὔτε ἱππέας οὔθ’ ὁπλίτας, ὥσπερ δὲ ἡττώμενοι πεφοβημένως
-διὰ τῶν φευγόντων πολεμίων διέπεσον. Καὶ μὴν οἱ ἅμιπποι καὶ οἱ πελτασταὶ,
-συννενικηκότες τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν, ἀφίκοντο μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ εὐωνύμου, ὡς κρατοῦντες·
-ἐκεῖ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ πλεῖστοι αὐτῶν ἀπέθανον.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_757"><a href="#FNanchor_757">[757]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 33, 34.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_758"><a href="#FNanchor_758">[758]</a></span>
-The statement of Diodorus (xv, 87) on this point appears to me more
-probable than that of Xenophon (vii, 5, 26).
-</p>
-<p>
-The Athenians boasted much of this slight success with their cavalry,
-enhancing its value by acknowledging that all their allies had been defeated
-around them (Plutarch, De Gloriâ Athen. p. 350 A.).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_759"><a href="#FNanchor_759">[759]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 88; Cicero, De Finibus, ii, 30, 97; Epistol. ad Familiares,
-v, 12, 5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_760"><a href="#FNanchor_760">[760]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Apophthegm. Regum, p. 194 C.; Ælian, V. H. xii, 3.
-</p>
-<p>
-Both Plutarch and Diodorus talk of Epaminondas being carried back to
-the <i>camp</i>. But it seems that there could hardly have been any camp.
-Epaminondas had marched out only a few hours before from Tegea. A
-tent may have been erected on the field to receive him. Five centuries
-afterwards, the Mantineans showed to the traveller Pausanias a spot called
-Skiopê near the field of battle, to which (they affirmed) the wounded Epaminondas
-had been carried off, in great pain, and with his hand on his wound—from
-whence he had looked with anxiety on the continuing battle (Pausan.
-viii, 11, 4).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_761"><a href="#FNanchor_761">[761]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 35; Pausanias, i, 3, 3; viii, 9, 2-5; viii, 11, 4;
-ix, 15, 3.
-</p>
-<p>
-The reports however which Pausanias gives, and the name of Machærion
-which he heard both at Mantinea and at Sparta, are confused, and are
-hardly to be reconciled with the story of Plutarch.
-</p>
-<p>
-Moreover, it would seem that the subsequent Athenians did not clearly
-distinguish between the first battle fought by the Athenian cavalry, immediately
-after their arrival at Mantinea, when they rescued that town from
-being surprised by the Thebans and Thessalians—and the general action
-which followed a few days afterwards wherein Epaminondas was slain.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_762"><a href="#FNanchor_762">[762]</a></span>
-See the oration of Demosthenes on behalf of the Megalopolitans
-(Orat. xvi, s. 10, p. 204; s. 21, p. 206).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_763"><a href="#FNanchor_763">[763]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 35; Diodor. xv, 89; Polybius, iv, 33.
-</p>
-<p>
-Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellen. <small>B.C.</small> 361) assigns the conclusion of
-peace to the succeeding year. I do not know however what ground there
-is for assuming such an interval between the battle and the peace. Diodorus
-appears to place the latter immediately after the former. This would
-not count for much, indeed, against any considerable counter-probability;
-but the probability here (in my judgment) is rather in favor of immediate
-sequence between the two events.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_764"><a href="#FNanchor_764">[764]</a></span>
-Pausanias, viii, 11, 4, 5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_765"><a href="#FNanchor_765">[765]</a></span>
-Cicero, Tusculan. i, 2, 4; De Orator. iii, 34, 139. “Epaminondas,
-princeps, meo judicio, Græciæ,” etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_766"><a href="#FNanchor_766">[766]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Philopœmen, c. 3; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_767"><a href="#FNanchor_767">[767]</a></span>
-See the inscription of four lines copied by Pausanias from the statue of
-Epaminondas at Thebes (Paus. ix, 16, 3):—
-</p>
-<div class="poetry-container">
-  <div class="poetry">
-    <p>Ἡμετέραις βουλαῖς Σπάρτη μὲν ἐκείρατο δόξαν, etc.</p>
-  </div>
-</div>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_768"><a href="#FNanchor_768">[768]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 5, 8, 9.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_769"><a href="#FNanchor_769">[769]</a></span>
-Demosthenes, Philipp. I, p. 51, s. 46.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_770"><a href="#FNanchor_770">[770]</a></span>
-The remark of Diodorus (xv, 88) upon Epaminondas is more emphatic
-than we usually find in him,—Παρὰ μὲν γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἓν ἂν εὕροι
-προτέρημα τῆς δόξης, παρὰ δὲ τούτῳ πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς ἠθροισμένας.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_771"><a href="#FNanchor_771">[771]</a></span>
-Polybius, xxxii, 8, 6. Cornelius Nepos (Epaminondas, c. 4) gives one
-anecdote, among several which he affirms to have found on record, of large
-pecuniary presents tendered to, and repudiated by, Epaminondas; an anecdote
-recounted with so much precision of detail, that it appears to deserve
-credit, though we cannot assign the exact time when the alleged briber
-Diomedon of Kyzicus, came to Thebes.
-</p>
-<p>
-Plutarch (De Genio Socratis, p. 583 F.) relates an incident about Jason
-of Pheræ tendering money in vain to Epaminondas, which cannot well
-have happened before the liberation of the Kadmeia (the period to which
-Plutarch’s dialogue assigns it), but may have happened afterwards.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare Plutarch, Apophthegm. Reg. p. 193 C.; and Plutarch’s Life of
-Fabius Maximus, c. 27.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_772"><a href="#FNanchor_772">[772]</a></span>
-Aristotel. Politic. iii, 2, 10.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_773"><a href="#FNanchor_773">[773]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Compar. Alkibiad. and Coriolanus, c. 4. Ἐπεὶ τό γε
-μὴ λιπαρῆ μηδὲ θεραπευτικὸν ὄχλων εἶναι, καὶ Μέτελλος εἶχε καὶ Ἀριστείδης
-καὶ Ἐπαμεινώνδας· ἀλλὰ τῷ καταφρονεῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὧν δῆμός ἐστι καὶ δοῦναι
-καὶ ἀφελέσθαι κύριος, ἐξοστρακιζόμενοι καὶ ἀποχειροτονούμενοι καὶ
-καταδικαζόμενοι πολλάκις οὐκ ὠργίζοντο τοῖς πολίταις ἀγνωμονοῦσιν,
-ἀλλ’ ἠγάπων αὖθις μεταμελομένους καὶ διηλλάττοντο παρακαλούντων.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_774"><a href="#FNanchor_774">[774]</a></span>
-See an anecdote about Epaminondas as the diplomatist and negotiator
-on behalf of Thebes against Athens—δικαιολογούμενος, etc. Athenæus,
-xiv, p. 650 E.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_775"><a href="#FNanchor_775">[775]</a></span>
-Homer, Iliad, iii, 210-220 (Menelaus and Odysseus)—
-</p>
-<div class="poetry-container">
-  <div class="poetry">
-    <p>Ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ Τρώεσσιν ἀγειρομένοισιν ἔμιχθεν,</p>
-    <p>Ἤτοι μὲν Μενέλαος ἐπιτροχάδην ἀγόρευε,</p>
-    <p>Παῦρα μὲν, ἀλλὰ μάλα λιγέως· ἐπεὶ οὐ πολύμυθος, etc.</p>
-    <p>... Ἀλλ’ ὅτε δή ῥ’ ὄπα τε μεγάλην ἐκ στήθεος ἵει (Odysseus),</p>
-    <p>Καὶ ἔπεα νιφάδεσσιν ἐοικότα χειμερίῃσιν,</p>
-    <p>Οὐκέτ’ ἔπειτ’ Ὀδυσῆΐ γ’ ἐρίσσειε βροτὸς ἄλλος, etc.</p>
-  </div>
-</div>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_776"><a href="#FNanchor_776">[776]</a></span>
-See Vol. VIII. of this History, Ch. lxvii, p. 357-397—φρονεῖν, λέγειν, καὶ πράττειν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_777"><a href="#FNanchor_777">[777]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 192 E. Athenæ. xiii, p. 590 C.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_778"><a href="#FNanchor_778">[778]</a></span>
-Hieronymus ap. Athenæ. xiii, p. 602 A.; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18;
-Xen. Rep. Lacedæmon. ii, 12.
-</p>
-<p>
-See the striking and impassioned fragment of Pindar, addressed by him
-when old to the youth Theoxenus of Tenedos, Fragm. 2 of the Skolia, in
-Dissen’s edition, and Boeckh’s edition of Pindar, vol. iii, p. 611, ap. Athenæum,
-xiii, p. 605 C.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_779"><a href="#FNanchor_779">[779]</a></span>
-See Theopompus, Frag. 182, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. xiii, p. 605 A.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_780"><a href="#FNanchor_780">[780]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Pelopid. <i>ut sup.</i>; Plutarch, Amatorius, p. 761 D.; compare
-Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 39.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_781"><a href="#FNanchor_781">[781]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 94.
-</p>
-<p>
-I venture here to depart from Diodorus, who states that these three thousand
-men were <i>Athenians</i>, not <i>Thebans</i>; that the Megalopolitans sent to ask
-aid from <i>Athens</i>, and that the <i>Athenians</i> sent these three thousand men under
-Pammenes.
-</p>
-<p>
-That Diodorus (or the copyist) has here mistaken Thebans for Athenians,
-appears to me, on the following grounds:—
-</p>
-<p>
-1. Whoever reads attentively the oration delivered by Demosthenes in
-the Athenian assembly (about ten years after this period) respecting the
-propriety of sending an armed force to defend Megalopolis against the
-threats of Sparta—will see, I think, that Athens can never before have
-sent any military assistance to Megalopolis. Both the arguments which
-Demosthenes urges, and those which he combats as having been urged by
-opponents, exclude the reality of any such previous proceeding.
-</p>
-<p>
-2. Even at the time when the above-mentioned oration was delivered, the
-Megalopolitans were still (compare Diodorus, xvi, 39) under special alliance
-with, and guardianship of, Thebes—though the latter had then been
-so much weakened by the Sacred War and other causes, that it seemed
-doubtful whether she could give them complete protection against Sparta.
-But in the year next after the battle of Mantinea, the alliance between
-Megalopolis and Thebes, as well as the hostility between Megalopolis and
-Athens, was still fresher and more intimate. The Thebans (then in unimpaired
-power), who had fought for them in the preceding year,—not the
-Athenians, who had fought against them,—would be the persons invoked
-for aid to Megalopolis; nor had any positive reverses as yet occurred to
-disable the Thebans from furnishing aid.
-</p>
-<p>
-3. Lastly, Pammenes is a <i>Theban</i> general, friend of Epaminondas. He is
-mentioned as such not only by Diodorus himself in another place (xvi, 34),
-but also by Pausanias (viii, 27, 2), as the general who had been sent to
-watch over the building of Megalopolis, by Plutarch (Plutarch, Pelopidas,
-c. 26; Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 805 F.), and by Polyænus (v,
-16, 3). We find a private Athenian citizen named Pammenes, a goldsmith,
-mentioned in the oration of Demosthenes against Meidias (s. 31. p. 521);
-but no Athenian officer or public man of that time so named.
-</p>
-<p>
-Upon these grounds, I cannot but feel convinced that Pammenes and his
-troops were Thebans, and not Athenians.
-</p>
-<p>
-I am happy to find myself in concurrence with Dr. Thirlwall on this
-point (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. xliii, p. 368 note).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_782"><a href="#FNanchor_782">[782]</a></span>
-See Isokrates, Orat. vi, (Archidamus) s. 85-93.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_783"><a href="#FNanchor_783">[783]</a></span>
-Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archid.) s. 73.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_784"><a href="#FNanchor_784">[784]</a></span>
-Cornelius Nepos has given a biography of Datames at some length,
-recounting his military exploits and stratagems. He places Datames, in
-point of military talent, above all <i>barbari</i>, except Hamilcar Barca and
-Hannibal (c. 1). Polyænus also (vii, 29) recounts several memorable proceedings
-of the same chief. Compare too Diodorus, xv, 91; and Xen.
-Cyropæd. viii, 8, 4.
-</p>
-<p>
-We cannot make out with any certainty either the history, or the chronology,
-of Datames. His exploits seem to belong to the last ten years of
-Artaxerxes Mnemon, and his death seems to have taken place a little before
-the death of that prince; which last event is to be assigned to 359-358 <small>B.C.</small>
-See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast. Hell. ch. 18. p. 316, Appendix.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_785"><a href="#FNanchor_785">[785]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 91, 92; Xenophon, Cyropæd. viii, 8, 4.
-</p>
-<p>
-Our information about these disturbances in the interior of the Persian
-empire is so scanty and confused, that few of the facts can be said to be
-certainly known. Diodorus has evidently introduced into the year 362-361
-<small>B.C.</small> a series of events, many of them belonging to years before and after.
-Rehdantz (Vit. Iphicrat. Chabr. et. Timoth. p. 154-161) brings together all
-the statements; but unfortunately with little result.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_786"><a href="#FNanchor_786">[786]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Agesil. c. 36; Athenæus, xiv, p. 616 D.; Cornelius Nepos,
-Agesil. c. 8.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_787"><a href="#FNanchor_787">[787]</a></span>
-See Pseudo-Aristotel. Œconomic. ii, 25.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_788"><a href="#FNanchor_788">[788]</a></span>
-Diodorus (xv, 93) differs from Plutarch and others (whom I follow) in
-respect to the relations of Tachos and Nektanebis with Agesilaus; affirming
-that Agesilaus supported Tachos, and supported him with success,
-against Nektanebis.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 2, 3.
-</p>
-<p>
-We find Chabrias serving Athens in the Chersonese—in 359-358 <small>B.C.</small>
-(Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 204).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_789"><a href="#FNanchor_789">[789]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 93; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 38-40; Cornelius Nepos, Agesil. 8.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_790"><a href="#FNanchor_790">[790]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Encom. Ages. vii, 7. Εἰ δ’ αὖ καλὸν καὶ μισοπέρσην εἶναι, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_791"><a href="#FNanchor_791">[791]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Agesil. c. 35.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_792"><a href="#FNanchor_792">[792]</a></span>
-Diodor. xv, 93.
-</p>
-<p>
-There is a difference between Diodorus and the Astronomical Canon, in
-the statements about the length of reign, and date of death, of Artaxerxes
-Mnemon, of about two years—361 or 359 <small>B.C.</small> See Mr. Clinton’s Fasti
-Hellenici, Appendix, ch. 18. p. 316—where the statements are brought
-together and discussed. Plutarch states the reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon
-to have lasted sixty-two years (Plutarch, Artax. c. 33); which cannot be
-correct, though in what manner the error is to be amended, we cannot
-determine.
-</p>
-<p>
-An Inscription of Mylasa in Karia recognizes the forty-fifth year of the
-reign of Artaxerxes, and thus supports the statement in the Astronomical
-Canon, which assigns to him forty-six years of reign. See Boeckh, Corp.
-Inscr. No. 2691, with his comments, p. 470.
-</p>
-<p>
-This same inscription affords ground of inference respecting the duration
-of the revolt; for it shows that the Karian Mausolus recognized himself as
-satrap, and Artaxerxes as his sovereign, in the year beginning November
-359 <small>B.C.</small>, which corresponds with the forty-fifth year of Artaxerxes Mnemon.
-The revolt therefore must have been suppressed before that period:
-see Sievers, Geschichte von Griechenland bis zur Schlacht von Mantineia,
-p. 373, note.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_793"><a href="#FNanchor_793">[793]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 29, 30; Justin, x, 1-3.
-</p>
-<p>
-Plutarch states that the lady whom the prince Darius asked for, was,
-Aspasia of Phokæa—the Greek mistress of Cyrus the younger, who had
-fallen into the hands of Artaxerxes after the battle of Kunaxa, and had
-acquired a high place in the monarch’s affections.
-</p>
-<p>
-But if we look at the chronology of the case, it will appear hardly possible
-that the lady who inspired so strong a passion to Darius, in or about
-361 <small>B.C.</small>, as to induce him to risk the displeasure of his father—and so
-decided a reluctance on the part of Artaxerxes to give her up—can have
-been the person who accompanied Cyrus to Kunaxa <i>forty years</i> before; for
-the battle of Kunaxa was fought in 401 <small>B.C.</small> The chronological improbability
-would be still greater, if we adopted Plutarch’s statement that Artaxerxes
-reigned sixty-two years; for it is certain that the battle of Kunaxa
-occurred very near the beginning of his reign, and the death of his son
-Darius near the end of it.
-</p>
-<p>
-Justin states the circumstances which preceded the death of Artaxerxes
-Mnemon in a manner yet more tragical. He affirms that the plot against
-the life of Artaxerxes was concerted by Darius in conjunction with several
-of his brothers; and that, on the plot being discovered, all these brothers,
-together with their wives and children, were put to death. Ochus, on coming
-to the throne, put to death a great number of his kinsmen and of the
-principal persons about the court, together with their wives and children—fearing
-a like conspiracy against himself.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_794"><a href="#FNanchor_794">[794]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 153.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_795"><a href="#FNanchor_795">[795]</a></span>
-The affirmation of Cornelius Nepos (Timotheus, c. 1), that Timotheus
-made war on Kotys with such success as to bring into the Athenian treasury
-twelve hundred talents, appears extravagant as to amount; even if
-we accept it as generally true.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_796"><a href="#FNanchor_796">[796]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 155.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_797"><a href="#FNanchor_797">[797]</a></span>
-See Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p. 151, and the
-preceding page.
-</p>
-<p>
-M. Rehdantz has put together, with great care and sagacity, all the fragments
-of evidence respecting this obscure period; and has elicited, as it
-seems to me, the most probable conclusions deducible from such scanty
-premises.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_798"><a href="#FNanchor_798">[798]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 5, 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_799"><a href="#FNanchor_799">[799]</a></span>
-We are fortunate enough to get this date exactly,—the twenty third
-of the month Metageitnion, in the archonship of Molon,—mentioned by
-Demosthenes adv. Polyklem, p. 1207, s. 5, 6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_800"><a href="#FNanchor_800">[800]</a></span>
-Diodor xvi, 95; Polyænus, vi, 2, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_801"><a href="#FNanchor_801">[801]</a></span>
-Polyænus, vi, 2, 2.
-</p>
-<p>
-It must have been about this time (362-361 <small>B.C.</small>) that Alexander of Pheræ
-sent envoys into Asia to engage the service of Charidemus and his mercenary
-band, then in or near the troad. His application was not accepted
-(Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 675, s. 192).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_802"><a href="#FNanchor_802">[802]</a></span>
-Demosthenes, de Coronâ Trierarch. p. 1230, s. 9.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus farther states that the Athenians placed Chares in command
-of a fleet for the protection of the Ægean; but that this admiral took himself
-off to Korkyra, and did nothing but plunder the allies (Diodor. xvi,
-95).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_803"><a href="#FNanchor_803">[803]</a></span>
-Compare Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 174-176; and Æschines,
-Fals. Leg. p. 250, c. 14.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_804"><a href="#FNanchor_804">[804]</a></span>
-The facts as stated in the text are the most probable result, as it seems
-to me, derivable from Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 250, c. 14.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_805"><a href="#FNanchor_805">[805]</a></span>
-Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii, 3, 3.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ergophilus seems to have been fined (Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 398, s.
-200).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_806"><a href="#FNanchor_806">[806]</a></span>
-Demosthen. adv. Polyklem. p. 1207. s. 6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_807"><a href="#FNanchor_807">[807]</a></span>
-Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 655, s. 122; cont. Polyklem. p. 1207.
-</p>
-<p>
-ὅτε Μιλτοκύθης ἀπέστη Κότυος ... ἐγράφη τι παρ’ ὑμῖν ψήφισμα τοιοῦτον, δι’ οὗ
-Μιλτοκύθης μὲν <em class="gesperrt">ἀπῆλθε</em> φοβηθεὶς καὶ νομίσας ὑμᾶς οὐ προσέχειν αὐτῷ,
-Κότυς δὲ ἐγκρατὴς τοῦ τε ὄρους τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τῶν θησαυρῶν ἐγένετο.
-</p>
-<p>
-The word ἀπῆλθε implies that Miltokythes was at Athens in person.
-</p>
-<p>
-The humble letter written by Kotys, in his first alarm at the revolt of
-Miltokythes, is referred to by the orator, p. 658, s. 136, 137.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_808"><a href="#FNanchor_808">[808]</a></span>
-Demosthenes adv. Polykl. p. 1210, s. 16; Demosthenes cont. Aristok.
-p. 655, s. 123.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_809"><a href="#FNanchor_809">[809]</a></span>
-Demosthen. adv. Polyklem, p. 1212, s. 24-26; p. 1213, s. 27; p. 1225, s.
-71.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_810"><a href="#FNanchor_810">[810]</a></span>
-Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 673, s. 187. Ἐκ γὰρ Ἀβύδου,
-τῆς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ὑμῖν ἐχθρᾶς, καὶ ὅθεν ἦσαν οἱ Σηστὸν καταλαβόντες,
-εἰς Σηστὸν διέβαινεν, ἣν εἶχε Κότυς. (He is speaking of Charidemus.)
-</p>
-<p>
-The other oration of Demosthenes (adv. Polykl. p. 1212) contains distinct
-intimation that Sestos was not lost by the Athenians <i>until after November
-361</i> <small>B.C.</small> Apollodorus the Athenian trierarch was in the town at that
-time, as well as various friends whom he mentions; so that Sestos must
-have been still an Athenian possession in November 361 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-It is lucky for some points of historical investigation, that the purpose
-of this oration against Polykles (composed by Demosthenes, but spoken by
-Apollodorus) requires great precision and specification of dates, even to
-months and days. Apollodorus complains that he has been constrained to
-bear the expense of a trierarchy, for four months beyond the year in which
-it was incumbent upon him jointly with a colleague. He sues the person
-whose duty it was to have relieved him as successor at the end of the year,
-but who had kept aloof and cheated him. The trierarchy of Apollodorus
-began in August 362 <small>B.C.</small>, and lasted (not merely to Aug. 361 <small>B.C.</small>, its legal
-term, but) to November 361 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 144, note), in the valuable
-chapters which he devotes to the obscure chronology of the period, has overlooked
-this exact indication of the time <i>after which</i> the Athenians lost Sestos.
-He supposes the loss to have taken place two or three years earlier.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_811"><a href="#FNanchor_811">[811]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 155.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_812"><a href="#FNanchor_812">[812]</a></span>
-Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 658, s. 136; p. 679, s. 211.
-</p>
-<p>
-What is said in the latter passage about the youthful Kersobleptes, is
-doubtless not less true of his father Kotys.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_813"><a href="#FNanchor_813">[813]</a></span>
-Demosthen. pro Phormione, p. 960, s. 64; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 398,
-s. 200.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_814"><a href="#FNanchor_814">[814]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 672, s. 184.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_815"><a href="#FNanchor_815">[815]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 671, s. 183. Compare Pseudo-Aristot.
-Œconomic. ii, 30.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_816"><a href="#FNanchor_816">[816]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 672, 673.
-</p>
-<p>
-The orator reads a letter (not cited however) from the governor of Krithôtê,
-announcing the formidable increase of force which threatened the
-place since the arrival of Charidemus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_817"><a href="#FNanchor_817">[817]</a></span>
-Aristotle (Politic. v, 8, 12) mentions the act and states that the two
-young men did it to avenge their father. He does not expressly say what
-Kotys had done to the father; but he notices the event in illustration of the
-general category,—Πολλαὶ δ’ ἐπιθέσεις γεγένηνται καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχύνεσθαι
-τῶν μονάρχων τινάς (compare what Tacitus says about <i>mos regius</i>—Annal.
-vi, 1). Aristotle immediately adds another case of cruel
-mutilation inflicted by Kotys,—Ἀδάμας δ’ ἀπέστη Κότυος διὰ τὸ ἐκτμηθῆναι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ
-παῖς ὢν, ὡς ὑβρισμένος.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare, about Kotys, Theopompus, Fragm. 33, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ.
-xii, p. 531, 532.
-</p>
-<p>
-Böhnecke (Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte, p. 725, 726)
-places the death of Kotys in 359 <small>B.C.</small>; and seems to infer from Athenæus
-(vi, p. 248; xii, p. 531) that he had actual communication with Philip of
-Macedon as king, whose accession took place between Midsummer 360 and
-Midsummer 359 <small>B.C.</small> But the evidence does not appear to me to bear out
-such a conclusion.
-</p>
-<p>
-The story cited by Athenæus from Hegesander, about letters reaching
-Philip from Kotys, cannot be true about this Kotys; because it seems impossible
-that Philip, in the first year of his reign, can have had any such
-flatterer as Kleisophus; Philip being at that time in the greatest political
-embarrassments, out of which he was only rescued by his indefatigable
-energy and ability. And the journey of Philip to Onokarsis, also mentioned
-by Athenæus out of Theopompus, does not imply any personal communication
-with Kotys.
-</p>
-<p>
-My opinion is, that the assassination of Kotys dates more probably in
-360 <small>B.C.</small></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_818"><a href="#FNanchor_818">[818]</a></span>
-Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 142; p. 662, s. 150; p. 675, s.
-193. Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 542 E.; Plutarch, adv. Koloten, p. 1126, B.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_819"><a href="#FNanchor_819">[819]</a></span>
-Plutarch, De Sui Laude, <i>ut sup.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_820"><a href="#FNanchor_820">[820]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristokr. p. 674, s. 193. μειρακύλλιον, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_821"><a href="#FNanchor_821">[821]</a></span>
-Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 623, 624, s. 8-12; p. 664, s. 153 (in which
-passage κηδεστὴς may be fairly taken to mean any near connection by marriage).
-</p>
-<p>
-About Athenodorus compare Isokrates, Or. viii, (de Pace) s. 31.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_822"><a href="#FNanchor_822">[822]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 674-676, s. 193-199.
-</p>
-<p>
-In sect. 194, are the words, <em class="gesperrt">ἧκε δὲ Κηφισόδοτος στρατηγῶν</em>,
-πρὸς ὃν αὐτὸς (Charidemus) ἔπεμψε τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐκείνην, καὶ αἱ
-τριήρεις, αἳ, ὅτ’ ἦν ἄδηλα τὰ τῆς σωτηρίας αὐτῷ, καὶ μὴ συγχωροῦντος
-Ἀρταβάζου σώζειν ἔμελλον αὐτόν.
-</p>
-<p>
-The verb ἧκε, in my judgment—not to the <i>first coming out</i> of Kephisodotus
-from Athens to take the command, as Weber (Comment. ad
-Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 460) and other commentators think, but—to
-the coming of Kephisodotus with ten triremes <i>to Perinthus</i>, near which
-place Charidemus was, for the purpose of demanding fulfilment of what
-the latter had promised; see s. 196. When Kephisodotus came to him at
-Perinthus (παρόντος τοῦ στρατηγοῦ—πρὸς ὃν τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐπεπόμφει—s.
-195) to make this demand, then Charidemus, instead of behaving honestly,
-acted like a traitor and an enemy. The allusion to this antecedent letter
-from Charidemus to Kephisodotus, shows that the latter must have been on
-the spot for some time, and therefore that ἧκε cannot refer to his first coming
-out.
-</p>
-<p>
-The term ἑπτὰ μῆνας (s. 196) counts, I presume, from the death of Kotys.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_823"><a href="#FNanchor_823">[823]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 199; Æschines cont. Ktesiphont.
-p. 384, c. 20.
-</p>
-<p>
-Demosthenes himself may probably have been among the trierarchs called
-before the dikastery as witnesses to prove what took place at Perinthus
-and Alopekonnesus (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 200); Euthykles,
-the speaker of the discourse against Aristokrates, had been himself also
-among the officers serving (p. 675, s. 196; p. 683, s. 223).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_824"><a href="#FNanchor_824">[824]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 679, s. 209; p. 681, s. 216. Demosthen.
-de Halonneso, p. 87, s. 42.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_825"><a href="#FNanchor_825">[825]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 201. οὐκ ὄντος νομίμου
-τοῖς Θρᾳξὶν ἀλλήλους ἀποκτιννύναι, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_826"><a href="#FNanchor_826">[826]</a></span>
-Demosthenes, cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 201.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_827"><a href="#FNanchor_827">[827]</a></span>
-Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 202-204.
-</p>
-<p>
-Aristotle (Politic. v. 5, 9) mentions the association or faction of Iphiades
-as belonging to Abydos, not to Sestos. Perhaps there may have been an
-Abydene association now exercising influence at Sestos; at least we are
-told, that the revolution which deprived the Athenians of Sestos, was
-accomplished in part by exiles who crossed from Abydos; something like
-the relation between Argos and Corinth in the years immediately preceding
-the peace of Antalkidas.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_828"><a href="#FNanchor_828">[828]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 678, p. 205, 206; p. 680. s. 211, 212.
-The arrival of Chares in the Hellespont is marked by Demosthenes as
-immediately following the expedition of Athens to drive the Thebans out
-of Eubœa, which took place about the middle of 358 <small>B.C.</small></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_829"><a href="#FNanchor_829">[829]</a></span>
-We see that Sestos must have been surrendered on this occasion,
-although Diodorus describes it as having been conquered by Chares five
-years afterwards, in the year 353 <small>B.C.</small> (Diod. xvi, 34). It is evident from
-the whole tenor of the oration of Demosthenes, that Charidemus did actually
-surrender the Chersonese at this time. Had he still refused to surrender
-Sestos, the orator would not have failed to insist on the fact emphatically
-against him. Besides, Demosthenes says, comparing the conduct of
-Philip towards the Olynthians, with that of Kersobleptes towards Athens—ἐκεῖνος ἐκείνοις
-Ποτίδαιαν οὐχὶ τηνικαῦτ’ ἀπέδωκεν, ἥνικ’ ἀποστερεῖν οὐκέθ’ οἷός τ’ ἦν, ὥσπερ ὑμῖν Κερσοβλέπτης
-Χεῤῥόνησον (p. 656. s. 128).
-This distinctly announces that the Chersonese was <i>given back</i> to Athens,
-though reluctantly and tardily, by Kersobleptes. Sestos must have been
-given up along with it, as the principal and most valuable post upon all
-accounts. If it be true (as Diodorus states) that Chares in 353 <small>B.C.</small> took
-Sestos by siege, slew the inhabitants of military age and reduced the rest
-to slavery—we must suppose the town again to have revolted between 358
-and 353 <small>B.C.</small>; that is, during the time of the Social War; which is highly
-probable. But there is much in the statement of Diodorus which I cannot
-distinctly make out; for he says that Kersobleptes in 353 <small>B.C.</small>, on account
-of his hatred towards Philip, surrendered to Athens all the cities in the
-Chersonese except Kardia. That had already been done in 358 <small>B.C.</small>, and
-without any reference to Philip; and if after surrendering the Chersonese
-in 358 <small>B.C.</small>, Kersobleptes had afterwards reconquered it, so as to have it
-again in his possession in the beginning of 353 <small>B.C.</small>—it seems unaccountable
-that Demosthenes should say nothing about the reconquest in his oration
-against Aristokrates, where he is trying to make all points possible
-against Kersobleptes.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_830"><a href="#FNanchor_830">[830]</a></span>
-Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 681, s. 216.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_831"><a href="#FNanchor_831">[831]</a></span>
-Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 623, s. 8; p. 654, s. 121. The chronology
-of these events as given by Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p.
-147) appears to me nearly correct, in spite of the strong objection expressed
-against it by Weber (Prolegg. ad Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. lxxiii.)—and
-more exact than the chronology of Böhnecke, Forschungen, p. 727,
-who places the coming out of Kephisodotus as general to the Chersonese
-in 358 <small>B.C.</small>, which is, I think, a full year too late. Rehdantz does not allow,
-as I think he ought to do, for a certain interval between Kephisodotus and
-the Ten Envoys, during which Athenodorus acted for Athens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_832"><a href="#FNanchor_832">[832]</a></span>
-Demosthen. cont. Polyklem, p. 1212, s. 26.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_833"><a href="#FNanchor_833">[833]</a></span>
-Demosthen. Philippic. I, p. 41, s. 6. εἴχομέν ποτε ἡμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
-Πύδναν καὶ Ποτίδαιαν καὶ Μεθώνην <em class="gesperrt">καὶ πάντα τὸν τόπον τοῦτον οἰκεῖον κύκλῳ</em>, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_834"><a href="#FNanchor_834">[834]</a></span>
-I have not made any mention of the expedition against Eubœa (whereby
-Athens drove the Theban invaders out of that island), though it occurred
-just about the same time as the recovery of the Chersonese.
-</p>
-<p>
-That expedition will more properly come to be spoken of in my next
-volume. But the recovery of the Chersonese was the closing event of a
-series of proceedings which had been going on for four years; so that I
-could hardly leave that series unfinished.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_835"><a href="#FNanchor_835">[835]</a></span>
-Thucyd. vii, 50-58.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_836"><a href="#FNanchor_836">[836]</a></span>
-Lysias, Orat. xx, (pro Polystrato) s. 26, 27.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_837"><a href="#FNanchor_837">[837]</a></span>
-Thucyd. vii, 48, 49.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_838"><a href="#FNanchor_838">[838]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 34.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_839"><a href="#FNanchor_839">[839]</a></span>
-Thucyd. viii, 2; compare vii, 55.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_840"><a href="#FNanchor_840">[840]</a></span>
-Thucyd. vii, 33-57; Dionysius Halikarn. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 453.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_841"><a href="#FNanchor_841">[841]</a></span>
-Thucyd. viii, 26, 35, 91.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_842"><a href="#FNanchor_842">[842]</a></span>
-Thucyd. viii, 29, 45, 78, 84.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_843"><a href="#FNanchor_843">[843]</a></span>
-Thucyd. viii, 84.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_844"><a href="#FNanchor_844">[844]</a></span>
-Thucyd. viii, 85.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_845"><a href="#FNanchor_845">[845]</a></span>
-Thucyd. viii, 105; Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 7.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_846"><a href="#FNanchor_846">[846]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 19.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_847"><a href="#FNanchor_847">[847]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 23-26.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_848"><a href="#FNanchor_848">[848]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 23. Ἔῤῥει τὰ καλά. Μίνδαρος ἀπεσσούα· πεινῶντι
-τὤνδρες· ἀπορέομες τί χρὴ δρᾷν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_849"><a href="#FNanchor_849">[849]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 27.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_850"><a href="#FNanchor_850">[850]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 27-31.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_851"><a href="#FNanchor_851">[851]</a></span>
-Thucyd. viii, 85.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_852"><a href="#FNanchor_852">[852]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 31; Diodor. xiii, 63.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_853"><a href="#FNanchor_853">[853]</a></span>
-Thucyd. vii, 55.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_854"><a href="#FNanchor_854">[854]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 33-35.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_855"><a href="#FNanchor_855">[855]</a></span>
-Compare Diodor. xiii, 75—about the banishment of Dioklês.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_856"><a href="#FNanchor_856">[856]</a></span>
-Aristotel. Politic. v, 3, 6. Καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ὁ δῆμος, αἴτιος γενόμενος
-τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐκ πολιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλε.
-</p>
-<p>
-v, 4, 4, 5. Καὶ Διονύσιος κατηγορῶν Δαφναίου καὶ τῶν πλουσίων ἠξιώθη τῆς τυραννίδος,
-διὰ τὴν ἔχθραν πιστευθεὶς ὡς δημοτικὸς ὤν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_857"><a href="#FNanchor_857">[857]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 56.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_858"><a href="#FNanchor_858">[858]</a></span>
-Thucyd. vi, 34. Speech of Hermokrates to his countrymen at Syracuse—δοκεῖ
-δέ μοι καὶ ἐς Καρχηδόνα ἄμεινον εἶναι πέμψαι. Οὐ γὰρ ἀνέλπιστον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ διὰ
-φόβου εἰσὶ μή ποτε Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔλθωσιν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_859"><a href="#FNanchor_859">[859]</a></span>
-Polybius, iii, 22, 23, 24.
-</p>
-<p>
-He gives three separate treaties (either wholly or in part) between the
-Carthaginians and Romans. The latest of the three belongs to the days
-of Pyrrhus, about 278 <small>B.C.</small>; the earliest to 508 <small>B.C.</small> The intermediate
-treaty is not marked as to date by any specific evidence, but I see no ground
-for supposing that it is so late as 345 <small>B.C.</small>, which is the date assigned to it
-by Casaubon, identifying it with the treaty alluded to by Livy, vii, 27. I
-cannot but think that it is more likely to be of earlier date, somewhere
-between 480-410 <small>B.C.</small> This second treaty is far more restrictive than the
-first, against the Romans; for it interdicts them from all traffic either with
-Sardinia or Africa, except the city of Carthage itself; the first treaty permitted
-such trade under certain limitations and conditions. The second
-treaty argues a comparative superiority of Carthage to Rome, which would
-rather seem to belong to the latter half of the fifth century <small>B.C.</small>, than to
-the latter half of the fourth.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_860"><a href="#FNanchor_860">[860]</a></span>
-Strabo, xvii, p. 832, 833; Livy, Epitome, lib. 51.
-</p>
-<p>
-Strabo gives the circumference as three hundred and sixty stadia, and the
-breadth of the isthmus as sixty stadia. But this is noticed by Barth as
-much exaggerated (Wanderungen auf der Küste des Mittelmeers, p. 85).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_861"><a href="#FNanchor_861">[861]</a></span>
-Appian. Reb. Punic, viii, 75.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_862"><a href="#FNanchor_862">[862]</a></span>
-Strabo, <i>ut sup.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_863"><a href="#FNanchor_863">[863]</a></span>
-This is the view of Movers, sustained with much plausibility, in his
-learned and instructive work—Geschichte der Phœnizier, vol. ii, part ii, p.
-435-455. See Diodor. xx, 55.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_864"><a href="#FNanchor_864">[864]</a></span>
-Livy, xxix, 25. Compare the last chapter of the history of Herodotus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_865"><a href="#FNanchor_865">[865]</a></span>
-Diodor. xx, 17; Appian, viii, 3, 68.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_866"><a href="#FNanchor_866">[866]</a></span>
-Colonel Leake observes, with respect to the modern Greeks, who work
-on the plains of Turkey, upon the landed property of Turkish proprietors—“The
-Helots seem to have resembled the Greeks, who labor on the Turkish
-farms <i>in the plains</i> of Turkey, and who are bound to account to their
-masters for one-half of the produce of the soil, as Tyrtæus says of the
-Messenians of his time—
-</p>
-<div class="poetry-container">
-  <div class="poetry">
-    <p class="i1">Ὥσπερ ὄνοι μεγάλοις ἄχθεσι τειρόμενοι</p>
-    <p>Δεσποσύνοισι φέροντες, ἀναγκαίης ὑπὸ λυγρῆς,</p>
-    <p class="i1">Ἥμισυ πᾶν, ὅσσον κάρπον ἄρουρα φέροι.</p>
-    <p class="rt">(Tyrtæus, Frag. 5, ed. Schneid.)</p>
-  </div>
-</div>
-<p>
-The condition of the Greeks in the mountainous regions is not so hard”
-(Leake, Peloponnesiaca, p. 168).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_867"><a href="#FNanchor_867">[867]</a></span>
-Polybius, i, 72; Livy, xxxiv, 62.
-</p>
-<p>
-Movers (Geschichte der Phœnizier, ii, 2, p. 455) assigns this large assessment
-to Leptis Magna; but the passage of Livy can relate only to Leptis
-Parva, in the region called Emporia.
-</p>
-<p>
-Leptis Magna was at a far greater distance from Carthage, near the
-Great Syrtis.
-</p>
-<p>
-Dr. Barth (Wanderungen durch die Küstenländer des Mittelländischen
-Meers, p. 81-146) has given a recent and valuable examination of the site
-of Carthage and of the neighboring regions. On his map, however, the
-territory called Emporia is marked near the Lesser Syrtis, two hundred
-miles from Carthage (Pliny, H. N. v, 3). Yet it seems certain that the
-name Emporia must have comprised the territory south of Carthage and
-approaching very near to the city; for Scipio Africanus, in his expedition
-from Sicily, directed his pilots to steer for Emporia. He intended to land
-very near Carthage; and he actually did land on the White Cape, near
-to that city, but on the north side, and still nearer to Utica. This region
-north of Carthage was probably not included in the name Emporia (Livy,
-xxix, 25-27).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_868"><a href="#FNanchor_868">[868]</a></span>
-Aristotel. Politic. ii, 8, 9; vi, 3, 5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_869"><a href="#FNanchor_869">[869]</a></span>
-Appian, viii, 32, 54, 59; Phlegon, Trall. de Mirabilibus, c. 18. Εὔμαχος
-δέ φησιν ἐν Περιηγήσει, Καρχηδονίους περιταφρεύοντας τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπαρχίαν, εὑρεῖν ὀρύσσοντας
-δύο σκελετοὺς ἐν σόρῳ κειμένους, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-The line of trench however was dug apparently at an early stage of the
-Carthaginian dominion; for the Carthaginians afterwards, as they grew
-more powerful, extended their possessions beyond the trench; as we see by
-the passages of Appian above referred to.
-</p>
-<p>
-Movers (Gesch. der Phœniz. ii, 2, p. 457) identifies this trench with the
-one which Pliny names near Thenæ on the Lesser Syrtis, as having been dug
-by order of the second Africanus—to form a boundary between the Roman
-province of Africa, and the dominion of the native kings (Pliny, H.
-N. v, 3). But I greatly doubt such identity. It appears to me that this
-last is distinct from the Carthaginian trench.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_870"><a href="#FNanchor_870">[870]</a></span>
-A Carthaginian citizen wore as many rings as he had served campaigns
-(Aristotel. Politic. vii, 2, 6).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_871"><a href="#FNanchor_871">[871]</a></span>
-Diodor. xx, 10.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_872"><a href="#FNanchor_872">[872]</a></span>
-Appian, viii, 80. Twenty thousand panoplies, together with an immense
-stock of weapons and engines of siege, were delivered up to the
-perfidious manœuvres of the Romans, a little before the last siege of Carthage.
-</p>
-<p>
-See Bötticher, Geschichte der Carthager, p. 20-25.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_873"><a href="#FNanchor_873">[873]</a></span>
-Diodor. xvi, 8.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_874"><a href="#FNanchor_874">[874]</a></span>
-See the striking description in Livy, of the motley composition of the
-Carthaginian mercenary armies, where he bestows just admiration on the
-genius of Hannibal, for having always maintained his ascendency over
-them, and kept them in obedience and harmony (Livy, xxviii, 12). Compare
-Polybius, i, 65-67, and the manner in which Imilkon abandoned his
-mercenaries to destruction at Syracuse (Diodor. xiv, 75-77).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_875"><a href="#FNanchor_875">[875]</a></span>
-There were in like manner two suffetes in Gades and each of the other
-Phœnician colonies (Livy, xxviii, 37). Cornelius Nepos (Hannibal, c. 7)
-talks of Hannibal as having been made <i>king</i> (rex) when he was invested
-with his great foreign military command, at twenty-two years of age. So
-Diodorus (xiv, 54) talks about Imilkon, and Herodotus (vii, 166) about
-Hamilkar.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_876"><a href="#FNanchor_876">[876]</a></span>
-See Movers, Die Phönizier, ii, 1, p. 483-499.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_877"><a href="#FNanchor_877">[877]</a></span>
-Polybius, x, 18; Livy, xxx, 16.
-</p>
-<p>
-Yet again Polybius in another place speaks of the Gerontion at Carthage
-as representing the aristocratical force, and as opposed to the πλῆθος or
-people (vi, 51). It would seem that by Γερόντιον he must mean the same
-as the assembly called in another passage (x, 18) Σύγκλητος.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_878"><a href="#FNanchor_878">[878]</a></span>
-Aristotel. Politic. ii, 8, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_879"><a href="#FNanchor_879">[879]</a></span>
-Livy, xxxiii, 46. Justin (xix, 2) mentions the one hundred select Senators
-set apart as judges.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_880"><a href="#FNanchor_880">[880]</a></span>
-Heeren (Ideen über den Verkehr der Alten Welt, part ii, p. 138, 3rd
-edit.) and Kluge (in his Dissertation, Aristoteles de Politiâ Carthaginiensium,
-Wratisl. 1824) have discussed all these passages with ability. But
-their materials do not enable them to reach any certainty.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_881"><a href="#FNanchor_881">[881]</a></span>
-Valerius Max. ix, 5, 4. “Insolentiæ inter Carthaginiensem et Campanum
-senatum quasi æmulatio fuit. Ille enim separato à plebe balneo lavabatur,
-hic diverso foro utebatur.”</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_882"><a href="#FNanchor_882">[882]</a></span>
-Diodor. xx, 10; xxiii, 9; Valer. Max. ii, 7, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_883"><a href="#FNanchor_883">[883]</a></span>
-Aristotel Politic. iii, 5, 6.
-</p>
-<p>
-These banquets must have been settled, daily proceedings,—as well as
-multitudinous, in order to furnish even apparent warrant for the comparison
-which Aristotle makes with the Spartan public mess. But even granting
-the analogy on these external points,—the intrinsic difference of
-character and purpose between the two must have been so great, that the
-comparison seems not happy.
-</p>
-<p>
-Livy (xxxiv, 61) talks of the <i>circuli et convivia</i> at Carthage; but this is
-probably a general expression, without particular reference to the public
-banquets mentioned by Aristotle.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_884"><a href="#FNanchor_884">[884]</a></span>
-Aristotel. Polit. ii, 8, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_885"><a href="#FNanchor_885">[885]</a></span>
-Aristot. Polit. ii, 8, 1. He briefly alludes to the abortive conspiracy of
-Hanno (v, 6, 2), which is also mentioned in Justin (xxi, 4). Hanno is said
-to have formed the plan of putting to death the Senate, and making himself
-despot. But he was detected, and executed under the severest tortures;
-all his family being put to death along with him.
-</p>
-<p>
-Not only is it very difficult to make out Aristotle’s statements about the
-Carthaginian government,—but some of them are even contradictory.
-One of these (v, 10, 3) has been pointed out by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire,
-who proposes to read ἐν Χαλκηδόνι instead of ἐν Καρχηδόνι. In another
-place (v, 10, 4) Aristotle calls Carthage (ἐν Καρχηδόνι δημοκρατουμένῃ) a
-state democratically governed; which cannot be reconciled with what he
-says in ii, 8, respecting its government.
-</p>
-<p>
-Aristotle compares the Council of One Hundred and Four at Carthage
-to the Spartan ephors. But it is not easy to see how so numerous a body
-could have transacted the infinite diversity of administrative and other business
-performed by the five ephors.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_886"><a href="#FNanchor_886">[886]</a></span>
-Justin. xix, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_887"><a href="#FNanchor_887">[887]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_888"><a href="#FNanchor_888">[888]</a></span>
-Justin, xix, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_889"><a href="#FNanchor_889">[889]</a></span>
-Diodor. xii, 82.
-</p>
-<p>
-It seems probable that the war which Diodorus mentions to have taken
-place in 452 <small>B.C.</small>, between the Egestæans and Lilybæans—was really a war
-between Egesta and Selinus (see Diodor, xi, 86—with Wesseling’s note).
-Lilybæum as a town attained no importance until after the capture of Motyê
-by the older Dionysius in 393 <small>B.C.</small></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_890"><a href="#FNanchor_890">[890]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 43.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_891"><a href="#FNanchor_891">[891]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 43.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_892"><a href="#FNanchor_892">[892]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 43. Κατέστησαν στρατηγὸν τὸν Ἀννίβαν, κατὰ νόμους
-τότε βασιλεύοντα. Οὗτος δὲ ἦν υἱωνὸς μὲν τοῦ πρὸς Γέλωνα πολεμήσαντος Ἁμίλκου,
-καὶ πρὸς Ἱμέρᾳ τελευτήσαντος, υἱὸς δὲ Γέσκωνος, ὃς διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἧτταν
-ἐφυγαδεύθη, καὶ κατεβίωσεν ἐν τῇ Σελινοῦντι. Ὁ δ’ οὖν Ἀννίβας, ὢν μὲν καὶ
-<em class="gesperrt">φύσει μισέλλην</em>, ὅμως δὲ τὰς τῶν προγόνων ἀτιμίας διορθώσασθαι βουλόμενος, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-The banishment of Giskon, and that too for the whole of his life, deserves
-notice, as a point of comparison between the Greek republics and Carthage.
-A defeated general in Greece, if he survived his defeat, was not unfrequently
-banished, even where there seems neither proof nor probability
-that he had been guilty of misconduct, or misjudgment, or omission. But
-I do not recollect any case in which, when a Grecian general thus apparently
-innocent was not merely defeated but slain in the battle, his son was
-banished for life, as Giskon was banished by the Carthaginians. In appreciating
-the manner in which the Grecian states, both democratical and oligarchical,
-dealt with their officers, the contemporary republic of Carthage
-is one important standard of comparison. Those who censure the Greeks,
-will have to find stronger terms of condemnation when they review the
-proceedings of the Carthaginians.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_893"><a href="#FNanchor_893">[893]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 43, 44.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_894"><a href="#FNanchor_894">[894]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 44.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_895"><a href="#FNanchor_895">[895]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 59.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_896"><a href="#FNanchor_896">[896]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 55; xi, 21.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_897"><a href="#FNanchor_897">[897]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 54-58. οἱ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις Ἕλληνες ξυμμαχοῦντες, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-It cannot therefore be exact,—that which Plutarch affirms, Timoleon, c.
-30,—that the Carthaginians had never employed Greeks in their service,
-at the time of the battle of the Krimêsus,—<small>B.C.</small> 340.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_898"><a href="#FNanchor_898">[898]</a></span>
-Thucyd. vi, 34. δυνατοὶ δέ εἰσι (the Carthaginians) μάλιστα τῶν νῦν,
-βουληθέντες· χρυσὸν γὰρ καὶ ἄργυρον πλεῖστον κέκτηνται, ὅθεν ὅ τε πόλεμος καὶ
-τἄλλα εὐπορεῖ.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_899"><a href="#FNanchor_899">[899]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 54, 55.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_900"><a href="#FNanchor_900">[900]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 56, 57.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_901"><a href="#FNanchor_901">[901]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 57.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_902"><a href="#FNanchor_902">[902]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 57, 58.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_903"><a href="#FNanchor_903">[903]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 59. Ὁ δὲ Ἀννίβας ἀπεκρίθη, τοὺς μὲν Σελινουντίους
-μὴ δυναμένους τηρεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, πεῖραν τῆς δουλείας λήψεσθαι· τοὺς δὲ
-θεοὺς ἐκτὸς Σελινοῦντος οἴχεσθαι, προσκόψαντας τοῖς ἐνοικοῦσιν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_904"><a href="#FNanchor_904">[904]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 59. The ruins, yet remaining, of the ancient temples of
-Selinus, are vast and imposing; characteristic as specimens of Doric art,
-during the fifth and sixth centuries <small>B.C.</small> From the great magnitude of the
-fallen columns, it has been supposed that they were overthrown by an earthquake.
-But the ruins afford distinct evidence, that these columns have
-been first undermined, and then overthrown by crow-bars.
-</p>
-<p>
-This impressive fact, demonstrating the agency of the Carthaginian destroyers,
-is stated by Niebuhr, Vorträge über alte Geschichte, vol. iii. p. 207.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_905"><a href="#FNanchor_905">[905]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 60.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_906"><a href="#FNanchor_906">[906]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 61, 62.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_907"><a href="#FNanchor_907">[907]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 62. Τῶν δ’ αἰχμαλώτων γυναικάς τε καὶ παῖδας διαδοὺς
-εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον παρεφύλαττε· τῶν δ’ ἀνδρῶν τοὺς ἁλόντας, εἰς τρισχιλίους ὄντας,
-παρήγαγεν ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ πρότερον Ἀμίλκας ὁ πάππος αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ Γέλωνος ἀνῃρέθη,
-καὶ πάντας αἰκισάμενος κατέσφαξε.
-</p>
-<p>
-The Carthaginians, after their victory over Agathokles in 307 <small>B.C.</small>, sacrificed
-their finest prisoners as offerings of thanks to the gods (Diodor. xx,
-65.)</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_908"><a href="#FNanchor_908">[908]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 79.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_909"><a href="#FNanchor_909">[909]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 37.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_910"><a href="#FNanchor_910">[910]</a></span>
-Herodot. vi, 28.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_911"><a href="#FNanchor_911">[911]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 62-80.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_912"><a href="#FNanchor_912">[912]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 62.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_913"><a href="#FNanchor_913">[913]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 28. Οἱ δ’ οὐκ ἔφασαν δεῖν στασιάζειν πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_914"><a href="#FNanchor_914">[914]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 31; Diodor. xiii, 63.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_915"><a href="#FNanchor_915">[915]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 63.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_916"><a href="#FNanchor_916">[916]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 63, 75.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_917"><a href="#FNanchor_917">[917]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 75. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Διοκλῆς ἐφυγαδεύθη, τὸν
-δὲ Ἑρμοκράτην οὐδ’ ὡς προσεδέξαντο· ὑπώπτευον γὰρ τὴν τἀνδρὸς τόλμαν,
-μή ποτε τυχὼν ἡγεμονίας, ἀναδείξῃ ἑαυτὸν τύραννον.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_918"><a href="#FNanchor_918">[918]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 75. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἑρμοκράτης τότε τὸν καιρὸν οὐχ ὁρῶν
-εὔθετον εἰς τὸ βιάσασθαι, πάλιν ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς Σελινοῦντα. Μετὰ δέ τινα χρόνον,
-τῶν φίλων αὐτὸν μεταπεμπομένων, ὥρμησε μετὰ τρισχιλίων στρατιωτῶν, καὶ πορευθεὶς
-διὰ τῆς Γελώας, ἧκε νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὸν συντεταγμένον τόπον.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_919"><a href="#FNanchor_919">[919]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 4, 8.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_920"><a href="#FNanchor_920">[920]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 75.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenophon (Hellen. i, 3, 13) states that Hermokrates, ἤδη φεύγων ἐκ Συρακουσῶν,
-was among those who accompanied Pharnabazus along with the
-envoys intended to go to Susa, but who only went as far as Gordium in
-Phrygia, and were detained by Pharnabazus (on the requisition of Cyrus)
-for three years. This must have been in the year 407 <small>B.C.</small> Now I cannot
-reconcile this with the proceedings of Hermokrates as described by Diodorus;
-his coming to the Sicilian Messênê,—his exploits near Selinus,—his
-various attempts to procure restoration to Syracuse:—all of which
-must have occurred in 408-407 <small>B.C.</small>, ending with the death of Hermokrates.
-</p>
-<p>
-It seems to me impossible that the person mentioned by Xenophon as
-accompanying Pharnabazus into the interior can have been the eminent
-Hermokrates. Whether it was another person of the same name,—or
-whether Xenophon was altogether misinformed,—I will not take upon me
-to determine. There were really two contemporary Syracusans bearing
-that name, for the father of Dionysius the despot was named Hermokrates.
-</p>
-<p>
-Polybius (xii, 25) states that Hermokrates fought with the Lacedæmonians
-at Ægospotami. He means the eminent general so called; who
-however cannot have been at Ægospotami in the summer or autumn of
-405 <small>B.C.</small> There is some mistake in the assertion of Polybius, but I do not
-know how to explain it.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_921"><a href="#FNanchor_921">[921]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 96; xiv, 66.
-</p>
-<p>
-Isokrates, Or. v, Philipp. s. 73—Dionysius, πολλοστὸς ὢν Συρακοσίων
-καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Demosthenes, adv. Leptinem, p. 506, s. 178. γραμματέως, ὥς φασι, etc.
-Polybius (xv, 35), ἐκ δημοτικῆς καὶ ταπεινῆς ὑποθέσεως ὁρμηθεὶς, etc. Compare
-Polyænus, v, 2, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_922"><a href="#FNanchor_922">[922]</a></span>
-Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 24. Διονύσιος ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους. Diodor. xiii, 91.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_923"><a href="#FNanchor_923">[923]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 75.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_924"><a href="#FNanchor_924">[924]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 79.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_925"><a href="#FNanchor_925">[925]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 80; Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 21.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_926"><a href="#FNanchor_926">[926]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 81-84.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_927"><a href="#FNanchor_927">[927]</a></span>
-Diogen. Laert. viii, 63.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_928"><a href="#FNanchor_928">[928]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 81-84; Polyb. ix, 7.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_929"><a href="#FNanchor_929">[929]</a></span>
-Diodor. xi, 25.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_930"><a href="#FNanchor_930">[930]</a></span>
-Virgil, Æneid. iii, 704.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_931"><a href="#FNanchor_931">[931]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 85.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_932"><a href="#FNanchor_932">[932]</a></span>
-See about the Topography of Agrigentum,—Seyfert, Akragas, p. 21,
-23, 40 (Hamburg, 1845).
-</p>
-<p>
-The modern town of Girgenti stands on one of the hills of this vast
-aggregate, which is overspread with masses of ruins, and around which the
-traces of the old walls may be distinctly made out, with considerable remains
-of them in some particular parts.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare Polybius, i, 18; ix, 27.
-</p>
-<p>
-Pindar calls the town ποταμίᾳ τ’ Ἀκράγαντι—Pyth. vi, 6: ἱερὸν οἴκημα
-ποταμοῦ—Olymp. ii, 10.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_933"><a href="#FNanchor_933">[933]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 85.
-</p>
-<p>
-We read of a stratagem in Polyænus (v, 10, 4), whereby Imilkon is said
-to have enticed the Agrigentines, in one of their sallies, into incautious
-pursuit, by a simulated flight; and thus to have inflicted upon them a serious
-defeat.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_934"><a href="#FNanchor_934">[934]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 86.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_935"><a href="#FNanchor_935">[935]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 87.
-</p>
-<p>
-It appears that an eminence a little way eastward from Agrigentum still
-bears the name of <i>Il Campo Cartaginese</i>, raising some presumption that it
-was once occupied by the Carthaginians. Evidently, the troops sent out
-by Imilkon to meet and repel Daphnæus, must have taken post to the eastward
-of Agrigentum, from which side the Syracusan army of relief was
-approaching. Seyfert (Akragas, p. 41) contests this point, and supposes
-that they must have been on the western side; misled by the analogy of the
-Roman siege in 262 <small>B.C.</small>, when the Carthaginian relieving army under
-Hanno were coming from the westward,—from Heraklei (Polyb. i, 19).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_936"><a href="#FNanchor_936">[936]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 87.
-</p>
-<p>
-The youth of Argeius, combined with the fact of his being in high command,
-makes us rather imagine that he was of noble birth: compare Thucydid.
-vi, 38,—the speech of Athenagoras.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_937"><a href="#FNanchor_937">[937]</a></span>
-Mention is again made, sixty-five years afterwards, in the description
-of the war of Timoleon against the Carthaginians,—of the abundance of
-gold and silver drinking cups, and rich personal ornaments, carried by the
-native Carthaginians on military service (Diodor. xvi, 81; Plutarch, Timoleon,
-c. 28, 29).
-</p>
-<p>
-There was a select body of Carthaginians,—a Sacred Band,—mentioned
-in these later times, consisting of two thousand five hundred men of distinguished
-bravery as well as of conspicuous position in the city (Diodor.
-xvi, 80; xx, 10).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_938"><a href="#FNanchor_938">[938]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 88.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_939"><a href="#FNanchor_939">[939]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 89, 90.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_940"><a href="#FNanchor_940">[940]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 91.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_941"><a href="#FNanchor_941">[941]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 88.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenophon confirms the statement of Diodorus, that Agrigentum was
-taken by famine (Hellen. i, 5, 21; ii, 2, 24).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_942"><a href="#FNanchor_942">[942]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 91.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_943"><a href="#FNanchor_943">[943]</a></span>
-Demosthenes de Coronâ, p. 286, s. 220.
-</p>
-<p>
-This comparison is made by M. Brunet de Presle, in his valuable historical
-work (Recherches sur les Establissemens des Grecs en Sicile, Part ii, s.
-39, p. 219).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_944"><a href="#FNanchor_944">[944]</a></span>
-Aristotel. Politic. v, 5, 6. Γίνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας,
-καὶ ὅταν ἀναλώσωσι τὰ ἴδια, ζῶντες ἀσελγῶς· καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι καινοτομεῖν ζητοῦσι,
-καὶ ἢ τυραννίδι ἐπιτίθενται αὐτοὶ, ἢ κατασκευάζουσιν ἕτερον· ὥσπερ Ἱππαρῖνος Διονύσιον
-ἐν Συρακούσαις.
-</p>
-<p>
-Hipparinus was the father of Dion, respecting whom more hereafter.
-</p>
-<p>
-Plato, in his warm sympathy for Dion, assigns to Hipparinus more of an
-equality of rank and importance with the elder Dionysius, than the subsequent
-facts justify (Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 353 A.; p. 355 F.).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_945"><a href="#FNanchor_945">[945]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 91. Ἀπορουμένων δὲ πάντων παρελθών Διονύσιος ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους,
-τῶν μὲν στρατηγῶν κατηγόρησεν, ὡς προδιδόντων τὰ πράγματα τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις· τὰ δὲ πλήθη
-παρώξυνε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν τιμωρίαν, παρακαλῶν μὴ περιμεῖναι τὸν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους κλῆρον,
-ἀλλ’ ἐκ χειρὸς εὐθέως ἐπιθεῖναι τὴν δίκην.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_946"><a href="#FNanchor_946">[946]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 91. Τῶν δ’ ἀρχόντων ζημιούντων τὸν Διονύσιον κατὰ
-τοὺς νόμους, ὡς θορυβοῦντα, Φίλιστος, ὁ τὰς ἱστορίας ὕστερον συγγράψας,
-οὐσίαν ἔχων μεγάλην, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-In the description given by Thucydides (vi, 32-39) of the debate in the
-Syracusan assembly (prior to the arrival of the Athenian expedition) in
-which Hermokrates and Athenagoras speak, we find the magistrates interfering
-to prevent the continuance of a debate which had become very personal
-and acrimonious; though there was nothing in it at all brutal, nor
-any exhortation to personal violence or infringement of the law.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_947"><a href="#FNanchor_947">[947]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 91.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_948"><a href="#FNanchor_948">[948]</a></span>
-Plato, Epistol. viii, p. 354. Οἱ γὰρ πρὸ Διονυσίου καὶ Ἱππαρίνου ἀρξάντων
-Σικελιῶται τότε ὡς ᾤοντο εὐδαιμόνως ἔζων, τρυφῶντές τε καὶ ἅμα ἀρχόντων ἄρχοντες· οἱ καὶ
-τοῦς δέκα στρατηγοὺς κατέλευσαν βάλλοντες τοὺς πρὸ Διονυσίου, κατὰ νόμον οὐδένα κρίναντες,
-ἵνα δὴ δουλεύοιεν μηδένι μήτε σὺν δίκῃ μήτε νόμῳ δεσπότῃ, ἐλεύθεροι δ’ εἶεν πάντῃ πάντως·
-ὅθεν αἱ τυραννίδες ἐγένοντο αὐτοῖς.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodor. xiii, 92. παραυτίκα τοὺς μὲν ἔλυσε τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἑτέρους δὲ εἵλετο στρατηγοὺς,
-ἐν οἷς καὶ τὸν Διονύσιον. Some little time afterwards, Diodorus
-farther mentions that Dionysius accused before the public assembly, and
-caused to be put to death, Daphnæus and Demarchus (xiii, 96); now
-Daphnæus was one of the generals (xiii, 86-88).
-</p>
-<p>
-If we assume the fact to have occurred as Plato affirms it, we cannot
-easily explain how something so impressive and terror-striking came to be
-transformed into the more commonplace statement of Diodorus, by Ephorus,
-Theopompus, Hermeias, Timæus, or Philistus, from one of whom probably
-his narrative is borrowed.
-</p>
-<p>
-But if we assume Diodorus to be correct, we can easily account for the
-erroneous belief in the mind of Plato. A very short time before this scene
-at Syracuse, an analogous circumstance had really occurred at Agrigentum.
-The assembled Agrigentines, being inflamed against their generals for
-what they believed to be slackness or treachery in the recent fight with the
-Carthaginians, had stoned four of them on the spot, and only spared the
-fifth on the score of his youth (Diodor. xiii, 87).
-</p>
-<p>
-I cannot but think that Plato confounded in his memory the scene and
-proceedings at Syracuse with the other events, so recently antecedent, at
-Agrigentum. His letter (from which the above citation is made) was written
-in his old age,—fifty years after the event.
-</p>
-<p>
-This is one inaccuracy as to matter-of-fact, which might be produced in
-support of the views of those who reject the letters of Plato as spurious,
-though Ast does not notice it, while going through the letters <i>seriatim</i>, and
-condemning them not only as un-Platonic but as despicable compositions.
-After attentively studying both the letters themselves, and his reasoning, I
-dissent entirely from Ast’s conclusion. The first letter, that which purports
-to come not from Plato, but from Dion, is the only one against which
-he seems to me to have made out a good case (see Ast, Ueber Platon’s Leben
-und Schriften, p. 504-530). Against the others, I cannot think that
-he has shown any sufficient ground for pronouncing them to be spurious
-and I therefore continue to treat them as genuine, following the opinion of
-Cicero and Plutarch. It is admitted by Ast that their authenticity was not
-suspected in antiquity, as far as our knowledge extends. Without considering
-the presumption hence arising as conclusive, I think it requires to be
-countervailed by stronger substantive grounds than those which Ast has
-urged.
-</p>
-<p>
-Among the total number of thirteen letters, those relating to Dion and
-Dionysius (always setting aside the first letter)—that is the second, third,
-fourth, seventh, eighth, and thirteenth,—are the most full of allusions to
-fact and details. Some of them go very much into detail. Now had they
-been the work of a forger, it is fair to contend that he could hardly avoid
-laying himself more open to contradiction than he has done, on the score
-of inaccuracy and inconsistency with the supposed situation. I have
-already mentioned one inaccuracy which I take to be a <i>fault</i> of memory,
-both conceivable and pardonable. Ast mentions another, to disprove the
-authenticity of the eighth letter, respecting the son of Dion. Plato, in
-this eighth letter, speaking in the name of the deceased Dion, recommends
-the Syracusans to name Dion’s son as one of the members of a tripartite
-kingship, along with Hipparinus (son of the elder Dionysius) and the
-younger Dionysius. This (contends Ast, p. 523) cannot be correct, because
-Dion’s son died before his father. To make the argument of Ast
-complete, we ought to be sure that Dion had only <i>one</i> son; for which there
-is doubtless the evidence of Plutarch, who after having stated that the son
-of Dion, a youth nearly grown up, threw himself from the roof of the
-house and was killed, goes on to say that Kallippus, the political enemy of
-Dion, founded upon this misfortune a false rumor which he circulated,—ὡς ὁ Δίων
-<em class="gesperrt">ἄπαις γεγονὼς</em> ἔγνωκε τὸν Διονυσίου καλεῖν Ἀπολλοκράτην καὶ ποιεῖσθαι
-διάδοχον (Plutarch, Dion. c. 55, 56: compare also c. 21,—τοῦ παιδίου).
-But since the rumor was altogether false, we may surely imagine
-that Kallippus, taking advantage of a notorious accident which had
-just proved fatal to the eldest son of Dion, may have fabricated a false
-statement about the family of Dion, though there might be a younger boy
-at home. It is not certain that the number of Dion’s children was familiarly
-known among the population of Syracuse; nor was Dion himself in
-the situation of an assured king, able to transfer his succession at once to
-a boy not yet adult. And when we find in another chapter of Plutarch’s
-Life of Dion (c. 31), that the son of Dion was called by Timæus, <i>Aretæus</i>,—and
-by Timonides, <i>Hipparinus</i>,—this surely affords some presumption
-that there were <i>two</i> sons, and not one son called by two different names.
-</p>
-<p>
-I cannot therefore admit that Ast has proved the eighth Platonic letter
-to be inaccurate in respect to matter of fact. I will add that the letter does
-not mention the <i>name</i> of Dion’s son (though Ast says that it calls him <i>Hipparinus</i>);
-and that it does specify the <i>three</i> partners in the tripartite kingship
-suggested (though Ast says that it only mentioned <i>two</i>).
-</p>
-<p>
-Most of Ast’s arguments against the authenticity of the letters, however,
-are founded, not upon alleged inaccuracies of fact, but upon what he maintains
-to be impropriety and meanness of thought, childish intrusion of
-philosophy, unseasonable mysticism and pedantry, etc. In some of his
-criticisms I coincide, though by no means in all. But I cannot accept
-them as evidence to prove the point for which he contends,—the spuriousness
-of the letters. The proper conclusion from his premises appears to
-me to be, that Plato wrote letters which, when tried by our canons about
-letter-writing, seem awkward, pedantic, and in bad taste. Dionysius of
-Halikarnassus (De adm. vi dicend. in Demosth. p. 1025-1044), while emphatically
-extolling the admirable composition of Plato’s dialogues, does
-not scruple to pass an unfavorable criticism upon him as a speech-writer;
-referring to the speeches in the Symposion as well as to the funeral
-harangue in the Menexenus. Still less need we be afraid to admit, that
-Plato was not a graceful letter-writer.
-</p>
-<p>
-That Plato would feel intensely interested, and even personally involved,
-in the quarrel between Dionysius II. and Dion, cannot be doubted. That
-he would write letters to Dionysius on the subject,—that he would anxiously
-seek to maintain influence over him, on all grounds,—that he would
-manifest a lofty opinion of himself and his own philosophy,—is perfectly
-natural and credible. And when we consider both the character and the
-station of Dionysius, it is difficult to lay down beforehand any assured
-canon as to the epistolary tone which Plato would think most suitable to
-address him.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_949"><a href="#FNanchor_949">[949]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_950"><a href="#FNanchor_950">[950]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 93.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_951"><a href="#FNanchor_951">[951]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 93.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_952"><a href="#FNanchor_952">[952]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 94.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_953"><a href="#FNanchor_953">[953]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 95. Διαλυθείσης δὲ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, οὐκ ὀλίγοι
-τῶν Συρακουσίων κατηγόρουν τῶν πραχθέντων, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ταῦτα κεκυρωκότες·
-τοῖς γὰρ λογισμοῖς εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἐρχόμενοι, τὴν ἐσομένην δυναστείαν ἀνεθεώρουν.
-Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν βεβαιῶσαι βουλόμενοι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἔλαθον ἑαυτοὺς δεσπότην
-τῆς πατρίδος καθεστακότες. Ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος, <em class="gesperrt">τὴν μετάνοιαν τῶν ὄχλων φθάσαι
-βουλόμενος</em>, ἐπεζήτει δι’ οὗ τρόπου δύναιτο φύλακας αἰτήσασθαι τοῦ σώματος·
-τούτου γὰρ συγχωρηθέντος, ῥᾳδίως ἤμελλε κυριεύσειν τῆς τυραννίδος.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_954"><a href="#FNanchor_954">[954]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 95. Αὐτὴ δ’ ἡ πόλις (Leontini) τότε φρούριον ἦν
-τοῖς Συρακουσίοις, πλῆρες ὕπαρχον φυγάδων καὶ ξένων ἀνθρώπων. Ἤλπιζε γὰρ
-τούτους συναγωνιστὰς ἕξειν, ἀνθρώπους δεομένους μεταβολῆς· τῶν δὲ
-Συρακουσίων τοὺς πλείστους οὐδ’ ἥξειν εἰς Λεοντίνους.
-</p>
-<p>
-Many of the expelled Agrigentines settled at Leontini, by permission of
-the Syracusans (Diodor. xiii, 89).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_955"><a href="#FNanchor_955">[955]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 95.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_956"><a href="#FNanchor_956">[956]</a></span>
-Aristotel. Politic. iii, 10, 10. Καὶ Διονυσίῳ τις, ὅτ’ ᾔτει τοὺς
-φύλακας, συνεβούλευε τοῖς Συρακουσίοις διδόναι τοσούτους τοὺς φύλακας—i. e.
-τοσαύτην τὴν ἴσχυν, ὥσθ’ ἑκάστου μὲν καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ συμπλειόνων κρείττω, τοῦ
-δὲ πλήθους ἥττω, εἶναι.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_957"><a href="#FNanchor_957">[957]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 7. τοὺς ἠλευθερωμένους δούλους, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_958"><a href="#FNanchor_958">[958]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 96.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_959"><a href="#FNanchor_959">[959]</a></span>
-Diodor. 1, c.; Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_960"><a href="#FNanchor_960">[960]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 24. Ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς ἔληγεν, ἐν ᾧ μεσοῦντι Διονύσιος ἐτυράννησε,
-etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-The year meant here is an Olympic year, from Midsummer to Midsummer;
-so that the middle months of it would fall in the first quarter of the
-Julian year.
-</p>
-<p>
-If we compare however Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 21 with ii, 2, 24, we shall see
-that the indications of time cannot both be correct; for the acquisition of
-the despotism by Dionysius followed immediately, and as a consequence
-directly brought about, upon the capture of Agrigentum by the Carthaginians.
-</p>
-<p>
-It seems to me that the mark of time is not quite accurate in either one
-passage or the other. The capture of Agrigentum took place at the close
-of <small>B.C.</small> 406; the acquisition of the despotism by Dionysius, in the early
-months of 405 <small>B.C.</small>, as Diodorus places them. Both events are in the same
-Olympic year, between Midsummer 406 <small>B.C.</small> and Midsummer 405 <small>B.C.</small>
-But this year is exactly the year which falls between the two passages above
-referred to in Xenophon; not coinciding exactly with either one or the
-other. Compare Dodwell, Chronolog. Xenoph. ad ann. 407 <small>B.C.</small></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_961"><a href="#FNanchor_961">[961]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 82, 96, 108. τὰς γλυφὰς καὶ τὰ περιττοτέρως
-εἰργασμένα κατέσκαψεν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_962"><a href="#FNanchor_962">[962]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 109.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_963"><a href="#FNanchor_963">[963]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 109.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_964"><a href="#FNanchor_964">[964]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 111.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_965"><a href="#FNanchor_965">[965]</a></span>
-Μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριναν,
-<span
-  class="replace"
-  id="tn_6"
-  title="In the original English edition: ἀκινητὸς γὰρ ἀμείνων">ἀκίνητόν περ ἐοῦσαν</span>—
-</p>
-<div class="poetry-container">
-  <div class="poetry">
-    <p class="i5">“fatis nunquam concessa moveri</p>
-    <p>Apparet Camarina procul.”—Virgil. Æneid, iii, 701.</p>
-  </div>
-</div>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_966"><a href="#FNanchor_966">[966]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii. 111. Οὐδεμία γὰρ ἦν παρ’ αὐτοῖς φειδὼ τῶν
-ἁλισκομένων, ἀλλ’ ἀσυμπαθῶς τῶν ἠτυχηκότων οὓς μὲν ἀνεσταύρουν, οἷς
-δ’ ἀφορήτους ἐπῆγον ὕβρεις.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_967"><a href="#FNanchor_967">[967]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 112; xiv, 44. Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_968"><a href="#FNanchor_968">[968]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 112.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_969"><a href="#FNanchor_969">[969]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 113. παρῆν περὶ μέσας νύκτας πρὸς τὴν πύλην
-τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς ... εἰσήλαυνε διὰ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_970"><a href="#FNanchor_970">[970]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 113. Compare Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_971"><a href="#FNanchor_971">[971]</a></span>
-Xenophon (Hellen. ii, 3, 5) states that “the Leontines, co-residents at
-Syracuse, revolted to their own city from Dionysius and the Syracusans.”
-</p>
-<p>
-This migration to Leontini seems a part of the same transaction as what
-Diodorus notices (xiii, 113). Leontini, recognized as independent by the
-peace which speedily followed, is mentioned again shortly afterwards as independent
-(xiv, 14). It had been annexed to Syracuse before the Athenian
-siege.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_972"><a href="#FNanchor_972">[972]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 114. καὶ Συρακουσίους μὲν ὑπὸ Διονύσιον τετάχθαι, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_973"><a href="#FNanchor_973">[973]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 114.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus begins this chapter with the words,—<em class="gesperrt">Διόπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων
-ἀναγκαζόμενος</em> Ἰμίλκων, ἔπεμψεν εἰς Συρακούσας κήρυκα, παρακαλῶν τοὺς
-ἡττημένους διαλύσασθαι. Ἀσμένως δ’ ὑπακούσαντος τοῦ Διονυσίου, τὴν εἰρήνην
-ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἔθεντο, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Now there is not the smallest matter of fact either mentioned or indicated
-before, to which the word διόπερ can have reference. Nothing is mentioned
-but success on the part of the Carthaginians, and disaster on the part of
-the Greeks; the repulse of the attack made by Dionysius upon the Carthaginian
-camp,—his retreat and evacuation of Gela and Kamarina,—the
-occupation of Gela by the Carthaginians,—the disorder, mutiny, and partial
-dispersion of the army of Dionysius in its retreat,—the struggle within
-the walls of Syracuse. There is nothing in all this to which διόπερ can
-refer. But a few lines farther on, after the conditions of peace have been
-specified, Diodorus alludes to <i>the</i> terrible disease (ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου) which laid
-waste the Carthaginian army, as if he had mentioned it before.
-</p>
-<p>
-I find in Niebuhr (Vorträge über alte Geschichte, vol. iii, p. 212, 213) the
-opinion expressed, that here is a gap in Diodorus “intentionally disguised in
-the MSS., and not yet noticed by any editor.” Some such conclusion seems
-to me unavoidable. Niebuhr thinks, that in the lost portion of the text, it
-was stated that Imilkon marched on to Syracuse, formed the siege of the
-place, and was there visited with the terrific pestilence to which allusion is
-made in the remaining portion of the text. This also is nowise improbable;
-yet I do not venture to assert it,—since the pestilence may possibly have
-broken out while Imilkon was still at Gela.
-</p>
-<p>
-Niebuhr farther considers, that Dionysius lost the battle of Gela through
-miserable generalship,—that he lost it by design, as suitable to his political
-projects,—and that by the terms of the subsequent treaty, he held the territory
-around Syracuse only under Carthaginian supremacy.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_974"><a href="#FNanchor_974">[974]</a></span>
-Justin, xxii, 2; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 2, 7, 9.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_975"><a href="#FNanchor_975">[975]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiii, 114.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_976"><a href="#FNanchor_976">[976]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 10.
-</p>
-<p>
-The valuable support lent to Dionysius by the Spartans is emphatically
-denounced by Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegyric.) s. 145; Orat. viii, (De Pace)
-s. 122.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_977"><a href="#FNanchor_977">[977]</a></span>
-Plato, while he speaks of Dionysius and Hipparinus on this occasion as
-the saviors of Syracuse, does not insist upon extraordinary valor and ability
-on their parts, but assigns the result mainly to fortune and the favor of
-the gods (Plato, Epistol. viii, p. 353 B.; p. 355 F.).
-</p>
-<p>
-His letter is written with a view of recommending a compromise at Syracuse,
-between the party of freedom, and the descendants of Dionysius and
-Hipparinus; he thus tries to set up as good a case as he can, in favor of
-the title of both the two latter to the gratitude of the Syracusans.
-</p>
-<p>
-He reluctantly admits how much Dionysius the elder afterwards abused
-the confidence placed in him by the Syracusans (p. 353 C.).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_978"><a href="#FNanchor_978">[978]</a></span>
-That this was the situation of the fortified <i>horrea publica</i> at Syracuse,
-we see from Livy, xxiv, 21. I think we may presume that they were begun
-at this time by Dionysius, as they form a natural part of his scheme.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_979"><a href="#FNanchor_979">[979]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 7.
-</p>
-<p>
-The residence of Dionysius in the acropolis, and the quarters of his mercenaries
-without the acropolis, but still within Ortygia,—are noticed in
-Plato’s account of his visit to the younger Dionysius (Plato, Epistol. vii, p.
-350; Epist. iii, p. 315).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_980"><a href="#FNanchor_980">[980]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 7. Τῆς δὲ χώρας τὴν μὲν ἀρίστην ἐξελόμενος ἐδωρήσατο
-τοῖς τε φίλοις καὶ τοῖς ἐφ’ ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένοις· <em class="gesperrt">τὴν δ’ ἄλλην ἐμέρισεν
-ἐπίσης ξένῳ τε καὶ πολίτῃ</em>, συμπεριλαβὼν τῷ τῶν πολιτῶν ὀνόματι τοὺς
-ἠλευθερωμένους δούλους, οὓς ἐκάλει νεοπολίτας. Διέδωκε δὲ καὶ τὰς οἰκίας τοῖς
-ὄχλοις, πλὴν τῶν ἐν τῇ Νήσῳ· ταύτας δὲ τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τοῖς μισθοφόροις
-ἐδωρήσατο. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὴν τυραννίδα καλῶς ἐδόκει διῳκηκέναι, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_981"><a href="#FNanchor_981">[981]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 78.
-</p>
-<p>
-So also, after the death of the elder Dionysius, Plutarch speaks of his
-military force as having been βαρβάρων μυρíανδρον φυλακήν (Plutarch,
-Dion. c. 10). These expressions however have little pretence to numerical
-accuracy.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_982"><a href="#FNanchor_982">[982]</a></span>
-Cicero in Verrem, v. 32, 84; 38, 98.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_983"><a href="#FNanchor_983">[983]</a></span>
-Aristotel. Politic. v, 9, 4. Καὶ ἡ εἰσφορὰ τῶν τελῶν
-(τυραννικόν ἐστι) ἐν πέντε γὰρ ἔτεσιν ἐπὶ Διονυσίου τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν
-εἰσενηνοχέναι συνέβαινε.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_984"><a href="#FNanchor_984">[984]</a></span>
-Diodorus, xiv, 7.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_985"><a href="#FNanchor_985">[985]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 7. Compare an occurrence very similar, at Mendê in
-Thrace (Thucyd. iv, 130).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_986"><a href="#FNanchor_986">[986]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 8.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_987"><a href="#FNanchor_987">[987]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 10.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_988"><a href="#FNanchor_988">[988]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 8; xx, 78. Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus) sect. 49.
-</p>
-<p>
-It appears that Timæus the historian ascribed this last observation to
-Philistus; and Diodorus copies Timæus in one of the passages above referred
-to, though not in the other. But Philistus himself in his history
-asserted that the observation had been made by another person (Plutarch,
-Dion. c. 35).
-</p>
-<p>
-The saying seems to have been remembered and cited long afterwards in
-Syracuse; but cited as having been delivered by Dionysius himself, not as
-addressed to him (Livy, xxiv, 22).
-</p>
-<p>
-Isokrates, while recording the saying, represents it as having been delivered
-when the Carthaginians were pressing Syracuse hardly by siege; having
-in mind doubtless the siege or blockade undertaken by Imilkon seven
-years afterwards. But I apprehend this to be a misconception. The story
-seems to suit better to the earlier occasion named by Diodorus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_989"><a href="#FNanchor_989">[989]</a></span>
-Herodotus, v, 71; Thucydides, i, 112.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_990"><a href="#FNanchor_990">[990]</a></span>
-It is said that the Campanians, on their way to Syracuse, passed by
-Agyrium, and deposited their baggage in the care of Agyris the despot of
-that town (Diodor. xiv, 9). But if we look at the position of Agyrium on
-the map, it seems difficult to understand how mercenaries coming from the
-Carthaginian territory, and in great haste to reach Syracuse, can have
-passed anywhere near to it.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_991"><a href="#FNanchor_991">[991]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 9.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_992"><a href="#FNanchor_992">[992]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 9. The subsequent proceedings of the Campanians justified
-his wisdom in dismissing them. They went to Entella (a town among
-the dependencies of Carthage, in the south-western portion of Sicily,—Diod.
-xiv, 48), where they were welcomed and hospitably treated by the inhabitants.
-In the night, they set upon the Entellan citizens by surprise,
-put them all to death, married their widows and daughters, and kept possession
-of the town for themselves.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_993"><a href="#FNanchor_993">[993]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 10. Ἀπέστειλαν (οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι) Ἄριστον, ἄνδρα τῶν
-ἐπιφανῶν, εἰς Συρακούσας, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ προσποιούμενοι καταλιπεῖν τὴν δυναστείαν,
-τῇ δ’ ἀληθείᾳ σπεύδοντες αὐξῆσαι τὴν τυραννίδα· ἤλπιζον γὰρ συγκατασκευάζοντες
-τὴν ἀρχὴν, ὑπήκοον ἕξειν τὸν Διονύσιον διὰ τὰς εὐεργεσίας. Ὁ δ’ Ἄριστος
-καταπλεύσας εἰς Συρακούσας, καὶ τῷ τυράννῳ λάθρα περὶ τούτων διαλεχθεὶς,
-τούς τε Συρακοσίους ἀνασείων, Νικοτέλην τὸν Κορίνθιον ἀνεῖλεν, ἀφηγούμενον
-τῶν Συρακοσίων· τοὺς δὲ πιστεύσαντας προδοὺς, τὸν μὲν τύραννον ἰσχυρὸν κατέστησε,
-διὰ δὲ τῆς πράξεως ταύτης ἀσχημονεῖν ἐποίησεν αὑτὸν ἅμα καὶ τὴν πατρίδα.
-Compare xiv, 70.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_994"><a href="#FNanchor_994">[994]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 10. Καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ παρεσκευάζετο πρὸς τὴν
-ἀσφάλειαν τῆς τυραννίδος, ὡς ἂν ἔργοις ἤδη πεῖραν εἰληφὼς, ὅτι πᾶν
-ὑπομένουσιν οἱ Συρακούσιοι χάριν τοῦ μὴ δουλεύειν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_995"><a href="#FNanchor_995">[995]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Lysander, c. 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_996"><a href="#FNanchor_996">[996]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 34.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_997"><a href="#FNanchor_997">[997]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 58.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_998"><a href="#FNanchor_998">[998]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 61.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_999"><a href="#FNanchor_999">[999]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 15.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1000"><a href="#FNanchor_1000">[1000]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 16. This Archonides may probably have been son of the
-Sikel prince Archonides, who, having taken active part as an ally of Nikias
-and the Athenian invaders against Syracuse, died just before Gylippus
-reached Sicily (Thucyd. vii, 1).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1001"><a href="#FNanchor_1001">[1001]</a></span>
-See the Dissertation of Saverio Cavallari,—Zur Topographie von
-Syrakus (Göttingen, 1845), p. 22.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1002"><a href="#FNanchor_1002">[1002]</a></span>
-See, for a farther exposition of these points, my account of the siege
-of Syracuse by the Athenians, Vol. VII, ch. lix, lx.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1003"><a href="#FNanchor_1003">[1003]</a></span>
-Thucyd. vi, 75.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1004"><a href="#FNanchor_1004">[1004]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 18. λίθων τετραπόδων. The stones may have been cubes
-of four feet; but this does not certainly appear.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1005"><a href="#FNanchor_1005">[1005]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 18.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1006"><a href="#FNanchor_1006">[1006]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 18. Καθόλου δὲ ἀποθέμενος τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς βάρος,
-ἰδιώτην αὑτὸν ἀπεδείκνυε, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare cap. 45 and cap. 47—μισοῦντες τὸ βάρος τῆς τῶν Φοινίκων ἐπικρατείας,
-etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1007"><a href="#FNanchor_1007">[1007]</a></span>
-According to the testimony of Saverio Cavallari, the architect under
-whose directions the excavations were made in 1839, whereby these remains
-were first fully disclosed (Zur Topographie von Syrakus, p. 21).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1008"><a href="#FNanchor_1008">[1008]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 45. Ἀπετίθετο γὰρ ἤδη τὸ πικρὸν τῆς τυραννίδος,
-καὶ μεταβαλλόμενος εἰς ἐπιείκειαν, φιλανθρωπότερον ἦρχε τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων,
-οὔτε φονεύων, οὔτε φυγάδας ποιῶν, <em class="gesperrt">καθάπερ εἰώθει</em>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1009"><a href="#FNanchor_1009">[1009]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 7.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1010"><a href="#FNanchor_1010">[1010]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 45.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1011"><a href="#FNanchor_1011">[1011]</a></span>
-Thucyd. vi, 46.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1012"><a href="#FNanchor_1012">[1012]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 40.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1013"><a href="#FNanchor_1013">[1013]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 40.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1014"><a href="#FNanchor_1014">[1014]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 44, 106, 107.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1015"><a href="#FNanchor_1015">[1015]</a></span>
-Diodorus, when he first mentions the answer, does not give this remark
-as comprised in it; though he afterwards alludes to it as having been <i>said</i>
-to be (φασὶ) so comprised (xix, 44-107).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1016"><a href="#FNanchor_1016">[1016]</a></span>
-Aristot. Politic. v, 6, 7. Ἔτι διὰ τὸ πάσας τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς
-πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι, μᾶλλον πλεονεκτοῦσιν οἱ γνώριμοι· οἷον καὶ ἐν
-Λακεδαίμονι εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσίαι ἔρχονται, καὶ ἔξεστι ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν θέλωσι
-τοῖς γνωρίμοις μᾶλλον, καὶ κηδεύειν ὅτῳ θέλουσι. Διὸ καὶ ἡ Λοκρῶν πολιτεία
-ἀπώλετο ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον κηδείας· ὃ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, οὐδ’
-ἂν ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εὖ μεμιγμένῃ.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1017"><a href="#FNanchor_1017">[1017]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1018"><a href="#FNanchor_1018">[1018]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 42, 43.
-</p>
-<p>
-The historian Philistus had described with much minuteness these warlike
-preparations of Dionysius. Diodorus has probably abridged from him
-(Philisti Fragment. xxxiv, ed. Marx and ed. Didot.)</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1019"><a href="#FNanchor_1019">[1019]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1020"><a href="#FNanchor_1020">[1020]</a></span>
-Thucyd. i, 13.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1021"><a href="#FNanchor_1021">[1021]</a></span>
-Thucyd. vii, 36-62.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1022"><a href="#FNanchor_1022">[1022]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 42.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1023"><a href="#FNanchor_1023">[1023]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 41. Συμπροθυμουμένων δὲ τῶν Συρακουσίων
-τῇ τοῦ Διονυσίου προαιρέσει, πολλὴν συνέβαινε γενέσθαι τὴν φιλοτιμίαν
-περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων κατασκευήν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1024"><a href="#FNanchor_1024">[1024]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 43, 44, 45.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1025"><a href="#FNanchor_1025">[1025]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 41.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1026"><a href="#FNanchor_1026">[1026]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 44; xvi, 6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1027"><a href="#FNanchor_1027">[1027]</a></span>
-Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1028"><a href="#FNanchor_1028">[1028]</a></span>
-Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v, 20, 57-63; Valer. Maxim. ix, 13; Diodor. xiv, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1029"><a href="#FNanchor_1029">[1029]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 45.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1030"><a href="#FNanchor_1030">[1030]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 41.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1031"><a href="#FNanchor_1031">[1031]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 46.
-</p>
-<p>
-There were also Greeks, and seemingly Greeks of some consideration,
-who resided at Carthage, and seemed to have continued resident there
-throughout the war between the Carthaginians and Dionysius (Diodor. xiv,
-77). We should infer, from their continuing to reside there, that the Carthaginians
-did not retaliate upon them the plunder now authorized by Dionysius
-against their countrymen resident at Syracuse; and farther, it affords
-additional probability that the number of Carthaginians actually plundered
-at Syracuse was not considerable.
-</p>
-<p>
-For instances of intermarriage, and inter-residence, between Carthage
-and Syracuse, see Herodot. vii, 166; Livy, xxiv, 6.
-</p>
-<p>
-Phœnician coins have been found in Ortygia, bearing a Phœnician inscription
-signifying <i>The Island</i>,—which was the usual denomination of Ortygia
-(Movers, Die Phönizier, ii, 2, p. 327).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1032"><a href="#FNanchor_1032">[1032]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 55. Τοῦτο δ’ ἐμηχανήσατο (Ἰμίλκων) πρὸς τὸ
-μηδένα τῶν κατασκόπων ἀπαγγεῖλαι τὸν κατάπλουν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1033"><a href="#FNanchor_1033">[1033]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 46, 47.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1034"><a href="#FNanchor_1034">[1034]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 47.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1035"><a href="#FNanchor_1035">[1035]</a></span>
-Herodot. vii, 145. Τὰ δὲ Γέλωνος πρήγματα μεγάλα ἐλέγετο
-εἶναι, οὐδαμῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τῶν οὐ πολλὸν μέζω. Compare c. 160-162.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1036"><a href="#FNanchor_1036">[1036]</a></span>
-Herodot. vii, 158. Gelon’s speech to the Lacedæmonians who come to
-solicit his aid against Xerxes.
-</p>
-<p>
-Αὐτοὶ δὲ, ἐμεῦ πρότερον δεηθέντος βαρβαρικοῦ στρατοῦ συνεπάψασθαι,
-ὅτε μοι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους νεῖκος συνῆπτο ... <em class="gesperrt">ὑποτείνοντός τε
-τὰ ἐμπόρια συνελευθεροῦν</em>, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1037"><a href="#FNanchor_1037">[1037]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 46. Οὐ μόνον γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς οὐσίας διήρπασαν,
-ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὺς συλλαμβάνοντες, πᾶσαν αἰκίαν καὶ ὕβριν εἰς τὰ σώματα
-αὐτῶν ἀπετίθεντο, μνημονεύοντες ὧν αὐτοὶ κατὰ τὴν αἰχμαλωσίαν ἔπαθον.
-Ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ τῆς κατὰ τῶν Φοινίκων τιμωρίας προέβησαν, καὶ τότε καὶ
-κατὰ τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον, ὥστε τοὺς Καρχηδονίους διδαχθῆναι μηκέτι
-παρανομεῖν εἰς τοὺς ὑποπεσόντας.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1038"><a href="#FNanchor_1038">[1038]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 47.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1039"><a href="#FNanchor_1039">[1039]</a></span>
-Thucyd. vi, 2; Pausan. v, 25, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1040"><a href="#FNanchor_1040">[1040]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 48. Διονύσιος δὲ μετὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτόνων
-κατασκεψάμενος τοὺς τόπους, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Artemon the engineer was consulted by Perikles at the siege of Samos
-(Plutarch, Perikles, c. 27).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1041"><a href="#FNanchor_1041">[1041]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 48, 49.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1042"><a href="#FNanchor_1042">[1042]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 49. ἐχώννυε τὸν μεταξὺ πόρον, καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς
-ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ λόγον ἅμα τῇ τοῦ χώματος αὐξήσει προσήγαγε τοῖς τείχεσι.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1043"><a href="#FNanchor_1043">[1043]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 50.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1044"><a href="#FNanchor_1044">[1044]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 50; Polyænus, v, 2, 6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1045"><a href="#FNanchor_1045">[1045]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 51, 52, 53.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1046"><a href="#FNanchor_1046">[1046]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 53.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1047"><a href="#FNanchor_1047">[1047]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 54.
-</p>
-<p>
-Leptines was brother of Dionysius (xiv, 102; xv, 7), though he afterwards
-married the daughter of Dionysius,—a marriage not condemned by
-Grecian sentiment.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1048"><a href="#FNanchor_1048">[1048]</a></span>
-Justin, xx, 5. One of these Carthaginians of rank, who, from political
-enmity to Hanno, wrote letters in Greek to communicate information to
-Dionysius, was detected and punished as a traitor. On this occasion, the
-Carthaginian senate is said to have enacted a law, forbidding all citizens to
-learn Greek,—either to write it or to speak it.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1049"><a href="#FNanchor_1049">[1049]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 54; Polyænus, v, 10, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1050"><a href="#FNanchor_1050">[1050]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 55.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1051"><a href="#FNanchor_1051">[1051]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 55.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1052"><a href="#FNanchor_1052">[1052]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 56, 57. τῶν ἰδίων ἱππέων ἐν Συρακούσαις ὄντων, etc.
-διὰ τῶν πεπτωκότων τειχῶν εἰσβιασάμενοι, etc. τὰ τείχη καταπεπτωκότα,
-etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare another example of inattention to the state of their walls, on
-the part of the Messenians (xix, 65).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1053"><a href="#FNanchor_1053">[1053]</a></span>
-Kleon and the Athenians took Torônê by a similar manœuvre (Thucyd.
-v, 2).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1054"><a href="#FNanchor_1054">[1054]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 57.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1055"><a href="#FNanchor_1055">[1055]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 58. Ἰμίλκων δὲ τῆς Μεσσήνης τὰ τείχη κατασκάψας,
-προσέταξε τοῖς στρατιώταις καταβαλεῖν τὰς οἰκίας εἰς ἔδαφος, καὶ μήτε κέραμον,
-μήθ’ ὕλην, μήτ’ ἄλλο μηδὲν ὑπολιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν κατακαῦσαι, τὰ δὲ συντρίψαι.
-Ταχὺ δὲ τῇ τῶν στρατιωτῶν πολυχειρίᾳ λαβόντων τῶν ἔργων συντέλειαν, ἡ πόλις
-ἄγνωστος ἦν, ὅπου πρότερον αὐτὴν οἰκεῖσθαι συνέβαινεν. Ὁρῶν γὰρ τὸν τόπον
-πόῤῥω μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν συμμαχίδων πόλεων κεχωρισμένον, εὐκαιρότατον δὲ τῶν περὶ
-Σικελίαν ὄντα, προῄρητο δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ τελέως ἀοίκητον διατηρεῖν, ἢ δυσχερῆ
-καὶ πολυχρόνιον τὴν κτίσιν αὐτῆς γίνεσθαι.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ἐναποδειξάμενος οὖν τὸ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας μῖσος ἐν τῇ τῶν Μεσσηνίων ἀτυχίᾳ, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-It would appear, however, that the demolition of Messênê can hardly
-have been carried so far in fact as Imilkon intended; since the city reappears
-shortly afterwards in renewed dignity.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1056"><a href="#FNanchor_1056">[1056]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 59-76.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1057"><a href="#FNanchor_1057">[1057]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 59.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1058"><a href="#FNanchor_1058">[1058]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 60, 61. Compare the speech of Theodôrus at Syracuse
-afterwards (c. 68), from which we gather a more complete idea of what
-passed after the battle.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1059"><a href="#FNanchor_1059">[1059]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 61. Καὶ καθόλου δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος
-ἀπεδείκνυε πολέμιον ὕπαρχον τῶν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν.
-</p>
-<p>
-These manifestations of anti-Hellenic sentiment, among the various
-neighbors of the Sicilian Greeks, are important to notice, though they are
-not often brought before us.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1060"><a href="#FNanchor_1060">[1060]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 61.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1061"><a href="#FNanchor_1061">[1061]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 63.
-</p>
-<p>
-Polyænus (v, 8, 2) recounts a manœuvre of <i>Leptines</i>, practised in bringing
-back a Lacedæmonian reinforcement from Sparta to Sicily on his voyage
-along the Tarentine coast. Perhaps this may be the Lacedæmonian
-division intended.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1062"><a href="#FNanchor_1062">[1062]</a></span>
-Thucyd. vii, 42; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 21; Diodor. xiii, 11.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1063"><a href="#FNanchor_1063">[1063]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 62.
-</p>
-<p>
-The text of Diodorus is here so perplexed as to require conjectural alteration,
-which Rhodomannus has supplied; yet not so as to remove all
-that is obscure. The word εἰσθεόμεναι still remains to be explained or corrected.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1064"><a href="#FNanchor_1064">[1064]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 63. Κατελάβετο δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς προάστειον,
-καὶ τοὺς νέως τῆς τε Δήμητρος καὶ Κόρης ἐσύλησεν.
-</p>
-<p>
-Cicero (in Verrem, iv, 52, 53) distinctly mentions the temples of Demeter
-and Persephonê, and the statue of Apollo Temenites, among the characteristic
-features of Neapolis; which proves the identity of Neapolis with
-what Diodorus calls the suburb of Achradina. This identity, recognized
-by Serra di Falco, Colonel Leake, and other authors, is disputed by Saverio
-Cavallari, on grounds which do not appear to me sufficient.
-</p>
-<p>
-See Colonel Leake, notes on Syracuse, pp. 7-10; Cavallari, Zur Topographie
-von Syrakus, p. 20.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1065"><a href="#FNanchor_1065">[1065]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 64. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοιούτων λόγων γινομένων, Διονύσιος
-κατέπλευσε, καὶ συναγαγὼν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπῄνει τοὺς Συρακουσίους, καὶ παρεκάλει
-θαῤῥεῖν, ἐπαγγελλόμενος ταχέως καταλύσειν τὸν πόλεμον. Ἤδη δ’ αὐτοῦ μέλλοντος
-διαλύειν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἀναστὰς Θεόδωρος ὁ Συρακούσιος, ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν
-εὐδοκιμῶν καὶ δοκῶν εἶναι πρακτικὸς, ἀπετόλμησε περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας
-τοιούτοις χρήσασθαι λόγοις.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1066"><a href="#FNanchor_1066">[1066]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 65. Οὗτος δὲ, τὰ μὲν ἱερὰ συλήσας, τοὺς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν
-πλούτους ἅμα ταῖς τῶν κεκτημένων ψυχαῖς ἀφελόμενος, τοὺς οἰκέτας μισθοδοτεῖ
-ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν δεσποτῶν δουλείας....
-</p>
-<p>
-c. 66. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρόπολις, δούλων ὅπλοις τηρουμένη, κατὰ τῆς πόλεως
-ἐπιτετείχισται· τὸ δὲ τῶν μισθοφόρων πλῆθος ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ τῶν Συρακοσίων
-ἤθροισται. Καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἐπίσης βραβεύων τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ
-μόναρχος πλεονεξίᾳ κρίνων πράττειν πάντα. Καὶ νῦν μὲν οἱ πολέμιοι βραχὺ
-μέρος ἔχουσι τῆς χώρας· Διονύσιος δὲ, πᾶσαν ποιήσας ἀνάστατον, τοῖς τὴν
-τυραννίδα συναύξουσιν ἐδωρήσατο....
-</p>
-<p>
-... Καὶ πρὸς μὲν Καρχηδονίους δύο μάχας ἐνστησάμενος ἐν ἑκατέραις ἥττηται·
-παρὰ δὲ τοῖς πολίταις πιστευθεὶς ἅπαξ στρατηγίαν, εὐθέως ἀφείλετο τὴν
-ἐλευθερίαν· φονεύων μὲν τοὺς παῤῥησίαν ἄγοντας ὑπὲρ τῶν νόμων, φυγαδεύων
-δὲ τοὺς ταῖς οὐσίαις προέχοντας· καὶ τὰς μὲν τῶν φυγάδων γυναῖκας οἰκέταις
-καὶ μιγάσιν ἀνθρώποις συνοικίζων, τῶν δὲ πολιτικῶν ὅπλων βαρβάρους καὶ
-ξένους ποιῶν κυρίους....
-</p>
-<p>
-c. 67. Οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα τὸν πολέμιον ἔχοντες ἡγεμόνα, τὸν τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν
-ἱερὰ σεσυληκότα;
-</p>
-<p>
-c. 69. Διόπερ ἕτερον ἡγεμόνα ζητητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὸν σεσυληκότα τοὺς τῶν θεῶν
-ναοὺς στρατηγὸν ἔχοντες ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ θεομαχῶμεν....</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1067"><a href="#FNanchor_1067">[1067]</a></span>
-Thucyd. i, 18; Herodot. v, 92.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1068"><a href="#FNanchor_1068">[1068]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 70. Τοιούτοις τοῦ Θεοδώρου χρησαμένου λόγοις,
-οἱ μὲν Συρακούσιοι μετέωροι ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγένοντο, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους
-ἀπέβλεπον. Φαρακίδου δὲ τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίου ναυαρχοῦντος τῶν συμμάχων, καὶ
-παρελθόντος ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα, πάντες προσεδόκων ἀρχηγὸν ἔσεσθαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1069"><a href="#FNanchor_1069">[1069]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 70. Ὁ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸν τύραννον ἔχων οἰκείως, etc.; compare
-Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 14.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1070"><a href="#FNanchor_1070">[1070]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 70. Παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσδοκίαν γενομένης τῆς ἀποφάσεως,
-οἱ μὲν μισθόφοροι συνέδραμον πρὸς τὸν Διονύσιον, οἱ δὲ Συρακούσιοι καταπλαγέντες
-τὴν ἡσυχίαν, εἶχον, πολλὰ τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις καταρώμενοι. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ πρότερον
-Ἀρέτης ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος (he is called previously <i>Aristus</i>, xiv, 10),
-ἀντιλαμβανομένων αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας, ἐγένετο προδότης· καὶ τότε Φαρακίδας
-ἐνέστη ταῖς ὁρμαῖς τῶν Συρακουσίων.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1071"><a href="#FNanchor_1071">[1071]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 70. Συνεπελάβετο δὲ καὶ τῇ τοῦ δαιμονίου συμφορᾷ
-τὸ μυριάδας εἰς ταὐτὸ συναθροισθῆναι, καὶ τὸ τῆς ὥρας εἶναι πρὸς τὰς νόσους
-ἐνεργότατον, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1072"><a href="#FNanchor_1072">[1072]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 71-76. πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδας ἐπεῖδον ἀτάφους
-διὰ τὸν λοιμὸν σεσωρευμένους.
-</p>
-<p>
-I give the figure as I find it, without pretending to trust it as anything
-more than an indication of a great number.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1073"><a href="#FNanchor_1073">[1073]</a></span>
-Thucyd. ii, 54.
-</p>
-<p>
-When the Roman general Marcellus was besieging Syracuse in 212 <small>B.C.</small>,
-a terrific pestilence, generated by causes similar to that of this year, broke
-out. All parties, Romans, Syracusans, and Carthaginians, suffered from it
-considerably; but the Carthaginians worst of all; they are said to have all
-perished (Livy, xxv, 26).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1074"><a href="#FNanchor_1074">[1074]</a></span>
-Thucyd. vii, 22, 23.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1075"><a href="#FNanchor_1075">[1075]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 72. Οὗτοι δ’ ἦσαν οἱ μισθόφοροι τῷ Διονυσίῳ παρὰ
-πάντας ἀλλοτριώτατοι, καὶ πλεονάκις ἀποστάσεις καὶ ταραχὰς ποιοῦντες. Διόπερ
-ὁ μὲν Διονύσιος τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν ἦν παρηγγελκὼς, ὅταν ἐξάπτωνται τῶν πολεμίων,
-φεύγειν, καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους ἐγκαταλιπεῖν· ὧν ποιησάντων τὸ προσταχθὲν,
-οὗτοι μὲν ἅπαντες κατεκόπησαν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1076"><a href="#FNanchor_1076">[1076]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 72. Πάντη δὲ τῶν ἐξοχωτάτων νεῶν θραυομένων,
-αἱ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐμβόλων ἀναῤῥηττόμεναι λακίδες ἐξαίσιον ἐποιοῦντο ψόφον, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1077"><a href="#FNanchor_1077">[1077]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 75.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1078"><a href="#FNanchor_1078">[1078]</a></span>
-Diodor. xiv, 77.</p>
-</div>
-
-</div>
-
-<hr class="chap" />
-
-
-<div class="transnote" id="tnote">
-  <p class="tnotetit">Transcriber's note</p>
-  <ul>
-    <li>Original spelling, hyphenation and punctuation have been kept, but variant spellings were made
-    consistent when a predominant usage was found.</li>
-    <li>Footnotes have been renumbered and moved to the end of the book.</li>
-    <li>Blank pages have been skipped.</li>
-    <li>Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after comparison with a later edition of
-    this work. Greek text has also been corrected after checking with this later edition and with Perseus,
-    when the reference was found.</li>
-    <li>Some inconsistencies in the use of diæresis (like “reorganize” and “reörganize”) and in the use
-    of accents over proper nouns (like “Autokles” and “Autoklês”) have been retained.</li>
-    <li>Throughout the text, “Mövers” has been changed to “Movers”, when referring to Franz Karl Movers,
-    as it is the spelling used in the title pages of his main works in German.</li>
-    <li>The following changes were also made, after checking with other editions:
-      <table summary="changes made">
-        <tr>
-          <td>page</td>
-          <td class="tdr">&#8199;<a href="#Page_27">27</a>:</td>
-          <td class="tdr">“Phokæn”</td>
-          <td>→</td>
-          <td>“<a href="#tn_1">Phokæan</a>”</td>
-        </tr>
-        <tr>
-          <td>page</td>
-          <td class="tdr">&#8199;<a href="#Page_94">94</a>:</td>
-          <td class="tdr">“from”</td>
-          <td>→</td>
-          <td>“<a href="#tn_4">at</a>”</td>
-        </tr>
-        <tr>
-          <td>page</td>
-          <td class="tdr">&#8199;<a href="#Page_96">96</a>:</td>
-          <td class="tdr">“Kannônes”</td>
-          <td>→</td>
-          <td>“<a href="#tn_2">Kannônus</a>”</td>
-        </tr>
-        <tr>
-          <td>page</td>
-          <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_374">374</a>:</td>
-          <td class="tdr">“troad”</td>
-          <td>→</td>
-          <td>“<a href="#tn_5">Troad</a>”</td>
-        </tr>
-        <tr>
-          <td>note</td>
-          <td class="tdr"><a href="#Footnote_711">711</a>:</td>
-          <td class="tdr">“vii, 39”</td>
-          <td>→</td>
-          <td>“<a href="#tn_3">vii, 4, 39</a>”</td>
-        </tr>
-      </table>
-    </li>
-    <li>In note <a href="#Footnote_965">965</a>, the printed book version has been retained:
-    “Μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριναν, <a href="#tn_6">ἀκίνητόν περ ἐοῦσαν</a>”, but the original English
-    edition has “Μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριναν, ἀκινητὸς γὰρ ἀμείνων”.</li>
-    <li>The book cover image was created by the transcriber and is placed in the public domain.</li>
-  </ul>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-<pre>
-
-
-
-
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