diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'old/51183-h/51183-h.htm')
| -rw-r--r-- | old/51183-h/51183-h.htm | 29005 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 29005 deletions
diff --git a/old/51183-h/51183-h.htm b/old/51183-h/51183-h.htm deleted file mode 100644 index 7360df4..0000000 --- a/old/51183-h/51183-h.htm +++ /dev/null @@ -1,29005 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" - "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> -<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> - <head> - <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> - <meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> - <title> - History of Greece - Vol. 10/12, by George Grote — A Project Gutenberg eBook - </title> - <link rel="coverpage" href="images/cover.jpg" /> - <style type="text/css"> - - body { margin: 0 auto; max-width: 40em; } - p { margin: 0.75em 0 0 0; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; } - - h1, h2 { text-align: center; clear: both; font-weight: normal; } - h1 { line-height: 1.5em; } - h2 { margin: 0.75em 0 1em 0; font-size: 120%; line-height: 130%; } - - h2:first-line { line-height: 2em; font-size: 1.3em; } - h2.nobreak { page-break-before: avoid; } - - .falseh1 { margin: 0 0 1em 0; text-indent: 0; text-align: center; - font-weight: normal; font-size: 175%; clear: both; } - - .p1 { margin-top: 1em; } - .p2 { margin-top: 2em; } - .p4 { margin-top: 4em; } - - .xs { font-size: x-small; } - .small { font-size: small; } - .medium { font-size: medium; } - .large { font-size: large; } - .xl { font-size: x-large; } - - .front { margin: 3em 0; page-break-before: always; } - .front p { margin: 0; text-indent: 0; text-align: left; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 90%; } - .tit { margin: 3em auto 0 auto; page-break-before: always; } - .tit p { text-indent: 0; text-align: center; } - .chapter { page-break-before: always; margin-top: 2em; } - .goright { text-align: right; padding-right: 1.5em; } - - hr { clear: both; width: 33%; text-align: center; margin: 3em auto; } - hr.chap { width: 20%; } - hr.sep2 { width: 6%; margin: 1.5em auto; } - hr.tb { width: 30%; } - - .smcap { font-variant: small-caps; } - .gesperrt { letter-spacing: 0.15em; margin-right: -0.15em; } - .noindent { text-indent: 0; } - .center { text-align: center; text-indent: 0; } - - .contents { font-size: 90%; } - .contents p { clear: both; padding-left: 1em; text-indent: -1em; } - .contents p.chap { padding-top: 1em; padding-left: 0; text-indent: 0; text-align: center; } - .contents p.toright { margin: 0; padding: 0; text-indent: 0; text-align: right; } - - table { margin: 0.5em auto; padding-right: 2em; } - .tdr { text-align: right; white-space: nowrap; } - - .pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */ - /* visibility: hidden; */ - position: absolute; - right: 90%; - font-size: small; - font-variant: normal; - font-style: normal; - font-weight: normal; - letter-spacing: normal; - text-align: right; - color: #B0B0B0; - text-indent: 0; - } - - /* Images */ - .figcenter { margin: 2em auto; text-align: center; } - - /* Footnotes */ - .footnotes { margin: 3em 0; border: medium solid #C0C0C0; background-color: white; - page-break-before: always; } - .footnote { margin: 1em 2em; font-size: 90%; } - .footnote a { text-decoration: none; } - .footnote p { margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0; text-indent: 1.5em; } - .footnote p.ni { text-indent: 0; } - .footnote .label { padding-right: .5em; } - .fnanchor { vertical-align: top; text-decoration: none; font-size: 0.75em; - font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; } - - - - /* Poetry */ - .poetry-container { text-align: center; } - .poetry { display: inline-block; margin: 0.75em 0; text-align: left; } - .poetry p { margin: 0; padding-left: 2em; text-align: left; text-indent: -2em; } - .poetry p.i1 { padding-left: 3em; } - .poetry p.i5 { padding-left: 7em; } - .poetry p.rt { text-align: right; } - - /* Transcriber's notes */ - .transnote { border: thin solid gray; background-color: #f8f8f8; font-family: sans-serif; - font-size: smaller; margin: 3em 0; padding: 1em 2em 1em 0; - page-break-before: always; } - #tnote li { margin-top: 0.5em; text-align: justify; } - .tnotetit { font-weight: bold; text-align: center; text-indent: 0; margin-bottom: 1em; } - .replace { text-decoration: none; border-bottom: thin dotted gray; } - - @media handheld, print - { - p { margin: 0; } - - hr { clear: both; width: 34%; margin-left: 33%; } - hr.chap { width: 20%; margin-left: 40%; } - hr.sep2 { width: 6%; margin-left: 47%; } - hr.tb { width: 30%; margin-left: 35%; } - - .screenonly { display: none; } - .poetry { font-size: 90%; } - - .footnotes { border: none; } - .footnote { margin: 1em 0; } - .replace { border-bottom: none; } - } - - </style> - </head> - <body> - - -<pre> - -Project Gutenberg's History of Greece, Volume 10 (of 12), by George Grote - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: History of Greece, Volume 10 (of 12) - -Author: George Grote - -Release Date: February 11, 2016 [EBook #51183] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF GREECE, VOLUME 10 OF 12 *** - - - - -Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Ramon Pajares Box and the -Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net -(This file was produced from images generously made -available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<div class="front"> - <p><a href="#tnote">Transcriber's note</a></p> - <p><a href="#ToC">Table of Contents</a></p> -</div> - -<div class="screenonly"> - <div class="figcenter"> - <img src="images/cover.jpg" - alt="Book cover" /> - </div> -</div> - -<div class="tit"> - <hr class="chap" /> - - <h1>HISTORY OF GREECE</h1> - - <p class="xl p2"><small>BY</small><br /> - GEORGE GROTE, <span class="smcap">Esq.</span></p> - - <p class="large p2">VOL. X.</p> - - <p class="xs p4">REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION.</p> - - <p class="medium p2">NEW YORK:<br /> - HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,<br /> - <span class="small">329 <small>AND</small> 331 <small>PEARL STREET.</small></span></p> - - <hr class="chap" /> -</div> - - -<div class="chapter"> - <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iii">[p. iii]</span></p> - <h2 class="nobreak">PREFACE TO VOL. X.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="large noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span> present -Volume is already extended to an unusual number of pages; yet I have -been compelled to close it at an inconvenient moment, midway in the -reign of the Syracusan despot Dionysius. To carry that reign to its -close, one more chapter will be required, which must be reserved for -the succeeding volume.</p> - -<p class="large">The history of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, -forming as it does a stream essentially distinct from that of the -Peloponnesians, Athenians, etc., is peculiarly interesting during -the interval between 409 <small>B.C.</small> (the date of the -second Carthaginian invasion) and the death of Timoleon in 336 -<small>B.C.</small> It is, moreover, reported to us by authors -(Diodorus and Plutarch), who, though not themselves very judicious -as selectors, had before them good contemporary witnesses. And it -includes some of the most prominent and impressive characters of the -Hellenic world,—Dionysius I., Dion with Plato as instructor, and -Timoleon.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iv">[p. iv]</span></p> - -<p class="large">I thought it indispensable to give adequate -development to this important period of Grecian history, even at the -cost of that inconvenient break which terminates my tenth volume. At -one time I had hoped to comprise in that volume not only the full -history of Dionysius I., but also that of Dionysius II. and Dion—and -that of Timoleon besides. Three new chapters, including all this -additional matter, are already composed and ready. But the bulk of -the present volume compels me to reserve them for the commencement -of my next, which will carry Grecian history down to the battle of -Chæroneia and the death of Philip of Macedon—and which will, I trust, -appear without any long interval of time.</p> - -<p class="large goright">G. G.</p> - -<p class="large"><span class="smcap">London, Feb. 15, 1852.</span></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="ToC"> - <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_v">[p. v]</span></p> - <h2>CONTENTS.<br /> - <span class="large">VOL. X.</span></h2> - <hr class="sep2" /> - <p class="xl center">PART II.</p> - <p class="large center">CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.</p> - <hr class="sep2" /> -</div> - -<div class="contents"> - -<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXVI.</p> -<p class="small center">FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS DOWN TO THE SUBJUGATION OF -OLYNTHUS BY SPARTA.</p> - -<p class="p1">Peace or convention of Antalkidas. Its import and -character. Separate partnership between Sparta and Persia. — -Degradation in the form of the convention — an edict drawn up, -issued, and enforced, by Persia upon Greece. — Gradual loss of -Pan-hellenic dignity, and increased submission towards Persia as a -means of purchasing Persian help — on the part of Sparta. — Her first -application before the Peloponnesian war; subsequent applications. — -Active partnership between Sparta and Persia against Athens, after -the Athenian catastrophe at Syracuse. Athens is ready to follow her -example. — The Persian force aids Athens against Sparta, and breaks -up her maritime empire. — No excuse for the subservience of Sparta to -the Persians. Evidence that Hellenic independence was not destined -to last much longer. — Promise of universal autonomy — popular to -the Grecian ear — how carried out. — The Spartans never intended to -grant, nor ever really granted, general autonomy. — Immediate point -made against Corinth and Thebes — isolation of Athens. — Persian -affairs — unavailing efforts of the Great King to reconquer Egypt. -— Evagoras, despot of Salamis in Cyprus. — Descent of Evagoras -— condition of the island of Cyprus. — Greek princes of Salamis -are dispossessed by a Phœnician dynasty. — Evagoras dethrones the -Phœnician, and becomes despot of Salamis. — Able and beneficent -government of Evagoras. — His anxiety to revive Hellenism in Cyprus -— he looks to the aid of Athens. — Relations of Evagoras with Athens -during the closing years of the Peloponnesian war. — Evagoras at -war with the Persians — he receives aid both from Athens and from -Egypt — he is at first very successful, so as even to capture Tyre. -— Struggle of Evagoras against the whole force of the Persian empire -after the peace of Antalkidas. — Evagoras, after a ten years’ war, -is reduced, but obtains an honorable peace, mainly owing to the -dispute between the two satraps jointly commanding. — Assassination -of Evagoras, as well as of his son Pnytagoras, by an eunuch slave of -Nikokreon. — Nikoklês, son of Evagoras, becomes despot of Salamis. -Great power gained by Sparta through the peace of Antalkidas. She -becomes practically mistress of Corinth, and the Corinthian isthmus. -Miso-Theban tendencies of Sparta — especially of Agesilaus. — The -Spartans restore Platæa. Former conduct of Sparta towards Platæa. — -Motives of Sparta in restoring Platæa. A politic step, as likely to -sever Thebes from Athens. — Platæa becomes a dependency and outpost -of Sparta. Main object of Sparta to prevent the reconstitution of -the Bœotiad federation — Spartan policy at this time directed by the -partisan spirit of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_vi">[p. vi]</span> -Agesilaus, opposed by his colleague Agesipolis. — Oppressive behavior -of the Spartans towards Mantinea. They require the walls of the -city to be demolished. — Agesipolis blockades the city, and forces -it to surrender, by damming up the river Ophis. The Mantineans are -forced to break up their city into villages. — Democratical leaders -of Mantinea — owed their lives to the mediation of the exiled king -Pausanias. — Mantinea is pulled down and distributed into five -villages. — High-handed despotism of Sparta towards Mantinea — signal -partiality of Xenophon. Return of the philo-Laconian exiles in the -various cities, as partisans for the purposes of Sparta — case of -Phlius. — Competition of Athens with Sparta for ascendency at sea. -Athens gains ground, and gets together some rudiments of a maritime -confederacy. — Ideas entertained by some of the Spartan leaders, of -acting against the Persians for the rescue of the Asiatic Greeks. -— Panegyrical Discourse of Isokrates. — State of Macedonia and -Chalkidikê — growth of Macedonian power during the last years of the -Peloponnesian war. — Perdikkas and Archelaus — energy and ability -of the latter. — Contrast of Macedonia and Athens. — Succeeding -Macedonian kings — Orestes, Æropus, Pausanias, Amyntas. Assassination -frequent. — Amyntas is expelled from Macedonia by the Illyrians. -— Chalkidians of Olynthus — they take into their protection the -Macedonian cities on the coast, when Amyntas runs away before the -Illyrians. Commencement of the Olynthian confederacy. — Equal and -liberal principles on which the confederacy was framed from the -beginning. Accepted willingly by the Macedonian and Greco-Macedonian -cities. — The Olynthians extend their confederacy among the Grecian -cities in Chalkidic Thrace — their liberal procedure — several -cities join. — Akanthus and Apollonia resist the proposition. -Olynthus menaces. They then solicit Spartan intervention against -her. — Speech of Kleigenes the Akanthian envoy at Sparta. — Envoys -from Amyntas at Sparta. — The Spartan Eudamidas is sent against -Olynthus at once, with such force as could be got ready. He checks -the career of the Olynthians. — Phœbidas, brother of Eudamidas, -remains behind to collect fresh force, and march to join his brother -in Thrace. He passes through the Theban territory and near Thebes. -— Conspiracy of Leontiades and the philo-Laconian party in Thebes, -to betray the town and citadel to Phœbidas. — The opposing leaders -— Leontiades and Ismenias — were both Polemarchs. — Leontiades -overawes the Senate, and arrests Ismenias: Pelopidas and the leading -friends of Ismenias go into exile. — Phœbidas in the Kadmeia — -terror and submission at Thebes. — Mixed feelings at Sparta — great -importance of the acquisition to Spartan interests. — Displeasure -at Sparta more pretended than real, against Phœbidas; Agesilaus -defends him. — Leontiades at Sparta — his humble protestations -and assurances — the ephors decide that they will retain the -Kadmeia, but at the same time fine Phœbidas. — The Lacedæmonians -cause Ismenias to be tried and put to death. Iniquity of this -proceeding. — Vigorous action of the Spartans against Olynthus — -Teleutias is sent there with a large force, including a considerable -Theban contingent. Derdas coöperates with him. — Teleutias being -at first successful, and having become over-confident, sustains a -terrible defeat from the Olynthians under the walls of their city. -— Agesipolis is sent to Olynthus from Sparta with a reinforcement. -He dies of a fever. — Polybiades succeeds Agesipolis as commander -— he reduces Olynthus to submission — extinction of the Olynthian -federation. Olynthus and the other cities are enrolled as allies -of Sparta. — Intervention of Sparta with the government of Phlius. -— Agesilaus marches an army against Phlius — reduces the town by -blockade, after a long resistance. The Lacedæmonians occupy <span -class="pagenum" id="Page_vii">[p. vii]</span>the acropolis, naming -a council of one hundred as governors.</p> -<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_76">1-72</a></p> - - -<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXVII.</p> -<p class="small center">FROM THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY THE LACEDÆMONIANS -DOWN TO THE CONGRESS AT SPARTA, AND PARTIAL PEACE, IN 371 -<small>B.C.</small></p> - -<p class="p1">Great ascendency of Sparta on land in 379 -<small>B.C.</small> — Sparta is now feared as the great despot of -Greece. — Strong complaint of the rhetor Lysias, expressed at the -Olympic festival of 384 <small>B.C.</small> — Panegyrical oration of -Isokrates. — Censure upon Sparta pronounced by the philo-Laconian -Xenophon. — His manner of marking the point of transition in his -history — from Spartan glory to Spartan disgrace. — Thebes under -Leontiades and the philo-Spartan oligarchy, with the Spartan garrison -in the Kadmeia — oppressive and tyrannical government. — Discontent -at Thebes, though under compression. Theban exiles at Athens. — The -Theban exiles at Athens, after waiting some time in hopes of a rising -at Thebes, resolve to begin a movement themselves. — Pelopidas takes -the lead — he, with Mellon and five other exiles, undertakes the task -of destroying the rulers of Thebes. Coöperation of Phyllidas the -secretary, and Charon at Thebes. — Plans of Phyllidas for admitting -the conspirators into Thebes and the government-house — he invites -the polemarchs to a banquet. — The scheme very nearly frustrated -— accident which prevented Chlidon from delivering his message. — -Pelopidas and Mellon get secretly into Thebes, and conceal themselves -in the house of Charon. — Leontiades and Hypates are slain in their -houses. — Phyllidas opens the prison, and sets free the prisoners. -Epaminondas and many other citizens appear in arms. — Universal joy -among the citizens on the ensuing morning, when the event was known. -General assembly in the market-place — Pelopidas, Mellon, and Charon -are named the first Bœotarchs. — Aid to the conspirators from private -sympathizers in Attica. — Pelopidas and the Thebans prepare to storm -the Kadmeia — the Lacedæmonian garrison capitulate and are dismissed -— several of the oligarchical Thebans are put to death in trying to -go away along with them. The harmost who surrendered the Kadmeia -is put to death by the Spartans. — Powerful sensation produced by -this incident throughout the Grecian world. — Indignation in Sparta -at the revolution of Thebes — a Spartan army sent forth at once -under king Kleombrotus. He retires from Bœotia without achieving -anything. — Kleombrotus passes by the Athenian frontier — alarm at -Athens — condemnation of the two Athenian generals who had favored -the enterprise of Pelopidas. — Attempt of Sphodrias from Thespiæ -to surprise the Peiræus by a night-march. He fails. — Different -constructions put upon this attempt and upon the character of -Sphodrias. — The Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens seized, but dismissed. -— Trial of Sphodrias at Sparta; acquitted through the private favor -and sympathies of Agesilaus. — Comparison of Spartan with Athenian -procedure. — The Athenians declare war against Sparta, and contract -alliance with Thebes. — Exertions of Athens to form a new maritime -confederacy, like the Confederacy of Delos. Thebes enrolls herself as -a member. — Athens sends round envoys to the islands in the Ægean. -Liberal principles on which the new confederacy is formed. — Envoys -sent round by Athens — Chabrias, Timotheus, Kallistratus. — Service -of Iphikrates in Thrace after the peace of Antalkidas. He marries -the daughter of the Thracian prince Kotys, and acquires possession -of a Thracian seaport, Drys. — Timotheus and Kallistratus. — Synod -of the new confederates assembled at Athens — votes for war on a -large scale. — Members of the confederacy were at first willing -and harmonious — a fleet is equipped. — New property-tax imposed -at Athens. The Solonian<span class="pagenum" id="Page_viii">[p. -viii]</span> census. — The Solonian census retained in the main, -though with modifications, at the restoration under the archonship of -Eukleides in 403 <small>B.C.</small> — Archonship of Nausinikus in -378 <small>B.C.</small> — New census and schedule then introduced, of -all citizens worth twenty minæ and upwards, distributed into classes, -and entered for a fraction of their total property; each class for -a different fraction. — All metics, worth more than twenty-five -minæ, were registered in the schedule; all in one class, each man -for one-sixth of his property. Aggregate schedule. — The Symmories — -containing the twelve hundred wealthiest citizens — the three hundred -wealthiest leaders of the Symmories. — Citizens not wealthy enough -to be included in the Symmories, yet still entered in the schedule, -and liable to property-tax. Purpose of the Symmories — extension of -the principle to the trierarchy. — Enthusiasm at Thebes in defence -of the new government and against Sparta. Military training — the -Sacred Band. — Epaminondas. — His previous character and training — -musical and intellectual, as well as gymnastic. Conversation with -philosophers, Sokratic as well as Pythagorean. — His eloquence -— his unambitious disposition — gentleness of his political -resentments. — Conduct of Epaminondas at the Theban revolution of -379 <small>B.C.</small> — he acquires influence, through Pelopidas, -in the military organization of the city. — Agesilaus marches to -attack Thebes with the full force of the Spartan confederacy — good -system of defence adopted by Thebes — aid from Athens under Chabrias. -Increase of the Theban strength in Bœotia, against the philo-Spartan -oligarchies in the Bœotian cities. — Second expedition of Agesilaus -into Bœotia — he gains no decisive advantage. The Thebans acquire -greater and greater strength. Agesilaus retires — he is disabled -by a hurt in the leg. — Kleombrotus conducts the Spartan force to -invade Bœotia. — He retires without reaching Bœotia. — Resolution -of Sparta to equip a large fleet, under the admiral Pollis. The -Athenians send out a fleet under Chabrias — Victory of Chabrias at -sea near Naxos. Recollections of the battle of Arginusæ. — Extension -of the Athenian maritime confederacy, in consequence of the victory -at Naxos. — Circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by Timotheus with an -Athenian fleet — his victory over the Lacedæmonian fleet — his -success in extending the Athenian confederacy — his just dealing. -— Financial difficulties of Athens. — She becomes jealous of the -growing strength of Thebes — steady and victorious progress of Thebes -in Bœotia. — Victory of Pelopidas at Tegyra over the Lacedæmonians. -— The Thebans expel the Lacedæmonians out of all Bœotia, except -Orchomenus — they reorganize the Bœotian federation. — They invade -Phokis — Kleombrotus is sent thither with an army for defence — -Athens makes a separate peace with the Lacedæmonians. — Jason of -Pheræ — his energetic character and formidable power. — His prudent -dealing with Polydamas. — The Lacedæmonians find themselves unable to -spare any aid for Thessaly — they dismiss Polydamas with a refusal. -He comes to terms with Jason, who becomes Tagus of Thessaly. — -Peace between Athens and Sparta — broken off almost immediately. -The Lacedæmonians declare war again, and resume their plans upon -Zakynthus and Korkyra. — Lacedæmonian armament under Mnasippus, -collected from all the confederates, invades Korkyra. — Mnasippus -besieges the city — high cultivation of the adjoining lands. — The -Korkyræans blocked up in the city — supplies intercepted — want -begins — no hope of safety except in aid from Athens. Reinforcement -arrives from Athens — large Athenian fleet preparing under Timotheus. -Mnasippus is defeated and slain — the city supplied with provisions. -— Approach of the Athenian reinforcement — Hypermenês, successor -of Mnasippus, conveys away the armament, leaving his sick and much -property behind. — Tardy arrival of the Athenian fleet — it is -commanded<span class="pagenum" id="Page_ix">[p. ix]</span> not by -Timotheus, but by Iphikrates — causes of the delay — preliminary -voyage of Timotheus, very long protracted. — Discontent at Athens, in -consequence of the absence of Timotheus — distress of the armament -assembled at Kalauria — Iphikrates and Kallistratus accuse Timotheus. -Iphikrates named admiral in his place. — Return of Timotheus — an -accusation is entered against him, but trial is postponed until the -return of Iphikrates from Korkyra. — Rapid and energetic movements -of Iphikrates towards Korkyra — his excellent management of the -voyage. On reaching Kephallenia, he learns the flight of the -Lacedæmonians from Korkyra. — He goes on to Korkyra, and captures by -surprise the ten Syracusan triremes sent by Dionysius to the aid of -Sparta. — Iphikrates in want of money — he sends home Kallistratus -to Athens — he finds work for his seamen at Korkyra — he obtains -funds by service in Akarnania. — Favorable tone of public opinion -at Athens, in consequence of the success at Korkyra — the trial of -Timotheus went off easily — Jason and Alketas come to support him — -his quæstor is condemned to death. — Timotheus had been guilty of -delay, not justifiable under the circumstances — though acquitted, -his reputation suffered — he accepts command under Persia. — -Discouragement of Sparta in consequence of her defeat at Korkyra, -and of the triumphant position of Iphikrates. — Helikê and Bura are -destroyed by an earthquake. — The Spartans again send Antalkidas to -Persia, to sue for a fresh intervention — the Persian satraps send -down an order that the Grecian belligerents shall make up their -differences. — Athens disposed towards peace. — Athens had ceased -to be afraid of Sparta, and had become again jealous of Thebes. — -Equivocal position of the restored Platæa now that the Lacedæmonians -had been expelled from Bœotia. — The Thebans forestall a negotiation -by seizing Platæa, and expelling the inhabitants, who again take -refuge at Athens. — Strong feeling excited in Athens against the -Thebans, on account of their dealings with Platæa and Thespiæ. The -Plataic discourse of Isokrates. — Increased tendency of the Athenians -towards peace with Sparta — Athens and the Athenian confederacy give -notice to Thebes. General congress for peace at Sparta. — Speeches of -the Athenian envoys Kallias, Autokles, Kallistratus. — Kallistratus -and his policy. — He proposes that Sparta and Athens shall divide -between them the headship of Greece — Sparta on land, Athens at -sea — recognizing general autonomy. — Peace is concluded. Autonomy -of each city to be recognized: Sparta to withdraw her harmosts and -garrisons. — Oaths exchanged. Sparta takes the oath for herself and -her allies. Athens takes it for herself: her allies take it after -her, successively. — The oath proposed to the Thebans. Epaminondas, -the Theban envoy, insists upon taking the oath in the name of the -Bœotian federation. Agesilaus and the Spartans require that he shall -take it for Thebes alone. — Daring and emphatic speeches delivered -by Epaminondas in the congress — protesting against the overweening -pretensions of Sparta. He claims recognition of the ancient -institutions of Bœotia, with Thebes as president of the federation. -— Indignation of the Spartans, and especially of Agesilaus — brief -questions exchanged — Thebes is excluded from the treaty. — General -peace sworn, including Athens, Sparta, and the rest — Thebes -alone is excluded. — Terms of peace — compulsory and indefeasible -confederacies are renounced — voluntary alliances alone maintained. -— Real point in debate <span class="pagenum" id="Page_x">[p. -x]</span>between Agesilaus and Epaminondas.</p> -<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_77">72-174</a></p> - -<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXVIII.</p> -<p class="small center">BATTLE OF LEUKTRA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.</p> - -<p class="p1">Measures for executing the stipulations made at the -congress of Sparta. — Violent impulse of the Spartans against Thebes. -— King Kleombrotus is ordered to march into Bœotia, and encamps at -Leuktra. — New order of battle adopted by Epaminondas. — Confidence -of the Spartans and of Kleombrotus. — Battle of Leuktra. — Defeat -of the Spartans and death of Kleombrotus. — Faint adherence of the -Spartan allies. — Spartan camp after the defeat — confession of -defeat by sending to solicit the burial-truce. — Great surprise, and -immense alteration of feeling, produced throughout Greece by the -Theban victory. — Effect of the news at Sparta — heroic self-command. -— Reinforcements sent from Sparta. — Proceedings in Bœotia after the -battle of Leuktra. The Theban victory not well received at Athens. -— Jason of Pheræ arrives at Leuktra — the Spartan army retires from -Bœotia under capitulation. — Treatment of the defeated citizens on -reaching Sparta — suspension of the law. — Lowered estimation of -Sparta in Greece — prestige of military superiority lost. — Extension -of the power of Thebes. Treatment of Orchomenus and Thespiæ. — -Power and ambition of Jason. — Plans of Jason — Pythian festival. -— Assassination of Jason at Pheræ. — Relief to Thebes by the death -of Jason — satisfaction in Greece. — Proceedings in Peloponnesus -after the defeat of Leuktra. Expulsion of the Spartan harmosts -and dekarchies. — Skytalism at Argos — violent intestine feud. — -Discouragement and helplessness of Sparta. — Athens places herself -at the head of a new Peloponnesian land-confederacy. — Accusation -preferred in the Amphyctionic assembly, by Thebes against Sparta. -— The Spartans are condemned to a fine — importance of this fact -as an indication. — Proceedings in Arcadia. — Reëstablishment of -the city of Mantinea by its own citizens. — Humiliating refusal -experienced by Agesilaus from the Mantineans — keenly painful to a -Spartan. — Feeling against Agesilaus at Sparta. — Impulse among the -Arcadians towards Pan-Arcadian union. Opposition from Orchomenus -and Tegea. — Revolution at Tegea — the philo-Spartan party are put -down or expelled. — Tegea becomes anti-Spartan, and favorable to -the Pan-Arcadian union. — Pan-Arcadian union is formed. — March -of Agesilaus against Mantinea. Evidence of lowered sentiment in -Sparta. — Application by the Arcadians to Athens for aid against -Sparta; it is refused: they then apply to the Thebans. — Proceedings -and views of Epaminondas since the battle of Leuktra. — Plans of -Epaminondas for restoring the Messenians in Peloponnesus. — Also, -for consolidating the Arcadians against Sparta. — Epaminondas and -the Theban army arrive in Arcadia. Great allied force assembled -there. The allies entreat him to invade Laconia. — Reluctance of -Epaminondas to invade Laconia — reasonable grounds for it. — He -marches into Laconia — four lines of invasion. — He crosses the -Eurotas and approaches close to Sparta. — Alarm at Sparta — arrival -of various allies to her aid by sea. — Discontent in Laconia among -the Periœki and Helots — danger to Sparta from that cause. — Vigilant -defence of Sparta by Agesilaus. — Violent emotion of the Spartans, -especially the women. Partial attack upon Sparta by Epaminondas. — -He retires without attempting to storm Sparta: ravages Laconia down -to Gythium. He returns into Arcadia. — Great effect of this invasion -upon Grecian opinion — Epaminondas is exalted, and Sparta farther -lowered. — Foundation of the Arcadian Megalopolis. — Foundation of -Messênê. — Abstraction of Western Laconia from Sparta. — Periœki -and Helots established as freemen along with the Messenians on -the Lacedæmonian border. — The details of this reorganiz<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_xi">[p. xi]</span>ing process unhappily -unknown. — Megalopolis — the Pan-Arcadian Ten Thousand. — Epaminondas -and his army evacuate Peloponnesus. — The Spartans solicit aid from -Athens — language of their envoys, as well as those from Corinth -and Phlius, at Athens. — Reception of the envoys — the Athenians -grant the prayer. — Vote passed to aid Sparta — Iphikrates is named -general. — March of Iphikrates and his army to the Isthmus. — Trial -of Epaminondas at Thebes for retaining his command beyond the legal -time — his honorable and easy acquittal.</p> -<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_78">174-241</a></p> - -<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXIX.</p> -<p class="small center">FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO THE DEATH -OF PELOPIDAS.</p> - -<p class="p1">Changes in Peloponnesus since the battle of Leuktra. -— Changes out of Peloponnesus. — Amyntas prince of Macedonia. -— Ambitious views of Athens after the battle of Leuktra. — Her -aspirations to maritime empire, and to the partial recovery of -kleruchies. — She wishes to recover Amphipolis — Amyntas recognizes -her right to the place. — Athens and Amphipolis. — Death of Jason -and Amyntas — state of Thessaly and Macedonia. — Alexander of Pheræ -— he is opposed by Pelopidas — influence of Thebes in Thessaly. — -State of Macedonia — Alexander son of Amyntas — Euridikê — Ptolemy. -— Assistance rendered by the Athenian Iphikrates to the family of -Amyntas. — Iphikrates and Timotheus. — The Spartan allied army -defends the line of Mount Oneium — Epaminondas breaks through -it, and marches into Peloponnesus. — Sikyon joins the Thebans — -Phlius remains faithful to Sparta. — Reinforcement from Syracuse -to Peloponnesus, in aid of Sparta. — Forbearance and mildness of -Epaminondas. — Energetic action and insolence of the Arcadians — -Lykomedes animates and leads them on. — Great influence of Lykomedes. -— Elis tries to recover her supremacy over the Triphylian towns, -which are admitted into the Arcadian union, to the great offence of -Elis. — Mission of Philiskus to Greece by Ariobarzanes. — Political -importance of the reconstitution of Messênê, which now becomes the -great subject of discord. Messenian victor proclaimed at Olympia. -— Expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly. — The Tearless Battle -— victory of the Spartan Archidamus over the Arcadians. — Third -expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus — his treatment of the -Achæan cities. — The Thebans reverse the policy of Epaminondas, -on complaint of the Arcadians and others. They do not reëlect him -Bœotarch. — Disturbed state of Sikyon. Euphron makes himself despot — -his rapacious and sanguinary conduct. — Sufferings of the Phliasians -— their steady adherence to Sparta. — Assistance rendered to Phlius -by the Athenian Chares — surprise of the fort of Thyamia. — Euphron -is expelled from Sikyon by the Arcadians and Thebans — he retires -to the harbor, which he surrenders to the Spartans. — Euphron -returns to Sikyon — he goes to Thebes, and is there assassinated. — -The assassins are put upon their trial at Thebes — their defence. -— They are acquitted by the Theban Senate. — Sentiment among the -Many of Sikyon, favorable to Euphron — honors shown to his body and -memory. — The Sikyonians recapture their harbor from the Spartans. -— Application of Thebes for Persian countenance to her headship — -mission of Pelopidas and other envoys to Susa. — Pelopidas obtains -from Persia a favorable rescript. — Protest of the Athenians and -Arcadians against the rescript. — Pelopidas brings back the rescript. -It is read publicly before the Greek states convoked at Thebes. -— The states convoked at Thebes refuse to receive the rescript. -The Arcadian deputies protest against the headship of Thebes. — -The Thebans send the re<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xii">[p. -xii]</span>script to be received at Corinth; the Corinthians refuse: -failure of the Theban object. — Mission of Pelopidas to Thessaly. -He is seized and detained prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ. — The -Thebans despatch an army to rescue Pelopidas. The army, defeated -and retreating, is only saved by Epaminondas, then a private man. -— Triumph of Alexander in Thessaly and discredit of Thebes. Harsh -treatment of Pelopidas. — Second Theban army sent into Thessaly, -under Epaminondas, for the rescue of Pelopidas, who is at length -released by Alexander under a truce. — Oropus is taken from Athens -and placed in the hands of the Thebans. The Athenians recall Chares -from Corinth. — Athens discontented with her Peloponnesian allies; -she enters into alliance with Lykomedes and the Arcadians. Death of -Lykomedes. — Epaminondas is sent as envoy into Arcadia; he speaks -against Kallistratus. — Project of the Athenians to seize Corinth; -they are disappointed. — They apply to Sparta. — Refusal of the -Spartans to acknowledge the independence of Messênê; they reproach -their allies with consenting. — Corinth, Epidaurus, Phlius, etc., -conclude peace with Thebes, but without Sparta — recognizing the -independence of Messênê. — Athens sends a fresh embassy to the -Persian king — altered rescript from him, pronouncing Amphipolis to -be an Athenian possession. — Timotheus sent with a fleet to Asia — -Agesilaus — revolt of Ariobarzanes. — Conquest of Samos by Timotheus. -— Partial readmission to the Chersonese obtained by Timotheus. -— Athenian kleruchs or settlers sent thither as proprietors. — -Difficulties of Athens in establishing kleruchs in the Chersonese. -— Kotys of Thrace. — Timotheus supersedes Iphikrates. — Timotheus -acts with success on the coast of Macedonia and Chalkidikê. He -fails at Amphipolis. — Timotheus acts against Kotys and near the -Chersonese. — Measures of the Thebans in Thessaly — Pelopidas is -sent with an army against Alexander of Pheræ. — Epaminondas exhorts -the Thebans to equip a fleet against Athens. — Discussion between -him and Menekleidas in the Theban assembly. — Menekleidas seemingly -right in dissuading naval preparations. — Epaminondas in command of -a Theban fleet in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. Pelopidas attacks -Alexander of Pheræ — his success in battle — his rashness — he is -slain. — Excessive grief of the Thebans and Thessalians for his -death. — The Thebans completely subdue Alexander of Pheræ.</p> -<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_79">242-310</a></p> - -<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXX.</p> -<p class="small center">FROM THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA.</p> - -<p class="p1">Conspiracy of the knights of Orchomenus against Thebes -— destruction of Orchomenus by the Thebans. — Repugnance excited -against the Thebans — regret and displeasure of Epaminondas. — -Return of Epaminondas from his cruise — renewed complications in -Peloponnesus. — State of Peloponnesus — Eleians and Achæans in -alliance with Sparta. — The Eleians aim at recovering Triphylia — -the Spartans, at recovering Messênê. — War between the Eleians and -Arcadians; the latter occupy Olympia. — Second invasion of Elis by -the Arcadians. Distress of the Eleians. Archidamus and the Spartans -invade Arcadia. — Archidamus establishes a Spartan garrison at -Kromnus. The Arcadians gain advantages over him — armistice. — The -Arcadians blockade Kromnus, and capture the Spartan garrison. — The -Arcadians celebrate the Olympic festival along with the Pisatans — -excluding the Eleians. — The Eleians invade the festival by arms — -conflict on the plain of Olympia — bravery of the Eleians. — Feelings -of the spectators at Olympia. — The Arcadians take the treasures of -Olympia to pay their militia. — Violent dissensions arising among -the members of the Arcadian communion, in<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_xiii">[p. xiii]</span> consequence of this appropriation. -The Arcadian assembly pronounces against it. — Farther dissensions in -Arcadia — invitation sent to the Thebans — peace concluded with Elis. -— The peace generally popular — celebrated at Tegea — seizure of -many oligarchical members at Tegea by the Theban harmost. — Conduct -of the Theban harmost. — View taken by Epaminondas. — His view is -more consistent with the facts recounted by Xenophon, than the view -of Xenophon himself. — Policy of Epaminondas and the Thebans. — -Epaminondas marches with a Theban army into Peloponnesus, to muster -at Tegea. — Agesilaus and the Spartans are sent for. — Night-march -of Epaminondas to surprise Sparta. Agesilaus is informed in time -to prevent surprise. — Epaminondas comes up to Sparta, but finds -it defended. — He marches back to Tegea — despatches his cavalry -from thence to surprise Mantinea. — The surprise is baffled, by the -accidental arrival of the Athenian cavalry — battle of cavalry near -Mantinea, in which the Athenians have the advantage. — Epaminondas -resolves to attack the enemy near Mantinea. — View of Xenophon — -that this resolution was forced upon him by despair — examined. — -Alacrity of the army of Epaminondas, when the order for fighting is -given. — Mantinico-Tegeatic plain — position of the Lacedæmonians and -Mantineans. — March of Epaminondas from Tegea. — False impression -produced upon the enemy by his manœuvres. — Theban order of battle — -plans of the commander. — Disposition of the cavalry on both sides. -— Unprepared state of the Lacedæmonian army. — Battle of Mantinea — -complete success of the dispositions of Epaminondas. — Victory of the -Thebans — Epaminondas is mortally wounded. — Extreme discouragement -caused by his death among the troops, even when in full victory -and pursuit. — Victory claimed by both sides — nevertheless the -Lacedæmonians are obliged to solicit the burial-truce. — Dying -moments of Epaminondas. — The two other best Theban officers are -slain also in the battle. — Who slew Epaminondas? Different persons -honored for it. — Peace concluded — <i>statu quo</i> recognized, including -the independence of Messênê — Sparta alone stands out — the Thebans -return home. — Results of the battle of Mantinea, as appreciated -by Xenophon — unfair to the Thebans. — Character of Epaminondas. -— Disputes among the inhabitants of Megalopolis. The Thebans send -thither a force under Pammenes, which maintains the incorporation. -— Agesilaus and Archidamus. — State of Persia — revolted satraps -and provinces — Datames. — Formidable revolt of the satraps in Asia -Minor — it is suppressed by the Persian court, through treachery. -— Agesilaus goes as commander to Egypt — Chabrias is there also. — -Death and character of Agesilaus. — State of Egypt and Persia. — -Death of Artaxerxes Mnemon. Murders in the royal family. — Athenian -maritime operations — Timotheus makes war against Amphipolis and -against Kotys. — Ergophilus succeeds Timotheus at the Chersonese — -Kallisthenes succeeds him against Amphipolis — war at sea against -Alexander of Pheræ. — Ergophilus and Kallisthenes both unsuccessful -— both tried. — Autokles in the Hellespont and Bosphorus — convoy -for the corn-ships out of the Euxine. — Miltokythes revolts from -Kotys in Thrace — ill-success of the Athenians. — Menon — Timomachus -— as commanders in the Chersonese. The Athenians lose Sestos. — -Kephisodotus in the Chersonese. Charidemus crosses thither from -Abydos. — Assassination of Kotys. — Kersobleptes succeeds Kotys. -Berisades and Amadokus, his rivals — ill-success of Athens — -Kephisodotus. — Improved prospects of Athens in the Chersonese — -Athenodorus — Charidemus. — Charidemus is forced to accept the -convention of Athenodorus — his evasions — the Chersonese with Sestos -is restored to Athens. — The transmarine empire of Athens now at its -maximum. Mischievous effects of her conquests<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_xiv">[p. xiv]</span> made against Olynthus. — Maximum of -second Athenian empire — accession of Philip of Macedon.</p> -<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_80">311-383</a></p> - -<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXXI.</p> -<p class="small center">SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT -BEFORE SYRACUSE.</p> - -<p class="p1">Syracuse after the destruction of the Athenian -armament. — Anticipation of the impending ruin of Athens — revolution -at Thurii. — Syracusan squadron under Hermokrates goes to act against -Athens in the Ægean. — Disappointed hopes — defeat at Kynossema — -second ruinous defeat at Kyzikus. — Sufferings of the Syracusan -seamen — disappointment and displeasure at Syracuse. — Banishment of -Hermokrates and his colleagues. Sentence communicated by Hermokrates -to the armament. — Internal state of Syracuse — constitution of -Diokles. — Difficulty of determining what that constitution was. — -Invasion from Carthage. — State of the Carthaginians. — Extent of -Carthaginian empire — power, and population — Liby-Phœnicians. — -Harsh dealing of Carthage towards her subjects. Colonies sent out -from Carthage. — Military force of Carthage. — Political constitution -of Carthage. — Oligarchical system and sentiment at Carthage. — -Powerful families at Carthage — Mago, Hamilkar, Hasdrubal. — Quarrel -between Egesta and Selinus in Sicily. — Application of Egesta to -Carthage for aid — application granted — eagerness of Hannibal. — -Carthaginian envoys sent to Sicily. — Hannibal crosses over to Sicily -with a very large armament. He lays siege to Selinus. — Vigorous -assault on Selinus — gallant resistance — the town is at length -stormed. — Selinus is sacked and plundered — merciless slaughter. — -Delay of the Syracusans and others in sending aid. Answer of Hannibal -to their embassy. — Hannibal marches to Himera and besieges it. Aid -from Syracuse under Diokles — sally from Himera. Hannibal destroys -Himera, and slaughters three thousand prisoners, as an expiation -to the memory of his grandfather. — Alarm throughout the Greeks of -Sicily — Hannibal dismisses his army, and returns to Carthage. — -New intestine discord in Syracuse — Hermokrates comes to Sicily. — -He levies troops to effect his return by force. — He is obliged to -retire — he establishes himself in the ruins of Selinus, and acts -against the Carthaginians. — His father attempts to reënter Syracuse, -with the bones of the Syracusans slain near Himera. Banishment of -Diokles. — Hermokrates tries again to penetrate into Syracuse with -an armed force. — He is defeated and slain. — First appearance of -Dionysius at Syracuse. — Weakness of Syracuse, arising out of this -political discord — party of Hermokrates. Danger from Carthage. — -Fresh invasion of Sicily, by the Carthaginians. Immense host under -Hannibal and Imilkon. — Great alarm in Sicily — active preparations -for defence at Agrigentum. — Grandeur, wealth, and population of -Agrigentum. — The Carthaginians attack Agrigentum. They demolish -the tombs near its walls. Distemper among their army. Religious -terrors — sacrifice. — Syracusan reinforcement to Agrigentum, under -Daphnæus. His victory over the Iberians. He declines to pursue them. -— Daphnæus enters Agrigentum. Discontent against the Agrigentine -generals, for having been backward in attack. They are put to death. -— Privations in both armies — Hamilkar captures the provision-ships -of the Syracusans — Agrigentum is evacuated. — Agrigentum taken and -plundered by the Carthagians. — Terror throughout Sicily. — Bitter -complaints against the Syracusan generals. — The Hermokratean party -at Syracuse comes forward to subvert the government and elevate -Dionysius. — Harangue of Diony<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xv">[p. -xv]</span>sius in the Syracusan assembly against the generals, -who are deposed by vote of the people, and Dionysius with others -appointed in their room. — Ambitious arts of Dionysius — he intrigues -against his colleagues, and frustrates all their proceedings. He -procures a vote for restoring the Hermokratean exiles. — Dionysius -is sent with a Syracusan reinforcement to Gela. He procures the -execution or banishment of the Geloan oligarchy. — He returns to -Syracuse with an increased force — he accuses his colleagues of -gross treason. — Dionysius is named general, single-handed, with -full powers. — Apparent repentance of the people after the vote. -Stratagem of Dionysius to obtain a vote ensuring to him a body -of paid guards. — March of Dionysius to Leontini. — Dionysius -establishes himself at Syracuse as despot. — Dionysius as despot — -the means whereby he attained the power.</p> -<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_81">383-446</a></p> - -<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXXII.</p> -<p class="small center">SICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS AT SYRACUSE.</p> - -<p class="p1">Imilkon with the Carthaginian army marches from -Agrigentum to attack Gela. — Brave defence of the Geloans — -Dionysius arrives with an army to relieve them. — Plan of Dionysius -for a general attack on the Carthaginian army. — He is defeated -and obliged to retreat. — He evacuates Gela and Kamarina — flight -of the population of both places, which are taken and sacked by -the Carthaginians. — Indignation and charges of treachery against -Dionysius. — Mutiny of the Syracusan horsemen — they ride off -to Syracuse, and declare against Dionysius. — Their imprudence. -Dionysius master of Syracuse. — Propositions of peace come from -Imilkon. Terms of peace. — Collusion of Dionysius with the -Carthaginians, who confirm his dominion over Syracuse. Pestilence in -the Carthaginian army. — Near coincidence, in time, of this peace, -with the victory of Lysander at Ægospotami — sympathy of Sparta with -Dionysius. — Depressed condition of the towns of Southern Sicily, -from Cape Pachynus to Lilybæum. — Strong position of Dionysius. — -Strong fortifications and other buildings erected by Dionysius, in -and about Ortygia. — He assigns houses in Ortygia to his soldiers and -partisans — he distributes the lands of Syracuse anew. — Exorbitant -exactions of Dionysius — discontent at Syracuse. — Dionysius marches -out of Syracuse against the Sikels — mutiny of the Syracusan soldiers -at Herbesa — Dorikus the commander is slain. — The Syracusan -insurgents, with assistance from Rhegium and Messênê, besiege -Dionysius in Ortygia. — Despair of Dionysius — he applies to a body -of Campanians in the Carthaginian service, for aid. — He amuses the -assailants with feigned submission — arrival of the Campanians — -victory of Dionysius. — Dionysius strengthens his despotism more than -before — assistance lent to him by the Spartan Aristus — Nikoteles -the Corinthian is put to death. — He disarms the Syracusan citizens -— strengthens the fortifications of Ortygia — augments his mercenary -force. — Dionysius conquers Naxus, Katana, and Leontini. — Great -power of Dionysius. Foundation of Alæsa by Archonides. — Resolution -of Dionysius to make war upon Carthage. — Locality of Syracuse — -danger to which the town had been exposed, in the Athenian siege. -— Additional fortifications made by Dionysius along the northern -ridge of the cliffs of Epipolæ, up the Euryalus. — Popularity of the -work — efforts made by all the Syracusans as well as by Dionysius -himself. — Preparations of Dionysius for aggressive war against the -Carthaginians. — Improvement in the behavior of Dionysius towards -the Syracusans. — His conciliatory offers to other Grecian cities in -Sicily. Hostile sentiment of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xvi">[p. -xvi]</span> the Rhegines towards him. Their application to Messênê. -— He makes peace with Messênê and Rhegium. — He desires to marry a -Rhegine wife. His proposition is declined by the city. He is greatly -incensed. — He makes a proposition to marry a wife from Lokri — his -wish is granted — he marries a Lokrian maiden named Doris. — Immense -warlike equipment of Dionysius at Syracuse — arms, engines, etc. — -Naval preparations in the harbor of Syracuse. Enlargement of the bulk -of ships of war — quadriremes and quinqueremes. — General sympathy of -the Syracusans in his projects against Carthage. — He hires soldiers -from all quarters. — He celebrates his nuptials with two wives on the -same day — Doris and Aristomachê. Temporary good feeling at Syracuse -towards him. — He convokes the Syracusan assembly, and exhorts them -to war against Carthage. — He desires to arrest the emigration of -those who were less afraid of the Carthaginian dominion than of his. -— He grants permission to plunder the Carthaginian residents and -ships at Syracuse. Alarm at Carthage — suffering in Africa from the -pestilence. — Dionysius marches out from Syracuse with a prodigious -army against the Carthaginians in Sicily. — Insurrection against -Carthage, among the Sicilian Greeks subject to her. Terrible tortures -inflicted on the Carthaginians. — Dionysius besieges the Carthaginian -seaport Motyê. — Situation of Motyê — operations of the siege — -vigorous defence. — Dionysius overruns the neighboring dependencies -of Carthage — doubtful result of the siege of Motyê — appearance -of Imilkon with a Carthaginian fleet — he is obliged to return. — -Desperate defence of Motyê. It is at length taken by a nocturnal -attack. — Plunder of Motyê — the inhabitants either slaughtered or -sold for slaves. — Farther operations of Dionysius. — Arrival of -Imilkon with a Carthaginian armament — his successful operations — he -retakes Motyê. — Dionysius retires to Syracuse. — Imilkon captures -Messênê. — Revolt of the Sikels from Dionysius. Commencement of -Tauromenium. — Provisions of Dionysius for the defence of Syracuse — -he strengthens Leontini — he advances to Katana with his land-army -as well as his fleet. — Naval battle off Katana — great victory -of the Carthaginian fleet under Magon. — Arrival of Imilkon to -join the fleet of Magon near Katana — fruitless invitation to the -Campanians of Ætna. — Dionysius retreats to Syracuse — discontent of -his army. — Imilkon marches close up to Syracuse — the Carthaginian -fleet come up to occupy the Great Harbor — their imposing entry. -Fortified position of Imilkon near the Harbor. — Imilkon plunders -the suburb of Achradina — blockades Syracuse by sea. — Naval victory -gained by the Syracusan fleet during the absence of Dionysius. — -Effect of this victory in exalting the spirits of the Syracusans. — -Public meeting convened by Dionysius — mutinous spirit against him — -vehement speech by Thedorus. — Sympathy excited by the speech in the -Syracusan assembly. — The Spartan Pharakidas upholds Dionysius — who -finally dismisses the assembly, and silences the adverse movement. — -Alliance of Sparta with Dionysius — suitable to her general policy -at the time. The emancipation of Syracuse depended upon Pharakidas. -— Dionysius tries to gain popularity. — Terrific pestilence among -the Carthaginian army before Syracuse. — Dionysius attacks the -Carthaginian camp. He deliberately sacrifices a detachment of his -mercenaries. — Success of Dionysius, both by sea and by land, -against the Syracusan position. — Conflagration of the Carthaginian -camp — exultation at Syracuse. — Imilkon concludes a secret treaty -with Dionysius, to be allowed to escape with the Carthaginians, -on condition of abandoning his remaining army. Destruction of the -remaining Carthaginian army, except Sikels and Iberians. — Distress -at Carthage — miserable end of Imilkon. — Danger of Carthage — anger -and revolt of her African subjects — at length put down.</p> -<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_82">446-512</a></p> - -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_76"> - <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_1">[p. 1]</a></span></p> - <p class="falseh1">HISTORY OF GREECE.</p> - <hr class="sep2" /> - <p class="xl center">PART II.<br /> - <small>CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.</small></p> - <hr class="sep2" /> - <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXVI.<br /> - FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS DOWN TO THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY SPARTA.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span> -peace or convention<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" -class="fnanchor">[1]</a> which bears the name of Antalkidas, was an -incident of serious and mournful import in Grecian history. Its true -character cannot be better described than in a brief remark and reply -which we find cited in Plutarch. “Alas for Hellas (observed some one -to Agesilaus) when we see our Laconians <i>medising</i>!”—“Nay (replied -the Spartan king), say rather the Medes (Persians) <i>laconising</i>.”<a -id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> - -<p>These two propositions do not exclude each other. Both were -perfectly true. The convention emanated from a separate partnership -between Spartan and Persian interests. It was solicited by the -Spartan Antalkidas, and propounded by him to Tiribazus<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_2">[p. 2]</span> on the express ground, -that it was exactly calculated to meet the Persian king’s purposes -and wishes,—as we learn even from the philo-Laconian Xenophon.<a -id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> While -Sparta and Persia were both great gainers, no other Grecian state -gained anything, as the convention was originally framed. But after -the first rejection, Antalkidas saw the necessity of conciliating -Athens by the addition of a special article providing that Lemnos, -Imbros, and Skyros should be restored to her.<a id="FNanchor_4" -href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> This addition seems -to have been first made in the abortive negotiations which form -the subject of the discourse already mentioned, pronounced by -Andokides. It was continued afterwards and inserted in the final -decree which Antalkidas and Tiribazus brought down in the king’s -name from Susa; and it doubtless somewhat contributed to facilitate -the adherence of Athens, though the united forces of Sparta and -Persia had become so overwhelming, that she could hardly have had -the means of standing out, even if the supplementary article had -been omitted. Nevertheless, this condition undoubtedly did secure to -Athens a certain share in the gain, conjointly with the far larger -shares both of Sparta and Persia. It is, however, not less true, -that Athens, as well as Thebes,<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" -class="fnanchor">[5]</a> assented to the peace only under fear and -compulsion. As to the other states of Greece, they were interested -merely in the melancholy capacity of partners in the general loss and -degradation.</p> - -<p>That degradation stood evidently marked in the form, origin, and -transmission, of the convention, even apart from its substance. -It was a fiat issued from the court of Susa; as such it was -ostentatiously proclaimed and “sent down” from thence to Greece. -Its authority was derived from the king’s seal, and its sanction -from his concluding threat, that he would make war against all -recusants. It was brought down by the satrap Tiribazus (along<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_3">[p. 3]</span> with Antalkidas), read by -him aloud, and heard with submission by the assembled Grecian envoys, -after he had called their special attention to the regal seal.<a -id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> Such was -the convention which Sparta, the ancient president of the Grecian -world had been the first to solicit at the hands of the Persian -king, and which she now not only set the example of sanctioning by -her own spontaneous obedience, but even avouched as guarantee and -champion against all opponents; preparing to enforce it at the point -of the sword against any recusant state, whether party to it or -not. Such was the convention which was now inscribed on stone, and -placed as a permanent record in the temples of the Grecian cities;<a -id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> nay, even -in the common sanctuaries,—the Olympic, Pythian, and others,—the -great <i>foci</i> and rallying points of Pan-hellenic sentiment. Though -called by the name of a convention, it was on the very face of it -a peremptory mandate proceeding from the ancient enemy of Greece, -an acceptance of which was nothing less than an act of obedience. -While to him it was a glorious trophy, to all<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_4">[p. 4]</span> Pan-hellenic patriots it was the -deepest disgrace and insult.<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" -class="fnanchor">[8]</a> Effacing altogether the idea of an -independent Hellenic world, bound together and regulated by the -self-acting forces and common sympathies of its own members,—even the -words of the convention proclaimed it as an act of intrusive foreign -power, and erected the barbarian king into a dictatorial settler of -Grecian differences; a guardian<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" -class="fnanchor">[9]</a> who cared for the peace of Greece more -than the Greeks themselves. And thus, looking to the form alone, it -was tantamount to that symbol of submission—the cession of earth -and water—which had been demanded a century before by the ancestor -of Artaxerxes from the ancestors of the Spartans and Athenians; -a demand, which both Sparta and Athens then not only repudiated, -but resented so cruelly, as to put to death the heralds by whom it -was brought,—stigmatizing the Æginetans and others as traitors to -Hellas for complying with it.<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" -class="fnanchor">[10]</a> Yet nothing more would have been implied -in such cession than what stood embodied in the inscription on -that “colonna infame,” which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">[p. -5]</span> placed the peace of Antalkidas side by side with the -Pan-hellenic glories and ornaments at Olympia.<a id="FNanchor_11" -href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p> - -<p>Great must have been the change wrought by the intermediate -events, when Sparta, the ostensible president of Greece,—in her own -estimation even more than in that of others,<a id="FNanchor_12" -href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a>—had so lost all -Pan-hellenic conscience and dignity, as to descend into an obsequious -minister, procuring and enforcing a Persian mandate for political -objects of her own. How insane would such an anticipation have -appeared to Æschylus, or the audience who heard the Persæ! to -Herodotus or Thucydides! to Perikles and Archidamus! nay, even to -Kallikratidas or Lysander! It was the last consummation of a series -of previous political sins, invoking more and more the intervention -of Persia to aid her against her Grecian enemies.</p> - -<p>Her first application to the Great King for this purpose dates -from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">[p. 6]</span> the commencement -of the Peloponnesian war, and is prefaced by an apology, little -less than humiliating, from king Archidamus; who, not unconscious -of the sort of treason which he was meditating, pleads that Sparta, -when the Athenians are conspiring against her, ought not to be -blamed for asking from foreigners as well as from Greeks aid for -her own preservation.<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" -class="fnanchor">[13]</a> From the earliest commencement to the -seventh year of the war, many separate and successive envoys -were despatched by the Spartans to Susa; two of whom were seized -in Thrace, brought to Athens, and there put to death. The rest -reached their destination, but talked in so confused a way, and -contradicted each other so much, that the Persian court, unable to -understand what they meant,<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" -class="fnanchor">[14]</a> sent Artaphernes with letters to Sparta -(in the seventh year of the war) complaining of such stupidity, and -asking for clearer information. Artaphernes fell into the hands of an -Athenian squadron at Eion on the Strymon, and was conveyed to Athens; -where he was treated with great politeness, and sent back (after the -letters which he carried had been examined) to Ephesus. What is more -important to note is, that Athenian envoys were sent along with him, -with a view of bringing Athens into friendly communication with the -Great King; which was only prevented by the fact that Artaxerxes -Longimanus just then died. Here we see the fatal practice, generated -by intestine war, of invoking Persian aid; begun by Sparta as an -importunate solicitor,—and partially imitated by Athens, though we do -not know what her envoys were instructed to say, had they been able -to reach Susa.</p> - -<p>Nothing more is heard about Persian intervention until the year of -the great Athenian disasters before Syracuse. Elate with the hopes -arising out of that event, the Persians required no solicitation, but -were quite as eager to tender interference for their own purposes, as -Sparta was to invite them for hers. How ready Sparta was to purchase -their aid by the surrender of the Asiatic<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_7">[p. 7]</span> Greeks, and that too without any -stipulations in their favor,—has been recounted in my last volume.<a -id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> She -had not now the excuse,—for it stands only as an excuse and not as a -justification—of self-defence against aggression from Athens, which -Archidamus had produced at the beginning of the war. Even then it was -only a colorable excuse, not borne out by the reality of the case; -but now, the avowed as well as the real object was something quite -different,—not to repel, but to crush, Athens. Yet to accomplish that -object, not even of pretended safety, but of pure ambition, Sparta -sacrificed unconditionally the liberty of her Asiatic kinsmen; a -price which Archidamus at the beginning of the war would certainly -never have endured the thoughts of paying, notwithstanding the then -formidable power of Athens. Here, too, we find Athens following the -example; and consenting, in hopes of procuring Persian aid, to the -like sacrifice, though the bargain was never consummated. It is true -that she was then contending for her existence. Nevertheless, the -facts afford melancholy proof how much the sentiment of Pan-hellenic -independence became enfeebled in both the leaders, amidst the -fierce intestine conflict terminated by the battle of Ægospotami.<a -id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">[p. 8]</span></p> - -<p>After that battle, the bargain between Sparta and Persia would -doubtless have been fulfilled, and the Asiatic Greeks would have -passed at once under the dominion of the latter,—had not an entirely -new train of circumstances arisen out of the very peculiar position -and designs of Cyrus. That young prince did all in his power to -gain the affections of the Greeks, as auxiliaries for his ambitious -speculations; in which speculations both Sparta and the Asiatic -Greeks took part, compromising themselves irrevocably against -Artaxerxes, and still more against Tissaphernes. Sparta thus became -unintentionally the enemy of Persia, and found herself compelled to -protect the Asiatic Greeks against his hostility, with which they -were threatened; a protection easy for her to confer, not merely -from the unbounded empire which she then enjoyed over the Grecian -world, but from the presence of the renowned Cyreian Ten Thousand, -and the contempt for Persian military strength which they brought -home from their retreat. She thus finds herself in the exercise of a -Pan-hellenic protectorate or presidency, first through the ministry -of Derkyllidas, next of Agesilaus, who even sacrifices at Aulis, -takes up the sceptre of Agamemnon, and contemplates large schemes of -aggression against the Great King. Here, however, the Persians play -against her the same game which she had invoked them to assist in -playing against Athens. Their fleet, which fifteen years before she -had invited for her own purposes, is now brought in against herself, -and with far more effect, since her empire was more odious as well as -more oppressive than the Athenian. It is now Athens and her allies -who call in Persian aid; without any direct engagement, indeed, to -surrender the Asiatic Greeks, for we are told that after the battle -of Knidus, Konon incurred the displeasure of the Persians by his -supposed plans for reuniting them with Athens,<a id="FNanchor_17" -href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> and Athenian aid was -still continued to Evagoras,—yet, nevertheless, indirectly paving -the way for that consummation. If Athens and her allies here render -themselves culpable of an abnegation of Pan-hellenic sentiment, we -may remark, as before, that they act under the pressure of stronger -necessities than could ever be pleaded by Sparta; and that they might -employ on their own behalf, with much greater truth, the excuse -of self-preservation preferred by king Archidamus.</p> <p><span -class="pagenum" id="Page_9">[p. 9]</span></p> <p>But never on any -occasion did that excuse find less real place than in regard to -the mission of Antalkidas. Sparta was at that time so powerful, -even after the loss of her maritime empire, that the allies at the -Isthmus of Corinth, jealous of each other and held together only -by common terror, could hardly stand on the defensive against her, -and would probably have been disunited by reasonable offers on her -part; nor would she have needed even to recall Agesilaus from Asia. -Nevertheless, the mission was probably dictated in great measure by -a groundless panic, arising from the sight of the revived Long Walls -and refortified Piræus, and springing at once to the fancy, that a -new Athenian empire, such as had existed forty years before, was -about to start into life; a fancy little likely to be realized, since -the very peculiar circumstances which had created the first Athenian -empire were now totally reversed. Debarred from maritime empire -herself, the first object with Sparta was, to shut out Athens from -the like; the next, to put down all partial federations or political -combinations, and to enforce universal autonomy, or the maximum of -political isolation; in order that there might nowhere exist a power -capable of resisting herself, the strongest of all individual states. -As a means to this end, which was no less in the interest of Persia -than in hers, she outbid all prior subserviences to the Great King, -betrayed to him not only one entire division of her Hellenic kinsmen, -but also the general honor of the Hellenic name in the most flagrant -manner,—and volunteered to <i>medise</i> in order that the Persians might -repay her by <i>laconising</i>.<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" -class="fnanchor">[18]</a> To ensure fully the obedience of all the -satraps, who had more than once manifested dissentient views of their -own, Antalkidas procured and brought down a formal order signed and -sealed at Susa; and Sparta undertook, without shame or scruple, to -enforce the same order,—“the convention sent down by the king,”—upon -all her countrymen; thus converting them into the subjects, and -herself into a sort of viceroy or satrap, of Artaxerxes. Such an -act of treason to the Pan-hellenic cause was far more flagrant and -destructive than that alleged confederacy with the Persian king, -for which the Theban Ismenias was afterwards put to death, and -that, too, by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">[p. 10]</span> -the Spartans themselves.<a id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" -class="fnanchor">[19]</a> Unhappily it formed a precedent for -the future, and was closely copied afterwards by Thebes;<a -id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> -foreboding but too clearly the short career which Grecian political -independence had to run.</p> - -<p>That large patriotic sentiment, which dictated the magnanimous -answer sent by the Athenians<a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" -class="fnanchor">[21]</a> to the offers of Mardonius in 479 -<small>B.C.</small>, refusing in the midst of ruin present and -prospective, all temptation to betray the sanctity of Pan-hellenic -fellowship,—that sentiment which had been during the two following -generations the predominant inspiration of Athens, and had also been -powerful, though always less powerful, at Sparta,—was now, in the -former, overlaid by more pressing apprehensions, and in the latter -completely extinguished. Now it was to the leading states that -Greece had to look, for holding up the great banner of Pan-hellenic -independence; from the smaller states nothing more could be required -than that they should adhere to and defend it, when upheld.<a -id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> But so -soon as Sparta was seen to solicit and enforce, and Athens to accept -(even under constraint), the proclamation under the king’s hand and -seal brought down by Antalkidas,—that banner was no longer a part -of the public emblems of Gre<span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">[p. -11]</span>cian political life. The grand idea represented by it,—of -collective self-determining Hellenism,—was left to dwell in the -bosoms of individual patriots.</p> - -<p>If we look at the convention of Antalkidas apart from its form and -warranty, and with reference to its substance, we shall find that -though its first article was unequivocally disgraceful, its last was -at least popular as a promise to the ear. Universal autonomy, to -each city, small or great, was dear to Grecian political instinct. -I have already remarked more than once that the exaggerated force -of this desire was the chief cause of the short duration of Grecian -freedom. Absorbing all the powers of life to the separate parts, -it left no vital force or integrity to the whole; especially, it -robbed both each and all of the power of self-defence against foreign -assailants. Though indispensable up to a certain point and under -certain modifications, yet beyond these modifications, which Grecian -political instinct was far from recognizing, it produced a great -preponderance of mischief. Although, therefore, this item of the -convention was in its promise acceptable and popular,—and although -we shall find it hereafter invoked as a protection in various -individual cases of injustice,—we must inquire how it was carried -into execution, before we can pronounce whether it was good or evil, -the present of a friend or of an enemy.</p> - -<p>The succeeding pages will furnish an answer to this inquiry. -The Lacedæmonians, as “presidents (guarantees or executors) of the -peace, sent down by the king,”<a id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23" -class="fnanchor">[23]</a> undertook the duty of execution; and we -shall see that from the beginning they meant nothing sincerely. They -did not even attempt any sincere and steady compliance with the -honest, though undistinguishing, political instinct of the Greek -mind; much less did they seek to grant as much as was really good, -and to withhold the remainder. They defined autonomy in such manner, -and meted it out in such portions, as suited their own political -interests and purposes. The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">[p. -12]</span> promise made by the convention, except in so far as it -enabled them to increase their own power by dismemberment or party -intervention, proved altogether false and hollow. For if we look -back to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when they sent to -Athens to require general autonomy throughout Greece, we shall find -that the word had then a distinct and serious import; demanding that -the cities held in dependence by Athens should be left free, which -freedom Sparta might have ensured for them herself at the close of -the war, had she not preferred to convert it into a far harsher -empire. But in 387 (the date of the peace of Antalkidas) there were -no large body of subjects to be emancipated, except the allies of -Sparta herself, to whom it was by no means intended to apply. So -that in fact, what was promised, as well as what was realized, even -by the most specious item of this disgraceful convention, was—“that -cities should enjoy autonomy, not for their own comfort and in -their own way, but for Lacedæmonian convenience;” a significant -phrase (employed by Perikles,<a id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" -class="fnanchor">[24]</a> in the debates preceding the Peloponnesian -war) which forms a sort of running text for Grecian history during -the sixteen years between the peace of Antalkidas and the battle of -Leuktra.</p> - -<p>I have already mentioned that the first two applications of -the newly-proclaimed autonomy, made by the Lacedæmonians, were to -extort from the Corinthian government the dismissal of its Argeian -auxiliaries, and to compel Thebes to renounce her ancient presidency -of the Bœotian federation. The latter especially was an object which -they had long had at heart;<a id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25" -class="fnanchor">[25]</a> and by both, their ascendency in Greece -was much increased. Athens, too, terrified by the new development -of Persian force as well as partially bribed by the restoration of -her three islands, into an acceptance of the peace,—was thus robbed -of her Theban and Corinthian allies, and disabled from opposing the -Spartan projects. But before we enter upon these projects, it will -be convenient to turn for a short time to the proceedings of the -Persians.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">[p. 13]</span></p> - -<p>Even before the death of Darius Nothus (father of Artaxerxes and -Cyrus) Egypt had revolted from the Persians, under a native prince -named Amyrtæus. To the Grecian leaders who accompanied Cyrus in his -expedition against his brother, this revolt was well known to have -much incensed the Persians; so that Klearchus, in the conversation -which took place after the death of Cyrus about accommodation with -Artaxerxes, intimated that the Ten Thousand could lend him effectual -aid in reconquering Egypt.<a id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" -class="fnanchor">[26]</a> It was not merely these Greeks who were -exposed to danger by the death of Cyrus, but also the various -Persians and other subjects who had lent assistance to him; all of -whom made submission and tried to conciliate Artaxerxes, except -Tamos, who had commanded the fleet of Cyrus on the coasts both of -Ionia and Kilikia. Such was the alarm of Tamos when Tissaphernes -came down in full power to the coast, that he fled with his fleet -and treasures to Egypt, to seek protection from king Psammetichus, -to whom he had rendered valuable service. This traitor, however, -having so valuable a deposit brought to him, forgot every thing -else in his avidity to make it sure, and put to death Tamos -with all his children.<a id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27" -class="fnanchor">[27]</a> About 395 <small>B.C.</small>, we -find Nephereus king of Egypt lending aid to the Lacedæmonian -fleet against Artaxerxes.<a id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28" -class="fnanchor">[28]</a> Two years afterwards (392-390 -<small>B.C.</small>), during the years immediately succeeding the -victory of Knidus, and the voyage of Pharnabazus across the Ægean to -Peloponnesus,—we hear of that satrap as employed with Abrokomas and -Tithraustes in strenuous but unavailing efforts to reconquer Egypt.<a -id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> -Having thus<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">[p. 14]</span> -repulsed the Persians, the Egyptian king Akoras is found between -390-380 <small>B.C.</small>,<a id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30" -class="fnanchor">[30]</a> sending aid to Evagoras in Cyprus against -the same enemy. And in spite of farther efforts made afterwards by -Artaxerxes to reconquer Egypt, the native kings in that country -maintained their independence for about sixty years in all, until the -reign of his successor Ochus.</p> - -<p>But it was a Grecian enemy,—of means inferior, yet of qualities -much superior, to any of these Egyptians,—who occupied the chief -attention of the Persians immediately after the peace of Antalkidas: -Evagoras, despot of Salamis in Cyprus. Respecting that prince we -possess a discourse of the most glowing and superabundant eulogy, -composed after his death for the satisfaction (and probably paid -for with the money) of his son and successor Nikoklês, by the -contemporary Isokrates. Allowing as we must do for exaggeration -and partiality, even the trustworthy features of the picture are -sufficiently interesting.</p> - -<p>Evagoras belonged to a Salaminian stock or Gens called the -Teukridæ, which numbered among its ancestors the splendid legendary -names of Teukrus, Telamon, and Æakus; taking its departure, through -them, from the divine name of Zeus. It was believed that the -archer Teukrus, after returning from the siege of Troy to (the -Athenian) Salamis, had emigrated under a harsh order from his father -Telamon, and given commencement to the city of that name on the -eastern coast of Cyprus.<a id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" -class="fnanchor">[31]</a> As in Sicily, so in Cyprus, the Greek -and Phœnician elements were found in near contact, though in very -different proportions. Of the nine or ten separate city communities, -which divided among them the whole sea-coast, the inferior towns -being all dependent upon one<span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">[p. -15]</span> or other of them,—seven pass for Hellenic, the two most -considerable being Salamis and Soli; three for Phœnician,—Paphos, -Amathus, and Kitium. Probably, however, there was in each a mixture -of Greek and Phœnician population, in different proportions.<a -id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> Each -was ruled by its own separate prince or despot, Greek or Phœnician. -The Greek immigrations (though their exact date cannot be assigned) -appear to have been later in date than the Phœnician. At the time -of the Ionic revolt (<small>B.C.</small> 496), the preponderance -was on the side of Hellenism; yet with considerable intermixture -of Oriental custom. Hellenism was, however, greatly crushed by -the Persian reconquest of the revolters, accomplished through -the aid of the Phœnicians<a id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33" -class="fnanchor">[33]</a> on the opposite continent. And though -doubtless the victories of Kimon and the Athenians (470-450 -<small>B.C.</small>) partially revived it, yet Perikles, in -his pacification with the Persians, had prudently relinquished -Cyprus as well as Egypt;<a id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34" -class="fnanchor">[34]</a> so that the Grecian element in the -former,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">[p. 16]</span> receiving -little extraneous encouragement, became more and more subordinate to -the Phœnician.</p> - -<p>It was somewhere about this time that the reigning princes -of Salamis, who at the time of the Ionic revolt had been Greeks -of the Teukrid Gens,<a id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35" -class="fnanchor">[35]</a> were supplanted and dethroned by a -Phœnician exile who gained their confidence and made himself -despot in their place.<a id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36" -class="fnanchor">[36]</a> To insure his own sceptre, this usurper -did everything in his power to multiply and strengthen the Phœnician -population, as well as to discourage and degrade the Hellenic. The -same policy was not only continued by his successor at Salamis, but -seems also to have been imitated in several of the other towns; -insomuch that during most part of the Peloponnesian war, Cyprus -became sensibly dis-hellenized. The Greeks in the island were harshly -oppressed; new Greek visitors and merchants were kept off by the -most repulsive treatment, as well as by threats of those cruel -mutilations of the body which were habitually employed as penalties -by the Orientals; while Grecian arts, education, music, poetry, -and intelligence, were rapidly on the decline.<a id="FNanchor_37" -href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">[p. 17]</span></p> - -<p>Notwithstanding such untoward circumstances, in which the youth -of the Teukrid Evagoras at Salamis was passed, he manifested at -an early age so much energy both of mind and body, and so much -power of winning popularity, that he became at once a marked man -both among Greeks and Phœnicians. It was about this time that the -Phœnician despot was slain, through a conspiracy formed by a Kitian -or Tyrian named Abdêmon, who got possession of his sceptre.<a -id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> The -usurper, mistrustful of his position, and anxious to lay hands upon -all conspicuous persons who might be capable of doing him mischief, -tried to seize Evagoras; but the latter escaped and passed over to -Soli and Kilikia. Though thus to all appearance a helpless exile, -he found means to strike a decisive blow, while the new usurpation, -stained by its first violences and rapacity, was surrounded by -enemies, doubters, or neutrals, without having yet established any -firm footing. He crossed over from Soli in Kilikia, with a small but -determined band of about fifty followers,—obtained secret admission -by a postern gate of Salamis,—and assaulted Abdêmon by night in -his palace. In spite of a vastly superior number of guards, this -enterprise was conducted with such extraordinary daring and judgment, -that Abdêmon perished, and Evagoras became despot in his place.<a -id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a></p> - -<p>The splendor of this exploit was quite sufficient to seat Evagoras -unopposed on the throne, amidst a population always accustomed -to princely government; while among the Salaminian Greeks he was -still farther endeared by his Teukrid descent.<a id="FNanchor_40" -href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> His conduct fully -justified the expectations entertained. Not merely did he refrain -from bloodshed, or spoliation, or violence for<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_18">[p. 18]</span> the gratification of personal appetite; -abstinences remarkable enough in any Grecian despot to stamp his -reign with letters of gold, and the more remarkable in Evagoras, -since he had the susceptible temperament of a Greek, though his great -mental force always kept it under due control.<a id="FNanchor_41" -href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> But he was also careful -in inquiring into, and strict in punishing crime, yet without -those demonstrations of cruel infliction by which an Oriental -prince displayed his energy.<a id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42" -class="fnanchor">[42]</a> His government was at the same time -highly popular and conciliating, as well towards the multitude as -towards individuals. Indefatigable in his own personal supervision, -he examined everything for himself, shaped out his own line of -policy, and kept watch over its execution.<a id="FNanchor_43" -href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> He was foremost in -all effort and in all danger. Maintaining undisturbed security, -he gradually doubled the wealth, commerce, industry, and military -force, of the city, while his own popularity and renown went on -increasing.</p> - -<p>Above all, it was his first wish to renovate, both in Salamis -and in Cyprus, that Hellenism which the Phœnician despots of -the last fifty years had done so much to extinguish or corrupt. -For aid in this scheme, he seems to have turned his thoughts to -Athens, with which city he was connected as a Teukrid, by gentile -and legendary sympathies,—and which was then only just ceasing -to be the great naval power of the Ægean. For though we cannot -exactly make out the date at which Evagoras began to reign, -we<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">[p. 19]</span> may conclude -it to have been about 411 or 410 <small>B.C.</small> It seems -to have been shortly after that period that he was visited by -Andokides the Athenian;<a id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44" -class="fnanchor">[44]</a> moreover, he must have been a prince -not merely established, but powerful, when he ventured to harbor -Konon in 405 <small>B.C.</small>, after the battle of Ægospotami. -He invited to Salamis fresh immigrants from Attica and other -parts of Greece, as the prince Philokyprus of Soli had done under -the auspices of Solon,<a id="FNanchor_45" href="#Footnote_45" -class="fnanchor">[45]</a> a century and a half before. He took -especial pains to revive and improve Grecian letters, arts, teaching, -music, and intellectual tendencies. Such encouragement was so -successfully administered, that in a few years, without constraint -or violence, the face of Salamis was changed. The gentleness and -sociability, the fashions and pursuits, of Hellenism, became again -predominant; with great influence of example over all the other towns -of the island.</p> - -<p>Had the rise of Evagoras taken place a few years earlier, Athens -might perhaps have availed herself of the opening to turn her -ambition eastward, in preference to that disastrous impulse which -led her westward to Sicily. But coming as he did only at that later -moment when she was hard pressed to keep up even a defensive war, he -profited rather by her weakness than by her strength. During those -closing years of the war, when the Athenian empire was partially -broken up, and when the Ægean, instead of the tranquillity which it -had enjoyed for fifty years under Athens, became a scene of contest -between two rival money-levying fleets,—many out-settlers from -Athens, who had acquired property in the islands, the Chersonesus, or -elsewhere, under her guarantee, found themselves insecure in every -way, and were tempted to change their abodes. Finally, by the defeat -of Ægospotami (<small>B.C.</small> 405), all such out-settlers as -then remained were expelled, and forced to seek shelter either at -Athens (at that moment the least attractive place in Greece), or in -some other locality. To such persons, not less than to the Athenian -admiral Konon with his small remnant of Athenian triremes saved out -of the great defeat, the proclaimed invitations of Evagoras would -present a harbor of refuge nowhere else to be found. Accordingly, -we learn that numerous settlers of the best character, from<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_20">[p. 20]</span> different parts of -Greece, crowded to Salamis.<a id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46" -class="fnanchor">[46]</a> Many Athenian women, during the years -of destitution and suffering which preceded as well as followed -the battle of Ægospotami, were well pleased to emigrate and find -husbands in that city;<a id="FNanchor_47" href="#Footnote_47" -class="fnanchor">[47]</a> while throughout the wide range of the -Lacedæmonian empire, the numerous victims exiled by the harmosts and -dekarchies had no other retreat on the whole so safe and tempting. -The extensive plain of Salamis afforded lands for many colonists. On -what conditions, indeed, they were admitted, we do not know; but the -conduct of Evagoras as a ruler, gave universal satisfaction.</p> - -<p>During the first years of his reign, Evagoras doubtless paid -his tribute regularly, and took no steps calculated to offend the -Persian king. But as his power increased, his ambition increased -also. We find him towards the year 390 <small>B.C.</small>, -engaged in a struggle not merely with the Persian king, but with -Amathus and Kitium in his own island, and with the great Phœnician -cities on the mainland. By what steps, or at what precise period, -this war began, we cannot determine. At the time of the battle -of Knidus (394 <small>B.C.</small>) Evagoras had not only paid -his tribute, but was mainly instrumental in getting the Persian -fleet placed under Konon to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">[p. -21]</span> act against the Lacedæmonians, himself serving aboard.<a -id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> It -was in fact (if we may believe Isokrates) to the extraordinary -energy, ability, and power, displayed by him on that occasion in the -service of Artaxerxes himself, that the jealousy and alarm of the -latter against him are to be ascribed. Without any provocation, and -at the very moment when he was profiting by the zealous services of -Evagoras, the Great King treacherously began to manœuvre against -him, and forced him into the war in self-defence.<a id="FNanchor_49" -href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> Evagoras accepted the -challenge, in spite of the disparity of strength, with such courage -and efficiency, that he at first gained marked successes. Seconded -by his son Pnytagoras, he not only worsted and humbled Amathus, -Kitium, and Soli, which cities, under the prince Agyris, adhered to -Artaxerxes,—but also equipped a large fleet, attacked the Phœnicians -on the mainland with so much vigor as even to take the great city -of Tyre; prevailing, moreover, upon some of the Kilikian towns to -declare against the Persians.<a id="FNanchor_50" href="#Footnote_50" -class="fnanchor">[50]</a> He received powerful aid from Akoris, -the native and independent king in Egypt, as well as from Chabrias -and the force sent out by the Athenians.<a id="FNanchor_51" -href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> Beginning apparently -about 390 <small>B.C.</small>, the war against Evagoras lasted -something more than ten years, costing the Persians great efforts and -an immense expenditure of money. Twice did Athens send a squadron to -his assistance, from gratitude for his long protection to Konon and -his energetic efforts before and in the battle of Knidus,—though she -thereby ran every risk of making the Persians her enemies.</p> - -<p>The satrap Tiribazus saw that so long as he had on his hands<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_22">[p. 22]</span> a war in Greece, it was -impossible for him to concentrate his force against the prince of -Salamis and the Egyptians. Hence, in part, the extraordinary effort -made by the Persians to dictate, in conjunction with Sparta, the -peace of Antalkidas, and to get together such a fleet in Ionia as -should overawe Athens and Thebes into submission. It was one of -the conditions of that peace that Evagoras should be abandoned;<a -id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> -the whole island of Cyprus being acknowledged as belonging to the -Persian king. Though thus cut off from Athens, and reduced to no -other Grecian aid than such mercenaries as he could pay, Evagoras -was still assisted by Akoris of Egypt, and even by Hekatomnus -prince of Karia with a secret present of money.<a id="FNanchor_53" -href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> But the peace of -Antalkidas being now executed in Asia, the Persian satraps were -completely masters of the Grecian cities on the Asiatic sea-board, -and were enabled to convey round to Kilikia and Cyprus not only -their whole fleet from Ionia, but also additional contingents from -these very Grecian cities. A large portion of the Persian force -acting against Cyprus was thus Greek, yet seemingly acting by -constraint, neither well paid nor well used,<a id="FNanchor_54" -href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> and therefore not very -efficient.</p> - -<p>The satraps Tiribazus and Orontes commanded the land force, a -large portion of which was transported across to Cyprus; the admiral -Gaos was at the head of the fleet, which held its station at Kitium -in the south of the island. It was here that Evagoras, having -previously gained a battle on land, attacked them. By extraordinary -efforts he had got together a fleet of two hundred triremes, -nearly equal in number to theirs; but after a hard-fought<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_23">[p. 23]</span> contest, in which he at -first seemed likely to be victorious, he underwent a complete naval -defeat, which disqualified him from keeping the sea, and enabled -the Persians to block up Salamis as well by sea as by land.<a -id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> -Though thus reduced to his own single city, however, Evagoras -defended himself with unshaken resolution, still sustained by aid -from Akoris in Egypt; while Tyre and several towns in Kilikia also -continued in revolt against Artaxerxes; so that the efforts of the -Persians were distracted, and the war was not concluded until ten -years after its commencement.<a id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56" -class="fnanchor">[56]</a> It cost them on the whole (if we -may believe Isokrates)<a id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57" -class="fnanchor">[57]</a> fifteen thousand talents in money, and such -severe losses in men, that Tiribazus acceded to the propositions -of Evagoras for peace, consenting to leave him in full possession -of Salamis, under payment of a stipulated tribute, “like a slave -to his master.” These last words were required by the satrap to be -literally inserted in the convention; but Evagoras peremptorily -refused his consent, demanding that the tribute should be recognized -as paid by “one<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">[p. 24]</span> -king to another.” Rather than concede this point of honor, he even -broke off the negotiation, and resolved again to defend himself -to the uttermost. He was rescued, after the siege had been yet -farther prolonged, by a dispute which broke out between the two -commanders of the Persian army. Orontes, accusing Tiribazus of -projected treason and rebellion against the king, in conjunction -with Sparta, caused him to be sent for as prisoner to Susa, and -thus became sole commander. But as the besieging army was already -wearied out by the obstinate resistance of Salamis, he consented -to grant the capitulation, stipulating only for the tribute, and -exchanging the offensive phrase enforced by Tiribazus, for the -amendment of the other side.<a id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58" -class="fnanchor">[58]</a></p> - -<p>It was thus that Evagoras was relieved from his besieging enemies, -and continued for the remainder of his life as tributary prince -of Salamis under the Persians. He was no farther engaged in war, -nor was his general popularity among the Salaminians diminished -by the hardships which they had gone through along with him.<a -id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a> -His prudence calmed the rankling antipathy of the Great King, who -would gladly have found a pretext for breaking the treaty. His -children were numerous, and lived in harmony as well with him as -with each other. Isokrates specially notices this fact, standing -as it did in marked contrast with the family-relations of most of -the Grecian despots, usually stained with jealousies, antipathies, -and conflict, often with actual bloodshed.<a id="FNanchor_60" -href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> But he omits to notice -the incident whereby Evagoras perished; an incident not in keeping -with that superhuman good fortune and favor from the gods, of which -the Panegyrical Oration boasts as having been vouchsafed to the -hero throughout his life.<a id="FNanchor_61" href="#Footnote_61" -class="fnanchor">[61]</a> It was seemingly not very long after -the peace, that a Sa<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">[p. -25]</span>laminian named Nikokreon formed a conspiracy against his -life and dominion, but was detected, by a singular accident, before -the moment of execution, and forced to seek safety in flight. He -left behind him a youthful daughter in his harem, under the care of -an eunuch (a Greek, born in Elis) named Thrasydæus; who, full of -vindictive sympathy in his master’s cause, made known the beauty -of the young lady both to Evagoras himself and to Pnytagoras, the -most distinguished of his sons, partner in the gallant defence -of Salamis against the Persians. Both of them were tempted, each -unknown to the other, to make a secret assignation for being -conducted to her chamber by the eunuch; both of them were there -assassinated by his hand.<a id="FNanchor_62" href="#Footnote_62" -class="fnanchor">[62]</a></p> - -<p>Thus perished a Greek of preëminent vigor and intelligence, -remarkably free from the vices usual in Grecian despots, and -form<span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">[p. 26]</span>ing a strong -contrast in this respect with his contemporary Dionysius, whose -military energy is so deeply stained by crime and violence. Nikoklês, -the son of Evagoras, reigned at Salamis after him, and showed -much regard, accompanied by munificent presents, to the Athenian -Isokrates; who compliments him as a pacific and well-disposed prince, -attached to Greek pursuits and arts, conversant by personal study -with Greek philosophy, and above all, copying his father in that just -dealing and absence of wrong towards person or property, which had so -much promoted the comfort as well as the prosperity of the city.<a -id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a></p> - -<p>We now revert from the episode respecting Evagoras,—interesting -not less from the eminent qualities of that prince than from the -glimpse of Hellenism struggling with the Phœnician element in -Cyprus,—to the general consequences of the peace of Antalkidas in -Central Greece. For the first time since the battle of Mykalê in -479 <small>B.C.</small>, the Persians were now really masters of -all the Greeks on the Asiatic coast. The satraps lost no time in -confirming their dominion. In all the cities which they suspected, -they built citadels and planted permanent garrisons. In some -cases, their mistrust or displeasure was carried so far as to -raze the town altogether.<a id="FNanchor_64" href="#Footnote_64" -class="fnanchor">[64]</a> And thus these cities, having already once -changed their position greatly for the worse, by passing from easy -subjection under Athens to the harsh rule of Lacedæmonian harmosts -and native decemvirs,—were now transferred to masters yet more -oppressive and more completely without the pale of Hellenic sympathy. -Both in public extortion, and in wrong doing towards individuals, -the commandant and his mercenaries, whom the satrap maintained, were -probably more rapacious, and certainly more unrestrained, than even -the harmosts of Sparta. Moreover, the Persian grandees required -beautiful boys as eunuchs for their service, and beautiful women -as inmates of their harems.<a id="FNanchor_65" href="#Footnote_65" -class="fnanchor">[65]</a> What was taken for their convenience -admitted neither<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">[p. 27]</span> -of recovery nor redress; and Grecian women, if not more beautiful -than many of the native Asiatics, were at least more intelligent, -lively, and seductive,—as we may read in the history of that -<span class="replace" id="tn_1" title="In the printed book: -Phokæn">Phokæan</span> lady, the companion of Cyrus, who was taken -captive at Kunaxa. Moreover, these Asiatic Greeks, when passing into -the hands of Oriental masters, came under the maxims and sentiment -of Orientals, respecting the infliction of pain or torture,—maxims -not only more cruel than those of the Greeks, but also making -little distinction between freemen and slaves.<a id="FNanchor_66" -href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a> The difference between -the Greeks and Phœnicians in Cyprus, on this point, has been just -noticed; and doubtless the difference between Greeks and Persians -was still more marked. While the Asiatic Greeks were thus made -over by Sparta and the Perso-Spartan convention of Antalkidas, to -a condition in every respect worse, they were at the same time -thrown in, as reluctant auxiliaries, to strengthen the hands of the -Great King against other Greeks,—against Evagoras in Cyprus,—and -above all, against the islands adjoining the coast of Asia,—Chios, -Samos, Rhodes, etc.<a id="FNanchor_67" href="#Footnote_67" -class="fnanchor">[67]</a> These islands were now exposed to the same -hazard, from their overwhelming Persian neighbors, as that from which -they had been rescued nearly a century before by the Confederacy -of Delos, and by the Athenian empire into which that Confederacy -was transformed. All the tutelary combination that the genius, the -energy, and the Pan-hellenic ardor, of Athens had first organized, -and so long kept up,—was now broken up; while Sparta, to whom -its<span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">[p. 28]</span> extinction was -owing, in surrendering the Asiatic Greeks, had destroyed the security -even of the islanders.</p> - -<p>It soon appeared, however, how much Sparta herself had gained by -this surrender in respect to dominion nearer home. The government -of Corinth,—wrested from the party friendly to Argos, deprived of -Argeian auxiliaries, and now in the hands of the restored Corinthian -exiles who were the most devoted partisans of Sparta,—looked to her -for support, and made her mistress of the Isthmus, either for offence -or for defence. She thus gained the means of free action against -Thebes, the enemy upon whom her attention was first directed. Thebes -was now the object of Spartan antipathy, not less than Athens had -formerly been; especially on the part of King Agesilaus, who had to -avenge the insult offered to himself at the sacrifice near Aulis, -as well as the strenuous resistance on the field of Koroneia. He -was at the zenith of his political influence; so that his intense -miso-Theban sentiment made Sparta, now becoming aggressive on all -sides, doubly aggressive against Thebes. More prudent Spartans, -like Antalkidas, warned him<a id="FNanchor_68" href="#Footnote_68" -class="fnanchor">[68]</a> that his persevering hostility would -ultimately kindle in the Thebans a fatal energy of military -resistance and organization. But the warning was despised until it -was too fully realized in the development of the great military -genius of Epaminondas, and in the defeat of Leuktra.</p> - -<p>I have already mentioned that in the solemnity of exchanging -oaths to the peace of Antalkidas, the Thebans had hesitated at -first to recognize the autonomy of the other Bœotian cities; upon -which Agesilaus had manifested a fierce impatience to exclude them -from the treaty, and attack them single-handed.<a id="FNanchor_69" -href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> Their timely accession -balked him in this impulse; but it enabled him to enter upon a -series of measures highly humiliating to the dignity as well as to -the power of Thebes. All the Bœotian cities were now proclaimed -autonomous under the convention. As solicitor, guarantee, and -interpreter, of that convention, Sparta either had, or professed to -have, the right of guarding their autonomy against dangers, actual -or contingent, from their previous Vorort or presiding city. For -this purpose she availed herself of this<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_29">[p. 29]</span> moment of change to organize in each -of them a local oligarchy, composed of partisans adverse to Thebes -as well as devoted to herself, and upheld in case of need by a -Spartan harmost and garrison.<a id="FNanchor_70" href="#Footnote_70" -class="fnanchor">[70]</a> Such an internal revolution grew almost -naturally out of the situation; since the previous leaders, and -the predominant sentiment in most of the towns, seem to have been -favorable to Bœotian unity, and to the continued presidency of -Thebes. These leaders would therefore find themselves hampered, -intimidated, and disqualified, under the new system, while those who -had before been an opposition minority would come forward with a bold -and decided policy, like Kritias and Theramenes at Athens after the -surrender of the city to Lysander. The new leaders doubtless would -rather invite than repel the establishment of a Spartan harmost in -their town, as a security to themselves against resistance from their -own citizens as well as against attacks from<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_30">[p. 30]</span> Thebes, and as a means of placing them -under the assured conditions of a Lysandrian dekarchy. Though most of -the Bœotian cities were thus, on the whole, favorable to Thebes,—and -though Sparta thrust upon them the boon, which she called autonomy, -from motives of her own, and not from their solicitation,—yet, -Orchomenus and Thespiæ, over whom the presidency of Thebes appears -to have been harshly exercised, were adverse to her, and favorable -to the Spartan alliance.<a id="FNanchor_71" href="#Footnote_71" -class="fnanchor">[71]</a> These two cities were strongly garrisoned -by Sparta, and formed her main stations in Bœotia.<a id="FNanchor_72" -href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a></p> - -<p>The presence of such garrisons, one on each side of Thebes,—the -discontinuance of the Bœotarchs, with the breaking up of all symbols -and proceedings of the Bœotian federation,—and the establishment of -oligarchies devoted to Sparta in the other cities,—was doubtless a -deep wound to the pride of the Thebans. But there was another wound -still deeper, and this the Lacedæmonians forthwith proceeded to -inflict,—the restoration of Platæa.</p> - -<p>A melancholy interest attaches both to the locality of this -town, as one of the brightest scenes of Grecian glory,—and to its -brave and faithful population, victims of an exposed position -combined with numerical feebleness. Especially, we follow with a -sort of repugnance the capricious turns of policy which dictated -the Spartan behavior towards them. One hundred and twenty years -before, the Platæans had thrown themselves upon Sparta, to entreat -her protection against Thebes. The Spartan king Kleomenes had then -declined the obligation as too distant, and had recommended them to -ally themselves with Athens.<a id="FNanchor_73" href="#Footnote_73" -class="fnanchor">[73]</a> This recommendation, though dictated -chiefly by a wish to raise contention between Athens and Thebes, -was complied with; and the alliance, severing Platæa altogether -from the Bœotian confederacy, turned out both advantageous and -honorable to her until the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. -At that time, it suited the policy of the Spartans to uphold and -strengthen in every way the supremacy of Thebes over the Bœotian -cities; it was altogether by Spartan intervention, indeed, that the -power of Thebes was reës<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">[p. -31]</span>tablished, after the great prostration as well as disgrace -which she had undergone, as traitor to Hellas and zealous in the -service of Mardonius.<a id="FNanchor_74" href="#Footnote_74" -class="fnanchor">[74]</a> Athens, on the other hand, was at that -time doing her best to break up the Bœotian federation, and to enrol -its various cities as her allies; in which project, though doubtless -suggested by and conducive to her own ambition, she was at that time -(460-445 <small>B.C.</small>) perfectly justifiable on Pan-hellenic -grounds; seeing that Thebes as their former chief had so recently -enlisted them all in the service of Xerxes, and might be expected to -do the same again if a second Persian invasion should be attempted. -Though for a time successful, Athens was expelled from Bœotia by -the defeat of Korôneia; and at the beginning of the Peloponnesian -war, the whole Bœotian federation (except Platæa, was united under -Thebes, in bitter hostility against her. The first blow of the war, -even prior to any declaration, was struck by Thebes in her abortive -nocturnal attempt to surprise Platæa. In the third year of the war, -king Archidamus, at the head of the full Lacedæmonian force, laid -siege to the latter town; which, after an heroic defence and a long -blockade, at length surrendered under the extreme pressure of famine; -yet not before one half its brave defenders had forced their way -out over the blockading wall, and escaped to Athens, where all the -Platæan old men, women, and children, had been safely lodged before -the siege. By a cruel act which stands among the capital iniquities -of Grecian warfare, the Lacedæmonians had put to death all the -Platæan captives, two hundred in number, who fell into their hands; -the town of Platæa had been razed, and its whole territory, joined -to Thebes, had remained ever since cultivated on Theban account.<a -id="FNanchor_75" href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> The -surviving Platæans had been dealt with kindly and hospitably by the -Athenians. A qualified right of citizenship was conceded to them at -Athens, and when Skionê was recaptured in 420 <small>B.C.</small>, -that town (vacant by the slaughter of its captive citizens) was -handed over to the Platæans as a residence.<a id="FNanchor_76" -href="#Footnote_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a> Compelled to evacuate -Skionê, they were obliged at the close of the Peloponnesian war,<a -id="FNanchor_77" href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a> -to return to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">[p. 32]</span> -Athens, where the remainder of them were residing at the time -of the peace of Antalkidas; little dreaming that those who had -destroyed their town and their fathers forty years before, would now -turn round and restore it.<a id="FNanchor_78" href="#Footnote_78" -class="fnanchor">[78]</a></p> - -<p>Such restoration, whatever might be the ostensible grounds on -which the Spartans pretended to rest it, was not really undertaken -either to carry out the convention of Antalkidas, which guaranteed -only the autonomy of <i>existing</i> towns,—or to repair previous -injustice, since the prior destruction had been the deliberate act -of themselves, and of King Archidamus the father of Agesilaus,—but -simply as a step conducive to the present political views of Sparta. -And towards this object it was skilfully devised. It weakened the -Thebans, not only by wresting from them what had been, for about -forty years, a part of their territory and property; but also by -establishing upon it a permanent stronghold in the occupation of -their bitter enemies, assisted by a Spartan garrison. It furnished -an additional station for such a garrison in Bœotia, with the full -consent of the newly-established inhabitants. And more than all, -it introduced a subject of contention between Athens and Thebes, -calculated to prevent the two from hearty coöperation afterwards -against Sparta. As the sympathy of the Platæans with Athens was no -less ancient and cordial than their antipathy against Thebes, we -may probably conclude that the restoration of the town was an act -acceptable to the Athenians; at least, at first, until they saw -the use made of it, and the position which Sparta came to occupy -in reference to Greece generally. Many of the Platæans, during -their residence at Athens, had intermarried with Athenian women,<a -id="FNanchor_79" href="#Footnote_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a> who -now, probably, accompanied their husbands to the restored little -town on the north of Kithæron, near the southern bank of the river -Asôpus.</p> - -<p>Had the Platæans been restored to a real and honorable autonomy, -such as they enjoyed in alliance with Athens before the Peloponnesian -war, we should have cordially sympathized with the event. But the -sequel will prove—and their own subsequent statement emphatically -sets forth—that they were a mere dependency of Sparta, and an outpost -of Spartan operations against<span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">[p. -33]</span> Thebes.<a id="FNanchor_80" href="#Footnote_80" -class="fnanchor">[80]</a> They were a part of the great revolution -which the Spartans now brought about in Bœotia; whereby Thebes -was degraded from the president of a federation into an isolated -autonomous city, while the other Bœotian cities, who had been -before members of the federation, were elevated each for itself -into the like autonomy; or rather (to substitute the real truth<a -id="FNanchor_81" href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> in -place of Spartan professions) they became enrolled and sworn in as -dependent allies of Sparta, under oligarchical factions devoted to -her purposes and resting upon her for support. That the Thebans -should submit to such a revolution, and, above all, to the sight of -Platæa as an independent neighbor with a territory abstracted from -themselves,—proves how much they felt their own weakness, and how -irresistible at this moment was the ascendency of their great enemy, -in perverting to her own ambition the popular lure of universal -autonomy held out by the peace of Antalkidas. Though compelled to -acquiesce, the Thebans waited in hopes of some turn of fortune -which would enable them to reörganize the Bœotian federation; while -their hostile sentiment towards Sparta was not the less bitter for -being suppressed. Sparta on her part kept constant watch to prevent -the reunion of Bœotia;<a id="FNanchor_82" href="#Footnote_82" -class="fnanchor">[82]</a> an object in which she was for a -time completely successful, and was even<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_34">[p. 34]</span> enabled, beyond her hopes, to become -possessed of Thebes itself,<a id="FNanchor_83" href="#Footnote_83" -class="fnanchor">[83]</a> through a party of traitors within,—as will -presently appear.</p> - -<p>In these measures regarding Bœotia, we recognize the vigorous -hand, and the miso-Theban spirit, of Agesilaus. He was at this time -the great director of Spartan foreign policy, though opposed by his -more just and moderate colleague king Agesipolis,<a id="FNanchor_84" -href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a> as well as by a -section of the leading Spartans, who reproached Agesilaus with -his project of ruling Greece by means of subservient local -despots or oligarchies in the various cities,<a id="FNanchor_85" -href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a> and who contended -that the autonomy promised by the peace of Antalkidas ought to be -left to develop itself freely, without any coërcive intervention -on the part of Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_86" href="#Footnote_86" -class="fnanchor">[86]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">[p. 35]</span></p> - -<p>Far from any wish thus to realize the terms of peace which they -had themselves imposed, the Lacedæmonians took advantage of an early -moment after becoming free from their enemies in Bœotia and Corinth, -to strain their authority over their allies beyond its previous -limits. Passing in review<a id="FNanchor_87" href="#Footnote_87" -class="fnanchor">[87]</a> the conduct of each during the war, -they resolved to make an example of the city of Mantinea. Some -acts, not of positive hostility, but of equivocal fidelity, were -imputed to the Mantineans. They were accused of having been slack -in performance of their military obligations, sometimes even to the -length of withholding their contingent altogether, under pretence of -a season of religious truce; of furnishing corn in time of war to -the hostile Argeians; and of plainly manifesting their disaffected -feeling towards Sparta,—chagrin at every success which she -obtained,—satisfaction, when she chanced to experience a reverse.<a -id="FNanchor_88" href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a> -The Spartan ephors now sent an envoy to Mantinea, denouncing all -such past behavior, and peremptorily requiring that the walls of -the city should be demolished, as the only security for future -penitence and amendment. As compliance was refused, they despatched -an army, summoning the allied contingents generally for the purpose -of enforcing the sentence.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">[p. -36]</span> They intrusted the command to king Agesipolis, since -Agesilaus excused himself from the duty, on the ground that the -Mantineans had rendered material service to his father Archidamus -in the dangerous Messenian war which had beset Sparta during the -early part of his reign.<a id="FNanchor_89" href="#Footnote_89" -class="fnanchor">[89]</a></p> - -<p>Having first attempted to intimidate the Mantineans by ravaging -their lands, Agesipolis commenced the work of blockade by digging -a ditch around the town; half of his soldiers being kept on guard, -while the rest worked with the spade. The ditch being completed, he -prepared to erect a wall of circumvallation. But being apprised that -the preceding harvest had been so good, as to leave a large stock -of provision in the town, and to render the process of starving it -out tedious both for Sparta and for her allies,—he tried a more -rapid method of accomplishing his object. As the river Ophis, of -considerable breadth for a Grecian stream, passed through the -middle of the town, he dammed up its efflux on the lower side;<a -id="FNanchor_90" href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a> thus -causing it to inundate the interior of the<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_37">[p. 37]</span> city and threaten the stability of the -walls; which seem to have been of no great height, and built of -sun-burnt bricks. Disappointed in their application to Athens for -aid,<a id="FNanchor_91" href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a> -and unable to provide extraneous support for their tottering towers, -the Mantineans were compelled to solicit a capitulation. But -Agesipolis now refused to grant the request, except on condition -that not only the fortifications of their city, but the city itself, -should be in great part demolished; and that the inhabitants -should be re-distributed into those five villages, which had been -brought together, many years before, to form the aggregate city of -Mantinea. To this also the Mantineans were obliged to submit, and the -capitulation was ratified.</p> - -<p>Though nothing was said in the terms of it about the chiefs of -the Mantinean democratical government, yet these latter, conscious -that they were detested both by their own oligarchical opposition -and by the Lacedæmonians, accounted themselves certain of being put -to death. And such would assuredly have been their fate, had not -Pausanias (the late king of Sparta, now in exile at Tegea), whose -good opinion they had always enjoyed, obtained as a personal favor -from his son Agesipolis the lives of the most obnoxious, sixty in -number, on condition that they should depart into exile. Agesipolis -had much difficulty in accomplishing the wishes of his father. His -Lacedæmonian soldiers were ranged in arms on both sides of the gate -by which the obnoxious men went out; and Xenophon notices it as a -signal mark of Lacedæmonian discipline, that they could keep their -spears unemployed when disarmed enemies were thus within their -reach; especially as the oligarchical Mantineans manifested the most -murderous propensities, and were exceedingly difficult to control.<a -id="FNanchor_92" href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a> As at -Peiræus before, so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">[p. 38]</span> -here at Mantinea again,—the liberal, but unfortunate, king Pausanias -is found interfering in the character of mediator to soften the -ferocity of political antipathies.</p> - -<p>The city of Mantinea was now broken up, and the inhabitants -were distributed again into the five constituent villages. Out of -four-fifths of the population, each man pulled down his house in -the city, and rebuilt it in the village near to which his property -lay. The remaining fifth continued to occupy Mantinea as a village. -Each village was placed under oligarchical government, and left -unfortified. Though at first (says Xenophon) the change proved -troublesome and odious, yet presently, when men found themselves -resident upon their landed properties,—and still more, when they felt -themselves delivered from the vexatious demagogues,—the new situation -became more popular than the old. The Lacedæmonians were still -better satisfied. Instead of one city of Mantinea, five distinct -Arcadian villages now stood enrolled in their catalogue of allies. -They assigned to each a separate xenâgus (Spartan officer destined -to the command of each allied contingent), and the military service -of all was henceforward performed with the utmost regularity.<a -id="FNanchor_93" href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a></p> - -<p>Such was the dissection or cutting into parts of the ancient -city Mantinea; one of the most odious acts of high-handed Spartan -despotism. Its true character is veiled by the partiality of the -historian, who recounts it with a confident assurance, that after the -trouble of moving was over, the population felt themselves deci<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_39">[p. 39]</span>dedly bettered by the -change. Such an assurance is only to be credited, on the ground that, -being captives under the Grecian laws of war, they may have been -thankful to escape the more terrible liabilities of death or personal -slavery, at the price of forfeiting their civic community. That their -feelings towards the change were those of genuine aversion, is shown -by their subsequent conduct after the battle of Leuktra. As soon as -the fear of Sparta was removed, they flocked together, with unanimous -impulse, to reconstitute and refortify their dismantled city.<a -id="FNanchor_94" href="#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a> It -would have been strange indeed had the fact been otherwise; for -attachment to a civic community was the strongest political instinct -of the Greek mind. The citizen of a town was averse—often most -unhappily averse—to compromise the separate and autonomous working of -his community by joining in any larger political combination, however -equitably framed, and however it might promise on the whole an -increase of Hellenic dignity. But still more vehemently did he shrink -from the idea of breaking up his town into separate villages, and -exchanging the character of a citizen for that of a villager, which -was nothing less than great<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">[p. -40]</span> social degradation, in the eyes of Greeks generally, -Spartans not excepted.<a id="FNanchor_95" href="#Footnote_95" -class="fnanchor">[95]</a></p> - -<p>In truth the sentence executed by the Spartans against Mantinea -was in point of dishonor, as well as of privation, one of the -severest which could be inflicted on free Greeks. All the distinctive -glory and superiority of Hellenism,—all the intellectual and artistic -manifestations,—all that there was of literature and philosophy, -or of refined and rational sociality,—depended upon the city-life -of the people. And the influence of Sparta, during the period of -her empire, was peculiarly mischievous and retrograde, as tending -not only to decompose the federations such as Bœotia into isolated -towns, but even to decompose suspected towns such as Mantinea into -villages; all for the purpose of rendering each of them exclusively -dependent upon herself. Athens, during her period of empire, had -exercised no such disuniting influence; still less Thebes, whom we -shall hereafter find coming forward actively to found the new and -great cities of Megalopolis and Messênê. The imperial tendencies of -Sparta are worse than those of either Athens or Thebes; including -less of improving or Pan-hellenic sympathies, and leaning the most -systematically upon subservient factions in each subordinate city. In -the very treatment of Mantinea just recounted, it is clear that the -attack of Sparta was welcomed at least, if not originally invited, by -the oligarchical party of the place, who sought to grasp the power -into their own hands and to massacre their political opponents. In -the first object they completely succeeded, and their government -probably was more assured in the five villages than it would have -been in the entire town. In the second, nothing prevented them -from succeeding except the accidental intervention of the exile -Pausanias; an accident, which alone rescued the Spartan name from -the additional disgrace of a political massacre, over and above the -lasting odium incurred by the act itself; by breaking up an ancient -autonomous city, which had shown no act of overt enmity, and which -was so moderate in its democratical manifestations as to receive -the fa<span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">[p. 41]</span>vorable -criticism of judges rather disinclined towards democracy generally.<a -id="FNanchor_96" href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a> -Thirty years before, when Mantinea had conquered certain neighboring -Arcadian districts, and had been at actual war with Sparta to -preserve them, the victorious Spartans exacted nothing more than the -reduction of the city to its original district;<a id="FNanchor_97" -href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> now they are satisfied -with nothing less than the partition of the city into unfortified -villages, though there had been no actual war preceding. So much had -Spartan power, as well as Spartan despotic propensity, progressed -during this interval.</p> - -<p>The general language of Isokrates, Xenophon, and Diodorus,<a -id="FNanchor_98" href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a> -indicates that this severity towards Mantinea was only the most -stringent among a series of severities, extended by the Lacedæmonians -through their whole confederacy, and operating upon all such of its -members as gave them ground for dissatisfaction or mistrust. During -the ten years after the surrender of Athens, they had been lords of -the Grecian world both by land and sea, with a power never before -possessed by any Grecian state; until the battle of Knidus, and -the combination of Athens, Thebes, Argos, and Corinth, seconded by -Persia, had broken up their empire at sea, and much endangered it on -land. At length the peace of Antalkidas, enlisting Persia on their -side (at the price of the liberty of the Asiatic Greeks), had enabled -them to dissolve the hostile combination against them. The general -autonomy, of which they were the authorized interpreters, meant -nothing more than a separation of the Bœotian cities from Thebes,<a -id="FNanchor_99" href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a> and -of Corinth from Argos,—being noway intended to apply to the relation -between Sparta and her allies. Having thus their hands free, the -Lacedæmonians applied themselves to raise their ascendency on land to -the point where it had stood before the battle of Knidus, and even to -regain as much as possible of their empire at sea. To bring back a -dominion such as that of the Lysandrian harmosts and dekarchies, and -to reconstitute a local oligarchy of their most devoted partisans, -in each of those cities where the government had been somewhat -liberalized during the recent period of war,—was their systematic -policy.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">[p. 42]</span></p> - -<p>Those exiles who had incurred the condemnation of their -fellow-citizens for subservience to Sparta, now found the season -convenient for soliciting Spartan intervention to procure their -return. It was in this manner that a body of exiled political -leaders from Phlius,—whose great merit it was that the city when -under their government had been zealous in service to Sparta, but -had now become lukewarm or even disaffected in the hands of their -opponents,—obtained from the ephors a message, polite in form but -authoritative in substance, addressed to the Phliasians, requiring -that the exiles should be restored, as friends of Sparta banished -without just cause.<a id="FNanchor_100" href="#Footnote_100" -class="fnanchor">[100]</a></p> - -<p>While the Spartan power, for the few years succeeding the peace -of Antalkidas, was thus decidedly in ascending movement on land, -efforts were also made to reëstablish it at sea. Several of the -Cyclades and other smaller islands were again rendered tributary. In -this latter sphere, however, Athens became her competitor. Since the -peace, and the restoration of Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, combined -with the refortified Peiræus and its Long Walls,—Athenian commerce -and naval power had been reviving, though by slow and humble steps. -Like the naval force of England compared with France, the warlike -marine of Athens rested upon a considerable commercial marine, -which latter hardly existed at all in Laconia. Sparta had no seamen -except constrained Helots or paid foreigners;<a id="FNanchor_101" -href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a> while the commerce -of Peiræus had both required and maintained a numerous population -of this character. The harbor of Peiræus was convenient in respect -of accommodation, and well-stocked with artisans,—while Laconia -had few artisans, and was notoriously destitute of harbors.<a -id="FNanchor_102" href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a> -Accordingly, in this maritime competition, Athens, though but the -shadow of her former self, started at an advantage as compared with -Sparta, and in spite of the superiority of the latter on land, was -enabled to compete with her in acquiring tributary dependencies -among the smaller islands of the Ægean. To these latter, who had -no marine of their own, and who (like Athens herself) required -habitual supplies of imported corn, it was important to<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_43">[p. 43]</span> obtain both access to -Peiræus and protection from the Athenian triremes against that swarm -of pirates, who showed themselves after the peace of Antalkidas, when -there was no predominant maritime state; besides which, the market -of Peiræus was often supplied with foreign corn from the Crimea, -through the preference shown by the princes of Bosphorus to Athens, -at a time when vessels from other places could obtain no cargo.<a -id="FNanchor_103" href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a> -A moderate tribute paid to Athens would secure to the tributary -island greater advantages than if paid to Sparta,—with at least -equal protection. Probably, the influence of Athens over these -islanders was farther aided by the fact, that she administered the -festivals, and lent out the funds, of the holy temple at Delos. -We know by inscriptions remaining, that large sums were borrowed -at interest from the temple-treasure, not merely by individual -islanders, but also by the island-cities collectively,—Naxos, Andros, -Tenos, Siphnos, Seriphos. The Amphiktyonic council who dispensed -these loans (or at least the presiding members) were Athenians -named annually at Athens.<a id="FNanchor_104" href="#Footnote_104" -class="fnanchor">[104]</a> Moreover, these islanders rendered -religious homage and attendance at the Delian festivals, and were -thus brought within the range of a central Athenian influence, -capable, under favorable circumstances, of being strengthened and -rendered even politically important.</p> - -<p>By such helps, Athens was slowly acquiring to herself a second -maritime confederacy, which we shall presently find to be of -considerable moment, though never approaching the grandeur of her -former empire; so that in the year 380 <small>B.C.</small>, when -Isokrates published his Panegyrical Discourse (seven years after the -peace of Antalkidas), though her general power was still slender -compared with the overruling might of Sparta,<a id="FNanchor_105" -href="#Footnote_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a> yet her navy had -already<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">[p. 44]</span> made such -progress, that he claims for her the right of taking the command -by sea, in that crusade which he strenuously enforces, of Athens -and Sparta in harmonious unity at the head of all Greece, against -the Asiatic barbarians.<a id="FNanchor_106" href="#Footnote_106" -class="fnanchor">[106]</a></p> - -<p>It would seem that a few years after the peace of Antalkidas, -Sparta became somewhat ashamed of having surrendered the Asiatic -Greeks to Persia; and that king Agesipolis and other leading -Spartans encouraged the scheme of a fresh Grecian expedition -against Asia, in compliance with propositions from some disaffected -subjects of Artaxerxes.<a id="FNanchor_107" href="#Footnote_107" -class="fnanchor">[107]</a> Upon some such project, currently -discussed though never realized, Isokrates probably built his -Panegyrical Oration, composed in a lofty strain of patriotic -eloquence (380 <small>B.C.</small>) to stimulate both Sparta and -Athens in the cause, and calling on both, as joint chiefs of Greece, -to suspend dissensions at home for a great Pan-hellenic manifestation -against the common enemy abroad. But whatever ideas of this kind the -Spartan leaders may have entertained, their attention was taken off, -about 382 <small>B.C.</small> by movements in a more remote region -of the Grecian world, which led to important consequences.</p> - -<p>Since the year 414 <small>B.C.</small> (when the Athenians were -engaged in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">[p. 45]</span> the -siege of Syracuse), we have heard nothing either of the kings of -Macedonia, or of the Chalkidic Grecian cities in the peninsula of -Thrace adjoining Macedonia. Down to that year, Athens still retained -a portion of her maritime empire in those regions. The Platæans were -still in possession of Skiônê (on the isthmus of Pallênê) which she -had assigned to them; while the Athenian admiral Euetion, seconded -by many hired Thracians, and even by Perdikkas king of Macedonia, -undertook a fruitless siege to reconquer Amphipolis on the Strymon.<a -id="FNanchor_108" href="#Footnote_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a> -But the fatal disaster at Syracuse having disabled Athens from -maintaining such distant interests, they were lost to her along with -her remaining empire,—perhaps earlier; though we do not know how. -At the same time, during the last years of the Peloponnesian war, -the kingdom of Macedonia greatly increased in power; partly, we may -conceive, from the helpless condition of Athens,—but still more -from the abilities and energy of Archelaus, son and successor of -Perdikkas.</p> - -<p>The course of succession among the Macedonian princes seems not -to have been settled, so that disputes and bloodshed took place at -the death of several of them. Moreover, there were distinct tribes -of Macedonians, who, though forming part, really or nominally, of -the dominion of the Temenid princes, nevertheless were immediately -subject to separate but subordinate princes of their own. The -reign of Perdikkas had been troubled in this manner. In the first -instance, he had stripped his own brother Alketas of the crown,<a -id="FNanchor_109" href="#Footnote_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a> who -appears (so far as we can make out) to have had<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_46">[p. 46]</span> the better right to it; next he had -also expelled his younger brother Philippus from his subordinate -principality. To restore Amyntas the son of Philippus, was one of -the purposes of the Thrakian prince Sitalkês, in the expedition -undertaken conjointly with Athens, during the second year of -the Peloponnesian war.<a id="FNanchor_110" href="#Footnote_110" -class="fnanchor">[110]</a> On the death of Perdikkas (about 413 -<small>B.C.</small>), his eldest or only legitimate son was a -child of seven years old; but his natural son<a id="FNanchor_111" -href="#Footnote_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a> Archelaus was -of mature age and unscrupulous ambition. The dethroned Alketas -was yet alive, and had now considerable chance of reëstablishing -himself on the throne; Archelaus, inviting him and his son under -pretence that he would himself bring about their reëstablishment, -slew them both amidst the intoxication of a banquet. He next -despatched the boy, his legitimate brother, by suffocating him in a -well; and through these crimes made himself king. His government, -however, was so energetic and able, that Macedonia reached a -degree of military power such as none of his predecessors had ever -possessed. His troops, military equipments, and fortified places, -were much increased in numbers; while he also cut straight roads -of communication between the various portions of his territory,—a -novelty seemingly everywhere, at that time.<a id="FNanchor_112" -href="#Footnote_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a> Besides such improved -organization (which unfortunately we are not permitted to know in -detail), Archelaus founded a splendid periodical Olympic festival, -in honor of the Olympian Zeus and the Muses,<a id="FNanchor_113" -href="#Footnote_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a> and maintained -correspondence with the poets and philosophers of Athens. He -prevailed upon the tragic poets Euripides and Agathon, as well as -the epic poet Chœrilus, to visit him in Macedonia, where Euripides -especially was treated with distinguished favor and munificence,<a -id="FNanchor_114" href="#Footnote_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a> -remaining<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">[p. 47]</span> there -until his death in 406 or 405 <small>B.C.</small> Archelaus also -invited Sokrates, who declined the invitation,—and appears to have -shown some favor to Plato.<a id="FNanchor_115" href="#Footnote_115" -class="fnanchor">[115]</a> He perished in the same year as Sokrates -(399 <small>B.C.</small>), by a violent death; two Thessalian -youths, Krateuas and Hellanokrates, together with a Macedonian -named Dekamnichus, being his assassins during a hunting-party. The -first two were youths to whom he was strongly attached, but whose -dignity he had wounded by insulting treatment and non-performance -of promises; the third was a Macedonian, who, for having made an -offensive remark upon the bad breath of Euripides, had been given -up by the order of Archelaus to the poet, in order that he might -be flogged for it. Euripides actually caused the sentence to be -inflicted; but it was not till six years after his death that -Dekamnichus, who had neither forgotten nor forgiven the affront, -found the opportunity of taking revenge by instigating and aiding -the assassins of Archelaus.<a id="FNanchor_116" href="#Footnote_116" -class="fnanchor">[116]</a></p> - -<p>These incidents, recounted on the authority of Aristotle, and -relating as well to the Macedonian king Archelaus as to the Athenian -citizen and poet Euripides, illustrate the political contrast -between Macedonia and Athens. The government of the former is one -wholly personal,—dependent on the passions, tastes, appetites, and -capacities, of the king. The ambition of Archelaus leads both to his -crimes for acquiring the throne, and to his improved organization -of the military force of the state afterwards; his admiration for -the poets and philosophers of Athens makes<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_48">[p. 48]</span> him sympathize warmly with Euripides, -and ensure to the latter personal satisfaction for an offensive -remark; his appetites, mingling license with insult, end by drawing -upon him personal enemies of a formidable character. <i>L’Etat, -c’est moi</i>—stands marked in the whole series of proceedings; the -personality of the monarch is the determining element. Now at Athens, -no such element exists. There is, on the one hand, no easy way of -bringing to bear the ascendency of an energetic chief to improve the -military organization,—as Athens found to her cost, when she was -afterwards assailed by Philip, the successor after some interval, and -in many respects the parallel, of Archelaus. But on the other hand, -neither the personal tastes nor the appetites, of any individual -Athenian, count as active causes in the march of public affairs, -which is determined by the established law and by the pronounced -sentiments of the body of citizens. However gross an insult might -have been offered to Euripides at Athens, the dikasts would never -have sentenced that the offender should be handed over to him to be -flogged. They would have inflicted such measure of punishment as the -nature of the wrong, and the preëxisting law appeared to them to -require. Political measures, or judicial sentences, at Athens, might -be well or ill-judged; but at any rate, they were always dictated -by regard to a known law and to the public conceptions entertained -of state-interests, state-dignity, and state-obligations, without -the avowed intrusion of any man’s personality. To Euripides,—who -had throughout his whole life been the butt of Aristophanes and -other comic writers, and who had been compelled to hear, in the -crowded theatre, taunts far more galling than what is ascribed to -Dekamnichus,—the contrast must have been indeed striking, to have -the offender made over to him, and the whip placed at his disposal, -by order of his new patron. And it is little to his honor, that -he should have availed himself of the privilege, by causing the -punishment to be really administered; a punishment which he could -never have seen inflicted, during the fifty years of his past life, -upon any free Athenian citizen.</p> - -<p>Krateuas did not survive the deed more than three or four days, -after which Orestes, son of Archelaus, a child, was placed on the -throne, under the guardianship of Æropus. The latter, however, -after about four years, made away with his ward, and reigned -in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">[p. 49]</span> his stead for -two years. He then died of sickness, and was succeeded by his son -Pausanias; who, after a reign of only one year, was assassinated -and succeeded by Amyntas.<a id="FNanchor_117" href="#Footnote_117" -class="fnanchor">[117]</a> This Amyntas (chiefly celebrated as -the father of Philip and the grandfather of Alexander the Great), -though akin to the royal family, had been nothing more than an -attendant of Æropus,<a id="FNanchor_118" href="#Footnote_118" -class="fnanchor">[118]</a> until he made himself king by putting -to death Pausanias.<a id="FNanchor_119" href="#Footnote_119" -class="fnanchor">[119]</a> He reigned, though with interruptions, -twenty-four years (393-369 <small>B.C.</small>); years, for the most -part, of trouble and humiliation for Macedonia, and of occasional -exile for himself. The vigorous military organization introduced by -Archelaus appears to have declined; while the frequent dethronements -and assassinations of kings, beginning even with Perdikkas the father -of Archelaus, and continued down to Amyntas, unhinged the central -authority and disunited the various portions of the Macedonian name; -which naturally tended to separation, and could only be held together -by a firm hand.</p> - -<p>The interior regions of Macedonia were bordered, to the north, -north-east, and north-west, by warlike barbarian tribes, Thracian -and Illyrian, whose invasions were not unfrequent and often -formidable. Tempted, probably, by the unsettled position of the -government, the Illyrians poured in upon Amyntas during the first -year of his reign; perhaps they may have been invited by other -princes of the interior,<a id="FNanchor_120" href="#Footnote_120" -class="fnanchor">[120]</a> and at all events their coming would -operate as a signal for malcontents to declare themselves. -Amyntas,—having only acquired the sceptre a few months before -by assassinating his predecessor, and having little hold on the -people,—was not only unable to repel them, but found himself obliged -to evacuate Pella, and even to retire from Macedonia altogether. -Despairing of his position, he made over to the Olynthians a -large<span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">[p. 50]</span> portion of -the neighboring territory,—Lower Macedonia or the coast and cities -round the Thermaic Gulf.<a id="FNanchor_121" href="#Footnote_121" -class="fnanchor">[121]</a> As this cession is represented to have -been made at the moment of his distress and expatriation, we may -fairly suspect that it was made for some reciprocal benefit or -valuable equivalent; of which Amyntas might well stand in need, at a -moment of so much exigency.</p> - -<p>It is upon this occasion that we begin to hear again of the -Chalkidians of Olynthus, and the confederacy which they gradually -aggregated around their city as a centre. The confederacy seems to -have taken its start from this cession of Amyntas,—or rather, to -speak more properly, from his abdication; for the cession of what -he could not keep was of comparatively little moment, and we shall -see that he tried to resume it as soon as he acquired strength. -The effect of his flight was, to break up the government of Lower -or maritime Macedonia, and to leave the cities therein situated -defenceless against the Illyrians or other invaders from the -interior. To these cities, the only chance of security, was to throw -themselves upon the Greek cities on the coast, and to organize in -conjunction with the latter a confederacy for mutual support. Among -all the Greeks on that coast, the most strenuous and persevering -(so they had proved themselves in their former contentions against -Athens when at the summit of her power) as well as the nearest, were -the Chalkidians of Olynthus. These Olynthians now put themselves -forward,—took into their alliance and under their protection the -smaller towns of maritime Macedonia immediately near them,—and -soon extended their confederacy so as to comprehend all the larger -towns in this region,—including even Pella, the most considerable -city of the country.<a id="FNanchor_122" href="#Footnote_122" -class="fnanchor">[122]</a> As they began<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_51">[p. 51]</span> this enterprise at a time when the -Illyrians were masters of the country so as to drive Amyntas to -despair and flight, we may be sure that it must have cost them -serious efforts, not without great danger if they failed. We may -also be sure that the cities themselves must have been willing, not -to say eager, coadjutors; just as the islanders and Asiatic Greeks -clung to Athens at the first formation of the confederacy of Delos. -The Olynthians could have had no means of conquering even the less -considerable Macedonian cities, much less Pella, by force and against -the will of the inhabitants.</p> - -<p>How the Illyrians were compelled to retire, and by what steps -the confederacy was got together, we are not permitted to know. -Our information (unhappily very brief) comes from the Akanthian -envoy Kleigenês, speaking at Sparta about ten years afterwards -(<small>B.C.</small> 383), and describing in a few words the -confederacy as it then stood. But there is one circumstance which -this witness,—himself hostile to Olynthus and coming to solicit -Spartan aid against her,—attests emphatically; the equal, generous, -and brotherly principles, upon which the Olynthians framed their -scheme from the beginning. They did not present themselves as an -imperial city enrolling a body of dependent allies, but invited each -separate city to adopt common laws and reciprocal citizenship with -Olynthus, with full liberty of intermarriage, commercial dealing, -and landed proprietorship. That the Macedonian cities near the sea -should welcome so liberal a proposition as this, coming from the -most powerful of their Grecian neighbors, cannot at all surprise -us; especially at a time when they were exposed to the Illyrian -invaders, and when Amyntas had fled the country. They had hitherto -always been subjects;<a id="FNanchor_123" href="#Footnote_123" -class="fnanchor">[123]</a> their cities had not<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_52">[p. 52]</span> (like the Greek cities) enjoyed each its -own separate autonomy within its own walls; the offer, now made to -them by the Olynthians, was one of freedom in exchange for their past -subjection under the Macedonian kings, combined with a force adequate -to protect them against Illyrian and other invaders. Perhaps also -these various cities,—Anthemus, Therma, Chalastra, Pella, Alôrus, -Pydna, etc.,—may have contained, among the indigenous population, a -certain proportion of domiciliated Grecian inhabitants, to whom the -proposition of the Olynthians would be especially acceptable.</p> - -<p>We may thus understand why the offer of Olynthus was gladly -welcomed by the Macedonian maritime cities. They were the first who -fraternized as voluntary partners in the confederacy; which the -Olynthians, having established this basis, proceeded to enlarge -farther, by making the like liberal propositions to the Greek cities -in their neighborhood. Several of these latter joined voluntarily; -others were afraid to refuse; insomuch that the confederacy came -to include a considerable number of Greeks,—especially, Potidæa, -situated on the Isthmus of Pallênê, and commanding the road of -communication between the cities within Pallênê and the continent. -The Olynthians carried out with scrupulous sincerity their professed -principles of equal and intimate partnership, avoiding all -encroachment or offensive preëminence in favor of their own city. But -in spite of this liberal procedure, they found among their Grecian -neighbors obstructions which they had not experienced from the -Macedonian. Each of the Grecian cities had been accustomed to its own -town-autonomy and separate citizenship, with its peculiar laws and -customs. All of them were attached to this kind of distinct political -life, by one of the most tenacious and universal instincts of the -Greek mind; all of them would renounce it with reluctance, even on -consenting to enter the Olynthian confederacy, with its generous -promise, its enlarged security, and its manifest advantages; and -there were even some who, disdaining every prospective consideration, -refused to change their condition at all except at the point of the -sword.</p> - -<p>Among these last were Akanthus and Apollonia, the largest cities -(next to Olynthus) in the Chalkidic peninsula, and, therefore, -the least unable to stand alone. To these the Olynthians<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_53">[p. 53]</span> did not make application, -until they had already attracted within their confederacy a -considerable number of other Grecian as well as Macedonian cities. -They then invited Akanthus and Apollonia to come in, upon the same -terms of equal union and fellow-citizenship. The proposition being -declined, they sent a second message intimating that, unless it were -accepted within a certain time, they would enforce it by compulsory -measures. So powerful already was the military force of the Olynthian -confederacy, that Akanthus and Apollonia, incompetent to resist -without foreign aid, despatched envoys to Sparta to set forth the -position of affairs in the Chalkidic peninsula, and to solicit -intervention against Olynthus.</p> - -<p>Their embassy reached Sparta about <small>B.C.</small> 383, -when the Spartans, having broken up the city of Mantinea into -villages, and coërced Phlius, were in the full swing of power -over Peloponnesus,—and when they had also dissolved the Bœotian -federation, placing harmosts in Platæa and Thespiæ as checks upon -any movement of Thebes. The Akanthian Kleigenês, addressing himself -to the Assembly of Spartans and their allies, drew an alarming -picture of the recent growth and prospective tendencies of Olynthus, -invoking the interference of Sparta against that city. The Olynthian -confederacy (he said) already comprised many cities, small and great, -Greek as well as Macedonian,—Amyntas having lost his kingdom. Its -military power, even at present great, was growing every day.<a -id="FNanchor_124" href="#Footnote_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a> The -territory, comprising a large breadth of fertile corn-land, could -sustain a numerous population. Wood for ship-building was close at -hand, while the numerous<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">[p. -54]</span> harbors of the confederate cities ensured a thriving trade -as well as a steady revenue from custom-duties. The neighboring -Thracian tribes would be easily kept in willing dependence, and -would thus augment the military force of Olynthus; even the gold -mines of Mount Pangæus would speedily come within her assured reach. -“All that I now tell you (such was the substance of his speech) is -matter of public talk among the Olynthian people, who are full of -hope and confidence. How can you Spartans, who are taking anxious -pains to prevent the union of the Bœotian cities,<a id="FNanchor_125" -href="#Footnote_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a> permit the -aggregation of so much more formidable a power, both by land and -by sea, as this of Olynthus? Envoys have already been sent thither -from Athens and Thebes,—and the Olynthians have decreed to send an -embassy in return for contracting alliance with those cities; hence, -your enemies will derive a large additional force. We of Akanthus and -Apollonia, having declined the proposition to join the confederacy -voluntarily, have received notice that, if we persist, they will -constrain us. Now we are anxious to retain our paternal laws and -customs, continuing as a city by ourselves.<a id="FNanchor_126" -href="#Footnote_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a> But if we cannot -obtain aid from you, we shall be under the necessity of joining -them,—as several other cities have already done, from not daring -to refuse; cities, who would have sent envoys along with us, had -they not been afraid of offending the Olynthians. These cities, if -you interfere forthwith, and with a powerful force, will now revolt -from the new confederacy. But if you postpone your interference, -and allow time for the confederacy to work, their sentiments will -soon alter. They will come to be knit together in attached unity, -by the co-burgership, the intermarriage, and the reciprocity of -landed possessions, which have already been enacted prospectively. -All of them will become convinced that they have a common interest -both in belonging to, and in strengthening the confederacy,—just as -the Arcadians, when they follow you, Spartans, as allies, are not -only enabled to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">[p. 55]</span> -preserve their own property, but also to plunder others. If, by your -delay, the attractive tendencies of the confederacy should come -into real operation, you will presently find it not so much within -your power to dissolve.<a id="FNanchor_127" href="#Footnote_127" -class="fnanchor">[127]</a>”</p> - -<p>This speech of the Akanthian envoy is remarkable in more than one -respect. Coming from the lips of an enemy, it is the best of all -testimonies to the liberal and comprehensive spirit in which the -Olynthians were acting. They are accused,—not of injustice, nor of -selfish ambition, nor of degrading those around them,—but literally, -of organizing a new partnership on principles too generous and too -seductive; of gently superseding, instead of violently breaking -down, the barriers between the various cities, by reciprocal ties -of property and family among the citizens of each; of uniting them -all into a new political aggregate, in which not only all would -enjoy equal rights, but all without exception would be gainers. The -advantage, both in security and in power, accruing prospectively to -all, is not only admitted by the orator, but stands in the front of -his argument. “Make haste and break up the confederacy (he impresses -upon Sparta) before its fruit is ripe, so that the confederates may -never taste it nor find out how good it is; for if they do, you -will not prevail on them to forego it.” By implication, he also -admits,—and he says nothing tending even to raise a doubt,—that the -cities which he represents, Akanthus and Apollonia, would share -along with the rest in this same benefit. But the Grecian political -instinct was nevertheless predominant,—“We wish to preserve our -paternal laws, and to be a city by ourselves.” Thus nakedly is -the objection stated; when the question was, not whether Akanthus -should lose its freedom and become subject to an imperial city like -Athens,—but whether it should become a free and equal member of a -larger political aggregate, cemented by every tie which could make -union<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">[p. 56]</span> secure, -profitable, and dignified. It is curious to observe how perfectly -the orator is conscious that this repugnance, though at the moment -preponderant, was nevertheless essentially transitory, and would give -place to attachment when the union came to be felt as a reality; -and how eagerly he appeals to Sparta to lose no time in clenching -the repugnance, while it lasted. He appeals to her, not for any -beneficial or Pan-hellenic objects, but in the interests of her own -dominion, which required that the Grecian world should be as it were -pulverized into minute, self-acting, atoms without cohesion,—so that -each city, or each village, while protected against subjection to -any other, should farther be prevented from equal political union -or fusion with any other; being thus more completely helpless and -dependent in reference to Sparta.</p> - -<p>It was not merely from Akanthus and Apollonia, but also from -the dispossessed Macedonian king Amyntas, that envoys reached -Sparta to ask for aid against Olynthus. It seems that Amyntas, -after having abandoned the kingdom and made his cession to the -Olynthians, had obtained some aid from Thessaly and tried to -reinstate himself by force. In this scheme he had failed, being -defeated by the Olynthians. Indeed we find another person named -Argæus, mentioned as competitor for the Macedonian sceptre, and -possessing it for two years.<a id="FNanchor_128" href="#Footnote_128" -class="fnanchor">[128]</a></p> - -<p>After hearing these petitioners, the Lacedæmonians first -declared their own readiness to comply with the prayer, and to put -down Olynthus; next, they submitted the same point to the vote of -the assembled allies.<a id="FNanchor_129" href="#Footnote_129" -class="fnanchor">[129]</a> Among these latter, there was no genuine -antipathy against the Olynthians, such as that which had prevailed -against Athens before the Peloponnesian war, in the synod then -held at Sparta. But the power of Sparta over her allies was now -far greater than it had been then. Most of their cities were -under oligarchies, dependent upon her support for authority over -their fellow-citizens; moreover, the recent events in Bœotia and -at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">[p. 57]</span> Mantinea had -operated as a serious intimidation. Anxiety to keep the favor of -Sparta was accordingly paramount, so that most of the speakers as -well as most of the votes, declared for war,<a id="FNanchor_130" -href="#Footnote_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a> and a combined -army of ten thousand men was voted to be raised. To make up such -total, a proportional contingent was assessed upon each confederate; -combined with the proviso now added for the first time, that each -might furnish money instead of men, at the rate of three Æginæan -oboli (half an Æginæan drachma) for each hoplite. A cavalry-soldier, -to those cities which furnished such, was reckoned as equivalent -to four hoplites; a hoplite, as equivalent to two peltasts; or -pecuniary contribution on the same scale. All cities in default -were made liable to a forfeit of one stater (four drachmæ) per day, -for every soldier not sent; the forfeit to be enforced by Sparta.<a -id="FNanchor_131" href="#Footnote_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a> -Such licensed substitution of pecuniary payment for personal -service, is the same as I have already described to have taken -place nearly a century before in the confederacy of Delos under -the presidency of Athens.<a id="FNanchor_132" href="#Footnote_132" -class="fnanchor">[132]</a> It was a system not likely to be -extensively acted upon among the Spartan allies, who were at once -poorer and more warlike than those of Athens. But in both cases it -was favorable to the ambition of the leading state; and the tendency -becomes here manifest, to sanction, by the formality of a public -resolution, that increased Lacedæmonian ascendency which had already -grown up in practice.</p> - -<p>The Akanthian envoys, while expressing their satisfaction with -the vote just passed, intimated that the muster of these numerous -contingents would occupy some time, and again insisted on the -necessity of instant intervention, even with a small force; before -the Olynthians could find time to get their plans actually in work -or appreciated by the surrounding cities. A moderate Lacedæmonian -force (they said), if despatched forthwith, would not only<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_58">[p. 58]</span> keep those who had -refused to join Olynthus, steady to their refusal, but also induce -others, who had joined reluctantly, to revolt. Accordingly the -ephors appointed Eudamidas at once, assigning to him two thousand -hoplites,—Neodamodes (or enfranchised Helots), Periœki, and Skiritæ -or Arcadian borderers. Such was the anxiety of the Akanthians for -haste, that they would not let him delay even to get together the -whole of this moderate force. He was put in march immediately, with -such as were ready; while his brother Phœbidas was left behind -to collect the remainder and follow him. And it seems that the -Akanthians judged correctly. For Eudamidas, arriving in Thrace after -a rapid march, though he was unable to contend against the Olynthians -in the field, yet induced Potidæa to revolt from them, and was -able to defend those cities, such as Akanthus and Apollonia, which -resolutely stood aloof.<a id="FNanchor_133" href="#Footnote_133" -class="fnanchor">[133]</a> Amyntas brought a force to coöperate with -him.</p> - -<p>The delay in the march of Phœbidas was productive of -consequences no less momentous than unexpected. The direct line -from Peloponnesus to Olynthus lay through the Theban territory; a -passage which the Thebans, whatever might have been their wishes, -were not powerful enough to refuse, though they had contracted an -alliance with Olynthus,<a id="FNanchor_134" href="#Footnote_134" -class="fnanchor">[134]</a> and though proclamation was made that no -Theban citizens should join the Lacedæmonian force. Eudamidas, having -departed at a moment’s notice, passed through Bœotia without a halt, -in his way to Thrace. But it was known that his brother Phœbidas was -presently to follow; and upon this fact the philo-Laconian party in -Thebes organized a conspiracy.</p> - -<p>They obtained from the ephors, and from the miso-Theban -feelings of Agesilaus, secret orders to Phœbidas, that he should -coöperate with them in any party movement which they might find -opportunity of executing;<a id="FNanchor_135" href="#Footnote_135" -class="fnanchor">[135]</a> and when he halted with his<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_59">[p. 59]</span> detachment near the -gymnasium a little way without the walls, they concerted matters as -well with him as among themselves. Leontiades, Hypatês, and Archias, -were the chiefs of the party in Thebes favorable to Sparta; a party -decidedly in minority, yet still powerful, and at this moment so -strengthened by the unbounded ascendency of the Spartan name, that -Leontiades himself was one of the polemarchs of the city. Of the -anti-Spartan, or predominant sentiment in Thebes,—which included most -of the wealthy and active citizens, those who came successively into -office as hipparchs or generals of the cavalry,<a id="FNanchor_136" -href="#Footnote_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a>—the leaders were -Ismenias and Androkleides. The former, especially, the foremost as -well as ablest conductor of the late war against Sparta, was now in -office as Polemarch, conjointly with his rival Leontiades.</p> - -<p>While Ismenias, detesting the Spartans, kept aloof from Phœbidas, -Leontiades assiduously courted him and gained his confidence. On the -day of the Thesmophoria,<a id="FNanchor_137" href="#Footnote_137" -class="fnanchor">[137]</a> a religious festival<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_60">[p. 60]</span> celebrated by the women apart from the -men, during which the acropolis or Kadmeia was consecrated to their -exclusive use,—Phœbidas, affecting to have concluded his halt, -put himself in march to proceed as if towards Thrace; seemingly -rounding the walls of Thebes, but not going into it. The Senate -was actually assembled in the portico of the agora, and the heat -of a summer’s noon had driven every one out of the streets, when -Leontiades, stealing away from the Senate, hastened on horseback -to overtake Phœbidas, caused him to face about, and conducted the -Lacedæmonians straight up to the Kadmeia; the gates of which, as -well as those of the town, were opened by his order as polemarch. -There were not only no citizens in the streets, but none even in the -Kadmeia; no male person being permitted to be present at the feminine -Thesmophoria; so that Phœbidas and his army became possessed of -the Kadmeia without the smallest opposition. At the same time they -became possessed of an acquisition of hardly less importance,—the -persons of all the assembled Theban women; who served as hostages -for the quiet submission, however reluctant, of the citizens in the -town below. Leontiades handed to Phœbidas the key of the gates, -and then descended into the town, giving orders that no man should -go up without his order.<a id="FNanchor_138" href="#Footnote_138" -class="fnanchor">[138]</a></p> - -<p>The assembled Senate heard with consternation the occupation of -the acropolis by Phœbidas. Before any deliberation could be taken -among the senators, Leontiades came down to resume his seat. The -lochages and armed citizens of his party, to whom he had previously -given orders, stood close at hand. “Senators (said he), be not -intimidated by the news that the Spartans are in the Kadmeia; -for they assure us that they have no hostile purpose against any -one who does not court war against them. But I, as polemarch, am -empowered by law to seize any one whose behavior is manifestly and -capitally criminal. Accordingly, I seize this man Ismenias, as the -great inflamer of war. Come forward, captains and soldiers, lay -hold of him, and carry him off where your orders direct.” Ismenias -was accordingly seized and hurried off<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_61">[p. 61]</span> as a prisoner to the Kadmeia; while -the senators, thunderstruck and overawed, offered no resistance. -Such of them as were partisans of the arrested polemarch, and -many even of the more neutral members, left the Senate and went -home, thankful to escape with their lives. Three hundred of them, -including Androkleidas, Pelopidas, Mellon, and others, sought safety -by voluntary exile to Athens; after which, the remainder of the -Senate, now composed of few or none except philo-Spartan partisans, -passed a vote formally dismissing Ismenias, and appointing a new -polemarch in his place.<a id="FNanchor_139" href="#Footnote_139" -class="fnanchor">[139]</a></p> - -<p>This blow of high-handed violence against Ismenias forms a -worthy counterpart to the seizure of Theramenes by Kritias,<a -id="FNanchor_140" href="#Footnote_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a> -twenty-two years before, in the Senate of Athens under the Thirty. -Terror-striking in itself, it was probably accompanied by similar -deeds of force against others of the same party. The sudden explosion -and complete success of the conspiracy, plotted by the Executive -Chief himself, the most irresistible of all conspirators,—the -presence of Phœbidas in the Kadmeia, and of a compliant Senate in -the town,—the seizure or flight of Ismenias and all his leading -partisans,—were more than sufficient to crush all spirit of -resistance on the part of the citizens; whose first anxiety probably -was, to extricate their wives and daughters from the custody of -the Lacedæmonians in the Kadmeia. Having such a price to offer, -Leontiades would extort submission the more easily, and would -probably procure a vote of the people ratifying the new <i>régime</i>, -the Spartan alliance, and the continued occupation of the acropolis. -Having accomplished the first settlement of his authority, he -proceeded without delay to Sparta, to make known the fact that “order -reigned” at Thebes.</p> - -<p>The news of the seizure of the Kadmeia and of the revolution at -Thebes had been received at Sparta with the greatest surprise, as -well as with a mixed feeling of shame and satisfaction. Everywhere -throughout Greece, probably, it excited a greater sensation than -any event since the battle of Ægospotami. Tried by the recognized -public law of Greece, it was a flagitious iniquity, for which Sparta -had not the shadow of a pretence. It was even<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_62">[p. 62]</span> worse than the surprise of Platæa by the -Thebans before the Peloponnesian war, which admitted of the partial -excuse that war was at any rate impending; whereas in this case, the -Thebans had neither done nor threatened anything to violate the peace -of Antalkidas. It stood condemned by the indignant sentiment of all -Greece, unwillingly testified even by the philo-Laconian Xenophon<a -id="FNanchor_141" href="#Footnote_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a> -himself. But it was at the same time an immense accession to Spartan -power. It had been achieved with preëminent skill and success; -and Phœbidas might well claim to have struck for Sparta the most -important blow since Ægospotami, relieving her from one of her two -really formidable enemies.<a id="FNanchor_142" href="#Footnote_142" -class="fnanchor">[142]</a></p> - -<p>Nevertheless, far from receiving thanks at Sparta, he became -the object of wrath and condemnation, both with the ephors and the -citizens generally. Every one was glad to throw upon him the odium -of the proceeding, and to denounce him as having acted without -orders. Even the ephors, who had secretly authorized him beforehand -to coöperate generally with the faction at Thebes, having doubtless -never given any specific instructions, now indignantly disavowed -him. Agesilaus alone stood forward in his defence, contending -that the only question was, whether his proceeding at Thebes had -been injurious or beneficial to Sparta. If the former, he merited -punishment; if the latter, it was always lawful to render service, -even <i>impromptu</i> and without previous orders.</p> - -<p>Tried by this standard, the verdict was not doubtful. For -every man at Sparta felt how advantageous the act was in itself; -and felt it still more, when Leontiades reached the city, humble -in solicitation as well as profuse in promise. In his speech -addressed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">[p. 63]</span> to the -assembled ephors and Senate, he first reminded them how hostile -Thebes had hitherto been to them, under Ismenias and the party just -put down,—and how constantly they had been in jealous alarm, lest -Thebes should reconstitute by force the Bœotian federation. “Now -(added he) your fears may be at an end; only take as good care to -uphold our government, as we shall take to obey your orders. For -the future, you will have nothing to do but to send us a short -despatch, to get every service which you require.<a id="FNanchor_143" -href="#Footnote_143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a>” It was resolved by -the Lacedæmonians, at the instance of Agesilaus, to retain their -garrison now in the Kadmeia, to uphold Leontiades with his colleagues -in the government of Thebes, and to put Ismenias upon his trial. -Yet they at the same time, as a sort of atonement to the opinion of -Greece, passed a vote of censure on Phœbidas, dismissed him from -his command, and even condemned him to a fine. The fine, however, -most probably was never exacted; for we shall see by the conduct of -Sphodrias afterwards that the displeasure against Phœbidas, if at -first genuine, was certainly of no long continuance.</p> - -<p>That the Lacedæmonians should at the same time condemn Phœbidas -and retain the Kadmeia—has been noted as a gross contradiction. -Nevertheless, we ought not to forget, that had they evacuated the -Kadmeia, the party of Leontiades at Thebes, which had compromised -itself for Sparta as well as for its own aggrandizement, would have -been irretrievably sacrificed. The like excuse, if excuse it be, -cannot be urged in respect to their treatment of Ismenias; whom -they put upon his trial at Thebes, before a court consisting of -three Lacedæmonian commissioners, and one from each allied city. -He was accused, probably by Leontiades and his other enemies, -of having entered into friendship and con<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_64">[p. 64]</span>spiracy with the Persian king to the -detriment of Greece,<a id="FNanchor_144" href="#Footnote_144" -class="fnanchor">[144]</a>—of having partaken in the Persian -funds brought into Greece by Timokrates the Rhodian,—and of being -the real author of that war which had disturbed Greece from 395 -<small>B.C.</small> down to the peace of Antalkidas. After an -unavailing defence, he was condemned and executed. Had this doom been -inflicted upon him by his political antagonists as a consequence of -their intestine victory, it would have been too much in the analogy -of Grecian party-warfare to call for any special remark. But there -is something peculiarly revolting in the prostitution of judicial -solemnity and Pan-hellenic pretence, which the Lacedæmonians here -committed. They could have no possible right to try Ismenias as a -criminal at all; still less to try him as a criminal on the charge -of confederacy with the Persian king,—when they had themselves, -only five years before, acted not merely as allies, but even as -instruments, of that monarch, in enforcing the peace of Antalkidas. -If Ismenias had received money from one Persian satrap, the Spartan -Antalkidas had profited in like manner by another,—and for the like -purpose too of carrying on Grecian war. The real motive of the -Spartans was doubtless to revenge themselves upon this distinguished -Theban for having raised against them the war which began in 395 -<small>B.C.</small> But the mockery of justice by which that revenge -was masked, and the impudence of punishing in him as treason that -same foreign alliance with which they had ostentatiously identified -themselves, lends a deeper enormity to the whole proceeding.</p> - -<p>Leontiades and his partisans were now established as rulers in -Thebes, with a Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia to sustain them -and execute their orders. The once-haughty Thebes was enrolled as -a member of Lacedæmonian confederacy. Sparta was now enabled to -prosecute her Olynthian expedition with redoubled vigor. Eudamidas -and Amyntas, though they repressed the growth of the Olynthian -confederacy, had not been strong enough to put it down; so that a -larger force was necessary, and the aggregate of ten thousand men, -which had been previously decreed, was put into instant requisition, -to be commanded by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">[p. 65]</span> -Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus. The new general, a man of very -popular manners, was soon on his march at the head of this large -army, which comprised many Theban hoplites as well as horsemen, -furnished by the new rulers in their unqualified devotion to Sparta. -He sent forward envoys to Amyntas in Macedonia, urging upon him the -most strenuous efforts for the purpose of recovering the Macedonian -cities which had joined the Olynthians,—and also to Derdas, prince -of the district of Upper Macedonia called Elimeia, inviting his -coöperation against that insolent city, which would speedily extend -her dominion (he contended) from the maritime region to the interior, -unless she were put down.<a id="FNanchor_145" href="#Footnote_145" -class="fnanchor">[145]</a></p> - -<p>Though the Lacedæmonians were masters everywhere and had -their hands free,—though Teleutias was a competent officer with -powerful forces,—and though Derdas joined with four hundred -excellent Macedonian horse,—yet the conquest of Olynthus was found -no easy enterprise.<a id="FNanchor_146" href="#Footnote_146" -class="fnanchor">[146]</a> The Olynthian cavalry, in particular, -was numerous and efficient. Unable as they were to make head -against Teleutias in the field or repress his advance, nevertheless -in a desultory engagement which took place near the city gates, -they defeated the Lacedæmonian and Theban cavalry, threw even the -infantry into confusion, and were on the point of gaining a complete -victory, had not Derdas with his cavalry on the other wing, made a -diversion which forced them to come back for the protection of the -city. Teleutias, remaining master of the field, continued to ravage -the Olynthian territory during the summer, for which, however, the -Olynthians retaliated by frequent marauding expeditions against the -cities in alliance with him.<a id="FNanchor_147" href="#Footnote_147" -class="fnanchor">[147]</a></p> - -<p>In the ensuing spring, the Olynthians sustained various partial -defeats, especially one near Apollonia, from Derdas. They were -more and more confined to their walls; insomuch that Teleutias -became confident and began to despise them. Under these dispo<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_66">[p. 66]</span>sitions on his part, a -body of Olynthian cavalry showed themselves one morning, passed -the river near their city, and advanced in calm array towards the -Lacedæmonian camp. Indignant at such an appearance of daring, -Teleutias directed Tlemonidas with the peltasts to disperse them; -upon which the Olynthians slowly retreated, while the peltasts -rushed impatiently to pursue them, even when they recrossed the -river. No sooner did the Olynthians see that half the peltasts had -crossed it, than they suddenly turned, charged them vigorously, -and put them to flight with the loss of their commander Tlemonidas -and a hundred others. All this passed in sight of Teleutias, who -completely lost his temper. Seizing his arms, he hurried forward to -cover the fugitives with the hoplites around him, sending orders to -all his troops, hoplites, peltasts, and horsemen, to advance also. -But the Olynthians, again retreating, drew him on towards the city, -with such inconsiderate forwardness, that many of his soldiers -ascending the eminence on which the city was situated, rushed -close up to the walls.<a id="FNanchor_148" href="#Footnote_148" -class="fnanchor">[148]</a> Here, however, they were received by a -shower of missiles which forced them to recede in disorder; upon -which the Olynthians again sallied forth, probably, from more -than one gate at once, and charged them first with cavalry and -peltasts, next with hoplites. The Lacedæmonians and their allies, -disturbed and distressed by the first, were unable to stand against -the compact charge of the last; Teleutias himself, fighting in -the foremost ranks, was slain, and his death was a signal for the -flight of all around. The whole besieging force dispersed and fled -in different directions,—to Akanthus, to Spartôlus, to Potidæa, -to Apollonia. So vigorous and effective was the pursuit of the -Olynthians, that the loss of the fugitives was immense. The whole -army was in fact ruined;<a id="FNanchor_149" href="#Footnote_149" -class="fnanchor">[149]</a> for probably many of the allies who -escaped became discouraged and went home.</p> - -<p>At another time, probably, a victory so decisive might have -deterred the Lacedæmonians from farther proceedings, and saved -Olynthus. But now, they were so completely masters everywhere -else, that they thought only of repairing the dishonor by a -still<span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">[p. 67]</span> more -imposing demonstration. Their king Agesipolis was placed at the -head of an expedition on the largest scale; and his name called -forth eager coöperation, both in men and money, from the allies. -He marched with thirty Spartan counsellors, as Agesilaus had gone -to Asia; besides a select body of energetic youth as volunteers, -from the Periœki, from the illegitimate sons of Spartans, and from -strangers or citizens who had lost their franchise through poverty, -introduced as friends of richer Spartan citizens to go through the -arduous Lykurgean training.<a id="FNanchor_150" href="#Footnote_150" -class="fnanchor">[150]</a> Amyntas and Derdas also were instigated to -greater exertions than before, so that Agesipolis was enabled, after -receiving their reinforcements in his march through Macedonia, to -present himself before Olynthus with an overwhelming force, and to -confine the citizens within their walls. He then completed the ravage -of their territory, which had been begun by Teleutias; and even took -Torônê by storm. But the extreme heat of the summer weather presently -brought upon him a fever, which proved fatal in a week’s time; -although he had caused himself to be carried for repose to the shady -grove, and clear waters, near the temple of Dionysus at Aphytis. -His body was immersed in honey and transported to Sparta, where -it was buried with the customary solemnities.<a id="FNanchor_151" -href="#Footnote_151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a></p> - -<p>Polybiades, who succeeded Agesipolis in the command, prosecuted -the war with undiminished vigor; and the Olynthians, debarred -from their home produce as well as from importation, were<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_68">[p. 68]</span> speedily reduced to -such straits as to be compelled to solicit peace. They were obliged -to break up their own federation, and to enrol themselves as sworn -members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, with its obligations -of service to Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_152" href="#Footnote_152" -class="fnanchor">[152]</a> The Olynthian union being dissolved, -the component Grecian cities were enrolled severally as allies of -Sparta, while the maritime cities of Macedonia were deprived of their -neighboring Grecian protector, and passed again under the dominion of -Amyntas.</p> - -<p>Both the dissolution of this growing confederacy, and the -reconstitution of maritime Macedonia, were signal misfortunes to -the Grecian world. Never were the arms of Sparta more mischievously -or more unwarrantably employed. That a powerful Grecian confederacy -should be formed in the Chalkidic peninsula, in the border region -where Hellas joined the non-Hellenic tribes,—was an incident of -signal benefit to the Hellenic world generally. It would have -served as a bulwark to Greece against the neighboring Macedonians -and Thracians, at whose expense its conquests, if it made any, -would have been achieved. That Olynthus did not oppress her Grecian -neighbors—that the principles of her confederacy were of the most -equal, generous, and seducing character,—that she employed no greater -compulsion than was requisite to surmount an unreflecting instinct -of town-autonomy,—and that the very towns who obeyed this instinct -would have become sensible themselves, in a very short time, of the -benefits conferred by the confederacy on each and every one,—these -are facts certified by the urgency of the reluctant Akanthians, -when they entreat Sparta to leave no interval for the confederacy -to make its workings felt. Nothing but the intervention of Sparta -could have crushed this liberal and beneficent promise; nothing -but the accident, that during the three years from 382 to 379 -<small>B.C.</small>, she was at the maximum of her power and had her -hands quite free, with Thebes and its Kadmeia under her garrison. -Such prosperity did not long continue unabated. Only a few months -after the submission of Olynthus, the Kadmeia was retaken by the -Theban exiles, who raised so vigorous a war against Sparta, that -she would have been disabled from meddling with Olynthus,—as we -shall find illustrated by the fact (hereafter to be recounted), that -she declined interfering in Thessaly to pro<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_69">[p. 69]</span>tect the Thessalian cities against Jason -of Pheræ. Had the Olynthian confederacy been left to its natural -working, it might well have united all the Hellenic cities around it -in harmonious action, so as to keep the sea coast in possession of -a confederacy of free and self-determining communities, confining -the Macedonian princes to the interior. But Sparta threw in her -extraneous force, alike irresistible and inauspicious, to defeat -these tendencies; and to frustrate that salutary change,—from -fractional autonomy and isolated action into integral and equal -autonomy with collective action,—which Olynthus was laboring to -bring about. She gave the victory to Amyntas, and prepared the -indispensable basis upon which his son Philip afterwards rose, to -reduce not only Olynthus, but Akanthus, Apollonia, and the major part -of the Grecian world, to one common level of subjection. Many of -those Akanthians, who spurned the boon of equal partnership and free -communion with Greeks and neighbors, lived to discover how impotent -were their own separate walls as a bulwark against Macedonian -neighbors; and to see themselves confounded in that common servitude -which the imprudence of their fathers had entailed upon them. By -the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta had surrendered the Asiatic Greeks -to Persia; by crushing the Olynthian confederacy, she virtually -surrendered the Thracian Greeks to the Macedonian princes. Never -again did the opportunity occur of placing Hellenism on a firm, -consolidated, and self-supporting basis, round the coast of the -Thermaic Gulf.</p> - -<p>While the Olynthian expedition was going on, the Lacedæmonians -were carrying on, under Agesilaus, another intervention within -Peloponnesus, against the city of Phlius. It has already been -mentioned that certain exiles of this city had recently been -recalled, at the express command of Sparta. The ruling party -in Phlius had at the same time passed a vote to restore the -confiscated property of these exiles; reimbursing out of the public -treasury, to those who had purchased it, the price which they had -paid,—and reserving all disputed points for judicial decision.<a -id="FNanchor_153" href="#Footnote_153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a> The -returned exiles now again came to Sparta, to prefer complaint that -they could obtain no just restitution of their property; that the -tribunals of the city were in the hands of their opponents,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_70">[p. 70]</span> many of them directly -interested as purchasers, who refused them the right of appealing -to any extraneous and impartial authority; and that there were even -in the city itself many who thought them wronged. Such allegations -were, probably, more or less founded in truth. At the same time, the -appeal to Sparta, abrogating the independence of Phlius, so incensed -the ruling Phliasians that they passed a sentence of fine against -all the appellants. The latter insisted on this sentence as a fresh -count for strengthening their complaints at Sparta; and as a farther -proof of anti-Spartan feeling, as well as of high-handed injustice, -in the Phliasian rulers.<a id="FNanchor_154" href="#Footnote_154" -class="fnanchor">[154]</a> Their cause was warmly espoused by -Agesilaus, who had personal relations of hospitality with some of the -exiles; while it appears that his colleague, King Agesipolis, was on -good terms with the ruling party at Phlius,—had received from them -zealous aid, both in men and money, for his Olynthian expedition,—and -had publicly thanked them for their devotion to Sparta.<a -id="FNanchor_155" href="#Footnote_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a> The -Phliasian government, emboldened by the proclaimed testimonial of -Agesipolis, certifying their fidelity, had fancied that they stood -upon firm ground, and that no Spartan coërcion would be enforced -against them. But the marked favor of Agesipolis, now absent in -Thrace, told rather against them in the mind of Agesilaus; pursuant -to that jealousy which usually prevailed between the two Spartan -kings. In spite of much remonstrance at Sparta, from many who -deprecated hostilities against a city of five thousand citizens, -for the profit of a handful of exiles,—he not only seconded the -proclamation of war against Phlius by the ephors, but also took -the command of the army.<a id="FNanchor_156" href="#Footnote_156" -class="fnanchor">[156]</a></p> - -<p>The army being mustered, and the border sacrifices favorable, -Agesilaus marched with his usual rapidity towards Phlius; -dismissing those Phliasian envoys, who met him on the road and -bribed or entreated him to desist, with the harsh reply that the -government had already deceived Sparta once, and that he would be -satisfied with nothing less than the surrender of the acropolis. -This being refused, he marched to the city, and blocked it up by -a wall of circumvallation. The besieged defended themselves<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_71">[p. 71]</span> with resolute bravery -and endurance, under a citizen named Delphion; who, with a select -troop of three hundred, maintained constant guard at every point, and -even annoyed the besiegers by frequent sallies. By public decree, -every citizen was put upon half-allowance of bread, so that the -siege was prolonged to double the time which Agesilaus, from the -information of the exiles as to the existing stock of provisions, had -supposed to be possible. Gradually, however, famine made itself felt; -desertions from within increased, among those who were favorable, -or not decidedly averse, to the exiles; desertions, which Agesilaus -took care to encourage by an ample supply of food, and by enrolment -as Phliasian emigrants on the Spartan side. At length, after -about a year’s blockade,<a id="FNanchor_157" href="#Footnote_157" -class="fnanchor">[157]</a> the provisions within were exhausted, so -that the besieged were forced to entreat permission from Agesilaus to -despatch envoys to Sparta and beg for terms. Agesilaus granted their -request. But being at the same time indignant that they submitted -to Sparta rather than to him, he sent to ask the ephors that the -terms might be referred to his dictation. Meanwhile he redoubled his -watch over the city; in spite of which, Delphion, with one of his -most active subordinates, contrived to escape at this last hour. -Phlius was now compelled to surrender at discretion to Agesilaus, -who named a Council of One Hundred (half from the exiles, half from -those within the city) vested with absolute powers of life and death -over all the citizens, and authorized to frame a constitution for -the future government of the city. Until this should be done, he -left a garrison in the acropolis, with assured pay for six months.<a -id="FNanchor_158" href="#Footnote_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a></p> - -<p>Had Agesipolis been alive, perhaps the Phliasians might have -obtained better terms. How the omnipotent Hekatontarchy named -by the partisan feelings of Agesilaus,<a id="FNanchor_159" -href="#Footnote_159" class="fnanchor">[159]</a> conducted themselves, -we<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">[p. 72]</span> do not know. But -the presumptions are all unfavorable, seeing that their situation as -well as their power was analogous to that of the Thirty at Athens and -the Lysandrian Dekarchies elsewhere.</p> - -<p>The surrender of Olynthus to Polybiades, and of Phlius to -Agesilaus, seem to have taken place nearly at the same time.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_77"> - <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXVII.<br /> - FROM THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY THE LACEDÆMONIANS - DOWN TO THE CONGRESS AT SPARTA, AND PARTIAL - PEACE, IN 371 <small>B.C.</small></h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">At</span> -the beginning of 379 <small>B.C.</small>, the empire of the -Lacedæmonians on land had reached a pitch never before paralleled. -On the sea, their fleet was but moderately powerful, and they seem -to have held divided empire with Athens over the smaller islands; -while the larger islands (so far as we can make out) were independent -of both. But the whole of inland Greece, both within and without -Peloponnesus,—except Argos, Attica, and perhaps the more powerful -Thessalian cities,—was now enrolled in the confederacy dependent -on Sparta. Her occupation of Thebes, by a Spartan garrison and an -oligarchy of local partisans, appeared to place her empire beyond -all chance of successful attack; while the victorious close of the -war against Olynthus carried everywhere an intimidating sense of her -far-reaching power. Her allies, too,—governed as they were in many -cases by Spartan harmosts, and by oligarchies whose power rested on -Sparta,—were much more dependent upon her than they had been during -the time of the Peloponnesian war.</p> - -<p>Such a position of affairs rendered Sparta an object of the same -mingled fear and hatred (the first preponderant) as had been felt -towards imperial Athens fifty years before, when she was designated -as the “despot city.<a id="FNanchor_160" href="#Footnote_160" -class="fnanchor">[160]</a>” And this sentiment was farther<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_73">[p. 73]</span> aggravated by the recent -peace of Antalkidas, in every sense the work of Sparta; which she had -first procured, and afterwards carried into execution. That peace -was disgraceful enough, as being dictated by the king of Persia, -enforced in his name, and surrendering to him all the Asiatic Greeks. -But it became yet more disgraceful when the universal autonomy which -it promised was seen to be so executed, as to mean nothing better -than subjection to Sparta. Of all the acts yet committed by Sparta, -not only in perversion of the autonomy promised to every city, -but in violation of all the acknowledged canons of right dealing -between city and city,—the most flagrant was, her recent seizure and -occupation of the Kadmeia at Thebes. Her subversion (in alliance -with, and partly for the benefit of, Amyntas king of Macedonia) -of the free Olynthian confederacy was hardly less offensive to -every Greek of large or Pan-hellenic patriotism. She appeared as -the confederate of the Persian king on one side, of Amyntas the -Macedonian, on another, of the Syracusan despot Dionysius on a -third,—as betraying the independence of Greece to the foreigner, and -seeking to put down, everywhere within it, that free spirit which -stood in the way of her own harmosts and partisan oligarchies.</p> - -<p>Unpopular as Sparta was, however, she stood out incontestably -as the head of Greece. No man dared to call into question her -headship, or to provoke resistance against it. The tone of patriotic -and free-spoken Greeks at this moment is manifested in two eminent -residents at Athens,—Lysias and Isokrates. Of these two rhetors, -the former composed an oration which he publicly read at Olympia -during the celebration of the 99th Olympiad, <small>B.C.</small> -384, three years after the peace of Antalkidas. In this oration -(of which unhappily only a fragment remains, preserved by -Dionysius of Halikarnassus), Lysias raises the cry of danger to -Greece, partly from the Persian king, partly from the despot -Dionysius of Syracuse.<a id="FNanchor_161" href="#Footnote_161" -class="fnanchor">[161]</a> He calls upon all Greeks to lay aside -hos<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">[p. 74]</span>tility and -jealousies one with the other, and to unite in making head against -these two really formidable enemies, as their ancestors had -previously done, with equal zeal for putting down despots and for -repelling the foreigner. He notes the number of Greeks (in Asia) -handed over to the Persian king, whose great wealth would enable -him to hire an indefinite number of Grecian soldiers, and whose -naval force was superior to anything which the Greeks could muster; -while the strongest naval force in Greece was that of the Syracusan -Dionysius. Recognizing the Lacedæmonians as chiefs of Greece, Lysias -expresses his astonishment that they should quietly permit the fire -to extend itself from one city to another. They ought to look upon -the misfortunes of those cities which had been destroyed, both by -the Persians and by Dionysius, as coming home to themselves; not to -wait patiently, until the two hostile powers had united their forces -to attack the centre of Greece, which yet remained independent.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">[p. 75]</span></p> <p>Of -the two common enemies,—Artaxerxes and Dionysius,—whom Lysias -thus denounces, the latter had sent to this very Olympic festival -a splendid Theôry, or legation to offer solemn sacrifice in his -name; together with several chariots to contend in the race, and -some excellent rhapsodes to recite poems composed by himself. The -Syracusan legation, headed by Thearides, brother of Dionysius, were -clothed with rich vestments, and lodged in a tent of extraordinary -magnificence, decorated with gold and purple; such, probably, as had -not been seen since the ostentatious display made by Alkibiades<a -id="FNanchor_162" href="#Footnote_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a> in -the ninetieth Olympiad (<small>B.C.</small> 420). While instigating -the spectators present to exert themselves as Greeks for the -liberation of their fellow-Greeks enslaved by Dionysius, Lysias -exhorted them to begin forthwith their hostile demonstration against -the latter, by plundering the splendid tent before them, which -insulted the sacred plain of Olympia with the spectacle of wealth -extorted from Grecian sufferers. It appears that this exhortation -was partially, but only partially, acted upon.<a id="FNanchor_163" -href="#Footnote_163" class="fnanchor">[163]</a> Some persons -assailed the tents, but were, probably, re<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_76">[p. 76]</span>strained by the Eleian superintendents -without difficulty. Yet the incident, taken in conjunction with -the speech of Lysias, helps us to understand the apprehensions and -sympathies which agitated the Olympic crowd in <small>B.C.</small> -384. This was the first Olympic festival after the peace of -Antalkidas; a festival memorable, not only because it again brought -thither Athenians, Bœotians, Corinthians, and Argeians, who must -have been prevented by the preceding war from coming either in -<small>B.C.</small> 388 or in <small>B.C.</small> 392,—but also as -it exhibited the visitors and Theôries from the Asiatic Greeks, for -the first time since they had been handed over by Sparta to the -Persians,—and the like also from those numerous Italians and Sicilian -Greeks whom Dionysius had enslaved. All these sufferers, especially -the Asiatics, would doubtless be full of complaints respecting the -hardships of their new lot, and against Sparta as having betrayed -them; complaints, which would call forth genuine sympathy in the -Athenians, Thebans, and all others who had submitted reluctantly to -the peace of Antalkidas. There was thus a large body of sentiment -prepared to respond to the declamations of Lysias. And many a -Grecian patriot, who would be ashamed to lay hands on the Syracusan -tents or envoys, would yet yield a mournful assent to the orator’s -remark, that the free Grecian world was on fire<a id="FNanchor_164" -href="#Footnote_164" class="fnanchor">[164]</a> at both sides; that -Asiatics, Italians, and Sicilians, had already passed into the hands -of Artaxerxes and Dionysius; and that, if these two formidable -enemies should coalesce, the liberties even of central Greece would -be in great danger.</p> - -<p>It is easy to see how much such feeling of grief and shame -would<span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">[p. 77]</span> tend to -raise antipathy against Sparta. Lysias, in that portion of his -speech which we possess, disguises his censure against her under -the forms of surprise. But Isokrates, who composed an analogous -discourse four years afterwards (which may perhaps have been read -at the next Olympic festival of <small>B.C.</small> 380), speaks -out more plainly. He denounces the Lacedæmonians as traitors to the -general security and freedom of Greece, and as seconding foreign -kings as well as Grecian despots to aggrandize themselves at the -cost of autonomous Grecian cities,—all in the interest of their own -selfish ambition. No wonder (he says) that the free and self-acting -Hellenic world was every day becoming contracted into a narrower -space, when the presiding city Sparta assisted Artaxerxes, Amyntas, -and Dionysius to absorb it,—and herself undertook unjust aggressions -against Thebes, Olynthus, Phlius, and Mantinea.<a id="FNanchor_165" -href="#Footnote_165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a></p> - -<p>The preceding citations, from Lysias and Isokrates, would be -sufficient to show the measure which intelligent contemporaries -took, both of the state of Greece and of the conduct of Sparta, -during the eight years succeeding the peace of Antalkidas (387-379 -<small>B.C.</small>). But the philo-Laconian Xenophon is still -more emphatic in his condemnation of Sparta. Having described her -triumphant and seemingly unassailable position after the subjugation -of Olynthus and Phlius, he proceeds to say,<a id="FNanchor_166" -href="#Footnote_166" class="fnanchor">[166]</a>—“I could produce -numerous oth<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">[p. 78]</span>er -incidents, both in and out of Greece, to prove that the gods take -careful note of impious men and of evil-doers; but the events which -I am now about to relate are quite sufficient. The Lacedæmonians, -who had sworn to leave each city autonomous, having violated their -oaths by seizing the citadel of Thebes, were punished by the very -men whom they had wronged,—though no one on earth had ever before -triumphed over them. And the Theban faction who had introduced them -into the citadel, with the deliberate purpose that their city should -be enslaved to Sparta in order that they might rule despotically -themselves,—were put down by no more than seven assailants, among the -exiles whom they had banished.”</p> - -<p>What must have been the hatred, and sense of abused ascendency, -entertained towards Sparta by neutral or unfriendly Greeks, when -Xenophon, alike conspicuous for his partiality to her and for his -dislike of Thebes, could employ these decisive words in ushering -in the coming phase of Spartan humiliation, representing it as a -well-merited judgment from the gods? The sentence which I have just -translated marks, in the commonplace manner of the Xenophontic -Hellenica, the same moment of pointed contrast and transition,—past -glory suddenly and unexpectedly darkened by supervening -misfortune,—which is foreshadowed in the narrative of Thucydides -by the dialogue between the Athenian envoys and the Melian<a -id="FNanchor_167" href="#Footnote_167" class="fnanchor">[167]</a> -council; or in the Œdipus and Antigonê of Sophokles,<a -id="FNanchor_168" href="#Footnote_168" class="fnanchor">[168]</a> by -the warnings of the prophet Teiresias.</p> - -<p>The government of Thebes had now been for three years (since -the blow struck by Phœbidas) in the hands of Leontiades and his -oligarchical partisans, upheld by the Spartan garrison in the -Kadmeia. Respecting the details of its proceedings we have scarce -any information. We can only (as above remarked) judge of it by -the analogy of the Thirty tyrants at Athens, and of the Lysandrian -Dekarchies, to which it was exactly similar in origin, position, -and interests. That the general spirit of it must have been cruel, -oppressive, and rapacious,—we cannot doubt; though in what degree -we have no means of knowing. The appetites<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_79">[p. 79]</span> of uncontrolled rulers, as well as -those of a large foreign garrison, would ensure such a result; -besides which, those rulers must have been in constant fear of -risings or conspiracies amidst a body of high-spirited citizens -who saw their city degraded, from being the chief of the Bœotian -federation, into nothing better than a captive dependency of Sparta. -Such fear was aggravated by the vicinity of a numerous body of -Theban exiles, belonging to the opposite or anti-Spartan party; -three or four hundred of whom had fled to Athens at the first -seizure of their leader Ismenias, and had been doubtless joined -subsequently by others. So strongly did the Theban rulers apprehend -mischief from these exiles, that they hired assassins to take them -off by private murder at Athens; and actually succeeded in thus -killing Androkleidas, chief of the band and chief successor of the -deceased Ismenias,—though they missed their blows at the rest.<a -id="FNanchor_169" href="#Footnote_169" class="fnanchor">[169]</a> -And we may be sure that they made the prison in Thebes subservient -to multiplied enormities and executions, when we read not only -that one hundred and fifty prisoners were found in it when the -government was put down,<a id="FNanchor_170" href="#Footnote_170" -class="fnanchor">[170]</a> but also that in the fervor of that -revolutionary movement, the slain gaoler was an object of such -fierce antipathy, that his corpse was trodden and spit upon by a -crowd of Theban women.<a id="FNanchor_171" href="#Footnote_171" -class="fnanchor">[171]</a> In Thebes, as in other Grecian cities, the -women not only took no part in political disputes, but rarely even -showed themselves in public;<a id="FNanchor_172" href="#Footnote_172" -class="fnanchor">[172]</a> so that this furious demonstration -of vin<span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">[p. 80]</span>dictive -sentiment must have been generated by the loss or maltreatment of -sons, husbands, and brothers.</p> - -<p>The Theban exiles found at Athens not only secure shelter, -but genuine sympathy with their complaints against Lacedæmonian -injustice. The generous countenance which had been shown by the -Thebans, twenty-four years before, to Thrasybulus and the other -Athenian refugees, during the omnipotence of the Thirty, was now -gratefully requited under this reversal of fortune to both cities;<a -id="FNanchor_173" href="#Footnote_173" class="fnanchor">[173]</a> and -requited too in defiance of the menaces of Sparta, who demanded that -the exiles should be expelled,—as she had in the earlier occasion -demanded that the Athenian refugees should be dismissed from Thebes. -To protect these Theban exiles, however, was all that Athens could -do. Their restoration was a task beyond her power,—and seemingly -yet more beyond their own. For the existing government of Thebes -was firmly seated, and had the citizens completely under control. -Administered by a small faction, Archias, Philippus, Hypatês, and -Leontiades (among whom the first two were at this moment polemarchs, -though the last was the most energetic and resolute)—it was at -the same time sustained by the large garrison of fifteen hundred -Lacedæmonians and allies,<a id="FNanchor_174" href="#Footnote_174" -class="fnanchor">[174]</a> under Lysanoridas and two other harmosts, -in the Kadmeia,—as well as by the Lacedæmonian posts in the other -Bœotian cities around,—Orchomenus, Thespiæ, Platæa, Tanagra, etc. -Though the general body of Theban senti<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_81">[p. 81]</span>ment in the city was decidedly adverse -to the government, and though the young men while exercising -in the palæstra (gymnastic exercises being more strenuously -prosecuted at Thebes than anywhere else except at Sparta) kept up -by private communication the ardor of an earnest, but compressed, -patriotism,—yet all manifestation or assemblage was forcibly kept -down, and the commanding posts of the lower town, as well as the -citadel, were held in vigilant occupation by the ruling minority.<a -id="FNanchor_175" href="#Footnote_175" class="fnanchor">[175]</a></p> - -<p>For a certain time the Theban exiles at Athens waited in hopes -of some rising at home, or some positive aid from the Athenians. -At length, in the third winter after their flight, they began to -despair of encouragement from either quarter, and resolved to take -the initiative upon themselves. Among them were numbered several -men of the richest and highest families at Thebes, proprietors of -chariots, jockeys, and training establishments, for contending at -the various festivals: Pelopidas, Mellon, Damokleidas, Theopompus, -Pherenikus, and others.<a id="FNanchor_176" href="#Footnote_176" -class="fnanchor">[176]</a></p> - -<p>Of these the most forward in originating aggressive measures, -though almost the youngest, was Pelopidas; whose daring and -self-devotion, in an enterprise which seemed utterly desperate, soon -communicated itself to a handful of his comrades. The exiles, keeping -up constant private correspondence with their friends in Thebes, felt -assured of the sympathy of the citizens generally, if they could -once strike a blow. Yet nothing less would be sufficient than the -destruction of the four rulers, Leontiades and his colleagues,—nor -would any one within the city devote himself to so hopeless a danger. -It was this conspiracy which Pelopidas, Mellon, and five or ten -other exiles (the entire band is differently numbered, by some as -seven, by others, twelve<a id="FNanchor_177" href="#Footnote_177" -class="fnanchor">[177]</a>) un<span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">[p. -82]</span>dertook to execute. Many of their friends in Thebes came -in as auxiliaries to them, who would not have embarked in the design -as primary actors. Of all auxiliaries, the most effective and -indispensable was Phyllidas, the secretary of the polemarchs; next -to him, Charon, an eminent and earnest patriot. Phyllidas, having -been despatched to Athens on official business, entered into secret -conference with the conspirators, concerted with them the day for -their coming to Thebes, and even engaged to provide for them access -to the persons of the polemarchs. Charon not only promised them -concealment in his house, from their first coming within the gates -until the moment of striking their blow should have arrived,—but -also entered his name to share in the armed attack. Nevertheless, -in spite of such partial encouragements, the plan still appeared -desperate to many who wished heartily for its success. Epaminondas, -for example,—who now for the first time comes before us,—resident -at Thebes, and not merely sympathizing with the political views of -Pelopidas, but also bound to him by intimate friendship,—dissuaded -others from the attempt, and declined participating in it. He -announced distinctly that he would not become an accomplice in civil -bloodshed. It appears that there were men among the exiles whose -violence made him fear that they would not, like Pelopidas, draw the -sword exclusively against Leontiades and his colleagues, but would -avail themselves of success to perpetrate unmeasured violence against -other political enemies.<a id="FNanchor_178" href="#Footnote_178" -class="fnanchor">[178]</a></p> - -<p>The day for the enterprise was determined by Phyllidas the -secretary, who had prepared an evening banquet for Archias and -Philippus, in celebration of the period when they were going out of -office as polemarchs,—and who had promised on that occasion to bring -into their company some women remarkable for beauty, as well as of -the best families in Thebes.<a id="FNanchor_179" href="#Footnote_179" -class="fnanchor">[179]</a> In concert with the general body of -Theban exiles at Athens, who held themselves ready on the borders -of Attica, together with some Athenian sympathizers, to march to -Thebes the instant that they should receive<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_83">[p. 83]</span> intimation,—and in concert also with two -out of the ten Stratêgi of Athens, who took on themselves privately -to countenance the enterprise, without any public vote,—Pelopidas -and Mellon, and their five companions,<a id="FNanchor_180" -href="#Footnote_180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a> crossed Kithæron -from Athens to Thebes. It was wet weather, about December -<small>B.C.</small> 379; they were disguised as rustics or hunters, -with no other arms than a concealed dagger; and they got within the -gates of Thebes one by one at nightfall, just when the latest farming -men were coming home from their fields. All of them arrived safe at -the house of Charon, the appointed rendezvous.</p> - -<p>It was, however, by mere accident that they had not been -turned back, and the whole scheme frustrated. For a Theban named -Hipposthenidas, friendly to the conspiracy, but faint-hearted, who -had been let into the secret against the will of Phyllidas,—became so -frightened as the moment of execution approached, that he took upon -himself, without the knowledge of the rest, to despatch Chlidon, a -faithful slave of Mellon, ordering him to go forth on horseback from -Thebes, to meet his master on the road, and to desire that he and his -comrades would go back to Attica, since circumstances had happened to -render the project for the moment impracticable. Chlidon, going home -to fetch his bridle, but not finding it in its usual place, asked his -wife where it was. The woman, at first pretending to look for it, at -last confessed that she had lent it to a neighbor. Chlidon became -so irritated with this delay, that he got into a loud altercation -with his wife, who on her part wished him ill luck with his journey. -He at last beat her, until neighbors ran in to interpose. His -departure was thus accidentally frustrated, so that the intended -message of countermand never reached the conspirators on their way.<a -id="FNanchor_181" href="#Footnote_181" class="fnanchor">[181]</a></p> - -<p>In the house of Charon they remained concealed all the ensuing -day, on the evening of which the banquet of Archias and Philippus -was to take place. Phyllidas had laid his plan for introducing them -at that banquet, at the moment when the two polemarchs had become -full of wine, in female attire, as being the<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_84">[p. 84]</span> women whose visit was expected. The -hour had nearly arrived, and they were preparing to play their -parts, when an unexpected messenger knocked at the door, summoning -Charon instantly into the presence of the polemarchs. All within -were thunderstruck with the summons, which seemed to imply that the -plot had been divulged, perhaps by the timid Hipposthenidas. It was -agreed among them that Charon must obey at once. Nevertheless, he -himself, even in the perilous uncertainty which beset him, was most -of all apprehensive lest the friends whom he had sheltered should -suspect him of treachery towards themselves and their cause. Before -departing, therefore, he sent for his only son, a youth of fifteen, -and of conspicuous promise in every way. This youth he placed in the -hands of Pelopidas, as a hostage for his own fidelity. But Pelopidas -and the rest, vehemently disclaiming all suspicion, entreated Charon -to put his son away, out of the reach of that danger in which all -were now involved. Charon, however, could not be prevailed on -to comply, and left his son among them to share the fate of the -rest. He went into the presence of Archias and Philippus; whom he -found already half-intoxicated, but informed, by intelligence from -Athens, that some plot, they knew not by whom, was afloat. They -had sent for him to question him, as a known friend of the exiles; -but he had little difficulty, aided by the collusion of Phyllidas, -in blinding the vague suspicions of drunken men, anxious only to -resume their conviviality.<a id="FNanchor_182" href="#Footnote_182" -class="fnanchor">[182]</a> He was allowed to retire and rejoin -his friends. Nevertheless, soon after his departure,—so many were -the favorable chances which befel these improvident men,—a fresh -message was delivered to Archias the polemarch, from his namesake -Archias the Athenian Hierophant, giving an exact account of the -names and scheme of the conspirators, which had become known<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_85">[p. 85]</span> to the philo-Laconian -party at Athens. The messenger who bore this despatch delivered -it to Archias with an intimation, that it related to very serious -matters. “Serious matters for to-morrow,” said the polemarch, as he -put the despatch, unopened and unread, under the pillow of the couch -on which he was reclining.<a id="FNanchor_183" href="#Footnote_183" -class="fnanchor">[183]</a></p> - -<p>Returning to their carousal, Archias and Philippus impatiently -called upon Phyllidas to introduce the women according to his -promise. Upon this the secretary retired, and brought the -conspirators, clothed in female attire, into an adjoining chamber; -then going back to the polemarchs, he informed them that the women -would not come in unless all the domestics were first dismissed. -An order was forthwith given that these latter should depart, -while Phyllidas took care that they should be well provided with -wine at the lodging of one among their number. The polemarchs were -thus left only with one or two friends at table, half-intoxicated -as well as themselves; among them Kabeirichus, the archon of the -year, who always throughout his term kept the consecrated spear of -office in actual possession, and had it at that moment close to -his person. Phyllidas now conducted the pretended women into the -banqueting-room; three of them attired as ladies of distinction, the -four others following as female attendants. Their long veils, and -ample folds of clothing, were quite sufficient as disguise,—even -had the guests at table been sober,—until they sat down by the side -of the polemarchs; and the instant of lifting their veils was the -signal for using their daggers. Archias and Philippus were slain -at once and with little resistance; but Kabeirichus with his spear -tried to defend himself, and thus perished with the others, though -the conspirators had not originally intended to take his life.<a -id="FNanchor_184" href="#Footnote_184" class="fnanchor">[184]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">[p. 86]</span></p> <p>Having -been thus far successful, Phyllidas conducted three of the -conspirators,—Pelopidas, Kephisodôrus, and Damokleidas,—to the house -of Leontiades, into which he obtained admittance by announcing -himself as the bearer of an order from the polemarchs. Leontiades was -reclining after supper, with his wife sitting spinning wool by his -side, when they entered his chamber. Being a brave and powerful man, -he started up, seized his sword, and mortally wounded Kephisodôrus -in the throat; a desperate struggle then ensued between him and -Pelopidas in the narrow doorway, where there was no room for a third -to approach. At length, however, Pelopidas overthrew and killed him, -after which they retired, enjoining the wife with threats to remain -silent, and closing the door after them with peremptory commands -that it should not be again opened. They then went to the house of -Hypatês, whom they slew while he attempted to escape over the roof.<a -id="FNanchor_185" href="#Footnote_185" class="fnanchor">[185]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">[p. 87]</span></p> <p>The -four great rulers of the philo-Laconian party in Thebes having been -now put to death, Phyllidas proceeded with the conspirators to the -prison. Here the gaoler, a confidential agent in the oppressions of -the deceased governors, hesitated to admit him; but was slain by a -sudden thrust with his spear, so as to ensure free admission to all. -To liberate the prisoners, probably, for the most part men of kindred -politics with the conspirators,—to furnish them with arms taken -from the battle-spoils hanging up in the neighboring porticos,—and -to range them in battle order near the temple of Amphion,—were the -next proceedings; after which they began to feel some assurance -of safety and triumph.<a id="FNanchor_186" href="#Footnote_186" -class="fnanchor">[186]</a> Epaminondas and Gorgidas, apprised of -what had occurred, were the first who appeared in arms with a few -friends to sustain the cause; while proclamation was everywhere made -aloud, through heralds, that the despots were slain,—that Thebes -was free,—and that all Thebans who valued freedom should muster in -arms in the market-place. There were at that moment in Thebes many -trumpeters who had come to contend for the prize at the approaching -festival of the Herakleia. Hipposthenidas engaged these men to blow -their trumpets in different parts of the city, and thus everywhere to -excite the citizens to arms.<a id="FNanchor_187" href="#Footnote_187" -class="fnanchor">[187]</a></p> - -<p>Although during the darkness surprise was the prevalent -feeling, and no one knew what to do,—yet so soon as day dawned, -and the truth became known, there was but one feeling of joy -and patriotic enthusiasm among the majority of the citizens.<a -id="FNanchor_188" href="#Footnote_188" class="fnanchor">[188]</a> -Both<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">[p. 88]</span> horsemen and -hoplites hastened in arms to the agora. Here for the first time -since the seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas, a formal assembly -of the Theban people was convened, before which Pelopidas and his -fellow-conspirators presented themselves. The priests of the city -crowned them with wreaths, and thanked them in the name of the -local gods; while the assembly hailed them with acclamations of -delight and gratitude, nominating with one voice Pelopidas, Mellon, -and Charon, as the first renewed Bœotarchs.<a id="FNanchor_189" -href="#Footnote_189" class="fnanchor">[189]</a> The revival of this -title, which had been dropped since the peace of Antalkidas, was -in itself an event of no mean significance; implying not merely -that Thebes had waked up again into freedom, but that the Bœotian -confederacy also had been, or would be, restored.</p> - -<p>Messengers had been forthwith despatched by the conspirators to -Attica to communicate their success; upon which all the remaining -exiles, with the two Athenian generals privy to the plot, and a -body of Athenian volunteers, or <i>corps francs</i>, all of whom were -ready on the borders awaiting the summons,—flocked to Thebes to -complete the work. The Spartan generals, on their side also, sent -to Platæa and Thespiæ for aid. During the whole night, they had -been distracted and alarmed by the disturbance in the city; lights -showing themselves here and there, with trumpets sounding and shouts -for the recent success.<a id="FNanchor_190" href="#Footnote_190" -class="fnanchor">[190]</a> Apprised speedily of the slaughter of -the polemarchs, from whom they had been accustomed to receive -orders, they knew not whom to trust or to consult, while they were -doubtless beset by affrighted fugitives of the now defeated party, -who would hurry up the Kadmeia for safety. They reckoned at first on -a diversion in their favor from the forces at Platæa and Thespiæ. -But these forces were not permitted even to approach the city gate; -being vigorously charged, as soon as they came in sight, by the -newly-mustered Theban cavalry, and forced to retreat with loss. The -Lacedæmonians in the citadel were thus not only left without support, -but saw their enemies in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">[p. -89]</span> the city reinforced by the other exiles, and by the -auxiliary volunteers.<a id="FNanchor_191" href="#Footnote_191" -class="fnanchor">[191]</a></p> - -<p>Meanwhile, Pelopidas and the other new Bœotarchs found themselves -at the head of a body of armed citizens, full of devoted patriotism -and unanimous in hailing the recent revolution. They availed -themselves of this first burst of fervor to prepare for storming -the Kadmeia without delay, knowing the importance of forestalling -all aid from Sparta. And the citizens were already rushing up -to the assault,—proclamation being made of large rewards to -those who should first force their way in,—when the Lacedæmonian -commander sent proposals for a capitulation.<a id="FNanchor_192" -href="#Footnote_192" class="fnanchor">[192]</a> Undisturbed egress -from Thebes, with the honors of war, being readily guaranteed to -him by oath, the Kadmeia was then surrendered. As the Spartans were -marching out of the gates, many Thebans of the defeated party came -forth also. But against these latter the exasperation of the victors -was so ungovernable, that several of the most odious were seized as -they passed, and put to death; in some cases, even their children -along with them. And more of them would have been thus despatched, -had not the Athenian auxiliaries, with generous anxiety, exerted -every effort to get them out of sight and put them into safety.<a -id="FNanchor_193" href="#Footnote_193" class="fnanchor">[193]</a> -We are not told,—nor is it certain,—that these Thebans were -protected under the capitulation. Even had they been so, however, -the wrathful impulse might still have prevailed against them. Of -the three harmosts who thus evacuated the Kadmeia without a blow, -two were put to death, the third was heavily fined and banished, by -the authorities at Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_194" href="#Footnote_194" -class="fnanchor">[194]</a> We do not know what the fortifi<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_90">[p. 90]</span>cations of the Kadmeia -were, nor how far it was provisioned. But we can hardly wonder that -these officers were considered to have dishonored the Lacedæmonian -arms, by making no attempt to defend it; when we recollect that -hardly more than four or five days would be required to procure -adequate relief from home,—and that forty-three years afterwards, the -Macedonian garrison in the same place maintained itself against the -Thebans in the city for more than fourteen days, until the return -of Alexander from Illyria.<a id="FNanchor_195" href="#Footnote_195" -class="fnanchor">[195]</a> The first messenger who brought news -to Sparta of the conspiracy and revolution at Thebes, appears to -have communicated at the same time that the garrison had evacuated -the Kadmeia and was in full retreat, with a train of Theban exiles -from the defeated party.<a id="FNanchor_196" href="#Footnote_196" -class="fnanchor">[196]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">[p. 91]</span></p> - -<p>This revolution at Thebes came like an electric shock upon the -Grecian world. With a modern reader, the assassination of the<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_92">[p. 92]</span> four leaders, in their -houses and at the banquet, raises a sentiment of repugnance which -withdraws his attention from the other fea<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_93">[p. 93]</span>tures of this memorable deed. Now an -ancient Greek not only had no such repugnance, but sympathized -with the complete revenge for the seizure of the Kadmeia and the -death of Ismenias; while he admired, besides, the extraordinary -personal daring of Pelopidas and Mellon,—the skilful forecast of -the plot,—and the sudden overthrow, by a force so contemptibly -small, of a government which the day before seemed unassailable.<a -id="FNanchor_197" href="#Footnote_197" class="fnanchor">[197]</a> It -deserves note that we here see the richest men in Thebes undertaking -a risk, single-handed and with their own persons, which must have -appeared on a reasonable estimate little less than desperate. -From the Homeric Odysseus and Achilles down to the end of free -Hellenism, the rich Greek strips in the Palæstra,<a id="FNanchor_198" -href="#Footnote_198" class="fnanchor">[198]</a> and exposes his -person in the ranks as a soldier like the poorest citizens; being -generally superior to them in strength and bodily efficiency.</p> - -<p>As the revolution in Thebes acted forcibly on the Grecian -mind from the manner in which it was accomplished, so by its -positive effects it altered forthwith the balance of power in -Greece. The empire of Sparta, far from being undisputed and nearly -universal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">[p. 94]</span> over -Greece, is from henceforward only maintained by more or less effort, -until at length it is completely overthrown.<a id="FNanchor_199" -href="#Footnote_199" class="fnanchor">[199]</a></p> - -<p>The exiles from Thebes, arriving <span class="replace" id="tn_4" -title="In the printed book: from">at</span> Sparta, inflamed -both the ephors, and the miso-Theban Agesilaus, to the highest -pitch. Though it was then the depth of winter,<a id="FNanchor_200" -href="#Footnote_200" class="fnanchor">[200]</a> an expedition was -decreed forthwith against Thebes, and the allied contingents were -summoned. Agesilaus declined to take the command of it, on the -ground that he was above sixty years of age, and therefore no longer -liable to compulsory foreign service. But this (says Xenophon<a -id="FNanchor_201" href="#Footnote_201" class="fnanchor">[201]</a>) -was not his real reason. He was afraid that his enemies at Sparta -would say,—“Here is Agesilaus again putting us to expense, in order -that he may uphold despots in other cities,”—as he had just done, and -had been reproached with doing, at Phlius; a second proof that the -reproaches against Sparta (which I have cited a few pages above from -Lysias and Isokrates) of allying herself with Greek despots as well -as with foreigners to put down Grecian freedom, found an echo even in -Sparta herself. Accordingly Kleombrotus, the other king of Sparta, -took the command. He had recently succeeded his brother Agesipolis, -and had never commanded before.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">[p. 95]</span></p> - -<p>Kleombrotus conducted his army along the Isthmus of Corinth -through Megara to Platæa, cutting to pieces an outpost of -Thebans, composed chiefly of the prisoners set free by the recent -revolution, who had been placed for the defence of the intervening -mountain-pass. From Platæa he went forward to Thespiæ, and from -thence to Kynoskephalæ in the Theban territory, where he lay encamped -for sixteen days; after which he retreated to Thespiæ. It appears -that he did nothing, and that his inaction was the subject of much -wonder in his army, who are said to have even doubted whether he was -really and earnestly hostile to Thebes. Perhaps the exiles, with -customary exaggeration, may have led him to hope that they could -provoke a rising in Thebes, if he would only come near. At any rate -the bad weather must have been a serious impediment to action; since -in his march back to Peloponnesus through Kreusis and Ægosthenæ -the wind blew a hurricane, so that his soldiers could not proceed -without leaving their shields and coming back afterwards to fetch -them. Kleombrotus did not quit Bœotia, however, without leaving -Sphodrias as harmost at Thespiæ, with one third of the entire army, -and with a considerable sum of money to employ in hiring mercenaries -and acting vigorously against the Thebans.<a id="FNanchor_202" -href="#Footnote_202" class="fnanchor">[202]</a></p> - -<p>The army of Kleombrotus, in its march from Megara to Platæa, -had passed by the skirts of Attica; causing so much alarm to the -Athenians, that they placed Chabrias with a body of peltasts, to -guard their frontier and the neighboring road through Eleutheræ into -Bœotia. This was the first time that a Lacedæmonian army had touched -Attica (now no longer guarded by the lines of Corinth, as in the war -between 394 and 388 <small>B.C.</small>) since the retirement of -king Pausanias in 404 <small>B.C.</small>; furnishing a proof of -the exposure of the country, such as to revive in the Athenian mind -all the terrible recollections of Dekeleia and the Peloponnesian -war. It was during the first prevalence of this alarm,—and -seemingly while Kleombrotus was still with his army at Thespiæ or -Kynoskephalæ, close on the Athenian frontier,—that three Lacedæmonian -envoys, Etymoklês and two others, arrived at Athens to demand -satisfaction for the part taken by the two Athenian generals and the -Athenian volunteers, in concerting and aid<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_96">[p. 96]</span>ing the enterprise of Pelopidas and his -comrades. So overpowering was the anxiety in the public mind to avoid -giving offence to Sparta, that these two generals were both of them -accused before the dikastery. The first of them was condemned and -executed; the second, profiting by this warning (since, pursuant -to the psephism of <span class="replace" id="tn_2" title="In the -printed book: Kannônes">Kannônus</span>,<a id="FNanchor_203" -href="#Footnote_203" class="fnanchor">[203]</a> the two would be -put on trial separately), escaped, and a sentence of banishment -was passed against him.<a id="FNanchor_204" href="#Footnote_204" -class="fnanchor">[204]</a> These two generals had been unquestionably -guilty of a grave abuse of their official functions. They had brought -the state into public hazard, not merely without consulting the -senate or assembly, but even without taking the sense of their own -board of Ten. Nevertheless the severity of the sentence pronounced -indicates the alarm, as well as the displeasure, of the general body -of Athenians; while it served as a disclaimer in fact, if not in -form, of all political connection with Thebes.<a id="FNanchor_205" -href="#Footnote_205" class="fnanchor">[205]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">[p. 97]</span></p> - -<p>Even before the Lacedæmonian envoys had quitted Athens, -however, an incident, alike sudden and memorable, completely<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_98">[p. 98]</span> altered the Athenian -temper. The Lacedæmonian harmost Sphodrias (whom Kleombrotus had left -at Thespiæ to prosecute the war against Thebes), being informed that -Peiræus on its land side was without gates or night watch,—since -there was no suspicion of attack,—conceived the idea of surprising -it by a night-march from Thespiæ, and thus of mastering at one -stroke the commerce, the wealth, and the naval resources of Athens. -Putting his troops under march one evening after an early supper, he -calculated on reaching the Peiræus the next morning before daylight. -But his reckoning proved erroneous. Morning overtook him when he -had advanced no farther than the Thriasian plain near Eleusis; from -whence, as it was useless to proceed farther, he turned back and -retreated to Thespiæ; not, however, without committing various acts -of plunder against the neighboring Athenian residents.</p> - -<p>This plan against Peiræus appears to have been not ill conceived. -Had Sphodrias been a man competent to organize and execute movements -as rapid as those of Brasidas, there is no reason why it might -not have succeeded; in which case the whole face of the war would -have been changed, since the Lacedæmonians, if once masters of -Peiræus, both could and would have maintained the place. But it -was one of those injustices, which no one ever commends until it -has been successfully consummated,—“consilium quod non potest -laudari nisi peractum.<a id="FNanchor_206" href="#Footnote_206" -class="fnanchor">[206]</a>” As it<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_99">[p. 99]</span> failed, it has been considered, by -critics as well as by contemporaries, not merely as a crime but as -a fault, and its author Sphodrias as a brave man, but singularly -weak and hot-headed.<a id="FNanchor_207" href="#Footnote_207" -class="fnanchor">[207]</a> Without admitting the full extent of -this censure, we may see that his present aggression grew out of -an untoward emulation of the glory which Phœbidas, in spite of the -simulated or transient displeasure of his countrymen, had acquired -by seizing the Kadmeia. That Sphodrias received private instructions -from Kleombrotus (as Diodorus states) is not sufficiently proved; -while the suspicion, intimated by Xenophon as being abroad, that he -was wrought upon by secret emissaries and bribes from his enemies the -Thebans, for the purpose of plunging Athens into war with Sparta, -is altogether improbable;<a id="FNanchor_208" href="#Footnote_208" -class="fnanchor">[208]</a> and seems merely an hypothesis suggested -by the consequences of the act,—which were such, that if his enemies -had bribed him, he could not have served them better.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">[p. 100]</span></p> - -<p>The presence of Sphodrias and his army in the Thriasian plain -was communicated shortly after daybreak at Athens, where it excited -no less terror than surprise. Every man instantly put himself -under arms for defence; but news soon arrived that the invader had -retired. When thus reassured, the Athenians passed from fear to -indignation. The Lacedæmonian envoys, who were lodging at the house -of Kallias the proxenus of Sparta, were immediately put under arrest -and interrogated. But all three affirmed that they were not less -astonished, and not less exasperated, by the march of Sphodrias, than -the Athenians themselves; adding, by way of confirmation, that had -they been really privy to any design of seizing the Peiræus, they -would have taken care not to let themselves be found in the city, -and in their ordinary lodging at the house of the proxenus, where -of course their persons would be at once seized. They concluded by -assuring the Athenians, that Sphodrias would not only be indignantly -disavowed, but punished capitally, at Sparta. And their reply was -deemed so satisfactory, that they were allowed to depart; while an -Athenian embassy was sent to Sparta, to demand the punishment of -the offending general.<a id="FNanchor_209" href="#Footnote_209" -class="fnanchor">[209]</a></p> - -<p>The Ephors immediately summoned Sphodrias home to Sparta, to take -his trial on a capital charge. So much did he himself despair of -his case, that he durst not make his appearance; while the general -impression was, both at Sparta and elsewhere, that he would certainly -be condemned. Nevertheless, though thus absent and undefended, he -was acquitted, purely through private favor and esteem for his -general character. He was of the party of Kleombrotus, so that -all the friends of that prince espoused his cause, as a matter -of course. But as he was of the party opposed to Agesilaus, his -friends dreaded that the latter would declare<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_101">[p. 101]</span> against him, and bring about his -condemnation. Nothing saved Sphodrias except the peculiar intimacy -between his son Kleonymus and Archidamus son of Agesilaus. The -mournful importunity of Archidamus induced Agesilaus, when this -important cause was brought before the Senate of Sparta, to put aside -his judicial conviction, and give his vote in the following manner: -“To be sure, Sphodrias is guilty; upon that there cannot be two -opinions. Nevertheless, we cannot put to death a man like him, who, -as boy, youth, and man, has stood unblemished in all Spartan honor. -Sparta cannot part with soldiers like Sphodrias.<a id="FNanchor_210" -href="#Footnote_210" class="fnanchor">[210]</a>” The friends of -Agesilaus, following this opinion and coinciding with those of -Kleombrotus, ensured a favorable verdict. And it is remarkable, -that Etymoklês himself, who as envoy at Athens had announced as -a certainty that Sphodrias would be put to death,—as senator and -friend of Agesilaus voted for his acquittal.<a id="FNanchor_211" -href="#Footnote_211" class="fnanchor">[211]</a></p> - -<p>This remarkable incident (which comes to us from a witness not -merely philo-Laconian, but also personally intimate with Agesilaus) -shows how powerfully the course of justice at Sparta was overruled by -private sympathy and interests,—especially, those of the two kings. -It especially illustrates what has been stated in a former chapter -respecting the oppressions exercised by the Spartan harmosts and the -dekadarchies, for which no redress was attainable at Sparta. Here -was a case where not only the guilt of Sphodrias stood confessed, -but in which also his acquittal was sure to be followed by a war -with Athens. If, under such circumstances, the Athenian demand for -redress was overruled by the favor of the two kings, what chance -was there of any justice to the complaint of a dependent city, or -an injured individual,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">[p. -102]</span> against the harmost? The contrast between Spartan and -Athenian proceeding is also instructive. Only a few days before, -the Athenians condemned, at the instance of Sparta, their two -generals who had without authority lent aid to the Theban exiles. -In so doing, the Athenian dikastery enforced the law against clear -official misconduct,—and that, too, in a case where their sympathies -went along with the act, though their fear of a war with Sparta was -stronger. But the most important circumstance to note is, that at -Athens there is neither private influence, nor kingly influence, -capable of overruling the sincere judicial conscience of a numerous -and independent dikastery.</p> - -<p>The result of the acquittal of Sphodrias must have been well known -beforehand to all parties at Sparta. Even by the general voice of -Greece, the sentence was denounced as iniquitous.<a id="FNanchor_212" -href="#Footnote_212" class="fnanchor">[212]</a> But the Athenians, -who had so recently given strenuous effect to the remonstrances -of Sparta against their own generals, were stung by it to the -quick; and only the more stung, in consequence of the extraordinary -compliments to Sphodrias on which the acquittal was made to turn. -They immediately contracted hearty alliance with Thebes, and made -vigorous preparations for war against Sparta both by land and sea. -After completing the fortifications of Peiræus, so as to place it -beyond the reach of any future attempt, they applied themselves to -the building of new ships of war, and to the extension of their -naval ascendency, at the expense of Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_213" -href="#Footnote_213" class="fnanchor">[213]</a></p> - -<p>From this moment, a new combination began in Grecian politics. The -Athenians thought the moment favorable to attempt the construction -of a new confederacy, analogous to the Confederacy of Delos, formed -a century before; the basis on which had been reared the formidable -Athenian empire, lost at the close of the Peloponnesian war. Towards -such construction there was so far a tendency, that Athens had -already a small body of maritime allies; while rhetors like Isokrates -(in his Panegyrical Discourse, published two years before) had been -familiarizing the public mind with larger ideas. But the enterprise -was now pressed with the determination and vehemence of men smarting -under recent insult. The Athenians had good ground to build upon; -since,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">[p. 103]</span> while the -discontent against the ascendency of Sparta was widely spread, the -late revolution in Thebes had done much to lessen that sentiment -of fear upon which such ascendency chiefly rested. To Thebes, the -junction with Athens was preëminently welcome, and her leaders gladly -enrolled their city as a constituent member of the new confederacy.<a -id="FNanchor_214" href="#Footnote_214" class="fnanchor">[214]</a> -They cheerfully acknowledged the presidency of Athens,—reserving, -however, tacitly or expressly, their own rights as presidents of the -Bœotian federation, as soon as that could be reconstituted; which -reconstitution was at this moment desirable even for Athens, seeing -that the Bœotian towns were now dependent allies of Sparta under -harmosts and oligarchies.</p> - -<p>The Athenians next sent envoys round to the principal islands and -maritime cities in the Ægean, inviting all of them to an alliance -on equal and honorable terms. The principles were in the main the -same as those upon which the confederacy of Delos had been formed -against the Persians, almost a century before. It was proposed that -a congress of deputies should meet at Athens, one from each city, -small as well as great, each with one vote; that Athens should be -president, yet each individual city autonomous; that a common fund -should be raised, with a common naval force, through assessment -imposed by this congress upon each, and applied as the same -authority might prescribe; the general purpose being defined to be, -maintenance of freedom and security from foreign aggression, to each -confederate, by the common force of all. Care was taken to banish as -much as possible those associations of tribute and subjection which -rendered the recollection of the former Athenian empire unpopular.<a -id="FNanchor_215" href="#Footnote_215" class="fnanchor">[215]</a> -And as there were many Athenian citizens, who, during those times -of supremacy, had been planted out as kleruchs or out-settlers -in various dependencies, but had been deprived of their -properties at the close of the war,—it was thought necessary to -pass a formal decree,<a id="FNanchor_216" href="#Footnote_216" -class="fnanchor">[216]</a> re<span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">[p. -104]</span>nouncing and barring all revival of these suspended -rights. It was farther decreed that henceforward no Athenian should -on any<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">[p. 105]</span> pretence -hold property, either in house or land, in the territory of any -one of the confederates; neither by purchase, nor as security for -money lent, nor by any other mode of acquisition. Any Athenian -infringing this law, was rendered liable to be informed against -before the synod; who, on proof of the fact, were to deprive him of -the property,—half of it going to the informer, half to the general -purposes of the confederacy.</p> - -<p>Such were the liberal principles of confederacy now proposed by -Athens,—who, as a candidate for power, was straightforward and just, -like the Herodotean Deiokês,<a id="FNanchor_217" href="#Footnote_217" -class="fnanchor">[217]</a>—and formally ratified, as well by the -Athenians as by the general voice of the confederate deputies -assembled within their walls. The formal decree and compact of -alliance was inscribed on a stone column and placed by the side -of the statue of Zeus Eleutherius or the Liberator; a symbol, of -enfranchisement from Sparta accomplished, as well as of freedom to -be maintained against Persia and other enemies.<a id="FNanchor_218" -href="#Footnote_218" class="fnanchor">[218]</a> Periodical meetings -of the confederate deputies were provided to be held (how often, we -do not know) at Athens, and the synod was recognized as competent -judge of all persons, even Athenian citizens, charged with treason -against the confederacy. To give fuller security to the confederates -generally, it was provided in the original compact, that if any -Athenian citizen should either speak, or put any question to the -vote, in the Athenian assembly, contrary to the tenor of that -document,—he should be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">[p. -106]</span> tried before the synod for treason; and that, if found -guilty, he might be condemned by them to the severest punishment.</p> - -<p>Three Athenian leaders stood prominent as commissioners in the -first organization of the confederacy, and in the dealings with -those numerous cities whose junction was to be won by amicable -inducement,—Chabrias, Timotheus son of Konon, and Kallistratus.<a -id="FNanchor_219" href="#Footnote_219" class="fnanchor">[219]</a></p> - -<p>The first of the three is already known to the reader. He and -Iphikrates were the most distinguished warriors whom Athens numbered -among her citizens. But not having been engaged in any war, since -the peace of Antalkidas in 387 <small>B.C.</small>, she had had no -need of their services; hence both of them had been absent from the -city during much of the last nine years, and Iphikrates seems still -to have been absent. At the time when that peace was concluded, -Iphikrates was serving in the Hellespont and Thrace, Chabrias with -Evagoras in Cyprus; each having been sent thither by Athens at the -head of a body of mercenary peltasts. Instead of dismissing their -troops, and returning to Athens as peaceful citizens, it was not less -agreeable to the military tastes of these generals, than conducive -to their importance and their profit, to keep together their bands, -and to take foreign service. Accordingly, Chabrias had continued -in service first in Cyprus, next with the native Egyptian king -Akoris. The Persians, against whom he served, found his hostility so -inconvenient, that Pharnabazus demanded of the Athenians to recall -him, on pain of the Great King’s displeasure; and requested at the -same time that Iphikrates might be sent to aid the Persian satraps -in organizing a great expedition against Egypt. The Athenians, to -whom the goodwill of Persia was now of peculiar importance, complied -on both points; recalled Chabrias, who thus became disposable for -the Athenian service,<a id="FNanchor_220" href="#Footnote_220" -class="fnanchor">[220]</a> and despatched Iphikrates to take command -along with the Persians.</p> - -<p>Iphikrates, since the peace of Antalkidas, had employed his -peltasts in the service of the kings of Thrace: first of Seuthes, -near the shores of the Propontis, whom he aided in the recovery of -certain lost dominions,—next of Kotys, whose favor he acquired, -and whose daughter he presently married.<a id="FNanchor_221" -href="#Footnote_221" class="fnanchor">[221]</a> Not only did -he enjoy great scope for warlike operations and plunder, -among the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">[p. 107]</span> -“butter-eating Thracians,”<a id="FNanchor_222" href="#Footnote_222" -class="fnanchor">[222]</a>—but he also acquired, as dowry, a -large stock of such produce as Thracian princes had at their -disposal, together with a boon even more important,—a seaport -village not far from the mouth of the Hebrus, called Drys, where -he established a fortified post, and got together a Grecian colony -dependent on himself.<a id="FNanchor_223" href="#Footnote_223" -class="fnanchor">[223]</a> Miltiades, Alkibiades, and other -eminent Athenians had done the same thing before him; though -Xenophon had refused a similar proposition when made to him by -the earlier Seuthes.<a id="FNanchor_224" href="#Footnote_224" -class="fnanchor">[224]</a> Iphikrates thus became a great man in -Thrace, yet by no means abandoning his connection with Athens, -but making his position in each subservient to his importance in -the other. While he was in a situation to favor the projects of -Athenian citizens for mercantile and territorial acquisitions in the -Chersonese and other parts<span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">[p. -108]</span> of Thrace,—he could also lend the aid of Athenian naval -and military art, not merely to princes in Thrace, but to others even -beyond those limits,—since we learn that Amyntas king of Macedonia -became so attached or indebted to him as to adopt him for his son.<a -id="FNanchor_225" href="#Footnote_225" class="fnanchor">[225]</a> -When sent by the Athenians to Persia, at the request of Pharnabazus -(about 378 <small>B.C.</small> apparently), Iphikrates had fair -ground for anticipating that a career yet more lucrative was -opening before him.<a id="FNanchor_226" href="#Footnote_226" -class="fnanchor">[226]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">[p. 109]</span></p> - -<p>Iphikrates being thus abroad, the Athenians joined with Chabrias, -in the mission and measures for organizing their new confed<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_110">[p. 110]</span>eracy, two other -colleagues, of whom we now hear for the first time—Timotheus son of -Konon, and Kallistratus the most celebrated orator of his time.<a -id="FNanchor_227" href="#Footnote_227" class="fnanchor">[227]</a> -The abilities of Kallistratus were not military at all; while -Timotheus and Chabrias were men of distinguished military merit. -But in acquiring new allies and attracting deputies to her proposed -congress, Athens stood in need of persuasive appeal, conciliatory -dealing, and substantial fairness in all her propositions, not less -than of generalship. We are told that Timotheus, doubtless as son -of the liberator Konon, from the recollections of the battle of -Knidus—was especially successful in procuring new adhesions; and -probably Kallistratus,<a id="FNanchor_228" href="#Footnote_228" -class="fnanchor">[228]</a> going round with him to the different -islands, contributed by his eloquence not a little to the same -result. On their invitation, many cities entered as con<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_111">[p. 111]</span>federates.<a -id="FNanchor_229" href="#Footnote_229" class="fnanchor">[229]</a> -At this time (as in the earlier confederacy of Delos) all who -joined must have been unconstrained members. And we may understand -the motives of their junction, when we read the picture drawn by -Isokrates (in 380 <small>B.C.</small>) of the tyranny of the -Persians on the Asiatic mainland, threatening, to absorb the -neighboring islands. Not only was there now a new basis of imposing -force, presented by Athens and Thebes in union—but there was also -a wide-spread hatred of imperial Sparta, aggravated since her -perversion of the pretended boon of autonomy, promised by the peace -of Antalkidas; and the conjunction of these sentiments caused the -Athenian mission of invitation to be extremely successful. All the -cities in Eubœa (except Histiæa, at the north of the island)—as -well as Chios, Mitylênê, Byzantium, and Rhodes—the three former -of whom had continued favorably inclined to Athens ever since the -peace of Antalkidas,<a id="FNanchor_230" href="#Footnote_230" -class="fnanchor">[230]</a>—all entered into the confederacy. An -Athenian fleet under Chabrias, sailing among the Cyclades and -the other islands of the Ægean, aided in the expulsion of the -Lacedæmonian harmosts,<a id="FNanchor_231" href="#Footnote_231" -class="fnanchor">[231]</a> together with their devoted local -oligarchies, wherever they still subsisted; and all the cities -thus liberated became equal members of the newly-constituted -congress at Athens. After a certain interval, there came to be -not less than<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">[p. 112]</span> -seventy cities, many of them separately powerful, which sent -deputies to it;<a id="FNanchor_232" href="#Footnote_232" -class="fnanchor">[232]</a> an aggregate sufficient to intimidate -Sparta, and even to flatter Athens with the hope of restoration to -something like her former lustre.</p> - -<p>The first votes both of Athens herself, and of the newly-assembled -congress, threatened war upon the largest scale. A resolution was -passed to equip twenty thousand hoplites, five hundred horsemen, -and two hundred triremes.<a id="FNanchor_233" href="#Footnote_233" -class="fnanchor">[233]</a> Probably the insular and Ionic deputies -promised each a certain contribution of money, but nothing beyond. -We do not, however, know how much,—nor how far the engagements, -large or small, were realized,—nor whether Athens was authorized to -enforce execution against defaulters,—or was in circumstances to act -upon such authority, if granted to her by the congress. It was in -this way (as the reader will recollect from my fifth volume) that -Athens had first rendered herself unpopular in the confederacy of -Delos,—by enforcing the resolutions of the confederate synod against -evasive or seceding members. It was in this way that what was at -first a voluntary association had ultimately slid into an empire by -constraint. Under the new circumstances of 378 <small>B.C.</small>, -we may presume that the confederates, though ardent and full of -promises on first assembling at Athens, were even at the outset not -exact, and became afterwards still less exact, in performance; yet -that Athens was forced to be reserved in claiming, or in exercising, -the right of enforcement. To obtain a vote of contribution by the -majority of deputies present, was only the first step in the process; -to obtain punctual payment, when the Athenian fleet was sent round -for the purpose of collecting,—yet without incurring dangerous -unpopularity,—was the second step, but by far the most doubtful and -difficult.</p> - -<p>It must, however, be borne in mind that at this moment, when the -confederacy was first formed, both Athens and the other cities<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_113">[p. 113]</span> came together from -a spontaneous impulse of hearty mutuality and coöperation. A few -years afterwards, we shall find this changed; Athens selfish, and -the confederates reluctant.<a id="FNanchor_234" href="#Footnote_234" -class="fnanchor">[234]</a> Inflamed, as well by their position -of renovated headship, as by fresh animosity against Sparta, the -Athenians made important efforts of their own, both financial and -military. Equipping a fleet, which for the time was superior in the -Ægean, they ravaged the hostile territory of Histiæa in Eubœa, and -annexed to their confederacy the islands of Peparêthus and Skiathus. -They imposed upon themselves also a direct property-tax; to what -amount, however, we do not know.</p> - -<p>It was on the occasion of this tax that they introduced a great -change in the financial arrangements and constitution of the -city; a change conferring note upon the archonship of Nausinikus, -(<small>B.C.</small> 378-377). The great body of substantial Athenian -citizens as well as metics were now classified anew for purposes of -taxation. It will be remembered that even from the time of Solon<a -id="FNanchor_235" href="#Footnote_235" class="fnanchor">[235]</a> -the citizens of Athens had been distributed into four -classes,—Pentakosiomedimni, Hippeis, Zeugitæ, Thêtes,—distinguished -from each other by the amount of their respective properties. Of -these Solonian classes, the fourth, or poorest, paid no direct -taxes; while the three former were taxed according to assessments -representing a certain proportion of their actual property. The -taxable property of the richest (or Pentakosiomedimni, including all -at or above the minimum income of five hundred medimni of corn per -annum) was entered in the tax-book at a sum equal to twelve times -their income; that of the Hippeis (comprising all who possessed -between three hundred and five hundred medimni of annual income) at -ten times their income; that of the Zeugitæ (or possessors of an -annual income between two hundred and three<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_114">[p. 114]</span> hundred medimni) at five times their -income. A medimnus of corn was counted as equivalent to a drachma; -which permitted the application of this same class-system to movable -property as well as to land. So that, when an actual property-tax -(or <i>eisphora</i>) was imposed, it operated as an equal or proportional -tax, so far as regarded all the members of the same class; but as -a graduated or progressive tax, upon all the members of the richer -class as compared with those of the poorer.</p> - -<p>The three Solonian property-classes above named appear to have -lasted, though probably not without modifications, down to the close -of the Peloponnesian war; and to have been in great part preserved, -after the renovation of the democracy in <small>B.C.</small> -403, during the archonship of Eukleides.<a id="FNanchor_236" -href="#Footnote_236" class="fnanchor">[236]</a> Though eligibility -to the great offices of state had before that time ceased to be -dependent on pecuniary qualification, it was still necessary to -possess some means of distinguishing the wealthier citizens, not -merely in case of direct taxation being imposed, but also because the -liability to serve in liturgies or burdensome offices was consequent -on a man’s enrolment as possessor of more than a given minimum of -property. It seems, therefore, that the Solonian census, in its main -principles of classification and graduation, was retained. Each man’s -property being valued, he was ranged in one of three or more classes -according to its amount. For each of the classes, a fixed proportion -of taxable capital to each man’s property was assumed, and each was -entered in the schedule, not for his whole property, but for the -sum of taxable capital corresponding to his property, according to -the proportion assumed. In the first or richest class, the taxable -capital bore a greater ratio to the actual property than in the less -rich; in the second, a greater ratio than in the third. The sum of -all these items of taxable capital, in all the different classes, -set opposite to each man’s name in the schedule, constituted the -aggregate census of Attica; upon which all direct property-tax was -imposed, in equal proportion upon every man.</p> - -<p>Respecting the previous modifications in the register of taxable -property, or the particulars of its distribution into classes, -which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">[p. 115]</span> had -been introduced in 403 <small>B.C.</small> at the archonship of -Eukleides, we have no information. Nor can we make out how large or -how numerous were the assessments of direct property-tax, imposed -at Athens between that archonship and the archonship of Nausinikus -in 378 <small>B.C.</small> But at this latter epoch the register -was again considerably modified, at the moment when Athens was -bracing herself up for increased exertions. A new valuation was -made of the property of every man possessing property to the amount -of twenty-five minæ (or twenty-five hundred drachmæ) and upwards. -Proceeding upon this valuation, every one was entered in the schedule -for a sum of taxable capital equal to a given fraction of what he -possessed. But this fraction was different in each of the different -classes. How many classes there were, we do not certainly know; nor -can we tell, except in reference to the lowest class taxed, what sum -was taken as the minimum for any one of them. There could hardly -have been less, however, than three classes, and there may probably -have been four. But respecting the first or richest class, we know -that each man was entered in the schedule for a taxable capital -equal to one-fifth of his estimated property; and that possessors -of fifteen talents were included in it. The father of Demosthenes -died in this year, and the boy Demosthenes was returned by his -guardians to the first class, as possessor of fifteen talents; upon -which his name was entered on the schedule with a taxable capital -of three talents set against him; being one-fifth of his actual -property. The taxable capital of the second class was entered at -a fraction less than one-fifth of their actual property (probably -enough, one-sixth, the same as all the registered metics); that of -the third, at a fraction still smaller; of the fourth (if there was -a fourth), even smaller than the third. This last class descended -down to the minimum of twenty-five minæ, or twenty-five hundred -drachmæ; below which no account was taken.<a id="FNanchor_237" -href="#Footnote_237" class="fnanchor">[237]</a></p> <p><span -class="pagenum" id="Page_116">[p. 116]</span></p> <p>Besides the -taxable capitals of the citizens, thus graduated, the schedule also -included those of the metics or resident aliens; who were each -enrolled (without any difference of greater or smaller property, -above twenty-five minæ) at a taxable capital equal to one-sixth -of his actual property;<a id="FNanchor_238" href="#Footnote_238" -class="fnanchor">[238]</a> being a proportion less than the richest -class of citizens, and probably equal to the second class in order -of wealth. All these items summed up amounted to five thousand seven -hundred and fifty or six thousand talents,<a id="FNanchor_239" -href="#Footnote_239" class="fnanchor">[239]</a> forming the aggregate -schedule of taxable property; that is, something near about six -thousand talents. A property-tax was no part of the regular ways and -means of the state. It was imposed only on special occasions; and -whenever it was imposed, it was assessed upon this schedule,—every -man, rich or poor, being rated equally according to his taxable -capital as there entered. A property-tax of one per cent. would -thus produce sixty talents; two per cent., one hundred and twenty -talents, etc. It is highly probable that the exertions of Athens -during the archonship of Nausinikus, when this new schedule was first -prepared, may have caused a property-tax to be then imposed, but we -do not know to what amount.<a id="FNanchor_240" href="#Footnote_240" -class="fnanchor">[240]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">[p. 117]</span></p> - -<p>Along with this new schedule of taxable capital, a new -distribution of the citizens now took place into certain bodies -called Symmories. As far as we can make out, on a very obscure -subject, it seems that these Symmories were twenty in number, two -to each tribe; that each contained sixty citizens, thus making one -thousand two hundred in all; that these one thousand two hundred -were the wealthiest citizens of the schedule,—containing, perhaps, -the two first out of the four classes enrolled. Among these one -thousand two hundred, however, the three hundred wealthiest stood -out as a separate body; thirty from each tribe. These three hundred -were the wealthiest men in the city, and were called “the leaders -or chiefs of the Symmories.” The three hundred and the twelve -hundred corresponded, speaking roughly, to the old Solonian classes -of Pentakosiomedimni and Hippeis; of which<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_118">[p. 118]</span> latter class there had also been -twelve hundred, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.<a -id="FNanchor_241" href="#Footnote_241" class="fnanchor">[241]</a> -The liturgies, or burdensome and costly offices, were discharged -principally by the Three Hundred, but partly also by the Twelve -Hundred. It would seem that the former was a body essentially -fluctuating, and that after a man had been in it for some time, -discharging the burdens belonging to it, the Stratêgi or Generals -suffered him to be mingled with the Twelve Hundred, and promoted -one of the latter body to take his place in the Three Hundred. As -between man and man, too, the Attic law always admitted the process -called Antidosis, or Exchange of Property. Any citizen who believed -himself to have been overcharged with costly liturgies, and that -another citizen, as rich or richer than himself, had not borne his -fair share,—might, if saddled with a new liturgy, require the other -to undertake it in his place; and in case of refusal, might tender -to him an exchange of properties, under an engagement that he would -undertake the new charge, if the property of the other were made over -to him.</p> - -<p>It is to be observed, that besides the twelve hundred wealthiest -citizens who composed the Symmories, there were a more considerable -number of less wealthy citizens not included in them, yet still -liable to the property-tax; persons who possessed property from -the minimum of twenty-five minæ, up to some maximum that we do not -know, at which point the Symmories began,—and who corresponded, -speaking loosely, to the third class or Zeugitæ of the Solonian -census. The two Symmories of each tribe (comprising its one hundred -and twenty richest members) superintended the property-register -of each tribe, and collected the contributions due from its less -wealthy registered members. Occasionally, when the state required -immediate payment, the thirty richest men in each tribe (making -up altogether the three hundred) advanced the whole sum of tax -chargeable upon the tribe, having their legal remedy of enforcement -against the other members for the recovery of the sum chargeable -upon each. The richest citizens were thus both armed with rights -and charged with duties,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">[p. -119]</span> such as had not belonged to them before the archonship -of Nausinikus. By their intervention (it was supposed) the schedule -would be kept nearer to the truth as respects the assessment on each -individual, while the sums actually imposed would be more immediately -forthcoming, than if the state directly interfered by officers of -its own. Soon after, the system of the Symmories was extended to the -trierarchy; a change which had not at first been contemplated. Each -Symmory had its chiefs, its curators, its assessors, acting under the -general presidency of the Stratêgi. Twenty-five years afterwards, we -also find Demosthenes (then about thirty years of age) recommending a -still more comprehensive application of the same principle, so that -men, money, ships, and all the means and forces of the state, might -thus be parcelled into distinct fractions, and consigned to distinct -Symmories, each with known duties of limited extent for the component -persons to perform, and each exposed not merely to legal process, -but also to loss of esteem, in the event of non-performance. It will -rather appear, however, that, in practice, the system of Symmories -came to be greatly abused, and to produce pernicious effects never -anticipated.</p> - -<p>At present, however, I only notice this new financial and -political classification introduced in 378 <small>B.C.</small>, -as one evidence of the ardor with which Athens embarked in her -projected war against Sparta. The feeling among her allies, the -Thebans, was no less determined. The government of Leontiades and -the Spartan garrison had left behind it so strong an antipathy, that -the large majority of citizens, embarking heartily in the revolution -against them, lent themselves to all the orders of Pelopidas and -his colleagues; who, on their part, had no other thought but to -repel the common enemy. The Theban government now became probably -democratical in form; and still more democratical in spirit, from -the unanimous ardor pervading the whole mass. Its military force -was put under the best training; the most fertile portion of the -plain north of Thebes, from which the chief subsistence of the city -came, was surrounded by a ditch and a palisade,<a id="FNanchor_242" -href="#Footnote_242" class="fnanchor">[242]</a> to repel the expected -Spartan invasion; and the memorable Sacred Band was now for the first -time organized. This was a brigade of three<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_120">[p. 120]</span> hundred hoplites, called the Lochus, -or regiment of the city, as being consecrated to the defence of the -Kadmeia, or acropolis.<a id="FNanchor_243" href="#Footnote_243" -class="fnanchor">[243]</a> It was put under constant arms and -training, at the public expense, like the Thousand at Argos, of -whom mention was made in my seventh volume.<a id="FNanchor_244" -href="#Footnote_244" class="fnanchor">[244]</a> It consisted of -youthful citizens from the best families, distinguished for their -strength and courage amidst the severe trials of the palæstra -in Thebes, and was marshalled in such manner, that each pair of -neighboring soldiers were at the same time intimate friends; so -that the whole band were thus kept together by ties which no -dangers could sever. At first its destination, under Gorgidas its -commander (as we see by the select Three Hundred who fought in 424 -<small>B.C.</small> at the battle of Delium),<a id="FNanchor_245" -href="#Footnote_245" class="fnanchor">[245]</a> was to serve as front -rank men, for the general body of hoplites to follow. But from a -circumstance to be mentioned presently, it came to be employed by -Pelopidas and Epaminondas as a regiment by itself, and in a charge -was then found irresistible.<a id="FNanchor_246" href="#Footnote_246" -class="fnanchor">[246]</a></p> - -<p>We must remark that the Thebans had always been good soldiers, -both as hoplites and as cavalry. The existing enthusiasm, therefore, -with the more sustained training, only raised good soldiers into much -better. But Thebes was now blessed with another good fortune, such as -had never yet befallen her. She found among her citizens a leader of -the rarest excellence. It is now for the first time that Epaminondas, -the son of Polymnis, begins to stand out in the public life of -Greece. His family, poor rather than rich, was among the most ancient -in Thebes, belonging to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">[p. -121]</span> those Gentes called Sparti, whose heroic progenitors -were said to have sprung from the dragon’s teeth sown by Kadmus.<a -id="FNanchor_247" href="#Footnote_247" class="fnanchor">[247]</a> He -seems to have been now of middle age; Pelopidas was younger, and of -a very rich family; yet the relations between the two were those of -equal and intimate friendship, tested in a day of battle, wherein the -two were ranged side by side as hoplites, and where Epaminondas had -saved the life of his wounded friend, at the cost of several wounds, -and the greatest possible danger, to himself.<a id="FNanchor_248" -href="#Footnote_248" class="fnanchor">[248]</a></p> - -<p>Epaminondas had discharged, with punctuality, those military -and gymnastic duties which were incumbent on every Theban citizen. -But we are told that in the gymnasia he studied to acquire the -maximum of activity rather than of strength; the nimble movements -of a runner and wrestler,—not the heavy muscularity, purchased -in part by excessive nutriment, of the Bœotian pugilist.<a -id="FNanchor_249" href="#Footnote_249" class="fnanchor">[249]</a> He -also learned music, vocal and instrumental, and<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_122">[p. 122]</span> dancing; by which, in those days, -was meant, not simply the power of striking the lyre or blowing -the flute, but all that belonged to the graceful, expressive, and -emphatic management, either of the voice or of the body; rhythmical -pronunciation, exercised by repetition of the poets,—and disciplined -movements, for taking part in a choric festival with becoming -consonance amidst a crowd of citizen performers. Of such gymnastic -and musical training, the combination of which constituted an -accomplished Grecian citizen, the former predominated at Thebes, -the latter at Athens. Moreover, at Thebes the musical training -was based more upon the flute (for the construction of which, -excellent reeds grew near the Lake Kopaïs); at Athens more upon -the lyre, which admitted of vocal accompaniment by the player. -The Athenian Alkibiades<a id="FNanchor_250" href="#Footnote_250" -class="fnanchor">[250]</a> was heard to remark, when he threw away -his flute in disgust, that flute-playing was a fit occupation for -the Thebans, since they did not know how to speak; and in regard to -the countrymen of Pindar<a id="FNanchor_251" href="#Footnote_251" -class="fnanchor">[251]</a> generally, the remark was hardly -less true than contemptuous. On this capital point, Epaminondas -formed a splendid exception. Not only had he learnt the lyre<a -id="FNanchor_252" href="#Footnote_252" class="fnanchor">[252]</a> -as well as the flute from the best masters, but also, dissenting -from his brother Kapheisias and his friend Pelopidas, he manifested -from his earliest years an ardent intellectual impulse, which would -have been remarkable even in an Athenian. He sought with eagerness -the conversation of the philosophers within his reach, among whom -were the Theban Simmias and the Tarentine Spintharus, both of -them once companions of Sokrates; so that the stirring influence -of the Sokratic method would thus find its way, partially and at -second-hand, to the bosom of Epaminondas. As the relations between -Thebes and Athens, ever since the close of the Peloponnesian war, -had become more and more<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">[p. -123]</span> friendly, growing at length into alliance and joint war -against the Spartans,—we may reasonably presume that he profited -by teachers at the latter city as well as at the former. But the -person to whom he particularly devoted himself, and whom he not only -heard as a pupil, but tended almost as a son, during the close of -an aged life,—was a Tarentine exile, named Lysis; a member of the -Pythagorean brotherhood, who, from causes which we cannot make out, -had sought shelter at Thebes, and dwelt there until his death.<a -id="FNanchor_253" href="#Footnote_253" class="fnanchor">[253]</a> -With him, as well as with other philosophers, Epaminondas discussed -all the subjects of study and inquiry then afloat. By perseverance -in this course for some years, he not only acquired considerable -positive instruction, but also became practised in new and -enlarged intellectual combinations; and was, like Perikles,<a -id="FNanchor_254" href="#Footnote_254" class="fnanchor">[254]</a> -emancipated from that timorous interpretation of nature, which -rendered so many Grecian commanders the slaves of signs and omens. -His patience as a listener, and his indifference to showy talk on -his own account, were so remarkable, that Spintharus (the father of -Aristoxenus), after numerous conversations with him, affirmed that -he had never met with any one who understood more, or talked less.<a -id="FNanchor_255" href="#Footnote_255" class="fnanchor">[255]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">[p. 124]</span></p> - -<p>Nor did such reserve proceed from any want of ready powers of -expression. On the contrary, the eloquence of Epaminondas, when -he entered upon his public career, was shown to be not merely -preëminent among Thebans, but effective even against the best -Athenian opponents.<a id="FNanchor_256" href="#Footnote_256" -class="fnanchor">[256]</a> But his disposition was essentially -modest and unambitious, combined with a strong intellectual -curiosity and a great capacity; a rare combination amidst a race -usually erring on the side of forwardness and self-esteem. Little -moved by personal ambition, and never cultivating popularity by -unworthy means, Epaminondas was still more indifferent on the score -of money. He remained in contented poverty to the end of his life, -not leaving enough to pay his funeral expenses, yet repudiating -not merely the corrupting propositions of foreigners, but also -the solicitous tenders of personal friends;<a id="FNanchor_257" -href="#Footnote_257" class="fnanchor">[257]</a> though we are -told that, when once serving the costly office of choregus, he -permitted his friend Pelopidas to bear a portion of the expense.<a -id="FNanchor_258" href="#Footnote_258" class="fnanchor">[258]</a> -As he thus stood exempt from two of the besetting infirmities which -most frequently misguided eminent Greek statesmen, so there was a -third characteristic not less estimable in his moral character; -the gentleness of his political antipathies,—his repugnance to -harsh treatment of conquered enemies,—and his refusal to mingle in -intestine bloodshed. If ever there were men whose conduct seemed -to justify unmeasured retaliation, it was Leontiades and his -fellow-traitors. They had opened the doors of the Kadmeia to the -Spartan Phœbidas, and had put to death the Theban leader Ismenias. -Yet Epaminondas disapproved of the scheme of Pelopidas and the other -exiles to assassinate them, and declined to take part in it; partly -on prudential grounds, but partly, also,<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_125">[p. 125]</span> on conscientious scruples.<a -id="FNanchor_259" href="#Footnote_259" class="fnanchor">[259]</a> -None of his virtues was found so difficult to imitate by his -subsequent admirers, as this mastery over the resentful and -vindictive passions.<a id="FNanchor_260" href="#Footnote_260" -class="fnanchor">[260]</a></p> - -<p>Before Epaminondas could have full credit for these virtues, -however, it was necessary that he should give proof of the -extraordinary capacities for action with which they were combined, -and that he should achieve something to earn that exclamation -of praise which we shall find his enemy Agesilaus afterwards -pronouncing, on seeing him at the head of the invading Theban army -near Sparta,—“Oh! thou man of great deeds!”<a id="FNanchor_261" -href="#Footnote_261" class="fnanchor">[261]</a> In the year -<small>B.C.</small> 379, when the Kadmeia was emancipated, he was -as yet undistinguished in public life, and known only to Pelopidas -with his other friends; among whom, too, his unambitious and -inquisitive disposition was a subject of complaint as keeping him -unduly in the background.<a id="FNanchor_262" href="#Footnote_262" -class="fnanchor">[262]</a> But the unparalleled phenomena of that -year supplied a spur which overruled all backwardness, and smothered -all rival inclinations. The Thebans, having just recovered their -city by an incredible turn of fortune, found themselves exposed -single-handed to the full<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">[p. -126]</span> attack of Sparta and her extensive confederacy. Not -even Athens had yet declared in their favor, nor had they a single -other ally. Under such circumstances, Thebes could only be saved by -the energy of all her citizens,—the unambitious and philosophical -as well as the rest. As the necessities of the case required such -simultaneous devotion, so the electric shock of the recent revolution -was sufficient to awaken enthusiasm in minds much less patriotic than -that of Epaminondas. He was among the first to join the victorious -exiles in arms, after the contest had been transferred from the -houses of Archias and Leontiades to the open market-place; and he -would probably have been among the first to mount the walls of the -Kadmeia, had the Spartan harmost awaited an assault. Pelopidas -being named Bœotarch, his friend Epaminondas was naturally placed -among the earliest and most forward organizers of the necessary -military resistance against the common enemy; in which employment -his capacities speedily became manifest. Though at this moment -almost an unknown man, he had acquired, in <small>B.C.</small> -371, seven years afterwards, so much reputation both as speaker and -as general, that he was chosen as the expositor of Theban policy -at Sparta, and trusted with the conduct of the battle of Leuktra, -upon which the fate of Thebes hinged. Hence we may fairly conclude, -that the well-planned and successful system of defence, together -with the steady advance of Thebes against Sparta, during the -intermediate years, was felt to have been in the main his work.<a -id="FNanchor_263" href="#Footnote_263" class="fnanchor">[263]</a></p> - -<p>The turn of politics at Athens which followed the acquittal -of Sphodrias was an unspeakable benefit to the Thebans, in -second<span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">[p. 127]</span>ing as -well as encouraging their defence; and the Spartans, not unmoved -at the new enemies raised up by their treatment of Sphodrias, -thought it necessary to make some efforts on their side. They -organized on a more systematic scale the military force of their -confederacy, and even took some conciliatory steps with the view -of effacing the odium of their past misrule.<a id="FNanchor_264" -href="#Footnote_264" class="fnanchor">[264]</a> The full force -of their confederacy,—including, as a striking mark of present -Spartan power, even the distant Olynthians,<a id="FNanchor_265" -href="#Footnote_265" class="fnanchor">[265]</a>—was placed in motion -against Thebes in the course of the summer under Agesilaus; who -contrived, by putting in sudden requisition a body of mercenaries -acting in the service of the Arcadian town Kleitor against its -neighbor the Arcadian Orchomenus, to make himself master of the -passes of Kithæron, before the Thebans and Athenians could have -notice of his passing the Lacedæmonian border.<a id="FNanchor_266" -href="#Footnote_266" class="fnanchor">[266]</a> Then crossing -Kithæron into Bœotia, he established his head-quarters at Thespiæ, -a post already under Spartan occupation. From thence he commenced -his attacks upon the Theban territory, which he found defended -partly by a considerable length of ditch and palisade—partly by the -main force of Thebes, assisted by a division of mixed Athenians and -mercenaries, sent from Athens under Chabrias. Keeping on their own -side of the palisade, the Thebans suddenly sent out their cavalry, -and attacked Agesilaus by surprise, occasioning some loss. Such -sallies were frequently repeated, until, by a rapid march at break -of day, he forced his way through an opening in the breastwork into -their inner country, which he laid waste nearly to the city walls.<a -id="FNanchor_267" href="#Footnote_267" class="fnanchor">[267]</a> -The Thebans and Athenians, though not offering him battle on equal -terms, nevertheless kept the field against him, taking care to hold -positions advantageous for defence. Agesilaus on his side did not -feel confident enough to attack them against such odds. Yet on one -occasion he had made up his mind to do so; and was marching up to -the charge, when he was daunted by the firm attitude and excellent -array of the troops of Chabrias. They had received orders to await -his approach, on a high and advantageous ground, without moving until -signal should be given; with their shields resting on the<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_128">[p. 128]</span> knee, and their -spears protended. So imposing was their appearance, that Agesilaus -called off his troops without daring to complete the charge.<a -id="FNanchor_268" href="#Footnote_268" class="fnanchor">[268]</a> -After a month or more of devastations on the lands of Thebes, and a -string of desultory skirmishes in which he seems to have lost rather -than gained, Agesilaus withdrew to Thespiæ; the fortifications of -which he strengthened, leaving Phœbidas with a considerable force in -occupation, and then leading back his army to Peloponnesus.</p> - -<p>Phœbidas,—the former captor of the Kadmeia,—thus stationed at -Thespiæ, carried on vigorous warfare against Thebes; partly with -his own Spartan division, partly with the Thespian hoplites, who -promised him unshrinking support. His incursions soon brought on -reprisals from the Thebans; who invaded Thespiæ, but were repulsed -by Phœbidas with the loss of all their plunder. In the pursuit, -however, hurrying incautiously forward, he was slain by a sudden -turn of the Theban cavalry;<a id="FNanchor_269" href="#Footnote_269" -class="fnanchor">[269]</a> upon which all his troops fled, chased by -the Thebans to the very gates of Thespiæ. Though the Spartans, in -consequence of this misfortune, despatched by sea another general and -division to replace Phœbidas, the cause of the Thebans was greatly -strengthened by their recent victory. They pushed their success not -only against Thespiæ, but against the other Bœotian cities, still -held by local oligarchies in dependence on Sparta. At the same time, -these oligarchies were threatened by the growing strength of their -own popular or philo-Theban citizens, who crowded in considerable -numbers as exiles to Thebes.<a id="FNanchor_270" href="#Footnote_270" -class="fnanchor">[270]</a></p> - -<p>A second expedition against Thebes, undertaken by Agesilaus -in the ensuing summer with the main army of the confederacy, was -neither more decisive nor more profitable than the preceding. Though -he contrived, by a well-planned stratagem, to surprize the<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_129">[p. 129]</span> Theban palisade, and -lay waste the plain, he gained no serious victory; and even showed, -more clearly than before, his reluctance to engage except upon -perfectly equal terms.<a id="FNanchor_271" href="#Footnote_271" -class="fnanchor">[271]</a> It became evident that the Thebans -were not only strengthening their position in Bœotia, but also -acquiring practice in warfare and confidence against the Spartans; -insomuch that Antalkidas and some other companions remonstrated with -Agesilaus, against carrying on the war so as only to give improving -lessons to his enemies in military practice,—and called upon him -to strike some decisive blow. He quitted Bœotia, however, after -the summer’s campaign, without any such step.<a id="FNanchor_272" -href="#Footnote_272" class="fnanchor">[272]</a> In his way he -appeased an intestine conflict which was about to break out in -Thespiæ. Afterwards, on passing to Megara, he experienced a strain or -hurt, which grievously injured his sound leg, (it has been mentioned -already that he was lame of one leg,) and induced his surgeon to open -a vein in the limb for reducing the inflammation. When this was done, -however, the blood could not be stopped until he swooned. Having been -conveyed home to Sparta in great suffering, he was confined to his -couch for several months; and he remained during a much longer time -unfit for active command.<a id="FNanchor_273" href="#Footnote_273" -class="fnanchor">[273]</a></p> - -<p>The functions of general now devolved upon the other king -Kleombrotus, who in the next spring conducted the army of the -confederacy to invade Bœotia anew. But on this occasion, the -Athenians and Thebans had occupied the passes of Kithæron, so -that he was unable even to enter the country, and was obliged to -dismiss his troops without achieving anything.<a id="FNanchor_274" -href="#Footnote_274" class="fnanchor">[274]</a></p> - -<p>His inglorious retreat excited such murmurs among the allies when -they met at Sparta, that they resolved to fit out a large naval -force, sufficient both to intercept the supplies of imported corn to -Athens, and to forward an invading army by sea against Thebes, to -the Bœotian port of Kreusis in the Krissæan Gulf. The former object -was attempted first. Towards midsummer, a fleet of sixty triremes, -fitted out under the Spartan admiral Pollis,<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_130">[p. 130]</span> was cruising in the Ægean; especially -round the coast of Attica, near Ægina, Keos, and Andros. The -Athenians, who, since their recently renewed confederacy, had been -undisturbed by any enemies at sea, found themselves thus threatened, -not merely with loss of power, but also with loss of trade and -even famine; since their corn-ships from the Euxine, though safely -reaching Geræstus (the southern extremity of Eubœa), were prevented -from doubling Cape Sunium. Feeling severely this interruption, they -fitted out at Peiræus a fleet of eighty triremes,<a id="FNanchor_275" -href="#Footnote_275" class="fnanchor">[275]</a> with crews -mainly composed of citizens; who, under the admiral Chabrias, in -a sharply contested action near Naxos, completely defeated the -fleet of Pollis, and regained for Athens the mastery of the sea. -Forty-nine Lacedæmonian triremes were disabled or captured, eight -with their entire crews.<a id="FNanchor_276" href="#Footnote_276" -class="fnanchor">[276]</a> Moreover, Chabrias might have destroyed -all or most of the rest, had he not suspended his attack, having -eighteen of his own ships disabled, to pick up both the living -men and the dead bodies on board, as well as all Athenians -who were swimming for their lives. He did this (we are told<a -id="FNanchor_277" href="#Footnote_277" class="fnanchor">[277]</a>), -from distinct<span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">[p. 131]</span> -recollection of the fierce displeasure of the people against the -victorious generals after the battle of Arginusæ. And we may thus -see, that though the proceedings on that memorable occasion were -stained both by illegality and by violence, they produced a salutary -effect upon the public conduct of subsequent commanders. Many a brave -Athenian (the crews consisting principally of citizens) owed his -life, after the battle of Naxos, to the terrible lesson administered -by the people to their generals in 406 <small>B.C.</small>, thirty -years before.</p> - -<p>This was the first great victory (in September, 376 -<small>B.C.</small><a id="FNanchor_278" href="#Footnote_278" -class="fnanchor">[278]</a>) which the Athenians had gained at sea -since the Peloponnesian war; and while it thus filled them with -joy and confidence, it led to a material enlargement of their -maritime confederacy. The fleet of Chabrias,—of which a squadron -was detached under the orders of Phokion, a young Athenian now -distinguishing himself for the first time and often hereafter to -be mentioned,—sailed victorious round the Ægean, made prize of -twenty other triremes in single ships, brought in three thousand -prisoners with one hundred and ten talents in money, and annexed -seventeen new cities to the confederacy, as sending deputies to the -synod and furnishing contributions. The discreet and conciliatory -behavior of Phokion, especially obtained much favor among the -islanders, and determined several new adhesions to Athens.<a -id="FNanchor_279" href="#Footnote_279" class="fnanchor">[279]</a> To -the inhabitants<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">[p. 132]</span> -of Abdêra in Thrace, Chabrias rendered an inestimable service, by -aiding them to repulse a barbarous horde of Triballi, who quitting -their abode from famine, had poured upon the sea-coast, defeating -the Abderites and plundering their territory. The citizens, -grateful for a force left to defend their town, willingly allied -themselves with Athens, whose confederacy thus extended itself -to the coast of Thrace.<a id="FNanchor_280" href="#Footnote_280" -class="fnanchor">[280]</a></p> - -<p>Having prosperously enlarged their confederacy to the east of -Peloponnesus, the Athenians began to aim at the acquisition of new -allies in the west. The fleet of sixty triremes, which had recently -served under Chabrias, was sent, under the command of Timotheus, the -son of Konon, to circumnavigate Peloponnesus and alarm the coast -of Laconia; partly at the instance of the Thebans, who were eager -to keep the naval force of Sparta occupied, so as to prevent her -from conveying troops across the Krissæan Gulf from Corinth to the -Bœotian port of Kreusis.<a id="FNanchor_281" href="#Footnote_281" -class="fnanchor">[281]</a> This Periplus of Peloponnesus,—the first -which the fleet of Athens had attempted since her humiliation at -Ægospotami,—coupled with the ensuing successes, was long remembered -by the countrymen of Timotheus. His large force, just dealing, -and conciliatory professions, won new and valuable allies. Not -only Kephallenia, but the still more important island of Korkyra, -voluntarily accepted his propositions; and as he took care to avoid -all violence or interference with the political constitution, -his popularity all around augmented every day. Alketas, prince -of the Molossi,—the Chaonians with other Epirotic tribes,—and -the Akarnanians on the coast,—all embraced his alliance.<a -id="FNanchor_282" href="#Footnote_282" class="fnanchor">[282]</a> -While near Alyzia and Leukas on this coast, he was assailed by the -Peloponnesian ships under Nikolochus, rather inferior in number to -his fleet. He defeated them, and being shortly afterwards reinforced -by other triremes from Korkyra, he became so superior in those -waters, that the hostile fleet did not dare to show itself. Having -received only thirteen talents on quitting Athens, we are told that -he had great difficulty in paying his fleet; that he procured an -advance of money, from each of the sixty trierarchs in his fleet, -of seven minæ towards the pay of their respective ships;<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_133">[p. 133]</span> and that he also sent -home requests for large remittances from the public treasury;<a -id="FNanchor_283" href="#Footnote_283" class="fnanchor">[283]</a> -measures which go to bear out that honorable repugnance to the -plunder of friends or neutrals, and care to avoid even the suspicion -of plunder, which his panegyrist Isokrates ascribes to him.<a -id="FNanchor_284" href="#Footnote_284" class="fnanchor">[284]</a> -This was a feature unhappily rare among the Grecian generals on -both sides, and tending to become still rarer, from the increased -employment of mercenary bands.</p> - -<p>The demands of Timotheus on the treasury of Athens were not -favorably received. Though her naval position was now more -brilliant and commanding than it had been since the battle of -Ægospotami,—though no Lacedæmonian fleet showed itself to disturb -her in the Ægean,<a id="FNanchor_285" href="#Footnote_285" -class="fnanchor">[285]</a>—yet the cost of the war began to be -seriously felt. Privateers from the neighboring island of Ægina -annoyed her commerce, requiring a perpetual coast-guard; while -the contributions from the deputies to the confederate synod were -not sufficient to dispense with the necessity of a heavy direct -property tax at home.<a id="FNanchor_286" href="#Footnote_286" -class="fnanchor">[286]</a></p> - -<p>In this synod the Thebans, as members of the confederacy, -were represented.<a id="FNanchor_287" href="#Footnote_287" -class="fnanchor">[287]</a> Application was made to them to -contribute towards the cost of the naval war; the rather, as -it was partly at their instance that the fleet had been sent -round to the Ionian Sea. But the Thebans declined compliance,<a -id="FNanchor_288" href="#Footnote_288" class="fnanchor">[288]</a> -nor were they<span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">[p. 134]</span> -probably in any condition to furnish pecuniary aid. Their refusal -occasioned much displeasure at Athens, embittered by jealousy at -the strides which they had been making during the two last years, -partly through the indirect effect of the naval successes of Athens. -At the end of the year 377 <small>B.C.</small>, after the two -successive invasions of Agesilaus, the ruin of two home crops had -so straitened the Thebans, that they were forced to import corn -from Pagasæ in Thessaly; in which enterprise their ships and seamen -were at first captured by the Lacedæmonian harmost at Oreus in -Eubœa, Alketas. His negligence, however, soon led not only to an -outbreak of their seamen who had been taken prisoners, but also to -the revolt of the town from Sparta, so that the communication of -Thebes with Pagasæ became quite unimpeded. For the two succeeding -years, there had been no Spartan invasion of Bœotia; since, in 376 -<small>B.C.</small>, Kleombrotus could not surmount the heights -of Kithæron,—while in 375 <small>B.C.</small>, the attention of -Sparta had been occupied by the naval operations of Timotheus in -the Ionian Sea. During these two years, the Thebans had exerted -themselves vigorously against the neighboring cities of Bœotia, in -most of which a strong party, if not the majority of the population, -was favorable to them, though the government was in the hands of the -philo-Spartan oligarchy, seconded by Spartan harmosts and garrison.<a -id="FNanchor_289" href="#Footnote_289" class="fnanchor">[289]</a> -We hear of one victory gained by the Theban cavalry near Platæa, -under Charon; and of another near Tanagra, in which Panthöides, the -Lacedæmonian harmost in that town, was slain.<a id="FNanchor_290" -href="#Footnote_290" class="fnanchor">[290]</a></p> - -<p>But the most important of all their successes was that of -Pelopidas near Tegyra. That commander, hearing that the Spartan -harmost, with his two (moræ or) divisions in garrison at Orchomenus, -had gone away on an excursion into the Lokrian territory, made a -dash from Thebes with the Sacred Band and a few cavalry, to surprise -the place. It was the season in which the waters of the Lake Kopaïs -were at the fullest, so that he was obliged to take a wide circuit -to the north-west, and to pass by Tegyra, on the road between -Orchomenus and the Opuntian Lokris. On arriving<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_135">[p. 135]</span> near Orchomenus, he ascertained that -there were still some Lacedæmonians in the town, and that no surprise -could be effected; upon which he retraced his steps. But on reaching -Tegyra, he fell in with the Lacedæmonian commanders, Gorgoleon and -Theopompus, returning with their troops from the Lokrian excursion. -As his numbers were inferior to theirs by half, they rejoiced in the -encounter; while the troops of Pelopidas were at first dismayed, and -required all his encouragement to work them up. But in the fight -that ensued, closely and obstinately contested in a narrow pass, -the strength, valor, and compact charge of the Sacred Band proved -irresistible. The two Lacedæmonian commanders were both slain; -their troops opened, to allow the Thebans an undisturbed retreat; -but Pelopidas, disdaining this opportunity, persisted in the combat -until all his enemies dispersed and fled. The neighborhood of -Orchomenus forbade any long pursuit, so that Pelopidas could only -erect his trophy, and strip the dead, before returning to Thebes.<a -id="FNanchor_291" href="#Footnote_291" class="fnanchor">[291]</a></p> - -<p>This combat, in which the Lacedæmonians were for the first time -beaten in fair field by numbers inferior to their own, produced -a strong sensation in the minds of both the contending parties. -The confidence of the Thebans, as well as their exertion, was -redoubled; so that by the year 374 <small>B.C.</small>, they -had cleared Bœotia of the Lacedæmonians, as well as of the local -oligarchies which sustained them; persuading or constraining the -cities again to come into union with Thebes, and reviving the -Bœotian confederacy. Haliartus, Korôneia, Lebadeia, Tanagra, -Thespiæ, Platæa, and the rest, thus became again Bœotian;<a -id="FNanchor_292" href="#Footnote_292" class="fnanchor">[292]</a> -leaving out Orchomenus alone, (with its dependency Chæroneia,) -which was on the borders of Phokis, and still continued under -Lacedæmonian occupation. In most of these cities, the party friendly -to Thebes was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">[p. 136]</span> -numerous, and the change, on the whole, popular; though in some the -prevailing sentiment was such, that adherence was only obtained by -intimidation. The change here made by Thebes, was not to absorb these -cities into herself, but to bring them back to the old federative -system of Bœotia; a policy which she had publicly proclaimed on -surprising Platæa in 431 <small>B.C.</small><a id="FNanchor_293" -href="#Footnote_293" class="fnanchor">[293]</a> While resuming her -own ancient rights and privileges as head of the Bœotian federation, -she at the same time guaranteed to the other cities,—by convention, -probably express, but certainly implied,—their ancient rights, their -security, and their qualified autonomy, as members; the system which -had existed down to the peace of Antalkidas.</p> - -<p>The position of the Thebans was materially improved by this -reconquest or reconfederation of Bœotia. Becoming masters of Kreusis, -the port of Thespiæ,<a id="FNanchor_294" href="#Footnote_294" -class="fnanchor">[294]</a> they fortified it, and built some triremes -to repel any invasion from Peloponnesus by sea across the Krissæan -Gulf. Feeling thus secure against invasion, they began to retaliate -upon their neighbors and enemies the Phokians, allies of Sparta, -and auxiliaries in the recent attacks on Thebes,—yet also, from -ancient times, on friendly terms with Athens.<a id="FNanchor_295" -href="#Footnote_295" class="fnanchor">[295]</a> So hard pressed -were the Phokians,—especially as Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly -was at the same time their bitter enemy,<a id="FNanchor_296" -href="#Footnote_296" class="fnanchor">[296]</a>—that unless -assisted, they would have been compelled to submit to the Thebans, -and along with them Orchomenus, including the Lacedæmonian garrison -then occupying it; while the treasures of the Delphian Temple -would also have been laid open, in case the Thebans should think -fit to seize them. Intimation being sent by<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_137">[p. 137]</span> the Phokians to Sparta, King -Kleombrotus was sent to their aid, by sea across the Gulf, with four -Lacedæmonian divisions of troops, and an auxiliary body of allies.<a -id="FNanchor_297" href="#Footnote_297" class="fnanchor">[297]</a> -This reinforcement, compelling the Thebans to retire, placed both -Phokis and Orchomenus in safety. While Sparta thus sustained -them, even Athens looked upon the Phokian cause with sympathy. -When she saw that the Thebans had passed from the defensive to -the offensive,—partly by her help, yet nevertheless refusing to -contribute to the cost of her navy,—her ancient jealousy of them -became again so powerful, that she sent envoys to Sparta, to propose -terms of peace. What these terms were, we are not told; nor does it -appear that the Thebans even received notice of the proceeding. But -the peace was accepted at Sparta, and two of the Athenian envoys were -despatched at once from thence, without even going home, to Korkyra, -for the purpose of notifying the peace to Timotheus, and ordering him -forthwith to conduct his fleet back to Athens.<a id="FNanchor_298" -href="#Footnote_298" class="fnanchor">[298]</a></p> - -<p>This proposition of the Athenians, made seemingly in a moment of -impetuous dissatisfaction, was made to the advantage of Sparta,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_138">[p. 138]</span> and served somewhat to -countervail a mortifying revelation which had reached the Spartans a -little before from a different quarter.</p> - -<p>Polydamas, an eminent citizen of Pharsalus in Thessaly, came to -Sparta to ask for aid. He had long been on terms of hospitality -with the Lacedæmonians; while Pharsalus had not merely been -in alliance with them, but was for some time occupied by one -of their garrisons.<a id="FNanchor_299" href="#Footnote_299" -class="fnanchor">[299]</a> In the usual state of Thessaly, the great -cities Larissa, Pheræ, Pharsalus, and others, each holding some -smaller cities in a state of dependent alliance, were in disagreement -with each other,—often even in actual war. It was rare that they -could be brought to concur in a common vote for the election of a -supreme chief or Tagus. At his own city of Pharsalus, Polydamas was -now in the ascendant, enjoying the confidence of all the great family -factions who usually contended for predominance; to such a degree, -indeed, that he was entrusted with the custody of the citadel and the -entire management of the revenues, receipts as well as disbursements. -Being a wealthy man, “hospitable and ostentatious in the Thessalian -fashion,” he advanced money from his own purse to the treasury -whenever it was low, and repaid himself when public funds came in.<a -id="FNanchor_300" href="#Footnote_300" class="fnanchor">[300]</a></p> - -<p>But a greater man than Polydamas had now arisen in -Thessaly,—Jason, despot of Pheræ; whose formidable power, threatening -the independence of Pharsalus, he now came to Sparta to denounce. -Though the force of Jason can hardly have been very considerable when -the Spartans passed through Thessaly, six years before, in their -repeated expeditions against Olynthus, he was now not only despot of -Pheræ, but master of nearly all the Thessalian cities (as Lykophron -of Pheræ had partially succeeded in becoming thirty years before),<a -id="FNanchor_301" href="#Footnote_301" class="fnanchor">[301]</a> as -well as of a large area of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">[p. -139]</span> tributary circumjacent territory. The great instrument -of his dominion was, a standing and well-appointed force of six -thousand mercenary troops, from all parts of Greece. He possessed -all the personal qualities requisite for conducting soldiers with -the greatest effect. His bodily strength was great; his activity -indefatigable; his self-command, both as to hardship and as to -temptation, alike conspicuous. Always personally sharing both in the -drill and in the gymnastics of the soldiers, and encouraging military -merits with the utmost munificence, he had not only disciplined them, -but inspired them with extreme warlike ardor and devotion to his -person. Several of the neighboring tribes, together with Alketas, -prince of the Molossi in Epirus, had been reduced to the footing -of his dependent allies. Moreover, he had already defeated the -Pharsalians, and stripped them of many of the towns which had once -been connected with them, so that it only remained for him now to -carry his arms against their city. But Jason was prudent, as well as -daring. Though certain of success, he wished to avoid the odium of -employing force, and the danger of having malcontents for subjects. -He therefore proposed to Polydamas, in a private interview, that he -(Polydamas) should bring Pharsalus under Jason’s dominion, accepting -for himself the second place in Thessaly, under Jason installed as -Tagus or president. The whole force of Thessaly thus united, with -its array of tributary nations around, would be decidedly the first -power in Greece, superior on land either to Sparta or Thebes, and -at sea to Athens. And as to the Persian king, with his multitudes -of unwarlike slaves, Jason regarded him as an enemy yet easier to -overthrow; considering what had been achieved first by the Cyreians, -and afterwards by Agesilaus.</p> - -<p>Such were the propositions, and such the ambitious hopes, which -the energetic despot of Pheræ had laid before Polydamas; who -replied, that he himself had long been allied with Sparta, and that -he could take no resolution hostile to her interests. “Go to<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_140">[p. 140]</span> Sparta, then (rejoined -Jason), and give notice there, that I intend to attack Pharsalus, and -that it is for them to afford you protection. If they cannot comply -with the demand, you will be unfaithful to the interests of your -city if you do not embrace my offers.” It was on this mission that -Polydamas was now come to Sparta, to announce that unless aid could -be sent to him, he should be compelled unwillingly to sever himself -from her. “Recollect (he concluded) that the enemy against whom you -will have to contend is formidable in every way, both from personal -qualities and from power; so that nothing short of a first-rate -force and commander will suffice. Consider, and tell me what you can -do.”</p> - -<p>The Spartans, having deliberated on the point, returned a reply in -the negative. Already a large force had been sent under Kleombrotus -as essential to the defence of Phokis; moreover, the Athenians were -now the stronger power at sea. Lastly, Jason had hitherto lent no -active assistance to Thebes and Athens—which he would assuredly be -provoked to do, if a Spartan army interfered against him in Thessaly. -Accordingly the ephors told Polydamas plainly, that they were unable -to satisfy his demands, recommending him to make the best terms that -he could, both for Pharsalus and for himself. Returning to Thessaly, -he resumed his negotiation with Jason, and promised substantial -compliance with what was required. But he entreated to be spared the -dishonor of admitting a foreign garrison into the citadel which had -been confidentially entrusted to his care; engaging at the same time -to bring his fellow-citizens into voluntary union with Jason, and -tendering his two sons as hostages for faithful performance. All this -was actually brought to pass. The politics of the Pharsalians were -gently brought round, so that Jason, by their votes as well as the -rest, was unanimously elected Tagus of Thessaly.<a id="FNanchor_302" -href="#Footnote_302" class="fnanchor">[302]</a></p> - -<p>The dismissal of Polydamas implied a mortifying confession of -weakness on the part of Sparta. It marks, too, an important stage in -the real decline of her power. Eight years before, at the instance -of the Akanthian envoys, backed by the Macedonian Amyntas, she had -sent three powerful armies in succession to<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_141">[p. 141]</span> crush the liberal and promising -confederacy of Olynthus, and to re-transfer the Grecian cities on -the sea-coast to the Macedonian crown. The region to which her -armies had been sent, was the extreme verge of Hellas. The parties -in whose favor she acted, had scarcely the shadow of a claim, as -friends or allies; while those <i>against</i> whom she acted, had neither -done nor threatened any wrong to her: moreover, the main ground on -which her interference was invoked, was to hinder the free and equal -confederation of Grecian cities. <i>Now</i>, a claim, and a strong claim, -is made upon her by Polydamas of Pharsalus, an old friend and ally. -It comes from a region much less distant; lastly, her political -interest would naturally bid her arrest the menacing increase of -an aggressive power already so formidable as that of Jason. Yet so -seriously has the position of Sparta altered in the last eight years -(382-374 <small>B.C.</small>), that she is now compelled to decline -a demand which justice, sympathy, and political policy alike prompted -her to grant. So unfortunate was it for the Olynthian confederacy, -that their honorable and well-combined aspirations fell exactly -during those few years in which Sparta was at her maximum of power! -So unfortunate was such coincidence of time, not only for Olynthus, -but for Greece generally:—since nothing but Spartan interference -restored the Macedonian kings to the sea-coast, while the Olynthian -confederacy, had it been allowed to expand, might probably have -confined them to the interior, and averted the death-blow which came -upon Grecian freedom in the next generation from their hands.</p> - -<p>The Lacedæmonians found some compensation for their reluctant -abandonment of Polydamas, in the pacific propositions from Athens -which liberated them from one of their chief enemies. But the peace -thus concluded was scarcely even brought to execution. Timotheus, -being ordered home from Korkyra, obeyed and set sail with his fleet. -He had serving along with him some exiles from Zakynthus; and as -he passed by that island in his homeward voyage, he disembarked -these exiles upon it, aiding them in establishing a fortified post. -Against this proceeding the Zakynthian government laid complaints at -Sparta, where it was so deeply resented, that redress having been -in vain demanded at Athens, the peace was at once broken off, and -war again declared. A Lacedæmonian squadron of twenty-five sail was -despatched to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">[p. 142]</span> -assist the Zakynthians,<a id="FNanchor_303" href="#Footnote_303" -class="fnanchor">[303]</a> while plans were formed for the -acquisition of the more important island of Korkyra. The fleet of -Timotheus having now been removed home, a malcontent Korkyræan party -formed a conspiracy to introduce the Lacedæmonians as friends, -and betray the island to them. A Lacedæmonian fleet of twenty-two -triremes accordingly sailed thither, under color of a voyage to -Sicily. But the Korkyræan government, having detected the plot, -refused to receive them, took precautions for defence, and sent -envoys to Athens to entreat assistance.</p> - -<p>The Lacedæmonians now resolved to attack Korkyra openly, with -the full naval force of their confederacy. By the joint efforts -of Sparta, Corinth, Leukas, Ambrakia, Elis, Zakynthus, Achaia, -Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis,—strengthened by<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_143">[p. 143]</span> pecuniary payments -from other confederates, who preferred commuting their obligation -to serve beyond sea,—a fleet of sixty triremes and a body of one -thousand five hundred mercenary hoplites were assembled; besides some -Lacedæmonians, probably Helots or Neodamodes.<a id="FNanchor_304" -href="#Footnote_304" class="fnanchor">[304]</a> At the same time, -application was sent to Dionysius the Syracusan despot, for his -coöperation against Korkyra, on the ground that the connection of -that island with Athens had proved once, and might prove again, -dangerous to his city.</p> - -<p>It was in the spring of 373 <small>B.C.</small> that this force -proceeded against Korkyra, under the command of the Lacedæmonian -Mnasippus; who, having driven in the Korkyræan fleet with the loss -of four triremes, landed on the island, gained a victory, and -confined the inhabitants within the walls of the city. He next -carried his ravages round the adjacent lands, which were found in -the highest state of cultivation, and full of the richest produce; -fields admirably tilled,—vineyards in surpassing condition,—with -splendid farm-buildings, well-appointed wine-cellars, and abundance -of cattle as well as laboring-slaves. The invading soldiers, -while enriching themselves by depredations on cattle and slaves, -became so pampered with the plentiful stock around, that they -refused to drink any wine that was not of the first quality.<a -id="FNanchor_305" href="#Footnote_305" class="fnanchor">[305]</a> -Such is the picture given by Xenophon, an unfriendly witness, of -the democratical Korkyra, in respect of its lauded economy, at the -time when it was invaded by Mnasippus; a picture not less memorable -than that presented by Thucydides (in the speech of Archidamus), -of the flourishing agriculture surrounding democratical Athens, -at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">[p. 144]</span> the moment -when the hand of the Peloponnesian devastator was first felt there -in 431 <small>B.C.</small><a id="FNanchor_306" href="#Footnote_306" -class="fnanchor">[306]</a></p> - -<p>With such plentiful quarters for his soldiers, Mnasippus encamped -on a hill near the city walls, cutting off those within from supplies -out of the country, while he at the same time blocked up the harbor -with his fleet. The Korkyræans soon began to be in want. Yet they -seemed to have no chance of safety except through aid from the -Athenians; to whom they had sent envoys with pressing entreaties,<a -id="FNanchor_307" href="#Footnote_307" class="fnanchor">[307]</a> and -who had now reason to regret their hasty consent (in the preceding -year) to summon home the fleet of Timotheus from the island. -However, Timotheus was again appointed admiral of a new fleet to -be sent thither; while a division of six hundred peltasts, under -Stesiklês, was directed to be despatched by the quickest route, -to meet the immediate necessities of the Korkyræans, during the -delays unavoidable in the preparation of the main fleet and its -circumnavigation of Peloponnesus. These peltasts were conveyed by -land across Thessaly and Epirus, to the coast opposite Korkyra; upon -which island they were enabled to land through the intervention of -Alketas solicited by the Athenians. They were fortunate enough to -get into the town; where they not only brought the news that a large -Athenian fleet might be speedily expected, but also contributed much -to the defence. Without such encouragement and aid, the Korkyræans -would hardly have held out; for the famine within the walls increased -daily; and at length became so severe, that<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_145">[p. 145]</span> many of the citizens deserted, and -numbers of slaves were thrust out. Mnasippus refused to receive them, -making public proclamation that every one who deserted should be sold -into slavery; and since deserters nevertheless continued to come, -he caused them to be scourged back to the city-gates. As for the -unfortunate slaves, being neither received by him, nor re-admitted -within, many perished outside of the gates from sheer hunger.<a -id="FNanchor_308" href="#Footnote_308" class="fnanchor">[308]</a></p> - -<p>Such spectacles of misery portended so visibly the approaching -hour of surrender, that the besieging army became careless, and -the general insolent. Though his military chest was well-filled, -through the numerous pecuniary payments which he had received from -allies in commutation of personal service,—yet he had dismissed -several of his mercenaries without pay, and had kept all of them -unpaid for the last two months. His present temper made him not -only more harsh towards his own soldiers,<a id="FNanchor_309" -href="#Footnote_309" class="fnanchor">[309]</a> but also less -vigilant in the conduct of the siege. Accordingly the besieged, -detecting from their watch-towers the negligence of the guards, chose -a favorable opportunity and made a vigorous sally. Mnasippus, on -seeing his outposts driven in, armed himself and hastened forward -with the Lacedæmonians around him to sustain them; giving orders to -the officers of the mercenaries to bring their men forward also. But -these officers replied, that they could not answer for the obedience -of soldiers without pay; upon which Mnasippus was so incensed, that -he struck them with his stick and with the shaft of his spear. Such -an insult inflamed still farther the existing discontent. Both -officers and soldiers came to the combat discouraged and heartless, -while the Athenian peltasts and the Korkyræan hoplites, rushing -out of several gates at once, pressed their attack with desperate -energy. Mnasippus, after displaying great personal valor, was at -length slain, and all his troops, being completely routed, fled back -to the fortified camp in which their stores were preserved. Even -this too might have been taken, and the whole armament destroyed, -had the besieged attacked it<span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">[p. -146]</span> at once. But they were astonished at their own success. -Mistaking the numerous camp-followers for soldiers in reserve, they -retired back to the city.</p> - -<p>Their victory was however so complete, as to reopen easy -communication with the country, to procure sufficient temporary -supplies, and to afford a certainty of holding out until -reinforcement from Athens should arrive. Such reinforcement, indeed, -was already on its way, and had been announced as approaching to -Hypermenês (second under the deceased Mnasippus), who had now -succeeded to the command. Terrified at the news, he hastened to sail -round from his station,—which he had occupied with the fleet to -block up the harbor,—to the fortified camp. Here he first put the -slaves, as well as the property, aboard of his transports, and sent -them away; remaining himself to defend the camp with the soldiers -and marines,—but remaining only a short time, and then taking these -latter also aboard the triremes. He thus completely evacuated the -island, making off for Leukas. But such had been the hurry,—and so -great the terror lest the Athenian fleet should arrive,—that much -corn and wine, many slaves, and even many sick and wounded soldiers, -were left behind. To the victorious Korkyræans, these acquisitions -were not needed to enhance the value of a triumph which rescued -them from capture, slavery, or starvation.<a id="FNanchor_310" -href="#Footnote_310" class="fnanchor">[310]</a></p> - -<p>The Athenian fleet had not only been tardy in arriving, so as -to incur much risk of finding the island already taken,—but when -it did come, it was commanded by Iphikrates, Chabrias, and the -orator Kallistratus,<a id="FNanchor_311" href="#Footnote_311" -class="fnanchor">[311]</a>—not by Timotheus, whom the original vote -of the people had nominated. It appears that Timotheus,—who (in -April 373 <small>B.C.</small>), when the Athenians first learned -that the formidable Lacedæmonian fleet had begun to attack Korkyra, -had been directed to proceed thither forthwith with a fleet of sixty -triremes,—found a difficulty in manning his ships at Athens, and -therefore undertook a preliminary cruise to procure both seamen and -contributory funds, from the maritime allies. His first act was to -transport the six hundred peltasts under Stesiklês to Thessaly, -where he entered into relations with Jason of Pheræ. He persuaded -the latter to become the ally of Athens, and to further<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_147">[p. 147]</span> the march of Stesiklês -with his division by land across Thessaly over the passes of Pindus, -to Epirus; where Alketas, who was at once the ally of Athens, and the -dependent of Jason, conveyed them by night across the strait from -Epirus to Korkyra. Having thus opened important connection with the -powerful Thessalian despot, and obtained from him a very seasonable -service, together (perhaps) with some seamen from Pagasæ to man his -fleet,—Timotheus proceeded onward to the ports of Macedonia, where he -also entered into relations with Amyntas, receiving from him signal -marks of private favor,—and then to Thrace as well as the neighboring -islands. His voyage procured for him valuable subsidies in money and -supplies of seamen, besides some new adhesions and deputies to the -Athenian confederacy.</p> - -<p>This preliminary cruise of Timotheus, undertaken with the -general purpose of collecting means for the expedition to -Korkyra, began in the month of April or commencement of May 373 -<small>B.C.</small><a id="FNanchor_312" href="#Footnote_312" -class="fnanchor">[312]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">[p. -148]</span> On departing, it appears, he had given orders to such -of the allies as were intended to form part of the expedition, -to assemble at Kalauria (an island off Trœzen, consecrated to -Poseidon) where he would himself come and take them up to proceed -onward. Pursuant to such order, several contingents mustered at -this island,—among them the Bœotians, who sent several triremes, -though in the preceding year it had been alleged against them -that they contributed nothing to sustain the naval exertions of -Athens. But Timotheus stayed out a long time. Reliance was placed -upon him, and upon the money which he was to bring home, for the -pay of the fleet; and the unpaid triremes accordingly fell into -distress and disorganization at Kalauria, awaiting his return.<a -id="FNanchor_313" href="#Footnote_313" class="fnanchor">[313]</a> In -the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">[p. 149]</span> mean time -fresh news reached Athens that Korkyra was much pressed; so that -great indignation was felt against the absent admiral, for employing -in his present cruise a precious interval essential to enable him to -reach the island in time. Iphikrates (who had recently come back from -serving with Pharnabazus, in an unavailing attempt to reconquer Egypt -for the Persian king) and the orator Kallistratus, were especially -loud in their accusations against him. And as the very salvation -of Korkyra required pressing haste, the Athenians cancelled the -appointment of Timotheus even during his absence,—naming Iphikrates, -Kallistratus, and Chabrias, to equip a fleet and go round to -Korkyra without delay.<a id="FNanchor_314" href="#Footnote_314" -class="fnanchor">[314]</a></p> - -<p>Before they could get ready, Timotheus returned; bringing several -new adhesions to the confederacy, with a flourishing account -of general success.<a id="FNanchor_315" href="#Footnote_315" -class="fnanchor">[315]</a> He went down to Kalauria to supply the -deficiencies of funds, and make up for the embarrassments which his -absence had occasioned. But he could not pay the Bœotian trierarchs -without borrowing money for the purpose on his own credit; for -though the sum brought home from his voyage was considerable, it -would appear that the demands upon him had been greater still. At -first an accusation, called for in consequence of the pronounced -displeasure of the public, was entered against him by Iphikrates and -Kallistratus. But as these two had been named joint admirals for -the expedition to Korkyra, which admitted of no delay,—his trial -was postponed until the autumn; a postponement advantageous to the -accused, and doubtless seconded by his friends.<a id="FNanchor_316" -href="#Footnote_316" class="fnanchor">[316]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">[p. 150]</span></p> - -<p>Meanwhile Iphikrates adopted the most strenuous measures for -accelerating the equipment of his fleet. In the present temper of the -public, and in the known danger of Korkyra, he was allowed (though -perhaps Timotheus, a few weeks earlier, would not have been allowed) -not only to impress seamen in the port, but even to coërce the -trierarchs with severity,<a id="FNanchor_317" href="#Footnote_317" -class="fnanchor">[317]</a> and to employ all the triremes reserved -for the coast-guard of Attica, as well as the two sacred triremes -called Paralus and Salaminia. He thus completed a fleet of seventy -sail, promising to send back a large portion of it directly, if -matters took a favorable turn at Korkyra. Expecting to find on -the watch for him a Lacedæmonian fleet fully equal to his own, he -arranged his voyage so as to combine the maximum of speed with -training to his seamen, and with preparation for naval combat. -The larger sails of an ancient trireme were habitually taken out -of the ship previous to a battle, as being inconvenient aboard: -Iphikrates left such sails at Athens,—employed even the smaller -sails sparingly,—and kept his seamen constantly at the oar; which -greatly accelerated his progress, at the same time that it kept the -men in excellent training. Every day he had to stop, for meals and -rest, on an enemy’s shore; and these halts were conducted with such -extreme dexterity as well as precision, that the least possible -time was consumed, not enough for any local hostile force to get -together. On reaching Sphakteria, Iphikrates learnt for the first -time the defeat and death of Mnasippus. Yet not fully trusting the -correctness of his information, he still persevered both in his -celerity and his precautions, until he reached Kephallenia, where he -first fully satisfied himself that the danger of Korkyra was past. -The excellent management of Iphikrates throughout this expedition is -spoken of in terms of admiration by Xenophon.<a id="FNanchor_318" -href="#Footnote_318" class="fnanchor">[318]</a></p> - -<p>Having no longer any fear of the Lacedæmonian fleet, the Athenian -commander probably now sent back the home-squadron of Attica which -he had been allowed to take, but which could ill be spared from -the defence of the coast.<a id="FNanchor_319" href="#Footnote_319" -class="fnanchor">[319]</a> After making himself master of some of -the Kephallenian cities, he then proceeded<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_151">[p. 151]</span> onward to Korkyra; where the squadron -of ten triremes from Syracuse was now on the point of arriving; sent -by Dionysius to aid the Lacedæmonians, but as yet uninformed of their -flight. Iphikrates, posting scouts on the hills to give notice of -their approach, set apart twenty triremes to be ready for moving at -the first signal. So excellent was his discipline, (says Xenophon,) -that “the moment the signal was made, the ardor of all the crews was -a fine thing to see; there was not a man who did not hasten at a run -to take his place aboard.”<a id="FNanchor_320" href="#Footnote_320" -class="fnanchor">[320]</a> The ten Syracusan triremes, after their -voyage across from the Iapygian cape, had halted to rest their men -on one of the northern points of Korkyra; where they were found -by Iphikrates and captured, with all their crews and the admiral -Anippus; one alone escaping, through the strenuous efforts of her -captain, the Rhodian Melanôpus. Iphikrates returned in triumph, -towing his nine prizes into the harbor of Korkyra. The crews, being -sold or ransomed, yielded to him a sum of sixty talents; the admiral -Anippus was retained in expectation of a higher ransom, but slew -himself shortly afterwards from mortification.<a id="FNanchor_321" -href="#Footnote_321" class="fnanchor">[321]</a></p> - -<p>Though the sum thus realized enabled Iphikrates for the time -to pay his men, yet the suicide of Anippus was a pecuniary -disappointment to him, and he soon began to need money. This -consideration induced him to consent to the return of his colleague -Kallistratus; who,—an orator by profession, and not on friendly -terms with Iphikrates,—had come out against his own consent. -Iphikrates had himself singled out both Kallistratus and Chabrias -as his colleagues. He was not indifferent to the value of their -advice, nor did he fear the criticisms, even of rivals, on what -they<span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">[p. 152]</span> really saw -in his proceedings. But he had accepted the command under hazardous -circumstances; not only from the insulting displacement of Timotheus, -and the provocation consequently given to a powerful party attached -to the son of Konon,—but also in great doubts whether he could -succeed in relieving Korkyra, in spite of the rigorous coërcion -which he applied to man his fleet. Had the island been taken and had -Iphikrates failed, he would have found himself exposed to severe -crimination, and multiplied enemies, at Athens. Perhaps Kallistratus -and Chabrias, if left at home, might in that case have been among his -assailants,—so that it was important to him to identify both of them -with his good or ill success, and to profit by the military ability -of the latter, as well as by the oratorical talent of the former.<a -id="FNanchor_322" href="#Footnote_322" class="fnanchor">[322]</a> As -the result of the expedition, however, was altogether favorable, all -such anxieties were removed. Iphikrates could well afford to part -with both his colleagues; and Kallistratus engaged, that if permitted -to go home, he would employ all his efforts to keep the fleet well -paid from the public treasury; or if this were impracticable, -that he would labor to procure peace.<a id="FNanchor_323" -href="#Footnote_323" class="fnanchor">[323]</a> So terrible are the -difficulties which the Grecian generals now experience in procuring -money from Athens, (or from other cities in whose service they are -acting,) for payment of their troops! Iphikrates suffered the same -embarrassment which Timotheus had experienced the year before,—and -which will be found yet more painfully felt as we advance forward in -the history. For the present, he subsisted his seamen by find<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_153">[p. 153]</span>ing work for them on the -farms of the Korkyræans, where there must doubtless have been ample -necessity for repairs after the devastations of Mnasippus, while he -crossed over to Akarnania with his peltasts and hoplites, and there -obtained service with the townships friendly to Athens against such -others as were friendly to Sparta; especially against the warlike -inhabitants of the strong town called Thyrieis.<a id="FNanchor_324" -href="#Footnote_324" class="fnanchor">[324]</a></p> - -<p>The happy result of the Korkyræan expedition, imparting universal -satisfaction at Athens, was not less beneficial to Timotheus than -to Iphikrates. It was in November, 373 <small>B.C.</small>, that -the former, as well as his quæstor or military treasurer Antimachus, -underwent each his trial. Kallistratus, having returned home, -pleaded against the quæstor, perhaps against Timotheus also, as -one of the accusers;<a id="FNanchor_325" href="#Footnote_325" -class="fnanchor">[325]</a> though probably in a spirit of greater -gentleness and moderation, in consequence of his recent joint success -and of the general good temper prevalent in the city. And while -the edge of the accusation against Timotheus was thus blunted, the -defence was strengthened not merely by numerous citizen friends -speaking in his favor with increased confidence, but also by the -unusual phenomenon of two powerful foreign supporters. At the -request of Timotheus, both Alketas of Epirus, and Jason of Pheræ, -came to Athens a little before the trial, to appear as witnesses -in his favor. They were received and lodged by him in his house in -the Hippodamian Agora, the principal square of the Peiræus. And as -he was then in some embarrassment for want of money, he found it -necessary to borrow various articles of finery in order to do them -honor,—clothes, bedding, and two silver drinking bowls,—from Pasion, -a wealthy banker near at hand. These two important witnesses would -depose to the zealous service and estimable qualities of Timotheus; -who had inspired them with warm interest, and had been the means of -bringing them into alliance with Athens; an alliance, which they -had sealed at once by conveying Stesikles and his division across -Thessaly and Epirus to Korkyra. The minds of the dikastery would -be powerfully affected by seeing before them such a man as Jason -of Pheræ, at that moment the most powerful individual in Greece; -and we are<span class="pagenum" id="Page_154">[p. 154]</span> not -surprised to learn that Timotheus was acquitted. His treasurer -Antimachus, not tried by the same dikastery, and doubtless not so -powerfully befriended, was less fortunate. He was condemned to death, -and his property confiscated; the dikastery doubtless believing (on -what evidence we do not know) that he had been guilty of fraud in -dealing with the public money, which had caused serious injury at a -most important crisis. Under the circumstances of the case, he was -held responsible as treasurer, for the pecuniary department of the -money-levying command confided to Timotheus by the people.</p> - -<p>As to the military conduct, for which Timotheus himself would be -personally accountable, we can only remark that having been invested -with the command for the special purpose of relieving the besieged -Korkyra, he appears to have devoted an unreasonable length of time -to his own self-originated cruise elsewhere; though such cruise was -in itself beneficial to Athens; insomuch that if Korkyra had really -been taken, the people would have had good reason for imputing the -misfortune to his delay.<a id="FNanchor_326" href="#Footnote_326" -class="fnanchor">[326]</a> And although<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_155">[p. 155]</span> he was now acquitted, his reputation -suffered so much by the whole affair, that in the ensuing spring -he was glad to accept an<span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">[p. -156]</span> invitation of the Persian satraps, who offered him the -command of the Grecian mercenaries in their service for the Egyptian -war;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">[p. 157]</span> the same -command from which Iphikrates had retired a little time before.<a -id="FNanchor_327" href="#Footnote_327" class="fnanchor">[327]</a></p> - -<p>That admiral, whose naval force had been reinforced by a -large number of Korkyræan triremes, was committing without -opposition incursions against Akarnania, and the western coast -of Peloponnesus; insomuch that the expelled Messenians, in -their distant exile at Hesperides in Libya, began to conceive -hopes of being restored by Athens to Naupaktus, which they had -occupied under her protection during the Peloponnesian war.<a -id="FNanchor_328" href="#Footnote_328" class="fnanchor">[328]</a> -And while the Athenians were thus masters at sea both east and -west of Peloponnesus,<a id="FNanchor_329" href="#Footnote_329" -class="fnanchor">[329]</a> Sparta and her confederates, discouraged -by the ruinous failure of their expedition against Korkyra in the -preceding year, appear to have remained inactive. With such mental -predispositions, they were powerfully affected by religious alarm -arising from certain frightful earthquakes and inundations with -which Peloponnesus was visited during this year, and which were -regarded as marks of the wrath of the god Poseidon. More of these -formidable visitations occurred this year in Peloponnesus than had -ever before been known; especially one, the worst of all, whereby -the two towns of Helikê and Bura in Achaia were destroyed, together -with a large portion of their population. Ten Lacedæmonian triremes, -which happened to be moored on this shore on the night when the -calamity occurred, were destroyed by the rush of the waters.<a -id="FNanchor_330" href="#Footnote_330" class="fnanchor">[330]</a></p> - -<p>Under these depressing circumstances, the Lacedæmonians had -recourse to the same manœuvre which had so well served their purpose -fifteen years before, in 388-387 <small>B.C.</small> They sent -Antal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">[p. 158]</span>kidas -again as envoy to Persia, to entreat both pecuniary aid,<a -id="FNanchor_331" href="#Footnote_331" class="fnanchor">[331]</a> and -a fresh Persian intervention enforcing anew the peace which bore his -name; which peace had now been infringed (according to Lacedæmonian -construction) by the reconstitution of the Bœotian confederacy -under Thebes as president. And it appears that in the course of -the autumn or winter, Persian envoys actually did come to Greece, -requiring that the belligerents should all desist from war, and wind -up their dissensions on the principles of the peace of Antalkidas.<a -id="FNanchor_332" href="#Footnote_332" class="fnanchor">[332]</a> The -Persian satraps, at this time renewing their efforts against Egypt, -were anxious for the cessation of hostilities in Greece, as a means -of enlarging their numbers of Grecian mercenaries; of which troops -Timotheus had left Athens a few months before to take the command.</p> - -<p>Apart, however, from this prospect of Persian intervention, which -doubtless was not without effect,—Athens herself was becoming more -and more disposed towards peace. That common fear and hatred of the -Lacedæmonians, which had brought her into alliance with Thebes in -378 <small>B.C.</small>, was now no longer predominant. She was -actually at the head of a considerable maritime confederacy; and -this she could hardly hope to increase by continuing the war, since -the Lacedæmonian naval power had already been humbled. Moreover, -she found the expense of warlike operations very burdensome, -nowise defrayed either by the contributions of her allies or by -the results of victory. The orator Kallistratus,—who had promised -either to procure remittances from Athens to<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_159">[p. 159]</span> Iphikrates, or to recommend the -conclusion of peace,—was obliged to confine himself to the latter -alternative, and contributed much to promote the pacific dispositions -of his countrymen.<a id="FNanchor_333" href="#Footnote_333" -class="fnanchor">[333]</a></p> - -<p>Moreover, the Athenians had become more and more alienated from -Thebes. The ancient antipathy between these two neighbors had for a -time been overlaid by common fear of Sparta. But as soon as Thebes -had reëstablished her authority in Bœotia, the jealousies of Athens -again began to arise. In 374 <small>B.C.</small>, she had concluded -a peace with the Spartans, without the concurrence of Thebes; which -peace was broken almost as soon as made, by the Spartans themselves, -in consequence of the proceedings of Timotheus at Zakynthus. The -Phokians,—against whom, as having been active allies of Sparta in -her invasions of Bœotia, Thebes was now making war,—had also been -ancient friends of Athens, who sympathized with their sufferings.<a -id="FNanchor_334" href="#Footnote_334" class="fnanchor">[334]</a> -Moreover, the Thebans on their side probably resented the unpaid and -destitute condition in which their seamen had been left by Timotheus -at Kalauria, during the expedition for the relief of Korkyra in -the preceding year;<a id="FNanchor_335" href="#Footnote_335" -class="fnanchor">[335]</a> an expedition of which Athens alone reaped -both the glory and the advantage. Though they remained members of -the confederacy, sending deputies to the congress at Athens, the -unfriendly spirit on both sides continued on the increase, and was -farther exasperated by their violent proceeding against Platæa in the -first half of 372 <small>B.C.</small></p> - -<p>During the last three or four years, Platæa, like the other towns -of Bœotia, had been again brought into the confederacy under Thebes. -Reëstablished by Sparta after the peace of Antalkidas as a so-called -autonomous town, it had been garrisoned by her as a post against -Thebes, and was no longer able to maintain a real autonomy after the -Spartans had been excluded from Bœotia in 376 <small>B.C.</small> -While other Bœotian cities were glad to find themselves emancipated -from their philo-Laconian oligarchies and rejoined to the federation -under Thebes, Platæa,—as well as Thespiæ,—submitted to the union -only by constraint; awaiting any favorable opportunity for breaking -off, either by means of Sparta or of Athens. Aware probably of -the growing coldness<span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">[p. -160]</span> between the Athenians and Thebans, the Platæans were -secretly trying to persuade Athens to accept and occupy their town, -annexing Platæa to Attica;<a id="FNanchor_336" href="#Footnote_336" -class="fnanchor">[336]</a> a project hazardous both to Thebes and -Athens, since it would place them at open war with each other, while -neither was yet at peace with Sparta.</p> - -<p>This intrigue, coming to the knowledge of the Thebans, determined -them to strike a decisive blow. Their presidency, over more than one -of the minor Bœotian cities, had always been ungentle, suitable to -the roughness of their dispositions. Towards Platæa, especially, they -not only bore an ancient antipathy, but regarded the reëstablished -town as little better than a Lacedæmonian encroachment, abstracting -from themselves a portion of territory which had become Theban, by -prescriptive enjoyment lasting for forty years from the surrender -of Platæa in 427 <small>B.C.</small> As it would have been to -them a loss as well as embarrassment, if Athens should resolve to -close with the tender of Platæa,—they forestalled the contingency -by seizing the town for themselves. Since the reconquest of Bœotia -by Thebes, the Platæans had come again, though reluctantly, under -the ancient constitution of Bœotia; they were living at peace with -Thebes, acknowledging her rights as president of the federation, -and having their own rights as members guaranteed in return by her, -probably under positive engagement,—that is, their security, their -territory, and their qualified autonomy, subject to the federal -restrictions and obligations. But though thus at peace with Thebes,<a -id="FNanchor_337" href="#Footnote_337" class="fnanchor">[337]</a> the -Platæans knew<span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">[p. 161]</span> -well what was her real sentiment towards them, and their own towards -her. If we are to believe, what seems very probable, that they were -secretly negotiating with Athens to help them in breaking off from -the federation,—the consciousness of such an intrigue tended still -farther to keep them in anxiety and suspicion. Accordingly, being -apprehensive of some aggression from Thebes, they kept themselves -habitually on their guard. But their vigilance was somewhat -relaxed and most of them went out of the city to their farms in -the country, on the days, well known beforehand, when the public -assemblies in Thebes were held. Of this relaxation the Bœotarch -Neokles took advantage.<a id="FNanchor_338" href="#Footnote_338" -class="fnanchor">[338]</a> He conducted a Theban armed force, -immediately from the assembly, by a circuitous route through -Hysiæ to Platæa; which town he found deserted by most of its male -adults, and unable to make resistance. The Platæans,—dispersed in -the fields, finding their walls, their wives, and their families, -all in possession of the victor,—were under the necessity of -accepting the terms proposed to them. They were allowed to depart -in safety, and to carry away all their mov<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_162">[p. 162]</span>able property; but their town was -destroyed, and its territory again annexed to Thebes. The unhappy -fugitives were constrained for the second time to seek refuge at -Athens, where they were again kindly received, and restored to the -same qualified right of citizenship as they had enjoyed prior to -the peace of Antalkidas.<a id="FNanchor_339" href="#Footnote_339" -class="fnanchor">[339]</a></p> - -<p>It was not merely with Platæa, but also with Thespiæ, that Thebes -was now meddling. Mistrusting the dispositions of the Thespians, she -constrained them to demolish the fortifications of their town;<a -id="FNanchor_340" href="#Footnote_340" class="fnanchor">[340]</a> -as she had caused to be done fifty-two years before, after the -victory of Delium,<a id="FNanchor_341" href="#Footnote_341" -class="fnanchor">[341]</a> on suspicion of leanings favorable to -Athens.</p> - -<p>Such proceedings on the part of the Thebans in Bœotia excited -strong emotion at Athens; where the Platæans not only appeared<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_163">[p. 163]</span> as suppliants, with -the tokens of misery conspicuously displayed, but also laid their -case pathetically before the assembly, and invoked aid to regain -their town, of which they had been just bereft. On a question -at once so touching and so full of political consequences, many -speeches were doubtless composed and delivered, one of which has -fortunately reached us; composed by Isokrates, and perhaps actually -delivered by a Platæan speaker before the public assembly. The hard -fate of this interesting little community is here impressively -set forth; including the bitterest reproaches, stated with not a -little of rhetorical exaggeration, against the multiplied wrongs -done by Thebes, as well towards Athens as towards Platæa. Much -of his invective is more vehement than conclusive. Thus when -the orator repeatedly claims for Platæa her title to autonomous -existence, under the guarantee of universal autonomy sworn at the -peace of Antalkidas,<a id="FNanchor_342" href="#Footnote_342" -class="fnanchor">[342]</a>—the Thebans would doubtless reply, that at -the time of that peace, Platæa was no longer in existence; but had -been extinct for forty years, and was only renovated afterwards by -the Lacedæmonians for their own political purposes. And the orator -intimates plainly, that the Thebans were noway ashamed of their -proceeding, but came to Athens to justify it, openly and avowedly; -moreover, several of the most distinguished Athenian speakers -espoused the same side.<a id="FNanchor_343" href="#Footnote_343" -class="fnanchor">[343]</a> That the Platæans had coöperated with -Sparta in her recent operations in Bœotia against both Athens -and Thebes, was an undeniable fact; which the orator himself can -only extenuate by saying that they acted under constraint from a -present Spartan force,—but which was cited on the opposite side as -a proof of their philo-Spartan dispositions, and of their readiness -again to join the common enemy as soon as he presented himself.<a -id="FNanchor_344" href="#Footnote_344" class="fnanchor">[344]</a> -The Thebans would accuse Platæa of subsequent treason to the<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_164">[p. 164]</span> confederacy; and -they even seem to have contended, that they had rendered a -positive service to the general Athenian confederacy of which -they were members,<a id="FNanchor_345" href="#Footnote_345" -class="fnanchor">[345]</a> by expelling the inhabitants of Platæa and -dismantling Thespiæ; both towns being not merely devoted to Sparta, -but also adjoining Kithæron, the frontier line whereby a Spartan -army would invade Bœotia. Both in the public assembly of Athens, and -in the general congress of the confederates at that city, animated -discussions were raised upon the whole subject;<a id="FNanchor_346" -href="#Footnote_346" class="fnanchor">[346]</a> discussions, wherein, -as it appears, Epaminondas, as the orator and representative of -Thebes, was found a competent advocate against Kallistratus, the -most distinguished speaker in Athens; sustaining the Theban cause -with an ability which greatly enhanced his growing reputation.<a -id="FNanchor_347" href="#Footnote_347" class="fnanchor">[347]</a></p> - -<p>But though the Thebans and their Athenian supporters, having all -the prudential arguments on their side, carried the point so that no -step was taken to restore the Platæans, nor any hostile declaration -made against those to whom they owed their expulsion,—yet the general -result of the debates, animated by keen sympathy with the Platæan -sufferers, tended decidedly to poison the good feeling, and loosen -the ties, between Athens and Thebes. This change showed itself by an -increased gravitation towards peace with Sparta; strongly advocated -by the orator Kallistratus, and now promoted not merely by the -announced Persian inter<span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">[p. -165]</span>vention, but by the heavy cost of war, and the absence -of all prospective gain from its continuance. The resolution was at -length taken,—first by Athens, and next, probably, by the majority -of the confederates assembled at Athens,—to make propositions of -peace to Sparta, where it was well known that similar dispositions -prevailed towards peace. Notice of this intention was given to the -Thebans, who were invited to send envoys thither also, if they chose -to become parties. In the spring of 371 <small>B.C.</small>, at the -time when the members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy were assembled -at Sparta, both the Athenian and Theban envoys, and those from the -various members of the Athenian confederacy, arrived there. Among -the Athenian envoys, two at least,—Kallias (the hereditary daduch -or torchbearer of the Eleusinian ceremonies) and Autoklês,—were -men of great family at Athens; and they were accompanied by -Kallistratus the orator.<a id="FNanchor_348" href="#Footnote_348" -class="fnanchor">[348]</a> From the Thebans, the only man of note was -Epaminondas, then one of the Bœotarchs.</p> - -<p>Of the debates which took place at this important congress, we -have very imperfect knowledge; and of the more private diplomatic -conversations, not less important than the debates, we have no -knowledge at all. Xenophon gives us a speech from each of the three -Athenians, and from no one else. That of Kallias, who announces -himself as hereditary proxenus of Sparta at Athens, is boastful and -empty, but eminently philo-Laconian in spirit;<a id="FNanchor_349" -href="#Footnote_349" class="fnanchor">[349]</a> that of Autoklês is -in the opposite tone, full of severe censure on the past conduct of -Sparta; that of Kallistratus, delivered after the other two,—while -the enemies of Sparta were elate, her friends humiliated, and both -parties silent from the fresh effect of the reproaches of Autoklês,<a -id="FNanchor_350" href="#Footnote_350" class="fnanchor">[350]</a>—is -framed in a spirit of conciliation; admitting faults on both sides, -but deprecating the continuance of war, as injurious to both, and -showing how much the joint interests of both pointed towards peace.<a -id="FNanchor_351" href="#Footnote_351" class="fnanchor">[351]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">[p. 166]</span></p> - -<p>This orator, representing the Athenian diplomacy of the time, -recognizes distinctly the peace of Antalkidas as the basis upon which -Athens was prepared to treat,—autonomy to each city, small as well -as great; and in this way, coinciding with the views of the Persian -king, he dismisses with indifference the menace that Antalkidas was -on his way back from Persia with money to aid the Lacedæmonians -in the war. It was not from fear of the Persian treasures (he -urged),—as the enemies of peace asserted,—that Athens sought peace.<a -id="FNanchor_352" href="#Footnote_352" class="fnanchor">[352]</a> -Her affairs were now so prosperous, both by sea and land, as -to prove that she only did so on consideration of the general -evils of prolonged war, and on a prudent abnegation of that rash -confidence which was always ready to contend for extreme stakes,<a -id="FNanchor_353" href="#Footnote_353" class="fnanchor">[353]</a> -like a gamester playing double or quits. The time had come for both -Sparta and Athens now to desist from hostilities. The former had -the strength on land, the latter was predominant at sea; so that -each could guard the other; while the reconciliation of the two -would produce peace throughout the Hellenic world, since in each -separate city, one of the two opposing local parties rested on -Athens, the other on Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_354" href="#Footnote_354" -class="fnanchor">[354]</a> But it was indispensably necessary that -Sparta should renounce that system of aggression (already pointedly -denounced by the Athenian, Autoklês) on which she had acted since -the peace of Antalkidas; a system, from which she had at last reaped -bitter fruits, since her unjust seizure of the Kadmeia had ended -by throwing into the arms of the Thebans all those Bœotian cities, -whose separate autonomy she had bent her whole policy to ensure.<a -id="FNanchor_355" href="#Footnote_355" class="fnanchor">[355]</a></p> - -<p>Two points stand out in this remarkable speech, which takes a -judicious measure of the actual position of affairs;—first, autonomy -to every city; and autonomy in the genuine sense, not construed -and enforced by the separate interests of Sparta, as it<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_167">[p. 167]</span> had been at the -peace of Antalkidas; next, the distribution of such preëminence or -headship, as was consistent with this universal autonomy, between -Sparta and Athens; the former on land, the latter at sea,—as the -means of ensuring tranquillity in Greece. That “autonomy perverted -to Lacedæmonian purposes,”—which Perikles had denounced before -the Peloponnesian war as the condition of Peloponnesus, and which -had been made the political canon of Greece by the peace of -Antalkidas,—was now at an end. On the other hand, Athens and Sparta -were to become mutual partners and guarantees; dividing the headship -of Greece by an ascertained line of demarcation, yet neither of them -interfering with the principle of universal autonomy. Thebes, and -her claim to the presidency of Bœotia, were thus to be set aside by -mutual consent.</p> - -<p>It was upon this basis that the peace was concluded. The armaments -on both sides were to be disbanded; the harmosts and garrisons -everywhere withdrawn, in order that each city might enjoy full -autonomy. If any city should fail in observance of these conditions, -and continue in a career of force against any other, all were at -liberty to take arms for the support of the injured party; but no -one who did not feel disposed, was bound so to take arms. This last -stipulation exonerated the Lacedæmonian allies from one of their most -vexatious chains.</p> - -<p>To the conditions here mentioned, all parties agreed; and on -the ensuing day the oaths were exchanged. Sparta took the oath for -herself and her allies; Athens took the oath for herself only; her -allies afterwards took it severally, each city for itself. Why such -difference was made, we are not told; for it would seem that the -principle of severance applied to both confederacies alike.</p> - -<p>Next came the turn of the Thebans to swear; and here the fatal -hitch was disclosed. Epaminondas, the Theban envoy, insisted on -taking the oath, not for Thebes separately, but for Thebes as -president of the Bœotian federation, including all the Bœotian -cities. The Spartan authorities on the other hand, and Agesilaus as -the foremost of all, strenuously opposed him. They required that he -should swear for Thebes alone, leaving the Bœotian cities to take the -oath each for itself.</p> - -<p>Already in the course of the preliminary debates, Epaminondas -had spoken out boldly against the ascendency of Sparta.<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_168">[p. 168]</span> While most of -the deputies stood overawed by her dignity, represented by the -energetic Agesilaus as spokesman,—he, like the Athenian Autoklês, -and with strong sympathy from many of the deputies present, had -proclaimed that nothing kept alive the war except her unjust -pretensions, and that no peace could be durable unless such -pretensions were put aside.<a id="FNanchor_356" href="#Footnote_356" -class="fnanchor">[356]</a> Accepting the conditions of peace as -finally determined, he presented himself to swear to them in the -name of the Bœotian federation. But Agesilaus, requiring that each -of the Bœotian cities should take the oath for itself, appealed to -those same principles of liberty which Epaminondas himself had just -invoked, and asked him whether each of the Bœotian cities had not as -good a title to autonomy as Thebes. Epaminondas might have replied -by asking, why Sparta had just been permitted to take the oath for -her allies as well as for herself. But he took a higher ground. He -contended that the presidency of Bœotia was held by Thebes on as good -a title as the sovereignty of Laconia by Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_357" -href="#Footnote_357" class="fnanchor">[357]</a> He would remind the -assembly that when Bœotia was first conquered and settled by its -present inhabitants, the other towns had all been planted out from -Thebes as their chief and mother-city; that the federal union of -all, administered by Bœotarchs chosen by and from all, with Thebes -as president, was coeval with the first settlement of the country; -that the separate autonomy of each was qualified by an established -institution, devolving on the Bœotarchs and councils sitting at -Thebes the management of the foreign relations of all jointly. -All this had been already pleaded by the Theban orator fifty-six -years earlier, before the five Spartan commissioners, assembled to -determine the fate of the captives after the surrender of Platæa; -when he required the condemnation of the Platæans as guilty of -treason to the ancestral institutions of Bœotia;<a id="FNanchor_358" -href="#Footnote_358" class="fnanchor">[358]</a> and the Spartan -commis<span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">[p. 169]</span>sioners -had recognized the legitimacy of these institutions by a sweeping -sentence of death against the transgressors. Moreover, at a time -when the ascendency of Thebes over the Bœotian cities had been -greatly impaired by her anti-Hellenic coöperation with the invading -Persians, the Spartans themselves had assisted her with all their -power to reëstablish it, as a countervailing force against Athens.<a -id="FNanchor_359" href="#Footnote_359" class="fnanchor">[359]</a> -Epaminondas could show, that the presidency of Thebes over the -Bœotian cities was the keystone of the federation; a right not only -of immemorial antiquity, but pointedly recognized and strenuously -vindicated by the Spartans themselves. He could show farther that -it was as old, and as good, as their own right to govern the -Laconian townships; which latter was acquired and held (as one of -the best among their own warriors had boastfully proclaimed)<a -id="FNanchor_360" href="#Footnote_360" class="fnanchor">[360]</a> by -nothing but Spartan valor and the sharpness of the Spartan sword.</p> - -<p>An emphatic speech of this tenor, delivered amidst the deputies -assembled at Sparta, and arraigning the Spartans not merely in their -supremacy over Greece, but even in their dominion at home,—was as it -were the shadow cast before, by coming events. It opened a question -such as no Greek had ever ventured to raise. It was a novelty -startling to all,—extravagant probably in the eyes of Kallistratus -and the Athenians,—but to the Spartans themselves, intolerably -poignant and insulting.<a id="FNanchor_361" href="#Footnote_361" -class="fnanchor">[361]</a> They had already a long<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_170">[p. 170]</span> account of antipathy -to clear off with Thebes; their own wrong-doing in seizing the -Kadmeia,—their subsequent humiliation in losing it and being unable -to recover it,—their recent short-comings and failures, in the last -seven years of war against Athens and Thebes jointly. To aggravate -this deep-seated train of hostile associations, their pride was now -wounded in an unforeseen point, the tenderest of all. Agesilaus, -full to overflowing of the national sentiment, which in the mind of -a Spartan passed for the first of virtues, was stung to the quick. -Had he been an Athenian orator like Kallistratus, his wrath would -have found vent in an animated harangue. But a king of Sparta was -anxious only to close these offensive discussions with scornful -abruptness, thus leaving to the presumptuous Theban no middle ground -between humble retraction and acknowledged hostility. Indignantly -starting from his seat, he said to Epaminondas,—“Speak plainly,—will -you, or will you not, leave to each of the Bœotian cities its -separate autonomy?” To which the other replied—“Will <i>you</i> leave -each of the Laconian towns autonomous?” Without saying another word, -Agesilaus immediately caused the name of the Thebans to be struck -out of the roll, and proclaimed them excluded from the treaty.<a -id="FNanchor_362" href="#Footnote_362" class="fnanchor">[362]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">[p. 171]</span></p> - -<p>Such was the close of this memorable congress at Sparta -in June, 371 <small>B.C.</small> Between the Spartans and -Athenians, and their respective allies, peace was sworn. But the -Thebans were excluded, and their deputies returned home (if we -may believe Xenophon<a id="FNanchor_363" href="#Footnote_363" -class="fnanchor">[363]</a>) discouraged and mournful. Yet such a man -as Epaminondas must have been well aware that neither his claims -nor his arguments would be admitted by Sparta. If therefore he was -disappointed with the result, this must be because he had counted -upon, but did not obtain, support from the Athenians or others.</p> - -<p>The leaning of the Athenian deputies had been adverse rather than -favorable to Thebes throughout the congress. They were disinclined, -from their sympathies with the Platæans, to advocate the presidential -claims of Thebes, though on the whole it was the political interest -of Athens that the Bœotian federation should be<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_172">[p. 172]</span> maintained, as a bulwark to herself -against Sparta. Yet the relations of Athens with Thebes, after the -congress as before it, were still those of friendship, nominal rather -than sincere. It was only with Sparta, and her allies, that Thebes -was at war, without a single ally attached to her. On the whole, -Kallistratus and his colleagues had managed the interests of Athens -in this congress with great prudence and success. They had disengaged -her from the alliance with Thebes, which had been dictated seven -years before by common fear and dislike of Sparta, but which had no -longer any adequate motive to countervail the cost of continuing -the war; at the same time, the disengagement had been accomplished -without bad faith. The gains of Athens, during the last seven years -of war, had been considerable. She had acquired a great naval -power, and a body of maritime confederates; while her enemies the -Spartans had lost their naval power in the like proportion. Athens -was now the ascendent leader of maritime and insular Greece,—while -Sparta still continued to be the leading power on land, but only -on land; and a tacit partnership was now established between the -two, each recognizing the other in their respective halves of -the Hellenic hegemony.<a id="FNanchor_364" href="#Footnote_364" -class="fnanchor">[364]</a> Moreover, Athens had the prudence to -draw her stake, and quit the game, when at the maximum of her -acquisitions, without taking the risk of future contingencies.</p> - -<p>On both sides, the system of compulsory and indefeasable -confederacies was renounced; a renunciation which had already been -once sworn to, sixteen years before, at the peace of Antalkidas, but -treacherously perverted by Sparta in the execution. Under this new -engagement, the allies of Sparta or Athens ceased to constitute an -organized permanent body, voting by its majority, passing resolutions -permanently binding upon dissentients, arming the chief state with -more or less power of enforcement against all, and forbidding -voluntary secessions of individual members. They became a mere -uncemented aggregate of individuals, each acting for himself; taking -counsel together as long as they chose, and coöperating so far as -all were in harmony; but no one being bound by any decision of -the others, nor recognizing any right in the others to compel him -even to performance of what he had specially<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_173">[p. 173]</span> promised, if it became irksome. By -such change, therefore, both Athens and Sparta were losers in power; -yet the latter to a much greater extent than the former, inasmuch as -her reach of power over her allies had been more comprehensive and -stringent.</p> - -<p>We here see the exact point upon which the requisition addressed -by Sparta to Thebes, and the controversy between Epaminondas and -Agesilaus, really turned. Agesilaus contended that the relation -between Thebes and the other Bœotian cities was the same as what -subsisted between Sparta and her allies; that accordingly, when -Sparta renounced the indefeasible and compulsory character of -her confederacy, and agreed to deal with each of its members as -a self-acting and independent unit, she was entitled to demand -that Thebes should do the same in reference to the Bœotian towns. -Epaminondas, on the contrary, denied the justice of this parallel. -He maintained that the proper subject of comparison to be taken, was -the relation of Sparta, not to her extra-Laconian allies, but to -the Laconian townships; that the federal union of the Bœotian towns -under Thebes was coeval with the Bœotian settlement, and among the -most ancient phenomena of Greece; that in reference to other states, -Bœotia, like Laconia or Attica, was the compound and organized -whole, of which each separate city was only a fraction; that other -Greeks had no more right to meddle with the internal constitution -of these fractions, and convert each of them into an integer,—than -to insist on separate independence for each of the townships of -Laconia. Epaminondas did not mean to contend that the power of Thebes -over the Bœotian cities was as complete and absolute in degree, as -that of Sparta over the Laconian townships; but merely that her -presidential power, and the federal system of which it formed a part, -were established, indefeasible, and beyond the interference of any -Hellenic convention,—quite as much as the internal government of -Sparta in Laconia.</p> - -<p>Once already this question had been disputed between Sparta and -Thebes at the peace of Antalkidas; and already decided once by the -superior power of the former, extorting submission from the latter. -The last sixteen years had reversed the previous decision, and -enabled the Thebans to reconquer those presidential rights of which -the former peace had deprived them. Again, therefore, the question -stood for decision, with keener antipathy<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_174">[p. 174]</span> on both sides,—with diminished power -in Sparta,—but with increased force, increased confidence, and a -new leader whose inestimable worth was even yet but half-known,—in -Thebes. The Athenians,—friendly with both, yet allies of -neither,—suffered the dispute to be fought out without interfering. -How it was settled will appear in the next chapter.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_78"> - <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXVIII.<br /> - BATTLE OF LEUKTRA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">Immediately</span> -after the congress at Sparta in June 371 <small>B.C.</small>, -the Athenians and Lacedæmonians both took steps to perform the -covenants sworn respectively to each other as well as to the allies -generally. The Athenians despatched orders to Iphikrates, who -was still at Korkyra or in the Ionian Sea, engaged in incursions -against the Lacedæmonian or Peloponnesian coasts,—that he should -forthwith conduct his fleet home, and that if he had made any -captures subsequent to the exchange of oaths at Sparta, they -should all be restored;<a id="FNanchor_365" href="#Footnote_365" -class="fnanchor">[365]</a> so as to prevent the misunderstanding -which had occurred fifty-two years before with Brasidas,<a -id="FNanchor_366" href="#Footnote_366" class="fnanchor">[366]</a> -in the peninsula of Pallênê. The Lacedæmonians on their side sent -to withdraw their harmosts and their garrisons from every city -still under occupation. Since they had already made such promise -once before, at the peace of Antalkidas, but had never performed -it,—commissioners,<a id="FNanchor_367" href="#Footnote_367" -class="fnanchor">[367]</a> not Spartans, were now named from the -general congress, to enforce the execution of the agreement.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">[p. 175]</span></p> - -<p>No great haste, however, was probably shown in executing this -part of the conditions; for the whole soul and sentiment of the -Spartans were absorbed by their quarrel with Thebes. The miso-Theban -impulse now drove them on with a fury which overcame all other -thoughts; and which, though doubtless Agesilaus and others considered -it at the time as legitimate patriotic resentment for the recent -insult, appeared to the philo-Laconian Xenophon, when he looked -back upon it from the subsequent season of Spartan humiliation, to -be a misguiding inspiration sent by the gods,<a id="FNanchor_368" -href="#Footnote_368" class="fnanchor">[368]</a>—like that of the -Homeric Atê. Now that Thebes stood isolated from Athens and all other -allies out of Bœotia, Agesilaus had full confidence of being able -to subdue her thoroughly. The same impression of the superiority of -Spartan force was also entertained both by the Athenians and by other -Greeks; to a great degree even by the Thebans themselves. It was -anticipated that the Spartans would break up the city of Thebes into -villages (as they had done at Mantinea) or perhaps retaliate upon -her the fate which she had inflicted upon Platæa—or even decimate -her citizens and her property to the profit of the Delphian god, -pursuant to the vow that had been taken more than a century before, -in consequence of the assistance lent by the Thebans to Xerxes.<a -id="FNanchor_369" href="#Footnote_369" class="fnanchor">[369]</a> Few -persons out of Bœotia doubted of the success of Sparta.</p> - -<p>To attack Thebes, however, an army was wanted; and as Sparta, -by the peace just sworn, had renounced everything like imperial -ascendency over her allies, leaving each of them free to send or -withhold assistance as they chose,—to raise an army was no easy -task; for the allies, generally speaking, being not at all inflamed -with the Spartan antipathy against Thebes, desired only to be left -to enjoy their newly-acquired liberty. But it so happened, that at -the moment when peace was sworn, the Spartan king Kleombrotus was -actually at the head of an army, of Lacedæmonians and allies, in -Phokis, on the north-western frontier of Bœotia. Immediately on -hearing of the peace, Kleombrotus sent home to ask for instructions -as to his future proceedings. By the unanimous voice of the Spartan -authorities and assembly, with Agesilaus as<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_176">[p. 176]</span> the most vehement of all,<a -id="FNanchor_370" href="#Footnote_370" class="fnanchor">[370]</a> he -was directed to march against the Thebans, unless they should flinch -at the last moment (as they had done at the peace of Antalkidas), -and relinquish their presidency over the other Bœotian cities. -One citizen alone, named Prothöus, interrupted this unanimity. He -protested against the order, first, as a violation of their oaths, -which required them to disband the army and reconstitute it on the -voluntary principle,—next, as imprudent in regard to the allies, -who now looked upon such liberty as their right, and would never -serve with cordiality unless it were granted to them. But Prothöus -was treated with disdain as a silly alarmist,<a id="FNanchor_371" -href="#Footnote_371" class="fnanchor">[371]</a> and the peremptory -order was despatched to Kleombrotus; accompanied, probably, by a -reinforcement of Spartans and Lacedæmonians, the number of whom, in -the ensuing battle, seems to have been greater than can reasonably be -imagined to have been before serving in Phokis.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile no symptoms of concession were manifested at Thebes.<a -id="FNanchor_372" href="#Footnote_372" class="fnanchor">[372]</a> -Epaminondas, on his return, had found cordial sympathy with the -resolute tone which he had adopted both in defence of the Bœotian -federation and against Sparta. Though every one felt the magnitude -of the danger, it was still hoped that the enemy might be prevented -from penetrating out of Phokis into Bœotia. Epaminondas accordingly -occupied with a strong force the narrow pass near Koroneia, lying -between a spur of Mount Helikon on one side and the Lake Kopaïs on -the other; the same position as had been taken by the Bœotians, and -forced by the army returning from Asia under Agesilaus, twenty-three -years before. Orchomenus lay northward (that is, on the Phokian side) -of this position; and its citizens, as well as its Lacedæmonian -garrison, now doubtless formed part of the invading army of -Kleombrotus. That prince, with a degree of military skill rare in -the Spartan commanders, baffled all the Theban calculations. Instead -of march<span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">[p. 177]</span>ing by -the regular road from Phokis into Bœotia, he turned southward by -a mountain-road scarcely deemed practicable, defeated the Theban -division under Chæreas which guarded it, and crossed the ridge of -Helikon to the Bœotian port of Kreusis on the Crissæan Gulf. Coming -upon this place by surprise, he stormed it, capturing twelve Theban -triremes which lay in the harbor. He then left a garrison to occupy -the port, and marched without delay over the mountainous ground -into the territory of Thespiæ on the eastern declivity of Helikon; -where he encamped on the high ground, at a place of ever-memorable -name, called Leuktra.<a id="FNanchor_373" href="#Footnote_373" -class="fnanchor">[373]</a></p> - -<p>Here was an important success, skilfully gained; not only placing -Kleombrotus within an easy march of Thebes, but also opening a sure -communication by sea with Sparta, through the port of Kreusis, and -thus eluding the difficulties of Mount Kithæron. Both the king -and the Lacedæmonians around him were full of joy and confidence; -while the Thebans on their side were struck with dismay as well as -surprise. It required all the ability of Epaminondas, and all the -daring of Pelopidas, to uphold the resolution of their countrymen, -and to explain away or neutralize the terrific signs and portents, -which a dispirited Greek was sure to see in every accident of the -road. At length, however, they succeeded in this, and the Thebans -with their allied Bœotians were marched out from Thebes to Leuktra, -where they were posted on a declivity opposite to the Spartan camp. -They were commanded by the seven Bœotarchs, of whom Epaminondas -was one. But such was the prevalent apprehension of joining battle -with the Spartans on equal terms, that even when actually on the -ground, three of these Bœotarchs refused to concur in the order for -fighting, and proposed to shut themselves up in Thebes for a siege, -sending their wives and families away to Athens. Epaminondas was -vainly combatting their determination, when the seventh Bœotarch, -Branchylides, arrived from the passes of Kithæron, where he had been -on guard, and was prevailed upon to vote in favor of the bolder -course. Though a majority was thus secured for fighting, yet the -feeling throughout the Theban camp was more that of brave despair -than of cheering hope; a conviction that it was better to perish -in the field, than to live in exile with the Lacedæmonians<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_178">[p. 178]</span> masters of the -Kadmeia. Some encouraging omens, however, were transmitted to -the camp, from the temples in Thebes as well as from that of -Trophonius at Lebadeia:<a id="FNanchor_374" href="#Footnote_374" -class="fnanchor">[374]</a> and a Spartan exile named Leandrias, -serving in the Theban ranks, ventured to assure them that they were -now on the very spot foredoomed for the overthrow of the Lacedæmonian -empire. Here stood the tomb of two females (daughters of a Leuktrian -named Skedasus) who had been violated by two Lacedæmonians and had -afterwards slain themselves. Skedasus, after having in vain attempted -to obtain justice from the Spartans for this outrage, came back, -imprecating curses on them, and slew himself also. The vengeance of -these departed sufferers would now be sure to pour itself out on -Sparta, when her army was in their own district and near their own -tomb. And the Theban leaders, to whom the tale was full of opportune -encouragement, crowned the tomb with wreaths, invoking the aid of its -inmates against the common enemy now present.<a id="FNanchor_375" -href="#Footnote_375" class="fnanchor">[375]</a></p> - -<p>While others were thus comforted by the hope of superhuman -aid, Epaminondas, to whom the order of the coming battle had been -confided, took care that no human precautions should be wanting. -His task was arduous; for not only were his troops dispirited, -while those of the enemy were confident,—but their numbers were -inferior, and some of the Bœotians present were hardly even<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_179">[p. 179]</span> trustworthy. What -the exact numbers were on either side, we are not permitted to -know. Diodorus assigns about six thousand men to the Thebans; -Plutarch states the numbers of Kleombrotus at eleven thousand.<a -id="FNanchor_376" href="#Footnote_376" class="fnanchor">[376]</a> -Without placing faith in these figures, we see good reason for -believing that the Theban total was decidedly inferior. For such -inferiority Epaminondas strove to make up by skilful tactics, and -by a combination at that time novel as well as ingenious. In all -former Grecian battles, the opposite armies had been drawn up in -line, and had fought along the whole line; or at least such had -been the intention of the generals,—and if it was not realized, the -cause was to be sought in accidents of the ground, or backwardness -or disorder on the part of some division of the soldiers. Departing -from this habit, Epaminondas now arrayed his troops so as to bring -his own left to bear with irresistible force upon the Spartan right, -and to keep back the rest of his army comparatively out of action. -Knowing that Kleombrotus, with the Spartans and all the official -persons, would be on the right of their own line, he calculated that, -if successful on this point against the best troops, he should find -little resistance from the remainder. Accordingly he placed on his -own left wing chosen Theban hoplites, to the prodigious depth of -fifty shields, with Pelopidas and the Sacred Band in front. His order -of advance was disposed obliquely or in echelon, so that the deep -column on the left should join battle first, while the centre and -right kept comparatively back and held themselves more in a defensive -attitude.</p> - -<p>In 371 <small>B.C.</small>, such a combination was absolutely -new, and betokened high military genius. It is therefore no disgrace -to Kleombrotus that he was not prepared for it, and that he adhered -to the ordinary Grecian tactics of joining battle at once along -the whole line. But so unbounded was the confidence reigning among -the Spartans, that there never was any occasion on which peculiar -precautions were less thought of. When, from their entrenched camp -on the Leuktrian eminence, they saw the Thebans encamped on an -opposite eminence, separated from them by a small breadth of low -ground and moderate declivities,—their only impatience was to hurry -on the decisive moment, so as to prevent the enemy from escaping. -Both the partisans and the opponents of Kleom<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_180">[p. 180]</span>brotus united in provoking the order -for battle, each in their own language. The former urged him, since -he had never yet done anything against the Thebans, to strike a -blow, and clear himself from the disparaging comparisons which rumor -instituted between him and Agesilaus; the latter gave it to be -understood, that if Kleombrotus were now backward, their suspicions -would be confirmed that he leaned in his heart towards the Thebans.<a -id="FNanchor_377" href="#Footnote_377" class="fnanchor">[377]</a> -Probably the king was himself sufficiently eager to fight, and -so would any other Spartan general have been, under the same -circumstances, before the battle of Leuktra. But even had he been -otherwise, the impatience, prevalent among the Lacedæmonian portion -of his army, left him no option. Accordingly, the decided resolution -to fight was taken. The last council was held, and the final orders -issued by Kleombrotus, after his morning meal, where copious -libations of wine both attested and increased the confident temper -of every man. The army was marched out of the camp, and arrayed on -the lower portion of the declivity; Kleombrotus with the Spartans and -most of the Lacedæmonians being on the right, in an order of twelve -deep. Some Lacedæmonians were also on the left, but respecting the -order of the other parts of the line, we have no information. The -cavalry was chiefly posted along the front.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, Epaminondas also marched down his declivity, in his -own chosen order of battle: his left wing being both forward, -and strengthened into very deep order, for desperate attack. -His cavalry too were posted in front of his line. But before he -commenced his march, he sent away his baggage and attendants home -to Thebes; while at the same time he made proclamation that any of -his Bœotian hoplites, who were not hearty in the cause, might also -retire, if they chose. Of such permission the Thespians immediately -availed themselves;<a id="FNanchor_378" href="#Footnote_378" -class="fnanchor">[378]</a> so many were there, in the Theban camp, -who estimated the chances to be all in favor of Lacedæmonian victory. -But when these men, a large portion of them unarmed, were seen -retiring, a considerable detachment from the army of Kleombrotus, -either with or without orders, ran after to prevent their escape, -and forced them to return for safety to the<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_181">[p. 181]</span> main Theban army. The most zealous -among the allies of Sparta present,—the Phokians, the Phliasians, and -the Herakleots, together with a body of mercenaries,—executed this -movement; which seems to have weakened the Lacedæmonians in the main -battle, without doing any mischief to the Thebans.</p> - -<p>The cavalry first engaged, in front of both lines; and here the -superiority of the Thebans soon became manifest. The Lacedæmonian -cavalry,—at no time very good, but at this moment unusually bad, -composed of raw and feeble novices, mounted on horses provided by -the rich,—was soon broken and driven back upon the infantry, whose -ranks were disturbed by the fugitives. To reëstablish the battle, -Kleombrotus gave the word for the infantry to advance, himself -personally leading the right. The victorious Theban cavalry probably -hung upon the Lacedæmonian infantry of the centre and left, and -prevented them from making much forward movement; while Epaminondas -and Pelopidas with their left, advanced according to their intention -to bear down Kleombrotus and his right wing. The shock here was -terrible; on both sides victory was resolutely and desperately -disputed, in a close hand-combat, with pushing of opposite shields -and opposite masses. But such was the overwhelming force of the -Theban charge,—with the sacred band or chosen warriors in front, -composed of men highly trained in the palæstra,<a id="FNanchor_379" -href="#Footnote_379" class="fnanchor">[379]</a> and the deep column -of fifty shields propelling behind,—that even the Spartans, with -all their courage, obstinacy, and discipline, were unable to stand -up against it. Kleombrotus, himself either in or near the front, -was mortally wounded, apparently early in the battle; and it was -only by heroic and unexampled efforts, on the part of his comrades -around, that he was carried off yet alive, so as to preserve him from -falling into the hands of the enemy. Around him also fell the most -eminent members of the Spartan official staff; Deinon the polemarch, -Sphodrias, with his son Kleonymus, and several others. After an -obstinate resistance and a fearful slaughter, the right wing of the -Spartans was completely beaten, and driven back to their camp on the -higher ground.</p> - -<p>It was upon this Spartan right wing, where the Theban left was -irresistibly strong, that all the stress of the battle fell,—as<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_182">[p. 182]</span> Epaminondas had -intended that it should. In no other part of the line does there -appear to have been any serious fighting; partly through his -deliberate scheme of not pushing forward either his centre or -his right,—partly through the preliminary victory of the Theban -cavalry, which probably checked a part of the forward march of -the enemy’s line,—and partly also through the lukewarm adherence, -or even suppressed hostility, of the allies marshalled under the -command of Kleombrotus.<a id="FNanchor_380" href="#Footnote_380" -class="fnanchor">[380]</a> The Phokians and Herakleots,—zealous in -the cause from hatred of Thebes,—had quitted the line to strike a -blow at the retiring baggage and attendants; while the remaining -allies, after mere nominal fighting and little or no loss, retired -to the camp as soon as they saw the Spartan right defeated and -driven back to it. Moreover, even some Lacedæmonians on the left -wing, probably astounded by the lukewarmness of those around them, -and by the unexpected calamity on their own right, fell back in -the same manner. The whole Lacedæmonian force, with the dying -king, was thus again assembled and formed behind the entrenchment -on the higher ground, where the victorious Thebans did not -attempt to molest them.<a id="FNanchor_381" href="#Footnote_381" -class="fnanchor">[381]</a></p> - -<p>But very different were their feelings as they now stood arrayed -in the camp, from that exulting boastfulness with which they -had quitted it an hour or two before; and fearful was the loss -when it came to be verified. Of seven hundred Spartans who had -marched forth from the camp, only three hundred returned to it.<a -id="FNanchor_382" href="#Footnote_382" class="fnanchor">[382]</a> One -thousand Lacedæmonians, besides, had been left on the field, even -by the admission of Xenophon; probably the real number was<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_183">[p. 183]</span> even larger. Apart from -this, the death of Kleombrotus was of itself an event impressive to -every one, the like of which had never occurred since the fatal day -of Thermopylæ. But this was not all. The allies who stood alongside -of them in arms were now altered men. All were sick of their cause, -and averse to farther exertion; some scarcely concealed a positive -satisfaction at the defeat. And when the surviving polemarchs, now -commanders, took counsel with the principal officers as to the steps -proper in the emergency, there were a few, but very few, Spartans -who pressed for renewal of the battle, and for recovering by force -their slain brethren in the field, or perishing in the attempt. -All the rest felt like beaten men; so that the polemarchs, giving -effect to the general sentiment, sent a herald to solicit the regular -truce for burial of their dead. This the Thebans granted, after -erecting their own trophy.<a id="FNanchor_383" href="#Footnote_383" -class="fnanchor">[383]</a> But Epaminondas, aware that the Spartans -would practise every stratagem to conceal the magnitude of their -losses, coupled the grant with a condition that the allies should -bury their dead first. It was found that the allies had scarce -any dead to pick up, and that nearly every slain warrior on the -field was a Lacedæmonian.<a id="FNanchor_384" href="#Footnote_384" -class="fnanchor">[384]</a> And thus the Theban general, while he -placed the loss beyond possibility of concealment, proclaimed -at the same time such public evidence of Spartan courage, as to -rescue the misfortune of Leuktra from all aggravation on the score -of dishonor. What the Theban loss was, Xenophon does not tell -us. Pausanias states it at forty-seven men,<a id="FNanchor_385" -href="#Footnote_385" class="fnanchor">[385]</a> Diodorus at three -hundred. The former number is preposterously small, and even the -latter is doubtless under the truth; for a victory in close fight, -over soldiers like the Spartans, must have been dearly purchased. -Though the bodies of the Spartans were given up to burial, their arms -were retained; and the shields of the principal officers were seen by -the traveller Pausanias at Thebes five hundred years afterwards.<a -id="FNanchor_386" href="#Footnote_386" class="fnanchor">[386]</a></p> - -<p>Twenty days only had elapsed, from the time when Epaminondas -quitted Sparta after Thebes had been excluded from the general -peace, to the day when he stood victorious on the field of<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_184">[p. 184]</span> Leuktra.<a -id="FNanchor_387" href="#Footnote_387" class="fnanchor">[387]</a> -The event came like a thunderclap upon every one in Greece, upon -victors as well as vanquished,—upon allies and neutrals, near -and distant, alike. The general expectation had been that Thebes -would be speedily overthrown and dismantled; instead of which, not -only she had escaped, but had inflicted a crushing blow on the -military majesty of Sparta. It is in vain that Xenophon,—whose -account of the battle is obscure, partial, and imprinted with that -chagrin which the event occasioned to him,<a id="FNanchor_388" -href="#Footnote_388" class="fnanchor">[388]</a>—ascribes the defeat -to untoward accidents,<a id="FNanchor_389" href="#Footnote_389" -class="fnanchor">[389]</a> or to the rashness and convivial -carelessness of Kleombrotus; upon whose generalship Agesilaus and -his party at Sparta did not scruple to cast ungenerous reproach,<a -id="FNanchor_390" href="#Footnote_390" class="fnanchor">[390]</a> -while others faintly exculpated him by saying that he had fought -contrary to his better judgment, under<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_185">[p. 185]</span> fear of unpopularity. Such criticisms, -coming from men wise after the fact, and consoling themselves for -the public calamity by censuring the unfortunate commander, will -not stand examination. Kleombrotus represented on this occasion the -feeling universal among his countrymen. He was ordered to march -against Thebes with the full belief, entertained by Agesilaus and all -the Spartan leaders, that her unassisted force could not resist him. -To fight the Thebans on open ground was exactly what he and every -other Spartan desired. While his manner of forcing the entrance of -Bœotia, and his capture of Kreusis, was a creditable manœuvre, he -seems to have arranged his order of battle in the manner usual with -Grecian generals at the time. There appears no reason to censure -his generalship, except in so far as he was unable to divine,—what -no one else divined,—the superior combinations of his adversary, -then for the first time applied to practice. To the discredit of -Xenophon, Epaminondas is never named in his narrative of the battle, -though he recognizes in substance that the battle was decided by -the irresistible Theban force brought to bear upon one point of -the enemy’s phalanx; a fact which both Plutarch and Diodorus<a -id="FNanchor_391" href="#Footnote_391" class="fnanchor">[391]</a> -expressly refer to the genius of the general. All the calculations -of Epaminondas turned out successful. The bravery of the Thebans, -cavalry as well as infantry, seconded by the training which they had -received during the last few years, was found sufficient to carry -his plans into full execution. To this circumstance, principally, -was owing the great revolution of opinion throughout Greece which -followed the battle. Every one felt that a new military power had -arisen, and that the Theban training, under the generalship of -Epaminondas, had proved itself more than a match on a fair field, -with shield and spear, and with numbers on the whole inferior,—for -the ancient Lykurgean discipline; which last had hitherto stood -without a parallel as turning out artists and craftsmen in war, -against mere citizens in the opposite ranks, armed but without -the like training.<a id="FNanchor_392" href="#Footnote_392" -class="fnanchor">[392]</a> Essentially stationary and old-fashioned, -the Lykurgean discipline was now<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_186">[p. 186]</span> overborne by the progressive military -improvement of other states, handled by a preëminent tactician; -a misfortune predicted by the Corinthians<a id="FNanchor_393" -href="#Footnote_393" class="fnanchor">[393]</a> at Sparta sixty years -before, and now realised, to the conviction of all Greece, on the -field of Leuktra.</p> - -<p>But if the Spartan system was thus invaded and overpassed in its -privilege of training soldiers, there was another species of teaching -wherein it neither was nor could be overpassed,—the hard lesson of -enduring pain and suppressing emotion. Memorable indeed was the -manner in which the news of this fatal catastrophe was received at -Sparta. To prepare the reader by an appropriate contrast, we may -turn to the manifestation at Athens twenty-seven years before, when -the trireme called Paralus arrived from Ægospotami, bearing tidings -of the capture of the entire Athenian fleet. “The moan of distress -(says the historian)<a id="FNanchor_394" href="#Footnote_394" -class="fnanchor">[394]</a> reached all up the Long Walls from Peiræus -to Athens, as each man communicated the news to his neighbor: on that -night, not a man slept, from bewailing for his lost fellow-citizens -and for his own impending ruin.” Not such was the scene at Sparta, -when the messenger arrived from the field of Leuktra, although there -was everything calculated to render the shock violent. For not only -was the defeat calamitous and humiliating beyond all former parallel, -but it came at a moment when every man reckoned on victory. As soon -as Kleombrotus, having forced his way into Bœotia, saw the unassisted -Thebans on plain ground before him, no Spartan entertained any doubt -of the result. Under this state of feeling, a messenger arrived -with the astounding revelation, that the army was totally defeated, -with the loss of the king, of four hundred Spartans, and more than -a thousand Lacedæmonians; and that defeat stood confessed by having -solicited the truce for interment of the slain. At the moment when -he arrived, the festival called the Gymnopædia<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_187">[p. 187]</span> was actually being celebrated, on -its last day; and the chorus of grown men was going through its -usual solemnity in the theatre. In spite of all the poignancy of -the intelligence, the ephors would not permit the solemnity to be -either interrupted or abridged. “<i>Of necessity, I suppose, they were -grieved</i>,—but they went through the whole as if nothing had happened, -only communicating the names of the slain to their relations, and -issuing a general order to the women, to make no noise or wailing, -but to bear the misfortune in silence.” That such an order should -be issued, is sufficiently remarkable; that it should be issued and -obeyed, is what could not be expected; that it should not only be -issued and obeyed, but overpassed, is what no man could believe, if -it were not expressly attested by the contemporary historian. “On -the morrow (says he) you might see those whose relations had been -slain, walking about in public with bright and cheerful countenances; -but of those whose relatives survived, scarce one showed himself; -and the few who were abroad, looked mournful and humbled.”<a -id="FNanchor_395" href="#Footnote_395" class="fnanchor">[395]</a></p> - -<p>In comparing this extraordinary self-constraint and obedience to -orders, at Sparta, under the most trying circumstances,—with the -sensitive and demonstrative temper, and spontaneous outburst of -feeling at Athens, so much more nearly approaching to the Homeric -type of Greeks,—we must at the same time remark, that in reference -to active and heroic efforts for the purpose of repairing past -calamities and making head against preponderant odds, the Athenians -were decidedly the better of the two. I have al<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_188">[p. 188]</span>ready recounted the prodigious and -unexpected energy displayed by Athens, after the ruinous loss of -her two armaments before Syracuse, when no one expected that she -could have held out for six months: I am now about to recount the -proceedings of Sparta, after the calamity at Leuktra,—a calamity -great and serious indeed, yet in positive amount inferior to what -had befallen the Athenians at Syracuse. The reader will find that, -looking to the intensity of active effort in both cases, the -comparison is all to the advantage of Athens; excusing at least, -if not justifying, the boast of Perikles<a id="FNanchor_396" -href="#Footnote_396" class="fnanchor">[396]</a> in his memorable -funeral harangue,—that his countrymen, without the rigorous drill -of Spartans, were yet found noway inferior to Spartans in daring -exertion, when the hour of actual trial arrived.</p> - -<p>It was the first obligation of the ephors to provide for the -safety of their defeated army in Bœotia; for which purpose they -put in march nearly the whole remaining force of Sparta. Of the -Lacedæmonian moræ, or military divisions (seemingly six in the -aggregate), two or three had been sent with Kleombrotus; all the -remainder were now despatched, even including elderly citizens up -to near sixty years of age, and all who had been left behind in -consequence of other public offices. Archidamus took the command -(Agesilaus still continuing to be disabled), and employed himself -in getting together the aid promised from Tegea,—from the villages -representing the disintegrated Mantinea,—from Corinth, Sikyon, -Phlius, and Achaia; all these places being still under the same -oligarchies which had held them under Lacedæmonian patronage, and -still adhering to Sparta. Triremes were equipped at Corinth, as -a means of transporting the new army across to Kreusis, and thus -joining the defeated troops at Leuktra; the port of Kreusis, the -recent acquisition of Kleombrotus, being now found inestimable, -as the only means of access into Bœotia.<a id="FNanchor_397" -href="#Footnote_397" class="fnanchor">[397]</a></p> - -<p>Meanwhile the defeated army still continued in its entrenched camp -at Leuktra, where the Thebans were at first in no hurry to disturb -it. Besides that this was a very arduous enterprise, even after the -recent victory,—we must recollect the actual feeling of the Thebans -themselves, upon whom their own victory had come by surprise, at -a moment when they were animated more by <span class="pagenum" -id="Page_189">[p. 189]</span>despair than by hope. They were -doubtless absorbed in the intoxicating triumph and exultation of -the moment, with the embraces and felicitations of their families -in Thebes, rescued from impending destruction by their valor. Like -the Syracusans after their last great victory<a id="FNanchor_398" -href="#Footnote_398" class="fnanchor">[398]</a> over the Athenian -fleet in the Great Harbor, they probably required an interval to give -loose to their feelings of ecstasy, before they would resume action. -Epaminondas and the other leaders, aware how much the value of Theban -alliance was now enhanced, endeavored to obtain reinforcement from -without, before they proceeded to follow up the blow. To Athens they -sent a herald, crowned with wreaths of triumph, proclaiming their -recent victory. They invited the Athenians to employ the present -opportunity for taking full revenge on Sparta, by joining their hands -with those of Thebes. But the sympathies of the Athenians were now -rather hostile than friendly to Thebes, besides that they had sworn -peace with Sparta, not a month before. The Senate, who were assembled -in the acropolis when the herald arrived, heard his news with evident -chagrin, and dismissed him without even a word of courtesy; while -the unfortunate Platæans, who were doubtless waiting in the city in -expectation of the victory of Kleombrotus, and of their own speedy -reëstablishment, found themselves again struck down and doomed to -indefinite exile.</p> - -<p>To Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly, another Theban herald was sent for -the same purpose, and very differently received. The despot sent back -word that he would come forthwith by sea, and ordered triremes to be -equipped for the purpose. But this was a mere deception; for at the -same time, he collected the mercenaries and cavalry immediately near -to him, and began his march by land. So rapid were his movements, -that he forestalled all opposition,—though he had to traverse the -territory of the Herakleots and Phokians, who were his bitter -enemies,—and joined the Thebans safely in Bœotia.<a id="FNanchor_399" -href="#Footnote_399" class="fnanchor">[399]</a> But when the Theban -leaders proposed that he should attack the Lacedæmonian camp in -flank, from the high ground, while they would march straight up -the hill and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">[p. 190]</span> -attack it in front,—Jason strongly dissuaded the enterprise as too -perilous; recommending that they should permit the enemy’s departure -under capitulation. “Be content (said he) with the great victory -which you have already gained. Do not compromise it by attempting -something yet more hazardous, against Lacedæmonians driven to despair -in their camp. Recollect that a few days ago, <i>you</i> yourselves were -in despair, and that your recent victory is the fruit of that very -feeling. Remember that the gods take pleasure in bringing about these -sudden changes of fortune.”<a id="FNanchor_400" href="#Footnote_400" -class="fnanchor">[400]</a> Having by such representations convinced -the Thebans, he addressed a friendly message to the Lacedæmonians, -reminding them of their dangerous position, as well as of the little -trust to be reposed in their allies,—and offering himself as mediator -to negotiate for their safe retreat. Their acquiescence was readily -given; and at his instance, a truce was agreed to by both parties, -assuring to the Lacedæmonians the liberty of quitting Bœotia. In -spite of the agreement, however, the Lacedæmonian commander placed -little faith either in the Thebans or in Jason, apprehending a fraud -for the purpose of inducing him to quit the camp and of attacking him -on the march. Accordingly, he issued public orders in the camp for -every man to be ready for departure after the evening meal, and to -march in the night to Kithæron, with a view of passing that mountain -on the next morning. Having put the enemy on this false scent, he -directed his real night-march by a different and not very easy way, -first to Kreusis, next to Ægosthena in the Megarian territory.<a -id="FNanchor_401" href="#Footnote_401" class="fnanchor">[401]</a> -The Thebans offered no opposition; nor is<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_191">[p. 191]</span> it at all probable that they intended -any fraud, considering that Jason was here the guarantee, and that he -had at least no motive to break his word.</p> - -<p>It was at Ægosthena that the retreating Lacedæmonians met -Archidamus, who had advanced to that point with the Laconian -forces, and was awaiting the junction of his Peloponnesian allies. -The purpose of his march being now completed, he advanced no -farther. The armament was disbanded, and Lacedæmonians as well as -allies returned home.<a id="FNanchor_402" href="#Footnote_402" -class="fnanchor">[402]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum" -id="Page_192">[p. 192]</span></p> <p>In all communities, the return -of so many defeated soldiers, liberated under a capitulation by the -enemy, would have been a scene of mourning. But in Sparta it was -pregnant with grave and dangerous consequences. So terrible was the -scorn and ignominy heaped upon the Spartan citizen who survived a -defeat, that life became utterly intolerable to him. The mere fact -sufficed for his condemnation, without any inquiry into justifying -or extenuating circumstances. No citizen at home would speak to him, -or be seen consorting with him in tent, game, or chorus; no other -family would intermarry with his; if he was seen walking about with -an air of cheerfulness, he was struck and ill-used by the passers-by, -until he assumed that visible humility which was supposed to become -his degraded position. Such rigorous treatment (which we learn from -the panegyrist Xenophon)<a id="FNanchor_403" href="#Footnote_403" -class="fnanchor">[403]</a> helps to explain the satisfaction of the -Spartan father and mother, when they learned that their son was among -the slain and not among the survivors. Defeat of Spartan troops had -hitherto been rare. But in the case of the prisoners at Sphakteria, -when released from captivity and brought back to a degraded existence -at Sparta, some uneasiness had been felt, and some precautions deemed -necessary to prevent them from becoming dangerous malcontents.<a -id="FNanchor_404" href="#Footnote_404" class="fnanchor">[404]</a> -Here was another<span class="pagenum" id="Page_193">[p. 193]</span> -case yet more formidable. The vanquished returning from Leuktra -were numerous, while the severe loss sustained in the battle amply -attested their bravery. Aware of the danger of enforcing against them -the established custom, the ephors referred the case to Agesilaus; -who proposed that for that time and case the customary penalties -should be allowed to sleep; but should be revived afterwards and -come into force as before. Such was the step accordingly taken;<a -id="FNanchor_405" href="#Footnote_405" class="fnanchor">[405]</a> -so that the survivors from this fatal battle-field were enabled to -mingle with the remaining citizens without dishonor or degradation. -The step was indeed doubly necessary, considering the small aggregate -number of fully qualified citizens; which number always tended to -decline,—from the nature of the Spartan political franchise combined -with the exigencies of Spartan training,<a id="FNanchor_406" -href="#Footnote_406" class="fnanchor">[406]</a>—and could not bear -even so great a diminution as that of the four hundred slain at -Leuktra. “Sparta (says Aristotle) could not stand up against a single -defeat, but was ruined through the small number of her citizens.”<a -id="FNanchor_407" href="#Footnote_407" class="fnanchor">[407]</a></p> - -<p>The cause here adverted to by Aristotle, as explaining the utter -loss of ascendency abroad, and the capital diminution both of power -and of inviolability at home, which will now be found to come thick -upon Sparta, was undoubtedly real and important. But a fact still -more important was, the alteration of opinion produced everywhere -in Greece with regard to Sparta, by the sudden shock of the battle -of Leuktra. All the prestige and old associations connected with -her long-established power vanished; while the hostility and -fears, inspired both by herself and by her partisans, but hitherto -reluctantly held back in silence,—now burst forth into open -manifestation.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">[p. 194]</span></p> - -<p>The ascendency, exercised down to this time by Sparta north of -the Corinthian Gulf, in Phokis and elsewhere, passed away from her, -and became divided between the victorious Thebans and Jason of -Pheræ. The Thebans, and the Bœotian confederates who were now in -cordial sympathy with them, excited to enthusiasm by their recent -success, were eager for fresh glories, and readily submitted to -the full exigencies of military training; while under a leader -like Epaminondas, their ardor was turned to such good account, -that they became better soldiers every month.<a id="FNanchor_408" -href="#Footnote_408" class="fnanchor">[408]</a> The Phokians, unable -to defend themselves single-handed, were glad to come under the -protection of the Thebans, as less bitterly hostile to them than -the Thessalian Jason,—and concluded with them obligations of mutual -defence and alliance.<a id="FNanchor_409" href="#Footnote_409" -class="fnanchor">[409]</a> The cities of Eubœa, together with the -Lokrians (both Epiknemidian and Opuntian,) the Malians and the -town of Heraklea, followed the example. The latter town was now -defenceless; for Jason, in returning from Bœotia to Thessaly, -had assaulted it and destroyed its fortifications; since by its -important site near the pass of Thermopylæ, it might easily be -held as a position to bar his entrance into Southern Greece.<a -id="FNanchor_410" href="#Footnote_410" class="fnanchor">[410]</a> The -Bœotian town of Orchomenus, which had held with the Lacedæmonians -even until the late battle, was now quite defenceless; and the -Thebans, highly exasperated against its inhabitants, were disposed -to destroy the city, reducing the inhabitants to slavery. Severe -as this proposition was, it would not have exceeded the customary -rigors of war, nor even what might have befallen Thebes herself, -had Kleombrotus been victorious at Leuktra. But the strenuous -remonstrance of Epaminondas prevented it from being carried into -execution. Alike distinguished for mild temper and for long-sighted -views, he reminded his countrymen that in their present aspiring -hopes towards ascendency in Greece, it was essential to establish -a character for moderation of dealing<a id="FNanchor_411" -href="#Footnote_411" class="fnanchor">[411]</a> not inferior to their -military courage, as attested by the recent victory. Accordingly, -the Orchomenians were par<span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">[p. -195]</span>doned upon submission, and re-admitted as members of the -Bœotian confederacy. To the Thespians, however, the same lenity was -not extended. They were expelled from Bœotia, and their territory -annexed to Thebes. It will be recollected, that immediately before -the battle of Leuktra, when Epaminondas caused proclamation to be -made that such of the Bœotians as were disaffected to the Theban -cause might march away, the Thespians had availed themselves of the -permission and departed.<a id="FNanchor_412" href="#Footnote_412" -class="fnanchor">[412]</a> The fugitive Thespians found shelter, like -the Platæans, at Athens.<a id="FNanchor_413" href="#Footnote_413" -class="fnanchor">[413]</a></p> - -<p>While Thebes was commemorating her recent victory by the erection -of a treasury chamber,<a id="FNanchor_414" href="#Footnote_414" -class="fnanchor">[414]</a> and the dedication of pious offerings at -Delphi,—while the military organization of Bœotia was receiving such -marked improvement, and the cluster of dependent states attached -to Thebes was thus becoming larger, under the able management of -Epaminondas,—Jason in Thessaly was also growing more powerful every -day. He was tagus of all Thessaly; with its tributary neighbors -under complete obedience,—with Macedonia partly dependent on -him,—and with a mercenary force, well paid and trained, greater -than had ever been assembled in Greece. By dismantling Heraklea, -in his return home from Bœotia, he had laid open the strait of -Thermopylæ, so as to be sure of access into southern Greece whenever -he chose. His personal ability and ambition, combined with his great -power, inspired universal alarm; for no man knew whither he would -direct his arms; whether to Asia, against the Persian king, as he -was fond of boasting,<a id="FNanchor_415" href="#Footnote_415" -class="fnanchor">[415]</a>—or northward against the cities in -Chalkidikê—or southward against Greece.</p> - -<p>The last-mentioned plan seemed the most probable, at the -beginning of 370 <small>B.C.</small>, half a year after the -battle of Leuktra: for Jason proclaimed distinctly his intention -of being present at the Pythian festival (the season for which -was about August 1, 370 <small>B.C.</small>, near Delphi), not -only with splendid presents and sacrifices to Apollo, but also -at the head of a numerous army. Orders had<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_196">[p. 196]</span> been given that his troops should -hold themselves ready for military service,<a id="FNanchor_416" -href="#Footnote_416" class="fnanchor">[416]</a>—about the time when -the festival was to be celebrated; and requisitions had been sent -round, demanding from all his tributaries victims for the Pythian -sacrifice, to a total of not less than one thousand bulls, and ten -thousand sheep, goats, and swine; besides a prize-bull to take -the lead in the procession, for which a wreath of gold was to be -given. Never before had such honor been done to the god; for those -who came to offer sacrifice were usually content with one or more -beasts bred on the neighboring plain of Kirrha.<a id="FNanchor_417" -href="#Footnote_417" class="fnanchor">[417]</a> We must recollect, -however, that this Pythian festival of 370 <small>B.C.</small> -occurred under peculiar circumstances; for the two previous festivals -in 374 <small>B.C.</small> and 378 <small>B.C.</small> must have been -comparatively unfrequented; in consequence of the war between Sparta -and her allies on one side, and Athens and Thebes on the other,—and -also of the occupation of Phokis by Kleombrotus. Hence the festival -of 370 <small>B.C.</small>, following immediately after the peace, -appeared to justify an extraordinary burst of pious magnificence, to -make up for the niggardly tributes to the god during the two former; -while the hostile dispositions of the Phokians would be alleged as an -excuse for the military force intended to accompany Jason.</p> - -<p>But there were other intentions, generally believed though not -formally announced, which no Greek could imagine without uneasiness. -It was affirmed that Jason was about to arrogate to himself the -presidency and celebration of the festival, which belonged<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_197">[p. 197]</span> of right to the -Amphiktyonic assembly. It was feared, moreover, that he would lay -hands on the rich treasures of the Delphian temple; a scheme said -to have been conceived by the Syracusan despot Dionysius fifteen -years before, in conjunction with the epirot Alketas, who was now -dependent upon Jason.<a id="FNanchor_418" href="#Footnote_418" -class="fnanchor">[418]</a> As there were no visible means of warding -off this blow, the Delphians consulted the god to know what they -were to do if Jason approached the treasury; upon which the god -replied, that he would himself take care of it,—and he kept his -word. This enterprising despot, in the flower of his age and at -the summit of his power, perished most unexpectedly before the day -of the festival arrived.<a id="FNanchor_419" href="#Footnote_419" -class="fnanchor">[419]</a> He had been reviewing his cavalry near -Pheræ, and was sitting to receive and answer petitioners, when seven -young men approached, apparently in hot dispute with each other, and -appealing to him for a settlement. As soon as they got near, they -set upon him and slew him.<a id="FNanchor_420" href="#Footnote_420" -class="fnanchor">[420]</a> One was killed on the spot by the guards, -and another also as he was mounting on horseback; but the remaining -five contrived to reach horses ready prepared for them and to gallop -away out of the reach of pursuit. In most of the Grecian cities -which these fugitives visited, they were received with distinguished -honor, as having relieved the Grecian world from one who inspired -universal alarm,<a id="FNanchor_421" href="#Footnote_421" -class="fnanchor">[421]</a> now that Sparta was unable to resist him, -while no other power had as yet taken her place.</p> - -<p>Jason was succeeded in his dignity, but neither in his -power,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_198">[p. 198]</span> nor -ability, by two brothers,—Polyphron and Polydorus. Had he lived -longer, he would have influenced most seriously the subsequent -destinies of Greece. What else he would have done, we cannot say; but -he would have interfered materially with the development of Theban -power. Thebes was a great gainer by his death, though perfectly -innocent of it, and though in alliance with him to the last; insomuch -that his widow went to reside there for security.<a id="FNanchor_422" -href="#Footnote_422" class="fnanchor">[422]</a> Epaminondas was -relieved from a most formidable rival, while the body of Theban -allies north of Bœotia became much more dependent than they would -have remained, if there had been a competing power like that of Jason -in Thessaly. The treasures of the god were preserved a few years -longer, to be rifled by another hand.</p> - -<p>While these proceedings were going on in Northern Greece, during -the months immediately succeeding the battle of Leuktra, events -not less serious and stirring had occurred in Peloponnesus. The -treaty sworn at Sparta twenty days before that battle, bound the -Lacedæmonians to disband their forces, remove all their harmosts and -garrisons, and leave every subordinate city to its own liberty of -action. As they did not scruple to violate the treaty by the orders -sent to Kleombrotus, so they probably were not zealous in executing -the remaining conditions; though officers were named, for the express -purpose of going round to see that the evacuation of the cities was -really carried into effect.<a id="FNanchor_423" href="#Footnote_423" -class="fnanchor">[423]</a> But it probably was not accomplished in -twenty days; nor would it perhaps have been ever more than nominally -accomplished, if Kleombrotus had been successful in Bœotia. But -after these twenty days came the portentous intelligence of the -fate of that prince and his army. The invincible arm of Sparta -was broken; she had not a man to spare for the maintenance of -foreign ascendency. Her harmosts disappeared at once, (as they had -disappeared from the Asiatic and insular cities twenty-three years -before, immediately after the battle of Knidus,<a id="FNanchor_424" -href="#Footnote_424" class="fnanchor">[424]</a>) and returned home. -Nor was this all. The Lacedæmonian ascendency had been maintained -everywhere by local oligarchies or dekarchies, which had been for -the most part violent and oppressive. Against these governments, now -deprived<span class="pagenum" id="Page_199">[p. 199]</span> of their -foreign support, the long-accumulated flood of internal discontent -burst with irresistible force, stimulated probably by returning -exiles. Their past misgovernment was avenged by severe sentences -and proscription, to the length of great reactionary injustice; -and the parties banished by this anti-Spartan revolution became so -numerous, as to harass and alarm seriously the newly-established -governments. Such were the commotions which, during the latter half -of 371 <small>B.C.</small>, disturbed many of the Peloponnesian -towns,—Phigaleia, Phlius, Corinth, Sikyon, Megara, etc., though -with great local difference, both of detail and of result.<a -id="FNanchor_425" href="#Footnote_425" class="fnanchor">[425]</a></p> - -<p>But the city where intestine commotion took place in its most -violent form was Argos. We do not know how this fact was con<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_200">[p. 200]</span>nected with the general -state of Grecian politics at the time, for Argos had not been in any -way subject to Sparta, nor a member of the Spartan confederacy, nor -(so far as we know) concerned in the recent war, since the peace -of Antalkidas in 387 <small>B.C.</small> The Argeian government -was a democracy, and the popular leaders were vehement in their -denunciations against the oligarchical opposition party—who were men -of wealth and great family position. These last, thus denounced, -formed a conspiracy for the forcible overthrow of the government. -But the conspiracy was discovered prior to execution, and some of -the suspected conspirators were interrogated under the torture, to -make them reveal their accomplices; under which interrogation one -of them deposed against thirty conspicuous citizens. The people, -after a hasty trial, put these thirty men to death, and confiscated -their property, while others slew themselves to escape the same -fate. So furious did the fear and wrath of the people become, -exasperated by the popular leaders, that they continued their -executions until they had put to death twelve hundred (or, as some -say, fifteen hundred) of the principal citizens. At length the -popular leaders became themselves tired and afraid of what they had -done; upon which the people were animated to fury against them, and -put them to death also.<a id="FNanchor_426" href="#Footnote_426" -class="fnanchor">[426]</a></p> - -<p>This gloomy series of events was termed the Skytalism, or -Cudgelling, from the instrument (as we are told) by which these -multiplied executions were consummated; though the name seems more -to indicate an impetuous popular insurrection than deliberate -executions. We know the facts too imperfectly to be able to infer -anything more than the brutal working of angry political passion -amidst a population like that of Argos or Korkyra, where there -was not (as at Athens) either a taste for speech, or the habit -of being guided by speech, and of hearing both sides of every -question fully discussed. Cicero remarks that he had never heard -of an Argeian orator. The acrimony of Demosthenes and Æschines -was discharged by mutual eloquence of vituperation, while the -assembly or the dikastery afterwards decided between them. We are -told that the assembled Athenian people, when they heard the news -of the Skytalism at Argos, were so shocked at it, that they<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_201">[p. 201]</span> caused the solemnity of -purification to be performed round the assembly.<a id="FNanchor_427" -href="#Footnote_427" class="fnanchor">[427]</a></p> - -<p>Though Sparta thus saw her confidential partisans deposed, -expelled, or maltreated, throughout so many of the Peloponnesian -cities,—and though as yet there was no Theban interference within -the isthmus, either actual or prospective,—yet she was profoundly -discouraged, and incapable of any effort either to afford protection -or to uphold ascendency. One single defeat had driven her to the -necessity of contending for home and family;<a id="FNanchor_428" -href="#Footnote_428" class="fnanchor">[428]</a> probably too the -dispositions of her own Periœki and Helots in Laconia, were such -as to require all her force as well as all her watchfulness. At -any rate, her empire and her influence over the sentiments of -Greeks out of Laconia, became suddenly extinct, to a degree which -astonishes us, when we recollect that it had become a sort of -tradition in the Greek mind, and that, only nine years before, -it had reached as far as Olynthus. How completely her ascendency -had passed away, is shown in a remarkable step taken by Athens, -seemingly towards the close of 371 <small>B.C.</small>, about -four months after the battle of Leuktra. Many of the Peloponnesian -cities, though they had lost both their fear and their reverence -for Sparta, were still anxious to continue members of a voluntary -alliance under the presidency of some considerable city. Of this -feeling the Athenians took advantage, to send envoys and invite -them to enter into a common league at Athens, on the basis of the -peace of Antalkidas, and of the peace recently sworn at Sparta.<a -id="FNanchor_429" href="#Footnote_429" class="fnanchor">[429]</a> -Many<span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">[p. 202]</span> of them, -obeying the summons, entered into an engagement to the following -effect: “I will adhere to the peace sent down by the Persian king, -and to the resolutions of the Athenians and the allies generally. -If any of the cities who have sworn this oath shall be attacked, -I will assist her with all my might.” What cities, or how many, -swore to this engagement, we are not told; we make out indirectly -that Corinth was one;<a id="FNanchor_430" href="#Footnote_430" -class="fnanchor">[430]</a> but the Eleians refused it, on the ground -that their right of sovereignty over the Marganeis, the Triphylians, -and the Skilluntians, was not recognized. The formation of the league -itself, however, with Athens as president, is a striking fact, as -evidence of the sudden dethronement of Sparta, and as a warning -that she would henceforward have to move in her own separate orbit, -like Athens after the Peloponnesian war. Athens stepped into the -place of Sparta, as president of the Peloponnesian confederacy, and -guarantee of the sworn peace; though the cities which entered into -this new compact were not for that reason understood to break with -their ancient president.<a id="FNanchor_431" href="#Footnote_431" -class="fnanchor">[431]</a></p> - -<p>Another incident too, apparently occurring about the present -time, though we cannot mark its exact date,—serves to mark the -altered position of Sparta. The Thebans preferred in the assembly of -Amphiktyons an accusation against her, for the unlawful capture of -their citadel the Kadmeia by Phœbidas, while under a sworn peace; and -for the sanction conferred by the Spartan authorities on this act, in -detaining and occupying the place. The Amphiktyonic assembly found -the Spartans guilty, and condemned them to a fine of five hundred -talents. As the fine was not paid, the assembly, after a certain -interval, doubled it; but the second sentence remained unexecuted -as well as the first, since there were no means of enforcement.<a -id="FNanchor_432" href="#Footnote_432" class="fnanchor">[432]</a> -Probably neither those who<span class="pagenum" id="Page_203">[p. -203]</span> preferred the charge, nor those who passed the vote, -expected that the Lacedæmonians would really submit to pay the -fine. The utmost which could be done, by way of punishment for such -contumacy, would be to exclude them from the Pythian games, which -were celebrated under the presidency of the Amphiktyons; and we may -perhaps presume that they really were thus excluded.</p> - -<p>The incident however deserves peculiar notice, in more than -one point of view. First, as indicating the lessened dignity of -Sparta. Since the victory of Leuktra and the death of Jason, Thebes -had become preponderant, especially in Northern Greece, where the -majority of the nations or races voting in the Amphiktyonic assembly -were situated. It is plainly through the ascendency of Thebes, -that this condemnatory vote was passed. Next, as indicating the -incipient tendency, which we shall hereafter observe still farther -developed, to extend the functions of the Amphiktyonic assembly -beyond its special sphere of religious solemnities, and to make it -the instrument of political coërcion or revenge in the hands of -the predominant state. In the previous course of this history, an -entire century has passed without giving occasion to mention the -Amphiktyonic assembly as taking part in political affairs. Neither -Thucydides nor Xenophon, though their united histories cover seventy -years, chiefly of Hellenic conflict, ever speak of that assembly. -The latter, indeed, does not even notice this fine imposed upon the -Lacedæmonians, although it falls within the period of his history. -We know the fact only from Diodorus and Justin; and unfortunately -merely as a naked fact, without any collateral or preliminary -details. During the sixty or seventy years preceding the battle of -Leuktra, Sparta had always had her regular political confederacy -and synod of allies convened by herself: her political ascendency -was exercised over them, <i>eo nomine</i>, by a method more direct -and easy than that of perverting the religious authority of the -Amphiktyonic assembly, even if such a proceeding were open to her.<a -id="FNanchor_433" href="#Footnote_433" class="fnanchor">[433]</a> But -when Thebes, after the battle of Leuktra, became the more powerful -state individually, she had no such established confederacy and -synod of allies, to sanction her propositions, and to share or abet -her antipathies. The Amphiktyonic assembly,<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_204">[p. 204]</span> meeting alternately at Delphi and -at Thermopylæ, and composed of twelve ancient races, principally -belonging to Northern Greece, as well as most of them inconsiderable -in power,—presented itself as a convenient instrument for her -purposes. There was a certain show of reason for considering the -seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas as a religious offence; since it -was not only executed during the Pythian festival, but was in itself -a glaring violation of the public law and interpolitical obligations -recognized between Grecian cities; which, like other obligations, -were believed to be under the sanction of the gods; though -probably, if the Athenians and Platæans had preferred a similar -complaint to the Amphiktyons against Thebes for her equally unjust -attempt to surprise Platæa under full peace in the spring of 431 -<small>B.C.</small>,—both Spartans and Thebans would have resisted -it. In the present case, however, the Thebans had a case against -Sparta sufficiently plausible, when combined with their overruling -ascendency, to carry a majority in the Amphiktyonic assembly, and -to procure the imposition of this enormous fine. In itself the -sentence produced no direct effect,—which will explain the silence of -Xenophon. But it is the first of a series of proceedings, connected -with the Amphiktyons, which will be found hereafter pregnant with -serious results for Grecian stability and independence.</p> - -<p>Among all the inhabitants of Peloponnesus, none were more -powerfully affected, by the recent Spartan overthrow at Leuktra, -than the Arcadians. Tegea, their most important city, situated on -the border of Laconia, was governed by an oligarchy wholly in the -interest of Sparta: Orchomenus was of like sentiment; and Mantinea -had been broken up into separate villages (about fifteen years -before) by the Lacedæmonians themselves—an act of high-handed -injustice committed at the zenith of their power after the peace -of Antalkidas. The remaining Arcadian population were in great -proportion villagers; rude men, but excellent soldiers, and always -ready to follow the Lacedæmonian banners, as well from old habit and -military deference, as from the love of plunder.<a id="FNanchor_434" -href="#Footnote_434" class="fnanchor">[434]</a></p> - -<p>The defeat of Leuktra effaced this ancient sentiment. The -Arcadians not only ceased to count upon victory and plunder in -the service of Sparta, but began to fancy that their own military -prow<span class="pagenum" id="Page_205">[p. 205]</span>ess was not -inferior to that of the Spartans; while the disappearance of the -harmosts left them free to follow their own inclinations. It was by -the Mantineans that the movement was first commenced. Divested of -Grecian city-life, and condemned to live in separate villages, each -under its own philo-Spartan oligarchy, they had nourished a profound -animosity, which manifested itself on the first opportunity of -deposing these oligarchies and coming again together. The resolution -was unanimously adopted, to re-establish Mantinea with its walls, and -resume their political consolidation; while the leaders banished by -the Spartans at their former intervention, now doubtless returned to -become foremost in the work.<a id="FNanchor_435" href="#Footnote_435" -class="fnanchor">[435]</a> As the breaking up of Mantinea had been -one of the most obnoxious acts of Spartan omnipotence, so there -was now a strong sympathy in favor of its re-establishment. Many -Arcadians from other quarters came to lend auxiliary labor, while -the Eleians sent three talents as a contribution towards the cost. -Deeply mortified by this proceeding, yet too weak to prevent it by -force, the Spartans sent Agesilaus with a friendly remonstrance. -Having been connected with the city by paternal ties of hospitality, -he had declined the command of the army of coërcion previously -employed against it; nevertheless, on this occasion, the Mantinean -leaders refused to convene their public assembly to hear his -communication, desiring that he would make known his purpose to them. -Accordingly, he intimated that he had come with no view of hindering -the re-establishment of the city, but simply to request that they -would defer it until the consent of Sparta could be formally given; -which (he promised) should soon be forthcoming, together with a -handsome subscription to lighten the cost. But the Mantinean leaders -answered, that compliance was impossible, since a public resolution -had already been taken to prosecute the work forthwith. Enraged -at such a rebuff, yet without power to resent it, Agesilaus was -compelled to return home.<a id="FNanchor_436" href="#Footnote_436" -class="fnanchor">[436]</a> The Mantineans persevered and com<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_206">[p. 206]</span>pleted the rebuilding of -their city, on a level site, and in an elliptical form, surrounded -with elaborate walls and towers.</p> - -<p>The affront here offered, probably studiously offered, by -Mantinean leaders who had either been exiles themselves, or -sympathized with the exiles,—was only the prelude to a series of -others (presently to be recounted) yet more galling and intolerable. -But it was doubtless felt to the quick both by the ephors and by -Agesilaus, as a public symptom of that prostration into which they -had so suddenly fallen. To appreciate fully such painful sentiment, -we must recollect that an exaggerated pride and sense of dignity, -individual as well as collective, founded upon military excellence -and earned by incredible rigor of training,—was the chief mental -result imbibed by every pupil of Lykurgus, and<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_207">[p. 207]</span> hitherto ratified as legitimate by -the general testimony of Greece. This was his principal recompense -for the severe fatigue, the intense self-suppression, the narrow, -monotonous, and unlettered routine, wherein he was born and died. As -an individual, the Spartan citizen was pointed out by the finger of -admiration at the Olympic and other festivals;<a id="FNanchor_437" -href="#Footnote_437" class="fnanchor">[437]</a> while he saw his -city supplicated from the most distant regions of Greece, and obeyed -almost everywhere near her own border, as Pan-hellenic president. -On a sudden, with scarce any preparatory series of events, he -now felt this proud prerogative sentiment not only robbed of its -former tribute, but stung in the most mortifying manner. Agesilaus, -especially, was the more open to such humiliation, since he was not -only a Spartan to the core, but loaded with the consciousness of -having exercised more influence than any other king before him,—of -having succeeded to the throne at a moment when Sparta was at the -maximum of her power,—and of having now in his old age accompanied -her, in part brought her by his misjudgments, into her present -degradation.</p> - -<p>Agesilaus had, moreover, incurred unpopularity among the Spartans -themselves, whose chagrin took the form of religious scruple and -uneasiness. It has been already stated that he was, and had been from -childhood, lame; which deformity had been vehemently insisted on by -his opponents (during the dispute between him and Leotychides in 398 -<small>B.C.</small> for the vacant throne) as disqualifying him for -the regal dignity, and as being the precise calamity against which an -ancient oracle—“Beware of a lame reign”—had given warning. Ingenious -interpretation by Lysander, combined with superior personal merit -in Agesilaus, and suspicions about the legitimacy of Leotychides, -had caused the objection to be then overruled. But there had always -been a party, even during the palmy days of Agesilaus, who thought -that he had obtained the crown under no good auspices. And when the -humiliation of Sparta arrived, every man’s religion suggested to him -readily the cause of it,<a id="FNanchor_438" href="#Footnote_438" -class="fnanchor">[438]</a>—“See what comes of having set at nought -the gracious warning of the gods, and put upon ourselves a lame -reign!” In spite of such untoward impression, however, the real -energy and bravery of Agesilaus, which had not deserted<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_208">[p. 208]</span> even an infirm body -and an age of seventy years, was more than ever indispensable to his -country. He was still the chief leader of her affairs, condemned to -the sad necessity of submitting to this Mantinean affront, and much -worse that followed it, without the least power of hindrance.</p> - -<p>The reëstablishment of Mantinea was probably completed during the -autumn and winter of <small>B.C.</small> 371-370. Such coalescence -of villages into a town, coupled with the predominance of feelings -hostile to Sparta, appears to have suggested the idea of a larger -political union among all who bore the Arcadian name. As yet, no -such union had ever existed; the fractions of the Arcadian name had -nothing in common, apart from other Greeks, except many legendary -and religious sympathies, with a belief in the same heroic lineage -and indigenous antiquity.<a id="FNanchor_439" href="#Footnote_439" -class="fnanchor">[439]</a> But now the idea and aspiration, espoused -with peculiar ardor by a leading Mantinean named Lykomedes, spread -itself rapidly over the country, to form a “commune Arcadum,” or -central Arcadian authority, composed in certain proportions out -of all the sections now autonomous,—and invested with peremptory -power of determining by the vote of its majority. Such central -power, however, was not intended to absorb or set aside the separate -governments, but only to be exercised for certain definite purposes; -in maintaining unanimity at home, together with concurrent, -independent action, as to foreign states.<a id="FNanchor_440" -href="#Footnote_440" class="fnanchor">[440]</a> This plan of -Pan-Arcadian federation was warmly promoted by the Mantineans, who -looked to it as a protec<span class="pagenum" id="Page_209">[p. -209]</span>tion to themselves in case the Spartan power should -revive; as well as by the Thebans and Argeians, from whom aid was -expected in case of need. It found great favor in most parts of -Arcadia, especially in the small districts bordering on Laconia, -which stood most in need of union to protect themselves against -the Spartans,—the Mænalians, Parrhasians, Eutresians, Ægytes,<a -id="FNanchor_441" href="#Footnote_441" class="fnanchor">[441]</a> -etc. But the jealousies among the more considerable cities made some -of them adverse to any scheme emanating from Mantinea. Among these -unfriendly opponents were Heræa, on the west of Arcadia bordering -on Elis,—Orchomenus,<a id="FNanchor_442" href="#Footnote_442" -class="fnanchor">[442]</a> conterminous with Mantinea to the -north—and Tegea, conterminous to the south. The hold of the Spartans -on Arcadia had been always maintained chiefly through Orchomenus and -Tegea. The former was the place where they deposited their hostages -taken from other suspected towns; the latter was ruled by Stasippus -and an oligarchy devoted to their interests.<a id="FNanchor_443" -href="#Footnote_443" class="fnanchor">[443]</a></p> - -<p>Among the population of Tegea, however, a large proportion were -ardent partisans of the new Pan-Arcadian movement, and desirous -of breaking off their connection with Sparta. At the head of -this party were Proxenus and Kallibius; while Stasippus and his -friends, supported by a senate composed chiefly of their partisans, -vehemently opposed any alteration of the existing system. Proxenus -and his partisans resolved to appeal to the assembled people, whom -accordingly they convoked in arms; pacific popular assemblies, with -free discussion, forming seemingly no part of the constitution of -the city. Stasippus and his friends appeared in armed numbers also; -and a conflict ensued, in which each party charged the other with -bad faith and with striking the first blow.<a id="FNanchor_444" -href="#Footnote_444" class="fnanchor">[444]</a> At first Stasippus -had the advantage. Proxenus with a few of the<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_210">[p. 210]</span> opposite party were slain, while -Kallibius with the remainder maintained himself near the town-wall, -and in possession of the gate on the side towards Mantinea. To that -city he had before despatched an express, entreating aid, while he -opened a parley with the opponents. Presently the Mantinean force -arrived, and was admitted within the gates; upon which Stasippus, -seeing that he could no longer maintain himself, escaped by another -gate towards Pallantium. He took sanctuary with a few friends in -a neighboring temple of Artemis, whither he was pursued by his -adversaries, who removed the roof, and began to cast the tiles -down upon them. The unfortunate men were obliged to surrender. -Fettered and placed on a cart, they were carried back to Tegea, and -put on their trial before the united Tegeans and Mantineans, who -condemned them and put them to death. Eight hundred Tegeans, of -the defeated party, fled as exiles to Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_445" -href="#Footnote_445" class="fnanchor">[445]</a></p> - -<p>Such was the important revolution which now took place at Tegea; -a struggle of force on both sides, and not of discussion,—as was in -the nature of the Greek oligarchical governments, where scarce any -serious change of policy in the state could be brought about without -violence. It decided the success of the Pan-Arcadian movement, which -now proceeded with redoubled enthusiasm. Both Mantinea and Tegea were -cordially united in its favor; though Orchomenus, still strenuous -in opposing it, hired for that purpose, as well as for her own -defence, a body of mercenaries from Corinth under Polytropus. A full -assembly of the Arcadian name was convoked at a small town called -Asea, in the mountainous district west of Tegea. It appears to have -been numerously attended; for we hear of one place, Eutæa (in the -district of Mount Mænalus,<a id="FNanchor_446" href="#Footnote_446" -class="fnanchor">[446]</a> and near the borders of Laconia), from -whence every single male adult went to the assembly. It was here -that the consummation of the Pan-Arcadian confederacy was finally -determined; though Orchomenus and Heræa still stood aloof.<a -id="FNanchor_447" href="#Footnote_447" class="fnanchor">[447]</a></p> - -<p>There could hardly be a more fatal blow to Sparta than this loss -to herself, and transfer to her enemies, of Tegea, the most powerful -of her remaining allies.<a id="FNanchor_448" href="#Footnote_448" -class="fnanchor">[448]</a> To assist the exiles and avenge -Stasip<span class="pagenum" id="Page_211">[p. 211]</span>pus, as -well as to arrest the Arcadian movement, she resolved on a march -into the country, in spite of her present dispirited condition; -while Heræa and Lepreum, but no other places, sent contingents to -her aid. From Elis and Argos, on the other hand, reinforcements -came to Mantinea and Tegea. Proclaiming that the Mantineans had -violated the recent peace by their entry into Tegea, Agesilaus -marched across the border against them. The first Arcadian town -which he reached was Eutæa,<a id="FNanchor_449" href="#Footnote_449" -class="fnanchor">[449]</a> where he found that all the male adults -had gone to the great Arcadian assembly. Though the feebler -population, remaining behind, were completely in his power, he took -scrupulous care to respect both person and property, and even lent -aid to rebuild a decayed portion of the wall. At Eutæa he halted -a day or two, thinking it prudent to wait for the junction of -the mercenary force and the Bœotian exiles under Polytropus, now -at Orchomenus. Against the latter place, however, the Mantineans -had marched under Lykomêdes, while Polytropus, coming forth from -the walls to meet them, had been defeated with loss, and slain.<a -id="FNanchor_450" href="#Footnote_450" class="fnanchor">[450]</a> -Hence Agesilaus was compelled to advance onward with his own -unassisted forces, through the territory of Tegea up to the -neighborhood of Mantinea. His onward march left the way from Asea -to Tegea free, upon which the Arcadians assembled at Asea broke up, -and marched by night to Tegea; from whence, on the next day, they -proceeded to Mantinea, along the mountain range eastward of the -Tegeatic plain; so that the whole Arcadian force thus became united. -Agesilaus on his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_212">[p. 212]</span> -side, having ravaged the fields and encamped within little more -than two miles from the walls of Mantinea, was agreeably surprised -by the junction of his allies from Orchomenus, who had eluded by a -night-march the vigilance of the enemy. Both on one side and on the -other, the forces were thus concentrated. Agesilaus found himself -on the first night, without intending it, embosomed in a recess of -the mountains near Mantinea, where the Mantineans gathered on the -high ground around, in order to attack him from above, the next -morning. By a well-managed retreat, he extricated himself from this -inconvenient position, and regained the plain; where he remained -three days, prepared to give battle if the enemy came forth, -in order that he might “not seem (says Xenophon) to hasten his -departure through fear.”<a id="FNanchor_451" href="#Footnote_451" -class="fnanchor">[451]</a> As the enemy kept within their walls, -he marched homeward, on the fourth day, to his former camp in the -Tegean territory. The enemy did not pursue, and he then pushed on -his march, though it was late in the evening, to Eutæa; “wishing -(says Xenophon) to get his troops off before even the enemies’ fires -could be seen, in order that no one might say that his return was a -flight. He thought that he had raised the spirit of Sparta out of the -previous discouragement, by invading Arcadia and ravaging the country -without any enemy coming forth to fight him.”<a id="FNanchor_452" -href="#Footnote_452" class="fnanchor">[452]</a> The army was then -brought back to Sparta and disbanded.</p> - -<p>It had now become a matter of boast for Agesilaus (according to -his own friendly historian) to keep the field for three or four days, -without showing fear of Arcadians and Eleians! So fatally had Spartan -pride broken down, since the day (less than eighteen months before) -when the peremptory order had been sent to Kleombrotus, to march out -of Phokis straight against Thebes!</p> - -<p>Nevertheless it was not from fear of Agesilaus, but from a wise -discretion, that the Arcadians and Eleians had kept within the<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_213">[p. 213]</span> walls of Mantinea. -Epaminondas with the Theban army was approaching to their aid, -and daily expected; a sum of ten talents having been lent by the -Eleians to defray the cost.<a id="FNanchor_453" href="#Footnote_453" -class="fnanchor">[453]</a> He had been invited by them and by others -of the smaller Peloponnesian states, who felt the necessity of -some external protector against Sparta,—and who even before they -applied to Thebes for aid, had solicited the like interference from -Athens (probably under the general presidency accepted by Athens, -and the oaths interchanged by her with various inferior cities, -since the battle of Leuktra), but had experienced a refusal.<a -id="FNanchor_454" href="#Footnote_454" class="fnanchor">[454]</a></p> - -<p>Epaminondas had been preparing for this contingency ever since -the battle of Leuktra. The first use made of his victory had been to -establish or confirm the ascendency of Thebes both over the recusant -Bœotian cities and over the neighboring Phokians and Lokrians, etc. -After this had been accomplished, he must have been occupied (during -the early part of 370 <small>B.C.</small>) in anxiously watching the -movements of Jason of Pheræ,—who had already announced his design -of marching with an imposing force to Delphi for the celebration -of the Pythian games (about August 1.) Though this despot was the -ally of Thebes, yet as both his power, and his aspirations towards -the headship of Greece,<a id="FNanchor_455" href="#Footnote_455" -class="fnanchor">[455]</a> were well known, no Theban general, even -of prudence inferior to Epaminondas, could venture in the face of -such liabilities to conduct away the Theban force into Peloponnesus, -leaving Bœotia uncovered. The assassination of Jason relieved Thebes -from such apprehensions, and a few weeks sufficed to show that his -successors were far less formidable in power as well as in ability. -Accordingly, in the autumn of 370 <small>B.C.</small> Epaminondas -had his attention free to turn to Peloponnesus, for the purpose both -of maintaining the anti-Spartan revolution which had taken place in -Tegea, and of seconding the pronounced impulse among the Arcadians -towards federative coalition.</p> - -<p>But the purposes of this distinguished man went farther still; -embracing long-sighted and permanent arrangements, such as should -forever disable Sparta from recovering her prominent sta<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_214">[p. 214]</span>tion in the Grecian -world. While with one hand he organized Arcadia, with the other he -took measures for replacing the exiled Messenians on their ancient -territory. To achieve this, it was necessary to dispossess the -Spartans of the region once known as independent Messenia, under -its own line of kings, but now, for near three centuries, the best -portion of Laconia, tilled by Helots for the profit of proprietors -at Sparta. While converting these Helots into free Messenians, as -their forefathers had once been, Epaminondas proposed to invite -back all the wanderers of the same race who were dispersed in -various portions of Greece; so as at once to impoverish Sparta by -loss of territory, and to plant upon her flank a neighbor bitterly -hostile. It has been already mentioned, that during the Peloponnesian -war, the exiled Messenians had been among the most active allies -of Athens and Sparta,—at Naupaktus, at Sphakteria, at Pylus, in -Kephallenia, and elsewhere. Expelled at the close of that war by -the triumphant Spartans,<a id="FNanchor_456" href="#Footnote_456" -class="fnanchor">[456]</a> not only from Peloponnesus, but also from -Naupaktus and Kephallenia, these exiles had since been dispersed -among various Hellenic colonies; at Rhegium in Italy, at Messênê in -Sicily, at Hesperides in Libya. From 404 <small>B.C.</small> (the -close of the war) to 373 <small>B.C.</small>, they had remained thus -without a home. At length, about the latter year (when the Athenian -confederate navy again became equal or superior to the Lacedæmonian -on the west coast of Peloponnesus), they began to indulge the hope of -being restored to Naupaktus.<a id="FNanchor_457" href="#Footnote_457" -class="fnanchor">[457]</a> Probably their request may have been -preferred and discussed in the synod of Athenian allies, where the -Thebans sat as members. Nothing however had been done towards it by -the Athenians,—who soon became fatigued with the war, and at length -made peace with Sparta,—when the momentous battle of Leuktra altered, -both completely and suddenly, the balance of power in Greece. A -chance of protection was now opened to the Messenians from Thebes, -far more promising than they had ever had from Athens. Epaminondas, -well aware of the loss as well as humiliation that he should -inflict upon Sparta by restoring them to their ancient territory, -entered into communication with them, and caused them to be invited -to Peloponnesus from all their distant places of emigration.<a -id="FNanchor_458" href="#Footnote_458" class="fnanchor">[458]</a> By -the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_215">[p. 215]</span> time of his -march into Arcadia, in the late autumn of 370 <small>B.C.</small>, -many of them had already joined him, burning with all their ancient -hatred of Sparta, and contributing to aggravate the same sentiment -among Thebans and allies.</p> - -<p>With the scheme of restoring the Messenians, was combined in -the mind of Epaminondas another, for the political consolidation -of the Arcadians; both being intended as parts of one strong and -self-supporting organization against Sparta on her own border. Of -course he could have accomplished nothing of the kind, if there had -not been a powerful spontaneous movement towards consolidation among -the Arcadians themselves. But without his guidance and protection, -the movement would have proved abortive, through the force of local -jealousies within the country, fomented and seconded by Spartan aid -from without. Though the general vote for federative coalition had -been passed with enthusiasm, yet to carry out such a vote to the -satisfaction of all, without quarrelling on points of detail, would -have required far more of public-minded sentiment, as well as of -intelligence, than what could be reckoned upon among the Arcadians. -It was necessary to establish a new city; since the standing jealousy -between Mantinea and Tegea, now for the first time embarked in one -common cause, would never have permitted that either should be -preferred as the centre of the new consolidation.<a id="FNanchor_459" -href="#Footnote_459" class="fnanchor">[459]</a> Besides fixing upon -the new site required, it was indispensable also to choose between -conflicting exigencies, and to break up ancient habits, in a way such -as could hardly have been enforced by any majority purely Arcadian. -The authority here deficient was precisely supplied by Epaminondas; -who brought with him a victorious army and a splendid personal name, -combined with impartiality as to the local politics of Arcadia, and -single-minded hostility to Sparta.</p> - -<p>It was with a view to these two great foundations, as well as -to expel Agesilaus, that Epaminondas now marched the Theban army -into Arcadia; the command being voluntarily intrusted to him by -Pelopidas and the other Bœotarchs present. He arrived shortly after -the retirement of Agesilaus, while the Arcadi<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_216">[p. 216]</span>ans and Eleians were ravaging the lands -of the recusant town of Heræa. As they speedily came back to greet -his arrival, the aggregate confederate body,—Argeians, Arcadians, and -Eleians, united with the Thebans and their accompanying allies,—is -said to have amounted to forty thousand, or according to some, even -to seventy thousand men.<a id="FNanchor_460" href="#Footnote_460" -class="fnanchor">[460]</a> Not merely had Epaminondas brought with -him a choice body of auxiliaries,—Phokians, Lokrians, Eubœans, -Akarnanians, Herakleots, Malians, and Thessalian cavalry and -peltasts,—but the Bœotian bands themselves were so brilliant -and imposing, as to excite universal admiration. The victory of -Leuktra had awakened among them an enthusiastic military ardor, -turned to account by the genius of Epaminondas, and made to produce -a finished discipline which even the unwilling Xenophon cannot -refuse to acknowledge.<a id="FNanchor_461" href="#Footnote_461" -class="fnanchor">[461]</a> Conscious of the might of their assembled -force, within a day’s march of Laconia, the Arcadians, Argeians, -and Eleians pressed Epaminondas to invade that country, now that -no allies could approach the frontier to its aid. At first he was -unwilling to comply. He had not come prepared for the enterprise; -being well aware, from his own journey to Sparta (when the -peace-congress was held there prior to the battle of Leuktra), of -the impracticable nature of the intervening country, so easy to -be defended, especially during the winter-season, by troops like -the Lacedæmonians, whom he believed to be in occupation of all the -passes. Nor was his reluctance overcome until the instances of his -allies were backed by assurances from the Arcadians on the frontier, -that the passes were not all guarded; as well as by invitations from -some of the discontented Periœki, in Laconia. These Periœki engaged -to revolt openly, if he would only show himself in the country. They -told him that there was a general slackness throughout Laconia in -obeying the military requisitions from Sparta; and tendered their -lives as atonement if they should be found to speak falsely. By -such encouragements, as well as by the general impatience of all -around him to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_217">[p. 217]</span> -revenge upon Sparta her long career of pride and abused ascendency, -Epaminondas was at length induced to give the order of invasion.<a -id="FNanchor_462" href="#Footnote_462" class="fnanchor">[462]</a></p> - -<p>That he should have hesitated in taking this responsibility, -will not surprise us, if we recollect, that over and above the -real difficulties of the country, invasion of Laconia by land was -an unparalleled phenomenon,—that the force of Sparta was most -imperfectly known,—that no such thought had been entertained when he -left Thebes,—that the legal duration of command, for himself and his -colleagues, would not permit it,—and that though his Peloponnesian -allies were forward in the scheme, the rest of his troops and his -countrymen might well censure him, if the unknown force of resistance -turned out as formidable as their associations from old time led them -to apprehend.</p> - -<p>The invading army was distributed into four portions, all -penetrating by different passes. The Eleians had the westernmost -and easiest road, the Argeians the easternmost;<a id="FNanchor_463" -href="#Footnote_463" class="fnanchor">[463]</a> while the Thebans -themselves and the Arcadians formed the two central divisions. The -latter alone experienced any serious resistance. More daring even -than the Thebans, they encountered Ischolaus the Spartan at Ium or -Oeum in the district called Skiritis, attacked him in the village, -and overpowered him by vehemence of assault, by superior numbers, -and seemingly also by some favor or collusion<a id="FNanchor_464" -href="#Footnote_464" class="fnanchor">[464]</a> on the part of the -inhabitants. After a desperate resistance, this brave Spartan with -nearly all his division perished. At Karyæ, the Thebans also found -and surmounted some resistance; but the victory of the Arcadians -over Ischolaus operated as an encouragement to all, so that the four -divisions reached Sellasia<a id="FNanchor_465" href="#Footnote_465" -class="fnanchor">[465]</a> and were again<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_218">[p. 218]</span> united in safety. Undefended and -deserted (seemingly) by the Spartans, Sellasia was now burnt and -destroyed by the invaders, who, continuing their march along the -plain or valley towards the Eurotas, encamped in the sacred grove of -Apollo. On the next day they reached the Eurotas, at the foot of the -bridge which crossed that river and led to the city of Sparta.</p> - -<p>Epaminondas found the bridge too well-guarded to attempt forcing -it; a strong body of Spartan hoplites being also discernible on -the other side, in the sacred ground of Athênê Alea. He therefore -marched down the left bank of the river, burning and plundering the -houses in his way, as far as Amyklæ, between two and three miles -below Sparta. Here he found a ford, though the river was full, from -the winter season; and accomplished the passage, defeating, after a -severe contest, a body of Spartans who tried to oppose it. He was now -on the same side of the river as Sparta, to which city he slowly and -cautiously made his approach; taking care to keep his Theban troops -always in the best battle order, and protecting them, when encamped, -by felled trees; while the Arcadians and other Peloponnesian allies -dispersed around to plunder the neighboring houses and property.<a -id="FNanchor_466" href="#Footnote_466" class="fnanchor">[466]</a></p> - -<p>Great was the consternation which reigned in the city; destitute -of fortifications, yet hitherto inviolate in fact and unassailable -even in idea. Besides their own native force, the Spartans had no -auxiliaries except those mercenaries from Orchomenus who had come -back with Agesilaus; nor was it certain beforehand that even these -troops would remain with them, if the invasion became formidable.<a -id="FNanchor_467" href="#Footnote_467" class="fnanchor">[467]</a> On -the first assemblage of the irresistible army on their frontier, they -had despatched one of their commanders of foreign contingents (called -Xenâgi) to press the instant coming of such Peloponnesian allies as -remained faithful to them; and also envoys to Athens, entreating -assistance from that city. Auxiliaries were obtained, and rapidly put -under march, from Pellênê,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_219">[p. -219]</span> Sikyon, Phlius, Corinth, Epidaurus, Trœzen, -Hermionê, and Halieis.<a id="FNanchor_468" href="#Footnote_468" -class="fnanchor">[468]</a> But the ordinary line of march into -Laconia was now impracticable to them; the whole frontier being -barred by Argeians and Arcadians. Accordingly they were obliged to -proceed first to the Argolic peninsula, and from thence to cross by -sea (embarking probably at Halieis on the south-western coast of the -peninsula) to Prasiæ on the eastern coast of Laconia; from whence -they made their way over the Laconian mountains to Sparta. Being -poorly provided with vessels, they were forced to cross in separate -detachments, and to draw lots for priority.<a id="FNanchor_469" -href="#Footnote_469" class="fnanchor">[469]</a> By this chance the -Phliasian contingent did not come over until the last; while the -xenagus, eager to reach Sparta, left them behind, and conducted the -rest thither, arriving only just before the confederate enemies -debouched from Sellasia. The Phliasians, on crossing to Prasiæ, -found neither their comrades nor the xenagus, but were obliged to -hire a guide to Sparta. Fortunately they arrived there both safely -and in time, eluding the vigilance of the enemy, who were then near -Amyklæ.</p> - -<p>These reinforcements were no less seasonable to Sparta, than -creditable to the fidelity of the allies. For the bad feeling which -habitually reigned in Laconia, between the Spartan citizens on one -side, and the Periœki and Helots on the other, produced in this hour -of danger its natural fruits of desertion, alarm, and weakness. -Not only were the Periœki and Helots in standing discontent, but -even among the Spartan citizens themselves, a privileged fraction -called Peers had come to monopolize political honors; while the -remainder,—poorer men, yet ambitious and active, and known under -the ordinary name of the Inferiors,—were subject to a degrading -exclusion, and rendered bitterly hostile. The account given in a -previous chapter of the conspiracy of Kinadon, will have disclosed -the fearful insecurity of the Spartan citizen, surrounded by so many -disaffected companions; Periœki and Helots<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_220">[p. 220]</span> in Laconia, inferior citizens at -Sparta. On the appearance of the invading enemy, indeed, a certain -feeling of common interest arose, since even the disaffected might -reasonably imagine that a plundering soldiery, if not repelled at -the point of the sword, would make their condition worse instead of -better. And accordingly, when the ephors made public proclamation, -that any Helot who would take heavy armor and serve in the ranks as -an hoplite, should be manumitted,—not less than six thousand Helots -gave in their names to serve. But a body thus numerous, when seen -in arms, became itself the object of mistrust to the Spartans; so -that the arrival of their new allies from Prasiæ was welcomed as a -security, not less against the armed Helots within the city, than -against the Thebans without.<a id="FNanchor_470" href="#Footnote_470" -class="fnanchor">[470]</a> Open enmity, however, was not wanting. A -considerable number both of Periœki and Helots actually took arms on -behalf of the Thebans; others remained inactive, disregarding the -urgent summons from the ephors, which could not now be enforced.<a -id="FNanchor_471" href="#Footnote_471" class="fnanchor">[471]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_221">[p. 221]</span></p> - -<p>Under such wide-spread feelings of disaffection the defence even -of Sparta itself against the assailing enemy was a task requiring -all the energy of Agesilaus. After having vainly tried to hinder -the Thebans from crossing the Eurotas, he was forced to abandon -Amyklæ and to throw himself back upon the city of Sparta, towards -which they immediately advanced. More than one conspiracy was on -the point of breaking out, had not his vigilance forestalled the -projects. Two hundred young soldiers of doubtful fidelity were -marching, without orders, to occupy a strong post (sacred to Artemis) -called the Issorium. Those around him were about to attack them, -but Agesilaus, repressing their zeal, went up alone to the band, -addressed them in language betokening no suspicion, yet warning them -that they had mistaken his orders: their services were needed, not -at the Issorium, but in another part of the city. They obeyed his -orders, and moved to the spot indicated; upon which he immediately -occupied the Issorium with troops whom he could trust. In the ensuing -night, he seized and put to death fifteen of the leaders of the -two hundred. Another conspiracy, said to have been on the point -of breaking out, was repressed by seizing the conspirators in the -house where they were assembled, and putting them to death untried; -the first occasion (observes Plutarch) on which any Spartan was -ever put to death untried,<a id="FNanchor_472" href="#Footnote_472" -class="fnanchor">[472]</a>—a statement which I hesitate to believe -without knowing from whom he borrowed it, but which, if true, proves -that the Spartan kings and ephors did not apply to Spartan citizens -the same measure as to Periœki and Helots.</p> - -<p>By such severe proceedings, disaffection was kept under; while -the strong posts of the city were effectively occupied, and the -wider approaches barricaded by heaps of stones and earth.<a -id="FNanchor_473" href="#Footnote_473" class="fnanchor">[473]</a> -Though destitute of walls, Sparta was extremely defensible by -position. Epaminondas marched slowly up to it from Amyklæ; the -Arcadians and others in his army spreading themselves to burn and -plunder the neighborhood. On the third or fourth day his cavalry -occupied the Hippodrome (probably a space of level ground near -the river, under the hilly site of the town), where the Spartan -cavalry, though inferior both in number and in goodness, gained<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_222">[p. 222]</span> an advantage over -them, through the help of three hundred chosen hoplites whom -Agesilaus had planted in ambush hard by, in a precinct sacred to the -Dioskuri. Though this action was probably of little consequence, yet -Epaminondas did not dare to attempt the city by storm. Satisfied with -having defied the Spartans and manifested his mastery of the field -even to their own doors, he marched away southward down to Eurotas. -To them, in their present depression, it was matter of consolation -and even of boasting,<a id="FNanchor_474" href="#Footnote_474" -class="fnanchor">[474]</a> that he had not dared to assail them -in their last stronghold. The agony of their feelings,—grief, -resentment, and wounded honor,—was intolerable. Many wished to go out -and fight, at all hazard; but Agesilaus resisted them with the same -firmness as Perikles had shown at Athens, when the Peloponnesians -first invaded Attica at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. -Especially the Spartan women, who had never before beheld an enemy, -are said to have manifested emotions so furious and distressing, -as to increase much the difficulty of defence.<a id="FNanchor_475" -href="#Footnote_475" class="fnanchor">[475]</a> We are even told -that Antalkidas, at that time one of the ephors, sent his children -for safety away from Sparta to the island of Kythêra. Epaminondas -knew well how desperate the resistance of the Spartans would be -if their city were attacked; while to himself, in the midst of a -hostile and impracticable country, repulse would be absolute ruin.<a -id="FNanchor_476" href="#Footnote_476" class="fnanchor">[476]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_223">[p. 223]</span></p> - -<p>On leaving Sparta, Epaminondas carried his march as far as Helos -and Gythium on the sea-coast; burning and plundering the country, -and trying for three days to capture Gythium, which contained the -Lacedæmonian arsenal and ships. Many of the Laconian Periœki joined -and took service in his army; nevertheless his attempt on Gythium -did not succeed; upon which he turned back and retraced his steps to -the Arcadian frontier. It was the more necessary for him to think of -quitting Laconia, since his Peloponnesian allies, the Arcadians and -others, were daily stealing home with the rich plunder which they -had acquired, while his supplies were also becoming deficient.<a -id="FNanchor_477" href="#Footnote_477" class="fnanchor">[477]</a></p> - -<p>Epaminondas had thus accomplished far more than he had projected -when quitting Thebes; for the effect of the expedition on Grecian -opinion was immense. The reputation of his army, as well as his -own, was prodigiously exalted; and even the narrative of Xenophon, -unfriendly as well as obscure, bears involuntary testimony both to -the excellence of his generalship and to the good discipline of his -troops. He made his Thebans keep in rank and hold front against the -enemy, even while their Arcadian allies were dispersing around for -plunder. Moreover, the insult and humiliation to Sparta were still -greater than that inflicted by the battle of Leuktra; which had -indeed shown that she was no longer invincible in the field, but -had still left her with the admitted supposition of an inviolable -territory and an unapproachable city.</p> - -<p>The resistance of the Spartans indeed (except in so far as -regards their city) had been far less than either friends or enemies -expected;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_224">[p. 224]</span> the -belief in their power was thus proportionally abridged. It now -remained for Epaminondas to complete their humiliation by executing -those two enterprises which had formed the special purpose of his -expedition: the reëstablishment of Messênê, and the consolidation of -the Arcadians.</p> - -<p>The recent invasion of Laconia, victorious as well as lucrative, -had inspired the Arcadians with increased confidence and antipathy -against Sparta, and increased disposition to listen to Epaminondas. -When that eminent man proclaimed the necessity of establishing a -strong frontier against Sparta on the side of Arcadia, and when -he announced his intention of farther weakening Sparta by the -restoration of the exiled Messenians,—the general feeling of the -small Arcadian communities, already tending in the direction of -coalescence, became strong enough to overbear all such impediments -of detail as the breaking up of ancient abode and habit involves. -Respecting early Athenian history, we are told by Thucydides,<a -id="FNanchor_478" href="#Footnote_478" class="fnanchor">[478]</a> -that the legendary Theseus, “having become powerful, in addition -to his great capacity,” had effected the discontinuance of those -numerous independent governments which once divided Attica, and had -consolidated them all into one common government at Athens. Just -such was the revolution now operated by Epaminondas, through the -like combination of intelligence and power. A Board of Œkists or -Founders was named to carry out the resolution taken by the Arcadian -assemblies at Asea and Tegea, for the establishment of a Pan-Arcadian -city and centre. Of this Board, two were from Tegea, two from -Mantinea, two from Kleitor, two from the district of Menalus, two -from that of the Parrhasians. A convenient site being chosen upon -the river Helisson (which flowed through and divided the town in -two), about twenty miles west of Tegea, well-fitted to block up the -marches of Sparta in a north-westerly direction,—the foundation of -the new Great City (Megalopolis) was laid by the Œkists jointly with -Epaminondas. Forty distinct Arcadian townships,<a id="FNanchor_479" -href="#Footnote_479" class="fnanchor">[479]</a> from all sides of -this centre, were persuaded to join the new community. Ten were from -the Mænalii, eight from the Parrhasii, six from the Eutresii,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_225">[p. 225]</span> three great sections -of the Arcadian name, each an aggregate of villages. Four little -townships, occupying a portion of the area intended for the new -territory, yet being averse to the scheme, were constrained to -join; but in one of them, Trapezus, the aversion was so strong, -that most of the inhabitants preferred to emigrate, and went to -join the Trapezuntines in the Euxine Sea (Trebizond), who received -them kindly. Some of the leading Trapezuntines were even slain by -the violent temper of the Arcadian majority. The walls of the new -city enclosed an area of fifty stadia in circumference (more than -five miles and a half); while an ample rural territory was also -gathered around it, extending northward as much as twenty-four miles -from the city, and conterminous on the east with Tegea, Mantinea, -Orchomenus, and Kaphyæ,—on the west with Messênê,<a id="FNanchor_480" -href="#Footnote_480" class="fnanchor">[480]</a> Phigalia, and -Heræa.</p> - -<p>The other new city,—Messênê,—was founded under the joint auspices -of the Thebans and their allies, Argeians and others; Epitelês -being especially chosen by the Argeians for that purpose.<a -id="FNanchor_481" href="#Footnote_481" class="fnanchor">[481]</a> -The Messenian exiles, though eager and joyful at the thought of -regaining their name and nationality, were averse to fix their new -city either at Œchalia or Andania, which had been the scenes of -their calamities in the early wars with Sparta. Moreover the site of -Mount Ithômê is said to have been pointed out by the hero Kaukon, -in a dream, to the Ageian general Epitelês. The local circumstances -of this mountain (on which the last gallant resistance of the -revolted Messenians against Sparta had been carried on, between the -Persian and Peloponnesian wars) were such, that the indications -of dreams, prophets, and religious signs coincided fully with the -deliberate choice of a judge like Epaminondas. In after days, this -hill Ithômê (then bearing the town and citadel of Messênê), together -with the Akrocorinthus, were marked out by De<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_226">[p. 226]</span>metrius of Pharus as the two horns of -Peloponnesus: whoever held these two horns, was master of the bull.<a -id="FNanchor_482" href="#Footnote_482" class="fnanchor">[482]</a> -Ithômê was near two thousand five hundred feet above the level of -the sea, having upon its summit an abundant spring of water, called -Klepsydra. Upon this summit the citadel or acropolis of the new -town of Messênê was built; while the town itself was situated lower -down on the slope, though connected by a continuous wall with its -acropolis. First, solemn sacrifices were offered, by Epaminondas, -who was recognized as Œkist or Founder,<a id="FNanchor_483" -href="#Footnote_483" class="fnanchor">[483]</a> to Dionysius and -Apollo Ismenius,—by the Argeians, to the Argeian Hêrê and Zeus -Nemeius,—by the Messenians, to Zeus Ithomatês and the Dioskuri. -Next, prayer was made to the ancient Heroes and Heroines of the -Messenian nation, especially to the invincible warrior Aristomenes, -that they would now come back and again take up their residence as -inmates in enfranchised Messênê. After this, the ground was marked -out and the building was begun, under the sound of Argeian and -Bœotian flutes, playing the strains of Pronomus and Sakadas. The best -masons and architects were invited from all Greece, to lay out the -streets with regularity, as well as to ensure a proper distribution -and construction of the sacred edifices.<a id="FNanchor_484" -href="#Footnote_484" class="fnanchor">[484]</a> In respect of the -fortifications, too, Epaminondas was studiously provident. Such -was their excellence and solidity, that they exhibited matter for -admiration even in the after-days of the traveller Pausanias.<a -id="FNanchor_485" href="#Footnote_485" class="fnanchor">[485]</a></p> - -<p>From their newly-established city on the hill of Ithômê, the -Messenians enjoyed a territory extending fifteen miles southward -down to the Messenian Gulf, across a plain, then as well as now, the -richest and most fertile in Peloponnesus; while to the eastward, -their territory was conterminous with that of Arcadia and the -contemporary establishment of Megalopolis. All the newly-appropriated -space was land cut off from the Spartan dominion. How much -was cut off in the direction south-east of Ithômê (along the -north-eastern coast of the Messenian Gulf), we cannot exactly say. -But it would appear that the Periœki of Thuria, situated in that -neighborhood, were converted into an independent community<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_227">[p. 227]</span> and protected by -the vicinity of Messênê.<a id="FNanchor_486" href="#Footnote_486" -class="fnanchor">[486]</a> What is of more importance to -notice, however, is,—that all the extensive district westward -and south-westward of Ithômê,—all the south-western corner of -Peloponnesus, from the river Neda southward to Cape Akritas,—was now -also subtracted from Sparta. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian -war, the Spartan Brasidas had been in garrison near Methônê<a -id="FNanchor_487" href="#Footnote_487" class="fnanchor">[487]</a> -(not far from Cape Akritas); Pylus,—where the Athenian Demosthenes -erected his hostile fort, near which the important capture at -Sphakteria was effected,—had been a maritime point belonging to -Sparta, about forty-six miles from the city;<a id="FNanchor_488" -href="#Footnote_488" class="fnanchor">[488]</a> Aulon (rather farther -north, near the river Neda) had been at the time of the conspiracy of -Kinadon a township of Spartan Periœki, of very doubtful fidelity.<a -id="FNanchor_489" href="#Footnote_489" class="fnanchor">[489]</a> Now -all this wide area, from the north-eastern corner of the Messenian -Gulf westward, the best half of the Spartan territory, was severed -from Sparta to become the property of Periœki and Helots, converted -into freemen; not only sending no rent or tribute to Sparta, as -before, but bitterly hostile to her from the very nature of their -tenure. It was in the ensuing year that the Arcadian army cut to -pieces the Lacedæmonian garrison at Asinê,<a id="FNanchor_490" -href="#Footnote_490" class="fnanchor">[490]</a> killing the Spartan -polemarch Geranor; and probably about the same time the other -Lacedæmonian garrisons in the south-western peninsula must have been -expelled. Thus liberated, the Periœki of the region welcomed the new -Messênê as the guarantee of their independence. Epaminondas, besides -confirming the independence of Methônê and Asinê, reconstituted -some other towns,<a id="FNanchor_491" href="#Footnote_491" -class="fnanchor">[491]</a> which under Lacedæmonian dominion had -probably been kept unfortified and had dwindled away.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_228">[p. 228]</span></p> - -<p>In the spring of 425 <small>B.C.</small>, when Demosthenes landed -at Pylus, Thucydides considers it a valuable acquisition for Athens, -and a serious injury to Sparta, to have lodged a small garrison of -Messenians in that insignificant post, as plunderers of Spartan -territory and instigators of Helots to desertion,<a id="FNanchor_492" -href="#Footnote_492" class="fnanchor">[492]</a>—especially as -their dialect could not be distinguished from that of the Spartans -themselves. How prodigious must have been the impression throughout -Greece, when Epaminondas, by planting the Messenian exiles and others -on the strong frontier city and position of Ithômê, deprived Sparta -in a short time of all the wide space between that mountain and the -western sea, enfranchising the Periœki and Helots contained in it! -We must recollect that the name Messênê had been from old times -applied generally to this region, and that it was never bestowed -upon any city before the time of Epaminondas. When therefore the -Spartans complained of “the liberation of Messênê,”—“the loss of -Messênê,”—they included in the word, not simply the city on Mount -Ithômê, but all this territory besides; though it was not all -comprised in the domain of the new city.</p> - -<p>They complained yet more indignantly, that along with the genuine -Messenians, now brought back from exile,—a rabble of their own -emancipated Periœki and Helots had been domiciled on their border.<a -id="FNanchor_493" href="#Footnote_493" class="fnanchor">[493]</a> -Herein were included, not only such of these two classes<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_229">[p. 229]</span> as, having before -dwelt in servitude throughout the territory westward of Ithômê, now -remained there in a state of freedom—but also doubtless a number of -others who deserted from other parts of Laconia. For as we know that -such desertions had been not inconsiderable, even when there was no -better shelter than the outlying posts of Pylus and Kythêra—so we may -be sure that they became much more numerous, when the neighboring -city of Messênê was founded under adequate protection, and when -there was a chance of obtaining, westward of the Messenian Gulf, -free lands with a new home. Moreover, such Periœki and Helots as -had actually joined the invading army of Epaminondas in Laconia, -would be forced from simple insecurity to quit the country when -he retired, and would be supplied with fresh residences in the -newly-enfranchised territory. All these men would pass at once, -out of a state of peculiarly harsh servitude, into the dignity of -free and equal Hellens,<a id="FNanchor_494" href="#Footnote_494" -class="fnanchor">[494]</a> sending again a solemn Messenian -legation or Theôry to the Olympic festival, after an interval of -more than three centuries,<a id="FNanchor_495" href="#Footnote_495" -class="fnanchor">[495]</a>—outdoing their former masters in the -magnitude of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">[p. 230]</span> -their offerings from the same soil,—and requiting them for previous -ill-usage by words of defiance and insult, instead of that universal -deference and admiration which a Spartan had hitherto been accustomed -to look upon as his due.</p> - -<p>The enfranchisement and reörganization of all Western Laconia, -the renovation of the Messenian name, the foundation of the two -new cities (Messênê and Megalopolis) in immediate neighborhood and -sympathy,—while they completed the degradation of Sparta, constituted -in all respects the most interesting political phenomena that -Greece had witnessed for many years. To the profound mortification -of the historian,—he is able to recount nothing more than the bare -facts, with such inferences as these facts themselves warrant. -Xenophon, under whose eyes all must have passed, designedly -omits to notice them;<a id="FNanchor_496" href="#Footnote_496" -class="fnanchor">[496]</a> Pausanias, whom we<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_231">[p. 231]</span> have to thank for most of what we know, -is prompted by his religious imagination to relate many divine signs -and warnings, but little matter of actual occurrence. Details are -altogether withheld from us. We know neither how long a time was -occupied in the building of the two cities, nor who furnished the -cost; though both the one and the other must have been considerable. -Of the thousand new arrangements, incident to the winding up of many -small townships, and the commencement of two large cities, we are -unable to render any account. Yet there is no point of time wherein -social phenomena are either so interesting or so instructive. In -describing societies already established and ancient, we find the -force of traditional routine almost omnipotent in its influence -both on men’s actions and on their feelings; bad as well as good -is preserved in one concrete, since the dead weight of the past -stifles all constructive intelligence, and leaves little room even -for improving aspirations. But the forty small communities which -coalesced into Megalopolis, and the Messenians and other settlers -who came for the first time together on the hill of Ithômê, were in -a state in which new exigencies of every kind pressed for immediate -satisfaction. There was no file to afford a precedent, nor any -resource left except to submit all the problems to discussion by -those whose character and judgment was most esteemed. Whether the -problems were well- or ill-solved, there must have been now a genuine -and earnest attempt to strike out as good a solution as the lights of -the time and place permitted, with a certain latitude for conflicting -views. Arrangements must have been made for the apportionment of -houses and lands among the citizens, by purchase, or grant, or both -together; for the political and judicial constitution; for religious -and recreative ceremonies, for military defence, for markets, for -the security and transmission of property, etc. All these and many -other social wants of a nascent community must now have been provided -for, and it would have been highly interesting to know how. Unhappily -the means are denied to us. We can record little more than the bare -fact that these two youngest members of the Hellenic brotherhood of -cities were born at the same time, and under the auspices of the -same presiding genius, Epami<span class="pagenum" id="Page_232">[p. -232]</span>nondas; destined to sustain each other in neighborly -sympathy and in repelling all common danger from the attacks of -Sparta; a purpose, which, even two centuries afterwards, remained -engraven on the mind of a Megalopolitan patriot like Polybius.<a -id="FNanchor_497" href="#Footnote_497" class="fnanchor">[497]</a></p> - -<p>Megalopolis was intended not merely as a great city in itself, but -as the centre of the new confederacy; which appears to have comprised -all Arcadia, except Orchomenus and Heræa. It was enacted that a synod -or assembly, from all the separate members of the Arcadian name, -and in which probably every Arcadian citizen from the constituent -communities had the right of attending, should be periodically -convoked there. This assembly was called the Ten Thousand, or the -Great Number. A body of Arcadian troops, called the Epariti, destined -to uphold the federation, and receiving pay when on service, was -also provided. Assessments were levied upon each city for their -support, and a Pan-Arcadian general (probably also other officers) -was named. The Ten Thousand, on behalf of all Arcadia, received -foreign envoys,—concluded war, or peace, or alliance,—and tried -all officers or other Arcadians brought before them on accusations -of public misconduct.<a id="FNanchor_498" href="#Footnote_498" -class="fnanchor">[498]</a> The great Athenian orators, Kallistratus, -Demosthenes, Æschines, on various occasions pleaded before it.<a -id="FNanchor_499" href="#Footnote_499" class="fnanchor">[499]</a> -What were its times of meeting, we are unable to say. It contributed -seriously, for a certain time, to sustain a Pan-Arcadian communion -of action and sentiment which had never before existed;<a -id="FNanchor_500" href="#Footnote_500" class="fnanchor">[500]</a> and -to prevent, or soften, those dissensions which had always a tendency -to break out among the separate Arcadian cities. The patriotic -enthusiasm, however, out of which Megalopolis had first arisen, -gradually became enfeebled. The city never attained that preëminence -or power which its founders contemplated, and which had caused -the city to be laid out on a scale too large for the population -actually inhabiting it.<a id="FNanchor_501" href="#Footnote_501" -class="fnanchor">[501]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_233">[p. 233]</span></p> - -<p>Not only was the portion of Laconia west of the Messenian Gulf -now rendered independent of Sparta, but also much of the territory -which lies north of Sparta, between that city and Arcadia. Thus the -Skiritæ (hardy mountaineers of Arcadian race, heretofore dependent -upon Sparta, and constituting a valuable contingent to her armies),<a -id="FNanchor_502" href="#Footnote_502" class="fnanchor">[502]</a> -with their territory forming the northern frontier of Laconia -towards Arcadia, became from this time independent of and -hostile to Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_503" href="#Footnote_503" -class="fnanchor">[503]</a> The same is the case even with a place -much nearer to Sparta,—Sellasia; though this latter was retaken by -the Lacedæmonians four or five years afterwards.<a id="FNanchor_504" -href="#Footnote_504" class="fnanchor">[504]</a></p> - -<p>Epaminondas remained about four months beyond the legal duration -of his command in Arcadia and Laconia.<a id="FNanchor_505" -href="#Footnote_505" class="fnanchor">[505]</a> The sufferings -of a severe mid-winter were greatly mitigated to his soldiers by -the Arcadians, who, full of devoted friendship, pressed upon them -an excess of hospitality which he could not permit consistently -with his military duties.<a id="FNanchor_506" href="#Footnote_506" -class="fnanchor">[506]</a> He stayed long enough to settle all the -preliminary debates and difficulties, and to put in train of serious -execution the establishment of Messênê and Megalopolis. For the -completion of a work thus comprehensive, which changed the face -and character of Peloponnesus, much time was of course necessary. -Accordingly, a Theban division under Pamenes was left to repel all -obstruction from Sparta;<a id="FNanchor_507" href="#Footnote_507" -class="fnanchor">[507]</a> while Tegea also, from this time for<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_234">[p. 234]</span>ward, for some -years, was occupied as a post by a Theban harmost and garrison.<a -id="FNanchor_508" href="#Footnote_508" class="fnanchor">[508]</a></p> - -<p>Meanwhile the Athenians were profoundly affected by these -proceedings of Epaminondas in Peloponnesus. The accumulation of -force against Sparta was so powerful, that under a chief like -him, it seemed sufficient to crush her; and though the Athenians -were now neutral in the contest, such a prospect was not at all -agreeable to them,<a id="FNanchor_509" href="#Footnote_509" -class="fnanchor">[509]</a> involving the aggrandizement of Thebes -to a point inconsistent with their security. It was in the midst of -the successes of Epaminondas that envoys came to Athens from Sparta, -Corinth, and Phlius, to entreat her aid. The message was one not -merely humiliating to the Lacedæmonians, who had never previously -sent the like request to any Grecian city,—but also difficult to -handle in reference to Athens. History showed abundant acts of -jealousy and hostility, little either of good feeling or consentient -interest, on the part of the Lacedæmonians towards her. What little -was to be found, the envoys dexterously brought forward; going back -to the dethronement of the Peisistratids from Athens by Spartan help, -the glorious expulsion of Xerxes from Greece by the joint efforts of -both cities,—and the auxiliaries sent by Athens into Laconia in 465 -<small>B.C.</small>, to assist the Spartans against the revolted -Messenians<span class="pagenum" id="Page_235">[p. 235]</span> on -Mount Ithômê. In these times (he reminded the Athenian assembly) -Thebes had betrayed the Hellenic cause by joining Xerxes, and had -been an object of common hatred to both. Moreover the maritime -forces of Greece had been arrayed under Athens in the Confederacy -of Delos, with full sanction and recommendation from Sparta; -while the headship of the latter by land had in like manner been -accepted by the Athenians. He called on the assembly, in the name of -these former glories, to concur with Sparta in forgetting all the -deplorable hostilities which had since intervened, and to afford -to her a generous relief against the old common enemy. The Thebans -might even now be decimated (according to the vow said to have -been taken after the repulse of Xerxes), in spite of their present -menacing ascendency,—if Athens and Sparta could be brought heartily -to coöperate; and might be dealt with as Thebes herself had wished to -deal with Athens after the Peloponnesian war, when Sparta refused to -concur in pronouncing the sentence of utter ruin.<a id="FNanchor_510" -href="#Footnote_510" class="fnanchor">[510]</a></p> - -<p>This appeal from Sparta was earnestly seconded by the envoys -from Corinth and Phlius. The Corinthian speaker contended, that -Epaminondas and his army, passing through the territory of Corinth -and inflicting damage upon it in their passage into Peloponnesus, -had committed a glaring violation of the general peace, sworn in -371 <small>B.C.</small>, first at Sparta and afterwards at Athens, -guaranteeing universal autonomy to every Grecian city. The envoy -from Phlius,—while complimenting Athens on the proud position which -she now held, having the fate of Sparta in her hands,—dwelt on the -meed of honor which she would earn in Greece, if she now generously -interfered to rescue her ancient rival, forgetting past injuries -and remembering only past benefits. In adopting such policy, too, -she would act in accordance with her own true interests; since, -should Sparta be crushed, the Thebans would become undisputed heads -of Greece, and more formidable still to Athens.<a id="FNanchor_511" -href="#Footnote_511" class="fnanchor">[511]</a></p> - -<p>It was not among the least marks of the prostration of Sparta, -that she should be compelled to send such an embassy to Athens, and -to entreat an amnesty for so many untoward realities during the past. -The contrast is indeed striking, when we set her present language -against that which she had held respecting Athens, before and through -the Peloponnesian war.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_236">[p. 236]</span></p> - -<p>At first, her envoys were heard with doubtful favor; the -sentiment of the assembly being apparently rather against than for -them. “Such language from the Spartans (murmured the assembled -citizens) is intelligible enough during their present distress; but -so long as they were in good circumstances, we received nothing -but ill-usage from them.”<a id="FNanchor_512" href="#Footnote_512" -class="fnanchor">[512]</a> Nor was the complaint of the Spartans, -that the invasion of Laconia was contrary to the sworn peace -guaranteeing universal autonomy, admitted without opposition. Some -said that the Lacedæmonians had drawn the invasion upon themselves, -by their previous interference with Tegea and in Arcadia; and that -the intervention of the Mantineans at Tegea had been justifiable, -since Stasippus and the philo-Laconian party in that city had been -the first to begin unjust violence. On the other hand, the appeal -made by the envoys to the congress of Peloponnesian allies held -in 404 <small>B.C.</small>, after the surrender of Athens,—when -the Theban deputy had proposed that Athens should be totally -destroyed, while the Spartans had strenuously protested against -so cruel a sentence—made a powerful impression on the assembly, -and contributed more than anything else to determine them in favor -of the proposition.<a id="FNanchor_513" href="#Footnote_513" -class="fnanchor">[513]</a> “As Athens was then, so Sparta is now, on -the brink of ruin, from the fiat of the same enemy: Athens was then -rescued by Sparta, and shall she now leave the rescue unrequited?” -Such was the broad and simple issue which told upon the feelings of -the assembled Athenians, disposing them to listen with increasing -favor both to the envoys from Corinth and Phlius, and to their own -speakers on the same side.</p> - -<p>To rescue Sparta, indeed, was prudent as well as generous. -A counterpoise would thus be maintained against the excessive -aggrandizement of Thebes, which at this moment doubtless caused -serious alarm and jealousy to the Athenians. And thus, after -the first ebullition of resentment against Sparta, naturally -suggested by the history of the past, the philo-Spartan view of -the situation gradually became more and more predominant in the -assembly. Kallistratus<a id="FNanchor_514" href="#Footnote_514" -class="fnanchor">[514]</a> the orator spoke eloquently in -support of the Lace<span class="pagenum" id="Page_237">[p. -237]</span>dæmonians; while the adverse speakers were badly listened -to, as pleading in favor of Thebes, whom no one wished to aggrandize -farther. A vote, decisive and enthusiastic, was passed for assisting -the Spartans with the full force of Athens; under the command of -Iphikrates, then residing as a private citizen<a id="FNanchor_515" -href="#Footnote_515" class="fnanchor">[515]</a> at Athens, since the -peace of the preceding year, which had caused him to be recalled from -Korkyra.</p> - -<p>As soon as the sacrifices, offered in contemplation of this -enterprise were announced to be favorable, Iphikrates made -proclamation that the citizens destined for service should equip -themselves and muster in arms in the grove of Akadêmus (outside -the gates), there to take their evening meal, and to march the -next morning at daybreak. Such was the general ardor, that many -citizens went forth from the gates even in advance of Iphikrates -himself; and the total force which followed him is said to have -been twelve thousand men,—not named under conscription by the -general, but volunteers.<a id="FNanchor_516" href="#Footnote_516" -class="fnanchor">[516]</a> He first marched to Corinth, where he -halted some days; much to the discontent of his soldiers, who were -impatient to accomplish their project of carrying rescue to Sparta. -But Iphikrates was well aware that all beyond Corinth was hostile -ground, and that he had formidable enemies to deal with. After -having established his position at Corinth, and obtained information -regarding the enemy, he marched into Arcadia, and there made war -without any important result. Epaminondas and his army had quitted -Laconia, while many of the Arcadians and Eleians had gone home with -the plunder acquired; so that Sparta was, for the time, out of -danger. Impelled in part by the recent manifestation of Athens,<a -id="FNanchor_517" href="#Footnote_517" class="fnanchor">[517]</a> -the Theban general himself soon commenced his march of return into -Bœotia, in which it was necessary for him to pass the line of -Mount Oneium between Corinth and Kenchreæ. This line was composed -of difficult ground, and afforded good means of resistance to the -passage of an army; nevertheless Iphikrates, though he occupied its -two extremities, did not attempt directly to<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_238">[p. 238]</span> bar the passage of the Thebans. He -contented himself with sending out from Corinth all his cavalry, -both Athenian and Corinthian, to harass them in their march. But -Epaminondas beat them back with some loss, and pursued them to the -gates of Corinth. Excited by this spectacle, the Athenian main body -within the town were eager to march out and engage in general battle. -Their ardor was however repressed by Iphikrates; who, refusing to go -forth, suffered the Thebans to continue their retreat unmolested.<a -id="FNanchor_518" href="#Footnote_518" class="fnanchor">[518]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_239">[p. 239]</span></p> - -<p>On returning to Thebes, Epaminondas with Pelopidas and the -other Bœotarchs, resigned the command. They had already<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_240">[p. 240]</span> retained it for four -months longer than the legal expiration of their term. Although, -by the constitutional law of Thebes, any general who retained his -functions longer than the period fixed by law was pronounced worthy -of death, yet Epaminondas, while employed in his great projects -for humiliating Sparta and founding the two hostile cities on her -border, had taken upon himself to brave this illegality, persuading -all his colleagues to concur with him. On resigning the command, all -of them had to undergo that trial of accountability which awaited -every retiring magistrate, as a matter of course,—but which, in the -present case, was required on special ground, since all had committed -an act notoriously punishable as well as of dangerous precedent. -Epaminondas undertook the duty of defending his colleagues as well -as himself. That he as well as Pelopidas had political enemies, -likely to avail themselves of any fair pretext for accusing him,—is -not to be doubted. But we may well doubt, whether on the present -occasion any of these enemies actually came forward to propose that -the penalty legally incurred should be inflicted; not merely because -this proposition, in the face of a victorious army, returning elate -with their achievements and proud of their commanders, was full of -danger to the mover himself,—but also for another reason,—because -Epaminondas would hardly be imprudent enough to wait for the case -to be stated by his enemies. Knowing that the illegality committed -was flagrant and of hazardous example,—having also the reputation -of his colleagues as well as his own to protect,—he would forestall -accusation by coming forward himself to explain and justify the -proceeding. He set forth the glorious results of the expedition just -finished; the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_241">[p. 241]</span> -invasion and devastation of Laconia, hitherto unvisited by any -enemy,—the confinement of the Spartans within their walls,—the -liberation of all Western Laconia, and the establishment of Messênê -as a city,—the constitution of a strong new Arcadian city, forming, -with Tegea on one flank and Messênê on the other, a line of defence -on the Spartan frontier, so as to ensure the permanent depression of -the great enemy of Thebes,—the emancipation of Greece generally, from -Spartan ascendency, now consummated.</p> - -<p>Such justification,—whether delivered in reply to a substantive -accuser, or (which is more probable) tendered spontaneously by -Epaminondas himself,—was not merely satisfactory, but triumphant. -He and the other generals were acquitted by acclamation; without -even going through the formality of collecting the votes.<a -id="FNanchor_519" href="#Footnote_519" class="fnanchor">[519]</a> -And it appears that both Epaminondas and Pelopidas were immediately -re-appointed among the Bœotarchs of the year.<a id="FNanchor_520" -href="#Footnote_520" class="fnanchor">[520]</a></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_79"> - <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_242">[p. 242]</span></p> - <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXIX.<br /> - FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO - THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">Prodigious</span> -was the change operated throughout the Grecian world during the -eighteen months between June 371 <small>B.C.</small> (when the -general peace, including all except Thebes, was sworn at Sparta, -twenty days before the battle of Leuktra), and the spring of 369 -<small>B.C.</small>, when the Thebans, after a victorious expedition -into Peloponnesus, were reconducted home by Epaminondas.</p> - -<p>How that change worked in Peloponnesus, amounting to a partial -reconstitution of the peninsula, has been sketched in the preceding -chapter. Among most of the cities and districts hitherto dependent -allies of Sparta, the local oligarchies, whereby Spartan influence -had been maintained, were overthrown, not without harsh and violent -reaction. Laconia had been invaded and laid waste, while the Spartans -were obliged to content themselves with guarding their central hearth -and their families from assault. The western and best half of Laconia -had been wrested from them; Messênê had been constituted as a free -city on their frontier; a large proportion of their Periœki and -Helots had been converted into independent Greeks bitterly hostile -to them; moreover the Arcadian population had been emancipated from -their dependence, and organized into self-acting jealous neighbors in -the new city of Megalopolis, as well as in Tegea and Mantinea. The -once philo-Laconian Tegea was now among the chief enemies of Sparta; -and the Skiritæ, so long numbered as the bravest of the auxiliary -troops of the latter, were now identified in sentiment with Arcadians -and Thebans against her.</p> - -<p>Out of Peloponnesus, the change wrought had also been -considerable; partly, in the circumstances of Thessaly and Macedonia, -partly in the position and policy of Athens.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_243">[p. 243]</span></p> - -<p>At the moment of the battle of Leuktra (July, 371 -<small>B.C.</small>) Jason was tagus of Thessaly, and Amyntas -king of Macedonia. Amyntas was dependent on, if not tributary to, -Jason, whose dominion, military force, and revenue, combined with -extraordinary personal energy and ability, rendered him decidedly -the first potentate in Greece, and whose aspirations were known to -be unbounded; so that he inspired more or less alarm everywhere, -especially to weaker neighbors like the Macedonian prince. Throughout -a reign of twenty-three years, full of trouble and peril, Amyntas -had cultivated the friendship both of Sparta and of Athens,<a -id="FNanchor_521" href="#Footnote_521" class="fnanchor">[521]</a> -especially the former. It was by Spartan aid only that he had been -enabled to prevail over the Olynthian confederacy, which would -otherwise have proved an overmatch for him. At the time when Sparta -aided him to crush that promising and liberal confederacy, she was -at the maximum of her power (382-379 <small>B.C.</small>), holding -even Thebes under garrison among her subject allies. But the -revolution of Thebes, and the war against Thebes and Athens (from 378 -<small>B.C.</small> downward) had sensibly diminished her power on -land; while the newly-organized naval force and maritime confederacy -of the Athenians, had overthrown her empire at sea. Moreover, the -great power of Jason in Thessaly had so grown up (combined with -the resistance of the Thebans) as to cut off the communication -of Sparta with Macedonia, and even to forbid her (in 374 -<small>B.C.</small>) from assisting her faithful ally, the Pharsalian -Polydamas, against him.<a id="FNanchor_522" href="#Footnote_522" -class="fnanchor">[522]</a> To Amyntas, accordingly, the friendship -of Athens, now again the greatest maritime potentate in Greece, -had become more important than that of Sparta. We know that he -tried to conciliate the powerful Athenian generals, Iphikrates and -Timotheus. He adopted the former as his son;<a id="FNanchor_523" -href="#Footnote_523" class="fnanchor">[523]</a> at what exact -period, cannot be discovered; but I have<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_244">[p. 244]</span> already stated that Iphikrates had -married the daughter of Kotys king of Thrace, and had acquired a -maritime settlement called Drys, on the Thracian coast. In the years -373-372 <small>B.C.</small>, we find Timotheus also in great favor -with Amyntas, testified by a valuable present sent to him at Athens; -a cargo of timber, the best produce of Macedonia.<a id="FNanchor_524" -href="#Footnote_524" class="fnanchor">[524]</a> Amyntas was at this -period on the best footing with Athens, sent his deputies as a -confederate to the regular synod there assembled, and was treated -with considerable favor.<a id="FNanchor_525" href="#Footnote_525" -class="fnanchor">[525]</a></p> - -<p>The battle of Leuktra (July 371 <small>B.C.</small>) tended to -knit more closely the connection between Amyntas and the Athenians, -who were now the auxiliaries most likely to sustain him against the -ascendency of Jason. It produced at the same time the more important -effect of stimulating the ambition of Athens in every direction. -Not only her ancient rival, Sparta, beaten in the field and driven -from one humiliation to another, was disabled from opposing her, -and even compelled to solicit her aid,—but new rivals, the Thebans, -were suddenly lifted into an ascendency inspiring her with mingled -jealousy and apprehension. Hence fresh hopes as well as fresh -jealousies conspired to push Athens in a career of aspiration -such as had never appeared open to her since the disasters of 404 -<small>B.C.</small> Such enlargement of her views was manifested -conspicuously by the step taken two or three months after the -battle of Leuktra (mentioned in my preceding chapter),—of causing -the peace, which had already been sworn at Sparta in the preceding -month of June, to be resworn under the presidency and guarantee -of Athens, by cities binding themselves mutually to each other as -defensive allies of Athens;<a id="FNanchor_526" href="#Footnote_526" -class="fnanchor">[526]</a> thus silently disenthroning Sparta and -taking her place.</p> - -<p>On land, however, Athens had never held, and could hardly expect -to hold, anything above the second rank, serving as a bulwark -against Theban aggrandizement. At sea she already occupied the -first place, at the head of an extensive confederacy; and it was -to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_245">[p. 245]</span> farther -maritime aggrandizement that her present chances, as well as her -past traditions, pointed. Such is the new path upon which we now -find her entering. At the first formation of her new confederacy, -in 378 <small>B.C.</small>, she had distinctly renounced all idea -of resuming the large amount of possessions, public and private, -which had been snatched from her along with her empire at the -close of the Peloponnesian war; and had formally proclaimed that -no Athenian citizen should for the future possess or cultivate -land out of Attica—a guarantee against renovation of the previous -kleruchies or out-possessions. This prudent self-restraint, which -had contributed so much during the last seven years to raise her -again into naval preëminence, is now gradually thrown aside, under -the tempting circumstances of the moment. Henceforward, the Athenian -maritime force becomes employed for the recovery of lost possessions -as well as for protection or enlargement of the confederacy. The -prohibition against kleruchies out of Attica will soon appear to be -forgotten. Offence is given to the prominent members of the maritime -confederacy; so that the force of Athens, misemployed and broken into -fragments, is found twelve or thirteen years afterwards unable to -repel a new aggressor, who starts up, alike able and unexpected, in -the Macedonian prince Philip, son of Amyntas.</p> - -<p>Very different was the position of Amyntas himself towards -Athens, in 371 <small>B.C.</small> He was an unpretending ally, -looking for help in case of need against Jason, and sending his -envoy to the meeting at Athens about September or October 371 -<small>B.C.</small>, when the general peace was resworn under -Athenian auspices. It was at this meeting that Athens seems to have -first put forth her new maritime pretensions. While guaranteeing -to every Grecian city, great and small, the enjoyment of autonomy, -she made exception of some cities which she claimed as belonging to -herself. Among these was certainly Amphipolis; probably also the -towns in the Thracian Chersonesus and Potidæa; all which we find, -a few years afterwards, occupied by Athenians.<a id="FNanchor_527" -href="#Footnote_527" class="fnanchor">[527]</a> How much of their -lost possessions the Athenians thought it prudent now to reclaim, -we cannot distinctly make out. But we know that their aspirations -grasped<span class="pagenum" id="Page_246">[p. 246]</span> much -more than Amphipolis;<a id="FNanchor_528" href="#Footnote_528" -class="fnanchor">[528]</a> and the moment was probably thought -propitious for making other demands besides. Amyntas through his -envoy, together with the rest of the assembled envoys, recognized -without opposition the right of the Athenians to Amphipolis.<a -id="FNanchor_529" href="#Footnote_529" class="fnanchor">[529]</a></p> - -<p>Such recognition was not indeed in itself either any loss to -Amyntas, or any gain to Athens; for Amphipolis, though bordering -on his kingdom, had never belonged to him, nor had he any power of -transferring it. Originally an Athenian colony,<a id="FNanchor_530" -href="#Footnote_530" class="fnanchor">[530]</a> next taken from<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_247">[p. 247]</span> Athens in 424-423 -<small>B.C.</small> by Brasidas, through the improvidence of the -Athenian officers Euklês and Thucydides, then recolonized under -Lacedæmonian auspices,—it had ever since remained an independent -city; though Sparta had covenanted to restore it by the peace of -Nikias (421 <small>B.C.</small>), but had never performed her -covenant. Its unparalleled situation, near to both the bridge and -mouth of the Strymon, in the midst of a fertile territory, within -reach of the mining district of Pangæus,—rendered it a tempting -prize; and the right of Athens to it was indisputable; so far as -original colonization before the capture by Brasidas, and formal -treaty of cession by Sparta after the capture, could confer a right. -But this treaty, not fulfilled at the time, was now fifty years old. -The repugnance of the Amphipolitan population, which had originally -prevented its fulfilment, was strengthened by all the sanction of -a long prescription; while the tomb and chapel of Brasidas their -second founder, consecrated in the agora, served as an imperishable -admonition to repel all pretensions on the part of Athens. Such -pretensions, whatever might be the right, were deplorably impolitic -unless Athens was prepared to back them by strenuous efforts of men -and money; from which we shall find her shrinking now as she had done -(under the unwise advice of Nikias) in 421 <small>B.C.</small>, -and the years immediately succeeding. In fact, the large renovated -pretensions of Athens both to Amphipolis and to other places on -the Macedonian and Chalkidic coast, combined with her languor and -inertness in military action,—will be found henceforward among the -greatest mischiefs to the general cause of Hellenic independence, and -among the most effective helps to the well-conducted aggressions of -Philip of Macedon.</p> <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_248">[p. -248]</span></p> <p>Though the claim of Athens to the recovery of -a portion of her lost transmarine possessions was thus advanced -and recognized in the congress of autumn 371 <small>B.C.</small>, -she does not seem to have been able to take any immediate steps -for prosecuting it. Six months afterwards, the state of northern -Greece was again completely altered by the death, nearly at the -same time, of Jason in Thessaly, and of Amyntas in Macedonia.<a -id="FNanchor_531" href="#Footnote_531" class="fnanchor">[531]</a> The -former was cut off (as has been mentioned in the preceding chapter) -by assassination, while in the plenitude of his vigor; and his -great power could not be held together by an inferior hand. His two -brothers, Polyphron and Polydorus, succeeded him in the post of tagus -of Thessaly. Polyphron, having put to death his brother, enjoyed the -dignity for a short time; after which he too was slain by a third -brother, Alexander of Pheræ; but not before he had committed gross -enormities by killing and banishing many of the most eminent citizens -of Larissa and Pharsalus; among them the estimable Polydamas.<a -id="FNanchor_532" href="#Footnote_532" class="fnanchor">[532]</a> -The Larissæan exiles, many belonging to the great family of the -Aleuadæ, took refuge in Macedonia, where Amyntas (having died in -370 <small>B.C.</small>) had been succeeded in the throne by his -youthful son Alexander. The latter, being persuaded to invade -Thessaly for the purpose of restoring them, succeeded in getting -possession of Larissa and Krannon; both which cities he kept under -his own garrisons, in spite of unavailing resistance from Polyphron -and Alexander of Pheræ.<a id="FNanchor_533" href="#Footnote_533" -class="fnanchor">[533]</a></p> - -<p>This Alexander, who succeeded to Jason’s despotism in Pheræ, and -to a considerable portion of his military power, was nevertheless -unable to keep together the whole of it, or to retain Thessaly and -its circumjacent tributaries in one united dominion. The Thessalian -cities hostile to him invited assistance, not merely from Alexander -of Macedon, but also from the Thebans; who despatched Pelopidas -into the country, seemingly in 369 <small>B.C.</small>, soon -after the return of the army under Epaminondas from its victorious -progress<span class="pagenum" id="Page_249">[p. 249]</span> in -Laconia and Arcadia. Pelopidas entered Thessaly at the head of -an army, and took Larissa with various other cities into Theban -protection; apparently under the acquiescence of Alexander of -Macedon, with whom he contracted an alliance.<a id="FNanchor_534" -href="#Footnote_534" class="fnanchor">[534]</a> A large portion of -Thessaly thus came under the protection of Thebes in hostility to the -dynasty of Pheræ, and to the brutal tyrant Alexander who now ruled in -that city.</p> - -<p>Alexander of Macedon found that he had difficulty enough in -maintaining his own dominion at home, without holding Thessalian -towns in garrison. He was harassed by intestine dissensions, -and after a reign of scarcely two years, was assassinated (368 -<small>B.C.</small>) by some conspirators of Alôrus and Pydna, -two cities (half Macedonian, half Hellenic) near the western -coast of the Thermaic Gulf. Ptolemæus (or Ptolemy) of Alôrus is -mentioned as leader of the enterprise, and Apollophanês of Pydna -as one of the agents.<a id="FNanchor_535" href="#Footnote_535" -class="fnanchor">[535]</a> But besides these conspirators, there -was also another enemy, Pausanias,—a man of the royal lineage and a -pretender to the throne;<a id="FNanchor_536" href="#Footnote_536" -class="fnanchor">[536]</a> who, having been hitherto in banishment, -was now returning at the head of a considerable body of Greeks, -supported by numerous partisans in Macedonia,—and was already -master of Anthemus, Thermê, Strepsa, and other places in or<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_250">[p. 250]</span> near the Thermaic Gulf. -He was making war both against Ptolemy and against the remaining -family of Amyntas. Eurydikê, the widow of that prince, was now -left with her two younger children, Perdikkas, a young man, and -Philip, yet a youth. She was in the same interest with Ptolemy, the -successful conspirator against her son Alexander, and there was -even a tale which represented her as his accomplice in the deed. -Ptolemy was regent, administering her affairs and those of her minor -children, against Pausanias.<a id="FNanchor_537" href="#Footnote_537" -class="fnanchor">[537]</a></p> - -<p>Deserted by many of their most powerful friends, Eurydikê and -Ptolemy would have been forced to yield the country to Pausanias, -had they not found by accident a foreign auxiliary near at hand. -The Athenian admiral Iphikrates, with a squadron of moderate force, -was then on the coast of Macedonia. He had been sent thither by -his countrymen (369 <small>B.C.</small>) (soon after his partial -conflict near Corinth with the retreating army of Epaminondas, on -its way from Peloponnesus to Bœotia), for the purpose of generally -surveying the maritime region of Macedonia and Thrace, opening -negotiations with parties in the country, and laying his plans for -future military operations. At the period when Alexander was slain, -and when Pausanias was carrying on his invasion, Iphikrates happened -to be on the Macedonian coast. He was there visited by Eurydikê -with her two sons Perdikkas and Philip; the latter seemingly about -thirteen or fourteen years of age, the former somewhat older. She -urgently implored him<span class="pagenum" id="Page_251">[p. -251]</span> to assist the family in their present emergency, -reminding him that Amyntas had not only throughout his life been a -faithful ally of Athens, but had also adopted him (Iphikrates) as his -son, and had thus constituted him brother to the two young princes. -Placing Perdikkas in his hands, and causing Philip to embrace his -knees, she appealed to his generous sympathies, and invoked his aid -as the only chance of restoration, or even of personal safety, to the -family. Iphikrates, moved by this affecting supplication, declared in -her favor, acted so vigorously against Pausanias as to expel him from -Macedonia, and secured the sceptre to the family of Amyntas; under -Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent for the time.</p> - -<p>This striking incident is described by the orator Æschines<a -id="FNanchor_538" href="#Footnote_538" class="fnanchor">[538]</a> in -an oration delivered many years afterwards at Athens. The boy, who -then clasped the knees of Iphikrates, lived afterwards to overthrow -the independence, not of Athens alone, but of Greece generally. The -Athenian general had not been sent to meddle in the disputes of -succession to the Macedonian crown. Nevertheless, looking at the -circumstances of the time, his interference may really have promised -beneficial consequences to Athens; so that we have no right to -blame him for the unforeseen ruin which it was afterwards found to -occasion.</p> - -<p>Though the interference of Iphikrates maintained the family of -Amyntas, and established Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent, it did not -procure to Athens the possession of Amphipolis; which was not in the -power of the Macedonian kings to bestow. Amphipolis was at that time -a free Greek city, inhabited by a population in the main seemingly -Chalkidic, and in confederacy with Olynthus.<a id="FNanchor_539" -href="#Footnote_539" class="fnanchor">[539]</a> Iphikrates prosecuted -his naval operations on the coast of Thrace and Macedonia for a -period of three years (368-365 <small>B.C.</small>). We make out -very imperfectly what he achieved. He took into his service a general -named Charidemus, a native of Oreus in Eu<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_252">[p. 252]</span>bœa; one of those Condottieri (to use an -Italian word familiar in the fourteenth century), who, having a band -of mercenaries under his command, hired himself to the best bidder -and to the most promising cause. These mercenaries served under -Iphikrates for three years,<a id="FNanchor_540" href="#Footnote_540" -class="fnanchor">[540]</a> until he was dismissed by the Athenians -from his command and superseded by Timotheus. What successes they -enabled him to obtain for Athens, is not clear; but it is certain -that he did not succeed in taking Amphipolis. He seems to have -directed one or two attempts against the town by other officers, -which proved abortive; but he got possession of some Amphipolitan -prisoners or hostages,<a id="FNanchor_541" href="#Footnote_541" -class="fnanchor">[541]</a> which opened a prospect of accomplishing -the surrender of the town.</p> - -<p>It seems evident, however, in spite of our great dearth of -information, that Iphikrates during his command between 369-365 -<small>B.C.</small> did not satisfy the expectations of his -countrymen. At that time, those expectations were large, as -testified by sending out not only Iphikrates to Macedonia and -Thrace, but also Timotheus (who had returned from his service with -the Persians in 372-371 <small>B.C.</small>) to Ionia and the -Hellespont, in conjunction with Ariobarzanes the satrap of Phrygia.<a -id="FNanchor_542" href="#Footnote_542" class="fnanchor">[542]</a> -That satrap was in possession of Sestos, as well as of various other -towns in the Thracian Chersonesus, towards which Athenian ambition -now tended, according to that new turn, towards more special and -separate acquisitions for Athens, which it had taken since the battle -of Leuktra. But<span class="pagenum" id="Page_253">[p. 253]</span> -before we advert to the achievements of Timotheus (366-365 -<small>B.C.</small>) in these regions, we must notice the main -course of political conflict in Greece Proper, down to the partial -pacification of 366 <small>B.C.</small></p> - -<p>Though the Athenians had sent Iphikrates (in the winter of -370-369 <small>B.C.</small>) to rescue Sparta from the grasp of -Epaminondas, the terms of a permanent alliance had not yet been -settled between them; envoys from Sparta and her allies visited -Athens shortly afterwards for that purpose.<a id="FNanchor_543" -href="#Footnote_543" class="fnanchor">[543]</a> All pretensions -to exclusive headship<span class="pagenum" id="Page_254">[p. -254]</span> on the part of Sparta were now at an end. Amidst abundant -discussion in the public assembly, all the speakers, Lacedæmonian and -others as well as Athenian, unanimously pronounced that the headship -must be vested jointly and equally in Sparta and Athens; and the only -point in debate was, how such an arrangement could be most suitably -carried out. It was at first proposed that the former should command -on land, the latter at sea; a distribution, which, on first hearing, -found favor both as equitable and convenient, until an Athenian -named Kephisodotus reminded his countrymen, that the Lacedæmonians -had few ships of war, and those manned chiefly by Helots; while the -land-force of Athens consisted of her horsemen and hoplites, the -choice citizens of the state. Accordingly, on the distribution now -pointed out, Athenians, in great numbers and of the best quality, -would be placed under Spartan command; while few Lacedæmonians, and -those of little dignity, would go under Athenian command; which would -be, not equality, but the reverse. Kephisodotus proposed that both -on land and at sea, the command should alternate between Athens and -Sparta, in periods of five days; and his amendment was adopted.<a -id="FNanchor_544" href="#Footnote_544" class="fnanchor">[544]</a></p> - -<p>Though such amendment had the merit of perfect equality between -the two competitors for headship, it was by no means well-calculated -for success in joint operations against a general like Epaminondas. -The allies determined to occupy Corinth as a main station, and to -guard the line of Mount Oneium between that city and Kenchreæ,<a -id="FNanchor_545" href="#Footnote_545" class="fnanchor">[545]</a> so -as to prevent the Thebans from again penetrating into Peloponnesus. -It is one mark of the depression in the fortunes of Sparta, that -this very station, now selected for the purpose of keeping a Theban -invader away from her frontier, had been held, during the war from -394-387 <small>B.C.</small>, by the Athenians and Thebans against -herself, to prevent her from breaking out of Peloponnesus into -Attica and Bœotia. Never since the invasion of Xerxes had there -been any necessity for defending the Isthmus of Corinth against an -extra-Peloponnesian assailant. But now, even to send a force from -Sparta to Corinth, recourse must have been had to transport by sea, -either across the Argolic<span class="pagenum" id="Page_255">[p. -255]</span> Gulf from Prasiæ to Halieis, or round Cape Skyllæum to -the Saronic Gulf and Kenchreæ; for no Spartan troops could march by -land across Arcadia or Argos. This difficulty however was surmounted, -and a large allied force (not less than twenty thousand men according -to Diodorus),—consisting of Athenians with auxiliary mercenaries -under Chabrias, Lacedæmonians, Pellenians, Epidaurians, Megarians, -Corinthians, and all the other allies still adhering to Sparta,—was -established in defensive position along the line of Oneium.</p> - -<p>It was essential for Thebes to reopen communication with her -Peloponnesian allies. Accordingly Epaminondas, at the head of the -Thebans and their northern allies, arrived during the same summer -in front of this position, on his march into Peloponnesus. His -numbers were inferior to those of his assembled enemies, whose -position prevented him from joining his Arcadian, Argeian, and -Eleian allies, already assembled in Peloponnesus. After having -vainly challenged the enemy to come down and fight in the plain, -Epaminondas laid his plan for attacking the position. Moving from his -camp a little before daybreak, so as to reach the enemy just when -the night-guards were retiring, but before the general body had yet -risen and got under arms,<a id="FNanchor_546" href="#Footnote_546" -class="fnanchor">[546]</a>—he directed an assault along the whole -line. But his principal effort, at the head of the chosen Theban -troops, was made against the Lacedæmonians and Pellenians, who were -posted in the most assailable part of the line.<a id="FNanchor_547" -href="#Footnote_547" class="fnanchor">[547]</a> So skilfully was his -movement conducted, that he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_256">[p. -256]</span> completely succeeded in surprising them. The Lacedæmonian -polemarch, taken unprepared, was driven from his position, and -forced to retire to another point of the hilly ground. He presently -sent to solicit a truce for burying his dead; agreeing to abandon -the line of Oneium, which had now become indefensible. The other -parts of the Theban army made no impression by their attack, nor -were they probably intended to do more than occupy attention, -while Epaminondas himself vigorously assailed the weak point of -the position. Yet Xenophon censures the Lacedæmonian polemarch as -faint-hearted, for having evacuated the whole line as soon as his -own position was forced; alleging, that he might easily have found -another good position on one of the neighboring eminences, and might -have summoned reinforcements from his allies,—and that the Thebans, -in spite of their partial success, were so embarrassed how to descend -on the Peloponnesian side of Oneium, that they were half disposed to -retreat. The criticism of Xenophon indicates doubtless an unfavorable -judgment pronounced by many persons in the army; the justice of which -we are not in a condition to appreciate. But whether the Lacedæmonian -commander was to blame or not, Epaminondas, by his skilful and -victorious attack upon this strong position, enhanced his already -high military renown.<a id="FNanchor_548" href="#Footnote_548" -class="fnanchor">[548]</a></p> - -<p>Having joined his Peloponnesian allies, Arcadians, Eleians, and -Argeians, he was more than a match for the Spartan and Athenian -force, which appears now to have confined itself to Corinth, Lechæum, -and Kenchreæ. He ravaged the territories of Epidaurus, Trœzen, and -Phlius; and obtained possession of Sikyon as well as of Pellênê.<a -id="FNanchor_549" href="#Footnote_549" class="fnanchor">[549]</a> -At Sikyon, a vote of the people being taken, it was resolved to -desert Sparta, to form alliance with Thebes, and to admit a Theban -harmost and garrison into the acropolis; Euphron, a citizen hitherto -preponderant in the city by means of Sparta and devoted to her -interest, now altered<span class="pagenum" id="Page_257">[p. -257]</span> his politics and went along with the stronger tide.<a -id="FNanchor_550" href="#Footnote_550" class="fnanchor">[550]</a> We -cannot doubt also that Epaminondas went into Arcadia to encourage and -regulate the progress of his two great enterprises,—the foundation -of Messênê and Megalopolis; nor does the silence of Xenophon on -such a matter amount to any disproof. These new towns having been -commenced less than a year before, cannot have been yet finished, -and may probably have required the reappearance of his victorious -army. The little town of Phlius,—situated south of Sikyon and west -of Corinth,—which was one of the most faithful allies of Sparta, -was also in great hazard of being captured by the Phliasian exiles. -When the Arcadians and Eleians were marching through Nemea to join -Epaminondas at Oneium, these exiles entreated them only to show -themselves near Phlius; with the assurance that such demonstration -would suffice to bring about the capture of the town. The exiles then -stole by night to the foot of the town walls with scaling-ladders, -and there lay hid, until, as day began to break, the scouts from the -neighboring hill Trikaranum announced that the allied enemies were in -sight. While the attention of the citizens within was thus engaged -on the other side, the concealed exiles planted their ladders, -overpowered the few unprepared guards, and got possession of the -acropolis. Instead of contenting themselves with this position until -the allied force came up, they strove also to capture the town; but -in this they were defeated by the citizens, who, by desperate efforts -of bravery, repulsed both the intruders within and the enemy without; -thus preserving their town.<a id="FNanchor_551" href="#Footnote_551" -class="fnanchor">[551]</a> The fidelity of the Phliasians to Sparta -entailed upon them severe hardships through the superiority of -their enemies in the field, and through perpetual ravage of their -territory from multiplied hostile neighbors (Argos, Arcadia, and -Sikyon), who had established fortified posts on their borders; for -it was only<span class="pagenum" id="Page_258">[p. 258]</span> on -the side of Corinth that the Phliasians had a friendly neighbor to -afford them the means of purchasing provisions.<a id="FNanchor_552" -href="#Footnote_552" class="fnanchor">[552]</a></p> - -<p>Amidst general success, the Thebans experienced partial reverses. -Their march carrying them near to Corinth, a party of them had -the boldness to rush at the gates, and to attempt a surprise of -the town. But the Athenian Chabrias, then commanding within it, -disposed his troops so skilfully, and made so good a resistance, -that he defeated them with loss and reduced them to the necessity of -asking for the ordinary truce to bury their dead, which were lying -very near to the walls.<a id="FNanchor_553" href="#Footnote_553" -class="fnanchor">[553]</a> This advantage over the victorious -Thebans somewhat raised the spirits of the Spartan allies; who were -still farther encouraged by the arrival in Lechæum of a squadron -from Syracuse, bringing a body of two thousand mercenary Gauls and -Iberians, with fifty horsemen, as a succor from the despot Dionysius. -Such foreigners had never before been seen in Peloponnesus. Their -bravery, and singular nimbleness of movement, gave them the -advantage in several partial skirmishes, and disconcerted the -Thebans. But the Spartans and Athenians were not bold enough to -hazard a general battle, and the Syracusan detachment returned home -after no very long stay,<a id="FNanchor_554" href="#Footnote_554" -class="fnanchor">[554]</a> while the Thebans also went back to -Bœotia.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_259">[p. 259]</span></p> - -<p>One proceeding of Epaminondas during this expedition merits -especial notice. It was the general practice of the Thebans to put to -death all the Bœotian exiles who fell into their hands as prisoners, -while they released under ransom all other Greek prisoners. At the -capture of a village named Phœbias in the Sikyonian territory, -Epaminondas took captive a considerable body of Bœotian exiles. With -the least possible delay, he let them depart under ransom, professing -to regard them as belonging to other cities.<a id="FNanchor_555" -href="#Footnote_555" class="fnanchor">[555]</a> We find him always -trying to mitigate the rigorous dealing then customary towards -political opponents.</p> - -<p>Throughout this campaign of 369 <small>B.C.</small>, all the -Peloponnesian allies had acted against Sparta cheerfully under -Epaminondas and the Thebans. But in the ensuing year the spirit -of the Arcadians had been so raised, by the formation of the new -Pan-Arcadian communion, by the progress of Messênê and Megalopolis, -and the conspicuous depression of Sparta,—that they fancied -themselves not only capable of maintaining their independence by -themselves, but also entitled to divide headship with Thebes, as -Athens divided it with Sparta. Lykomedes the Mantinean, wealthy, -energetic, and able, stood forward as the exponent of this new -aspiration, and as the champion of Arcadian dignity. He reminded -the Ten Thousand (the Pan-Arcadian synod),—that while all other -residents in Peloponnesus were originally immigrants, they alone were -the indigenous occupants of the peninsula; that they were the most -numerous section, as well as the bravest and hardiest men, who bore -the Hellenic name,—of which proof was afforded by the fact, that -Arcadian mercenary soldiers were preferred to all others; that the -Lacedæmonians had never ventured to invade Attica, nor the Thebans to -invade Laconia, without Arcadian auxiliaries. “Let us follow no man’s -lead (he concluded), but stand up for ourselves. In former days, we -built up the power of Sparta by serving in her armies; and now, if -we submit quietly to follow the Thebans, without demanding alternate -headship for ourselves, we shall presently find them to be Spartans -under another name.”<a id="FNanchor_556" href="#Footnote_556" -class="fnanchor">[556]</a></p> - -<p>Such exhortations were heard with enthusiasm by the assembled -Arcadians, to whom political discussion and the sentiment of -collective dignity was a novelty. Impressed with admiration for -Ly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_260">[p. 260]</span>komedes, -they chose as officers every man whom he recommended calling upon -him to lead them into active service, so as to justify their new -pretensions. He conducted them into the territory of Epidaurus, now -under invasion by the Argeians; who were however in the greatest -danger of being cut off, having their retreat intercepted by a body -of troops from Corinth under Chabrias,—Athenians and Corinthians. -Lykomêdês with his Arcadians, fighting his way through enemies -as well as through a difficult country, repelled the division of -Chabrias, and extricated the embarrassed Argeians. He next invaded -the territory south of the new city of Messene and west of the -Messenian Gulf, part of which was still held by Spartan garrisons. -He penetrated as far as Asinê, where the Spartan commander, Geranor, -drew out his garrison to resist them, but was defeated with loss, and -slain, while the suburbs of Asinê were destroyed.<a id="FNanchor_557" -href="#Footnote_557" class="fnanchor">[557]</a> Probably the -Spartan mastery of the south-western corner of the Peloponnesus was -terminated by this expedition. The indefatigable activity which these -Arcadians now displayed under their new commander, overpowering all -enemies, and defying all hardships and difficulties of marching over -the most rugged mountains, by night as well as by day, throughout the -winter season,—excited everywhere astonishment and alarm; not without -considerable jealousy even on the part of their allies the Thebans.<a -id="FNanchor_558" href="#Footnote_558" class="fnanchor">[558]</a></p> - -<p>While such jealousy tended to loosen the union between the -Arcadians and Thebes, other causes tended at the same time to -disunite them from Elis. The Eleians claimed rights of supremacy -over Lepreon and the other towns of Triphylia, which rights they had -been compelled by the Spartan arms to forego thirty years before.<a -id="FNanchor_559" href="#Footnote_559" class="fnanchor">[559]</a> -Ever since that period, these towns had ranked as separate -communities, each for itself as a dependent ally of Sparta. Now -that the power of the latter was broken, the Eleians aimed at<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_261">[p. 261]</span> resumption of their -lost supremacy. But the formation of the new “commune Arcadum” at -Megalopolis, interposed an obstacle never before thought of. The -Tryphilian towns, affirming themselves to be of Arcadian origin, -and setting forth as their eponymous Hero Triphylus son of Arkas,<a -id="FNanchor_560" href="#Footnote_560" class="fnanchor">[560]</a> -solicited to be admitted as fully qualified members of the incipient -Pan-Arcadian communion. They were cordially welcomed by the general -Arcadian body (with a degree of sympathy similar to that recently -shown by the Germans towards Sleswick-Holstein), received as -political brethren, and guaranteed as independent against Elis.<a -id="FNanchor_561" href="#Footnote_561" class="fnanchor">[561]</a> The -Eleians, thus finding themselves disappointed of the benefits which -they had anticipated from the humiliation of Sparta, became greatly -alienated from the Arcadians.</p> - -<p>Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Phrygia, with whom the Athenians -had just established a correspondence, now endeavored (perhaps -at their instance) to mediate for peace in Greece, sending over -a citizen of Abydus named Philiskus, furnished with a large -sum of money. Choosing Delphi as a centre, Philiskus convoked -thither, in the name of the Persian king, deputies from all the -belligerent parties, Theban, Lacedæmonian, Athenian, etc., to meet -him. These envoys never consulted the god as to the best means of -attaining peace (says Xenophon), but merely took counsel among -themselves; hence, he observes, little progress was made towards -peace; since the Spartans<a id="FNanchor_562" href="#Footnote_562" -class="fnanchor">[562]</a> peremptorily insisted that Messênê should -again be restored to them, while the Thebans were not less firm -in resisting the proposition. It rather seems that the allies of -Sparta were willing to concede the point, and even tried, though in -vain, to overcome her reluctance. The congress accordingly broke up; -while Philiskus, declaring himself in favor of Sparta and Athens, -employed his money in levying mercenaries for the professed purpose -of aiding them in the war.<a id="FNanchor_563" href="#Footnote_563" -class="fnanchor">[563]</a> We do not find,<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_262">[p. 262]</span> however, that he really lent them any -aid. It would appear that his mercenaries were intended for the -service of the satrap himself, who was then organizing his revolt -from Artaxerxes; and that his probable purpose in trying to close -the war was, that he might procure Grecian soldiers more easily and -abundantly. Though the threats of Philiskus produced no immediate -result, however, they so alarmed the Thebans as to determine them -to send an embassy up to the Great King; the rather, as they -learnt that the Lacedæmonian Euthykles had already gone up to the -Persian court, to solicit on behalf of Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_564" -href="#Footnote_564" class="fnanchor">[564]</a></p> - -<p>How important had been the move made by Epaminondas in -reconstituting the autonomous Messenians, was shown, among other -evidences, by the recent abortive congress at Delphi. Already this -formed the capital article in Grecian political discussion; an -article, too, on which Sparta stood nearly alone. For not only the -Thebans (whom Xenophon<a id="FNanchor_565" href="#Footnote_565" -class="fnanchor">[565]</a> specifies as if there were no others -of the same sentiment), but all the allies of Thebes, felt hearty -sympathy and identity of interest with the newly-enfranchised -residents in Mount Ithômê and in Western Laconia; while the -allies even of Sparta were, at most, only lukewarm against them, -if not positively inclined in their favor.<a id="FNanchor_566" -href="#Footnote_566" class="fnanchor">[566]</a> A new phenomenon -soon presented itself, which served as a sort of recognition of the -new-born, or newly-revived, Messenian community, by the public voice -of Greece. At the one hundred and third Olympic festival (Midsummer -368 <small>B.C.</small>),—which occurred within less than two -years after Epaminondas laid the foundation-stone of Messênê,—a -Messenian boy named Damiskus gained the wreath as victor in the -foot-race of boys. Since the first Messenian war, whereby the nation -became subject to Sparta,<a id="FNanchor_567" href="#Footnote_567" -class="fnanchor">[567]</a> no Messenian victor had ever been -enrolled; though before that war, in the earliest half-century of -recorded Olympiads, several Messenian victors are found on the -register. No competitor was admitted to enter the lists, except -as<span class="pagenum" id="Page_263">[p. 263]</span> a free Greek -from a free community; accordingly so long as these Messenians had -been either enslaved, or in exile, they would never have been allowed -to contend for the prize under that designation. So much the stronger -was the impression produced, when, in 368 <small>B.C.</small>, after -an interval of more than three centuries, Damiscus the Messenian was -proclaimed victor. No Theôry (or public legation for sacrifice) could -have come to Olympia from Sparta, since she was then at war both -with Eleians and Arcadians; probably few individual Lacedæmonians -were present; so that the spectators, composed generally of Greeks -unfriendly to Sparta, would hail the proclamation of the new name as -being an evidence of her degradation, as well as from sympathy with -the long and severe oppression of the Messenians.<a id="FNanchor_568" -href="#Footnote_568" class="fnanchor">[568]</a> This Olympic -festival,—the first after the great revolution occasioned by the -battle of Leuktra,—was doubtless a scene of earnest anti-Spartan -emotion.</p> - -<p>During this year 368 <small>B.C.</small>, the Thebans undertook -no march into Peloponnesus; the peace-congress at Delphi probably -occupied their attention, while the Arcadians neither desired nor -needed their aid. But Pelopidas conducted in this year a Theban -force into Thessaly, in order to protect Larissa and the other -cities against Alexander of Pheræ, and to counter-work the ambitious -projects of that despot, who was soliciting reinforcement from -Athens. In his first object he succeeded. Alexander was compelled -to visit him at Larissa, and solicit peace. This despot, however, -alarmed at the complaints which came from all sides against his -cruelty,—and at the language, first, admonitory, afterwards, -menacing, of Pelopidas—soon ceased to think himself in safety, and -fled home to Pheræ. Pelopidas established a defensive union against -him among the other Thessalian cities, and then marched onward into -Macedonia, where the regent Ptolemy, not strong enough to resist, -entered into alliance with the Thebans; surrendering to them thirty -hostages from the most distinguished families in Macedonia, as a -guarantee for his faithful adherence. Among the hostages was the -youthful Philip, son of Amyntas, who remained in this character -at Thebes for some<span class="pagenum" id="Page_264">[p. -264]</span> years, under the care of Pammenês.<a id="FNanchor_569" -href="#Footnote_569" class="fnanchor">[569]</a> It was thus that -Ptolemy and the family of Amyntas, though they had been maintained in -Macedonia by the active intervention of Iphikrates and the Athenians -not many months before, nevertheless now connected themselves by -alliance with the Thebans, the enemies of Athens. Æschines the -Athenian orator denounces them for ingratitude; but possibly the -superior force of the Thebans left them no option. Both the Theban -and Macedonian force became thus enlisted for the protection of -the freedom of Amphipolis against Athens.<a id="FNanchor_570" -href="#Footnote_570" class="fnanchor">[570]</a> And Pelopidas -returned to Thebes, having extended the ascendency of Thebes not only -over Thessaly, but also over Macedonia, assured by the acquisition of -the thirty hostages.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_265">[p. 265]</span></p> - -<p>Such extension of the Theban power, in Northern Greece, -disconcerted the maritime projects of Athens on the coast of -Macedonia, at the same time that it laid the foundation of an -alliance between her and Alexander of Pheræ. While she was thus -opposing the Thebans in Thessaly, a second squadron and reinforcement -arrived at Corinth from Syracuse, under Kissidas, despatched by the -despot Dionysius. Among the synod of allies assembled at Corinth, -debate being held as to the best manner of employing them, the -Athenians strenuously urged that they should be sent to act in -Thessaly. But the Spartans took an opposite view, and prevailed to -have them sent round to the southern coast of Laconia, in order -that they might coöperate in repelling or invading the Arcadians.<a -id="FNanchor_571" href="#Footnote_571" class="fnanchor">[571]</a> -Reinforced by these Gauls and other mercenaries, Archidamus -led out the Lacedæmonian forces against Arcadia. He took Karyæ -by assault, putting to death every man whom he captured in the -place; and he farther ravaged all the Arcadian territory, in the -district named after the Parrhasii, until the joint Arcadian and -Argeian forces arrived to oppose him; upon which he retreated to -an eminence near Midea.<a id="FNanchor_572" href="#Footnote_572" -class="fnanchor">[572]</a> Here Kissidas, the Syracusan commander, -gave notice that he must retire, as the period to which his orders -reached had expired. He accordingly marched back to Sparta; but -midway in the march, in a narrow pass, the Messenian troops -arrested his advance, and so hampered him, that he was forced to -send to Archidamus for aid. The latter soon appeared, while the -main body of Arcadians and Argeians followed also; and Archidamus -resolved to attack them in general battle near Midea. Imploring his -soldiers, in an emphatic appeal, to rescue the great name of Sparta -from the disgrace into which it had fallen, he found them full of -responsive ardor. They rushed with such fierceness to the charge, -that the Arcadians and Argeians were thoroughly daunted, and fled -with scarce any resistance. The pursuit was vehement, especially -by the Gallic mercenaries, and the slaughter frightful. Ten<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_266">[p. 266]</span> thousand men (if we -are to believe Diodorus) were slain, without the loss of a single -Lacedæmonian. Of this easy and important victory,—or, as it came to -be called, “the tearless battle,”—news was forthwith transmitted by -the herald Demotelês to Sparta. So powerful was the emotion produced -by his tale, that all the Spartans who heard it burst into tears; -Agesilaus, the Senators, and the ephors, setting the example;<a -id="FNanchor_573" href="#Footnote_573" class="fnanchor">[573]</a>—a -striking proof how humbled, and disaccustomed to the idea of victory, -their minds had recently become!—a striking proof also, when we -compare it with the inflexible self-control which marked their -reception of the disastrous tidings from Leuktra, how much more -irresistible is unexpected joy than unexpected grief, in working on -these minds of iron temper!</p> - -<p>So offensive had been the insolence of the Arcadians, that -the news of their defeat was not unwelcome even to their allies -the Thebans and Eleians. It made them feel that they were not -independent of Theban aid, and determined Epaminondas again to show -himself in Peloponnesus, with the special view of enrolling the -Achæans in his alliance. The defensive line of Oneium was still -under occupation by the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, who had their -head-quarters at Corinth. Yet having remained unattacked all the -preceding year, it was now so negligently guarded, that Peisias, the -general of Argos, instigated by a private request of Epaminondas, -was enabled suddenly to seize the heights above Kenchreæ, with a -force of two thousand men and seven days’ provision. The Theban -commander, hastening his march, thus found the line of Oneium open -near Kenchreæ, and entered Peloponnesus without resistance; after -which he proceeded, joined by his Peloponnesian allies, against -the cities in Achaia.<a id="FNanchor_574" href="#Footnote_574" -class="fnanchor">[574]</a> Until the battle of Leuktra, these cities -had been among<span class="pagenum" id="Page_267">[p. 267]</span> -the dependent allies of Sparta, governed by local oligarchies in -her interest. Since that event, they had broken off from her, but -were still under oligarchical governments (though doubtless not the -same men), and had remained neutral without placing themselves in -connection either with Arcadians or Thebans.<a id="FNanchor_575" -href="#Footnote_575" class="fnanchor">[575]</a> Not being in a -condition to resist so formidable an invading force, they opened -negotiations with Epaminondas, and solicited to be enrolled as allies -of Thebes; engaging to follow her lead whenever summoned, and to do -their duty as members of her synod. They tendered securities which -Epaminondas deemed sufficient for the fulfilment of their promise. -Accordingly, by virtue of his own personal ascendency, he agreed to -accept them as they stood, without requiring either the banishment -of the existing rulers or substitution of democratical forms in -place of the oligarchical.<a id="FNanchor_576" href="#Footnote_576" -class="fnanchor">[576]</a> Such a proceeding was not only suitable -to the moderation of dealing so remarkable in Epaminondas, but also -calculated to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_268">[p. 268]</span> -strengthen the interests of Thebes in Peloponnesus, in the present -jealous and unsatisfactory temper of the Arcadians, by attaching -to her on peculiar grounds Achæans as well as Eleians; the latter -being themselves half-alienated from the Arcadians. Epaminondas -farther liberated Naupaktus and Kalydon,<a id="FNanchor_577" -href="#Footnote_577" class="fnanchor">[577]</a> which were held by -Achæan garrisons, and which he enrolled as separate allies of Thebes; -whither he then returned, without any other achievements (so far as -we are informed) in Peloponnesus.</p> - -<p>But the generous calculations of this eminent man found -little favor with his countrymen. Both the Arcadians, and the -opposition-party in the Achæan cities, preferred accusations against -him, alleging that he had discouraged and humiliated all the real -friends of Thebes; leaving power in the hands of men who would join -Sparta on the first opportunity. The accusation was farther pressed -by Menekleidas, a Theban speaker of ability, strongly adverse -to Epaminondas, as well as to Pelopidas. So pronounced was the -displeasure of the Thebans,—partly perhaps from reluctance to offend -the Arcadians,—that they not only reversed the policy of Epaminondas -in Achaia, but also refrained from reëlecting him as Bœotarch -during the ensuing year.<a id="FNanchor_578" href="#Footnote_578" -class="fnanchor">[578]</a> They sent harmosts of their own to each -of the Achæan cities,—put down the existing oligarchies,—sent the -chief oligarchical members and partisans into exile,—and established -democratical governments in each. Hence a great body of exiles soon -became accumulated; who, watching for a favorable opportunity and -combining their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_269">[p. 269]</span> -united forces against each city successively, were strong enough to -overthrow the newly-created democracies, and to expel the Theban -harmosts. Thus restored, the Achæan oligarchs took decided and -active part with Sparta;<a id="FNanchor_579" href="#Footnote_579" -class="fnanchor">[579]</a> vigorously pressing the Arcadians on one -side, while the Lacedæmonians, encouraged by the recent Tearless -Battle, exerted themselves actively on the other.</p> - -<p>The town of Sikyon, closely adjoining to Achaia, was at this time -in alliance with Thebes, having a Theban harmost and garrison in its -acropolis. But its government, which had always been oligarchical, -still remained unaltered. The recent counter-revolution in the Achæan -cities, followed closely by their junction with Sparta, alarmed -the Arcadians and Argeians, lest Sikyon also should follow the -example. Of this alarm a leading Sikyonian citizen named Euphron, -took advantage. He warned them that if the oligarchy were left in -power, they would certainly procure aid from the garrison at Corinth, -and embrace the interests of Sparta. To prevent such defection (he -said) it was indispensable that Sikyon should be democratized. He -then offered himself, with their aid, to accomplish the revolution, -seasoning his offer with strong protestations of disgust against the -intolerable arrogance and oppression of Sparta: protestations not -unnecessary, since he had himself, prior to the battle of Leuktra, -carried on the government of his native city as local agent for her -purposes and interest. The Arcadians and Argeians, entering into -the views of Euphron, sent to Sikyon a large force, under whose -presence and countenance he summoned a general assembly in the -market-place, proclaimed the oligarchy to be deposed, and proposed -an equal democracy for the future. His proposition being adopted, he -next invited the people to choose generals; and the persons chosen -were, as might naturally be expected, himself with five partisans. -The prior oligarchy had not been without a previous mercenary force -in their service, under the command of Lysimenês; but these men were -overawed by the new foreign force introduced. Euphron now proceeded -to reorganize them, to place them under the command of his son Adeas -instead of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_270">[p. 270]</span> -Lysimenês, and to increase their numerical strength. Selecting -from them a special body-guard for his own personal safety, and -being thus master of the city under the ostensible color of chief -of the new democracy, he commenced a career of the most rapacious -and sanguinary tyranny.<a id="FNanchor_580" href="#Footnote_580" -class="fnanchor">[580]</a> He caused several of his colleagues to -be assassinated, and banished others. He expelled also by wholesale -the wealthiest and most eminent citizens, on suspicion of Laconism; -confiscating their properties to supply himself with money, pillaging -the public treasure, and even stripping the temples of all their rich -stock of consecrated gold and silver ornaments. He farther procured -for himself adherents by liberating numerous slaves, exalting them to -the citizenship, and probably enrolling them among his paid force.<a -id="FNanchor_581" href="#Footnote_581" class="fnanchor">[581]</a> -The power which he thus acquired became very great. The money seized -enabled him not only to keep in regular pay his numerous mercenaries, -but also to bribe the leading Arcadians and Argeians, so that they -connived at his enormities; while he was farther ready and active in -the field to lend them military support. The Theban harmost still -held the acropolis with his garrison, though Euphron was master of -the town and harbor.</p> - -<p>During the height of Euphron’s power at Sikyon, the neighboring -city of Phlius was severely pressed. The Phliasians had remained -steadily attached to Sparta throughout all her misfortunes; -notwithstanding incessant hostilities from Argos, Arcadia, Pellênê, -and Sikyon, which destroyed their crops and inflicted upon them -serious hardships. I have already recounted, that in the year 369 -<small>B.C.</small>, a little before the line of Oneium was forced -by Epaminondas, the town of Phlius, having been surprised by its -own exiles with the aid of Eleians and Arcadians, had only been -saved by the desperate bravery and resistance of its citizens.<a -id="FNanchor_582" href="#Footnote_582" class="fnanchor">[582]</a> -In the ensuing year, 368 <small>B.C.</small>, the Argeian -and Arcadian force again ravaged the Phliasian plain, doing -great damage; yet not without some loss to themselves in their -departure, from the attack of the chosen Phliasian hoplites and -of some Athenian horsemen from Corinth.<a id="FNanchor_583" -href="#Footnote_583" class="fnanchor">[583]</a> In the ensuing year -367 <small>B.C.</small>, a second invasion of the Phliasian territory -was attempted by Euphron,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_271">[p. -271]</span> with his own mercenaries to the number of two -thousand,—the armed force of Sikyon and Pellênê,—and the Theban -harmost and garrison from the acropolis of Sikyon. On arriving near -Phlius, the Sikyonians and Pellenians were posted near the gate of -the city which looked towards Corinth, in order to resist any sally -from within; while the remaining invaders made a circuit round, -over an elevated line of ground called the <i>Trikaranum</i> (which had -been fortified by the Argeians and was held by their garrison), to -approach and ravage the Phliasian plain. But the Phliasian cavalry -and hoplites so bravely resisted them, as to prevent them from -spreading over the plain to do damage, until at the end of the day -they retreated to rejoin the Sikyonians and Pellenians. From these -last, however, they happened to be separated by a ravine which -forced them to take a long circuit; while the Phliasians, passing -by a shorter road close under their own walls, were beforehand in -reaching the Sikyonians and Pellenians, whom they vigorously attacked -and defeated with loss. Euphron with his mercenaries, and the Theban -division, arrived too late to prevent the calamity, which they -made no effort to repair.<a id="FNanchor_584" href="#Footnote_584" -class="fnanchor">[584]</a></p> - -<p>An eminent Pellenian citizen, named Proxenus having been here -made prisoner, the Phliasians, in spite of all their sufferings, -released him without ransom. This act of generosity—coupled with -the loss sustained by the Pellenians in the recent engagement, as -well as with the recent oligarchical counter-revolutions which had -disjoined the other Achæan cities from Thebes—altered the politics -of Pellênê, bringing about a peace between that city and Phlius.<a -id="FNanchor_585" href="#Footnote_585" class="fnanchor">[585]</a> -Such an accession afforded sensible<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_272">[p. 272]</span> relief,—it might almost be said, -salvation,—to the Phliasians, in the midst of cruel impoverishment; -since even their necessary subsistence, except what was obtained by -marauding excursions from the enemy, being derived by purchase from -Corinth, was found difficult to pay for, and still more difficult -to bring home, in the face of an enemy. They were now enabled, by -the aid of the Athenian general Charês and his mercenary troops from -Corinth, to escort their families and their non-military population -to Pellênê, where a kindly shelter was provided by the citizens. The -military Phliasians, while escorting back a stock of supplies to -Phlius, broke through and defeated an ambuscade of the enemy in their -way; and afterwards, in conjunction with Charês, surprised the fort -of Thyamia, which the Sikyonians were fortifying as an aggressive -post on their borders. The fort became not only a defence for -Phlius, but a means of aggression against the enemy, affording also -great facility for the introduction of provisions from Corinth.<a -id="FNanchor_586" href="#Footnote_586" class="fnanchor">[586]</a></p> - -<p>Another cause, both of these successes and of general relief to -the Phliasians, arose out of the distracted state of affairs in -Sikyon. So intolerable had the tyranny of Euphron become, that the -Arcadians, who had helped to raise him up, became disgusted. Æneas of -Stymphalus, general of the collective Arcadian force, marched with a -body of troops to Sikyon, joined the Theban harmost in the Acropolis, -and there summoned the Sikyonian <i>notables</i> to an assembly. Under -his protection, the intense sentiment against Euphron was freely -manifested, and it was resolved to recall the numerous exiles, whom -he had banished without either trial or public sentence. Dreading -the wrath of these numerous and bitter enemies, Euphron thought -it prudent to retire with his mercenaries to the harbor; where he -invited Pasimêlus the Lacedæmonian to come, with a portion of the -garrison of Corinth, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_273">[p. -273]</span> immediately declared himself an open partisan of Sparta. -The harbor, a separate town and fortification at some little distance -from the city (as Lechæum was from Corinth), was thus held by and -for the Spartans; while Sikyon adhered to the Thebans and Arcadians. -In Sikyon itself however, though evacuated by Euphron, there still -remained violent dissensions. The returning exiles were probably -bitter in reactionary measures; the humbler citizens were fearful of -losing their newly-acquired political privileges; and the liberated -slaves, yet more fearful of forfeiting that freedom, which the recent -revolution had conferred upon them.</p> - -<p>Hence Euphron still retained so many partisans, that having -procured from Athens a reinforcement of mercenary troops, he was -enabled to return to Sikyon, and again to establish himself as -master of the town in conjunction with the popular party. But -as his opponents, the principal men in the place, found shelter -along with the Theban garrison in the acropolis, which he vainly -tried to take by assault,<a id="FNanchor_587" href="#Footnote_587" -class="fnanchor">[587]</a>—his possession even of the town was -altogether precarious, until such formidable neighbors could be -removed. Accordingly he resolved to visit Thebes, in hopes of -obtaining from the authorities an order for expelling his opponents -and handing over Sikyon a second time to his rule. On what grounds, -after so recent a defection to the Spartans, he rested his hopes -of success, we do not know; except that he took with him a large -sum of money for the purpose of bribery.<a id="FNanchor_588" -href="#Footnote_588" class="fnanchor">[588]</a> His Sikyonian -opponents, alarmed lest he should really carry his point, followed -him to Thebes, where their alarm was still farther increased by -seeing him in familiar converse with the magistrates. Under the first -impulse of terror and despair, they assassinated Euphron in broad -daylight,—on the Kadmeia, and even before the doors of the Theban -Senate-house, wherein both magistrates and Senate were sitting.</p> - -<p>For an act of violence thus patent, they were of course seized -forthwith, and put upon their trial, before the Senate. The -magistrates invoked upon their heads the extreme penalty of death, -insisting upon the enormity and even impudence of the outrage, -committed almost under the eyes of the authorities,—as well as upon -the sacred duty of vindicating not merely the majesty, but even -the security of the city, by exemplary punishment upon of<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_274">[p. 274]</span>fenders who had despised -its laws. How many in number were the persons implicated, we do not -know. All, except one, denied actual hand-participation; but that -one avowed it frankly, and stood up to justify it before the Theban -Senate. He spoke in substance nearly as follows,—taking up the -language of the accusing magistrates:—</p> - -<p>“Despise you I cannot, men of Thebes; for you are masters of -my person and life. It was on other grounds of confidence that -I slew this man: first, I had the conviction of acting justly; -next, I trusted in your righteous judgment. I knew that <i>you</i> did -not wait for trial and sentence to slay Archias and Hypatês,<a -id="FNanchor_589" href="#Footnote_589" class="fnanchor">[589]</a> -whom you caught after a career similar to that of Euphron,—but -punished them at the earliest practicable opportunity, under the -conviction that men manifest in sacrilege, treason, and despotism, -were already under sentence by all men. Well! and was not Euphron, -too, guilty of all these crimes? Did not he find the temples full of -gold and silver offerings, and strip them until they were empty? How -can there be a traitor more palpable than the man, who, favored and -upheld by Sparta, first betrayed her to you; and then again, after -having received every mark of confidence from you, betrayed you to -her,—handing over the harbor of Sikyon to your enemies? Was not he -a despot without reserve, the man who exalted slaves, not only into -freemen, but into citizens? the man who despoiled, banished, or slew, -not criminals, but all whom he chose, and most of all, the chief -citizens? And now, after having vainly attempted, in conjunction -with your enemies the Athenians, to expel your harmost by force from -Sikyon, he has collected a great stock of money, and come hither to -turn it to account. Had he assembled arms and soldiers against you, -you would have thanked me for killing him. How then can you punish -me for giving him his due, when he has come with money to corrupt -you, and to purchase from you again the mastery of Sikyon, to your -own disgrace as well as mis<span class="pagenum" id="Page_275">[p. -275]</span>chief? Had he been my enemy and your friend, I should -undoubtedly have done wrong to kill him in your city; but as he is -a traitor, playing you false, how is he more my enemy than yours? I -shall be told that he came hither of his own accord, confiding in the -laws of the city. Well! you would have thanked me for killing him -anywhere out of Thebes; why not <i>in</i> Thebes also, when he has come -hither only for the purpose of doing you new wrong in addition to the -past? Where among Greeks has impunity ever been assured to traitors, -deserters, or despots? Recollect, that you have passed a vote that -exiles from any one of your allied cities might be seized as outlaws -in any other. Now Euphron is a condemned exile, who has ventured to -come back to Sikyon without any vote of the general body of allies. -How can any one affirm that he has not justly incurred death? I -tell you in conclusion, men of Thebes,—if you put me to death, you -will have made yourselves the avengers of your very worst enemy,—if -you adjudge me to have done right, you will manifest yourselves -publicly as just avengers, both on your own behalf and on that of -your whole body of allies.”<a id="FNanchor_590" href="#Footnote_590" -class="fnanchor">[590]</a></p> - -<p>This impressive discourse induced the Theban Senate to pronounce -that Euphron had met with his due. It probably came from one of the -principal citizens of Sikyon, among whom were most of the enemies -as well as the victims of the deceased despot. It appeals, in a -characteristic manner, to that portion of Grecian morality which bore -upon men, who by their very crimes procured for themselves the means -of impunity; against whom there was no legal force to protect others, -and who were therefore considered as not being entitled to protection -themselves, if the daggers of others could ever be made to reach -them. The tyrannicide appeals to this sentiment with confidence, as -diffused throughout all the free Grecian cities. It found responsive -assent in the Theban Senate, and would probably have found the like -assent, if set<span class="pagenum" id="Page_276">[p. 276]</span> -forth with equal emphasis, in most Grecian senates or assemblies -elsewhere.</p> - -<p>Very different, however, was the sentiment in Sikyon. The body -of Euphron was carried thither, and enjoyed the distinguished -preëminence of being buried in the market-place.<a id="FNanchor_591" -href="#Footnote_591" class="fnanchor">[591]</a> There, along -with his tomb, a chapel was erected, in which he was worshipped -as Archêgetês, or Patron-hero and Second Founder, of the city. -He received the same honors as had been paid to Brasidas at -Amphipolis. The humbler citizens and the slaves, upon whom he had -conferred liberty and political franchise,—or at least the name of -a political franchise,—remembered him with grateful admiration as -their benefactor, forgetting or excusing the atrocities which he -had wreaked upon their political opponents. Such is the retributive -Nemesis which always menaces, and sometimes overtakes, an oligarchy -who keep the mass of the citizens excluded from political privileges. -A situation is thus created, enabling some ambitious and energetic -citizen to confer favors and earn popularity among the many, and thus -to acquire power, which, whether employed or not for the benefit -of the many, goes along with their antipathies when it humbles or -crushes the previously monopolizing few.</p> - -<p>We may presume from these statements that the government of -Sikyon became democratical. But the provoking brevity of Xenophon -does not inform us of the subsequent arrangements made with the -Theban harmost in the acropolis,—nor how the intestine dissensions, -between the democracy in the town and the refugees in the citadel, -were composed,—nor what became of those citizens who slew Euphron. -We learn only that not long afterwards, the harbor of Sikyon, which -Euphron had held in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, -was left imperfectly defended by the recall of the latter to Athens; -and that it was accordingly retaken by the forces from the town, -aided by the Arcadians.<a id="FNanchor_592" href="#Footnote_592" -class="fnanchor">[592]</a></p> - -<p>It appears that these proceedings of Euphron (from his first -proclamation of the democracy at Sikyon and real acquisition of -despotism to himself, down to his death and the recovery of the -harbor) took place throughout the year 367 <small>B.C.</small> -and the earlier half of 366 <small>B.C.</small> No such enemy, -probably, would have arisen<span class="pagenum" id="Page_277">[p. -277]</span> to embarrass Thebes, unless the policy recommended by -Epaminondas in Achaia had been reversed, and unless he himself had -fallen under the displeasure of his countrymen. His influence too -was probably impaired, and the policy of Thebes affected for the -worse, by the accidental absence of his friend Pelopidas, who was -then on his mission to the Persian court at Susa. Such a journey -and return, with the transaction of the business in hand, must have -occupied the greater part of the year 367 <small>B.C.</small>, being -terminated probably by the return of the envoys in the beginning of -366 <small>B.C.</small></p> - -<p>The leading Thebans had been alarmed by the language of -Philiskus,—who had come over a few months before as envoy from the -satrap Ariobarzanes and had threatened to employ Asiatic money -in the interest of Athens and Sparta against Thebes, though his -threats seem never to have been realized, as well as by the presence -of the Lacedæmonian Euthyklês (after the failure of Antalkidas<a -id="FNanchor_593" href="#Footnote_593" class="fnanchor">[593]</a>) -at the Persian court, soliciting aid. Moreover Thebes had now -pretensions to the headship of Greece, at least as good as -either of her two rivals; while since the fatal example set by -Sparta at the peace called by the name of Antalkidas in 387 -<small>B.C.</small>, and copied by Athens after the battle of Leuktra -in 371 <small>B.C.</small>,—it had become a sort of recognized -fashion that the leading Grecian state should sue out its title -from the terror-striking rescript of the Great King, and proclaim -itself as enforcing terms which he had dictated. On this ground of -borrowed elevation Thebes now sought to place herself. There was in -her case a peculiar reason which might partly excuse the value set -upon it by her leaders. It had been almost the capital act of her -policy to establish the two new cities, Megalopolis and Messênê. -The vitality and chance for duration, of both,—especially that of -the latter, which had the inextinguishable hostility of Sparta to -contend with,—would be materially improved, in the existing state -of the Greek mind, if they were recognized as autonomous under -a Persian rescript. To attain this object,<a id="FNanchor_594" -href="#Footnote_594" class="fnanchor">[594]</a> Pelopidas and -Isme<span class="pagenum" id="Page_278">[p. 278]</span>nias now -proceeded as envoys to Susa; doubtless under a formal vote of the -allied synod, since the Arcadian Antiochus, a celebrated pankratiast, -the Eleian Archidamus, and a citizen from Argos, accompanied them. -Informed of the proceeding, the Athenians also sent Timagoras and -Leon to Susa; and we read with some surprise that these hostile -envoys all went up thither in the same company.<a id="FNanchor_595" -href="#Footnote_595" class="fnanchor">[595]</a></p> - -<p>Pelopidas, though he declined to perform the usual ceremony -of prostration,<a id="FNanchor_596" href="#Footnote_596" -class="fnanchor">[596]</a> was favorably received by the Persian -court. Xenophon,—who recounts the whole proceeding in a manner -unfairly invidious towards the Thebans, forgetting that they were now -only copying the example of Sparta in courting Persian aid,—affirms -that his application was greatly furthered by the recollection of the -ancient alliance of Thebes with Xerxes, against Athens and Sparta, -at the time of the battle of Platæa; and by the fact that Thebes -had not only refused to second, but had actually discountenanced, -the expedition of Agesilaus against Asia. We may perhaps doubt, -whether this plea counted for much; or the straightforward eloquence -of Pelopidas, so much extolled by Plutarch,<a id="FNanchor_597" -href="#Footnote_597" class="fnanchor">[597]</a> which could only -reach Persian ears through an interpreter. But the main fact for -the Great King to know was, that the Thebans had been victorious -at Leuktra; that they had subsequently trodden down still farther -the glory of Sparta, by carrying their arms over Laconia, and -emancipating the conquered half of the country; that when they -were no longer in Pelopon<span class="pagenum" id="Page_279">[p. -279]</span>nesus, their allies the Arcadians and Argeians had been -shamefully defeated by the Lacedæmonians (in the Tearless Battle). -Such boasts on the part of Pelopidas,—confirmed as matters of fact -even by the Athenian Timagoras,—would convince the Persian ministers -that it was their interest to exercise ascendency over Greece through -Thebes in preference to Sparta. Accordingly Pelopidas being asked -by the Great King what sort of rescript he wished, obtained his own -terms. Messênê was declared autonomous and independent of Sparta: -Amphipolis also was pronounced to be a free and autonomous city: -the Athenians were directed to order home and lay up their ships of -war now in active service, on pain of Persian intervention against -them, in case of disobedience. Moreover Thebes was declared the head -city of Greece, and any city refusing to follow her headship was -menaced with instant compulsion by Persian force.<a id="FNanchor_598" -href="#Footnote_598" class="fnanchor">[598]</a> In reference to the -points in dispute between Elis and Arcadia (the former claiming -sovereignty over Triphylia, which professed itself Arcadian and had -been admitted into the Arcadian communion), the rescript pronounced -in favor of the Eleians;<a id="FNanchor_599" href="#Footnote_599" -class="fnanchor">[599]</a> probably at the instance of<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_280">[p. 280]</span> Pelopidas, since there -now subsisted much coldness between the Thebans and Arcadians.</p> - -<p>Leon the Athenian protested against the Persian rescript, -observing aloud when he heard it read,—“By Zeus, Athenians, I think -it is time for you to look out for some other friend than the Great -King.” This remark, made in the King’s hearing and interpreted -to him, produced the following addition to the rescript: “If the -Athenians have anything juster to propose, let them come to the -King and inform him.” So vague a modification, however, did little -to appease the murmurs of the Athenians. On the return of their -two envoys to Athens, Leon accused his colleague Timagoras of -having not only declined to associate with him during the journey, -but also of having lent himself to the purposes of Pelopidas, of -being implicated in treasonable promises, and of receiving large -bribes from the Persian King. On these charges Timagoras was -condemned and executed.<a id="FNanchor_600" href="#Footnote_600" -class="fnanchor">[600]</a> The Arcadian envoy Antiochus was equally -indignant at the rescript; refusing even to receive such presents of -formal courtesy as were tendered to all, and accepted by Pelopidas -himself, who however strictly declined everything beyond. The conduct -of this eminent Theban thus exhibited a strong contrast with the -large acquisitions of the Athenian Timagoras.<a id="FNanchor_601" -href="#Footnote_601" class="fnanchor">[601]</a> Antiochus, on -returning to Arcadia,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_281">[p. -281]</span> made report of his mission to the Pan-Arcadian synod, -called the Ten Thousand, at Megalopolis. He spoke in the most -contemptuous terms of all that he had seen at the Persian court. -There were (he said) plenty of bakers, cooks, wine-pourers, -porters, etc., but as for men competent to fight against Greeks, -though he looked out for them with care, he could see none; and -even the vaunted golden plane-tree was not large enough to furnish -shade for a grasshopper.<a id="FNanchor_602" href="#Footnote_602" -class="fnanchor">[602]</a></p> - -<p>On the other hand, the Eleian envoy returned with feelings of -satisfaction, and the Thebans with triumph. Deputies from each of -their allied cities were invited to Thebes, to hear the Persian -rescript. It was produced by a native Persian, their official -companion from Susa,—the first Persian probably ever seen in Thebes -since the times immediately preceding the battle of Platæa,—who, -after exhibiting publicly the regal seal, read the document -aloud; as the satrap Tiribazus had done on the occasion of the -peace of Antalkidas.<a id="FNanchor_603" href="#Footnote_603" -class="fnanchor">[603]</a></p> - -<p>But though the Theban leaders thus closely copied the conduct of -Sparta both as to means and as to end, they by no means found the -like ready acquiescence, when they called on the deputies present -to take an oath to the rescript, to the Great King, and to Thebes. -All replied that they had come with instructions, authorizing them -to hear and report, but no more; and that acceptance or rejection -must be decided in their respective cities. Nor was this the worst. -Lykomedes and the other deputies from Arcadia, already jealous of -Thebes, and doubtless farther alienated by the angry report of their -envoy Antiochus, went yet farther, and entered a general protest -against the headship of Thebes; affirming that the synod ought not -to be held constantly in that city, but in the seat of war, wherever -that might be. Incensed at such language, the Thebans accused -Lykomedes of violating the cardinal principle of the confederacy; -upon which he and his Arcadian comrades forthwith retired and went -home, declaring that they would no longer sit in the synod. The other -deputies appear to have followed his example. Indeed, as they had -refused to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_282">[p. 282]</span> take -the oath submitted to them, the special purpose of the synod was -defeated.</p> - -<p>Having thus failed in carrying their point with the allies -collectively, the Thebans resolved to try the efficacy of -applications individually. They accordingly despatched envoys, with -the Persian rescript in hand, to visit the cities successively, -calling upon each for acceptance with an oath of adhesion. Each -city separately (they thought) would be afraid to refuse, under -peril of united hostility from the Great King and from Thebes. So -confident were they in the terrors of the king’s name and seal, that -they addressed this appeal not merely to the cities in alliance -with them, but even to several among their enemies. Their envoys -first set forth the proposition at Corinth; a city, not only at -variance with them, but even serving as a centre of operation for -the Athenian and Lacedæmonian forces to guard the line of Oneium, -and prevent the entrance of a Theban army into Peloponnesus. But -the Corinthians rejected the proposition altogether, declining -formally to bind themselves by any common oaths towards the Persian -king. The like refusal was experienced by the envoys as they -passed on to Peloponnesus, if not from all the cities visited, at -least from so large a proportion, that the mission was completely -frustrated. And thus the rescript, which Thebes had been at such -pains to procure, was found practically inoperative in confirming -or enforcing her headship;<a id="FNanchor_604" href="#Footnote_604" -class="fnanchor">[604]</a> though doubtless the mere fact, that it -comprised and recognized Messênê, contributed to strengthen the -vitality, and exalt the dignity, of that new-born city.</p> - -<p>In their efforts to make the Persian rescript available towards -the recognition of their headship throughout Greece, the Thebans -would naturally visit Thessaly and the northern districts as well -as Peloponnesus. It appears that Pelopidas and Ismenias themselves -undertook this mission; and that in the execution of it they were -seized and detained as prisoners by Alexander of Pheræ. That despot -seems to have come to meet them, under pacific appearances, at -Pharsalus. They indulged hopes of prevailing on him as well as -the other Thessalians to accept the Persian<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_283">[p. 283]</span> rescript; for we see by the example -of Corinth, that they had tried their powers of persuasion on -enemies as well as friends. But the Corinthians, while refusing the -application, had nevertheless respected the public morality held -sacred even between enemies in Greece, and had dismissed the envoys -(whether Pelopidas was among them, we cannot assert) inviolate. Not -so the tyrant of Pheræ. Perceiving that Pelopidas and Ismenias were -unaccompanied by any military force, he seized their persons, and -carried them off to Pheræ as prisoners.</p> - -<p>Treacherous as this proceeding was, it proved highly profitable -to Alexander. Such was the personal importance of Pelopidas, that -his imprisonment struck terror among the partisans of Thebes in -Thessaly, and induced several of them to submit to the despot of -Pheræ; who moreover sent to apprise the Athenians of his capture, -and to solicit their aid against the impending vengeance of Thebes. -Greatly impressed with the news, the Athenians looked upon Alexander -as a second Jason, likely to arrest the menacing ascendency of -their neighbor and rival.<a id="FNanchor_605" href="#Footnote_605" -class="fnanchor">[605]</a> They immediately despatched to his aid -thirty triremes and one thousand hoplites under Autoklês; who, -unable to get through the Euripus, when Bœotia and Eubœa were -both hostile to Athens, were forced to circumnavigate the latter -island. He reached Pheræ just in time; for the Thebans, incensed -beyond measure at the seizure of Pelopidas, had despatched without -delay eight thousand hoplites and six hundred cavalry to recover -or avenge him. Unfortunately for them, Epaminondas had not been -rechosen commander since his last year’s proceedings in Achaia. He -was now serving as an hoplite in the ranks, while Kleomenes with -other Bœotarchs had the command. On entering Thessaly, they were -joined by various allies in the country. But the army of Alex<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_284">[p. 284]</span>ander, aided by the -Athenians, and placed under the command of Autoklês, was found -exceedingly formidable, especially in cavalry. The Thessalian allies -of Thebes, acting with their habitual treachery, deserted in the -hour of danger; and the enterprise, thus difficult and perilous, was -rendered impracticable by the incompetence of the Bœotarchs. Unable -to make head against Alexander and the Athenians, they were forced -to retreat homeward. But their generalship was so unskilful, and -the enemy’s cavalry so active, that the whole army was in imminent -danger of being starved or destroyed. Nothing saved them now, but the -presence of Epaminondas as a common soldier in the ranks. Indignant -as well as dismayed, the whole army united to depose their generals, -and with one voice called upon him to extricate them from their -perils. Epaminondas accepted the duty,—marshalled the retreat in -consummate order,—took for himself the command of the rear-guard, -beating off all the attacks of the enemy,—and conducted the army -safely back to Thebes.<a id="FNanchor_606" href="#Footnote_606" -class="fnanchor">[606]</a></p> - -<p>This memorable exploit, while it disgraced the unsuccessful -Bœotarchs, who were condemned to fine and deposition from their -office, raised higher than ever the reputation of Epaminondas among -his countrymen. But the failure of the expedition was for the time a -fatal blow to the influence of Thebes in Thessaly; where Alexander -now reigned victorious and irresistible, with Pelopidas still in -his dungeon. The cruelties and oppressions, at all times habitual -to the despot of Pheræ, were pushed to an excess beyond all former -parallel. Besides other brutal deeds of which we read with horror, he -is said to have surrounded by his military force the unarmed citizens -of Melibœa and Skotussa, and slaughtered them all in mass. In such -hands, the life of Pelopidas hung by a thread; yet he himself, with -that personal courage which never forsook him, held the language of -unsubdued defiance and provocation against the tyrant. Great sympathy -was manifested by many Thessalians, and even by Thêbê the wife of -Alexander, for so illustrious a prisoner; and Alexander, fearful -of incurring the implacable enmity of Thebes, was induced to spare -his life, though retaining him as a prisoner. His confinement, too, -appears to have lasted some time before the Thebans, discouraged -by their late ill-success, were prepared to undertake a second -expedition.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_285">[p. 285]</span></p> - -<p>At length they sent a force for the purpose; which was placed, -on this occasion, under the command of Epaminondas. The renown of -his name rallied many adherents in the country; and his prudence, -no less than his military skill, was conspicuously exhibited, in -defeating and intimidating Alexander, yet without reducing him to -such despair as might prove fatal to the prisoner. The despot was at -length compelled to send an embassy excusing his recent violence, -offering to restore Pelopidas, and soliciting to be admitted to peace -and alliance with Thebes. But Epaminondas would grant nothing more -than a temporary truce,<a id="FNanchor_607" href="#Footnote_607" -class="fnanchor">[607]</a> coupled with the engagement of evacuating -Thessaly; while he required in exchange the release of Pelopidas -and Ismenias. His terms were acceded to, so that he had the delight -of conveying his liberated friend in safety to Thebes. Though this -primary object was thus effected, however, it is plain that he did -not restore Thebes to the same influence in Thessaly which she had -enjoyed prior to the seizure of Pelopidas.<a id="FNanchor_608" -href="#Footnote_608" class="fnanchor">[608]</a> That event with its -consequences<span class="pagenum" id="Page_286">[p. 286]</span> -still remained a blow to Thebes and a profit to Alexander; who -again became master of all or most part of Thessaly, together with -the Magnêtes, the Phthiot Achæans, and other tributary nations -dependent on Thessaly—maintaining unimpaired his influence and -connection at Athens.<a id="FNanchor_609" href="#Footnote_609" -class="fnanchor">[609]</a></p> - -<p>While the Theban arms were thus losing ground in Thessaly, an -important point was gained in their favor on the other side of -Bœotia. Orôpus, on the north-eastern frontier of Attica adjoining -Bœotia, was captured and wrested from Athens by a party of exiles -who crossed over from Eretria in Eubœa, with the aid of Themison, -despot of the last-mentioned town. It had been more than once lost -and regained between Athens and Thebes; being seemingly in its origin -Bœotian, and never incorporated as a Deme or equal constituent member -of the Athenian commonwealth, but only recognized as a dependency -of Athens; though, as it was close on the frontier, many of its -inhabitants were also citizens of Athens, de<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_287">[p. 287]</span>mots of the neighboring Deme Græa.<a -id="FNanchor_610" href="#Footnote_610" class="fnanchor">[610]</a> So -recently before as the period immediately preceding the battle of -Leuktra, angry remonstrances had been exchanged between Athens and -Thebes respecting a portion of the Oropian territory. At that time, -it appears, the Thebans were forced to yield, and their partisans -in Oropus were banished.<a id="FNanchor_611" href="#Footnote_611" -class="fnanchor">[611]</a> It was these partisans who, through -the aid of Themison and the Eretrians, now effected their return, -so as to repossess themselves of Oropus, and doubtless to banish -the principal citizens friendly to Athens.<a id="FNanchor_612" -href="#Footnote_612" class="fnanchor">[612]</a> So great was the -sensation produced among the Athenians, that they not only marched -with all their force to recover the place, but also recalled their -general, Chares, with that mercenary force which he commanded in -the territories of Corinth and Phlius. They farther requested aid -from the Corinthians and their other allies in Peloponnesus. These -allies did not obey the summons; but the Athenian force alone -would have sufficed to retake Oropus, had not the Thebans occupied -it so as to place it beyond their attack. Athens was obliged to -acquiesce in their occupation of it; though under protest, and -with the understanding that the disputed right should be referred -to impartial arbitration.<a id="FNanchor_613" href="#Footnote_613" -class="fnanchor">[613]</a></p> - -<p>This seizure of Oropus produced more than one material -consequence. Owing to the recall of Chares from Corinth, the harbor -of Sikyon could no longer be maintained against the Sikyonians -in the town; who, with the aid of the Arcadians, recaptured it, -so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_288">[p. 288]</span> that both -town and harbor again came into the league of Thebans and Arcadians. -Moreover, Athens became discontented with her Peloponnesian allies, -for having neglected her summons on the emergency at Oropus, although -Athenian troops had been constantly in service for the protection of -Peloponnesus against the Thebans. The growth of such dispositions -at Athens became known to the Mantinean Lykomedes; the ablest and -most ambitious leader in Arcadia, who was not only jealous of the -predominance of the Thebans, but had come to a formal rupture with -them at the synod held for the reception of the Persian rescript.<a -id="FNanchor_614" href="#Footnote_614" class="fnanchor">[614]</a> -Anxious to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes as well as from -Sparta, Lykomedes now took advantage of the discontent of Athens to -open negotiations with that city; persuading the majority of the -Arcadian Ten Thousand to send him thither as ambassador. There was -difficulty among the Athenians in entertaining his proposition, -from the alliance subsisting between them and Sparta. But they were -reminded, that to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes, was no less -in the interest of Sparta than of Athens; and a favorable answer was -then given to Lykomedes. The latter took ship at Peiræus for his -return, but never reached Arcadia; for he happened to land at the -spot where the Arcadian exiles of the opposite party were assembled, -and these men put him to death at once.<a id="FNanchor_615" -href="#Footnote_615" class="fnanchor">[615]</a> In spite of his -death, however, the alliance between Arcadia and Athens was still -brought to pass, though not without opposition.</p> - -<p>Thebes was during this year engaged in her unsuccessful campaign -in Thessaly (alluded to already) for the rescue of Pelopidas, which -disabled her from effective efforts in Peloponnesus. But as soon as -that rescue had been accomplished, Epaminondas, her greatest man, and -her only conspicuous orator, was despatched into Arcadia to offer, -in conjunction with an envoy from Argos, diplomatic obstruction to -the proposed Athenian alliance. He had to speak against Kallistratus, -the most distinguished orator at Athens,<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_289">[p. 289]</span> who had been sent by his countrymen to -plead their cause amidst the Arcadian Ten Thousand, and who, among -other arguments, denounced the enormities which darkened the heroic -legends both of Thebes and Argos. “Were not Orestes and Alkmæon, both -murderers of their mothers (asked Kallistratus), natives of Argos? -Was not Œdipus, who slew his father and married his mother, a native -of Thebes?”—“Yes (said Epaminondas, in his reply) they were. But -Kallistratus has forgotten to tell you, that these persons, while -they lived at home were innocent, or reputed to be so. As soon as -their crimes became known, Argos and Thebes banished them; and then -it was that Athens received them, stained with confessed guilt.”<a -id="FNanchor_616" href="#Footnote_616" class="fnanchor">[616]</a> -This clever retort told much to the credit of the rhetorical skill -of Epaminondas; but his speech as a whole, was not successful. The -Arcadians concluded alliance with Athens; yet without formally -renouncing friendship with Thebes.</p> - -<p>As soon as such new alliance had been ratified, it became -important to Athens to secure a free and assured entrance into -Peloponnesus; while at the same time the recent slackness of the -Corinthians, in regard to the summons to Oropus, rendered her -mistrustful of their fidelity. Accordingly it was resolved in the -Athenian assembly, on the motion of a citizen named Demotion, to -seize and occupy Corinth; there being already some scattered Athenian -garrisons, on various points of the Corinthian territory, ready to -be concentrated and rendered useful for such a purpose. A fleet -and land-force under Chares was made ready and despatched. But on -reaching the Corinthian port of Kenchreæ, Chares found himself shut -out even from admittance. The proposition of Demotion, and the -resolution of the Athenians had become known to the Corinthians; -who forthwith stood upon their guard, sent soldiers of their own to -relieve the various Athenian outposts on their territory, and called -upon these latter to give in any complaints for<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_290">[p. 290]</span> which they might have ground, as their -services were no longer needed. Chares pretended to have learnt that -Corinth was in danger. But both he and the remaining Athenians were -dismissed, though with every expression of thanks and politeness.<a -id="FNanchor_617" href="#Footnote_617" class="fnanchor">[617]</a></p> - -<p>The treacherous purpose of Athens was thus baffled, and the -Corinthians were for the moment safe. Yet their position was -precarious and uncomfortable; for their enemies, Thebes and Argos, -were already their masters by land, and Athens had now been converted -from an ally into an enemy. Hence they resolved to assemble a -sufficient mercenary force in their own pay;<a id="FNanchor_618" -href="#Footnote_618" class="fnanchor">[618]</a> but while thus -providing for military security, they sent envoys to Thebes to open -negotiations for peace. Permission was granted to them by the Thebans -to go and consult their allies, and to treat for peace in conjunction -with as many as could be brought to share their views. Accordingly -the Corinthians went to Sparta and laid their case before the full -synod of allies, convoked for the occasion. “We are on the point -of ruin (said the Corinthian envoy), and must make peace. We shall -rejoice to make it in conjunction with you, if you will consent; -but if you think proper to persevere in the war, be not displeased -if we make peace without you.” The Epidaurians and Phliasians, -reduced to the like distress, held the same language of weariness -and impatience for peace.<a id="FNanchor_619" href="#Footnote_619" -class="fnanchor">[619]</a></p> - -<p>It had been ascertained at Thebes, that no propositions for peace -could be entertained, which did not contain a formal recognition -of the independence of Messênê. To this the Corinthians and other -allies of Sparta had no difficulty in agreeing. But they vainly -en<span class="pagenum" id="Page_291">[p. 291]</span>deavored to -prevail upon Sparta herself to submit to the same concession. The -Spartans resolutely refused to relinquish a territory inherited -from victorious forefathers, and held under so long a prescription. -They repudiated yet more indignantly the idea of recognizing as -free Greeks and equal neighbors, those who had so long been their -slaves; and they proclaimed their determination of continuing -the war, even single-handed and with all its hazards, to regain -what they had lost;<a id="FNanchor_620" href="#Footnote_620" -class="fnanchor">[620]</a> and although they could not directly -prohibit the Corinthians and other allies, whose sickness of the -war had become intolerable, from negotiating a separate peace for -themselves,—yet they gave only a reluctant consent. Archidamus -son of Agesilaus even reproached the allies with timorous -selfishness, partly in deserting their benefactress Sparta at her -hour of need, partly in recommending her to submit to a sacrifice -ruinous to her honor.<a id="FNanchor_621" href="#Footnote_621" -class="fnanchor">[621]</a> The Spartan prince conjured his -country<span class="pagenum" id="Page_292">[p. 292]</span>men, -in the name of all their ancient dignity, to spurn the mandates -of Thebes; to shrink neither from effort nor from peril for the -reconquest of Messênê, even if they had to fight alone against all -Greece; and to convert their military population into a permanent -camp, sending away their women and children to an asylum in friendly -foreign cities.</p> - -<p>Though the Spartans were not inclined to adopt the desperate -suggestions of Archidamus, yet this important congress ended -by a scission between them and their allies. The Corinthians, -Phliasians, Epidaurians, and others, went to Thebes, and concluded -peace; recognizing the independence of Messênê, and affirming the -independence of each separate city within its own territory, without -either obligatory alliance, or headship on the part of any city. Yet -when the Thebans invited them to contract an alliance, they declined, -saying that this would be only embarking in war on the other side; -whereas that which they sighed for was peace. Peace was accordingly -sworn, upon the terms indicated in the Persian rescript, so far as -regarded the general autonomy of each separate town, and specially -that of Messênê; but not including any sanction, direct or indirect, -of Theban headship.<a id="FNanchor_622" href="#Footnote_622" -class="fnanchor">[622]</a></p> - -<p>This treaty removed out of the war, and placed in a position -of neutrality, a considerable number of Grecian states; chiefly -those near the Isthmus,—Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus; probably Trœzen -and Hermionê, since we do not find them again mentioned among the -contending parties. But it left the more powerful states, Thebes and -Argos,—Sparta and Athens,<a id="FNanchor_623" href="#Footnote_623" -class="fnanchor">[623]</a>—still at war; as well as Arcadia, -Achaia, and Elis. The relations between these states, however, -were now somewhat complicated; for Thebes was at war with Sparta, -and in alliance, though not altogether hearty alliance,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_293">[p. 293]</span> with the Arcadians; -while Athens was at war with Thebes, yet in alliance with Sparta -as well as with Arcadia. The Argeians were in alliance with Thebes -and Arcadia, and at war with Sparta; the Eleians were on unfriendly -terms, though not yet at actual war, with Arcadia—yet still (it -would appear) in alliance with Thebes. Lastly, the Arcadians -themselves were losing their internal coöperation and harmony one -with another, which had only so recently begun. Two parties were -forming among them, under the old conflicting auspices of Mantinea -and Tegea. Tegea, occupied by a Theban harmost and garrison, held -strenuously with Megalopolis and Messênê as well as with Thebes, thus -constituting a strong and united frontier against Sparta.</p> - -<p>As the Spartans complained of their Peloponnesian allies, for -urging the recognition of Messênê as an independent state,—so they -were no less indignant with the Persian king; who, though still -calling himself their ally, had inserted the same recognition -in the rescript granted to Pelopidas.<a id="FNanchor_624" -href="#Footnote_624" class="fnanchor">[624]</a> The Athenians also -were dissatisfied with this rescript. They had (as has been already -stated) condemned to death Timagoras, one of their envoys who had -accompanied Pelopidas, for having received bribes. They now availed -themselves of the opening left for them in the very words of the -rescript, to send a fresh embassy up to the Persian court, and -solicit more favorable terms. Their new envoys, communicating the -fact that Timagoras had betrayed his trust and had been punished -for it, obtained from the Great King a fresh rescript, pronouncing -Amphipolis to be an Athenian possession instead of a free city.<a -id="FNanchor_625" href="#Footnote_625" class="fnanchor">[625]</a> -Whether that other article also in the<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_294">[p. 294]</span> former rescript, which commanded Athens -to call in all her armed ships, was now revoked, we cannot say; but -it seems probable.</p> - -<p>At the same time that the Athenians sent this second embassy, -they also despatched an armament under Timotheus to the coast of -Asia Minor, yet with express instructions not to violate the peace -with the Persian king. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, went to the same -scene, though without any public force; availing himself only of -his long-established military reputation to promote the interests -of his country as negotiator. Both Spartan and Athenian attention -was now turned, directly and specially, towards Ariobarzanes the -satrap of Phrygia; who (as has been already related) had sent over -to Greece, two years before, Philiskus of Abydus, with the view -either of obtaining from the Thebans peace on terms favorable to -Sparta, or of aiding the latter against them.<a id="FNanchor_626" -href="#Footnote_626" class="fnanchor">[626]</a> Ariobarzanes was then -preparing, and apparently had since openly consummated, his revolt -from the Persian king, which Agesilaus employed all his influence in -fomenting. The Athenians, however, still wishing to avoid a distinct -breach with Persia, instructed Timotheus to assist Ariobarzanes,—yet -with a formal proviso, that he should not break truce with the Great -King. They also conferred both upon Ariobarzanes (with his three -sons), and upon Philiskus, the gift of Athenian citizenship.<a -id="FNanchor_627" href="#Footnote_627" class="fnanchor">[627]</a> -That satrap seems now to have had a large mercenary force, and to -have been in possession of both sides of the Hellespont, as well as -of Perinthus on the Propontis; while Philiskus, as his chief officer, -exercised extensive ascendency, disgraced by much tyranny and -brutality, over the Grecian cities in that region.</p> - -<p>Precluded by his instructions from openly aiding the revolted -Ariobarzanes, Timotheus turned his force against the island of -Samos; which was now held by Kyprothemis, a Grecian chief with a -military force in the service of Tigranes, Persian satrap<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_295">[p. 295]</span> on the opposite -mainland. How or when Tigranes had acquired it we do not know; but -the Persians, when once left by the peace of Antalkidas in quiet -possession of the continental Asiatic Greeks, naturally tended to -push their dominion over the neighboring islands. After carrying on -his military operations in Samos, with eight thousand peltasts and -thirty triremes, for ten or eleven months, Timotheus became master of -it. His success was the more gratifying, as he had found means to pay -and maintain his troops during the whole time at the cost of enemies; -without either drawing upon the Athenian treasury, or extorting -contributions from allies.<a id="FNanchor_628" href="#Footnote_628" -class="fnanchor">[628]</a> An important possession was thus acquired -for Athens, while a considerable number of Samians of the opposite -party went into banishment, with the loss of their properties. -Since Samos was not among the legitimate possessions of the king of -Persia, this conquest was not understood to import war between him -and Athens. Indeed it appears that the revolt of Ariobarzanes, and -the uncertain fidelity of various neighboring satraps, shook for -some time the king’s authority, and absorbed his revenues in these -regions. Autophradates, the satrap of Lydia,—and Mausôlus, native -prince of Karia under Persian supremacy,—attacked Ariobarzanes, with -the view, real or pretended, of quelling his revolt; and laid siege -to Assus and Adramyttium. But they are said to have been induced to -desist by the personal influence of Agesilaus.<a id="FNanchor_629" -href="#Footnote_629" class="fnanchor">[629]</a> As the latter had -no army, nor any means of allurement (except perhaps some money -derived from Ariobarzanes), we may fairly presume that the two -besiegers were not very earnest in the cause. Moreover, we shall find -both<span class="pagenum" id="Page_296">[p. 296]</span> of them, -a few years afterwards, in joint revolt with Ariobarzanes himself -against the Persian king.<a id="FNanchor_630" href="#Footnote_630" -class="fnanchor">[630]</a> Agesilaus obtained, from all three, -pecuniary aid for Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_631" href="#Footnote_631" -class="fnanchor">[631]</a></p> - -<p>The acquisition of Samos, while it exalted the reputation of -Timotheus, materially enlarged the maritime dominion of Athens. -It seems also to have weakened the hold of the Great King on Asia -Minor,—to have disposed the residents, both satraps and Grecian -cities, to revolt,—and thus to have helped Ariobarzanes, who rewarded -both Agesilaus and Timotheus. Agesilaus was enabled to carry home a -sum of money to his embarrassed countrymen; but Timotheus, declining -pecuniary aid, obtained for Athens the more valuable boon of -readmission to the Thracian Chersonese. Ariobarzanes made over to him -Sestus and Krithôtê in that peninsula; possessions doubly precious, -as they secured to the Athenians a partial mastery of the passage of -the Hellespont; with a large circumjacent territory for occupation.<a -id="FNanchor_632" href="#Footnote_632" class="fnanchor">[632]</a></p> - -<p>Samos and the Chersonese were not simply new tributary -confederates aggregated to the Athenian synod. They were, in large -proportion, new territories acquired to Athens, open to be occupied -by Athenian citizens as out-settlers or kleruchs. Much of the -Chersonese had been possessed by Athenian citizens, even from the -time of the first Miltiades and afterwards down to the destruction -of the Athenian empire in 405 <small>B.C.</small> Though all -these proprietors had been then driven home and expropriated, they -had never lost the hope of a favorable turn of fortune and<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_297">[p. 297]</span> eventual reëntry.<a -id="FNanchor_633" href="#Footnote_633" class="fnanchor">[633]</a> -That moment had now arrived. The formal renunciation of all private -appropriations of land out of Attica, which Athens had proclaimed at -the formation of her second confederacy in 378 <small>B.C.</small>, -as a means of conciliating maritime allies—was forgotten, now -that she stood no longer in fear of Sparta. The same system of -kleruchies, which had so much discredited her former empire, was -again partially commenced. Many kleruchs, or lot-holders, were sent -out to occupy lands both at Samos and in the Chersonese. These men -were Athenian citizens, who still remained citizens of Athens even -in their foreign domicile, and whose properties formed part of -the taxable schedule of Athens. The particulars of this important -measure are unknown to us. At Samos the emigrants must have been -new men; for there had never been any kleruchs there before.<a -id="FNanchor_634" href="#Footnote_634" class="fnanchor">[634]</a> -But in the Chersonese, the old Athenian proprietors, who had been -expropriated forty years before (or their descendants), doubtless -now went back, and tried, with more or less of success, to regain -their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_298">[p. 298]</span> previous -lands; reinforced by bands of new emigrants. And Timotheus, -having once got footing at Sestus and Krithôtê, soon extended his -acquisitions to Elæus and other places; whereby Athens was emboldened -publicly to claim the whole Chersonese, or at least most part of it, -as her own ancient possession,—from its extreme northern boundary -at a line drawn across the isthmus north of Kardia, down to Elæus -at its southern extremity.<a id="FNanchor_635" href="#Footnote_635" -class="fnanchor">[635]</a></p> - -<p>This transfer of lands in Samos to Athenian proprietors, combined -with the resumption of the Chersonese, appears to have excited -a strong sensation throughout Greece, as a revival of ambitious -tendencies on the part of Athens, and a manifest departure from -those disinterested professions which she had set forth in 378 -<small>B.C.</small> Even in the Athenian assembly, a citizen named -Kydias pronounced an emphatic protest against the emigration of -the kleruchs to Samos.<a id="FNanchor_636" href="#Footnote_636" -class="fnanchor">[636]</a> However, obnoxious as the measure was -to criticism, yet having been preceded by a conquering siege and -the expulsion of many native proprietors, it does not seem to have -involved Athens in so much real difficulty as the resumption of -her old rights in the Chersonese. Not only did she here come into -conflict with independent towns, like Kardia,<a id="FNanchor_637" -href="#Footnote_637" class="fnanchor">[637]</a> which resisted her -pretensions,—and with resident proprietors whom she was to aid her -citizens in dispossessing,—but also with a new enemy, Kotys, king of -Thrace. That prince, claiming the Chersonese as Thracian territory, -was himself on the point of seizing Sestus, when Agesilaus or -Ariobarzanes drove him away,<a id="FNanchor_638" href="#Footnote_638" -class="fnanchor">[638]</a> to make room for Timotheus and the -Athenians.</p> - -<p>It has been already mentioned, that Kotys,<a id="FNanchor_639" -href="#Footnote_639" class="fnanchor">[639]</a>—the new Thracian -enemy, but previously the friend and adopted citizen, of Athens,—was -father-in-law of the Athenian general Iphikrates, whom he had -enabled to establish and people the town and settlement called -Drys, on the coast of Thrace. Iphikrates had been employed by the -Athenians for the last three or four years on the coasts of Macedonia -and Chalkidikê, and especially against Am<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_299">[p. 299]</span>phipolis; but he had neither taken the -latter place, nor obtained (so far as we know) any other success; -though he had incurred the expense for three years of a mercenary -general named Charidemus with a body of troops. How so unprofitable -a result, on the part of an energetic man like Iphikrates, is to be -explained,—we cannot tell. But it naturally placed him before the -eyes of his countrymen in disadvantageous contrast with Timotheus, -who had just acquired Samos and the Chersonese. An additional reason -for mistrusting Iphikrates, too, was presented by the fact, that -Athens was now at war with his father-in-law Kotys. Hence it was now -resolved by the Athenians to recall him, and appoint Timotheus<a -id="FNanchor_640" href="#Footnote_640" class="fnanchor">[640]</a> to -an extensive command, including Thrace and Macedonia as well as the -Chersonese. Perhaps party enmities between the two Athenian chiefs, -with their respective friends, may have contributed to the change. -As Iphikrates had been the accuser of Timotheus a few years before, -so the latter may have seized this opportunity of retaliating.<a -id="FNanchor_641" href="#Footnote_641" class="fnanchor">[641]</a> -At all events the dismissed general conducted himself in such -a manner as to justify the mistrust of his countrymen; taking -part with his father-in-law Kotys in the war, and actually -fighting against Athens.<a id="FNanchor_642" href="#Footnote_642" -class="fnanchor">[642]</a> He had got into his possession some -hostages of Amphipolis, surrendered to him by Harpalus; which gave -great hopes of extorting the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_300">[p. -300]</span> surrender of the town. These hostages he had consigned -to the custody of the mercenary general Charidemus, though a -vote had been passed in the Athenian assembly that they should -be sent to Athens.<a id="FNanchor_643" href="#Footnote_643" -class="fnanchor">[643]</a> As soon as the appointment of Iphikrates -was cancelled, Charidemus forthwith surrendered the hostages to -the Amphipolitans themselves, thus depriving Athens of a material -advantage. And this was not all. Though Charidemus had been three -years with his band in the service of Athens under Iphikrates, -yet when the new general Timotheus wished to reëngage him, he -declined the proposition; conveying away his troops in Athenian -transports, to enter into the pay of a decided enemy of Athens—Kotys; -and in conjunction with Iphikrates himself.<a id="FNanchor_644" -href="#Footnote_644" class="fnanchor">[644]</a> He was subsequently -coming by sea from Kardia to take service under her other enemies, -Olynthus and Amphipolis, when he was captured by the Athenian fleet. -Under these circumstances, he was again prevailed on to serve -Athens.</p> - -<p>It was against these two cities, and to the general coast of -Macedonia and the Chalkidic Thrace, that Timotheus devoted his first -attention, postponing for the moment Kotys and the Chersonese. -In this enterprise he found means to obtain the alliance of -Macedonia, which had been hostile to his predecessor Iphikrates. -Ptolemy of Alôrus, regent of that country, who had assassinated the -preceding king, Alexander son of Amyntas, was himself assassinated -(365 <small>B.C.</small>) by Perdikkas, brother of Alexander.<a -id="FNanchor_645" href="#Footnote_645" class="fnanchor">[645]</a> -Perdikkas, during the first year or two of his reign, seems to -have been friendly and not hostile to Athens. He lent aid to -Timotheus, who turned his force against Olynthus and other towns -both in the Chalkidic Thrace and on the coast of Macedonia.<a -id="FNanchor_646" href="#Footnote_646" class="fnanchor">[646]</a> -Probably the Olynthian confederacy may have been again acquir<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_301">[p. 301]</span>ing strength during -the years of recent Spartan humiliation; so that Perdikkas now -found his account in assisting Athens to subdue or enfeeble it, -just as his father Amyntas had invoked Sparta for the like purpose. -Timotheus, with the assistance of Perdikkas, was very successful -in these parts; making himself master of Torônê, Potidæa, Pydna, -Methônê, and various other places. As he mastered many of the -Chalkidic towns allied with Olynthus, the means and adherents still -retained by that city became so much diminished, that Timotheus -is spoken of loosely as having conquered it.<a id="FNanchor_647" -href="#Footnote_647" class="fnanchor">[647]</a> Here, as at Samos, -he obtained his successes not only without cost to Athens, but also -(as we are told) without severities upon the allies, simply from -the regular contributions of the Thracian confederates of Athens, -assisted by the employment of a temporary coinage of base metal.<a -id="FNanchor_648" href="#Footnote_648" class="fnanchor">[648]</a> -Yet though Timotheus was thus victorious in and near the Thermaic -Gulf, he was not more fortunate than his predecessor in his attempt -to achieve that which Athens had most at heart,—the capture of -Amphipolis; although, by the accidental capture of Charidemus at -sea, he was enabled again to enlist that chief with his band, whose -services seem to have been gratefully appreciated at Athens.<a -id="FNanchor_649" href="#Footnote_649" class="fnanchor">[649]</a> -Timotheus first despatched Alkimachus, who was repulsed,—then landed -himself and attacked the city. But the Amphipolitans, aided by the -neighboring Thracians, in large numbers (and perhaps by the Thracian -Kotys), made so strenuous a resistance, that he was forced to retire -with loss; and even to burn some triremes, which, having been carried -across to assail the city from the wide part of<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_302">[p. 302]</span> the river Strymon above, could not -be brought off in the face of the enemy.<a id="FNanchor_650" -href="#Footnote_650" class="fnanchor">[650]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_303">[p. 303]</span></p> - -<p>Timotheus next turned his attention to the war against Kotys in -Thrace, and to the defence of the newly-acquired Athenian possessions -in the Chersonese, now menaced by the appearance of a new and -unexpected enemy to Athens in the eastern waters of the Ægean,—a -Theban fleet.</p> - -<p>I have already mentioned that in 366 <small>B.C.</small>, Thebes -had sustained great misfortunes in Thessaly. Pelopidas had been -fraudulently seized and detained as prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ; -a Theban army had been sent to rescue him, but had been dishonorably -repulsed, and had only been enabled to effect its retreat by the -genius of Epaminondas, then serving as a private, and called upon by -the soldiers to take the command. Afterwards, Epaminondas himself -had been sent at the head of a second army to extricate his captive -friend, which he had accomplished, but not without relinquishing -Thessaly and leaving Alexander more powerful than ever. For a certain -time after this defeat, the Thebans remained comparatively humbled -and quiet. At length, the aggravated oppressions of the tyrant -Alexander occasioned such suffering, and provoked such missions of -complaint on the part of the Thessalians to Thebes, that Pelopidas, -burning with ardor to revenge both his city and himself, prevailed on -the Thebans to place him at the head of a fresh army for the purpose -of invading Thessaly.<a id="FNanchor_651" href="#Footnote_651" -class="fnanchor">[651]</a></p> - -<p>At the same time, probably, the remarkable successes of the -Athenians under Timotheus, at Samos and the Chersonese, had -excited uneasiness throughout Greece, and jealousy on the part of -the Thebans. Epaminondas ventured to propose to his countrymen -that they should grapple with Athens on her own element,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_304">[p. 304]</span> and compete for -the headship of Greece not only on land but at sea. In fact the -rescript brought down by Pelopidas from the Persian court sanctioned -this pretension, by commanding Athens to lay up her ships of -war, on pain of incurring the chastisement of the Great King;<a -id="FNanchor_652" href="#Footnote_652" class="fnanchor">[652]</a> -a mandate, which she had so completely defied as to push her -maritime efforts more energetically than before. Epaminondas -employed all his eloquence to impress upon his countrymen, that, -Sparta being now humbled, Athens was their actual and prominent -enemy. He reminded them,—in language such as had been used by -Brasidas in the early years of the Peloponnesian war, and by -Hermokrates at Syracuse,<a id="FNanchor_653" href="#Footnote_653" -class="fnanchor">[653]</a>—that men such as the Thebans, brave and -trained soldiers on land, could soon acquire the like qualities -on shipboard; and that the Athenians themselves had once been -mere landsmen, until the exigencies of the Persian war forced -them to take to the sea.<a id="FNanchor_654" href="#Footnote_654" -class="fnanchor">[654]</a> “We must put down this haughty rival (he -exhorted his countrymen); we must transfer to our own citadel, the -Kadmeia, those magnificent Propylæa which adorn the entrance of -the acropolis at Athens.”<a id="FNanchor_655" href="#Footnote_655" -class="fnanchor">[655]</a></p> - -<p>Such emphatic language, as it long lived in the hostile -recollection of Athenian orators, so it excited at the moment extreme -ardor on the part of the Theban hearers. They resolved to build and -equip one hundred triremes, and to construct docks with ship-houses -fit for the constant maintenance of such a number. Epaminondas -himself was named commander, to sail with the first fleet, as -soon as it should be ready, to the Hellespont and the islands -near Ionia; while invitations were at the same time despatched -to Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, encouraging them to prepare for -breaking with Athens.<a id="FNanchor_656" href="#Footnote_656" -class="fnanchor">[656]</a> Some opposition however was made in -the assembly to the new undertaking; especially by Menekleidas, -an opposition speaker, who, being frequent and severe in his -criticisms upon the leading men such as Pelopidas and Epaminon<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_305">[p. 305]</span>das, has been handed -down by Nepos and Plutarch in odious colors. Demagogues like him, -whose power resided in the public assembly, are commonly represented -as if they had a natural interest in plunging their cities into -war, in order that there might be more matter of accusation against -the leading men. This representation is founded mainly on the -picture which Thucydides gives of Kleon in the first half of the -Peloponnesian war: I have endeavored in my sixth volume to show,<a -id="FNanchor_657" href="#Footnote_657" class="fnanchor">[657]</a> -that it is not a fair estimate even of Kleon separately, much less of -the demagogues generally, unwarlike men both in tastes and aptitudes. -Menekleidas at Thebes, far from promoting warlike expeditions in -order that he might denounce the generals when they came back, -advocated the prudence of continued peace, and accused Epaminondas -of involving his country in distant and dangerous schemes, with a -view to emulate the glories of Agamemnon by sailing from Aulis in -Bœotia, as commander of an imposing fleet to make conquests in the -Hellespont. “By the help of Thebes (replied Epaminondas) I have -already done more than Agamemnon. He, with the forces of Sparta -and all Greece besides, was ten years in taking a single city; -while <i>I</i>, with the single force of Thebes and at the single day -of Leuktra, have crushed the power of the Agamemnonian Sparta.”<a -id="FNanchor_658" href="#Footnote_658" class="fnanchor">[658]</a> -While repelling the charge of personal motives, Epaminondas contended -that peace would be equivalent to an abnegation of the headship -of Greece; and that, if Thebes wished to maintain that ascendant -station, she must keep her citizens in constant warlike training and -action.</p> - -<p>To err with Epaminondas may be considered, by some readers, as -better than being right with Menekleidas. But on the main point of -this debate, Menekleidas appears to have been really right. For the -general exhortations ascribed to Epaminondas<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_306">[p. 306]</span> resemble but too closely those -feverish stimulants, which Alkibiades administered at Athens to -wind up his countrymen for the fatal expedition against Syracuse.<a -id="FNanchor_659" href="#Footnote_659" class="fnanchor">[659]</a> -If we should even grant his advice to be wise, in reference -to land-warfare, we must recollect that he was here impelling -Thebes into a new and untried maritime career, for which she had -neither aptitude nor facilities. To maintain ascendency on land -alone, would require all her force, and perhaps prove too hard -for her; to maintain ascendency by land and sea at once would be -still more impracticable. By grasping at both she would probably -keep neither. Such considerations warrant us in suspecting, -that the project of stretching across the Ægean for ultramarine -dependencies was suggested to this great man not so much by a sound -appreciation of the permanent interests of Thebes, as by jealousy -of Athens,—especially since the recent conquests of Timotheus.<a -id="FNanchor_660" href="#Footnote_660" class="fnanchor">[660]</a></p> - -<p>The project however was really executed, and a large Theban fleet -under Epaminondas crossed the Ægean in 363 <small>B.C.</small> In -the same year, apparently, Pelopidas marched into Thessaly, at the -head of a Theban land-force, against Alexander of Pheræ. What the -fleet achieved, we are scarcely permitted to know. It appears that -Epaminondas visited Byzantium; and we are told that he drove off the -Athenian guard-squadron under Laches, prevailing upon several of -the allies of Athens to declare in his favor.<a id="FNanchor_661" -href="#Footnote_661" class="fnanchor">[661]</a> Both he<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_307">[p. 307]</span> and Timotheus appear -to have been in these seas, if not at the same time, at least with -no great interval of time between. Both were solicited by the -oligarchy of the Pontic Herakleia against the people; and both -declined to furnish aid.<a id="FNanchor_662" href="#Footnote_662" -class="fnanchor">[662]</a> Timotheus is said to have liberated -the besieged town of Kyzikus: by whom it was besieged, we do not -certainly know, but probably by the Theban fleet.<a id="FNanchor_663" -href="#Footnote_663" class="fnanchor">[663]</a> Epaminondas brought -back his fleet at the end of the year, without having gained any -splendid victory or acquired any tenable possession for Thebes; -yet not without weakening Athens, unsettling her hold upon her -dependencies, and seconding indirectly the hostilities carried on -by Kotys; insomuch that the Athenian affairs in the Chersonese and -Thrace were much less prosperous in 362 <small>B.C.</small> than they -had been in 364 <small>B.C.</small> Probably Epaminondas intended to -return with his fleet in the next year (362 <small>B.C.</small>), and -to push his maritime enterprises still farther;<a id="FNanchor_664" -href="#Footnote_664" class="fnanchor">[664]</a> but we shall find him -imperatively called elsewhere, to another and a fatal battle-field. -And thus the first naval expedition of Thebes was likewise the -last.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile his friend and colleague Pelopidas had marched into -Thessaly against the despot Alexander; who was now at the height -of his power, holding in dependence a large portion of Thessaly -together with the Phthiot Achæans and the Magnetes, and having Athens -as his ally. Nevertheless, so revolting had been his cruelties, -and so numerous were the malcontents who had sent to invite aid -from Thebes, that Pelopidas did not despair of overpowering him. -Nor was he daunted even by an eclipse of the sun, which is said -to have occurred just as he was commencing his march, nor by the -gloomy warnings which the prophets founded upon it; though this -event intimidated many of his fellow-citizens, so that his force -was rendered less numerous as well as less confident. Arriving -at Pharsalus, and strengthening himself by the junction of his -Thessalian allies, he found Alexander approaching to meet him at the -head of a well-appointed mercenary force, greatly superior in number. -The two chiefs contended who should occupy first the hills called -Kynos Kephalæ, or the Dog’s Heads. Pelopidas<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_308">[p. 308]</span> arrived there first with his cavalry, -beat the cavalry of the enemy, and pursued them to some distance; but -he thus left the hills open to be occupied by the numerous infantry -of the enemy, while his own infantry, coming up later, were repulsed -with loss in their attempt to carry the position. Thus unpromising -did the battle appear, when Pelopidas returned from the pursuit. -Ordering his victorious cavalry to charge the infantry on the hill in -flank, he immediately dismounted, seized his shield, and put himself -at the head of his own discouraged infantry, whom he again led up -the hill to attack the position. His presence infused so much fresh -ardor, that his troops, in spite of being twice repulsed, succeeded -in a third attempt to drive the enemy from the summit of the hill. -Thus master of the hill, Pelopidas saw before him the whole army -of the enemy, retiring in some disorder, though not yet beaten; -while Alexander in person was on the right wing, exerting himself -to rally and encourage them. When Pelopidas beheld, as it were -within his reach, this detested enemy,—whose treacherous arrest and -dungeon he had himself experienced, and whose cruelties filled every -one’s mouth,—he was seized with a transport of rage and madness, -like Cyrus the younger on the field of Kunaxa at the sight of his -brother Artaxerxes. Without thinking of his duties as a general, or -even looking to see by whom he was followed, he rushed impetuously -forward, with loud cries and challenges to Alexander to come forth -and fight. The latter, declining the challenge, retired among his -guards, into the midst of whom Pelopidas plunged, with the few who -followed him; and there, while fighting with desperate bravery, met -his death. So rapidly had this rash proceeding been consummated, that -his army behind did not at first perceive it. But they presently -hastened forward to rescue or avenge him, vigorously charged the -troops of Alexander, and put them to flight with severe loss.<a -id="FNanchor_665" href="#Footnote_665" class="fnanchor">[665]</a></p> - -<p>Yet this victory, though important to the Thebans, and still more -important to the Thessalians, was to both of them robbed of all -its sensible value by the death of Pelopidas. The demonstrations -of grief throughout the army were unbounded and universal. The -soldiers yet warm from their victory, the wounded men with wounds yet -untended, flocked around the corpse, piling up near to it as a<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_309">[p. 309]</span> trophy the arms of the -slain enemies. Many, refusing either to kindle fire, or to touch -their evening meal, testified their affliction by cutting off their -own hair as well as the manes of their horses. The Thessalian cities -vied with each other in tokens of affectionate respect, and obtained -from the Thebans permission to take the chief share in his funeral, -as their lost guardian and protector. At Thebes, the emotion was no -less strikingly manifested. Endeared to his countrymen first as the -head of that devoted handful of exiles who braved every peril to -rescue the city from the Lacedæmonians, Pelopidas had been reëlected -without interruption to the annual office of Bœotarch during all the -years that had since elapsed<a id="FNanchor_666" href="#Footnote_666" -class="fnanchor">[666]</a> (378-364 <small>B.C.</small>). He had -taken a leading part in all their struggles, and all their glories; -he had been foremost to cheer them in the hour of despondency; he -had lent himself, with the wisdom of a patriot and the generosity of -a friend, to second the guiding ascendency of Epaminondas, and his -moderation of dealing towards conquered enemies.<a id="FNanchor_667" -href="#Footnote_667" class="fnanchor">[667]</a></p> - -<p>All that Thebes could do, was, to avenge the death of Pelopidas. -The Theban generals, Malkitas and Diogeiton,<a id="FNanchor_668" -href="#Footnote_668" class="fnanchor">[668]</a> conducted a pow<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_310">[p. 310]</span>erful force of seven -thousand hoplites into Thessaly, and put themselves at the head of -their partisans in that country. With this united army, they pressed -Alexander hard, completely worsted him, and reduced him to submit to -their own terms. He was compelled to relinquish all his dependencies -in Thessaly; to confine himself to Pheræ, with its territory near the -Gulf of Pagasæ; and to swear adherence to Thebes as a leader. All -Thessaly, together with the Phthiot Achæans and the Magnêtes, became -annexed to the headship of the Thebans, who thus acquired greater -ascendency in Northern Greece than they had ever enjoyed before.<a -id="FNanchor_669" href="#Footnote_669" class="fnanchor">[669]</a> The -power of Alexander was effectually put down on land; but he still -continued both powerful and predatory at sea, as will be seen in the -ensuing year.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_80"> - <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_311">[p. 311]</span></p> - <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXX.<br /> - FROM THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">It</span> -was during this period,—while Epaminondas was absent with the fleet, -and while Pelopidas was engaged in that Thessalian campaign from -whence he never returned,—that the Thebans destroyed Orchomenus. -That city, the second in the Bœotian federation, had always been -disaffected towards Thebes; and the absence of the two great leaders, -as well as of a large Theban force in Thessaly, seems to have been -regarded by the Orchomenian Knights or Horsemen (the first and -richest among the citizens, three hundred in number) as a favorable -moment for attack. Some Theban exiles took part in this scheme, with -a view to overthrow the existing government; and a day, appointed -for a military review near Thebes, was fixed for execution. A large -number of conspirators joined, with apparent ardor. But before the -day arrived, several of them repented and betrayed the plot to the -Bœotarchs; upon which the Orchomenian horsemen were seized, brought -before the Theban assembly, condemned to death, and executed. But -besides this, the resolution was taken to destroy the town, to kill -the male adults, and to sell the women and children into slavery.<a -id="FNanchor_670" href="#Footnote_670" class="fnanchor">[670]</a> -This barbarous decree was executed, though probably a certain -fraction found means to escape, forming the kernel of that population -which was afterwards restored. The full measure of ancient Theban -hatred was thus satiated; a hatred, tracing its origin even to -those mythical times when Thebes was said to have paid tribute to -Orchomenus. But the erasure of this venerable city from the list of -autonomous units in Hellas, with the wholesale execution and sale of -so many free kinsmen into slavery, excited strong sympathy throughout -the neighbors, as well as repugnance against Theban cruelty;<a -id="FNanchor_671" href="#Footnote_671" class="fnanchor">[671]</a> -a sentiment probably aggra<span class="pagenum" id="Page_312">[p. -312]</span>vated by the fact, which we must presume to have been -concurrent,—that the Thebans appropriated the territory among their -own citizens. It would seem that the neighboring town of Koroneia -shared the same fate; at least the two are afterwards spoken of -together in such manner as to make us suppose so.<a id="FNanchor_672" -href="#Footnote_672" class="fnanchor">[672]</a> Thebes thus absorbed -into herself these two towns and territories to the north of her own -city, as well as Platæa and Thespiæ to the south.</p> - -<p>We must recollect that during the supremacy of Sparta and the -period of Theban struggle and humiliation, before the battle of -Leuktra, Orchomenus had actively embraced the Spartan cause. -Shortly after that victory, the Thebans had been anxious under -their first impulse of resentment to destroy the city, but had -been restrained by the lenient recommendations of Epaminondas.<a -id="FNanchor_673" href="#Footnote_673" class="fnanchor">[673]</a> -All their half-suppressed wrath was revived by the conspiracy of the -Orchomenian Knights; yet the extreme severity of the proceeding would -never have been consummated, but for the absence of Epaminondas, -who was deeply chagrined on his return.<a id="FNanchor_674" -href="#Footnote_674" class="fnanchor">[674]</a> He well knew the -bitter censures which Thebes would draw upon herself by punishing -the entire city for the conspiracy of the wealthy Knights, and in -a manner even more rigorous than Platæa and Thespiæ; since the -inhabitants of these two latter were expelled with their families out -of Bœotia, while the Orchome<span class="pagenum" id="Page_313">[p. -313]</span>nian male adults were slain, and the women and children -sold into slavery.</p> - -<p>On returning from his maritime expedition at the end of 363 -<small>B.C.</small>, Epaminondas was reëlected one of the -Bœotarchs. He had probably intended to renew his cruise during the -coming year. But his chagrin for the Orchomenian affair, and his -grief for the death of Pelopidas,—an intimate friend, as well as -a political colleague whom he could trust,—might deter him from a -second absence; while the affairs of Peloponnesus also were now -becoming so complicated, as to render the necessity of renewed Theban -interference again probable.</p> - -<p>Since the peace concluded in 366 <small>B.C.</small> with Corinth, -Phlius, etc., Thebes had sent no army into that peninsula; though her -harmost and garrison still continued at Tegea, perhaps at Megalopolis -and Messênê also. The Arcadians, jealous of her as well as disunited -among themselves, had even gone so far as to contract an alliance -with her enemy Athens. The main conflict however now was, between the -Arcadians and the Eleians, respecting the possession of Triphylia and -the Pisatid. The Eleians about this time (365 <small>B.C.</small>) -came into alliance again with Sparta,<a id="FNanchor_675" -href="#Footnote_675" class="fnanchor">[675]</a> relinquishing their -alliance with Thebes; while the Achæans, having come into vigorous -coöperation with Sparta<a id="FNanchor_676" href="#Footnote_676" -class="fnanchor">[676]</a> ever since 367 <small>B.C.</small> -(by reaction against the Thebans, who, reserving the judicious -and moderate policy of Epaminondas, violently changed the Achæan -governments), allied themselves with Elis also, in or before 365 -<small>B.C.</small><a id="FNanchor_677" href="#Footnote_677" -class="fnanchor">[677]</a> And thus Sparta, though robbed by the -pacification of 366 <small>B.C.</small> of the aid of Corinth, -Phlius, Epidaurus, etc., had now acquired in exchange Elis and -Achaia,—confederates not less valuable.</p> - -<p>Triphylia, the territory touching the western coast of -Peloponnesus, immediately north of the river Neda,—and the Pisatid -(including the lower course of the river Alpheius and the plain -of Olympia), immediately north of Triphylia,—both of them between -Messenia and Elis,—had been in former times conquered and long held -by the Eleians, but always as discontented subjects. Sparta, in -the days of her unquestioned supremacy, had<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_314">[p. 314]</span> found it politic to vindicate their -independence, and had compelled the Eleians, after a war of two -or three years, to renounce formally all dominion over them.<a -id="FNanchor_678" href="#Footnote_678" class="fnanchor">[678]</a> -No sooner, however, had the battle of Leuktra disarmed Sparta, than -the Eleians reclaimed their lost dominion;<a id="FNanchor_679" -href="#Footnote_679" class="fnanchor">[679]</a> while the -subjects on their side found new protectors in the Arcadians, -and were even admitted, under pretence of kindred race, into the -Pan-Arcadian confederacy.<a id="FNanchor_680" href="#Footnote_680" -class="fnanchor">[680]</a> The Persian rescript brought down by -Pelopidas (367-366 <small>B.C.</small>) seems to have reversed -this arrangement, recognizing the imperial rights of the Eleians.<a -id="FNanchor_681" href="#Footnote_681" class="fnanchor">[681]</a> -But as the Arcadians had repudiated the rescript, it remained for -the Eleians to enforce their imperial rights by arms, if they could. -They found Sparta in the same interest as themselves; not only -equally hostile to the Arcadians, but also complaining that she had -been robbed of Messênê, as they complained of the loss of Triphylia. -Sparta had just gained a slight advantage over the Arcadians, in -the recapture of Sellasia; chiefly through the aid of a Syracusan -reinforcement of twelve triremes, sent to them by the younger -Dionysius, but with orders speedily to return.<a id="FNanchor_682" -href="#Footnote_682" class="fnanchor">[682]</a></p> - -<p>Besides the imperial claims over Triphylia and the Pisatid, -which thus placed Elis in alliance with Sparta and in conflict with -Arcadia,—there was also a territory lying north of the Alpheius -(on the hilly ground forming the western or Eleian side of Mount -Erymanthus, between Elis and the north-western portion of Arcadia), -which included Lasion and the highland townships called Akroreii, -and which was disputed between Elis and Arcadia. At this moment, -it was included as a portion of the Pan-Arcadian aggregate;<a -id="FNanchor_683" href="#Footnote_683" class="fnanchor">[683]</a> -but the Eleians, claiming it as their own and suddenly marching in -along with a body of Arcadian exiles, seized and occupied Lasion -as well as some of the neighboring Akroreii. The Arcadians were -not slow in avenging the affront. A body of their Pan-Arcadian -militia called the epariti, collected from the various cities and -districts, marched to Lasion, defeated the Eleian hoplites with -considerable loss both of men and arms, and<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_315">[p. 315]</span> drove them out of the district. The -victors recovered both Lasion and all the Akroreii, except Thraustus; -after which they proceeded to the sacred ground of Olympia, and -took formal possession of it, planting a garrison, protected by a -regular stockaded circle, on the hill called Kronion. Having made -good this position, they marched on even to the city of Elis itself, -which was unfortified (though it had a tenable acropolis), so that -they were enabled to enter it, finding no resistance until they -reached the agora. Here they found mustered the Eleian horsemen and -the chosen hoplites, who repulsed them with some loss. But Elis -was in great consternation; while a democratical opposition now -manifested itself against the ruling oligarchy,—seizing the acropolis -in hopes of admitting the Arcadians. The bravery of the horsemen -and hoplites, however, put down this internal movement, recovered -the acropolis, and forced the malcontents, to the number of four -hundred, to evacuate the city. Thus expelled, the latter seized and -established themselves at Pylus (in the Eleian territory, about nine -miles from Elis towards the Arcadian border<a id="FNanchor_684" -href="#Footnote_684" class="fnanchor">[684]</a>), where they were -reinforced not only by a body of Arcadians, but also by many of their -partisans who came from the city to join them. From this fortified -post, planted in the country like Dekeleia in Attica, they carried -on harassing war against the Eleians in the city, and reduced them -after some time to great straits. There were even hopes of compelling -the city to surrender, and a fresh invasion of the Arcadians was -invited to complete the enterprise. The Eleians were only rescued -by a reinforcement from their allies in Achaia, who came in large -force and placed the city in safety; so that the Arcadians could do -nothing more than lay waste the territory around.<a id="FNanchor_685" -href="#Footnote_685" class="fnanchor">[685]</a></p> - -<p>Retiring on this occasion, the Arcadians renewed their invasion -not long afterwards; their garrison still occupying Olympia, and the -exiles continuing at Pylus. They now marched all across the country, -even approaching Kyllênê, the harbor of Elis on the western sea. -Between the harbor and the city, the Eleians ventured to attack them, -but were defeated with such loss, that their general Andromachus (who -had prompted the attack) fell upon his sword in despair. The distress -of the Eleians became greater<span class="pagenum" id="Page_316">[p. -316]</span> than ever. In hopes of drawing off the Arcadian invaders, -they sent an envoy to Sparta, entreating that the Lacedæmonians -would make a diversion on their side of Arcadia. Accordingly, the -Spartan prince Archidamus (son of king Agesilaus), invading the -south-western portion of Arcadia, occupied a hill-town or post called -Kromnus (seemingly in the territory of Megalopolis, and cutting off -the communication between that city and Messênê), which he fortified -and garrisoned with about two hundred Spartans and Periœki. The -effect which the Eleians contemplated was produced. The Arcadian -army (except the garrison of Olympia) being withdrawn home, they had -leisure to act against Pylus. The Pylian exiles had recently made an -abortive attempt upon Thalamæ, on their return from which they were -overtaken and worsted by the Eleians, with severe loss in killed, and -two hundred of their number ultimately made prisoners. Among these -latter, all the Eleian exiles were at once put to death; all the -remainder sold for slaves.<a id="FNanchor_686" href="#Footnote_686" -class="fnanchor">[686]</a></p> - -<p>Meanwhile the main Arcadian force, which had returned from -Elis, was joined by allies,—Thebans,<a id="FNanchor_687" -href="#Footnote_687" class="fnanchor">[687]</a> Argeians, and -Messenians,—and marched at once to Kromnus. They there blocked up -the Lacedæmonian garrison by a double palisade carried all around, -which they kept a numerous force to occupy. In vain did Archidamus -attempt to draw them off, by carrying his devastations into the -Skiritis and other portions of Arcadia; for the Skiritæ, in former -days dependents of Sparta and among the most valuable constituents -of the Lacedæmonian armies,<a id="FNanchor_688" href="#Footnote_688" -class="fnanchor">[688]</a> had now become independent Arcadians. The -blockade was still continued without interruption. Archidamus next -tried to get possession of a hill-top which commanded the Arcadian -position. But in marching along the road up, he encountered the -enemy in great force, and was repulsed with some loss; himself being -thrust through the thigh with a spear, and his relatives Polyænidas -and Chilon slain.<a id="FNanchor_689" href="#Footnote_689" -class="fnanchor">[689]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_317">[p. -317]</span> The Lacedæmonian troops retreated for some space into -a wider breadth of ground, where they were again formed in battle -order, yet greatly discouraged both by the repulse and by the -communication of the names of the slain, who were among the most -distinguished soldiers of Sparta. The Arcadians on the contrary were -advancing to the charge in high spirits, when an ancient Spartan, -stepping forth from the ranks, shouted with a loud voice “What -need to fight, gentlemen? Is it not better to conclude a truce and -separate?” Both armies accepted the proposition joyfully. The truce -was concluded; the Lacedæmonians took up their dead and retired: the -Arcadians also retreated to the spot where they had gained their -advantage, and there erected their trophy.<a id="FNanchor_690" -href="#Footnote_690" class="fnanchor">[690]</a></p> - -<p>Under the graphic description here given by Xenophon, seems to -be concealed a defeat of the Lacedæmonians more serious than he -likes to enunciate. The Arcadians completely gained their point, -by continuing the blockade without interruption. One more attempt -was made by the Lacedæmonians for the relief of their countrymen. -Suddenly assailing the palisade at night, they succeeded in mastering -the portion of it guarded by the Argeians.<a id="FNanchor_691" -href="#Footnote_691" class="fnanchor">[691]</a> They broke down -an opening, and called to the besieged to hasten out. But the -relief had come unexpected, so that only a few of those near at -hand could profit by it to escape. The Arcadians, hurrying to -the spot in large force, drove off the assailants and reënclosed -the besieged, who were soon compelled to surrender for want of -provisions. More than a hundred prisoners, Spartans and Periœki -together, were distributed among the captors,—Argeians, Thebans, -Arcadians, and Messenians,—one share to each.<a id="FNanchor_692" -href="#Footnote_692" class="fnanchor">[692]</a> Sixty years before, -the capture of two hundred and twenty Spartans and Lacedæmonians -in Sphakteria, by Kleon and Demosthenes, had excited the extreme -of incredulous wonder throughout all Greece; emphatically noted by -the impartial Thucydides.<a id="FNanchor_693" href="#Footnote_693" -class="fnanchor">[693]</a> Now, not a trace of such sentiment -appears, even in the philo-Laconian Xenophon. So sadly had Spartan -glory declined!</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_318">[p. 318]</span></p> - -<p>Having thus put an end to the Spartan attack, the Arcadians -resumed their aggression against Elis, in conjunction with a new -project of considerable moment. It was now the spring immediately -preceding the celebration of the great quadrennial Olympic -festival, which came about midsummer. The presidency over this -sacred ceremony had long been the cherished privilege of the -Eleians, who had acquired it when they conquered the Pisatans—the -inhabitants of the region immediately around Olympia, and the -first curators of the festival in its most primitive state. These -Pisatans, always reluctant subjects of Elis, had never lost the -conviction that the presidency of the festival belonged to them of -right; and had entreated Sparta to restore to them their right, -thirty-five years before, when Agis as conqueror imposed terms of -peace upon the Eleians.<a id="FNanchor_694" href="#Footnote_694" -class="fnanchor">[694]</a> Their request had been then declined, -on the ground that they were too poor and rude to do worthy -honor to the ceremony. But on now renewing it, they found the -Arcadians more compliant than the Spartans had been. The Arcadian -garrison, which had occupied the sacred plain of Olympia for more -than a year, being strongly reinforced, preparation was made for -celebrating the festival by the Pisatans under Arcadian protection.<a -id="FNanchor_695" href="#Footnote_695" class="fnanchor">[695]</a> -The Grecian states would receive with surprise, on this occasion, -two distinct notices from official heralds, announcing to them the -commencement of the hieromenia or sacred season, and the precise day -when the ceremonies would begin: for doubtless the Eleians, though -expelled by force from Olympia, still asserted their rights and sent -round their notices as usual.</p> - -<p>It was evident that this memorable plain, consecrated as it -was to Hellenic brotherhood and communion, would on the present -occasion be dishonored by dispute and perhaps by bloodshed: for the -Arcadians summoned to the spot, besides their own military strength, -a considerable body of allies: two thousand hoplites from Argos, -and four hundred horsemen from Athens. So imposing a force being -considered sufficient to deter the unwarlike Eleians from any idea of -asserting their rights by arms, the Arcadians and Pisatans began the -festival with its ordinary routine of sacrifice and matches. Having -gone through the chariot-race, they entered upon the pentathlon, -or quintuple contest, wherein the running<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_319">[p. 319]</span> match and the wrestling-match came -first in order. The running-match had already been completed, and -those who had been successful enough in it to go on contending for -the prize in the other four points, had begun to wrestle in the -space between the stadium and the great altar,<a id="FNanchor_696" -href="#Footnote_696" class="fnanchor">[696]</a>—when suddenly the -Eleians were seen entering the sacred ground in arms, accompanied by -their allies the Achæans, and marching up to the opposite bank of -the little river Kladeus,—which flowed at a little distance to the -westward of the Altis, or interior enclosed precinct of Zeus, falling -afterwards into the Alpheius. Upon this the Arcadians drew up in -armed order, on their own side of the Kladeus, to resist the farther -approach of the Eleians.<a id="FNanchor_697" href="#Footnote_697" -class="fnanchor">[697]</a> The latter, with a boldness for which -no one gave<span class="pagenum" id="Page_320">[p. 320]</span> -them credit, forded the rivulet, headed by Stratolas with his -chosen band of three hundred, and vigorously charged first the -Arcadians, next the Argeians; both of whom were defeated and driven -back. The victorious Eleians forced their way into the Altis, and -pressed forward to reach the great altar. But at every step of -their advance the resistance became stronger, aided as it was by -numerous buildings,—the senate-house, the temple of Zeus, and various -porticos,—which both deranged their ranks, and furnished excellent -positions of defence for darters and archers on the roofs. Stratolas -was here slain; while his troops, driven out of the sacred ground, -were compelled to recross the Kladeus. The festival was then resumed -and prosecuted in its usual order. But the Arcadians were so afraid -of a renewed attack on the following day, that they not only occupied -the roofs of all the buildings more completely than before, but -passed the night in erecting a palisade of defence; tearing down -for that purpose the temporary booths which had been carefully -put up to accommodate the crowd of visitors.<a id="FNanchor_698" -href="#Footnote_698" class="fnanchor">[698]</a> Such precautions -rendered the place unassailable, so that the Eleians were obliged -to return home on the next day; not without sympathy and admiration -among many of the Greeks, for the unwonted boldness which they -had displayed. They revenged themselves by pronouncing the 104th -Olympiad to be no Olympiad at all, and by registering it as such in -their catalogue, when they regained power; preserving however the -names of those who had been proclaimed victors, which appeared in -the lists like the rest.<a id="FNanchor_699" href="#Footnote_699" -class="fnanchor">[699]</a></p> - -<p>Such was the unholy combat which dishonored the sanctuary of -Pan-hellenic brotherhood, and in which the great temple, with its -enthroned inmate the majestic Zeus of Pheidias, was for the first -time turned into a fortress against its habitual presidents the -Eleians. It was a combat wherein, though both Thebes and Sparta, the -competing leaders of Greece, stand clear, Athens as well as most of -the Peloponnesian chief states were implicated. It had been brought -on by the rapacious ambition of the Arcadians, and its result seemed -to confirm them, under color of Pisatan presi<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_321">[p. 321]</span>dency, in the permanent mastery of -Olympia. But in spite of such apparent promise, it was an event -which carried in itself the seeds of violent reaction. We cannot -doubt that the crowd of Grecian spectators present were not merely -annoyed by the interruption of the proceedings and by the demolition -of their tents, but also deeply shocked by the outrage to the -sacred ground,—“imminentium templorum religio.”<a id="FNanchor_700" -href="#Footnote_700" class="fnanchor">[700]</a> Most of them probably -believed the Eleians to be the rightful presidents, having never -either seen or heard of any one else in that capacity. And they could -hardly help feeling strong sympathy for the unexpected courage of -these dispossessed presidents; which appeared so striking to Xenophon -(himself perhaps a spectator) that he ascribes it to a special -inspiration of the gods.<a id="FNanchor_701" href="#Footnote_701" -class="fnanchor">[701]</a></p> - -<p>If they disapproved of the conduct of the Arcadians and Pisatans -as an unjust intrusion, they would disapprove yet more of that -spoliation of the rich temples at Olympia, whereby the intruders -rewarded themselves. The Arcadians, always on the look-out for -plunder and pay as mercenary soldiers, found themselves supplied with -both, in abundant measure, from this war: the one from the farms, the -stock, and the field-laborers, of the Eleian neighborhood generally, -more plentiful than in any part of Peloponnesus;<a id="FNanchor_702" -href="#Footnote_702" class="fnanchor">[702]</a> the other from -the ample accumulation, both of money and of precious offerings, -distributed over the numerous temples at Olympia. The Pisatans, now -installed as administrators, would readily consent to appropriate -these treasures to the pay of their own defenders, whom they -doubtless considered as acting in the service of the Olympian Zeus. -Accordingly the Epariti, the militia of joint Arcadia, were better -paid than ever they had been before so that the service attracted -numerous volunteers of the poorer class.<a id="FNanchor_703" -href="#Footnote_703" class="fnanchor">[703]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_322">[p. 322]</span></p> - -<p>At the outset of the Peloponnesian war, the Corinthians and -Spartans had talked of prosecuting it in part by borrowed money -from the treasuries of Delphi and Olympia.<a id="FNanchor_704" -href="#Footnote_704" class="fnanchor">[704]</a> How far the project -had ever been executed, we have no information. But at least, it had -not been realized in any such way as to form a precedent for the -large sums now appropriated by the Pisatans and Arcadians; which -appropriation accordingly excited much outcry, as flagrant rapacity -and sacrilege. This sentiment was felt with peculiar force among -many even of the Arcadians themselves, the guilty parties. Moreover -some of the leaders employed had made important private acquisitions -for themselves, so as to provoke both resentment and jealousy among -their rivals. The Pan-Arcadian communion, recently brought together -and ill-cemented, was little calculated to resist the effect of any -strong special cause of dissension. It was composed of cities which -had before been accustomed to act apart and even in hostility to each -other; especially Mantinea and Tegea. These two cities now resumed -their ancient rivalry.<a id="FNanchor_705" href="#Footnote_705" -class="fnanchor">[705]</a> The Mantineans, jealous both of Tegea -and Megalopolis, began to labor underhand against Arcadian unity -and the Theban alliance,—with a view to renewed connection with -Sparta; though only five years before, they had owed to Thebes the -reëstablishment of their own city, after it had been broken up into -villages by Spartan force. The appropriation of the sacred funds, -offensive as it was to much of sincere sentiment, supplied them with -a convenient ground for commencing opposition. In the Mantinean -assembly, a resolution was passed, renouncing all participation -in the Olympic treasures; while at the same time an adequate sum -was raised among the citizens, to furnish pay for all members of -the Epariti who came from their city. This sum was forwarded to -the officers in command; who however not only refused to receive -it; but even summoned the authors of the proceeding to take their -trial before the Pan-Arcadian assembly,—the Ten Thousand at -Megalopolis,—on the charge of breaking up the integrity of Arcadia.<a -id="FNanchor_706" href="#Footnote_706" class="fnanchor">[706]</a> The -Mantinean leaders<span class="pagenum" id="Page_323">[p. 323]</span> -thus summoned, having refused to appear, and being condemned in their -absence by the Ten Thousand,—a detachment of the epariti was sent to -Mantinea to secure their persons. But the gates were found shut, and -the order was set at defiance. So much sympathy was manifested in -Arcadia towards the Mantineans, that many other towns copied their -protest. Nay, even the majority of the Ten Thousand themselves, moved -by repeated appeals made to them in the name of the offended gods, -were gradually induced to adopt it also, publicly renouncing and -interdicting all farther participation in the Olympian treasures.</p> - -<p>Here was a just point carried, and an important advantage gained, -in desisting from a scandalous misappropriation. The party which -had gained it immediately sought to push it farther. Beginning as -the advocates of justice and of the Olympian Zeus, the Mantineans -speedily pronounced themselves more clearly as the champions of -oligarchy; friendly to Sparta and adverse to Thebes. Supplies from -Olympia being no longer obtained, the means presently failed, of -paying the epariti or public militia. Accordingly, such members -of that corps as were too poor to continue without pay, gradually -relinquished the service; while on the other hand, the more wealthy -and powerful citizens, by preconcerted understanding with each -other, enrolled themselves in large numbers, for the purpose of -getting the national force out of the hands of the opposite party -and into their own.<a id="FNanchor_707" href="#Footnote_707" -class="fnanchor">[707]</a> The leaders of that opposite party saw -plainly, that this oligarchical movement would not only bring them -to severe account for the appropriation of the sacred treasure, but -would also throw Arcadia again into alliance with Sparta. Accordingly -they sent intimation to the Thebans of the impending change of -policy, inviting them to prevent it by an immediate expedition -into Arcadia. Informed of this proceeding,<a id="FNanchor_708" -href="#Footnote_708" class="fnanchor">[708]</a> the opposite leaders -brought it before the Pan-Arcadian assembly; in which they obtained a -resolution, that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_324">[p. 324]</span> -envoys should be despatched to Thebes, desiring that no Theban army -might enter into Arcadia until formally summoned,—and cancelling the -preceding invitation as unauthorized. At the same time, the assembly -determined to conclude peace with the Eleians, and to restore to -them the locality of Olympia with all their previous rights. The -Eleians gladly consented, and peace was accordingly concluded.<a -id="FNanchor_709" href="#Footnote_709" class="fnanchor">[709]</a></p> - -<p>The transactions just recounted occupied about one year and nine -or ten months, from Midsummer 364 <small>B.C.</small> (the time -of the battle at Olympia) to about April 362 <small>B.C.</small> -The peace was generally popular throughout Arcadia, seemingly -even among the cities which adhered to Thebes, though it had been -concluded without consulting the Thebans. Even at Tegea, the centre -of Theban influence, satisfaction was felt at the abandonment of the -mischievous aggression and spoliation of Olympia, wherein the Thebans -had had no concern. Accordingly when the peace, having been first -probably sworn in other Arcadian cities, came to be sworn also at -Tegea,—not only the city authorities, but also the Theban harmost, -who occupied the town with a garrison of three hundred Bœotians, were -present and took part in the ceremony. After it had been finished, -most of the Mantineans went home; their city being both unfriendly -to Tegea and not far distant. But many other Arcadians passed the -evening in the town, celebrating the peace by libations, pæans, -and feasting. On a sudden the gates were shut by order, and the -most prominent of the oligarchical party were arrested as they sat -at the feast, by the Bœotian garrison and the Arcadian Epariti of -the opposite party. The leaders seized were in such considerable -number, as to fill both the prison and the government-house; though -there were few Mantineans among them, since most of these last had -gone home. Among the rest the consternation was extreme. Some let -themselves down from the walls, others escaped surreptitiously by the -gates. Great was the indignation excited at Mantinea on the following -morning, when the news of this violent arrest was brought thither. -The authorities,—while they sent round the intelligence to the -remaining Arcadian cities, inviting them at once to arms,—despatched -heralds to Tegea, demanding all the Mantinean<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_325">[p. 325]</span> prisoners there detained. They at the -same time protested emphatically against the arrest or the execution -of any Arcadian, without previous trial before the Pan-Arcadian -community; and they pledged themselves in the name of Mantinea, -to answer for the appearance of any Arcadian against whom charges -might be preferred.<a id="FNanchor_710" href="#Footnote_710" -class="fnanchor">[710]</a></p> - -<p>Upon receiving this requisition, the Theban harmost -forthwith released all his prisoners. He then called together -an assembly,—seemingly attended by only a few persons, from -feelings of mistrust,<a id="FNanchor_711" href="#Footnote_711" -class="fnanchor">[711]</a>—wherein he explained that he had been -misled, and that he had ordered the arrest upon a false report that -a Lacedæmonian force was on the borders, prepared to seize the city -in concert with treacherous correspondents within. A vote was passed -accepting the explanation, though (according to Xenophon) no one -believed it. Yet envoys were immediately sent to Thebes probably -from the Mantineans and other Arcadians, complaining loudly of his -conduct, and insisting that he should be punished with death.</p> - -<p>On a review of the circumstances, there seems reason for believing -that the Theban officer gave a true explanation of the motives under -which he had acted. The fact of his releasing the prisoners at the -first summons, is more consistent with this supposition than with -any other. Xenophon indeed says that his main object was to get -possession of the Mantineans, and that, when he found but few of the -latter among the persons seized, he was indifferent to the detention -of the rest. But if such had been his purpose, he would hardly have -set about it in so blind and clumsy a manner. He would have done -it while the Mantineans were still in the town, instead of waiting -until after their departure. He would not have perpetrated an act -offensive as well as iniquitous, without assuring himself that it was -done at a time when the determining purpose was yet attainable. On -the other hand, nothing can be more natural than the supposition that -the more violent among the Arcadian epariti believed in the existence -of a plot to betray Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, and impressed the -Theban with a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_326">[p. 326]</span> -persuasion of the like impending danger. To cause a revolution in -Tegea, would be a great point gained for the oligarchical party, -and would be rendered comparatively practicable by the congregation -of a miscellaneous body of Arcadians in the town. It is indeed -not impossible, that the idea of such a plot may really have been -conceived; but it is at least highly probable, that the likelihood -of such an occurrence was sincerely believed in by opponents.<a -id="FNanchor_712" href="#Footnote_712" class="fnanchor">[712]</a></p> - -<p>The explanation of the Theban governor, affirming that his -order for arrest had either really averted, or appeared to him -indispensable to avert, a projected treacherous betrayal,—reached -Thebes at the same time as the complaints against him. It was not -only received as perfectly satisfactory, but Epaminondas even replied -to the complainants by counter-complaints of his own,—“The arrest (he -said) was an act more justifiable than the release of those arrested. -You Arcadians have already committed treason against us. It was on -your account, and at your request, that we carried the war into -Peloponnesus,—and you now conclude peace without consulting us! Be -assured that we shall presently come in arms into Arcadia, and make -war to support our partisans in the country.”<a id="FNanchor_713" -href="#Footnote_713" class="fnanchor">[713]</a></p> - -<p>Such was the peremptory reply which the Arcadian envoy brought -back from Thebes, announcing to his countrymen that they must -prepare for war forthwith. They accordingly concerted measures for -resistance with the Eleians and Achæans. They sent an invitation to -the Lacedæmonians to march into Arcadia, and assist in repelling -any enemy who should approach for the purpose of subjugating -Peloponnesus,—yet with the proviso, as to headship, that each state -should take the lead when the war was in its own territory; and they -farther sent to solicit aid from Athens. Such were the measures taken -by the Mantineans and their partisans, now forming the majority in -the Pan-Arcadian aggregate, who (to use the language of Xenophon) -“were really solicitous for Peloponnesus.”<a id="FNanchor_714" -href="#Footnote_714" class="fnanchor">[714]</a> “Why do these Thebans -(said<span class="pagenum" id="Page_327">[p. 327]</span> they) -march into our country when we desire them not to come? For what -other purpose, except to do us mischief? to make us do mischief -to each other, in order that both parties may stand in need of -<i>them</i>? to enfeeble Peloponnesus as much as possible, in order that -they may hold it the more easily in slavery?”<a id="FNanchor_715" -href="#Footnote_715" class="fnanchor">[715]</a> Such is the language -which Xenophon repeats, with a sympathy plainly evincing his -philo-Laconian bias. For when we follow the facts as he himself -narrates them, we shall find them much more in harmony with the -reproaches which he puts into the mouth of Epaminondas. Epaminondas -had first marched into Peloponnesus (in 369 <small>B.C.</small>) -at the request of both Arcadians and Eleians, for the purpose of -protecting them against Sparta. He had been the first to give -strength and dignity to the Arcadians, by organizing them into a -political aggregate, and by forming a strong frontier for them -against Sparta, in Messênê and Megalopolis. When thus organized, the -Arcadians had manifested both jealousy of Thebes, and incompetence -to act wisely for themselves. They had caused the reversal of the -gentle and politic measures adopted by Epaminondas towards the Achæan -cities, whom they had thus thrown again into the arms of Sparta. -They had, of their own accord, taken up the war against Elis and the -mischievous encroachment at Olympia. On the other hand, the Thebans -had not marched into Peloponnesus since 367 <small>B.C.</small>—an -interval now of nearly five years. They had tried to persuade the -Arcadians to accept the Persian rescript, and to desist from the idea -of alliance with Athens; but when refused, they had made no attempt -to carry either of these points by force. Epaminondas had a fair -right now to complain of them for having made peace with Elis and -Achaia, the friends and allies of Sparta, without any consultation -with Thebes. He probably believed that there had been a real plot to -betray Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, as one fruit of this treacherous -peace; and he saw plainly that the maintenance of the frontier line -against Sparta,—Tegea, Megalopolis, and Messênê,—could no longer be -assured without a new Theban invasion.</p> - -<p>This appears to me the reasonable estimate of the situation in -Peloponnesus, in June 362 <small>B.C.</small>—immediately before -the last invasion of Epaminondas. We cannot trust the unfavorable -judg<span class="pagenum" id="Page_328">[p. 328]</span>ment of -Xenophon with regard either to this great man or to the Thebans. -It will not stand good, even if compared with the facts related by -himself; still less probably would it stand, if we had the facts from -an impartial witness.</p> - -<p>I have already recounted as much as can be made out -of the proceedings of the Thebans, between the return of -Pelopidas from Persia with the rescript (in the winter 367-366 -<small>B.C.</small>) to the close of 363 <small>B.C.</small> In -366-365 <small>B.C.</small>, they had experienced great loss and -humiliation in Thessaly connected with the detention of Pelopidas, -whom they had with difficulty rescued from the dungeon of Pheræ. In -364-363 <small>B.C.</small>, Pelopidas had been invested with a fresh -command in Thessaly, and though he was slain, the Theban arms had -been eminently successful, acquiring more complete mastery of the -country than ever they possessed before; while Epaminondas, having -persuaded his countrymen to aim at naval supremacy, had spent the -summer of 363 <small>B.C.</small> as admiral of a powerful Theban -fleet on the coast of Asia. Returning to Thebes at the close of 363 -<small>B.C.</small>, he found his friend Pelopidas slain; while the -relations of Thebes, both in Peloponnesus and in Thessaly, were -becoming sufficiently complicated to absorb his whole attention -on land, without admitting farther aspirations towards maritime -empire. He had doubtless watched, as it went on, the gradual -change of politics in Arcadia (in the winter and spring of 363-362 -<small>B.C.</small>), whereby the Mantinean and oligarchical party, -profiting by the reaction of sentiment against the proceedings at -Olympia, had made itself a majority in the Pan-Arcadian assembly -and militia, so as to conclude peace with Elis, and to present the -prospect of probable alliance with Sparta, Elis, and Achaia. This -political tendency was doubtless kept before Epaminondas by the -Tegean party in Arcadia, opposed to the party of Mantinea; being -communicated to him with partisan exaggerations even beyond the -reality. The danger, actual or presumed, of Tegea, with the arrest -which had been there operated, satisfied him that a powerful Theban -intervention could be no longer deferred. As Bœotarch, he obtained -the consent of his countrymen to assemble a Bœotian force, to summon -the allied contingents, and to conduct this joint expedition into -Peloponnesus.</p> - -<p>The army with which he began his march was numerous and -imposing. It comprised all the Bœotians and Eubœans, with a<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_329">[p. 329]</span> large number of -Thessalians (some even sent by Alexander of Pheræ, who had now -become a dependent ally of Thebes), the Lokrians, Malians, Ænianes, -and probably various other allies from Northern Greece; though -the Phokians declined to join, alleging that their agreement with -Thebes was for alliance purely defensive.<a id="FNanchor_716" -href="#Footnote_716" class="fnanchor">[716]</a> Having passed -the line of Mount Oneium,—which was no longer defended, as it -had been at his former entrance,—he reached Nemea, where he was -probably joined by the Sikyonian contingent,<a id="FNanchor_717" -href="#Footnote_717" class="fnanchor">[717]</a> and where he -halted, in hopes of intercepting the Athenian contingent in their -way to join his enemies. He probably had information which induced -him to expect them;<a id="FNanchor_718" href="#Footnote_718" -class="fnanchor">[718]</a> but the information turned out false. -The Athenians never appeared, and it was understood that they were -preparing to cross by sea to the eastern coast of Laconia. After a -fruitless halt, he proceeded onward to Tegea, where his Peloponnesian -allies all presently joined him: the Arcadians of Tegea, Pallantium, -Asea, and Megalopolis, the Messenians—(all these forming the line of -frontier against Laconia)—and the Argeians.</p> - -<p>The halt at Nemea, since Epaminondas missed its direct purpose, -was injurious in another way, as it enabled the main body of his -Peloponnesian enemies to concentrate at Mantinea; which junction -might probably have been prevented, had he entered Arcadia without -delay. A powerful Peloponnesian army was there united, consisting -of the Mantineans with the major part of the other Arcadians,—the -Eleians,—and the Achæans. Invitation had been sent to the Spartans; -and old Agesilaus, now in his eightieth year, was in full march with -the Lacedæmonian forces to Mantinea. Besides this, the Athenian -contingent was immediately expected; especially valuable from its -cavalry, since the Peloponnesians were not strong in that description -of force,—some of them indeed having none at all.</p> - -<p>Epaminondas established his camp and place of arms within the -walls of Tegea; a precaution which Xenophon praises, as making his -troops more secure and comfortable, and his motions less ob<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_330">[p. 330]</span>servable by the enemy.<a -id="FNanchor_719" href="#Footnote_719" class="fnanchor">[719]</a> -He next marched to Mantinea, to provoke the enemy to an action -before the Spartans and Athenians joined; but they kept carefully on -their guard, close to Mantinea, too strongly posted to be forced.<a -id="FNanchor_720" href="#Footnote_720" class="fnanchor">[720]</a> On -returning to his camp in Tegea, he was apprised that Agesilaus with -the Spartan force, having quitted Sparta on the march to Mantinea, -had already made some progress and reached Pellênê. Upon this he -resolved to attempt the surprise of Sparta by a sudden night-march -from Tegea, which lay in the direct road from Sparta to Mantinea, -while Agesilaus in getting from Sparta to Mantinea had to pursue -a more circuitous route to the westward. Moving shortly after the -evening meal, Epaminondas led the Theban force with all speed towards -Sparta; and he had well-nigh come upon that town, “like a nest of -unprotected young birds,” at a moment when no resistance could have -been made. Neither Agesilaus, nor any one else, expected so daring -and well-aimed a blow, the success of which would have changed -the face of Greece. Nothing saved Sparta except the providential -interposition of the gods,<a id="FNanchor_721" href="#Footnote_721" -class="fnanchor">[721]</a> signified by the accident that a Kretan -runner hurried to Agesilaus, with the news that the Thebans were -in full march southward from Tegea, and happened to arrest in time -his farther progress towards Mantinea. Agesilaus instantly returned -back with the troops around him to Sparta, which was thus put in a -sufficient posture of defence before the Thebans arrived. Though -sufficient for the emergency, however, his troops were not numerous; -for the Spartan cavalry and mercenary forces were still absent, -having been sent forward to Mantinea. Orders were sent for the main -army at that city to hasten immediately to the relief of Sparta.<a -id="FNanchor_722" href="#Footnote_722" class="fnanchor">[722]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_331">[p. 331]</span></p> - -<p>The march of Epaminondas had been undertaken only on the -probability, well-nigh realized, of finding Sparta undefended. He was -in no condition to assault the city, if tolerably occupied,—still -less to spend time before it; for he knew that the enemy from -Mantinea would immediately follow him into Laconia, within which he -did not choose to hazard a general action. He found it impracticable -to take this unfortified, yet unassailable city, Sparta, even at -his former invasion of 370-369 <small>B.C.</small>; when he had -most part of Peloponnesus in active coöperation with him, and when -the Lacedæmonians had no army in the field. Accordingly, though he -crossed the Eurotas and actually entered into the city of Sparta<a -id="FNanchor_723" href="#Footnote_723" class="fnanchor">[723]</a> -(which had no walls to keep him out), yet as soon as he perceived the -roofs manned with soldiers and other preparations for resistance, -he advanced with great caution, not adventuring into the streets -and amidst the occupied houses. He only tried to get possession -of various points of high ground commanding the city, from whence -it might be possible to charge down upon the defenders with -advantage. But even here, though inferior in number they prevented -him from making any impression. And Archidamus son of Agesilaus, -sallying forth unexpectedly beyond the line<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_332">[p. 332]</span> of defence, with a small company of -one hundred hoplites, scrambled over some difficult ground in his -front, and charged the Thebans even up the hill, with such gallantry, -that he actually beat them back with some loss; pursuing them for -a space, until he was himself repulsed and forced to retreat.<a -id="FNanchor_724" href="#Footnote_724" class="fnanchor">[724]</a> The -bravery of the Spartan Isidas, too, son of Phœbidas the captor of -the Theban Kadmeia, did signal honor to Sparta, in this day of her -comparative decline. Distinguished for beauty and stature, this youth -sallied forth naked and unshielded, with his body oiled as in the -palæstra. Wielding in his right hand a spear and in his left a sword, -he rushed among the enemy, dealing death and destruction; in spite -of which he was suffered to come back unwounded: so great was the -awe inspired by his singular appearance and desperate hardihood. The -ephors decorated him afterwards with a wreath of honor, but at the -same time fined him for exposing himself without defensive armor.<a -id="FNanchor_725" href="#Footnote_725" class="fnanchor">[725]</a></p> - -<p>Though the Spartans displayed here an honorable gallantry, -yet these successes, in themselves trifling, are magnified into -importance only by the partiality of Xenophon. The capital fact -was, that Agesilaus had been accidentally forewarned so as to get -back to Sparta and put it in defence before the Thebans arrived. As -soon as Epaminondas ascertained this, he saw that his project was -no longer practicable; nor did he do more than try the city round, -to see if he could detect any vulnerable point, without involving -himself in a hazardous assault. Baffled in his first scheme, he -applied himself, with equal readiness of resource and celerity of -motion, to the execution of a second. He knew that the hostile army -from Mantinea would be immediately put in march for Sparta, to ward -off all danger from that city. Now the straight road from Mantinea -to Sparta (a course nearly due south all the way) lying through -Tegea, was open to Epaminondas, but not to the enemy, who would be -forced to take another and more circuitous route, probably by Asea -and Pallantion; so that he was actually nearer to Mantinea than -they. He determined to return to Tegea forthwith, while they were -on their march towards Sparta, and before<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_333">[p. 333]</span> they could be apprised of his change of -purpose. Breaking up accordingly, with scarce any interval of rest, -he marched back to Tegea; where it became absolutely indispensable -to give repose to his hoplites, after such severe fatigue. But he -sent forward his cavalry without any delay, to surprise Mantinea, -which would be now (he well knew) unprepared and undefended; with -its military force absent on the march to Sparta, and its remaining -population, free as well as slave, largely engaged in the fields -upon the carrying of harvest. Nothing less than the extraordinary -ascendency of Epaminondas,—coupled with his earnestness in setting -forth the importance of the purpose, as well as the probable -plunder,—could have prevailed upon the tired horsemen to submit to -such additional toil, while their comrades were enjoying refreshment -and repose at Tegea.<a id="FNanchor_726" href="#Footnote_726" -class="fnanchor">[726]</a></p> - -<p>Everything near Mantinea was found in the state which Epaminondas -anticipated. Yet the town was preserved, and his well-laid scheme -defeated, by an unexpected contingency which the Mantineans -doubtless ascribed to the providence of the gods,—as Xenophon -regards the previous warning given to Agesilaus. The Athenian -cavalry had arrived, not an hour before, and had just dismounted -from their horses within the walls of Mantinea. Having departed -from Eleusis (probably after ascertaining that Epaminondas no -longer occupied Nemea), they took their evening meal and rested -at the isthmus of Corinth, where they seem to have experienced -some loss or annoyance.<a id="FNanchor_727" href="#Footnote_727" -class="fnanchor">[727]</a> They then passed forward through Kleonæ -to Mantinea, arriving thither without having broken fast, either -themselves or their horses, on that day. It was just after they -reached Mantinea, and when they had yet taken no refreshment,—that -the Theban and Thessalian cavalry suddenly<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_334">[p. 334]</span> made their appearance, having -advanced even to the temple of Poseidon, within less than a -mile of the gates.<a id="FNanchor_728" href="#Footnote_728" -class="fnanchor">[728]</a></p> - -<p>The Mantineans were terror-struck at this event. Their military -citizens were absent on the march to Sparta, while the remainder -were dispersed about the fields. In this helpless condition, they -implored aid from the newly-arrived Athenian cavalry; who, though -hungry and tired, immediately went forth,—and indeed were obliged -to do so, since their own safety depended upon it. The assailants -were excellent cavalry, Thebans and Thessalians, and more numerous -than the Athenians. Yet such was the gallantry with which the -latter fought, in a close and bloody action, that on the whole they -gained the advantage, forced the assailants to retire, and had -the satisfaction to preserve Mantinea with all its citizens and -property. Xenophon extols<a id="FNanchor_729" href="#Footnote_729" -class="fnanchor">[729]</a> (and doubtless with good reason) the -generous energy of the Athenians, in going forth hungry and fatigued. -But we must recollect that the Theban cavalry had undergone yet -more severe hunger and fatigue,—that Epaminondas would never have -sent them forward in such condition, had he expected any serious -resistance; and that they probably dispersed to some extent, for -the purpose of plundering and seizing subsistence in the fields -through which they passed, so that they were found in disorder when -the Athenians sallied out upon them. The Athenian cavalry-commander -Kephisodôrus,<a id="FNanchor_730" href="#Footnote_730" -class="fnanchor">[730]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_335">[p. -335]</span> together with Gryllus (son of the historian Xenophon), -then serving with his brother Diodorus among the Athenian horse, -were both slain in the battle. A memorable picture at Athens by the -contemporary painter Euphranor, commemorated both the battle and the -personal gallantry of Gryllus, to whose memory the Mantineans also -paid distinguished honors.</p> - -<p>Here were two successive movements of Epaminondas, both -well-conceived, yet both disappointed by accident, without any -omission of his own. He had his forces concentrated at Tegea, while -his enemies on their side, returning from Sparta, formed a united -camp in the neighborhood of Mantinea. They comprised Lacedæmonians, -Eleians, Arcadians, Achæans, and Athenians; to the number, in all, -of twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse, if we could trust -the assertion of Diodorus;<a id="FNanchor_731" href="#Footnote_731" -class="fnanchor">[731]</a> who also gives the numbers of Epaminondas -as thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse. Little value -can be assigned to either of these estimates; nor is it certain -which of the two armies was the more numerous. But Epaminondas saw -that he had now no chance left for striking a blow except through -a pitched battle, nor did he at all despair of the result.<a -id="FNanchor_732" href="#Footnote_732" class="fnanchor">[732]</a> -He had brought out his northern allies for a limited time; which -time they were probably not disposed to prolong, as the season of -harvest was now approaching. Moreover, his stock of provisions -was barely sufficient;<a id="FNanchor_733" href="#Footnote_733" -class="fnanchor">[733]</a> the new crop being not yet gathered in, -while the crop of the former year was probably almost exhausted. He -took his resolution therefore to attack the enemy forthwith.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_336">[p. 336]</span></p> - -<p>But I cannot adopt the view of Xenophon, that such resolution -was forced upon Epaminondas, against his own will, by a desperate -position, rendering it impossible for him to get away without -fighting,—by the disappointment of finding so few allies on his -own side, and so many assembled against him,—and by the necessity -of wiping off the shame of his two recent failures (at Sparta and -at Mantinea) or perishing in the attempt.<a id="FNanchor_734" -href="#Footnote_734" class="fnanchor">[734]</a> This is an estimate -of the position of Epaminondas, not consistent with the facts -narrated by Xenophon himself. It could have been no surprise to the -Theban general that the time had arrived for ordering a battle. -With what other view had he come into Peloponnesus? Or for what -other purpose could he have brought so numerous an army? Granting -that he expected greater support in Peloponnesus than he actually -found, we cannot imagine him to have hoped that his mere presence, -without fighting, would suffice to put down enemies courageous as -well as powerful. Xenophon exaggerates the importance of the recent -defeats (as he terms them) before Sparta and Mantinea. These were -checks or disappointments rather than defeats. On arriving at Tegea, -Epaminondas had found it practicable (which he could not have known -beforehand) to attempt a <i>coup de main</i>, first against Sparta, -next against Mantinea. Here were accidental opportunities which -his genius discerned and turned to account. Their success, so near -to actual attainment, would have been a prodigious point gained;<a -id="FNanchor_735" href="#Footnote_735" class="fnanchor">[735]</a> -but their accidental failure left him not worse off than he was -before. It remained for him then, having the enemy before him in the -field, and no farther opportunities of striking at them unawares by -side-blows, to fight them openly; which he and all around him must -have contemplated, from their first entrance into Peloponnesus, as -the only probable way of deciding the contest.</p> - -<p>The army of Epaminondas, far from feeling that sentiment of -disappointed hope and stern necessity which Xenophon ascribes to -their commander, were impatient to fight under his orders, and<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_337">[p. 337]</span> full of enthusiastic -alacrity when he at last proclaimed his intention. He had kept them -within the walls of Tegea, thus not only giving them better quarters -and fuller repose, but also concealing his proceedings from the -enemy; who on their side were encamped on the border of the Mantinean -territory. Rejoicing in the prospect of going forth to battle, the -horsemen and hoplites of Epaminondas all put themselves in their -best equipment. The horsemen whitened their helmets,—the hoplites -burnished up their shields, and sharpened their spears and swords. -Even the rustic and half-armed Arcadian villagers, who had nothing -but clubs in place of sword or spear, were eager to share the dangers -of the Thebans, and inscribed upon their shields (probably nothing -but miserable squares of wood) the Theban ensign.<a id="FNanchor_736" -href="#Footnote_736" class="fnanchor">[736]</a> The best spirit and -confidence animated all the allies, as they quitted the gates of -Tegea, and disposed themselves in the order of march commanded by -Epaminondas.</p> - -<p>The lofty Mantinico-Tegeatic plain, two thousand feet above the -level of the sea (now known as the plain of Tripolitza)—“is the -greatest of that cluster of valleys in the centre of Peloponnesus, -each of which is so closely shut in by the intersecting mountains -that no outlet is afforded to the waters except through the -moun<span class="pagenum" id="Page_338">[p. 338]</span>tains -themselves.”<a id="FNanchor_737" href="#Footnote_737" -class="fnanchor">[737]</a> Its length stretches from north to -south, bordered by the mountain range of Mænalus on the west, and -of Artemisium and Parthenion on the east. It has a breadth of -about eight miles in the broadest part, and of one mile in the -narrowest. Mantinea is situated near its northern extremity, Tegea -near its southern; the direct distance between the two cities, -in a line not much different from north and south, being about -ten English miles. The frontier line between their two domains -was formed by a peculiarly narrow part of the valley, where a low -ridge projecting from the range of Mænalus on the one side, and -another from Artemisium on the opposite, contract the space and -make a sort of defensible pass near four miles south of Mantinea;<a -id="FNanchor_738" href="#Footnote_738" class="fnanchor">[738]</a> -thus about six miles distant from Tegea. It was at this position, -covering the whole Mantinean territory, that the army opposed to -Epaminondas was concentrated; the main Lacedæmonian force as well -as the rest having now returned from Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_739" -href="#Footnote_739" class="fnanchor">[739]</a></p> - -<p>Epaminondas, having marched out from Tegea by the northern -gate, arrayed his army in columns proper for advancing towards the -enemy; himself with the Theban columns forming the van. His array -being completed, he at first began his forward march in a direction -straight towards the enemy. But presently he changed his course, -turning to the left towards the Mænalian range of mountains which -forms the western border of the plain, and which he probably reached -somewhere near the site of the present Tripolitza. From thence he -pursued his march northward, skirting the flank of the mountain -on the side which lies over against or fronts towards Tegea;<a -id="FNanchor_740" href="#Footnote_740" class="fnanchor">[740]</a> -until at length he neared the enemy’s po<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_339">[p. 339]</span>sition, upon their right flank. He here -halted, and caused his columns to face to the right; thus forming -a line, or phalanx of moderate depth, fronting towards the enemy. -During the march, each lochus or company had marched in single file -with the lochage or captain (usually the strongest and best soldier -in it), at the head; though we do not know how many of these lochages -marched abreast, or what was the breadth of the column. When the -phalanx or front towards the enemy was formed, each lochage was of -course in line with his company, and at its left hand; while the -Thebans and Epaminondas himself were at the left of the whole line. -In this position, Epaminondas gave the order to ground arms.<a -id="FNanchor_741" href="#Footnote_741" class="fnanchor">[741]</a></p> - -<p>The enemy, having watched him ever since he had left Tegea and -formed his marching array, had supposed at first that he was coming -straight up to the front of their position, and thus expected speedy -battle. But when he turned to the left towards the mountains, so that -for some time he did not approach sensibly nearer to their position, -they began to fancy that he had no intention of fighting on that day. -Such belief, having been once raised, still continued, even though, -by advancing along the skirts of the mountain, he gradually arrived -very close upon their right flank. They were farther confirmed in the -same supposition, when they saw his phalanx ground arms; which they -construed as an indication that he was about to encamp on the spot -where he stood. It is probable that Epaminondas may have designedly -simulated some other preliminaries of encampment, since his march -from Tegea seems to have been arranged for the purpose partly of -raising such false impression in his enemies, partly of getting upon -their right flank instead of their front. He completely succeeded in -his object. The soldiers on the Lacedæmonian side, believing that -there would be no battle until the next day, suffered their ranks -to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_340">[p. 340]</span> fall into -disorder, and scattered about the field. Many of the horsemen even -took off their breast-plates and unbridled their horses. And what was -of hardly less consequence,—that mental preparation of the soldier, -whereby he was wound up for the moment of action, and which provident -commanders never omitted, if possible, to inflame by a special -harangue at the moment,—was allowed to slacken and run down.<a -id="FNanchor_742" href="#Footnote_742" class="fnanchor">[742]</a> So -strongly was the whole army persuaded of the intention of Epaminondas -to encamp, that they suffered him not only without hindrance, but -even without suspicion, to make all his movements and dispositions -preparatory to immediate attack.</p> - -<p>Such improvidence is surprising, when we recollect that the -ablest commander and the best troops in Greece were so close -upon the right of their position. It is to be in part explained, -probably, by the fact that the Spartan headship was now at an -end, and that there was no supreme chief to whom the whole body -of Lacedæmonian allies paid deference. If either of the kings -of Sparta was present,—a point not distinctly ascertainable,—he -would have no command except over the Lacedæmonian troops. In the -entire allied army, the Mantineans occupied the extreme right (as -on a former occasion, because the battle was in their territory,<a -id="FNanchor_743" href="#Footnote_743" class="fnanchor">[743]</a> -and because the Lacedæmonians had lost their once-recognized -privilege), together with the other Arcadians. On the right-centre -and centre were the Lacedæmonians, Eleians, and Achæans; on the -extreme left, the Athenians.<a id="FNanchor_744" href="#Footnote_744" -class="fnanchor">[744]</a> There was cavalry on both the wings; -Athenian on the left,—Eleian on the right; spread out with no -more than the ordinary depth, and without any intermixture of -light infantry along with the horsemen.<a id="FNanchor_745" -href="#Footnote_745" class="fnanchor">[745]</a></p> - -<p>In the phalanx of Epaminondas, he himself with the Thebans and -Bœotians was on the left; the Argeians on the right; the<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_341">[p. 341]</span> Arcadians, -Messenians, Eubœans, Sikyonians and other allies in the centre.<a -id="FNanchor_746" href="#Footnote_746" class="fnanchor">[746]</a> It -was his purpose to repeat the same general plan of attack which had -succeeded so perfectly at Leuktra; to head the charge himself with -his Bœotians on the left against the opposing right or right-centre, -and to bear down the enemy on that side with irresistible force, -both of infantry and cavalry; while he kept back his right and -centre, composed of less trustworthy troops, until the battle should -have been thus wholly or partially decided. Accordingly, he caused -the Bœotian hoplites,—occupying the left of his line in lochi or -companies, with the lochage or captain at the left extremity of -each,—to wheel to the right and form in column fronting the enemy, -in advance of his remaining line. The Theban lochages thus became -placed immediately in face of the enemy, as the heads of a column of -extraordinary depth; all the hoplites of each lochus, and perhaps -of more than one lochus, being ranged in file behind them.<a -id="FNanchor_747" href="#Footnote_747" class="fnanchor">[747]</a> -What the actual depth was, or what was the exact number of the -lochus, we do not know. At Leuktra, Epaminondas had attacked with -fifty shields of depth; at Mantinea, the depth of his column was -probably not less. Himself, with the chosen Theban warriors, were -at the head of it, and he relied upon breaking through the enemy’s -phalanx at whatever point he charged; since their files would -hardly be more than eight deep, and very inadequate to resist so -overwhelming a shock. His column would cut through the phalanx of the -enemy, like the prow of a trireme impelled in sea-fight against the -midships of her antagonist.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_342">[p. 342]</span></p> - -<p>It was apparently only the Bœotian hoplites who were thus formed -in column, projecting forward in advance; while the remaining -allies were still left in their ordinary phalanx or lines.<a -id="FNanchor_748" href="#Footnote_748" class="fnanchor">[748]</a> -Epaminondas calculated, that when he should have once broken through -the enemy’s phalanx at a single point, the rest would either take -flight, or become so dispirited, that his allies coming up in phalanx -could easily deal with them.</p> - -<p>Against the cavalry on the enemy’s right, which was marshaled -only with the ordinary depth of a phalanx of hoplites (four, six, -or perhaps eight deep),<a id="FNanchor_749" href="#Footnote_749" -class="fnanchor">[749]</a> and without any light infantry -intermingled with the ranks—the Theban general opposed on his -left his own excellent cavalry, Theban and Thessalian, but in -strong and deep column, so as to ensure to them also a superior -weight of attack. He farther mingled in their ranks some active -footmen, darters and slingers, of whom he had many from Thessaly -and the Maliac Gulf.<a id="FNanchor_750" href="#Footnote_750" -class="fnanchor">[750]</a></p> - -<p>There remained one other precaution to take. His deep Theban and -Bœotian column, in advancing to the charge, would be exposed on its -right or unshielded side to the attack of the Athenians, especially -the Athenian cavalry, from the enemy’s left. To guard against any -such movement, he posted, upon some rising ground near his right, -a special body of reserve, both horse and<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_343">[p. 343]</span> foot, in order to take the Athenians in -the rear if they should attempt it.</p> - -<p>All these fresh dispositions for attack, made on the spot, must -have occupied time, and caused much apparent movement. To constitute -both the column of infantry, and the column of cavalry, for attack -on his left—and to post the body of reserve on the rising ground -at his right against the Athenians—were operations which the enemy -from their neighboring position could not help seeing. Yet they -either did not heed, or did not understand, what was going on.<a -id="FNanchor_751" href="#Footnote_751" class="fnanchor">[751]</a> -Nor was it until Epaminondas, perceiving all to be completed, -actually gave the word of command to “take up arms,” that they had -any suspicion of the impending danger. As soon as they saw him in -full march moving rapidly towards them, surprise and tumultuous -movement pervaded their body. The scattered hoplites ran to their -places; the officers exerted every effort to establish regular -array; the horsemen hastened to bridle their horses and resume -their breast-plates.<a id="FNanchor_752" href="#Footnote_752" -class="fnanchor">[752]</a> And though the space dividing the two -armies was large enough to allow such mischief to be partially -corrected,—yet soldiers thus taken unawares, hurried, and troubled, -were not in condition to stand the terrific shock of chosen Theban -hoplites in deep column.</p> - -<p>The grand force of attack, both of cavalry and infantry, which -Epaminondas organized on his left, was triumphant in both its -portions. His cavalry, powerfully aided by the intermingled darters -and light troops from Thessaly, broke and routed the enemy’s cavalry -opposed to them, and then restraining themselves from pursuit, -turned to fall upon the phalanx of infantry. Epaminondas, on his -part, with his Theban column, came into close conflict with the -Mantinean and Lacedæmonian line of infantry, whom, after a desperate -struggle of shield, spear, and sword, he bore down by superior force -and weight. He broke through the enemy’s line of infantry at this -point, compelling the Lacedæmonians opposed to him, after a brave -and murderous resistance, to turn their backs and take to flight. -The remaining troops of the enemy’s line, seeing the best portion -of their army defeated and in flight, turned<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_344">[p. 344]</span> and fled also. The centre and right -of Epaminondas, being on a less advanced front, hardly came into -conflict with the enemy until the impression of his charge had been -felt, and therefore found the troops opposed to them already wavering -and disheartened. The Achæan, Eleian, and other infantry on that -side, gave way after a short resistance; chiefly as it would appear, -from contagion and alarm, when they saw the Lacedæmonians broken. The -Athenians however, especially the cavalry, on the left wing of their -own army, seem to have been engaged in serious encounter with the -cavalry opposite to them. Diodorus affirms them to have been beaten, -after a gallant fight,<a id="FNanchor_753" href="#Footnote_753" -class="fnanchor">[753]</a> until the Eleian cavalry from the right -came to their aid. Here, as on many other points, it is difficult to -reconcile his narrative with Xenophon, who plainly intimates that the -stress of the action fell on the Theban left and Lacedæmonian right -and centre,—and from whose narrative we should rather have gathered, -that the Eleian cavalry, beaten on their own right, may have been -aided by the Athenian cavalry from the left; reversing the statement -of Diodorus.</p> - -<p>In regard to this important battle, however, we cannot grasp -with confidence anything beyond the capital determining feature -and the ultimate result.<a id="FNanchor_754" href="#Footnote_754" -class="fnanchor">[754]</a> The calculations of Epaminondas were<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_345">[p. 345]</span> completely realized. -The irresistible charge, both of infantry and cavalry, made by -himself with his left wing, not only defeated the troops immediately -opposed, but caused the enemy’s whole army to take flight. It was -under these victorious circumstances, and while he was pressing on -the retiring enemy at the head of his Theban column of infantry, -that he received a mortal wound with a spear in the breast. He was -by habit and temper, always foremost in braving danger, and on this -day probably exposed himself preëminently, as a means of encouraging -those around him, and ensuring the success of his own charge, on -which so much depended; moreover, a Grecian general fought on foot -in the ranks, and carried the same arms (spear, shield, etc.) as a -private soldier. Diodorus tells us that the Lacedæmonian infantry -were making a prolonged resistance, when Epaminondas put himself -at the head of the Thebans for a fresh and desperate effort; that -he stepped forward, darted his javelin, and slew the Lacedæmonian -commander; that having killed several warriors, and intimidated -others, he forced them to give way; that the Lacedæmonians, seeing -him in advance of his comrades, turned upon him and overwhelmed him -with darts, some of which he avoided, others he turned off with his -shield, while others, after they had actually entered his body and -wounded him, he plucked out and employed them in repelling the enemy. -At length he received a mortal wound in his breast with a spear.<a -id="FNanchor_755" href="#Footnote_755" class="fnanchor">[755]</a> I -cannot altogether admit to notice these details; which once passed as -a portion of Grecian history, though they seem rather the offspring -of an imagination fresh from the perusal of the Iliad than a recital -of an actual combat of Thebans and Lacedæmonians, both eminent -for close-rank fighting, with long spear and heavy shield.<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_346">[p. 346]</span> The mortal wound of -Epaminondas, with a spear in the breast, is the only part of the case -which we really know. The handle of the spear broke, and the point -was left sticking in his breast. He immediately fell, and as the -enemy were at that moment in retreat, fell into the arms of his own -comrades. There was no dispute for the possession of his body, as -there had been for Kleombrotus at Leuktra.</p> - -<p>The news of his mortal wound spread like wild-fire through his -army; and the effect produced is among the most extraordinary -phenomena in all Grecian military history. I give it in the words -of the contemporary historian. “It was thus (says Xenophon) that -Epaminondas arranged his order of attack; and he was not disappointed -in his expectation. For having been victorious, on the point where -he himself charged, he caused the whole army of the enemy to take -flight. But so soon as he fell, those who remained had no longer -any power even of rightly using the victory. Though the phalanx -of the enemy’s infantry was in full flight, the Theban hoplites -neither killed a single man more, nor advanced a step beyond the -actual ground of conflict. Though the enemy’s cavalry was also in -full flight, yet neither did the Theban horsemen continue their -pursuit, nor kill any more either of horsemen or of hoplites, but -fell back through the receding enemies with the timidity of beaten -men. The light troops and peltasts, who had been mingled with the -Theban cavalry and had aided in their victory, spread themselves over -towards the enemy’s left with the security of conquerors; but there -(being unsupported by their own horsemen) they were mostly cut to -pieces by the Athenians.”<a id="FNanchor_756" href="#Footnote_756" -class="fnanchor">[756]</a></p> - -<p>Astonishing as this recital is, we cannot doubt that it is -literally<span class="pagenum" id="Page_347">[p. 347]</span> true, -since it contradicts the sympathies of the reciting witness. Nothing -but the pressure of undeniable evidence could have constrained -Xenophon to record a scene so painful to him as the Lacedæmonian army -beaten, in full flight, and rescued from destruction only by the -untimely wound of the Theban general. That Epaminondas would leave -no successor either equal or second to himself, now that Pelopidas -was no more,—that the army which he commanded should be incapable of -executing new movements or of completing an unfinished campaign,—we -can readily conceive. But that on the actual battle-field, when the -moment of dangerous and doubtful struggle has been already gone -through, and when the soldier’s blood is up, to reap his reward -in pursuit of an enemy whom he sees fleeing before him—that at -this crisis of exuberant impatience, when Epaminondas, had he been -unwounded, would have found it difficult to restrain his soldiers -from excessive forwardness, they should have become at once paralyzed -and disarmed on hearing of his fall,—this is what we could not -have believed, had we not found it attested by a witness at once -contemporary and hostile. So striking a proof has hardly ever been -rendered, on the part of soldiers towards their general, of devoted -and absorbing sentiment. All the hopes of this army, composed of such -diverse elements, were centred in Epaminondas; all their confidence -of success, all their security against defeat, were derived from the -idea of acting under his orders; all their power, even of striking -down a defeated enemy, appeared to vanish when those orders were -withdrawn. We are not indeed to speak of such a proceeding with -commendation. Thebes and her allied cities had great reason to -complain of their soldiers, for a grave dereliction of military duty, -and a capital disappointment of well-earned triumph,—whatever may be -our feelings about the motive. Assuredly the man who would be most -chagrined of all, and whose dying moments must have been embittered -if he lived to hear it,—was Epaminondas himself. But when we look at -the fact simply as a mark and measure of the ascendency established -by him over the minds of his soldiers, it will be found hardly -paralleled in history. I have recounted, a few pages ago, the intense -grief displayed by the Thebans and their allies in Thessaly over -the dead body of Pelopidas<a id="FNanchor_757" href="#Footnote_757" -class="fnanchor">[757]</a> on the<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_348">[p. 348]</span> hill of Kynoskephalæ. But all direct -and deliberate testimonies of attachment to a dead or dying chief -(and doubtless these too were abundant on the field of Mantinea) fall -short of the involuntary suspension of arms in the tempting hour of -victory.</p> - -<p>That the real victory, the honors of the day, belonged to -Epaminondas and the Thebans, we know from the conclusive evidence of -Xenophon. But as the vanquished, being allowed to retire unpursued, -were only separated by a short distance from the walls of Mantinea, -and perhaps rallied even before reaching the town,—as the Athenian -cavalry had cut to pieces some of the straggling light troops,—they -too pretended to have gained a victory. Trophies were erected on both -sides. Nevertheless the Thebans were masters of the field of battle; -so that the Lacedæmonians, after some hesitation, were forced to send -a herald to solicit truce for the burial of the slain, and to grant -for burial such Theban bodies as they had in their possession.<a -id="FNanchor_758" href="#Footnote_758" class="fnanchor">[758]</a> -This was the understood confession of defeat.</p> - -<p>The surgeons, on examining the wound of Epaminondas, with the -spear-head yet sticking in it, pronounced that he must die as -soon as that was withdrawn. He first inquired whether his shield -was safe; and his shield-bearer, answering in the affirmative, -produced it before his eyes. He next asked about the issue of -the battle, and was informed that his own army was victorious.<a -id="FNanchor_759" href="#Footnote_759" class="fnanchor">[759]</a> -He then desired to see Iolaidas and Daiphantus, whom he intended to -succeed him as commanders; but received the mournful reply, that both -of them had been slain.<a id="FNanchor_760" href="#Footnote_760" -class="fnanchor">[760]</a> “Then (said he) you must make<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_349">[p. 349]</span> peace with the enemy.” -He ordered the spear-head to be withdrawn, when the efflux of blood -speedily terminated his life.</p> - -<p>Of the three questions here ascribed to the dying chief, the third -is the gravest and most significant. The death of these two other -citizens, the only men in the camp whom Epaminondas could trust, -shows how aggravated and irreparable was the Theban loss, not indeed -as to number, but as to quality. Not merely Epaminondas himself, but -the only two men qualified in some measure to replace him, perished -in the same field; and Pelopidas had fallen in the preceding year. -Such accumulation of individual losses must be borne in mind when -we come to note the total suspension of Theban glory and dignity, -after this dearly-bought victory. It affords emphatic evidence of the -extreme forwardness with which their leaders exposed themselves, as -well as of the gallant resistance which they experienced.</p> - -<p>The death of Epaminondas spread rejoicing in the Lacedæmonian camp -proportioned to the sorrow of the Theban. To more than one warrior -was assigned the honor of having struck the blow. The Mantineans -gave it to their citizen Machærion; the Athenians, to Gryllus -son of Xenophon; the Spartans, to their countryman Antikrates.<a -id="FNanchor_761" href="#Footnote_761" class="fnanchor">[761]</a> At -Sparta, distinguished honor was shown, even in the days of Plutarch, -to the posterity of Antikrates, who was believed to have rescued the -city from her most formidable enemy. Such tokens afford precious -testimony, from witnesses beyond all suspicion, to the memory of -Epaminondas.</p> - -<p>How the news of his death was received at Thebes, we have no -positive account. But there can be no doubt that the sorrow,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_350">[p. 350]</span> so paralysing -to the victorious soldiers on the field of Mantinea, was felt -with equal acuteness, and with an effect not less depressing, -in the senate-house and market-place of Thebes. The city, the -citizen-soldiers, and the allies, would be alike impressed with the -mournful conviction, that the dying injunction of Epaminondas must -be executed. Accordingly, negotiations were opened, and peace was -concluded,—probably at once, before the army left Peloponnesus. -The Thebans and their Arcadian allies exacted nothing more than -the recognition of the <i>statu quo;</i> to leave everything exactly as -it was, without any change or reactionary measure, yet admitting -Megalopolis, with the Pan-Arcadian constitution attached to it,—and -admitting also Messênê as an independent city. Against this last -article Sparta loudly and peremptorily protested. But not one of her -allies sympathized with her feelings. Some, indeed, were decidedly -against her; to such a degree, that we find the maintenance of -independent Messênê against Sparta ranking shortly afterwards as an -admitted principle in Athenian foreign politics.<a id="FNanchor_762" -href="#Footnote_762" class="fnanchor">[762]</a> Neither Athenians, -nor Eleians, nor Arcadians, desired to see Sparta strengthened. None -had any interest in prolonging the war, with prospects doubtful to -every one; while all wished to see the large armies now in Arcadia -dismissed. Accordingly, the peace was sworn to on these conditions, -and the autonomy of Messênê guaranteed, by all, except the Spartans; -who alone stood out, keeping themselves without friends or -auxiliaries, in the hope for better times,—rather than submit to what -they considered as an intolerable degradation.<a id="FNanchor_763" -href="#Footnote_763" class="fnanchor">[763]</a></p> - -<p>Under these conditions, the armies on both sides retired. -Xenophon is right in saying, that neither party gained anything, -either city, territory, or dominion; though before the battle, -considering<span class="pagenum" id="Page_351">[p. 351]</span> -the magnitude of the two contending armies, every one had expected -that the victors, whichever they were, would become masters, and -the vanquished, subjects. But his assertion,—that “there was more -disturbance, and more matter of dispute, in Greece, after the battle -than before it,”—must be interpreted, partly as the inspiration of -a philo-Laconian sentiment, which regards a peace not accepted by -Sparta as no peace at all,—partly as based on the circumstance, -that no definite headship was recognized as possessed by any state. -Sparta had once enjoyed it, and had set the disgraceful example of -suing out a confirmation of it from the Persian king at the peace of -Antalkidas. Both Thebes and Athens had aspired to the same dignity, -and both by the like means, since the battle of Leuktra; neither -of them had succeeded. Greece was thus left without a head, and -to this extent the affirmation of Xenophon is true. But it would -not be correct to suppose that the last expedition of Epaminondas -into Peloponnesus was unproductive of any results,—though it was -disappointed of its great and brilliant fruits by his untimely -death. Before he marched in, the Theban party in Arcadia, (Tegea, -Megalopolis, etc.), was on the point of being crushed by the -Mantineans and their allies. His expedition, though ending in an -indecisive victory, nevertheless broke up the confederacy enlisted -in support of Mantinea; enabling Tegea and Megalopolis to maintain -themselves against their Arcadian opponents, and thus leaving the -frontier against Sparta unimpaired. While therefore we admit the -affirmation of Xenophon,—that Thebes did not gain by the battle -either city, or territory, or dominion,—we must at the same time add, -that she gained the preservation of her Arcadian allies, and of her -anti-Spartan frontier, including Messênê.</p> - -<p>This was a gain of considerable importance. But dearly, indeed, -was it purchased, by the blood of her first hero, shed on the field -of Mantinea; not to mention his two seconds, whom we know only -from his verdict,—Daiphantus and Iolaidas.<a id="FNanchor_764" -href="#Footnote_764" class="fnanchor">[764]</a> He was buried on the -field of battle, and a monumental column was erected on his tomb.</p> - -<p>Scarcely any character in Grecian history has been judged -with so much unanimity as Epaminondas. He has obtained a meed -of admiration,—from all, sincere and hearty,—from some,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_352">[p. 352]</span> enthusiastic. Cicero -pronounces him to be the first man of Greece.<a id="FNanchor_765" -href="#Footnote_765" class="fnanchor">[765]</a> The judgment of -Polybius, though not summed up so emphatically in a single epithet, -is delivered in a manner hardly less significant and laudatory. Nor -was it merely historians or critics who formed this judgment. The -best men of action, combining the soldier and the patriot, such as -Timoleon and Philopœmen,<a id="FNanchor_766" href="#Footnote_766" -class="fnanchor">[766]</a> set before them Epaminondas as their -model to copy. The remark has been often made, and suggests itself -whenever we speak of Epaminondas, though its full force will be felt -only when we come to follow the subsequent history,—that with him -the dignity and commanding influence of Thebes both began and ended. -His period of active political life comprehends sixteen years, from -the resurrection of Thebes into a free community, by the expulsion -of the Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison, and the subversion -of the ruling oligarchy,—to the fatal day of Mantinea (379-362 -<small>B.C.</small>). His prominent and unparalleled ascendency -belongs to the last eight years, from the victory of Leuktra (371 -<small>B.C.</small>). Throughout this whole period, both all that -we know and all that we can reasonably divine, fully bears out the -judgment of Polybius and Cicero, who had the means of knowing much -more. And this too,—let it be observed,—though Epaminondas is tried -by a severe canon: for the chief contemporary witness remaining -is one decidedly hostile. Even the philo-Laconian Xenophon finds -neither misdeeds nor omissions to reveal in the capital enemy of -Sparta,—mentions him only to record what is honorable,—and manifests -the perverting bias mainly by suppressing or slurring over his -triumphs. The man whose eloquence bearded Agesilaus at the congress -immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra,<a id="FNanchor_767" -href="#Footnote_767" class="fnanchor">[767]</a>—who in that -battle stripped Sparta of her glory, and transferred the wreath -to Thebes,—who a few months afterwards, not only ravaged all the -virgin territory of Laconia, but cut off the best half of it for -the restitution of independent Messênê, and erected the hostile -Arcadian community of Megalopolis on its frontier,—the author of -these fatal disasters inspires to Xenophon such intolera<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_353">[p. 353]</span>ble chagrin and -antipathy, that in the two first he keeps back the name, and in -the third, suppresses the thing done. But in the last campaign, -preceding the battle of Mantinea (whereby Sparta incurred no -positive loss, and where the death of Epaminondas softened every -predisposition against him), there was no such violent pressure upon -the fidelity of the historian. Accordingly, the concluding chapter -of Xenophon’s ‘Hellenica’ contains a panegyric,<a id="FNanchor_768" -href="#Footnote_768" class="fnanchor">[768]</a> ample and -unqualified, upon the military merits of the Theban general; upon -his daring enterprise, his comprehensive foresight, his care to -avoid unnecessary exposure of soldiers, his excellent discipline, -his well-combined tactics, his fertility of aggressive resource in -striking at the weak points of the enemy, who content themselves with -following and parrying his blows (to use a simile of Demosthenes<a -id="FNanchor_769" href="#Footnote_769" class="fnanchor">[769]</a>) -like an unskilful pugilist, and only succeed in doing so by signal -aid from accident. The effort of strategic genius, then for the -first time devised and applied, of bringing an irresistible force of -attack to bear on one point of the hostile line, while the rest of -his army was kept comparatively back until the action had been thus -decided,—is clearly noted by Xenophon, together with its triumphant -effect, at the battle of Mantinea; though the very same combination -on the field of Leuktra is slurred over in his description, as if it -were so commonplace as not to require any mention of the chief with -whom it originated. Compare Epaminondas with Agesilaus,—how great is -the superiority of the first,—even in the narrative of Xenophon, the -earnest panegyrist of the other! How manifestly are we made to see -that nothing except the fatal spear-wound at Mantinea, prevented him -from reaping the fruit of a series of admirable arrangements, and -from becoming arbiter of Peloponnesus, including Sparta herself!</p> - -<p>The military merits alone of Epaminondas, had they merely -belonged to a general of mercenaries, combined with nothing -praiseworthy in other ways,—would have stamped him as a man of -high and original genius, above every other Greek, antecedent or -contemporary. But it is the peculiar excellence of this great man -that we are not compelled to borrow from one side of his character -in order to compensate deficiencies in another.<a id="FNanchor_770" -href="#Footnote_770" class="fnanchor">[770]</a> His splendid -mili<span class="pagenum" id="Page_354">[p. 354]</span>tary capacity -was never prostituted to personal ends: neither to avarice, nor -ambition, nor overweening vanity. Poor at the beginning of his life, -he left at the end of it not enough to pay his funeral expenses; -having despised the many opportunities for enrichment which his -position afforded, as well as the richest offers from foreigners.<a -id="FNanchor_771" href="#Footnote_771" class="fnanchor">[771]</a> -Of ambition he had so little, by natural temperament, that his -friends accused him of torpor. But as soon as the perilous -exposure of Thebes required it, he displayed as much energy in her -defence as the most ambitious of her citizens, without any of that -captious exigence, frequent in ambitious men, as to the amount of -glorification or deference due to him from his countrymen. And his -personal vanity was so faintly kindled, even after the prodigious -success at Leuktra, that we find him serving in Thessaly as a private -hoplite in the ranks, and in the city as an ædile or inferior -street-magistrate, under the title of Telearchus. An illustrious -specimen of that capacity and goodwill, both to command and to be -commanded, which Aristotle pronounces to form in their combination -the characteristic feature of the worthy citizen.<a id="FNanchor_772" -href="#Footnote_772" class="fnanchor">[772]</a> He once incurred -the displeasure of his fellow-citizens, for his wise and moderate -policy in Achaia, which they were ill-judged enough to reverse. -We cannot doubt also that he was frequently attacked by political -censors and enemies,—the condition of eminence in every free state; -but neither of these causes ruffled the dignified calmness of his -political course. As he never courted popularity by unworthy arts, so -he bore unpopularity without murmurs, and without angry renunciation -of patriotic duty.<a id="FNanchor_773" href="#Footnote_773" -class="fnanchor">[773]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_355">[p. 355]</span></p> - -<p>The mildness of his antipathies against political opponents at -home was undeviating; and, what is even more remarkable, amidst the -precedence and practice of the Grecian world, his hostility against -foreign enemies, Bœotian dissentients, and Theban exiles, was -uniformly free from reactionary vengeance. Sufficient proofs have -been adduced in the preceding pages of this rare union of attributes -in the same individual; of lofty disinterestedness, not merely -as to corrupt gains, but as to the more seductive irritabilities -of ambition, combined with a just measure of attachment towards -partisans, and unparalleled gentleness towards enemies. His -friendship with Pelopidas was never disturbed during the fifteen -years of their joint political career; an absence of jealousy signal -and creditable to both, though most creditable to Pelopidas, the -richer, as well as the inferior, man of the two. To both, and to -the harmonious coöperation of both, Thebes owed her short-lived -splendor and ascendency. Yet when we compare the one with the other, -we not only miss in Pelopidas the transcendent strategic genius and -conspicuous eloquence, but even the constant vigilance and prudence, -which never deserted his friend. If Pelopidas had had Epaminondas as -his companion in Thessaly, he would hardly have trusted himself to -the good faith, nor tasted the dungeon, of the Pheræan Alexander; nor -would he have rushed forward to certain destruction, in a transport -of phrensy, at the view of that hated tyrant in the subsequent -battle.</p> - -<p>In eloquence, Epaminondas would doubtless have found superiors -at Athens; but at Thebes, he had neither equal, nor predecessor, -nor successor. Under the new phase into which Thebes passed by the -expulsion of the Lacedæmonians out of the Kadmeia, such a gift was -second in importance only to the great strategic qualities; while -the combination of both elevated their possessor into the envoy, -the counsellor, the debater, of his country,<a id="FNanchor_774" -href="#Footnote_774" class="fnanchor">[774]</a><span class="pagenum" -id="Page_356">[p. 356]</span> as well as her minister at war and -commander-in-chief. The shame of acknowledging Thebes as leading -state in Greece, embodied in the current phrases about Bœotian -stupidity, would be sensibly mitigated, when her representative -in an assembled congress spoke with the flowing abundance of -the Homeric Odysseus, instead of the loud, brief, and hurried -bluster of Menelaus.<a id="FNanchor_775" href="#Footnote_775" -class="fnanchor">[775]</a> The possession of such eloquence, -amidst the uninspiring atmosphere of Thebes, implied far greater -mental force than a similar accomplishment would have betokened at -Athens. In Epaminondas, it was steadily associated with thought and -action,—that triple combination of thinking, speaking, and acting, -which Isokrates and other Athenian sophists<a id="FNanchor_776" -href="#Footnote_776" class="fnanchor">[776]</a> set before their -hearers as the stock and qualification for meritorious civic life. To -the bodily training and soldier-like practice, common to all Thebans, -Epaminondas added an ardent intellectual impulse and a range of -discussion with the philosophical men around, peculiar to himself. -He was not floated into public life by the accident of birth or -wealth,—nor hoisted and propped up by oligarchical clubs,—nor even -determined to it originally by any spontaneous ambition of his own. -But the great revolution of 379 <small>B.C.</small>, which expelled -from Thebes both the Lacedæmonian garrison and the local oligarchy -who ruled by its aid, forced him forward by the strongest obligations -both of duty and interest; since nothing but an energetic defence -could rescue both him and every other free Theban from slavery. It -was by the like necessity that the American revolution, and the first -French revolution, thrust into the front rank the most instructed and -capable men of the country, whether ambitious by temperament or not. -As the pressure of the time impelled Epaminondas forward, so it also -disposed his countrymen to look out for a competent leader wherever -he was to be found; and in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_357">[p. -357]</span> no other living man could they obtain the same union -of the soldier, the general, the orator, and the patriot. Looking -through all Grecian history, it is only in Perikles that we find the -like many-sided excellence; for though much inferior to Epaminondas -as a general, Perikles must be held superior to him as a statesman. -But it is alike true of both,—and the remark tends much to illustrate -the sources of Grecian excellence,—that neither sprang exclusively -from the school of practice and experience. They both brought -to that school minds exercised in the conversation of the most -instructed philosophers and sophists accessible to them,—trained to -varied intellectual combinations and to a larger range of subjects -than those that came before the public assembly,—familiarized with -reasonings which the scrupulous piety of Nikias forswore, and which -the devoted military patriotism of Pelopidas disdained.</p> - -<p>On one point, as I have already noticed, the policy recommended -by Epaminondas to his countrymen appears of questionable wisdom,—his -advice to compete with Athens for transmarine and naval power. -One cannot recognize in this advice the same accurate estimate of -permanent causes,—the same long-sighted view, of the conditions of -strength to Thebes and of weakness to her enemies, which dictated the -foundation of Messênê and Megalopolis. These two towns, when once -founded, took such firm root, that Sparta could not persuade even -her own allies to aid in effacing them; a clear proof of the sound -reasoning on which their founder had proceeded. What Epaminondas -would have done,—whether he would have followed out maxims equally -prudent and penetrating,—if he had survived the victory of -Mantinea,—is a point which we cannot pretend to divine. He would -have found himself then on a pinnacle of glory, and invested with a -plenitude of power, such as no Greek ever held without abusing. But -all that we know of Epaminondas justifies the conjecture that he -would have been found equal, more than any other Greek, even to this -great trial; and that his untimely death shut him out from a future -not less honorable to himself, than beneficial to Thebes and to -Greece generally.</p> - -<p>Of the private life and habits of Epaminondas we know scarcely -anything. We are told that he never married; and we find brief -allusions, without any details, to attachments in which he -is said<span class="pagenum" id="Page_358">[p. 358]</span> -to have indulged.<a id="FNanchor_777" href="#Footnote_777" -class="fnanchor">[777]</a> Among the countrymen of Pindar,<a -id="FNanchor_778" href="#Footnote_778" class="fnanchor">[778]</a> -devoted attachment between mature men and beautiful youths was -more frequent than in other parts of Greece. It was confirmed -by interchange of mutual oaths at the tomb of Iolaus, and was -reckoned upon as the firmest tie of military fidelity in the hour -of battle. Asopichus and Kaphisodorus are named as youths to whom -Epaminondas was much devoted. The first fought with desperate -bravery at the battle of Leuktra, and after the victory caused an -image of the Leuktrian trophy to be carved on his shield, which -he dedicated at Delphi;<a id="FNanchor_779" href="#Footnote_779" -class="fnanchor">[779]</a> the second perished along with his -illustrious friend and chief on the field of Mantinea, and was -buried in a grave closely adjacent to him.<a id="FNanchor_780" -href="#Footnote_780" class="fnanchor">[780]</a></p> - -<p>It rather appears that the Spartans, deeply incensed against their -allies for having abandoned them in reference to Messênê, began to -turn their attention away from the affairs of Greece to those of Asia -and Egypt. But the dissensions in Arcadia were not wholly appeased -even by the recent peace. The city of Megalopolis had been founded -only eight years before by the coalescence of many smaller townships, -all previously enjoying a separate autonomy more or less perfect. The -vehement anti-Spartan impulse, which marked the two years immediately -succeeding the battle of Leuktra, had overruled to so great a degree -the prior instincts of these townships, that they had lent themselves -to the plans of Lykomedes and Epaminondas for an enlarged community -in the new city. But since that period, reaction had taken place. -The Mantineans had come to be at the head of an anti-Megalopolitan -party in Arcadia; and several of the communities which had been -merged in Megalopolis, counting upon aid from them and from the -Eleians, insisted on seceding, and returning to<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_359">[p. 359]</span> their original autonomy. But for -foreign aid, Megalopolis would now have been in great difficulty. -A pressing request was sent to the Thebans, who despatched into -Arcadia three thousand hoplites under Pammenes. This force enabled -the Megalopolitans, though not without measures of considerable -rigor, to uphold the integrity of their city, and keep the refractory -members in communion.<a id="FNanchor_781" href="#Footnote_781" -class="fnanchor">[781]</a> And it appears that the interference thus -obtained was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_360">[p. 360]</span> -permanently efficacious, so that the integrity of this recent -Pan-Arcadian community was no farther disturbed.</p> - -<p>The old king Agesilaus was compelled, at the age of eighty, -to see the dominion of Sparta thus irrevocably narrowed, her -influence in Arcadia overthrown, and the loss of Messênê formally -sanctioned even by her own allies. All his protests, and those of -his son Archidamus, so strenuously set forth by Isokrates, had only -ended by isolating Sparta more than ever from Grecian support and -sympathy. Archidamus probably never seriously attempted to execute -the desperate scheme which he had held out as a threat some two or -three years before the battle of Mantinea; that the Lacedæmonians -would send away their wives and families, and convert their military -population into a perpetual camp, never to lay down arms until -they should have reconquered Messênê or perished in the attempt.<a -id="FNanchor_782" href="#Footnote_782" class="fnanchor">[782]</a> Yet -he and his father, though deserted by all Grecian allies, had not yet -abandoned the hope that they might obtain aid, in the shape of money -for levying mercenary troops, from the native princes in Egypt and -the revolted Persian satraps in Asia, with whom they seem to have -been for some time in a sort of correspondence.<a id="FNanchor_783" -href="#Footnote_783" class="fnanchor">[783]</a></p> - -<p>About the time of the battle of Mantinea,—and as it would seem, -for some years before,—a large portion of the western dominions of -the Great King were in a state partly of revolt, partly of dubious -obedience. Egypt had been for some years in actual revolt, and -under native princes, whom the Persians had vainly endeavored to -subdue (employing for that purpose the aid of the Athenian generals -Iphikrates and Timotheus) both in 374 and 371 <small>B.C.</small> -Ariobarzanes, satrap of the region near the Propontis and the -Hellespont, appears to have revolted about the year 367-366 -<small>B.C.</small> In other parts of Asia Minor, too,—Paphlagonia, -Pisidia, etc.,—the subordinate princes or governors became -disaffected to Artaxerxes. But their disaffection was for a certain -time kept down by the extraordinary ability and vigor of a Karian -named Datames, commander for the king in a part of Kappadokia, who -gained several important victories over them by rapidity of movement -and well-combined stratagem. At length the services of Datames became -so distinguished as to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_361">[p. -361]</span> excite the jealousy of many of the Persian grandees; -who poisoned the royal mind against him, and thus drove him to -raise the standard of revolt in his own district of Kappadokia, -under alliance and concert with Ariobarzanes. It was in vain that -Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, was sent by Artaxerxes with a -powerful force to subdue Datames. The latter resisted all the open -force of Persia, and was at length overcome only by the treacherous -conspiracy of Mithridates (son of Ariobarzanes), who, corrupted -by the Persian court and becoming a traitor both to his father -Ariobarzanes and to Datames, simulated zealous coöperation, tempted -the latter to a confidential interview, and there assassinated him.<a -id="FNanchor_784" href="#Footnote_784" class="fnanchor">[784]</a></p> - -<p>Still, however, there remained powerful princes and satraps in -Asia Minor, disaffected to the court; Mausôlus, prince of Karia; -Orontes, satrap of Mysia, and Autophradates, satrap of Lydia,—the -last having now apparently joined the revolters, though he had -before been active in upholding the authority of the king. It seems -too that the revolt extended to Syria and Phœnicia, so that all -the western coast with its large revenues, as well as Egypt, was -at once subtracted from the empire. Tachos, native king of Egypt, -was prepared to lend assistance to this formidable combination -of disaffected commanders, who selected Orontes as their chief; -confiding to him their united forces, and sending Rheomithres to -Egypt to procure pecuniary aid. But the Persian court broke the force -of this combination by corrupting both Orontes and Rheomithres, who -betrayed their confederates, and caused the enterprise to fail. -Of the particulars we know little or nothing.<a id="FNanchor_785" -href="#Footnote_785" class="fnanchor">[785]</a></p> <p><span -class="pagenum" id="Page_362">[p. 362]</span></p> <p>Both the Spartan -king Agesilaus, with a thousand Lacedæmonian or Peloponnesian -hoplites,—and the Athenian general Chabrias, were invited to Egypt -to command the forces of Tachos; the former on land, the latter -at sea. Chabrias came simply as a volunteer, without any public -sanction or order from Athens. But the service of Agesilaus was -undertaken for the purposes and with the consent of the authorities -at home, attested by the presence of thirty Spartans who came out -as his counsellors. The Spartans were displeased with the Persian -king for having sanctioned the independence of Messênê; and as -the prospect of overthrowing or enfeebling his empire appeared -at this moment considerable, they calculated on reaping a large -reward for their services to the Egyptian prince, who would in -return lend them assistance towards their views in Greece. But -dissension and bad judgment marred all the combinations against the -Persian king. Agesilaus, on reaching Egypt,<a id="FNanchor_786" -href="#Footnote_786" class="fnanchor">[786]</a> was received with -little respect. The Egyptians saw with astonishment, that one, whom -they had invited as a formidable warrior, was a little deformed -old man, of mean attire, and sitting on the grass with his troops, -careless of show or luxury. They not only vented their disappointment -in sarcastic remarks, but also declined to invest him with the -supreme command, as he had anticipated. He was only recognized as -general of the mercenary land force, while Tachos himself commanded -in chief, and Chabrias was at the head of the fleet. Great efforts -were made to assemble a force competent to act against the Great -King; and Chabrias is said to have suggested various stratagems -for obtaining money from the Egyptians.<a id="FNanchor_787" -href="#Footnote_787" class="fnanchor">[787]</a> The army having been -thus strengthened, Agesilaus, though discontented and indignant, -nevertheless accompanied Tachos on an expedition against the Persian -forces in Phœnicia; from whence they were forced to return by the -revolt of Nektanebis, cousin of Tachos, who caused himself<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_363">[p. 363]</span> to be proclaimed king -of Egypt. Tachos was now full of supplications to Agesilaus to -sustain him against his competitor for the Egyptian throne; while -Nektanebis, also on his side, began to bid high for the favor of -the Spartans. With the sanction of the authorities at home, but in -spite of the opposition of Chabrias, Agesilaus decided in favor of -Nektanebis, withdrawing the mercenaries from the camp of Tachos,<a -id="FNanchor_788" href="#Footnote_788" class="fnanchor">[788]</a> -who was accordingly obliged to take flight. Chabrias returned home -to Athens; either not choosing to abandon Tachos, whom he had -come to serve,—or recalled by special order of his countrymen, in -consequence of the remonstrance of the Persian king. A competitor -for the throne presently arose in the Mendesian division of Egypt. -Agesilaus, vigorously maintaining the cause of Nektanebis, defeated -all the efforts of his opponent. Yet his great schemes against -the Persian empire were abandoned, and nothing was effected as -the result of his Egyptian expedition except the establishment of -Nektanebis; who, having in vain tried to prevail upon him to stay -longer, dismissed him in the winter season with large presents, and -with a public donation to Sparta of two hundred and thirty talents. -Agesilaus marched from the Nile towards Kyrênê, in order to obtain -from that town and its ports ships for the passage home. But he died -on the march, without reaching Kyrênê. His body was conveyed home -by his troops, for burial, in a preparation of wax, since honey -was not to be obtained.<a id="FNanchor_789" href="#Footnote_789" -class="fnanchor">[789]</a></p> - -<p>Thus expired, at an age somewhat above eighty, the ablest and -most energetic of the Spartan kings. He has enjoyed the advantage, -denied to every other eminent Grecian leader, that his character and -exploits have been set out in the most favorable point of view by a -friend and companion,—Xenophon. Making every allowance for partiality -in this picture, there will still remain a really great and -distinguished character. We find the virtues of<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_364">[p. 364]</span> a soldier, and the abilities of a -commander, combined with strenuous personal will and decision, in -such measure as to ensure for Agesilaus constant ascendency over -the minds of others far beyond what was naturally incident to his -station; and that, too, in spite of conspicuous bodily deformity, -amidst a nation eminently sensitive on that point. Of the merits -which Xenophon ascribes to him, some are the fair results of a -Spartan education;—his courage, simplicity of life, and indifference -to indulgences,—his cheerful endurance of hardship under every form. -But his fidelity to engagements, his uniform superiority to pecuniary -corruption, and those winning and hearty manners which attached to -him all around—were virtues not Spartan but personal to himself. -We find in him, however, more analogy to Lysander—a man equally -above reproach on the score of pecuniary gain—than to Brasidas or -Kallikratidas. Agesilaus succeeded to the throne, with a disputed -title, under the auspices and through the intrigues of Lysander; -whose influence, at that time predominant both at Sparta and in -Greece, had planted everywhere dekarchies and harmosts as instruments -of ascendency for imperial Sparta—and under the name of Sparta, for -himself. Agesilaus, too high-spirited to comport himself as second -to any one, speedily broke through so much of the system as had been -constructed to promote the personal dominion of Lysander; yet without -following out the same selfish aspirations, or seeking to build up -the like individual dictatorship, on his own account. His ambition -was indeed unbounded, but it was for Sparta in the first place, and -for himself only in the second. The misfortune was, that in his -measures for upholding and administering the imperial authority of -Sparta, he still continued that mixture of domestic and foreign -coërcion (represented by the dekarchy and the harmost) which had been -introduced by Lysander; a sad contrast with the dignified equality, -and emphatic repudiation of partisan interference, proclaimed by -Brasidas, as the watchword of Sparta, at Akanthus and Torônê—and with -the still nobler Pan-hellenic aims of Kallikratidas.</p> - -<p>The most glorious portion of the life of Agesilaus was that spent -in his three Asiatic campaigns, when acting under the miso-Persian -impulse for which his panegyrist gives him so much credit.<a -id="FNanchor_790" href="#Footnote_790" class="fnanchor">[790]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_365">[p. 365]</span></p> <p>He -was here employed in a Pan-hellenic purpose, to protect the Asiatic -Greeks against that subjection to Persia which Sparta herself had -imposed upon them a few years before, as the price of Persian aid -against Athens.</p> - -<p>The Persians presently succeeded in applying the lessons of Sparta -against herself, and in finding Grecian allies to make war upon her -near home. Here was an end of the Pan-hellenic sentiment, and of the -truly honorable ambition, in the bosom of Agesilaus. He was recalled -to make war nearer home. His obedience to the order of recall is -greatly praised by Plutarch and Xenophon—in my judgment, with little -reason, since he had no choice but to come back. But he came back -an altered man. His miso-Persian feeling had disappeared, and had -been exchanged for a miso-Theban sentiment which gradually acquired -the force of a passion. As principal conductor of the war between -394-387 <small>B.C.</small>, he displayed that vigor and ability -which never forsook him in military operations. But when he found -that the empire of Sparta near home could not be enforced except by -making her the ally of Persia and the executor of a Persian rescript, -he was content to purchase such aid, in itself dishonorable, by the -still greater dishonor of sacrificing the Asiatic Greeks. For the -time, his policy seemed to succeed. From 387-379 <small>B.C.</small> -(that is, down to the time of the revolution at Thebes, effected by -Pelopidas and his small band), the ascendency of Sparta on land, -in Central Greece, was continually rising. But her injustice and -oppression stand confessed even by her panegyrist Xenophon; and -this is just the period when the influence of Agesilaus was at its -maximum. Afterwards we find him personally forward in sheltering -Sphodrias from punishment, and thus bringing upon his countrymen a -war with Athens as well as with Thebes. In the conduct of that war -his military operations were, as usual, strenuous and able, with -a certain measure of success. But on the whole, the war turns out -unfavorably for Sparta. In 371 <small>B.C.</small>, she is obliged -to accept peace on terms very humiliating, as compared with her -position in 387 <small>B.C.</small>; and the only compensation -which she receives, is, the opportunity of striking the Thebans -out of the treaty, thus leaving them to contend single-handed -against what seemed overwhelming odds. Of this intense miso-Theban -impulse, which so speedily brought about the unexpected and crushing -disaster at Leuktra, Agesilaus stands<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_366">[p. 366]</span> out as the prominent spokesman. In -the days of Spartan misfortune which followed, we find his conduct -creditable and energetic, so far as the defensive position, in -which Sparta then found herself, allowed; and though Plutarch -seems displeased with him<a id="FNanchor_791" href="#Footnote_791" -class="fnanchor">[791]</a> for obstinacy in refusing to acknowledge -the autonomy of Messênê (at the peace concluded after the battle of -Mantinea), when acknowledged by all the other Greeks,—yet it cannot -be shown that this refusal brought any actual mischief to Sparta; and -circumstances might well have so turned out, that it would have been -a gain.</p> - -<p>On the whole, in spite of the many military and personal merits of -Agesilaus, as an adviser and politician he deserves little esteem. -We are compelled to remark the melancholy contrast between the state -in which he found Sparta at his accession, and that wherein he left -her at his death—“Marmoream invenit, lateritiam reliquit.” Nothing -but the death of Epaminondas at Mantinea saved her from something -yet worse; though it would be unfair to Agesilaus, while we are -considering the misfortunes of Sparta during his reign, not to -recollect that Epaminondas was an enemy more formidable than she had -ever before encountered.</p> - -<p>The efficient service rendered by Agesilaus during his last -expedition to Egypt, had the effect of establishing firmly the -dominion of Nektanebis the native king, and of protecting that -country for the time from being reconquered by the Persians; an event -that did not happen until a few years afterwards, during the reign of -the next Persian king. Of the extensive revolt, however, which at one -time threatened to wrest from the Persian crown Asia Minor as well as -Egypt, no permanent consequence remained. The treachery of Orontes -and Rheomithres so completely broke up the schemes of the revolters, -that Artaxerxes Mnemon still maintained the Persian empire (with the -exception of Egypt), unimpaired.</p> - -<p>He died not long after the suppression of the revolt (apparently -about a year after it, in 359-358 <small>B.C.</small>), having -reigned forty-five or forty-six years.<a id="FNanchor_792" -href="#Footnote_792" class="fnanchor">[792]</a> His death was -preceded by one of those<span class="pagenum" id="Page_367">[p. -367]</span> bloody tragedies which so frequently stained the -transmission of a Persian sceptre. Darius, the eldest son of -Artaxerxes, had been declared by his father successor to the throne. -According to Persian custom, the successor thus declared was -entitled to prefer any petition which he pleased; the monarch being -held bound to grant it. Darius availed himself of the privilege -to ask for one of the favorite inmates of his father’s harem, -for whom he had contracted a passion. The request so displeased -Artaxerxes, that he seemed likely to make a new appointment as to -the succession; discarding Darius and preferring his younger son -Ochus, whose interests were warmly espoused by Atossa, wife as well -as daughter of the monarch. Alarmed at this prospect, Darius was -persuaded by a discontented courtier, named Teribazus, to lay a -plot for assassinating Artaxerxes; but the plot was betrayed, and -the king caused both Darius and Teribazus to be put to death. By -this catastrophe the chance of Ochus was improved, and his ambition -yet farther stimulated. But there still remained two princes, older -than he—Arsames and Ariaspes. Both these brothers he contrived to -put out of the way; the one by a treacherous deceit, entrapping him -to take poison,—the other by assassination. Ochus thus stood next -as successor to the crown, which was not long denied to him,—for -Artaxerxes, now very old and already struck down by the fatal -consummation respecting his eldest son, Darius, did not survive the -additional sorrow of seeing his two other sons die so speedily<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_368">[p. 368]</span> afterwards.<a -id="FNanchor_793" href="#Footnote_793" class="fnanchor">[793]</a> -He expired, and his son Ochus, taking the name of Artaxerxes, -succeeded to him without opposition; manifesting as king the same -sanguinary dispositions as those by which he had placed himself on -the throne.</p> - -<p>During the two years following the battle of Mantinea, Athens, -though relieved by the general peace from land-war, appears to -have been entangled in serious maritime contests and difficulties. -She had been considerably embarrassed by two events; by the -Theban naval armament under Epaminondas, and by the submission of -Alexander of Pheræ to Thebes,—both events belonging to 364-363 -<small>B.C.</small> It was in 363-362 <small>B.C.</small> that the -Athenian Timotheus,—having carried on war with eminent success -against Olynthus and the neighboring cities in the Thermaic Gulf, but -with very bad success against Amphipolis,—transferred his forces to -the war against Kotys king of Thrace near the Thracian Chersonese. -The arrival of the Theban fleet in the Hellespont greatly distracted -the Athenian general, and served as a powerful assistance to Kotys; -who was moreover aided by the Athenian gen<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_369">[p. 369]</span>eral Iphikrates, on this occasion -serving his father-in-law against his country.<a id="FNanchor_794" -href="#Footnote_794" class="fnanchor">[794]</a> Timotheus is -said to have carried on war against Kotys with advantage, and to -have acquired for Athens a large plunder.<a id="FNanchor_795" -href="#Footnote_795" class="fnanchor">[795]</a> It would appear that -his operations were of an aggressive character, and that during his -command in those regions the Athenian possessions in the Chersonese -were safe from Kotys; for Iphikrates would only lend his aid to -Kotys towards defensive warfare; retiring from his service when -he began to attack the Athenian possessions in the Chersonese.<a -id="FNanchor_796" href="#Footnote_796" class="fnanchor">[796]</a></p> - -<p>We do not know what circumstances brought about the dismissal -or retirement of Timotheus from the command. But in the next year, -we find Ergophilus as Athenian commander in the Chersonese, and -Kallisthenes (seemingly) as Athenian commander against Amphipolis.<a -id="FNanchor_797" href="#Footnote_797" class="fnanchor">[797]</a> -The transmarine affairs of Athens, however, were far from improving. -Besides that under the new general she seems to have been losing -strength near the Chersonese, she had now upon her hands a new -maritime enemy—Alexander of Pheræ. A short time previously, he had -been her ally against Thebes, but the victories of the Thebans -during the preceding year had so completely humbled him, that he -now identified his cause with theirs; sending troops to join the -expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus,<a id="FNanchor_798" -href="#Footnote_798" class="fnanchor">[798]</a> and equipping a -fleet to attack the maritime allies of Athens. His fleet captured -the island of Tenos, ravaged several of the other Cyclades, and laid -siege to Peparethos. Great alarm prevailed in Athens, and about -the end of August (362 <small>B.C.</small>),<a id="FNanchor_799" -href="#Footnote_799" class="fnanchor">[799]</a> two months after -the battle of Mantinea,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_370">[p. -370]</span> a fleet was equipped with the utmost activity, for the -purpose of defending the insular allies, as well as of acting in the -Hellespont. Vigorous efforts were required from all the trierarchs, -and really exerted by some, to accelerate the departure of this -fleet. But that portion of it, which, while the rest went to the -Hellespont, was sent under Leosthenes to defend Peparethos,—met with -a defeat from the ships of Alexander, with the loss of five triremes -and six hundred prisoners.<a id="FNanchor_800" href="#Footnote_800" -class="fnanchor">[800]</a> We are even told that soon after this -naval advantage, the victors were bold enough to make a dash into the -Peiræus itself (as Teleutias had done twenty-seven years before), -where they seized both property on shipboard and men on the quay, -before there was any force ready to repel them.<a id="FNanchor_801" -href="#Footnote_801" class="fnanchor">[801]</a> The Thessalian -marauders were ultimately driven back to their harbor of Pegasæ; yet -not without much annoyance to the insular confederates, and some -disgrace to Athens. The defeated admiral Leosthenes was condemned -to death; while several trierarchs,—who, instead of serving in -person, had performed the duties incumbent on them by deputy and -by contract, were censured or put upon trial.<a id="FNanchor_802" -href="#Footnote_802" class="fnanchor">[802]</a></p> - -<p>Not only had the affairs of Athens in the Hellespont become -worse under Ergophilus than under Timotheus, but Kallisthenes also, -who had succeeded Timotheus in the operations against Amphipolis, -achieved no permanent result. It would appear that the Amphipolitans, -to defend themselves against Athens, had invoked the aid of the -Macedonian king Perdikkas; and placed their city in his hands. That -prince had before acted in conjunction with the Athenian force -under Timotheus against Olynthus; and their<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_371">[p. 371]</span> joint invasion had so much weakened -the Olynthians as to disable them from affording aid to Amphipolis. -At least, this hypothesis explains how Amphipolis came now, for the -first time, to be no longer a free city; but to be disjoined from -Olynthus, and joined with (probably garrisoned by) Perdikkas, as a -possession of Macedonia.<a id="FNanchor_803" href="#Footnote_803" -class="fnanchor">[803]</a> Kallisthenes thus found himself at war -under greater disadvantages than Timotheus; having Perdikkas as his -enemy, together with Amphipolis. Nevertheless, it would appear, -he gained at first great advantages, and reduced Perdikkas to the -necessity of purchasing a truce by the promise to abandon the -Amphipolitans. The Macedonian prince, however, having gained time -during the truce to recover his strength, no longer thought of -performing his promise, but held Amphipolis against the Athenians as -obstinately as before. Kallisthenes had let slip an opportunity which -never again returned. After having announced at Athens the victorious -truce and the approaching surrender, he seems to have been compelled, -on his return, to admit that he had been cheated into suspending -operations, at a moment when (as it seemed) Amphipolis might have -been conquered. For this misjudgment or misconduct he was put upon -trial at Athens, on returning to his disappointed countrymen; -and at the same time Ergophilus also, who had been summoned home -from the Chersonesus for his ill-success or bad management of -the war against Kotys.<a id="FNanchor_804" href="#Footnote_804" -class="fnanchor">[804]</a> The people were much incensed against -both; but most against Ergophilus. Nevertheless it happened that -Kallisthenes was tried first, and condemned to death. On the next -day, Ergophilus was tried. But the verdict of the preceding day -had discharged the wrath of the dikasts, and rendered them so -much more indulgent, that they acquitted him.<a id="FNanchor_805" -href="#Footnote_805" class="fnanchor">[805]</a></p> - -<p>Autokles was sent in place of Ergophilus to carry on war for -Athens in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. It was not merely against -Kotys that his operations were necessary. The Prokon<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_372">[p. 372]</span>nesians, allies of -Athens, required protection against the attacks of Kyzikus; besides -which, there was another necessity yet more urgent. The stock of -corn was becoming short, and the price rising, not merely at Athens, -but at many of the islands in the Ægean, and at Byzantium and other -places. There prevailed therefore unusual anxiety, coupled with keen -competition, for the corn in course of importation from the Euxine. -The Byzantines, Chalkedonians, and Kyzikenes, had already begun to -detain the passing corn-ships, for the supply of their own markets; -and nothing less than a powerful Athenian fleet could ensure the -safe transit of such supplies to Athens herself.<a id="FNanchor_806" -href="#Footnote_806" class="fnanchor">[806]</a> The Athenian fleet, -guarding the Bosphorus even from the Hieron inwards (the chapel near -the junction of the Bosphorus with the Euxine), provided safe convoy -for the autumnal exports of this essential article.</p> - -<p>In carrying on operations against Kotys, Autokles was favored -with an unexpected advantage by the recent revolt of a powerful -Thracian named Miltokythes against that prince. This revolt so -alarmed Kotys, that he wrote a letter to Athens in a submissive -tone, and sent envoys to purchase peace by various concessions. -At the same time Miltokythes also first sent envoys—next, went in -person—to Athens, to present his own case and solicit aid. He was -however coldly received. The vote of the Athenian assembly, passed -on hearing the case (and probably procured in part through the -friends of Iphikrates), was so unfavorable,<a id="FNanchor_807" -href="#Footnote_807" class="fnanchor">[807]</a> as to send him away -not merely in discouragement, but in alarm; while Kotys recovered all -his power in Thrace, and even became master of the Sacred Mountain -with its abundance of wealthy deposits. Nevertheless, in spite -of this imprudent vote, the Athenians really intended to sustain -Miltokythes against Kotys. Their general Autokles was recalled after -a few months, and put upon his trial for having suffered Kotys to put -down this enemy unassisted.<a id="FNanchor_808" href="#Footnote_808" -class="fnanchor">[808]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_373">[p. -373]</span> How the trial ended or how the justice of the case -stood, we are unable to make out from the passing allusions of -Demosthenes.</p> - -<p>Menon was sent as commander to the Hellespont to supersede -Autokles; and was himself again superseded after a few months, by -Timomachus. Convoy for the corn-vessels out of the Euxine became -necessary anew, as in the preceding year; and was furnished a -second time during the autumn of 361 <small>B.C.</small> by the -Athenian ships of war;<a id="FNanchor_809" href="#Footnote_809" -class="fnanchor">[809]</a> not merely for provisions under transport -to Athens, but also for those going to Maroneia, Thasos, and -other places in or near Thrace. But affairs in the Chersonese -became yet more unfavorable to Athens. In the winter of 361-360 -<small>B.C.</small>, Kotys, with the coöperation of a body of -Abydene citizens and Sestian exiles, who crossed the Hellespont -from Abydos, contrived to surprise Sestos;<a id="FNanchor_810" -href="#Footnote_810" class="fnanchor">[810]</a> the most important -place in the Chersonese, and the guard-post of the Hellespont -on its European side, for all vessels passing in or out. The -whole Chersonese was now thrown open to his aggressions. He made -preparations for attacking Elæus and Krithôtê, the two other chief -possessions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_374">[p. 374]</span> of -Athens, and endeavored to prevail on Iphikrates to take part in -his projects. But that general, though he had assisted Kotys in -defence against Athens, refused to commit the more patent treason -involved in aggressive hostility against her. He even quitted -Thrace, but not daring at once to visit Athens, retired to Lesbos.<a -id="FNanchor_811" href="#Footnote_811" class="fnanchor">[811]</a> In -spite of his refusal, however, the settlers and possessions of Athens -in the Chersonese were attacked and imperiled by Kotys, who claimed -the whole peninsula as his own, and established toll-gatherers -at Sestos to levy the dues both of strait and harbor.<a -id="FNanchor_812" href="#Footnote_812" class="fnanchor">[812]</a></p> - -<p>The fortune of Athens in these regions was still unpropitious. -All her late commanders, Ergophilus, Autokles, Menon, Timomachus, -had been successively deficient in means, in skill, or in fidelity, -and had undergone accusation at home.<a id="FNanchor_813" -href="#Footnote_813" class="fnanchor">[813]</a> Timomachus was now -superseded by Kephisodotus, a man of known enmity towards both -Iphikrates and Kotys.<a id="FNanchor_814" href="#Footnote_814" -class="fnanchor">[814]</a> But Kephisodotus achieved no more than -his predecessors, and had even to contend against a new enemy, who -crossed over from Abydos to Sestos to reinforce Kotys—Charidemus with -the mercenary division under his command. That officer, since his -service three years before under Timotheus against Amphipolis, had -been for some time in Asia, especially in the <span class="replace" -id="tn_5" title="In the printed book: troad">Troad.</span> He hired -himself to the satrap Artabazus; of whose embarrassments he took -advantage to seize by fraud the towns of Skepsis, Kebren, and Ilium; -intending to hold them as a little principality.<a id="FNanchor_815" -href="#Footnote_815" class="fnanchor">[815]</a> Finding his position, -however, ultimately untenable against the probable force of the -satrap, he sent a letter across to the Chersonese, to the Athenian -commander Kephisodotus, asking for Athenian triremes to transport -his division across to Europe; in return for which, if granted, he -engaged to crush Kotys and reconquer the Chersonese for Athens. This -proposition, whether accepted or not, was never realized; for<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_375">[p. 375]</span> Charidemus was enabled, -through a truce unexpectedly granted to him by the satrap, to cross -over from Abydos to Sestos without any Athenian ships. But as soon -as he found himself in the Chersonese, far from aiding Athens to -recover that peninsula, he actually took service with Kotys against -her; so that Elæeus and Krithôtê, her chief remaining posts, were in -greater peril than ever.<a id="FNanchor_816" href="#Footnote_816" -class="fnanchor">[816]</a></p> - -<p>The victorious prospects of Kotys, however, were now unexpectedly -arrested. After a reign of twenty-four years he was assassinated by -two brothers, Python and Herakleides, Greeks from the city of Ænus in -Thrace, and formerly students under Plato at Athens. They committed -the act to avenge their father; upon whom, as it would appear, Kotys -had inflicted some brutal insult, under the influence of that violent -and licentious temper which was in him combined with an energetic -military character.<a id="FNanchor_817" href="#Footnote_817" -class="fnanchor">[817]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_376">[p. -376]</span> Having made their escape, Python and his brother retired -to Athens, where they were received with every demonstration of -honor, and presented with the citizenship as well as with golden -wreaths; partly as tyrannicides, partly as having relieved the -Athenians from an odious and formidable enemy.<a id="FNanchor_818" -href="#Footnote_818" class="fnanchor">[818]</a> Disclaiming the -warm eulogies heaped upon him by various speakers in the assembly, -Python is said to have replied—“It was a god who did the deed; we -only lent our hands:”<a id="FNanchor_819" href="#Footnote_819" -class="fnanchor">[819]</a> an anecdote, which, whether it be -truth or fiction, illustrates powerfully the Greek admiration of -tyrannicide.</p> - -<p>The death of Kotys gave some relief to Athenian affairs in -the Chersonese. Of his children, even the eldest, Kersobleptes, -was only a youth:<a id="FNanchor_820" href="#Footnote_820" -class="fnanchor">[820]</a> moreover two other Thracian chiefs, -Berisades and Amadokus, now started up as pretenders to shares in -the kingdom of Thrace. Kersobleptes employed as his main support and -minister the mercenary general Charidemus, who either had already -married, or did now marry, his sister; a nuptial connection had been -formed in like manner by Amadokus with two Greeks named Simon and -Bianor—and by Berisades with an Athenian citizen named Athenodorus, -who (like Iphikrates and others) had founded a city, and possessed -a certain independent dominion, in or near the Chersonese.<a -id="FNanchor_821" href="#Footnote_821" class="fnanchor">[821]</a> -These Grecian mercenary chiefs thus united themselves by nuptial -ties to the princes whom they served, as Seuthes had proposed to -Xenophon, and as the Italian Condottieri of the fifteenth century -ennobled themselves by similar alliance with princely families—for -example, Sforza with the Visconti of Milan. All these three Thracian -competitors were now represented by Grecian agents. But at first, -it seems, Charidemus on behalf of Kersobleptes was the strongest. -He and his army were near Perinthus on the north coast of the -Propontis, where the Athenian<span class="pagenum" id="Page_377">[p. -377]</span> commander, Kephisodotus, visited him, with a small -squadron of ten triremes, in order to ask for the fulfilment of those -fair promises which Charidemus had made in his letter from Asia. But -Charidemus treated the Athenians as enemies, attacked by surprise -the seamen on shore, and inflicted upon them great damage. He then -pressed the Chersonese severely for several months, and marched -even into the midst of it, to protect a nest of pirates whom the -Athenians were besieging at the neighboring islet on its western -coast—Alopekonnesus. At length, after seven months of unprofitable -warfare (dating from the death of Kotys), he forced Kephisodotus -to conclude with him a convention so disastrous and dishonorable, -that as soon as known at Athens, it was indignantly repudiated.<a -id="FNanchor_822" href="#Footnote_822" class="fnanchor">[822]</a> -Kephisodotus, being recalled in disgrace, was put upon his trial, -and fined; the orator Demosthenes (we are told), who had served as -one of the trierarchs in the fleet, being among his accusers.<a -id="FNanchor_823" href="#Footnote_823" class="fnanchor">[823]</a></p> - -<p>Among the articles of this unfavorable convention, one was -that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_378">[p. 378]</span> the Greek -city of Kardia should be specially reserved to Charidemus himself. -That city—eminently convenient from its situation on the isthmus -connecting the Chersonese with Thrace—claimed by the Athenians -as within the Chersonese, yet at the same time intensely hostile -to Athens—became his principal station.<a id="FNanchor_824" -href="#Footnote_824" class="fnanchor">[824]</a> He was fortunate -enough to seize, through treachery, the person of the Thracian -Miltokythes, who had been the pronounced enemy of Kotys, and had -coöperated with Athens. But he did not choose to hand over this -important prisoner to Kersobleptes, because the life of Miltokythes -would thus have been saved: it not being the custom of Thracians, -in their intestine disputes, to put each other to death.<a -id="FNanchor_825" href="#Footnote_825" class="fnanchor">[825]</a> -We remark with surprise a practice milder than that of Greece, -amidst a people decidedly more barbarous and blood-thirsty than -the Greeks. Charidemus accordingly surrendered Miltokythes to the -Kardians, who put the prisoner with his son into a boat, took -them a little way out to sea, slew the son before the eyes of the -father, and then drowned the father himself.<a id="FNanchor_826" -href="#Footnote_826" class="fnanchor">[826]</a> It is not improbable -that there may have been some special antecedent causes, occasioning -intense antipathy on the part of the Kardians towards Miltokythes, -and inducing Charidemus to hand him over to them as an acceptable -subject for revenge. However this may be, their savage deed kindled -violent indignation among all the Thracians, and did much injury to -the cause of Kersobleptes and Charidemus. Though Kephisodotus had -been recalled, and though a considerable interval elapsed before any -successor came from Athens, yet Berisades and Amadokus joined their -forces in one common accord, and sent to the Athenians propositions -of alliance, with request for pecuniary aid. Athenodorus, the general -of Berisades, putting himself at the head of Thracians and Athenians -together, found himself superior in the field to Kersobleptes and -Charidemus; whom he constrained to accept a fresh convention dictated -by himself. Herein it was provided, that the kingdom of Thrace -should be divided in equal portions between the three competitors; -that all three should concur in surrendering the Chersonese to -Athens;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_379">[p. 379]</span> and -that the son of a leading man named Iphiades at Sestos, held by -Charidemus as hostage for the adherence of that city, should be -surrendered to Athens also.<a id="FNanchor_827" href="#Footnote_827" -class="fnanchor">[827]</a></p> - -<p>This new convention, sworn on both sides, promised to Athens -the full acquisition which she desired. Considering the thing as -done, the Athenians sent Chabrias as commander in one trireme to -receive the surrender, but omitted to send the money requested by -Athenodorus; who was accordingly constrained to disband his army for -want of pay. Upon this Kersobleptes and Charidemus at once threw up -their engagement, refused to execute the convention just sworn, and -constrained Chabrias, who had come without any force, to revert to -the former convention concluded with Kephisodotus. Disappointed and -indignant, the Athenians disavowed the act of Chabrias, in spite -of his high reputation. They sent ten envoys to the Chersonese, -insisting that the convention of Athenodorus should be resworn by all -the three Thracian competitors—Berisades, Amadokus, Kersobleptes; -if the third declined, the envoys were instructed to take measures -for making war upon him, while they received the engagements of -the other two. But such a mission, without arms, obtained nothing -from Charidemus and Kersobleptes, except delay or refusal; while -Berisades and Amadokus sent to Athens bitter complaints respecting -the breach of faith. At length, after some months—just after the -triumphant conclusion of the expedition of Athens against Eubœa -(358 <small>B.C.</small>)—the Athenian Chares arrived in the -Chersonese, at the head of a considerable mercenary force. Then -at length the two recusants were compelled to swear anew to the -convention of Athenodorus, in the presence of the latter as well as -of Berisades and Amadokus.<a id="FNanchor_828" href="#Footnote_828" -class="fnanchor">[828]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_380">[p. -380]</span> And it would appear that before long, its conditions -were realized. Charidemus surrendered the Chersonese, of course -including its principal town Sestos, to Athens;<a id="FNanchor_829" -href="#Footnote_829" class="fnanchor">[829]</a> yet he retained -for himself Kardia,<a id="FNanchor_830" href="#Footnote_830" -class="fnanchor">[830]</a> which was affirmed (though the -Athenians denied it) not to be included in the boundaries of -that peninsula. The kingdom of Thrace was also divided between -Kersobleptes, Berisades, and Amadokus; which triple division, -diminishing the strength of each, was regarded by Athens as a great -additional guarantee for her secure possession of the Chersonese.<a -id="FNanchor_831" href="#Footnote_831" class="fnanchor">[831]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_381">[p. 381]</span></p> - -<p>It was thus that Athens at length made good her possession of -the Chersonese against the neighboring Thracian potentates. And it -would seem that her transmarine power, with its dependencies and -confederates, now stood at a greater height than it had ever reached -since the terrible reverses of 405 <small>B.C.</small> Among them -were numbered not only a great number of the Ægean islands (even the -largest, Eubœa, Chios, Samos, and Rhodes), but also the continental -possessions of Byzantium—the Chersonese—Maroneia<a id="FNanchor_832" -href="#Footnote_832" class="fnanchor">[832]</a> with other places on -the southern coast of Thrace—and Pydna, Methônê, and Potidæa, with -most of the region surrounding the Thermaic Gulf.<a id="FNanchor_833" -href="#Footnote_833" class="fnanchor">[833]</a> This last portion -of empire had been acquired at the cost of the Olynthian fraternal -alliance of neighboring cities, against which Athens too, as well as -Sparta, by an impulse most disastrous for the future independence of -Greece, had made war with inauspicious success. The Macedonian king -Perdikkas, with a just instinct towards the future aggrandizement of -his dynasty, had assisted her in thus weakening Olynthus; feeling -that the towns on the Thermaic Gulf, if they formed parts of a -strong Olynthian confederacy of brothers and neighbors, reciprocally -attached and self-sustaining, would resist Macedonia more -effectively, than if they were half-reluctant dependencies of Athens, -even with the chances of Athenian aid by sea. The aggressive hand of -Athens against Olynthus, indeed, between 368-363 <small>B.C.</small>, -was hardly less mischievous, to Greece generally, than that of Sparta -had been between 382-380 <small>B.C.</small> Sparta had crushed the -Olynthian confederacy in its first brilliant promise—Athens prevented -it from rearing its head anew. Both conspired to break down the most -effective barrier against Macedonian aggrandizement; neither were -found competent to provide any adequate protection to Greece in its -room.</p> - -<p>The maximum of her second empire, which I have remarked -that Athens attained by the recovery of the Chersonese,<a -id="FNanchor_834" href="#Footnote_834" class="fnanchor">[834]</a> -lasted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_382">[p. 382]</span> but for a -moment. During the very same year, there occurred that revolt among -her principal allies, known by the name of the Social War, which gave -to her power a fatal shock, and left the field comparatively clear -for the early aggressions of her yet more formidable enemy—Philip -of Macedon. That prince had already emerged from his obscurity as a -hostage in Thebes, and had succeeded his brother Perdikkas, slain in -a battle with the Illyrians, as king (360-359 <small>B.C.</small>). -At first, his situation appeared not merely difficult, but almost -hopeless. Not the most prescient eye in Greece could have recognized, -in the inexperienced youth struggling at his first accession against -rivals at home, enemies abroad, and embarrassments of every kind—the -future conqueror of Chæroneia, and destroyer of Grecian independence. -How, by his own genius, energy, and perseverance, assisted by the -faults and dissensions of his Grecian enemies, he attained his -inauspicious eminence—will be recounted in my subsequent volume.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>At the opening of my ninth volume, after the surrender of Athens, -Greece was under the Spartan empire. Its numerous independent -city-communities were more completely regimented under one chief than -they had ever been before, Athens and Thebes being both numbered -among the followers of Sparta.</p> - -<p>But the conflicts recounted in these two volumes (during an -interval of forty-four years—404-403 <small>B.C.</small> to 360-359 -<small>B.C.</small>) have wrought the melancholy change of leaving -Greece more disunited, and more destitute of presiding Hellenic -authority, than she had been at any time since the Persian invasion. -Thebes, Sparta, and Athens, had all been engaged in weakening each -other; in which, unhappily, each has been far more successful than -in strengthening<span class="pagenum" id="Page_383">[p. 383]</span> -herself. The maritime power of Athens is now indeed considerable, and -may be called very great, if compared with the state of degradation -to which she had been brought in 403 <small>B.C.</small> But it -will presently be seen how unsubstantial is the foundation of her -authority, and how fearfully she has fallen off from that imperial -feeling and energy which ennobled her ancestors under the advice of -Perikles.</p> - -<p>It is under these circumstances, so untoward for defence, that the -aggressor from Macedonia arises.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_81"> - <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXXI.<br /> - SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN - ARMAMENT BEFORE SYRACUSE.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">In</span> -the sixtieth chapter of this work, I brought down the history of -the Grecian communities in Sicily to the close of the Athenian -siege of Syracuse, where Nikias and Demosthenes with nearly their -entire armament perished by so lamentable a fate. I now resume from -that point the thread of Sicilian events, which still continues so -distinct from those of Peloponnesus and Eastern Greece, that it is -inconvenient to include both in the same chapters.</p> - -<p>If the destruction of the great Athenian armament (in September -413 <small>B.C.</small>) excited the strongest sensation throughout -every part of the Grecian world, we may imagine the intoxication -of triumph with which it must have been hailed in Sicily. It had -been achieved (Gylippus and the Peloponnesian allies aiding) by the -united efforts of nearly all the Grecian cities in the island,—for -all of them had joined Syracuse as soon as her prospects became -decidedly encouraging; except Naxos and Katana, which were allied -with the Athenians,—and Agrigentum, which remained neutral.<a -id="FNanchor_835" href="#Footnote_835" class="fnanchor">[835]</a> -Unfortunately we know little or nothing of the proceedings<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_384">[p. 384]</span> of the Syracusans, -immediately following upon circumstances of so much excitement -and interest. They appear to have carried on war against -Katana, where some fugitives from the vanquished Athenian army -contributed to the resistance against them.<a id="FNanchor_836" -href="#Footnote_836" class="fnanchor">[836]</a> But both this city -and Naxos, though exposed to humiliation and danger as allies -of the defeated Athenians, contrived to escape without the loss -of their independence. The allies of Syracuse were probably not -eager to attack them, and thereby to aggrandize that city farther; -while the Syracusans themselves also would be sensible of great -exhaustion, arising from the immense efforts through which alone -their triumph had been achieved. The pecuniary burdens to which -they had been obliged to submit—known to Nikias during the last -months of the siege,<a id="FNanchor_837" href="#Footnote_837" -class="fnanchor">[837]</a> and fatally misleading his judgment,—were -so heavy as to task severely their powers of endurance. After -paying, and dismissing with appropriate gratitude, the numerous -auxiliaries whom they had been obliged to hire,—after celebrating -the recent triumph, and decorating the temples, in a manner -satisfactory to the exuberant joy of the citizens<a id="FNanchor_838" -href="#Footnote_838" class="fnanchor">[838]</a>—there would probably -be a general disposition to repose rather than to aggressive warfare. -There would be much destruction to be repaired throughout their -territory, poorly watched or cultivated during the year of the -siege.</p> - -<p>In spite of such exhaustion, however, the sentiment of -exasperation and vengeance against Athens, combined with gratitude -towards the Lacedæmonians, was too powerful to be balked. A confident -persuasion reigned throughout Greece that Athens<a id="FNanchor_839" -href="#Footnote_839" class="fnanchor">[839]</a> could not hold out -for one single summer after her late terrific disaster; a persuasion, -founded greatly on the hope of a large auxiliary squadron to act -against her from Syracuse and her other enemies in Sicily and Italy. -In this day of Athenian distress, such enemies of course became more -numerous. Especially the city of Thurii in Italy,<a id="FNanchor_840" -href="#Footnote_840" class="fnanchor">[840]</a> which had been -friendly to Athens and had furnished aid to Demosthenes in his -expedition to Sicily, now underwent a change, banished three hundred -of the leading philo-Athenian citizens (among them the rhetor -Lysias), and espoused<span class="pagenum" id="Page_385">[p. -385]</span> the Peloponnesian cause with ardor. The feeling of -reaction at Thurii, and of vengeance at Syracuse, stimulated the -citizens of both places to take active part in an effort promising to -be easy and glorious, for the destruction of Athens and her empire. -And volunteers were doubtless the more forward, as the Persian -satraps of the sea-board were now competing with each other in -invitations to the Greeks, with offers of abundant pay.</p> - -<p>Accordingly, in the summer of the year 412 <small>B.C.</small> -(the year following the catastrophe of the Athenian armament,) a -Sicilian squadron of twenty triremes from Syracuse and two from -Selinus, under the command of Hermokrates, reached Peloponnesus and -joined the Lacedæmonian fleet in its expedition across the Ægean -to Miletus. Another squadron of ten triremes from Thurii, under -the Rhodian Dorieus, and a farther reinforcement from Tarentum, -and Lokri, followed soon after. It was Hermokrates who chiefly -instigated his countrymen to this effort.<a id="FNanchor_841" -href="#Footnote_841" class="fnanchor">[841]</a> Throughout the trying -months of the siege, he had taken a leading part in the defence -of Syracuse, seconding the plans of Gylippus with equal valor and -discretion. As commander of the Syracusan squadron in the main fleet -now acting against Athens in the Ægean (events already described in -my sixty-first chapter), his conduct was not less distinguished. -He was energetic in action, and popular in his behavior towards -those under his command; but what stood out most conspicuously as -well as most honorably, was his personal incorruptibility. While -the Peloponnesian admiral and trierarchs accepted the bribes of -Tissaphernes, conniving at his betrayal of the common cause and -breach of engagement towards the armament, with indifference to -the privations of their own unpaid seamen,—Hermokrates and Dorieus -were strenuous in remonstrance, even to the extent of drawing upon -themselves the indignant displeasure of the Peloponnesian admiral -Astyochus, as well as of the satrap himself.<a id="FNanchor_842" -href="#Footnote_842" class="fnanchor">[842]</a> They were the -more earnest in performing this duty, because the Syracusan and -Thurian triremes were manned by freemen in larger proportion than -the remaining fleet.<a id="FNanchor_843" href="#Footnote_843" -class="fnanchor">[843]</a></p> - -<p>The sanguine expectation, however, entertained by Hermokrates -and his companions in crossing the sea from Sicily,—that one<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_386">[p. 386]</span> single effort would -gloriously close the war,—was far from being realized. Athens -resisted with unexpected energy; the Lacedæmonians were so slack -and faint-hearted, that they even let slip the golden opportunity -presented to them by the usurpation of the Athenian Four Hundred. -Tissaphernes was discovered to be studiously starving and protracting -the war for purposes of his own, which Hermokrates vainly tried -to counter-work by a personal visit and protest at Sparta.<a -id="FNanchor_844" href="#Footnote_844" class="fnanchor">[844]</a> -Accordingly, the war trailed on with fluctuating success, and even -renovated efficiency on the part of Athens; so that the Syracusans at -home, far from hearing announced the accomplishment of those splendid -anticipations under which their squadron had departed, received -news generally unfavorable, and at length positively disastrous. -They were informed that their seamen were ill-paid and distressed; -while Athens, far from striking her colors, had found means to -assemble a fleet at Samos competent still to dispute the mastery of -the Ægean. They heard of two successive naval defeats, which the -Peloponnesian and Syracusan fleets sustained in the Hellespont<a -id="FNanchor_845" href="#Footnote_845" class="fnanchor">[845]</a> -(one at Kynossema,—411 <small>B.C.</small>,—a second between Abydos -and Dardanus,—410 <small>B.C.</small>); and at length of a third, -more decisive and calamitous than the preceding,—the battle of -Kyzikus (409 <small>B.C.</small>), wherein the Lacedæmonian admiral -Mindarus was slain, and the whole of his fleet captured or destroyed. -In this defeat the Syracusan squadron were joint sufferers. Their -seamen were compelled to burn all their triremes without exception, -in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy; -and were left destitute, without clothing or subsistence, on the -shores of the Propontis amidst the satrapy of Pharnabazus.<a -id="FNanchor_846" href="#Footnote_846" class="fnanchor">[846]</a> -That satrap, with generous forwardness, took them into his pay, -advanced to them clothing and provision for two months, and furnished -them with timber from the woods of Mount Ida to build fresh ships. At -Antandrus (in the Gulf of Adramyttium, one great place of export for -Idæan timber), where the reconstruction took place, the Syracusans -made themselves so acceptable and useful to the citizens, that a -vote of thanks and a grant of citizenship was passed to all of them -who chose to accept it.<a id="FNanchor_847" href="#Footnote_847" -class="fnanchor">[847]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_387">[p. 387]</span></p> - -<p>In recounting this battle, I cited the brief and rude despatch, -addressed to the Lacedæmonians by Hippokrates, surviving second -officer of the slain Mindarus, describing the wretched condition -of the defeated armament—“Our honor is gone. Mindarus is slain. -The men are hungry. We know not what to do.”<a id="FNanchor_848" -href="#Footnote_848" class="fnanchor">[848]</a> This curious -despatch has passed into history, because it was intercepted by the -Athenians, and never reached its destination. But without doubt the -calamitous state of facts, which it was intended to make known, flew -rapidly, under many different forms of words, both to Peloponnesus -and to Syracuse. Sad as the reality was, the first impression made -by the news would probably be yet sadder; since the intervention -of Pharnabazus, whereby the sufferers were so much relieved, would -hardly be felt or authenticated until after some interval. At -Syracuse, the event on being made known excited not only powerful -sympathy with the sufferers, but also indignant displeasure against -Hermokrates and his colleagues; who, having instigated their -countrymen three years before, by sanguine hopes and assurances, to -commence a foreign expedition for the purpose of finally putting down -Athens, had not only achieved nothing, but had sustained a series of -reverses, ending at length in utter ruin, from the very enemy whom -they had pronounced to be incapable of farther resistance.</p> - -<p>It was under such sentiment of displeasure, shortly after the -defeat of Kyzikus, that a sentence of banishment was passed at -Syracuse against Hermokrates and his colleagues. The sentence was -transmitted to Asia, and made known by Hermokrates himself to the -armament, convoked in public meeting. While lamenting and protesting -against its alleged injustice and illegality, he entreated the -armament to maintain unabated good behavior for the future, and to -choose new admirals for the time, until the successors nominated -at Syracuse should arrive. The news was heard with deep regret by -the trierarchs, the pilots, and the maritime soldiers or marines; -who, attached to Hermokrates from his popular manner, his constant -openness of communication with them, and his anxiety to collect their -opinions, loudly proclaimed that they would neither choose, nor -serve under, any other lead<span class="pagenum" id="Page_388">[p. -388]</span>ers.<a id="FNanchor_849" href="#Footnote_849" -class="fnanchor">[849]</a> But the admirals repressed this -disposition, deprecating any resistance to the decree of the city. -They laid down their command, inviting any man dissatisfied with them -to prefer his complaint at once publicly, and reminding the soldiers -of the many victories and glorious conflicts, both by land and sea, -which had knit them together by the ties of honorable fellowship. -No man stood forward to accuse them; and they consented, on the -continued request of the armament, to remain in command, until their -three successors arrived—Demarchus, Myskon, and Potamis. They then -retired amidst universal regret; many of the trierarchs even binding -themselves by oath, that on returning to Syracuse they would procure -their restoration. The change of commanders took place at Miletus.<a -id="FNanchor_850" href="#Footnote_850" class="fnanchor">[850]</a></p> - -<p>Though Hermokrates, in his address to the soldiers, would -doubtless find response when he invoked the remembrance of past -victories, yet he would hardly have found the like response in a -Syracusan assembly. For if we review the proceedings of the armament -since he conducted it from Syracuse to join the Peloponnesian -fleet, we shall find that on the whole his expedition had been a -complete failure, and that his assurances of success against Athens -had ended in nothing but disappointment. There was therefore ample -cause for the discontent of his countrymen. But on the other hand, -as far as our limited means of information enable us to judge, the -sentence of banishment against him appears to have been undeserved -and unjust. For we cannot trace the ill-success of Hermokrates to -any misconduct or omission on his part; while in regard to personal -incorruptibility, and strenuous resistance to the duplicity of -Tissaphernes, he stood out as an honorable exception among a body -of venal colleagues. That satrap, indeed, as soon as Hermokrates -had fallen into disgrace, circulated a version of his own, -pretending that the latter, having asked money from him and been -refused, had sought by calumnious means to revenge such refusal.<a -id="FNanchor_851" href="#Footnote_851" class="fnanchor">[851]</a> -But this story, whether believed elsewhere or not, found no credit -with the other satrap Pharnabazus; who warmly espoused the cause -of the banished general, presenting him with a sum of money even -unsolicited. This money<span class="pagenum" id="Page_389">[p. -389]</span> Hermokrates immediately employed in getting together -triremes and mercenary soldiers to accomplish his restoration -to Syracuse by force.<a id="FNanchor_852" href="#Footnote_852" -class="fnanchor">[852]</a> We shall presently see how he fared -in this attempt. Meanwhile we may remark that the sentence of -banishment, though in itself unjust, would appear amply justified in -the eyes of his countrymen by his own subsequent resort to hostile -measures against them.</p> - -<p>The party opposed to Hermokrates had now the preponderance in -Syracuse, and by their influence probably the sentence against him -was passed, under the grief and wrath occasioned by the defeat of -Kyzikus. Unfortunately we have only the most scanty information as -to the internal state of Syracuse during the period immediately -succeeding the Athenian siege; a period of marked popular sentiment -and peculiar interest. As at Athens under the pressure of the -Xerxeian invasion—the energies of all the citizens, rich and poor, -young and old, had been called forth for repulse of the common -enemy, and had been not more than enough to achieve it. As at Athens -after the battles of Salamis and Platæa, so at Syracuse after the -destruction of the Athenian besiegers—the people, elate with the -plenitude of recent effort, and conscious that the late successful -defence had been the joint work of all, were in a state of animated -democratical impulse, eager for the utmost extension and equality -of political rights. Even before the Athenian siege, the government -had been democratical; a fact, which Thucydides notices as among the -causes of the successful defence, by rendering the citizens unanimous -in resistance, and by preventing the besiegers from exciting -intestine discontent.<a id="FNanchor_853" href="#Footnote_853" -class="fnanchor">[853]</a> But in the period immediately after -the siege, it underwent changes which are said to have rendered -it still more democratical. On the proposition of an influential -citizen named Dioklês, a commission of Ten was named, of which he -was president, for the purpose of revising both the constitution and -the legislation of the city. Some organic alterations were adopted, -one of which was, that the lot should be adopted, instead of the -principle of election, in the nomination of magistrates. Furthermore, -a new code, or collection of criminal and civil enactments, was -drawn up and sanctioned. We know nothing of its details, but we -are told that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_390">[p. 390]</span> -its penalties were extremely severe, its determination of offences -minute and special, and its language often obscure as well as brief. -It was known by the name of the Laws of Dioklês, the chief of the -Committee who had prepared it. Though now adopted at Syracuse, it did -not last long; for we shall find in five or six years the despotism -of Dionysius extinguishing it, just as Peisistratus had put down -the Solonian legislation at Athens. But it was again revived at the -extinction of the Dionysian dynasty, after the lapse of more than -sixty years; with comments and modifications by a committee, among -whose members were the Corinthians Kephalus and Timoleon. It is also -said to have been copied in various other Sicilian cities, and to -have remained in force until the absorption of all Sicily under the -dominion of the Romans.<a id="FNanchor_854" href="#Footnote_854" -class="fnanchor">[854]</a></p> - -<p>We have the austere character of Dioklês illustrated by -a story (of more than dubious credit,<a id="FNanchor_855" -href="#Footnote_855" class="fnanchor">[855]</a> and of which the -like is recounted respecting other Grecian legislators), that having -inadvertently violated one of his own enactments, he enforced the -duty of obedience by falling on his own sword. But unfortunately we -are not permitted to know the substance of his laws, which would have -thrown so much light on the sentiments and position of the Sicilian -Greeks. Nor can we distinctly make out to what extent the political -constitution of Syracuse was now changed. For though Diodorus tells -us that the lot was now applied to the nomination of magistrates, -yet he does not state whether it was applied to all magistrates, -or under what reserves and exceptions—such, for example, as those -adopted at Athens. Aristotle too states that the Syracusan people, -after the Athenian siege, changed their constitution from a partial -democracy into an entire democracy. Yet he describes Dionysius, five -or six years afterwards, as pushing himself up to the despotism, -by the most violent demagogic opposition; and as having accused, -disgraced, and overthrown certain rich leaders then in possession of -the functions of government.<a id="FNanchor_856" href="#Footnote_856" -class="fnanchor">[856]</a> If the constitutional forms were rendered -more democratical, it would seem that the practice cannot have -materially changed, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_391">[p. -391]</span> that the persons actually in leading function still -continued to be rich men.</p> - -<p>The war carried on by the Syracusans against Naxos and Katana, -after continuing more than three years,<a id="FNanchor_857" -href="#Footnote_857" class="fnanchor">[857]</a> was brought to a -close by an enemy from without, even more formidable than Athens. -This time, the invader was not Hellenic, but Phœnician—the ancient -foe of Hellas, Carthage.</p> - -<p>It has been already recounted, how in the same eventful year -(480 <small>B.C.</small>) which transported Xerxes across the -Hellespont to meet his defeat at Salamis, the Carthaginians had -poured into Sicily a vast mercenary host under Hamilkar, for the -purpose of reinstating in Himera the despot Terillus, who had been -expelled by Theron of Agrigentum. On that occasion, Hamilkar had been -slain, and his large army defeated, by the Syracusan despot Gelon, -in the memorable battle of Himera. So deep had been the impression -left by this defeat, that for the seventy years which intervened -between 480-410 <small>B.C.</small>, the Carthaginians had never -again invaded the island. They resumed their aggressions shortly -after the destruction of the Athenian power before Syracuse; which -same event had also stimulated the Persians, who had been kept in -restraint while the Athenian empire remained unimpaired, again to -act offensively for the recovery of their dominion over the Asiatic -Greeks. The great naval power of Athens, inspiring not merely reserve -but even alarm to Carthage,<a id="FNanchor_858" href="#Footnote_858" -class="fnanchor">[858]</a> had been a safeguard to the Hellenic world -both at its eastern and its western extremity. No sooner was that -safeguard overthrown, than the hostile pressure of the foreigner -began to be felt, as well upon Western Sicily as on the eastern coast -of the Ægean.</p> - -<p>From this time forward for two centuries, down to the conclusion -of the second Punic war, the Carthaginians will be found frequent in -their aggressive interventions in Sicily, and upon an extensive<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_392">[p. 392]</span> scale, so as to act -powerfully on the destinies of the Sicilian Greeks. Whether any -internal causes had occurred to make them abstain from intervention -during the preceding generations, we are unable to say. The history -of this powerful and wealthy city is very little known. We make out -a few facts, which impart a general idea both of her oligarchical -government and of her extensive colonial possessions, but which -leave us in the dark as to her continuous history. Her possessions -were most extensive, along the coast of Africa both eastward and -westward from her city; comprehending also Sardinia and the Balearic -isles, but (at this time, probably) few settlements in Spain. She -had quite enough to occupy her attention elsewhere, without meddling -in Sicilian affairs; the more so, as her province in Sicily was -rather a dependent ally than a colonial possession. In the early -treaties made with Rome, the Carthaginians restrict and even -interdict the traffic of the Romans both with Sardinia and Africa -(except Carthage itself), but they grant the amplest license of -intercourse with the Carthaginian province of Sicily; which they -consider as standing in the same relation to Carthage as the cities -of Latium stood in to Rome.<a id="FNanchor_859" href="#Footnote_859" -class="fnanchor">[859]</a> While the connection of Carthage -with Sicily was thus less close, it would appear that her other -dependencies gave her much trouble, chiefly in consequence of her own -harsh and extortionate dominion.</p> - -<p>All our positive information, scanty as it is, about Carthage -and her institutions, relates to the fourth, third, or second -centuries <small>B.C.</small>, yet it may be held to justify -presumptive conclusions as to the fifth<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_393">[p. 393]</span> century <small>B.C.</small>, -especially in reference to the general system pursued. The -maximum of her power was attained before her first war with -Rome, which began in 264 <small>B.C.</small>; the first and -second Punic wars both of them greatly reduced her strength and -dominion. Yet in spite of such reduction we learn that about 150 -<small>B.C.</small>, shortly before the third Punic war, which ended -in the capture and depopulation of the city, not less than seven -hundred thousand souls<a id="FNanchor_860" href="#Footnote_860" -class="fnanchor">[860]</a> were computed in it, as occupants -of a fortified circumference of above twenty miles, covering a -peninsula with its isthmus. Upon this isthmus its citadel Byrsa -was situated, surrounded by a triple wall of its own, and crowned -at its summit by a magnificent temple of Æsculapius. The numerous -population is the more remarkable, since Utica (a considerable -city, colonized from Phœnicia more anciently than even Carthage -itself, and always independent of the Carthaginians, though in -the condition of an inferior and discontented ally), was within -the distance of seven miles from Carthage<a id="FNanchor_861" -href="#Footnote_861" class="fnanchor">[861]</a> on the one side, -and Tunis seemingly not much farther off on the other. Even at that -time, too, the Carthaginians are said to have possessed three hundred -tributary cities in Libya.<a id="FNanchor_862" href="#Footnote_862" -class="fnanchor">[862]</a> Yet this was but a small fraction of the -prodigious empire which had belonged to them certainly in the fourth -century <small>B.C.</small>, and in all probability also between -480-410 <small>B.C.</small> That empire extended eastward as far -as the Altars of the Philæni, near the Great Syrtis,—westward, all -along the coast to the Pillars of Herakles and the western coast of -Morocco. The line of coast south-east of Carthage, as far as the bay -called the Lesser Syrtis, was proverbial (under the name of Byzacium -and the Emporia) for its fertility. Along this extensive line were -distributed indigenous Libyan tribes, living by agriculture; and a -mixed population called Liby-Phœnicians, formed by intermarriage and -coalition of some of these tribes either with colonists from Tyre -and Sidon, or perhaps with a Canaanitish population akin in race to -the Phœnicians, yet of still earlier settlement in the country.<a -id="FNanchor_863" href="#Footnote_863" class="fnanchor">[863]</a> -These Liby-Phœnicians<span class="pagenum" id="Page_394">[p. -394]</span> dwelt in towns, seemingly of moderate size and -unfortified, but each surrounded by a territory ample and fertile, -yielding large produce. They were assiduous cultivators, but -generally unwarlike, which latter quality was ascribed by ancient -theory to the extreme richness of their soil.<a id="FNanchor_864" -href="#Footnote_864" class="fnanchor">[864]</a> Of the Liby-Phœnician -towns the number is not known to us, but it must have been -prodigiously great, since we are told that both Agathokles and -Regulus in their respective invasions captured no less than two -hundred. A single district, called Tuska, is also spoken of as -having fifty towns.<a id="FNanchor_865" href="#Footnote_865" -class="fnanchor">[865]</a></p> - -<p>A few of the towns along the coast,—Hippo, Utica, Adrumetum, -Thapsus, Leptis, etc.,—were colonies from Tyre, like Carthage -herself. With respect to Carthage, therefore, they stood upon a -different footing from the Liby-Phœnician towns, either maritime -or in the interior. Yet the Carthaginians contrived in time to -render every town tributary, with the exception of Utica. They thus -derived revenue from all the inhabitants of this fertile region, -Tyrian, Liby-Phœnician, and indigenous Libyan; and the amount -which they imposed appears to have been exorbitant. At one time, -immediately after the first Punic war, they took from the rural -cultivators as much as one-half of their produce,<a id="FNanchor_866" -href="#Footnote_866" class="fnanchor">[866]</a> and doubled at one -stroke the tribute levied upon the towns. The town and district of -Leptis paid to them a tribute of one talent per day, or three hundred -and sixty-five talents annually. Such exactions were not collected -without extreme harshness of enforcement,<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_395">[p. 395]</span> sometimes stripping the tax-payer of -all that he possessed, and even tearing him from his family to be -sold in person for a slave.<a id="FNanchor_867" href="#Footnote_867" -class="fnanchor">[867]</a> Accordingly the general sentiment among -the dependencies towards Carthage was one of mingled fear and hatred, -which rendered them eager to revolt on the landing of any foreign -invader. In some cases the Carthaginians seem to have guarded against -such contingencies by paid garrisons; but they also provided a -species of garrison from among their own citizens; by sending out -from Carthage poor men, and assigning to them lots of land with the -cultivators attached. This provision for poor citizens as emigrants -(mainly analogous to the Roman colonies), was a standing feature in -the Carthaginian political system, serving the double purpose of -obviating discontent among their own town population at home, and of -keeping watch over their dependencies abroad.<a id="FNanchor_868" -href="#Footnote_868" class="fnanchor">[868]</a></p> - -<p>In the fifth century <small>B.C.</small>, the Carthaginians had -no apprehension of any foreign enemy invading them from seaward; -an enterprise first attempted in 316 <small>B.C.</small>, to the -surprise of every one, by the boldness of the Syracusan Agathokles. -Nor were their enemies on the land side formidable as conquerors, -though they were extremely annoying as plunderers. The Numidians and -other native tribes, half-naked and predatory horsemen, distinguished -for speed as well as for indefatigable activity, so harassed the -individ<span class="pagenum" id="Page_396">[p. 396]</span>ual -cultivators of the soil, that the Carthaginians dug a long line of -ditch to keep them off.<a id="FNanchor_869" href="#Footnote_869" -class="fnanchor">[869]</a> But these barbarians did not acquire -sufficient organization to act for permanent objects, until the -reign of Masinissa and the second Punic war with Rome. During -the fifth and fourth centuries <small>B.C.</small>, therefore -(prior to the invasion of Agathokles), the warfare carried on by -the Carthaginians was constantly aggressive and in foreign parts. -For these purposes they chiefly employed foreign mercenaries, -hired for the occasion from Italy, Gaul, Spain, and the islands -of the Western Mediterranean, together with conscripts from their -Libyan dependencies. The native Carthaginians,<a id="FNanchor_870" -href="#Footnote_870" class="fnanchor">[870]</a> though encouraged by -honorary marks to undertake this military service, were generally -averse to it, and sparingly employed. But these citizens, though -not often sent on foreign service, constituted a most formidable -force when called upon. No less then forty thousand hoplites went -forth from the gates of Carthage to resist Agathokles, together -with one thousand cavalry, and two thousand war-chariots.<a -id="FNanchor_871" href="#Footnote_871" class="fnanchor">[871]</a> -An immense public magazine,—of arms, muniments of war of all kinds, -and provisions,—appears to have been kept in the walls of Byrsa, -the citadel of Carthage.<a id="FNanchor_872" href="#Footnote_872" -class="fnanchor">[872]</a> A chosen division of two thousand five -hundred citi<span class="pagenum" id="Page_397">[p. 397]</span>zens, -men of wealth and family, formed what was called the Sacred -Band of Carthage,<a id="FNanchor_873" href="#Footnote_873" -class="fnanchor">[873]</a> distinguished for their bravery in the -field as well as for the splendor of their arms, and the gold and -silver plate which formed part of their baggage. We shall find these -citizen-troops occasionally employed on service in Sicily: but most -part of the Carthaginian armies consists of Gauls, Iberians, Libyans, -etc., a mingled host got together for the occasion, discordant in -language as well as in customs. Such men had never any attachment -to the cause in which they fought,—seldom, to the commanders under -whom they served; while they were often treated by Carthage with bad -faith, and recklessly abandoned to destruction.<a id="FNanchor_874" -href="#Footnote_874" class="fnanchor">[874]</a> A military system -such as this was pregnant with danger, if ever the mercenary soldiers -got footing in Africa; as happened after the first Punic war, when -the city was brought to the brink of ruin. But on foreign service in -Sicily, these mercenaries often enabled Carthage to make conquest at -the cost only of her money, without any waste of the blood of her own -citizens. The Carthaginian generals seem generally to have relied, -like Persians, upon numbers,—manifesting little or no military skill; -until we come to the Punic wars with Rome, conducted under Hamilkar -Barca and his illustrious son Hannibal.</p> - -<p>Respecting the political constitution of Carthage, the facts known -are too few, and too indistinct, to enable us to comprehend its real -working. The magistrates most conspicuous in rank and precedence -were, the two kings or suffetes, who presided over the Senate.<a -id="FNanchor_875" href="#Footnote_875" class="fnanchor">[875]</a> -They seem to have been renewed annually, though how far the same -persons were reëligible, or actually rechosen, we do not<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_398">[p. 398]</span> know, but they were -always selected out of some few principal families or Gentes. There -is reason for believing that the genuine Carthaginian citizens were -distributed into three tribes, thirty curiæ, and three hundred -gentes—something in the manner of the Roman patricians. From these -gentes emanated a Senate of three hundred, out of which again -was formed a smaller council or committee of thirty <i>principes</i> -representing the curiæ;<a id="FNanchor_876" href="#Footnote_876" -class="fnanchor">[876]</a> sometimes a still smaller, of only ten -<i>principes</i>. These little councils are both frequently mentioned -in the political proceedings of Carthage; and perhaps the Thirty -may coincide with what Polybius calls the Gerusia, or Council of -Ancients,—the Three Hundred, with that which he calls the Senate.<a -id="FNanchor_877" href="#Footnote_877" class="fnanchor">[877]</a> -Aristotle assimilates the two kings (suffetes) of Carthage to the two -kings of Sparta—and the Gerusia of Carthage also to that of Sparta;<a -id="FNanchor_878" href="#Footnote_878" class="fnanchor">[878]</a> -which latter consisted of thirty members, including the kings -who sat in it. But Aristotle does not allude to any assembly at -Carthage analogous to what Polybius calls the Senate. He mentions -two Councils, one of one hundred members, the other of one hundred -and four; and certain Boards of Five,—the pentarchies. He compares -the Council of one hundred and four to the Spartan ephors; yet again -he talks of the pentarchies as invested with extensive functions, -and terms the Council of one hundred the greatest authority in the -state. Perhaps this last Council was identical with the assembly -of one hundred Judges (said to have been chosen from the Senate -as a check upon the generals employed), or Ordo Judicum; of which -Livy speaks after the second Punic war, as existing with its -members perpetual and so powerful that it overruled all the other -assemblies and magistracies of the state. Through the influence -of Hannibal, a law was passed to lessen the overweening power of -this Order of Judges; causing them to be elected only for one year, -instead of being perpetual.<a id="FNanchor_879" href="#Footnote_879" -class="fnanchor">[879]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_399">[p. 399]</span></p> - -<p>These statements, though coming from valuable authors, convey so -little information and are withal so difficult to reconcile, that -both the structure and working of the political machine at Carthage -may be said to be unknown.<a id="FNanchor_880" href="#Footnote_880" -class="fnanchor">[880]</a> But it seems clear that the general spirit -of the government was highly oligarchical; that a few rich, old, and -powerful families, divided among themselves the great offices and -influence of the state; that they maintained themselves in pointed -and even insolent distinction from the multitude;<a id="FNanchor_881" -href="#Footnote_881" class="fnanchor">[881]</a> that they stood -opposed to each other in bitter feuds, often stained by gross -perfidy and bloodshed; and that the treatment with which, through -these violent party-antipathies, unsuccessful generals were visited, -was cruel in the extreme.<a id="FNanchor_882" href="#Footnote_882" -class="fnanchor">[882]</a> It appears that wealth was one -indispensable qualification, and that magistrates and generals -procured their appointments in a great measure by corrupt means. Of -such corruption, one variety was, the habit of constantly regaling -the citizens in collective banquets of the <i>curiæ</i> or the political -associations; a habit so continual, and embracing so wide a circle of -citizens, that Aristotle compares these banquets to the <i>phiditia</i> -or public mess of Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_883" href="#Footnote_883" -class="fnanchor">[883]</a> There was a demos or people at Carthage, -who were consulted on particular occasions, and before whom -propositions were publicly debated, in cases where the suffetes and -the small Council were not all of one mind.<a id="FNanchor_884" -href="#Footnote_884" class="fnanchor">[884]</a> How numerous<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_400">[p. 400]</span> this demos was, or what -proportion of the whole population it comprised, we have no means of -knowing. But it is plain, that whether more or less considerable, -its multitude was kept under dependence to the rich families -by stratagems such as the banquets, the lucrative appointments -with lots of land in foreign dependencies, etc. The purposes of -government were determined, its powers wielded and the great offices -held—suffetes, senators, generals, or judges,—by the members of a -small number of wealthy families; and the chief opposition which -they encountered, was from their feuds against each other. In the -main, the government was conducted with skill and steadiness, as well -for internal tranquillity as for systematic foreign and commercial -aggrandizement. Within the knowledge of Aristotle, Carthage had -never suffered either the successful usurpation of a despot, or any -violent intestine commotion.<a id="FNanchor_885" href="#Footnote_885" -class="fnanchor">[885]</a></p> - -<p>The first eminent Carthaginian leader brought to our notice, is -Mago (seemingly about 530-500 <small>B.C.</small>), who is said -to have mainly contributed to organize the forces, and extend the -dominion, of Carthage. Of his two sons, one, Hasdrubal, perished -after a victorious career in Sardinia;<a id="FNanchor_886" -href="#Footnote_886" class="fnanchor">[886]</a> the other, Hamilkar, -commanding at the battle of Himera in Sicily, was there defeated -and slain by Gelon, as has been already recounted. After the death -of Hamilkar, his son Giskon was condemned to perpetual exile, -and passed his life in Sicily at the Greek city of Selinus.<a -id="FNanchor_887" href="#Footnote_887" class="fnanchor">[887]</a> -But the sons of Hasdrubal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_401">[p. -401]</span> still remained at Carthage, the most powerful citizens -in the state; carrying on hostilities against the Moors and other -indigenous Africans, whom they compelled to relinquish the tribute -which Carthage had paid, down to that time, for the ground whereon -the city was situated. This family are said indeed to have been so -powerful, that a check upon their ascendency was supposed to be -necessary; and for that purpose the select One Hundred Senators -sitting as judges were now nominated for the first time.<a -id="FNanchor_888" href="#Footnote_888" class="fnanchor">[888]</a> -Such wars in Africa doubtless tended to prevent the Carthaginians -from farther interference in Sicily, during the interval between -480-410 <small>B.C.</small> There were probably other causes also, -not known to us,—and down to the year 413 <small>B.C.</small>, the -formidable naval power of Athens (as has been already remarked) kept -them on the watch even for themselves. But now, after the great -Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, apprehensions from that quarter -were dissipated; so that Carthage again found leisure, as well as -inclination, to seek in Sicily both aggrandizement and revenge.</p> - -<p>It is remarkable that the same persons, acting in the same -quarrel, who furnished the pretext or the motive for the recent -invasion by Athens, now served in the like capacity as prompters -to Carthage. The inhabitants of Egesta, engaged in an unequal war -with rival neighbors at Selinus, were in both cases the soliciting -parties. They had applied to Carthage first, without success,<a -id="FNanchor_889" href="#Footnote_889" class="fnanchor">[889]</a> -before they thought of sending to invoke aid from Athens. This war -indeed had been for the time merged and forgotten in the larger -Athenian enterprise against Syracuse; but it revived after that -catastrophe, wherein Athens and her armament were shipwrecked. The -Egestæans had not only lost their protectors, but had incurred -aggravated hostility from their neighbors, for having brought upon -Sicily so formidable an ultramarine enemy. Their original quarrel -with Selinus had related to a disputed portion of border territory. -This point they no longer felt competent to maintain, under<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_402">[p. 402]</span> their present -disadvantageous circumstances. But the Selinuntines, confident -as well as angry, were now not satisfied with success in their -original claim. They proceeded to strip the Egestæans of other lands -indisputably belonging to them, and seriously menaced the integrity -as well as the independence of the city. To no other quarter could -the Egestæans turn, with any chance of finding both will and -power to protect them, except to Carthage.<a id="FNanchor_890" -href="#Footnote_890" class="fnanchor">[890]</a></p> - -<p>The town of Egesta (non-Hellenic or at least only semi-Hellenic) -was situated on or near the northern line of Sicilian coast, not -far from the western cape of the island, and in the immediate -neighborhood of the Carthaginian settlements,—Motyê, Panormus (now -Palermo), and Soloeis or Soluntum. Selinus also was near the western -cape, but on the southern coast of Sicily, with its territory -conterminous to the southern portion of Egesta. When therefore the -Egestæan envoys presented their urgent supplications at Carthage -for aid, proclaiming that unless assisted they must be subjugated -and become a dependency of Selinus,—the Carthaginians would not -unreasonably conceive, that their own Sicilian settlements would be -endangered, if their closest Hellenic neighbor were allowed thus -to aggrandize herself. Accordingly they agreed to grant the aid -solicited; yet not without much debate and hesitation. They were -uneasy at the idea of resuming military operations in Sicily,—which -had been laid aside for seventy years, and had moreover left such -disastrous recollections<a id="FNanchor_891" href="#Footnote_891" -class="fnanchor">[891]</a>—at a moment when Syracusan courage -stood in high renown, from the recent destruction of the Athenian -armament. But the recollections of the Gelonian victory at Himera, -while they suggested apprehension, also kindled the appetite of -revenge; especially in the bosom of Hannibal, the grandson of -that general Hamilkar who had there met his death. Hannibal was -at this moment king, or rather first of the two suffetes, chief -executive magistrates of Carthage, as his grandfather had been -seventy years before. So violent had been the impression made upon -the Carthaginians by the defeat of Himera, that they had banished -Giskon, son of the slain general Hamilkar and father of Hannibal, -and had condemned him to pass his whole life in exile. He had chosen -the Greek city of Selinus; where probably Hannibal also had spent -his youth, though restored<span class="pagenum" id="Page_403">[p. -403]</span> since to his country and to his family consequence,—and -from whence he brought back an intense antipathy to the Greek name, -as well as an impatience to wipe off by a signal revenge the dishonor -both of his country and of his family. Accordingly, espousing with -warmth the request of the Egestæans, he obtained from the Senate -authority to take effective measures for their protection.<a -id="FNanchor_892" href="#Footnote_892" class="fnanchor">[892]</a></p> - -<p>His first proceeding was to send envoys to Egesta and Selinus, -to remonstrate against the encroachments of the Selinuntines; with -farther instructions, in case remonstrance proved ineffectual, to -proceed with the Egestæans to Syracuse, and there submit the whole -dispute to the arbitration of the Syracusans. He foresaw that the -Selinuntines, having superiority of force on their side, would refuse -to acknowledge any arbitration; and that the Syracusans, respectfully -invoked by one party but rejected by the other, would stand aside -from the quarrel altogether. It turned out as he had expected. -The Selinuntines sent envoys to Syracuse, to protest against the -representations from Egesta and Carthage; but declined to refer -their case to arbitration. Accordingly, the Syracusans passed a vote -that they would maintain their alliance with Selinus, yet without -impeachment of their pacific relations with Carthage: thus leaving -the latter free to act without obstruction. Hannibal immediately -sent over a body of troops to the aid of Egesta: five<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_404">[p. 404]</span> thousand Libyans or -Africans; and eight hundred Campanian mercenaries, who had been -formerly in the pay and service of the Athenians before Syracuse, -but had quitted that camp before the final catastrophe occurred.<a -id="FNanchor_893" href="#Footnote_893" class="fnanchor">[893]</a></p> - -<p>In spite of the reinforcement and the imposing countenance -of Carthage, the Selinuntines, at this time in full power and -prosperity, still believed themselves strong enough to subdue Egesta. -Under such persuasion, they invaded the territory with their full -force. They began to ravage the country, yet at first with order -and precaution; but presently, finding no enemy in the field to -oppose them, they became careless, and spread themselves about for -disorderly plunder. This was the moment for which the Egestæans -and Carthaginians were watching. They attacked the Selinuntines -by surprise, defeated them with the loss of a thousand men, and -recaptured the whole booty.<a id="FNanchor_894" href="#Footnote_894" -class="fnanchor">[894]</a></p> - -<p>The war, as hitherto carried on, was one offensive on the part of -the Selinuntines, for the purpose of punishing or despoiling their -ancient enemy Egesta. Only so far as was necessary for the defence of -the latter, had the Carthaginians yet interfered. But against such an -interference the Selinuntines, if they had taken a prudent measure of -their own force, would have seen that they were not likely to achieve -any conquest. Moreover, they might perhaps have obtained peace now, -had they sought it; as a considerable minority among them, headed by -a citizen named Empedion,<a id="FNanchor_895" href="#Footnote_895" -class="fnanchor">[895]</a> urgently recommended: for Selinus appears -always to have been on more friendly terms with Carthage than any -other Grecian city in Sicily. Even at the great battle of Himera, the -Selinuntine troops had not only not assisted Gelon, but had actually -fought in the Carthaginian army under Hamilkar;<a id="FNanchor_896" -href="#Footnote_896" class="fnanchor">[896]</a> a plea, which, had -it been pressed, might probably have had weight with Hannibal. -But this claim upon the goodwill of Carthage appears only to have -rendered them more confident and passionate in braving her force -and in prosecuting the war. They sent to Syracuse to ask for aid, -which the Syracusans, under present circumstances, promised to send -them. But the promise was given with little cordiality, as appears -by the manner in which they fulfilled it, as well as from<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_405">[p. 405]</span> the neutrality which -they had professed so recently before; for the contest seemed to -be aggressive on the part of Selinus, so that Syracuse had little -interest in helping her to conquer Egesta. Neither Syracusans -nor Selinuntines were prepared for the immense preparations, and -energetic rapidity of movement by which Hannibal at once altered the -character, and enlarged the purposes, of the war. He employed all the -ensuing autumn and winter in collecting a numerous host of mercenary -troops from Africa, Spain, and Campania, with various Greeks who were -willing to take service.<a id="FNanchor_897" href="#Footnote_897" -class="fnanchor">[897]</a></p> - -<p>In the spring of the memorable year 409 <small>B.C.</small>, -through the exuberant wealth of Carthage, he was in a condition -to leave Africa with a great fleet of sixty triremes, and fifteen -hundred transports or vessels of burthen;<a id="FNanchor_898" -href="#Footnote_898" class="fnanchor">[898]</a> conveying an army, -which, according to the comparatively low estimate of Timæus, -amounted to more than one hundred thousand men; while Ephorus -extended the number to two hundred thousand infantry, and four -thousand cavalry, together with muniments of war and battering -machines for siege. With these he steered directly for the western -Cape of Sicily, Lilybæum; taking care, however, to land his troops -and to keep his fleet on the northern side of that cape, in the bay -near Motyê,—and not to approach the southern shore, lest he should -alarm the Syracusans with the idea that he was about to prosecute -his voyage farther eastward along the southern coast towards their -city. By this precaution, he took the best means for prolonging the -period of Syracusan inaction. The Selinuntines, panic-struck at the -advent of an enemy so much more overwhelming than they had expected, -sent pressing messengers to Syracuse to accelerate the promised help. -They had made no provision for standing on the defensive against a -really formidable aggressor. Their walls, though strong enough to -hold out against Sicilian neighbors, had been neglected during the -long-continued absence of any foreign besieger, and were now in many -places out of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_406">[p. 406]</span> -repair. Hannibal left them no time to make good past deficiencies. -Instead of wasting his powerful armament (as the unfortunate Nikias -had done five years before) by months of empty flourish and real -inaction, he waited only until he was joined by the troops from -Egesta and the neighboring Carthaginian dependencies, and then -marched his whole force straight from Lilybæum to Selinus. Crossing -the river Mazara in his way, and storming the fort which lay near -its mouth, he soon found himself under the Selinuntine walls. He -distributed his army into two parts, each provided with battering -machines and movable wooden towers; and then assailed the walls -on many points at once, choosing the points where they were most -accessible or most dilapidated. Archers and slingers in great numbers -were posted near the walls, to keep up a discharge of missiles and -chase away the defenders from the battlements. Under cover of such -discharge, six wooden towers were rolled up to the foot of the -wall, to which they were equal or nearly equal in height, so that -the armed men in their interior were prepared to contend with the -defenders almost on a level. Against other portions of the wall, -battering-rams with iron heads were driven by the combined strength -of multitudes, shaking or breaking through its substance, especially -where it showed symptoms of neglect or decay. Such were the methods -of attack which Hannibal now brought to bear upon the unprepared -Selinuntines. He was eager to forestal the arrival of auxiliaries, -by the impetuous movements of his innumerable barbaric host, the -largest seen in Sicily since his grandfather Hamilkar had been -defeated before Himera. Collected from all the shores of the western -Mediterranean, it presented soldiers heterogeneous in race, in arms, -in language,—in everything, except bravery and common appetite for -blood as well as plunder.<a id="FNanchor_899" href="#Footnote_899" -class="fnanchor">[899]</a></p> - -<p>The dismay of the Selinuntines, when they suddenly found -themselves under the sweep of this destroying hurricane, is not to -be described. It was no part of the scheme of Hannibal to impose -conditions or grant capitulation; for he had promised the plunder of -their town to his soldiers. The only chance of the besieged was, to -hold out with the courage of desperation, until they could receive -aid from their Hellenic brethren on the south<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_407">[p. 407]</span>ern coast,—Agrigentum, Gela, and -especially Syracuse,—all of whom they had sent to warn and to -supplicate. Their armed population crowded to man the walls, with a -resolution worthy of Greeks and citizens; while the old men and the -females, though oppressed with agony from the fate which seemed to -menace them, lent all the aid and encouragement in their power. Under -the sound of trumpets, and every variety of war-cry, the assailants -approached the walls, encountering everywhere a valiant resistance. -They were repulsed again and again, with the severest loss. But fresh -troops came up to relieve those who were slain or fatigued; and at -length, after a murderous struggle, a body of Campanians forced their -way over the walls into the town. Yet in spite of such temporary -advantage, the heroic efforts of the besieged drove them out again -or slew them, so that night arrived without the capture being -accomplished. For nine successive days was the assault thus renewed -with undiminished fury; for nine successive days did this heroic -population maintain a successful resistance, though their enemies -were numerous enough to relieve each other perpetually,—though -their own strength was every day failing,—and though not a single -friend arrived to their aid. At length, on the tenth day, and after -terrible loss to the besiegers, a sufficient breach was made in the -weak part of the wall, for the Iberians to force their way into the -city. Still however the Selinuntines, even after their walls were -carried, continued with unabated resolution to barricade and defend -their narrow streets, in which their women also assisted, by throwing -down stones and tiles upon the assailants from the house-tops. All -these barriers were successively overthrown, by the unexhausted -numbers, and increasing passion, of the barbaric host; so that the -defenders were driven back from all sides into the agora, where most -of them closed their gallant defence by an honorable death. A small -minority, among whom was Empedion, escaped to Agrigentum, where they -received the warmest sympathy and the most hospitable treatment.<a -id="FNanchor_900" href="#Footnote_900" class="fnanchor">[900]</a></p> - -<p>Resistance being thus at an end, the assailants spread themselves -through the town in all the fury of insatiate appetites,—murderous, -lustful, and rapacious. They slaughtered indiscrimi<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_408">[p. 408]</span>nately elders and -children, preserving only the grown women as captives. The sad -details of a town taken by storm are to a great degree the same -in every age and nation; but the destroying barbarians at Selinus -manifested one peculiarity, which marks them as lying without the -pale of Hellenic sympathy and sentiment. They mutilated the bodies -of the slain; some were seen with amputated hands strung together -in a row and fastened round their girdles; while others brandished -heads on the points of their spears and javelins.<a id="FNanchor_901" -href="#Footnote_901" class="fnanchor">[901]</a> The Greeks (seemingly -not numerous) who served under Hannibal, far from sharing in these -ferocious manifestations, contributed somewhat to mitigate the -deplorable fate of the sufferers. Sixteen thousand Selinuntines -are said to have been slain, five thousand to have been taken -captive; while two thousand six hundred escaped to Agrigentum.<a -id="FNanchor_902" href="#Footnote_902" class="fnanchor">[902]</a> -These figures are probably under, rather than above, the truth. Yet -they do not seem entitled to any confidence; nor do they give us any -account of the entire population in its different categories,—old and -young,—men and women,—freemen and slaves,—citizens and metics. We -can only pretend to appreciate this mournful event in the gross. All -exact knowledge of its details is denied to us.</p> - -<p>It does little honor either to the generosity or to the prudence -of the Hellenic neighbors of Selinus, that this unfortunate city -should have been left to its fate unassisted. In vain was messenger -after messenger despatched, as the defence became more and more -critical, to Agrigentum, Gela, and Syracuse. The military force -of the two former was indeed made ready, but postponed its march -until joined by that of the last; so formidable was the account -given of the invading host. Meanwhile the Syracusans were not -ready. They thought it requisite, first, to close the war which -they were prosecuting against Katana and Naxos,—next, to muster a -large and carefully-appointed force. Before these preliminaries -were finished, the nine days of siege were past, and the death-hour -of Selinus had sounded. Probably the Syracusans were misled by the -Sicilian operations of Nikias, who, beginning with a long interval -of inaction, had then approached their town by slow blockade, such -as the circumstances of his case required. Expecting in the case -of Selinus that Hannibal would enter upon<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_409">[p. 409]</span> the like elaborate siege,—and not -reflecting that he was at the head of a vast host of miscellaneous -foreigners hired for the occasion, of whose lives he could afford -to be prodigal, while Nikias commanded citizens of Athens and other -Grecian states, whom he could not expose to the murderous but -thorough-going process of ever-renewed assault against strong walls -recently erected,—they were thunderstruck on being informed that nine -days of carnage had sufficed for the capture. The Syracusan soldiers, -a select body of three thousand, who at length joined the Geloans -and Agrigentines at Agrigentum, only arrived in time to partake in -the general dismay everywhere diffused. A joint embassy was sent by -three cities to Hannibal, entreating him to permit the ransom of the -captives, and to spare the temples of the gods; while Empedion went -at the same time to sue for compassion on behalf of his own fugitive -fellow-citizens. To the former demand the victorious Carthaginian -returned an answer at once haughty and characteristic,—“The -Selinuntines have not been able to preserve their freedom, and must -now submit to a trial of slavery. The gods have become offended -with them, and have taken their departure from the town.”<a -id="FNanchor_903" href="#Footnote_903" class="fnanchor">[903]</a> -To Empedion, an ancient friend and pronounced partisan of the -Carthaginians, his reply was more indulgent. All the relatives of -Empedion, found alive among the captives, were at once given up; -moreover permission was granted to the fugitive Selinuntines to -return, if they pleased, and reoccupy the town with its lands, as -tributary subjects of Carthage. At the same time that he granted -such permission, however, Hannibal at once caused the walls to -be razed, and even the town with its temples to be destroyed.<a -id="FNanchor_904" href="#Footnote_904" class="fnanchor">[904]</a> -What was done about the proposed ransom, we do not hear.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_410">[p. 410]</span></p> - -<p>Having satiated his troops with this rich plunder Hannibal now -quitted the scene of bloodshed and desolation, and marched across -the island to Himera on its northern coast. Though Selinus, as the -enemy of Egesta, had received the first shock of his arms, yet it was -against Himera that the grand purpose of his soul was directed. Here -it was that Hamilkar had lost both his army and his life, entailing -inexpiable disgrace upon the whole life of his son Giskon: here it -was that his grandson intended to exact full vengeance and requital -from the grandchildren of those who then occupied the fated spot. -Not only was the Carthaginian army elate with the past success, -but a number of fresh Sikels and Sikans, eager to share in plunder -as well as to gratify the antipathies of their races against the -Grecian intruders, flocked to join it; thus making up the losses -sustained in the recent assault. Having reached Himera, and disposed -his army in appropriate positions around, Hannibal proceeded to -instant attack, as at Selinus; pushing up his battering machines and -towers against the vulnerable portions of the walls, and trying at -the same time to undermine them. The Himeræans defended themselves -with desperate bravery; and on this occasion the defence was not -unassisted; for four thousand allies, chiefly Syracusans, and headed -by the Syracusan Dioklês, had come to the city as a reinforcement. -For a whole day they repelled with slaughter repeated assaults. -No impression being made upon the city, the besieged became so -confident in their own valor, that they resolved not to copy the -Selinuntines in confining themselves to defence, but to sally out -at daybreak the next morning and attack the besiegers in the field. -Ten thousand gallant men,—Himeræans, Syracusans, and other Grecian -allies,—accordingly marched out with the dawn; while the battlements -were lined with old men and women as anxious spectators of their -exploits. The Carthaginians near the walls, who, preparing to renew -the assault, looked for nothing less than for a sally, were taken -by surprise. In spite of their great superiority of number, and in -spite of great personal bravery, they fell into confusion, and were -incapable of long resisting the gallant and orderly charge of the -Greeks. At length they gave way and fled towards the neighboring -hill, where Hannibal himself with his body of reserve was posted to -cover the operations of assault. The Greeks pursued them fiercely and -slaughtered great numbers (six thousand according to Timæus,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_411">[p. 411]</span> but not less than -twenty thousand, if we are to accept the broad statement of Ephorus), -exhorting each other not to think of making prisoners. But in the -haste and exultation of pursuit, they became out of breath, and their -ranks fell into disorder. In this untoward condition, they found -themselves face to face with the fresh body of reserve brought up by -Hannibal, who marched down the hill to receive and succor his own -defeated fugitives. The fortune of the battle was now so completely -turned, that the Himeræans, after bravely contending for some time -against these new enemies, found themselves overpowered and driven -back to their own gates. Three thousand of their bravest warriors, -however, despairing of their city and mindful of the fate of Selinus, -disdained to turn their backs, and perished to a man in obstinate -conflict with the overwhelming numbers of the Carthaginians.<a -id="FNanchor_905" href="#Footnote_905" class="fnanchor">[905]</a></p> - -<p>Violent was the sorrow and dismay in Himera, when the flower of -her troops were thus driven in as beaten men, with the loss of half -their numbers. At this moment there chanced to arrive at the port -a fleet of twenty-five triremes, belonging to Syracuse and other -Grecian cities in Sicily; which triremes had been sent to aid the -Peloponnesians in the Ægean, but had since come back, and were now -got together for the special purpose of relieving the besieged city. -So important a reinforcement ought to have revived the spirit of -the Himeræans. It announced that the Syracusans were in full march -across the island, with the main force of the city, to the relief -of Himera. But this good news was more than countervailed by the -statement, that Hannibal was ordering out the Carthaginian fleet in -the bay of Motyê, in order that it might sail round cape Lilybæum and -along the southern coast into the harbor of Syracuse, now defenceless -through the absence of its main force. Apparently the Syracusan -fleet, in sailing from Syracuse to Himera, had passed by the bay of -Motyê, observed maritime movement among the Carthaginians there, and -picked up these tidings in explanation. Here was intelligence more -than sufficient to excite alarm for home, in the bosom of Dioklês -and the Syracusans at Himera; especially under the despondency now -reigning. Dioklês not only enjoined the captains of the fleet to -sail back immediately to Syracuse, in order to guard against the -apprehended<span class="pagenum" id="Page_412">[p. 412]</span> -surprise, but also insisted upon marching back thither himself by -land with the Syracusan forces, and abandoning the farther defence -of Himera. He would in his march home meet his fellow-citizens on -their march outward, and conduct them back along with him. To the -Himeræans, this was a sentence of death, or worse than death. It -plunged them into an agony of fright and despair. But there was -no safer counsel to suggest, nor could they prevail upon Dioklês -to grant anything more than means of transport for carrying off -the Himeræan population, when the city was relinquished to the -besiegers. It was agreed that the fleet, instead of sailing straight -to Syracuse, should employ itself in carrying off as much of the -population as could be put on board, and in depositing them safely -at Messênê; after which it would return to fetch the remainder, who -would in the mean time defend the city with their utmost force.</p> - -<p>Such was the frail chance of refuge now alone open to these -unhappy Greeks, against the devouring enemy without. Immediately the -feebler part of the population,—elders, women, and children,—crowding -on board until the triremes could hold no more, sailed away along the -northern coast to Messênê. On the same night, Dioklês also marched -out of the city with his Syracusan soldiers; in such haste to get -home, that he could not even tarry to bury the numerous Syracusan -soldiers who had been just slain in the recent disastrous sally. -Many of the Himeræans, with their wives and children, took their -departure along with Dioklês, as their only chance of escape; since -it was but too plain that the triremes could not carry away all. -The bravest and most devoted portion of the Himeræan warriors still -remained, to defend their city until the triremes came back. After -keeping armed watch on the walls all night, they were again assailed -on the next morning by the Carthaginians, elate with their triumph -of the preceding day and with the flight of so many defenders. Yet -notwithstanding all the pressure of numbers, ferocity, and battering -machines, the resistance was still successfully maintained; so -that night found Himera still a Grecian city. On the next day, the -triremes came back, having probably deposited their unfortunate cargo -in some place of safety not so far off as Messênê. If the defenders -could have maintained their walls until another sunset, many of them -might yet have escaped. But the good fortune, and probably the<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_413">[p. 413]</span> physical force, of -these brave men, was now at an end. The gods were quitting Himera, -as they had before quitted Selinus. At the moment when the triremes -were seen coming near to the port, the Iberian assailants broke down -a wide space of the fortification with their battering-rams, poured -in through the breach, and overcame all opposition. Encouraged by -their shouts, the barbaric host now on all sides forced the walls, -and spread themselves over the city, which became one scene of -wholesale slaughter and plunder. It was no part of the scheme of -Hannibal to interrupt the plunder, which he made over as a recompense -to his soldiers. But he speedily checked the slaughter, being -anxious to take as many prisoners as possible, and increasing the -number by dragging away all who had taken sanctuary in the temples. -A few among this wretched population may have contrived to reach -the approaching triremes; all the rest either perished or fell into -the hands of the victor.<a id="FNanchor_906" href="#Footnote_906" -class="fnanchor">[906]</a></p> - -<p>It was a proud day for the Carthaginian general when he stood -as master on the ground of Himera; enabled to fulfil the duty, -and satisfy the exigencies, of revenge for his slain grandfather. -Tragical indeed was the consummation of this long-cherished purpose. -Not merely the walls and temples (as at Selinus), but all the -houses in Himera, were razed to the ground. Its temples, having -been first stripped of their ornaments and valuables, were burnt. -The women and children taken captive were distributed as prizes -among the soldiers. But all the male captives, three thousand in -number, were conveyed to the precise spot where Hamilkar had been -slain, and there put to death with indignity,<a id="FNanchor_907" -href="#Footnote_907" class="fnanchor">[907]</a> as an expiatory -satisfaction to his lost honor. Lastly, in order that even the hated -name of Himera might pass into oblivion, a new town called Therma -(so designated because of some warm springs) was shortly afterwards -founded by the Carthaginians in the neighborhood.<a id="FNanchor_908" -href="#Footnote_908" class="fnanchor">[908]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_414">[p. 414]</span></p> - -<p>No man can now read the account of this wholesale massacre without -horror and repugnance. Yet we cannot doubt, that among all the acts -of Hannibal’s life, this was the one in which he most gloried; -that it realized, in the most complete and emphatic manner, his -concurrent inspirations of filial sentiment, religious obligation, -and honor as a patriot; that to show mercy would have been regarded -as a mean dereliction of these esteemed impulses; and that if the -prisoners had been even more numerous, all of them would have been -equally slain, rendering the expiatory fulfilment only so much the -more honorable and efficacious. In the Carthaginian religion, human -sacrifices were not merely admitted, but passed for the strongest -manifestation of devotional fervor, and were especially resorted to -in times of distress, when the necessity for propitiating the gods -was accounted most pressing. Doubtless the feelings of Hannibal were -cordially shared, and the plenitude of his revenge envied, by the -army around him. So different, sometimes so totally contrary, is the -tone and direction of the moral sentiments, among different ages and -nations.</p> - -<p>In the numerous wars of Greeks against Greeks, which we have -been unfortunately called upon to study, we have found few or no -examples of any considerable town taken by storm. So much the -more terrible was the shock throughout the Grecian world, of the -events just recounted; Selinus and Himera, two Grecian cities of -ancient standing and uninterrupted prosperity,—had both of them -been stormed, ruined, and depopulated, by a barbaric host, within -the space of three months.<a id="FNanchor_909" href="#Footnote_909" -class="fnanchor">[909]</a> No event at all parallel had occurred -since the sack of Miletus by the Persians after the Ionic revolt -(495 <small>B.C.</small>),<a id="FNanchor_910" href="#Footnote_910" -class="fnanchor">[910]</a> which raised such powerful sympathy and -mourning in Athens. The war now raging in the Ægean, between Athens -and Sparta with their respective allies, doubtless contributed to -deaden, throughout Central Greece, the impression of calamities -sustained by Greeks at the western extremity of Sicily. But within -that island, the sympathy with the sufferers was most acute, and -aggravated by terror for the future. The Carthaginian general -had displayed a degree of energy equal to any Grecian officer -throughout the war, with a command of besieging and battering -machinery surpassing even the best equipped Grecian cities.<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_415">[p. 415]</span> The mercenaries whom -he had got together were alike terrible from their bravery and -ferocity; encouraging Carthaginian ambition to follow up its late -rapid successes by attacks against the other cities of the island. -No such prospects indeed were at once realized. Hannibal, having -completed his revenge at Himera, and extended the Carthaginian -dominion all across the north-west corner of Sicily (from Selinus on -the southern sea to the site of Himera or Therma on the northern), -dismissed his mercenary troops and returned home. Most of them were -satiated with plunder as well as pay, though the Campanians, who -had been foremost at the capture of Selinus, thought themselves -unfairly stinted, and retired in disgust.<a id="FNanchor_911" -href="#Footnote_911" class="fnanchor">[911]</a> Hannibal carried -back a rich spoil, with glorious trophies, to Carthage, where he was -greeted with enthusiastic welcome and admiration.<a id="FNanchor_912" -href="#Footnote_912" class="fnanchor">[912]</a></p> - -<p>Never was there a time when the Greek cities in Sicily,—and -Syracuse especially, upon whom the others would greatly rest in -the event of a second Carthaginian invasion,—had stronger motives -for keeping themselves in a condition of efficacious defence. -Unfortunately, it was just at this moment that a new cause of -intestine discord burst upon Syracuse; fatally impairing her -strength, and proving in its consequences destructive to her -liberty. The banished Syracusan general Hermokrates had recently -arrived at Messênê in Sicily; where he appears to have been, at -the time when the fugitives came from Himera. It has already been -mentioned that he, with two colleagues, had commanded the Syracusan -contingent serving with the Peloponnesians under Mindarus in Asia. -After the disastrous defeat of Kyzikus, in which Mindarus was -slain and every ship in the fleet taken or destroyed, sentence -of banishment was passed at Syracuse against the three admirals. -Hermokrates was exceedingly popular among the trierarchs and the -officers; he had stood conspicuous for incorruptibility, and had -conducted himself (so far as we have means of judging) with energy -and ability in his command. The sentence, unmerited by his behavior, -was dictated by acute vexation for the loss of the fleet, and for -the disappointment of those expectations which Hermokrates had held -out; combined with the fact that Diokles and the opposite party were -now in the ascendant at Sy<span class="pagenum" id="Page_416">[p. -416]</span>racuse. When the banished general, in making it known -to the armament, complained of its injustice and illegality, he -obtained warm sympathy, and even exhortations still to retain the -command, in spite of orders from home. He forbade them earnestly to -think of raising sedition against their common city and country;<a -id="FNanchor_913" href="#Footnote_913" class="fnanchor">[913]</a> -upon which the trierarchs, when they took their last and affectionate -leave of him, bound themselves by oath, as soon as they should -return to Syracuse, to leave no means untried for procuring his -restoration.</p> - -<p>The admonitory words addressed by Hermokrates to the forwardness -of the trierarchs, would have been honorable to his patriotism, -had not his own conduct at the same time been worthy of the worst -enemies of his country. For immediately on being superseded by the -new admirals, he went to the satrap Pharnabazus, in whose favor he -stood high; and obtained from him a considerable present of money, -which he employed in collecting mercenary troops and building -ships, to levy war against his opponents in Syracuse and procure -his own restoration.<a id="FNanchor_914" href="#Footnote_914" -class="fnanchor">[914]</a> Thus strengthened, he returned from Asia -to Sicily, and reached the Sicilian Messênê rather before the capture -of Himera by the Carthaginians. At Messênê he caused five fresh -triremes to be built, besides taking into his pay one thousand of -the expelled Himeræans. At the head of these troops, he attempted -to force his way into Syracuse, under concert with his friends in -the city, who engaged to assist his admission by arms. Possibly some -of the trierarchs of his armament, who had before sworn to lend him -their aid, had now returned and were among this body of interior -partisans.</p> - -<p>The moment was well chosen for such an enterprise. As the disaster -at Kyzikus had exasperated the Syracusans against Hermokrates, so -we cannot doubt that there must have been a strong reaction against -Diokles and his partisans, in consequence of the fall of Selinus -unaided, and the subsequent abandonment of Himera. What degree -of blame may fairly attach to Diokles for these misfortunes, we -are not in a condition to judge. But such<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_417">[p. 417]</span> reverses in themselves were sure to -discredit him more or less, and to lend increased strength and -stimulus to the partisans of the banished Hermokrates. Nevertheless -that leader, though he came to the gates of Syracuse, failed in -his attempt to obtain admission, and was compelled to retire; upon -which he marched his little army across the interior of the island, -and took possession of the dismantled Selinus. Here he established -himself as the chief of a new settlement, got together as many as -he could of the expelled inhabitants (among whom probably some had -already come back along with Empedion), and invited many fresh -colonists from other quarters. Reëstablishing a portion of the -demolished fortifications, he found himself gradually strengthened -by so many new-comers, as to place at his command a body of six -thousand chosen hoplites,—probably independent of other soldiers -of inferior merit. With these troops he began to invade the -Carthaginian settlements in the neighborhood, Motyê and Panormus.<a -id="FNanchor_915" href="#Footnote_915" class="fnanchor">[915]</a> -Having defeated the forces of both in the field, he carried his -ravages successfully over their territories, with large acquisitions -of plunder. The Carthaginians had now no army remaining in Sicily; -for their immense host of the preceding year had consisted only of -mercenaries levied for the occasion, and then disbanded.</p> - -<p>These events excited strong sensation throughout Sicily. The -valor of Hermokrates, who had restored Selinus and conquered the -Carthaginians on the very ground where they had stood so recently -in terrific force, was contrasted with the inglorious proceeding -of Diokles at Himera. In the public assemblies of Syracuse, this -topic, coupled with the unjust sentence whereby Hermokrates had been -banished, was emphatically set forth by his partisans; producing -some reaction in his favor, and a still greater effect in disgracing -his rival Diokles. Apprised that the tide of Syracusan opinion was -turning towards him, Hermokrates made renewed preparations for his -return, and resorted to a new stratagem for the purpose of smoothing -the difficulty. He marched from Selinus to the ruined site of Himera, -informed himself of the spot where the Syracusan troops had undergone -their murderous defeat, and collected together the bones of his -slain fellow-citizens; which (or rather the unburied bodies) must -have lain<span class="pagenum" id="Page_418">[p. 418]</span> upon -the field unheeded for about two years. Having placed these bones on -cars richly decorated, he marched with his forces and conveyed them -across the island from Himera to the Syracusan border. Here as an -exile he halted; thinking it suitable now to display respect for the -law,—though in his previous attempt he had gone up to the very gates -of the city, without any similar scruples. But he sent forward some -friends with the cars and the bones, tendering them to the citizens -for the purpose of being honored with due funeral solemnities. Their -arrival was the signal for a violent party discussion, and for an -outburst of aggravated displeasure against Diokles, who had left -the bodies unburied on the field of battle. “It was to Hermokrates -(so his partisans urged) and to his valiant efforts against the -Carthaginians, that the recovery of these remnants of the slain, and -the opportunity of administering to them the funeral solemnities, was -now owing. Let the Syracusans, after duly performing such obsequies, -testify their gratitude to Hermokrates by a vote of restoration, and -their displeasure against Diokles by a sentence of banishment.”<a -id="FNanchor_916" href="#Footnote_916" class="fnanchor">[916]</a> -Diokles with his partisans was thus placed at great disadvantage. -In opposing the restoration of Hermokrates, he thought it necessary -also to oppose the proposition for welcoming and burying the -bones of the slain citizens. Here the feelings of the people went -vehemently against him; the bones were received and interred, amidst -the respectful attendance of all; and so strong was the reactionary -sentiment generally, that the partisans of Hermokrates carried their -proposition for sentencing Diokles to banishment. But on the other -hand, they could not so far prevail as to obtain the restoration of -Hermokrates himself. The purposes of the latter had been so palpably -manifested, in trying a few months before to force his way into the -city by surprise, and in now presenting himself at the frontier -with an armed force under his command,—that his readmission would -have been nothing less than a deliberate surrender of the freedom -of the city to a despot.<a id="FNanchor_917" href="#Footnote_917" -class="fnanchor">[917]</a></p> - -<p>Having failed in this well-laid stratagem for obtaining a vote -of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_419">[p. 419]</span> consent, -Hermokrates saw that his return could not at that moment be -consummated by open force. He therefore retired from the Syracusan -frontier; yet only postponing his purposes of armed attack until his -friends in the city could provide for him a convenient opportunity. -We see plainly that his own party within had been much strengthened, -and his opponents enfeebled, by the recent manœuvre. Of this a proof -is to be found in the banishment of Diokles, who probably was not -succeeded by any other leader of equal influence. After a certain -interval, the partisans of Hermokrates contrived a plan which they -thought practicable, for admitting him into the city by night. -Forewarned by them, he marched from Selinus at the head of three -thousand soldiers, crossed the territory of Gela,<a id="FNanchor_918" -href="#Footnote_918" class="fnanchor">[918]</a> and reached the -concerted spot near the gate of Achradina during the night. From the -rapidity of his advance, he had only a few troops along with him; the -main body not having been able to keep up. With these few, however, -he hastened to the gate, which he found already in possession -of his friends, who had probably (like Pasimêlus at Corinth<a -id="FNanchor_919" href="#Footnote_919" class="fnanchor">[919]</a>) -awaited a night on which they were posted to act as sentinels. -Master of the gate, Hermokrates, though joined by his partisans -within in arms, thought it prudent to postpone decisive attack -until his own main force came up. But during this interval, the -Syracusan authorities in the city, apprised of what had happened, -mustered their full military strength in the agora, and lost no time -in falling upon the band of aggressors. After a sharply contested -combat, these aggressors were completely worsted, and Hermokrates -himself slain with a considerable proportion of his followers. -The remainder having fled, sentence of banishment was passed upon -them. Several among the wounded, however, were reported by their -relatives as slain, in order that they might escape being comprised -in such a condemnation.<a id="FNanchor_920" href="#Footnote_920" -class="fnanchor">[920]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_420">[p. 420]</span></p> - -<p>Thus perished one of the most energetic of the Syracusan citizens; -a man not less effective as a defender of his country against foreign -enemies, than himself dangerous as a formidable enemy to her internal -liberties. It would seem, as far as we can make out, that his attempt -to make himself master of his country was powerfully seconded, and -might well have succeeded. But it lacked that adventitious support -arising from present embarrassment and danger in the foreign -relations of the city, which we shall find so efficacious two years -afterwards in promoting the ambitious projects of Dionysius.</p> - -<p>Dionysius,—for the next coming generation the most formidable -name in the Grecian world,—now appears for the first time in -history. He was a young Syracusan of no consideration from family -or position, described as even of low birth and low occupation; -as a scribe or secretary, which was looked upon as a subordinate, -though essential, function.<a id="FNanchor_921" href="#Footnote_921" -class="fnanchor">[921]</a> He was the son of Hermokrates,—not -that eminent person whose death has been just described, but -another person of the same name, whether related or<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_421">[p. 421]</span> not, we do not know.<a -id="FNanchor_922" href="#Footnote_922" class="fnanchor">[922]</a> -It is highly probable that he was a man of literary ability and -instruction, since we read of him in after-days as a composer of -odes and tragedies; and it is certain that he stood distinguished -in all the talents for military action,—bravery, force of will, -and quickness of discernment. On the present occasion, he espoused -strenuously the party of Hermokrates, and was one of those who took -arms in the city on his behalf. Having distinguished himself in the -battle, and received several wounds, he was among those given out -for dead by his relations.<a id="FNanchor_923" href="#Footnote_923" -class="fnanchor">[923]</a> In this manner he escaped the sentence of -banishment passed against the survivors. And when, in the course of -a certain time, after recovering from his wounds, he was produced -as unexpectedly living,—we may presume that his opponents and the -leading men in the city left him unmolested, not thinking it worth -while to reopen political inquisition in reference to matters already -passed and finished. He thus remained in the city, marked out by his -daring and address to the Hermokratæan party, as the person most fit -to take up the mantle, and resume the anti-popular designs, of their -late leader. It will presently be seen how the chiefs of this party -lent their aid to exalt him.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the internal condition of Syracuse was greatly enfeebled -by this division. Though the three several attempts of Hermokrates to -penetrate by force or fraud into the city had all failed, yet they -had left a formidable body of malcontents behind; while the opponents -also, the popular government and its leaders, had been materially -reduced in power and consideration by the banishment of Diokles. This -magistrate was succeeded by Daphnæus and others, of whom we know -nothing, except that they are spoken of as rich men and representing -the sentiments of the rich,—and that they seem to have manifested but -little ability. Nothing could be more unfortunate than the weakness -of Syracuse at this particular juncture: for the Carthaginians, elate -with their successes at Selinus and Himera, and doubtless also piqued -by the subsequent retaliation of Hermokrates upon their dependencies -at Motyê and Panormus, were just now meditating a second invasion -of Sicily on a still larger scale. Not uninformed of their<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_422">[p. 422]</span> projects, the Syracusan -leaders sent envoys to Carthage to remonstrate against them, and to -make propositions for peace. But no satisfactory answer could be -obtained, nor were the preparations discontinued.<a id="FNanchor_924" -href="#Footnote_924" class="fnanchor">[924]</a></p> - -<p>In the ensuing spring, the storm gathering from Africa burst with -destructive violence upon this fated island. A mercenary force had -been got together during the winter, greater than that which had -sacked Selinus and Himera; three hundred thousand men, according to -Ephorus,—one hundred and twenty thousand, according to Xenophon and -Timæus. Hannibal was again placed in command; but his predominant -impulses of family and religion having been satiated by the great -sacrifice of Himera, he excused himself on the score of old age, -and was only induced to accept the duty by having his relative -Imilkon named as colleague. By their joint efforts, the immense -host of Iberians, Mediterranean islanders, Campanians, Libyans, and -Numidians, was united at Carthage, and made ready to be conveyed -across, in a fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes, with no less -than one thousand five hundred transports.<a id="FNanchor_925" -href="#Footnote_925" class="fnanchor">[925]</a> To protect the -landing, forty Carthaginian triremes were previously sent over to -the Bay of Motyê. The Syracusan leaders, with commendable energy and -watchfulness, immediately despatched the like number of triremes -to attack them, in hopes of thereby checking the farther arrival -of the grand armament. They were victorious, destroying fifteen of -the Carthaginian triremes, and driving the rest back to Africa; yet -their object was not attained; for Hannibal himself, coming forth -immediately with fifty fresh triremes, constrained the Syracusans -to retire. Presently afterwards the grand armament appeared, -disembarking its motley crowd of barbaric warriors near the western -cape of Sicily.</p> - -<p>Great was the alarm caused throughout Sicily by their arrival. All -the Greek cities either now began to prepare for war, or pushed with -a more vigorous hand equipments previously begun, since they seem to -have had some previous knowledge of the purpose of the enemy. The -Syracusans sent to entreat assistance both from the Italian Greeks -and from Sparta. From the latter city, however, little was to be -expected, since her whole<span class="pagenum" id="Page_423">[p. -423]</span> efforts were now devoted to the prosecution of the war -against Athens; this being the year wherein Kallikratidas commanded, -and when the battle of Arginusæ was fought.</p> - -<p>Of all Sicilian Greeks, the Agrigentines were both the most -frightened and the most busily employed. Conterminous as they were -with Selinus on their western frontier, and foreseeing that the first -shock of the invasion would fall upon them, they immediately began -to carry in their outlying property within the walls, as well as -to accumulate a stock of provisions for enduring blockade. Sending -for Dexippus, a Lacedæmonian then in Gela as commander of a body -of mercenaries for the defence of that town, they engaged him in -their service, with one thousand five hundred hoplites; reinforced -by eight hundred of those Campanians who had served with Hannibal -at Himera, but had quitted him in disgust.<a id="FNanchor_926" -href="#Footnote_926" class="fnanchor">[926]</a></p> - -<p>Agrigentum was at this time in the highest state of prosperity -and magnificence; a tempting prize for any invader. Its population -was very great; comprising, according to one account, twenty -thousand citizens among an aggregate total of two hundred thousand -males,—citizens, metics, and slaves; according to another account, -an aggregate total of no less than eight hundred thousand persons;<a -id="FNanchor_927" href="#Footnote_927" class="fnanchor">[927]</a> -numbers unauthenticated, and not to be trusted farther than as -indicating a very populous city. Situated a little more than two -miles from the sea, and possessing a spacious territory highly -cultivated, especially with vines and olives, Agrigentum carried on a -lucrative trade with the opposite coast of Africa, where at that time -no such plantations flourished. Its temples and porticos, especially -the spacious temple of Zeus Olympius,—its statues and pictures,—its -abundance of chariots and horses,—its fortifications,—its sewers,—its -artificial lake of near a mile in circumference, abundantly stocked -with fish,—all these placed it on a par with the most splendid cities -of the Hellenic world.<a id="FNanchor_928" href="#Footnote_928" -class="fnanchor">[928]</a> Of the numerous prisoners taken at the -defeat of the Carthaginians near Himera seventy years before, a very -large proportion had fallen to the lot of the Agrigentines, and had -been employed by them in public works contributing to the advantage -or ornament of the city.<a id="FNanchor_929" href="#Footnote_929" -class="fnanchor">[929]</a> The hospitality of the wealthy -citizens,—Gellias,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_424">[p. -424]</span> Antisthenes, and others,—was carried even to profusion. -The surrounding territory was celebrated for its breed of horses,<a -id="FNanchor_930" href="#Footnote_930" class="fnanchor">[930]</a> -which the rich Agrigentines vied with each other in training and -equipping for the chariot-race. At the last Olympic games immediately -preceding this fatal Carthaginian invasion (that is at the 93rd -Olympiad,—408 <small>B.C.</small>), the Agrigentine Exænetus gained -the prize in a chariot-race. On returning to Sicily after his -victory, he was welcomed by many of his friends, who escorted him -home in procession with three hundred chariots, each drawn by a pair -of white horses, and all belonging to native Agrigentines. Of the -festival by which the wealthy Antisthenes celebrated the nuptials of -his daughter, we read an account almost fabulous. Amidst all this -wealth and luxury, it is not surprising to hear that the rough duties -of military exercise were imperfectly kept up, and that indulgences, -not very consistent with soldier-like efficiency, were allowed to the -citizens on guard.</p> - -<p>Such was Agrigentum in May 406 <small>B.C.</small>, when Hannibal -and Imilkon approached it with their powerful army. Their first -propositions, however, were not of a hostile character. They invited -the Agrigentines to enter into alliance with Carthage; or if this -were not acceptable, at any rate to remain neutral and at peace. Both -propositions were declined.<a id="FNanchor_931" href="#Footnote_931" -class="fnanchor">[931]</a></p> - -<p>Besides having taken engagements with Gela and Syracuse, the -Agrigentines also felt a confidence, not unreasonable, in the -strength of their own walls and situation. Agrigentum with its -citadel was placed on an aggregate of limestone hills, immediately -above the confluence of two rivers, both flowing from the north; -the river Akragas on the eastern and southern sides of the city, -and the Hypsas on its western side. Of this aggregate of hills, -separated from each other by clefts and valleys, the northern half -is the loftiest, being about eleven hundred feet above the level of -the sea—the southern half is less lofty. But on all sides, except -on the south-west, it rises by a precipitous ascent; on the side -towards the sea, it springs immediately out of the plain, thus -presenting a fine prospect to ships passing along the coast. The -whole of this aggregate of hills was encompassed by a continuous -wall, built round the declivity, and in some parts hewn out of -the solid rock. The town<span class="pagenum" id="Page_425">[p. -425]</span> of Agrigentum was situated in the southern half of the -walled enclosure. The citadel, separated from it by a ravine, and -accessible only by one narrow ascent, stood on the north-eastern -hill; it was the most conspicuous feature in the place, called -the Athenæum, and decorated by temples of Athênê and of Zeus -Atabyrius. In the plain under the southern wall of the city stood -the Agrigentine sepulchres.<a id="FNanchor_932" href="#Footnote_932" -class="fnanchor">[932]</a>—Reinforced by eight hundred Campanian -mercenaries, with the fifteen hundred other mercenaries brought by -Dexippus from Gela,—the Agrigentines awaited confidently the attack -upon their walls, which were not only in far better condition than -those of Selinus, but also unapproachable by battering-machines or -movable towers, except on one part of the south-western side. It was -here that Hannibal, after reconnoitering the town all round, began -his attack. But after hard fighting without success for one day, -he was forced to retire at nightfall; and even lost his battering -train, which was burnt during the night by a sally of the besieged.<a -id="FNanchor_933" href="#Footnote_933" class="fnanchor">[933]</a> -Desisting from farther attempts on that point, Hannibal now ordered -his troops to pull down the tombs; which were numerous on the lower -or southern side of the city, and many of which, especially that of -the despot Theron, were of conspicuous grandeur. By this measure he -calculated on providing materials adequate to the erection of immense -mounds, equal in height to the southern wall, and sufficiently -close to it for the purpose of assault. His numerous host had made -considerable progress in demolishing these tombs, and were engaged -in breaking down the monument of Theron,<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_426">[p. 426]</span> when their progress was arrested by a -thunderbolt falling upon it. This event was followed by religious -terrors, suddenly overspreading the camp. The prophets declared that -the violation of the tombs was an act of criminal sacrilege. Every -night the spectres of those whose tombs had been profaned manifested -themselves, to the affright of the soldiers on guard; while the -judgment of the gods was manifested in a violent pestilential -distemper. Numbers of the army perished, Hannibal himself among -them; and even of those who escaped death, many were disabled from -active duty by distress and suffering. Imilkon was compelled to -appease the gods, and to calm the agony of the troops, by a solemn -supplication according to the Carthaginian rites. He sacrificed -a child, considered as the most propitiatory of all offerings, -to Kronus; and cast into the sea a number of animal victims as -offerings to Poseidon.<a id="FNanchor_934" href="#Footnote_934" -class="fnanchor">[934]</a></p> - -<p>These religious rites calmed the terrors of the army, and -mitigated, or were supposed to have mitigated, the distemper; so -that Imilkon, while desisting from all farther meddling with the -tombs, was enabled to resume his batteries and assaults against -the walls, though without any considerable success. He also dammed -up the western river Hypsas, so as to turn the stream against the -wall; but this manœuvre produced no effect. His operations were -presently interrupted by the arrival of a powerful army which -marched from Syracuse, under Daphnæus, to the relief of Agrigentum. -Reinforced in its road by the military strength of Kamarina and Gela, -it amounted to thirty thousand foot and five thousand horse, on -reaching the river Himera, the eastern frontier of the Agrigentine -territory; while a fleet of thirty Syracusan triremes sailed along -the coast to second its efforts. As these troops neared the town, -Imilkon despatched against them a body of Iberians and Campanians;<a -id="FNanchor_935" href="#Footnote_935" class="fnanchor">[935]</a> who -however, after a strenuous<span class="pagenum" id="Page_427">[p. -427]</span> combat, were completely defeated, and driven back to the -Carthaginian camp near the city, where they found themselves under -the protection of the main army. Daphnæus, having secured the victory -and inflicted severe loss upon the enemy, was careful to prevent his -troops from disordering their ranks in the ardor of pursuit, in the -apprehension that Imilkon with the main body might take advantage -of that disorder to turn the fortune of the day,—as had happened in -the terrible defeat before Himera, three years before. The routed -Iberians were thus allowed to get back to the camp. At the same time -the Agrigentines, witnessing from the walls, with joyous excitement, -the flight of their enemies, vehemently urged their generals to lead -them forth for an immediate sally, in order that the destruction -of the fugitives might thus be consummated. But the generals were -inflexible in resisting such demand; conceiving that the city itself -would thus be stripped of its defenders, and that Imilkon might seize -the occasion for assaulting it with his main body, when there was not -sufficient force to repel them. The defeated Iberians thus escaped -to the main camp; neither pursued by the Syracusans, nor impeded, as -they passed near the Agrigentine walls, by the population within.</p> - -<p>Presently Daphnæus with his victorious army reached Agrigentum, -and joined the citizens; who flocked in crowds, along with the -Lacedæmonian Dexippus, to meet and welcome them. But the joy of -meeting, and the reciprocal congratulations on the recent victory, -were fatally poisoned by general indignation for the unmolested -escape of the defeated Iberians; occasioned by nothing less than -remissness, cowardice, or corruption, (so it was contended), on the -part of the generals,—first the Syracusan generals, and next the -Agrigentine. Against the former, little was now said, though much -was held in reserve, as we shall soon hear. But against the latter, -the discontent of the Agrigentine population burst forth instantly -and impetuously. A public assembly being held on the spot, the -Agrigentine generals, five in number, were put under accusation. -Among many speakers who denounced them as guilty of treason, the -most violent of all was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_428">[p. -428]</span> the Kamarinæan Menês,—himself one of the leaders, -seemingly of the Kamarinæan contingent in the army of Daphnæus. The -concurrence of Menês, carrying to the Agrigentines a full sanction of -their sentiments, wrought them up to such a pitch of fury, that the -generals, when they came to defend themselves, found neither sympathy -nor even common fairness of hearing. Four out of the five were -stoned and put to death on the spot; the fifth, Argeius, was spared -only on the ground of his youth; and even the Lacedæmonian Dexippus -was severely censured.<a id="FNanchor_936" href="#Footnote_936" -class="fnanchor">[936]</a></p> - -<p>How far, in regard to these proceedings, the generals were really -guilty, or how far their defence, had it been fairly heard, would -have been valid,—is a point which our scanty information does not -enable us to determine. But it is certain that the arrival of the -victorious Syracusans at Agrigentum completely altered the relative -position of affairs. Instead of farther assaulting the walls, -Imilkon was attacked in his camp by Daphnæus. The camp, however, -was so fortified as to repel all attempts, and the siege from this -time forward became only a blockade; a contest of patience and -privation between the city and the besiegers, lasting seven or -eight months from the commencement of the siege. At first Daphnæus, -with his own force united to the Agrigentines, was strong enough to -harass the Carthaginians and intercept their supplies, so that the -greatest distress began to prevail among their army. The Campanian -mercenaries even broke out into mutiny, crowding, with clamorous -demands for provision and with menace of deserting, around the tent -of Imilkon; who barely pacified them by pledging to them the gold -and silver drinking-cups of the chief Carthaginians around him,<a -id="FNanchor_937" href="#Footnote_937" class="fnanchor">[937]</a> -coupled with entreaties that they<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_429">[p. 429]</span> would wait yet a few days. During -that short interval, he meditated and executed a bold stroke of -relief. The Syracusans and Agrigentines were mainly supplied by sea -from Syracuse; from whence a large transport of provision-ships was -now expected, under convoy of some Syracusan triremes. Apprised of -their approach, Imilkon silently brought out forty Carthaginian -triremes from Motyê and Panormus, with which he suddenly attacked the -Syracusan convoy, no way expecting such a surprise. Eight Syracusan -triremes were destroyed; the remainder were driven ashore, and the -whole fleet of transports fell into the hands of Imilkon. Abundance -and satisfaction now reigned in the camp of the Carthaginians, -while the distress, and with it the discontent, was transferred to -Agrigentum. The Campanian mercenaries in the service of Dexippus -began the mutiny, complaining to him of their condition. Perhaps he -had been alarmed and disgusted at the violent manifestation of the -Agrigentines against their generals, extending partly to himself -also. At any rate, he manifested no zeal in the defence, and was -even suspected of having received a bribe of fifteen talents from -the Carthaginians. He told the Campanians that Agrigentum was no -longer tenable, for want of supplies; upon which they immediately -retired, and marched away to Messênê, affirming that the time -stipulated for their stay had expired. Such a secession struck -every one with discouragement. The Agrigentine generals immediately -instituted an examination, to ascertain the quantity of provision -still remaining in the city. Having made the painful discovery that -there remained but very little, they took the resolution of causing -the city to be evacuated by its population during the coming night.<a -id="FNanchor_938" href="#Footnote_938" class="fnanchor">[938]</a></p> - -<p>A night followed, even more replete with woe and desolation than -that which had witnessed the flight of Diokles with the inhabitants -of Himera from their native city. Few scenes can be imagined more -deplorable than the vast population of Agrigentum obliged to hurry -out of their gates during a December night, as their only chance of -escape from famine or the sword of a merciless enemy. The road to -Gela was beset by a distracted crowd, of both sexes and of every age -and condition, confounded in one indiscriminate lot of suffering. No -thought could be bestowed on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_430">[p. -430]</span> the preservation of property or cherished possessions. -Happy were they who could save their lives; for not a few, through -personal weakness or the immobility of despair, were left behind. -Perhaps here and there a citizen, combining the personal strength -with the filial piety of Æneas, might carry away his aged father with -the household gods on his shoulders; but for the most part, the old, -the sick, and the impotent, all whose years were either too tender -or too decrepit to keep up with a hurried flight, were of necessity -abandoned. Some remained and slew themselves, refusing even to -survive the loss of their homes and the destruction of their city; -others, among whom was the wealthy Gellias, consigned themselves -to the protection of the temples, but with little hope that it -would procure them safety. The morning’s dawn exhibited to Imilkon -unguarded walls, a deserted city, and a miserable population of -exiles huddled together in disorderly flight on the road to Gela.</p> - -<p>For these fugitives, however, the Syracusan and Agrigentine -soldiers formed a rear-guard sufficient to keep off the aggravated -torture of a pursuit. But the Carthaginian army found enough to -occupy them in the undefended prey which was before their eyes. -They rushed upon the town with the fury of men who had been -struggling and suffering before it for eight months. They ransacked -the houses, slew every living person that was left, and found -plunder enough to satiate even a ravenous appetite. Temples as -well as private dwellings were alike stripped, so that those who -had taken sanctuary in them became victims like the rest: a fate -which Gellius only avoided by setting fire to the temple in which -he stood and perishing in its ruins. The great public ornaments -and trophies of the city,—the bull of Phalaris, together with the -most precious statues and pictures,—were preserved by Imilkon -and sent home as decorations to Carthage.<a id="FNanchor_939" -href="#Footnote_939" class="fnanchor">[939]</a> While he gave up the -houses of Agrigentum to be thus gutted, he still kept them standing, -and caused them to serve as winter-quarters for the repose of his -soldiers, after the hardships of an eight months’ siege. The unhappy -Agrigentine fugitives first found shelter and kind hospitality -at Gela; from whence they were afterwards, by permission of the -Syracusans, transferred to Leontini.</p> <p><span class="pagenum" -id="Page_431">[p. 431]</span></p> <p>I have described, as far as -the narrative of Diodorus permits us to know, this momentous and -tragical portion of Sicilian history; a suitable preface to the long -despotism of Dionysius. It is evident that the seven or eight months -(the former of these numbers is authenticated by Xenophon, while -the latter is given by Diodorus) of the siege or blockade must have -contained matters of the greatest importance which are not mentioned, -and that even of the main circumstances which brought about the -capture, we are most imperfectly informed. But though we cannot fully -comprehend its causes, its effects are easy to understand. They -were terror-striking and harrowing in the extreme. When the storm -which had beaten down Selinus and Himera was now perceived to have -extended its desolation to a city so much more conspicuous, among the -wealthiest and most populous in the Grecian world,—when the surviving -Agrigentine population, including women and children, and the great -proprietors of chariots whose names stood recorded as victors at -Olympia, were seen all confounded in one common fate of homeless -flight and nakedness—when the victorious host and its commanders -took up their quarters in the deserted houses, ready to spread -their conquests farther after a winter of repose,—there was hardly -a Greek in Sicily who did not tremble for his life and property.<a -id="FNanchor_940" href="#Footnote_940" class="fnanchor">[940]</a> -Several of them sought shelter at Syracuse, while others even quitted -the island altogether, emigrating to Italy.</p> - -<p>Amidst so much anguish, humiliation, and terror, there were -loud complaints against the conduct of the Syracusan generals -under whose command the disaster had occurred. The censure which -had been cast upon them before, for not having vigorously pursued -the defeated Iberians, was now revived, and aggravated tenfold by -the subsequent misfortune. To their inefficiency the capture of -Agrigentum was ascribed, and apparently not without substantial -cause; for the town was so strongly placed as to defy assault, and -could only be taken by blockade; now we discern no impediments -adequate to hinder the Syracusan generals from procuring supplies of -provisions; and it seems clear that the surprise of the Syracusan -store-ships might have been prevented by proper precautions; upon -which surprise the whole question turned, between famine in<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_432">[p. 432]</span> the Carthaginian camp -and famine in Agrigentum.<a id="FNanchor_941" href="#Footnote_941" -class="fnanchor">[941]</a> The efficiency of Dexippus and the other -generals, in defending Agrigentum (as depicted by Diodorus), stands -sadly inferior to the vigor and ability displayed by Gylippus before -Syracuse, as described by Thucydides: and we can hardly wonder that -by men in the depth of misery, like the Agrigentines,—or in extreme -alarm, like the other Sicilian Greeks—these generals, incompetent or -treasonable, should be regarded as the cause of the ruin.</p> - -<p>Such a state of sentiment, under ordinary circumstances, would -have led to the condemnation of the generals and to the nomination -of others, with little farther result. But it became of far graver -import, when combined with the actual situation of parties in -Syracuse. The Hermokratean opposition party,—repelled during the -preceding year with the loss of its leader, yet nowise crushed,—now -re-appeared more formidable than ever, under a new leader more -aggressive even than Hermokrates himself. Throughout ancient as well -as modern history, defeat and embarrassment in the foreign relations -have proved fruitful causes of change in the internal government. -Such auxiliaries had been wanting to the success of Hermokrates in -the preceding year; but alarms of every kind now overhung the city -in terrific magnitude, and when the first Syracusan assembly was -convoked on returning from Agrigentum, a mournful silence reigned;<a -id="FNanchor_942" href="#Footnote_942" class="fnanchor">[942]</a> -as in the memorable description given by Demosthenes of the -Athenian assembly held immediately after the taking of Elateia.<a -id="FNanchor_943" href="#Footnote_943" class="fnanchor">[943]</a> -The generals had lost the confidence of their fellow-citizens; yet -no one else was forward, at a juncture so full of peril, to assume -their duty, by proffering fit counsel for the future conduct of -the war. Now was the time for the Hermokratean party to lay their -train for putting down the government. Dionysius, though both -young and of mean family, was adopted as leader in consequence of -that audacity and bravery<span class="pagenum" id="Page_433">[p. -433]</span> which even already he had displayed, both in the fight -along with Hermokrates and in the battles against the Carthaginians. -Hipparinus, a Syracusan of rich family, who had ruined himself by -dissolute expenses, was eager to renovate his fortunes by seconding -the elevation of Dionysius to the despotism;<a id="FNanchor_944" -href="#Footnote_944" class="fnanchor">[944]</a> Philistus (the -subsequent historian of Syracuse), rich, young, and able, threw -himself ardently into the same cause; and doubtless other leading -persons, ancient Hermokrateans and others, stood forward as partisans -in the conspiracy. But it either was, from the beginning, or speedily -became, a movement organized for the purpose of putting the sceptre -into the hands of Dionysius, to whom all the rest, though several -among them were of far greater wealth and importance, served but as -satellites and auxiliaries.</p> - -<p>Amidst the silence and disquietude which reigned in the Syracusan -assembly, Dionysius was the first who rose to address them. He -enlarged upon a topic suitable alike to the temper of his auditors -and to his own views. He vehemently denounced the generals as having -betrayed the security of Syracuse to the Carthaginians,—and as the -persons to whom the ruin of Agrigentum, together with the impending -peril of every man around, was owing. He set forth their misdeeds, -real or alleged, not merely with fulness and acrimony, but with -a ferocious violence outstripping all the limits of admissible -debate, and intended to bring upon them a lawless murder, like the -death of the generals recently at Agrigentum. “There they sit, -the traitors! Do not wait for legal trial or verdict; but lay -hands upon them at once, and inflict upon them summary justice.”<a -id="FNanchor_945" href="#Footnote_945" class="fnanchor">[945]</a> -Such a brutal exhortation, not unlike that of<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_434">[p. 434]</span> the Athenian Kritias, when he caused -the execution of Theramenes in the oligarchical senate, was an -offence against law as well as against parliamentary order. The -presiding magistrates reproved Dionysius as a disturber of order, -and fined him, as they were empowered by law.<a id="FNanchor_946" -href="#Footnote_946" class="fnanchor">[946]</a> But his partisans -were loud in his support. Philistus not only paid down the fine for -him on the spot, but publicly proclaimed that he would go on for -the whole day paying all similar fines which might be imposed,—and -incited Dionysius to persist in such language as he thought proper. -That which had begun as illegality, was now aggravated into open -defiance of the law. Yet so enfeebled was the authority of the -magistrates, and so vehement the cry against them, in the actual -position of the city, that they were unable either to punish or -to repress the speaker. Dionysius pursued his harangue in a tone -yet more inflammatory, not only accusing the generals of having -corruptly betrayed Agrigentum, but also denouncing the conspicuous -and wealthy citizens generally, as oligarchs who held tyrannical -sway,—who treated the many with scorn, and made their own profit -out of the misfortunes of the city. Syracuse (he contended) could -never be saved, unless men of a totally different character were -invested with authority; men, not chosen from wealth and station, -but of humble birth, belonging to the people by position, and kind -in their deportment from consciousness of their own weakness.<a -id="FNanchor_947" href="#Footnote_947" class="fnanchor">[947]</a> -His bitter invective against generals already discredited, together -with the impetuous warmth of his apparent sympathy for the people -against the rich, were both alike favorably received. Plato states -that the assembly became so furiously exasperated, as to follow -literally the lawless and blood-thirsty inspirations of Dionysius, -and to stone all these generals, ten in number, on the spot, -without any form of trial. But Diodorus simply tells us, that a -vote was passed to cashier<span class="pagenum" id="Page_435">[p. -435]</span> the generals, and to name in their places Dionysius, -Hipparinus, and others.<a id="FNanchor_948" href="#Footnote_948" -class="fnanchor">[948]</a> This latter statement is, in my opinion, -the more probable.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_436">[p. 436]</span></p> - -<p>Such was the first stage of what we may term the despot’s -progress, successfully consummated. The pseudo-demagogue Dio<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_437">[p. 437]</span>nysius outdoes, in -fierce professions of antipathy against the rich, anything that we -read as coming from the real demagogues, Athenagoras at Syracuse, -or Kleon at Athens. Behold him now sitting as a member of the new -Board of generals, at a moment when the most assiduous care and -energy, combined with the greatest unanimity, were required to put -the Syracusan military force into an adequate state of efficiency. It -suited the policy of Dionysius not only to bestow no care or energy -himself, but to nullify all that was bestowed by his colleagues, and -to frustrate deliberately all chance of unanimity. He immediately -began a systematic opposition and warfare against his colleagues. He -refused to attend at their Board, or to hold any communication with -them. At the frequent assemblies held during this agitated state of -the public mind, he openly denounced them as engaged in treasonable -correspondence with the enemy. It is obvious that his colleagues, -men newly chosen in the same spirit with himself, could not as yet -have committed any such treason in favor of the Carthaginians. -But among them was his accomplice Hipparinus;<a id="FNanchor_949" -href="#Footnote_949" class="fnanchor">[949]</a> while probably -the rest also, nominated by a party devoted to him personally, -were selected in a spirit of collusion, as either thorough-going -partisans,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_438">[p. 438]</span> or -worthless and incompetent men, easy for him to set aside. At any -rate, his calumnies, though received with great repugnance by the -leading and more intelligent citizens, found favor with the bulk of -the assembly, predisposed at that moment from the terrors of the -situation to suspect every one. The new Board of generals being thus -discredited, Dionysius alone was listened to as an adviser. His -first and most strenuous recommendation was, that a vote should be -passed for restoring the exiles; men (he affirmed) attached to their -country, and burning to serve her, having already refused the offers -of her enemies; men who had been thrown into banishment by previous -political dispute, but who, if now generously recalled, would -manifest their gratitude by devoted patriotism, and serve Syracuse -far more warmly than the allies invoked from Italy and Peloponnesus. -His discredited colleagues either could not, or would not, oppose the -proposition; which, being warmly pressed by Dionysius and all his -party, was at length adopted by the assembly. The exiles accordingly -returned, comprising all the most violent men who had been in arms -with Hermokrates when he was slain. They returned glowing with -party-antipathy and revenge, prepared to retaliate upon others -the confiscation under which themselves had suffered, and looking -to the despotism of Dionysius as their only means of success.<a -id="FNanchor_950" href="#Footnote_950" class="fnanchor">[950]</a></p> - -<p>The second step of the despot’s progress was now accomplished. -Dionysius had filled up the ranks of the Hermokratean party, and -obtained an energetic band of satellites, whose hopes and interests -were thoroughly identified with his own. Meanwhile letters arrived -from Gela, entreating reinforcements, as Imilkon was understood to be -about to march thither. Dionysius being empowered to march thither a -body of two thousand hoplites, with four hundred horsemen, turned the -occasion to profitable account. A regiment of mercenaries, under the -Lacedæmonian Dexippus, was in garrison at Gela; while the government -of the town is said to have been oligarchical, in the hands of the -rich, though with a strong and discontented popular opposition. On -reaching Gela, Dionysius immediately took part with the latter; -originating the most violent propositions against the governing -rich, as he had done at Syracuse. Accusing them of treason in the -public assembly, he obtained<span class="pagenum" id="Page_439">[p. -439]</span> a condemnatory vote under which they were put to death -and their properties confiscated. With the funds so acquired, he paid -the arrears due to the soldiers of Dexippus, and doubled the pay of -his own Syracusan division. These measures procured for him immense -popularity, not merely with all the soldiers, but also with the -Geloan Demos, whom he had relieved from the dominion of their wealthy -oligarchy. Accordingly, after passing a public vote testifying their -gratitude, and bestowing upon him large rewards, they despatched -envoys to carry the formal expression of their sentiments to -Syracuse. Dionysius resolved to go back thither at the same time, -with his Syracusan soldiers; and tried to prevail on Dexippus to -accompany him with his own division. This being refused, he went -thither with his Syracusans alone. To the Geloans, who earnestly -entreated that they might not be forsaken when the enemy was daily -expected, he contented himself with replying that he would presently -return with a larger force.<a id="FNanchor_951" href="#Footnote_951" -class="fnanchor">[951]</a></p> - -<p>A third step was thus obtained. Dionysius was going back to -Syracuse with a testimonial of admiration and gratitude from -Gela,—with increased attachment on the part of his own soldiers, -on account of the double pay,—and with the means of coining and -circulating a new delusion. It was on the day of a solemn festival -that he reached the town, just as the citizens were coming in crowds -out of the theatre. Amidst the bustle of such a scene as well as -of the return of the soldiers, many citizens flocked around him to -inquire, What news about the Carthaginians? “Do not ask about your -foreign enemies (was the reply of Dionysius); you have much worse -enemies within among you. Your magistrates,—these very men upon whose -watch you rely during the indulgence of the festival,—they are the -traitors who are pillaging the public money, leaving the soldiers -unpaid, and neglecting all necessary preparation, at a moment when -the enemy with an immense host is on the point of assailing you. I -knew their treachery long ago, but I have now positive proof of it. -For Imilkon sent to me an envoy, under pretence of treating about the -prisoners, but in reality to purchase my silence and connivance; he -tendered to me a larger bribe than he had given to them, if I would -consent to refrain from hindering them, since I could not be induced -to take<span class="pagenum" id="Page_440">[p. 440]</span> part in -their intrigues. This is too much. I am come home now to throw up -my command. While my colleagues are corruptly bartering away their -country, I am willing to take my share as a citizen in the common -risk, but I cannot endure to incur shame as an accomplice in their -treachery.”</p> - -<p>Such bold allegations, scattered by Dionysius among the crowd -pressing round him,—renewed at length, with emphatic formality in -the regular assembly held the next day,—and concluding with actual -resignation,—struck deep terror into the Syracusan mind. He spoke -with authority, not merely as one fresh from the frontier exposed, -but also as bearing the grateful testimonial of the Geloans, echoed -by the soldiers whose pay he had recently doubled. His assertion of -the special message from Imilkon, probably an impudent falsehood, -was confidently accepted and backed by all these men, as well as -by his other partisans, the Hermokratean party, and most of all by -the restored exiles. What defence the accused generals made, or -tried to make, we are not told. It was not likely to prevail, nor -did it prevail, against the positive deposition of a witness so -powerfully seconded. The people, persuaded of their treason, were -incensed against them, and trembled at the thought of being left, by -the resignation of Dionysius, to the protection of such treacherous -guardians against the impending invasion. Now was the time for his -partisans to come forward with their main proposition: “Why not get -rid of these traitors, and keep Dionysius alone? Leave them to be -tried and punished at a more convenient season; but elect him at -once general with full powers, to make head against the pressing -emergency from without. Do not wait until the enemy is actually -assaulting our walls. Dionysius is the man for our purpose, the only -one with whom we have a chance of safety. Recollect that our glorious -victory over the three hundred thousand Carthaginians at Himera was -achieved by Gelon acting as general with full powers.” Such rhetoric -was irresistible in the present temper of the assembly,—when the -partisans of Dionysius were full of audacity and acclamation,—when -his opponents were discomfited, suspicious of each other, and without -any positive scheme to propose,—and when the storm, which had already -overwhelmed Selinus, Himera, and Agrigentum, was about to burst on -Gela and Syracuse. A vote of the assembly was<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_441">[p. 441]</span> passed, appointing Dionysius general -of the city, alone, and with full powers;<a id="FNanchor_952" -href="#Footnote_952" class="fnanchor">[952]</a> by what majority we -do not know.</p> - -<p>The first use which the new general-plenipotentiary made of his -dignity was to propose, in the same assembly, that the pay of the -soldiers should be doubled. Such liberality (he said) would be the -best means of stimulating their zeal; while in regard to expense, -there need be no hesitation; the money might easily be provided.</p> - -<p>Thus was consummated the fourth, and most important, act of the -despot’s progress. A vote of the assembly had been obtained, passed -in constitutional forms, vesting in Dionysius a single-handed power -unknown to and above the laws,—unlimited and unresponsible. But he -was well aware that the majority of those who thus voted had no -intention of permanently abnegating their freedom,—that they meant -only to create a temporary dictatorship, under the pressing danger -of the moment, for the express purpose of preserving that freedom -against a foreign enemy,—and that even thus much had been obtained -by impudent delusion and calumny, which subsequent reflection would -speedily dissipate. No sooner had the vote passed, than symptoms -of regret and alarm became manifest among the people. What one -assembly had conferred, a second repentant assembly might revoke.<a -id="FNanchor_953" href="#Footnote_953" class="fnanchor">[953]</a> It -therefore now remained for Dionysius to ensure the perpetuity of his -power by some organized means; so as to prevent the repentance, of -which he already discerned the commencement, from realizing itself -in any actual revocation. For this purpose he required a military -force extra-popular and anti-popular; bound to himself and not to -the city. He had indeed acquired popularity with the Syracusan as -well as with the mercenary soldiers, by doubling and ensuring their -pay. He had energetic adherents, prepared to go all lengths on his -behalf, especially among the restored exiles. This was an<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_442">[p. 442]</span> important basis, but -not sufficient for his objects without the presence of a special body -of guards, constantly and immediately available, chosen as well as -controlled by himself, yet acting in such vocation under the express -mandate and sanction of the people. He required a farther vote of the -people, legalizing for his use such a body of guards.</p> - -<p>But with all his powers of delusion, and all the zeal of his -partisans, he despaired of getting any such vote from an assembly -held at Syracuse. Accordingly, he resorted to a manœuvre, proclaiming -that he had resolved on a march to Leontini, and summoning the full -military force of Syracuse (up to the age of forty) to march along -with him, with orders for each man to bring with him thirty days’ -provision. Leontini had been, a few years before, an independent -city; but was now an outlying fortified post, belonging to the -Syracusans; wherein various foreign settlers, and exiles from the -captured Sicilian cities, had obtained permission to reside. Such -men, thrown out of their position and expectations as citizens, were -likely to lend either their votes or their swords willingly to the -purposes of Dionysius. While he thus found many new adherents there, -besides those whom he brought with him, he foresaw that the general -body of the Syracusans, and especially those most disaffected to -him, would not be disposed to obey his summons or accompany him.<a -id="FNanchor_954" href="#Footnote_954" class="fnanchor">[954]</a> -For nothing could be more preposterous, in a public point of view, -than an out-march of the whole Syracusan force for thirty days to -Leontini, where there was neither danger to be averted nor profit to -be reaped; at a moment too when the danger on the side of Gela was -most serious, from the formidable Carthaginian host at Agrigentum.</p> - -<p>Dionysius accordingly set out with a force which purported, -ostensibly and according to summons, to be the full military -manifestation of Syracuse; but which, in reality, comprised mainly -his own adherents. On encamping for the night near to Leontini, -he caused a factitious clamor and disturbance to be raised during -the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_443">[p. 443]</span> darkness, -around his own tent,—ordered fires to be kindled,—summoned on a -sudden his most intimate friends,—and affected to retire under their -escort to the citadel. On the morrow an assembly was convened, of -the Syracusans and residents present, purporting to be a Syracusan -assembly; Syracuse in military guise, or as it were in Comitia -Centuriata,—to employ an ancient phrase belonging to the Roman -republic. Before this assembly Dionysius appeared, and threw himself -upon their protection; affirming that his life had been assailed -during the preceding night,—calling upon them emphatically to stand -by him against the incessant snares of his enemies,—and demanding -for that purpose a permanent body of guards. His appeal, plausibly -and pathetically turned, and doubtless warmly seconded by zealous -partisans, met with complete success. The assembly,—Syracusan or -quasi-Syracusan, though held at Leontini,—passed a formal decree, -granting to Dionysius a body-guard of six hundred men, selected -by himself and responsible to him alone.<a id="FNanchor_955" -href="#Footnote_955" class="fnanchor">[955]</a> One speaker indeed -proposed to limit the guards to such a number as should be sufficient -to protect him against any small number of personal enemies, but -not to render him independent of, or formidable to, the many.<a -id="FNanchor_956" href="#Footnote_956" class="fnanchor">[956]</a> But -such precautionary refinement was not likely to be much considered, -when the assembly was dishonest or misguided enough to pass the -destructive vote here solicited; and even if embodied in the words -of the resolution, there were no means of securing its observance -in practice. The regiment of guards being once formally sanctioned, -Dionysius heeded little the limit of number prescribed to him. He -immediately enrolled more than one thousand men, selected as well -for their bravery as from their poverty and desperate position. He -provided them with the choicest arms, and promised to them the most -munificent pay. To this basis of a certain, permanent, legalized, -regiment of household troops, he added farther a sort of standing -army, composed of mercenaries hardly less at his devotion than -the guards properly so called. In addition to the mercenaries -already around<span class="pagenum" id="Page_444">[p. 444]</span> -him, he invited others from all quarters, by tempting offers; -choosing by preference outlaws and profligates, and liberating -slaves for the purpose.<a id="FNanchor_957" href="#Footnote_957" -class="fnanchor">[957]</a> Next, summoning from Gela Dexippus the -Lacedæmonian, with the troops under his command, he sent this officer -away to Peloponnesus,—as a man not trustworthy for his purpose and -likely to stand forward on behalf of the freedom of Syracuse. He then -consolidated all the mercenaries under one organization, officering -them anew with men devoted to himself.</p> - -<p>This fresh military levy and organization was chiefly accomplished -during his stay at Leontini, without the opposition which would -probably have arisen if it had been done at Syracuse; to which latter -place Dionysius marched back, in an attitude far more imposing than -when he left it. He now entered the gates at the head not only of his -chosen body-guard, but also of a regular army of mercenaries, hired -by and dependent upon himself. He marched them at once into the islet -of Ortygia (the interior and strongest part of the city, commanding -the harbor), established his camp in that acropolis of Syracuse, and -stood forth as despot conspicuously in the eyes of all. Though the -general sentiment among the people was one of strong repugnance, yet -his powerful military force and strong position rendered all hope -of open resistance desperate. And the popular assembly,—convoked -under the pressure of this force, and probably composed of none but -his partisans,—was found so subservient, as to condemn and execute, -upon his requisition, Daphnæus and Demarchus. These two men, both -wealthy and powerful in Syracuse, had been his chief opponents, and -were seemingly among the very generals whom he had incited the people -to massacre on the spot without any form of trial, in one of the -previous public assemblies.<a id="FNanchor_958" href="#Footnote_958" -class="fnanchor">[958]</a> One step alone remained to decorate -the ignoble origin of Dionysius, and to mark the triumph of the -Hermokratean party by whom its elevation had been mainly brought -about. He immediately married the daughter of Hermokrates; -giving his own sister in marriage to Polyxenus, the brother of -that deceased chief.<a id="FNanchor_959" href="#Footnote_959" -class="fnanchor">[959]</a></p> - -<p>Thus was consummated the fifth or closing act of the despot’s -progress, rendering Dionysius master of the lives and fortunes -of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_445">[p. 445]</span> his -fellow-countrymen. The successive stages of his rise I have detailed -from Diodorus, who (excepting a hint or two from Aristotle) is -our only informant. His authority is on this occasion better than -usual, since he had before him not merely Ephorus and Timæus, but -also Philistus. He is, moreover, throughout this whole narrative at -least clear and consistent with himself. We understand enough of the -political strategy pursued by Dionysius, to pronounce that it was -adapted to his end with a degree of skill that would have greatly -struck a critical eye like Machiavel; whose analytical appreciation -of means, when he is canvassing men like Dionysius, has been often -unfairly construed as if it implied sympathy with and approbation -of their end. We see that Dionysius, in putting himself forward as -the chief and representative of the Hermokratean party, acquired -the means of employing a greater measure of fraud and delusion than -an exile like Hermokrates, in prosecution of the same ambitious -purposes. Favored by the dangers of the state and the agony of the -public mind, he was enabled to simulate an ultra-democratical ardor -both in defence of the people against the rich, and in denunciation -of the unsuccessful or incompetent generals, as if they were corrupt -traitors. Though it would seem that the government of Syracuse, in -406 <small>B.C.</small>, must have been strongly democratical, -yet Dionysius in his ardor for popular rights, treats it as an -anti-popular oligarchy; and tries to acquire the favor of the people -by placing himself in the most open quarrel and antipathy to the -rich. Nine years before, in the debate between Hermokrates and -Athenagoras in the Syracusan assembly, the former stood forth, or -at least was considered to stand forth, as champion of the rich; -while the latter spoke as a conservative democrat, complaining of -conspiracies on the part of the rich. In 406 <small>B.C.</small>, -the leader of the Hermokratean party has reversed this policy, -assuming a pretended democratical fervor much more violent than that -of Athenagoras. Dionysius, who took up the trade of what is called a -demagogue on this one occasion, simply for the purpose of procuring -one single vote in his own favor, and then shutting the door by force -against all future voting and all correction,—might resort to grosser -falsehood than Athenagoras; who, as an habitual speaker, was always -before the people, and even if successful by fraud at one meeting, -was nevertheless open to exposure at a second.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_446">[p. 446]</span></p> - -<p>In order that the voting of any public assembly shall be really -available as a protection to the people, its votes must not only be -preceded by full and free discussion, but must also be open from -time to time to rediscussion and correction. That error will from -time to time be committed, as well by the collective people as by -particular fractions of the people, is certain; opportunity for -amendment is essential. A vote which is understood to be final, and -never afterwards to be corrigible, is one which can hardly turn to -the benefit of the people themselves, though it may often, as in the -case of Dionysius, promote the sinister purposes of some designing -protector.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_82"> - <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXXII.<br /> - SICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS AT - SYRACUSE.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span> -proceedings, recounted at the close of my last chapter, whereby -Dionysius erected his despotism, can hardly have occupied less -than three months; coinciding nearly with the first months of 405 -<small>B.C.</small>, inasmuch as Agrigentum was taken about the -winter solstice of 406 <small>B.C.</small><a id="FNanchor_960" -href="#Footnote_960" class="fnanchor">[960]</a> He was not molested -during this<span class="pagenum" id="Page_447">[p. 447]</span> -period by the Carthaginians, who were kept inactive in quarters -at Agrigentum, to repose after the hardships of the blockade; -employed in despoiling the city of its movable ornaments, for -transmission to Carthage, and in burning or defacing, with barbarous -antipathy, such as could not be carried away.<a id="FNanchor_961" -href="#Footnote_961" class="fnanchor">[961]</a> In the spring -Imilkon moved forward towards Gela, having provided himself with -fresh siege-machines, and ensured his supplies from the Carthaginian -territory in his rear. Finding no army to oppose him, he spread his -troops over the territory both of Gela and of Kamarina, where much -plunder was collected and much property ruined. He then returned -to attack Gela, and established a fortified camp by clearing some -plantation-ground near the river of the same name, between the city -and the sea. On this spot stood, without the walls, a colossal statue -of Apollo, which Imilkon caused to be carried off and sent as a -present to Tyre.</p> - -<p>Gela was at this moment defended only by its own citizens, for -Dionysius had called away Dexippus with the mercenary troops. Alarmed -at the approach of the formidable enemy who had already mastered -Agrigentum, Himera, and Selinus,—the Geloans despatched pressing -entreaties to Dionysius for aid; at the same time resolving to -send away their women and children for safety to Syracuse. But the -women, to whom the idea of separation was intolerable, supplicated -so earnestly to be allowed to stay and share the fortunes of their -fathers and husbands, that this resolution was abandoned. In -expectation of speedy relief from Dionysius, the defence was brave -and energetic. While parties of the Geloans, well-acquainted with the -country, sallied out and acted with great partial success against -the Carthaginian plunderers,—the mass of the citizens repelled the -assaults of Imilkon against the walls. His battering-machines and -storming-parties were brought to bear on several places at once; -the walls themselves,—being neither in so good a condition, nor -placed upon so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_448">[p. 448]</span> -unassailable an eminence, as those of Agrigentum,—gave way on more -than one point. Yet still the besieged, with obstinate valor, -frustrated every attempt to penetrate within; reëstablishing -during the night the breaches which had been made during the day. -The feebler part of their population aided, by every means in -their power, the warriors on the battlements; so the defence was -thus made good until Dionysius appeared with the long-expected -reinforcement. It comprised his newly-levied mercenaries, with the -Syracusan citizens, and succors from the Italian as well as from the -Sicilian Greeks; amounting in all to fifty thousand men, according -to Ephorus,—to thirty thousand foot, and one thousand horse, as -Timæus represented. A fleet of fifty ships of war sailed round -Cape Pachynus to coöperate with them off Gela.<a id="FNanchor_962" -href="#Footnote_962" class="fnanchor">[962]</a></p> - -<p>Dionysius fixed his position between Gela and the sea, opposite to -that of the Carthaginians, and in immediate communication with his -fleet. His presence having suspended the assaults upon the town, he -became in his turn the aggressor; employing both his cavalry and his -fleet to harass the Carthaginians and intercept their supplies. The -contest now assumed a character nearly the same as had taken place -before Agrigentum, and which had ended so unfavorably to the Greeks. -At length, after twenty days of such desultory warfare, Dionysius, -finding that he had accomplished little, laid his plan for a direct -attack upon the Carthaginian camp. On the side towards the sea, as no -danger had been expected, that camp was unfortified; it was there, -accordingly, that Dionysius resolved to make his principal attack -with his left division, consisting principally of Italiot Greeks, -sustained by the Syracusan ships, who were to attack simultaneously -from seaward. He designed at the same time also to strike blows from -two other points. His right division, consisting of Sicilian allies, -was ordered to march on the right or western side of the town of -Gela, and thus fall upon the left of the Carthaginian camp; while he -himself, with the mercenary troops which he kept specially around -him, intended to advance through the town itself, and assail the -advanced or central portion of their position near the walls, where -their battering-machinery was posted. His cavalry were directed<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_449">[p. 449]</span> to hold themselves -in reserve for pursuit, in case the attack proved successful; or -for protection to the retreating infantry, in case it failed.<a -id="FNanchor_963" href="#Footnote_963" class="fnanchor">[963]</a></p> - -<p>Of this combined scheme, the attack upon the left or seaward side -of the Carthaginian camp, by the Italiot division and the fleet -in concert, was effectively executed, and promised at first to be -successful. The assailants overthrew the bulwarks, forced their way -into the camp, and were only driven out by extraordinary efforts -on the part of the defenders; chiefly Iberians and Campanians, but -reinforced from the other portions of the army, which were as yet -unmolested. But of the two other divisions of Dionysius, the right -did not attack until long after the moment intended, and the centre -never attacked at all. The right had to make a circuitous march, over -the Geloan plain round the city, which occupied longer time than had -been calculated; while Dionysius with the mercenaries around him, -intending to march through the city, found themselves so obstructed -and embarrassed that they made very slow progress, and were yet -longer before they could emerge on the Carthaginian side. Probably -the streets, as in so many other ancient towns, were crooked, narrow, -and irregular; perhaps also, farther blocked up by precautions -recently taken for defence. And thus the Sicilians on the right, -not coming up to the attack until the Italians on the left had been -already repulsed, were compelled to retreat, after a brave struggle, -by the concurrent force of the main Carthaginian army. Dionysius and -his mercenaries, coming up later still, found that the moment for -attack had passed altogether, and returned back into the city without -fighting at all.</p> - -<p>Whether the plan or the execution was here at fault,—or both the -one and the other,—we are unable certainly to determine. There will -appear reasons for suspecting, that Dionysius was not displeased at a -repulse which should discourage his army, and furnish an excuse for -abandoning Gela. After retiring again within the walls, he called -together his principal friends to consult what was best to be done. -All were of opinion that it was imprudent to incur farther hazard -for the preservation of the town. Dionysius now found himself in -the same position as Diokles after the defeat<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_450">[p. 450]</span> near Himera, and as Daphnæus and the -other Syracusan generals before Agrigentum, after the capture of -their provision-fleet by the Carthaginians. He felt constrained to -abandon Gela, taking the best means in his power for protecting the -escape of the inhabitants. Accordingly, to keep the intention of -flight secret, he sent a herald to Imilkon to solicit a burial-truce -for the ensuing day; he also set apart a body of two thousand light -troops, with orders to make noises in front of the enemy throughout -the whole night, and to keep the lights and fires burning, so -as to prevent any suspicion on the part of the Carthaginians.<a -id="FNanchor_964" href="#Footnote_964" class="fnanchor">[964]</a> -Under cover of these precautions, he caused the Geloan population to -evacuate their city in mass at the commencement of night, while he -himself with his main army followed at midnight to protect them. All -hurried forward on their march to Syracuse, turning to best account -the hours of darkness. On their way thither lay Kamarina,—Kamarina -the immovable,<a id="FNanchor_965" href="#Footnote_965" -class="fnanchor">[965]</a> as it was pronounced by an ancient oracle -or legend, yet on that fatal night seeming to falsify the epithet. -Not thinking himself competent to defend this city, Dionysius forced -all the Kamarinæan population to become partners in the flight of -the Geloans. The same heart-rending scene, which has already been -recounted at Agrigentum and Himera, was now seen repeated on the road -from Gela to Syracuse: a fugitive multitude, of all ages and of both -sexes, free as well as slave, destitute and terror-stricken, hurrying -they knew not whither, to get beyond the reach of a merciless enemy. -The flight to Syracuse, however, was fortunately not molested by any -pursuit. At daybreak the Carthaginians, discovering the abandonment -of the city, immediately rushed in and took possession of it. As very -little of the valuable property within it had been removed, a rich -plunder fell into the hands of the conquering host, whose barbarous -hands massacred indiscriminately the miserable remnant left behind: -old men, sick, and children, unable to accompany a flight so sudden -and so rapid. Some of the conquerors farther satiated their ferocious -instincts by crucifying or mutilating these unhappy prisoners.<a -id="FNanchor_966" href="#Footnote_966" class="fnanchor">[966]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_451">[p. 451]</span></p> - -<p>Amidst the sufferings of this distressed multitude, however, and -the compassion of the protecting army, other feelings also were -powerfully aroused. Dionysius, who had been so unmeasured and so -effective in calumniating unsuccessful generals before, was now -himself exposed to the same arrows. Fierce were the bursts of wrath -and hatred against him, both among the fugitives and among the army. -He was accused of having betrayed to the Carthaginians, not only -the army, but also Gela and Kamarina, in order that the Syracusans, -intimidated by these formidable neighbors so close to their borders, -might remain in patient servitude under his dominion. It was remarked -that his achievements for the relief of Gela had been unworthy of -the large force which he brought with him; that the loss sustained -in the recent battle had been nowise sufficient to compel, or even -to excuse, a disgraceful flight; that the mercenaries, especially, -the force upon which he most relied, had not only sustained no loss, -but had never been brought into action; that while his measures -taken against the enemy had thus been partial and inefficient, they -on their side had manifested no disposition to pursue him in his -flight,—thus affording a strong presumption of connivance between -them. Dionysius was denounced as a traitor by all,—except his own -mercenaries, whom he always kept near him for security. The Italiot -allies, who had made the attack and sustained the main loss during -the recent battle, were so incensed against him for having left them -thus unsupported, that they retired in a body, and marched across the -centre of the island home to Italy.</p> - -<p>But the Syracusans in the army, especially the horsemen, the -principal persons in the city, had a double ground of anger against -Dionysius; partly from his misconduct or supposed treachery in -this recent enterprise, but still more from the despotism which he -had just erected over his fellow-citizens. This despotism, having -been commenced in gross fraud and consummated by violence, was now -deprived of the only plausible color which it had ever worn, since -Dionysius had been just as disgracefully unsuccessful against the -Carthaginians as those other generals whom he had denounced and -superseded. Determined to rid themselves of one whom they<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_452">[p. 452]</span> hated at once as a -despot and as a traitor, the Syracusan horsemen watched for an -opportunity of setting upon Dionysius during the retreat, and killing -him. But finding him too carefully guarded by the mercenaries -who always surrounded his person, they went off in a body, and -rode at their best speed to Syracuse, with the full purpose of -reëstablishing the freedom of the city, and keeping out Dionysius. -As they arrived before any tidings had been received of the defeat -and flight at Gela, they obtained admission without impediment into -the islet of Ortygia; the primitive interior city, commanding the -docks and harbor, set apart by the despot for his own residence -and power. They immediately assaulted and plundered the house of -Dionysius, which they found richly stocked with gold, silver, and -valuables of every kind. He had been despot but a few weeks; so -that he must have begun betimes to despoil others, since it seems -ascertained that his own private property was by no means large. -The assailants not only plundered his house with all its interior -wealth, but also maltreated his wife so brutally that she afterwards -died of the outrage.<a id="FNanchor_967" href="#Footnote_967" -class="fnanchor">[967]</a> Against this unfortunate woman they -probably cherished a double antipathy, not only as the wife of -Dionysius, but also as the daughter of Hermokrates. They at the -same time spread abroad the news that Dionysius had fled never to -return; for they fully confided in the disruption which they had -witnessed among the retiring army, and in the fierce wrath which they -had heard universally expressed against him.<a id="FNanchor_968" -href="#Footnote_968" class="fnanchor">[968]</a> After having betrayed -his army, together with Gela and Kamarina, to the Carthaginians, by a -flight without any real ground of necessity (they asserted),—he had -been exposed, disgraced, and forced to flee in reality, before the -just displeasure of his own awakened fellow-citizens. Syracuse was -now free; and might, on the morrow, reconstitute formally her popular -government.</p> - -<p>Had these Syracusans taken any reasonable precautions against -adverse possibilities, their assurances would probably have proved -correct. The career of Dionysius would here have ended. But while -they abandoned themselves to the plunder of his house and brutal -outrage against his wife, they were so rashly confident in his -supposed irretrievable ruin, and in their own mastery of the insular -portion of the city, that they neglected to guard the gate of<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_453">[p. 453]</span> Achradina (the outer -city) against his reëntry. The energy and promptitude of Dionysius -proved too much for them. Informed of their secession from the army, -and well knowing their sentiments, he immediately divined their -projects, and saw that he could only defeat them by audacity and -suddenness of attack. Accordingly, putting himself at the head of his -best and most devoted soldiers,—one hundred horsemen and six hundred -foot,—he left his army and proceeded by a forced march to Syracuse; -a distance of about four hundred stadia, or about forty-five English -miles. He arrived there about midnight, and presented himself, not -at the gate of Ortygia, which he had probably ascertained to be in -possession of his enemies, but at that of Achradina; which latter -(as has been already mentioned) formed a separate fortification -from Ortygia, with the Nekropolis between them.<a id="FNanchor_969" -href="#Footnote_969" class="fnanchor">[969]</a> Though the gate was -shut, he presently discovered it to be unguarded, and was enabled -to apply to it some reeds gathered in the marshes on his road, so -as to set it on fire and burn it. So eager had he been for celerity -of progress, that at the moment when he reached the gate, a part -only of his division were with him. But as the rest arrived while -the flames were doing their work, he entered, with the whole body, -into Achradina or the outer city. Marching rapidly through the -streets, he became master, without resistance, of all this portion -of the city, and of the agora, or market-place, which formed its -chief open space. His principal enemies, astounded by this alarming -news, hastened out of Ortygia into Achradina, and tried to occupy -the agora. But they found it already in possession of Dionysius; and -being themselves very few in number, having taken no time to get -together any considerable armed body, they were overpowered and slain -by his mercenaries. Dionysius was thus strong enough to vanquish all -his enemies, who entered Achradina in small and successive parties, -without any order, as they came out of Ortygia. He then proceeded -to attack the houses of those whom he knew to be unfriendly to his -dominion, slew such as he could find within, and forced the rest to -seek shelter in exile. The great body of the Syracusan horsemen,—who -but the evening before were masters of the city, and might with -common prudence have maintained themselves in it, were thus either -destroyed or<span class="pagenum" id="Page_454">[p. 454]</span> -driven into banishment. As exiles they established themselves -in the town of Ætna.<a id="FNanchor_970" href="#Footnote_970" -class="fnanchor">[970]</a></p> - -<p>Thus master of the city, Dionysius was joined on the ensuing -day by the main body of his mercenaries, and also by the Sicilian -allies, who had now completed their march. The miserable sufferers -from Gela and Kamarina, who looked upon him with indignation as their -betrayer,—went to reside at Leontini; seemingly as companions of the -original Leontine citizens, who had been for some time domiciliated -at Syracuse, but who no longer chose to remain there under Dionysius. -Leontini thus became again an independent city.<a id="FNanchor_971" -href="#Footnote_971" class="fnanchor">[971]</a></p> - -<p>Though the disasters at Gela had threatened to ruin Dionysius, -yet he was now, through his recent victory, more master of Syracuse -than ever; and had more completely trodden down his opponents. The -horsemen, whom he had just destroyed and chased away, were for the -most part the rich and powerful citizens of Syracuse. To have put -down such formidable enemies, almost indispensable as leaders to -any party which sought to rise against him, was the strongest of -all negative securities for the prolongation of his reign. There -was no public assembly any longer at Syracuse, to which he had to -render account of his proceedings at Gela and Kamarina, and before -which he was liable to be arraigned,—as he himself had arraigned -his predecessors who had commanded at Himera and Agrigentum. All -such popular securities he had already overridden or subverted. The -superiority of force, and intimidation of opponents, upon which his -rule rested, were now more manifest and more decisive than ever.</p> - -<p>Notwithstanding such confirmed position, however, Dionysius -might still have found defence difficult, if Imilkon had marched -on with his victorious army, fresh from the plunder of Gela and -Kamarina, and had laid energetic siege to Syracuse. From all<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_455">[p. 455]</span> hazard and alarm of -this sort he was speedily relieved, by propositions for peace, which -came spontaneously tendered by the Carthaginian general. Peace was -concluded between them, on the following terms:—</p> - -<p>1. The Carthaginians shall retain all their previous possessions, -and all their Sikanian dependencies, in Sicily. They shall keep, -besides, Selinus, Himera, Agrigentum. The towns of Gela and Kamarina -may be reoccupied by their present fugitive inhabitants; but on -condition of paying tribute to Carthage, and destroying their walls -and fortifications.</p> - -<p>2. The inhabitants of Leontini and Messênê, as well as all the -Sikel inhabitants, shall be independent and autonomous.</p> - -<p>3. The Syracusans shall be subject to Dionysius.<a -id="FNanchor_972" href="#Footnote_972" class="fnanchor">[972]</a></p> - -<p>4. All the captives, and all the ships, taken on both sides, shall -be mutually restored.</p> - -<p>Such were the conditions upon which peace was now concluded. -Though they were extremely advantageous to Carthage, assigning to -her, either as subject or as tributary, the whole of the southern -shore of Sicily,—yet as Syracuse was, after all, the great prize to -be obtained, the conquest of which was essential to the security -of all the remainder, we are astonished that Imilkon did not push -forward to attack it, at a moment so obviously promising. It -appears that immediately after the conquest of Gela and Kamarina, -the Carthaginian army was visited by a pestilential distemper, -which is said to have destroyed nearly the half of it, and to -have forbidden future operations. The announcement of this event -however, though doubtless substantially exact, comes to us in a -way somewhat confused.<a id="FNanchor_973" href="#Footnote_973" -class="fnanchor">[973]</a> And when we read, as one of the<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_456">[p. 456]</span> articles in the -treaty, the express and formal provision that “The Syracusans -shall be subject to Dionysius,”—we discern plainly, that there was -also an additional cause for this timely overture, so suitable to -his interests. There was real ground for those bitter complaints -against Dionysius, which charged him with having betrayed Gela and -Kamarina to the Carthaginians in order to assure his own dominion -at Syracuse. The Carthaginians, in renouncing all pretensions to -Syracuse and recognizing its autonomy, could have no interest in -dictating its internal government. If they determined to recognize -by formal treaty the sovereignty as vested in Dionysius, we may -fairly conclude that he had purchased the favor from them by some -underhand service previously rendered. In like manner both Hiketas -and Agathoklês,—the latter being the successor, and in so many -points the parallel of Dionysius, ninety years afterwards,—availed -themselves of Carthaginian support as one stepping-stone to the -despotism of Syracuse.<a id="FNanchor_974" href="#Footnote_974" -class="fnanchor">[974]</a></p> - -<p>The pestilence, however, among the Carthaginian army is said to -have been so terrible as to destroy nearly the half of their numbers. -The remaining half, on returning to Africa, either found it already -there, or carried it with them; for the mortality at and around -Carthage was not less deplorable than in Sicily.<a id="FNanchor_975" -href="#Footnote_975" class="fnanchor">[975]</a></p> <p><span -class="pagenum" id="Page_457">[p. 457]</span></p> <p>It was in the -summer of 405 <small>B.C.</small>, that this treaty was concluded, -which consigned all the Hellenic ground on the south of Sicily to -the Carthaginian dominion, and Syracuse with its population to -that of Dionysius. It was in September or October of the same year -that Lysander effected his capture of the entire Athenian fleet at -Ægospotami, destroyed the maritime ascendency and power of Athens, -and gave commencement to the Lacedæmonian empire, completed by the -actual surrender of Athens during the ensuing year. The dekarchies -and harmosts, planted by Lysander in so many cities of the central -Hellenic world, commenced their disastrous working nearly at the same -time as the despotism of Dionysius in Syracuse. This is a point to be -borne in mind, in reference to the coming period. The new position -and policy wherein Sparta now became involved, imparted to her a -sympathy with Dionysius such as in earlier times she probably would -not have felt; and which contributed materially, in a secondary way, -to the durability of his dominion, as well by positive intrigues of -Lacedæmonian agents, as by depriving the oppressed Syracusans of -effective aid or countenance from Corinth or other parts of Greece.<a -id="FNanchor_976" href="#Footnote_976" class="fnanchor">[976]</a></p> - -<p>The period immediately succeeding this peace was one of distress, -depression, and alarm, throughout all the south of Sicily. According -to the terms of the treaty, Gela and Kamarina might be reoccupied by -their fugitive population; yet with demolished walls,—with all traces -of previous opulence and comfort effaced by the plunderers,—and -under the necessity of paying tribute to Carthage. The condition -of Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera, now actually portions of -Carthaginian territory, was worse; especially Agrigentum, hurled -at one blow from the loftiest pinnacle of prosperous independence. -No free Hellenic territory was any longer to be found between Cape -Pachynus and Cape Lilybæum, beyond the Syracusan frontier.</p> - -<p>Amidst the profound discouragement of the Syracusan mind, the -withdrawal from Sicily of the terror-striking Carthaginian army<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_458">[p. 458]</span> would be felt as a -relief, and would procure credit for Dionysius.<a id="FNanchor_977" -href="#Footnote_977" class="fnanchor">[977]</a> It had been brought -about under him, though not as a consequence of his exploits; for -his military operations against Imilkon at Gela had been completely -unsuccessful (and even worse); and the Carthaginians had suffered -no harm except from the pestilence. While his partisans had thus a -plea for extolling him as the savior of the city, he also gathered -strength in other ways out of the recent events. He had obtained a -formal recognition of his government from the Carthaginians; he had -destroyed or banished the chief Syracusan citizens opposed to his -dominion, and struck terror into the rest; he had brought back all -his mercenary troops and guards, without loss or dissatisfaction. He -now availed himself of his temporary strength to provide precautions -for perpetuity, before the Syracusans should recover spirit, or -obtain a favorable opportunity, to resist.</p> - -<p>His first measure was to increase the fortifications of the -islet called Ortygia, strengthening it as a position to be held -separately from Achradina and the remaining city. He constructed -a new wall, provided with lofty turrets and elaborate defences of -every kind, immediately outside of the mole which connected this -islet with Sicily. On the outside of this new wall, he provided -convenient places for transacting business, porticos spacious enough -to shelter a considerable multitude, and seemingly a distinct strong -fort, destined for a public magazine of corn.<a id="FNanchor_978" -href="#Footnote_978" class="fnanchor">[978]</a> It suited his purpose -that the trade of the town should be carried on, and the persons -of the traders congregated, under or near the outer walls of his -peculiar fortress. As a farther means of security, he also<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_459">[p. 459]</span> erected a distinct -citadel or acropolis within the islet and behind the new wall. The -citadel was close to the Lesser Harbor or Portus Lakkius. Its walls -were so extended as to embrace the whole of this harbor, closing -it up in such a way as to admit only one ship at a time, though -there was room for sixty ships within. He was thus provided with an -almost impregnable stronghold, not only securing him against attack -from the more numerous population in the outer city, but enabling -him to attack them whenever he chose,—and making him master, at the -same time, of the grand means of war and defence against foreign -enemies.</p> - -<p>To provide a fortress in the islet of Ortygia, was one step -towards perpetual dominion at Syracuse; to fill it with devoted -adherents, was another. For Dionysius, the instruments of dominion -were his mercenary troops and body-guards; men chosen by himself from -their aptitude to his views, identified with him in interest, and -consisting in large proportion not merely of foreigners, but even of -liberated slaves. To these men he now proceeded to assign a permanent -support and residence. He distributed among them the houses in the -islet or inferior stronghold, expelling the previous proprietors, and -permitting no one to reside there except his own intimate partisans -and soldiers. Their quarters were in the islet, while he dwelt in -the citadel,—a fortress within a fortress, sheltering his own person -against the very garrison or standing army, by means of which he kept -Syracuse in subjection.<a id="FNanchor_979" href="#Footnote_979" -class="fnanchor">[979]</a> Having provided houses for his soldiers, -by extruding the residents in Ortygia,—he proceeded to assign to them -a comfortable maintenance, by the like wholesale dispossession of -proprietors, and reappropriation of lands, without. He distributed -anew the entire Syracusan territory; reserving the best lands, and -the best shares, for his own friends and for the officers in command -of his mercenaries,—and apportioning the remaining territory in equal -shares to all the inhabitants, citizens as well as non-citizens. By -this distribution the latter became henceforward citizens as well -as the former; so far at least, as any man<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_460">[p. 460]</span> could be properly called a citizen -under his despotism. Even the recently enfranchised slaves became new -citizens and proprietors as well as the rest.<a id="FNanchor_980" -href="#Footnote_980" class="fnanchor">[980]</a></p> - -<p>Respecting this sweeping change of property, it is mortifying to -have no farther information than is contained in two or three brief -sentences of Diodorus. As a basis for entire redivision of lands, -Dionysius would find himself already possessed of the property -of those Syracusan Horsemen or Knights whom he had recently put -down or banished. As a matter of course, their property would be -confiscated, and would fall into his possession for reassignment. -It would doubtless be considerable, inasmuch as these Horsemen -were for the most part wealthy men. From this basis, Dionysius -enlarged his scheme to the more comprehensive idea of a general -spoliation and reappropriation, for the benefit of his partisans -and his mercenary soldiers. The number of these last we do not -know; but on an occasion not very long afterwards, the mercenaries -under him are mentioned as amounting to about ten thousand.<a -id="FNanchor_981" href="#Footnote_981" class="fnanchor">[981]</a> -To ensure landed properties to each of these men, together with -the monopoly of residence in Ortygia, nothing less than a sweeping -confiscation would suffice. How far the equality of share, set forth -in principle, was or could be adhered to in practice, we cannot -say. The maxim of allowing residence in Ortygia to none but friends -and partisans, passed from Dionysius into a traditional observance -for future anti-popular governments of Syracuse. The Roman consul -Marcellus, when he subdued the city near two centuries afterwards, -prescribed the rule of admitting into the islet none but Romans, and -of excluding all native Syracusan residents.<a id="FNanchor_982" -href="#Footnote_982" class="fnanchor">[982]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_461">[p. 461]</span></p> - -<p>Such mighty works of fortification, combined with so extensive -a revolution both in property and in domicile, cannot have been -accomplished in less than a considerable time, nor without provoking -considerable resistance in detail. Nor is it to be forgotten that -the pecuniary cost of such fortifications must have been very -heavy. How Dionysius contrived to levy the money, we do not know. -Aristotle informs us that the contributions which he exacted from -the Syracusans were so exorbitant, that within the space of five -years, the citizens had paid into his hands their entire property; -that is, twenty per cent. per annum upon their whole property.<a -id="FNanchor_983" href="#Footnote_983" class="fnanchor">[983]</a> To -what years this statement refers, we do not know; nor what was the -amount of contribution exacted on the special occasion now before us. -But we may justly infer from it that Dionysius would not scruple to -lay his hand heavily upon the Syracusans for the purpose of defraying -the cost of his fortifications; and that the simultaneous burthen -of large contributions would thus come to aggravate the painful -spoliation and transfers of property, and the still more intolerable -mischiefs of a numerous standing army domiciled as masters in the -heart of the city. Under such circumstances, we are not surprised -to learn that the discontent among the Syracusans was extreme, and -that numbers of them were greatly mortified at having let slip the -favorable opportunity of excluding Dionysius, when the Horsemen -were actually for a moment masters of Syracuse, before he suddenly -came back from Gela.<a id="FNanchor_984" href="#Footnote_984" -class="fnanchor">[984]</a></p> - -<p>Whatever might be the extent of indignation actually felt, -there could be no concert or manifestation in Syracuse, under a -watchful despot with the overwhelming force assembled in Ortygia. -But a suitable moment speedily occurred. Having completed his -fortress and new appropriation for the assured maintenance of -the mercenaries, Dionysius resolved to attempt a conquest of the -autonomous Sikel tribes in the interior of the island, some of whom -had sided with Carthage in the recent war. He accordingly marched out -with a military force, consisting partly of his mercenary troops, -part<span class="pagenum" id="Page_462">[p. 462]</span>ly of armed -Syracusan citizens under a commander named Dorikus. While he was -laying siege to the town of Erbessus, the Syracusan troops, finding -themselves assembled in arms and animated with one common sentiment, -began to concert measures for open resistance to Dionysius. The -commander Dorikus, in striving to repress these manifestations, -lifted up his hand to chastise one of the most mutinous speakers;<a -id="FNanchor_985" href="#Footnote_985" class="fnanchor">[985]</a> -upon which the soldiers rushed forward in a body to defend him. They -slew Dorikus, and proclaimed themselves again, with loud shouts, -free Syracusan citizens; calling upon all their comrades in the camp -to unite against the despot. They also sent a message forthwith to -the town of Ætna, inviting the immediate junction of the Syracusan -Horsemen, who had sought shelter there in their exile from Dionysius. -Their appeal found the warmest sympathy among the Syracusan soldiers -in the camp, all of whom declared themselves decisively against the -despot, and prepared for every effort to recover their liberty.</p> - -<p>So rapidly did this sentiment break out into vehement and -unanimous action, that Dionysius was too much intimidated to attempt -to put it down at once by means of his mercenaries. Profiting by -the lesson which he had received, after the return march from -Gela, he raised the siege of Erbessus forthwith, and returned -to Syracuse to make sure of his position in Ortygia, before his -Syracusan enemies could arrive there. Meanwhile the latter, thus -left full of joy and confidence, as well as masters of the camp, -chose for their leaders those soldiers who had slain Dorikus, and -found themselves speedily reinforced by the Horsemen, or returning -exiles from Ætna. Resolved to spare no effort for liberating -Syracuse, they sent envoys to Messênê and Rhegium, as well as to -Corinth, for aid; while they at the same time marched with all their -force to Syracuse, and encamped on the heights of Epipolæ. It is -not clear whether they remained in this position, or whether they -were enabled, through the sympathy of the population, to possess -themselves farther of the outer city Achradina, and with its -appendages Tycha and Neapolis. Dionysius was certainly cut off from -all communication with the country; but he maintained himself in his -impregnable position in Ortygia, now exclusively occupied by his -chosen<span class="pagenum" id="Page_463">[p. 463]</span> partisans -and mercenaries. If he even continued master of Achradina, he must -have been prevented from easy communication with it. The assailants -extended themselves under the walls of Ortygia, from Epipolæ to -the Greater as well as the Lesser Harbor.<a id="FNanchor_986" -href="#Footnote_986" class="fnanchor">[986]</a> A considerable -naval force was sent to their aid from Messênê and Rhegium, giving -to them the means of blocking him up on the seaside; while the -Corinthians, though they could grant no farther assistance, testified -their sympathy by sending Nikoteles as adviser.<a id="FNanchor_987" -href="#Footnote_987" class="fnanchor">[987]</a> The leaders of the -movement proclaimed Syracuse again a free city, offered large rewards -for the head of Dionysius, and promised equal citizenship to all the -mercenaries who should desert him.</p> - -<p>Several of the mercenaries, attracted by such offers, as well -as intimidated by that appearance of irresistible force which -characterizes the first burst of a popular movement, actually came -over and were well received. Everything seemed to promise success to -the insurgents, who, not content with the slow process of blockade, -brought up battering-machines, and vehemently assaulted the walls -of Ortygia. Nothing now saved Dionysius except those elaborate -fortifications which he had so recently erected, defying all attack. -And even though sheltered by them, his position appeared to be so -desperate, that desertion from Ortygia every day increased. He -himself began to abandon the hope of maintaining his dominion; -discussing with his intimate friends the alternative, between death -under a valiant but hopeless resistance, and safety purchased by -a dishonorable flight. There remained but one means of rescue: to -purchase the immediate aid of a body of twelve hundred mercenary -Campanian cavalry, now in the Carthaginian service, and stationed -probably at Gela or Agrigentum. His brother-in-law Polyxenus -advised him to mount his swiftest horse, to visit in person the -Campanians, and bring them to the relief of Ortygia. But this -counsel was strenuously resisted by two intimate friends,—Helôris -and Megaklês,—who both impressed upon him, that the royal robe was -the only honorable funeral garment, and that, instead of quitting -his post at full speed, he ought to cling to it until he was -dragged away by the leg.<a id="FNanchor_988" href="#Footnote_988" -class="fnanchor">[988]</a> Accordingly, Dionysius determined to -hold out, without quitting Ortygia; sending private en<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_464">[p. 464]</span>voys to the Campanians, -with promises of large pay if they would march immediately to his -defence. The Carthaginians were probably under obligation not to -oppose this, having ensured to Dionysius by special article of treaty -the possession of Syracuse.</p> - -<p>To gain time for their arrival, by deluding and disarming the -assailants, Dionysius affected to abandon all hope of prolonged -defence, and sent to request permission to quit the city, along with -his private friends and effects. Permission was readily granted -to him to depart with five triremes. But as soon as this evidence -of success had been acquired, the assailants without abandoned -themselves to extravagant joy and confidence, considering Dionysius -as already subdued, and the siege as concluded. Not merely was all -farther attack suspended, but the forces were in a great measure -broken up. The Horsemen were disbanded, by a proceeding alike unjust -and ungrateful, to be sent back to Ætna; while the hoplites dispersed -about the country to their various lands and properties. The same -difficulty of keeping a popular force long together for any military -operation requiring time, which had been felt when the Athenians -besieged their usurpers Kylon and Peisistratus in the acropolis,<a -id="FNanchor_989" href="#Footnote_989" class="fnanchor">[989]</a> was -now experienced in regard to the siege of Ortygia. Tired with the -length of the siege, the Syracusans blindly abandoned themselves to -the delusive assurance held out by Dionysius; without taking heed to -maintain their force and efficiency undiminished, until his promised -departure should be converted into a reality. In this unprepared -and disorderly condition, they were surprised by the sudden arrival -of the Campanians,<a id="FNanchor_990" href="#Footnote_990" -class="fnanchor">[990]</a> who, attacking and defeating them with -considerable loss, forced<span class="pagenum" id="Page_465">[p. -465]</span> their way through to join Dionysius in Ortygia. At the -same time, a reinforcement of three hundred fresh mercenaries reached -him by sea. The face of affairs was now completely changed. The -recent defeat produced among the assailants not only discouragement, -but also mutual recrimination and quarrel. Some insisted upon still -prosecuting the siege of Ortygia, while others, probably the friends -of the recently dismissed Horsemen, declared in favor of throwing it -up altogether and joining the Horsemen at Ætna; a resolution, which -they seem at once to have executed. Observing his opponents thus -enfeebled and torn by dissension, Dionysius sallied out and attacked -them, near the suburb called Neapolis or Newtown, on the south-west -of Achradina. He was victorious, and forced them to disperse. But -he took great pains to prevent slaughter of the fugitives, riding -up himself to restrain his own troops; and he subsequently buried -the slain with due solemnity. He was anxious by these proceedings -to conciliate the remainder; for the most warlike portion of his -opponents had retired to Ætna, where no less than seven thousand -hoplites were now assembled along with the Horsemen. Dionysius sent -thither envoys to invite them to return to Syracuse, promising the -largest amnesty for the past. But it was in vain that his envoys -expatiated upon his recent forbearance towards the fugitives and -decent interment of the slain. Few could be induced to come back, -except such as had left their wives and families at Syracuse in his -power. The larger proportion, refusing all trust in his word and all -submission to his command, remained in exile at Ætna. Such as did -return were well treated, in hopes of inducing the rest gradually -to follow their example.<a id="FNanchor_991" href="#Footnote_991" -class="fnanchor">[991]</a></p> - -<p>Thus was Dionysius rescued from a situation apparently desperate, -and reëstablished in his dominion; chiefly through the rash -presumption (as on the former occasion after the retreat from Gela), -the want of persevering union, and the absence of any commanding -leader, on the part of his antagonists. His first proceeding was -to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_466">[p. 466]</span> dismiss the -newly-arrived Campanians. For though he had to thank them mainly -for his restoration, he was well aware that they were utterly -faithless, and that on the first temptation they were likely -to turn against him.<a id="FNanchor_992" href="#Footnote_992" -class="fnanchor">[992]</a> But he adopted more efficient means for -strengthening his dominion in Syracuse, and for guarding against a -repetition of that danger from which he had so recently escaped. -He was assisted in his proceedings by a Lacedæmonian envoy named -Aristus, recently despatched by the Spartans for the ostensible -purpose of bringing about an amicable adjustment of parties at -Syracuse. While Nikoteles, who had been sent from Corinth, espoused -the cause of the Syracusan people, and put himself at their head -to obtain for them more or less of free government,—Aristus, on -the contrary, lent himself to the schemes of Dionysius. He seduced -the people away from Nikoteles, whom he impeached and caused to be -slain. Next, pretending himself to act along with the people, and to -employ the great ascendency of Sparta in defence of their freedom,<a -id="FNanchor_993" href="#Footnote_993" class="fnanchor">[993]</a> -he gained their confidence and then betrayed them. The despot was -thus enabled to strengthen himself more decisively than before, and -probably to take off the effective popular leaders thus made known to -him; while the mass of the citizens were profoundly discouraged by -finding Sparta enlisted in the conspiracy against their liberties.</p> - -<p>Of this renovated tide of success Dionysius took advantage, to -strike another important blow. During the season of harvest,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_467">[p. 467]</span> while the citizens -were busy in the fields, he caused the houses to be searched, and -seized all the arms found therein. Not satisfied with thus robbing -his opponents of the means of attack, he farther proceeded to -construct additional fortifications around the islet of Ortygia, -to augment his standing army of mercenaries, and to build fresh -ships. Feeling more than ever that his dominion was repugnant to -the Syracusans, and rested only on naked force, he thus surrounded -himself with precautions probably stronger than any other Grecian -despot had ever accumulated. He was yet farther strengthened by -the pronounced and active support of Sparta, now at the maximum of -her imperial ascendency;<a id="FNanchor_994" href="#Footnote_994" -class="fnanchor">[994]</a> and by the presence of the mighty Lysander -at Syracuse as her ambassador to countenance and exalt him.<a -id="FNanchor_995" href="#Footnote_995" class="fnanchor">[995]</a> -The Spartan alliance, however, did not prevent him from enrolling -among his mercenaries a considerable fraction of the Messenians, -the bitter enemies of Sparta; who were now driven out of Naupaktus -and Kephallenia, with no other possession left except their arms<a -id="FNanchor_996" href="#Footnote_996" class="fnanchor">[996]</a>—and -whose restoration to Peloponnesus by Epaminondas, about thirty years -afterwards, has been described in a preceding chapter.</p> - -<p>So large a mercenary force, while the people in Syracuse were -prostrate and in no condition for resistance, naturally tempted -Dionysius to seek conquest as well as plunder beyond the border. Not -choosing as yet to provoke a war with Carthage, he turned his arms -to the north and north-west of the Syracusan territory; the Grecian -(Chalkidic or Ionic) cities, Naxus, Katana, and Leontini—and the -Sikels, towards the centre of Sicily. The three Chalkidic cities -were the old enemies of Syracuse, but Leontini had been conquered by -the Syracusans even before the Athenian expedition, and remained as -a Syracusan possession until the last peace with the Carthaginians, -when it had been declared independent. Naxus and Katana had contrived -to retain their independence against Syracuse, even after the ruin -of the Athenian armament under Nikias. At the head of a powerful -force, Dionysius marched out from Syracuse first against the town of -Ætna, occupied by a considerable body of Syracusan exiles hostile to -his dominion.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_468">[p. 468]</span> -Though the place was strong by situation,<a id="FNanchor_997" -href="#Footnote_997" class="fnanchor">[997]</a> yet these men, -too feeble to resist, were obliged to evacuate it; upon which he -proceeded to attack Leontini. But on summoning the inhabitants to -surrender, he found his propositions rejected, and every preparation -made for a strenuous defence; so that he could do nothing more than -plunder the territory around, and then advanced onward into the -interior Sikel territory, towards Enna and Erbita. But his march -in this direction was little more than a feint, for the purpose of -masking his real views upon Naxus and Katana, with both which cities -he had already opened intrigues. Arkesilaus, general of Katana, and -Prokles, general of Naxus, were both carrying on corrupt negotiations -for the purpose of selling to him the liberty of their native cities. -Until the negotiations were completed, Dionysius wished to appear -as if turning his arms elsewhere, and therefore marched against -Enna. Here he entered into conspiracy with an Ennæan citizen named -Aeimnestus, whom he instigated to seize the sceptre of his native -town,—by promises of assistance, on condition of being himself -admitted afterwards. Aeimnestus made the attempt and succeeded, -but did not fulfil his engagement to Dionysius; who resented this -proceeding so vehemently, that he assisted the Ennæans in putting -down Aeimnestus, delivered him as prisoner into their hands, and then -retired, satisfied with such revenge, without farther meddling. He -next marched against Erbita, before which he passed his time with -little or no result, until the bribes promised at Naxus and Katana -had taken effect. At length the terms were fully settled. Dionysius -was admitted at night by Arkesilaus into Katana, seized the city, -disarmed the inhabitants, and planted there a powerful garrison. -Naxus was next put into his hands, by the like corruption on the -part of Prokles; who was rewarded with a large bribe, and with the -privilege of preserving his kinsmen. Both cities were given up to -be plundered by his soldiers; after which the walls as well as the -houses were demolished, and the inhabitants sold as slaves. The -dismantled site of Katana was then assigned to a body of Campanian -mercenaries in the service of Dionysius, who however retained in -his possession hostages for their fidelity;<a id="FNanchor_998" -href="#Footnote_998" class="fnanchor">[998]</a> the site of Naxus -to the indigenous Sikels in the neighborhood. These captures struck -so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_469">[p. 469]</span> much terror -into the Leontines, that when Dionysius renewed his attack upon -them, they no longer felt competent to resist. He required them to -surrender their city, to remove to Syracuse, and there to reside -for the future as citizens; which term meant, at the actual time, -as subjects of his despotism. The Leontines obeyed the requisition, -and their city thus again became an appendage of Syracuse.<a -id="FNanchor_999" href="#Footnote_999" class="fnanchor">[999]</a></p> - -<p>These conquests of Dionysius, achieved mainly by corrupting the -generals of Naxos and Katana, were of serious moment, and spread -so much alarm among the Sikels of the interior, that Archonides, -the Sikel prince of Erbita, thought it prudent to renounce his town -and soil; withdrawing to a new site beyond the Nebrode mountains, -on the northern coast of the island, more out of the reach of -Syracusan attack. Here, with his mercenary soldiers and with a large -portion of his people who voluntarily accompanied him, he founded -the town of Alæsa.<a id="FNanchor_1000" href="#Footnote_1000" -class="fnanchor">[1000]</a></p> - -<p>Strengthened at home by these successes abroad, the sanguine -despot of Syracuse was stimulated to still greater enterprises. -He resolved to commence aggressive war with the Carthaginians. -But against such formidable enemies, large preparations were -indispensable, defensive as well as offensive, before his design -could be proclaimed. First, he took measures to ensure the -defensibility of Syracuse against all contingencies. Five Grecian -cities on the south of the island, one of them the second in Sicily, -had already undergone the deplorable fate of being sacked by a -Carthaginian host; a calamity, which might possibly be in reserve for -Syracuse also, especially if she herself provoked a war, unless the -most elaborate precautions were taken to render a successful blockade -impossible.</p> - -<p>Now the Athenian blockade under Nikias had impressed valuable -lessons on the mind of every Syracusan. The city had then been -well-nigh blocked up by a wall of circumvallation carried from sea -to sea; which was actually more than half completed, and would have -been entirely completed, had the original com<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_470">[p. 470]</span>mander been Demosthenes instead of -Nikias. The prodigious importance of the slope of Epipolæ to the -safety of the city had been demonstrated by the most unequivocal -evidence. In my seventh volume, I have already described the site -of Syracuse and the relation of this slope to the outer city called -Achradina. Epipolæ was a gentle ascent west of Achradina. It was -bordered, along both the north side and the south side, by lines of -descending cliff, cut down precipitously, about twenty feet deep -in their lowest part. These lines of cliff nearly converged at the -summit of the slope, called Euryalus; leaving a narrow pass or road -between elevated banks, which communicated with the country both -north and west of Syracuse. Epipolæ thus formed a triangle upon an -inclined plane, sloping upward from its base, the outer wall of -Achradina, to its apex at Euryalus; and having its two sides formed, -the one by the northern, the other by the southern, line of cliffs. -This apex formed a post of the highest importance, commanding the -narrow road which approached Epipolæ from its western extremity or -summit, and through which alone it was easy for an army to get on -the declivity of Epipolæ, since the cliffs on each side were steep, -though less steep on the northern side than on the southern.<a -id="FNanchor_1001" href="#Footnote_1001" class="fnanchor">[1001]</a> -Unless an enemy acquired possession of this slope, Syracuse could -never be blocked up from the northern sea at Trogilus to the Great -Harbor; an enterprise, which Nikias and the Athenians were near -accomplishing, because they first surprised from the northward the -position of Euryalus, and from thence poured down upon the slope -of Epipolæ. I have already described, in my seventh volume, how -the arrival of Gylippus deprived them of superiority in the field, -at a time when their line of circumvallation was already half -finished,—having been carried from the centre of Epipolæ southward -down to Great Harbor, and being partially completed from the same -point across the northern half of Epipolæ to the sea at Trogilus; how -he next intercepted their farther progress, by carrying out, from -the outer wall of Achradina, a cross wall traversing their intended -line of circumvallation and ending at the northern cliff; how he -finally erected a fort or guard-post on the summit of Euryalus, which -he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_471">[p. 471]</span> connected with -the cross-wall just mentioned by a single wall of junction carried -down the slope of Epipolæ.<a id="FNanchor_1002" href="#Footnote_1002" -class="fnanchor">[1002]</a></p> - -<p>Both the danger which Syracuse had then incurred, and the means -whereby it had been obviated, were fresh in the recollection of -Dionysius. Since the Athenian siege, the Syracusans may perhaps -have preserved the fort erected by Gylippus near Euryalus; but -they had pulled down the wall of junction, the cross-wall, and the -outer wall of protection constructed between the arrival of Nikias -in Sicily and his commencement of the siege, enclosing the sacred -precinct of Apollo Temenites. The outer city of Syracuse was thus -left with nothing but the wall of Achradina, with its two suburbs or -excrescences, Tychê and Neapolis. Dionysius now resolved to provide -for Syracuse a protection substantially similar to that contrived -by Gylippus, yet more comprehensive, elaborate, and permanent. He -carried out an outer line of defence, starting from the sea near -the port called Trogilus, enclosing the suburb called Tychê (which -adjoined Achradina to the north-west), and then ascending westward, -along the brink of the northern cliff of Epipolæ, to the summit of -that slope at Euryalus. The two extremities thus became connected -together,—not as in the time of Gylippus,<a id="FNanchor_1003" -href="#Footnote_1003" class="fnanchor">[1003]</a> by a single -cross-wall carried out from the city-wall to the northern cliff, -and then joined at an angle by another single wall descending the -slope of Epipolæ from Euryalus, but,—by one continuous new line -bordering the northern cliff down to the sea. And the new line, -instead of being a mere single wall, was now built under the advice -of the best engineers, with lofty and frequent towers interspersed -throughout its length, to serve both as means of defence and as -permanent quarters for soldiers. Its length was thirty stadia -(about three and a half English miles); it was constructed of -large stones carefully hewn, some of them four feet in length.<a -id="FNanchor_1004" href="#Footnote_1004" class="fnanchor">[1004]</a> -The quarries at hand supplied abundant materials, and for the labor -necessary, Dionysius brought together all the population of the city -and its neighborhood, out of whom he selected sixty thousand of the -most<span class="pagenum" id="Page_472">[p. 472]</span> effective -hands, to work on the wall. Others were ordered to cut the stones -in the quarry, while six thousand teams of oxen were put in harness -to draw them to the spot. The work was set out by furlongs and by -smaller spaces of one hundred feet each, to regiments of suitable -number, each under the direction of an overseer.<a id="FNanchor_1005" -href="#Footnote_1005" class="fnanchor">[1005]</a></p> - -<p>As yet, we have heard little about Dionysius except acts of fraud, -violence, and spoliation, for the purpose of establishing his own -dominion over Syracuse, and aggrandizing himself by new conquests -on the borders. But this new fortification was a work of different -import. Instead of being, like his forts and walls in Ortygia, -a guardhouse both of defence and aggression merely for himself -against the people of Syracuse,—it was a valuable protection to the -people, and to himself along with them, against foreign besiegers. -It tended much to guarantee Syracuse from those disasters which had -so recently befallen Agrigentum and the other cities. Accordingly, -it was exceeding popular among the Syracusans, and produced between -them and Dionysius a sentiment of friendship and harmony such as had -not before been seen. Every man labored at the work not merely with -good will, but with enthusiasm; while the despot himself displayed -unwearied zeal, passing whole days on the spot, and taking part in -all the hardship and difficulty. He showed himself everywhere amidst -the mass, as an unguarded citizen, without suspicion or reserve, -in marked contrast with the harshness of his previous demeanor,<a -id="FNanchor_1006" href="#Footnote_1006" class="fnanchor">[1006]</a> -proclaiming rewards for the best and most rapid workmen; he also -provided attendance or relief for those whose strength gave way. -Such was the emulation thus inspired, that the numbers assembled, -often toiling by night as well as by day, completed the whole wall -in the space of twenty days. The fort at Euryalus, which formed the -termination of this newly-constructed line of wall, is probably -not to be understood as comprised within so short a period of -execution; at least in its complete consummation. For the defences -provided at this fort (either now or at a later<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_473">[p. 473]</span> period) were prodigious in extent as -well as elaborate in workmanship; and the remains of them exhibit, -even to modern observers, the most complete specimen preserved to us -of ancient fortification.<a id="FNanchor_1007" href="#Footnote_1007" -class="fnanchor">[1007]</a> To bring them into such a condition -must have occupied a longer time than twenty days. Even as to the -wall, perhaps, twenty days is rather to be understood as indicating -the time required for the essential continuity of its line, leaving -towers, gates, etc., to be added afterwards.</p> - -<p>To provide defence for Syracuse against a besieging army, however, -was only a small part of the extensive schemes of Dionysius. What he -meditated was aggressive war against the Carthaginians; for which -purpose, he not only began to accumulate preparations of every kind -on the most extensive scale, but also modified his policy both -towards the Syracusans and towards the other Sicilian Greeks.</p> - -<p>Towards the Syracusans his conduct underwent a material change. -The cruelty and oppression which had hitherto marked his dominion -was discontinued; he no longer put men to death, or sent them into -banishment, with the same merciless hand as before. In place of -such tyranny, he now substituted comparative mildness, forbearance, -and conciliation.<a id="FNanchor_1008" href="#Footnote_1008" -class="fnanchor">[1008]</a> Where the system had before been so -fraught with positive maltreatment to many and alarm to all, the -mitigation of it must have been sensibly as well as immediately -felt. And when we make present to our minds the relative position of -Dionysius and the Syracusans, we shall see that the evil inflicted by -his express order by no means represented the whole amount of evil -which they suffered. He occupied the impregnable fortress of Ortygia, -with the entire harbor, docks, and maritime means of the city. The -numerous garrison in his pay, and devoted to him, consisted in great -part of barbaric or non-Hellenic soldiers and of liberated slaves, -probably also non-Hellenic. The Syracusans resident in the outer city -and around were not only destitute of the means of defensive concert -and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_474">[p. 474]</span> organization, -but were also disarmed. For these mercenaries either pay was to -be provided from the contributions of the citizens, or lands from -their properties; for them, and for other partisans also, Dionysius -had enforced spoliations and transfers of land and house-property -by wholesale.<a id="FNanchor_1009" href="#Footnote_1009" -class="fnanchor">[1009]</a> Now, while the despot himself was -inflicting tyrannical sentences for his own purposes, we may be sure -that these men, the indispensable instruments of his tyranny, would -neither of themselves be disposed to respect the tranquillity of -the other citizens, nor be easily constrained to do so. It was not, -therefore, merely from the systematic misrule of the chief that the -Syracusans had to suffer, but also from the insolence and unruly -appetites of the subordinates. And accordingly they would be doubly -gainers, when Dionysius, from anxiety to attack the Carthaginians, -thought it prudent to soften the rigor of his own proceedings; since -his example, and in case of need his interference, would restrict the -license of his own partisans. The desire for foreign conquest made -it now his interest to conciliate some measure of goodwill from the -Syracusans; or at least to silence antipathies which might become -embarrassing if they broke out in the midst of a war. And he had in -this case the advantage of resting on another antipathy, powerful -and genuine in their minds. Hating as well as fearing Carthage, -the Syracusans cordially sympathized in the aggressive schemes of -Dionysius against her; which held out a prospect of relief from the -tyranny under which they groaned, and some chance of procuring a -restoration of the arms snatched from them.<a id="FNanchor_1010" -href="#Footnote_1010" class="fnanchor">[1010]</a></p> - -<p>Towards the Sicilian Greeks, also, the conduct of Dionysius was -mainly influenced by his anti-Carthaginian projects, which made him -eager to put aside, or at least to defer, all possibilities of war -in other quarters. The inhabitants of Rhegium, on the Italian side -of the Strait of Messina, had recently manifested a disposition to -attack him. They were of common Chalkidic origin with Naxos and -Katana, the two cities which Dionysius had recently conquered and -enslaved. Sixteen years before, when the powerful Athenian armament -visited Sicily with the ostensible view of protecting the Chalkidic -cities against Syracuse, the Rhegines in spite of their fellowship -of race, had refused the invitation of Nikias<a id="FNanchor_1011" -href="#Footnote_1011" class="fnanchor">[1011]</a> to lend assistance, -being then afraid of Athens.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_475">[p. -475]</span> But subsequent painful experience had taught them, that -to residents in or near Sicily, Syracuse was the more formidable -enemy of the two. The ruin of Naxus and Katana, with the great -extension of Syracusan dominion northward, had filled them with -apprehension from Dionysius, similar to the fears of Carthage, -inspired to the Syracusans themselves by the disasters of Agrigentum -and Gela. Anxious to revenge their enslaved kinsmen, the Rhegines -projected an attack upon Dionysius before his power should become -yet more formidable; a resolution, in which they were greatly -confirmed by the instigations of the Syracusan exiles (now driven -from Ætna and the other neighboring cities to Rhegium), confident -in their assurances that insurrection would break out against -Dionysius at Syracuse, so soon as any foreign succor should be -announced as approaching. Envoys were sent across the strait to -Messênê, soliciting coöperation against Dionysius, upon the urgent -plea that the ruin of Naxus and Katana could not be passed over, -either in generosity or in prudence, by neighbors on either side of -the strait. These representations made so much impression on the -generals of Messênê, that without consulting the public assembly, -they forthwith summoned the military force of the city, and marched -along with the Rhegines towards the Syracusan frontier,—six thousand -Rhegine and four thousand Messenian hoplites,—six hundred Rhegine -and four hundred Messenian horsemen,—with fifty Rhegine triremes. -But when they reached the frontiers of the Messenian territory, -a large portion of the soldiers refused to follow their generals -farther. A citizen named Laomedon headed the opposition, contending -that the generals had no authority to declare war without a public -vote of the city, and that it was imprudent to attack Dionysius -unprovoked. Such was the effect of these remonstrances, that the -Messenian soldiers returned back to their city; while the Rhegines, -believing themselves to be inadequate to the enterprise single -handed, went home also.<a id="FNanchor_1012" href="#Footnote_1012" -class="fnanchor">[1012]</a></p> - -<p>Apprised of the attack meditated, Dionysius had already led his -troops to defend the Syracusan frontier. But he now reconducted them -back to Syracuse, and listened favorably to propositions for peace -which speedily reached him, from Rhegium and<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_476">[p. 476]</span> Messênê.<a id="FNanchor_1013" -href="#Footnote_1013" class="fnanchor">[1013]</a> He was anxious -to conciliate them for the present, at all price, in order that -the Carthaginians, when he came to execute his plans, might find -no Grecian allies to coöperate with them in Sicily. He acquired -an influence in Messênê, by making to the city large concessions -of conterminous territory; on which side of the border, or how -acquired, we do not know. He farther endeavored to open an intimate -connection with Rhegium by marrying a Rhegine wife; with which -view he sent a formal message to the citizens, asking permission -to contract such an alliance, accompanied with a promise to confer -upon them important benefits, both in territorial aggrandizement -and in other ways. After a public debate, the Rhegines declined -his proposition. The feeling in their city was decidedly hostile -to Dionysius, as the recent destroyer of Naxus and Katana; and -it appears that some of the speakers expressed themselves with -contemptuous asperity, remarking that the daughter of the public -executioner was the only fit wife for him.<a id="FNanchor_1014" -href="#Footnote_1014" class="fnanchor">[1014]</a> Taken by itself, -the refusal would be sufficiently galling to Dionysius. But when -coupled with such insulting remarks (probably made in public debate -in the presence of his own envoys, for it seems not credible -that the words should have been embodied in the formal reply or -resolution of the assembly<a id="FNanchor_1015" href="#Footnote_1015" -class="fnanchor">[1015]</a>), it left the bitterest animosity; a -feeling, which we shall hereafter find in full operation.</p> - -<p>Refused at Rhegium, Dionysius sent to prefer a similar request, -with similar offers, at the neighboring city of Lokri; where -it was favorably entertained. It is remarkable that Aristotle -comments upon this acquiescence of the Lokrians as an act of grave -imprudence, and as dictated only by the anxiety of the principal -citizens, in an oligarchical government, to seek for aggrandizement -to themselves out of such an alliance. The request would not have -been granted (Aristotle observes) either in a democracy or in a -well-regulated aristocracy. The marital connection now contracted -by Dionysius with a Lokrian female, Doris, the daughter of a -citizen of distinction named Xenetus, produced as an ultimate -conse<span class="pagenum" id="Page_477">[p. 477]</span>quence -the overthrow of the oligarchy of Lokri.<a id="FNanchor_1016" -href="#Footnote_1016" class="fnanchor">[1016]</a> And even among -the Lokrians, the request was not granted without opposition. A -citizen named Aristeides (one of the companions of Plato), whose -daughter Dionysius had solicited in marriage, returned for answer -that he would rather see her dead than united to a despot. In revenge -for this bitter reply, Dionysius caused the sons of Aristeides -to be put to death.<a id="FNanchor_1017" href="#Footnote_1017" -class="fnanchor">[1017]</a></p> - -<p>But the amicable relations which Dionysius was at so much pains -to establish with the Greek cities near the Strait of Messênê, -were destined chiefly to leave him free for preparations against -Carthage; which preparations he now commenced on a gigantic scale. -Efforts so great and varied, combined not merely with forecast but -with all the scientific appliances then available, have not hitherto -come before us throughout this history. The terrible effect with -which Hannibal had recently employed his battering-machines against -Selinus and Himera, stimulated Dionysius to provide himself with the -like implements in greater abundance than any Greek general had ever -before possessed. He collected at Syracuse, partly by constraint, -partly by allurement, all the best engineers, mechanists, armorers, -artisans, etc., whom Sicily or Italy could furnish. He set them -upon the construction of machines and other muniments of war, and -upon the manufacture of arms offensive as well as defensive, with -the greatest possible assiduity. The arms provided were of great -variety; not merely such as were suitable for Grecian soldiers, heavy -or light, but also such as were in use among the different barbaric -tribes around the Mediterranean, Gauls, Iberians, Tyrrhenians, etc., -from whom Dionysius intended to hire mercenaries; so that every -different soldier would be furnished, on arriving, with the sort -of weapon which had become habitual to him. All Syracuse became a -bustling military workshop,—not only the market-places, porticos, -palæstræ, and large private houses, but also the fore-cham<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_478">[p. 478]</span>bers and back-chambers -of the various temples. Dionysius distributed the busy multitude -into convenient divisions, each with some eminent citizen as -superintendent. Visiting them in person frequently, and reviewing -their progress, he recompensed largely, and invited to his table, -those who produced the greatest amount of finished work. As he -farther offered premiums for inventive skill, the competition of -ingenious mechanists originated several valuable warlike novelties; -especially the great projectile engine for stones and darts, called -Catapulta, which was now for the first time devised. We are told that -the shields fabricated during this season of assiduous preparation -were not less than one hundred and forty thousand in number, and -the breast-plates fourteen thousand, many of them unrivalled -in workmanship, destined for the body-guard and the officers. -Helmets, spears, daggers, etc., with other arms and weapons in -indefinite variety, were multiplied in corresponding proportion.<a -id="FNanchor_1018" href="#Footnote_1018" class="fnanchor">[1018]</a> -The magazines of arms, missiles, machines, and muniments of war -in every variety, accumulated in Ortygia, continued stupendous in -amount through the whole life of Dionysius, and even down to the -downfall of his son.<a id="FNanchor_1019" href="#Footnote_1019" -class="fnanchor">[1019]</a></p> - -<p>If the preparations for land-warfare were thus stupendous, those -for sea-warfare were fully equal, if not superior. The docks of -Syracuse were filled with the best ship-builders, carpenters, and -artisans; numerous wood-cutters were sent to cut ship-timber on -the well-clothed slopes of Ætna and the Calabrian Apennines; teams -of oxen were then provided to drag it to the coast, from whence it -was towed in rafts to Syracuse. The existing naval establishment -of Syracuse comprised one hundred and ten triremes; the existing -docks contained one hundred and fifty ship-houses, or covered slips -for the purpose either of building or housing a trireme. But this -was very inadequate to the conceptions of Dionysius, who forthwith -undertook the construction of one hundred and sixty new ship-houses, -each competent to hold two vessels,—and then commenced the building -of new ships of war to the number of two hundred; while he at the -same time put all<span class="pagenum" id="Page_479">[p. 479]</span> -the existing vessels and docks into the best state of repair. -Here too, as in the case of the catapulta, the ingenuity of his -architects enabled him to stand forth as a maritime inventor. As -yet, the largest ship of war which had ever moved on the Grecian or -Mediterranean waters, was the trireme, which was rowed by three banks -or tiers of oars. It was now three centuries since the first trireme -had been constructed at Corinth and Samos by the inventive skill of -the Corinthian Ameinokles:<a id="FNanchor_1020" href="#Footnote_1020" -class="fnanchor">[1020]</a> it was not until the period succeeding -the Persian invasion that even triremes had become extensively -employed; nor had any larger vessels ever been thought of. The -Athenians, who during the interval between the Persian invasion -and their great disaster at Syracuse had stood preëminent and set -the fashion in all nautical matters, were under no inducement to -build above the size of the trireme. As their style of manœuvring -consisted of rapid evolutions and changes in the ship’s direction, -for the purpose of striking the weak parts of an enemy’s ship with -the beak of their own,—so, if the size of their ship had been -increased, her capacity for such nimble turns and movements would -have been diminished. But the Syracusans had made no attempt to copy -the rapid evolutions of the Athenian navy. On the contrary, when -fighting against the latter in the confined harbor of Syracuse,<a -id="FNanchor_1021" href="#Footnote_1021" class="fnanchor">[1021]</a> -they had found every advantage in their massive build of ships, and -straightforward impact of bow driven against bow. For them, the -larger ships were the more suitable and efficient; so that Dionysius -or his naval architects, full of ambitious aspirations, now struck -out the plan of building ships of war with four or five banks of -oars instead of three; that is, quadriremes, or quinqueremes, -instead of triremes.<a id="FNanchor_1022" href="#Footnote_1022" -class="fnanchor">[1022]</a> Not only did the Syracusan despot thus -equip a naval force equal in number of ships to Athens in her best -days; but he also exhibited ships larger than Athens had ever -possessed, or than Greece had ever conceived.</p> - -<p>In all these offensive preparations against Carthage, as in -the previous defences on Epipolæ, the spontaneous impulse of -the Syracusans generally went hand in hand with Dionysius.<a -id="FNanchor_1023" href="#Footnote_1023" class="fnanchor">[1023]</a> -Their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_480">[p. 480]</span> sympathy -and concurrence greatly promoted the success of his efforts, for -this immense equipment against the common enemy. Even with all this -sympathy, indeed, we are at a loss to understand, nor are we at all -informed, how he found money to meet so prodigious an outlay.</p> - -<p>After the material means for war had thus been completed,—an -operation which can hardly have occupied less than two or three -years,—it remained to levy men. On this point, the ideas of Dionysius -were not less aspiring. Besides his own numerous standing force, he -enlisted all the most effective among the Syracusan citizens, as well -as from the cities in his dependency. He sent friendly addresses, -and tried to acquire popularity, among the general body of Greeks -throughout the island. Of his large fleet, one-half was manned with -Syracusan rowers, marines, and officers; the other half with seamen -enlisted from abroad. He farther sent envoys both to Italy and to -Peloponnesus to obtain auxiliaries, with offers of the most liberal -pay. From Sparta, now at the height of her power, and courting his -alliance as a means of perpetuity to her own empire, he received such -warm encouragement, that he was enabled to enlist no inconsiderable -numbers in Peloponnesus; while many barbaric or non-Hellenic soldiers -from the western regions near the Mediterranean were hired also.<a -id="FNanchor_1024" href="#Footnote_1024" class="fnanchor">[1024]</a> -He at length succeeded, to his satisfaction, in collecting an -aggregate army, formidable not less from numbers and bravery, -than from elaborate and diversified equipment. His large and -well-stocked armory (already noticed) enabled him to furnish each -newly-arrived soldier, from all the different nations, with native -and appropriate weapons.<a id="FNanchor_1025" href="#Footnote_1025" -class="fnanchor">[1025]</a></p> - -<p>When all his preparations were thus complete, his last step -was to celebrate his nuptials, a few days previous to the active -commencement of the war. He married, at one and the same time, -two wives,—the Lokrian Doris (already mentioned), and a Syracusan -woman named Aristomachê, daughter of his partisan Hipparinus -(and sister of Dion, respecting whom much will occur hereafter). -The first use made of one among his newly-invented quinquereme -vessels, was to sail to Lokri, decked out in the richest ornaments -of gold and silver, for the purpose of conveying Doris<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_481">[p. 481]</span> in state to Ortygia. -Aristomachê was also brought to his house in a splendid chariot -with four white horses.<a id="FNanchor_1026" href="#Footnote_1026" -class="fnanchor">[1026]</a> He celebrated his nuptials with both -of them in his house on the same day; no one knew which bedchamber -he visited first; and both of them continued constantly to live -with him at the same table, with equal dignity, for many years. -He had three children by Doris, the eldest of whom was Dionysius -the Younger; and four by Aristomachê; but the latter was for a -considerable time childless; which greatly chagrined Dionysius. -Ascribing her barrenness to magical incantations, he put to death -the mother of his other wife Doris, as the alleged worker of these -mischievous influences.<a id="FNanchor_1027" href="#Footnote_1027" -class="fnanchor">[1027]</a> It was the rumor at Syracuse that -Aristomachê was the most beloved of the two. But Dionysius treated -both of them well, and both of them equally; moreover his son by -Doris succeeded him, though he had two sons by the other. His -nuptials were celebrated with banquets and festive recreations, -wherein all the Syracusan citizens as well as the soldiers partook. -The scene was probably the more grateful to Dionysius, as he seems -at this moment, when every man’s mind was full of vindictive impulse -and expected victory against Carthage, to have enjoyed a real -short-lived popularity, and to have been able to move freely among -the people; without that fear of assassination which habitually -tormented his life even in his inmost privacy and bedchamber—and -that extremity of suspicion which did not except either his wives -or his daughters.<a id="FNanchor_1028" href="#Footnote_1028" -class="fnanchor">[1028]</a></p> - -<p>After a few days devoted to such fellowship and festivity, -Dionysius convoked a public assembly, for the purpose of formally -announcing the intended war. He reminded the Syracusans that the -Carthaginians were common enemies to Greeks in general, but most -of all to the Sicilian Greeks—as recent events but too plainly -testified. He appealed to their generous sympathies on behalf of -the five Hellenic cities, in the southern part of the island, which -had lately undergone the miseries of capture by the generals of -Carthage, and were still groaning under her yoke. Nothing prevented -Carthage (he added) from attempting to extend her dominion over the -rest of the island, except the pestilence under which she had herself -been suffering in Africa. To the Syracusans<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_482">[p. 482]</span> this ought to be an imperative -stimulus for attacking her at once, and rescuing their Hellenic -brethren, before she had time to recover.<a id="FNanchor_1029" -href="#Footnote_1029" class="fnanchor">[1029]</a></p> - -<p>These motives were really popular and impressive. There was -besides another inducement, which weighed with Dionysius to hasten -the war, though he probably did not dwell upon it in his public -address to the Syracusans. He perceived that various Sicilian Greeks -were migrating voluntarily with their properties into the territory -of Carthage; whose dominion, though hateful and oppressive, was, -at least while untried, regarded by many with less terror than -his dominion when actually suffered. By commencing hostilities at -once, he expected not only to arrest such emigration, but to induce -such Greeks as were actually subjects of Carthage to throw off -her yoke and join him.<a id="FNanchor_1030" href="#Footnote_1030" -class="fnanchor">[1030]</a></p> - -<p>Loud acclamations from the Syracusan assembly hailed the -proposition for war with Carthage; a proposition, which only -converted into reality what had been long the familiar expectation -of every man. And the war was rendered still more popular by the -permission, which Dionysius granted forthwith, to plunder all the -Carthaginian residents and mercantile property either in Syracuse -or in any of his dependent cities. We are told that there were not -only several domiciliated Carthaginians at Syracuse, but also many -loaded vessels belonging to Carthage in the harbor, so that the -plunder was lucrative.<a id="FNanchor_1031" href="#Footnote_1031" -class="fnanchor">[1031]</a> But though such may have been the case -in ordinary times, it seems hardly credible, that under the actual -circumstances, any Carthaginian (person or property) can have -been at Syracuse except by accident; for war with Carthage<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_483">[p. 483]</span> had been long -announced, not merely in current talk, but in the more unequivocal -language of overwhelming preparation. Nor is it easy to understand -how the prudent Carthaginian Senate (who probably were not less -provided with spies at Syracuse than Dionysius was at Carthage)<a -id="FNanchor_1032" href="#Footnote_1032" class="fnanchor">[1032]</a> -can have been so uninformed as to be taken by surprise at the last -moment, when Dionysius sent thither a herald formally declaring -war; which herald was not sent until after the license for private -plunder had been previously granted. He peremptorily required -the Carthaginians to relinquish their dominion over the Greek -cities in Sicily,<a id="FNanchor_1033" href="#Footnote_1033" -class="fnanchor">[1033]</a> as the only means of avoiding war. To -such a proposition no answer was returned, nor probably expected. -But the Carthaginians were now so much prostrated (like Athens in -the second or third years of the Peloponnesian war) by depopulation, -suffering, terrors, and despondency, arising out of the pestilence -which beset them in Africa, that they felt incompetent to any serious -effort, and heard with alarm the letter read from Dionysius. There -was, however, no alternative, so that they forthwith despatched some -of their ablest citizens to levy troops for the defence of their -Sicilian possessions.<a id="FNanchor_1034" href="#Footnote_1034" -class="fnanchor">[1034]</a></p> - -<p>The first news that reached them was indeed appalling. Dionysius -had marched forth with his full power, Syracusan as well as -foreign, accumulated by so long a preparation. It was a power, the -like of which had never been beheld in Greece; greater even than -that wielded by his predecessor Gelon eighty years before. If the -contemporaries of Gelon had been struck with awe<a id="FNanchor_1035" -href="#Footnote_1035" class="fnanchor">[1035]</a> at the superiority -of his force to anything that Hellas could show elsewhere, as much -or more would the same sentiment be felt by those who surrounded -Dionysius. More intimately still was a similar comparison, with the -mighty victor of Himera, present to Dionysius himself. He exulted in -setting out with an army yet more imposing, against the same enemy, -and for the same purpose of liberating the maritime cities of Sicily -subject to Carthage;<a id="FNanchor_1036" href="#Footnote_1036" -class="fnanchor">[1036]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_484">[p. -484]</span> cities, whose number and importance had since fearfully -augmented.</p> - -<p>These subject-cities, from Kamarina on one side of the island -to Selinus and Himera on the other, though there were a certain -number of Carthaginian residents established there, had no effective -standing force to occupy or defend them on the part of Carthage; -whose habit it was to levy large mercenary hosts for the special -occasion and then to disband them afterwards. Accordingly, as -soon as Dionysius with his powerful army passed the Syracusan -border, and entered upon his march westward along the southern -coast of the island, proclaiming himself as liberator—the most -intense anti-Carthaginian manifestations burst forth at once, at -Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera. These Greeks did -not merely copy the Syracusans in plundering the property of all -Carthaginians found among them, but also seized their persons, and -put them to death with every species of indignity and torture. A -frightful retaliation now took place for the cruelties recently -committed by the Carthaginian armies, in the sacking of Selinus, -Agrigentum, and the other conquered cities.<a id="FNanchor_1037" -href="#Footnote_1037" class="fnanchor">[1037]</a> The Hellenic -war-practice, in itself sufficiently rigorous, was aggravated -into a merciless and studied barbarity, analogous to that which -had disfigured the late proceedings of Carthage and her western -mercenaries. These “Sicilian vespers,” which burst out throughout -all the south of Sicily against the Carthaginian residents, -surpassed even the memorable massacre known under that name in the -thirteenth century, wherein the Angevine knights and soldiers were -indeed assassinated, but not tortured. Diodorus tells us that the -Carthaginians learnt from the retaliation thus suffered, a lesson of -forbearance. It will not appear however, from their future conduct, -that the lesson was much laid to heart; while it is unhappily -cer<span class="pagenum" id="Page_485">[p. 485]</span>tain, that -such interchange of cruelties with less humanized neighbors, -contributed to lower in the Sicilian Greeks that measure of -comparative forbearance which characterized the Hellenic race in its -own home.</p> - -<p>Elate with this fury of revenge, the citizens of Kamarina, Gela, -Agrigentum, and Selinus joined Dionysius on his march along the -coast. He was enabled, from his abundant stock of recently fabricated -arms, to furnish them with panoplies and weapons; for it is probable -that as subjects of Carthage they had been disarmed. Strengthened -by all these reinforcements, he mustered a force of eighty thousand -men, besides more than three thousand cavalry; while the ships of war -which accompanied him along the coast were nearly two hundred, and -the transports, with stores and battering machines, not less than -five hundred. With this prodigious army, the most powerful hitherto -assembled under Grecian command, he appeared before the Carthaginian -settlement of Motyê, a fortified seaport in a little bay immediately -north of Cape Lilybæum.<a id="FNanchor_1038" href="#Footnote_1038" -class="fnanchor">[1038]</a></p> - -<p>Of the three principal establishments of Carthage in -Sicily,—Motyê, Panormus (Palermo), and Soloeis,—Motyê was at -once the nearest to the mother-city,<a id="FNanchor_1039" -href="#Footnote_1039" class="fnanchor">[1039]</a> the most important, -and the most devoted. It was situated (like the original Syracuse -in Ortygia) upon a little islet, separated from Sicily by a narrow -strait about two-thirds of a mile in breadth, which its citizens -had bridged over by means of a mole, so as to form a regular, -though narrow, footpath. It was populous, wealthy, flourishing, and -distinguished for the excellence both of its private houses and -its fortifications. Perceiving the approach of Dionysius, and not -intimidated by the surrender of their neighbors and allies, the -Elymi at Eryx, who did not dare to resist so powerful a force,—the -Motyênes put themselves in the best condition of defence. They -broke up their mole, and again insulated themselves from Sicily, in -the hope of holding out until relief should be sent from Carthage. -Resolved to avenge upon Motyê the sufferings of Agrigentum and -Selinus, Dionysius took a survey of the place in conjunction with -his principal engineers. It deserves notice, that this is among -the earliest sieges recorded in Grecian history wherein we read of -a pro<span class="pagenum" id="Page_486">[p. 486]</span>fessed -engineer as being directly and deliberately called on to advise the -best mode of proceeding.<a id="FNanchor_1040" href="#Footnote_1040" -class="fnanchor">[1040]</a></p> - -<p>Having formed his plans, he left his admiral Leptines with a -portion of the army to begin the necessary works, while he himself -with the remainder laid waste the neighboring territory dependent on -or allied with Carthage. The Sikani and others submitted to him; but -Ankyræ, Soloeis, Panormus, Egesta, and Entella, all held out, though -the citizens were confined to their walls, and obliged to witness, -without being able to prevent, the destruction of their lands.<a -id="FNanchor_1041" href="#Footnote_1041" class="fnanchor">[1041]</a> -Returning from this march, Dionysius pressed the siege of Motyê with -the utmost ardor, and with all the appliances which his engineers -could devise. Having moored his transports along the beach, and -hauled his ships of war ashore in the harbor, he undertook the -laborious task of filling up the strait (probably of no great depth) -which divided Motyê from the main island;<a id="FNanchor_1042" -href="#Footnote_1042" class="fnanchor">[1042]</a>—or at least as much -of the length of the strait as was sufficient to march across both -with soldiers and with battering engines, and to bring them up close -against the walls of the city. The numbers under his command enabled -him to achieve this enterprise, though not without a long period -of effort, during which the Carthaginians tried more than once to -interrupt his proceedings. Not having a fleet capable of contending -in pitched battle against the besiegers, the Carthaginian general -Imilkon tried two successive manœuvres. He first sent a squadron of -ten ships of war to sail suddenly into the harbor of Syracuse, in -hopes that the diversion thus operated would constrain Dionysius to -detach a portion of his fleet from Motyê. Though the attack, however, -was so far successful as to destroy many merchantmen in the harbor, -yet the assailants were beaten off without making any more serious -impression, or creating the diversion intended.<a id="FNanchor_1043" -href="#Footnote_1043" class="fnanchor">[1043]</a> Imilkon next -made an attempt to surprise the armed ships of Dionysius,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_487">[p. 487]</span> as they lay hauled -ashore in the harbor near Motyê. Crossing over from Carthage by -night, with one hundred ships of war, to the Selinuntine coast, he -sailed round Cape Lilybæum, and appeared at daybreak off Motyê. His -appearance took every man by surprise. He destroyed or put to flight -the ships on guard, and sailed into the harbor prepared for attack -while as yet only a few of the Syracusan ships had been got afloat. -As the harbor was too confined to enable Dionysius to profit by his -great superiority in number and size of ships, a great portion of his -fleet would have been now destroyed, had it not been saved by his -numerous land force and artillery on the beach. Showers of missiles, -from this assembled crowd as well as from the decks of the Syracusan -ships, prevented Imilkon from advancing far enough to attack with -effect. The newly-invented engine called the catapulta, of which -the Carthaginians had as yet had no experience, was especially -effective; projecting large masses to a great distance, it filled -them with astonishment and dismay. While their progress was thus -arrested, Dionysius employed a new expedient to rescue his fleet from -the dilemma in which it had been caught. His numerous soldiers were -directed to haul the ships, not down to the harbor, but landward, -across a level tongue of land, more than two miles in breadth, which -separated the harbor of Motyê from the outer sea. Wooden planks were -laid so as to form a pathway for the ships; and in spite of the -great size of the newly-constructed quadriremes and quinqueremes, -the strength and ardor of the army sufficed for this toilsome effort -of transporting eighty ships across in one day. The entire fleet, -double in number to that of the Carthaginians, being at length got -afloat, Imilkon did not venture on a pitched battle, but returned -at once back to Africa.<a id="FNanchor_1044" href="#Footnote_1044" -class="fnanchor">[1044]</a></p> - -<p>Though the citizens of Motyê saw from the walls the mournful -spectacle of their friends retiring, their courage was nowise -abated. They knew well that they had no mercy to expect; that the -general ferocity of the Carthaginians in their hour of victory, -and especially the cruel treatment of Greek captives even in Motyê -itself, would now be retaliated; and that their only chance lay in -a brave despair. The road across the strait having been at length -completed, Dionysius brought up his engines and began his<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_488">[p. 488]</span> assault. While the -catapulta with its missiles prevented defenders from showing -themselves on the battlements, battering-rams were driven up to -shake or overthrow the walls. At the same time large towers on -wheels were rolled up, with six different stories in them one above -the other, and in height equal to the houses. Against these means -of attack the besieged on their side elevated lofty masts above the -walls, with yards projecting outwards. Upon these yards stood men -protected from the missiles by a sort of breastwork, and holding -burning torches, pitch, and other combustibles, which they cast down -upon the machines of the assailants. Many machines took fire in the -woodwork, and it was not without difficulty that the conflagration -was extinguished. After a long and obstinate resistance, however, -the walls were at length overthrown or carried by assault, and the -besiegers rushed in, imagining the town to be in their power. But -the indefatigable energy of the besieged had already put the houses -behind into a state of defence, and barricaded the streets, so that -a fresh assault, more difficult than the first, remained to be -undertaken. The towers on wheels were rolled near, but probably could -not be pushed into immediate contact with the houses in consequence -of the ruins of the overthrown wall which impeded their approach. -Accordingly the assailants were compelled to throw out wooden -platforms or bridges from the towers to the houses, and to march -along these to the attack. But here they were at great disadvantage, -and suffered severe loss. The Motyenes, resisting desperately, -prevented them from setting firm foot on the houses, slew many of -them in hand-combat, and precipitated whole companies to the ground, -by severing or oversetting the platform. For several days this -desperate combat was renewed. Not a step was gained by the besiegers, -yet the unfortunate Motyenes became each day more exhausted, -while portions of the foremost houses were also overthrown. Every -evening Dionysius recalled his troops to their night’s repose, -renewing the assault next morning. Having thus brought the enemy -into an expectation that the night would be undisturbed, he on one -fatal night took them by surprise, sending the Thurian Archylus -with a chosen body of troops to attack the foremost defences. -This detachment, planting ladders and climbing up by means of the -half-demolished houses, established themselves firmly in a position -within the town before re<span class="pagenum" id="Page_489">[p. -489]</span>sistance could be organized. In vain did the Motyenes, -discovering the stratagem too late, endeavor to dislodge them. The -main force of Dionysius was speedily brought up across the artificial -earth-way to confirm their success, and the town was thus carried, -in spite of the most gallant resistance, which continued even after -it had become hopeless.<a id="FNanchor_1045" href="#Footnote_1045" -class="fnanchor">[1045]</a></p> - -<p>The victorious host who now poured into Motyê, incensed not -merely by the length and obstinacy of the defence, but also by -antecedent Carthaginian atrocities at Agrigentum and elsewhere, -gave full loose to the sanguinary impulses of retaliation. They -butchered indiscriminately men and women, the aged and the children, -without mercy to any one. The streets were thus strewed with the -slain, in spite of all efforts on the part of Dionysius, who desired -to preserve the captives that they might be sold as slaves, and -thus bring in a profitable return. But his orders to abstain from -slaughter were not obeyed, nor could he do anything more than invite -the sufferers by proclamation to take refuge in the temples; a step, -which most of them would probably resort to uninvited. Restrained -from farther slaughter by the sanctuary of the temples, the victors -now turned to pillage. Abundance of gold, silver, precious vestments, -and other marks of opulence, the accumulations of a long period of -active prosperity, fell into their hands; and Dionysius allowed to -them the full plunder of the town, as a recompense for the toils -of the siege. He farther distributed special recompenses to those -who had distinguished themselves; one hundred minæ being given to -Archylus, the leader of the successful night-surprise. All the -surviving Motyenes he sold into slavery; but he reserved for a more -cruel fate Daimenês and various other Greeks who had been taken among -them. These Greeks he caused to be crucified;<a id="FNanchor_1046" -href="#Footnote_1046" class="fnanchor">[1046]</a> a specimen of -the Phœnician penalties transferred by example to their Hellenic -neighbors and enemies.</p> - -<p>The siege of Motyê having occupied nearly all the summer, -Dionysius now reconducted his army homeward. He left at the place a -Sikel garrison under the command of the Syracusan Biton, as well as a -large portion of his fleet, one hundred and twenty ships, under the -command of his brother Leptines; who was in<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_490">[p. 490]</span>structed to watch for the arrival of -any force from Carthage, and to employ himself in besieging the -neighboring towns of Egesta and Entella. The operations against -these two towns however had little success. The inhabitants defended -themselves bravely, and the Egestæans were even successful, through -a well-planned nocturnal sally, in burning the enemy’s camp, with -many horses, and stores of all kinds in the tents. Neither of the -two towns was yet reduced, when, in the ensuing spring, Dionysius -himself returned with his main force from Syracuse. He reduced -the inhabitants of Halikyæ to submission, but effected no other -permanent conquest, nor anything more than devastation of the -neighboring territory dependent upon Carthage.<a id="FNanchor_1047" -href="#Footnote_1047" class="fnanchor">[1047]</a></p> - -<p>Presently the face of the war was changed by the arrival of -Imilkon from Carthage. Having been elevated to the chief magistracy -of the city, he now brought with him an overwhelming force, -collected as well from the subjects in Africa as from Iberia and -the Western Mediterranean. It amounted, even in the low estimate -of Timæus, to one hundred thousand men, reinforced afterwards in -Sicily by thirty thousand more,—and in the more ample computations -of Ephorus, to three hundred thousand foot, four thousand horse, -four hundred chariots of war, four hundred ships of war, and six -hundred transports carrying stores and engines. Dionysius had his -spies at Carthage,<a id="FNanchor_1048" href="#Footnote_1048" -class="fnanchor">[1048]</a> even among men of rank and politicians, -to apprise him of all movements or public orders. But Imilkon, to -obviate knowledge of the precise point in Sicily where he intended -to land, gave to the pilots sealed instructions, to be opened only -when they were out at sea, indicating Panormus (Palermo) as the -place of rendezvous.<a id="FNanchor_1049" href="#Footnote_1049" -class="fnanchor">[1049]</a> The transports made directly for that -port, without nearing the land elsewhere; while Imilkon with the -ships of war approached the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_491">[p. -491]</span> harbor of Motyê and sailed from thence along the coast -to Panormus. He probably entertained the hope of intercepting -some portion of the Syracusan fleet. But nothing of the kind was -found practicable; while Leptines on his side was even fortunate -enough to be able to attack, with thirty triremes, the foremost -vessels of the large transport-fleet on their voyage to Panormus. -He destroyed no less than fifty of them, with five thousand men, -and two hundred chariots of war; but the remaining fleet reached -the port in safety, and were there joined by Imilkon with the -ships of war. The land force being disembarked, the Carthaginian -general led them to Motyê, ordering his ships of war to accompany -him along the coast. In his way he regained Eryx, which was at -heart Carthaginian, having only been intimidated into submission to -Dionysius during the preceding year. He then attacked Motyê, which -he retook, seemingly after very little resistance. It had held out -obstinately against the Syracusans a few months before, while in -the hands of its own Carthaginian inhabitants, with their families -and properties around them; but the Sikel garrison had far less -motive for stout defence.<a id="FNanchor_1050" href="#Footnote_1050" -class="fnanchor">[1050]</a></p> - -<p>Thus was Dionysius deprived of the conquest which had cost him so -much blood and toil during the preceding summer. We are surprised -to learn that he made no effort to prevent its recapture, though he -was then not far off, besieging Egesta,—and though his soldiers, -elate with the successes of the preceding year were eager for a -general battle. But Dionysius, deeming this measure too adventurous, -resolved to retreat to Syracuse. His provisions were failing, and -he was at a great distance from allies, so that defeat would have -been ruinous. He therefore returned to Syracuse, carrying with -him some of the Sikanians, whom he persuaded to evacuate their -abode in the Carthaginian neighborhood, promising to provide them -with better homes elsewhere. Most of them, however, declined his -offers; some (among them, the Halikyæans) preferring to resume -their alliance with Carthage. Of the recent acquisitions nothing -now remained to Dionysius beyond the Selinuntine boundary; but -Gela, Kamarina, Agrigentum, and Selinus had been emancipated from -Carthage, and were still in a state of dependent alliance with -him;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_492">[p. 492]</span> a result -of moment,—yet seemingly very inadequate to the immense warlike -preparations whereby it had been attained. Whether he exercised a -wise discretion in declining to fight the Carthaginians, we have not -sufficient information to determine. But his army appear to have been -dissatisfied with it, and it was among the causes of the outbreak -against him shortly afterwards at Syracuse.<a id="FNanchor_1051" -href="#Footnote_1051" class="fnanchor">[1051]</a></p> - -<p>Thus left master of the country, Imilkon, instead of trying to -reconquer Selinus and Himera, which had probably been impoverished -by recent misfortunes,—resolved to turn his arms against Messênê -in the north-east of the island; a city as yet fresh and -untouched,—so little prepared for attack that its walls were not -in good repair,—and moreover at the present moment yet farther -enfeebled by the absence of its horsemen in the army of Dionysius.<a -id="FNanchor_1052" href="#Footnote_1052" class="fnanchor">[1052]</a> -Accordingly, he marched along the northern coast of Sicily, with his -fleet coasting in the same direction to coöperate with him. He made -terms with Kephalœdium and Therma, captured the island of Lipara, and -at length reached Cape Pelôrus, a few miles from Messênê. His rapid -march and unexpected arrival struck the Messenians with dismay. Many -of them, conceiving defence to be impossible against so numerous a -host, sent away their families and their valuable property to Rhegium -or elsewhere. On the whole, however, a spirit of greater confidence -prevailed, arising in part from an ancient prophecy preserved among -the traditions of the town, purporting that the Carthaginians should -one day carry water in Messênê. The interpreters affirmed that “to -carry water” meant, of course, “to be a slave,”—and the Messenians, -persuading themselves that this portended defeat to Imilkon, sent -out their chosen military force to meet him at Pelôrus, and oppose -his disembarkation. The Carthaginian commander, seeing these troops -on their march, ordered his fleet to sail forward into the harbor -of the city, and attack it from seaward during the absence of the -defenders. A north wind so fa<span class="pagenum" id="Page_493">[p. -493]</span>vored the advance of the ships, that they entered the -harbor full sail, and found the city on that side almost unguarded. -The troops who had marched out towards Pelôrus hastened back, -but were too late;<a id="FNanchor_1053" href="#Footnote_1053" -class="fnanchor">[1053]</a> while Imilkon himself also, pushing -forward by land, forced his way into the town over the neglected -parts of the wall. Messênê was taken; and its unhappy population -fled in all directions for their lives. Some found refuge in the -neighboring cities; others ran to the hill-forts of the Messenian -territory, planted as a protection against the indigenous Sikels; -while about two hundred of them near the harbor, cast themselves into -the sea, and undertook the arduous task of swimming across to the -Italian coast, in which fifty of them succeeded.<a id="FNanchor_1054" -href="#Footnote_1054" class="fnanchor">[1054]</a></p> - -<p>Though Imilkon tried in vain to carry by assault some of the -Messenian hill-forts, which were both strongly placed and gallantly -defended,—yet his capture of Messênê itself was an event both -imposing and profitable. It deprived Dionysius of an important ally, -and lessened his facilities for obtaining succor from Italy. But -most of all, it gratified the anti-Hellenic sentiment of the Punic -general and his army, counterbalancing the capture of Motyê in the -preceding year. Having taken scarce any captives, Imilkon had nothing -but unconscious stone and wood upon which to vent his antipathy. He -ordered the town, the walls, and all the buildings, to be utterly -burnt and demolished; a task which his numerous host are said to -have executed so effectually, that there remained hardly anything -but ruins, without a trace of human residence.<a id="FNanchor_1055" -href="#Footnote_1055" class="fnanchor">[1055]</a><span -class="pagenum" id="Page_494">[p. 494]</span> He received adhesion -and reinforcements from most of the Sikels<a id="FNanchor_1056" -href="#Footnote_1056" class="fnanchor">[1056]</a> of the interior, -who had been forced to submit to Dionysius a year or two before, -but detested his dominion. To some of these Sikels, the Syracusan -despot had assigned the territory of the conquered Naxians, with -their city probably unwalled. But anxious as they were to escape -from him, many had migrated to a point somewhat north of Naxus,—to -the hill of Taurus, immediately over the sea, unfavorably celebrated -among the Sikel population as being the spot where the first Greek -colonists had touched on arriving in the island. Their migration -was encouraged, multiplied, and organized, under the auspices of -Imilkon, who prevailed upon them to construct, upon the strong -eminence of Taurus, a fortified post, which formed the beginning -of the city afterwards known as Tauromenium.<a id="FNanchor_1057" -href="#Footnote_1057" class="fnanchor">[1057]</a> Magon was sent with -the Carthaginian fleet to assist in the enterprise.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Dionysius, greatly disquieted at the capture of Messênê, -exerted himself to put Syracuse in an effective position of defence -on her northern frontier. Naxus and Katana being both unfortified, he -was forced to abandon them, and he induced the Campanians whom he had -planted in Katana to change their quarters to the strong town called -Ætna, on the skirt of the mountain so named. He made Leontini his -chief position; strengthening as much as possible the fortifications -of the city as well as those of the neighboring country forts, -wherein he accumulated magazines of provisions from the fertile -plains around. He had still a force of thirty thousand foot and more -than three thousand horse; he had also a fleet of one hundred and -eighty ships of war,—triremes and others. During the year preceding, -he had brought out both a land force and a naval force much superior -to this, even for purposes of aggression; how it happened that he -could now command no more, even for defence and at home,—or what had -become of the difference,—we are not told. Of the one hundred and -eighty ships of war, sixty only were manned by the extraordinary -proceeding of liberating slaves. Such sudden and serious changes -in the amount of military force from year to year, are perceptible -among Carthaginians as well as Greeks,—indeed throughout most part -of Grecian history;—the armies being got together chiefly<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_495">[p. 495]</span> for special occasions, -and then dismissed. Dionysius farther despatched envoys to Sparta, -soliciting a reinforcement of a thousand mercenary auxiliaries. -Having thus provided the best defence that he could through the -territory, he advanced forward with his main land-force to Katana, -having his fleet also moving in coöperation, immediately off -shore.</p> - -<p>Towards this same point of Katana the Carthaginians were now -moving, in their march against Syracuse. Magon was directed to coast -along with the fleet from Taurus (Tauromenium) to Katana, while -Imilkon intended himself to march with the land force on shore, -keeping constantly near the fleet for the purpose of mutual support. -But his scheme was defeated by a remarkable accident. A sudden -eruption took place from Ætna; so that the stream of lava from the -mountain to the sea forbade all possibility of marching along the -shore to Katana, and constrained him to make a considerable circuit -with his army on the land-side of the mountain. Though he accelerated -his march as much as possible, yet for two days or more he was -unavoidably cut off from the fleet; which under the command of Magon -was sailing southward towards Katana. Dionysius availed himself of -this circumstance to advance beyond Katana along the beach stretching -northward, to meet Magon in his approach, and attack him separately. -The Carthaginian fleet was much superior in number, consisting of -five hundred sail in all; a portion of which, however, were not -strictly ships of war, but armed merchantmen,—that is, furnished -with brazen bows for impact against an enemy, and rowed with oars. -But on the other hand, Dionysius had a land-force close at hand to -coöperate with his fleet; an advantage which in ancient naval warfare -counted for much, serving in case of defeat as a refuge to the ships, -and in case of victory as intercepting or abridging the enemy’s -means of escape. Magon, alarmed when he came in sight of the Grecian -land-force mustered on the beach, and the Grecian fleet rowing up to -attack him,—was nevertheless constrained unwillingly to accept the -battle. Leptines, the Syracusan admiral,—though ordered by Dionysius -to concentrate his ships as much as possible, in consequence of his -inferior numbers,—attacked with boldness, and even with temerity; -advancing himself with thirty ships greatly before the rest, and -being apparently farther out to sea than the enemy. His bravery -at first appeared successful, destroying or damaging the headmost -ships of the enemy. But their superior numbers<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_496">[p. 496]</span> presently closed around him, and after -a desperate combat, fought in the closest manner, ship to ship and -hand to hand, he was forced to sheer off, and to seek escape seaward. -His main fleet, coming up in disorder, and witnessing his defeat, -were beaten also, after a strenuous contest. All of them fled, either -landward or seaward as they could, under vigorous pursuit by the -Carthaginian vessels; and in the end, no less than a hundred of the -Syracusan ships, with twenty thousand men, were numbered as taken, or -destroyed. Many of the crews, swimming or floating in the water on -spars, strove to get to land to the protection of their comrades. But -the Carthaginian small craft, sailing very near to the shore, slew or -drowned these unfortunate men, even under the eyes of friends ashore -who could render no assistance. The neighboring water became strewed, -both with dead bodies and with fragments of broken ships. As victors, -the Carthaginians were enabled to save many of their own seamen, -either on board of damaged ships, or swimming for their lives. Yet -their own loss too was severe; and their victory, complete as it -proved, was dearly purchased.</p> - -<p>Though the land-force of Dionysius had not been at all engaged, -yet the awful defeat of his fleet induced him to give immediate -orders for retreating, first to Katana and afterwards yet farther to -Syracuse. As soon as the Syracusan army had evacuated the adjoining -shore, Magon towed all his prizes to land, and there hauled them up -on the beach; partly for repair, wherever practicable,—partly as -visible proofs of the magnitude of the triumph, for encouragement to -his own armament. Stormy weather just then supervening, he was forced -to haul his own ships ashore also for safety, and remained there for -several days refreshing the crews. To keep the sea under such weather -would have been scarcely practicable; so that if Dionysius, instead -of retreating, had continued to occupy the shore with his unimpaired -land-force, it appears that the Carthaginian ships would have been -in the greatest danger; constrained either to face the storm, to -run back a considerable distance northward, or to make good their -landing against a formidable enemy, without being able to wait for -the arrival of Imilkon.<a id="FNanchor_1058" href="#Footnote_1058" -class="fnanchor">[1058]</a> The latter, after no very long interval, -came up, so that the land-force and the navy of the Carthaginians -were now<span class="pagenum" id="Page_497">[p. 497]</span> again -in coöperation. While allowing his troops some days of repose and -enjoyment of the victory, he sent envoys to the town of Ætna, -inviting the Campanian mercenary soldiers to break with Dionysius and -join him. Reminding them that their countrymen at Entella were living -in satisfaction as a dependency of Carthage (which they had recently -testified by resisting the Syracusan invasion), he promised to them -an accession of territory, and a share in the spoils of the war, -to be wrested from Greeks who were enemies of Campanians not less -than of Carthaginians.<a id="FNanchor_1059" href="#Footnote_1059" -class="fnanchor">[1059]</a> The Campanians of Ætna would gladly have -complied with his invitation, and were only restrained from joining -him by the circumstance that they had given hostages to the despot of -Syracuse, in whose army also their best soldiers were now serving.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Dionysius, in marching back to Syracuse, found his -army grievously discontented. Withdrawn from the scene of action -without even using their arms, they looked forward to nothing -better than a blockade at Syracuse, full of hardship and privation. -Accordingly many of them protested against retreat, conjuring him -to lead them again to the scene of action, that they might either -assail the Carthaginian fleet in the confusion of landing, or join -battle with the advancing land-force under Imilkon. At first, -Dionysius consented to such change of scheme. But he was presently -reminded that unless he hastened back to Syracuse, Magon with the -victorious fleet might sail thither, enter the harbor, and possess -himself of the city; in the same manner as Imilkon had recently -succeeded at Messênê. Under these apprehensions he renewed his -original order for retreat, in spite of the vehement protest of -his Sicilian allies; who were indeed so incensed that most of them -quitted him at once. Which of the two was the wiser plan, we have -no sufficient means to determine. But the circumstances seem not -to have been the same as those preceding the capture of Messênê; -for Magon was not in a condition to move forward at once with the -fleet, partly from his loss in the recent action, partly from the -stormy weather; and might perhaps have been intercepted in the<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_498">[p. 498]</span> very act of landing, -if Dionysius had moved rapidly back to the shore. As far as we can -judge, it would appear that the complaints of the army against the -hasty retreat of Dionysius rested on highly plausible grounds. He -nevertheless persisted, and reached Syracuse with his army not only -much discouraged, but greatly diminished by the desertion of allies. -He lost no time in sending forth envoys to the Italian Greeks and -to Peloponnesus, with ample funds for engaging soldiers, and urgent -supplications to Sparta as well as to Corinth.<a id="FNanchor_1060" -href="#Footnote_1060" class="fnanchor">[1060]</a> Polyxenus, his -brother-in-law, employed on this mission, discharged his duty with -such diligence, that he came back in a comparatively short space -of time, with thirty-two ships of war under the command of the -Lacedæmonian Pharakidas.<a id="FNanchor_1061" href="#Footnote_1061" -class="fnanchor">[1061]</a></p> - -<p>Meanwhile Imilkon, having sufficiently refreshed his troops -after the naval victory off Katana, moved forward towards Syracuse -both with the fleet and the land-force. The entry of his fleet -into the Great Harbor was ostentatious and imposing; far above -even that of the second Athenian armament, when Demosthenes first -exhibited its brilliant but short-lived force.<a id="FNanchor_1062" -href="#Footnote_1062" class="fnanchor">[1062]</a> Two hundred and -eight ships of war first rowed in, marshalled in the best order, and -adorned with the spoils of the captured Syracusan ships. These were -followed by transports, five hundred of them carrying soldiers, and -one thousand others either empty or bringing stores and machines. The -total number of vessels, we are told, reached almost two thousand, -covering a large portion of the Great Harbor.<a id="FNanchor_1063" -href="#Footnote_1063" class="fnanchor">[1063]</a> The numerous -land-force marched up about the same time; Imilkon establishing his -head quarters in the temple of Zeus Olympius, nearly one English mile -and a half from the city. He presently drew up his forces in order -of battle, and advanced nearly to the city walls; while his ships of -war also, being<span class="pagenum" id="Page_499">[p. 499]</span> -divided into two fleets of one hundred ships each, showed themselves -in face of the two interior harbors or docks (on each side of the -connecting strait between Ortygia and the main land) wherein the -Syracusan ships were safely lodged. He thus challenged the Syracusans -to combat on both elements; but neither challenge was accepted.</p> - -<p>Having by such defiance farther raised the confidence of his -own troops, he first spread them over the Syracusan territory, and -allowed them for thirty days to enrich themselves by unlimited -plunder. Next, he proceeded to establish fortified posts, as -essential to the prosecution of a blockade which he foresaw would -be tedious. Besides fortifying the temple of the Olympian Zeus, he -constructed two other forts; one at Cape Plemmyrium (on the southern -entrance of the harbor, immediately opposite to Ortygia, where -Nikias had erected a post also), the other on the Great Harbor, -midway between Plemmyrium and the temple of the Olympian Zeus, at -the little bay called Daskon. He farther encircled his whole camp, -near the last-mentioned temple, with a wall; the materials of which -were derived in part from the demolition of the numerous tombs -around; especially one tomb, spacious and magnificent, commemorating -Gelon and his wife Damaretê. In these various fortified posts he was -able to store up the bread, wine, and other provisions which his -transports were employed in procuring from Africa and Sardinia, for -the continuous subsistence of so mighty an host.</p> - -<p>It would appear as if Imilkon had first hoped to take the city -by assault; for he pushed up his army as far as the very walls of -Achradina (the outer city). He even occupied the open suburb of that -city, afterwards separately fortified under the name of Neapolis, -wherein were situated the temples of Demeter and Persephonê, -which he stripped of their rich treasures.<a id="FNanchor_1064" -href="#Footnote_1064" class="fnanchor">[1064]</a> But if such<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_500">[p. 500]</span> was his plan, he soon -abandoned it, and confined himself to the slower process of reducing -the city by famine. His progress in this enterprise, however, -was by no means encouraging. We must recollect that he was not, -like Nikias, master of the centre of Epipolæ; able from thence to -stretch his right arm southward to the Great Harbor, and his left -arm northward to the sea at Trogilus. As far as we are able to make -out, he never ascended the southern cliff, nor got upon the slope of -Epipolæ; though it seems that at this time there was no line of wall -along the southern cliff, as Dionysius had recently built along the -northern. The position of Imilkon was confined to the Great Harbor -and to the low lands adjoining, southward of the cliff of Epipolæ; -so that the communications of Syracuse with the country around -remained partially open on two sides,—westward, through the Euryalus -at the upper extremity of Epipolæ,—and northward towards Thapsus -and Megara, through the Hexapylon, or the principal gate in the new -fortification constructed by Dionysius along the northern cliff of -Epipolæ. The full value was now felt of that recent fortification, -which, protecting Syracuse both to the north and west, and guarding -the precious position of Euryalus, materially impeded the operations -of Imilkon. The city was thus open, partially at least, on two -sides, to receive supplies by land. And even by sea means were -found to introduce provisions. Though Imilkon had a fleet so much -stronger that the Syracusans did not dare to offer pitched battle, -yet he found it difficult to keep such constant watch as to exclude -their store-ships, and ensure the arrival of his own. Dionysius and -Leptines went forth themselves from the harbor with armed squadrons -to accelerate and protect the approach of their supplies; while -several desultory encounters took place, both of land-force and of -shipping, which proved advantageous to the Syracusans, and greatly -raised their spirits.</p> - -<p>One naval conflict especially, which occurred while Dionysius was -absent on his cruise, was of serious moment. A corn-ship belonging to -Imilkon’s fleet being seen entering the Great Harbor, the Syracusans -suddenly manned five ships of war, mastered it, and hauled it into -their own dock. To prevent such capture, the Carthaginians from -their station sent out forty ships of war; upon which the Syracusans -equipped their whole naval force, bore down upon the forty with -numbers decidedly superior, and completely<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_501">[p. 501]</span> defeated them. They captured the -admiral’s ship, damaged twenty-four others, and pursued the rest to -the naval station; in front of which they paraded, challenging the -enemy to battle. As the challenge was not accepted, they returned to -their own dock, towing in their prizes in triumph.</p> - -<p>This naval victory indicated, and contributed much to occasion, -that turn in the fortune of the siege which each future day still -farther accelerated. Its immediate effect was to fill the Syracusan -public with unbounded exultation. “Without Dionysius we conquer our -enemies; under his command we are beaten; why submit to slavery under -him any longer?” Such was the burst of indignant sentiment which -largely pervaded the groups and circles in the city; strengthened -by the consciousness that they were now all armed and competent to -extort freedom,—since Dionysius, when the besieging enemy actually -appeared before the city, had been obliged, as the less of two -hazards, to produce and redistribute the arms which he had previously -taken from them. In the midst of this discontent, Dionysius himself -returned from his cruise. To soothe the prevalent temper, he was -forced to convene a public assembly; wherein he warmly extolled the -recent exploit of the Syracusans, and exhorted them to strenuous -confidence, promising that he would speedily bring the war to a -close.</p> - -<p>It is possible that Dionysius, throughout his despotism, may have -occasionally permitted what were called public assemblies; but we -may be very sure, that, if ever convened, they were mere matters -of form, and that no free discussion or opposition to his will was -ever tolerated. On the present occasion, he anticipated the like -passive acquiescence; and after having delivered a speech, doubtless -much applauded by his own partisans, he was about to dismiss the -assembly, when a citizen named Theodôrus unexpectedly rose. He was -a Horseman or Knight,—a person of wealth and station in the city, -of high character and established reputation for courage. Gathering -boldness from the time and circumstances, he now stood forward to -proclaim publicly that hatred of Dionysius, and anxiety for freedom, -which so many of his fellow-citizens around had been heard to -utter privately and were well known to feel.<a id="FNanchor_1065" -href="#Footnote_1065" class="fnanchor">[1065]</a></p> <p><span -class="pagenum" id="Page_502">[p. 502]</span></p> <p>Diodorus in -his history gives us a long harangue (whether composed by himself, -or copied from others, we cannot tell) as pronounced by Theodôrus. -The main topics of it are such as we should naturally expect, and -are probably, on the whole, genuine. It is a full review, and an -emphatic denunciation, of the past conduct of Dionysius, concluding -with an appeal to the Syracusans to emancipate themselves from his -dominion. “Dionysius (the speaker contends, in substance) is a -worse enemy than the Carthaginians: who, if victorious, would be -satisfied with a regular tribute, leaving us to enjoy our properties -and our paternal polity. Dionysius has robbed us of both. He has -pillaged our temples of their sacred deposits. He has slain or -banished our wealthy citizens, and then seized their properties by -wholesale, to be transferred to his own satellites. He has given -the wives of these exiles in marriage to his barbarian soldiers. He -has liberated our slaves, and taken them into his pay, in order to -keep their masters in slavery. He has garrisoned our own citadel -against us, by means of these slaves, together with a host of other -mercenaries. He has put to death every citizen who ventured to raise -his voice in defence of the laws and constitution. He has abused -our confidence,—once, unfortunately, carried so far as to nominate -him general,—by employing his powers to subvert our freedom, and -rule us according to his own selfish rapacity in place of justice. -He has farther stripped us of our arms; these, recent necessity has -compelled him to restore,—and these, if we are men, we shall now -employ for the recovery of our own freedom.”<a id="FNanchor_1066" -href="#Footnote_1066" class="fnanchor">[1066]</a></p> <p><span -class="pagenum" id="Page_503">[p. 503]</span></p> <p>“If the conduct -of Dionysius towards Syracuse has been thus infamous, it has been no -better towards the Sicilian Greeks generally. He betrayed Gela and -Kamarina, for his own purposes, to the Carthaginians. He suffered -Messênê to fall into their hands without the least help. He reduced -to slavery, by gross treachery, our Grecian brethren and neighbors -of Naxus and Katana; transferring the latter to the non-Hellenic -Campanians, and destroying the former. He might have attacked -the Carthaginians immediately after their landing from Africa at -Panormus, before they had recovered from the fatigue of the voyage. -He might have fought the recent naval combat near the port of Katana, -instead of near the beach north of that town; so as to ensure to our -fleet, if worsted, an easy and sure retreat. Had he chosen to keep -his land-force on the spot, he might have prevented the victorious -Carthaginian fleet from approaching land, when the storm came on -shortly after the battle; or he might have attacked them, if they -tried to land, at the greatest advantage. He has conducted the war, -altogether, with disgraceful incompetence; not wishing sincerely, -indeed, to get rid of them as enemies, but preserving the terrors -of Carthage, as an indirect engine to keep Syracuse in subjection -to himself. As long as we fought with him, we have been constantly -unsuccessful; now that we have come to fight without him, recent -experience tells us that we can beat the Carthaginians, even with -inferior numbers.</p> - -<p>“Let us look out for another leader (concluded Theodôrus), -in place of a sacrilegious temple-robber whom the gods have now -abandoned. If Dionysius will consent to relinquish his dominion, -let him retire from the city with his property unmolested; if he -will not, we are here all assembled, we are possessed of our arms, -and we have both Italian and Peloponnesian allies by our side. The -assembly will determine whether it will choose leaders from our own -citizens,—or from our metropolis Corinth,—or from the Spartans, the -presidents of all Greece.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_504">[p. 504]</span></p> - -<p>Such are the main points of the long harangue ascribed to -Theodôrus; the first occasion, for many years, on which the voice -of free speech had been heard publicly in Syracuse. Among the -charges advanced against Dionysius, which go to impeach his manner -of carrying on the war against the Carthaginians, there are several -which we can neither admit nor reject, from our insufficient -knowledge of the facts. But the enormities ascribed to him in his -dealing with the Syracusans,—the fraud, violence, spoliation, and -bloodshed, whereby he had first acquired, and afterwards upheld, his -dominion over them,—these are assertions of matters of fact, which -coincide in the main with the previous narrative of Diodorus, and -which we have no ground for contesting.</p> - -<p>Hailed by the assembly with great sympathy and acclamation, this -harangue seriously alarmed Dionysius. In his concluding words, -Theodôrus had invoked the protection of Corinth as well as of Sparta, -against the despot, whom with such signal courage he had thus -ventured publicly to arraign. Corinthians as well as Spartans were -now lending aid in the defence, under the command of Pharakidas. -That Spartan officer came forward to speak next after Theodôrus. -Among various other sentiments of traditional respect towards -Sparta, there still prevailed a remnant of the belief that she was -adverse to despots; as she really had once been, at an earlier -period of her history.<a id="FNanchor_1067" href="#Footnote_1067" -class="fnanchor">[1067]</a> Hence the Syracusans hoped, and even -expected, that Pharakidas would second the protest of Theodôrus, -and stand forward as champion of freedom to the first Grecian -city in Sicily.<a id="FNanchor_1068" href="#Footnote_1068" -class="fnanchor">[1068]</a> Bitterly indeed were they disappointed. -Dionysius had established with Pharakidas relations as friendly -as those of the Thirty tyrants at Athens with Kallibius the -Lacedæmonian harmost in the acropolis.<a id="FNanchor_1069" -href="#Footnote_1069" class="fnanchor">[1069]</a> Accordingly -Pharakidas in his speech not only discountenanced the proposition -just made, but declared himself emphatically in favor of the despot; -intimating that he had been sent to aid the Syracusans and Dionysius -against the Carthaginians,—not to put down<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_505">[p. 505]</span> the dominion of Dionysius. To the -Syracusans this declaration was a denial of all hope. They saw -plainly that in any attempt to emancipate themselves, they would -have against them not merely the mercenaries of Dionysius, but also -the whole force of Sparta, then imperial and omnipotent; represented -on the present occasion by Pharakidas, as it had been in a previous -year by Aristus. They were condemned to bear their chains in silence, -not without unavailing curses against Sparta. Meanwhile Dionysius, -thus powerfully sustained, was enabled to ride over the perilous -and critical juncture. His mercenaries crowded in haste around his -person,—having probably been sent for, as soon as the voice of a -free spokesman was heard.<a id="FNanchor_1070" href="#Footnote_1070" -class="fnanchor">[1070]</a> And he was thus enabled to dismiss -an assembly, which had seemed for one short instant to threaten -the perpetuity of his dominion, and to promise emancipation for -Syracuse.</p> - -<p>During this interesting and momentous scene, the fate of Syracuse -had hung upon the decision of Pharakidas: for Theodôrus, well aware -that with a besieging enemy before the gates, the city could not be -left without a supreme authority, had conjured the Spartan commander, -with his Lacedæmonian and Corinthian allies, to take into his own -hands the control and organization of the popular force. There can -be little doubt that Pharakidas could have done this, if he had been -so disposed, so as at once to make head against the Carthaginians -without, and to restrain, if not to put down, the despotism within. -Instead of undertaking the tutelary intervention solicited by the -people, he threw himself into the opposite scale, and strengthened -Dionysius more than ever, at the moment of his greatest peril. -The proceeding of Pharakidas was doubtless conformable to his -instructions from home, as well as to the oppressive and crushing -policy which Sparta, in these days of her unresisted empire (between -the victory of Ægospotami and the defeat of Knidus), pursued -throughout the Grecian world.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_506">[p. 506]</span></p> - -<p>Dionysius was fully sensible of the danger which he had thus been -assisted to escape. Under the first impressions of alarm, he strove -to gain something like popularity; by a conciliatory language and -demeanor, by presents adroitly distributed, and by invitations to -his table. Whatever may have been the success of such artifices, the -lucky turn, which the siege was now taking, was the most powerful of -all aids for building up his full power anew.</p> - -<p>It was not the arms of the Syracusans, but the wrath of Demeter -and Persephonê, whose temple (in the suburb of Achradina) Imilkon -had pillaged, that ruined the besieging army before Syracuse. So the -piety of the citizens interpreted that terrific pestilence which -now began to rage among the multitude of their enemies without. The -divine wrath was indeed seconded (as the historian informs us<a -id="FNanchor_1071" href="#Footnote_1071" class="fnanchor">[1071]</a>) -by physical causes of no ordinary severity. The vast numbers of -the host were closely packed together; it was now the beginning of -autumn, the most unhealthy period of the year; moreover this summer -had been preternaturally hot, and the low marshy ground near the -Great Harbor, under the chill of morning contrasted with the burning -sun of noon, was the constant source of fever and pestilence. These -unseen and irresistible enemies fell with appalling force upon the -troops of Imilkon; especially upon the Libyans, or native Africans, -who were found the most susceptible. The intense and varied bodily -sufferings of this distemper,—the rapidity with which it spread -from man to man,—and the countless victims which it speedily -accumulated,—appear to have equalled, if not surpassed, the worst -days of the pestilence of Athens in 429 <small>B.C.</small> Care -and attendance upon the sick, or even interment of the dead, became -impracticable; so that the whole camp presented a scene of deplorable -agony, aggravated by the horrors and stench of one hundred and fifty -thousand unburied bodies.<a id="FNanchor_1072" href="#Footnote_1072" -class="fnanchor">[1072]</a> The military strength of the -Carthaginians was completely prostrated by such a visita<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_507">[p. 507]</span>tion. Far from being -able to make progress in the siege, they were not even able to defend -themselves against moderate energy on the part of the Syracusans; -who (like the Peloponnesians during the great plague of Athens) -were themselves untouched by the distemper.<a id="FNanchor_1073" -href="#Footnote_1073" class="fnanchor">[1073]</a></p> - -<p>Such was the wretched spectacle of the Carthaginian army, clearly -visible from the walls of Syracuse. To overthrow it by a vigorous -attack, was an enterprise not difficult; indeed, so sure, in the -opinion of Dionysius, that in organizing his plan of operation, he -made it the means of deliberately getting rid of some troops in the -city who had become inconvenient to him. Concerting measures for a -simultaneous assault upon the Carthaginian station both by sea and -land, he entrusted eighty ships of war to Pharakidas and Leptines, -with orders to move at daybreak; while he himself conducted a body -of troops out of the city, during the darkness of night; issuing -forth by Epipolæ and Euryalus (as Gylippus had formerly done when -he surprised Plemmyrium<a id="FNanchor_1074" href="#Footnote_1074" -class="fnanchor">[1074]</a>), and making a circuit until he came, on -the other side of the Anapus, to the temple of Kyanê; thus getting on -the land-side or south-west of the Carthaginian position. He first -despatched his horsemen, together with a regiment of one thousand -mercenary foot-soldiers, to commence the attack. These latter troops -had become peculiarly obnoxious to him, having several times engaged -in revolt and disturbance. Accordingly, while he now ordered them -up to the assault in conjunction with the horse, he at the same -time gave secret directions to the horse, to desert their comrades -and take flight. Both his orders were obeyed. The onset having been -made jointly, in the heat of combat the horsemen fled, leaving -their comrades all to be cut to pieces by the Carthaginians.<a -id="FNanchor_1075" href="#Footnote_1075" class="fnanchor">[1075]</a> -We have as yet heard nothing about difficulties arising<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_508">[p. 508]</span> to Dionysius from his -mercenary troops, on whose arms his dominion rested; and what we are -here told is enough merely to raise curiosity without satisfying -it. These men are said to have been mutinous and disaffected; a -fact, which explains, if it does not extenuate, the gross perfidy of -deliberately inveigling them to destruction, while he still professed -to keep them under his command.</p> - -<p>In the actual state of the Carthaginian army, Dionysius could -afford to make them a present of this obnoxious division. His own -attack, first upon the fort of Polichnê, next upon that near the -naval station at Daskon, was conducted with spirit and success. -While the defenders, thinned and enfeebled by the pestilence, were -striving to repel him on the land-side, the Syracusan fleet came -forth from its docks in excellent spirits and order to attack the -ships at the station. These Carthaginian ships, though afloat and -moored, were very imperfectly manned. Before the crews could get -aboard to put them on their defence, the Syracusan triremes and -quinqueremes, ably rowed and with their brazen beaks well directed, -drove against them on the quarter or midships, and broke through the -line of their timbers. The crash of such impact was heard afar off, -and the best ships were thus speedily disabled.<a id="FNanchor_1076" -href="#Footnote_1076" class="fnanchor">[1076]</a> Following up their -success, the Syracusans jumped aboard, overpowered the crews, or -forced them to seek safety as they could in flight. The distracted -Carthaginians being thus pressed at the same time by sea and by land, -the soldiers of Dionysius from the land-side forced their way through -the entrenchment to the shore, where forty pentekonters were hauled -up, while immediately near them were moored both merchantmen and -triremes. The assailants set fire to the pentekonters; upon which the -flames, rapidly spreading under a strong wind, communicated presently -to all the merchantmen and triremes adjacent. Unable to arrest this -terrific conflagration, the crews were obliged to leap overboard; -while the vessels, severed from their moorings by the burning of the -cables, drifted against each other under the wind, until the naval -station at Daskon became one scene of ruin.</p> - -<p>Such a volume of flame, though destroying the naval -resources<span class="pagenum" id="Page_509">[p. 509]</span> of the -Carthaginians, must at the same time have driven off the assailing -Syracusan ships of war, and probably also the assailants by land. -But to those who contemplated it from the city of Syracuse, across -the breadth of the Great Harbor, it presented a spectacle grand and -stimulating in the highest degree; especially when the fire was seen -towering aloft amidst the masts, yards, and sails of the merchantmen. -The walls of the city were crowded with spectators, women, children, -and aged men, testifying their exultation by loud shouts, and -stretching their hands to heaven,—as on the memorable day, near -twenty years before, when they gained their final victory in the -same harbor, over the Athenian fleet. Many lads and elders, too much -excited to remain stationary, rushed into such small craft as they -could find, and rowed across the harbor to the scene of action, where -they rendered much service by preserving part of the cargoes, and -towing away some of the enemy’s vessels deserted but not yet on fire. -The evening of this memorable day left Dionysius and the Syracusans -victorious by land as well as by sea; encamped near the temple of -Olympian Zeus which had so recently been occupied by Imilkon. Though -they had succeeded in forcing the defences of the latter both at -Polichnê and at Daskon, and in inflicting upon him a destructive -defeat, yet they would not aim at occupying his camp, in its infected -and deplorable condition.</p> - -<p>On two former occasions during the last few years, we have seen -the Carthaginian armies decimated by pestilence,—near Agrigentum -and near Gela,—previous to this last and worst calamity. Imilkon, -copying the weakness of Nikias rather than the resolute prudence -of Demosthenes, had clung to his insalubrious camp near the Great -Harbor, long after all hope of reducing Syracuse had ceased, and -while suffering and death to the most awful extent were daily -accumulating around him. But the recent defeat satisfied even him -that his position was no longer tenable. Retreat was indispensable; -yet nowise impracticable,—with the brave men, Iberians and others, -in his army, and with the Sikels of the interior on his side,—had -he possessed the good qualities as well as the defects of Nikias, -or been capable of anything like that unconquerable energy which -ennobled the closing days of the latter. Instead of taking the best -measures available for a retiring march, Imilkon despatched a secret -envoy to Dionysius, unknown to the Syracusans generally; tendering to -him the sum of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_510">[p. 510]</span> -three hundred talents which yet remained in the camp, on condition -of the fleet and army being allowed to sail to Africa unmolested. -Dionysius would not consent, nor would the Syracusans have confirmed -any such consent, to let them all escape; but he engaged to permit -the departure of Imilkon himself with the native Carthaginians. The -sum of three hundred talents was accordingly sent across by night to -Ortygia; and the fourth night ensuing was fixed for the departure of -Imilkon and his Carthaginians, without opposition from Dionysius. -During that night forty of their ships, filled with Carthaginians, -put to sea and sailed in silence out of the harbor. Their stealthy -flight, however, did not altogether escape the notice of the -Corinthian seamen in Syracuse; who not only apprised Dionysius, but -also manned some of their own ships and started in pursuit. They -overtook and destroyed one or two of the slowest sailers; but all the -rest with Imilkon himself, accomplished their flight to Carthage.</p> - -<p>Dionysius,—while he affected to obey the warning of -the Corinthians, with movements intentionally tardy and -unavailing,—applied himself with earnest activity to act against -the forsaken army remaining. During the same night he led out his -troops from the city to the vicinity of their camp. The flight -of Imilkon speedily promulgated, had filled the whole army with -astonishment and consternation. No command,—no common cause,—no -bond of union,—now remained among this miscellaneous host, already -prostrated by previous misfortune. The Sikels in the army, being -near to their own territory and knowing the roads, retired at -once, before daybreak, and reached their homes. Scarcely had they -passed, when the Syracusan soldiers occupied the roads, and barred -the like escape to others. Amidst the general dispersion of the -abandoned soldiers, some perished in vain attempts to force the -passes, others threw down their arms and solicited mercy. The -Iberians alone, maintaining their arms and order with unshaken -resolution, sent to Dionysius propositions to transfer to him their -service; which he thought proper to accept, enrolling them among -his mercenaries. All the remaining host, principally Libyans, being -stripped and plundered by his soldiers, became his captives, and were -probably sold as slaves.<a id="FNanchor_1077" href="#Footnote_1077" -class="fnanchor">[1077]</a></p> - -<p>The heroic efforts of Nikias, to open for his army a retreat -in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_511">[p. 511]</span> the face of -desperate obstacles, had ended in a speedy death as prisoner at -Syracuse,—yet without anything worse than the usual fate of prisoners -of war. But the base treason of Imilkon, though he insured a safe -retreat home by betraying the larger portion of his army, earned for -him only a short prolongation of life amidst the extreme of ignominy -and remorse. When he landed at Carthage with the fraction of his -army preserved, the city was in the deepest distress. Countless -family losses, inflicted by the pestilence, added a keener sting to -the unexampled public loss and humiliation now fully made known. -Universal mourning prevailed; all public and private business was -suspended, all the temples were shut, while the authorities and the -citizens met Imilkon in sad procession on the shore. The defeated -commander strove to disarm their wrath, by every demonstration of -a broken and prostrate spirit. Clothed in the sordid garment of a -slave, he acknowledged himself as the cause of all the ruin, by his -impiety towards the gods; for it was they, and not the Syracusans, -who had been his real enemies and conquerors. He visited all the -temples, with words of atonement and supplication,—replied to all the -inquiries about relatives who had perished under the distemper,—and -then retiring, blocked up the doors of his house, where he starved -himself to death.</p> - -<p>But the season of misfortune to Carthage was not closed by his -decease. Her dominion over her Libyan subjects was always harsh -and unpopular, rendering them disposed to rise against her at any -moment of calamity. Her recent disaster in Sicily would have been -in itself perhaps sufficient to stimulate them into insurrection; -but its effect was aggravated by their resentment for the deliberate -betrayal of their troops serving under Imilkon, not one of whom -lived to come back. All the various Libyan subject towns had on -this matter one common feeling of indignation; all came together in -congress, agreed to unite their forces, and formed an army which -is said to have reached one hundred and twenty thousand men. They -established their head-quarters at Tunês (Tunis), a town within a -short distance of Carthage itself, and were for a certain time so -much stronger in the field, that the Carthaginians were obliged -to remain within their walls. For a moment it seemed as if the -star of this great commercial city was about to set for ever. -The Carthaginians themselves were in the depth of despondency, -believing themselves to be under the wrath<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_512">[p. 512]</span> of the goddesses Demeter and her -daughter Persephonê; who, not content with the terrible revenge -already taken in Sicily, for the sacrilege committed by Imilkon, -were still pursuing them into Africa. Under the extreme religious -terror which beset the city, every means were tried to appease the -offended goddesses. Had it been supposed that the Carthaginian gods -had been insulted, expiation would have been offered by the sacrifice -of human victims,—and those too the most precious, such as beautiful -captives, or children of conspicuous citizens. But on this occasion, -the insult had been offered to Grecian gods, and atonement was to be -made according to the milder ceremonies of Greece. The Carthaginians -had never yet instituted in their city any worship of Demeter or -Persephonê; they now established temples in honor of these goddesses, -appointed several of their most eminent citizens to be priests, and -consulted the Greeks resident among them, as to the form of worship -most suitable to be offered. After having done this, and cleared -their own consciences, they devoted themselves to the preparation of -ships and men for the purpose of carrying on the war. It was soon -found that Demeter and Persephonê were not implacable, and that the -fortune of Carthage was returning. The insurgents, though at first -irresistible, presently fell into discord among themselves about -the command. Having no fleet, they became straitened for want of -provisions, while Carthage was well supplied by sea from Sardinia. -From these and similar causes, their numerous host gradually melted -away, and rescued the Carthaginians from alarm at the point where -they were always weakest. The relations of command and submission, -between Carthage and her Libyan subjects, were established as -they had previously stood, leaving her to recover slowly from her -disastrous reverses.<a id="FNanchor_1078" href="#Footnote_1078" -class="fnanchor">[1078]</a></p> - -<p>But though the power of Carthage in Africa was thus restored, -in Sicily it was reduced to the lowest ebb. It was long before she -could again make head with effect against Dionysius, who was left -at liberty to push his conquests in another direction, against the -Italiot Greeks. The remaining operations of his reign,—successful -against the Italiots, unsuccessful against Carthage,—will come to be -recounted in my next succeeding chapter and volume.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="footnotes"> - -<h2>FOOTNOTES</h2> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1"><a href="#FNanchor_1">[1]</a></span> -It goes by both names; Xenophon more commonly speaks of ἡ εἰρήνη—Isokrates, -of αἱ συνθῆκαι. -</p> -<p> -Though we say, the peace <i>of</i> Antalkidas, the Greek authors say ἡ ἐπ’ Ἀνταλκίδου -εἰρήνη; I do not observe that they ever phrase it with the genitive -case Ἀνταλκίδου simply, without a preposition.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_2"><a href="#FNanchor_2">[2]</a></span> -Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 22 (compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 23; and his -Apophtheg. Lacon. p. 213 B). Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀγησίλαος, πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα—Φεῦ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, -ὅπου μηδίζουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ Λάκωνες!... Μᾶλλον, εἶπεν, οἱ Μῆδοι λακωνίζουσι.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_3"><a href="#FNanchor_3">[3]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 14.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_4"><a href="#FNanchor_4">[4]</a></span> -The restoration of these three islands forms the basis of historical truth -in the assertion of Isokrates, that the Lacedæmonians were so subdued by -the defeat of Knidus, as to come and tender maritime empire to Athens—(ἐλθεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν -δώσοντας) Orat. vii, (Areopagit.) s. 74; Or. ix, (Evagor.); -s. 83. But the assertion is true respecting a later time; for the Lacedæmonians -really did make this proposition to Athens after they had been enfeebled -and humiliated by the battle of Leuktra; but not before (Xenoph. -Hellen. vii. 1, 3).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_5"><a href="#FNanchor_5">[5]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 111.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_6"><a href="#FNanchor_6">[6]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 30, 31. Ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ παρήγγειλεν ὁ Τιρίβαζος παρεῖναι -<em class="gesperrt">τοὺς βουλομένους ὑπακοῦσαι</em>, ἣν βασιλεὺς εἰρήνην καταπέμποι, ταχέως πάντες -παρεγένοντο. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ξυνῆλθον, <em class="gesperrt">ἐπιδείξας ὁ Τιρίβαζος τὰ βασιλέως σημεῖα</em>, -ἀνεγίνωσκε τὰ γεγραμμένα, εἶχε δὲ ὧδε· -</p> -<p> -Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς <em class="gesperrt">νομίζει δίκαιον</em>, τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, -καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομένας καὶ Κύπρον· τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ -μεγάλας, αὐτονόμους εἶναι, πλὴν Λήμνου, καὶ Ἴμβρου καὶ Σκύρου, ταύτας δὲ, ὥσπερ τὸ -ἀρχαῖον, εἶναι Ἀθηναίων. Ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται, <em class="gesperrt">τούτοις ἐγὼ -πολεμήσω</em>, μετὰ τῶν ταὐτα βουλομένων, καὶ πέζῇ καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν, καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ -χρήμασιν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_7"><a href="#FNanchor_7">[7]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 211. Καὶ ταύτας ἡμᾶς ἠνάγκασεν (the -Persian king) ἐν στήλαις λιθίναις ἀναγράψαντας ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν ἱερῶν ἀναθεῖναι, -πολὺ κάλλιον τρόπαιον τῶν ἐν ταῖς μάχαις γιγνομένων. -</p> -<p> -The Oratio Panegyrica of Isokrates (published about 380 <small>B.C.</small>, seven -years afterwards) from which I here copy, is the best evidence of the feelings -with which an intelligent and patriotic Greek looked upon this treaty -at the time; when it was yet recent, but when there had been full time to -see how the Lacedæmonians carried it out. His other orations, though -valuable and instructive, were published later, and represent the feelings of -after-time. -</p> -<p> -Another contemporary, Plato in his Menexenus (c. 17, p. 245 D), stigmatizes -severely “the base and unholy act (αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀνόσιον ἔργον) of surrendering -Greeks to the foreigner,” and asserts that the Athenians resolutely -refused to sanction it. This is a sufficient mark of his opinion respecting -the peace of Antalkidas.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_8"><a href="#FNanchor_8">[8]</a></span> -Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 207. Ἃ χρῆν ἀναιρεῖν, καὶ μηδεμίαν -ἐᾷν ἡμέραν, νομίζοντες, <em class="gesperrt">προστάγματα καὶ οὐ συνθήκας</em> εἶναι, etc. (s. -213). Αἰσχρὸν ἡμᾶς <em class="gesperrt">ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑβριζομένης</em>, μηδεμίαν ποιήσασθαι -κοινὴν τιμωρίαν, etc. -</p> -<p> -The word προστάγματα exactly corresponds with an expression of Xenophon -(put in the mouth of Autokles the Athenian envoy at Sparta), respecting -the dictation of the peace of Antalkidas by Artaxerxes—Καὶ ὅτε μὲν <em class="gesperrt">Βασιλεὺς -προσέταττεν</em> αὐτονόμους τὰς πόλεις εἶναι, etc. (Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 9).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_9"><a href="#FNanchor_9">[9]</a></span> -Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 205. Καίτοι πῶς οὐ χρὴ διαλύειν ταύτας -τὰς ὁμολογίας, ἐξ ὧν τοιαύτη δόξα γέγονεν, ὥστε ὁ μὲν Βάρβαρος κήδεται τῆς Ἑλλάδος -καὶ φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης ἐστὶν, ἡμῶν δέ τινές εἰσιν οἱ λυμαινόμενοι καὶ κακῶς ποιοῦντες -αὐτήν; -</p> -<p> -The word employed by Photius in his abstract of Theopompus (whether -it be the expression of Theopompus himself, we cannot be certain—see -Fragm. 111, ed. Didot), to designate the position taken by Artaxerxes in -reference to this peace, is—τὴν εἰρήνην ἣν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐβράβευσεν—which -implies the peremptory decision of an official judge, analogous to -another passage (139) of the Panegyr. Orat. of Isokrates—Νῦν δ’ ἐκεῖνός -(Artaxerxes) ἐστιν, ὁ διοικῶν τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ μόνον οὐκ ἐπιστάθμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι -καθιστάς. Πλὴν γὰρ τούτου τί τῶν ἄλλων ὑπόλοιπόν ἐστιν; Οὐ καὶ τοῦ πολέμου κύριος -ἐγένετο, καὶ <em class="gesperrt">τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπρυτάνευσε</em>, καὶ τῶν παρόντων πραγμάτων ἐπιστάτης -καθέστηκεν;</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_10"><a href="#FNanchor_10">[10]</a></span> -Herodot. vi, 49. κατηγόρεον Αἰγινητέων τὰ πεποιήκοιεν, προδόντες -τὴν Ἑλλάδα.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_11"><a href="#FNanchor_11">[11]</a></span> -Isokrates, Orat. xii, (Panathen.) s. 112-114. -</p> -<p> -Plutarch (Agesil. c. 23; Artaxerxes, c. 21, 22) expresses himself in terms -of bitter and well-merited indignation of this peace,—“if indeed (says he) -we are to call this ignominy and betrayal of Greece by the name of <i>peace</i>, -which brought with it as much infamy as the most disastrous war.” Sparta -(he says) lost her headship by her defeat at Leuktra, but her honor had been -lost before, by the convention of Antalkidas. -</p> -<p> -It is in vain, however, that Plutarch tries to exonerate Agesilaus from -any share in the peace. From the narrative (in Xenophon’s Hellenica, -v. i, 33) of his conduct at the taking of the oaths, we see that he espoused -it most warmly. Xenophon (in the Encomium of Agesilaus, vii, 7) takes -credit to Agesilaus for being μισοπέρσης, which was true, from the year <small>B.C.</small> -396 to <small>B.C.</small> 394. But in <small>B.C.</small> 387, at the time of the peace of Antalkidas, -he had become μισοθηβαῖος; his hatred of Persia had given place to hatred -of Thebes. -</p> -<p> -See also a vigorous passage of Justin (viii, 4), denouncing the disgraceful -position of the Greek cities at a later time in calling in Philip of Macedon -as arbiter; a passage not less applicable to the peace of Antalkidas; -and perhaps borrowed from Theopompus.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_12"><a href="#FNanchor_12">[12]</a></span> -Compare the language in which the Ionians, on their revolt from Darius -king of Persia about 500 <small>B.C.</small>, had implored the aid of Sparta (Herodot. v, -49). Τὰ κατήκοντα γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα· Ἰώνων παῖδας δούλους εἶναι ἀντ’ ἐλευθέρων—ὄνειδος καὶ ἄλγος -μέγιστον μὲν αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν, <em class="gesperrt">ἔτι δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑμῖν, ὅσῳ προεστέατε τῆς Ἑλλάδος</em>. -</p> -<p> -How striking is the contrast between these words and the peace of Antalkidas! -and what would have been the feelings of Herodotus himself if he -could have heard of the latter event!</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_13"><a href="#FNanchor_13">[13]</a></span> -Thucyd. i, 82. Κἀν τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν ἐξαρτύεσθαι ξυμμάχων -τε προσαγωγῇ καὶ Ἑλλήνων <em class="gesperrt">καὶ βαρβάρων</em>, εἴ ποθέν τινα <em class="gesperrt">ἢ ναυτικοῦ ἢ χρημάτων</em> -δύναμιν προσληψόμεθα, (<em class="gesperrt">ἀνεπίφθονον</em> δὲ, ὅσοι ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων -ἐπιβουλευόμεθα, μὴ Ἕλληνας μόνον <em class="gesperrt">ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρους</em> προσλαβόντας διασωθῆναι), -etc. Compare also Plato, Menexenus, c. 14, p. 243 B.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_14"><a href="#FNanchor_14">[14]</a></span> -Thucyd. ii, 7, 67; iv, 50.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_15"><a href="#FNanchor_15">[15]</a></span> -See Vol. IX, Ch. LXXV, p. 360. -</p> -<p> -Compare the expressions of Demosthenes (cont. Aristokrat. c. 33, p. 666) -attesting the prevalent indignation among the Athenians of his time, about -this surrender of the Asiatic Greeks by Sparta,—and his oration De Rhodior. -Libertate, c. 13, p. 199, where he sets the peace of Kallias, made by -Athens with Persia in 449 <small>B.C.</small>, in contrast with the peace of Antalkidas, -contracted under the auspices of Sparta.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_16"><a href="#FNanchor_16">[16]</a></span> -This is strikingly set forth by Isokrates, Or. xii, (Panathen.) s. 167-173. -In this passage, however, he distributes his blame too equally between -Sparta and Athens, whereas the blame belongs of right to the former, in -far greater proportion. Sparta not only began the practice of invoking the -Great King, and invoking his aid by disgraceful concessions,—but she also -carried it, at the peace of Antalkidas, to a more extreme point of selfishness -and subservience. Athens is guilty of following the bad example of -her rival, but to a less extent, and under greater excuse on the plea of necessity. -</p> -<p> -Isokrates says in another place of this discourse, respecting the various -acts of wrong-doing towards the general interest of Hellas—ἐπιδεικτέον τοὺς μὲν -ἡμετέρους <em class="gesperrt">ὀψιμαθεῖς</em> αὐτῶν γεγενημένους, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ <em class="gesperrt">τὰ μὲν πρώτους, -τὰ δὲ μόνους</em>, ἐξαμαρτόντας (Panath. s. 103). Which -is much nearer the truth than the passage before referred to.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_17"><a href="#FNanchor_17">[17]</a></span> -Cornelius Nepos, Conon. c. 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_18"><a href="#FNanchor_18">[18]</a></span> -Isok. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 145. Καὶ τῷ βαρβάρῳ τῷ τῆς Ἀσίας -κρατοῦντι συμπράττουσι (the Lacedæmonians) ὅπως ὡς μεγίστην ἀρχὴν ἕξουσιν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_19"><a href="#FNanchor_19">[19]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 35.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_20"><a href="#FNanchor_20">[20]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-39.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_21"><a href="#FNanchor_21">[21]</a></span> -Herodot. viii, 143. -</p> -<p> -The explanation which the Athenians give to the Spartan envoys, of the -reasons and feelings which dictated their answer of refusal to Alexander -(viii, 144), are not less impressive than the answer itself. -</p> -<p> -But whoever would duly feel and appreciate the treason of the Spartans -in soliciting the convention of Antalkidas, should read in contrast with it -that speech which their envoys address to the Athenians, in order to induce -the latter to stand out against the temptations of Mardonius (viii, 142).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_22"><a href="#FNanchor_22">[22]</a></span> -The sixth oration (called Archidamus) of Isokrates sets forth emphatically -the magnanimous sentiments, and comprehensive principles, on which -it becomes Sparta to model her public conduct,—as altogether different -from the simple considerations of prudence and security which are suitable -to humbler states like Corinth, Epidaurus, or Phlius (Archidamus, s. 105, -106, 110). -</p> -<p> -Contrast these lofty pretensions with the dishonorable realities of the -convention of Antalkidas,—not thrust upon Sparta by superior force, but -both originally sued out, and finally enforced by her, for her own political -ends. -</p> -<p> -Compare also Isokrates, Or. xii. (Panathen.) s. 169-172, about the dissension -of the leading Grecian states, and its baneful effects.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_23"><a href="#FNanchor_23">[23]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36. -</p> -<p> -Ἐν δὲ τῷ πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἀντιῤῥόπως τοῖς ἐναντίοις πράττοντες οἱ -Λακεδαιμόνιοι, <em class="gesperrt">πολὺ ἐπικυδέστεροι ἐγένοντο</em> ἐκ τῆς ἐπ’ -Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνης καλουμένης· <em class="gesperrt">προστάται γὰρ γενόμενοι τῆς -ὑπὸ βασιλέως καταπεμφθείσης εἰρήνης</em> καὶ τὴν αὐτονομίαν -ταῖς πόλεσι πράττοντες, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_24"><a href="#FNanchor_24">[24]</a></span> -Thucyd. i, 144. Νῦν δὲ τούτοις (to the Lacedæmonian envoys) -ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀποπέμψωμεν ... τὰς δὲ πόλεις ὅτι αὐτονόμους ἀφήσομεν, εἰ -καὶ αὐτονόμους ἔχοντες ἐσπεισάμεθα, καὶ ὅταν κἀκεῖνοι ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀποδῶσι -πόλεσι <em class="gesperrt">μὴ σφίσι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ -αὐτοῖς ἑκάστοις, ὡς βούλονται</em>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_25"><a href="#FNanchor_25">[25]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36. οὗπερ πάλαι ἐπεθύμουν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_26"><a href="#FNanchor_26">[26]</a></span> -Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 13. -</p> -<p> -It would appear that the revolt of Egypt from Persia must date between -414-411 <small>B.C.</small>; but this point is obscure. See Boeckh, Manetho und die -Hundsstern-Periode, pp. 358, 363, Berlin 1845; and Ley, Fata et Conditio -Ægypti sub Imperio Persarum, p. 55.</p> -<p> -M. Rehdautz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Timothei, et Chabriæ, p. 240, places the -revolt rather earlier, about 414 <small>B.C.</small>; and Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellen. -Appendix, ch. 18, p. 317) countenances the same date.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_27"><a href="#FNanchor_27">[27]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 35. -</p> -<p> -This Psammetichus is presumed by Ley (in his Dissertation above cited, -p. 20) to be the same person as Amyrtæus the Saite in the list of Manetho, -under a different name. It is also possible, however, that he may have -been king over a part of Egypt, contemporaneous with Amyrtæus.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_28"><a href="#FNanchor_28">[28]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 79.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_29"><a href="#FNanchor_29">[29]</a></span> -This is the chronology laid down by M. Rehdautz (Vitæ Iphicratis, -Chabriæ, et Timothei, Epimetr. ii, pp. 241, 242) on very probable grounds, -principally from Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 161, 162.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_30"><a href="#FNanchor_30">[30]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 2, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_31"><a href="#FNanchor_31">[31]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokl.) s. 50; Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 21; Pausanias, -ii, 29, 4; Diodor. xiv, 98. -</p> -<p> -The historian Theopompus, when entering upon the history of Evagoras, -seems to have related many legendary tales respecting the Greek Gentes in -Cyprus, and to have represented Agamemnon himself as ultimately migrating -to it (Theopompus, Frag. 111, ed. Wichers; and ed. Didot. ap. -Photium). -</p> -<p> -The tomb of the archer Teukrus was shown at Salamis in Cyprus. See -the Epigram of Aristotle, Antholog. i, 8, 112.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_32"><a href="#FNanchor_32">[32]</a></span> -Movers, in his very learned investigations respecting the Phœnicians -(vol. iii, ch. 5, p. 203-221 <i>seq.</i>), attempts to establish the existence of an -ancient population in Cyprus, called Kitians; once extended over the -island, and of which the town called Kitium was the remnant. He supposes -them to have been a portion of the Canaanitish population, anterior to the -Jewish occupation of Palestine. The Phœnician colonies in Cyprus he -reckons as of later date, superadded to, and depressing these natives. He -supposes the Kilikian population to have been in early times Canaanitish -also. Engel (Kypros, vol. i, p. 166) inclines to admit the same hypothesis -as highly probable. -</p> -<p> -The sixth century <small>B.C.</small> (from 600 downwards) appears to have been very -unfavorable to the Phœnicians, bringing upon Tyre severe pressure from -the Chaldeans, as it brought captivity upon the Jews. During the same -period, the Grecian commerce with Egypt was greatly extended, especially -by the reign of the Phil-hellenic Amasis, who acquired possession of Cyprus. -Much of the Grecian immigration into Cyprus probably took place -at this time; we know of one body of settlers invited by Philokyprus to -Soli, under the assistance of the Athenian Solon (Movers, p. 244 <i>seq.</i>).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_33"><a href="#FNanchor_33">[33]</a></span> -Herodot. v, 109. -</p> -<p> -Compare the description given by Herodotus of the costume and arms -of the Cypriots in the armament of Xerxes,—half Oriental (vii, 90). The -Salaminians used chariots of war in battle (v, 113); as the Carthaginians -did, before they learnt the art of training elephants (Diodor. xvi, 80; Plutarch, -Timoleon, c. 27).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_34"><a href="#FNanchor_34">[34]</a></span> -See Vol. V. of this History, Ch. xlv, p. 335.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_35"><a href="#FNanchor_35">[35]</a></span> -One of these princes, however, is mentioned as bearing the Phœnician -name of Siromus (Herod. v, 104).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_36"><a href="#FNanchor_36">[36]</a></span> -We may gather this by putting together Herodot. iv, 102; v, 104-114, -with Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 22.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_37"><a href="#FNanchor_37">[37]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 23, 55, 58. -</p> -<p> -Παραλαβὼν γὰρ (Evagoras) <em class="gesperrt">τὴν πόλιν ἐκβεβαρβαρωμένην</em>, καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν Φοινίκων -ἀρχὴν οὔτε τοὺς Ἕλληνας προσδεχομένην, οὔτε τέχνας ἐπισταμένην, οὔτ’ ἐμπορίῳ -χρωμένην, οὔτε λιμένα κεκτημένην, etc. -</p> -<p> -Πρὶν μὲν γὰρ λαβεῖν Εὐαγόραν τὴν ἀρχὴν, οὕτως ἀπροσοίστως καὶ χαλεπῶς εἶχον, ὥστε -καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων τούτους ἐνόμιζον εἶναι βελτίστους οἵ <em class="gesperrt">τινες ὠμότατα πρὸς -τοὺς Ἕλληνας διακείμενοι</em> τυγχάνοιεν, etc. -</p> -<p> -This last passage receives remarkable illustration from the oration of -Lysias against Andokides, in which he alludes to the visit of the latter to -Cyprus—μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἔπλευσεν ὡς τὸν Κιτιέων βασιλέα, καὶ προδιδοὺς ληφθεὶς -ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐδέθη, καὶ οὐ μόνον τὸν θάνατον ἐφοβεῖτο ἀλλὰ τὰ καθ’ ἡμέραν -αἰκίσματα, <em class="gesperrt">οἰόμενος τὰ ἀκρωτήρια ζῶντος</em> ἀποτμηθήσεσθαι (s. 26). -</p> -<p> -Engel (Kypros, vol. i, p. 286) impugns the general correctness of this -narrative of Isokrates. He produces no adequate reasons, nor do I myself -see any, for this contradiction. -</p> -<p> -Not only Konon, but also his friend Nikophemus, had a wife and family -at Cyprus, besides another family in Athens (Lysias, De Bonis Aristophanis, -Or. xix, s. 38).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_38"><a href="#FNanchor_38">[38]</a></span> -Theopompus (Fr. 111) calls Abdêmon a Kitian; Diodorus (xiv, 98) -calls him a Tyrian. Movers (p. 206) thinks that both are correct, and that -he was a Kitian living at Tyre, who had migrated from Salamis during the -Athenian preponderance there. There were Kitians, not natives of the -town of Kition, but belonging to the ancient population of the island, living -in the various towns of Cyprus; and there were also Kitians mentioned as -resident at Sidon (Diogen. Laert. Vit. Zenon. s. 6).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_39"><a href="#FNanchor_39">[39]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 29-35; also Or. iii, (Nikokl.) s. 33; -Theopomp. Fragm. 111, ed. Wichers and ed. Didot. Diodor. xiv, 98. -</p> -<p> -The two latter mention the name, Audymon or Abdêmon, which Isokrates -does not specify.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_40"><a href="#FNanchor_40">[40]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 33.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_41"><a href="#FNanchor_41">[41]</a></span> -Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 53. ἡγούμενος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀγόμενος -ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_42"><a href="#FNanchor_42">[42]</a></span> -Isokr. Or. ix, 51. οὐδένα μὲν ἀδικῶν, τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς τιμῶν, -καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἁπάντων ἄρχων, <em class="gesperrt">νομίμως δὲ τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας</em> κολάζων -(s. 58)—ὃς οὐ μόνον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόλιν πλείονος ἀξίαν ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν -τόπον ὅλον, τὸν περιέχοντα τὴν νῆσον, <em class="gesperrt">ἐπὶ πρᾳότητα καὶ μετριότητα</em> -προήγαγεν, etc.; compare s. 81. -</p> -<p> -These epithets, <i>lawful</i> punishment, <i>mild</i> dealing, etc., cannot be fully understood -except in contrast with the mutilations alluded to by Lysias, in -the passage cited in a note on page 16, above; also with exactly similar -mutilations, mentioned by Xenophon as systematically inflicted upon offenders -by Cyrus the younger (Xenoph. Anabas. i, 9, 13). Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν -(says Isokrates about the Persians) οὕτως αἰκίζεται τοὺς οἰκέτας, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι -τοὺς ἐλευθέρους κολάζουσιν—Or. iv, (Paneg.) 142.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_43"><a href="#FNanchor_43">[43]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 50-56. -</p> -<p> -The language of the encomiast, though exaggerated, must doubtless be -founded in truth, as the result shows.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_44"><a href="#FNanchor_44">[44]</a></span> -Lysias cont. Andokid. s. 28.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_45"><a href="#FNanchor_45">[45]</a></span> -Plutarch, Solon, c. 26.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_46"><a href="#FNanchor_46">[46]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 59-61; compare Lysias, Or. xix, (De Aristoph. -Bon.) s. 38-46; and Diodor. xiv, 98.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_47"><a href="#FNanchor_47">[47]</a></span> -Isokrates, <i>l. c.</i> παιδοποιεῖσθαι δὲ τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν -γυναῖκας λαμβάνοντες παρ’ ἡμῶν, etc. -</p> -<p> -For the extreme distress of Athenian women during these trying times -consult the statement in Xenophon, Memorab. ii, 7, 2-4. -</p> -<p> -The Athenian Andokides is accused of having carried out a young woman -of citizen family,—his own cousin, and daughter of an Athenian -named Aristeides,—to Cyprus, and there to have sold her to the despot of -Kitium for a cargo of wheat. But being threatened with prosecution for -this act before the Athenian Dikastery, he stole her away again and brought -her back to Athens; in which act, however, he was detected by the prince, -and punished with imprisonment from which he had the good fortune to -escape. (Plutarch, Vit. X, Orat. p. 834; Photius, Cod. 261; Tzetzes, Chiliad. -vi, 367). -</p> -<p> -How much there may be of truth in this accusation, we have no means -of determining. But it illustrates the way in which the Athenian maidens, -who had no dowry at home, were provided for by their relatives elsewhere. -Probably Andokides took this young woman out, under the engagement to find -a Grecian husband for her in Cyprus. Instead of doing this, he sold her for -his own profit to the harem of the prince; or at least, is accused of having -so sold her.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_48"><a href="#FNanchor_48">[48]</a></span> -This much appears even from the meagre abstract of Ktesias, given by -Photius (Ktesiæ Persica, c. 63, p. 80, ed. Bähr). -</p> -<p> -Both Ktesias and Theopompus (Fr. iii, ed. Wichers, and ed. Didot) recounted -the causes which brought about the war between the Persian king -and Evagoras.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_49"><a href="#FNanchor_49">[49]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 71, 73, 74. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτον (Evagoras) οὕτως -ἐκ πολλοῦ περιδεῶς ἔσχε (Artaxerxes), <em class="gesperrt">ὥστε μεταξὺ πάσχων εὖ</em>, πολεμεῖν πρὸς αὐτὸν -ἐπεχείρησε, δίκαια μὲν οὐ ποιῶν, etc.—ἐπειδὴ <em class="gesperrt">ἠναγκάσθη πολεμεῖν</em> (<i>i. e.</i> Evagoras).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_50"><a href="#FNanchor_50">[50]</a></span> -Isokr. Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 75, 76; Diodor. xiv, 98; Ephorus, Frag. 134, -ed. Didot.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_51"><a href="#FNanchor_51">[51]</a></span> -Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 2; Demosthenes adv. Leptinem, p. 479, -s. 84.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_52"><a href="#FNanchor_52">[52]</a></span> -Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 162. Εὐαγόραν—ὃς ἐν ταῖς -συνθήκαις ἔκδοτός ἐστιν, etc. -</p> -<p> -We must observe, however, that Cyprus had been secured to the king of -Persia, even under the former peace, so glorious to Athens, concluded by -Perikles about 449 <small>B.C.</small>, and called the peace of Kallias. It was, therefore, -neither a new demand on the part of Artaxerxes, nor a new concession on -the part of the Greeks, at the peace of Antalkidas.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_53"><a href="#FNanchor_53">[53]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 2. -</p> -<p> -It appears that Artaxerxes had counted much upon the aid of Hekatomnus -for conquering Evagoras (Diodor. xiv, 98). -</p> -<p> -About 380 <small>B.C.</small>, Isokrates reckons Hekatomnus as being merely dependent -in name on Persia; and ready to revolt openly on the first opportunity -(Isokrates, Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 189).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_54"><a href="#FNanchor_54">[54]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 153, 154, 179.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_55"><a href="#FNanchor_55">[55]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_56"><a href="#FNanchor_56">[56]</a></span> -Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 187, 188—with Isokrates, Or. -ix, (Evag.) s. 77. -</p> -<p> -The war was not concluded,—and Tyre as well as much of Kilikia was -still in revolt,—when Isokrates published the Panegyrical Oration. At -that time, Evagoras had maintained the contest six years, counting either -from the peace of Antalkidas (387 <small>B.C.</small>) or from his naval defeat about a -year or two afterwards; for Isokrates does not make it quite clear from -what point of commencement he reckons the six years. -</p> -<p> -We know that the war between the king of Persia and Evagoras had -begun as early as 390 <small>B.C.</small>, in which year an Athenian fleet was sent to -assist the latter (Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 24). Both Isokrates and Diodorus -state that it lasted ten years; and I therefore place the conclusion of it in -380 or 379 <small>B.C.</small>, soon after the date of the Panegyrical Oration of Isokrates. -I dissent on this point from Mr. Clinton (see Fasti Hellenici, ad annos 387-376 -<small>B.C.</small>, and his Appendix, No. 12—where the point is discussed). He -supposes the war to have begun after the peace of Antalkidas, and to have -ended in 376 <small>B.C.</small> I agree with him in making light of Diodorus, but he -appears to me on this occasion to contradict the authority of Xenophon,—or -at least only to evade the necessity of contradicting him by resorting to -an inconvenient hypothesis, and by representing the two Athenian expeditions -sent to assist Evagoras in Cyprus, first in 390 <small>B.C.</small>, next in 388 <small>B.C.</small>, -as relating to “<i>hostile measures before the war began</i>” (p. 280). To me it appears -more natural and reasonable to include these as a part of the war.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_57"><a href="#FNanchor_57">[57]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. ix, s. 73-76.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_58"><a href="#FNanchor_58">[58]</a></span> -Diodor. xv. 8, 9. -</p> -<p> -This remarkable anecdote, of susceptible Grecian honor on the part of -Evagoras, is noway improbable, and seems safe to admit on the authority -of Diodorus. Nevertheless, it forms so choice a morsel for a panegyrical -discourse such as that of Isokrates, that one cannot but think he would -have inserted it had it come to his knowledge. His silence causes great -surprise—not without some suspicion as to the truth of the story.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_59"><a href="#FNanchor_59">[59]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 40,—a passage which must be more true -of Evagoras than of Nikokles.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_60"><a href="#FNanchor_60">[60]</a></span> -Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 88. Compare his Orat. viii, (De Pace) s. 138.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_61"><a href="#FNanchor_61">[61]</a></span> -Isokrates, ib. s. 85. εὐτυχέστερον καὶ θεοφιλέστερον, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_62"><a href="#FNanchor_62">[62]</a></span> -I give this incident, in the main, as it is recounted in the fragment of -Theopompus, preserved as a portion of the abstract of that author by Photius -(Theopom. Fr. 111, ed. Wichers and ed. Didot). -</p> -<p> -Both Aristotle (Polit. v, 8, 10) and Diodorus (xv, 47) allude to the assassination -of Evagoras by the eunuch; but both these authors conceive the -story differently from Theopompus. Thus Diodorus says—Nikoklês, the -eunuch, assassinated Evagoras, and became “despot of Salamis.” This -appears to be a confusion of Nikoklês with Nikokreon. Nikoklês was the -son of Evagoras, and the manner in which Isokrates addresses him affords -the surest proof that <i>he</i> had no hand in the death of his father. -</p> -<p> -The words of Aristotle are—ἡ (ἐπίθεσις) τοῦ εὐνούχου Εὐαγόρᾳ τῷ Κυπρίῳ· -διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν γυναῖκα παρελέσθαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἀπέκτεινεν ὡς ὑβρισμένος. -So perplexing is the passage in its literal sense, that M. Barthélemy -St. Hilaire, in the note to his translation, conceives ὁ εὐνοῦχος to be a surname -or <i>sobriquet</i> given to the conspirator, whose real name was Nikoklês. -But this supposition is, in my judgment, contradicted by the fact, that Theopompus -marks the same fact, of the assassin being an eunuch, by another -word—Θρασυδαίου <em class="gesperrt">τοῦ ἡμιάῤῥενος</em>, ὃς ἦν Ἠλεῖος τὸ γένος, etc. -</p> -<p> -It is evident that Aristotle had heard the story differently from Theopompus, -and we have to choose between the two. I prefer the version of -the latter; which is more marked as well as more intelligible, and which -furnishes the explanation why Pnytagoras,—who seems to have been the -most advanced of the sons, being left in command of the besieged Salamis -when Evagoras quitted it to solicit aid in Egypt,—did not succeed his -father, but left the succession to Nikoklês, who was evidently (from the -representation even of an eulogist like Isokrates) not a man of much energy. -The position of this eunuch in the family of Nikokreon seems to mark -the partial prevalence of Oriental habits.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_63"><a href="#FNanchor_63">[63]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikoklês) s. 38-48; Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 100; Or. -xv, (Permut.) s. 43. Diodorus (xv, 47) places the assassination of Evagoras -in 374 <small>B.C.</small></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_64"><a href="#FNanchor_64">[64]</a></span> -Isokrates. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142, 156, 190. Τάς τε πόλεις τὰς Ἑλληνίδας -οὕτω κυρίως παρείληφεν, ὥστε τὰς μὲν κατασκάπτειν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀκροπόλεις ἐντειχίζειν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_65"><a href="#FNanchor_65">[65]</a></span> -See Herodot. vi, 9; ix, 76.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_66"><a href="#FNanchor_66">[66]</a></span> -Isokrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142. -</p> -<p> -Οἷς (to the Asiatic Greeks after the peace of Antalkidas) οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ -δασμολογεῖσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀκροπόλεις ὁρᾷν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν κατεχομένας, ἀλλὰ -πρὸς ταῖς κοιναῖς συμφοραῖς δεινότερα πάσχουσι τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀργυρωνήτων· -οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὕτως αἰκίζεται τοὺς οἰκέτας, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους -κολάζουσιν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_67"><a href="#FNanchor_67">[67]</a></span> -Isokrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 143, 154, 189, 190. -How immediately the inland kings, who had acquired possession of the -continental Grecian cities, aimed at acquiring the islands also, is seen in -Herodot. i, 27. Chios and Samos indeed, surrendered without resisting, to -the first Cyrus, when he was master of the continental towns, though he had -no naval force (Herod. i, 143-169). Even after the victory of Mykalê, the -Spartans deemed it impossible to protect these islanders against the Persian -masters of the continent (Herod. ix, 106). Nothing except the energy -and organization of the Athenians proved that it was possible to do so.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_68"><a href="#FNanchor_68">[68]</a></span> -Plutarch, Agesil. c. 26; Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_69"><a href="#FNanchor_69">[69]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 33.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_70"><a href="#FNanchor_70">[70]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46. Ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι -καθειστήκεσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις. Respecting the Bœotian city of Tanagra, -he says—ἔτι γὰρ τότε καὶ τὴν Τανάγραν οἱ περὶ Ὑπατόδωρον, φίλοι ὄντες -τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, εἶχον (v, 4, 49). -</p> -<p> -Schneider, in his note on the former of these two passages, explains the -word δυναστεῖαι as follows—“Sunt factiones optimatium qui Lacedæmoniis -favebant, cum præsidio et harmostâ Laconico.” This is perfectly -just; but the words ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις seem also to require an explanation. -These words allude to the “factio optimatium” at Thebes, of whom Leontiades -was the chief; who betrayed the Kadmeia (the citadel of Thebes) to -the Lacedæmonian troops under Phœbidas in 382 <small>B.C.</small>; and who remained -masters of Thebes, subservient to Sparta and upheld by a standing Lacedæmonian -garrison in the Kadmeia, until they were overthrown by the -memorable conspiracy of Pelopidas and Mellon in 379 <small>B.C.</small> It is to this -oligarchy under Leontiades at Thebes, devoted to Spartan interests and -resting on Spartan support,—that Xenophon compares the governments -planted by Sparta, after the peace of Antalkidas, in each of the Bœotian cities. -What he says, of the government of Leontiades and his colleagues at -Thebes, is—“that they deliberately introduced the Lacedæmonians into -the acropolis, and enslaved Thebes to them, in order that they might themselves -exercise a despotism”—τούς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγαγόντας εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς, -καὶ βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν πόλιν δουλεύειν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν (v, 4, 1: -compare v, 2, 36). This character—conveying a -strong censure in the mouth of the philo-Laconian Xenophon—belongs to -all the governments planted by Sparta in the Bœotian cities after the peace -of Antalkidas, and, indeed, to the Dekarchies generally which she established -throughout her empire.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_71"><a href="#FNanchor_71">[71]</a></span> -Xenoph. Memorab. iii, 5, 2; Thucyd. iv, 133; Diodor. xv, 79.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_72"><a href="#FNanchor_72">[72]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 15-20; Diodor. xv, 32-37; Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) -s. 14. 15.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_73"><a href="#FNanchor_73">[73]</a></span> -Herodot. vi, 108.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_74"><a href="#FNanchor_74">[74]</a></span> -See Vol. V. Ch. xlv, p. 327 of this History.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_75"><a href="#FNanchor_75">[75]</a></span> -Thucyd. iii, 68.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_76"><a href="#FNanchor_76">[76]</a></span> -Thucyd. v, 32; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 126; Or. xii, (Panathen.) -s. 101.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_77"><a href="#FNanchor_77">[77]</a></span> -Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_78"><a href="#FNanchor_78">[78]</a></span> -Pausanias, ix, 1, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_79"><a href="#FNanchor_79">[79]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. xiv. (Plataic.) s. 54.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_80"><a href="#FNanchor_80">[80]</a></span> -See the Orat. xiv, (called Plataicus) of Isokrates; which is a pleading -probably delivered in the Athenian assembly by the Platæans (after the -second destruction of their city), and, doubtless, founded upon their own -statements. The painful dependence and compulsion under which they -were held by Sparta, is proclaimed in the most unequivocal terms (s. 31, -33, 48); together with the presence of a Spartan harmost and garrison in -their town (s. 14).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_81"><a href="#FNanchor_81">[81]</a></span> -Xenophon says, truly enough, that Sparta made the Bœotian cities -αὐτονόμους ἀπὸ τῶν Θηβαίων (v. 1, 36), which she had long desired to do. -Autonomy, in the sense of disconnection from Thebes, was insured to them,—but -in no other sense.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_82"><a href="#FNanchor_82">[82]</a></span> -To illustrate the relations of Thebes, the other Bœotian cities, and -Sparta, between the peace of Antalkidas and the seizure of the Kadmeia by -Sparta (387-382 <small>B.C.</small>)—compare the speech of the Akanthian envoys, and -that of the Theban Leontiades, at Sparta (Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 16-34). -Ὑμᾶς (the Spartans) τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως μὴ καθ’ ἓν εἴη, -etc. Καὶ ὑμεῖς γε τότε μὲν ἀεὶ προσείχετε τὸν νοῦν, πότε ἀκούσεσθε βιαζομένους -αὐτοὺς (the Thebans) τὴν Βοιωτίαν ὑφ’ αὑτοῖς εἶναι· νῦν δὲ, ἐπεὶ τάδε πέπρακται, -οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς δεῖ Θηβαίους φοβεῖσθαι, etc. Compare Diodor. xv, 20.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_83"><a href="#FNanchor_83">[83]</a></span> -In the Orat. (14) Plataic. of Isokrates, s. 30—we find it stated among -the accusations against the Thebans, that during this period (<i>i. e.</i> between -the peace of Antalkidas and the seizure of the Kadmeia) they became -sworn in as members of the Spartan alliance and as ready to act with -Sparta conjointly against Athens. If we could admit this as true, we might -also admit the story of Epaminondas and Pelopidas serving in the Spartan -army at Mantinea (Plutarch, Pelop. c. 3). But I do not see how it can be -even partially true. If it had been true, I think Xenophon could not have -failed to mention it: all that he does say, tends to contradict it.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_84"><a href="#FNanchor_84">[84]</a></span> -Diodor. xv. 29.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_85"><a href="#FNanchor_85">[85]</a></span> -How currently this reproach was advanced against Agesilaus, may be -seen in more than one passage of the Hellenica of Xenophon; whose narrative -is both so partial, and so ill-constructed, that the most instructive -information is dropped only in the way of unintentional side-wind, where -we should not naturally look for it. Xen. Hellen. v. 3, 16. πολλῶν δὲ λεγόντων Λακεδαιμονίων -ὡς ὀλίγων ἕνεκεν ἀνθρώπων πόλει (Phlius) ἀπεχθάνοιτο -(Agesilaus) πλέον πεντακισχιλίων ἀνδρῶν. Again, v, 4, 13. (Ἀγησίλαος) -εὖ εἰδὼς, ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγοίη, λέξειαν οἱ πολῖται, ὡς Ἀγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσειε τοῖς τυράννοις, -πράγματα τῇ πόλει παρέχοι, etc. Compare Plutarch, -Agesil. c. 24-26.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_86"><a href="#FNanchor_86">[86]</a></span> -Diodorus indeed affirms, that this was really done, for a short time; -that the cities which had before been dependent allies of Sparta were now -emancipated and left to themselves; that a reaction immediately ensued -against those dekarchies or oligarchies which had hitherto managed the -cities in the interests of Sparta; that this reaction was so furious, as everywhere -to kill, banish, or impoverish, the principal partisans of Spartan supremacy; -and that the accumulated complaints and sufferings of these -exiles drove the Spartans, after having “endured the peace like a heavy -burthen” (ὥσπερ βαρὺ φόρτιον—xv, 5) for a few months, to shake it off, and -to reëstablish by force their own supremacy as well as the government of -their friends in all the various cities. In this statement there is nothing -intrinsically improbable. After what we have heard of the dekarchies under -Sparta, no extent of violence in the reaction against them is incredible, nor -can we doubt that such reaction would carry with it some new injustice, -along with much well-merited retribution. Hardly any but Athenian citizens -were capable of the forbearance displayed by Athens both after the -Four Hundred and after the Thirty. Nevertheless, I believe that Diodorus -is here mistaken, and that he has assigned to the period immediately succeeding -the peace of Antalkidas, those reactionary violences which took -place in many cities about sixteen years subsequently, <i>after the battle of -Leuktra</i>. For Xenophon, in recounting what happened after the peace of -Antalkidas, mentions nothing about any real autonomy granted by Sparta -to her various subject-allies, and subsequently revoked; which he would -never have omitted to tell us, had the fact been so, because it would have -supplied a plausible apology for the high-handed injustice of the Spartans, -and would have thus lent aid to the current of partiality which manifests -itself in his history.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_87"><a href="#FNanchor_87">[87]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 1-8. Αἰσθόμενοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπισκοποῦντας -τοὺς ξυμμάχους, ὁποῖοί τινες ἕκαστοι ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ αὐτοῖς ἐγεγένηντο, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_88"><a href="#FNanchor_88">[88]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 2. He had before stated, that the Mantineans had -really shown themselves pleased, when the Lacedæmonian Mora was destroyed -near Corinth by Iphikrates (iv, 5, 18).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_89"><a href="#FNanchor_89">[89]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_90"><a href="#FNanchor_90">[90]</a></span> -In 1627, during the Thirty years’ War, the German town of Wolfenbüttel -was constrained to surrender in the same manner, by damming up the -river Ocker which flowed through it; a contrivance of General Count Pappenheim, -the Austrian besieging commander. See Colonel Mitchell’s Life -of Wallenstein, p. 107. -</p> -<p> -The description given by Xenophon of Mantinea as it stood in 385 <small>B.C.</small>, -with the river Ophis, a considerable stream, passing through the middle of -it, is perfectly clear. When the city, after having been now broken up, was -rebuilt in 370 <small>B.C.</small>, the site was so far changed that the river no longer ran -through it. But the present course of the river Ophis, as given by excellent -modern topographical examiners, Colonel Leake and Kiepert, is at a -very considerable distance from the Mantinea rebuilt in 370 <small>B.C.</small>; the situation -of which is accurately known, since the circuit of its walls still remains -distinctly marked. The Mantinea of 370 <small>B.C.</small>, therefore, as compared -with the Mantinea in 385 <small>B.C.</small>, must have been removed to a considerable -distance—or else the river Ophis must have altered its course. Colonel -Leake supposes that the Ophis had been artificially diverted from its course, -in order that it might be brought through the town of Mantinea; a supposition, -which he founds on the words of Xenophon,—σοφωτέρων γενομένων ταύτῃ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων, -τὸ μὴ διὰ τειχῶν ποταμὸν ποιεῖσθαι (Hellen. v, 2, -7). But it is very difficult to agree with him on this point, when we look -at his own map (annexed to the Peloponnesiaca) of the Mantinice and Tegeatis, -and observe the great distance between the river Ophis and Mantinea; -nor do the words of Xenophon seem necessarily to imply any artificial -diversion of the river. It appears easier to believe that the river has -changed its course. See Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 71; -and Peloponnesiaca, p. 380; and Ernst Curtius, Peloponnesos, p. 239—who -still, however, leaves the point obscure.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_91"><a href="#FNanchor_91">[91]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_92"><a href="#FNanchor_92">[92]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 6. Οἰομένων δὲ ἀποθανεῖσθαι τῶν ἀργολιζόντων, -καὶ τῶν τοῦ δήμου προστατῶν, διεπράξατο ὁ πατὴρ (see before, v, 2, 3) παρὰ τοῦ -Ἀγησιπόλιδος, ἀσφάλειαν αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι, ἀπαλλαττομένοις ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἑξήκοντα -οὖσι. Καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν μὲν τῆς ὁδοῦ, ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῶν πυλῶν ἔχοντες τὰ δόρατα -οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἔστησαν, θεώμενοι τοὺς ἐξιόντας· <em class="gesperrt">καὶ μισοῦντες αὐτοὺς ὅμως -ἀπείχοντο αὐτῶν ῥᾷον ἢ οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν Μαντινέων</em>· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν εἰρήσθω -μέγα τεκμήριον πειθαρχίας. -</p> -<p> -I have remarked more than once, and the reader will here observe a new -example, how completely the word βέλτιστοι—which is applied to the -wealthy or aristocratical party in politics, as its equivalent is in other languages, -by writers who sympathize with them—is divested of all genuine -ethical import as to character.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_93"><a href="#FNanchor_93">[93]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 7. -</p> -<p> -He says of this breaking up of the city of Mantinea, διῳκίσθη ἡ Μαντίνεια τετραχῆ, -καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ᾤκουν. Ephorus (Fr. 138, ed. Didot) -states that it was distributed into the five original villages; and Strabo affirms -that there were <i>five</i> original constituent villages (viii, p. 337). Hence -it is probable that Mantinea the city was still left, after this διοίκισις, to -subsist as one of the five unfortified villages; so that Ephorus, Strabo, and -Xenophon may be thus made to agree, in substance.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_94"><a href="#FNanchor_94">[94]</a></span> -This is mentioned by Xenophon himself (Hellen. vi, 5, 3). The Lacedæmonians, -though they remonstrated against it, were at that time too -much humiliated to interfere by force and prevent it. The reason why -they did not interfere by force (according to Xenophon) was that a general -peace had just then been sworn, guaranteeing autonomy to every distinct -town, so that the Mantineans under this peace had a right to do what they -did—στρατεύειν γε μέντοι ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς οὐ δυνατὸν ἐδόκει εἶναι, ἐπ’ αὐτονομίᾳ -τῆς εἰρήνης γεγενημένης (vi, 5, 5). Of this second peace, Athens was the -originator and the voucher; but the autonomy which it guaranteed was -only the same as had been professedly guaranteed by the peace of Antalkidas, -of which Sparta had been the voucher. -</p> -<p> -General autonomy, as interpreted by Athens, was a different thing from -general autonomy as it had been when interpreted by Sparta. The Spartans, -when they had in their own hands both the power of interpretation and -the power of enforcement, did not scruple to falsify autonomy so completely -as to lay siege to Mantinea and break up the city by force; while, when -interpretation and enforcement had passed to Athens, they at once recognized -that the treaty precluded them from a much less violent measure of -interference. -</p> -<p> -We may see by this, how thoroughly partial and Laconian is the account -given by Xenophon of the διοίκισις of Mantinea; how completely he keeps -out of view the odious side of that proceeding.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_95"><a href="#FNanchor_95">[95]</a></span> -See the remarkable sentence of the Spartans, in which they reject the -claim of the Pisatans to preside over and administer the Olympic festival -(which had been their ancient privilege) because they were χωρίται and not fit -for the task (Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31): compare χωριτικῶς (Xen. Cyrop. iv. -5, 54).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_96"><a href="#FNanchor_96">[96]</a></span> -Aristot. Polit. vi, 2, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_97"><a href="#FNanchor_97">[97]</a></span> -Thucyd. v, 81.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_98"><a href="#FNanchor_98">[98]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 133, 134, 146, 206; Or. viii, (De Pace) s. -123; Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 1-8; Diodor. xv, 5, 9-19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_99"><a href="#FNanchor_99">[99]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 35.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_100"><a href="#FNanchor_100">[100]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v. 2, 8-10. -</p> -<p> -The consequences of this forced return are difficult to foresee; they will -appear in a subsequent page.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_101"><a href="#FNanchor_101">[101]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 3-12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_102"><a href="#FNanchor_102">[102]</a></span> -Xen. Hell. iv, 8, 7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_103"><a href="#FNanchor_103">[103]</a></span> -Isokrates, Orat. xvii, (Trapezit.) s. 71.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_104"><a href="#FNanchor_104">[104]</a></span> -See the valuable inscription called the Marmor Sandvicense, which contains -the accounts rendered by the annual Amphiktyons at Delos, from -377-373 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -Boeckh, Staats-haushaltung der Athener, vol. ii, p. 214, ed. 1; vol. ii, p. -78 <i>seq.</i>, ed. 2nd. -</p> -<p> -The list of cities and individuals who borrowed money from the temple is -given in these accounts, together with the amount of interest either paid by -them, or remaining in arrear.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_105"><a href="#FNanchor_105">[105]</a></span> -This is the description which Isokrates himself gives (Orat. xv, (Permutat.) -s. 61) of the state of the Grecian world when he published his Panegyrical -Discourse—ὅτε Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν ἦρχον τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταπεινῶς ἐπράττομεν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_106"><a href="#FNanchor_106">[106]</a></span> -The Panegyrical Discourse of Isokrates, the date of it being pretty exactly -known, is of great value for enabling us to understand the period immediately -succeeding the peace of Antalkidas. -</p> -<p> -He particularly notices the multiplication of pirates, and the competition -between Athens and Sparta about tribute from the islands in the Ægean -(s. 133). Τίς γὰρ ἂν τοιαύτης καταστάσεως ἐπιθυμήσειεν, ἐν ᾗ καταποντισταὶ -μὲν τὴν θάλασσαν κατέχουσι, πελτασταὶ δὲ τὰς πόλεις καταλαμβάνουσι, etc. -</p> -<p> -... Καίτοι χρὴ τοὺς φύσει καὶ μὴ διὰ τύχην μέγα φρονοῦντας τοιούτοις ἔργοις -ἐπιχειρεῖν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ <em class="gesperrt">τοὺς νησιώτας δασμολογεῖν</em>, οὓς ἄξιόν ἐστιν -ἐλέειν, ὁρῶντας τούτους μὲν διὰ σπανιότητα τῆς γῆς ὄρη γεωργεῖν ἀναγκαζομένους, -τοὺς δ’ ἠπειρώτας δι’ ἀφθονίαν τῆς χώρας τὴν μὲν πλείστην αὐτῆς ἀργὸν -περιορῶντας, etc. (s. 151). -</p> -<p> -... Ὧν ἡμεῖς (Athenians and Spartans) οὐδεμίαν ποιούμεθα πρόνοιαν, -ἀλλὰ <em class="gesperrt">περὶ μὲν τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων ἀμφισβητοῦμεν</em>, τοσαύτας δὲ τὸ πλῆθος -καὶ τηλικαύτας τὸ μέγεθος δυνάμεις οὕτως εἰκῇ τῷ βαρβάρῳ παραδεδώκαμεν. -</p> -<p> -Compare Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 12—μὴ εἰς νησύδρια ἀποβλέποντας, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_107"><a href="#FNanchor_107">[107]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 9, 19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_108"><a href="#FNanchor_108">[108]</a></span> -Thucyd. vii, 9.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_109"><a href="#FNanchor_109">[109]</a></span> -This is attested by Plato, Gorgias, c. 26. p. 471 A. -</p> -<p> -... Ὅς γε (Archelaus son of Perdikkas) πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν δεσπότην -καὶ θεῖον (Alketas) μεταπεμψάμενος, <em class="gesperrt">ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣν Περδίκκας -αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο</em>, etc. -</p> -<p> -This statement of Plato, that Perdikkas expelled his brother Alketas from -the throne, appears not to be adverted to by the commentators. Perhaps it -may help to explain the chronological embarrassments connected with the -reign of Perdikkas, the years of which are assigned by different authors, as -23, 28, 35, 40, 41. See Mr. Clinton, Fasti Hellen. ch. iv, p. 222—where he -discusses the chronology of the Macedonian kings: also Krebs, Lection. Diodoreæ, -p. 159. -</p> -<p> -There are no means of determining when the reign of Perdikkas began—nor -exactly, when it ended. We know from Thucydides that he was king -in 432, and in 414 <small>B.C.</small> But the fact of his acquiring the crown by the expulsion -of an elder brother, renders it less wonderful that the beginning of -his reign should be differently stated by different authors; though these authors -seem mostly to conceive Perdikkas as the immediate successor of -Alexander, without any notice of Alketas.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_110"><a href="#FNanchor_110">[110]</a></span> -Thucyd. i, 57; ii, 97-100.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_111"><a href="#FNanchor_111">[111]</a></span> -The mother of Archelaus was a female slave belonging to Alketas; it is -for this reason that Plato calls Alketas <em class="gesperrt">δεσπότην</em> καὶ θεῖον of Archelaus -(Plato, Gorgias, c. 26. p. 471 A.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_112"><a href="#FNanchor_112">[112]</a></span> -Thucyd. ii, 100. ὁδοὺς εὐθείας ἔτεμε, etc. See the note in Ch. lxix, p. -17 of Vol. IX.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_113"><a href="#FNanchor_113">[113]</a></span> -Arrian, i, 11; Diodor. xvii, 16.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_114"><a href="#FNanchor_114">[114]</a></span> -Plutarch, De Vitioso Pudore, c. 7, p. 531 E.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_115"><a href="#FNanchor_115">[115]</a></span> -Aristotel. Rhetoric, ii, 24; Seneca, de Beneficiis, v, 6; Ælian, V. H. -xiv, 17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_116"><a href="#FNanchor_116">[116]</a></span> -See the statements, unfortunately very brief, of Aristotle (Politic. v, 8, -10-13). Plato (Alkibiad. ii, c. 5, p. 141 D), while mentioning the assassination -of Archelaus by his παιδικὰ represents the motive of the latter differently -from Aristotle, as having been an ambitious desire to possess himself -of the throne. Diodorus (xiv, 37) represents Krateuas as having killed -Archelaus unintentionally in a hunting-party. -</p> -<p> -Καὶ τῆς Ἀρχελάου δ’ ἐπιθέσεως Δεκάμνιχος ἡγεμὼν ἐγένετο, παροξύνων τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους -πρῶτος· αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς, ὅτι αὐτὸν ἐξέδωκε μαστιγῶσαι Εὐριπίδῃ τῷ ποιητῇ· ὁ δὲ -Εὐριπίδης ἐχαλέπαινεν εἰπόντος τι αὐτοῦ εἰς δυσώδειαν τοῦ στόματος (Arist. Pol. <i>l. c.</i>). -</p> -<p> -Dekamnichus is cited by Aristotle as one among the examples of persons -actually scourged; which proves that Euripides availed himself of the privilege -accorded by Archelaus.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_117"><a href="#FNanchor_117">[117]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv. 84-89.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_118"><a href="#FNanchor_118">[118]</a></span> -Ælian, V. H. xii, 43; Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 263; Justin, vii, 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_119"><a href="#FNanchor_119">[119]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 89. Ἐτελεύτησε δὲ καὶ Παυσανίας ὁ τῶν Μακεδόνων -βασιλεὺς, ἀναιρεθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἀμύντου δόλῳ, ἄρξας ἐνιαυτόν· τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν -κατέσχεν Ἀμύντας, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_120"><a href="#FNanchor_120">[120]</a></span> -See in Thucyd. iv, 112—the relations of Arrhibæus, prince of the -Macedonians called Lynkestæ in the interior country, with the Illyrian invaders—<small>B.C.</small> -423. -</p> -<p> -Archelaus had been engaged at a more recent period in war with a -prince of the interior named Arrhibæus,—perhaps the same person (Aristot. -Polit. v, 8, 11).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_121"><a href="#FNanchor_121">[121]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 92; xv, 19. Ἀπογνοὺς δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν, Ὀλυνθίοις -μὲν τὴν συνεγγὺς χώραν ἐδωρήσατο, etc. Τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ὀλυνθίων δωρησαμένου -πολλὴν τῆς ὁμόρου χώρας, διὰ τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δυναστείας, etc. -</p> -<p> -The flight of Amyntas, after a year’s reign, is confirmed by Dexippus ap. -Syncell. p. 263.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_122"><a href="#FNanchor_122">[122]</a></span> -Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 12. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης μεγίστη -πόλις Ὄλυνθος σχεδὸν πάντες ἐπίστασθε. Οὗτοι τῶν πόλεων προσηγάγοντο ἔστιν -ἃς, ἐφ’ ᾧτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι νόμοις καὶ συμπολιτεύειν· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν -μειζόνων προσέλαβόν τινας. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐπεχείρησαν καὶ τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας -πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου, τοῦ βασιλέως Μακεδόνων. Ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰσήκουσαν -αἱ ἐγγύτατα αὐτῶν, ταχὺ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς πόῤῥω καὶ μείζους ἐπορεύοντο· καὶ -κατελίπομεν ἡμεῖς ἔχοντας ἤδη ἄλλας τε πολλὰς, καὶ Πέλλαν, ἥπερ μεγίστη -τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ πόλεων. Καὶ Ἀμύνταν δὲ αἰσθανόμεθα ἀποχωροῦντά τε ἐκ τῶν -πόλεων, καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἐκπεπτωκότα ἤδη ἐκ πάσης Μακεδονίας. -</p> -<p> -We know from Diodorus that Amyntas fled the country in despair, and -ceded a large proportion at least of Lower Macedonia to the Olynthians. -Accordingly, the struggle between the latter and Amyntas (here alluded -to), must have taken place when he came back and tried to resume his dominion.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_123"><a href="#FNanchor_123">[123]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 12—τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν -ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου, etc.; compare v, 2, 38.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_124"><a href="#FNanchor_124">[124]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 14. -</p> -<p> -The number of Olynthian troops is given in Xenophon as eight hundred -hoplites—a far greater number of peltasts—and one thousand horsemen, -assuming that Akanthus and Apollonia joined the confederacy. It has -been remarked by Mr. Mitford and others, that these numbers, as they here -stand, must be decidedly smaller than the reality. But we have no means -of correction open to us. Mr. Mitford’s suggestion of eight thousand hoplites -in place of eight hundred, rests upon no authority. -</p> -<p> -Demosthenes states that Olynthus by herself, and before she had brought -all the Chalkidians into confederacy (οὔπω Χαλκιδέων πάντων εἰς ἓν συνῳκισμένων—De -Fals. Leg. c. 75, p. 425) possessed four hundred horsemen, -and a citizen population of 5000; no more than this (he says) at the time -when the Lacedæmonians attacked them. The historical statements of the -great orator, for a time which nearly coincides with his own birth, are to -be received with caution.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_125"><a href="#FNanchor_125">[125]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 16. Ἐννοήσατε δὲ καὶ τόδε, πῶς εἰκὸς, -ὑμᾶς τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως μὴ καθ’ ἓν εἴη, πολὺ δὲ -μείζονος ἀθροιζομένης δυνάμεως ἀμελῆσαι, etc. -</p> -<p> -I translate here the substance of the speech, not the exact words.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_126"><a href="#FNanchor_126">[126]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 14. Ἡμεῖς δὲ, ὦ ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι, -βουλόμεθα μὲν τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι, καὶ αὐτοπολῖται εἶναι· -εἰ μέντοι μὴ βοηθήσει τις, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡμῖν μετ’ ἐκείνων γίγνεσθαι.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_127"><a href="#FNanchor_127">[127]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 18. Δεῖ γε μὴν ὑμᾶς καὶ τόδε εἰδέναι, -ὡς, ἣν εἰρήκαμεν δύναμιν μεγάλην οὖσαν, οὔπω δυσπάλαιστός τις ἐστίν· -αἱ γὰρ ἄκουσαι τῶν πόλεων <em class="gesperrt">τῆς πολιτείας κοινωνοῦσαι</em>, αὗται, -ἄν τι ἴδωσιν ἀντίπαλον, ταχὺ ἀποστήσονται· <em class="gesperrt">εἰ μέντοι -συγκλεισθήσονται ταῖς τε ἐπιγαμίαις καὶ ἐγκτήσεσι παρ’ ἀλλήλαις, -ἃς ἐψηφισμένοι εἰσὶ—καὶ γνώσονται, ὅτι μετὰ τῶν κρατούντων ἕπεσθαι -κερδαλέον ἐστὶν</em>, ὥσπερ Ἄρκαδες, ὅταν μεθ’ ὑμῶν ἴωσι, τά τε αὐτῶν -σώζουσι καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἁρπάζουσιν—<em class="gesperrt">ἴσως οὔκεθ’ ὁμοίως εὔλυτα -ἔσται</em>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_128"><a href="#FNanchor_128">[128]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 92; xv, 19. -</p> -<p> -Demosthenes speaks of Amyntas as having been expelled from his kingdom -by the Thessalians (cont. Aristokrat. c. 29, p. 657). If this be historically -correct, it must be referred to some subsequent war in which he was -engaged with the Thessalians, perhaps to the time when Jason of Pheræ -acquired dominion over Macedonia (Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 11).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_129"><a href="#FNanchor_129">[129]</a></span> -See above in this History, Vol. VI. Ch. xlviii. p. 79.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_130"><a href="#FNanchor_130">[130]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 20. Ἐκ τούτου μέντοι, πολλοὶ μὲν -ξυνηγόρευον στρατιὰν ποιεῖν, μάλιστα δὲ οἱ βουλόμενοι Λακεδαιμονίοις -χαρίζεσθαι, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_131"><a href="#FNanchor_131">[131]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 21, 22. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus (xv, 31) mentions the fact that an hoplite was reckoned equivalent -to two peltasts, in reference to a Lacedæmonian muster-roll of a few -years afterwards; but it must have been equally necessary to fix the proportion -on the present occasion.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_132"><a href="#FNanchor_132">[132]</a></span> -See Vol. V. Ch. xlv, p. 302 of this History.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_133"><a href="#FNanchor_133">[133]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 24; Diodor. xv, 21.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_134"><a href="#FNanchor_134">[134]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 27-34.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_135"><a href="#FNanchor_135">[135]</a></span> -This is the statement of Diodorus (xv, 20), and substantially that of Plutarch -(Agesil. c. 24), who intimates that it was the general belief of the time. -And it appears to me much more probable than the representation of Xenophon—that -the first idea arose when Phœbidas was under the walls of Thebes, -and that the Spartan leader was persuaded by Leontiades to act on his own -responsibility. The behavior of Agesilaus and of the ephors after the fact -is like that of persons who had previously contemplated the possibility of it. -But the original suggestion must have come from the Theban faction themselves.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_136"><a href="#FNanchor_136">[136]</a></span> -Plutarch (De Genio Socratis, c. 5, p. 578 B.) states that most of these generals -of cavalry (τῶν ἱππαρχηκότων νομίμως) were afterwards in exile with -Pelopidas at Athens. -</p> -<p> -We have little or no information respecting the government of Thebes. -It would seem to have been at this moment a liberalized oligarchy. There -was a Senate, and two Polemarchs (perhaps the Polemarchs may have -been more than two in all, though the words of Xenophon rather lead us to -suppose <i>only</i> two)—and there seems also to have been a civil magistrate, -chosen by lot (ὁ κυαμιστὸς ἄρχων) and renewed annually, whose office was -marked by his constantly having in his possession the sacred spear of state -(τὸ ἱερὸν δόρυ) and the city-seal (Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 31. p. 597—B.—C.). -</p> -<p> -At this moment, it must be recollected, there were no such officers as Bœotarchs; -since the Lacedæmonians, enforcing the peace of Antalkidas, had -put an end to the Bœotian federation.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_137"><a href="#FNanchor_137">[137]</a></span> -The rhetor Aristeides (Or. xix, Eleusin. p. 452 Cant.; p. 419 Dind.) -states that the Kadmeia was seized during the Pythian festival. This festival -would take place, July or August 382 <small>B.C.</small>; near the beginning of the -third year of the (99th) Olympiad. See above in this History, Vol. VI. -Ch. liv, p. 455, note. Respecting the year and month in which the Pythian -festival was held, there is a difference of opinion among commentators. I -agree with those who assign it to the first quarter of the third Olympic year. -And the date of the march of Phœbidas would perfectly harmonize with this -supposition. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon mentions nothing about the Pythian festival as being in -course of celebration when Phœbidas was encamped near Thebes: for it -had no particular reference to Thebes.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_138"><a href="#FNanchor_138">[138]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 28, 29.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_139"><a href="#FNanchor_139">[139]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 30, 31.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_140"><a href="#FNanchor_140">[140]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. ii, 3. See above in this History, Vol. VIII. Ch. lxv. p. 252.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_141"><a href="#FNanchor_141">[141]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_142"><a href="#FNanchor_142">[142]</a></span> -It is curious that Xenophon, treating Phœbidas as a man more warm-hearted -than wise, speaks of him as if he had rendered no real service to -Sparta by the capture of the Kadmeia (v, 2, 28). The explanation of this -is, that Xenophon wrote his history at a later period, after the defeat at -Leuktra and the downfall of Sparta; which downfall was brought about by -the reaction against her overweening and oppressive dominion, especially -after the capture of the Kadmeia,—or (in the pious creed of Xenophon) by -the displeasure of the gods, which such iniquity drew down upon her (v, 4, -1). In this way, therefore, it is made out that Phœbidas had not acted -with true wisdom, and that he had done his country more harm than good; -a criticism, which we may be sure that no man advanced, at the time of the -capture itself, or during the three years after it.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_143"><a href="#FNanchor_143">[143]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 34. -</p> -<p> -Καὶ ὑμεῖς γε (says Leontiades to the Lacedæmonian ephors) τότε μὲν ἀεὶ -προσείχετε τὸν νοῦν, πότε ἀκούσεσθε βιαζομένους αὐτοὺς τὴν Βοιωτίαν ὑφ’ -αὑτοῖς εἶναι· νῦν δ’, ἐπεὶ τάδε πέπρακται, οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς δεῖ Θηβαίους -φοβεῖσθαι· ἀλλ’ ἀρκέσει ὑμῖν μικρὰ σκυτάλη, ὥστε ἐκεῖθεν πάντα -πράττεσθαι, ὅσων ἂν δέησθε—ἐὰν, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς ὑμῶν, οὕτω καὶ ὑμεῖς -ἡμῶν, ἐπιμελῆσθε. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon mentions the displeasure of the ephors and the Spartans generally -against Phœbidas (χαλεπῶς ἔχοντας τῷ Φοιβίδᾳ) but not the fine, which -is certified by Diodorus (xv, 20), by Plutarch (Pelopidas, c. 6, and De Genio -Socratis, p. 576 A), and Cornelius Nepos (Pelopid. c. 1).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_144"><a href="#FNanchor_144">[144]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 35; Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, p. 576 A. Plutarch -in another place (Pelopid. c. 5) represents Ismenias as having been conveyed -to Sparta and tried there.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_145"><a href="#FNanchor_145">[145]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 38.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_146"><a href="#FNanchor_146">[146]</a></span> -Demosthenes (De Fals. Leg. c. 75, p. 425) speaks with proper commendation -of the brave resistance made by the Olynthians against the great -force of Sparta. But his expressions are altogether misleading as to the -tenor and result of the war. If we had no other information than his, we -should be led to imagine that the Olynthians had been victorious, and the -Lacedæmonians baffled.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_147"><a href="#FNanchor_147">[147]</a></span> -Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 40-43.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_148"><a href="#FNanchor_148">[148]</a></span> -Thucyd. i, 63—with the Scholiast.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_149"><a href="#FNanchor_149">[149]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 4-6. παμπλήθεις ἀπέκτειναν ἀνθρώπους -καὶ ὅτι περ ὄφελος ἦν τούτου τοῦ στρατεύματος. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus (xv, 21) states the loss at twelve hundred men.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_150"><a href="#FNanchor_150">[150]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 9. Πολλοὶ δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν περιοίκων -ἐθελονταὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἠκολούθουν, καὶ ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων καλουμένων, -καὶ νόθοι τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, μάλα εὐειδεῖς τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καλῶν -οὐκ ἄπειροι. -</p> -<p> -The phrase—ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων—is illustrated by a passage from Phylarchus -in Athenæus, vi, p. 271 (referred to by Schneider in his note here). -I have already stated that the political franchise of a Spartan citizen depended -upon his being able to furnish constantly his quota to the public -mess-table. Many of the poor families became unable to do this, and thus -lost their qualification and their training; but rich citizens sometimes paid -their quota for them, and enabled them by such aid to continue their training -as ξύντροφοι, τρόφιμοι, μόθακες, etc. as companions of their own sons. -The two sons of Xenophon were educated at Sparta (Diog. Laert. ii, 54), -and would thus be ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων καλουμένων. If either of them was -now old enough, he might probably have been one among the volunteers to -accompany Agesipolis.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_151"><a href="#FNanchor_151">[151]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 18; Pausan. iii, 5, 9.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_152"><a href="#FNanchor_152">[152]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 26; Diodor. xv, 22, 23.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_153"><a href="#FNanchor_153">[153]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_154"><a href="#FNanchor_154">[154]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 10, 11.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_155"><a href="#FNanchor_155">[155]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 10. ἡ Φλιασίων πόλις, ἐπαινεθεῖσα -μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀγησιπόλιδος, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ταχέως αὐτῷ χρήματα ἐς -τὴν στρατιὰν ἔδοσαν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_156"><a href="#FNanchor_156">[156]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 12, 13; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24; Diodor. xv, 20.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_157"><a href="#FNanchor_157">[157]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 25. -</p> -<p> -Καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ Φλιοῦντα οὕτως αὖ ἐπετετέλεστο ἐν ὀκτὼ μησὶ καὶ ἐνιαυτῷ. -</p> -<p> -This general expression “the matters relative to Phlius,” comprises not -merely the blockade, but the preliminary treatment and complaints of the -Phliasian exiles. One year, therefore, will be as much as we can allow for -the blockade,—perhaps more than we ought to allow.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_158"><a href="#FNanchor_158">[158]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 17-26.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_159"><a href="#FNanchor_159">[159]</a></span> -The panegyrist of Agesilaus finds little to commend in these Phliasian -proceedings, except the φιλεταιρεία or partisan-attachment of his hero -(Xenoph. Agesil. ii, 21).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_160"><a href="#FNanchor_160">[160]</a></span> -Thucyd. i, 124. πόλιν τύραννον.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_161"><a href="#FNanchor_161">[161]</a></span> -Lysias, Frag. Orat. xxxiii, (Olympic.) ed. Bekker ap. Dionys. Hal. Judic. -de Lysiâ, p. 520-525, Reisk. -</p> -<p> -... Ὁρῶν οὕτως αἰσχρῶς διακειμένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν αὐτῆς ὄντα -ὑπὸ τῷ βαρβάρῳ, πολλὰς δὲ πόλεις ὑπὸ τυράννων ἀναστάτους γεγενημένας. -</p> -<p> -... Ὁρῶμεν γὰρ τοὺς κινδύνους καὶ μεγάλους καὶ παντάχοθεν περιεστηκότας. -Ἐπίστασθε δὲ, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῶν κρατούντων τῆς θαλάσσης, τῶν δὲ χρημάτων -βασιλεὺς ταμίας· <em class="gesperrt">τὰ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων σώματα, τῶν δαπανᾶσθαι δυναμένων</em>· -ναῦς δὲ πολλὰς αὐτὸς κέκτηται, πολλὰς δ’ ὁ τύραννος τῆς Σικελίας.... -</p> -<p> -... Ὥστε ἄξιον—τοὺς προγόνους μιμεῖσθαι, οἱ τοὺς μὲν βαρβάρους ἐποίησαν, -τῆς ἀλλοτρίας ἐπιθυμοῦντας, τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν ἐστερῆσθαι· τοὺς δὲ τυράννους -ἐξελάσαντες, κοινὴν ἅπασι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κατέστησαν. Θαυμάζω δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους -πάντων μάλιστα, τίνι ποτε γνώμῃ χρώμενοι, <em class="gesperrt">καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν</em>, -ἡγεμόνες ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, etc. -</p> -<p> -... Οὐ τοίνυν ὁ ἐπιὼν καιρὸς τοῦ παρόντος βελτίων· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλοτρίας δεῖ τὰς -τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς νομίζειν, ἀλλ’ οἰκείας· οὐδ’ ἀναμεῖναι, ἕως ἂν ἐπ’ -αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς αἱ δυνάμεις <em class="gesperrt">ἀμφοτέρων</em> (of Artaxerxes and Dionysius) -ἔλθωσιν, ἀλλ’ ἕως ἔτι ἔξεστι, τὴν τούτων ὕβριν κωλῦσαι. -</p> -<p> -Ephorus appears to have affirmed that there was a plan concerted between -the Persian king and Dionysius, for attacking Greece in concert and -dividing it between them (see Ephori Fragm. 141, ed. Didot). The assertion -is made by the rhetor Aristeides, and the allusion to Ephorus is here -preserved by the Scholiast on Aristeides (who, however, is mistaken, in referring -it to Dionysius <i>the younger</i>). Aristeides ascribes the frustration of -this attack to the valor of two Athenian generals, Iphikrates, and Timotheus; -the former of whom captured the fleet of Dionysius, while the latter -defeated the Lacedæmonian fleet at Leukas. But these events happened -in 373-372 <small>B.C.</small>, when the power of Dionysius was not so formidable or -aggressive as it had been between 387-382 <small>B.C.</small>: moreover, the ships of -Dionysius taken by Iphikrates were only ten in number, a small squadron. -Aristeides appears to me to have misconceived the date to which the assertion -of Ephorus really referred.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_162"><a href="#FNanchor_162">[162]</a></span> -See Pseudo-Andokides cont. Alkibiad. s. 30; and Vol. VII. of this History, -Ch. lv, p. 53.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_163"><a href="#FNanchor_163">[163]</a></span> -Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 519; Diodor. xiv, 109. ὥστε τινας -τολμῆσαι διαρπάζειν τὰς σκηνάς. -</p> -<p> -Dionysius does not specify the date of this oration of Lysias; but Diodorus -places it at Olympiad 98—<small>B.C.</small> 388—the year before the peace of Antalkidas. -On this point I venture to depart from him, and assign it to -Olympiad 99, or 384 <small>B.C.</small>, three years after the peace; the rather as his -Olympic chronology appears not clear, as may be seen by comparing xv, 7 -with xiv, 109. -</p> -<p> -1. The year 388 <small>B.C.</small> was a year of war, in which Sparta with her allies -on one side,—and Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos on the other,—were -carrying on strenuous hostilities. The war would hinder the four last-mentioned -states from sending any public legation to sacrifice at the Olympic -festival. Lysias, as an Athenian metic, could hardly have gone there at -all; but he certainly could not have gone there to make a public and bold -oratorical demonstration. -</p> -<p> -2. The language of Lysias implies that the speech was delivered after the -cession of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia,—ὁρῶν πολλὰ μὲν αὐτῆς (Ἑλλάδος) ὄντα -ὑπὸ τῷ Βαρβάρῳ, etc. This is quite pertinent after the peace of Antalkidas; -but not at all admissible before that peace. The same may be -said about the phrase,—οὐ γὰρ ἀλλοτρίας δεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς -νομίζειν, ἀλλ’ οἰκείας; which must be referred to the recent subjection -of the Asiatic Greeks by Persia, and of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks by -Dionysius. -</p> -<p> -3. In 388 <small>B.C.</small>—when Athens and so large a portion of the greater cities -of Greece were at war with Sparta, and therefore contesting her headship,—Lysias -would hardly have publicly talked of the Spartans as ἡγεμόνες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, -οὐκ ἀδίκως, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον ἀρετὴν καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιστήμην. This -remark is made also by Sievers (Geschich. -Griech. bis zur Schlacht von Mantinea, p. 138). Nor would he have declaimed -so ardently against the Persian king, at a time when Athens was -still not despairing of Persian aid against Sparta. -</p> -<p> -On these grounds (as well as on others which I shall state when I recount -the history of Dionysius), it appears to me that this oration of Lysias is -unsuitable to <small>B.C.</small> 388—but perfectly suitable to 384 <small>B.C.</small></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_164"><a href="#FNanchor_164">[164]</a></span> -Lysias, Orat. Olymp. Frag. καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_165"><a href="#FNanchor_165">[165]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 145, 146: compare his Orat. viii, (De -Pace) s. 122; and Diodor. xv, 23. -</p> -<p> -Dionysius of Syracuse had sent twenty triremes to join the Lacedæmonians -at the Hellespont, a few months before the peace of Antalkidas (Xenophon, -Hellen. v, 1, 26).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_166"><a href="#FNanchor_166">[166]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 1. Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἄν τις ἔχοι καὶ ἄλλα λέγειν, -καὶ Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ βαρβαρικὰ, ὡς θεοὶ οὔτε τῶν ἀσεβούντων οὔτε τῶν ἀνόσια ποιούντων -ἀμελοῦσι· νῦν γε μὴν λέξω τὰ προκείμενα. Λακεδαιμόνιοί τε γὰρ, οἱ ὀμόσαντες -αὐτονόμους ἐάσειν τὰς πόλεις, τὴν ἐν Θήβαις ἀκρόπολιν κατασχόντες, ὑπ’ αὐτῶν -μόνον τῶν ἀδικηθέντων ἐκολάσθησαν, πρῶτον οὐδ’ ὑφ’ ἑνὸς τῶν πώποτε ἀνθρώπων -κρατηθέντες. Τούς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγαγόντας εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ -βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν πόλιν δουλεύειν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν ... τὴν -τούτων ἀρχὴν ἑπτὰ μόνον τῶν φυγόντων ἤρκεσαν καταλῦσαι. -</p> -<p> -This passage is properly characterized by Dr. Peter (in his Commentatio -Critica in Xenophontis Hellenica, Hall. 1837, p. 82) as the turning-point in -the history:— -</p> -<p> -“Hoc igitur in loco quasi editiore operis sui Xenophon subsistit, atque -uno in conspectu Spartanos, et ad suæ felicitatis fastigium ascendere videt, -et rursus ab eo delabi: tantâ autem divinæ justitiæ conscientiâ tangitur in -hac Spartanorum fortunâ conspicuæ, ut vix suum judicium, quanquam id -solet facere, suppresserit.”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_167"><a href="#FNanchor_167">[167]</a></span> -See Vol. VII. of this History,—the close of Chapter lvi.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_168"><a href="#FNanchor_168">[168]</a></span> -Soph. Œdip. Tyr. 450; Antigon. 1066.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_169"><a href="#FNanchor_169">[169]</a></span> -Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 6: compare Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 29, p. -596 B.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_170"><a href="#FNanchor_170">[170]</a></span> -Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 14.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_171"><a href="#FNanchor_171">[171]</a></span> -Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 33, p. 598 B, C. ᾧ καὶ μεθ’ ἡμέραν -ἐπενέβησαν καὶ προσέπτυσαν οὐκ ὀλίγαι γυναῖκες. -</p> -<p> -Among the prisoners was a distinguished Theban of the democratic party, -named Amphitheus. He was about to be shortly executed, and the -conspirators, personally attached to him, seem to have accelerated the hour -of their plot partly to preserve his life (Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. p. 577 D, -p. 586 F.).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_172"><a href="#FNanchor_172">[172]</a></span> -The language of Plutarch (De Gen. Socrat. c. 33, p. 598 C.) is illustrated -by the description given in the harangue of Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. -(c. xi, s. 40)—of the universal alarm prevalent in Athens after the battle -of Chæroneia, such that even the women could not stay in their houses—ἀναξίως -αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πόλεως ὁρωμένας, etc. Compare also the words of -Makaria, in the Herakleidæ of Euripides, 475; and Diodor. xiii, 55, in his -description of the capture of Selinus in Sicily.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_173"><a href="#FNanchor_173">[173]</a></span> -Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 6. -</p> -<p> -See this sentiment of gratitude on the part of Athenian democrats, towards -those Thebans who had sheltered them at Thebes during the exile -along with Thrasybulus,—strikingly brought out in an oration of Lysias, -of which unfortunately only a fragment remains (Lysias, Frag. 46, 47, -Bekk.; Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Isæo, p. 594). The speaker of this oration -had been received at Thebes by Kephisodotus the father of Pherenikus; the -latter was now in exile at Athens; and the speaker had not only welcomed -him (Pherenikus) to his house with brotherly affection, but also delivered -this oration on his behalf before the Dikastery; Pherenikus having rightful -claims on the property left behind by the assassinated Androkleidas.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_174"><a href="#FNanchor_174">[174]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 25; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 12; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. -17, p. 586 E. -</p> -<p> -In another passage of this treatise (the last sentence but one) he sets -down the numbers in the Kadmeia at five thousand: but the smaller number -is most likely to be true.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_175"><a href="#FNanchor_175">[175]</a></span> -Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 4, p. 577 B; c. 17, p. 587 B; c. 25, p. 594 C; -c. 27, p. 595 A.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_176"><a href="#FNanchor_176">[176]</a></span> -Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 7, 8. -</p> -<p> -Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 17, p. 587 D. Τῶν Μέλλωνος ἁρματηλατῶν ἐπιστάτης.... Ἆρ’ οὐ Χλίδωνα -λέγεις, τὸν κέλητι τὰ Ἡραῖα νικῶντα πέρυσιν;</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_177"><a href="#FNanchor_177">[177]</a></span> -Xenophon says <i>seven</i> (Hellen. v, 4, 1, 2); Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos -say <i>twelve</i> (Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 2, p. 576 C.; Plutarch, Pelopidas c. -8-13; Cornel. Nepos, Pelopidas, c. 2). -</p> -<p> -It is remarkable that Xenophon never mentions the name of Pelopidas in -this conspiracy; nor indeed (with one exception) throughout his Hellenica.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_178"><a href="#FNanchor_178">[178]</a></span> -Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 3, p. 576 E.; p. 577 A.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_179"><a href="#FNanchor_179">[179]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 4. τὰς σεμνοτάτας καὶ καλλίστας τῶν ἐν Θήβαις. Plutarch, -De Gen. Socr. c. 4, p. 577 C.; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 9. -</p> -<p> -The Theban women were distinguished for majestic figure and beauty -(Dikæarchus, Vit. Græc. p. 144, ed Fuhr.).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_180"><a href="#FNanchor_180">[180]</a></span> -Plutarch, (Pelopid. c. 25; De Gen. Socr. c. 26, p. 594 D.) mentions -Menekleidês, Damokleidas, and Theopompus among them. Compare Cornel. -Nepos, Pelopid. c. 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_181"><a href="#FNanchor_181">[181]</a></span> -Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 8; Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. c. 17, p. 586 B.; c. -18, p. 587 D-E.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_182"><a href="#FNanchor_182">[182]</a></span> -Xenophon does not mention this separate summons and visit of Charon -to the polemarchs,—nor anything about the scene with his son. He only -notices Charon as having harbored the conspirators in his house, and seems -even to speak of him as a person of little consequence—παρὰ Χαρωνί τινι, -etc. (v, 4, 3). -</p> -<p> -The anecdote is mentioned in both the compositions of Plutarch (De Gen. -Socr. c. 28, p. 595; and Pelopidas, c. 9), and is too interesting to be omitted, -being perfectly consistent with what we read in Xenophon; though it has -perhaps somewhat of a theatrical air.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_183"><a href="#FNanchor_183">[183]</a></span> -Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 10; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 30, p. 596 F. Εἰς -αὔριον τὰ σπουδαῖα. -</p> -<p> -This occurrence also finds no place in the narrative of Xenophon. Cornelius -Nepos, Pelopidas, c. 3. Æneas (Poliorcetic. c. 31) makes a general -reference to the omission of immediate opening of letters arrived, as having -caused the capture of the Kadmeia; which was, however, only its remote -consequence.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_184"><a href="#FNanchor_184">[184]</a></span> -The description given by Xenophon, of this assassination of the polemarchs -at Thebes, differs materially from that of Plutarch. I follow Xenophon -in the main; introducing, however, several of the details found in -Plutarch, which are interesting, and which have the air of being authentic. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon himself intimates (Hellen. v, 4, 7), that besides the story given -in the text, there was also another story told by some,—that Mellon and -his companions had got access to the polemarchs in the guise of drunken -revellers. It is this latter story which Plutarch has adopted, and which carries -him into many details quite inconsistent with the narrative of Xenophon. -I think the story, of the conspirators having been introduced in female -attire, the more probable of the two. It is borne out by the exact analogy -of what Herodotus tells us respecting Alexander son of Amyntas, -prince of Macedonia (Herod. v, 20). -</p> -<p> -Compare Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 10, 11; Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. c. 31, -p. 597. Polyænus (ii, 4, 3) gives a story with many different circumstances, -yet agreeing in the fact that Pelopidas in female attire killed the Spartan -general. The story alluded to by Aristotle (Polit. v, 5, 10), though he names -both Thebes and Archias, can hardly refer to this event. -</p> -<p> -It is Plutarch, however, who mentions the presence of Kabeirichus the -archon at the banquet, and the curious Theban custom that the archon during -his year of office never left out of his hand the consecrated spear. As a -Bœotian born, Plutarch was doubtless familiar with these old customs. -</p> -<p> -From what other authors Plutarch copied the abundant details of this revolution -at Thebes, which he interweaves in the life of Pelopidas and in the -treatise called De Genio Socratis—we do not know. Some critics suppose -him to have borrowed from Dionysodôrus and Anaxis—Bœotian historians -whose work comprised this period, but of whom not a single fragment is -preserved (see Fragm. Histor. Græc. ed. Didot, vol. ii, p. 84).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_185"><a href="#FNanchor_185">[185]</a></span> -Xen. Hell. v, 4, 9; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 11, 12; and De Gen. Socr. p. 597 -D-F. Here again Xenophon and Plutarch differ; the latter represents -that Pelopidas got into the house of Leontiades <i>without</i> Phyllidas,—which -appears to me altogether improbable. On the other hand, Xenophon mentions -nothing about the defence of Leontiades and his personal conflict with -Pelopidas, which I copy from Plutarch. So brave a man as Leontiades, awake -and sober, would not let himself be slain without a defence dangerous -to assailants. Plutarch, in another place, singles out the death of Leontiades -as the marking circumstance of the whole glorious enterprise, and the -most impressive to Pelopidas (Plutarch—Non posse suaviter vivi secundum -Epicurum—p. 1099 A-E.).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_186"><a href="#FNanchor_186">[186]</a></span> -Xenoph. Hell. v, 4, 8; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 12; De Gen. Socr. p. 598 B.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_187"><a href="#FNanchor_187">[187]</a></span> -This is a curious piece of detail, which we learn from Plutarch (De -Gen. Socr. c. 34. p. 598 D.). -</p> -<p> -The Orchomenian Inscriptions in Boeckh’s Collection record the prizes -given to these Σαλπιγκταὶ or trumpeters (see Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. No. 1584, -1585, etc.).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_188"><a href="#FNanchor_188">[188]</a></span> -The unanimous joy with which the consummation of the revolution was -welcomed in Thebes,—and the ardor with which the citizens turned out to -support it by armed force,—is attested by Xenophon, no very willing witness,—Hellen. -v, 4, 9. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡμέρα ἦν καὶ φανερὸν ἦν τὸ γεγενημένον, ταχὺ δὴ καὶ οἱ ὁπλῖται -καὶ οἱ ἱππεῖς σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐξεβοήθουν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_189"><a href="#FNanchor_189">[189]</a></span> -Plutarch, Pelop. c. 12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_190"><a href="#FNanchor_190">[190]</a></span> -Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 598 E.; Pelop. c. 12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_191"><a href="#FNanchor_191">[191]</a></span> -Xenophon expressly mentions that the Athenians who were invited to -come, and who actually did come, to Thebes, were the two generals and the -volunteers; all of whom were before privy to the plot, and were in readiness -on the borders of Attica—τοὺς <em class="gesperrt">πρὸς τοῖς ὁρίοις</em> Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοὺς δύο -τῶν στρατηγῶν—οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι <em class="gesperrt">ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρίων</em> ἤδη παρῆσαν -(Hellen. v, 4, 9, 10).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_192"><a href="#FNanchor_192">[192]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 10, 11. προσέβαλον πρὸς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν—τὴν -προθυμίαν τῶν προσιόντων ἁπάντων ἑώρων, etc. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus, xv, 25. ἔπειτα τοὺς πολίτας ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν παρακαλέσαντες -(the successful Theban conspirators, Pelopidas, etc.) <em class="gesperrt">συνέργους ἔσχον -ἅπαντας τοὺς Θηβαίους</em>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_193"><a href="#FNanchor_193">[193]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_194"><a href="#FNanchor_194">[194]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 13; Diodor. xv, 27. -</p> -<p> -Plutarch (Pelopid. c. 13) augments the theatrical effect by saying that the -Lacedæmonian garrison on its retreat, actually met at Megara the reinforcements -under king Kleombrotus, which had advanced thus far, on their -march to relieve the Kadmeia. But this is highly improbable. The account -of Xenophon intimates clearly that the Kadmeia was surrounded on -the next morning after the nocturnal movement. The commanders capitulated -in the first moment of distraction and despair, without even standing -an assault.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_195"><a href="#FNanchor_195">[195]</a></span> -Arrian, i, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_196"><a href="#FNanchor_196">[196]</a></span> -In recounting this revolution at Thebes, and the proceedings of the -Athenians in regard to it, I have followed Xenophon almost entirely. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus (xv, 25, 26) concurs with Xenophon in stating that the Theban -exiles got back from Attica to Thebes by night, partly through the concurrence -of the Athenians (συνεπιλαβομένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων)—slew the rulers—called -the citizens to freedom next morning, finding all hearty in the -cause—and then proceeded to besiege the fifteen hundred Lacedæmonians -and Peloponnesians in the Kadmeia. -</p> -<p> -But after thus much of agreement, Diodorus states what followed, in a -manner quite inconsistent with Xenophon; thus (he tells us)— -</p> -<p> -The Lacedæmonian commander sent instant intelligence to Sparta of -what had happened, with request for a reinforcement. The Thebans at -once attempted to storm the Kadmeia, but were repulsed with great loss, -both of killed and wounded. Fearing that they might not be able to take -the fort before reinforcement should come from Sparta, they sent envoys to -Athens to ask for aid, reminding the Athenians that they (the Thebans) -had helped to emancipate Athens from the Thirty, and to restore the democracy -(ὑπομιμνήσκοντες μὲν ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ <em class="gesperrt">συγκατήγαγον τὸν δῆμον</em> τῶν Ἀθηναίων -καθ’ ὃν καιρὸν ὑπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα κατεδουλώθησαν). The -Athenians, partly from desire to requite this favor, partly from a wish to -secure the Thebans as allies against Sparta, passed a public vote to assist -them forthwith. Demophon the general got together five thousand hoplites -and five hundred horsemen, with whom he hastened to Thebes on the next -day; and all the remaining population were prepared to follow, if necessary -(πανδημεί). All the other cities in Bœotia also sent aid to Thebes too,—so -that there was assembled there a large force of twelve thousand hoplites -and two thousand horsemen. This united force, the Athenians being among -them, assaulted the Kadmeia day and night, relieving each other; but were -repelled with great loss of killed and wounded. At length the garrison -found themselves without provisions; the Spartans were tardy in sending -reinforcement; and sedition broke out among the Peloponnesian allies who -formed the far larger part of the garrison. These Peloponnesians, refusing -to fight longer, insisted upon capitulating; which the Lacedæmonian governor -was obliged perforce to do, though both he and the Spartans along -with him desired to hold out to the death. The Kadmeia was accordingly -surrendered, and the garrison went back to Peloponnesus. The Lacedæmonian -reinforcement from Sparta arrived only a little too late. -</p> -<p> -All these circumstances stated by Diodorus are not only completely different -from Xenophon, but irreconcilable with his conception of the event. -We must reject either the one or the other. -</p> -<p> -Now Xenophon is not merely the better witness of the two, but is in this -case sustained by all the collateral probabilities of the case. -</p> -<p> -1. Diodorus represents the Athenians as having despatched by public -vote, assistance to Thebes, in order to requite the assistance which the Thebans -had before sent to restore the Athenian democracy against the Thirty. -Now this is incorrect in point of fact. The Thebans had <i>never sent any assistance</i>, -positive or ostensible, to Thrasybulus and the Athenian democrats -against the Thirty. They had assisted Thrasybulus underhand, and without -any public government-act; and they had refused to serve along with -the Spartans against him. But they never sent any force to help him -against the Thirty. Consequently, the Athenians <i>could not</i> now have sent -any public force to Thebes, <i>in requital</i> for a similar favor done before by the -Thebans to them. -</p> -<p> -2. Had the Athenians passed a formal vote, sent a large public army, -and taken vigorous part in several bloody assaults on the Lacedæmonian -garrison in the Kadmeia,—this would have been the most flagrant and unequivocal -commencement of hostilities against Sparta. No Spartan envoys -could, after that, have gone to Athens, and stayed safely in the house of -the Proxenus,—as we know from Xenophon that they did. Besides,—the -story of Sphodrias (presently to be recounted) proves distinctly that -Athens was at peace with Sparta, and had committed no act of hostility -against her, for three or four months at least after the revolution at Thebes. -It therefore refutes the narrative of Diodorus about the public vote of the -Athenians, and the public Athenian force under Demophon, aiding in the -attack of the Kadmeia. Strange to say,—Diodorus himself, three chapters -afterwards (xv, 29), relates this story about Sphodrias, just in the same -manner (with little difference) as Xenophon; ushering in the story with a -declaration, that <i>the Athenians were still at peace with Sparta</i>, and forgetting -that he had himself recounted a distinct rupture of that peace on the part -of the Athenians. -</p> -<p> -3. The news of the revolution at Thebes must necessarily have taken the -Athenian public completely by surprise (though some few Athenians were -privy to the scheme), because it was a scheme which had no chance of succeeding -except by profound secrecy. Now, that the Athenian public, hearing -the news for the first time,—having no positive act to complain of on -the part of Sparta, and much reason to fear her power,—having had no -previous circumstances to work them up, or prepare them for any dangerous -resolve,—should identify themselves at once with Thebes, and provoke -war with Sparta in the impetuous manner stated by Diodorus,—this is, in -my judgment, eminently improbable, requiring good evidence to induce us -to believe it. -</p> -<p> -4. Assume the statement of Diodorus to be true,—what reasonable explanation -can be given of the erroneous version which we read in Xenophon? -The facts as he recounts them conflict most pointedly with his -philo-Laconian partialities; first, the overthrow of the Lacedæmonian -power at Thebes, by a handful of exiles; still more, the whole story of -Sphodrias and his acquittal. -</p> -<p> -But assume the statement of Xenophon to be true,—and we can give a -very plausible explanation how the erroneous version in Diodorus arose. -A few months later, after the acquittal of Sphodrias at Sparta, the Athenians -did enter heartily into the alliance of Thebes, and sent a large public -force (indeed five thousand hoplites, the same number as those of Demophon, -according to Diodorus, c. 32) to assist her in repelling Agesilaus with -the Spartan army. It is by no means unnatural that their public vote and -expedition undertaken about July 378 <small>B.C.</small>,—should have been erroneously -thrown back to December 379 <small>B.C.</small> The Athenian orators were fond of -boasting that Athens had saved the Thebans from Sparta; and this might -be said with some truth, in reference to the aid which she really rendered -afterwards. Isokrates (Or. Plataic. s. 31) makes this boast in general terms; -but Deinarchus (cont. Demosthen. s. 40) is more distinct, and gives in a -few words a version the same as that which we find in Diodorus; so also -does Aristeides, in two very brief allusions (Panathen. p. 172, and Or. -xxxviii, Socialis, p. 486-498). Possibly Aristeides as well as Diodorus may -have copied from Ephorus; but however this may be, it is easy to understand -the mistake out of which their version grew. -</p> -<p> -5. Lastly, Plutarch mentions nothing about the public vote of the Athenians, -and the regular division of troops under Demophon which Diodorus -asserts to have aided in the storming of the Kadmeia. See Plutarch (De -Gen. Socrat. ad fin. Agesil. c. 23; Pelopid. 12, 13). He intimates only, as -Xenophon does, that there were some Athenian volunteers who assisted the -exiles. -</p> -<p> -M. Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 38-43) discusses this discrepancy -at considerable length, and cites the opinion of various German -authors in respect to it, with none of whom I altogether concur. -</p> -<p> -In my judgment, the proper solution is, to reject altogether (as belonging -to a later time) the statement of Diodorus, respecting the public vote at -Athens, and the army said to have been sent to Thebes under Demophon; -and to accept the more credible narrative of Xenophon; which ascribes to -Athens a reasonable prudence, and great fear of Sparta,—qualities such -as Athenian orators would not be disposed to boast of. According to that -narrative, the question about sending Athenians to aid in storming the Kadmeia -could hardly have been submitted for public discussion, since that citadel -was surrendered at once by the intimidated garrison.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_197"><a href="#FNanchor_197">[197]</a></span> -The daring <i>coup de main</i> of Pelopidas and Mellon, against the government -of Thebes, bears a remarkable analogy to that by which Evagoras got -into Salamis and overthrew the previous despot (Isokrates, Or. ix, Evagor. -s. 34).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_198"><a href="#FNanchor_198">[198]</a></span> -See, in illustration of Greek sentiment on this point, Xenophon, Hellen. -iii, 4, 19; and Xenophon, Enc. Ages. i, 28.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_199"><a href="#FNanchor_199">[199]</a></span> -If, indeed, we could believe Isokrates, speaking through the mouth of a -Platæan, it would seem that the Thebans, immediately after their revolution, -sent an humble embassy to Sparta deprecating hostility, entreating to -be admitted as allies, and promising service, even against their benefactors -the Athenians, just as devoted as the deposed government had rendered; -an embassy which the Spartans haughtily answered by desiring them to -receive back their exiles, and to cast out the assassins Pelopidas and his -comrades. It is possible that the Thebans may have sent to try the possibility -of escaping Spartan enmity; but it is highly improbable that they -made any such promises as those here mentioned; and it is certain that -they speedily began to prepare vigorously for that hostility which they saw -to be approaching. -</p> -<p> -See Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 31. -</p> -<p> -This oration is put into the mouth of a Platæan, and seems to be an assemblage -of nearly all the topics which could possibly be enforced, truly or -falsely, against Thebes.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_200"><a href="#FNanchor_200">[200]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 14. μάλα χειμῶνος ὄντος.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_201"><a href="#FNanchor_201">[201]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 13. εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγοίη, λέξειαν οἱ -πολῖται, ὡς Ἀγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσειε τοῖς τυράννοις, πράγματα τῇ πόλει -παρέχοι. Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_202"><a href="#FNanchor_202">[202]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 15-18.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_203"><a href="#FNanchor_203">[203]</a></span> -See Vol. VIII. of this History, Ch. lxiv, p. 196—about the psephism -of Kannônus.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_204"><a href="#FNanchor_204">[204]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 19; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 14. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon mentions the Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens, but does not -expressly say that they were sent to demand reparation for the conduct of -these two generals or of the volunteers. I cannot doubt, however, that the -fact was so; for in those times, there were no resident envoys,—none but -envoys sent on special missions.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_205"><a href="#FNanchor_205">[205]</a></span> -The trial and condemnation of these two generals has served as the -groundwork for harsh reproach against the Athenian democracy. Wachsmuth -(Hellen. Alterth. i, p. 654) denounces it as “a judicial horror, or abomination—ein -Greul-gericht.” Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. -44, 45) says,—“Quid? quia invasionem Lacedæmoniorum viderant in -Bœotiam factam esse, non puduit eos, damnare imperatores quorum facta -suis decretis comprobaverant?” ... “Igitur hanc <i>illius facinoris excusationem</i> -habebimus: Rebus quæ a Thebanis agebantur (<i>i. e.</i> by the propositions -of the Thebans seeking peace from Sparta, and trying to get enrolled -as her allies,—alleged by Isokrates, which I have noticed above as being, -in my judgment, very inaccurately recorded) cognitis, Athenienses, quo -<i>enixius subvenerant, eo majore pœnitentiâ perculsi</i> sunt.... Sed tantum abfuit -ut sibimet irascerentur, ut, <i>e more Atheniensium, punirentur qui perfecerant -id quod tum populus exoptaverat</i>.” -</p> -<p> -The censures of Wachsmuth, Rehdantz, etc. assume as matter of fact,—1. -That the Athenians had passed a formal vote in the public assembly to -send assistance to Thebes, under two generals, who accordingly went out in -command of the army and performed their instructions. 2. That the Athenians, -becoming afterwards repentant or terrified, tried and condemned -these two generals for having executed the commission entrusted to them. -</p> -<p> -I have already shown grounds (in a previous note) for believing that the -first of these affirmations is incorrect; the second, as dependent on it, will -therefore be incorrect also. -</p> -<p> -These authors here appear to me to single out a portion of each of the -two <i>inconsistent</i> narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus, and blend them together -in a way which contradicts both. -</p> -<p> -Thus, they take from Diodorus the allegation, that the Athenians sent to -Thebes by public vote a large army, which fought along with the Thebans -against the Kadmeia,—an allegation which, not only is not to be found in -Xenophon, but which his narrative plainly, though indirectly, excludes. -</p> -<p> -Next, they take from Xenophon the allegation, that the Athenians tried -and condemned the two generals who were accomplices in the conspiracy -of Mellon against the Theban rulers,—τὼ δύω στρατηγὼ, οἳ συνηπιστάσθην -τὴν τοῦ Μέλλωνος ἐπὶ τοὺς περὶ Λεοντιάδην ἐπανάστασιν (v, 4, 19). Now -the mention of these two generals follows naturally and consistently in -<i>Xenophon</i>. He had before told us that there were <i>two</i> out of the Athenian -generals, who both assisted underhand in organizing the plot, and afterwards -went with the volunteers to Thebes. But it cannot be fitted on to -the narrative of <i>Diodorus, who never says a word about this condemnation by -the Athenians</i>—nor even mentions <i>any two Athenian generals</i>, at all. He -tells us that the Athenian army which went to Thebes was commanded by -Demophon; he notices no colleague whatever. He says in general words, -that the conspiracy was organized “with the assistance of the Athenians” -(συνεπιλαβομένων Ἀθηναίων); not saying a word about any <i>two generals</i> as -especially active. -</p> -<p> -Wachsmuth and Rehdantz take it for granted, most gratuitously, that -these two condemned generals (mentioned by Xenophon and not by Diodorus) -are identical with Demophon and another colleague, commanders of -an army which went out by public vote (mentioned by Diodorus and not -by Xenophon). -</p> -<p> -The narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus (as I have before observed) -are distinct and inconsistent with each other. We have to make our option -between them. I adhere to that of Xenophon, for reasons previously given. -But if any one prefers that of Diodorus, he ought then to reject altogether -the story of the condemnation of the two Athenian generals (<i>who nowhere -appear in Diodorus</i>), and to suppose that Xenophon was misinformed upon -that point, as upon the other facts of the case. -</p> -<p> -That the two Athenian generals (assuming the Xenophontic narrative as -true) should be tried and punished, when the consequences of their unauthorized -proceeding were threatening to come with severity upon Athens,—appears -to me neither improbable nor unreasonable. Those who are -shocked by the very severity of the sentence, will do well to read the remarks -which the Lacedæmonian envoys make (Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 23) on -the conduct of Sphodrias. -</p> -<p> -To turn from one severe sentence to another,—whoever believes the narrative -of Diodorus in preference to that of Xenophon, ought to regard the -execution of those two Lacedæmonian commanders who surrendered the -Kadmeia as exceedingly cruel. According to Diodorus, these officers had -done everything which brave men could do; they had resisted a long time, -repelled many attacks, and were only prevented from farther holding out -by a mutiny among their garrison. -</p> -<p> -Here again, we see the superiority of the narrative of Xenophon over -that of Diodorus. According to the former, these Lacedæmonian commanders -surrendered the Kadmeia without any resistance at all. Their -condemnation, like that of the Athenian two generals, becomes a matter -easy to understand and explain.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_206"><a href="#FNanchor_206">[206]</a></span> -Tacit. Histor. i, 38. -</p> -<p> -Compare (in Plutarch, Anton. c. 32) the remark of Sextus Pompey to his -captain Menas, when the latter asked his permission to cut the cables of -the ship, while Octavius and Antony were dining on board, and to seize -their persons,—“I cannot permit any such thing; but you ought to have -done it without asking my permission.” A reply familiar to the readers of -Shakspeare’s Antony and Cleopatra.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_207"><a href="#FNanchor_207">[207]</a></span> -Kallisthenes, Frag. 2, ed. Didot, apud Harpokration, v. Σφοδρίας; Diodor. -xv, 29; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 14; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24. The miscalculation -of Sphodrias as to the time necessary for his march to Peiræus -is not worse than other mistakes which Polybius (in a very instructive discourse, -ix, 12, 20, seemingly extracted from his lost commentaries on Tactics) -recounts as having been committed by various other able commanders.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_208"><a href="#FNanchor_208">[208]</a></span> -Πείθουσι τὸν ἐν ταῖς Θεσπιαῖς ἁρμοστὴν Σφοδρίαν, χρήματα δόντες, -ὡς ὑπωπτεύετο—Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 20; Diodor. xv, 29; Plutarch, Pelopid. -c. 14; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24, 25. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus affirms private orders from Kleombrotus to Sphodrias. -</p> -<p> -In rejecting the suspicion mentioned by Xenophon,—that it was the -Theban leaders who instigated and bribed Sphodrias,—we may remark—1. -That the plan might very possibly have succeeded; and its success -would have been ruinous to the Thebans. Had they been the instigators, -they would not have failed to give notice of it at Athens at the same time; -which they certainly did not do. 2. That if the Lacedæmonians had punished -Sphodrias, no war would have ensued. Now every man would have -predicted, that assuming the scheme to fail, they certainly would punish -him. 3. The strong interest taken by Agesilaus afterwards in the fate of -Sphodrias, and the high encomium which he passed on the general character -of the latter,—are quite consistent with a belief on his part that Sphodrias -(like Phœbidas) may have done wrong towards a foreign city from over-ambition -in the service of his country. But if Agesilaus (who detested the -Thebans beyond measure) had believed that Sphodrias was acting under -the influence of bribes from them, he would not merely have been disposed -to let justice take its course, but would have approved and promoted the -condemnation. -</p> -<p> -On a previous occasion (Hellen. iii, 5, 3) Xenophon had imputed to the -Thebans a similar refinement of stratagem; seemingly with just as little -cause.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_209"><a href="#FNanchor_209">[209]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_210"><a href="#FNanchor_210">[210]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 32. Ἐκεῖνός γε (Ἀγησίλαος) πρὸς πάντας -ὅσοις διείλεκται, ταῦτὰ λέγει· Μὴ ἀδικεῖν μὲν Σφοδρίαν ἀδύνατον εἶναι· -ὅστις μέντοι, παῖς τε ὢν καὶ παιδίσκος καὶ ἡβῶν, πάντα τὰ καλὰ ποιῶν -διετέλεσε, χαλεπὸν εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἀποκτιννύναι· τὴν γὰρ Σπάρτην -τοιούτων δεῖσθαι στρατιωτῶν. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon explains at some length (v, 4, 25-33) and in a very interesting -manner, both the relations between Kleonymus and Archidamus, and the -appeal of Archidamus to his father. The statement has all the air of being -derived from personal knowledge, and nothing but the fear of prolixity hinders -me from giving it in full. -</p> -<p> -Compare Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 25; Diodor. xv, 29.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_211"><a href="#FNanchor_211">[211]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 22-32.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_212"><a href="#FNanchor_212">[212]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 24.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_213"><a href="#FNanchor_213">[213]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 34-63.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_214"><a href="#FNanchor_214">[214]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 34; Xen. de Vectigal. v, 7; Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) -s. 20, 23, 37; Diodor. xv, 29.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_215"><a href="#FNanchor_215">[215]</a></span> -The contribution was now called σύνταξις, not φόρος; see Isokrates, De -Pace, s. 37-46; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7; Harpokration, v. Σύνταξις. -</p> -<p> -Plutarch, De Fortunâ Athen. p. 351. ἰσόψηφον αὐτοῖς τὴν Ἑλλάδα κατέστησαν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_216"><a href="#FNanchor_216">[216]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 47. Καὶ <em class="gesperrt">τῶν μὲν κτημάτων τῶν -ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν ἀπέστητε</em>, βουλόμενοι τὴν συμμαχίαν ὡς μεγίστην ποιῆσαι, etc. -</p> -<p> -Diodor. xv, 28, 29. Ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ καὶ <em class="gesperrt">τὰς γενομένας κληρουχίας ἀποκαταστῆσαι -τοῖς πρότερον κυρίοις γεγονόσι</em>, καὶ νόμον ἔθεντο μηδένα τῶν Ἀθηναίων γεωργεῖν -ἐκτὸς τῆς Ἀττικῆς. Διὰ δὲ ταύτης τῆς φιλανθρωπίας ἀνακτησάμενοι τὴν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν -εὔνοιαν, ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἰδίαν ἡγεμονίαν. -</p> -<p> -Isokrates and Diodorus speak loosely of this vote, in language which -might make us imagine that it was one of distinct restitution, giving back -property <i>actually enjoyed</i>. But the Athenians had never actually regained -the outlying private property lost at the close of the war, though they had -much desired it, and had cherished hopes that a favorable turn of circumstances -might enable them to effect the recovery. As the recovery, if -effected, would be at the cost of those whom they were now soliciting as -allies, the public and formal renunciation of such rights was a measure of -much policy, and contributed greatly to appease uneasiness in the islands; -though in point of fact nothing was given up except rights to property not -really enjoyed. -</p> -<p> -An Inscription has recently been discovered at Athens, recording the -original Athenian decree, of which the main provisions are mentioned in my -text. It bears date in the archonship of Nausinikus. It stands, with the -restorations of M. Boeckh (fortunately a portion of it has been found in -tolerably good preservation), in the Appendix to the new edition of his -work,—“Über die Staats-haushaltung der Athener—Verbesserungen und -Nachträge zu den drei Banden der Staats-haushaltung der Athener,” p. xx. -</p> -<p> -Ἀπὸ δὲ Ναυσινίκου ἄρχοντος μὴ ἐξεῖναι μήτε ἰδίᾳ μήτε δημοσίᾳ Ἀθηναίων μηδενὶ -ἐγκτήσασθαι ἐν ταῖς τῶν συμμάχων χώραις μήτε οἰκίαν μήτε χώριον, μήτε πριαμένῳ, -μήτε ὑποθεμένῳ, μήτε ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ μηδενί. Ἐὰν δέ τις ὠνῆται ἢ κτᾶται ἢ τίθηται -τρόπῳ ὁτῳοῦν, ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλομένῳ τῶν συμμάχων φῆναι πρὸς τοὺς συνέδρους τῶν -συμμάχων. Οἱ δὲ σύνεδροι ἀπο- -μενοι ἀποδόντων [τὸ μὲν ἥ]μισυ τῷ φῄναντι, τὸ δὲ -ἄ[λλο κοιν]ὸν ἔστω τῶν συνμμάχων. Ἐὰν δέ τις [ἴῃ] ἐπὶ πολέμῳ ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιησαμένους -τὴν συμμαχίαν, ἢ κατὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν, βοηθεῖν Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τούτοις -καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. Ἐὰν δέ τις εἴπῃ ἢ ἐπιψηφίσῃ, -ἢ ἄρχων ἢ ἰδιώτης, παρὰ τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα, ὡς λύειν τι δεῖ τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ψηφίσματι -εἰρημένων, ὑπαρχέτω μὲν αὐτῷ ἀτίμῳ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημόσια ἔστω καὶ τῆς θεοῦ -τὸ ἐπιδέκατον· καὶ κρινέσθω ἐν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ὡς διαλύων τὴν συμμαχίαν. -Ζημιούντων δὲ αὐτὸν θανάτῳ ἢ φυγῇ ὅπου Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι κρατοῦσι. Ἐὰν δὲ θανάτῳ -τιμήθῃ, μὴ ταφήτω ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ μηδὲ ἐν τῇ τῶν συμμάχων. -</p> -<p> -Then follows a direction, that the Secretary of the Senate of Five Hundred -shall inscribe the decree on a column of stone, and place it by the side -of the statue of Zeus Eleutherius; with orders to the Treasurers of the goddess -to disburse sixty drachmas for the cost of so doing. -</p> -<p> -It appears that there is annexed to this Inscription a list of such cities as -had already joined the confederacy, together with certain other names -added afterwards, of cities which joined subsequently. The Inscription itself -directs such list to be recorded,—εἰς δὲ τὴν στήλην ταύτην ἀναγράφειν τῶν τε -οὐσῶν πόλεων συμμαχίδων τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ ἥτις ἂν ἄλλη σύμμαχος γίγνηται. -</p> -<p> -Unfortunately M. Boeckh has not annexed this list, which, moreover, he -states to have been preserved only in a very partial and fragmentary condition. -He notices only, as contained in it, the towns of Poiessa and Korêsus -in the island of Keos,—and Antissa and Eresus in Lesbos; all four as -autonomous communities.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_217"><a href="#FNanchor_217">[217]</a></span> -Herodot. i, 96. Ὁ δὲ, οἷα δὴ μνεώμενος ἀρχὴν, ἰθύς τε καὶ δίκαιος ἦν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_218"><a href="#FNanchor_218">[218]</a></span> -This is the sentiment connected with Ζεὺς Ἐλευθέριος,—Pausanias -the victor of Platæa, offers to Zeus Eleutherius a solemn sacrifice and thanksgiving -immediately after the battle, in the agora of the town (Thucyd. ii, -71). So the Syracusans immediately after the expulsion of the Gelonian -dynasty (Diodor. xi, 72)—and Mæandrius at Samos (Herodot. iii, 142).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_219"><a href="#FNanchor_219">[219]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 29.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_220"><a href="#FNanchor_220">[220]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 29.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_221"><a href="#FNanchor_221">[221]</a></span> -Cornel. Nepos, Iphicrates, c. 2; Chabrias, c. 2, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_222"><a href="#FNanchor_222">[222]</a></span> -See an interesting Fragment (preserved by Athenæus, iv, p. 131) of the -comedy called <i>Protesilaus</i>—by the Athenian poet Anaxandrides (Meineke, -Comic. Græc. Frag. iii, p. 182). It contains a curious description of the -wedding of Iphikrates with the daughter of Kotys in Thrace; enlivened by -an abundant banquet and copious draughts of wine given to crowds of -Thracians in the market-place:— -</p> -<div class="poetry-container"> - <div class="poetry"> - <p>δειπνεῖν δ’ <em class="gesperrt">ἄνδρας βουτυροφάγας</em></p> - <p>αὐχμηροκόμας μυριοπληθεῖς, etc.,</p> - </div> -</div> -<p class="ni">brazen vessels as large as wine vats, full of broth,—Kotys himself girt -round, and serving the broth in a golden basin, then going about to taste -all the bowls of wine and water ready mixed, until he was himself the first -man intoxicated. Iphikrates brought from Athens several of the best -players on the harp and flute. -</p> -<p> -The distinction between the <i>butter</i> eaten, or rubbed on the skin, by the -Thracians, and the <i>olive-oil</i> habitually consumed in Greece, deserves notice. -The word αὐχμηροκόμας seems to indicate the absence of those scented unguents -which, at the banquet of Greeks, would have been applied to the -hair of the guests, giving to it a shining gloss and moisture. It appears -that the Lacedæmonian women, however, sometimes anointed themselves -with butter, and not with oil; see Plutarch, adv. Koloten, p. 1109 B. -</p> -<p> -The number of warlike stratagems in Thrace, ascribed to Iphikrates by -Polyænus and other Tactic writers, indicates that his exploits there were -renowned as well as long-continued.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_223"><a href="#FNanchor_223">[223]</a></span> -Theopomp. Fragm. 175, ed. Didot; Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_224"><a href="#FNanchor_224">[224]</a></span> -Xenoph. Anab. vii, 2, 38; vii, 5, 8; vii, 6, 43. Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 17; -Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 36. -</p> -<p> -See also a striking passage (in Lysias Orat. xxviii, cont. Ergokl. s. 5) -about the advice given to Thrasybulus by a discontented fellow-citizen, to -seize Byzantium, marry the daughter of Seuthes, and defy Athens.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_225"><a href="#FNanchor_225">[225]</a></span> -Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 13. p. 249. -</p> -<p> -At what time this adoption took place, we cannot distinctly make out; -Amyntas died in 370 <small>B.C.</small>, while from 378-371 <small>B.C.</small>, Iphikrates seems to -have been partly on service with the Persian satraps, partly in command of -the Athenian fleet in the Ionian Sea (see Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, etc. ch. -4). Therefore, the adoption took place at some time between 387-378 <small>B.C.</small>; -perhaps after the restoration of Amyntas to his maritime dominions by the -Lacedæmonian expedition against Olynthus—382-380 <small>B.C.</small> Amyntas -was so weak and insecure, from the Thessalians, and other land-neighbors -(see Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s. 112), that it was much to his advantage -to cultivate the favor of a warlike Athenian established on the -Thracian coast, like Iphikrates.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_226"><a href="#FNanchor_226">[226]</a></span> -From these absences of men like Iphikrates and Chabrias, a conclusion -has been drawn severely condemning the Athenian people. They were so -envious and ill-tempered (it has been said), that none of their generals -could live with comfort at Athens; all lived abroad as they could. Cornelius -Nepos (Chabrias, c. 3) makes the remark, borrowed originally from -Theopompus (Fr. 117, ed. Didot), and transcribed by many modern commentators -as if it were exact and literal truth—“Hoc Chabrias nuntio (i. -e. on being recalled from Egypt, in consequence of the remonstrance of -Pharnabazus) Athenas rediit neque ibi diutius est moratus quam fuit necesse. -Non enim libenter erat ante oculos civium suorum, quod et vivebat -laute, et indulgebat sibi liberalius, quam ut invidiam vulgi posset effugere. -Est enim hoc commune vitium in magnis liberisque civitatibus, ut invidia -gloriæ comes sit, et libenter de his detrahant, quos eminere videant altius; -neque animo æquo pauperes alienam opulentium intuentur fortunam. Itaque -Chabrias, quoad ei licebat, plurimum aberat. Neque vero solus ille -aberat Athenis libenter, sed omnes fere principes fecerunt idem, quod -tantum se ab invidiâ putabant abfuturos, quantum a conspectu suorum -recessissent. Itaque Conon plurimum Cypri vixit, Iphicrates in Thraciâ, -Timotheus Lesbi, Chares in Sigeo.” -</p> -<p> -That the people of Athens, among other human frailties, had their fair -share of envy and jealousy, is not to be denied; but that these attributes -belonged to them in a marked or peculiar manner, cannot (in my judgment) -be shown by any evidence extant,—and most assuredly is not shown -by the evidence here alluded to. -</p> -<p> -“Chabrias was fond of a life of enjoyment and luxurious indulgence.” -If instead of being an Athenian, he had been a Spartan, he would undoubtedly -have been compelled to expatriate in order to gratify this taste; for it -was the express drift and purpose of the Spartan discipline, not to equalize -property, but to equalize the habits, enjoyments, and personal toils, of the -rich and poor. This is a point which the admirers of Lykurgus,—Xenophon -and Plutarch,—attest not less clearly than Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, -and others. If then it were considered a proof of envy and ill-temper, -to debar rich men from spending their money in procuring enjoyments, we -might fairly consider the reproach as made out against Lykurgus and -Sparta. Not so against Athens. There was no city in Greece where the -means of luxurious and comfortable living were more abundantly exhibited -for sale, nor where a rich man was more perfectly at liberty to purchase -them. Of this the proofs are everywhere to be found. Even the son of this -very Chabrias, Ktesippus, who inherited the appetite for enjoyment, without -the greater qualities of his father,—found the means of gratifying -his appetite so unfortunately easy at Athens, that he wasted his whole substance -in such expenses (Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7; Athenæus, iv, p. 165). -And Chares was even better liked at Athens in consequence of his love of -enjoyment and license,—if we are to believe another Fragment (238) of -the same Theopompus. -</p> -<p> -The allegation of Theopompus and Nepos, therefore, is neither true as -matter of fact, nor sufficient, if it had been true, to sustain the hypothesis -of a malignant Athenian public, with which they connect it. Iphikrates -and Chabrias did not stay away from Athens because they loved enjoyments -or feared the envy of their countrymen; but because both of them were -large gainers by doing so, in importance, in profit, and in tastes. Both of -them were men πολεμικοὶ καὶ φιλοπόλεμοι ἐσχάτως (to use an expression of -Xenophon respecting the Lacedæmonian Klearchus—Anab. ii, 6, 1); both -of them loved war and had great abilities for war,—qualities quite compatible -with strong appetite for enjoyment; while neither of them had either -taste or talent for the civil routine and debate of Athens when at peace. -Besides, each of them was commander of a body of peltasts, through whose -means he could obtain lucrative service as well as foreign distinction; so -that we can assign a sufficient reason why both of them preferred to be absent -from Athens during most part of the nine years that the peace of Antalkidas -continued. Afterwards, Iphikrates was abroad three or four years, -in service with the Persian satraps, by order of the Athenians; Chabrias -also went a long time afterwards, again on foreign service, to Egypt, at the -same time when the Spartan king Agesilaus was there (yet without staying -long away, since we find him going out on command from Athens to the -Chersonese in 359-358 <small>B.C.</small>—Demosth. cont. Aristokr. p. 677, s. 204); but -neither he nor Agesilaus, went there to escape the mischief of envious -countrymen. Demosthenes does not talk of Iphikrates as being uncomfortable -in Athens, or anxious to get out of it; see Orat. cont. Meidiam, p. -535, s. 83. -</p> -<p> -Again, as to the case of Konon and his residence in Cyprus; it is truly -surprising to see this fact cited as an illustration of Athenian jealousy or -ill-temper. Konon went to Cyprus immediately after the disaster of Ægospotami, -and remained there, or remained away from Athens, for eleven years -(405-393 <small>B.C.</small>) until the year after his victory at Knidus. It will be recollected -that he was one of the six Athenian generals who commanded the -fleet at Ægospotami. That disaster, while it brought irretrievable ruin upon -Athens, was at the same time such as to brand with well-merited infamy the -generals commanding. Konon was so far less guilty than his colleagues, as -he was in a condition to escape with eight ships when the rest were captured. -But he could not expect, and plainly did not expect, to be able to -show his face again in Athens, unless he could redeem the disgrace by some -signal fresh service. He nobly paid this debt to his country, by the victory -of Knidus in 394 <small>B.C.</small>; and then came back the year afterwards, to a grateful -and honorable welcome at Athens. About a year or more after this, he -went out again as envoy to Persia in the service of his country. He was -there seized and imprisoned by the satrap Tiribazus, but contrived to make -his escape, and died at Cyprus, as it would appear, about 390 <small>B.C.</small> Nothing -therefore can be more unfounded than the allegation of Theopompus, -“that Konon lived abroad at Cyprus, because he was afraid of undeserved -ill-temper from the public at Athens.” For what time Timotheus -may have lived at Lesbos, we have no means of saying. But from the year -370 <small>B.C.</small> down to his death, we hear of him so frequently elsewhere, in the -service of his country, that his residence cannot have been long.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_227"><a href="#FNanchor_227">[227]</a></span> -Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 40, p. 283.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_228"><a href="#FNanchor_228">[228]</a></span> -The employment of the new word συντάξεις, instead of the unpopular -term φόρους, is expressly ascribed to Kallistratus,—Harpokration in Voce.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_229"><a href="#FNanchor_229">[229]</a></span> -Isokrates gives the number twenty-four cities (Or. xv, Permut. s. 120). So -also Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. s. 15; cont. Philokl. s. 17. The statement -of Æschines, that Timotheus brought seventy-five cities into the confederacy, -appears large, and must probably include all that that general either acquired -or captured (Æsch. Fals. Leg. c. 24, p. 263). Though I think the -number twenty-four probable enough, yet it is difficult to identify what -towns they were. For Isokrates, so far as he particularizes, includes Samos, -Sestos, and Krithôtê, which were not acquired until many years afterwards,—in -366-365 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -Neither of these orators distinguish between those cities which Timotheus -brought or persuaded to come into the confederacy, when it was first formed -(among which we may reckon Eubœa, or most part of it—Plutarch, De -Glor. Athen. p. 351 A.)—from those others which he afterwards took by -siege, like Samos.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_230"><a href="#FNanchor_230">[230]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. xiv, Plataic. s. 30.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_231"><a href="#FNanchor_231">[231]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 20. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑφ’ ὑμῶν κατὰ -κράτος ἁλόντες εὐθὺς μὲν ἁρμοστοῦ καὶ δουλείας ἀπηλλάγησαν, νῦν δὲ τοῦ -συνεδρίου καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσιν, etc. -</p> -<p> -The adverb of time here used indicates about 372 <small>B.C.</small>, about a year before -the battle of Leuktra.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_232"><a href="#FNanchor_232">[232]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 30.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_233"><a href="#FNanchor_233">[233]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 29. -</p> -<p> -Polybius (ii, 62) states that the Athenians <i>sent out</i> (not merely, <i>voted</i> to -send out) ten thousand hoplites, and manned one hundred triremes. -</p> -<p> -Both these authors treat the resolution as if it were taken by the Athenians -alone; but we must regard it in conjunction with the newly-assembled -synod of allies.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_234"><a href="#FNanchor_234">[234]</a></span> -Xen. De Vectigal. v, 6. οὔκουν καὶ τότ’, ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἀπεσχόμεθα, -πάλιν <em class="gesperrt">ὑπὸ τῶν νησιωτῶν ἑκόντων προστάται</em> τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἐγενόμεθα; -</p> -<p> -In the early years of this confederacy, votive offerings of wreaths or -crowns, in token of gratitude to Athens, were decreed by the Eubœans, as -well as by the general body of allies. These crowns were still to be seen -thirty years afterwards at Athens, with commemorative inscriptions (Demosthen. -cont. Androtion. c. 21, p. 616; cont. Timokrat. c. 41, p. 756).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_235"><a href="#FNanchor_235">[235]</a></span> -For the description of the Solonian census, see Vol. III, Ch. xi, p. 117, -of this History.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_236"><a href="#FNanchor_236">[236]</a></span> -This is M. Boeckh’s opinion, seemingly correct, as far as can be made -out on a subject very imperfectly known (Public Economy of Athens, B, -iv, ch. 5).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_237"><a href="#FNanchor_237">[237]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aphob. i, p. 815, 816; cont. Aphob. ii, p. 836; cont. -Aphob. de Perjur. p. 862. Compare Boeckh, Publ. Econ. Ath. iv, 7. -</p> -<p> -In the exposition which M. Boeckh gives of the new property-schedule -introduced under the archonship of Nausinikus, he inclines to the hypothesis -of four distinct Classes, thus distributed (p. 671 of the new edition of -his Staats-haushaltung der Athener):— -</p> -<p> -1. The first class included all persons who possessed property to the value -of twelve talents and upwards. They were entered on the schedule, each -for one-fifth, or twenty per cent. of his property. -</p> -<p> -2. The second class comprised all who possessed property to the amount -of six talents, but below twelve talents. Each was enrolled in the -schedule, for the amount of sixteen per cent. upon his property. -</p> -<p> -3. The third class included all whose possessions amounted to the value -of two talents, but did not reach six talents. Each was entered in the -schedule at the figure of twelve per cent. upon his property. -</p> -<p> -4. The fourth class comprised all, from the minimum of twenty-five minæ, -but below the maximum of two talents. Each was entered in the schedule -for the amount of eight per cent. upon his property. -</p> -<p> -This detail rests upon no positive proof; but it serves to illustrate the -principle of distribution, and of graduation, then adopted.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_238"><a href="#FNanchor_238">[238]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Androtion. p. 612, c. 17. τὸ ἑκτὸν μέρος εἰσφέρειν μετὰ τῶν μετοίκων.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_239"><a href="#FNanchor_239">[239]</a></span> -Polybius states the former sum (ii, 62), Demosthenes the latter (De -Symmoriis, p. 183, c. 6). Boeckh however has shown, that Polybius did -not correctly conceive what the sum which he stated really meant.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_240"><a href="#FNanchor_240">[240]</a></span> -I am obliged again, upon this point, to dissent from M. Boeckh, who -sets it down as positive matter of fact that a property-tax of five per cent., -amounting to three hundred talents, was imposed and levied in the archonship -of Nausinikus (Publ. Econ. Ath. iv, 7, 8; p. 517-521, Eng. Transl.). The -evidence upon which this is asserted, is, a passage of Demosthenes cont. -Androtion. (p. 606. c. 14). Ὑμῖν <em class="gesperrt">παρὰ τὰς εἰσφορὰς τὰς ἀπὸ Ναυσινίκου</em>, παρ’ ἴσως -τάλαντα τριακόσια ἢ μικρῷ πλείω, ἔλλειμμα τέτταρα καὶ δέκα ἐστὶ τάλαντα· ὧν ἑπτὰ οὗτος -(Androtion) εἰσέπραξεν. Now these -words imply,—not that a property-tax of about three hundred talents had -been levied or called for <i>during</i> the archonship of Nausinikus, but—that a -total sum of three hundred talents, or thereabouts, had been levied (or called -for) by all the various property-taxes imposed <i>from the archonship of Nausinikus -down to the date of the speech</i>. The oration was spoken about 355 <small>B.C.</small>; -the archonship of Nausinikus was in 378 <small>B.C.</small> What the speaker affirms, -therefore, is, that a sum of three hundred talents had been levied or called for -by all the various property-taxes imposed between these two dates; and -that the aggregate sum of arrears due upon all of them, at the time when -Androtion entered upon his office, was fourteen talents. -</p> -<p> -Taylor, indeed, in his note, thinking that the sum of three hundred talents -is very small, as the aggregate of all property-taxes imposed for twenty-three -years, suggests that it might be proper to read <em class="gesperrt">ἐπὶ</em> Ναυσινίκου -instead of <em class="gesperrt">ἀπὸ</em> Ναυσινίκου; and I presume that M. Boeckh adopts that -reading. But it would be unsafe to found an historical assertion upon such -a change of text, even if the existing text were more indefensible than it -actually is. And surely the plural number τὰς εἰσφορὰς proves that the orator -has in view, not the single property-tax imposed in the archonship of -Nausinikus, but two or more property-taxes, imposed at different times. -Besides, Androtion devoted himself to the collection of outstanding arrears -generally, in whatever year they might have accrued. He would have no -motive to single out those which had accrued in the year 378 <small>B.C.</small>; moreover, -those arrears would probably have become confounded with others, -long before 355 <small>B.C.</small> Demosthenes selects the year of Nausinikus as his -initial period, because it was then that the new schedule and a new reckoning, -began.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_241"><a href="#FNanchor_241">[241]</a></span> -Respecting the Symmories, compare Boeckh, Staats-haushaltung der -Athener, iv, 9, 10; Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Publ. Græcor. s. 78; Parreidt, -De Symmoriis, p. 18 <i>seq.</i></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_242"><a href="#FNanchor_242">[242]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 38.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_243"><a href="#FNanchor_243">[243]</a></span> -Plutarch. Pelopid. c. 18, 19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_244"><a href="#FNanchor_244">[244]</a></span> -Hist. of Greece. Vol. VII, ch. lv, p. 11.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_245"><a href="#FNanchor_245">[245]</a></span> -Diodor. xii, 70. -</p> -<p> -These pairs of neighbors who fought side by side at Delium, were called -Heniochi and Parabatæ,—Charioteers and Side Companions; a name borrowed -from the analogy of chariot-fighting, as described in the Iliad and -probably in many of the lost epic poems; the charioteer being himself an -excellent warrior, though occupied for the moment with other duties,—Diomedes -and Sthenelus, Pandarus and Æneas, Patroklus and Automedon, -etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_246"><a href="#FNanchor_246">[246]</a></span> -Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18, 19. -</p> -<p> -Ὁ συνταχθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἐπαμινώνδου ἱερὸς λόχος (Hieronymus apud Athenæum, -xiii, p. 602 A.). There was a Carthaginian military division which -bore the same title, composed of chosen and wealthy citizens, two thousand -five hundred in number (Diodor. xvi, 80).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_247"><a href="#FNanchor_247">[247]</a></span> -Pausan. viii, 11, 5. -</p> -<p> -Dikæarchus, only one generation afterwards, complained that he could -not find out the name of the mother of Epaminondas (Plutarch, Agesil. -c. 19).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_248"><a href="#FNanchor_248">[248]</a></span> -Plutarch, Pelop. c. 4; Pausan. ix, 13, 1. According to Plutarch, Epaminondas -had attained the age of forty years, before he became publicly known -(De Occult. Vivendo, p. 1129 C.). -</p> -<p> -Plutarch affirms that the battle (in which Pelopidas was desperately -wounded, and saved by Epaminondas) took place at Mantinea, when they -were fighting on the side of the Lacedæmonians, under king Agesipolis, -against the Arcadians; the Thebans being at that time friends of Sparta, -and having sent a contingent to her aid. -</p> -<p> -I do not understand what battle Plutarch can here mean. The Thebans -were never so united with Sparta as to send any contingent to her aid, after -the capture of Athens (in 404 <small>B.C.</small>). Most critics think that the war referred -to by Plutarch, is, the expedition conducted by Agesipolis against Mantinea, -whereby the city was broken up into villages—in 385 <small>B.C.</small>; see Mr. -Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici ad 385 <small>B.C.</small> But, in the first place, there cannot -have been any Theban contingent then assisting Agesipolis; for Thebes -was on terms unfriendly with Sparta,—and certainly was not her ally. In -the next place, there does not seem to have been any battle, according to -Xenophon’s account. -</p> -<p> -I therefore am disposed to question Plutarch’s account, as to this alleged -battle of Mantinea; though I think it probable that Epaminondas may have -saved the life of Pelopidas at some earlier conflict, before the peace of Antalkidas.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_249"><a href="#FNanchor_249">[249]</a></span> -Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 2; Plutarch, Apophth. Reg. p. 192 D.; Aristophan. -Acharn. 872. -</p> -<p> -Compare the citations in Athenæus, x, p. 417. The perfection of form -required in the runner was also different from that required in the wrestler -(Xenoph. Memor. iii, 8, 4; iii, 10, 6).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_250"><a href="#FNanchor_250">[250]</a></span> -Plutarch, Alkib. c. 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_251"><a href="#FNanchor_251">[251]</a></span> -Pindar, Olymp. vi, 90.</p> -<div class="poetry-container"> - <div class="poetry"> - <p>ἀρχαῖον ὄνειδος—Βοιώτιον ὗν, etc.</p> - </div> -</div> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_252"><a href="#FNanchor_252">[252]</a></span> -Aristoxenus mentions the flute, Cicero and Cornelius Nepos the lyre -(Aristoxen. Fr. 60, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. iv, p. 184; Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i, -2, 4; Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 2).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_253"><a href="#FNanchor_253">[253]</a></span> -Aristoxenus, Frag. 11, ed. Didot; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 583, -Cicero, De Offic. i, 44, 155; Pausan. ix, 13, 1; Ælian, V. H. iii, 17. -</p> -<p> -The statement (said to have been given by Aristoxenus, and copied by -Plutarch as well as by Jamblichus) that Lysis, who taught Epaminondas, -had been one of the persons actually present in the synod of Pythagoreans -at Kroton when Kylon burnt down the house, and that he with another had -been the only persons who escaped—cannot be reconciled with chronology.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_254"><a href="#FNanchor_254">[254]</a></span> -Compare Diodor. xv, 52 with Plutarch, Perikles, c. 6, and Plutarch, Demosthenes, -c. 20.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_255"><a href="#FNanchor_255">[255]</a></span> -Plutarch, De Gen. Sokrat. p. 576 D. μετείληφε παιδείας διαφόρου -καὶ περιττῆς—(p. 585 D.) τὴν ἀρίστην τροφὴν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ—(p. 592 F.) Σπίνθαρος -ὁ Ταραντῖνος οὐκ ὀλίγον αὐτῷ (Epaminondas) συνδιατρίψας ἐνταῦθα χρόνον, ἀεὶ δήπου -λέγει, μηδενί που τῶν καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρώπων ἐντετευχέναι, μήτε πλείονα γιγνώσκοντι -μήτε ἐλάττονα φθεγγομένῳ. Compare Cornel. -Nepos, Epamin. c. 3—and Plutarch, De Audiend. c. 3, p. 39 F. -</p> -<p> -We may fairly presume that this judgment of Spintharus was communicated -by him to his son Aristoxenus, from whom Plutarch copied it; and -we know that Aristoxenus in his writings mentioned other particulars -respecting Epaminondas (Athenæus, iv, p. 184). We see thus that Plutarch -had access to good sources of information respecting the latter. And as he -had composed a life of Epaminondas (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 28), though unfortunately -it has not reached us, we may be confident that he had taken -some pains to collect materials for the purpose, which materials would naturally -be employed in his dramatic dialogue, “De Genio Socratis.” This -strengthens our confidence in the interesting statements which that dialogue -furnishes respecting the character of Epaminondas; as well as in the -incidental allusions interspersed among Plutarch’s other writings.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_256"><a href="#FNanchor_256">[256]</a></span> -Cornel. Nepos, Epaminond. c. 5; Plutarch, Præcept. Reip. Gerend. p. -819 C. Cicero notices him as the only man with any pretensions to oratorical -talents, whom Thebes, Corinth, or Argos had ever produced (Brutus, -c. 13, 50).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_257"><a href="#FNanchor_257">[257]</a></span> -Plutarch (De Gen. Socr. p. 583, 584; Pelopid. c. 3; Fab. Max. c. 27. -Compar. Alcibiad. and Coriol. c. 4): Cornel. Nepos. Epamin. c. 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_258"><a href="#FNanchor_258">[258]</a></span> -Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 1; Justin, vi, 8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_259"><a href="#FNanchor_259">[259]</a></span> -Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 576 F. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ, μὴ πείθων -ὡς οἴεται βέλτιον εἶναι ταῦτα μὴ πράσσειν· εἰκότως ἀντιτείνει πρὸς ἃ μὴ -πέφυκε, μηδὲ δοκιμάζει, παρακαλούμενος. -</p> -<p> -... Ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ πείθει τοὺς πολλοὺς, ἀλλὰ ταύτην ὡρμήκαμεν τὴν ὁδὸν, ἐᾷν -αὐτὸν κελεύει φόνου καθαρὸν ὄντα καὶ ἀναίτιον ἐφεστᾶναι τοῖς καιροῖς, μετὰ -τοῦ δικαίου τῷ συμφέροντι προσοισόμενον. -</p> -<p> -Compare the same dialogue, p. 594 B.; and Cornelius Nepos, Pelopidas, -c. 4. -</p> -<p> -Isokrates makes a remark upon Evagoras of Salamis, which may be well -applied to Epaminondas; that the objectionable means, without which the -former could not have got possession of the sceptre, were performed by -others and not by him; while all the meritorious and admirable functions -of command were reserved for Evagoras (Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 28).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_260"><a href="#FNanchor_260">[260]</a></span> -See the striking statements of Plutarch and Pausanias about -Philopœmen,—καίπερ Ἐπαμεινώνδου βουλόμενος εἶναι μάλιστα ζηλωτὴς, τὸ -δραστήριον καὶ συνετὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ χρημάτων ἀπαθὲς ἰσχυρῶς ἐμιμεῖτο, τῷ δὲ -πράῳ καὶ βαθεῖ καὶ φιλανθρώπῳ παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς διαφορὰς ἐμμένειν οὐ -δυνάμενος, δι’ ὀργὴν καὶ φιλονεικίαν, μᾶλλον ἐδόκει στρατιωτικῆς ἢ πολιτικῆς -ἀρετῆς οἰκεῖος εἶναι. To the like purpose, Pausanias, viii, 49, 2; Plutarch, -Pelopidas, c. 25: Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 3—“patiens admirandum in -modum.”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_261"><a href="#FNanchor_261">[261]</a></span> -Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 32. Ὦ τοῦ μεγαλοπράγμονος ἀνθρώπου!</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_262"><a href="#FNanchor_262">[262]</a></span> -Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 576 E. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ, Βοιωτῶν ἁπάντων -τῷ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀξιῶν διαφέρειν, ἀμβλὺς ἐστι καὶ ἀπρόθυμος.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_263"><a href="#FNanchor_263">[263]</a></span> -Bauch, in his instructive biography of Epaminondas (Epaminondas, -und Thebens Kampf um die Hegemonie: Breslau, 1834, p. 26), seems to -conceive that Epaminondas was never employed in any public official post -by his countrymen, until the period immediately preceding the battle of -Leuktra. I cannot concur in this opinion. It appears to me that he must -have been previously employed in such posts as enabled him to show his -military worth. For all the proceedings of 371 <small>B.C.</small> prove that in that year -he actually possessed a great and established reputation, which must have -been acquired by previous acts in a conspicuous position; and as he had no -great family position to start from, his reputation was probably acquired -only by slow degrees. -</p> -<p> -The silence of Xenophon proves nothing in contradiction of this supposition; -for he does not mention Epaminondas even at Leuktra.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_264"><a href="#FNanchor_264">[264]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 31.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_265"><a href="#FNanchor_265">[265]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 54; Diodor. xv, 31.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_266"><a href="#FNanchor_266">[266]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 36-38.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_267"><a href="#FNanchor_267">[267]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 41.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_268"><a href="#FNanchor_268">[268]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 32; Polyæn. ii, 1, 2; Cornel. Nepos, Chabrias, c. 1,—“obnixo -genu scuto,”—Demosthen. cont. Leptinem, p. 479. -</p> -<p> -The Athenian public having afterwards voted a statue to the honor of -Chabrias, he made choice of this attitude for the design (Diodor. xv, 33).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_269"><a href="#FNanchor_269">[269]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4. 42-45; Diodor. xv, 33.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_270"><a href="#FNanchor_270">[270]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου πάλιν αὖ τὰ τῶν Θηβαίων ἀνεζωπυρεῖτο, -καὶ ἐστρατεύοντο εἰς Θεσπιὰς, καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περιοικίδας πόλεις. Ὁ μέντοι δῆμος -ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰς τὰς Θήβας ἀπεχώρει· ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι καθειστήκεσαν, -ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις· ὥστε καὶ οἱ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσι φίλοι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων βοηθείας -ἐδέοντο.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_271"><a href="#FNanchor_271">[271]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 47, 51. -</p> -<p> -The anecdotes in Polyænus (ii, 1, 18-20), mentioning faint-heartedness -and alarm among the allies of Agesilaus, are likely to apply (certainly in -part) to this campaign.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_272"><a href="#FNanchor_272">[272]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 33, 34; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 26.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_273"><a href="#FNanchor_273">[273]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 58.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_274"><a href="#FNanchor_274">[274]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 59.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_275"><a href="#FNanchor_275">[275]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 61. ἐνέβησαν αὐτοὶ εἰς τὰς ναῦς, etc. Boeckh (followed -by Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. 38, vol. v, p. 58) connects with this -maritime expedition an Inscription (Corp. Insc. No. 84, p. 124) recording a -vote of gratitude, passed by the Athenian assembly in favor of Phanokritus, -a native of Parium in the Propontis. But I think that the vote can -hardly belong to the present expedition. The Athenians could not need to -be informed by a native of Parium about the movements of a hostile fleet -near Ægina and Keos. The information given by Phanokritus must have -related more probably, I think, to some occasion of the transit of hostile -ships along the Hellespont, which a native of Parium would be the likely -person first to discover and communicate.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_276"><a href="#FNanchor_276">[276]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 35; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 17, p. 480. -</p> -<p> -I give the number of prize-ships taken in this action, as stated by Demosthenes; -in preference to Diodorus, who mentions a smaller number. The -orator, in enumerating the exploits of Chabrias in this oration, not only -speaks from a written memorandum in his hand, which he afterwards causes -to be read by the clerk,—but also seems exact and special as to numbers, -so as to inspire greater confidence than usual.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_277"><a href="#FNanchor_277">[277]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 35. Chabrias ἀπέσχετο παντελῶς τοῦ διωγμοῦ, ἀναμνησθεὶς -τῆς ἐν Ἀργινούσαις ναυμαχίας, ἐν ᾗ τοὺς νικήσαντας στρατηγοὺς ὁ δῆμος ἀντὶ μεγάλης -εὐεργεσίας θανάτῳ περιέβαλεν, <em class="gesperrt">αἰτιασάμενος ὅτι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας κατὰ τὴν -ναυμαχίαν οὐκ ἔθαψαν</em>· εὐλαβήθη οὖν (see Wesseling and Stephens’s note) μή ποτε -τῆς περιστάσεως ὁμοίας γενομένης κινδυνεύσῃ παθεῖν παραπλήσια. Διόπερ <em class="gesperrt">ἀποστὰς -τοῦ διώκειν, ἀνελέγετο τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς διανηχομένους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἔτι ζῶντας -διέσωσε, τοὺς δὲ τετελευτηκότας ἔθαψεν</em>. Εἰ δὲ μὴ περὶ ταύτην ἐγένετο τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, -ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἅπαντα τὸν πολεμίων στόλον διέφθειρε. -</p> -<p> -This passage illustrates what I remarked in my preceding volume (Vol. -VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 175), respecting the battle of Arginusæ and the proceedings -at Athens afterwards. I noticed that Diodorus incorrectly represented -the excitement at Athens against the generals as arising from their having -neglected to pick up the bodies of the <i>slain</i> warriors for burial,—and that -he omitted the more important fact, that they left many living and wounded -warriors to perish. -</p> -<p> -It is curious, that in the first of the two sentences above cited, Diodorus -repeats his erroneous affirmation about the battle of Arginusæ; while in the -second sentence he corrects the error, telling us that Chabrias, profiting by -the warning, took care to pick up the <i>living</i> men on the wrecks and in the -water, as well as the dead bodies.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_278"><a href="#FNanchor_278">[278]</a></span> -Plutarch, Phokion, c. 6; Plutarch, Camillus, c. 19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_279"><a href="#FNanchor_279">[279]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Leptin. p. 480; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_280"><a href="#FNanchor_280">[280]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 36. He states by mistake, that Chabrias was afterwards -assassinated at Abdera.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_281"><a href="#FNanchor_281">[281]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 62.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_282"><a href="#FNanchor_282">[282]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 64; Diodor. xv, 36.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_283"><a href="#FNanchor_283">[283]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 66; Isokrates, De Permutat. s. 116; Cornelius Nepos, -Timotheus, c. 2. -</p> -<p> -The advance of seven minæ respectively, obtained by Timotheus from -the sixty trierarchs under his command, is mentioned by Demosthenes -cont. Timotheum (c. 3, p. 1187). I agree with M. Boeckh (Public Economy -of Athens, ii, 24, p. 294) in referring this advance to his expedition to Korkyra -and other places in the Ionian Sea in 375-374 <small>B.C.</small>; not to his subsequent -expedition of 373 <small>B.C.</small>, to which Rehdantz, Lachmann, Schlosser, -and others would refer it (Vitæ Iphicratis, etc. p. 89). In the second expedition, -it does not appear that he ever had really sixty triremes, or sixty -trierarchs, under him. Xenophon (Hellen. v, 4, 63) tells us that the fleet sent -with Timotheus to Korkyra consisted of sixty ships; which is the exact -number of trierarchs named by Demosthenes.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_284"><a href="#FNanchor_284">[284]</a></span> -Isokrates, Orat. De Permutat. s. 128, 131, 135.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_285"><a href="#FNanchor_285">[285]</a></span> -Isokrates, De Permutat. s. 117; Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c. 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_286"><a href="#FNanchor_286">[286]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_287"><a href="#FNanchor_287">[287]</a></span> -See Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 21, 23, 37.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_288"><a href="#FNanchor_288">[288]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1. Οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι, αὐξανομένους μὲν ὁρῶντες διὰ σφᾶς -τοὺς Θηβαίους, χρήματά δ’ οὐ συμβαλλομένους εἰς τὸ ναυτικὸν, αὐτοὶ δ’ ἀποκναιόμενοι -καὶ χρημάτων εἰσφοραῖς καὶ λῃστείαις ἐξ Αἰγίνης, καὶ φυλακαῖς τῆς χώρας, ἐπεθύμησαν -παύσασθαι τοῦ πολέμου.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_289"><a href="#FNanchor_289">[289]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46-55.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_290"><a href="#FNanchor_290">[290]</a></span> -Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 15-25.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_291"><a href="#FNanchor_291">[291]</a></span> -Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 17; Diodor. xv, 37. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon does not mention the combat at Tegyra. Diodorus mentions, -what is evidently this battle, near Orchomenus; but he does not name Tegyra. -</p> -<p> -Kallisthenes seems to have described the battle of Tegyra, and to have -given various particulars respecting the religious legends connected with -that spot (Kallisthenes, Fragm. 3, ed. Didot, ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Τεγύρα).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_292"><a href="#FNanchor_292">[292]</a></span> -That the Thebans thus became again presidents of all Bœotia, and revived -the Bœotian confederacy,—is clearly stated by Xenophon, Hellen. v, -4, 63; vi, 1, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_293"><a href="#FNanchor_293">[293]</a></span> -Thucyd. ii, 2. Ἀνεῖπεν ὁ κήρυξ (the Theban herald after the Theban -troops had penetrated by night into the middle of Platæa εἴ τις βούλεται <em class="gesperrt">κατὰ -τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν</em> ξυμμαχεῖν, τίθεσθαι παρ’ αὐτοὺς τὰ ὅπλα, -νομίζοντες σφίσι ῥᾳδίως τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ προσχωρήσειν τὴν πόλιν. -</p> -<p> -Compare the language of the Thebans about τὰ πάτρια τῶν Βοιωτῶν (iii, -61, 65, 66). The description which the Thebans give of their own professions -and views, when they attacked Platæa in 431 <small>B.C.</small>, may be taken as fair -analogy to judge of their professions and views towards the recovered Bœotian -towns in 376-375 <small>B.C.</small></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_294"><a href="#FNanchor_294">[294]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3; Compare Diodor. xv, 53.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_295"><a href="#FNanchor_295">[295]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 31; Xen. Hellen, vi, 3, 1; iii, 6, 21.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_296"><a href="#FNanchor_296">[296]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 21-27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_297"><a href="#FNanchor_297">[297]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 1; vi, 21. -</p> -<p> -This expedition of Kleombrotus to Phokis is placed by Mr. Fynes Clinton -in 375 <small>B.C.</small> (Fast. Hel. ad 375 <small>B.C.</small>). To me it seems to belong rather -to 374 <small>B.C.</small> It was not undertaken until the Thebans had reconquered all -the Bœotian cities (Xen. Hell. vi, 1, 1); and this operation seems to have -occupied them all the two years,—376 and 375 <small>B.C.</small> See v, 4, 63, where -the words οὔτ’ ἐν ᾧ Τιμόθεος περιέπλευσε must be understood to include, -not simply the time which Timotheus took in <i>actually circumnavigating</i> Peloponnesus, -but the year which he spent afterwards in the Ionian Sea, and -the time which he occupied in performing his exploits near Korkyra, Leukas, -and the neighborhood generally. The “Periplus” for which Timotheus -was afterwards honored at Athens (see Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. c. -90, p. 458) meant the exploits performed by him during the year and with -the fleet of the “Periplus.” -</p> -<p> -It is worth notice that the Pythian games were celebrated in this year -374 <small>B.C.</small>,—ἐπὶ Σωκρατίδου ἄρχοντος; that is, in the first quarter of that -archon, or the third Olympic year; about the beginning of August, Chabrias -won a prize at these games with a chariot and four; in celebration of -which, he afterwards gave a splendid banquet at the point of sea-shore called -Kôlias, near Athens (Demosthen. cont. Neæram. c. 11, p. 1356).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_298"><a href="#FNanchor_298">[298]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1, 2. -</p> -<p> -Kallias seems to have been one of the Athenian envoys (Xen. Hellen. vi, -3, 4).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_299"><a href="#FNanchor_299">[299]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 82.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_300"><a href="#FNanchor_300">[300]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 3. Καὶ ὁπότε μὲν ἐνδεὴς εἴη, παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ -προσετίθει· ὁπότε δὲ περιγένοιτο τῆς προσόδου, ἀπελάμβανεν· ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως -φιλόξενός τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τὸν Θετταλικὸν τρόπον. -</p> -<p> -Such loose dealing of the Thessalians with their public revenues helps us -to understand how Philip of Macedon afterwards got into his hands the -management of their harbors and customs-duties (Demosthen. Olynth. i, p. -15; ii. p. 20). It forms a striking contrast with the exactness of the Athenian -people about their public receipts and disbursements, as testified in the -inscriptions yet remaining.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_301"><a href="#FNanchor_301">[301]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 4. -</p> -<p> -The story (told in Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. p. 583 F.) of Jason sending -a large sum of money to Thebes, at some period anterior to the recapture -of the Kadmeia, for the purpose of corrupting Epaminondas,—appears -not entitled to credit. Before that time, Epaminondas was too little known -to be worth corrupting; moreover, Jason did not become <i>tagus</i> of Thessaly -until long after the recapture of the Kadmeia (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 18, 19).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_302"><a href="#FNanchor_302">[302]</a></span> -See the interesting account of this mission, and the speech of Polydamas, -which I have been compelled greatly to abridge (in Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, -4-18).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_303"><a href="#FNanchor_303">[303]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 3; Diodor. xv, 45. -</p> -<p> -The statements of Diodorus are not clear in themselves; besides that on -some points, though not in the main, they contradict Xenophon. Diodorus -states that those exiles whom Timotheus brought back to Zakynthus, were -the philo-Spartan leaders, who had been recently expelled for their misrule -under the empire of Sparta. This statement must doubtless be incorrect. -The exiles whom Timotheus restored must have belonged to the anti-Spartan -party in the island. -</p> -<p> -But Diodorus appears to me to have got into confusion by representing -that universal and turbulent reaction against the philo-Spartan oligarchies, -which really did not take place until after the battle of Leuktra—as if it -had taken place some three years earlier. The events recounted in Diodor. -xv, 40, seem to me to belong to a period <i>after</i> the battle of Leuktra. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus also seems to have made a mistake in saying that the Athenians -sent <i>Ktesikles</i> as auxiliary commander to <i>Zakynthus</i> (xv, 46); whereas -this very commander is announced by himself in the next chapter (as well -as by Xenophon, who calls him <i>Stesikles</i>) as sent to <i>Korkyra</i> (Hellen. v, -2, 10). -</p> -<p> -I conceive Diodorus to have inadvertently mentioned this Athenian expedition -under Stesiklês or Ktesiklês, twice over; once as sent to Zakynthus—then -again, as sent to <i>Korkyra</i>. The latter is the truth. No Athenian -expedition at all appears on this occasion to have gone to Zakynthus; -for Xenophon enumerates the Zakynthians among those who helped to fit -out the fleet of Mnasippus (v, 2, 3). -</p> -<p> -On the other hand, I see no reason for calling in question the reality of -the two Lacedæmonian expeditions, in the last half of 374 <small>B.C.</small>—one under -Aristokrates to Zakynthus, the other under Alkidas to Korkyra—which -Diodorus mentions (Diod. xv, 45, 46). It is true that Xenophon does not -notice either of them; but they are noway inconsistent with the facts which -he does state.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_304"><a href="#FNanchor_304">[304]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 3, 5, 16: compare v, 2, 21—about the commutation -of personal service for money. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus (xv, 47) agrees with Xenophon in the main about the expedition -of Mnasippus, though differing on several other contemporary points.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_305"><a href="#FNanchor_305">[305]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 6. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀπέβη (when Mnasippus landed), -ἐκράτει τε τῆς γῆς καὶ ἐδῄου ἐξειργασμένην μὲν παγκαλῶς καὶ πεφυτευμένην τὴν χώραν, -μεγαλοπρεπεῖς δὲ οἰκήσεις καὶ οἰνῶνας κατεσκευασμένους ἔχουσαν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν· ὥστ’ -ἔφασαν τοὺς στρατιώτας εἰς τοῦτο τρυφῆς ἐλθεῖν, ὥστ’ οὐκ ἐθέλειν πίνειν, εἰ μὴ -ἀνθοσμίας εἴη. Καὶ ἀνδράποδα δὲ καὶ βοσκήματα πάμπολλα ἡλίσκετο ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν. -</p> -<p> -Οἶνον, implied in the antecedent word οἰνῶνας, is understood after πίνειν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_306"><a href="#FNanchor_306">[306]</a></span> -Thucyd. i, 82. (Speech of Archidamus) μὴ γὰρ ἄλλο τι νομίσητε -τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν (of the Athenians) ἢ ὅμηρον ἔχειν, καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ἐξείργασται. -</p> -<p> -Compare the earlier portion of the same speech (c. 80), and the second -speech of the same Archidamus (ii, 11). -</p> -<p> -To the same purpose Thucydides speaks, respecting the properties of the -wealthy men established throughout the area of Attica,—οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ καλὰ κτήματα κατὰ -τὴν χώραν οἰκοδομίαις τε καὶ πολυτελέσι κατασκευαῖς ἀπολωλεκότες -(<i>i. e.</i> by the invasion)—Thucyd. ii, 65.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_307"><a href="#FNanchor_307">[307]</a></span> -The envoys from Korkyra to Athens (mentioned by Xenophon, v, 2, 9) -would probably cross Epirus and Thessaly, through the aid of Alketas. -This would be a much quicker way for them than the circumnavigation of -Peloponnesus: and it would suggest the same way for the detachment of -Stesiklês presently to be mentioned.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_308"><a href="#FNanchor_308">[308]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 15.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_309"><a href="#FNanchor_309">[309]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 16. -</p> -<p> -Ὁ δ’ αὖ Μνάσιππος ὁρῶν ταῦτα, ἐνόμιζέ τε ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη ἔχειν τὴν πόλιν, -καὶ περὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους, ἐκαινούργει, καὶ τοὺς μέν τινας αὐτῶν ἀπομίσθους -ἐπεποιήκει, τοῖς δ’ οὖσι καὶ δυοῖν ἤδη μηνοῖν ὤφειλε τὸν μισθὸν, οὐκ ἀπορῶν, -ὡς ἐλέγετο, χρημάτων, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_310"><a href="#FNanchor_310">[310]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 18-26; Diodor. xv, 47.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_311"><a href="#FNanchor_311">[311]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi. 2, 39.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_312"><a href="#FNanchor_312">[312]</a></span> -The manner in which I have described the preliminary cruise of Timotheus, -will be found (I think) the only way of uniting into one consistent -narrative the scattered fragments of information which we possess respecting -his proceedings in this year. -</p> -<p> -The date of his setting out from Athens is exactly determined by Demosthenes, -adv. Timoth. p. 1186—the month Munychion, in the archonship -of Sokratidês—April 373 <small>B.C.</small> Diodorus says that he proceeded to Thrace, -and that he acquired several new members for the confederacy (xv, 47); -Xenophon states that he sailed towards the islands (Hellen. vi, 2, 12); two -statements not directly the same, yet not incompatible with each other. In -his way to Thrace, he would naturally pass up the Eubœan strait and along -the coast of Thessaly. -</p> -<p> -We know that Stesikles and his peltasts must have got to Korkyra, not -by sea circumnavigating Peloponnesus, but by land across Thessaly and -Epirus; a much quicker way. Xenophon tells us that the Athenians -“asked Alketas to help them to cross over from the mainland of Epirus to -the opposite island of Korkyra: and that they were in consequence carried -across by night,”—Ἀλκέτου δὲ ἐδεήθησαν <em class="gesperrt">συνδιαβιβάσαι</em> τούτους· καὶ οὗτοι -μὲν <em class="gesperrt">νυκτὸς διακομισθέντες</em> που τῆς χώρας, εἰσῆλθον εἰς τὴν πόλιν. -</p> -<p> -Now these troops could not have got to Epirus without crossing Thessaly; -nor could they have crossed Thessaly without the permission and -escort of Jason. Moreover, Alketas himself was the dependent of Jason, -whose goodwill was therefore doubly necessary (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 7). -</p> -<p> -We farther know that in the year preceding (374 <small>B.C.</small>), Jason was not -yet in alliance with Athens, nor even inclined to become so, though the -Athenians were very anxious for it (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 10). But in November -373 <small>B.C.</small>, Jason (as well as Alketas) appears as the established ally -of Athens; not as then becoming her ally for the first time, but as so completely -an established ally, that he comes to Athens for the express purpose -of being present at the trial of Timotheus and of deposing in his favor—Ἀφικομένου -γὰρ Ἀλκέτου καὶ Ἰάσονος ὡς τοῦτον (Timotheus) ἐν τῷ Μαιμακτηριῶνι μηνὶ τῷ ἐπ’ Ἀστείου -ἄρχοντος, <em class="gesperrt">ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τὸν τούτου, βοηθησόντων αὐτῷ</em> καὶ καταγομένων εἰς -τὴν οἰκίαν τὴν ἐν Πειραιεῖ, etc. -(Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 5, p. 1190). Again,—Αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτον (Timotheus) -<em class="gesperrt">ἐξαιτουμένων μὲν</em> τῶν ἐπιτηδείων καὶ οἰκείων αὐτῷ ἁπάντων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ <em class="gesperrt">Ἀλκέτου -καὶ Ἰάσονος, συμμάχων ὄντων ὑμῖν</em>, μόλις μὲν ἐπείσθητε ἀφεῖναι -(Demosthen. ib. c, 3, p. 1187.) We see from hence, -therefore, that the first alliance between Jason and Athens had been contracted -in the early part of 373 <small>B.C.</small>; we see farther that it had been contracted -by Timotheus in his preliminary cruise, which is the only reasonable -way of explaining the strong interest felt by Jason as well as by -Alketas in the fate of Timotheus, inducing them to take the remarkable -step of coming to Athens to promote his acquittal. It was Timotheus who -had first made the alliance of Athens with Alketas (Diodor. xv, 36; Cornel. -Nepos, Timoth. c. 2), a year or two before. -</p> -<p> -Combining all the circumstances here stated, I infer with confidence, -that Timotheus, in his preliminary cruise, visited Jason, contracted alliance -between him and Athens, and prevailed upon him to forward the division -of Stesikles across Thessaly to Epirus and Korkyra. -</p> -<p> -In this oration of Demosthenes, there are three or four exact dates mentioned, -which are a great aid to the understanding of the historical events -of the time. That oration is spoken by Apollodorus, claiming from Timotheus -the repayment of money lent to him by Pasion the banker, father of -Apollodorus; and the dates specified are copied from entries made by Pasion -at the time in his commercial books (c. 1. p. 1186; c. 9. p. 1197).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_313"><a href="#FNanchor_313">[313]</a></span> -Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 3, p. 1188. ἄμισθον μὲν τὸ στράτευμα -καταλελύσθαι ἐν Καλαυρίᾳ, etc.—ibid. c. 10, p. 1199. προσῆκε γὰρ τῷ μὲν -Βοιωτίῳ ἄρχοντι παρὰ τούτου (Timotheus) τὴν τροφὴν τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ -παραλαμβάνειν· <em class="gesperrt">ἐκ γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν συντάξεων ἡ μισθοφορία ἦν τῷ στρατεύματι· -τὰ δὲ χρήματα σὺ</em> (Timotheus) <em class="gesperrt">ἅπαντα ἐξέλεξας ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων</em>· καὶ -σὲ ἔδει αὐτῶν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_314"><a href="#FNanchor_314">[314]</a></span> -Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 2, 12, 13, 39; Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 3. p. 1188.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_315"><a href="#FNanchor_315">[315]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 47.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_316"><a href="#FNanchor_316">[316]</a></span> -I collect what is here stated from Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 3. p. -1188; c. 10. p. 1199. It is there said that Timotheus was about to sail -home from Kalauria to take his trial; yet it is certain that his trial did not -take place until the month Mæmakterion or November. Accordingly, the -trial must have been postponed, in consequence of the necessity for Iphikrates -and Kallistratus going away at once to preserve Korkyra.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_317"><a href="#FNanchor_317">[317]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 14. Ὁ δὲ (Iphikrates) ἐπεὶ κατέστη -στρατηγὸς, μάλα ὀξέως τὰς ναῦς ἐπληροῦτο, καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους ἠνάγκαζε.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_318"><a href="#FNanchor_318">[318]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 27, 32.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_319"><a href="#FNanchor_319">[319]</a></span> -Compare vi, 2, 14—with vi, 2, 39.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_320"><a href="#FNanchor_320">[320]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 34.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_321"><a href="#FNanchor_321">[321]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 35, 38; Diodor. xv, 47. -</p> -<p> -We find a story recounted by Diodorus (xvi, 57), that the Athenians under -Iphikrates captured, off Korkyra, some triremes of Dionysius, carrying -sacred ornaments to Delphi and Olympia. They detained and appropriated -the valuable cargo, of which Dionysius afterwards loudly complained. -</p> -<p> -This story (if there be any truth in it) can hardly allude to any other -triremes than those under Anippus. Yet Xenophon would probably have -mentioned the story, if he had heard it; since it presents the enemies of -Sparta as committing sacrilege. And whether the triremes were carrying -sacred ornaments or not, it is certain that they were coming to take part -in the war, and were therefore legitimate prizes.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_322"><a href="#FNanchor_322">[322]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 39. The meaning of Xenophon here is not very -clear, nor is even the text perfect. -</p> -<p> -Ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ ταύτην τὴν στρατηγίαν τῶν Ἰφικράτους οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐπαινῶ· ἔπειτα καὶ -τὸ <em class="gesperrt">προσελέσθαι κελεῦσαι ἑαυτῷ</em> (this shows that Iphikrates -himself singled them out) Καλλίστρατόν τε τὸν δημήγορον, οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον -ὄντα, καὶ Χαβρίαν, μάλα στρατηγικὸν νομιζόμενον. Εἴτε γὰρ φρονίμους αὐτοὺς -ἡγούμενος εἶναι, συμβούλους λαβεῖν ἐβούλετο, σῶφρόν μοι δοκεῖ διαπράξασθαι· -<em class="gesperrt">εἴτε ἀντιπάλους νομίζων</em>, οὕτω θρασέως (some words -in the text seem to be wanting) ... μήτε καταῤῥᾳθυμῶν μήτε καταμελῶν -φαίνεσθαι μηδὲν, μεγαλοφρονοῦντος ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι. -</p> -<p> -I follow Dr. Thirlwall’s translation of οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον, which appears -to me decidedly preferable. The word ἠφίει (vi, 3, 3) shows that Kallistratus -was an unwilling colleague.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_323"><a href="#FNanchor_323">[323]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3. ὑποσχόμενος γὰρ Ἰφικράτει (Kallistratus) -<em class="gesperrt">εἰ αὐτὸν ἠφίει</em>, ἢ χρήματα πέμψειν τῷ ναυτικῷ, ἢ εἰρήνην ποιήσειν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_324"><a href="#FNanchor_324">[324]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 37, 38.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_325"><a href="#FNanchor_325">[325]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Timoth. c. 9, p. 1197, 1198.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_326"><a href="#FNanchor_326">[326]</a></span> -The narrative here given of the events of 373 <small>B.C.</small>, so far as they concern -Timotheus and Iphikrates, appears to me the only way of satisfying -the exigencies of the case, and following the statements of Xenophon and -Demosthenes. -</p> -<p> -Schneider in his note, indeed, implies, and Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, -etc. p. 86) contends, that Iphikrates did not take command of the fleet, nor -depart from Athens, until <i>after</i> the trial of Timotheus. There are some -expressions in the oration of Demosthenes, which might seem to countenance -this supposition; but it will be found hardly admissible, if we attentively -study the series of facts. -</p> -<p> -1. Mnasippus arrived with his armament at Korkyra, and began the -siege, either before April, or at the first opening of April, 373 <small>B.C.</small> For his -arrival there, and the good condition of his fleet, was known at Athens <i>before</i> -Timotheus received his appointment as admiral of the fleet for the -relief of the island (Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 10, 11, 12). -</p> -<p> -2. Timotheus sailed from Peiræus on this appointed voyage, in April -373 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -3. Timotheus was tried at Athens in November 373 <small>B.C.</small>; Alketas and -Jason being then present, as allies of Athens and witnesses in his favor. -</p> -<p> -Now, if the truth were, that Iphikrates did not depart from Athens with -his fleet until after the trial of Timotheus in November, we must suppose -that the siege of Korkyra by Mnasippus lasted seven months, and the cruise -of Timotheus nearly five months. Both the one and the other are altogether -improbable. The Athenians would never have permitted Korkyra -to incur so terrible a chance of capture, simply in order to wait for the trial -of Timotheus. Xenophon does not expressly say how long the siege of -Korkyra lasted; but from his expressions about the mercenaries of Mnasippus -(that already pay was owing to them for <i>as much as two months</i>,—καὶ -δυοῖν <em class="gesperrt">ἤδη</em> μηνοῖν—vi, 2, 16), we should infer that it could hardly have -lasted more than three months in all. Let us say, that it lasted four -months; the siege would then be over in August, and we know that the -fleet of Iphikrates arrived just after the siege was concluded. -</p> -<p> -Besides, is it credible, that Timotheus—named as admiral for the express -purpose of relieving Korkyra, and knowing that Mnasippus was -already besieging the place with a formidable fleet—would have spent so -long a time as <i>five</i> months in his preliminary cruise? -</p> -<p> -I presume Timotheus to have stayed out in this cruise about <i>two</i> months; -and even this length of time would be quite sufficient to raise strong displeasure -against him at Athens, when the danger and privations of Korkyra -were made known as hourly increasing. At the time when Timotheus -came back to Athens, he found all this displeasure actually afloat against -him, excited in part by the strong censures of Iphikrates and Kallistratus -(Dem. cont. Timoth. p. 1187. c. 3). The adverse orations in the public -assembly, besides inflaming the wrath of the Athenians against him, caused -a vote to be passed deposing him from his command to Korkyra, and nominating -in his place Iphikrates, with Chabrias and Kallistratus. Probably -those who proposed this vote would at the same time give notice that they -intended to prefer a judicial accusation against Timotheus for breach or -neglect of duty. But it would be the interest of all parties to postpone -<i>actual trial</i> until the fate of Korkyra should be determined, for which purpose -the saving of time would be precious. Already too much time had -been lost, and Iphikrates was well aware that his whole chance of success -depended on celerity; while Timotheus and his friends would look upon -postponement as an additional chance of softening the public displeasure, -besides enabling them to obtain the attendance of Jason and Alketas. Still, -though trial was postponed, Timotheus was from this moment under impeachment. -The oration composed by Demosthenes therefore (delivered -by Apollodorus as plaintiff, several years afterwards),—though speaking -loosely, and not distinguishing the angry speeches against Timotheus <i>in -the public assembly</i> (in June 373 <small>B.C.</small>, or thereabouts, whereby his deposition -was obtained), from the accusing speeches against him at his actual trial in -November 373 <small>B.C.</small>, <i>before the dikastery</i>—is nevertheless not incorrect in -saying,—ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἀπεχειροτονήθη μὲν ὑφ’ ὑμῶν στρατηγὸς διὰ τὸ μὴ περιπλεῦσαι -Πελοπόννησον, ἐπὶ <em class="gesperrt">κρίσει δὲ παρεδέδοτο εἰς τὸν δῆμον</em>, αἰτίας τῆς μεγίστης -τυχὼν (c. 3, p. 1187)—and again respecting his coming -from Kalauria to Athens—μέλλων τοίνυν καταπλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν κρίσιν, ἐν Καλαυρίᾳ -δανείζεται, etc. (p. 1188, 1189.) That Timotheus had been handed -over to the people for trial—that he was sailing back from Kalauria <i>for -his trial</i>—might well be asserted respecting his position in the month of -June, though his trial did not actually take place until November. I think -it cannot be doubted that the triremes at Kalauria would form a part of that -fleet which actually went to Korkyra under Iphikrates; not waiting to go -thither until after the trial of Timotheus in November, but departing as -soon as Iphikrates could get ready, probably about July 373 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -Rehdantz argues that if Iphikrates departed with the fleet in July, he -must have returned to Athens in November to the trial of Timotheus, which -is contrary to Xenophon’s affirmation that he remained in the Ionian sea -until 371 <small>B.C.</small> But if we look attentively at the oration of Demosthenes, -we shall see that there is no certain ground for affirming Iphikrates to have -been present in Athens in November, during the actual trial of Timotheus. -The phrases in p. 1187—ἐφειστήκει δ’ αὐτῷ Καλλίστρατος καὶ Ἰφικράτης ... οὕτω δὲ -διέθεσαν ὑμᾶς κατηγοροῦντες τούτου αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ συναγορεύοντες αὐτοῖς, etc., -may be well explained, so far as Iphikrates is concerned, -by supposing them to allude to those pronounced censures in the -public assembly whereby the vote of deposition against Timotheus was -obtained, and whereby the general indignation against him was first excited. -I therefore see no reason for affirming that Iphikrates was actually present -at the trial of Timotheus in November. But Kallistratus was really present -at the trial (see c. 9. p. 1197, 1198); which consists well enough with -the statement of Xenophon, that this orator obtained permission from Iphikrates -to leave him at Korkyra and come back to Athens (vi, 3, 3). Kallistratus -directed his accusation mainly against Antimachus, the treasurer of -Timotheus. And it appears to me that under the circumstances of the -case, Iphikrates, having carried his point of superseding Timotheus in the -command and gaining an important success at Korkyra—might be well-pleased -to be dispensed from the obligation of formally accusing him before -the dikastery, in opposition to Jason and Alketas, as well as to a -powerful body of Athenian friends. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus (xv, 47) makes a statement quite different from Xenophon. -He says that Timotheus was at first deposed from his command, but afterwards -forgiven and re-appointed by the people (jointly with Iphikrates) in -consequence of the great accession of force which he had procured in his -preliminary cruise. Accordingly the fleet, one hundred and thirty triremes -in number, was despatched to Korkyra under the joint command of Iphikrates -and Timotheus. Diodorus makes no mention of the trial of Timotheus. -This account is evidently quite distinct from that of Xenophon, -which latter is on all grounds to be preferred, especially as its main points -are in conformity with the Demosthenic oration.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_327"><a href="#FNanchor_327">[327]</a></span> -Demosth. cont. Timoth. c. 6. p. 1191; c. 8. p. 1194. -</p> -<p> -We see from another passage of the same oration, that the creditors of -Timotheus reckoned upon his making a large sum of money in the Persian -service (c. 1, p. 1185). This farther illustrates what I have said in a previous -note, about the motives of the distinguished Athenian officers to take -service in foreign parts away from Athens.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_328"><a href="#FNanchor_328">[328]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 38; Pausanias, iv, 26, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_329"><a href="#FNanchor_329">[329]</a></span> -See a curious testimony to this fact in Demosthen. cont. Neæram, c. 12, -p. 1357.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_330"><a href="#FNanchor_330">[330]</a></span> -Diodor. xi, 48, 49; Pausan. vii, 25; Ælian. Hist. Animal. xi, 19. -</p> -<p> -Kallisthenes seems to have described at large, with appropriate religious -comments, numerous physical portents which occurred about this time (see -Kallisthen. Fragm. 8, ed. Didot).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_331"><a href="#FNanchor_331">[331]</a></span> -This second mission of Antalkidas is sufficiently verified by an indirect -allusion of Xenophon (vi, 3, 12). His known philo-Laconian sentiments -sufficiently explain why he avoids directly mentioning it.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_332"><a href="#FNanchor_332">[332]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 50. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus had stated (a few chapters before, xv, 38) that Persian envoys -had also come into Greece a little before the peace of 374 <small>B.C.</small>, and had -been the originators of that previous peace. But this appears to me one of -the cases (not a few altogether in his history) in which he repeats himself, -or gives the same event twice over under analogous circumstances. The -intervention of the Persian envoys bears much more suitably on the period -immediately preceding the peace of 371 <small>B.C.</small>, than upon that which preceded -the peace of 374 <small>B.C.</small>, when, in point of fact, no peace was ever fully -executed. -</p> -<p> -Dionysius of Halikarnassus also (Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 479) represents the -king of Persia as a party to the peace sworn by Athens and Sparta in 371 -<small>B.C.</small></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_333"><a href="#FNanchor_333">[333]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_334"><a href="#FNanchor_334">[334]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_335"><a href="#FNanchor_335">[335]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Timoth. p. 1188, s. 17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_336"><a href="#FNanchor_336">[336]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 46. I do not know from whom Diodorus copied this statement; -but it seems extremely reasonable.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_337"><a href="#FNanchor_337">[337]</a></span> -This seems to me what is meant by the Platæan speaker in Isokrates, -when he complains more than once that Platæa had been taken by the -Thebans in time of peace,—εἰρήνης οὔσης. The speaker, in protesting -against the injustice of the Thebans, appeals to two guarantees which they -have violated; for the purpose of his argument, however, the two are not -clearly distinguished, but run together into one. The first guarantee was, -the peace of Antalkidas, under which Platæa had been restored, and to -which Thebes, Sparta, and Athens, were all parties. The second guarantee, -was that given by Thebes when she conquered the Bœotian cities in -377-370 <small>B.C.</small>, and reconstituted the federation; whereby she ensured to the -Platæans existence as a city, with so much of autonomy as was consistent -with the obligations of a member of the Bœotian federation. When the -Platæan speaker accuses the Thebans of having violated “the oaths and -the agreement” (ὅρκους καὶ ξυνθήκας), he means the terms of the peace of -Antalkidas, subject to the limits afterwards imposed by the submission of -Platæa to the federal system of Bœotia. He calls for the tutelary interference -of Athens, as a party to the peace of Antalkidas. -</p> -<p> -Dr. Thirlwall thinks (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 38. p. 70-72) that the Thebans -were parties to the peace of 374 <small>B.C.</small> between Sparta and Athens; that they -accepted it, intending deliberately to break it; and that under that peace, -the Lacedæmonian harmosts and garrisons were withdrawn from Thespiæ -and other places in Bœotia. I am unable to acquiesce in this view; which -appears to me negatived by Xenophon, and neither affirmed nor implied in -the Plataic discourse of Isokrates. In my opinion, there were no Lacedæmonian -harmosts in Bœotia (except at Orchomenus in the north) in 374 -B.C. Xenophon tells (Hellen. v, 4, 63; vi, 1, 1) that the Thebans “were -recovering the Bœotian cities—had subdued the Bœotian cities”—in or -before 375 <small>B.C.</small>, so that they were able to march out of Bœotia and invade -Phokis; which implies the expulsion or retirement of all the Lacedæmonian -forces from the southern part of Bœotia. -</p> -<p> -The reasoning in the Plataic discourse of Isokrates is not very clear or -discriminating; nor have we any right to expect that it should be, in the -pleading of a suffering and passionate man. But the expression εἰρήνης οὔσης -and εἰρήνη may always (in my judgment) be explained, without referring -it, as Dr. Thirlwall does, to the peace of 374 <small>B.C.</small>, or supposing -Thebes to have been a party to that peace.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_338"><a href="#FNanchor_338">[338]</a></span> -Pausanias, ix, 1, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_339"><a href="#FNanchor_339">[339]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 47. -</p> -<p> -Pausanias (ix, 1, 3) places this capture of Platæa in the third year (counting -the years from midsummer to midsummer) before the battle of Leuktra; -or in the year of the archon Asteius at Athens; which seems to me the -true date, though Mr. Clinton supposes it (without ground, I think) to be -contradicted by Xenophon. The year of the archon Asteius reaches from -midsummer 373 to 372 <small>B.C.</small> It is in the latter half of the year that I suppose -Platæa to have been taken.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_340"><a href="#FNanchor_340">[340]</a></span> -I infer this from Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 21-38; compare also -sect. 10. The Platæan speaker accuses the Thebans of having destroyed -the walls of some Bœotian cities (over and above what they had done to -Platæa,) and I venture to apply this to Thespiæ. Xenophon indeed states -that the Thespians were at this very period treated exactly like the Platæans; -that is, driven out of Bœotia, and their town destroyed; except -that they had not the same claim on Athens (Hellen. vi, 3, 1—ἀπόλιδας γενομένους: -compare also vi, 3, 5). Diodorus also (xv, 46) speaks of the -Thebans as having destroyed Thespiæ. But against this, I gather, from -the Plataic Oration of Isokrates, that the Thespians were not in the same -plight with the Platæans when that oration was delivered; that is, they -were not expelled collectively out of Bœotia. Moreover, Pausanias also -expressly says that the Thespians were present in Bœotia at the time of -the battle of Leuktra, and that they were expelled shortly afterwards. -Pausanias at the same time gives a distinct story, about the conduct of the -Thespians, which it would not be reasonable to reject (ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1). -I believe therefore that Xenophon has spoken inaccurately in saying that -the Thespians were ἀπόλιδες <i>before</i> the battle of Leuktra. It is quite possible -that they might have sent supplications to Athens (ἱκετεύοντας—Xen. -Hell. vi, 3, 1) in consequence of the severe mandate to demolish their -walls.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_341"><a href="#FNanchor_341">[341]</a></span> -Thucyd. iv, 133.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_342"><a href="#FNanchor_342">[342]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 11, 13, 18, 42, 46, 47, 68.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_343"><a href="#FNanchor_343">[343]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 3. Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ Θηβαίους -ἑωρῶμεν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου παρεσκευασμένους πείθειν ὑμᾶς ὡς οὐδὲν εἰς ἡμᾶς -ἐξημαρτήκασι, διὰ βραχέων ἂν ἐποιησάμεθα τοὺς λόγους· ἐπειδὴ δ’ εἰς τοῦτ’ -ἀτυχίας ἤλθομεν, ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀγῶνα πρὸς τούτους ἀλλὰ καὶ -τῶν ῥητόρων τοὺς δυνατωτάτους, οὓς ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων αὑτοῖς οὗτοι -παρεσκευάσαντο συνηγόρους, etc. -</p> -<p> -Compare sect. 36.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_344"><a href="#FNanchor_344">[344]</a></span> -Isokr. Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 12, 13, 14, 16, 28, 33, 48.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_345"><a href="#FNanchor_345">[345]</a></span> -Isokrat. Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 23-27. λέγουσιν ὡς ὑπὲρ -τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν συμμάχων ταῦτ’ ἔπραξαν—φασὶ τὸ Θηβαίους ἔχειν τὴν -ἡμετέραν, τοῦτο σύμφερον εἶναι τοῖς συμμάχοις, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_346"><a href="#FNanchor_346">[346]</a></span> -Isokrat. Or. 14, (Plat.) s. 23, 24.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_347"><a href="#FNanchor_347">[347]</a></span> -Diodorus, (xv, 38) mentions the parliamentary conflict between Epaminondas -and <i>Kallistratus</i>, assigning it to the period immediately antecedent -to the abortive peace concluded between Athens and Sparta three years -before. I agree with Wesseling (see his note <i>ad loc.</i>) in thinking that these -debates more properly belong to the time immediately preceding the peace -of 371 <small>B.C.</small> Diodorus has made great confusion between the two; sometimes -repeating twice over the same antecedent phenomena, as if they belonged -to both,—sometimes assigning to one what properly belongs to the -other. -</p> -<p> -The altercation between Epaminondas and <i>Kallistratus</i> (ἐν τῷ κοινῷ συνεδρίῳ) -seems to me more properly appertaining to debates in the assembly -of the confederacy at Athens,—rather than to debates at Sparta, in the -preliminary discussions for peace, where the altercations between Epaminondas -and <i>Agesilaus</i> occurred.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_348"><a href="#FNanchor_348">[348]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3. -</p> -<p> -It seems doubtful, from the language of Xenophon, whether Kallistratus -was one of the envoys appointed, or only a companion.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_349"><a href="#FNanchor_349">[349]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 4-6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_350"><a href="#FNanchor_350">[350]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 7-10. Ταῦτ’ εἰπὼν, σιωπὴν μὲν παρὰ πάντων ἐποίησεν -(Autoklês), ἡδομένους δὲ τοὺς ἀχθομένους τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐποίησε.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_351"><a href="#FNanchor_351">[351]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 10-17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_352"><a href="#FNanchor_352">[352]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 12, 13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_353"><a href="#FNanchor_353">[353]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 16.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_354"><a href="#FNanchor_354">[354]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 14. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ γῆν μὲν τις ἂν, -ὑμῶν φίλων ὄντων, ἱκανὸς γένοιτο ἡμᾶς λυπῆσαι; κατὰ θάλαττάν γε μὴν -τις ἂν ὑμᾶς βλάψαι τι, ἡμῶν ὑμῖν ἐπιτηδείων ὄντων;</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_355"><a href="#FNanchor_355">[355]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 11. Καὶ ὑμῖν δὲ ἔγωγε ὁρῶ διὰ τὰ -ἀγνωμόνως πραχθέντα ἔστιν ὅτε πολλὰ ἀντίτυπα γιγνόμενα· ὧν ἦν καὶ -ἡ καταληφθεῖσα ἐν Θήβαις Καδμεία· νῦν γοῦν, ὡς (?) ἐσπουδάσατε -αὐτονόμους τὰς πόλεις γίγνεσθαι, πᾶσαι πάλιν, ἐπεὶ ἠδικήθησαν -οἱ Θηβαῖοι, ἐπ’ ἐκείνοις γεγένηνται.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_356"><a href="#FNanchor_356">[356]</a></span> -Plutarch, Agesil. c. 27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_357"><a href="#FNanchor_357">[357]</a></span> -Plutarch. Agesil. c. 28.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_358"><a href="#FNanchor_358">[358]</a></span> -Thucyd. iii, 61. ἡμῶν (the Thebans) κτισάντων Πλάταιαν ὕστερον -τῆς ἄλλης Βοιωτίας καὶ ἄλλα χωρία μετ’ αὐτῆς, ἃ ξυμμίκτους ἀνθρώπους ἐξελάσαντες -ἔσχομεν, οὐκ ἠξίουν οὗτοι (the Platæans), <em class="gesperrt">ὥσπερ ἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον</em>, -ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ’ ἡμῶν, <em class="gesperrt">ἔξω δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωτῶν παραβαίνοντες τὰ πάτρια</em>, -ἐπειδὴ προσηναγκάζοντο, προσεχώρησαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, etc. -</p> -<p> -Again (c. 65) he says respecting the oligarchical Platæans who admitted -the Theban detachment when it came by night to surprise Platæa,—εἰ δὲ ἄνδρες -ὑμῶν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ γένει, βουλόμενοι τῆς μὲν ἔξω ξυμμαχίας ὑμᾶς παῦσαι, -<em class="gesperrt">ἐς δὲ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια καταστῆσαι</em>, ἐπεκαλέσαντο ἕκοντες, etc. -</p> -<p> -Again (c. 66), κατὰ τὰ πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια, etc. Compare ii, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_359"><a href="#FNanchor_359">[359]</a></span> -Diodor. xi, 81.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_360"><a href="#FNanchor_360">[360]</a></span> -Thucyd. iv, 126. -</p> -<p> -Brasidas, addressing his soldiers when serving in Macedonia, on the approach -of the Illyrians:— -</p> -<p> -Ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ εἶναι προσήκει ὑμῖν τὰ πολέμια, οὐ διὰ ξυμμάχων παρουσίαν -ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ δι’ οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν, καὶ μηδὲν πλῆθος πεφοβῆσθαι ἑτέρων· -οἵ γε μηδὲ ἀπὸ πολιτειῶν τοιούτων ἥκετε, ἐν αἷς οὐ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων ἄρχουσιν, -ἀλλὰ πλειόνων μᾶλλον ἐλάσσους· <em class="gesperrt">οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ κτησάμενοι τὴν δυναστείαν -ἢ τῷ μαχόμενοι κρατεῖν</em>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_361"><a href="#FNanchor_361">[361]</a></span> -One may judge of the revolting effect produced by such a proposition, -before the battle of Leuktra,—by reading the language which Isokrates -puts into the mouth of the Spartan prince Archidamus, five or six years -after that battle, protesting that all Spartan patriots ought to perish rather -than consent to the relinquishment of Messenia,—περὶ μὲν ἄλλων τινῶν -ἀμφισβητήσεις, ἐγίγνοντο, περὶ δὲ Μεσσήνης, οὔτε βασιλεὺς, οὐθ’ ἡ τῶν -Ἀθηναίων πόλις, οὐδὲ πώποθ’ ἡμῖν ἐνεκάλεσεν ὡς ἀδίκως κεκτημένοις αὐτήν (Isok. -Arch. s. 32). In the spring of 371 <small>B.C.</small>, what had once been Messenia, was -only a portion of Laconia, which no one thought of distinguishing from -the other portions (see Thucyd. iv, 3, 11).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_362"><a href="#FNanchor_362">[362]</a></span> -Plutarch, Agesil. c. 28; Pausanias, ix, 13, 1; compare Diodor. xv, 51. -Pausanias erroneously assigns the debate to the congress preceding the -peace of Antalkidas in 387 <small>B.C.</small>; at which time Epaminondas was an unknown -man. -</p> -<p> -Plutarch gives this interchange of brief questions, between Agesilaus and -Epaminondas, which is in substance the same as that given by Pausanias, -and has every appearance of being the truth. But he introduces it in a -very bold and abrupt way, such as cannot be conformable to the reality. -To raise a question about the right of Sparta to govern Laconia, was a most -daring novelty. A courageous and patriotic Theban might venture upon -it as a retort against those Spartans who questioned the right of Thebes to -her presidency of Bœotia; but he would never do so without assigning his -reasons to justify an assertion so startling to a large portion of his hearers. -The reasons which I here ascribe to Epaminondas are such as we know to -have formed the Theban creed, in reference to the Bœotian cities; such as -were actually urged by the Theban orator in 427 <small>B.C.</small>, when the fate of the -Platæan captives was under discussion. After Epaminondas had once laid -out the reasons in support of his assertion, he might then, if the same brief -question were angrily put to him a second time, meet it with another equally -brief counter-question or retort. It is this final interchange of thrusts -which Plutarch has given, omitting the arguments previously stated by Epaminondas, -and necessary to warrant the seeming paradox which he advances. -We must recollect that Epaminondas does not contend that -Thebes was entitled to <i>as much power</i> in Bœotia as Sparta in Laconia. He -only contends that Bœotia, under the presidency of Thebes, was as much -an integral political aggregate, as Laconia under Sparta,—in reference to -the Grecian world. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon differs from Plutarch in his account of the conduct of the -Theban envoys. He does not mention Epaminondas at all, nor any envoy -by name; but he says that “the Thebans, having entered their name among -the cities which had taken the oaths, came on the next day and requested, -that the entry might be altered, and that ‘<i>the Bœotians</i>’ might be substituted -in place of <i>the Thebans</i>, as having taken the oath. Agesilaus told them -that he could make no change; but he would strike their names out if they -chose, and he accordingly did strike them out” (vi, 3, 19). It seems to me -that this account is far less probable than that of Plutarch, and bears every -mark of being incorrect. Why should such a man as Epaminondas (who -doubtless was the envoy) consent at first to waive the presidential pretensions -of Thebes, and to swear for her alone? If he did consent, why should -he retract the next day? Xenophon is anxious to make out Agesilaus to -be as much in the right as may be; since the fatal consequences of his proceedings -manifested themselves but too soon.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_363"><a href="#FNanchor_363">[363]</a></span> -Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 3, 20.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_364"><a href="#FNanchor_364">[364]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 38-82.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_365"><a href="#FNanchor_365">[365]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_366"><a href="#FNanchor_366">[366]</a></span> -Thucyd. iv.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_367"><a href="#FNanchor_367">[367]</a></span> -Diodorus, xv, 38. ἐξαγωγεῖς, Xen. Hellen. <i>l. c.</i> -</p> -<p> -Diodorus refers the statements in this chapter to the peace between Athens -and Sparta in 374 <small>B.C.</small> I have already remarked that they belong -properly to the peace of 371 <small>B.C.</small>; as Wesseling suspects in his note.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_368"><a href="#FNanchor_368">[368]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3. ἤδη γὰρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ δαιμόνιον ἦγεν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_369"><a href="#FNanchor_369">[369]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 20; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 20; Diodor. xv, 51.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_370"><a href="#FNanchor_370">[370]</a></span> -Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 28.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_371"><a href="#FNanchor_371">[371]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 2, 3. ἐκεῖνον μὲν φλυαρεῖν ἡγήσατο, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_372"><a href="#FNanchor_372">[372]</a></span> -It is stated that either the Lacedæmonians from Sparta, or Kleombrotus -from Phokis, sent a new formal requisition to Thebes, that the Bœotian -cities should be left autonomous; and the requisition was repudiated (Diodor. -xv, 51; Aristeides, Or. (Leuktr.) ii, xxxiv, p. 644, ed. Dindorf). But -such mission seems very doubtful.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_373"><a href="#FNanchor_373">[373]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3, 4; Diodor. xv, 53; Pausan. ix, 13, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_374"><a href="#FNanchor_374">[374]</a></span> -Kallisthenes, apud Cic. de Divinatione, i, 34, Fragm. 9, ed. Didot.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_375"><a href="#FNanchor_375">[375]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 7; Diodor. xv, 54; Pausan. ix, 13, 3; Plutarch, Pelopid. -c. 20, 21; Polyænus, ii, 3, 8. -</p> -<p> -The latter relates that Pelopidas in a dream saw Skedasus, who directed -him to offer on this tomb “an auburn virgin” to the deceased females. Pelopidas -and his friends were greatly perplexed about the fulfilment of this -command; many urged that it was necessary for some maiden to devote -herself, or to be devoted by her parents, as a victim for the safety of the -country, like Menœkeus and Makaria in the ancient legends; others denounced -the idea as cruel and inadmissible. In the midst of the debate, a -mare, with a chestnut filly, galloped up, and stopped not far off; upon which -the prophet Theokritus exclaimed,—“Here comes the victim required, -sent by the special providence of the gods.” The chestnut filly was caught -and offered as a sacrifice on the tomb; every one being in high spirits from -a conviction that the mandate of the gods had been executed. -</p> -<p> -The prophet Theokritus figures in the treatise of Plutarch De Genio Socratis -(c. 3, p. 576 D.) as one of the companions of Pelopidas in the conspiracy -whereby the Theban oligarchy was put down and the Lacedæmonians -expelled from the Kadmeia.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_376"><a href="#FNanchor_376">[376]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 52-56; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 20.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_377"><a href="#FNanchor_377">[377]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_378"><a href="#FNanchor_378">[378]</a></span> -Polyæn. ii, 2, 2; Pausanias, ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_379"><a href="#FNanchor_379">[379]</a></span> -Plutarch, Symposiac. ii. 5, p. 639 F.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_380"><a href="#FNanchor_380">[380]</a></span> -Pausanias (ix, 13, 4; compare viii, 6, 1) lays great stress upon this indifference -or even treachery of the allies. Xenophon says quite enough to authenticate -the reality of the fact (Hellen. vi, 4, 15-24); see also Cicero De -Offic. ii, 7, 26. -</p> -<p> -Polyænus has more than one anecdote respecting the dexterity of Agesilaus -in dealing with faint-hearted conduct or desertion on the part of the allies -of Sparta (Polyæn. ii, 1, 18-20).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_381"><a href="#FNanchor_381">[381]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 13, 14.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_382"><a href="#FNanchor_382">[382]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. l. c. Plutarch (Agesil. c. 28) states a thousand Lacedæmonians -to have been slain; Pausanias (ix, 13, 4) gives the number as more -than a thousand; Diodorus mentions four thousand (xv. 56), which is doubtless -above the truth, though the number given by Xenophon may be fairly -presumed as somewhat below it. Dionysius of Halikarnassus (Antiq. Roman. -ii, 17) states that seventeen hundred Spartans perished.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_383"><a href="#FNanchor_383">[383]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 15.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_384"><a href="#FNanchor_384">[384]</a></span> -Pausan. ix, 13, 4; Plutarch, Apotheg. Reg. p. 193 B.; Cicero, de officiis, -ii, 7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_385"><a href="#FNanchor_385">[385]</a></span> -Pausan. ix, 13, 4; Diodor. xv, 55.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_386"><a href="#FNanchor_386">[386]</a></span> -Pausan. ix, 16, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_387"><a href="#FNanchor_387">[387]</a></span> -This is an important date, preserved by Plutarch (Agesil. c. 28). The -congress was broken up at Sparta on the fourteenth of the Attic month Skirrophorion -(June), the last month of the year of the Athenian archon Alkisthenes; -the battle was fought on the fifth of the Attic month of Hekatombæon, -the first month of the next Attic year, of the archon Phrasikleidês; -about the beginning of July.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_388"><a href="#FNanchor_388">[388]</a></span> -Diodorus differs from Xenophon on one important matter connected -with the battle; affirming that Archidamus son of Agesilaus was present -and fought, together with various other circumstances, which I shall discuss -presently, in a future note. I follow Xenophon.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_389"><a href="#FNanchor_389">[389]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 8. Εἰς δ’ οὖν τὴν μάχην τοῖς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίοις πάντα τἀναντία -ἐγίγνετο, τοῖς δὲ (to the Thebans) πάντα καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης κατωρθοῦτο.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_390"><a href="#FNanchor_390">[390]</a></span> -Isokrates, in the Oration vi, called <i>Archidamus</i> (composed about five years -after the battle, as if to be spoken by Archidamus son of Agesilaus), puts -this statement distinctly into the mouth of Archidamus—μέχρι μὲν ταυτησὶ τῆς ἡμέρας -δεδυστυχηκέναι δοκοῦμεν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τῇ πρὸς Θηβαίους, καὶ τοῖς μὲν σώμασι κρατηθῆναι -<em class="gesperrt">διὰ τὸν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡγησάμενον</em>, etc. (s. 9). -</p> -<p> -I take his statement as good evidence of the real opinion entertained both -by Agesilaus and by Archidamus; an opinion the more natural, since the -two contemporary kings of Sparta were almost always at variance, and at -the head of opposing parties; especially true about Agesilaus and Kleombrotus, -during the life of the latter. -</p> -<p> -Cicero (probably copying Kallisthenes or Ephorus) says, de Officiis, i, 24, -84—“Illa plaga (Lacedæmoniis) pestifera, quâ, quum Cleombrotus invidiam -timens temere cum Epaminondâ conflixisset, Lacedæmoniorum opes -corruerunt.” Polybius remarks (ix. 23, we know not from whom he borrowed) -that all the proceedings of Kleombrotus during the empire of Sparta, -were marked with a generous regard for the interests and feelings of the allies; -while the proceedings of Agesilaus were of the opposite character.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_391"><a href="#FNanchor_391">[391]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 55. Epaminondas, ἰδίᾳ τινι καὶ περιττῇ τάξει -χρησάμενος, διὰ τῆς ἰδίας στρατηγίας περιεποιήσατο τὴν περιβόητον -νίκην ... διὸ καὶ λοξὴν ποιήσας τὴν φάλαγγα, τῷ τοὺς ἐπιλέκτους -ἔχοντι κέρατι ἔγνω κρίνειν τὴν μάχην, etc. Compare Plutarch, Pelop. c. 23.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_392"><a href="#FNanchor_392">[392]</a></span> -See Aristotel. Politic. viii, 3, 3, 5. -</p> -<p> -Compare Xenophon, De Repub. Laced. xiii, 5. τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους αὐτοσχεδιαστὰς εἶναι -τῶν στρατιωτικῶν, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ μόνους τῷ ὄντι τεχνίτας τῶν πολεμικῶν—and Xenoph. -Memorab. iii, 5, 13, 14.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_393"><a href="#FNanchor_393">[393]</a></span> -Thucyd. i, 71. ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν (of you Spartans) τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα -πρὸς αὐτούς ἐστιν. <em class="gesperrt">Ἀνάγκη δ’ ὥσπερ τέχνης ἀεὶ τὰ ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρατεῖν</em>· -καὶ ἡσυχαζούσῃ μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα ἄριστα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκαζομένοις -ἰέναι, <em class="gesperrt">πολλῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ</em>, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_394"><a href="#FNanchor_394">[394]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_395"><a href="#FNanchor_395">[395]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 16. Γενομένων δὲ τούτων, ὁ μὲν εἰς τὴν -Λακεδαίμονα ἀγγελῶν τὸ πάθος ἀφικνεῖται, Γυμνοπαιδιῶν τε οὐσῶν τῆς τελευταίας, -καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρικοῦ χόρου ἔνδον ὄντος· Οἱ δὲ ἔφοροι, ἐπεὶ ἤκουσαν τὸ πάθος, -ἐλυποῦντο μὲν, ὥσπερ οἶμαι, ἀνάγκῃ· τὸν μέντοι χόρον οὐκ ἐξήγαγον, ἀλλὰ -διαγωνίσασθαι εἴων. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους ἑκάστου τῶν -τεθνηκότων ἀπέδοσαν· προεῖπον δὲ ταῖς γυναιξὶ, μὴ ποιεῖν κραυγὴν, ἀλλὰ -σιγῇ τὸ πάθος φέρειν. Τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ ἦν ὁρᾷν, ὧν μὲν ἐτέθνασαν οἱ -προσήκοντες, λιπαροὺς καὶ φαιδροὺς ἐν τῷ φανερῷ ἀναστρεφομένους· ὧν δὲ -ζῶντες ἠγγελμένοι ἦσαν, ὀλίγους ἂν εἶδες, τούτους δὲ σκυθρωποὺς καὶ -ταπεινοὺς περιϊόντας—and Plutarch, Agesil. c. 29. -</p> -<p> -See a similar statement of Xenophon, after he has recounted the cutting -in pieces of the Lacedæmonian mora near Lechæum, about the satisfaction -and even triumph of those of the Lacedæmonians who had lost relations in -the battle; while every one else was mournful (Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 10). -Compare also Justin, xxviii, 4—the behavior after the defeat of Sellasia.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_396"><a href="#FNanchor_396">[396]</a></span> -Thucyd. ii, 39.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_397"><a href="#FNanchor_397">[397]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 17-19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_398"><a href="#FNanchor_398">[398]</a></span> -See Thucyd. vii, 73.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_399"><a href="#FNanchor_399">[399]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 20, 21. -</p> -<p> -However, since the Phokians formed part of the beaten army at Leuktra, -it must be confessed that Jason had less to fear from them at this moment, -than at any other.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_400"><a href="#FNanchor_400">[400]</a></span> -Pausanias states that immediately after the battle, Epaminondas gave -permission to the allies of Sparta to depart and go home, by which permission -they profited, so that the Spartans now stood alone in the camp (Paus. -ix, 14, 1). This however is inconsistent with the account of Xenophon -(vi, 4, 26), and I think improbable. -</p> -<p> -Sievers (Geschichte, etc. p. 247) thinks that Jason preserved the Spartans -by outwitting and deluding Epaminondas. But it appears to me that the -storming of the Spartan camp was an arduous enterprise, wherein more -Thebans than Spartans would have been slain: moreover, the Spartans -were masters of the port of Kreusis, so that there was little chance of starving -out the camp before reinforcements arrived. The capitulation granted -by Epaminondas seems to have been really the wisest proceeding.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_401"><a href="#FNanchor_401">[401]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 22-25. -</p> -<p> -The road from Kreusis to Leuktra, however, must have been that by -which Kleombrotus arrived.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_402"><a href="#FNanchor_402">[402]</a></span> -This is the most convenient place for noticing the discrepancy, as to -the battle of Leuktra, between Diodorus and Xenophon. I have followed -Xenophon. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus (xv, 54) states both the arrival of Jason in Bœotia, and the -out-march of Archidamus from Sparta, to have taken place, <i>not after</i> the -battle of Leuktra, but <i>before</i> it. Jason (he says) came with a considerable -force to the aid of the Thebans. He prevailed upon Kleombrotus, who -doubted the sufficiency of his own numbers, to agree to a truce and to evacuate -Bœotia. But as Kleombrotus was marching homeward, he met Archidamus -with a second Lacedæmonian army, on his way to Bœotia, by -order of the ephors, for the purpose of reinforcing him. Accordingly Kleombrotus, -finding himself thus unexpectedly strengthened, openly broke -the truce just concluded, and marched back with Archidamus to Leuktra. -Here they fought the battle, Kleombrotus commanding the right wing, and -Archidamus the left. They sustained a complete defeat, in which Kleombrotus -was slain; the result being the same on both statements. -</p> -<p> -We must here make our election between the narrative of Xenophon and -that of Diodorus. That the authority of the former is greater, speaking generally, -I need hardly remark; nevertheless his philo-Laconian partialities -become so glaring and preponderant, during these latter books of the Hellenica -(where he is discharging the mournful duty of recounting the humiliation -of Sparta), as to afford some color for the suspicions of Palmerius, -Morus, and Schneider, who think that Xenophon has concealed the direct -violation of truce on the part of the Spartans, and that the facts really occurred -as Diodorus has described them. See Schneider ad Xen. Hellen. -vi, 4, 5, 6. -</p> -<p> -It will be found, however, on examining the facts, that such suspicion -ought not to be admitted, and that there are grounds for preferring the -narrative of Xenophon. -</p> -<p> -1. He explains to us how it happened that the remains of the Spartan -army, after the defeat of Leuktra, escaped out of Bœotia. Jason arrives -after the battle, and prevails upon the Thebans to allow them to retreat -under a truce; Archidamus also arrives after the battle to take them up. -If the defeat had taken place under the circumstances mentioned by Diodorus,—Archidamus -and the survivors would have found it scarcely possible -to escape out of Bœotia. -</p> -<p> -2. If Diodorus relates correctly, there must have been a violation of truce -on the part of Kleombrotus and the Lacedæmonians, as glaring as any that -occurs in Grecian history. But such violation is never afterwards alluded -to by any one, among the misdeeds of the Lacedæmonians. -</p> -<p> -3. A part, and an essential part, of the story of Diodorus, is, that Archidamus -was present and fought at Leuktra. But we have independent evidence -rendering it almost certain that he was not there. Whoever reads -the Discourse of Isokrates called <i>Archidamus</i> (Or. vi, sect. 9, 10, 129), will -see that such observations could not have been put into the mouth of Archidamus, -if he had been present there, and (of course) in joint command -with Kleombrotus. -</p> -<p> -4. If Diodorus be correct, Sparta must have levied a new army from her -allies, just after having sworn the peace, which peace exonerated her allies -from everything like obligation to follow her headship; and a new army, -not for the purpose of extricating defeated comrades in Bœotia, but for -pure aggression against Thebes. This, to say the least, is eminently improbable. -</p> -<p> -On these grounds, I adhere to Xenophon and depart from Diodorus.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_403"><a href="#FNanchor_403">[403]</a></span> -Xenoph. Rep. Lac. c. ix; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_404"><a href="#FNanchor_404">[404]</a></span> -Thucyd. v, 34.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_405"><a href="#FNanchor_405">[405]</a></span> -Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30; Plutarch, Apophtheg. Lacon. p. 214 B.; Apophtheg. -Reg. p. 191 C.; Polyænus, ii, 1, 13. -</p> -<p> -A similar suspension of penalties, for the special occasion, was enacted -after the great defeat of Agis and the Lacedæmonians by Antipater, <small>B.C.</small> -330. Akrotatus, son of King Kleomenes, was the only person at Sparta -who opposed the suspension (Diodor. xix, 70). He incurred the strongest -unpopularity for such opposition. Compare also Justin, xxviii, 4—describing -the public feeling at Sparta after the defeat at Sellasia.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_406"><a href="#FNanchor_406">[406]</a></span> -The explanation of Spartan citizenship will be found in an earlier part -of this History, Vol. II, Ch. vi.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_407"><a href="#FNanchor_407">[407]</a></span> -Aristotel. Polit. ii, 6, 12. Μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν ἡ πόλις, -ἀλλ’ ἀπώλετο διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_408"><a href="#FNanchor_408">[408]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 24. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ -πάντες ἐγυμνάζοντο περὶ τὰ ὅπλα, ἀγαλλόμενοι τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις νίκῃ, etc. -</p> -<p> -These are remarkable words from the unwilling pen of Xenophon: compare -vii, 5, 12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_409"><a href="#FNanchor_409">[409]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 23; vii, 5, 4; Diodor. xv, 57.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_410"><a href="#FNanchor_410">[410]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 27; vi, 5, 23.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_411"><a href="#FNanchor_411">[411]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 57.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_412"><a href="#FNanchor_412">[412]</a></span> -Pausan. ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_413"><a href="#FNanchor_413">[413]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 1. -</p> -<p> -I have already given my reasons (in a note on the preceding chapter) for -believing that the Thespians were not ἀπόλιδες <i>before</i> the battle of Leuktra.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_414"><a href="#FNanchor_414">[414]</a></span> -Pausanias, x, 11, 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_415"><a href="#FNanchor_415">[415]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 141.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_416"><a href="#FNanchor_416">[416]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 30. παρήγγειλε δὲ καὶ ὡς στρατευσομένοις -εἰς τὸν περὶ τὰ Πύθια χρόνον Θετταλοῖς παρασκευάζεσθαι. -</p> -<p> -I agree with Dr. Arnold’s construction of this passage (see his Appendix -ad. Thucyd. v, 1, at the end of the second volume of his edition of Thucydides) -as opposed to that of Mr. Fynes Clinton. At the same time, I do -not think that the passage proves much either in favor of his view, or -against the view of Mr. Clinton, about the month of the Pythian festival; -which I incline to conceive as celebrated about August 1; a little later than -Dr. Arnold, a little earlier than Mr. Clinton, supposes. Looking to the -lunar months of the Greeks, we must recollect that the festival would not -always coincide with the same month or week of our year. -</p> -<p> -I cannot concur with Dr. Arnold in setting aside the statement of Plutarch -respecting the coincidence of the Pythian festival with the battle of -Koroneia.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_417"><a href="#FNanchor_417">[417]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 29, 30. βοῦν ἠγεμόνα, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_418"><a href="#FNanchor_418">[418]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_419"><a href="#FNanchor_419">[419]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 30. ἀποκρίνασθαι τὸν θεὸν, ὅτι αὐτῷ -μελήσει. <em class="gesperrt">Ὁ δ’ οὖν ἀνὴρ, τηλικοῦτος ὢν, καὶ τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα -διανοούμενος</em>, etc. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon evidently considers the sudden removal of Jason as a consequence -of the previous intention expressed by the god to take care of his -own treasure.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_420"><a href="#FNanchor_420">[420]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 31, 32. -</p> -<p> -The cause which provoked these young men is differently stated: compare -Diodor. xv, 60; Valer. Maxim. ix, 10, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_421"><a href="#FNanchor_421">[421]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 32. -</p> -<p> -The death of Jason in the spring or early summer of 370 <small>B.C.</small>, refutes -the compliment which Cornelius Nepos (Timoth. c. 4) pays to Timotheus; -who can never have made war upon Jason after 373 <small>B.C.</small>, when he received -the latter at Athens in his house.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_422"><a href="#FNanchor_422">[422]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 37.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_423"><a href="#FNanchor_423">[423]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 38. ἐξαγωγεῖς.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_424"><a href="#FNanchor_424">[424]</a></span> -Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_425"><a href="#FNanchor_425">[425]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 39, 40. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus mentions these commotions as if they had taken place after the -peace concluded in 374 <small>B.C.</small>, and not after the peace of 371 <small>B.C.</small> But it is -impossible that they can have taken place after the former, which in point -of fact, was broken off almost as soon as sworn,—was never carried into -effect,—and comprised no one but Athens and Sparta. I have before remarked -that Diodorus seems to have confounded, both in his mind and in -his history, these two treaties of peace together, and has predicated of the -former what really belongs to the latter. The commotions which he mentions -come in, most naturally and properly, immediately after the battle of -Leuktra. -</p> -<p> -He affirms the like reaction against Lacedæmonian supremacy and its -local representatives in the various cities, to have taken place even after -the peace of Antalkidas in 387 <small>B.C.</small> (xv, 5). But if such reaction began at -that time, it must have been promptly repressed by Sparta, then in undiminished -and even advancing power. -</p> -<p> -Another occurrence, alleged to have happened after the battle of Leuktra, -may be properly noticed here. Polybius (ii, 39), and Strabo seemingly -copying him (viii, p. 384), assert that both Sparta and Thebes agreed to -leave their disputed questions of power to the arbitration of the Achæans, -and to abide by their decision. Though I greatly respect the authority of -Polybius, I am unable here to reconcile his assertion either with the facts -which unquestionably occurred, or with general probability. If any such -arbitration was ever consented to, it must have come to nothing; for the -war went on without interruption. But I cannot bring myself to believe -that it was even consented to, either by Thebes or by Sparta. The exuberant -confidence of the former, the sense of dignity on the part of the latter, -must have indisposed both to such a proceeding; especially to the acknowledgment -of umpires like the Achæan cities, who enjoyed little estimation -in 370 <small>B.C.</small>, though they acquired a good deal a century and a half afterwards.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_426"><a href="#FNanchor_426">[426]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 57, 58.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_427"><a href="#FNanchor_427">[427]</a></span> -Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. p. 814 B.; Isokrates. Or. v, (Philip.) -s. 58.; compare Dionys. Halic. Antiq. Rom. vii, 66.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_428"><a href="#FNanchor_428">[428]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 10. -</p> -<p> -The discouragement of the Spartans is revealed by the unwilling, though -indirect, intimations of Xenophon,—not less than by their actual conduct—Hellen. -vi, 5, 21; vii, 1, 30-32; compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_429"><a href="#FNanchor_429">[429]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 1-3. -</p> -<p> -Ἐνθυμηθέντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὅτι οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἔτι οἴονται, χρῆναι ἀκολουθεῖν, -καὶ οὔπω διακέοιντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὥσπερ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους διέθεσαν—μεταπέμπονται -τὰς πόλεις, ὅσοι βούλονται τῆς εἰρήνης μετέχειν, ἣν βασιλεὺς κατέπεμψεν. -</p> -<p> -In this passage, Morus and some other critics maintain that we ought to -read οὔπω (which seems not to be supported by any MSS.), in place of -οὕτω. Zeune and Schneider have admitted the new reading into the text; -yet they doubt the propriety of the change, and I confess that I share their -doubts. The word οὕτω will construe, and gives a clear sense; a very different -sense from οὔπω, indeed,—yet more likely to have been intended by -Xenophon.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_430"><a href="#FNanchor_430">[430]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 37.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_431"><a href="#FNanchor_431">[431]</a></span> -Thus the Corinthians still continued allies of Sparta (Xen. Hellen. vii, -4, 8).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_432"><a href="#FNanchor_432">[432]</a></span> -Diodor. xvi, 23-29; Justin, viii, 1. -</p> -<p> -We may fairly suppose that both of them borrow from Theopompus, who -treated at large of the memorable Sacred War against the Phokians, which -began in 355 <small>B.C.</small>, and in which the conduct of Sparta was partly determined -by this previous sentence of the Amphiktyons. See Theopompi -Fragm. 182-184, ed. Didot.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_433"><a href="#FNanchor_433">[433]</a></span> -See Tittmann, Ueber den Bund der Amphiktyonen, pp. 192-197 (Berlin, -1812).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_434"><a href="#FNanchor_434">[434]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_435"><a href="#FNanchor_435">[435]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 6; vi, 5, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_436"><a href="#FNanchor_436">[436]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 4, 5. -</p> -<p> -Pausanias (viii, 8, 6: ix, 14, 2) states that the Thebans reëstablished the -city of Mantinea. The act emanated from the spontaneous impulse of the -Mantineans and other Arcadians, before the Thebans had yet begun to interfere -actively in Peloponnesus, which we shall presently find them doing. -But it was doubtless done in reliance upon Theban support, and was in all -probability made known to, and encouraged by, Epaminondas. It formed -the first step to that series of anti-Spartan measures in Arcadia, which I -shall presently relate. -</p> -<p> -Either the city of Mantinea now built was not exactly in the same situation -as the one dismantled in 385 <small>B.C.</small>, since the river Ophis did not run -through it, as it had run through the former,—or else the course of -the Ophis has altered. If the former, there would be three successive -sites, the oldest of them being on the hill called Ptolis, somewhat north of -Gurzuli. Ptolis was perhaps the larger of the primary constituent villages. -Ernst Curtius (Peloponnesos, p. 242) makes the hill Gurzuli to be the same -as the hill called Ptolis; Colonel Leake distinguishes the two, and places -Ptolis on his map northward of Gurzuli (Peloponnesiaca, p. 378-381). The -summit of Gurzuli is about one mile distant from the centre of Mantinea -(Leake, Peloponnes. p. 383). -</p> -<p> -The walls of Mantinea, as rebuilt in 370 <small>B.C.</small>, form an ellipse of about -eighteen stadia, or a little more than two miles in circumference. The -greater axis of the ellipse points north and south. It was surrounded with -a wet ditch, whose waters join into one course at the west of the town, and -form a brook which Sir William Gell calls the Ophis (Itinerary of the Morea, -p. 142). The face of the wall is composed of regularly cut square -stones; it is about ten feet thick in all,—four feet for an outer wall, two feet -for an inner wall, and an intermediate space of four feet filled up with rubbish. -There were eight principal double gates, each with a narrow winding approach, -defended by a round tower on each side. There were quadrangular -towers, eighty feet apart, all around the circumference of the walls (Ernst -Curtius, Peloponnesos, p. 236, 237). -</p> -<p> -These are instructive remains, indicating the ideas of the Greeks respecting -fortification in the time of Epaminondas. It appears that Mantinea -was not so large as Tegea, to which last Curtius assigns a circumference -of more than three miles (p. 253).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_437"><a href="#FNanchor_437">[437]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus) s. 111.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_438"><a href="#FNanchor_438">[438]</a></span> -Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30, 31, 34.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_439"><a href="#FNanchor_439">[439]</a></span> -It seems, however, doubtful whether there were not some common Arcadian -coins struck, even before the battle of Leuktra. -</p> -<p> -Some such are extant; but they are referred by K. O. Müller, as well as -by M. Boeckh (Metrologisch. Untersuchungen, p. 92) to a later date subsequent -to the foundation of Megalopolis. -</p> -<p> -On the other hand, Ernst Curtius (Beyträge zur Aeltern Münzkunde, p. -85-90, Berlin, 1851) contends that there is a great difference in the style -and execution of these coins, and that several in all probability belong to a -date earlier than the battle of Leuktra. He supposes that these older coins -were struck in connection with the Pan-Arcadian sanctuary and temple of -Zeus Lykæus, and probably out of a common treasury at the temple of that -god for religious purposes; perhaps also in connection with the temple of -Artemis Hymnia (Pausan. viii, 5, 11) between Mantinea and Orchomenus.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_440"><a href="#FNanchor_440">[440]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 6. συνῆγον ἐπὶ τὸ συνιέναι πᾶν τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν, -καὶ ὅ,τι νικῴη ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῶν πόλεων, etc. -</p> -<p> -Compare Diodor. xv, 59-62.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_441"><a href="#FNanchor_441">[441]</a></span> -See Pausanias, viii, 27, 2, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_442"><a href="#FNanchor_442">[442]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 11.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_443"><a href="#FNanchor_443">[443]</a></span> -For the relations of these Arcadian cities, with Sparta and with each -other, see Thucyd. iv, 134; v, 61, 64, 77.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_444"><a href="#FNanchor_444">[444]</a></span> -Xenophon in his account represents Stasippus and his friends as being -quite in the right, and as having behaved not only with justice but with -clemency. But we learn from an indirect admission, in another place, that -there was also another story, totally different, which represented Stasippus -as having begun unjust violence. Compare Hellenic. vi, 5, 7, 8 with vi, 5, -36. -</p> -<p> -The manifest partiality of Xenophon, in these latter books, greatly diminishes -the value of his own belief on such a matter.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_445"><a href="#FNanchor_445">[445]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi. 5. 8, 9, 10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_446"><a href="#FNanchor_446">[446]</a></span> -Pausanias, viii, 27, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_447"><a href="#FNanchor_447">[447]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 11, 12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_448"><a href="#FNanchor_448">[448]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 2. -</p> -<p> -See the prodigious anxiety manifested by the Lacedæmonians respecting -the sure adhesion of Tegea (Thucyd. v, 64).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_449"><a href="#FNanchor_449">[449]</a></span> -I cannot but think that Eutæa stands marked upon the maps of Kiepert -at a point too far from the frontier of Laconia, and so situated in reference -to Asea, that Agesilaus must have passed very near Asea in order to get to -it; which is difficult to suppose, seeing that the Arcadian convocation was -assembled at Asea. Xenophon calls Eutæa πόλιν ὅμορον with reference to -Laconia (Hellen. vi, 5, 12); this will hardly suit with the position marked -by Kiepert. -</p> -<p> -The district called Mænalia must have reached farther southward than -Kiepert indicates on his map. It included Oresteion, which was on the -straight road from Sparta to Tegea (Thucyd. v, 64; Herodot. ix, 11). -Kiepert has placed Oresteion in his map agreeably to what seems the meaning -of Pausanias, viii, 44, 3. But it rather appears that the place mentioned -by Pausanias must have been <i>Oresthasion</i>, and that <i>Oresteion</i> must have been -a different place, though Pausanias considers them the same. See the geographical -Appendix to K. O. Müller’s Dorians, vol. ii, p. 442—Germ. edit.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_450"><a href="#FNanchor_450">[450]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 13, 14; Diodor. xv, 62.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_451"><a href="#FNanchor_451">[451]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 20. ὅπως μὴ δοκοίη φοβούμενος σπεύδειν τὴν ἔφοδον. -</p> -<p> -See Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, c. xxiv, p. 74, 75. The exact -spot designated by the words τὸν ὄπισθεν κόλπον τῆς Μαντινικῆς, seems -hardly to be identified.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_452"><a href="#FNanchor_452">[452]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 21. βουλόμενος ἀπαγαγεῖν τοὺς ὁπλίτας, πρὶν καὶ -τὰ πυρὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἰδεῖν, ἵνα μή τις εἴπῃ, ὡς φεύγων ἀπαγάγοι. Ἐκ γὰρ τῆς πρόσθεν -ἀθυμίας ἐδόκει τε ἀνειληφέναι τὴν πόλιν, ὅτι καὶ ἐμβεβλήκει εἰς τὴν Ἀρκαδίαν, καὶ -δῃοῦντι τὴν χώραν οὐδεὶς ἠθελήκει μάχεσθαι: compare Plutarch, -Agesil. c. 30.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_453"><a href="#FNanchor_453">[453]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_454"><a href="#FNanchor_454">[454]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 62. Compare Demosthenes, Orat. pro Megalopolit. pp. 205-207, s. 13-23.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_455"><a href="#FNanchor_455">[455]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 60.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_456"><a href="#FNanchor_456">[456]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 34.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_457"><a href="#FNanchor_457">[457]</a></span> -Pausanias. iv, 26, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_458"><a href="#FNanchor_458">[458]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 66; Pausanias, iv, 26, 3, 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_459"><a href="#FNanchor_459">[459]</a></span> -To illustrate small things by great—At the first formation of the -Federal Constitution of the United States of America, the rival pretensions -of New York and Philadelphia were among the principal motives for creating -the new federal city of Washington.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_460"><a href="#FNanchor_460">[460]</a></span> -Plutarch, Agesil. c. 31; and compare Agesil. and Pomp. c. 4; Diodor. -xv, 62. Compare Xenophon, Agesilaus, 2, 24.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_461"><a href="#FNanchor_461">[461]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 23. Οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες καὶ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Ἠλεῖοι -ἔπειθον αὐτοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι ὡς τάχιστα εἰς τὴν Λακωνικήν, ἐπιδείκνυντες μὲν τὸ -ἑαυτῶν πλῆθος, ὑπερεπαινοῦντες δὲ τὸ τῶν Θηβαίων στράτευμα. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν -Βοιωτοὶ ἐγυμνάζοντο πάντες περὶ τὰ ὅπλα, ἀγαλλόμενοι τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις νίκῃ, -etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_462"><a href="#FNanchor_462">[462]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 24, 25.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_463"><a href="#FNanchor_463">[463]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 64. -</p> -<p> -See Colonel Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, ch. 23, p. 29.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_464"><a href="#FNanchor_464">[464]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 26. When we read that the Arcadians got on the -roofs of the houses to attack Ischolaus, this fact seems to imply that they -were admitted into the houses by the villagers.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_465"><a href="#FNanchor_465">[465]</a></span> -Respecting the site of Sellasia, Colonel Leake thinks, and advances -various grounds for supposing, that Sellasia was on the road from Sparta -to the north-east, towards the Thyreatis; and that Karyæ was on the road -from Sparta northward, towards Tegea. The French investigators of the -Morea, as well as Professor Ross and Kiepert, hold a different opinion, and -place Sellasia on the road from Sparta northward towards Tegea (Leake, -Peloponnesiaca, p. 342-352; Ross, Reisen im Peloponnes. p. 187; Berlin, -1841). -</p> -<p> -Upon such a point, the authority of Colonel Leake is very high; yet the -opposite opinion respecting the site of Sellasia seems to me preferable.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_466"><a href="#FNanchor_466">[466]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 30; Diodor. xv, 65.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_467"><a href="#FNanchor_467">[467]</a></span> -This I apprehend to be the meaning of the phrase—ἐπεὶ μέντοι -ἔμενον μὲν οἱ ἐξ Ὀρχομένου μισθόφοροι, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_468"><a href="#FNanchor_468">[468]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 29; vii, 2, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_469"><a href="#FNanchor_469">[469]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 2. Καὶ <em class="gesperrt">διαβαίνειν τελευταῖοι λαχόντες</em> -(the Phliasians) εἰς Πρασιὰς τῶν συμβοηθησάντων ... οὐ γὰρ πώποτε ἀφέστασαν, -ἀλλ’ οὐδ’, ἐπεὶ ὁ ξεναγὸς <em class="gesperrt">τοὺς προδιαβεβῶτας</em> λαβὼν ἀπολιπὼν αὐτοὺς -ᾤχετο, οὐδ’ ὡς ἀπεστράφησαν, ἀλλ’ ἡγεμόνα μισθωσάμενοι ἐκ Πρασιῶν, ὄντων -τῶν πολεμίων περὶ Ἀμύκλας, ὅπως ἐδύναντο διαδύντες ἐς Σπάρτην ἀφίκοντο.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_470"><a href="#FNanchor_470">[470]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 28, 29. ὥστε φόβον αὖ οὗτοι παρεῖχον -συντεταγμένοι καὶ λίαν ἐδόκουν πολλοὶ εἶναι, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_471"><a href="#FNanchor_471">[471]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 25; vi, 5, 32; vii, 2, 2. -</p> -<p> -It is evident from the last of these three passages, that the number of -Periœki and Helots who actually revolted, was very considerable; and that -the contrast between the second and third passages evinces the different -feelings with which the two seem to have been composed by Xenophon. -</p> -<p> -In the second, he is recounting the invasion of Epaminondas, with a wish -to soften the magnitude of the Spartan disgrace and calamity as much as -he can. Accordingly, he tells us no more than this,—“there were some -among the Periœki, who even took active service in the attack of Gythium, -and fought along with the Thebans,”—ἦσαν δέ τινες τῶν Περιοίκων, οἳ καὶ -ἐπέθεντο καὶ συνεστρατεύοντο τοῖς μετὰ Θηβαίων. -</p> -<p> -But in the third passage (vii, 2, 2: compare his biography called Agesilaus, -ii, 24) Xenophon is extolling the fidelity of the Phliasians to Sparta -under adverse circumstances of the latter. Hence it then suits his argument, -to magnify these adverse circumstances, in order to enhance the merit -of the Phliasians; and he therefore tells us,—“<i>Many</i> of the Periœki, all -the Helots, and all the allies except a few, had revolted from Sparta,”—σφαλέντων -δ’ αὐτῶν τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχῃ, καὶ ἀποστάντων μὲν πολλῶν Περιοίκων, ἀποστάντων δὲ -πάντων τῶν Εἱλώτων, ἔτι δὲ τῶν συμμάχων πλὴν πάνυ ὀλίγων, ἐπιστρατευόντων δ’ αὐτοῖς, -ὡς εἰπεῖν, πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πιστοὶ διέμειναν (the Phliasians). -</p> -<p> -I apprehend that both statements depart from the reality, though in opposite -directions. I have adopted in the text something between the two.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_472"><a href="#FNanchor_472">[472]</a></span> -Plutarch, Agesil. c. 32; Polyænus, ii, 1, 14; Ælian, V. H. xiv, 27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_473"><a href="#FNanchor_473">[473]</a></span> -Æneas, Poliorceticus, c. 2, p. 16.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_474"><a href="#FNanchor_474">[474]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 32. Καὶ τὸ μὲν μὴ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν -προσβαλεῖν ἂν ἔτι αὐτοὺς, ἤδη τι ἐδόκει θαῤῥαλεώτερον, εἶναι. -</p> -<p> -This passage is not very clear, nor are the commentators unanimous -either as to the words or as to the meaning. Some omit μὴ, construe ἐδόκει -as if it were ἐδόκει τοῖς Θηβαίοις, and translate θαῤῥαλεώτερον “excessively -rash.” -</p> -<p> -I agree with Schneider in dissenting from this alteration and construction. -I have given in the text what I believe to be the meaning.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_475"><a href="#FNanchor_475">[475]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 28; Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 8; Plutarch, Agesil. c. -32, 33; Plutarch, comp. Agesil. and Pomp. c. 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_476"><a href="#FNanchor_476">[476]</a></span> -Aristotle (in his Politica, iv, 10, 5), discussing the opinion of those political -philosophers who maintained that a city ought to have no walls, but -to be defended only by the bravery of its inhabitants,—gives various reasons -against such opinion, and adds “that these are old-fashioned thinkers; -that the cities which made such ostentatious display of personal courage, -have been proved to be wrong by actual results”—λίαν ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσι, -καὶ ταῦθ’ ὁρῶντες ἐλεγχομένας ἔργῳ τὰς ἐκείνως καλλωπισαμένας. -</p> -<p> -The commentators say (see the note of M. Barth. St. Hilaire) that Aristotle -has in his view Sparta at the moment of this Theban invasion. I do -not see what else he can mean; yet at the same time, if such be his meaning, -the remark is surely difficult to admit. Epaminondas came close up -to Sparta, but did not dare to attempt to carry it by assault. If the city -had had walls like those of Babylon, they could not have procured for her -any greater protection. To me the fact appears rather to show (contrary -to the assertion of Aristotle) that Sparta was so strong by position, combined -with the military character of her citizens, that she could dispense -with walls. -</p> -<p> -Polyænus (ii, 2, 5) has an anecdote, I know not from whom borrowed, to -the effect that Epaminondas might have taken Sparta, but designedly refrained -from doing so, on the ground that the Arcadians and others would -then no longer stand in need of Thebes. Neither the alleged matter of -fact, nor the reason, appear to me worthy of any credit. Ælian (V. H. iv, -8) has the same story, but with a different reason assigned.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_477"><a href="#FNanchor_477">[477]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 50; Diodor. xv, 67.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_478"><a href="#FNanchor_478">[478]</a></span> -Thucyd. ii, 15. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ Θησεὺς ἐβασίλευσε, γενόμενος -μετὰ τοῦ ξυνετοῦ καὶ δυνατὸς, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_479"><a href="#FNanchor_479">[479]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 72.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_480"><a href="#FNanchor_480">[480]</a></span> -Pausan. viii, 27; viii, 35, 5. Diodor. xv, 63. -</p> -<p> -See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, p. 418, where the facts -respecting Megalopolis are brought together and discussed. -</p> -<p> -It is remarkable that though Xenophon (Hellen. v, 2, 7) observes that the -capture of Mantinea by Agesipolis had made the Mantineans see the folly -of having a river run through their town,—yet in choosing the site of Megalopolis, -this same feature was deliberately reproduced: and in this choice -the Mantineans were parties concerned.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_481"><a href="#FNanchor_481">[481]</a></span> -Pausan. iv, 26, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_482"><a href="#FNanchor_482">[482]</a></span> -Strabo. viii, p. 361: Polybius, vii, 11.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_483"><a href="#FNanchor_483">[483]</a></span> -Pausan. ix, 14, 2: compare the inscription on the statue of Epaminondas -(ix, 15, 4).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_484"><a href="#FNanchor_484">[484]</a></span> -Pausan. iv, 27, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_485"><a href="#FNanchor_485">[485]</a></span> -Pausan. iv, 31, 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_486"><a href="#FNanchor_486">[486]</a></span> -Pausan. iv, 31, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_487"><a href="#FNanchor_487">[487]</a></span> -Thucyd. ii, 25.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_488"><a href="#FNanchor_488">[488]</a></span> -Thucyd. iv, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_489"><a href="#FNanchor_489">[489]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_490"><a href="#FNanchor_490">[490]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 25.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_491"><a href="#FNanchor_491">[491]</a></span> -Pausan. iv, 27, 4. ἀνῴκιζον δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πολίσματα, etc. Pausanias, following -the line of coast from the mouth of the river Pamisus in the Messenian -Gulf, round Cape Akritas to the mouth of the Neda in the Western -Sea,—enumerates the following towns and places,—Kôronê, Kolônides, -Asinê, the Cape Akritas, the Harbor Phœnikus, Methônê, or Mothônê, Pylus, -Aulon (Pausan. iv, 34, 35, 36). The account given by Skylax (Periplus, -c. 46, 47) of the coast of these regions, appears to me confused and -unintelligible. He reckons Asinê and Mothônê as cities of Laconia; but -he seems to have conceived these cities as being in the <i>central southern</i> projection -of Peloponnesus (whereof Cape Tænarus forms the extremity); and -not to have conceived at all the <i>south-western</i> projection, whereof Cape Akritas -forms the extremity. He recognizes Messene, but he pursues the Paraplus -of the Messenian coast from the mouth of the river Neda to the coast -of the Messenian Gulf south of Ithômê without interruption. Then after -that, he mentions Asinê, Mothônê, Achilleios Limên, and Psamathus, with -Cape Tænarus between them. Besides, he introduces in Messenia two different -cities,—one called Messênê, the other called Ithômê; whereas there -was only one Messênê situated on Mount Ithome. -</p> -<p> -I cannot agree with Niebuhr, who, resting mainly upon this account of -Skylax, considers that the south-western corner of Peloponnesus remained -a portion of Laconia and belonging to Sparta, long after the establishment -of the city of Messênê. See the Dissertation of Niebuhr on the age of Skylax -of Karyanda,—in his Kleine Schriften, p. 119.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_492"><a href="#FNanchor_492">[492]</a></span> -Thucyd. iv, 3, 42.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_493"><a href="#FNanchor_493">[493]</a></span> -The Oration (vi,) called Archidamus, by Isokrates. exhibits powerfully -the Spartan feeling of the time, respecting this abstraction of territory, and -emancipation of serfs, for the purpose of restoring Messênê, s. 30. Καὶ εἰ μὲν τοὺς -ὡς ἀληθῶς Μεσσηνίους κατῆγον (the Thebans), ἠδίκουν μὲν ἂν, ὅμως δ’ εὐλογωτέρως ἂν -εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐξημάρτανον· νῦν δὲ τοὺς Εἵλωτας ὁμόρους ἡμῖν παρακατοικίζουσιν, ὥστε μὴ -τοῦτ’ εἶναι χαλεπώτατον, εἰ τῆς χώρας στερησόμεθα παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ’ εἰ τοὺς -δούλους ἡμετέρους ἐποψόμεθα κυρίους αὐτῆς ὄντας. -</p> -<p> -Again—s. 101. ἢν γὰρ παρακατοικισώμεθα τοὺς Εἵλωτας, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ταύτην περιΐδωμεν -αὐξηθεῖσαν, τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι πάντα τὸν βίον ἐν ταραχαῖς καὶ κινδύνοις διατελοῦμεν -ὄντες; compare also sections 8 and 102.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_494"><a href="#FNanchor_494">[494]</a></span> -Isokrates, Orat. vi, (Archidam.) s. 111. Ἄξιον δὲ καὶ τὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα -καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσχυνθῆναι πανηγύρεις, ἐν αἷς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν (Spartans) ζηλωτότερος -ἦν καὶ θαυμαστότερος τῶν ἀθλητῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τὰς νίκας ἀναιρουμένων. Εἰς ἃς -τίς ἂν ἐλθεῖν τολμήσειεν, ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι καταφρονηθησόμενος—ἔτι δὲ πρὸς -<em class="gesperrt">τούτοις ὀψόμενος μὲν τοὺς οἰκέτας ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας</em> ἧς οἱ πατέρες ἡμῖν κατέλιπον -ἀπαρχὰς καὶ θυσίας μείζους ἡμῶν ποιουμένους, ἀκουσόμενος δ’ <em class="gesperrt">αὐτῶν τοιαύταις -βλασφημίαις χρωμένων, οἵαις περ εἰκὸς τοὺς χαλεπώτερον τῶν ἄλλων δεδουλευκότας</em>, -ἐξ ἴσου δὲ νῦν τὰς συνθήκας τοῖς δεσπόταις πεποιημένους. -</p> -<p> -This oration, composed only five or six years after the battle of Leuktra, -is exceedingly valuable as a testimony of the Spartan feeling under such -severe humiliations.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_495"><a href="#FNanchor_495">[495]</a></span> -The freedom of the Messenians had been put down by the first Messenian -war, after which they became subjects of Sparta. The second Messenian -war arose from their revolt. -</p> -<p> -No free Messenian legation could therefore have visited Olympia since -the termination of the first war; which is placed by Pausanias (iv, 13, 4) in -723 <small>B.C.</small>; though the date is not to be trusted. Pausanias (iv, 27, 3) gives -two hundred and eighty-seven years between the end of the second Messenian -war and the foundation of Messênê by Epaminondas. See the -note of Siebelis on this passage. Exact dates of these early wars cannot -be made out.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_496"><a href="#FNanchor_496">[496]</a></span> -The partiality towards Sparta, visible even from the beginning of Xenophon’s -history, becomes more and more exaggerated throughout the two latter -books wherein he recounts her misfortunes; it is moreover intensified by -spite against the Thebans and Epaminondas as her conquerors. But there is -hardly any instance of this feeling, so glaring or so discreditable, as the case -now before us. In describing the expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus -in the winter of 370-369 <small>B.C.</small>, he totally omits the foundation both of -Messênê and Megalopolis; though in the after part of his history, he alludes -(briefly) both to one and to the other as facts accomplished. He represents -the Thebans to have come into Arcadia with their magnificent army, for the -simple purpose of repelling Agesilaus and the Spartans, and to have been -desirous of returning to Bœotia, as soon as it was ascertained that the latter -had already returned to Sparta (vi, 5, 23). Nor does he once mention -the name of Epaminondas as general of the Thebans in the expedition, any -more than he mentions him at Leuktra. -</p> -<p> -Considering the momentous and striking character of these facts, and the -eminence of the Theban general by whom they were achieved, such silence -on the part of an historian, who professes to recount the events of -the time, is an inexcusable dereliction of his duty to state the <i>whole truth</i>. -It is plain that Messênê and Megalopolis wounded to the quick the philo-Spartan -sentiment of Xenophon. They stood as permanent evidences of -the degradation of Sparta, even after the hostile armies had withdrawn -from Laconia. He prefers to ignore them altogether. Yet he can find -space to recount, with disproportionate prolixity, the two applications of -the Spartans to Athens for aid, with the favorable reception which they obtained,—also -the exploits of the Phliasians in their devoted attachment to -Sparta.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_497"><a href="#FNanchor_497">[497]</a></span> -See a striking passage in Polybius, iv, 32. Compare also Pausan. v, -29, 3; and viii, 27, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_498"><a href="#FNanchor_498">[498]</a></span> -Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 38; vii, 4, 2, 33, 34; vii, 3, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_499"><a href="#FNanchor_499">[499]</a></span> -Demosthen. Fals. Legat. p. 344, s. 11, p. 403, s. 220, Æschines, Fals. -Leg. p. 296, c. 49; Cornel. Nepos. Epamin. c. 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_500"><a href="#FNanchor_500">[500]</a></span> -Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 38; vii, 4, 33; Diodor. xv, 59; Aristotle—Ἀρκάδων -Πολιτεία—ap. Harpokration, v. Μύριοι, p. 106, ed. Neumann.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_501"><a href="#FNanchor_501">[501]</a></span> -Polybius, ii, 55.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_502"><a href="#FNanchor_502">[502]</a></span> -Thucyd. v, 66.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_503"><a href="#FNanchor_503">[503]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 21.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_504"><a href="#FNanchor_504">[504]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 12; Diodor. xv, 64.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_505"><a href="#FNanchor_505">[505]</a></span> -The exact number of eighty-five days, given by Diodorus (xv. 67), -seems to show that he had copied literally from Ephorus or some other -older author. -</p> -<p> -Plutarch, in one place (Agesil. c. 32), mentions “three entire months,” -which differs little from eighty-five days. He expresses himself as if Epaminondas -spent all this time in ravaging Laconia. Yet again, in the -Apophth. Reg. p. 194 B. (compare Ælian, V. H. xiii, 42), and in the life of -Pelopidas (c. 25), Plutarch states, that Epaminondas and his colleagues held -the command four whole months over and above the legal time, being engaged -in their operations in Laconia and Messenia. This seems to me the -more probable interpretation of the case; for the operations seem too large -to have been accomplished in either three or four months.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_506"><a href="#FNanchor_506">[506]</a></span> -See a remarkable passage in Plutarch—An Seni sit gerenda Respublica -(c. 8, p. 788 A.).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_507"><a href="#FNanchor_507">[507]</a></span> -Pausan. viii, 27, 2. Pammenes is said to have been an earnest friend -of Epaminondas, but of older political standing; to whom Epaminondas -partly owed his rise (Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcep. p. 805 F.). -</p> -<p> -Pausanias places the foundation of Megalopolis in the same Olympic -year as the battle of Leuktra, and a few months after that battle, during the -archonship of Phrasikleides at Athens; that is, between Midsummer 371 -and Midsummer 370 <small>B.C.</small> (Pausan. viii, 27, 6). He places the foundation -of Messênê in the next Olympic year, under the archonship of Dyskinêtus -at Athens; that is, between Midsummer 370 and Midsummer 369 <small>B.C.</small> (iv, -27, 5). -</p> -<p> -The foundation of Megalopolis would probably be understood to date -from the initial determination taken by the assembled Arcadians, soon after -the revolution at Tegea, to found a Pan-Arcadian city and federative league. -This was probably taken before Midsummer 370 <small>B.C.</small>, and the date of Pausanias -would thus be correct. -</p> -<p> -The foundation of Messênê would doubtless take its æra from the expedition -of Epaminondas,—between November and March 370-369 <small>B.C.</small> -which would be during the archonship of Dyskinêtus at Athens, as Pausanias -affirms. -</p> -<p> -What length of time was required to complete the erection and establishment -of either city, we are not informed. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus places the foundation of Megalopolis in 368 <small>B.C.</small> (xv, 72).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_508"><a href="#FNanchor_508">[508]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 36.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_509"><a href="#FNanchor_509">[509]</a></span> -Isokrates (Archidamus), Or. vi, s. 129.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_510"><a href="#FNanchor_510">[510]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 34, 35.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_511"><a href="#FNanchor_511">[511]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 38-48.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_512"><a href="#FNanchor_512">[512]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 35. Οἱ μέντοι Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ πάνυ ἐδέξαντο, -ἀλλὰ θροῦς τις τοιοῦτος διῆλθεν, ὡς νῦν μὲν ταῦτα λέγοιεν· ὅτε δὲ εὖ -ἔπραττον, ἐπέκειντο ἡμῖν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_513"><a href="#FNanchor_513">[513]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 35. Μέγιστον δὲ τῶν λεχθέντων -παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐδόκει εἶναι, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_514"><a href="#FNanchor_514">[514]</a></span> -Demosthenes cont. Neær. p. 1353. -</p> -<p> -Xenokleides, a poet, spoke in opposition to the vote for supporting Sparta (ib.).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_515"><a href="#FNanchor_515">[515]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 49; Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 479.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_516"><a href="#FNanchor_516">[516]</a></span> -This number is stated by Diodorus (xv, 63).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_517"><a href="#FNanchor_517">[517]</a></span> -To this extent we may believe what is said by Cornelius Nepos (Iphicrates, -c. 2).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_518"><a href="#FNanchor_518">[518]</a></span> -The account here given in the text coincides as to the matter of fact -with Xenophon, as well as with Plutarch; and also (in my belief) with -Pausanias (Xen. Hell. vi, 5, 51; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 24; Pausan. ix, 14, 3). -</p> -<p> -But though I accept the facts of Xenophon, I cannot accept either his -suppositions as to the purpose, or his criticisms on the conduct, of Iphikrates. -Other modern critics appear to me not to have sufficiently distinguished -Xenophon’s <i>facts</i> from his <i>suppositions</i>. -</p> -<p> -Iphikrates (says Xenophon), while attempting to guard the line of Mount -Oneium, in order that the Thebans might not be able to reach Bœotia,—left -the excellent road adjoining to Kenchreæ unguarded. Then,—wishing -to inform himself, whether the Thebans had as yet passed the Mount -Oneium, he sent out as scouts all the Athenian and all the Corinthian cavalry. -Now (observes Xenophon) a few scouts can see and report as well as -a great number; while the great number find it more difficult to get back -in safety. By this foolish conduct of Iphikrates, in sending out so large a -body, several horsemen were lost in the retreat; which would not have -happened if he had only sent out a few. -</p> -<p> -The criticism here made by Xenophon appears unfounded. It is plain, -from the facts which he himself states, that Iphikrates never intended to -bar the passage of the Thebans; and that he sent out his whole body of -cavalry, not simply as scouts, but to harass the enemy on ground which he -thought advantageous for the purpose. That so able a commander as Iphikrates -should have been guilty of the gross blunders with which Xenophon -here reproaches him, is in a high degree improbable; it seems to me more -probable that Xenophon has misconceived his real purpose. Why indeed -should Iphikrates wish to expose the whole Athenian army in a murderous -conflict for the purpose of preventing the homeward march of the Thebans? -His mission was, to rescue Sparta; but Sparta was now no longer in danger; -and it was for the advantage of Athens that the Thebans should go -back to Bœotia, rather than remain in Peloponnesus. That he should content -himself with harassing the Thebans, instead of barring their retreat -directly, is a policy which we should expect from him. -</p> -<p> -There is another circumstance in this retreat which has excited discussion -among the commentators, and on which I dissent from their views. It is -connected with the statement of Pausanias, who says,—Ὡς προϊὼν τῷ στρατῷ -(Epaminondas) κατὰ Λέχαιον ἐγίνετο, καὶ διεξιέναι τῆς ὁδοῦ τὰ στενὰ καὶ δύσβατα -ἔμελλεν, Ἰφικράτης ὁ Τιμοθέου πελταστὰς καὶ ἄλλην Ἀθηναίων ἔχων δύναμιν, ἐπιχειρεῖ -τοῖς Θηβαίοις. Ἐπαμινώνδας δὲ τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους τρέπεται, <em class="gesperrt">καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀφικόμενος -Ἀθηναίων τὸ ἄστυ</em>, ὡς ἐπεξιέναι μαχουμένους τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐκώλυεν Ἰφικράτης, -ὁ δὲ αὖθις ἐς τὰς Θήβας ἀπήλαυνε. -</p> -<p> -In this statement there are some inaccuracies, as that of calling Iphikrates -“son of Timotheus;” and speaking of <i>Lechæum</i>, where Pausanias -ought to have named <i>Kenchreæ</i>. For Epaminondas could not have passed -Corinth on the side of Lechæum, since the Long Walls, reaching from one -to the other, would prevent him; moreover, the “rugged ground” was between -Corinth and Kenchreæ, not between Corinth and Lechæum. -</p> -<p> -But the words which occasion most perplexity are those which follow: -“Epaminondas repulses the assailants, and <i>having come to the city itself of -the Athenians</i>, when Iphikrates forbade the Athenians to come out and fight, -he (Epaminondas) again marched away to Thebes.” -</p> -<p> -What are we to understand <i>by the city of the Athenians</i>? The natural -sense of the word is certainly Athens; and so most of the commentators -relate. But when the battle was fought between Corinth and Kenchreæ, -can we reasonably believe that Epaminondas pursued the fugitives to Athens—through -the city of Megara, which lay in the way, and which seems -then (Diodor. xv, 68) to have been allied with Athens? The station of -Iphikrates was <i>Corinth</i>; from thence he had marched out,—and thither his -cavalry, when repulsed, would go back, as the nearest shelter. -</p> -<p> -Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Greece, vol. v, ch. 39, p. 141) understands Pausanias -to mean, that Iphikrates retired with his defeated cavalry to Corinth,—that -Epaminondas then marched straight on to Athens,—and that Iphikrates -followed him. “Possibly (he says) the only mistake in this statement -is, that it represents the <i>presence</i> of Iphikrates, instead of his <i>absence</i>, -as the cause which prevented the Athenians from fighting. According to -Xenophon, Iphikrates must have been in the rear of Epaminondas.” -</p> -<p> -I cannot think that we obtain this from the words of Xenophon. Neither -he nor Plutarch countenance the idea that Epaminondas marched to the -walls of Athens, which supposition is derived solely from the words of -Pausanias. Xenophon and Plutarch intimate only that Iphikrates interposed -some opposition, and not very effective opposition, near Corinth, to -the retreating march of Epaminondas, from Peloponnesus into Bœotia. -</p> -<p> -That Epaminondas should have marched to Athens at all, under the circumstances -of the case, when he was returning to Bœotia, appears to me -in itself improbable, and to be rendered still more improbable by the silence -of Xenophon. Nor is it indispensable to put this construction even upon -Pausanias; who may surely have meant by the words—πρὸς αὐτὸ Ἀθηναίων τὸ ἄστυ,—not -Athens, but <i>the city then occupied by the Athenians engaged</i>,—that -is, <i>Corinth</i>. <i>The city of the Athenians</i>, in reference to this battle, was -Corinth; it was the city out of which the troops of Iphikrates had just -marched, and to which, on being defeated, they naturally retired for safety, -pursued by Epaminondas to the gates. The statement of Pausanias,—that -Iphikrates would not let the Athenians in the town (Corinth) go out -to fight,—then follows naturally. Epaminondas, finding that they would -not come out, drew back his troops, and resumed his march to Thebes. -</p> -<p> -The stratagem of Iphikrates noticed by Polyænus (iii, 9, 29), can hardly -be the same incident as this mentioned by Pausanias. It purports to be a -nocturnal surprise planned by the Thebans against Athens; which certainly -must be quite different (if it be in itself a reality) from this march of Epaminondas. -And the stratagem ascribed by Polyænus to Iphikrates is of a -strange and highly improbable character.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_519"><a href="#FNanchor_519">[519]</a></span> -Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25; Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 194 B.; Pausan. -ix, 14, 4; Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 7, 8; Ælian, V. H. xiii, 42. -</p> -<p> -Pausanias states the fact plainly and clearly; the others, especially Nepos -and Ælian, though agreeing in the main fact, surround it with colors -exaggerated and false. They represent Epaminondas as in danger of being -put to death by ungrateful and malignant fellow-citizens; Cornelius Nepos -puts into his mouth a justificatory speech of extreme insolence (compare -Arist. Or. xlvi, περὶ τοῦ παραφθέγματος—p. 385 Jebb.; p. 520 Dindorf.); -which, had it been really made, would have tended more than anything else -to set the public against him,—and which is moreover quite foreign to the -character of Epaminondas. To carry the exaggeration still farther, Plutarch -(De Vitioso Pudore, p. 540 E.) describes Pelopidas as trembling and -begging for his life. -</p> -<p> -Epaminondas had committed a grave illegality, which could not be -passed over without notice in his trial of accountability. But he had a -good justification. It was necessary that he should put in the justification; -when put in, it passed triumphantly. What more could be required? The -facts, when fairly stated, will not serve as an illustration of the alleged ingratitude -of the people towards great men.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_520"><a href="#FNanchor_520">[520]</a></span> -Diodorus (xv, 81) states that Pelopidas was Bœotarch without interruption, -annually re-appointed, from the revolution of Thebes down to his decease. -Plutarch also (Pelopid. c. 34) affirms that when Pelopidas died, he -was in the thirteenth year of his appointment; which may be understood -as the same assertion in other words. Whether Epaminondas was rechosen, -does not appear. -</p> -<p> -Sievers denies the reappointment as well of Pelopidas as of Epaminondas. -But I do not see upon what grounds; for, in my judgment, Epaminondas -appears again as commander in Peloponnesus during this same year -(369 <small>B.C.</small>) Sievers holds Epaminondas to have commanded without being -Bœotarch; but no reason is produced for this (Sievers, Geschicht. Griech. -bis zur Schlacht von Mantinea, p. 277).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_521"><a href="#FNanchor_521">[521]</a></span> -Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 249; Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. -124. Ὁ γὰρ πατήρ σου (Isokrates to Philip) πρὸς τὰς πόλεις ταύτας (Sparta, -Athens, Argos, and Thebes), αἷς σοι παραινῶ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, πρὸς ἁπάσας οἰκείως εἶχε. -</p> -<p> -The connection of Amyntas with Thebes could hardly have been considerable; -that with Argos, was based upon a strong legendary and ancestral -sentiment rather than on common political grounds; with Athens, it -was both political and serious; with Sparta, it was attested by the most essential -military aid and coöperation.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_522"><a href="#FNanchor_522">[522]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_523"><a href="#FNanchor_523">[523]</a></span> -Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 249.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_524"><a href="#FNanchor_524">[524]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Timotheum. c. 8, p. 1194; Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 11.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_525"><a href="#FNanchor_525">[525]</a></span> -Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 248. τὴν πατρικὴν εὔνοιαν, καὶ τὰς -εὐεργεσίας ἃς ὑμεῖς ὑπήρξατε Ἀμύντᾳ, τῷ Φιλίππου πατρὶ, etc. -</p> -<p> -Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. c. 30, p. 660. τὴν πατρικὴν φιλίαν ἀνανεοῦθαι -(Philip to the Athenians): compare ibid. c. 29, p. 657.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_526"><a href="#FNanchor_526">[526]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_527"><a href="#FNanchor_527">[527]</a></span> -Demosthen. (Philippic. ii, c. 4, p. 71; De Halonneso, c. 3, p. 79; De -Rebus Chersones. c. 2, p. 91); also Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosthen. c. 6, -p. 163.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_528"><a href="#FNanchor_528">[528]</a></span> -Compare the aspirations of Athens, as stated in 391 <small>B.C.</small>, when the -propositions of peace recommended by Andokides were under consideration, -aspirations, which were then regarded as beyond all hope of attainment, -and imprudent even to talk about (Andokides, De Pace, s. 15). φέρε, ἀλλὰ Χεῤῥόνησον -καὶ τὰς ἀποικίας καὶ τὰ ἐγκτήματα καὶ τὰ χρέα ἵνα ἀπολάβωμεν; Ἀλλ’ οὔτε βασιλεὺς, οὔτε -οἱ σύμμαχοι, συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν, μεθ’ ὧν αὐτὰ δεῖ πολεμοῦντας κτήσασθαι.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_529"><a href="#FNanchor_529">[529]</a></span> -Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 250. -</p> -<p> -Συμμαχίας γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων συνελθούσης, εἷς ὢν τούτων -Ἀμύντας ὁ Φιλίππου πατὴρ, καὶ πέμπων σύνεδρον, καὶ τῆς καθ’ ἐαυτὸν ψήφου κύριος -ὢν, <em class="gesperrt">ἐψηφίσατο Ἀμφίπολιν τὴν Ἀθηναίων συνεξαιρεῖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίοις</em>. -Καὶ τοῦτο τὸ κοινὸν δόγμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ τοὺς ψηφισαμένους, <em class="gesperrt">ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων -γραμμάτων</em> μάρτυρας παρεσχόμην. -</p> -<p> -The remarkable event to which Æschines here makes allusion, must have -taken place either in the congress held at Sparta, in the month preceding -the battle of Leuktra, where the general peace was sworn, with universal -autonomy guaranteed,—leaving out only Thebes; or else, at the subsequent -congress held three or four months afterwards at Athens, where a -peace, on similar conditions generally, was again sworn under the auspices -of Athens as president. -</p> -<p> -My conviction is, that it took place on the latter occasion,—at Athens. -First, the reference of Æschines to the δημόσια γράμματα leads us to conclude -that the affair was transacted in that city; secondly, I do not think -that the Athenians would have been in any situation to exact such a reserve -in their favor, prior to the battle of Leuktra; thirdly, the congress at Sparta -was held, not for the purpose of συμμαχία or alliance, but for that of terminating -the war and concluding peace; while the subsequent congress at -Athens formed the basis of a defensive alliance, to which, either then or -soon afterwards, Sparta acceded.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_530"><a href="#FNanchor_530">[530]</a></span> -The pretensions advanced by Philip of Macedon (in his Epistola ad -Athenienses, ap. Demosthen. p. 164), that Amphipolis or its locality originally -belonged to his ancestor Alexander son of Amyntas, as having expelled -the Persians from it,—are unfounded, and contradicted by Thucydides. -At least, if (which is barely possible) Alexander ever did acquire the -spot, he must have lost it afterwards; for it was occupied by the Edonian -Thracians, both in 465 <small>B.C.</small>, when Athens made her first unsuccessful -attempt to plant a colony there,—and in 437 <small>B.C.</small>, when she tried again -with better success under Agnon, and established Amphipolis (Thucyd. iv, -102). -</p> -<p> -The expression of Æschines, that Amyntas in 371 <small>B.C.</small> “gave up or receded -from” Amphipolis (ὧν δ’ Ἀμύντας ἀπέστη—De Fals. Leg. 1 c.) can -at most only be construed as referring to rights which he may have claimed, -since he was never in actual possession of it; though we cannot wonder -that the orator should use such language in addressing Philip son of Amyntas, -who was really master of the town.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_531"><a href="#FNanchor_531">[531]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 60.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_532"><a href="#FNanchor_532">[532]</a></span> -Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 4, 33, 34. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus (xv, 61) calls Alexander of Pheræ brother of Polydorus; Plutarch -(Pelopid. c. 29) calls him nephew. Xenophon does not expressly say -which; but his narrative seems to countenance the statement of Diodorus -rather than that of Plutarch.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_533"><a href="#FNanchor_533">[533]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 61.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_534"><a href="#FNanchor_534">[534]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 67. -</p> -<p> -The transactions of Macedonia and Thessaly at this period are difficult -to make out clearly. What is stated in the text comes from Diodorus; -who affirms, however, farther,—that Pelopidas marched into Macedonia, -and brought back as a hostage to Thebes the youthful Philip, brother of -Alexander. This latter affirmation is incorrect; we know that Philip was -in Macedonia, and free, <i>after</i> the death of Alexander. And I believe that -the march of Pelopidas into Macedonia, with the bringing back of Philip -as a hostage, took place in the following year 368 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -Justin also states (vii, 5) erroneously, that Alexander of Macedon gave -his brother Philip as a hostage, first to the Illyrians, next to the Thebans.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_535"><a href="#FNanchor_535">[535]</a></span> -Demosthen. De Fals. Leg. c. 58, p. 402; Diodorus, xv, 71. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus makes the mistake of calling this Ptolemy son of Amyntas -and brother of Perdikkas; though he at the same time describes him as -Πτολεμαῖος Ἀλωρίτης, which description would hardly be applied to one of -the royal brothers. Moreover, the passage of Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 14, -p. 250, shows that Ptolemy was not son of Amyntas; and Dexippus (ap. -Syncellum, p. 263) confirms the fact. -</p> -<p> -See these points discussed in Mr. Fynes Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, -c. 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_536"><a href="#FNanchor_536">[536]</a></span> -Diodor. xvi, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_537"><a href="#FNanchor_537">[537]</a></span> -Æschines, Fals. Legat. c. 13, 14, p. 249, 250; Justin, vii, 6. -</p> -<p> -Æschines mentions Ptolemy as regent, on behalf of Eurydikê and her -younger sons. Æschines also mentions Alexander as having recently died, -but says nothing about his assassination. Nevertheless there is no reason -to doubt that he was assassinated, which we know both from Demosthenes -and Diodorus; and assassinated by Ptolemy, which we know from Plutarch -(Pelop. c. 27), Marsyas (ap. Athenæum, xiv. p. 629), and Diodorus. -Justin states that Eurydikê conspired both against her husband Amyntas, -and against her children, in concert with a paramour. The statements of -Æschines rather tend to disprove the charge of her having been concerned -in the death of Amyntas, but to support that of her having been accomplice -with Ptolemy in the murder of Alexander. -</p> -<p> -Assassination was a fate which frequently befel the Macedonian kings. -When we come to the history of Olympias, mother of Alexander the -Great, it will be seen that Macedonian queens were capable of greater -crimes than those imputed to Eurydikê.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_538"><a href="#FNanchor_538">[538]</a></span> -Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 13, 14, p. 249, 250; Cornelius Nepos, Iphicrates, -c. 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_539"><a href="#FNanchor_539">[539]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 150. -</p> -<p> -μισθοῖ πάλιν αὑτὸν (Charidemus) τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις, τοῖς ὑμετέροις ἐχθροῖς -καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσιν Ἀμφίπολιν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον. -</p> -<p> -Demosthenes is here speaking of the time when Timotheus superseded -Iphikrates in the command, that is, about 365-364 <small>B.C.</small> But we are fairly -entitled to presume that the same is true of 369 or 368 <small>B.C.</small></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_540"><a href="#FNanchor_540">[540]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 149, c. 37.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_541"><a href="#FNanchor_541">[541]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aristokr. p. 669, s. 149, c. 37. -</p> -<p> -The passage in which the orator alludes to these <i>hostages</i> of the Amphipolitans -in the hands of Iphikrates, is unfortunately not fully intelligible -without farther information. -</p> -<p> -(Charidemus) Πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς <em class="gesperrt">Ἀμφιπολιτῶν ὁμήρους, οὓς παρ’ Ἁρπάλου -λαβὼν Ἰφικράτης ἔδωκε φυλάττειν αὐτῷ, ψηφισαμένων ὑμῶν</em> ὡς ὑμᾶς -κομίσαι, παρέδωκεν Ἀμφιπολίταις· καὶ τοῦ μὴ λαβεῖν Ἀμφίπολιν, τοῦτ’ -ἐμπόδιον κατέστη. -</p> -<p> -Who Harpalus was,—or what is meant by Iphikrates “obtaining (or -capturing) from him the Amphipolitan hostages”—we cannot determine. -Possibly Harpalus may have been commander of a body of Macedonians -or Thracians acting as auxiliaries to the Amphipolitans, and in this character -exacting hostages from them as security. Charidemus, as we see afterwards -when acting for Kersobleptes, received hostages from the inhabitants -of Sestos (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 679. c. 40 s. 177).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_542"><a href="#FNanchor_542">[542]</a></span> -Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libertat. c. 5, p. 193.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_543"><a href="#FNanchor_543">[543]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 1. -</p> -<p> -The words τῷ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει must denote the year beginning in the spring -of 369 <small>B.C.</small> On this point I agree with Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. -40, p. 145 note); differing from him however (p. 146 note), as well as from -Mr. Clinton, in this,—that I place the second expedition of Epaminondas -into Peloponnesus (as Sievers places it, p. 278) in 369 <small>B.C.</small>; not in 368 -<small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -The narrative of Xenophon carries to my mind conviction that this is -what he meant to affirm. In the beginning of Book VII, he says, τῷ δ’ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει -Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων πρέσβεις ἦλθον αὐτοκράτορες Ἀθήναζε, βουλευσόμενοι -καθ’ ὅ,τι ἡ συμμαχία ἔσοιτο Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις. -</p> -<p> -Now the words τῷ δ’ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει denote the spring of 369 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -Xenophon goes on to describe the assembly and the discussion at Athens, -respecting the terms of alliance. This description occupies, from vii, 1, 1 -to vii, 1, 14, where the final vote and agreement is announced. -</p> -<p> -Immediately after this vote, Xenophon goes on to say,—Στρατευομένων δ’ ἀμφοτέρων -αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων (Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and allies) -εἰς Κόρινθον, ἔδοξε κοινῇ φυλάττειν τὸ Ὄνειον. Καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐπορεύοντο οἱ Θηβαῖοι -καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι, παραταξάμενοι ἐφύλαττον ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν τοῦ Ὀνείου. -</p> -<p> -I conceive that the decision of the Athenian assembly,—the march of -the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to guard the lines of Oneion,—and -the march of the Thebans to enter Peloponnesus,—are here placed by -Xenophon as events in immediate sequence, with no long interval of time -between them. I see no ground to admit the interval of a year between -the vote of the assembly and the march of the Thebans; the more so, as -Epaminondas might reasonably presume that the building of Megalopolis -and Messene, recently begun, would need to be supported by another Theban -army in Peloponnesus during 369 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -It is indeed contended (and admitted even by Sievers) that Epaminondas -could not have been reëlected Bœotarch in 369 <small>B.C.</small> But in this point I -do not concur. It appears to me that the issue of the trial at Thebes was -triumphant for him; thus making it more probable,—not less probable,—that -he and Pelopidas were reëlected Bœotarchs immediately.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_544"><a href="#FNanchor_544">[544]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 10-14.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_545"><a href="#FNanchor_545">[545]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 15, 16; Diodor. xv, 68.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_546"><a href="#FNanchor_546">[546]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 16; Polyænus, ii, 2, 9. -</p> -<p> -This was an hour known to be favorable to sudden assailants, affording -a considerable chance that the enemy might be off their guard. It was at -the same hour that the Athenian Thrasybulus surprised the troops of the -Thirty, near Phylê in Attica (Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 6).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_547"><a href="#FNanchor_547">[547]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. ib.; Pausanias, ix, 15, 2. -</p> -<p> -Pausanias describes the battle as having been fought περὶ Λέχαιον; not -very exact, topographically, since it was on the other side of Corinth, between -Corinth and Kenchreæ. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus (xv, 68) states that the whole space across, from Kenchreæ on -one sea to Lechæum on the other, was trenched and palisaded by the Athenians -and Spartans. But this cannot be true, because the Long Walls -were a sufficient defence between Corinth and Lechæum; and even between -Corinth and Kenchreæ, it is not probable that any such continuous line of -defence was drawn, though the assailable points were probably thus guarded. -Xenophon does not mention either trench or palisade.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_548"><a href="#FNanchor_548">[548]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 14-17; Diodor. xv, 68.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_549"><a href="#FNanchor_549">[549]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 18; vii, 2, 11; Diodor. xv, 69. -</p> -<p> -This march against Sikyon seems alluded to by Pausanias (vi, 3, 1); the -Eleian horse were commanded by Stomius, who slew the enemy’s commander -with his own hand. -</p> -<p> -The stratagem of the Bœotian Pammenes in attacking the harbor of -Sikyon (Polyænus, v, 16, 4) may perhaps belong to this undertaking.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_550"><a href="#FNanchor_550">[550]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 18, 22, 44; vii, 3, 2-8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_551"><a href="#FNanchor_551">[551]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 5-9. -</p> -<p> -This incident may have happened in 369 <small>B.C.</small>, just about the time when -Epaminondas surprised and broke through the defensive lines of Mount -Oneium. In the second chapter of the seventh Book, Xenophon takes up -the history of Phlius, and carries it on from the winter of 370-369 <small>B.C.</small>, -when Epaminondas invaded Laconia, through 369, 368, 367 <small>B.C.</small></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_552"><a href="#FNanchor_552">[552]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_553"><a href="#FNanchor_553">[553]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 19; Diodor. xv, 69.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_554"><a href="#FNanchor_554">[554]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 22; Diodor. xv, 70. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus states that these mercenaries had been furnished with pay for -five months; if this is correct, I presume that we must understand it as -comprehending the time of their voyage from Sicily and back to Sicily. -Nevertheless, the language of Xenophon would not lead us to suppose that -they remained in Peloponnesus even so long as three months. -</p> -<p> -I think it certain however that much more must have passed in this campaign -than what Xenophon indicates. Epaminondas would hardly have -forced the passage of the Oneium for such small objects as we find mentioned -in the Hellenica. -</p> -<p> -An Athenian Inscription, extremely defective, yet partially restored and -published by M. Boeckh (Corp. Inscr. No. 85 a. Addenda to vol. i, p. 897), -records a vote of the Athenian people and of the synod of Athenian confederates—praising -Dionysius of Syracuse,—and recording him with his -two sons as benefactors of Athens. It was probably passed somewhere -near this time; and we know from Demosthenes that the Athenians granted -the freedom of their city to Dionysius and his descendants (Demosthenes -ad Philipp. Epistol. p. 161, as well as the Epistle of Philip, on which this -is a comment). The Inscription is too defective to warrant any other inferences.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_555"><a href="#FNanchor_555">[555]</a></span> -Pausanias, ix, 15, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_556"><a href="#FNanchor_556">[556]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 23.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_557"><a href="#FNanchor_557">[557]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 25. -</p> -<p> -Στρατευσάμενοι δὲ καὶ εἰς Ἀσίνην τῆς Λακωνικῆς, ἐνίκησάν τε τὴν τῶν -Λακεδαιμονίων φρουρὰν, καὶ τὸν Γεράνορα, τὸν πολέμαρχον Σπαρτιάτην -γεγενημένον, ἀπέκτειναν, καὶ τὸ προάστειον τῶν Ἀσιναίων ἐπόρθησαν. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus states that Lykomedes and the Arcadians took Pellênê, which -is in a different situation, and can hardly refer to the same expedition (xv, -67).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_558"><a href="#FNanchor_558">[558]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 26.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_559"><a href="#FNanchor_559">[559]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30, 31.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_560"><a href="#FNanchor_560">[560]</a></span> -Polyb. iv, 77.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_561"><a href="#FNanchor_561">[561]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 26; vii, 4, 12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_562"><a href="#FNanchor_562">[562]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27. Ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐλθόντες, τῷ μὲν θεῷ -οὐδὲν ἐκοινώσαντο, ὅπως ἂν ἡ εἰρήνη γένοιτο, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐβουλεύοντο.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_563"><a href="#FNanchor_563">[563]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27; Diodor. xv, 70. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus states that Philiskus was sent by Artaxerxes; which seems not -exact; he was sent by Ariobarzanes in the name of Artaxerxes. Diodorus -also says that Philiskus left two thousand mercenaries with pay provided, -for the service of the Lacedæmonians; which troops are never afterwards -mentioned.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_564"><a href="#FNanchor_564">[564]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_565"><a href="#FNanchor_565">[565]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_566"><a href="#FNanchor_566">[566]</a></span> -See this fact indicated in Isokrates, Archidamus (Or. vi,) s. 2-11.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_567"><a href="#FNanchor_567">[567]</a></span> -Pausanias, vi, 2, 5. -</p> -<p> -Two Messenian victors had been proclaimed during the interval; but -they were inhabitants of Messênê in Sicily. And these two were ancient -citizens of Zanklê, the name which the Sicilian Messênê bore before Anaxilaus -the despot chose to give to it this last-mentioned name.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_568"><a href="#FNanchor_568">[568]</a></span> -See the contrary, or Spartan, feeling,—disgust at the idea of persons -who had just been their slaves, presenting themselves as spectators and -competitors in the plain of Olympia,—set forth in Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus) -s. 111, 112.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_569"><a href="#FNanchor_569">[569]</a></span> -Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 26.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_570"><a href="#FNanchor_570">[570]</a></span> -Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 249. -</p> -<p> -... διδάσκων, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὑπὲρ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἀντέπραττε (Ptolemy) -τῇ πόλει (to Athens), καὶ πρὸς Θηβαίους διαφερομένων Ἀθηναίων, συμμαχίαν ἐποιήσατο, etc. -</p> -<p> -Neither Plutarch nor Diodorus appear to me precise in specifying and -distinguishing the different expeditions of Pelopidas into Thessaly. I cannot -but think that he made four different expeditions; two before his embassy -to the Persian court (which embassy took place in 367 <small>B.C.</small>; see Mr. -Clinton, Fast. Hellen. on that year, who rightly places the date of the embassy), -and two after it. -</p> -<p> -1. The first was, in 369 <small>B.C.</small>, after the death of Amyntas, but during the -short reign, less than two years, of his son Alexander of Macedon. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus mentions this fact (xv, 67), but he adds, what is erroneous, that -Pelopidas on this occasion brought back Philip as a hostage. -</p> -<p> -2. The second was in 368 <small>B.C.</small>; also mentioned by Diodorus (xv, 71) -and by Plutarch (Pelop. c. 26). -</p> -<p> -Diodorus (erroneously, as I think) connects this expedition with the seizure -and detention of Pelopidas by Alexander of Pheræ. But it was really -on this occasion that Pelopidas brought back the hostages. -</p> -<p> -3. The third (which was rather a mission than an expedition) was in 366 -<small>B.C.</small>, after the return of Pelopidas from the Persian court, which happened -seemingly in the beginning of 366 <small>B.C.</small> In this third march, Pelopidas was -seized and made prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ, until he was released by -Epaminondas. Plutarch mentions this expedition, clearly distinguishing -it from the second (Pelopidas, c. 27—μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν, etc.); but with -this mistake, in my judgment, that he places it before the journey of Pelopidas -to the Persian court; whereas it really occurred after and in consequence -of that journey, which dates in 367 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -4. The fourth and last, in 364-363 <small>B.C.</small>; wherein he was slain (Diodor. -xv. 80; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 32).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_571"><a href="#FNanchor_571">[571]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_572"><a href="#FNanchor_572">[572]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28. The place here called Midea cannot be identified. -The only place of that name known, is in the territory of Argos, -quite different from what is here mentioned. O. Müller proposes to substitute -Malæa for Midea; a conjecture, which there are no means of verifying.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_573"><a href="#FNanchor_573">[573]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28-32; Diodor. xv, 72; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 33.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_574"><a href="#FNanchor_574">[574]</a></span> -I think that this third expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus -belongs to 367 <small>B.C.</small>; being simultaneous with the embassy of Pelopidas to -the Persian court. Many chronologers place it in 366 <small>B.C.</small>, after the conclusion -of that embassy; because the mention of it occurs in Xenophon -after he has brought the embassy to a close. But I do not conceive that -this proves the fact of subsequent date. For we must recollect that the embassy -lasted several months; moreover the expedition was made while -Epaminondas was Bœotarch; and he ceased to be so during the year 366 -<small>B.C.</small> Besides, if we place the expedition in 366 <small>B.C.</small>, there will hardly be -time left for the whole career of Euphron at Sikyon, which intervened before -the peace of 366 <small>B.C.</small> between Thebes and Corinth (see Xen. Hellen. -vii, 1, 44 <i>seq.</i>). -</p> -<p> -The relation of cotemporaneousness between the embassy of Pelopidas -to Persia, and the expedition of Epaminondas, seems indicated when we -compare vii, 1, 33 with vii, 1, 48—Συνεχῶς δὲ βουλευόμενοι οἱ Θηβαῖοι, ὅπως ἂν -τὴν ἡγεμονίαν λάβοιεν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἐνόμισαν εἰ πέμψειαν πρὸς τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα, -etc. Then Xenophon proceeds to recount the whole embassy, -together with its unfavorable reception on returning, which takes up -the entire space until vii, 2, 41, when he says—Αὖθις δ’ Ἐπαμεινώνδας, βουληθεὶς -τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς προσυπαγαγέσθαι, ὅπως μᾶλλον σφίσι καὶ οἱ Ἀρκάδες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι -προσέχοιεν τὸν νοῦν, ἔγνωκε στρατευτέον εἶναι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀχαΐαν. -</p> -<p> -This fresh expedition of Epaminondas is one of the modes adopted by -the Thebans of manifesting their general purpose expressed in the former -words,—συνεχῶς βουλευόμενοι, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_575"><a href="#FNanchor_575">[575]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 42-44. -</p> -<p> -The neutrality before observed, is implied in the phrase whereby Xenophon -describes their conduct afterwards; ἐπεὶ δὲ κατελθόντες <em class="gesperrt">οὐκέτι ἐμέσευον</em>, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_576"><a href="#FNanchor_576">[576]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 42. -</p> -<p> -His expression marks how completely these terms were granted by the -personal determination of Epaminondas, overruling opposition,—<em class="gesperrt">ἐνδυναστεύει</em> -ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ὥστε μὴ φυγαδεῦσαι τοὺς κρατίστους, μηδὲ τὰς πολιτείας μεταστῆσαι, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_577"><a href="#FNanchor_577">[577]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 75.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_578"><a href="#FNanchor_578">[578]</a></span> -Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 43; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 25. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus (xv, 72) refers the displeasure of the Thebans against Epaminondas -to the events of the preceding year. They believed (according to -Diodorus) that Epaminondas had improperly spared the Spartans, and not -pushed his victory so far as might have been done, when he forced the lines -of Mount Oneium in 369 <small>B.C.</small> But it is scarcely credible that the Thebans -should have been displeased on this account; for the forcing of the lines -was a capital exploit, and we may see from Xenophon that Epaminondas -achieved much more than the Spartans and their friends believed to be possible. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon tells us that the Thebans were displeased with Epaminondas, -on complaint from the Arcadians and others, for his conduct in Achaia two -years after the action at Oneium; that is, in 367 <small>B.C.</small> This is much more -probable in itself, and much more consistent with the general series of -facts, than the cause assigned by Diodorus.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_579"><a href="#FNanchor_579">[579]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 23. -</p> -<p> -For a similar case, in which exiles from many different cities, congregating -in a body, became strong enough to carry their restoration in each city -successively, see Thucyd. i, 113.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_580"><a href="#FNanchor_580">[580]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 44-46; Diodor. xv, 70.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_581"><a href="#FNanchor_581">[581]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen, vii, 3, 8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_582"><a href="#FNanchor_582">[582]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 6-9.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_583"><a href="#FNanchor_583">[583]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_584"><a href="#FNanchor_584">[584]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 11-15.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_585"><a href="#FNanchor_585">[585]</a></span> -This change of politics at Pellênê is not mentioned by Xenophon, at -the time, though it is noticed afterwards (vii, 4, 17) as a fact accomplished; -but we must suppose it to have occurred now, in order to reconcile sections -11-14 with sections 18-20 of vii, 2. -</p> -<p> -The strong Laconian partialities of Xenophon induce him to allot not -only warm admiration, but a space disproportionate compared with other -parts of his history, to the exploits of the brave little Phliasian community. -Unfortunately, here, as elsewhere, he is obscure in the description of particular -events, and still more perplexing when we try to draw from him a -clear idea of the general series. -</p> -<p> -With all the defects and partiality of Xenophon’s narrative, however, we -must recollect that it is a description of real events by a contemporary author -who had reasonable means of information. This is a precious ingredient, -which gives value to all that he says; inasmuch as we are so constantly -obliged to borrow our knowledge of Grecian history either from -authors who write at second-hand and after the time,—or from orators -whose purposes are usually different from those of the historian. Hence I -have given a short abridgment of these Phliasian events as described by -Xenophon, though they were too slight to exercise influence on the main -course of the war.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_586"><a href="#FNanchor_586">[586]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 18-23.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_587"><a href="#FNanchor_587">[587]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 9.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_588"><a href="#FNanchor_588">[588]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 4-6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_589"><a href="#FNanchor_589">[589]</a></span> -This refers to the secret expedition of Pelopidas and the six other -Theban conspirators from Athens to Thebes, at the time when the Lacedæmonians -were masters of that town and garrisoned the Kadmeia. The -conspirators, through the contrivance of the secretary Phyllidas, got access -in disguise to the oligarchical leaders of Thebes, who were governing under -Lacedæmonian ascendency, and put them to death. This event is described -in a former chapter, Ch. lxxvii, p. 85 <i>seq.</i></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_590"><a href="#FNanchor_590">[590]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 7-11. -</p> -<p> -To the killing of Euphron, followed by a defence so characteristic and -emphatic on the part of the agent,—Schneider and others refer, with great -probability, the allusion in the Rhetoric of Aristotle (ii, 24, 2)—καὶ περὶ -τοῦ Θήβῃσιν ἀποθανόντος, περὶ οὗ ἐκέλευε κρῖναι, εἰ δίκαιος ἦν ἀποθανεῖν ὡς -οὐκ ἄδικον ὂν ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν δικαίως ἀποθανόντα.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_591"><a href="#FNanchor_591">[591]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_592"><a href="#FNanchor_592">[592]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_593"><a href="#FNanchor_593">[593]</a></span> -Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_594"><a href="#FNanchor_594">[594]</a></span> -It is plain that Messênê was the great purpose with Pelopidas in his -mission to the Persian court; we see this not only from Cornelius Nepos -(Pelop. c. 4) and Diodorus (xv, 81), but also even from Xenophon, Hellen. -vii, 1, 36.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_595"><a href="#FNanchor_595">[595]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-38; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30; Plutarch, Artaxerx. -c. 22. -</p> -<p> -The words of Xenophon ἠκολούθει δὲ καὶ Ἀργεῖος must allude to some -Argeian envoy; though the name is not mentioned, and must probably -have dropped out,—or perhaps the word τις, as Xenophon may not have -heard the name. -</p> -<p> -It would appear that in the mission which Pharnabazus conducted up to -the Persian court (or at least undertook to conduct) in 408 <small>B.C.</small>, envoys -from hostile Greek cities were included in the same company (Xen. Hellen. -i, 3, 13), as on the present occasion.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_596"><a href="#FNanchor_596">[596]</a></span> -Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22. -</p> -<p> -His colleague Ismenias, however, is said to have dropped his ring, and -then to have stooped to pick it up, immediately before the king; thus going -through the prostration.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_597"><a href="#FNanchor_597">[597]</a></span> -Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_598"><a href="#FNanchor_598">[598]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 36. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ βασιλέως ὁ Πελοπίδας -τί βούλοιτο ἑαυτῷ γραφῆναι, εἶπεν ὅτι Μεσσήνην τε αὐτόνομον εἶναι ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, -καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἀνέλκειν τὰς ναῦς: εἰ δὲ ταῦτα μὴ πείθοιντο, στρατεύειν ἐπ’ αὐτούς· -<em class="gesperrt">εἴ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι ἀκολουθεῖν</em>, ἐπὶ ταύτην πρῶτον ἰέναι. -</p> -<p> -It is clear that these are not the exact words of the rescript of 367 <small>B.C.</small>, -though in the former case of the peace of Antalkidas (387 <small>B.C.</small>) Xenophon -seems to have given the rescript in its exact words (v, 1, 31). -</p> -<p> -What he states afterwards (vii, 1, 38) about Elis and Arcadia proves that -other matters were included. Accordingly I do not hesitate to believe that -Amphipolis also was recognized as autonomous. This we read in Demosthenes, -Fals. Leg. p. 383, c. 42. Καὶ γάρ τοι πρῶτον μὲν Ἀμφίπολιν πόλιν ἡμετέραν -δούλην κατέστησεν (the king of Persia), <em class="gesperrt">ἣν τότε σύμμαχον αὐτῷ καὶ φίλην</em> -ἔγραψεν. Demosthenes is here alluding to the effect -produced on the mind of the Great King, and to the alteration in his proceedings, -when he learnt that Timagoras had been put to death on returning -to Athens; the adverb of time τότε alludes to the rescript given when -Timagoras was present. -</p> -<p> -In the words of Xenophon,—εἴ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι <em class="gesperrt">ἀκολουθεῖν</em>,—the -headship of Thebes is declared or implied. Compare the convention -imposed by Sparta upon Olynthus, after the latter was subdued (v, 3, 26.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_599"><a href="#FNanchor_599">[599]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38. Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πρέσβεων ὁ μὲν Ἠλεῖος Ἀρχίδαμος, -ὅτι <em class="gesperrt">προὐτίμησε τὴν Ἦλιν πρὸ τῶν Ἀρκάδων</em>, ἐπήνει τὰ τοῦ βασιλέως· ὁ δ’ Ἀντίοχος, -ὅτι <em class="gesperrt">ἠλαττοῦτο τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν</em>, οὔτε τὰ δῶρα ἐδέξατο, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_600"><a href="#FNanchor_600">[600]</a></span> -Demosthen. Fals. Leg. c. 42, p. 383. -</p> -<p> -In another passage of the same oration (c. 57, p. 400), Demosthenes says -that Leon had been joint envoy with Timagoras <i>for four years</i>. Certainly -this mission of Pelopidas to the Persian court cannot have lasted four years; -and Xenophon states that the Athenians sent the two envoys when they -heard that Pelopidas was going thither. I imagine that Leon and Timagoras -may have been sent up to the Persian court shortly after the battle of -Leuktra, at the time when the Athenians caused the former rescript of the -Persian king to be resworn, putting Athens as head into the place of Sparta -(Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 1, 2). This was exactly four years before (371-367 <small>B.C.</small>). -Leon and Timagoras having jointly undertaken and perhaps recently -returned from their first embassy, were now sent <i>jointly</i> on a second. Demosthenes -has summed up the time of the two as if it were one.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_601"><a href="#FNanchor_601">[601]</a></span> -Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30. -</p> -<p> -Demosthenes speaks of the amount received, in money, by Timagoras -from the Persian king as having been forty talents, ὡς λέγεται (Fals. Leg. -p. 383), besides other presents and conveniences. Compare also Plutarch, -Artaxerxes, c. 22.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_602"><a href="#FNanchor_602">[602]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_603"><a href="#FNanchor_603">[603]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 30.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_604"><a href="#FNanchor_604">[604]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 40. Καὶ αὐτὴ μὲν ἡ Πελοπίδου καὶ -τῶν Θηβαίων τῆς ἀρχῆς περιβολὴ οὕτω διελύθη.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_605"><a href="#FNanchor_605">[605]</a></span> -The strong expressions of Demosthenes show what a remarkable effect -was produced by the news at Athens (cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 142). -</p> -<p> -Τί δ’; Ἀλέξανδρον ἐκεῖνον τὸν Θετταλὸν, ἡνίκ’ εἶχε μὲν αἰχμάλωτον δήσας Πελοπίδαν, -ἐχθρὸς δ’ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἦν Θηβαίοις, ὑμῖν δ’ οἰκείως διέκειτο, οὕτως ὥστε παρ’ ὑμῶν -στρατηγὸν αἰτεῖν, ἐβοηθεῖτε δ’ αὐτῷ καὶ πάντ’ ἦν Ἀλέξανδρος, etc. -</p> -<p> -Alexander is said to have promised to the Athenians so ample a supply -of cattle as should keep the price of meat very low at Athens (Plutarch, -Apophtheg. Reg. p. 193 E.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_606"><a href="#FNanchor_606">[606]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 71; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 28; Pausanias ix, 15, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_607"><a href="#FNanchor_607">[607]</a></span> -Plutarch (Pelopidas, c. 29) says, a truce for thirty days; but it is difficult -to believe that Alexander would have been satisfied with a term so very -short.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_608"><a href="#FNanchor_608">[608]</a></span> -The account of the seizure of Pelopidas by Alexander, with its consequences, -is contained chiefly in Diodorus, xv, 71-75; Plutarch, Pelopidas, -c. 27-29; Cornel. Nep. Pelop. c. 5; Pausanias, ix, 15, 1. Xenophon does -not mention it. -</p> -<p> -I have placed the seizure in the year 366 <small>B.C.</small>, after the return of Pelopidas -from his embassy in Persia; which embassy I agree with Mr. Fynes -Clinton in referring to the year 367 <small>B.C.</small> Plutarch places the seizure before -the embassy; Diodorus places it in the year between Midsummer 368 and -Midsummer 367 <small>B.C.</small>; but he does not mention the embassy at all, in its -regular chronological order; he only alludes to it in summing up the exploits -at the close of the career of Pelopidas. -</p> -<p> -Assuming the embassy to the Persian court to have occurred in 367 <small>B.C.</small>, -the seizure cannot well have happened before that time. -</p> -<p> -The year 368 <small>B.C.</small> seems to have been that wherein Pelopidas made his -second expedition into Thessaly, from which he returned victorious, bringing -back the hostages. See above, p. 264, note. -</p> -<p> -The seizure of Pelopidas was accomplished at a time when Epaminondas -was not Bœotarch, nor in command of the Theban army. Now it seems to -have been not until the close of 367 <small>B.C.</small>, after the accusations arising out -of his proceedings in Achaia, that Epaminondas missed being rechosen as -general. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon, in describing the embassy of Pelopidas to Persia, mentions -his grounds for expecting a favorable reception, and the matters which he -had to boast of (Hell. vii, 1, 35). Now if Pelopidas, immediately before, -had been seized and detained for some months in prison by Alexander of -Pheræ, surely Xenophon would have alluded to it as an item on the other -side. I know that this inference from the silence of Xenophon is not always -to be trusted. But in this case, we must recollect that he dislikes both -the Theban leaders; and we may fairly conclude, that where he is enumerating -the trophies of Pelopidas, he would hardly have failed to mention a -signal disgrace, if there had been one, immediately preceding. -</p> -<p> -Pelopidas was taken prisoner by Alexander, not in battle, but when in -pacific mission, and under circumstances in which no man less infamous -than Alexander would have seized him (παρασπονδηθεὶς—Plutarch, Apoph. -p. 194 D.; Pausan. ix, 15, 1; “legationis jure satis tectum se arbitraretur” -Corn. Nep.). His imprudence in trusting himself under any circumstances -to such a man as Alexander, is blamed by Polybius (viii, 1) and others. -But we must suppose such imprudence to be partly justified or explained -by some plausible circumstances; and the proclamation of the Persian rescript -appears to me to present the most reasonable explanation of his proceeding. -</p> -<p> -On these grounds, which, in my judgment, outweigh any probabilities on -the contrary side, I have placed the seizure of Pelopidas in 366 <small>B.C.</small>, after -the embassy to Persia; not without feeling, however, that the chronology -of this period cannot be rendered absolutely certain.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_609"><a href="#FNanchor_609">[609]</a></span> -Plutarch. Pelopid c. 31-35.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_610"><a href="#FNanchor_610">[610]</a></span> -See the instructive Inscription and comments published by Professor -Ross, in which the Deme Γραῆς, near Oropus, was first distinctly made -known (Ross, Die Demen von Attika, p. 6, 7—Halle, 1846).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_611"><a href="#FNanchor_611">[611]</a></span> -Isokrates, Orat. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 22-40.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_612"><a href="#FNanchor_612">[612]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1; Diodor. xv, 76. -</p> -<p> -The previous capture of Oropus, when Athens lost it in 411 <small>B.C.</small>, was -accomplished under circumstances very analogous (Thucyd. viii, 60).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_613"><a href="#FNanchor_613">[613]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1; Diodor. xv, 76. -</p> -<p> -Compare Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 259, s. 123; Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. -p. 397, s. 85. -</p> -<p> -It would seem that we are to refer to this loss of Oropus the trial of Chabrias -and Kallistratus in Athens, together with the memorable harangue of -the latter which Demosthenes heard as a youth with such strong admiration. -But our information is so vague and scanty, that we can make out nothing -certainly on the point. Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, -p. 109-114) brings together all the scattered testimonies in an instructive -chapter.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_614"><a href="#FNanchor_614">[614]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 39; vii, 4, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_615"><a href="#FNanchor_615">[615]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 3. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon notices the singularity of the accident. There were plenty of -vessels in Peiræus; Lykomedes had only to make his choice, and to determine -where he would disembark. He fixed upon the exact spot where the -exiles were assembled, not knowing that they were there—δαιμονιώτατα ἀποθνήσκει.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_616"><a href="#FNanchor_616">[616]</a></span> -Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 6: Plutarch, Repub. Ger. Præc. p. -810 F.; Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 193 D. -</p> -<p> -Compare a similar reference, on the part of others, to the crimes embodied -in Theban legend (Justin, ix, 3). -</p> -<p> -Perhaps it may have been during this embassy into Peloponnesus, that -Kallistratus addressed the discourse to the public assembly at Mêssenê, to -which Aristotle makes allusion (Rhetoric, iii, 17, 3); possibly enough, -against Epaminondas also.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_617"><a href="#FNanchor_617">[617]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 4-6. -</p> -<p> -The public debates of the Athenian assembly were not favorable to the -success of a scheme, like that proposed by Demotion, to which secrecy was -indispensable. Compare another scheme, divulged in like manner, in Thucydides, -iii, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_618"><a href="#FNanchor_618">[618]</a></span> -It seems probable that these were the mercenaries placed by the Corinthians -under the command of Timophanes, and employed by him afterwards -as instruments for establishing a despotism. -</p> -<p> -Plutarch (Timoleon, c. 3, 4) alludes briefly to mercenaries equipped about -this time (as far as we can verify his chronology) and to the Corinthian -mercenaries now assembled, in connection with Timoleon and Timophanes, -of whom I shall have to say much in a future chapter.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_619"><a href="#FNanchor_619">[619]</a></span> -Compare Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 8, 9 with Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus), -s. 106.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_620"><a href="#FNanchor_620">[620]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 9.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_621"><a href="#FNanchor_621">[621]</a></span> -This sentiment of dissatisfaction against the allies is strongly and repeatedly -set forth in the oration of Isokrates called Archidamus, composed -as if to be spoken in this synod,—and good evidence (whether actually -spoken or not) of the feelings animating the prince and a large party at -Sparta. Archidamus treats those allies who recommended the Spartans to -surrender Messênê, as worse enemies even than those who had broken off -altogether. He specifies Corinthians, Phliasians, and Epidaurians, sect. 11-13,—εἰς τοῦτο -δ’ ἥκουσι πλεονεξίας, καὶ τοσαύτην ἡμῶν κατεγνώκασιν ἀνανδρίαν, ὥστε πολλάκις ἡμᾶς ἀξιώσαντες -ὑπὲρ τῆς αὑτῶν πολεμεῖν, ὑπὲρ Μεσσήνης οὐκ οἴονται δεῖν κινδυνεύειν· ἀλλ’ ἵν’ αὐτοὶ τὴν σφετέραν -αὐτῶν ἀσφαλῶς καρπῶνται, πειρῶνται διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς ὡς χρὴ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς τῆς ἡμετέρας παραχωρῆσαι, -καὶ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπαπειλοῦσιν, ὡς, εἰ μὴ ταῦτα συγχωρήσομεν, ποιησόμενοι τὴν εἰρήνην κατὰ -σφᾶς αὐτούς. Compare sect. 67, 87, -99, 105, 106, 123. -</p> -<p> -We may infer from this discourse of Isokrates, that the displeasure of -the Spartans against their allies, because the latter advised them to relinquish -Messênê,—was much greater than the narrative of Xenophon (Hellen. -vii, 4, 8-11) would lead us to believe. -</p> -<p> -In the argument prefixed to the discourse, it is asserted (among various -other inaccuracies), that the Spartans had sent to Thebes to ask for peace, -and that the Thebans had said in reply,—peace would be granted, εἰ Μεσσήνην ἀνοικίσωσι καὶ -αὐτόνομον ἐάσωσι. Now the Spartans had never sent -to Thebes for this purpose; the Corinthians went to Thebes, and there -learnt the peremptory condition requiring that Messênê should be recognized. -Next, the Thebans would never require Sparta to recolonize or reconstitute -(ἀνοικίσαι) Messênê; that had been already done by the Thebans -themselves.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_622"><a href="#FNanchor_622">[622]</a></span> -Diodorus (xv, 76) states that the Persian king sent envoys to Greece -who caused this peace to be concluded. But there seems no ground for believing -that any Persian envoys had visited Greece since the return of Pelopidas, -whose return with the rescript did in fact constitute a Persian intervention. -The peace now concluded was upon the general basis of that -rescript; so far, but no farther (as I conceive), the assertion of Diodorus -about Persian intervention is exact.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_623"><a href="#FNanchor_623">[623]</a></span> -Diodorus (xv, 76) is farther inaccurate in stating the peace as universally -accepted, and as being a conclusion of the Bœotian and Lacedæmonian -war, which had begun with the battle of Leuktra.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_624"><a href="#FNanchor_624">[624]</a></span> -Xenophon, Enc. Agesil. ii, 30. ἐνόμιζε—τῷ Πέρσῃ δίκην ἐπιθήσειν -καὶ τῶν πρόσθεν, καὶ ὅτι νῦν, σύμμαχος εἶναι φάσκων, ἐπέταττε Μεσσήνην ἀφιέναι.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_625"><a href="#FNanchor_625">[625]</a></span> -This second mission of the Athenians to the Persian court (pursuant -to the invitation contained in the rescript given to Pelopidas, Xen. Hellen. -vii, 1, 37), appears to me implied in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 384, s. 150, -p. 420, s. 283; Or. De Halonneso, p. 84, s. 30. -</p> -<p> -If the king of Persia was informed that Timagoras had been put to death -by his countrymen on returning to Athens,—and if he sent down (κατέπεμψεν) -a fresh rescript about Amphipolis,—this information can only -have been communicated, and the new rescript only obtained, by a second -embassy sent to him from Athens. -</p> -<p> -Perhaps the Lacedæmonian Kallias may have accompanied this second -Athenian mission to Susa; we hear of him as having come back with a -friendly letter from the Persian king to Agesilaus (Xenophon, Enc. Ages. -viii, 3; Plutarch, Apophth. Lacon. p. 1213 E.), brought by a Persian messenger. -But the statement is too vague to enable us to verify this as the -actual occasion.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_626"><a href="#FNanchor_626">[626]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_627"><a href="#FNanchor_627">[627]</a></span> -Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libert. p. 193, s. 10, cont. Aristokrat. p. 666, s. -165; p. 687, s. 242.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_628"><a href="#FNanchor_628">[628]</a></span> -Demosth. <i>ut sup.</i>; Isokrates, Or. xv, (De Permut.) s. 118; Cornel. -Nepos, Timoth. c. 1. -</p> -<p> -The stratagems whereby Timotheus procured money for his troops at Samos, -are touched upon in the Pseudo-Aristoteles, Œconomic. ii, 23; and in -Polyæn. iii, 10, 9; so far as we can understand them, they appear to be only -contributions, levied under a thin disguise, upon the inhabitants. -</p> -<p> -Since Ariobarzanes gave money to Agesilaus, he may perhaps have given -some to Timotheus during this siege.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_629"><a href="#FNanchor_629">[629]</a></span> -Xenoph. Enc. Ages. ii, 26; Polyænus, vii, 26. -</p> -<p> -I do not know whether it is to this period that we are to refer the -siege of Atarneus by Autophradates, which he was induced to relinquish -by an ingenious proposition of Eubulus, who held the place (Aristot. Politic. -ii, 4, 10).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_630"><a href="#FNanchor_630">[630]</a></span> -It is with the greatest difficulty that we make out anything like a thread -of events at this period; so miserably scanty and indistinct are our authorities. -</p> -<p> -Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, chap, v. p. 118-130) is -an instructive auxiliary in putting together the scraps of information; compare -also Weissenborn, Hellen. p. 192-194 (Jena, 1844).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_631"><a href="#FNanchor_631">[631]</a></span> -Xen. Enc. Ages. ii, 26, 27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_632"><a href="#FNanchor_632">[632]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. xv, (De Permut.) s. 115-119; Cornelius Nepos, Timotheus, -c. 1. -</p> -<p> -Isokrates particularly dwells upon the fact that the conquests of Timotheus -secured to Athens a large circumjacent territory—ὧν ληφθεισῶν ἅπας ὁ τόπος περιέχων -οἰκεῖος ἠναγκάσθη τῇ πόλει γενέσθαι, etc. (s. 114). -</p> -<p> -From the value of the Hellespont to Athens as ensuring a regular supply -of corn imported from the Euxine, Sestus was sometimes called “the flour-board -of the Peiræus”—ἡ τηλία τοῦ Πειραιῶς (Aristot. Rhetor. iii, 10, 3).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_633"><a href="#FNanchor_633">[633]</a></span> -See Andokides de Pace, s. 15.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_634"><a href="#FNanchor_634">[634]</a></span> -That the Athenian occupation of Samos (doubtless only in part) by -kleruchs, <i>began</i> in 366 or 365 <small>B.C.</small>,—is established by Diodorus, xviii, 8-18, -when he mentions the restoration of the Samians forty-three years afterwards -by the Macedonian Perdikkas. This is not inconsistent with the -fact that additional detachments of kleruchs were sent out in 361 and in -352 <small>B.C.</small>, as mentioned by the Scholiast on Æschines cont. Timarch. p. 31 -c. 12; and by Philochorus, Fr. 131, ed. Didot. See the note of Wesseling, -who questions the accuracy of the date in Diodorus. I dissent from his -criticism, though he is supported both by Boeckh (Public Econ. of Athens, -b. iii, p. 428) and by Mr. Clinton (F. H. ad ann. 352). I think it highly -improbable that so long an interval should have elapsed between the capture -of the island and the sending of the kleruchs, or that this latter measure, -offensive as it was in the eyes of Greece, should have been <i>first</i> resorted -to by Athens in 352 <small>B.C.</small>, when she had been so much weakened -both by the Social War, and by the Progress of Philip. Strabo mentions -two thousand kleruchs as having been sent to Samos. But whether he -means the first batch alone, or altogether, we cannot say (Strabo xiv, p. -638). The father of the philosopher Epikurus was among these kleruchs; -compare Diogen. Laert. x, 1. -</p> -<p> -Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ et Timothei, p. 127) seems to me -to take a just view of the very difficult chronology of this period. -</p> -<p> -Demosthenes mentions the property of the kleruchs, in his general review -of the ways and means of Athens; in a speech delivered in Olym. 106, before -352 <small>B.C.</small> (De Symmoriis, p. 182, s. 19).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_635"><a href="#FNanchor_635">[635]</a></span> -See Demosthenes, De Halonneso, p. 86, s. 40-42; Æschines, De Fals. -Legat. 264, s. 74.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_636"><a href="#FNanchor_636">[636]</a></span> -Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii, 8, 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_637"><a href="#FNanchor_637">[637]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 201; p. 679, s. 209.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_638"><a href="#FNanchor_638">[638]</a></span> -Xenophon, Enc. Agesil. ii, 26.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_639"><a href="#FNanchor_639">[639]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 141.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_640"><a href="#FNanchor_640">[640]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 174. Ἐπειδὴ τὸν μὲν Ἰφικράτην -ἀποστράτηγον ἐποιήσατε, Τιμόθεον δ’ ἐπ’ Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ Χεῤῥόνησον ἐξεπέμψατε -στρατηγὸν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_641"><a href="#FNanchor_641">[641]</a></span> -See Demosthen. cont. Timoth. p. 1187, 1188, s. 10-15. -</p> -<p> -Timotheus swore and pledged himself publicly in the Athenian assembly, -on one occasion, to prefer against Iphikrates a γραφὴν ξενίας; but he never -realized this engagement, and he even afterwards became so far reconciled -with Iphikrates, as to give his daughter in marriage to the son of the latter -(ibid. p. 1204, s. 78). -</p> -<p> -To what precise date, or circumstance, this sworn engagement is to be -referred, we cannot determine. Possibly the γραφὴ ξενίας may refer to the -connection of Iphikrates with Kotys, which might entail in some manner -the forfeiture of his right of citizenship; for it is difficult to understand -how γραφὴ ξενίας, in its usual sense (implying the negation of any original -right of citizenship), could ever be preferred as a charge against Iphikrates; -who not only performed all the active duties of a citizen, but served in the -highest post, and received from the people distinguished honors.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_642"><a href="#FNanchor_642">[642]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 153. ἐτόλμησεν ὑπὲρ τῶν -Κότυος πραγμάτων ἐναντία τοῖς ὑμετέροις στρατηγοῖς ναυμαχεῖν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_643"><a href="#FNanchor_643">[643]</a></span> -Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669. s. 174-177. Respecting these hostages, -I can do nothing more than repeat the brief and obscure notice of Demosthenes. -Of the various conjectures proposed to illustrate it, none appear -to me at all satisfactory. Who Harpalus was, I cannot presume to say.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_644"><a href="#FNanchor_644">[644]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aristocrat. p. 669. s. 175. -</p> -<p> -The orator refers to letters written by Iphikrates and Timotheus to the -Athenian people, in support of these allegations. Unfortunately these letters -are not cited in substance.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_645"><a href="#FNanchor_645">[645]</a></span> -Diodorus, xv, 77; Æschines de Fals. Leg. p. 250. c. 14.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_646"><a href="#FNanchor_646">[646]</a></span> -Demosthenes (Olynth. 1, p. 21. s. 14) mentions the assistance of the -Macedonians to Timotheus against Olynthus. Compare also his oration -ad Philippi Epistolam (p. 154. s. 9). This can hardly allude to anything -else than the war carried on by Timotheus on those coasts in 364 <small>B.C.</small> See -also Polyæn. iii, 10, 14.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_647"><a href="#FNanchor_647">[647]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 81; Cornelius Nepos, Timoth. 1; Isokrates, Or. xv, (De -Permut.) s. 115-119; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. s. 14. cont. Philokl. s. 19. -</p> -<p> -I give in the text what I apprehend to be the real truth contained in the -large assertion of Isokrates,—Χαλκιδεῖς ἅπαντας κατεπολέμησεν (s. 119). -The orator states that Timotheus acquired twenty-four cities in all; but -this total probably comprises his conquests in other times as well as in -other places. The expression of Nepos—“Olynthios bello subegit” is -vague.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_648"><a href="#FNanchor_648">[648]</a></span> -Isokrates, <i>l. c.</i>; Aristotel. Œconomic. ii, 22: Polyæn. iii, 10, 14.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_649"><a href="#FNanchor_649">[649]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669. s. 177.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_650"><a href="#FNanchor_650">[650]</a></span> -Polyænus (iii, 10, 8) mentions this fact, which is explained by comparing -(in Thucydides, vii, 9) the description of the attack made by the Athenian -Euetion upon Amphipolis in 414 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -These ill-successes of Timotheus stand enumerated, as I conceive, in -that catalogue of <i>nine</i> defeats, which the Scholiast on Æschines (De Fals. -Leg. p. 755, Reiske) specifies as having been undergone by Athens at the -territory called <i>Nine Ways</i> (Ἐννέα Ὁδοὶ), the previous name of the spot -where Amphipolis was built. They form the eighth and ninth items of the -catalogue. -</p> -<p> -The third item, is the capture of Amphipolis by Brasidas. The fourth -is, the defeat of Kleon by Brasidas. Then come,— -</p> -<p> -5. οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ἐπ’ Ἠϊόνα Ἀθηναῖοι ἐξελάθησαν. The only way in -which I can make historical fact out of these words, is, by supposing that -they allude to the driving in of all the out-resident Athenians to Athens, -after the defeat of Ægospotami. We know from Thucydides that when -Amphipolis was taken by Brasidas, many of the Athenians who were there -settled retired to Eion; where they probably remained until the close of the -Peloponnesian war, and were then forced back to Athens. We should then -have to construe οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ἐπ’ Ἠϊόνα Ἀθηναῖοι—“the Athenians residing -at Eion;” which, though not a usual sense of the preposition ἐπὶ with -an accusative case, seems the only definite meaning which can be made out -here. -</p> -<p> -6. οἱ μετὰ Σιμμίχου στρατηγοῦντος διεφθάρησαν. -</p> -<p> -7. ὅτε Πρωτόμαχος ἀπέτυχεν (Ἀμφιπολιτῶν αὐτοὺς παραδόντων τοῖς ὁμόροις Θρᾳξί, -these last words are inserted by Bekker from a MS.). These -two last-mentioned occurrences are altogether unknown. We may perhaps -suppose them to refer to the period when Iphikrates was commanding the -forces of Athens in these regions, from 368-365 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -8. ἐκπεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Τιμοθέου Ἀλκíμαχος ἀπέτυχεν αὐτοῦ, παραδόντων αὑτοὺς Θρᾳξὶν -ἐπὶ Τιμοκράτους Ἀθήνῃσιν ἄρχοντος. -</p> -<p> -The word Τιμοθέου is here inserted by Bekker from a MS., in place of -Τιμοσθένους, which appeared in Reiske’s edition. -</p> -<p> -9. Τιμόθεος ἐπιστρατεύσας ἡττήθη ἐπὶ Καλαμιώνος. -</p> -<p> -Here are two defeats of Timotheus specified, one in the archonship of -Timokrates, which exactly coincides with the command of Timotheus in -these regions (Midsummer 364 to Midsummer 363 <small>B.C.</small>). But the other -archon Kalamion, is unknown in the Fasti of Athens. Winiewski (Comment. -in Demosth. de Corona, p. 39), Böhnecke, and other commentators -follow Corsini in representing Kalamion to be a corruption of <i>Kallimedes</i>, -who was archon from Midsummer 360-359 <small>B.C.</small>; and Mr. Clinton -even inserts the fact in his tables for that year. But I agree with -Rehdantz (Vit. Iph. Chab. et Tim. p. 153) that such an occurrence after -Midsummer 360 <small>B.C.</small>, can hardly be reconciled with the proceedings in the -Chersonese before and after that period, as reported by Demosthenes in the -Oration against Aristokrates. Without being able to explain the mistake -about the name of the archon, and without determining whether the real -mistake may not consist in having placed ἐπὶ in place of ὑπὸ,—I cannot -but think that Timotheus underwent two repulses, one by his lieutenant, -and another by himself, near Amphipolis,—both of them occurring in 364 -or the early part of 363 <small>B.C.</small> During great part of 363 <small>B.C.</small>, the attention -of Timotheus seems to have been turned to the Chersonese, Byzantium, -Kotys, etc. -</p> -<p> -My view of the chronology of this period agrees generally with that of -Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 42, p. 244-257).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_651"><a href="#FNanchor_651">[651]</a></span> -Plutarch Pelopid. c. 31; Diodor. xv, 80.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_652"><a href="#FNanchor_652">[652]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 36.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_653"><a href="#FNanchor_653">[653]</a></span> -Thucyd ii, 87; vii, 21.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_654"><a href="#FNanchor_654">[654]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 78.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_655"><a href="#FNanchor_655">[655]</a></span> -Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 276, c. 32, s. 111. Ἐπαμινώνδας, -οὐχ ὑποπτήξας τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀξίωμα, εἶπε διαῤῥήδην ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν -Θηβαίων, ὡς δεῖ τὰ τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀκροπόλεως προπύλαια μετενεγκεῖν εἰς -τὴν προστασίαν τῆς Καδμείας.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_656"><a href="#FNanchor_656">[656]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 78, 79.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_657"><a href="#FNanchor_657">[657]</a></span> -See Vol. VI. Ch. liv. p. 475.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_658"><a href="#FNanchor_658">[658]</a></span> -Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 5; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25; Plutarch, -De Sui Laude, p. 542 A. -</p> -<p> -Neither of these the authors appear to me to conceive rightly either the -attack, or the reply, in which the name of Agamemnon is here brought forward. -As I have given it in the text, there is a real foundation for the -attack, and a real point in the reply; as it appears in Cornelius Nepos, -there is neither one nor the other. -</p> -<p> -That the Spartans regarded themselves as having inherited the leadership -of Greece from Agamemnon, may be seen by Herodotus, vii, 159.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_659"><a href="#FNanchor_659">[659]</a></span> -Thucyd. vi, 17, 18.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_660"><a href="#FNanchor_660">[660]</a></span> -Plutarch (Philopœmen, c. 14) mentions that some authors represented -Epaminondas as having consented unwillingly to this maritime expedition. -He explains such reluctance by reference to the disparaging opinion expressed -by Plato about maritime service. But this opinion of Plato is -founded upon reasons foreign to the character of Epaminondas; and it -seems to me evident that the authors whom Plutarch here followed, introduced -the opinion only as an hypothesis to explain why so great a general -on land as Epaminondas had accomplished so little at sea, when he took -command of a fleet; putting himself in a function for which he had little -capacity, like Philopœmen (Plutarch, Reipublic. Gerend. Præcep. p. 812 E.). -</p> -<p> -Bauch (in his tract, Epaminondas und Thebens Kampf um die Hegemonie, -Breslau, 1834, p. 70, 71) maintains that Epaminondas was constrained -against his own better judgment to undertake this maritime enterprise. -I cannot coincide in his opinion. The oracle which Bauch cites -from Pausanias (viii, 11, 6) proves as little as the above extract from Plutarch.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_661"><a href="#FNanchor_661">[661]</a></span> -Isokrates. Or. v, (Philip.) s. 53; Diodor. xv, 78. ἰδίας τὰς πόλεις -τοῖς Θηβαίοις ἐποίησεν. I do not feel assured that these general words apply -to Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, which had before been mentioned.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_662"><a href="#FNanchor_662">[662]</a></span> -Justin, xvi, 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_663"><a href="#FNanchor_663">[663]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 81; Cornel. Nepos, Timotheus, c. 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_664"><a href="#FNanchor_664">[664]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 79.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_665"><a href="#FNanchor_665">[665]</a></span> -For the description of this memorable scene, see Plutarch, Pelopidas, -c. 31, 32; Diodor. xv, 80, 81; Cornel. Nepos. Pelopid. c. 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_666"><a href="#FNanchor_666">[666]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 81. Plutarch (Pelop. c. 34) states substantially the same.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_667"><a href="#FNanchor_667">[667]</a></span> -Plutarch, Compar. Pelopid. and Marcell. c. 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_668"><a href="#FNanchor_668">[668]</a></span> -Diodor. (xv, 78) places in one and the same year both,—1. The maritime -project of Epaminondas, including his recommendation of it, the -equipment of the fleet, and the actual expedition. 2. The expedition of -Pelopidas into Thessaly, with its immediate consequences.—He mentions -the former of the two first, but he places both in the first year of Olympiad -104, the year in which Timokrates was archon at Athens; that is, -from Midsummer 364 to Midsummer 363 <small>B.C.</small> He passes immediately -from the maritime expedition into an allusion to the battle of Mantinea, -which (he says) proved fatal to Epaminondas and hindered him from following -up his ideas of maritime activity. -</p> -<p> -The battle of Mantinea took place in June or July 362 <small>B.C.</small> The maritime -expedition, immediately preceding that battle, would therefore naturally -take place in the summer of 363 <small>B.C.</small>; the year 364 <small>B.C.</small> having been -occupied in the requisite naval equipments. -</p> -<p> -I incline to think that the march of Pelopidas into Thessaly also took place -during 363 <small>B.C.</small>, and that his death thus occurred while Epaminondas was -absent on shipboard. A probable reason is thus supplied why the second -Theban army which went to avenge Pelopidas, was commanded, not by his -friend and colleague Epaminondas, but by other generals. Had Epaminondas -been then at home, this would hardly have been. -</p> -<p> -The eclipse of the sun, which both Plutarch and Diodorus mention to -have immediately preceded the out-march of Pelopidas, does not seem to -have been as yet certainly identified. Dodwell, on the authority of an astronomical -friend, places it on the 13th of June, 364 <small>B.C.</small>, at five o’clock in -the morning. On the other hand, Calvisius places it on the 13th of July in -the same Julian year, at a quarter before eleven o’clock in the day (see -L’Art de Vérifier les Dates, tom. i, p. 257). We may remark, that the day -named by Dodwell (as he himself admits) would not fall within the Olympic -year 364-363 <small>B.C.</small>, but during the months preceding the commencement -of that year. Moreover Dodwell speaks as if there were no other months -in the year, except June, July, and August, fit for military expeditions; an -hypothesis not reasonable to admit. -</p> -<p> -Sievers and Dr. Thirlwall both accept the eclipse mentioned by Dodwell, -as marking the time when the expedition of Pelopidas commenced—June -364 <small>B.C.</small> But against this, Mr. Clinton takes no notice of it in his tables; -which seems to show that he was not satisfied as to the exactness of Dodwell’s -statement or the chronological identity. If it should turn out, on -farther astronomical calculations, that there occurred no eclipse of the sun -in the year 363 <small>B.C.</small>, visible at Thebes,—I should then fix upon the eclipse -mentioned by Calvisius (13 July 364 <small>B.C.</small>) as identifying the time of the -expedition of Pelopidas; which would, on that supposition, precede by -eight or nine months the commencement of the transmarine cruise of Epaminondas. -The eclipse mentioned by Calvisius is preferable to that mentioned -by Dodwell, because it falls within the Olympic year indicated by -Diodorus. -</p> -<p> -But it appears to me that farther astronomical information is here required.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_669"><a href="#FNanchor_669">[669]</a></span> -Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 35.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_670"><a href="#FNanchor_670">[670]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 79.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_671"><a href="#FNanchor_671">[671]</a></span> -See the sentiment expressed by Demosthenes cont. Leptinem, p. 489, s. -121,—an oration delivered in 355 <small>B.C.</small>; eight years after the destruction of -Orchomenus.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_672"><a href="#FNanchor_672">[672]</a></span> -Demosth. De Pace, p. 62, s. 21; Philippic. II, p. 69, s. 13; s. 15; Fals. -Leg. p. 375, s. 122; p. 387, s. 162; p. 445, s. 373.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_673"><a href="#FNanchor_673">[673]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 57.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_674"><a href="#FNanchor_674">[674]</a></span> -Pausan. ix, 15, 2. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus places in the same year all the three facts:—1. The maritime -expedition of Epaminondas. 2. The expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly, -his death, and the following Theban victories over Alexander of Pheræ. -3. The conspiracy of the Orchomenian Knights, and the destruction of Orchomenus. -</p> -<p> -The year in which he places them is, the archonship of Timokrates,—from -Midsummer 364 to Midsummer 363 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -That the destruction of Orchomenus occurred during the absence of Epaminondas, -and that he was greatly distressed at it on his return,—is distinctly -stated by Pausanias; who however is (in my judgment) so far mistaken, -that he refers the absence of Epaminondas to that previous occasion -when he had gone into Thessaly to rescue Pelopidas from the dungeon of -Alexander, 366 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -This date is not so probable as the date assigned by Diodorus; nor do -the chronological conceptions of Pausanias seem to me exact.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_675"><a href="#FNanchor_675">[675]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_676"><a href="#FNanchor_676">[676]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 43.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_677"><a href="#FNanchor_677">[677]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_678"><a href="#FNanchor_678">[678]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 30, 31.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_679"><a href="#FNanchor_679">[679]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_680"><a href="#FNanchor_680">[680]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 26.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_681"><a href="#FNanchor_681">[681]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_682"><a href="#FNanchor_682">[682]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_683"><a href="#FNanchor_683">[683]</a></span> -It had been taken from Elis by Agis, at the peace of 399 <small>B.C.</small> after his -victorious war (Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_684"><a href="#FNanchor_684">[684]</a></span> -Pausanias, vi, 22, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_685"><a href="#FNanchor_685">[685]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 13-18; Diodor. xv, 77.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_686"><a href="#FNanchor_686">[686]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 26.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_687"><a href="#FNanchor_687">[687]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27. -</p> -<p> -The Thebans who are here mentioned must have been soldiers in garrison -at Tegea, Megalopolis, or Messênê. No fresh Theban troops had come -into Peloponnesus.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_688"><a href="#FNanchor_688">[688]</a></span> -Thucyd. v, 68; Xen. Rep. Laced, xii, 3; xiii, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_689"><a href="#FNanchor_689">[689]</a></span> -The seizure of Kromnus by the Lacedæmonians, and the wound received -by Archidamus, are alluded to by Justin, vi, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_690"><a href="#FNanchor_690">[690]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 20-25. Ὡς δὲ, πλησίον ὄντων, ἀναβοήσας -τις τῶν πρεσβυτέρων εἶπε—Τί δεῖ ἡμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες, μάχεσθαι, ἀλλ’ οὐ σπεισαμένους -διαλυθῆναι; ἄσμενοι δὴ ἀμφότεροι ἀκούσαντες, ἐσπείσαντο.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_691"><a href="#FNanchor_691">[691]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27. The conjecture of Palmerius,—τοῦ κατὰ -τοὺς Ἀργείους,—seems here just and necessary.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_692"><a href="#FNanchor_692">[692]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_693"><a href="#FNanchor_693">[693]</a></span> -Thucyd. iv, 40.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_694"><a href="#FNanchor_694">[694]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_695"><a href="#FNanchor_695">[695]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 29. Compare Pausanias, vi, 22, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_696"><a href="#FNanchor_696">[696]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 29. Καὶ τὴν μὲν ἱπποδρομίαν ἤδη ἐπεποιήκεσαν, -καὶ τὰ δρομικὰ τοῦ πεντάθλου· οἱ δ’ εἰς πάλην ἀφικόμενοι <em class="gesperrt">οὐκέτι ἐν τῷ δρόμῳ</em>, -ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ τοῦ δρόμου καὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ ἐπάλαιον. <em class="gesperrt">Οἱ γὰρ Ἠλεῖοι</em> παρῆσαν ἤδη, etc. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus erroneously represents (xv, 78) the occurrence as if the Eleians -had been engaged in celebrating the festival, and as if the Pisatans and -Arcadians had marched up and attacked them while doing so. The Eleians -were really the assailants.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_697"><a href="#FNanchor_697">[697]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. <i>l. c.</i> Οἱ γὰρ Ἠλεῖοι παρῆσαν σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις <em class="gesperrt">εἰς τὸ -τέμενος</em>. Οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες ποῤῥωτέρω μὲν οὐκ ἀπήντησαν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ Κλαδάου ποτάμου -παρετάξαντο, ὃς παρὰ τὴν Ἄλτιν καταῤῥέων εἰς τὸν Ἄλφειον ἐμβάλλει. Καὶ μὴν <em class="gesperrt">οἱ Ἠλεῖοι -τἀπὶ θάτερα τοῦ ποτάμου παρετάξαντο</em>, σφαγιασάμενοι δὲ εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν. -</p> -<p> -The τέμενος must here be distinguished from the Altis; as meaning the -entire breadth of consecrated ground at Olympia, of which the Altis formed -a smaller interior portion enclosed with a wall. The Eleians entered into -the τέμενος before they crossed the river Kladeus, which flowed <i>through</i> the -τέμενος, but <i>alongside</i> of the Altis. The tomb of Œnomaus, which was -doubtless included in the τέμενος, was on the right bank of the Kladeus -(Pausan. vi, 21, 3); while the Altis was on the left bank of the river. -</p> -<p> -Colonel Leake (in his Peloponnesiaca, pp. 6, 107) has given a copious and -instructive exposition of the ground of Olympia, as well as of the notices -left by Pausanias respecting it. Unfortunately, little can be made out certainly, -except the position of the great temple of Zeus in the Altis. Neither -the positions assigned to the various buildings, the Stadion, or the -Hippodrome, by Colonel Leake,—nor those proposed by Kiepert in the -plan comprised in his maps—nor by Ernst Curtius, in the Plan annexed -to his recent Dissertation called <i>Olympia</i> (Berlin, 1852)—rest upon very -sufficient evidence. Perhaps future excavations may hereafter reveal much -that is now unknown. -</p> -<p> -I cannot agree with Colonel Leake however in supposing that Pisa was -at any time a <i>city</i>, and afterwards deserted.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_698"><a href="#FNanchor_698">[698]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4. 32. ὥστε οὐδ’ ἀνεπαύσαντο τῆς νυκτὸς -ἐκκόπτοντες τὰ διαπεπονημένα σκηνώματα, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_699"><a href="#FNanchor_699">[699]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 78; Pausanias, vi, 8, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_700"><a href="#FNanchor_700">[700]</a></span> -Tacitus, Hist. i, 40. He is describing the murder of Galba in the Forum -at Rome, by the Othonian soldiers:— -</p> -<p> -“Igitur milites Romani, quasi Vologesen aut Pacorum avito Arsacidarum -solio depulsuri, ac non Imperatorem suum, inermem et senem, trucidare -pergerent—disjectâ plebe, proculcato Senatu, truces armis, rapidis -equis, forum irrumpunt: nec illos Capitolii aspectus, et imminentium templorum -religio, et priores et futuri Principes, terruere, quominus facerent -scelus, cujus ultor est quisquis successit.”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_701"><a href="#FNanchor_701">[701]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 32.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_702"><a href="#FNanchor_702">[702]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 20; Polybius, iv, 73.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_703"><a href="#FNanchor_703">[703]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33, 34.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_704"><a href="#FNanchor_704">[704]</a></span> -Thucyd. i, 121. -</p> -<p> -Perikles in his speech at Athens alludes to this understood purpose of -the Spartans and their confederacy (Thucyd. i, 143).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_705"><a href="#FNanchor_705">[705]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33, 34; Diodor. xv, 82; Pausanias, vii, 8, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_706"><a href="#FNanchor_706">[706]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33. φάσκοντες αὐτοὺς λυμαίνεσθαι τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν, -ἀνεκαλοῦντο εἰς τοὺς μυρίους τοὺς προστάτας αὐτῶν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_707"><a href="#FNanchor_707">[707]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 34.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_708"><a href="#FNanchor_708">[708]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 34. <em class="gesperrt">Οἱ δὲ τὰ κράτιστα τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ -βουλευόμενοι</em> ἔπεισαν τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων, πέμψαντας πρέσβεις εἰπεῖν -τοῖς Θηβαίοις, etc. -</p> -<p> -The phrase here used by Xenophon, to describe the oligarchical party, -marks his philo-Laconian sentiment. Compare vii, 5, 1. οἱ κηδόμενοι τῆς -Πελοποννήσου, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_709"><a href="#FNanchor_709">[709]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. <i>l. c.</i></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_710"><a href="#FNanchor_710">[710]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 37, 38.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_711"><a href="#FNanchor_711">[711]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. -<span class="replace" id="tn_3" title="In the printed book: vii, 39">vii, 4, 39</span>. -συγκαλέσας τῶν Ἀρκάδων ὁπόσοι -γε δὴ συνελθεῖν ἠθέλησαν, ἀπελογεῖτο, ὡς ἐξαπατηθείη.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_712"><a href="#FNanchor_712">[712]</a></span> -The representation of Diodorus (xv, 82), though very loose and vague, -gives us to understand that the two opposing parties at Tegea came to an -actual conflict of arms, on occasion of the peace.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_713"><a href="#FNanchor_713">[713]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 40.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_714"><a href="#FNanchor_714">[714]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 1. Οἱ κηδόμενοι τῆς Πελοποννήσου.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_715"><a href="#FNanchor_715">[715]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 2, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_716"><a href="#FNanchor_716">[716]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 5; Diodor. xv, 85.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_717"><a href="#FNanchor_717">[717]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 85.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_718"><a href="#FNanchor_718">[718]</a></span> -The explanation which Xenophon gives of this halt at Nemea,—as if -Epaminondas was determined to it by a peculiar hatred of Athens (Hellen. -vii, 5, 6)—seems alike fanciful and ill-tempered.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_719"><a href="#FNanchor_719">[719]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_720"><a href="#FNanchor_720">[720]</a></span> -Plutarch, De Gloriâ Athen. p. 346 B.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_721"><a href="#FNanchor_721">[721]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 10. Καὶ εἰ μὴ Κρὴς, θείᾳ τινὶ μοίρᾳ προσελθὼν, -ἐξήγγειλε τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ προσιὸν τὸ στράτευμα, ἔλαβεν ἂν τὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ νεοττιὰν, -παντάπασιν ἔρημον τῶν ἀμυνουμένων. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus coincides in the main fact (xv, 82, 83), though with many inaccuracies -of detail. He gives a very imperfect idea of this narrow escape -of Sparta, which is fully attested by Xenophon, even against his own partialities. -</p> -<p> -Kallisthenes asserted that the critical intelligence had been conveyed to -Agesilaus by a Thespian named Euthynus (Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 34).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_722"><a href="#FNanchor_722">[722]</a></span> -Xenophon (Hellen. vii, 5, 10, 11) describes these facts in a manner different -on several points from Polybius (ix, 8), and from Diodorus (xv, 83). -Xenophon’s authority appears to me better in itself, while his narrative is -also more probable. He states distinctly that Agesilaus heard the news -of the Theban march while he was yet at Pellênê (on the road to Mantinea, -to which place a large portion of the Spartan troops had already gone forward),—that -he turned back forthwith, and reached Sparta before Epaminondas, -with a division not numerous, yet sufficient to put the town in a -state of defence. Whereas Polybius affirms, that Agesilaus heard the news -when he was at Mantinea,—that he marched from thence with the whole -army to Sparta, but that Epaminondas reached Sparta before him, had -already attacked the town and penetrated into the market-place, when Agesilaus -arrived and drove him back. Diodorus relates that Agesilaus never -left Sparta, but that the other king Agis, who had been sent with the army -to Mantinea, divining the plans of Epaminondas, sent word by some swift -Kretan runners to Agesilaus and put him upon his guard. -</p> -<p> -Wesseling remarks justly, that the mention of Agis must be a mistake; -that the second king of Sparta at that time was named Kleomenes. -</p> -<p> -Polyænus (ii, 3, 10) states correctly that Agesilaus reached Sparta before -Epaminondas; but he adds many other details which are too uncertain -to copy.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_723"><a href="#FNanchor_723">[723]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 11. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένετο Ἐπαμινώνδας -<em class="gesperrt">ἐν τῇ πόλει</em> τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_724"><a href="#FNanchor_724">[724]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 12, 13. -</p> -<p> -Justin (vi, 7) greatly exaggerates the magnitude and violence of the -contest. He erroneously represents that Agesilaus did not reach Sparta -till after Epaminondas.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_725"><a href="#FNanchor_725">[725]</a></span> -Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 34.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_726"><a href="#FNanchor_726">[726]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 14. Πάλιν δὲ πορευθεὶς ὡς ἐδύνατο τάχιστα -εἰς τὴν Τεγέαν, τοὺς μὲν ὁπλίτας ἀνέπαυσε, τοὺς δὲ ἱππέας ἔπεμψεν εἰς τὴν Μαντίνειαν, -δεηθεὶς αὐτῶν προσκαρτερῆσαι, καὶ διδάσκων ὡς πάντα μὲν εἰκὸς ἔξω εἶναι τὰ τῶν Μαντινέων -βοσκήματα, πάντας δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἄλλως τε καὶ σίτου συγκομιδῆς οὔσης.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_727"><a href="#FNanchor_727">[727]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 15, 16. -</p> -<p> -The words—δυστυχήματος γεγενημένου ἐν Κορίνθῳ τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν—allude -to something which we have no means of making out. It is possible -that the Corinthians, who were at peace with Thebes and had been ill-used -by Athens (vii, 4, 6-10), may have seen with displeasure, and even molested, -the Athenian horsemen while resting on their territory.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_728"><a href="#FNanchor_728">[728]</a></span> -Polybius, ix, 8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_729"><a href="#FNanchor_729">[729]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 15, 16, 17. -</p> -<p> -Plutarch (De Gloriâ Athen. p. 346 D.—E.) recounts the general fact of -this battle and the rescue of Mantinea; yet with several inaccuracies which -we refute by means of Xenophon. -</p> -<p> -Diodor. (xv, 84) mentions the rescue of Mantinea by the unexpected arrival -of the Athenians; but he states them as being six thousand soldiers, -that is hoplites, under Hegelochus; and he says nothing about the cavalry -battle. Hegesilaus is named by Ephorus (ap. Diog. Laert. ii, 54,—compare -Xenoph. De Vectigal. iii, 7) as the general of the entire force sent out -by Athens on this occasion, consisting of infantry as well as cavalry. The -infantry must have come up somewhat later. -</p> -<p> -Polybius also (ix, 8), though concurring in the main with Xenophon, differs -in several details. I follow the narrative of Xenophon.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_730"><a href="#FNanchor_730">[730]</a></span> -Harpokration v, Κηφισόδωρος, Ephorus ap. Diogen. Laert. ii, 53; Pausan. -1, 3, 4; viii, 9, 8; viii, 11, 5. -</p> -<p> -There is a confusion, on several points, between this cavalry battle near -Mantinea,—and the great or general battle, which speedily followed it, -wherein Epaminondas was slain. Gryllus is sometimes said to have been -slain in the battle of Mantinea, and even to have killed Epaminondas with -his own hand. It would seem as if the picture of Euphranor represented -Gryllus in the act of killing the Theban commander; and as if the latter -tradition of Athens as well as of Thebes, erroneously bestowed upon that -Theban commander the name of Epaminondas. -</p> -<p> -See this confusion discussed and cleared up, in a good article on the Battle -of Mantinea, by Arnold Schäfer, p. 58, 59, in the Rheinisches Museum -für Philologie (1846—Fünfter Jahrgang, Erstes Heft).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_731"><a href="#FNanchor_731">[731]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 84.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_732"><a href="#FNanchor_732">[732]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 8. καὶ μὴν οἰόμενος κρείττων τῶν ἀντιπάλων εἶναι, -etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_733"><a href="#FNanchor_733">[733]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 19. σπάνια δὲ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔχοντας ὅμως πείθεσθαι -ἐθέλειν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_734"><a href="#FNanchor_734">[734]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 18. αὐτὸς δὲ λελυμασμένος παντάπασι -τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δόξῃ ἔσοιτο, ἡττημένος μὲν ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι σὺν πολλῷ ὁπλιτικῷ -ὑπ’ ὀλίγων, ἡττημένος δὲ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ ἱππομαχίᾳ, αἴτιος δὲ γεγενημένος -διὰ τὴν ἐς Πελοπόννησον στράτειαν τοῦ συνεστάναι Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ -Ἀρκάδας καὶ Ἠλείους καὶ Ἀθηναίους· ὥστε οὐκ ἐδόκει δυνατὸν εἶναι ἀμαχεὶ -παρελθεῖν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_735"><a href="#FNanchor_735">[735]</a></span> -Polybius, ix. 8, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_736"><a href="#FNanchor_736">[736]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 20. Προθύμως μὲν ἐλευκοῦντο οἱ ἱππεῖς τὰ κράνη, -κελεύοντος ἐκείνου· ἐπεγράφοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἀρκάδων ὁπλῖται, ῥόπαλα ἔχοντες, -ὡς Θηβαῖοι ὄντες· πάντες δὲ ἠκονῶντο καὶ λόγχας καὶ μαχαίρας, καὶ ἐλαμπρύνοντο -τὰς ἀσπίδας. -</p> -<p> -There seems a sort of sneer in these latter words, both at the Arcadians -and Thebans. The Arcadian club-men are called ὁπλῖται; and are represented -as passing themselves off to be as good as Thebans. -</p> -<p> -Sievers (Geschicht. p. 342) and Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. c. 40, p. 200) follow -Eckhel in translating this passage to mean that “the Arcadian hoplites -inscribed upon their shields the figure of a club, that being the ensign of -the Thebans.” I cannot think this interpretation is the best,—at least -until some evidence is produced, that the Theban symbol on the shield was -a club. Xenophon does not disdain on other occasions to speak sneeringly -of the Theban hoplites,—see vii, 5, 12. The mention of λόγχας καὶ μαχαίρας, -immediately afterwards, sustains the belief that ῥόπαλα ἔχοντες, immediately -before, means “men armed with clubs”; the natural sense of the -words. -</p> -<p> -The horsemen are said to have “whitened their helmets (or head-pieces).” -Hence I presume that these head-pieces were not made of metal, but of -wood or wicker-work. Compare Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 25.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_737"><a href="#FNanchor_737">[737]</a></span> -See Colonel Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, ch. 24, p. 45.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_738"><a href="#FNanchor_738">[738]</a></span> -Three miles from Mantinea (Leake, ib. p. 51-94) “a low ridge of rocks, -which, advancing into the plain from a projecting part of the Mænalium, -formed a natural division between the districts of Tegea and Mantineia.” -</p> -<p> -Compare the same work, vol. i, ch. 3, p. 100, 112, 114, and the recent valuable -work of Ernst Curtius, Peloponnesos (Gotha, 1851), pp. 232-247. -Gell says that a wall has once been carried across the plain at this boundary -(Itinerary of the Morea, p. 141-143).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_739"><a href="#FNanchor_739">[739]</a></span> -See the indications of the locality of the battle in Pausanias, viii, 11, 4, -5; and Colonel Leake—as above referred to.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_740"><a href="#FNanchor_740">[740]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 21. -</p> -<p> -Tripolitza is reckoned by Colonel Leake as about three miles and a half -from the site of Tegea; Mr. Dodwell states it as about four miles, and -Gell’s Itinerary of the Morea much the same. -</p> -<p> -Colonel Leake reckons about eight miles from Tripolitza to Mantinea. -Gell states it as two hours and three minutes, Dodwell as two hours and five -minutes,—or seven miles. -</p> -<p> -Colonel Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. i, p. 88-100; Gell’s Itinerary, p. -141; Dodwell’s Travels, vol. ii, p. 418-422. -</p> -<p> -It would seem that Epaminondas, in this latter half of his march, must -have followed nearly the road from Mantinea to Pallantium. Pallantium -was situated west by south from Tegea.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_741"><a href="#FNanchor_741">[741]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_742"><a href="#FNanchor_742">[742]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ, ὡς πρὸς τῷ ὄρει ἐγένετο, -ἐπεὶ ἐξετάθη αὐτῷ ἡ φάλαγξ, ὑπὸ τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς ἔθετο τὰ ὅπλα· ὥστε εἰκάσθη -στρατοπεδευομένῳ. Τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσας, ἔλυσε μὲν τῶν πλείστων πολεμίων τὴν ἐν -ταῖς ψυχαῖς πρὸς μάχην παρασκευήν, ἔλυσε δὲ τὴν ἐν ταῖς συντάξεσιν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_743"><a href="#FNanchor_743">[743]</a></span> -Thucyd. v, 67; Pausanias, viii, 9, 5; viii. 10, 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_744"><a href="#FNanchor_744">[744]</a></span> -Diodor. xv. 85. -</p> -<p> -That the Athenians were on the left, we also know from Xenophon (Hell. -vii, 5, 24), though he gives no complete description of the arrangement of -the allies on either side.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_745"><a href="#FNanchor_745">[745]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 23.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_746"><a href="#FNanchor_746">[746]</a></span> -Here again, we know from Xenophon that the Thebans were on the -left; but the general arrangement of the other contingents we obtain only -from Diodorus (xv, 85). -</p> -<p> -The Tactica of Arrian, also (xi, 2) inform us that Epaminondas formed -his attacking column, at Leuktra, of the Thebans—at Mantinea, of all -the Bœotians. -</p> -<p> -About the practice of the Thebans, both at and after the battle of Leuktra, -to make their attack with the left, see Plutarch. Quæst. Roman. p. -282 D.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_747"><a href="#FNanchor_747">[747]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22. Ἐπεί γε μὴν, παραγαγὼν τοὺς ἐπὶ κέρως -πορευομένους λόχους εἰς μέτωπον, ἰσχυρὸν ἐποιήσατο τὸ περὶ ἑαυτὸν ἔμβολον, -τότε δὴ ἀναλαβεῖν παραγγείλας τὰ ὅπλα, ἡγεῖτο· οἱ δ’ ἠκολούθουν ... Ὁ δὲ τὸ -στράτευμα ἀντίπρωρον ὥσπερ τριήρη προσῆγε, νομίζων, ὅπη ἐμβαλὼν διακόψειε, -διαφθερεῖν ὅλον τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων στράτευμα, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_748"><a href="#FNanchor_748">[748]</a></span> -I agree with Folard (Traité de la Colonne, p. lv-lxi, prefixed to the -translation of Polybius) in considering ἔμβολον to be a column,—rather -than a wedge tapering towards the front. And I dissent from Schneider’s -explanation, who says,—“Epaminondas phalangem contrahit sensim et colligit -in frontem, ut cunei seu rostri navalis formam efficeret. Copiæ igitur -ex utroque latere explicatæ transeunt in frontem; hoc est, παράγειν εἰς μέτωπον.” -It appears to me that the troops which Epaminondas caused to -wheel into the front and to form the advancing column, consisted only of -the left or Theban division, the best troops in the army,—τῷ μὲν ἰσχυροτάτῳ παρεσκευάζετο -ἀγωνίζεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀσθενέστατον πόῤῥω ἀπέστησεν. Moreover, -the whole account of Xenophon implies that Epaminondas made the -attack from his own left against the enemy’s right, or right-centre. He was -afraid that the Athenians would take him in flank from their own left.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_749"><a href="#FNanchor_749">[749]</a></span> -Compare a similar case in Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 13, where the Grecian -cavalry, in the Asiatic army of Agesilaus, is said to be drawn up ὥσπερ φάλαγξ ἐπὶ -τεσσάρων, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_750"><a href="#FNanchor_750">[750]</a></span> -These πέζοι ἅμιπποι—light-armed footmen, intermingled with the -ranks of the cavalry,—are numbered as an important item in the military -establishment of the Syracusan despot Gelon (Herodot. vii. 158).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_751"><a href="#FNanchor_751">[751]</a></span> -Perhaps Epaminondas may have contrived in part to conceal what was -going on by means of cavalry-movements in his front. Something of the -kind seems alluded to by Polyænus (ii, 3, 14).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_752"><a href="#FNanchor_752">[752]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_753"><a href="#FNanchor_753">[753]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 85. -</p> -<p> -The orator Æschines fought among the Athenian hoplites on this occasion -(Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 300. c. 53.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_754"><a href="#FNanchor_754">[754]</a></span> -The remark made by Polybius upon this battle deserves notice. He -states that the description given of the battle by Ephorus was extremely -incorrect and absurd, arguing great ignorance both of the ground where it -was fought and of the possible movements of the armies. He says that -Ephorus had displayed the like incompetence also in describing the battle -of Leuktra; in which case, however, his narrative was less misleading, -because that battle was simple and easily intelligible, involving movements -only of one wing of each army. But in regard to the battle of Mantinea -(he says), the misdescription of Ephorus was of far more deplorable effect; -because that battle exhibited much complication and generalship, which -Ephorus did not at all comprehend, as might be seen by any one who measured -the ground and studied the movements reported in his narrative (Polybius, -xii, 25). -</p> -<p> -Polybius adds that Theopompus and Timæus were as little to be trusted -in the description of land-battles as Ephorus. Whether this remark has -special application to the battle of Mantinea, I do not clearly make out. -He gives credit however to Ephorus for greater judgment and accuracy, -in the description of naval battles. -</p> -<p> -Unfortunately, Polybius has not given us his own description of this battle -of Mantinea. He only says enough to make us feel how imperfectly we -know its details. There is too much reason to fear that the account which -we now read in Diodorus may be borrowed in large proportion from that -very narrative of Ephorus here so much disparaged.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_755"><a href="#FNanchor_755">[755]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 87. Cornelius Nepos (Epam. c. 9) seems to copy the same -authority as Diodorus, though more sparing of details. He does not seem -to have read Xenophon. -</p> -<p> -I commend the reader again to an excellent note of Dr. Arnold, on Thucydides, -iv, 11; animadverting upon similar exaggerations and embellishments -of Diodorus, in the description of the conduct of Brasidas at Pylus.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_756"><a href="#FNanchor_756">[756]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 25. Τὴν μὲν δὴ συμβολὴν οὕτως ἐποιήσατο, -καὶ οὐκ ἐψεύσθη τῆς ἐλπίδος· <em class="gesperrt">κρατήσας γὰρ ἧ προσέβαλεν, ὅλον ἐποίησε</em> -φεύγειν τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων. Ἐπεί γε μὴν ἐκεῖνος ἔπεσεν, οἱ λοιποὶ οὐδὲ τῇ νίκῃ -ὀρθῶς ἔτι ἐδυνάσθησαν χρήσασθαι, ἀλλὰ φυγούσης μὲν αὐτοῖς τῆς ἐναντίας -φάλαγγος, οὐδένα ἀπέκτειναν οἱ ὁπλῖται, οὐδὲ προῆλθον ἐκ τοῦ χωρίου ἔνθα -ἡ συμβολὴ ἐγένετο· φυγόντων δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν ἱππέων, ἀπέκτειναν μὲν οὐδὲ -οἱ ἱππεῖς διώκοντες οὔτε ἱππέας οὔθ’ ὁπλίτας, ὥσπερ δὲ ἡττώμενοι πεφοβημένως -διὰ τῶν φευγόντων πολεμίων διέπεσον. Καὶ μὴν οἱ ἅμιπποι καὶ οἱ πελτασταὶ, -συννενικηκότες τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν, ἀφίκοντο μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ εὐωνύμου, ὡς κρατοῦντες· -ἐκεῖ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ πλεῖστοι αὐτῶν ἀπέθανον.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_757"><a href="#FNanchor_757">[757]</a></span> -Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 33, 34.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_758"><a href="#FNanchor_758">[758]</a></span> -The statement of Diodorus (xv, 87) on this point appears to me more -probable than that of Xenophon (vii, 5, 26). -</p> -<p> -The Athenians boasted much of this slight success with their cavalry, -enhancing its value by acknowledging that all their allies had been defeated -around them (Plutarch, De Gloriâ Athen. p. 350 A.).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_759"><a href="#FNanchor_759">[759]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 88; Cicero, De Finibus, ii, 30, 97; Epistol. ad Familiares, -v, 12, 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_760"><a href="#FNanchor_760">[760]</a></span> -Plutarch, Apophthegm. Regum, p. 194 C.; Ælian, V. H. xii, 3. -</p> -<p> -Both Plutarch and Diodorus talk of Epaminondas being carried back to -the <i>camp</i>. But it seems that there could hardly have been any camp. -Epaminondas had marched out only a few hours before from Tegea. A -tent may have been erected on the field to receive him. Five centuries -afterwards, the Mantineans showed to the traveller Pausanias a spot called -Skiopê near the field of battle, to which (they affirmed) the wounded Epaminondas -had been carried off, in great pain, and with his hand on his wound—from -whence he had looked with anxiety on the continuing battle (Pausan. -viii, 11, 4).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_761"><a href="#FNanchor_761">[761]</a></span> -Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 35; Pausanias, i, 3, 3; viii, 9, 2-5; viii, 11, 4; -ix, 15, 3. -</p> -<p> -The reports however which Pausanias gives, and the name of Machærion -which he heard both at Mantinea and at Sparta, are confused, and are -hardly to be reconciled with the story of Plutarch. -</p> -<p> -Moreover, it would seem that the subsequent Athenians did not clearly -distinguish between the first battle fought by the Athenian cavalry, immediately -after their arrival at Mantinea, when they rescued that town from -being surprised by the Thebans and Thessalians—and the general action -which followed a few days afterwards wherein Epaminondas was slain.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_762"><a href="#FNanchor_762">[762]</a></span> -See the oration of Demosthenes on behalf of the Megalopolitans -(Orat. xvi, s. 10, p. 204; s. 21, p. 206).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_763"><a href="#FNanchor_763">[763]</a></span> -Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 35; Diodor. xv, 89; Polybius, iv, 33. -</p> -<p> -Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellen. <small>B.C.</small> 361) assigns the conclusion of -peace to the succeeding year. I do not know however what ground there -is for assuming such an interval between the battle and the peace. Diodorus -appears to place the latter immediately after the former. This would -not count for much, indeed, against any considerable counter-probability; -but the probability here (in my judgment) is rather in favor of immediate -sequence between the two events.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_764"><a href="#FNanchor_764">[764]</a></span> -Pausanias, viii, 11, 4, 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_765"><a href="#FNanchor_765">[765]</a></span> -Cicero, Tusculan. i, 2, 4; De Orator. iii, 34, 139. “Epaminondas, -princeps, meo judicio, Græciæ,” etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_766"><a href="#FNanchor_766">[766]</a></span> -Plutarch, Philopœmen, c. 3; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_767"><a href="#FNanchor_767">[767]</a></span> -See the inscription of four lines copied by Pausanias from the statue of -Epaminondas at Thebes (Paus. ix, 16, 3):— -</p> -<div class="poetry-container"> - <div class="poetry"> - <p>Ἡμετέραις βουλαῖς Σπάρτη μὲν ἐκείρατο δόξαν, etc.</p> - </div> -</div> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_768"><a href="#FNanchor_768">[768]</a></span> -Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 5, 8, 9.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_769"><a href="#FNanchor_769">[769]</a></span> -Demosthenes, Philipp. I, p. 51, s. 46.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_770"><a href="#FNanchor_770">[770]</a></span> -The remark of Diodorus (xv, 88) upon Epaminondas is more emphatic -than we usually find in him,—Παρὰ μὲν γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἓν ἂν εὕροι -προτέρημα τῆς δόξης, παρὰ δὲ τούτῳ πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς ἠθροισμένας.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_771"><a href="#FNanchor_771">[771]</a></span> -Polybius, xxxii, 8, 6. Cornelius Nepos (Epaminondas, c. 4) gives one -anecdote, among several which he affirms to have found on record, of large -pecuniary presents tendered to, and repudiated by, Epaminondas; an anecdote -recounted with so much precision of detail, that it appears to deserve -credit, though we cannot assign the exact time when the alleged briber -Diomedon of Kyzicus, came to Thebes. -</p> -<p> -Plutarch (De Genio Socratis, p. 583 F.) relates an incident about Jason -of Pheræ tendering money in vain to Epaminondas, which cannot well -have happened before the liberation of the Kadmeia (the period to which -Plutarch’s dialogue assigns it), but may have happened afterwards. -</p> -<p> -Compare Plutarch, Apophthegm. Reg. p. 193 C.; and Plutarch’s Life of -Fabius Maximus, c. 27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_772"><a href="#FNanchor_772">[772]</a></span> -Aristotel. Politic. iii, 2, 10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_773"><a href="#FNanchor_773">[773]</a></span> -Plutarch, Compar. Alkibiad. and Coriolanus, c. 4. Ἐπεὶ τό γε -μὴ λιπαρῆ μηδὲ θεραπευτικὸν ὄχλων εἶναι, καὶ Μέτελλος εἶχε καὶ Ἀριστείδης -καὶ Ἐπαμεινώνδας· ἀλλὰ τῷ καταφρονεῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὧν δῆμός ἐστι καὶ δοῦναι -καὶ ἀφελέσθαι κύριος, ἐξοστρακιζόμενοι καὶ ἀποχειροτονούμενοι καὶ -καταδικαζόμενοι πολλάκις οὐκ ὠργίζοντο τοῖς πολίταις ἀγνωμονοῦσιν, -ἀλλ’ ἠγάπων αὖθις μεταμελομένους καὶ διηλλάττοντο παρακαλούντων.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_774"><a href="#FNanchor_774">[774]</a></span> -See an anecdote about Epaminondas as the diplomatist and negotiator -on behalf of Thebes against Athens—δικαιολογούμενος, etc. Athenæus, -xiv, p. 650 E.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_775"><a href="#FNanchor_775">[775]</a></span> -Homer, Iliad, iii, 210-220 (Menelaus and Odysseus)— -</p> -<div class="poetry-container"> - <div class="poetry"> - <p>Ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ Τρώεσσιν ἀγειρομένοισιν ἔμιχθεν,</p> - <p>Ἤτοι μὲν Μενέλαος ἐπιτροχάδην ἀγόρευε,</p> - <p>Παῦρα μὲν, ἀλλὰ μάλα λιγέως· ἐπεὶ οὐ πολύμυθος, etc.</p> - <p>... Ἀλλ’ ὅτε δή ῥ’ ὄπα τε μεγάλην ἐκ στήθεος ἵει (Odysseus),</p> - <p>Καὶ ἔπεα νιφάδεσσιν ἐοικότα χειμερίῃσιν,</p> - <p>Οὐκέτ’ ἔπειτ’ Ὀδυσῆΐ γ’ ἐρίσσειε βροτὸς ἄλλος, etc.</p> - </div> -</div> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_776"><a href="#FNanchor_776">[776]</a></span> -See Vol. VIII. of this History, Ch. lxvii, p. 357-397—φρονεῖν, λέγειν, καὶ πράττειν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_777"><a href="#FNanchor_777">[777]</a></span> -Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 192 E. Athenæ. xiii, p. 590 C.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_778"><a href="#FNanchor_778">[778]</a></span> -Hieronymus ap. Athenæ. xiii, p. 602 A.; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18; -Xen. Rep. Lacedæmon. ii, 12. -</p> -<p> -See the striking and impassioned fragment of Pindar, addressed by him -when old to the youth Theoxenus of Tenedos, Fragm. 2 of the Skolia, in -Dissen’s edition, and Boeckh’s edition of Pindar, vol. iii, p. 611, ap. Athenæum, -xiii, p. 605 C.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_779"><a href="#FNanchor_779">[779]</a></span> -See Theopompus, Frag. 182, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. xiii, p. 605 A.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_780"><a href="#FNanchor_780">[780]</a></span> -Plutarch, Pelopid. <i>ut sup.</i>; Plutarch, Amatorius, p. 761 D.; compare -Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 39.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_781"><a href="#FNanchor_781">[781]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 94. -</p> -<p> -I venture here to depart from Diodorus, who states that these three thousand -men were <i>Athenians</i>, not <i>Thebans</i>; that the Megalopolitans sent to ask -aid from <i>Athens</i>, and that the <i>Athenians</i> sent these three thousand men under -Pammenes. -</p> -<p> -That Diodorus (or the copyist) has here mistaken Thebans for Athenians, -appears to me, on the following grounds:— -</p> -<p> -1. Whoever reads attentively the oration delivered by Demosthenes in -the Athenian assembly (about ten years after this period) respecting the -propriety of sending an armed force to defend Megalopolis against the -threats of Sparta—will see, I think, that Athens can never before have -sent any military assistance to Megalopolis. Both the arguments which -Demosthenes urges, and those which he combats as having been urged by -opponents, exclude the reality of any such previous proceeding. -</p> -<p> -2. Even at the time when the above-mentioned oration was delivered, the -Megalopolitans were still (compare Diodorus, xvi, 39) under special alliance -with, and guardianship of, Thebes—though the latter had then been -so much weakened by the Sacred War and other causes, that it seemed -doubtful whether she could give them complete protection against Sparta. -But in the year next after the battle of Mantinea, the alliance between -Megalopolis and Thebes, as well as the hostility between Megalopolis and -Athens, was still fresher and more intimate. The Thebans (then in unimpaired -power), who had fought for them in the preceding year,—not the -Athenians, who had fought against them,—would be the persons invoked -for aid to Megalopolis; nor had any positive reverses as yet occurred to -disable the Thebans from furnishing aid. -</p> -<p> -3. Lastly, Pammenes is a <i>Theban</i> general, friend of Epaminondas. He is -mentioned as such not only by Diodorus himself in another place (xvi, 34), -but also by Pausanias (viii, 27, 2), as the general who had been sent to -watch over the building of Megalopolis, by Plutarch (Plutarch, Pelopidas, -c. 26; Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 805 F.), and by Polyænus (v, -16, 3). We find a private Athenian citizen named Pammenes, a goldsmith, -mentioned in the oration of Demosthenes against Meidias (s. 31. p. 521); -but no Athenian officer or public man of that time so named. -</p> -<p> -Upon these grounds, I cannot but feel convinced that Pammenes and his -troops were Thebans, and not Athenians. -</p> -<p> -I am happy to find myself in concurrence with Dr. Thirlwall on this -point (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. xliii, p. 368 note).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_782"><a href="#FNanchor_782">[782]</a></span> -See Isokrates, Orat. vi, (Archidamus) s. 85-93.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_783"><a href="#FNanchor_783">[783]</a></span> -Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archid.) s. 73.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_784"><a href="#FNanchor_784">[784]</a></span> -Cornelius Nepos has given a biography of Datames at some length, -recounting his military exploits and stratagems. He places Datames, in -point of military talent, above all <i>barbari</i>, except Hamilcar Barca and -Hannibal (c. 1). Polyænus also (vii, 29) recounts several memorable proceedings -of the same chief. Compare too Diodorus, xv, 91; and Xen. -Cyropæd. viii, 8, 4. -</p> -<p> -We cannot make out with any certainty either the history, or the chronology, -of Datames. His exploits seem to belong to the last ten years of -Artaxerxes Mnemon, and his death seems to have taken place a little before -the death of that prince; which last event is to be assigned to 359-358 <small>B.C.</small> -See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast. Hell. ch. 18. p. 316, Appendix.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_785"><a href="#FNanchor_785">[785]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 91, 92; Xenophon, Cyropæd. viii, 8, 4. -</p> -<p> -Our information about these disturbances in the interior of the Persian -empire is so scanty and confused, that few of the facts can be said to be -certainly known. Diodorus has evidently introduced into the year 362-361 -<small>B.C.</small> a series of events, many of them belonging to years before and after. -Rehdantz (Vit. Iphicrat. Chabr. et. Timoth. p. 154-161) brings together all -the statements; but unfortunately with little result.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_786"><a href="#FNanchor_786">[786]</a></span> -Plutarch, Agesil. c. 36; Athenæus, xiv, p. 616 D.; Cornelius Nepos, -Agesil. c. 8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_787"><a href="#FNanchor_787">[787]</a></span> -See Pseudo-Aristotel. Œconomic. ii, 25.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_788"><a href="#FNanchor_788">[788]</a></span> -Diodorus (xv, 93) differs from Plutarch and others (whom I follow) in -respect to the relations of Tachos and Nektanebis with Agesilaus; affirming -that Agesilaus supported Tachos, and supported him with success, -against Nektanebis. -</p> -<p> -Compare Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 2, 3. -</p> -<p> -We find Chabrias serving Athens in the Chersonese—in 359-358 <small>B.C.</small> -(Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 204).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_789"><a href="#FNanchor_789">[789]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 93; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 38-40; Cornelius Nepos, Agesil. 8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_790"><a href="#FNanchor_790">[790]</a></span> -Xenoph. Encom. Ages. vii, 7. Εἰ δ’ αὖ καλὸν καὶ μισοπέρσην εἶναι, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_791"><a href="#FNanchor_791">[791]</a></span> -Plutarch, Agesil. c. 35.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_792"><a href="#FNanchor_792">[792]</a></span> -Diodor. xv, 93. -</p> -<p> -There is a difference between Diodorus and the Astronomical Canon, in -the statements about the length of reign, and date of death, of Artaxerxes -Mnemon, of about two years—361 or 359 <small>B.C.</small> See Mr. Clinton’s Fasti -Hellenici, Appendix, ch. 18. p. 316—where the statements are brought -together and discussed. Plutarch states the reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon -to have lasted sixty-two years (Plutarch, Artax. c. 33); which cannot be -correct, though in what manner the error is to be amended, we cannot -determine. -</p> -<p> -An Inscription of Mylasa in Karia recognizes the forty-fifth year of the -reign of Artaxerxes, and thus supports the statement in the Astronomical -Canon, which assigns to him forty-six years of reign. See Boeckh, Corp. -Inscr. No. 2691, with his comments, p. 470. -</p> -<p> -This same inscription affords ground of inference respecting the duration -of the revolt; for it shows that the Karian Mausolus recognized himself as -satrap, and Artaxerxes as his sovereign, in the year beginning November -359 <small>B.C.</small>, which corresponds with the forty-fifth year of Artaxerxes Mnemon. -The revolt therefore must have been suppressed before that period: -see Sievers, Geschichte von Griechenland bis zur Schlacht von Mantineia, -p. 373, note.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_793"><a href="#FNanchor_793">[793]</a></span> -Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 29, 30; Justin, x, 1-3. -</p> -<p> -Plutarch states that the lady whom the prince Darius asked for, was, -Aspasia of Phokæa—the Greek mistress of Cyrus the younger, who had -fallen into the hands of Artaxerxes after the battle of Kunaxa, and had -acquired a high place in the monarch’s affections. -</p> -<p> -But if we look at the chronology of the case, it will appear hardly possible -that the lady who inspired so strong a passion to Darius, in or about -361 <small>B.C.</small>, as to induce him to risk the displeasure of his father—and so -decided a reluctance on the part of Artaxerxes to give her up—can have -been the person who accompanied Cyrus to Kunaxa <i>forty years</i> before; for -the battle of Kunaxa was fought in 401 <small>B.C.</small> The chronological improbability -would be still greater, if we adopted Plutarch’s statement that Artaxerxes -reigned sixty-two years; for it is certain that the battle of Kunaxa -occurred very near the beginning of his reign, and the death of his son -Darius near the end of it. -</p> -<p> -Justin states the circumstances which preceded the death of Artaxerxes -Mnemon in a manner yet more tragical. He affirms that the plot against -the life of Artaxerxes was concerted by Darius in conjunction with several -of his brothers; and that, on the plot being discovered, all these brothers, -together with their wives and children, were put to death. Ochus, on coming -to the throne, put to death a great number of his kinsmen and of the -principal persons about the court, together with their wives and children—fearing -a like conspiracy against himself.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_794"><a href="#FNanchor_794">[794]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 153.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_795"><a href="#FNanchor_795">[795]</a></span> -The affirmation of Cornelius Nepos (Timotheus, c. 1), that Timotheus -made war on Kotys with such success as to bring into the Athenian treasury -twelve hundred talents, appears extravagant as to amount; even if -we accept it as generally true.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_796"><a href="#FNanchor_796">[796]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 155.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_797"><a href="#FNanchor_797">[797]</a></span> -See Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p. 151, and the -preceding page. -</p> -<p> -M. Rehdantz has put together, with great care and sagacity, all the fragments -of evidence respecting this obscure period; and has elicited, as it -seems to me, the most probable conclusions deducible from such scanty -premises.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_798"><a href="#FNanchor_798">[798]</a></span> -Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 5, 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_799"><a href="#FNanchor_799">[799]</a></span> -We are fortunate enough to get this date exactly,—the twenty third -of the month Metageitnion, in the archonship of Molon,—mentioned by -Demosthenes adv. Polyklem, p. 1207, s. 5, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_800"><a href="#FNanchor_800">[800]</a></span> -Diodor xvi, 95; Polyænus, vi, 2, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_801"><a href="#FNanchor_801">[801]</a></span> -Polyænus, vi, 2, 2. -</p> -<p> -It must have been about this time (362-361 <small>B.C.</small>) that Alexander of Pheræ -sent envoys into Asia to engage the service of Charidemus and his mercenary -band, then in or near the troad. His application was not accepted -(Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 675, s. 192).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_802"><a href="#FNanchor_802">[802]</a></span> -Demosthenes, de Coronâ Trierarch. p. 1230, s. 9. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus farther states that the Athenians placed Chares in command -of a fleet for the protection of the Ægean; but that this admiral took himself -off to Korkyra, and did nothing but plunder the allies (Diodor. xvi, -95).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_803"><a href="#FNanchor_803">[803]</a></span> -Compare Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 174-176; and Æschines, -Fals. Leg. p. 250, c. 14.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_804"><a href="#FNanchor_804">[804]</a></span> -The facts as stated in the text are the most probable result, as it seems -to me, derivable from Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 250, c. 14.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_805"><a href="#FNanchor_805">[805]</a></span> -Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii, 3, 3. -</p> -<p> -Ergophilus seems to have been fined (Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 398, s. -200).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_806"><a href="#FNanchor_806">[806]</a></span> -Demosthen. adv. Polyklem. p. 1207. s. 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_807"><a href="#FNanchor_807">[807]</a></span> -Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 655, s. 122; cont. Polyklem. p. 1207. -</p> -<p> -ὅτε Μιλτοκύθης ἀπέστη Κότυος ... ἐγράφη τι παρ’ ὑμῖν ψήφισμα τοιοῦτον, δι’ οὗ -Μιλτοκύθης μὲν <em class="gesperrt">ἀπῆλθε</em> φοβηθεὶς καὶ νομίσας ὑμᾶς οὐ προσέχειν αὐτῷ, -Κότυς δὲ ἐγκρατὴς τοῦ τε ὄρους τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τῶν θησαυρῶν ἐγένετο. -</p> -<p> -The word ἀπῆλθε implies that Miltokythes was at Athens in person. -</p> -<p> -The humble letter written by Kotys, in his first alarm at the revolt of -Miltokythes, is referred to by the orator, p. 658, s. 136, 137.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_808"><a href="#FNanchor_808">[808]</a></span> -Demosthenes adv. Polykl. p. 1210, s. 16; Demosthenes cont. Aristok. -p. 655, s. 123.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_809"><a href="#FNanchor_809">[809]</a></span> -Demosthen. adv. Polyklem, p. 1212, s. 24-26; p. 1213, s. 27; p. 1225, s. -71.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_810"><a href="#FNanchor_810">[810]</a></span> -Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 673, s. 187. Ἐκ γὰρ Ἀβύδου, -τῆς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ὑμῖν ἐχθρᾶς, καὶ ὅθεν ἦσαν οἱ Σηστὸν καταλαβόντες, -εἰς Σηστὸν διέβαινεν, ἣν εἶχε Κότυς. (He is speaking of Charidemus.) -</p> -<p> -The other oration of Demosthenes (adv. Polykl. p. 1212) contains distinct -intimation that Sestos was not lost by the Athenians <i>until after November -361</i> <small>B.C.</small> Apollodorus the Athenian trierarch was in the town at that -time, as well as various friends whom he mentions; so that Sestos must -have been still an Athenian possession in November 361 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -It is lucky for some points of historical investigation, that the purpose -of this oration against Polykles (composed by Demosthenes, but spoken by -Apollodorus) requires great precision and specification of dates, even to -months and days. Apollodorus complains that he has been constrained to -bear the expense of a trierarchy, for four months beyond the year in which -it was incumbent upon him jointly with a colleague. He sues the person -whose duty it was to have relieved him as successor at the end of the year, -but who had kept aloof and cheated him. The trierarchy of Apollodorus -began in August 362 <small>B.C.</small>, and lasted (not merely to Aug. 361 <small>B.C.</small>, its legal -term, but) to November 361 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 144, note), in the valuable -chapters which he devotes to the obscure chronology of the period, has overlooked -this exact indication of the time <i>after which</i> the Athenians lost Sestos. -He supposes the loss to have taken place two or three years earlier.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_811"><a href="#FNanchor_811">[811]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 155.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_812"><a href="#FNanchor_812">[812]</a></span> -Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 658, s. 136; p. 679, s. 211. -</p> -<p> -What is said in the latter passage about the youthful Kersobleptes, is -doubtless not less true of his father Kotys.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_813"><a href="#FNanchor_813">[813]</a></span> -Demosthen. pro Phormione, p. 960, s. 64; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 398, -s. 200.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_814"><a href="#FNanchor_814">[814]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 672, s. 184.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_815"><a href="#FNanchor_815">[815]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 671, s. 183. Compare Pseudo-Aristot. -Œconomic. ii, 30.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_816"><a href="#FNanchor_816">[816]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 672, 673. -</p> -<p> -The orator reads a letter (not cited however) from the governor of Krithôtê, -announcing the formidable increase of force which threatened the -place since the arrival of Charidemus.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_817"><a href="#FNanchor_817">[817]</a></span> -Aristotle (Politic. v, 8, 12) mentions the act and states that the two -young men did it to avenge their father. He does not expressly say what -Kotys had done to the father; but he notices the event in illustration of the -general category,—Πολλαὶ δ’ ἐπιθέσεις γεγένηνται καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχύνεσθαι -τῶν μονάρχων τινάς (compare what Tacitus says about <i>mos regius</i>—Annal. -vi, 1). Aristotle immediately adds another case of cruel -mutilation inflicted by Kotys,—Ἀδάμας δ’ ἀπέστη Κότυος διὰ τὸ ἐκτμηθῆναι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ -παῖς ὢν, ὡς ὑβρισμένος. -</p> -<p> -Compare, about Kotys, Theopompus, Fragm. 33, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. -xii, p. 531, 532. -</p> -<p> -Böhnecke (Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte, p. 725, 726) -places the death of Kotys in 359 <small>B.C.</small>; and seems to infer from Athenæus -(vi, p. 248; xii, p. 531) that he had actual communication with Philip of -Macedon as king, whose accession took place between Midsummer 360 and -Midsummer 359 <small>B.C.</small> But the evidence does not appear to me to bear out -such a conclusion. -</p> -<p> -The story cited by Athenæus from Hegesander, about letters reaching -Philip from Kotys, cannot be true about this Kotys; because it seems impossible -that Philip, in the first year of his reign, can have had any such -flatterer as Kleisophus; Philip being at that time in the greatest political -embarrassments, out of which he was only rescued by his indefatigable -energy and ability. And the journey of Philip to Onokarsis, also mentioned -by Athenæus out of Theopompus, does not imply any personal communication -with Kotys. -</p> -<p> -My opinion is, that the assassination of Kotys dates more probably in -360 <small>B.C.</small></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_818"><a href="#FNanchor_818">[818]</a></span> -Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 142; p. 662, s. 150; p. 675, s. -193. Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 542 E.; Plutarch, adv. Koloten, p. 1126, B.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_819"><a href="#FNanchor_819">[819]</a></span> -Plutarch, De Sui Laude, <i>ut sup.</i></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_820"><a href="#FNanchor_820">[820]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aristokr. p. 674, s. 193. μειρακύλλιον, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_821"><a href="#FNanchor_821">[821]</a></span> -Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 623, 624, s. 8-12; p. 664, s. 153 (in which -passage κηδεστὴς may be fairly taken to mean any near connection by marriage). -</p> -<p> -About Athenodorus compare Isokrates, Or. viii, (de Pace) s. 31.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_822"><a href="#FNanchor_822">[822]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 674-676, s. 193-199. -</p> -<p> -In sect. 194, are the words, <em class="gesperrt">ἧκε δὲ Κηφισόδοτος στρατηγῶν</em>, -πρὸς ὃν αὐτὸς (Charidemus) ἔπεμψε τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐκείνην, καὶ αἱ -τριήρεις, αἳ, ὅτ’ ἦν ἄδηλα τὰ τῆς σωτηρίας αὐτῷ, καὶ μὴ συγχωροῦντος -Ἀρταβάζου σώζειν ἔμελλον αὐτόν. -</p> -<p> -The verb ἧκε, in my judgment—not to the <i>first coming out</i> of Kephisodotus -from Athens to take the command, as Weber (Comment. ad -Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 460) and other commentators think, but—to -the coming of Kephisodotus with ten triremes <i>to Perinthus</i>, near which -place Charidemus was, for the purpose of demanding fulfilment of what -the latter had promised; see s. 196. When Kephisodotus came to him at -Perinthus (παρόντος τοῦ στρατηγοῦ—πρὸς ὃν τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐπεπόμφει—s. -195) to make this demand, then Charidemus, instead of behaving honestly, -acted like a traitor and an enemy. The allusion to this antecedent letter -from Charidemus to Kephisodotus, shows that the latter must have been on -the spot for some time, and therefore that ἧκε cannot refer to his first coming -out. -</p> -<p> -The term ἑπτὰ μῆνας (s. 196) counts, I presume, from the death of Kotys.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_823"><a href="#FNanchor_823">[823]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 199; Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. -p. 384, c. 20. -</p> -<p> -Demosthenes himself may probably have been among the trierarchs called -before the dikastery as witnesses to prove what took place at Perinthus -and Alopekonnesus (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 200); Euthykles, -the speaker of the discourse against Aristokrates, had been himself also -among the officers serving (p. 675, s. 196; p. 683, s. 223).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_824"><a href="#FNanchor_824">[824]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 679, s. 209; p. 681, s. 216. Demosthen. -de Halonneso, p. 87, s. 42.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_825"><a href="#FNanchor_825">[825]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 201. οὐκ ὄντος νομίμου -τοῖς Θρᾳξὶν ἀλλήλους ἀποκτιννύναι, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_826"><a href="#FNanchor_826">[826]</a></span> -Demosthenes, cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 201.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_827"><a href="#FNanchor_827">[827]</a></span> -Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 202-204. -</p> -<p> -Aristotle (Politic. v. 5, 9) mentions the association or faction of Iphiades -as belonging to Abydos, not to Sestos. Perhaps there may have been an -Abydene association now exercising influence at Sestos; at least we are -told, that the revolution which deprived the Athenians of Sestos, was -accomplished in part by exiles who crossed from Abydos; something like -the relation between Argos and Corinth in the years immediately preceding -the peace of Antalkidas.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_828"><a href="#FNanchor_828">[828]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 678, p. 205, 206; p. 680. s. 211, 212. -The arrival of Chares in the Hellespont is marked by Demosthenes as -immediately following the expedition of Athens to drive the Thebans out -of Eubœa, which took place about the middle of 358 <small>B.C.</small></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_829"><a href="#FNanchor_829">[829]</a></span> -We see that Sestos must have been surrendered on this occasion, -although Diodorus describes it as having been conquered by Chares five -years afterwards, in the year 353 <small>B.C.</small> (Diod. xvi, 34). It is evident from -the whole tenor of the oration of Demosthenes, that Charidemus did actually -surrender the Chersonese at this time. Had he still refused to surrender -Sestos, the orator would not have failed to insist on the fact emphatically -against him. Besides, Demosthenes says, comparing the conduct of -Philip towards the Olynthians, with that of Kersobleptes towards Athens—ἐκεῖνος ἐκείνοις -Ποτίδαιαν οὐχὶ τηνικαῦτ’ ἀπέδωκεν, ἥνικ’ ἀποστερεῖν οὐκέθ’ οἷός τ’ ἦν, ὥσπερ ὑμῖν Κερσοβλέπτης -Χεῤῥόνησον (p. 656. s. 128). -This distinctly announces that the Chersonese was <i>given back</i> to Athens, -though reluctantly and tardily, by Kersobleptes. Sestos must have been -given up along with it, as the principal and most valuable post upon all -accounts. If it be true (as Diodorus states) that Chares in 353 <small>B.C.</small> took -Sestos by siege, slew the inhabitants of military age and reduced the rest -to slavery—we must suppose the town again to have revolted between 358 -and 353 <small>B.C.</small>; that is, during the time of the Social War; which is highly -probable. But there is much in the statement of Diodorus which I cannot -distinctly make out; for he says that Kersobleptes in 353 <small>B.C.</small>, on account -of his hatred towards Philip, surrendered to Athens all the cities in the -Chersonese except Kardia. That had already been done in 358 <small>B.C.</small>, and -without any reference to Philip; and if after surrendering the Chersonese -in 358 <small>B.C.</small>, Kersobleptes had afterwards reconquered it, so as to have it -again in his possession in the beginning of 353 <small>B.C.</small>—it seems unaccountable -that Demosthenes should say nothing about the reconquest in his oration -against Aristokrates, where he is trying to make all points possible -against Kersobleptes.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_830"><a href="#FNanchor_830">[830]</a></span> -Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 681, s. 216.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_831"><a href="#FNanchor_831">[831]</a></span> -Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 623, s. 8; p. 654, s. 121. The chronology -of these events as given by Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. -147) appears to me nearly correct, in spite of the strong objection expressed -against it by Weber (Prolegg. ad Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. lxxiii.)—and -more exact than the chronology of Böhnecke, Forschungen, p. 727, -who places the coming out of Kephisodotus as general to the Chersonese -in 358 <small>B.C.</small>, which is, I think, a full year too late. Rehdantz does not allow, -as I think he ought to do, for a certain interval between Kephisodotus and -the Ten Envoys, during which Athenodorus acted for Athens.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_832"><a href="#FNanchor_832">[832]</a></span> -Demosthen. cont. Polyklem, p. 1212, s. 26.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_833"><a href="#FNanchor_833">[833]</a></span> -Demosthen. Philippic. I, p. 41, s. 6. εἴχομέν ποτε ἡμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, -Πύδναν καὶ Ποτίδαιαν καὶ Μεθώνην <em class="gesperrt">καὶ πάντα τὸν τόπον τοῦτον οἰκεῖον κύκλῳ</em>, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_834"><a href="#FNanchor_834">[834]</a></span> -I have not made any mention of the expedition against Eubœa (whereby -Athens drove the Theban invaders out of that island), though it occurred -just about the same time as the recovery of the Chersonese. -</p> -<p> -That expedition will more properly come to be spoken of in my next -volume. But the recovery of the Chersonese was the closing event of a -series of proceedings which had been going on for four years; so that I -could hardly leave that series unfinished.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_835"><a href="#FNanchor_835">[835]</a></span> -Thucyd. vii, 50-58.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_836"><a href="#FNanchor_836">[836]</a></span> -Lysias, Orat. xx, (pro Polystrato) s. 26, 27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_837"><a href="#FNanchor_837">[837]</a></span> -Thucyd. vii, 48, 49.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_838"><a href="#FNanchor_838">[838]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 34.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_839"><a href="#FNanchor_839">[839]</a></span> -Thucyd. viii, 2; compare vii, 55.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_840"><a href="#FNanchor_840">[840]</a></span> -Thucyd. vii, 33-57; Dionysius Halikarn. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 453.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_841"><a href="#FNanchor_841">[841]</a></span> -Thucyd. viii, 26, 35, 91.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_842"><a href="#FNanchor_842">[842]</a></span> -Thucyd. viii, 29, 45, 78, 84.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_843"><a href="#FNanchor_843">[843]</a></span> -Thucyd. viii, 84.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_844"><a href="#FNanchor_844">[844]</a></span> -Thucyd. viii, 85.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_845"><a href="#FNanchor_845">[845]</a></span> -Thucyd. viii, 105; Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_846"><a href="#FNanchor_846">[846]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_847"><a href="#FNanchor_847">[847]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 23-26.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_848"><a href="#FNanchor_848">[848]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 23. Ἔῤῥει τὰ καλά. Μίνδαρος ἀπεσσούα· πεινῶντι -τὤνδρες· ἀπορέομες τί χρὴ δρᾷν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_849"><a href="#FNanchor_849">[849]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_850"><a href="#FNanchor_850">[850]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 27-31.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_851"><a href="#FNanchor_851">[851]</a></span> -Thucyd. viii, 85.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_852"><a href="#FNanchor_852">[852]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 31; Diodor. xiii, 63.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_853"><a href="#FNanchor_853">[853]</a></span> -Thucyd. vii, 55.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_854"><a href="#FNanchor_854">[854]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 33-35.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_855"><a href="#FNanchor_855">[855]</a></span> -Compare Diodor. xiii, 75—about the banishment of Dioklês.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_856"><a href="#FNanchor_856">[856]</a></span> -Aristotel. Politic. v, 3, 6. Καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ὁ δῆμος, αἴτιος γενόμενος -τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐκ πολιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλε. -</p> -<p> -v, 4, 4, 5. Καὶ Διονύσιος κατηγορῶν Δαφναίου καὶ τῶν πλουσίων ἠξιώθη τῆς τυραννίδος, -διὰ τὴν ἔχθραν πιστευθεὶς ὡς δημοτικὸς ὤν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_857"><a href="#FNanchor_857">[857]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 56.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_858"><a href="#FNanchor_858">[858]</a></span> -Thucyd. vi, 34. Speech of Hermokrates to his countrymen at Syracuse—δοκεῖ -δέ μοι καὶ ἐς Καρχηδόνα ἄμεινον εἶναι πέμψαι. Οὐ γὰρ ἀνέλπιστον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ διὰ -φόβου εἰσὶ μή ποτε Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔλθωσιν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_859"><a href="#FNanchor_859">[859]</a></span> -Polybius, iii, 22, 23, 24. -</p> -<p> -He gives three separate treaties (either wholly or in part) between the -Carthaginians and Romans. The latest of the three belongs to the days -of Pyrrhus, about 278 <small>B.C.</small>; the earliest to 508 <small>B.C.</small> The intermediate -treaty is not marked as to date by any specific evidence, but I see no ground -for supposing that it is so late as 345 <small>B.C.</small>, which is the date assigned to it -by Casaubon, identifying it with the treaty alluded to by Livy, vii, 27. I -cannot but think that it is more likely to be of earlier date, somewhere -between 480-410 <small>B.C.</small> This second treaty is far more restrictive than the -first, against the Romans; for it interdicts them from all traffic either with -Sardinia or Africa, except the city of Carthage itself; the first treaty permitted -such trade under certain limitations and conditions. The second -treaty argues a comparative superiority of Carthage to Rome, which would -rather seem to belong to the latter half of the fifth century <small>B.C.</small>, than to -the latter half of the fourth.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_860"><a href="#FNanchor_860">[860]</a></span> -Strabo, xvii, p. 832, 833; Livy, Epitome, lib. 51. -</p> -<p> -Strabo gives the circumference as three hundred and sixty stadia, and the -breadth of the isthmus as sixty stadia. But this is noticed by Barth as -much exaggerated (Wanderungen auf der Küste des Mittelmeers, p. 85).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_861"><a href="#FNanchor_861">[861]</a></span> -Appian. Reb. Punic, viii, 75.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_862"><a href="#FNanchor_862">[862]</a></span> -Strabo, <i>ut sup.</i></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_863"><a href="#FNanchor_863">[863]</a></span> -This is the view of Movers, sustained with much plausibility, in his -learned and instructive work—Geschichte der Phœnizier, vol. ii, part ii, p. -435-455. See Diodor. xx, 55.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_864"><a href="#FNanchor_864">[864]</a></span> -Livy, xxix, 25. Compare the last chapter of the history of Herodotus.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_865"><a href="#FNanchor_865">[865]</a></span> -Diodor. xx, 17; Appian, viii, 3, 68.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_866"><a href="#FNanchor_866">[866]</a></span> -Colonel Leake observes, with respect to the modern Greeks, who work -on the plains of Turkey, upon the landed property of Turkish proprietors—“The -Helots seem to have resembled the Greeks, who labor on the Turkish -farms <i>in the plains</i> of Turkey, and who are bound to account to their -masters for one-half of the produce of the soil, as Tyrtæus says of the -Messenians of his time— -</p> -<div class="poetry-container"> - <div class="poetry"> - <p class="i1">Ὥσπερ ὄνοι μεγάλοις ἄχθεσι τειρόμενοι</p> - <p>Δεσποσύνοισι φέροντες, ἀναγκαίης ὑπὸ λυγρῆς,</p> - <p class="i1">Ἥμισυ πᾶν, ὅσσον κάρπον ἄρουρα φέροι.</p> - <p class="rt">(Tyrtæus, Frag. 5, ed. Schneid.)</p> - </div> -</div> -<p> -The condition of the Greeks in the mountainous regions is not so hard” -(Leake, Peloponnesiaca, p. 168).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_867"><a href="#FNanchor_867">[867]</a></span> -Polybius, i, 72; Livy, xxxiv, 62. -</p> -<p> -Movers (Geschichte der Phœnizier, ii, 2, p. 455) assigns this large assessment -to Leptis Magna; but the passage of Livy can relate only to Leptis -Parva, in the region called Emporia. -</p> -<p> -Leptis Magna was at a far greater distance from Carthage, near the -Great Syrtis. -</p> -<p> -Dr. Barth (Wanderungen durch die Küstenländer des Mittelländischen -Meers, p. 81-146) has given a recent and valuable examination of the site -of Carthage and of the neighboring regions. On his map, however, the -territory called Emporia is marked near the Lesser Syrtis, two hundred -miles from Carthage (Pliny, H. N. v, 3). Yet it seems certain that the -name Emporia must have comprised the territory south of Carthage and -approaching very near to the city; for Scipio Africanus, in his expedition -from Sicily, directed his pilots to steer for Emporia. He intended to land -very near Carthage; and he actually did land on the White Cape, near -to that city, but on the north side, and still nearer to Utica. This region -north of Carthage was probably not included in the name Emporia (Livy, -xxix, 25-27).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_868"><a href="#FNanchor_868">[868]</a></span> -Aristotel. Politic. ii, 8, 9; vi, 3, 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_869"><a href="#FNanchor_869">[869]</a></span> -Appian, viii, 32, 54, 59; Phlegon, Trall. de Mirabilibus, c. 18. Εὔμαχος -δέ φησιν ἐν Περιηγήσει, Καρχηδονίους περιταφρεύοντας τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπαρχίαν, εὑρεῖν ὀρύσσοντας -δύο σκελετοὺς ἐν σόρῳ κειμένους, etc. -</p> -<p> -The line of trench however was dug apparently at an early stage of the -Carthaginian dominion; for the Carthaginians afterwards, as they grew -more powerful, extended their possessions beyond the trench; as we see by -the passages of Appian above referred to. -</p> -<p> -Movers (Gesch. der Phœniz. ii, 2, p. 457) identifies this trench with the -one which Pliny names near Thenæ on the Lesser Syrtis, as having been dug -by order of the second Africanus—to form a boundary between the Roman -province of Africa, and the dominion of the native kings (Pliny, H. -N. v, 3). But I greatly doubt such identity. It appears to me that this -last is distinct from the Carthaginian trench.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_870"><a href="#FNanchor_870">[870]</a></span> -A Carthaginian citizen wore as many rings as he had served campaigns -(Aristotel. Politic. vii, 2, 6).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_871"><a href="#FNanchor_871">[871]</a></span> -Diodor. xx, 10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_872"><a href="#FNanchor_872">[872]</a></span> -Appian, viii, 80. Twenty thousand panoplies, together with an immense -stock of weapons and engines of siege, were delivered up to the -perfidious manœuvres of the Romans, a little before the last siege of Carthage. -</p> -<p> -See Bötticher, Geschichte der Carthager, p. 20-25.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_873"><a href="#FNanchor_873">[873]</a></span> -Diodor. xvi, 8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_874"><a href="#FNanchor_874">[874]</a></span> -See the striking description in Livy, of the motley composition of the -Carthaginian mercenary armies, where he bestows just admiration on the -genius of Hannibal, for having always maintained his ascendency over -them, and kept them in obedience and harmony (Livy, xxviii, 12). Compare -Polybius, i, 65-67, and the manner in which Imilkon abandoned his -mercenaries to destruction at Syracuse (Diodor. xiv, 75-77).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_875"><a href="#FNanchor_875">[875]</a></span> -There were in like manner two suffetes in Gades and each of the other -Phœnician colonies (Livy, xxviii, 37). Cornelius Nepos (Hannibal, c. 7) -talks of Hannibal as having been made <i>king</i> (rex) when he was invested -with his great foreign military command, at twenty-two years of age. So -Diodorus (xiv, 54) talks about Imilkon, and Herodotus (vii, 166) about -Hamilkar.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_876"><a href="#FNanchor_876">[876]</a></span> -See Movers, Die Phönizier, ii, 1, p. 483-499.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_877"><a href="#FNanchor_877">[877]</a></span> -Polybius, x, 18; Livy, xxx, 16. -</p> -<p> -Yet again Polybius in another place speaks of the Gerontion at Carthage -as representing the aristocratical force, and as opposed to the πλῆθος or -people (vi, 51). It would seem that by Γερόντιον he must mean the same -as the assembly called in another passage (x, 18) Σύγκλητος.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_878"><a href="#FNanchor_878">[878]</a></span> -Aristotel. Politic. ii, 8, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_879"><a href="#FNanchor_879">[879]</a></span> -Livy, xxxiii, 46. Justin (xix, 2) mentions the one hundred select Senators -set apart as judges.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_880"><a href="#FNanchor_880">[880]</a></span> -Heeren (Ideen über den Verkehr der Alten Welt, part ii, p. 138, 3rd -edit.) and Kluge (in his Dissertation, Aristoteles de Politiâ Carthaginiensium, -Wratisl. 1824) have discussed all these passages with ability. But -their materials do not enable them to reach any certainty.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_881"><a href="#FNanchor_881">[881]</a></span> -Valerius Max. ix, 5, 4. “Insolentiæ inter Carthaginiensem et Campanum -senatum quasi æmulatio fuit. Ille enim separato à plebe balneo lavabatur, -hic diverso foro utebatur.”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_882"><a href="#FNanchor_882">[882]</a></span> -Diodor. xx, 10; xxiii, 9; Valer. Max. ii, 7, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_883"><a href="#FNanchor_883">[883]</a></span> -Aristotel Politic. iii, 5, 6. -</p> -<p> -These banquets must have been settled, daily proceedings,—as well as -multitudinous, in order to furnish even apparent warrant for the comparison -which Aristotle makes with the Spartan public mess. But even granting -the analogy on these external points,—the intrinsic difference of -character and purpose between the two must have been so great, that the -comparison seems not happy. -</p> -<p> -Livy (xxxiv, 61) talks of the <i>circuli et convivia</i> at Carthage; but this is -probably a general expression, without particular reference to the public -banquets mentioned by Aristotle.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_884"><a href="#FNanchor_884">[884]</a></span> -Aristotel. Polit. ii, 8, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_885"><a href="#FNanchor_885">[885]</a></span> -Aristot. Polit. ii, 8, 1. He briefly alludes to the abortive conspiracy of -Hanno (v, 6, 2), which is also mentioned in Justin (xxi, 4). Hanno is said -to have formed the plan of putting to death the Senate, and making himself -despot. But he was detected, and executed under the severest tortures; -all his family being put to death along with him. -</p> -<p> -Not only is it very difficult to make out Aristotle’s statements about the -Carthaginian government,—but some of them are even contradictory. -One of these (v, 10, 3) has been pointed out by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, -who proposes to read ἐν Χαλκηδόνι instead of ἐν Καρχηδόνι. In another -place (v, 10, 4) Aristotle calls Carthage (ἐν Καρχηδόνι δημοκρατουμένῃ) a -state democratically governed; which cannot be reconciled with what he -says in ii, 8, respecting its government. -</p> -<p> -Aristotle compares the Council of One Hundred and Four at Carthage -to the Spartan ephors. But it is not easy to see how so numerous a body -could have transacted the infinite diversity of administrative and other business -performed by the five ephors.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_886"><a href="#FNanchor_886">[886]</a></span> -Justin. xix, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_887"><a href="#FNanchor_887">[887]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_888"><a href="#FNanchor_888">[888]</a></span> -Justin, xix, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_889"><a href="#FNanchor_889">[889]</a></span> -Diodor. xii, 82. -</p> -<p> -It seems probable that the war which Diodorus mentions to have taken -place in 452 <small>B.C.</small>, between the Egestæans and Lilybæans—was really a war -between Egesta and Selinus (see Diodor, xi, 86—with Wesseling’s note). -Lilybæum as a town attained no importance until after the capture of Motyê -by the older Dionysius in 393 <small>B.C.</small></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_890"><a href="#FNanchor_890">[890]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 43.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_891"><a href="#FNanchor_891">[891]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 43.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_892"><a href="#FNanchor_892">[892]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 43. Κατέστησαν στρατηγὸν τὸν Ἀννίβαν, κατὰ νόμους -τότε βασιλεύοντα. Οὗτος δὲ ἦν υἱωνὸς μὲν τοῦ πρὸς Γέλωνα πολεμήσαντος Ἁμίλκου, -καὶ πρὸς Ἱμέρᾳ τελευτήσαντος, υἱὸς δὲ Γέσκωνος, ὃς διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἧτταν -ἐφυγαδεύθη, καὶ κατεβίωσεν ἐν τῇ Σελινοῦντι. Ὁ δ’ οὖν Ἀννίβας, ὢν μὲν καὶ -<em class="gesperrt">φύσει μισέλλην</em>, ὅμως δὲ τὰς τῶν προγόνων ἀτιμίας διορθώσασθαι βουλόμενος, etc. -</p> -<p> -The banishment of Giskon, and that too for the whole of his life, deserves -notice, as a point of comparison between the Greek republics and Carthage. -A defeated general in Greece, if he survived his defeat, was not unfrequently -banished, even where there seems neither proof nor probability -that he had been guilty of misconduct, or misjudgment, or omission. But -I do not recollect any case in which, when a Grecian general thus apparently -innocent was not merely defeated but slain in the battle, his son was -banished for life, as Giskon was banished by the Carthaginians. In appreciating -the manner in which the Grecian states, both democratical and oligarchical, -dealt with their officers, the contemporary republic of Carthage -is one important standard of comparison. Those who censure the Greeks, -will have to find stronger terms of condemnation when they review the -proceedings of the Carthaginians.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_893"><a href="#FNanchor_893">[893]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 43, 44.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_894"><a href="#FNanchor_894">[894]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 44.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_895"><a href="#FNanchor_895">[895]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 59.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_896"><a href="#FNanchor_896">[896]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 55; xi, 21.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_897"><a href="#FNanchor_897">[897]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 54-58. οἱ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις Ἕλληνες ξυμμαχοῦντες, etc. -</p> -<p> -It cannot therefore be exact,—that which Plutarch affirms, Timoleon, c. -30,—that the Carthaginians had never employed Greeks in their service, -at the time of the battle of the Krimêsus,—<small>B.C.</small> 340.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_898"><a href="#FNanchor_898">[898]</a></span> -Thucyd. vi, 34. δυνατοὶ δέ εἰσι (the Carthaginians) μάλιστα τῶν νῦν, -βουληθέντες· χρυσὸν γὰρ καὶ ἄργυρον πλεῖστον κέκτηνται, ὅθεν ὅ τε πόλεμος καὶ -τἄλλα εὐπορεῖ.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_899"><a href="#FNanchor_899">[899]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 54, 55.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_900"><a href="#FNanchor_900">[900]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 56, 57.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_901"><a href="#FNanchor_901">[901]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 57.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_902"><a href="#FNanchor_902">[902]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 57, 58.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_903"><a href="#FNanchor_903">[903]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 59. Ὁ δὲ Ἀννίβας ἀπεκρίθη, τοὺς μὲν Σελινουντίους -μὴ δυναμένους τηρεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, πεῖραν τῆς δουλείας λήψεσθαι· τοὺς δὲ -θεοὺς ἐκτὸς Σελινοῦντος οἴχεσθαι, προσκόψαντας τοῖς ἐνοικοῦσιν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_904"><a href="#FNanchor_904">[904]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 59. The ruins, yet remaining, of the ancient temples of -Selinus, are vast and imposing; characteristic as specimens of Doric art, -during the fifth and sixth centuries <small>B.C.</small> From the great magnitude of the -fallen columns, it has been supposed that they were overthrown by an earthquake. -But the ruins afford distinct evidence, that these columns have -been first undermined, and then overthrown by crow-bars. -</p> -<p> -This impressive fact, demonstrating the agency of the Carthaginian destroyers, -is stated by Niebuhr, Vorträge über alte Geschichte, vol. iii. p. 207.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_905"><a href="#FNanchor_905">[905]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 60.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_906"><a href="#FNanchor_906">[906]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 61, 62.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_907"><a href="#FNanchor_907">[907]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 62. Τῶν δ’ αἰχμαλώτων γυναικάς τε καὶ παῖδας διαδοὺς -εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον παρεφύλαττε· τῶν δ’ ἀνδρῶν τοὺς ἁλόντας, εἰς τρισχιλίους ὄντας, -παρήγαγεν ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ πρότερον Ἀμίλκας ὁ πάππος αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ Γέλωνος ἀνῃρέθη, -καὶ πάντας αἰκισάμενος κατέσφαξε. -</p> -<p> -The Carthaginians, after their victory over Agathokles in 307 <small>B.C.</small>, sacrificed -their finest prisoners as offerings of thanks to the gods (Diodor. xx, -65.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_908"><a href="#FNanchor_908">[908]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 79.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_909"><a href="#FNanchor_909">[909]</a></span> -Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 37.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_910"><a href="#FNanchor_910">[910]</a></span> -Herodot. vi, 28.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_911"><a href="#FNanchor_911">[911]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 62-80.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_912"><a href="#FNanchor_912">[912]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 62.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_913"><a href="#FNanchor_913">[913]</a></span> -Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 28. Οἱ δ’ οὐκ ἔφασαν δεῖν στασιάζειν πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_914"><a href="#FNanchor_914">[914]</a></span> -Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 31; Diodor. xiii, 63.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_915"><a href="#FNanchor_915">[915]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 63.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_916"><a href="#FNanchor_916">[916]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 63, 75.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_917"><a href="#FNanchor_917">[917]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 75. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Διοκλῆς ἐφυγαδεύθη, τὸν -δὲ Ἑρμοκράτην οὐδ’ ὡς προσεδέξαντο· ὑπώπτευον γὰρ τὴν τἀνδρὸς τόλμαν, -μή ποτε τυχὼν ἡγεμονίας, ἀναδείξῃ ἑαυτὸν τύραννον.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_918"><a href="#FNanchor_918">[918]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 75. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἑρμοκράτης τότε τὸν καιρὸν οὐχ ὁρῶν -εὔθετον εἰς τὸ βιάσασθαι, πάλιν ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς Σελινοῦντα. Μετὰ δέ τινα χρόνον, -τῶν φίλων αὐτὸν μεταπεμπομένων, ὥρμησε μετὰ τρισχιλίων στρατιωτῶν, καὶ πορευθεὶς -διὰ τῆς Γελώας, ἧκε νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὸν συντεταγμένον τόπον.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_919"><a href="#FNanchor_919">[919]</a></span> -Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 4, 8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_920"><a href="#FNanchor_920">[920]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 75. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon (Hellen. i, 3, 13) states that Hermokrates, ἤδη φεύγων ἐκ Συρακουσῶν, -was among those who accompanied Pharnabazus along with the -envoys intended to go to Susa, but who only went as far as Gordium in -Phrygia, and were detained by Pharnabazus (on the requisition of Cyrus) -for three years. This must have been in the year 407 <small>B.C.</small> Now I cannot -reconcile this with the proceedings of Hermokrates as described by Diodorus; -his coming to the Sicilian Messênê,—his exploits near Selinus,—his -various attempts to procure restoration to Syracuse:—all of which -must have occurred in 408-407 <small>B.C.</small>, ending with the death of Hermokrates. -</p> -<p> -It seems to me impossible that the person mentioned by Xenophon as -accompanying Pharnabazus into the interior can have been the eminent -Hermokrates. Whether it was another person of the same name,—or -whether Xenophon was altogether misinformed,—I will not take upon me -to determine. There were really two contemporary Syracusans bearing -that name, for the father of Dionysius the despot was named Hermokrates. -</p> -<p> -Polybius (xii, 25) states that Hermokrates fought with the Lacedæmonians -at Ægospotami. He means the eminent general so called; who -however cannot have been at Ægospotami in the summer or autumn of -405 <small>B.C.</small> There is some mistake in the assertion of Polybius, but I do not -know how to explain it.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_921"><a href="#FNanchor_921">[921]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 96; xiv, 66. -</p> -<p> -Isokrates, Or. v, Philipp. s. 73—Dionysius, πολλοστὸς ὢν Συρακοσίων -καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν, etc. -</p> -<p> -Demosthenes, adv. Leptinem, p. 506, s. 178. γραμματέως, ὥς φασι, etc. -Polybius (xv, 35), ἐκ δημοτικῆς καὶ ταπεινῆς ὑποθέσεως ὁρμηθεὶς, etc. Compare -Polyænus, v, 2, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_922"><a href="#FNanchor_922">[922]</a></span> -Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 24. Διονύσιος ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους. Diodor. xiii, 91.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_923"><a href="#FNanchor_923">[923]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 75.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_924"><a href="#FNanchor_924">[924]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 79.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_925"><a href="#FNanchor_925">[925]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 80; Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 21.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_926"><a href="#FNanchor_926">[926]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 81-84.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_927"><a href="#FNanchor_927">[927]</a></span> -Diogen. Laert. viii, 63.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_928"><a href="#FNanchor_928">[928]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 81-84; Polyb. ix, 7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_929"><a href="#FNanchor_929">[929]</a></span> -Diodor. xi, 25.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_930"><a href="#FNanchor_930">[930]</a></span> -Virgil, Æneid. iii, 704.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_931"><a href="#FNanchor_931">[931]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 85.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_932"><a href="#FNanchor_932">[932]</a></span> -See about the Topography of Agrigentum,—Seyfert, Akragas, p. 21, -23, 40 (Hamburg, 1845). -</p> -<p> -The modern town of Girgenti stands on one of the hills of this vast -aggregate, which is overspread with masses of ruins, and around which the -traces of the old walls may be distinctly made out, with considerable remains -of them in some particular parts. -</p> -<p> -Compare Polybius, i, 18; ix, 27. -</p> -<p> -Pindar calls the town ποταμίᾳ τ’ Ἀκράγαντι—Pyth. vi, 6: ἱερὸν οἴκημα -ποταμοῦ—Olymp. ii, 10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_933"><a href="#FNanchor_933">[933]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 85. -</p> -<p> -We read of a stratagem in Polyænus (v, 10, 4), whereby Imilkon is said -to have enticed the Agrigentines, in one of their sallies, into incautious -pursuit, by a simulated flight; and thus to have inflicted upon them a serious -defeat.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_934"><a href="#FNanchor_934">[934]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 86.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_935"><a href="#FNanchor_935">[935]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 87. -</p> -<p> -It appears that an eminence a little way eastward from Agrigentum still -bears the name of <i>Il Campo Cartaginese</i>, raising some presumption that it -was once occupied by the Carthaginians. Evidently, the troops sent out -by Imilkon to meet and repel Daphnæus, must have taken post to the eastward -of Agrigentum, from which side the Syracusan army of relief was -approaching. Seyfert (Akragas, p. 41) contests this point, and supposes -that they must have been on the western side; misled by the analogy of the -Roman siege in 262 <small>B.C.</small>, when the Carthaginian relieving army under -Hanno were coming from the westward,—from Heraklei (Polyb. i, 19).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_936"><a href="#FNanchor_936">[936]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 87. -</p> -<p> -The youth of Argeius, combined with the fact of his being in high command, -makes us rather imagine that he was of noble birth: compare Thucydid. -vi, 38,—the speech of Athenagoras.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_937"><a href="#FNanchor_937">[937]</a></span> -Mention is again made, sixty-five years afterwards, in the description -of the war of Timoleon against the Carthaginians,—of the abundance of -gold and silver drinking cups, and rich personal ornaments, carried by the -native Carthaginians on military service (Diodor. xvi, 81; Plutarch, Timoleon, -c. 28, 29). -</p> -<p> -There was a select body of Carthaginians,—a Sacred Band,—mentioned -in these later times, consisting of two thousand five hundred men of distinguished -bravery as well as of conspicuous position in the city (Diodor. -xvi, 80; xx, 10).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_938"><a href="#FNanchor_938">[938]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 88.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_939"><a href="#FNanchor_939">[939]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 89, 90.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_940"><a href="#FNanchor_940">[940]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 91.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_941"><a href="#FNanchor_941">[941]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 88. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon confirms the statement of Diodorus, that Agrigentum was -taken by famine (Hellen. i, 5, 21; ii, 2, 24).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_942"><a href="#FNanchor_942">[942]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 91.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_943"><a href="#FNanchor_943">[943]</a></span> -Demosthenes de Coronâ, p. 286, s. 220. -</p> -<p> -This comparison is made by M. Brunet de Presle, in his valuable historical -work (Recherches sur les Establissemens des Grecs en Sicile, Part ii, s. -39, p. 219).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_944"><a href="#FNanchor_944">[944]</a></span> -Aristotel. Politic. v, 5, 6. Γίνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, -καὶ ὅταν ἀναλώσωσι τὰ ἴδια, ζῶντες ἀσελγῶς· καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι καινοτομεῖν ζητοῦσι, -καὶ ἢ τυραννίδι ἐπιτίθενται αὐτοὶ, ἢ κατασκευάζουσιν ἕτερον· ὥσπερ Ἱππαρῖνος Διονύσιον -ἐν Συρακούσαις. -</p> -<p> -Hipparinus was the father of Dion, respecting whom more hereafter. -</p> -<p> -Plato, in his warm sympathy for Dion, assigns to Hipparinus more of an -equality of rank and importance with the elder Dionysius, than the subsequent -facts justify (Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 353 A.; p. 355 F.).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_945"><a href="#FNanchor_945">[945]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 91. Ἀπορουμένων δὲ πάντων παρελθών Διονύσιος ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους, -τῶν μὲν στρατηγῶν κατηγόρησεν, ὡς προδιδόντων τὰ πράγματα τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις· τὰ δὲ πλήθη -παρώξυνε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν τιμωρίαν, παρακαλῶν μὴ περιμεῖναι τὸν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους κλῆρον, -ἀλλ’ ἐκ χειρὸς εὐθέως ἐπιθεῖναι τὴν δίκην.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_946"><a href="#FNanchor_946">[946]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 91. Τῶν δ’ ἀρχόντων ζημιούντων τὸν Διονύσιον κατὰ -τοὺς νόμους, ὡς θορυβοῦντα, Φίλιστος, ὁ τὰς ἱστορίας ὕστερον συγγράψας, -οὐσίαν ἔχων μεγάλην, etc. -</p> -<p> -In the description given by Thucydides (vi, 32-39) of the debate in the -Syracusan assembly (prior to the arrival of the Athenian expedition) in -which Hermokrates and Athenagoras speak, we find the magistrates interfering -to prevent the continuance of a debate which had become very personal -and acrimonious; though there was nothing in it at all brutal, nor -any exhortation to personal violence or infringement of the law.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_947"><a href="#FNanchor_947">[947]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 91.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_948"><a href="#FNanchor_948">[948]</a></span> -Plato, Epistol. viii, p. 354. Οἱ γὰρ πρὸ Διονυσίου καὶ Ἱππαρίνου ἀρξάντων -Σικελιῶται τότε ὡς ᾤοντο εὐδαιμόνως ἔζων, τρυφῶντές τε καὶ ἅμα ἀρχόντων ἄρχοντες· οἱ καὶ -τοῦς δέκα στρατηγοὺς κατέλευσαν βάλλοντες τοὺς πρὸ Διονυσίου, κατὰ νόμον οὐδένα κρίναντες, -ἵνα δὴ δουλεύοιεν μηδένι μήτε σὺν δίκῃ μήτε νόμῳ δεσπότῃ, ἐλεύθεροι δ’ εἶεν πάντῃ πάντως· -ὅθεν αἱ τυραννίδες ἐγένοντο αὐτοῖς. -</p> -<p> -Diodor. xiii, 92. παραυτίκα τοὺς μὲν ἔλυσε τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἑτέρους δὲ εἵλετο στρατηγοὺς, -ἐν οἷς καὶ τὸν Διονύσιον. Some little time afterwards, Diodorus -farther mentions that Dionysius accused before the public assembly, and -caused to be put to death, Daphnæus and Demarchus (xiii, 96); now -Daphnæus was one of the generals (xiii, 86-88). -</p> -<p> -If we assume the fact to have occurred as Plato affirms it, we cannot -easily explain how something so impressive and terror-striking came to be -transformed into the more commonplace statement of Diodorus, by Ephorus, -Theopompus, Hermeias, Timæus, or Philistus, from one of whom probably -his narrative is borrowed. -</p> -<p> -But if we assume Diodorus to be correct, we can easily account for the -erroneous belief in the mind of Plato. A very short time before this scene -at Syracuse, an analogous circumstance had really occurred at Agrigentum. -The assembled Agrigentines, being inflamed against their generals for -what they believed to be slackness or treachery in the recent fight with the -Carthaginians, had stoned four of them on the spot, and only spared the -fifth on the score of his youth (Diodor. xiii, 87). -</p> -<p> -I cannot but think that Plato confounded in his memory the scene and -proceedings at Syracuse with the other events, so recently antecedent, at -Agrigentum. His letter (from which the above citation is made) was written -in his old age,—fifty years after the event. -</p> -<p> -This is one inaccuracy as to matter-of-fact, which might be produced in -support of the views of those who reject the letters of Plato as spurious, -though Ast does not notice it, while going through the letters <i>seriatim</i>, and -condemning them not only as un-Platonic but as despicable compositions. -After attentively studying both the letters themselves, and his reasoning, I -dissent entirely from Ast’s conclusion. The first letter, that which purports -to come not from Plato, but from Dion, is the only one against which -he seems to me to have made out a good case (see Ast, Ueber Platon’s Leben -und Schriften, p. 504-530). Against the others, I cannot think that -he has shown any sufficient ground for pronouncing them to be spurious -and I therefore continue to treat them as genuine, following the opinion of -Cicero and Plutarch. It is admitted by Ast that their authenticity was not -suspected in antiquity, as far as our knowledge extends. Without considering -the presumption hence arising as conclusive, I think it requires to be -countervailed by stronger substantive grounds than those which Ast has -urged. -</p> -<p> -Among the total number of thirteen letters, those relating to Dion and -Dionysius (always setting aside the first letter)—that is the second, third, -fourth, seventh, eighth, and thirteenth,—are the most full of allusions to -fact and details. Some of them go very much into detail. Now had they -been the work of a forger, it is fair to contend that he could hardly avoid -laying himself more open to contradiction than he has done, on the score -of inaccuracy and inconsistency with the supposed situation. I have -already mentioned one inaccuracy which I take to be a <i>fault</i> of memory, -both conceivable and pardonable. Ast mentions another, to disprove the -authenticity of the eighth letter, respecting the son of Dion. Plato, in -this eighth letter, speaking in the name of the deceased Dion, recommends -the Syracusans to name Dion’s son as one of the members of a tripartite -kingship, along with Hipparinus (son of the elder Dionysius) and the -younger Dionysius. This (contends Ast, p. 523) cannot be correct, because -Dion’s son died before his father. To make the argument of Ast -complete, we ought to be sure that Dion had only <i>one</i> son; for which there -is doubtless the evidence of Plutarch, who after having stated that the son -of Dion, a youth nearly grown up, threw himself from the roof of the -house and was killed, goes on to say that Kallippus, the political enemy of -Dion, founded upon this misfortune a false rumor which he circulated,—ὡς ὁ Δίων -<em class="gesperrt">ἄπαις γεγονὼς</em> ἔγνωκε τὸν Διονυσίου καλεῖν Ἀπολλοκράτην καὶ ποιεῖσθαι -διάδοχον (Plutarch, Dion. c. 55, 56: compare also c. 21,—τοῦ παιδίου). -But since the rumor was altogether false, we may surely imagine -that Kallippus, taking advantage of a notorious accident which had -just proved fatal to the eldest son of Dion, may have fabricated a false -statement about the family of Dion, though there might be a younger boy -at home. It is not certain that the number of Dion’s children was familiarly -known among the population of Syracuse; nor was Dion himself in -the situation of an assured king, able to transfer his succession at once to -a boy not yet adult. And when we find in another chapter of Plutarch’s -Life of Dion (c. 31), that the son of Dion was called by Timæus, <i>Aretæus</i>,—and -by Timonides, <i>Hipparinus</i>,—this surely affords some presumption -that there were <i>two</i> sons, and not one son called by two different names. -</p> -<p> -I cannot therefore admit that Ast has proved the eighth Platonic letter -to be inaccurate in respect to matter of fact. I will add that the letter does -not mention the <i>name</i> of Dion’s son (though Ast says that it calls him <i>Hipparinus</i>); -and that it does specify the <i>three</i> partners in the tripartite kingship -suggested (though Ast says that it only mentioned <i>two</i>). -</p> -<p> -Most of Ast’s arguments against the authenticity of the letters, however, -are founded, not upon alleged inaccuracies of fact, but upon what he maintains -to be impropriety and meanness of thought, childish intrusion of -philosophy, unseasonable mysticism and pedantry, etc. In some of his -criticisms I coincide, though by no means in all. But I cannot accept -them as evidence to prove the point for which he contends,—the spuriousness -of the letters. The proper conclusion from his premises appears to -me to be, that Plato wrote letters which, when tried by our canons about -letter-writing, seem awkward, pedantic, and in bad taste. Dionysius of -Halikarnassus (De adm. vi dicend. in Demosth. p. 1025-1044), while emphatically -extolling the admirable composition of Plato’s dialogues, does -not scruple to pass an unfavorable criticism upon him as a speech-writer; -referring to the speeches in the Symposion as well as to the funeral -harangue in the Menexenus. Still less need we be afraid to admit, that -Plato was not a graceful letter-writer. -</p> -<p> -That Plato would feel intensely interested, and even personally involved, -in the quarrel between Dionysius II. and Dion, cannot be doubted. That -he would write letters to Dionysius on the subject,—that he would anxiously -seek to maintain influence over him, on all grounds,—that he would -manifest a lofty opinion of himself and his own philosophy,—is perfectly -natural and credible. And when we consider both the character and the -station of Dionysius, it is difficult to lay down beforehand any assured -canon as to the epistolary tone which Plato would think most suitable to -address him.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_949"><a href="#FNanchor_949">[949]</a></span> -Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_950"><a href="#FNanchor_950">[950]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 93.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_951"><a href="#FNanchor_951">[951]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 93.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_952"><a href="#FNanchor_952">[952]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 94.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_953"><a href="#FNanchor_953">[953]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 95. Διαλυθείσης δὲ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, οὐκ ὀλίγοι -τῶν Συρακουσίων κατηγόρουν τῶν πραχθέντων, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ταῦτα κεκυρωκότες· -τοῖς γὰρ λογισμοῖς εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἐρχόμενοι, τὴν ἐσομένην δυναστείαν ἀνεθεώρουν. -Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν βεβαιῶσαι βουλόμενοι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἔλαθον ἑαυτοὺς δεσπότην -τῆς πατρίδος καθεστακότες. Ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος, <em class="gesperrt">τὴν μετάνοιαν τῶν ὄχλων φθάσαι -βουλόμενος</em>, ἐπεζήτει δι’ οὗ τρόπου δύναιτο φύλακας αἰτήσασθαι τοῦ σώματος· -τούτου γὰρ συγχωρηθέντος, ῥᾳδίως ἤμελλε κυριεύσειν τῆς τυραννίδος.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_954"><a href="#FNanchor_954">[954]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 95. Αὐτὴ δ’ ἡ πόλις (Leontini) τότε φρούριον ἦν -τοῖς Συρακουσίοις, πλῆρες ὕπαρχον φυγάδων καὶ ξένων ἀνθρώπων. Ἤλπιζε γὰρ -τούτους συναγωνιστὰς ἕξειν, ἀνθρώπους δεομένους μεταβολῆς· τῶν δὲ -Συρακουσίων τοὺς πλείστους οὐδ’ ἥξειν εἰς Λεοντίνους. -</p> -<p> -Many of the expelled Agrigentines settled at Leontini, by permission of -the Syracusans (Diodor. xiii, 89).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_955"><a href="#FNanchor_955">[955]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 95.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_956"><a href="#FNanchor_956">[956]</a></span> -Aristotel. Politic. iii, 10, 10. Καὶ Διονυσίῳ τις, ὅτ’ ᾔτει τοὺς -φύλακας, συνεβούλευε τοῖς Συρακουσίοις διδόναι τοσούτους τοὺς φύλακας—i. e. -τοσαύτην τὴν ἴσχυν, ὥσθ’ ἑκάστου μὲν καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ συμπλειόνων κρείττω, τοῦ -δὲ πλήθους ἥττω, εἶναι.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_957"><a href="#FNanchor_957">[957]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 7. τοὺς ἠλευθερωμένους δούλους, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_958"><a href="#FNanchor_958">[958]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 96.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_959"><a href="#FNanchor_959">[959]</a></span> -Diodor. 1, c.; Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_960"><a href="#FNanchor_960">[960]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 24. Ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς ἔληγεν, ἐν ᾧ μεσοῦντι Διονύσιος ἐτυράννησε, -etc. -</p> -<p> -The year meant here is an Olympic year, from Midsummer to Midsummer; -so that the middle months of it would fall in the first quarter of the -Julian year. -</p> -<p> -If we compare however Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 21 with ii, 2, 24, we shall see -that the indications of time cannot both be correct; for the acquisition of -the despotism by Dionysius followed immediately, and as a consequence -directly brought about, upon the capture of Agrigentum by the Carthaginians. -</p> -<p> -It seems to me that the mark of time is not quite accurate in either one -passage or the other. The capture of Agrigentum took place at the close -of <small>B.C.</small> 406; the acquisition of the despotism by Dionysius, in the early -months of 405 <small>B.C.</small>, as Diodorus places them. Both events are in the same -Olympic year, between Midsummer 406 <small>B.C.</small> and Midsummer 405 <small>B.C.</small> -But this year is exactly the year which falls between the two passages above -referred to in Xenophon; not coinciding exactly with either one or the -other. Compare Dodwell, Chronolog. Xenoph. ad ann. 407 <small>B.C.</small></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_961"><a href="#FNanchor_961">[961]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 82, 96, 108. τὰς γλυφὰς καὶ τὰ περιττοτέρως -εἰργασμένα κατέσκαψεν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_962"><a href="#FNanchor_962">[962]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 109.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_963"><a href="#FNanchor_963">[963]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 109.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_964"><a href="#FNanchor_964">[964]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 111.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_965"><a href="#FNanchor_965">[965]</a></span> -Μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριναν, -<span - class="replace" - id="tn_6" - title="In the original English edition: ἀκινητὸς γὰρ ἀμείνων">ἀκίνητόν περ ἐοῦσαν</span>— -</p> -<div class="poetry-container"> - <div class="poetry"> - <p class="i5">“fatis nunquam concessa moveri</p> - <p>Apparet Camarina procul.”—Virgil. Æneid, iii, 701.</p> - </div> -</div> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_966"><a href="#FNanchor_966">[966]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii. 111. Οὐδεμία γὰρ ἦν παρ’ αὐτοῖς φειδὼ τῶν -ἁλισκομένων, ἀλλ’ ἀσυμπαθῶς τῶν ἠτυχηκότων οὓς μὲν ἀνεσταύρουν, οἷς -δ’ ἀφορήτους ἐπῆγον ὕβρεις.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_967"><a href="#FNanchor_967">[967]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 112; xiv, 44. Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_968"><a href="#FNanchor_968">[968]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 112.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_969"><a href="#FNanchor_969">[969]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 113. παρῆν περὶ μέσας νύκτας πρὸς τὴν πύλην -τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς ... εἰσήλαυνε διὰ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_970"><a href="#FNanchor_970">[970]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 113. Compare Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_971"><a href="#FNanchor_971">[971]</a></span> -Xenophon (Hellen. ii, 3, 5) states that “the Leontines, co-residents at -Syracuse, revolted to their own city from Dionysius and the Syracusans.” -</p> -<p> -This migration to Leontini seems a part of the same transaction as what -Diodorus notices (xiii, 113). Leontini, recognized as independent by the -peace which speedily followed, is mentioned again shortly afterwards as independent -(xiv, 14). It had been annexed to Syracuse before the Athenian -siege.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_972"><a href="#FNanchor_972">[972]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 114. καὶ Συρακουσίους μὲν ὑπὸ Διονύσιον τετάχθαι, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_973"><a href="#FNanchor_973">[973]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 114. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus begins this chapter with the words,—<em class="gesperrt">Διόπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων -ἀναγκαζόμενος</em> Ἰμίλκων, ἔπεμψεν εἰς Συρακούσας κήρυκα, παρακαλῶν τοὺς -ἡττημένους διαλύσασθαι. Ἀσμένως δ’ ὑπακούσαντος τοῦ Διονυσίου, τὴν εἰρήνην -ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἔθεντο, etc. -</p> -<p> -Now there is not the smallest matter of fact either mentioned or indicated -before, to which the word διόπερ can have reference. Nothing is mentioned -but success on the part of the Carthaginians, and disaster on the part of -the Greeks; the repulse of the attack made by Dionysius upon the Carthaginian -camp,—his retreat and evacuation of Gela and Kamarina,—the -occupation of Gela by the Carthaginians,—the disorder, mutiny, and partial -dispersion of the army of Dionysius in its retreat,—the struggle within -the walls of Syracuse. There is nothing in all this to which διόπερ can -refer. But a few lines farther on, after the conditions of peace have been -specified, Diodorus alludes to <i>the</i> terrible disease (ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου) which laid -waste the Carthaginian army, as if he had mentioned it before. -</p> -<p> -I find in Niebuhr (Vorträge über alte Geschichte, vol. iii, p. 212, 213) the -opinion expressed, that here is a gap in Diodorus “intentionally disguised in -the MSS., and not yet noticed by any editor.” Some such conclusion seems -to me unavoidable. Niebuhr thinks, that in the lost portion of the text, it -was stated that Imilkon marched on to Syracuse, formed the siege of the -place, and was there visited with the terrific pestilence to which allusion is -made in the remaining portion of the text. This also is nowise improbable; -yet I do not venture to assert it,—since the pestilence may possibly have -broken out while Imilkon was still at Gela. -</p> -<p> -Niebuhr farther considers, that Dionysius lost the battle of Gela through -miserable generalship,—that he lost it by design, as suitable to his political -projects,—and that by the terms of the subsequent treaty, he held the territory -around Syracuse only under Carthaginian supremacy.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_974"><a href="#FNanchor_974">[974]</a></span> -Justin, xxii, 2; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 2, 7, 9.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_975"><a href="#FNanchor_975">[975]</a></span> -Diodor. xiii, 114.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_976"><a href="#FNanchor_976">[976]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 10. -</p> -<p> -The valuable support lent to Dionysius by the Spartans is emphatically -denounced by Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegyric.) s. 145; Orat. viii, (De Pace) -s. 122.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_977"><a href="#FNanchor_977">[977]</a></span> -Plato, while he speaks of Dionysius and Hipparinus on this occasion as -the saviors of Syracuse, does not insist upon extraordinary valor and ability -on their parts, but assigns the result mainly to fortune and the favor of -the gods (Plato, Epistol. viii, p. 353 B.; p. 355 F.). -</p> -<p> -His letter is written with a view of recommending a compromise at Syracuse, -between the party of freedom, and the descendants of Dionysius and -Hipparinus; he thus tries to set up as good a case as he can, in favor of -the title of both the two latter to the gratitude of the Syracusans. -</p> -<p> -He reluctantly admits how much Dionysius the elder afterwards abused -the confidence placed in him by the Syracusans (p. 353 C.).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_978"><a href="#FNanchor_978">[978]</a></span> -That this was the situation of the fortified <i>horrea publica</i> at Syracuse, -we see from Livy, xxiv, 21. I think we may presume that they were begun -at this time by Dionysius, as they form a natural part of his scheme.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_979"><a href="#FNanchor_979">[979]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 7. -</p> -<p> -The residence of Dionysius in the acropolis, and the quarters of his mercenaries -without the acropolis, but still within Ortygia,—are noticed in -Plato’s account of his visit to the younger Dionysius (Plato, Epistol. vii, p. -350; Epist. iii, p. 315).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_980"><a href="#FNanchor_980">[980]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 7. Τῆς δὲ χώρας τὴν μὲν ἀρίστην ἐξελόμενος ἐδωρήσατο -τοῖς τε φίλοις καὶ τοῖς ἐφ’ ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένοις· <em class="gesperrt">τὴν δ’ ἄλλην ἐμέρισεν -ἐπίσης ξένῳ τε καὶ πολίτῃ</em>, συμπεριλαβὼν τῷ τῶν πολιτῶν ὀνόματι τοὺς -ἠλευθερωμένους δούλους, οὓς ἐκάλει νεοπολίτας. Διέδωκε δὲ καὶ τὰς οἰκίας τοῖς -ὄχλοις, πλὴν τῶν ἐν τῇ Νήσῳ· ταύτας δὲ τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τοῖς μισθοφόροις -ἐδωρήσατο. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὴν τυραννίδα καλῶς ἐδόκει διῳκηκέναι, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_981"><a href="#FNanchor_981">[981]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 78. -</p> -<p> -So also, after the death of the elder Dionysius, Plutarch speaks of his -military force as having been βαρβάρων μυρíανδρον φυλακήν (Plutarch, -Dion. c. 10). These expressions however have little pretence to numerical -accuracy.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_982"><a href="#FNanchor_982">[982]</a></span> -Cicero in Verrem, v. 32, 84; 38, 98.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_983"><a href="#FNanchor_983">[983]</a></span> -Aristotel. Politic. v, 9, 4. Καὶ ἡ εἰσφορὰ τῶν τελῶν -(τυραννικόν ἐστι) ἐν πέντε γὰρ ἔτεσιν ἐπὶ Διονυσίου τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν -εἰσενηνοχέναι συνέβαινε.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_984"><a href="#FNanchor_984">[984]</a></span> -Diodorus, xiv, 7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_985"><a href="#FNanchor_985">[985]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 7. Compare an occurrence very similar, at Mendê in -Thrace (Thucyd. iv, 130).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_986"><a href="#FNanchor_986">[986]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_987"><a href="#FNanchor_987">[987]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_988"><a href="#FNanchor_988">[988]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 8; xx, 78. Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus) sect. 49. -</p> -<p> -It appears that Timæus the historian ascribed this last observation to -Philistus; and Diodorus copies Timæus in one of the passages above referred -to, though not in the other. But Philistus himself in his history -asserted that the observation had been made by another person (Plutarch, -Dion. c. 35). -</p> -<p> -The saying seems to have been remembered and cited long afterwards in -Syracuse; but cited as having been delivered by Dionysius himself, not as -addressed to him (Livy, xxiv, 22). -</p> -<p> -Isokrates, while recording the saying, represents it as having been delivered -when the Carthaginians were pressing Syracuse hardly by siege; having -in mind doubtless the siege or blockade undertaken by Imilkon seven -years afterwards. But I apprehend this to be a misconception. The story -seems to suit better to the earlier occasion named by Diodorus.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_989"><a href="#FNanchor_989">[989]</a></span> -Herodotus, v, 71; Thucydides, i, 112.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_990"><a href="#FNanchor_990">[990]</a></span> -It is said that the Campanians, on their way to Syracuse, passed by -Agyrium, and deposited their baggage in the care of Agyris the despot of -that town (Diodor. xiv, 9). But if we look at the position of Agyrium on -the map, it seems difficult to understand how mercenaries coming from the -Carthaginian territory, and in great haste to reach Syracuse, can have -passed anywhere near to it.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_991"><a href="#FNanchor_991">[991]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 9.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_992"><a href="#FNanchor_992">[992]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 9. The subsequent proceedings of the Campanians justified -his wisdom in dismissing them. They went to Entella (a town among -the dependencies of Carthage, in the south-western portion of Sicily,—Diod. -xiv, 48), where they were welcomed and hospitably treated by the inhabitants. -In the night, they set upon the Entellan citizens by surprise, -put them all to death, married their widows and daughters, and kept possession -of the town for themselves.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_993"><a href="#FNanchor_993">[993]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 10. Ἀπέστειλαν (οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι) Ἄριστον, ἄνδρα τῶν -ἐπιφανῶν, εἰς Συρακούσας, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ προσποιούμενοι καταλιπεῖν τὴν δυναστείαν, -τῇ δ’ ἀληθείᾳ σπεύδοντες αὐξῆσαι τὴν τυραννίδα· ἤλπιζον γὰρ συγκατασκευάζοντες -τὴν ἀρχὴν, ὑπήκοον ἕξειν τὸν Διονύσιον διὰ τὰς εὐεργεσίας. Ὁ δ’ Ἄριστος -καταπλεύσας εἰς Συρακούσας, καὶ τῷ τυράννῳ λάθρα περὶ τούτων διαλεχθεὶς, -τούς τε Συρακοσίους ἀνασείων, Νικοτέλην τὸν Κορίνθιον ἀνεῖλεν, ἀφηγούμενον -τῶν Συρακοσίων· τοὺς δὲ πιστεύσαντας προδοὺς, τὸν μὲν τύραννον ἰσχυρὸν κατέστησε, -διὰ δὲ τῆς πράξεως ταύτης ἀσχημονεῖν ἐποίησεν αὑτὸν ἅμα καὶ τὴν πατρίδα. -Compare xiv, 70.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_994"><a href="#FNanchor_994">[994]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 10. Καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ παρεσκευάζετο πρὸς τὴν -ἀσφάλειαν τῆς τυραννίδος, ὡς ἂν ἔργοις ἤδη πεῖραν εἰληφὼς, ὅτι πᾶν -ὑπομένουσιν οἱ Συρακούσιοι χάριν τοῦ μὴ δουλεύειν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_995"><a href="#FNanchor_995">[995]</a></span> -Plutarch, Lysander, c. 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_996"><a href="#FNanchor_996">[996]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 34.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_997"><a href="#FNanchor_997">[997]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 58.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_998"><a href="#FNanchor_998">[998]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 61.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_999"><a href="#FNanchor_999">[999]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 15.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1000"><a href="#FNanchor_1000">[1000]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 16. This Archonides may probably have been son of the -Sikel prince Archonides, who, having taken active part as an ally of Nikias -and the Athenian invaders against Syracuse, died just before Gylippus -reached Sicily (Thucyd. vii, 1).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1001"><a href="#FNanchor_1001">[1001]</a></span> -See the Dissertation of Saverio Cavallari,—Zur Topographie von -Syrakus (Göttingen, 1845), p. 22.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1002"><a href="#FNanchor_1002">[1002]</a></span> -See, for a farther exposition of these points, my account of the siege -of Syracuse by the Athenians, Vol. VII, ch. lix, lx.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1003"><a href="#FNanchor_1003">[1003]</a></span> -Thucyd. vi, 75.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1004"><a href="#FNanchor_1004">[1004]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 18. λίθων τετραπόδων. The stones may have been cubes -of four feet; but this does not certainly appear.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1005"><a href="#FNanchor_1005">[1005]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 18.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1006"><a href="#FNanchor_1006">[1006]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 18. Καθόλου δὲ ἀποθέμενος τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς βάρος, -ἰδιώτην αὑτὸν ἀπεδείκνυε, etc. -</p> -<p> -Compare cap. 45 and cap. 47—μισοῦντες τὸ βάρος τῆς τῶν Φοινίκων ἐπικρατείας, -etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1007"><a href="#FNanchor_1007">[1007]</a></span> -According to the testimony of Saverio Cavallari, the architect under -whose directions the excavations were made in 1839, whereby these remains -were first fully disclosed (Zur Topographie von Syrakus, p. 21).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1008"><a href="#FNanchor_1008">[1008]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 45. Ἀπετίθετο γὰρ ἤδη τὸ πικρὸν τῆς τυραννίδος, -καὶ μεταβαλλόμενος εἰς ἐπιείκειαν, φιλανθρωπότερον ἦρχε τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων, -οὔτε φονεύων, οὔτε φυγάδας ποιῶν, <em class="gesperrt">καθάπερ εἰώθει</em>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1009"><a href="#FNanchor_1009">[1009]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1010"><a href="#FNanchor_1010">[1010]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 45.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1011"><a href="#FNanchor_1011">[1011]</a></span> -Thucyd. vi, 46.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1012"><a href="#FNanchor_1012">[1012]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 40.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1013"><a href="#FNanchor_1013">[1013]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 40.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1014"><a href="#FNanchor_1014">[1014]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 44, 106, 107.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1015"><a href="#FNanchor_1015">[1015]</a></span> -Diodorus, when he first mentions the answer, does not give this remark -as comprised in it; though he afterwards alludes to it as having been <i>said</i> -to be (φασὶ) so comprised (xix, 44-107).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1016"><a href="#FNanchor_1016">[1016]</a></span> -Aristot. Politic. v, 6, 7. Ἔτι διὰ τὸ πάσας τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς -πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι, μᾶλλον πλεονεκτοῦσιν οἱ γνώριμοι· οἷον καὶ ἐν -Λακεδαίμονι εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσίαι ἔρχονται, καὶ ἔξεστι ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν θέλωσι -τοῖς γνωρίμοις μᾶλλον, καὶ κηδεύειν ὅτῳ θέλουσι. Διὸ καὶ ἡ Λοκρῶν πολιτεία -ἀπώλετο ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον κηδείας· ὃ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, οὐδ’ -ἂν ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εὖ μεμιγμένῃ.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1017"><a href="#FNanchor_1017">[1017]</a></span> -Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1018"><a href="#FNanchor_1018">[1018]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 42, 43. -</p> -<p> -The historian Philistus had described with much minuteness these warlike -preparations of Dionysius. Diodorus has probably abridged from him -(Philisti Fragment. xxxiv, ed. Marx and ed. Didot.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1019"><a href="#FNanchor_1019">[1019]</a></span> -Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1020"><a href="#FNanchor_1020">[1020]</a></span> -Thucyd. i, 13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1021"><a href="#FNanchor_1021">[1021]</a></span> -Thucyd. vii, 36-62.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1022"><a href="#FNanchor_1022">[1022]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 42.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1023"><a href="#FNanchor_1023">[1023]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 41. Συμπροθυμουμένων δὲ τῶν Συρακουσίων -τῇ τοῦ Διονυσίου προαιρέσει, πολλὴν συνέβαινε γενέσθαι τὴν φιλοτιμίαν -περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων κατασκευήν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1024"><a href="#FNanchor_1024">[1024]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 43, 44, 45.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1025"><a href="#FNanchor_1025">[1025]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 41.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1026"><a href="#FNanchor_1026">[1026]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 44; xvi, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1027"><a href="#FNanchor_1027">[1027]</a></span> -Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1028"><a href="#FNanchor_1028">[1028]</a></span> -Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v, 20, 57-63; Valer. Maxim. ix, 13; Diodor. xiv, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1029"><a href="#FNanchor_1029">[1029]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 45.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1030"><a href="#FNanchor_1030">[1030]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 41.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1031"><a href="#FNanchor_1031">[1031]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 46. -</p> -<p> -There were also Greeks, and seemingly Greeks of some consideration, -who resided at Carthage, and seemed to have continued resident there -throughout the war between the Carthaginians and Dionysius (Diodor. xiv, -77). We should infer, from their continuing to reside there, that the Carthaginians -did not retaliate upon them the plunder now authorized by Dionysius -against their countrymen resident at Syracuse; and farther, it affords -additional probability that the number of Carthaginians actually plundered -at Syracuse was not considerable. -</p> -<p> -For instances of intermarriage, and inter-residence, between Carthage -and Syracuse, see Herodot. vii, 166; Livy, xxiv, 6. -</p> -<p> -Phœnician coins have been found in Ortygia, bearing a Phœnician inscription -signifying <i>The Island</i>,—which was the usual denomination of Ortygia -(Movers, Die Phönizier, ii, 2, p. 327).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1032"><a href="#FNanchor_1032">[1032]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 55. Τοῦτο δ’ ἐμηχανήσατο (Ἰμίλκων) πρὸς τὸ -μηδένα τῶν κατασκόπων ἀπαγγεῖλαι τὸν κατάπλουν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1033"><a href="#FNanchor_1033">[1033]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 46, 47.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1034"><a href="#FNanchor_1034">[1034]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 47.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1035"><a href="#FNanchor_1035">[1035]</a></span> -Herodot. vii, 145. Τὰ δὲ Γέλωνος πρήγματα μεγάλα ἐλέγετο -εἶναι, οὐδαμῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τῶν οὐ πολλὸν μέζω. Compare c. 160-162.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1036"><a href="#FNanchor_1036">[1036]</a></span> -Herodot. vii, 158. Gelon’s speech to the Lacedæmonians who come to -solicit his aid against Xerxes. -</p> -<p> -Αὐτοὶ δὲ, ἐμεῦ πρότερον δεηθέντος βαρβαρικοῦ στρατοῦ συνεπάψασθαι, -ὅτε μοι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους νεῖκος συνῆπτο ... <em class="gesperrt">ὑποτείνοντός τε -τὰ ἐμπόρια συνελευθεροῦν</em>, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1037"><a href="#FNanchor_1037">[1037]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 46. Οὐ μόνον γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς οὐσίας διήρπασαν, -ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὺς συλλαμβάνοντες, πᾶσαν αἰκίαν καὶ ὕβριν εἰς τὰ σώματα -αὐτῶν ἀπετίθεντο, μνημονεύοντες ὧν αὐτοὶ κατὰ τὴν αἰχμαλωσίαν ἔπαθον. -Ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ τῆς κατὰ τῶν Φοινίκων τιμωρίας προέβησαν, καὶ τότε καὶ -κατὰ τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον, ὥστε τοὺς Καρχηδονίους διδαχθῆναι μηκέτι -παρανομεῖν εἰς τοὺς ὑποπεσόντας.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1038"><a href="#FNanchor_1038">[1038]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 47.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1039"><a href="#FNanchor_1039">[1039]</a></span> -Thucyd. vi, 2; Pausan. v, 25, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1040"><a href="#FNanchor_1040">[1040]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 48. Διονύσιος δὲ μετὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτόνων -κατασκεψάμενος τοὺς τόπους, etc. -</p> -<p> -Artemon the engineer was consulted by Perikles at the siege of Samos -(Plutarch, Perikles, c. 27).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1041"><a href="#FNanchor_1041">[1041]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 48, 49.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1042"><a href="#FNanchor_1042">[1042]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 49. ἐχώννυε τὸν μεταξὺ πόρον, καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς -ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ λόγον ἅμα τῇ τοῦ χώματος αὐξήσει προσήγαγε τοῖς τείχεσι.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1043"><a href="#FNanchor_1043">[1043]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 50.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1044"><a href="#FNanchor_1044">[1044]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 50; Polyænus, v, 2, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1045"><a href="#FNanchor_1045">[1045]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 51, 52, 53.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1046"><a href="#FNanchor_1046">[1046]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 53.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1047"><a href="#FNanchor_1047">[1047]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 54. -</p> -<p> -Leptines was brother of Dionysius (xiv, 102; xv, 7), though he afterwards -married the daughter of Dionysius,—a marriage not condemned by -Grecian sentiment.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1048"><a href="#FNanchor_1048">[1048]</a></span> -Justin, xx, 5. One of these Carthaginians of rank, who, from political -enmity to Hanno, wrote letters in Greek to communicate information to -Dionysius, was detected and punished as a traitor. On this occasion, the -Carthaginian senate is said to have enacted a law, forbidding all citizens to -learn Greek,—either to write it or to speak it.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1049"><a href="#FNanchor_1049">[1049]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 54; Polyænus, v, 10, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1050"><a href="#FNanchor_1050">[1050]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 55.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1051"><a href="#FNanchor_1051">[1051]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 55.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1052"><a href="#FNanchor_1052">[1052]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 56, 57. τῶν ἰδίων ἱππέων ἐν Συρακούσαις ὄντων, etc. -διὰ τῶν πεπτωκότων τειχῶν εἰσβιασάμενοι, etc. τὰ τείχη καταπεπτωκότα, -etc. -</p> -<p> -Compare another example of inattention to the state of their walls, on -the part of the Messenians (xix, 65).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1053"><a href="#FNanchor_1053">[1053]</a></span> -Kleon and the Athenians took Torônê by a similar manœuvre (Thucyd. -v, 2).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1054"><a href="#FNanchor_1054">[1054]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 57.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1055"><a href="#FNanchor_1055">[1055]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 58. Ἰμίλκων δὲ τῆς Μεσσήνης τὰ τείχη κατασκάψας, -προσέταξε τοῖς στρατιώταις καταβαλεῖν τὰς οἰκίας εἰς ἔδαφος, καὶ μήτε κέραμον, -μήθ’ ὕλην, μήτ’ ἄλλο μηδὲν ὑπολιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν κατακαῦσαι, τὰ δὲ συντρίψαι. -Ταχὺ δὲ τῇ τῶν στρατιωτῶν πολυχειρίᾳ λαβόντων τῶν ἔργων συντέλειαν, ἡ πόλις -ἄγνωστος ἦν, ὅπου πρότερον αὐτὴν οἰκεῖσθαι συνέβαινεν. Ὁρῶν γὰρ τὸν τόπον -πόῤῥω μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν συμμαχίδων πόλεων κεχωρισμένον, εὐκαιρότατον δὲ τῶν περὶ -Σικελίαν ὄντα, προῄρητο δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ τελέως ἀοίκητον διατηρεῖν, ἢ δυσχερῆ -καὶ πολυχρόνιον τὴν κτίσιν αὐτῆς γίνεσθαι. -</p> -<p> -Ἐναποδειξάμενος οὖν τὸ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας μῖσος ἐν τῇ τῶν Μεσσηνίων ἀτυχίᾳ, etc. -</p> -<p> -It would appear, however, that the demolition of Messênê can hardly -have been carried so far in fact as Imilkon intended; since the city reappears -shortly afterwards in renewed dignity.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1056"><a href="#FNanchor_1056">[1056]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 59-76.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1057"><a href="#FNanchor_1057">[1057]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 59.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1058"><a href="#FNanchor_1058">[1058]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 60, 61. Compare the speech of Theodôrus at Syracuse -afterwards (c. 68), from which we gather a more complete idea of what -passed after the battle.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1059"><a href="#FNanchor_1059">[1059]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 61. Καὶ καθόλου δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος -ἀπεδείκνυε πολέμιον ὕπαρχον τῶν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν. -</p> -<p> -These manifestations of anti-Hellenic sentiment, among the various -neighbors of the Sicilian Greeks, are important to notice, though they are -not often brought before us.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1060"><a href="#FNanchor_1060">[1060]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 61.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1061"><a href="#FNanchor_1061">[1061]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 63. -</p> -<p> -Polyænus (v, 8, 2) recounts a manœuvre of <i>Leptines</i>, practised in bringing -back a Lacedæmonian reinforcement from Sparta to Sicily on his voyage -along the Tarentine coast. Perhaps this may be the Lacedæmonian -division intended.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1062"><a href="#FNanchor_1062">[1062]</a></span> -Thucyd. vii, 42; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 21; Diodor. xiii, 11.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1063"><a href="#FNanchor_1063">[1063]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 62. -</p> -<p> -The text of Diodorus is here so perplexed as to require conjectural alteration, -which Rhodomannus has supplied; yet not so as to remove all -that is obscure. The word εἰσθεόμεναι still remains to be explained or corrected.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1064"><a href="#FNanchor_1064">[1064]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 63. Κατελάβετο δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς προάστειον, -καὶ τοὺς νέως τῆς τε Δήμητρος καὶ Κόρης ἐσύλησεν. -</p> -<p> -Cicero (in Verrem, iv, 52, 53) distinctly mentions the temples of Demeter -and Persephonê, and the statue of Apollo Temenites, among the characteristic -features of Neapolis; which proves the identity of Neapolis with -what Diodorus calls the suburb of Achradina. This identity, recognized -by Serra di Falco, Colonel Leake, and other authors, is disputed by Saverio -Cavallari, on grounds which do not appear to me sufficient. -</p> -<p> -See Colonel Leake, notes on Syracuse, pp. 7-10; Cavallari, Zur Topographie -von Syrakus, p. 20.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1065"><a href="#FNanchor_1065">[1065]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 64. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοιούτων λόγων γινομένων, Διονύσιος -κατέπλευσε, καὶ συναγαγὼν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπῄνει τοὺς Συρακουσίους, καὶ παρεκάλει -θαῤῥεῖν, ἐπαγγελλόμενος ταχέως καταλύσειν τὸν πόλεμον. Ἤδη δ’ αὐτοῦ μέλλοντος -διαλύειν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἀναστὰς Θεόδωρος ὁ Συρακούσιος, ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν -εὐδοκιμῶν καὶ δοκῶν εἶναι πρακτικὸς, ἀπετόλμησε περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας -τοιούτοις χρήσασθαι λόγοις.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1066"><a href="#FNanchor_1066">[1066]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 65. Οὗτος δὲ, τὰ μὲν ἱερὰ συλήσας, τοὺς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν -πλούτους ἅμα ταῖς τῶν κεκτημένων ψυχαῖς ἀφελόμενος, τοὺς οἰκέτας μισθοδοτεῖ -ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν δεσποτῶν δουλείας.... -</p> -<p> -c. 66. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρόπολις, δούλων ὅπλοις τηρουμένη, κατὰ τῆς πόλεως -ἐπιτετείχισται· τὸ δὲ τῶν μισθοφόρων πλῆθος ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ τῶν Συρακοσίων -ἤθροισται. Καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἐπίσης βραβεύων τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ -μόναρχος πλεονεξίᾳ κρίνων πράττειν πάντα. Καὶ νῦν μὲν οἱ πολέμιοι βραχὺ -μέρος ἔχουσι τῆς χώρας· Διονύσιος δὲ, πᾶσαν ποιήσας ἀνάστατον, τοῖς τὴν -τυραννίδα συναύξουσιν ἐδωρήσατο.... -</p> -<p> -... Καὶ πρὸς μὲν Καρχηδονίους δύο μάχας ἐνστησάμενος ἐν ἑκατέραις ἥττηται· -παρὰ δὲ τοῖς πολίταις πιστευθεὶς ἅπαξ στρατηγίαν, εὐθέως ἀφείλετο τὴν -ἐλευθερίαν· φονεύων μὲν τοὺς παῤῥησίαν ἄγοντας ὑπὲρ τῶν νόμων, φυγαδεύων -δὲ τοὺς ταῖς οὐσίαις προέχοντας· καὶ τὰς μὲν τῶν φυγάδων γυναῖκας οἰκέταις -καὶ μιγάσιν ἀνθρώποις συνοικίζων, τῶν δὲ πολιτικῶν ὅπλων βαρβάρους καὶ -ξένους ποιῶν κυρίους.... -</p> -<p> -c. 67. Οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα τὸν πολέμιον ἔχοντες ἡγεμόνα, τὸν τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν -ἱερὰ σεσυληκότα; -</p> -<p> -c. 69. Διόπερ ἕτερον ἡγεμόνα ζητητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὸν σεσυληκότα τοὺς τῶν θεῶν -ναοὺς στρατηγὸν ἔχοντες ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ θεομαχῶμεν....</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1067"><a href="#FNanchor_1067">[1067]</a></span> -Thucyd. i, 18; Herodot. v, 92.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1068"><a href="#FNanchor_1068">[1068]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 70. Τοιούτοις τοῦ Θεοδώρου χρησαμένου λόγοις, -οἱ μὲν Συρακούσιοι μετέωροι ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγένοντο, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους -ἀπέβλεπον. Φαρακίδου δὲ τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίου ναυαρχοῦντος τῶν συμμάχων, καὶ -παρελθόντος ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα, πάντες προσεδόκων ἀρχηγὸν ἔσεσθαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1069"><a href="#FNanchor_1069">[1069]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 70. Ὁ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸν τύραννον ἔχων οἰκείως, etc.; compare -Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 14.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1070"><a href="#FNanchor_1070">[1070]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 70. Παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσδοκίαν γενομένης τῆς ἀποφάσεως, -οἱ μὲν μισθόφοροι συνέδραμον πρὸς τὸν Διονύσιον, οἱ δὲ Συρακούσιοι καταπλαγέντες -τὴν ἡσυχίαν, εἶχον, πολλὰ τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις καταρώμενοι. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ πρότερον -Ἀρέτης ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος (he is called previously <i>Aristus</i>, xiv, 10), -ἀντιλαμβανομένων αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας, ἐγένετο προδότης· καὶ τότε Φαρακίδας -ἐνέστη ταῖς ὁρμαῖς τῶν Συρακουσίων.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1071"><a href="#FNanchor_1071">[1071]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 70. Συνεπελάβετο δὲ καὶ τῇ τοῦ δαιμονίου συμφορᾷ -τὸ μυριάδας εἰς ταὐτὸ συναθροισθῆναι, καὶ τὸ τῆς ὥρας εἶναι πρὸς τὰς νόσους -ἐνεργότατον, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1072"><a href="#FNanchor_1072">[1072]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 71-76. πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδας ἐπεῖδον ἀτάφους -διὰ τὸν λοιμὸν σεσωρευμένους. -</p> -<p> -I give the figure as I find it, without pretending to trust it as anything -more than an indication of a great number.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1073"><a href="#FNanchor_1073">[1073]</a></span> -Thucyd. ii, 54. -</p> -<p> -When the Roman general Marcellus was besieging Syracuse in 212 <small>B.C.</small>, -a terrific pestilence, generated by causes similar to that of this year, broke -out. All parties, Romans, Syracusans, and Carthaginians, suffered from it -considerably; but the Carthaginians worst of all; they are said to have all -perished (Livy, xxv, 26).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1074"><a href="#FNanchor_1074">[1074]</a></span> -Thucyd. vii, 22, 23.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1075"><a href="#FNanchor_1075">[1075]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 72. Οὗτοι δ’ ἦσαν οἱ μισθόφοροι τῷ Διονυσίῳ παρὰ -πάντας ἀλλοτριώτατοι, καὶ πλεονάκις ἀποστάσεις καὶ ταραχὰς ποιοῦντες. Διόπερ -ὁ μὲν Διονύσιος τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν ἦν παρηγγελκὼς, ὅταν ἐξάπτωνται τῶν πολεμίων, -φεύγειν, καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους ἐγκαταλιπεῖν· ὧν ποιησάντων τὸ προσταχθὲν, -οὗτοι μὲν ἅπαντες κατεκόπησαν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1076"><a href="#FNanchor_1076">[1076]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 72. Πάντη δὲ τῶν ἐξοχωτάτων νεῶν θραυομένων, -αἱ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐμβόλων ἀναῤῥηττόμεναι λακίδες ἐξαίσιον ἐποιοῦντο ψόφον, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1077"><a href="#FNanchor_1077">[1077]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 75.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1078"><a href="#FNanchor_1078">[1078]</a></span> -Diodor. xiv, 77.</p> -</div> - -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="transnote" id="tnote"> - <p class="tnotetit">Transcriber's note</p> - <ul> - <li>Original spelling, hyphenation and punctuation have been kept, but variant spellings were made - consistent when a predominant usage was found.</li> - <li>Footnotes have been renumbered and moved to the end of the book.</li> - <li>Blank pages have been skipped.</li> - <li>Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after comparison with a later edition of - this work. Greek text has also been corrected after checking with this later edition and with Perseus, - when the reference was found.</li> - <li>Some inconsistencies in the use of diæresis (like “reorganize” and “reörganize”) and in the use - of accents over proper nouns (like “Autokles” and “Autoklês”) have been retained.</li> - <li>Throughout the text, “Mövers” has been changed to “Movers”, when referring to Franz Karl Movers, - as it is the spelling used in the title pages of his main works in German.</li> - <li>The following changes were also made, after checking with other editions: - <table summary="changes made"> - <tr> - <td>page</td> - <td class="tdr"> <a href="#Page_27">27</a>:</td> - <td class="tdr">“Phokæn”</td> - <td>→</td> - <td>“<a href="#tn_1">Phokæan</a>”</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>page</td> - <td class="tdr"> <a href="#Page_94">94</a>:</td> - <td class="tdr">“from”</td> - <td>→</td> - <td>“<a href="#tn_4">at</a>”</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>page</td> - <td class="tdr"> <a href="#Page_96">96</a>:</td> - <td class="tdr">“Kannônes”</td> - <td>→</td> - <td>“<a href="#tn_2">Kannônus</a>”</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>page</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_374">374</a>:</td> - <td class="tdr">“troad”</td> - <td>→</td> - <td>“<a href="#tn_5">Troad</a>”</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>note</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Footnote_711">711</a>:</td> - <td class="tdr">“vii, 39”</td> - <td>→</td> - <td>“<a href="#tn_3">vii, 4, 39</a>”</td> - </tr> - </table> - </li> - <li>In note <a href="#Footnote_965">965</a>, the printed book version has been retained: - “Μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριναν, <a href="#tn_6">ἀκίνητόν περ ἐοῦσαν</a>”, but the original English - edition has “Μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριναν, ἀκινητὸς γὰρ ἀμείνων”.</li> - <li>The book cover image was created by the transcriber and is placed in the public domain.</li> - </ul> -</div> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of History of Greece, Volume 10 (of 12), by -George Grote - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF GREECE, VOLUME 10 OF 12 *** - -***** This file should be named 51183-h.htm or 51183-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/1/1/8/51183/ - -Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Ramon Pajares Box and the -Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net -(This file was produced from images generously made -available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, -and may not be used if you charge for the eBooks, unless you receive -specific permission. If you do not charge anything for copies of this -eBook, complying with the rules is very easy. You may use this eBook -for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative works, reports, -performances and research. They may be modified and printed and given -away--you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks -not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the -trademark license, especially commercial redistribution. - -START: FULL LICENSE - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full -Project Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at -www.gutenberg.org/license. - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or -destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your -possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a -Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound -by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the -person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph -1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this -agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the -Foundation" or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection -of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual -works in the collection are in the public domain in the United -States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the -United States and you are located in the United States, we do not -claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, -displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as -all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope -that you will support the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting -free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm -works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the -Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with the work. You can easily -comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the -same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg-tm License when -you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are -in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, -check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this -agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, -distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any -other Project Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no -representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any -country outside the United States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other -immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear -prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work -on which the phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, -performed, viewed, copied or distributed: - - This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and - most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no - restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it - under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this - eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the - United States, you'll have to check the laws of the country where you - are located before using this ebook. - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is -derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not -contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the -copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in -the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are -redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply -either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or -obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any -additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms -will be linked to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works -posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the -beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including -any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access -to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format -other than "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official -version posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site -(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense -to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means -of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original "Plain -Vanilla ASCII" or other form. Any alternate format must include the -full Project Gutenberg-tm License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -provided that - -* You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed - to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he has - agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid - within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are - legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty - payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in - Section 4, "Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg - Literary Archive Foundation." - -* You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all - copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue - all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg-tm - works. - -* You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of - any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of - receipt of the work. - -* You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work or group of works on different terms than -are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing -from both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and The -Project Gutenberg Trademark LLC, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project -Gutenberg-tm collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may -contain "Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate -or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other -intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or -other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or -cannot be read by your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium -with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you -with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in -lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person -or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second -opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If -the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing -without further opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO -OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT -LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of -damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement -violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the -agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or -limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or -unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the -remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in -accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the -production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, -including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of -the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this -or any Project Gutenberg-tm work, (b) alteration, modification, or -additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any -Defect you cause. - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of -computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It -exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations -from people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future -generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see -Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at -www.gutenberg.org - - - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by -U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is in Fairbanks, Alaska, with the -mailing address: PO Box 750175, Fairbanks, AK 99775, but its -volunteers and employees are scattered throughout numerous -locations. Its business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, Salt -Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up to -date contact information can be found at the Foundation's web site and -official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND -DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular -state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To -donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project -Gutenberg-tm concept of a library of electronic works that could be -freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and -distributed Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of -volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in -the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not -necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper -edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search -facility: www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. - - - -</pre> - -</body> -</html> - - - |